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***Hegemony Bad***...............................................................................................1 Frontline.......................................................................................................................................3 ***Uniqueness.........................................................................................................6 Low Now.......................................................................................................................................7 Collapse Inevitable.....................................................................................................................10 Multipolarity Inevitable..............................................................................................................17 Multilat Inevitable......................................................................................................................19 Heg Multilat..........................................................................................................................20 Challengers Now.........................................................................................................................21 Heg Low (1/2)............................................................................................................................26 Heg Low (2/2)............................................................................................................................27 AT: Best Military Sustains.........................................................................................................29 AT: Soft Power Sustains.............................................................................................................30 AT: Economy Sustains ...............................................................................................................31 ***Alternative Uniqueness....................................................................................32 Heg Sustainable (1/2)................................................................................................................33 Heg Sustainable (2/2)................................................................................................................35 ***Heg Bad............................................................................................................37 Bad – Generic.............................................................................................................................38 Bad – China War........................................................................................................................39 XTN: China War.....................................................................................................................40 Bad – Counterbalancing.............................................................................................................41 Bad – Disease.............................................................................................................................42 Bad – Iran Strikes......................................................................................................................43 Bad – Middle East War..............................................................................................................45 AT: Heg Solves MidEast War.................................................................................................46 Bad – Proliferation.....................................................................................................................47 AT: Heg Solves Prolif..............................................................................................................49 Bad – Russia War.......................................................................................................................51 Bad – Sino-Russia Alliance........................................................................................................52 Bad – Space Weapons................................................................................................................53 Bad – Terrorism.........................................................................................................................55 Heg Fails - Terrorism.................................................................................................................57 XTN: Terrorism......................................................................................................................58 AT: Heg Solves Terror............................................................................................................59 Bad – US-EU Relations.............................................................................................................60 XTN: US-EU Relations...........................................................................................................61 Relations Good.......................................................................................................................62 Doesn’t Solve War......................................................................................................................63 Clinging to Power -> War..........................................................................................................69 Collapse =/= War.......................................................................................................................70 Retrenchment Good...................................................................................................................72 Heg Turns (1/3)..........................................................................................................................75 Heg Turns (2/3)..........................................................................................................................77 Heg Turns (3/3).........................................................................................................................78
2 of 154 ***Authors............................................................................................................80 AT: Ferguson..............................................................................................................................81 AT: Khalilzhad...........................................................................................................................82 AT: Brooks&Wohlforth..............................................................................................................83 ***Multipolarity Good...........................................................................................84 MultiPol Good – Generic...........................................................................................................85 MultiPol Good – Terror.............................................................................................................86 MultiPol Good – Iran.................................................................................................................87 Heg Unsustainable.....................................................................................................................90 Heg Unsustainable (Soft Power/Unpopular Policies)...............................................................99 Heg Decline Inevitable.............................................................................................................102 Alt Cause – Resource Collapse.................................................................................................104 Heg Collapse Inevitable (1/18).................................................................................................105 Heg Collapse Inevitable (2/18)................................................................................................106 Heg Collapse Inevitable (3/18).................................................................................................107 Heg Collapse Inevitable (4/18)................................................................................................108 Heg Collapse Inevitable (5/18).................................................................................................109 Heg Collapse Inevitable (6/18)..................................................................................................111 Heg Collapse Inevitable (7/18).................................................................................................112 Heg Collapse Inevitable (8/18).................................................................................................113 Heg Collapse Inevitable (9/18).................................................................................................114 Heg Collapse Inevitable (10/18)...............................................................................................115 Heg Collapse Inevitable (11/18)................................................................................................116 Heg Collapse Inevitable (12/18)................................................................................................117 Heg Collapse Inevitable (13/18)...............................................................................................118 Heg Collapse Inevitable (14/18)...............................................................................................119 .................................................................................................................................................120 Heg Collapse Inevitable (15/18)................................................................................................121 Heg Collapse Inevitable (16/18)...............................................................................................122 Heg Collapse Inevitable (17/18)...............................................................................................123 Heg Collapse Inevitable (18/18)...............................................................................................124 Exts – Yes China Rise...............................................................................................................126 Yes – China/Russia Counterbalancing.....................................................................................132 UQ – Yes Heg Decline..............................................................................................................133 UQ – Yes Heg Decline (Middle East) ......................................................................................138 Withdrawal K/T Sustainability................................................................................................139 Attempts to Maintain Heg Bad.................................................................................................141 Heg Bad – Iran ........................................................................................................................143 Heg Bad – Prolif ......................................................................................................................144 Offshore Balancing Good – General ........................................................................................145 Offshore Balancing Good – China............................................................................................148 Offshore Balancing Good – Middle East/Terrorism ...............................................................149 Offshore Balancing Good – Terrorism/Prolif .........................................................................150 AT Heg Solves War (General)...................................................................................................151 AT Heg Solves Asia Stability ....................................................................................................153 AT Heg Solves China ................................................................................................................154
3 of 154
Primacy will be impossible to sustain – dollar, fiscal pressure, rising challengers, overstretch Layne 10 (Christopher Layne, Professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A&M's George H.W. Bush
School of Government & Public Service. "Graceful decline: the end of Pax Americana". The American Conservative. May 2010. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_7060/is_5_9/ai_n54223596/) AK
China's economy has been growing much more rapidly than the United States' over the last two decades and continues to do so, maintaining audacious 8 percent growth projections in the midst of a global recession. Leading economic forecasters predict that it will overtake the U.S. as the world's largest economy, measured by overall GDP, sometime around 2020. Already in 2008, China passed the U.S. as the world's leading manufacturing nation--a title the United States had enjoyed for over a century--and this year China will displace Japan as the world's second-largest economy. Everything we know about the trajectories of rising great powers tells us that China will use its increasing wealth to build formidable military power and that it will seek to become the dominant power in East Asia. Optimists contend that once the U.S. recovers from what historian Niall Ferguson calls the
"Great Repression"--not quite a depression but more than a recession--we'll be able to answer the Chinese challenge. The country, they remind us, faced a larger debt-GDP ratio after World War II yet embarked on an era of sustained growth. They forget that
the postwar era was a golden age of U.S. industrial and financial dominance, trade surpluses, and persistent high growth rates. Those days are gone. The United States of 2010 and the world in which it lives are far different from those of 1945. Weaknesses in the fundamentals of the American economy have been accumulating for more than three decades. In the 1980s, these problems were acutely diagnosed by a number of
writers--notably David Calleo, Paul Kennedy, Robert Gilpin, Samuel Huntington, and James Chace--who predicted that these structural ills would ultimately erode the economic foundations of America's global preeminence. A spirited late-1980s debate was cut short, when, in quick succession, the Soviet Union collapsed, Japan's economic bubble burst, and the U.S. experienced an apparent economic revival during the Clinton administration. Now the delayed day of reckoning is fast
approaching. Even in the best case, the United States will emerge from the current crisis with fundamental handicaps. The Federal Reserve and Treasury have pumped massive amounts of dollars into circulation in hope of reviving the economy. Add to that the $1 trillion-plus budget deficits that the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) predicts the United States will incur for at least a decade. When the projected deficits are bundled with the persistent U.S. currentaccount deficit, the entitlements overhang (the unfunded future liabilities of Medicare and Social Security), and the cost of the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is reason to worry about the United States' fiscal stability. As the CBO says, "Even if the recovery occurs as projected and the stimulus bill is allowed to expire, the country will face the highest debt/GDP ratio in 50 years and an increasingly unsustainable and urgent fiscal problem." The dollar's vulnerability is the United States' geopolitical Achilles' heel. Its role as the international economy's reserve currency ensures American preeminence, and if it loses that status, hegemony will be literally unaffordable. As Cornell professor Jonathan Kirshner observes, the dollar's vulnerability "presents potentially significant and underappreciated restraints upon contemporary American political and military predominance." Fears for the dollar's long-term health predated the current financial and economic crisis. The meltdown has amplified them and highlighted two new factors that bode ill for continuing reserve-currency status. First, the other big financial players in the international economy are either military rivals (China) or ambiguous allies (Europe) that have their own ambitions and no longer require U.S. protection from the Soviet threat. Second, the dollar faces an uncertain future because of concerns that its value will diminish over time. Indeed, China,
which has holdings estimated at nearly $2 trillion, is worried that America will leave it with huge piles of depreciated dollars.
China's vote of no confidence is reflected in its recent calls to create a new reserve currency. In coming years, the U.S. will be under increasing pressure to defend the dollar by preventing runaway inflation. This will require it to impose fiscal self-discipline through some combination of budget cuts, tax increases, and interest-rate hikes. Given that the last two options could choke off renewed growth, there is likely to be strong pressure to slash the federal budget. But it will be almost impossible to make meaningful cuts in federal spending without deep reductions in
“Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment”. First. and cutting defense spending. we argue that the rate of decline helps explain what forms great power retrenchment will take. Third. and make diplomatic overtures to enemies. States that retrench often regain their position in the hierarchy of great powers. Based on the empirical record. states respond to penury the same way they do to plenty: they seek to adopt policies that maximize security given available means." Faced with these hard decisions. but necessity is the mother of invention." he writes in Multilateralism in Munich. defense expenditures are "more likely to be decisive in the future when the U. Discretionary non-defense domestic spending accounts for only about 20 percent of annual federal outlays. seek new allies or rely more heavily on old ones. International Security Spring 2011. Americans will find themselves afflicted with hegemony fatigue. Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College. Faced with diminishing resources. Knowing only a state’s rate of relative economic decline explains its corresponding degree of retrenchment in as much as 61 percent of the cases we examined. 40 percent managed to recover their ordinal rank. and Joseph.4 of 154 defense expenditures. Vol. As Kirshner puts it. when U. Far from being a hazardous policy. Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami. "These aren't the golden 1990s. states renounce risky ties. draw down their military obligations. we question the logic and evidence of the retrenchment pessimists. none of the declining powers that failed to retrench recovered their relative position. and declining great powers face powerful incentives to contract their interests in a prompt and proportionate manner. In contrast.) AK In this article. our analysis suggests that great powers facing acute decline are less likely to initiate or escalate militarized interstate disputes. the absolute size of U. Following the dictates of neorealist theory. Great powers are able to rebalance their commitments through compromise.12 Retrenchment is by no means easy. Second. How fast great powers fall contributes to whether these retrenching states will internally reform. No.S. Pages 7-44. and adjustment more difficult to postpone.S. cutting non-defense spending. a range of 61–83 percent.org/articles/a_multipolar_moment But times have changed. In these ways. This article fills these gaps by systematically examining the relationship between acute relative decline and the responses of great powers. and impose adjustments on domestic populations. argues FPIF contributor Hannes Artens. We examine eighteen cases of acute relative decline since 1870 and advance three main arguments. In this first decade of the 21st century. "This combination will force the Obama administration to stop cherrypicking issues on which it wants to cooperate and forging ahead on those issues it believes it can still handle alone. 35. great powers retrench for the same reason they expand: the rigors of great power politics compel them to do so. So the United States will face obvious "guns or butter" choices. 4. rather than conflict. great powers moderate their foreign policy ambitions and offer concessions in areas of lesser strategic value. is under pressure to make real choices about taxes and spending. Your authors are pessimists – empirical data proves retrenchment is more peaceful than the alternatives MacDonald and Parent 11 (Paul. peaceful retrenchment is the most common response. increase reliance on allies or adversaries. Contrary to the pessimistic conclusions of critics. retrenchment neither requires aggression nor invites predation. power was at its zenith. retrenchment can be successful. Multiple balancing powers and internal issues make heg collapse inevitable – only abandoning unipolarity solves lashout and great power conflict John Feffer (co-director of Foreign Policy In Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies)February 2009 “A Multipolar Moment” http://www. choices must be made between raising taxes. Further. we challenge the retrenchment pessimists’ claim that domestic or international constraints inhibit the ability of declining great powers to retrench.fpif.' as British minister Ed Balls put it in perhaps only slight exaggeration. we find that the magnitude of relative decline helps explain the extent of great power retrenchment. we find that great powers retrenched in no less than eleven and no more than fifteen of the eighteen cases. when states fall in the hierarchy of great powers. When borrowing becomes more difficult. the capitalist West is facing defeat in Afghanistan and is on the verge of 'the worst recession in a hundred years. Of the fifteen great powers that adopted retrenchment in response to acute relative decline. In fact. When international conditions demand it. even over short time spans. To date there has been neither a comprehensive study of great power retrenchment nor a study that lays out the case for retrenchment as a practical or probable policy. Necessity .S.
Over here. economy. and we might finally see the end of the dollar's reign as global currency. Several powerful countries in the South (particularly India. Brazil. Global problems like climate change and financial collapse require global solutions. and South Africa) are quietly acquiring more geopolitical heft. in which all sides humbly accept what is realistically possible.S. so we either evolve multilateral responses or we do a dinosaur dive into extinction. Debt has been the gravedigger of many an empire. the stimulus package. and all of our nuclear weapons have done little to prevent North Korea from entering the nuclear club.5 of 154 will dictate a more pragmatic multilateralism." Are we thus witnessing the final end of the unipolar moment? China is coming up fast. we are quagmired in Afghanistan. The global recession is hammering the U. I can hear the adding machine totting up the numbers. The European Union's expansion has been accompanied by relatively few growing pains. Or is that the sound of dirt hitting a coffin lid? . the Pentagon is still maintaining the world's largest military force — but we have failed to defeat al-Qaeda. With the bank bailout. the red ink is mounting. the bill for two wars plus the Pentagon's already gargantuan budget. meanwhile.
6 of 154 ***Uniqueness .
The US is now reduced to the role of disgruntled spectator as a UN vote to recognise Palestinian statehood draws near.uk/commentisfree/2011/jul/14/hillary-clinton-world-tour) Hillary Clinton's 11-day round-the-world tour is remarkable even by the high-flying standards of US secretaries of state. is that pressure on Muammar Gaddafi's embattled regime in Tripoli is telling. if anything. Clinton's visit to financially stricken Athens on Sunday is unlikely to be of any practical assistance. “Hillary Clinton circumnavigates a sphere of diminishing US influence”. http://www. Iran and the IsraelPalestine conflict.S. on India's de facto support for the Burmese dictatorship. To confuse matters further. Turkey will propose yet another "roadmap" to end the conflict.nytimes. What will not be said is that the US increasingly views Delhi as a vital counterweight to a steadily more aggressive China. Italy and Russia. It will be notable as much for what is not said as what is. All three issues speak to American impotence. Clinton will do well to avoid David Cameron's mistake of indulging in gratuitous Pakistan-bashing on Indian soil. 2011. its unhelpful stance on Kashmir and its machinations in Afghanistan. and its ever greater reliance on Chinese capital and Chinese imports.com/interactive/2011/06/24/opinion/global/20110624_SUPERPOWER. 2011. But paradoxically. Clinton's Turkish leg will include bilateral talks on Syria. But while China and Russia afford him diplomatic cover. where she will join European and other foreign ministers in the international contact group co-ordinating the Nato-led intervention in Libya. The next stop on Clinton's grand tour – India – will take her into the sphere of superpower rivalries. June 24th. Clinton will finish her global circumnavigation in Hong Kong. Her words angered Beijing but did not alter its behaviour. has so far hedged its bets. promulgated by France. It's certain to make headlines around the globe. there is little more the US can do other than complain. Counter-terrorism will be high on the agenda following Wednesday's bombings in Mumbai. Like the Greeks. “No More Superpower?” The New York Times. behind the scenes Clinton may hear well-rehearsed complaints that the US is not doing enough. the Israeli prime minister. July 14th. power — just look at events in the Middle East. http://www. In this context. But Washington. for example. Despite claims that Gaddafi is close to throwing in the towel.7 of 154 Low Now American influence and dominance is diminished now – Clinton tour proves Tisdall 7-14 (Simon. there is as yet no concrete sign that he will stand down – amid widening differences in approach between the US and Britain. A security conference in Bali is certain to touch on a host of territorial disputes between China and its neighbours.guardian. this diplomatic tour de force may unintentionally highlight the apparently inexorable decline of American power and influence. which. to stop trying to fence off the South China Sea. In Damascus. And with the Obama administration's peace plan torpedoed by Binyamin Netanyahu. When you're winning. and that the outlines of a negotiated settlement are beginning to emerge. worried in part about encouraging Islamist extremists. The sharp crack as Israel’s prime minister slapped President Obama’s face with a refusal to halt . And it is arguably USpatented transnational market capitalism that created the whole sorry mess in the first place. The official line. The secretary of state will say a lot about strengthening ties through strategic dialogue and commercial collaboration. Clinton's first stop is in Istanbul on Friday. Clinton made waves last year when she warned China.co. While that assessment will be publicly upheld in Istanbul. British journalist. For this reason Clinton cannot be expected to dwell. The US is one of the few countries with a bigger national debt than Greece. militarily and in other ways. Given America's own protectionist record. Bashar al-Assad continues to ignore ever more shrill American criticism of the nationwide security crackdown. and Barack Obama remains opposed to direct intervention. where the greatest challenges to American power are rising. Americans seem incapable of achieving a consensus on how to address it. chairman of Doha Debates. staff writer. Hegemony low and declining – Middle East proves Sebastian 6/23 (Tim.html?ref=middleeast) There’s no doubt about the devaluation of U. in effect. you can afford to laugh. not leadership. Clinton can have little to say on Palestine. Clinton could give the interventionists a boost were she to announce US recognition of the rebel national council in Benghazi as Libya's government and release more than $30bn in regime funds frozen in US banks. where she is due to make a speech decrying protectionism. Clinton's sojourn will be rounded off in south-east and east Asia. with another confrontation involving Vietnam reported only today. Iran's recent decision to dramatically accelerate its suspect uranium enrichment programme gives the lie to claims that the Tehran regime is retreating under the US-led sanctions campaign. Clinton said this week that the Syrian president had forfeited the legitimacy to rule. Much the same might be said of the effect of American strictures on North Korea. The Guardian UK. has grown more belligerent. France. to back up its Nato partners. this piece of doorstep impudence is more likely to elicit smiles than snarls in Beijing.
started with the 9/11 catastrophe and war in Afghanistan. India. 2011. Only this time it’s not called America. We are living in an interesting time.com/interactive/2011/06/24/opinion/global/20110624_SUPERPOWER. there is no peace at all. Israel will have to make new accom. Competitive Workforce. I would like it to come as soon as possible to a new balance.S. There really is a new world. America will buy you a ticket. America’s currency is at rock bottom in the Arab world. the largest Ferris wheel in the world is in Singapore.8 of 154 settlements still reverberates around the region. But history took a different turn.0 (Time of Texas Online – “US – Behind in Education. Don’t assume the worst. International terrorism was vividly painted as a conflict of civilizations.html?ref=middleeast) The gradual diminishing of American influence. Unnatural was the short period of unconditional world leadership that the U. and Barack Obama. http://timesoftexas. economically and scientifically. the European Union. is a natural and logical process. Freedom is a much more inspiring teacher than oppression.nytimes. “And … more troublingly. during his election campaign. promised to restore America’s popularity. new Arab governments will have to stand on their own feet.” notes Fareed Zakaria. It needs to show the world that it will no longer back leaders who abuse their own people’s freedom in the mistaken belief that it will help Americans sleep more securely back home. July 1st. So the decline of U. The world is rapidly changing. that you can murder and torture all you want — but if you go quietly when you’ve had enough. 2011. a turning point: The world saw that America was taking on too much. charts the fall of America’s dominance and the simultaneous rise of the rest of the world in his book The Post-American World: Release 2.’’ in the sense that there were no more alternatives to American leadership and values. power may be good for the Middle East. The Bush presidency was marked by America’s diminishing reputation. perhaps.0. energy. Far from stopping conflicts. [the United States is] also losing [its] key grip on indices such as patent creation. The war in Iraq — started despite the protests of the allies and with no sanction of the U. “No More Superpower?” The New York Times. Brazil. scientific creations and things like that — which are really harbingers of future economic growth. competitiveness. the host of CNN’s Fareed Zakaria GPS and an editor at large for Time magazine. Not because the vacuum will be filled by more palatable players — but because this one needs a break. Only the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from the Cold War brought ‘‘the only superpower’’ the authority unthinkable before: Some philosophers even started speaking about ‘‘the end of history. and post-crisis Russia. the largest oil refinery is in India. With Washington’s power diminished. It makes no sense to tell Muammar el-Qaddafi to leave Libya because of crimes against his own people — and then to help him evade international justice by touting for his safe haven in a country that doesn’t acknowledge the International Criminal Court. host of CNN`s Fareed Zakaria GPS and editor for Time Magazine. and infrastructure Times of Texas 7/1 *citing Fareed Zakaria. It needs. Digital Infrastructure”. What more powerful signal can there be to despots present and future.com/2011/07/01/us-behind-ineducation-competitive-workforce-new-energy-digital-infrastructure/) Thirty years ago. withdraw from military conflicts and focus on domestic problems and the financial crisis. New energy. primarily China. It makes no sense to trumpet freedom and justice — belatedly — in Egypt and remain virtually silent about the gross human rights violations reported in Bahrain. America is in decline – education. http://www.modations with them. not because it can’t press buttons — or find and kill Osama bin Laden — but because its policies make no sense. Permanent representative of Russia to NATO. After decades of American engagement in the peace process. and the rise of other power centers. The post-Soviet decade marked the peak of American influence and authority.S. but about the enhancement of such power centers as China. The term of the third post-Soviet president. American power on the decline – Iraq was a turning point Rogozin 6/23 (Dmitry. enjoyed at the historic moment of the collapse of Communism and the disintegration of the Soviet state. It makes no sense to provide Israel with weapons to destroy Palestinian property and then offer assistance to put the rubble back together again. the biggest factory in the world is in China. including Russia — and in the entire world.” Zakaria. to paraphrase President Clinton. Now we speak not only about America’s weakened role. writer of the book The Post-American World: Release 2. Bush.N. which shows how the collapse of communism and the Soviet empire — as well as the rise of global markets — has leveled the . But today? “The tallest building in the world is now in Dubai. stumble. this will ensure a steady supply for years to come. the United States dominated the world politically. the largest investment fund in the world is in Abu Dhabi. where there would be several centers capable of sharing responsibility for security and development both in certain regions — for example in an expanded Europe. June 24th. to find new friends. Security Council — was. instead of just searching out its enemies. The ‘‘conflict balance’’ of the Cold War was very soon changed by global destabilization. George W. fall and hopefully emerge stronger.
“The result is you have countries all over the world thriving and taking advantage of the political stability they have achieved. the rise of the rest [of the globe] is a win-win. loaning money. “To put it in perspective. the economic connections of a global market. He says America is now heading toward what he calls a “post-American” world. “Politics and power is a realm of relative influence. … If we didn’t have the rest of the world growing. saving. the established power — the United States.” he says. the Bush tax cuts would expire next year. Zakaria says.9 trillion to the federal government over the next 10 years. in which the United States’ share of the “global pie” is much smaller — as the rest of the globe begins to catch up. becomes mired in debate and cannot deal with the short-term deficit. “That by itself would yield $3. Zakaria says.” he says.9 of 154 playing field for many other countries around the world. It’s not possible for two countries to be the leading dominant political power at the same time.” he says. the technological connection into this market.” But Zakaria cautions that the economic growth around the world — and the benefits that global economic stability create — do not extend to the political arena.” America’s political system. “The more countries that get rich [and] the larger the world economy.” .” America. investing. “So as China expands its role in Asia. “In economic terms. is also starting to lag behind other countries in education. the United States economy would be in much worse shape than it is today. building a competitive workforce. whose role is diminishing? Of course. the more people there are producing.” he tells Fresh Air‘s Terry Gross. “And we are all witnesses to this phenomenon. consuming. and fostering new energy and digital infrastructure to support those workers — all markers of long-term economic growth. We would go to the bottom of the pack in terms of deficit as a percentage of GDP among the rich countries in the world — we would basically solve our fiscal problems for the short term. if Congress were to do nothing.
Those days are gone forever. Economically.S.S. The Pax Americana is already crumbling in slow motion The current international order is based on the economic and security structures that the U. Faced with these hard choices.S. impersonal forces compounded by the United States’ own self-defeating policies. If so. The looming fiscal results from the $1 trillion plus budget deficits that the U. The United States of 2011 are different from 1945. “Bye bye. trade surpluses. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A & M University's Bush School of Government and Public Service. The entire fabric of world order that the United States established after 1945 – the Pax Americana – rested on the foundation of U. http://findarticles. May 2010. the United States will emerge from the current crisis facing a grave fiscal crisis. the U. The decline of American power means the end of U.S. From this unparalleled military and economic power came a Pax Americana that has endured for more than six decades. Indeed.S. primacy will endure for years to come. China’s economy has been growing much more rapidly than the United States’ over the last two decades and continues to do so.com/p/articles/mi_7060/is_5_9/ai_n54223596/) AK The United States emerged from World War II in a position of global dominance. "Graceful decline: the end of Pax Americana". empire. military and economic preponderance. If the dollar loses that status America’s hegemony literally will be unaffordable.S. The US decline reflects its own economic troubles. and providing the reserve currency. supplying liquidity for the world economy. Bush School of Government & Public Service. many in the mainstream foreign-policy community see these as temporary setbacks and believe that U. dominance in world politics and the beginning of the transition to a new constellation of world power.S. Meaningful cuts in federal spending mean deep reductions in defense expenditures because discretionary non-defense – domestic – spending accounts for only about 20% of annual federal outlays. It seemed the sun would never set on the U. the impact of these big historical forces is reflected in the emergence of new great powers like China and India which is being driven by the unprecedented shift in the center of global economic power from the Euro-Atlantic area to Asia. Miss American Pie” The European Magazine Online – 3-28-2011 http://theeuropean-magazine. Americans may contract hegemony fatigue. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A&M's George H.com/223-layne-christopher/231-pax-americana) AK American primacy’s end is result of history’s big. created after World War II. there is reason to worry about United States’ long-term fiscal stability – and the role of the dollar.S. industrial and financial dominance. But America is increasingly unable to play the hegemon's assigned role. This will require fiscal self-discipline through a combination of tax increases and big spending cuts. When these are bundled with the entitlements overhang (the unfunded future liabilities of Medicare and Social Security) and the cost of the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The American Conservative. the United States no longer fits the part. The dollar’s vulnerability is the United States’ real geopolitical Achilles’ heel because the dollar’s role as the international economy’s reserve currency role underpins U.10 of 154 Collapse Inevitable The Pax Americana is unsustainable and is already crumbling – too many alt causes to save it now Layne 11 (Christopher Layne is Professor and Robert M.W.S. the U.S. will be compelled to retrench strategically and the Pax Americana will end. not the biggest borrower. faced a larger debt/GDP ratio after World War II. and yet embarked on a sustained era of growth. recovers from the recession. Professor and Robert M. After all. Still. Externally. But the post-war era was a golden age of U. will be pressured to defend the dollar by preventing runaway inflation. In coming years the U. it offers public goods by opening its domestic market to other states. not cause them. Even in the best case. the Pax Americana is already is crumbling in slow motion. The American people are . Faced with wars it cannot win or quit and an economy begging rescue.S. a hegemon is responsible for stabilizing key regions and guarding the global commons.S. and sustained high growth rates. A hegemon is supposed to solve international crises. Decline is coming – hegemony is unsustainable in its current form Layne 10 (Christopher Layne. It is supposed to be the lender of last resort. they say. Militarily. will incur for at least a decade. primacy. Optimists contend that current worries about decline will fade once the U.
Intervention is thus the United States' default in foreign policy. come from "over there. and international politics is entering a period of transition: no longer unipolar but not yet fully multipolar. that the U. http://findarticles.S. Indeed. The consequence has been to contribute to the very imperial overstretch that is accelerating the United States' decline. As the Financial Times observed. Bush School of Government & Public Service. strong." We have long thought that we cannot live safely in a world of such imperfections and that it is therefore our national duty to cure these ills by using American power to construct a world order based on our values. "Graceful decline: the end of Pax Americana". But when your power declines. as a nation. And because the U.S. but as the U. and justifies endless interventions that ultimately destroy our hegemony Layne 10 (Christopher Layne. The view that the world is doomed without hegemony is flawed – exceptionalist. plays a less important and powerful role as a world leader than it did a decade ago. and Russia--are rising.S. is different. (That is." U. These assumptions invest American foreign policy with a tendency to see the world in terms of good versus evil. the belief. it believes it has the obligation to prevail in this global struggle. one of the towering figures in the study of international politics. it had the luxury of acting on its delusions without paying too high a price.S. Americans believe that our political and economic systems provide "a prototypical solution for the world's disorders. This shift in the global balance of power will dramatically affect international politics: the likelihood of intense great-power security competitions--and even war--will increase." So we cling to the idea that our hegemony is necessary for our own and everyone else's security. imperialist. militarism. and terrorism." In the same Pew study.S. The epoch of American dominance is drawing to a close. Mr. as Edmund Stillman and William Pfaff wrote some 45 years ago. better. All these bad things.000 names on the Vietnam Memorial or the tens of thousands of U.S. used to tell us about American foreign policy. Bush made repeatedly in justifying his policy of exporting democracy at the point of a bayonet. U. hold about the world. and morally superior to the rest of the world. dating back to the Puritans.S. just 27 percent chose the United States. We work multilaterally through international institutions because--we are told--these promote cooperation and trust among states. you begin to pay a price for repeating your mistakes. 44 percent of Americans polled said that China was the leading economic power. 41 percent of the public believes that the U. None of these propositions is self-evident. We attempt to tame the world by exporting democracy because--we are told--democracies do not fight each other.W. May 2010. "When you are big. others--notably China. and the post-1945 Pax Americana will be replaced by an international order that reflects the interests.) But as my graduate school mentor. looks through this prism. We export our model of freemarket capitalism because--we are told--states that are economically interdependent do not fight each other. military personnel who have suffered disfiguring wounds or been killed in Iraq and Afghanistan. and latterly totalitarianism. "Coming at a moment when Chinese prestige is growing and the U.S. Americans have always looked at the outside world suspiciously and viewed it as a source of contagion: war. Much of America's decline can be attributed to its own self-defeating policies. imperialism. leadership has to co-exist with several rising powers. foreign-policy elites have extrapolated from our national experience and concluded. you can afford to make the same dumb mistakes over and over again. values. But they are illusions that "express the deepest beliefs which Americans. According to a December 2009 Pew survey. India.11 of 154 awakening to a new reality more quickly than the academy.com/p/articles/mi_7060/is_5_9/ai_n54223596/) AK The foundational American myth of empire is exceptionalism. if you discount the 58. Obama's trip has symbolized the advent of a more multi-polar world where U. the current era of globalization will end. the United States will pay a high price if it endlessly repeats its mistakes.S. we believe. there is overwhelming evidence that they are wrong. genocide. Kenneth Waltz. Because that U. The American Conservative. To change our foreign policy--to come to grips with the end of the Pax Americana--we first need to change the way we see the world." If we could just give the rest of the world a makeover so it looked like the United States. Professor and Robert M. that the United States is a model for the world and "America's wants and values are universal"--a point George W. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A&M's George H. . is facing enormous difficulties. all would be well.S. President Barack Obama's November 2009 trip to China provided both substantive and emblematic evidence of the shift. and norms of emerging powers. America's security and way of life are purportedly endangered by the existence of hostile ideologies anywhere in the world because peace and freedom are allegedly indivisible. non-democratic forms of governance. decline means that in the 21st century. religious intolerance. enjoyed such vast superiority for such a long time. most notably China. stumbles. and powerful.
S. amid soaring prices. Take these as signposts of a world to come. in other words. and a continuing decline in real wages. the Tianhe-1A. Similarly. "Other countries are no longer willing to buy into the idea that the U. the country sank to 12th place in 2010. the United States had already fallen to number three in global merchandise exports. There is no reason to believe that this trend will reverse itself. dominion over the oceans. Riding a political tide of disillusionment and despair. A harbinger of further decline: in 2009 the U.S.S. 34. space. Hegemony—Myth or Reality?: A Review Essay.000. Unable to pay for swelling deficits by selling now-devalued Treasury notes abroad.S. After leading the world for decades in 25. 1. great and regional. was still number two behind Japan in worldwide patent applications with 232. 09 [“The Waning of U. Summer 2009] For an overview of trends that could affect international politics over the next two decades. The World Economic Forum ranked the United States at a mediocre 52nd among 139 nations in the quality of its university math and science instruction in 2010. “How America will collapse”. three main threats exist to America’s dominant position in the global economy: loss of economic clout thanks to a shrinking share of world trade. the decline of American technological innovation. In mid-2009. dollar).000. No. Add to this clear evidence that the U. a far-right patriot captures the presidency with thundering rhetoric." Simultaneously. India.15Global Trends 2025 is not light reading. but it is significantly more insightful and intellectually courageous than typical government reports. the U. Faced with a fading superpower incapable of paying the bills.to 34-year-olds with university degrees. Smail Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. and the end of the dollar's privileged status as the global reserve currency. Under pressure at home and abroad. hit rock bottom in ranking among the 40 nations surveyed by the Information Technology & Innovation Foundation when it came to "change" in "global innovation-based competitiveness" during the previous decade. 10 (Alfred. not staying here as once would have happened. most of whom will be heading home.S. Russia. the cost of imports soars. said one U. education system. that source of future scientists and innovators. as long expected. that it "blows away the existing No. "to hasten the bankruptcy of the U.S. Adding substance to these statistics. but China was closing fast at 195. Vol. 12/6/10. Such negative trends are encouraging increasingly sharp criticism of the dollar's role as the world’s reserve currency. thanks to a blistering 400 percent increase since 2000. a former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund.html) Today.” International Security. so powerful. By now. ever-rising unemployment. Chair in National Security at the School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. Washington is finally forced to slash its bloated military budget. Suddenly. as economist Michael Hudson has argued. China's central bank governor suggested that the future might lie with a global reserve currency "disconnected from individual nations" (that is. J.com/news/feature/2010/12/06/america_collapse_2025/index.R. and of a possible attempt. are now foreigners. the United States is likely to face a critical shortage of talented scientists. dollar finally loses its special status as the world's reserve currency. Nearly half of all graduate students in the sciences in the U. Meanwhile.S. domestic divisions widen into violent clashes and divisive debates.12 of 154 Heg falling now — external threats to the economy outweigh the aff’s internal links McCoy. Heg unsustainable – multiple constraints ensure collapse and rise of alternatives Christopher Layne.S. the U. often over remarkably irrelevant issues. Rogoff. American leadership in technological innovation is on the wane. demanding respect for American authority and threatening military retaliation or economic reprisal. http://www. 1 machine" in America. Iran. knows best on economic policy.S. with the world's central banks holding an astronomical $4 trillion in U. In 2008.S. expert.S. with just 11 percent of them compared to 12 percent for China and 16 percent for the European Union.S. and cyberspace." Economic Decline: Scenario 2020 After years of swelling deficits fed by incessant warfare in distant lands. has been falling behind its competitors. China. By 2008. in 2020." observed Kenneth S. the U.W. financial-military world order. Its key geopolitical .S. The world pays next to no attention as the American Century ends in silence.salon. it is far too late. Russian president Dimitri Medvedev insisted that it was time to end "the artificially maintained unipolar system" based on "one formerly strong reserve currency. provocatively challenge U. By 2025. a good starting point is the National Intelligence Council’s (NIC’s) Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World. however. Treasury notes. forces back from hundreds of overseas bases to a continental perimeter. Washington slowly pulls U. and other powers. in October China's Defense Ministry unveiled the world's fastest supercomputer.
the rise of China and India to great power status will restore each to “the positions they held two centuries ago when China produced approximately 30 percent and India 15 percent of the world’s wealth” (p. Hegemony—Myth or Reality? A Review Essay". 31–32). global dominance” (p.19 [End Page 153] As the NIC observes. Russia will also seek to reestablish its sphere of influence in the “near abroad” (pp.).17] Because of uncertainties about economics. Brooks and Wohlforth wrote their book before its effects became evident). 30). Global Trends predicts that over the next two decades. 1. capabilities. Jordan Professor of International Affairs at Texas A&M's George Bush School of Government and Public Service. Ph. longterm structural weaknesses that have been accumulating for more than three decades were causing U. Although at the time this issue went to press.S. LL. the financial privileges conferred on the United States by the dollar’s unchallenged reserve currency status have underpinned the preeminent role of the United States in international politics since the end of World War II. No. Galileo. military. it will have less power—and foreign policy options—than it has been accustomed to having since 1945 (ibid. Their ascent is being propelled by “the global shift in relative wealth and economic power” from North America and the Euro-Atlantic world to Asia—a shift “without precedent in modern history” (ibid.D. in Political Science from the University of California.16 As Global Trends 2025 points out. however. economic and political constraints may undermine U. even before the meltdown. but a growing number of analysts disagree. 7). and domestic political constraints that may erode U. J. According to the NIC.S. in addition to relative decline. the NIC believes that the “chances are good that China and India will continue to rise” (p. 23–24. The United States’ soft power may diminish as its liberal model of political and economic development is challenged by authoritarian/statist alternatives (pp. the dollar remained strong and will continue to be the reserve currency for some time to come. and economic. China’s spring 2009 call to replace the dollar with a new reserve currency signals that the NIC’s long-term worries may be justified. financial. 29). 09 – Mary Julia and George R. At home.76 The warning signs with respect to U.S. Ultimately. By 2025. power.S. Summer 2009. and opportunity costs of being the world’s leader are reassessed by American voters” (p. “the dollar’s decline may force the United States into difficult tradeoffs between achieving ambitious foreign policy goals and the high domestic costs of supporting those objectives” (pp. the NIC believes it “will be a leading force in opposition to U. the dollar’s role as the international economy’s preeminent reserve currency will erode.75 The long-term impact of the current economic crisis largely will determine who is right (and to be fair.). the NIC did have an inkling of the meltdown’s potential long-term implications for U. 93).74 Brooks and Wohlforth purport to deny the possibility that America is in relative decline. If Russia overcomes its demographic challenge and continues its revival as a great power. 97). India. Yet. and especially demography. although the United States will probably be primus inter pares in a multipolar international system twenty years from now. in International Law from Virginia Law. 93). buoyed by its strong economic growth rate. 34. "The Waning of U. military supremacy will no longer be as dominant as it has been since the Cold War’s end (p. Nevertheless. both of which are linked to the fear that after recovery. 97). The NIC concludes that America’s “interest and willingness to play a leadership role may be more constrained as the economic. the growing dependence of the United States on foreign capital inflows “may curtail U. India. Russia’s great power trajectory is more problematic than China’s or India’s (pp. China. 30). 32. and possibly Russia are emerging great powers. decline are a looming fiscal crisis and doubts about the future of the dollar as the reserve currency. Although both states could encounter speed bumps that might slow—or even derail—their ascents to great power status. Because its great power status is closely tied to its ability to control both the energy resources and pipelines of Central Asia and the Caucasus. will “strive for a multipolar system with New Delhi as one of the poles” (ibid.S. 94.-dominated unipolar world will give way to multipolarity during the next two decades spurred by two causal mechanisms: the emergence of new great powers (and potentially important regional powers). China figures to have the world’s second-largest economy (measured by gross domestic product [GDP]) and will be a first-rank military power (p. economic power to wane. Decline is inevitable – heg is economically unsustainable Layne.S.S. the United States will face a serious inflationary threat. U. the United States will confront other constraints on its international role. affecting the availability of manpower for both the military and the labor pools (pp.S.S. hegemony. and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute (Christopher.S.13 of 154 conclusion is that the U. In particular.77 Optimists . 8–9. Vol. 3. domestic governance issues. 82).M.). Global Trends 2025 was published just before the full scope of the global financial and economic crisis became apparent. 32). freedom of action in unanticipated ways” (p. p. energy prices.D. International Security. Thus. 13–14).18 Between 2009 and 2025. July 6th 2010. Russia’s population is forecast to drop from 141 million to below 130 million. from USC. Moreover. 21-23) PDF The publications reviewed in this essay examine whether the United States is in (or is headed for) relative decline. 12.
protection from the Soviet threat. industrial and financial dominance. was a golden age of U. “Even if the recovery occurs as projected and the stimulus bill is allowed to expire. and sustained high growth rates. http://www. To rule mankind.S. as well as a political system extolled for its superiority to all other systems. while struggling internally to recover from an economic collapse not seen since the Great Depression.S. and recent events have magnified concerns that predated the financial and economic crisis. the entitlements overhang. American supremacy in a post-cold war environment seems outmatched by a progressively more unstable world.79 When the projected deficits are bundled with the persistent U. however. America has been the leader of the free world for the last 60 years. which is why many economists believe that even in the best case. it will emerge from the current crisis with serious macroeconomic handicaps. current account deficit. As Jonathan Kirshner noted on the eve of the meltdown. to rising tensions in South Asia and the Middle East. to Russia's show of force in Georgia. America today faces the same dilemma of the eastern Roman empire: should it attempt to regain its lost global supremacy or fortify and adapt to the new world? Will we follow Virgil's famous line from the Aeneid. the Iraq war pushed many of our enemies to see us as a common threat where religious differences would have otherwise made cooperation impossible. fears of a fiscal crisis will fade: the country faced a larger debt to GDP ratio after World War II. Brooks and Wohlforth concede unipolarity can only last for 20 more years and that counterbalancing is occuring . While the dangers we face were once diverse and scattered.guardian.S. and the cost of two ongoing wars. with awful sway. the other big players in the international economy now are either military rivals (China) or ambiguous “allies” (Europe) that have their own ambitions and no longer require U.14 of 154 contend that once the United States recovers. America has paved the way for an even less palatable Iranian dominance in the region. there are nonetheless parallels worth considering.80 The CBO states. America is facing a wide array of increasingly troubling threats. 't is thine alone.”82 The dollar’s loss of reserve currency status would undermine U. dominance. as Eric Helleiner notes. 2009. 83 First. there is reason to worry about the United States’ longterm fiscal stability.78 Chief among these handicaps are the increase in the money supply (caused by the massive amount of dollars the Federal Reserve and Treasury have pumped into circulation to rescue the economy).84 Hegemony is unsustainable in today`s world – collapse coming The Guardian 9 (The Guardian UK. there is a “risk of defections generating a herd-like momentum” away from it.co. and the $1 trillion plus budget deficits that the Brookings Institution and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) project the United States will incur for at least a decade. the dollar’s vulnerability “presents potentially significant and underappreciated restraints upon contemporary American political and military predominance. January 19. if the dollar experiences dramatic depreciation in the future. But from China's rapidly rising status as a global player. and make the world obey. Second. the country will face the highest debt/GDP ratio in 50 years and an increasingly urgent and unsustainable fiscal problem. Like Rome. it spells trouble ahead for the dollar. Because of these two factors.S. Moreover. America has spread itself too thin and is unable to respond to new threats as they emerge with either a convincing show of military force or a skilled use of soft power to leverage its credibility in the world. however." or preserve our strength and create a framework for global cooperation in which America acts as a mediator and responsible actor rather than instigator. The United States of 2009 is far different from the United States of 1945. and yet embarked on a sustained era of growth. in collapsing the Ba'athist regime of Saddam Hussein.”81 If the Congressional Budget Office is right. trade surpluses. While the comparison to ancient Rome is imperfect. "Rome. the dollar faces an uncertain future because of concerns that its value will diminish over time.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2009/jan/19/barack-obama-rome-empire) By virtue of its economic and military power. The postwar era.
technology.S. military overstretch. It is unclear how long this formula will work. like all hegemonic systems. It is unclear when the US will fully withdraw from Iraq and Afghanistan. International Security. Summer 2009) Brooks and Wohlforth make a strong case for unipolar stability.’ But recent developments might justify a reevaluation of this conclusion. the US appears much weaker today than it did five years ago. “The Waning of U. According to the theory of hegemonic stability. key question is whether the early decades of the twenty-first century will witness the decline of U.all realists agree Snyder PhD. hegemony will endure well into the future. but so is the hegemon’s ability to actually do things. 1. and this is spurring an ongoing process of multipolarization.pdf] Crucial to hegemonic stability theory is that the hegemon actually does things. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service (Christopher.S. The classic Gilpinian dilemma provides insight into the present predicament the US finds itself in: This three-way struggle over priorities (protection. Relative power is important. “Systermic theory in an era of declining US hegemony.15 of 154 Layne. Over time. it provided a stable international monetary system which facilitated . Brooks and Wohlforth actually concede that unipolarity is not likely to last more than another twenty years. Hegemony—Myth or Reality”. and resources stretched. which allows other states to catch up. If it suppresses consumption. US security guarantees may prove less credible than they once were.45 Out of Balance U. know-how. Hegemons sprint to the front of the great power pack because of economic leadership based on productivity and technological innovation. No.S. leading allies to enhance their own military capabilities. they do not engage the argument that. Keohane has argued that after World War II the US provided three major sets of benefits in the area of international political economy: First. 09 Professor. seems more bound.42 Their case is based on a freeze-frame view of the distribution of capabilities in the international system. The problem does not only stem from fact that the US is bogged down in two wars. Vol.pdf] At the turn of the century it appeared as if we were living through a ‘hegemonic age. Because all are suffering. external weakness will inevitably lead to its defeat by rising powers. For example.umd. The US may still be a giant. the US is still a giant in terms of relative power differentials.bsos. for now at least. the American era of unipolarity contains the seeds of its own demise. If the society fails to save and reinvest a sufficient fraction of its surplus wealth in industry and agriculture.43 A Superficially. however. 34.umd. “Systermic theory in an era of declining US hegemony. and managerial skills diffuse throughout the international economic system.” http://www. Professor of Public Policy at the University of Maryland 10 – [Quddus Z. Thus far the US has maintained a massive defense budget while consumption and investment have been sustained by deficit spending. and Robert M.bsos. everyone is getting hit. and investment) produces a profound dilemma for society. the debate about unipolar stability is misleading. despite their claim at the beginning [End Page 161] of World that unipolarity is robust and that U. these projects will gobble up massive amounts of resources and treasure at a time when America’s own recovery is being partly bankrolled by foreign powers like China.economic problems. which is not very long at all. US hegemony is unsustainable.43 The point is simply that America’s unilateral assertiveness on the international scene is changing. the economic basis of the society and its capacity to sustain either consumption or protection will decline. however. or provides benefits.With its armed forces over-extended. Of course. But there is less to their argument than meets the eye. In this respect. but one that. it is also in the throes of a serious economic downturn. and rising powers Snyder PhD. Professor of Public Policy at the University of Maryland 10 – [Quddus Z. the consequence can be severe internal social tensions and class conflict…If the society neglects to pay the costs of defense. It is unlikely that the US will have either the political will or capability to take on major international undertakings.edu/gvpt/irworkshop/papers_fall09/snyder. it is also an implicit admission that—although it has yet to bear fruit—other states are engaged in counterbalancing the United States. Snyder. leadership costs sap the hegemon’s power and push it into decline. Similarly.S hegemony is unsustainable.44 Not only is this a weak case for unipolarity. Snyder. consumption. After all.edu/gvpt/irworkshop/papers_fall09/snyder.” http://www. hegemony.
