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***Hegemony Bad***
***Hegemony Bad***...............................................................................................1 Frontline.......................................................................................................................................3 ***Uniqueness.........................................................................................................6 Low Now.......................................................................................................................................7 Collapse Inevitable.....................................................................................................................10 Multipolarity Inevitable..............................................................................................................17 Multilat Inevitable......................................................................................................................19 Heg  Multilat..........................................................................................................................20 Challengers Now.........................................................................................................................21 Heg Low (1/2)............................................................................................................................26 Heg Low (2/2)............................................................................................................................27 AT: Best Military Sustains.........................................................................................................29 AT: Soft Power Sustains.............................................................................................................30 AT: Economy Sustains ...............................................................................................................31 ***Alternative Uniqueness....................................................................................32 Heg Sustainable (1/2)................................................................................................................33 Heg Sustainable (2/2)................................................................................................................35 ***Heg Bad............................................................................................................37 Bad – Generic.............................................................................................................................38 Bad – China War........................................................................................................................39 XTN: China War.....................................................................................................................40 Bad – Counterbalancing.............................................................................................................41 Bad – Disease.............................................................................................................................42 Bad – Iran Strikes......................................................................................................................43 Bad – Middle East War..............................................................................................................45 AT: Heg Solves MidEast War.................................................................................................46 Bad – Proliferation.....................................................................................................................47 AT: Heg Solves Prolif..............................................................................................................49 Bad – Russia War.......................................................................................................................51 Bad – Sino-Russia Alliance........................................................................................................52 Bad – Space Weapons................................................................................................................53 Bad – Terrorism.........................................................................................................................55 Heg Fails - Terrorism.................................................................................................................57 XTN: Terrorism......................................................................................................................58 AT: Heg Solves Terror............................................................................................................59 Bad – US-EU Relations.............................................................................................................60 XTN: US-EU Relations...........................................................................................................61 Relations Good.......................................................................................................................62 Doesn’t Solve War......................................................................................................................63 Clinging to Power -> War..........................................................................................................69 Collapse =/= War.......................................................................................................................70 Retrenchment Good...................................................................................................................72 Heg Turns (1/3)..........................................................................................................................75 Heg Turns (2/3)..........................................................................................................................77 Heg Turns (3/3).........................................................................................................................78

2 of 154 ***Authors............................................................................................................80 AT: Ferguson..............................................................................................................................81 AT: Khalilzhad...........................................................................................................................82 AT: Brooks&Wohlforth..............................................................................................................83 ***Multipolarity Good...........................................................................................84 MultiPol Good – Generic...........................................................................................................85 MultiPol Good – Terror.............................................................................................................86 MultiPol Good – Iran.................................................................................................................87 Heg Unsustainable.....................................................................................................................90 Heg Unsustainable (Soft Power/Unpopular Policies)...............................................................99 Heg Decline Inevitable.............................................................................................................102 Alt Cause – Resource Collapse.................................................................................................104 Heg Collapse Inevitable (1/18).................................................................................................105 Heg Collapse Inevitable (2/18)................................................................................................106 Heg Collapse Inevitable (3/18).................................................................................................107 Heg Collapse Inevitable (4/18)................................................................................................108 Heg Collapse Inevitable (5/18).................................................................................................109 Heg Collapse Inevitable (6/18)..................................................................................................111 Heg Collapse Inevitable (7/18).................................................................................................112 Heg Collapse Inevitable (8/18).................................................................................................113 Heg Collapse Inevitable (9/18).................................................................................................114 Heg Collapse Inevitable (10/18)...............................................................................................115 Heg Collapse Inevitable (11/18)................................................................................................116 Heg Collapse Inevitable (12/18)................................................................................................117 Heg Collapse Inevitable (13/18)...............................................................................................118 Heg Collapse Inevitable (14/18)...............................................................................................119 .................................................................................................................................................120 Heg Collapse Inevitable (15/18)................................................................................................121 Heg Collapse Inevitable (16/18)...............................................................................................122 Heg Collapse Inevitable (17/18)...............................................................................................123 Heg Collapse Inevitable (18/18)...............................................................................................124 Exts – Yes China Rise...............................................................................................................126 Yes – China/Russia Counterbalancing.....................................................................................132 UQ – Yes Heg Decline..............................................................................................................133 UQ – Yes Heg Decline (Middle East) ......................................................................................138 Withdrawal K/T Sustainability................................................................................................139 Attempts to Maintain Heg Bad.................................................................................................141 Heg Bad – Iran ........................................................................................................................143 Heg Bad – Prolif ......................................................................................................................144 Offshore Balancing Good – General ........................................................................................145 Offshore Balancing Good – China............................................................................................148 Offshore Balancing Good – Middle East/Terrorism ...............................................................149 Offshore Balancing Good – Terrorism/Prolif .........................................................................150 AT Heg Solves War (General)...................................................................................................151 AT Heg Solves Asia Stability ....................................................................................................153 AT Heg Solves China ................................................................................................................154

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Primacy will be impossible to sustain – dollar, fiscal pressure, rising challengers, overstretch Layne 10 (Christopher Layne, Professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A&M's George H.W. Bush
School of Government & Public Service. "Graceful decline: the end of Pax Americana". The American Conservative. May 2010. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_7060/is_5_9/ai_n54223596/) AK

China's economy has been growing much more rapidly than the United States' over the last two decades and continues to do so, maintaining audacious 8 percent growth projections in the midst of a global recession. Leading economic forecasters predict that it will overtake the U.S. as the world's largest economy, measured by overall GDP, sometime around 2020. Already in 2008, China passed the U.S. as the world's leading manufacturing nation--a title the United States had enjoyed for over a century--and this year China will displace Japan as the world's second-largest economy. Everything we know about the trajectories of rising great powers tells us that China will use its increasing wealth to build formidable military power and that it will seek to become the dominant power in East Asia. Optimists contend that once the U.S. recovers from what historian Niall Ferguson calls the
"Great Repression"--not quite a depression but more than a recession--we'll be able to answer the Chinese challenge. The country, they remind us, faced a larger debt-GDP ratio after World War II yet embarked on an era of sustained growth. They forget that

the postwar era was a golden age of U.S. industrial and financial dominance, trade surpluses, and persistent high growth rates. Those days are gone. The United States of 2010 and the world in which it lives are far different from those of 1945. Weaknesses in the fundamentals of the American economy have been accumulating for more than three decades. In the 1980s, these problems were acutely diagnosed by a number of
writers--notably David Calleo, Paul Kennedy, Robert Gilpin, Samuel Huntington, and James Chace--who predicted that these structural ills would ultimately erode the economic foundations of America's global preeminence. A spirited late-1980s debate was cut short, when, in quick succession, the Soviet Union collapsed, Japan's economic bubble burst, and the U.S. experienced an apparent economic revival during the Clinton administration. Now the delayed day of reckoning is fast

approaching. Even in the best case, the United States will emerge from the current crisis with fundamental handicaps. The Federal Reserve and Treasury have pumped massive amounts of dollars into circulation in hope of reviving the economy. Add to that the $1 trillion-plus budget deficits that the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) predicts the United States will incur for at least a decade. When the projected deficits are bundled with the persistent U.S. currentaccount deficit, the entitlements overhang (the unfunded future liabilities of Medicare and Social Security), and the cost of the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is reason to worry about the United States' fiscal stability. As the CBO says, "Even if the recovery occurs as projected and the stimulus bill is allowed to expire, the country will face the highest debt/GDP ratio in 50 years and an increasingly unsustainable and urgent fiscal problem." The dollar's vulnerability is the United States' geopolitical Achilles' heel. Its role as the international economy's reserve currency ensures American preeminence, and if it loses that status, hegemony will be literally unaffordable. As Cornell professor Jonathan Kirshner observes, the dollar's vulnerability "presents potentially significant and underappreciated restraints upon contemporary American political and military predominance." Fears for the dollar's long-term health predated the current financial and economic crisis. The meltdown has amplified them and highlighted two new factors that bode ill for continuing reserve-currency status. First, the other big financial players in the international economy are either military rivals (China) or ambiguous allies (Europe) that have their own ambitions and no longer require U.S. protection from the Soviet threat. Second, the dollar faces an uncertain future because of concerns that its value will diminish over time. Indeed, China,
which has holdings estimated at nearly $2 trillion, is worried that America will leave it with huge piles of depreciated dollars.

China's vote of no confidence is reflected in its recent calls to create a new reserve currency. In coming years, the U.S. will be under increasing pressure to defend the dollar by preventing runaway inflation. This will require it to impose fiscal self-discipline through some combination of budget cuts, tax increases, and interest-rate hikes. Given that the last two options could choke off renewed growth, there is likely to be strong pressure to slash the federal budget. But it will be almost impossible to make meaningful cuts in federal spending without deep reductions in

Discretionary non-defense domestic spending accounts for only about 20 percent of annual federal outlays. 35. none of the declining powers that failed to retrench recovered their relative position. International Security Spring 2011. great powers retrench for the same reason they expand: the rigors of great power politics compel them to do so. How fast great powers fall contributes to whether these retrenching states will internally reform.org/articles/a_multipolar_moment But times have changed. "This combination will force the Obama administration to stop cherrypicking issues on which it wants to cooperate and forging ahead on those issues it believes it can still handle alone.S.12 Retrenchment is by no means easy. we argue that the rate of decline helps explain what forms great power retrenchment will take. Pages 7-44. a range of 61–83 percent. Following the dictates of neorealist theory. we find that great powers retrenched in no less than eleven and no more than fifteen of the eighteen cases. and adjustment more difficult to postpone. In this first decade of the 21st century. draw down their military obligations. increase reliance on allies or adversaries. First. and impose adjustments on domestic populations. we challenge the retrenchment pessimists’ claim that domestic or international constraints inhibit the ability of declining great powers to retrench. even over short time spans. As Kirshner puts it." he writes in Multilateralism in Munich. Faced with diminishing resources. Vol. Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami.S. and make diplomatic overtures to enemies. In fact. 40 percent managed to recover their ordinal rank. When international conditions demand it. our analysis suggests that great powers facing acute decline are less likely to initiate or escalate militarized interstate disputes. we find that the magnitude of relative decline helps explain the extent of great power retrenchment. Contrary to the pessimistic conclusions of critics. peaceful retrenchment is the most common response. This article fills these gaps by systematically examining the relationship between acute relative decline and the responses of great powers. defense expenditures are "more likely to be decisive in the future when the U. we question the logic and evidence of the retrenchment pessimists.fpif. Your authors are pessimists – empirical data proves retrenchment is more peaceful than the alternatives MacDonald and Parent 11 (Paul. When borrowing becomes more difficult." Faced with these hard decisions.4 of 154 defense expenditures. Far from being a hazardous policy. Of the fifteen great powers that adopted retrenchment in response to acute relative decline. but necessity is the mother of invention.) AK In this article. Great powers are able to rebalance their commitments through compromise. Necessity . choices must be made between raising taxes. So the United States will face obvious "guns or butter" choices. retrenchment can be successful. We examine eighteen cases of acute relative decline since 1870 and advance three main arguments. Knowing only a state’s rate of relative economic decline explains its corresponding degree of retrenchment in as much as 61 percent of the cases we examined. the absolute size of U. To date there has been neither a comprehensive study of great power retrenchment nor a study that lays out the case for retrenchment as a practical or probable policy. States that retrench often regain their position in the hierarchy of great powers. and cutting defense spending. is under pressure to make real choices about taxes and spending. “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment”. states renounce risky ties.' as British minister Ed Balls put it in perhaps only slight exaggeration. Americans will find themselves afflicted with hegemony fatigue. No. Multiple balancing powers and internal issues make heg collapse inevitable – only abandoning unipolarity solves lashout and great power conflict John Feffer (co-director of Foreign Policy In Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies)February 2009 “A Multipolar Moment” http://www. states respond to penury the same way they do to plenty: they seek to adopt policies that maximize security given available means. and Joseph. In contrast. argues FPIF contributor Hannes Artens. retrenchment neither requires aggression nor invites predation. Second. great powers moderate their foreign policy ambitions and offer concessions in areas of lesser strategic value. power was at its zenith. "These aren't the golden 1990s. Further.S. the capitalist West is facing defeat in Afghanistan and is on the verge of 'the worst recession in a hundred years. and declining great powers face powerful incentives to contract their interests in a prompt and proportionate manner. Based on the empirical record. cutting non-defense spending. 4. rather than conflict. seek new allies or rely more heavily on old ones. Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College. Third. In these ways. when states fall in the hierarchy of great powers. when U.

we are quagmired in Afghanistan. meanwhile. economy." Are we thus witnessing the final end of the unipolar moment? China is coming up fast. the bill for two wars plus the Pentagon's already gargantuan budget.5 of 154 will dictate a more pragmatic multilateralism. and we might finally see the end of the dollar's reign as global currency. Global problems like climate change and financial collapse require global solutions. the Pentagon is still maintaining the world's largest military force — but we have failed to defeat al-Qaeda. so we either evolve multilateral responses or we do a dinosaur dive into extinction. The European Union's expansion has been accompanied by relatively few growing pains.S. Several powerful countries in the South (particularly India. With the bank bailout. Brazil. The global recession is hammering the U. in which all sides humbly accept what is realistically possible. the red ink is mounting. and all of our nuclear weapons have done little to prevent North Korea from entering the nuclear club. Debt has been the gravedigger of many an empire. I can hear the adding machine totting up the numbers. Or is that the sound of dirt hitting a coffin lid? . and South Africa) are quietly acquiring more geopolitical heft. Over here. the stimulus package.

6 of 154 ***Uniqueness .

militarily and in other ways. and Barack Obama remains opposed to direct intervention. Her words angered Beijing but did not alter its behaviour. to back up its Nato partners. While that assessment will be publicly upheld in Istanbul. It's certain to make headlines around the globe. there is as yet no concrete sign that he will stand down – amid widening differences in approach between the US and Britain. Clinton will do well to avoid David Cameron's mistake of indulging in gratuitous Pakistan-bashing on Indian soil. Turkey will propose yet another "roadmap" to end the conflict. June 24th. Clinton's visit to financially stricken Athens on Sunday is unlikely to be of any practical assistance. The next stop on Clinton's grand tour – India – will take her into the sphere of superpower rivalries. What will not be said is that the US increasingly views Delhi as a vital counterweight to a steadily more aggressive China. Given America's own protectionist record. France. Clinton said this week that the Syrian president had forfeited the legitimacy to rule. In this context.co. Clinton's sojourn will be rounded off in south-east and east Asia. In Damascus. has grown more belligerent. 2011. Clinton could give the interventionists a boost were she to announce US recognition of the rebel national council in Benghazi as Libya's government and release more than $30bn in regime funds frozen in US banks. is that pressure on Muammar Gaddafi's embattled regime in Tripoli is telling. “No More Superpower?” The New York Times. Like the Greeks. this piece of doorstep impudence is more likely to elicit smiles than snarls in Beijing. Clinton made waves last year when she warned China. where she is due to make a speech decrying protectionism. not leadership. A security conference in Bali is certain to touch on a host of territorial disputes between China and its neighbours. which. to stop trying to fence off the South China Sea.uk/commentisfree/2011/jul/14/hillary-clinton-world-tour) Hillary Clinton's 11-day round-the-world tour is remarkable even by the high-flying standards of US secretaries of state. Clinton can have little to say on Palestine. Clinton's first stop is in Istanbul on Friday. For this reason Clinton cannot be expected to dwell. It will be notable as much for what is not said as what is. To confuse matters further. there is little more the US can do other than complain. All three issues speak to American impotence. “Hillary Clinton circumnavigates a sphere of diminishing US influence”. http://www. Much the same might be said of the effect of American strictures on North Korea. The US is one of the few countries with a bigger national debt than Greece. 2011. and that the outlines of a negotiated settlement are beginning to emerge. Clinton will finish her global circumnavigation in Hong Kong. where the greatest challenges to American power are rising.guardian. staff writer. worried in part about encouraging Islamist extremists. with another confrontation involving Vietnam reported only today. The official line. and its ever greater reliance on Chinese capital and Chinese imports. for example. on India's de facto support for the Burmese dictatorship. chairman of Doha Debates. The Guardian UK. And with the Obama administration's peace plan torpedoed by Binyamin Netanyahu. the Israeli prime minister. power — just look at events in the Middle East. Iran's recent decision to dramatically accelerate its suspect uranium enrichment programme gives the lie to claims that the Tehran regime is retreating under the US-led sanctions campaign. Italy and Russia. Despite claims that Gaddafi is close to throwing in the towel.S.nytimes. When you're winning. The secretary of state will say a lot about strengthening ties through strategic dialogue and commercial collaboration.7 of 154 Low Now American influence and dominance is diminished now – Clinton tour proves Tisdall 7-14 (Simon. Hegemony low and declining – Middle East proves Sebastian 6/23 (Tim. promulgated by France. But paradoxically. if anything. July 14th. where she will join European and other foreign ministers in the international contact group co-ordinating the Nato-led intervention in Libya. But Washington. has so far hedged its bets. http://www. And it is arguably USpatented transnational market capitalism that created the whole sorry mess in the first place. behind the scenes Clinton may hear well-rehearsed complaints that the US is not doing enough. in effect. Clinton's Turkish leg will include bilateral talks on Syria. you can afford to laugh. The sharp crack as Israel’s prime minister slapped President Obama’s face with a refusal to halt . this diplomatic tour de force may unintentionally highlight the apparently inexorable decline of American power and influence. Bashar al-Assad continues to ignore ever more shrill American criticism of the nationwide security crackdown.html?ref=middleeast) There’s no doubt about the devaluation of U. Americans seem incapable of achieving a consensus on how to address it. Counter-terrorism will be high on the agenda following Wednesday's bombings in Mumbai. But while China and Russia afford him diplomatic cover. British journalist. its unhelpful stance on Kashmir and its machinations in Afghanistan.com/interactive/2011/06/24/opinion/global/20110624_SUPERPOWER. The US is now reduced to the role of disgruntled spectator as a UN vote to recognise Palestinian statehood draws near. Iran and the IsraelPalestine conflict.

New energy. Unnatural was the short period of unconditional world leadership that the U.com/interactive/2011/06/24/opinion/global/20110624_SUPERPOWER. Freedom is a much more inspiring teacher than oppression. but about the enhancement of such power centers as China.nytimes.” notes Fareed Zakaria. promised to restore America’s popularity. that you can murder and torture all you want — but if you go quietly when you’ve had enough.N. Security Council — was. Digital Infrastructure”. The term of the third post-Soviet president. The Bush presidency was marked by America’s diminishing reputation. and infrastructure Times of Texas 7/1 *citing Fareed Zakaria. The war in Iraq — started despite the protests of the allies and with no sanction of the U. started with the 9/11 catastrophe and war in Afghanistan. scientific creations and things like that — which are really harbingers of future economic growth. there is no peace at all. instead of just searching out its enemies. http://timesoftexas. Only the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from the Cold War brought ‘‘the only superpower’’ the authority unthinkable before: Some philosophers even started speaking about ‘‘the end of history. the biggest factory in the world is in China. where there would be several centers capable of sharing responsibility for security and development both in certain regions — for example in an expanded Europe. Competitive Workforce. new Arab governments will have to stand on their own feet. to paraphrase President Clinton. I would like it to come as soon as possible to a new balance. economically and scientifically. primarily China. energy.modations with them. stumble. which shows how the collapse of communism and the Soviet empire — as well as the rise of global markets — has leveled the .0 (Time of Texas Online – “US – Behind in Education. fall and hopefully emerge stronger. the largest Ferris wheel in the world is in Singapore. “No More Superpower?” The New York Times.0. and the rise of other power centers. to find new friends. American power on the decline – Iraq was a turning point Rogozin 6/23 (Dmitry. “And … more troublingly. enjoyed at the historic moment of the collapse of Communism and the disintegration of the Soviet state. Now we speak not only about America’s weakened role.com/2011/07/01/us-behind-ineducation-competitive-workforce-new-energy-digital-infrastructure/) Thirty years ago. the host of CNN’s Fareed Zakaria GPS and an editor at large for Time magazine. After decades of American engagement in the peace process. this will ensure a steady supply for years to come. It makes no sense to provide Israel with weapons to destroy Palestinian property and then offer assistance to put the rubble back together again. 2011.” Zakaria. Don’t assume the worst. The ‘‘conflict balance’’ of the Cold War was very soon changed by global destabilization. and post-crisis Russia. perhaps. It makes no sense to tell Muammar el-Qaddafi to leave Libya because of crimes against his own people — and then to help him evade international justice by touting for his safe haven in a country that doesn’t acknowledge the International Criminal Court. June 24th. America is in decline – education. competitiveness. writer of the book The Post-American World: Release 2. International terrorism was vividly painted as a conflict of civilizations. America’s currency is at rock bottom in the Arab world. George W. But today? “The tallest building in the world is now in Dubai. With Washington’s power diminished.8 of 154 settlements still reverberates around the region. the largest oil refinery is in India. withdraw from military conflicts and focus on domestic problems and the financial crisis. http://www.’’ in the sense that there were no more alternatives to American leadership and values. Not because the vacuum will be filled by more palatable players — but because this one needs a break. The world is rapidly changing. including Russia — and in the entire world. Israel will have to make new accom. a turning point: The world saw that America was taking on too much. Brazil. What more powerful signal can there be to despots present and future. the largest investment fund in the world is in Abu Dhabi. It makes no sense to trumpet freedom and justice — belatedly — in Egypt and remain virtually silent about the gross human rights violations reported in Bahrain. during his election campaign.S. July 1st. the European Union.S. Bush. Far from stopping conflicts. host of CNN`s Fareed Zakaria GPS and editor for Time Magazine.html?ref=middleeast) The gradual diminishing of American influence. But history took a different turn. charts the fall of America’s dominance and the simultaneous rise of the rest of the world in his book The Post-American World: Release 2. Permanent representative of Russia to NATO. and Barack Obama. [the United States is] also losing [its] key grip on indices such as patent creation. So the decline of U. It needs. India. Only this time it’s not called America. not because it can’t press buttons — or find and kill Osama bin Laden — but because its policies make no sense. America will buy you a ticket. 2011. The post-Soviet decade marked the peak of American influence and authority. There really is a new world. the United States dominated the world politically. is a natural and logical process. It needs to show the world that it will no longer back leaders who abuse their own people’s freedom in the mistaken belief that it will help Americans sleep more securely back home. power may be good for the Middle East. We are living in an interesting time.

“In economic terms.” he says.” . “To put it in perspective. Zakaria says. “The result is you have countries all over the world thriving and taking advantage of the political stability they have achieved. … If we didn’t have the rest of the world growing.” he tells Fresh Air‘s Terry Gross. consuming. We would go to the bottom of the pack in terms of deficit as a percentage of GDP among the rich countries in the world — we would basically solve our fiscal problems for the short term. is also starting to lag behind other countries in education. It’s not possible for two countries to be the leading dominant political power at the same time. loaning money. and fostering new energy and digital infrastructure to support those workers — all markers of long-term economic growth. the more people there are producing. the United States economy would be in much worse shape than it is today. saving. the technological connection into this market.” America. “So as China expands its role in Asia. “The more countries that get rich [and] the larger the world economy.” he says. building a competitive workforce. the established power — the United States. the economic connections of a global market. He says America is now heading toward what he calls a “post-American” world.” But Zakaria cautions that the economic growth around the world — and the benefits that global economic stability create — do not extend to the political arena. in which the United States’ share of the “global pie” is much smaller — as the rest of the globe begins to catch up. the rise of the rest [of the globe] is a win-win.” America’s political system. whose role is diminishing? Of course.9 of 154 playing field for many other countries around the world. “And we are all witnesses to this phenomenon. becomes mired in debate and cannot deal with the short-term deficit. if Congress were to do nothing. “That by itself would yield $3.9 trillion to the federal government over the next 10 years. Zakaria says. the Bush tax cuts would expire next year. investing. “Politics and power is a realm of relative influence.” he says.

Economically. the U.com/223-layne-christopher/231-pax-americana) AK American primacy’s end is result of history’s big. This will require fiscal self-discipline through a combination of tax increases and big spending cuts. Faced with these hard choices. When these are bundled with the entitlements overhang (the unfunded future liabilities of Medicare and Social Security) and the cost of the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. But America is increasingly unable to play the hegemon's assigned role. Bush School of Government & Public Service. Optimists contend that current worries about decline will fade once the U. From this unparalleled military and economic power came a Pax Americana that has endured for more than six decades. it offers public goods by opening its domestic market to other states. empire. primacy. “Bye bye. a hegemon is responsible for stabilizing key regions and guarding the global commons. The dollar’s vulnerability is the United States’ real geopolitical Achilles’ heel because the dollar’s role as the international economy’s reserve currency role underpins U. will be pressured to defend the dollar by preventing runaway inflation. Americans may contract hegemony fatigue. Indeed.S. the U. If the dollar loses that status America’s hegemony literally will be unaffordable. they say. "Graceful decline: the end of Pax Americana". Those days are gone forever. The decline of American power means the end of U.com/p/articles/mi_7060/is_5_9/ai_n54223596/) AK The United States emerged from World War II in a position of global dominance. and yet embarked on a sustained era of growth. industrial and financial dominance. Militarily. It is supposed to be the lender of last resort. not cause them. The Pax Americana is already crumbling in slow motion The current international order is based on the economic and security structures that the U. Decline is coming – hegemony is unsustainable in its current form Layne 10 (Christopher Layne. The American people are .S. there is reason to worry about United States’ long-term fiscal stability – and the role of the dollar. faced a larger debt/GDP ratio after World War II. Externally. recovers from the recession. Faced with wars it cannot win or quit and an economy begging rescue. In coming years the U. will incur for at least a decade.S.S. military and economic preponderance. It seemed the sun would never set on the U. many in the mainstream foreign-policy community see these as temporary setbacks and believe that U. The American Conservative. trade surpluses.10 of 154 Collapse Inevitable The Pax Americana is unsustainable and is already crumbling – too many alt causes to save it now Layne 11 (Christopher Layne is Professor and Robert M. Meaningful cuts in federal spending mean deep reductions in defense expenditures because discretionary non-defense – domestic – spending accounts for only about 20% of annual federal outlays. After all.S.S.S. impersonal forces compounded by the United States’ own self-defeating policies. If so.S.S.S. Miss American Pie” The European Magazine Online – 3-28-2011 http://theeuropean-magazine. Still. the United States will emerge from the current crisis facing a grave fiscal crisis. the impact of these big historical forces is reflected in the emergence of new great powers like China and India which is being driven by the unprecedented shift in the center of global economic power from the Euro-Atlantic area to Asia. not the biggest borrower. Even in the best case. and providing the reserve currency. the Pax Americana is already is crumbling in slow motion. May 2010. and sustained high growth rates. The looming fiscal results from the $1 trillion plus budget deficits that the U. primacy will endure for years to come.S. China’s economy has been growing much more rapidly than the United States’ over the last two decades and continues to do so. created after World War II. supplying liquidity for the world economy. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A & M University's Bush School of Government and Public Service. A hegemon is supposed to solve international crises. will be compelled to retrench strategically and the Pax Americana will end.S. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A&M's George H. The United States of 2011 are different from 1945. But the post-war era was a golden age of U. Professor and Robert M.W. the United States no longer fits the part. The US decline reflects its own economic troubles. http://findarticles. The entire fabric of world order that the United States established after 1945 – the Pax Americana – rested on the foundation of U. dominance in world politics and the beginning of the transition to a new constellation of world power.

President Barack Obama's November 2009 trip to China provided both substantive and emblematic evidence of the shift. religious intolerance.S. leadership has to co-exist with several rising powers. Bush made repeatedly in justifying his policy of exporting democracy at the point of a bayonet. and international politics is entering a period of transition: no longer unipolar but not yet fully multipolar. This shift in the global balance of power will dramatically affect international politics: the likelihood of intense great-power security competitions--and even war--will increase. We attempt to tame the world by exporting democracy because--we are told--democracies do not fight each other.S. and justifies endless interventions that ultimately destroy our hegemony Layne 10 (Christopher Layne. the belief. values. is different. better. it had the luxury of acting on its delusions without paying too high a price. that the United States is a model for the world and "America's wants and values are universal"--a point George W. ." In the same Pew study.S. that the U.) But as my graduate school mentor. but as the U. non-democratic forms of governance. Much of America's decline can be attributed to its own self-defeating policies. Kenneth Waltz. 44 percent of Americans polled said that China was the leading economic power. strong. it believes it has the obligation to prevail in this global struggle. the United States will pay a high price if it endlessly repeats its mistakes. 41 percent of the public believes that the U. come from "over there. Obama's trip has symbolized the advent of a more multi-polar world where U. genocide. None of these propositions is self-evident. others--notably China. stumbles. And because the U. But when your power declines. just 27 percent chose the United States. if you discount the 58. Intervention is thus the United States' default in foreign policy. All these bad things. (That is. According to a December 2009 Pew survey. These assumptions invest American foreign policy with a tendency to see the world in terms of good versus evil. used to tell us about American foreign policy.S. enjoyed such vast superiority for such a long time. one of the towering figures in the study of international politics.com/p/articles/mi_7060/is_5_9/ai_n54223596/) AK The foundational American myth of empire is exceptionalism. America's security and way of life are purportedly endangered by the existence of hostile ideologies anywhere in the world because peace and freedom are allegedly indivisible. India. Indeed. The consequence has been to contribute to the very imperial overstretch that is accelerating the United States' decline. Bush School of Government & Public Service. Americans believe that our political and economic systems provide "a prototypical solution for the world's disorders. and norms of emerging powers. decline means that in the 21st century." So we cling to the idea that our hegemony is necessary for our own and everyone else's security. you can afford to make the same dumb mistakes over and over again. we believe. Because that U. May 2010.11 of 154 awakening to a new reality more quickly than the academy.S. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A&M's George H. As the Financial Times observed. military personnel who have suffered disfiguring wounds or been killed in Iraq and Afghanistan.S. foreign-policy elites have extrapolated from our national experience and concluded. U. imperialist. "When you are big. Americans have always looked at the outside world suspiciously and viewed it as a source of contagion: war. The view that the world is doomed without hegemony is flawed – exceptionalist. there is overwhelming evidence that they are wrong. To change our foreign policy--to come to grips with the end of the Pax Americana--we first need to change the way we see the world. "Coming at a moment when Chinese prestige is growing and the U. as a nation. We export our model of freemarket capitalism because--we are told--states that are economically interdependent do not fight each other. We work multilaterally through international institutions because--we are told--these promote cooperation and trust among states. and powerful. The American Conservative. But they are illusions that "express the deepest beliefs which Americans. dating back to the Puritans. and terrorism. Professor and Robert M. imperialism. and Russia--are rising." U.S.S. and the post-1945 Pax Americana will be replaced by an international order that reflects the interests. hold about the world. and morally superior to the rest of the world. as Edmund Stillman and William Pfaff wrote some 45 years ago. "Graceful decline: the end of Pax Americana". plays a less important and powerful role as a world leader than it did a decade ago. Mr. and latterly totalitarianism. is facing enormous difficulties." We have long thought that we cannot live safely in a world of such imperfections and that it is therefore our national duty to cure these ills by using American power to construct a world order based on our values. http://findarticles.000 names on the Vietnam Memorial or the tens of thousands of U. The epoch of American dominance is drawing to a close. looks through this prism.S. most notably China. the current era of globalization will end.S. militarism.W. all would be well." If we could just give the rest of the world a makeover so it looked like the United States. you begin to pay a price for repeating your mistakes.

in 2020. has been falling behind its competitors.S. most of whom will be heading home. China's central bank governor suggested that the future might lie with a global reserve currency "disconnected from individual nations" (that is. dollar finally loses its special status as the world's reserve currency. A harbinger of further decline: in 2009 the U. the U. By 2025. Faced with a fading superpower incapable of paying the bills.S.S. Such negative trends are encouraging increasingly sharp criticism of the dollar's role as the world’s reserve currency. as long expected. Russian president Dimitri Medvedev insisted that it was time to end "the artificially maintained unipolar system" based on "one formerly strong reserve currency. Treasury notes. that it "blows away the existing No.com/news/feature/2010/12/06/america_collapse_2025/index. Hegemony—Myth or Reality?: A Review Essay. thanks to a blistering 400 percent increase since 2000. In mid-2009. was still number two behind Japan in worldwide patent applications with 232." observed Kenneth S. it is far too late.000. 10 (Alfred. however.S. "to hasten the bankruptcy of the U. a good starting point is the National Intelligence Council’s (NIC’s) Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World. dominion over the oceans. Heg unsustainable – multiple constraints ensure collapse and rise of alternatives Christopher Layne." Economic Decline: Scenario 2020 After years of swelling deficits fed by incessant warfare in distant lands. By now. knows best on economic policy. 09 [“The Waning of U. not staying here as once would have happened. Summer 2009] For an overview of trends that could affect international politics over the next two decades. expert. a far-right patriot captures the presidency with thundering rhetoric. Rogoff.W.salon.R. 1 machine" in America. space. domestic divisions widen into violent clashes and divisive debates. provocatively challenge U. Chair in National Security at the School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. Smail Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Take these as signposts of a world to come.12 of 154 Heg falling now — external threats to the economy outweigh the aff’s internal links McCoy. the Tianhe-1A. Under pressure at home and abroad. No. three main threats exist to America’s dominant position in the global economy: loss of economic clout thanks to a shrinking share of world trade. J. and cyberspace.html) Today. "Other countries are no longer willing to buy into the idea that the U. said one U.S. 12/6/10. Vol. Add to this clear evidence that the U. hit rock bottom in ranking among the 40 nations surveyed by the Information Technology & Innovation Foundation when it came to "change" in "global innovation-based competitiveness" during the previous decade. so powerful.S. that source of future scientists and innovators. financial-military world order. Its key geopolitical . great and regional. Meanwhile. but China was closing fast at 195. Suddenly." Simultaneously. the United States is likely to face a critical shortage of talented scientists. Russia. In 2008. as economist Michael Hudson has argued. Washington is finally forced to slash its bloated military budget. American leadership in technological innovation is on the wane. and other powers. with the world's central banks holding an astronomical $4 trillion in U. the cost of imports soars. There is no reason to believe that this trend will reverse itself. http://www. and of a possible attempt. Unable to pay for swelling deficits by selling now-devalued Treasury notes abroad. Adding substance to these statistics. Similarly. ever-rising unemployment. but it is significantly more insightful and intellectually courageous than typical government reports. Iran.to 34-year-olds with university degrees. “How America will collapse”. education system. the country sank to 12th place in 2010.S.S. dollar).S. the U. are now foreigners. Nearly half of all graduate students in the sciences in the U. in October China's Defense Ministry unveiled the world's fastest supercomputer. The World Economic Forum ranked the United States at a mediocre 52nd among 139 nations in the quality of its university math and science instruction in 2010. Washington slowly pulls U. 34. and a continuing decline in real wages. the decline of American technological innovation. with just 11 percent of them compared to 12 percent for China and 16 percent for the European Union. in other words. The world pays next to no attention as the American Century ends in silence.15Global Trends 2025 is not light reading. 1. and the end of the dollar's privileged status as the global reserve currency. the U. India. Riding a political tide of disillusionment and despair.000. often over remarkably irrelevant issues. forces back from hundreds of overseas bases to a continental perimeter.S.S. By 2008. After leading the world for decades in 25.S. China. amid soaring prices. the United States had already fallen to number three in global merchandise exports.S.” International Security. a former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund. demanding respect for American authority and threatening military retaliation or economic reprisal.

global dominance” (p. will “strive for a multipolar system with New Delhi as one of the poles” (ibid. both of which are linked to the fear that after recovery. although the United States will probably be primus inter pares in a multipolar international system twenty years from now.). 97). 82).13 of 154 conclusion is that the U. Russia’s great power trajectory is more problematic than China’s or India’s (pp. the NIC believes it “will be a leading force in opposition to U. “the dollar’s decline may force the United States into difficult tradeoffs between achieving ambitious foreign policy goals and the high domestic costs of supporting those objectives” (pp. the United States will face a serious inflationary threat. At home. Moreover.77 Optimists . J. India. hegemony. 23–24. power.S. the rise of China and India to great power status will restore each to “the positions they held two centuries ago when China produced approximately 30 percent and India 15 percent of the world’s wealth” (p. U. 32).S. the financial privileges conferred on the United States by the dollar’s unchallenged reserve currency status have underpinned the preeminent role of the United States in international politics since the end of World War II. Jordan Professor of International Affairs at Texas A&M's George Bush School of Government and Public Service.). China’s spring 2009 call to replace the dollar with a new reserve currency signals that the NIC’s long-term worries may be justified. Brooks and Wohlforth wrote their book before its effects became evident). Galileo. capabilities. and opportunity costs of being the world’s leader are reassessed by American voters” (p. Ph. financial. decline are a looming fiscal crisis and doubts about the future of the dollar as the reserve currency. it will have less power—and foreign policy options—than it has been accustomed to having since 1945 (ibid.17] Because of uncertainties about economics. 32.16 As Global Trends 2025 points out. domestic governance issues. 7). 1. Thus. India. Ultimately. In particular. 3.S. Russia will also seek to reestablish its sphere of influence in the “near abroad” (pp. 09 – Mary Julia and George R. however.S. No. from USC. 8–9. Summer 2009.D. 21-23) PDF The publications reviewed in this essay examine whether the United States is in (or is headed for) relative decline. 34. military supremacy will no longer be as dominant as it has been since the Cold War’s end (p. the NIC believes that the “chances are good that China and India will continue to rise” (p. Global Trends predicts that over the next two decades. Their ascent is being propelled by “the global shift in relative wealth and economic power” from North America and the Euro-Atlantic world to Asia—a shift “without precedent in modern history” (ibid.).D. the growing dependence of the United States on foreign capital inflows “may curtail U.S. LL. and especially demography. July 6th 2010. The NIC concludes that America’s “interest and willingness to play a leadership role may be more constrained as the economic.-dominated unipolar world will give way to multipolarity during the next two decades spurred by two causal mechanisms: the emergence of new great powers (and potentially important regional powers). By 2025. If Russia overcomes its demographic challenge and continues its revival as a great power. Decline is inevitable – heg is economically unsustainable Layne. Although at the time this issue went to press. Russia’s population is forecast to drop from 141 million to below 130 million.75 The long-term impact of the current economic crisis largely will determine who is right (and to be fair. China. in Political Science from the University of California. Hegemony—Myth or Reality? A Review Essay". the NIC did have an inkling of the meltdown’s potential long-term implications for U. and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute (Christopher.S. Nevertheless. 13–14).19 [End Page 153] As the NIC observes. 31–32). freedom of action in unanticipated ways” (p.M. According to the NIC. even before the meltdown. Vol. International Security.74 Brooks and Wohlforth purport to deny the possibility that America is in relative decline. and possibly Russia are emerging great powers. affecting the availability of manpower for both the military and the labor pools (pp. Although both states could encounter speed bumps that might slow—or even derail—their ascents to great power status. economic power to wane. China figures to have the world’s second-largest economy (measured by gross domestic product [GDP]) and will be a first-rank military power (p. the United States will confront other constraints on its international role. 93). p. energy prices. 30).S. 97). Because its great power status is closely tied to its ability to control both the energy resources and pipelines of Central Asia and the Caucasus. but a growing number of analysts disagree.18 Between 2009 and 2025. economic and political constraints may undermine U. Yet. 93).76 The warning signs with respect to U. and economic. in addition to relative decline. longterm structural weaknesses that have been accumulating for more than three decades were causing U. and domestic political constraints that may erode U.S. the dollar’s role as the international economy’s preeminent reserve currency will erode. buoyed by its strong economic growth rate. 30). Global Trends 2025 was published just before the full scope of the global financial and economic crisis became apparent. The United States’ soft power may diminish as its liberal model of political and economic development is challenged by authoritarian/statist alternatives (pp.S. 94. military. 12. 29). the dollar remained strong and will continue to be the reserve currency for some time to come. in International Law from Virginia Law. "The Waning of U.S.

78 Chief among these handicaps are the increase in the money supply (caused by the massive amount of dollars the Federal Reserve and Treasury have pumped into circulation to rescue the economy). the entitlements overhang. and sustained high growth rates. America has paved the way for an even less palatable Iranian dominance in the region. But from China's rapidly rising status as a global player. the country will face the highest debt/GDP ratio in 50 years and an increasingly urgent and unsustainable fiscal problem. To rule mankind. The United States of 2009 is far different from the United States of 1945.S. January 19. industrial and financial dominance. however. as Eric Helleiner notes. there are nonetheless parallels worth considering. protection from the Soviet threat. was a golden age of U. the dollar faces an uncertain future because of concerns that its value will diminish over time. to rising tensions in South Asia and the Middle East. fears of a fiscal crisis will fade: the country faced a larger debt to GDP ratio after World War II. and the $1 trillion plus budget deficits that the Brookings Institution and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) project the United States will incur for at least a decade.79 When the projected deficits are bundled with the persistent U. trade surpluses.”81 If the Congressional Budget Office is right. Second. it will emerge from the current crisis with serious macroeconomic handicaps. American supremacy in a post-cold war environment seems outmatched by a progressively more unstable world.guardian. the dollar’s vulnerability “presents potentially significant and underappreciated restraints upon contemporary American political and military predominance. While the dangers we face were once diverse and scattered. 2009. The postwar era.80 The CBO states. Because of these two factors. while struggling internally to recover from an economic collapse not seen since the Great Depression.”82 The dollar’s loss of reserve currency status would undermine U. Like Rome. and make the world obey. it spells trouble ahead for the dollar.S. 't is thine alone. http://www.S. the Iraq war pushed many of our enemies to see us as a common threat where religious differences would have otherwise made cooperation impossible. and recent events have magnified concerns that predated the financial and economic crisis. there is a “risk of defections generating a herd-like momentum” away from it.co. "Rome. America today faces the same dilemma of the eastern Roman empire: should it attempt to regain its lost global supremacy or fortify and adapt to the new world? Will we follow Virgil's famous line from the Aeneid. current account deficit. in collapsing the Ba'athist regime of Saddam Hussein. As Jonathan Kirshner noted on the eve of the meltdown. there is reason to worry about the United States’ longterm fiscal stability. which is why many economists believe that even in the best case. America has spread itself too thin and is unable to respond to new threats as they emerge with either a convincing show of military force or a skilled use of soft power to leverage its credibility in the world. “Even if the recovery occurs as projected and the stimulus bill is allowed to expire. and yet embarked on a sustained era of growth. Moreover.S. dominance. and the cost of two ongoing wars. While the comparison to ancient Rome is imperfect. the other big players in the international economy now are either military rivals (China) or ambiguous “allies” (Europe) that have their own ambitions and no longer require U.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2009/jan/19/barack-obama-rome-empire) By virtue of its economic and military power. with awful sway. however. Brooks and Wohlforth concede unipolarity can only last for 20 more years and that counterbalancing is occuring ." or preserve our strength and create a framework for global cooperation in which America acts as a mediator and responsible actor rather than instigator. to Russia's show of force in Georgia.14 of 154 contend that once the United States recovers. America has been the leader of the free world for the last 60 years.84 Hegemony is unsustainable in today`s world – collapse coming The Guardian 9 (The Guardian UK. if the dollar experiences dramatic depreciation in the future. America is facing a wide array of increasingly troubling threats. as well as a political system extolled for its superiority to all other systems. 83 First.

pdf] Crucial to hegemonic stability theory is that the hegemon actually does things.” http://www. Over time. everyone is getting hit. Professor of Public Policy at the University of Maryland 10 – [Quddus Z. hegemony.S. If the society fails to save and reinvest a sufficient fraction of its surplus wealth in industry and agriculture. which allows other states to catch up. it is also an implicit admission that—although it has yet to bear fruit—other states are engaged in counterbalancing the United States. Hegemony—Myth or Reality”. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service (Christopher. Because all are suffering. Brooks and Wohlforth actually concede that unipolarity is not likely to last more than another twenty years. Snyder. Professor of Public Policy at the University of Maryland 10 – [Quddus Z. After all. and managerial skills diffuse throughout the international economic system. it is also in the throes of a serious economic downturn. the debate about unipolar stability is misleading. however. Summer 2009) Brooks and Wohlforth make a strong case for unipolar stability.umd.umd. US hegemony is unsustainable. “Systermic theory in an era of declining US hegemony. Relative power is important. Thus far the US has maintained a massive defense budget while consumption and investment have been sustained by deficit spending.43 A Superficially. like all hegemonic systems. for now at least. Snyder. International Security. the US appears much weaker today than it did five years ago. know-how. Vol. hegemony will endure well into the future. But there is less to their argument than meets the eye. military overstretch. “Systermic theory in an era of declining US hegemony. seems more bound. 09 Professor.edu/gvpt/irworkshop/papers_fall09/snyder.With its armed forces over-extended. but so is the hegemon’s ability to actually do things. For example. leading allies to enhance their own military capabilities. 34. 1. It is unclear how long this formula will work. and investment) produces a profound dilemma for society.economic problems. The US may still be a giant. despite their claim at the beginning [End Page 161] of World that unipolarity is robust and that U.15 of 154 Layne. and this is spurring an ongoing process of multipolarization. “The Waning of U.bsos. Of course.S.edu/gvpt/irworkshop/papers_fall09/snyder.S hegemony is unsustainable. consumption. the US is still a giant in terms of relative power differentials. If it suppresses consumption. which is not very long at all. and resources stretched. they do not engage the argument that. and Robert M. it provided a stable international monetary system which facilitated . US security guarantees may prove less credible than they once were. Hegemons sprint to the front of the great power pack because of economic leadership based on productivity and technological innovation.42 Their case is based on a freeze-frame view of the distribution of capabilities in the international system. these projects will gobble up massive amounts of resources and treasure at a time when America’s own recovery is being partly bankrolled by foreign powers like China. In this respect. No.bsos.” http://www.43 The point is simply that America’s unilateral assertiveness on the international scene is changing. The problem does not only stem from fact that the US is bogged down in two wars. however. technology. It is unclear when the US will fully withdraw from Iraq and Afghanistan.’ But recent developments might justify a reevaluation of this conclusion. leadership costs sap the hegemon’s power and push it into decline. key question is whether the early decades of the twenty-first century will witness the decline of U. but one that.pdf] At the turn of the century it appeared as if we were living through a ‘hegemonic age. the consequence can be severe internal social tensions and class conflict…If the society neglects to pay the costs of defense. Similarly. Keohane has argued that after World War II the US provided three major sets of benefits in the area of international political economy: First. It is unlikely that the US will have either the political will or capability to take on major international undertakings. the economic basis of the society and its capacity to sustain either consumption or protection will decline.all realists agree Snyder PhD. or provides benefits. the American era of unipolarity contains the seeds of its own demise.S.44 Not only is this a weak case for unipolarity. external weakness will inevitably lead to its defeat by rising powers.45 Out of Balance U. and rising powers Snyder PhD. The classic Gilpinian dilemma provides insight into the present predicament the US finds itself in: This three-way struggle over priorities (protection. According to the theory of hegemonic stability.

and third. The hegemonic cycle usually ends in war. and inevitable overextension.25 Sadly. Challengers will arise. The hegemon cannot maintain its dominance in the face of mounting costs. all good things must come to an end. and eventual decline. second. the its allies gain access to Middle Eastern oil at stable prices. . Central to the theory of hegemonic stability is that the arrangement is ultimately unsustainable.”26 Virtually no realist believes that hegemony can persist indefinitely. losses in relative power.16 of 154 trade and payments. expansion. it provided a US helped market for goods and permitted trade on an asymmetrical basis. and thereafter begins anew: “The conclusion of one hegemonic war is the beginning of another cycle of growth.

