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Unilateralism & Hard Power Good
Uniqueness: No Multilat Now......................................................................................................................................3 US Is Winning War In Iraq...........................................................................................................................................4 Unilat Key to Peace......................................................................................................................................................5 AT Multilat Key to Peace.............................................................................................................................................6 Multilat Kills Heg **Arms Sales**..............................................................................................................................7 Arms Sales Impact Extension.......................................................................................................................................8 Arms Sales Extension – AT Small Arms Balance Peace.............................................................................................9 Multilat Kills Heg/Unilat Key **Bolton**................................................................................................................10 Bolton Extension – EU Link.......................................................................................................................................11 Bolton Extension – Exceptionalism Key....................................................................................................................12 Bolton Extension – Snowballs....................................................................................................................................13 Multilat Kills Heg/Unilat Key **Cumbersome**......................................................................................................14 Multilat Kills Heg/Unilat Key **Freedom of Action** (1 of 3)................................................................................15 Multilat Kills Heg/Unilat Key **Freedom of Action** (2 of 3)................................................................................16 Multilat Kills Heg/Unilat Key **Freedom of Action** (3 of 3)................................................................................17 Multilat Kills Heg/Unilat Key **Public Support/Isolationism**..............................................................................18 **Unilat Accesses Cooperation Benefits of Multilat Better (1 of 2)**......................................................................19 **Unilat Accesses Cooperation Benefits of Multilat Better (2 of 2)**......................................................................20 AT Anti-Terror Cooperation Key...............................................................................................................................21 AT China Relations DA..............................................................................................................................................22 AT Don’t Need Hard Power to Stop Terror...............................................................................................................23 AT EU Relations DA..................................................................................................................................................24 AT Fiscal Overstretch (1 of 2)....................................................................................................................................25 AT Fiscal Overstretch (2 of 2)....................................................................................................................................26 AT Force Overstretch.................................................................................................................................................27 AT Multilat Prevents Terror/Anti-Americanism........................................................................................................28 AT Should Cede to Europe/Legitimacy Good............................................................................................................29 Hard Power Key to Econ............................................................................................................................................30 Hard Power Key to Effective Multilat........................................................................................................................31 Hard Power Key to Peace (1 of 2)..............................................................................................................................32 Hard Power Key to Peace (2 of 2)..............................................................................................................................33 Hard Power Key to Soft Power..................................................................................................................................34 **Hard Power Is All That Matters (Soft Power Useless)**.......................................................................................35 AT Soft Power Key to Bases......................................................................................................................................36 AT Soft Power Prevents Terrorism............................................................................................................................37 AT Solf Power Solves NoKo......................................................................................................................................38 **Can’t Solve Soft Power Anyway (1 of 2)**...........................................................................................................39 **Can’t Solve Soft Power Anyway (2 of 2)**...........................................................................................................40 Preemption Prevents Prolif/Terror..............................................................................................................................41 Prolif Impact Extension..............................................................................................................................................42 AT Preemption Will Snowball into Bigger Wars.......................................................................................................43 Treaty Exceptionalism Key to Heg.............................................................................................................................44 UN Bad (1 of 2)..........................................................................................................................................................45 UN Bad (2 of 2)..........................................................................................................................................................46 Tax Cuts Trade-Off With Bush Doctrine...................................................................................................................47
Bing Debate 06-07
Unilat & Hard Power Good
Bing Debate 06-07
Unilat & Hard Power Good
Uniqueness: No Multilat Now
(__) Bush administration is firmly committed to the Bush Doctrine – recent rhetoric proves.
Philip H. Gordon, Aug 2006, senior fellow @ Brookings, “The End of the Bush Revolution,” Foreign Affairs 84.4, p proquest Reading over President George W. Bush's March 2006 National Security Strategy, one would be hard-pressed to find much evidence that the president has backed away from what has become known as the Bush doctrine. "America is at war," says the document; we will "fight our enemies abroad instead of waiting for them to arrive in our country" and "support democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture,"
with the ultimate goal of "ending tyranny in our world."
Talk to any senior administration official, and he or she will tell you that the president is as committed as ever to the "revolutionary" foreign policy principles he spelled out after 9/11: the United States is fighting a war on terror and must remain on the offensive and ready to act alone, U.S. power is the foundation of global order, and the spread of democracy and freedom is the key to a safer and more peaceful world. Bush reiterated such thinking in his 2006 State of the Union address, insisting that the U.S. will "act boldly in freedom's cause" and "never surrender to evil."
(__) The US has broken from multilateral constrains and international law.
David Henrickson, Summer 2005, prof @ Colorado College & leading member of the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, “The
Curious Case of American Hegemony,” World Policy Journal 22.2, p http://www.worldpolicy.org/journal/articles/wpj05-2/hendrickson.html#author
The administration also argued that democratic government and the liberal ideals with which it was associated were of universal validity and that the United States has a right, perhaps even in some cases a duty, to impose such a government by force against tyrants. Though the administration insisted that the Iraq war was launched to safeguard American security, it was also continually represented as a noble cause. Never in history, proponents said, had so many been freed at so little cost. Bush also broke dramatically from the constraints of multilateral organizations, insisting that no foreign government could control the decisions of the United States in matters of war and peace. After it became apparent that the United States could probably get only 4 votes (out of 15) in the U.N. Security Council to approve the use of force against Iraq, one administration official said, "We
will want to make sure that the United States never gets caught again in a diplomatic choke
point in the Security Council or in NATO." (10) In keeping with this attitude, the administration had previously withdrawn from or scuttled a range of
international treaties, including the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the International Criminal Court, and the Kyoto Protocol on climate change. And why not? As John Bolton, the fox whom Bush nominated in 2005 to guard the U.N. henhouse, observed in 1999, "It is a big mistake for us to grant any validity to international
law even when it may seem in our short-term interest to do so—because, over the long term, the goal of those who think that international law really means anything are those who want to constrict the United States." (11)
(__) Bush administration is ideologically opposed to multilateralism.
George Soros, 2004, Global Financier and International Development Expert, THE BUBBLE OF AMERICAN SUPREMACY, pp. 82 That is not how the Bush administration sees America's role in the world. It has a visceral aversion to all multilateral arrangements. It believes that international relations are purely relations of power, not law, and since America is the most powerful nation, multilateral treaties and institutions impose undue limitations on the exercise of American power. The only form of cooperation the Bush administration can live wit h is one in which the United States decides and others follow. This attitude has led to the Bush doctrine.
Bing Debate 06-07
Unilat & Hard Power Good
US Is Winning War In Iraq
(__) The US is over-whelming winning the war in Iraq – the insurgency poses no real threat to the establishment of legitimate government that the US has pursued.
Frederick W. Kagan, 8-8-2005, resident scholar @ American Enterprise Institute, “Stay the Course, Mr. President,” LA Times, p L/N the military situation in Iraq today is positive--far better than it ever was when we were fighting guerrillas in Vietnam, or when the Soviets were fighting the Afghan mujahedin, or in almost any other major insurgency of the 20th century. With few exceptions, the insurgents in Iraq are not able to undertake militarily meaningful attacks on U.S. troops. They cannot prevent U.S. forces from moving wherever they want in the country nor can they keep U.S. forces from carrying out the operations they choose to pursue aggressively. This situation contrasts markedly with both the Vietnam and Soviet-Afghan wars, in which insurgents actually besieged U.S. forces at Khe Sanh
Despite what you may have read, and isolated a large Soviet garrison at Khost for nearly the entire conflict, among other incidents. Yes, the Iraqi insurgents have inflicted a steady stream of casualties on U.S. troops with improvised explosive devices, or IEDs, and car bombs, but they are
not able to hold ground or attack prepared U.S. forces and fight them toe-to-toe as the North Vietnamese and mujahedin did regularly. Another piece of good news from Iraq is that the insurgents are offering a mainly nihilistic message. Most skillful revolutionaries promise concrete benefits from their victory. Insurgents frequently work not only to terrorize local villagers but to help improve their lives in small ways. The Iraqi insurgents offer only fear. They oppose formation of the new Iraqi government but have not offered any alternative. In January 2004, insurgent leader Abu Musab Zarqawi said, "We have declared a bitter war against the principle of democracy and all those who seek to enact it." Eight million Iraqis defied him and voted instead. Today, most Iraqis remain committed to finding a way to make the new government work. One reflection of this is that Iraqis continue to wait in long lines to join the nascent Iraqi army and police forces, despite a campaign by the insurgents to explode bombs at recruiting stations. Not all recruits are idealistic--many are simply seeking work or the prestige of being a member of the
army or police. But their presence at the recruiting stations proves that the insurgents have neither offered them an alternative, terrorized them sufficiently nor de-legitimized the government enough in their eyes to keep them away.
Perhaps the best news from the region these days is that the Iraqi army is finally producing units able to fight on their own.
According to Lt. Gen. David Petraeus, there are now more than 170,000 "trained and equipped" Iraqi police and military personnel, and more than 105 police and army battalions are "in the fight." Over the next few months, tens of thousands more Iraqi troops will be able to take the field in the struggle against
the insurgency. They should number around 250,000 by next summer. By waging a terrorist campaign, the insurgents have designed a war they can sustain for a long time. Obtaining explosives, making bombs and
setting them off does not require much skill, money or even courage. The next year will probably not see a significant reduction in the number of explosions, and it's possible, as the Palestinian intifada and the three-decade-long campaign of violence by the Irish Republican Army show, that this situation may last for many years. It is thus unwise to measure progress in Iraq by the number of deaths or bombs in a given period. Progress must instead be measured in the establishment of a stable
and legitimate government and the creation of state structures able to function even in the face of attacks.
One big problem, however, is the paucity of coalition troops. Commanders, as a result, are required to make hard choices among such critical tasks as sealing borders, keeping critical lines of communication clear, defending their own troops, training indigenous forces, clearing insurgent-infested areas and attacking promising insurgent targets.
If the U.S. were to keep its troop levels constant over the next 18 months, the manpower[sic] available to perform all of these critical tasks would increase dramatically as Iraqi forces became available to handle basic security functions.
Unfortunately, it does not appear that the Bush administration favors such a course. Repeated rumors--including a report about U.S. plans to withdraw, leaked by the British Ministry of Defense recently, and statements by the new U.S. ambassador to Iraq--indicate that the administration would prefer to pull U.S. troops out of Iraq as Iraqi forces become available in larger numbers. Understandable though that desire is, it is wrongheaded. Now, above all, is the moment when determination and perseverance are most needed. If the U.S. begins
pulling troops out prematurely, it runs the risk of allowing the insurgency to grow, perhaps becoming what it now is not--a real military threat to the government. If, on the other hand, Bush stays the course and pays the price for success, the prospects for winning will get better every day.
IR expert and winner of the Bradley Prize for Promotion of Liberal Democracy. and still plays a key role in making that paradise possible. too: It is called isolationism. p. with all its vast power. for the very reasons he suggests. p L/N The form of realism that I am arguing for-call it the new unilateralism-is clear in its determination to self-consciously and confidently deploy American power in pursuit of those global ends. American leaders. Senior Associate at Carnegie Endowment for Peace. Isolationists would abandon the larger world and use American power exclusively for the narrowest of American interests: manning Fortress America by defending the American homeland and putting up barriers to trade and immigration. Winter 2003. Note: global ends. Our role in the Balkans was essentially to create a microbalance: to support the weaker Bosnian Muslims against their more dominant neighbors. but because they deem the ends far too broad. OF PARADISE AND POWER: AMERICA AND EUROPE IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER. 75-76 The United States is already operating according to Cooper's double standard. (__) Unilateralism is key to US balancing multiple conflict flashpoints – it is the only way to ensure global peace. U S 5 . America's (intended) exertions on behalf of pre-emptive non-proliferation. are clearly in the interest of both the United States and the international system as a whole. left to deal with the Saddams and the ayatollahs. remains stuck in history. Charles Krauthammer. and subsequently to support the weaker Albanian Kosovars against the Serbs. We balanced Iraq by supporting its weaker neighbors in the Gulf War. We balance China by supporting the ring of smaller states at its periphery (from South Korea to Taiwan. mans[sic] the walls but cannot walk through the gate. the Kim Jon Ils and the Jiang Zemins. it identifies two other major interests. "The Unipolar Moment Revisited. both of these tasks often advance American national interests as well. and regional equilibria produce stability that benefits a commercial republic like the United States. Critics of the new unilateralism often confuse it with isolationism because both are prepared to unashamedly exercise American power. joining the weaker coalition against the stronger to create equilibrium. believe that global security and a liberal order . Of course. It The United States. The promotion of democracy multiplies the number of nations likely to be friendly to the nited tates.Bing Debate 06-07 Unilat & Hard Power Good Unilat Key to Peace (__) American unilateralism is the exception to global norms – unilateralism is key to maintaining peace abroad. There is a form of unilateralism that is devoted only to narrow American selfinterest and it has a name." THE NATIONAL INTEREST. too. both global: extending the peace by advancing democracy and preserving the peace by acting as balancer of last resort. even to Vietnam). But isolationists oppose America acting as a unipolar power not because they disagree with the unilateral means.as well as Europe's "postmodern" paradise cannot long survive unless the United States does use its power in the dangerous Hobbesian world that still flourishes outside Europe. too. In particular. leaving most of the benefits to others. it cannot enter the paradise itself. America's unique global power allows it to be the balancer in every region. The new unilateralism defines American interests far beyond narrow self-defense. Britain was the balancer in Europe. 2003. What this means is that although the United States has played the critical role in bringing Europe into this Kantian paradise. Robert Kagan.
ceip. Such institutions are often extremely poorly resourced and. The truth is that the institutions and procedures of global multilateralism don't work very well. the League of Nations nurtured multilateral discussions. Very often. In addition. some unilateral actions override soothing diplomatic nattering. p L/N But if it is a mistake. In current circumstances. Washington Quarterly. (__) There’s a bipartisan consensus that multilat can’t provide peace. Pikayev.Bing Debate 06-07 Unilat & Hard Power Good AT Multilat Key to Peace (__) Multilateralism is too slow to prevent conflict escalation. given its overwhelming economic.asp The United States. They rarely have. Winter 2003. it is an understandable one. Rather than mounting individual effective actions against the provocations of Japanese empire-building in China. equally miscasts international policy in a world where circumstances may indeed warrant unilateral decisiveness. March 2003. p http://www. European leaders endlessly consulted one another. The multinationalists have failed dismally to make a case for their approach to solving the world's problems. grasping for a common denominator that no consultation would ever achieve. p proquest Moreover. is becoming increasingly dissatisfied with a need of looking for consensus among dozens of countries – as it is required by multilateral mechanisms. it requires long and painful negotiations. 6 . (__) Multilat institutions have no resources. Italian aggression against Ethiopia or Nazi trial runs for Blitzkrieg and Holocaust. that of multilateralism. In other words. Alexander A. Washington perceives multilateral regimes as very slow and often incapable to provide with resolute and efficient response when needed. The United States. and NATO to act in Africa and the Balkans to stop genocide and ethnic cleansing. that thinks so.org/files/nonprolif/default. political and military supremacy. 2003. such consensus is very difficult to achieve. at the same time. and the nature of the achieved multilateral deal could be far away from the original US expectations. And British Prime Minister Tony Blair has complained about the failure of multilateral institutions to solve problems. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. Business Week. with its unilateral impulses. 79. p 39 The opposing principle. (__) Multilateralism is too slow and ineffective when action is needed – multilat responses are never efficient. President Bill Clinton complained bitterly about the inability of the U. 4-21-2003.N. And it isn't just the Bush Administration. as the superior power in the world. must assume the responsibility of deploying its might for the benefit and welfare of itself and the rest of the world. producing only futility. badly overstretched. NUCLEAR ISSUES IN THE POST SEPTEMBER 11TH ERA. a great number of them suffer from low staff morale these days as well. Frank Schuller and Thomas Grant. most people have unreal expectations of the power of global multilaterals. No. In the 1920s and 1930s. The attacks of 11 September on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon count as an incident deserving of response regardless of the sentiments and sympathies of other nations.