Central to the theory of hegemonic stability is that the arrangement is ultimately unsustainable.16 of 154 trade and payments. losses in relative power. and third. Challengers will arise. all good things must come to an end.25 Sadly. and eventual decline. the its allies gain access to Middle Eastern oil at stable prices. The hegemonic cycle usually ends in war. . and thereafter begins anew: “The conclusion of one hegemonic war is the beginning of another cycle of growth. The hegemon cannot maintain its dominance in the face of mounting costs. it provided a US helped market for goods and permitted trade on an asymmetrical basis.”26 Virtually no realist believes that hegemony can persist indefinitely. expansion. and inevitable overextension. second.
financial. 30). Although both states could encounter speed bumps that might slow—or even derail—their ascents to great power status. Vol. the dollar remained strong and will continue to be the reserve currency for some time to come. Nevertheless. If Russia overcomes its demographic challenge and continues its revival as a great power. the United States will confront other constraints on its international role. U. affecting the availability of manpower for both the military and the labor pools (pp.S.16 As Global Trends 2025 points out. Summer 2009) For an overview of trends that could affect international politics over the next two decades. and possibly Russia are emerging great powers. China’s spring 2009 call to replace the dollar with a new reserve currency signals that the NIC’s long-term worries may be justified. 32. military. India. the NIC believes it “will be a leading force in opposition to U. At home. 23–24. 8–9. 94. military supremacy will no longer be as dominant as it has been since the Cold War’s end (p. “The Waning of U. freedom of action in unanticipated ways” (p. Although at the time this issue went to press. and opportunity costs of being the world’s leader are reassessed by American voters” (p. and especially demography. 32). 31–32). Their ascent is being propelled by “the global shift in relative wealth and economic power” from North America and the Euro-Atlantic world to Asia—a shift “without precedent in modern history” (ibid. Moreover. 7).18 Between 2009 and 2025. 93).15Global Trends 2025 is not light reading.).S. a good starting point is the National Intelligence Council’s (NIC’s) Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World. the rise of China and India to great power status will restore each to “the positions they held two centuries ago when China produced approximately 30 percent and India 15 percent of the world’s wealth” (p. 82). will “strive for a multipolar system with New Delhi as one of the poles” (ibid. although the United States . buoyed by its strong economic growth rate. 12. and rising challengers Layne. power. No. 93). in addition to relative decline. 29). Global Trends predicts that over the next two decades. the NIC believes that the “chances are good that China and India will continue to rise” (p. and Robert M. International Security. Ultimately. Its key geopolitical conclusion is that the U.-dominated unipolar world will give way to multipolarity during the next two decades spurred by two causal mechanisms: the emergence of new great powers (and potentially important regional powers). 1. China figures to have the world’s second-largest economy (measured by gross domestic product [GDP]) and will be a first-rank military power (p. economic and political constraints may undermine U. 34. China. In particular. The NIC concludes that America’s “interest and willingness to play a leadership role may be more constrained as the economic. 09 Professor.S.S. 97). Thus. Russia will also seek to reestablish its sphere of influence in the “near abroad” (pp.S. 97). Global Trends 2025 was published just before the full scope of the global financial and economic crisis became apparent. hegemony. According to the NIC. Because its great power status is closely tied to its ability to control both the energy resources and pipelines of Central Asia and the Caucasus. energy prices. 13–14). By 2025. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service (Christopher. global dominance” (p.). the growing dependence of the United States on foreign capital inflows “may curtail U. Hegemony—Myth or Reality”.17 [End Page 152] Because of uncertainties about economics.19 [End Page 153] As the NIC observes. and domestic political constraints that may erode U. 3. The United States’ soft power may diminish as its liberal model of political and economic development is challenged by authoritarian/statist alternatives (pp.S.S. but it is significantly more insightful and intellectually courageous than typical government reports. the dollar’s role as the international economy’s preeminent reserve currency will erode. “the dollar’s decline may force the United States into difficult tradeoffs between achieving ambitious foreign policy goals and the high domestic costs of supporting those objectives” (pp. India. Russia’s great power trajectory is more problematic than China’s or India’s (pp. erosion of public support. Russia’s population is forecast to drop from 141 million to below 130 million. capabilities. the financial privileges conferred on the United States by the dollar’s unchallenged reserve currency status have underpinned the preeminent role of the United States in international politics since the end of World War II. 30). domestic governance issues.17 of 154 Multipolarity Inevitable Multipolarity inevitable---collapse of the dollar. the NIC did have an inkling of the meltdown’s potential long-term implications for U.S. and economic. however.
guardian. In such circumstances. Not that this era is yet upon us. it won't just be Russia and Turkey expanding their reach in the region. too – presumably having fewer demands than Washington about their clients pursuing democratic reforms and peace with Israel. A new cold war is unlikely. but China. However.18 of 154 will probably be primus inter pares in a multipolar international system twenty years from now. India and Brazil will all bid for a role. but the age of unchallenged US hegemony in the Middle East could be ending. Stephen Walt has highlighted that this shift in power is global. Saudi Arabia's growing relationship with China might signify the shape of things to come.co. If the age of American uni-polarity is coming to an end. the recent actions of Russia and Turkey in the Middle East do show a new assertiveness from regional powers to pursue their own path in defiance of US will.uk/commentisfree/2010/may/31/us-hegemony-middle-east-ending) Yet even though the return to cold war bi-polar blocs in the Middle East is unlikely. US power is waning. http://www. Turkey and Brazil's recent nuclear deal with Iran typify this emerging new climate. perhaps hastened by unnecessary wars and economic shortsightedness. should it desire. squeezing the defiant few like Syria and Saddam Hussein's Iraq. “US hegemony in Middle East is ending”. the quagmires of Iraq and Afghanistan have exposed the limits of US ambitions. 10 Analyst of Middle East Affairs (Chris. it will have less power—and foreign policy options—than it has been accustomed to having since 1945 (ibid. it is much more likely that international relations in the Middle East will come to reflect the multi-polar world that will follow rather than revert to a bi-polar cold war. trade agreements or diplomatic coups. today's Middle East sees a power vacuum led by partial US retreat being filled by assertive regional and middle powers. with Asia's share of GDP already outstripping that of the US or Europe. The US remains the superpower and could still effect serious change in the region. Multipolarity coming now Phillips. while the economic crisis has forced the Obama administration to focus energy elsewhere. Though Washington remains the world's only superpower. While the Bush era saw the US hegemonic in the region. the region's international relations are changing. As ever. whether through arms deals. it seems the Middle East could prove a microcosm of these international changes.). .
in part because of a simple logic: as global economic interdependence grows. First." Robert Keohane argues. Milbank Professor of Politic' and International Affairs at Princeton University in both the Woodrow 'Wilson School and the Politics Department.43 " Multilateralism is inevitable – most authors agree unilateralism is unlikely David Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi 4 – Held is Graham Wallas Professor of Political Science @ the London School of Economics and Political Science. essentially for three reasons. If this remains true in the years ahead. "Economic interdependence and multilateralism American support for multilateralism is likely to be sustained _ even in the face of resistance and ideological challenges to multilateralism within the Bush administration . He is the author of After Victory: Institutions. social. "As interdependence rises. Strategic Restraint Wid the Rebuilding of Order after Major War (2001). weaker states are more likely to cooperate willingly and have less reason to resist the hegemony of the stronger state. . Over the postwar era.19 of 154 Multilat Inevitable Multilateralism is inevitable G. Finally. Pg 5-6 Most contributors to this volume are skeptical about the idea that the world is moving toward a new imperial order. and technological gains that derive from integration into the world economy. "the opportunity costs of not co-ordinating policy increase. The more economically interconnected that states become the more dependent they are for the realization of their objectives on the actions of other states.. the need for multilateral coordination of policies also increases. Edited by David Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi. "American Power in the 21st Century". Archibugi is Lecturer in Global Politics in the Departments of Government and International Relations of the London School of Economics and Political Science. Second. compared with the costs of sacrificing autonomy as a consequence of making binding agreements. He is also coauthor of State Power and World Markets (2002) and editor of America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power(2002). it is rational for dominant powers to accept some limitations to their freedom of action in the form of multilateral institutions. the need for multilateral coordination of policie-s also grows. it is easy to predict that the demands for multilateral agreements .will increase and not decrease. Ikenberry emphasizes the lack of motivation: America is unlikely in the tuture to reject multilateralism and a rule-based international order.. Edited by David Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi. American political culture stresses the importance of the rule of law as a foundation.42 Rising economic interdependence is one of the great hallmarks of the contemporary international system. John Ikenberry 4 Ikenberry is the Albert G. as global economic interdependence grows. which won the Schroeder/Jervis Award for best book in History and International Politics by the American Political Science Association. This development is considered unlikely because they see the United States as lacking the motivation and/or the capacity to establish an empire. states have actively and consistently sought to open markets and reap the economic. “American Power in the 21st Century”.even and perhaps especially by the United States . if the stronger state accepts some restrictions on how it can use its power.
" .and it explains the remarkably durable and legitimate character of the existing international order." This has been a strategy that the United States has pursued to a greater or lesser degree across the twentieth century . which itself reflects an older multilateral bargain between the United States and the outside world. which won the Schroeder/Jervis Award for best book in History and International Politics by the American Political Science Association.and it suggests that the current administration should respond to general power management incentives and limit its tilt toward unilateralism. thereby encouraging the acquiescence and cooperation of weaker states.and the search for rule-based agreements . He is the author of After Victory: Institutions. John Ikenberry 4 Ikenberry is the Albert G.should increase rather than decrease with the rise of American unipolarity. multilateralism . should rein in the Bush administration . "American Power in the 21st Century". Edited by David Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi. It predicts that the existing multilateral order. From this perspective. Milbank Professor of Politic' and International Affairs at Princeton University in both the Woodrow 'Wilson School and the Politics Department. Strategic Restraint Wid the Rebuilding of Order after Major War (2001). The support for multilateralism is a way to signal restraint and commitment to other states. American hegemony and multilateralism American support for multilateralism can also stem from a grand strategic interest in preserving power and creating a stable and legitimate international order.20 of 154 Heg Multilat US hegemony results in more multilateralism G. He is also coauthor of State Power and World Markets (2002) and editor of America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power(2002).
" But predictions of the imminent demise of the Chinese miracle have been a regular feature of Western analysis ever since it got rolling in the late 1970s. This is no Soviet-style economic basket case. But it was never a plausible candidate to be No.are slipping down the economic ranks.4) AK It is certainly true that when Americans are worrying about national decline. for roughly three decades. In 1989. At the current pace. "I do. The Chinese are the preferred partners of many African governments and the biggest trading partner of other emerging powers. China will overcome all obstacles – challenges the US Rachman 2011 (Gideon Rachman. The famous projection by Goldman Sachs that China's economy will be bigger than that of the United States by 2027 was made before the 2008 economic crash.and China is the wolf. China could be No. Turkey.com/articles/2011/01/02/think_again_american_decline?page=0. That is just a taste of things to come. This Time It`s For Real”. The wolf did arrive -. China's economic prowess is already allowing Beijing to challenge American influence all over the world.com/articles/2011/01/02/think_again_american_decline?page=0. New powers are on the rise: India. such as Greece and Portugal. "Do I still think America will remain the sole superpower?" he asked. has proved its economic prowess on the global stage. Foreign Policy Magazine. February 2011. And China is only the largest part of a bigger story about the rise of new economic and political players. China has alarming political and economic transitions to navigate. Yet even if you factor in considerable future economic and political turbulence. which collectively constrain America's ability to shape the world.Britain. Bush suggested that China's internal problems mean that its economy will be unlikely to rival America's in the foreseeable future. Over the long term. and it is sitting on more than $2. Its economy has been growing at 9 to 10 percent a year. It is now the world's leading exporter and its biggest manufacturer. also experienced many years of rapid economic growth and is still an export powerhouse.foreignpolicy. http://www. But a frequently overlooked fact about that fable is that the boy was eventually proved right. February 2011. Brazil. So Americans can be forgiven if they greet talk of a new challenge from China as just another case of the boy who cried wolf. even Germany -. doubling in size roughly every seven years. journalist Financial Times and formerly at The Economist – “Think Again: American Decline. the Soviet and Japanese threats to American supremacy proved chimerical. France.21 of 154 Challengers Now Hegemony unsustainable – new powers are challenging America Rachman 2011 (Gideon Rachman.foreignpolicy. By contrast. it would be absurd to pretend that China does not face major challenges. Italy. of course. This Time It`s For Real”. The Soviet Union collapsed because its economic system was highly inefficient. In a recent interview with the Times of London. The Communist Party is unlikely to be able to maintain its monopoly on political power forever. In the short term. Of course. The country also faces major demographic and environmental challenges: The population is aging rapidly as a result of the one-child policy.5 trillion of foreign reserves. 1 well before then. Japan.4) AK In the end. which means that the average Japanese person would have to be more than twice as rich as the average American before Japan's economy surpassed America's. former U. Or the votes by Turkey and Brazil against America at the United Nations on sanctions against Iran. they tend to overlook the weaknesses of their scariest-looking rival. And the country's traditional dependence on exports and an undervalued currency are coming under increasing criticism from the United States and other international actors demanding a "rebalancing" of China's export-driven economy. Think of how India and Brazil sided with China at the global climate-change talks. and China is threatened by water shortages and pollution. such as Brazil and South Africa. China's population is more than four times that of the United States. The Chinese challenge to the United States is more serious for both economic and demographic reasons. Chinese goods compete all over the world. journalist Financial Times and formerly at The Economist – “Think Again: American Decline. In the 1990s. China is also stepping in to buy the bonds of financially strapped members of the eurozone. Yet the Chinese economy has kept growing. there is plenty of evidence that a property bubble is building in big cities like Shanghai. by contrast. China. President George W. They each have their own foreign-policy preferences. of course. The Japanese population is less than half that of the United States. The flaws in the Soviet and Japanese systems became obvious only in retrospect. Foreign Policy Magazine. Those who are confident that American hegemony will be extended long into the future point to the potential liabilities of the Chinese system.S. That was never going to happen. http://www. it would be a big . 1. America's traditional allies in Europe -. and inflation is on the rise. economy watchers regularly pointed to the parlous state of Chinese banks and state-owned enterprises. on average. the Communist Party seemed to be staggering after the Tiananmen Square massacre. a fatal flaw that was disguised for a long time because the USSR never attempted to compete on world markets.
so it will not face turbulence and disorder on remotely the scale Germany did in the 20th century.S. government clearly thinks that China's undervaluation of its currency is a form of protectionism that has led to global economic imbalances and job losses in the United States. But America will never again experience the global dominance it enjoyed in the 17 years between the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991 and the financial crisis of 2008. But that implies the rules of the game aren't rigged. in particular oil. drive to deal with "global economic imbalances" was essentially thwarted by China's obdurate refusal to change its currency policy.S. which is driving up global prices." But whatever they say in formal speeches. Obama summarized the traditional approach when he said. arguing that tariffs or other retaliatory measures would be a legitimate response. and nations need not fear the success of another. have explicitly welcomed China's rise. but that is because both sides have nuclear weapons.S. power will simply disappear.22 of 154 mistake to assume that the Chinese challenge to U. Those days are over. have taken a similar line. in Political Science from the University of California. and economy Rachman 2011 (Gideon Rachman. albeit shorn of its imperial ambitions. Both sides have taken part in the talks with North Korea. China is unlikely to get sucked into a world war. "Power does not need to be a zero-sum game. The analogy to the rise of Germany from the mid-19th century onward is instructive. Jordan Professor of International Affairs at Texas A&M's George Bush School of Government and Public Service. the collapse of democracy. Growing Chinese economic and military clout clearly poses a long-term threat to American hegemony in the Pacific. The U. West Germany was once again one of the world's leading economies. http://www. but the cost of securing Chinese agreement was a weak deal that is unlikely to derail the Iranian nuclear program. the U. February 2011. and the destruction of its major cities and infrastructure by Allied bombs. Ph. Once countries get the hang of economic growth. no matter what obstacles lie in its path. And when it comes to the broader geopolitical picture. Fred Bergsten. Germany went through two catastrophic military defeats. It is mercifully unlikely that the United States and China would ever actually go to war. The United States still has formidable strengths.M. It is a central tenet of modern economics that trade is mutually beneficial for both partners. At the G-20 summit in November.D. such as New York Times columnist Paul Krugman and the Peterson Institute's C. We are on a collision course with China – military. Larry Summers. The Chinese reluctantly agreed to a new package of U. from territorial disputes in Asia to human rights. This Time It`s For Real”. remarked pointedly that the normal rules about the mutual benefits of trade do not necessarily apply when one trading partner is practicing mercantilist or protectionist policies. it takes a great deal to throw them off course. presidents. new international rivalries are inevitably emerging.4) AK Successive U. Its military has a global presence and a technological edge that no other country can yet match. the Great Depression. Leading economists. And yet by the end of the 1950s. China is also competing fiercely for access to resources. To do anything else would needlessly antagonize the Chinese.S. rivalry between a rising China and a weakened America is now apparent across a whole range of issues. despite the gauzy rhetoric of globalization that comforted the last generation of American politicians.… We welcome China's efforts to play a greater role on the world stage. not because globalization has magically dissolved their differences. sanctions on Iran. Its economy will eventually recover. Speaking before the 2010 World Economic Forum. America's leaders are clearly beginning to have their doubts. hyperinflation. And whatever economic and political difficulties it does experience will not be enough to stop the country's rise to great-power status. in . the world of the future looks even more like a zero-sum game. troops. China is counter-balancing the US now Layne. In fact.-China standoff.foreignpolicy. 09 – Mary Julia and George R. Foreign Policy Magazine. LL. Just before his first visit to China. In a nuclear age. then Obama's chief economic advisor. foreign policy. China does not like Kim Jong Il's regime. The 2009 climate-change talks in Copenhagen ended in disarray after another U. but a barely submerged rivalry prevents truly effective Sino-American cooperation. So much for the win-win world. and rightly so. from the first Bush to Obama.S. but it is also very wary of a reunified Korea on its borders. Sheer size and economic momentum mean that the Chinese juggernaut will keep rolling forward.com/articles/2011/01/02/think_again_american_decline?page=0. particularly if the new Korea still played host to U. a winwin rather than a zero-sum. journalist Financial Times and formerly at The Economist – “Think Again: American Decline.N.S. American leaders are right to reject zero-sum logic in public. For the United States has been acting as if the mutual interests created by globalization have repealed one of the oldest laws of international politics: the notion that rising players eventually clash with established powers. But that shouldn't obscure this unavoidable fact: As economic and political power moves from West to East.
1-2209. chief of US naval operations. “Chinese Plans to End US Hegemony in the Pacific”.nationalinterest. is the poster child for Asia’s rise.. "The Waning of U. in early 2009. J. Hegemony—Myth or Reality? A Review Essay". which already has overtaken the United States as the world’s leading manufacturer—a crown the United States wore for more than a century.S. p. and." Counterbalancing inevitable – multiple factors Pape 2k9 (Robert A. at a recent speech hosted by the Heritage Foundation. surveillance and target acquisition. In 2003 Goldman Sachs predicted that China would pass the United States in GDP by 2041. Among the anti-access/area-denial (A2AD) capabilities being fielded by China include antisatellite weapons. Chinese military and political doctrine holds that China should rule the waves out to the second island chain of the western Pacific. unmanned aerial vehicles. advanced fighter aircraft. electromagnetic weapons. from USC. and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute (Christopher.S. Galileo.47 The shift of economic clout to East Asia is important because it could propel China’s ascent—thus hastening the relative decline of U. and many analysts— including the NIC. and much sooner than many expect[. a conservative Washington think tank. advanced radar systems. the Economist Intelligence Unit predicted that China’s GDP would surpass the United States’ in 2021.52 And. and (implicitly) Mahbubani and Zakaria—agree that China is the rising power most likely to challenge U." said Admiral Gary Roughead. of course.49 Their analysis. For sure. there are indications that the unipolar era is drawing to a close. the trend lines appear to favor China.46 Here. its allies and partners: acquiesce in a dramatic shift in the military balance or take steps to preserve it. "the cost incurred by the US military to operate in the [w]estern Pacific will likely rise sharply. "The PLA navy is increasing its numbers of submarines and other ships." All of this has US military planners and thinkers worried. and they dismiss the idea that China could become a viable counterweight to a hegemonic United States within any meaningful time frame. 51 China also may overtake the United States in GDP in the next ten to fifteen years.. global economic power is flowing from the United States and Europe to Asia.This situation creates a strategic choice for the United States. “Empire Falls.S military strength Buxbaum. power—and also because emerging regional multipolarity could trigger future major power war.) PDF Toward multipolarity? The ascent of new great powers would be the strongest evidence of multipolarization. the United States still has an impressive lead in the categories they measure. Mahbubani. and ballistic and cruise missiles. there is evidence that as the NIC. Khanna. to a point. 34. But political problems and budgetary woes could kill the program before it ever gets started. and the two most important indicators of whether this is happening are relative growth rates and shares of world GDP. is static. http://oilprice. China’s already challenging U.S.50 Looking ahead. or Washington undertakes actions to offset or counterbalance the effects of the PLA’s military buildup.D. Khanna. http://www. 1.html) The US is developing an air-sea battle concept to counter China's military buildup. essentially dividing the Pacific between the US and China and ending US hegemony on that ocean. Vol.23 of 154 International Law from Virginia Law. which extends as far as Guam and New Guinea. Brooks and Wohlforth are skeptical about China’s rise.48 Unsurprisingly. No. 10 Analyst @ ISN Security Watch. then. Summer 2009. The Chinese also have an emerging and muscular deep-water navy.org/Article.aspx?id=20484) . Zakaria contend." said a report recently released by the Washington-based Center for Budgetary and Strategic Assessments. "Navies tend to grow with economies and as trade becomes more important. The A2AD buildup threatens the US forward presence and power projection in the region. China. perhaps to prohibitive levels. hegemony. "Unless Beijing diverts from its current course of action. 17-18. and that the coming decades could witness a power transition. July 6th 2010..com/Geo-Politics/International/Chinese-Plans-to-End-USHegemony-in-the-Pacific. but in 2008 it revised the time frame to 2028. China's People's Liberation Army is building up anti-access and area-denial capabilities with the apparent goal of extending their power to the western half of the Pacific Ocean.” National Interest Online.]. Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. however.53 Empirically. International Security. how-ever. (Peter A. spaced-based reconnaissance.
must work for the long haul and so depends on the power a state is able to produce in the future. power certainly helps. the basic definition of power in international politics is simple: power is the aggregate resources a state has at its disposal to achieve its aims. Since the cold war. our policies have been based on these flawed arguments. FROM ROME. This is true in any rough-and-tumble environment. U. Venice. America’s declining power means that the unipolar world is indeed coming to an end.S. Simply maintaining these commitments requires enormous resources.S. A healthy appreciation of our situation by American leaders may lead to policies that could mitigate. power is heavily dependent on the size and quality of its military forces and other current power assets. however. seeking to ensure peace and stability not just in its own neighborhood— the Americas—but also in Europe and Asia. solutions to each of them individually and all of them collectively will be heavily influenced by America’s reduced power position in the world. we will look back at the Bush administration years as the death knell for American hegemony.1 But it is not only how much power a state has that matters. America’s power is fundamentally a result of its economic strength. Still. increasingly negative current-account balances and other internal economic weaknesses have cost the United States real power in today’s world of rapidly spreading knowledge and technology. relative decline has been. seeking to denuclearize North Korea and expanding America’s military allies in Europe up to the borders of Russia itself. If present trends continue. China and other major powers could seriously oppose American military power. along with the oil-rich Persian Gulf (as well as other parts of the world). For the past eight years. The United States is not just the sole superpower in the unipolar-dominance school’s world. al-Qaeda’s new sanctuary in western Pakistan. policies they oppose and that the United States will increasingly face harsh foreign-policy choices. There is also good reason to think that. but in recent years American leaders have pursued far more ambitious goals than merely maintaining the status quo. . the more its power matters and hence the more relative economic strength it needs. the rise and fall of great nations has been driven primarily by relative economic strength. In international politics. those convinced of U. Although the immediate problems of war in Iraq and Afghanistan. Imperial China. virtually discounting the possibility that Germany. growing government debt. our own hubris may be our downfall. the more international commitments a state has.24 of 154 AMERICA IS in unprecedented decline. while the ultimate foundation of American power—the relative superiority of the U.S. but pursued ambitious objectives in all three major regions at the same time—waging wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. France. From public intellectuals like Charles Krauthammer and Niall Ferguson to neoconservatives like Paul Wolfowitz and Robert Kagan. Most important. Like so many great powers that have come and gone before. dominance in the international system have encouraged American policy makers to act unilaterally and seize almost any opportunity to advance American interests no matter the costs to others. The self-inflicted wounds of the Iraq War. To be sure. all believe the principal feature of the post-cold-war world is the unchallengeable dominance of American power.S. economy in the world—has been in decline since early on in the Bush administration. thus far. the fall of American power will be more precipitous with the passage of time. fairly short. The Bush administration has not just continued America’s traditional grand strategy. further decline in the foreseeable future. the most important of which are to defend its national interests. Productive capacity—defined by indicators such as wealth. Although scholars have long debated its nuances.S. But. A successful grand strategy. France. Iran’s continued nuclear program and Russia’s recent military adventure in Georgia are high-priority issues. At any given moment. both at home and abroad. Russia. even to academicians like Dartmouth’s William Wohlforth and Stephen Brooks. Over time. America’s shrinking share of world economic production is a fact of life and important changes in U. For nearly two decades. This is simply no longer realistic. Great Britain and the Soviet Union to the United States today. grand strategy are necessary to prevent the decline in America’s global position from accelerating. that major powers will increasingly have the strength to balance against U. the period of U. if not rectify.S. A Ford Explorer is a powerful vehicle—unless it collides with a Mack Truck. Spain. without deliberate action. As Paul Kennedy so ably describes in his classic The Rise and Fall of Great Powers. power does not ensure success. the United States has maintained a vast array of overseas commitments. It is also how much power a state has relative to other states. but is so relatively more powerful than any other country that it can reshape the international order according to American interests.
25 of 154 technology and population size—is a prerequisite for building and modernizing military forces. The United States, like any state, may choose to vary the degree to which its productive capacities are used to create military assets. But it is the economy as a whole that constrains the choice. And the size of the economy relative to potential rivals ultimately determines the limits of power in international politics. Major assessments of this relative position have long turned heavily on a single
statistic: America’s share of world economic product. Advocates of extending America’s unipolar dominance are well aware of the central importance of the economic foundations of American power and routinely present detailed statistics on the U.S. share of world product. The basic notion is simple: take U.S. domestic product in any year and divide it by the aggregate total of the gross domestic product of all states in the world. To measure gross domestic product, the unipolar-dominance school prefers to compare every country’s output in current-year U.S. dollars, a method that tends to show America is much further ahead of other countries than alternative measures. Indeed, the most recent call for America to exploit its hegemonic position (published in 2008) rests on the presumption of U.S. dominance based on the current-year dollar figures.2 By this metric, in 2006 the United States had 28 percent of world product while its nearest most likely competitor, China, had 6 percent. Looks pretty good for America, right? Alas,
single-year “snapshots” of America’s relative power are of limited value for assessing the sustainability of its grand strategy over many years. For grand-strategic concerns—especially how well the United States can balance its resources and foreign-policy commitments—the trajectory of American power compared to other states is of seminal importance. For the sake of argument, let us start with the unipolar-dominance school’s preferred measure of American hegemony, but look at the trajectory of the data over time. According to GDP figures in current U.S. dollars
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United States increased its share of world production during the 1990s, reached its apogee in 2000, and then began to steadily lose ground during the eight years of the Bush administration, with its relative power ultimately falling by nearly a quarter in the first decade of the twenty-first century. At the same time, the relative power of China, the state many consider America’s most likely future rival, has grown consistently. If we look out as far as the IMF can see
(2013), things get even worse—with the United States expected to continue declining and China to continue rising. The United States has been going through the first decade of the twenty-first century not stronger than
before, but substantially weaker. How good are the numbers? Economists commonly use two other methods to calculate GDP, constant-dollar calculations and purchasing power parity.3 Although each offers advantages and disadvantages, for our purposes what matters is that they form a lower bound of America’s relative decline. And regardless of the metric, the trend is the same. Again using IMF figures, Table 2 shows the trajectory of the share of world product for the United States and China using both alternative measures. Simply put, the United States is now a declining power. This new reality has tremendous implications
for the future of American grand strategy. THE EROSION of the underpinnings of U.S. power is the result of uneven rates of economic growth between America, China and other states in the world. Despite all the pro-economy talk from the Bush administration, the fact is that since 2000, U.S. growth rates are down
almost 50 percent from the Clinton years. This trajectory is almost sure to be revised further downward as the consequences of the financial crisis in fall 2008 become manifest. As Table 3 shows, over the past two decades, the average rate of U.S. growth has fallen considerably, from nearly 4 percent annually during the Clinton years to just over 2 percent per year under Bush. At the same time,
China has sustained a consistently high rate of growth of 10 percent per year—a truly stunning performance. Russia has also turned its economic trajectory around, from year after year of losses in the 1990s to significant annual gains since 2000. Worse, America’s decline was well under way before the economic downturn, which is likely to only further weaken U.S. power. As
the most recent growth estimates (November 2008) by the IMF make clear, although all major countries are suffering economically, China and Russia are expected to continue growing at a substantially greater rate than the United States. True, the United States has not lost its position as the most innovative country in the world, with more patents each year than in all other countries combined. However, the ability to diffuse new technology—to turn chalkboard ideas into mass-produced
applications—has been spreading rapidly across many parts of the globe, and with it the ultimate sources of state power—productive capacities. America is losing its overwhelming technological dominance in the leading industries of the knowledge economy. In past eras—the “age of
iron” and the “age of steel”—leading states retained their technological advantages for many decades.4 As Fareed Zakaria describes in his recent book, The Post-American World, technology and knowledge diffuse more quickly today, and their rapid global diffusion is a profound factor driving down America’s power compared to other countries. For instance, although the United States
remains well ahead of China on many indicators of leading technology on a per capita basis, this grossly under-weights the size of the knowledge economy in China compared to America. Whereas
in 2000, the United States had three times the computer sales, five times the internet users and forty times the broadband subscribers as China, in 2008, the Chinese have caught or nearly caught up with Americans in every category in the aggregate.5 The fact that the United States remains ahead of China on a per capita basis does matter—it means that China, with more
than four times the U.S. population, can create many more knowledge workers in the future.
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Heg Low (1/2)
American hegemony is a myth – we don’t have sufficient ground forces to project power
Mearshimer, 06 (John Mearsheimer, Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. "Conversations in International Relations - Interview with John J. Mearsheimer (Part I)," International Relations, Vol. 20, No. 1 (2006), pp. 105-124. http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0039.pdf) I think that many commentators and security experts overestimate the power of the United States. Despite all the talk about global hegemony, it is especially difficult to dominate the entire planet, not only because it is very large, but also because it is necessary to project power over large bodies of water, which is a formidable task. For sure, the United States is a hegemon in the western hemisphere. That is because the Americas are its backyard and because there is no state in the region that has the military power to stand up to the United States in a war. But dominating the rest of the globe is virtually impossible at this point in time. To accomplish that end, the United States would need immense power projection capabilities and lots more land power or boots on the ground than it now has or is likely to have anytime soon. I have a chapter in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics titled ‘The Primacy of Land Power’, where I explain why armies and the forces that support them are the core ingredients of military power. The Bush Administration made a fatal blunder in this regard. It assumed that it could use sophisticated aircraft with precision guided munitions and small ground forces to reorder the Middle East, and maybe even the whole world. Instead of relying on big battalions, the United States was going to shock and awe its way to victory. Iraq was supposed to be the first of many great triumphs. There was even much talk about creating an American empire in the Middle East. This whole scheme was delusional from the start, because there was no way that the United States could succeed in Iraq without a large army. Any state bent on reordering the world at the end of a rifle barrel better have an abundance of land power, because that task is not going to be accomplished on the cheap. The United States, however, does not have and will not have in our lifetime anywhere near enough soldiers to dominate the globe the way it dominates the western hemisphere. The unipolar moment never was and probably never will be.
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U.S. power in decline
Parag Khanna 2008 (Senior Research Fellow and Director, Global Governance Initiative, New America Initiative, January 28, , New York Times Magazine, “Waving Goodbye to Hegemony,” http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2008/waving_goodbye_hegemony_6604)
There are plenty of statistics that will still tell the story of America's global dominance: our military spending, our share of the global economy and the like. But there are statistics, and there are trends. To really understand how quickly American power is in decline around the world, I've spent the past two years traveling in some 40 countries in the five most strategic regions of the planet -- the countries of the second world. They are not in the first-world core of the global economy, nor in its third-world periphery. Lying alongside and between the Big Three, second-world countries are the swing states that will determine which of the superpowers has the upper hand for the next generation of geopolitics. From Venezuela to Vietnam and Morocco to Malaysia, the new reality of global affairs is that there is not one way to win allies and influence countries but three: America's coalition (as in "coalition of the willing"), Europe's consensus and China's consultative styles. The geopolitical marketplace will decide which will lead the 21st century. The key second-world countries in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, South America, the Middle East and Southeast Asia are more than just "emerging markets." If you include China, they hold a majority of the world's foreign-exchange reserves and savings, and their spending power is making them the global economy's most important new consumer markets and thus engines of global growth -- not replacing the United States but not dependent on it either. I.P.O.'s from the so-called BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China) alone accounted for 39 percent of the volume raised globally in 2007, just one indicator of second-world countries' rising importance in corporate finance -- even after you subtract China. When Tata of India is vying to buy Jaguar, you know the landscape of power has changed. Second-world countries are also fast becoming hubs for oil and timber, manufacturing and services, airlines and infrastructure -- all this in a geopolitical marketplace that puts their loyalty up for grabs to any of the Big Three, and increasingly to all of them at the same time. Second-world states won't be subdued: in the age of network power, they won't settle for being mere export markets. Rather, they are the places where the Big Three must invest heavily and to which they must relocate productive assets to maintain influence.
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Foreign Affairs. http://www. military. For the past several decades. This has allowed it to guarantee U.S. he also cautioned. will make it progressively more expensive in blood and treasure--perhaps prohibitively expensive-for U." Despite this admonition.accessmylibrary. Ph. military an unmatched ability to project power worldwide.S. “The Pentagon's wasting assets: the eroding foundations of American power”. .D. grand strategy assumes that such advantages will continue indefinitely. one that is better suited for the types of irregular conflicts now being waged in Afghanistan and Iraq. U. However. July 1st 2009. and underwrite security commitments around the globe. and hostile states. The diffusion of advanced military technologies. U.. access to the global commons. from Harvard University and President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (Andrew F. Meanwhile. "It would be irresponsible not to think about and prepare for the future. the U.29 of 154 AT: Best Military Sustains Our military is deteriorating and their authors don’t assume future threats Krepinevich." in the language of defense strategists. including East Asia and the Persian Gulf. 09 -. an overwhelming advantage in technology and resources has given the U.S. they are already starting to disappear. such as Iran.) THE MILITARY foundations of the United States' global dominance are eroding. assure the safety of the homeland. military's long-unfettered access to the global commons--including space and cyberspace--is being increasingly challenged.com/coms2/summary_028638273632_ITM. In fact. such as China. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates argued in these pages for a more "balanced" U.S. Recently. policymakers are discounting real future threats.Professor of International Relations and History at Boston University. Several events in recent years have demonstrated that traditional means and methods of projecting power and accessing the global commons are growing increasingly obsolete-becoming "wasting assets.S. forces to carry out their missions in areas of vital interest. thereby increasing the prospect of strategic surprises.S. What is needed is nothing short of a fundamental strategic review of the United States' position in the world--one similar in depth and scope to those undertaken in the early days of the Cold War. Military forces that do deploy successfully will find it increasingly difficult to defend what they have been sent to protect.S. combined with the continued rise of new powers.
http://www. in Europe the idea has all but vanished. policy in Iraq. 11 and the Iraq war.) The striking thing about the present international situation is the degree to which America remains what Bill Clinton once called "the indispensable nation. It even trumpets its willingness to train Iraqi soldiers. The much-anticipated global effort to balance against American hegemony -. indicating agreement with the American view that China is a potential strategic concern.S. even with an administration they allegedly despise.which the realists have been anticipating for more than 15 years now -.org/publications/index. and the big question remains what it was in the 1990s: Who will be invited to join NATO? .30 of 154 AT: Soft Power Sustains Soft power is irrelevant to hegemony Kagan. Germany's Afghanistan. It is bending over backward to show support for the mission in be a strategic partner as it was during the Cold War. in German terms. Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment For International Peace and Adjunct Professor of History at Georgetown University (Robert. while still dissenting from U. meaningful number of troops. Western Europe will not new government. Nevertheless. and even the project of creating a common foreign and defense policy has slowed if not stalled. For Eastern and Central Europe. because Western Europeans no longer feel threatened and therefore do not seek American protection. not America.cfm?fa=view&id=17894&prog=zgp&proj=zusr. January 15th 2006. But if they really feared American power. Europeans would be taking more urgent steps to strengthen the European Union's hand to check it. most notably by continuing to supply a small but. Nor are Europeans refusing to cooperate. European Union defense budgets continue their steady decline." Despite global opinion polls registering broad hostility to George W. the current trend is toward closer cooperation. The Washington Post. On the contrary.has simply not occurred.carnegieendowment. Both trends are primarily the result of internal European politics. Bush's United States. is working hard and ostentatiously to improve relations. “Still the Colossus”. the behavior of governments and political leaders suggests America's position in the world is not all that different from what it was before Sept. 06 – PhD from American University. the growing threat is Russia. Chancellor Angela Merkel promises to work closely with Washington on the question of the China arms embargo.
"In the most profound financial change in recent Middle East history. there is a growing acceptance amongst those winners that one consequence of this power shift will be to strengthen their currencies"." said Kit Juckes. The report "has helped concentrate the minds of traders and investors alike. under the front-page headline "The Demise of the Dollar".to end dollar dealings for oil. the shift in economic power away from the G7 economies is continuing. Russia and Gulf States are among nations prepared to ditch the dollar for oil trades has heightened the uncertainty surrounding the US currency's future. Following the summit. including Saudi Arabia. the euro. "Three conclusions stand out very clearly. Abu Dhabi. the dollar's underlying downtrend will remain in place. 09 (“US facing massive economic ‘power shift’ with dollar’s downward spiral”. were considering replacing the dollar as the currency for oil deals. Qatar and Russia. Meanwhile at a G20 summit in Pittsburgh last month." Even so." Zukang was speaking at the annual meetings of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. http://rawstory. and has given them another excuse to take the dollar lower. "Secondly. together with China. an analyst at currency traders ECU Group. The Raw Story. US Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner repeated Washington's commitment to a strong dollar.com/2009/10/us-facing-massive-economic-power-shift-with-dollars-downward-spiral/) The dollar's position as the world's leading reserve currency faces increased pressure as the financial crisis allows emerging economies greater influence on the world stage. The Independent. October 11th 2009. Russia." added Juckes. Sha Zukang. said "important progress in managing imbalances can be made by reducing the (dollar) reserve currency country's 'privilege' to run external deficits in order to provide international liquidity. with bold plans to fix global imbalances and give more clout to emerging giants such as China and India. The dollar slumped against rivals last week in the wake of the British daily's controversial report. analysts said.31 of 154 AT: Economy Sustains Every indicator goes our way – economic power is declining Agence France-Presse. But last week the finance chief was left to watch as traders used The Independent's report as an opportunity to push lower the troubled US unit. gold and a new. Firstly. The report was denied by a host of countries. . unified currency planned for nations in the Gulf Co-operation Council." wrote The Independent's Middle East correspondent Robert Fisk. as long as the US economy is not strong enough for any rise in interest rates to be conceivable for a long time." added Fisk. world leaders unveiled a new vision for economic governance. whose President Robert Zoellick recently warned that the United States should not "take for granted" the dollar's role as preeminent global reserve currency. A report last week in The Independent claiming that China. reported last Tuesday that Gulf states. Gulf Arabs are planning -. Kuwait and Qatar.along with China. They would switch "to a basket of currencies including the Japanese yen and Chinese yuan." GFT Global Markets analyst David Morrison told AFP. Japan and France. Japan and France -. Russia. which had allowed the United States the "privilege" of building up a huge trade deficit. citing Gulf Arab and Chinese banking sources. And finally. UN undersecretary-general for economic and social affairs. "The US dollar is being hurt by the continued talk of a shift away from a dollar-centric world. including Kuwait. the United Nations itself last week called for a new global reserve currency to end dollar supremacy. while France dismissed it as "pure speculation.
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All of the aspiring poles face a problem the .ksg. power indexes alone cannot capture the importance of the fact that the United States is in North America while all the other potential poles are in or around Eurasia.pdf) Unipolarity rests on two pillars. Local balances of power may loom larger in the calculations of other states than the background unipolar structure. many scholars expect bi. bandwagon.D. the aspiring counterbalancer will have to confront not just the capabilities of the unipolar state. They propose three ways in which unipolarity will end: counterbalancing by other states. Ph. If things go poorly. in Political Science.. B. Yale University. is that the countercoalitions of the past—on which most of our empirical knowledge of alliance politics is based—formed against centrally located land powers (France. Wohlforth. Germany. Mexico. Similarly. in International Relations. in International Relations. and the Soviet Union) that constituted relatively unambiguous security threats to their neighbors. Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund A. Daniel Webster Professor of Government. Wohlforth. Summer 1999. in Political Science. Vol 24. however. regional integration. 28. the Atlantic. M. and it may not even be the most important one for many states. The balance of power between the sole pole and the second-tier states is not the only one that matters. or the differential growth in power.. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University.33 of 154 Heg Sustainable (1/2) Heg is sustainable – power gap too large and protected location.A. in International Relations. the U. position as an offshore power determines the nature and likely longevity of unipolarity.A. M. “The Stability of a Unipolar World. No. Even a declining offshore unipolar state will have unusually wide opportunities to play divide and rule. The fact that Soviet power happened to be situated in the heart of Eurasia was a key condition of bipolarity.” MIT Press. The second pillar—geography—is just as important. we must also consider its four truest allies: Canada.harvard. the threshold concentration of power necessary to sustain unipolarity is lower than most scholars assume. As a result. B. Yale University M.pdf) The key.D. Efforts to produce a counterbalance globally will generate powerful countervailing action locally.ksg. Wohlforth. Ph.edu/files/wohlforthvol24no1. Empirically proven – counterbalancing not a threat to US heg. p. Summer 1999.S. “The Stability of a Unipolar World. Wohlforth. in International Relations. Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund A. political science. Vol 24. 99 (William C. Ph. Yale University. Location matters . Coordinating a counterbalance against an offshore state that has already achieved unipolar status will be much more difficult. This massive power gap implies that any countervailing change must be strong and sustained to produce structural effects.A.Phil.A. Just as the raw numbers could not capture the real dynamics of bipolarity. Yale University M. political science.D. No. Daniel Webster Professor of Government. Any second-tier state seeking to counterbalance has to contend with the existing pro-U.” MIT Press. and the Pacific. http://belfercenter. 1. International Security.S. 99 (William C. Because they fail to appreciate the sheer size and comprehensiveness of the power gap and the advantages conveyed by geography.harvard. 1.or multipolarity to reappear quickly.D.Phil. 29-30. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. I have already established the first: the sheer size and comprehensiveness of the power gap separating the United States from other states. pp. None of these is likely to generate structural change in the policy-relevant future. In addition to all the other advantages the United States possesses. Ph. http://belfercenter. Yale University.edu/files/wohlforthvol24no1. Beloit College. but also those of its other great power allies. Yale University. Beloit College. International Security.
S. the United States’ first move in any counterbalancing game of this sort could be to try to promote such pivotal states to great power status. . Indeed. in each region there are smaller “pivotal states” that make natural U.S. allies against an aspiring regional power. allies the moment an unambiguous challenge to Washington’s preeminence emerges.34 of 154 United States does not: great power neighbors that could become crucial U. In addition. as it did with China against the Soviet Union in the latter days of the Cold War.
35 of 154 Heg Sustainable (2/2) Unipolarity is a movement – not easily derailed. Yale University. In each case. 1. No. In the bipolarity debate.” so the recovery of Europe and Japan appeared as fatal threats to the United States’ position. Ph. As a result. Yale University. Ph. analysts changed reference points to minimize U. power. International Security.edu/files/wohlforthvol24no1.Phil. 99 (William C. pp. the current concentration of power in the United States is something new in the world.S. position circa 1946. Summer 1999. If unipolarity is so robust. to pronounce the United States’ decline in the 1980s. in International Relations.ksg.D.D. http://belfercenter. in Political Science. in International Relations. Daniel Webster Professor of Government.A. M. Yale University M. “The Stability of a Unipolar World.harvard.” MIT Press. and finally to bid unipolarity adieu after the Cold War are all examples. Many analysts have come to define unipolarity as an imperial system such as Rome where there is only one great power and all other states are satrapies or dependencies. Wohlforth. the reference point became the extremely tight alliance of the 1950s.” It is a deeply embedded material condition of world politics that has the potential to last for many decades. to herald the rise of Japan or China as superpowers in the 1980s and 1990s. and international institutions do not matter— we should not expect a return of balance-of-power politics à la multipolarity for the simple reason that we are living in the modern world’s first unipolar system. 37-38..pdf) The distribution of material capabilities at the end of the twentieth century is unprecedented. B. Vol 24. so any disagreement between the United States and Europe was seen as a harbinger of multipolarity. . Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund A. The rush to proclaim the return of multipolarity in the 1960s and 1970s. However we view this venerable explanatory variable. why do so many writers hasten to declare its demise? The answer may lie in the common human tendency to conflate power trends with existing relationships. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. And unipolarity is not a “moment. political science. Beloit College.A. new forms of interdependence. “hegemony” was deªned as “the U. Even if world politics works by the old rules—even if democracy. In the 1980s. each act of defiance of Washington’s preferences on any issue comes to be seen as the return of a multipolar world.S. Wohlforth.
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which acquire new energy. power. and some will leave the alliance. The security threshold corresponds to the quantity of power that Waltz calls “appropriate” for a state to be secure in an anarchic international system. because they thought in terms of absolute. . especially if one side should defeat the other. “The Security Curve and the Structure of International Politics. The concept of balancing necessarily implies that there is a maximum amount of power that a state can accumulate to achieve maximum security. its allies and that further increases in its power become gradually less useful.1162/ISEC_a_00037 Beyond a certain point.mitpressjournals. Institutions. The flow of defectors encourages the major power’s rivals.30 Obviously.org/doi/pdf/10. not relative. Further increases in the major partner’s power will exacerbate differences with its allies. Meanwhile. on the other.” International Security. where further increases in the major state’s relative power no longer compensate for the defection of its allies and the mobilization of neutral states into the enemy coalition.) http://www. and relations with enemies and neutrals. the game is no longer worth the candle for the allies: the threat posed by their enemies is relatively less significant than the threat of growing control posed by their major partner. (Davide. The situation eventually reaches a tipping point. Classical realists did not make this point explicitly. leaving the aspiring hegemon less secure than before. neutral states begin to reflect on the costs of their neutrality. This result stems from a structural disequilibrium between allied relations. The apex of the parabola corresponds to an implicit concept in realist balance of power theory: the security threshold.38 of 154 Bad – Generic Hegemony and increases in military power result in backlash Fiammenghi 11. postdoctoral fellow in the Department of Politics. so that it can accommodate the evolution of technology and the eventuality that an arms race could frustrate a state’s expansionist efforts. The concept must be understood in a relative sense. A parabola nicely illustrates the relationship between power and security that I have just described. When the state’s coalition is able to effectively discourage aggression. History at the University of Bologna. on the one hand. there is no amount of absolute power that can guarantee a state’s security once and for all. In the meantime. Further increases tilt the balance in favor of the major power’s rivals. the gains that a state accrues from further increases in its power will start to diminish. This threshold represents the maximum amount of power a state can accumulate before further increases begin to reduce its security. leaving them with little choice but submission. Beyond that threshold. Neutral states realize that the moment has come to take sides. At some point. power maximization and security maximization become incompatible goals. Spring 2011. the control that the major partner exercises over its allies becomes stronger.