30). India. “The Waning of U. the NIC did have an inkling of the meltdown’s potential long-term implications for U. although the United States . The NIC concludes that America’s “interest and willingness to play a leadership role may be more constrained as the economic. the growing dependence of the United States on foreign capital inflows “may curtail U. Hegemony—Myth or Reality”. and domestic political constraints that may erode U. the financial privileges conferred on the United States by the dollar’s unchallenged reserve currency status have underpinned the preeminent role of the United States in international politics since the end of World War II. 93). U. Moreover. and rising challengers Layne. and possibly Russia are emerging great powers. 97).18 Between 2009 and 2025. At home. military supremacy will no longer be as dominant as it has been since the Cold War’s end (p. military. The United States’ soft power may diminish as its liberal model of political and economic development is challenged by authoritarian/statist alternatives (pp. 7). a good starting point is the National Intelligence Council’s (NIC’s) Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World. 1. Summer 2009) For an overview of trends that could affect international politics over the next two decades. and especially demography. China figures to have the world’s second-largest economy (measured by gross domestic product [GDP]) and will be a first-rank military power (p. 29). erosion of public support. global dominance” (p. 3. 94. India. 09 Professor. 34. 31–32). the NIC believes it “will be a leading force in opposition to U. in addition to relative decline. 12. No. 13–14).15Global Trends 2025 is not light reading. capabilities. economic and political constraints may undermine U. Because its great power status is closely tied to its ability to control both the energy resources and pipelines of Central Asia and the Caucasus. but it is significantly more insightful and intellectually courageous than typical government reports. Although at the time this issue went to press. According to the NIC. domestic governance issues. Although both states could encounter speed bumps that might slow—or even derail—their ascents to great power status.S. Russia’s population is forecast to drop from 141 million to below 130 million.S. China’s spring 2009 call to replace the dollar with a new reserve currency signals that the NIC’s long-term worries may be justified. By 2025. hegemony. 82). 30).-dominated unipolar world will give way to multipolarity during the next two decades spurred by two causal mechanisms: the emergence of new great powers (and potentially important regional powers).17 [End Page 152] Because of uncertainties about economics. financial. power. China. Russia will also seek to reestablish its sphere of influence in the “near abroad” (pp. the dollar’s role as the international economy’s preeminent reserve currency will erode. Nevertheless.). however. Its key geopolitical conclusion is that the U. International Security. 97).S. Global Trends predicts that over the next two decades. and opportunity costs of being the world’s leader are reassessed by American voters” (p. buoyed by its strong economic growth rate. the rise of China and India to great power status will restore each to “the positions they held two centuries ago when China produced approximately 30 percent and India 15 percent of the world’s wealth” (p. Global Trends 2025 was published just before the full scope of the global financial and economic crisis became apparent. Ultimately. “the dollar’s decline may force the United States into difficult tradeoffs between achieving ambitious foreign policy goals and the high domestic costs of supporting those objectives” (pp. 8–9.17 of 154 Multipolarity Inevitable Multipolarity inevitable---collapse of the dollar. energy prices. the dollar remained strong and will continue to be the reserve currency for some time to come. the United States will confront other constraints on its international role. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service (Christopher.S.).S. 32). Their ascent is being propelled by “the global shift in relative wealth and economic power” from North America and the Euro-Atlantic world to Asia—a shift “without precedent in modern history” (ibid.S. Vol.S. the NIC believes that the “chances are good that China and India will continue to rise” (p. and economic. Thus.S. If Russia overcomes its demographic challenge and continues its revival as a great power. 23–24. affecting the availability of manpower for both the military and the labor pools (pp. freedom of action in unanticipated ways” (p. and Robert M. 93).16 As Global Trends 2025 points out. will “strive for a multipolar system with New Delhi as one of the poles” (ibid. 32. In particular. Russia’s great power trajectory is more problematic than China’s or India’s (pp.19 [End Page 153] As the NIC observes.

). A new cold war is unlikely. Though Washington remains the world's only superpower. too – presumably having fewer demands than Washington about their clients pursuing democratic reforms and peace with Israel.guardian. The US remains the superpower and could still effect serious change in the region. As ever. the recent actions of Russia and Turkey in the Middle East do show a new assertiveness from regional powers to pursue their own path in defiance of US will. Turkey and Brazil's recent nuclear deal with Iran typify this emerging new climate. the region's international relations are changing. . US power is waning.18 of 154 will probably be primus inter pares in a multipolar international system twenty years from now. Saudi Arabia's growing relationship with China might signify the shape of things to come. In such circumstances. perhaps hastened by unnecessary wars and economic shortsightedness. it won't just be Russia and Turkey expanding their reach in the region.uk/commentisfree/2010/may/31/us-hegemony-middle-east-ending) Yet even though the return to cold war bi-polar blocs in the Middle East is unlikely. “US hegemony in Middle East is ending”. should it desire. Stephen Walt has highlighted that this shift in power is global. Multipolarity coming now Phillips. it will have less power—and foreign policy options—than it has been accustomed to having since 1945 (ibid. 10 Analyst of Middle East Affairs (Chris. Not that this era is yet upon us. it is much more likely that international relations in the Middle East will come to reflect the multi-polar world that will follow rather than revert to a bi-polar cold war. whether through arms deals. but China. but the age of unchallenged US hegemony in the Middle East could be ending. it seems the Middle East could prove a microcosm of these international changes. If the age of American uni-polarity is coming to an end. However.co. India and Brazil will all bid for a role. trade agreements or diplomatic coups. while the economic crisis has forced the Obama administration to focus energy elsewhere. squeezing the defiant few like Syria and Saddam Hussein's Iraq. the quagmires of Iraq and Afghanistan have exposed the limits of US ambitions. While the Bush era saw the US hegemonic in the region. http://www. with Asia's share of GDP already outstripping that of the US or Europe. today's Middle East sees a power vacuum led by partial US retreat being filled by assertive regional and middle powers.

social. Edited by David Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi. and technological gains that derive from integration into the world economy. "the opportunity costs of not co-ordinating policy increase. Ikenberry emphasizes the lack of motivation: America is unlikely in the tuture to reject multilateralism and a rule-based international order.in part because of a simple logic: as global economic interdependence grows. it is rational for dominant powers to accept some limitations to their freedom of action in the form of multilateral institutions. The more economically interconnected that states become the more dependent they are for the realization of their objectives on the actions of other states. He is also coauthor of State Power and World Markets (2002) and editor of America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power(2002).19 of 154 Multilat Inevitable Multilateralism is inevitable G. American political culture stresses the importance of the rule of law as a foundation. "Economic interdependence and multilateralism American support for multilateralism is likely to be sustained _ even in the face of resistance and ideological challenges to multilateralism within the Bush administration . John Ikenberry 4 Ikenberry is the Albert G. . Second. which won the Schroeder/Jervis Award for best book in History and International Politics by the American Political Science Association. the need for multilateral coordination of policie-s also grows.43 " Multilateralism is inevitable – most authors agree unilateralism is unlikely David Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi 4 – Held is Graham Wallas Professor of Political Science @ the London School of Economics and Political Science. "American Power in the 21st Century". as global economic interdependence grows. it is easy to predict that the demands for multilateral agreements . Strategic Restraint Wid the Rebuilding of Order after Major War (2001). First. Edited by David Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi.42 Rising economic interdependence is one of the great hallmarks of the contemporary international system. essentially for three reasons." Robert Keohane argues. Milbank Professor of Politic' and International Affairs at Princeton University in both the Woodrow 'Wilson School and the Politics Department. if the stronger state accepts some restrictions on how it can use its power.even and perhaps especially by the United States . Finally. compared with the costs of sacrificing autonomy as a consequence of making binding agreements.. Pg 5-6 Most contributors to this volume are skeptical about the idea that the world is moving toward a new imperial order. "As interdependence rises. This development is considered unlikely because they see the United States as lacking the motivation and/or the capacity to establish an empire. weaker states are more likely to cooperate willingly and have less reason to resist the hegemony of the stronger state.. Over the postwar era.will increase and not decrease. “American Power in the 21st Century”. He is the author of After Victory: Institutions. the need for multilateral coordination of policies also increases. states have actively and consistently sought to open markets and reap the economic. Archibugi is Lecturer in Global Politics in the Departments of Government and International Relations of the London School of Economics and Political Science. If this remains true in the years ahead.

Edited by David Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi." . which itself reflects an older multilateral bargain between the United States and the outside world. thereby encouraging the acquiescence and cooperation of weaker states.and it suggests that the current administration should respond to general power management incentives and limit its tilt toward unilateralism.20 of 154 Heg  Multilat US hegemony results in more multilateralism G. which won the Schroeder/Jervis Award for best book in History and International Politics by the American Political Science Association. It predicts that the existing multilateral order. John Ikenberry 4 Ikenberry is the Albert G. The support for multilateralism is a way to signal restraint and commitment to other states. "American Power in the 21st Century". should rein in the Bush administration . Strategic Restraint Wid the Rebuilding of Order after Major War (2001). He is also coauthor of State Power and World Markets (2002) and editor of America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power(2002). American hegemony and multilateralism American support for multilateralism can also stem from a grand strategic interest in preserving power and creating a stable and legitimate international order.should increase rather than decrease with the rise of American unipolarity. From this perspective. multilateralism .and the search for rule-based agreements . He is the author of After Victory: Institutions.and it explains the remarkably durable and legitimate character of the existing international order. Milbank Professor of Politic' and International Affairs at Princeton University in both the Woodrow 'Wilson School and the Politics Department." This has been a strategy that the United States has pursued to a greater or lesser degree across the twentieth century .

The Soviet Union collapsed because its economic system was highly inefficient. Chinese goods compete all over the world.com/articles/2011/01/02/think_again_american_decline?page=0. In 1989. This Time It`s For Real”. it would be a big . 1.and China is the wolf.are slipping down the economic ranks. it would be absurd to pretend that China does not face major challenges. The Communist Party is unlikely to be able to maintain its monopoly on political power forever. of course. And the country's traditional dependence on exports and an undervalued currency are coming under increasing criticism from the United States and other international actors demanding a "rebalancing" of China's export-driven economy. China is also stepping in to buy the bonds of financially strapped members of the eurozone. also experienced many years of rapid economic growth and is still an export powerhouse. The Chinese challenge to the United States is more serious for both economic and demographic reasons. a fatal flaw that was disguised for a long time because the USSR never attempted to compete on world markets. China has alarming political and economic transitions to navigate. for roughly three decades. such as Brazil and South Africa. Over the long term. The Chinese are the preferred partners of many African governments and the biggest trading partner of other emerging powers. doubling in size roughly every seven years.4) AK In the end. In the 1990s. And China is only the largest part of a bigger story about the rise of new economic and political players. there is plenty of evidence that a property bubble is building in big cities like Shanghai. http://www. Japan. Turkey. America's traditional allies in Europe -.4) AK It is certainly true that when Americans are worrying about national decline. Or the votes by Turkey and Brazil against America at the United Nations on sanctions against Iran. Yet even if you factor in considerable future economic and political turbulence. which collectively constrain America's ability to shape the world. has proved its economic prowess on the global stage." But predictions of the imminent demise of the Chinese miracle have been a regular feature of Western analysis ever since it got rolling in the late 1970s. France. Think of how India and Brazil sided with China at the global climate-change talks. journalist Financial Times and formerly at The Economist – “Think Again: American Decline. The country also faces major demographic and environmental challenges: The population is aging rapidly as a result of the one-child policy. The wolf did arrive -.Britain. the Soviet and Japanese threats to American supremacy proved chimerical. In the short term. But it was never a plausible candidate to be No. and it is sitting on more than $2. The flaws in the Soviet and Japanese systems became obvious only in retrospect. But a frequently overlooked fact about that fable is that the boy was eventually proved right. Brazil.foreignpolicy. The famous projection by Goldman Sachs that China's economy will be bigger than that of the United States by 2027 was made before the 2008 economic crash. the Communist Party seemed to be staggering after the Tiananmen Square massacre. They each have their own foreign-policy preferences. That is just a taste of things to come. Its economy has been growing at 9 to 10 percent a year. "I do. Those who are confident that American hegemony will be extended long into the future point to the potential liabilities of the Chinese system. former U. of course. That was never going to happen.S. Bush suggested that China's internal problems mean that its economy will be unlikely to rival America's in the foreseeable future. February 2011. Italy. Foreign Policy Magazine. by contrast. So Americans can be forgiven if they greet talk of a new challenge from China as just another case of the boy who cried wolf. 1 well before then. In a recent interview with the Times of London. China could be No. New powers are on the rise: India.com/articles/2011/01/02/think_again_american_decline?page=0. http://www. This is no Soviet-style economic basket case. journalist Financial Times and formerly at The Economist – “Think Again: American Decline.foreignpolicy.5 trillion of foreign reserves. and inflation is on the rise. "Do I still think America will remain the sole superpower?" he asked. China's economic prowess is already allowing Beijing to challenge American influence all over the world. It is now the world's leading exporter and its biggest manufacturer. This Time It`s For Real”. they tend to overlook the weaknesses of their scariest-looking rival. economy watchers regularly pointed to the parlous state of Chinese banks and state-owned enterprises.21 of 154 Challengers Now Hegemony unsustainable – new powers are challenging America Rachman 2011 (Gideon Rachman. The Japanese population is less than half that of the United States. Foreign Policy Magazine. By contrast. on average. Yet the Chinese economy has kept growing. At the current pace. even Germany -. such as Greece and Portugal. Of course. President George W. China will overcome all obstacles – challenges the US Rachman 2011 (Gideon Rachman. February 2011. and China is threatened by water shortages and pollution. which means that the average Japanese person would have to be more than twice as rich as the average American before Japan's economy surpassed America's. China's population is more than four times that of the United States. China.

arguing that tariffs or other retaliatory measures would be a legitimate response. American leaders are right to reject zero-sum logic in public. sanctions on Iran. So much for the win-win world.com/articles/2011/01/02/think_again_american_decline?page=0. despite the gauzy rhetoric of globalization that comforted the last generation of American politicians. America's leaders are clearly beginning to have their doubts. Leading economists. China is also competing fiercely for access to resources. which is driving up global prices. The U. But that shouldn't obscure this unavoidable fact: As economic and political power moves from West to East. so it will not face turbulence and disorder on remotely the scale Germany did in the 20th century. Growing Chinese economic and military clout clearly poses a long-term threat to American hegemony in the Pacific. And when it comes to the broader geopolitical picture. power will simply disappear. foreign policy. China is counter-balancing the US now Layne. Its economy will eventually recover. and nations need not fear the success of another. Germany went through two catastrophic military defeats. But America will never again experience the global dominance it enjoyed in the 17 years between the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991 and the financial crisis of 2008. LL. but that is because both sides have nuclear weapons. it takes a great deal to throw them off course.S.S. and economy Rachman 2011 (Gideon Rachman. not because globalization has magically dissolved their differences. Foreign Policy Magazine. Larry Summers. West Germany was once again one of the world's leading economies. particularly if the new Korea still played host to U. Its military has a global presence and a technological edge that no other country can yet match. have explicitly welcomed China's rise. Jordan Professor of International Affairs at Texas A&M's George Bush School of Government and Public Service. For the United States has been acting as if the mutual interests created by globalization have repealed one of the oldest laws of international politics: the notion that rising players eventually clash with established powers. Sheer size and economic momentum mean that the Chinese juggernaut will keep rolling forward. Speaking before the 2010 World Economic Forum. And yet by the end of the 1950s. a winwin rather than a zero-sum.4) AK Successive U. rivalry between a rising China and a weakened America is now apparent across a whole range of issues. in particular oil. China is unlikely to get sucked into a world war. Ph. Obama summarized the traditional approach when he said. The Chinese reluctantly agreed to a new package of U. such as New York Times columnist Paul Krugman and the Peterson Institute's C. drive to deal with "global economic imbalances" was essentially thwarted by China's obdurate refusal to change its currency policy. We are on a collision course with China – military. This Time It`s For Real”. troops. and rightly so.… We welcome China's efforts to play a greater role on the world stage. It is mercifully unlikely that the United States and China would ever actually go to war. presidents. have taken a similar line.D. the world of the future looks even more like a zero-sum game. http://www. the collapse of democracy. the Great Depression. It is a central tenet of modern economics that trade is mutually beneficial for both partners.S. no matter what obstacles lie in its path. new international rivalries are inevitably emerging. February 2011. At the G-20 summit in November. But that implies the rules of the game aren't rigged.N. hyperinflation. The analogy to the rise of Germany from the mid-19th century onward is instructive.22 of 154 mistake to assume that the Chinese challenge to U. from territorial disputes in Asia to human rights. but the cost of securing Chinese agreement was a weak deal that is unlikely to derail the Iranian nuclear program. Fred Bergsten. In a nuclear age.M. Once countries get the hang of economic growth. And whatever economic and political difficulties it does experience will not be enough to stop the country's rise to great-power status. To do anything else would needlessly antagonize the Chinese. government clearly thinks that China's undervaluation of its currency is a form of protectionism that has led to global economic imbalances and job losses in the United States. journalist Financial Times and formerly at The Economist – “Think Again: American Decline. in Political Science from the University of California. Both sides have taken part in the talks with North Korea. remarked pointedly that the normal rules about the mutual benefits of trade do not necessarily apply when one trading partner is practicing mercantilist or protectionist policies.foreignpolicy. and the destruction of its major cities and infrastructure by Allied bombs." But whatever they say in formal speeches. in . Those days are over. from the first Bush to Obama.-China standoff. albeit shorn of its imperial ambitions. In fact. then Obama's chief economic advisor.S. "Power does not need to be a zero-sum game. Just before his first visit to China. 09 – Mary Julia and George R. but a barely submerged rivalry prevents truly effective Sino-American cooperation. China does not like Kim Jong Il's regime. but it is also very wary of a reunified Korea on its borders.S. the U. The United States still has formidable strengths.S. The 2009 climate-change talks in Copenhagen ended in disarray after another U.

Chinese military and political doctrine holds that China should rule the waves out to the second island chain of the western Pacific.]. International Security. in early 2009.html) The US is developing an air-sea battle concept to counter China's military buildup. is the poster child for Asia’s rise. and much sooner than many expect[.D. advanced fighter aircraft. essentially dividing the Pacific between the US and China and ending US hegemony on that ocean. 17-18. surveillance and target acquisition. No. p. July 6th 2010." All of this has US military planners and thinkers worried.48 Unsurprisingly. a conservative Washington think tank. Zakaria contend.S. http://oilprice.S. unmanned aerial vehicles. and. to a point." said Admiral Gary Roughead. Khanna. which already has overtaken the United States as the world’s leading manufacturer—a crown the United States wore for more than a century. which extends as far as Guam and New Guinea.S.49 Their analysis.” National Interest Online. "The Waning of U. or Washington undertakes actions to offset or counterbalance the effects of the PLA’s military buildup. and the two most important indicators of whether this is happening are relative growth rates and shares of world GDP. then.aspx?id=20484) . and they dismiss the idea that China could become a viable counterweight to a hegemonic United States within any meaningful time frame.) PDF Toward multipolarity? The ascent of new great powers would be the strongest evidence of multipolarization. and ballistic and cruise missiles. China's People's Liberation Army is building up anti-access and area-denial capabilities with the apparent goal of extending their power to the western half of the Pacific Ocean. For sure. is static. The Chinese also have an emerging and muscular deep-water navy. “Empire Falls. (Peter A. how-ever. Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. but in 2008 it revised the time frame to 2028. advanced radar systems..23 of 154 International Law from Virginia Law. chief of US naval operations. at a recent speech hosted by the Heritage Foundation." Counterbalancing inevitable – multiple factors Pape 2k9 (Robert A. "Unless Beijing diverts from its current course of action.47 The shift of economic clout to East Asia is important because it could propel China’s ascent—thus hastening the relative decline of U. Among the anti-access/area-denial (A2AD) capabilities being fielded by China include antisatellite weapons. however. 1-2209. hegemony.nationalinterest. Summer 2009. of course. electromagnetic weapons. global economic power is flowing from the United States and Europe to Asia. 34. Khanna. Hegemony—Myth or Reality? A Review Essay". "The PLA navy is increasing its numbers of submarines and other ships. Galileo. power—and also because emerging regional multipolarity could trigger future major power war.S military strength Buxbaum. But political problems and budgetary woes could kill the program before it ever gets started.52 And.com/Geo-Politics/International/Chinese-Plans-to-End-USHegemony-in-the-Pacific. and (implicitly) Mahbubani and Zakaria—agree that China is the rising power most likely to challenge U. the Economist Intelligence Unit predicted that China’s GDP would surpass the United States’ in 2021. 51 China also may overtake the United States in GDP in the next ten to fifteen years. the United States still has an impressive lead in the categories they measure. J. the trend lines appear to favor China. Vol. there are indications that the unipolar era is drawing to a close. from USC. 10 Analyst @ ISN Security Watch.50 Looking ahead.. Brooks and Wohlforth are skeptical about China’s rise. Mahbubani. and that the coming decades could witness a power transition.. its allies and partners: acquiesce in a dramatic shift in the military balance or take steps to preserve it. In 2003 Goldman Sachs predicted that China would pass the United States in GDP by 2041. and many analysts— including the NIC. there is evidence that as the NIC. perhaps to prohibitive levels.This situation creates a strategic choice for the United States. The A2AD buildup threatens the US forward presence and power projection in the region." said a report recently released by the Washington-based Center for Budgetary and Strategic Assessments. China’s already challenging U. “Chinese Plans to End US Hegemony in the Pacific”.53 Empirically. spaced-based reconnaissance. China.org/Article. and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute (Christopher.46 Here. 1. "the cost incurred by the US military to operate in the [w]estern Pacific will likely rise sharply. http://www. "Navies tend to grow with economies and as trade becomes more important.

China and other major powers could seriously oppose American military power. all believe the principal feature of the post-cold-war world is the unchallengeable dominance of American power. Since the cold war. Imperial China. For the past eight years. Over time. the period of U. but is so relatively more powerful than any other country that it can reshape the international order according to American interests. America’s declining power means that the unipolar world is indeed coming to an end. power is heavily dependent on the size and quality of its military forces and other current power assets.S. If present trends continue. As Paul Kennedy so ably describes in his classic The Rise and Fall of Great Powers. but pursued ambitious objectives in all three major regions at the same time—waging wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Russia. further decline in the foreseeable future. but in recent years American leaders have pursued far more ambitious goals than merely maintaining the status quo. The self-inflicted wounds of the Iraq War. seeking to ensure peace and stability not just in its own neighborhood— the Americas—but also in Europe and Asia. It is also how much power a state has relative to other states. grand strategy are necessary to prevent the decline in America’s global position from accelerating. A Ford Explorer is a powerful vehicle—unless it collides with a Mack Truck. The United States is not just the sole superpower in the unipolar-dominance school’s world. This is simply no longer realistic. Venice. There is also good reason to think that. however.1 But it is not only how much power a state has that matters. the rise and fall of great nations has been driven primarily by relative economic strength. we will look back at the Bush administration years as the death knell for American hegemony.S. A healthy appreciation of our situation by American leaders may lead to policies that could mitigate. France. that major powers will increasingly have the strength to balance against U. the United States has maintained a vast array of overseas commitments. our policies have been based on these flawed arguments. To be sure. increasingly negative current-account balances and other internal economic weaknesses have cost the United States real power in today’s world of rapidly spreading knowledge and technology. seeking to denuclearize North Korea and expanding America’s military allies in Europe up to the borders of Russia itself. if not rectify. A successful grand strategy. must work for the long haul and so depends on the power a state is able to produce in the future. U. those convinced of U. Great Britain and the Soviet Union to the United States today. even to academicians like Dartmouth’s William Wohlforth and Stephen Brooks. Still. al-Qaeda’s new sanctuary in western Pakistan. .S. Productive capacity—defined by indicators such as wealth. the fall of American power will be more precipitous with the passage of time. power certainly helps. along with the oil-rich Persian Gulf (as well as other parts of the world). economy in the world—has been in decline since early on in the Bush administration. Most important. fairly short. solutions to each of them individually and all of them collectively will be heavily influenced by America’s reduced power position in the world. the most important of which are to defend its national interests. The Bush administration has not just continued America’s traditional grand strategy. the more its power matters and hence the more relative economic strength it needs. Although scholars have long debated its nuances.S. policies they oppose and that the United States will increasingly face harsh foreign-policy choices. both at home and abroad. virtually discounting the possibility that Germany. America’s power is fundamentally a result of its economic strength. without deliberate action. This is true in any rough-and-tumble environment. power does not ensure success. From public intellectuals like Charles Krauthammer and Niall Ferguson to neoconservatives like Paul Wolfowitz and Robert Kagan. In international politics.S. For nearly two decades. dominance in the international system have encouraged American policy makers to act unilaterally and seize almost any opportunity to advance American interests no matter the costs to others. Although the immediate problems of war in Iraq and Afghanistan. America’s shrinking share of world economic production is a fact of life and important changes in U. growing government debt. relative decline has been. Spain. while the ultimate foundation of American power—the relative superiority of the U. Simply maintaining these commitments requires enormous resources.24 of 154 AMERICA IS in unprecedented decline. Iran’s continued nuclear program and Russia’s recent military adventure in Georgia are high-priority issues. FROM ROME. But. thus far. our own hubris may be our downfall. the more international commitments a state has.S. France. the basic definition of power in international politics is simple: power is the aggregate resources a state has at its disposal to achieve its aims. At any given moment. Like so many great powers that have come and gone before.

25 of 154 technology and population size—is a prerequisite for building and modernizing military forces. The United States, like any state, may choose to vary the degree to which its productive capacities are used to create military assets. But it is the economy as a whole that constrains the choice. And the size of the economy relative to potential rivals ultimately determines the limits of power in international politics. Major assessments of this relative position have long turned heavily on a single
statistic: America’s share of world economic product. Advocates of extending America’s unipolar dominance are well aware of the central importance of the economic foundations of American power and routinely present detailed statistics on the U.S. share of world product. The basic notion is simple: take U.S. domestic product in any year and divide it by the aggregate total of the gross domestic product of all states in the world. To measure gross domestic product, the unipolar-dominance school prefers to compare every country’s output in current-year U.S. dollars, a method that tends to show America is much further ahead of other countries than alternative measures. Indeed, the most recent call for America to exploit its hegemonic position (published in 2008) rests on the presumption of U.S. dominance based on the current-year dollar figures.2 By this metric, in 2006 the United States had 28 percent of world product while its nearest most likely competitor, China, had 6 percent. Looks pretty good for America, right? Alas,

single-year “snapshots” of America’s relative power are of limited value for assessing the sustainability of its grand strategy over many years. For grand-strategic concerns—especially how well the United States can balance its resources and foreign-policy commitments—the trajectory of American power compared to other states is of seminal importance. For the sake of argument, let us start with the unipolar-dominance school’s preferred measure of American hegemony, but look at the trajectory of the data over time. According to GDP figures in current U.S. dollars
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United States increased its share of world production during the 1990s, reached its apogee in 2000, and then began to steadily lose ground during the eight years of the Bush administration, with its relative power ultimately falling by nearly a quarter in the first decade of the twenty-first century. At the same time, the relative power of China, the state many consider America’s most likely future rival, has grown consistently. If we look out as far as the IMF can see

(2013), things get even worse—with the United States expected to continue declining and China to continue rising. The United States has been going through the first decade of the twenty-first century not stronger than
before, but substantially weaker. How good are the numbers? Economists commonly use two other methods to calculate GDP, constant-dollar calculations and purchasing power parity.3 Although each offers advantages and disadvantages, for our purposes what matters is that they form a lower bound of America’s relative decline. And regardless of the metric, the trend is the same. Again using IMF figures, Table 2 shows the trajectory of the share of world product for the United States and China using both alternative measures. Simply put, the United States is now a declining power. This new reality has tremendous implications

for the future of American grand strategy. THE EROSION of the underpinnings of U.S. power is the result of uneven rates of economic growth between America, China and other states in the world. Despite all the pro-economy talk from the Bush administration, the fact is that since 2000, U.S. growth rates are down
almost 50 percent from the Clinton years. This trajectory is almost sure to be revised further downward as the consequences of the financial crisis in fall 2008 become manifest. As Table 3 shows, over the past two decades, the average rate of U.S. growth has fallen considerably, from nearly 4 percent annually during the Clinton years to just over 2 percent per year under Bush. At the same time,

China has sustained a consistently high rate of growth of 10 percent per year—a truly stunning performance. Russia has also turned its economic trajectory around, from year after year of losses in the 1990s to significant annual gains since 2000. Worse, America’s decline was well under way before the economic downturn, which is likely to only further weaken U.S. power. As

the most recent growth estimates (November 2008) by the IMF make clear, although all major countries are suffering economically, China and Russia are expected to continue growing at a substantially greater rate than the United States. True, the United States has not lost its position as the most innovative country in the world, with more patents each year than in all other countries combined. However, the ability to diffuse new technology—to turn chalkboard ideas into mass-produced

applications—has been spreading rapidly across many parts of the globe, and with it the ultimate sources of state power—productive capacities. America is losing its overwhelming technological dominance in the leading industries of the knowledge economy. In past eras—the “age of
iron” and the “age of steel”—leading states retained their technological advantages for many decades.4 As Fareed Zakaria describes in his recent book, The Post-American World, technology and knowledge diffuse more quickly today, and their rapid global diffusion is a profound factor driving down America’s power compared to other countries. For instance, although the United States

remains well ahead of China on many indicators of leading technology on a per capita basis, this grossly under-weights the size of the knowledge economy in China compared to America. Whereas
in 2000, the United States had three times the computer sales, five times the internet users and forty times the broadband subscribers as China, in 2008, the Chinese have caught or nearly caught up with Americans in every category in the aggregate.5 The fact that the United States remains ahead of China on a per capita basis does matter—it means that China, with more

than four times the U.S. population, can create many more knowledge workers in the future.

26 of 154

Heg Low (1/2)
American hegemony is a myth – we don’t have sufficient ground forces to project power
Mearshimer, 06 (John Mearsheimer, Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. "Conversations in International Relations - Interview with John J. Mearsheimer (Part I)," International Relations, Vol. 20, No. 1 (2006), pp. 105-124. http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0039.pdf) I think that many commentators and security experts overestimate the power of the United States. Despite all the talk about global hegemony, it is especially difficult to dominate the entire planet, not only because it is very large, but also because it is necessary to project power over large bodies of water, which is a formidable task. For sure, the United States is a hegemon in the western hemisphere. That is because the Americas are its backyard and because there is no state in the region that has the military power to stand up to the United States in a war. But dominating the rest of the globe is virtually impossible at this point in time. To accomplish that end, the United States would need immense power projection capabilities and lots more land power or boots on the ground than it now has or is likely to have anytime soon. I have a chapter in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics titled ‘The Primacy of Land Power’, where I explain why armies and the forces that support them are the core ingredients of military power. The Bush Administration made a fatal blunder in this regard. It assumed that it could use sophisticated aircraft with precision guided munitions and small ground forces to reorder the Middle East, and maybe even the whole world. Instead of relying on big battalions, the United States was going to shock and awe its way to victory. Iraq was supposed to be the first of many great triumphs. There was even much talk about creating an American empire in the Middle East. This whole scheme was delusional from the start, because there was no way that the United States could succeed in Iraq without a large army. Any state bent on reordering the world at the end of a rifle barrel better have an abundance of land power, because that task is not going to be accomplished on the cheap. The United States, however, does not have and will not have in our lifetime anywhere near enough soldiers to dominate the globe the way it dominates the western hemisphere. The unipolar moment never was and probably never will be.

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Heg Low (2/2)
U.S. power in decline
Parag Khanna 2008 (Senior Research Fellow and Director, Global Governance Initiative, New America Initiative, January 28, , New York Times Magazine, “Waving Goodbye to Hegemony,” http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2008/waving_goodbye_hegemony_6604)

There are plenty of statistics that will still tell the story of America's global dominance: our military spending, our share of the global economy and the like. But there are statistics, and there are trends. To really understand how quickly American power is in decline around the world, I've spent the past two years traveling in some 40 countries in the five most strategic regions of the planet -- the countries of the second world. They are not in the first-world core of the global economy, nor in its third-world periphery. Lying alongside and between the Big Three, second-world countries are the swing states that will determine which of the superpowers has the upper hand for the next generation of geopolitics. From Venezuela to Vietnam and Morocco to Malaysia, the new reality of global affairs is that there is not one way to win allies and influence countries but three: America's coalition (as in "coalition of the willing"), Europe's consensus and China's consultative styles. The geopolitical marketplace will decide which will lead the 21st century. The key second-world countries in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, South America, the Middle East and Southeast Asia are more than just "emerging markets." If you include China, they hold a majority of the world's foreign-exchange reserves and savings, and their spending power is making them the global economy's most important new consumer markets and thus engines of global growth -- not replacing the United States but not dependent on it either. I.P.O.'s from the so-called BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China) alone accounted for 39 percent of the volume raised globally in 2007, just one indicator of second-world countries' rising importance in corporate finance -- even after you subtract China. When Tata of India is vying to buy Jaguar, you know the landscape of power has changed. Second-world countries are also fast becoming hubs for oil and timber, manufacturing and services, airlines and infrastructure -- all this in a geopolitical marketplace that puts their loyalty up for grabs to any of the Big Three, and increasingly to all of them at the same time. Second-world states won't be subdued: in the age of network power, they won't settle for being mere export markets. Rather, they are the places where the Big Three must invest heavily and to which they must relocate productive assets to maintain influence.

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09 -.) THE MILITARY foundations of the United States' global dominance are eroding. Meanwhile. one that is better suited for the types of irregular conflicts now being waged in Afghanistan and Iraq. Ph." in the language of defense strategists.. an overwhelming advantage in technology and resources has given the U. including East Asia and the Persian Gulf. "It would be irresponsible not to think about and prepare for the future. they are already starting to disappear. and hostile states. . Secretary of Defense Robert Gates argued in these pages for a more "balanced" U.S. The diffusion of advanced military technologies. This has allowed it to guarantee U.S. and underwrite security commitments around the globe. combined with the continued rise of new powers. thereby increasing the prospect of strategic surprises.S. July 1st 2009. http://www. will make it progressively more expensive in blood and treasure--perhaps prohibitively expensive-for U.S. Several events in recent years have demonstrated that traditional means and methods of projecting power and accessing the global commons are growing increasingly obsolete-becoming "wasting assets. “The Pentagon's wasting assets: the eroding foundations of American power”. Foreign Affairs. assure the safety of the homeland. he also cautioned. Recently. For the past several decades. forces to carry out their missions in areas of vital interest. military an unmatched ability to project power worldwide. the U. access to the global commons. from Harvard University and President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (Andrew F.com/coms2/summary_028638273632_ITM. such as Iran.S. In fact. military. military's long-unfettered access to the global commons--including space and cyberspace--is being increasingly challenged. such as China.S. policymakers are discounting real future threats.D.Professor of International Relations and History at Boston University. Military forces that do deploy successfully will find it increasingly difficult to defend what they have been sent to protect. U.29 of 154 AT: Best Military Sustains Our military is deteriorating and their authors don’t assume future threats Krepinevich." Despite this admonition. U.accessmylibrary. However. grand strategy assumes that such advantages will continue indefinitely.S. What is needed is nothing short of a fundamental strategic review of the United States' position in the world--one similar in depth and scope to those undertaken in the early days of the Cold War.

which the realists have been anticipating for more than 15 years now -.has simply not occurred. “Still the Colossus”. It is bending over backward to show support for the mission in be a strategic partner as it was during the Cold War. Germany's Afghanistan. even with an administration they allegedly despise. Europeans would be taking more urgent steps to strengthen the European Union's hand to check it. meaningful number of troops. Bush's United States. Nor are Europeans refusing to cooperate. For Eastern and Central Europe. January 15th 2006. But if they really feared American power." Despite global opinion polls registering broad hostility to George W. Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment For International Peace and Adjunct Professor of History at Georgetown University (Robert. It even trumpets its willingness to train Iraqi soldiers. in Europe the idea has all but vanished. most notably by continuing to supply a small but. http://www. indicating agreement with the American view that China is a potential strategic concern.) The striking thing about the present international situation is the degree to which America remains what Bill Clinton once called "the indispensable nation. the growing threat is Russia. 06 – PhD from American University. Both trends are primarily the result of internal European politics. Nevertheless. the current trend is toward closer cooperation. and the big question remains what it was in the 1990s: Who will be invited to join NATO? . in German terms. the behavior of governments and political leaders suggests America's position in the world is not all that different from what it was before Sept. The Washington Post. while still dissenting from U.org/publications/index. The much-anticipated global effort to balance against American hegemony -. not America. European Union defense budgets continue their steady decline. Chancellor Angela Merkel promises to work closely with Washington on the question of the China arms embargo. because Western Europeans no longer feel threatened and therefore do not seek American protection. 11 and the Iraq war.cfm?fa=view&id=17894&prog=zgp&proj=zusr. Western Europe will not new government.30 of 154 AT: Soft Power Sustains Soft power is irrelevant to hegemony Kagan. is working hard and ostentatiously to improve relations. On the contrary.carnegieendowment.S. and even the project of creating a common foreign and defense policy has slowed if not stalled. policy in Iraq.

the United Nations itself last week called for a new global reserve currency to end dollar supremacy. Gulf Arabs are planning -. Japan and France." added Juckes. 09 (“US facing massive economic ‘power shift’ with dollar’s downward spiral”.along with China. as long as the US economy is not strong enough for any rise in interest rates to be conceivable for a long time. The Raw Story. including Kuwait. under the front-page headline "The Demise of the Dollar". The Independent. unified currency planned for nations in the Gulf Co-operation Council.to end dollar dealings for oil. "The US dollar is being hurt by the continued talk of a shift away from a dollar-centric world." GFT Global Markets analyst David Morrison told AFP." wrote The Independent's Middle East correspondent Robert Fisk. Sha Zukang." Even so. But last week the finance chief was left to watch as traders used The Independent's report as an opportunity to push lower the troubled US unit. which had allowed the United States the "privilege" of building up a huge trade deficit. gold and a new." added Fisk. Following the summit. an analyst at currency traders ECU Group. citing Gulf Arab and Chinese banking sources. Qatar and Russia. were considering replacing the dollar as the currency for oil deals. "Three conclusions stand out very clearly. And finally. Meanwhile at a G20 summit in Pittsburgh last month. Firstly. the euro. the dollar's underlying downtrend will remain in place. Abu Dhabi. October 11th 2009. The report was denied by a host of countries." Zukang was speaking at the annual meetings of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank.31 of 154 AT: Economy Sustains Every indicator goes our way – economic power is declining Agence France-Presse. US Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner repeated Washington's commitment to a strong dollar. the shift in economic power away from the G7 economies is continuing. world leaders unveiled a new vision for economic governance. Japan and France -. They would switch "to a basket of currencies including the Japanese yen and Chinese yuan. Russia and Gulf States are among nations prepared to ditch the dollar for oil trades has heightened the uncertainty surrounding the US currency's future.com/2009/10/us-facing-massive-economic-power-shift-with-dollars-downward-spiral/) The dollar's position as the world's leading reserve currency faces increased pressure as the financial crisis allows emerging economies greater influence on the world stage. http://rawstory. "Secondly. whose President Robert Zoellick recently warned that the United States should not "take for granted" the dollar's role as preeminent global reserve currency. The report "has helped concentrate the minds of traders and investors alike. there is a growing acceptance amongst those winners that one consequence of this power shift will be to strengthen their currencies". . Russia." said Kit Juckes. Kuwait and Qatar. analysts said. and has given them another excuse to take the dollar lower. reported last Tuesday that Gulf states. A report last week in The Independent claiming that China. while France dismissed it as "pure speculation. together with China. with bold plans to fix global imbalances and give more clout to emerging giants such as China and India. including Saudi Arabia. Russia. The dollar slumped against rivals last week in the wake of the British daily's controversial report. UN undersecretary-general for economic and social affairs. "In the most profound financial change in recent Middle East history. said "important progress in managing imbalances can be made by reducing the (dollar) reserve currency country's 'privilege' to run external deficits in order to provide international liquidity.

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Empirically proven – counterbalancing not a threat to US heg. Yale University M. the aspiring counterbalancer will have to confront not just the capabilities of the unipolar state. Location matters . regional integration. position as an offshore power determines the nature and likely longevity of unipolarity.pdf) The key. 1. Vol 24. Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund A.ksg. political science. As a result. If things go poorly. Local balances of power may loom larger in the calculations of other states than the background unipolar structure. the U. 28. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University.edu/files/wohlforthvol24no1. 99 (William C. 99 (William C. This massive power gap implies that any countervailing change must be strong and sustained to produce structural effects.harvard. Ph. is that the countercoalitions of the past—on which most of our empirical knowledge of alliance politics is based—formed against centrally located land powers (France. or the differential growth in power. the Atlantic. B. International Security.33 of 154 Heg Sustainable (1/2) Heg is sustainable – power gap too large and protected location. bandwagon. They propose three ways in which unipolarity will end: counterbalancing by other states. http://belfercenter..or multipolarity to reappear quickly. “The Stability of a Unipolar World.A. but also those of its other great power allies. Vol 24.D.harvard. The fact that Soviet power happened to be situated in the heart of Eurasia was a key condition of bipolarity.pdf) Unipolarity rests on two pillars. Wohlforth. in International Relations.. Yale University. and it may not even be the most important one for many states. M.” MIT Press. and the Pacific. The balance of power between the sole pole and the second-tier states is not the only one that matters. Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund A. All of the aspiring poles face a problem the .Phil. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. in International Relations. Efforts to produce a counterbalance globally will generate powerful countervailing action locally. Ph. Just as the raw numbers could not capture the real dynamics of bipolarity. in International Relations. http://belfercenter.S. No. in Political Science. Yale University.D. In addition to all the other advantages the United States possesses. Yale University M.A. Daniel Webster Professor of Government. 1. Even a declining offshore unipolar state will have unusually wide opportunities to play divide and rule. No. Mexico. None of these is likely to generate structural change in the policy-relevant future.Phil. “The Stability of a Unipolar World. M. B. Summer 1999. in Political Science. Wohlforth. Summer 1999.A. Wohlforth.D. Beloit College. pp. many scholars expect bi. and the Soviet Union) that constituted relatively unambiguous security threats to their neighbors. however. Germany. the threshold concentration of power necessary to sustain unipolarity is lower than most scholars assume. Wohlforth. Yale University. Yale University. 29-30.A.D. in International Relations.edu/files/wohlforthvol24no1. Because they fail to appreciate the sheer size and comprehensiveness of the power gap and the advantages conveyed by geography. Similarly. International Security. Coordinating a counterbalance against an offshore state that has already achieved unipolar status will be much more difficult. Beloit College. Ph. we must also consider its four truest allies: Canada. political science. p. Any second-tier state seeking to counterbalance has to contend with the existing pro-U.” MIT Press.ksg. Daniel Webster Professor of Government. Ph. The second pillar—geography—is just as important.S. I have already established the first: the sheer size and comprehensiveness of the power gap separating the United States from other states. power indexes alone cannot capture the importance of the fact that the United States is in North America while all the other potential poles are in or around Eurasia.

the United States’ first move in any counterbalancing game of this sort could be to try to promote such pivotal states to great power status. as it did with China against the Soviet Union in the latter days of the Cold War. in each region there are smaller “pivotal states” that make natural U.34 of 154 United States does not: great power neighbors that could become crucial U. .S. allies against an aspiring regional power. allies the moment an unambiguous challenge to Washington’s preeminence emerges. Indeed.S. In addition.

Vol 24. to pronounce the United States’ decline in the 1980s. The rush to proclaim the return of multipolarity in the 1960s and 1970s. power.A. No. M.Phil. in International Relations.ksg. 1. Ph. Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund A. to herald the rise of Japan or China as superpowers in the 1980s and 1990s. analysts changed reference points to minimize U.35 of 154 Heg Sustainable (2/2) Unipolarity is a movement – not easily derailed. . so any disagreement between the United States and Europe was seen as a harbinger of multipolarity. Yale University. Ph. each act of defiance of Washington’s preferences on any issue comes to be seen as the return of a multipolar world. And unipolarity is not a “moment. In the bipolarity debate. 37-38. Even if world politics works by the old rules—even if democracy. B. and finally to bid unipolarity adieu after the Cold War are all examples. new forms of interdependence. Yale University M.pdf) The distribution of material capabilities at the end of the twentieth century is unprecedented. International Security. In each case.S. As a result. Many analysts have come to define unipolarity as an imperial system such as Rome where there is only one great power and all other states are satrapies or dependencies. why do so many writers hasten to declare its demise? The answer may lie in the common human tendency to conflate power trends with existing relationships. If unipolarity is so robust. http://belfercenter. political science. “hegemony” was deªned as “the U.” so the recovery of Europe and Japan appeared as fatal threats to the United States’ position. the current concentration of power in the United States is something new in the world. Wohlforth. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. In the 1980s. Summer 1999. in International Relations. in Political Science. Wohlforth. pp. Yale University. position circa 1946. Beloit College. Daniel Webster Professor of Government.D.” MIT Press.edu/files/wohlforthvol24no1.S.D..” It is a deeply embedded material condition of world politics that has the potential to last for many decades.harvard. 99 (William C. However we view this venerable explanatory variable.A. the reference point became the extremely tight alliance of the 1950s. “The Stability of a Unipolar World. and international institutions do not matter— we should not expect a return of balance-of-power politics à la multipolarity for the simple reason that we are living in the modern world’s first unipolar system.

