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***Hegemony Bad***...............................................................................................1 Frontline.......................................................................................................................................3 ***Uniqueness.........................................................................................................6 Low Now.......................................................................................................................................7 Collapse Inevitable.....................................................................................................................10 Multipolarity Inevitable..............................................................................................................17 Multilat Inevitable......................................................................................................................19 Heg Multilat..........................................................................................................................20 Challengers Now.........................................................................................................................21 Heg Low (1/2)............................................................................................................................26 Heg Low (2/2)............................................................................................................................27 AT: Best Military Sustains.........................................................................................................29 AT: Soft Power Sustains.............................................................................................................30 AT: Economy Sustains ...............................................................................................................31 ***Alternative Uniqueness....................................................................................32 Heg Sustainable (1/2)................................................................................................................33 Heg Sustainable (2/2)................................................................................................................35 ***Heg Bad............................................................................................................37 Bad – Generic.............................................................................................................................38 Bad – China War........................................................................................................................39 XTN: China War.....................................................................................................................40 Bad – Counterbalancing.............................................................................................................41 Bad – Disease.............................................................................................................................42 Bad – Iran Strikes......................................................................................................................43 Bad – Middle East War..............................................................................................................45 AT: Heg Solves MidEast War.................................................................................................46 Bad – Proliferation.....................................................................................................................47 AT: Heg Solves Prolif..............................................................................................................49 Bad – Russia War.......................................................................................................................51 Bad – Sino-Russia Alliance........................................................................................................52 Bad – Space Weapons................................................................................................................53 Bad – Terrorism.........................................................................................................................55 Heg Fails - Terrorism.................................................................................................................57 XTN: Terrorism......................................................................................................................58 AT: Heg Solves Terror............................................................................................................59 Bad – US-EU Relations.............................................................................................................60 XTN: US-EU Relations...........................................................................................................61 Relations Good.......................................................................................................................62 Doesn’t Solve War......................................................................................................................63 Clinging to Power -> War..........................................................................................................69 Collapse =/= War.......................................................................................................................70 Retrenchment Good...................................................................................................................72 Heg Turns (1/3)..........................................................................................................................75 Heg Turns (2/3)..........................................................................................................................77 Heg Turns (3/3).........................................................................................................................78
2 of 154 ***Authors............................................................................................................80 AT: Ferguson..............................................................................................................................81 AT: Khalilzhad...........................................................................................................................82 AT: Brooks&Wohlforth..............................................................................................................83 ***Multipolarity Good...........................................................................................84 MultiPol Good – Generic...........................................................................................................85 MultiPol Good – Terror.............................................................................................................86 MultiPol Good – Iran.................................................................................................................87 Heg Unsustainable.....................................................................................................................90 Heg Unsustainable (Soft Power/Unpopular Policies)...............................................................99 Heg Decline Inevitable.............................................................................................................102 Alt Cause – Resource Collapse.................................................................................................104 Heg Collapse Inevitable (1/18).................................................................................................105 Heg Collapse Inevitable (2/18)................................................................................................106 Heg Collapse Inevitable (3/18).................................................................................................107 Heg Collapse Inevitable (4/18)................................................................................................108 Heg Collapse Inevitable (5/18).................................................................................................109 Heg Collapse Inevitable (6/18)..................................................................................................111 Heg Collapse Inevitable (7/18).................................................................................................112 Heg Collapse Inevitable (8/18).................................................................................................113 Heg Collapse Inevitable (9/18).................................................................................................114 Heg Collapse Inevitable (10/18)...............................................................................................115 Heg Collapse Inevitable (11/18)................................................................................................116 Heg Collapse Inevitable (12/18)................................................................................................117 Heg Collapse Inevitable (13/18)...............................................................................................118 Heg Collapse Inevitable (14/18)...............................................................................................119 .................................................................................................................................................120 Heg Collapse Inevitable (15/18)................................................................................................121 Heg Collapse Inevitable (16/18)...............................................................................................122 Heg Collapse Inevitable (17/18)...............................................................................................123 Heg Collapse Inevitable (18/18)...............................................................................................124 Exts – Yes China Rise...............................................................................................................126 Yes – China/Russia Counterbalancing.....................................................................................132 UQ – Yes Heg Decline..............................................................................................................133 UQ – Yes Heg Decline (Middle East) ......................................................................................138 Withdrawal K/T Sustainability................................................................................................139 Attempts to Maintain Heg Bad.................................................................................................141 Heg Bad – Iran ........................................................................................................................143 Heg Bad – Prolif ......................................................................................................................144 Offshore Balancing Good – General ........................................................................................145 Offshore Balancing Good – China............................................................................................148 Offshore Balancing Good – Middle East/Terrorism ...............................................................149 Offshore Balancing Good – Terrorism/Prolif .........................................................................150 AT Heg Solves War (General)...................................................................................................151 AT Heg Solves Asia Stability ....................................................................................................153 AT Heg Solves China ................................................................................................................154
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Primacy will be impossible to sustain – dollar, fiscal pressure, rising challengers, overstretch Layne 10 (Christopher Layne, Professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A&M's George H.W. Bush
School of Government & Public Service. "Graceful decline: the end of Pax Americana". The American Conservative. May 2010. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_7060/is_5_9/ai_n54223596/) AK
China's economy has been growing much more rapidly than the United States' over the last two decades and continues to do so, maintaining audacious 8 percent growth projections in the midst of a global recession. Leading economic forecasters predict that it will overtake the U.S. as the world's largest economy, measured by overall GDP, sometime around 2020. Already in 2008, China passed the U.S. as the world's leading manufacturing nation--a title the United States had enjoyed for over a century--and this year China will displace Japan as the world's second-largest economy. Everything we know about the trajectories of rising great powers tells us that China will use its increasing wealth to build formidable military power and that it will seek to become the dominant power in East Asia. Optimists contend that once the U.S. recovers from what historian Niall Ferguson calls the
"Great Repression"--not quite a depression but more than a recession--we'll be able to answer the Chinese challenge. The country, they remind us, faced a larger debt-GDP ratio after World War II yet embarked on an era of sustained growth. They forget that
the postwar era was a golden age of U.S. industrial and financial dominance, trade surpluses, and persistent high growth rates. Those days are gone. The United States of 2010 and the world in which it lives are far different from those of 1945. Weaknesses in the fundamentals of the American economy have been accumulating for more than three decades. In the 1980s, these problems were acutely diagnosed by a number of
writers--notably David Calleo, Paul Kennedy, Robert Gilpin, Samuel Huntington, and James Chace--who predicted that these structural ills would ultimately erode the economic foundations of America's global preeminence. A spirited late-1980s debate was cut short, when, in quick succession, the Soviet Union collapsed, Japan's economic bubble burst, and the U.S. experienced an apparent economic revival during the Clinton administration. Now the delayed day of reckoning is fast
approaching. Even in the best case, the United States will emerge from the current crisis with fundamental handicaps. The Federal Reserve and Treasury have pumped massive amounts of dollars into circulation in hope of reviving the economy. Add to that the $1 trillion-plus budget deficits that the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) predicts the United States will incur for at least a decade. When the projected deficits are bundled with the persistent U.S. currentaccount deficit, the entitlements overhang (the unfunded future liabilities of Medicare and Social Security), and the cost of the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is reason to worry about the United States' fiscal stability. As the CBO says, "Even if the recovery occurs as projected and the stimulus bill is allowed to expire, the country will face the highest debt/GDP ratio in 50 years and an increasingly unsustainable and urgent fiscal problem." The dollar's vulnerability is the United States' geopolitical Achilles' heel. Its role as the international economy's reserve currency ensures American preeminence, and if it loses that status, hegemony will be literally unaffordable. As Cornell professor Jonathan Kirshner observes, the dollar's vulnerability "presents potentially significant and underappreciated restraints upon contemporary American political and military predominance." Fears for the dollar's long-term health predated the current financial and economic crisis. The meltdown has amplified them and highlighted two new factors that bode ill for continuing reserve-currency status. First, the other big financial players in the international economy are either military rivals (China) or ambiguous allies (Europe) that have their own ambitions and no longer require U.S. protection from the Soviet threat. Second, the dollar faces an uncertain future because of concerns that its value will diminish over time. Indeed, China,
which has holdings estimated at nearly $2 trillion, is worried that America will leave it with huge piles of depreciated dollars.
China's vote of no confidence is reflected in its recent calls to create a new reserve currency. In coming years, the U.S. will be under increasing pressure to defend the dollar by preventing runaway inflation. This will require it to impose fiscal self-discipline through some combination of budget cuts, tax increases, and interest-rate hikes. Given that the last two options could choke off renewed growth, there is likely to be strong pressure to slash the federal budget. But it will be almost impossible to make meaningful cuts in federal spending without deep reductions in
35. When international conditions demand it.' as British minister Ed Balls put it in perhaps only
slight exaggeration. draw down their military obligations. Great powers are able to rebalance their commitments through compromise. the capitalist West is facing defeat in Afghanistan and is on the verge of 'the worst recession in a hundred years.4 of 154 defense expenditures. great powers retrench for the same reason they expand: the rigors of great power politics compel them to do so. "This combination will force the Obama administration to stop cherrypicking issues on which it wants to cooperate and forging ahead on those issues it believes it can still handle alone. Of the fifteen great powers that
adopted retrenchment in response to acute relative decline. 4. and make diplomatic overtures to enemies. and Joseph. we find that great powers retrenched in no less than eleven and no more than fifteen of the eighteen cases. Knowing only a state’s rate
of relative economic decline explains its corresponding degree of retrenchment in as much as 61 percent of the cases we examined. Contrary to the pessimistic conclusions of critics. In fact.S. increase
reliance on allies or adversaries. when U.S. is under pressure to make real choices about taxes and spending. and impose adjustments on domestic populations. We examine eighteen cases of acute relative decline since 1870 and advance three main arguments. First. Following the dictates of neorealist theory. Second. How fast great powers fall contributes to whether these retrenching states will internally reform. rather than conflict. To date there has been neither a comprehensive study of great power retrenchment nor a study that lays out the case for retrenchment as a practical or probable policy. states respond to penury the same way they do to plenty: they seek to adopt policies that maximize security given available means. Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College. we find that the magnitude of relative decline helps explain the extent of great power retrenchment.S.
Multiple balancing powers and internal issues make heg collapse inevitable – only abandoning unipolarity solves lashout and great power conflict John Feffer (co-director of Foreign Policy In Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies)February 2009 “A Multipolar Moment” http://www. Based on the
empirical record. a range of 61–83 percent. power was at its zenith. retrenchment can be successful. In these ways. the absolute size of U. defense expenditures are "more likely to be decisive in the future when the U." Faced with these hard decisions. we argue that the rate of decline helps explain what forms great power retrenchment will take. when states fall in the hierarchy of great powers. cutting non-defense spending. Third. retrenchment neither requires aggression nor invites predation. Vol. International Security Spring 2011. Necessity
.) AK In this article. Pages 7-44. So the United States will face obvious "guns or butter" choices. and declining great powers face powerful incentives to contract their interests in a prompt and proportionate manner. When borrowing becomes more difficult. 40 percent managed to recover their ordinal rank. great powers moderate their foreign policy ambitions and offer concessions in areas of lesser strategic value. “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment”. but necessity is the mother of invention.fpif. In contrast. Discretionary non-defense domestic spending accounts for only about 20 percent of annual federal outlays. choices must be made between raising taxes. and adjustment more difficult to postpone. we challenge the
retrenchment pessimists’ claim that domestic or international constraints inhibit the ability of declining great powers to retrench.org/articles/a_multipolar_moment
But times have changed. and cutting defense spending. our analysis suggests that great powers facing acute
decline are less likely to initiate or escalate militarized interstate disputes. Faced with diminishing resources. even over short time spans." he writes in Multilateralism in Munich. seek new allies or rely more heavily on old ones. No. Further. "These
aren't the golden 1990s.12 Retrenchment is by no means easy. In this first decade of the 21st century. none of the declining powers that failed to retrench recovered their relative position. argues FPIF contributor Hannes Artens. This article fills these gaps by systematically examining the relationship between acute relative decline and the responses of great powers. Americans will find themselves afflicted with hegemony fatigue. As Kirshner puts it. peaceful retrenchment is the most common response. Your authors are pessimists – empirical data proves retrenchment is more peaceful than the alternatives MacDonald and Parent 11 (Paul. Assistant
Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami. states renounce risky ties. Far from being a hazardous policy. we question the logic and evidence of the retrenchment pessimists. States that retrench often regain their position in the hierarchy of great powers.
meanwhile." Are we thus witnessing the final end of the unipolar moment? China is coming up fast. Debt has been the gravedigger of many an empire.5 of 154
will dictate a more pragmatic multilateralism. Over here. With the bank bailout. the red ink is mounting. so we either evolve multilateral responses or we do a dinosaur dive into extinction. we are quagmired in Afghanistan. I can hear the adding machine totting up the numbers.S. Several powerful countries in the South (particularly India. Brazil. The global recession is hammering the U. The European Union's expansion has been accompanied by relatively few growing pains. in which all sides humbly accept what is realistically possible. economy. and we might finally see the end of the dollar's reign as global currency. the stimulus package. and all of our nuclear weapons have done little to prevent North Korea from entering the nuclear club. Global problems like climate change and financial collapse require global solutions. and South Africa) are quietly acquiring more geopolitical heft. Or is that the sound of dirt hitting a coffin lid?
. the bill for two wars plus the Pentagon's already gargantuan budget. the Pentagon is still maintaining the world's largest military force — but we have failed to defeat al-Qaeda.
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if anything. militarily and in other ways. Italy and Russia. Given America's own protectionist record. The secretary of state will say a lot about strengthening ties through strategic dialogue and commercial collaboration. For this reason Clinton cannot be expected to dwell. To confuse matters further.S. When you're winning. The official line. not leadership. The Guardian UK. http://www.
July 14th.com/interactive/2011/06/24/opinion/global/20110624_SUPERPOWER. What will not be said is that the US increasingly views Delhi as a vital counterweight to a steadily more aggressive China.nytimes. behind the scenes
Clinton may hear well-rehearsed complaints that the US is not doing enough. staff writer. Clinton will finish her global circumnavigation in Hong Kong. Clinton will do well to avoid David Cameron's mistake of indulging in gratuitous Pakistan-bashing on Indian soil. But while China and Russia afford him diplomatic cover. this diplomatic tour de force may unintentionally
highlight the apparently inexorable decline of American power and influence. Americans seem incapable of achieving a consensus on how to address it. But Washington. Iran and the IsraelPalestine conflict. promulgated by France. Clinton's visit to financially stricken Athens on Sunday is unlikely to be of any practical assistance. chairman of Doha Debates. All three issues speak to American impotence. is that pressure on Muammar Gaddafi's embattled regime in Tripoli is telling. Iran's recent decision to dramatically accelerate its suspect uranium enrichment programme gives the lie to claims that the Tehran regime is retreating under the US-led sanctions campaign. Clinton made waves last year when she warned China. Clinton's sojourn will be rounded off
in south-east and east Asia. Counter-terrorism will be high on the agenda following Wednesday's bombings in Mumbai. Hegemony low and declining – Middle East proves Sebastian 6/23 (Tim. It's certain to make headlines around the globe. Like the Greeks. It will be notable as much for what is not said as what is.guardian. for example. British journalist. The US is now reduced to the role of disgruntled spectator as a UN vote to recognise Palestinian statehood draws near. to
stop trying to fence off the South China Sea. where the greatest challenges to American power are rising. In this context. on India's de facto support for the Burmese dictatorship. power — just look at events in the Middle East. “Hillary Clinton circumnavigates a sphere of diminishing US influence”. you can afford to laugh. which. Bashar al-Assad continues to ignore ever more shrill American criticism of the nationwide security crackdown. the Israeli prime minister. June
24th. in effect.co. and Barack Obama remains opposed to direct intervention. there is as yet
no concrete sign that he will stand down – amid widening differences in approach between the US and Britain. Turkey will propose yet another "roadmap" to end the conflict. Despite claims that Gaddafi is close to throwing in the towel. The next stop on Clinton's grand tour – India – will take her into the sphere of superpower rivalries. Her words angered Beijing but did not alter its behaviour. Clinton could give the
interventionists a boost were she to announce US recognition of the rebel national council in Benghazi as Libya's government and release more than $30bn in regime funds frozen in US banks. In Damascus. Clinton's Turkish leg will include bilateral talks on Syria. 2011. Clinton said this week that the Syrian president had forfeited the legitimacy to rule. “No More Superpower?” The New York Times. France. And it is arguably USpatented transnational market capitalism that created the whole sorry mess in the first place. and that the outlines of a negotiated settlement are beginning to emerge. And with the Obama administration's peace plan torpedoed by Binyamin Netanyahu. this piece of doorstep impudence is more likely to elicit smiles than snarls in Beijing. http://www. Clinton can have little to say on Palestine. has so far hedged its bets. there is little more the US can do other than complain. But paradoxically. 2011. its unhelpful stance on Kashmir and its machinations in Afghanistan. where she will join European and
other foreign ministers in the international contact group co-ordinating the Nato-led intervention in Libya. Clinton's first stop is in Istanbul on Friday. to back up its Nato partners. and its ever greater reliance on Chinese capital and Chinese imports.uk/commentisfree/2011/jul/14/hillary-clinton-world-tour) Hillary Clinton's 11-day round-the-world tour is remarkable even by the high-flying standards of US secretaries of state. has grown more belligerent. A security
conference in Bali is certain to touch on a host of territorial disputes between China and its neighbours.7 of 154
American influence and dominance is diminished now – Clinton tour proves Tisdall 7-14 (Simon. Much the same might be said of the effect of American strictures on North Korea. While that assessment will be publicly upheld in Istanbul. where she is due to make a speech decrying protectionism. worried in part about encouraging Islamist extremists. with another confrontation involving Vietnam reported only today.html?ref=middleeast)
There’s no doubt about the devaluation of U. The sharp crack as Israel’s prime minister slapped President Obama’s face with a refusal to halt
. The US is one of the few countries with a bigger national debt than Greece.
America will buy you a ticket. and post-crisis Russia. New energy. and the rise of other power centers. http://www. and Barack Obama. It needs to show the world that it will no longer back leaders who abuse their own people’s freedom in the mistaken belief that it will help Americans sleep more securely back home.modations with them. is a natural and logical process. instead of just searching out its enemies. writer of the book The Post-American World: Release 2. The
term of the third post-Soviet president. scientific creations and things like that — which are really harbingers of future economic growth. and infrastructure Times of Texas 7/1 *citing Fareed Zakaria. Now we speak not only about America’s weakened role. charts the fall of America’s dominance and the simultaneous rise of the rest of the world in his book The Post-American World:
Release 2. It makes no sense to tell Muammar el-Qaddafi to leave Libya because of crimes against his own people — and then to help him evade international justice by touting for his safe haven in a country that doesn’t acknowledge the International Criminal Court. enjoyed at the historic moment of the collapse of Communism and the disintegration of the Soviet state. economically and scientifically. It makes no sense to provide Israel with weapons to destroy Palestinian property and then offer assistance to put the rubble back together again. Israel will have to make new accom. Bush.8 of 154 settlements still reverberates around the region. The world is rapidly changing.” Zakaria. primarily China. the largest investment fund in the world is in Abu Dhabi. the largest Ferris wheel in the world is in Singapore. Freedom is a much more inspiring teacher than oppression. The post-Soviet decade marked the peak of American influence and authority. 2011. There really is a new world.S. which shows how the collapse of communism and the Soviet empire — as well as the rise of global markets — has leveled the
.N. the biggest factory in the world is in China. After decades of American engagement in the peace process.0. The Bush presidency was marked by America’s diminishing reputation. not because it can’t press buttons — or find and kill Osama bin Laden — but because its policies make no sense. that you can murder and torture all you want — but if you go quietly when you’ve had enough. But history took a different turn.com/interactive/2011/06/24/opinion/global/20110624_SUPERPOWER. a turning point: The world saw that America was taking on too much. George W. stumble. where there
would be several centers capable of sharing responsibility for security and development both in certain regions — for example in an expanded Europe. power may be good for the Middle East. “And … more troublingly. India.” notes Fareed Zakaria. this will ensure a steady supply for years to
come. Security Council — was. 2011. Far from stopping conflicts. Not because the vacuum will be filled
by more palatable players — but because this one needs a break.com/2011/07/01/us-behind-ineducation-competitive-workforce-new-energy-digital-infrastructure/) Thirty years ago. promised to restore America’s popularity. Digital Infrastructure”. fall and hopefully emerge stronger. Permanent representative of Russia to NATO.S. there is no peace at all. new Arab governments will have to stand on their own feet. The ‘‘conflict balance’’ of the Cold War was very soon changed by global destabilization. the host of CNN’s
Fareed Zakaria GPS and an editor at large for Time magazine. With Washington’s power diminished. http://timesoftexas. Competitive Workforce. but about the enhancement of such power centers as China. during his election campaign. July 1st. the European Union. energy. host of CNN`s Fareed Zakaria GPS and editor for Time
Magazine. Don’t assume the worst. perhaps. including Russia — and in the entire world. [the United States is] also losing [its] key grip on indices such as patent creation. We are living in an interesting time. competitiveness. The war in Iraq — started despite the protests of the allies and with no sanction of the U.0 (Time of Texas Online – “US – Behind in Education. withdraw from military conflicts and focus on domestic problems and the financial crisis. But today? “The tallest
building in the world is now in Dubai. “No More Superpower?” The New York Times. It makes no sense to trumpet freedom and justice — belatedly — in Egypt and remain virtually silent about the gross human rights violations reported in Bahrain. So the decline of U. started with the 9/11 catastrophe and war in Afghanistan. the largest oil refinery is in India. the United States dominated the world politically.’’ in the sense that there were no more alternatives to American leadership and values.
American power on the decline – Iraq was a turning point Rogozin 6/23 (Dmitry. Brazil. June
24th.nytimes. I would like it to come as soon as possible to a new balance. to find new friends. What more powerful signal can there
be to despots present and future. to paraphrase President Clinton. Only this time it’s not called America. It needs.html?ref=middleeast)
The gradual diminishing of American influence. International terrorism was vividly painted as a conflict of civilizations. Only the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from
the Cold War brought ‘‘the only superpower’’ the authority unthinkable before: Some philosophers even started speaking about ‘‘the end of history. America’s currency is at rock bottom in the Arab world.
America is in decline – education. Unnatural was the short period of unconditional world leadership that the U.
the rise of the rest [of the globe] is a win-win. whose role
is diminishing? Of course.” he says. “In economic terms. becomes mired in debate and cannot deal with the short-term deficit. the Bush tax cuts would expire next year. and fostering new energy and digital infrastructure to support those workers — all markers of long-term economic growth. if Congress were to do nothing. “To
put it in perspective. “And we are all witnesses to this phenomenon. “Politics and power is a realm of relative influence.” America’s political system. consuming. saving. building a competitive workforce. loaning money. “That by itself would yield $3.” he says.” America. Zakaria says. the technological connection into this market. “The result is you have countries all over the world thriving and taking advantage of the political stability they have achieved. Zakaria says. is also starting to lag behind other countries in education. the more people there are producing. “So as China expands its role in Asia. We would go to the bottom of the pack in terms of deficit as a percentage of GDP among the rich countries in the world — we would basically solve our fiscal problems for the short term. in which the United States’ share of the “global pie” is much smaller — as the rest of the globe begins to catch up. … If we didn’t have the rest of the world growing.” he says.” he tells Fresh Air‘s Terry Gross.9 trillion to the federal government over the next 10 years.9 of 154 playing field for many other countries around the world. investing. It’s not possible for two countries to be the leading dominant political power at the same time.”
. the economic connections of a global market. He says America is now heading toward what he calls a “post-American” world. “The more countries that get rich [and]
the larger the world economy.” But Zakaria cautions that the economic growth around the world — and the benefits that global economic stability create — do not extend to the political arena. the United States economy would be in much worse shape than it is today. the established power — the United States.
and providing the reserve currency. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A & M University's Bush
School of Government and Public Service. Miss American Pie” The European Magazine Online – 3-28-2011 http://theeuropean-magazine. It seemed the sun would never set on the
hegemon is responsible for stabilizing key regions and guarding the global commons. A hegemon
is supposed to solve international crises. created after World War II. Professor and Robert M. Optimists contend that current worries about decline will fade once the U. The Pax Americana is already crumbling in slow motion The current international order is based on the economic and security structures that the U. In coming years the U. If the dollar loses that status America’s hegemony literally will be unaffordable. the United States no longer fits the part. the U.S.S. When these are bundled with the entitlements overhang (the unfunded future liabilities of Medicare and Social Security) and the cost of the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The decline of American power means the end of U. empire. Faced with wars it cannot win or quit and an economy begging rescue. faced a larger debt/GDP ratio after World War II. The United States of 2011 are different from 1945. The US decline reflects its own economic troubles. The American people are
. This will require fiscal self-discipline through a combination of tax increases and big spending cuts. they say. Americans may
contract hegemony fatigue. Faced with these hard choices. It is supposed to be the lender of last resort. Militarily. trade surpluses. it offers public goods by opening its domestic market to other states.S. China’s economy has been growing much more rapidly than the United States’ over the last two decades and continues to do so. But the post-war era was a golden age of U. the U.10 of 154
The Pax Americana is unsustainable and is already crumbling – too many alt causes to save it now Layne 11 (Christopher Layne is Professor and Robert M. Decline is coming – hegemony is unsustainable in its current form Layne 10 (Christopher Layne. The looming fiscal results from the $1 trillion plus budget deficits that the U. dominance in world politics and the beginning of the transition to a new constellation of world power.S. and yet embarked on a sustained era of growth. many in the mainstream foreign-policy
community see these as temporary setbacks and believe that U. May 2010.S. not cause them. http://findarticles. Even in the best case. will be compelled to retrench strategically and the Pax Americana will end. Externally. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A&M's George H. "Graceful decline: the end of Pax Americana". military and economic preponderance. primacy will endure for years to come. impersonal forces compounded by the United States’ own self-defeating policies. The dollar’s vulnerability is the United States’ real geopolitical Achilles’ heel because the dollar’s role as the international economy’s reserve currency role underpins U. will be pressured to defend the dollar by preventing runaway inflation.S. the United States will emerge from the current crisis facing a grave fiscal crisis. If so. Indeed.com/p/articles/mi_7060/is_5_9/ai_n54223596/) AK The United States emerged from World War II in a position of global dominance. primacy. Those days are gone forever. supplying liquidity for the world economy.W. From this unparalleled military and economic power came a Pax Americana that has endured for more than six decades. and sustained high growth rates. “Bye bye. the impact of these big historical forces is reflected in the emergence of new great powers like China and India which is being driven by the unprecedented shift in the center of global economic power from the Euro-Atlantic area to Asia. not the biggest borrower. The entire fabric of world order that the United States established after 1945 – the Pax Americana – rested on the foundation of U. will incur for at least a decade. the Pax Americana is already is crumbling in slow motion.S. Economically. After all. Bush
School of Government & Public Service. The American Conservative. industrial and financial dominance.S. there is reason to worry about United States’ long-term fiscal stability – and the role of the dollar.com/223-layne-christopher/231-pax-americana) AK
American primacy’s end is result of history’s big. recovers from the recession. Still.S. But America is increasingly unable to play the hegemon's assigned role.
Meaningful cuts in federal spending mean deep reductions in defense expenditures because discretionary non-defense – domestic – spending accounts for only about 20% of annual federal outlays.S.S.S.
imperialism. others--notably China. enjoyed such vast superiority for such a long time. and latterly totalitarianism.S. India. May 2010. values. one of the towering figures in the study of international politics." So we cling to the idea that our hegemony is necessary for our own and everyone else's security. We work multilaterally through international institutions because--we are told--these promote cooperation and trust among states. militarism. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A&M's George H. is facing enormous difficulties." U. Obama's trip has symbolized the advent of a more multi-polar world where U. and powerful. Bush
School of Government & Public Service.S. is different. just 27 percent chose the United States. most notably China. Bush made repeatedly in justifying his policy of exporting democracy at the point of a bayonet. Indeed.com/p/articles/mi_7060/is_5_9/ai_n54223596/) AK The foundational American myth of empire is exceptionalism.) But as my graduate school mentor. According to a December 2009 Pew survey. come from "over there. The American Conservative. there is overwhelming evidence that they are wrong." We have long thought that we cannot live safely in a world of such imperfections and that it is therefore our national duty to cure these ills by using American power to construct a world order based on our values. stumbles. "Coming at a moment when Chinese prestige is growing and the U. We export our model of freemarket capitalism because--we are told--states that are economically interdependent do not fight each other. looks through this prism.
foreign-policy elites have extrapolated from our national experience and concluded.S. military personnel who have suffered disfiguring wounds or been killed in Iraq and Afghanistan. plays a less important and powerful role as a world leader than it did a decade ago. strong.S. the current era of globalization will end. and terrorism. as a nation.
Because that U. genocide. non-democratic forms of governance. the United States will pay a high price if it endlessly repeats its mistakes.S. And because the U.
Much of America's decline can be attributed to its own self-defeating policies. All these bad things. Professor and Robert M. religious intolerance. "When you are
big. and the post-1945 Pax Americana will be replaced by an
international order that reflects the interests. Kenneth Waltz. America's security and way of life are purportedly endangered by the existence of hostile ideologies anywhere in the world because peace and freedom are allegedly indivisible. As the Financial Times observed. we believe. 41 percent of the public believes that the U. President Barack Obama's November 2009 trip to China provided both substantive and emblematic evidence of the shift. if you discount the 58.S. To change our foreign policy--to come to grips with the end of the Pax Americana--we first need to change the way we see the world.S. http://findarticles. and norms of emerging powers. that the U. it believes it has the obligation to prevail in this global struggle. leadership has to co-exist with several rising powers. and morally superior to the rest of the world. Intervention is thus the United States' default in foreign policy. and Russia--are rising. U. dating back to the Puritans. you can afford to make the same dumb mistakes over and over again. None of these propositions is self-evident.W. The view that the world is doomed without hegemony is flawed – exceptionalist.11 of 154
awakening to a new reality more quickly than the academy. used to tell us about American foreign policy. better. as Edmund Stillman and William Pfaff wrote some 45 years ago. This shift in the global balance of power will
dramatically affect international politics: the likelihood of intense great-power security competitions--and even war--will increase. The consequence has been to contribute to the very imperial overstretch that is accelerating the United States' decline. "Graceful decline: the end of Pax Americana". (That is.S. The epoch of
American dominance is drawing to a close. you begin to pay a price for repeating your mistakes. that the United States is a model for the world and "America's wants and values are universal"--a point George W.S.000 names on the Vietnam Memorial or the tens of thousands of U. but as the U. all would be well. We attempt to tame the world by exporting democracy because--we are told--democracies do not fight each other." In the same
Pew study. But they are illusions that "express the deepest beliefs which Americans. Mr." If we could just give the rest of the world a makeover so it looked like the United States. and justifies endless interventions that ultimately destroy our hegemony Layne 10 (Christopher Layne. the belief.
. 44 percent of Americans polled said that China was the leading economic power. it had the luxury of acting on its delusions without paying too high a price. Americans
have always looked at the outside world suspiciously and viewed it as a source of contagion: war. and international politics is entering a period of transition: no longer unipolar but not yet fully multipolar. decline means that in the 21st century. These assumptions invest American foreign policy
with a tendency to see the world in terms of good versus evil.S. Americans believe that our political and economic systems provide "a prototypical solution for the world's disorders. hold about the world. But when your power declines. imperialist.
Meanwhile. forces back from hundreds of overseas bases to a continental perimeter.html)
Today. and a continuing decline in real wages. the United States is likely to face a critical shortage of
talented scientists. and of a possible attempt. American leadership in technological innovation is on the wane.S.S. The world pays next to no attention as the American Century ends in silence. In mid-2009. that it "blows away the existing No. By now. Russian president Dimitri Medvedev insisted that it was time to end "the artificially maintained unipolar system" based on "one formerly strong reserve currency.S. There is no reason to believe that this trend will reverse itself.S. demanding respect for American authority and threatening military retaliation or economic reprisal." observed Kenneth S. Hegemony—Myth or Reality?: A Review Essay.S. dollar finally loses its special status as the world's reserve currency. the United States had already fallen to number three in global merchandise exports. that
source of future scientists and innovators.
Heg unsustainable – multiple constraints ensure collapse and rise of alternatives
Christopher Layne. amid soaring prices.12 of 154
Heg falling now — external threats to the economy outweigh the aff’s internal links
America will collapse”.S. so powerful. and cyberspace. provocatively challenge U. ever-rising unemployment. a far-right patriot captures the presidency with thundering rhetoric. the decline of American technological innovation.S. thanks to a blistering 400 percent increase since 2000.S. China. Russia. hit rock bottom in ranking among the 40 nations surveyed by the
Information Technology & Innovation Foundation when it came to "change" in "global innovation-based competitiveness" during the previous decade. the U.15Global Trends 2025 is not light reading. No. are now foreigners. and the end of the dollar's privileged status as the global reserve currency. Adding substance to these statistics. dollar).S. space. the U. Unable to pay for swelling deficits by selling now-devalued Treasury notes abroad. Smail Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Similarly. Under pressure at home and
abroad. most of whom will be heading home. Riding a political tide of disillusionment and despair. was still number two behind Japan in worldwide patent applications with
232. Add to this clear evidence that the U. J. 34.to 34-year-olds with university degrees. education system. "Other countries are no longer willing to buy into the idea that the U. said one U. Chair in National Security at the School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. 10 (Alfred. By 2008. Treasury notes. Iran.000. China's central bank governor suggested that the future might lie with a global reserve currency "disconnected from individual nations" (that is. 12/6/10. Nearly half of all
graduate students in the sciences in the U.” International Security. the cost of imports soars. with the world's central banks holding an astronomical $4 trillion in U. 1 machine" in America. the Tianhe-1A. Such negative trends are encouraging increasingly sharp criticism of the dollar's role as the world’s reserve currency. the U. the country sank to 12th place in 2010. After leading the world for decades in 25. A harbinger of further decline: in 2009 the U. not staying here as once would have happened. Its key geopolitical
.S. Rogoff. as long expected. knows best on economic policy.S. In 2008.S. Faced with a fading superpower incapable of paying the bills. By 2025.salon.000. Summer 2009] For an overview of trends that could affect international politics over the next two decades. Washington slowly pulls U. as economist Michael Hudson has argued. and other powers.R. often over remarkably irrelevant issues. great and regional. has been falling behind its competitors. it is far too late." Simultaneously. "to hasten the bankruptcy of the U. in 2020.S. but China was closing fast at 195." Economic Decline: Scenario 2020 After years of swelling deficits fed by incessant warfare in distant lands. expert. 1. three
main threats exist to America’s dominant position in the global economy: loss of economic clout thanks to a shrinking share of world trade. Vol. 09 [“The Waning of U. however. Suddenly. http://www. The World Economic Forum ranked the United States at a mediocre 52nd among 139 nations in the quality of its university math and science instruction in 2010. India. a good starting point is the National Intelligence Council’s (NIC’s) Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World.W. with just 11 percent of them compared to 12 percent for China and 16 percent for the European Union. but it is significantly more insightful and intellectually courageous than typical government reports. Washington is finally forced to slash its bloated military budget. a former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund. in other words. financial-military world order. domestic divisions widen into violent clashes and divisive debates. in October China's
Defense Ministry unveiled the world's fastest supercomputer. Take these as signposts of a world to come.com/news/feature/2010/12/06/america_collapse_2025/index. dominion over the oceans.
hegemony. According to the NIC. both of
which are linked to the fear that after recovery. and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute (Christopher. will “strive for a multipolar system with New Delhi as one of the poles” (ibid. and economic. buoyed by its strong economic growth rate. China’s spring 2009 call to replace the dollar with a new reserve currency signals that the NIC’s long-term worries may be justified.S. power. Although at the time this issue went to press. the NIC believes that the “chances are good that China and India will continue to rise” (p. Yet. 13–14). global dominance” (p. India. The NIC concludes that America’s “interest and willingness to play a leadership role may be more constrained as the economic. the United States will face a serious inflationary threat. International Security.S.M. India. capabilities. 8–9. 21-23) PDF The publications reviewed in this essay examine whether the United States is in (or is headed for) relative decline. The United States’ soft power may diminish as its liberal model of political and economic development is challenged by authoritarian/statist alternatives (pp. Moreover. in Political Science from the University of California. affecting the availability of manpower for both the military and the labor pools (pp. Nevertheless. Decline is inevitable – heg is economically unsustainable Layne. Ph. the NIC believes it “will be a leading force in opposition to U. in International Law from Virginia Law. J. Thus. July 6th 2010.). even before the meltdown. 93). and opportunity costs of being the world’s leader are reassessed by American voters” (p.
longterm structural weaknesses that have been accumulating for more than three decades were causing U. and possibly Russia are emerging great powers. the growing dependence of the United States on foreign capital inflows “may curtail U. economic power to wane.18 Between 2009 and 2025. the NIC did have an inkling of the meltdown’s potential long-term implications for U. although the United States will probably be primus inter pares in a multipolar international system twenty years from now. it will have less power—and foreign policy options—than it has been accustomed to having since 1945 (ibid. 30). domestic governance issues. the dollar remained strong and will continue to be the reserve currency for some time to come.74 Brooks and Wohlforth purport to deny the possibility that America is in relative decline.13 of 154 conclusion is that the U. 94. p. however.S. China. Because its great power status is closely tied to its ability to control both the energy resources and pipelines of Central Asia and the Caucasus. LL. the dollar’s role as
the international economy’s preeminent reserve currency will erode. 32.19 [End Page 153] As the NIC observes. Brooks and Wohlforth wrote their book before its effects became evident).17] Because of uncertainties about
economics. Russia will
also seek to reestablish its sphere of influence in the “near abroad” (pp.). 93). 97). and domestic political constraints that may erode U. 09 – Mary Julia and George R. 3. Hegemony—Myth or Reality? A Review Essay". 32). 82). "The Waning of U. Global Trends predicts that over the next two decades. but a growing number of analysts disagree.D. 1. and especially demography.S.S. Galileo. 23–24. military supremacy will no longer be as dominant as it has been since the Cold War’s end (p. economic and political constraints may undermine U. freedom of action in unanticipated ways” (p.77 Optimists
.S. 34. By 2025.16 As Global
Trends 2025 points out.S.D. the financial privileges conferred on the United States by the
dollar’s unchallenged reserve currency status have underpinned the preeminent role of the United States in international politics since the end of World War II. China figures to have the
world’s second-largest economy (measured by gross domestic product [GDP]) and will be a first-rank military power (p. 97).76 The warning signs with respect to U. Russia’s great power trajectory is more problematic than China’s or India’s (pp.
Russia’s population is forecast to drop from 141 million to below 130 million. Summer 2009. Global Trends 2025 was published just before the full scope of the global financial and
economic crisis became apparent. Vol. Jordan Professor of International Affairs at Texas A&M's George Bush
School of Government and Public Service. energy prices. 31–32). 29).75 The long-term impact of the current economic crisis largely will determine who is right (and to be fair. U. financial. In particular. Their ascent is being
propelled by “the global shift in relative wealth and economic power” from North America and the Euro-Atlantic world to Asia—a shift “without precedent in modern history” (ibid. in addition to relative decline. the rise of China and India to great power status will restore each to “the positions they held two centuries ago when China produced approximately 30 percent and India 15 percent of the world’s wealth” (p.S. decline are a looming fiscal crisis and doubts about the future of the dollar as the reserve currency. the United States will confront other constraints on its international role. No.). Ultimately.S. At home. “the dollar’s decline may force the United States into difficult
tradeoffs between achieving ambitious foreign policy goals and the high domestic costs of supporting those objectives” (pp. If Russia overcomes its demographic challenge and continues its revival as a great power. military. 12. 30). Although both states could encounter speed bumps that might slow—or even derail—their ascents to great power status.-dominated unipolar world will give way to multipolarity during the next two decades spurred by two causal mechanisms: the emergence of new great powers (and potentially important regional powers).S. from USC. 7).
there are nonetheless parallels worth considering. and yet embarked on a sustained era of growth. however. current account deficit. the country will face the highest debt/GDP ratio in 50 years and an increasingly urgent and unsustainable fiscal problem. "Rome. while struggling internally to recover from an economic collapse not seen since the Great Depression.”81 If the Congressional Budget Office is right. the dollar’s vulnerability “presents potentially significant and underappreciated restraints upon contemporary American political and military predominance. which is why many economists believe that even in the best case.80 The CBO states. the dollar faces an uncertain future because of concerns that its value will diminish over time. While the dangers we face were once diverse and scattered. and the cost of two ongoing wars. But from China's rapidly rising status as a global player. however.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2009/jan/19/barack-obama-rome-empire)
By virtue of its economic and military power." or preserve our strength and create a framework for global cooperation in which America acts as a mediator and responsible actor rather than instigator.S. As Jonathan Kirshner noted on the eve of the meltdown. as Eric Helleiner notes. if the dollar experiences dramatic depreciation in the future.14 of 154
contend that once the United States recovers. Brooks and Wohlforth concede unipolarity can only last for 20 more years and that counterbalancing is occuring
. Second. to Russia's show of force in Georgia.84 Hegemony is unsustainable in today`s world – collapse coming The Guardian 9 (The Guardian UK. The United States of 2009 is far different from the United States of 1945. dominance. industrial and financial dominance. 83 First. protection from the Soviet threat.S.guardian. it will emerge from the current crisis with serious macroeconomic handicaps. with awful sway. the other big players in the international economy now are either military rivals (China) or ambiguous “allies” (Europe) that have their own ambitions and no longer require U. Because of these two factors. and recent events have magnified concerns that predated the financial and economic crisis. and the $1 trillion plus budget deficits that the Brookings Institution and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) project the United States will incur for at least a decade. 't is thine alone. Moreover. there is a “risk of defections generating a herd-like momentum” away from it. and sustained high growth rates.79 When the projected deficits are bundled with the persistent
U. America is facing a wide array of increasingly troubling threats. “Even if the recovery occurs as projected and the stimulus bill is allowed to expire. it spells trouble ahead for the dollar.78 Chief among these handicaps are the increase in the money supply (caused by the massive amount of dollars the Federal Reserve and Treasury have pumped into circulation to rescue the economy). America has spread itself too thin and is unable to respond to new threats as they emerge with either a convincing show of military force or a skilled use of soft power to leverage its credibility in the world. in collapsing the Ba'athist regime of Saddam Hussein.S. there is reason to worry about the United States’ longterm fiscal stability. Like Rome. America today faces the same dilemma of the eastern Roman empire: should it attempt to regain its lost global supremacy or fortify and adapt to the new world? Will we follow Virgil's famous line from the Aeneid. to rising tensions in South Asia and the Middle East. The postwar era. trade surpluses. America has been the leader of the free world for the last 60 years.”82 The dollar’s loss of reserve currency status would undermine U. was a golden age of U. American supremacy in a post-cold war environment seems outmatched by a progressively more unstable world. While the comparison to ancient Rome is imperfect. To rule mankind. the Iraq war pushed many of our enemies to see us as a common threat where religious differences would have otherwise made cooperation impossible. as well as a political system extolled for its superiority to all other systems. and make the world obey.S. 2009. the entitlements overhang. fears of a fiscal crisis will fade: the country faced a larger debt to GDP ratio after World War II. America has paved the way for an even less palatable Iranian dominance in the region.
http://www. January 19.
44 Not only is this a weak case for unipolarity. Relative power is important. Vol. leading allies to enhance their own military capabilities. US hegemony is unsustainable. it is also an implicit admission that—although it has yet to bear fruit—other states are engaged in counterbalancing the United States. technology. the US is still a giant in terms of relative power differentials. consumption.43 The point is simply that America’s unilateral assertiveness on the international scene is changing. which is not very long at all. hegemony.” http://www.45
Out of Balance
U.” http://www. and resources stretched. or provides benefits. military overstretch. Professor of Public Policy at the University of Maryland 10 – [Quddus Z. Snyder.42 Their case is based on a freeze-frame view of the distribution of capabilities in the international system. US security guarantees may prove less credible than they once were. Summer 2009) Brooks and Wohlforth make a strong case for unipolar stability. No.
the US appears much weaker today than it did five years ago. Of course.S. The problem does not only stem from fact that the US is bogged down in two wars.pdf] At the turn of the century it appeared as if we were living through a ‘hegemonic age. 1. hegemony will endure well into the future. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service (Christopher. external weakness will inevitably lead to its defeat by rising powers.bsos. Hegemony—Myth or Reality”.S. know-how. Keohane has argued that after World War II the US provided three major sets of benefits in the area of international political economy: First.edu/gvpt/irworkshop/papers_fall09/snyder. In this respect. for now at least.edu/gvpt/irworkshop/papers_fall09/snyder. seems more bound. The classic Gilpinian dilemma provides insight into the present predicament the US finds itself in: This three-way struggle over priorities (protection. Similarly. key question is whether the early decades of the twenty-first century will witness the decline of U.
According to the theory of hegemonic stability. “Systermic theory in an era of
declining US hegemony. 34.umd. the debate about unipolar stability is misleading. If it
suppresses consumption. The US may still be a giant. these projects will gobble up massive amounts of resources and treasure at a time when America’s own recovery is being partly bankrolled by foreign powers like China. everyone is getting hit. however. International Security.15 of 154 Layne. “Systermic theory in an era of
declining US hegemony.S.With its armed forces over-extended.umd. the American era of unipolarity contains the seeds of its own demise. and investment) produces a profound dilemma for society. like all hegemonic systems. Brooks and Wohlforth actually concede that unipolarity is not likely to last more than another twenty years. Because all are suffering. For example. the consequence can be severe internal social tensions and class conflict…If the society neglects to pay the costs of defense. After all. If the society fails to save and reinvest a sufficient fraction of its surplus wealth in industry and agriculture. and this is spurring an ongoing process of multipolarization. 09 Professor.all realists agree Snyder PhD. and Robert M. despite their claim at the beginning [End Page 161] of World
that unipolarity is robust and that U. leadership costs sap the hegemon’s power and push it into decline. Hegemons sprint to the front of the great power pack because of economic leadership based on productivity and technological innovation. But there is less to their argument than meets the eye. It is unclear when the US will fully withdraw from Iraq and Afghanistan.S hegemony is unsustainable. which allows other states to catch up. it is also in the throes of a serious economic downturn. Thus far the US has maintained a massive defense budget while consumption and
investment have been sustained by deficit spending. “The Waning of U. It is unclear how long this formula will work.’ But recent developments might justify a reevaluation of this conclusion.bsos. the economic basis of the society and its capacity to sustain either consumption or protection will decline.economic problems. It is unlikely that the US will have either the political will or capability to take on major international undertakings. and managerial skills diffuse throughout the international economic system. and rising powers Snyder PhD. however. it provided a stable international monetary system which facilitated
. Over time.43 A
Superficially. Professor of Public Policy at the University of Maryland 10 – [Quddus Z.pdf]
Crucial to hegemonic stability theory is that the hegemon actually does things. Snyder. but
one that. but so is the hegemon’s ability to actually do things. they do not engage the argument that.
all good things must come to an end.