Russia. because U. if they were drawn into the war. If China were able to successfully annex Taiwan. China. but now that China is on the verge of possessing a survivable nuclear retaliatory capability. the po-tential risks to the United States of coming to Taiwan's (or Japan's) defensealso are increasing.decision makers "care more about Los Angeles than they do about 'Taiwan. India and Great Britain. which increases the chances for conflict. Taiwan and United States are the primary actors in this scenario.pdf) A war between China."29This comment illustrates an important point:: Taiwan matters more to China than it does to Washington (and one hopes Los Angeles matters more to U.28 As China's military power—conventional and nuclear—increases. However. China-Taiwan war escalates globally and goes nuclear Hunkovic. other countries will not be considered in this study. because states increasingly have greater latitude to pursue theirown foreign and security policy agendas than was the case during the coldwar. as well as all other countries in the world that participate in the global economy. today. nuclear deterrent there-fore could not prevent Beijing from using force against Taiwan. In a showdown over Taiwan. there are few countries in the world that will not be economically and/or militarily affected by it.” http://www. the United Stateswould be engaged in extended deterrence to prevent China from attacking.S. and the U. Taiwan and the United States has the potential to escalate into a nuclear conflict and a third world war. whose actions will determine its eventual outcome. it is becoming quite real. during the cold war the respective U. both Koreas. The spring 1996 crisis between China and Taiwan is illusive.39 of 154 Bad – China War Heg leads to draw-in to Taiwan war – alliance guarantees Layne 6 Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 167-8 Since the cold war. In addition. Beijing's 1996 threat was. as well as the Pacific and even into India.27ln contrast. the strategic context affecting extended deterrence has shifted against the United States in other ways. “The Chinese-Taiwanese Conflict. both superpowers exercised considerable control over their major allies and thus were at minimal risk of being chain-ganged into a conflict—that is.officials than does Taipei).S. therefore. there is a real risk of the United States being dragged into a war because of a protected state's irresponsible behavior. intervention in what it regards as an internal Chinese matter.S. however. of course. China now was a nuclear power. Moreover. hollow. For one thing. East Asia's likely flash-points are contested gray areas.S. Australia. which could in turn create an international standoff and deployment of military forces to contain the threat. including Japan. which reduced the chances for a superpower clash. and Soviet spheres were demarcated clearly. In any case. A good illustration is the current Taipei regime's flirtation with declaring the island's independence fromChina—a move that Beijing says would compel a forcible Chinese re-sponse—which poses a real danger that the United States could be ensnared in a major war by the risk taking behavior of its Taiwanese client state. would be engaged in direct deterrence to prevent U. in which the United States and China are the two most dominant members. the possibility exists that they could then plan to attack Japan and begin a policy of aggressive expansionism in East and Southeast Asia. instead of the cold war's clearly delineated spheres of influence.lampmethod. During the crisis—which China provoked by conducting intimidatingmilitary exercises in an attempt to influence Taiwan's presidential elections—a Chinese official said that unlike the Formosa Strait crises during the1950s. if China and the United States engage in a full-scale conflict.org/eCommons/Hunkovic. many countries other than the primary actors could be affected by such a conflict. Beijing. 09 – American Military University (Lee. getting dragged into a war in which their own interests were not directly implicated because of the actions of an ally or client. . therefore.S.
the United States should not ignore the potential strategic ramifications of China’s arrival on the world stage as a great power. because the United States has the “last clear chance” to adopt a grand strategy that will serve its interests in balancing Chinese power without running the risk of an armed clash with [end page 73] Beijing. Published by Routledge. Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute. depends largely on what strategy the United States chooses to adopt toward China. p. On this score. Sino-American conflict is virtually certain. Whether Washington and Beijing actually come to blows. 2007 ["The Case Against the American Empire." American Empire: A Debate. 73-74 ] To be sure. the lesson of history is that the emergence of new great powers in the international system leads to conflict. the notion—propagated by Beijing—that China’s will be a “peaceful rise” is just as fanciful as claims by American policy-makers that China has no need to build up its military capabilities because it is unthreatened by any other state. not peace.40 of 154 XTN: China War Primacy is a collision course with China – conflict inevitable Layne 7 Christopher LAYNE. however. this does not mean that the United States and China inevitably are on a collision course that will culminate in the next decade or two in a war. however. . ISBN 0415952034. If the United States continues to aim at upholding its current primacy. After all. Still.
asymmetric conflicts against terrorists (in the Philippines.com/10_06_03/cover. http://www. on its present course. and rising great powers like China could erode America’s relative power—especially if the U. Perhaps the proponents of America’s imperial ambitions are right and the U. and thereby overreach themselves. possibly in a failed Pakistan.S. October 6 2003.S. regional powers (Iran. The British found out toward the end of the 19th century that a seemingly unassailable international power position can melt away with unexpected rapidity. history reminds us that things change fast in international politics.” Hegemons have lots of power and because there is no countervailing force to stop them.amconmag. Over time. Counter-balancing will quickly erode US dominance Layne 3 Christopher Layne.S. is too mighty to be counter-balanced.41 of 154 Bad – Counterbalancing US hegemony risks a geopolitical backlash.html] As for the argument that the U. will not suffer the same fate as previous hegemonic powers. this hegemonic muscle-flexing has a price. 2003 [The American Conservative. Member of Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy. North Korea). Indeed. suffers setbacks in future conflicts. they are tempted to use it repeatedly. and elsewhere). The Cost of Empire. for example in a war with China over Taiwan. the United States seems fated to succumb to the “hegemon’s temptation. The cumulative costs of fighting —or preparing to fight—guerilla wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Don’t bet on it. The very fact of America’s overwhelming power is bound to produce a geopolitical backlash—which is why it’s only a short step from the celebration of imperial glory to the recessional of imperial power. .
and several years of mounting hysteria about avian flu. “How Globalization Went Bad”.) The same is true for global public health. including the World Health Organization. Yet the threat is too arcane and not immediate enough for the West to force the issue. Globalization is turning the world into an enormous petri dish for the incubation of infectious disease. or other Western agencies in. Bacteria can reproduce a new generation in less than 30 minutes. Solutions are only possible when and where we get the upper hand. Professor of Political Science at UC-Berkeley and Director of the Institute of International Studies. we’re not likely to get any help. Naazneen Barma. because it just evolves too quickly. the world is still not ready for a viral pandemic in Southeast Asia or sub-Saharan Africa. As long as the United States remains the world’s lone superpower. al 7. (Steven. January-February 2007. SARS. Even after HIV. that feel threatened by American power. What’s needed is another great power to take over a piece of the work. America can’t change that alone.S. a power that has more immediate interests in the countries where diseases incubate and one that is seen as less of a threat. Humans cannot outsmart disease. Establishing an early warning system for these diseases—exactly what we lacked in the case of SARS a few years ago and exactly what we lack for avian flu today—will require a significant level of intervention into the very places that don’t want it. Foreign Policy. perhaps not entirely coincidentally. That will be true as long as international intervention means American interference. Matthew Kroenig. while it takes us decades to come up with a new generation of antibiotics. These are often the same countries. The most likely sources of the next ebola or HIVlike pandemic are the countries that simply won’t let U. . Ely Ratner.42 of 154 Bad – Disease Preeminence makes solving diseases like bird flu impossible – only multipolarity reduces global resentment enough to allow for responses to pandemics Weber et. Poor countries where humans live in close proximity to farm animals are the best place to breed extremely dangerous zoonotic disease.
military repeatedly warns of overstretch and is dismayed at the hawkish calls for further adventures.from our inner cities to the slaughters in central Africa -. 2003 [“The Perils of Empire: This Looks Like America’s Moment. Still. ambassador to Iraq.S.S.43 of 154 Bad – Iran Strikes Primacy causes conflict with Iran Layne 7 Christopher LAYNE. The Bush Doctrine’s three key components are rejection of deterrence in favor of preventive/preemptive military action. Most countries in the world. Chief among these is Iraq. It possesses the world's single largest national economy but faces huge trade and budget deficits and economic rivalries from an equally large European Union and a fast-growing China. not only on the nuclear weapons issue but—ominously—with respect to regime change and democratization. http://www. Yet it has taken little comfort from this.S. from the Balkans and Kuwait to Afghanistan and Korea. The United States is unchallenged militarily and sees no rival Great Power in sight. in the recent war on Saddam missionary zeal to remake the Middle East in our own image? We could end up merely creating for ourselves ever Hussein's regime. The fundamental cause of tensions between the United States and Iran is the nature of America’s ambitions in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. concerns about Iranian interference have been magnified. Secretary of State Colin L.at least not now. but its obligations look even larger. it no longer feels constrained from intervening in sensitive areas like the Middle East or Central Asia. Powell. there are other important issues that are driving the United States and Iran toward an armed confrontation. despite the fears of liberals at home and abroad. dominance over that region. These are reflected in current U. Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute. And the fourth is that even the present supine Congress would bestir itself and demand that the brakes be applied. Scared. Bush has stated on several occasions—in language that recalls his prewar stance on Iraq—is that a nucleararmed Iran is “intolerable. Successful in our Iraq military campaign. Navy's carrier groups and the return to think we will not be marching on Damascus or Tehran -. 2007 ["The Case Against the American Empire. however.htm] This brings us to the broadest question of all. Its armed forces look colossal (as did Britain's in 1919). With all that is crying out for attention -. The first is the of other military units for rest and overhaul. Washington Post. US military decline prevents attack on Iran Kennedy 3 Paul Kennedy. it is hardly coincidental that the administration’s policy toward Tehran bears a striking similarity to its policy [end page 76] during the run-up to the March 2003 invasion of Iraq.S. The clear victor of the Cold War. S. Tony Blair insisted that there were "no plans" for invading Syria. foreign service. including its boss. April 20. Iran’s nuclear program and its role in Iraq are merely the tip of the iceberg. Washington’s policy. determination to effectuate a radical shake-up in the politics of the Persian Gulf and Middle East. including members of the current anti-Saddam coalition. it feels less secure and is spending massive amounts on armaments. With Iraq teetering on the brink of a sectarian civil war between Shiites and Sunnis. language. there are at least four reasons announced recall of some of the U. The key question today is whether these assumptions are correct. Infantry divisions were tied down in Iraq or standing by to go there. grand strategy—which has come to be known as the Bush Doctrine. This is because the same strategic assumptions that underlay the administration’s pre- invasion Iraq policy now are driving its Iran policy. the United States and Iran are on course for a showdown.can we really afford this more crumbling frontiers of insecurity. Recently. during the prime minister's question time in the House of Commons last week. Published by Routledge. is it not time to rein in our own "forward" school and be a little more modest in our aims. The main source of conflict—or at least the one that has grabbed the lion’s share of the headlines—is Tehran’s evident determination to develop a nuclear weapons program. The second is that. It is small wonder that while liberals protest soaring defense expenditures. p. the U. The Dutch. should national security interests demand it. ISBN 0415952034. History Should Give Us Pause”.” Beyond nuclear weapons. spending and relations with the international community? Just a few days ago.org/views03/0420-02. Since 9/11. "Big stick" .S. part or all of eight of the 10 U." American Empire: A Debate. Is that a good long-term policy for the number one power in the democratic world? The Dutch aren't alone. has accused Tehran of meddling in Iraqi affairs by providing arms and training to Shiite militias and by currying favor with the Shiite politicians who dominate Iraq’s recently elected government. however. of course. that of defining America's position in the world over the years to come. The third is that an aggressive move against the governments in Damascas or Tehran would probably provoke the wholesale resignation of the U. and gaining U. Zalmay Khalilzad. It has taken on military commitments all over the globe. Professor of History and the Director of International Security Studies at Yale University. are dumbfounded at the threats against Syria and Iran made by influential members of the Bush administration. 76-77 Iran Because of the strategy of primacy and empire. as President George W. In a real sense. the U. In this respect.S.commondreams. I was shocked when a Dutch journalist told me that many of his countrymen were now "scared" of America.
ambassador to Iraq. Iran’s nuclear program and its role in Iraq are merely the tip of the iceberg. Review of International Studies (2009). In a real sense. These are reflected in current U.) Iran Because of the strategy of primacy and empire. however. Heg causes war with Iran Layne 7 (Christopher. 64-65. With Iraq teetering on the brink of a sectarian civil war between Shiites and Sunnis.S. The main source of conflict—or at least the one that has grabbed the lion’s share of the headlines—is Tehran’s evident determination to develop a nuclear weapons program. concerns about Iranian interference have been magnified. not only on the nuclear weapons issue but—ominously—with respect to regime change and democratization. literary and national editor of the Atlantic. as President George W. however. the United States and Iran are on course for a showdown.S. Zalmay Khalilzad. Chief among these is Iraq. it is hardly coincidental that the administration’s policy toward Tehran bears a striking similarity to its policy [end page 76] during the run-up to the March 2003 invasion of Iraq. "The Case Against the American Empire. Washington’s policy. there are other important issues that are driving the United States and Iran toward an armed confrontation. has accused Tehran of meddling in Iraqi affairs by providing arms and training to Shiite militias and by currying favor with the Shiite politicians who dominate Iraq’s recently elected government. The fundamental cause of tensions between the United States and Iran is the nature of America’s ambitions in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. the U. This is because the same strategic assumptions that underlay the administration’s pre-invasion Iraq policy now are driving its Iran policy. grand strategy —which has come to be known as the Bush Doctrine. .44 of 154 warnings to Syria and Iran may continue." American Empire: A Debate.S. Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute. In this respect. but neither the Marines nor the Army are about to embark on another war. determination to effectuate a radical shake-up in the politics of the Persian Gulf and Middle East. Recently. p. The Bush Doctrine’s three key components are rejection of deterrence in favor of preventive/preemptive military action. and gaining U. Bush has stated on several occasions—in language that recalls his prewar stance on Iraq—is that a nuclear-armed Iran is “intolerable.” Beyond nuclear weapons. The key question today is whether these assumptions are correct. dominance over that region.
nautilus. has created a situation that ties the hands of any Iraq administration. reconstruction and reform agendas that will be essential for the reconstruction of Iraq and a reduction of international tensions in a region that is super charged. we should not of course expect peace and development to reign any time soon. together with the dismantling of much of the previous Iraq administrative structure.org/fora/security/SeldonDiscussion. including the United Nations and European nations. coordinator of Japan Focus. the tieing of the hands of the present administration by a series of neoliberal policies that deny fiscal authority to the government. including the systematic withdrawal of US forces and elimination of US bases. Policies that sharply reduced US domination of Iraq.45 of 154 Bad – Middle East War US heg causes Iraqi instability Selden 4 (Mark. http://www. . might create more hopeful conditions for relief. coupled with a stronger international presence. and the farflung base structure designed to support US primacy in the region. What can be said with confidence is that the US has embarked on a course that has brought disaster to Iraq and the region and disgrace to the United States. The Bush administration's attempt to hide the fact that fundamental elements of its flawed policies remain in place seems certain to add fuel to the fire. Whatever the changes.) What policies make sense with respect to Iraq following the transfer of certain formal powers to the handpicked Iraq administration? What is most striking in my view is the continuity of the effort to sustain American domination of Iraq through the permanent stationing of 138. the needs of the Iraqi people and society are unlikely to be met. an electronic journal and archive on Japan and the Asia-Pacific.html. both governments and NGOs. and the transfer of many of the most lucrative sectors of the Iraq economy to American firms. 6/30/04 “Discusson of ‘Notes From Ground Zero’: Power equity and Postwar Construction in Two Eras”. It seems certain that if that multinational presence is predominantly military. This.000 US troops supplemented by allied troops and US mercenaries.
Syria helped gain the release of prisoners in Iran and Gaza. There is no longer any serious "cost" for defying the United States in the global arena. capabilities and reason. And now Turkey and Brazil have cajoled Iran into accepting an agreement that the US. We have been rendered irrelevant. Our pointless and protracted wars in Afghanistan and Iraq will be the last time we will launch a major battle in the region. Unable to win wars or deliver diplomatic coups . That massive show of flexing brawn over brain burst a global perception bubble about our intentions. This credibility was compromised further with our irrational support of Israel's attacks on Lebanon and Gaza in 2006 and 2008/9 respectively.46 of 154 AT: Heg Solves MidEast War US has no influence in the middle east – cant mediate the conflict Narwani. http://www. Russia and China could not. And by the double standards employed over Israel's violations of international law and its illegal nuclear weapons stash .and struggling to maintain our economic equilibrium .particularly when viewed against the backdrop of our startling rhetoric over Iran's nuclear program. 2) The US's inability to achieve a resolution with Iran over its nuclear program.Washington has lost the fundamental tools for global leadership. let alone push through a negotiated solution . and is knee deep in negotiating a solution to the conflict in Darfur. In short.and this after 19 years of a "USsponsored" peace process. May 24 2010. “Washington Just Lost the Middle East in a Big Way”. . And no place does this impotence manifest more vividly than the modern Middle East. despite our insistence on involving ourselves with every peep heard in the Mideast.huffingtonpost.com/sharminenarwani/washington-just-lost-the_b_586222. But nothing highlights our irrelevance more than two recent developments: 1) The US's inability today to convene even perfunctory peace talks between Israelis and Palestinians. 10 Senior Associate @ Oxford University (Sharmine. Germany. The only breakthrough in this long-winded effort to tame Iran's nuclear aspirations was struck by Turkey and Brazil last week. England.html It's official. It is Qatar that stepped in to broker a deal between Hezbollah and the Lebanese government in 2008. France. the US seems incapable of resolving even a traffic dispute in the Middle East.
however. national security. But they can certainly hope to deter America from using it. for 40 years. because it had the Soviet nuclear umbrella.. It didn’t need to. Naazneen Barma. they turn to people like A. in the wake of the Iraq war. it is fast becoming a necessity. the bottom line is simple: The U. end those regimes tomorrow if it chose to do so.D. including Beijing. national security.] The world is paying a heavy price for the instability created by the combination of globalization and unipolarity. ET AL. How would things be different in a multipolar world? For starters. and the United States is bearing most of the burden. The Eastern bloc was full of countries with advanced technological capabilities in every area except one—nuclear weapons. states that felt threatened by the United States could turn to the Soviet Union’s nuclear umbrella for protection. America’s conventional military strength means a lot less to a nuclear North Korea. and the United States is bearing most of the burden. Weber 7 [Steven WEBER. North Korea didn’t seek nuclear weapons. North Korea is the clearest example. The Chinese refuse to admit that there is a problem. No country in the world can dream of challenging U. with its own supply (states willing to share nuclear technology) and demand (states that badly want a nuclear weapon). the bottom line is simple: The U. Matthew Kroenig. President Bill Clinton’s administration readied war plans to strike his nuclear installations preemptively.” Foreign Policy. But that doesn’t matter much from the perspective of a government that thinks the Pentagon has it in its sights. And the best deterrent yet invented is the . and Ely Ratner. Today. Ely Ratner. Consider the case of nuclear proliferation. And the Russians are aiding Iran’s nuclear ambitions.S. and many other capitals. the only state with a tougher nonproliferation policy than the United States was the Soviet Union. nuclear-armed communist neighbors. with Naazneen Barma. No country in the world can dream of challenging U. and even collaborate on some particularly hard cases. Consider the case of nuclear proliferation. and many other capitals. North Korea was surrounded by feuding. Kim Il Sung. with conventional force. great powers could split the job of policing proliferation. But that doesn’t matter much from the perspective of a government that thinks the Pentagon has it in its sights. It has become fashionable. Pyongyang was pushing ahead full steam on plutonium reprocessing facilities. barely flinched when former U. Ph.S. to the detriment of U. conventional military power. U. Now. but they are unwilling to consider serious sticks. Foreign Policy) The world is paying a heavy price for the instability created by the combination of globalization and unipolarity. and Kim’s son rules the country with an iron fist. conventional military power. But they can certainly hope to deter America from using it. January/February. Pyongyang.S. in the wake of the Iraq war. it was officially at war with its southern neighbor. Not a single country that had a formal alliance with Moscow ever became a nuclear power. end those regimes tomorrow if it chose to do so. North Korea’s founder. There’s effectively a market out there for proliferation.47 of 154 Bad – Proliferation Unipolarity makes countering proliferation impossible – only a multipolar world can solve. But.S. military could.S. to comment on the limits of conventional military force. Matthew Kroenig. But today we see the uneven and inadequate level of effort that non-superpowers devote to stopping proliferation. Before 1989. troops on its border. There’s effectively a market out there for proliferation. Within five years of the Soviet collapse. January-February 2007. primacy causes nuclear prolif Weber et. and it stared continuously at tens of thousands of U. The United States may not be able to stabilize and rebuild Iraq. Candidates at the University of California-Berkeley and Research Fellows at its New Era Foreign Policy Center. Khan. It has become fashionable. including Beijing. with conventional force. to the detriment of U. The United States may not be able to stabilize and rebuild Iraq.S. And the best deterrent yet invented is the threat of nuclear retaliation. It’s often forgotten now that. When push comes to shove. “How Globalization Went Bad”. Today North Korea is likely a nuclear power. to comment on the limits of conventional military force. Professor of Political Science at UC-Berkeley and Director of the Institute of International Studies. The Europeans dangle carrots at Iran. In Tehran. The overlap of unipolarity with globalization ratchets up both the supply and demand. But much of this analysis is overblown. That brinkmanship paid off.S. nonproliferation today is almost entirely America’s burden. 2007 “How Globalization Went Bad. Pyongyang.S. The overlap of unipolarity with globalization ratchets up both the supply and demand.S. Saddam Hussein’s great strategic blunder was that he took too long to get to the same place. Having your own nuclear weapon used to be a luxury. (Steven. Few countries had it worse during the Cold War. Professor of Political Science and Director of the Institute for International Studies at the University of California-Berkeley. But much of this analysis is overblown. with its own supply (states willing to share nuclear technology) and demand (states that badly want a nuclear weapon). In Tehran.Q. Moscow simply wouldn’t permit it. al 7. military could. during the Cold War. Issue 158.
That brinkmanship paid off. Today. for 40 years. troops on its border. . Now. Few countries had it worse during the Cold War. North Korea was surrounded by feuding. It didn’t need to. because it had the Soviet nuclear umbrella. and Kim’s son rules the country with an iron fist. Kim Il Sung. nuclear-armed communist neighbors. and it stared continuously at tens of thousands of U.Q. Pyongyang was pushing ahead full steam on plutonium reprocessing facilities. Today North Korea is likely a nuclear power. North Korea is the clearest example.S. But. Within five years of the Soviet collapse. Saddam Hussein’s great strategic blunder was that he took too long to get to the same place. Before 1989. they turn to people like A. President Bill Clinton’s administration readied war plans to strike his nuclear installations preemptively. Having your own nuclear weapon used to be a luxury.48 of 154 threat of nuclear retaliation. Khan. states that felt threatened by the United States could turn to the Soviet Union’s nuclear umbrella for protection.S. however. America’s conventional military strength means a lot less to a nuclear North Korea. it is fast becoming a necessity. barely flinched when former U. North Korea didn’t seek nuclear weapons. it was officially at war with its southern neighbor. North Korea’s founder.
could be classified into this category of stable group hegemony of nuclear weapons. Russia. Stable nuclear group hegemony is quite often challenged by those countries such as North Korea and Iran that are not in compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and other international obligations. counselor and trustee at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and professor of American foreign policy at the School of Advanced International Studies @ Johns Hopkins University) 2007 “Second Chance” p 103 The failure to contain nuclear proliferation in the Far East and in South Asia conveyed a sobering lesson. 4/19. heady days of American unilateral supremacy.K. angered over the new U. Ayatollah Ali Khameini. http://www. nuclear weapons policy. Even Iran's supreme leader. Pakistan. and Israel are nowadays officially recognized to be nations of nuclear weapons. Security Council. The U. A successful preventive effort would have required an early concentration of attention on the issue.49 of 154 AT: Heg Solves Prolif American hegemony cannot prevent proliferation by itself. “Stable Group Hegemony of Nuclear Arms. The lesson bequeathed to the Clinton administration's successor was that even given the great asymmetry of power between the United States and any would-be proliferator. the possibility of nuclear terrorism will always linger around us like a “devil-dream'' embedded in our unconscious mental world. reflecting these kinds of complaints. North Korea is still not returning to the six-party talks. They also tackled how to reduce the number of thousands of poorly guarded nuclear reactors or fuel storage sites in many nations.. though. the only alternative to sear was genuine international cooperation. quite sure of the leaders' capacity to produce stern mandatory international standards or measures to stop further proliferation of nuclear weapons. relevant materials.” Korea Times. Short of a unilateral military action--with all its unpredictable consequences—even the world's only superpower could not by itself dissuade a country firmly determined to acquire nuclear weapons. Zbigniew Brzezinski (formerly President Carter’s National Security Advisor. the traditional standing members of the U.'' This time. programs and facilities. self-restraint and costly consequences for continued pursuit of nuclear weapons. have urged their government to formally complain to the United Nations in a petition that calls the United States a warmonger and threat to world peace. In the early. also spoke out against the Obama administration's revised nuclear policy by saying that ``The United States is a sinister government and cannot be trusted. At the nuclear summit in Washington. at an early stage of the nuclear challenge. a stable group hegemony of nuclear weapons is to create a stable order of nuclear politics. It is apparent that North Korea and Iran will not follow the norms and rules of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).co. China. it was easy to ignore incipient proliferation in the belief that an intimidating response by the United States would eventually suffice to halt it. Of course. the world leaders are strongly urged to develop practical means and ways to keep the stable . India. Heg doesn’t solve prolif – rogue nations don’t follow norms or rules Park 10 – director of public relations at Korean Political Science Association [Tae-woo. and a large majority of Iranian lawmakers. 47 leaders from all over the world discussed the ways and means of how to secure all weaponsuseable nuclear material within four years and how to eliminate the possibility that terrorists could buy or steal a nuclear weapon. France and the U.html] In the same context.S.. mounted on at least a regional basis.N.koreatimes. If those challenges are not tackled properly through this kind of nuclear summit diplomacy. We are not.kr/www/news/opinon/2010/07/198_64433. determined and coordinated mobilization of other concerned states.S. and early formulation of a program including both incentives.
50 of 154 nuclear order rooted firmly on earth with detailed plans such as how to curb North Korea and Iran's nuclear programs in the future. .
Earlier in March the Kremlin had suggested that the international community should have a say when the world's richest countries make decisions with global implications.51 of 154 Bad – Russia War Heg destroys Russian relations and causes global war Press TV 9 (“Medvedev lashes out at US hegemony. His remarks came shortly before the US President Barack Obama delivered a key speech in New York.presstv.aspx? id=106209§ionid=351020602.ir/detail." he added. There can be no "high-flown justification for military adventures. Dmitry Medvedev said those problems of one country. attacking efforts by any party to advance what he called "utopian projects of global supremacy … 'Global Caliphate' or 'Benevolent Hegemony'". Speaking at the opening of a global security conference in the central Russian city of Yaroslavl on Monday. suppression of rights and freedoms -. where he described the global economic crisis as Washington and Wall Street's "collective failure". "This happens immediately and incompetence and reluctance to solve one's own problems inflict damage not only to your country but to a huge number of other countries. Medvedev did not refer to the United States by name but the target of his comments was clear. .of any illegal activities.” Sept 15 http://www. The Russian president also lashed out at what he thought the "ill-thought-out" policies of a country that led to the global financial melt down. Medvedev's comments further developed those ideas." he stressed. have the potential to lead to international conflict.) Russia's President has slammed America's global dominance saying all nations have the right to remark on the policies of a state whose actions affect the world.
both are being forced by America's aggressive posture to revamp their militaries. This is an idiotic provocation as the Russians can eliminate anti-ballistic missiles with cruise missiles. Russia and China have now witnessed enough of the Bush administration's unprovoked aggression in the world to take neocon intentions seriously. as he begins a foreign tour designed to revitalise Chinese diplomacy. US administrations after Reagan's have broken the agreements and understandings.guardian. and its criticism of the occupation of Iraq has been muted. Thus. Is Bush blind to the danger that he will cause an Islamic revolution within Pakistan that will depose the US puppet and present the Middle East with an Islamic state armed with nuclear weapons? Considering the instabilities and dangers that abound. Reagan and Gorbachev ended the cold war. for the military-security complex and are paid to restart the cold war for the sake of the profits of the armaments industry. After a week in Russia Mr Hu will attend the G8 conference in France. But Chinese diplomacy is still based on seeking good relations with the US.com/roberts/?articleid=11422) This week the Russian and Chinese militaries are conducting a joint military exercise involving large numbers of troops and combat vehicles. Meeting in Moscow yesterday. Unilateralism leads to a Sino-Russia alliance. the US failures in Iraq and Afghanistan. . Russia. the predominance of the US in the post-Iraqi-war world. Today.co. That means the conflict toward which the neocons are driving will be a nuclear conflict. These are gratuitous acts of aggression. Other countries appear ready to join the military alliance. Both the Russian and Chinese governments are trying to devote resources to their economic development. They also said that the UN should be given the "central role" in Iraq's reconstruction. where China has been given observer status for the first time. if not counterbalance.and shocked . like Bush and Cheney. His senior military advisers appear to have been impressed . Neocons are people who desire war. The neoconservative idiots have actually written papers. they said that they stood for "a multipolar. he will stand aside and permit Bush to make air strikes inside Pakistan. saying scenarios "of forceful pressure or use of force are unacceptable". Yet. and China would establish the hegemony of the cockroach. Neocons believe that the US is supreme in the world and can dictate its course. they called for a peaceful solution on the Korean peninsula.by the White House's pre-emptive strategy. Cynics believe that the neocons are just shills. In an attempt to gain the advantage in a nuclear conflict. read by Russians and Chinese. it most certainly cannot occupy Russia or China. Kyrgkyzstan. The Bush regime even thinks that as it has bought and paid for Musharraf. The Bush regime has initiated a propaganda war against the Russian government of Vladimir Putin. But the fact is that the neocons actually believe their delusions about American hegemony. “US Hegemony Spawns Russian-Chinese Military Alliance”. about why the US must use its military superiority to assert hegemony over Russia and China.china The new president of China. has joined President Vladimir Putin of Russia in a call for a "multipolar world" while condemning "the use of force". Americans need to understand what the neocon Bush regime cannot: a nuclear exchange between the US. The Bush regime is the most irresponsibly aggressive regime the world has seen since Hitler's. http://www. America's influence in the world is limited to its payments of tens of millions of dollars to bribed heads of foreign governments. and now believe that China must do more to hold its own. Hu Jintao. but know nothing about it. not to their militaries. and Kazakstan are participating. such as Egypt's and Pakistan's.uk/world/2003/may/28/russia. As the US has proven that it cannot occupy the Iraqi city of Baghdad despite 5 years of efforts.antiwar. The US gratuitously brought NATO and anti-ballistic missiles to Russia's borders. The former Soviet Republics of Tajikistan. The two presidents are trying to establish a better Sino-Russian understanding which will offset.52 of 154 Bad – Sino-Russia Alliance Heg leads to a Sino-Russia Alliance that culminates in superpower nuclear conflict Roberts 07 Economist and Former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury (Paul Craig. the aggressive posture of the Bush regime goes far beyond recklessness. the neocons are positioning US anti-ballistic missiles on Soviet borders in Poland and the Czech Republic. at least in the medium term. However. The Guardian 3 5/28/2003 “China and Russia look for a counterbalance” http://www. This new potent military alliance is a real world response to neoconservative delusions about US hegemony.5 years the Bush regime has destroyed the world's good will toward the US. before he left home Mr Hu called for more military modernisation of China. In a mere 6. In another thrust at US unilateralism. just and democratic world order" on the basis of international law. Significantly.
S. The Bush administration just announced that it is going to employ a missile defense system.53 of 154 Bad – Space Weapons Hegemony causes a buildup of space weapons O`Hanlon 6 Michael E. O’Hanlon. for more than twenty straight years. consciously. 13] Non-American opponents of weaponizing space make many of the same arguments.) In 2001 China presented an incomplete draft treaty banning the weaponization of space. by American calculation it might have tripled.: Brookings Institution. Computer errors are daily occurrences in the US computer system. a small ABM system around Moscow. 2006 [“The State of Space: From Strategic Reconnaissance to Tactical Warfighting to Possible Weaponsization” ed. so instead of having twenty missiles targeting the United States they’ll build it up and probably have a submarine launched capacity. dominating the world by force and dismantling the hated welfare state measures at home. deployment. American strategic analysts call that an accident waiting to happen. The Chinese are surely going to respond to a so called missile defense system since it eliminates their strategic nuclear capacity. It was also just reported that the Pentagon is developing hypersonic planes which will orbit in space. but there was another one which was important and hasn’t been much discussed. undermined ratification of old bio-weapons treaties. which they claim are much more sophisticated and are on computer controlled automated launch. Noam Chomsky 4/24/2004 “an interview with Noam Chomsky. that they’re deploying their offensive missiles. It means putting space platforms in orbit from which you can launch offensive weapons. We know how the US reacted to this when the Russians made a slight move in that direction by placing. The US is developing low yield nuclear weapons which is in violation of international treaties and the Russians understand. that's the way the cookie crumbles. U.htm Well the most visible and publicized implementation was the invasion of Iraq. China increases its missile capacity. What does ownership of space mean? Well that’s presented in leaked plans. well that’s OK. So have a number of U. as well as the ASAT debate of the 1980s. But it has taken on a new tone in what many view as an era of American unipolarity or hegemony. The air force space command immediately announced plans to move from it called control of space to ownership of space. enter the atmosphere at the last minute so they can’t be detected and instantaneously drop highly destructive precision weaponry. The UN General Assembly has continued to pass resolutions. p. if you increase the threat of terror. And its not that Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld and so on want the world destroyed.S. the Russian systems are worse. in 1968. In comparison if you threaten to blow up the world.org/April2004/Mars0424. These things are going to misfire. They very pointedly said this is in response to US escalation. You get a ripple effect. without warning and instantaneously with first strike authority. Think what they’re going to be like in the Russian systems. You are asking for a disaster. most of which do not favor putting weapons in space. as do strategic analysts. China and Russia have been consistently vocal in their opposition to the weaponization of space and their desire for a treaty banning the testing. opposing the weaponization of space. including Canada. India responds. allies. Testimony before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces of the House Armed Services Committee. The world is under very tight surveillance so you can detect if somebody is walking across the street in Ankara.C. so they’re going to react to it. Everybody knows that a missile defense system is an offensive weapon. it’s a first strike weapon. India increases it and Pakistan responds. you can find them. Now others react to that threat. highly destructive weapons. and Georgia abstained.” http://www. Washington D. That sets off a new cycle. They immediately moved to undermine international treaties. The American systems which are much more sophisticated have a three minute period during which human intervention can prevent automated response. June 21. that their purpose is to attack the command bunkers that control their retaliatory nuclear systems. targeting the rear outposts with nuclear weapons so they would overwhelm any possible defense. that’s important. The US reacted at once by targeting it with offensive nuclear weapons. (The vote passed by 156 to 0. which in 1998 proposed that the United Nations convene a committee on outer space in its Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. They also worry about a unilateralist America pursuing its own military advantage at the expense of other countries. the United States. and in 2002 China and Russia jointly presented another draft that included bans on weapons based in space and on any use of weapons against objects in space. In recent years. This dispute has much of its origins and motivation in the history of the ballistic missile defense debate. so Russian defense spending has predictably sharply increased since Bush came in. The Bush administration immediately moved to expand offensive military capacity. Do you think the Russians will react differently? No they’re saying straight out that they’ve adopted Bush’s first strike doctrine. Do we want Pakistan to increase its offensive nuclear capacity? Have a look at how their missiles are controlled. In December 2001 it called for negotiations on a treaty to prevent an arms race in outer space at the Geneva Conference. Israel. Just a couple of weeks ago the Russian had their first major military maneuvers in the last two decades. This is extraordinarily dangerous. It terminated negotiations on an enforceable bio weapons treaty. those risks aren’t important as compared to what its important. which is exactly consistent with the security strategy. . Micronesia. and use of such capabilities.dissidentvoice. raising the threat to survival. These moves are deliberately. it just doesn’t matter much to them. hegemony will force space weaponization which causes space racing resulting in extinction. that no one can challenge our total domination. There’s universal agreement on this by both sides.
54 of 154 .
strictly speaking. The Bush administration’s deliberate fabrications were designed to win Congressional and public support for a prolonged ‘surge’. As Bruce Hoffman says. ‘It is hardly likely that Middle Eastern radicals would be hatching schemes like the destruction of the World Trade Center if the US had not been identified so long as the mainstay of Israel. the Shah of Iran. Review of International Studies (2009). Terrorists may not be able to balance against the US. it is dangerous for the US to base its strategy for combating terrorism on the belief ‘that Muslims hate and attack us for what we are and think rather than for what we do’.41 In a similar vein. it has grossly exaggerated the links between the insurgent group Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and Osama Bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda organisation and. it is clear that the Bush administration never intended to withdraw from Iraq militarily and aimed for the US to retain permanent US military bases there. or resistance. And. this claim overlooked the fact that AQI came into existence only after the March 2003 US invasion of Iraq. but they can engage in a related form of activity aimed at undermining American primacy by raising its costs. Indeed the use of violence for such purposes is the hallmark of terrorism. and ideological reasons. .38 Terrorism.46 Al-Qaeda fits this pattern. the 9/11 attack was in keeping with the Clausewitzian paradigm of war: force was used against the US by its adversaries to advance their political objectives. .45 In other words. the Bush adminis. Cambridge Journals. President Bush’s endlessly reiterated claim that the US was attacked because Islamic radicals ‘hate us because of our freedom’ betrayed a complete misunderstanding of the dynamics that underpin the clash between the US and Middle Eastern terrorists. beyond connoting the idea of counterweight. and widely popular foreign policy goals .40 Here. and American military planners are preparing for a long-lasting ‘post-occupation’ US presence there. Underscoring this point. and Jordan. tenuous. . indeed. who served as senior American commander in Iraq during the surge and now heads CENTCOM (the US military command with overall responsibility for the Middle East) has repeatedly emphasised that the US commit. Richard K.51 In fact. in Iraq the US is fighting the same terrorists who attacked the US on 9/11. because it is an instrument that the weak use against the strong. the military actions of Al-Qaeda and its allies are acts of war.43 Specifically. and it is likely that there will be more US forces in Iraq in January 2009 than there were prior to the surge. engaged in ‘balancing’ the US (because balancing is a form of state behaviour). Al-Qaeda wants to compel the US to remove its military presence from the Persian Gulf.47 Here.49 When it first announced the surge. the government of Iraqi Nouri al-Maliki indicated that Baghdad wanted to set a timeline for US troop withdrawals. but their actions are of a kind frequently found in international politics: the use of violence against a state(s) to attain clearly defined political objectives. at best. After all. of course. The Iraqi government refused to accede to the Bush administration’s desire to negotiate a long-term security agreement that would allow the US to maintain permanent bases in Iraq. there are Islamic radicals who. and one of its principal objectives ‘is the expulsion of American troops from the Persian Gulf and the reduction of Washington’s power in the region’.50 General David Petraeus. and thereby trigger an upsurge of popular discontent in the Islamic world that would lead to the overthrow of the Saudi monarchy and other proAmerican regimes in the Middle East (Egypt. the actions of groups like Al-Qaeda reflect some of the key attributes of balancing. Scheurer observes that. at the same time. Organisations like Al-Qaeda may be non-state actors.39 From this perspective. senseless. Although the Bush administration had strongly opposed any suggestions that there should be a fixed timetable for US withdrawal from Iraq in July 2008. In fact. literary and national editor of the Atlantic. is fundamentally an asymmetric form of conflict.) Terrorist organisations like Al-Qaeda are non-state actors. meant to advance bin Laden’s clear. even when the surge itself has ended.52 What will happen under the new US administration is unclear. Instead it lasted well into 2008. and as such. But that is not why the US is a target for Islamic terrorists.48 Bush repeatedly asserted that. 9/11 represented a violent counterreaction to America’s policies in the Middle East – especially its drive to dominate the region both geopolitically and culturally. any draw-down of US forces will take place gradually. the administration said it would last through 2007. As German military strategist Carl von Clausewitz himself observed. Despicable and brutal though it was. “America’s Middle East grand strategy after Iraq: the moment for offshore balancing has arrived”. terrorism is ‘about power: the pursuit of power. The Bush administration. Betts observed following the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center that. claimed that the US is fighting terrorism in Iraq. In his study of suicide terrorist groups.44 Al-Qaeda’s leaders also apparently hoped that the September 11 attacks would provoke a US overreaction. limited.’. and that its links with Bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda are.42 It is the US’ attempt to impose its primacy and preferences on the Middle East that fuels groups like Al-Qaeda and fans Islamic fundamental. To make this point. 5/25/9. focused. balancing also signifies opposition. and the use of power to achieve political change’. As Michael Schuerer – who headed the CIA analytical team monitoring Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda – says. Al-Qaeda seeks to undermine US primacy. they are not.ism. ‘irrational’ act of violence. religious. hence – in a blatant prevarication – tied AQI and the war in Iraq to 9/11. For sure.tration’s inflexible determination to maintain a long-term American military presence in Iraq is exactly the wrong policy to reduce terrorism. moreover. President Bush all but confirmed this in May 2007 when he said that he wanted the US to play the same kind of role in Iraq that it has in South Korea since the end of the Korean War. to a hegemon. for example) and their replacement by fundamentalist Islamic governments. Terrorism is a form of ‘blowback’ against America’s preponderant role in international affairs. and thereby compel changes in America’s Middle Eastern grand strategy. During 2008. and force Washington to alter its stance on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. . not terrorism . Bush’s position seemed to soften and the administration said the US would support a ‘time horizon’ for US . Of course. The US presence on the ground in the Middle East also incites terrorists to attack American interests. and conservative Arab regimes and the source of a cultural assault on Islam’. the acquisition of power. Yet. do hate the US for cultural. ‘War is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its political object’.ment to Iraq is long-term in nature. ‘In the context of ideas bin Laden shares with his brethren. Pakistan.55 of 154 Bad – Terrorism US Heg causes terrorism – US presence in the Middle East and 9/11 proves Layne 9 (Christopher. Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute. the 9/11 assault on the US was not a random. the 9/11 attack was undertaken with cool calculation to achieve well-defined geopolitical objectives. Pape has found that ‘what nearly all suicide terrorist attacks have in common is a specific secular and strategic goal: to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from territory that the terrorists consider to be their homeland’.
emerge victorious.53 What the new US admin.56 of 154 troop withdrawals from Iraq as an ‘aspirational goal’. The huge US politico-military footprint in the Middle East region – including Iraq – is.) and Senator John McCain (R. 04 – Al-Ahram political analyst (Mohamed. along with America’s policy on the Israel/Palestinian issue. Ill.” Al Ahram Weekly. August/September 1. Instead of solving this problem.eg/2004/705/op5. No.org. Societies would close in on themselves.istration will do about the US presence in Iraq is an open question. and turned the entire region into a source of recruits for various radical terrorist groups. tensions different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a could lead to a third world war. http://weekly. This between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. The impact is extinction Sid-Ahmed. military presence in Iraq for some time to come.) during the 2008 US presidential campaign. staying in Iraq will exacerbate it. The admin. it seems certain that there will be a significant American Instead of reducing American vulnerability to terrorism. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another.htm) What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails. the presence of US troops in Iraq and the Middle East increases it by reinforcing the widespread perception in the Islamic world that the US is pursuing a neo-colonial policy in the Middle East in furtherance of its own imperial ambitions. 705. the primary driver of Middle Eastern terrorism. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet. Ariz. police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights.istration’s overall policy in the Middle East has inflamed anti-American sentiment. from which no one will war will be without winners and losers. “Extinction!. we will all be losers. but based on the positions taken by Senator Barak Obama (D.ahram. this .
Al-Ahram Weekly Online. . Jordan. which poses a real threat not just to one society or country.htm) Any incoming US president must bear in mind several lessons from the lean years of the Bush presidency.org. it must detach that drive from its imperial ambitions. “Collapse of Empire. if the US intends to deal seriously with a drive to end terrorism. Secretary General of Arab Thought Forum. Amman. The American insistence on pursuing its project of global hegemony behind the guise of the war on terror was ultimately detrimental to both causes.” http://weekly. In the future.Terrorism Heg can’t solve terrorism. Arab Thought Forum.eg/2008/915/op1. The first is that it is dangerous to link terrorism. The hegemonic project is on the verge of collapse after the US has been sapped of enormous resources while terrorism has become more widespread.ahram. Secretary General. 08 (Hassan Nafaa. 9/24/08. Nafaa. with imperial ambitions.57 of 154 Heg Fails .
Bin Laden has repeatedly said that he attacks the United States because of its occupation of Muslim lands and its support for corrupt Middle Eastern governments. 5/25/9. however. Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute. henhouse.S.asp?id=2182.S.independent. Ph. . foreign policy causes blowback terrorism against the United States? Again. The upshot of Rev.) But what about Wright’s implication that U. asymmetric strategies mean the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities. these states seek other methods of offsetting American power. Review of International Studies (2009). Regional powers – especially those on the US hit list like Iran and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq – cannot slug it out toe-to-toe against the US’ dominant hightech conventional forces. the chickens would not be roosting as much in the U.S.traditional balancing that is being employed to contest US primacy. the facts are on his side. and dissuading Washington from using its military muscle against them.58 of 154 XTN: Terrorism Heg causes terror Layne 9 (Layne.org/newsroom/article. WMD – especially the possession of nuclear weapons – is one way these states can level the strategic playing field and deter the US from attacking them. interventionist foreign policy toward the Middle East is not.S.S. Wright’s remarks is that if the United States militarily intervened less overseas. Cambridge Journals. Poll after poll in the Arab/Islamic world indicates that U. The use of asymmetric strategies to oppose American power – especially in the Middle East where US policy has an imperial dimension – illustrates the dictum that empires inevitably provoke resistance. Heg causes terror – empirics and polls Eland 8 (Ivan. Wright’s largely correct analysis of U. foreign occupation and military interventions with blowback terrorism against the U. in Public Policy from George Washington University and Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute. Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute.S. May 5. literary and national editor of the Atlantic. http://www.D. but U. Finally. targets. empirical studies have linked U. foreign policy is being thrown out with his other wacky and bigoted ravings. “Reverend Wright Is Not Totally Wrong”. It is too bad that Rev. Terrorism is another asymmetric strategy – one employed by non-state actors like Al-Qaeda and similar jihadist groups – to resist US dominance. and even culture are popular in these countries. Because they are threatened by the US. political and economic freedoms. When employed by states. asymmetric strategies are another type of non. “America’s Middle East grand strategy after Iraq: the moment for offshore balancing has arrived”. technology.) In addition to soft balancing.S.
the utmost effort should be made to capture or kill bin Laden and eradicate al Qaeda. but in the long term the only way to effectively deal with anti – United States terrorism is to reduce the motivation of terrorists to attack America in the first place. Poll after poll in the Muslim world indicates that Muslims like US political and economic freedoms. the Soviet rival is in the dustbin of history. technology. Naturally. Summer 2008. at least a plausible argument could be made for some [End Page 94] US intervention overseas to counter Soviet encroachment. homeland security efforts will likely have only limited effect. it sabotages it. in the short term. Specifically.59 of 154 AT: Heg Solves Terror Terrorists aren’t deterred by military power because it falls out of asymmetric power calculations Eland 08 senior fellow at the Independent Institute (ivan. Retaliation for US interventionism in the Arab-Muslim world is al Qaeda’s primary motive for attacking the United States. Mediterranean Quarterly Volume 19. would make Americans safer at home. The only type of attack that cannot be deterred by the US nuclear arsenal is that from terrorists — as was demonstrated on 9/11. but the US quest for an informal global empire actually undermines this objective. Thus. non-Muslim — occupation of Muslim lands and meddling in their politics by supporting corrupt dictators and Israel. and even culture but hate US meddling in their world. Osama bin Laden’s biggest gripes are with US — that is. Protecting its citizens and property should be the first goal of any government. and the gains from interventionism have been drastically reduced while the costs have skyrocketed. with thousands of miles of borders and many possible targets. But the Cold War is long over. Because conventional and nuclear military power have very little utility in stopping terrorist attacks and because the United States has an open society. practicing military restraint. Number 3. Empire does not equal security — in fact. . rather than interventionism. Back to the Future: Rediscovering America’s Foreign Policy Traditions During the Cold War.
