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Edinonachalie and the Soviet Industrial Manager, 1928-1937 Author(s): Hiroaki Kuromiya Source: Soviet Studies, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Apr., 1984), pp. 185-204 Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/151385 . Accessed: 18/08/2011 02:38
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SOVIET STUDIES, vol. XXXVI, no. 2, April 1984, pp. 185-204
EDINONACHALIE AND THE SOVIET INDUSTRIAL MANAGER, 1928-1937
By HIROAKI KUROMIYA*
IN September 1929 the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party adopted a special resolution calling for the 'establishment and consolidation of edinonachalie' [oneman management] in industrial enterprises. The resolution sought to alter fundamentally the political and managerial structure of the factory in accordance with the imperatives of rapid industrialisation. It was a hallmark of Stalin's 'revolution from above'. Viewing edinonachalie as a microcosm of the Stalinist state's ever increasing tendency toward centralisation and dictatorial rule, Western scholars have emphasised three dimensions of it in particular. First, edinonachalie was a deliberate attempt to create a 'nachal'stvo class' (or 'little Stalins') with despotic power in the factories and to 'stabilise the flux' of an 'unhinged social structure'.2 Second, edinonachalie stripped the party and trade union organisations of powers in the factory, forcing them to turn their face 'away from the workers' and serve as props of the 'little Stalins'.3 Third, as a logical consequence of the first two dimensions, edinonachalie inculcated in the managers a 'taste for power and pleasure in using it' and allowed them to hold the workers in 'iron gloves'.4 Although there is a good deal of truth to this standard interpretation, one is struck by some contradictions implicit in it. If, for instance, the party leadership intended edinonachalie to stabilise the factory by despotic managerial power, why did they institute it while constantly mobilising the workers to criticise the managers? Furthermore, if edinonachalie was a deliberate attempt to create despotic managers for whom 'rudeness [grubost'] became a virtue',5 why was it that in 1937-38 many managerial cadres were labelled as 'bigwigs' ('vel'mozhi') and purged for 'despotic' power-precisely the despotic power which, according to the traditional view, was implicit in edinonachalie from 1929 on? These contradictions appear to stem from the fact that Western scholars have paid little attention to exactly what the party leadership meant by edinonachalie, have largely ignored the political context in which it evolved,6 and have viewed it through retrospective binoculars, focusing upon selected consequences of its introduction. As the party leadership conceived it, Edinonachalie was a notion more complex than 'oneman management' or 'one-man rule' suggests. 7 The party leaders never identified it with despotic power. Nor did they intend to oppose it to workers' control. Edinonachalie meant institutionalised, accountable one-man management with workers' control incorporated; and it embodied a deliberate attempt to train the Communist managers in the midst of socialist construction to be real one-man managers. In this article we shall explore the meaning of edinonachalie by focusing on the all important year 1929 and more tentatively treating the evolution of edinonachalie in the 1930s. We shall suggest that edinonachalie was indeed a microcosm of the way in which Soviet political leaders sought to administer
did not dictate organisational forms. . i. Practically speaking. The principle of edinonachalie. First. On the other hand. The September resolution was its hallmark. edinonachalie was a problem of the administrative and technical competence of the Soviet cadres. The concept of edinonachalie. i. in his view. inspecting. more important. managerial single command had been undermined by the party and union organisations as well. however. then. Apart from the rhetoric. Second. the party. but the microcosm was different from that which Western scholars have sought to depict in their definitions of edinonachalie. In early 1929 the party leadership embarked upon the public campaign for edinonachalie. edinonachalie. What. lacking technical expertise. i. It was first introduced in 1918. in accordance with the policies of the workers' and peasants' government. too. actually represented a specific notion of democratisation of administration. though it did not materialise even in this limited sense. did edinonachalie mean in 1929? What necessitated edinonachalie in 1929? The problem of edinonachalie emerged in the political context of class vigilance posed by the Shakhty trial in 1928 of 'bourgeois' specialists who were alleged to have been engaged in 'wrecking'. Lenin did refer to the dictatorship of the director. who was by contrast typically 'bourgeois'. which caused the critical deterioration of work discipline in 1928. a specific notion of democracy. with the actors involved therein. Stressing the director's responsibility for the technological aspect of production. as Lenin conceived it.186 EDINONACHALIE AND THE society. the workers and peasants were at the same time to aid the cadres and to be 'initiated into the realm of administration' through the job of 'control'. the Communist (Red) director had turned into a follower of his nominal subordinate. a parallelism which had 'weakened the director's responsibility for production' and caused 'virtual lack of command [beznachalie] in production'.e. for which they were individually responsible. underwent alteration. 10 but incorporated workers' control (as Lenin defined it) as an integral constituent.e. edinonachalie was a problem of strict accountability: while the cadres were to do their jobs. overseeing the correct activity of the cadres by checking. which frequently altered. as the dictatorship of the proletariat represented. The crisis manifested itself in at least three respects. Communists (and workers) in responsible administrative positions. The campaign was the party leaders' response to a political crisis in the factories in 1928-29. collegial) of management but. and the union. non-Communist with a nonproletarian background. 8 In this sense edinonachalie was a 'step toward democratisation'. Western scholars generally see its introduction as a step toward dictatorial rule. On the one hand.e. The campaign was intended to eliminate this dualism of two directors and to institutionalise the Red director's single managerial command. the technical director (chief engineer). The campaign for edinonachalie was an attempt to curb labour indiscipline by strengthening managerial authority and to remove the triple managerial parallelism of the director. during NEP edinonachalie meant scarcely more than the union's nonintervention in management operating the factory on market principles. the campaign urged him to master technical expertise. Edinonachalie was a guiding principle of administration throughout both the Lenin and the Stalin eras. and verifying them without replacing them. 9 It was not the 'direct antithesis of workers' control'. Edinonachalie was concerned not only with the organisational aspect (one-man vs.
e. disclosed in early 1928. i. management had virtually nullified workers' control over management. 15 The Shakhty affair. the Communist managers tended either to trust implicitly or distrust indiscriminately the 'bourgeois' specialists with whom they worked. copewithourtaskin everything. anopinionthatwe can i. amalgamated In other words. the three issues of the political crisis in the factories. 17 Simply put. the Shakhty affair spelled for the Stalin faction a political bankruptcy of class-conciliatory management. to Pretentious and whicharecontradictory essence. The majority of the factory directors were Communists. in self-sufficiency lackof faithin ourstrength. In the pages which follow. with which the campaign for edinonachalie was concerned. it was precisely the managers' inattention to workers' criticisms that undermined managerial authority and accountability. Revitalising workers' control over and participation in management through their 'creative activity' and 'production initiative' (such as socialist competition and the shock movement [udarnichestvo]). In practical terms. the managerial and technical competence of the Soviet cadres and strict accountability. 16 In political terms. Ultimately. 13 Communist inferiority often took the form of komchvanstvo (Communist conceit) and specialist-baiting: At thebasis[of specialist-baiting] thetwolargest lie sins:komchvanstvo. Yet the campaign also represented a political strategy which seemed detrimental to the immediate interests of industry: the campaign embodied the party leaders' effort to minimise reliance on the 'bourgeois' experts in the industrialisation drive by promoting and training Communist and worker cadres in the midst of the drive. the Communist managers.e. the campaign for edinonachalie sought to enhance managerial authority and accountability. According to the party leaders. the Red director lost 'proletarian hegemony' in the factory. The conclusion which the Stalin faction drew from the Shakhty affair was the imperative . I On the eve of the 'great turning point' of 1929 the Communists in managerial positions were incomparably inferior to the 'bourgeois' specialists in terms of education in general and technical expertise in particular. will be treated separately in order to gain a clearer insight into the notion of edinonachalie. strange it mayappear. as lack and. where the chief engineer (typically 'bourgeois') acted as virtual one-man manager. the campaign was necessitated by the imperatives of rapid industrialisation: it sought to establish strong and efficient management.it appears. but the direction of production operation was entrusted to the 'bourgeois' specialists. prompted the Stalin faction of the party leadership to declare that it was on this precarious relationship that such 'wrecking' had grown: ignorant of technology. They declared that Soviet power was under the technological yoke of the Tartars (tekhnicheskaya tatarshchina. 12 The cultural and technical inferiority of Communist managers was one of the most serious problems that confronted the party leaders in 1928-29.INDUSTRIAL MANAGER 187 Third. the campaign posed the same problems as had concerned Lenin. of the faithin the possibilityof subjecting specialists the influenceof the proletariat.are. allowed 'bourgeois' specialists to manipulate production and even to have complete freedom of activity. 14 in harmoniously specialist-baiting.lackoffaith in ourstrength. unwittingly or not. the 'Tartars' being the 'bourgeois' specialists).