. the its allies gain access to Middle Eastern oil at stable prices.25 Sadly.16 of 154
trade and payments. Central to the theory of hegemonic stability is that the arrangement is ultimately unsustainable.”26 Virtually no realist believes that hegemony can persist indefinitely. it provided a US helped
market for goods and permitted trade on an asymmetrical basis. The hegemonic cycle usually ends in war. and eventual decline. and inevitable overextension. and thereafter begins anew: “The conclusion of one hegemonic war is the beginning of another cycle of growth. losses in relative power. and third. expansion. Challengers will arise. The hegemon cannot maintain its dominance in the face of mounting costs. second.
Russia’s population is forecast to drop from 141 million to below 130 million. China. 7).18 Between 2009 and 2025. 93). No. economic and political constraints may undermine U. the growing dependence of the United States on foreign capital inflows “may curtail U.17 of 154
Multipolarity inevitable---collapse of the dollar. 1. If Russia overcomes its demographic challenge and continues its revival as a
great power. and domestic political constraints that may erode U. and especially demography. U. Its key geopolitical conclusion is that the U. Global Trends 2025 was published just before the full scope of the global financial and economic crisis became apparent. the rise of China and India to great power status will
restore each to “the positions they held two centuries ago when China produced approximately 30 percent and India 15 percent of the world’s wealth” (p. China’s spring 2009 call to replace the dollar with a new reserve currency signals that the NIC’s long-term worries may be justified. 3. China figures to have the world’s second-largest economy (measured by gross domestic product [GDP]) and will be a first-rank military power (p.). in addition to relative decline. global dominance” (p.S. 97). Nevertheless.S. military. will “strive for a multipolar system with New Delhi as one of the poles” (ibid. affecting the availability of manpower for both the military and the labor pools (pp. energy prices.17 [End Page 152]
Because of uncertainties about economics. capabilities. and economic. Thus.19 [End Page 153] As the NIC observes. Although at the time this issue went to press.16 As Global Trends 2025 points out. the NIC did have an inkling of the meltdown’s potential long-term implications for U. India. The NIC concludes that America’s “interest and willingness to play a leadership role may be more constrained as the economic. and opportunity costs of being the world’s leader are reassessed by American voters” (p. and possibly Russia are emerging great powers. “The Waning of U. 94. Global Trends predicts that over the next two decades.S. but it is significantly more insightful and intellectually courageous than typical government reports. 32. 8–9. International Security. 30). India. Vol. 30).).-dominated unipolar world will give way to multipolarity during the next two decades spurred by two causal mechanisms: the emergence of new great powers (and potentially important regional powers). 12. a good starting point is the National Intelligence Council’s (NIC’s) Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World. the NIC believes it “will be a leading force in opposition to U. 82).S. 09 Professor. the financial privileges conferred on the United States by the dollar’s unchallenged reserve currency status have underpinned the preeminent role of the United States in international politics since the end of World War II. military supremacy will no longer be as dominant as it has been since the Cold War’s end (p. At home. erosion of public support. and Robert M. In particular. 23–24. 93). The United States’ soft power may diminish as its liberal model of political and economic development is challenged by authoritarian/statist alternatives (pp.15Global Trends 2025 is not light reading.S. freedom of action in unanticipated ways” (p. “the dollar’s decline may force the United States into difficult tradeoffs between achieving ambitious foreign policy goals and the high domestic costs of supporting those objectives” (pp. Hegemony—Myth or Reality”. and rising challengers Layne. Ultimately. however. 97). Russia’s great power trajectory is more problematic than China’s or India’s (pp. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service (Christopher. buoyed by its strong economic growth rate.S. power. although the United States
. Summer 2009) For an overview of trends that could affect international politics over the next two decades. financial. the dollar remained strong and will continue to be the reserve currency for some time to come. hegemony. Because its great power status is closely tied to its ability to control both the energy resources and pipelines of Central Asia and the Caucasus. Moreover. Their ascent is being propelled by “the global shift in relative wealth and
economic power” from North America and the Euro-Atlantic world to Asia—a shift “without precedent in modern history” (ibid. According to the NIC. the United States will confront other constraints on its international role. 31–32).S. 29). Although both states could encounter speed bumps that might slow—or even derail—their ascents to great power status. the NIC believes that the “chances are good that China and India will continue to rise” (p. 32).S. Russia will also seek to reestablish its sphere of influence in the “near abroad” (pp. By 2025. domestic governance issues. 13–14). the dollar’s role as the international economy’s preeminent reserve currency will erode. 34.
the recent actions of Russia and Turkey
in the Middle East do show a new assertiveness from regional powers to pursue their own path in defiance of US will.
Multipolarity coming now Phillips. However. the region's international relations are changing. A new cold war is unlikely. If the age of American uni-polarity is coming to an end. but China. squeezing the defiant few like Syria and Saddam Hussein's Iraq. While the Bush era saw the US hegemonic in the region.guardian.18 of 154
will probably be primus inter pares in a multipolar international system twenty years from now. it will have less power—and foreign policy options—than it has been accustomed to having since 1945 (ibid.
. “US hegemony in Middle East is ending”. Turkey and Brazil's recent nuclear deal with Iran typify this emerging new climate.). whether through arms deals. with Asia's share of GDP already outstripping that of the US or Europe. it won't just be Russia and Turkey expanding their reach in the region. US power is waning.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/may/31/us-hegemony-middle-east-ending) Yet even though the return to cold war bi-polar blocs in the Middle East is unlikely. perhaps hastened by unnecessary wars and economic shortsightedness. while the economic crisis has forced the Obama administration to focus energy elsewhere. Though Washington remains the world's only superpower. The US remains the superpower and could still effect serious change in the region. the quagmires of Iraq and Afghanistan have exposed the limits of US ambitions. India and Brazil will all bid for a role. In such circumstances. it is much more likely that international relations in the Middle East will come to reflect the
multi-polar world that will follow rather than revert to a bi-polar cold war. it seems the Middle East could prove a microcosm of these international changes. should it desire. As ever. too – presumably having fewer demands than Washington about their clients pursuing democratic reforms and peace with Israel. today's Middle East sees a power vacuum led by partial US retreat being filled by assertive regional and middle powers. Saudi Arabia's growing relationship with China might signify the shape of things to come. Stephen Walt has highlighted that this shift in power is global. http://www. Not that this era is yet upon us. trade agreements or diplomatic coups. but the age of unchallenged US hegemony in the Middle East could be ending. 10 Analyst of Middle East Affairs (Chris.
Edited by David Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi. which won the Schroeder/Jervis Award for best book in History and International Politics by the American Political Science Association. it is easy to predict that the demands for multilateral agreements .will increase and not decrease. Milbank Professor of Politic' and International Affairs at Princeton University in both the Woodrow 'Wilson School and the Politics Department. "American Power in the 21st Century". American political culture stresses the importance of the rule of law as a foundation.even and perhaps especially by the United States . He is also coauthor of State Power and World Markets (2002) and editor of America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power(2002).43 "
Multilateralism is inevitable – most authors agree unilateralism is unlikely
David Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi 4 – Held is Graham Wallas Professor of Political Science @ the London School of Economics and Political Science. Over the postwar era. First. and technological gains that derive from integration into the world economy. if the stronger state accepts some restrictions on how it can use its power.42 Rising economic interdependence is one of the great hallmarks of the contemporary international system. the need for multilateral coordination of policies also increases. “American Power in the 21st Century”.
. as global economic interdependence grows. Finally. essentially for three reasons.in part because of a simple logic: as global economic interdependence grows. He is the author of After Victory: Institutions. Pg 5-6 Most contributors to this volume are skeptical about the idea that the world is moving toward a new imperial order. compared with the costs of sacrificing autonomy as a consequence of making binding agreements. social. the need for multilateral coordination of policie-s also grows. "the opportunity costs of not co-ordinating policy increase. Strategic Restraint Wid the Rebuilding of Order after Major War (2001). Edited by David Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi. Archibugi is Lecturer in Global Politics in the Departments of Government and International Relations of the London School of Economics and Political Science. John Ikenberry 4 Ikenberry is the Albert G. states have actively and consistently sought to open markets and reap the economic. This development is considered unlikely because they see the United States as lacking the motivation and/or the capacity to establish an empire. Ikenberry emphasizes the lack of motivation: America is unlikely in the tuture to reject multilateralism and a rule-based international order." Robert Keohane argues. "As interdependence rises. If this remains true in the years ahead. Second..19 of 154
Multilateralism is inevitable
G. "Economic interdependence and multilateralism American support for multilateralism is likely to be sustained _ even in the face of resistance and ideological challenges to multilateralism within the Bush administration . The more economically interconnected that states become the more dependent they are for the realization of their objectives on the actions of other states. weaker states are more likely to cooperate willingly and have less reason to resist the hegemony of the stronger state. it is rational for dominant powers to accept some limitations to their freedom of action in the form of multilateral institutions..
20 of 154
US hegemony results in more multilateralism
G. American hegemony and multilateralism American support for multilateralism can also stem from a grand strategic interest in preserving power and creating a stable and legitimate international order. thereby encouraging the acquiescence and cooperation of weaker states.should increase rather than decrease with the rise of American unipolarity. He is also coauthor of State Power and World Markets (2002) and editor of America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power(2002). He is the author of After Victory: Institutions. From this perspective. multilateralism . Strategic Restraint Wid the Rebuilding of Order after Major War (2001). should rein in the Bush administration .and it explains the remarkably durable and legitimate character of the existing international order. It predicts that the existing multilateral order.and the search for rule-based agreements . Edited by David Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi. which won the Schroeder/Jervis Award for best book in History and International Politics by the American Political Science Association. Milbank Professor of Politic' and International Affairs at Princeton University in both the Woodrow 'Wilson School and the Politics Department. John Ikenberry 4 Ikenberry is the Albert G."
. which itself reflects an older multilateral bargain between the United States and the outside world. The support for multilateralism is a way to signal restraint and commitment to other states." This has been a strategy that the United States has pursued to a greater or lesser degree across the twentieth century .and it suggests that the current administration should respond to general power management incentives and limit its tilt toward unilateralism. "American Power in the 21st Century".
Bush suggested that China's internal problems mean that its economy will be unlikely to rival America's in the foreseeable future. February 2011. In 1989. Its economy has been growing at 9 to 10 percent a year. Of course. and it is sitting on more than $2. doubling in size roughly every seven years. They each have their own foreign-policy preferences.com/articles/2011/01/02/think_again_american_decline?page=0. http://www. Italy. China. That is just a taste of things to come. France. It is now the world's leading exporter and its biggest manufacturer.4) AK In the end. But a frequently overlooked
fact about that fable is that the boy was eventually proved right. And China is only the largest part of a bigger story about the rise of new economic and political players. And the country's traditional dependence on exports and an undervalued currency are coming under increasing criticism from the United States and other international actors demanding a "rebalancing" of China's export-driven economy. which means that the average Japanese person would have to be more than twice as rich as the average American before Japan's economy surpassed America's.and China is the wolf.4) AK It is certainly true that when Americans are worrying about national decline. Foreign Policy Magazine. New powers are on the rise: India.Britain. China's economic prowess is already allowing Beijing to challenge American influence all over the world. Yet the Chinese economy has kept growing. Over the long term. by contrast. even Germany -. Yet even if you factor in considerable future economic and political turbulence. February 2011. they
tend to overlook the weaknesses of their scariest-looking rival. for roughly three decades. Brazil. So Americans can be forgiven if they greet talk of a new challenge from China as just another case of the boy who cried wolf. Japan. journalist Financial Times and formerly at The Economist – “Think Again: American
Decline. 1 well before then. former
U. "Do I still think America will remain the sole superpower?" he asked. President George W. Chinese goods compete all over the
world. Foreign Policy Magazine. journalist Financial Times and formerly at The Economist – “Think Again: American
Decline. But it was never a plausible candidate to be No. it would be absurd to pretend that China does not face major challenges. Turkey.are slipping down the economic ranks. That was never going to happen. The Soviet Union collapsed because its economic system was highly inefficient. of course. there is plenty of
evidence that a property bubble is building in big cities like Shanghai. America's traditional allies in Europe -. a fatal flaw that was disguised for a long time because the USSR never attempted to compete on world markets.5 trillion of foreign reserves. China will overcome all obstacles – challenges the US Rachman 2011 (Gideon Rachman. Those who are confident that American hegemony will be extended long into the future point to the potential liabilities of the Chinese system. economy watchers regularly pointed to the parlous state of Chinese banks and state-owned enterprises. The wolf did arrive -.com/articles/2011/01/02/think_again_american_decline?page=0.foreignpolicy. In a recent interview with the Times of London. China's population is more
than four times that of the United States. The Chinese
are the preferred partners of many African governments and the biggest trading partner of other emerging powers. Think of how India and Brazil sided with China at the global climate-change talks.21 of 154
Hegemony unsustainable – new powers are challenging America Rachman 2011 (Gideon Rachman. This Time It`s For Real”. the Communist Party seemed to be staggering after the Tiananmen Square massacre. it would be a big
. 1. This Time It`s For Real”. At the current pace. The Japanese population is less than half that of the United States. on average. also experienced many years of rapid economic growth and is still an export powerhouse. and China is threatened by water shortages and pollution. "I do. which collectively constrain America's ability to shape the world. This is no Soviet-style economic basket case. The flaws in the Soviet and Japanese systems became obvious only in retrospect. of course. China has alarming political and economic transitions to navigate. the Soviet and Japanese threats to American supremacy proved chimerical. http://www. such as Greece and Portugal. China is also stepping in to buy the bonds of financially strapped members of the
eurozone.foreignpolicy. Or the votes by Turkey and Brazil against America at the United Nations on sanctions against Iran. The Chinese challenge to the United States is more serious for both economic and demographic reasons." But predictions of the
imminent demise of the Chinese miracle have been a regular feature of Western analysis ever since it got rolling in the late 1970s. and inflation is on the rise. The country also faces major demographic and environmental challenges: The population is aging rapidly as
a result of the one-child policy. has proved its economic prowess on the global stage. In the 1990s. In the short term. such as Brazil and South Africa. The famous projection by Goldman Sachs that China's economy will be bigger than that of the United States by 2027 was made before the 2008 economic crash.S. By contrast. China could be No. The Communist Party is unlikely to be able to maintain its monopoly on political power forever.
government clearly thinks that China's undervaluation of its currency is a form
of protectionism that has led to global economic imbalances and job losses in the United States. presidents. the collapse of democracy. drive to deal with "global economic imbalances" was essentially thwarted by China's obdurate refusal to change its currency policy. At the G-20 summit in November. but the cost of securing Chinese agreement was a weak deal that is unlikely to derail the Iranian nuclear program. Speaking before the
2010 World Economic Forum. China is counter-balancing the US now Layne. This Time It`s For Real”. Germany went through two catastrophic military defeats.… We welcome China's efforts to play a greater role on the world stage. Its economy will eventually recover. The 2009 climate-change talks in Copenhagen ended in disarray after another
U.foreignpolicy.S. Its military has a global presence and a technological edge that no other country can yet match. the world of the future looks even more like a zero-sum game. West Germany was once again one of the world's leading economies.M. "Power does not need to be a zero-sum game. Those days are over. have taken a similar line. The U. and the destruction of its major cities and infrastructure by Allied bombs. but a barely submerged rivalry prevents truly effective Sino-American cooperation. albeit shorn of its imperial ambitions.N.
which is driving up global prices. China is also competing fiercely for access to resources.D. and rightly so. it takes a great deal to throw them off course. The
United States still has formidable strengths. Both sides have taken part in the talks with North Korea.S.com/articles/2011/01/02/think_again_american_decline?page=0. Sheer size and economic momentum mean that the Chinese juggernaut will keep rolling forward. from territorial disputes in Asia to human rights. no matter what obstacles lie in its path. then Obama's chief economic advisor. China does not like Kim Jong Il's regime. Larry Summers. so it will not face turbulence and disorder on remotely the scale Germany did in the 20th century.S.-China standoff. Fred Bergsten. and economy Rachman 2011 (Gideon Rachman. journalist Financial Times and formerly at The Economist – “Think Again: American
Decline. To do anything else would needlessly antagonize the Chinese. So much for the win-win world. troops. China is unlikely to get sucked into a world war. In fact. Obama summarized the traditional approach when he said. remarked pointedly that the normal rules about the mutual benefits of trade do not necessarily apply when one trading partner is practicing mercantilist or protectionist policies. the Great Depression. February 2011. but it is also very wary of a reunified Korea on its borders.4) AK Successive U. such as New York Times columnist Paul Krugman and the Peterson Institute's C. rivalry between a rising China and a weakened America is now apparent across a whole range of issues. Just before his first visit to China.S. We are on a collision course with China – military. a winwin rather than a zero-sum. power will simply disappear. from the first Bush to Obama. It is mercifully unlikely that the United States and China would ever actually go to war. despite the gauzy rhetoric of globalization that comforted the last generation of American politicians. Jordan Professor of International Affairs at Texas A&M's George Bush
School of Government and Public Service. But America will never again experience the global
dominance it enjoyed in the 17 years between the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991 and the financial crisis of 2008. It is a central tenet of modern economics that trade is mutually beneficial for both partners. LL. in
. But that implies the rules of the game aren't rigged. But that shouldn't obscure this unavoidable fact: As economic and political power moves from West to East. not because globalization has magically dissolved their differences. in particular oil. foreign policy. Once countries get the hang of economic growth. sanctions on
Iran. http://www. Ph. And
when it comes to the broader geopolitical picture.22 of 154 mistake to assume that the Chinese challenge to U. arguing that tariffs or other retaliatory measures would be a legitimate response. new international rivalries are inevitably emerging. Growing Chinese economic and military clout clearly poses a long-term threat to American hegemony in the Pacific. America's leaders are clearly beginning to have their doubts. 09 – Mary Julia and George R. hyperinflation. And whatever economic and political difficulties it does experience will not be enough to stop the country's rise to great-power status. American leaders are right to reject zero-sum logic in public. the U. For the United States has been acting as if the mutual interests created by globalization have repealed one of the oldest laws of international politics: the notion that rising players eventually clash with established powers.S. have explicitly welcomed China's rise. and nations need not fear the success of another. The Chinese reluctantly agreed to a new package of U. In a nuclear age. Foreign Policy Magazine. but that is
because both sides have nuclear weapons." But whatever they say in
formal speeches. The analogy to the rise of Germany from the mid-19th century onward is instructive. in Political Science from the University of California. particularly if the new Korea still played host to U.S.
Leading economists. And yet by the end of the 1950s.
"Navies tend to grow with economies and as trade becomes more important. to a point.S.52 And. and much sooner than many expect[. For sure. 1-2209. Galileo. Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. and the two most important indicators of whether this is happening are relative growth rates and shares of world GDP. Khanna. 1." All of this has US military planners and thinkers worried. and they dismiss the idea that China could become a viable counterweight to a hegemonic United States within any meaningful time frame. (Peter A. http://oilprice. electromagnetic weapons. and many analysts— including the NIC. advanced fighter aircraft. at a recent speech hosted by the Heritage Foundation. China. Brooks and Wohlforth are skeptical about China’s rise.S. surveillance and target acquisition. 10 Analyst @ ISN Security Watch. Mahbubani.aspx?id=20484)
. power—and also because emerging regional multipolarity could trigger future major power war. Zakaria contend. unmanned aerial vehicles. which already has overtaken the United States as the world’s leading manufacturer—a crown the United States wore for more than a century. spaced-based reconnaissance.].html) The US is developing an air-sea battle concept to counter China's military buildup.org/Article.50 Looking ahead. "the cost incurred by the US military to operate in the [w]estern
Pacific will likely rise sharply.S. in early 2009. its allies and partners: acquiesce in a dramatic shift in
the military balance or take steps to preserve it. In 2003 Goldman Sachs predicted that China would pass the United States in GDP by 2041. “Empire Falls.. July 6th 2010. and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute (Christopher. is the poster child for
Asia’s rise. Among the anti-access/area-denial (A2AD) capabilities being fielded by China include antisatellite weapons.46 Here.23 of 154
International Law from Virginia Law.S military strength Buxbaum.48 Unsurprisingly. and. 17-18.53 Empirically. "Unless Beijing diverts from its current course of action.
and that the coming decades could witness a power transition. is static. and ballistic and cruise missiles." said a report recently released by the Washington-based Center for Budgetary and Strategic Assessments. how-ever. "The PLA navy is increasing its numbers of submarines and other ships.) PDF Toward multipolarity? The ascent of new great powers would be the strongest evidence of
multipolarization. perhaps to prohibitive levels. p. Khanna. International Security. 51 China also may overtake the United States in GDP in the next ten to fifteen years. hegemony. The Chinese also have an
emerging and muscular deep-water navy. Chinese military and political doctrine holds that China should rule the waves out to the second island chain of the western Pacific. or Washington undertakes actions to offset or
counterbalance the effects of the PLA’s military buildup. Summer 2009. there is evidence that as the NIC. from USC. global economic power is flowing from the United States and Europe to Asia. however. China's People's Liberation Army is building up anti-access and area-denial capabilities with the apparent goal of extending their power to the western half of the Pacific Ocean. then. But political problems and budgetary woes could kill the program before it ever gets started.49 Their analysis.nationalinterest.This situation creates a strategic choice for the United States. China’s already challenging U.D. Hegemony—Myth or Reality? A Review Essay". there are indications that the unipolar era is drawing to a close." said Admiral Gary Roughead."
Counterbalancing inevitable – multiple factors Pape 2k9 (Robert A. chief of US naval operations. “Chinese Plans to End US Hegemony in the Pacific”.” National Interest Online. of course.com/Geo-Politics/International/Chinese-Plans-to-End-USHegemony-in-the-Pacific. The A2AD buildup threatens the US forward presence and power projection in the region. the United States still has an impressive lead in the categories they measure. but in 2008 it revised the time frame to 2028. the Economist Intelligence Unit predicted that China’s GDP would surpass the United States’ in 2021. the trend lines appear to favor China. which extends as far as Guam and New Guinea. a conservative Washington think tank.47 The shift of economic clout to East Asia is important because it could propel China’s ascent—thus hastening the relative decline of U. essentially dividing the Pacific between the US and China and ending US hegemony on that ocean. http://www.. and (implicitly) Mahbubani and Zakaria—agree that China is the rising power most likely to challenge U.. J. "The Waning of U. 34. Vol. advanced radar systems. No.
but pursued ambitious objectives in all three major regions at the same time—waging wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. FROM ROME. the rise and fall of great nations has been driven primarily by relative economic strength. the basic definition of power in international politics is simple: power is the aggregate resources a state has at its disposal to achieve its aims. policies they oppose and that the United States will increasingly face harsh foreign-policy choices. To be sure. but in recent years American leaders have pursued far more ambitious goals than merely maintaining the status quo. but is so relatively more powerful than any other country that it can reshape the international order according to American interests. This is simply no longer realistic. It is also how much power a state has relative to other states. power certainly helps. Russia. The self-inflicted wounds of the Iraq War. the period of U. that major powers will increasingly have the strength to balance against U. Spain.S. power is heavily dependent on the size and quality of its military forces and other current power assets. economy in the world—has been in decline since early on in the Bush administration. Since the cold war. our
policies have been based on these flawed arguments.S. power does not ensure success.S. the more
its power matters and hence the more relative economic strength it needs. This is true in any rough-and-tumble environment. From public intellectuals like Charles Krauthammer and Niall Ferguson to neoconservatives like Paul Wolfowitz and Robert Kagan. seeking to denuclearize North Korea and expanding America’s military allies in Europe up to the borders of Russia itself. France. The United States is not just the sole superpower in the
unipolar-dominance school’s world. the United States has maintained a vast array of overseas commitments. America’s shrinking share of world economic production is a fact of life and important changes in U. At any given moment.1 But it is not only how much power a state has that matters. America’s declining power means that the unipolar world is indeed coming to an end. Imperial China. seeking to ensure peace and stability not just in its own neighborhood— the Americas—but also in Europe and Asia. even to academicians like Dartmouth’s William Wohlforth and Stephen Brooks. while the ultimate foundation of American power—the relative superiority of the U.S.S. solutions to each of them individually and all of them collectively will be heavily influenced by America’s reduced power position in the world. the most important of which are to defend its national interests. France. America’s power is fundamentally a result of its economic strength. Like so many great powers that have come and gone before. Although scholars have long debated its nuances. Still. dominance in the international system have encouraged American policy makers to act unilaterally and seize almost any opportunity to advance American interests no matter the costs to others. fairly short. however. grand strategy are necessary to prevent the decline in America’s global position from accelerating. growing government debt. along with the oil-rich Persian Gulf (as well as other parts of the world). the fall of American power will be more precipitous with the passage of time. A successful grand strategy. further decline in the foreseeable future. virtually discounting the possibility that Germany. U. our own hubris may be our downfall. As Paul Kennedy so ably describes in his classic The Rise and Fall of Great Powers. if not rectify. we will look back at the Bush administration years as the death knell for American hegemony. Productive capacity—defined by indicators such as wealth. A healthy appreciation of our situation by American leaders may lead to policies that could mitigate. But. without deliberate action. Great Britain and the Soviet Union to the United States
today. The Bush administration has not just continued America’s traditional grand strategy. Over time. increasingly negative current-account balances and other internal economic weaknesses have cost the United States real power in today’s world of rapidly spreading knowledge and technology.
. Most important. relative decline has been. all believe the principal feature of the post-cold-war world is the unchallengeable dominance of American power. those convinced of U. al-Qaeda’s new sanctuary in western Pakistan. In international politics. If present trends continue. China and other major powers could seriously oppose American military power. Although the immediate problems of war in Iraq and Afghanistan.S. Venice. Simply maintaining these commitments requires enormous resources. both at home and abroad. For the past eight years.24 of 154 AMERICA IS in unprecedented decline. For nearly two decades. There is also good reason to think that. Iran’s continued nuclear program and Russia’s recent military adventure in Georgia are high-priority issues. A Ford Explorer is a powerful vehicle—unless it collides with a Mack Truck. must work for the long haul and so depends on the power a state is able to produce in the future. thus far. the more international commitments a state has.
25 of 154 technology and population size—is a prerequisite for building and modernizing military forces. The United States, like any state, may choose to vary the degree to which its productive capacities are used to create military assets. But it is the economy as a whole that constrains the choice. And the size of the economy relative to potential rivals ultimately determines the limits of power in international politics. Major assessments of this relative position have long turned heavily on a single
statistic: America’s share of world economic product. Advocates of extending America’s unipolar dominance are well aware of the central importance of the economic foundations of American power and routinely present detailed statistics on the U.S. share of world product. The basic notion is simple: take U.S. domestic product in any year and divide it by the aggregate total of the gross domestic product of all states in the world. To measure gross domestic product, the unipolar-dominance school prefers to compare every country’s output in current-year U.S. dollars, a method that tends to show America is much further ahead of other countries than alternative measures. Indeed, the most recent call for America to exploit its hegemonic position (published in 2008) rests on the presumption of U.S. dominance based on the current-year dollar figures.2 By this metric, in 2006 the United States had 28 percent of world product while its nearest most likely competitor, China, had 6 percent. Looks pretty good for America, right? Alas,
single-year “snapshots” of America’s relative power are of limited value for assessing the sustainability of its grand strategy over many years. For grand-strategic concerns—especially how well the United States can balance its resources and foreign-policy commitments—the trajectory of American power compared to other states is of seminal importance. For the sake of argument, let us start with the unipolar-dominance school’s preferred measure of American hegemony, but look at the trajectory of the data over time. According to GDP figures in current U.S. dollars
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United States increased its share of world production during the 1990s, reached its apogee in 2000, and then began to steadily lose ground during the eight years of the Bush administration, with its relative power ultimately falling by nearly a quarter in the first decade of the twenty-first century. At the same time, the relative power of China, the state many consider America’s most likely future rival, has grown consistently. If we look out as far as the IMF can see
(2013), things get even worse—with the United States expected to continue declining and China to continue rising. The United States has been going through the first decade of the twenty-first century not stronger than
before, but substantially weaker. How good are the numbers? Economists commonly use two other methods to calculate GDP, constant-dollar calculations and purchasing power parity.3 Although each offers advantages and disadvantages, for our purposes what matters is that they form a lower bound of America’s relative decline. And regardless of the metric, the trend is the same. Again using IMF figures, Table 2 shows the trajectory of the share of world product for the United States and China using both alternative measures. Simply put, the United States is now a declining power. This new reality has tremendous implications
for the future of American grand strategy. THE EROSION of the underpinnings of U.S. power is the result of uneven rates of economic growth between America, China and other states in the world. Despite all the pro-economy talk from the Bush administration, the fact is that since 2000, U.S. growth rates are down
almost 50 percent from the Clinton years. This trajectory is almost sure to be revised further downward as the consequences of the financial crisis in fall 2008 become manifest. As Table 3 shows, over the past two decades, the average rate of U.S. growth has fallen considerably, from nearly 4 percent annually during the Clinton years to just over 2 percent per year under Bush. At the same time,
China has sustained a consistently high rate of growth of 10 percent per year—a truly stunning performance. Russia has also turned its economic trajectory around, from year after year of losses in the 1990s to significant annual gains since 2000. Worse, America’s decline was well under way before the economic downturn, which is likely to only further weaken U.S. power. As
the most recent growth estimates (November 2008) by the IMF make clear, although all major countries are suffering economically, China and Russia are expected to continue growing at a substantially greater rate than the United States. True, the United States has not lost its position as the most innovative country in the world, with more patents each year than in all other countries combined. However, the ability to diffuse new technology—to turn chalkboard ideas into mass-produced
applications—has been spreading rapidly across many parts of the globe, and with it the ultimate sources of state power—productive capacities. America is losing its overwhelming technological dominance in the leading industries of the knowledge economy. In past eras—the “age of
iron” and the “age of steel”—leading states retained their technological advantages for many decades.4 As Fareed Zakaria describes in his recent book, The Post-American World, technology and knowledge diffuse more quickly today, and their rapid global diffusion is a profound factor driving down America’s power compared to other countries. For instance, although the United States
remains well ahead of China on many indicators of leading technology on a per capita basis, this grossly under-weights the size of the knowledge economy in China compared to America. Whereas
in 2000, the United States had three times the computer sales, five times the internet users and forty times the broadband subscribers as China, in 2008, the Chinese have caught or nearly caught up with Americans in every category in the aggregate.5 The fact that the United States remains ahead of China on a per capita basis does matter—it means that China, with more
than four times the U.S. population, can create many more knowledge workers in the future.
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Heg Low (1/2)
American hegemony is a myth – we don’t have sufficient ground forces to project power
Mearshimer, 06 (John Mearsheimer, Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. "Conversations in International Relations - Interview with John J. Mearsheimer (Part I)," International Relations, Vol. 20, No. 1 (2006), pp. 105-124. http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0039.pdf) I think that many commentators and security experts overestimate the power of the United States. Despite all the talk about global hegemony, it is especially difficult to dominate the entire planet, not only because it is very large, but also because it is necessary to project power over large bodies of water, which is a formidable task. For sure, the United States is a hegemon in the western hemisphere. That is because the Americas are its backyard and because there is no state in the region that has the military power to stand up to the United States in a war. But dominating the rest of the globe is virtually impossible at this point in time. To accomplish that end, the United States would need immense power projection capabilities and lots more land power or boots on the ground than it now has or is likely to have anytime soon. I have a chapter in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics titled ‘The Primacy of Land Power’, where I explain why armies and the forces that support them are the core ingredients of military power. The Bush Administration made a fatal blunder in this regard. It assumed that it could use sophisticated aircraft with precision guided munitions and small ground forces to reorder the Middle East, and maybe even the whole world. Instead of relying on big battalions, the United States was going to shock and awe its way to victory. Iraq was supposed to be the first of many great triumphs. There was even much talk about creating an American empire in the Middle East. This whole scheme was delusional from the start, because there was no way that the United States could succeed in Iraq without a large army. Any state bent on reordering the world at the end of a rifle barrel better have an abundance of land power, because that task is not going to be accomplished on the cheap. The United States, however, does not have and will not have in our lifetime anywhere near enough soldiers to dominate the globe the way it dominates the western hemisphere. The unipolar moment never was and probably never will be.
27 of 154
Heg Low (2/2)
U.S. power in decline
Parag Khanna 2008 (Senior Research Fellow and Director, Global Governance Initiative, New America Initiative, January 28, , New York Times Magazine, “Waving Goodbye to Hegemony,” http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2008/waving_goodbye_hegemony_6604)
There are plenty of statistics that will still tell the story of America's global dominance: our military spending, our share of the global economy and the like. But there are statistics, and there are trends. To really understand how quickly American power is in decline around the world, I've spent the past two years traveling in some 40 countries in the five most strategic regions of the planet -- the countries of the second world. They are not in the first-world core of the global economy, nor in its third-world periphery. Lying alongside and between the Big Three, second-world countries are the swing states that will determine which of the superpowers has the upper hand for the next generation of geopolitics. From Venezuela to Vietnam and Morocco to Malaysia, the new reality of global affairs is that there is not one way to win allies and influence countries but three: America's coalition (as in "coalition of the willing"), Europe's consensus and China's consultative styles. The geopolitical marketplace will decide which will lead the 21st century. The key second-world countries in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, South America, the Middle East and Southeast Asia are more than just "emerging markets." If you include China, they hold a majority of the world's foreign-exchange reserves and savings, and their spending power is making them the global economy's most important new consumer markets and thus engines of global growth -- not replacing the United States but not dependent on it either. I.P.O.'s from the so-called BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China) alone accounted for 39 percent of the volume raised globally in 2007, just one indicator of second-world countries' rising importance in corporate finance -- even after you subtract China. When Tata of India is vying to buy Jaguar, you know the landscape of power has changed. Second-world countries are also fast becoming hubs for oil and timber, manufacturing and services, airlines and infrastructure -- all this in a geopolitical marketplace that puts their loyalty up for grabs to any of the Big Three, and increasingly to all of them at the same time. Second-world states won't be subdued: in the age of network power, they won't settle for being mere export markets. Rather, they are the places where the Big Three must invest heavily and to which they must relocate productive assets to maintain influence.
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"It would be irresponsible not to think about and prepare for the future.accessmylibrary. forces to carry out their missions in areas of vital interest.
. Ph. one that is better suited for the types of irregular conflicts now being waged in Afghanistan and Iraq. Meanwhile.)
THE MILITARY foundations of the United States' global dominance are eroding. and underwrite security commitments around the globe. This has allowed it to guarantee U.29 of 154
AT: Best Military Sustains
Our military is deteriorating and their authors don’t assume future threats Krepinevich.S. he also cautioned. http://www. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates argued in these pages for a more "balanced" U. Several events in recent years have demonstrated that traditional means and methods of projecting power and accessing the global commons are growing increasingly obsolete-becoming "wasting assets. assure the safety of the homeland. such as Iran. thereby increasing the prospect of strategic surprises. combined with the continued rise of new powers.S. Recently." in the language of defense strategists. military an unmatched ability to project power worldwide. 09 -. military's long-unfettered access to the global commons--including space and cyberspace--is being increasingly challenged. an overwhelming advantage in technology and resources has given the U. access to the global commons.S. July 1st 2009. the U.S.D. Military forces that do deploy successfully will find it increasingly difficult to defend what they have been sent to protect. and hostile states." Despite this admonition.com/coms2/summary_028638273632_ITM. In fact.Professor of International Relations and History at Boston University.S. will make it progressively more expensive in blood and treasure--perhaps prohibitively expensive-for U. However. policymakers are discounting real future threats. The diffusion of advanced military technologies. such as China. military. Foreign Affairs. U. they are already starting to disappear.S. from Harvard University
and President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (Andrew F. including East Asia and the Persian Gulf. For the past several decades. What is needed is nothing short of a fundamental strategic review of the United States' position in the world--one
similar in depth and scope to those undertaken in the early days of the Cold War.S. “The Pentagon's wasting assets: the eroding foundations of American power”.. U. grand strategy assumes that such advantages will continue indefinitely.
It even trumpets its willingness to train Iraqi soldiers. Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment For International Peace and Adjunct
Professor of History at Georgetown University (Robert. most notably by continuing to supply a small but. European Union defense budgets continue their steady decline. Both trends are primarily the result of internal European politics. “Still the Colossus”. Nevertheless. while still dissenting from U.carnegieendowment. 11 and the Iraq war. The Washington Post. the current trend is toward closer cooperation.S. Nor are Europeans refusing to cooperate. the behavior of governments and political leaders suggests
America's position in the world is not all that different from what it was before Sept. not America. But if they really feared American power. and the big question remains what it was in the 1990s: Who will be invited to join NATO?
.30 of 154
AT: Soft Power Sustains
Soft power is irrelevant to hegemony Kagan. and
even the project of creating a common foreign and defense policy has slowed if not stalled. Bush's United States.org/publications/index. It is bending over backward to show support for the mission in
be a strategic partner as it was during the Cold War. Germany's
Afghanistan. For Eastern and Central Europe. because Western Europeans no longer feel threatened and therefore do not seek American protection. 06 – PhD from American University. Western Europe will not new government." Despite global opinion polls registering broad hostility to George W.has simply not occurred.which the realists have been anticipating for more than 15 years now -. policy in Iraq. meaningful number of troops. indicating agreement with the American view that China is a potential strategic concern. Chancellor Angela Merkel promises to work closely with Washington on the question of the China arms embargo. Europeans would be
taking more urgent steps to strengthen the European Union's hand to check it. the growing threat is Russia. is working hard and ostentatiously to improve relations. even with an administration they allegedly despise.cfm?fa=view&id=17894&prog=zgp&proj=zusr. On the contrary. The much-anticipated global effort to balance against American hegemony -.)
The striking thing about the present international situation is the degree to which America remains what Bill Clinton once called "the indispensable nation. http://www. in Europe the idea has all but vanished. January 15th 2006. in German terms.
UN undersecretary-general for economic and social affairs. an analyst at currency traders ECU Group. Russia. the dollar's underlying downtrend will remain in place. analysts said. citing Gulf Arab and Chinese banking sources. including Saudi Arabia. unified currency planned
for nations in the Gulf Co-operation Council. Japan and France." Even so. said "important progress in managing imbalances can be made by reducing the (dollar) reserve currency country's 'privilege' to run external deficits in order to provide international liquidity. whose President Robert Zoellick recently warned that the United States should not "take for granted" the dollar's role as preeminent global reserve currency. The report was denied by a host of countries. were considering replacing the dollar as the currency for oil deals.31 of 154
AT: Economy Sustains
Every indicator goes our way – economic power is declining Agence France-Presse.com/2009/10/us-facing-massive-economic-power-shift-with-dollars-downward-spiral/)
The dollar's position as the world's leading reserve currency faces increased pressure as the financial crisis allows emerging economies greater influence on the world stage. Qatar and Russia. "Three conclusions stand out very clearly. The Raw Story. together with China. the euro. A report last week in The Independent claiming that China. Kuwait and Qatar. The dollar slumped against rivals last week in the wake of the British daily's controversial report. Russia. there is a growing acceptance amongst those winners that one consequence of this power shift will be to strengthen their currencies". world leaders unveiled a new vision for economic governance.to end dollar dealings for oil. including Kuwait. Meanwhile at a G20 summit in Pittsburgh last month.
. the shift in economic power away from the G7 economies is continuing. They would switch "to a basket of currencies including the Japanese yen and Chinese yuan. the United Nations itself last week called for a new global reserve currency to end dollar supremacy." added Juckes. http://rawstory. with bold plans
to fix global imbalances and give more clout to emerging giants such as China and India. The Independent." Zukang was speaking at the annual meetings of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. reported last Tuesday that Gulf states. "The US dollar is being hurt by the continued talk of a shift away from a dollar-centric world. Russia and Gulf States are among nations prepared to ditch the dollar for oil trades has heightened the uncertainty surrounding the US currency's future.along with China. But last week the finance chief was left to watch as traders used The Independent's report as an opportunity to push lower the troubled US unit. US Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner repeated Washington's commitment to a strong dollar. Abu Dhabi. "Secondly.
October 11th 2009. while France dismissed it as "pure speculation. which had allowed the United States the "privilege" of building up a huge trade deficit. and has given them another excuse to take the dollar lower." GFT Global Markets analyst David Morrison told AFP. under the front-page headline "The
Demise of the Dollar". as long as the US economy is not strong enough for any rise in interest rates to be conceivable for a long time." added Fisk. gold and a new. The
report "has helped concentrate the minds of traders and investors alike." wrote The Independent's Middle East correspondent Robert Fisk. Sha Zukang. Firstly. Japan and France -. "In the most profound financial change in recent Middle East history. Gulf
Arabs are planning -. And finally." said Kit Juckes. Following
the summit. 09 (“US facing massive economic ‘power shift’ with dollar’s downward spiral”.
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Local balances of power may loom larger in the calculations of other states than the background unipolar structure.” MIT Press. p. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. Efforts to produce a counterbalance globally will generate
powerful countervailing action locally.” MIT Press. As a result. Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund A.edu/files/wohlforthvol24no1. Ph.D.Phil. and the Soviet Union) that constituted relatively unambiguous security threats to their neighbors. http://belfercenter. bandwagon. International Security. many scholars expect bi. Beloit College. Yale University. is that the countercoalitions of the past—on which most of our empirical knowledge of alliance politics is based—formed against centrally located land powers (France.A.A.edu/files/wohlforthvol24no1. Wohlforth. B.S. Wohlforth.A. Yale University. Summer 1999. in International Relations. however. M. the Atlantic. Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund A. The second pillar—geography—is just as important. Vol 24. or the differential growth in power. and the Pacific.
power indexes alone cannot capture the importance of the fact that the United States is in North America while all the other potential poles are in or around Eurasia. pp. The balance of power between the sole pole and the second-tier states is not the only one that matters.harvard. No. This
massive power gap implies that any countervailing change must be strong and sustained to produce structural effects.. Daniel Webster Professor of Government. Yale University M.
Wohlforth. 1.ksg. and it may not even be the most important one for many states. Coordinating a counterbalance against an offshore state that has already
achieved unipolar status will be much more difficult.pdf) The key. “The Stability of a Unipolar World. we must also consider its four truest allies: Canada. 28. Just as the raw numbers could not capture the real dynamics of bipolarity. “The Stability of a Unipolar World. Daniel Webster Professor of Government. http://belfercenter. Summer 1999.33 of 154
Heg Sustainable (1/2)
Heg is sustainable – power gap too large and protected location. Germany.harvard. Beloit College. 29-30. If
things go poorly.pdf) Unipolarity rests on two pillars. the aspiring counterbalancer will have to confront not just the capabilities of the unipolar state. Empirically proven – counterbalancing not a threat to US heg.or multipolarity to reappear quickly. Even a declining offshore unipolar state will have unusually wide opportunities to play divide and rule. I have already established the first: the sheer size and comprehensiveness of the power gap separating the United States from other states.D. Location matters . political science. Because they fail to
appreciate the sheer size and comprehensiveness of the power gap and the advantages conveyed by geography. All of the aspiring poles face a problem the
. Ph.D. 99
(William C.Phil. position as an offshore power determines the nature and likely longevity of unipolarity. No. Wohlforth. Yale University. B.. Yale University M. in International Relations. Vol 24. Ph. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. Mexico.D. in Political Science. International Security. Yale University.A. but also those of its other great power allies. 99
(William C. None of these is likely to generate structural change in the policy-relevant future. They propose three ways in
which unipolarity will end: counterbalancing by other states. 1. political science. the U.ksg.S. In addition to all the other advantages the United States possesses. Similarly. the threshold concentration of power necessary to sustain unipolarity is lower than most scholars assume. M. in International Relations. in International Relations. in Political Science. Any second-tier state seeking to counterbalance has to contend with the existing pro-U. regional integration. Ph. The fact that Soviet power happened to be situated in the heart of Eurasia was a key condition of bipolarity.
Indeed.S. in each region there are
smaller “pivotal states” that make natural U.S.34 of 154
United States does not: great power neighbors that could become crucial U. In addition. as it did with China against the Soviet Union in the latter days of the Cold War. allies against an aspiring regional power. the United States’ first move in any counterbalancing game of this sort could be to try to promote such pivotal states to great power status. allies the moment an unambiguous challenge to Washington’s preeminence emerges.
Yale University M. political science. power. 1.S. Beloit College. Summer 1999.A. in International Relations. Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund A. In the 1980s.” It is a deeply embedded material condition of world politics that has the potential to last for many decades. in International Relations. 99
(William C. B.” so the recovery of Europe and Japan appeared as fatal threats to the United States’ position. the current concentration of power in the United States is something new in the world. pp.
. each act of defiance of Washington’s preferences on any issue comes to be seen as the return of a multipolar world. Many analysts have come to define unipolarity as an imperial system such as Rome where there is only one great power and all other states are satrapies or dependencies. In the bipolarity debate.A. Daniel Webster Professor of Government. In each case. to herald the rise of Japan or China as superpowers in the 1980s and 1990s. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. the reference point became the extremely tight alliance of the 1950s..
Wohlforth.35 of 154
Heg Sustainable (2/2)
Unipolarity is a movement – not easily derailed.Phil.harvard. new forms of interdependence.S. No. However we view this venerable explanatory variable. Ph. The rush to proclaim the return of multipolarity in the 1960s and 1970s. http://belfercenter. Yale University. International Security. And unipolarity is not a “moment. to pronounce the United States’ decline in the 1980s. Ph. Wohlforth. analysts changed reference points to minimize U. M. position circa 1946. As a result.edu/files/wohlforthvol24no1. Vol 24. Yale University. If unipolarity is so robust. “The Stability of a Unipolar World.pdf) The distribution of material capabilities at the end of the twentieth century is unprecedented.D. “hegemony” was deªned as “the U. and finally to bid unipolarity adieu after the Cold War are all examples. so any disagreement between the United States and Europe was seen as a harbinger of multipolarity. 37-38. Even if world politics works by the old rules—even if democracy. and international institutions do not matter— we should not expect a
return of balance-of-power politics à la multipolarity for the simple reason that we are living in the modern world’s first unipolar system. why do so many writers hasten to declare its demise?
The answer may lie in the common human tendency to conflate power trends with existing relationships.ksg.” MIT Press. in Political Science.D.
36 of 154
37 of 154
where further increases in the major state’s relative power no longer compensate for the defection of its allies and the mobilization of neutral states into the enemy coalition. not relative.) http://www. neutral states begin to reflect on the costs of their neutrality. power. The apex of the parabola corresponds to an implicit concept in realist balance of power theory: the security threshold. Classical realists did not make this point explicitly.