Assist Prof of Bus.S.-produced TOW-2 missile. Israel is alleged to have incorporated U. the United States is diffusing its production capacity and technology to other countries. in the seven years since the Persian Gulf war (and the cold war) ended. Thailand. the Peoples' Republic of China subsequently transferred several of these improved missiles to Saudi Arabia.S.” 16 Ariz. law to Chile.S. the armament industries of U. n800 In addition. and the need for interoperable fighting forces.fas. n784 The United States has recognized the negative impact of such transactions upon nonproliferation efforts. n786 [continues] 4. the US government and other major arms exporting governments have apparently decided that no fundamental re-evaluation of the role of military force in international relations is advisable. Int'l & Comp. Armament Exports and the "Boomerang Effect" U.-made AIM-9-L Sidewinder missile and the MAPATS anti-tank missile based upon the U. p http://www. J. thereby needlessly placing U. military personnel at risk. 1998. “We Arm the World. armaments exports also serve to enhance the capabilities of potential adversaries. co-production and development transactions. Law @ U of the Pacific and LL. more than 6.3 million. For example. n778 For example.S. n782 Ironically.S. Lucien J. B) Arms sales hurt US leadership by increasing proliferation and decreasing the effectiveness of the US military. in perhaps one of the most underreported recent news stories in the armaments field. Taiwan.produced weaponry to the Peoples' Republic of China. n801 In the Gulf War. Law 577.S. Brazil.M.S. the United States and other key military powers have increased their reliance on military force through UN operations and/or regional alliances. and Venezuela.S. Dhooge. n780 Additionally. assisted the Chinese military in developing a laser-guided anti-tank missile. 1999. Israel is alleged to have transferred U.5 million in U. technology into its own weapons and exported those weapons without U. Instead of placing greater emphasis on the rule of law and non-military diplomacy during the past decade. and India have benefited from U. n781 Finally. Multilateral military operations. p L/N Even close allies of the United States have transferred weaponry without authorization.600 Panamanian military personnel received training under the International Military Education and Training Program between 1950 and 1987 at a cost of $ 8. Ethiopia.S. n783 [*670] 3. approval. The Arms Trade Revealed. Israel allegedly cooperated with the former apartheid regime in South Africa regarding the development of ballistic missiles and transferred armaments in violation of U.org/asmp/library/handbook/cover. By engaging in co-production and development. Lora Lumpe & Jeff Donarski. n779 Included in these weapons are the Python 3 air-to-air missile based upon the U. and $ 33. and improved the guidance system for the Chinese CSS-2 ballistic missile. military aid during the 1980s. International and Comparative Law from Georgetown U Law Center. n785 Nevertheless.S.Bing Debate 06-07 Unilat & Hard Power Good Multilat Kills Heg **Arms Sales** (__) Multilateralism is the prime motivator of US arms sales. allies in Europe as well as Israel. Consulting Senior Associate with the International Peace Research Institute and Member of the Advisory Board for the Foreign Policy in Focus Project & Project Associate at the Arms Sales Monitoring Project @ the Federation of American Scientists.S. the United Nations coalition encountered an Iraqi war machine equipped to a significant degree by the United States. which is demonstrated by its requirements that the degree of protection afforded sensitive technology and the potential for unauthorized transfers and misuse be determined prior to the initiation of co-production and development activities. the American forces that invaded Panama in December 1989 encountered a military that received 44% of its weapons from the United States between 1984 and 1989. 7 .html Unfortunately. Proliferation Through the Creation of Indigenous Armaments Industries Arms transfers also increase proliferation by enhancing global weapons production capacity. now provide one of the principal justifications for arms exporting and military training-by the United States in particular.
8 .3 billion and averaged $ 14.3 billion annually. regional conflicts and proliferation possible. n33 These imports constituted a combined 51% of the value of all imports for these countries. Assist Prof of Bus.Bing Debate 06-07 Unilat & Hard Power Good Arms Sales Impact Extension (__) American arms exports make mass human rights violations. East Timor. Armament imports by developing countries increased by $ 5. n34 These armament transfers have had a catastrophic effect upon the developing world. Finally.” 16 Ariz. American armaments have served to maintain repressive governments in the Middle East. American armaments have been utilized in the commission of human rights violations committed throughout the world including Egypt and the Occupied Territories. U. Law @ U of the Pacific and LL. “We Arm the World. armament exports have retarded the economic development of some of its leading customers. International and Comparative Law from Georgetown U Law Center. and Mexico. Furthermore. Asia.7 billion in profits to American defense contractors in 1996. p L/N The United States supplanted the Soviet Union as the world's leading armament exporter in 1990.6 billion in armaments in 1995 which amount was three times that of the next supplier and 49% of the global marketplace. J. Egypt. n30 The second cause for the increase in armament transfers in 1995 was increasing demand in the developing world. Dhooge. the Republic of Korea. the Republic of China. the developing world imported $ 323 billion in armaments. an industry record and double the amount of profits earned by such contractors in 1985. n29 These exports yielded $ 7. n32 The top five importers in 1995--Saudi Arabia. n31 Between 1985 and 1995. armament exports totaled $ 157.M. 1999. Law 577. n27 Between 1985 and 1995. Lucien J.6 billion in 1995 to $ 21. Armament exports have also served to inflame regional tensions and increase proliferation through unauthorized transfers and creation of indigenous armaments industries. Int'l & Comp. an increase of 36%.3 billion. and South America. Turkey.9 billion in armaments that constituted 65% [*582] of global imports.S.3 billion annually.S. U. with such imports averaging $ 29. Colombia. Peru. and Thailand--purchased $ 13. n28 The United States sold $ 15.
the ability to create regional balances is undoubtedly facilitated by the fact that the United States is arming both sides in many regional competitions-Greece and Turkey. it is doubtful that the Saudis would be able to counter threats from Iran and Iraq completely. and full participation in the UN Register of Conventional Arms. no amount of modern conventional weaponry could deter it. 83). None of these states were democracies at the time of US arms supply. technology and military training-in Panama. US forces have been deployed several times recently to combat former US allies-and recipients of US weapons. financial resources and the possession of nuclear armaments. that the Gulf monarchies lack the population. in Southeast Asia. A bill pending in Congress would attempt to keep the United States from making potentially disastrous exports by identifying characteristics of less stable governments. but also for aggression and repression." Similarly. then. A better bet for Singapore would be to put its energy into strengthening diplomatic and legal means for heading off and resolving any future disputes. Iran's threat perception has increased accordingly. but he must notify Congress of the exemption before weapons could be exported. Consulting Senior Associate with the International Peace Research Institute and Member of the Advisory Board for the Foreign Policy in Focus Project & Project Associate at the Arms Sales Monitoring Project @ the Federation of American Scientists. Egypt and Israel. Because Iran (unlike Iraq) is not under a UN arms embargo. if China-the world's most populous state and a nuclear power-were determined to attack Singapore (for example). China (to a limited degree) and Taiwan. the Pentagon has channeled billions of dollars of sophisticated weaponry to Saudi Arabia. The President may exempt a country which fails to meet these criteria. While this legislation might not block all dangerous sales. Somalia. For example. p http://www.html First. Iraq. it finds willing suppliers-principally in China and Russia. Until their recent nuclear tests. non-aggression (against other states). A second problem with this argument is the fundamental relationship of weapons to warfare. Most observers agree. for example. said that despite "long-term plans to expand their military with the purchase of equipment.. Lora Lumpe & Jeff Donarski. Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates in the 1990s. it would increase scrutiny on weapons supplied to those governments that may be less stable because of repressive or aggressive practices. and all had egregious human rights records. 9 . again in pursuit of an elusive strategic arms balance. Arms sales to Iran are then said to be "destabilizing" and to warrant more arms transfers from America. The Arms Trade Revealed. spurring Tehran to seek more weaponry. the four conditions a country must meet in order to be eligible for US weapons are: democratic form of government.org/asmp/library/handbook/cover. training and military tradition necessary to defend their territories.. reputedly to help these countries deter attack by Iraq or Iran. respect for basic human rights of citizens. The former Director of Naval Intelligence. What is important. however. 1998. Rear Admiral Edward Sheafer. American weapons shipments very often engender a response from other buyers and sellers. Weapons are useful not only for self-defense. In reality.. though. is the nature and stability of the regime to which the arms are flowing.fas. Under the "Code of Conduct" (see p. A third flaw with the balance of power rationale lies in the impossibility of establishing military parity among regional states that have a dramatic disparity in territory. Persian Gulf sheikdoms and Israel. Granted. Haiti and Liberia. several states are justifying an expensive round of military purchases on the basis of a need to deter Chinese adventurism.Bing Debate 06-07 Unilat & Hard Power Good Arms Sales Extension – AT Small Arms Balance Peace (__) Conventional arms are unable to provide consistent balancing – inevitable asymmetries mean conventional arms only increase the risks of conflict. population. the administration appeared ready to supply arms to both India and Pakistan. At the same time. the United States-as noted above-is not the only arms supplier.
consistent with the overall objective of reducing individual nation-state autonomy. Ever since the 1992 Conference on Environment and Development (the "Rio Summit"). and only for now). Bolton. Although space constraints permit only brief mention of a few contemporary issues. J. It is well past the point when the costs to the United States-reduced constitutional autonomy. bagpipe-like. particularly that of the United States. As a consequence. fought out at the confluence of constitutional theory and foreign policy. there is a Globalist proposal. simply refused to play the game. the same. former Vice President of AEI and current US representative to the UN. The decisive issue facing the United States internationally. 205. for example. the environment has seen the largest increment of regulatory initiatives. the consequence is. for all practical purposes. John R. fall 2000. Int'l L. reduction of our international power. In short. for virtually every area of public policy. in effect. fall 2000. is the unrestrained and uncritical acceptance of Globalist slogans ("global solutions for global problems") can be allowed to proceed. Bolton. However. and the current understanding of these costs far too limited to be acceptable. and the Clinton Administration has been hard at work attempting to persuade the Senate to ratify the extensive legislative backlog of existing conventions. former Vice President of AEI and current US representative to the UN. largely because they had failed to produce the expected bonanza of "free" resources and technology that the third world had been expecting. the "code of conduct" approach largely failed in its broader objectives because the developed world. and limitations on our domestic and foreign policy options and solutions--are far too great. and is currently considering adopting a Framework Convention on [*220] Tobacco Control. the underlying statist. p L/N Globalism. including the 1997 Kyoto Protocol on Global Warming. several of which have been pending for decades. has progressed from breast-milk substitutes. the debate over global governance. but it has seized the opportunity to resurrect itself as part of the larger impulse toward global governance that emerged during the 20th century's last decade. Int'l L. Should we. J. not only today but far into the foreseeable future. represents a kind of worldwide cartelization of governments and interest groups. 205. 10 .Bing Debate 06-07 Unilat & Hard Power Good Multilat Kills Heg/Unilat Key **Bolton** (__) The US only maintains its freedom of action by not giving into demands to abide by international norms and values – this ‘refusal to play the game’ is key to preserving US autonomy. therefore. take global governance "seriously?" Sadly. Whether we are ready or not. “Should we take Global Governance Seriously?” 1 Chi. “Should we take Global Governance Seriously?” 1 Chi. and the Reagan Administration in the United States in particular. n46 But others are also hard at work. international regulatory efforts faded in the 1980s and 1990s. p L/N Although some regulatory schemes were adopted and some were not. impaired popular sovereignty. Even though its proponents purportedly abjure global government as such (at least rhetorically. B) The internationalist agenda’s success will constrain US autonomy and freedom of action – it would be the end of US heg. regulatory impulse itself has not only not disappeared. The WHO. the answer is yes. John R. there should be no doubt that. n47 The ILO is still negotiating conventions on labor standards. the field of substantive international regulatory policy is simply waiting for the breath of Globalist inspiration to expand again.
not content alone with transferring their own national sovereignty to Brussels. For the Europeans. they have also felt more comfortable in propounding worldwide solutions consistent with the direction of EU policy. precisely the opposite of the [*221] instinctive Americanist inclination. former Vice President of AEI and current US representative to the UN. a desire to have a state strong enough to be a separate pillar in the world. “Should we take Global Governance Seriously?” 1 Chi. the As political elites in Europe grow increasingly comfortable in ceding large areas of national competencies to EU mechanisms in Brussels. indeed powerful. J. Faced with sweeping international economic change. especially on the left. fall 2000. as they have observed in the United States. but these compelling. John R. and their social-democratic welfare systems too expensive to withstand. Int'l L. 11 . p L/N European Union of the 1990s and the next decade has replaced the Developing World (and its NIEO and NWICO) as the leading source of substantive Globalist policy. they have also decided. 205. European Globalists have found that the international power of their states is too insignificant. Thus.Bing Debate 06-07 Unilat & Hard Power Good Bolton Extension – EU Link (__) The EU seeks to constrain US heg – European consolidation of power should be avoided to sustain US unipolarity. business reasons are also tinged with a discernable anti-Americanism. to transfer some of ours to worldwide institutions and norms. has been to aggregate state power through the EU mechanism. their currencies too weak. Bolton. thus making the European Union a miniature precursor to global governance. The European reaction. there is also a strong economic logic to an integrated continental market. in effect. In many respects.