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where further increases in the major state’s relative power no longer compensate for the defection of its allies and the mobilization of neutral states into the enemy coalition. . Neutral states realize that the moment has come to take sides. Beyond that threshold.” International Security. especially if one side should defeat the other. Meanwhile. (Davide. History at the University of Bologna. This result stems from a structural disequilibrium between allied relations. Further increases tilt the balance in favor of the major power’s rivals. power maximization and security maximization become incompatible goals. its allies and that further increases in its power become gradually less useful. In the meantime. the control that the major partner exercises over its allies becomes stronger. When the state’s coalition is able to effectively discourage aggression. because they thought in terms of absolute.38 of 154 Bad – Generic Hegemony and increases in military power result in backlash Fiammenghi 11. and some will leave the alliance. so that it can accommodate the evolution of technology and the eventuality that an arms race could frustrate a state’s expansionist efforts. The security threshold corresponds to the quantity of power that Waltz calls “appropriate” for a state to be secure in an anarchic international system. “The Security Curve and the Structure of International Politics. there is no amount of absolute power that can guarantee a state’s security once and for all. not relative. At some point. This threshold represents the maximum amount of power a state can accumulate before further increases begin to reduce its security. The flow of defectors encourages the major power’s rivals. the game is no longer worth the candle for the allies: the threat posed by their enemies is relatively less significant than the threat of growing control posed by their major partner. and relations with enemies and neutrals. which acquire new energy. The concept of balancing necessarily implies that there is a maximum amount of power that a state can accumulate to achieve maximum security. Further increases in the major partner’s power will exacerbate differences with its allies. power. The apex of the parabola corresponds to an implicit concept in realist balance of power theory: the security threshold. leaving them with little choice but submission. on the one hand. Institutions. Spring 2011.30 Obviously. the gains that a state accrues from further increases in its power will start to diminish. The concept must be understood in a relative sense. postdoctoral fellow in the Department of Politics. neutral states begin to reflect on the costs of their neutrality.org/doi/pdf/10. leaving the aspiring hegemon less secure than before.) http://www. The situation eventually reaches a tipping point.1162/ISEC_a_00037 Beyond a certain point. on the other.mitpressjournals. Classical realists did not make this point explicitly. A parabola nicely illustrates the relationship between power and security that I have just described.

therefore.S. both superpowers exercised considerable control over their major allies and thus were at minimal risk of being chain-ganged into a conflict—that is. A good illustration is the current Taipei regime's flirtation with declaring the island's independence fromChina—a move that Beijing says would compel a forcible Chinese re-sponse—which poses a real danger that the United States could be ensnared in a major war by the risk taking behavior of its Taiwanese client state. many countries other than the primary actors could be affected by such a conflict. during the cold war the respective U. In any case. hollow. it is becoming quite real. 09 – American Military University (Lee. the strategic context affecting extended deterrence has shifted against the United States in other ways."29This comment illustrates an important point:: Taiwan matters more to China than it does to Washington (and one hopes Los Angeles matters more to U. therefore. today.org/eCommons/Hunkovic. because U. whose actions will determine its eventual outcome.28 As China's military power—conventional and nuclear—increases. Taiwan and the United States has the potential to escalate into a nuclear conflict and a third world war. In a showdown over Taiwan. For one thing.39 of 154 Bad – China War Heg leads to draw-in to Taiwan war – alliance guarantees Layne 6 Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 167-8 Since the cold war. the po-tential risks to the United States of coming to Taiwan's (or Japan's) defensealso are increasing. Australia. and the U. Moreover. which increases the chances for conflict. in which the United States and China are the two most dominant members. Beijing. however. would be engaged in direct deterrence to prevent U. China. there are few countries in the world that will not be economically and/or militarily affected by it. nuclear deterrent there-fore could not prevent Beijing from using force against Taiwan. including Japan. of course. as well as the Pacific and even into India. . other countries will not be considered in this study. there is a real risk of the United States being dragged into a war because of a protected state's irresponsible behavior. Taiwan and United States are the primary actors in this scenario. as well as all other countries in the world that participate in the global economy.pdf) A war between China. “The Chinese-Taiwanese Conflict. both Koreas.officials than does Taipei). intervention in what it regards as an internal Chinese matter. China now was a nuclear power. During the crisis—which China provoked by conducting intimidatingmilitary exercises in an attempt to influence Taiwan's presidential elections—a Chinese official said that unlike the Formosa Strait crises during the1950s. the possibility exists that they could then plan to attack Japan and begin a policy of aggressive expansionism in East and Southeast Asia.S. The spring 1996 crisis between China and Taiwan is illusive. and Soviet spheres were demarcated clearly.S. However. which reduced the chances for a superpower clash.lampmethod.S. getting dragged into a war in which their own interests were not directly implicated because of the actions of an ally or client. if China and the United States engage in a full-scale conflict. If China were able to successfully annex Taiwan. the United Stateswould be engaged in extended deterrence to prevent China from attacking. Beijing's 1996 threat was. because states increasingly have greater latitude to pursue theirown foreign and security policy agendas than was the case during the coldwar.S.” http://www. In addition. but now that China is on the verge of possessing a survivable nuclear retaliatory capability. Russia. instead of the cold war's clearly delineated spheres of influence.27ln contrast. East Asia's likely flash-points are contested gray areas. if they were drawn into the war.decision makers "care more about Los Angeles than they do about 'Taiwan. India and Great Britain. which could in turn create an international standoff and deployment of military forces to contain the threat. China-Taiwan war escalates globally and goes nuclear Hunkovic.

however. If the United States continues to aim at upholding its current primacy. ISBN 0415952034. Published by Routledge. Whether Washington and Beijing actually come to blows. however. 73-74 ] To be sure.40 of 154 XTN: China War Primacy is a collision course with China – conflict inevitable Layne 7 Christopher LAYNE. the lesson of history is that the emergence of new great powers in the international system leads to conflict." American Empire: A Debate. this does not mean that the United States and China inevitably are on a collision course that will culminate in the next decade or two in a war. the United States should not ignore the potential strategic ramifications of China’s arrival on the world stage as a great power. . Sino-American conflict is virtually certain. After all. not peace. the notion—propagated by Beijing—that China’s will be a “peaceful rise” is just as fanciful as claims by American policy-makers that China has no need to build up its military capabilities because it is unthreatened by any other state. p. because the United States has the “last clear chance” to adopt a grand strategy that will serve its interests in balancing Chinese power without running the risk of an armed clash with [end page 73] Beijing. On this score. Still. Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute. 2007 ["The Case Against the American Empire. depends largely on what strategy the United States chooses to adopt toward China.

S. and thereby overreach themselves. on its present course.amconmag.S. will not suffer the same fate as previous hegemonic powers. The British found out toward the end of the 19th century that a seemingly unassailable international power position can melt away with unexpected rapidity. Counter-balancing will quickly erode US dominance Layne 3 Christopher Layne. October 6 2003. The cumulative costs of fighting —or preparing to fight—guerilla wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. suffers setbacks in future conflicts. Don’t bet on it.html] As for the argument that the U. 2003 [The American Conservative. Over time. possibly in a failed Pakistan.com/10_06_03/cover.S. Perhaps the proponents of America’s imperial ambitions are right and the U. they are tempted to use it repeatedly.” Hegemons have lots of power and because there is no countervailing force to stop them. North Korea). the United States seems fated to succumb to the “hegemon’s temptation. history reminds us that things change fast in international politics. . for example in a war with China over Taiwan.41 of 154 Bad – Counterbalancing US hegemony risks a geopolitical backlash. regional powers (Iran. The very fact of America’s overwhelming power is bound to produce a geopolitical backlash—which is why it’s only a short step from the celebration of imperial glory to the recessional of imperial power. http://www. Indeed. is too mighty to be counter-balanced. this hegemonic muscle-flexing has a price. and rising great powers like China could erode America’s relative power—especially if the U. asymmetric conflicts against terrorists (in the Philippines. Member of Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy. and elsewhere). The Cost of Empire.

Establishing an early warning system for these diseases—exactly what we lacked in the case of SARS a few years ago and exactly what we lack for avian flu today—will require a significant level of intervention into the very places that don’t want it.S. Foreign Policy. (Steven. including the World Health Organization. and several years of mounting hysteria about avian flu. That will be true as long as international intervention means American interference. January-February 2007. As long as the United States remains the world’s lone superpower.42 of 154 Bad – Disease Preeminence makes solving diseases like bird flu impossible – only multipolarity reduces global resentment enough to allow for responses to pandemics Weber et. that feel threatened by American power. America can’t change that alone. These are often the same countries. Matthew Kroenig. Bacteria can reproduce a new generation in less than 30 minutes. because it just evolves too quickly. perhaps not entirely coincidentally. Poor countries where humans live in close proximity to farm animals are the best place to breed extremely dangerous zoonotic disease. Even after HIV. Solutions are only possible when and where we get the upper hand. the world is still not ready for a viral pandemic in Southeast Asia or sub-Saharan Africa. al 7. or other Western agencies in. “How Globalization Went Bad”. Globalization is turning the world into an enormous petri dish for the incubation of infectious disease. Professor of Political Science at UC-Berkeley and Director of the Institute of International Studies. What’s needed is another great power to take over a piece of the work. while it takes us decades to come up with a new generation of antibiotics. SARS. we’re not likely to get any help. Ely Ratner. a power that has more immediate interests in the countries where diseases incubate and one that is seen as less of a threat. Yet the threat is too arcane and not immediate enough for the West to force the issue. Naazneen Barma. . The most likely sources of the next ebola or HIVlike pandemic are the countries that simply won’t let U.) The same is true for global public health. Humans cannot outsmart disease.

not only on the nuclear weapons issue but—ominously—with respect to regime change and democratization. Washington’s policy. 76-77 Iran Because of the strategy of primacy and empire. The main source of conflict—or at least the one that has grabbed the lion’s share of the headlines—is Tehran’s evident determination to develop a nuclear weapons program. Since 9/11. spending and relations with the international community? Just a few days ago. Most countries in the world. however. And the fourth is that even the present supine Congress would bestir itself and demand that the brakes be applied. ISBN 0415952034. it feels less secure and is spending massive amounts on armaments. there are at least four reasons announced recall of some of the U. April 20.S. determination to effectuate a radical shake-up in the politics of the Persian Gulf and Middle East. 2007 ["The Case Against the American Empire." American Empire: A Debate.can we really afford this more crumbling frontiers of insecurity. and gaining U. in the recent war on Saddam missionary zeal to remake the Middle East in our own image? We could end up merely creating for ourselves ever Hussein's regime.htm] This brings us to the broadest question of all. Iran’s nuclear program and its role in Iraq are merely the tip of the iceberg. It possesses the world's single largest national economy but faces huge trade and budget deficits and economic rivalries from an equally large European Union and a fast-growing China. It has taken on military commitments all over the globe. Successful in our Iraq military campaign. These are reflected in current U. but its obligations look even larger. that of defining America's position in the world over the years to come.from our inner cities to the slaughters in central Africa -. it is hardly coincidental that the administration’s policy toward Tehran bears a striking similarity to its policy [end page 76] during the run-up to the March 2003 invasion of Iraq. 2003 [“The Perils of Empire: This Looks Like America’s Moment.S. military repeatedly warns of overstretch and is dismayed at the hawkish calls for further adventures. It is small wonder that while liberals protest soaring defense expenditures. The second is that. there are other important issues that are driving the United States and Iran toward an armed confrontation.S. In this respect. Chief among these is Iraq. The fundamental cause of tensions between the United States and Iran is the nature of America’s ambitions in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. p. Tony Blair insisted that there were "no plans" for invading Syria. S. The Bush Doctrine’s three key components are rejection of deterrence in favor of preventive/preemptive military action. The Dutch. from the Balkans and Kuwait to Afghanistan and Korea. of course. Scared. language. The third is that an aggressive move against the governments in Damascas or Tehran would probably provoke the wholesale resignation of the U. Navy's carrier groups and the return to think we will not be marching on Damascus or Tehran -. has accused Tehran of meddling in Iraqi affairs by providing arms and training to Shiite militias and by currying favor with the Shiite politicians who dominate Iraq’s recently elected government. Powell. Yet it has taken little comfort from this. the U. "Big stick" . the U. ambassador to Iraq.commondreams. should national security interests demand it. concerns about Iranian interference have been magnified. Is that a good long-term policy for the number one power in the democratic world? The Dutch aren't alone. during the prime minister's question time in the House of Commons last week. grand strategy—which has come to be known as the Bush Doctrine. including its boss. the United States and Iran are on course for a showdown. are dumbfounded at the threats against Syria and Iran made by influential members of the Bush administration. US military decline prevents attack on Iran Kennedy 3 Paul Kennedy. Infantry divisions were tied down in Iraq or standing by to go there.org/views03/0420-02. With all that is crying out for attention -. part or all of eight of the 10 U. The United States is unchallenged militarily and sees no rival Great Power in sight. including members of the current anti-Saddam coalition. Professor of History and the Director of International Security Studies at Yale University. Zalmay Khalilzad. http://www. The key question today is whether these assumptions are correct. The first is the of other military units for rest and overhaul.S. With Iraq teetering on the brink of a sectarian civil war between Shiites and Sunnis. is it not time to rein in our own "forward" school and be a little more modest in our aims. Published by Routledge. despite the fears of liberals at home and abroad. In a real sense. Washington Post. as President George W. This is because the same strategic assumptions that underlay the administration’s pre- invasion Iraq policy now are driving its Iran policy.at least not now. Secretary of State Colin L. The clear victor of the Cold War. I was shocked when a Dutch journalist told me that many of his countrymen were now "scared" of America. however. History Should Give Us Pause”. foreign service. Its armed forces look colossal (as did Britain's in 1919).” Beyond nuclear weapons. Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute. it no longer feels constrained from intervening in sensitive areas like the Middle East or Central Asia. Recently.S.S. Still. dominance over that region.43 of 154 Bad – Iran Strikes Primacy causes conflict with Iran Layne 7 Christopher LAYNE. Bush has stated on several occasions—in language that recalls his prewar stance on Iraq—is that a nucleararmed Iran is “intolerable.

The Bush Doctrine’s three key components are rejection of deterrence in favor of preventive/preemptive military action. as President George W. p." American Empire: A Debate. however.S. The key question today is whether these assumptions are correct. concerns about Iranian interference have been magnified. has accused Tehran of meddling in Iraqi affairs by providing arms and training to Shiite militias and by currying favor with the Shiite politicians who dominate Iraq’s recently elected government.S. The main source of conflict—or at least the one that has grabbed the lion’s share of the headlines—is Tehran’s evident determination to develop a nuclear weapons program. The fundamental cause of tensions between the United States and Iran is the nature of America’s ambitions in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. With Iraq teetering on the brink of a sectarian civil war between Shiites and Sunnis. Recently. grand strategy —which has come to be known as the Bush Doctrine.44 of 154 warnings to Syria and Iran may continue. and gaining U. In a real sense. Bush has stated on several occasions—in language that recalls his prewar stance on Iraq—is that a nuclear-armed Iran is “intolerable. Zalmay Khalilzad. These are reflected in current U. dominance over that region. Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute. 64-65. Washington’s policy. Heg causes war with Iran Layne 7 (Christopher. the United States and Iran are on course for a showdown. but neither the Marines nor the Army are about to embark on another war. there are other important issues that are driving the United States and Iran toward an armed confrontation. the U. Iran’s nuclear program and its role in Iraq are merely the tip of the iceberg. Chief among these is Iraq.S.) Iran Because of the strategy of primacy and empire. it is hardly coincidental that the administration’s policy toward Tehran bears a striking similarity to its policy [end page 76] during the run-up to the March 2003 invasion of Iraq. however. This is because the same strategic assumptions that underlay the administration’s pre-invasion Iraq policy now are driving its Iran policy. not only on the nuclear weapons issue but—ominously—with respect to regime change and democratization. determination to effectuate a radical shake-up in the politics of the Persian Gulf and Middle East. "The Case Against the American Empire. literary and national editor of the Atlantic. Review of International Studies (2009). ambassador to Iraq. . In this respect.” Beyond nuclear weapons.

the tieing of the hands of the present administration by a series of neoliberal policies that deny fiscal authority to the government. including the United Nations and European nations. might create more hopeful conditions for relief. and the transfer of many of the most lucrative sectors of the Iraq economy to American firms.45 of 154 Bad – Middle East War US heg causes Iraqi instability Selden 4 (Mark. http://www. has created a situation that ties the hands of any Iraq administration. both governments and NGOs. Whatever the changes. Policies that sharply reduced US domination of Iraq. the needs of the Iraqi people and society are unlikely to be met. coupled with a stronger international presence.) What policies make sense with respect to Iraq following the transfer of certain formal powers to the handpicked Iraq administration? What is most striking in my view is the continuity of the effort to sustain American domination of Iraq through the permanent stationing of 138. an electronic journal and archive on Japan and the Asia-Pacific. together with the dismantling of much of the previous Iraq administrative structure.org/fora/security/SeldonDiscussion. What can be said with confidence is that the US has embarked on a course that has brought disaster to Iraq and the region and disgrace to the United States. coordinator of Japan Focus. 6/30/04 “Discusson of ‘Notes From Ground Zero’: Power equity and Postwar Construction in Two Eras”. reconstruction and reform agendas that will be essential for the reconstruction of Iraq and a reduction of international tensions in a region that is super charged.nautilus. This. and the farflung base structure designed to support US primacy in the region.html. we should not of course expect peace and development to reign any time soon.000 US troops supplemented by allied troops and US mercenaries. including the systematic withdrawal of US forces and elimination of US bases. The Bush administration's attempt to hide the fact that fundamental elements of its flawed policies remain in place seems certain to add fuel to the fire. . It seems certain that if that multinational presence is predominantly military.

com/sharminenarwani/washington-just-lost-the_b_586222. In short. let alone push through a negotiated solution .particularly when viewed against the backdrop of our startling rhetoric over Iran's nuclear program.46 of 154 AT: Heg Solves MidEast War US has no influence in the middle east – cant mediate the conflict Narwani. We have been rendered irrelevant.huffingtonpost. despite our insistence on involving ourselves with every peep heard in the Mideast. It is Qatar that stepped in to broker a deal between Hezbollah and the Lebanese government in 2008. That massive show of flexing brawn over brain burst a global perception bubble about our intentions. Russia and China could not.html It's official. http://www. and is knee deep in negotiating a solution to the conflict in Darfur. England. May 24 2010. Our pointless and protracted wars in Afghanistan and Iraq will be the last time we will launch a major battle in the region. And now Turkey and Brazil have cajoled Iran into accepting an agreement that the US. But nothing highlights our irrelevance more than two recent developments: 1) The US's inability today to convene even perfunctory peace talks between Israelis and Palestinians. Germany. This credibility was compromised further with our irrational support of Israel's attacks on Lebanon and Gaza in 2006 and 2008/9 respectively. “Washington Just Lost the Middle East in a Big Way”. Syria helped gain the release of prisoners in Iran and Gaza. Unable to win wars or deliver diplomatic coups . The only breakthrough in this long-winded effort to tame Iran's nuclear aspirations was struck by Turkey and Brazil last week. 2) The US's inability to achieve a resolution with Iran over its nuclear program. There is no longer any serious "cost" for defying the United States in the global arena. .and struggling to maintain our economic equilibrium . 10 Senior Associate @ Oxford University (Sharmine.and this after 19 years of a "USsponsored" peace process. capabilities and reason. And by the double standards employed over Israel's violations of international law and its illegal nuclear weapons stash . France.Washington has lost the fundamental tools for global leadership. the US seems incapable of resolving even a traffic dispute in the Middle East. And no place does this impotence manifest more vividly than the modern Middle East.

It’s often forgotten now that. The United States may not be able to stabilize and rebuild Iraq. But that doesn’t matter much from the perspective of a government that thinks the Pentagon has it in its sights. And the best deterrent yet invented is the . U. Today. But much of this analysis is overblown. It has become fashionable. with its own supply (states willing to share nuclear technology) and demand (states that badly want a nuclear weapon). the only state with a tougher nonproliferation policy than the United States was the Soviet Union.Q. January/February. No country in the world can dream of challenging U. That brinkmanship paid off. The Eastern bloc was full of countries with advanced technological capabilities in every area except one—nuclear weapons. America’s conventional military strength means a lot less to a nuclear North Korea. In Tehran. Having your own nuclear weapon used to be a luxury. It didn’t need to. Pyongyang. and many other capitals.S. 2007 “How Globalization Went Bad. The overlap of unipolarity with globalization ratchets up both the supply and demand. North Korea’s founder. but they are unwilling to consider serious sticks. the bottom line is simple: The U.] The world is paying a heavy price for the instability created by the combination of globalization and unipolarity. with its own supply (states willing to share nuclear technology) and demand (states that badly want a nuclear weapon). Ph.S. it was officially at war with its southern neighbor. Ely Ratner. And the best deterrent yet invented is the threat of nuclear retaliation. they turn to people like A. But much of this analysis is overblown. Professor of Political Science at UC-Berkeley and Director of the Institute of International Studies. during the Cold War. North Korea is the clearest example. and Ely Ratner. President Bill Clinton’s administration readied war plans to strike his nuclear installations preemptively. nuclear-armed communist neighbors. military could. The Europeans dangle carrots at Iran. But that doesn’t matter much from the perspective of a government that thinks the Pentagon has it in its sights.” Foreign Policy.S. Moscow simply wouldn’t permit it. Naazneen Barma. It has become fashionable. including Beijing.S. “How Globalization Went Bad”. Khan. And the Russians are aiding Iran’s nuclear ambitions. But they can certainly hope to deter America from using it.S. and it stared continuously at tens of thousands of U. But today we see the uneven and inadequate level of effort that non-superpowers devote to stopping proliferation. it is fast becoming a necessity. because it had the Soviet nuclear umbrella. with Naazneen Barma.. But. How would things be different in a multipolar world? For starters. to the detriment of U.S. Consider the case of nuclear proliferation. to the detriment of U. Candidates at the University of California-Berkeley and Research Fellows at its New Era Foreign Policy Center. troops on its border. states that felt threatened by the United States could turn to the Soviet Union’s nuclear umbrella for protection. in the wake of the Iraq war. however. military could. for 40 years. Kim Il Sung. Today North Korea is likely a nuclear power. with conventional force. But they can certainly hope to deter America from using it. January-February 2007. Saddam Hussein’s great strategic blunder was that he took too long to get to the same place. great powers could split the job of policing proliferation. end those regimes tomorrow if it chose to do so. There’s effectively a market out there for proliferation.D. Before 1989.S. conventional military power. and the United States is bearing most of the burden. Matthew Kroenig. No country in the world can dream of challenging U. Within five years of the Soviet collapse. Weber 7 [Steven WEBER. the bottom line is simple: The U. nonproliferation today is almost entirely America’s burden. Few countries had it worse during the Cold War. Professor of Political Science and Director of the Institute for International Studies at the University of California-Berkeley. in the wake of the Iraq war. including Beijing. The Chinese refuse to admit that there is a problem. Matthew Kroenig. national security. The overlap of unipolarity with globalization ratchets up both the supply and demand. to comment on the limits of conventional military force. ET AL. to comment on the limits of conventional military force. Pyongyang. The United States may not be able to stabilize and rebuild Iraq. There’s effectively a market out there for proliferation. North Korea was surrounded by feuding. and the United States is bearing most of the burden. Consider the case of nuclear proliferation. North Korea didn’t seek nuclear weapons. and Kim’s son rules the country with an iron fist. Not a single country that had a formal alliance with Moscow ever became a nuclear power. end those regimes tomorrow if it chose to do so. primacy causes nuclear prolif Weber et. with conventional force.S. and even collaborate on some particularly hard cases.S. (Steven. In Tehran. Now.47 of 154 Bad – Proliferation Unipolarity makes countering proliferation impossible – only a multipolar world can solve. al 7. Foreign Policy) The world is paying a heavy price for the instability created by the combination of globalization and unipolarity. Pyongyang was pushing ahead full steam on plutonium reprocessing facilities. and many other capitals. barely flinched when former U. conventional military power. national security. Issue 158. When push comes to shove.

Khan. Few countries had it worse during the Cold War. President Bill Clinton’s administration readied war plans to strike his nuclear installations preemptively. however. it is fast becoming a necessity. Within five years of the Soviet collapse. That brinkmanship paid off. because it had the Soviet nuclear umbrella. But. and Kim’s son rules the country with an iron fist. states that felt threatened by the United States could turn to the Soviet Union’s nuclear umbrella for protection. Today North Korea is likely a nuclear power. Pyongyang was pushing ahead full steam on plutonium reprocessing facilities. North Korea was surrounded by feuding. they turn to people like A. nuclear-armed communist neighbors. barely flinched when former U. troops on its border.S.Q. North Korea is the clearest example. Now.S. it was officially at war with its southern neighbor. for 40 years. America’s conventional military strength means a lot less to a nuclear North Korea. Before 1989. North Korea didn’t seek nuclear weapons. Today. It didn’t need to. North Korea’s founder.48 of 154 threat of nuclear retaliation. Kim Il Sung. and it stared continuously at tens of thousands of U. . Saddam Hussein’s great strategic blunder was that he took too long to get to the same place. Having your own nuclear weapon used to be a luxury.

Russia..S. also spoke out against the Obama administration's revised nuclear policy by saying that ``The United States is a sinister government and cannot be trusted. the world leaders are strongly urged to develop practical means and ways to keep the stable .K. and a large majority of Iranian lawmakers. the possibility of nuclear terrorism will always linger around us like a “devil-dream'' embedded in our unconscious mental world. Stable nuclear group hegemony is quite often challenged by those countries such as North Korea and Iran that are not in compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and other international obligations. the only alternative to sear was genuine international cooperation. the traditional standing members of the U. The U. France and the U. heady days of American unilateral supremacy. relevant materials.kr/www/news/opinon/2010/07/198_64433. The lesson bequeathed to the Clinton administration's successor was that even given the great asymmetry of power between the United States and any would-be proliferator. Zbigniew Brzezinski (formerly President Carter’s National Security Advisor.” Korea Times. self-restraint and costly consequences for continued pursuit of nuclear weapons. counselor and trustee at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and professor of American foreign policy at the School of Advanced International Studies @ Johns Hopkins University) 2007 “Second Chance” p 103 The failure to contain nuclear proliferation in the Far East and in South Asia conveyed a sobering lesson. 47 leaders from all over the world discussed the ways and means of how to secure all weaponsuseable nuclear material within four years and how to eliminate the possibility that terrorists could buy or steal a nuclear weapon.S. China. Security Council.co. Even Iran's supreme leader. though. have urged their government to formally complain to the United Nations in a petition that calls the United States a warmonger and threat to world peace.html] In the same context. They also tackled how to reduce the number of thousands of poorly guarded nuclear reactors or fuel storage sites in many nations. could be classified into this category of stable group hegemony of nuclear weapons. angered over the new U. 4/19. Short of a unilateral military action--with all its unpredictable consequences—even the world's only superpower could not by itself dissuade a country firmly determined to acquire nuclear weapons. It is apparent that North Korea and Iran will not follow the norms and rules of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). A successful preventive effort would have required an early concentration of attention on the issue.. “Stable Group Hegemony of Nuclear Arms. http://www. mounted on at least a regional basis. and Israel are nowadays officially recognized to be nations of nuclear weapons. Pakistan.'' This time. North Korea is still not returning to the six-party talks. Of course. determined and coordinated mobilization of other concerned states. nuclear weapons policy. at an early stage of the nuclear challenge. India. If those challenges are not tackled properly through this kind of nuclear summit diplomacy.N. At the nuclear summit in Washington. it was easy to ignore incipient proliferation in the belief that an intimidating response by the United States would eventually suffice to halt it. Heg doesn’t solve prolif – rogue nations don’t follow norms or rules Park 10 – director of public relations at Korean Political Science Association [Tae-woo. Ayatollah Ali Khameini.49 of 154 AT: Heg Solves Prolif American hegemony cannot prevent proliferation by itself.koreatimes. programs and facilities. and early formulation of a program including both incentives. In the early. quite sure of the leaders' capacity to produce stern mandatory international standards or measures to stop further proliferation of nuclear weapons. a stable group hegemony of nuclear weapons is to create a stable order of nuclear politics. We are not. reflecting these kinds of complaints.

50 of 154 nuclear order rooted firmly on earth with detailed plans such as how to curb North Korea and Iran's nuclear programs in the future. .

"This happens immediately and incompetence and reluctance to solve one's own problems inflict damage not only to your country but to a huge number of other countries. There can be no "high-flown justification for military adventures. Earlier in March the Kremlin had suggested that the international community should have a say when the world's richest countries make decisions with global implications. Medvedev did not refer to the United States by name but the target of his comments was clear.presstv.aspx? id=106209&sectionid=351020602. suppression of rights and freedoms -. His remarks came shortly before the US President Barack Obama delivered a key speech in New York. Medvedev's comments further developed those ideas. have the potential to lead to international conflict. attacking efforts by any party to advance what he called "utopian projects of global supremacy … 'Global Caliphate' or 'Benevolent Hegemony'".51 of 154 Bad – Russia War Heg destroys Russian relations and causes global war Press TV 9 (“Medvedev lashes out at US hegemony. where he described the global economic crisis as Washington and Wall Street's "collective failure". ." he stressed.ir/detail. The Russian president also lashed out at what he thought the "ill-thought-out" policies of a country that led to the global financial melt down.” Sept 15 http://www. Dmitry Medvedev said those problems of one country." he added. Speaking at the opening of a global security conference in the central Russian city of Yaroslavl on Monday.of any illegal activities.) Russia's President has slammed America's global dominance saying all nations have the right to remark on the policies of a state whose actions affect the world.

The Bush regime is the most irresponsibly aggressive regime the world has seen since Hitler's.com/roberts/?articleid=11422) This week the Russian and Chinese militaries are conducting a joint military exercise involving large numbers of troops and combat vehicles. Both the Russian and Chinese governments are trying to devote resources to their economic development. at least in the medium term. Thus. The Bush regime even thinks that as it has bought and paid for Musharraf. just and democratic world order" on the basis of international law.china The new president of China. both are being forced by America's aggressive posture to revamp their militaries.co. and China would establish the hegemony of the cockroach. read by Russians and Chinese. “US Hegemony Spawns Russian-Chinese Military Alliance”. Today. http://www. But Chinese diplomacy is still based on seeking good relations with the US. His senior military advisers appear to have been impressed . This new potent military alliance is a real world response to neoconservative delusions about US hegemony. the predominance of the US in the post-Iraqi-war world. Reagan and Gorbachev ended the cold war. These are gratuitous acts of aggression. The two presidents are trying to establish a better Sino-Russian understanding which will offset. Neocons believe that the US is supreme in the world and can dictate its course. before he left home Mr Hu called for more military modernisation of China. Americans need to understand what the neocon Bush regime cannot: a nuclear exchange between the US. about why the US must use its military superiority to assert hegemony over Russia and China. But the fact is that the neocons actually believe their delusions about American hegemony. The Bush regime has initiated a propaganda war against the Russian government of Vladimir Putin. Meeting in Moscow yesterday. As the US has proven that it cannot occupy the Iraqi city of Baghdad despite 5 years of efforts.52 of 154 Bad – Sino-Russia Alliance Heg leads to a Sino-Russia Alliance that culminates in superpower nuclear conflict Roberts 07 Economist and Former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury (Paul Craig. Significantly. like Bush and Cheney. but know nothing about it. he will stand aside and permit Bush to make air strikes inside Pakistan. the US failures in Iraq and Afghanistan. not to their militaries. The US gratuitously brought NATO and anti-ballistic missiles to Russia's borders. They also said that the UN should be given the "central role" in Iraq's reconstruction. In an attempt to gain the advantage in a nuclear conflict. where China has been given observer status for the first time. The former Soviet Republics of Tajikistan. the neocons are positioning US anti-ballistic missiles on Soviet borders in Poland and the Czech Republic. such as Egypt's and Pakistan's. saying scenarios "of forceful pressure or use of force are unacceptable". and Kazakstan are participating. Cynics believe that the neocons are just shills. they called for a peaceful solution on the Korean peninsula.uk/world/2003/may/28/russia. The Guardian 3 5/28/2003 “China and Russia look for a counterbalance” http://www. US administrations after Reagan's have broken the agreements and understandings. Is Bush blind to the danger that he will cause an Islamic revolution within Pakistan that will depose the US puppet and present the Middle East with an Islamic state armed with nuclear weapons? Considering the instabilities and dangers that abound. Yet.and shocked . Neocons are people who desire war. America's influence in the world is limited to its payments of tens of millions of dollars to bribed heads of foreign governments. However. Hu Jintao. The neoconservative idiots have actually written papers. . for the military-security complex and are paid to restart the cold war for the sake of the profits of the armaments industry.antiwar. as he begins a foreign tour designed to revitalise Chinese diplomacy. In another thrust at US unilateralism. That means the conflict toward which the neocons are driving will be a nuclear conflict. Russia and China have now witnessed enough of the Bush administration's unprovoked aggression in the world to take neocon intentions seriously. they said that they stood for "a multipolar. Unilateralism leads to a Sino-Russia alliance. and its criticism of the occupation of Iraq has been muted. In a mere 6. This is an idiotic provocation as the Russians can eliminate anti-ballistic missiles with cruise missiles. Russia.guardian. if not counterbalance. After a week in Russia Mr Hu will attend the G8 conference in France. and now believe that China must do more to hold its own. Other countries appear ready to join the military alliance. Kyrgkyzstan. has joined President Vladimir Putin of Russia in a call for a "multipolar world" while condemning "the use of force". it most certainly cannot occupy Russia or China. the aggressive posture of the Bush regime goes far beyond recklessness.5 years the Bush regime has destroyed the world's good will toward the US.by the White House's pre-emptive strategy.

You are asking for a disaster. They very pointedly said this is in response to US escalation. which in 1998 proposed that the United Nations convene a committee on outer space in its Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. highly destructive weapons. targeting the rear outposts with nuclear weapons so they would overwhelm any possible defense. and in 2002 China and Russia jointly presented another draft that included bans on weapons based in space and on any use of weapons against objects in space. enter the atmosphere at the last minute so they can’t be detected and instantaneously drop highly destructive precision weaponry. They also worry about a unilateralist America pursuing its own military advantage at the expense of other countries. 2006 [“The State of Space: From Strategic Reconnaissance to Tactical Warfighting to Possible Weaponsization” ed. There’s universal agreement on this by both sides. it just doesn’t matter much to them. so instead of having twenty missiles targeting the United States they’ll build it up and probably have a submarine launched capacity. the Russian systems are worse. and Georgia abstained. American strategic analysts call that an accident waiting to happen. Just a couple of weeks ago the Russian had their first major military maneuvers in the last two decades. The US is developing low yield nuclear weapons which is in violation of international treaties and the Russians understand. India responds. Computer errors are daily occurrences in the US computer system. You get a ripple effect. but there was another one which was important and hasn’t been much discussed. Do you think the Russians will react differently? No they’re saying straight out that they’ve adopted Bush’s first strike doctrine. 13] Non-American opponents of weaponizing space make many of the same arguments.S. as well as the ASAT debate of the 1980s. for more than twenty straight years. It was also just reported that the Pentagon is developing hypersonic planes which will orbit in space. as do strategic analysts. p. U. These moves are deliberately. They immediately moved to undermine international treaties. deployment. Think what they’re going to be like in the Russian systems.org/April2004/Mars0424. you can find them. which they claim are much more sophisticated and are on computer controlled automated launch. by American calculation it might have tripled. that no one can challenge our total domination. Micronesia. This dispute has much of its origins and motivation in the history of the ballistic missile defense debate. Israel. allies. undermined ratification of old bio-weapons treaties. In December 2001 it called for negotiations on a treaty to prevent an arms race in outer space at the Geneva Conference. that their purpose is to attack the command bunkers that control their retaliatory nuclear systems. In comparison if you threaten to blow up the world. the United States. . consciously. The US reacted at once by targeting it with offensive nuclear weapons. The American systems which are much more sophisticated have a three minute period during which human intervention can prevent automated response. so Russian defense spending has predictably sharply increased since Bush came in. those risks aren’t important as compared to what its important. The air force space command immediately announced plans to move from it called control of space to ownership of space. it’s a first strike weapon. The Bush administration immediately moved to expand offensive military capacity. which is exactly consistent with the security strategy. China increases its missile capacity. China and Russia have been consistently vocal in their opposition to the weaponization of space and their desire for a treaty banning the testing. a small ABM system around Moscow. without warning and instantaneously with first strike authority. well that’s OK. India increases it and Pakistan responds. including Canada. The Bush administration just announced that it is going to employ a missile defense system.dissidentvoice. What does ownership of space mean? Well that’s presented in leaked plans. Everybody knows that a missile defense system is an offensive weapon. So have a number of U. Do we want Pakistan to increase its offensive nuclear capacity? Have a look at how their missiles are controlled. And its not that Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld and so on want the world destroyed. dominating the world by force and dismantling the hated welfare state measures at home. (The vote passed by 156 to 0.: Brookings Institution. That sets off a new cycle. opposing the weaponization of space. It terminated negotiations on an enforceable bio weapons treaty. The world is under very tight surveillance so you can detect if somebody is walking across the street in Ankara.C. The UN General Assembly has continued to pass resolutions. June 21. so they’re going to react to it.S. O’Hanlon. and use of such capabilities. The Chinese are surely going to respond to a so called missile defense system since it eliminates their strategic nuclear capacity. raising the threat to survival. Washington D. that they’re deploying their offensive missiles.53 of 154 Bad – Space Weapons Hegemony causes a buildup of space weapons O`Hanlon 6 Michael E. that's the way the cookie crumbles.” http://www. We know how the US reacted to this when the Russians made a slight move in that direction by placing. that’s important. It means putting space platforms in orbit from which you can launch offensive weapons. Testimony before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces of the House Armed Services Committee. if you increase the threat of terror. Noam Chomsky 4/24/2004 “an interview with Noam Chomsky.htm Well the most visible and publicized implementation was the invasion of Iraq. most of which do not favor putting weapons in space. hegemony will force space weaponization which causes space racing resulting in extinction.) In 2001 China presented an incomplete draft treaty banning the weaponization of space. in 1968. This is extraordinarily dangerous. But it has taken on a new tone in what many view as an era of American unipolarity or hegemony. These things are going to misfire. In recent years. Now others react to that threat.

54 of 154 .

Yet. “America’s Middle East grand strategy after Iraq: the moment for offshore balancing has arrived”. who served as senior American commander in Iraq during the surge and now heads CENTCOM (the US military command with overall responsibility for the Middle East) has repeatedly emphasised that the US commit.ment to Iraq is long-term in nature. the government of Iraqi Nouri al-Maliki indicated that Baghdad wanted to set a timeline for US troop withdrawals. and American military planners are preparing for a long-lasting ‘post-occupation’ US presence there.55 of 154 Bad – Terrorism US Heg causes terrorism – US presence in the Middle East and 9/11 proves Layne 9 (Christopher. President Bush’s endlessly reiterated claim that the US was attacked because Islamic radicals ‘hate us because of our freedom’ betrayed a complete misunderstanding of the dynamics that underpin the clash between the US and Middle Eastern terrorists. there are Islamic radicals who. ‘War is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its political object’. in Iraq the US is fighting the same terrorists who attacked the US on 9/11. Underscoring this point. . ‘irrational’ act of violence. religious. The Iraqi government refused to accede to the Bush administration’s desire to negotiate a long-term security agreement that would allow the US to maintain permanent bases in Iraq. or resistance. and Jordan.44 Al-Qaeda’s leaders also apparently hoped that the September 11 attacks would provoke a US overreaction. the Shah of Iran. this claim overlooked the fact that AQI came into existence only after the March 2003 US invasion of Iraq. Bush’s position seemed to soften and the administration said the US would support a ‘time horizon’ for US . and thereby compel changes in America’s Middle Eastern grand strategy.38 Terrorism. it is clear that the Bush administration never intended to withdraw from Iraq militarily and aimed for the US to retain permanent US military bases there. strictly speaking. The US presence on the ground in the Middle East also incites terrorists to attack American interests. the military actions of Al-Qaeda and its allies are acts of war. and ideological reasons. of course. the administration said it would last through 2007. at best. and thereby trigger an upsurge of popular discontent in the Islamic world that would lead to the overthrow of the Saudi monarchy and other proAmerican regimes in the Middle East (Egypt.52 What will happen under the new US administration is unclear. even when the surge itself has ended.tration’s inflexible determination to maintain a long-term American military presence in Iraq is exactly the wrong policy to reduce terrorism. Cambridge Journals. the 9/11 assault on the US was not a random. The Bush administration’s deliberate fabrications were designed to win Congressional and public support for a prolonged ‘surge’. Review of International Studies (2009). literary and national editor of the Atlantic.50 General David Petraeus. . balancing also signifies opposition. engaged in ‘balancing’ the US (because balancing is a form of state behaviour). 5/25/9.48 Bush repeatedly asserted that. tenuous. Richard K. ‘In the context of ideas bin Laden shares with his brethren. Although the Bush administration had strongly opposed any suggestions that there should be a fixed timetable for US withdrawal from Iraq in July 2008. and it is likely that there will be more US forces in Iraq in January 2009 than there were prior to the surge. do hate the US for cultural. Al-Qaeda wants to compel the US to remove its military presence from the Persian Gulf.43 Specifically. After all.49 When it first announced the surge. But that is not why the US is a target for Islamic terrorists. terrorism is ‘about power: the pursuit of power. it is dangerous for the US to base its strategy for combating terrorism on the belief ‘that Muslims hate and attack us for what we are and think rather than for what we do’. indeed. In fact. For sure. not terrorism . As Bruce Hoffman says. In his study of suicide terrorist groups. Scheurer observes that. 9/11 represented a violent counterreaction to America’s policies in the Middle East – especially its drive to dominate the region both geopolitically and culturally. and conservative Arab regimes and the source of a cultural assault on Islam’. meant to advance bin Laden’s clear. Pakistan. to a hegemon. because it is an instrument that the weak use against the strong.45 In other words.40 Here. beyond connoting the idea of counterweight. the actions of groups like Al-Qaeda reflect some of the key attributes of balancing. they are not.42 It is the US’ attempt to impose its primacy and preferences on the Middle East that fuels groups like Al-Qaeda and fans Islamic fundamental. and as such. Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute. . Instead it lasted well into 2008. Of course. claimed that the US is fighting terrorism in Iraq.ism. hence – in a blatant prevarication – tied AQI and the war in Iraq to 9/11. ‘It is hardly likely that Middle Eastern radicals would be hatching schemes like the destruction of the World Trade Center if the US had not been identified so long as the mainstay of Israel. As German military strategist Carl von Clausewitz himself observed. Al-Qaeda seeks to undermine US primacy. To make this point. at the same time. President Bush all but confirmed this in May 2007 when he said that he wanted the US to play the same kind of role in Iraq that it has in South Korea since the end of the Korean War. Pape has found that ‘what nearly all suicide terrorist attacks have in common is a specific secular and strategic goal: to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from territory that the terrorists consider to be their homeland’. Betts observed following the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center that. and that its links with Bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda are.39 From this perspective.51 In fact. it has grossly exaggerated the links between the insurgent group Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and Osama Bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda organisation and. and widely popular foreign policy goals . Despicable and brutal though it was. for example) and their replacement by fundamentalist Islamic governments. and force Washington to alter its stance on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.’. and one of its principal objectives ‘is the expulsion of American troops from the Persian Gulf and the reduction of Washington’s power in the region’. Terrorism is a form of ‘blowback’ against America’s preponderant role in international affairs. and the use of power to achieve political change’. the 9/11 attack was undertaken with cool calculation to achieve well-defined geopolitical objectives. Terrorists may not be able to balance against the US. And. . the Bush adminis. As Michael Schuerer – who headed the CIA analytical team monitoring Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda – says. The Bush administration. limited. senseless. but they can engage in a related form of activity aimed at undermining American primacy by raising its costs.46 Al-Qaeda fits this pattern. During 2008. the 9/11 attack was in keeping with the Clausewitzian paradigm of war: force was used against the US by its adversaries to advance their political objectives. any draw-down of US forces will take place gradually. Organisations like Al-Qaeda may be non-state actors. but their actions are of a kind frequently found in international politics: the use of violence against a state(s) to attain clearly defined political objectives.41 In a similar vein. focused.47 Here. the acquisition of power.) Terrorist organisations like Al-Qaeda are non-state actors. is fundamentally an asymmetric form of conflict. Indeed the use of violence for such purposes is the hallmark of terrorism. moreover.

it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. the primary driver of Middle Eastern terrorism. along with America’s policy on the Israel/Palestinian issue. this . Ill. police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights.56 of 154 troop withdrawals from Iraq as an ‘aspirational goal’. Ariz. emerge victorious. tensions different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive.eg/2004/705/op5.) during the 2008 US presidential campaign. the presence of US troops in Iraq and the Middle East increases it by reinforcing the widespread perception in the Islamic world that the US is pursuing a neo-colonial policy in the Middle East in furtherance of its own imperial ambitions. “Extinction!. and turned the entire region into a source of recruits for various radical terrorist groups. No. we will all be losers. from which no one will war will be without winners and losers.org. but based on the positions taken by Senator Barak Obama (D. it seems certain that there will be a significant American Instead of reducing American vulnerability to terrorism. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet. 04 – Al-Ahram political analyst (Mohamed. This between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. staying in Iraq will exacerbate it.htm) What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails. The impact is extinction Sid-Ahmed.ahram. http://weekly.istration’s overall policy in the Middle East has inflamed anti-American sentiment. Instead of solving this problem. The admin.istration will do about the US presence in Iraq is an open question. August/September 1. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a could lead to a third world war. Societies would close in on themselves. The huge US politico-military footprint in the Middle East region – including Iraq – is.53 What the new US admin. 705.) and Senator John McCain (R.” Al Ahram Weekly. military presence in Iraq for some time to come. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another.

The hegemonic project is on the verge of collapse after the US has been sapped of enormous resources while terrorism has become more widespread. Secretary General of Arab Thought Forum. .” http://weekly.org. “Collapse of Empire. which poses a real threat not just to one society or country. with imperial ambitions. 08 (Hassan Nafaa. Jordan. Nafaa. it must detach that drive from its imperial ambitions. Al-Ahram Weekly Online. In the future.ahram. if the US intends to deal seriously with a drive to end terrorism. The American insistence on pursuing its project of global hegemony behind the guise of the war on terror was ultimately detrimental to both causes. Amman. 9/24/08. Secretary General.57 of 154 Heg Fails . The first is that it is dangerous to link terrorism. Arab Thought Forum.htm) Any incoming US president must bear in mind several lessons from the lean years of the Bush presidency.Terrorism Heg can’t solve terrorism.eg/2008/915/op1.

WMD – especially the possession of nuclear weapons – is one way these states can level the strategic playing field and deter the US from attacking them.S.) But what about Wright’s implication that U. Regional powers – especially those on the US hit list like Iran and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq – cannot slug it out toe-to-toe against the US’ dominant hightech conventional forces.asp?id=2182. Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute. these states seek other methods of offsetting American power.) In addition to soft balancing.independent.S. in Public Policy from George Washington University and Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute. asymmetric strategies are another type of non. Heg causes terror – empirics and polls Eland 8 (Ivan.58 of 154 XTN: Terrorism Heg causes terror Layne 9 (Layne. When employed by states. Finally. the chickens would not be roosting as much in the U. . and dissuading Washington from using its military muscle against them. foreign policy is being thrown out with his other wacky and bigoted ravings. Review of International Studies (2009). the facts are on his side.org/newsroom/article. asymmetric strategies mean the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities. It is too bad that Rev. literary and national editor of the Atlantic. and even culture are popular in these countries. Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute.S.S. 5/25/9. “America’s Middle East grand strategy after Iraq: the moment for offshore balancing has arrived”. political and economic freedoms. empirical studies have linked U. May 5. The use of asymmetric strategies to oppose American power – especially in the Middle East where US policy has an imperial dimension – illustrates the dictum that empires inevitably provoke resistance.S. Ph. http://www.D. foreign policy causes blowback terrorism against the United States? Again. Wright’s remarks is that if the United States militarily intervened less overseas. henhouse. however. but U. Because they are threatened by the US. “Reverend Wright Is Not Totally Wrong”.traditional balancing that is being employed to contest US primacy. technology. targets. Wright’s largely correct analysis of U. Bin Laden has repeatedly said that he attacks the United States because of its occupation of Muslim lands and its support for corrupt Middle Eastern governments. Cambridge Journals. Terrorism is another asymmetric strategy – one employed by non-state actors like Al-Qaeda and similar jihadist groups – to resist US dominance. The upshot of Rev.S.S. interventionist foreign policy toward the Middle East is not. Poll after poll in the Arab/Islamic world indicates that U. foreign occupation and military interventions with blowback terrorism against the U.

59 of 154 AT: Heg Solves Terror Terrorists aren’t deterred by military power because it falls out of asymmetric power calculations Eland 08 senior fellow at the Independent Institute (ivan. the utmost effort should be made to capture or kill bin Laden and eradicate al Qaeda. and the gains from interventionism have been drastically reduced while the costs have skyrocketed. at least a plausible argument could be made for some [End Page 94] US intervention overseas to counter Soviet encroachment. Poll after poll in the Muslim world indicates that Muslims like US political and economic freedoms. rather than interventionism. Thus. Summer 2008. Empire does not equal security — in fact. Protecting its citizens and property should be the first goal of any government. would make Americans safer at home. in the short term. and even culture but hate US meddling in their world. . Osama bin Laden’s biggest gripes are with US — that is. But the Cold War is long over. non-Muslim — occupation of Muslim lands and meddling in their politics by supporting corrupt dictators and Israel. Mediterranean Quarterly Volume 19. with thousands of miles of borders and many possible targets. Back to the Future: Rediscovering America’s Foreign Policy Traditions During the Cold War. but the US quest for an informal global empire actually undermines this objective. but in the long term the only way to effectively deal with anti – United States terrorism is to reduce the motivation of terrorists to attack America in the first place. it sabotages it. practicing military restraint. Number 3. Naturally. Specifically. technology. the Soviet rival is in the dustbin of history. Retaliation for US interventionism in the Arab-Muslim world is al Qaeda’s primary motive for attacking the United States. homeland security efforts will likely have only limited effect. Because conventional and nuclear military power have very little utility in stopping terrorist attacks and because the United States has an open society. The only type of attack that cannot be deterred by the US nuclear arsenal is that from terrorists — as was demonstrated on 9/11.