. This result stems from a structural disequilibrium between allied relations. The concept of balancing necessarily implies that there is a maximum amount of power that a state can accumulate to achieve maximum security. on the one hand.1162/ISEC_a_00037
Beyond a certain point. and relations with enemies and neutrals. The situation eventually reaches a tipping point. The
concept must be understood in a relative sense.mitpressjournals. there is no amount of absolute power that can guarantee a state’s security once and for all. The flow of defectors encourages the major power’s rivals. A parabola
nicely illustrates the relationship between power and security that I have just described. Further increases tilt the balance in favor of the major power’s rivals.org/doi/pdf/10. This threshold represents the maximum amount of power a state can accumulate before further increases begin to reduce its security. leaving the aspiring hegemon less secure than before. The security threshold corresponds to the quantity of power that Waltz calls “appropriate” for a state to be secure in an anarchic international system. In the meantime. which acquire new energy. Institutions. and some will leave the alliance. Neutral states realize that the moment has come to take sides. When the state’s coalition is able to effectively discourage aggression.30 Obviously. “The
Security Curve and the Structure of International Politics. (Davide. especially if one side should defeat the other. At some point. postdoctoral fellow in the Department of Politics. History at the University of Bologna.” International Security. so that it can accommodate the evolution of technology and the eventuality that an arms race could frustrate a state’s expansionist efforts. power maximization and security maximization become incompatible goals. Beyond that threshold. leaving them with little choice but submission. the game is no longer worth the candle for the allies: the threat posed by their enemies is relatively less significant than the threat of growing control posed by their major partner. its allies and that further increases in its power become gradually less useful. the gains that a state accrues from further increases in its power will start to diminish.38 of 154
Bad – Generic
Hegemony and increases in military power result in backlash Fiammenghi 11. the control that the major partner exercises over its allies becomes stronger. Meanwhile. Spring 2011. because they thought in terms of absolute. Further increases in the major partner’s power will exacerbate differences with its allies. on the other.
however. Taiwan and the United States has the potential to escalate into a nuclear conflict and a third world war. both Koreas. China. China now was a nuclear power.S. Australia. because states increasingly have greater latitude to pursue theirown foreign and security policy agendas than was the case during the coldwar.pdf)
A war between China. the strategic context affecting extended deterrence has shifted against the United States in other ways. During the crisis—which China provoked by conducting intimidatingmilitary exercises in an attempt to influence Taiwan's presidential elections—a Chinese official said that unlike the Formosa Strait crises during the1950s. as well as all other countries in the world that participate in the global economy. Russia.28 As China's military power—conventional and nuclear—increases. if China and the United States engage in a full-scale conflict.
. there is a real risk of the United States being dragged into a war because of a protected state's irresponsible behavior. The spring 1996 crisis between China and Taiwan is illusive. and the U. “The Chinese-Taiwanese Conflict. which could in turn create an international standoff and deployment of military forces to contain the threat. the po-tential risks to the United States of coming to Taiwan's (or Japan's) defensealso are increasing. China-Taiwan war escalates globally and goes nuclear Hunkovic. therefore.org/eCommons/Hunkovic. For one thing. instead of the cold war's clearly delineated spheres of influence. Taiwan and
United States are the primary actors in this scenario. In a showdown over Taiwan. However. other countries will not be considered in this study.S. which increases the chances for conflict. whose actions will determine its eventual outcome. today. Beijing's 1996 threat was. Beijing.27ln contrast. intervention in what it regards as an internal Chinese matter. the possibility exists that they could then plan to attack Japan and begin a policy of aggressive expansionism in East and Southeast Asia. as well as the Pacific and even into India. getting dragged into a war in which their own interests were not directly implicated because of the actions of an ally or client. during the cold war the respective U. If China were able to successfully annex Taiwan.S. East Asia's likely flash-points are contested gray areas. nuclear deterrent there-fore could not prevent Beijing from using force against Taiwan.39 of 154
Bad – China War
Heg leads to draw-in to Taiwan war – alliance guarantees Layne 6 Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M
University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 167-8
Since the cold war. of course.lampmethod. hollow. In addition. India and Great Britain.” http://www.officials than does Taipei). many countries other than the primary actors could be affected by such a conflict.S. and Soviet spheres were demarcated clearly. including Japan. but now that China is on the verge of possessing a survivable nuclear retaliatory capability. In any case.S. there are few countries in the world that will not be economically and/or militarily affected by it. because U. both superpowers exercised considerable control over their major allies and thus were at minimal risk of being chain-ganged into a conflict—that is. A good illustration is the current Taipei regime's flirtation with declaring the island's independence fromChina—a move that Beijing says
would compel a forcible Chinese re-sponse—which poses a real danger that the United States could be ensnared in a major war by the risk taking behavior of its Taiwanese client state. in which the United States and China are the two most dominant members."29This comment illustrates an important point:: Taiwan matters more to China than it does to Washington (and one hopes Los Angeles matters more to U. if they were drawn into the war. would be engaged in direct deterrence to prevent U. which reduced the chances for a superpower clash. 09 – American Military University (Lee. the United Stateswould be engaged in extended deterrence to prevent China from attacking.decision makers "care more about Los Angeles
than they do about 'Taiwan. therefore. it is becoming quite real. Moreover.
Whether Washington and Beijing actually come to blows. because the United States has the “last clear chance” to adopt a grand strategy that will serve its interests in balancing Chinese power without running the risk of an armed clash with [end page 73] Beijing. depends largely on what strategy the United States chooses to adopt toward China. the notion—propagated by Beijing—that China’s will be a “peaceful rise” is just as fanciful as claims by American policy-makers that China has no need to build up its military capabilities because it is unthreatened by any other state. Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University
and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute. p. ISBN 0415952034. 73-74 ]
To be sure. this does not mean that the United States and China inevitably are on a collision course that will culminate in the next decade or two in a war.40 of 154
XTN: China War
Primacy is a collision course with China – conflict inevitable Layne 7 Christopher LAYNE. Sino-American conflict is virtually certain. Still. however. After all.
. not peace. If the United States continues to aim at upholding its current primacy." American Empire: A Debate. On this score. Published by Routledge. 2007 ["The Case Against the American Empire. the lesson of history is that the emergence of new great powers in the international system leads to conflict. however. the United States should not ignore the potential strategic ramifications of China’s arrival on the world stage as a great power.
history reminds us that things
change fast in international politics. will not suffer the same fate as previous hegemonic powers. Counter-balancing will quickly erode US dominance Layne 3 Christopher Layne. suffers setbacks in future conflicts. regional powers (Iran. Over time. they are tempted to use it repeatedly. North Korea). The British found out toward the end of the 19th century that a seemingly unassailable international power position can melt away with unexpected rapidity.
.41 of 154
Bad – Counterbalancing
US hegemony risks a geopolitical backlash. Member of Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy. is too mighty to be counter-balanced. The Cost of
Empire. the United States seems fated to succumb to the “hegemon’s temptation.S. Indeed.html] As for the argument that the U. and rising great powers like China could erode America’s relative
power—especially if the U.amconmag.S. and thereby overreach themselves. The cumulative costs of fighting —or preparing to fight—guerilla
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.” Hegemons have lots of power and because there is no countervailing force to stop them. The very fact of America’s overwhelming power is bound to produce a geopolitical backlash—which is why it’s only a short step from the celebration of imperial glory to the recessional of imperial power.com/10_06_03/cover. October 6 2003.S. on its present course. asymmetric conflicts against terrorists (in the Philippines. for example in a war with China over
Taiwan. Don’t bet on it. 2003 [The American Conservative. Perhaps the proponents of America’s imperial ambitions are right and the U. possibly in a failed Pakistan. and elsewhere). this hegemonic muscle-flexing has a price. http://www.
These are often the same countries. Poor countries where humans live in close proximity to farm animals are the best place to breed extremely dangerous zoonotic disease. Foreign Policy. including the World Health Organization. SARS. or other Western agencies in. Globalization is turning the world into an enormous petri dish
for the incubation of infectious disease. and several years of mounting hysteria about avian flu.
. Ely Ratner. Solutions are only possible when and where we get the upper hand. That will be true as long as international intervention means American interference. The most likely sources of the next ebola or HIVlike pandemic are the countries that simply won’t let U. Establishing an early warning system for these diseases—exactly what we lacked in the case of SARS a few years ago and exactly what we lack for avian flu today—will require a significant level of intervention into the very places that don’t want it. that feel threatened by American power.
Naazneen Barma. al 7. a power that has more immediate interests in the countries where diseases incubate and one that is seen as less of a threat.) The same is true for global public health. while it takes us decades to come up with a new generation of antibiotics. we’re not likely to get any help. America can’t change that alone. (Steven. Even after HIV. “How Globalization Went Bad”. Yet the threat is too arcane and not immediate enough for the West to force the issue. Professor of Political Science at UC-Berkeley and Director of the Institute of International Studies. What’s needed is another great power to take over a piece of the work. perhaps not entirely coincidentally. because it just evolves too quickly. Bacteria can reproduce a new generation in less than 30 minutes. Humans cannot outsmart disease.42 of 154
Bad – Disease
Preeminence makes solving diseases like bird flu impossible – only multipolarity reduces global resentment enough to allow for responses to pandemics Weber et. Matthew Kroenig. As long as the United States remains the world’s lone superpower.S. January-February 2007. the world is still not
ready for a viral pandemic in Southeast Asia or sub-Saharan Africa.
Still. Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University
and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute. Navy's carrier groups and the return
to think we will not be marching on Damascus or Tehran -. In a real sense. ISBN 0415952034. not only on the nuclear weapons issue but—ominously—with respect to regime change and democratization. It has taken on military commitments all over the globe. there are at least four reasons announced recall of some of the U. I was shocked when a Dutch journalist told me that many of his countrymen were now "scared" of America. during the prime minister's question time in the House of Commons last week. are dumbfounded at the threats against Syria and Iran made by influential members of the Bush administration. Its armed forces look colossal (as did Britain's in 1919). Chief among these is Iraq.” Beyond nuclear weapons.S. With all that is crying out for attention -. it is hardly coincidental that the administration’s policy toward Tehran bears a striking similarity to its policy [end page 76] during the run-up to the March 2003 invasion of Iraq. concerns about Iranian interference have been magnified. it no longer feels constrained from intervening in sensitive areas like the Middle East or Central Asia. It is small wonder that while liberals protest soaring defense expenditures. Is that a good long-term policy for the number one power in the democratic world? The Dutch aren't alone. from the Balkans and Kuwait to Afghanistan and Korea. Powell. foreign service. In this respect. http://www. however. Professor of History and the Director of International Security Studies at Yale University. that of defining America's position in the world over the years to come. should national security interests demand it. Most countries in the world. "Big stick"
. This is because the same strategic assumptions that underlay the administration’s pre-
invasion Iraq policy now are driving its Iran policy. And the fourth is that even the present supine Congress would bestir itself and demand that the brakes be applied. Iran’s nuclear
program and its role in Iraq are merely the tip of the iceberg. ambassador to Iraq. Recently. 76-77 Iran Because of the strategy of primacy and empire. the United States and Iran are
on course for a showdown. including members of the current anti-Saddam coalition. the U.from our inner cities to the slaughters in central Africa -.S. The United States is unchallenged militarily and sees no rival Great Power in sight. Successful in our Iraq military campaign. The Bush Doctrine’s three key components are rejection
of deterrence in favor of preventive/preemptive military action.S.S. Washington’s policy.
US military decline prevents attack on Iran Kennedy 3 Paul Kennedy. Published by Routledge.S. determination to effectuate a radical shake-up in the politics of the Persian Gulf and Middle East. 2003
[“The Perils of Empire: This Looks Like America’s Moment. has
accused Tehran of meddling in Iraqi affairs by providing arms and training to Shiite militias and by currying favor with the Shiite politicians who dominate Iraq’s recently elected government. These are reflected in current U. The third is that an aggressive move against the governments in Damascas or Tehran would probably provoke the wholesale resignation of the U. Zalmay Khalilzad. The clear victor of the Cold War. the U.S. and gaining U. it feels less secure and is spending massive amounts on armaments." American Empire: A Debate. The Dutch. including its boss. but its obligations look even
larger. Tony Blair insisted
that there were "no plans" for invading Syria. language. Secretary of State Colin L. Washington Post. Yet it has taken little comfort from this. Bush has stated on several occasions—in language that recalls his prewar stance on Iraq—is that a nucleararmed Iran is “intolerable.43 of 154
Bad – Iran Strikes
Primacy causes conflict with Iran Layne 7 Christopher LAYNE. grand strategy—which has come to be known as the Bush Doctrine. spending and relations with the international community? Just a few days ago. It possesses the world's single largest national economy but faces huge trade and budget deficits and economic rivalries from an equally large European Union and a fast-growing China. dominance over that region. The second is that.can we really afford this more crumbling frontiers of insecurity. The first is the of other military units for rest and
overhaul. Since 9/11. Scared. as President George W. With Iraq teetering on the brink of a sectarian civil war between Shiites and Sunnis. however.commondreams. The main source of conflict—or at least the one that has grabbed the lion’s share of the headlines—is Tehran’s evident determination to develop a nuclear weapons program.org/views03/0420-02. is it not time to rein in our own "forward" school and be a little more modest in our aims. military repeatedly warns of overstretch and is dismayed at the hawkish calls for further adventures. The fundamental cause of tensions between the United States and Iran is the nature of America’s ambitions in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. S. 2007 ["The Case Against the American Empire. of course. p.htm]
This brings us to the broadest question of all. History Should Give Us Pause”. part or all of eight of the 10 U.at least not now. in the recent war on Saddam missionary zeal to remake the Middle East in our own image? We could end up merely creating for ourselves ever
Hussein's regime. April 20. despite the fears of liberals at home and abroad. Infantry divisions were tied down in Iraq or standing by to go there. there are other important issues that are driving the United States and Iran toward an armed confrontation. The key question today is whether these
assumptions are correct.
—which has come to be known as the Bush Doctrine. In a real sense. Heg causes war with Iran
Layne 7 (Christopher. With Iraq teetering on the brink of a sectarian civil war between Shiites and Sunnis. Iran’s
nuclear program and its role in Iraq are merely the tip of the iceberg. not only on the nuclear weapons issue but—ominously—with respect to regime change and democratization. has accused Tehran of meddling in Iraqi affairs by providing arms and training to Shiite militias and by currying favor with the Shiite politicians who dominate Iraq’s recently elected government. the United States and Iran are on course for a showdown. dominance over that region. Chief among these is Iraq. but neither the Marines nor the Army are about to embark on another war. ambassador to Iraq. concerns about Iranian interference have been magnified. determination to effectuate a radical shake-up in the politics of the Persian Gulf and Middle East.S.
Zalmay Khalilzad. however. "The Case Against the American Empire.S.) Iran Because
of the strategy of primacy and empire. Recently. Washington’s policy. there are other important issues that are driving the United States and Iran toward an armed confrontation. The Bush Doctrine’s three key components are rejection of deterrence in favor of preventive/preemptive military action.
.S. Bush has stated on several occasions—in language that recalls his prewar stance on Iraq—is that a nuclear-armed Iran is “intolerable. p. This is because the
same strategic assumptions that underlay the administration’s pre-invasion Iraq policy now are driving its Iran policy.” Beyond nuclear weapons. however. Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University
and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute. 64-65. it is hardly coincidental that the administration’s policy toward Tehran bears a striking similarity to its policy [end page 76] during the run-up to the March 2003 invasion of Iraq. literary and national editor of the Atlantic. and gaining U. Review of International Studies (2009). The fundamental cause of tensions between the United States and Iran is the nature of America’s ambitions in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. as President George W. the U.44 of 154 warnings to Syria and Iran may continue. These are reflected in current U. In this respect. The main source of conflict—or at least the one that has grabbed the lion’s share of the headlines—is Tehran’s evident determination to develop a nuclear weapons program. The key question today is whether these assumptions are correct." American Empire: A Debate.
What policies make sense with respect to Iraq following the transfer of certain formal powers to the handpicked Iraq administration? What is most striking in my view is the continuity of the effort to sustain American
domination of Iraq through the permanent stationing of 138. including the systematic withdrawal of US forces and elimination of US bases. The Bush
administration's attempt to hide the fact that fundamental elements of its flawed policies remain in place seems certain to add fuel to the fire. reconstruction and reform agendas that will be essential for the reconstruction of Iraq and a reduction of international tensions in a region that is super charged. including the United Nations and European nations.000 US troops supplemented by allied troops and US mercenaries. and the farflung base structure designed to support US primacy in the region.html.
It seems certain that if that multinational presence is predominantly military. Policies that sharply reduced US domination of Iraq.nautilus. the needs of the Iraqi people and society are unlikely to be met.org/fora/security/SeldonDiscussion. the tieing of the hands of the present administration by a series of neoliberal policies that deny fiscal authority to the government. we should not of course expect peace and development to reign any time soon. 6/30/04 “Discusson of ‘Notes From Ground Zero’: Power equity and Postwar Construction in Two Eras”. together with the dismantling of much of the previous Iraq administrative structure. has created a situation that ties the hands of any Iraq administration. coordinator of Japan Focus.45 of 154
Bad – Middle East War
US heg causes Iraqi instability Selden 4 (Mark. might create more hopeful conditions for relief. an electronic journal and archive on Japan and the Asia-Pacific. coupled with a stronger international presence. and the transfer of many of the most lucrative sectors of the Iraq economy to American firms. Whatever the changes.
. http://www. both governments and NGOs. What can be said with confidence is that the US has embarked on a course that has brought disaster to Iraq and the region and disgrace to the United States.
May 24 2010. http://www. Germany. There is no longer any serious "cost" for defying the United States in the global arena. France. despite our insistence on involving ourselves with every peep heard in
the Mideast. We have been rendered irrelevant. And now Turkey and Brazil
have cajoled Iran into accepting an agreement that the US. capabilities and reason. That massive show of flexing brawn over brain burst a global perception bubble about our intentions. In short.html It's official. 2) The US's inability to achieve a resolution with Iran over its nuclear program. Our pointless and protracted wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq will be the last time we will launch a major battle in the region. Syria helped gain the release of prisoners in Iran and Gaza. Russia and China could not.46 of 154
AT: Heg Solves MidEast War
US has no influence in the middle east – cant mediate the conflict Narwani.huffingtonpost. This credibility was compromised further with our irrational support of Israel's attacks on Lebanon and Gaza in 2006 and 2008/9 respectively. “Washington Just Lost the Middle East in a Big Way”. and is knee deep in negotiating a solution to the conflict in Darfur. Unable to win wars or deliver diplomatic coups .and struggling to maintain our economic equilibrium .com/sharminenarwani/washington-just-lost-the_b_586222. But nothing highlights our irrelevance more than two recent developments: 1) The US's inability today to convene even perfunctory peace talks between
Israelis and Palestinians.particularly when
viewed against the backdrop of our startling rhetoric over Iran's nuclear program.Washington has lost the fundamental tools for global leadership.
. And by the double standards employed over Israel's violations of international law and its illegal nuclear weapons stash . the US seems incapable of resolving even a traffic dispute in the Middle East.and this after 19 years of a "USsponsored" peace process. And no
place does this impotence manifest more vividly than the modern Middle East. England. 10 Senior Associate @ Oxford University (Sharmine. let alone push through a negotiated solution . The only breakthrough in this long-winded effort to tame Iran's nuclear aspirations was struck by Turkey and Brazil last week. It is
Qatar that stepped in to broker a deal between Hezbollah and the Lebanese government in 2008.
Professor of Political Science and Director of the Institute for International Studies at the University of
California-Berkeley. In Tehran.S. the only state with a tougher nonproliferation policy than the United States was the Soviet Union. al 7. and it stared continuously at tens of thousands of U. great powers could split the job of policing proliferation. because it had the Soviet nuclear umbrella. Ph. The overlap of unipolarity with globalization ratchets up both the supply and demand. Ely Ratner. barely flinched when former U. military could. in the wake of the Iraq war. 2007 “How Globalization Went Bad. primacy causes nuclear prolif Weber et. No country in the world can dream of challenging U.47 of 154
Bad – Proliferation
Unipolarity makes countering proliferation impossible – only a multipolar world can solve. ET AL. But today we see the uneven and inadequate level of effort that non-superpowers devote to stopping proliferation. Professor of Political Science at UC-Berkeley and Director of the Institute of International Studies. President Bill Clinton’s administration readied war plans to strike his nuclear installations preemptively. But much of this analysis is overblown. U. In Tehran. When push comes to shove. during the Cold War. to comment on the limits of conventional military force. That brinkmanship paid off. conventional military power. and the United States is bearing most of the burden. and many other capitals. North Korea didn’t seek nuclear weapons. It didn’t need to. Before 1989. it was officially at war with its southern neighbor. The overlap of unipolarity with globalization ratchets up both the supply and demand. Saddam Hussein’s great strategic blunder was that he took too long to get to the same place. and the United States is bearing most of the burden. military could. states that felt threatened by the United States could turn to the Soviet Union’s nuclear umbrella for protection. And the Russians are aiding Iran’s nuclear ambitions. including Beijing. But much of this analysis is overblown. to comment on the limits of conventional military
force. “How Globalization Went Bad”. national security. Foreign Policy)
The world is paying a heavy price for the instability created by the combination of globalization and unipolarity.S.
It has become fashionable. Kim Il Sung. Few countries had it worse during the Cold War. It’s often forgotten now that.S. national security. in the wake of the Iraq war. the bottom line is simple: The U. nonproliferation today is almost entirely America’s burden. Pyongyang. Now. Matthew Kroenig. Weber 7 [Steven WEBER.D. North Korea’s founder. they turn to people like A.” Foreign Policy. America’s conventional military strength means a lot less to a nuclear North Korea.S. The Chinese refuse to admit that there is a problem. to the detriment of U. Matthew Kroenig. troops on its border. end those regimes tomorrow if it chose to do so. But. conventional military power. Within five years of the Soviet collapse.S. But they can certainly hope to deter America from using it. North Korea was surrounded by
feuding. and Kim’s son rules the country with an iron fist.
Naazneen Barma. The United States may not be able to stabilize and rebuild Iraq.]
The world is paying a heavy price for the instability created by the combination of globalization and unipolarity..
No country in the world can dream of challenging U. Issue 158. including Beijing. for 40 years. Moscow simply wouldn’t permit it. But that doesn’t matter much from the perspective of a government that thinks the Pentagon has it in its sights. with Naazneen Barma.S. with its own supply (states willing to share nuclear technology) and demand (states that badly want a nuclear weapon). And the best deterrent yet invented is the
. Pyongyang was pushing ahead full steam on plutonium reprocessing facilities. Today North Korea is likely a nuclear power. it is fast becoming a necessity. Candidates at the University of California-Berkeley and Research Fellows at its New Era Foreign Policy Center. and many other capitals. but they are unwilling to consider serious sticks. North Korea is the clearest example. How would
things be different in a multipolar world? For starters. Today. Consider the case of nuclear proliferation. Pyongyang. with its own supply (states willing to share nuclear technology) and demand (states that badly want a nuclear weapon). Consider the case of nuclear proliferation. January-February 2007.S.S. The Europeans dangle carrots at Iran. nuclear-armed communist neighbors. Having your own nuclear weapon used to be a luxury. to the detriment of U. and even collaborate on some particularly hard cases. And the best deterrent yet invented is the threat of nuclear retaliation. There’s effectively a market out there for proliferation.Q. But that doesn’t matter much from the perspective of a government that thinks the Pentagon has it in its sights. (Steven. There’s effectively a market out there for proliferation. end those regimes tomorrow if it chose to do so.S. January/February. It has become fashionable. with conventional force. Khan. the bottom line is simple: The U. with conventional force. The United States may not be able to stabilize and rebuild Iraq. however.
But they can certainly hope to deter America from using it. and Ely Ratner. Not a single country that had a formal alliance with Moscow ever became a nuclear power. The Eastern bloc was full of countries with advanced technological capabilities in every area except one—nuclear weapons.
Few countries had it worse during the Cold War. for 40 years.
because it had the Soviet nuclear umbrella. Today. troops on its border. It didn’t need to.S. Saddam Hussein’s great strategic blunder was that he took too long to get to the same place. Khan.Q.
.48 of 154 threat of nuclear retaliation. states that felt threatened by the United States could turn to the Soviet Union’s nuclear umbrella for protection. they turn to people like A. and it stared continuously at tens of thousands of U. North Korea is the clearest example. barely flinched when former U. President Bill Clinton’s administration readied war plans to strike his nuclear installations preemptively.
Kim Il Sung. Now. Before 1989. North Korea was surrounded by feuding. Pyongyang was pushing ahead full steam on plutonium reprocessing facilities. however. and Kim’s son rules the country with an iron fist. Today North Korea is likely a nuclear power. That brinkmanship paid off. it is fast becoming a necessity. America’s conventional military strength means a lot less to a nuclear North Korea. North Korea’s founder.S. But. Having your own nuclear weapon used to be a luxury. nuclear-armed
communist neighbors. Within five years of the Soviet collapse. North Korea didn’t seek nuclear weapons. it was officially at war with its southern neighbor.
the world leaders are strongly urged to develop practical means and ways to keep the stable
. the possibility of nuclear terrorism will always linger around us like a “devil-dream'' embedded in our unconscious mental world. Russia. If those challenges are not tackled properly through this kind of nuclear summit diplomacy..N. the only alternative to sear was genuine international cooperation. In the
early. it was easy to ignore incipient proliferation in the belief that an intimidating response by the United States would eventually suffice to halt it. Stable nuclear group hegemony is quite often challenged by those countries such as North Korea and Iran that are not in compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and other international obligations. Heg doesn’t solve prolif – rogue nations don’t follow norms or rules
Park 10 – director of public relations at Korean Political Science Association [Tae-woo. North Korea is still not returning to the six-party talks. The lesson bequeathed to the Clinton administration's successor was that even given the great asymmetry of power between the United States and any would-be
proliferator. They also tackled how to reduce the number of thousands of poorly guarded nuclear reactors or fuel storage sites in many nations. and early formulation of a program including both
incentives. a stable group hegemony of nuclear weapons is to create a stable order of nuclear politics.kr/www/news/opinon/2010/07/198_64433.S. India.html] In the same context.co. reflecting these kinds of complaints.S. We are not. China.
“Stable Group Hegemony of Nuclear Arms. Even Iran's supreme leader. though. At the nuclear summit in Washington. self-restraint and costly consequences for continued pursuit of nuclear weapons. Short of a unilateral military action--with all its unpredictable consequences—even the world's only superpower could not by itself dissuade a country firmly determined to acquire nuclear weapons. programs and facilities. 47 leaders from all over the world discussed the ways and means of how to secure all weaponsuseable nuclear material within four years and how to eliminate the possibility that terrorists could buy or steal a nuclear weapon. mounted on at least a regional basis. relevant materials. France and the U. Pakistan. the traditional standing members of the U.49 of 154
AT: Heg Solves Prolif
American hegemony cannot prevent proliferation by itself. and a large majority of Iranian lawmakers. also spoke out against the Obama administration's revised nuclear policy by saying that ``The United States is a sinister government and cannot be trusted. at an early stage of the nuclear challenge. have urged their government to formally complain to the United Nations in a petition that calls the United States a warmonger and threat to world peace. The U. counselor and trustee at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and professor of American foreign policy at the School of Advanced International Studies @ Johns Hopkins University) 2007 “Second Chance” p 103 The failure to contain nuclear proliferation in the Far East and in South Asia conveyed a sobering lesson.K. Security Council.'' This time. heady days of American unilateral supremacy. nuclear weapons policy. angered over the new U. Ayatollah Ali Khameini.koreatimes. http://www. A successful preventive effort would have required an early concentration of attention on the issue. It is apparent that North Korea and Iran will not follow the norms and rules of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 4/19. could be classified into this category of stable group hegemony of nuclear weapons..” Korea Times. quite sure of the leaders' capacity to produce stern mandatory international standards or measures to stop further proliferation of nuclear weapons. Of course.
determined and coordinated mobilization of other concerned states. Zbigniew Brzezinski (formerly President Carter’s National Security Advisor. and Israel are nowadays officially recognized to be nations of nuclear weapons.
.50 of 154 nuclear order rooted firmly on earth with detailed plans such as how to curb North Korea and Iran's nuclear programs in the future.
where he described the global economic crisis as Washington and Wall Street's "collective failure".presstv.ir/detail. His remarks came shortly
before the US President Barack Obama delivered a key speech in New York. Dmitry Medvedev said those problems of one country. Earlier in March the Kremlin had suggested that the international community should have a say when the world's richest countries make decisions with global implications.
. "This happens immediately and incompetence and reluctance to solve one's own problems inflict damage not only to your country but to a huge number of other countries. The Russian president also lashed out at what he thought the "ill-thought-out" policies of a country that led to the global financial melt down. There can be no "high-flown
justification for military adventures. Medvedev did not refer to the United States by name but the target of his comments was clear.aspx?
Russia's President has slammed America's global dominance saying all nations have the right to remark on the policies of a state whose actions affect the world. attacking efforts by any party to advance what he called "utopian projects of global supremacy … 'Global Caliphate' or 'Benevolent Hegemony'".” Sept 15 http://www.of any illegal activities." he stressed. suppression of rights and freedoms -.51 of 154
Bad – Russia War
Heg destroys Russian relations and causes global war Press TV 9 (“Medvedev lashes out at US hegemony." he added. Medvedev's comments
further developed those ideas. Speaking at the opening of a global security conference in the central Russian city of Yaroslavl on Monday. have the potential to lead to international conflict.
has joined President Vladimir Putin of Russia
in a call for a "multipolar world" while condemning "the use of force". for the military-security complex and are paid to restart the cold war for the sake of the profits of the armaments industry. about why the US must use its military superiority to assert hegemony over Russia and China. the US failures in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Bush regime has initiated a propaganda war against the Russian government of Vladimir Putin.
They also said that the UN should be given the "central role" in Iraq's reconstruction. The
neoconservative idiots have actually written papers. Neocons believe that the US is supreme in the world and can dictate its course.
Neocons are people who desire war. where China has been given observer status for the first time. The US gratuitously brought NATO and anti-ballistic missiles to Russia's borders. before he left home Mr Hu called for more military modernisation of China.
. like Bush and Cheney. they called for a peaceful solution on the Korean peninsula. but know nothing about it. In another thrust at US unilateralism. just and democratic world order" on the basis of international law. Kyrgkyzstan. In a mere 6. they said that they stood for "a multipolar. such as Egypt's and Pakistan's.
The two presidents are trying to establish a better Sino-Russian understanding which will offset. In an attempt to gain the advantage in a nuclear conflict. The Bush regime is the most irresponsibly aggressive regime the world has seen since Hitler's. Significantly. Russia and China have now witnessed enough of the Bush administration's unprovoked aggression in the world to take neocon intentions seriously. he will stand
aside and permit Bush to make air strikes inside Pakistan. The former Soviet Republics of Tajikistan. Thus. and Kazakstan are participating.
After a week in Russia Mr Hu will attend the G8 conference in France. This is an idiotic provocation as the Russians can eliminate anti-ballistic missiles with cruise missiles. and China would establish the hegemony of the cockroach. the neocons are positioning US anti-ballistic missiles on Soviet borders in Poland and the Czech Republic. Meeting in Moscow yesterday. However. Both the Russian
and Chinese governments are trying to devote resources to their economic development. read by Russians and Chinese. As the US has proven that it cannot occupy the Iraqi city of Baghdad despite 5 years of efforts. These are gratuitous acts of aggression. http://www.co. But Chinese diplomacy is still
based on seeking good relations with the US.and shocked . Other countries appear ready to join the military alliance. Yet. His senior military advisers appear to have been impressed . “US Hegemony Spawns Russian-Chinese
Military Alliance”.china The new president of China.52 of 154
Bad – Sino-Russia Alliance
Heg leads to a Sino-Russia Alliance that culminates in superpower nuclear conflict Roberts 07 Economist and Former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury (Paul Craig.5 years the Bush regime has destroyed the world's good will toward the US. Is Bush blind to the danger that he will cause an Islamic revolution within Pakistan that will depose the US puppet and present the Middle East with an Islamic state armed with nuclear weapons? Considering the instabilities and dangers that abound.antiwar. US administrations after Reagan's have broken the agreements and understandings. This new potent military alliance is a real world response to neoconservative delusions about US hegemony. Today.guardian.
Unilateralism leads to a Sino-Russia alliance. saying scenarios "of forceful pressure or use of force are unacceptable". the predominance of the US in the post-Iraqi-war world. But the fact
is that the neocons actually believe their delusions about American hegemony. That means the conflict toward which the neocons are driving will be a nuclear conflict. Americans need to understand what the neocon Bush regime cannot: a nuclear exchange between the US.by the White House's pre-emptive strategy.com/roberts/?articleid=11422)
This week the Russian and Chinese militaries are conducting a joint military exercise involving large numbers of troops and combat vehicles. both are being forced by America's aggressive posture to revamp their militaries. Reagan and Gorbachev ended the cold war. at least in the medium term. it most certainly cannot occupy Russia or China. not to their militaries. The Bush regime even thinks that as it has bought and paid for Musharraf. if not counterbalance. as he begins a foreign tour designed to revitalise Chinese diplomacy. and now believe that China must do more to hold its own.uk/world/2003/may/28/russia. the aggressive posture of the Bush regime goes far beyond recklessness. Hu Jintao. Cynics believe that the neocons are just shills. Russia. America's influence in the world is limited to its payments of tens of millions of dollars to bribed heads of foreign governments. and its criticism of the occupation of Iraq has been muted. The Guardian 3 5/28/2003 “China and Russia look for a counterbalance”
well that’s OK. highly destructive weapons. India responds. allies. it’s a first strike weapon. Israel. those risks aren’t important as compared to what its important. by American calculation it might have tripled. It means putting space platforms in orbit from which you can launch offensive weapons. They immediately moved to undermine international treaties. The American systems which are much more sophisticated have a three minute period during which human intervention can prevent automated response. What does ownership of space mean? Well that’s presented in leaked plans. the United States. and in 2002 China and Russia jointly presented another draft that included bans on weapons based in space and on any use of weapons against objects in space. These moves are deliberately. which in 1998 proposed that the United Nations convene a committee on outer space in its Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.S. Do you think the Russians will react differently? No they’re saying straight out that they’ve adopted Bush’s first strike doctrine. Computer errors are daily occurrences in the US computer system. The US reacted at once by targeting it with offensive nuclear weapons. that no one can challenge our total domination. Washington D. Noam Chomsky 4/24/2004 “an interview with Noam Chomsky. And its not that Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld and so on want the world destroyed. This is extraordinarily dangerous. They very pointedly said this is in response to US escalation. without warning and instantaneously with first strike authority. which is exactly consistent with the security strategy. enter the atmosphere at the last minute so they can’t be detected and instantaneously drop highly destructive precision weaponry. including Canada. 2006 [“The State of Space: From Strategic Reconnaissance to Tactical Warfighting to Possible Weaponsization” ed. The Bush administration just announced that it is going to employ a missile defense system. Think what they’re going to be like in the Russian systems. in 1968. it just doesn’t matter much to them. Everybody knows that a missile defense system is an offensive weapon.C. The air force space command immediately announced plans to move from it called control of space to ownership of space. We know how the US reacted to this when the Russians made a slight move in that direction by placing.htm
Well the most visible and publicized implementation was the invasion of Iraq. that's the way the cookie crumbles. That sets off a new cycle. if you increase the threat of terror. It terminated negotiations on an enforceable bio weapons treaty. So have a number of U. You are asking for a disaster.53 of 154
Bad – Space Weapons
Hegemony causes a buildup of space weapons O`Hanlon 6 Michael E. The Bush administration immediately moved to expand offensive military capacity. which they claim are much more sophisticated and are on computer controlled automated launch. targeting the rear outposts with nuclear weapons so they would overwhelm any possible defense. deployment. consciously. but there was another one which was important and hasn’t been much discussed. and use of such capabilities. that their purpose is to attack the command bunkers that control their retaliatory nuclear systems. You get a ripple effect. most of which do not favor putting weapons in space. so instead of having twenty missiles targeting the United States they’ll build it up and probably have a submarine launched capacity. China and Russia have been consistently vocal in their opposition
to the weaponization of space and their desire for a treaty banning the testing.
.S. Just a couple of weeks ago the
Russian had their first major military maneuvers in the last two decades. Testimony before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces of the House Armed Services
Committee. In comparison if you threaten to blow up the world. as do strategic analysts.dissidentvoice. raising the threat to survival. the Russian systems are worse. 13] Non-American opponents of weaponizing space make many of the same arguments. so they’re going to react to it. (The vote passed by 156 to 0. Now others react to that threat. China increases its missile capacity. In December 2001 it called for
negotiations on a treaty to prevent an arms race in outer space at the Geneva Conference. p. June 21. for
more than twenty straight years. The Chinese are surely going to respond to a so called missile defense system since it eliminates their strategic nuclear capacity. so Russian defense spending has predictably sharply increased since Bush came in. hegemony will force space weaponization which causes space racing resulting in extinction. Micronesia. In recent years.: Brookings Institution.
U. you can find them. American strategic analysts call that an accident waiting to happen.) In 2001 China presented an incomplete draft treaty banning the weaponization of space. that they’re deploying their offensive missiles. This dispute has much of its origins and motivation in the history of the ballistic missile defense debate.org/April2004/Mars0424.” http://www. The world is under very tight surveillance so you can detect if somebody is walking across the street in Ankara. that’s important. The US is developing low yield nuclear weapons which is in violation of international treaties and the Russians understand. It was also just reported that the Pentagon is developing hypersonic
planes which will orbit in space. and Georgia abstained. dominating the world by force and dismantling the hated welfare state measures at home. opposing the weaponization of space. undermined ratification of old bio-weapons treaties. a small ABM system around Moscow. But it has taken on a new tone in what many view as an era of American unipolarity or hegemony. The UN General Assembly has continued to pass resolutions. These things are going to misfire. India increases it and Pakistan responds. They also worry about a
unilateralist America pursuing its own military advantage at the expense of other countries. O’Hanlon. as well as the ASAT debate of the 1980s. There’s universal agreement on this by both sides. Do we want Pakistan to increase its offensive nuclear capacity? Have a look at how their missiles are controlled.
54 of 154
President Bush’s endlessly reiterated claim that the US was attacked because Islamic radicals ‘hate us because of our freedom’ betrayed a complete misunderstanding of the dynamics that underpin the clash between the US and Middle Eastern terrorists.ism. and American military planners are preparing for a long-lasting ‘post-occupation’ US presence there. Pape has found that ‘what nearly all suicide terrorist attacks have in common is a specific secular and strategic goal: to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from territory that the terrorists consider to be their homeland’. Despicable and brutal though it was. but their actions are of a kind frequently found in international politics: the use of violence against a state(s) to attain clearly defined political objectives. at best. Organisations like Al-Qaeda may be non-state actors. do hate the US for cultural. moreover. who served as senior American commander in Iraq during the surge and now heads CENTCOM (the US military command with overall responsibility for the Middle East) has repeatedly emphasised that the US commit. not terrorism .41 In a similar vein. the 9/11 assault on the US was not a random. the 9/11 attack was undertaken with
cool calculation to achieve well-defined geopolitical objectives. focused. the acquisition of power. Pakistan. the Shah of Iran. .)
Terrorist organisations like Al-Qaeda are non-state actors. Bush’s position seemed to soften and the administration said the US would support a ‘time horizon’ for US
. tenuous. And. is fundamentally an asymmetric form of conflict. beyond connoting the idea of counterweight. Yet. claimed that the US is fighting terrorism in Iraq. or resistance. because it is an instrument that the weak use against the strong. Instead it lasted well into 2008. In his study of suicide terrorist groups. and Jordan. in Iraq the US is fighting the same terrorists who attacked the US on 9/11. terrorism is ‘about power: the pursuit of power.50 General David Petraeus. 5/25/9.42 It is the US’ attempt to impose its primacy and preferences on the Middle East that fuels groups like Al-Qaeda and fans Islamic fundamental. ‘In the context of ideas bin Laden shares with his brethren. Terrorists may not be able to balance against the US. Scheurer observes that. Underscoring this point.46 Al-Qaeda fits this pattern. In fact. even when the surge itself has ended. it is clear that the Bush administration never intended to withdraw from Iraq militarily and aimed for the US to retain permanent US military bases there. hence – in a blatant prevarication – tied AQI and the war in Iraq to 9/11. there are Islamic radicals who. But that is not why the US is a target for Islamic terrorists. the government of Iraqi Nouri al-Maliki indicated that Baghdad wanted to set a timeline for US troop withdrawals.44 Al-Qaeda’s leaders also apparently hoped that the September 11 attacks would provoke a US overreaction. Of course. .tration’s inflexible determination to maintain a long-term American military presence in Iraq is exactly the wrong policy to reduce terrorism. Indeed the use of violence for such purposes is the hallmark of terrorism. and thereby trigger an upsurge of popular discontent in the Islamic world that would lead to the overthrow of the Saudi monarchy and other proAmerican regimes in the Middle East (Egypt. and as such. Al-Qaeda seeks to undermine US primacy. . and thereby compel changes in America’s Middle Eastern grand strategy. any draw-down of US forces will take place gradually. the actions of groups like Al-Qaeda reflect some of the key attributes of balancing. limited. engaged in ‘balancing’ the US (because balancing is a form of state behaviour). to a hegemon. Terrorism is a form of ‘blowback’ against America’s
preponderant role in international affairs.43 Specifically.49 When it first announced the surge. it is dangerous for the US to base its strategy for combating terrorism on the belief ‘that Muslims hate and attack us for what we are and think rather than for what we do’. “America’s Middle East grand strategy after Iraq: the moment for offshore balancing has arrived”. at the same time.40 Here. and ideological reasons. ‘irrational’ act of violence. and it is likely that there will be more US forces in Iraq in January 2009 than there were prior to the surge. the Bush adminis.39 From this perspective. 9/11 represented a violent
counterreaction to America’s policies in the Middle East – especially its drive to dominate the region both
geopolitically and culturally. the 9/11 attack was in keeping with the Clausewitzian paradigm of war: force was used against the US by its adversaries to advance their political objectives. the administration said it would last through 2007. for example) and their replacement by fundamentalist Islamic governments. ‘War is not an act of senseless
passion but is controlled by its political object’. To make this point. As German military strategist Carl von Clausewitz himself observed. balancing also signifies opposition. and force Washington to alter its stance on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.45 In other words.52 What will happen under the new US administration is unclear. religious. Al-Qaeda wants to compel the US to remove its military presence from the Persian Gulf. For sure. strictly speaking. As Michael Schuerer – who headed the CIA analytical team monitoring Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda – says. meant to advance bin Laden’s clear. President Bush all but confirmed this in May 2007 when he said that he wanted the US to play the same kind of role in Iraq that it has in South Korea since the end of the Korean War. and one of its principal objectives ‘is the expulsion of American troops from the Persian Gulf and the reduction of Washington’s
power in the region’. Although the Bush administration had strongly opposed any suggestions that there should be a fixed timetable for US withdrawal from Iraq in July 2008.48 Bush repeatedly asserted that.ment to Iraq is long-term in nature. indeed. and conservative Arab regimes and the source of a cultural assault on Islam’. it has grossly exaggerated the links between the insurgent group Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and Osama Bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda organisation and.’. literary and national editor of the Atlantic.55 of 154
Bad – Terrorism
US Heg causes terrorism – US presence in the Middle East and 9/11 proves Layne 9 (Christopher. The Bush administration. ‘It is hardly likely that Middle Eastern radicals would be hatching schemes like the destruction of the World Trade Center if the US had not been identified so long as the mainstay of Israel. Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and
Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute. . The US presence on the ground in the Middle East also incites terrorists to
attack American interests. After all. and widely popular foreign policy goals . Betts observed following the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center that.47 Here. and that its links with Bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda are.51 In fact. of course. Cambridge Journals. but they can engage in a related form of activity aimed at undermining American primacy by raising its costs. and the use of power to achieve political change’. the military actions of Al-Qaeda and its allies are acts of war. The Iraqi government refused to accede to the Bush administration’s desire to negotiate a long-term security agreement that would allow the US to maintain permanent bases in Iraq. As Bruce Hoffman says. Review of International Studies (2009). During 2008. senseless. Richard K. The Bush administration’s deliberate fabrications were designed to win Congressional and public support for a prolonged ‘surge’.38 Terrorism. they are not. this claim overlooked the fact that AQI came into existence only after the March 2003 US invasion of Iraq.
org. but based on the positions taken by Senator Barak Obama (D.
emerge victorious.53 What the new US admin. it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Ariz. 04 – Al-Ahram political analyst (Mohamed.” Al Ahram Weekly.istration’s overall policy in the Middle East has inflamed anti-American sentiment. we will all be losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet. staying in Iraq will exacerbate it.istration will do about the US presence in Iraq is an open question.) during the 2008 US presidential campaign. The admin.
military presence in Iraq for some time to come. from which no one will war will be without winners and losers.ahram. No. Ill. 705. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a could lead to a third world war. and turned the entire region into a source of recruits for various radical terrorist groups.
http://weekly.htm) What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails. the presence of US troops in Iraq and the Middle East increases it by reinforcing the widespread perception in the Islamic world that the US is pursuing a neo-colonial policy in the Middle East in furtherance of its own imperial ambitions. August/September 1. tensions different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. the primary driver of Middle Eastern terrorism. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds.56 of 154
troop withdrawals from Iraq as an ‘aspirational goal’. This
between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. Instead of solving this problem.
The impact is extinction Sid-Ahmed. this
.eg/2004/705/op5. The huge US politico-military footprint in the Middle East region – including Iraq – is. police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another. “Extinction!.) and Senator John McCain (R. Societies would close in on themselves.
along with America’s policy on the Israel/Palestinian issue. it seems certain that there will be a significant American
Instead of reducing American vulnerability to terrorism.
(Hassan Nafaa.htm) Any incoming US president must bear in mind several lessons from the lean years of the Bush presidency. The first is that it is dangerous to link terrorism. Arab Thought Forum. The hegemonic project is on the verge of collapse after the US has been sapped of enormous resources while terrorism has become more widespread. Secretary General of Arab Thought Forum. Secretary General. Amman.” http://weekly.57 of 154
Heg Fails . which poses a real threat not just to one society or country.eg/2008/915/op1. it must detach that drive from its imperial ambitions.
.ahram. Al-Ahram Weekly Online. Jordan. if the US intends to deal seriously with a drive to end terrorism. In the future. “Collapse of Empire. 9/24/08. The American insistence on pursuing its
project of global hegemony behind the guise of the war on terror was ultimately detrimental to both causes. with imperial ambitions.org.Terrorism
Heg can’t solve terrorism.
but U.S. foreign policy causes blowback terrorism against the
United States? Again. Bin
Laden has repeatedly said that he attacks the United States because of its occupation of Muslim lands and its support for corrupt Middle Eastern governments. technology. and even culture are popular in these countries. in Public Policy
from George Washington University and Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute. these states seek other methods of offsetting American power.S.58 of 154
Heg causes terror Layne 9 (Layne. Finally.) In addition to soft balancing.independent.S. Heg causes terror – empirics and polls Eland 8 (Ivan.) But what about Wright’s implication that U.asp?id=2182. interventionist foreign policy toward the Middle East is not. http://www.S. The upshot of Rev. henhouse. Terrorism is another asymmetric strategy – one employed by non-state actors like Al-Qaeda and similar jihadist groups – to resist US dominance. 5/25/9. Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute. Wright’s largely correct analysis of U.S. Poll after poll in the Arab/Islamic world indicates that U. May 5.D. “Reverend Wright Is Not Totally Wrong”. Because they are threatened by the US. WMD – especially the possession of nuclear weapons – is one way these states can level the strategic playing field and deter the US from attacking them. It is too bad that Rev. empirical studies have linked U. asymmetric strategies mean the acquisition of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) capabilities. Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and
Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute.
. foreign occupation and
military interventions with blowback terrorism against the U. Cambridge Journals. Ph.
foreign policy is being thrown out with his other wacky and bigoted ravings.traditional balancing that is being employed to contest US primacy. the chickens would not be roosting as much in the U. however. asymmetric strategies are another type of non.S.S. and dissuading Washington from using its military muscle against them. The use of asymmetric strategies to oppose American power – especially in the Middle East where US policy has an imperial dimension – illustrates the dictum that empires inevitably provoke resistance. “America’s Middle East grand strategy after Iraq: the moment for offshore balancing has arrived”.org/newsroom/article. the facts are on his side. literary and national editor of the Atlantic. When employed by states. political and economic freedoms. Wright’s remarks is that if the United States militarily intervened less overseas. targets. Review of International Studies (2009). Regional powers – especially those on the US hit list like Iran and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq – cannot slug it out toe-to-toe against the US’ dominant hightech conventional forces.
technology. But the Cold War is long over. Thus. Retaliation for US
interventionism in the Arab-Muslim world is al Qaeda’s primary motive for attacking the United States.
