With William J. Schneider Jr.

Interview by James W. Canan

What is the Defense Science Board, and what does it do? The DSB does classified and unclassified studies to help the leadership of the DOD make good decisions on science and technology. We have approximately 42 members, including seven senior members, and an infrastructure of about 400 consultants from all over the U.S. who are experts in particular domains of science and technology. Some are university people, some are in industry, some were once with government labs and agencies, like the former director of DARPA. When did it come into existence? Last year was the 50th anniversary of our founding. The DSB was formed in 1956 during the cold war, on the recommendation of the Hoover Commission, to focus on meeting the analytic needs of the DOD leadership. The origins of defense technology had shifted from government arsenals to the private sector, and the secretary of defense needed an independent body of scientists and technical experts to help advise him on deciding among the possible choices that the private sector would present to him. Is the situation still pretty much the same? Fast-forward to the post-cold-war period, when the DOD needed to evolve from circumstances where it had a longterm, well-understood, monolithic adversary. When the Soviet Union went away, the adversary became more diffuse, and the studies the DSB began to undertake for the secretary of defense were part of the overall process of trying to come to grips with that. For example? Studies in response to the experiences of U.S. forces in the Balkans, where those forces encountered certain circumstances that were differenta lot more mingling of combatants with noncombatants. The aerial campaign in Kosovo produced quite a few lessons about how to shift our
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forces from trying to attrit an adversary, which is what we needed to do in the cold war, to trying to produce political effects that might be more effective than carpetbombing the Serbian army. The DSB was involved in doing studies on that, in determining what kind of science and technology would be needed to support the forces that were developing and changing.

military force that would be more responsive to that. How does this translate into the modernization of U.S. weapons and platforms? We took into account the fact that the modernization cycle for platforms was very long. We needed to analyze how to modernize more quickly to help bring about military transformation. The result was that the focus of transformation investments is less on platforms, more on C4ISR [command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance]. What we need to do is shift the whole C4ISR area from monitoring the movements of units, their order of battle, to monitoring individuals. Thats very important, because the fact that we can see a division or a regiment with images is not good enough to help us find Osama bin Laden. How does the DSB come into play in all that? Shifting our focus from [unit-based] orders of battle to individuals has created a huge need for change in the defense establishment, including the change in the kinds of technologies that are going to help us get at that problem. Thats what weve tried to respond to in the DSB. We did a study in 2004 in an effort to identify the technology tracks that we needed to take to get our C4ISR to adapt to tracking individuals. Once we can do that, all we need is the right interface between the C4ISR and the platforms. We can use an old platform with precision weapons and it will be plenty lethal enough. What we need is the C4ISR layer. DSB has been very active in many dimensions of that problem, trying to understand how to be able to integrate and fuse the data and have it produce firepower. That sounds fundamental to network-centric warfare. Thats right, and thats certainly the aim. Our sensor base is becoming increasingly capable, but the management of the

Information technology is having a tremendous impact on defense. IT has changed our calculations completely. Nonkinetic military operations may become the dominant part of future campaigns.

What about Iraq? What has the DSB focused on in connection with that war? Weve done a lot of work around the politics of Iraq, in broadly advising how U.S. forces might be properly equipped to support the stabilization and reconstruction mission, in addition to the hard-core combat operations. Does this involve studies on which technologies may be needed in the future with respect to, say, space and air systems? Yes, thats been a very important subtext of our work. When [former] Secretary Rumsfeld came in, he was very explicit about the need to shift our focus from tech-based planning to capabilities-based planning. We could no longer count on optimizing our forces against specific threats, because each threat could cover a wide range of adversaries. So our goal was and is to better understand what capabilities modern technologies would permit an adversary to field, and then build a