After the second world war. b) Relations Key To Solve Disease Breakout Steinberg 3 James B. vol. can be dealt with far more successfully if we act together. Steinberg. the Germans down and the Americans in. Foreign Policy Studies. we are likely to be far more successful at meeting the new global threats. in almost every case. Summer. not cold-war ideology . Vice President and Director.from business and NGOs to terrorists and money-launderers .and keeping the Europeans apart.org/pub_display. August 13.60 of 154 Bad – US-EU Relations a) Hegemony hurts US-EU relations Layne 3 Christopher Layne.led it to establish its own hegemony over western Europe. money. This is because American hegemony remains the cause of the rift. 2. and preserving our freedom and prosperity. Ocean and land barriers offer little protection. . America's strategic ambitions - based primarily on economic self-interest. Transnational threats.play an increasingly influential role. from terrorism and international crime to environmental damage and disease pose an increasing danger to our well being. During the 20th century. 2003 [Cato Reports.php?pub_id=6001] Major combat operations in Iraq ended in April but the transatlantic rupture between the US and "old" Europe triggered by the war has not healed. the US fought two large wars in Europe to stop a hegemonic Germany from threatening America's backyard. a new ‘global politics’ is required to address the threats and opportunities that affect us all. 45 no. 2003 [The Brookings Institution. Weak states threaten our security as much as powerful ones. It is more accurate to say that America's commitment to the Atlantic alliance is about staying on top . than if we try to achieve these goals alone. The struggle for supremacy has been a feature of US-European relations since America emerged as a great power in the late 19th century. There is a well-known quip that Nato was created to keep the Russians out.cato. In the place of geopolitics.but also foster the proliferation of technology for weapons of mass destruction. people and ideas facilitate the spread of economic opportunity . p. http://www. 113-46] Both the United States and Europe face new global threats and opportunities that. Porous borders and the extraordinary global flows of goods. If we can work together. Non-state actors . Survival. writer at the Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute in Washington.
and the concomitant power imbalance between the United States and Europe.cato.cato. 2003 [Cato Reports. Hegemony has forced an inevitable struggle between the US and the EU Layne 3 Christopher Layne. through the European Security and Defence Policy.led it to establish its own hegemony over western Europe.based primarily on economic self-interest. The eventual rupture arising from this long-simmering dispute may ultimately prove damaging to security on both sides of the Atlantic. America's strategic ambitions .org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6001] The real source of transatlantic conflict is America’s role as a global hegemon.org/pub_display. . http://www. August 13. Washington has tried to hamper the EU's moves towards political unity and strategic self-sufficiency. Unless and until America’s foreign policy elites adopt a new foreign policy vision. Washington is trying to derail the EU's plans to create. 2003 [Cato Reports. relations between the United States and its European allies will only continue to worsen. one that does not presume that the United States will retain its hegemonic position in perpetuity. August 13. writer at the Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute in Washington. 2003 [Cato Reports. not cold-war ideology . the US fought two large wars in Europe to stop a hegemonic Germany from threatening America's backyard.php?pub_id=6001] Unsurprisingly. August 13. After the second world war.org/pub_display. More generally. It has encouraged the expansion of Nato and the EU in the hope that the new members from central and eastern Europe will keep in check Franco-German aspirations for a counterweight to American power. http://www. During the 20th century.php?pub_id=6001] The struggle for supremacy has been a feature of US-European relations since America emerged as a great power in the late 19th century. writer at the Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute in Washington.61 of 154 XTN: US-EU Relations Hegemony will worsen us-eu relations Layne 3 Christopher Layne. http://www. the Bush administration is playing a game of divide and rule to undermine the EU's sense of common purpose.cato. writer at the Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute in Washington. military capabilities outside Nato's aegis. US hegemony undermines EU stability Layne 3 Christopher Layne.
has already tempted Moscow to resume its earlier pressure on Georgia and Azerbaijan to abandon their aspirations for inclusion in the Euro-Atlantic community and to step up its efforts to undermine any enduring U. arresting scores of suspected terrorists. infiltration. Proquest] While Russia has not stood in the way of any decisive U. Former Diplomat at Johns Hopkins & CSIS. They can perform essential tasks of monitoring. These risks could be lessened by closer U. Europe remains a frontline region in the war against terrorism just as it was in the war against communism. given divergent American and European perspectives. The Muslim diaspora communities into which terrorist cells can invisibly blend remain the likeliest staging grounds for future al-Qaeda attacks on the United States. political and military presence in Central Asia.S. it would mean less opportunity for self-serving inaction. A resurgence of Muslim extremism of the Taliban variety could then even acquire a regional scope.-EU strategic collaboration with regard to Iraq and Iran. for the European Union. iss. financial and (to some degree) military support-the Euro-Atlantic community could foster a genuinely stable and possibly even democratic post-Saddam regime. This profound change helps us understand the erroneous premise of Bush’s foreign policy. That would make it more difficult for the United States to engage the Central Asian states in a larger regional effort to combat Islamic fundamentalism in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 2003 [“AMERICAN PROSPECT”. US-EU relations are key to preventing Russia war Brzezinski 4 Zbigniew Brzezinski. the current geopolitical earthquake in the Persian Gulf could jeopardize America's efforts to consolidate the independence of the Caspian Basin states. Europeans’ linguistic skills and cultural knowledge alone ensure that they can make indispensable contributions to U. NYU Law School Professor. Kagan has apparently failed to realize the degree to which the contours of American national security have been redrawn since 9-11. 75. That may not be easy to achieve. despite the prevailing cliche. The war on transnational terrorism depends essentially on information gathering and policing. For the United States. But acting together-with the threat of U.S. In other words. National-security strategy must now operate in a domain where soldiering and policing have become of coequal importance. American preoccupation with the mess in Iraq. disruption and apprehension for which our own unrivaled military machine is patently inadequate. the United States is not the world’s only superpower. the European police have been acting in a perfectly Hobbesian manner. . organized and financed in Europe. The National Interest. In other words. p. despite his pose as a no-nonsense realist. 2003-2004 [“Hegemonic Quicksand”.S. Winter. a joint approach would mean less freedom of unilateral action.62 of 154 Relations Good Relations with EU are key to solve terrorism Holmes 3 Stephen Holmes. military efforts to alter the strategic realities of the region. military power reinforced by the EU's political. 21] The September 11 attacks were partly planned. Their capacities to respond effectively to today’s greatest security threats easily rival those of the United States.S. security. but the benefits of cooperation outweigh the costs of any compromise. The home front and the foreign front have now been disconcertingly blurred. and in these respects the Europeans are anything but security pygmies. In our new security environment.S. not to mention the cleavage between America and Europe as well as the increased American-Iranian tensions. As daily press reports also reveal.
And although the United States remains a dominant international economic player in absolute terms. That exclusion was enforced through everyday brutality. notwithstanding its preponderant power. It is frankly absurd that we spend more today to fight Osama bin Laden and his tiny band of murderous thugs than we spent to face down Joseph Stalin and Chairman Mao. Islamic extremists are scary. They advance arguments diametrically at odds with the primacist consensus. A number continue to do so today.1 But preponderant capabilities across the board do not guarantee effective influence in any given arena. 2011. Supply disruptions are likely to be temporary. After the cold war the outcome of adjustment struggles is less certain because the United States is no longer in a position to dictate the terms. http://depaul. Some scholars. Ebsco. World Politics 61.) During the cold war the United States dictated the terms of adjustment.S. it is unrealistic to expect that a new spasm of global conflict would erupt if the United States were to modestly refocus its efforts. and the costs of mitigating their effects should be borne by those who stand to lose — or gain — the most. April 21. and call on other countries to play a larger role in their own defense.S. their "success" was based on the exclusion of the vast majority of the populations of India and Brazil. Trade routes need not be policed by a single dominant power. McIntyre 11—Professor at Depaul University. The people here have grown accustomed to living at the center of the earth. but it can no longer count on getting its own way.edu/MichaelMcIntyre/Papers/535440/When_Hegemony_Fails) Even when the ruling alliances of colonial India or the Brazil of Empire and Old Republic were not threatened with dissolution. logic of hegemonic stability theory from the very beginning. questioned the What Purpose?” http://www. and other capabilities. and in the security of their respective regions. Western Political Science Association. were put down with a brutality that frequently . But while there are credible alternatives to the United States serving in its current dual role as world policeman / armed social worker.org/u-s-military-power-preeminence-for-what-purpose/ Most in Washington still embraces the notion that America is. episodic and frequently diagnosed as criminal. It derived the necessary leverage because it provided for the security of its economic partners and because there were no viable alter natives to an economic order centered on the United States. Professor of Government at Dartmouth.63 of 154 Doesn’t Solve War Heg doesn’t solve war Christopher Preble (director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute) August 2010 “U. and the very success of the U. not only from the pact of domination or a share in political power.-centered world economy has afforded America’s supporters a greater range of international and domestic economic options. No. specializing in Critical IR Theory. the world’s indispensable nation. of the universe. but from the life of civil society.S. military. It faces rising economic challengers with their own agendas and with greater discretion in international economic policy than America’s cold war allies had enjoyed.academia. “When Hegemony Fails: British Imperialism in India and Brazil from the Nineteenth to the Early Twentieth Centuries”. and forever will be. no longer enjoys the same type of security leverage it once possessed. The claim that the United States is unipolar is a statement about its cumulative economic. dominance in the international security arena no longer translates into effective leverage in the international economic arena. Hegemony fails—obstacles to inclusionary policies. after the cold war it has found itself more vulnerable and constrained than it was during the golden economic era after World War II. The United States. draw down its military power. Military Power: Preeminence for however. The tangible benefits of all this military spending flow disproportionately to this tiny corner of the United States while the schlubs in fly-over country pick up the tab. International Political Economy (Michael. the foreign policy establishment in Washington has no interest in exploring them. but hardly comparable to the threat posed by a globe-straddling Soviet Union armed with thousands of nuclear weapons. The United States may continue to act its own way. Social Movements.cato-at-liberty. 1. and indeed. while their eruptions into the political sphere. U. Heg doesn’t solve war – US lacks influence it used to have to influence conflicts Mastanduno 9 (Michael. Many factors have contributed to the dramatic decline in the number of wars between nationstates. the international economy is complex and resilient.
World Focus. National Security Council at the White House (Nina. however. in the epoch when the ruling alliances of Brazil and India were beginning to come apart. And it wrecked. political activity with broader aims tends to take the form of public and communal resistance: a prophetic community gathers in the Brazilian sertão (Cunha 87 1944). says Robert Kagan. It is a selflimiting form of resistance. Such criminality/resistance is recurrent and endemic. with substantial geographical divergence and uneven enforcement. where some members of the I. In India. Primacy tempted our leaders into a reckless war in Iraq. “The False Promise of Primacy in US Foreign Policy”. as was its implicit goal. then. the reforms in property law needed to carry out such a project were enacted in weakened form after delays of decades. pressed for a deepening of the pact of domination to include an idealized sturdy yeoman peasantry alongside the large landowners who had previously formed their core 86group of allies. who was able to incorporate relatively well-off peasants into a powerful political alliance. There is no reason to think of such activity as other than criminal. fluid. The "dangerous classes" at the bottom of the social hierarchy faced routine criminal sanction. but also localized and evanescent. This misreading of the politics of the dominated is not a simple misreading. it was Gandhi. so long as we remember that it is criminality with a distinctly limited political purpose. there are no channels for such an appeal to be made.64 of 154 crossed into blood lust.C. A fixation on primacy paradoxically managed to undermine the influence and authority . Not only would a call for incorporation be rebuffed. It did nothing to slow China’s influence. Hegemony fails—recent political climate proves. Director of the RAND Center for Asia Pacific Policy. Despite this stringently exclusionary polity. Negation and reversal rather than programmatic reform are its common idiom. In the end. both British and Hindu (Guha 1983.39 Its categories of friend and foe are improvised. Not so. Subordinate groups therefore have little incentive to press for incorporation into the existing alliance. a small landowner turns to banditry when forced off his land by a larger landowner.S.org/blog/2010/01/22/the-false-promise-of-primacy-in-us-foreignpolicy/9372/) One unquestionable success of the Obama administration so far has been to turn the page on the failed Bush foreign policy framework. who reveals a perverse nostalgia for the previous paradigm in his recent writings in which he argues that the Obama administration is formulating foreign policy from a perspective that accepts. the decline of American power. rather than fights. International affairs fellowship from the Council on Foreign Relations. Senior political scientist at RAND Corporation. But the proof is in the pudding. could maintain its pretense only by rigidly excluding dark-skinned lower classes from political participation. and changing." subject to group sanction.S. our relationship with Russia. the belief that the lynchpin of American security was for it to remain more powerful than all other countries by a huge. is one response to subordination. The primary effect of the failure of cultural hegemony. with Moscow’s help. in India through the designation of certain groups as "criminal tribes. In the absence of channels for demands of inclusion. the primacy strategy didn’t deliver. Hachigan 10—Senior Fellow at American Progress. in Brazil through vagrancy statutes and the criminalization of certain aspects of Afro-Brazilian life. The excluded are therefore left with a politics of resistance. Mona Sutphen and I described why this was a misguided strategy in our 2008 book. always at pains (with little success) to present itself to the world as a European civilization in the tropics. however restrictively defined. The Next American Century: How the U. villagers riot to call attention to a corrupt local official. Brazil. It is normally a response with limited aims: slaves kill a harsh overseer. both because the range of loyalties it can mobilize is geographically restricted and because its attention to signs at the expense of strategy. is not that it destabilizes political regimes but that it creates substantial obstacles to the creation of inclusionary polities. though some common features can be found in both contexts. workers in the most heavily industrialized cities in both countries managed to gouge out a space for public contestation that they never gave back. In the end. Can Thrive As Other Powers Rise. 2010. http://worldfocus. you have to remember that American foreign policy leaders during the Bush administration clung to the false promise of primacy. 77-83). Criminal activity. not the British. the Santals of eastern India rise up to expel "outsiders" (diku). It did not prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons. To understand this yearning for American policy of yore. a politics often read as criminality by the dominant. fixed margin. a poor vagrant steals to survive. January 22.
And America needs India to help track extremists. How can we get these big. to say the least. It’s not because the president is looking to attend more international meetings. Obama elaborated on his view of great power relations. and pandemics such as swine flu — the forces of disorder that can and do affect Americans right here at home. In fact. Hachigan 10—Senior Fellow at American Progress. World Focus. in Moscow. and pandemics.org/blog/2010/01/22/the-false-promise-of-primacy-in-us-foreignpolicy/9372/) Robert Kagan now accuses President Obama of reorienting American foreign policy away from its WWII and Cold War roots. America needs Russia to secure its loose nuclear materials so terrorists cant get it. Nevertheless. It’s still early days. International affairs fellowship from the Council on Foreign Relations. Kagan’s analyses fail to discuss two major developments that demand a new approach—the increased potency of transnational threats and the new salience of domestic policy in America’s world standing. knowing that democratic government is the best way to achieve this goal As for primacy. India. any world order that tries to elevate one nation or group of people over another will inevitably fail. Senior political scientist at RAND Corporation. Kagan does not reveal the Obama administration’s reasons for pursuing strategic collaborations with China. Yet no staffer that I have ever spoken with would suggest that these relationships are beyond rivalry. “Our power alone cannot protect us. the fact that the Bush administration embraced the notion of primacy was a comfort to the remaining Cold Warriors. saying. these partnerships are necessary to protect Americans from common threats in terrorists. but the Obama approach is paying dividends. global warming. Moreover. Transnational threats also explain why the Obama administration is taking international institutions seriously. pivotal powers and demand responsibility from them on global challenges Reinvigorate and repair existing alliances Reengage with international institutions and rules. buttering up autocracies and forsaking our democratic allies. and other pivotal powers. President Barack Obama’s approach is different. http://worldfocus.N. but of seeking common cause. America needs China — the world’s largest emitter — to cut down on its carbon. China not only voted for tough U. His political allies and his detractors can agree that Obama sees foreign policy not in terms of asserting America’s unparalleled might. Fortunately. China has agreed to limit its carbon intensity. the contours of the new paradigm are fairly clear: Lead the world in addressing shared challenges Treat other governments and peoples — friends and foes — with respect Forge strategic collaborations with big. including with other major powers.65 of 154 America did have. The World Health Organization led the battle against swine flu last year just as the International Monetary Fund bailed out a slew of countries headed toward financial ruin. international architecture and traditional alliances are not mutually exclusive. Kagan writes as if the Obama administration is engaging with re-emerging powers to prove an ideological point that great power strife is a relic of history. nuclear proliferation. January 22. “The False Promise of Primacy in US Foreign Policy”. Obama dismissed that as a strategy goal in his inaugural address when he observed. National Security Council at the White House (Nina. Kagan barely mentions these threats. economic crises. Russia. nuclear proliferation. On the one-year mark of his presidency. “a great power does not show strength by dominating or demonizing other countries…[G]iven our interdependence. The pursuit of power is no longer a zero-sum game — progress must be shared. focusing on how “to adjust” to the decline in American primacy instead of trying to reverse it. pushing for increased accountability Make basic political and economic rights available to more people. 2010. And. sanctions . He portrays administration officials as naïve ideologues. for the first time last year. America needs all of them to contain pandemics.” Later.” Hegemony fails—cooperation is key to prevent terrorism. but to keep its own people safe. global warming. as Kagan would imply. economic crises. Director of the RAND Center for Asia Pacific Policy. More importantly. proud countries to take these steps? Aggressive diplomacy. it’s because international rules and institutions play a vital coordinating role when threats cross borders.
for example. democracies have been America’s most enduring allies. roughly 2 million Iraqis have left the country and 1. And these nations and others agreed during the darkest days of the financial crisis to coordinate their macroeconomic moves. the American military is not going to win either one of these conflicts. unable to prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons in the first place. To make matters worse. and they invariably end up adopting ruthless policies normally associated with brutal dictators. subject their actions to oversight. as it clear from James Madison’s observation that ‘no nation can preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare. shows that their fears were justified. despite all the phony talk about how the “surge” has worked in Iraq and how a similar strategy can produce another miracle in Afghanistan. more than one hundred thousand Iraqi civilians have been killed. not to mention the weakening of the rule of law at home. The Founding Fathers understood this problem. “US Quest for Global Hegemony”. the United States is now engaged in protracted wars in Afghanistan and Iraq that have so far cost well over a trillion dollars and resulted in around forty-seven thousand American casualties. but Beijing and Moscow did recently join in a harsh rebuke that the International Atomic Energy Agency issued. The United States has also been unable to solve three other major foreign-policy problems. co-chaired by the United States and Russia. in contrast to Kagan’s assertion that the administration has failed to gain “any meaningful Chinese help in North Korea. The unpleasant truth is that the United States is in a world of . 2010. Hegemony fails—resistance. And in our own history. The pain and suffering inflicted on Iraq has been enormous. in fruitless pursuit of victory. it also enforced them.” They have. and allow for independent institutions are more dependable trading partners. countries that continuously fight wars invariably build powerful national-security bureaucracies that undermine civil liberties and make it difficult to hold leaders accountable for their behavior. Iran Review. and there is no end in sight. every post– Cold War administration has tried and failed to settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. rendition and torture over the past decade. Finally. we continue to have differences with these pivotal powers. As anyone with a rudimentary knowledge of world events knows. all indicators are that this problem will deteriorate further as the West Bank and Gaza are incorporated into a Greater Israel. Professor at the Pennsylvania State University School of International Affairs **CEO of Strategic Energy and Global Analysis (STRATEGA) and Senior Lecturer and Senior Research Fellow at Yale University’s Jackson Institute for Global Affairs (Flynt and Hillary. is up and running again. Governments that represent the will of their people are far less likely to descend into failed states.’ Washington’s pursuit of policies like assassination.7 million more have been internally displaced. And the United States.C. now seems incapable of compelling Pyongyang to give them up. Kagan is simply wrong to suggest that administration officials have failed to “continue to press Russia and China for reform. or to wage war on others.org/content/Documents/US_Quest_for_Global_Hegemony. is what President Obama said in Moscow: The arc of history shows us that governments which serve their own people survive and thrive.. Governments that promote the rule of law. What Others Think. The United States has been at war for a startling two out of every three years since 1989. A successor to the START treaty to reduce our arsenal of nuclear weapons is not yet complete. Iran remains a challenge. however. provocative way that ends up being counterproductive. http://www.” Russia has allowed the United States to transport supplies through its territory into Afghanistan. including those we once waged war with in Europe and Asia– nations that today live with great security and prosperity. Of course. Since the war began in March 2003. Moreover. to terrorize their citizens. We may well be stuck in both quagmires for years to come.iranreview. Here. Washington has worked overtime—with no success—to shut down Iran’s uranium-enrichment capability for fear that it might lead to Tehran acquiring nuclear weapons. have been disastrous. Leverette and Leverette 10—*Senior fellow at the New America Foundation in Washington. The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. including on human rights and democracy. but it’s on the way. just not in a grandstanding. December 22. governments which serve only their own power do not. D.66 of 154 against Pyongyang.htm) The results.
It was also a dismal failure. The underlying belief is that new liberal democracies will be peacefully inclined and pro-American. It is a posture he describes as “offshore balancing”—which is actually the United States’ traditional approach to grand strategy. interests. for all its talk of “change”. they are likely to resist this advice and keep threatening states that will not follow Washington’s orders. The Bush administration’s quest for global dominance was based on a profound misunderstanding of the threat environment facing the United States after 9/11. With global dominance. has largely embraced the same delusions of global dominance that got the United States into such trouble on the foreign-policy front under the Clinton and George W. so the more the better. Primacy does not prevent a global nuclear exchange or create regional stability Nina Hachigan and Monica Sutphen. after 9/11. But. Bush over Al Gore in 2000 that. The alternative.” John warns that the Obama Administration. instead pursuing global dominance. the United States rejected [various strategic alternatives]. climate change. President Bush adopted a radical grand strategy that has no parallel in American history. This grand strategy is ‘imperial’ at its core. And the president and his advisers overestimated what military force could achieve in the modern world. on foreign policy issues. a national security strategy based on suing and ratiaing primacy has not made America more secure. or proliferation. and this state of affairs is only likely to get worse in the next few years. because they are virtually limitless. no serious attempt is made to prioritize U. Bush largely ran against the kind of liberal imperialism that Gore advocated and that the administration he served as Vice-President had practiced. the strategy of primacy failed to deliver. America’s military might has not been the answer to terrorism.S. John points out that “the Bush administration’s fondness for threatening to attack adversaries (oftentimes with the additional agenda of forced democratization) encouraged nuclear proliferation. instead believing that other countries—save for so-called rogue states like Iran and North Korea—would see the United States as a benign hegemon serving their own interests. making the world over in America’s image. which means making sure that the United States remains the most powerful state in the international system. disease. This triumvirate of errors doomed Washington’s effort to dominate the globe.” In this vein.” John is equally clear when it comes to diagnosing the source of America’s “world of trouble” on the foreign-policy front: “The root cause of America’s troubles is that it adopted a flawed grand strategy after the Cold War. before it developed hegemonic hubris. p. One would think that such arrogance might alienate other states. and North Korea have become more dangerous in the last seven years. 168-9 In practice. this means that Washington must care a lot about every country’s politics. but most American policy makers of the early nineties and beyond were confident that would not happen. Stanford Center for International Security. especially in the Middle East: “By pursuing this extraordinary scheme to transform an entire region at the point of a gun. If America makes primacy the main goal of . as John points out. Of course. Global dominance has two broad objectives: maintaining American primacy. in turn greatly underestimating how difficult it would be to spread democracy in the Middle East. of course. a strategy of maintaining primacy is counterproductive when it comes to pivotal powers. as Afghanistan and Iraq unravel and the blame game escalates to poisonous levels. undermined American values and institutions on the home front. Iraq. but likely to backfire in dangerous ways if it relied too heavily on military force to achieve its ambitious agenda. Bush took the quest for global dominance to new heights. Worse than being ineffec tive with transnational threats and smaller powers. and threatened its position in the world. in effect. is not “Fortress America” isolationism. 2008. and spreading democracy across the globe. The Next American Century. John Mearsheimer has given it an indispensable guide for thinking through those choices. But as long as America’s leaders remain committed to global dominance. its proponents believe that the United States has the right as well as the responsibility to interfere in the politics of other countries. or what might alternatively be called global hegemony. The best way for the United States to maximize the prospects of halting or at least slowing down the spread of nuclear weapons would be to stop threatening other countries because that gives them a compelling reason to acquire the ultimate deterrent. which was not just doomed to fail. Bush administrations. Iran. From the Clinton administration on. While the fact of being the world’s only superpower has substantial benefits. America still has not faced up to its most fundamental strategic choices in a post-Cold War world. not less.” John reminds those of us who voted for George W.67 of 154 trouble today on the foreign-policy front.
A further constraint on the emergence of great-power rivals is that many of the other major powers are dependent on the international system for their economic welfare and political stability. American cannot trumpet its desire to dominate the world military and then question why China is modernizing its military. which has not stimulated such a response. Those interests are closely tied to cross-border flows of goods. want to disrupt an order that serves their national interests. But it has not. then why shouldn’t the pivotal powers do the same? A goal of primacy signals that sheer strength is most critical to security. President. Integration into the modern world dampens great-power competition and conflict. investment. it surely has.html?mode=print The fact that classic great-power rivalry has not come to pass and is unlikely to arise anytime soon is also partly a result of the United States' behavior. They do not. foreign policy are pervasive. is not perceived as a threat. people.S.flows in which the United States plays a critical role. This is not to say that the United States under the leadership of George W. accordingly. . May/June 2008 . energy.org/20080501faessay87304/richard-n-haass/the-age-ofnonpolarity.S. acted in a manner that has led other states to conclude that the United States constitutes a threat to their vital national interests. Bush has not alienated other nations. services. Haass. U. nor do other powers want to challenge the status quo Richard N.S. Council on Foreign Relations.foreignaffairs. Doubts about the wisdom and legitimacy of U. but this has tended to lead more to denunciations (and an absence of cooperation) than outright resistance. http://www.68 of 154 its national security strategy. and technology -. decline has not produced hegemonic rivalry because the U. for the most part. Foreign Affairs .
in turn.S. Maintaining heg even just to shape the new multipolar system causes backlash and war – only a complete transition away solves Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 158 At the same time.another two decades? Given that American hegemony is destined to end sooner rather than later and that the costs of trying to "shape the international system" to America's liking will rise (even as the benefits of doing so diminish). contrary to my 1993 prediction.S. which. the costs of trying to hold on to hegemony are high and going to become higher. America's military commitments abroad have become a source of insecurity for the United States. U. probably will not be challenged by great power rivals as early as 2010.69 of 154 Clinging to Power -> War Mulitpolarity is inevitable – trying to retain hegemony ensures a war-filled transition Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 190 Advocates of hegemony claim that it is illusory to think that the United States can retract its military power safely from Eurasia. The answer to this assertion is that the risks and costs of American grand strategy are growing. because they carry the risk of entrapping the United States in great power Eurasian wars. The United States can do this by adopting an offshore balancing grand strategy. it is even more doubtful that U. Rather than fostering peace and stability in Eurasia. At the same time. efforts to prolong it. hegemony will endure until the early 2030s. .S. As other states—notably China—rapidly close the gap. security guarantees are driving creeping re-nationalization by America's Eurasian allies. Although the United States. hegemony is fated to end in the next decade or two regardless of U.at best. understandable doubts about the credibility of U. Is it worthwhile paying the price to hang onto unipolarity for. it would make more sense grand strategically for the United States to retrench and husband its resources for the long haul. and the strategy is not likely to work much longer in any event. is leading to a reversion to multipolarity. it doubtless is true that it will take some time for others' balancing efforts to realize their intended outcome. In this changing geopolitical context.S.
Mere. Proponents of hegemony fear that if great power wars in Eurasia occur. Summer 2003. America's Changing Internationalism.e. thus offering a potential explanation for the otherwise puzzling persistence of cooperation in the 1980s despite America’s relative decline. power. As mentioned at the outset of this chapter.S. distilled to its essence. a struggle that will require patience and . While Snidal was modeling a theory he did not believe in. or even benefit somewhat. the United States "could suffer few economic losses during a war. Transition is smooth – decline in power causes global cooperation Carla Norrlof (an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto) 2010 “America’s Global Advantage US Hegemony and International Cooperation” p. First. the waning hegemon continues to be taken advantage of."sa This really is not an economic argument but rather an argument about the consequences of Eurasia's political and ideological. Kupchan.40 Snidal demonstrated that collective action depends as much on the hegemon’s size. Primacy” Database: Academic Search Premier As this new century progresses.S. There are numerous possible geopolitical rivalries in Eurasia. If one were to use Snidal’s production function in the revised model (i. 50 Keohane and Snidal’s predictions – that the waning of American power did not have to jeopardize cooperation – were in this context reassuring. The United States has only limited power to affect the amount of war and peace in the international system. Second. The ultimate vision that should guide U. and the End of U. not just the hegemon. As this transition proceeds. by plugging the numbers from his production function into the revised model). and whatever influence it does have is being eroded by the creeping multipolarization under way in Eurasia. to disguise ulterior motives for U.S. they could bring to power militaristic or totalitarian regimes. as it does on the size of other actors in the international system. so smaller states have to chip in for the good to be provided. while at the same time working with major states in both regions to promote collective management of the global system. and East Asia. involvement in a big Eurasian war. 118. This threat is easily exaggerated. several points need to be made. Europe. By paying attention to the size of all Great Powers. but it's a good bet that some will.S. Political Science Quarterly. these distributional implications haunt the literature and cast decline as inescapable and continuous Withdrawal is smooth Charles A. Most of these will not culminate in war. Snidal opened up the possibility that a more symmetrical distribution of power might enhance the prospects for the provision of public goods. military intervention in Eurasia. the outcomes are going to be caused more by those states' calculations of their interests than by the presence of U. They would also coordinate efforts in the battle against terrorism. closure. The likelihood for cooperation increases with American decline because the hegemon can no longer singlehandedly provide the good as it declines.S. Issue 2 “The Rise of Europe..S. These major powers would together manage developments and regulate relations both within and among their respective regions. this argument is a restatement of the fear that U. proponents of American hegemony overestimate the amount of influence that the United States has on the international system. Hence. Finally. unipolarity will give way to a world of multiple centers of power. 00323195.S. grand strategy is the construction of a concertlike directorate of the major powers in North America. and manipulated. But regardless of whether Eurasian great powers remain at peace. and still find the postwar environment quite costly to its own trade and investment. American grand strategy should focus on making both Europe and East Asia less reliant on U. security and interests inevitably will be jeopardized by a Eurasian hegemon. forces in Eurasia.70 of 154 Collapse =/= War Your evidence overestimates the US’s ability to shape the international system – doesn’t contain conflict and wont shape the new multipolar system Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 176-7 A second contention advanced by proponents of American hegemony is that the United States cannot withdraw from Eurasia because a great power war there could shape the post conflict international system in ways harmful to U. Vol. as well as economic. Keohane explained the persistence of cooperation in terms of states’ continued demand for regimes. the possible benefits of "environment shaping" have to be weighed against the possible costs of U. interests.S.
Mustering the political will and the foresight to pursue this vision will be a formidable task. and East Asia on South Asia and Southeast Asia. information. focus on Latin America.71 of 154 steady cooperation among many different nations. But it is far wiser and safer to get ahead of the curve and shape structural change by design than to find unipolarity giving way to a chaotic multipolarity by default. It will take a decade. and Africa. for reasons of both proximity and culture. North America might. if not two. But the decisions taken by the United States early in the twenty-first century will play a critical role in determining whether multipolarity reemerges peacefully or brings with it the competitive jockeying that has so frequently been the precursor to great power war in the past. Regional centers of power also have the potential to facilitate the gradual incorporation of developing nations into global flows of trade. long accustomed to calling the shots. for a new international system to evolve. long accustomed to passing the buck. Europe on Russia. nor leaders in Europe and East Asia. Neither American leaders. will find the transition an easy one. therefore. The United States will need to begin ceding influence and autonomy to regions that have grown all too comfortable with American primacy. and values. often have the strongest incentives to promote prosperity and stability in their immediate peripheries. Strong and vibrant regional centers.[*] . the Middle East.
there does not appear to be a strong connection between regime type and retrenchment. Nor do declining great powers appear more vulnerable to external predation than other great powers. a range of 61–83 percent. International Security Spring 2011. or the Soviet Union could have done to stay aloft. “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment”.67 Declining great powers also initiated fewer militarized disputes. Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College. producing a range of 67–100 percent. states facing small declines experience levels of hostility in their militarized disputes that are two and a half .69 Far from being more likely to lash out aggressively. and Joseph. and three are debatable. two retrenched and one case is arguable. we find that great powers facing acute relative decline adopted retrenchment in at least eleven and at most fifteen of the eighteen cases. declining power don`t go to war – when they do. even with the benefit of hindsight. but of these.) AK With regard to militarized disputes. declining great powers demonstrate more caution and restraint in the use of force: they were involved in an average of 1. By any accounting. and recovery of lost rank was fairly frequent.61 In many cases of decline. Moreover. Further. seven retrenched. it is hard to say what great powers such as Britain. 35. International Security Spring 2011. two did not. in six of fifteen cases. and Joseph. There are only three cases of autocracy. this does not prove that a preferable policy existed. Wars. Retrenchment is preferable – empirically averages fewer wars than unipolar world MacDonald and Parent 11 (Paul. In contrast to arguments that retrenchment is rare. Nor does the evidence support the view that domestic interests constrain retrenchment. Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami. or because retrenchment allows vulnerable powers to effectively recover from decline and still deter potential challengers. or 72 percent. This may be because external predators have great difficulty assessing the vulnerability of potential victims. These findings suggest that retrenching states rarely courted disaster and occasionally regained their prior position. even if retrenchment was not successful. In the five years following an ordinal transition. do not appear to be a common fate for declining states. a majority of the countries in these cases retrenched shortly after their ordinal transition. In particular.72 of 154 Retrenchment Good Historically. 4. Declining great powers found themselves embroiled in an interstate war in only four of the eighteen cases. evidence at the coarse-grained level tentatively supports the neorealist approach outlined above: during acute relative decline. which makes comparison among groups difficult.7 fewer militarized disputes in the five years following ordinal change compared with other great powers over similar periods. Democracies account for about two-thirds of the great powers in our study. politics is often a game of unpalatable alternatives. preventive or otherwise. and their disputes tended to escalate to lower levels of hostility than the baseline category (see figure 2). Pages 7-44. No. 4. Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College. Of the twelve democracies. Vol. and are slightly more likely to face acute relative declines. yielding parameters from 58 to 83 percent. declining states refrain from initiating and escalating military disputes. accounting for thirteen of our eighteen cases. a significant majority of great powers of differing regime types elected to retrench. France.60 In addition. and in only one of these cases—1935 United Kingdom—did the declining power go to war with the power that had just surpassed it in ordinal rank. “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment”. declining great powers that adopted a policy of retrenchment managed to rebound. great powers experiencing medium or small declines are much less likely to escalate their disputes to high levels of hostility. Pages 7-44. Every one of the great powers in our sample that chose to retrench did so within five years of the ordinal transition. 35.59 In short. No. This suggests timely responses to external constraints rather than domestic intransigence. Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami.68 These findings suggest the need for a fundamental revision to the pessimist’s argument regarding the war proneness of declining powers. eventually recovering their ordinal rank from the state that surpassed them. Vol. Short of a miracle.) AK Based on our universe of cases. wars aren’t global MacDonald and Parent 11 (Paul. there are few restorative solutions available. the predictions of retrenchment pessimists receive little support. Moreover. the rate of relative decline is associated with different levels of hostility across militarized disputes.
and Great Britain could likely coast on a large lead in domestic capital stock. 35. relatively secure continental great powers. In addition. States often curtail their commitments and mellow their ambitions as they fall in the ranks of great powers. International Security Spring 2011. International Security Spring 2011. states can seldom afford to fool themselves or pamper parochial interests when relative power is perilously slipping away. Holding on to exposed and expensive commitments simply for the sake of one’s reputation is a greater geopolitical gamble than withdrawing to cheaper. retrenchment pessimists are incorrect when they suggest that retrenchment is an uncommon policy response to great power decline. Vol. Both are large. fearing the steady erosion of U. Third. No. and recovering hegemons may be influential because they can play a pivotal role in alliance formation. We counter that there are deductive and empirical reasons to doubt this argument. 4. We believe the empirical record supports these conclusions. The last reversal at the pinnacle of power was the Anglo-American transition. Retrenchment good – avoids violence and leads to a better state MacDonald and Parent 11 (Paul.S.73 of 154 times less than the average great power. stakes world of great power politics.93 China faces a variety of domestic political challenges. and work to decrease costly international commitments. Some might view this prospect with apprehension. the United States was slowly emerging from the Civil War. the rate of relative Second and related. Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College. Yet our analysis suggests that retrenchment need not signal weakness. Based on the historical track record of great powers facing acute relative decline. they should be able to more readily identify and eliminate extraneous burdens without exposing vulnerabilities or exciting domestic populations. They do this for the same reason that they tend to seize opportunities to expand: international incentives are strong inducements. Pages 7-44. possess more extensive overseas commitments. which threatens grave harm to any state that tries to cross them. “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment”. In the high- . 4. In the next few years. It is likely to initiate and become embroiled in fewer militarized disputes than the average great power and to settle these disputes more amicably. hegemonic powers should actually find it easier to manage acute relative decline. Although China and the United States differ in regime type. Fallen hegemons still have formidable capability. more defensible frontiers. Theoretically. No. which may complicate its ability to sustain its economic performance or engage in foreign policy adventurism. our analysis suggests some grounds for optimism. Strategic retrenchment peaceful – leads to a balanced multipolar world MacDonald and Parent 11 (Paul. 35. The tenor of that transition may have been influenced by a number of factors: both states were democratic maritime empires. Further. Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College. Far from encouraging further predation. credibility. hegemonic powers. similar factors may work to cushion the impending SinoAmerican transition. Vol.) AK This article has advanced three main arguments. shift burdens to its allies. declining great powers react in a prompt and proportionate manner to their dwindling fortunes. In particular. Some observers might dispute our conclusions. periods of hegemonic transition do not appear more conflict prone than those of acute decline. including strains among rival regions. First. the United States should be able to retrench in the coming decades.) AK Contrary to these predictions. which took place around 1872 and was resolved without armed confrontation. and Joseph. compromise appears to be a crucial component of retreating to a more defensible—and credible—set of commitments. a fact that mitigates potential geopolitical competition. Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami. Pages 7-44. they are no longer the top target for balancing coalitions. the United States is ripe to overhaul its military. almost by definition. These findings suggest that diplomatic moderation and compromise can be a particularly attractive strategy for managing moderate declines. “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment”. Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami. arguing that hegemonic transitions are more conflict prone than other moments of acute relative decline. and Joseph.
Taken together. Competition spurs states to improve themselves. spending can be curbed. Although we make no claim that the rate of relative decline explains everything. and innovation fostered. . we suggest that our study represents a solid first cut and that domestic political factors loom too large in discussions of power transitions and hegemonic change. The historical record gives little cause for despair.74 of 154 decline explains not only the extent of retrenchment but also the form. the more likely states are to reform their militaries. and if done intelligently this makes states better. Some of the invigorating effects of decline may depend on the pervasive pessimism it arouses. The faster the rate of decline. and refrain from using force in international disputes. interest groups controlled. but our findings suggest its benefits are overlooked. it may be unwise to speak these conclusions too loudly. declining powers rise to the challenge of decline so well that they recapture their former glory with some regularity. Retrenchment has a bad reputation. increase reliance on allies. these findings suggest that retrenchment is an attractive strategy for dealing with great power decline. Of course. And there is a fair chance of rebound.
and your ideal world order is one in which no single state is dominant. With so much power in the hands of one country-a country that considers itself destined to lead the world how should other nations respond? Imagine. Walt. and the political fortunes of Sharon and Blair depend on keeping these relationships strong.S. Harvard University.S.S.75 of 154 Heg Turns (1/3) U. as the September 11. http://www. Professor of International Affairs. Professor of International Affairs.org/stable/pdfplus/20031709. by fostering greater cooperation with key allies. http://www.S. The United States will not and should not exit the world stage anytime soon. by rebuilding its crumbling international image. in the world .S. power? Or perhaps you are the prime minister of India. You regard U. How do you deal with American power? This question is one for which every world leader must have an answer. the debate is over how best to deal with it.. So how can Kim stay in power.S. So is the health of the U.S. 05 (Stephen M.jstor. Walt. and they have devised numerous strategies to manage and limit it.org/stable/pdfplus/20031709. Harvard University.. foreign policy tend to portray anti Americanism as hostility toward American values or simple resentment of U. Basic security is at issue. most important of all. President Bush has said that " America was targeted for attack because we're the brightest beacon of freedom . presidents. power and seek to use it to advance their own interests. and. For the rest of the world. foreign policy as often naive and overweening. Harvard University. 2001.S. many governments still value U. terrorist attacks demonstrated. Primacy causes other countries to try to “tame” America – 9/11 proves Walt. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and British Prime Minister Tony Blair have worked hard to establish personal connections with U. opposition and North Korea's Lilliputian status? On the other end of the spectrum. dominance." and North Korea's entire GDP is only one-twentieth the size of the U. Consider Kim Jong I1.S. for a moment. Can you take advantage of parallel U. Bush has called part of an "axis of evil. defense budget. that you are the president of France. The time to worry is now.S.S. September 05. He rules a country that George W. some more daunting than others. So what do you do about the United States? Now picture yourself as the president of Russia. You face serious regional challengesincluding the rising power of China-but relations with Washington are sometimes prickly. Taming American Power. influence. And the response of other states to U. much less improve his position. and the United States' global dominance is disquieting.S. Professor of International Affairs. September 05. given U. economy. US dominance causes terrorism. The only remnants of your country's former superpower status are an aging nuclear arsenal and membership in the UN Security Council. POLICYMAKERS have spent the past decade debating how best to wield American power.S. 05 (Stephen M. Walt. Many countries fear U. interests to advance those of India? Leaders throughout the world face similar issues. Taming American Power. Professor of International Affairs.pdf) U." He . with the market share of U. Harvard University. Yet even Washington's close allies are now looking for ways to tame the United States' might. But it must make its dominant position acceptable to others-by using military force sparingly. Israel and the United Kingdom have long relied on their special relationships with the United States. To be sure.jstor.S.S. power is something Americans must care about as well. How do you improve Russia's situation in a world dominated by U. firms declining in key overseas markets due to anti-American sentiment.pdf) Proponents of a muscular U.
a degree of resentment. "Our leading position in the world will continue to breed unease. were not protesting our policies. issued in March. stated. 2001." . "The terrorists who attacked our country on September 11. and resistance.76 of 154 later explained. They were protesting our existence." And the Pentagon's new National Defense Strategy.
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Their heg good authors only take into account American perspectives, not overseas views.
Walt, Professor of International Affairs, Harvard University, 05
(Stephen M. Walt, Professor of International Affairs, Harvard University, September 05, Taming American Power, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/20031709.pdf)
Americans tend to see U.S. primacy as beneficial to both their country and the rest of the world. In 2002, the Pew Global Attitudes Project found that 79 percent of U.S. citizens believe it is
good that "American ideas and customs are spreading around the world," and more than 70 percent think that U.S. foreign policy takes the interests of other states into account either "a great deal" or "a fair amount." Bill Clinton has described the United States as "a beacon of hope to peoples around the world," and Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington has declared U.S. predominance to be "central to the future of freedom, democracy, open economies, and international order." In other words, without a benign hegemon maintaining a peaceful global order, many countries would not be able to enjoy the prosperity and security they have come to take for granted. Unfortunately, this rosy view of U.S. power is not shared overseas, where, according to the 2002 Pew survey, overwhelming majorities say that the United States considers the interests of others "not much" or "not at all." Between 40 percent and 6o percent of foreigners polled think the United States is waging its war on terrorism not solely out of security concerns, but also
to "control Mideast oil," "protect Israel," "target Muslim governments," or "dominate the world." A January 2005 BBC survey of 21 countries found only five-India, the Philippines, Poland,
South Africa, and South Korea-where a majority of people had "positive" attitudes toward the United States. Although the United States' global standing has rebounded slightly since the invasion of Iraq two years ago, Pew reported in June 2005 that majorities in all 15 countries it surveyed "favor another country challenging America's global military supremacy, "and that support for the U.S.-led "war on terror" is declining on every continent. Indeed, citizens in Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Russia, Spain, and the United Kingdom now hold more favorable views of China than of the United States.
Heg causes conflicts – experts agree.
Wohlforth, Ph.D, political science, Yale University, 99
(William C. Wohlforth, Daniel Webster Professor of Government, B.A. in International Relations, Beloit College, M.A. in International Relations, Yale University M.Phil., Ph.D. in Political Science, Yale University, Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, Summer 1999, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” MIT Press, International Security, Vol 24, No. 1, p. 6, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/wohlforthvol24no1.pdf) Although they disagree vigorously on virtually every other aspect of post–Cold War world politics, scholars of international relations increasingly share this conventional wisdom about unipolarity. Whether they think that the current structure is on the verge of shifting away from unipolarity or that it has already done so, scholars believe that it [unipolarity] is prone to conflict as other states seek to create a counterpoise to the overweening power of the leading state. The assumption that unipolarity is unstable has framed the wide-ranging debate over the nature of post–Cold War world politics. Since 1991 one of the central questions in dispute has been how to explain continued cooperation and the absence of old-style balance-of-power politics despite major shifts in the distribution of power.
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Hegemony causes war and is unsustainable Eland, 2007 (Ivan. Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute. Ph.D. in Public Policy from George Washington University and Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute. “A Foreign Policy that Only Tarzan Could Love.” Feb 12. http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=1911)
Republicans, however, will be happy to know that George W. Bush should not be solely blamed for this aggressive U.S. foreign policy. Although he did ensnare the United States into significant quagmires on the ground in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States’ modern-day interventionist foreign policy dates back to the Democratic Truman administration after World War II. Of all countries during the post-war period, including the authoritarian Soviet Union, the United States has been, by far, the most aggressive nation on the planet with its military. Even during the Cold War, of the two superpowers, the United States was the first-among-equals and took advantage of it to intervene militarily in all parts of the world. The United States used the fight against communism to advance its imperial tentacles into backwater countries, such as Korea, Vietnam, Angola, Nicaragua, etc. At the international security conference, the suave Secretary of Defense Gates dismissed Putin’s unanswered specific charges on U.S. missile defense in Europe, the expansion of a hostile NATO alliance to Russia’s borders, and U.S. meddling in Russia’s traditional sphere of influence by saying that the United States felt that “one Cold War was quite enough.” Yet Putin was right that the United States is pursuing another Cold War, this time an unstated one, against both Russia and China. In his most astute criticism of the lone superpower’s foreign policy, Putin noted that the power amassed by a global power “destroys it from within.” Alluding to the aggressive, militaristic U.S. foreign policy, Putin noted correctly that, “it has nothing in common with democracy, of course.” Surprisingly, Putin, a domestic autocrat himself, seems to see what the U.S. founders knew, but what the occupants of the post–World War II imperial presidency have not been able to fathom. During the Roman Republic, the concentration of power associated with a militarized foreign policy led to the disintegration of the republic itself. The same thing is happening in the United States now. Thus, to safeguard one of the greatest domestic systems in the world, U.S. citizens and policy makers should drop the Tarzan foreign policy and return to the founders’ policy of minimal interference in the affairs of other nations.