. Poll after poll in the Muslim world indicates that Muslims like US political and economic freedoms. non-Muslim — occupation of Muslim lands and meddling in their politics by supporting corrupt dictators and Israel.59 of 154
AT: Heg Solves Terror
Terrorists aren’t deterred by military power because it falls out of asymmetric power calculations Eland 08 senior fellow at the Independent Institute (ivan. practicing military restraint. Protecting its citizens and property should be the first
goal of any government. in the short term. homeland security efforts will likely have only limited effect. with thousands of miles of borders and many possible targets. but the US quest for an informal global empire actually undermines this objective. the Soviet rival is in the dustbin of history. rather than interventionism. The only type of attack that cannot be deterred by
the US nuclear arsenal is that from terrorists — as was demonstrated on 9/11. would make Americans safer at home. and the gains from interventionism have been drastically reduced while the costs have skyrocketed. Osama bin Laden’s biggest gripes are with US — that is. at least a plausible argument could be made for some [End Page 94] US intervention overseas to counter Soviet encroachment. Naturally. but in the long term the only way to effectively deal with anti – United States terrorism is to reduce the motivation of terrorists to attack America in the first place. and even culture but hate US meddling in their world. Specifically. the utmost effort should be made to capture or kill bin Laden and eradicate al Qaeda. Back to the Future: Rediscovering America’s Foreign Policy Traditions
During the Cold War. Mediterranean Quarterly Volume 19. Summer 2008. it sabotages it. Because conventional and nuclear military power have very little utility in
stopping terrorist attacks and because the United States has an open society. Number 3. Empire does not equal security — in fact.
and keeping the Europeans apart. http://www. than if we try to achieve these goals alone. Ocean and land barriers offer little protection. If we can work together. can be dealt with far more successfully if we act together.60 of 154
Bad – US-EU Relations
a) Hegemony hurts US-EU relations Layne 3 Christopher Layne. The struggle for supremacy has been a feature of US-European relations since America
emerged as a great power in the late 19th century.but also foster the proliferation of technology for weapons of mass destruction. the US fought two large wars in Europe to stop a hegemonic Germany from threatening America's backyard.play an increasingly influential role. 2003 [The Brookings Institution. 113-46] Both the United States and Europe
face new global threats and opportunities that. vol. Summer. August 13.from business and NGOs to terrorists and money-launderers . Vice President and Director.php?pub_id=6001] Major combat operations in Iraq ended in April but the transatlantic
rupture between the US and "old" Europe triggered by the war has not healed. During the 20th century. 2003
[Cato Reports. After the second world war. Transnational threats. Foreign Policy Studies. Non-state actors . Weak states threaten our security as much as powerful ones. people and ideas facilitate the spread of economic opportunity . 2. not cold-war ideology . 45 no. America's strategic ambitions
based primarily on economic self-interest. This is because American hegemony remains the cause of the rift.
Survival. from terrorism and international crime to environmental damage and disease pose an increasing danger to our well being. a new ‘global politics’ is required to address the threats and opportunities that affect us all. There is a well-known quip that Nato was created to keep the Russians out. the
Germans down and the Americans in. writer at the Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute in Washington. money.led it to establish its own hegemony over western Europe. in almost every case.
b) Relations Key To Solve Disease Breakout Steinberg 3 James B.org/pub_display. In the place of geopolitics. It is more accurate to say that America's commitment to the Atlantic alliance is about staying on top .cato. and preserving our freedom and prosperity. Porous
borders and the extraordinary global flows of goods. Steinberg. we are likely to be far more successful at meeting the new global
cato. After the second world war. through the European Security and Defence Policy. August 13. 2003
[Cato Reports. America's strategic ambitions . http://www. one that does not presume that the United States will retain its hegemonic position in perpetuity. It has encouraged the expansion of Nato and the
EU in the hope that the new members from central and eastern Europe will keep in check Franco-German aspirations for a counterweight to American power. writer at the Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute in Washington. Washington is trying to derail the EU's plans to create. the US fought two large wars in Europe to stop a hegemonic Germany from threatening America's backyard. During the 20th century. http://www.org/pub_display.
. Unless and until America’s foreign policy elites adopt a new foreign policy vision. not cold-war ideology . August 13.cato. Washington has tried to hamper the EU's moves
towards political unity and strategic self-sufficiency. Hegemony has forced an inevitable struggle between the US and the EU Layne 3 Christopher Layne.php?pub_id=6001]
The real source of transatlantic conflict is America’s role as a global hegemon. military capabilities outside Nato's aegis. writer at the Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute in Washington.php?pub_id=6001] Unsurprisingly. the Bush administration is playing a game of divide and
rule to undermine the EU's sense of common purpose.61 of 154
XTN: US-EU Relations
Hegemony will worsen us-eu relations Layne 3 Christopher Layne.org/pub_display. The eventual rupture arising from this long-simmering dispute may ultimately prove damaging to security on both sides of the Atlantic.php?pub_id=6001]
The struggle for supremacy has been a feature of US-European relations since America emerged as a great power in the late 19th century. relations between the United States and its European allies will only continue to worsen.based primarily on economic self-interest. 2003
[Cato Reports. August 13. More generally.org/pub_display.cato. writer at the Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute in Washington. http://www. US hegemony undermines EU stability Layne 3 Christopher Layne. 2003
[Cato Reports. and the concomitant power imbalance between the United States and Europe.led it to establish its own hegemony over western Europe.
Kagan has apparently failed to realize the degree to which the contours of American national security have been redrawn since 9-11. This profound change helps us understand the erroneous premise of Bush’s foreign policy. p. for the European Union. arresting scores of suspected terrorists. That may not be easy to achieve. political and military presence in Central Asia. financial and (to some degree) military support-the Euro-Atlantic community could foster a genuinely stable and possibly even democratic post-Saddam regime. The war on transnational terrorism depends essentially on information gathering and policing.
For the United States. organized and financed in Europe. The home front and the foreign front have now been disconcertingly blurred. given divergent American and European perspectives. despite the prevailing cliche. That would make it more difficult for the United States to engage the Central Asian states in a larger regional effort to combat Islamic fundamentalism in Afghanistan and Pakistan. military power reinforced by the EU's political. National-security strategy must now operate in a domain where soldiering and policing have become of coequal importance. 21] The September 11 attacks were partly planned.62 of 154
Relations with EU are key to solve terrorism Holmes 3 Stephen Holmes. Their capacities to respond effectively to today’s greatest security threats easily rival those of the United States. As daily press reports also reveal. American preoccupation with the mess in Iraq. military efforts to alter the strategic realities of the region. US-EU relations are key to preventing Russia war Brzezinski 4 Zbigniew Brzezinski. A resurgence of Muslim extremism of the Taliban variety could then even acquire a regional scope.S. Former Diplomat at Johns Hopkins & CSIS. but the benefits of cooperation outweigh the costs of any compromise. disruption and apprehension for which our own unrivaled military machine is patently inadequate. They can perform essential tasks of monitoring. In other words. iss.-EU strategic collaboration with regard to Iraq and Iran. 2003 [“AMERICAN PROSPECT”. the European police have been acting in a
perfectly Hobbesian manner.
. has already tempted Moscow to resume its earlier pressure on Georgia and Azerbaijan to abandon their aspirations for inclusion in the Euro-Atlantic community and to step up its efforts to undermine any enduring U. The
National Interest. infiltration. Europe remains a frontline region in the war against terrorism just
as it was in the war against communism.S. the United States
is not the world’s only superpower. The Muslim
diaspora communities into which terrorist cells can invisibly blend remain the likeliest staging grounds for future al-Qaeda attacks on the United States. NYU Law School Professor. In other words. Proquest]
While Russia has not stood in the way of any decisive U.S. Winter. a joint approach would mean less freedom of unilateral action. These risks could be lessened by closer U. Europeans’ linguistic skills and cultural knowledge alone ensure that they can make indispensable contributions to U. In our new security environment.S. 75. security. despite his pose as a no-nonsense realist. not to mention the cleavage between America and Europe as well as the increased American-Iranian tensions. 2003-2004 [“Hegemonic Quicksand”. it would mean less opportunity for self-serving inaction. But acting together-with the threat of U. and in these respects the Europeans are anything but security pygmies.S. the current geopolitical earthquake in the Persian Gulf could jeopardize America's efforts to consolidate the independence of the Caspian Basin states.
Ebsco. and other capabilities. It derived the necessary leverage because it provided for the security of its economic partners and because there were no viable alter natives to an economic order centered on the United States. World Politics 61. draw down its military power. That exclusion was enforced through everyday brutality. military. It is frankly absurd that we spend more today to fight Osama bin Laden and his tiny band of murderous thugs than we spent to face down Joseph Stalin and Chairman Mao. and call on other countries to play a larger role in their own defense. but from the life of civil society. U. the world’s indispensable nation. 2011. and forever will be. but hardly comparable to the threat
posed by a globe-straddling Soviet Union armed with thousands of nuclear weapons. A number continue to do so today. They advance arguments diametrically at odds with the primacist consensus. Supply disruptions are likely to be temporary. no longer enjoys the same type of security leverage it once possessed. http://depaul.
Heg doesn’t solve war – US lacks influence it used to have to influence conflicts Mastanduno 9 (Michael. but it can no longer count on getting its own way. Military Power: Preeminence for
not only from the pact of domination or a share in political power. Hegemony fails—obstacles to inclusionary policies. it is unrealistic to expect that a new spasm of global conflict would erupt if the United States were to modestly refocus its efforts. “When Hegemony Fails: British Imperialism in India and Brazil from the Nineteenth to the Early Twentieth Centuries”.S. the international economy is complex and resilient. Western Political Science Association. while their eruptions into the political sphere. Trade routes need not be policed by a single dominant power.cato-at-liberty. And although the United States remains a dominant international economic player in absolute terms. Islamic extremists are scary.edu/MichaelMcIntyre/Papers/535440/When_Hegemony_Fails)
Even when the ruling alliances of colonial India or the Brazil of Empire and Old Republic were not threatened with dissolution.academia. 1. after the cold war it has found itself more vulnerable and constrained than it was during the golden economic era after World War II.) During the cold war the United States dictated the terms of adjustment. questioned the What Purpose?” http://www.
The claim that the United States is unipolar is a statement about its cumulative economic. were put down with a brutality that frequently
. and in the security of their respective regions.
But while there are credible alternatives to the United States serving in its current dual role as world policeman / armed social worker. their "success" was based on the exclusion of the vast majority of the populations of India and Brazil. International Political Economy (Michael. The United States. No. and the costs of mitigating their effects should be borne by those who stand to lose — or gain — the most. The people here have grown accustomed to living at the center of the earth. It faces rising economic challengers with their own agendas and with greater discretion in international economic policy than America’s cold war allies had enjoyed.
Many factors have contributed to the dramatic decline in the number of wars between nationstates. Some scholars. of the universe. specializing in Critical IR Theory.63 of 154
Doesn’t Solve War
Heg doesn’t solve war Christopher Preble (director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute) August 2010 “U. episodic and frequently diagnosed as criminal. notwithstanding its preponderant power. The United States may continue to act its own way. The tangible benefits of all this military spending flow disproportionately to this tiny corner of the United States while the schlubs in fly-over country pick up the tab.S. Professor of Government at Dartmouth. the foreign policy establishment in Washington has no interest in exploring them.
logic of hegemonic stability theory from the very beginning. Social Movements. and indeed. dominance in the
international security arena no longer translates into effective leverage in the international economic arena.1 But preponderant capabilities across the board do not guarantee effective influence in any given arena.org/u-s-military-power-preeminence-for-what-purpose/ Most in Washington still embraces the notion that America is.-centered world economy has afforded America’s supporters a greater range of international and domestic economic options. McIntyre 11—Professor at Depaul University. After the cold war the outcome of adjustment struggles is less certain because the United States is no longer in a position to dictate the terms. and the very success of the U. April 21.
rather than fights. Brazil. the primacy strategy didn’t deliver. fluid. a politics often read as criminality by the dominant. This misreading of the politics of the dominated is not a simple misreading. political activity with broader aims tends to take the form of public and communal resistance: a prophetic community gathers in the Brazilian sertão (Cunha 87 1944). National Security Council at the White House (Nina. And it wrecked. Not only would a call for incorporation be rebuffed.C. not the British." subject to group sanction. a small landowner turns to banditry when forced off his land by a larger landowner. as was its implicit goal. who was able to incorporate relatively well-off peasants into a powerful political alliance. It did nothing to slow China’s influence. there are no channels for such an appeal to be made. The excluded are therefore left with a politics of resistance. In the absence of
channels for demands of inclusion. then. 2010. says Robert Kagan.S. Despite this stringently
exclusionary polity. with Moscow’s help. http://worldfocus. both because the range of loyalties it can mobilize is geographically restricted and because its attention to signs at the expense of strategy. It is normally a response with
limited aims: slaves kill a harsh overseer. Mona Sutphen and I described why this was a misguided strategy in our 2008 book. the reforms in property law needed to carry out such a project were enacted in weakened
form after delays of decades. Criminal activity.39 Its categories of friend and foe are improvised. Primacy tempted our leaders into a reckless war in Iraq. January 22. and changing. you have to remember that American foreign policy leaders during the Bush administration clung to the false promise of primacy. it was Gandhi. International affairs fellowship from the Council on Foreign Relations.
Hegemony fails—recent political climate proves. Hachigan 10—Senior Fellow at American Progress. The primary effect of the failure of cultural hegemony. World Focus. however. 77-83). Can Thrive As Other Powers Rise. the belief that the lynchpin of American security was for it to remain more powerful than all other countries by a huge. the Santals of eastern India rise up to expel "outsiders" (diku). Director of the RAND Center for Asia Pacific Policy. our relationship with Russia. Such criminality/resistance is recurrent and endemic.64 of 154 crossed into blood lust. in the epoch when the ruling alliances of Brazil and India were beginning to come apart. To
understand this yearning for American policy of yore. Senior political scientist at RAND Corporation. workers in the most heavily industrialized cities in both countries managed to gouge out a space for public contestation that they never gave back. villagers riot to call attention to a corrupt local official. pressed for a deepening of the pact of domination to
include an idealized sturdy yeoman peasantry alongside the large landowners who had previously formed their core 86group of allies. a poor vagrant steals to survive. where some members of the I. A fixation on primacy paradoxically managed to undermine the influence and authority
. the decline of American power. It did not prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons. so long as we remember that it is criminality with a distinctly limited political purpose. with substantial geographical divergence and uneven enforcement. Subordinate groups therefore have little incentive to press for incorporation into the existing alliance. In India.org/blog/2010/01/22/the-false-promise-of-primacy-in-us-foreignpolicy/9372/)
One unquestionable success of the Obama administration so far has been to turn the page on the failed Bush foreign policy framework. however restrictively defined. but also localized and evanescent. is not that it destabilizes political regimes but that it creates substantial obstacles to the creation of inclusionary polities. is one response to subordination. “The False Promise of Primacy in US Foreign Policy”. fixed margin. in India through the designation of certain groups as "criminal tribes. There is no reason to think of such activity as other than criminal. in Brazil through vagrancy statutes and the criminalization of certain aspects of Afro-Brazilian life. It is a selflimiting form of resistance. who reveals a perverse nostalgia for the previous paradigm in his recent writings in which he argues that the Obama administration is formulating foreign policy from a perspective that accepts. In the end. both British and Hindu (Guha 1983. But the proof is in the pudding. Not so. though some common features can be found in both contexts. In the end. The Next American Century: How the U.S. always at pains (with little success) to present itself to the world as a European civilization in the tropics. Negation and reversal rather than programmatic reform are its common idiom. The "dangerous classes" at the bottom of the social hierarchy faced routine criminal sanction. could maintain its pretense only by rigidly excluding dark-skinned lower classes from political participation.
for the first time last year. China has agreed to limit its carbon intensity. World Focus. as Kagan would imply. the fact that the Bush administration embraced the notion of primacy was a comfort to the remaining Cold Warriors. 2010. economic crises. Kagan barely mentions these threats. Nevertheless. and other pivotal powers. sanctions
. “The False Promise of Primacy in US Foreign Policy”. international architecture and traditional alliances are not mutually exclusive. “Our power alone cannot protect us. global warming. but to keep its own people safe. it’s because international rules and institutions play a vital coordinating role when threats cross borders. these partnerships are necessary to protect Americans from common threats in terrorists. Director of the RAND Center for Asia Pacific Policy. any world order that tries to elevate one nation or group of people over another will inevitably fail. He portrays administration officials as naïve ideologues. including with other major powers. to say the least.65 of 154
America did have. the contours of the new paradigm are fairly clear: Lead the world in addressing shared challenges Treat other governments and peoples — friends and foes — with respect Forge strategic collaborations with big. America needs all of them to contain pandemics. Yet no staffer that I have ever spoken with would suggest that these relationships are beyond rivalry. but the Obama approach is paying dividends. global warming. The pursuit of power is no longer a zero-sum game — progress must be shared. nuclear proliferation. Transnational threats also explain why the Obama administration is taking international institutions seriously. pivotal powers and demand responsibility from them on global challenges Reinvigorate and repair existing alliances Reengage with international institutions and rules.”
Hegemony fails—cooperation is key to prevent terrorism. economic crises. and pandemics such as swine flu — the forces of disorder that can and do affect Americans right here at home.org/blog/2010/01/22/the-false-promise-of-primacy-in-us-foreignpolicy/9372/)
Robert Kagan now accuses President Obama of reorienting American foreign policy away from its WWII and Cold War roots. The World Health Organization led the
battle against swine flu last year just as the International Monetary Fund bailed out a slew of countries headed toward financial ruin. His political allies and his detractors can agree that Obama sees foreign policy not in terms of asserting America’s unparalleled might. focusing on how “to adjust” to the decline in American primacy instead of trying to reverse it. knowing that democratic government is the best way to achieve this goal As for primacy. in Moscow. It’s still early days.N. India. Hachigan 10—Senior Fellow at American Progress. America needs China — the world’s largest emitter — to cut down on its carbon. On the one-year mark of his presidency. “a great power does not show strength by dominating or demonizing other countries…[G]iven our interdependence. And. Kagan’s
analyses fail to discuss two major developments that demand a new approach—the increased potency of transnational threats and the new salience of domestic policy in America’s world standing. How can we get these big. nuclear proliferation. National Security Council at the White House (Nina. proud countries to take these steps? Aggressive diplomacy. buttering up autocracies and forsaking our democratic allies. pushing for increased accountability Make basic political and economic rights available to more people. America needs Russia to secure its loose nuclear materials so terrorists cant get it.” Later. Fortunately. It’s not because the president is looking to attend more international meetings. but of seeking common cause. And America needs India to help track extremists. Senior political scientist at RAND Corporation. More importantly. Kagan writes as if the Obama administration is engaging with re-emerging powers to prove an ideological point that great power strife is a relic of history. Obama dismissed that as a strategy goal in his inaugural address when he observed. Moreover. President Barack Obama’s approach is different. Russia. January 22. In fact. Kagan does not reveal the Obama administration’s reasons for pursuing strategic collaborations with China. International affairs fellowship from the Council on Foreign Relations. http://worldfocus. Obama elaborated on his view of great power relations. and pandemics. China not only voted for tough U. saying.
A successor to the START treaty to reduce our arsenal of nuclear weapons is not yet complete. rendition and torture over the past decade. Washington has worked overtime—with no success—to shut down Iran’s uranium-enrichment capability for fear that it might lead to Tehran acquiring nuclear weapons. We may well be stuck in both quagmires for years to come. is up and running again. And in our own history. “US Quest for Global Hegemony”. not to mention the weakening of the rule of law at home. countries that continuously fight wars invariably build powerful national-security bureaucracies that undermine civil liberties and make it difficult to hold leaders accountable for their behavior. in contrast to Kagan’s assertion that the administration has failed to gain “any meaningful Chinese help in North Korea. and allow for independent institutions are more dependable trading partners.iranreview. Iran Review. now seems incapable of compelling Pyongyang to give them up. 2010. shows that their fears were justified. What Others Think. The Founding Fathers understood this problem. and they invariably end up adopting ruthless policies normally associated with brutal dictators. including those we once waged war with in Europe and Asia– nations that today live with great security and prosperity. And these nations and others agreed during the darkest days of the financial crisis to coordinate their macroeconomic moves. unable to prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons in the first place. however. as it clear from James Madison’s observation that ‘no nation can preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare. democracies have been America’s most enduring allies.
D. and there is no end in sight. Since the war began in March 2003. Kagan is simply wrong to suggest that administration officials have failed to “continue to press Russia and China for reform. And the United States. but Beijing and Moscow did recently join in a harsh rebuke that the International Atomic Energy Agency issued. Here. Professor at the Pennsylvania State University School of International Affairs **CEO of Strategic Energy and Global Analysis (STRATEGA) and Senior Lecturer and Senior Research Fellow at Yale University’s Jackson Institute for Global Affairs
(Flynt and Hillary. have been disastrous. more than one hundred thousand Iraqi civilians have been killed. including on human rights and democracy. The pain and suffering inflicted on Iraq has been enormous. The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.org/content/Documents/US_Quest_for_Global_Hegemony. for example.66 of 154
against Pyongyang. Governments that promote the rule of law. Of
course. or to wage war on others. The United States has also been unable to solve three other major foreign-policy problems.” They have. December 22. the United States is now engaged in protracted wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq that have so far cost well over a trillion dollars and resulted in around forty-seven thousand American casualties. but it’s on the way.7 million more have been internally displaced.” Russia has allowed the United States to transport supplies through its territory into Afghanistan. The United States has been at war for a startling two out of every three years since 1989. Finally. the American military is not going to win either one of these conflicts. to terrorize their citizens. governments which serve only their own power do not. provocative way that ends up being counterproductive. http://www. Leverette and Leverette 10—*Senior fellow at the New America Foundation in Washington. all indicators are that this problem will deteriorate further as the West Bank and Gaza are incorporated into a Greater Israel. we continue to have differences with these pivotal powers. Moreover. is what President Obama said in Moscow: The arc of history shows us that governments which serve their own people survive and thrive. in fruitless pursuit of victory. Governments that represent the will of their people are far less likely to descend into failed states. every post– Cold War administration has tried and failed to settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. To make matters worse. just not in a grandstanding. co-chaired by the United States and Russia.htm)
The results. As anyone with a rudimentary knowledge of world events knows..C. despite all the phony talk about how the “surge” has worked in Iraq and how a similar strategy can produce another miracle in Afghanistan. roughly 2 million Iraqis have left the country and 1.’ Washington’s pursuit of policies like
assassination. Hegemony fails—resistance. it also enforced them. subject their actions to oversight. The unpleasant truth is that the United States is in a world of
. Iran remains a challenge.
John points out that
“the Bush administration’s fondness for threatening to attack adversaries (oftentimes with the additional agenda of forced democratization) encouraged nuclear proliferation. for all its talk of “change”. Of course. especially in the Middle East: “By pursuing this extraordinary scheme to transform an entire region at the point of a gun.67 of 154 trouble today on the foreign-policy front. or what might alternatively be called global hegemony. And the president and his advisers overestimated what military force could achieve in the modern world. the
United States rejected [various strategic alternatives]. Bush largely ran against the kind of liberal imperialism that Gore advocated and that the administration he served as Vice-President had practiced. before it developed hegemonic hubris. undermined American values and institutions on the home front. a national security strategy based on suing and ratiaing primacy has not made America more secure. The alternative. It is a posture he describes
as “offshore balancing”—which is actually the United States’ traditional approach to grand strategy. If America makes primacy the main goal of
. on foreign policy issues. in effect. after 9/11. The Bush administration’s quest for global dominance was based on a profound misunderstanding of the threat environment facing the United States after 9/11. The underlying belief is that new liberal democracies will be peacefully inclined and pro-American. President Bush adopted a radical grand strategy that has no parallel in American history. Bush administrations. of course. America still has not faced up to its most fundamental strategic choices in a post-Cold War world. not less. Iran. interests.” John is equally clear when
it comes to diagnosing the source of America’s “world of trouble” on the foreign-policy front: “The root cause of America’s troubles is that it adopted a flawed grand strategy after the Cold War.”
John warns that the Obama Administration. instead pursuing global dominance. so the more the better. Stanford Center for International Security. as John points out. But as long as America’s leaders remain committed to global dominance. This triumvirate of errors doomed Washington’s effort to dominate the globe. John Mearsheimer has given it an indispensable guide for thinking through those choices. But. It was also a dismal failure. in turn greatly underestimating how difficult it would be to spread democracy in the Middle East. instead believing that other countries—save for so-called rogue states like Iran and North Korea—would see the United States as a benign hegemon serving their own interests. and threatened its position in the world. Primacy does not prevent a global nuclear exchange or create regional stability Nina Hachigan and Monica Sutphen. but most American policy makers of the early nineties and beyond were confident that would not happen. p.
Bush over Al Gore in 2000 that. which means making sure that the United States remains the most powerful state in the international system. its proponents believe that the United States has the right as well as the responsibility to interfere in the politics of other countries. From the Clinton administration on. a strategy of maintaining primacy is counterproductive when it comes to pivotal powers. because they are virtually limitless. America’s military might has not been the answer to terrorism. as Afghanistan and Iraq unravel and the blame game escalates to poisonous levels. and North Korea have become more dangerous in the last seven years. climate change. they are likely to resist this advice and keep threatening states that will not follow Washington’s orders. The best way for the United States to maximize the
prospects of halting or at least slowing down the spread of nuclear weapons would be to stop threatening other countries because that gives them a compelling reason to acquire the ultimate deterrent. which was not just doomed to fail. This grand strategy is ‘imperial’ at its core.” John reminds those of us who voted for George W. One would think that such arrogance might alienate other states. With global dominance. or proliferation. disease. the strategy of primacy failed to deliver. Iraq. has largely embraced the same delusions of global dominance that got the United States into such trouble on the foreign-policy front under the Clinton and George W. Worse than being ineffec tive with transnational threats and smaller powers.S. While the fact of being the world’s only superpower has substantial benefits. making the world over in America’s image. Global dominance has two broad objectives:
maintaining American primacy. and this state of affairs is only likely to get worse in the next few years. no serious attempt is made to prioritize U.
this means that Washington must care a lot about every country’s politics. The Next American Century. 2008. Bush took the quest for
global dominance to new heights. and spreading democracy across the globe. but likely to backfire in dangerous ways if it relied too heavily on military force to achieve its ambitious agenda.” In this vein. is not “Fortress America” isolationism. 168-9 In practice.
This is not to say that the United States under the leadership of George W. foreign policy are pervasive. http://www. then why shouldn’t the pivotal powers do the same? A goal of primacy signals that sheer strength is most critical to security.S. it surely has. Integration into the modern world dampens great-power competition and conflict. May/June 2008 .
. accordingly.flows in which the United States plays a critical role. American cannot trumpet its desire to dominate the world military and then question why China is modernizing its military.foreignaffairs. They do not. Those interests are closely tied to cross-border flows of goods. and technology -. Haass. which has not stimulated such a response. people. want to disrupt an order that serves their national interests. Bush has not alienated other nations. acted in a manner that has led other states to conclude that the United States constitutes a threat to their vital national interests. U. Doubts about the wisdom and legitimacy of U. investment. President.org/20080501faessay87304/richard-n-haass/the-age-ofnonpolarity. services. nor do other powers want to challenge the status quo Richard N.html?mode=print The fact that classic great-power rivalry has not come to pass and is unlikely to arise anytime soon is also partly a result of the United States' behavior. But it has not.68 of 154 its national security strategy.S. for the most part. Foreign Affairs . energy.S. A further constraint on the emergence of great-power rivals is that many of the other major powers are dependent on the international system for their economic welfare and political stability. decline has not produced hegemonic rivalry because the U. is not perceived as a threat. but this has tended to lead more to denunciations (and an absence of cooperation) than outright resistance. Council on Foreign Relations.
S. it doubtless is true that it will take some time for others' balancing efforts to realize their intended outcome.
.S.S. because they carry the risk of entrapping the United States in great power Eurasian wars. contrary to my 1993 prediction. and the strategy is not likely to work much longer in any event. The United States can do this by adopting an offshore balancing grand strategy. U. which. Is it worthwhile paying the price to hang onto unipolarity for. Maintaining heg even just to shape the new multipolar system causes backlash and war – only a complete transition away solves Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 158
At the same time. Rather than fostering peace and stability in Eurasia.another two decades?
Given that American hegemony is destined to end sooner rather than later and that the costs of trying to "shape the international system" to America's liking will rise (even as the benefits of doing so diminish). understandable doubts about the credibility of U. the costs of trying to hold on to hegemony are high and going to become higher. America's military commitments abroad have become a source of insecurity for the United States. hegemony will endure until the early 2030s. In this changing geopolitical context. in turn. it is even more doubtful that U. As other states—notably China—rapidly close the gap.69 of 154
Clinging to Power -> War
Mulitpolarity is inevitable – trying to retain hegemony ensures a war-filled transition Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 190 Advocates of hegemony claim that it is illusory to think that the United States can retract its military power safely from Eurasia. efforts to prolong it. probably will not be challenged by great power rivals as early as 2010.at best. The answer to this assertion is that the risks and costs of American grand strategy are growing. Although the United States. security guarantees are driving creeping re-nationalization by America's Eurasian allies. At the same time. is leading to a reversion to multipolarity.S. it
would make more sense grand strategically for the United States to retrench and husband its resources for the long haul. hegemony is fated to end in the next decade or two regardless of U.
Transition is smooth – decline in power causes global cooperation Carla Norrlof (an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto) 2010 “America’s Global Advantage US Hegemony and International Cooperation” p. this argument is a restatement of the fear that U. distilled to its essence. the outcomes are going to be caused more by those states' calculations of their interests than by the presence of U. They would
also coordinate efforts in the battle against terrorism. involvement in a big Eurasian war. and still find the postwar environment quite costly to its own trade and investment. grand strategy is the construction of a concertlike directorate of the major powers in North America. These major powers would together manage developments and regulate relations both within and among their respective regions. military intervention in Eurasia. the waning hegemon continues to be taken advantage of. Second."sa This really is not an economic argument but rather an argument about the consequences of Eurasia's political and ideological.. thus offering a potential explanation for the otherwise puzzling persistence of cooperation in the 1980s despite
America’s relative decline. Primacy” Database: Academic Search Premier
As this new century progresses. forces in Eurasia.S. and manipulated. so smaller states have to chip in for the good to be provided.S. Kupchan. Europe. proponents of American hegemony overestimate the amount
of influence that the United States has on the international system. Hence. Proponents of hegemony fear that if great power wars in Eurasia occur. a struggle that will require patience and
. America's Changing Internationalism. several points need to be made. Political Science Quarterly. and whatever influence it does have is being eroded by the creeping multipolarization under way in Eurasia.S. While Snidal was modeling a theory he did not believe in. American grand strategy should focus on making both Europe and East Asia less reliant on U. closure.S. 118. they could bring to power militaristic or totalitarian regimes. security and interests inevitably will be jeopardized by a Eurasian hegemon. The likelihood for cooperation increases with American decline because the hegemon can no longer singlehandedly provide the good as it declines. the possible benefits of "environment shaping" have to be weighed against the possible costs of U. the United States "could suffer few economic losses during a war. power.S. as it does on the size of other actors in the international system. First.40 Snidal demonstrated that collective action depends as much on the hegemon’s size. Summer 2003. and the End of U.S. Mere. This threat is easily exaggerated. By paying attention to the size of all Great Powers. 50
Keohane and Snidal’s predictions – that the
waning of American power did not have to jeopardize cooperation – were in this context reassuring. Finally. But regardless of
whether Eurasian great powers remain at peace. Vol. If one were to use Snidal’s production function in the
revised model (i. The United States has only limited power to affect the amount of war
and peace in the international system.S. interests. There are numerous possible geopolitical rivalries in Eurasia. as well as economic. As this transition proceeds. or even benefit somewhat. 00323195. to disguise ulterior motives for U. The ultimate vision that should guide U. not just the hegemon.e. these distributional implications haunt the literature and cast decline as inescapable and continuous
Withdrawal is smooth Charles A. while at the same time working with major states in both regions to promote collective management of the global system. by plugging the numbers from his production function into the revised model). As mentioned at the outset of this chapter. Issue 2 “The Rise of Europe.S. but it's a good bet that some will. unipolarity will give way to a world of multiple centers of power. and East Asia. Most of these will not culminate in war. Snidal opened up the possibility that a more symmetrical distribution of power might enhance the prospects for the provision of public goods. Keohane explained the persistence of
cooperation in terms of states’ continued demand for regimes.70 of 154
Collapse =/= War
Your evidence overestimates the US’s ability to shape the international system – doesn’t contain conflict and wont shape the new multipolar system Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 176-7
A second contention advanced by proponents of American hegemony is that the United States cannot withdraw from Eurasia because a great power war there could shape the post conflict international system in ways harmful to U.
71 of 154 steady cooperation among many different nations. if not two. It will take a decade. long accustomed to calling the shots. Europe on Russia. But it is far wiser
and safer to get ahead of the curve and shape structural change by design than to find unipolarity giving way to a chaotic multipolarity by default. for a new international system to evolve. information. often have the strongest incentives to promote prosperity and stability in their immediate peripheries. long accustomed to passing the buck. and East Asia on South Asia and Southeast Asia. and Africa. Regional centers of power also have the potential to facilitate the gradual incorporation of developing nations into global flows of trade. nor leaders in Europe and East Asia. Strong and vibrant regional centers. for reasons of both proximity and culture. the Middle East. focus on Latin America. The United States will need to begin ceding influence and autonomy to regions that have grown all too comfortable with American primacy. and values. will find the transition an easy one. But the decisions taken by the United States early in the twenty-first century will play a critical role in determining whether multipolarity reemerges peacefully or brings with it the competitive jockeying that has so frequently been the precursor to great power war in the past. Mustering the political will and the foresight to pursue this vision will be a formidable task. Neither American leaders.[*]
. therefore. North America might.
4. declining power don`t go to war – when they do. There are only three cases of autocracy. Short of a miracle.67 Declining great powers also initiated fewer militarized disputes. politics is often a game of unpalatable alternatives. 4. This may be because external predators have great difficulty assessing the vulnerability of potential victims. declining great powers demonstrate more caution and restraint in the use of force: they were involved in an average of 1. producing a range of 67–100 percent. Every one of the great powers in our sample that chose to retrench did so within five years of the ordinal transition. Pages 7-44. we find that great powers facing acute relative decline adopted retrenchment in at least eleven and at most fifteen of the eighteen cases. Moreover. Nor do declining great powers appear more vulnerable to external predation than other great powers. No.) AK Based on our universe of cases. do not appear to be a common fate for declining states. a significant majority of great powers of differing regime types elected to retrench. and are
slightly more likely to face acute relative declines. declining great powers that adopted a policy of retrenchment managed to rebound. states facing small declines experience levels of hostility in their militarized disputes that are two and a half
.) AK With regard to militarized disputes. and their disputes tended to escalate to lower levels of hostility than the baseline category (see figure 2). Vol. even if retrenchment was not successful. this does not prove that a preferable policy existed. in six of fifteen cases. two did not. These findings suggest that retrenching states rarely courted disaster and occasionally regained their prior position. and in only one of these cases—1935 United Kingdom—did the declining power go to war with the power that had just surpassed it in ordinal rank. By any accounting. Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College. Of the twelve democracies. and recovery of lost rank was fairly frequent. but of these. seven retrenched. “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment”.7 fewer militarized disputes in the five years following ordinal change compared with other great powers over similar periods. Vol. Nor does the evidence support
the view that domestic interests constrain retrenchment. This suggests timely responses to external constraints rather
than domestic intransigence.59 In short. Retrenchment is preferable – empirically averages fewer wars than unipolar world MacDonald and Parent 11 (Paul. 35. Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College. Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami. preventive or otherwise. wars aren’t global MacDonald and Parent 11 (Paul. 35.
Wars. or the Soviet Union could have done to stay aloft. yielding parameters from 58 to 83 percent.61 In many cases of decline. and Joseph. Further. Moreover. it is hard to say what great powers such as Britain. there are few restorative solutions available. Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami.69 Far from being more likely to lash out aggressively. even with the benefit of hindsight. International Security Spring 2011. Declining great powers found themselves embroiled in an interstate war in only four of the eighteen cases. “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment”.72 of 154
Historically. two retrenched and one case is arguable. International Security Spring 2011. a majority of the
countries in these cases retrenched shortly after their ordinal transition. or because retrenchment allows vulnerable powers to effectively recover from decline and still deter potential challengers. declining states refrain from initiating and escalating military disputes.60 In addition. Pages 7-44. and Joseph.68 These findings suggest the need for a fundamental revision to the pessimist’s argument regarding the war proneness of declining powers. great powers experiencing medium or small declines are much less likely to escalate their disputes to high levels of hostility. which makes comparison among groups difficult. accounting for thirteen of our eighteen cases. No. the predictions of retrenchment pessimists receive little support. and three are debatable. In the five years following an ordinal transition. or 72 percent. In particular. eventually recovering their ordinal rank from the state that surpassed them. there does not appear to be a strong connection between regime type and retrenchment. the rate of relative decline is associated with different levels of hostility across militarized disputes. In
contrast to arguments that retrenchment is rare. France. a range of 61–83 percent. Democracies account for about two-thirds of the great powers in our study. evidence at the coarse-grained level tentatively supports the neorealist approach outlined above: during acute relative decline.
Further. and Joseph. which threatens grave harm to any state that tries to cross them.93 China faces a variety of domestic political challenges. Retrenchment good – avoids violence and leads to a better state MacDonald and Parent 11 (Paul. In the next few years. “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment”. No. hegemonic powers. Some might view this prospect with apprehension.73 of 154 times less than the average great power. declining great powers react in a prompt and proportionate manner to their dwindling fortunes. Based on the historical track record of great powers facing acute relative decline. Fallen hegemons still have formidable capability. shift burdens to its allies. Both are large. “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment”. 35. Pages 7-44. Vol. Vol. they are no longer the top target for balancing coalitions. Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami. Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College. and Great Britain could likely coast on a large lead in domestic capital stock. In particular. almost by definition. which took place around 1872 and was resolved without armed confrontation. Although China and the United States differ in regime type. International Security Spring 2011.) AK This article has advanced three main arguments. The last reversal at the pinnacle of power was the Anglo-American transition. including strains among rival regions. more defensible frontiers. retrenchment pessimists are incorrect when they suggest that retrenchment is an uncommon policy response to great power decline. similar factors may work to cushion the impending SinoAmerican transition. These findings suggest that diplomatic moderation and compromise can be a particularly attractive strategy for managing moderate declines. stakes world of great power politics. they should be able to more readily identify and eliminate extraneous burdens without exposing vulnerabilities or exciting domestic populations. Some observers might dispute our conclusions. Third. compromise appears to be a crucial component of retreating to a more defensible—and credible—set of commitments. First. Strategic retrenchment peaceful – leads to a balanced multipolar world MacDonald and Parent 11 (Paul. Holding on to exposed and expensive commitments simply for the sake of one’s reputation is a greater geopolitical gamble than withdrawing to cheaper. and work to decrease costly international commitments. In the high-
. The tenor of that transition may have been influenced by a number of factors: both states were democratic maritime empires. Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami. 4. states can seldom afford to fool themselves or pamper parochial interests when relative power is perilously slipping away. We counter that there are deductive and empirical reasons to doubt this argument. In addition. Far from encouraging further predation. We believe the empirical record supports these conclusions. No. and Joseph. arguing that hegemonic transitions are more conflict prone than other moments of acute relative decline. our analysis suggests some grounds for optimism. Yet our analysis suggests that retrenchment need not signal weakness. hegemonic powers should actually find it easier to manage acute relative decline. the United States should be able to retrench in the coming decades. They do this for the same reason that they tend to seize opportunities to expand: international incentives are strong inducements. the United States is ripe to overhaul its military.) AK Contrary to these predictions. credibility. a fact that mitigates potential geopolitical competition. periods of hegemonic transition do not appear more conflict prone than those of acute decline. It is likely to initiate and become embroiled in fewer militarized disputes than the average great power and to settle these disputes more amicably. fearing the steady erosion of U. 35. Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College. and recovering hegemons may be influential because they can play a pivotal role in alliance formation. 4. Theoretically. the United States was slowly emerging from the Civil War.S. relatively secure continental great powers. the rate of relative
Second and related. which may complicate its ability to sustain its economic performance or engage in foreign policy adventurism. Pages 7-44. International Security Spring 2011. possess more extensive overseas commitments. States often curtail their commitments and mellow their ambitions as they fall in the ranks of great powers.
. it may be unwise to speak these
conclusions too loudly. and if done intelligently this makes states better.74 of 154 decline explains not only the extent of retrenchment but also the form. The historical record gives little cause for despair. these findings suggest that retrenchment is an attractive strategy for dealing with great power decline. Taken together. we suggest that our study represents a solid first cut and that domestic political factors loom too large in discussions of power transitions and hegemonic change. the more likely states are to reform their militaries. spending can be curbed. Competition spurs states to improve themselves. The faster the rate of decline. Of course. Although we make no claim
that the rate of relative decline explains everything. increase reliance on allies. Some of the invigorating effects of decline may depend on the pervasive pessimism it arouses. and innovation fostered. Retrenchment has a bad reputation. declining powers rise to the challenge of decline so well that they recapture their former glory with some regularity. And there is a fair chance of rebound. interest groups controlled.
but our findings suggest its benefits are overlooked. and refrain from using force in international disputes.
So what do you do about the United States? Now picture yourself as the president of Russia." He
. 2001. How do you deal with American power? This question is one for which every world leader must have an answer. Bush has called part of an "axis of evil. Consider Kim Jong I1. Many countries fear U. opposition and North Korea's Lilliputian status? On the other end of the spectrum. You face serious regional challengesincluding the rising power of China-but relations with Washington are sometimes prickly. Harvard University.S. Professor of International Affairs. and your ideal world order is one in which no single state is dominant.S. Can you take advantage of
parallel U. Professor of International Affairs. economy. for a moment.S. given U.S. interests to advance those of India? Leaders throughout the world face similar issues. and the United States' global dominance is disquieting.org/stable/pdfplus/20031709. Primacy causes other countries to try to “tame” America – 9/11 proves
Walt. Walt. Professor of International Affairs. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and British Prime Minister Tony Blair have worked hard to establish personal connections with U. But it must make its dominant position acceptable to others-by using military force sparingly. power is something Americans must care about as well.. For the rest of the world. and they have devised numerous strategies to manage and limit it. foreign policy as often naive and overweening.S. http://www. Taming American Power.S.S. some more daunting than others. President Bush has said that " America was targeted for attack because we're the brightest beacon of freedom .
Walt. Basic security is at issue. many governments still value U. that you are the president of France. defense budget. foreign policy tend to portray anti Americanism as hostility toward American values or simple resentment of U. To be sure.S. http://www. With so much power in the hands of one country-a country that considers itself destined to lead the world how should other nations respond? Imagine.S. The only remnants of your country's former
superpower status are an aging nuclear arsenal and membership in the UN Security Council. And the response of other states to U. by fostering greater cooperation with key allies. Harvard University. POLICYMAKERS have spent the past decade debating how best to wield American power. the debate is over how best to deal with it.S.org/stable/pdfplus/20031709. So how can Kim stay in power. You regard U.
US dominance causes terrorism.S. How do you improve Russia's situation in a world dominated by U. Yet even Washington's close allies are now looking for ways to tame the United States' might. power? Or perhaps you are the prime minister of India. power and seek to use it to advance their own interests. by rebuilding its crumbling international image. and the political fortunes of Sharon and Blair depend on keeping these relationships strong. He rules a country that George W. much less improve his position.. 05
(Stephen M. Taming American Power. presidents. Professor of International Affairs. Harvard University. The time to worry is now. So is the health of the U.S. terrorist attacks demonstrated. as the September 11. firms declining in key overseas markets due to anti-American sentiment.jstor." and North Korea's entire GDP is only one-twentieth the size of the U.S. most important of all. Israel and the United Kingdom have long relied on their special relationships with the United States. Walt.pdf) U. with the
market share of U. September 05.75 of 154
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U. dominance. 05
(Stephen M. influence. September 05.pdf) Proponents of a muscular U. Harvard University.jstor. The United States will not and
should not exit the world stage anytime soon.S.S. and. in the world .
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later explained. They were protesting our existence." And the Pentagon's new National Defense Strategy. "The terrorists who attacked our country on September 11. "Our leading position in the world will continue to
breed unease. and resistance. were not protesting our policies. stated. issued in March."
. 2001. a degree of resentment.
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Their heg good authors only take into account American perspectives, not overseas views.
Walt, Professor of International Affairs, Harvard University, 05
(Stephen M. Walt, Professor of International Affairs, Harvard University, September 05, Taming American Power, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/20031709.pdf)
Americans tend to see U.S. primacy as beneficial to both their country and the rest of the world. In 2002, the Pew Global Attitudes Project found that 79 percent of U.S. citizens believe it is
good that "American ideas and customs are spreading around the world," and more than 70 percent think that U.S. foreign policy takes the interests of other states into account either "a great deal" or "a fair amount." Bill Clinton has described the United States as "a beacon of hope to peoples around the world," and Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington has declared U.S. predominance to be "central to the future of freedom, democracy, open economies, and international order." In other words, without a benign hegemon maintaining a peaceful global order, many countries would not be able to enjoy the prosperity and security they have come to take for granted. Unfortunately, this rosy view of U.S. power is not shared overseas, where, according to the 2002 Pew survey, overwhelming majorities say that the United States considers the interests of others "not much" or "not at all." Between 40 percent and 6o percent of foreigners polled think the United States is waging its war on terrorism not solely out of security concerns, but also
to "control Mideast oil," "protect Israel," "target Muslim governments," or "dominate the world." A January 2005 BBC survey of 21 countries found only five-India, the Philippines, Poland,
South Africa, and South Korea-where a majority of people had "positive" attitudes toward the United States. Although the United States' global standing has rebounded slightly since the invasion of Iraq two years ago, Pew reported in June 2005 that majorities in all 15 countries it surveyed "favor another country challenging America's global military supremacy, "and that support for the U.S.-led "war on terror" is declining on every continent. Indeed, citizens in Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Russia, Spain, and the United Kingdom now hold more favorable views of China than of the United States.
Heg causes conflicts – experts agree.
Wohlforth, Ph.D, political science, Yale University, 99
(William C. Wohlforth, Daniel Webster Professor of Government, B.A. in International Relations, Beloit College, M.A. in International Relations, Yale University M.Phil., Ph.D. in Political Science, Yale University, Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, Summer 1999, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” MIT Press, International Security, Vol 24, No. 1, p. 6, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/wohlforthvol24no1.pdf) Although they disagree vigorously on virtually every other aspect of post–Cold War world politics, scholars of international relations increasingly share this conventional wisdom about unipolarity. Whether they think that the current structure is on the verge of shifting away from unipolarity or that it has already done so, scholars believe that it [unipolarity] is prone to conflict as other states seek to create a counterpoise to the overweening power of the leading state. The assumption that unipolarity is unstable has framed the wide-ranging debate over the nature of post–Cold War world politics. Since 1991 one of the central questions in dispute has been how to explain continued cooperation and the absence of old-style balance-of-power politics despite major shifts in the distribution of power.