Americanist-Globalist divide is the deepest. or (2) "going backward to the spirit and methods of what one of our members described as the 'sheriff's posse'--dressed up to masquerade as global action. “Should we take Global Governance Seriously?” 1 Chi. p L/N To make "Our Global Neighborhood" hospitable. but by constraining and limiting the nation-states themselves. n18 Even her [*211] subsequent refusal to indict NATO officials does not finally resolve the matter. complaints alleging that NATO in fact committed the crime of aggression have been submitted to the Prosecutor of one of the ICC's predecessor courts. Economist. John R. fall 2000. former Vice President of AEI and current US representative to the UN. or raise the costs to successively more unacceptable levels by increasing the legal risks and liabilities perceived by top civilian and military planners of the United States and its allies undertaking military action. John R. Although the Prosecutor. through the threat of prosecution." n6 At a time when "hegemony. 205. n19 NGOs hoping to change Pentagon behavior as much as the international "rules" themselves. It is not an explicit ideology but a pattern of beliefs. Int'l L. 11-8-2003. p L/N On this view. former Vice President of AEI and current US representative to the UN. Bolton. p L/N Indeed. n10 U S Persian Gulf War. J. her carefully worded statement only raised more questions about what she was actually doing. an administration that encourages American wealth and power will tend to encourage intrinsic exceptionalism. not in the old-fashioned. n5 the report's anti-American tone is unmistakable. Bolton. John R. Bolton. “Should we take Global Governance Seriously?” 1 Chi. Int'l L. balance-of-power way among nation states. n7 the animus is clear. Int'l L. America is powerful because it is exceptional. J. n9 and at what was broadly believed by many Americans to be an accurate description of (__) Internationalist NGOs will raise the costs of using US heg to unacceptable levels if they’re given the international credence needed to pursue prosecution of the US. Moscow or Paris (or even by well-meaning Americans) is a code word for the United States. (__) America is powerful because it maintains its exceptional nature." n8 Leaving aside apparently trivial problems such as how to measure the international "common will. The Use of Force: Legitimacy and Authority. attitudes and instincts. The Co-Chairmen[sic] pose as alternatives: (1) "going forward to a new era of security that responds to law and collective will and common responsibility". a fact we can and should legitimately consider in assessing the Globalist agenda. J.Bing Debate 06-07 Unilat & Hard Power Good Bolton Extension – Exceptionalism Key (__) Multilateral decision-making is the easiest way for the internationalist agenda to become entrenched – it removes important decisions from the sole authority of the US. Walter Russell Mead of the Council on Foreign Relations dubs this impulse "American revivalism". 12 . fall 2000. former Vice President of AEI and current US representative to the UN. an important predicate is to restrain the use of force." whether used in Beijing. 205. 205. And because what makes America different also keeps it rich and powerful. The Co-Chairmen[sic] say." the Co-Chairmen[sic] have taken direct aim at what the [*208] nited tates did in the 1991-92 America's role in the post-Cold War world. (__) The internationalist agenda frowns at US heg – it would seek to constrain the US’s intervention capabilities. limiting their decisions or transferring them to another source of authority is ultimately central to the diminution of sovereignty and the advance of global governance. America is not exceptional because it is powerful. Since decisions to use military force are the most important that any nation-state faces. for example. hope to constrain military operations. in abjuring "global government" that they seek to avoid a world that is "more accommodating to power [and] more hospitable to hegemonic ambition. in response to news reports. fall 2000. and thus lower the potential effectiveness of such actions. subsequently denied that she was conducting a "formal inquiry" into NATO's actions. p L/N Although two Americans were members of the Commission. Here is where the A. “Should we take Global Governance Seriously?” 1 Chi.
J. p L/N The Globalists' second approach is specifically targeted against the United States. Int'l L. Bolton. fall 2000. This conscious effort at limiting "American exceptionalism" is consistent with the larger effort to constrain national autonomy because the United States as a whole is the most important skeptic of these efforts. “Should we take Global Governance Seriously?” 1 Chi. John R. in an effort to bend our system into something more compatible with human rights and other standards more generally accepted elsewhere.Bing Debate 06-07 Unilat & Hard Power Good Bolton Extension – Snowballs (__) Every time the US gives in to international pressure it sets a powerful precedent for future constraints on US power – every instance is critical. 205. 13 . it sets a significant. precedent for all of the others. and detrimental. former Vice President of AEI and current US representative to the UN. Every time America is forced to bend its knee to international pressure.
multilateral coalition is not just supportive of. multilateralism necessarily entails moral equivocation and watereddown positions. through the European Union. eds. it also exacerbates the problem of optimal division of labor between participants. and anti-Americanism that has accompanied the unipolar moment. consensus means no one loses. UNILATERALISM AND US FOREIGN POLICY: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES. Reality probably lies somewhere in the midst of these options. p http://people. Clearly the rise of legalized institutions within the Free World since the end of World War II has delegitimized the use of force. including civilian casualties. but often relies on. In short. Editor of Concord Bridge Magazine. as pointed out by Robert Kagan in Of Paradise and Power. 2003.pdf There are several possible explanations as to why force (or hard power) has become so objectionable to international opinion. In addition. 5-20-03. (__) Multilateralism trades-off with American moral resolve. Engagement and discussion are seen as softer tools that ensure an equitable outcome for those involved. by force if necessary. refugee flows and economic disruption." Concord Bridge Magazine. Institute of World Economy and International Relations.brandeis. Thus unless America can convince the international community to accept the virtues of its moral stances. in this sense. senior researcher @ Center for International Security. forestalling war and its attendant train of miseries. The international community and many Americans view the associated costs of war as far outweighing any benefits of military action. 14 . have seen the supposed bounty of institutionalized multilateral cooperation. after all. American foreign policy has long had a moralistic strain that seeks to improve the world. and thus nations must go to great length to avoid international conflict. often causing more problems than it solves. is not a force multiplier. Among these explanations is the development of an international norm against the aggressive use of force. who. Tobias Harris. Force has become bête noire especially among the nations of Europe. Malone and Khong.Bing Debate 06-07 Unilat & Hard Power Good Multilat Kills Heg/Unilat Key **Cumbersome** (__) Multilat ends effective military deployment. But consensus precludes the possibility of firm moral positions. "Gulliver Unbound. Ekaterina Stepanova. as nations have come to view institutions as more capable of resolving international disputes than force-ofarms.edu/~cbmag/Articles/2003%20May/Gulliver%20unbound-%20May%202003. in cases that involve (or might involve) large-scale combat. force is the bluntest tool in the foreign policy toolbox. multilateralism is Europeanism writ large. Decisions are not made between two relatively equivalent choices but between what is right and wrong. a reply based on the impotency of much of the world in the face of America’s overwhelming military superiority. p 190-1 Multilateralism slows down the use of force and. signifying that opposition is more to the American unilateral use of force rather than to any use of force per se. as decisions reflect the lowest-common denominator among actors. the exclusive military capabilities of There are many technical problems associated with multilateral military actions: the United States which gives Washington one more argument for keeping the unilateral option open. To them. It is consensus-driven because.
and international-security? 15 . but why not give in there in order to build good will for future needs? But appeasing multilateralism does not assuage it. yes. but because it spreads risk. that declaration-and the credibility of American determination to act unilaterally-in and of itself created a coalition. assemble a coalition and. indeed calls for. under the most unilateralist of administrations. where the long-term benefit both to the American national interest and global interests is demonstrable.S.) Kyoto failed on its merits. IR expert and winner of the Bradley Prize for Promotion of Liberal Democracy. "The Unipolar Moment Revisited.12 I have my doubts. They are made by asserting a position and inviting others to join. Yemen did everything it could to stymie the American investigation. Countries will cooperate with us. and that one needs to think long-term.S. But there is a need to do so in Afghanistan and in Iraq. Prudence. No need to act the superpower on steel tariffs. Unilateralism simply means that one does not allow oneself to be hostage to others. No need to act the superpower in East Timor or Bosnia. they argue. you are likely to injure yourself in the long-term when you encounter problems that require the full cooperation of other partners. Cole. such as counter-terrorism. sharing rulemaking functions with others." THE NATIONAL INTEREST. Did that diminish the anti-American feeling in the region? Did it garner support for subsequent Iraq policy dictated by the original acquiescence to the coalition? The attacks of September 11 were planned during the Clinton Administration."13 If the concern about the new unilateralism is that American assertiveness be judiciously rationed. and made it clear that he was prepared to act alone if necessary. He joined because no one wants to be left at the dock when the hegemon is sailing. both about its own interest and about the global interest. One acts in concert with others if possible. which concentrated the mind of heretofore recalcitrant states like Yemen on the costs of non-cooperation with the United States. Warm and fuzzy feelings are a distant third. "this will not stand". reject Security Council support for an attack on Iraq. on the theory that sharing decision-making enlists others in our own hegemonic enterprise and makes things less costly. If you are too vigorous in asserting yourself in the short-term. thus undermining America's future freedom of action-and thus contradicting the pragmatic realists' own goals. Why? Because the extremist rage against the United States is engendered by the very structure of the international system. The United States made an extraordinary effort in the Gulf War to get UN support. Especially on matters of national security. deny itself the fruits of victory in order to honor coalition goals. first. When George Bush senior said of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Pragmatic realists also value international support in the interest of sharing burdens. share decisionmaking. America should neither defer nor contract out decision-making. the Security Council refuses to back you? Do you allow yourself to be dictated to on issues of vital national-. occasional concessions on non-vital issues if only to maintain psychological good will. not by the details of our management of it. But we should not delude ourselves as to what psychological good will buys. one willingly constricts sovereignty. Winter 2003. (Increased emissions from China. say. They are prepared to engage in a pragmatic multilateralism.Bing Debate 06-07 Unilat & Hard Power Good Multilat Kills Heg/Unilat Key **Freedom of Action** (1 of 3) (__) Unilateralism is the best way to achieve international cooperation and maintain US power necessary to sustain unipolarity and freedom of action – legitimizing multilateral constrains sets precedent for future constraints and does not ease anti-Americanism. p L/N A THIRD critique comes from what might be called pragmatic realists. free trade being perhaps the only mathematically provable political good. particularly when the concessions involve permanent structural constrictions such as those imposed by an International Criminal Court. This was not a result of a sudden attack of good will toward America. however. Trade agreements are easy calls. The same case was made for the chemical and biological weapons treaties-sure. out of their own self-interest and. appeasement merely legitimizes it. "Straining relationships now will lead only to a more challenging policy environment later on. Today. a single hegemon risks far more violent resentment than would a power that consistently acts as primus inter pares. who see the new unilateralism I have outlined as hubristic. The Kyoto Protocol. Repeated acquiescence to provisions that America deems injurious reinforces the notion that legitimacy derives from international consensus. Hafez al-Asad did not join out of feelings of good will. war-making and the deployment of power. at the end of the day. and whose objections are practical. It lifted not a finger to suppress terrorism. Charles Krauthammer. The resentments were hardly assuaged. What "pragmatic" realists often fail to realize is that unilateralism is the high road to multilateralism. Yemen has decided to assist in the war on terrorism. would have harmed the American economy while doing nothing for the global environment. Unilateralism does not mean seeking to act alone. This was under an American administration that was obsessively accommodating and multilateralist. but was nonetheless pushed because the rest of the world supported it. they are useless or worse. One does not go it alone or dictate terms on every issue. America must be guided by its independent judgment. India and Third World countries exempt from its provisions would have more than made up for American cuts. The nontrivial question that separates unilateralism from multilateralism-and that tests the "pragmatic realists"-is this: What do you do if. But there is a need to do so on missile defense. for example. It was a result of the war in Afghanistan. an administration that made a fetish of consultation and did its utmost to subordinate American hegemony and smother unipolarity. No unilateralist would. it is hard to disagree. After the attack on the U. They value great power concert.14 Coalitions are not made by superpowers going begging hat in hand. They seek Security Council support not because it confers any moral authority. Others require great skepticism. second. Arrogance and gratuitous high-handedness are counterproductive. The prudent exercise of power allows. On some issues such as membership in and support of the WTO. As Brooks and Wohlforth put it. Take counterterrorism. In their view. as we have seen. out of the need and desire to cultivate good relations with the world's superpower.
This reticence is not part of a nefarious American effort to achieve immunity from international law. But multilateralism imposed on Great Powers. War and peace remain different worlds. military doctrine. the United States has always taken its obligations seriously-refusing. you see. it can be traced to recognition by the United States that the world remains a dangerous place. But that. particularly at the DMZ in Korea. helped to negotiate a number of these treaties. 16 . such as the 1977 Protocol I Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (Protocol I) or the 1997 Ottawa anti-landmine convention. it bellum and jus in bello Although the United States has steadfastly rejected the most sweeping innovations. the United States has simply acted within its legal rights as an independent sovereign. Rather.org/docLib/20040227_book755text. if not cripple. They cannot be imposed. Historically. Peacetime norms. To domesticate the most undomesticated. Unlike many countries. Sr. IR expert & winner of the Bradley Prize for Promotion of Liberal Democracy. The nuclear test ban would have seriously degraded the American nuclear arsenal. For starters. Which is precisely why France is an ardent multilateralist. constricted by the will—and interests—of other nations.” The National Interest 73. DC office of Baker & Hosteller LLP and write frequently on international law and defense issues and both served in the Reagan and Bush.S. For the first time in modern history. for example. dependent on. and that adoption of a "policing" model for warfare would hamper.S. But why should America be? Why. DEMOCRATIC REALISM: AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN A UNILATERAL WORLD. was really going to be most constrained by these treaties? The ABM amendments were aimed squarely at American advances and strategic defenses. to defend its interests with or without UN Security Council approval. is the whole point of the multilateral enterprise: To reduce American freedom of action by making it subservient to. and of new interpretations of existing treaties (such as the UN Charter). as critics have sometimes asserted. The laws of war. national interest on the planet—ours.Bing Debate 06-07 Unilat & Hard Power Good Multilat Kills Heg/Unilat Key **Freedom of Action** (2 of 3) (__) Multilateralism constrains US freedom of action by imposing norms and limitations that only apply to the US. Overall. the high value the United States places on force protection would be suspect under these rules. Similarly. after all. are far more restrictive than the laws of war because they operate in an environment in which the state has an effective monopoly on the lawful use of force. in the end. Nor does the American refusal to follow Europe's lead in this area stem from any lack of humanitarian zeal. and has rejected agreements that could be interpreted as contrary to key aspects of U. protocols. where necessary. met so much Pentagon resistance that even Clinton could not initial it) would have had a devastating impact on U. and in which the damage that any single individual or group can inflict is limited. or of customary norms. Indeed. conventional forces. the United States has clearly asserted that it will use force. which embrace new international conventions with little intent to comply thereafter. does liberal internationalism want to tie down Gulliver. by operating its aircraft at heights well beyond the range of enemy air defenses. and particularly on a unipolar power. partners in the Washington. America's ability to defend itself-and its allies. multilateralism is a way for weak countries to multiply their power by attaching themselves to stronger ones. To tie down Gulliver with a thousand strings.aei. Fall 2003. In particular. David B Rivkin Jr & Lee A Casey. not at Russia. favoring instead more traditional jus ad norms. What the critics fail to realize is that binding international legal obligations must be based on the consent of the affected states. to blunt the pursuit of American national interests by making them subordinate to a myriad of other interests? (__) Multilat constrains threaten to erode America’s ability to leverage military power and threaten the use of force – not submitting to such constrains is key to maintaining US heg. is intended to restrain that power. the principal military powers differ fundamentally over the proper rules governing warfare. by contrast. which guide the conduct of police and security establishments in modern democracies. in the end. administrations. and. to ratify treaties it does not plan to implement. And the land mine treaty (which the Clinton administration spent months negotiating but. each with a unique logic and distinct imperatives that require dissimilar rules. In eschewing many of the new international legal norms accepted by Europe. “Leashing the Dogs of War. p http://www. Who. Why then this obsession with conventions. one of the principal allegations leveled against the United States is that it has improperly sought to shield its soldiers from the dangers of combat-for example. making it difficult in many cases to distinguish between military and civilian targets. Accepting a "policing" model for warfare would undermine the key tenets of American strategic thinking. p proquest These efforts have taken the form of multilateral conventions. decisive force would be considered "excessive" and subject to sanction. the importance of this Euro-American doctrinal divergence cannot be overestimated. legalisms? Their obvious net effect is to temper American power. The Kyoto Protocol exempted India and China. the fundamental American doctrine of "decisive force" would have to go. under a model of armed conflict better suited to "managing" problems than winning wars. which lags hopelessly behind. apply in a context in which the state does not have a monopoly on either the lawful right to use force or on the use of the most destructive weapons. Charles Krauthaumer.pdf Moral suasion is a farce. April 2004. whether because of policy or constitutional concerns. Any robust use of force is certain to cause some civilian casualties. most outsized.