e. i. and Managerial Personnel'. the director was unwilling to admit his technical backwardness. . The Stalin faction chose the second path. . 30 Thus they were to institutionalise one-man management (edinolichie) in the factory.29 By concentrating powers in the director's hands. 24 Stalin urged that the regulations be replaced by new ones which would 'alter the conditions of work of the managerial cadres and help them to become real and absolute masters [polnovlastnye khozyaeva] of their job'. i. allowing him to assume all its powers and responsibilities. 25 As a matter of fact. 31 The principle of one and only one director was further elaborated by the September 1929 resolution on edinonachalie and the new 'Model Regulations of Production Enterprises' issued on 4 January 1930 by Vesenkha. then it compelled him to acquire the prerequisites for the position. our Red engineers.188 EDINONACHALIE AND THE of enhancing the technical expertise of Communists and of creating a 'proletarian intelligentsia': this would solve the dichotomy between 'Red' and 'expert'. the Bolsheviks had two paths they could take at this juncture: either to postpone socialist construction for 10 years until Communists and workers acquired technical expertise. Stalin contended in April 1928 that the current conditions of work. To some extent. 21 In particular. 32 . . 22 Having lost the sense of class struggle and responsibility. it was forced by lack of other alternatives: Young cadres i.are still too weak in practicaltrainingto implement edinonachalie. even before the Shakhty affair there had been a definite policy of greater decentralisation of factory operation. leaving to the general [Red] director the right to settle conflicts.28 The most important measure was the 'Basic Rules on the Rights and Duties of Administrative. the Communist manager became a 'rubber-stamp' or 'follower' ('khvostik') of 'saboteurs and wrecker-specialists'. Certainly edinonachalie was not devoid of risk. 26 But because this move was ignored by the trusts. Technical. to "represent". 19 The Shakhty affair forced them to choose between the two.23 Worse still.e. It is difficult to carry out edinonachalieby alien.e. on voit'. the new Rules 'eliminated the possibility of the existence in the enterprise of two directors-' "technical" and "Red" '. Yet ultimately edinonachalie embodied the party leaders' deliberate attempt to train the nominal director to become a real director during the actual course of socialist construction.. but their choice embodied Bolshevik maximalism as expressed by Lenin: 'On s'engage et puis . non-Soviethands [i.27 after the Shakhty affair the Central Control Commission of the party (TsKK) and Vesenkhahad to exercise pressure 'to a sufficiently brutal degree'. Edinonachalie embodied such Bolshevik thinking. to twiddle his thumbs'. mastery of technology. the domination of the chief engineer. It promoted the inexperienced Communist into the position of the sole director. in short. 20 'bourgeois'specialists]. the 'Model Regulations' of factory management issued in 1926 by the Supreme Council of National Economy (Vesenkha) conferred 'practically all the rights on the technical director [chief engineer]. . given the director's technical 'incompetence'. which was undertaken as early as 1927 by the Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate (RKI) yet issued by Vesenkha only in early 1929.e. which was to transfer more discretionary powers from the trust to the factory director and to encourage the latter's managerial initiative. or to begin socialist construction immediately and teach them technology in the very process of construction. according to Stalin. 18 According to Stalin's later account. had 'hampered the development' of the director and threatened to 'maim' him.
interferein all the affairsof the factory. moreseriously. 34 In February 1931 Stalin stressed to the managers that their mastery of technology was the prerequisite to the establishment of edinonachalie: It is oftenasked:Whydo we not haveedinonachalie? do not haveit andwe shallnot get it until We we havemastered is Herein ourselves. But in the short run. as a sanction to attack the spetsy and management. the ultimate goal of the campaign was. Hence Stalin put forth the slogan 'technology decides everything'. managerial up. paperandof littleauthority vigorous reallyauthoritative leadership As a resultof selfcadres beginning smarten to becomemorevigilant. let 33 mustmastertechnology[tekhnika]. for their part. 36who were unwilling to admit their technical backwardness and 'mistakes' (such as the Shakhty affair and other 'wrecking' activities by their subordinates). which had deteriorated throughout 1928. according to Stalin.39 In June 1928 Stalin had to warn against the 'vulgarisation of the slogan of self-criticism'. to strengthen fromleadership is on and into .INDUSTRIAL MANAGER 189 Edinonachalie eliminated the dual power of the Red and the technical directors and granted the former a vast range of rights and responsibilities not only for general administration but for organisational-technical problems as well. 37 questionsof economicleadership Stalin used self-criticism to encourage the workers to reveal and criticise managerial defects and shortcomings. beat [him] in the mug'. II The pressure for edinonachalie came from above.Bolsheviks Edinonachalie encouraged or rather forced the unwilling managers to master technology and become real and absolute masters of their job: the institutionalisation of edinonachalie compelled them to rid themselves of komchvanstvo and become technically competent. Stalin emphasised the meaning of the campaign: but it Self-criticism needednot in orderto weakenleadership. also pressed for greater powers if only to boost labour discipline at work. The self-criticism campaign. In short. triggered by the Shakhty affair. Some workers understood the Shakhty trial 'in their own way'. Stalin emphasised this point in February 1931: If you are a factorydirector. 38 A leader of the miners' union openly sanctioned specialist-baiting: 'If a technician treats workers rudely. and strengthen managerial authority in the long run.to approach are to our criticism. i. focused above all on the managerial cadres. The Communist managers.. 40 . technology. the director was held answerable for virtually everything in the factory. Thetasktherefore thatwe master technology lies the only guarantee that our plan will be fulfilledcompletelyand that edinonachalie be will 35 established. nothingescapeyou. to 'improve and strengthen' the managers. look into everything. mass mobilisation for selfcriticism militated against labour discipline.e. [should we] beat him in the mug? Yes.. learnand learnagain. While it alerted the Communists and workers to the 'bourgeois' specialists' 'threat'.. compel the managers to heed workers' criticisms.. which often turned into a 'witch-hunt [travlya] against the managerial cadres'.
They were constantly rebuked by the party leadership: Whenpeoplesaythattheydo not have[able]people. training and placing them appropriately. Rather they stressed managerial ability to incorporate workers' criticisms as essential to labour discipline.theyarewrong. The second step which the managers took was to expand their rights to select managerialtechnical personnel.43 and demanded the right to promote workers of their own choice. and the third was a demand that the powers of the party and union organisations in the factory be circumscribed. because workers regarded people promoted this way not as their supervisors but as their 'henchmen'. and train as managers what few able cadres were available. and checking up on their political and technical qualifications. where our Red director regards workers' criticisms with attention. 44Edinonachalie unequivocally affirmed the director's right to select all the managerial-technical personnel of his plant (although he had to consult the party and union organisations). given the shortage of reliable and competent candidates: and do [Foremen brigadiers] not wantto. The managers had had little control over whom to promote to supervisory positions.Therearepeopleandtalented . Yet the party leadership used the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' to find. andareafraidof takingpowerinto theirown hands. mismanagement. however. allocate. The first was opposition to self-criticism itself. This right entailed the director's personal responsibility for selecting the best people. But they were rebuked by the party leadership: 'In the enterprise.45 The managers' complaint that they did not have people competent enough to staff the management was their favourite 'excuse' for labour indiscipline. etc. failures to fulfill production plans. This turned out to be an enormous task. because the workers (and the party and union organisations) often pressed successfully for 'their own' people. Evidently this practice adversely affected labour discipline. whereas it was losing control over the workers at work.The are material] thingis that our foremenand brigadiers the kindof humanmaterial[chelovecheskii that for the most partdoes not meetthe conditionsneededto realizeedinonachalie.41 Apparently the party leaders did not encourage the managers to discipline workers by power (coercion) alone. labour discipline does not decline but improves. Even the selection of foremen (mastera) was a difficult job. Consequently the managers were vocal about their complaints. It was certainly the same kind of complaint the party leadership harboured with regard to the managers.42 The managers complained in early 1929 that one of the most important reasons for labour indiscipline was the massive promotion of workers (of dubious qualifications) into administrative-technical positions. The managers were urged to use edinonachalie for the same purpose in relation to their own subordinate cadres. The managers started complaining about the ill-effects of self-criticism soon after the campaign got underway in the spring of 1928.190 EDINONACHALIE AND THE Indeed the plight of factory management was abysmal: it was under ever increasing pressure for greater production and productivity. regardless of their technical and organisational calibre. So does the productivity of labour'. the second was a demand for greater powers in the selection of their subordinate cadres. which were manifested in at least three forms.