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Hegemony causes war and is unsustainable Eland, 2007 (Ivan. Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute. Ph.D. in Public Policy from George Washington University and Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute. “A Foreign Policy that Only Tarzan Could Love.” Feb 12. http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=1911)
Republicans, however, will be happy to know that George W. Bush should not be solely blamed for this aggressive U.S. foreign policy. Although he did ensnare the United States into significant quagmires on the ground in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States’ modern-day interventionist foreign policy dates back to the Democratic Truman administration after World War II. Of all countries during the post-war period, including the authoritarian Soviet Union, the United States has been, by far, the most aggressive nation on the planet with its military. Even during the Cold War, of the two superpowers, the United States was the first-among-equals and took advantage of it to intervene militarily in all parts of the world. The United States used the fight against communism to advance its imperial tentacles into backwater countries, such as Korea, Vietnam, Angola, Nicaragua, etc. At the international security conference, the suave Secretary of Defense Gates dismissed Putin’s unanswered specific charges on U.S. missile defense in Europe, the expansion of a hostile NATO alliance to Russia’s borders, and U.S. meddling in Russia’s traditional sphere of influence by saying that the United States felt that “one Cold War was quite enough.” Yet Putin was right that the United States is pursuing another Cold War, this time an unstated one, against both Russia and China. In his most astute criticism of the lone superpower’s foreign policy, Putin noted that the power amassed by a global power “destroys it from within.” Alluding to the aggressive, militaristic U.S. foreign policy, Putin noted correctly that, “it has nothing in common with democracy, of course.” Surprisingly, Putin, a domestic autocrat himself, seems to see what the U.S. founders knew, but what the occupants of the post–World War II imperial presidency have not been able to fathom. During the Roman Republic, the concentration of power associated with a militarized foreign policy led to the disintegration of the republic itself. The same thing is happening in the United States now. Thus, to safeguard one of the greatest domestic systems in the world, U.S. citizens and policy makers should drop the Tarzan foreign policy and return to the founders’ policy of minimal interference in the affairs of other nations.
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In India. San Diego.81 of 154
Ferguson ignores the fact that imperialism promoted holocausts and famines Johnson 6 Chalmers Johnson. "If one leaves aside their fundamentally different resource
endowments. the explanation for India's underperformance compared with." When Mao Zedong introduced Soviet-style
collective farms into China and did not get satisfactory results. the British did not go far enough in enforcing their ideas.
. 84 After all their arguments have been deployed. The nations that avoided the fates of India. author and professor emeritus of the University of California. say. Canada lies not in British exploitation but rather in the insufficient scale of British interference in the Indian economy. how do analysts
like Ferguson and Friedman explain the nineteenth-century poverty of India and China. China. NEMESIS: THE
LAST DAYS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC. the several dozen Holocaust-sized famines in both countries while food sat on the docks waiting to be exported. and
the Philippines did so by throwing off foreign rule early—as did the United States—or by modernizing militarily in order to hold off the imperialists (and ultimately join them)—as did Japan. Ferguson argues. Mexico. a monument to communist extremism similar to the extremes of laissez-faire that the British dogmatically imposed on their conquered territories—and that Ferguson would have preferred to be yet more extreme." This Great Leap Forward of the late 1950s produced a famine that took some thirty million Chinese lives. The historical evidence suggests a strong correlation exists between being on the receiving end of imperialism and immisseration. 2006. he did not abandon them but turned instead to truly gigantic collectives called "communes. p. and their current status as "late developers"? Students of communism will not be surprised by the answer.
" Khalilzad’s theories are wrong Nashashibi 3 Isaam M. Nashashibi.82 of 154
Khalilzad’s views are single minded Nashashibi 3 Isaam M.org/issam04172003. however. April 17. He tends to look at military solutions as the first. Frequent Writer on Arab Issues. Khalilzad's impeccable credentials make him a natural for membership in the neo-conservatives cabal which is the driving force behind Washington's Iraq policy. Nashashibi. perhaps.html] His many critics point out. http://www."
." his former associate stressed. "[Zalmay thinks of] security to the exclusion of everything else. "If he was in private business rather than government. US-Based Director of Deir Yassin Remembered. Counterpunch.html]
More importantly." said Anatol Lieven. 2003
[“The Neocon’s Bagman to Baghdad”. "He has a narrow of view of the Middle East and South Asia.org/issam04172003. "he would have been sacked long ago. http://www. not the last policy option. that Khalilzad has been wrong as often as he has been
rightgoing back to the days when he advocated arming the same Afghani groups that later spawned the Taliban. April 17. an analyst with the Carnegie Endowment for Peace in Washington. Counterpunch. 2003
[“The Neocon’s Bagman to Baghdad”.counterpunch. US-Based Director of Deir Yassin Remembered. Frequent Writer on Arab Issues.counterpunch.
Ph. Brooks and Wohlforth’s inability to provide a convincing explanation for the absence of coalition formation against
the United States in the early Cold War period. which allows other states to catch up. in Political Science from the University of California. 15.ksg. weakens their explanation for nonbalancing after the end of the Cold War.45
Brooks and Wolforth concede that coalitional balancing will work against the US Jack S.harvard. Rogers Professor of Political Science at Indiana University. they do not engage the argument that. Similarly. could form an effective balancing coalition against the United States if it was seen as so threatening. July 6th 2009. despite their claim at the be-ginning of World Out of Balance that unipolarity is robust and that U. J. however. hegemony.S. and the combination of the European Union. Jordan Professor of International Affairs at Texas A&M's George Bush
School of Government and Public Service. reinforced by nuclear deterrence.edu/files/Balancing_on_Land_and_at_Sea. Galileo. Hegemony—Myth or Reality? A Review Essay". LL.S. and they joined the United States in a defensive balancing coalition against the Soviet Union. then there were plenty of opportunities for a counterbalancing coalition to form against the United States throughout the Cold War period. Brooks
and Wohlforth concede that even today the member states of the European Union collectively exceed the United States in gross domestic product.83 of 154
Reject Brooks and Wohlforth – their analysis is based off a freeze frame of IR and doesn't into account other factors that cause hegemonic decline Layne. former president of the International Studies Association. know-how. Brooks and Wohlforth actually concede that unipolarity is not likely to last more than another twenty years. from USC. Hegemons sprint to the front of the great power pack because of economic leadership based on productivity and technological innovation. In this respect. and Russia. which is not very long at all.pdf In addition.42 Their case is based on a freeze-frame view of the distribution of capabilities in the international system. Brooks and Wohlforth make a strong case for unipolar stability. "The Waning of U. technology. Instead. Vol.D. when such behavior would not have been so risky. 09 – Mary Julia and George R. like all hegemonic systems.S. most of the great powers perceived that the greatest threat to their interests came from the Soviet Union. If the hypothesis that great powers balance against aspiring hegemons is unconditionally valid. and if the only issue is the distribution of material capabilities. International Security. p. hegemony will endure well into the future. No. it is also an implicit admission that—although it has yet to bear fruit—other states are engaged in counterbalancing the United States. and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute (Christopher. But there is less to their argument than meets the eye. China.43 A key question is whether the early decades of
the twenty-first century will witness the decline of U. 1. and this is spurring an ongoing process of multipolarization. Japan. After all. in International Law from Virginia Law. Thompson (Donald A. Over time. leadership costs sap the hegemon’s power and push it into decline.44 Not only is this a weak case for unipolarity. and managerial skills diffuse throughout the international economic system. Summer 2009. 34.77
(Board of Governors’ Professor at Rutgers University and former president of both the International Studies Association and the Peace Science Society) and William R. KONTOPOULOS) PDF Superficially. the debate about unipolar stability is misleading.M. Brooks
and Wohlforth’s argument that the balancing hypothesis applies only to states that are growing and threatening to achieve a position of hegemony but not to established hegemons such as the United States raises the question of why other leading states did not balance against the United States when it was a rising great power but before it established a position of primacy—
perhaps in the late 1940s. not from the United States. the
American era of unipolarity contains the seeds of its own demise.D. and Managing Editor of International Studies Quarterly) Summer 2010 “ Balancing on Land and at Sea Do States Ally against the Leading Global Power?” http://belfercenter.
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131 Thus. As an offshore balancer. exercise a free hand strategically. the United States should begin to retrench strategically and capitalize on the advantages accruing to insular great powers in multipolar systems. withdrawal and a concurrent shift to multipolarity would prevent American involvement in major power wars. allies. the United States must accept some reduction in its relative hard power by adopting a multipolar—and essentially unilateral—offshore balancing strategy that accommodates the rise of new great powers.S.85 of 154
MultiPol Good – Generic
U.S. 2006 (Christopher. Maintaining U. Consequently. thus causing the United States to become imperially overstretched and involving it in unnecessary wars that will reduce its power. Unilateral offshore balancing. The United States is far removed from powerful rivals and shielded from them both by geography and its own hard power. as an insular great power. 130 It also must rein in the scope of its extravagant ambitions to shape the international system in accordance with its Wilsonian ideology. the United States is far less vulnerable to the effects of "instability" than are the major powers of Eurasia." International Security. Fall. and avoid being automatically engulfed in Eurasian conflicts because of its alliance commitments. deterritorialized conception of security divorced from the traditional metrics of great power grand strategy: the distribution of power in the international system and geography. which is a potentially dangerous strategy. An America [End Page 40] that has the wisdom and prudence to contain itself is less likely to be feared than one that begs the rest of the world to stop it before it expands hegemonically again.S. offshore balancing would take advantage of the unique geostrategic advantages that allow the United States to benefit from multipolarity. at some point. the risk of conflict and the possible exposure of the American homeland to attack. primacy may well hasten its end by stimulating more intensive efforts to balance against the United States. For the United States. interests. Rather than risking these outcomes. "The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States' Unipolar Moment. the United States must practice self-restraint (which is different from choosing to be constrained by others by adopting a multilateral approach to grand strategy). it probably will. attempting to sustain U. power. indeed. have to fight to uphold its primacy. to reduce others' concerns about its power. Its quest for hegemony is driven instead by an ideational. Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M
University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute. If the United States fails to adopt an offshore balancing strategy based on multipolarity and military and ideological self-restraint.S. is America's next grand strategy. Project Muse)
The United States has a hegemony problem because it wields hegemonic power. and it could—and should—insulate itself from possible future Eurasian great power wars. Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 170 By devolving full responsibility for their defense to U. the United States would reap security advantages from a reversion to multipolarity.
Attempts to uphold hegemony only erode primacy faster – only acceptance of multipolarity guarantees a peaceful transition Layne. Number 2. Volume 31.
.S. Paradoxically.S.S. derive directly from the overseas commitments mandated by hegemony's all-encompassing definition of U. The United States does not need to be an extraregional hegemon to be secure. primacy may already be in the early stages of erosion. To reduce the fear of U. hegemony is a game that no longer is worth the candle. especially given that U. rather than arising from any direct threat to the United States itself.
Their first mistake is to focus too heavily on military power alone. which retains cells in some 60 countries. they make important mistakes that will ultimately undercut the implementation of the new security strategy. tracing financial flows. And bombing cannot resolve the problem of cells in Hamburg or Detroit. For example. Foreign Affairs.
. Volume 82. But the metaphor of war should not blind Americans to the fact that suppressing terrorism will take years of patient.86 of 154
MultiPol Good – Terror
Multilateralism key to reducing threats from terrorism Nye 3 Joseph Nye. police work.S. 2003. U. Issue 4. military strength is crucial and that pure multilateralism is impossible. military power is essential to global stability and is a critical part of the response to terrorism. Rather than proving the new unilateralists' point. The best response to transnational terrorist networks is networks of cooperating government agencies.S. Harvard. unspectacular civilian cooperation with other countries in areas such as intelligence sharing. But all the precision bombing destroyed only a small fraction of al Qaeda's network. the partial nature of the success in Afghanistan illustrates the continuing need for cooperation. EBSCO Although the new unilateralists are right that maintaining U. July. and border controls. the American military success in Afghanistan dealt with the easiest part of the problem: toppling an oppressive and weak government in a poor country.
Had Israel attacked Bushehr they would have lost the war before the battle had even begun in the court of world opinion. So what more could the
Obama Administration have done to prevent Bushehr from coming online? The answer is simply
. if we've learned anything from the recent adventure in Iraq it's that the world has neither little stomach nor patience for preemptive war. this is indeed the New Normal.com/politics/columns/150306/Nuclear-Iran-and-the-Multi-Polar-World. Besides war. global interconnected markets. In short. in a situation like this once you've run out of carrots and there is no stick to use. “Nuclear Iran and the multi-polar world”. No Osirak-like mission was to be had. tread lightly. for example. So the question is. envoy to the United Nations John Bolton told the Israeli's and the world via Fox News that if Israel was going to launch an attack on Bushehr. the US also has to contend with the economic realities of the multi-polar world. it needed to do it before the 21st. When the Israeli's bombed Osirak they didn't bother to even warn the US. lest they risk radioactive fallout from blowing up a live nuclear reactor.87 of 154
MultiPol Good – Iran
Multipolarity solves Iran better than unipolarity Radulich. Negligible economic progress will probably occur but for the most part.7 billion in US treasury securities. It is one thing when only two countries have nuclear weapons and neither are particularly invested in your best interest and quite another when a number of countries have nuclear weapons and have a vested interest in your survival. Now. masters degree in social work (msw) and 10 years of social work.htm) Prior to this event former U. if either the US or China. And you can make this case the world over with the EU. there was minimal risk the plant would be used to make nuclear weapons. then there was no reason to bomb it in the first place. There were indicators that this was a possibility as the Saudi's had given Israel permission to fly over their country in the event they planned to actually attack Iran. In addition. The U. and frankly given the world of the early 80's. the highest since October 2008. But the week passed and there was no assault. China.S. etc. as imports from there jumped according to the Commerce Department earlier this month. Of course. Once Bill Clinton and the Republican
congress started us down the free trade path they left the proverbial barn door open and there's no closing it now. U.S. In a game of carrot and stick. The first and easiest to understand reason why
the Israeli's didn't attack Bushehr is that the US deemed it not to be a proliferation risk. not only did Iran begin to bring Bushehr online but also days later they even debuted an unmanned attack drone and announced plans for the mass production of high-speed missile-launching assault boats. The US and China are the two biggest economies in the world. Despite some of the crazy rhetoric we hear on cable news and even from the mouths of certain leaders across the world. there are in fact limits to growth whether you're global or isolated.
http://www. the economic repercussions to both countries would be far worse and much faster than anything else besides nuclear oblivion. Russia. both nuclear and conventional. Sure in the short run manufacturing will briefly return but sooner or later markets
become saturated and we're right back to where we are now. opted to do something of a "cowboy-like"
nature like bomb Iran or invade Taiwan. if the rationale for bombing it was to prevent weapons from being made there. as of June 2010. Russia and at least a third of Latin America. we've buried the stick and hope that lots of carrots work. why didn't the Israeli's make good on a
decade of threats and blow the place up? More to the point.
We're not going to embargo China or any country that really matters because doing so will only hurt us in the long run. they didn't have to. professional blogger on global events since 2004. As I stated earlier. Despite the assertions of boisterous radio personalities. trade deficit with China widened to $26. State Department spokesman Darby Holladay stated that since Russia had agreed to supply nuclear fuel and remove spent fuel rods. what more could the United States have done to prevent this event from occurring? The answers lies in the political-economic structure of the multi-polar world we are now living in.2 billion in
June. the times they have a-changed. mental
health. Latin America.411mania. war isn't something anyone is really interested in and therefore there's only so much any one country can do when another opts to flout international concerns.S. In fact. With countries scattered across the globe armed with
intercontinental ballistic missiles it behooves every serious country to at best. The dominoes that fell after they hit Iraq didn't register on the radar of the superpower that was the US. holds roughly $843. and health care experience as a licensed clinical social worker. Attacking Iran leads to military conflict with China. not to mention most of the Middle East as they are all tied together both militarily and financially. such is the multi-polar world. you are forced to just live with it and that's a reality for both the US and Israel. 8/23/10 (Mark.
Mutually Assured Destruction for everybody and nobody. we're all locked into an eternal state of check.
. We're not alone in that respect because quite frankly so is the rest of the sane. sanctions. trade wars. etc. The latest episode with Iran shows us that the US is more or less impotent.88 of 154 nothing. aren't a viable option either. That answer doesn't change if or when a Republican becomes president. with no checkmate in sight. Military action isn't a viable option. embargoes. Essentially a multi-polar world with every country seated at the round table means that for the most part. Welcome to the real New World Order. civilized world.
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Decline is inevitable -- soft power, defense spending, China rise. Geeraerts 11 – Gustaaf, professor of international relations at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel and director of the Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies (European Review, Vol. 19, No. 1, 57–67, 2011, “China, the EU, and the New Multipolarity,” http://www.vub.ac.be/biccs/site/assets/files/apapers/China,%20the%20EU%20and %20Multipolarity-2.pdf) The structure of the international system is changing with the evaporation of America’s unipolar moment. ‘The decline of U.S. primacy and the subsequent transition to a multipolar world are inevitable,’ Wang Jisi wrote in 2004. 2 More recently John Ikenberry stated that ‘The United States’ ‘‘unipolar moment’’ will inevitably end.’ 3 Not only has the inﬂuence of the lonely superpower severely been affected by the expensive wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; its economic clout too has declined faster than ever before and its soft power is increasingly contested. At the same time, China is undeniably becoming a global power. Since
the cautious opening up of China’s door by Deng Xiaoping in 1978, her economy has quadrupled in size and some expect it to double again over the next decade. China is about to become the second most
important single economy in the world. At the most recent G20 meeting in Pittsburgh, Hu Jintao, China’s president was the only one to arrive at the head of a major economy still enjoying strong growth, having the luxury of substantial ﬁnancial reserves. But China is not only growing economically, its military clout is also on the rise. 4 In 2008 China evolved into the world’s second highest military spender. 5 It is the only country emerging both as a military and economic rival of the US and thus generating a fundamental shift in the global distribution of power and inﬂuence. Such power transitions are a recurring phenomenon in
international politics and have always constituted episodes of uncertainty and higher risk. They contain the seeds of ﬁerce strategic rivalry between the up-and-coming state and the residing leading power, thereby increasing the likelihood of contention and conﬂict. No wonder that China’s spectacular economic growth and increasingly assertive diplomacy have incited other key-players to ponder how Beijing will seek to manage this transition and even more how it will use its leverage afterwards. Notwithstanding that China still sees itself partly as a developing country, it is becoming more conﬁdent in its rising power and status. As its economic interests abroad
are expanding rapidly, so will the pressure increase to safeguard them more proactively. National security is no longer solely a matter of defending sovereignty and domestic development. It also becomes necessary for China to back up its growing interests overseas with a
more robust diplomacy and security policy. To be sure, the US is still the most important single economy in the world. It also remains the world’s largest military power. While the EU has developed into an even
larger economy and has become the most important entity in terms of external trade ﬂows, politically and militarily it performs far below its potential and is no match either for the US or China. The EU’s foreign policy is confronted with a collective action problem of sorts, and as a result is lacking in bot strategic vision and assertiveness. Although still smaller than the other two, China has grown into the world’s second largest national economy and also the one that grows most quickly. According to some estimates, China will move on a par with the US in 2020 and
become the world’s biggest economy in 2030 (see Table 1). Moreover China is steadily increasing its military power. In Beijing’s view, economic prowess is not sufﬁcient for a state to become a ﬁrst rank power. ‘What is important is comprehensive national power, as shown by the ability of the Soviet Union to balance the much wealthier US in the Cold War and the continuing inability of an economically powerful Japan to play a political role’. 6 This view is very much in line with the neorealist conception that to be considered a ‘pole’ a country must amass sufﬁcient power in all of Waltz’s categories of power: ‘size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence.’ 7
Heg structurally unsustainable -- economics and rising powers. Petras 10 – James, retired Bartle Professor (Emeritus) of Sociology at Binghamton University in Binghamton, New York and adjunct professor at Saint Mary's University
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(4/28/10, “Rising and Declining Economic Powers: The Sino-US Conflict Deepens,” http://lahaine.org/petras/b2-img/petras_sinous.pdf) The US has a trade deficit with at least 91 other countries besides China, demonstrating that the problem is embedded in the structure of the US economy. Any punitive measure to restrict China’s exports to the US will only increase Washington’s deficit with other competitive exporters. A decline of US imports from China will not result in an increase for US manufacturers because of the under-capitalized nature of the latter, directly related to the pre-eminent position of finance capital in capturing and allocating savings. Moreover, “third countries” can re-export Chinese made products, putting the US in the unenviable
position of starting trade wars across the board or accepting the fact that a finance –commercial led economy is not competitive in today’s world economy. China’s decision to incrementally divert its trade surplus
from the purchase of US Treasury notes to more productive investments in developing its “hinterland” and to strategic overseas ventures in raw materials and energy sectors will eventually force the US Treasury to raise interest rates to avoid large scale flight from the dollar. Rising interest rates may benefit currency traders, but could weaken any US recovery or plunge the country back into a depression. Nothing weakens a global empire more than having to repatriate overseas investments and constrain foreign lending to bolster a sliding domestic economy. The pursuit of protectionist policies will have a major negative impact on US MNC in China since the bulk of their products are exported to the US market: Washington will cut its nose to spite its face. Moreover, a trade war could spill over and adversely affect US auto corporations producing for the Chinese market. GM and Ford are far more profitable in China than the US where they are running in the red 44 . A US trade war will have an initial negative impact on China until it adjusts and takes advantage of the potential 400 million consumers in the vast interior of the country. Moreover, Chinese economic policymakers are rapidly diversifying their trade toward Asia, Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, Russia and even in the EU. Trade protectionism may
create a few jobs in some uncompetitive manufacturing sectors in the US but it may cost more jobs in the commercial sector (Wal-Mart) which depends on low priced items to low income consumers. The bellicose trade rhetoric on Capitol Hill and confrontational policies adopted by the White House are dangerous posturing, designed to deflect attention from the profound structural weaknesses of the domestic foundations of the empire. The deeply entrenched financial sector and the equally dominant military metaphysic which directs foreign policy have led the US down the steep slope of chronic economic crises, endless costly wars, deepening class and ethno-racial inequalities as well as declining living standards. In the new competitive multi-polar world order, the
US cannot successfully follow the earlier path of blocking a rising imperial power’s access to strategic resources via colonial dictated boycotts. Not even in countries under US occupation, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, can the White House block China from signing lucrative investment and trade deals. With countries in the US sphere of influence, like
Taiwan, South Korea and Japan, the rate of growth of trade and investment with China far exceeds that of the US. Short of a full scale unilateral military blockade, the US cannot contain China’s rise as a world
economic actor, a newly emerging imperial power. The major weakness in China is internal, rooted
in class divisions and class exploitation, which the currently entrenched political elite profoundly linked through family and economic ties, might ameliorate but cannot eliminate 45 . Up to now China has been able to expand globally through a form of “social imperialism”, distributing a portion of the wealth generated overseas to a growing urban middle class and to upwardly mobile managers, professionals, real estate speculators and regional party cadre. In contrast the US, military directed overseas conquests have been costly with no
economic returns and with long term damage to the civilian economy both in its internal and external manifestations. Iraq and Afghanistan do not reward the imperial treasury in anyway comparable \\to what England plundered from India, South Africa and Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). In a world increasingly based in market relations, colonial style wars have no economic future. Huge military budgets and hundreds of military bases and military based alliances with neo-colonial states are the least efficient means to compete successfully in a globalized market place. That is the reason why the US is a declining empire and China, with its market driven approach is a newly emerging empire of a ‘new sort’ (sui generis).
S. many of them intended to deny US forces access in realms where American power has previously been unchallenged.macfound. There is widespread agreement that the US fiscal situation
is unsustainable. http://economyincrisis. and the Obama administration has raised concerns in Asia by decisions such as imposition of a punitive tariff on Chinese tyres. The Obama administration has already announced cuts to real defence spending.org/content/hugedeficits-altering-us-hegemony. Not only is the deficit out-ofcontrol . Although his popularity has dipped. public sentiment could constrain Washington from continuing to provide the two things that Asia most wants from America: open markets and security. Rory Medcalf. Even if the United States retains the will to remain Asia’s hegemon. cyber and blue-water naval capabilities.3 trillion in the 2011 fiscal year . As of September 2009. MacArthur Foundation and the Lowy Institute. a Pew poll released in December 2009 showed isolationist sentiment in the United States surging to a four-decade high. The CBO estimates that public debt. je) The sun may finally be setting on the American Century. Ensinger ’10.6 trillion. nuclear weapons are being assigned a more limited role in US defence planning. Nonetheless. but no consensus on the kinds of long-term solutions that need to be enacted. in which each
Times. The Economy in Crisis. will continue to grow to 68 per cent of GDP by 2019. according to The New York
America‘s massive and unsustainable debt will be the cause of waning influence around the world in the near future. 100 Should these trends continue. space. especially Asian powers Japan and China. By the end of the decade. with a particular focus on missile. deficits are projected to rise to over five percent of gross domestic product.but the nation’s projected long-term debt is even more unsustainable.
Dustin. “Huge Deficits Altering U. which claims that
. There is evidence that the United States is entering one of its inward-looking phases – a consequence of the economic downturn and costly wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. significant negative trends are emerging for America’s global role and its strategic position in Asia over the longer term.92 of 154
Decline is inevitable in the status quo – US isolationist attitudes and US spending unsustainably. China held $790 billion of U. high deficits.” http://asiasecurity. capabilities in domains which will become increasingly important. Even worse. Perhaps even more worrying. President Obama’s election was greeted with a wave of enthusiasm and hope for the future. which represented just 33 per cent of GDP in 2001. The problem is exacerbated by the political impasse in America.” The Times writes.expected to be 1.Journalist for Economy in Crisis. Beyond the next decade an ageing population and rising healthcare costs will increase America’s fiscal challenges. debt while Japan held roughly $752 billion. A strong US global role remains the orthodoxy on both sides of American politics and across the foreign policy elite. the US defence budget is likely to come under serious pressure from 2016. Andrew Shearer.pdf)
Such a domestic crisis in the United States seems unlikely. Absent a change in national priorities. Raoul Heinrichs. Protectionist sentiment is growing.S. This represents 11. particularly in Asia. The US Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
conservatively estimates the US federal budget deficit for 2009 will reach US$ 1. it is likely to face capacity constraints in the medium to long term.Bachelor of Arts in Journalism and Political Science (2/2/10.2 per cent in 2008 and the highest figure since the Second World War. “Power and Choice: Asian Security Futures. albeit gradual. Cook et al 10 – Malcolm.1000 Zumwalt destroyer will be terminated.2 per cent of gross domestic product – up massively from 3. “[Obama’s] budget draws a picture of a nation that like many American homeowners simply cannot get above water. 10 Plus. much of that debt is borrowed from foreign central banks. East Asia Program Director at the Lowy Institute for International Policy (June 2010. and uncertainties remain as to the long-term direction of space and missile defence programs. Hegemony”. even as Washington’s margin of conventional superiority diminishes. The economy is showing signs
of a recovery. Major weapons programs such as the F-22 advanced Raptor fighter and the DDG.org/images/uploads/blog_attachments/Asian_security_futur es_-_final_version. China’s rapid military modernisation program is likely to continue unabated during this period.
S. dominance in the international system have encouraged American policy makers to act unilaterally and seize almost any opportunity to advance American interests no matter the costs to others.S. we will look back at the Bush administration years as the death knell for American hegemony. For nearly two decades. In reality. further decline in the foreseeable future.S. others see America’s
imminent demise. believe that China. seeking to denuclearize North Korea and expanding America's military allies in Europe up to the borders of Russia itself. Russia. fairly short. without
deliberate action. our policies have been based on these flawed arguments. will not be able to maintain its current pace of economic growth long enough to pass the U.wars and economic power decline Pape 9 – Robert A.” http://findarticles. even to academicians like Dartmouth's William Wohlforth and Stephen Brooks. The United States is not just the sole superpower in the uni-polar-dominance school's world. A healthy appreciation of our situation
American leaders may lead to policies that could mitigate. as the world’s largest economy. The self-inflicted wounds of the Iraq War. al-Qaeda's new sanctuary in western Pakistan. but pursued ambitious objectives in all three major regions at the same time--waging wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. but is so relatively more powerful than any other country that it can reshape the international order according to American interests. The Bush administration has not just continued America's traditional grand strategy. long thought of as America’s top competitor for superpower status. Heg is unsustainable -. while the ultimate foundation of American power--the relative superiority of the U. Iran's continued nuclear program and Russia's recent military adventure in Georgia are high-priority issues. China and other major powers could seriously oppose American military power.. As of 2009. however. France. the period of U. Professor of political science at the University of Chicago (Jan-Feb. Still.
the United States has maintained a vast array of overseas commitments. solutions to each of them individually and all of them
. Others point out that America’s military might is still unmatched around the world.S. This is simply no longer realistic. There is also good reason to think that. If present trends continue. The next closest was China at just eight percent. Although the immediate problems of war in
by Iraq and Afghanistan. “Empire Falls.S. the fall of American power will be more precipitous with the passage of time. America's shrinking share of world economic production is a fact of life and important changes in U. along with the oil-rich Persian Gulf (as well as other parts of the world). And since the 1960s America’s gross domestic product has represented roughly 20 to 25 percent of the global economy. the decline of America’s manufacturing base. to put America back on a path of fiscal sanity and ensure that America remains a hegemony. if not rectify. Still. Since the cold war. seeking to ensure peace and stability not just in its own neighborhood--the Americas--but also in Europe and Asia. those convinced of U. and that the U. There are some analysts and experts. 2009. there needs to be a combination of both.S. For the past eight years.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_99/ai_n32148803/? tag=content. virtually discounting the possibility that Germany. increasingly negative current-account balances and other internal economic weaknesses have cost the United States real power in today's world of rapidly spreading knowledge and technology.93 of 154
Republicans refuse to even entertain the idea of any tax increase while Democrats chafe at the though of entitlement cuts. From public intellectuals like Charles
Krauthammer and Niall Ferguson to neoconservatives like Paul Wolfowitz and Robert Kagan. the U. thus far. grand strategy are necessary to prevent the decline in America's global position from accelerating.S. economy in the world--has been in decline since early on in the Bush administration. that believe America will remain the world’s preeminent power for some time. relative decline has been. but in recent years American leaders have pursued far more ambitious goals than merely maintaining the status quo. To be sure. unsustainable trade deficits and concerns about the strength of the dollar have all caused some experts to question America’s place in the world and suggest that American influence may be rapidly dwindling. economy is still by far the largest. An extremely low savings rate. all believe the principal feature of the post-
cold-war world is the unchallengeable dominance of American power. accounted for nearly half of all the world’s military expenditures. Some
side is firmly entrenched in an unwavering ideological battle.col1 originally from The National Interest) America is in unprecedented decline. followed by Russia at five percent. Simply maintaining these commitments requires enormous
resources. growing government debt.
but whether it has become a serious part of the problem. are now both more open to serious question. with the collapse of the Washington consensus. there is little scope left for the US to
legitimize its leadership by appealing to liberal values either political or economic. At this point.
When the world looks at American health and welfare policies. America's declining power means that the unipolar world is indeed coming to an end. Waltz Annual Lecture A World Order Without Superpowers : Decentred Globalism. On trade. at the financial mess. however.
Heg is unsustainable -. The Obama administration has a huge amount of damage to repair before it can present the US as a beacon of political liberalism. even if he is.g. that major powers will increasingly have the strength to balance against U. at the influence of religion and special interest lobbies in US domestic politics. Montague Burton Professor in the Department of International Relations (March 25. There was a very substantial element of hypocrisy in this position during the Cold War. and. economic influence.international legitimacy.” International Relations. other ideas about how to run the global political economy are in play. and at a federal environmental policy until recently in denial about global warming. the GWoT means that Washington is still under pressure to prefer antiterrorist governments to democratic ones. and its weakening position in Congress does not augur well. and internal conflicts Buzan 11 – Barry. at a US government that under Bush was openly comfortable with the use of torture and was reelected. Like so many great powers that have come and gone before. at a seeming US inclination to use force as the first-choice policy instrument. It has neither the economic resources. Obama’s options are massively
constrained by the magnitude of the economic crisis. much was done. Under Clinton and Bush. 2011. then the emergence of a more regionalized world political economy becomes more likely (more on this later). and. In terms of economic liberalism. both European social markets. the
Obama inheritance is even worse. and economic liberal values in the form of free(r) trade and financial liberalization.
and whether the US economic model is either sustainable or desirable. 25 no. its
weakening economic position making it more protectionist. “The Inaugural Kenneth N. our own hubris may be our downfall.
collectively will be heavily influenced by America's reduced power position in the world. badly damaged itself.94 of 154
Most important. That claim has long been based on the US championing of
political liberal values in the form of democracy and human rights. The US led the world into this recession. it will have to be done collectively (e. competitors to the dollar as reserve currency were on the rise. yet. policies they oppose and that the United States will increasingly face harsh foreign-policy choices. have gutted Washington’s credibility to say much about human rights.
cannot lead the world out of it. So America’s claim to represent the (liberal) future is now blighted both by its own failures and by the shortcomings of the liberal model itself. The EU model looks more attractive to some. giving bigger voices to other players. Even before the current economic crisis. the US had largely ceased to lead anyway. It is not clear that he is an economic liberal. On the political side. or are too protracted and costly. and the Beijing consensus.S. nor. If the world economy can be managed globally at all. as well as its fierce resistance to the International Criminal Court. March 2011 vol. even so. With the
Washington consensus discredited. In some ways the ‘civilian power’ EU is now a better representative of political liberal values. US abuses of human rights at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo. the US is losing its claim to be a model and to own the future. it now more easily asks not just whether the US is a questionable model. the ideological authority to do so. Whether an unsustainable ‘American way of life’ is an appropriate model for the rest of the world. many Democrats in Congress look likely to be even less enthusiastic about further trade liberalisation than the Bush Republicans were.’ 26 If attempts to get the global economy going again fail. and US indebtedness was weakening its position. the financial world took on a globalised life of its own. 25 The truth of Bromley’s observation has been amplified by recent events: ‘US economic leadership power exists but it is a wasting asset … governance
of the world economy is something that would have to be accomplished collectively if it is to be accomplished at all. its policy of ‘extraordinary renditions’ and acceptance of de facto torture. 1 3-25) In addition to standing increasingly on its own in the main areas of international policy. via the G20 and other suchlike groups of leading powers).
product in any year and divide it by the aggregate total of the gross domestic product of all states in the world. 2009. China. the United States has not lost its position as the most innovative country in the world. Tech diffusion = heg unsustainable.col1 originally from The National Interest) Advocates of extending America's unipolar dominance are well aware of the central importance of the economic foundations of American power and routinely present detailed statistics on the U.” http://findarticles. the ability to diffuse new technology--to turn chalkboard ideas into mass-produced applications--has
been spreading rapidly across many parts of the globe. dollars. America is losing its overwhelming technological dominance in the leading industries of the knowledge economy.” http://findarticles. and it is far from clear that it will ever be able to recover the leading position that it once possessed. single-year "snapshots" of America's relative
power are of limited value for assessing the sustainability of its grand strategy over many years. Looks pretty good for America. technology and knowledge diffuse more quickly today.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_99/ai_n32148803/? tag=content. and then began to steadily lose ground during the eight years of the Bush administration. religious. with more patents each year than in all other countries combined. and their rapid global
diffusion is a profound factor driving down America's power compared to other countries. had 6 percent. and with it the ultimate sources of state power--productive capacities. “Empire Falls. individualistic and anti-state than most other parts of the West. the unipolar-dominance school prefers to compare every
country's output in current-year U.95 of 154
and the emergent Chinese model to others. Professor of political science at the University of Chicago (Jan-Feb. the most recent call for America to exploit its hegemonic position (published in 2008) rests on the presumption of U. dominance based on the current-year dollar figures. in 2008.S. population.. Indeed. The US is no longer the only model of the future in play. the United
States had three times the computer sales.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_99/ai_n32148803/? tag=content. a method that tends to show America is much further ahead of other countries than alternative measures. (4) As Fareed Zakaria describes in his recent book. cultural conservatism and antistatism set it apart from most of Europe. (5) The fact that the United States remains ahead of China on a per capita basis does matter--it means that China. five times the internet users and forty times the broadband subscribers as China. 2009. To measure gross domestic product. According to GDP figures in current U. although the United States remains well ahead of China on many indicators of leading technology on a per capita basis.. The Post-American World.relative economic decline. Pape 9 – Robert A.col1 originally from The National Interest)
True.S. dollars from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). (2) By this metric.S. Whereas in 2000. The US
is much more culturally conservative. right? Alas. share of world product. with its relative power ultimately falling by nearly a quarter in the first
2006 the United States had 28 percent of world product while its nearest most likely competitor. but look at the trajectory of the data over time.S. and is being turned around by Obama. the United
States increased its share of world production during the 1990s. For grand-strategic concerns--especially how well the United States can balance its resources and foreign-policy commitments--the trajectory of American power compared to other states is of seminal importance. let us start with the
unipolar-dominance school's preferred measure of American hegemony. “Empire Falls. While some of this negative image was specific to the Bush administration. Pape 9 – Robert A.S. this grossly under-weights the size of the knowledge economy in China compared to America. For the sake of argument. US heg not sustainable -. Professor of political science at the University of Chicago (Jan-Feb.S. with more than four times the U. the Chinese have caught or nearly caught up with Americans in every
category in the aggregate. while its individualism and anti-statism set it apart from Asia. many of the deeper issues are structural. can create many more knowledge workers in the future. The basic notion is simple: take U. In past eras--the "age of iron" and the "age of steel"--leading states retained their
technological advantages for many decades. For instance. Its religiosity. reached its apogee in 2000. However.
growth has fallen considerably. U.S.. At the same time. Simply put. one can gain a rough weighting of the factors behind America's shrinking share of world production by asking a few simple counterfactual questions of the data.2 percent instead of its actual 23.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_99/ai_n32148803/? tag=content. Again using
IMF figures. has grown consistently. Pape 9 – Robert A. these back-of-the-envelope approximations serve as useful starting points. power is the result of uneven rates of economic growth between America.S. constant-dollar calculations and purchasing power parity. growth rates are down almost 50 percent from the Clinton years. although all major
countries are suffering economically.S.7
percent--the assumed marginal gain of 2. Russia has also turned its economic trajectory around. As Table 3 shows." Still. These estimates suggest that roughly a quarter of America's relative decline is due to
.S. If so. And regardless of the metric. the fact is that since 2000. power.” http://findarticles.col1 originally from The National Interest) So. U. “Empire Falls. How good are the numbers? Economists commonly use two other methods to calculate GDP. or 1.1 percent. If we look out as far as the IMF can see (2013). This new reality has
tremendous implications for the future of American grand strategy.7 percent per year from 2000 to 2008 instead of the (Bush) rate of 2. The
answers are pretty straightforward. these are
merely thought experiments. the United States is now a declining power.
America's decline was well under way before the economic downturn.S. for our purposes what matters is that they form a lower bound of America's relative decline. which leave out all manner of technical problems like "interaction effects. How much does China matter? Imagine the extreme case--that China had not grown. economic weaknesses under Bush or Chinas superior economic performance? Although precise answers are not possible. Professor of political science at the University of Chicago (Jan-Feb. over the past two decades. but we assume China did not grow at such an astounding rate? Of course. the average rate of U. The United States has been going through the first decade of the twenty-first century not stronger than before. America's share of world product in 2008 would be 24. America's share of world product in 2008 would have risen to 25.96 of 154
decade of the twenty-first century. 2009. The erosion of the underpinnings of U. China and Russia are expected to continue growing at a substantially greater rate than the United States.S. Despite all the pro-economy talk from the Bush administration. the trend is the same.3 percent.2 percent of world product accounts for about 15 percent of the U. Assuming the rest of the world continued at its actual rate of growth. decline. decline. the United States would have had a
bigger economy in absolute terms and would have lost less power relative to others.S. This trajectory is almost sure to be revised further downward as the consequences of the financial crisis in fall 2008 become manifest.S.2 percent more than today. What would happen if we assumed that the United States grew during the Bush years
at the same rate as during Clinton's? What would have happened had the world continued on its same trajectory.7 percent--the assumed marginal gain of 1. Table 2 shows the trajectory of the share of world product for the United States and China using both alternative measures. Heg decline inevitable and irreversible. the relative power of China. When compared to the share of world product lost by the United States from 2000 to 2008--7. Had the American economy grown at the (Clinton) rate of 3. how much is U. but substantially weaker. (3) Although each offers advantages and disadvantages. decline due to the global diffusion of technology. At the same time. China and other states in the world. China has sustained a consistently high rate of growth of 10 percent per year--a truly stunning performance. As the most recent growth estimates (November 2008) by the :ME make clear. from year after year of losses in the 1990s to significant annual gains since 2000.1 percent of world product amounts to some 27 percent of the U.
and the United States and the rest of the world continued along their actual path of economic growth since 2000. which is likely to only further weaken U. Worse.2 percent. the state many consider America's most likely future rival. (6) When compared to the share of gross world product lost by the United States from 2000 to 2008--7. things get even worse--with the United States expected to continue declining and China to continue rising. from nearly 4 percent annually during the Clinton years to just over 2 percent per year under Bush.
downfall is indeed extraordinary. during this election. self-inflicted wounds of the Bush years significantly exacerbated America's decline. it seemed like it mattered what the rest of the world thought about American politics. and undoubtedly the effects will continue to ripple around the world. Finn 2008). A significant amount of this debt is held by foreign governments. Given this.S. The effects of US neoimperialism reach
so extensively across the world that US elections are everyone’s business. and
that we will begin to see the emergence of a new world order. a sixth to Chinas superior performance and just over half to the spread of technology to the rest of the world. the unexpected internal collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The United States has always prided itself on exceptionalism. Economic collapse and debt. Indeed. And when one examines past declines and their consequences. and that our opposition to the imposition of American power. the national deficit moved past the $10 trillion mark.” AntipodeVolume 42. the signing of the executive order to close the controversial Guantanamo Bay detention facility. is something that will sit uncomfortably even with a less conservative Obama administration. 2010. predominantly Japan and China. Issue 2) However. It is difficult to see how one man. current-account deficits. In an attempt to save the US economy from recession. fall is remarkable and that dangerous instability in the international system may lie ahead. rescuing private finance with public finance. But I shall end this intervention on a note of optimism. and Obama’s carefully crafted speech at Cairo University in June 2009 aimed at easing tensions with the Muslim world. If we end up believing in the wishful thinking of unipolar dominance forever.S. All of this has led to one of the most significant declines of any state since the midnineteenth century. both signalled a sharp break with the previous Bush administration and have strengthened the global wave of diplomatic and popular goodwill (see Black 2009. America's relative decline since 2000 of some 30 percent represents a far greater loss of relative power in a shorter time than any power shift among European great powers from roughly the end of the Napoleonic Wars to World War II. the largest problem has been the state’s own financial situation. one which is fraught with difficulties. along with a number of oil exporting countries. etc. Watson 10 – Allan. it is clearly surpassed by only one other great-power decline. (February 18. In other words. it now seems that US hegemony is in decline. the costs could be far higher than a simple percentage drop in share of world product. UK. The US economy continues to be squeezed by the interest on the capital borrowed. Something fundamental has changed. The timing of this policy effectively forced the following Obama administration to continue down the same path. “US Hegemony and the Obama Administration: Towards a New World Order?. economic weaknesses (spending on the Iraq War.S. in size. can change well-practised unilateral US foreign policies or solve deep-rooted national anxieties. and the fact that the largest potential rival to US hegemony in the twenty-first century.). and the
. China. holds so much of the US debt. the previous administration. For the USA.
both by making the decline steeper and faster and crowding out productive investment that could have stimulated innovation to improve matters. Relying on foreign governments in this way comes with risks that are now starting to bite. The USA can no longer hope to keep China subordinate through economics alone. without the need to exercise the hard coercive unilateral military or economic power upon the rest of the world. From
this perspective. led by the most right-wing president in living memory. When the $700 billion bailout package for private financial institutions was passed through Congress. and the U. The above discussion suggests that the fundamental principles of US engagement with the rest of the world will change very little under an Obama-led US administration. it
becomes clear both that the U. lecturer in Human Geography at Staffordshire University. The
election of the first black president of the USA was after all an historic event. UK and a research fellow of the Globalisation and World Cities research network based at Loughborough University. took the unprecedented step of pursuing a “financial socialism” (Taylor et al 2009). tax cuts. It is one of the largest relative declines in modern history. For once. economically and politically. no matter how well supported. It gives the USA a chance to re-invent itself as a more open and tolerant nation and practice what may be termed as a “moral hegemony” (see Kobayashi and Peake 2000).97 of 154
U. the financial crisis of late 2008 and early 2009 has acted to undermine both the US and global economy.
The economic decay and the entrenched political and social elites have effectively depoliticized discontent. If the US imperial elite at present is at a loss as to how it can contain China’s rise to world power.org/petras/b2-img/petras_sinous.
. ravaging industrial centers and turning abandoned houses into parking lots. it need not conquer and exploit foreign colonized labor. unlike the US plagued by financial speculators who eat away and erode the economy. looking for Obama to be the president to guide the USA into a new age of multilateralism.98 of 154
associated vision of what constitutes our “security” (see Sidaway 2008).” http://lahaine. nor do financial elites embedded in extraordinary wealth and power surrender their privileged positions peacefully. Unlike Japan it has a vast multitude of workers. Over the long run. “Rising and Declining Economic Powers: The Sino-US Conflict Deepens. Despite the reservations expressed in this intervention. The world continues to watch hopefully. New York and adjunct professor at Saint Mary's University (4/28/10. The US Empire will continue to wallow in chronic stagnation. something will have to
break. depends on securing markets via economic competitiveness – market power – not military conquest. unending wars and increased reliance on the tools of political subversion. Empires do not die peacefully. whipping up chauvinist emotions by
scapegoating the rising new imperial state and forging military alliances to “encircle” China have absolutely no impact. We live in a post-colonial world where the vast majority of regimes will trade and invest with whoever pays the market price. They have not stopped all of China’s neighbors from expanding economic ties with it. I continue to share the sense of excitement and hope for change that has been so widely infectious since the election. military alliances and trade restrictions to slow its demise. a declining imperial power faced with profound internal imbalances.
The US unlike the established colonial powers of an earlier period cannot deny China access to strategic raw materials as was the case with Japan. 49 Propaganda. fifth column colonization and military driven empire building based on domestic decay.