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The nations that avoided the fates of India. San Diego. Mexico. say." When Mao Zedong introduced Soviet-style collective farms into China and did not get satisfactory results. the explanation for India's underperformance compared with. The historical evidence suggests a strong correlation exists between being on the receiving end of imperialism and immisseration. "If one leaves aside their fundamentally different resource endowments. China. NEMESIS: THE LAST DAYS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC. how do analysts like Ferguson and Friedman explain the nineteenth-century poverty of India and China. 2006.81 of 154 AT: Ferguson Ferguson ignores the fact that imperialism promoted holocausts and famines Johnson 6 Chalmers Johnson. . the several dozen Holocaust-sized famines in both countries while food sat on the docks waiting to be exported. author and professor emeritus of the University of California. and their current status as "late developers"? Students of communism will not be surprised by the answer. he did not abandon them but turned instead to truly gigantic collectives called "communes. Canada lies not in British exploitation but rather in the insufficient scale of British interference in the Indian economy. a monument to communist extremism similar to the extremes of laissez-faire that the British dogmatically imposed on their conquered territories—and that Ferguson would have preferred to be yet more extreme. and the Philippines did so by throwing off foreign rule early—as did the United States—or by modernizing militarily in order to hold off the imperialists (and ultimately join them)—as did Japan. 84 After all their arguments have been deployed." This Great Leap Forward of the late 1950s produced a famine that took some thirty million Chinese lives. the British did not go far enough in enforcing their ideas. Ferguson argues. p. In India.
Khalilzad's impeccable credentials make him a natural for membership in the neo-conservatives cabal which is the driving force behind Washington's Iraq policy. http://www.82 of 154 AT: Khalilzhad Khalilzad’s views are single minded Nashashibi 3 Isaam M. Counterpunch. 2003 [“The Neocon’s Bagman to Baghdad”. He tends to look at military solutions as the first.counterpunch." said Anatol Lieven. Nashashibi." . http://www.counterpunch. Nashashibi. Frequent Writer on Arab Issues. Frequent Writer on Arab Issues. that Khalilzad has been wrong as often as he has been rightgoing back to the days when he advocated arming the same Afghani groups that later spawned the Taliban. "[Zalmay thinks of] security to the exclusion of everything else.org/issam04172003.html] More importantly.html] His many critics point out. April 17. US-Based Director of Deir Yassin Remembered. Counterpunch. an analyst with the Carnegie Endowment for Peace in Washington." Khalilzad’s theories are wrong Nashashibi 3 Isaam M.org/issam04172003." his former associate stressed. April 17. "If he was in private business rather than government. perhaps. 2003 [“The Neocon’s Bagman to Baghdad”. "he would have been sacked long ago. US-Based Director of Deir Yassin Remembered. not the last policy option. "He has a narrow of view of the Middle East and South Asia. however.
KONTOPOULOS) PDF Superficially.D.S. Brooks and Wohlforth actually concede that unipolarity is not likely to last more than another twenty years.ksg. 09 – Mary Julia and George R. Similarly. Instead.M.edu/files/Balancing_on_Land_and_at_Sea. But there is less to their argument than meets the eye. which allows other states to catch up. and the combination of the European Union. In this respect. and Managing Editor of International Studies Quarterly) Summer 2010 “ Balancing on Land and at Sea Do States Ally against the Leading Global Power?” http://belfercenter. reinforced by nuclear deterrence.44 Not only is this a weak case for unipolarity. 34. in International Law from Virginia Law. Ph. and Russia. After all. Hegemony—Myth or Reality? A Review Essay".pdf In addition. like all hegemonic systems.42 Their case is based on a freeze-frame view of the distribution of capabilities in the international system. could form an effective balancing coalition against the United States if it was seen as so threatening. Japan. hegemony. despite their claim at the be-ginning of World Out of Balance that unipolarity is robust and that U. most of the great powers perceived that the greatest threat to their interests came from the Soviet Union. however. and managerial skills diffuse throughout the international economic system. and they joined the United States in a defensive balancing coalition against the Soviet Union. No. Brooks and Wohlforth concede that even today the member states of the European Union collectively exceed the United States in gross domestic product. 15. which is not very long at all. International Security.D. and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute (Christopher. then there were plenty of opportunities for a counterbalancing coalition to form against the United States throughout the Cold War period. not from the United States. when such behavior would not have been so risky. Rogers Professor of Political Science at Indiana University. they do not engage the argument that.77 .43 A key question is whether the early decades of the twenty-first century will witness the decline of U. from USC. former president of the International Studies Association. and if the only issue is the distribution of material capabilities. If the hypothesis that great powers balance against aspiring hegemons is unconditionally valid. and this is spurring an ongoing process of multipolarization. know-how. Brooks and Wohlforth’s inability to provide a convincing explanation for the absence of coalition formation against the United States in the early Cold War period. Hegemons sprint to the front of the great power pack because of economic leadership based on productivity and technological innovation. China. July 6th 2009. J. hegemony will endure well into the future.S. leadership costs sap the hegemon’s power and push it into decline. in Political Science from the University of California.45 Brooks and Wolforth concede that coalitional balancing will work against the US Jack S. "The Waning of U. technology. Vol.S. Jordan Professor of International Affairs at Texas A&M's George Bush School of Government and Public Service. the debate about unipolar stability is misleading. Over time. Brooks 10 and Wohlforth’s argument that the balancing hypothesis applies only to states that are growing and threatening to achieve a position of hegemony but not to established hegemons such as the United States raises the question of why other leading states did not balance against the United States when it was a rising great power but before it established a position of primacy— perhaps in the late 1940s. LL. Levy (Board of Governors’ Professor at Rutgers University and former president of both the International Studies Association and the Peace Science Society) and William R.83 of 154 AT: Brooks&Wohlforth Reject Brooks and Wohlforth – their analysis is based off a freeze frame of IR and doesn't into account other factors that cause hegemonic decline Layne. it is also an implicit admission that—although it has yet to bear fruit—other states are engaged in counterbalancing the United States. Summer 2009. 1.harvard. Thompson (Donald A. the American era of unipolarity contains the seeds of its own demise. Brooks and Wohlforth make a strong case for unipolar stability. weakens their explanation for nonbalancing after the end of the Cold War. Galileo. p.
84 of 154 ***Multipolarity Good .
Rather than risking these outcomes. .S. the United States would reap security advantages from a reversion to multipolarity.S. and avoid being automatically engulfed in Eurasian conflicts because of its alliance commitments. Fall. the United States must accept some reduction in its relative hard power by adopting a multipolar—and essentially unilateral—offshore balancing strategy that accommodates the rise of new great powers.S. rather than arising from any direct threat to the United States itself. to reduce others' concerns about its power. Its quest for hegemony is driven instead by an ideational.S. allies. The United States does not need to be an extraregional hegemon to be secure. 130 It also must rein in the scope of its extravagant ambitions to shape the international system in accordance with its Wilsonian ideology. as an insular great power. withdrawal and a concurrent shift to multipolarity would prevent American involvement in major power wars. offshore balancing would take advantage of the unique geostrategic advantages that allow the United States to benefit from multipolarity.85 of 154 MultiPol Good – Generic U. interests. is America's next grand strategy. Attempts to uphold hegemony only erode primacy faster – only acceptance of multipolarity guarantees a peaceful transition Layne. and it could—and should—insulate itself from possible future Eurasian great power wars. primacy may already be in the early stages of erosion. the United States must practice self-restraint (which is different from choosing to be constrained by others by adopting a multilateral approach to grand strategy). hegemony is a game that no longer is worth the candle. especially given that U. 2006 (Christopher. have to fight to uphold its primacy. it probably will. attempting to sustain U. As an offshore balancer. Unilateral offshore balancing. If the United States fails to adopt an offshore balancing strategy based on multipolarity and military and ideological self-restraint. Consequently. To reduce the fear of U. Number 2. which is a potentially dangerous strategy. the United States is far less vulnerable to the effects of "instability" than are the major powers of Eurasia. Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute. For the United States. Maintaining U. "The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States' Unipolar Moment. 131 Thus. Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 170 By devolving full responsibility for their defense to U. primacy may well hasten its end by stimulating more intensive efforts to balance against the United States." International Security.S. deterritorialized conception of security divorced from the traditional metrics of great power grand strategy: the distribution of power in the international system and geography. the United States should begin to retrench strategically and capitalize on the advantages accruing to insular great powers in multipolar systems. derive directly from the overseas commitments mandated by hegemony's all-encompassing definition of U. indeed. Project Muse) The United States has a hegemony problem because it wields hegemonic power.S. Paradoxically. An America [End Page 40] that has the wisdom and prudence to contain itself is less likely to be feared than one that begs the rest of the world to stop it before it expands hegemonically again. the risk of conflict and the possible exposure of the American homeland to attack. at some point. exercise a free hand strategically.S. Volume 31. The United States is far removed from powerful rivals and shielded from them both by geography and its own hard power. power. thus causing the United States to become imperially overstretched and involving it in unnecessary wars that will reduce its power.
Volume 82.S.S. which retains cells in some 60 countries. For example. and border controls. military power is essential to global stability and is a critical part of the response to terrorism. . 2003. the partial nature of the success in Afghanistan illustrates the continuing need for cooperation. tracing financial flows. Issue 4. U. Their first mistake is to focus too heavily on military power alone. unspectacular civilian cooperation with other countries in areas such as intelligence sharing. Rather than proving the new unilateralists' point. But the metaphor of war should not blind Americans to the fact that suppressing terrorism will take years of patient.86 of 154 MultiPol Good – Terror Multilateralism key to reducing threats from terrorism Nye 3 Joseph Nye. Foreign Affairs. the American military success in Afghanistan dealt with the easiest part of the problem: toppling an oppressive and weak government in a poor country. Harvard. military strength is crucial and that pure multilateralism is impossible. And bombing cannot resolve the problem of cells in Hamburg or Detroit. But all the precision bombing destroyed only a small fraction of al Qaeda's network. they make important mistakes that will ultimately undercut the implementation of the new security strategy. police work. The best response to transnational terrorist networks is networks of cooperating government agencies. July. EBSCO Although the new unilateralists are right that maintaining U.
No Osirak-like mission was to be had. When the Israeli's bombed Osirak they didn't bother to even warn the US. Negligible economic progress will probably occur but for the most part. they didn't have to. 8/23/10 (Mark. there are in fact limits to growth whether you're global or isolated. The dominoes that fell after they hit Iraq didn't register on the radar of the superpower that was the US. holds roughly $843. Attacking Iran leads to military conflict with China. In fact.87 of 154 MultiPol Good – Iran Multipolarity solves Iran better than unipolarity Radulich. Now. it needed to do it before the 21st. as of June 2010.S. as imports from there jumped according to the Commerce Department earlier this month. and health care experience as a licensed clinical social worker.com/politics/columns/150306/Nuclear-Iran-and-the-Multi-Polar-World. not only did Iran begin to bring Bushehr online but also days later they even debuted an unmanned attack drone and announced plans for the mass production of high-speed missile-launching assault boats. masters degree in social work (msw) and 10 years of social work. you are forced to just live with it and that's a reality for both the US and Israel. Besides war. So the question is.411mania. there was minimal risk the plant would be used to make nuclear weapons. As I stated earlier. envoy to the United Nations John Bolton told the Israeli's and the world via Fox News that if Israel was going to launch an attack on Bushehr. Sure in the short run manufacturing will briefly return but sooner or later markets become saturated and we're right back to where we are now. the economic repercussions to both countries would be far worse and much faster than anything else besides nuclear oblivion. tread lightly. Russia.htm) Prior to this event former U. In short. It is one thing when only two countries have nuclear weapons and neither are particularly invested in your best interest and quite another when a number of countries have nuclear weapons and have a vested interest in your survival. we've buried the stick and hope that lots of carrots work. “Nuclear Iran and the multi-polar world”. what more could the United States have done to prevent this event from occurring? The answers lies in the political-economic structure of the multi-polar world we are now living in. So what more could the Obama Administration have done to prevent Bushehr from coming online? The answer is simply . for example. etc. U. With countries scattered across the globe armed with intercontinental ballistic missiles it behooves every serious country to at best.7 billion in US treasury securities. if the rationale for bombing it was to prevent weapons from being made there. The first and easiest to understand reason why the Israeli's didn't attack Bushehr is that the US deemed it not to be a proliferation risk. And you can make this case the world over with the EU. In a game of carrot and stick. Of course. such is the multi-polar world. this is indeed the New Normal. mental health. war isn't something anyone is really interested in and therefore there's only so much any one country can do when another opts to flout international concerns. The U. the highest since October 2008. There were indicators that this was a possibility as the Saudi's had given Israel permission to fly over their country in the event they planned to actually attack Iran. Despite the assertions of boisterous radio personalities. then there was no reason to bomb it in the first place. trade deficit with China widened to $26. http://www. in a situation like this once you've run out of carrots and there is no stick to use. and frankly given the world of the early 80's. In addition. the times they have a-changed. Once Bill Clinton and the Republican congress started us down the free trade path they left the proverbial barn door open and there's no closing it now. opted to do something of a "cowboy-like" nature like bomb Iran or invade Taiwan. professional blogger on global events since 2004. if we've learned anything from the recent adventure in Iraq it's that the world has neither little stomach nor patience for preemptive war.2 billion in June. Russia and at least a third of Latin America. not to mention most of the Middle East as they are all tied together both militarily and financially. We're not going to embargo China or any country that really matters because doing so will only hurt us in the long run. State Department spokesman Darby Holladay stated that since Russia had agreed to supply nuclear fuel and remove spent fuel rods. lest they risk radioactive fallout from blowing up a live nuclear reactor. Had Israel attacked Bushehr they would have lost the war before the battle had even begun in the court of world opinion.S. both nuclear and conventional. if either the US or China. Despite some of the crazy rhetoric we hear on cable news and even from the mouths of certain leaders across the world. The US and China are the two biggest economies in the world. why didn't the Israeli's make good on a decade of threats and blow the place up? More to the point. the US also has to contend with the economic realities of the multi-polar world.S. Latin America. But the week passed and there was no assault. China. global interconnected markets.
. we're all locked into an eternal state of check. embargoes.88 of 154 nothing. civilized world. The latest episode with Iran shows us that the US is more or less impotent. with no checkmate in sight. etc. sanctions. That answer doesn't change if or when a Republican becomes president. Mutually Assured Destruction for everybody and nobody. trade wars. Military action isn't a viable option. aren't a viable option either. Welcome to the real New World Order. We're not alone in that respect because quite frankly so is the rest of the sane. Essentially a multi-polar world with every country seated at the round table means that for the most part.
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Decline is inevitable -- soft power, defense spending, China rise. Geeraerts 11 – Gustaaf, professor of international relations at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel and director of the Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies (European Review, Vol. 19, No. 1, 57–67, 2011, “China, the EU, and the New Multipolarity,” http://www.vub.ac.be/biccs/site/assets/files/apapers/China,%20the%20EU%20and %20Multipolarity-2.pdf) The structure of the international system is changing with the evaporation of America’s unipolar moment. ‘The decline of U.S. primacy and the subsequent transition to a multipolar world are inevitable,’ Wang Jisi wrote in 2004. 2 More recently John Ikenberry stated that ‘The United States’ ‘‘unipolar moment’’ will inevitably end.’ 3 Not only has the inﬂuence of the lonely superpower severely been affected by the expensive wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; its economic clout too has declined faster than ever before and its soft power is increasingly contested. At the same time, China is undeniably becoming a global power. Since
the cautious opening up of China’s door by Deng Xiaoping in 1978, her economy has quadrupled in size and some expect it to double again over the next decade. China is about to become the second most
important single economy in the world. At the most recent G20 meeting in Pittsburgh, Hu Jintao, China’s president was the only one to arrive at the head of a major economy still enjoying strong growth, having the luxury of substantial ﬁnancial reserves. But China is not only growing economically, its military clout is also on the rise. 4 In 2008 China evolved into the world’s second highest military spender. 5 It is the only country emerging both as a military and economic rival of the US and thus generating a fundamental shift in the global distribution of power and inﬂuence. Such power transitions are a recurring phenomenon in
international politics and have always constituted episodes of uncertainty and higher risk. They contain the seeds of ﬁerce strategic rivalry between the up-and-coming state and the residing leading power, thereby increasing the likelihood of contention and conﬂict. No wonder that China’s spectacular economic growth and increasingly assertive diplomacy have incited other key-players to ponder how Beijing will seek to manage this transition and even more how it will use its leverage afterwards. Notwithstanding that China still sees itself partly as a developing country, it is becoming more conﬁdent in its rising power and status. As its economic interests abroad
are expanding rapidly, so will the pressure increase to safeguard them more proactively. National security is no longer solely a matter of defending sovereignty and domestic development. It also becomes necessary for China to back up its growing interests overseas with a
more robust diplomacy and security policy. To be sure, the US is still the most important single economy in the world. It also remains the world’s largest military power. While the EU has developed into an even
larger economy and has become the most important entity in terms of external trade ﬂows, politically and militarily it performs far below its potential and is no match either for the US or China. The EU’s foreign policy is confronted with a collective action problem of sorts, and as a result is lacking in bot strategic vision and assertiveness. Although still smaller than the other two, China has grown into the world’s second largest national economy and also the one that grows most quickly. According to some estimates, China will move on a par with the US in 2020 and
become the world’s biggest economy in 2030 (see Table 1). Moreover China is steadily increasing its military power. In Beijing’s view, economic prowess is not sufﬁcient for a state to become a ﬁrst rank power. ‘What is important is comprehensive national power, as shown by the ability of the Soviet Union to balance the much wealthier US in the Cold War and the continuing inability of an economically powerful Japan to play a political role’. 6 This view is very much in line with the neorealist conception that to be considered a ‘pole’ a country must amass sufﬁcient power in all of Waltz’s categories of power: ‘size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence.’ 7
Heg structurally unsustainable -- economics and rising powers. Petras 10 – James, retired Bartle Professor (Emeritus) of Sociology at Binghamton University in Binghamton, New York and adjunct professor at Saint Mary's University
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(4/28/10, “Rising and Declining Economic Powers: The Sino-US Conflict Deepens,” http://lahaine.org/petras/b2-img/petras_sinous.pdf) The US has a trade deficit with at least 91 other countries besides China, demonstrating that the problem is embedded in the structure of the US economy. Any punitive measure to restrict China’s exports to the US will only increase Washington’s deficit with other competitive exporters. A decline of US imports from China will not result in an increase for US manufacturers because of the under-capitalized nature of the latter, directly related to the pre-eminent position of finance capital in capturing and allocating savings. Moreover, “third countries” can re-export Chinese made products, putting the US in the unenviable
position of starting trade wars across the board or accepting the fact that a finance –commercial led economy is not competitive in today’s world economy. China’s decision to incrementally divert its trade surplus
from the purchase of US Treasury notes to more productive investments in developing its “hinterland” and to strategic overseas ventures in raw materials and energy sectors will eventually force the US Treasury to raise interest rates to avoid large scale flight from the dollar. Rising interest rates may benefit currency traders, but could weaken any US recovery or plunge the country back into a depression. Nothing weakens a global empire more than having to repatriate overseas investments and constrain foreign lending to bolster a sliding domestic economy. The pursuit of protectionist policies will have a major negative impact on US MNC in China since the bulk of their products are exported to the US market: Washington will cut its nose to spite its face. Moreover, a trade war could spill over and adversely affect US auto corporations producing for the Chinese market. GM and Ford are far more profitable in China than the US where they are running in the red 44 . A US trade war will have an initial negative impact on China until it adjusts and takes advantage of the potential 400 million consumers in the vast interior of the country. Moreover, Chinese economic policymakers are rapidly diversifying their trade toward Asia, Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, Russia and even in the EU. Trade protectionism may
create a few jobs in some uncompetitive manufacturing sectors in the US but it may cost more jobs in the commercial sector (Wal-Mart) which depends on low priced items to low income consumers. The bellicose trade rhetoric on Capitol Hill and confrontational policies adopted by the White House are dangerous posturing, designed to deflect attention from the profound structural weaknesses of the domestic foundations of the empire. The deeply entrenched financial sector and the equally dominant military metaphysic which directs foreign policy have led the US down the steep slope of chronic economic crises, endless costly wars, deepening class and ethno-racial inequalities as well as declining living standards. In the new competitive multi-polar world order, the
US cannot successfully follow the earlier path of blocking a rising imperial power’s access to strategic resources via colonial dictated boycotts. Not even in countries under US occupation, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, can the White House block China from signing lucrative investment and trade deals. With countries in the US sphere of influence, like
Taiwan, South Korea and Japan, the rate of growth of trade and investment with China far exceeds that of the US. Short of a full scale unilateral military blockade, the US cannot contain China’s rise as a world
economic actor, a newly emerging imperial power. The major weakness in China is internal, rooted
in class divisions and class exploitation, which the currently entrenched political elite profoundly linked through family and economic ties, might ameliorate but cannot eliminate 45 . Up to now China has been able to expand globally through a form of “social imperialism”, distributing a portion of the wealth generated overseas to a growing urban middle class and to upwardly mobile managers, professionals, real estate speculators and regional party cadre. In contrast the US, military directed overseas conquests have been costly with no
economic returns and with long term damage to the civilian economy both in its internal and external manifestations. Iraq and Afghanistan do not reward the imperial treasury in anyway comparable \\to what England plundered from India, South Africa and Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). In a world increasingly based in market relations, colonial style wars have no economic future. Huge military budgets and hundreds of military bases and military based alliances with neo-colonial states are the least efficient means to compete successfully in a globalized market place. That is the reason why the US is a declining empire and China, with its market driven approach is a newly emerging empire of a ‘new sort’ (sui generis).
The Economy in Crisis. Nonetheless.2 per cent in 2008 and the highest figure since the Second World War.3 trillion in the 2011 fiscal year . Hegemony”. Not only is the deficit out-ofcontrol . public sentiment could constrain Washington from continuing to provide the two things that Asia most wants from America: open markets and security. a Pew poll released in December 2009 showed isolationist sentiment in the United States surging to a four-decade high. much of that debt is borrowed from foreign central banks. As of September 2009.1000 Zumwalt destroyer will be terminated. nuclear weapons are being assigned a more limited role in US defence planning.92 of 154 Decline is inevitable in the status quo – US isolationist attitudes and US spending unsustainably. Although his popularity has dipped. East Asia Program Director at the Lowy Institute for International Policy (June 2010. Even worse. in which each Times. Perhaps even more worrying. deficits are projected to rise to over five percent of gross domestic product. MacArthur Foundation and the Lowy Institute. which represented just 33 per cent of GDP in 2001. particularly in Asia. This represents 11. debt while Japan held roughly $752 billion. and uncertainties remain as to the long-term direction of space and missile defence programs.but the nation’s projected long-term debt is even more unsustainable. albeit gradual. By the end of the decade.pdf) Such a domestic crisis in the United States seems unlikely.S. “Power and Choice: Asian Security Futures. Even if the United States retains the will to remain Asia’s hegemon.2 per cent of gross domestic product – up massively from 3. space. “Huge Deficits Altering U. Andrew Shearer. The economy is showing signs of a recovery. 100 Should these trends continue.S. The problem is exacerbated by the political impasse in America.org/images/uploads/blog_attachments/Asian_security_futur es_-_final_version.Bachelor of Arts in Journalism and Political Science (2/2/10. which claims that .6 trillion. significant negative trends are emerging for America’s global role and its strategic position in Asia over the longer term. and the Obama administration has raised concerns in Asia by decisions such as imposition of a punitive tariff on Chinese tyres. Absent a change in national priorities.expected to be 1. many of them intended to deny US forces access in realms where American power has previously been unchallenged.org/content/hugedeficits-altering-us-hegemony. high deficits. capabilities in domains which will become increasingly important. it is likely to face capacity constraints in the medium to long term. A strong US global role remains the orthodoxy on both sides of American politics and across the foreign policy elite. even as Washington’s margin of conventional superiority diminishes. Beyond the next decade an ageing population and rising healthcare costs will increase America’s fiscal challenges. Major weapons programs such as the F-22 advanced Raptor fighter and the DDG. Ensinger ’10. Protectionist sentiment is growing. the US defence budget is likely to come under serious pressure from 2016. cyber and blue-water naval capabilities. The Obama administration has already announced cuts to real defence spending. Rory Medcalf. China’s rapid military modernisation program is likely to continue unabated during this period. “[Obama’s] budget draws a picture of a nation that like many American homeowners simply cannot get above water.macfound.” The Times writes. with a particular focus on missile. Raoul Heinrichs. but no consensus on the kinds of long-term solutions that need to be enacted. The CBO estimates that public debt. There is widespread agreement that the US fiscal situation is unsustainable.” http://asiasecurity. http://economyincrisis. especially Asian powers Japan and China. Dustin. according to The New York America‘s massive and unsustainable debt will be the cause of waning influence around the world in the near future. 10 Plus. China held $790 billion of U. The US Congressional Budget Office (CBO) conservatively estimates the US federal budget deficit for 2009 will reach US$ 1. will continue to grow to 68 per cent of GDP by 2019. There is evidence that the United States is entering one of its inward-looking phases – a consequence of the economic downturn and costly wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. je) The sun may finally be setting on the American Century.Journalist for Economy in Crisis. Cook et al 10 – Malcolm. President Obama’s election was greeted with a wave of enthusiasm and hope for the future.
the period of U. thus far. believe that China. the fall of American power will be more precipitous with the passage of time. without deliberate action. The United States is not just the sole superpower in the uni-polar-dominance school's world. “Empire Falls. Heg is unsustainable -. the decline of America’s manufacturing base.S. to put America back on a path of fiscal sanity and ensure that America remains a hegemony. The next closest was China at just eight percent. For the past eight years. there needs to be a combination of both. but in recent years American leaders have pursued far more ambitious goals than merely maintaining the status quo.S. however. but is so relatively more powerful than any other country that it can reshape the international order according to American interests. virtually discounting the possibility that Germany. From public intellectuals like Charles Krauthammer and Niall Ferguson to neoconservatives like Paul Wolfowitz and Robert Kagan. Some side is firmly entrenched in an unwavering ideological battle. the United States has maintained a vast array of overseas commitments.S. while the ultimate foundation of American power--the relative superiority of the U. seeking to ensure peace and stability not just in its own neighborhood--the Americas--but also in Europe and Asia. Although the immediate problems of war in by Iraq and Afghanistan. long thought of as America’s top competitor for superpower status. Simply maintaining these commitments requires enormous resources. fairly short.wars and economic power decline Pape 9 – Robert A.” http://findarticles. An extremely low savings rate.. will not be able to maintain its current pace of economic growth long enough to pass the U. Iran's continued nuclear program and Russia's recent military adventure in Georgia are high-priority issues.S. all believe the principal feature of the post- cold-war world is the unchallengeable dominance of American power.S. if not rectify.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_99/ai_n32148803/? tag=content. and that the U. To be sure. America's shrinking share of world economic production is a fact of life and important changes in U. solutions to each of them individually and all of them . This is simply no longer realistic. others see America’s imminent demise. If present trends continue. A healthy appreciation of our situation American leaders may lead to policies that could mitigate. we will look back at the Bush administration years as the death knell for American hegemony. economy in the world--has been in decline since early on in the Bush administration. grand strategy are necessary to prevent the decline in America's global position from accelerating. those convinced of U.93 of 154 Republicans refuse to even entertain the idea of any tax increase while Democrats chafe at the though of entitlement cuts. 2009. The Bush administration has not just continued America's traditional grand strategy. that believe America will remain the world’s preeminent power for some time. even to academicians like Dartmouth's William Wohlforth and Stephen Brooks. relative decline has been. unsustainable trade deficits and concerns about the strength of the dollar have all caused some experts to question America’s place in the world and suggest that American influence may be rapidly dwindling. China and other major powers could seriously oppose American military power. There is also good reason to think that. seeking to denuclearize North Korea and expanding America's military allies in Europe up to the borders of Russia itself. Still.S. For nearly two decades.S. further decline in the foreseeable future. along with the oil-rich Persian Gulf (as well as other parts of the world). France. growing government debt. followed by Russia at five percent. There are some analysts and experts. al-Qaeda's new sanctuary in western Pakistan. our policies have been based on these flawed arguments. Russia. Professor of political science at the University of Chicago (Jan-Feb.col1 originally from The National Interest) America is in unprecedented decline. as the world’s largest economy. increasingly negative current-account balances and other internal economic weaknesses have cost the United States real power in today's world of rapidly spreading knowledge and technology. the U. The self-inflicted wounds of the Iraq War. As of 2009. And since the 1960s America’s gross domestic product has represented roughly 20 to 25 percent of the global economy. Still. Since the cold war. but pursued ambitious objectives in all three major regions at the same time--waging wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In reality. accounted for nearly half of all the world’s military expenditures. dominance in the international system have encouraged American policy makers to act unilaterally and seize almost any opportunity to advance American interests no matter the costs to others. Others point out that America’s military might is still unmatched around the world. economy is still by far the largest.
and whether the US economic model is either sustainable or desirable. The EU model looks more attractive to some. have gutted Washington’s credibility to say much about human rights. and internal conflicts Buzan 11 – Barry. competitors to the dollar as reserve currency were on the rise. giving bigger voices to other players. at the influence of religion and special interest lobbies in US domestic politics. Even before the current economic crisis. it now more easily asks not just whether the US is a questionable model. Heg is unsustainable -. On trade. both European social markets. nor. Waltz Annual Lecture A World Order Without Superpowers : Decentred Globalism. It has neither the economic resources. much was done. and economic liberal values in the form of free(r) trade and financial liberalization. with the collapse of the Washington consensus. 25 no. On the political side. cannot lead the world out of it. the US had largely ceased to lead anyway.international legitimacy. however. as well as its fierce resistance to the International Criminal Court. the ideological authority to do so. Under Clinton and Bush. and. US abuses of human rights at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo. the US is losing its claim to be a model and to own the future. It is not clear that he is an economic liberal. that major powers will increasingly have the strength to balance against U.94 of 154 Most important. and at a federal environmental policy until recently in denial about global warming. When the world looks at American health and welfare policies. then the emergence of a more regionalized world political economy becomes more likely (more on this later). The US led the world into this recession. yet. and its weakening position in Congress does not augur well. 25 The truth of Bromley’s observation has been amplified by recent events: ‘US economic leadership power exists but it is a wasting asset … governance of the world economy is something that would have to be accomplished collectively if it is to be accomplished at all. If the world economy can be managed globally at all. its policy of ‘extraordinary renditions’ and acceptance of de facto torture. That claim has long been based on the US championing of political liberal values in the form of democracy and human rights. economic influence. Like so many great powers that have come and gone before. . the Obama inheritance is even worse. The Obama administration has a huge amount of damage to repair before it can present the US as a beacon of political liberalism. the financial world took on a globalised life of its own. are now both more open to serious question. at the financial mess. even so. and. Whether an unsustainable ‘American way of life’ is an appropriate model for the rest of the world. March 2011 vol. but whether it has become a serious part of the problem. collectively will be heavily influenced by America's reduced power position in the world. 2011. Montague Burton Professor in the Department of International Relations (March 25. 1 3-25) In addition to standing increasingly on its own in the main areas of international policy. and US indebtedness was weakening its position. America's declining power means that the unipolar world is indeed coming to an end. Obama’s options are massively constrained by the magnitude of the economic crisis. at a US government that under Bush was openly comfortable with the use of torture and was reelected.’ 26 If attempts to get the global economy going again fail. it will have to be done collectively (e. badly damaged itself. its weakening economic position making it more protectionist. With the Washington consensus discredited. “The Inaugural Kenneth N. So America’s claim to represent the (liberal) future is now blighted both by its own failures and by the shortcomings of the liberal model itself. and the Beijing consensus. There was a very substantial element of hypocrisy in this position during the Cold War.S.” International Relations. via the G20 and other suchlike groups of leading powers). other ideas about how to run the global political economy are in play. At this point. at a seeming US inclination to use force as the first-choice policy instrument. even if he is. or are too protracted and costly. our own hubris may be our downfall. many Democrats in Congress look likely to be even less enthusiastic about further trade liberalisation than the Bush Republicans were. there is little scope left for the US to legitimize its leadership by appealing to liberal values either political or economic. the GWoT means that Washington is still under pressure to prefer antiterrorist governments to democratic ones. In some ways the ‘civilian power’ EU is now a better representative of political liberal values. In terms of economic liberalism. policies they oppose and that the United States will increasingly face harsh foreign-policy choices.g.
let us start with the unipolar-dominance school's preferred measure of American hegemony.95 of 154 and the emergent Chinese model to others. and then began to steadily lose ground during the eight years of the Bush administration. Indeed. (4) As Fareed Zakaria describes in his recent book. the unipolar-dominance school prefers to compare every country's output in current-year U.S.col1 originally from The National Interest) Advocates of extending America's unipolar dominance are well aware of the central importance of the economic foundations of American power and routinely present detailed statistics on the U. the ability to diffuse new technology--to turn chalkboard ideas into mass-produced applications--has been spreading rapidly across many parts of the globe. America is losing its overwhelming technological dominance in the leading industries of the knowledge economy. According to GDP figures in current U. The US is much more culturally conservative. can create many more knowledge workers in the future. dollars from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The US is no longer the only model of the future in play. (5) The fact that the United States remains ahead of China on a per capita basis does matter--it means that China. and is being turned around by Obama.S. Professor of political science at the University of Chicago (Jan-Feb. with its relative power ultimately falling by nearly a quarter in the first . many of the deeper issues are structural. 2009. and it is far from clear that it will ever be able to recover the leading position that it once possessed. In past eras--the "age of iron" and the "age of steel"--leading states retained their technological advantages for many decades. right? Alas. but look at the trajectory of the data over time. US heg not sustainable -. while its individualism and anti-statism set it apart from Asia. religious. in 2008. “Empire Falls. and with it the ultimate sources of state power--productive capacities.S. The Post-American World. Pape 9 – Robert A. The basic notion is simple: take U. a method that tends to show America is much further ahead of other countries than alternative measures.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_99/ai_n32148803/? tag=content. and their rapid global diffusion is a profound factor driving down America's power compared to other countries. “Empire Falls.S. although the United States remains well ahead of China on many indicators of leading technology on a per capita basis.S. 2009.” http://findarticles. Looks pretty good for America.S.. individualistic and anti-state than most other parts of the West. the United States increased its share of world production during the 1990s.relative economic decline. with more patents each year than in all other countries combined. population. Its religiosity. had 6 percent. share of world product. technology and knowledge diffuse more quickly today. domestic product in any year and divide it by the aggregate total of the gross domestic product of all states in the world. dominance based on the current-year dollar figures. Whereas in 2000. the United States had three times the computer sales. dollars. (2) By this metric. However.. While some of this negative image was specific to the Bush administration. For the sake of argument. For grand-strategic concerns--especially how well the United States can balance its resources and foreign-policy commitments--the trajectory of American power compared to other states is of seminal importance. the United States has not lost its position as the most innovative country in the world. single-year "snapshots" of America's relative power are of limited value for assessing the sustainability of its grand strategy over many years. the most recent call for America to exploit its hegemonic position (published in 2008) rests on the presumption of U. cultural conservatism and antistatism set it apart from most of Europe. To measure gross domestic product. in 2006 the United States had 28 percent of world product while its nearest most likely competitor. five times the internet users and forty times the broadband subscribers as China. reached its apogee in 2000.col1 originally from The National Interest) True.” http://findarticles. with more than four times the U.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_99/ai_n32148803/? tag=content. Professor of political science at the University of Chicago (Jan-Feb. Tech diffusion = heg unsustainable. this grossly under-weights the size of the knowledge economy in China compared to America. the Chinese have caught or nearly caught up with Americans in every category in the aggregate. For instance. China. Pape 9 – Robert A.
U. power is the result of uneven rates of economic growth between America. the average rate of U. Professor of political science at the University of Chicago (Jan-Feb.3 percent. (3) Although each offers advantages and disadvantages. As the most recent growth estimates (November 2008) by the :ME make clear. Table 2 shows the trajectory of the share of world product for the United States and China using both alternative measures. Assuming the rest of the world continued at its actual rate of growth. one can gain a rough weighting of the factors behind America's shrinking share of world production by asking a few simple counterfactual questions of the data.2 percent instead of its actual 23.S. (6) When compared to the share of gross world product lost by the United States from 2000 to 2008--7.S.1 percent.S. At the same time. from year after year of losses in the 1990s to significant annual gains since 2000. the relative power of China. for our purposes what matters is that they form a lower bound of America's relative decline. This trajectory is almost sure to be revised further downward as the consequences of the financial crisis in fall 2008 become manifest. Russia has also turned its economic trajectory around. Pape 9 – Robert A. How much does China matter? Imagine the extreme case--that China had not grown. has grown consistently.S. America's share of world product in 2008 would have risen to 25. Again using IMF figures. but substantially weaker. or 1. This new reality has tremendous implications for the future of American grand strategy. When compared to the share of world product lost by the United States from 2000 to 2008--7. the United States would have had a bigger economy in absolute terms and would have lost less power relative to others. These estimates suggest that roughly a quarter of America's relative decline is due to .1 percent of world product amounts to some 27 percent of the U. The answers are pretty straightforward. decline due to the global diffusion of technology. which leave out all manner of technical problems like "interaction effects. Worse. economic weaknesses under Bush or Chinas superior economic performance? Although precise answers are not possible. Despite all the pro-economy talk from the Bush administration.2 percent of world product accounts for about 15 percent of the U.. “Empire Falls. The United States has been going through the first decade of the twenty-first century not stronger than before. decline. from nearly 4 percent annually during the Clinton years to just over 2 percent per year under Bush. China and other states in the world. Heg decline inevitable and irreversible. but we assume China did not grow at such an astounding rate? Of course. If we look out as far as the IMF can see (2013). although all major countries are suffering economically. growth has fallen considerably.S." Still. the United States is now a declining power. how much is U. China has sustained a consistently high rate of growth of 10 percent per year--a truly stunning performance. U. At the same time.7 percent--the assumed marginal gain of 1. constant-dollar calculations and purchasing power parity.2 percent. the fact is that since 2000. which is likely to only further weaken U. As Table 3 shows. America's decline was well under way before the economic downturn. these are merely thought experiments. power.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_99/ai_n32148803/? tag=content. the state many consider America's most likely future rival.7 percent--the assumed marginal gain of 2. decline. The erosion of the underpinnings of U. How good are the numbers? Economists commonly use two other methods to calculate GDP. growth rates are down almost 50 percent from the Clinton years. America's share of world product in 2008 would be 24. Had the American economy grown at the (Clinton) rate of 3.” http://findarticles.2 percent more than today. And regardless of the metric.S. Simply put. China and Russia are expected to continue growing at a substantially greater rate than the United States. over the past two decades. these back-of-the-envelope approximations serve as useful starting points. 2009.col1 originally from The National Interest) So. If so.S. things get even worse--with the United States expected to continue declining and China to continue rising.7 percent per year from 2000 to 2008 instead of the (Bush) rate of 2.S. What would happen if we assumed that the United States grew during the Bush years at the same rate as during Clinton's? What would have happened had the world continued on its same trajectory.96 of 154 decade of the twenty-first century. and the United States and the rest of the world continued along their actual path of economic growth since 2000. the trend is the same.
rescuing private finance with public finance. economic weaknesses (spending on the Iraq War. UK. Something fundamental has changed. took the unprecedented step of pursuing a “financial socialism” (Taylor et al 2009). the costs could be far higher than a simple percentage drop in share of world product. 2010. “US Hegemony and the Obama Administration: Towards a New World Order?. For once. Indeed. in size. China. led by the most right-wing president in living memory. and the U. economically and politically.” AntipodeVolume 42. without the need to exercise the hard coercive unilateral military or economic power upon the rest of the world. It is one of the largest relative declines in modern history. lecturer in Human Geography at Staffordshire University. The effects of US neoimperialism reach so extensively across the world that US elections are everyone’s business. it seemed like it mattered what the rest of the world thought about American politics. is something that will sit uncomfortably even with a less conservative Obama administration. and undoubtedly the effects will continue to ripple around the world. For the USA. Relying on foreign governments in this way comes with risks that are now starting to bite. current-account deficits. The US economy continues to be squeezed by the interest on the capital borrowed. predominantly Japan and China. (February 18. and that we will begin to see the emergence of a new world order.S. But I shall end this intervention on a note of optimism. And when one examines past declines and their consequences. If we end up believing in the wishful thinking of unipolar dominance forever. and that our opposition to the imposition of American power. The USA can no longer hope to keep China subordinate through economics alone. From this perspective. Watson 10 – Allan. the signing of the executive order to close the controversial Guantanamo Bay detention facility. self-inflicted wounds of the Bush years significantly exacerbated America's decline. downfall is indeed extraordinary. and the . It gives the USA a chance to re-invent itself as a more open and tolerant nation and practice what may be termed as a “moral hegemony” (see Kobayashi and Peake 2000). A significant amount of this debt is held by foreign governments. and the fact that the largest potential rival to US hegemony in the twenty-first century. both signalled a sharp break with the previous Bush administration and have strengthened the global wave of diplomatic and popular goodwill (see Black 2009.).S. holds so much of the US debt. In other words. In an attempt to save the US economy from recession. and Obama’s carefully crafted speech at Cairo University in June 2009 aimed at easing tensions with the Muslim world. the unexpected internal collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. UK and a research fellow of the Globalisation and World Cities research network based at Loughborough University. during this election. it now seems that US hegemony is in decline.97 of 154 U. tax cuts. The timing of this policy effectively forced the following Obama administration to continue down the same path. The election of the first black president of the USA was after all an historic event. no matter how well supported. the financial crisis of late 2008 and early 2009 has acted to undermine both the US and global economy. etc. both by making the decline steeper and faster and crowding out productive investment that could have stimulated innovation to improve matters.S. The United States has always prided itself on exceptionalism. can change well-practised unilateral US foreign policies or solve deep-rooted national anxieties. Given this. The above discussion suggests that the fundamental principles of US engagement with the rest of the world will change very little under an Obama-led US administration. Finn 2008). fall is remarkable and that dangerous instability in the international system may lie ahead. It is difficult to see how one man. the previous administration. it is clearly surpassed by only one other great-power decline. America's relative decline since 2000 of some 30 percent represents a far greater loss of relative power in a shorter time than any power shift among European great powers from roughly the end of the Napoleonic Wars to World War II. along with a number of oil exporting countries. the national deficit moved past the $10 trillion mark. All of this has led to one of the most significant declines of any state since the midnineteenth century. a sixth to Chinas superior performance and just over half to the spread of technology to the rest of the world. the largest problem has been the state’s own financial situation. it becomes clear both that the U. When the $700 billion bailout package for private financial institutions was passed through Congress. one which is fraught with difficulties. Issue 2) However. Economic collapse and debt.
looking for Obama to be the president to guide the USA into a new age of multilateralism. promoting separatist regimes which predictably collapse or are overthrown. a declining imperial power faced with profound internal imbalances. unlike Japan. We live in a post-colonial world where the vast majority of regimes will trade and invest with whoever pays the market price. China rising and domestic issues. fifth column colonization and military driven empire building based on domestic decay. it need not conquer and exploit foreign colonized labor. I continue to share the sense of excitement and hope for change that has been so widely infectious since the election. depends on securing markets via economic competitiveness – market power – not military conquest.” http://lahaine. The US Empire will continue to wallow in chronic stagnation. Empires do not die peacefully. China’s market driven empire building is attuned to modern times. Only time will tell how long the American people will endure the dispossession of homes. the mass of the US working class is at a loss as to how it can move from a military driven empire toward a productive republic. Despite the reservations expressed in this intervention. China. unending wars and increased reliance on the tools of political subversion. something will have to break. driven by an elite free to engage the world on its own terms. unlike the US plagued by financial speculators who eat away and erode the economy. whipping up chauvinist emotions by scapegoating the rising new imperial state and forging military alliances to “encircle” China have absolutely no impact. .98 of 154 associated vision of what constitutes our “security” (see Sidaway 2008). militarism and Zionist power will so bleed and isolate the United States that necessity will induce a forceful response … The longer it takes the more violent the rebirth of the republic. retired Bartle Professor (Emeritus) of Sociology at Binghamton University in Binghamton. Petras 10 – James. military alliances and trade restrictions to slow its demise. Unlike Japan it has a vast multitude of workers. was finally having an effect. New York and adjunct professor at Saint Mary's University (4/28/10. The economic decay and the entrenched political and social elites have effectively depoliticized discontent. “Rising and Declining Economic Powers: The Sino-US Conflict Deepens. The US unlike the established colonial powers of an earlier period cannot deny China access to strategic raw materials as was the case with Japan. They have not stopped all of China’s neighbors from expanding economic ties with it. There are no prospects that this will change in the near future. If the US imperial elite at present is at a loss as to how it can contain China’s rise to world power. Over the long run.pdf) As in the past. systemic economic crises have been converted into private individual maladies. nor do financial elites embedded in extraordinary wealth and power surrender their privileged positions peacefully. ravaging industrial centers and turning abandoned houses into parking lots.org/petras/b2-img/petras_sinous. China will push ahead with double digit growth. employer servitude. The world continues to watch hopefully. a loss of competitiveness in merchandise trade and an overdependence on financial activities looks to political retribution. 49 Propaganda.
both those of the Bush administration and those more long-standing. unshielded by the mediating effects of any overarching common cause or closely shared identity. The occupation of Iraq in 2003 looks set to generate far more and bigger problems than it has solved. 18 but also deepening the many tragedies in the region. Over the last decade that general sense has weakened rapidly.three examples: Buzan 11 – Barry. and partly because of the conspicuous turn to self-interested unilateralism that marked the eight years of the Bush administration. through its unquestioning support for Israel and its occupation of Iraq. are widely perceived to have been counterproductive. This festering sore has grown steadily worse. During the Cold War the unattractive elements of US policy in the Middle East were masked by the general agreement on the need to contain the Soviet . but even that is undermined by the hypocrisy of the US turning a blind eye to Israel’s substantial nuclear arsenal while seeking to forbid Arab states and Iran from acquiring their own deterrents. Vietnam and Chile. A brief look at three key policy areas – the Middle East/GWoT. More or less unconditional US support for Israel is a perennial Washington idiosyncrasy that inspires little enthusiasm elsewhere. 25 no. of course. “The Inaugural Kenneth N. Perhaps only on the question of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons does US policy in the Middle East enjoy much support. 25 no. Waltz Annual Lecture A World Order Without Superpowers : Decentred Globalism. with Israel creating ever more difficult facts on the ground.” International Relations. From Cuba. March 2011 vol. 1 3-25) The US.” International Relations. though here it has to be said that Europeans are just as culpable. This rhetorical shift seemed to abandon any US interest or belief in long-term friendships and alliances. But during the Cold War. 17 The Middle East is a profound mess and is likely to remain so. There has never been a golden age when the US was universally admired by the rest of the world. 2011. 1 3-25) Disagreements over policy in the Middle East already rank as one of the conspicuous areas of disaffection between the US and Europe. Montague Burton Professor in the Department of International Relations (March 25. a. the particular policies of the US now stand largely on their own terms. Middle East Buzan 11 – Barry. Montague Burton Professor in the Department of International Relations (March 25. and assisting in the self-destruction of its Palestinian negotiating partner. and limited nuclear war. 16 and. partly because there is no longer any great ideological struggle to sustain it. the impact of particular disaffections was offset by the widespread general sense that the West and its hangers-on were a lot better off with US leadership than without it. The main point for the question of US superpower legitimacy is that many of the US interventions in the Middle East. A striking symbol of this was the replacement of talk about ‘friends and allies’ or ‘the free world’ with a harsher instrumental line about ‘coalitions of the willing’. Waltz Annual Lecture A World Order Without Superpowers : Decentred Globalism. has never been short of unpopular foreign policies.99 of 154 Heg Unsustainable (Soft Power/Unpopular Policies) Heg is unsustainable -. “The Inaugural Kenneth N. to obstructionism on controlling climate change and the use of torture. and has so far hamstrung the US from pushing decisively towards a twostate solution to the Israel–Palestine problem. The Obama administration’s more robust line on the necessity of a two-state solution faces such daunting domestic and regional obstacles that its chances do not look promising.unpopularity isolates the US -. The US had rather limited success in selling the GWoT as a global macro-securitization to replace the Cold War. US support for the Saudi regime helps keep in power a government whose domestic deals with Wahabi Islamists recycles large sums of oil money into the support of Islamic fundamentalism. not only feeding the terrorist problem. and this seems set to continue. as a consequence. and to an extent in the 1990s. 2011. US policy has often been controversial among its friends. China and climate change – shows how the US stands ever more alone. March 2011 vol. and replace it with a rational choice logic of immediate and specific shared interest.