Niagara of data is formidable. Last summer, we did a study on information management in support of network operations, on the technologies and the architecture needed to make sure that information is directed to the individual who has the most need of it. Like into the cockpit of an airborne bomber? Yes, or to a soldier on the ground if he needs to know whos behind the door or in the next room, or where an explosive device might be planted. Information technology is having a tremendous impact on defense. IT has changed our calculations completely. Nonkinetic military operations may become the dominant part of future campaigns. Will air and space systems and operations be as important in the future as they are now? They are important, and they will be part of the mix. But in the future, with DNA testing, for example, we may be able to use DNA-type sensors to detect the movements of individuals on the ground. The integration of space- and groundbased sensors may turn out to be a decisive mix in the future, to home in on targets of interest. Would you say that all of this comes under the heading of military transformation? Yes. In 2005, we did a broad assessment of the impact of the transformation on U.S. military power, and [retired Air Force] Gen. Larry Welch, who is the president of IDA [Institute for Defense Analyses] and one of our senior members, commented that the transformation is at a place where evolutionary improvement is producing revolutionary change. Thats a very good summary, I think. None of the changes involved in the transformation, in areas such as C4ISR and precision of weapons and logistics, could be described as revolutionary in their impact on military forces as, say, atomic energy or communications satellites were. But relatively small steps, at relatively

to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States. He currently serves as a consultant to the Dept. of State, Dept. of Defense, and Dept. of Energy. From 1987 to 1993, he served as chairman of the Presidents General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament. Schneiders responsibilities in the Dept. of State included management of U.S. foreign economic and military assistance abroad, export control policy, and international telecommunications and information policy, as well as supervision of U.S. science attachs posted at U.S. embassies abroad. Schneider is the author of several works on defense policy, including Why ABM? Policy Issues in the Missile Defense Controversy, in 1969; Arms, Men, and Military Budgets, an annual review of defense budget issues; and Food, Foreign Policy, and Raw Material Cartels, a study of economic warfare, in 1976. He has also published numerous articles and monographs on defense and foreign policy, U.S. strategic forces, theater nuclear forces, and unconventional warfare. Schneider received his Ph.D. in economics from New York University in 1968. He is a member of the American Economic Association, the Econometric Society, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

William J. Schneider Jr. is the chairman of the Defense Science Board in the Dept. of Defense. He is also president of International Planning Services, an international trade and finance advisory firm, and is an adjunct fellow of the Hudson Institute. From 1982 to 1986, Schneider was undersecretary of state for security assistance, science and technology. He initially joined the Reagan administration in 1981 as associate director for national security and international affairs at the Office of Management and Budget. In addition, he served as chairman of the Presidents General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament (19871993); as a member of the JapanU.S. Friendship Commission; and as a member of the Commission

modest risk, when accumulated, are having a revolutionary effect on warfare. For example, the accumulation of new sensor and information technologies has made it possible for our forces to mitigate the fog of war by greatly increasing their knowledge of the battle space. How does this relate to defense acquisition in general, to making decisions on buying new aircraft and other platforms, for example?

The biggest problem for the government is that we have this huge, long-lived capital base that we need to evolve, and it cant be done cheaply or quickly. Thats why were focusing on the C4ISR base to modernize quickly and relatively cheaply. Its a fundamental change away from focus on platforms. Well be seeing our older platforms serving far into the future. Can you give an example or two?
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The B-52 bomber. We did a study on the B-52 engines, on how modern engine technology completely changed the nature of that platform by lessening its need to refuel to complete its missions. Reengining the B-52 gives it the ability to stay airborne and operate for long periods of time, to attack targets of opportunity and strike on demand. The reengining gives the B-52 a new lease on life. Can you discuss current DSB studies that will or may make a difference for U.S. forces? We recently began a study on the military applications of biologynot in weapons but in sensors, materials, electronics, communications, and the like. There could well be a wide range of practical applications. Please elaborate. How does biology apply? Weve had very impressive demonstrations, for example, of how viruses can be manipulated in a manner that can produce metal fibers. This could lead to the creation of a jacket that has a computer woven into its fabric, a communications device but without all the classic apparatus and copper and all that. Were also doing a study now on fuel economy. The department is looking for ways to reduce the need for liquid fuels, because transporting liquids to battle platforms accounts for 70% of logistics. So we would like to have vehicles that are more fuel-efficient, or at least find ways to mitigate our dependence on liquid fuels. Precision strikes help, because we dont need as many sorties. Look at what will happen with small-diameter bombs. The B-2 will carry about 300 of them, and should be able to strike that many, or almost that many, targets in just one sortie. So what were seeing is small steps rather than big leaps forward in defense technology? Yes, and thats very much a parallel to how commercial technology evolves. The commercial sector doesnt take big leaps because theres too much risk, so it takes incremental steps. This model has major implications for the defense industrial side. Shifting to evolutionary improvements, incremental changes, rather than always moving to the next generation of platforms and systems, means that the DOD and its contractors can get more out of, and sustain, their capital investments.
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Does the DSB do studies on specific platforms and systems? Yes. In fact, one of the areas in which the DSB made one of its most impressive impacts was a study in 1997 on the future of the submarine. The study was a major influence on the Navy in designing the next-generation nuclear submarine, because it sharpened the Navys awareness of the impact of information technology in changing the security environment. It showed that submarines would continue to play a decisive role in U.S. security, but concluded that the role would be different. The defense industrial base has come under scrutiny. Is the DSB part of that? A DSB task force is studying the interaction between the space-related industrial base and the impact of export controls on that base. The task force study is part of a larger effort that is under way to find out whether we have the right kind of industrial base. The undersecretary of the Air Force has raised concerns about the health of the space segment of the industrial base. That segment has shrunk in the commercial sector because fiber optics technology grew much faster than expected and has diminished the need for communications satellites. As a result, the industrial base that supports both the commercial space sector and the military space sector has been subjected to substantial attrition. What does this mean for national defense? It has created a concern in the DOD as to whether the industrial base for space products will be able to remain sufficiently vibrant to meet military needs. How do export controls come into play in this? In 1999 Congress passed legislation that changed the regulation of the exports of space-related technologies from the Dept. of Commerce to the Dept. of State, putting them under the provisions of the Arms Export Control Act. That brought the whole apparatus of the international traffic and arms regulations [ITAR] into play. As a consequence, the review process for exports of space-related technologies must take place on a case-by-case basis and has become prolonged. This is a concern for U.S. exporters. And for the national security space program?