China rising and domestic issues. retired Bartle Professor (Emeritus) of Sociology at Binghamton University in Binghamton. unlike Japan. driven by an elite free to engage the world on its own terms. a loss of competitiveness in merchandise trade and an overdependence on financial activities looks to political retribution. employer servitude. China’s market driven empire building is attuned to
modern times. the mass of the US working class is at a loss as to how it can move from a military driven empire toward a productive republic. Only time will tell how long the American people will endure the dispossession of homes. systemic economic crises have been converted into private individual maladies. China will push ahead with double digit growth. promoting separatist regimes which predictably collapse or are overthrown. China. Petras 10 – James. militarism and Zionist power will so bleed and isolate the United States that necessity will induce a forceful response … The longer it takes the more violent the rebirth of the republic.pdf)
As in the past. was finally having an effect. There are no prospects that this will change in the near future.
the impact of particular disaffections was offset by the widespread general sense that the West and its hangers-on were a lot better off with US leadership than without it. Montague Burton Professor in the Department of International Relations (March 25. Middle East Buzan 11 – Barry. Vietnam and Chile. 16 and. “The Inaugural Kenneth N.” International Relations.three examples: Buzan 11 – Barry. March 2011 vol. A striking symbol of this was the replacement of talk about ‘friends and allies’ or ‘the free world’ with a harsher instrumental line about ‘coalitions of the willing’.99 of 154
Heg Unsustainable (Soft Power/Unpopular Policies)
Heg is unsustainable -. Montague Burton Professor in the Department of International Relations (March 25. A brief look at three key policy areas – the Middle East/GWoT. 1 3-25) The US. This rhetorical shift seemed to abandon any US interest or belief in long-term friendships and alliances. 25 no. The Obama administration’s more robust line on the necessity of a two-state solution faces such daunting domestic and regional obstacles that its chances do not look promising. 2011. and limited nuclear war. though here it has to be said that Europeans are just as culpable. US support for the Saudi regime helps keep in power a government whose domestic deals with Wahabi Islamists recycles large sums of oil money into the support of Islamic fundamentalism. Perhaps
only on the question of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons does US policy in the Middle East enjoy much support. as a consequence. March 2011 vol. and this seems set to continue. Waltz Annual Lecture A World Order Without Superpowers : Decentred Globalism. are widely perceived to have been counterproductive. China and climate change – shows how the US stands ever more alone. of course. both those of the Bush administration and those more long-standing.” International Relations. More or less unconditional US support for Israel is a perennial Washington idiosyncrasy that inspires little enthusiasm elsewhere.
and replace it with a rational choice logic of immediate and specific shared interest. During the Cold War the unattractive
elements of US policy in the Middle East were masked by the general agreement on the need to contain the Soviet
. The US had rather limited success in selling the GWoT as a global macro-securitization to replace the Cold War. 2011. Over the last
decade that general sense has weakened rapidly. to obstructionism on controlling climate change and the use of torture. but even that is undermined by the hypocrisy of the US turning a blind eye to Israel’s substantial nuclear arsenal while seeking to forbid Arab states and Iran from acquiring their own deterrents.
and assisting in the self-destruction of its Palestinian negotiating partner. not only feeding the terrorist problem. US policy has often been controversial among its friends. a.
the particular policies of the US now stand largely on their own terms. There has never been a golden age when the US was universally admired by the rest of the world. has never been short of unpopular foreign policies. unshielded by the mediating effects of any overarching common cause or closely shared identity. and partly because of the conspicuous turn to self-interested unilateralism that marked the eight years of the Bush administration. 1 3-25) Disagreements over policy in the Middle East already rank as one of the conspicuous areas of disaffection between the US and Europe. 25 no. through its unquestioning support for Israel and its occupation of Iraq.unpopularity isolates the US -. with Israel creating ever more difficult facts on the ground. 18 but also deepening the many tragedies in the region. and has so far hamstrung the US from pushing decisively towards a twostate solution to the Israel–Palestine problem. But during the
Cold War. From Cuba. This festering sore has grown steadily worse. “The Inaugural Kenneth N. partly because there is no longer any great ideological struggle to sustain it. Waltz Annual Lecture A World Order Without Superpowers : Decentred Globalism. The main point for the question of US superpower legitimacy is that many of the US interventions in the Middle East. and to an extent in the 1990s. The occupation of Iraq in 2003 looks set to generate far more and bigger problems than it has solved. 17 The Middle East is a profound mess and is likely to remain so.
Given both the deep divisions and antagonisms in the Middle East. its alliance with the US. however. bad and. India has to balance a growing economic relationship with China against some still sensitive territorial disputes and a desire not to be overshadowed in status terms by China. then it becomes possible that US perceptions of China as threatening will not be shared widely. During the Cold War. The US role in facilitating China’s ‘reform and opening up’ since 1978 has also been broadly popular. If a rising China becomes ultra-nationalist. Japan and increasingly India have their own interests there. If it stays with the US. Yet the two countries have developed a quite stable strategic partnership. must appear threatening to the US. Those many voices currently in opposition to US hegemony. Russia may well want to continue to bandwagon with
China against the US. “The Inaugural Kenneth N.
Union. but somewhat strengthened. 19 the possibility of regional stability looks remote. shared by few. on the level of society and pubic opinion. even ever-faithful Britain would have trouble joining in any new US intervention in this region. The nature of the China that rises. March 2011 vol. this US concern will be a parochial one. Unless China turns nasty and threatening. and speaking of the need for a more multipolar world order. if at all. If China is relatively benign in the sense of not using violence against its neighbours. Japan is the toughest problem facing China’s ‘peaceful rise’ strategy. After the Iraq fiasco and the Afghan quagmire. 24 If China’s rise is benign.
But the Chinese leadership is determined to avoid the mistakes made by Germany. of the other great
.100 of 154
The GWoT not only failed to extend this cover. is that the long-standing drumbeat of concern in Washington about rising China as a peer competitor will get louder as China does indeed grow in power. Russia has worries about
Chinese designs on the sparsely populated territories of the Russian Far East. whether peaceful or not. Japan will face very difficult choices. 21 If they can carry off their design for a ‘peaceful rise’. also benefited from the masking effects of shared interests.
it is far from clear that other powers will feel threatened by China’s challenge to US hegemony.” International Relations.
but the US securitizes it anyway. That might not look attractive compared with the options of either resolving the history problems and bandwagoning with China or following India into a more independent. But if China conducts its peaceful rise successfully. India will probably try to continue to play the US and China against each other as it does now. leaving the main
economic and political costs of balancing China to the US. and US cultivation of China after 1971 helped to weaken the Soviet Union. 1 3-25) US policy on China. and staying broadly within the rules of the global economic order. but also amplified differences between the US and its allies. however. Europe will not care much about its rise. 20 To the extent that realist thinking dominates in Washington. and its effective fragmentation by the West. 25 no. aggressive and militarist. getting worse. 2011. which since the end of the Cold War has not only maintained. The US tie to Israel looks unlikely to change and will continue to poison Washington’s position in the region and much of the rest of the world. Japan and the Soviet Union in their rising period. underneath their formal political correctness. Unpopular US policies and competing interests in the region from other powers provide no foundations for legitimising US leadership. What is now in prospect. and will not feel threatened by it. possibly none. then a rising China. will be crucial to
whether others share US perceptions of China as a threat. China. China Buzan 11 – Barry. middle-ground position between Washington and Beijing. with both governments in different ways to blame. and share an interest in non-intervention and regime security. it would find itself being the front line in a new Cold War between Washington and Beijing. 23 The big question mark is Japan. and whose relationship with China remains deeply clouded by unsettled historical issues. and
the US retains its commitment to not tolerating any peer competitors. might welcome China’s rise. Russia. then it could well be that others would share US perceptions. 22 have many useful economic complementarities. containment of China was part of the East–West struggle. Montague Burton Professor in the Department of International Relations (March 25.
b. A considerable weight of expert opinion thinks that Sino-Japanese relations are. Waltz Annual Lecture A World Order Without Superpowers : Decentred Globalism. which are often in competition with those of the US. In the absence of any common cause. though less controversial than that on the Middle East.
if not impossible.
it is less clear that there is any fix for the problem of the unsustainable American lifestyle. This could easily become the dominant issue for
world politics. 2011. and the Bush administration’s resistance to serious pollution and emission controls. and the polarization of US politics will make it difficult. though the scientific uncertainties are still sufficient that the exact timing and unfolding of it are difficult to predict. requires collective action of a kind with serious economic consequences. though developments in the private sector and at the level of state and city governments might well restore some US credibility in this area. and even denial that there was a problem. it could put the US more on its own in relation to great power politics than it has been since before the First World War. March 2011 vol. Climate change Buzan 11 – Barry. “The Inaugural Kenneth N. 25 no. It poses questions of
common fate for all of humankind and. has in the eyes of many made the US more a part of the problem than of the solution. c. if rising temperatures and sea levels are to be controlled.
If China plays its hand cleverly. whether domestic or international. Yet the US is already unpopular on climate change. Montague Burton Professor in the Department of International Relations (March 25. 1 3-25) Climate change is a relatively new issue with only slight links back to the Cold War.” International Relations. However. Waltz Annual Lecture A World Order Without Superpowers : Decentred Globalism.101 of 154
powers. Obama’s enthusiasm for green energy as a fix for both the environment
and the economy has already been checked by the polarization in US politics. The commitment of Americans to a high consumption lifestyle. for the US to avoid remaining a big part of the problem
I believe that a complex. America is isolated. proliferation. Now its very presence in Eurasia is tenuous. Asia is shaping the world’s destiny — and exposing the flaws of the grand narrative of Western civilization in the process. Today the Asian landscape still features ancient civilizations but also by far the most people and. agrarian and feudal.html? _r=3&oref=slogin&pagewanted=all) Karl Marx and Max Weber both chastised Far Eastern cultures for being despotic. The rise of China in the East and of the European Union within the West has fundamentally altered a globe that recently appeared to have only an American gravity — pro or anti. what we see gradually happening in climate-change negotiations (as in Bali in December) — and need to see more of in the areas of preventing nuclear proliferation and rebuilding failed states — is a far greater sense of a division of labor
. What makes America unique in this seemingly value-free contest is not its liberal democratic ideals — which Europe may now represent better than America does — but rather its geography. as the world’s sole leader. As Europe’s and China’s spirits rise with every move into new domains of influence. It isn’t worth it.” in former Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick’s words.U. but how much longer will it do so as its own social standards rise far above this lowest common denominator? And why should China or other Asian countries become “responsible stakeholders. while Europe and China occupy two ends of the great Eurasian landmass that is the perennial center of gravity of geopolitics. “Waving Goodbye to Hegemony” http://www. Western imperialism united the globe. with Western ideals neither transferable nor relevant. Oswald Spengler saw it differently. the most money of any region in the world.nytimes. America must make itself irresistible to stay in the game. whether the United States or the United Nations.U. because the answer is unfolding before our eyes. the only reliable rule of history is its cycles of imperial rise and decline. and history promises the effort will fail. Neither China nor the E. multicultural landscape filled with transnational challenges from terrorism to global warming is completely unmanageable by a single authority. will replace the U. lacking the ingredients for organizational success. and as Toynbee also pithily noted. may uphold the principles of the United Nations that America once dominated. by certain measures. it has been shunned by the E. and Turkey. The E. As the historian Arnold Toynbee observed half a century ago. Despite the “mirage of immortality” that afflicts global empires. there is a marketplace of models of success for the second world to emulate. but it did not assure that the West would dominate forever — materially or morally. America must quickly accept and adjust to this reality. Europe will promote its supranational integration model as a path to resolving Mideast disputes and organizing Africa. Maintaining America’s empire can only get costlier in both blood and treasure. South Korea. The self-deluding universalism of the American imperium — that the world inherently needs a single leader and that American liberal ideology must be accepted as the basis of global order — has paradoxically resulted in America quickly becoming an everlonelier superpower. Instead. With or without America. is unwelcome in much of the Middle East and has lost much of East Asia’s confidence. America’s spirit is weakened. arguing that mankind both lives and thinks in unique cultural systems. “Accidental empire” or not. the only direction to go from the apogee of power is down. it successfully managed the Herculean task of running the world from one side of it. in an American-led international order when they had no seat at the table when the rules were drafted? Even as America stumbles back toward multilateralism. 08 (Parag Khanna. rather all three will constantly struggle to gain influence on their own and balance one another. not least the Chinese model of economic growth without political liberalization (itself an affront to Western modernization theory). Australia and Thailand. senior research fellow in the American Strategy Program of the New America Foundation. Would the world not be more stable if America could be reaccepted as its organizing principle and leader? It’s very much too late to be asking.102 of 154
Heg Decline Inevitable
Hegemonic decline is inevitable – a transition now towards multipolarity solves conflict. It already has. others are walking away from the American game and playing by their own rules. When America dominated NATO and led a rigid Pacific alliance system with Japan. Globalization resists centralization of almost any kind. Just as there is a geopolitical marketplace. The web of globalization now has three spiders. and climate change
Khanna. while China will push a Beijing consensus based on respect for sovereignty and mutual economic benefit.S.U.com/2008/01/27/magazine/27world-t.
a concrete burden-sharing among them by which they are judged not by their rhetoric but the responsibilities they fulfill. The arbitrarily composed Security Council is not the place to hash out such a division of labor.103 of 154
among the Big Three. The big issues are for the Big Three to sort out among themselves.
. Neither are any of the other multilateral bodies bogged down with weighted voting and cacophonously irrelevant voices.
It reveals vulnerabilities. degree in Political Science. “The Big Picture: Resource Collapse. It weakens the powerful. none of the leading great power nations seem well-suited to discover and adopt such new models. The same can be said of the leading global corporate powers. Senior Fellow. Those actors adopting the new successful models will find themselves disproportionately powerful.
. it sets up the conditions for the emergence of new models of power. Right now.org/index. and opens up new niches of influence.” http://ieet. setting the mighty against the mighty. as
ultimately the most effective responses to resource collapse will come from revolutions in technology and socio-economic behavior.php/IEET/more/cascio20080407/)
Resource collapse isn’t the cause of the rise of the post-hegemonic world. The climate and resource crises of the 2010s and 2020s will be compounded by a vacuum of global leadership. IEET. 08
(Jamais Cascio. It triggers conflict.104 of 154
Alt Cause – Resource Collapse
Resource collapse is important factor in hegemonic collapse. Most importantly. Senior Fellow of Institute for Emerging Ethics and Technologies (IEET). 4/8/08.
Cascio. but it’s an important driver.
regional consensuses in support of order and stability. Not just a direct military presence.S.
. The Bush administration deserves to be savagely criticised for the timing and the conduct of the Iraq war. In the former Soviet Union. in the course of which American global power will not be qualified but destroyed altogether. can present US strategy against Iran -. The empire can no longer raise enough taxes or soldiers. Like so many of their predecessors.be sustained permanently without war? Indeed. Impossible today. with potentially awful consequences for the world. The basic reasons why the American empire is bust are familiar from other imperial histories. In theory.still find extremely difficult to think about. the US wealthy classes have gained a grip over the state that allows them to escape taxation.realisticforeignpolicy. In an equally classical fashion. The result is that the empire can no longer pay for enough of the professional troops it needs to fulfil its self-assumed imperial tasks. central to what is happening is the greed and decadence of the imperial elites.105 of 154
Heg Collapse Inevitable (1/18)
Hegemony is unsustainable – slow decline now avoids a disastrous collapse later
Lieven. To place American power on a firmer footing requires putting it on a more limited footing. global power. may it not be that any power wishing to exercise hegemony in the region would have to go to war at regular intervals in defence of its authority or its local clients? Furthermore. 05 (Anatol Lieven.org/archives/2005/11/index. some at least of these moves may. War therefore means simply creating more and more areas of anarchy and breeding grounds for terrorism. Future historians may. unlike in 1917 or 1941. it could mean backing Japan and other countries against any Chinese aggression. however. the results would not have been significantly less awful. is unsustainable. it could mean accepting a qualified form of Russian sphere of influence. but direct military commitments and alliances should be avoided wherever possible.cuts to taxes on the middle classes. this process may occur through disastrous defeats. In the Middle East.S. establishment. however. and that given the realities of Iraqi society and history. senior research fellow at the New America Foundation and a member of the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy. it becomes clear how utterly unacceptable much of this approach would be to the entire existing US political order. When.but fiscally equally damaging -. the relative decline in US economic independence means that. It is to fall back on "offshore balancing". It can defeat other states in battle easily enough but it cannot turn them into loyal or stable allies. My fear though is that. It is important to note that this US weakness affects not only the ambitions of the Bush administration. the desirable US response to its imperial overstretch is simple and has been advocated by some leading independent US thinkers such as Professor Stephen Walt of Harvard. as presently conceived by the overwhelming majority of the U. but also geopolitical stances wholly shared by the Democrats. Despite the lessons of Iraq. For that matter. given the nature of the Middle East. For it is pointless to dream of long maintaining an American empire for which most Americans will neither pay nor fight. The result is that the US is incapable of waging more wars of occupation.supported by both parties -. rather than as a result of carefully planned and peaceful strategy. one traces what this might mean in practice in various parts of the world. conclude that President Bill Clinton's strategy of the 1990s would also have made the conquest of Iraq unavoidable sooner or later. Even a limited US-Chinese clash over Taiwan would be likely to produce catastrophic economic consequences for both sides. Mass acquiescence in this has to be bought with much smaller -. when possible. really serious war risks US economic disaster.php) U. such as in Iraq. In Asia. intended to create regional coalitions against potential aggressors and. http://www.Democrat and Republican. it is increasingly indebted and key vassal states are no longer reliable. It cannot introduce conscription because of the general demilitarisation of society and also because elite youths are no longer prepared to set an example of leadership and sacrifice by serving themselves. prove inescapable in a generation's time. it could involve separating US goals from Israeli ones and seeking detente with Iran. civilian and military -. “Decadent America Must Give Up Imperial Ambitions” 11-29-05. however. this is something that American policymakers -. but also defusing the threat of confrontation with China by encouraging the reintegration of Taiwan into the mainland.
. Across the globe. no country — friend of America’s or not — wants political tension to upset economic growth. The whole world is abetting China’s spectacular rise as evidenced by the ballooning share of trade in its gross domestic product — and China is exporting weapons at a rate reminiscent of the Soviet Union during the cold war. it is a bizarre phenomenon: small Asian nation-states should be balancing against the rising China.nytimes. And in the former Soviet Central Asian countries — the so-called Stans — China is the new heavyweight player. a set of Asian security and diplomatic institutions is being built from the inside out.com/2008/01/27/magazine/27world-t. From Thailand to Indonesia to Korea. it is deploying tens of thousands of its own engineers. from Canada to Cuba to Chávez’s Venezuela. Like Europeans. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization gathers these Central Asian strongmen together with China and Russia and may eventually become the “NATO of the East. they plan to launch their own regional monetary fund.html? _r=3&oref=slogin&pagewanted=all)
The East Asian Community is but one example of how China is also too busy restoring its place as the world’s “Middle Kingdom” to be distracted by the Middle Eastern disturbances that so preoccupy the United States. it is also making major strategic investments in the financial sector. senior research fellow in the American Strategy Program of the New America Foundation. Trade within the India-Japan-Australia triangle — of which China sits at the center — has surpassed trade across the Pacific. China is not only securing energy supplies. “Waving Goodbye to Hegemony” http://www. its manifest destiny pushing its Han pioneers westward while pulling defunct microstates like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Without firing a shot. Asians are insulating themselves from America’s economic uncertainties.106 of 154
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Hegemonic decline is inevitable – China rivals US influence and acts as a stabilizing force in Asia Khanna. while China has slashed tariffs and increased loans to its Southeast Asian neighbors. as well as oil-rich Kazakhstan. Aided by a 35 millionstrong ethnic Chinese diaspora well placed around East Asia’s rising economies. 08 (Parag Khanna. China is doing on its southern and western peripheries what Europe is achieving to its east and south. dam-builders and covert military personnel.S. resulting in America’s grip on the Pacific Rim being loosened one finger at a time. pinning America down while filling whatever power vacuums it can find. now enjoys a diplomatic. In America’s own hemisphere. into its orbit. but increasingly they rally toward it out of Asian cultural pride and an understanding of the historical-cultural reality of Chinese dominance. Under Japanese sponsorship. China is cutting massive resource and investment deals. Iran being the most prominent example. At the same time. In Africa. Every country in the world currently considered a rogue state by the U. To the Western eye. economic or strategic lifeline from China. aid workers. a Greater Chinese CoProsperity Sphere has emerged.
that American primacy could end much sooner than that. at some point
within the next decade or two. there are always potential pitfalls in projecting current trends several decades into the future (not least is that it is not easy to convert economic power into effective military power). primacy to multipolarity may be much closer than primacists want to admit. [Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute. The real issue is not if American primacy will end.” 36 Even the most ardent primacists know this to be true. It will take some time before any other state emerges as a true “peer competitor” of the United States. and transition from U. 64-65] Can the United States Be Caught? Up to a point.
Christopher LAYNE 2007. because that would imply a freezing of the differentiated pattern of growth rates. which is why they concede that American primacy won’t last forever. however."The Case Against the American Empire. in its survey of likely international developments up until 2020. For example. with impacts potentially as dramatic as those of the previous two. This is what the current debate in
the United States about the implications of China’s rise is all about. But if the ongoing shift in the distribution of relative power continues. There are indications. not static. which means that at any point in time some states are gaining in relative power while others are losing it. that—at best—the United States will not be able to hold onto its primacy much beyond 2030. The relative power position of great powers is dynamic.S." American Empire: A Debate. American primacy cannot be sustained indefinitely. the early 21st century may be seen as the time when some in the developing world led by China and India came into their Own. but how soon it will end. there is a yawning gap between the United States and the next-ranking powers. the CIA’s National Intelligence Council’s report Mapping the Global Future notes: The likely emergence of China and India as new major global players—similar to the rise of Germany in the 19th century and the United States in the early 20th century—will transform the geopolitical landscape. Already there is evidence suggesting that new great powers are in the process of emerging . a recent study by the CIA’s Strategic Assessment Group projects that by 2020 both China (which Mapping the Global Future pegs as “by any measure a first-rate military power” around 2020) and the European Union will come close to matching the United States in terms of their respective shares of world power.
.107 of 154
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We control uniqueness – collapse of primacy is inevitable by 2030. new great power rivals to the United States will emerge. new
poles of power in the international system are likely to emerge during the next decade or two. Indeed. Thus. To put it slightly differently. and military developments which has existed since time immemorial. as Paul Kennedy has observed. In a similar vein. technological advance. In the same way that commentators refer to the 1900s as the American Century.38 For sure. the primacists are correct. In terms of hard power. no great power ever has been able “to remain permanently ahead of all others. the leading primacists acknowledge. But China isn’t the only factor in play. p. Nevertheless.
the United States should begin to retrench strategically and capitalize on the advantages accruing to insular great powers in multipolar systems. to reduce others' concerns about its power. power. To reduce the fear of U. Unilateral offshore balancing. at some point."The Case Against the American Empire. but also one that ultimately is unsustainable. Real realists like Lippmann. attempting to sustain U. Hans Morgenthau. by asserting its power heavy-handedly. deterritorialized conception of security divorced from the traditional metrics of great power grand strategy: the distribution of power in the international system and geography." American Empire: A Debate. Walter Lippmann and Kenneth Waltz--
always warned of the dangers that a hegemonic United States would over-reach itself and. Its quest for hegemony is driven instead by an ideational. p. Morgenthau and
Waltz have highlighted the dangers that await if the United States gives in to the temptations of hegemonic power and have counseled instead that the United States pursue a grand strategy based on prudence and self-restraint. 130 It also must rein in the scope of its extravagant ambitions to shape the international system in accordance with its Wilsonian ideology. which is a potentially dangerous strategy. 64-65]
The United States has a hegemony problem because it wields hegemonic power. primacy may already be in the early stages of erosion. America's real realists--George F. the United States must accept some reduction in its relative hard power by adopting a multipolar—and essentially unilateral—offshore balancing strategy that accommodates the rise of new great powers. If the United States fails to adopt an offshore balancing strategy based on multipolarity and military and ideological self-restraint.
Heg is unsustainable Christopher Layne 2006. Maintaining U. primacy may well hasten its end by stimulating more intensive efforts to balance against the United States. Hegemony is not only a costly grand strategy. Fall
http://findarticles. The United States does not need to be an extraregional hegemon to be secure. Most of all. the real realists have understood the true paradox of American power: Precisely because of its power and
geography. especially given that U.S. and will remain so even if it no longer is a hegemon. They understood that the world is not malleable and will not respond to American-imposed social engineering. yet the very fact of its overwhelming capabilities has been a constant temptation for American policymakers to intervene abroad unwisely in the pursuit of unattainable goals (nation building or democracy promotion).S. They not only recognized that a wise grand strategy must balance ends and means. An America [End Page 40] that has the wisdom and prudence to contain itself is less likely to be feared than one that begs the rest of the world to stop it before it expands hegemonically again. is America's next grand strategy. the United States must practice self-restraint (which is different from choosing to be constrained by others by adopting a multilateral approach to grand strategy). thus causing the United States to become imperially overstretched and involving it in unnecessary wars that will reduce its power. Rather than risking these outcomes. National Interest. it probably will.108 of 154
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Collapse of hegemony and transition to off-shore balancing inevitable – delaying it just causes war
.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_85/ai_n16832448 The United States is a very powerful state. 131 Thus. Kennan.S. hegemony is a game that no longer is worth the candle. have to fight to uphold its primacy. there is very little the United States needs to do in the world in order to be secure. Paradoxically. but
also that it must differentiate between desirable objectives and attainable ones. Americans would do well to pay heed to these admonitions as they debate how the United States should alter its grand strategy as the unipolar era inexorably draws to a close. provoke opposition to it.S. Kennan. indeed. [Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas
A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute.
for example. the strategy of empire is unlikely to function if all sorts of states are allowed to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as a deterrent against the power projection of the United States.” which means taking military action before an
imminent attack by an adversary. But the “$64.” From this perspective. before a nation working on WMD.000 question is whether or not it makes sense to stand on the rooftops and announce loudly to the world that this is your doctrine. The Bush administration’s National Security Strategy boldly asserts that “our best defense is a good offense. . proximity matters. 93 Indeed.” 91 In his June 2. in preserving a balance of power. the risk of nuclear war could actually rise. I favor the Teddy Roosevelt approach to foreign policy: Speak softly and carry a big stick. . As political scientist Frank Russell once wrote: “Rome . State sovereignty also allows for the formation of multiple loci of power and the prospect of power balancing. President Bush laid out his vision of a future in which the United States more or less monopolizes global military power through preemption if necessary: “America has. such as India and Pakistan. Over the long run the strategy of empire will likely prove unsustainable and ultimately self-defeating. But it costs far more for the United States—a relatively secure nation separated from most of the world by two vast oceans—to project its power across the seas than it does for states located on other landmasses to project their power regionally.” 96 (continued from previous page – nothing cut) Consequently. we will have waited too long. . the security of the offense-minded state. adopted preemption as their official policy. In other words. and intends to keep. 2002. obtains them. Nov 26.” the belief that “the presence of oceans on much of the earth’s surface makes it impossible for any state to achieve global hegemony. or appears to undermine. however.” said Bush. . It will also increase the likelihood of war. allow [end page 13] these states to attempt to blackmail the United States and our allies to prevent us from deterring or repelling the aggressive behavior of rogue states.” 94 “There’s no question that great powers like the United States [can] launch preventative wars or preemptive strikes whenever they conclude it’s in their interests. which raises what John Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago has called the “stopping power of water. . That’s a blueprint for trouble if there ever was one. “The Empire Strikes Out: The ‘New Imperialism’ and its Fatal Flaws”. In practice this idea will bring preventative efforts. I think it would be better not to do that. the Bush
administration notes: “These weapons may . That’s because accepting the principle of noninterference is an impediment to a dominant state seeking to make other nations conform to its will. speech to West Point’s graduating class. the exceptions justify it—lest we establish precedents that others will emulate. in many cases the United States might launch a preventive attack to stop an incipient threat before it is even realized. p. What’s more.” adds Mearsheimer. Rome certainly was not interested in a balance of power for the very reason she was interested in a monopoly of power. offense-minded states have a tendency to incite security dilemmas. the United States currently has the world’s most powerful military. is to speak loudly (extended deterrence) and cut up and scatter Washington’s inadequate stick all over the place.” which says that striking early is less difficult than striking later. and “we have to be ready for preemptive action” because “if we wait for threats to fully materialize.) That approach is consistent with the strategy of empire. thus triggering a spiral of security competition that
. Certainly. That’s because the doctrine of prevention or preemption is predicated on the “ideology of the offensive. . [its] military strengths beyond challenge. The echo of Rome is clear. to make sure WMD proliferation is stopped at all costs. In its National Security Strategy.109 of 154
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Collapse is inevitable – sustaining hegemony only causes war and proliferation Eland 2002 (Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute. offense-minded states are apt to be war-prone because they believe the prospects for victory are very favorable to them. which are things an empire cannot accept if it is committed to maintaining supremacy. including war.” 92 (Although the president used the word “preemptive. Such states also see these weapons as their best means of overcoming the conventional superiority of the United States.” What’s more. “is that we all expect certain rules.” says a skeptical Bush administration official. such as Iraq. “One of the reasons there is not a constant state of war. if other nations. The logic of empire therefore dictates that as few states as possible should be allowed to gain a defensive footing with the United States.18)
The answer is probably no. A balance of power system is essentially a device for keeping the power of different states within limits by a system of checks and balances. the strategy of empire necessarily leads to a devaluation of other states’ sovereignty. and it spends much more on its defense than all its rivals combined. whereby the efforts of weaker states to increase their relative security undermines.” 95 The strategy of empire. But supporting preventative or preemptive action could shift the rules of the world order against peace and stability. never was interested . We just have to be careful that if we create exceptions to those rules.
which could in turn spur even more U. And other states will worry that the doctrine could be used against them. 98 Hence there is a paradox.S. 97 For example. as China’s economy grows.
. it may want more ability to control its
security environment within East Asia. The doctrine of prevention or preemptive intervention could actually create a greater incentive for other states to try to acquire WMD secretly as an insurance policy against American military might. The other major
problem with the doctrine of prevention or preemption is that in the absence of actual aggression against the United States. how will Washington prove that an attack might have happened? Surely some foreign and domestic critics will discount the threat afterward.110 of 154
can culminate in confrontation or war. which has a defense perimeter that is far forward and a military doctrine that is very preventive or preemptive. Inevitable mistakes will lead to recrimination and suspicions about America’s motives. The expansion of Chinese influence in that region may run afoul of a United States.
Western Europe and the British Isles were all under some kind of threat as the 1930s went on. expanding the campaign against terrorism to a country like Iraq would place severe strains on personnel and cause deep shortages of certain critical weapons.
even now. The primary danger is from an interventionist foreign policy that makes enemies who are resourceful and willing move into and exploit failed states. but that interventionism can create altogether new ones. Empires get into trouble because they get bogged down fighting protracted small
wars in the hinterland. to avoid confrontation with the Axis powers over the Spanish Civil War. And over the longer term there is the issue of being ready to fight a major theater war if necessary. a recent top-secret Pentagon war game. code named Prominent Hammer. like the proverbial man who
finds himself stuck in a hole. citizens and to threaten mass destruction. “To reach an accommodation with Italy in the Mediterranean. London was not in a position to rebuff a rising Nazi Germany early on because Britain was overstretched . . southwest Asia and the Sinai. policy or assuming a lower profile. H. that is. those advocates see it as an argument for deeper involvement. the demands of long-term deployments in places like the Balkans and South Korea. and the stress of ongoing operations in Afghanistan. today’s advocates of empire recommend more digging. and launching wars to transform countries like Iraq “into a beacon of hope. would affect the military’s ability to wage and win a new regional war. the danger posed by failed states is a consequence of something other than state failure per se. As former Reagan adviser and Cato Institute senior fellow Doug Bandow warns: “With the growing ability of small political movements and countries to kill U. The very problem of failed states. preventive
attacks on installations associated with those superweapons often founder on a lack of intelligence on the location of such clandestine small mobile. Thus . in short. the United States may find that its alliances and commitments around the world may sap its strength for dealing with any rising power—perhaps China.” 105 Empire. has revealed that.S. the security threat posed by failed states is really a second-order issue. though asserting their independence of the mother country. the risks of foreign entanglements increase. that is. Instead. . shows. The Joint Chiefs of Staff subsequently recommended postponing an attack against Iraq. economic aid. could be more interventionism. Failed states matter to today’s advocates of empire because the existence of such states raises the specter that interventionist foreign policies in one place can have a deadly price tag made possible by individuals willing to take advantage of the situation in another place.” The strategy of empire could make the United States less secure in another major way as well—by dispersing and overtasking its military personnel and equipment. 104 In 1937. In fact. America and its citizens will become an even greater lightning rod for the world’s political malcontents. Malaya and Singapore.111 of 154
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[Card continued without omission] prevention or preemption. The Dominions.S. 103 According to British
historian P. or deeply buried facilities. today’s advocates of empire are
unable to break out of their consolidating logic. the United States could conceivably lose one or more large cities to demented or irrational retaliation for American intervention. “The policy of ‘appeasement’ should never be appraised without recalling this sternly realistic recommendation. for ramping up U.S.) The unintended consequence of interventionism. and accumulating manifold security and treaty commitments they are obliged to honor. garrisoning myriad outposts. In coming years.S. M. Nevertheless. that is. not that interventionism necessarily solves problems. in other words. Their conclusion was that England should not make new enemies. Bell: [end page 15] The fundamental problem was the disparity between Britain’s commitments and her resources. According to the New York Times. promulgating foreign educational and health care programs. Thus.” 99 Yet it was such nation building that led to the attack on U. Accordingly. . (Yet as President Clinton [end page 14] found out in 1998 during Operation Desert Fox.” says Bell. But digging will neither get the man out of the hole nor make the United States safer. in other
words. One of the primary reasons Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain appeased Adolf Hitler at Munich in 1938 was that much of Britain’s strength was diffused throughout its far-flung empire. the fact that so many people in the Muslim world dislike America’s meddling is not seen as an argument for rethinking U. 102 The strategic implications are potentially enormous. “The war game measured how the strains of new commitments to domestic defense. to make only the most cautious response to Japanese aggression in China—all this followed in large part from the need to diminish the number of one’s enemies. Similarly. still relied on her for protection.
. Failed states are already an example of those self-reinforcing phenomena. telling other states and aspiring states who their leaders should be. Australia and New Zealand. Britain’s chiefs of staff produced a gloomy assessment of London’s security prospects. forces in Somalia. The commitments were almost literally worldwide. to find the basis of a settlement with Germany. the Middle East and Mediterranean.” 101 The conclusion was that the American military would be stretched very thin. reduced Britain’s
options in the face of a horrible danger.
to date. these others were allies dependent on American military protection. This current shortage of means is a further blow to America's hegemonic expectations. 2007 (Dean Acheson Professor. by continuing to add to its already immense reserves of surplus dollars. trained for intimate contact with the enemy. like countering guerrilla warfare and suicidal terrorism. p. has not been very good at it. The American military loathes this kind of fighting and. Put to the test. recent experience also reveals that America's global predominance has been seriously overestimated. however. The United States is now spending heavily to compensate for its deficiencies. Instead. During the Cold War.with more and cheaper troops. but at the expense of its own more balanced internal development. Director of the European Studies Program. but is still far short of the resources needed to prevail. credit to finance it no longer depends on allies in urgent need of protection. China. having a hegemonic superpower already installed might seem a great good fortune. Yet. with a good part of the exchange costs of America's world role eventually covered by others who accumulated the surplus dollars. 73-8)
Given our future's high potential for discord and destruction. it seems unreasonable to expect China to continue this practice indefinitely. credit comes increasingly from states whose indefinite accumulation of dollars seems contrary to their own long-term interests. and prepared for high casualties. Survival. Greater success would seem to require a different sort of military . Today. while the United States' external deficit is bigger than ever. the United States will face the tougher choices between guns and butter it has long been able to avoid. how long will America's enthusiasm for hegemony endure?
. together with American consumption and investment. While the United States is lavishly outfitted for high-technology warfare. for example. University Professor of The Johns Hopkins University. pursuing a hegemonic agenda in today's world requires different capabilities for more primitive forms of combat. subsidises its own imports.112 of 154
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Unipolar hegemony is unsustainable and doesn’t solve the terminal impacts Calleo. If credit from China is restricted. American power counts for less than expected. Financial experience during the Cold War accustomed the United States to abundant credit from the world economy. Given the growing protectionism against its exports. In the face of this unaccustomed constraint. Controlling hostile populations will demand extensive linguistic and policing skills.
What. First. which opens the door to American-European economic confrontations.S. a few actors look for shortcuts to overcome the massive imbalance in military capabilities. perhaps the most dominant great power in history. the war of words. Iran.S. They may hope to sway the American public . economic policy or wants to resist U.harvard.conventional weapons.S.S. symbols.ksg. Second. They resort to two tactics of the weak: terrorism and the possession of non. Other countries utilize rhetorical attacks and symbolic protests against U. Fourth.113 of 154
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Many factors challenge American hegemony including terrorism. The EU can thus engage. http://belfercenter. recent events in Iraq. While terrorism has long been seen as a weapon of the weak. and biological weapons may now be seen as a way of deflecting unwanted attention from Washington. win recruits. hegemony.S. and rogue states Pressman 2004 (Jeremy Pressman.
. even if the EU lacks the military might to engage in military disagreements. violence. policy in an effort to win the verbal war for hearts and minds at home and abroad. and North Korea are shedding light on the various ways in which nuclear. Even the U nited States. anti-American resentment. the United States has created the impression that non-conventional weapons are the best form of defense against the American empire. Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Connecticut in Storrs. hegemony does not offer a crystal clear road map. still needs cooperation from far weaker states on a host of issues such as the intelligence and police work needed to combat global terrorism. the specific economic relationship between the European Union (EU) and the United States does not fit the general pattern of U. dominance. chemical. are these forms of resistance? While the past decade of U. Anti-American actors rely in part on words to overcome material inferiority to the United States. and images does not simply reflect the will and ideas of the strongest country. in trade wars with the United States. then.S.edu/publication/2943/if_not_balancing_what_forms_of_resis tance_to_american_hegemony. economic dictates. and build support for anti-U. states can resist by withholding cooperation. it does suggest several different avenues by which states and disaffected peoples will resist U. What? Forms of Resistance to American Hegemony”. for example. Third. This gives those who are needed some leverage over the United States. “If Not Balancing. In projecting American military power around the globe. The EU has some economic weight to throw around when it disagrees with U.
preferences.S.harvard. What? Forms of Resistance to American Hegemony”. By virtue of geography. the door was open for meaningful non. the United States can pressure other countries to cooperate. They may judge and prioritize threats differently.html)
When other countries disapprove of U. The United States has worked with a wide range of states including Britain. they can resist by reducing cooperation that is essential for the advancement of U. Vetoing UNSC resolutions. Such support is essential for gathering intelligence and conducting international police work.ksg. bases are not immune to opposition either. Yet even close U. once the United States decided to target Iraq in 2002-03. Opponents of the war on Iraq used the threat of non-cooperation to slow the drive to war. and Uzbekistan. military greater access was based largely on the geographic cards Turkey holds. interest. and NATO involvement in getting ready. Kuwait was quick to support the U.S. they often favor a different policy to realize that interest. To some extent. a hyperpower still needs cooperation in some areas.S. evidence.compliance. financial support for reconstruction. This would be especially true when siding too closely with Washington could increase domestic political opposition and mobilize a strong challenge to regime survival.S.cooperation. certain nearby real estate became very important.edu/publication/2943/if_not_balancing_what_forms_of_resis tance_to_american_hegemony. Whether based on different interests or different policy preferences to pursue shared interests. Iraq assisted UN inspectors just enough so that some countries believed inspections were working even as Britain and the United States continued to decry Iraqi non.114 of 154
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America’s policy of aggression tanks cooperation efforts which are key to sustainable heg Pressman 2004 (Jeremy Pressman. Iraqi policy contributed to non. as the United States experienced in the Philippines and more recently in Okinawa.S. non-cooperation by less powerful states hurts U.S. “If Not Balancing. Longtime U. some states have unique assets that the United States covets. policy. efforts. or. http://belfercenter.S. The importance of the Turkish parliamentís vote against granting the U.html)
The dilemma of non-cooperation was also exemplified in other ways during the buildup to a war with Iraq. What? Forms of Resistance to American Hegemony”. Although the United States is dominant in many realms. Iraq appeared very aware of the possibility that its potential opponents could be divided by carefully calibrated Iraqi actions. For counter-terrorism. approach.S. Syria. If the United States is too aggressive or dismissive of local concerns. withholding cooperation would be counterproductive. effort. Once the United States asked for things like UN support for the war. For instance. Spain. “If Not Balancing.edu/publication/2943/if_not_balancing_what_forms_of_resis tance_to_american_hegemony. Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Connecticut in Storrs. Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Connecticut in Storrs. when they share the U. allies sometimes have different objectives. allies like France or Germany.S.cooperation by standard U.
. the war against al-Qaeda is illustrative.harvard. drug trafficking or intelligence-sharing. On cooperation more generally. If other countries always had the same interests and policies as the United States. withholding funds for the post-war reconstruction of Iraq. countries often drag their feet and slow the flow of information. In other words. http://belfercenter. Pakistan.S. putative allies may not feel inhibited about undermining the U. interests. but Turkey held out for much more. or preventing military preparations in Turkey under the NATO umbrella are all ways of resisting U.
No sustainable Heg—Policies like Iraq have tanked cooperation with important US allies Pressman 2004 (Jeremy Pressman. or suspects.ksg. But the depth of cooperation is always going to be in part a reflection of how willing the American partner is to cooperate.S.
S. stopped the United
the absence of the United Nations or some form of the international community meant the loss of access to Turkey during the war and greater difficulty getting aid and personnel to provide security and help with reconstruction. words are free if the topic is of interest to the international media.harvard. Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Connecticut in Storrs. The battle for hearts and minds is a two way street: while Washington is trying to build domestic support and win non-U. even if the words are not backed by material capabilities. any bit player can lambaste the United States.S. In hindsight. The open American system. policy are trying to convince the U. and foreign lobbying create opportunities for those opposed to U.S. public as well as non.edu/publication/2943/if_not_balancing_what_forms_of_resis tance_to_american_hegemony.S. Iraq. supporters in other countries. As became clear with Iraq.S. words and symbols can be used to make it harder for the United States to pursue and protect its interests.
. policy to win over both segments of the American public and U. international media. asymmetric warfare.html)
Another effect of words and symbols is that they can be used to undermine both domestic and international support for U. Words. In a system that values debate
and the clash of ideas.ksg. With the right message. “If Not Balancing. At the end of the day. opponents can range from longtime allies like France and Germany to the very target of the war. support.U. for example. policies. peoples. http://belfercenter.S. or.S. What? Forms of Resistance to American Hegemony”. Rhetorical assaults can increase the impact of other tactics such as non-cooperation. as we see in the next section.
States from getting the UN blessing for the war on Iraq.115 of 154
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International media and propaganda spur strong anti-American resentment tanking heg Pressman 2004 (Jeremy Pressman. foreign opponents of U.
cause of the effects of bipolarity itself." Salisbury said.. 15 iss. American grand strategists view the prospect of change in international politics in much the same way that British prime minister Lord Salisbury did toward the end of the nineteenth century. The suggestion that the days of American hegemony are numbered no doubt will be met with disbelief by advocates of the current grand strategy. it is the very fact of the Soviet Union 's collapse that has knocked the props out from under the strategy of preponderance. grand strategy must use these criteria to assess the comparative merits of both the current grand strategy and its competitors. hegemony prevents us from emerging as an offshore balancer – hegemonic decline is inevitable – it is better to let it decline now so we can choose our strategic position in the world Christopher Layne 1998. American hegemony cannot be maintained much beyond that period. that is only half of the argument. If the United States does not
choose now to begin making the transition to a new grand strategy better suited to the new century's emerging international realities. The United States could enjoy the relative predictability and stability of the bipolar era only be.S. Indeed. whether they are sustainable.S. The time to think about alternative grand strategic futures is now--before the United States is overtaken by events. Having fulfilled their hegemonic
ambitions following the Soviet Union 's collapse." However. seldom acknowledged by champions of preponderance. This strategy is also being undermined because the credibility of America 's extended deterrence strategy is eroding rapidly. I do not deprecate those who believe that bad things (increased geopolitical instability) could happen if the United States were to abandon the strategy of preponderance. power and the corresponding rise of new great powers-will render the strategy of preponderance untenable. Any serious debate about U. "and therefore it is in our interest that as little should happen as possible." The conditions that made American preponderance possible are changing rapidly. In advocating an offshore balancing strategy. the relative decline of U. they may. 2. "It simply has not been given to any one society to remain permanently ahead of all the oth.. International politics is dynamic. The United States could be hegemonic only because the Soviet threat caused others to accept American preeminence as prefer. Make no mistake: sometime in the early decades of the twenty-first century. America 's grand strategy will no longer be preponderance. the degree of risk they entail. The changing distribution of power in the inter. This is unsurprising. Visiting Associate Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School [World Policy Journal. without the Cold War.. America will not be able to preserve its Cold War preponderance or stability.national system-specifically. As Paul Kennedy has observed. “Rethinking American grand strategy: Hegemony or balance of power in the twenty-first century?” vol. however. not static. the costs and risks of the strategy of preponderance will rise to unacceptably high levels. events will force it to do so. Simply put. The time is rapidly approaching when the strategy of preponderance will be unable to pass these tests. proquest] My argument for adopting an alternative grand strategy is prospective: although it may be sustainable for perhaps another decade. Over time. Summer. "What ever happens will be for the worse. and their tangible and intangible domestic effects.able to Soviet domination.
.S. Grand strategies must be judged by the amount of security they provide. the advocates of preponderance want to keep the world the way it is. is that bad things--perhaps far worse things--could happen if the United States stays on its present strategic course.ers.116 of 154
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U. their cost. The other half.
No. is illustrative. Fall. This has led primacists to conclude that there has been no balancing against the United States. the primacists' focus on both the failure of new great powers to emerge and the absence of hard balancing distracts attention from other forms of behavior— notably leash-slipping—by major second-tier states that ultimately could lead to the end of unipolarity. hegemony and. a strategy of preponderance will fail. George Bush's New World Order and Bill Clinton's apparent commitment to assertive projection of America's democratic and human rights values reflect America's desire to "press its preferred policies" on others. Such a strategy articulates a vision of an American-led international order. For example. In February 1992. Moreover. As a consequence. in a February 1991 address to the New York Economic Club. 17.
. 124 Several weeks later. Bush said that because the United States had taken the leader's role in the Gulf militarily. Over time.4 1993) Inevitably. suggested that the deployment of United States forces in Europe and Japan could be used as a bargaining chip in trade negotiations with those countries. However. then-Vice President Dan Quayle linked the continuance of America's security commitment to NATO with West European concessions in the GATT negotiations. International Security. Nye. A hegemon tends to overpay for security. differential growth rates trigger shifts in relative economic power that ultimately result in the emergence of new great powers. A strategy of more or less benign hegemony does not prevent the emergence of new great powers. which eventually weakens the internal foundation of its external position. Over time. The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming of the United States' Unipolar Moment. “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise”. the effect is to erode the hegemon's preeminence. so will U. Other states underpay for security. contrary to the predictions of Waltzian balance of power theorists. which followed such a strategy.117 of 154
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Collapse inevitable – free-riding
Christopher Layne 1993 (Visiting Associate Professor at Naval Postgraduate school. Harvard professor Joseph S. not yet. p. A strategy of benign hegemony allows others to free-ride militarily and economically. Other states can justifiably infer that Washington's unipolar aspirations will result in the deliberate application of American power to compel them to adhere to the United States' policy preferences. such a policy will accelerate the hegemon's relative decline.S. America's renewed credibility would cause Germany and Japan to be more forthcoming in their economic relations with Washington. Associate Professor at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at
Texas A & M. 31 To be sure. Vol. No doubt. if it ends. The fate of nineteenth-century Britain.S. primacy. unipolarity persists. No new great powers have emerged to restore equilibrium to the balance of power by engaging in hard balancing against the United States—at least. Unipolarity is the foundation of U. benign hegemony facilitates the diffusion of wealth and technology to potential rivals. the strategy of preponderance could prolong unipolarity somewhat. which allows them to shift additional resources into economically productive investments. 125 Such a "leverage strategy" is no mere abstraction. There is another reason why a strategy of preponderance will not work. however." But there is more to it
than that. as long as eligible states calculate that the benefits of free riding outweigh the constraints imposed on them by American hegemony.