In February 1931 the new chairman of Vesenkha. Ordzhonikidze. he will be compelled to rise. However. the troika as a managerial organ was not an officially institutionalised organ. 56It was evident to the party leaders. In 1929 some managers went so far as to claim 'dictatorship in production'. the party secretary. the managerial and the union functions 'coalesced'. 50Edinonachalie was a measure to eliminate the 'triple bloc' and triple parallelism. 58 . and the troika disoriented the workers.INDUSTRIAL MANAGER 191 to peopleat that. it meant the managers' responsibility for exposing and removing the so-called 'saboteurs' and 'wreckers' among their subordinates. Labour discipline plummeted. administrative and technical competence) and of the 'ability to take responsibility' on themselves. 51(As a matter of fact.53 I. The party leaders generously granted the managers enormous powers. in the political context. Kraval' of Vesenkha had to take them to task: 'Some [managers] have gone too far in their pretensions'.47 but an illegitimate substitute for edinonachalie. . It is necessary be ableto promoteandbringthemup . the second step just discussed-the effort to gain the managerial right to appoint administrative-technical personnel-was part of this larger effort by the managers to increase their powers in the factories. display managerial initiative and creativity. This was all too clear to the managers. 48It was said in 1929 that the troika tended to form either a 'triple bloc' or triple managerial parallelism (with the party and union organisations as adjuncts to management. 55However. Edinonachalie gave the director enormous (even dictatorial) powers in order to enable him to curb labour indiscipline. they openly disclaimed the sole responsibility for the fulfilment of production targets: they sought collective responsibility in the troika. the party and union organisations in the factory. however. to raisethemin thevery processof work. Edinonachalie implied not only powers but strictly individual managerial responsibility for the use of the powers and the results of their use.. 57 The responsibility of edinonachalie weighed heavily upon the managers. or peculiar control organs usurping managerial functions). fulfill plan targets. i.54 They were accused of considering edinonachalie 'unlimited power' and assuming that they could do whatever they pleased.) Edinonachalie thus assured the director of single and undivided command in the factory. the Soviet manager claimed power rather than responsibility. . and..e. In February 1931 Ordzhonikidze declared that nobody would recognise as one-man managers those who shirked one-man responsibility. 52 Just like any other administrator. The troika very often assumed managerial functions as well. Put responsibility on him [cadre] and he will rise under the weight of responsibility. because they were guided by the belief that responsibility inherent in power would train the managers: People [cadres] grow up only under the weight of responsibility .46 In the same vein the managers bore the responsibility for checking and replacing 'unfit' personnel. above all. that dictatorship and collective responsibility were not compatible at all. This responsibility had far wider implications for.49 In both cases. emphasised to the managers that edinonachalie was a problem of the 'knowledge of business' (i. The third step the managers took was to circumscribe the powers of the rival organisations. and the chairman of the factory committee (union). however.e. The basic political structure in the factory in the late 1920s was the troika ('treugol'nik) consisting of the director. in particular the fulfilment of plan targets.
and in particular from below.In capitalism.we will not be able to cope withthe task of reconstructing industry. temporary worker control . III As discussed above.62 Clearly the Bolsheviks were quite conscious that in Soviet society market control did not exist or function as it did in capitalist society.e. moreover. 61 Control from below (or 'social control') by workers and their organizations was an integral mechanism of Soviet management.. the party leadership promoted various forms of control from below (the promotion of workers into administrative-technical positions. overseeing managerial activity. . the Central Committee of the party. 64In order to reveal managerial mistakes.) was still far from sufficient. only the expenditure in a differentdirection.60 edinonachalie required 'several-fold multiplied control' from below to 'prevent the unlimited despotism' [svoevlastie] of management. organizmy] [proizvodstvennye strictresponsibility the way the and for that understand unlesswe ensureedinonachalie establish 59 workproceeds.192 EDINONACHALIE AND THE In June 1930 Stalin urged the party and union organisations not to deprive management of responsibility: We can no longer allow our enterprises to be converted from production organisms Our partyand union organisations must at last into parliaments. In fact.knowing that the expenditure will insure us against a number of mistakes which may arise . this was part of a larger issue of managerial accountability: edinonachalie implied not only managerial power but managerial ability to accommodate workers' control. Stalin declared in 1928 that control from above (that of RKI. and bureaucratism. Yetweexpendmoneyon socialcontrol. together with 'control from above'. and emphasised that edinonachalie meant not the decline of control but its increase. the party leadership regarded the issue of labour discipline not only in terms of managerial power but also in terms of managerial ability to incorporate workers' criticisms. but that. it was 'by no means the chief thing now'. certain goes expenditure that number firmsgo busteveryyear.Butthe capitalists a thanwe do. which was rather 'control from below'. It is saidthatthe capitalists not havesuchcontrol.Thismeansthata givenfirmhasmadeso manymistakes it of is not in a positionto competewithotherfirms. 63 The Shakhty affair prompted Stalin to call for a strengthening of two-fold control from above and from below. had to replace 'spontaneous' market control and without which there would be no predictable management. abuses. it was precisely the weight of responsibility that the managers resisted shouldering. self-criticism.. an indispensable tool with which to hold the managers accountable: is It is clearthatsocialcontrolcostslots of money. According to the party leaders. etc. i. it was precisely lack of control from below that stupefied the Communist managers and helped the alleged 'wreckers'. However. Control from below was a deliberate mechanism which. In the political context of 1928-30 control from below also meant 'proletarian control' over the 'bourgeois' specialists and their 'followers' (Communist managers).but is it truethatthe expenditure unproductive? bearmore do Of coursenot. The party leadership consistently made it clear that managerial power was not free from workers' control.
Birman. the 'light cavalry' of the Komsomol. the shock movement). learn and heed the voice of the workers. A. they needed flexibility and manoeuvreability if they were to operate plants effectively. contended Birman. Birman's claim against control was tantamount to a call for a 'peculiar bloc of the controller and the controlled' or 'collusion [sgovor] for the purpose of concealing mistakes'. will nevertheless keep working steadfastly. 69 Edinonachalie did not mean the manager's absolute autonomy. Yet it was all too clear to the party leaders that edinonachalie free from control would be tantamount to 'collusion' or 'despotism'. rather than strengthen. which could easily have become despotic management.INDUSTRIAL MANAGER 193 commissions. and the unions. the voice of the masses. socialist competition. . The managers were constantly reminded that they were not free from control. Yet for Yakovlev. then director of the trust Iugostal'. i. . the party. But Yakovlev was apprehensive that the managers sought one-man command free of control while rejecting one-man responsibility. It was no wonder that the managers considered control nothing but intervention in their freedom of action. and Ya. and at times unjustly criticised . there was a good deal of truth to his argument. in practice. were bound hand and foot by the 'control-punitive deviations' of various organisations.67 Yakovlev declared with emphasis: If a temporary worker control commission or an organ of RKI or a group of light cavalry or an organ of the unions reveals defects [of management] and openly tells workersabout them. Birman claimed that only trust in the managers could create a sense of confidence and responsibility in themselves. control over management was often indistinguishable from intervention in management. and this was what the Soviet political leaders quite rightly apprehended. and. 71 . managerial authority and accountability. then this will be the best aid [for management]. which would nullify control and compound managerial mistakes and bureaucratism. control often turned into a heavy constraint on management. in particular. which was apparently supported by many managers.e. compelling the manager to work under control and criticism and to heed the workers: The good manager is one who. The managers. deputy People's Commissar for RKI. the 'sadistic' harassment of managers by countless RKI investigations. and control tended to undermine. production meetings. In 1928-30 they often tolerated unruly forms of control and criticism.70 By this he meant that only one-man responsibility was imposed on the managers whereas all sorts of control undermined their one-man command. Though Birman worded his speech at the Conference carefully. 'co-ordination' (with the party and union organisations). and were discouraged from initiative. however. The point resided. The issue of control was vividly highlighted by the debate at the XVI Party Conference (April 1929) between S. Birman denounced various forms of control and 'tutelage' on the part of workers. In essence.68 He denounced the managers for seeking another kind of aid. Otherwise nothing comes out of it. not in the excess of control but in the establishment of one-man responsibility and one-man command.65 In practice. collective responsibility. To be sure. Yakovlev. 66 To be sure. This was an intractable dilemma. despite being criticised. he was more explicit at a Vesenkha plenum held a few weeks before the Conference: 'In lugostal' there does not exist edinonachalie in managerial leadership'. but only 'one-man responsibility of management to everybody'. Yakovlev stressed.