S. for the moment. presents a number of serious political. and technical constraints in the use of force. If nothing else. however. the applicability of a particular term (debates about empire tend to degenerate into semantic squabbles) does not matter. (__) Unilateralism is key to global leadership and effective military action – multilat would destroy that. No U. The fact of the overwhelming power of the United States does.S. a stable political system. even partial accommodation to these interests. Ekaterina Stepanova. let alone replace. domestic politics would prohibit it. Cohen. there is no question of a countervailing coalition to block. and.S. p proquest In the end. b. which is essential for any multilateral cooperation. military strategy. in a world more complex than the bipolarity of the Cold War. UNILATERALISM & US FOREIGN POLICY: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES. Jul/Aug 2004. And the United States will not. No potential adversary comes close to it. For the United States.S.S. and a military that is unsurpassable in the foreseeable future.4. Its roots lie in a growing and extraordinarily productive population. Prof and Director of the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies @ JHUs School of Advanced International Studies. bind itself to an international institutional and legal order that will domesticate and restrain it. the U. it. Malone and Khong. even within the Western community of nations. Eliot A. 17 . military. strategic independence and global leadership. military superiority and the significant technological gap that exists between the United States and even its closest Western allies. “History and the Hyperpower. the political interests of countries tend to be diverse and fragmented.Bing Debate 06-07 Unilat & Hard Power Good Multilat Kills Heg/Unilat Key **Freedom of Action** (3 of 3) (__) US heg is guaranteed as long as the US does not bind itself to institutions that would limit US power. as some hope and others fear. For the United States. Research Associate at Carnegie Endowment for Peace. unilateralism in the use of force is first and foremost an essential element in a compelling demonstration of U. More important. p 183-184 Retaining the capability to apply force unilaterally and demonstrating periodically the willingness to use it remains a cornerstone of the U. leader in the next decade or two will call for a dramatic reduction in defense spending or deny that this country must be the strongest in the world. political-military leadership often views unilateralism as a technical prerequisite for effective command and control of military action. 2003. Given U. ed. ready to exert its power globally and act unilaterally if necessary.” Foreign Affairs 83.
it might spark the kind of sulking unilateral isolationist hangover which. the only winners would be dictators. in which a virtuous but anodyne deferral to "world opinion" is used as an excuse to do nothing.S. p 240-41 For a long time the Bush administration’s back-and-forth policies continued to be defined by the tension between its powerful hegemonists including Rumsfeld. neoconservative foreign policy strategists know the power of a paradigm. Cheney. They advocate unilateralism as right and realist while dismissing multilateralism as naive and unrealistic.S. foreign policy strategy. Unilateralism. They play on national pride by framing their policies in the overarching worldview of U. on the other hand.Bing Debate 06-07 Unilat & Hard Power Good Multilat Kills Heg/Unilat Key **Public Support/Isolationism** (__) Multilateralism stokes isolationism amongst the public – that would end US global leadership. and its multilateralists. p proquest To their credit. As for multilateralism. p ScienceDirect The exercise of the requisite unilateralism in the launching of U. Multilateralism." Orbis 46. and arms control and nonproliferation. Unless multilateralists stop preaching to the choir and start getting tough on themselves. after all." Only excessive concern about being "isolated" in multilateral arenas may induce a more isolationist American posture in one of two ways. Second. resisting as needed the multilateral initiatives of others. it could persuade Americans tired of leadership to revert to a multilateral isolationism. Winter 2004. former editor of Newsweek and Senior editor of the Washington Bureau. does not equate to "isolationism. including broad views of the United Nations.-led multilateral actions. the degree-by-degree warming of the globe. Whether Democrats trying to close the foreign policy confidence gap. is much easier to sell and so much conceptually cleaner than multilateralism. Michael Hirsh. than the use of force. they have yet to make the positive case for multilateralism as a credible and preferable U. mainly Powell and his small band of loyal deputies. Were either of these forms of isolationism to reemerge. Professor of International Law @ Hebrew U. spring 2002. Jentleson. Bruce W. its benefits are long-term and diffuse. The benefits are immediate. but no issue is more central to the overall debate. The hegemonists dominated thinking inside the White House – not least because their views continued to earn the president high popularity ratings. or Europeans wary of the United States acting alone. The broad unilateralism-multilateralism debate is about overarching ways of viewing the world and the role of the United States. (__) Multilateralists can’t maintain support for hegemony – uniltateralists can. director of the Terry Sanford Institute of Public Policy & prof of public policy and PoliSci @ Duke and a senior foreign policy adviser to presidential candidate Al Gore. 18 . they will not be trusted by the American public to conduct U. multilateralists’ lack of credibility on the use of force—the will to use it and the capacity to use it effectively—is their most damning weakness.S. and Wolfowitz. the International Criminal Court. “Tough love Multilateralism. and the costs long-term and diffuse: the distant threat of weapons of mass destruction.S. and none more problematic for multilateralists. First. Left and Right.2. 2003. (__) Benefits of unilateralism are immediate and the costs long-term – multilateralism means immediate costs with no public benefits. scholars of the Realist school have noted. "U.S. the global environment and the Kyoto Protocol. the distant notion that Europe or China may tip into opposing US hegemony decades hence. and so on. soft and weak. addressing the weaknesses that still cause too many people to have too many doubts about multilateralism’s viability as a realistic foreign policy strategy. unipolarism and dominance. At War With Ourselves.” The Washington Quarterly. Although multilateralists have had some success in conveying the flaws of unilateralism. rogues. foreign policy in a dangerous world. and terrorists. often follows periods of crusading interventionism. and more probably. including a strong leaderly image for the president. The debate is important in and of itself in that it frames and at least partially shapes positions on specific policies. Many issues come into play. The dynamic also works in the opposite direction: general worldviews are shaped by positions on particular issues. and its costs immediate: an image of compromise and indecisveness. Michla Pomerance. Republicans battling within the Bush administration.
spring 2002. by placing them in a multilateral framework. long ago learned—or should have learned. Multilateralism first locks countries into inaction. but not less meaningful. later fail to implement them.S. p ScienceDirect More fundamentally. 19 .’15 From this perspective. for one.16 In this respect. A less well-known. While the Johnson administration vacillated. and as a conscience-soothing substitute for action is a lesson that Israel. "unilateralism … is. the foremost American scholar of international organization. you will never have partners to go with you …. power."13 "Effective multilateralism starts with resolute unilateralism. and the guarantee would be implemented only multilaterally. seeking to mobilize an unattainable multilateral naval task force to break the Egyptian blockade. Theirs was a prescription for inaction and could provide its pretext. who understood this important lesson instinctively. but only to supplement and repeat a previously adopted UN Security Council resolution.S. Left and Right. as a reason and pretext for inaction."14 Or as Thomas Friedman wrote in 1995: If the Clinton foreign policy team has learned anything these past two years I hope it is this: there is no multilateralism without unilateralism. That multilateralism can readily serve as a restraint on U. but rather all those who insisted on untainted "humanitarian" motives for multilateral actions. "U. in fact. those who have understood the concept of "multilateralism" best have always emphasized the dependence of multilateralism on unilateralism. it may be noted that the disparate perspectives of Right unilateralists and Left multilateralists may easily lead to similar results. the threat to Israel’s security was becoming more palpable daily. Thus. emasculating) America’s security commitment to Israel by anchoring it in a formal treaty placed in a multilateral casing. The events preceding the Six-Day War furnished one unforgettable illustration of the problem." Orbis 46. The United States would grant the guarantee bilaterally. Multilateralism. the ones who were paying lip service to multilateralism were not Bush and his Republican followers. The Right would more readily hesitate to grant commitments in the first place. while the Left would extend the commitments but. Repeat after me: ‘The UN is us. Unless you first show people that you are ready to go alone. the mission of the leader is not respectful deference to the majority but determined pulling and hauling at it. indispensable to effective multilateralism.Bing Debate 06-07 Unilat & Hard Power Good **Unilat Accesses Cooperation Benefits of Multilat Better (1 of 2)** (__) International cooperation has always been dependent on resolute unilateralism – it spurs countries into action. Inis Claude (author of Swords into Plowshares). Michla Pomerance. Professor of International Law @ Hebrew U. lesson could be garnered from the subsequent scheme by Senator Fulbright for limiting (indeed. The UN is us. has written that despite the world’s bias against unilateralism.2.
Multilateralism. it accentuated yet again the dependence of multilateralism on unilateral American activism.S. that declaration-and the credibility of American determination to act unilaterally-in and of itself created a coalition. occasional concessions on non-vital issues if only to maintain psychological good will. (__) Hard power and unilateralism is key to successful coalition-building which avoids the disads of multilateralism while incurring the benefits. in some cases no doubt. Professor of International Law @ Hebrew U. He joined because no one wants to be left at the dock when the hegemon is sailing. p L/N The prudent exercise of power allows. Arrogance and gratuitous high-handedness are counterproductive. Yemen has decided to assist in the war on terrorism. out of the need and desire to cultivate good relations with the world's superpower. first. Take counterterrorism. and made it clear that he was prepared to act alone if necessary. second. p ScienceDirect But if Durban furnished ammunition for the Right multilateralist camp. Such international cooperation as was mustered by the administration in its counterterrorism campaign was motivated by an acknowledged convergence of interests in battling a scourge from which no state was exempt and. After the attack on the USS Cole. Warm and fuzzy feelings are a distant third. winter 2003. unprovable. But we should not delude ourselves as to what psychological good will buys. "this will not stand". Charles Krauthammer. which concentrated the mind of heretofore recalcitrant states like Yemen on the costs of non-cooperation with the United States. "The Unipolar Moment Revisited.Bing Debate 06-07 Unilat & Hard Power Good **Unilat Accesses Cooperation Benefits of Multilat Better (2 of 2)** (__) Multilateralism is most effective when it’s motivated by an uncompromising unilateral stance – the war on terror proves. Countries will cooperate with us. out of their own self-interest and.2. more multilateralist approach by the Bush administration have more greatly facilitated the post-September 11 multilateral cooperation it so desperately sought? The assumption. Left and Right. validating them retrospectively? Should one conclude (as did Thomas Friedman) that "the unilateralist message the Bush team sent from its first day in office—get rid of the climate treaty. When George Bush senior said of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. is unproven. September 11 did not invalidate the occasional need for unilateral abstentionism. This was not a result of a sudden attack of good will toward America. Today. The Bush team’s earlier unilateralist message was simply irrelevant. It was a result of the war in Afghanistan. "U. indeed calls for. spring 2002. IR expert. 20 .S. under the most unilateralist of administrations. forget the biological treaty. They are made by asserting a position and inviting others to join. On the other hand. did September 11 obliterate it and tilt the balance toward the Left multilateralist contentions. though widely held. Yemen did everything it could to stymie the American investigation. What "pragmatic" realists often fail to realize is that unilateralism is the high road to multilateralism. forget arms control. This was under an American administration that was obsessively accommodating and multilateralist." Orbis 46.14 Coalitions are not made by superpowers going begging hat in hand. It lifted not a finger to suppress terrorism." The National Interest. and highly improbable. Michla Pomerance. Hafez al-Asad did not join out of feelings of good will. wrath. and if the world doesn’t like it that’s tough—has now come back to haunt us"?55 Would an earlier. There was therefore no more need after September 11 than before to embrace multilateralism obsequiously rather than instrumentally. fear of incurring U.
policy. Assessing the intimacy of information-sharing arrangements between governments is impossible for outsiders. THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY. however. but intelligence professionals suggest that the United States does not share everything even with its closest allies and that even states with close ties to the United States may not be enthusiastic or generous about turning over information to their U. many of the states that might be in the best position to possess and provide information about terrorist activities in the Middle East or South Asia-such as Iran. Further. battle with terrorism includes a motley collection of states-some that are close to the United States but many that are not. the current loose coalition that has formed in support of the U. The barriers to collaboration must be enormous in such cases. with reluctance likely in both directions to forging the most sensitive sorts of concerns will inevitably arise that information is being manipulated. The United States will undoubtedly continue the diplomatic maneuverings it thinks are necessary or desirable to permit and support its war against terrorism. vexing. director of the International Security Program @ JFK School of Government. for example. ties between unfriendly states. and Syria-are states that have uneasy.S.S. Indeed. Tunisia .S. Libya. military personnel at Khobar Towers. 2003. THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY. messy. the Sheraton Hotel in Karachi. much less with foreign governments and foreign intelligence bureaucracies. it may reflect only partial truths or be misleading and self-serving in some way. Harvard. (__) Past intelligence cooperation didn’t prevent terrorism. a nightclub in Bali. Steven E. When genuine and useful information is provided. Moreover. p 202 Despite intelligence efforts and increased cooperation among national police and military intelligence services. agencies are reluctant to share information with each other. and occasionally fruitless exercise. parceled out to maximize the price. 21 . Miller. This ungainly coalition. or even hostile. Sociologist. or even falsely manufactured. that the government of Saudi Arabia was not more forthcoming in assisting the investigation of the 1996 terrorist attack on U. U. Steven E. action-a possibility that is mirrored in Bush administration concerns that the coalition might “shackle” the United States. the barriers to intensive intelligence collaboration are considerable. decisions or restraining U. the police are out of the loop. is unlikely to be so potent or so appealing an instrument that Washington is certain to sacrifice other policies comprehensively for its sake. killing 236 people in total and wounding many more while spreading fear in the ubiquitous world of “soft targets. shaded to advance the interests of the providing state. director of the International Security Program @ JFK School of Government. Benjamin Barber.S. p proquest For one thing. but others are likely to see it as a mechanism for influencing U. FEAR’S EMPIRE. In circumstances where deep trust between governments does not exist. the American consulate in Karachi. winter 2002. withheld. Congress is eyed warily. counterparts. and a hotel and an airplane in Kenya. in the period between the Afghanistan and Iraq operations there were deadly terrorist attacks against a synagogue in Bjerba.S. Washington was deeply frustrated. winter 2002.” (__) International anti-terror cooperation provides little benefit while only constraining US resources and freedom of action.Bing Debate 06-07 Unilat & Hard Power Good AT Anti-Terror Cooperation Key (__) Global intelligence cooperation increases the risk of war on terror failures through bad info. relations with the United States. the United States will not find it easy to push its coalition partners to do things they do not want to do or feel that they cannot do.S. Harvard. and other federal agencies are not routinely on the distribution list. p proquest Washington is likely to view the coalition as a source of support and an instrument of U. Managing this coalition will be a demanding. Miller. When sensitive information is involved. if it will be a true coalition.S.