There is a well-known quip that Nato was created to keep the Russians out.cato. After the second world war. Summer. 113-46] Both the United States and Europe face new global threats and opportunities that. Weak states threaten our security as much as powerful ones. August 13. During the 20th century.but also foster the proliferation of technology for weapons of mass destruction. Survival. the US fought two large wars in Europe to stop a hegemonic Germany from threatening America's backyard. In the place of geopolitics.play an increasingly influential role. a new ‘global politics’ is required to address the threats and opportunities that affect us all.from business and NGOs to terrorists and money-launderers . and preserving our freedom and prosperity. Non-state actors . people and ideas facilitate the spread of economic opportunity . 2003 [Cato Reports. This is because American hegemony remains the cause of the rift. we are likely to be far more successful at meeting the new global threats. b) Relations Key To Solve Disease Breakout Steinberg 3 James B. than if we try to achieve these goals alone. Vice President and Director. Ocean and land barriers offer little protection. . money. from terrorism and international crime to environmental damage and disease pose an increasing danger to our well being. 2003 [The Brookings Institution. America's strategic ambitions - based primarily on economic self-interest. Transnational threats.and keeping the Europeans apart.php?pub_id=6001] Major combat operations in Iraq ended in April but the transatlantic rupture between the US and "old" Europe triggered by the war has not healed.org/pub_display. Porous borders and the extraordinary global flows of goods.led it to establish its own hegemony over western Europe. It is more accurate to say that America's commitment to the Atlantic alliance is about staying on top . 45 no. in almost every case. vol. http://www. not cold-war ideology .60 of 154 Bad – US-EU Relations a) Hegemony hurts US-EU relations Layne 3 Christopher Layne. Steinberg. 2. If we can work together. can be dealt with far more successfully if we act together. writer at the Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute in Washington. The struggle for supremacy has been a feature of US-European relations since America emerged as a great power in the late 19th century. p. Foreign Policy Studies. the Germans down and the Americans in.

writer at the Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute in Washington. Hegemony has forced an inevitable struggle between the US and the EU Layne 3 Christopher Layne.org/pub_display. After the second world war. More generally. writer at the Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute in Washington. August 13. and the concomitant power imbalance between the United States and Europe. Washington has tried to hamper the EU's moves towards political unity and strategic self-sufficiency.cato. the Bush administration is playing a game of divide and rule to undermine the EU's sense of common purpose. one that does not presume that the United States will retain its hegemonic position in perpetuity. relations between the United States and its European allies will only continue to worsen.php?pub_id=6001] The real source of transatlantic conflict is America’s role as a global hegemon. August 13. 2003 [Cato Reports. US hegemony undermines EU stability Layne 3 Christopher Layne.led it to establish its own hegemony over western Europe.cato. military capabilities outside Nato's aegis.php?pub_id=6001] Unsurprisingly. 2003 [Cato Reports. http://www. Washington is trying to derail the EU's plans to create. not cold-war ideology .cato. writer at the Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute in Washington. http://www. Unless and until America’s foreign policy elites adopt a new foreign policy vision.org/pub_display. The eventual rupture arising from this long-simmering dispute may ultimately prove damaging to security on both sides of the Atlantic. through the European Security and Defence Policy. During the 20th century.php?pub_id=6001] The struggle for supremacy has been a feature of US-European relations since America emerged as a great power in the late 19th century.org/pub_display. August 13. .based primarily on economic self-interest. http://www. the US fought two large wars in Europe to stop a hegemonic Germany from threatening America's backyard. America's strategic ambitions .61 of 154 XTN: US-EU Relations Hegemony will worsen us-eu relations Layne 3 Christopher Layne. 2003 [Cato Reports. It has encouraged the expansion of Nato and the EU in the hope that the new members from central and eastern Europe will keep in check Franco-German aspirations for a counterweight to American power.

but the benefits of cooperation outweigh the costs of any compromise. This profound change helps us understand the erroneous premise of Bush’s foreign policy. The National Interest. The war on transnational terrorism depends essentially on information gathering and policing. 75. Proquest] While Russia has not stood in the way of any decisive U. A resurgence of Muslim extremism of the Taliban variety could then even acquire a regional scope. and in these respects the Europeans are anything but security pygmies. it would mean less opportunity for self-serving inaction. the current geopolitical earthquake in the Persian Gulf could jeopardize America's efforts to consolidate the independence of the Caspian Basin states. iss. The Muslim diaspora communities into which terrorist cells can invisibly blend remain the likeliest staging grounds for future al-Qaeda attacks on the United States.62 of 154 Relations Good Relations with EU are key to solve terrorism Holmes 3 Stephen Holmes.S. Kagan has apparently failed to realize the degree to which the contours of American national security have been redrawn since 9-11. . political and military presence in Central Asia. infiltration. They can perform essential tasks of monitoring. despite his pose as a no-nonsense realist. In our new security environment. arresting scores of suspected terrorists. NYU Law School Professor. Europe remains a frontline region in the war against terrorism just as it was in the war against communism.S. organized and financed in Europe. These risks could be lessened by closer U.-EU strategic collaboration with regard to Iraq and Iran. has already tempted Moscow to resume its earlier pressure on Georgia and Azerbaijan to abandon their aspirations for inclusion in the Euro-Atlantic community and to step up its efforts to undermine any enduring U. security. As daily press reports also reveal.S. The home front and the foreign front have now been disconcertingly blurred. American preoccupation with the mess in Iraq. But acting together-with the threat of U. That may not be easy to achieve. despite the prevailing cliche. Former Diplomat at Johns Hopkins & CSIS.S. 2003 [“AMERICAN PROSPECT”. given divergent American and European perspectives. That would make it more difficult for the United States to engage the Central Asian states in a larger regional effort to combat Islamic fundamentalism in Afghanistan and Pakistan. National-security strategy must now operate in a domain where soldiering and policing have become of coequal importance. Winter. For the United States. Europeans’ linguistic skills and cultural knowledge alone ensure that they can make indispensable contributions to U. 21] The September 11 attacks were partly planned. US-EU relations are key to preventing Russia war Brzezinski 4 Zbigniew Brzezinski.S. military power reinforced by the EU's political. a joint approach would mean less freedom of unilateral action. p. for the European Union. Their capacities to respond effectively to today’s greatest security threats easily rival those of the United States. In other words. financial and (to some degree) military support-the Euro-Atlantic community could foster a genuinely stable and possibly even democratic post-Saddam regime. not to mention the cleavage between America and Europe as well as the increased American-Iranian tensions. the United States is not the world’s only superpower. disruption and apprehension for which our own unrivaled military machine is patently inadequate. the European police have been acting in a perfectly Hobbesian manner. 2003-2004 [“Hegemonic Quicksand”. In other words. military efforts to alter the strategic realities of the region.

Trade routes need not be policed by a single dominant power.) During the cold war the United States dictated the terms of adjustment. They advance arguments diametrically at odds with the primacist consensus. Ebsco. but it can no longer count on getting its own way. Military Power: Preeminence for however. and in the security of their respective regions. logic of hegemonic stability theory from the very beginning. no longer enjoys the same type of security leverage it once possessed. the world’s indispensable nation. That exclusion was enforced through everyday brutality. “When Hegemony Fails: British Imperialism in India and Brazil from the Nineteenth to the Early Twentieth Centuries”. Western Political Science Association. specializing in Critical IR Theory. The United States may continue to act its own way. Hegemony fails—obstacles to inclusionary policies. The tangible benefits of all this military spending flow disproportionately to this tiny corner of the United States while the schlubs in fly-over country pick up the tab. World Politics 61. The United States. after the cold war it has found itself more vulnerable and constrained than it was during the golden economic era after World War II.S. were put down with a brutality that frequently . notwithstanding its preponderant power. No. it is unrealistic to expect that a new spasm of global conflict would erupt if the United States were to modestly refocus its efforts. the foreign policy establishment in Washington has no interest in exploring them. It derived the necessary leverage because it provided for the security of its economic partners and because there were no viable alter natives to an economic order centered on the United States.63 of 154 Doesn’t Solve War Heg doesn’t solve war Christopher Preble (director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute) August 2010 “U. But while there are credible alternatives to the United States serving in its current dual role as world policeman / armed social worker. The people here have grown accustomed to living at the center of the earth. draw down its military power. Some scholars. questioned the What Purpose?” http://www.edu/MichaelMcIntyre/Papers/535440/When_Hegemony_Fails) Even when the ruling alliances of colonial India or the Brazil of Empire and Old Republic were not threatened with dissolution.org/u-s-military-power-preeminence-for-what-purpose/ Most in Washington still embraces the notion that America is. and the very success of the U.S. and indeed. military.S. The claim that the United States is unipolar is a statement about its cumulative economic. 2011. Heg doesn’t solve war – US lacks influence it used to have to influence conflicts Mastanduno 9 (Michael. Many factors have contributed to the dramatic decline in the number of wars between nationstates. April 21. International Political Economy (Michael. and other capabilities. but from the life of civil society. of the universe.academia. U. And although the United States remains a dominant international economic player in absolute terms. McIntyre 11—Professor at Depaul University. A number continue to do so today. and the costs of mitigating their effects should be borne by those who stand to lose — or gain — the most. and call on other countries to play a larger role in their own defense. 1. Islamic extremists are scary.-centered world economy has afforded America’s supporters a greater range of international and domestic economic options. and forever will be. It is frankly absurd that we spend more today to fight Osama bin Laden and his tiny band of murderous thugs than we spent to face down Joseph Stalin and Chairman Mao. while their eruptions into the political sphere.cato-at-liberty. It faces rising economic challengers with their own agendas and with greater discretion in international economic policy than America’s cold war allies had enjoyed. http://depaul. not only from the pact of domination or a share in political power.1 But preponderant capabilities across the board do not guarantee effective influence in any given arena. Professor of Government at Dartmouth. episodic and frequently diagnosed as criminal. After the cold war the outcome of adjustment struggles is less certain because the United States is no longer in a position to dictate the terms. Supply disruptions are likely to be temporary. their "success" was based on the exclusion of the vast majority of the populations of India and Brazil. but hardly comparable to the threat posed by a globe-straddling Soviet Union armed with thousands of nuclear weapons. dominance in the international security arena no longer translates into effective leverage in the international economic arena. Social Movements. the international economy is complex and resilient.

and changing. Director of the RAND Center for Asia Pacific Policy." subject to group sanction. not the British. is one response to subordination. “The False Promise of Primacy in US Foreign Policy”.S. Senior political scientist at RAND Corporation. the belief that the lynchpin of American security was for it to remain more powerful than all other countries by a huge. there are no channels for such an appeal to be made. as was its implicit goal. To understand this yearning for American policy of yore. both British and Hindu (Guha 1983.S. in Brazil through vagrancy statutes and the criminalization of certain aspects of Afro-Brazilian life. Brazil. in India through the designation of certain groups as "criminal tribes. rather than fights. 2010. where some members of the I. says Robert Kagan. It did nothing to slow China’s influence. a politics often read as criminality by the dominant. It is normally a response with limited aims: slaves kill a harsh overseer. A fixation on primacy paradoxically managed to undermine the influence and authority . In the absence of channels for demands of inclusion. could maintain its pretense only by rigidly excluding dark-skinned lower classes from political participation. then. the reforms in property law needed to carry out such a project were enacted in weakened form after delays of decades. so long as we remember that it is criminality with a distinctly limited political purpose. 77-83). in the epoch when the ruling alliances of Brazil and India were beginning to come apart. In India. fluid. however. is not that it destabilizes political regimes but that it creates substantial obstacles to the creation of inclusionary polities. villagers riot to call attention to a corrupt local official. though some common features can be found in both contexts. the decline of American power. Subordinate groups therefore have little incentive to press for incorporation into the existing alliance. who was able to incorporate relatively well-off peasants into a powerful political alliance. our relationship with Russia. There is no reason to think of such activity as other than criminal. In the end. The Next American Century: How the U. who reveals a perverse nostalgia for the previous paradigm in his recent writings in which he argues that the Obama administration is formulating foreign policy from a perspective that accepts. fixed margin. the primacy strategy didn’t deliver. World Focus. In the end.org/blog/2010/01/22/the-false-promise-of-primacy-in-us-foreignpolicy/9372/) One unquestionable success of the Obama administration so far has been to turn the page on the failed Bush foreign policy framework.64 of 154 crossed into blood lust. It did not prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons.39 Its categories of friend and foe are improvised. it was Gandhi. political activity with broader aims tends to take the form of public and communal resistance: a prophetic community gathers in the Brazilian sertão (Cunha 87 1944). January 22. International affairs fellowship from the Council on Foreign Relations. And it wrecked. with substantial geographical divergence and uneven enforcement. Such criminality/resistance is recurrent and endemic. the Santals of eastern India rise up to expel "outsiders" (diku). Criminal activity. It is a selflimiting form of resistance. Hachigan 10—Senior Fellow at American Progress. always at pains (with little success) to present itself to the world as a European civilization in the tropics. This misreading of the politics of the dominated is not a simple misreading. workers in the most heavily industrialized cities in both countries managed to gouge out a space for public contestation that they never gave back. The primary effect of the failure of cultural hegemony. Can Thrive As Other Powers Rise. both because the range of loyalties it can mobilize is geographically restricted and because its attention to signs at the expense of strategy. you have to remember that American foreign policy leaders during the Bush administration clung to the false promise of primacy. with Moscow’s help.C. a poor vagrant steals to survive. Not so. The excluded are therefore left with a politics of resistance. however restrictively defined. National Security Council at the White House (Nina. Not only would a call for incorporation be rebuffed. But the proof is in the pudding. pressed for a deepening of the pact of domination to include an idealized sturdy yeoman peasantry alongside the large landowners who had previously formed their core 86group of allies. a small landowner turns to banditry when forced off his land by a larger landowner. The "dangerous classes" at the bottom of the social hierarchy faced routine criminal sanction. http://worldfocus. but also localized and evanescent. Hegemony fails—recent political climate proves. Negation and reversal rather than programmatic reform are its common idiom. Primacy tempted our leaders into a reckless war in Iraq. Despite this stringently exclusionary polity. Mona Sutphen and I described why this was a misguided strategy in our 2008 book.

President Barack Obama’s approach is different. Kagan writes as if the Obama administration is engaging with re-emerging powers to prove an ideological point that great power strife is a relic of history. in Moscow. to say the least. proud countries to take these steps? Aggressive diplomacy.” Later. National Security Council at the White House (Nina. January 22. and pandemics. saying. World Focus. In fact. America needs all of them to contain pandemics. global warming. It’s still early days. 2010. Fortunately. It’s not because the president is looking to attend more international meetings.65 of 154 America did have. Senior political scientist at RAND Corporation. sanctions . Transnational threats also explain why the Obama administration is taking international institutions seriously. buttering up autocracies and forsaking our democratic allies. And. On the one-year mark of his presidency.N. America needs Russia to secure its loose nuclear materials so terrorists cant get it. Kagan does not reveal the Obama administration’s reasons for pursuing strategic collaborations with China. India. More importantly. focusing on how “to adjust” to the decline in American primacy instead of trying to reverse it. nuclear proliferation. for the first time last year. but of seeking common cause. global warming. Kagan barely mentions these threats. pushing for increased accountability Make basic political and economic rights available to more people. it’s because international rules and institutions play a vital coordinating role when threats cross borders.org/blog/2010/01/22/the-false-promise-of-primacy-in-us-foreignpolicy/9372/) Robert Kagan now accuses President Obama of reorienting American foreign policy away from its WWII and Cold War roots. nuclear proliferation. http://worldfocus. “a great power does not show strength by dominating or demonizing other countries…[G]iven our interdependence. Yet no staffer that I have ever spoken with would suggest that these relationships are beyond rivalry. but to keep its own people safe. International affairs fellowship from the Council on Foreign Relations. including with other major powers.” Hegemony fails—cooperation is key to prevent terrorism. any world order that tries to elevate one nation or group of people over another will inevitably fail. China has agreed to limit its carbon intensity. How can we get these big. China not only voted for tough U. but the Obama approach is paying dividends. And America needs India to help track extremists. He portrays administration officials as naïve ideologues. economic crises. Nevertheless. international architecture and traditional alliances are not mutually exclusive. and other pivotal powers. The World Health Organization led the battle against swine flu last year just as the International Monetary Fund bailed out a slew of countries headed toward financial ruin. these partnerships are necessary to protect Americans from common threats in terrorists. America needs China — the world’s largest emitter — to cut down on its carbon. economic crises. The pursuit of power is no longer a zero-sum game — progress must be shared. “Our power alone cannot protect us. the contours of the new paradigm are fairly clear: Lead the world in addressing shared challenges Treat other governments and peoples — friends and foes — with respect Forge strategic collaborations with big. Kagan’s analyses fail to discuss two major developments that demand a new approach—the increased potency of transnational threats and the new salience of domestic policy in America’s world standing. knowing that democratic government is the best way to achieve this goal As for primacy. Obama elaborated on his view of great power relations. Moreover. His political allies and his detractors can agree that Obama sees foreign policy not in terms of asserting America’s unparalleled might. Hachigan 10—Senior Fellow at American Progress. “The False Promise of Primacy in US Foreign Policy”. the fact that the Bush administration embraced the notion of primacy was a comfort to the remaining Cold Warriors. as Kagan would imply. Obama dismissed that as a strategy goal in his inaugural address when he observed. and pandemics such as swine flu — the forces of disorder that can and do affect Americans right here at home. Russia. pivotal powers and demand responsibility from them on global challenges Reinvigorate and repair existing alliances Reengage with international institutions and rules. Director of the RAND Center for Asia Pacific Policy.

Iran remains a challenge. rendition and torture over the past decade. The pain and suffering inflicted on Iraq has been enormous. the United States is now engaged in protracted wars in Afghanistan and Iraq that have so far cost well over a trillion dollars and resulted in around forty-seven thousand American casualties.org/content/Documents/US_Quest_for_Global_Hegemony. have been disastrous. co-chaired by the United States and Russia. just not in a grandstanding. despite all the phony talk about how the “surge” has worked in Iraq and how a similar strategy can produce another miracle in Afghanistan. Finally. or to wage war on others. not to mention the weakening of the rule of law at home. as it clear from James Madison’s observation that ‘no nation can preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare. every post– Cold War administration has tried and failed to settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.66 of 154 against Pyongyang. A successor to the START treaty to reduce our arsenal of nuclear weapons is not yet complete.C. democracies have been America’s most enduring allies. The unpleasant truth is that the United States is in a world of . is up and running again. we continue to have differences with these pivotal powers. What Others Think. Of course. Governments that promote the rule of law. Hegemony fails—resistance. but Beijing and Moscow did recently join in a harsh rebuke that the International Atomic Energy Agency issued. for example.” They have. unable to prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons in the first place. The United States has been at war for a startling two out of every three years since 1989. countries that continuously fight wars invariably build powerful national-security bureaucracies that undermine civil liberties and make it difficult to hold leaders accountable for their behavior. provocative way that ends up being counterproductive. and they invariably end up adopting ruthless policies normally associated with brutal dictators. Kagan is simply wrong to suggest that administration officials have failed to “continue to press Russia and China for reform. And the United States. and there is no end in sight. We may well be stuck in both quagmires for years to come. Here. including on human rights and democracy. is what President Obama said in Moscow: The arc of history shows us that governments which serve their own people survive and thrive. now seems incapable of compelling Pyongyang to give them up. but it’s on the way.7 million more have been internally displaced.htm) The results. D. And these nations and others agreed during the darkest days of the financial crisis to coordinate their macroeconomic moves. however. And in our own history. Leverette and Leverette 10—*Senior fellow at the New America Foundation in Washington. all indicators are that this problem will deteriorate further as the West Bank and Gaza are incorporated into a Greater Israel. subject their actions to oversight. Moreover. Iran Review. shows that their fears were justified. more than one hundred thousand Iraqi civilians have been killed. the American military is not going to win either one of these conflicts.” Russia has allowed the United States to transport supplies through its territory into Afghanistan.. Professor at the Pennsylvania State University School of International Affairs **CEO of Strategic Energy and Global Analysis (STRATEGA) and Senior Lecturer and Senior Research Fellow at Yale University’s Jackson Institute for Global Affairs (Flynt and Hillary. Since the war began in March 2003. Governments that represent the will of their people are far less likely to descend into failed states. including those we once waged war with in Europe and Asia– nations that today live with great security and prosperity. To make matters worse.iranreview. in fruitless pursuit of victory. roughly 2 million Iraqis have left the country and 1. governments which serve only their own power do not. to terrorize their citizens. in contrast to Kagan’s assertion that the administration has failed to gain “any meaningful Chinese help in North Korea. and allow for independent institutions are more dependable trading partners. it also enforced them. The United States has also been unable to solve three other major foreign-policy problems. 2010. As anyone with a rudimentary knowledge of world events knows. December 22.’ Washington’s pursuit of policies like assassination. “US Quest for Global Hegemony”. The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Washington has worked overtime—with no success—to shut down Iran’s uranium-enrichment capability for fear that it might lead to Tehran acquiring nuclear weapons. http://www. The Founding Fathers understood this problem.

John points out that “the Bush administration’s fondness for threatening to attack adversaries (oftentimes with the additional agenda of forced democratization) encouraged nuclear proliferation. of course. One would think that such arrogance might alienate other states. no serious attempt is made to prioritize U. The alternative. the strategy of primacy failed to deliver. has largely embraced the same delusions of global dominance that got the United States into such trouble on the foreign-policy front under the Clinton and George W. It is a posture he describes as “offshore balancing”—which is actually the United States’ traditional approach to grand strategy. before it developed hegemonic hubris. It was also a dismal failure.” In this vein. and this state of affairs is only likely to get worse in the next few years. as Afghanistan and Iraq unravel and the blame game escalates to poisonous levels. The Bush administration’s quest for global dominance was based on a profound misunderstanding of the threat environment facing the United States after 9/11. From the Clinton administration on. Worse than being ineffec tive with transnational threats and smaller powers. But as long as America’s leaders remain committed to global dominance. instead believing that other countries—save for so-called rogue states like Iran and North Korea—would see the United States as a benign hegemon serving their own interests. America still has not faced up to its most fundamental strategic choices in a post-Cold War world. as John points out. and threatened its position in the world.” John reminds those of us who voted for George W. the United States rejected [various strategic alternatives]. The best way for the United States to maximize the prospects of halting or at least slowing down the spread of nuclear weapons would be to stop threatening other countries because that gives them a compelling reason to acquire the ultimate deterrent. Stanford Center for International Security. for all its talk of “change”. The underlying belief is that new liberal democracies will be peacefully inclined and pro-American. The Next American Century. not less. or what might alternatively be called global hegemony. a national security strategy based on suing and ratiaing primacy has not made America more secure. p. instead pursuing global dominance. Bush administrations. If America makes primacy the main goal of . which means making sure that the United States remains the most powerful state in the international system. Bush over Al Gore in 2000 that. they are likely to resist this advice and keep threatening states that will not follow Washington’s orders. And the president and his advisers overestimated what military force could achieve in the modern world. America’s military might has not been the answer to terrorism. which was not just doomed to fail. But. after 9/11. climate change. making the world over in America’s image. While the fact of being the world’s only superpower has substantial benefits.S.67 of 154 trouble today on the foreign-policy front. in effect. in turn greatly underestimating how difficult it would be to spread democracy in the Middle East. Iran. interests. so the more the better. especially in the Middle East: “By pursuing this extraordinary scheme to transform an entire region at the point of a gun. 168-9 In practice. 2008. Bush took the quest for global dominance to new heights. Iraq. because they are virtually limitless. is not “Fortress America” isolationism. this means that Washington must care a lot about every country’s politics. undermined American values and institutions on the home front. on foreign policy issues. President Bush adopted a radical grand strategy that has no parallel in American history. but most American policy makers of the early nineties and beyond were confident that would not happen. but likely to backfire in dangerous ways if it relied too heavily on military force to achieve its ambitious agenda. Of course. disease. and North Korea have become more dangerous in the last seven years. This triumvirate of errors doomed Washington’s effort to dominate the globe. and spreading democracy across the globe. With global dominance. This grand strategy is ‘imperial’ at its core. a strategy of maintaining primacy is counterproductive when it comes to pivotal powers.” John is equally clear when it comes to diagnosing the source of America’s “world of trouble” on the foreign-policy front: “The root cause of America’s troubles is that it adopted a flawed grand strategy after the Cold War. Primacy does not prevent a global nuclear exchange or create regional stability Nina Hachigan and Monica Sutphen.” John warns that the Obama Administration. or proliferation. Bush largely ran against the kind of liberal imperialism that Gore advocated and that the administration he served as Vice-President had practiced. John Mearsheimer has given it an indispensable guide for thinking through those choices. its proponents believe that the United States has the right as well as the responsibility to interfere in the politics of other countries. Global dominance has two broad objectives: maintaining American primacy.

Foreign Affairs . acted in a manner that has led other states to conclude that the United States constitutes a threat to their vital national interests. May/June 2008 . for the most part. They do not. and technology -. Council on Foreign Relations.68 of 154 its national security strategy. decline has not produced hegemonic rivalry because the U. investment. Integration into the modern world dampens great-power competition and conflict. . which has not stimulated such a response. accordingly. foreign policy are pervasive.foreignaffairs.S. President. U. American cannot trumpet its desire to dominate the world military and then question why China is modernizing its military.flows in which the United States plays a critical role. Haass. A further constraint on the emergence of great-power rivals is that many of the other major powers are dependent on the international system for their economic welfare and political stability. energy. but this has tended to lead more to denunciations (and an absence of cooperation) than outright resistance. want to disrupt an order that serves their national interests.org/20080501faessay87304/richard-n-haass/the-age-ofnonpolarity. then why shouldn’t the pivotal powers do the same? A goal of primacy signals that sheer strength is most critical to security. Bush has not alienated other nations. people. services.html?mode=print The fact that classic great-power rivalry has not come to pass and is unlikely to arise anytime soon is also partly a result of the United States' behavior. But it has not. is not perceived as a threat. it surely has.S. Doubts about the wisdom and legitimacy of U. This is not to say that the United States under the leadership of George W.S. nor do other powers want to challenge the status quo Richard N. http://www. Those interests are closely tied to cross-border flows of goods.

S. security guarantees are driving creeping re-nationalization by America's Eurasian allies. the costs of trying to hold on to hegemony are high and going to become higher. In this changing geopolitical context. in turn.S. . At the same time. because they carry the risk of entrapping the United States in great power Eurasian wars. it is even more doubtful that U. Is it worthwhile paying the price to hang onto unipolarity for. As other states—notably China—rapidly close the gap.S. Maintaining heg even just to shape the new multipolar system causes backlash and war – only a complete transition away solves Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 158 At the same time. which.at best.S. hegemony will endure until the early 2030s. it doubtless is true that it will take some time for others' balancing efforts to realize their intended outcome. and the strategy is not likely to work much longer in any event. Although the United States.69 of 154 Clinging to Power -> War Mulitpolarity is inevitable – trying to retain hegemony ensures a war-filled transition Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 190 Advocates of hegemony claim that it is illusory to think that the United States can retract its military power safely from Eurasia. understandable doubts about the credibility of U. America's military commitments abroad have become a source of insecurity for the United States. The answer to this assertion is that the risks and costs of American grand strategy are growing. efforts to prolong it. U. hegemony is fated to end in the next decade or two regardless of U. is leading to a reversion to multipolarity. Rather than fostering peace and stability in Eurasia. The United States can do this by adopting an offshore balancing grand strategy.another two decades? Given that American hegemony is destined to end sooner rather than later and that the costs of trying to "shape the international system" to America's liking will rise (even as the benefits of doing so diminish). it would make more sense grand strategically for the United States to retrench and husband its resources for the long haul. contrary to my 1993 prediction. probably will not be challenged by great power rivals as early as 2010.

As this transition proceeds. thus offering a potential explanation for the otherwise puzzling persistence of cooperation in the 1980s despite America’s relative decline. While Snidal was modeling a theory he did not believe in. But regardless of whether Eurasian great powers remain at peace. not just the hegemon. 50 Keohane and Snidal’s predictions – that the waning of American power did not have to jeopardize cooperation – were in this context reassuring. As mentioned at the outset of this chapter.S. America's Changing Internationalism. the possible benefits of "environment shaping" have to be weighed against the possible costs of U.S. Snidal opened up the possibility that a more symmetrical distribution of power might enhance the prospects for the provision of public goods. forces in Eurasia. as it does on the size of other actors in the international system. so smaller states have to chip in for the good to be provided. 118. Proponents of hegemony fear that if great power wars in Eurasia occur. Keohane explained the persistence of cooperation in terms of states’ continued demand for regimes. and whatever influence it does have is being eroded by the creeping multipolarization under way in Eurasia. grand strategy is the construction of a concertlike directorate of the major powers in North America.S. This threat is easily exaggerated."sa This really is not an economic argument but rather an argument about the consequences of Eurasia's political and ideological.40 Snidal demonstrated that collective action depends as much on the hegemon’s size. military intervention in Eurasia. Hence. American grand strategy should focus on making both Europe and East Asia less reliant on U. closure. Europe. There are numerous possible geopolitical rivalries in Eurasia. and manipulated. these distributional implications haunt the literature and cast decline as inescapable and continuous Withdrawal is smooth Charles A. security and interests inevitably will be jeopardized by a Eurasian hegemon. Finally. several points need to be made. by plugging the numbers from his production function into the revised model). Second. Mere. a struggle that will require patience and . the waning hegemon continues to be taken advantage of. They would also coordinate efforts in the battle against terrorism. First. Summer 2003.S. and East Asia. These major powers would together manage developments and regulate relations both within and among their respective regions. 00323195. the outcomes are going to be caused more by those states' calculations of their interests than by the presence of U.S. Transition is smooth – decline in power causes global cooperation Carla Norrlof (an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto) 2010 “America’s Global Advantage US Hegemony and International Cooperation” p. Political Science Quarterly. and the End of U. The likelihood for cooperation increases with American decline because the hegemon can no longer singlehandedly provide the good as it declines.S. while at the same time working with major states in both regions to promote collective management of the global system. Issue 2 “The Rise of Europe. Kupchan. but it's a good bet that some will. involvement in a big Eurasian war. By paying attention to the size of all Great Powers. unipolarity will give way to a world of multiple centers of power. distilled to its essence. this argument is a restatement of the fear that U. If one were to use Snidal’s production function in the revised model (i.70 of 154 Collapse =/= War Your evidence overestimates the US’s ability to shape the international system – doesn’t contain conflict and wont shape the new multipolar system Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 176-7 A second contention advanced by proponents of American hegemony is that the United States cannot withdraw from Eurasia because a great power war there could shape the post conflict international system in ways harmful to U. The United States has only limited power to affect the amount of war and peace in the international system.e. Primacy” Database: Academic Search Premier As this new century progresses. the United States "could suffer few economic losses during a war. power.. Vol. and still find the postwar environment quite costly to its own trade and investment.S. interests. as well as economic. The ultimate vision that should guide U. or even benefit somewhat. they could bring to power militaristic or totalitarian regimes. to disguise ulterior motives for U.S. proponents of American hegemony overestimate the amount of influence that the United States has on the international system. Most of these will not culminate in war.

for reasons of both proximity and culture. for a new international system to evolve. focus on Latin America. It will take a decade. Regional centers of power also have the potential to facilitate the gradual incorporation of developing nations into global flows of trade. therefore. the Middle East. and East Asia on South Asia and Southeast Asia. The United States will need to begin ceding influence and autonomy to regions that have grown all too comfortable with American primacy. Europe on Russia.[*] . will find the transition an easy one. information. Mustering the political will and the foresight to pursue this vision will be a formidable task. But the decisions taken by the United States early in the twenty-first century will play a critical role in determining whether multipolarity reemerges peacefully or brings with it the competitive jockeying that has so frequently been the precursor to great power war in the past. Neither American leaders. long accustomed to calling the shots. and Africa. nor leaders in Europe and East Asia. But it is far wiser and safer to get ahead of the curve and shape structural change by design than to find unipolarity giving way to a chaotic multipolarity by default. if not two. long accustomed to passing the buck. often have the strongest incentives to promote prosperity and stability in their immediate peripheries. and values.71 of 154 steady cooperation among many different nations. North America might. Strong and vibrant regional centers.

These findings suggest that retrenching states rarely courted disaster and occasionally regained their prior position. this does not prove that a preferable policy existed. Wars. declining states refrain from initiating and escalating military disputes. we find that great powers facing acute relative decline adopted retrenchment in at least eleven and at most fifteen of the eighteen cases.69 Far from being more likely to lash out aggressively. preventive or otherwise.60 In addition. No.67 Declining great powers also initiated fewer militarized disputes.) AK Based on our universe of cases. but of these. even if retrenchment was not successful. a range of 61–83 percent. or 72 percent. and their disputes tended to escalate to lower levels of hostility than the baseline category (see figure 2). and are slightly more likely to face acute relative declines.) AK With regard to militarized disputes. “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment”. and recovery of lost rank was fairly frequent. Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College.72 of 154 Retrenchment Good Historically. or the Soviet Union could have done to stay aloft. accounting for thirteen of our eighteen cases. and Joseph. Moreover. it is hard to say what great powers such as Britain. do not appear to be a common fate for declining states. yielding parameters from 58 to 83 percent. and Joseph. In particular. Declining great powers found themselves embroiled in an interstate war in only four of the eighteen cases. a majority of the countries in these cases retrenched shortly after their ordinal transition. In the five years following an ordinal transition. By any accounting. there are few restorative solutions available. Nor does the evidence support the view that domestic interests constrain retrenchment. International Security Spring 2011. Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami. France. This may be because external predators have great difficulty assessing the vulnerability of potential victims. states facing small declines experience levels of hostility in their militarized disputes that are two and a half . “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment”. This suggests timely responses to external constraints rather than domestic intransigence.61 In many cases of decline. two retrenched and one case is arguable. Every one of the great powers in our sample that chose to retrench did so within five years of the ordinal transition. and three are debatable. Nor do declining great powers appear more vulnerable to external predation than other great powers. Vol. No. producing a range of 67–100 percent. Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College. the rate of relative decline is associated with different levels of hostility across militarized disputes. declining great powers that adopted a policy of retrenchment managed to rebound. seven retrenched. Pages 7-44. a significant majority of great powers of differing regime types elected to retrench. In contrast to arguments that retrenchment is rare. International Security Spring 2011. 4. eventually recovering their ordinal rank from the state that surpassed them. Retrenchment is preferable – empirically averages fewer wars than unipolar world MacDonald and Parent 11 (Paul. 35. Moreover. Short of a miracle. the predictions of retrenchment pessimists receive little support. There are only three cases of autocracy. even with the benefit of hindsight. 4. evidence at the coarse-grained level tentatively supports the neorealist approach outlined above: during acute relative decline. politics is often a game of unpalatable alternatives. Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami. which makes comparison among groups difficult. in six of fifteen cases. Vol. two did not. Pages 7-44. Democracies account for about two-thirds of the great powers in our study. great powers experiencing medium or small declines are much less likely to escalate their disputes to high levels of hostility. Of the twelve democracies. and in only one of these cases—1935 United Kingdom—did the declining power go to war with the power that had just surpassed it in ordinal rank. or because retrenchment allows vulnerable powers to effectively recover from decline and still deter potential challengers. there does not appear to be a strong connection between regime type and retrenchment. Further.7 fewer militarized disputes in the five years following ordinal change compared with other great powers over similar periods. 35. declining power don`t go to war – when they do. wars aren’t global MacDonald and Parent 11 (Paul. declining great powers demonstrate more caution and restraint in the use of force: they were involved in an average of 1.59 In short.68 These findings suggest the need for a fundamental revision to the pessimist’s argument regarding the war proneness of declining powers.

credibility.) AK This article has advanced three main arguments. Third. possess more extensive overseas commitments. periods of hegemonic transition do not appear more conflict prone than those of acute decline. similar factors may work to cushion the impending SinoAmerican transition. and Joseph. Vol. they are no longer the top target for balancing coalitions. Although China and the United States differ in regime type. International Security Spring 2011. and work to decrease costly international commitments. fearing the steady erosion of U. We counter that there are deductive and empirical reasons to doubt this argument. No. stakes world of great power politics. Vol. shift burdens to its allies. 35. declining great powers react in a prompt and proportionate manner to their dwindling fortunes. The last reversal at the pinnacle of power was the Anglo-American transition. “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment”. hegemonic powers should actually find it easier to manage acute relative decline. Some might view this prospect with apprehension. In the next few years. which may complicate its ability to sustain its economic performance or engage in foreign policy adventurism. It is likely to initiate and become embroiled in fewer militarized disputes than the average great power and to settle these disputes more amicably. Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College. Some observers might dispute our conclusions. which threatens grave harm to any state that tries to cross them. compromise appears to be a crucial component of retreating to a more defensible—and credible—set of commitments. the United States is ripe to overhaul its military. the United States was slowly emerging from the Civil War. the United States should be able to retrench in the coming decades. Retrenchment good – avoids violence and leads to a better state MacDonald and Parent 11 (Paul. In the high- . The tenor of that transition may have been influenced by a number of factors: both states were democratic maritime empires. International Security Spring 2011. Yet our analysis suggests that retrenchment need not signal weakness. retrenchment pessimists are incorrect when they suggest that retrenchment is an uncommon policy response to great power decline.73 of 154 times less than the average great power. Pages 7-44. arguing that hegemonic transitions are more conflict prone than other moments of acute relative decline. almost by definition. Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami. Theoretically. Far from encouraging further predation. hegemonic powers.) AK Contrary to these predictions. No.93 China faces a variety of domestic political challenges. Fallen hegemons still have formidable capability. a fact that mitigates potential geopolitical competition. “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment”. Both are large. In addition. more defensible frontiers. 4. relatively secure continental great powers. our analysis suggests some grounds for optimism. they should be able to more readily identify and eliminate extraneous burdens without exposing vulnerabilities or exciting domestic populations. and Great Britain could likely coast on a large lead in domestic capital stock. Pages 7-44. They do this for the same reason that they tend to seize opportunities to expand: international incentives are strong inducements. the rate of relative Second and related. Strategic retrenchment peaceful – leads to a balanced multipolar world MacDonald and Parent 11 (Paul. We believe the empirical record supports these conclusions. Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College. In particular.S. and recovering hegemons may be influential because they can play a pivotal role in alliance formation. Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami. including strains among rival regions. Based on the historical track record of great powers facing acute relative decline. 35. These findings suggest that diplomatic moderation and compromise can be a particularly attractive strategy for managing moderate declines. States often curtail their commitments and mellow their ambitions as they fall in the ranks of great powers. First. Holding on to exposed and expensive commitments simply for the sake of one’s reputation is a greater geopolitical gamble than withdrawing to cheaper. which took place around 1872 and was resolved without armed confrontation. states can seldom afford to fool themselves or pamper parochial interests when relative power is perilously slipping away. and Joseph. Further. 4.

but our findings suggest its benefits are overlooked. Competition spurs states to improve themselves. And there is a fair chance of rebound. increase reliance on allies.74 of 154 decline explains not only the extent of retrenchment but also the form. The historical record gives little cause for despair. . Retrenchment has a bad reputation. it may be unwise to speak these conclusions too loudly. and refrain from using force in international disputes. spending can be curbed. Some of the invigorating effects of decline may depend on the pervasive pessimism it arouses. we suggest that our study represents a solid first cut and that domestic political factors loom too large in discussions of power transitions and hegemonic change. and if done intelligently this makes states better. the more likely states are to reform their militaries. Of course. declining powers rise to the challenge of decline so well that they recapture their former glory with some regularity. these findings suggest that retrenchment is an attractive strategy for dealing with great power decline. interest groups controlled. Although we make no claim that the rate of relative decline explains everything. and innovation fostered. The faster the rate of decline. Taken together.

So how can Kim stay in power. 05 (Stephen M. by fostering greater cooperation with key allies. interests to advance those of India? Leaders throughout the world face similar issues.S." He .75 of 154 Heg Turns (1/3) U. Many countries fear U. Bush has called part of an "axis of evil. http://www. POLICYMAKERS have spent the past decade debating how best to wield American power.S. How do you improve Russia's situation in a world dominated by U. September 05. Primacy causes other countries to try to “tame” America – 9/11 proves Walt. Consider Kim Jong I1. Harvard University.S. given U. With so much power in the hands of one country-a country that considers itself destined to lead the world how should other nations respond? Imagine. opposition and North Korea's Lilliputian status? On the other end of the spectrum. Walt. Harvard University. power? Or perhaps you are the prime minister of India. Professor of International Affairs. some more daunting than others. dominance. Basic security is at issue..S. and. Professor of International Affairs. He rules a country that George W. firms declining in key overseas markets due to anti-American sentiment. and they have devised numerous strategies to manage and limit it. Harvard University. power is something Americans must care about as well.pdf) U. You regard U. The time to worry is now.jstor. power and seek to use it to advance their own interests. for a moment. many governments still value U. Yet even Washington's close allies are now looking for ways to tame the United States' might. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and British Prime Minister Tony Blair have worked hard to establish personal connections with U. Taming American Power. So what do you do about the United States? Now picture yourself as the president of Russia. influence. Taming American Power. Professor of International Affairs. The United States will not and should not exit the world stage anytime soon. You face serious regional challengesincluding the rising power of China-but relations with Washington are sometimes prickly. Can you take advantage of parallel U. presidents. How do you deal with American power? This question is one for which every world leader must have an answer.S. with the market share of U. Walt. US dominance causes terrorism. The only remnants of your country's former superpower status are an aging nuclear arsenal and membership in the UN Security Council. For the rest of the world.pdf) Proponents of a muscular U. in the world . September 05. To be sure. Israel and the United Kingdom have long relied on their special relationships with the United States. Walt. So is the health of the U. terrorist attacks demonstrated.S. that you are the president of France.S. economy. And the response of other states to U. by rebuilding its crumbling international image. 05 (Stephen M. Harvard University.S.S. But it must make its dominant position acceptable to others-by using military force sparingly. Professor of International Affairs. 2001.." and North Korea's entire GDP is only one-twentieth the size of the U. the debate is over how best to deal with it. and the United States' global dominance is disquieting.org/stable/pdfplus/20031709.S. defense budget.S. foreign policy tend to portray anti Americanism as hostility toward American values or simple resentment of U.S.S. and your ideal world order is one in which no single state is dominant. http://www. foreign policy as often naive and overweening. President Bush has said that " America was targeted for attack because we're the brightest beacon of freedom . most important of all.jstor.S. and the political fortunes of Sharon and Blair depend on keeping these relationships strong. much less improve his position.S.org/stable/pdfplus/20031709. as the September 11.

were not protesting our policies. stated." . "The terrorists who attacked our country on September 11. a degree of resentment. They were protesting our existence. and resistance." And the Pentagon's new National Defense Strategy. issued in March. 2001.76 of 154 later explained. "Our leading position in the world will continue to breed unease.

77 of 154

Heg Turns (2/3)
Their heg good authors only take into account American perspectives, not overseas views.

Walt, Professor of International Affairs, Harvard University, 05
(Stephen M. Walt, Professor of International Affairs, Harvard University, September 05, Taming American Power, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/20031709.pdf)

Americans tend to see U.S. primacy as beneficial to both their country and the rest of the world. In 2002, the Pew Global Attitudes Project found that 79 percent of U.S. citizens believe it is
good that "American ideas and customs are spreading around the world," and more than 70 percent think that U.S. foreign policy takes the interests of other states into account either "a great deal" or "a fair amount." Bill Clinton has described the United States as "a beacon of hope to peoples around the world," and Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington has declared U.S. predominance to be "central to the future of freedom, democracy, open economies, and international order." In other words, without a benign hegemon maintaining a peaceful global order, many countries would not be able to enjoy the prosperity and security they have come to take for granted. Unfortunately, this rosy view of U.S. power is not shared overseas, where, according to the 2002 Pew survey, overwhelming majorities say that the United States considers the interests of others "not much" or "not at all." Between 40 percent and 6o percent of foreigners polled think the United States is waging its war on terrorism not solely out of security concerns, but also

to "control Mideast oil," "protect Israel," "target Muslim governments," or "dominate the world." A January 2005 BBC survey of 21 countries found only five-India, the Philippines, Poland,
South Africa, and South Korea-where a majority of people had "positive" attitudes toward the United States. Although the United States' global standing has rebounded slightly since the invasion of Iraq two years ago, Pew reported in June 2005 that majorities in all 15 countries it surveyed "favor another country challenging America's global military supremacy, "and that support for the U.S.-led "war on terror" is declining on every continent. Indeed, citizens in Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Russia, Spain, and the United Kingdom now hold more favorable views of China than of the United States.

Heg causes conflicts – experts agree.

Wohlforth, Ph.D, political science, Yale University, 99
(William C. Wohlforth, Daniel Webster Professor of Government, B.A. in International Relations, Beloit College, M.A. in International Relations, Yale University M.Phil., Ph.D. in Political Science, Yale University, Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, Summer 1999, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” MIT Press, International Security, Vol 24, No. 1, p. 6, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/wohlforthvol24no1.pdf) Although they disagree vigorously on virtually every other aspect of post–Cold War world politics, scholars of international relations increasingly share this conventional wisdom about unipolarity. Whether they think that the current structure is on the verge of shifting away from unipolarity or that it has already done so, scholars believe that it [unipolarity] is prone to conflict as other states seek to create a counterpoise to the overweening power of the leading state. The assumption that unipolarity is unstable has framed the wide-ranging debate over the nature of post–Cold War world politics. Since 1991 one of the central questions in dispute has been how to explain continued cooperation and the absence of old-style balance-of-power politics despite major shifts in the distribution of power.

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Hegemony causes war and is unsustainable Eland, 2007 (Ivan. Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute. Ph.D. in Public Policy from George Washington University and Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute. “A Foreign Policy that Only Tarzan Could Love.” Feb 12. http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=1911)
Republicans, however, will be happy to know that George W. Bush should not be solely blamed for this aggressive U.S. foreign policy. Although he did ensnare the United States into significant quagmires on the ground in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States’ modern-day interventionist foreign policy dates back to the Democratic Truman administration after World War II. Of all countries during the post-war period, including the authoritarian Soviet Union, the United States has been, by far, the most aggressive nation on the planet with its military. Even during the Cold War, of the two superpowers, the United States was the first-among-equals and took advantage of it to intervene militarily in all parts of the world. The United States used the fight against communism to advance its imperial tentacles into backwater countries, such as Korea, Vietnam, Angola, Nicaragua, etc. At the international security conference, the suave Secretary of Defense Gates dismissed Putin’s unanswered specific charges on U.S. missile defense in Europe, the expansion of a hostile NATO alliance to Russia’s borders, and U.S. meddling in Russia’s traditional sphere of influence by saying that the United States felt that “one Cold War was quite enough.” Yet Putin was right that the United States is pursuing another Cold War, this time an unstated one, against both Russia and China. In his most astute criticism of the lone superpower’s foreign policy, Putin noted that the power amassed by a global power “destroys it from within.” Alluding to the aggressive, militaristic U.S. foreign policy, Putin noted correctly that, “it has nothing in common with democracy, of course.” Surprisingly, Putin, a domestic autocrat himself, seems to see what the U.S. founders knew, but what the occupants of the post–World War II imperial presidency have not been able to fathom. During the Roman Republic, the concentration of power associated with a militarized foreign policy led to the disintegration of the republic itself. The same thing is happening in the United States now. Thus, to safeguard one of the greatest domestic systems in the world, U.S. citizens and policy makers should drop the Tarzan foreign policy and return to the founders’ policy of minimal interference in the affairs of other nations.