control was intended to promote worker participation in management and to help the managers to make correct decisions and execute them correctly and creatively. It helped to delineate the manager's individual responsibility and to throw its full weight on him. However flawed this integration may have been. Thus edinonachalie implied the managerial ability and obligation to make efficient. i. nevertheless. Although some were said in 1930 to have managed to 'master edinonachalie'. For years to come the party leadership would complain constantly about the 'extreme weakness of edinonachalie' and appeal for its establishment. they made mistakes. 79In January 1933 management gained the right to determine piece rates and output quotas independently. much freer of gross outside interference. the institutionalisation of edinonachalie and the promotion of workers' control were to further the 'recasting' of 'human material' (the managers). especially a check on managerial 'despotism' and mistakes. rational. control was to 'raise and educate' the manager. By adding to the weight of responsibility. to 'bring out. had gained considerable autonomy. 75 IV The elimination of dualism and parallelism was ultimately intended to render management efficient and accountable. A government decree of November 1932 empowered management to dismiss workers for even a single day's unjustified absenteeism. guide. 78 In December 1932 management took over all closed workers' co-operatives. Simultaneously.e. In other words. edinonachalie integrated single command (as in dictatorship) and maximum worker participation (as in workers' selfmanagement) without disrupting one-man responsibility. From late 1930 onwards. The new political framework which the campaign for edinonachalie sought to establish was to allow (or compel) the Communist managers to 'develop into the real leaders' of Soviet industry. the party leadership increasingly concerned itself with the problem of persistent interference in management and sought to channel workers' control in an orderly and predictable direction. without clearing them with the union . (If.73 and shock workers pressed for and supported edinonachalie as a 'sound regime of labour'. the party leaders continued to give the managers greater powers to compel them to 'grow under the weight'. democracy. and were made responsible for issuing ration books.72 If operated this way.74 Control was essential to the establishment of managerial authority and accountability.) Thus. the managers were solely responsible for them. 76In other words. in Soviet phraseology. and by 1933 the managers. and cement the creative initiative of the workers' [such as socialist competition and the shock movement] and to 'become a supplementary source of the growth of the creative activity of the workers'. It was emphasised that edinonachalie empowered the managers. 77the party leadership was well aware that the majority of Communist managers still lacked the technical expertise which was a prerequisite for edinonachalie. and workers' control was to ensure efficiency and accountability.194 EDINONACHALIE AND THE As a matter of principle. and productive use of power and to incorporate workers' control. control assumed certain 'democratic' functions. edinonachalie would create not managerial despotism but what was called 'production democracy'. according to the Bolshevik dialectic edinonachalie was perhaps the synthesis of dictatorship and its antithesis.
At the so-called 'congress of victors' (XVII Party Congress in early 1934).81 On the one hand. particularly those who lacked confidence in themselves because of their own ignorance and incompetence. Yet just as Communists' lack of confidence was symbiotic with their komchvanstvo. but their edinonachalie was no good.84 It meant at least two things for the manager to live up to the tasks of edinonachalie. Kaganovich declared in 1934 that they had 'outgrown control'. it was the other side of edinonachalie. 88Stalin declared at the congress: 'There is no place for windbags in operative work'. 87 If managers had proved unable to 'grow' capable of edinonachalie. and emphasised that on this question. There are many cases in which management was condemned for evading edinonachalie. and evoked cries from the audience: 'Quite right'.e. there were no differences of opinion in the party. seeking collective responsibility in the troika. edinonachalie'. 90The party leaders were .83 Certainly. he appealed for the 'exposure and expulsion from the administrative apparatus of incorrigible bureaucrats and red-tapists'. The problem was that the majority of managers hardly lived up to their powers and responsibilities. 'collusion' could be a piece with the exploitation of edinonachalie. On the other hand. the party leaders considered that the managers were disrupting accountability by circumscribing control: L. to use Yakovlev's expression. They ought either to learn to live up to their tasks or be replaced. i. Stalin openly expressed his impatience with certain types of managerial as well as party cadres. 89 However.INDUSTRIAL MANAGER 195 representatives. and passed the buck to others. a February 1934 editorial in Pravda declared: 'Out of the inept director [direktor-shlyapa]-whatever rights we give him and however we support him-all the same nothing comes out of him'. M. that progressively concerned the party leaders from 1933-34. and pigeon-holing them in deeds'. He attacked the 'windbags' ('boltuny'). 'despotism'. however. First. some managers claimed 'dictatorship' in the factory. with all the powers they had been granted. directed the plants badly. It was probably for this danger that in 1933 Ordzhonikidze assailed managers in the troubled Donbass: they cried 'edinonachalie. some managers. he had to be willing and able to accommodate workers' control with efficient management. 'did not want edinonachalie' and 'shied away from it'. 80 These powers meant managerial responsibility for labour discipline and the optimalisation of production. who. many managerial cadres were proving unable to grow under the ever increasing weight of responsibility. Second. incapable of organising anything'. On the one hand. the party leaders may have been tempted to replace them. At the 'congress of victors' Stalin contended: 'The bureaucrats and red-tapists [kantselyaristy]have long been past masters in the art of demonstrating their loyalty to party and government decisions in words. he had to be technically competent and capable of strong and efficient management. that some party leaders perceived by 1933-34 that. the party and union organisations 'deprived management of responsibility' by usurping managerial functions.86 Commenting on the lack of edinonachalie in the factories. the evasion of edinonachalie from lack of confidence. control and accountability. but were 'incapable of leadership. or. were 'honest and loyal to Soviet power'. they believed that even the managers' considerable improvement in technical expertise was still far from adequate: the factories had 'outgrown them'. which were formidable tasks. It appears. 82and thereby hindered the managers from 'growing up under the weight of responsibility'. because they talked only nonsense. according to Stalin. 85On the other hand.
). 96 Stalin's new slogan and the Stakhanovite movement may have reflected a 'conflict' within the party leadership concerning 'party and Soviet discipline' of the party and managerial cadres. at least two types of managers had deeply concerned some party leaders from 1933 onward.94 In effect. of ochkovtirateli[those who deceive the party and the government]and windbags.95 It was in this context that in 1935 Stalin dramatised the famous slogan 'cadres decide everything' instead of 'technology decides everything' and that from 1935 some party leaders promoted the Stakhanovite movement as a check from below on the work of the managerial-technical cadres. capableof 93 the to partyandSovietdiscipline. concretely directing workentrusted themandof strengthening Thus the party leadership laid renewed emphasis on control: 'Control forestalls the violation of party and government decisions'. it seems that apart from 'bureaucrats'. These 'bigwigs' seem to have been the 'little Stalins' to whom Western scholars have referred as a deliberate consequence of edinonachalie. 102 Stalin warned at the 'congress of victors' that 'overconceited bigwigs' had to be 'removed from the leading posts. they apparently considered that these two types of managers embodied what they had feared all along. 92 The goal was to facilitate the removalfromtheirposts of peoplewho violatethe decisionsof the partyandthe government. Some party leaders warned strongly that these people had to be 'beaten heavily'. the 'bigwigs' were those who considered that party decisions and Soviet laws were not written for them but for fools and that because they were irreplaceable they could violate the decisions and laws with impunity. boasting their fulfilment of production plans.196 EDINONACHALIE AND THE particularly concerned about managerial cadres' 'sabotage' of party decisions and Soviet laws and their 'deception [obman] of the party and the state' (shrewd buck-passing. They and were said to have assumed 'boyar-like' attitudes 100 to have become 'more than one-man 0l managers'.and the promotionto their place of new people-people devotedto the cause [lyudidela]. i. these 'little Stalins' would find themselves among those purged en masse in 1937-38. 103 These warnings were to culminate in the massive purge of managers in 1937-38. 'redtapists'. 'Good management pre-supposes good control'. irrespective of past services'. 91At the 'congress of victors' Stalin declared with emphasis that the main organisational task of the party was 'selection of people and checking-up on the implementation of decisions'. and evoked cries from the audience: 'Quite right'. 'many managers' created 'principalities' ('udel'nye knyazhestva') and 'petty tyranny' ('samodurstvo'). and appealed for the establishment of 'individual responsibility in work'.97 Whatever the case. The first were those branded as 'bigwigs' ('vel'mozhi'). misinformation and 'double planning' such as intentional concealment of the production capacity of the factory. managerial 'despotism' and 'collusion'. The February-March 1937 plenum of the Central Committee. the 2 January 1934 editorial of Pravda warned.e. 98Some managers. While one ought to be careful not to accept the party leaders' statements at face value. However. in 1934 the control system of the party and the government was reorganised into a centralised one geared to control and monitor the fulfilment of the decisions of the centre. etc. According to Stalin's account at the 'congress of victors'. what else do you want?'99 Considering that 'the victorious are not judged' ('pobeditelei ne sudyat'). considered themselves free of criticism: 'We are fulfilling the plan. and 'windbags'. which appears to have triggered .