moreover. SinoAmerican compromises on regional issues of mutual interest throughout the 1990s play to Ross' argument that the Sino-U.Bing Debate 06-07 Unilat & Hard Power Good AT China Relations DA (__) US-Sino relations will remain stable – neither seeks to upset the other. relationship is a competitive one. though the Sino-U. visiting fellow in the Contemporary China Centre and lectures on security in the Department of IR @ Australian National U. China wants to avoid a conflict with the United States. This portrayal of Sino-U. WORLD POLICY JOURNAL. (__) The US won’t engage China in an Asian war – neither actor wants to see conflict anyway. winter 2005. Thus while China and the United States compete for influence in each other's sphere by use of non-military means.S. inferior technology and inadequate training of personnel. and the evolution of their interests and military capabilities accordingly. Shannon Tow.-Soviet Cold War. Washington. (__) China and the US both benefit from non-interference plus China’s navy is old and can’t make moves against the US. He asserts that continental Southeast Asian states have aligned with China and maritime Southeast Asian states have aligned with the United States. Research Assistant @ School of Political Science and International Studies @ U of Queensland. The Japanese journalist Funabashi Yoichi quotes one Chinese think tank researcher as saying: “We are studying the origin of the U. Contemporary Southeast Asia 26. In his article "The Geography of Peace". remains wary of U. Dec 2004.3. Why did it happen? Was there no way to prevent it? Some see that a U. p 434 Robert Ross. Contemporary Southeast Asia 26. relations has been acknowledged by recent literature on Asia-Pacific security. Chinese naval capabilities remain limited due to ageing weapons systems. p 434 Third. something none of them wants to have to do. Dec 2004.3. there is no collision course.S. but what can we do China’s strategic response to the Bush Doctrine is not confrontational toward the United States and does not require China’s Asian neighbors to choose between Beijing and Washington. p 434 A stable Southeast Asia is also desired by the United States. Contemporary Southeast Asia 26. Ross therefore postulates that the emerging bipolar structure is likely to be a stable and enduring one. China is principally concerned with modernizing its economy and therefore desires regional stability in Southeast Asia. Ross argues that China and the United States' complementary geopolitical strengths simultaneously prevent them from forcefully interfering in one another's respective sphere of influence. relationship is an essentially stable one. (__) China has responded favorably to the Bush Doctrine.S. engagement in any Asian land war.3. it challenges Washington to think and act in ways quite different from the policies prescribed by the Bush Doctrine to prevent it?” when trying to resolve problems in international relations.S. Research Assistant @ School of Political Science and International Studies @ U of Queensland. Ross argues that as the two most geopolitically dominant regional actors. p proquest Clearly. The geographic position of China and the United States.-China cold war is inevitable. Shannon Tow. neither has an incentive to resort to conflict. 22 . Furthermore. Research Assistant @ School of Political Science and International Studies @ U of Queensland. make it unlikely that either country would seek to project power into the other's respective sphere.S. Shannon Tow. Americans are aware that China's cooperation is needed in areas of counterterrorism and missile proliferation. Dec 2004.26 Though it is not a design for what realists would call “balancing” against the United States.S. China and the United States preside over their own separate but complementary spheres of regional influence. Peter Van Ness.
perhaps because his realist paradigm does not stress soft power. Dean of JFK School of Government @ Harvard. But better an intelligent. BOSTON REVIEW.Bing Debate 06-07 Unilat & Hard Power Good AT Don’t Need Hard Power to Stop Terror (__) Nye agrees: we cannot win the war on terror without hard power. Stephen Walt recognizes this. moderate. 3-10-05. but he does not dwell on it. p L/N If the United States is going to win the struggle against terrorism. and mature realism than a truncated neoconservative Wilsonianism that stresses ideas but loses touch with reality. Joseph Nye. 23 . it will need learn again to combine soft power with hard power.
“The Unipolar Concert. specifically through the EU’s European Capabilities Action Program (2001) and NATO’s Prague Capabilities Commitment (2002). 24 . a task force is producing a defense book that looks into questions related to using hard power. stabilize regions. the linchpins of the Continent's transatlantic relationship. winter 2004. Significantly. Prof of IR @ JMU. Nye. As Harvard's Jospeh S. prof of IR & director of the Clingendael Center for Strategic Studies in the Netherlands. spring 2005. Mohammed Ayoob. as opposed to fundamental rules of the system or basic objectives. Solana’s strategy paper spells out Europe’s interests and the threats it faces and explicitly calls for expeditionary capabilities to protect those interests.S.S. “The Unipolar Concert. p proquest Europe has already taken significant concrete steps toward creating a credible military component in Europe. Mohammed Ayoob.. (__) Engagement will prevent relations from failing in the future.11 which is the equivalent of the U. The strategy paper could play an important role in helping reconcile Europe and the United States and facilitate a sorely needed joint U. has said in refuting the conservative political analyst Robert Kagan's assertion that when it comes to their approach to major strategic and international questions Europeans and Americans are from two different planets: "In their relations with each other all advanced democracies are from Venus. Security Council debates on Iraq from 1991 to 2003 makes it obvious that there were hardly any differences among the club of powerful states on taking steps that would severely derogate Iraq's sovereignty and eventually bring about a regime change. Washington Quarterly. Javier Solana. The differences were over the tactics to achieve these ends. disagreements within the concert are often over policy choices. presented a draft of a strategic concept.Bing Debate 06-07 Unilat & Hard Power Good AT EU Relations DA (__) Economic and security relations with Europe outweigh unilateralism. national security strategy. The shared objective is to deny Iran nuclear weapons capabilities and to curb its regional influence. A reading of the U. p proquest An article in the New York Times on the eve of the 2004 U. At the recommendation of representatives at the EU’s 2002 Laeken summit.N. p proquest Second.. Solana agreed that fighting terrorists abroad can increase security at home. the consequences for American-European relations will be bad" and that neither France nor Germany. spring 2005.” World Policy Journal 22." (__) Disagreements are only over policy choice – not the overall objectives and goals. presidential election began by asserting that the predominant view in Europe seemed to be that "no matter who wins . and combat terrorists. They assume everything hinges on Iraq and ignore the dense web of interlocking security and economic interests that bind industrialized Western Europe and America together. The imposition of no-flight zones and invasive inspections under U.” World Policy Journal 22.”12 a position welcomed by the Bush administration. In addition. Jr. would be willing to come to the aid of the United States in Iraq regardless of the outcome. the debate is about how best to attain these goals. Prof of IR @ JMU. in 2003 the EU’s high representative for common foreign and security policy.N. Deterring and punishing "rogue" states and denying unconventional capabilities to those outside the club are shared objectives from which no member of the concert dissents. (1) Analyses such as this one tend to portray America's relations with major European powers in one-dimensional terms. This was very clear in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. the paper argues that “[p]reemptive engagement can avoid more serious problems in the future. Indeed. The same applies to the concert's objectives regarding Iran. auspices between 1991 and 2003 clearly demonstrated this unity of purpose.-European declaration of strategic partnership.S. Rob de Wijk.
Fueled by government profligacy and low private savings rates. “The Overstretch Myth. and it would be undoubtedly larger yet if another major war were to be launched in the next few years. not economic. would set off a panic.S. assets bolsters U. financial stability posed by large foreign liabilities has been exaggerated. David H. “The Curious Case of American Hegemony." writes the economist Fred Bergsten. not undermine the United States' role as global pacesetter. interest rates to skyrocket. But these trends will at worst slow the growth of U.3 percent of GDP in 2004. economy to descend into crisis. To be sure.S.worldpolicy. fiscal overstretch can easily be remedied – it’s exaggeration to claim that it would harm the US economy. Summer 2005. the world's appetite for U. and the risk to U.2. "Official projections score the fiscal imbalance at a cumulative $5 trillion over the next decade. economy would tank even if federal tax revenues reached 25 percent of GDP. The experience of the 1990s shows that the structural gap between expenditures and revenues can be overcome without serious cost. The dollar's role as the global monetary standard is not threatened.8 percent of GDP. rests on an unsustainable accumulation of foreign debt. as Bergsten notes. who insist that "it is impossible to have a Bush Doctrine world with Clinton-era defense budgets. p http://www.2. If anything. p proquest The U. total net foreign liabilities are approaching a quarter of GDP. Two neoconservatives.” World Policy Journal 22. and the U. recently retired after 19 years as Managing Director of Moody's Sovereign Ratings Service. (44) These constraints should not be misconstrued. U. predominance rather than undermines it.S. Bush's sharp reduction in taxes is surely significant. they are political.org/journal/articles/wpj05-2/hendrickson.S. which was $412 billion in fiscal year 2004. according to doubters.S.S. residents spend abroad and what they earn abroad in a year--now stands at almost six percent of GDP.S. (43) The unwillingness to pay for what it wants and to want only what it is willing to pay for is also apparent from the underfunding of the Bush Doctrine. the current account deficit--the difference between what U. in this scenario. Sudden unwillingness by investors abroad to continue adding to their already large dollar assets. Still. ensuring its continued appeal for foreign central banks and private investors. the budget deficit could approach $1 trillion per year. Despite the persistence and pervasiveness of this doomsday prophecy. but spending remained stubbornly high at 19. economy. Levey. David Henrickson. not collapse of heg. prof @ Colorado College & leading member of the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy.html#author Inescapable signs of serious economic weakness emerged with the collapse of the stock market bubble and were exacerbated by the subsequent return of fiscal insolvency under the impetus of the Bush tax cuts and spending increases. was in nominal terms the largest ever and fell little short. and it is in any case difficult to believe that the U. "but exclude probable increases in overseas military and homeland-security expenditures. extension of the recent tax cuts and new entitlement increases. of the deficits produced by the Reagan tax cuts of 1981. The Bush tax cuts produced a federal tax take of 16.S." On current policies. hegemony is in reality solidly grounded: it rests on an economy that is continually extending its lead in the innovation and application of new technology. (__) Fiscal overstretch fears are exaggerated – worst case scenario is that US consumers feel slight pressure. The budget deficit.Bing Debate 06-07 Unilat & Hard Power Good AT Fiscal Overstretch (1 of 2) (__) Empirically.S." estimate the deficit at $100 billion a year.” Foreign Affairs 84. consumers' standard of living. as a percentage of GDP. dragging the rest of the world down with it. the economy will at some point have to adjust to a decline in the dollar and a rise in interest rates. in character. 25 . causing the dollar to tank. April 2005.
though. the risks are far less dire than they are made out to be. financial assets as a percentage of GDP is less enlightening than comparing it to the total available stock of U. the United States cannot escape a growing external debt. but it would not undermine the economic foundations of U.Bing Debate 06-07 Unilat & Hard Power Good AT Fiscal Overstretch (2 of 2) (__) Dollar collapse wouldn’t trigger an investment withdrawal – domestic investors would repatriate foreign holdings to secure the US economy. domestic savings and investment.S. assets. attracting foreign capital as well as immigrant labor with its rapid growth and the high returns it generates for investors. A significant repatriation of funds would thus slow the pace of the dollar decline and the rise in rates.S. hegemony would not be harmed. These foreign liabilities are the result of a string of current account deficits that have grown from 1. If the deficit remains at today's level.7 trillion. the NIIP peaked at almost 13 percent of GDP in 1980. David H. or -24 percent of GDP. fail to consider that future dollar depreciation and market adjustments in interest rates and asset prices will likely check the increase of the NIIP.S. not imminent collapse. But even if such a sharp break occurs--which is less likely than a gradual adjustment of exchange rates and interest rates--market-based adjustments will mitigate the consequences. with their propensity for deflation and stagnation. This last figure represents a whopping 74 percent of U. NIIP to -40 percent of GDP by 2010.S. The end results would be a smaller US trade deficit. hegemony. financial assets. changing mostly in response to changes in expected long-term profitability. At the start of 2004.” Foreign Affairs 84. recently retired after 19 years as Managing Director of Moody's Sovereign Ratings Service.1 trillion in agency bonds (such as those issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac).S. recently retired after 19 years as Managing Director of Moody's Sovereign Ratings Service. residents minus the value of U. and that it would eventually stabilize at around -63 percent. The United States' external liabilities are denominated in its own currency. direct investment abroad was about $2.6 trillion at the start of 2004. A panicky "capital flight" would ensue. the United States was a creditor to the rest of the world. between those emerging-market cases and the current condition of the global hegemon. “The Overstretch Myth. tempering the price decline for domestic stocks and bonds. meltdown. foreign direct investment in the United States was $2.2. as investors raced for the exits to avoid the falling dollar and plunging stock and bond prices. False Alarm The real question is just how much the United States' deteriorating NIIP threatens to undermine the economic foundations of U. total U. chronic current account deficits reflect strong economic fundamentals rather than fatal structural flaws. The precise answer depends on whether you explain current account deficits in terms of trade. Brazil. At the start of 2004.S. And in many ways. There are key differences. David H. Levey. p proquest Discussion of the United States' "net foreign debt" conjures up images of countries such as Argentina. hegemony. The "hegemony skeptics" fear such debt will lead to a collapse of the U.S.S. consumers and workers. the value of stocks.-held foreign financial assets versus $8. and 11 percent of the $15. Until 1989. Dollar depreciation against the euro and the yen in 2002 and 2003 kept the NIIP flat despite large current account deficits. But considering foreign ownership of U. Responding to a relative price decline in U. combined with the cheaper dollar.S. and financial liabilities.S. the value of foreign assets owned by U.5 trillion) exceed U.S. its increase will be far less dramatic than many economists fear. It has two components: direct investment. 26 .S. it would be even harder on the European and Japanese economies. These estimates.S. Levey.7 percent of GDP-about $650 billion--in 2004. securities amounted to $33. assets and likely Federal Reserve action to raise interest rates. Economists at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development estimate that ongoing deficits of 3 percent of GDP would bring the U. investors (arguably accompanied by bargain-hunting foreign investors) would repatriate some of their $4 trillion in foreign holdings in order to buy (now undervalued) assets. But chronic current account deficits ever since have given the United States the largest net liabilities in world history.5 trillion in equities outstanding. U. Such a selloff could result--as in emerging-market crises--if investors suddenly conclude that U. however.S.) Removing direct investment from the equation leaves $5. and its economy remains on the frontier of global technological innovation. but only 11 percent of the $6. foreign debt has become unsustainably large.2. Foreign investors held more than 38 percent of the $4 trillion in U.1 trillion in U. GDP--a statistic that would seem to give ample cause for alarm. the value of domestic operations directly controlled by a foreign company. or the composition of global wealth. Treasury bonds.4 trillion.S.S. Since foreign claims on the United States ($10.5 trillion in corporate bonds. and bank deposits held overseas. would eventually combine to improve the trade balance. they foresee the NIIP growing to -50 percent of GDP by 2010 and eventually to -100 percent.S. financial assets held by foreign investors. evoking the currency collapses and economic crises they have suffered as models for a coming U. however. although the NIIP will surely continue to grow for many years to come. April 2005.S. Although the period of global rebalancing would be painful for U. claims abroad ($7. April 2005. Such a transitory adjustment would be unpleasant. (Direct investment is relatively stable. dollar triggered by a precipitous unloading of U.4 trillion (some 50 percent of the world total). bonds.S. which remains the global monetary standard. assets owned by nonresidents. p proquest Whichever perspective on the current account one favors. The same result is likely for 2004 (final numbers will not be available until the end of June). 23 percent of the $6.1 trillion in U. The statistic at the center of the foreign debt debate is the net international investment position (NIIP). Thus. while U.S. “The Overstretch Myth.S. In each case.5 percent of GDP in the mid-1990s to an estimated 5. the NIIP is now negative: -$2. (__) Multiple economic factors check back fiscal overstretch – the account deficit only proves the strong economic fundamentals of the US. The ensuing recession.9 trillion). and Turkey.” Foreign Affairs 84. Unpacking the NIIP gives a better sense of the risk it actually poses.