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he did not abandon them but turned instead to truly gigantic collectives called "communes. In India." When Mao Zedong introduced Soviet-style collective farms into China and did not get satisfactory results. the explanation for India's underperformance compared with. and their current status as "late developers"? Students of communism will not be surprised by the answer. Ferguson argues. Canada lies not in British exploitation but rather in the insufficient scale of British interference in the Indian economy. the British did not go far enough in enforcing their ideas. China. NEMESIS: THE LAST DAYS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC. 84 After all their arguments have been deployed. say. p. Mexico. San Diego. author and professor emeritus of the University of California." This Great Leap Forward of the late 1950s produced a famine that took some thirty million Chinese lives. a monument to communist extremism similar to the extremes of laissez-faire that the British dogmatically imposed on their conquered territories—and that Ferguson would have preferred to be yet more extreme. . The historical evidence suggests a strong correlation exists between being on the receiving end of imperialism and immisseration.81 of 154 AT: Ferguson Ferguson ignores the fact that imperialism promoted holocausts and famines Johnson 6 Chalmers Johnson. "If one leaves aside their fundamentally different resource endowments. 2006. The nations that avoided the fates of India. and the Philippines did so by throwing off foreign rule early—as did the United States—or by modernizing militarily in order to hold off the imperialists (and ultimately join them)—as did Japan. how do analysts like Ferguson and Friedman explain the nineteenth-century poverty of India and China. the several dozen Holocaust-sized famines in both countries while food sat on the docks waiting to be exported.

org/issam04172003. "[Zalmay thinks of] security to the exclusion of everything else. Nashashibi.counterpunch." .82 of 154 AT: Khalilzhad Khalilzad’s views are single minded Nashashibi 3 Isaam M. Khalilzad's impeccable credentials make him a natural for membership in the neo-conservatives cabal which is the driving force behind Washington's Iraq policy. Nashashibi. US-Based Director of Deir Yassin Remembered.org/issam04172003. 2003 [“The Neocon’s Bagman to Baghdad”. "he would have been sacked long ago. http://www. US-Based Director of Deir Yassin Remembered. Counterpunch. Frequent Writer on Arab Issues.counterpunch. Frequent Writer on Arab Issues. that Khalilzad has been wrong as often as he has been rightgoing back to the days when he advocated arming the same Afghani groups that later spawned the Taliban. http://www. "He has a narrow of view of the Middle East and South Asia." Khalilzad’s theories are wrong Nashashibi 3 Isaam M. April 17.html] His many critics point out." said Anatol Lieven." his former associate stressed. perhaps. Counterpunch. however. an analyst with the Carnegie Endowment for Peace in Washington. not the last policy option. 2003 [“The Neocon’s Bagman to Baghdad”.html] More importantly. "If he was in private business rather than government. He tends to look at military solutions as the first. April 17.

77 .D. Brooks and Wohlforth make a strong case for unipolar stability. Japan. After all. Over time. which is not very long at all. Similarly. 09 – Mary Julia and George R. leadership costs sap the hegemon’s power and push it into decline. Brooks and Wohlforth’s inability to provide a convincing explanation for the absence of coalition formation against the United States in the early Cold War period. which allows other states to catch up. International Security. China. know-how. Levy (Board of Governors’ Professor at Rutgers University and former president of both the International Studies Association and the Peace Science Society) and William R.D. Ph. the American era of unipolarity contains the seeds of its own demise. despite their claim at the be-ginning of World Out of Balance that unipolarity is robust and that U. LL. and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute (Christopher.pdf In addition. they do not engage the argument that. and managerial skills diffuse throughout the international economic system. J.44 Not only is this a weak case for unipolarity. In this respect. Thompson (Donald A. If the hypothesis that great powers balance against aspiring hegemons is unconditionally valid. however. and they joined the United States in a defensive balancing coalition against the Soviet Union. former president of the International Studies Association. and if the only issue is the distribution of material capabilities. p. and the combination of the European Union. when such behavior would not have been so risky. and this is spurring an ongoing process of multipolarization. it is also an implicit admission that—although it has yet to bear fruit—other states are engaged in counterbalancing the United States. the debate about unipolar stability is misleading. Hegemony—Myth or Reality? A Review Essay". weakens their explanation for nonbalancing after the end of the Cold War. Summer 2009. "The Waning of U. most of the great powers perceived that the greatest threat to their interests came from the Soviet Union.42 Their case is based on a freeze-frame view of the distribution of capabilities in the international system. and Russia. 15. from USC. Brooks 10 and Wohlforth’s argument that the balancing hypothesis applies only to states that are growing and threatening to achieve a position of hegemony but not to established hegemons such as the United States raises the question of why other leading states did not balance against the United States when it was a rising great power but before it established a position of primacy— perhaps in the late 1940s.ksg. Rogers Professor of Political Science at Indiana University. 34. Hegemons sprint to the front of the great power pack because of economic leadership based on productivity and technological innovation.edu/files/Balancing_on_Land_and_at_Sea. could form an effective balancing coalition against the United States if it was seen as so threatening. Jordan Professor of International Affairs at Texas A&M's George Bush School of Government and Public Service. hegemony will endure well into the future. No.S. technology. reinforced by nuclear deterrence.S. then there were plenty of opportunities for a counterbalancing coalition to form against the United States throughout the Cold War period. hegemony. in International Law from Virginia Law.43 A key question is whether the early decades of the twenty-first century will witness the decline of U. KONTOPOULOS) PDF Superficially.S. July 6th 2009. Vol. and Managing Editor of International Studies Quarterly) Summer 2010 “ Balancing on Land and at Sea Do States Ally against the Leading Global Power?” http://belfercenter.M.83 of 154 AT: Brooks&Wohlforth Reject Brooks and Wohlforth – their analysis is based off a freeze frame of IR and doesn't into account other factors that cause hegemonic decline Layne. 1. Instead. like all hegemonic systems. But there is less to their argument than meets the eye.45 Brooks and Wolforth concede that coalitional balancing will work against the US Jack S. in Political Science from the University of California.harvard. Brooks and Wohlforth concede that even today the member states of the European Union collectively exceed the United States in gross domestic product. not from the United States. Galileo. Brooks and Wohlforth actually concede that unipolarity is not likely to last more than another twenty years.

84 of 154 ***Multipolarity Good .

S. exercise a free hand strategically. Maintaining U. Its quest for hegemony is driven instead by an ideational.S. Rather than risking these outcomes. the risk of conflict and the possible exposure of the American homeland to attack. derive directly from the overseas commitments mandated by hegemony's all-encompassing definition of U. the United States should begin to retrench strategically and capitalize on the advantages accruing to insular great powers in multipolar systems. and it could—and should—insulate itself from possible future Eurasian great power wars. which is a potentially dangerous strategy. rather than arising from any direct threat to the United States itself. Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute. thus causing the United States to become imperially overstretched and involving it in unnecessary wars that will reduce its power. it probably will. Paradoxically.S. 130 It also must rein in the scope of its extravagant ambitions to shape the international system in accordance with its Wilsonian ideology. Project Muse) The United States has a hegemony problem because it wields hegemonic power. indeed." International Security. offshore balancing would take advantage of the unique geostrategic advantages that allow the United States to benefit from multipolarity.S.S. have to fight to uphold its primacy. Attempts to uphold hegemony only erode primacy faster – only acceptance of multipolarity guarantees a peaceful transition Layne.S. Volume 31. as an insular great power. . If the United States fails to adopt an offshore balancing strategy based on multipolarity and military and ideological self-restraint. power. For the United States. 131 Thus. primacy may already be in the early stages of erosion. attempting to sustain U. The United States is far removed from powerful rivals and shielded from them both by geography and its own hard power. especially given that U. interests. An America [End Page 40] that has the wisdom and prudence to contain itself is less likely to be feared than one that begs the rest of the world to stop it before it expands hegemonically again.85 of 154 MultiPol Good – Generic U. deterritorialized conception of security divorced from the traditional metrics of great power grand strategy: the distribution of power in the international system and geography. Unilateral offshore balancing.S. hegemony is a game that no longer is worth the candle. Consequently. "The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States' Unipolar Moment. primacy may well hasten its end by stimulating more intensive efforts to balance against the United States. As an offshore balancer. at some point. The United States does not need to be an extraregional hegemon to be secure. the United States must practice self-restraint (which is different from choosing to be constrained by others by adopting a multilateral approach to grand strategy). is America's next grand strategy. allies. the United States is far less vulnerable to the effects of "instability" than are the major powers of Eurasia. withdrawal and a concurrent shift to multipolarity would prevent American involvement in major power wars. Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 170 By devolving full responsibility for their defense to U. and avoid being automatically engulfed in Eurasian conflicts because of its alliance commitments. the United States must accept some reduction in its relative hard power by adopting a multipolar—and essentially unilateral—offshore balancing strategy that accommodates the rise of new great powers. To reduce the fear of U. 2006 (Christopher. to reduce others' concerns about its power. Fall. Number 2. the United States would reap security advantages from a reversion to multipolarity.

military strength is crucial and that pure multilateralism is impossible. tracing financial flows. unspectacular civilian cooperation with other countries in areas such as intelligence sharing.86 of 154 MultiPol Good – Terror Multilateralism key to reducing threats from terrorism Nye 3 Joseph Nye. the American military success in Afghanistan dealt with the easiest part of the problem: toppling an oppressive and weak government in a poor country. The best response to transnational terrorist networks is networks of cooperating government agencies. and border controls. military power is essential to global stability and is a critical part of the response to terrorism. Rather than proving the new unilateralists' point. Harvard. Foreign Affairs. And bombing cannot resolve the problem of cells in Hamburg or Detroit. But all the precision bombing destroyed only a small fraction of al Qaeda's network. they make important mistakes that will ultimately undercut the implementation of the new security strategy. Their first mistake is to focus too heavily on military power alone. But the metaphor of war should not blind Americans to the fact that suppressing terrorism will take years of patient.S. the partial nature of the success in Afghanistan illustrates the continuing need for cooperation. For example. July. 2003. Issue 4.S. EBSCO Although the new unilateralists are right that maintaining U. U. Volume 82. police work. which retains cells in some 60 countries. .

Besides war. if we've learned anything from the recent adventure in Iraq it's that the world has neither little stomach nor patience for preemptive war. When the Israeli's bombed Osirak they didn't bother to even warn the US. tread lightly. As I stated earlier. if the rationale for bombing it was to prevent weapons from being made there. both nuclear and conventional. The first and easiest to understand reason why the Israeli's didn't attack Bushehr is that the US deemed it not to be a proliferation risk. why didn't the Israeli's make good on a decade of threats and blow the place up? More to the point. not to mention most of the Middle East as they are all tied together both militarily and financially. Russia and at least a third of Latin America. lest they risk radioactive fallout from blowing up a live nuclear reactor. Attacking Iran leads to military conflict with China. Had Israel attacked Bushehr they would have lost the war before the battle had even begun in the court of world opinion. State Department spokesman Darby Holladay stated that since Russia had agreed to supply nuclear fuel and remove spent fuel rods. the economic repercussions to both countries would be far worse and much faster than anything else besides nuclear oblivion.S. envoy to the United Nations John Bolton told the Israeli's and the world via Fox News that if Israel was going to launch an attack on Bushehr. China. In short. In a game of carrot and stick. Russia. The U. It is one thing when only two countries have nuclear weapons and neither are particularly invested in your best interest and quite another when a number of countries have nuclear weapons and have a vested interest in your survival. you are forced to just live with it and that's a reality for both the US and Israel. So the question is. as imports from there jumped according to the Commerce Department earlier this month. Now. not only did Iran begin to bring Bushehr online but also days later they even debuted an unmanned attack drone and announced plans for the mass production of high-speed missile-launching assault boats. etc. we've buried the stick and hope that lots of carrots work. the highest since October 2008. the US also has to contend with the economic realities of the multi-polar world. Of course.htm) Prior to this event former U. there was minimal risk the plant would be used to make nuclear weapons. We're not going to embargo China or any country that really matters because doing so will only hurt us in the long run.S. there are in fact limits to growth whether you're global or isolated. masters degree in social work (msw) and 10 years of social work. In addition. Negligible economic progress will probably occur but for the most part. But the week passed and there was no assault. The dominoes that fell after they hit Iraq didn't register on the radar of the superpower that was the US. In fact. U. http://www. holds roughly $843. if either the US or China. it needed to do it before the 21st. Once Bill Clinton and the Republican congress started us down the free trade path they left the proverbial barn door open and there's no closing it now. opted to do something of a "cowboy-like" nature like bomb Iran or invade Taiwan. global interconnected markets.2 billion in June.7 billion in US treasury securities. they didn't have to. and frankly given the world of the early 80's. mental health. No Osirak-like mission was to be had. There were indicators that this was a possibility as the Saudi's had given Israel permission to fly over their country in the event they planned to actually attack Iran. And you can make this case the world over with the EU.com/politics/columns/150306/Nuclear-Iran-and-the-Multi-Polar-World.411mania. The US and China are the two biggest economies in the world. “Nuclear Iran and the multi-polar world”. for example. trade deficit with China widened to $26. then there was no reason to bomb it in the first place. Despite some of the crazy rhetoric we hear on cable news and even from the mouths of certain leaders across the world. in a situation like this once you've run out of carrots and there is no stick to use. Despite the assertions of boisterous radio personalities. what more could the United States have done to prevent this event from occurring? The answers lies in the political-economic structure of the multi-polar world we are now living in. Sure in the short run manufacturing will briefly return but sooner or later markets become saturated and we're right back to where we are now. as of June 2010. and health care experience as a licensed clinical social worker. the times they have a-changed. Latin America. war isn't something anyone is really interested in and therefore there's only so much any one country can do when another opts to flout international concerns. 8/23/10 (Mark.87 of 154 MultiPol Good – Iran Multipolarity solves Iran better than unipolarity Radulich.S. this is indeed the New Normal. professional blogger on global events since 2004. So what more could the Obama Administration have done to prevent Bushehr from coming online? The answer is simply . such is the multi-polar world. With countries scattered across the globe armed with intercontinental ballistic missiles it behooves every serious country to at best.

we're all locked into an eternal state of check.88 of 154 nothing. etc. We're not alone in that respect because quite frankly so is the rest of the sane. civilized world. Welcome to the real New World Order. sanctions. aren't a viable option either. embargoes. Military action isn't a viable option. with no checkmate in sight. That answer doesn't change if or when a Republican becomes president. The latest episode with Iran shows us that the US is more or less impotent. trade wars. Mutually Assured Destruction for everybody and nobody. Essentially a multi-polar world with every country seated at the round table means that for the most part. .

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***HEG BAD***

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Heg Unsustainable
Decline is inevitable -- soft power, defense spending, China rise. Geeraerts 11 – Gustaaf, professor of international relations at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel and director of the Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies (European Review, Vol. 19, No. 1, 57–67, 2011, “China, the EU, and the New Multipolarity,” http://www.vub.ac.be/biccs/site/assets/files/apapers/China,%20the%20EU%20and %20Multipolarity-2.pdf) The structure of the international system is changing with the evaporation of America’s unipolar moment. ‘The decline of U.S. primacy and the subsequent transition to a multipolar world are inevitable,’ Wang Jisi wrote in 2004. 2 More recently John Ikenberry stated that ‘The United States’ ‘‘unipolar moment’’ will inevitably end.’ 3 Not only has the influence of the lonely superpower severely been affected by the expensive wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; its economic clout too has declined faster than ever before and its soft power is increasingly contested. At the same time, China is undeniably becoming a global power. Since
the cautious opening up of China’s door by Deng Xiaoping in 1978, her economy has quadrupled in size and some expect it to double again over the next decade. China is about to become the second most

important single economy in the world. At the most recent G20 meeting in Pittsburgh, Hu Jintao, China’s president was the only one to arrive at the head of a major economy still enjoying strong growth, having the luxury of substantial financial reserves. But China is not only growing economically, its military clout is also on the rise. 4 In 2008 China evolved into the world’s second highest military spender. 5 It is the only country emerging both as a military and economic rival of the US and thus generating a fundamental shift in the global distribution of power and influence. Such power transitions are a recurring phenomenon in
international politics and have always constituted episodes of uncertainty and higher risk. They contain the seeds of fierce strategic rivalry between the up-and-coming state and the residing leading power, thereby increasing the likelihood of contention and conflict. No wonder that China’s spectacular economic growth and increasingly assertive diplomacy have incited other key-players to ponder how Beijing will seek to manage this transition and even more how it will use its leverage afterwards. Notwithstanding that China still sees itself partly as a developing country, it is becoming more confident in its rising power and status. As its economic interests abroad

are expanding rapidly, so will the pressure increase to safeguard them more proactively. National security is no longer solely a matter of defending sovereignty and domestic development. It also becomes necessary for China to back up its growing interests overseas with a
more robust diplomacy and security policy. To be sure, the US is still the most important single economy in the world. It also remains the world’s largest military power. While the EU has developed into an even

larger economy and has become the most important entity in terms of external trade flows, politically and militarily it performs far below its potential and is no match either for the US or China. The EU’s foreign policy is confronted with a collective action problem of sorts, and as a result is lacking in bot strategic vision and assertiveness. Although still smaller than the other two, China has grown into the world’s second largest national economy and also the one that grows most quickly. According to some estimates, China will move on a par with the US in 2020 and
become the world’s biggest economy in 2030 (see Table 1). Moreover China is steadily increasing its military power. In Beijing’s view, economic prowess is not sufficient for a state to become a first rank power. ‘What is important is comprehensive national power, as shown by the ability of the Soviet Union to balance the much wealthier US in the Cold War and the continuing inability of an economically powerful Japan to play a political role’. 6 This view is very much in line with the neorealist conception that to be considered a ‘pole’ a country must amass sufficient power in all of Waltz’s categories of power: ‘size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence.’ 7

Heg structurally unsustainable -- economics and rising powers. Petras 10 – James, retired Bartle Professor (Emeritus) of Sociology at Binghamton University in Binghamton, New York and adjunct professor at Saint Mary's University

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(4/28/10, “Rising and Declining Economic Powers: The Sino-US Conflict Deepens,” http://lahaine.org/petras/b2-img/petras_sinous.pdf) The US has a trade deficit with at least 91 other countries besides China, demonstrating that the problem is embedded in the structure of the US economy. Any punitive measure to restrict China’s exports to the US will only increase Washington’s deficit with other competitive exporters. A decline of US imports from China will not result in an increase for US manufacturers because of the under-capitalized nature of the latter, directly related to the pre-eminent position of finance capital in capturing and allocating savings. Moreover, “third countries” can re-export Chinese made products, putting the US in the unenviable
position of starting trade wars across the board or accepting the fact that a finance –commercial led economy is not competitive in today’s world economy. China’s decision to incrementally divert its trade surplus

from the purchase of US Treasury notes to more productive investments in developing its “hinterland” and to strategic overseas ventures in raw materials and energy sectors will eventually force the US Treasury to raise interest rates to avoid large scale flight from the dollar. Rising interest rates may benefit currency traders, but could weaken any US recovery or plunge the country back into a depression. Nothing weakens a global empire more than having to repatriate overseas investments and constrain foreign lending to bolster a sliding domestic economy. The pursuit of protectionist policies will have a major negative impact on US MNC in China since the bulk of their products are exported to the US market: Washington will cut its nose to spite its face. Moreover, a trade war could spill over and adversely affect US auto corporations producing for the Chinese market. GM and Ford are far more profitable in China than the US where they are running in the red 44 . A US trade war will have an initial negative impact on China until it adjusts and takes advantage of the potential 400 million consumers in the vast interior of the country. Moreover, Chinese economic policymakers are rapidly diversifying their trade toward Asia, Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, Russia and even in the EU. Trade protectionism may
create a few jobs in some uncompetitive manufacturing sectors in the US but it may cost more jobs in the commercial sector (Wal-Mart) which depends on low priced items to low income consumers. The bellicose trade rhetoric on Capitol Hill and confrontational policies adopted by the White House are dangerous posturing, designed to deflect attention from the profound structural weaknesses of the domestic foundations of the empire. The deeply entrenched financial sector and the equally dominant military metaphysic which directs foreign policy have led the US down the steep slope of chronic economic crises, endless costly wars, deepening class and ethno-racial inequalities as well as declining living standards. In the new competitive multi-polar world order, the

US cannot successfully follow the earlier path of blocking a rising imperial power’s access to strategic resources via colonial dictated boycotts. Not even in countries under US occupation, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, can the White House block China from signing lucrative investment and trade deals. With countries in the US sphere of influence, like
Taiwan, South Korea and Japan, the rate of growth of trade and investment with China far exceeds that of the US. Short of a full scale unilateral military blockade, the US cannot contain China’s rise as a world

economic actor, a newly emerging imperial power. The major weakness in China is internal, rooted
in class divisions and class exploitation, which the currently entrenched political elite profoundly linked through family and economic ties, might ameliorate but cannot eliminate 45 . Up to now China has been able to expand globally through a form of “social imperialism”, distributing a portion of the wealth generated overseas to a growing urban middle class and to upwardly mobile managers, professionals, real estate speculators and regional party cadre. In contrast the US, military directed overseas conquests have been costly with no

economic returns and with long term damage to the civilian economy both in its internal and external manifestations. Iraq and Afghanistan do not reward the imperial treasury in anyway comparable \\to what England plundered from India, South Africa and Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). In a world increasingly based in market relations, colonial style wars have no economic future. Huge military budgets and hundreds of military bases and military based alliances with neo-colonial states are the least efficient means to compete successfully in a globalized market place. That is the reason why the US is a declining empire and China, with its market driven approach is a newly emerging empire of a ‘new sort’ (sui generis).

A strong US global role remains the orthodoxy on both sides of American politics and across the foreign policy elite.92 of 154 Decline is inevitable in the status quo – US isolationist attitudes and US spending unsustainably. China’s rapid military modernisation program is likely to continue unabated during this period.Bachelor of Arts in Journalism and Political Science (2/2/10.2 per cent in 2008 and the highest figure since the Second World War. public sentiment could constrain Washington from continuing to provide the two things that Asia most wants from America: open markets and security. Dustin. albeit gradual. but no consensus on the kinds of long-term solutions that need to be enacted. je) The sun may finally be setting on the American Century. Perhaps even more worrying. significant negative trends are emerging for America’s global role and its strategic position in Asia over the longer term. Ensinger ’10. Nonetheless. the US defence budget is likely to come under serious pressure from 2016.2 per cent of gross domestic product – up massively from 3. space. Even if the United States retains the will to remain Asia’s hegemon. which represented just 33 per cent of GDP in 2001.but the nation’s projected long-term debt is even more unsustainable. Not only is the deficit out-ofcontrol . “[Obama’s] budget draws a picture of a nation that like many American homeowners simply cannot get above water. 100 Should these trends continue. East Asia Program Director at the Lowy Institute for International Policy (June 2010. Hegemony”. Absent a change in national priorities. many of them intended to deny US forces access in realms where American power has previously been unchallenged.S. even as Washington’s margin of conventional superiority diminishes. Although his popularity has dipped. President Obama’s election was greeted with a wave of enthusiasm and hope for the future. China held $790 billion of U. Rory Medcalf. http://economyincrisis. it is likely to face capacity constraints in the medium to long term. according to The New York America‘s massive and unsustainable debt will be the cause of waning influence around the world in the near future. Even worse. debt while Japan held roughly $752 billion. As of September 2009.pdf) Such a domestic crisis in the United States seems unlikely. There is evidence that the United States is entering one of its inward-looking phases – a consequence of the economic downturn and costly wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. MacArthur Foundation and the Lowy Institute. By the end of the decade. There is widespread agreement that the US fiscal situation is unsustainable.org/content/hugedeficits-altering-us-hegemony.org/images/uploads/blog_attachments/Asian_security_futur es_-_final_version. The problem is exacerbated by the political impasse in America.3 trillion in the 2011 fiscal year .Journalist for Economy in Crisis.macfound. particularly in Asia. especially Asian powers Japan and China. in which each Times. which claims that . This represents 11.S. The US Congressional Budget Office (CBO) conservatively estimates the US federal budget deficit for 2009 will reach US$ 1. Protectionist sentiment is growing.” The Times writes.1000 Zumwalt destroyer will be terminated. Raoul Heinrichs. Cook et al 10 – Malcolm. cyber and blue-water naval capabilities. and uncertainties remain as to the long-term direction of space and missile defence programs. nuclear weapons are being assigned a more limited role in US defence planning. The economy is showing signs of a recovery. with a particular focus on missile.expected to be 1.6 trillion. The Obama administration has already announced cuts to real defence spending. capabilities in domains which will become increasingly important. and the Obama administration has raised concerns in Asia by decisions such as imposition of a punitive tariff on Chinese tyres. The CBO estimates that public debt. Beyond the next decade an ageing population and rising healthcare costs will increase America’s fiscal challenges. “Power and Choice: Asian Security Futures. “Huge Deficits Altering U. high deficits.” http://asiasecurity. Andrew Shearer. 10 Plus. The Economy in Crisis. will continue to grow to 68 per cent of GDP by 2019. a Pew poll released in December 2009 showed isolationist sentiment in the United States surging to a four-decade high. deficits are projected to rise to over five percent of gross domestic product. Major weapons programs such as the F-22 advanced Raptor fighter and the DDG. much of that debt is borrowed from foreign central banks.

2009. long thought of as America’s top competitor for superpower status. there needs to be a combination of both. seeking to ensure peace and stability not just in its own neighborhood--the Americas--but also in Europe and Asia. Since the cold war. If present trends continue. we will look back at the Bush administration years as the death knell for American hegemony. “Empire Falls. others see America’s imminent demise.S.” http://findarticles.wars and economic power decline Pape 9 – Robert A. seeking to denuclearize North Korea and expanding America's military allies in Europe up to the borders of Russia itself. accounted for nearly half of all the world’s military expenditures. while the ultimate foundation of American power--the relative superiority of the U. As of 2009. that believe America will remain the world’s preeminent power for some time. economy is still by far the largest. fairly short. Some side is firmly entrenched in an unwavering ideological battle. the fall of American power will be more precipitous with the passage of time.93 of 154 Republicans refuse to even entertain the idea of any tax increase while Democrats chafe at the though of entitlement cuts. followed by Russia at five percent. unsustainable trade deficits and concerns about the strength of the dollar have all caused some experts to question America’s place in the world and suggest that American influence may be rapidly dwindling. America's shrinking share of world economic production is a fact of life and important changes in U. And since the 1960s America’s gross domestic product has represented roughly 20 to 25 percent of the global economy..col1 originally from The National Interest) America is in unprecedented decline. and that the U. relative decline has been.S. increasingly negative current-account balances and other internal economic weaknesses have cost the United States real power in today's world of rapidly spreading knowledge and technology. solutions to each of them individually and all of them . as the world’s largest economy. but in recent years American leaders have pursued far more ambitious goals than merely maintaining the status quo. The next closest was China at just eight percent. From public intellectuals like Charles Krauthammer and Niall Ferguson to neoconservatives like Paul Wolfowitz and Robert Kagan. Professor of political science at the University of Chicago (Jan-Feb. however. The United States is not just the sole superpower in the uni-polar-dominance school's world. To be sure. thus far. without deliberate action. further decline in the foreseeable future. Russia. the period of U. The self-inflicted wounds of the Iraq War.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_99/ai_n32148803/? tag=content. those convinced of U.S. but pursued ambitious objectives in all three major regions at the same time--waging wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Simply maintaining these commitments requires enormous resources. An extremely low savings rate. There is also good reason to think that. Others point out that America’s military might is still unmatched around the world.S. grand strategy are necessary to prevent the decline in America's global position from accelerating. dominance in the international system have encouraged American policy makers to act unilaterally and seize almost any opportunity to advance American interests no matter the costs to others. if not rectify. For the past eight years. The Bush administration has not just continued America's traditional grand strategy. the United States has maintained a vast array of overseas commitments. For nearly two decades. Still. growing government debt. Still.S.S. Although the immediate problems of war in by Iraq and Afghanistan.S. along with the oil-rich Persian Gulf (as well as other parts of the world). the U. the decline of America’s manufacturing base. Iran's continued nuclear program and Russia's recent military adventure in Georgia are high-priority issues. believe that China. even to academicians like Dartmouth's William Wohlforth and Stephen Brooks. In reality. our policies have been based on these flawed arguments. A healthy appreciation of our situation American leaders may lead to policies that could mitigate. Heg is unsustainable -. China and other major powers could seriously oppose American military power. France. This is simply no longer realistic. al-Qaeda's new sanctuary in western Pakistan. will not be able to maintain its current pace of economic growth long enough to pass the U. to put America back on a path of fiscal sanity and ensure that America remains a hegemony. virtually discounting the possibility that Germany. but is so relatively more powerful than any other country that it can reshape the international order according to American interests. all believe the principal feature of the post- cold-war world is the unchallengeable dominance of American power. economy in the world--has been in decline since early on in the Bush administration. There are some analysts and experts.

There was a very substantial element of hypocrisy in this position during the Cold War. even if he is. its policy of ‘extraordinary renditions’ and acceptance of de facto torture. the US is losing its claim to be a model and to own the future. It is not clear that he is an economic liberal. however. at a seeming US inclination to use force as the first-choice policy instrument. and whether the US economic model is either sustainable or desirable. nor. giving bigger voices to other players. and its weakening position in Congress does not augur well. If the world economy can be managed globally at all. and. It has neither the economic resources. even so.94 of 154 Most important. and the Beijing consensus. When the world looks at American health and welfare policies. at a US government that under Bush was openly comfortable with the use of torture and was reelected. On trade. The EU model looks more attractive to some. Under Clinton and Bush. Obama’s options are massively constrained by the magnitude of the economic crisis. With the Washington consensus discredited. and US indebtedness was weakening its position. 25 The truth of Bromley’s observation has been amplified by recent events: ‘US economic leadership power exists but it is a wasting asset … governance of the world economy is something that would have to be accomplished collectively if it is to be accomplished at all. and economic liberal values in the form of free(r) trade and financial liberalization. it now more easily asks not just whether the US is a questionable model. In terms of economic liberalism. 1 3-25) In addition to standing increasingly on its own in the main areas of international policy. 25 no. At this point. then the emergence of a more regionalized world political economy becomes more likely (more on this later). competitors to the dollar as reserve currency were on the rise. In some ways the ‘civilian power’ EU is now a better representative of political liberal values. the ideological authority to do so. That claim has long been based on the US championing of political liberal values in the form of democracy and human rights. . there is little scope left for the US to legitimize its leadership by appealing to liberal values either political or economic. America's declining power means that the unipolar world is indeed coming to an end. collectively will be heavily influenced by America's reduced power position in the world.” International Relations. with the collapse of the Washington consensus. it will have to be done collectively (e. economic influence. are now both more open to serious question. at the influence of religion and special interest lobbies in US domestic politics. “The Inaugural Kenneth N.g. So America’s claim to represent the (liberal) future is now blighted both by its own failures and by the shortcomings of the liberal model itself. March 2011 vol. that major powers will increasingly have the strength to balance against U. at the financial mess. On the political side.S. and. our own hubris may be our downfall. or are too protracted and costly. cannot lead the world out of it. via the G20 and other suchlike groups of leading powers). badly damaged itself. the US had largely ceased to lead anyway.’ 26 If attempts to get the global economy going again fail. Montague Burton Professor in the Department of International Relations (March 25. many Democrats in Congress look likely to be even less enthusiastic about further trade liberalisation than the Bush Republicans were. Whether an unsustainable ‘American way of life’ is an appropriate model for the rest of the world. policies they oppose and that the United States will increasingly face harsh foreign-policy choices. US abuses of human rights at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo. Waltz Annual Lecture A World Order Without Superpowers : Decentred Globalism. The Obama administration has a huge amount of damage to repair before it can present the US as a beacon of political liberalism. but whether it has become a serious part of the problem. the GWoT means that Washington is still under pressure to prefer antiterrorist governments to democratic ones. have gutted Washington’s credibility to say much about human rights. its weakening economic position making it more protectionist. yet. and at a federal environmental policy until recently in denial about global warming. Like so many great powers that have come and gone before. the Obama inheritance is even worse. the financial world took on a globalised life of its own. both European social markets. Heg is unsustainable -. and internal conflicts Buzan 11 – Barry. much was done. other ideas about how to run the global political economy are in play. 2011. as well as its fierce resistance to the International Criminal Court.international legitimacy. Even before the current economic crisis. The US led the world into this recession.

the United States increased its share of world production during the 1990s. let us start with the unipolar-dominance school's preferred measure of American hegemony. The basic notion is simple: take U. many of the deeper issues are structural. Whereas in 2000.. dollars.col1 originally from The National Interest) True. and with it the ultimate sources of state power--productive capacities. “Empire Falls. (2) By this metric. the Chinese have caught or nearly caught up with Americans in every category in the aggregate. The Post-American World. with more patents each year than in all other countries combined. 2009. and is being turned around by Obama.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_99/ai_n32148803/? tag=content. According to GDP figures in current U. In past eras--the "age of iron" and the "age of steel"--leading states retained their technological advantages for many decades. Professor of political science at the University of Chicago (Jan-Feb. 2009.S. domestic product in any year and divide it by the aggregate total of the gross domestic product of all states in the world. the unipolar-dominance school prefers to compare every country's output in current-year U. religious. Tech diffusion = heg unsustainable. While some of this negative image was specific to the Bush administration.” http://findarticles. China. and their rapid global diffusion is a profound factor driving down America's power compared to other countries. single-year "snapshots" of America's relative power are of limited value for assessing the sustainability of its grand strategy over many years. dominance based on the current-year dollar figures.” http://findarticles. and then began to steadily lose ground during the eight years of the Bush administration. (5) The fact that the United States remains ahead of China on a per capita basis does matter--it means that China. “Empire Falls. The US is no longer the only model of the future in play. in 2008. To measure gross domestic product. population. (4) As Fareed Zakaria describes in his recent book. share of world product. Indeed.S. in 2006 the United States had 28 percent of world product while its nearest most likely competitor. The US is much more culturally conservative. US heg not sustainable -. five times the internet users and forty times the broadband subscribers as China. technology and knowledge diffuse more quickly today. Pape 9 – Robert A. while its individualism and anti-statism set it apart from Asia. the United States has not lost its position as the most innovative country in the world. Professor of political science at the University of Chicago (Jan-Feb. individualistic and anti-state than most other parts of the West. with its relative power ultimately falling by nearly a quarter in the first . cultural conservatism and antistatism set it apart from most of Europe. a method that tends to show America is much further ahead of other countries than alternative measures.S. dollars from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_99/ai_n32148803/? tag=content.S. America is losing its overwhelming technological dominance in the leading industries of the knowledge economy.S. can create many more knowledge workers in the future. the most recent call for America to exploit its hegemonic position (published in 2008) rests on the presumption of U.col1 originally from The National Interest) Advocates of extending America's unipolar dominance are well aware of the central importance of the economic foundations of American power and routinely present detailed statistics on the U.95 of 154 and the emergent Chinese model to others.. and it is far from clear that it will ever be able to recover the leading position that it once possessed. For grand-strategic concerns--especially how well the United States can balance its resources and foreign-policy commitments--the trajectory of American power compared to other states is of seminal importance. For the sake of argument. had 6 percent. Looks pretty good for America. right? Alas.relative economic decline. with more than four times the U. For instance.S. although the United States remains well ahead of China on many indicators of leading technology on a per capita basis. reached its apogee in 2000. but look at the trajectory of the data over time. However. Pape 9 – Robert A. Its religiosity. the ability to diffuse new technology--to turn chalkboard ideas into mass-produced applications--has been spreading rapidly across many parts of the globe. the United States had three times the computer sales. this grossly under-weights the size of the knowledge economy in China compared to America.

from year after year of losses in the 1990s to significant annual gains since 2000. over the past two decades. China and Russia are expected to continue growing at a substantially greater rate than the United States. decline. The United States has been going through the first decade of the twenty-first century not stronger than before. the United States is now a declining power.S.7 percent per year from 2000 to 2008 instead of the (Bush) rate of 2.. the fact is that since 2000. If we look out as far as the IMF can see (2013). U. America's decline was well under way before the economic downturn. As Table 3 shows. At the same time. the trend is the same. What would happen if we assumed that the United States grew during the Bush years at the same rate as during Clinton's? What would have happened had the world continued on its same trajectory.7 percent--the assumed marginal gain of 2. This trajectory is almost sure to be revised further downward as the consequences of the financial crisis in fall 2008 become manifest." Still. but we assume China did not grow at such an astounding rate? Of course. 2009. decline due to the global diffusion of technology. Table 2 shows the trajectory of the share of world product for the United States and China using both alternative measures. Simply put. these back-of-the-envelope approximations serve as useful starting points. growth rates are down almost 50 percent from the Clinton years. power is the result of uneven rates of economic growth between America. As the most recent growth estimates (November 2008) by the :ME make clear. (6) When compared to the share of gross world product lost by the United States from 2000 to 2008--7.S. China and other states in the world. has grown consistently. growth has fallen considerably.2 percent instead of its actual 23. Had the American economy grown at the (Clinton) rate of 3. one can gain a rough weighting of the factors behind America's shrinking share of world production by asking a few simple counterfactual questions of the data. although all major countries are suffering economically. and the United States and the rest of the world continued along their actual path of economic growth since 2000. Again using IMF figures. The answers are pretty straightforward.3 percent.2 percent.1 percent.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_99/ai_n32148803/? tag=content. Worse. Professor of political science at the University of Chicago (Jan-Feb.2 percent more than today. things get even worse--with the United States expected to continue declining and China to continue rising. These estimates suggest that roughly a quarter of America's relative decline is due to .96 of 154 decade of the twenty-first century. constant-dollar calculations and purchasing power parity.S.S. Heg decline inevitable and irreversible. (3) Although each offers advantages and disadvantages. how much is U. but substantially weaker. Assuming the rest of the world continued at its actual rate of growth. When compared to the share of world product lost by the United States from 2000 to 2008--7.7 percent--the assumed marginal gain of 1. At the same time. How much does China matter? Imagine the extreme case--that China had not grown.S. China has sustained a consistently high rate of growth of 10 percent per year--a truly stunning performance. the relative power of China. which is likely to only further weaken U. “Empire Falls. Despite all the pro-economy talk from the Bush administration. The erosion of the underpinnings of U. power. And regardless of the metric. If so.S.” http://findarticles. Russia has also turned its economic trajectory around. these are merely thought experiments. economic weaknesses under Bush or Chinas superior economic performance? Although precise answers are not possible.S. America's share of world product in 2008 would have risen to 25.col1 originally from The National Interest) So. This new reality has tremendous implications for the future of American grand strategy.1 percent of world product amounts to some 27 percent of the U. the average rate of U. for our purposes what matters is that they form a lower bound of America's relative decline. the state many consider America's most likely future rival. the United States would have had a bigger economy in absolute terms and would have lost less power relative to others.S.2 percent of world product accounts for about 15 percent of the U. or 1. America's share of world product in 2008 would be 24. Pape 9 – Robert A. decline. which leave out all manner of technical problems like "interaction effects. How good are the numbers? Economists commonly use two other methods to calculate GDP. U. from nearly 4 percent annually during the Clinton years to just over 2 percent per year under Bush.

A significant amount of this debt is held by foreign governments. It gives the USA a chance to re-invent itself as a more open and tolerant nation and practice what may be termed as a “moral hegemony” (see Kobayashi and Peake 2000). tax cuts. etc.97 of 154 U. The timing of this policy effectively forced the following Obama administration to continue down the same path. For the USA. America's relative decline since 2000 of some 30 percent represents a far greater loss of relative power in a shorter time than any power shift among European great powers from roughly the end of the Napoleonic Wars to World War II. Indeed. led by the most right-wing president in living memory. rescuing private finance with public finance. Economic collapse and debt.S. The effects of US neoimperialism reach so extensively across the world that US elections are everyone’s business. it seemed like it mattered what the rest of the world thought about American politics. the unexpected internal collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. self-inflicted wounds of the Bush years significantly exacerbated America's decline. UK. But I shall end this intervention on a note of optimism. When the $700 billion bailout package for private financial institutions was passed through Congress. the signing of the executive order to close the controversial Guantanamo Bay detention facility. China. Finn 2008). Issue 2) However. 2010. All of this has led to one of the most significant declines of any state since the midnineteenth century. The US economy continues to be squeezed by the interest on the capital borrowed. and the . current-account deficits. the financial crisis of late 2008 and early 2009 has acted to undermine both the US and global economy. For once. fall is remarkable and that dangerous instability in the international system may lie ahead. The USA can no longer hope to keep China subordinate through economics alone. without the need to exercise the hard coercive unilateral military or economic power upon the rest of the world. the costs could be far higher than a simple percentage drop in share of world product. it is clearly surpassed by only one other great-power decline. Watson 10 – Allan. (February 18. holds so much of the US debt. From this perspective. The above discussion suggests that the fundamental principles of US engagement with the rest of the world will change very little under an Obama-led US administration. the previous administration. and that our opposition to the imposition of American power. and Obama’s carefully crafted speech at Cairo University in June 2009 aimed at easing tensions with the Muslim world. “US Hegemony and the Obama Administration: Towards a New World Order?. In an attempt to save the US economy from recession. took the unprecedented step of pursuing a “financial socialism” (Taylor et al 2009). Given this.S. both by making the decline steeper and faster and crowding out productive investment that could have stimulated innovation to improve matters. one which is fraught with difficulties. In other words. It is one of the largest relative declines in modern history. And when one examines past declines and their consequences.” AntipodeVolume 42.). is something that will sit uncomfortably even with a less conservative Obama administration. economically and politically. no matter how well supported. economic weaknesses (spending on the Iraq War. along with a number of oil exporting countries. The United States has always prided itself on exceptionalism. Something fundamental has changed. downfall is indeed extraordinary. it becomes clear both that the U. If we end up believing in the wishful thinking of unipolar dominance forever. It is difficult to see how one man. UK and a research fellow of the Globalisation and World Cities research network based at Loughborough University. and the U. The election of the first black president of the USA was after all an historic event. during this election. predominantly Japan and China. the largest problem has been the state’s own financial situation. a sixth to Chinas superior performance and just over half to the spread of technology to the rest of the world. the national deficit moved past the $10 trillion mark.S. and undoubtedly the effects will continue to ripple around the world. both signalled a sharp break with the previous Bush administration and have strengthened the global wave of diplomatic and popular goodwill (see Black 2009. and the fact that the largest potential rival to US hegemony in the twenty-first century. Relying on foreign governments in this way comes with risks that are now starting to bite. lecturer in Human Geography at Staffordshire University. it now seems that US hegemony is in decline. can change well-practised unilateral US foreign policies or solve deep-rooted national anxieties. in size. and that we will begin to see the emergence of a new world order.

employer servitude. was finally having an effect. military alliances and trade restrictions to slow its demise. China rising and domestic issues. Over the long run. a loss of competitiveness in merchandise trade and an overdependence on financial activities looks to political retribution. depends on securing markets via economic competitiveness – market power – not military conquest. China. unlike the US plagued by financial speculators who eat away and erode the economy. 49 Propaganda. retired Bartle Professor (Emeritus) of Sociology at Binghamton University in Binghamton. . unlike Japan. fifth column colonization and military driven empire building based on domestic decay. Unlike Japan it has a vast multitude of workers. China will push ahead with double digit growth. New York and adjunct professor at Saint Mary's University (4/28/10. The US Empire will continue to wallow in chronic stagnation. it need not conquer and exploit foreign colonized labor. militarism and Zionist power will so bleed and isolate the United States that necessity will induce a forceful response … The longer it takes the more violent the rebirth of the republic. China’s market driven empire building is attuned to modern times. There are no prospects that this will change in the near future.98 of 154 associated vision of what constitutes our “security” (see Sidaway 2008). “Rising and Declining Economic Powers: The Sino-US Conflict Deepens. driven by an elite free to engage the world on its own terms. The economic decay and the entrenched political and social elites have effectively depoliticized discontent. We live in a post-colonial world where the vast majority of regimes will trade and invest with whoever pays the market price. Despite the reservations expressed in this intervention. Petras 10 – James. Empires do not die peacefully. nor do financial elites embedded in extraordinary wealth and power surrender their privileged positions peacefully.” http://lahaine.pdf) As in the past. I continue to share the sense of excitement and hope for change that has been so widely infectious since the election. The world continues to watch hopefully. a declining imperial power faced with profound internal imbalances. They have not stopped all of China’s neighbors from expanding economic ties with it. Only time will tell how long the American people will endure the dispossession of homes. systemic economic crises have been converted into private individual maladies. ravaging industrial centers and turning abandoned houses into parking lots. If the US imperial elite at present is at a loss as to how it can contain China’s rise to world power. unending wars and increased reliance on the tools of political subversion. the mass of the US working class is at a loss as to how it can move from a military driven empire toward a productive republic. looking for Obama to be the president to guide the USA into a new age of multilateralism.org/petras/b2-img/petras_sinous. promoting separatist regimes which predictably collapse or are overthrown. The US unlike the established colonial powers of an earlier period cannot deny China access to strategic raw materials as was the case with Japan. something will have to break. whipping up chauvinist emotions by scapegoating the rising new imperial state and forging military alliances to “encircle” China have absolutely no impact.