Yet when he sees that this policy has led to the decline of discipline and the breakdown of work. some party leaders appear to have judged by 1937 that many managers had failed to 'grow' capable of edinonachalie. and formed a 'collusion' ('sgovor). a February 1937 editorial in Pravda warned that this usurpation was no good because it only 'depraved the weak manager'. 105 The party leadership never identified edinonachalie with despotic power. and promote them'. their technical expertise was still very limited. It was therefore not contradictory but consistent that in 1934-36 some party leaders complained about the 'extreme weakness of edinonachalie' while attacking the 'bigwigs'. 106 and that in 1937 the party leaders appealed for 'firm execution of the principle of edinonachalie' while purging the 'bigwigs'. 113 Massive. Second. 'educate them. 112 These types of management were enmeshed with managers' disruptive treatment of their subordinates: either massive. the two contradictory kinds of treatment were often found amalgamated in one and the same manager: Today he plays the liberal [and] lives peacefully. for their part. 04 It is clear from the press campaign that the attack was aimed at the 'bigwigs'. saboteurs. the managers' inability to 'unmask' among their subordinate cadres those alleged to be 'wreckers. and he ordered that the troika be eliminated.. 117 First. 114 For the party leaders. did not heed and rely on the aktiv of the factories.. often intervened in or even replaced management. adopted decisions. managers. he rushes to the other extreme and starts pouring out repression right and left. Third. for the party leadership. but broke away from the aktiv. managers proved 'incapable of organising anything'. opportunely criticise them and correct their mistakes.e. 110 The troika as a substitute for edinonachalie died hard. and opened the door for the 'wreckers' and the 'enemies of the people'. 107 Echoing Stalin's remark in 1928. the troika formed a 'family As circle' and 'system of irresponsibility'. and by 1937 the party leaders were determined to do away with it. this behaviour of managers attested to their inability to use edinonachalie to find able people. .111 Although the party organisations in the factory justified their usurpation of managerial functions with reference to the weakness of the manager. At the February-March 1937 plenum Zhdanov harshly criticised the troika: this peculiar organisation. whereas playing the liberal frustrated 'conscious' workers who demanded that the manager put the factory in order. it 'disarmed the party and union organisations in combatting defects of management and at the same time disarmed management' because of collegiality (i. 109 a result. indiscriminate repression spelled 'despotic' management for the workers. met. indiscriminate repression or playing the liberal. The party organisations. collective responsibility). and spies'. According to Kaganovich's account in 1936. issued instructions for managers. 08 The second type of managers were accused of having disrupted accountability by seeking collective responsibility in the troika. attacked 'many managers' who 'by bureaucraticdistortions ofedinonachalie. 116 All in all. carefully train them. opportunely support and scold them. rendering itself impervious to the 'criticism and control of the workers'. considered themselves totally free from the control of the workers'.INDUSTRIAL MANAGER 197 the purge. which was 'not provided for by any party or Soviet law'. a July 1937 editorial in Pravda declared: 'Our self-criticism is to strengthen [labour] discipline [and] edinonachalie'. 115 In the political context of 1936-38 this inability also meant.
the majority of managers hardly lived up to them. Edinonachalie eliminated dualism between the Red and the technical directors and the triple parallelism of the troika. managers demonstrated their inability to train their subordinates and check up on their technical and political qualifications. to bolster labour discipline.. 121 Some 'little people' believed (or were led to believe) that their bosses were 'enemies of the people'. it should be mentioned that from 1933 on the party leadership had repeatedly warned the managers against their failure to 'grow'. The powers were complemented by workers' control. and to enhance managerial authority and accountability. 'incompetent leaders'. and economicwork]rest not on 'objective'conditionsbut on ourselvesand on ourselves alone. while Stalin appealed at the 'congress of victors' for the removal of 'bureaucrats'. it appears that by 1937 some party leaders deemed it possible and timely to replace those who had 'failed to grow' by those who promised to 'grow'.) While concrete analysis still remains to be conducted of political pressures working for and against power and control in the factories. and whether the party leaders' judgement was merely a pretext for justifying the removal of managers. This judgement may well have implied the removal of cadres deemed unable to overcome the 'failures and defects in work'. Enormous as their powers were. the party leadership turned to what Stalin called 'little people' or 'ordinary people from the bottom'. considered themselves 'irreplaceable'. (Stalin appeared to be irritated with the 'over-conceited bigwigs'. The party leaders believed (or hoped) that the managers would 'grow under the weight of . managers proved unable to incorporate workers' control into management: they lacked an 'aptitude for self-criticism'. Fourth.. At this point one may well be tempted to ask to what extent their failure to 'grow' was due to systemic constraints in the Soviet political and industrial structure. 'red-tapists'. which was ideally to help him make full use of the powers in an accountable and 'democratic' fashion. of for . this may have been at that time (1934) hardly more than a warning in view of the scarcity of 'new people' capable of edinonachalie. 'windbags'. 119 The implication was indeed 'cadres decide everything'. and even as 'saboteurs' and 'wreckers'. Edinonachalie granted the manager enormous powers to allow him to mobilise all the resources of his plant and establish strong and efficient management. from now on nine-tenths the responsibility the failuresand defectsin our work [party. 122 V The campaign for edinonachalie was the party leadership's response to the political crisis in the factories in 1928-29. and 'bigwigs'. As early as 1934 Stalin declared to the 'congress of victors'. In order to inspire action from below. Although any discussion of these important questions is beyond the scope of this article.198 EDINONACHALIE AND THE unwittingly or not. and institutionalised one-man command and responsibility. It sought to restore the Communist manager's domination ('proletarian hegemony') over the 'bourgeois' experts with whom he worked. he maintained. In fact. who. The campaign was a political imperative. 120 Many managerial cadres were branded as 'bigwigs'. soviet. disrupted accountability by 'despotism' or 'collusion'. 118 Fifth. 'windbags'.
14 September 1929. See also G. 172-3. 1974). see David Granick. This argument would go a considerable way toward explaining why the party leadership asserted that the 'bigwigs' had emerged in violation of the principle of edinonachalie. M. One would rather argue that even though. dictatorship and democratic control were dialectically synthesised in edinonachalie.) That is to say. pp. 160-61. 'small Stalins'. see Reinhard Bendix.Y. konferentsii i plenumov TsK. 2 M. edinonachalie embodied the party leaders' deliberate attempt to train the Communist administrative cadres 'under the weight of responsibility' and to promote administrative authority and accountability. pp. 'Postanovlenie TsK VKP(b) o merakh po uporyadocheniyu upravleniya proizvodstvom i ustanovleniyu edinonachaliya'. 'Society and the Stalinist State in the Period of the Five Year Plan'. whereas they had been 'outgrown' by the factories. although this issue has yet to be investigated. See Pravda. cit. For a similar. Management iln Russian Industry and Agriculture (N. become independent of democratic control.INDUSTRIAL MANAGER 199 responsibility'. 2. in practice. (Lewin's phrase. This article has suggested that the party leadership considered the question rather exclusively in terms of 'human material' (cadres). 3 Lewin. pp.. (The party leaders did not relegate them to mere props of the 'little Stalins'. which deals with the second half of the 1930s. 123) Finally. 27-8. This analysis of edinonachalie allows us to examine the traditional interpretation discussed at the outset of this article. 310-317. 1948). (The party leaders did not intend to allow the managers to hold the workers in 'iron gloves'. Certainly one might describe edinonachalie as far from 'democracy' and practically indistinguishable from 'despotism'. pp. edinonachalie was a microcosm of the way the Soviet political leaders sought to administer society. A Study in Soviet Economic Planning (N. to other domains as well. 4 (Moscow. is modified to 'little Stalins' in this article. in KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh s "ezdov. Management of the Industrial Firm in the USSR.) For a different view emphasising the 'complete absorption of the relation between management and labour in the omniscient and omnipresent dictatorship of the party'. However.Y. of California Pr. WorkandA uthority in Industry (Univ. of course. is a crucially important question. 1970). 1954). It would also go a long way toward explaining why the party leaders consistently compelled the managers to be attentive to workers' criticisms. This resolution was extended to the enterprises of the transport sector. (This argument on factory management would apply. and Aaron Yugow. but it would probably miss the whole point to explain away edinonachalie simply as 'despotism'. with necessary corrections. S. This dual discrepancy deeply concerned the party leaders. albeit less sweeping view. By the mid-1930s it may have led to some kind of political crisis. dictatorship could. v. This attempt assumed dramatic and even violent phases in the monitoring and replacement of administrators deemed unable to 'grow under the weight of responsibility'. Princeton University *I am grateful to Lynne Viola and Sally Ewing of Princeton University for their valuable comments and criticisms. How this independence could be achieved at all. For an economist's view of edinonachalie. it appears that some party leaders came to realise by 1933-34 that this was not the case: the managers had 'outgrown' control. 1976 No...) It would also help to explain what roles edinonachalie assigned to the party and union organisations in the factory. Schwarz.. Whatever the case. Social History. see Nicholas . Bienstock. in theory. op. it appears that by 1937 some party leaders deemed many managers unable to 'grow' and replaceable by better qualified cadres. Lewin.