S. (__) Even if military power is overstretched our military cannot be overwhelmed and US heg would remain intact. Prof and Director of the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies @ JHUs School of Advanced International Studies.brookings. fellow @ Brookings Institute. progressive policymakers should learn from the example of the U. Eliot A. It discusses preemption in the specific context of defeating terrorists and rogue states.S. 27 . U. the legions of the United States have no match. the Strategy envisions a much narrower role for preemption. Clinton administration officials partially justified the 1998 cruise missile attacks on targets in Afghanistan and Sudan on preventative grounds.” Foreign Affairs 83. and the gap between them and other militaries is only growing. covert operations. not whether it has to wait for them to attack before acting.S. anticipate threats from unconventional and irregular opponents who will avoid U. sophisticated intelligence. “Smart Power. which has long recognized that its comparative advantage comes not from size or firepower but from farsighted strategy. Suzanne Nossel. (__) Unilateral preemption won’t overstretch because it won’t be used for more than terrorism.2.S. strengths and seek out weaknesses.htm In contrast.in both cases.” Foreign Affairs 83. Today. THE BUSH NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: AN EVALUATION. government is doing enough to stop terrorists preemptively. p proquest Put thus. the debate in the United States has always been about whether the U.4. culture as well. 2002. But that does not undermine the basic fact of U. Not even in Vietnam. succumbing to primitive opponents inferior in weaponry and. did U. April 2004. military. Such leaders understand better than their civilian superiors the fragility of great military strength. “History and the Hyperpower. and such preemptive activities are well-established in international law. But again. Ivo H. Law enforcement. Nor is the argument for preempting terrorists controversial. and worry that their political masters will succumb to the intoxication of great power or their fellow citizens will fail to understand the commitment of money and blood that any war requires.S. It never suggests preemption has a role to play with respect to a rising China or any residual threat posed by Russia.S. Senior Fellow at the Security and Peace Institute and former Deputy to the Ambassador for UN Management and Reform. and intelligence gathering have always sought to preempt terrorist attacks. Instead. forces suffer a similar defeat. according to the imperial powers. Daalder. Jul/Aug 2004. predominance. and precise weaponry. p proquest As to the danger of overstretch. Augustus lost his legions in the Teutoburger Wald.Bing Debate 06-07 Unilat & Hard Power Good AT Force Overstretch (__) The US military advantages doesn’t come from boots on the ground – the level of sophistication prevents overstretch. viewed from within the picture appears different. p http://www. where the odds of such a debacle's occurring were highest. Generals and admirals fret over forces stretched too thin. Cohen. Disraeli his regiments at Isandhlwana -. professionalism. military power seems to invite hubris.edu/comm/policybriefs/pb109.
12-28-05. new relationships with oncehostile states like Afghanistan. almost the entire planet has chosen to be with us. DEFENSE NEWS. a single hegemon risks far more violent resentment than would a power that consistently acts as primus inter pares. then the animosity is likely to fade quickly. mobilizing and supporting locals willing to join the fight against radical Islam. has acceded to U. summer 2005. (__) The international anti-terror coalition has grown stronger even with US unilateralism in place. winter 2003. assemble a coalition and. Even as critics have deplored Bush's "with-us-or-against-us" rhetoric as simplistic and alienating. p proquest A third critique comes from what might be called pragmatic realists. And if acceptable terms are coupled with continued military power. sharing rule The United States made an extraordinary effort in the Gulf War to get UN support. but because it spreads risk. Moscow. I have my doubts. and whose objections are practical. IR expert.S. 28 . who see the new unilateralism I have outlined as hubristic. the fact remains that in grand strategic terms. to strengthen its strategic partnerships with archrivals India and Pakistan simultaneously. If the victor can devise terms that most of its foes and the rest of the international community can accept.S. With the eastward growth of NATO. In their view. the White House itself may not fully appreciate. just as al-Qaida has been said to "franchise" jihad . miraculously. not by the details of our management of it. the web of security commitments the United States has cultivated for the past 50 years has. attacks. an administration that made a fetish of consultation and did its utmost to subordinate American hegemony and smother unipolarity. history suggests that both the animosity and the damage may be more fleeting than many suppose. (__) The animosity triggered by military force is short-lived and easy to resolve. -making functions with others.3. deny itself the fruits of victory in order to honor coalition goals. counterterrorism alliances with former satellite states like Georgia. Pakistan and Libya. The resentments were hardly assuaged. Frederick Kagan. the United States has been quietly working to develop new and stronger alliances where they matter most: with the governments and societies of the greater Middle East. p proquest Though the use of force may stir anger and resentment in an enemy population and damage a state's position in the world community. share decision-making. Iraq. Did that diminish the anti-American feeling in the region? Did it garner support for subsequent Iraq policy dictated by the original acquiescence to the coalition? The attacks of September 11 were planned during the Clinton Administration. then the prospects for a lasting and stable peace are excellent. By far the most important element is the acceptability of the peace conditions imposed by the victor after the struggle. despite some grumbling.the Pentagon is building a rival franchise in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency.Bing Debate 06-07 Unilat & Hard Power Good AT Multilat Prevents Terror/Anti-Americanism (__) 9-11 and anti-Americanism came from the multilateral world. and that their scale and duration may depend on many elements other than the mere fact that force was used. They are prepared to engage in a pragmatic multilateralism.outsourcing the grunt work of suicide bombings to angry young locals from Turkey to Indonesia . expanded radically. They value great power concert. far from contracting. They seek Security Council support not because it confers any moral authority. In essence. alliance system is transforming in ways Since the Sept. as we have seen. Charles Krauthammer. and partnerships with other countries under threat by radical Islam. p L/N More importantly. NATIONAL INTEREST. 11. Why? Because the extremist rage against the United States is engendered by the very structure of the international system. The Wilson Quarterly 29. even as Washington and Paris have lobbed spitballs at each other. the U. Washington has been able. resident scholar in defense and security studies @ AEI.
as it has depended for the past half-century. too.Bing Debate 06-07 Unilat & Hard Power Good AT Should Cede to Europe/Legitimacy Good (__) US ceding power to Europe would do nothing – it would not increase our legitimacy and it would only put global security at risk because Europe will not hold up its end. And what. with their very different perception of the world. try to alter their perceptions of global threats to match that of their European friends? To do so would be irresponsible. in the interest of trans-Atlantic harmony. does such commonality still exist within the West now that the cold war has ended? For while the liberal trans-Atlantic community still shares much in common. p L/N But can the United States cede some power to Europe without putting American security. and indeed Europe's and the entire liberal democratic world's security. the philosophical schism on the fundamental questions of world order may now be overwhelming those commonalities. It is hard to imagine the crisis of legitimacy being resolved as long as this schism persists. Senior Asso. the United States cannot enlist the cooperation of Europeans if there is no common assessment of the nature of global threats today. 1-24-2004." 29 . For even if the United States were to fulfill its part of the bargain. Even Europeans. and grant the Europeans the influence they crave. is the United States to do? Should Americans. know that is true. at risk in even with the best of intentions. and by what it regards as sometimes the only means possible. Not only American security but the security of the liberal democratic world depends today. But it is precisely this gap in perception that has driven the United States and Europe apart in the post-cold-war world. force.S. Robert Kagan. means for our own security. as the British diplomat Robert Cooper suggests. would the Europeans. "The U. New York Times. [WMDs] they will not join in a common strategy. on American power. the process? Here lies the rub.@ Carnegie Endowment for Int’l Peace. And beware. of underestimating what the U. then. Nor will Europeans accord the United States legitimacy when it seeks to address those threats by itself. that international legitimacy stems from shared values and a shared history." Joschka Fischer has declared. For If it is true. in moments of clarity. and of the means that must be employed to meet them.S. is the only truly global player. "and I must warn against underestimating its importance for peace and stability in the world. fulfill theirs? As long as Europeans and Americans do not share a common view of the threat posed by terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.
cgi/10/7160/printer While Bush expounded on the virtues of America's presence across the world." Indeed! How were the Palestinians inspired? Did our worship of Sharon's savagery inspire? Did our overwhelming financial support for his indomitable military force inspire? Did the Bush administration's incarceration of over 1.Bing Debate 06-07 Unilat & Hard Power Good Hard Power Key to Econ (__) Hard power is key to our economy – entire sectors rely on a forward deployed stance. Florida. well fed." Roger Hollander.000 bottles of Native Tan sunblock. Prof @ UCal La Verne. On the eve of our second war on Iraq. Whole sectors of the American economy have come to rely on the military for sales. One task of such contractors is to keep uniformed members of the imperium housed in comfortable quarters. amused. LA Times. it also acquired 273.S.com/artman/exec/view.” p AlterNet. Sun Fun Products of Daytona Beach. no consultation with lawyers. a subsidiary of the Halliburton Corporation of Houston. president of the Japan Policy Institute and leading member of the American Empire Project which does in-depth research and analysis about US hegemony. 1-15-2004. (__) US military hard power is key to the US economy by protecting corporations that operate abroad. which design and manufacture weapons for the armed forces or. and supplied with enjoyable. almost triple its 1999 order and undoubtedly a boon to the supplier. “America’s Empire of Bases. The New Nation. and its subcontractor. William A. 2003).000 in Guantanamo without due process .org Our installations abroad bring profits to civilian industries.ittefaq. military presence worldwide only serves to reinforce the economic hegemony" that guarantees survival of the corporations that exploit the citizens of the undeveloped nation-states as they take control of that nation's natural resources ("Free Trade May Not Be Fair Trade. undertake contract services to build and maintain our far-flung outposts. affordable vacation facilities.no criminal charges. Bush continues his exhortation of American largesse: "we also provided inspiration for oppressed peoples. for example. Oklahoma. while the Defense Department was ordering up an extra ration of cruise missiles and depleted-uranium armor-piercing tank shells. Nov. p http://nation.inspire? Did the occupation of Iraq preceded by an internationally illegal invasion inspire? 30 . and no rights whatsoever ." he failed to mention that "expanding U. 1-29-2004. noting that the US had "made military and moral commitments in Europe and Asia which protected free nations from aggression and created the conditions in which new democracies could flourish. like the now well-publicized Kellogg. Chalmers Johnson. Control Supply Company of Tulsa. Cook. Brown & Root company.
however. It may be that. 31 . Or it may be that some unforeseen change within North Korea will yield such an outcome. p proquest International organizations.3. the use of American power to support them is a good investment in long-term security. Frederick Kagan. there is no finding a peaceful solution with Kim Jong Il. and that the continued failure to support international agencies charged with enforcing nonproliferation agreements will doom the cause of nonproliferation itself. summer 2005. as with Adolf Hitler and a few other die-hard aggressive leaders. Because such organizations help to identify current and future threats. scholar in defense and security studies @ AEI. especially those devoted to nonproliferation and peacekeeping. It is certain. that diplomatic approaches unsupported by military power will not make much of an impression on Pyongyang. in the end. and to galvanize international support behind the punishment of transgressors. can succeed in difficult circumstances only when their efforts are supported by credible military means.Bing Debate 06-07 Unilat & Hard Power Good Hard Power Key to Effective Multilat (__) US hard power is key to making multilateral institutions effective. Wilson Quarterly 29.
and limiting rivalries to trade and other pursuits of peace. It might even deter such challengers from undertaking expensive efforts to arm themselves in the first place. therefore. The containment of Iraq throughout the past decade fell principally upon U . with its tenets of 32reemptive war. promised a new global order. Only a United States reasonably well shielded from the blackmail of nuclear. The sine qua non for a strategy of American global pre-eminence. p L/N The Bush doctrine. and trying to support Taiwan's de facto independence without inciting Beijing. p 58-59 The relative stability of the current era sterns not just from the resources at the disposal of the United States. What the Bush doctrine calls for—paradoxically. 2-2-2004. As the President told graduating cadets at West Point in 2002. it is much cheaper than fighting the wars that would follow should we fail to build such a deterrent capacity. Eritrea. In Europe. The Neocon Reader. other countries should be able to set aside the distractions of arming and plotting against each other and put their energies into producing consumer electronics. tea. The End of the American Era. can only encourage such challenges. the United States can set about making trouble for hostile and potentially hostile nations. but also from its willingness to use them. in Asia and in the Middle East. hard-power centered. in Pyongyang and Beijing. America intends to keep its “military strengths beyond challenge. The best way to think of that order is by analogy with the internal organization of a nation-state. The United States has been either minding the store or putting out fires in virtually every quarter of the globe. An America whose willingness to project force is in doubt. the message we should be sending to potential foes is: “Don’t even think about it. Northern Ireland. (__) US military force credibility is key to global peace. Robert Kagan & William Kristol. regime change. American forces preserve the uneasy peace in East Asia. In the world of the Bush doctrine. ed b Irwin Stelzer. JOSHUA MICAH MARSHALL. and many other hot spots. which means that citizens don’t have to worry about arming to defend themselves against each other. When the Balkans fell prey to ethnic conflict during the 1990s it was the United States that eventually came to the rescue. (__) An assertive. they can focus on productive pursuits like raising families. making money. America still maintains a sizable troop presence in Europe to help ensure stability on the Continent. is a missile defense system that can protect all three of these targets.” That kind of deterrence offers the best recipe for lasting peace. thereby making the destabilizing arms races of other eras pointless. strong and well-led alliances. With the necessary military strength. if America has an effective monopoly on the exercise of military force. What makes a state a state is its monopoly over the legitimate use of force. Instead.S. at our allies and at the American homeland. will increasingly be jeopardized over the coming years as smaller powers acquire weapons of mass destruction and the missiles to launch them at American forces. Just as the most successful strategy in the Cold War combined containment of the Soviet Union with an effort to undermine the moral legitimacy of the Moscow regime. however. sr assoc @ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace & chair of the project for the New American Century. rather than waiting for them to make trouble for us. 2004. 32 . our allies and the United States itself. The New Yorker. And in the Middle East. The ability to project force overseas. America led the charge against terrorist networks and their sponsors in Afghanistan in 2001. and wherever tyrannical governments acquire the military power to threaten their neighbors. shoulders. prof or IR @ Georgetown. p 67-68 A strong America capable of projecting force quickly and with devastating effect to important regions of the world would make it less likely that challengers to regional stability would attempt to alter the status quo in their favor. given its proponents—is a form of world government. Only a well-protected America will be capable of deterring – and when necessary moving against – “rogue” regimes when they rise to challenge regional stability. keeping the lid on tensions between China and Japan. biological or chemical weapons will be able to shape the international environment to suit its interests and principles. Washington has been a central player in the search for peace. Charles Kupchan. Cyprus. unilateral foreign policy is the only way to prevent potential challengers from rising and causing conflict. and adequate missile defense. and permanent American military primacy. on the other hand. guarding South Korea from the regime to the north. textiles. so in the post-Cold War era a principal aim of American foreign policy should be to bring about a change of regime in hostile nations – in Baghdad and Belgrade.Bing Debate 06-07 Unilat & Hard Power Good Hard Power Key to Peace (1 of 2) (__) American hard power ensures peace by making wars a useless activity. 2003. and enjoying their leisure time.” In other words. states take the place of citizens.