1 3-25) The US. 17 The Middle East is a profound mess and is likely to remain so. 2011. Perhaps only on the question of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons does US policy in the Middle East enjoy much support. has never been short of unpopular foreign policies. Over the last decade that general sense has weakened rapidly. though here it has to be said that Europeans are just as culpable. China and climate change – shows how the US stands ever more alone. A striking symbol of this was the replacement of talk about ‘friends and allies’ or ‘the free world’ with a harsher instrumental line about ‘coalitions of the willing’. US policy has often been controversial among its friends. with Israel creating ever more difficult facts on the ground. of course.” International Relations. Montague Burton Professor in the Department of International Relations (March 25. March 2011 vol. 16 and. US support for the Saudi regime helps keep in power a government whose domestic deals with Wahabi Islamists recycles large sums of oil money into the support of Islamic fundamentalism.99 of 154 Heg Unsustainable (Soft Power/Unpopular Policies) Heg is unsustainable -. and to an extent in the 1990s. March 2011 vol. 2011. the impact of particular disaffections was offset by the widespread general sense that the West and its hangers-on were a lot better off with US leadership than without it. From Cuba. There has never been a golden age when the US was universally admired by the rest of the world. The main point for the question of US superpower legitimacy is that many of the US interventions in the Middle East. but even that is undermined by the hypocrisy of the US turning a blind eye to Israel’s substantial nuclear arsenal while seeking to forbid Arab states and Iran from acquiring their own deterrents.unpopularity isolates the US -. the particular policies of the US now stand largely on their own terms. This rhetorical shift seemed to abandon any US interest or belief in long-term friendships and alliances. The US had rather limited success in selling the GWoT as a global macro-securitization to replace the Cold War. unshielded by the mediating effects of any overarching common cause or closely shared identity. Vietnam and Chile. and partly because of the conspicuous turn to self-interested unilateralism that marked the eight years of the Bush administration. But during the Cold War. and limited nuclear war. A brief look at three key policy areas – the Middle East/GWoT. to obstructionism on controlling climate change and the use of torture.” International Relations.three examples: Buzan 11 – Barry. This festering sore has grown steadily worse. both those of the Bush administration and those more long-standing. “The Inaugural Kenneth N. 18 but also deepening the many tragedies in the region. not only feeding the terrorist problem. Waltz Annual Lecture A World Order Without Superpowers : Decentred Globalism. a. through its unquestioning support for Israel and its occupation of Iraq. Waltz Annual Lecture A World Order Without Superpowers : Decentred Globalism. More or less unconditional US support for Israel is a perennial Washington idiosyncrasy that inspires little enthusiasm elsewhere. Montague Burton Professor in the Department of International Relations (March 25. During the Cold War the unattractive elements of US policy in the Middle East were masked by the general agreement on the need to contain the Soviet . The occupation of Iraq in 2003 looks set to generate far more and bigger problems than it has solved. partly because there is no longer any great ideological struggle to sustain it. and replace it with a rational choice logic of immediate and specific shared interest. 25 no. are widely perceived to have been counterproductive. Middle East Buzan 11 – Barry. and has so far hamstrung the US from pushing decisively towards a twostate solution to the Israel–Palestine problem. and this seems set to continue. as a consequence. 25 no. The Obama administration’s more robust line on the necessity of a two-state solution faces such daunting domestic and regional obstacles that its chances do not look promising. 1 3-25) Disagreements over policy in the Middle East already rank as one of the conspicuous areas of disaffection between the US and Europe. and assisting in the self-destruction of its Palestinian negotiating partner. “The Inaugural Kenneth N.

its alliance with the US. If a rising China becomes ultra-nationalist. 2011. In the absence of any common cause. b. but somewhat strengthened. whether peaceful or not. March 2011 vol. The nature of the China that rises. it is far from clear that other powers will feel threatened by China’s challenge to US hegemony. and the US retains its commitment to not tolerating any peer competitors. 21 If they can carry off their design for a ‘peaceful rise’. Montague Burton Professor in the Department of International Relations (March 25. then it becomes possible that US perceptions of China as threatening will not be shared widely. which since the end of the Cold War has not only maintained. aggressive and militarist. But if China conducts its peaceful rise successfully.” International Relations. What is now in prospect. Those many voices currently in opposition to US hegemony. Europe will not care much about its rise. even ever-faithful Britain would have trouble joining in any new US intervention in this region. Russia. Waltz Annual Lecture A World Order Without Superpowers : Decentred Globalism. middle-ground position between Washington and Beijing. getting worse. During the Cold War. Japan is the toughest problem facing China’s ‘peaceful rise’ strategy. though less controversial than that on the Middle East. India has to balance a growing economic relationship with China against some still sensitive territorial disputes and a desire not to be overshadowed in status terms by China. and speaking of the need for a more multipolar world order. then it could well be that others would share US perceptions. 19 the possibility of regional stability looks remote. 24 If China’s rise is benign. might welcome China’s rise. bad and. Japan and increasingly India have their own interests there. India will probably try to continue to play the US and China against each other as it does now. If China is relatively benign in the sense of not using violence against its neighbours.100 of 154 The GWoT not only failed to extend this cover. but the US securitizes it anyway. containment of China was part of the East–West struggle. China Buzan 11 – Barry. If it stays with the US. Union. Unless China turns nasty and threatening. leaving the main economic and political costs of balancing China to the US. must appear threatening to the US. That might not look attractive compared with the options of either resolving the history problems and bandwagoning with China or following India into a more independent. however. Yet the two countries have developed a quite stable strategic partnership. The US tie to Israel looks unlikely to change and will continue to poison Washington’s position in the region and much of the rest of the world. with both governments in different ways to blame. underneath their formal political correctness. and share an interest in non-intervention and regime security. Japan and the Soviet Union in their rising period. and staying broadly within the rules of the global economic order. and its effective fragmentation by the West. and will not feel threatened by it. Given both the deep divisions and antagonisms in the Middle East. shared by few. then a rising China. 23 The big question mark is Japan. if at all. Unpopular US policies and competing interests in the region from other powers provide no foundations for legitimising US leadership. possibly none. But the Chinese leadership is determined to avoid the mistakes made by Germany. 22 have many useful economic complementarities. 20 To the extent that realist thinking dominates in Washington. and whose relationship with China remains deeply clouded by unsettled historical issues. The US role in facilitating China’s ‘reform and opening up’ since 1978 has also been broadly popular. will be crucial to whether others share US perceptions of China as a threat. Russia may well want to continue to bandwagon with China against the US. and US cultivation of China after 1971 helped to weaken the Soviet Union. which are often in competition with those of the US. After the Iraq fiasco and the Afghan quagmire. also benefited from the masking effects of shared interests. “The Inaugural Kenneth N. is that the long-standing drumbeat of concern in Washington about rising China as a peer competitor will get louder as China does indeed grow in power. it would find itself being the front line in a new Cold War between Washington and Beijing. China. however. on the level of society and pubic opinion. 25 no. but also amplified differences between the US and its allies. Japan will face very difficult choices. this US concern will be a parochial one. Russia has worries about Chinese designs on the sparsely populated territories of the Russian Far East. A considerable weight of expert opinion thinks that Sino-Japanese relations are. of the other great . 1 3-25) US policy on China.

This could easily become the dominant issue for world politics. However. it is less clear that there is any fix for the problem of the unsustainable American lifestyle. whether domestic or international. though developments in the private sector and at the level of state and city governments might well restore some US credibility in this area. 2011. for the US to avoid remaining a big part of the problem . “The Inaugural Kenneth N. Waltz Annual Lecture A World Order Without Superpowers : Decentred Globalism. requires collective action of a kind with serious economic consequences. Climate change Buzan 11 – Barry. 1 3-25) Climate change is a relatively new issue with only slight links back to the Cold War. has in the eyes of many made the US more a part of the problem than of the solution. Montague Burton Professor in the Department of International Relations (March 25. and the Bush administration’s resistance to serious pollution and emission controls. Obama’s enthusiasm for green energy as a fix for both the environment and the economy has already been checked by the polarization in US politics. though the scientific uncertainties are still sufficient that the exact timing and unfolding of it are difficult to predict.” International Relations. and even denial that there was a problem. It poses questions of common fate for all of humankind and. March 2011 vol. If China plays its hand cleverly. if not impossible. 25 no. Yet the US is already unpopular on climate change.101 of 154 powers. and the polarization of US politics will make it difficult. if rising temperatures and sea levels are to be controlled. it could put the US more on its own in relation to great power politics than it has been since before the First World War. The commitment of Americans to a high consumption lifestyle. c.

Despite the “mirage of immortality” that afflicts global empires. proliferation. What makes America unique in this seemingly value-free contest is not its liberal democratic ideals — which Europe may now represent better than America does — but rather its geography. When America dominated NATO and led a rigid Pacific alliance system with Japan. Neither China nor the E. I believe that a complex. will replace the U. and Turkey.S. 08 (Parag Khanna. Western imperialism united the globe. Instead. but it did not assure that the West would dominate forever — materially or morally. others are walking away from the American game and playing by their own rules. Maintaining America’s empire can only get costlier in both blood and treasure. America must make itself irresistible to stay in the game. “Waving Goodbye to Hegemony” http://www. and history promises the effort will fail. Today the Asian landscape still features ancient civilizations but also by far the most people and. It isn’t worth it. The rise of China in the East and of the European Union within the West has fundamentally altered a globe that recently appeared to have only an American gravity — pro or anti. Asia is shaping the world’s destiny — and exposing the flaws of the grand narrative of Western civilization in the process. the most money of any region in the world. agrarian and feudal. while China will push a Beijing consensus based on respect for sovereignty and mutual economic benefit.102 of 154 Heg Decline Inevitable Hegemonic decline is inevitable – a transition now towards multipolarity solves conflict.U. not least the Chinese model of economic growth without political liberalization (itself an affront to Western modernization theory). may uphold the principles of the United Nations that America once dominated. Globalization resists centralization of almost any kind. Australia and Thailand.html? _r=3&oref=slogin&pagewanted=all) Karl Marx and Max Weber both chastised Far Eastern cultures for being despotic.U. America must quickly accept and adjust to this reality. As the historian Arnold Toynbee observed half a century ago. arguing that mankind both lives and thinks in unique cultural systems. as the world’s sole leader. lacking the ingredients for organizational success. Just as there is a geopolitical marketplace. there is a marketplace of models of success for the second world to emulate. Oswald Spengler saw it differently. while Europe and China occupy two ends of the great Eurasian landmass that is the perennial center of gravity of geopolitics. in an American-led international order when they had no seat at the table when the rules were drafted? Even as America stumbles back toward multilateralism. Now its very presence in Eurasia is tenuous. and as Toynbee also pithily noted. with Western ideals neither transferable nor relevant. rather all three will constantly struggle to gain influence on their own and balance one another. Would the world not be more stable if America could be reaccepted as its organizing principle and leader? It’s very much too late to be asking. and climate change Khanna. by certain measures. “Accidental empire” or not.U. it successfully managed the Herculean task of running the world from one side of it. what we see gradually happening in climate-change negotiations (as in Bali in December) — and need to see more of in the areas of preventing nuclear proliferation and rebuilding failed states — is a far greater sense of a division of labor . the only reliable rule of history is its cycles of imperial rise and decline. America is isolated. With or without America. multicultural landscape filled with transnational challenges from terrorism to global warming is completely unmanageable by a single authority. whether the United States or the United Nations. As Europe’s and China’s spirits rise with every move into new domains of influence.” in former Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick’s words. but how much longer will it do so as its own social standards rise far above this lowest common denominator? And why should China or other Asian countries become “responsible stakeholders. senior research fellow in the American Strategy Program of the New America Foundation.com/2008/01/27/magazine/27world-t. The web of globalization now has three spiders. The self-deluding universalism of the American imperium — that the world inherently needs a single leader and that American liberal ideology must be accepted as the basis of global order — has paradoxically resulted in America quickly becoming an everlonelier superpower. It already has. South Korea. The E. Europe will promote its supranational integration model as a path to resolving Mideast disputes and organizing Africa. the only direction to go from the apogee of power is down. is unwelcome in much of the Middle East and has lost much of East Asia’s confidence. it has been shunned by the E.nytimes. America’s spirit is weakened. because the answer is unfolding before our eyes.

103 of 154 among the Big Three. a concrete burden-sharing among them by which they are judged not by their rhetoric but the responsibilities they fulfill. The arbitrarily composed Security Council is not the place to hash out such a division of labor. Neither are any of the other multilateral bodies bogged down with weighted voting and cacophonously irrelevant voices. The big issues are for the Big Three to sort out among themselves. .

It reveals vulnerabilities. Senior Fellow. IEET.” http://ieet. It weakens the powerful. “The Big Picture: Resource Collapse. none of the leading great power nations seem well-suited to discover and adopt such new models. and opens up new niches of influence. 4/8/08. but it’s an important driver. degree in Political Science. It triggers conflict. Most importantly. Senior Fellow of Institute for Emerging Ethics and Technologies (IEET). The same can be said of the leading global corporate powers.org/index. The climate and resource crises of the 2010s and 2020s will be compounded by a vacuum of global leadership.104 of 154 Alt Cause – Resource Collapse Resource collapse is important factor in hegemonic collapse. Cascio. Those actors adopting the new successful models will find themselves disproportionately powerful.php/IEET/more/cascio20080407/) Resource collapse isn’t the cause of the rise of the post-hegemonic world. . as ultimately the most effective responses to resource collapse will come from revolutions in technology and socio-economic behavior. it sets up the conditions for the emergence of new models of power. setting the mighty against the mighty. 08 (Jamais Cascio. Right now.

some at least of these moves may. it could mean backing Japan and other countries against any Chinese aggression. Future historians may. it is increasingly indebted and key vassal states are no longer reliable. For that matter. It is important to note that this US weakness affects not only the ambitions of the Bush administration. regional consensuses in support of order and stability. however. intended to create regional coalitions against potential aggressors and.php) U. with potentially awful consequences for the world. In the Middle East. however. but also defusing the threat of confrontation with China by encouraging the reintegration of Taiwan into the mainland. global power. conclude that President Bill Clinton's strategy of the 1990s would also have made the conquest of Iraq unavoidable sooner or later. given the nature of the Middle East. prove inescapable in a generation's time. Despite the lessons of Iraq. 05 (Anatol Lieven. It cannot introduce conscription because of the general demilitarisation of society and also because elite youths are no longer prepared to set an example of leadership and sacrifice by serving themselves. the desirable US response to its imperial overstretch is simple and has been advocated by some leading independent US thinkers such as Professor Stephen Walt of Harvard. is unsustainable.org/archives/2005/11/index. may it not be that any power wishing to exercise hegemony in the region would have to go to war at regular intervals in defence of its authority or its local clients? Furthermore. The basic reasons why the American empire is bust are familiar from other imperial histories. The result is that the US is incapable of waging more wars of occupation. but also geopolitical stances wholly shared by the Democrats.S. The result is that the empire can no longer pay for enough of the professional troops it needs to fulfil its self-assumed imperial tasks.be sustained permanently without war? Indeed.Democrat and Republican. War therefore means simply creating more and more areas of anarchy and breeding grounds for terrorism.supported by both parties -. central to what is happening is the greed and decadence of the imperial elites. really serious war risks US economic disaster. http://www. When.but fiscally equally damaging -.105 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (1/18) Hegemony is unsustainable – slow decline now avoids a disastrous collapse later Lieven. but direct military commitments and alliances should be avoided wherever possible. Even a limited US-Chinese clash over Taiwan would be likely to produce catastrophic economic consequences for both sides. The Bush administration deserves to be savagely criticised for the timing and the conduct of the Iraq war. and that given the realities of Iraqi society and history. can present US strategy against Iran -. “Decadent America Must Give Up Imperial Ambitions” 11-29-05. Mass acquiescence in this has to be bought with much smaller -. rather than as a result of carefully planned and peaceful strategy. senior research fellow at the New America Foundation and a member of the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy. It can defeat other states in battle easily enough but it cannot turn them into loyal or stable allies. Like so many of their predecessors. it becomes clear how utterly unacceptable much of this approach would be to the entire existing US political order. this process may occur through disastrous defeats. In an equally classical fashion. when possible. My fear though is that. Not just a direct military presence. For it is pointless to dream of long maintaining an American empire for which most Americans will neither pay nor fight. In the former Soviet Union. It is to fall back on "offshore balancing". however. establishment. civilian and military -. such as in Iraq. In theory. In Asia. unlike in 1917 or 1941. in the course of which American global power will not be qualified but destroyed altogether. it could involve separating US goals from Israeli ones and seeking detente with Iran. Impossible today. as presently conceived by the overwhelming majority of the U.realisticforeignpolicy. the results would not have been significantly less awful. the US wealthy classes have gained a grip over the state that allows them to escape taxation. The empire can no longer raise enough taxes or soldiers. . the relative decline in US economic independence means that.S.cuts to taxes on the middle classes. one traces what this might mean in practice in various parts of the world. this is something that American policymakers -.still find extremely difficult to think about. it could mean accepting a qualified form of Russian sphere of influence. To place American power on a firmer footing requires putting it on a more limited footing.

Every country in the world currently considered a rogue state by the U. pinning America down while filling whatever power vacuums it can find. but increasingly they rally toward it out of Asian cultural pride and an understanding of the historical-cultural reality of Chinese dominance. China is doing on its southern and western peripheries what Europe is achieving to its east and south. Iran being the most prominent example. And in the former Soviet Central Asian countries — the so-called Stans — China is the new heavyweight player. The whole world is abetting China’s spectacular rise as evidenced by the ballooning share of trade in its gross domestic product — and China is exporting weapons at a rate reminiscent of the Soviet Union during the cold war. Like Europeans. its manifest destiny pushing its Han pioneers westward while pulling defunct microstates like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. no country — friend of America’s or not — wants political tension to upset economic growth. Under Japanese sponsorship. 08 (Parag Khanna. Across the globe. it is also making major strategic investments in the financial sector. In America’s own hemisphere. dam-builders and covert military personnel. now enjoys a diplomatic.com/2008/01/27/magazine/27world-t. Trade within the India-Japan-Australia triangle — of which China sits at the center — has surpassed trade across the Pacific. At the same time. from Canada to Cuba to Chávez’s Venezuela.S. while China has slashed tariffs and increased loans to its Southeast Asian neighbors. aid workers. into its orbit. they plan to launch their own regional monetary fund. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization gathers these Central Asian strongmen together with China and Russia and may eventually become the “NATO of the East.106 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (2/18) Hegemonic decline is inevitable – China rivals US influence and acts as a stabilizing force in Asia Khanna. To the Western eye. resulting in America’s grip on the Pacific Rim being loosened one finger at a time. Without firing a shot. senior research fellow in the American Strategy Program of the New America Foundation. as well as oil-rich Kazakhstan. From Thailand to Indonesia to Korea. Aided by a 35 millionstrong ethnic Chinese diaspora well placed around East Asia’s rising economies. China is not only securing energy supplies. “Waving Goodbye to Hegemony” http://www. it is deploying tens of thousands of its own engineers.” . In Africa. it is a bizarre phenomenon: small Asian nation-states should be balancing against the rising China.nytimes. a Greater Chinese CoProsperity Sphere has emerged. economic or strategic lifeline from China. a set of Asian security and diplomatic institutions is being built from the inside out. Asians are insulating themselves from America’s economic uncertainties. China is cutting massive resource and investment deals.html? _r=3&oref=slogin&pagewanted=all) The East Asian Community is but one example of how China is also too busy restoring its place as the world’s “Middle Kingdom” to be distracted by the Middle Eastern disturbances that so preoccupy the United States.

Thus. but how soon it will end. a recent study by the CIA’s Strategic Assessment Group projects that by 2020 both China (which Mapping the Global Future pegs as “by any measure a first-rate military power” around 2020) and the European Union will come close to matching the United States in terms of their respective shares of world power. In the same way that commentators refer to the 1900s as the American Century. 64-65] Can the United States Be Caught? Up to a point. however. there are always potential pitfalls in projecting current trends several decades into the future (not least is that it is not easy to convert economic power into effective military power).107 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (3/18) We control uniqueness – collapse of primacy is inevitable by 2030. Already there is evidence suggesting that new great powers are in the process of emerging . American primacy cannot be sustained indefinitely. the early 21st century may be seen as the time when some in the developing world led by China and India came into their Own. The relative power position of great powers is dynamic. and military developments which has existed since time immemorial. There are indications. technological advance. that—at best—the United States will not be able to hold onto its primacy much beyond 2030. and transition from U. new poles of power in the international system are likely to emerge during the next decade or two. which is why they concede that American primacy won’t last forever. This is what the current debate in the United States about the implications of China’s rise is all about. no great power ever has been able “to remain permanently ahead of all others.” 36 Even the most ardent primacists know this to be true. But if the ongoing shift in the distribution of relative power continues.38 For sure. . because that would imply a freezing of the differentiated pattern of growth rates. Indeed. For example. Christopher LAYNE 2007. as Paul Kennedy has observed. primacy to multipolarity may be much closer than primacists want to admit. In a similar vein." American Empire: A Debate. the primacists are correct. there is a yawning gap between the United States and the next-ranking powers. But China isn’t the only factor in play. It will take some time before any other state emerges as a true “peer competitor” of the United States. In terms of hard power. with impacts potentially as dramatic as those of the previous two. which means that at any point in time some states are gaining in relative power while others are losing it. Nevertheless. not static."The Case Against the American Empire. at some point within the next decade or two. the CIA’s National Intelligence Council’s report Mapping the Global Future notes: The likely emergence of China and India as new major global players—similar to the rise of Germany in the 19th century and the United States in the early 20th century—will transform the geopolitical landscape. p. the leading primacists acknowledge. To put it slightly differently. that American primacy could end much sooner than that. The real issue is not if American primacy will end. [Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute.S. new great power rivals to the United States will emerge. in its survey of likely international developments up until 2020.

to reduce others' concerns about its power. Hegemony is not only a costly grand strategy. thus causing the United States to become imperially overstretched and involving it in unnecessary wars that will reduce its power. 131 Thus."The Case Against the American Empire. power.S. The United States does not need to be an extraregional hegemon to be secure. deterritorialized conception of security divorced from the traditional metrics of great power grand strategy: the distribution of power in the international system and geography. hegemony is a game that no longer is worth the candle. which is a potentially dangerous strategy. primacy may well hasten its end by stimulating more intensive efforts to balance against the United States. the United States must practice self-restraint (which is different from choosing to be constrained by others by adopting a multilateral approach to grand strategy). National Interest. attempting to sustain U. Walter Lippmann and Kenneth Waltz-- always warned of the dangers that a hegemonic United States would over-reach itself and. and will remain so even if it no longer is a hegemon. Real realists like Lippmann. there is very little the United States needs to do in the world in order to be secure. They understood that the world is not malleable and will not respond to American-imposed social engineering. They not only recognized that a wise grand strategy must balance ends and means. Morgenthau and Waltz have highlighted the dangers that await if the United States gives in to the temptations of hegemonic power and have counseled instead that the United States pursue a grand strategy based on prudence and self-restraint. especially given that U.S. the United States must accept some reduction in its relative hard power by adopting a multipolar—and essentially unilateral—offshore balancing strategy that accommodates the rise of new great powers. Paradoxically. To reduce the fear of U.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_85/ai_n16832448 The United States is a very powerful state. Unilateral offshore balancing. primacy may already be in the early stages of erosion. [Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute." American Empire: A Debate. If the United States fails to adopt an offshore balancing strategy based on multipolarity and military and ideological self-restraint. but also one that ultimately is unsustainable. is America's next grand strategy. Americans would do well to pay heed to these admonitions as they debate how the United States should alter its grand strategy as the unipolar era inexorably draws to a close.S. indeed. it probably will.108 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (4/18) Collapse of hegemony and transition to off-shore balancing inevitable – delaying it just causes war Christopher LAYNE 2007. Hans Morgenthau. p. by asserting its power heavy-handedly. An America [End Page 40] that has the wisdom and prudence to contain itself is less likely to be feared than one that begs the rest of the world to stop it before it expands hegemonically again. Fall http://findarticles. Most of all. Heg is unsustainable Christopher Layne 2006. Maintaining U. at some point. Rather than risking these outcomes. . the real realists have understood the true paradox of American power: Precisely because of its power and geography. but also that it must differentiate between desirable objectives and attainable ones. Kennan. 64-65] The United States has a hegemony problem because it wields hegemonic power. 130 It also must rein in the scope of its extravagant ambitions to shape the international system in accordance with its Wilsonian ideology. have to fight to uphold its primacy. yet the very fact of its overwhelming capabilities has been a constant temptation for American policymakers to intervene abroad unwisely in the pursuit of unattainable goals (nation building or democracy promotion). the United States should begin to retrench strategically and capitalize on the advantages accruing to insular great powers in multipolar systems. provoke opposition to it. America's real realists--George F. Kennan.S. Its quest for hegemony is driven instead by an ideational.

In practice this idea will bring preventative efforts. “One of the reasons there is not a constant state of war. offense-minded states are apt to be war-prone because they believe the prospects for victory are very favorable to them. Nov 26. the risk of nuclear war could actually rise.) That approach is consistent with the strategy of empire.” which says that striking early is less difficult than striking later. the exceptions justify it—lest we establish precedents that others will emulate. State sovereignty also allows for the formation of multiple loci of power and the prospect of power balancing. What’s more. That’s because the doctrine of prevention or preemption is predicated on the “ideology of the offensive. 2002. That’s because accepting the principle of noninterference is an impediment to a dominant state seeking to make other nations conform to its will.000 question is whether or not it makes sense to stand on the rooftops and announce loudly to the world that this is your doctrine. [its] military strengths beyond challenge. As political scientist Frank Russell once wrote: “Rome .” 92 (Although the president used the word “preemptive. such as India and Pakistan. such as Iraq. I favor the Teddy Roosevelt approach to foreign policy: Speak softly and carry a big stick. and “we have to be ready for preemptive action” because “if we wait for threats to fully materialize. in preserving a balance of power. the strategy of empire is unlikely to function if all sorts of states are allowed to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as a deterrent against the power projection of the United States.” 91 In his June 2. thus triggering a spiral of security competition that . which raises what John Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago has called the “stopping power of water. Rome certainly was not interested in a balance of power for the very reason she was interested in a monopoly of power. But it costs far more for the United States—a relatively secure nation separated from most of the world by two vast oceans—to project its power across the seas than it does for states located on other landmasses to project their power regionally. offense-minded states have a tendency to incite security dilemmas. and intends to keep. I think it would be better not to do that.” 95 The strategy of empire. the strategy of empire necessarily leads to a devaluation of other states’ sovereignty. if other nations. .” 96 (continued from previous page – nothing cut) Consequently.109 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (5/18) Collapse is inevitable – sustaining hegemony only causes war and proliferation Eland 2002 (Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute.” From this perspective. in many cases the United States might launch a preventive attack to stop an incipient threat before it is even realized.” the belief that “the presence of oceans on much of the earth’s surface makes it impossible for any state to achieve global hegemony. But supporting preventative or preemptive action could shift the rules of the world order against peace and stability. President Bush laid out his vision of a future in which the United States more or less monopolizes global military power through preemption if necessary: “America has. . . the United States currently has the world’s most powerful military. A balance of power system is essentially a device for keeping the power of different states within limits by a system of checks and balances. The logic of empire therefore dictates that as few states as possible should be allowed to gain a defensive footing with the United States. We just have to be careful that if we create exceptions to those rules. obtains them. for example. the security of the offense-minded state. we will have waited too long. speech to West Point’s graduating class.” said Bush. The echo of Rome is clear.18) The answer is probably no. Over the long run the strategy of empire will likely prove unsustainable and ultimately self-defeating. which are things an empire cannot accept if it is committed to maintaining supremacy. whereby the efforts of weaker states to increase their relative security undermines.” 94 “There’s no question that great powers like the United States [can] launch preventative wars or preemptive strikes whenever they conclude it’s in their interests.” What’s more. never was interested . p. 93 Indeed. . “The Empire Strikes Out: The ‘New Imperialism’ and its Fatal Flaws”. Such states also see these weapons as their best means of overcoming the conventional superiority of the United States.” adds Mearsheimer. proximity matters. In other words. is to speak loudly (extended deterrence) and cut up and scatter Washington’s inadequate stick all over the place. But the “$64. and it spends much more on its defense than all its rivals combined. allow [end page 13] these states to attempt to blackmail the United States and our allies to prevent us from deterring or repelling the aggressive behavior of rogue states. . however. adopted preemption as their official policy. the Bush administration notes: “These weapons may . It will also increase the likelihood of war. including war. before a nation working on WMD. . That’s a blueprint for trouble if there ever was one. to make sure WMD proliferation is stopped at all costs. or appears to undermine. The Bush administration’s National Security Strategy boldly asserts that “our best defense is a good offense. In its National Security Strategy. Certainly.” which means taking military action before an imminent attack by an adversary.” says a skeptical Bush administration official. “is that we all expect certain rules.

110 of 154 can culminate in confrontation or war. . which could in turn spur even more U. 98 Hence there is a paradox. which has a defense perimeter that is far forward and a military doctrine that is very preventive or preemptive. as China’s economy grows. Inevitable mistakes will lead to recrimination and suspicions about America’s motives. The doctrine of prevention or preemptive intervention could actually create a greater incentive for other states to try to acquire WMD secretly as an insurance policy against American military might. how will Washington prove that an attack might have happened? Surely some foreign and domestic critics will discount the threat afterward. The expansion of Chinese influence in that region may run afoul of a United States.S. The other major problem with the doctrine of prevention or preemption is that in the absence of actual aggression against the United States. And other states will worry that the doctrine could be used against them. it may want more ability to control its security environment within East Asia. 97 For example.

today’s advocates of empire are unable to break out of their consolidating logic. The commitments were almost literally worldwide. The primary danger is from an interventionist foreign policy that makes enemies who are resourceful and willing move into and exploit failed states. Their conclusion was that England should not make new enemies. citizens and to threaten mass destruction. in other words.” says Bell.S. 104 In 1937. today’s advocates of empire recommend more digging. Thus . not that interventionism necessarily solves problems. economic aid. And over the longer term there is the issue of being ready to fight a major theater war if necessary. forces in Somalia. the Middle East and Mediterranean. One of the primary reasons Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain appeased Adolf Hitler at Munich in 1938 was that much of Britain’s strength was diffused throughout its far-flung empire. “To reach an accommodation with Italy in the Mediterranean. . to make only the most cautious response to Japanese aggression in China—all this followed in large part from the need to diminish the number of one’s enemies. would affect the military’s ability to wage and win a new regional war. 102 The strategic implications are potentially enormous. Accordingly. the United States could conceivably lose one or more large cities to demented or irrational retaliation for American intervention. 103 According to British historian P. Empires get into trouble because they get bogged down fighting protracted small wars in the hinterland. Bell: [end page 15] The fundamental problem was the disparity between Britain’s commitments and her resources. Australia and New Zealand. or deeply buried facilities.” The strategy of empire could make the United States less secure in another major way as well—by dispersing and overtasking its military personnel and equipment. . that is. the fact that so many people in the Muslim world dislike America’s meddling is not seen as an argument for rethinking U. those advocates see it as an argument for deeper involvement. shows. But digging will neither get the man out of the hole nor make the United States safer. still relied on her for protection. the security threat posed by failed states is really a second-order issue. though asserting their independence of the mother country. code named Prominent Hammer.S. preventive attacks on installations associated with those superweapons often founder on a lack of intelligence on the location of such clandestine small mobile. Instead. in other words. Malaya and Singapore. the danger posed by failed states is a consequence of something other than state failure per se. expanding the campaign against terrorism to a country like Iraq would place severe strains on personnel and cause deep shortages of certain critical weapons. has revealed that.S. As former Reagan adviser and Cato Institute senior fellow Doug Bandow warns: “With the growing ability of small political movements and countries to kill U. could be more interventionism. The very problem of failed states. for ramping up U. and accumulating manifold security and treaty commitments they are obliged to honor. In fact.” 101 The conclusion was that the American military would be stretched very thin. Similarly. Western Europe and the British Isles were all under some kind of threat as the 1930s went on. reduced Britain’s options in the face of a horrible danger. The Dominions. policy or assuming a lower profile.” 99 Yet it was such nation building that led to the attack on U. M. “The policy of ‘appeasement’ should never be appraised without recalling this sternly realistic recommendation. like the proverbial man who finds himself stuck in a hole. Thus. the United States may find that its alliances and commitments around the world may sap its strength for dealing with any rising power—perhaps China. London was not in a position to rebuff a rising Nazi Germany early on because Britain was overstretched . In coming years.111 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (6/18) [Card continued without omission] prevention or preemption. and the stress of ongoing operations in Afghanistan. the risks of foreign entanglements increase. The Joint Chiefs of Staff subsequently recommended postponing an attack against Iraq. to avoid confrontation with the Axis powers over the Spanish Civil War. and launching wars to transform countries like Iraq “into a beacon of hope. but that interventionism can create altogether new ones. Nevertheless. to find the basis of a settlement with Germany. a recent top-secret Pentagon war game. . Failed states are already an example of those self-reinforcing phenomena. southwest Asia and the Sinai. America and its citizens will become an even greater lightning rod for the world’s political malcontents. (Yet as President Clinton [end page 14] found out in 1998 during Operation Desert Fox. the demands of long-term deployments in places like the Balkans and South Korea. promulgating foreign educational and health care programs. even now. Britain’s chiefs of staff produced a gloomy assessment of London’s security prospects. .) The unintended consequence of interventionism.” 105 Empire.S. H. that is. According to the New York Times. telling other states and aspiring states who their leaders should be. garrisoning myriad outposts. in short. Failed states matter to today’s advocates of empire because the existence of such states raises the specter that interventionist foreign policies in one place can have a deadly price tag made possible by individuals willing to take advantage of the situation in another place. “The war game measured how the strains of new commitments to domestic defense. that is.

credit comes increasingly from states whose indefinite accumulation of dollars seems contrary to their own long-term interests. Survival. pursuing a hegemonic agenda in today's world requires different capabilities for more primitive forms of combat. and prepared for high casualties. p. while the United States' external deficit is bigger than ever. University Professor of The Johns Hopkins University. has not been very good at it. Yet. for example. how long will America's enthusiasm for hegemony endure? . it seems unreasonable to expect China to continue this practice indefinitely. The United States is now spending heavily to compensate for its deficiencies. trained for intimate contact with the enemy. these others were allies dependent on American military protection. by continuing to add to its already immense reserves of surplus dollars.with more and cheaper troops. however. having a hegemonic superpower already installed might seem a great good fortune. Instead. Controlling hostile populations will demand extensive linguistic and policing skills. recent experience also reveals that America's global predominance has been seriously overestimated. If credit from China is restricted. but is still far short of the resources needed to prevail. 2007 (Dean Acheson Professor. the United States will face the tougher choices between guns and butter it has long been able to avoid. American power counts for less than expected. credit to finance it no longer depends on allies in urgent need of protection. While the United States is lavishly outfitted for high-technology warfare. China. Financial experience during the Cold War accustomed the United States to abundant credit from the world economy. Put to the test. Today. Greater success would seem to require a different sort of military . In the face of this unaccustomed constraint. like countering guerrilla warfare and suicidal terrorism. to date. subsidises its own imports. Director of the European Studies Program.112 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (7/18) Unipolar hegemony is unsustainable and doesn’t solve the terminal impacts Calleo. This current shortage of means is a further blow to America's hegemonic expectations. The American military loathes this kind of fighting and. together with American consumption and investment. During the Cold War. but at the expense of its own more balanced internal development. 73-8) Given our future's high potential for discord and destruction. Given the growing protectionism against its exports. with a good part of the exchange costs of America's world role eventually covered by others who accumulated the surplus dollars.

and biological weapons may now be seen as a way of deflecting unwanted attention from Washington.ksg. in trade wars with the United States. still needs cooperation from far weaker states on a host of issues such as the intelligence and police work needed to combat global terrorism. Second.S. chemical. states can resist by withholding cooperation. dominance. They may hope to sway the American public . What? Forms of Resistance to American Hegemony”. http://belfercenter. perhaps the most dominant great power in history. for example. Anti-American actors rely in part on words to overcome material inferiority to the United States. recent events in Iraq. and build support for anti-U. symbols. Iran. a few actors look for shortcuts to overcome the massive imbalance in military capabilities. and images does not simply reflect the will and ideas of the strongest country. policy in an effort to win the verbal war for hearts and minds at home and abroad. The EU has some economic weight to throw around when it disagrees with U.S. hegemony does not offer a crystal clear road map.S. Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Connecticut in Storrs. which opens the door to American-European economic confrontations. the specific economic relationship between the European Union (EU) and the United States does not fit the general pattern of U.S. the United States has created the impression that non-conventional weapons are the best form of defense against the American empire. and North Korea are shedding light on the various ways in which nuclear.edu/publication/2943/if_not_balancing_what_forms_of_resis tance_to_american_hegemony. the war of words. Other countries utilize rhetorical attacks and symbolic protests against U. then. it does suggest several different avenues by which states and disaffected peoples will resist U.html) What. violence. economic policy or wants to resist U. hegemony.S. .S.S. Fourth. Even the U nited States. win recruits. Third. anti-American resentment. “If Not Balancing. This gives those who are needed some leverage over the United States. economic dictates. While terrorism has long been seen as a weapon of the weak. and rogue states Pressman 2004 (Jeremy Pressman.113 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (8/18) Many factors challenge American hegemony including terrorism.conventional weapons. First.harvard. They resort to two tactics of the weak: terrorism and the possession of non. even if the EU lacks the military might to engage in military disagreements. In projecting American military power around the globe. The EU can thus engage. are these forms of resistance? While the past decade of U.

Iraq assisted UN inspectors just enough so that some countries believed inspections were working even as Britain and the United States continued to decry Iraqi non. “If Not Balancing. Iraq appeared very aware of the possibility that its potential opponents could be divided by carefully calibrated Iraqi actions. Spain. but Turkey held out for much more.S.S. countries often drag their feet and slow the flow of information. In other words. withholding cooperation would be counterproductive.compliance. For instance. and Uzbekistan. and NATO involvement in getting ready. Yet even close U. Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Connecticut in Storrs. What? Forms of Resistance to American Hegemony”. http://belfercenter. The importance of the Turkish parliamentís vote against granting the U.harvard. as the United States experienced in the Philippines and more recently in Okinawa. or suspects.cooperation.114 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (9/18) America’s policy of aggression tanks cooperation efforts which are key to sustainable heg Pressman 2004 (Jeremy Pressman. bases are not immune to opposition either. Whether based on different interests or different policy preferences to pursue shared interests. the door was open for meaningful non. On cooperation more generally. some states have unique assets that the United States covets.S. This would be especially true when siding too closely with Washington could increase domestic political opposition and mobilize a strong challenge to regime survival.edu/publication/2943/if_not_balancing_what_forms_of_resis tance_to_american_hegemony.S.ksg. Although the United States is dominant in many realms. Iraqi policy contributed to non. Once the United States asked for things like UN support for the war.S. Vetoing UNSC resolutions.S. military greater access was based largely on the geographic cards Turkey holds. once the United States decided to target Iraq in 2002-03. Longtime U. interests.harvard. “If Not Balancing. But the depth of cooperation is always going to be in part a reflection of how willing the American partner is to cooperate. They may judge and prioritize threats differently. http://belfercenter. they often favor a different policy to realize that interest. Syria.html) The dilemma of non-cooperation was also exemplified in other ways during the buildup to a war with Iraq. when they share the U. non-cooperation by less powerful states hurts U. If other countries always had the same interests and policies as the United States. effort.S.S. Such support is essential for gathering intelligence and conducting international police work. Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Connecticut in Storrs. preferences. If the United States is too aggressive or dismissive of local concerns. Pakistan. drug trafficking or intelligence-sharing. . For counter-terrorism.S.ksg.html) When other countries disapprove of U. financial support for reconstruction. or preventing military preparations in Turkey under the NATO umbrella are all ways of resisting U. putative allies may not feel inhibited about undermining the U.S. certain nearby real estate became very important. Kuwait was quick to support the U. approach. evidence. allies like France or Germany. the United States can pressure other countries to cooperate. By virtue of geography. allies sometimes have different objectives. withholding funds for the post-war reconstruction of Iraq. a hyperpower still needs cooperation in some areas. No sustainable Heg—Policies like Iraq have tanked cooperation with important US allies Pressman 2004 (Jeremy Pressman. Opponents of the war on Iraq used the threat of non-cooperation to slow the drive to war. efforts.edu/publication/2943/if_not_balancing_what_forms_of_resis tance_to_american_hegemony.S. the war against al-Qaeda is illustrative. or. To some extent. they can resist by reducing cooperation that is essential for the advancement of U. policy.cooperation by standard U. The United States has worked with a wide range of states including Britain. What? Forms of Resistance to American Hegemony”. interest.

U. http://belfercenter.S.S.edu/publication/2943/if_not_balancing_what_forms_of_resis tance_to_american_hegemony. Rhetorical assaults can increase the impact of other tactics such as non-cooperation. international media. policies. words are free if the topic is of interest to the international media.S.115 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (10/18) International media and propaganda spur strong anti-American resentment tanking heg Pressman 2004 (Jeremy Pressman. policy to win over both segments of the American public and U. At the end of the day. Iraq. support. any bit player can lambaste the United States. peoples. words and symbols can be used to make it harder for the United States to pursue and protect its interests.harvard. supporters in other countries.S. Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Connecticut in Storrs. In a system that values debate and the clash of ideas.S. even if the words are not backed by material capabilities. opponents can range from longtime allies like France and Germany to the very target of the war. or. Words. .S.html) Another effect of words and symbols is that they can be used to undermine both domestic and international support for U. for example. asymmetric warfare. and foreign lobbying create opportunities for those opposed to U.ksg.S. stopped the United the absence of the United Nations or some form of the international community meant the loss of access to Turkey during the war and greater difficulty getting aid and personnel to provide security and help with reconstruction. public as well as non. What? Forms of Resistance to American Hegemony”. “If Not Balancing. States from getting the UN blessing for the war on Iraq. In hindsight. With the right message. foreign opponents of U. As became clear with Iraq. The battle for hearts and minds is a two way street: while Washington is trying to build domestic support and win non-U. as we see in the next section. policy are trying to convince the U. The open American system.

"It simply has not been given to any one society to remain permanently ahead of all the oth. The United States could enjoy the relative predictability and stability of the bipolar era only be. it is the very fact of the Soviet Union 's collapse that has knocked the props out from under the strategy of preponderance. their cost. hegemony prevents us from emerging as an offshore balancer – hegemonic decline is inevitable – it is better to let it decline now so we can choose our strategic position in the world Christopher Layne 1998." Salisbury said. Make no mistake: sometime in the early decades of the twenty-first century. is that bad things--perhaps far worse things--could happen if the United States stays on its present strategic course. .ers. Visiting Associate Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School [World Policy Journal. This is unsurprising. American hegemony cannot be maintained much beyond that period. The time is rapidly approaching when the strategy of preponderance will be unable to pass these tests. In advocating an offshore balancing strategy.. 2." However." The conditions that made American preponderance possible are changing rapidly. The suggestion that the days of American hegemony are numbered no doubt will be met with disbelief by advocates of the current grand strategy. "and therefore it is in our interest that as little should happen as possible.S. "What ever happens will be for the worse. As Paul Kennedy has observed. The changing distribution of power in the inter. Having fulfilled their hegemonic ambitions following the Soviet Union 's collapse. grand strategy must use these criteria to assess the comparative merits of both the current grand strategy and its competitors.able to Soviet domination. seldom acknowledged by champions of preponderance. events will force it to do so. the costs and risks of the strategy of preponderance will rise to unacceptably high levels. Simply put. not static. without the Cold War. Indeed. The time to think about alternative grand strategic futures is now--before the United States is overtaken by events. Summer. Any serious debate about U.S. however.S. the relative decline of U.. the degree of risk they entail. America 's grand strategy will no longer be preponderance. they may. “Rethinking American grand strategy: Hegemony or balance of power in the twenty-first century?” vol. and their tangible and intangible domestic effects. that is only half of the argument.116 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (11/18) U. America will not be able to preserve its Cold War preponderance or stability. International politics is dynamic. whether they are sustainable. Grand strategies must be judged by the amount of security they provide.national system-specifically. I do not deprecate those who believe that bad things (increased geopolitical instability) could happen if the United States were to abandon the strategy of preponderance. 15 iss. This strategy is also being undermined because the credibility of America 's extended deterrence strategy is eroding rapidly. Over time. The United States could be hegemonic only because the Soviet threat caused others to accept American preeminence as prefer. proquest] My argument for adopting an alternative grand strategy is prospective: although it may be sustainable for perhaps another decade. If the United States does not choose now to begin making the transition to a new grand strategy better suited to the new century's emerging international realities.cause of the effects of bipolarity itself. The other half. the advocates of preponderance want to keep the world the way it is. power and the corresponding rise of new great powers-will render the strategy of preponderance untenable.. American grand strategists view the prospect of change in international politics in much the same way that British prime minister Lord Salisbury did toward the end of the nineteenth century.

Moreover. then-Vice President Dan Quayle linked the continuance of America's security commitment to NATO with West European concessions in the GATT negotiations. Over time.4 1993) Inevitably. However. No. Heg collapse inevitable – leash slipping Christopher Layne 2006. This has led primacists to conclude that there has been no balancing against the United States. 124 Several weeks later. As a consequence. George Bush's New World Order and Bill Clinton's apparent commitment to assertive projection of America's democratic and human rights values reflect America's desire to "press its preferred policies" on others. in a February 1991 address to the New York Economic Club. Fall. which allows them to shift additional resources into economically productive investments. p. No new great powers have emerged to restore equilibrium to the balance of power by engaging in hard balancing against the United States—at least. “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise”. primacy. benign hegemony facilitates the diffusion of wealth and technology to potential rivals. is illustrative. which followed such a strategy. Other states underpay for security.S. America's renewed credibility would cause Germany and Japan to be more forthcoming in their economic relations with Washington. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. which eventually weakens the internal foundation of its external position. so will U. a strategy of preponderance will fail. Bush said that because the United States had taken the leader's role in the Gulf militarily. Over time. The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming of the United States' Unipolar Moment. The fate of nineteenth-century Britain. the effect is to erode the hegemon's preeminence. 125 Such a "leverage strategy" is no mere abstraction. There is another reason why a strategy of preponderance will not work. if it ends. Jr. For example. Nye. such a policy will accelerate the hegemon's relative decline." But there is more to it than that. A strategy of more or less benign hegemony does not prevent the emergence of new great powers. 17. Such a strategy articulates a vision of an American-led international order. however. hegemony and. 31 To be sure. Associate Professor at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A & M.117 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (12/18) Collapse inevitable – free-riding Christopher Layne 1993 (Visiting Associate Professor at Naval Postgraduate school.S. suggested that the deployment of United States forces in Europe and Japan could be used as a bargaining chip in trade negotiations with those countries. No doubt. Harvard professor Joseph S. the strategy of preponderance could prolong unipolarity somewhat. In February 1992. . A strategy of benign hegemony allows others to free-ride militarily and economically. Vol. differential growth rates trigger shifts in relative economic power that ultimately result in the emergence of new great powers. contrary to the predictions of Waltzian balance of power theorists. International Security. as long as eligible states calculate that the benefits of free riding outweigh the constraints imposed on them by American hegemony. not yet. Other states can justifiably infer that Washington's unipolar aspirations will result in the deliberate application of American power to compel them to adhere to the United States' policy preferences. Unipolarity is the foundation of U. A hegemon tends to overpay for security. the primacists' focus on both the failure of new great powers to emerge and the absence of hard balancing distracts attention from other forms of behavior— notably leash-slipping—by major second-tier states that ultimately could lead to the end of unipolarity. unipolarity persists.

bipolar. Fifty years from now. America's optimal strategy is to make its power position similar to Goldilocks' porridge : not too strong. and probably much sooner. No doubt neorealism's critics will continue to point to second image factors as reasons to take an optimistic view of the future. Systemic change occasioned by the rise and fall of great powers has always been traumatic. and (2) enable the United States to do as well as possible in a multipolar world . International Security. International Security. and (5) if differential growth rate effects allow Japan to challenge America's leading position. which would invite others to exploit American vulnerabilities. too. Vol. Structural realists can be confident that events will vindicate their predictions: ( 1) Because of structural factors. No. “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise”. Vol. it is pointless to debate the comparative merits of unipolar. Rather than vainly and counterproductively pursuing a strategy of preponderance. Relative decline can be addressed by policies that focus on either or both of these causes. But this one is not fated to drag on inconclusively. it is less likely to have negative geopolitical repercussions than a policy that aims at perpetuating unipolarity. the debate between neorealists and their critics will continue. (3) unipolarity will cause other states to balance against the United States. The transition from unipolarity to multipolarity will challenge the United States to devise a policy that will arrest its relative decline while minimizing the chances that other states will be provoked into balancing against the United States. without pro voking others. energies on redressing the internal causes of relative decline would be perceived by others as less threatening than a strategy of preponderance. Although vigorous internal renewal might cause frictions with others over economic policy.118 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (13/18) Multipolarity is inevitable only a shift in US strategy to independence will solve the turns Christopher Layne 1993 (Visiting Associate Professor at Naval Postgraduate school. Unipolarity will inevitably collapse the US must switch to a multipolar strategy to avoid the harms Christopher Layne 1993 (Visiting Associate Professor at Naval Postgraduate school. 17. we will know who was right and who was wrong.S.4 1993) The coming years will be ones of turmoil in international politics. In coming years. which would frighten others into balancing against the United States. the United States-Japan relationship will become highly competitive and the possibility of hegemonic war will be present . No doubt. No. This approach would heighten others' concerns about the malign effects of unchecked American power. American policymakers need to remember that other states balance against hegemons and they should not want the United States to be seen by others as a "sprawling giant with gouty fingers and toes. Relative decline has internal and external causes. not too weak. the international system will provide a definitive field test of the contending views of inter national politics offered by neorealists and their critics. It would be counterproductive for the United States to attempt to maintain its relative power position by attempting to suppress the emergence of new great powers. (2) unipolarity will stimulate the emergence of eligible states as great powers . 17. and increase the probability that balancing behavior would be directed against the United States. and multipolar systems . which probably would accelerate the rise of new great powers." A policy that concentrates U.4 1993) Because multipolarity is inevitable . . an American strategy of preponderance or an attempt to perpetuate unipolarity is doomed to failure . but just right-strong enough to defend American interests. traditional patterns of great power competition will reemerge not withstanding the effect of secondimage factors. (4) in a multipolar system. the United States needs to design a strategy that will (1) safeguard its interests during the difficult transition from unipolarity to multipolarity. “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise”.

the United States can pursue an alternative grand strategy without sacrificing its security. and an emphasis on domestic needs over external ambitions. I have attempted to demonstrate that. The United States is secure enough from external threat that. not the maximum. . preponderance’s advocates want to keep the world the way it is. it is also about values. there is nothing wrong with taking advantage of that Cold War’s end to focus on economic and social challenges at home: “What we should want. not a pejorative: Offshore balancing is a twenty-firstcentury grand strategy consistent with America’s interests and its values. And it should do so. America First is an imperative.22 Issue.” No doubt. “it simply has not been given to any one society to remain permanently ahead of all the others…” Thus the strategy of preponderance must be reassessed. Vol. is the minimum. In this sense. such a policy is indeed self-interested and most assuredly moral. is dynamic not static.” Salisbury said. offshore balancing—an innenpolitik grand strategy that posits the primacy of domestic over foreign policy—is ethically driven: America’s mission lies at home. U.” International politics. 1 Summer 1997) It is unsurprising that having fulfilled their hegemonic ambitions following the Soviet Union’s collapse. not abroad. grand strategists view the prospect of change in international politics in much the same way that British Prime Minister Lord Salisbury did toward the end of the nineteenth century. however. “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy”. of external involvement. should it wish to do so. some would maintain that offshore balancing is both selfish and immoral. U. In fact.119 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (14/18) Heg collapse inevitable Layne 97 (Christopher Layne is Visiting Associate Professor at Naval Postgraduate school. is about more than strategy. As Paul Kennedy has observed. The debate between advocates of preponderance and offshore balancing. “and therefore it is in our interest that as little should happen as possible. in fact. As George F. it could choose to restraint over intervention. hegemony cannot last indefinitely.S. Kennan says. however. in these circumstances. nation over empire. “What ever happens will be for the worse. International Security.S.