19 the possibility of regional stability looks remote. 22 have many useful economic complementarities. then it becomes possible that US perceptions of China as threatening will not be shared widely. 2011. though less controversial than that on the Middle East. its alliance with the US. possibly none. even ever-faithful Britain would have trouble joining in any new US intervention in this region. bad and. and whose relationship with China remains deeply clouded by unsettled historical issues. Yet the two countries have developed a quite stable strategic partnership. which are often in competition with those of the US. If it stays with the US. it would find itself being the front line in a new Cold War between Washington and Beijing. is that the long-standing drumbeat of concern in Washington about rising China as a peer competitor will get louder as China does indeed grow in power. China Buzan 11 – Barry. and its effective fragmentation by the West. this US concern will be a parochial one. A considerable weight of expert opinion thinks that Sino-Japanese relations are. underneath their formal political correctness. Those many voices currently in opposition to US hegemony. but somewhat strengthened. getting worse. 21 If they can carry off their design for a ‘peaceful rise’. and US cultivation of China after 1971 helped to weaken the Soviet Union. 23 The big question mark is Japan. containment of China was part of the East–West struggle. also benefited from the masking effects of shared interests. Given both the deep divisions and antagonisms in the Middle East. shared by few. Russia. leaving the main economic and political costs of balancing China to the US. if at all. In the absence of any common cause. The US tie to Israel looks unlikely to change and will continue to poison Washington’s position in the region and much of the rest of the world. which since the end of the Cold War has not only maintained. and will not feel threatened by it. After the Iraq fiasco and the Afghan quagmire. it is far from clear that other powers will feel threatened by China’s challenge to US hegemony. The nature of the China that rises. Japan and the Soviet Union in their rising period. Unless China turns nasty and threatening. Montague Burton Professor in the Department of International Relations (March 25. Waltz Annual Lecture A World Order Without Superpowers : Decentred Globalism. b. But the Chinese leadership is determined to avoid the mistakes made by Germany. Russia may well want to continue to bandwagon with China against the US. If a rising China becomes ultra-nationalist. But if China conducts its peaceful rise successfully. but also amplified differences between the US and its allies. of the other great . however. “The Inaugural Kenneth N. and share an interest in non-intervention and regime security. aggressive and militarist. must appear threatening to the US. however. The US role in facilitating China’s ‘reform and opening up’ since 1978 has also been broadly popular. Japan will face very difficult choices. India has to balance a growing economic relationship with China against some still sensitive territorial disputes and a desire not to be overshadowed in status terms by China. on the level of society and pubic opinion. might welcome China’s rise. and staying broadly within the rules of the global economic order. During the Cold War. then it could well be that others would share US perceptions. middle-ground position between Washington and Beijing. Japan is the toughest problem facing China’s ‘peaceful rise’ strategy.100 of 154 The GWoT not only failed to extend this cover. That might not look attractive compared with the options of either resolving the history problems and bandwagoning with China or following India into a more independent. Union. Russia has worries about Chinese designs on the sparsely populated territories of the Russian Far East.” International Relations. with both governments in different ways to blame. and speaking of the need for a more multipolar world order. 1 3-25) US policy on China. March 2011 vol. and the US retains its commitment to not tolerating any peer competitors. will be crucial to whether others share US perceptions of China as a threat. What is now in prospect. India will probably try to continue to play the US and China against each other as it does now. Europe will not care much about its rise. China. 20 To the extent that realist thinking dominates in Washington. If China is relatively benign in the sense of not using violence against its neighbours. Japan and increasingly India have their own interests there. 24 If China’s rise is benign. Unpopular US policies and competing interests in the region from other powers provide no foundations for legitimising US leadership. but the US securitizes it anyway. then a rising China. 25 no. whether peaceful or not.
for the US to avoid remaining a big part of the problem . if rising temperatures and sea levels are to be controlled. and even denial that there was a problem. though the scientific uncertainties are still sufficient that the exact timing and unfolding of it are difficult to predict. Climate change Buzan 11 – Barry. 25 no. Obama’s enthusiasm for green energy as a fix for both the environment and the economy has already been checked by the polarization in US politics. Montague Burton Professor in the Department of International Relations (March 25. The commitment of Americans to a high consumption lifestyle. has in the eyes of many made the US more a part of the problem than of the solution. and the Bush administration’s resistance to serious pollution and emission controls. March 2011 vol. c. “The Inaugural Kenneth N. Waltz Annual Lecture A World Order Without Superpowers : Decentred Globalism. it could put the US more on its own in relation to great power politics than it has been since before the First World War. If China plays its hand cleverly. It poses questions of common fate for all of humankind and. However. 2011. and the polarization of US politics will make it difficult. This could easily become the dominant issue for world politics. Yet the US is already unpopular on climate change. whether domestic or international. if not impossible. though developments in the private sector and at the level of state and city governments might well restore some US credibility in this area.101 of 154 powers. requires collective action of a kind with serious economic consequences.” International Relations. 1 3-25) Climate change is a relatively new issue with only slight links back to the Cold War. it is less clear that there is any fix for the problem of the unsustainable American lifestyle.
Europe will promote its supranational integration model as a path to resolving Mideast disputes and organizing Africa. When America dominated NATO and led a rigid Pacific alliance system with Japan. but how much longer will it do so as its own social standards rise far above this lowest common denominator? And why should China or other Asian countries become “responsible stakeholders.html? _r=3&oref=slogin&pagewanted=all) Karl Marx and Max Weber both chastised Far Eastern cultures for being despotic. rather all three will constantly struggle to gain influence on their own and balance one another. while Europe and China occupy two ends of the great Eurasian landmass that is the perennial center of gravity of geopolitics. “Accidental empire” or not. “Waving Goodbye to Hegemony” http://www. It already has.com/2008/01/27/magazine/27world-t.U. Today the Asian landscape still features ancient civilizations but also by far the most people and.102 of 154 Heg Decline Inevitable Hegemonic decline is inevitable – a transition now towards multipolarity solves conflict. because the answer is unfolding before our eyes. Despite the “mirage of immortality” that afflicts global empires. As the historian Arnold Toynbee observed half a century ago. arguing that mankind both lives and thinks in unique cultural systems. and as Toynbee also pithily noted. what we see gradually happening in climate-change negotiations (as in Bali in December) — and need to see more of in the areas of preventing nuclear proliferation and rebuilding failed states — is a far greater sense of a division of labor . as the world’s sole leader. proliferation. senior research fellow in the American Strategy Program of the New America Foundation. America’s spirit is weakened. Oswald Spengler saw it differently.nytimes.U. may uphold the principles of the United Nations that America once dominated. Would the world not be more stable if America could be reaccepted as its organizing principle and leader? It’s very much too late to be asking.U. Asia is shaping the world’s destiny — and exposing the flaws of the grand narrative of Western civilization in the process. As Europe’s and China’s spirits rise with every move into new domains of influence. 08 (Parag Khanna.” in former Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick’s words. lacking the ingredients for organizational success. Maintaining America’s empire can only get costlier in both blood and treasure. and Turkey. and history promises the effort will fail. Globalization resists centralization of almost any kind. Instead. The web of globalization now has three spiders. whether the United States or the United Nations. Neither China nor the E. it has been shunned by the E. What makes America unique in this seemingly value-free contest is not its liberal democratic ideals — which Europe may now represent better than America does — but rather its geography. The E. Just as there is a geopolitical marketplace. Western imperialism united the globe. it successfully managed the Herculean task of running the world from one side of it. Now its very presence in Eurasia is tenuous. is unwelcome in much of the Middle East and has lost much of East Asia’s confidence. With or without America. Australia and Thailand. America is isolated. The self-deluding universalism of the American imperium — that the world inherently needs a single leader and that American liberal ideology must be accepted as the basis of global order — has paradoxically resulted in America quickly becoming an everlonelier superpower. in an American-led international order when they had no seat at the table when the rules were drafted? Even as America stumbles back toward multilateralism.S. the only reliable rule of history is its cycles of imperial rise and decline. there is a marketplace of models of success for the second world to emulate. multicultural landscape filled with transnational challenges from terrorism to global warming is completely unmanageable by a single authority. America must quickly accept and adjust to this reality. while China will push a Beijing consensus based on respect for sovereignty and mutual economic benefit. others are walking away from the American game and playing by their own rules. America must make itself irresistible to stay in the game. agrarian and feudal. South Korea. not least the Chinese model of economic growth without political liberalization (itself an affront to Western modernization theory). The rise of China in the East and of the European Union within the West has fundamentally altered a globe that recently appeared to have only an American gravity — pro or anti. will replace the U. with Western ideals neither transferable nor relevant. the only direction to go from the apogee of power is down. but it did not assure that the West would dominate forever — materially or morally. by certain measures. It isn’t worth it. I believe that a complex. and climate change Khanna. the most money of any region in the world.
Neither are any of the other multilateral bodies bogged down with weighted voting and cacophonously irrelevant voices. a concrete burden-sharing among them by which they are judged not by their rhetoric but the responsibilities they fulfill. .103 of 154 among the Big Three. The arbitrarily composed Security Council is not the place to hash out such a division of labor. The big issues are for the Big Three to sort out among themselves.
but it’s an important driver. it sets up the conditions for the emergence of new models of power. 08 (Jamais Cascio. and opens up new niches of influence.php/IEET/more/cascio20080407/) Resource collapse isn’t the cause of the rise of the post-hegemonic world. Cascio. The same can be said of the leading global corporate powers.104 of 154 Alt Cause – Resource Collapse Resource collapse is important factor in hegemonic collapse. It reveals vulnerabilities. setting the mighty against the mighty. . Most importantly. Senior Fellow of Institute for Emerging Ethics and Technologies (IEET). Those actors adopting the new successful models will find themselves disproportionately powerful. Right now. “The Big Picture: Resource Collapse. Senior Fellow. degree in Political Science. 4/8/08. It weakens the powerful. none of the leading great power nations seem well-suited to discover and adopt such new models.org/index. It triggers conflict. IEET. as ultimately the most effective responses to resource collapse will come from revolutions in technology and socio-economic behavior. The climate and resource crises of the 2010s and 2020s will be compounded by a vacuum of global leadership.” http://ieet.
unlike in 1917 or 1941. the results would not have been significantly less awful.Democrat and Republican. can present US strategy against Iran -. and that given the realities of Iraqi society and history. when possible. in the course of which American global power will not be qualified but destroyed altogether. really serious war risks US economic disaster. intended to create regional coalitions against potential aggressors and. it could involve separating US goals from Israeli ones and seeking detente with Iran. conclude that President Bill Clinton's strategy of the 1990s would also have made the conquest of Iraq unavoidable sooner or later. It can defeat other states in battle easily enough but it cannot turn them into loyal or stable allies. it is increasingly indebted and key vassal states are no longer reliable. To place American power on a firmer footing requires putting it on a more limited footing. central to what is happening is the greed and decadence of the imperial elites. In theory.S. My fear though is that. In the former Soviet Union. The result is that the US is incapable of waging more wars of occupation. The empire can no longer raise enough taxes or soldiers.be sustained permanently without war? Indeed. For that matter. with potentially awful consequences for the world. . For it is pointless to dream of long maintaining an American empire for which most Americans will neither pay nor fight. the desirable US response to its imperial overstretch is simple and has been advocated by some leading independent US thinkers such as Professor Stephen Walt of Harvard. http://www. it could mean accepting a qualified form of Russian sphere of influence. but also defusing the threat of confrontation with China by encouraging the reintegration of Taiwan into the mainland. “Decadent America Must Give Up Imperial Ambitions” 11-29-05. some at least of these moves may. In an equally classical fashion. The Bush administration deserves to be savagely criticised for the timing and the conduct of the Iraq war.but fiscally equally damaging -. 05 (Anatol Lieven. the relative decline in US economic independence means that. In the Middle East. this process may occur through disastrous defeats.cuts to taxes on the middle classes. civilian and military -. In Asia. such as in Iraq. is unsustainable. regional consensuses in support of order and stability. this is something that American policymakers -. as presently conceived by the overwhelming majority of the U. global power. but also geopolitical stances wholly shared by the Democrats. however.php) U. the US wealthy classes have gained a grip over the state that allows them to escape taxation. It is important to note that this US weakness affects not only the ambitions of the Bush administration. it becomes clear how utterly unacceptable much of this approach would be to the entire existing US political order. Future historians may. The basic reasons why the American empire is bust are familiar from other imperial histories. It is to fall back on "offshore balancing". establishment. Despite the lessons of Iraq. Even a limited US-Chinese clash over Taiwan would be likely to produce catastrophic economic consequences for both sides. prove inescapable in a generation's time. The result is that the empire can no longer pay for enough of the professional troops it needs to fulfil its self-assumed imperial tasks.org/archives/2005/11/index. may it not be that any power wishing to exercise hegemony in the region would have to go to war at regular intervals in defence of its authority or its local clients? Furthermore. It cannot introduce conscription because of the general demilitarisation of society and also because elite youths are no longer prepared to set an example of leadership and sacrifice by serving themselves. one traces what this might mean in practice in various parts of the world. however. however. When. senior research fellow at the New America Foundation and a member of the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy.supported by both parties -. Impossible today. it could mean backing Japan and other countries against any Chinese aggression.realisticforeignpolicy. rather than as a result of carefully planned and peaceful strategy. but direct military commitments and alliances should be avoided wherever possible.still find extremely difficult to think about.105 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (1/18) Hegemony is unsustainable – slow decline now avoids a disastrous collapse later Lieven. War therefore means simply creating more and more areas of anarchy and breeding grounds for terrorism.S. Not just a direct military presence. Mass acquiescence in this has to be bought with much smaller -. given the nature of the Middle East. Like so many of their predecessors.
To the Western eye. 08 (Parag Khanna. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization gathers these Central Asian strongmen together with China and Russia and may eventually become the “NATO of the East. aid workers.106 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (2/18) Hegemonic decline is inevitable – China rivals US influence and acts as a stabilizing force in Asia Khanna.nytimes. China is cutting massive resource and investment deals. as well as oil-rich Kazakhstan.html? _r=3&oref=slogin&pagewanted=all) The East Asian Community is but one example of how China is also too busy restoring its place as the world’s “Middle Kingdom” to be distracted by the Middle Eastern disturbances that so preoccupy the United States. it is also making major strategic investments in the financial sector. Every country in the world currently considered a rogue state by the U.” . a Greater Chinese CoProsperity Sphere has emerged. Across the globe.com/2008/01/27/magazine/27world-t. From Thailand to Indonesia to Korea. dam-builders and covert military personnel. into its orbit. At the same time. it is deploying tens of thousands of its own engineers. Under Japanese sponsorship. now enjoys a diplomatic. Without firing a shot. no country — friend of America’s or not — wants political tension to upset economic growth. The whole world is abetting China’s spectacular rise as evidenced by the ballooning share of trade in its gross domestic product — and China is exporting weapons at a rate reminiscent of the Soviet Union during the cold war. China is not only securing energy supplies. resulting in America’s grip on the Pacific Rim being loosened one finger at a time.S. Iran being the most prominent example. In Africa. Like Europeans. Aided by a 35 millionstrong ethnic Chinese diaspora well placed around East Asia’s rising economies. a set of Asian security and diplomatic institutions is being built from the inside out. it is a bizarre phenomenon: small Asian nation-states should be balancing against the rising China. In America’s own hemisphere. Trade within the India-Japan-Australia triangle — of which China sits at the center — has surpassed trade across the Pacific. And in the former Soviet Central Asian countries — the so-called Stans — China is the new heavyweight player. its manifest destiny pushing its Han pioneers westward while pulling defunct microstates like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. but increasingly they rally toward it out of Asian cultural pride and an understanding of the historical-cultural reality of Chinese dominance. Asians are insulating themselves from America’s economic uncertainties. from Canada to Cuba to Chávez’s Venezuela. China is doing on its southern and western peripheries what Europe is achieving to its east and south. “Waving Goodbye to Hegemony” http://www. they plan to launch their own regional monetary fund. senior research fellow in the American Strategy Program of the New America Foundation. while China has slashed tariffs and increased loans to its Southeast Asian neighbors. pinning America down while filling whatever power vacuums it can find. economic or strategic lifeline from China.
in its survey of likely international developments up until 2020. new great power rivals to the United States will emerge. The real issue is not if American primacy will end. In a similar vein. which means that at any point in time some states are gaining in relative power while others are losing it. Already there is evidence suggesting that new great powers are in the process of emerging .38 For sure.107 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (3/18) We control uniqueness – collapse of primacy is inevitable by 2030. To put it slightly differently. and military developments which has existed since time immemorial. that American primacy could end much sooner than that.S. however. But China isn’t the only factor in play. there is a yawning gap between the United States and the next-ranking powers. because that would imply a freezing of the differentiated pattern of growth rates. In the same way that commentators refer to the 1900s as the American Century. Nevertheless. American primacy cannot be sustained indefinitely. which is why they concede that American primacy won’t last forever. ." American Empire: A Debate. Indeed. but how soon it will end. p. There are indications. This is what the current debate in the United States about the implications of China’s rise is all about."The Case Against the American Empire. technological advance.” 36 Even the most ardent primacists know this to be true. It will take some time before any other state emerges as a true “peer competitor” of the United States. not static. as Paul Kennedy has observed. the CIA’s National Intelligence Council’s report Mapping the Global Future notes: The likely emergence of China and India as new major global players—similar to the rise of Germany in the 19th century and the United States in the early 20th century—will transform the geopolitical landscape. a recent study by the CIA’s Strategic Assessment Group projects that by 2020 both China (which Mapping the Global Future pegs as “by any measure a first-rate military power” around 2020) and the European Union will come close to matching the United States in terms of their respective shares of world power. Thus. new poles of power in the international system are likely to emerge during the next decade or two. primacy to multipolarity may be much closer than primacists want to admit. the primacists are correct. The relative power position of great powers is dynamic. that—at best—the United States will not be able to hold onto its primacy much beyond 2030. and transition from U. [Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute. In terms of hard power. But if the ongoing shift in the distribution of relative power continues. with impacts potentially as dramatic as those of the previous two. no great power ever has been able “to remain permanently ahead of all others. Christopher LAYNE 2007. 64-65] Can the United States Be Caught? Up to a point. the early 21st century may be seen as the time when some in the developing world led by China and India came into their Own. there are always potential pitfalls in projecting current trends several decades into the future (not least is that it is not easy to convert economic power into effective military power). the leading primacists acknowledge. For example. at some point within the next decade or two.
An America [End Page 40] that has the wisdom and prudence to contain itself is less likely to be feared than one that begs the rest of the world to stop it before it expands hegemonically again. at some point. 64-65] The United States has a hegemony problem because it wields hegemonic power.S. Unilateral offshore balancing.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_85/ai_n16832448 The United States is a very powerful state. America's real realists--George F. If the United States fails to adopt an offshore balancing strategy based on multipolarity and military and ideological self-restraint. National Interest. Paradoxically. which is a potentially dangerous strategy.S. the real realists have understood the true paradox of American power: Precisely because of its power and geography. p. Morgenthau and Waltz have highlighted the dangers that await if the United States gives in to the temptations of hegemonic power and have counseled instead that the United States pursue a grand strategy based on prudence and self-restraint. Hans Morgenthau. Maintaining U."The Case Against the American Empire. deterritorialized conception of security divorced from the traditional metrics of great power grand strategy: the distribution of power in the international system and geography. hegemony is a game that no longer is worth the candle. Fall http://findarticles. especially given that U. To reduce the fear of U. Rather than risking these outcomes. Kennan. indeed. to reduce others' concerns about its power. Real realists like Lippmann. by asserting its power heavy-handedly. They not only recognized that a wise grand strategy must balance ends and means. Hegemony is not only a costly grand strategy." American Empire: A Debate. yet the very fact of its overwhelming capabilities has been a constant temptation for American policymakers to intervene abroad unwisely in the pursuit of unattainable goals (nation building or democracy promotion). thus causing the United States to become imperially overstretched and involving it in unnecessary wars that will reduce its power. there is very little the United States needs to do in the world in order to be secure. Heg is unsustainable Christopher Layne 2006. but also that it must differentiate between desirable objectives and attainable ones. is America's next grand strategy. Its quest for hegemony is driven instead by an ideational. The United States does not need to be an extraregional hegemon to be secure.S. They understood that the world is not malleable and will not respond to American-imposed social engineering. Most of all.108 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (4/18) Collapse of hegemony and transition to off-shore balancing inevitable – delaying it just causes war Christopher LAYNE 2007. .S. Americans would do well to pay heed to these admonitions as they debate how the United States should alter its grand strategy as the unipolar era inexorably draws to a close. primacy may well hasten its end by stimulating more intensive efforts to balance against the United States. 131 Thus. Kennan. have to fight to uphold its primacy. provoke opposition to it. primacy may already be in the early stages of erosion. power. 130 It also must rein in the scope of its extravagant ambitions to shape the international system in accordance with its Wilsonian ideology. but also one that ultimately is unsustainable. the United States must practice self-restraint (which is different from choosing to be constrained by others by adopting a multilateral approach to grand strategy). and will remain so even if it no longer is a hegemon. it probably will. Walter Lippmann and Kenneth Waltz-- always warned of the dangers that a hegemonic United States would over-reach itself and. the United States must accept some reduction in its relative hard power by adopting a multipolar—and essentially unilateral—offshore balancing strategy that accommodates the rise of new great powers. attempting to sustain U. [Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute. the United States should begin to retrench strategically and capitalize on the advantages accruing to insular great powers in multipolar systems.
such as India and Pakistan. the risk of nuclear war could actually rise. “The Empire Strikes Out: The ‘New Imperialism’ and its Fatal Flaws”. President Bush laid out his vision of a future in which the United States more or less monopolizes global military power through preemption if necessary: “America has. including war.) That approach is consistent with the strategy of empire.” 96 (continued from previous page – nothing cut) Consequently. . In other words. “is that we all expect certain rules. In its National Security Strategy. The logic of empire therefore dictates that as few states as possible should be allowed to gain a defensive footing with the United States. But supporting preventative or preemptive action could shift the rules of the world order against peace and stability.” which means taking military action before an imminent attack by an adversary.109 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (5/18) Collapse is inevitable – sustaining hegemony only causes war and proliferation Eland 2002 (Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute. the United States currently has the world’s most powerful military.18) The answer is probably no. obtains them. in preserving a balance of power. before a nation working on WMD. thus triggering a spiral of security competition that . But it costs far more for the United States—a relatively secure nation separated from most of the world by two vast oceans—to project its power across the seas than it does for states located on other landmasses to project their power regionally.” 94 “There’s no question that great powers like the United States [can] launch preventative wars or preemptive strikes whenever they conclude it’s in their interests. State sovereignty also allows for the formation of multiple loci of power and the prospect of power balancing. Such states also see these weapons as their best means of overcoming the conventional superiority of the United States. It will also increase the likelihood of war. Nov 26. however. Certainly. I favor the Teddy Roosevelt approach to foreign policy: Speak softly and carry a big stick. and “we have to be ready for preemptive action” because “if we wait for threats to fully materialize. As political scientist Frank Russell once wrote: “Rome . the exceptions justify it—lest we establish precedents that others will emulate. .” 95 The strategy of empire. in many cases the United States might launch a preventive attack to stop an incipient threat before it is even realized. [its] military strengths beyond challenge. we will have waited too long. In practice this idea will bring preventative efforts. if other nations. . But the “$64. . is to speak loudly (extended deterrence) and cut up and scatter Washington’s inadequate stick all over the place. We just have to be careful that if we create exceptions to those rules. 2002. A balance of power system is essentially a device for keeping the power of different states within limits by a system of checks and balances. speech to West Point’s graduating class. offense-minded states have a tendency to incite security dilemmas. or appears to undermine.” From this perspective. p. and intends to keep.” which says that striking early is less difficult than striking later. What’s more.” says a skeptical Bush administration official. the strategy of empire is unlikely to function if all sorts of states are allowed to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as a deterrent against the power projection of the United States. That’s a blueprint for trouble if there ever was one. proximity matters. whereby the efforts of weaker states to increase their relative security undermines. the security of the offense-minded state.” What’s more. and it spends much more on its defense than all its rivals combined. such as Iraq. the strategy of empire necessarily leads to a devaluation of other states’ sovereignty. offense-minded states are apt to be war-prone because they believe the prospects for victory are very favorable to them. adopted preemption as their official policy. 93 Indeed. I think it would be better not to do that. for example. . to make sure WMD proliferation is stopped at all costs. which are things an empire cannot accept if it is committed to maintaining supremacy. allow [end page 13] these states to attempt to blackmail the United States and our allies to prevent us from deterring or repelling the aggressive behavior of rogue states. The echo of Rome is clear.000 question is whether or not it makes sense to stand on the rooftops and announce loudly to the world that this is your doctrine.” 91 In his June 2.” said Bush. . “One of the reasons there is not a constant state of war. Over the long run the strategy of empire will likely prove unsustainable and ultimately self-defeating.” adds Mearsheimer. which raises what John Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago has called the “stopping power of water. never was interested .” 92 (Although the president used the word “preemptive. That’s because accepting the principle of noninterference is an impediment to a dominant state seeking to make other nations conform to its will. That’s because the doctrine of prevention or preemption is predicated on the “ideology of the offensive.” the belief that “the presence of oceans on much of the earth’s surface makes it impossible for any state to achieve global hegemony. The Bush administration’s National Security Strategy boldly asserts that “our best defense is a good offense. the Bush administration notes: “These weapons may . Rome certainly was not interested in a balance of power for the very reason she was interested in a monopoly of power.
98 Hence there is a paradox. as China’s economy grows. The expansion of Chinese influence in that region may run afoul of a United States. which could in turn spur even more U. The doctrine of prevention or preemptive intervention could actually create a greater incentive for other states to try to acquire WMD secretly as an insurance policy against American military might. And other states will worry that the doctrine could be used against them.110 of 154 can culminate in confrontation or war. how will Washington prove that an attack might have happened? Surely some foreign and domestic critics will discount the threat afterward. The other major problem with the doctrine of prevention or preemption is that in the absence of actual aggression against the United States. it may want more ability to control its security environment within East Asia. 97 For example. Inevitable mistakes will lead to recrimination and suspicions about America’s motives. which has a defense perimeter that is far forward and a military doctrine that is very preventive or preemptive.S. .
” 99 Yet it was such nation building that led to the attack on U. 103 According to British historian P. or deeply buried facilities. One of the primary reasons Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain appeased Adolf Hitler at Munich in 1938 was that much of Britain’s strength was diffused throughout its far-flung empire. the fact that so many people in the Muslim world dislike America’s meddling is not seen as an argument for rethinking U. London was not in a position to rebuff a rising Nazi Germany early on because Britain was overstretched . the United States may find that its alliances and commitments around the world may sap its strength for dealing with any rising power—perhaps China. could be more interventionism. According to the New York Times. The commitments were almost literally worldwide. . preventive attacks on installations associated with those superweapons often founder on a lack of intelligence on the location of such clandestine small mobile. Britain’s chiefs of staff produced a gloomy assessment of London’s security prospects. In fact. the risks of foreign entanglements increase. telling other states and aspiring states who their leaders should be. like the proverbial man who finds himself stuck in a hole. code named Prominent Hammer.) The unintended consequence of interventionism. “To reach an accommodation with Italy in the Mediterranean. And over the longer term there is the issue of being ready to fight a major theater war if necessary. “The policy of ‘appeasement’ should never be appraised without recalling this sternly realistic recommendation. Failed states are already an example of those self-reinforcing phenomena. in other words. M. today’s advocates of empire are unable to break out of their consolidating logic. economic aid. not that interventionism necessarily solves problems. But digging will neither get the man out of the hole nor make the United States safer. Western Europe and the British Isles were all under some kind of threat as the 1930s went on. citizens and to threaten mass destruction. in other words. . . the danger posed by failed states is a consequence of something other than state failure per se. for ramping up U. . garrisoning myriad outposts. southwest Asia and the Sinai. to find the basis of a settlement with Germany. reduced Britain’s options in the face of a horrible danger. Australia and New Zealand. promulgating foreign educational and health care programs. In coming years. the United States could conceivably lose one or more large cities to demented or irrational retaliation for American intervention. Failed states matter to today’s advocates of empire because the existence of such states raises the specter that interventionist foreign policies in one place can have a deadly price tag made possible by individuals willing to take advantage of the situation in another place. Bell: [end page 15] The fundamental problem was the disparity between Britain’s commitments and her resources. still relied on her for protection. expanding the campaign against terrorism to a country like Iraq would place severe strains on personnel and cause deep shortages of certain critical weapons. policy or assuming a lower profile. and the stress of ongoing operations in Afghanistan. to make only the most cautious response to Japanese aggression in China—all this followed in large part from the need to diminish the number of one’s enemies. that is.” 101 The conclusion was that the American military would be stretched very thin. Malaya and Singapore. Similarly. has revealed that. and launching wars to transform countries like Iraq “into a beacon of hope. The very problem of failed states. The Joint Chiefs of Staff subsequently recommended postponing an attack against Iraq. that is. America and its citizens will become an even greater lightning rod for the world’s political malcontents. The Dominions. (Yet as President Clinton [end page 14] found out in 1998 during Operation Desert Fox. the security threat posed by failed states is really a second-order issue.S. those advocates see it as an argument for deeper involvement. Thus. a recent top-secret Pentagon war game. in short. today’s advocates of empire recommend more digging. to avoid confrontation with the Axis powers over the Spanish Civil War.” The strategy of empire could make the United States less secure in another major way as well—by dispersing and overtasking its military personnel and equipment.” 105 Empire. As former Reagan adviser and Cato Institute senior fellow Doug Bandow warns: “With the growing ability of small political movements and countries to kill U. even now.111 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (6/18) [Card continued without omission] prevention or preemption.S. “The war game measured how the strains of new commitments to domestic defense. 104 In 1937. the Middle East and Mediterranean. would affect the military’s ability to wage and win a new regional war. forces in Somalia. though asserting their independence of the mother country. but that interventionism can create altogether new ones. H. and accumulating manifold security and treaty commitments they are obliged to honor. Instead. The primary danger is from an interventionist foreign policy that makes enemies who are resourceful and willing move into and exploit failed states.S.S. Empires get into trouble because they get bogged down fighting protracted small wars in the hinterland.” says Bell. Their conclusion was that England should not make new enemies. that is. Nevertheless. the demands of long-term deployments in places like the Balkans and South Korea. Accordingly. 102 The strategic implications are potentially enormous. shows. Thus .
Controlling hostile populations will demand extensive linguistic and policing skills. for example. Given the growing protectionism against its exports.112 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (7/18) Unipolar hegemony is unsustainable and doesn’t solve the terminal impacts Calleo. Director of the European Studies Program. p. The American military loathes this kind of fighting and. While the United States is lavishly outfitted for high-technology warfare. Yet. This current shortage of means is a further blow to America's hegemonic expectations. pursuing a hegemonic agenda in today's world requires different capabilities for more primitive forms of combat. credit to finance it no longer depends on allies in urgent need of protection. recent experience also reveals that America's global predominance has been seriously overestimated. how long will America's enthusiasm for hegemony endure? . 73-8) Given our future's high potential for discord and destruction. Instead. In the face of this unaccustomed constraint. University Professor of The Johns Hopkins University. to date. but is still far short of the resources needed to prevail. 2007 (Dean Acheson Professor. it seems unreasonable to expect China to continue this practice indefinitely. the United States will face the tougher choices between guns and butter it has long been able to avoid. having a hegemonic superpower already installed might seem a great good fortune. by continuing to add to its already immense reserves of surplus dollars. Put to the test. these others were allies dependent on American military protection. subsidises its own imports. Survival. trained for intimate contact with the enemy. and prepared for high casualties. together with American consumption and investment. During the Cold War. Greater success would seem to require a different sort of military . with a good part of the exchange costs of America's world role eventually covered by others who accumulated the surplus dollars. If credit from China is restricted. has not been very good at it. like countering guerrilla warfare and suicidal terrorism. Today. but at the expense of its own more balanced internal development. The United States is now spending heavily to compensate for its deficiencies. however. Financial experience during the Cold War accustomed the United States to abundant credit from the world economy. China. credit comes increasingly from states whose indefinite accumulation of dollars seems contrary to their own long-term interests.with more and cheaper troops. while the United States' external deficit is bigger than ever. American power counts for less than expected.
and images does not simply reflect the will and ideas of the strongest country. violence. even if the EU lacks the military might to engage in military disagreements. symbols. hegemony. Anti-American actors rely in part on words to overcome material inferiority to the United States. This gives those who are needed some leverage over the United States. Even the U nited States. win recruits. Other countries utilize rhetorical attacks and symbolic protests against U. recent events in Iraq. “If Not Balancing. dominance.harvard.S. still needs cooperation from far weaker states on a host of issues such as the intelligence and police work needed to combat global terrorism. hegemony does not offer a crystal clear road map. and biological weapons may now be seen as a way of deflecting unwanted attention from Washington. economic dictates. Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Connecticut in Storrs. The EU can thus engage. it does suggest several different avenues by which states and disaffected peoples will resist U. They may hope to sway the American public . chemical. anti-American resentment. are these forms of resistance? While the past decade of U. The EU has some economic weight to throw around when it disagrees with U. economic policy or wants to resist U. and North Korea are shedding light on the various ways in which nuclear. First. http://belfercenter. Iran. in trade wars with the United States. the United States has created the impression that non-conventional weapons are the best form of defense against the American empire.S.S.ksg. Third. a few actors look for shortcuts to overcome the massive imbalance in military capabilities.S. . perhaps the most dominant great power in history.edu/publication/2943/if_not_balancing_what_forms_of_resis tance_to_american_hegemony. Fourth.S. While terrorism has long been seen as a weapon of the weak. the specific economic relationship between the European Union (EU) and the United States does not fit the general pattern of U. What? Forms of Resistance to American Hegemony”.S. then. Second. In projecting American military power around the globe.html) What. They resort to two tactics of the weak: terrorism and the possession of non.113 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (8/18) Many factors challenge American hegemony including terrorism.S. policy in an effort to win the verbal war for hearts and minds at home and abroad. and build support for anti-U.conventional weapons. states can resist by withholding cooperation. for example. which opens the door to American-European economic confrontations. the war of words. and rogue states Pressman 2004 (Jeremy Pressman.
Kuwait was quick to support the U. certain nearby real estate became very important. To some extent. http://belfercenter.S.S. some states have unique assets that the United States covets. http://belfercenter. By virtue of geography. financial support for reconstruction. Iraq appeared very aware of the possibility that its potential opponents could be divided by carefully calibrated Iraqi actions. Iraqi policy contributed to non. Although the United States is dominant in many realms. Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Connecticut in Storrs.S. interest. allies like France or Germany. Once the United States asked for things like UN support for the war. military greater access was based largely on the geographic cards Turkey holds. effort. They may judge and prioritize threats differently. . drug trafficking or intelligence-sharing.edu/publication/2943/if_not_balancing_what_forms_of_resis tance_to_american_hegemony. bases are not immune to opposition either. Iraq assisted UN inspectors just enough so that some countries believed inspections were working even as Britain and the United States continued to decry Iraqi non. Such support is essential for gathering intelligence and conducting international police work. Opponents of the war on Iraq used the threat of non-cooperation to slow the drive to war. withholding funds for the post-war reconstruction of Iraq.114 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (9/18) America’s policy of aggression tanks cooperation efforts which are key to sustainable heg Pressman 2004 (Jeremy Pressman.S. preferences. On cooperation more generally. the door was open for meaningful non.cooperation by standard U. Vetoing UNSC resolutions. a hyperpower still needs cooperation in some areas.edu/publication/2943/if_not_balancing_what_forms_of_resis tance_to_american_hegemony. and Uzbekistan. What? Forms of Resistance to American Hegemony”. This would be especially true when siding too closely with Washington could increase domestic political opposition and mobilize a strong challenge to regime survival. Yet even close U.harvard. But the depth of cooperation is always going to be in part a reflection of how willing the American partner is to cooperate. For counter-terrorism. allies sometimes have different objectives. The importance of the Turkish parliamentís vote against granting the U. when they share the U. In other words. “If Not Balancing. they can resist by reducing cooperation that is essential for the advancement of U.ksg. approach. they often favor a different policy to realize that interest. No sustainable Heg—Policies like Iraq have tanked cooperation with important US allies Pressman 2004 (Jeremy Pressman.S. “If Not Balancing. or preventing military preparations in Turkey under the NATO umbrella are all ways of resisting U. Pakistan. and NATO involvement in getting ready. the United States can pressure other countries to cooperate.S. What? Forms of Resistance to American Hegemony”. Longtime U. or suspects.S. Syria. putative allies may not feel inhibited about undermining the U. interests. as the United States experienced in the Philippines and more recently in Okinawa.compliance. The United States has worked with a wide range of states including Britain. efforts. the war against al-Qaeda is illustrative.S. Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Connecticut in Storrs. countries often drag their feet and slow the flow of information. If other countries always had the same interests and policies as the United States.ksg. Spain. once the United States decided to target Iraq in 2002-03. evidence. Whether based on different interests or different policy preferences to pursue shared interests.harvard. but Turkey held out for much more. non-cooperation by less powerful states hurts U. or. policy.S.S. For instance. withholding cooperation would be counterproductive.cooperation.html) The dilemma of non-cooperation was also exemplified in other ways during the buildup to a war with Iraq. If the United States is too aggressive or dismissive of local concerns.S.html) When other countries disapprove of U.
edu/publication/2943/if_not_balancing_what_forms_of_resis tance_to_american_hegemony.html) Another effect of words and symbols is that they can be used to undermine both domestic and international support for U. any bit player can lambaste the United States. peoples. Iraq. The battle for hearts and minds is a two way street: while Washington is trying to build domestic support and win non-U.S.S. policy are trying to convince the U. http://belfercenter. as we see in the next section. asymmetric warfare.S.S. or.S. The open American system. international media. policies.U. As became clear with Iraq. policy to win over both segments of the American public and U. Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Connecticut in Storrs. supporters in other countries.harvard. words and symbols can be used to make it harder for the United States to pursue and protect its interests.S.115 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (10/18) International media and propaganda spur strong anti-American resentment tanking heg Pressman 2004 (Jeremy Pressman. for example. public as well as non. support. Rhetorical assaults can increase the impact of other tactics such as non-cooperation. In a system that values debate and the clash of ideas. In hindsight. foreign opponents of U. States from getting the UN blessing for the war on Iraq. opponents can range from longtime allies like France and Germany to the very target of the war. and foreign lobbying create opportunities for those opposed to U.S. . even if the words are not backed by material capabilities. “If Not Balancing. Words.ksg. What? Forms of Resistance to American Hegemony”. words are free if the topic is of interest to the international media. With the right message. At the end of the day. stopped the United the absence of the United Nations or some form of the international community meant the loss of access to Turkey during the war and greater difficulty getting aid and personnel to provide security and help with reconstruction.
Simply put. Indeed. International politics is dynamic. Visiting Associate Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School [World Policy Journal. American grand strategists view the prospect of change in international politics in much the same way that British prime minister Lord Salisbury did toward the end of the nineteenth century.national system-specifically. America 's grand strategy will no longer be preponderance." Salisbury said. whether they are sustainable. American hegemony cannot be maintained much beyond that period. The other half. This is unsurprising. however. seldom acknowledged by champions of preponderance. "What ever happens will be for the worse. Any serious debate about U. the costs and risks of the strategy of preponderance will rise to unacceptably high levels. Grand strategies must be judged by the amount of security they provide. The time is rapidly approaching when the strategy of preponderance will be unable to pass these tests. The time to think about alternative grand strategic futures is now--before the United States is overtaken by events. hegemony prevents us from emerging as an offshore balancer – hegemonic decline is inevitable – it is better to let it decline now so we can choose our strategic position in the world Christopher Layne 1998. not static. 15 iss. The suggestion that the days of American hegemony are numbered no doubt will be met with disbelief by advocates of the current grand strategy. . As Paul Kennedy has observed. proquest] My argument for adopting an alternative grand strategy is prospective: although it may be sustainable for perhaps another decade. that is only half of the argument. “Rethinking American grand strategy: Hegemony or balance of power in the twenty-first century?” vol. 2..able to Soviet domination. the relative decline of U. I do not deprecate those who believe that bad things (increased geopolitical instability) could happen if the United States were to abandon the strategy of preponderance. it is the very fact of the Soviet Union 's collapse that has knocked the props out from under the strategy of preponderance. without the Cold War. The changing distribution of power in the inter. their cost. Over time." However. grand strategy must use these criteria to assess the comparative merits of both the current grand strategy and its competitors. and their tangible and intangible domestic effects. Summer.S. This strategy is also being undermined because the credibility of America 's extended deterrence strategy is eroding rapidly. power and the corresponding rise of new great powers-will render the strategy of preponderance untenable. The United States could be hegemonic only because the Soviet threat caused others to accept American preeminence as prefer.ers.S.S. the advocates of preponderance want to keep the world the way it is. "and therefore it is in our interest that as little should happen as possible. is that bad things--perhaps far worse things--could happen if the United States stays on its present strategic course. events will force it to do so. "It simply has not been given to any one society to remain permanently ahead of all the oth. they may. The United States could enjoy the relative predictability and stability of the bipolar era only be. America will not be able to preserve its Cold War preponderance or stability. Make no mistake: sometime in the early decades of the twenty-first century.116 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (11/18) U. If the United States does not choose now to begin making the transition to a new grand strategy better suited to the new century's emerging international realities.. Having fulfilled their hegemonic ambitions following the Soviet Union 's collapse.cause of the effects of bipolarity itself. the degree of risk they entail. In advocating an offshore balancing strategy." The conditions that made American preponderance possible are changing rapidly..
which eventually weakens the internal foundation of its external position. 31 To be sure. p. contrary to the predictions of Waltzian balance of power theorists. No. differential growth rates trigger shifts in relative economic power that ultimately result in the emergence of new great powers. Nye. then-Vice President Dan Quayle linked the continuance of America's security commitment to NATO with West European concessions in the GATT negotiations. In February 1992. As a consequence. Over time. A hegemon tends to overpay for security. Other states underpay for security. the strategy of preponderance could prolong unipolarity somewhat. A strategy of more or less benign hegemony does not prevent the emergence of new great powers. however. Harvard professor Joseph S. Moreover. This has led primacists to conclude that there has been no balancing against the United States. Vol. Unipolarity is the foundation of U. such a policy will accelerate the hegemon's relative decline.117 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (12/18) Collapse inevitable – free-riding Christopher Layne 1993 (Visiting Associate Professor at Naval Postgraduate school. “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise”. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. if it ends. primacy. is illustrative. a strategy of preponderance will fail. . Over time. hegemony and. George Bush's New World Order and Bill Clinton's apparent commitment to assertive projection of America's democratic and human rights values reflect America's desire to "press its preferred policies" on others. Heg collapse inevitable – leash slipping Christopher Layne 2006. No new great powers have emerged to restore equilibrium to the balance of power by engaging in hard balancing against the United States—at least.4 1993) Inevitably. The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming of the United States' Unipolar Moment. Fall. as long as eligible states calculate that the benefits of free riding outweigh the constraints imposed on them by American hegemony. International Security. For example. America's renewed credibility would cause Germany and Japan to be more forthcoming in their economic relations with Washington. A strategy of benign hegemony allows others to free-ride militarily and economically. 125 Such a "leverage strategy" is no mere abstraction. Jr. However. suggested that the deployment of United States forces in Europe and Japan could be used as a bargaining chip in trade negotiations with those countries. Associate Professor at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A & M. unipolarity persists. 124 Several weeks later.S. There is another reason why a strategy of preponderance will not work. the primacists' focus on both the failure of new great powers to emerge and the absence of hard balancing distracts attention from other forms of behavior— notably leash-slipping—by major second-tier states that ultimately could lead to the end of unipolarity. 17. which allows them to shift additional resources into economically productive investments. which followed such a strategy. The fate of nineteenth-century Britain." But there is more to it than that.S. in a February 1991 address to the New York Economic Club. benign hegemony facilitates the diffusion of wealth and technology to potential rivals. No doubt. so will U. Bush said that because the United States had taken the leader's role in the Gulf militarily. the effect is to erode the hegemon's preeminence. Other states can justifiably infer that Washington's unipolar aspirations will result in the deliberate application of American power to compel them to adhere to the United States' policy preferences. Such a strategy articulates a vision of an American-led international order. not yet.
not too weak. 17. it is less likely to have negative geopolitical repercussions than a policy that aims at perpetuating unipolarity. (4) in a multipolar system.4 1993) The coming years will be ones of turmoil in international politics. American policymakers need to remember that other states balance against hegemons and they should not want the United States to be seen by others as a "sprawling giant with gouty fingers and toes. Fifty years from now. the United States-Japan relationship will become highly competitive and the possibility of hegemonic war will be present . traditional patterns of great power competition will reemerge not withstanding the effect of secondimage factors. Vol. but just right-strong enough to defend American interests.4 1993) Because multipolarity is inevitable . America's optimal strategy is to make its power position similar to Goldilocks' porridge : not too strong. No doubt neorealism's critics will continue to point to second image factors as reasons to take an optimistic view of the future. Systemic change occasioned by the rise and fall of great powers has always been traumatic. International Security. it is pointless to debate the comparative merits of unipolar. Structural realists can be confident that events will vindicate their predictions: ( 1) Because of structural factors. (2) unipolarity will stimulate the emergence of eligible states as great powers . . bipolar. Although vigorous internal renewal might cause frictions with others over economic policy. Unipolarity will inevitably collapse the US must switch to a multipolar strategy to avoid the harms Christopher Layne 1993 (Visiting Associate Professor at Naval Postgraduate school. and (5) if differential growth rate effects allow Japan to challenge America's leading position. (3) unipolarity will cause other states to balance against the United States. But this one is not fated to drag on inconclusively. which probably would accelerate the rise of new great powers. 17. Relative decline has internal and external causes.118 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (13/18) Multipolarity is inevitable only a shift in US strategy to independence will solve the turns Christopher Layne 1993 (Visiting Associate Professor at Naval Postgraduate school. “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise”. which would invite others to exploit American vulnerabilities. and (2) enable the United States to do as well as possible in a multipolar world . too. and multipolar systems .S. and increase the probability that balancing behavior would be directed against the United States. No doubt. without pro voking others. In coming years. and probably much sooner. the international system will provide a definitive field test of the contending views of inter national politics offered by neorealists and their critics. This approach would heighten others' concerns about the malign effects of unchecked American power. which would frighten others into balancing against the United States. The transition from unipolarity to multipolarity will challenge the United States to devise a policy that will arrest its relative decline while minimizing the chances that other states will be provoked into balancing against the United States. International Security. “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise”. energies on redressing the internal causes of relative decline would be perceived by others as less threatening than a strategy of preponderance. we will know who was right and who was wrong. Relative decline can be addressed by policies that focus on either or both of these causes." A policy that concentrates U. It would be counterproductive for the United States to attempt to maintain its relative power position by attempting to suppress the emergence of new great powers. Vol. the United States needs to design a strategy that will (1) safeguard its interests during the difficult transition from unipolarity to multipolarity. the debate between neorealists and their critics will continue. Rather than vainly and counterproductively pursuing a strategy of preponderance. an American strategy of preponderance or an attempt to perpetuate unipolarity is doomed to failure . No. No.
is about more than strategy.119 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (14/18) Heg collapse inevitable Layne 97 (Christopher Layne is Visiting Associate Professor at Naval Postgraduate school. U. the United States can pursue an alternative grand strategy without sacrificing its security. however.22 Issue. not a pejorative: Offshore balancing is a twenty-firstcentury grand strategy consistent with America’s interests and its values. of external involvement. however. it is also about values. U. is the minimum.S. is dynamic not static. America First is an imperative.” Salisbury said. And it should do so. in these circumstances. not abroad. in fact. The United States is secure enough from external threat that.” No doubt. 1 Summer 1997) It is unsurprising that having fulfilled their hegemonic ambitions following the Soviet Union’s collapse. The debate between advocates of preponderance and offshore balancing. “and therefore it is in our interest that as little should happen as possible. there is nothing wrong with taking advantage of that Cold War’s end to focus on economic and social challenges at home: “What we should want. hegemony cannot last indefinitely. In this sense. such a policy is indeed self-interested and most assuredly moral.S. nation over empire. “it simply has not been given to any one society to remain permanently ahead of all the others…” Thus the strategy of preponderance must be reassessed. preponderance’s advocates want to keep the world the way it is.” International politics. it could choose to restraint over intervention. some would maintain that offshore balancing is both selfish and immoral. As Paul Kennedy has observed. In fact. should it wish to do so. International Security. . Kennan says. grand strategists view the prospect of change in international politics in much the same way that British Prime Minister Lord Salisbury did toward the end of the nineteenth century. “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy”. offshore balancing—an innenpolitik grand strategy that posits the primacy of domestic over foreign policy—is ethically driven: America’s mission lies at home. I have attempted to demonstrate that. “What ever happens will be for the worse. As George F. not the maximum. and an emphasis on domestic needs over external ambitions. Vol.