Such asymmetrical power portfolios create resentment among second-tier states that are powerful militarily but lack the great prestige the leading state's commercial and naval advantages bring. At the same time. Summer 1999. William C. American power is precisely what liberal internationalism wants to constrain and tie down and subsume in pursuit of some brave new Lockean world. and which might make a bid for hegemony. p proquest Moreover. April 2004. p http://www. And ironically. International Security 24. which is more secure.1. Who do you call if someone invades your country? You dial Washington. which is threatening which. Ass.aei. is America—American power. they make the leader seem vulnerable to pressure from the one element of power in which it does not excel: military capabilities. 33 . When the leading state excels in the production of economic and naval capabilities but not conventional land power.org/docLib/20040227_book755text. DEMOCRATIC REALISM: AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN A UNILATERAL WORLD.Bing Debate 06-07 Unilat & Hard Power Good Hard Power Key to Peace (2 of 2) (__) Military hard power prevents challengers to US unipolarity and removes the ambiguity that led to past wars. what stability we do enjoy today is owed to the overwhelming power and deterrent threat of the United States.pdf What does hold the international system together? What keeps it from degenerating into total anarchy? Not the phony security of treaties. it may seem simultaneously powerful and vulnerable. the power gap in the United States' favor is wider than any single measure can capture because the unipolar concentration of resources is symmetrical. Charles Krauthaumer. All the naval and commercial powers that most scholars identify as the hegemonic leaders of the past lacked military (especially landpower) capabilities commensurate with their global influence. technological. The result is ambiguity about which state is more powerful. In the unipolar world we inhabit. Prof of IR @ Georgetown. Unlike previous system leaders. military. Wohlforth. (__) US deterrence and power prevent global conflict. and geographical. In the unipolar world. not the best of goodwill among the nicer nations. to an enforcer of norms. the closest thing to a centralized authority. you call the cops. Asymmetrical power portfolios generate ambiguity. If someone invades your house. the United States has commanding leads in all the elements of material power: economic.
Joseph Nye. And some countries such as Canada. because of the incorporation of attractive causes such as economic aid or peacekeeping into their definitions of national interest. even though its economic and military resources continued to grow. Dean of JFK School of Government @ Harvard. Hard power can also be used to establish empires and institutions that set the agenda for smaller states – witness Soviet rule over the countries of Eastern Europe. p 9 Of course. Conversely. The Paradox of American Power. These are lessons that the unilateralists forget at their and our peril. And some countries may be attracted to others with hard power by the myth of invincibility or inevitability. the Netherlands. 2002. Sometimes the same power resources can affect the entire spectrum of behavior from coercion to attraction.Bing Debate 06-07 Unilat & Hard Power Good Hard Power Key to Soft Power (__) Hard power is key to soft power – the US cannot dictate the international agenda without it. A country that suffers economic and military decline is likely to lose its ability to shape the international agenda as well as its attractiveness. hard and soft power are related and can reinforce each other. the Soviet Union lost much of its soft power after it invaded Hungary and Czechoslovakia. 34 . and the Scandinavian states have political clout that is greater than their military and economic weight. Both are aspects of the ability to achieve our purposes by affecting the behavior of others. Imperious policies that utilized Soviet hard power actually undercut its soft power. The Vatican did not lose its soft power when it lost the Papal States in Italy in the nineteenth century. Both Hitler and Stalin tried to develop such myths. But soft power is not simply the reflection of hard power.
Thomas Weiss. Washington Quarterly. Washington was already spending more on its military than the next 15-25 countries combined (depending on who was counting). but the demonstrated military prowess in the war on Iraq made it crystal clear that primacy was a vast understatement.Bing Debate 06-07 Unilat & Hard Power Good **Hard Power Is All That Matters (Soft Power Useless)** (__) The currency of international politics no longer includes soft power – hard power is the only factor that matters. with an opening additional More recently. prof of international studies @ CUNY. p proquest Bipolarity has given way to what was supposed to be US primacy. 35 .13 but the hard currency of international politics undoubtedly remains military might. Before the war on Iraq. appropriation of $79 billion for the war. a third problem has arisen: Washington’s emergence as what former French foreign minister Hubert Vedrine aptly dubbed the hyper-puissane. Autumn 2003. the United States now spends more than the rest of the world’s militaries combined. Scholars discuss the nuances of economic and cultural leverage resulting from US soft power.
the First Marine Division from Camp Pendleton. most Americans do not recognize--or do not want to recognize-that the United States dominates the world through its military power.S. for example) as a testament to their newly found significance for the United States. The Sorrows of Empire. Kentucky. Due to government secrecy.S. and the U. These new friends include India. president of the Japan Policy Institute and leading member of the American Empire Project which does indepth research and analysis about US hegemony. president of the Japan Policy Institute and leading member of the American Empire Project which does indepth research and analysis about US hegemony. given American air superiority.Bing Debate 06-07 Unilat & Hard Power Good AT Soft Power Key to Bases (__) US already has an extensive network of bases. they are often ignorant of the fact that their government garrisons the globe. Chalmers Johnson. 2004. Bahrain. 36 . senior research fellow at the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique and an associate researcher at the Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches Internationales. California. p proquest The United States has also developed closer relations with a diverse set of global actors that might be termed “new friends. Georgia. p 24 During the second Iraq war. 2004. (__) US has increased relations with nations that have critical base locations with military-to-military interaction – soft power isn’t needed. They do not realize that a vast network of American military bases on every continent except America actually constitutes a new form of empire. WASHINGTON QUARTERLY. A few of these states have been designated as “non-NATO strategic allies” (Bahrain and the Philippines. All of them represent critical regional access points for the U.” These states may have had preexisting relations with the United States but now find themselves drawn more closely to the United States largely because of the new strategic conditions of the war on terrorism. government has used several of these states as staging areas for operations against local terrorist groups. the Fourth Infantry Division from Fort Hood. Uzbekistan. than to anything that might be called combat. Bruno Tertrais. for example. Military-to- military interactions with each of these countries have increased sharply in the last few years. The Sorrows of Empire. Jordan. as well as sites that might be breeding grounds for terrorism. the United States did not use its Persian Gulf and Central Asian bases except to launch bombers against Iraqi cities-an activity more akin to a training exercise. (__) US doesn’t need bases – air superiority allows rapid deployment from North America. p 1 As distinct from other peoples on this earth. military and other forms of presence—sometimes in a strictly geographical sense—in areas of potential instability and lawlessness. Chalmers Johnson. and the l0lst Airborne Division from Fort Campbell. spring 2004. Texas. Virtually all of the actual fighting forces came from “the homeland"-the Third Infantry Division from Fort Stewart. the Philippines. and Singapore.
but in the words of Jordan's King Abdallah. American feminism. There is no escaping the influence of Hollywood. But not for everyone: Individualism and liberties are attractive to many people but repulsive to some. THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN POWER. and change (as well as sex and violence). Generally. American popular culture has a global reach regardless of what we do. I can go anywhere I want and they can't stop me. and follow a more isolationist foreign policy. and we will have no choice but to deal with them through more effective counterterrorism policies. "they want to break down the fabric of the U. 37 .Bing Debate 06-07 Unilat & Hard Power Good AT Soft Power Prevents Terrorism (__) American values with trigger terrorism regardless – trading hard power for soft power only makes us more vulnerable. They want to break down what America stands for. p x-xi Some Americans are tempted to believe that we could reduce these hatreds and our vulnerability if we would withdraw our troops. open sexuality. But we would not remove our vulnerability. the global reach of American culture helps to enhance our soft power-our cultural and ideological appeal.S. individualism. American films and television express freedom. particularly fundamentalists. Dean of JFK School of Government @ Harvard." Some tyrants and fundamentalists will always hate us because of our values of openness opportunity. and the Internet. Not only are the terrorists who struck on September 11 dedicated to reducing can power. One of the terrorist pilots is reported to have said that he did not like the United States because it is "too lax. which would still reach well beyond our shores. and individual choices are profoundly subversive of patriarchal societies. which is anathema to some. Joseph Nye. curtail our alliances." Even if we had a weaker foreign policy. 2002. CNN. such groups would resent the power of the American economy. American corporations and citizens represent global capitalism.
March 2004. but also human rights and trade and investment. it does not have a civil society to press for change. “It is probably wishful thinking to expect that the regime will undergo a process of spontaneous self-reform that accepts international conventions of behaviour governing not only nuclear non-proliferation. and would cause considerable disruptions to the region. Despite diplomatic efforts by the US. Moody’s says an effective consensus remains elusive. Unlike Cuba.Bing Debate 06-07 Unilat & Hard Power Good AT Solf Power Solves NoKo (__) Successful soft-line engagement with North Korea is empirically denied – the states infrastructure prevents it from solving. The burden of such a collapse would be huge on South Korea.” says Moody’s. its political and economic power highly concentrated in a dynastic and insular leadership. Asia Today. The Koreas: Moody's costs the options. evidently because all States contiguous to North Korea fear the risks and consequences of a North Korean collapse. North Korea has not backed down from its threats. p L/N Despite agreeing to engage in talks. 38 . Japan and especially South Korea to engage North Korea over the past decade. it remains a highly insular State. North Korea is totalitarian.
p L/N Whatever the balance of costs and benefits of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty [CTBT]. Dean of JFK School of Government @ Harvard. p L/N When President Bush announced peremptorily that the Kyoto Protocol on global climate change was dead because it was not in US interests. Amnesty International is overly harsh in its declaration that "today the United States is as frequently an impediment to human rights as it is an advocate. Joseph Nye. Joseph Nye. the "dog" of domestic politics is often too large to be wagged by the tail of foreign policy. B) Human rights. Joseph Nye. winter 2003. our apparent hypocrisy is costly to our soft power. summer 2004. but when we ignore the connections. If the United States had said instead that Let me give you two examples from the current US administration. Kyoto was a flawed instrument and had worked for better means of addressing global climate change. damage the American reputation because they appear self-indulgent and demonstrate an unwillingness to consider the effects we are having on global climate change and other countries. Their evidence isn’t comparative. Political Science Quarterly 19.women). the United States under-cuts our soft power on these issues. THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN POWER. Joseph Nye. social. reduce the attractiveness of the United States to other countries but are the results of differences in values that may persist for some time.Bing Debate 06-07 Unilat & Hard Power Good **Can’t Solve Soft Power Anyway (1 of 2)** 1) Too many domestic policies hurt soft power – they can’t solve. Dean of JFK School of Government @ Harvard. 2002. p proquest Some domestic policies. Similarly. In a democracy..2. Similarly. New York Times. on trade with Iran or Cuba) into the jurisdiction of our allies. 39 . such as the refusal to limit gasguzzling vehicles. such as capital punishment and the absence of gun controls. there was a significant cost to our soft power in the Senate's rejection of it and the manner of the rejection. C) Kyoto. 3) All of our soft power alt causalities come from Nye who is the preeminent expert on ‘soft power’ – we are by far the most qualified. 1-3-2000. domestic agricultural subsidies that are structured in a way that protects wealthy farmers while we preach the virtue of free markets to poor countries appear hypocritical in the eyes of others. Dean of the JKF School of Government @ Harvard. particularly in Europe. and cultural rights and discrimination against '. we also diminish our soft power.' but by ignoring or refusing to ratify human rights treaties (such as those concerning economic. It led to the United States being voted off the UN Human Rights Commission. when we are seen as a bully that extends our laws (for example. it would not have wasted. Dean of JFK School of Government @ Harvard. he essentially squandered US soft power and increased resentment in many parts of the world. p 153 How we behave at home also matters. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. Other policies. 2) US has rejected lots of treaties which prevents soft power: A) CTBT.
prisoner treatment. 30 percent to 23 percent in Turkey. Far from producing the expected "bandwagoning.S. Global support for U. 21 percent in Russia." the exercise of unilateral U.S. 19 percent in Spain. 20 percent in the Netherlands. 63 percent to 43 percent in France. policies has never been a prerequisite for U. and the International Criminal Court (ICC) -. 61 percent to 41 percent in Germany.have taken their toll on the United States' popularity in the world and thus on its ability to win over allies.S. the United States itself. Gordon. 79 percent to 62 percent in Poland. activism. but it sure does not hurt. power has led to widespread hostility toward the Bush administration and.and of other U. “The End of the Bush Revolution. the percentage of those who believed that the United States took their country's interests into account was 19 percent in Canada. and 32 percent in the United Kingdom. and 75 percent to 55 percent in the United Kingdom.Bing Debate 06-07 Unilat & Hard Power Good **Can’t Solve Soft Power Anyway (2 of 2)** (__) US has no soft power for multiple reasons they cannot overcome. 18 percent in France. between 2002 and 2005 the percentage of people with a "favorable opinion" of the United States fell from 72 percent to 59 percent in Canada. 61 percent to 52 percent in Russia. 25 percent to 21 percent in Jordan. Aug 2006. 14 percent in Turkey. policies on issues ranging from the Middle East to climate change. p proquest The consequences of the war in Iraq -. According to the Pew Global Attitudes Project.4. 40 . senior fellow @ Brookings. 59 percent in Indonesia.” Foreign Affairs 84. in many cases. Philip H.S. 61 percent to 38 percent in Indonesia. 17 percent in Jordan. 38 percent in Germany. According to the same polls. 13 percent in Poland.