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History demonstrates that every empire has collapsed – cannot be sustained through force without public legitimacy
Carl Boggs 2005 (Social Science Professor National University (L.A.) , Planetary Politics: human rights, terror, and global society, ed. Stephen Eric Bronner)

The long history of empire aspiring to tyrannical rules over mass populations, hoping to expand their domain by overwhelming political coercion and military force, has been saturated with fierce resistance, deep quagmires, and humiliating failure: Rome, Spain, France under Napoleon, England, the brief twentieth-century global ventures of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. All at some point combined an unshakable political hubris with faith in armed violence as a means for building empire – and all had dazzling periods of success before disintegrating or being vanquished. Previous imperial regimes violated the basic Machiavellian premise that power without broad popular consent is destined to either implode or be overthrown. A corollary is that imperial domination by its very logic cannot easily secure much popular legitimacy, if any. By the 1940s the very idea of imperial control based upon foreign occupation had become historically obsolete, swept away by a series of postwar (and earlier) anticolonial struggles. The French colonial wars intended to retain control of Indochina and parts of Africa amounted to a final desperate reliance on brute force as the famous European “civilizing” mechanisms of religion, culture, and legal codes met with increasingly violent resistance. Dien Bien Phu and the Battle of Algiers symbolized the final eclipse of a colonial era in which European powers had recognized few limits to the use of military violence, much of it directed against civilian populations. The very ideology of imperial domination had been assaulted and destroyed in the name of ideals mainly imported from Europe itself—national self-determination, cultural autonomy, democracy.

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Heg Collapse Inevitable (16/18)
Drive for empire contains its own seeds of destruction through resistance and blowback
Carl Boggs 2005 (Social Science Professor National University (L.A.) , Planetary Politics: human rights, terror, and global society, ed. Stephen Eric Bronner) An urgent question for the fate of the planet is whether US ruling elites can for long sustain their drive toward global domination—that is, whether they can prevail in an arena where military force and political coercion have become the chosen methods of supremacy. We know that what governing regimes may require for popular support domestically may not readily extend to the sphere of world politics, where Hobbesian chaos tends to block normal mechanisms of legitimacy and order. US efforts to impose corporate and geopolitical agendas through military power, which of course it has in great abundance, will depend upon conditions of effective popular mobilization—needed to justify the costs and sacrifices of empire—but those very conditions (e.g. patriotism) quickly lose their ideological rationale beyond the national territory. Such conditions are in fact more likely to breed opposition and resistance to empire, including diverse expression of blowback. Signs of expanding opposition to empire have become increasingly visible; global terrorism and the events of 9/11, flourishing of an international antiwar movement during 2002 and 2003, growth of antisystem forces such as the World Social Forum, diffusion of anti-American sentiment in Europe the Muslim world, Asia, and elsewhere. To the degree that those ideological factors generating legitimacy for a new American militarism are bound to be counterproductive globally, imperial stability will more likely be reinforced by “postmodern” conditions involving widespread depoliticization, mass apathy, and privatized retreat ensuring greater elite autonomy. No doubt the rulers of empire would prefer a quieter, more atomized, depoliticized universe smoothly governed by routine economic transactions, the market, and consumerism, the ideal of an American-managed neoliberal hegemony grounded in a peaceful, more or less consensual imperial order. The problems here are twofold—the neoliberal model itself generates massive social contradictions while globalized, aggressive US military power works against the trajectory of single world hegemon, hoping to extend its rule over the entire planet, these contradictions are bound to significantly worsen.

expansive scope. including those referred to above.) . . Stephen Eric Bronner) While Gramsci never systematically brought the concept of hegemony into the realm of international politics. Yet it is not too difficult to see how the unique conditions of domestic support for US worldwide economic and military power might run counter to requirements for global hegemony. As the lone superpower with a huge seemingly invincible military apparatus. the United States has already lost much of its room to maneuver even as it wins immediate victories by means of economic and diplomatic leverage combined with military power—the same power that may soon become a double-edged sword. or threat of force. rooted in a strong patriotism.123 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (17/18) Military power undermines US heg and leadership – spurs resistance and is unsustainable Carl Boggs 2005 (Social Science Professor National University (L. and global society. Of course. A system of global domination resting largely upon military force. the global terrain with its vast mélange of competing nation-states. cannot in the scheme of things consolidate its rule on a foundation of legitimating beliefs and values. and dedicated to ruling the globe by force. and virtual absence of governing mechanisms differs radically from the state system that commanded most of Gramsci’s attention. ed.A. nor can it smooth over the harsh dysfunctions and conflicts endemic to the corporate world economy by mobilizing forms of hegemony such as nationalism and consumerism that work so fluidly in domestic politics. will naturally conflict with the multiplicity of competing interests and wills across the globe— interests and wills leading often to anti-imperial resistance and opposition just as predictably as any law of physics. Strong elements of “national-popular” consent underlying US empire. insights can be gleaned from several passages in the Prison Notebooks. Planetary Politics: human rights. terror.

124 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (18/18) Hegemonic collapse inevitable Khanna 8 (Parag Khanna is a senior research fellow in the American Strategy Program of the New America Foundation. multicivilizational. This essay is adapted from his book. and you could be forgiven for thinking it’s 1999. Maybe the best way to understand how quickly history happens is to look just a bit ahead. lagging decades behind China in both development and strategic appetite.. Afghanistan is stable. European and Chinese worldviews. they mean little. America’s unipolar moment lasted through the 1990s. both because of his policies and. That new global order has arrived. Condoleezza Rice has said America has no “permanent enemies. improvements to America’s image may or may not occur. and there is precious little Clinton or McCain or Obama could do to resist its growth.” but it has no permanent friends either. It’s as if the first decade of the 21st century didn’t happen — and almost as if history itself doesn’t happen. and not India. The Geopolitical Marketplace At best. whether to do it alone or with allies and what kind of world America should lead. as well as warships anchored at Bahrain and an Air Force presence in Qatar. America’s unipolar moment has inspired diplomatic and financial countermovements to block American bullying and construct an alternate world order. despite them. Why? Weren’t we supposed to reconnect with the United Nations and reaffirm to the world that America can. more significant. America’s standing in the world remains in steady decline.” http://www. an increasingly depopulated expanse run by Gazprom. Democrats and Republicans are bickering about where and how to intervene. and each assertion of power has awakened resistance in the form of terrorist networks. China has absorbed Taiwan and is steadily increasing its naval presence around the Pacific Rim and.> . But the distribution of power in the world has fundamentally altered over the two presidential terms of George W. Every expenditure has weakened America’s armed forces. it remained essentially a contest over Europe. The Big Three make the rules — their own rules — without any one of them dominating. Many saw the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq as the symbols of a global American imperialism.000 troops in the independent state of Kurdistan. lead it to collective security and prosperity? Indeed. not an incoherent Islam embroiled in internal wars. from the Pakistani port of Gwadar. for the first time in history. in fact. on the Arabian Sea. The postcold-war “peace dividend” was never converted into a global liberal order under American leadership. but either way. the more we will see the planetary stakes of the new global game. And the others are left to choose their suitors in this post-American world. The more we appreciate the differences among the American. This is geopolitics in the 21st century: the new Big Three. and should. as well as substantial nuclear energy. It is 2016. Bush.” to be published by Random House in March. we are competing — and losing — in a geopolitical marketplace alongside the world’s other superpowers: the European Union and China.gov. “Waving Goodbye to Hegemony. is a global. and Republicans believe muscular moralism is the way to go. multipolar battle. too. Russia and the Caspian Sea. America has pulled out of Iraq but has about 20. and the Hillary Clinton or John McCain or Barack Obama administration is nearing the end of its second term. Democrats believe they can hit a reset button.com/2008/01/27/magazine/27world-t. Not Russia. they were signs of imperial overstretch.html? _r=1&oref=slogin&ref=magazine&pagewanted=print) <Turn on the TV today.nytimes. The European Union has expanded to well over 30 members and has secure oil and gas flows from North Africa. was not truly an “East-West” struggle. The cold war. “The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order. but that was also a decade adrift. rather than bestriding the globe. insurgent groups and “asymmetric” weapons like suicide bombers. Previous eras of balance of power have been among European powers sharing a common culture. So now. What we have today. Iran is nuclear.

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either denying the charges or claiming they were internal affairs. White House policymakers and financial detractors of Beijing have ignored the formidable foundations of Chinese empire building and its capacity to rectify internal imbalances to sustain dynamic expansion. http://www. the most dynamic countries.pdf) A rising economic powers’ most formidable and effective response to the established imperial powers’ efforts to block its advance is … to keep on growing at double or triple the rate of growth of its declining adversary. China’s policy toward US attacks and threats was reactive and defensive. pointing to the structural weaknesses in the US economy. borrowing technology and upgrading its high tech industries. PriceWaterHouse Coopers and Goldman Sachs have come out with their set of predictions – China will become the largest economy by 2020 and on some parameters India will overtake Japan in . USA is still the largest economy with a GDP of $14 trillion. in the first quarter of 2010 China grew at 12%. When Washington protested at China’s violation of the human rights of Tibetan and Uigher separatists. for example.html.” http://lahaine. Later China responded by pointing out that the currency brouha had little to do with the US trade deficit. China. Nothing challenges the “crises” propaganda emitted by US embedded experts as the reports that. China went on the offensive.7% recording $4. however. India have voiced concern over its trade imbalances with China and entered in negotiations to increase its exports. (since Washington does a good job at self-destruction) rather it focuses on enhancing its own economic based strategy of increasing overseas investments. refuses to join its sanctions campaign against Iran and develops investment ties in Afghanistan while the US military occupation costs billions and alienates most Afghans including its client regime 39 . Most strikingly in Asia. despite pressure from Washington. Overall the US imperial strategy to stem its decline and block China’s growth as a world power has failed. without directly confronting the military mission promoted by Obama. publishing its own documented inventory of US domestic human right violations 38 . Given the overall growth of China. Sreekumar. China will overtake the US by 2020 -. Initially. Raghavan ‘10. retired Bartle Professor (Emeritus) of Sociology at Binghamton University in Binghamton. six times the projected growth of the US 37 .commodityonline. China rebuked Washington’s interference in China’s internal affairs and threatened to take reprisals which led Washington to drop its crusade.com/news/Futurology-Why-US-hegemony-will-decline25056-3-1. “Futurology: Why US hegemony will decline?”.org/petras/b2-img/petras_sinous.126 of 154 Exts – Yes China Rise Decline is inevitable .China is rising at unprecedented rates and US scare tactics can’t undermine its credibility Petras 10 – James. namely to its low level of savings.91 trillion likely to overtake Japan to second position. Over time Asia is replacing the US as the fastest growing trading partner of Beijing. More recently in April 2010. Commodity Online. je) Last week China released their GDP growth figures for 2009 which showed it grew 8. While attending “summits” and bilateral conferences it refuses to make concessions which prejudice its overseas markets. China refuses to lend support to Obama’s military centered strategy to buttress the empire. By 2010. China affirmed that is exchange rate was an “internal matter” and even acceded to US demands and revalued its currency (2006 – 2008) by 20%. China merely protested at US human rights attacks. Beijing has encouraged the US MNC to invest in China and export back to the US.demographic trends. capital formation and loss of competitiveness. the corporate penetration does not enhance US power rather it provides China with a lobby in Washington opposing protectionist measures. rather than proactive and offensive especially during the first decade of its advance toward global power status. New York and adjunct professor at Saint Mary's University (4/28/10. “Rising and Declining Economic Powers: The Sino-US Conflict Deepens. have ignored Washington’s warnings of China as a “security threat” and expanded their trade and economic ties with their neighbor. China does little to directly constrain US overseas expansion.Staff Writer for Commodity Online (1/24/10.

But the ‘Futurogist’ in me couldn’t ignore the following report from Massachussets. well-educated. analyzed data on birth weight. a new generation of kids are born who are underweight who could face increased risk in their adult life as well.key to overall global primacy. The study. In response. obstetric care and other trends from the National Center for Health Statistics Natality Data Sets. as it’s the largest obstacle to Beijing’s strategy.Howard S. I am quoting the report in full before coming to my theory of why US hegemony will end in another 20-30 years as predicted by futurologists. innovation. Harvard researchers say. President Obama dispatched the USS Chung-Hoon to provide armed escort for the surveillance ship.com/2010/05/06/china-ready-to-dominate-seas/4/. James. the obvious reason is because they produce more goods and services. je) The prospects for a Chinese surprise attack are. Naval War College and Senior Fellow at Foreign Policy Research Institute (5/6/10. on March 7 of 2009.828 U. The greater issue. into the South China Sea to assert China’s ‘rights and interests. If China or India emerges stronger. an affiliate of Harvard Medical School. The heavily damaged EP-3 made an emergency landing on the island.S. an oceanographic ship and a fisheries enforcement vessel. The Diplomat. US new borns are getting smaller which is to be studied in detail by the medical fraternity in the coming years. capitalism and innovative spirit. for example. China sent its largest and most modern ocean surveillance patrol ship. which were operating in the East China Sea. Chinese ships and aircraft harassed and threatened the USNS Bowditch and the USNS Sumner. In 1953.78 ounces less at birth during the study period. the line is derisively called ‘the cow tongue. received early prenatal care and delivered vaginally with no complications had babies who weighed an average of 2. The fact that the finding has come from Harvard Medical School is sure to ignite further research into causes leading to low birth weight babies and how to correct them. of course. knowledge capital. maternal and neonatal characteristics. married women who didn't smoke. In another of the many instances of harassment of US naval and air forces. “China Set for Naval Hegemony”. a similarly aggressive intercept occurred. Who knows biological reasons may be the critical factor that determines how long USA will remain the world’s largest economy. China failed to comply with its obligations under international law to show due regard for the rights of vessels and aircraft of other nations operating in the East and South China Seas.827. "Previous studies [covering periods into the early 1990s] have shown that birth weights have increased steadily during the past half-century. two commercial cargo ships crossed the bow of Impeccable. “U.127 of 154 2012. and even started using armed oceanographic ships and fisheries enforcement vessels to try to disrupt routine US military survey missions in the East China Sea. China has been equally obstinate in pressing specious ‘territorial’ claims to virtually the entire South China Sea.83 ounces between 1990 and 2005. physical activity.S.[1] Soon after the Impeccable incident. All of it will be lost if indeed. newborns have gotten smaller during the past 15 years. debatable. After all the US economy was built on free enterprise. In 2003.S. stopping directly in front of the ship. and again in 2002. babies born at full-term between 1990 and 2005. USA which states that during the past 15 years. At the same time. Chinese maritime forces stalked the USNS Impeccable ocean surveillance ship. Researchers at the Harvard Pilgrim Health Care Institute's department of population medicine. Working in tandem with an intelligence ship. ‘nine-dotted line’ that laid claim to 80 percent of the South China Sea. I feel the above report on US new borns indicate that biological reasons could also cause US hegemony to be threatened by emerging nations of China. China issued an infamous map with a U-shaped. political and military pressure—and sometimes aggression—to gradually bring the littoral seas under Chinese domination. utlising their human and natural resources in an efficient manner. In the summer of 2001. The causes of this decline remain unclear and babies born small not only face short-term complications but increased risk as adults. Kraska ’10. China initiated increasingly provocative warship and aircraft maneuvers. The fighter jet collided with the US aircraft. Beginning in 2000. a Chinese fighter jet aggressively intercepted a US Navy propeller-driven EP-3 surveillance aircraft 75 miles from Hainan Island.’ In 1974. resulting in the loss of the jet and pilot. stress and exposure to environmental toxins." Emily Oken of Harvard Medical School said in a statement. The researchers looked at data from 36. is how China has invested decades in a patient and aggressive campaign to slowly push other countries out of the East China Sea and South China Sea. In each of these cases. http://thediplomat. Oken and her colleagues found birth weights had decreased by an average of 1. Future research may identify other factors not included in the current data that might contribute to lower birth weight." Instead. In 2001. The US Navy is the main target. Today. also found white. the Yuzheng 311. China . Russia and India. natural resources. such as trends in mothers' diets.” So apart from factors such as industrial production. reversing a decades-long upward trend in birth weights.’ These three cases are only the tip of the iceberg. the USNS Victorious was harassed. Levie Chair of Operational Law at the U. The result: a well-coordinated campaign of legal. however. China will overtake naval heg -. "We expected to see a continuation of those increases. published in February's Obstetrics & Gynecology.

Chinese ground . But by claiming the South China Sea as its ‘territory. attracts more than 33 percent of the nation’s military spending. This isn’t new. Beijing has elevated the ‘the cow tongue’ to a vital national interest. Ironically. By comparison. after suffering an embarrassing indignity in 1996 when President Bill Clinton ordered the Nimitz and Independence carrier battle groups into the Taiwan Strait. another Okinawa Prefecture island. China again attacked Vietnamese forces on Johnson Reef and occupied six features in the Spratly Islands. Fourth. and the country’s intransigent and tireless peddling of patently illegal maritime claims.’ China is reaching far beyond its shores. has shrunk by 20 percent since 2001. The second US war was the First Barbary War of 1804. In February. In 1988. all spread thinly throughout the world. China’s grand effort to convert large swaths of the oceans into an area under Chinese suzerainty is a dangerous game that risks naval war. But ‘virtual presence’ is actual ragged with global responsibilities. on April 13 a Chinese Navy destroyer performed the menacing act of aiming its rapid-fire guns at a Japanese MSDF P-3C plane. While the United States has the forward-deployed USS George Washington on a short tether. the third US conflict was the War of 1812. Are you starting to see a pattern here? But China has made uncanny progress on its dogged trek to transition from an obsolete 1950s-style coastal defense force to a balanced blue water fleet. the Philippines. can be used to strike moving warships at sea. the New York Times reported that Chinese officials had told Deputy Secretary of State James B. Ironically. Malaysia and Brunei. including 75 major warships and more than 60 submarines. meaning that even two or three Chinese carriers operating in the area likely will exceed the number of US flattops. specifically designed to decapitate US carrier strike groups. the Vietnam War. AIP extends underwater endurance from a few days to one month. raising the danger that China was willing to endanger the safety of one of its aircraft to make a point. farther north. Last year. These maritime disputes are cast against the backdrop of decades of Chinese naval build-up. and the fourth war involving the United States was the Second Barbary War. Reportedly quieter than the US fast attack Los Angeles-class boats. China is working feverishly on a new weapon that will alter the strategic calculus—the 1. This is unlike any threat ever faced by the US Navy. For the first time. China has mastered quiet air-independent propulsion (AIP) power plants for its new Type 041 Yuan-class boats. in the Gulf of Tonkin. run hard-pressed to maintain a force of 11 carriers. a 10-ship Chinese flotilla. The Chinese fleet is about 260 vessels. The first war fought by an independent United States was over the issue of freedom of the seas—the 17981800 Quasi-War with France. the key US issue was ensuring freedom of the seas. The DF-21 will be armed with a maneuverable reentry vehicle (MARV) that. transited between Okinawa Island and Miyakojima. The Chinese Navy. Beijing’s maritime bullying. Likewise. and the entire force is complemented by hundreds of fast cruise-missiles shooting offshore patrol vessels and land-based aircraft. which was on a regular patrol mission in international airspace. in combination with a space-based maritime surveillance and targeting system. This occurred only two days after a Chinese helicopter flew within 90 feet of a MSDF destroyer monitoring the battle group. First. about to abandon its position of maritime superiority. and in 1994 Beijing captured Mischief Reef from the Philippines. China seized 33 Vietnamese fishing boats and 433 crew members near the Paracel Islands. on the other hand. oftentimes Washington has no other carrier in theater.’ They also lie far from China and within the 200-mile economic zones of neighboring Vietnam. and particularly maritime mobility. Steinberg that China would not tolerate ‘foreign interference’ in its ‘territory’ in the South China Sea. Taiwan.128 of 154 seized the Paracel Islands from Vietnam. the United States is under the delusion that it could maintain sea control in Asia. Second. while China should in turn reassure its neighbors that its rise is peaceful. the issue of freedom of the seas helped precipitate US involvement in two world wars and. 88 major surface combatants and 48 submarines. the United States devotes only 26 percent of its defense budget to the Navy and Marine Corps. 31 amphibious warfare ships. with short and secure internal lines of communication. which included two submarines. So accustomed to being militarily superior. and the prospect of intercepting a maneuvering ballistic missile reentry vehicle is daunting. the US Navy battle force. who notably coined the phrase ‘strategic reassurance’ to describe the idea that the United States should reassure China that its rise to prominence is welcome.500-mile range DF-21 ASBM. which will include aircraft carriers. and enables submarines to sprint underwater—greatly increasing their attack radius. The cornerstone of American power and security is global access. Then. The United States believes it can be ‘virtually present’ everywhere. most of the rocks and reefs of the Spratly and Paracel chains are merely navigational hazards and not ‘islands. demonstrating its ability to shoot down the aircraft. All of Beijing’s warships and land-based aircraft and submarines already are present in theater. and the US strategy is tacit recognition that the Navy that had approached 600 ships in the 1980s is incapable of maintaining even half that number. Third. For each of these conflicts. In one incident in October 2006. On April 10 of this year. is a force multiplier. The US fleet will be absence. As a maritime nation with worldwide responsibilities. China’s geographic position. an ultra-quiet Song–class AIP submarine surfaced inside the protective screen of the aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk. the elusive AIP diesel electrics are equipped with wake-honing torpedoes and anti-ship cruise missiles. Several factors are in play as China unveils a stable of advanced and emerging systems. the Center for Naval Analysis issued a report suggesting that none of this is hyperbole: the US Navy is at the tipping point. it was Steinberg. and then surge actual forces in the event of a crisis. a longtime Clinton associate. But in March. China has embarked on a program to build a powerful surface fleet.

with the US dollar as its reserve currency. Nevertheless. Yet the country cannot continue to keep the value of its currency artificially low if it hopes to become the world's dominant economic power.129 of 154 command and control is connected by spoof-proof hard-wire landlines. China is riding a wave of national overconfidence at the same time many regard the United States as preoccupied with counterinsurgency in central Asia. their stars and the super-rich will appear 300 times a day in a giant advertisement for the People's Republic. http://www. The United States superseded the British Empire after World War II. Brimming with uncontained satisfaction—even joy—at its relentless ascent. Moreover. the pioneers in China's race to the top have been displayed on a giant electronic billboard in New York's Times Square. Even before he left Beijing. During these sessions. retired Bartle Professor (Emeritus) of Sociology at Binghamton University in Binghamton. The second possibility is that other nations—foremost among them Japan and India—but also including virtually every other nation in the region from Russia to Vietnam. the Chinese leaders realized that no modern country has ever become a superpower without a reserve currency. such as in the commodities markets. Wagner ’11. the dollar and the euro. upon suddenly experiencing a growth spurt.cannot even be freely exchanged into another currency. China is overflowing with ethnic and cultural pride and itching to ‘teach lessons’ and settle old scores. the Chinese leader said that the world's monetary system. dominant not only on land.1518. je) China would like to make the yuan one of the world's anchor currencies. as the United States buckles under the strain of enormous budget deficits. forcing other countries to maintain reserves of Chinese money and providing significant advantages for Beijing. will begin to think more overtly about collective measures and how they can balance the growing power of Beijing. perhaps even allowing it to float freely. Today the renminbi -. In order to have a reserve currency. Fifth. To keep the prices of its exports artificially low. clumsily begins to throw around his weight. Dollar heg -. Caught up in the fanfare of the country’s meteoric rise. Beijing has used a complicated system of foreign currency controls to effectively shield the renminbi from global capital flows. China behaves like the gangly teenager who. but in the Western Pacific. Until now. Wieland. This would make the country's exports substantially more expensive and would drastically curb growth. China would have to give up all of this. strategically listless and brooding. in its global shopping spree. Secret Lectures on Reserve Currencies Years ago. As of last week. so that the exchange rate could be based on the real value of the currency and the strength of China's economy. the images of Chinese astronauts and athletes.Writer for Spiegel International (1/26/11. was a "product of the past. Any maritime conflict with the United States (or Japan) will push China teetering over the edge of a war fever not seen since the Guns of August. China rise inevitable – US tactics to undermine Chinese credibility have failed and increased Chinese confidence to project power Petras 10 – James. This suggests two outcomes. the visiting head of state had predicted that the dominant capitalist power could expect to see a redistribution of global power. These emotions fuel a ballooning sense of past wrongs to be compensated and future entitlements to be seized. Hu and the Politburo attended secret lectures in which Chinese professors explained the history of the rise and fall of major powers. The occasion for the new superpower's confident campaign was the state visit of President Hu Jintao. hardly a week goes by in which China does not launch new pilot projects to "internationalize" the yuan in the long term. These developments don’t leave a lot of room for optimism. “China Plans Path to Economic Hegemony”. Spiegel International. other countries will have to maintain reserves of the yuan instead of the current reserve currencies.html. In written interviews with the Wall Street Journal and the Washington Post." which is adorned with a portrait of Mao -. gaining more favorable terms as a result. New York and adjunct professor at Saint Mary's University . If that happens. It would have to gradually appreciate its currency. This explains why Beijing has pursued the internationalization of the yuan since the outbreak of the global financial crisis. when the dollar replaced the British pound as the dominant currency in the global financial system. 68. the prospect is remote that the US Navy alone will recalibrate the balance of sea power. The first is that China will indeed achieve its goal of becoming the Asian hegemonic power.741303. the country also essentially links the exchange rate of its currency to the dollar. China could then use its own currency to conduct transactions." China's long-term goal is to become a country with an anchor currency. China has a lot on its plate.de/international/business/0.spiegel.yuan will overtake it. For four weeks.the official name in China for the "people's money. which the Chinese believe has irrevocably harmed their American rival.00. They have made it to the heart of American capitalism. with US President Barack Obama.

For example. "The PLA navy is increasing its numbers of submarines and other ships. a conservative Washington think tank. deflecting attention from the facts of Chinese compliance in setting standards superior to the US 36 . specializes in business and government technology and security (5/31/10. have a repertoire of levers designed to discredit. je) The US is developing an air-sea battle concept to counter China's military buildup. US . to allow the US to gain trade advantages to reduce (“rebalance”) its trade deficit. Chinese military and political doctrine holds that China should rule the waves out to the second island chain of the western Pacific. “Rising and Declining Economic Powers: The Sino-US Conflict Deepens. While human rights propaganda serves as the stick to beat back China’s economic advance. or Washington undertakes actions to offset or counterbalance the effects of the PLA’s military buildup. http://oilprice.freelance journalist based near Washington. if we translate the meaning of the White House’s demand for China to “assume responsibility” for “rebalancing the world economy” it boils down to telling Beijing to reduce its dynamic growth. advanced radar systems. spaced-based reconnaissance. such as references to the US and China as the (G-2). In other words.com/Geo-Politics/International/Chinese-Plans-to-End-US-Hegemony-in-the-Pacific. Oil Price.. at a recent speech hosted by the Heritage Foundation. Behind this diplomatic rhetoric is an effort to harness China to a policy of collaborating and following US empire building strategies as a junior partner. advanced fighter aircraft. China should give up its market driven economic expansion to share “responsibility” in policing the world in which the US is supreme. at the expense of China’s economic interests. and ballistic and cruise missiles. "the cost incurred by the US military to operate in the [w]estern Pacific will likely rise sharply. opposing protectionism and seeking a negotiated settlement with Iran. At international gatherings like the recent Copenhagen Conference on climate warming. highlighting China’s human rights violations.This situation creates a strategic choice for the United States. perhaps to prohibitive levels. surveillance and target acquisition. on climate. One of the longest standing political ploys is Washington’s human rights propaganda campaign. Over time this imperial offensive to slow its decline has provoked an increasingly aggressive response as China gains confidence in its capacity to project power." said Admiral Gary Roughead. the two determining powers in the world. seduce. unmanned aerial vehicles.” http://lahaine. the GATT meeting on trade liberalization and the UN meeting on Iran. Washington also attempts to induce China’s cooperation in slowing down its decline. But political problems and budgetary woes could kill the program before it ever gets started. while China has invested billions in joint ventures with Iran and has developed a growing lucrative trading relation. deflect attention from its worldwide long term and large scale violation of human rights accompanying its global empire building and build an anti-China coalition. US diplomats frame this approach by emphasizing “treating China as an equal”. The Chinese also have an emerging and muscular deep-water navy.130 of 154 (4/28/10. like the US today. essentially dividing the Pacific between the US and China and ending US hegemony on that ocean. "Unless Beijing diverts from its current course of action. Washington attempts to satanize China as the main obstacle in reaching global accords. “Chinese Plans to End US Hegemony in the Pacific”. Among the anti-access/area-denial (A2AD) capabilities being fielded by China include anti-satellite weapons. isolate and contain rising world powers like China and put it on the defensive. while ignoring its own massive offenses and downplaying those of its allies like the Jewish state of Israel. "Navies tend to grow with economies and as trade becomes more important." All of this has US military planners and thinkers worried..pdf) Established empires in decline. chief of US naval operations. Likewise.org/petras/b2-img/petras_sinous. “currency manipulation” and other “unfair” economic practices 35 . recognizing it as a “world power” which has to “share responsibilities” 33 . the White House has promoted a “united front” with the EU against China’s supposedly “protectionism”.C. Peter.]. D. China Will End US Hegemony in the Pacific Buxbaum ’10. China's People's Liberation Army is building up anti-access and area-denial capabilities with the apparent goal of extending their power to the western half of the Pacific Ocean. the State Department hopes to inflate US moral authority." said a report recently released by the Washington-based Center for Budgetary and Strategic Assessments. and much sooner than many expect[. Alternating between positive symbolic gestures. By discrediting China internal politics. Washington demands China support sanctions to weaken and degrade Iran to enhance US military power in the Gulf 34 . The A2AD buildup threatens the US forward presence and power projection in the region. its allies and partners: acquiesce in a dramatic shift in the military balance or take steps to preserve it.html. which extends as far as Guam and New Guinea. electromagnetic weapons." In response to the Chinese challenge.

" said Krepinevich." A key objective of AirSea Battle. "To win one 100 victories in 100 battles is not the acme of skill. As a recent article in the Washington Post noted. "and will stay off for a good period of time[. "the bigger questions are what the intentions of the Chinese are and how the carriers will be used. an independent from Connecticut. according to the CSBA report." But US allies in the region might not see things that way. The Art of War. "US success will depend heavily on Japan’s active participation as an ally. the JMFDS could easily develop a closer relationship with the Chinese navy. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill. CSBA president and report co-author Andrew Krepinevich told ISN Security Watch. "Carrier operations are very complex." Pursuing AirSea Battle would require a reordering of Pentagon priorities. But the program has its political dimension as well: to reassure US allies." he added.131 of 154 strategic planners and thinkers are exploring a concept known as 'AirSea Battle. emphasizing." But the US may already be losing the hearts and minds of the Japanese." he said. short-range over than long-range strike systems. involving the development of specific military capabilities. including coercion or aggression. As Sun Tzu said in his classic.[R]ealistically. China could win a war on the Pacific without firing a shot. Admiral Roughead noted that the US Navy has a strong operational relationship with the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force.. real or perceived.' the subject of the new CSBA report. it is highly unlikely that we will achieve the real [budget] growth rates necessary to sustain the current force structure.. towards developing a balanced. is a complex set of concepts. The big squeeze Looming in the background are the budgetary constraints now being placed on the Pentagon. and a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. In a speech earlier this month. US inability. But if the Asia-centric attitudes in Japan prevail." advocates "a more Asia-centric view of Japan's place in the world. "The gusher has been turned off.]. and keep them from succumbing to Chinese pressure despite the apparent decline of US capabilities in the western Pacific. that would offset the Chinese buildup. US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned military commanders not to expect to get everything they ask for. to defend its allies and partners could lead to regional instability. That position does not promote sharp decision making that allocates scarce resources to emerging threats. "Besides." Although the immediate crisis on the Korean peninsula is having the effect of cementing US-Japanese relations-the Japanese government has accepted a plan it once rejected to relocate a US Marine base on Okinawa-it is not clear how long that attitude will last. Spurring the need for AirSea Battle. Roughead acknowledged reports that the Chinese are planning to deploy one or more aircraft carriers to the Pacific. as reflected in the Quadrennial Defense Review released earlier this year." he said. as outlined in the CSBA report. "only the second opposition party to take power in nearly 50 years. for example. is to deny adversaries a quick victory. The US also faces the problem of bolstering the confidence of its allies. "Admiral Roughead is conducting an AirSea Battle study inside the Pentagon. particularly the Japanese. If US allies fold in the face of increasing Chinese power. The projection of Chinese power on the Pacific may be enough for them to perceive their interests differently. such as greater integration between the US Navy and Air Force. a new capability for them." noted Senator Joseph Lieberman. Japan's current government. DoD continues to invest in capabilities that assume that the status quo will prevail in the western Pacific. at a recent Washington gathering. "It took us 70 years to get where we are. AirSea Battle. but dismissed any potential threat to US interests. such as long-range strike systems. In fact. "Most US allies in the region and lack strategic depth and must be supported and defended from the sea." . Gates has displayed a proclivity. multifaceted defense posture. and operating concepts. then. is that "China will attempt to achieve a quick victory by inflicting such damage that the US would choose to discontinue the fight or driving a major US ally out of the war. especially in light of the budget squeeze.

. cannot become the top power. human rights." "If China in the 21st century cannot become world number one. needs strong conventional forces to reduce its overreliance on its aging Soviet-era nuclear missile deterrent.” Yeah a ball game where we decided to sit out a few innings. Russia and China are Challenging US Power Hanson ’11. The call for China to abandon modesty about its global goals and "sprint to become world number one" comes from a People's Liberation Army (PLA) Senior Colonel. who warns that his nation's ascent will alarm Washington. dominance”. Russia’s military is launching its biggest rearmament effort since Soviet times.S. the U. 100 warships. a professor at the elite National Defense University. says it could create “a whole new ballgame. while already the world’s fifth-largest military spender. We need to make the commitment to maintain the dominant military that keeps us all safe. Russia Still Believes They Are A Superpower. director of the independent Interfax-Military News Agency. We already canceled the F-22 and the real concern is whether we will support the F-35 program now that it is our main fighter.Editor of Big Peace focusing on the practitioners of our national security policies on the groundserved as a Weapons Sergeant in 1st Special Forces Group across most of the Pacific Rim. It would be naive to pretend that a Russia run by Putin is not a threat or that the Chinese will not take advantage of the leverage they have due to well owning us. the top power.com/article/2010/03/01/us-china-usa-military-exclusiveidUSTRE6200P620100301. "As long as China seeks to rise to become world number one .132 of 154 Yes – China/Russia Counterbalancing China’s counterbalancing US dominance.com/jhanson/2011/03/03/russia-still-believes-they-are-a-superpower/. je) China should build the world's strongest military and move swiftly to topple the United States as the global "champion. Analysts say Russia. Now as much as I like spending cuts. then even if China is even more capitalist than the U. Liu Mingfu. His 303-page book stands out for its boldness even in a recent chorus of strident Chinese voices demanding a hard shove back against Washington over trade.writes and produces videos for the award-winning military site Blackfive (3/3/11. http://www. including a $650 billion program to procure 1." Liu writes in his newly published Chinese-language book. Reuters News. it is not healthy to emasculate our ability to deter our enemies. 600 combat planes. then inevitably it will become a straggler that is cast aside." writes Liu. risking war despite Beijing's hopes for a "peaceful rise.Staff Writer for Reuters News (2/28/10." "China's big goal in the 21st century is to become world number one. Buckley ’10.S.. There are plenty of folks in Congress salivating over the size of the program and dreaming of all the other things they could spend that money on. and 8 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. “China PLA officer urges challenging U." a senior Chinese PLA officer says in a new book reflecting swelling nationalist ambitions.reuters. and arms sales to Taiwan.. which trains rising officers.S." writes Liu. Jim. je) While we are busy cutting our military budget the Russians are following the lead of the Chinese and building up. Big Peace.000 new helicopters. http://bigpeace. will still be determined to contain it. the self-ruled island Beijing claims as its own. Tibet. Valentin Rudenko. Moscow – The graying bear is getting a make-over. We also need to make sure we have enough of those big floating boats they land them on too. . Chris. "The China Dream.

Yet. Whether this constructive posture will develop as the rule or will remain an exception remains to be seen. Another important explanatory factor is the American reluctance to commit to another potential long war. The US is now less interventionist by choice and by necessity – in this new international order. let alone to lead. First characteristic of the new international order: it seems less and less American as illustrated by the relatively discrete profile adopted by Washington on the whole Libyan crisis – and the Arab uprisings in general. “The vote on Libya reflects to a certain extent the new international order that is taking shape”EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 5 The vote on Libya offered an encouraging signal with Russia and China constructively abstaining rather than using their veto power. Global interdependence per se is not new. “Libya and the Post-American World: Implications for the EU. America still feels pretty safe. Research Fellow in the Europe in the World Program at Egmont – Royal Institute for International Relations (April 2011. Emerging powers have become sufficiently assertive to confront the West on some issues (sometimes individually. The soft-spoken American posture is a clear political choice related to domestic pressures but it is also a matter of necessity. after the disastrous experiences in Afghanistan and in Iraq – both conflicts which were supposed to end quickly.pdf) The vote on Libya reflects to a certain extent the new international order that is taking shape.edu/32037/1/SPB20-Libya-in-new-worldorder. as the phantoms of military and economic overstretch are present in all minds. Europe is in the driving seat and in spite of the chaotic ride due to intraEuropean divisions.pitt. This is a world of strategic opportunities where established and emerging powers can increasingly pursue their own agenda. Could they be next in the driving seat? Second characteristic: the emerging global order is probably more fragmented than during the previous bipolar era. This international order in the making is less dominated by Washington as it becomes more multipolar. On the other hand. This fragmentation makes international cooperation to solve global challenges more difficult. As emerging powers continue to build their global footprint and to develop global interests. Thus. US influence and ability to mediate conflicts is declining. Europe and the emerging powers are just discovering what this “post-American world” means in practice. Washington must choose carefully its priorities in terms of foreign policy for it is simply no longer able to be present simultaneously on every front. But from Brasilia to Beijing. sometimes as a bloc). Yet the direction of such foreign policy remains unclear. This looks very much like the “post-American world” described by Fareed Zakaria. like Libya. As the 2012 presidential election is nearing. for there is simply no alternative to address some of the most pressing global challenges. The Libyan crisis was a first illustration of what happens when the US takes a backseat. Obama seems also unwilling to wage another unpopular war. there is inevitably a third explanation for America’s discrete profile on Libya: the US is slowly losing its uncontested hegemony in international security. The era of “you are with us or against us” is inevitably over. but according to some scholars today’s interdependence is creating favourable conditions for international cooperation.133 of 154 UQ – Yes Heg Decline Shift to multipolarity now Renard 11 – Thomas. . and it is less predictable as emerging powers grasp new strategic opportunities to push forward their influence and ultimately their interests. at the moment. the world is increasingly interdependent and interconnected as largely illustrated by the recent economic crisis. notably due to the so called multipolarization of the international order. particularly in the Arab world.” http://aei. but remain prudent enough to avoid endangering their rise by investing too much in revisionist postures. independently from the US. For now. the tension between factors of fragmentation (possibly leading to a fracture?) and cohesion maintains the international system in flux and makes it less predictable. they are more likely to develop a sophisticated foreign policy. world leaders are contemplating this new American posture with interest. Part of the explanation for this discrete profile lies in the personality of Barack Obama who has developed a much more cautious approach to international problems in comparison with his predecessor.