1967). 553 and Stalin. Sochineniya. p. 22 Ibid. (See Inzhenerno-tekhnicheskie kadry promyshlennosti. 11. P.. Materialy Sektora Truda. p. V. these clearly stipulated one-man management (edinolichie). H. (Moscow. M. 5 Ibid. pp. 28 August 1928. 246) It should be noted that it was RKI that was most concerned about the lack of individual responsibility of Soviet officials. 79. 8 For a thoughtful and reasonable clarification of the meaning of 'control'. 6 J. 142.. v. 387 18 Stalin. Paramonov. 1957). p. 12 March 1929. 47. p. 1949). Promyshlennost'. 58-59. v. But 43 of these werepraktiki with no formal education. Rudzutak. 1928-39'. 58-59. 1930). 236. 11. 1979). pp. Slavic Review. 1970). . vkhodyashchem v sostav tresta' in Torgovo-promyshlennaya gazeta. 4 Lewin. a principle which remained only on paper. and 76-6% of these non-Communists had some form of education. 'Tipovoe polozhenie o proizvodstvennom predpriyatii.pp. (See Ordzhonikidze. op. 2 February 1929. 29 Torgovo-promyshlennaya gazeta. bp. 11 KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh . 2nd ed.'The Bolshevik Revolution and Workers' Control in Russian Industry'. Mass. 11.. 12 According to one survey. v. p. in Rabochaya gazeta. Sochineniya. 1 (14) (ed. cit. The Russian Revolution. zvit (Kharkov. 1928 no. Slavic Review. 11 (Moscow. Der Betrieb in der UdSSR: Stellung. 149. Putiproidennye. 157). v. 36-38. The Technical Intelligentsia and the Soviet State (London. Stanford. 79.) 15 See L. 47 -00o having completed higher education. 1917-29 (London. 14 A. Mysli i opyt starogo khozyaistvennika. pp. Kadry inzhenerno-tekhnicheskogo personala kamennougol'noi promyshlennosti Donetskogo basseina (Kharkov. 1981). 26 'Polozhenie o gosudarstvennykh promyshlennykh trestakh'. 1970). . Sochineniya. Organization und Management. p. 52. 1930). p. pp. p. v. 1966). Partiya i spetsialisty (Moscow-Leningrad. He referred to Circular no. Sten. 328-44. Vesenkha failed to take the initiative in this matter. 327-8 and Uchit'sya upravlyat'. p. 15 21 Stalin. McNeal. the report by Lebed' to a TsKK plenum in Pravda.4%0 these Communists did not have even an elementary education and of only 34 (2. 113-33 and Walter Stiss. only one being a praktik. a member of the Politbureau. v. M. in Sobranie zakonov i rasporyazhenii RabocheKrest'yanskogo pravitel'stva SSSR. 19 Stalin. 16 Ibid. 1(14). 3. 'Stalin and the Making of a New Elite. Sochineniya. On the other hand. 25 Stalin.) 1 See Ya. 2nded. 4. Rozengol'ts in XI z'izd KP(b)U. 159-61.. which appeared in Torgovo-promyshlennaya gazeta. 31 March 1926. 5-15 chervnya 1930 r. 28 See Yakovlev in Leningradskaya pravda. p. March 1963. 2 (Moscow. 39-392. pp.. But 88. Yakovlev. and Ordzhonikidze's to the VIII trade union congress in his Stat'i i rechi. 12 March 1929. 1928). 111-18.67o) of them had completed higher education. 7 See A. p. (Emphasis in the original. Ratsionalizatsii i sebestoimosti PTEU VSNKh SSSR (Moscow. From Lenin to Stalin. p. On the other hand. op. Avrich. V. and I. 27 See KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh . p. pp. 88. on 1 October 1929 84-9%0 of 1542 directors of industrial enterprises and institutions were Communists. cit. 20 See A. 33 of Vesenkha SSSR dated 29 March 1926. 1912-1933: A Study of Legal Form and Administrative Practice. 7 For this reason the Russian original edinonachalie is used in this article. Sochineniya. deputy People's Commissar for RKI. 25. (See V. . v. As a matter of fact. 58. R. Sbornik statei: po materialam TsKK VKP(b)-NK RKI (Moscow-Leningrad 1930). 1930). 439-40. 9 I owe this to the on-going dissertation of Sally Ewing of Princeton University. . v. 84-93. Sten. p. 62-1Jo of 2459 deputy and assistant directors were non-Communists: 76-6% of these were employees or their children by 'social position'. 28 of 30 chief engineers were non-Communists. pp. Rozengol'ts of RKI in XVIkonferentsiya VKP(b). 91-3. Etchin. (Moscow. v. Upon taking over Vesenkha in late 1930 Ordzhonikidze started by strengthening the individual responsibility of industrial cadres. 172. otchet (Moscow. Sten. in XVI konferentsiya VKP(b). p. p. pp. v. p. 8 September 1928. . 59. Azrael does not explain at all why it was precisely in 1929 that the party adopted the resolution. 226 and Rozengol'ts (ed. otchet (Moscow-Leningrad. 57. Sochineniya.). 10. pp. 14 October 1927. and Fitzpatrick. Stalin.. p. 454-9..' 10 See E. 1930). Note also that industrial planning was not decentralized but centralized. 'Social Insurance in Russia and the Soviet Union. Renke. 24 See Stalin's 1937 account in Sochineniya.) On the same date 48 out of 51 directors in the Donbass coal mines were Communists. P. 4.) . 1962). 1917-32 (Frankfurt a. (See Inzhenernyi trud. Yakovlev's report to the II Leningrad Party Conference in Leningradskaya pravda. aprel' 1929 g. KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh. 8. see Paul H. 11. 58-61. (See I. 1979 no. 556 and Kaganovich's remark quoted in Sheila Fitzpatrick. Kaganovich in XVI s"ezd VKP(b). cit. See his Managerial Power and Soviet Politics (Cambridge. R. A. Carr..-Bern. 47. 1927. 1979).. 23 See Ya.200 EDINONACHALIE AND THE Lampert. 311.