D. and the possible mixing of the two. On this view. including ballistic missiles. we deterred the use of WMDs by the threat of retaliation after we’d been attacked—and that’s too late.Bing Debate 06-07 Unilat & Hard Power Good Preemption Prevents Prolif/Terror (__) Preemption is the only choice left to prevent prolif – other methods have already failed. p L/N The scale of the outrage on September 11th made it inevitable that this would be seen as an act of war rather than mere criminality. maintains that preventive action should be part of a broader strategy of counterproliferation." By acting "offensively today to preclude the development and delivery of graver threats down the line. after all. The doctrine of preemption. April 2004. there was a strong view in the Bush administration that the treaties and conventions governing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction [WMDs] had failed. deterrence could work. the point of preemption is to deter the very acquisition of WMDs in the first place. and the Bush Administration has adopted a proactive response to the "proliferation-terrorism nexus. 41 . In the bipolar world of the Cold War. (__) US preemption is key to enforce norms that prevent WMD prolif. p http://www. Charles Krauthaumer. even before September 11th. preemption is the only possible strategy. a very high cost. they register commitments made by governments but threaten no sanctions if those commitments are broken or abrogated. p 107 Leaving behind the definitions and semantics of international law raises the practical issue of applying a strategy of prevention in a world of WMD. terrorist states and weapons of mass destruction [WMDs]. offering one perspective. Against both undeterrables and undetectables. but because Libya and any others contemplating trafficking with WMDs. have—for the first time—seen that it carries a cost. Ph. Parameters 35. with a stable nonsuicidal adversary. IR expert & winner of the Bradley Prize for Promotion of Liberal Democracy. the use of it. has been widely attacked for violating international norms. Laver. Past efforts at nonproliferation of WMD. the doctrine of preemption against openly hostile states pursuing weapons of mass destruction [WMDs] is an improvement on classical deterrence. DEMOCRATIC REALISM: AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN A UNILATERAL WORLD. Moreover.2." the Administration has the best chance of stopping or mitigating the effects of the WMD proliferation that has already occurred. That view became even more prominent after al-Qaeda's attacks.aei. Treaties. those uneasy with American power have made these two means of wielding it—preemption and unilateralism—the focus of unrelenting criticism. in particular. Economist. Deterrence does not work against people who ache for heaven. summer 2005. he argues. terrorists. It does not work against undeterrables. in history from UKentucky & taught military history @ West Point. What international norm? The one under which Israel was universally condemned— even the Reagan administration joined the condemnation at the Security Council— for preemptively destroying Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981? Does anyone today doubt that it was the right thing to do. have failed. The challenge will be "translating this strategic guidance into credible operational capabilities and plans. We are safer today not just because Saddam is gone. the very fact that the United States overthrew a hostile regime that repeatedly refused to come clean on its weapons has had precisely this deterrent effect. the punishment has to be meted out by the American sheriff. and that the response would prove the awesome determination of the American armed forces. Whether or not Iraq had large stockpiles of WMDs. 6-27-2002. the option of preemption is especially necessary. Harry S.pdf Now. are not legal documents but political ones. both strategically and morally? In a world of terrorists. look at Iraq. If you needed proof of that." (__) Preemption is the only effective way to prevent WMD prolif and terrorism by addressing undeterables and undetectables. These norms of good behavior had to be enforced with the threat of military power and even. apart from disapproval. And it does not work against undetectables: nonsuicidal enemy regimes that might attack through clandestine means—a suitcase nuke or anonymously delivered anthrax. Professor Jason Ellis. Traditionally. if necessary.org/docLib/20040227_book755text. Moreover.
if perilous. peripheral states. nor are rogue states. indeed to its essential security. perhaps even to America as a functioning modern society.mean for American foreign policy? That the first and most urgent task is protection from these weapons. The central truth of the coming era is that this is no longer the case: relatively small. resides in small. Missiles shrink distance. Germany-centrally located. It is of course banal to say that modern technology has shrunk the world. Their conjunction is. but to world. or the spreading of smallpox or anthrax throughout the general population. Yet it does face a serious threat to its dominance. and for all of its recently demonstrated resilience. and thus posing a threat both to world peace and to the dominant power. "The Unipolar Moment Revisited. Winter 2003. is an existential threat. The 9/11 suicide bombers were undeterrable. Charles Krauthammer.Bing Debate 06-07 Unilat & Hard Power Good Prolif Impact Extension (__) WMD prolif is the single greatest threat to world peace and US security. Both can be bought at market. Throughout the 1990s. peripheral and backward states will be able to emerge rapidly as threats not only to regional. for all of America's dominance. that in a shrunken world the divide between regional superpowers and great powers is radically narrowed. the author of the subsequent anthrax attacks has proven undetectable. IR expert and winner of the Bradley Prize for Promotion of Liberal Democracy. Like unipolarity. The possible alliance of rogue states with such undeterrables and undetectables-and the possible transfer to them of weapons of mass destruction-presents a new strategic situation that demands a new strategic doctrine. this is historically unique. We have just now entered an era in which the capacity for inflicting mass death. Nuclear (or chemical or biological) devices multiply power. stability. security. The threat is not trivial. p L/N THE AMERICAN hegemon has no great power enemies." THE NATIONAL INTEREST. It is the single greatest danger to the United States because. it had been assumed that WMD posed no emergency because traditional concepts of deterrence would hold. which gave the system a predictable. an historical oddity of the first order. It comes from a source even more historically odd: an archipelago of rogue states (some connected with transnational terrorists) wielding weapons of mass destruction[WMDs]. Fifty years ago. But the obvious corollary. It is perhaps the only realistic threat to America as a functioning hegemon. WMD are not new. September 11 revealed the possibility of future WMD-armed enemies both undeterrable and potentially undetectable. 42 . What does this conjunction of unique circumstances-unipolarity and the proliferation of terrible weapons-. there is one thing it might not survive: decapitation. It was inconceivable that a relatively small Middle Eastern state with an almost entirely imported industrial base could do anything more than threaten its neighbors. highly industrial and heavily populatedcould pose a threat to world security and to the other great powers. The catalyst for this realization was again September 11. The detonation of a dozen nuclear weapons in major American cities. Consequently the geopolitical map is irrevocably altered. is rarely drawn. We have had fifty years of experience with nuclear weapons-but in the context of bipolarity.
p http://www. Instead.Bing Debate 06-07 Unilat & Hard Power Good AT Preemption Will Snowball into Bigger Wars (__) Unilateral preemption won’t snowball into larger conflict because its only applied for specific. 43 . Clinton administration officials partially justified the 1998 cruise missile attacks on targets in Afghanistan and Sudan on preventative grounds.S. It discusses preemption in the specific context of defeating terrorists and rogue states. covert operations. and such preemptive activities are well-established in international law.brookings. 2002. fellow @ Brookings Institute. the Strategy envisions a much narrower role for preemption. Ivo H. and intelligence gathering have always sought to preempt terrorist attacks.htm In contrast. Daalder.edu/comm/policybriefs/pb109. government is doing enough to stop terrorists preemptively. THE BUSH NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: AN EVALUATION. the debate in the United States has always been about whether the U. Law enforcement. pre-flagged situations. Nor is the argument for preempting terrorists controversial. not whether it has to wait for them to attack before acting. It never suggests preemption has a role to play with respect to a rising China or any residual threat posed by Russia.
L." Why is it. Human Rights and Labor. that in the cathedral of international human rights. On the other. On the one hand. 1998-2001. while appearing "free" better serves his self-image than the more sedate label of being law-abiding. it maintains the illusion of unfettered sovereignty. n20 44 . it enjoys the appearance of compliance. He complies. because to obey visibly would mean surrendering his freedom and admitting to constraints. May 2003. Prof of Inter’l Law @ Yale Law School & Assis Sec of State for Democracy. because he uses radar detectors. rather than a pillar.” 55 Stan. Rev. the United States is so often seen as a flying buttress. and similar tricks to stay just this side of the law. he asked. By supporting and following the rules of the international realm most of the time. p L/N This third face of American exceptionalism Louis Henkin long ago dubbed "America's flying buttress mentality. the United States tries to have it both ways. [*1485] but unwilling to subject itself to the critical examination and rules of that structure? The short answer is that compliance without ratification gives a false sense of freedom. ham radios. Harold Hongju Koh. “On American Exceptionalism. but does not obey. 1479. willing to stand outside the structure supporting it. cruise control. It is a bit like the driver who regularly breaks the speed limit but rarely gets a ticket.Bing Debate 06-07 Unilat & Hard Power Good Treaty Exceptionalism Key to Heg (__) The doctrine of compliance without ratification is key to maintaining unconstrained global leadership. but always out of a sense of political prudence rather than legal obligation.
and the Future of the Nation-State. taking stock in this way of the various fragments of defunct empires and the muddled hinterlands where tribal and religious loyalties still take precedence over any political process. and therefore in the long run contribute to local and regional conflicts. 6-27-2003. the U.” Heritage Lecture #794. There is no doubt in my mind that the U.N. in the Soviet view. has no useful function and cannot serve as a peace-keeping institution. Commissioner on Human Rights can be appointed by Colonel Ghaddhafi. In short. It did not value the U. are sent by the people who have obtained power. When Syria can be a member of the Security Council. has no real claim to represent the people of our planet. But it does mean that it can also help to perpetuate unpeaceful forms of social order. p http://www. and it is understandable that people should have begun to question whether we should go along with an institution whose claim to our respect is founded in so much wishful thinking and so few seeming achievements. This doesn't mean that the U.N. institutions might begin to wonder whether everything has gone according to plan.N. fosters corrupt bureaucracy. resolutions in settling the conflicts of recent decades.N. granted to the Soviet Union the kind of legitimacy that it could never have acquired through the conduct of its leadership.N. bureaucracy1 and the seeming ineffectiveness or counterproductivity of U. causes conflict and war.org/Research/InternationalOrganizations/HL794.N. on the contrary. simply legitimizes whatever elites and tyrants have gained power over the particular "nations" named in its list. The Soviet Union used the U. prof of phil @ Birkbeck College in London and Boston U.N. “The United States.N. and when the U.N.N. the U. It supported the capture of the United Nations Association (an independent nonprofit organization which was founded to rally support for the international idea) by the peaceniks and encouraged the transformation of UNESCO into an instrument of leftist and anti-Western propaganda. for its peace-keeping function but. and Afghanistan. the U. Roger Scruton. But the processes that raised these territories to sovereignty often made little or no reference to the historical loyalties of the people who lived there and usually did nothing to guarantee that the rulers of those territories would have any real claim to represent those people or any real interest in doing so.Bing Debate 06-07 Unilat & Hard Power Good UN Bad (1 of 2) (__) The UN creates a bad framework for global stability – it creates and supports tyrannical governments. Angola. Add to such anomalies the well-documented corruption of the U. by whatever means. 45 . in the territories recognized by that body as sovereign. the United Nations. recognized it only as a way to neutralize Western defenses and confer retrospective legitimacy on its own colonial ventures in Ethiopia. Likewise.cfm We could move around the world. has helped the Arab despots to stay in power long after they could have been overthrown in a world that refused to recognize their legitimacy. Yemen. and enabled it to play a role on the world stage that it could not have played on the strength of its own miserable achievements. Ambassadors sent to the U. and its ancillary institutions as a front.N. In effect. as currently constituted. even the most resolute defender of the U. of diplomacy as--to invert Clausewitz's famous dictum--war by other means. and is ineffective in peacekeeping. and come quickly to the conclusion that the United Nations. was an integral component.heritage.N.
derived from patterns of settlement that are special to our continent and its diaspora. and civilized ways that divided them starkly from the pagans to the south of them. was formed in the wake of colonization.? It has probably outlasted what usefulness it had as a peace-keeping institution. p http://www. hardened into law. 46 . it has begun to impose intolerable burdens as old decisions. acquiring with the religion the language. Neither the Ibo nor the Yoruba see themselves as single tribes. and also by religion. p http://www. the United Nations. which has imposed a common jurisdiction.Bing Debate 06-07 Unilat & Hard Power Good UN Bad (2 of 2) (__) The UN has outlived its benefits and has become counter-productive – new multilateral agreements should take its place. A strong case could therefore be made for its abolition. Subsequent massacres of the Tutsi are perceived in the West as the result of tribal antagonisms too deeply rooted to yield to political solutions. this is the result of colonization. and inherited institutions.org/Research/InternationalOrganizations/HL794. Roger Scruton. they are the result of importing Western ideologies and class divisions into a society that had long ago risen above any merely tribal idea of membership.cfm What should we conclude concerning the future of the U. “The United States. and the Future of the Nation-State. 6-27-2003. prof of phil @ Birkbeck College in London and Boston U.heritage. for example. while elsewhere the tribe. Its bureaucracies and subordinate networks are rife with corruption. Some try to understand this situation by contrasting nations with tribes.” Heritage Lecture #794. but according to function. we are forced to treat Nigeria.N. and political allegiance for long enough to constitute a territorial and political unity. conceived as an extended kinship group. just like the nations of Europe. 6-27-2003. And the major disputes between nationstates proceed outside its reach. as the example of Nigeria illustrates. Moreover. the Hausa having been Islamized for a thousand years. The two peoples are distinguished by territory.N. securing areas of the globe against war. regarded each other as aliens. prof of phil @ Birkbeck College in London and Boston U.cfm Because the U." Yet the country of Nigeria has been settled for centuries by three distinct peoples: the Yoruba. “The United States. There is truth in this suggestion. the dominant minority--the Tutsi--raising cattle while the majority--the Hutu--tilled the land. Roger Scruton. who border the desert trade routes. and a single religious faith on people who. In fact. Equally instructive is the case of Rwanda. and the Future of the Nation-State.” Heritage Lecture #794. The people of Rwanda were divided not according to tribe. (__) The nation-state notion that the UN forces the nations of the world to conform to justifies colonialism and causes mass genocide. Multilateral treaties agreed between individual states. but the effect of Belgian rule was to divide the Tutsi from the Hutu and elevate them into an administrative elite while undermining the authority of the Rwandan king and eventually engineering the coup that deposed him. was designed. institutions. and as part of an attempt to decolonize in a peaceful manner. the Ibo of the internal regions. which existed for centuries as an independent kingdom. and the Hausa. These three groups are divided by territory. as a single state and therefore as one among the many "united nations.heritage. arguing that the nation is really a European idea. but it is not the whole truth.N. These people have shared language. until the arrival of the Europeans.org/Research/InternationalOrganizations/HL794. who inhabit the coastline. language. is the natural form of social order. and guaranteeing mutual aid in times of crisis might be far more effective at doing the work for which the U. even though there are tribal entities comprised within both groups. And although they are both now Christian. common political institutions. the United Nations. impact on new problems that they were not designed to solve. by language. literature.
If he is not willing to pay for his own doctrine. economy would tank even if federal tax revenues reached 25 percent of GDP. who will be? One cannot know how the contradiction between big government expenditures and small government tax revenues is going to be resolved.html#author Inescapable signs of serious economic weakness emerged with the collapse of the stock market bubble and were exacerbated by the subsequent return of fiscal insolvency under the impetus of the Bush tax cuts and spending increases. but spending remained stubbornly high at 19. The experience of the 1990s shows that the structural gap between expenditures and revenues can be overcome without serious cost. The Bush tax cuts produced a federal tax take of 16. as a percentage of GDP. they are political. (45) 47 . extension of the recent tax cuts and new entitlement increases. only that it has to be addressed. Two neoconservatives. The budget deficit. however. “The Curious Case of American Hegemony. of the deficits produced by the Reagan tax cuts of 1981. it will inevitably constrain the substantial increases that neoconservatives believe are necessary to fund the Bush Doctrine. was in nominal terms the largest ever and fell little short. the budget deficit could approach $1 trillion per year. "but exclude probable increases in overseas military and homeland-security expenditures. which was $412 billion in fiscal year 2004. (43) The unwillingness to pay for what it wants and to want only what it is willing to pay for is also apparent from the underfunding of the Bush Doctrine.org/journal/articles/wpj05-2/hendrickson. "Official projections score the fiscal imbalance at a cumulative $5 trillion over the next decade. Summer 2005. prof @ Colorado College & leading member of the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy. who insist that "it is impossible to have a Bush Doctrine world with Clinton-era defense budgets. Still." estimate the deficit at $100 billion a year.worldpolicy. Unless Bush reneges on his promises regarding taxes.Bing Debate 06-07 Unilat & Hard Power Good Tax Cuts Trade-Off With Bush Doctrine (__) Bush tax cuts trade-off with continued use of the Bush Doctrine. in character. p http://www. David Henrickson. and it would be undoubtedly larger yet if another major war were to be launched in the next few years. and it is in any case difficult to believe that the U. not economic. Bush's sharp reduction in taxes is surely significant." writes the economist Fred Bergsten.” World Policy Journal 22. as Bergsten notes.2." On current policies.S.3 percent of GDP in 2004.8 percent of GDP. (44) These constraints should not be misconstrued.
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