Heg collapse inevitable – leash slipping Christopher Layne 2006. Jr. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY.
the United States needs to design a strategy that will (1) safeguard its interests during the difficult transition from unipolarity to multipolarity. It would be counterproductive for the United States to attempt to maintain its relative power position by attempting to suppress the emergence of new great powers. (4) in a multipolar system.
. and (2) enable the United States to do as well as possible in a multipolar world . the United States-Japan relationship will become highly competitive and the possibility of hegemonic war will be present . Rather than vainly and counterproductively pursuing a strategy of preponderance.118 of 154
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Multipolarity is inevitable only a shift in US strategy to independence will solve the turns
Christopher Layne 1993 (Visiting Associate Professor at Naval Postgraduate school. Systemic change occasioned by the rise and fall of great powers has always been traumatic. bipolar. The transition from unipolarity to multipolarity will challenge the United States to devise a policy that will arrest its relative decline while minimizing the chances that other states will be provoked into balancing against the United States. No.S. (3) unipolarity will cause other states to balance against the United States.4 1993) The coming years will be ones of turmoil in international politics. America's optimal strategy is to make its power position similar to Goldilocks' porridge : not too strong. it is less likely to have negative geopolitical repercussions than a policy that aims at perpetuating unipolarity. the international system will provide a definitive field test of the contending views of inter national politics offered by neorealists and their critics. but just right-strong enough to defend American interests. Relative decline has internal and external causes. traditional patterns of great power competition will reemerge not withstanding the effect of secondimage factors. In coming years. which probably would accelerate the rise of new great powers. Although vigorous internal renewal might cause frictions with others over economic policy. it is pointless to debate the comparative merits of unipolar. Vol. This approach would heighten others' concerns about the malign effects of unchecked American power. (2) unipolarity will stimulate the emergence of eligible states as great powers . the debate between neorealists and their critics will continue. without pro voking others.4 1993) Because multipolarity is inevitable . International Security. 17. not too weak. “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise”. and increase the probability that balancing behavior would be directed against the United States. Vol.
Unipolarity will inevitably collapse the US must switch to a multipolar strategy to avoid the harms
Christopher Layne 1993 (Visiting Associate Professor at Naval Postgraduate school. No doubt neorealism's critics will continue to
point to second image factors as reasons to take an optimistic view of the future. energies on redressing the internal causes of relative decline would be perceived by others as less threatening than a strategy of preponderance. No. Fifty years from now. No doubt. and probably much sooner. But this one is not fated to drag on inconclusively. and multipolar systems ." A policy that concentrates U. Structural realists can be confident that events will vindicate their predictions: ( 1) Because of structural
factors. which would invite others to exploit American vulnerabilities. 17. we will know who was right and who was wrong. an American strategy of preponderance or an attempt to perpetuate unipolarity is doomed to failure . which would frighten others into balancing against the United States. Relative decline can be addressed by policies that focus on either or both of these causes. too. American policymakers need to remember that
other states balance against hegemons and they should not want the United States to be seen by others as a "sprawling giant with gouty fingers and toes. and (5) if differential growth rate effects allow Japan to challenge America's leading position. International Security. “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise”.
Vol. U. America First is an imperative.” Salisbury said. some would maintain that offshore balancing is both selfish and immoral. should it wish to do so. and an emphasis on domestic needs over external ambitions. offshore balancing—an innenpolitik grand strategy that posits the primacy of domestic over foreign policy—is ethically driven: America’s mission lies at home.S. preponderance’s advocates want to keep the world the way it is.22 Issue. I have attempted to demonstrate that. such a policy is indeed self-interested and most assuredly moral. there is nothing wrong with taking advantage of that Cold War’s end to focus on economic and social challenges at home: “What we should want. As Paul Kennedy has observed. grand strategists view the prospect of change in international politics in much the same way that British Prime Minister Lord Salisbury did toward the end of the nineteenth century. “What ever happens will be for the worse. Kennan says. U. In fact.119 of 154
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Heg collapse inevitable Layne 97 (Christopher Layne is Visiting Associate Professor at Naval Postgraduate school. 1 Summer 1997)
It is unsurprising that having fulfilled their hegemonic ambitions following the Soviet Union’s collapse. And it should do so. in these circumstances. of external involvement. International Security. In this sense. hegemony cannot last indefinitely. nation over empire. not abroad. The debate between advocates of preponderance and offshore balancing. “it simply has not been given to any one society to remain permanently ahead of all the others…” Thus the strategy of preponderance must be reassessed.S.” No doubt. “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy”. “and therefore it is in our interest that as little should happen as possible. in fact. however. not the maximum. however. As George F. the United States can pursue an alternative grand strategy without sacrificing its security. it is also about values. The United States is secure enough from external threat that.
. it could choose to restraint over intervention. is about more than strategy. is the minimum.” International politics. not a pejorative: Offshore balancing is a twenty-firstcentury grand strategy consistent with America’s interests and its values. is dynamic not static.
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History demonstrates that every empire has collapsed – cannot be sustained through force without public legitimacy
Carl Boggs 2005 (Social Science Professor National University (L.A.) , Planetary Politics: human rights, terror, and global society, ed. Stephen Eric Bronner)
The long history of empire aspiring to tyrannical rules over mass populations, hoping to expand their domain by overwhelming political coercion and military force, has been saturated with fierce resistance, deep quagmires, and humiliating failure: Rome, Spain, France under Napoleon, England, the brief twentieth-century global ventures of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. All at some point combined an unshakable political hubris with faith in armed violence as a means for building empire – and all had dazzling periods of success before disintegrating or being vanquished. Previous imperial regimes violated the basic Machiavellian premise that power without broad popular consent is destined to either implode or be overthrown. A corollary is that imperial domination by its very logic cannot easily secure much popular legitimacy, if any. By the 1940s the very idea of imperial control based upon foreign occupation had become historically obsolete, swept away by a series of postwar (and earlier) anticolonial struggles. The French colonial wars intended to retain control of Indochina and parts of Africa amounted to a final desperate reliance on brute force as the famous European “civilizing” mechanisms of religion, culture, and legal codes met with increasingly violent resistance. Dien Bien Phu and the Battle of Algiers symbolized the final eclipse of a colonial era in which European powers had recognized few limits to the use of military violence, much of it directed against civilian populations. The very ideology of imperial domination had been assaulted and destroyed in the name of ideals mainly imported from Europe itself—national self-determination, cultural autonomy, democracy.
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Drive for empire contains its own seeds of destruction through resistance and blowback
Carl Boggs 2005 (Social Science Professor National University (L.A.) , Planetary Politics: human rights, terror, and global society, ed. Stephen Eric Bronner) An urgent question for the fate of the planet is whether US ruling elites can for long sustain their drive toward global domination—that is, whether they can prevail in an arena where military force and political coercion have become the chosen methods of supremacy. We know that what governing regimes may require for popular support domestically may not readily extend to the sphere of world politics, where Hobbesian chaos tends to block normal mechanisms of legitimacy and order. US efforts to impose corporate and geopolitical agendas through military power, which of course it has in great abundance, will depend upon conditions of effective popular mobilization—needed to justify the costs and sacrifices of empire—but those very conditions (e.g. patriotism) quickly lose their ideological rationale beyond the national territory. Such conditions are in fact more likely to breed opposition and resistance to empire, including diverse expression of blowback. Signs of expanding opposition to empire have become increasingly visible; global terrorism and the events of 9/11, flourishing of an international antiwar movement during 2002 and 2003, growth of antisystem forces such as the World Social Forum, diffusion of anti-American sentiment in Europe the Muslim world, Asia, and elsewhere. To the degree that those ideological factors generating legitimacy for a new American militarism are bound to be counterproductive globally, imperial stability will more likely be reinforced by “postmodern” conditions involving widespread depoliticization, mass apathy, and privatized retreat ensuring greater elite autonomy. No doubt the rulers of empire would prefer a quieter, more atomized, depoliticized universe smoothly governed by routine economic transactions, the market, and consumerism, the ideal of an American-managed neoliberal hegemony grounded in a peaceful, more or less consensual imperial order. The problems here are twofold—the neoliberal model itself generates massive social contradictions while globalized, aggressive US military power works against the trajectory of single world hegemon, hoping to extend its rule over the entire planet, these contradictions are bound to significantly worsen.
A system of global domination resting largely upon military force. Yet it is not too difficult to see how the unique conditions of domestic support for US worldwide economic and military power might run counter to requirements for global hegemony. the United States has already lost much of its room to maneuver even as it wins immediate victories by means of economic and diplomatic leverage combined with military power—the same power that may soon become a double-edged sword. and dedicated to ruling the globe by force.
. and virtual absence of governing mechanisms differs radically from the state system that commanded most of Gramsci’s attention. nor can it smooth over the harsh dysfunctions and conflicts endemic to the corporate world economy by mobilizing forms of hegemony such as nationalism and consumerism that work so fluidly in domestic politics. Of course. the global terrain with its vast mélange of competing nation-states. and global society. As the lone superpower with a huge seemingly invincible military apparatus. rooted in a strong patriotism. insights can be gleaned from several passages in the Prison Notebooks. including those referred to above. terror. ed. Planetary Politics: human rights. cannot in the scheme of things consolidate its rule on a foundation of legitimating beliefs and values. will naturally conflict with the multiplicity of competing interests and wills across the globe— interests and wills leading often to anti-imperial resistance and opposition just as predictably as any law of physics.123 of 154
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Military power undermines US heg and leadership – spurs resistance and is unsustainable Carl Boggs 2005 (Social Science Professor National University (L. expansive scope. Strong elements of “national-popular” consent underlying US empire.A. Stephen Eric Bronner)
While Gramsci never systematically brought the concept of hegemony into the realm of international politics.) . or threat of force.
the more we will see the planetary stakes of the new global game. Condoleezza Rice has said America has no “permanent enemies.gov. Not Russia. we are competing — and losing — in a geopolitical marketplace alongside the world’s other superpowers: the European Union and China. as well as warships anchored at Bahrain and an Air Force presence in Qatar. But the distribution of power in the world has fundamentally altered over the two presidential terms of George W. whether to do it alone or with allies and what kind of world America should lead. and there is precious little Clinton or McCain or Obama could do to resist its growth. they mean little. multicivilizational. insurgent groups and “asymmetric” weapons like suicide bombers. both because of his policies and. Democrats and Republicans are bickering about where and how to intervene. This is geopolitics in the 21st century: the new Big Three. The Big Three make the rules — their own rules — without any one of them dominating. and each assertion of power has awakened resistance in the form of terrorist networks. multipolar battle. The Geopolitical Marketplace At best. America has pulled out of Iraq but has about 20. It’s as if the first decade of the 21st century didn’t happen — and almost as if history itself doesn’t happen. America’s unipolar moment has inspired diplomatic and financial countermovements to block American bullying and construct an alternate world order. not an incoherent Islam embroiled in internal wars. despite them.>
. and Republicans believe muscular moralism is the way to go.” http://www.” but it has no permanent friends either. for the first time in history. was not truly an “East-West” struggle. Previous eras of balance of power have been among European powers sharing a common culture. The European Union has expanded to well over 30 members and has secure oil and gas flows from North Africa. Why? Weren’t we supposed to reconnect with the United Nations and reaffirm to the world that America can.. from the Pakistani port of Gwadar. “The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order. That new global order has arrived. The postcold-war “peace dividend” was never converted into a global liberal order under American leadership. but that was also a decade adrift. It is 2016. and you could be forgiven for thinking it’s 1999. Russia and the Caspian Sea. and should. Iran is nuclear. America’s unipolar moment lasted through the 1990s.html? _r=1&oref=slogin&ref=magazine&pagewanted=print) <Turn on the TV today. too. lead it to collective security and prosperity? Indeed. European and Chinese worldviews. lagging decades behind China in both development and strategic appetite. more significant. in fact. as well as substantial nuclear energy.nytimes.” to be published by Random House in March.com/2008/01/27/magazine/27world-t. an increasingly depopulated expanse run by Gazprom. Many saw the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq as the symbols of a global American imperialism. This essay is adapted from his book. it remained essentially a contest over Europe. America’s standing in the world remains in steady decline.124 of 154
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Hegemonic collapse inevitable
Khanna 8 (Parag Khanna is a senior research fellow in the American Strategy Program of the New America Foundation. they were signs of imperial overstretch. is a global. Bush. rather than bestriding the globe. What we have today. The more we appreciate the differences among the American. Democrats believe they can hit a reset button. So now. The cold war. Every expenditure has weakened America’s armed forces. Maybe the best way to understand how quickly history happens is to look just a bit ahead. improvements to America’s image may or may not occur. and the Hillary Clinton or John McCain or Barack Obama administration is nearing the end of its second term. and not India.000 troops in the independent state of Kurdistan. Afghanistan is stable. but either way. China has absorbed Taiwan and is steadily increasing its naval presence around the Pacific Rim and. And the others are left to choose their suitors in this post-American world. “Waving Goodbye to Hegemony. on the Arabian Sea.
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91 trillion likely to overtake Japan to second position. despite pressure from
Washington. Later China responded by pointing out that the currency brouha had little to do with the US trade deficit. je)
Last week China released their GDP growth figures for 2009 which showed it grew 8. China merely protested at US human rights attacks. India have voiced concern over its trade imbalances with China and entered in negotiations to increase its exports. PriceWaterHouse Coopers and Goldman Sachs have come out with their set of predictions – China
will become the largest economy by 2020
and on some parameters India will overtake Japan in
. for example. China’s policy toward US attacks and threats was reactive and defensive. publishing its own documented inventory of US domestic human right violations 38 . the corporate penetration does not enhance US power rather it provides China with a lobby in Washington opposing protectionist measures. the
most dynamic countries. Overall the US imperial strategy to stem its decline and block China’s
growth as a world power has failed. Commodity Online. Beijing has encouraged the US MNC to invest in China
and export back to the US. White House policymakers and financial detractors of Beijing have
ignored the formidable foundations of Chinese empire building and its capacity to rectify internal imbalances to sustain dynamic expansion. borrowing technology and upgrading its high tech industries. namely to its low level of savings. USA is still the largest economy with a GDP of $14 trillion. China affirmed that is exchange rate was an “internal matter” and even acceded to US demands and revalued its currency (2006 – 2008) by 20%. More
recently in April 2010. China rebuked Washington’s interference in China’s internal affairs and threatened to take reprisals which led Washington to drop its crusade. rather than proactive and offensive especially during the first decade of its advance toward global power status. “Rising and Declining Economic Powers: The Sino-US Conflict Deepens. http://www. however. Over time Asia is replacing the US as the fastest growing trading partner of Beijing. China
refuses to lend support to Obama’s military centered strategy
to buttress the empire. have ignored Washington’s warnings of China as a “security threat” and expanded their trade and economic ties with their neighbor.demographic trends. either denying the charges or claiming they were internal affairs. Initially. China went on the offensive. Sreekumar.org/petras/b2-img/petras_sinous. While attending “summits” and bilateral conferences it refuses to make concessions which prejudice its overseas markets.126 of 154
Exts – Yes China Rise
Decline is inevitable . pointing to the structural weaknesses in the US economy. Most strikingly in Asia.commodityonline.
China will overtake the US by 2020 -. China does little to directly constrain US overseas expansion. retired Bartle Professor (Emeritus) of Sociology at Binghamton University in Binghamton. When Washington protested at China’s violation of the human rights of Tibetan and Uigher
recording $4. six times the projected growth of the US 37 . “Futurology: Why
US hegemony will decline?”. Given the overall growth of China. in the first quarter of 2010 China grew at 12%.pdf) A rising economic powers’ most formidable and effective response to the established imperial powers’ efforts to block its advance is … to keep on growing at double or triple the rate of growth of its declining adversary.html.” http://lahaine.China is rising at unprecedented rates and US scare tactics can’t undermine its credibility Petras 10 – James. By 2010. refuses to join its sanctions campaign against Iran and develops investment ties in Afghanistan while the US military occupation costs billions and alienates most Afghans including its client regime 39 . Raghavan ‘10. (since Washington does a good job at self-destruction) rather it focuses on enhancing its own economic based strategy of increasing overseas investments. capital formation and loss of competitiveness. Nothing challenges the “crises” propaganda emitted by US embedded experts as the reports that. China.com/news/Futurology-Why-US-hegemony-will-decline25056-3-1. New York and adjunct professor at Saint Mary's University (4/28/10.Staff Writer for Commodity Online (1/24/10. without directly confronting the military mission promoted by Obama.
Kraska ’10. China
. After all the US economy was built on free enterprise. In 2003.key to overall global primacy. "Previous studies [covering periods into the early 1990s] have shown that birth weights have increased steadily during the past half-century. Today. China failed to comply
with its obligations under international law to show due regard for the rights of vessels and aircraft of other nations operating in the East and South China Seas. the Yuzheng 311. of course. Beginning in 2000. an affiliate of Harvard Medical School. the USNS Victorious was harassed.S. If China or India emerges stronger.’ These three cases are only the
tip of the iceberg. Naval War College and Senior Fellow at
Foreign Policy Research Institute (5/6/10. stress and exposure to environmental toxins. also found white. a similarly aggressive intercept occurred. China sent its largest and most modern ocean surveillance patrol ship. The fighter jet collided with the US aircraft. The greater issue. and even started using armed oceanographic ships and
fisheries enforcement vessels to try to disrupt routine US military survey missions in the East China Sea." Emily Oken of Harvard Medical School said in a statement. for example. Chinese ships and aircraft harassed and
threatened the USNS Bowditch and the USNS Sumner.” So apart from factors
such as industrial production. maternal and neonatal characteristics. The fact that
the finding has come from Harvard Medical School is sure to ignite further research into causes leading to low birth weight babies and how to correct them. is how
China has invested decades in a patient and aggressive campaign to slowly push other countries out of the East China Sea and South China Sea. In 1953. which were operating in the East China Sea.
China will overtake naval heg -. and again in 2002. such as trends in mothers' diets.Howard S. well-educated. a Chinese fighter jet aggressively intercepted a US Navy propeller-driven EP-3 surveillance aircraft 75 miles from Hainan Island.
the obvious reason is because they produce more goods and services. In each of these cases. as it’s the largest obstacle to Beijing’s strategy. President Obama dispatched the USS Chung-Hoon to provide armed escort for the surveillance ship. the line is derisively called ‘the cow tongue. The causes of this decline remain unclear and babies born small not only face short-term complications but increased risk as adults. into the South China Sea to assert China’s ‘rights and interests. Soon after the Impeccable incident. Oken and her colleagues found birth weights had decreased by an average of 1. China initiated increasingly provocative warship and aircraft maneuvers. James. Harvard researchers say.’ In 1974. All of it will be lost if indeed.S. http://thediplomat. debatable. “U.828 U. stopping directly in front of the ship. Working in tandem with an intelligence ship. In 2001. In another of the many instances of harassment of US naval and air forces." Instead. The US Navy is the main target. published in February's Obstetrics & Gynecology. on March 7 of 2009. two commercial cargo ships crossed the bow of Impeccable. utlising their human and natural resources in an efficient manner. capitalism and innovative spirit. physical activity.com/2010/05/06/china-ready-to-dominate-seas/4/.83 ounces between 1990 and 2005. Chinese maritime forces stalked the USNS Impeccable ocean surveillance ship. a new generation of kids are born who are underweight who could face increased risk in their adult life as well. Russia and India. ‘nine-dotted line’ that laid
claim to 80 percent of the South China Sea. China has been equally obstinate in pressing specious ‘territorial’ claims to virtually the entire South China Sea. The researchers looked at data from 36. obstetric care and other trends from the National Center for Health Statistics Natality Data Sets. At the same time.S. In the summer of 2001. je) The prospects for a Chinese surprise attack are. Who knows biological reasons may be the critical factor that determines how long USA will remain the world’s largest economy. married women who didn't smoke. "We expected to see a continuation of those increases. an oceanographic ship and a fisheries enforcement vessel. Levie Chair of Operational Law at the U. natural resources. But the ‘Futurogist’ in me couldn’t ignore the following report from Massachussets. The result: a well-coordinated campaign of legal. reversing a decades-long upward trend in birth weights. resulting in the loss of the jet and pilot. received early prenatal care and delivered vaginally with no complications had babies who weighed an average of 2. analyzed data on birth weight. political and military pressure—and sometimes aggression—to gradually bring the littoral seas under Chinese domination. newborns have
gotten smaller during the past 15 years. China issued an infamous map with a U-shaped. innovation. however. US new borns are getting smaller which is to be studied in detail by the medical fraternity in the coming years. I feel the above report on US new borns indicate that biological reasons could also cause US hegemony to be threatened by emerging nations of China.127 of 154
2012. The study. In response. USA which states that during the past 15 years. The heavily damaged EP-3 made an emergency landing on the island. The Diplomat.827. knowledge capital. Researchers at the Harvard Pilgrim Health Care Institute's department of population medicine. “China Set for Naval Hegemony”.78 ounces less at birth during the study period. I am quoting the report in full before coming to my theory of why US hegemony will end in another 20-30 years as predicted by futurologists. Future research may identify other factors not included in the current data that might contribute to lower birth weight. babies born at full-term between 1990 and 2005.
who notably coined the phrase ‘strategic reassurance’ to describe the idea that the United States should reassure China that its rise to prominence is welcome. In 1988. China has mastered quiet air-independent propulsion (AIP) power plants for its new
Type 041 Yuan-class boats. These maritime disputes are cast
against the backdrop of decades of Chinese naval build-up. For the first time. in the Gulf of Tonkin. and the entire force is complemented by hundreds of fast cruise-missiles shooting offshore patrol vessels and land-based aircraft. Ironically. another Okinawa Prefecture island. with short
and secure internal lines of communication. and particularly maritime mobility. and enables submarines to sprint underwater—greatly increasing their attack radius. oftentimes Washington has no other carrier in theater. Malaysia and Brunei. As a maritime nation with worldwide responsibilities. and the country’s intransigent and tireless peddling of patently illegal maritime claims. The first war fought by an independent United States was over the issue of freedom of the seas—the 17981800 Quasi-War with France. All of Beijing’s warships and land-based aircraft and submarines already are present in theater. The United States believes it can be ‘virtually present’ everywhere. on the other hand. Fourth. on April 13 a Chinese Navy destroyer performed the menacing act of aiming its rapid-fire guns at a Japanese MSDF P-3C plane. raising the danger that China was willing to endanger the safety of one of its aircraft to make a point. China’s grand effort to convert large swaths of the oceans into an area under Chinese suzerainty is a dangerous game that risks naval war. This isn’t
new. Beijing has
elevated the ‘the cow tongue’ to a vital national interest. in combination with a space-based maritime surveillance and targeting system. The second US war was the First Barbary War of 1804. a 10-ship Chinese flotilla. Then. is a force multiplier. the Center for Naval Analysis issued a report suggesting that none of this is hyperbole: the US Navy is at the tipping point. can be used to strike moving warships at sea. Several factors are in play as China unveils a stable of advanced and emerging systems. Third. 88 major surface combatants and 48 submarines. the US Navy battle force. Chinese ground
. By comparison. the New York Times reported that Chinese officials
had told Deputy Secretary of State James B. For each of these conflicts. the key US issue was ensuring freedom of the seas.500-mile range DF-21 ASBM. about to abandon its position of maritime superiority. the third US conflict was the War of 1812. most of the rocks and reefs of the Spratly and Paracel chains are merely navigational hazards and not ‘islands. The DF-21 will be armed with a maneuverable reentry vehicle
(MARV) that. the Philippines. Reportedly quieter than the US fast attack Los Angeles-class boats. after suffering an embarrassing indignity in 1996 when President Bill Clinton ordered the Nimitz and Independence carrier battle groups into the Taiwan Strait. the United States is under the delusion that it could maintain sea control in Asia. China is working feverishly on a new weapon that will
alter the strategic calculus—the 1. which will include aircraft carriers. 31 amphibious warfare ships. China’s geographic position. and the fourth war involving the United States was the Second Barbary War. So accustomed to being militarily superior. China again attacked Vietnamese forces on Johnson Reef and occupied six features in the Spratly Islands.’ They also lie far from China and within the 200-mile economic zones of neighboring Vietnam. and then surge actual forces in the event of a crisis. Taiwan. In February. which included two submarines. it was Steinberg. Are you starting to see a pattern here? But China has made uncanny progress on its dogged trek to transition from an obsolete 1950s-style coastal defense force to a balanced blue water fleet. the United States devotes only 26 percent of its defense budget to the Navy and Marine Corps. all spread thinly throughout the world. While the United States has the forward-deployed USS George Washington on a short tether. the Vietnam War. specifically designed to decapitate US carrier strike groups. an ultra-quiet Song–class AIP submarine surfaced inside the protective screen of the aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk. and in 1994 Beijing captured Mischief Reef from the Philippines. and the US strategy is tacit recognition that the Navy that had approached 600 ships in the 1980s is incapable of maintaining even half that number. AIP extends underwater endurance from a few days to one month. This is unlike any threat ever faced by the US Navy. China has embarked on a program to build a powerful surface fleet. On April 10 of this year. and the prospect of intercepting a maneuvering ballistic missile reentry vehicle is daunting. Last year. Beijing’s maritime bullying. Likewise. The Chinese fleet is about 260 vessels. But in March. demonstrating its ability to shoot down the aircraft. The Chinese Navy. But ‘virtual presence’ is actual
ragged with global responsibilities. farther north. China seized 33 Vietnamese fishing boats and 433 crew members near the Paracel Islands. a longtime Clinton associate.128 of 154
seized the Paracel Islands from Vietnam. The US fleet will be
absence. Ironically. has shrunk by 20 percent since 2001. including 75 major warships and more than 60 submarines. while China should in turn reassure its neighbors that its rise is peaceful. In one incident in October 2006. This occurred only two days after a Chinese helicopter flew within 90 feet of a MSDF destroyer monitoring the battle group. Second. run hard-pressed to maintain a force of 11 carriers. the elusive AIP diesel electrics are equipped with wake-honing torpedoes and anti-ship cruise missiles. which was on a regular patrol mission in international airspace. Steinberg that China would not tolerate ‘foreign interference’ in its ‘territory’ in the South China Sea. meaning that even two or three Chinese carriers operating in the area likely will exceed the number of US flattops. transited between Okinawa Island and Miyakojima. the issue of freedom of the seas helped precipitate US involvement in two world wars and. But by claiming the South China Sea as its ‘territory. The cornerstone of American power and security is global access.’ China is reaching far beyond its shores. First. attracts more than 33 percent of the nation’s military spending.
leaders realized that no modern country has ever become a superpower without a reserve currency. upon suddenly experiencing a growth spurt. the country also essentially links the exchange rate of its currency to the dollar. Yet the country cannot continue to keep the value of its currency artificially low if it hopes to become
the world's dominant economic power. the dollar and the euro. During these sessions. They have made it to the heart of American capitalism. as the United States buckles
under the strain of enormous budget deficits. the visiting head of state had predicted that the dominant capitalist power could expect to see a redistribution of global power. “China Plans Path to
Economic Hegemony”. If that happens. in its global shopping spree. Until now.spiegel. http://www. These developments don’t leave a lot of room for optimism. This explains why Beijing has pursued the internationalization of the yuan since the outbreak of the global financial crisis. China behaves like the gangly teenager who. China is overflowing with ethnic and cultural pride and itching to ‘teach lessons’ and settle old scores.the official name in China for the "people's money. The United States superseded the British Empire after World War II. so that the exchange rate could be based on the real value of the currency and the strength of China's economy." China's long-term goal is to become a country with an anchor currency. the prospect is remote that the US Navy alone will recalibrate the balance of sea power. Secret Lectures on Reserve Currencies Years ago. the Chinese leader said that the world's monetary system. forcing other countries to maintain reserves of Chinese money and providing significant advantages for Beijing.cannot even be freely exchanged into another currency. hardly a week goes by in which China does not launch new pilot projects to
"internationalize" the yuan in the long term. when the dollar
replaced the British pound as the dominant currency in the global financial system. New York and adjunct professor at Saint Mary's University
. In order to have a reserve currency. Spiegel International. other countries will have to maintain reserves of the yuan instead of the current reserve currencies. China has a lot on its plate.1518. the pioneers in China's race to the top have been displayed on a giant electronic billboard in New York's Times Square. gaining more favorable terms as a result. the images of Chinese astronauts and athletes. such as in the commodities markets. Wagner ’11." which is adorned with a portrait of Mao -. which the Chinese believe has irrevocably harmed their American rival. In written interviews with the Wall Street Journal and the Washington Post. Moreover.741303. je)
China would like to make the yuan one of the world's anchor currencies. China rise inevitable – US tactics to undermine Chinese credibility have failed and increased Chinese confidence to project power Petras 10 – James.de/international/business/0. perhaps even allowing it to float freely. These emotions fuel a ballooning sense of past wrongs to be compensated and future entitlements to be seized. dominant not only on land. with the US dollar as its reserve currency. Wieland. Today the renminbi -.yuan will overtake it.Writer for Spiegel International (1/26/11. Even before he left Beijing. strategically listless and brooding.00. Beijing has used a complicated system of foreign currency controls to effectively shield the renminbi from global capital flows. Hu and the Politburo attended secret lectures in which Chinese professors explained the history of the rise and fall of major powers. their stars and the super-rich will appear 300 times a day in a giant advertisement for the People's Republic. The second possibility is that other
nations—foremost among them Japan and India—but also including virtually every other nation in the region from Russia to Vietnam. To keep the prices of its exports artificially low. China is riding a
wave of national overconfidence at the same time many regard the United States as preoccupied with counterinsurgency in central Asia. For four weeks. was a "product of the past. As of last week.html. This would make the country's exports substantially more expensive and would drastically curb growth. with US President Barack Obama. Brimming with uncontained satisfaction—even joy—at its relentless ascent. The first is that China will indeed achieve its goal of becoming the Asian hegemonic power. China would have to give up all of this. Caught up in the fanfare of the country’s meteoric rise.
Dollar heg -. The occasion for the new superpower's
confident campaign was the state visit of President Hu Jintao. China could then use its own currency to conduct
transactions.129 of 154
command and control is connected by spoof-proof hard-wire landlines. but in the Western Pacific. clumsily begins to throw around his weight. retired Bartle Professor (Emeritus) of Sociology at Binghamton University in Binghamton. 68. This suggests two outcomes. Fifth. will begin to think more overtly about collective measures and how they can balance the growing power of Beijing. It would have to gradually appreciate its currency. Any maritime conflict with the United States (or Japan) will push China teetering over the edge of a war fever not seen since the Guns of August. Nevertheless.
perhaps to prohibitive levels. Behind this diplomatic rhetoric is an effort to harness China to a policy of collaborating
and following US empire building strategies as a junior partner.]. "The PLA navy is increasing its
numbers of submarines and other ships. its allies and partners: acquiesce in a dramatic shift in the military balance or take steps to preserve it.130 of 154
(4/28/10. Alternating between positive symbolic gestures.This situation creates a strategic choice for the United States. In other words. which extends as far as Guam and New Guinea. the GATT meeting on trade liberalization and the UN meeting on Iran.html. essentially dividing the Pacific between the US and China and ending US hegemony on that ocean. recognizing it as a “world power” which has to “share responsibilities” 33 . For example. China should give up its market driven economic expansion to share “responsibility” in policing the world in which the US is supreme.com/Geo-Politics/International/Chinese-Plans-to-End-US-Hegemony-in-the-Pacific.org/petras/b2-img/petras_sinous." said Admiral Gary Roughead.. But political problems and budgetary woes could kill the program before it ever gets started. At
international gatherings like the recent Copenhagen Conference on climate warming. D. and much sooner than many
expect[. Washington demands China support sanctions to weaken and degrade Iran to enhance US military power in the Gulf 34 . je)
The US is developing an air-sea battle concept to counter China's military buildup. or Washington undertakes actions to offset or counterbalance the effects of the PLA’s military buildup.. like the US today. isolate and contain rising world powers like China and put it on the defensive. "Navies tend to grow with economies and as trade becomes more important. spaced-based reconnaissance. “currency manipulation” and other “unfair” economic practices 35 . opposing protectionism and seeking a negotiated settlement with Iran. China Will End US Hegemony in the Pacific Buxbaum ’10. if we translate the meaning of the White House’s demand for China to “assume responsibility” for “rebalancing the world economy” it boils down to telling Beijing to reduce its dynamic growth. Chinese military and political doctrine holds that China should rule the waves out to the second island chain of the western Pacific. “Rising and Declining Economic Powers: The Sino-US Conflict Deepens. While human rights propaganda serves as the stick to beat back China’s economic advance.” http://lahaine. while ignoring its own massive offenses and downplaying those of its allies like the Jewish state of Israel. "Unless Beijing
diverts from its current course of action. such as
references to the US and China as the (G-2)." All of this has US military planners and thinkers
worried. Washington also attempts to induce China’s cooperation in slowing down its decline. “Chinese Plans to End US Hegemony in the Pacific”. US
.freelance journalist based near Washington." said a report recently released by the Washington-based Center for Budgetary and Strategic Assessments. and ballistic and cruise missiles. surveillance and target acquisition. a conservative Washington think tank. unmanned aerial vehicles. at the expense of China’s
economic interests.pdf) Established empires in decline. at a recent speech hosted by the Heritage Foundation. electromagnetic weapons. the White House has promoted a “united front” with the EU against China’s supposedly “protectionism”. to allow the US to gain trade advantages to reduce (“rebalance”) its trade deficit. China's People's Liberation Army is building up anti-access and area-denial capabilities with the apparent goal of extending their power to the western half of the Pacific Ocean. http://oilprice. chief of US naval operations. while China has invested billions in joint ventures with Iran and has developed a growing lucrative trading relation. One of the longest standing political ploys is Washington’s human rights propaganda campaign. on climate. the State Department hopes to inflate US moral authority." In response to the Chinese challenge. deflecting attention from the facts of Chinese compliance in setting standards superior to the US 36 . Washington attempts to satanize China as the main obstacle in reaching global accords. Oil Price. specializes in business and government
technology and security (5/31/10. Likewise. The A2AD buildup threatens the US forward presence and power projection in the region. advanced fighter aircraft. deflect attention from its worldwide long term and large scale violation of human rights accompanying its global empire building and build an anti-China coalition. The
Chinese also have an emerging and muscular deep-water navy. seduce. Among the anti-access/area-denial (A2AD) capabilities being fielded by China include anti-satellite
weapons. Peter. US diplomats frame this approach by
emphasizing “treating China as an equal”.C.
Over time this imperial offensive to slow its decline has provoked an increasingly aggressive response as China gains confidence in its capacity to project power. the two determining powers in the world. By discrediting China internal politics. have a repertoire of levers designed to discredit. "the cost incurred by the US military to operate in the [w]estern
Pacific will likely rise sharply. advanced radar systems. highlighting China’s human rights violations.
particularly the Japanese. such as greater integration between the US Navy and Air Force. China could win a war on the Pacific without firing a shot. the JMFDS could easily develop a closer relationship with the Chinese navy.
As Sun Tzu said in his classic. "It took us 70 years to get where we are. then. "the bigger questions are what the intentions of the Chinese are and how the carriers will be used. and operating concepts. is a complex set of concepts. involving the development of specific military capabilities. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill. AirSea Battle. In fact. The projection of Chinese power on the Pacific
may be enough for them to perceive their interests differently." A key objective of AirSea Battle." he added." Although the immediate crisis on the Korean peninsula is having the effect of cementing US-Japanese relations-the Japanese government has accepted a plan it once rejected to relocate a US Marine base on Okinawa-it is not clear how long that attitude will last. as reflected in the Quadrennial Defense Review released earlier this year. an independent from Connecticut. Gates has displayed a proclivity. If US allies fold in the face of increasing Chinese power. "Carrier operations are very complex. Roughead acknowledged reports that the Chinese are planning to deploy one or more aircraft carriers to the Pacific. as outlined in the CSBA report. US inability.' the subject of the new CSBA report. that would offset the Chinese buildup. "To win one 100 victories in 100 battles is not the acme of skill." he said. "and will stay off for a good period of time[." he said. In a speech earlier this month." noted Senator Joseph Lieberman." But the US may already be losing the hearts and minds of the Japanese.. to defend its allies and partners could lead to regional instability. according to the CSBA report."
. US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned military commanders not to expect to get everything they ask for. it is highly unlikely that we will achieve the real [budget] growth rates necessary to sustain the current force structure. such as long-range strike systems. real or perceived..]." But US allies in the region might not see things that way. for example. "US success will depend heavily on Japan’s active participation as an ally. is that "China will attempt to achieve a quick victory by inflicting such damage that the US would choose to discontinue the fight or driving a major US ally out of the war. at a recent Washington gathering. DoD continues to invest in capabilities that assume that the status quo will prevail in the western Pacific. Spurring the need for AirSea Battle. but dismissed any potential threat to US interests. But if the Asia-centric attitudes in Japan prevail. That position does not promote sharp decision making that allocates scarce resources to emerging threats. But the program has its political dimension as well: to reassure US allies.131 of 154
strategic planners and thinkers are exploring a concept known as 'AirSea Battle. The Art of War. As a recent article in the Washington Post noted. multifaceted defense posture. "only the second opposition party to take power in nearly 50 years. emphasizing.[R]ealistically. and a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. The US also faces the
problem of bolstering the confidence of its allies. "Most US allies in the region and lack strategic depth and must be supported and defended from the sea. especially in light of the budget squeeze. a new capability for them. CSBA president and report co-author Andrew Krepinevich told ISN Security Watch. Japan's current government. "Besides. and keep them from succumbing to Chinese pressure despite the apparent decline of US capabilities in the western Pacific. is to deny adversaries a quick victory. "The gusher has been turned off." advocates "a more Asia-centric view of Japan's place in the world." said Krepinevich. towards developing a balanced.
including coercion or aggression. The big squeeze Looming in the background are the budgetary constraints now being placed on the Pentagon. "Admiral Roughead is conducting an AirSea Battle study inside the Pentagon. Admiral Roughead noted that the US Navy has a strong operational relationship with the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force." Pursuing AirSea Battle would require a reordering of Pentagon priorities. short-range over than long-range strike systems.
" "China's big goal in the 21st century is to become world number one. cannot become the top power. Moscow – The graying bear is getting a make-over. Russia Still Believes They Are A Superpower.com/article/2010/03/01/us-china-usa-military-exclusiveidUSTRE6200P620100301. We also need to make sure we have enough of those big floating boats they land them on too. je)
While we are busy cutting our military budget the Russians are following the lead of the Chinese and building up. the U. We need to make the
commitment to maintain the dominant military that keeps us all safe. who warns that his nation's ascent will alarm Washington. “China PLA officer urges challenging
U. Russia’s military is launching its biggest rearmament effort since Soviet times. "As long as China seeks to rise to become world number one .reuters.writes and produces videos for the award-winning military site Blackfive (3/3/11. Chris. then inevitably it will become a straggler that is cast aside." writes Liu. director of the independent Interfax-Military News Agency.
needs strong conventional forces to reduce its overreliance on its aging Soviet-era nuclear missile deterrent." Liu writes in his newly published Chinese-language book.132 of 154
Yes – China/Russia Counterbalancing
China’s counterbalancing US dominance. http://bigpeace.com/jhanson/2011/03/03/russia-still-believes-they-are-a-superpower/. Liu Mingfu. Jim. There are plenty of folks in Congress salivating over the size of
the program and dreaming of all the other things they could spend that money on. "The China Dream. Valentin Rudenko.
Russia and China are Challenging US Power Hanson ’11. http://www.. It would be naive to pretend that a Russia run by Putin is not a threat or that the Chinese will not take advantage of the leverage they have due to well owning us. Now as much as I like spending cuts. Buckley ’10. Tibet.. je)
China should build the world's strongest military and move swiftly to topple the United States as the global "champion.. the top power. the self-ruled island Beijing claims as its own. then even if China is even more capitalist than the U. and 8 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. a professor at the elite National Defense University.S. says it could create “a whole new ballgame.” Yeah a ball game where we decided to sit out a few innings. Analysts say Russia." writes Liu. 100 warships. including a $650 billion program to
procure 1. it is not
healthy to emasculate our ability to deter our enemies. His 303-page book stands out for its boldness even in a recent chorus of strident Chinese voices demanding a hard shove back against Washington over trade. 600 combat planes. and arms sales to Taiwan. will still be determined to contain it. The call for China to abandon modesty about its global goals and "sprint to become world number one" comes from a People's Liberation Army (PLA) Senior Colonel. Reuters News.S. which trains rising
officers.000 new helicopters.Editor of Big Peace focusing on the practitioners of our national security policies on the groundserved as a Weapons Sergeant in 1st Special Forces Group across most of the Pacific Rim. human rights.
." "If China in the 21st century cannot become world number one. We already canceled the F-22 and the real concern is whether we will support the F-35 program now that it is our main fighter.S.Staff Writer for Reuters News (2/28/10. while already the world’s fifth-largest military spender. risking war despite Beijing's hopes for a "peaceful rise." a senior Chinese PLA officer says in a new book reflecting swelling nationalist ambitions. Big Peace. dominance”.
are contemplating this new American posture with interest. they are more likely to develop a sophisticated foreign policy. The soft-spoken American posture is a clear
political choice related to domestic pressures but it is also a matter of necessity. US influence and ability to mediate conflicts is declining. Another important explanatory factor is the American reluctance to commit to another potential long war.
. Global interdependence per se is not new. This fragmentation makes international cooperation to solve global challenges more difficult.pitt. notably due to the so called multipolarization of the international order. as the phantoms of military and economic overstretch are present in all minds.” http://aei. Could they be next in the driving seat? Second characteristic: the emerging global order is probably more fragmented than during the previous bipolar era. But from Brasilia to Beijing. The US is now less interventionist by choice and by necessity – in this new international order. The Libyan crisis was a first illustration of what happens when the US takes a backseat.133 of 154
UQ – Yes Heg Decline
Shift to multipolarity now Renard 11 – Thomas. at the moment. independently from the US. “Libya and the Post-American World: Implications for the EU. Emerging powers have become sufficiently assertive to confront the West on some issues (sometimes individually. Obama seems also unwilling to wage another unpopular
war. Thus. but remain prudent enough
to avoid endangering their rise by investing too much in revisionist postures.edu/32037/1/SPB20-Libya-in-new-worldorder. This international order in the making is less dominated by Washington as it becomes more multipolar. Part of the explanation for this discrete profile lies in the personality of Barack Obama who has developed a much more cautious approach to international problems in comparison with his predecessor. Research Fellow in the Europe in the World Program at Egmont – Royal Institute for International Relations (April 2011. the world is
increasingly interdependent and interconnected as largely illustrated by the recent economic crisis. As emerging powers continue to build their
global footprint and to develop global interests. On the other hand. “The vote on Libya reflects to a certain extent the new international order that is taking shape”EGMONT
Royal Institute for International Relations 5 The vote on Libya offered an encouraging signal with Russia and China constructively abstaining rather than using their veto power. Europe and the emerging powers are just discovering what this “post-American world” means in practice. sometimes as a bloc). after the disastrous experiences in Afghanistan and in Iraq –
both conflicts which were supposed to end quickly. America still feels pretty safe.
Washington must choose carefully its priorities in terms of foreign policy for it is simply no longer able to be present simultaneously on every front. for there is simply no alternative to address some of the most pressing global challenges. Europe is in the driving seat and in spite of the chaotic ride due to intraEuropean divisions. Yet the direction of such foreign policy remains unclear. particularly in the Arab world. and it is less predictable as emerging powers grasp new strategic opportunities to push forward their influence and ultimately their interests. First
characteristic of the new international order: it seems less and less American as illustrated by the relatively discrete profile adopted by Washington on the whole Libyan crisis – and the Arab uprisings in general. Whether this constructive posture will develop as the rule or will remain an exception remains to be seen.pdf) The vote on Libya reflects to a certain extent the new international order that is taking shape. like Libya. This is a world of strategic opportunities where established and emerging powers can increasingly pursue their own agenda. there is inevitably a third explanation for America’s discrete profile on Libya: the US is slowly losing its uncontested hegemony in
international security. The era of
“you are with us or against us” is inevitably over. As the 2012 presidential election is nearing. the tension between factors of fragmentation (possibly leading to a fracture?) and cohesion maintains the international system in flux and makes it less predictable. but according to some scholars today’s interdependence is creating favourable conditions for international cooperation. let alone to lead. This looks very much like the “post-American world” described by Fareed Zakaria. For now. Yet.