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History demonstrates that every empire has collapsed – cannot be sustained through force without public legitimacy
Carl Boggs 2005 (Social Science Professor National University (L.A.) , Planetary Politics: human rights, terror, and global society, ed. Stephen Eric Bronner)
The long history of empire aspiring to tyrannical rules over mass populations, hoping to expand their domain by overwhelming political coercion and military force, has been saturated with fierce resistance, deep quagmires, and humiliating failure: Rome, Spain, France under Napoleon, England, the brief twentieth-century global ventures of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. All at some point combined an unshakable political hubris with faith in armed violence as a means for building empire – and all had dazzling periods of success before disintegrating or being vanquished. Previous imperial regimes violated the basic Machiavellian premise that power without broad popular consent is destined to either implode or be overthrown. A corollary is that imperial domination by its very logic cannot easily secure much popular legitimacy, if any. By the 1940s the very idea of imperial control based upon foreign occupation had become historically obsolete, swept away by a series of postwar (and earlier) anticolonial struggles. The French colonial wars intended to retain control of Indochina and parts of Africa amounted to a final desperate reliance on brute force as the famous European “civilizing” mechanisms of religion, culture, and legal codes met with increasingly violent resistance. Dien Bien Phu and the Battle of Algiers symbolized the final eclipse of a colonial era in which European powers had recognized few limits to the use of military violence, much of it directed against civilian populations. The very ideology of imperial domination had been assaulted and destroyed in the name of ideals mainly imported from Europe itself—national self-determination, cultural autonomy, democracy.
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Drive for empire contains its own seeds of destruction through resistance and blowback
Carl Boggs 2005 (Social Science Professor National University (L.A.) , Planetary Politics: human rights, terror, and global society, ed. Stephen Eric Bronner) An urgent question for the fate of the planet is whether US ruling elites can for long sustain their drive toward global domination—that is, whether they can prevail in an arena where military force and political coercion have become the chosen methods of supremacy. We know that what governing regimes may require for popular support domestically may not readily extend to the sphere of world politics, where Hobbesian chaos tends to block normal mechanisms of legitimacy and order. US efforts to impose corporate and geopolitical agendas through military power, which of course it has in great abundance, will depend upon conditions of effective popular mobilization—needed to justify the costs and sacrifices of empire—but those very conditions (e.g. patriotism) quickly lose their ideological rationale beyond the national territory. Such conditions are in fact more likely to breed opposition and resistance to empire, including diverse expression of blowback. Signs of expanding opposition to empire have become increasingly visible; global terrorism and the events of 9/11, flourishing of an international antiwar movement during 2002 and 2003, growth of antisystem forces such as the World Social Forum, diffusion of anti-American sentiment in Europe the Muslim world, Asia, and elsewhere. To the degree that those ideological factors generating legitimacy for a new American militarism are bound to be counterproductive globally, imperial stability will more likely be reinforced by “postmodern” conditions involving widespread depoliticization, mass apathy, and privatized retreat ensuring greater elite autonomy. No doubt the rulers of empire would prefer a quieter, more atomized, depoliticized universe smoothly governed by routine economic transactions, the market, and consumerism, the ideal of an American-managed neoliberal hegemony grounded in a peaceful, more or less consensual imperial order. The problems here are twofold—the neoliberal model itself generates massive social contradictions while globalized, aggressive US military power works against the trajectory of single world hegemon, hoping to extend its rule over the entire planet, these contradictions are bound to significantly worsen.
123 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (17/18) Military power undermines US heg and leadership – spurs resistance and is unsustainable Carl Boggs 2005 (Social Science Professor National University (L. A system of global domination resting largely upon military force. and dedicated to ruling the globe by force. and virtual absence of governing mechanisms differs radically from the state system that commanded most of Gramsci’s attention. Of course.A. cannot in the scheme of things consolidate its rule on a foundation of legitimating beliefs and values. the United States has already lost much of its room to maneuver even as it wins immediate victories by means of economic and diplomatic leverage combined with military power—the same power that may soon become a double-edged sword. including those referred to above. expansive scope. the global terrain with its vast mélange of competing nation-states.) . . terror. ed. Strong elements of “national-popular” consent underlying US empire. rooted in a strong patriotism. Yet it is not too difficult to see how the unique conditions of domestic support for US worldwide economic and military power might run counter to requirements for global hegemony. insights can be gleaned from several passages in the Prison Notebooks. nor can it smooth over the harsh dysfunctions and conflicts endemic to the corporate world economy by mobilizing forms of hegemony such as nationalism and consumerism that work so fluidly in domestic politics. Stephen Eric Bronner) While Gramsci never systematically brought the concept of hegemony into the realm of international politics. As the lone superpower with a huge seemingly invincible military apparatus. and global society. or threat of force. will naturally conflict with the multiplicity of competing interests and wills across the globe— interests and wills leading often to anti-imperial resistance and opposition just as predictably as any law of physics. Planetary Politics: human rights.
It is 2016. Previous eras of balance of power have been among European powers sharing a common culture. as well as warships anchored at Bahrain and an Air Force presence in Qatar.html? _r=1&oref=slogin&ref=magazine&pagewanted=print) <Turn on the TV today. but that was also a decade adrift. The European Union has expanded to well over 30 members and has secure oil and gas flows from North Africa. both because of his policies and. it remained essentially a contest over Europe. and should. the more we will see the planetary stakes of the new global game. Maybe the best way to understand how quickly history happens is to look just a bit ahead. Afghanistan is stable. as well as substantial nuclear energy. and each assertion of power has awakened resistance in the form of terrorist networks. lead it to collective security and prosperity? Indeed.gov. Democrats and Republicans are bickering about where and how to intervene. an increasingly depopulated expanse run by Gazprom. America’s unipolar moment lasted through the 1990s. China has absorbed Taiwan and is steadily increasing its naval presence around the Pacific Rim and. The more we appreciate the differences among the American. But the distribution of power in the world has fundamentally altered over the two presidential terms of George W. The cold war. European and Chinese worldviews. Democrats believe they can hit a reset button.” to be published by Random House in March. The postcold-war “peace dividend” was never converted into a global liberal order under American leadership. So now. they mean little.” but it has no permanent friends either. America’s standing in the world remains in steady decline. “Waving Goodbye to Hegemony. and the Hillary Clinton or John McCain or Barack Obama administration is nearing the end of its second term. and not India. and Republicans believe muscular moralism is the way to go. multicivilizational.124 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (18/18) Hegemonic collapse inevitable Khanna 8 (Parag Khanna is a senior research fellow in the American Strategy Program of the New America Foundation. “The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order. America has pulled out of Iraq but has about 20. Russia and the Caspian Sea. on the Arabian Sea. The Geopolitical Marketplace At best.. America’s unipolar moment has inspired diplomatic and financial countermovements to block American bullying and construct an alternate world order.> . improvements to America’s image may or may not occur. and you could be forgiven for thinking it’s 1999. more significant. lagging decades behind China in both development and strategic appetite. It’s as if the first decade of the 21st century didn’t happen — and almost as if history itself doesn’t happen.com/2008/01/27/magazine/27world-t. and there is precious little Clinton or McCain or Obama could do to resist its growth. Every expenditure has weakened America’s armed forces. insurgent groups and “asymmetric” weapons like suicide bombers.” http://www. And the others are left to choose their suitors in this post-American world. too. not an incoherent Islam embroiled in internal wars. but either way. This essay is adapted from his book. they were signs of imperial overstretch. from the Pakistani port of Gwadar.000 troops in the independent state of Kurdistan.nytimes. is a global. for the first time in history. multipolar battle. despite them. we are competing — and losing — in a geopolitical marketplace alongside the world’s other superpowers: the European Union and China. Condoleezza Rice has said America has no “permanent enemies. in fact. whether to do it alone or with allies and what kind of world America should lead. Many saw the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq as the symbols of a global American imperialism. This is geopolitics in the 21st century: the new Big Three. What we have today. Iran is nuclear. The Big Three make the rules — their own rules — without any one of them dominating. Not Russia. was not truly an “East-West” struggle. Bush. Why? Weren’t we supposed to reconnect with the United Nations and reaffirm to the world that America can. rather than bestriding the globe. That new global order has arrived.
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commodityonline. Over time Asia is replacing the US as the fastest growing trading partner of Beijing. Beijing has encouraged the US MNC to invest in China and export back to the US.html. China. USA is still the largest economy with a GDP of $14 trillion. have ignored Washington’s warnings of China as a “security threat” and expanded their trade and economic ties with their neighbor.91 trillion likely to overtake Japan to second position. in the first quarter of 2010 China grew at 12%. however. Initially. China merely protested at US human rights attacks. China went on the offensive. Most strikingly in Asia.7% recording $4. China’s policy toward US attacks and threats was reactive and defensive. je) Last week China released their GDP growth figures for 2009 which showed it grew 8. China will overtake the US by 2020 -. Sreekumar. White House policymakers and financial detractors of Beijing have ignored the formidable foundations of Chinese empire building and its capacity to rectify internal imbalances to sustain dynamic expansion. Given the overall growth of China. China refuses to lend support to Obama’s military centered strategy to buttress the empire. the most dynamic countries. the corporate penetration does not enhance US power rather it provides China with a lobby in Washington opposing protectionist measures. despite pressure from Washington. borrowing technology and upgrading its high tech industries. Later China responded by pointing out that the currency brouha had little to do with the US trade deficit. retired Bartle Professor (Emeritus) of Sociology at Binghamton University in Binghamton. rather than proactive and offensive especially during the first decade of its advance toward global power status. While attending “summits” and bilateral conferences it refuses to make concessions which prejudice its overseas markets. Overall the US imperial strategy to stem its decline and block China’s growth as a world power has failed. Raghavan ‘10.com/news/Futurology-Why-US-hegemony-will-decline25056-3-1. More recently in April 2010. either denying the charges or claiming they were internal affairs. publishing its own documented inventory of US domestic human right violations 38 . India have voiced concern over its trade imbalances with China and entered in negotiations to increase its exports. Nothing challenges the “crises” propaganda emitted by US embedded experts as the reports that. China affirmed that is exchange rate was an “internal matter” and even acceded to US demands and revalued its currency (2006 – 2008) by 20%. http://www. namely to its low level of savings. (since Washington does a good job at self-destruction) rather it focuses on enhancing its own economic based strategy of increasing overseas investments. China rebuked Washington’s interference in China’s internal affairs and threatened to take reprisals which led Washington to drop its crusade. refuses to join its sanctions campaign against Iran and develops investment ties in Afghanistan while the US military occupation costs billions and alienates most Afghans including its client regime 39 . New York and adjunct professor at Saint Mary's University (4/28/10.126 of 154 Exts – Yes China Rise Decline is inevitable . “Futurology: Why US hegemony will decline?”. without directly confronting the military mission promoted by Obama. When Washington protested at China’s violation of the human rights of Tibetan and Uigher separatists. six times the projected growth of the US 37 . for example.demographic trends. capital formation and loss of competitiveness.Staff Writer for Commodity Online (1/24/10. China does little to directly constrain US overseas expansion.” http://lahaine. pointing to the structural weaknesses in the US economy.pdf) A rising economic powers’ most formidable and effective response to the established imperial powers’ efforts to block its advance is … to keep on growing at double or triple the rate of growth of its declining adversary. “Rising and Declining Economic Powers: The Sino-US Conflict Deepens. Commodity Online.org/petras/b2-img/petras_sinous.China is rising at unprecedented rates and US scare tactics can’t undermine its credibility Petras 10 – James. By 2010. PriceWaterHouse Coopers and Goldman Sachs have come out with their set of predictions – China will become the largest economy by 2020 and on some parameters India will overtake Japan in .
the USNS Victorious was harassed.83 ounces between 1990 and 2005. a Chinese fighter jet aggressively intercepted a US Navy propeller-driven EP-3 surveillance aircraft 75 miles from Hainan Island. Harvard researchers say. In 1953. President Obama dispatched the USS Chung-Hoon to provide armed escort for the surveillance ship." Instead." Emily Oken of Harvard Medical School said in a statement. China will overtake naval heg -. two commercial cargo ships crossed the bow of Impeccable. The Diplomat. a similarly aggressive intercept occurred. In another of the many instances of harassment of US naval and air forces. http://thediplomat.S. babies born at full-term between 1990 and 2005. The heavily damaged EP-3 made an emergency landing on the island. But the ‘Futurogist’ in me couldn’t ignore the following report from Massachussets. The study. "Previous studies [covering periods into the early 1990s] have shown that birth weights have increased steadily during the past half-century. published in February's Obstetrics & Gynecology.S. and even started using armed oceanographic ships and fisheries enforcement vessels to try to disrupt routine US military survey missions in the East China Sea. obstetric care and other trends from the National Center for Health Statistics Natality Data Sets. The researchers looked at data from 36. Researchers at the Harvard Pilgrim Health Care Institute's department of population medicine. I feel the above report on US new borns indicate that biological reasons could also cause US hegemony to be threatened by emerging nations of China. In response. The greater issue. debatable. China issued an infamous map with a U-shaped.78 ounces less at birth during the study period. Levie Chair of Operational Law at the U. China has been equally obstinate in pressing specious ‘territorial’ claims to virtually the entire South China Sea. Kraska ’10. resulting in the loss of the jet and pilot. If China or India emerges stronger. Chinese ships and aircraft harassed and threatened the USNS Bowditch and the USNS Sumner. such as trends in mothers' diets. physical activity.com/2010/05/06/china-ready-to-dominate-seas/4/. After all the US economy was built on free enterprise. Naval War College and Senior Fellow at Foreign Policy Research Institute (5/6/10. knowledge capital. well-educated. Russia and India. an affiliate of Harvard Medical School.’ In 1974. The result: a well-coordinated campaign of legal. as it’s the largest obstacle to Beijing’s strategy. and again in 2002. Who knows biological reasons may be the critical factor that determines how long USA will remain the world’s largest economy. US new borns are getting smaller which is to be studied in detail by the medical fraternity in the coming years. In each of these cases. capitalism and innovative spirit. Soon after the Impeccable incident. "We expected to see a continuation of those increases. stopping directly in front of the ship. on March 7 of 2009. Beginning in 2000. is how China has invested decades in a patient and aggressive campaign to slowly push other countries out of the East China Sea and South China Sea. At the same time. Oken and her colleagues found birth weights had decreased by an average of 1. of course. also found white. the obvious reason is because they produce more goods and services. stress and exposure to environmental toxins. je) The prospects for a Chinese surprise attack are. for example. analyzed data on birth weight. into the South China Sea to assert China’s ‘rights and interests. “U. All of it will be lost if indeed. “China Set for Naval Hegemony”. received early prenatal care and delivered vaginally with no complications had babies who weighed an average of 2. In the summer of 2001. In 2001.’ These three cases are only the tip of the iceberg. China . China sent its largest and most modern ocean surveillance patrol ship.key to overall global primacy. political and military pressure—and sometimes aggression—to gradually bring the littoral seas under Chinese domination. however. reversing a decades-long upward trend in birth weights. The fact that the finding has come from Harvard Medical School is sure to ignite further research into causes leading to low birth weight babies and how to correct them. innovation. James. China failed to comply with its obligations under international law to show due regard for the rights of vessels and aircraft of other nations operating in the East and South China Seas. The causes of this decline remain unclear and babies born small not only face short-term complications but increased risk as adults. The fighter jet collided with the US aircraft. Today. China initiated increasingly provocative warship and aircraft maneuvers. ‘nine-dotted line’ that laid claim to 80 percent of the South China Sea. which were operating in the East China Sea. married women who didn't smoke. The US Navy is the main target.Howard S.S. a new generation of kids are born who are underweight who could face increased risk in their adult life as well. the Yuzheng 311.827. maternal and neonatal characteristics. Future research may identify other factors not included in the current data that might contribute to lower birth weight.127 of 154 2012.” So apart from factors such as industrial production. In 2003. newborns have gotten smaller during the past 15 years.828 U. the line is derisively called ‘the cow tongue. I am quoting the report in full before coming to my theory of why US hegemony will end in another 20-30 years as predicted by futurologists. Chinese maritime forces stalked the USNS Impeccable ocean surveillance ship. Working in tandem with an intelligence ship. utlising their human and natural resources in an efficient manner. USA which states that during the past 15 years. an oceanographic ship and a fisheries enforcement vessel. natural resources.
But ‘virtual presence’ is actual ragged with global responsibilities. and the fourth war involving the United States was the Second Barbary War. The Chinese fleet is about 260 vessels. 88 major surface combatants and 48 submarines. On April 10 of this year. a longtime Clinton associate. China is working feverishly on a new weapon that will alter the strategic calculus—the 1. most of the rocks and reefs of the Spratly and Paracel chains are merely navigational hazards and not ‘islands. the United States devotes only 26 percent of its defense budget to the Navy and Marine Corps. the Center for Naval Analysis issued a report suggesting that none of this is hyperbole: the US Navy is at the tipping point. in combination with a space-based maritime surveillance and targeting system. Second. Likewise. China again attacked Vietnamese forces on Johnson Reef and occupied six features in the Spratly Islands. Then.’ They also lie far from China and within the 200-mile economic zones of neighboring Vietnam. the Vietnam War. The Chinese Navy. In February. farther north. the third US conflict was the War of 1812. The first war fought by an independent United States was over the issue of freedom of the seas—the 17981800 Quasi-War with France. First. and then surge actual forces in the event of a crisis.’ China is reaching far beyond its shores. China’s grand effort to convert large swaths of the oceans into an area under Chinese suzerainty is a dangerous game that risks naval war. Are you starting to see a pattern here? But China has made uncanny progress on its dogged trek to transition from an obsolete 1950s-style coastal defense force to a balanced blue water fleet. AIP extends underwater endurance from a few days to one month. For the first time. The DF-21 will be armed with a maneuverable reentry vehicle (MARV) that. and enables submarines to sprint underwater—greatly increasing their attack radius. on April 13 a Chinese Navy destroyer performed the menacing act of aiming its rapid-fire guns at a Japanese MSDF P-3C plane. which was on a regular patrol mission in international airspace. and in 1994 Beijing captured Mischief Reef from the Philippines. China’s geographic position. run hard-pressed to maintain a force of 11 carriers. who notably coined the phrase ‘strategic reassurance’ to describe the idea that the United States should reassure China that its rise to prominence is welcome. attracts more than 33 percent of the nation’s military spending. All of Beijing’s warships and land-based aircraft and submarines already are present in theater. the key US issue was ensuring freedom of the seas. and the US strategy is tacit recognition that the Navy that had approached 600 ships in the 1980s is incapable of maintaining even half that number. all spread thinly throughout the world. The United States believes it can be ‘virtually present’ everywhere. While the United States has the forward-deployed USS George Washington on a short tether. an ultra-quiet Song–class AIP submarine surfaced inside the protective screen of the aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk. By comparison. Chinese ground . specifically designed to decapitate US carrier strike groups. This occurred only two days after a Chinese helicopter flew within 90 feet of a MSDF destroyer monitoring the battle group. the United States is under the delusion that it could maintain sea control in Asia. In 1988. So accustomed to being militarily superior. These maritime disputes are cast against the backdrop of decades of Chinese naval build-up. about to abandon its position of maritime superiority. with short and secure internal lines of communication. Fourth. which will include aircraft carriers. Several factors are in play as China unveils a stable of advanced and emerging systems.128 of 154 seized the Paracel Islands from Vietnam. and the country’s intransigent and tireless peddling of patently illegal maritime claims.500-mile range DF-21 ASBM. The second US war was the First Barbary War of 1804. after suffering an embarrassing indignity in 1996 when President Bill Clinton ordered the Nimitz and Independence carrier battle groups into the Taiwan Strait. Steinberg that China would not tolerate ‘foreign interference’ in its ‘territory’ in the South China Sea. and the prospect of intercepting a maneuvering ballistic missile reentry vehicle is daunting. For each of these conflicts. oftentimes Washington has no other carrier in theater. As a maritime nation with worldwide responsibilities. the elusive AIP diesel electrics are equipped with wake-honing torpedoes and anti-ship cruise missiles. meaning that even two or three Chinese carriers operating in the area likely will exceed the number of US flattops. it was Steinberg. This isn’t new. a 10-ship Chinese flotilla. in the Gulf of Tonkin. on the other hand. the issue of freedom of the seas helped precipitate US involvement in two world wars and. the US Navy battle force. demonstrating its ability to shoot down the aircraft. Beijing has elevated the ‘the cow tongue’ to a vital national interest. Third. Ironically. China seized 33 Vietnamese fishing boats and 433 crew members near the Paracel Islands. Taiwan. and particularly maritime mobility. can be used to strike moving warships at sea. But by claiming the South China Sea as its ‘territory. Last year. But in March. Ironically. transited between Okinawa Island and Miyakojima. and the entire force is complemented by hundreds of fast cruise-missiles shooting offshore patrol vessels and land-based aircraft. The US fleet will be absence. China has embarked on a program to build a powerful surface fleet. Reportedly quieter than the US fast attack Los Angeles-class boats. 31 amphibious warfare ships. which included two submarines. This is unlike any threat ever faced by the US Navy. In one incident in October 2006. The cornerstone of American power and security is global access. another Okinawa Prefecture island. Malaysia and Brunei. China has mastered quiet air-independent propulsion (AIP) power plants for its new Type 041 Yuan-class boats. the Philippines. the New York Times reported that Chinese officials had told Deputy Secretary of State James B. raising the danger that China was willing to endanger the safety of one of its aircraft to make a point. including 75 major warships and more than 60 submarines. is a force multiplier. has shrunk by 20 percent since 2001. while China should in turn reassure its neighbors that its rise is peaceful. Beijing’s maritime bullying.
je) China would like to make the yuan one of the world's anchor currencies. China is riding a wave of national overconfidence at the same time many regard the United States as preoccupied with counterinsurgency in central Asia.the official name in China for the "people's money. The occasion for the new superpower's confident campaign was the state visit of President Hu Jintao. Hu and the Politburo attended secret lectures in which Chinese professors explained the history of the rise and fall of major powers. It would have to gradually appreciate its currency. The United States superseded the British Empire after World War II. During these sessions. In order to have a reserve currency. the prospect is remote that the US Navy alone will recalibrate the balance of sea power. This would make the country's exports substantially more expensive and would drastically curb growth. The second possibility is that other nations—foremost among them Japan and India—but also including virtually every other nation in the region from Russia to Vietnam. as the United States buckles under the strain of enormous budget deficits. http://www. the country also essentially links the exchange rate of its currency to the dollar. which the Chinese believe has irrevocably harmed their American rival. with the US dollar as its reserve currency. They have made it to the heart of American capitalism. China behaves like the gangly teenager who. This suggests two outcomes. so that the exchange rate could be based on the real value of the currency and the strength of China's economy. Even before he left Beijing. but in the Western Pacific. the Chinese leader said that the world's monetary system." which is adorned with a portrait of Mao -. forcing other countries to maintain reserves of Chinese money and providing significant advantages for Beijing. New York and adjunct professor at Saint Mary's University . Wieland. Until now. the dollar and the euro. upon suddenly experiencing a growth spurt. These developments don’t leave a lot of room for optimism. when the dollar replaced the British pound as the dominant currency in the global financial system.cannot even be freely exchanged into another currency. the Chinese leaders realized that no modern country has ever become a superpower without a reserve currency. “China Plans Path to Economic Hegemony”. such as in the commodities markets.129 of 154 command and control is connected by spoof-proof hard-wire landlines." China's long-term goal is to become a country with an anchor currency. To keep the prices of its exports artificially low. Fifth. Beijing has used a complicated system of foreign currency controls to effectively shield the renminbi from global capital flows. the images of Chinese astronauts and athletes. Caught up in the fanfare of the country’s meteoric rise. Nevertheless. This explains why Beijing has pursued the internationalization of the yuan since the outbreak of the global financial crisis. Dollar heg -. Moreover. dominant not only on land. In written interviews with the Wall Street Journal and the Washington Post.741303. These emotions fuel a ballooning sense of past wrongs to be compensated and future entitlements to be seized. China has a lot on its plate. The first is that China will indeed achieve its goal of becoming the Asian hegemonic power.yuan will overtake it. their stars and the super-rich will appear 300 times a day in a giant advertisement for the People's Republic. Wagner ’11. China is overflowing with ethnic and cultural pride and itching to ‘teach lessons’ and settle old scores. As of last week. China would have to give up all of this. the pioneers in China's race to the top have been displayed on a giant electronic billboard in New York's Times Square. Any maritime conflict with the United States (or Japan) will push China teetering over the edge of a war fever not seen since the Guns of August. gaining more favorable terms as a result. was a "product of the past. Yet the country cannot continue to keep the value of its currency artificially low if it hopes to become the world's dominant economic power. other countries will have to maintain reserves of the yuan instead of the current reserve currencies.Writer for Spiegel International (1/26/11. strategically listless and brooding.de/international/business/0. hardly a week goes by in which China does not launch new pilot projects to "internationalize" the yuan in the long term. in its global shopping spree. For four weeks. retired Bartle Professor (Emeritus) of Sociology at Binghamton University in Binghamton. Brimming with uncontained satisfaction—even joy—at its relentless ascent. the visiting head of state had predicted that the dominant capitalist power could expect to see a redistribution of global power. Secret Lectures on Reserve Currencies Years ago.html.1518. China could then use its own currency to conduct transactions. If that happens.spiegel. China rise inevitable – US tactics to undermine Chinese credibility have failed and increased Chinese confidence to project power Petras 10 – James. 68. with US President Barack Obama. Spiegel International. clumsily begins to throw around his weight. Today the renminbi -. will begin to think more overtly about collective measures and how they can balance the growing power of Beijing. perhaps even allowing it to float freely.00.
electromagnetic weapons.” http://lahaine.pdf) Established empires in decline. But political problems and budgetary woes could kill the program before it ever gets started. “Rising and Declining Economic Powers: The Sino-US Conflict Deepens. http://oilprice. Among the anti-access/area-denial (A2AD) capabilities being fielded by China include anti-satellite weapons. je) The US is developing an air-sea battle concept to counter China's military buildup. China's People's Liberation Army is building up anti-access and area-denial capabilities with the apparent goal of extending their power to the western half of the Pacific Ocean. One of the longest standing political ploys is Washington’s human rights propaganda campaign. have a repertoire of levers designed to discredit. surveillance and target acquisition. By discrediting China internal politics. while China has invested billions in joint ventures with Iran and has developed a growing lucrative trading relation. essentially dividing the Pacific between the US and China and ending US hegemony on that ocean. “Chinese Plans to End US Hegemony in the Pacific”.C. opposing protectionism and seeking a negotiated settlement with Iran. China should give up its market driven economic expansion to share “responsibility” in policing the world in which the US is supreme.130 of 154 (4/28/10. deflect attention from its worldwide long term and large scale violation of human rights accompanying its global empire building and build an anti-China coalition. or Washington undertakes actions to offset or counterbalance the effects of the PLA’s military buildup. "Navies tend to grow with economies and as trade becomes more important. US .freelance journalist based near Washington. such as references to the US and China as the (G-2). advanced radar systems. at the expense of China’s economic interests. like the US today. Washington demands China support sanctions to weaken and degrade Iran to enhance US military power in the Gulf 34 .com/Geo-Politics/International/Chinese-Plans-to-End-US-Hegemony-in-the-Pacific.. advanced fighter aircraft. Washington also attempts to induce China’s cooperation in slowing down its decline. to allow the US to gain trade advantages to reduce (“rebalance”) its trade deficit. While human rights propaganda serves as the stick to beat back China’s economic advance. At international gatherings like the recent Copenhagen Conference on climate warming. chief of US naval operations. The A2AD buildup threatens the US forward presence and power projection in the region. US diplomats frame this approach by emphasizing “treating China as an equal”. China Will End US Hegemony in the Pacific Buxbaum ’10.This situation creates a strategic choice for the United States. In other words. deflecting attention from the facts of Chinese compliance in setting standards superior to the US 36 . the White House has promoted a “united front” with the EU against China’s supposedly “protectionism”. For example. D. which extends as far as Guam and New Guinea. its allies and partners: acquiesce in a dramatic shift in the military balance or take steps to preserve it. while ignoring its own massive offenses and downplaying those of its allies like the Jewish state of Israel. isolate and contain rising world powers like China and put it on the defensive. seduce. if we translate the meaning of the White House’s demand for China to “assume responsibility” for “rebalancing the world economy” it boils down to telling Beijing to reduce its dynamic growth. the GATT meeting on trade liberalization and the UN meeting on Iran..org/petras/b2-img/petras_sinous. "Unless Beijing diverts from its current course of action. recognizing it as a “world power” which has to “share responsibilities” 33 . Behind this diplomatic rhetoric is an effort to harness China to a policy of collaborating and following US empire building strategies as a junior partner. Chinese military and political doctrine holds that China should rule the waves out to the second island chain of the western Pacific. a conservative Washington think tank." All of this has US military planners and thinkers worried." said Admiral Gary Roughead. spaced-based reconnaissance. "the cost incurred by the US military to operate in the [w]estern Pacific will likely rise sharply. Oil Price. The Chinese also have an emerging and muscular deep-water navy. Likewise. perhaps to prohibitive levels. unmanned aerial vehicles. specializes in business and government technology and security (5/31/10. on climate.]. “currency manipulation” and other “unfair” economic practices 35 ." In response to the Chinese challenge. Over time this imperial offensive to slow its decline has provoked an increasingly aggressive response as China gains confidence in its capacity to project power. and ballistic and cruise missiles. highlighting China’s human rights violations.html. and much sooner than many expect[. Washington attempts to satanize China as the main obstacle in reaching global accords. "The PLA navy is increasing its numbers of submarines and other ships. Peter. Alternating between positive symbolic gestures. the two determining powers in the world." said a report recently released by the Washington-based Center for Budgetary and Strategic Assessments. the State Department hopes to inflate US moral authority. at a recent speech hosted by the Heritage Foundation.
US inability. to defend its allies and partners could lead to regional instability. and keep them from succumbing to Chinese pressure despite the apparent decline of US capabilities in the western Pacific. the JMFDS could easily develop a closer relationship with the Chinese navy. it is highly unlikely that we will achieve the real [budget] growth rates necessary to sustain the current force structure. real or perceived. but dismissed any potential threat to US interests. The big squeeze Looming in the background are the budgetary constraints now being placed on the Pentagon. as reflected in the Quadrennial Defense Review released earlier this year. "Most US allies in the region and lack strategic depth and must be supported and defended from the sea.]. US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned military commanders not to expect to get everything they ask for. That position does not promote sharp decision making that allocates scarce resources to emerging threats." A key objective of AirSea Battle." . including coercion or aggression. Admiral Roughead noted that the US Navy has a strong operational relationship with the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force. In a speech earlier this month. for example. as outlined in the CSBA report. AirSea Battle. multifaceted defense posture. "Admiral Roughead is conducting an AirSea Battle study inside the Pentagon.. In fact. The projection of Chinese power on the Pacific may be enough for them to perceive their interests differently. an independent from Connecticut. is a complex set of concepts." advocates "a more Asia-centric view of Japan's place in the world. emphasizing. "The gusher has been turned off. Japan's current government. is that "China will attempt to achieve a quick victory by inflicting such damage that the US would choose to discontinue the fight or driving a major US ally out of the war. particularly the Japanese. Gates has displayed a proclivity.[R]ealistically. towards developing a balanced. But the program has its political dimension as well: to reassure US allies. a new capability for them. Roughead acknowledged reports that the Chinese are planning to deploy one or more aircraft carriers to the Pacific. The Art of War. "only the second opposition party to take power in nearly 50 years. "It took us 70 years to get where we are. then. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill." Pursuing AirSea Battle would require a reordering of Pentagon priorities. The US also faces the problem of bolstering the confidence of its allies. involving the development of specific military capabilities." he said. and operating concepts. "and will stay off for a good period of time[. is to deny adversaries a quick victory. As a recent article in the Washington Post noted. and a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. according to the CSBA report.. As Sun Tzu said in his classic. especially in light of the budget squeeze." noted Senator Joseph Lieberman.131 of 154 strategic planners and thinkers are exploring a concept known as 'AirSea Battle. "the bigger questions are what the intentions of the Chinese are and how the carriers will be used. that would offset the Chinese buildup. DoD continues to invest in capabilities that assume that the status quo will prevail in the western Pacific. CSBA president and report co-author Andrew Krepinevich told ISN Security Watch. "To win one 100 victories in 100 battles is not the acme of skill." he added." he said. such as long-range strike systems. "US success will depend heavily on Japan’s active participation as an ally. If US allies fold in the face of increasing Chinese power. "Besides. China could win a war on the Pacific without firing a shot." said Krepinevich.' the subject of the new CSBA report." But US allies in the region might not see things that way. such as greater integration between the US Navy and Air Force. But if the Asia-centric attitudes in Japan prevail. "Carrier operations are very complex." But the US may already be losing the hearts and minds of the Japanese. short-range over than long-range strike systems. at a recent Washington gathering. Spurring the need for AirSea Battle." Although the immediate crisis on the Korean peninsula is having the effect of cementing US-Japanese relations-the Japanese government has accepted a plan it once rejected to relocate a US Marine base on Okinawa-it is not clear how long that attitude will last.
Tibet. .. Big Peace. will still be determined to contain it. Now as much as I like spending cuts. human rights. Jim. There are plenty of folks in Congress salivating over the size of the program and dreaming of all the other things they could spend that money on. His 303-page book stands out for its boldness even in a recent chorus of strident Chinese voices demanding a hard shove back against Washington over trade. http://www. Liu Mingfu. it is not healthy to emasculate our ability to deter our enemies.S. a professor at the elite National Defense University.S. the self-ruled island Beijing claims as its own. Russia and China are Challenging US Power Hanson ’11. the top power." "If China in the 21st century cannot become world number one.” Yeah a ball game where we decided to sit out a few innings.132 of 154 Yes – China/Russia Counterbalancing China’s counterbalancing US dominance. and 8 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. dominance”. then even if China is even more capitalist than the U.Staff Writer for Reuters News (2/28/10." Liu writes in his newly published Chinese-language book. which trains rising officers. je) China should build the world's strongest military and move swiftly to topple the United States as the global "champion. Reuters News. The call for China to abandon modesty about its global goals and "sprint to become world number one" comes from a People's Liberation Army (PLA) Senior Colonel.000 new helicopters. “China PLA officer urges challenging U. including a $650 billion program to procure 1. needs strong conventional forces to reduce its overreliance on its aging Soviet-era nuclear missile deterrent.com/article/2010/03/01/us-china-usa-military-exclusiveidUSTRE6200P620100301. http://bigpeace. It would be naive to pretend that a Russia run by Putin is not a threat or that the Chinese will not take advantage of the leverage they have due to well owning us. "As long as China seeks to rise to become world number one . Moscow – The graying bear is getting a make-over. while already the world’s fifth-largest military spender. je) While we are busy cutting our military budget the Russians are following the lead of the Chinese and building up." "China's big goal in the 21st century is to become world number one. We already canceled the F-22 and the real concern is whether we will support the F-35 program now that it is our main fighter. and arms sales to Taiwan. Buckley ’10. the U. Valentin Rudenko. "The China Dream. Russia Still Believes They Are A Superpower. Chris.Editor of Big Peace focusing on the practitioners of our national security policies on the groundserved as a Weapons Sergeant in 1st Special Forces Group across most of the Pacific Rim. We also need to make sure we have enough of those big floating boats they land them on too. director of the independent Interfax-Military News Agency." writes Liu..S." writes Liu." a senior Chinese PLA officer says in a new book reflecting swelling nationalist ambitions.. risking war despite Beijing's hopes for a "peaceful rise. cannot become the top power.writes and produces videos for the award-winning military site Blackfive (3/3/11. says it could create “a whole new ballgame. Russia’s military is launching its biggest rearmament effort since Soviet times. then inevitably it will become a straggler that is cast aside.com/jhanson/2011/03/03/russia-still-believes-they-are-a-superpower/.reuters. 100 warships. 600 combat planes. We need to make the commitment to maintain the dominant military that keeps us all safe. Analysts say Russia. who warns that his nation's ascent will alarm Washington.
” http://aei. like Libya. at the moment. independently from the US. This international order in the making is less dominated by Washington as it becomes more multipolar. there is inevitably a third explanation for America’s discrete profile on Libya: the US is slowly losing its uncontested hegemony in international security. sometimes as a bloc). Yet. Europe is in the driving seat and in spite of the chaotic ride due to intraEuropean divisions. . world leaders are contemplating this new American posture with interest. particularly in the Arab world. For now.133 of 154 UQ – Yes Heg Decline Shift to multipolarity now Renard 11 – Thomas. Obama seems also unwilling to wage another unpopular war. First characteristic of the new international order: it seems less and less American as illustrated by the relatively discrete profile adopted by Washington on the whole Libyan crisis – and the Arab uprisings in general. Emerging powers have become sufficiently assertive to confront the West on some issues (sometimes individually. Europe and the emerging powers are just discovering what this “post-American world” means in practice. Research Fellow in the Europe in the World Program at Egmont – Royal Institute for International Relations (April 2011. The US is now less interventionist by choice and by necessity – in this new international order. Part of the explanation for this discrete profile lies in the personality of Barack Obama who has developed a much more cautious approach to international problems in comparison with his predecessor. “Libya and the Post-American World: Implications for the EU. This is a world of strategic opportunities where established and emerging powers can increasingly pursue their own agenda. This fragmentation makes international cooperation to solve global challenges more difficult. Yet the direction of such foreign policy remains unclear. America still feels pretty safe. and it is less predictable as emerging powers grasp new strategic opportunities to push forward their influence and ultimately their interests. Global interdependence per se is not new. As the 2012 presidential election is nearing.pdf) The vote on Libya reflects to a certain extent the new international order that is taking shape. As emerging powers continue to build their global footprint and to develop global interests. Whether this constructive posture will develop as the rule or will remain an exception remains to be seen. The Libyan crisis was a first illustration of what happens when the US takes a backseat. The soft-spoken American posture is a clear political choice related to domestic pressures but it is also a matter of necessity. as the phantoms of military and economic overstretch are present in all minds. “The vote on Libya reflects to a certain extent the new international order that is taking shape”EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 5 The vote on Libya offered an encouraging signal with Russia and China constructively abstaining rather than using their veto power. This looks very much like the “post-American world” described by Fareed Zakaria. Could they be next in the driving seat? Second characteristic: the emerging global order is probably more fragmented than during the previous bipolar era.edu/32037/1/SPB20-Libya-in-new-worldorder. Washington must choose carefully its priorities in terms of foreign policy for it is simply no longer able to be present simultaneously on every front. The era of “you are with us or against us” is inevitably over. but according to some scholars today’s interdependence is creating favourable conditions for international cooperation. they are more likely to develop a sophisticated foreign policy. but remain prudent enough to avoid endangering their rise by investing too much in revisionist postures. let alone to lead. after the disastrous experiences in Afghanistan and in Iraq – both conflicts which were supposed to end quickly. Another important explanatory factor is the American reluctance to commit to another potential long war. But from Brasilia to Beijing. On the other hand. notably due to the so called multipolarization of the international order. Thus. US influence and ability to mediate conflicts is declining.pitt. the tension between factors of fragmentation (possibly leading to a fracture?) and cohesion maintains the international system in flux and makes it less predictable. the world is increasingly interdependent and interconnected as largely illustrated by the recent economic crisis. for there is simply no alternative to address some of the most pressing global challenges.
2 For the first time since the Second World War there is another source of universally acceptable payment and liquidity in the world economy —at a moment when the U. Non-U. the merchandise deficit has become too big to be paid for by services sold to foreigners. advertising and other business services) and/or income from overseas investments (profits.S. The United States still has immense—unequalled—power in international economics and politics. http://monthlyreview. France. During the 1990s. against 21 percent at present. Even during the golden days of 1944–1971 the United States was unable to avoid military defeat in Vietnam and a draw in Korea. Volume 55. share of exports of commercial services. while the dollar’s share fell from 67 to 40 percent.S. only two were U. closing in on the 48 percent issued in dollars. Britannia ruled the waves from 1815 to 1913. and the like). Since 1971. regulating. five involved takeovers by foreign multinationals (three British.S.S. Between 1981 and 1995. four of six chemical producers. The U. five of ten pharmaceutical firms. “U. Enduring Danger”. the positive balance on investment income has been shriveling as foreign investment in the United States has grown faster than U.org/2003/12/01/u-s-hegemony-continuing-decline-enduring-danger. U. with a combined gross domestic product (GDP) seven-tenths that of the United States. Together. but military power depends upon the economic resources at the disposal of the state. while the European Union (EU) had 23 percent—40 percent if intra-EU exports were counted. Half the foreign exchange reserves held by the world’s central banks were composed of dollars in 1990 compared to 76 percent in 1976. seven of the ten largest petroleum refiners. the fastest growing part of the world economy. A nation can run deficits in its trade in goods and still be in overall balance in its dealings with foreign countries.S.S. Of the top one hundred corporations in the world in 2000 ranked by foreign-held assets. four of seven airlines. but even as the sole superpower it finds itself less able than it once was to influence and control the course of events abroad. together. telecommunications. je) “Global hegemony” might be defined as a situation in which one nation-state plays a predominant role in organizing. the share of EU-based companies increased from 41 to 46 percent. but by the 1890s she was under economic challenge from the United States and Germany. the United States is not only less dominant. Of the twenty-five largest mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in the United States in 1998–2000. Of the twentyfive largest banks in the world. nineteen were non-U. Its military supremacy is no longer matched in the economic and political spheres. whose status as the world’s key currency has been eroding since the 1970s. compared with 47 percent in 1960. 17 percent of all new direct investment abroad came from the United States and 16 percent from Great Britain. It cannot be deployed to answer every threat to geopolitical and economic interests.S. hegemony began during the Second World War and peaked some thirty years later. but vulnerable. is now deteriorating sharply. six of ten telecommunications companies. Sixty percent of the world’s manufacturing production in 1950 came from the United States. stood at 24 percent in 2001. Bryn Mawr College (7/13/11. companies dominated major industries in 2002. current account (the sum of the balances in trade in goods and services plus net income from overseas investment). as was the case for Britain in South Africa (1899–1902) and the United States in Vietnam (1962–1975). exports have exceeded imports only in 1973 and 1975.S. Deficits in trade in goods can be offset by having a positive balance in sales of services abroad (financial. multinationals in the foreign sales of the world’s one hundred largest multinationals decreased from 30 to 25 percent. Twenty-one percent of the world’s stock of direct investment in other countries was American in 2001.S. investment abroad. Slow Merge Ahead: Hegemony Since the 1970s An idea of the decline of American economic power can be formed from the following:1 In 1950 the United States supplied half the world’s gross product. France and Belgium-Luxembourg supplied 21 percent. the share of U. balance of international payments is chalking up record deficits. the share of private world savings held in European currencies increased from 13 percent to 37 percent. Of the top twenty corporations involved in cross-border M&As from 1987 through 2001. they accounted for 5 percent of the value of all M&A deals during these years.S. and it raises the danger of imperial overreach. Issue 07 (December). (General Electric and Citigroup). Richard. irregularly and with periodic revivals. accounting for nine of the ten largest electronics and electrical equipment manufacturers. 25 percent in 1999. Japan had sixteen. Forty-four percent of new bonds have been issued in euros since the new currency was introduced in 1999. capital has in it. royalties. Hegemony: Continuing Decline. The weak link is the dollar. when the United States had a deficit in its trade in goods (merchandise) for the first time in seventy-eight years. and stabilizing the world political economy.S. interest. insurance. banks.134 of 154 DuBoff ’11Professor Emeritus of Economics. In 2002. During 1996–2001. In global finance. dividends. Monthly Review. The use of armed force has always been an inseparable part of hegemony. and between the two world wars was no longer able to function as underwriter to the world system. merchandise deficit has become too big to be paid for by services sold to foreigners plus remittances on investments. two German). the proportion rose back to 68 percent in 2001 because of the phasing out of ecus (reserves issued to European banks by the European Monetary Institute) to make way for the euro. The U. although the two largest were Citigroup and Bank of America. And since 1990. eight of the ten largest motor vehicle makers and electric and gas utilities. the United Kingdom. the balance turned negative: for the first time the United States is paying foreigners more investment income from their . twenty-three were American. But the U.S. and is of dubious value in preserving the global economic order and the stake that U. had forty. Germany. almost constantly in surplus from 1895 to 1977. and the Netherlands.