(Italics added. 1931 nos. 17-23. 1926 no. 5 April 1929. 56 See the meeting of some thirty top-level managers in Torgovo-promyshlennaya gazeta. p. Apparently. p. p. 11. pp. 51 'Pis'mo TsK VKP(b) vsem partiinym organizatsiyam o podnyatii trudovoi distsipliny' dated 21 February 1929 in KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh . 236. Akulov (secretary of VTsSPS-All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions) in Pravda. 7 March 1929. 15. v. 1928 no. 182-3. 1926 no. pp. 17. cit. 39 VI Vsesoyuznyi s"ezd gornorabochikh SSSR. 30 November 1928. Stenograficheskii otchet I-i proizvodstvennoi konferentsii Uralmeta.) Although his remark referred to the party cadres in general. (Italics added. emphasized: 'The director has to be the dictator in the factory' in Ekonomicheskaya zhizn'. 10-12. 54 Quoted in Trud. 6. 13. 1929 no. 133-34. 12. Deputy People's Commissar of Labour and Chairman of the State Commission for the Improvement of Labour Discipline set up in February 1929. 13. 288-89. 1. 2nd ed. 169-75. p. 4. p. Even I. and Torgovo-promyshlennaya gazeta. (See Note 111) 49 See editorial in Trud. 26 August 1938. Trud. 571. 16. (See Izvestiya TsIK SSSR. op. See also Rozengol'ts (ed. p. See also Torgovo-promyshlennaya gazeta. 34 See Ordzhonikidze's speech at the XVI Party Congress in XVIs "ezd VKP(b). 24 April 1929. 5 April 1929. cit. Kaganovich in XVII s"ezd VKP(b). otchet (Moscow. pp.. 6 March 1929 and Voprosy truda. 137. p. (Italics added. close co-operation with a strict division of functions among the troika's three bodies. yanvar'-fevral' 1934 g. its implication for managerial cadres was apparent. 9 March. Predpriyatie. p. 26 March 1930. 8 and Partrabotnik (Leningrad). p. 20. p. see also his speeches in XVI s"ezd VKP(b). 43 Torgovo-promyshlennaya gazeta. 323-3. 50 Partiinoe stroitel'stvo. i. (Italics added) For the same point.. (Moscow. 12-17.). he referred to it as an administrative organ. p. Izvestiya Stalinskogo okrkoma VKP(b).. Sten. Sten. 41 See the plenum of the Party Control Commission on Pravda. p. 297. pp. 4. op. 1932). 3 March 1929. XI z'izd KP(b)U. cit. v. 1930 nos. p. Sochineniya. p. 1929 no. pp. 13-14. 37 Ibid. 1928 no. 136-7. 1934). cit. 12 September 1929. 17 March 1932. 46 See L. 15 March 1929.. cit. 1930 no. A March 1929 government decree affirmed the director's right to one-man decision (i. 225-6. 6 September 1928. Partrabotnik (Leningrad). 11-12. 57 Ordzhonikidze. Izvestiya Donskogo okrkoma VKP(b).e. 58 See L.) . 42 Torgovo-promyshlennaya gazeta. 297. pp. 6 March 1929. 30 August 1928. cit. pp. M. 17 March 1932. 4. 21-22. op. 21(45) p. 36 Ibid.. p. M. pp. pp. (Sverdlovsk.. pp. See also Sputnik agitatora dlya goroda. 405 and Stalin. 23. v. v. 13. 1928 no. 50. p. 28 October 1931 and Khozyaistvo i upravlenie. 31 Ibid. 7 March 1929). an 'illegitimate' organ. otchet (Moscow. 6 March 1929. Inzhenernyi rabotnik. 27. 83. v. v. 10. p. 19-20. 531. See also Ordzhonikidze. 35 Stalin. 1929 no. 20 January.. 1(14). Veinberg (of TsKK and VTsSPS) and Tolstopyatov in Trud. Kaganovich in Rabochaya Moskva. p.INDUSTRIAL MANAGER 201 30 Trud. p. 23 November 1929. 50. pp 104-9.) 53 Quoted in Trud. 3 September 1929. edinolichie carries less hierarchical implications than does edinonachalie. 195. pp. 672 (Glebov-Avilov). op. Predpriyatie. For this see Izvestiya Nizhegorodskogo kraevogo komiteta VKP(b).. etc. 2. 33 Stalin. 76. pp. 1929). is not necessarily clear about this point. 12.. 8. 41. 80 and Rabochaya Moskva. 2 and 3 February 1929. Sochineniya. Rabochaya gazeta. Izvestiya TsK VKP(b). Sochineniya. Rabochaya gazeta. 1928 no. . Tolstopyatov. 1928 no. 37-8. 1929 nos. without clearing it with the union) to impose penalties (including firing) on violators of labour discipline. 12. 667. 14. 47 See editorial in Proletarii (Kharkov). 1 September 1929 and Torgovo-promyshlennayagazeta. v. 1928). op. 55 Pravda. 1929 no. Rabochaya gazeta. 27. 27 February. 61 Izvestiya Severo-Kavkazskogo kraikoma VKP(b). 5. 11. In 1937. XIz'izd KP(b)U. 6 July 1928. 13-16yanvarya 1929 g.. 52 Ordzhonikidzc. Suiss.) See also XVIs"ezd VKP(b). etc.. p. etc. 60 Ordzhonikidze. 21(45). 12. p. Sochineniya. 5-6. 668. which was employed in the September 1929 resolution and became the standard term thereafter. 40 Stalin. 2. 8. pp. when Zhdanov ordered the elimination of the troika. 25 May. 21 December 1928. 38 Ekonomicheskaya zhizn'. Sochineniya. p. 45 XI z'izd KP(b)U. 19. 32 Gosudarstvennoe predpriyatie. op. 1930 nos. 48 The party leadership encouraged the troika only as a form of communication. Only one of them opposed collective responsibility. 59 Stalin. 432. 7-8. pp. Ibid. 22 August. 8. 2 February 1929.e. pp. p. (Italics added.
1 (London. Kaganovich in XVII s"ezd VKP(b). M. 448-54. Zhdanov in Izvestiya Nizhegorodskogo kraevogo komiteta VKP(b). (Italics added. v.) 86 XVII s"ezd VKP(b). 11. 75 See L. 65 For these. Izvestiya Nizhegorodskogo kraevogo komiteta VKP(b). 13. For the 'democratization' of management. 'Heros du travail et commandants de la production. v.) 77 XVIs"ezd VKP(b). 114.. . 1926-1929. p. cit. (Italics added. p. 1926-1929. p. 14-15.. pp. Factory and Manager in the USSR (Cambridge. p. 1936). Voroshilov. 679. 562. 5. 574. 1930). 3. 446-60. 370-71. 55. 28-9. . . 8 October 1929.S. pp. 3. 1932. A. 88 Stalin.) One form of circumscribing control was an extremely complicated division of responsibility based on 'functionalism' ('funktsionalka'). 184-5. 1935). Foundations of a Planned Economy. 4-5. pp. (Italics added. p. 3-14. 23 and Za industrializatsiyu. 367-70. 85 Ibid. Za industrializatsiyu. 574-5. 28 August 1928. 36. 83 See A. 61-2. 1929). p. 13. See also S.. 11. 64 Ibid.) 73 Istoriya industrializatsii Srednego Povolzh 'ya. 78 Sobranie zakonov . in IIIplenum TsKK VKP(b). 8. and Stalin). 32-33. v. pp. 7-10 yanvarya 1936 g. 1930 no. (Italics added. 59-60. Le compagne stakhanoviste et les strategies fractionelles en U.Y. M. p. W. 146-7. Sochineniya. 25 January 1930 (Central Committee appeal). v. 249-75 and 'Societe et appareile d'Etat sovietique (1936-1938): contradictions et interferences'. December 1929. 96 Pervoe Vsesoyuznoe soveshchanie rabochikh i rabotnits stakhanovtsev. 68 Ibid. 1979 no. 23 November. 679.. Gol'tsman in Trud. v. pp.. 66 XVI konferentsiya VKP(b). A. Rezul'taty obsledovanii NK-RKI kapital'nogo stroitel'stva VSNKh SSSR (Moscow.. pp. Davies. 1957). Recherches. (See Organizatsiya upravleniya.. Sochineniya. p. 371-5 (L. p. Foundations of a Planned Economy. Stalino. p. It should be noted that a government decree of 18 July 1929 imposed on the director personal responsibility for realizing the proposals of production meetings and individual workers. 1971). AnnalesE. p. 71 See E.) 69 Ibid. XI z'izd KP(b)U. (Italics added. p. 667. Mass. 280-1. 1. 1932.. See also A. Molotov. v. 5. Molot. M. pp.) 63 Stalin. 452. v. (Italics added. Sochineniya.. no. 1974). 1978 nos. 12 May 1928. v. p. Kaganovich. 8 March 1930. Za industrializatsiyu. Andreev. See. no. 446-60. H. 1930 nos. 9 August 1933 and Pervyi Vsedonetskii slet stakhanovtsev-masterov uglya. (Italics added. p. 546. 5. 14-17 noyabrya 1935 g. otchet (Moscow. Schwarz. 372. Kaganovich in Partiinoe stroitel'stvo. Carr and R. 159-60. 1929. p.. Sten. 18 and E. 51. 8 March 1930. 269. pp. from 1933 on there had been waves of 'purges' of 'unfit' managerial cadres. 28 March 1930.R. 19. 7875. . 563 and L. 72 Sputnik agitatora dlya goroda. 13.. see Ordzhonikidze. 97 Gabor T. 2 (London. pp. Carr. 18. 25 February 1934. 11. 24. for example. 73. 706. 81 Pravda. 58. 11-13. 1929 no. otchet (Kharkov. 92 Stalin. 1926-1941 gg. pp. 13. 91 For the first major attack on this. 74 Pravda.) 89 Ibid. 90 Stalin. Pravda. Etchin. In fact. M. pp. 15 February 1930.S.202 EDINONACHALIE AND THE 62 Z.C. as is well presented by Joseph Berliner. cit. v. 1931). H. Rittersporn.) 76 This phrase is in Stalin. 1934. 506.. 23. 95 KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh . 80-489. 0 edinonachalii (Moscow. etc. . p. pp. 73. pp. ch. he used the phrase 'control-punitive deviations' not at the Conference but in his article that appeared at the very time of the Conference. Dokumenty i materialy (Kuibyshev. 67 XVI konferentsiya VKP(b).) 94 See Stalin and L. 27 April 1929).. 80 Trud.843-67. In practice the institutionalization of one-man responsibility was disintegrated by 'functionalism'. (See Sobranie zakonov .. 6 April 1929. op. pp. ch. 1969). Yaroslavsky (secretary of TsKK) in Pravda. 13. 1952). Rabochaya gazeta. This kind of behaviour died hard. pp. Kaganovich in XVIIs"ezd VKP(b). then People's Commissar for RKIand chairman of TsKK. Iyul' 1931 (Moscow-Leningrad. XVIs"ezd VKP(b). pp. Sochineniya. (1935-1936)'. As a matter of fact. 369. Sochineniya.) 87 'O sovetskom direktore i edinonachalii' in Pravda. Sten. pp. v. 79 Ibid. Labor in the Soviet Union (N. pp. pp. 350-1. Partiinoe stroitel'stvo. 1930 nos. . (See Torgovopromyshlennaya gazeta. see E. 454-61. 82 See A. 84 Ordzhonikidze. see A. op. 4. 47-415. 9 May 1933. 93 Ibid. M. p. 13. (Italics in the original.S. For 70 . 4. 11. 1934. Belen'ky.