Of the twenty-five largest mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in the United States in 1998–2000. The use of armed force has always been an inseparable part of hegemony. Issue 07 (December). while the European Union (EU) had 23 percent—40 percent if intra-EU exports were counted.S. exports have exceeded imports only in 1973 and 1975. the share of private world savings held in European currencies increased from 13 percent to 37 percent.S. and is of dubious value in preserving the global economic order and the stake that U. only two were U. six of ten telecommunications companies. Even during the golden days of 1944–1971 the United States was unable to avoid military defeat in Vietnam and a draw in Korea. the balance turned negative: for the first time the United States is paying foreigners more investment income from their . the share of U. The United States still has immense—unequalled—power in international economics and politics. is now deteriorating sharply. Its military supremacy is no longer matched in the economic and political spheres. http://monthlyreview.org/2003/12/01/u-s-hegemony-continuing-decline-enduring-danger. A nation can run deficits in its trade in goods and still be in overall balance in its dealings with foreign countries. as was the case for Britain in South Africa (1899–1902) and the United States in Vietnam (1962–1975). Since 1971. The weak link is the dollar. Half the foreign exchange reserves held by the world’s central banks were composed of dollars in 1990 compared to 76 percent in 1976. Of the top twenty corporations involved in cross-border M&As from 1987 through 2001. they accounted for 5 percent of the value of all M&A deals during these years. dividends. Twenty-one percent of the world’s stock of direct investment in other countries was American in 2001.S. Britannia ruled the waves from 1815 to 1913. Richard.S. but by the 1890s she was under economic challenge from the United States and Germany. 17 percent of all new direct investment abroad came from the United States and 16 percent from Great Britain. Volume 55. investment abroad. Bryn Mawr College (7/13/11. stood at 24 percent in 2001. The U. Deficits in trade in goods can be offset by having a positive balance in sales of services abroad (financial. multinationals in the foreign sales of the world’s one hundred largest multinationals decreased from 30 to 25 percent. It cannot be deployed to answer every threat to geopolitical and economic interests. four of seven airlines. telecommunications.134 of 154 DuBoff ’11Professor Emeritus of Economics. Forty-four percent of new bonds have been issued in euros since the new currency was introduced in 1999. je) “Global hegemony” might be defined as a situation in which one nation-state plays a predominant role in organizing. balance of international payments is chalking up record deficits. 25 percent in 1999. but vulnerable. the proportion rose back to 68 percent in 2001 because of the phasing out of ecus (reserves issued to European banks by the European Monetary Institute) to make way for the euro. and the like). five involved takeovers by foreign multinationals (three British. but even as the sole superpower it finds itself less able than it once was to influence and control the course of events abroad. (General Electric and Citigroup). Of the twentyfive largest banks in the world. the share of EU-based companies increased from 41 to 46 percent. the United States is not only less dominant. banks. with a combined gross domestic product (GDP) seven-tenths that of the United States. The U. whose status as the world’s key currency has been eroding since the 1970s. Of the top one hundred corporations in the world in 2000 ranked by foreign-held assets. twenty-three were American. while the dollar’s share fell from 67 to 40 percent.S.S. seven of the ten largest petroleum refiners. But the U. but military power depends upon the economic resources at the disposal of the state. companies dominated major industries in 2002. “U. U. four of six chemical producers. against 21 percent at present. together. irregularly and with periodic revivals. and stabilizing the world political economy. nineteen were non-U. almost constantly in surplus from 1895 to 1977. accounting for nine of the ten largest electronics and electrical equipment manufacturers. interest. and between the two world wars was no longer able to function as underwriter to the world system. France and Belgium-Luxembourg supplied 21 percent. France. Slow Merge Ahead: Hegemony Since the 1970s An idea of the decline of American economic power can be formed from the following:1 In 1950 the United States supplied half the world’s gross product. regulating. Non-U. capital has in it. During the 1990s. although the two largest were Citigroup and Bank of America. current account (the sum of the balances in trade in goods and services plus net income from overseas investment).S. five of ten pharmaceutical firms. eight of the ten largest motor vehicle makers and electric and gas utilities. insurance. In 2002.S. Enduring Danger”. Japan had sixteen. Together. Monthly Review.S. And since 1990. had forty. compared with 47 percent in 1960. hegemony began during the Second World War and peaked some thirty years later. the fastest growing part of the world economy. Between 1981 and 1995. In global finance. when the United States had a deficit in its trade in goods (merchandise) for the first time in seventy-eight years.S.2 For the first time since the Second World War there is another source of universally acceptable payment and liquidity in the world economy —at a moment when the U. During 1996–2001. and the Netherlands. the United Kingdom. share of exports of commercial services. royalties. closing in on the 48 percent issued in dollars. the merchandise deficit has become too big to be paid for by services sold to foreigners.S. advertising and other business services) and/or income from overseas investments (profits. merchandise deficit has become too big to be paid for by services sold to foreigners plus remittances on investments.S. two German). and it raises the danger of imperial overreach. Sixty percent of the world’s manufacturing production in 1950 came from the United States. Hegemony: Continuing Decline. the positive balance on investment income has been shriveling as foreign investment in the United States has grown faster than U. Germany.

political system and stage of development. Interest rates in the United States might surge. companies. and Iran has considered a conversion since 1999. As the dollar declines in value.135 of 154 holdings here than it receives from its own investments abroad.S. 1. The EU. 19. because of its share of world GDP and world trade could be a first tier actor. Therefore. In 2002. the integration of Japan a generation ago.S. but to fully qualify it would have to upgrade its hard power base: economic capability. and consumers would pay more for imported goods. arousing suspicion that the United States favors a cheaper dollar to help pay off its ballooning trade deficit. but unlike the British Empire in the decades before the First World War. In any event the dollar is now perceived to be as risky an asset as the euro and possibly two or three other currencies (yen. 24 percent of all U.3 So far the global investor class has seemed willing to finance America’s external deficits.S. By mid-2003. Great Britain’s current account was in surplus. and elsewhere were cut back sharply in 2003.” Thus. This is how the United States turned into a debtor nation in 1986. companies are continuing to invest abroad. saw little chance of change “in the near future…[but] in the long run the euro is not at such a disadvantage versus the dollar.-owned assets abroad. China’s ascent engenders a fundamental change in yet another sense.8 percent of GDP. a record 4. Vol.”5 If foreign investors get cold feet. governments). U. ceasing to invest in U. borrowing money would become harder. residents (individuals.rising powers. corporate bonds and stocks.” Adoption of the euro by Europe’s principal oil producers. could create “a momentum to shift the oil pricing system to euros. concluded Yarjani. In a speech in Spain in April 2002. “We can get the same return in Britain and the Nordic countries.5 trillion more than U. The Euro-zone has a bigger share of global trade than the US and…a more balanced external accounts position. Javad Yarjani. the dollar would start falling faster. San Francisco. German investments in choice office properties in New York.%20the%20EU%20and %20Multipolarity-2. but it may not be forever. stocks and bonds. All these differences reduce the likelihood that Beijing will easily accept the systemic responsibilities that Western key players associate with great power status. By contrast. In the first tier we have the US and an ever more powerful China. they can use them to buy American assets (U. where the currency risk is greater?” asked the chief investment officer of a Munich-based property fund. No. 57–67.S. While the buildings were becoming cheaper in euros. Swiss franc). foreigners owned 41 percent of U.S. rents were shrinking when converted from dollars back home. professor of international relations at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel and director of the Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies (European Review. when income from services and foreign investment was larger than its merchandise trade deficits. Geeraerts 11 – Gustaaf. Japan. and 13 percent of corporate stock. Like most gaps between income and expenses. “OPEC will not discount entirely the possibility of adopting euro pricing and payments in the future. the United States is unable to finance those investments from its current account.S.S.be/biccs/site/assets/files/apapers/China. Brazil. the head of OPEC’s Market Analysis Department. South Africa. draining income from other purchases and dampening the economy. Russia. Norway and Britain.ac. Iraq switched to the euro in 2000 (presumably terminated with extreme prejudice in March 2003). The deficits are exerting a downward drag on the dollar. companies.” http://www. and the New Multipolarity. foreign-owned assets in the United States are now worth $2. the current account deficit is covered by borrowing. When foreigners receive dollars from transactions with U. economy. the United States borrowed $503 billion from abroad.4 Until recently all Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) sold their oil for dollars only. the large European states and the remaining members of the G20. Treasury marketable debt. “China. A dollar rout could cause skittish investors to dump U. sending Wall Street into a dive. industries or selling off their dollar holdings. averaging 3 to 4 percent of GDP every year from 1850 to 1913.S.pdf) The emerging multipolar structure is a multilayered one: it consists of two tiers (see Table 2). and real estate). so why go to the United States. it poses a challenge to the era of Western hegemony at the level of system values and rules of the game. 8 The second tier comprises most regional powers like India. the ‘integration of China into the existing global economic order will thus be more difficult than was. Multipolarity now -. Because of China’s being different in terms of culture. the EU. political competence and military strength. say. the return to foreign investors on dollar-denominated assets falls.vub. Yet their weight is such that it is key for the first tier players to take them in account. Treasury bonds. history.’ 3 China’s rise is not . sterling. 2011. corporate bonds. They matter in a number of important international issue areas but are lacking in comprehensive power.

armaments wars and eventually decades of global conflict and violence. precisely during critical power transitions. Some point out that. No. As a consequence of increased international engagement and increasing economic interests abroad. LexisNexis) The biggest secret to be revealed by WikiLeaks should have been the easiest to spot without the website's classified document dump: U.%20the%20EU%20and %20Multipolarity-2. The outcome is that Iran's attempts to establish a nuclear capability and North Korea's aggression against its southern neighbour have been met with no effective response. In the early and middle 19th century. There is . Geeraerts 11 – Gustaaf. regional rivalries may turn nasty. Europe and China are geopolitically more proximate than ever before.be/biccs/site/assets/files/apapers/China. and the New Multipolarity. The United States can no longer afford to act as an unquestionably benign trade hegemon. The WikiLeaks documents show the United States attempting to assemble regional alliances to address problems like North Korea's continued isolation from the global community. 1. In previous decades. There are a number of risk-reducing advantages to the world in having a clearly defined hegemon. “China. for example. “WikiLeaks exposes waning U. 2010. increasing risk premiums in their respective regions and across the globe. Vol.136 of 154 only changing the distribution of power in the system. 2011.” http://www. hegemony.it will foster cooperation and stability -.ac. It's hard to avoid the overall impression from the disclosure of 250. provided its intentions are reasonably benevolent. Beijing actually has a profound interest in seeing that the international rules and institutions function effectively. That underscores a heightened risk for global investors that without U. hegemony is on the wane. many emerging powers in the past have relinquished their resistance against imperialist policies by gradually starting to apply the very strategies themselves: the use of coercion to chase unequal economic gains.” National Post's Financial Post & FP Investing. 10 As China is already firmly integrated in the current international regimes and benefits from their smooth functioning. and Iranian nuclear ambitions. Yet the question remains to what extent Beijing will use its growing influence to transform the international system and bring its rules and institutions more in line with the country’s national interests. 57–67. Then after 1873 the decline of Britain's relative economic strength and the later build-up of the German navy reduced Britain's power and led to increased protectionism. professor of international relations at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel and director of the Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies (European Review. South Korea and Panama free trade deals. Others point out that China is developing within a system with strongly established international institutions.000 secret State Department cables that the 1990s vision of U. the United States led the way toward global trade expansion. it also engenders a change in the distribution of identities. Journalist and economist for Reuters Breakviews (November 30. the EU. supremacy and peaceful globalization is irrevocably ending. they expect multilateralism to be a crucial ingredient of Beijing’s foreign policy. hence its petty retaliation against certain Chinese exports and its monetary policies perceived as mercantilist that encourage other countries to erect barriers to free movement of goods and capital. while the Doha global free trade talks are stone dead. Yet its efforts in these areas have been ineffectual as the nation's power to coerce and cajole has been reduced by its relative economic and military decline.vub. 10 Heg is on the decline -. Yet it is far from clear how Beijing will seek to manage its position in the evolving international system and how it will strike the balance between power politics and multilateralism. Today there appears no longer to be a Congressional consensus to ratify even the limited Colombia.pdf) China and Europe are both regional powers with broad global interests. as did Britain in the 19th century. trade barriers rise and fiscal policies destroy wealth. Multipolarity coming -.S. the creation of spheres of influence and the formation of alliances to prevent hostile powers from obstructing these ventures.US multilateral actions and wikileaks prove Hutchinson 10 – Martin.S. 19. the US and the EU would prefer to integrate China in the global governance structures they established and safeguarded in the past few decades and hope for a reproduction of the existing system. British hegemony pushed the global economy toward free trade and defused regional rivalries and armaments wars. which it makes ample use of to sustain its growth. leadership. 9 They expect power politics to gradually take the upper hand. Some expect that China too will inevitably go down this road. Understandably.S.S.Europe and China are filling in.

and others. Successful bilateral cooperation will be key in promoting global peaceful development. with the hope that things will get better. and the growth of more significant manufacturing powers such as Japan. In spite of all the friction and misunderstanding. This area was rock-solid during the 50s and 60s. draining wars. Europe and China have shown themselves anxious not to slide into another era of great power rivalry. to support effective governance. Global Hegemony . and enhance maritime security. If Beijing and Brussels are serious about changing the nature of great power politics.137 of 154 an important joint interest to promote stability and sustainable development in those regions that we share in our extended neighbourhoods. Rubin/Summers/Lindsay/Snow/Paulson/Geithner. Midas Letter. to invest in the safety of our energy supplies. It is legitimate that growing interests bring the need to exert influence. Associate Director of the Frederick A. There is a strong need to work together to enhance security. Andy. there are no longer anymore viable "band-aids" to apply.Professor of Sustainable Enterprise at the University of Michigan. Such a contest would severely weaken the two player’s chances for sustainable internal development. to limit the impact of environmental hazards. nothing. but has proven to be fleeting in the 90s and 00s due to the decline in America's finances. Just politicians being politicians.midasletter. Erb Institute for Global Sustainable Enterprise (4/18/09. to guarantee that our policies benefit lasting stability and development.The Beginning and the End”. All along the "foundation" of U.'s brief reign as world superpower has been marked by the continuing application of No long-term strategies.S. but effective multilateralism also implies that all parties are committed to overcoming diverging expectations and trying to reach a pragmatic consensus on how to make foreign policies complementary and mutually supportive. and Barbara M. US Hegemony is Ending Hoffman ’09. This is particularly the case of the Middle East. Africa. and Greenspan/Bernanke administrations.S. horribly counterproductive actions taken during Clinton/Bush/Obama. To be effective. Thanks to the natural weakening of this foundation. je) The U. a strategic axis between China and Europe built on mutual benefit and understanding will be indispensable. and South-Central Asia. which will be key in boosting positive power vis-a`-vis others. As the unipolar moment fades. . China. tackle non-traditional security threats. global hegemony was its manufacturing base. Europe and China could be in the vanguard here as well. both sides need each other if they are to develop an alternative for harsh international anarchy. but this should be cooperative and aim at sharing the costs of maintaining security. We have to avoid that these regions develop into a belt of insecurity that endangers our development. no game plans. multilateral organizations need to reflect the emerging new international order.php. It will also give them the scope to strengthen their internal unity. “U. as well as the short-term "band-aids" to try and buy time. In this order the major powers will have to balance between meeting increasing international expectations and persistent strong internal needs. doing what it takes to get reelected. http://www. the weakening of its military due to a series of unproductive. The emerging multilayered and culturally diversified multipolarity will make global governance much more complex and is by no means a guarantee for multilateralism.S.com/commentary/090418-2_US-hegemonythe-beginning-and-the-end. We are moving steadily towards a new multipolar world order.

can continue calling the shots in the Middle East by holding the hands of Hosni Mubarak. Not unlike Winston Churchill who insisted that Britain could retain its empire after 1945. a Gallup poll indicated that 50 percent of the public supports the notion that the U.S. is constrained in its ability to determine outcomes in the Middle East.php? pub_id=12903) The downfall of the pro-American autocrats in Tunisia and Egypt and the growing threat to regimes that are either allied with Washington (Bahrain) or doing business with it (Yemen). the deadlocked Israeli-Palestinian peace process.S.S.” http://www. He also the continuing U. leadership that are not going to be fulfilled." And without the U. strategic interests. support for imposing a no-fly zone in Libya is based on the assumption that France and Britain are going to take up the leading military role in the operation with the Americans providing some limited tactical support in enforcing the zone and is "not going to deploy ground troops into Libya. “Obama Turns Failure into Success in the Middle East.S. there is no support in Washington for opening a new military front in the region.S. can do to reverse this process.org/pub_display. the U.S. are at stake. and the diverging U. 2011. understands that . Obama not only recognizes that the U. while a recent Washington Post polls suggested that 64 percent of Americans believe that the war in Afghanistan is not worth fighting.cato.S.S. or by taking a tougher line against Iran.Middle East and North Africa Hadar 11 – Leon. willing to deploy its troops in new military interventions. Indeed. cannot be described as anything other than a devastating blow to U.S. hegemony in the Middle East is over. preoccupation with that region doesn't allow Washington to invest the required time and resources in maintaining its position in East Asia where core interests U. "should mind its own business internationally and let other countries get along the best they can on their own.S. And there is not much that the U." as Obama stressed over the weekend.S. the inconclusive war in Afghanistan. some Americans (and Israelis) fantasize that the U. and Turkish interests — it becomes obvious that the age of U. But with a military overstretched in Iraq and Afghanistan and with a budget deficit rising to the stratosphere. by establishing a No-Fly Zone in Libya.138 of 154 UQ – Yes Heg Decline (Middle East) US heg is irreversibly declining -. Coupled with the costly military intervention in Iraq.S. research fellow at the Cato Institute (March 22. In fact. waltzing with Hosni or threatening to shoot down Kaddafi's planes or imposing more sanctions on Ahmenajid will only create expectations for renewed U. Iran's nuclear military program.

What passes for the current US private manufacturing sector shows no appetite for such a historic change. Petras 10 – James. Nothing short of a political and economic revolution can reverse the decline of the US. To bring about this political and economic revolution requires a new configuration of the state which pursues public investments creating competitive industries. only if it carries out deep political and economic changes. retired Bartle Professor (Emeritus) of Sociology at Binghamton University in Binghamton.org/petras/b2-img/petras_sinous. corroded by a corrupt political elite beholden to a parasitic speculator economic elite. Only then will the US be able to compete economically with China in the world economy. Focusing investment on the growing market for clean energy and technology for domestic and overseas economies. Substituting trade missions for military bases. “Rising and Declining Economic Powers: The Sino-US Conflict Deepens. could increase inflows to the US and reduce outflows abroad. to become competitive in domestic and overseas markets. Confiscatory taxes on the millionaire/billionaires especially the entire ‘Wall Street” ruling elite.pdf) In the face of the US’s demonstrable economic decline. industry would have to lower its profits. deepens the domestic market and expands social services.5 billion muslim world. pushed by the pro-Israel fifth column embedded in top financial and political institutions and in control of the legislature 47 . while upgrading local production to competitive levels. The key is to rebalance the US economy from finance driven to industrial centered: but any such shift requires class warfare against entrenched power on Wall Street and in Washington 46 . Ending military directed empire building will open the flow of public financing toward civilian technological innovations. China’s class. To expand overseas markets. ending restrictions on overseas technology sales can further reduce trade deficits. Vast sums need to be reallocated from wars. ‘marketing’ and speculation into social services like comprehensive national health plans high skill engineering and advanced industrial training to increase efficiency and competitiveness in the domestic market. can the ruling elite recognize that its empire is not sustainable (let alone desirable)? The US can increase its exports to China and its share of world trade to balance its accounts. Ending political links and billion dollar subsidies to militarized states like Israel and lifting sanctions on major economic markets like Iran will decrease outflows from the US treasury and enhance economic inflows and opportunities for productive sectors throughout the 1. including merchandise and commodities reducing toxic chemical and environmentally damaging sources of energy.139 of 154 Withdrawal K/T Sustainability Decline is more than inevitable – to maintain our power we would need to restructure our entire country and withdraw our military forces from across the world. which would reduce charges to industry and state. inequalities. increase its investments in applied research and development and vastly improve the quality of its products. will create new jobs and lower the cost of living while enhancing living standards. Up to now manufacturers have bought into or been bought out by financial institutions: they have lost their distinct character as a productive sector. Washington must end boycotts and military subservience to Israel. private wealth and public corruption and discriminatory treatment of migrants as second grade citizens (a dual citizenship system) will be resolved internally as the socio-economic divisions translate into class struggle. costly and selfdestructive trade wars or worse. and a cap on all income over one million dollars can finance social security and comprehensive public national health system. China’s internal “imbalances” are profound and pervasive and over time can weaken the pillars of external expansion. Even assuming that there is a political shift toward re- industrializing the US. Fundamental . The transfer of a trillion dollars in military spending from colonial wars could easily finance the reconversion to a civilian economy producing quality goods for local and overseas consumption. The transition from a militarist imperialist power. The transition from empire to republic requires a profound rebalancing of social power and a deep restructuring of the US economy. uneven regional development. To more forward requires a head-on confrontation with the ideologues of finance capital and a rejection of their efforts to deflect attention from their role in destroying America. The “blame” China campaign for what are in reality internally caused US structural imbalances must be confronted before it leads us into new.” http://lahaine. to a productive republic with a balanced economy and competitive sector requires fundamental political changes and a profound ideological revolution. New York and adjunct professor at Saint Mary's University (4/28/10.

but these changes require a revival of the class struggle against state and private vested interests.140 of 154 changes in the privatized health system toward a comprehensive national public health system are essential. .

the narratives of America’s decline and Obama’s restraint are distinct but also crucially connected. ‘I … have an unyielding belief that all people yearn for certain things. and that ‘the United States of America has helped underwrite global security for more than six decades with the blood of our citizens and the strength of our arms’. as those who seek to qualify the decline thesis have suggested. makes him ideologically and temperamentally well suited to the former course in a way that. Evidently this is not a president who wishes to break signally with the mainstream.” International Affairs Volume 87. refusing to accept the waning of its primacy. even as he sought distance from his predecessor with the proclamation that ‘no system of government can or should be imposed by one nation on any other’. then this will clear the way for a judicious retrenchment. In his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech in December 2009 he made it clear. his predecessor was not. preserving influence to the maximum extent possible through whatever legacy of norms and institutions is bequeathed by its primacy. as some genuine dissidents from the prevailing foreign policy discourse would wish. it is inconceivable that he would explicitly declare his strategy to be one of managed American decline. In doing so they set their faces against the reality of the coming American decline. he also endorsed with only slight qualification the liberal universalist view of civil liberties as transcendent human rights. ‘The ability to speak your mind and have a say in how you are governed. Facing this incipient period of decline. As part of such a project. deliberate escalation of strategic rivalry with China in East Asia. 100 No doubt sensibly. President Obama does not by any means represent a radical break with the traditions of American foreign policy in the modern era. Examination of his major foreign policy pronouncements reveals that he remains within the mainstream of the American discourse on foreign policy. Adam Quinn. this is a president who. spelling out his view that ‘the instruments of war do have a role to play in preserving the peace’. The alternative course involves the initiation or escalation of conflictual scenarios for which the United States increasingly lacks the resources to cater: provocation of a military conclusion to the impasse with Iran. Issue 4) As noted in the opening passages of this article. within the confines of the mainstream. University of Birmingham (July 1. America’s leaders may walk one of two paths. trimming ambitions in line with the fact that the nation can no longer act on the global stage with the wide latitude once afforded by its superior power. 98 In his Cairo speech in June the same year. in short. a good president to inaugurate an era of managed decline. Or it can ‘rage against the dying of the light’. use the significant resources still at its disposal to smooth the edges of its loss of relative power. they implicitly suppose that the resources will be available to support such a course. government that is transparent and doesn’t steal from the people. 101 In contemplating the diminished and diminishing weight of the United States upon the scales of . in suggesting that he is ‘weak’ and that a ‘tougher’ policy is needed.141 of 154 Attempts to Maintain Heg Bad Status quo heg is a sinking ship that will facilitate a peaceful decline – but a drastic increase in attempts to maintain our hegemony incites conflicts Quinn 11 – Adam. embraces caution and restraint to the greatest extent that one could hope for without an epochal paradigm shift in the intellectual framework of American foreign policymaking. 97 If the United States can embrace the spirit of managed decline. President Obama’s approach. These are not just American ideas. commitment to continuing the campaign in Afghanistan for another decade. Those who vocally demand that the President act more boldly are not merely criticizing him. He is. Lecturer in International Studies.’ he declared. that he is no pacifist. 2011. to cite one example. given the likely political reaction at home. Either the nation can come to terms with the reality of the process that is under way and seek to finesse it in the smoothest way possible. “The Art of Declining Politely. not for the first time. a costly effort to consistently apply principles of military interventionism. the freedom to live as you choose. Nevertheless. regime change and democracy promotion in response to events in North Africa.’ 99 His Westminster speech repeated these sentiments. defined by restraint and awareness of limits. it can. confidence in the rule of law and the equal administration of justice. either by advocating a radical shrinking of America’s military strength as a good in itself or by disavowing liberal universalist global visions.

It is also important not to be unduly deterministic in projecting the consequences of American decline.142 of 154 global power. as critics of the decline thesis sometimes observe. It may well be. At present it seems it is fortunate enough to have a president who fits the bill. . it may result in conflict. fill any westerner with glee. It may be a process that unfolds gradually and peacefully. or continues to be drawn into wars with middle powers or on the periphery in spite of its shrinking capacity to afford them. whatever reservations one may have held regarding US primacy. resulting in a new order that functions with peace and stability even in the absence of American primacy. Alternatively. But the likelihood that the United States can preserve its prosperity and influence and see its hegemony leave a positive legacy rather than go down thrashing its limbs about destructively will be greatly increased if it has political leaders disposed to minimize conflict and consider American power a scarce resource—in short. that the prospect of increased global power for a state such as China should not. Which outcome occurs will depend on more than the choices of America alone. on reflection. if the United States clashes with rising powers as it refuses to relinquish the prerogatives of the hegemon. leaders who can master the art of declining politely. it is important not to conflate the question of what will be with that of what we might prefer.

Ayatollah Khamene'i also warned the US against launching an attack against Iran and said if Washington chooses to resort to military means against Iran. the Leader added. threats and intimidation are not talks. Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamene'i is opposed to talks with the US because they want to push any negotiation to the way they want and they halt it unilaterally if it is not favourable to them." Mehr news agency quoted Ebrahimi as saying. negotiations are impossible under these conditions. 2010. On 18 August. deputy head of the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission of Iran's Parliament (Majlis) Hoseyn Ebrahimi said on Monday [23 August]. Ayatollah Khamene'i said that Iran could not engage in negotiations with the US." he further explained. . "Based on its hegemonic attitude. because "talks in an environment of pressure. "If they [the US] stop their threats and sanctions the Islamic Republic will enter talks with them as it has said before. Washington severed all diplomatic ties with Tehran in the aftermath of the US embassy takeover in Iran. the confrontation will not be restricted to the region alone.143 of 154 Heg Bad – Iran Heg prevents Iran talks – top officials’ statements BBC 10 – BBC Monitoring International Reports (August 24.” BBC through Lexis) 24 August: The Islamic Republic will not enter talks with the United States unless the Americans stop their hegemony. “Iranian MP says US 'hegemony' makes talks impossible." There may be room for talks if the US drops sanctions and a threatening language against the Islamic Republic. therefore. a top Iranian lawmaker has said. shortly after the victory of the Islamic Revolution in 1979. the US tries to impose its will on the world nations.

The superpowers remained so convinced of the correctness of their respective privileged positions in the world system that they refused to make mutual concessions to achieve arms control. Other nations also chose military strength over cooperation and in the process diminished Washington’s and Moscow’s power in the international system. Americans have remained infatuated with unilateral and technological solutions to the atomic threat. From the Baruch Plan to national missile defense. and the PRC. American hegemony. The University of North Carolina Press. even states that could not provide their citizenry with a decent standard of living. other states built the bomb when they could afford to. Print) Throughout the nuclear age. Pakistan. Since the dawn of the nuclear age.144 of 154 Heg Bad – Prolif US hegemony spurs other countries to acquire nuclear weapons and ultimately undermines American influence – turns case Maddock 10 (Shane J. nuclear hegemony by undercutting their own professed commitment to nuclear nondissemination. the United States has squandered opportunities to forge cooperative ventures to halt proliferation. And they have repeatedly attempted to preserve U. no president has proven capable of producing the right political mixture to yield a viable nonproliferation accord.S. author of multiple books concerning American Foreign Relations. such as India. combined with arrogance and a Hobbesian worldview. North Korea. A paradoxical equation derived from this practice. “Nuclear Apartheid”. Taught by the superpowers that nuclear weapons equal political power and that warheads prevent wars. catalyzed nuclear nationalism in other states and helped break the bonds of Washington’s influence. As the technology became cheaper and more easily available. found the resources to produce limited nuclear arsenals. PhD from the University of Connecticut in US history and teacher at Stonehill College. .

As an offshore balancer.145 of 154 Offshore Balancing Good – General Offshore balancing solves war and maintains US power best. and more generally acting as if we have the right and the responsibility to interfere in the domestic politics of other countries. he R.cambridge. This behavior. He is on the Advisory Council of The National Interesthttp://nationalinterest. But it protect its interests in areas of little strategic importance. je) President Obama is making a serious mistake heading down this road. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. Offshore balancing is key to prevent any conflict through deterrence and hard power if necessary – it avoids political backlash and increases soft power Layne 9 – Christopher. The driving factor behind offshore balancing is its proponents’ recognition that the US has a ‘hegemony’ problem. 3 Its proponents believe that offshore balancing can do a better job than primacy of enhancing American security and matching US foreign policy objectives with the resources available to support them. including Europe and the Middle East. Once the potential hegemon is checked. but also gets us involved in nation building. online at http://journals. 35: 5-25. Robert M. In the event a potential hegemon comes on the scene in one of those regions. Europe and the Gulf. An offshore balancing strategy would permit the US to withdraw its ground forces from Eurasia (including the Middle East) and assume an over-the- .” Review of International Studies (2009). “Imperial by Design”. nuclear proliferation or a traditional great-power rival. Washington should also get out of the business of trying to spread democracy around the globe. to the world. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University (2009. the United States should concentrate on making sure that no state dominates Northeast Asia.R. the US would rely on the tried and true dynamics of the balance of power to thwart any states with hegemonic ambitions. or terrorist attacks – and alienates public opinion in large swaths of the globe. Offshore balancing does not mean that the United States should ignore the rest of should maintain a substantially lower profile outside of Northeast Asia. which has served this country well for most of its history and offers the best formula for dealing with the threats facing America—whether it be terrorism. America’s strategy of primacy increases US vulnerability to a geopolitical backlash – whether in the guise of countervailing great power coalitions. Offshore balancing is based on the assumption that the most vital US interests are preventing the emergence of a dominant power in Europe and East Asia – a ‘Eurasian hegemon’ – and forestalling the emergence of a regional (‘oil’) hegemon in the Middle East. The National Interest. Mearsheimer ’11. “America’s Middle East grand strategy after Iraq: the moment for offshore balancing has arrived.org/action/displayFulltext? type=1&fid=3291804&jid=RIS&volumeId=35&issueId=01&aid=3291800&bodyId=&me mbershipNumber=&societyETOCSession=) Primacy’s neorealist critics have outlined an alternative grand strategy that increasingly resonates with the American public: offshore balancing. serves on the Advisory Council of The National Interest (12/16/10. not only generates resentment toward the United States. Jan-Feb 2011 Issue. and it should rely on diplomacy and economic statecraft. which violates the all-important principle of selfdetermination. He should instead return to the grand strategy of offshore balancing. In general terms. Only a Eurasian hegemon could pose an existential threat to the US. and the economies of the advanced industrial states depend. but it should be stationed offshore or back in the United States. and that it remains the world’s only regional hegemon. This is the best way to ensure American primacy. John. A regional hegemon in the Middle East could imperil the flow of oil upon which the US economy. not military force. which invariably leads to no end of trouble. Washington should rely on local forces to counter it and only come onshore to join the fight when it appears that they cannot do the job themselves. We should build a robust military to intervene in those areas. American troops should go back over the horizon. Europe or the Persian Gulf.org/article/imperial-by-design-4576?page=show. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago.

offshore balancers recognise that one of the few ironclad rules in international politics is that when one great power becomes too powerful – when it bids to achieve hegemony – it is defeated by the counter-balancing efforts of the other major powers in the international system. Primacy is based on the belief that it is better for the US to defend its allies and clients than to have them defend themselves. on the other hand. Spain under Philip II. If – and only if – regional power balances look to be failing would the US re-insert its troops into Eurasia. Offshore balancing contrasts sharply with primacy because primacists fear a world with independent. When employed by states. or military – counter-balancing that the US will face in coming years. of course. as well as economic. Most of all it is a strategy that fits within the broad realist tradition because it recognises the difference between. and Germany under Hitler (and. asymmetric strategies mean the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities. and is based on prudence and self-restraint in the conduct of US strategy. 7 In addition to soft balancing. 5 And. including so-called soft balancing. The attempt by France. not on the intentions that underlie them. asymmetric strategies are another type of nontraditional balancing that is being employed to contest US primacy. defines US interests in terms of what is vital rather than simply desirable. there are new forms of balancing with which Washington already is contending. as the only great power in a ‘unipolar’ system. the security of the others is threatened. Germany. and a possible armed confrontation between the US and Iran. and policies must be judged on their consequences. 6 The most notable manifestation of soft balancing is the use by other major states of diplomacy and international institutions to try to restrain American actions. multiple poles of power. Offshore balancers. on the other hand. the best strategy is to rely on a balance of power approach that devolves to other states the costs and risks of their defense. France under Louis XIV and Napoleon. The Bush administration’s disastrous policies in Iraq and the Middle East are a much needed reminder that this is a test Wilsonianism too often fails. implications of China’s rapid ascent are – at the very least – an implicit acknowledgment that the days of unchallenged US dominance in world affairs are numbered. Offshore balancing is a realist strategy because it eschews the ideological crusading on behalf of democracy that is endemic to Wilsonianism. they are important for two reasons.146 of 154 horizon military posture. Regional powers – . The history of the modern international state system (which dates back to about 1500) is littered with the wreckage of great powers that tried an failed to achieve geopolitical primacy: the Hapsburg Empire under Charles V. Second. on one hand. believe for an insular great power like the US. some would argue. the ethic of responsibility. 4 Yet. First. recent studies by the CIA offer compelling evidence that by 2020 the era of America’s unipolar ascendancy will be drawing to a close as new poles of power in the international system approach the US share of world power. it is so much more powerful than its nearest possible competitors. The reason is simple: the basic motivation of all major states is to survive. balances ends and means. Russia and China to forestall the US invasion of Iraq by withholding United Nation’s Security Council authorisation is one example of soft balancing. In foreign policymaking the road to hell is paved with good intentions. Some primacists believe that the US is immune to being counter-balanced because. what the sociologist Max Weber called the ethic of conviction and. soft balancing efforts to rein-in American power may help the other major states learn to cooperate in ways that will the open the door to future hard balancing against the US. growing apprehensions about the military. Even if soft balancing efforts fail. under Kaiser Wilhelm II). First. they fundamentally agree on the strategy’s basic premises. and when one among them threatens to gain preponderant power. Although there are some nuanced differences among offshore balancing’s proponents. A second point upon which offshore balancers agree is that in addition to the traditional kind of – ‘hard’. they indicate that other major states regard US geopolitical dominance as a problem that needs to be addressed. Another example is the effort of the same nations and Britain to promote a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue that will avoid the imposition of UN sanctions on Teheran. Offshore balancers believe the US must adjust to incipient multipolarity because they understand that – unless the US is prepared to fight an unending series of preventive wars – new great powers inevitably will emerge in the next decade or two. Failure is the fate of hegemons.

Terrorism is another asymmetric strategy – one employed by non-state actors like Al-Qaeda and similar jihadist groups – to resist US dominance. . WMD – especially the possession of nuclear weapons – is one way these states can level the strategic playing field and deter the US from attacking them. these states seek other methods of offsetting American power. and dissuading Washington from using its military muscle against them. The use of asymmetric strategies to oppose American power – especially in the Middle East where US policy has an imperial dimension – illustrates the dictum that empires inevitably provoke resistance. however.147 of 154 especially those on the US hit list like Iran and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq – cannot slug it out toe-to-toe against the US’ dominant high-tech conventional forces. Because they are threatened by the US.

Jan-Feb 2011 Issue. is committed to staying out of fights in the periphery and concentrating instead on truly serious threats. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. serves on the Advisory Council of The National Interest (12/16/10. but also makes it difficult to concentrate its forces against China. see the United States as the indispensable nation that must do almost all of the heavy lifting to make containment work. because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves. For starters. which not only wears down its military in peripheral conflicts. “Imperial by Design”.148 of 154 Offshore Balancing Good – China Offshore balancing solves China rise. Offshore balancing. This is why Beijing should hope that the American military remains heavily involved in Afghanistan and Iraq for many years to come. But this is not a smart strategy because the human and economic price of checking a powerful adversary can be great. The National Interest. attempting to dominate the globe encourages the United States to fight wars all around the world. The United States will have to play a key role in countering China. Mearsheimer ’11. in contrast. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago.org/article/imperial-by-design-4576?page=show. on the other hand. he R. Another virtue of offshore balancing is its emphasis on getting other countries to assume the burden of containing an aspiring regional hegemon. je) Of course. but an America no longer weakened by unnecessary foreign intervention will be far more capable of checking Beijing’s ambitions. however. It almost always makes good sense to get other countries to pay as many of those costs as possible while preserving one’s own power. Offshore balancing. is better suited to the task. especially if war breaks out. John.R. He is on the Advisory Council of The National Interesthttp://nationalinterest. . Global dominators. America would check China’s rise even if it were pursuing global dominance.

the pursuit of geopolitical and ideological dominance ‘over there’ has increased the terrorist threat over here. Indeed. In the Middle East. 56 The Pew survey’s results suggest that. there are signs that Americans already accept offshore balancing’s key premises. and by strengthening America’s homeland defences. 55 The Bush administration’s policy of maintaining a dominating American military presence in the Persian Gulf and overthrowing nasty Middle Eastern regimes increased the terrorist threat to the US instead of reducing it. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University (2009. America’s military presence overseas’. As this debate gathers steam.org/action/displayFulltext? type=1&fid=3291804&jid=RIS&volumeId=35&issueId=01&aid=3291800&bodyId=&me mbershipNumber=&societyETOCSession=) By lowering America’s politico-military profile in the region. unlike primacists. A military collision between the US and Iran is still a possibility. “America’s Middle East grand strategy after Iraq: the moment for offshore balancing has arrived. And if the US continues to pursue a strategy of primacy. One huge disaster is enough – more than enough – for any grand strategy. the strategic setbacks will not end with Iraq. covert operations. And. The same Pew survey also found that: ‘An increasing number of Americans see nonmilitary approaches – such as decreasing US dependence on Middle East oil and avoiding involvement with the problems of other countries’ as effective strategies for reducing the terrorist threat to the US. As Robert Pape argues. and globally. ‘The US does have important interests in the Middle East – including access to oil and the need to combat terrorism – but neither objective is well served by occupying the region with its own military forces’. online at http://journals. the best way to do so is to adopt an offshore balancing strategy and fight terrorists discreetly with good intelligence (including collaboration with US allies). an offshore balancing strategy would contribute importantly to lowering the terrorist threat to the US. it will become apparent that a neorealist strategy of offshore balancing is the best candidate to become America’s next grand strategy – both in the Middle East. primacy means that the US is headed for a train wreck with China. when 48 per cent of those surveyed believed that the best defense against terrorism was to increase US military involvement abroad. not increase. This is a striking turnabout from summer 2002. offshore balancing ‘is America’s best strategy for the Persian Gulf’ because the ‘mere presence of tens of thousands of US troops in the region is likely to fuel continued fear of foreign occupation that will fuel anti-American terrorism in the future’. Robert M. For example. outside of the Middle East. a recent 32 per cent margin. more Americans believe that the best way to reduce the threat of terrorist attacks on the US is to decrease. Stephen Walt – who also favours a US offshore balancing strategy in the Middle East – observes.” Review of International Studies (2009). 54 Similarly. As Americans come to realise that the strategy of primacy makes the US less secure. they are becoming more receptive to the arguments for an offshore balancing strategy. If the new administration wants to reduce US vulnerability.cambridge. . the American people are drawing the correct grand strategic lessons from the Iraq debacle. 57 It is time to begin a long overdue debate on future US strategy after Iraq.149 of 154 Offshore Balancing Good – Middle East/Terrorism Offshore balancing is comparatively the best strategy to prevent terrorism and middle east escalation Layne 9 – Christopher. 35: 5-25.

only as a matter of last resort. as University of Chicago professor Robert Pape’s research shows. . “Imperial by Design”. John. serves on the Advisory Council of The National Interest (12/16/10. But all things considered. It has two main virtues. The National Interest. je) Specifically. Reagan had the good sense to quickly pull the remaining marines out of Lebanon and keep them offshore. attack. and some of America’s adversaries will still have powerful incentives to acquire a nuclear arsenal.R. America would still carry a big stick with offshore balancing but would wield it much more discreetly than it does now. Placing American troops in the Arab and Muslim world is a major cause of terrorist attacks against the United States. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. Remember what happened after President Ronald Reagan sent marines into Beirut in 1982? A suicide bomber blew up their barracks the following year.org/article/imperial-by-design-4576?page=show. He is on the Advisory Council of The National Interesthttp://nationalinterest. And it is worth noting that the perpetrators of this act did not pursue us after we withdrew. thus diminishing their need to have their own deterrents. Furthermore. Jan-Feb 2011 Issue. offshore balancing is still better than global dominance for keeping proliferation in check. because offshore balancing calls for Washington to help local powers contain aspiring regional hegemons in Northeast Asia. It calls for using military force in only three regions of the world. there is no reason that it cannot extend its nuclear umbrella over its allies in those areas. the strategy is not perfect: some allies will want their own nuclear weapons out of fear that the United States might not be there for them in a future crisis. he R. which would lessen their need to acquire atomic weapons to protect themselves from a U. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. Europe and the Gulf. the United States would be less threatening to other countries. killing 241 service members.S. and even then. Offshore balancing is also a better policy than global dominance for combating nuclear proliferation. Certainly. As a result. Mearsheimer ’11. offshore balancing is the best grand strategy for ameliorating our terrorism problem.150 of 154 Offshore Balancing Good – Terrorism/Prolif Solves terrorism and prolif.

Perhaps we've all learned something? Even if major war between nations seems more remote than ever before. and that more power will keep us safer. President Barack Obama is expected to sign it.cato.” http://www. A decline in heg won’t cause conflict – we have sufficient deterrence and policymakers exaggerate foreign troubles with security threats Friedman and Preble 10 – Benjamin. peoples disconnected from any particular nation-state or peoples united by ideologies that transcend national boundaries? What if al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations are but the tip of the iceberg? Newspapers and opinion journals are littered these days with apocalyptic predictions of an impending — or even ongoing — world war.151 of 154 AT Heg Solves War (General) Heg doesn’t solve war -. excluding funds for the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. most of which have nothing to do with our military prowess. How likely is it that the so-called war on terrorism will be looked upon through the long lens of history as comparable to the world wars of the 20th century? Not very. Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute (May 20. that military power keeps us safe. our generosity and our ingenuity is expressed in countless ways. This is neither naive nor utopian. but the fact remains that the major powers have managed to avoid the very sorts of cataclysms that claimed the lives of an estimated 100 million people in the first half of the 20th century. Christopher. The violence and bloodshed that can be deployed by non-state actors is an order of magnitude smaller than what could be caused by even a mediumsize modern industrial state. But the true strength of the United States. pending resolution of minor disputes like funding for the alternative Joint Strike Fighter engine. Congress is poised to pass the largest military budget since World War II — roughly $550 billion. By reducing the size of our military to a level more consistent with our own needs. is its people. Although we aspire to a time when disputes are settled peacefully. or Soviet (or Chinese. 2001. the president has taken . research fellow in defense and homeland security at the Cato Institute. perhaps over Taiwan.structure of the international system checks. Does Military Power Keep Us Safe? (Part II). but the threat of global thermonuclear war hung over every aspect of Cold War diplomacy. pale in comparison to the death and destruction that took place between August 1914 and November 1918. which claimed far fewer lives but lasted nearly five times longer than the two world wars combined? Again. It always has been. 2009. We have come to believe. Both are ideological struggles. no.cato. while others see a hot one with China in the offing. we sometimes seem a long way from that noble goal. and the prospects for future casualties. erroneously. Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute (September 21.php?pub_id=10228) For too long. the true source of U. we have defined our strength as a nation by our capacity for waging war. fought chiefly by non-military means. Despite Obama's professed concern about the huge budget deficit.” http://www. Preble 9 – Christopher. The world is a dangerous place. and by encouraging others to become more self-reliant. The casualties caused by international terrorist incidents since September 11. Can it even be compared with the Cold War. Those prospects cannot be dismissed lightly. power.org/pub_display. The casualties caused by international terrorist incidents since September 11 pale in comparison to the death and destruction that took place between 1914 and 1918. Some worry of a new cold war with Russia.S.org/pub_display.php? pub_id=12156&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed %3A+CatoRecentOpeds+(Cato+Recent+Op-eds) With the Senate close to voting on the defense authorization bill. what of war between peoples. Our spirit.S. and again between September 1939 and August 1945. And the scale of violence that would have been unleashed had U. we can make space for the other forms of human interaction that facilitate security and prosperity over the long term. “Drop Pretension to Supremacy. French or British) decision makers lost their cool would have caused far more death and destruction than Osama bin Laden can muster in the darkest reaches of his imagination.

ambitions. Fewer missions. Substantially reducing military spending means reducing U. Geography. along with advances in strike technology. But much of Washington's military spending is geared toward defending others and toward the dubious proposition that global stability depends on U. security. The resulting force would be more elite. because it could enhance security. Because a less active military can make conventional and counterinsurgency warfare less likely. Washington confuses what it wants from its military (global primacy or hegemony) with what it needs (safety). If our military had less to do. In nearly all cases. limit the number of countries that build up their military to balance U. Sending large armies to occupy — and try to manage the politics of — hostile Muslim countries is not effective counterterrorism policy.S. it is counterproductive. In most cases. Citing the need for austerity.S.152 of 154 no meaningful steps to rein in military spending. A force reduction strategy would make sense even without deficits.S. less strained and far less expensive.S. for example — as major U. It would reduce the possibility of fighting unnecessary wars. Making large spending cuts without reducing military commitments is a recipe for overburdening service members. wealth and nuclear weapons provide us with a degree of safety that our ancestors would envy.S. Policymakers exaggerate the capability of existing enemies and invent new ones by defining traditional foreign troubles — geopolitical competition among states and instability within them. however. remove an impetus for nuclear weapons proliferation and prevent foreign peoples from resenting us for occupying their countries. Nor should Washington embrace strategic restraint just for budgetary reasons. we recommend cutting the Army and Marine Corps by roughly one-third. according to a Cato Institute report released Tuesday. they are not. forces. By shedding missions. weapons and vehicles procured and operational costs. Not exactly a revolution of fiscal discipline. . military deployments. Hawks and defense industry trade groups say this spending is essential to U. the Pentagon could spend less — at least $1. security threats. the Pentagon could cut force structure — reducing personnel.22 trillion less over the next 10 years. would also allow for reductions in the Air Force and Navy. Pentagon officials have a goal of 1 percent real growth in the Defense Department budget over the next decade.

The U. apart from the U. . called the East Asian Community.S. while recognizing America's limited ability to influence the PRC's behavior.php?pub_id=11015) The potential for conflict remains. The most important relationship for the 21st century will be that between the existing superpower and the potential superpower. The PRC has much at stake on a stable Korean Peninsula. that means proposing a free trade agreement. World War II ended more than six decades ago: The Japanese do not have a double dose of original sin and America should no longer play geopolitical wetnurse for nations that long ago developed the means to protect their own interests. Washington should withdraw its garrisons from Japanese soil and turn defense responsibility for Japan over to Tokyo. and encourage the peaceful settlement of disputes. An improved bilateral relationship is more likely than isolation to encourage greater respect by Beijing for the liberty of its citizens. Japan. steps back from its dominant military role. also should encourage greater cooperation between Japan and its neighbors. Japanese.S. a transformational agenda. Washington should allow the Republic of Korea to lead the nonproliferation campaign. maintains one-sided "mutual" defense treaties with Japan and South Korea.S. The Obama administration should pursue a different course. That the U. engagement with the North. foreign policy. The president should treat Japan as a full partner. The Obama administration should coordinate South Korea. In economics.S. will be most secure if friendly states in East Asia work together to confront sources of instability.153 of 154 AT Heg Solves Asia Stability Heg decline doesn’t cause East Asian conflict -. “Policy Change for East Asia. Yet Washington's Cold War alliance structure remains essentially unchanged. At the same time. the U.S. but should increasingly devolve defense responsibilities on countries in the region. The starting point should be a push to ratify the FTA with South Korea. Such a cooperative venture also would help channel China's rise in peaceful directions. must remain militarily dominant is taken for granted. As the U. intervention along its border is treated as a threat to American security. policies regarding Pyongyang. Moreover. will remain engaged in East Asia. Washington must forge a cooperative relationship on difficult regional issues like North Korea. it also has much to gain from taking the lead in promoting diplomatic solutions of regional problems. At the same time. Washington should engage North Korea over its nuclear program. Washington should strengthen economic and trade ties with China. President Obama needs to promote a changed attitude as much as offer new policies. On defense. and U.S.S. However. But Washington no longer has any need to attempt to preserve regional military hegemony. Washington should embrace rather than resist such an approach. However. the ROK and its neighbors should step forward.S. The U. Bandow 9 – Doug. The U. The president should press for a more active PRC policy to support reinvigorated U. Washington should speak frankly about the importance of human rights.multilateral cooperation solves. such instability would pose little threat to the U. is losing its financial ability to do so. He is a former special assistant to President Reagan (November 29.S.S.cato. The Japanese government apparently is interested in promoting a regional order.” http://www.org/pub_display. should inform the North that full international integration requires the participation of South Korea. The U. rather than merely adjusting its controversial Status of Forces Agreement. In Washington.S. senior fellow at the Cato Institute. And at a time of economic crisis the U. emphasizing economic integration while promoting military detachment.S. the People's Republic of China's apparent determination to create a military capable of deterring U. President Obama should begin moving the region into a new era of less security dependence on Washington. Seoul has the most at stake in maintaining a peaceful peninsula.S. What has ever been must ever be appears to be the basis of U. promote respect for human rights. without any link to a global hegemonic competitor like the Soviet Union. 2009. and Russia as well. America's cultural and economic ties are long-lasting and mutually beneficial. China. Washington should seek to tighten regional economic integration. America still has a major economic role to play.S.

Chinese managers and workers are already facing increased local hostility in some areas. Senior Research Fellow. but it will also run into the same immense barriers to development that African states have faced up to now. In Africa.S. Moreover. Pakistan – and North Korea is more a ghastly liability than an ally. China's only true ally in the world is Soviet Union discovered during the Cold War.Russian Relations and the Rise of China. let alone the dollar or the euro. China is working on what has been called its "string of pearls" strategy to develop ports around the Indian Ocean. and certainly of the wars in Vietnam and Iraq.S. In addition. and China.S.3 Secondly. in terms of global power or learn from U. the whole greater Middle East looks like an area that any sensible great power will in future try to avoid. navy away from China's coasts and prevent the U. Finally.S. but so far these are for commercial use. but by reducing any possibility of a Taiwanese declaration of independence at the same time. interests. Beijing is now devoting great effort to developing these. The destruction of that system through economic conflict or war would deal a shattering blow to the Chinese economy. and thereby to the stability of the Chinese political system and the rule of the Communist Party. The yuan has a very long way to go before it even begins to rival the pound or the yen as a global currency. China may be able to make a better contribution to the continent's development than the West has done. former senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (July 11..S.net/publications/policy/us_russian_relations_and_the_rise_of_chi na) There is no necessity that the rise of China will lead to increased tension or conflict between the U. . from effectively defending Taiwan. China would wish to infuriate and frighten India by turning them into Chinese military bases. it is a rather striking comment on China's international strategic weakness that apart from North Korea. it is not likely that the host countries India is after all a great deal closer to them than China is. this is one of the most complex of all military-industrial undertakings. American Strategy Program. even if China becomes the world's largest economy this will by no means automatically equate to an ability to rival the U. 2011. In terms of military power.S.2 When it comes to global power projection China suffers from two huge drawbacks and is likely to do so for a long time to come.S. China has gone from being one of the Western system's greatest victims in the 19th Century to being one of the greatest beneficiaries of the global market system created by the British Empire and the United States. the Chinese may well be approaching the point where they can drive the U.newamerica. A significant role in America's decline has been played by its strategic over-extension. mistakes. compared to the U. Neither the Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO) nor the loose economic consultative grouping of BRICS resemble military alliances. In fact. but as the lacks stable and extensive alliance systems. and with the possible exception of Pakistan. “U. This was arguably true of the Korean and Afghan Wars.154 of 154 AT Heg Solves China Decline in heg doesn’t mean Chinese rise or conflict – structural barriers and interdependence OR china can’t compete – military disparity is still too great Lieven 11 – Anatol.” http://www. The first is its lack of aircraft carriers. not to dominate. and Pakistan could become the same. and embroilment in local wars which in the end had little to do with real U.S. China makes a conflict over Taiwan much less likely. Indeed. due both to harsh managerial practices and the commercial competition of Chinese workers and traders. as a global superpower.S. and the Chinese are only at the very early stages. there is the question of whether China will wish to emulate the U.