South Africa.” http://www. companies. a record 4. When foreigners receive dollars from transactions with U. ceasing to invest in U. sending Wall Street into a dive.rising powers. Yet their weight is such that it is key for the ﬁrst tier players to take them in account. so why go to the United States. In 2002. economy. Iraq switched to the euro in 2000 (presumably terminated with extreme prejudice in March 2003). “China. professor of international relations at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel and director of the Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies (European Review. because of its share of world GDP and world trade could be a ﬁrst tier actor.S.be/biccs/site/assets/files/apapers/China. political competence and military strength. foreign-owned assets in the United States are now worth $2. foreigners owned 41 percent of U. While the buildings were becoming cheaper in euros. All these differences reduce the likelihood that Beijing will easily accept the systemic responsibilities that Western key players associate with great power status. 19. 2011.-owned assets abroad. Swiss franc). No.S. Because of China’s being different in terms of culture. 57–67. and 13 percent of corporate stock. history. say. averaging 3 to 4 percent of GDP every year from 1850 to 1913. Russia. 1. residents (individuals. By mid-2003. They matter in a number of important international issue areas but are lacking in comprehensive power. In any event the dollar is now perceived to be as risky an asset as the euro and possibly two or three other currencies (yen. sterling. the ‘integration of China into the existing global economic order will thus be more difﬁcult than was. China’s ascent engenders a fundamental change in yet another sense. and Iran has considered a conversion since 1999. “OPEC will not discount entirely the possibility of adopting euro pricing and payments in the future.S. when income from services and foreign investment was larger than its merchandise trade deficits. Multipolarity now -.3 So far the global investor class has seemed willing to finance America’s external deficits. Therefore.” Thus. In a speech in Spain in April 2002. industries or selling off their dollar holdings. the head of OPEC’s Market Analysis Department. Japan. companies. Treasury bonds.S.S. The Euro-zone has a bigger share of global trade than the US and…a more balanced external accounts position.S. political system and stage of development. stocks and bonds. San Francisco.”5 If foreign investors get cold feet. By contrast.135 of 154 holdings here than it receives from its own investments abroad. and elsewhere were cut back sharply in 2003. As the dollar declines in value. where the currency risk is greater?” asked the chief investment officer of a Munich-based property fund. corporate bonds and stocks.S.” Adoption of the euro by Europe’s principal oil producers. companies are continuing to invest abroad.8 percent of GDP. but it may not be forever. Brazil. it poses a challenge to the era of Western hegemony at the level of system values and rules of the game.ac. the current account deficit is covered by borrowing. 24 percent of all U. 8 The second tier comprises most regional powers like India. Geeraerts 11 – Gustaaf. Like most gaps between income and expenses.pdf) The emerging multipolar structure is a multilayered one: it consists of two tiers (see Table 2). A dollar rout could cause skittish investors to dump U.’ 3 China’s rise is not . Treasury marketable debt.5 trillion more than U. the integration of Japan a generation ago. rents were shrinking when converted from dollars back home.%20the%20EU%20and %20Multipolarity-2. concluded Yarjani. draining income from other purchases and dampening the economy. corporate bonds. but to fully qualify it would have to upgrade its hard power base: economic capability. the EU. Norway and Britain.4 Until recently all Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) sold their oil for dollars only. and real estate). they can use them to buy American assets (U. the United States borrowed $503 billion from abroad. The deficits are exerting a downward drag on the dollar. U. arousing suspicion that the United States favors a cheaper dollar to help pay off its ballooning trade deficit. “We can get the same return in Britain and the Nordic countries. Vol. Great Britain’s current account was in surplus. the large European states and the remaining members of the G20. German investments in choice office properties in New York. In the ﬁrst tier we have the US and an ever more powerful China. the return to foreign investors on dollar-denominated assets falls.vub. borrowing money would become harder. and consumers would pay more for imported goods. saw little chance of change “in the near future…[but] in the long run the euro is not at such a disadvantage versus the dollar. The EU. and the New Multipolarity. could create “a momentum to shift the oil pricing system to euros. Interest rates in the United States might surge. but unlike the British Empire in the decades before the First World War.S. This is how the United States turned into a debtor nation in 1986. the dollar would start falling faster. governments). the United States is unable to finance those investments from its current account. Javad Yarjani.
Others point out that China is developing within a system with strongly established international institutions. provided its intentions are reasonably benevolent. 2010. Journalist and economist for Reuters Breakviews (November 30. In the early and middle 19th century. the United States led the way toward global trade expansion.136 of 154 only changing the distribution of power in the system. Some point out that. 2011. they expect multilateralism to be a crucial ingredient of Beijing’s foreign policy. There is . Yet its efforts in these areas have been ineffectual as the nation's power to coerce and cajole has been reduced by its relative economic and military decline.” National Post's Financial Post & FP Investing. hegemony. the EU. many emerging powers in the past have relinquished their resistance against imperialist policies by gradually starting to apply the very strategies themselves: the use of coercion to chase unequal economic gains. 1.Europe and China are filling in. and the New Multipolarity. trade barriers rise and fiscal policies destroy wealth.be/biccs/site/assets/files/apapers/China. armaments wars and eventually decades of global conflict and violence. 10 As China is already ﬁrmly integrated in the current international regimes and beneﬁts from their smooth functioning. hegemony is on the wane. The outcome is that Iran's attempts to establish a nuclear capability and North Korea's aggression against its southern neighbour have been met with no effective response.%20the%20EU%20and %20Multipolarity-2. The WikiLeaks documents show the United States attempting to assemble regional alliances to address problems like North Korea's continued isolation from the global community. As a consequence of increased international engagement and increasing economic interests abroad. 19.vub. 57–67.ac. professor of international relations at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel and director of the Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies (European Review. There are a number of risk-reducing advantages to the world in having a clearly defined hegemon. precisely during critical power transitions. Yet the question remains to what extent Beijing will use its growing inﬂuence to transform the international system and bring its rules and institutions more in line with the country’s national interests. which it makes ample use of to sustain its growth. LexisNexis) The biggest secret to be revealed by WikiLeaks should have been the easiest to spot without the website's classified document dump: U. Geeraerts 11 – Gustaaf.S.it will foster cooperation and stability -. Today there appears no longer to be a Congressional consensus to ratify even the limited Colombia. That underscores a heightened risk for global investors that without U. and Iranian nuclear ambitions. the US and the EU would prefer to integrate China in the global governance structures they established and safeguarded in the past few decades and hope for a reproduction of the existing system. hence its petty retaliation against certain Chinese exports and its monetary policies perceived as mercantilist that encourage other countries to erect barriers to free movement of goods and capital. for example. Understandably. “WikiLeaks exposes waning U.S.pdf) China and Europe are both regional powers with broad global interests.US multilateral actions and wikileaks prove Hutchinson 10 – Martin. It's hard to avoid the overall impression from the disclosure of 250. Beijing actually has a profound interest in seeing that the international rules and institutions function effectively. Vol. 10 Heg is on the decline -. supremacy and peaceful globalization is irrevocably ending. South Korea and Panama free trade deals. the creation of spheres of inﬂuence and the formation of alliances to prevent hostile powers from obstructing these ventures.000 secret State Department cables that the 1990s vision of U. Multipolarity coming -. 9 They expect power politics to gradually take the upper hand. regional rivalries may turn nasty. The United States can no longer afford to act as an unquestionably benign trade hegemon. Then after 1873 the decline of Britain's relative economic strength and the later build-up of the German navy reduced Britain's power and led to increased protectionism. In previous decades. “China.S.S. leadership. it also engenders a change in the distribution of identities. Some expect that China too will inevitably go down this road.” http://www. as did Britain in the 19th century. British hegemony pushed the global economy toward free trade and defused regional rivalries and armaments wars. Yet it is far from clear how Beijing will seek to manage its position in the evolving international system and how it will strike the balance between power politics and multilateralism. while the Doha global free trade talks are stone dead. Europe and China are geopolitically more proximate than ever before. No. increasing risk premiums in their respective regions and across the globe.
no game plans. This is particularly the case of the Middle East. Associate Director of the Frederick A. a strategic axis between China and Europe built on mutual beneﬁt and understanding will be indispensable. We have to avoid that these regions develop into a belt of insecurity that endangers our development.com/commentary/090418-2_US-hegemonythe-beginning-and-the-end. China. to guarantee that our policies beneﬁt lasting stability and development. Europe and China have shown themselves anxious not to slide into another era of great power rivalry. there are no longer anymore viable "band-aids" to apply. and enhance maritime security. to limit the impact of environmental hazards.137 of 154 an important joint interest to promote stability and sustainable development in those regions that we share in our extended neighbourhoods. both sides need each other if they are to develop an alternative for harsh international anarchy. and South-Central Asia. doing what it takes to get reelected. Just politicians being politicians. tackle non-traditional security threats. but has proven to be fleeting in the 90s and 00s due to the decline in America's finances. and Barbara M. draining wars. and the growth of more significant manufacturing powers such as Japan.S. Midas Letter. All along the "foundation" of U. Thanks to the natural weakening of this foundation. but this should be cooperative and aim at sharing the costs of maintaining security. We are moving steadily towards a new multipolar world order. which will be key in boosting positive power vis-a`-vis others. and others. There is a strong need to work together to enhance security. As the unipolar moment fades. The emerging multilayered and culturally diversiﬁed multipolarity will make global governance much more complex and is by no means a guarantee for multilateralism.php. global hegemony was its manufacturing base. Rubin/Summers/Lindsay/Snow/Paulson/Geithner. and Greenspan/Bernanke administrations. “U. horribly counterproductive actions taken during Clinton/Bush/Obama. Such a contest would severely weaken the two player’s chances for sustainable internal development.midasletter. Andy. to invest in the safety of our energy supplies. to support effective governance.The Beginning and the End”. the weakening of its military due to a series of unproductive.Professor of Sustainable Enterprise at the University of Michigan. Global Hegemony .S. It will also give them the scope to strengthen their internal unity. nothing. In spite of all the friction and misunderstanding. Successful bilateral cooperation will be key in promoting global peaceful development.S. je) The U. . but effective multilateralism also implies that all parties are committed to overcoming diverging expectations and trying to reach a pragmatic consensus on how to make foreign policies complementary and mutually supportive.'s brief reign as world superpower has been marked by the continuing application of No long-term strategies. as well as the short-term "band-aids" to try and buy time. http://www. US Hegemony is Ending Hoffman ’09. In this order the major powers will have to balance between meeting increasing international expectations and persistent strong internal needs. If Beijing and Brussels are serious about changing the nature of great power politics. It is legitimate that growing interests bring the need to exert inﬂuence. Europe and China could be in the vanguard here as well. To be effective. with the hope that things will get better. Africa. This area was rock-solid during the 50s and 60s. multilateral organizations need to reﬂect the emerging new international order. Erb Institute for Global Sustainable Enterprise (4/18/09.
cannot be described as anything other than a devastating blow to U. can do to reverse this process. Indeed.S.S.S. "should mind its own business internationally and let other countries get along the best they can on their own. Iran's nuclear military program.S. and the diverging U.S. the U. “Obama Turns Failure into Success in the Middle East. the deadlocked Israeli-Palestinian peace process.” http://www. some Americans (and Israelis) fantasize that the U. a Gallup poll indicated that 50 percent of the public supports the notion that the U. Not unlike Winston Churchill who insisted that Britain could retain its empire after 1945.S.Middle East and North Africa Hadar 11 – Leon. the inconclusive war in Afghanistan.S.org/pub_display. preoccupation with that region doesn't allow Washington to invest the required time and resources in maintaining its position in East Asia where core interests U. are at stake. or by taking a tougher line against Iran. Coupled with the costly military intervention in Iraq.S.138 of 154 UQ – Yes Heg Decline (Middle East) US heg is irreversibly declining -. willing to deploy its troops in new military interventions." And without the U.cato. support for imposing a no-fly zone in Libya is based on the assumption that France and Britain are going to take up the leading military role in the operation with the Americans providing some limited tactical support in enforcing the zone and is "not going to deploy ground troops into Libya. And there is not much that the U. leadership that are not going to be fulfilled. But with a military overstretched in Iraq and Afghanistan and with a budget deficit rising to the stratosphere. and Turkish interests — it becomes obvious that the age of U.S. hegemony in the Middle East is over. research fellow at the Cato Institute (March 22." as Obama stressed over the weekend.S. while a recent Washington Post polls suggested that 64 percent of Americans believe that the war in Afghanistan is not worth fighting. understands that . is constrained in its ability to determine outcomes in the Middle East.php? pub_id=12903) The downfall of the pro-American autocrats in Tunisia and Egypt and the growing threat to regimes that are either allied with Washington (Bahrain) or doing business with it (Yemen). Obama not only recognizes that the U. waltzing with Hosni or threatening to shoot down Kaddafi's planes or imposing more sanctions on Ahmenajid will only create expectations for renewed U. by establishing a No-Fly Zone in Libya. In fact. He also the continuing U. can continue calling the shots in the Middle East by holding the hands of Hosni Mubarak. there is no support in Washington for opening a new military front in the region.S. 2011. strategic interests.S.
“Rising and Declining Economic Powers: The Sino-US Conflict Deepens.5 billion muslim world. To bring about this political and economic revolution requires a new configuration of the state which pursues public investments creating competitive industries. To more forward requires a head-on confrontation with the ideologues of finance capital and a rejection of their efforts to deflect attention from their role in destroying America. New York and adjunct professor at Saint Mary's University (4/28/10. could increase inflows to the US and reduce outflows abroad.pdf) In the face of the US’s demonstrable economic decline. Even assuming that there is a political shift toward re- industrializing the US. ‘marketing’ and speculation into social services like comprehensive national health plans high skill engineering and advanced industrial training to increase efficiency and competitiveness in the domestic market. Nothing short of a political and economic revolution can reverse the decline of the US. including merchandise and commodities reducing toxic chemical and environmentally damaging sources of energy. Focusing investment on the growing market for clean energy and technology for domestic and overseas economies. to a productive republic with a balanced economy and competitive sector requires fundamental political changes and a profound ideological revolution. pushed by the pro-Israel fifth column embedded in top financial and political institutions and in control of the legislature 47 . will create new jobs and lower the cost of living while enhancing living standards. The key is to rebalance the US economy from finance driven to industrial centered: but any such shift requires class warfare against entrenched power on Wall Street and in Washington 46 . China’s class. only if it carries out deep political and economic changes. Vast sums need to be reallocated from wars. To expand overseas markets. and a cap on all income over one million dollars can finance social security and comprehensive public national health system. uneven regional development. deepens the domestic market and expands social services. retired Bartle Professor (Emeritus) of Sociology at Binghamton University in Binghamton.” http://lahaine. The “blame” China campaign for what are in reality internally caused US structural imbalances must be confronted before it leads us into new. Washington must end boycotts and military subservience to Israel.org/petras/b2-img/petras_sinous. Substituting trade missions for military bases. to become competitive in domestic and overseas markets. can the ruling elite recognize that its empire is not sustainable (let alone desirable)? The US can increase its exports to China and its share of world trade to balance its accounts. Ending political links and billion dollar subsidies to militarized states like Israel and lifting sanctions on major economic markets like Iran will decrease outflows from the US treasury and enhance economic inflows and opportunities for productive sectors throughout the 1. while upgrading local production to competitive levels. inequalities. The transition from empire to republic requires a profound rebalancing of social power and a deep restructuring of the US economy. Fundamental . Ending military directed empire building will open the flow of public financing toward civilian technological innovations. The transfer of a trillion dollars in military spending from colonial wars could easily finance the reconversion to a civilian economy producing quality goods for local and overseas consumption. Only then will the US be able to compete economically with China in the world economy. which would reduce charges to industry and state. The transition from a militarist imperialist power. increase its investments in applied research and development and vastly improve the quality of its products. ending restrictions on overseas technology sales can further reduce trade deficits. Petras 10 – James.139 of 154 Withdrawal K/T Sustainability Decline is more than inevitable – to maintain our power we would need to restructure our entire country and withdraw our military forces from across the world. corroded by a corrupt political elite beholden to a parasitic speculator economic elite. Up to now manufacturers have bought into or been bought out by financial institutions: they have lost their distinct character as a productive sector. industry would have to lower its profits. What passes for the current US private manufacturing sector shows no appetite for such a historic change. private wealth and public corruption and discriminatory treatment of migrants as second grade citizens (a dual citizenship system) will be resolved internally as the socio-economic divisions translate into class struggle. costly and selfdestructive trade wars or worse. China’s internal “imbalances” are profound and pervasive and over time can weaken the pillars of external expansion. Confiscatory taxes on the millionaire/billionaires especially the entire ‘Wall Street” ruling elite.
but these changes require a revival of the class struggle against state and private vested interests.140 of 154 changes in the privatized health system toward a comprehensive national public health system are essential. .
President Obama’s approach. the freedom to live as you choose. Examination of his major foreign policy pronouncements reveals that he remains within the mainstream of the American discourse on foreign policy. The alternative course involves the initiation or escalation of conflictual scenarios for which the United States increasingly lacks the resources to cater: provocation of a military conclusion to the impasse with Iran.” International Affairs Volume 87. These are not just American ideas. embraces caution and restraint to the greatest extent that one could hope for without an epochal paradigm shift in the intellectual framework of American foreign policymaking. then this will clear the way for a judicious retrenchment.141 of 154 Attempts to Maintain Heg Bad Status quo heg is a sinking ship that will facilitate a peaceful decline – but a drastic increase in attempts to maintain our hegemony incites conflicts Quinn 11 – Adam. as some genuine dissidents from the prevailing foreign policy discourse would wish. Or it can ‘rage against the dying of the light’. preserving influence to the maximum extent possible through whatever legacy of norms and institutions is bequeathed by its primacy. Facing this incipient period of decline. a good president to inaugurate an era of managed decline. even as he sought distance from his predecessor with the proclamation that ‘no system of government can or should be imposed by one nation on any other’. “The Art of Declining Politely. to cite one example. President Obama does not by any means represent a radical break with the traditions of American foreign policy in the modern era. confidence in the rule of law and the equal administration of justice. it is inconceivable that he would explicitly declare his strategy to be one of managed American decline. 2011. Either the nation can come to terms with the reality of the process that is under way and seek to finesse it in the smoothest way possible. and that ‘the United States of America has helped underwrite global security for more than six decades with the blood of our citizens and the strength of our arms’. defined by restraint and awareness of limits. Lecturer in International Studies. As part of such a project. Issue 4) As noted in the opening passages of this article. Adam Quinn. 100 No doubt sensibly. spelling out his view that ‘the instruments of war do have a role to play in preserving the peace’. his predecessor was not. as those who seek to qualify the decline thesis have suggested. 97 If the United States can embrace the spirit of managed decline. they implicitly suppose that the resources will be available to support such a course. within the confines of the mainstream. University of Birmingham (July 1. in suggesting that he is ‘weak’ and that a ‘tougher’ policy is needed. he also endorsed with only slight qualification the liberal universalist view of civil liberties as transcendent human rights. in short. use the significant resources still at its disposal to smooth the edges of its loss of relative power.’ he declared. the narratives of America’s decline and Obama’s restraint are distinct but also crucially connected. ‘I … have an unyielding belief that all people yearn for certain things. government that is transparent and doesn’t steal from the people. Evidently this is not a president who wishes to break signally with the mainstream. either by advocating a radical shrinking of America’s military strength as a good in itself or by disavowing liberal universalist global visions. not for the first time.’ 99 His Westminster speech repeated these sentiments. In doing so they set their faces against the reality of the coming American decline. deliberate escalation of strategic rivalry with China in East Asia. given the likely political reaction at home. He is. this is a president who. makes him ideologically and temperamentally well suited to the former course in a way that. refusing to accept the waning of its primacy. In his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech in December 2009 he made it clear. regime change and democracy promotion in response to events in North Africa. it can. trimming ambitions in line with the fact that the nation can no longer act on the global stage with the wide latitude once afforded by its superior power. commitment to continuing the campaign in Afghanistan for another decade. that he is no pacifist. 101 In contemplating the diminished and diminishing weight of the United States upon the scales of . a costly effort to consistently apply principles of military interventionism. 98 In his Cairo speech in June the same year. ‘The ability to speak your mind and have a say in how you are governed. Those who vocally demand that the President act more boldly are not merely criticizing him. Nevertheless. America’s leaders may walk one of two paths.
on reflection.142 of 154 global power. It may be a process that unfolds gradually and peacefully. whatever reservations one may have held regarding US primacy. it is important not to conflate the question of what will be with that of what we might prefer. Alternatively. it may result in conflict. or continues to be drawn into wars with middle powers or on the periphery in spite of its shrinking capacity to afford them. fill any westerner with glee. It may well be. . Which outcome occurs will depend on more than the choices of America alone. resulting in a new order that functions with peace and stability even in the absence of American primacy. It is also important not to be unduly deterministic in projecting the consequences of American decline. At present it seems it is fortunate enough to have a president who fits the bill. as critics of the decline thesis sometimes observe. if the United States clashes with rising powers as it refuses to relinquish the prerogatives of the hegemon. But the likelihood that the United States can preserve its prosperity and influence and see its hegemony leave a positive legacy rather than go down thrashing its limbs about destructively will be greatly increased if it has political leaders disposed to minimize conflict and consider American power a scarce resource—in short. that the prospect of increased global power for a state such as China should not. leaders who can master the art of declining politely.
2010. a top Iranian lawmaker has said. negotiations are impossible under these conditions.” BBC through Lexis) 24 August: The Islamic Republic will not enter talks with the United States unless the Americans stop their hegemony. Washington severed all diplomatic ties with Tehran in the aftermath of the US embassy takeover in Iran." Mehr news agency quoted Ebrahimi as saying." he further explained. shortly after the victory of the Islamic Revolution in 1979. ." There may be room for talks if the US drops sanctions and a threatening language against the Islamic Republic. "Based on its hegemonic attitude. deputy head of the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission of Iran's Parliament (Majlis) Hoseyn Ebrahimi said on Monday [23 August]. the US tries to impose its will on the world nations. Ayatollah Khamene'i said that Iran could not engage in negotiations with the US. therefore. the Leader added.143 of 154 Heg Bad – Iran Heg prevents Iran talks – top officials’ statements BBC 10 – BBC Monitoring International Reports (August 24. “Iranian MP says US 'hegemony' makes talks impossible. Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamene'i is opposed to talks with the US because they want to push any negotiation to the way they want and they halt it unilaterally if it is not favourable to them. threats and intimidation are not talks. Ayatollah Khamene'i also warned the US against launching an attack against Iran and said if Washington chooses to resort to military means against Iran. On 18 August. "If they [the US] stop their threats and sanctions the Islamic Republic will enter talks with them as it has said before. because "talks in an environment of pressure. the confrontation will not be restricted to the region alone.
and the PRC. found the resources to produce limited nuclear arsenals. Since the dawn of the nuclear age. even states that could not provide their citizenry with a decent standard of living. A paradoxical equation derived from this practice. “Nuclear Apartheid”. the United States has squandered opportunities to forge cooperative ventures to halt proliferation. . As the technology became cheaper and more easily available.144 of 154 Heg Bad – Prolif US hegemony spurs other countries to acquire nuclear weapons and ultimately undermines American influence – turns case Maddock 10 (Shane J. From the Baruch Plan to national missile defense. Americans have remained infatuated with unilateral and technological solutions to the atomic threat. combined with arrogance and a Hobbesian worldview. Pakistan. other states built the bomb when they could afford to. nuclear hegemony by undercutting their own professed commitment to nuclear nondissemination. PhD from the University of Connecticut in US history and teacher at Stonehill College. author of multiple books concerning American Foreign Relations. The University of North Carolina Press. And they have repeatedly attempted to preserve U. such as India. Print) Throughout the nuclear age. American hegemony. catalyzed nuclear nationalism in other states and helped break the bonds of Washington’s influence.S. The superpowers remained so convinced of the correctness of their respective privileged positions in the world system that they refused to make mutual concessions to achieve arms control. Taught by the superpowers that nuclear weapons equal political power and that warheads prevent wars. no president has proven capable of producing the right political mixture to yield a viable nonproliferation accord. Other nations also chose military strength over cooperation and in the process diminished Washington’s and Moscow’s power in the international system. North Korea.
Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. The National Interest. Robert M. This is the best way to ensure American primacy. and that it remains the world’s only regional hegemon. or terrorist attacks – and alienates public opinion in large swaths of the globe. Mearsheimer ’11. not military force. Washington should rely on local forces to counter it and only come onshore to join the fight when it appears that they cannot do the job themselves. He is on the Advisory Council of The National Interesthttp://nationalinterest. “Imperial by Design”. the US would rely on the tried and true dynamics of the balance of power to thwart any states with hegemonic ambitions. But it protect its interests in areas of little strategic importance. serves on the Advisory Council of The National Interest (12/16/10. but also gets us involved in nation building. which has served this country well for most of its history and offers the best formula for dealing with the threats facing America—whether it be terrorism. 35: 5-25. In the event a potential hegemon comes on the scene in one of those regions. nuclear proliferation or a traditional great-power rival. he R. Once the potential hegemon is checked. The driving factor behind oﬀshore balancing is its proponents’ recognition that the US has a ‘hegemony’ problem.cambridge. “America’s Middle East grand strategy after Iraq: the moment for oﬀshore balancing has arrived. In general terms. Jan-Feb 2011 Issue. Europe or the Persian Gulf. Europe and the Gulf. He should instead return to the grand strategy of offshore balancing. not only generates resentment toward the United States. We should build a robust military to intervene in those areas.org/action/displayFulltext? type=1&fid=3291804&jid=RIS&volumeId=35&issueId=01&aid=3291800&bodyId=&me mbershipNumber=&societyETOCSession=) Primacy’s neorealist critics have outlined an alternative grand strategy that increasingly resonates with the American public: oﬀshore balancing. je) President Obama is making a serious mistake heading down this road. and more generally acting as if we have the right and the responsibility to interfere in the domestic politics of other countries. 3 Its proponents believe that oﬀshore balancing can do a better job than primacy of enhancing American security and matching US foreign policy objectives with the resources available to support them. American troops should go back over the horizon. online at http://journals.” Review of International Studies (2009). and the economies of the advanced industrial states depend. including Europe and the Middle East. As an oﬀshore balancer. A regional hegemon in the Middle East could imperil the ﬂow of oil upon which the US economy.145 of 154 Offshore Balancing Good – General Offshore balancing solves war and maintains US power best. which violates the all-important principle of selfdetermination. to the world. which invariably leads to no end of trouble. Washington should also get out of the business of trying to spread democracy around the globe. but it should be stationed offshore or back in the United States. Only a Eurasian hegemon could pose an existential threat to the US.org/article/imperial-by-design-4576?page=show. Oﬀshore balancing is based on the assumption that the most vital US interests are preventing the emergence of a dominant power in Europe and East Asia – a ‘Eurasian hegemon’ – and forestalling the emergence of a regional (‘oil’) hegemon in the Middle East. the United States should concentrate on making sure that no state dominates Northeast Asia. Offshore balancing does not mean that the United States should ignore the rest of should maintain a substantially lower profile outside of Northeast Asia. America’s strategy of primacy increases US vulnerability to a geopolitical backlash – whether in the guise of countervailing great power coalitions. John. This behavior.R. and it should rely on diplomacy and economic statecraft. Offshore balancing is key to prevent any conflict through deterrence and hard power if necessary – it avoids political backlash and increases soft power Layne 9 – Christopher. An oﬀshore balancing strategy would permit the US to withdraw its ground forces from Eurasia (including the Middle East) and assume an over-the- . Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University (2009.
including so-called soft balancing. and is based on prudence and self-restraint in the conduct of US strategy. Primacy is based on the belief that it is better for the US to defend its allies and clients than to have them defend themselves. If – and only if – regional power balances look to be failing would the US re-insert its troops into Eurasia. there are new forms of balancing with which Washington already is contending. When employed by states. on one hand. recent studies by the CIA oﬀer compelling evidence that by 2020 the era of America’s unipolar ascendancy will be drawing to a close as new poles of power in the international system approach the US share of world power. deﬁnes US interests in terms of what is vital rather than simply desirable. on the other hand. it is so much more powerful than its nearest possible competitors. First. soft balancing eﬀorts to rein-in American power may help the other major states learn to cooperate in ways that will the open the door to future hard balancing against the US. Oﬀshore balancing contrasts sharply with primacy because primacists fear a world with independent. 6 The most notable manifestation of soft balancing is the use by other major states of diplomacy and international institutions to try to restrain American actions. In foreign policymaking the road to hell is paved with good intentions. under Kaiser Wilhelm II). Oﬀshore balancing is a realist strategy because it eschews the ideological crusading on behalf of democracy that is endemic to Wilsonianism. multiple poles of power. growing apprehensions about the military. they are important for two reasons. Russia and China to forestall the US invasion of Iraq by withholding United Nation’s Security Council authorisation is one example of soft balancing. they fundamentally agree on the strategy’s basic premises. First. 4 Yet. Some primacists believe that the US is immune to being counter-balanced because. France under Louis XIV and Napoleon. Even if soft balancing eﬀorts fail. some would argue. Oﬀshore balancers believe the US must adjust to incipient multipolarity because they understand that – unless the US is prepared to ﬁght an unending series of preventive wars – new great powers inevitably will emerge in the next decade or two. Spain under Philip II. A second point upon which oﬀshore balancers agree is that in addition to the traditional kind of – ‘hard’. Regional powers – . asymmetric strategies are another type of nontraditional balancing that is being employed to contest US primacy. Second. the security of the others is threatened. what the sociologist Max Weber called the ethic of conviction and. 5 And. implications of China’s rapid ascent are – at the very least – an implicit acknowledgment that the days of unchallenged US dominance in world aﬀairs are numbered. Most of all it is a strategy that ﬁts within the broad realist tradition because it recognises the diﬀerence between. on the other hand. not on the intentions that underlie them. of course. Germany. as the only great power in a ‘unipolar’ system. and a possible armed confrontation between the US and Iran. believe for an insular great power like the US. Oﬀshore balancers. and when one among them threatens to gain preponderant power. as well as economic. or military – counter-balancing that the US will face in coming years. The Bush administration’s disastrous policies in Iraq and the Middle East are a much needed reminder that this is a test Wilsonianism too often fails. and Germany under Hitler (and. the ethic of responsibility. The reason is simple: the basic motivation of all major states is to survive.146 of 154 horizon military posture. oﬀshore balancers recognise that one of the few ironclad rules in international politics is that when one great power becomes too powerful – when it bids to achieve hegemony – it is defeated by the counter-balancing eﬀorts of the other major powers in the international system. Another example is the eﬀort of the same nations and Britain to promote a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue that will avoid the imposition of UN sanctions on Teheran. The history of the modern international state system (which dates back to about 1500) is littered with the wreckage of great powers that tried an failed to achieve geopolitical primacy: the Hapsburg Empire under Charles V. The attempt by France. 7 In addition to soft balancing. balances ends and means. asymmetric strategies mean the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities. the best strategy is to rely on a balance of power approach that devolves to other states the costs and risks of their defense. and policies must be judged on their consequences. Failure is the fate of hegemons. Although there are some nuanced diﬀerences among oﬀshore balancing’s proponents. they indicate that other major states regard US geopolitical dominance as a problem that needs to be addressed.
147 of 154 especially those on the US hit list like Iran and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq – cannot slug it out toe-to-toe against the US’ dominant high-tech conventional forces. Terrorism is another asymmetric strategy – one employed by non-state actors like Al-Qaeda and similar jihadist groups – to resist US dominance. . these states seek other methods of oﬀsetting American power. however. Because they are threatened by the US. and dissuading Washington from using its military muscle against them. WMD – especially the possession of nuclear weapons – is one way these states can level the strategic playing ﬁeld and deter the US from attacking them. The use of asymmetric strategies to oppose American power – especially in the Middle East where US policy has an imperial dimension – illustrates the dictum that empires inevitably provoke resistance.
org/article/imperial-by-design-4576?page=show. which not only wears down its military in peripheral conflicts. John. This is why Beijing should hope that the American military remains heavily involved in Afghanistan and Iraq for many years to come.148 of 154 Offshore Balancing Good – China Offshore balancing solves China rise. But this is not a smart strategy because the human and economic price of checking a powerful adversary can be great. he R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. The National Interest. is better suited to the task. Global dominators. attempting to dominate the globe encourages the United States to fight wars all around the world. because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves. on the other hand. America would check China’s rise even if it were pursuing global dominance. serves on the Advisory Council of The National Interest (12/16/10. especially if war breaks out.R. It almost always makes good sense to get other countries to pay as many of those costs as possible while preserving one’s own power. Another virtue of offshore balancing is its emphasis on getting other countries to assume the burden of containing an aspiring regional hegemon. Offshore balancing. Offshore balancing. For starters. Mearsheimer ’11. but also makes it difficult to concentrate its forces against China. Jan-Feb 2011 Issue. in contrast. “Imperial by Design”. is committed to staying out of fights in the periphery and concentrating instead on truly serious threats. . but an America no longer weakened by unnecessary foreign intervention will be far more capable of checking Beijing’s ambitions. however. see the United States as the indispensable nation that must do almost all of the heavy lifting to make containment work. The United States will have to play a key role in countering China. je) Of course. He is on the Advisory Council of The National Interesthttp://nationalinterest. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago.
and by strengthening America’s homeland defences. And. Indeed. In the Middle East. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University (2009. the strategic setbacks will not end with Iraq. If the new administration wants to reduce US vulnerability. “America’s Middle East grand strategy after Iraq: the moment for oﬀshore balancing has arrived. more Americans believe that the best way to reduce the threat of terrorist attacks on the US is to decrease. This is a striking turnabout from summer 2002.cambridge.” Review of International Studies (2009). a recent 32 per cent margin. The same Pew survey also found that: ‘An increasing number of Americans see nonmilitary approaches – such as decreasing US dependence on Middle East oil and avoiding involvement with the problems of other countries’ as eﬀective strategies for reducing the terrorist threat to the US. 54 Similarly. outside of the Middle East. 56 The Pew survey’s results suggest that. A military collision between the US and Iran is still a possibility. and globally. As Americans come to realise that the strategy of primacy makes the US less secure. the best way to do so is to adopt an oﬀshore balancing strategy and ﬁght terrorists discreetly with good intelligence (including collaboration with US allies). 57 It is time to begin a long overdue debate on future US strategy after Iraq. the American people are drawing the correct grand strategic lessons from the Iraq debacle. there are signs that Americans already accept oﬀshore balancing’s key premises. when 48 per cent of those surveyed believed that the best defense against terrorism was to increase US military involvement abroad. primacy means that the US is headed for a train wreck with China. covert operations. unlike primacists. they are becoming more receptive to the arguments for an oﬀshore balancing strategy. 55 The Bush administration’s policy of maintaining a dominating American military presence in the Persian Gulf and overthrowing nasty Middle Eastern regimes increased the terrorist threat to the US instead of reducing it. an oﬀshore balancing strategy would contribute importantly to lowering the terrorist threat to the US. 35: 5-25. the pursuit of geopolitical and ideological dominance ‘over there’ has increased the terrorist threat over here. As Robert Pape argues.org/action/displayFulltext? type=1&fid=3291804&jid=RIS&volumeId=35&issueId=01&aid=3291800&bodyId=&me mbershipNumber=&societyETOCSession=) By lowering America’s politico-military proﬁle in the region. Stephen Walt – who also favours a US oﬀshore balancing strategy in the Middle East – observes. ‘The US does have important interests in the Middle East – including access to oil and the need to combat terrorism – but neither objective is well served by occupying the region with its own military forces’. One huge disaster is enough – more than enough – for any grand strategy. Robert M. online at http://journals. not increase. As this debate gathers steam. it will become apparent that a neorealist strategy of oﬀshore balancing is the best candidate to become America’s next grand strategy – both in the Middle East. And if the US continues to pursue a strategy of primacy. . oﬀshore balancing ‘is America’s best strategy for the Persian Gulf’ because the ‘mere presence of tens of thousands of US troops in the region is likely to fuel continued fear of foreign occupation that will fuel anti-American terrorism in the future’.149 of 154 Offshore Balancing Good – Middle East/Terrorism Offshore balancing is comparatively the best strategy to prevent terrorism and middle east escalation Layne 9 – Christopher. America’s military presence overseas’. For example.
org/article/imperial-by-design-4576?page=show. Reagan had the good sense to quickly pull the remaining marines out of Lebanon and keep them offshore. Furthermore. “Imperial by Design”. offshore balancing is the best grand strategy for ameliorating our terrorism problem. as University of Chicago professor Robert Pape’s research shows. only as a matter of last resort. Europe and the Gulf. The National Interest. serves on the Advisory Council of The National Interest (12/16/10. Certainly. Remember what happened after President Ronald Reagan sent marines into Beirut in 1982? A suicide bomber blew up their barracks the following year. It calls for using military force in only three regions of the world.R. offshore balancing is still better than global dominance for keeping proliferation in check. And it is worth noting that the perpetrators of this act did not pursue us after we withdrew. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. Mearsheimer ’11. Placing American troops in the Arab and Muslim world is a major cause of terrorist attacks against the United States. attack. As a result. But all things considered. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. thus diminishing their need to have their own deterrents. killing 241 service members. John. America would still carry a big stick with offshore balancing but would wield it much more discreetly than it does now. He is on the Advisory Council of The National Interesthttp://nationalinterest. the United States would be less threatening to other countries. Jan-Feb 2011 Issue.S. Offshore balancing is also a better policy than global dominance for combating nuclear proliferation. which would lessen their need to acquire atomic weapons to protect themselves from a U. he R. It has two main virtues. and some of America’s adversaries will still have powerful incentives to acquire a nuclear arsenal. because offshore balancing calls for Washington to help local powers contain aspiring regional hegemons in Northeast Asia. je) Specifically. and even then.150 of 154 Offshore Balancing Good – Terrorism/Prolif Solves terrorism and prolif. . there is no reason that it cannot extend its nuclear umbrella over its allies in those areas. the strategy is not perfect: some allies will want their own nuclear weapons out of fear that the United States might not be there for them in a future crisis.
Those prospects cannot be dismissed lightly.php? pub_id=12156&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed %3A+CatoRecentOpeds+(Cato+Recent+Op-eds) With the Senate close to voting on the defense authorization bill. we sometimes seem a long way from that noble goal. erroneously. French or British) decision makers lost their cool would have caused far more death and destruction than Osama bin Laden can muster in the darkest reaches of his imagination. pending resolution of minor disputes like funding for the alternative Joint Strike Fighter engine. Perhaps we've all learned something? Even if major war between nations seems more remote than ever before. that military power keeps us safe. Congress is poised to pass the largest military budget since World War II — roughly $550 billion. our generosity and our ingenuity is expressed in countless ways.” http://www. The casualties caused by international terrorist incidents since September 11 pale in comparison to the death and destruction that took place between 1914 and 1918. power. 2009. the true source of U. President Barack Obama is expected to sign it. Both are ideological struggles. Preble 9 – Christopher. and by encouraging others to become more self-reliant.structure of the international system checks. while others see a hot one with China in the offing. we can make space for the other forms of human interaction that facilitate security and prosperity over the long term. and the prospects for future casualties. most of which have nothing to do with our military prowess. perhaps over Taiwan. pale in comparison to the death and destruction that took place between August 1914 and November 1918.org/pub_display.S. Some worry of a new cold war with Russia. but the fact remains that the major powers have managed to avoid the very sorts of cataclysms that claimed the lives of an estimated 100 million people in the first half of the 20th century. And the scale of violence that would have been unleashed had U. Does Military Power Keep Us Safe? (Part II). “Drop Pretension to Supremacy. We have come to believe.cato. A decline in heg won’t cause conflict – we have sufficient deterrence and policymakers exaggerate foreign troubles with security threats Friedman and Preble 10 – Benjamin. no. Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute (May 20.org/pub_display. 2001. The violence and bloodshed that can be deployed by non-state actors is an order of magnitude smaller than what could be caused by even a mediumsize modern industrial state. but the threat of global thermonuclear war hung over every aspect of Cold War diplomacy. what of war between peoples. and that more power will keep us safer. the president has taken . excluding funds for the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. Despite Obama's professed concern about the huge budget deficit.151 of 154 AT Heg Solves War (General) Heg doesn’t solve war -. and again between September 1939 and August 1945.php?pub_id=10228) For too long. The casualties caused by international terrorist incidents since September 11.cato. How likely is it that the so-called war on terrorism will be looked upon through the long lens of history as comparable to the world wars of the 20th century? Not very. or Soviet (or Chinese. Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute (September 21. But the true strength of the United States.” http://www. which claimed far fewer lives but lasted nearly five times longer than the two world wars combined? Again. Our spirit. peoples disconnected from any particular nation-state or peoples united by ideologies that transcend national boundaries? What if al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations are but the tip of the iceberg? Newspapers and opinion journals are littered these days with apocalyptic predictions of an impending — or even ongoing — world war. is its people. This is neither naive nor utopian. Christopher. Although we aspire to a time when disputes are settled peacefully.S. By reducing the size of our military to a level more consistent with our own needs. fought chiefly by non-military means. The world is a dangerous place. we have defined our strength as a nation by our capacity for waging war. It always has been. Can it even be compared with the Cold War. research fellow in defense and homeland security at the Cato Institute.
ambitions. If our military had less to do. Fewer missions. Geography. however. remove an impetus for nuclear weapons proliferation and prevent foreign peoples from resenting us for occupying their countries. Policymakers exaggerate the capability of existing enemies and invent new ones by defining traditional foreign troubles — geopolitical competition among states and instability within them. weapons and vehicles procured and operational costs. we recommend cutting the Army and Marine Corps by roughly one-third. Citing the need for austerity. In most cases.S. security. security threats. In nearly all cases. Making large spending cuts without reducing military commitments is a recipe for overburdening service members. The resulting force would be more elite. Washington confuses what it wants from its military (global primacy or hegemony) with what it needs (safety). they are not. the Pentagon could cut force structure — reducing personnel. Substantially reducing military spending means reducing U. the Pentagon could spend less — at least $1. wealth and nuclear weapons provide us with a degree of safety that our ancestors would envy. forces.S. But much of Washington's military spending is geared toward defending others and toward the dubious proposition that global stability depends on U. Hawks and defense industry trade groups say this spending is essential to U. military deployments. Because a less active military can make conventional and counterinsurgency warfare less likely. would also allow for reductions in the Air Force and Navy. less strained and far less expensive.152 of 154 no meaningful steps to rein in military spending. because it could enhance security. Not exactly a revolution of fiscal discipline. Pentagon officials have a goal of 1 percent real growth in the Defense Department budget over the next decade. . By shedding missions.S. Sending large armies to occupy — and try to manage the politics of — hostile Muslim countries is not effective counterterrorism policy. It would reduce the possibility of fighting unnecessary wars. for example — as major U. Nor should Washington embrace strategic restraint just for budgetary reasons.S. along with advances in strike technology.S. limit the number of countries that build up their military to balance U. it is counterproductive.22 trillion less over the next 10 years. according to a Cato Institute report released Tuesday. A force reduction strategy would make sense even without deficits.
In economics. And at a time of economic crisis the U. the U. America still has a major economic role to play. Washington must forge a cooperative relationship on difficult regional issues like North Korea.” http://www. and encourage the peaceful settlement of disputes.S. called the East Asian Community. The Obama administration should pursue a different course. The starting point should be a push to ratify the FTA with South Korea. What has ever been must ever be appears to be the basis of U. a transformational agenda.S. On defense. without any link to a global hegemonic competitor like the Soviet Union. Washington should engage North Korea over its nuclear program. must remain militarily dominant is taken for granted. However. also should encourage greater cooperation between Japan and its neighbors. The U. Washington should speak frankly about the importance of human rights. The U. maintains one-sided "mutual" defense treaties with Japan and South Korea. Japanese. At the same time. policies regarding Pyongyang. is losing its financial ability to do so. will be most secure if friendly states in East Asia work together to confront sources of instability. In Washington.S.S. Washington should strengthen economic and trade ties with China. Bandow 9 – Doug. President Obama needs to promote a changed attitude as much as offer new policies. The president should press for a more active PRC policy to support reinvigorated U. The most important relationship for the 21st century will be that between the existing superpower and the potential superpower. Washington should withdraw its garrisons from Japanese soil and turn defense responsibility for Japan over to Tokyo. Japan. while recognizing America's limited ability to influence the PRC's behavior. The president should treat Japan as a full partner.S. rather than merely adjusting its controversial Status of Forces Agreement. The PRC has much at stake on a stable Korean Peninsula. it also has much to gain from taking the lead in promoting diplomatic solutions of regional problems.multilateral cooperation solves. That the U. The Obama administration should coordinate South Korea. foreign policy. “Policy Change for East Asia.org/pub_display.S. should inform the North that full international integration requires the participation of South Korea. However. 2009. China. World War II ended more than six decades ago: The Japanese do not have a double dose of original sin and America should no longer play geopolitical wetnurse for nations that long ago developed the means to protect their own interests. and U. such instability would pose little threat to the U.S. Washington should allow the Republic of Korea to lead the nonproliferation campaign. Moreover. Such a cooperative venture also would help channel China's rise in peaceful directions. Washington should seek to tighten regional economic integration. promote respect for human rights. But Washington no longer has any need to attempt to preserve regional military hegemony. Washington should embrace rather than resist such an approach.cato.S. An improved bilateral relationship is more likely than isolation to encourage greater respect by Beijing for the liberty of its citizens.S. steps back from its dominant military role. and Russia as well. emphasizing economic integration while promoting military detachment. . the ROK and its neighbors should step forward. but should increasingly devolve defense responsibilities on countries in the region. Seoul has the most at stake in maintaining a peaceful peninsula.153 of 154 AT Heg Solves Asia Stability Heg decline doesn’t cause East Asian conflict -. The U. apart from the U. The Japanese government apparently is interested in promoting a regional order.S.php?pub_id=11015) The potential for conflict remains. intervention along its border is treated as a threat to American security. that means proposing a free trade agreement. He is a former special assistant to President Reagan (November 29. The U.S. senior fellow at the Cato Institute.S.S.S. engagement with the North. President Obama should begin moving the region into a new era of less security dependence on Washington. At the same time. Yet Washington's Cold War alliance structure remains essentially unchanged. will remain engaged in East Asia. As the U. the People's Republic of China's apparent determination to create a military capable of deterring U. America's cultural and economic ties are long-lasting and mutually beneficial.
“U. and China. 2011.S. the whole greater Middle East looks like an area that any sensible great power will in future try to avoid. American Strategy Program. due both to harsh managerial practices and the commercial competition of Chinese workers and traders. Senior Research Fellow. Neither the Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO) nor the loose economic consultative grouping of BRICS resemble military alliances. The first is its lack of aircraft carriers.S. the Chinese may well be approaching the point where they can drive the U.S. but as the lacks stable and extensive alliance systems. . China may be able to make a better contribution to the continent's development than the West has done. The yuan has a very long way to go before it even begins to rival the pound or the yen as a global currency. China makes a conflict over Taiwan much less likely. but by reducing any possibility of a Taiwanese declaration of independence at the same time.newamerica. Moreover. Beijing is now devoting great effort to developing these. China would wish to infuriate and frighten India by turning them into Chinese military bases. this is one of the most complex of all military-industrial undertakings. let alone the dollar or the euro. there is the question of whether China will wish to emulate the U. In addition.Russian Relations and the Rise of China. mistakes. but it will also run into the same immense barriers to development that African states have faced up to now.S. In Africa. and certainly of the wars in Vietnam and Iraq. and the Chinese are only at the very early stages. Chinese managers and workers are already facing increased local hostility in some areas. it is a rather striking comment on China's international strategic weakness that apart from North Korea. former senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (July 11. and thereby to the stability of the Chinese political system and the rule of the Communist Party. as a global superpower.S. but so far these are for commercial use.. In terms of military power. navy away from China's coasts and prevent the U.S.154 of 154 AT Heg Solves China Decline in heg doesn’t mean Chinese rise or conflict – structural barriers and interdependence OR china can’t compete – military disparity is still too great Lieven 11 – Anatol. China has gone from being one of the Western system's greatest victims in the 19th Century to being one of the greatest beneficiaries of the global market system created by the British Empire and the United States. Finally. compared to the U. from effectively defending Taiwan. The destruction of that system through economic conflict or war would deal a shattering blow to the Chinese economy. interests. in terms of global power or learn from U. China's only true ally in the world is Soviet Union discovered during the Cold War.S. even if China becomes the world's largest economy this will by no means automatically equate to an ability to rival the U. it is not likely that the host countries India is after all a great deal closer to them than China is.S. Indeed.3 Secondly. China is working on what has been called its "string of pearls" strategy to develop ports around the Indian Ocean. Pakistan – and North Korea is more a ghastly liability than an ally. In fact.net/publications/policy/us_russian_relations_and_the_rise_of_chi na) There is no necessity that the rise of China will lead to increased tension or conflict between the U. and Pakistan could become the same.” http://www. not to dominate. and embroilment in local wars which in the end had little to do with real U. and with the possible exception of Pakistan.S. This was arguably true of the Korean and Afghan Wars.2 When it comes to global power projection China suffers from two huge drawbacks and is likely to do so for a long time to come. A significant role in America's decline has been played by its strategic over-extension.
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