1979). 3 April 1935. 31 October 1937. v.. 3. pp. see J. 13. 21 April 1937. Partiinoe stroitel'stvo. disorganizers.. KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh . 1936 no. 120 For the emergence of this new cohort of cadres in 1937-38. op. 8 April 1937. XVII s"ezd VKP(b). See also L.. 16 March. p. 21 April 1937. See Granick. 1976). 5 April. 'The "Great Purges" Reconsidered.. Zarkhidze's vindictiveness dated back to 1932 (probably a mistake for 1933). 6. 17 For a different view. 21. (Italics added. Sten. 114 See editorial in Pravda. 'O narodnokhozyaistvennom plane SSSR na 1937 god'. 593 and 603. 116 See Molotov. and wreckers. 536. 1936 no. pp. The Soviet Communist Party. Note that the government and party resolution of 23 March 1934 signed by Molotov and Stalin harshly criticized Communist managers in the railways: 'It is difficult to distinguish them from ochkovtirateli. 21. pp. 30 January 1938. 25 October 1935.) See also XVII s"ezd VKP(b). v. 53. 28 July 1937.) 99 Molot. S. Leningradskaya pravda. cit.) It is noteworthy in this connection that while he disapproved of collegial management. But we could regard this as implying that edinonachalie presupposed the political leadership and control of the party organizations. see Kendall E..D. and his chief engineer were among those accused of 'bureaucraticdistortions of edinonachalie'. 21 April 1937. 109 See editorials in Pravda. This latter interpretation appears consistent with Zhdanov's speech at the XVIII Party Congress. p. 7 April 1937. 225-247. (See Za industrializatsiyu. pp. Leningradskaya pravda. especially party cadres.. p. 17 February 1937. 25 March. 13. Partiinoe stroitel'stvo. 13 and 23 May 1935. 29 March 1934. 25 October 1935. 28 July 1937: Pravda. (See Za industrializatsiyu. 1933-39' (Boston College. v. 24 March 1937. 121 Stalin. 12 February. 367. in Sobranie zakonov . 108 Pravda. '01 Za rudu i mineraly. otchet [Moscow. 111 See Pravda. p. 17-18. 103 Stalin. Both Zhdanov and Stalin consistently insisted on collective leadership in the party organizations and considered one-man leadership always one-sided. 28 July 1937. 113See Kaganovich's remark on the railway managers in Partiinoe stroitel'stvo. (See Sobranie zakonov .) 106 See editorials in Pravda. 1934 no. mart 1939 g. 1 (Kiev. v. 102 See Zimin (North Caucasus Party Secretary) in Molot.17 February. v. But they never approved of collegial management in the factory. 6. 21. 110 See Pravda. 105 Za industrializatsiyu. pp. 104 See Molotov's speech at the plenum on 28 February 1937 published in Pravda. 216. Komunistychna Partiya Ukrainy v rezolyutsiyakh i rishenniyakh z'izidiv. See Kaganovich. 25-30. as enemies of the Soviet government'. 6. See also Stalin's speech at the plenum in Sochineniya. 370. 29 April. . etc. 25. 9. p. 98 See his speech at the XVII Party Congress in Sochineniya. Za industrializatsiyu. 21 March. 26 July 1934. N. then director of zavod im. 24 March.. Pr. surrogate of collective leadership'. 11 June 1933. . konferentsii i plenumiv TsK. This ambiguous statement may have suggested disagreements within the party leadership concerning edinonachalie. 107 See Molotov's speech in Pravda. He believed that his demotion was due to their . 1978). Petrovskogo. p. 17. 24 March. 2. Pravda. 119 Stalin. Ph. Leningradskaya pravda. P. 16 March. 17 February 1937. v. . p. The party card does not save them from the punitive hand of the party and the government.. 17 March. . and editorials in Pravda. 54. 24 July. p. 4 and 18 February 1934. Anisimova in Leningrad). 238-41. 1939). 118 See Molotov.) 112 See editorial in Pravda. Pravda. Kaganovich's order on the Donbass coal mines in Pravda. (See XVIII s"ezd VKP(b). v.. Arch Getty. Zapiski mastera (Moscow-Leningrad. 5. . M. Molot. cit. p. Za industrializatsiyu. p. 15 April 1934. 2 January. 22 March 1937. Za industrializatsiyu. 13. 25 February. 1(14). '00 Pravda. Sochineniya. which instead sees a 'growth' of the managers. dissertation. 24-98. 1937 no. 1934 nos. 13. see Fitzpatrick. 122 See S. 1934. 13. (This label was also applied to other people. 24 June. Sochineniya.INDUSTRIAL MANAGER 203 a more cautious view. when he was demoted from a foremanship by the managerial and party cadres of his factory (fabrika im. Zarkhidze. Za industrializatsiyu. Bailes. 8 April 1937. 11 March 1937 and compare this with his remark in 1930 (Note 82). which do not balk at dealing with them as disorganizers of rail transport. op. 26 April 1936. (Granick confuses this point. 370. 11 June 1933. Origins of the Soviet Technical Intelligentsia.) Clearly they were among those branded as 'bigwigs'. 1937. 852 (May 1936 plenum). 6 January 1938. pp. 29 August 1936. 29 August 1936. 16-117. Sochineniya. 535. 24 June 1937. Birman.) See also the 29 March 1937 government resolution. caricature. 24 July 1937. 41-48. 21 April 1937 and the 'secret' resolution of the Central Committee quoted in his speech. 5. 1. 282-7. p. Zhdanov described the troika as a 'parody. 1(14). 154. 1917-1941 (Princeton Univ. 17 June. 9. Note that in 1937. Technology and Society under Lenin and Stalin. 1939]. pp. 29.
56-7. Gudov recanted his accusations against his bosses ('enemies of the people'): at that time he became very suspicious and sensed in ordinary production defects the bosses' 'malicious intention'. 151-2) See also A. The Local Party Organs in Industrial Decision-Making (Cambridge. 1969). pp. 1970]. pp. 80-100. Busygin. pp. op. 203-31 and Jerry F. The Soviet Prefects..204 distortion of the party order against the so-called 'chancellery-bureaucratic' method of work. In his later account. Hough. 1938). . pp. pp. 80-81. Put'stakhanovtsa (Moscow. see also A. Gudov. Sud'ba rabochego [Moscow. Busygin's later account in his Sversheniya (Moscow. Zhizn' moya i moikh druzei (Moscow. 123 For the role of the party organizations in the factory in the late 1930s and later. 60. Mass.. I. For accusations by 'little people' against their bosses. 1939). pp. 1972). Gudov. 33-34. (See I. cit. see Granick.
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