One example is that of a European satellite maker that produces what are called ITAR-free satellites, meaning that they dont have any U.S. components in them at all, as a way of avoiding dependence on U.S. suppliers....

Yes. I am concerned about the impact of export controls on this segment because it is likely to produce antibodies among our industrial partners abroad. From their perspective, the processing that basically routine U.S. exports have to go through every time poses a risk to them that they may not be able to get their American-made components on time. That is a serious concern. In the commercial market, companies are liable for damages if they are late in making deliveries, so they must avoid that. Would you give an example of the problem, of its impact abroad? One example is that of a European satellite maker that produces what are called ITAR-free satellites, meaning that they dont have any U.S. components in them at all, as a way of avoiding dependence on U.S. suppliers who have to have their exports processed as exports of defense articles to offshore producers. Is anything being done about this? The State Dept. has instituted an electronic system called e-trade that is expected to substantially increase the speed of the processing of export applications. What is the DSBs role? We are trying to understand the degree to which the processing improvements at State will mitigate the problem, and whether the problem can be solved by focusing on improving the export licensing process and not on more fundamental measures. One possible remedy would be to go back to the previous situation and have the Commerce Dept. process the

cases, but that would involve statutory change. Go back to the broader study that you mentionedthe one on the defense industrial base as a wholeand talk more about it. That study is being done because the defense market is topping out and it is likely that there will be some restructuring of the defense industry. The number of platforms being purchased has declined sharply. When I was working at the Office of Management and Budget 25 years ago, the defense industry was producing a thousand military aircraft a year. Now it is producing fewer than 200 tactical aircraft a year. The same thing applies to other platforms, such as vehicles. There were 35 major defense contractors in those days. Now there are eight. So the market is shifting more to C4ISR and services, and all of those things tend to create a lot of incentives for the industry to consolidate, and in different ways.

What is the DODs responsibility? The DOD has to approve the consolidations, and wants to be able to influence the nature of the consolidations and how they take place. The problem the department will have over the next several years relates to choices that it will have to make about how the industry transforms. Ten years ago, when a lot of the prime contractors were consolidating, the DSB did a study on the vertical integration of the defense industry. Now the situation is a little different. The primes are increasingly focusing much more on systems engineering and integration and much less on developing the underlying technologies. That development is coming from second-tier and third-tier contractors and, to an increasing degree, from commercial sources. How does the DSB come into the picture? The DSB study is being done for the undersecretary of defense for acquisition,

The problem the department will have over the next several years relates to choices that it will have to make about how the industry transforms.

technology, and logistics, who has the main burden of responsibility for making decisions on how the department might become involved. How do you personally view the situation? I share the concern that this is an increasingly important issue that must be faced by the DOD, because the national security space program is already in jeopardy for a variety of reasons, some related to export controls.

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