Deficits in trade in goods can be offset by having a positive balance in sales of services abroad (financial. exports have exceeded imports only in 1973 and 1975. France. compared with 47 percent in 1960. but even as the sole superpower it finds itself less able than it once was to influence and control the course of events abroad. six of ten telecommunications companies. share of exports of commercial services. current account (the sum of the balances in trade in goods and services plus net income from overseas investment).
but vulnerable. The use of armed force has always been an inseparable part of hegemony. In 2002. Non-U. regulating.org/2003/12/01/u-s-hegemony-continuing-decline-enduring-danger. whose status as the world’s key currency has been eroding since the 1970s. they accounted for 5 percent of the value of all M&A deals during these years. the share of EU-based companies increased from 41 to 46 percent.S. multinationals in the foreign sales of the world’s one hundred largest multinationals decreased from 30 to 25 percent. Japan had sixteen. balance of international payments is chalking up record deficits. accounting for nine of the ten largest electronics and electrical equipment manufacturers. and stabilizing the world political economy. The weak link is the dollar. interest. advertising and other business services) and/or income from overseas investments (profits.S. twenty-three were American. five involved takeovers by foreign multinationals (three British. is now deteriorating sharply. dividends. And since 1990. Germany. Sixty percent of the world’s manufacturing production in 1950 came from the United States. and it raises the danger of imperial overreach. investment abroad. the share of U. Hegemony: Continuing Decline. Richard. http://monthlyreview. the share of
private world savings held in European currencies increased from 13 percent to 37 percent. Its military supremacy is no longer matched in the economic and political spheres.S. In global finance. Half the foreign exchange reserves held by the world’s central banks were composed of dollars in 1990 compared to 76 percent in 1976. insurance.S. Forty-four percent of new bonds have been issued in euros since the new currency was introduced in 1999. with a combined gross domestic product (GDP) seven-tenths that of the United States. The United States still has immense—unequalled—power in international economics and politics. five of ten pharmaceutical firms. Monthly Review. Twenty-one percent of the world’s stock of direct investment in other countries was American in 2001. but military power depends upon the economic resources at the disposal of the state. telecommunications. U. Of the twentyfive largest banks in the world. and the like).S. Volume 55. against 21 percent at present. together. The U.2 For the first time since the Second World War there
is another source of universally acceptable payment and liquidity in the world economy —at a moment when the U.
hegemony began during the Second World War and peaked some thirty years later. “U. banks. the United Kingdom. Of the top one hundred corporations in the world in 2000 ranked by foreign-held assets. Slow Merge Ahead: Hegemony Since the 1970s An idea of the decline of American economic power can be formed from the following:1 In 1950 the United States supplied half the world’s gross product. while the European Union (EU) had 23 percent—40 percent if intra-EU exports were counted. the balance turned negative: for the
first time the United States is paying foreigners more investment income from their
. as was the case for Britain in South Africa (1899–1902) and the United States in Vietnam (1962–1975). two German). Since 1971. 17 percent of all new direct investment abroad came from the United States and 16 percent from Great Britain. the positive balance on investment income has been shriveling as foreign investment in the United States has grown faster than U. During 1996–2001. while the dollar’s share fell from 67 to 40 percent. merchandise deficit has become too big to be paid for by services sold to foreigners plus remittances on investments. Of the top twenty corporations involved in cross-border M&As from 1987 through 2001. Britannia ruled the waves from 1815 to 1913. nineteen were non-U. capital has in it. A nation can run deficits in its trade in goods and still be in overall balance in its dealings with foreign countries. (General Electric and Citigroup). the fastest growing part of the world economy. The U. eight of the ten largest motor vehicle makers and electric and gas utilities. Enduring Danger”. when the United States had a deficit in its trade in goods (merchandise) for the
first time in seventy-eight years. the United States is not only less dominant. Between 1981 and 1995. Bryn Mawr College (7/13/11. je) “Global hegemony” might be defined as a situation in which one nation-state plays a
predominant role in organizing. Together.S. four of six chemical producers. the merchandise deficit has become too big to be paid for by services sold to foreigners.S. Issue 07 (December). companies dominated major industries in 2002. Of the twenty-five largest mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in the United States in 1998–2000. closing in on the 48 percent issued in dollars.S. and the Netherlands. royalties. seven of the ten largest petroleum refiners. stood at 24 percent in 2001. four of seven airlines. although the two largest were Citigroup and Bank of America. Even during the golden days of 1944–1971 the United States was unable to avoid
military defeat in Vietnam and a draw in Korea. and is of dubious value in preserving the global economic order and the stake that U. had forty. and between the two world wars was no longer able to function as underwriter to the world system.S. almost constantly in surplus from 1895 to 1977. irregularly and with periodic revivals. the proportion rose back to 68 percent in 2001 because of the phasing out of ecus (reserves issued to European banks by the European Monetary Institute) to make way for the euro. It cannot be deployed to
answer every threat to geopolitical and economic interests.S. only two were U.134 of 154
DuBoff ’11Professor Emeritus of Economics. 25 percent in 1999. but by the 1890s she was under economic challenge from the United States and Germany.S. During the 1990s. France and Belgium-Luxembourg supplied 21 percent. But the U.S.
Like most gaps between
income and expenses. it poses a challenge to the era of Western hegemony at the level of system values and rules of the game. but unlike the British Empire in the decades before the First World War.8 percent of GDP. corporate bonds.135 of 154
holdings here than it receives from its own investments abroad. and consumers would pay more for imported goods. the ‘integration of China into the existing global economic order will thus be more difﬁcult than was. say. and real estate). sterling. 24 percent of all U. residents (individuals.pdf) The emerging multipolar structure is a multilayered one: it consists of two tiers (see Table 2). China’s ascent engenders a fundamental change in yet another sense.S.5 trillion more than U. 2011. draining income from other purchases and dampening the economy. stocks and bonds. when income from services and foreign investment was larger than its merchandise trade deficits. the EU. and 13 percent of corporate stock. South Africa. concluded Yarjani.4 Until recently all Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) sold their oil for dollars only.3 So far the global investor class has seemed willing to finance America’s external
deficits. and Iran has considered a conversion since 1999. so why go to the United States.” Adoption of the euro by Europe’s principal oil
Francisco. companies.S. history. the United States borrowed $503 billion from abroad. Geeraerts 11 – Gustaaf. U.vub. In any event the dollar is now perceived to be as risky an asset as the euro and possibly two or three other currencies (yen. Great Britain’s current account was in surplus. Brazil. but it may not be forever. political competence and military strength. Javad Yarjani. All these differences reduce the likelihood that Beijing will easily accept the systemic responsibilities that Western key players associate with great power status. In the ﬁrst tier we have the US and an ever more powerful China. As the dollar declines in value. saw little chance of change “in the near future…[but] in the long run the euro is not at such a disadvantage versus the dollar. rents were shrinking when converted from dollars back home. In a speech in Spain in April 2002. Iraq switched to the euro in 2000 (presumably terminated with extreme prejudice in March 2003). and the New Multipolarity. A dollar rout could cause skittish investors to dump U. Russia. While the buildings were becoming cheaper in euros. a record 4.S. By contrast. “OPEC will not discount entirely the possibility of adopting euro pricing and payments in the future. the United States is unable to finance those investments from its current account. 57–67. the integration of Japan a generation ago.%20the%20EU%20and %20Multipolarity-2.S.S.’ 3 China’s rise is not
. they can use them to buy American assets (U.”5 If foreign investors get cold feet. Treasury marketable debt. Treasury bonds. but to fully qualify it would have to upgrade its hard power base: economic capability. professor of international relations at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel and director of the Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies (European Review. borrowing money would become harder. They matter in a number of important international issue areas but are lacking in comprehensive power.
Multipolarity now -. governments).” http://www. because of its share of world GDP and world trade could be a ﬁrst tier actor. the current account deficit is covered by borrowing.-owned assets abroad. industries or selling off their dollar holdings. where the currency risk is greater?” asked the chief investment officer of a Munich-based property fund. The EU. political system and stage of development.” Thus. ceasing to invest in U. 1. Because of China’s being different in terms of culture. the large European states and the remaining members of the G20. the head of OPEC’s Market Analysis Department. economy. “China. This is how the United States turned into a debtor nation in 1986. corporate bonds and stocks. Norway and Britain. companies. Therefore. When foreigners receive dollars from transactions with U. arousing suspicion that the United States favors a cheaper dollar to help pay off its ballooning trade deficit. “We can get the same return in Britain and the Nordic countries.rising powers. By mid-2003. Japan. the return to foreign investors on dollar-denominated assets falls. No. Yet their weight is such that it is key for the ﬁrst tier players to take them in account.S. German investments in choice office properties in New York. Interest rates in the United States might surge. In 2002. 8 The second tier comprises most regional powers like India. The deficits are exerting a downward drag on the dollar. foreign-owned assets in the United States are now worth $2. foreigners owned 41 percent of U.be/biccs/site/assets/files/apapers/China.S. Vol. and elsewhere were cut back sharply in 2003. the dollar would start falling faster. The Euro-zone has a bigger share of global trade than the US and…a more balanced external accounts position.S.ac. sending Wall Street into a dive. Swiss franc). companies are continuing to invest abroad. could create “a momentum to shift the oil pricing system to euros. averaging 3 to 4 percent of GDP every year from 1850 to 1913. 19.
S. Yet the question
remains to what extent Beijing will use its growing inﬂuence to transform the international system and bring its rules and institutions more in line with the country’s national interests. the United States led the way toward global trade expansion. Today there appears no longer to be a Congressional consensus to ratify even the limited Colombia.Europe and China are filling in.ac. supremacy and peaceful globalization is irrevocably ending. it also engenders a change in the distribution of identities. Europe and China are geopolitically more proximate than ever before. provided its intentions are reasonably benevolent. 2011. Yet it is far from clear how Beijing will seek to manage its position in
the evolving international system and how it will strike the balance between power politics and multilateralism. “WikiLeaks exposes waning U. The United States
can no longer afford to act as an unquestionably benign trade hegemon.000 secret State Department cables that the 1990s vision of U. 10
Heg is on the decline -. In previous decades. Yet its efforts
in these areas have been ineffectual as the nation's power to coerce and cajole has been reduced by its relative economic and military decline. Multipolarity coming -. hegemony is on the wane.be/biccs/site/assets/files/apapers/China. trade barriers rise and fiscal policies destroy wealth. Vol. hence its petty retaliation against certain Chinese exports and its monetary policies perceived as mercantilist that encourage other countries to erect barriers to free movement of goods and capital. Some expect that China too will inevitably go down this road. As a consequence of increased international engagement and increasing economic interests abroad.US multilateral actions and wikileaks prove Hutchinson 10 – Martin. 1. LexisNexis) The biggest secret to be revealed by WikiLeaks should have been the easiest to spot without the website's classified document dump: U. precisely during critical power transitions. 57–67.S. leadership. increasing risk premiums in their respective regions and across the globe. which it makes ample use of to sustain its growth. armaments wars and eventually decades of global conflict and violence.pdf) China and Europe are both regional powers with broad global interests. The outcome is that Iran's attempts to establish a nuclear capability
and North Korea's aggression against its southern neighbour have been met with no effective response. 9 They expect power politics to gradually take the upper hand. the US and the EU would prefer to integrate China in the global governance
structures they established and safeguarded in the past few decades and hope for a reproduction of the existing system.%20the%20EU%20and %20Multipolarity-2.” National Post's Financial Post & FP Investing. the creation of spheres of inﬂuence and the formation of alliances to prevent hostile powers from obstructing these ventures. South Korea and Panama free trade deals. Geeraerts 11 – Gustaaf. 10 As China is already ﬁrmly integrated in the current international
regimes and beneﬁts from their smooth functioning. That underscores a heightened risk for global investors that without U. Journalist and economist for Reuters Breakviews (November 30. as did Britain in the 19th
century. 2010. British hegemony pushed the global economy toward free trade and defused regional rivalries and armaments wars. No. In the early and middle 19th century. There is
. hegemony. while the Doha global free trade talks are stone dead. The WikiLeaks documents show the United States
attempting to assemble regional alliances to address problems like North Korea's continued isolation from the global community. many emerging powers in the past have relinquished their resistance against imperialist policies by gradually starting to apply the very strategies themselves: the use of coercion to chase unequal economic gains. There are a number of risk-reducing advantages to the world in having a clearly defined hegemon.vub. professor of international relations at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel and director of the Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies (European Review. they expect multilateralism to be a crucial ingredient of Beijing’s foreign policy.S. Understandably. It's hard to avoid the overall
impression from the disclosure of 250. Beijing actually has a profound interest in seeing that the international rules and institutions function effectively. the EU.” http://www. Others point out that China is developing within a system with strongly established international institutions.it will foster cooperation and stability -. Then after 1873 the decline of Britain's relative economic strength and the later build-up of the German navy reduced Britain's power and led to increased protectionism. “China.S. regional rivalries may turn nasty. Some point out that.136 of 154
only changing the distribution of power in the system. and Iranian nuclear ambitions. for example. 19. and the New Multipolarity.
doing what it takes to get reelected. je) The U. multilateral organizations need to reﬂect the
emerging new international order. Global Hegemony . global hegemony was its manufacturing base. Just politicians being politicians. both sides need each other if they are to develop an alternative for harsh international anarchy. The emerging multilayered and
culturally diversiﬁed multipolarity will make global governance much more complex and is by no means a guarantee for multilateralism.The Beginning and the End”. and Barbara M. horribly counterproductive actions taken during Clinton/Bush/Obama. In this order the major powers will have to balance between meeting increasing international expectations and persistent strong internal needs. This area was rock-solid during the 50s and 60s. but effective multilateralism also implies that all parties are committed to overcoming diverging expectations and trying to reach a pragmatic consensus on how to make foreign policies complementary and mutually supportive.
.S. Midas Letter. We are moving steadily towards a new multipolar world
order. no game plans. and South-Central Asia. If Beijing and Brussels are serious about changing the nature of great power politics. Thanks to the natural weakening of this foundation.midasletter. All along the "foundation" of U. It is
legitimate that growing interests bring the need to exert inﬂuence. We have to avoid that these regions develop into a belt of insecurity that endangers our development.S. Europe and China have shown themselves anxious not to slide into another era of great power rivalry. Erb Institute for Global Sustainable Enterprise (4/18/09.
US Hegemony is Ending Hoffman ’09. a strategic axis between China and Europe built on mutual beneﬁt and understanding will be indispensable. Andy.com/commentary/090418-2_US-hegemonythe-beginning-and-the-end.Professor of Sustainable Enterprise at the University of Michigan. There is a strong need to work together to enhance security. draining wars. Such a contest would severely weaken the two player’s chances for sustainable internal development. Europe and China could be in the vanguard here as well.php. and enhance maritime security. which will be key in boosting positive power vis-a`-vis others. to guarantee that our policies beneﬁt lasting stability and development. This is particularly the case of the Middle East. the weakening of its military due to a series of unproductive. there
longer anymore viable "band-aids" to apply. as well as the
short-term "band-aids" to try and buy time. but this should be cooperative and aim at sharing the costs of maintaining security.137 of 154
an important joint interest to promote stability and sustainable development in those regions that we share in our extended neighbourhoods. “U. In spite of all the friction and misunderstanding. to limit the impact of environmental hazards. Associate Director of the
Frederick A. and Greenspan/Bernanke administrations. Africa. to invest in the safety of our energy supplies. with the hope that things will get better. to support effective governance. and the growth of more significant manufacturing powers such as Japan. China. and others. nothing.'s brief reign as world superpower has been marked by the continuing application of
No long-term strategies. http://www. tackle non-traditional security threats. but has proven to be fleeting in the 90s and 00s due to the decline in America's finances. It will also give them the
scope to strengthen their internal unity. Rubin/Summers/Lindsay/Snow/Paulson/Geithner.S. To be effective. Successful bilateral cooperation will be key in promoting global peaceful development. As the unipolar moment fades.
by establishing a No-Fly Zone in Libya. 2011. "should mind its own business internationally and let other countries get along the best they can on their own. In fact. waltzing with Hosni or threatening to shoot down Kaddafi's planes or imposing more sanctions on Ahmenajid will only create expectations for renewed U. the U.S. some Americans (and Israelis) fantasize that the U. are at stake. can continue calling the shots in the Middle East by holding the hands of Hosni Mubarak.S. Coupled with the costly military intervention in Iraq.S. But with a military overstretched in Iraq and Afghanistan and with a budget deficit rising to the stratosphere.S.S. leadership that are not going to be fulfilled. the inconclusive war in Afghanistan. can do to reverse this process. “Obama Turns Failure into Success in the Middle East. Obama not only recognizes that the U. cannot be described as anything other than a devastating blow to U. and the diverging U. preoccupation with that region doesn't allow Washington to invest the required time and resources in maintaining its position in East Asia where core interests U." as Obama stressed over the weekend. Iran's nuclear military program.S.S.S.cato.” http://www.S.org/pub_display. a Gallup poll indicated that 50 percent of the public supports the notion that the U.
.S. And there is not much that the U. research fellow at the Cato Institute (March 22.S.138 of 154
UQ – Yes Heg Decline (Middle East)
US heg is irreversibly declining -. is constrained in its ability to determine outcomes in the Middle East. or by taking a tougher line against Iran. Not unlike Winston Churchill who insisted that Britain could retain its empire after 1945. support for
imposing a no-fly zone in Libya is based on the assumption that France and Britain are going to take up the leading military role in the operation with the Americans providing some limited tactical support in enforcing the zone and is "not going to deploy ground troops into Libya. strategic interests. He also
the continuing U." And without the U. Indeed. and Turkish interests — it becomes obvious that the age of U. the deadlocked Israeli-Palestinian peace process. there is no support in Washington for opening a new military front in the region.S.php? pub_id=12903) The downfall of the pro-American autocrats in Tunisia and Egypt and the growing threat to regimes that are either allied with Washington (Bahrain) or doing business with it (Yemen). hegemony in the Middle East is over. while a recent Washington Post polls suggested that 64 percent of Americans believe that the war in Afghanistan is not worth fighting. willing to deploy its troops in new military interventions.Middle East and North Africa Hadar 11 – Leon.
The key is to rebalance the US economy from finance driven to industrial centered: but any such shift requires class warfare against entrenched power on Wall Street and in Washington
46 . will create new jobs and lower the cost of living while enhancing living standards. costly and selfdestructive trade wars or worse. which would reduce charges to industry and state. to become competitive in domestic and overseas markets. pushed by the pro-Israel fifth column embedded in top financial and political institutions and in control of the legislature 47 . The transition from a militarist imperialist power.org/petras/b2-img/petras_sinous. private wealth and public corruption and discriminatory treatment of migrants as second grade citizens (a dual citizenship system) will be resolved internally as the socio-economic divisions translate into class struggle. China’s internal “imbalances” are profound and pervasive and over
time can weaken the pillars of external expansion. industry would have to lower its profits. Petras 10 – James. Even assuming that there is a political shift toward re-
industrializing the US. while upgrading local production to competitive levels. To expand overseas
markets. to a productive republic with a balanced economy and competitive sector requires fundamental political changes and a profound ideological revolution. uneven regional development. Only then will the US be able to compete economically with China in the world economy.139 of 154
Withdrawal K/T Sustainability
Decline is more than inevitable – to maintain our power we would need to restructure our entire country and withdraw our military forces from across the world. Nothing short of a political and economic revolution can reverse the decline of the US. Focusing investment on the growing market for clean energy and technology for domestic and overseas economies. Vast sums need to be reallocated from wars.5 billion muslim world. “Rising and Declining Economic Powers: The Sino-US Conflict Deepens. including merchandise and commodities reducing toxic chemical and environmentally damaging sources of energy. To bring about this political and economic revolution requires a new configuration of the state which pursues public investments creating competitive industries. ending restrictions on overseas technology sales can further reduce trade deficits. could increase inflows to the US and reduce outflows abroad. The transition from empire to republic requires a profound rebalancing of
social power and a deep restructuring of the US economy. The transfer of a trillion dollars in military
spending from colonial wars could easily finance the reconversion to a civilian economy producing quality goods for local and overseas consumption.” http://lahaine. Washington must end boycotts and military subservience to Israel. corroded by a corrupt political elite beholden to a parasitic speculator economic elite. only if it carries out deep political and economic changes. ‘marketing’ and speculation into social services like comprehensive national health plans high skill engineering and advanced industrial training to increase efficiency and competitiveness in the domestic market. Ending military directed empire building will open the flow of public financing toward civilian technological innovations. increase its investments in applied research and development and vastly improve the quality of its products. retired Bartle Professor (Emeritus) of Sociology at Binghamton University in Binghamton. deepens the domestic market and expands social services. Fundamental
. Confiscatory taxes on the millionaire/billionaires especially the entire ‘Wall Street” ruling elite. New York and adjunct professor at Saint Mary's University (4/28/10. To more forward requires a head-on confrontation with the ideologues of finance
capital and a rejection of their efforts to deflect attention from their role in destroying America. Ending political links and billion dollar subsidies to militarized states like Israel and lifting sanctions on major economic markets like Iran will decrease outflows from the US treasury and enhance economic inflows and opportunities for productive sectors throughout the 1. can the ruling elite recognize that its empire is not sustainable (let alone desirable)? The US can increase its exports to China and its share of
world trade to balance its accounts. Up to now manufacturers have bought into or been bought out by financial institutions: they have lost their distinct character as a productive sector. inequalities. and a cap on all income over one million dollars can finance social security and comprehensive public national health system. China’s class. The “blame” China campaign for what are in reality internally caused US structural imbalances must be confronted before it leads us into new. Substituting trade missions for military bases. What passes for the current US private manufacturing sector shows no appetite for such a historic change.pdf)
In the face of the US’s demonstrable economic decline.
140 of 154
changes in the privatized health system toward a comprehensive national public health system are essential.
. but these changes require a revival of the class struggle against state and private vested interests.
These are not just American ideas. Lecturer in International Studies. The alternative course involves the initiation or escalation of conflictual scenarios for which the United States increasingly lacks the resources to cater: provocation of a military conclusion to the impasse with Iran. his predecessor was not. then this will clear the way for a judicious retrenchment. a good president to inaugurate an era of managed decline. President Obama does not by any means represent a radical break with the
traditions of American foreign policy in the modern era. Either the nation can come to terms with the reality of the process that is under way and seek to finesse it in the smoothest way possible. In doing so they set their faces against the reality of the coming American decline. even as he sought distance from his predecessor with the proclamation that ‘no system of government can or should be imposed by one nation on any other’. makes him ideologically and temperamentally well suited to the former course in a way that. Or it can ‘rage against the dying of the light’. Issue 4) As noted in the opening passages of this article. commitment to continuing the campaign in Afghanistan for another decade. deliberate escalation of strategic rivalry with China in East Asia.’ 99 His Westminster speech repeated these sentiments. within the confines of the mainstream. in short.’ he declared. 100 No doubt sensibly. government that is transparent and doesn’t steal from the people. this is a president who. refusing to accept the waning of its primacy. trimming ambitions in line with the fact that the nation can no longer act on the global stage with the wide latitude once afforded by its superior power. He is. In his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech in December 2009 he made it clear. embraces caution and restraint to the greatest extent that one could hope for without an epochal paradigm shift in the intellectual framework of American foreign policymaking. ‘I … have an unyielding belief that all people yearn for certain things. given the likely political reaction at home. “The Art of Declining Politely. University of Birmingham (July 1. it can. spelling out his view that ‘the instruments of war do have a role to play in preserving the peace’. confidence in the rule of law and the equal administration of justice. preserving influence to the maximum extent possible through whatever legacy of norms and institutions is bequeathed by its primacy. 97 If the United States can embrace the spirit of managed decline. use the significant resources still at its disposal to smooth the edges of its loss of relative power. in suggesting that he is ‘weak’ and that a ‘tougher’ policy is needed. as some genuine dissidents from the prevailing foreign policy discourse would wish. Facing this incipient period of decline. Evidently
this is not a president who wishes to break signally with the mainstream. Those who vocally demand that the President act more boldly are not merely criticizing him. President Obama’s approach. he also endorsed with only slight qualification the liberal universalist view of civil liberties as transcendent human rights. not for the first time. 98 In his Cairo speech in June the same year. Nevertheless. As part of such a project. as those who seek to qualify the decline thesis have suggested. 101 In contemplating the diminished and diminishing weight of the United States upon the scales of
. defined by restraint and awareness of limits. 2011. Adam Quinn. either by advocating a radical shrinking of America’s military strength as a good in itself or by disavowing liberal universalist global visions.141 of 154
Attempts to Maintain Heg Bad
Status quo heg is a sinking ship that will facilitate a peaceful decline – but a drastic increase in attempts to maintain our hegemony incites conflicts Quinn 11 – Adam. it is inconceivable that he would explicitly declare his strategy to be one of managed American decline. that he is no pacifist.” International Affairs Volume 87. and that ‘the United States of America has helped underwrite global security for more than six decades with the blood of our citizens and the strength of our arms’. ‘The ability to speak your mind and have a say in how you are governed. a costly effort to consistently apply principles of military interventionism. the freedom to live as you choose. Examination of his major foreign policy pronouncements reveals that he remains within the mainstream of the American discourse on foreign policy. they implicitly suppose that the resources will be available to support such a course. the narratives of America’s decline and Obama’s restraint are distinct but also crucially connected. America’s leaders may walk one of two paths. regime change and democracy promotion in response to events in North Africa. to cite one example.
Which outcome occurs will depend on more than the choices of America alone. on reflection. if the United States clashes with rising powers as it refuses to relinquish the prerogatives of the hegemon. fill any westerner with glee.142 of 154
global power. It may be a process that unfolds gradually and peacefully. it is important not to conflate the question of what will be with that of what we might prefer. or continues to be drawn into wars with middle powers or on the periphery in spite of its shrinking capacity to afford them. that the prospect of increased global power for a state such as China should not. At present it seems it is fortunate enough to have a
president who fits the bill. It
may well be. leaders who can master the art of declining politely. it may result in conflict. as critics of the decline thesis sometimes observe. resulting in a new order that functions with peace and stability even in the absence of American primacy. But the likelihood that the United States can preserve its prosperity and influence and see its hegemony leave a positive legacy rather than go down thrashing its limbs about destructively will be greatly increased if it has political leaders disposed to minimize conflict and consider American power a scarce resource—in short. Alternatively. It is also important not to be unduly deterministic in projecting the consequences of American decline. whatever reservations one may have held regarding US primacy.
"Based on its hegemonic attitude. the US tries to impose its will on the world nations. Ayatollah Khamene'i said that Iran could not engage in negotiations with the US. therefore. deputy head of the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission of Iran's Parliament (Majlis) Hoseyn Ebrahimi said on Monday [23 August]." Mehr news agency quoted Ebrahimi as saying. a top Iranian lawmaker has said. Ayatollah Khamene'i also warned the US against launching an attack against Iran and said if Washington chooses to resort to military means against Iran.” BBC through Lexis) 24 August: The Islamic Republic will not enter talks with the United States unless the Americans stop their hegemony. On 18 August. 2010. threats and intimidation are not talks. “Iranian MP says US 'hegemony' makes talks impossible." he further explained. Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamene'i is opposed to talks with the US because they want to push any negotiation to the way they want and they halt it unilaterally if it is not favourable to them. negotiations are impossible under these conditions. the confrontation will not be restricted to the region alone." There may be room for talks if the US drops sanctions and a threatening language against the Islamic
Republic.143 of 154
Heg Bad – Iran
Heg prevents Iran talks – top officials’ statements BBC 10 – BBC Monitoring International Reports (August 24.
. shortly after the victory of the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Washington severed all diplomatic ties with Tehran in the aftermath of the US embassy takeover in Iran. the Leader added. "If they [the US] stop their threats and sanctions the Islamic Republic will enter talks with them as it has said before. because "talks in an environment of pressure.
nuclear hegemony by undercutting their own professed commitment to nuclear nondissemination. combined with arrogance and a Hobbesian worldview. And they have repeatedly attempted to preserve U.
. A paradoxical equation derived from this practice. Since the dawn of the nuclear age. Other nations also chose military strength over cooperation
and in the process diminished Washington’s and Moscow’s power in the international system. found the resources to produce limited nuclear arsenals.144 of 154
Heg Bad – Prolif
US hegemony spurs other countries to acquire nuclear weapons and ultimately undermines American influence – turns case Maddock 10 (Shane J. the United States has squandered opportunities to forge cooperative ventures to halt proliferation. such as India. Taught by the superpowers that nuclear weapons equal political power and that warheads prevent wars. author of multiple books concerning American Foreign Relations. PhD from the University of Connecticut in US history and teacher at Stonehill College. “Nuclear Apartheid”. North Korea. As the technology became cheaper and more easily available.S. Print) Throughout the nuclear age. catalyzed nuclear nationalism in other states and helped break the bonds of Washington’s influence. From the Baruch Plan to national missile defense. even states that could not provide their citizenry with a decent standard of living. Pakistan. other states built the bomb when they could afford to. The superpowers remained so convinced of the correctness of their respective privileged positions in the world system that they refused to make mutual concessions to achieve arms control. Americans have remained infatuated with unilateral and technological solutions to the atomic threat. no president has proven capable of producing the right
political mixture to yield a viable nonproliferation accord. American hegemony. The University of North Carolina Press. and the PRC.
A regional hegemon in the Middle East could imperil the ﬂow of oil upon which the US economy. Washington should also get out of the business of trying to spread democracy around the globe. 3 Its proponents believe that oﬀshore balancing can do a better job than primacy of enhancing American security and matching US foreign policy objectives with the resources available to support them. but it should be stationed offshore or back in the United States. Europe or the Persian Gulf. Mearsheimer ’11. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University
of Chicago.” Review of International Studies (2009). which invariably leads to no end of trouble. je) President Obama is making a serious mistake heading down this road. not only generates resentment toward the United States. Only a Eurasian hegemon could pose an existential threat to the US. the United States should concentrate on making sure that no state dominates Northeast Asia. Washington should rely on local forces to counter it and only come onshore to join the fight when it
appears that they cannot do the job themselves. not military force. or terrorist attacks – and alienates public opinion in large swaths of the globe.cambridge. he R. Robert M. and it should rely on diplomacy and economic statecraft. American troops should go back over the horizon. Europe and the Gulf. But it protect its interests in areas of little strategic importance. which has served this country well for most of its history and offers the best formula for dealing with the threats facing America—whether it be terrorism. This behavior. serves on the Advisory Council of The National Interest (12/16/10. and more generally acting as if we have the right and the responsibility to interfere in the domestic politics of other countries. including Europe and the Middle East. America’s strategy of primacy increases US vulnerability to a geopolitical backlash – whether in the guise of countervailing great power coalitions.org/article/imperial-by-design-4576?page=show. 35: 5-25. In the event a potential hegemon comes on the scene in one of those regions. The driving factor behind oﬀshore balancing is its proponents’ recognition that the US has a ‘hegemony’ problem.
Offshore balancing is key to prevent any conflict through deterrence and hard power if necessary – it avoids political backlash and increases soft power Layne 9 – Christopher. nuclear proliferation or a traditional great-power rival. Once the potential hegemon is checked. We should build a robust military to intervene in those areas.145 of 154
Offshore Balancing Good – General
Offshore balancing solves war and maintains US power best. This is the best way to ensure American primacy. Jan-Feb 2011 Issue. which violates the all-important principle of selfdetermination.org/action/displayFulltext? type=1&fid=3291804&jid=RIS&volumeId=35&issueId=01&aid=3291800&bodyId=&me mbershipNumber=&societyETOCSession=) Primacy’s neorealist critics have outlined an alternative grand strategy that increasingly resonates with the American public: oﬀshore balancing. Offshore balancing does not mean that the United States should ignore the rest of
should maintain a substantially lower profile outside of Northeast Asia. He should instead
return to the grand strategy of offshore balancing. to
the world. In general terms. and the economies of the advanced industrial states depend. “America’s Middle East grand strategy after Iraq: the moment for oﬀshore balancing has arrived. John. Oﬀshore balancing is based on the assumption that the most vital US
interests are preventing the emergence of a dominant power in Europe and East Asia – a ‘Eurasian hegemon’ – and
forestalling the emergence of a regional (‘oil’) hegemon in the Middle East.R. the US would rely on the tried and true dynamics of the balance of power to thwart any states with hegemonic ambitions. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University (2009. “Imperial by Design”. and that it remains the world’s only regional hegemon. The National Interest. but also gets us involved in nation building. As an oﬀshore balancer. He is on the Advisory Council of The National Interesthttp://nationalinterest. online at http://journals. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. An oﬀshore balancing strategy would permit the US to withdraw its ground forces from Eurasia (including the Middle East) and assume an over-the-
4 Yet. The history of the modern international state system (which dates back to about 1500) is littered with the wreckage of great powers that tried an failed to achieve geopolitical primacy: the Hapsburg Empire under Charles V. the ethic of responsibility. soft balancing eﬀorts to rein-in American power may help the other major states learn to cooperate in ways that will the open the door to future hard balancing against the US. 5 And. Russia and China to forestall the US invasion of Iraq by withholding United Nation’s Security Council authorisation is one example of soft balancing. on the other hand. Oﬀshore balancing contrasts sharply with primacy because primacists fear a world with independent. First. In foreign policymaking the road to
hell is paved with good intentions. they are important for two reasons. Most of all it is a strategy that ﬁts within the broad realist tradition because it recognises the diﬀerence between. The reason is simple: the basic motivation of all major states is to survive. If – and only if – regional power balances look to be failing would the US re-insert its
troops into Eurasia.146 of 154
horizon military posture. 6 The most notable manifestation of soft balancing is the use by other major states of diplomacy and international institutions to try to restrain American actions. Primacy is based on the belief that it is better for the
US to defend its allies and clients than to have them defend themselves. asymmetric strategies are another type of nontraditional balancing that is being employed to contest US primacy. Oﬀshore balancing is a realist strategy because it eschews the ideological crusading on behalf of democracy that is endemic to Wilsonianism. Spain under Philip II. they fundamentally agree on the strategy’s basic premises. there are new forms of balancing with which Washington already is contending. believe for an insular great power like the US. or military – counter-balancing that the US will face in coming years. and policies must be judged on their consequences. and Germany under Hitler (and. Germany. The Bush administration’s disastrous policies in Iraq and the Middle East are a much needed reminder that this is a test Wilsonianism too often fails. and when one among them threatens to gain preponderant power. Another example is the eﬀort of the same nations and Britain to promote a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue that will avoid the imposition of UN sanctions on Teheran. growing
apprehensions about the military. Failure is the fate of hegemons. including so-called soft balancing. recent studies by the CIA oﬀer compelling evidence that by 2020 the era of America’s unipolar ascendancy will be drawing to a close as new poles of power in the international system approach the US share of world power. not on the intentions that underlie them. on the other hand. 7 In addition to soft balancing. some would argue. Oﬀshore balancers believe the US must adjust to incipient multipolarity because they understand that – unless the US is prepared to ﬁght an unending series of preventive wars – new great powers inevitably will emerge in the next decade or two. Even if soft balancing eﬀorts fail. of course. on one hand. Regional powers –
. The attempt by France. the best strategy is to rely on a balance of power approach that devolves to other states the costs and risks of their defense. the security of the others is threatened. France under Louis XIV and Napoleon. Second. First. multiple poles of power. they indicate that other major states regard US geopolitical dominance as a problem that needs to be addressed. it is so much more powerful than its nearest possible competitors. deﬁnes US interests in terms of what is vital rather than simply desirable. Some primacists believe that the US is immune to being counter-balanced because. what the sociologist Max Weber called the ethic of conviction and. When employed by states. Although there are some nuanced diﬀerences among oﬀshore balancing’s proponents. oﬀshore balancers recognise that one of the few ironclad rules in international politics is that when one great power becomes too powerful – when it bids to achieve hegemony – it is defeated by the counter-balancing eﬀorts of the other major powers in the international system. Oﬀshore balancers. and is based on
prudence and self-restraint in the conduct of US strategy. under Kaiser Wilhelm II). as well as economic. asymmetric strategies mean the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities. as the only great power in a ‘unipolar’ system. A second point upon which oﬀshore balancers agree is that in addition to
the traditional kind of – ‘hard’. implications of China’s rapid ascent are – at the very least – an implicit acknowledgment that the days of unchallenged US dominance in world aﬀairs are numbered. balances ends and means. and a possible armed confrontation between the US and Iran.
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especially those on the US hit list like Iran and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq – cannot
slug it out toe-to-toe against the US’ dominant high-tech conventional forces. The use of asymmetric strategies to oppose American power – especially in the Middle East where US policy has an imperial dimension – illustrates the dictum that empires inevitably provoke resistance. WMD – especially the possession of nuclear weapons – is one way these states can level the strategic playing ﬁeld and deter the US from attacking them. Because they are threatened by the US. however. Terrorism is another asymmetric strategy – one employed by non-state actors like Al-Qaeda and similar jihadist groups – to resist US dominance. and dissuading Washington from using its military muscle against them. these states seek other methods of oﬀsetting American power.
R. For starters. “Imperial by Design”.
. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. It almost always
makes good sense to get other countries to pay as many of those costs as possible while preserving one’s own power. he R.148 of 154
Offshore Balancing Good – China
Offshore balancing solves China rise. in contrast. The United States will have to play a key role in countering China. but an America no longer weakened by unnecessary foreign intervention will be far more capable of checking Beijing’s ambitions. but also makes it difficult to concentrate its forces against China. serves on the Advisory Council of The National Interest (12/16/10. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University
of Chicago. He is on the Advisory Council of The National Interesthttp://nationalinterest. This is why Beijing should hope that the American military remains heavily involved in Afghanistan and Iraq for many years to come. Offshore balancing. on the other hand. je) Of course. however.org/article/imperial-by-design-4576?page=show. attempting to dominate the globe encourages the United States to fight wars all around the world. America would check China’s rise even if it were pursuing global dominance. Another virtue of offshore balancing is its emphasis on getting other countries to assume the burden of containing an aspiring regional hegemon. John. which not only wears down its military in peripheral conflicts. is better suited to the task. Jan-Feb 2011 Issue. see the United States as the indispensable nation that must do almost
all of the heavy lifting to make containment work. Mearsheimer ’11. But this is not a smart strategy because the human and economic price of checking a powerful adversary can be great. is committed to staying out of fights in the periphery and concentrating instead on truly serious threats. especially if war breaks out. The National Interest. because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves. Offshore
balancing. Global dominators.
the strategic setbacks
will not end with Iraq. One huge disaster is enough – more than enough – for any grand strategy. the best way to do so is to adopt an oﬀshore balancing strategy and ﬁght terrorists discreetly with good intelligence (including collaboration with US allies). 35: 5-25. unlike primacists. the pursuit of geopolitical and ideological dominance ‘over there’ has increased the terrorist threat over here. The same Pew survey also found that: ‘An increasing number of Americans see nonmilitary approaches – such as decreasing US dependence on Middle East oil and avoiding involvement with the problems of other countries’ as eﬀective strategies for reducing the terrorist threat to the US. ‘The US does have important interests in the Middle East – including access to oil and the need to combat terrorism – but neither objective is well served by occupying the region with its own military forces’. As Americans come to realise that the strategy of primacy makes the US less secure. And if the US continues to pursue a strategy of primacy.cambridge. 54 Similarly. primacy means that the US is headed for a train wreck with China. a recent 32 per cent margin. In the Middle East. “America’s Middle East grand strategy after Iraq: the moment for oﬀshore balancing has arrived. For example. online at http://journals.” Review of International Studies (2009). America’s military presence overseas’. Robert M. not increase.org/action/displayFulltext? type=1&fid=3291804&jid=RIS&volumeId=35&issueId=01&aid=3291800&bodyId=&me mbershipNumber=&societyETOCSession=) By lowering America’s politico-military proﬁle in the region. more Americans believe that the best way to reduce the threat of terrorist attacks on the US is to decrease. an oﬀshore balancing strategy would contribute importantly to lowering the terrorist threat to the US. This is a striking turnabout from summer 2002. As this debate gathers steam. there are signs that Americans already accept oﬀshore balancing’s key premises. oﬀshore balancing ‘is America’s best strategy for the Persian Gulf’ because the ‘mere presence of tens of thousands of US troops in the region is likely to fuel continued fear of foreign occupation that will fuel anti-American terrorism in the future’. A military collision between the US and Iran is still a possibility. when 48 per cent of those surveyed believed that the best defense against terrorism was to increase US military involvement abroad. and globally. they are becoming more receptive to the arguments for an oﬀshore balancing strategy. And. covert operations. 57 It is time to begin a long overdue debate on future US strategy after Iraq. Stephen Walt – who also favours a US oﬀshore balancing strategy in the Middle East – observes. Indeed.
. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University (2009. outside of the Middle East. As Robert Pape argues. 55 The Bush administration’s policy of maintaining a dominating American military presence in the Persian Gulf and overthrowing nasty Middle Eastern regimes increased the terrorist threat to the US instead of reducing it. and by strengthening America’s homeland defences. the American people are drawing the correct
grand strategic lessons from the Iraq debacle.149 of 154
Offshore Balancing Good – Middle East/Terrorism
Offshore balancing is comparatively the best strategy to prevent terrorism and middle east escalation Layne 9 – Christopher. it will become apparent that a neorealist strategy of oﬀshore balancing is the best candidate to become America’s next grand strategy – both in the Middle East. 56 The Pew survey’s results suggest that. If the new administration wants to reduce US vulnerability.
Reagan had the good sense to quickly pull the remaining marines out of Lebanon and keep them offshore.R. attack. the strategy is not perfect: some allies will want their own nuclear weapons out of
fear that the United States might not be there for them in a future crisis. And it is worth noting that
the perpetrators of this act did not pursue us after we withdrew. Remember what happened after President Ronald Reagan sent marines into Beirut in 1982? A
suicide bomber blew up their barracks the following year. Europe and the Gulf. offshore balancing is the best grand strategy for ameliorating our terrorism
problem. But all things considered. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. the United States would be less threatening to other countries.
. there is no reason that it cannot extend its nuclear umbrella over its allies in those areas. Placing American troops in the Arab and Muslim world is a major cause of terrorist attacks against the United States. killing 241 service members.150 of 154
Offshore Balancing Good – Terrorism/Prolif
Solves terrorism and prolif. John. he R. It calls for using military force in only three regions of the world. as University of Chicago professor Robert Pape’s research shows. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University
of Chicago. Certainly. which would lessen their need to acquire atomic weapons to protect themselves from a U.S. It has two
main virtues. je) Specifically. thus diminishing their need to have their own deterrents.org/article/imperial-by-design-4576?page=show. and even then. only as a matter of last resort. “Imperial by Design”. The National Interest. Jan-Feb 2011 Issue. offshore balancing is still
better than global dominance for keeping proliferation in check. Furthermore. serves on the Advisory Council of The National Interest (12/16/10. because offshore balancing calls for Washington to help local powers contain aspiring regional hegemons in Northeast Asia. Mearsheimer ’11. and some of America’s adversaries will still have powerful incentives to acquire a nuclear arsenal. America would still carry a big stick with offshore balancing but would wield it
much more discreetly than it does now. Offshore balancing is also a better policy than global dominance for combating nuclear proliferation. As a result. He is on the Advisory Council of The National Interesthttp://nationalinterest.
Congress is poised to pass the largest military budget since World War II — roughly $550 billion.S. most of which have nothing to do with our military prowess. erroneously. which claimed far fewer lives but
lasted nearly five times longer than the two world wars combined? Again. we can make space for the other forms of human interaction that facilitate security and prosperity over the long term. Some worry of a new cold war with Russia. but the fact remains that the major powers have managed to avoid the very sorts of cataclysms that claimed the lives of an estimated 100 million people in the first half of the 20th century. and the prospects for future casualties.” http://www. How likely is it that the so-called war on terrorism will be looked upon through the
long lens of history as comparable to the world wars of the 20th century? Not very. 2001. fought chiefly by non-military means. Preble 9 – Christopher. Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute (September 21. Both are ideological struggles. excluding funds for the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.cato.php? pub_id=12156&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed %3A+CatoRecentOpeds+(Cato+Recent+Op-eds)
With the Senate close to voting on the defense authorization bill. 2009. while others see a hot one with China in the offing. French or British) decision makers lost their cool would have caused far more death and destruction than Osama bin Laden can muster in the darkest reaches of his imagination. The casualties caused by international terrorist incidents since September 11 pale in comparison to the death and destruction that took place between 1914 and 1918. and that more power will keep us safer. The casualties caused by international terrorist incidents since September 11. Despite Obama's professed concern about the huge budget deficit. the true source of U. what of war between peoples. We have come to believe. but the threat of global thermonuclear war hung over every
aspect of Cold War diplomacy. It always has been. Does Military Power Keep Us Safe? (Part II).” http://www. “Drop Pretension to Supremacy.S. A decline in heg won’t cause conflict – we have sufficient deterrence and policymakers exaggerate foreign troubles with security threats Friedman and Preble 10 – Benjamin. that military power keeps us safe. Although we aspire to a time when disputes are settled peacefully. peoples disconnected from any particular nation-state or peoples united by ideologies that transcend national boundaries? What if al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations are but the tip of the iceberg? Newspapers and
opinion journals are littered these days with apocalyptic predictions of an impending — or even ongoing — world war. Our spirit. Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute (May 20. The violence and bloodshed that can be deployed by non-state actors is an order of magnitude smaller than what could be caused by even a mediumsize modern industrial state. no.structure of the international system checks. we have defined our strength as a nation by our capacity for waging war.151 of 154
AT Heg Solves War (General)
Heg doesn’t solve war -. Can it even be compared with the Cold War. By reducing the size of our military to a level more consistent with our own needs. and again between September 1939 and August 1945. or Soviet (or Chinese. Christopher. power. The world is a dangerous place. pale in comparison to the death and destruction that took place between August 1914 and November 1918.org/pub_display.cato. But the true strength
of the United States. pending resolution of minor disputes like funding for the alternative Joint Strike Fighter engine. Perhaps we've all learned something? Even if major war between nations seems more remote than ever before. And the scale of violence that would have been unleashed had U. is its people. and by encouraging others to become more self-reliant. we sometimes seem a long way from that noble goal. President Barack Obama is expected to sign it. research fellow in defense and homeland security at the Cato Institute. perhaps over Taiwan.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10228)
For too long. This is neither naive nor utopian. the president has taken
. Those prospects cannot be dismissed lightly. our generosity and our ingenuity is expressed in countless ways.
security threats.S.S. according to a Cato Institute report released Tuesday. The resulting force would be more elite.S. Citing the need for austerity. Hawks and defense industry trade groups say this spending is essential to U. along with advances in strike technology. Fewer missions. because it could enhance security. Sending large armies to occupy — and try to manage the politics of — hostile Muslim countries is not effective counterterrorism policy. ambitions. we recommend cutting the Army and Marine Corps by roughly one-third. would also allow for reductions in the Air Force and Navy. Because a less active military can make conventional and counterinsurgency warfare less likely. Geography. less strained and far less expensive. By shedding missions. remove an impetus for nuclear weapons proliferation and prevent foreign peoples from resenting us for occupying their countries.152 of 154
no meaningful steps to rein in military spending. Pentagon officials have a goal of 1 percent real growth in the Defense Department budget over the next decade. weapons and vehicles procured and operational costs.
. In most cases. Making large spending cuts without reducing military commitments is a recipe for overburdening service members. In nearly all cases. they are not. Not exactly a revolution of fiscal discipline.S. it is counterproductive. forces. the Pentagon could cut
force structure — reducing personnel. for example — as major U. the Pentagon could spend less — at least $1. A force reduction strategy would make sense even
without deficits. Substantially reducing military spending means reducing U. wealth and nuclear weapons provide us with a degree of safety that our ancestors would envy. Washington confuses what it wants from its military (global primacy or hegemony) with what it needs (safety). Policymakers exaggerate the capability of existing enemies and invent new ones by defining traditional foreign troubles — geopolitical competition among states and instability within them.22 trillion less over the next 10 years. If our military had less to do. limit the number of countries that build up their military to balance U. however. It would reduce the possibility of fighting unnecessary wars. military deployments. Nor should Washington embrace strategic restraint just for budgetary reasons.S. But much of Washington's military spending is geared toward defending others and toward the dubious proposition that global stability depends on U.
Washington should speak frankly about the importance of human rights. The U. that means proposing a free trade agreement. At the same time. and encourage the peaceful settlement of disputes. World War II ended more than six decades
ago: The Japanese do not have a double dose of original sin and America should no longer play geopolitical wetnurse for nations that long ago developed the means to protect their own interests. the U. As the U. On defense. President Obama needs to promote a changed attitude as much as offer new policies. and Russia as well. That the U. The PRC has much at stake on a stable Korean Peninsula. Japanese. Washington should embrace rather than resist such an approach. such instability would pose little threat to the U.S. The president should press for a more active PRC policy to support reinvigorated U.S. and U. Such a cooperative venture also would help channel China's rise in peaceful directions. will remain engaged in East Asia. Yet Washington's Cold War alliance structure remains essentially unchanged. Bandow 9 – Doug. At the same time.S. China. He is a former special assistant to President Reagan (November 29. Japan.S. The starting point should be a push to ratify the FTA with South Korea. America's cultural and economic ties are long-lasting and mutually beneficial. The Japanese government apparently is interested in promoting a regional order. the People's Republic of China's apparent determination to create a military
capable of deterring U. “Policy Change for East Asia. engagement with the North. What has ever been must ever be appears to be the basis of U.
. should inform the North that full
international integration requires the participation of South Korea. However. while recognizing America's limited ability to influence the PRC's behavior. The Obama administration should pursue a different course. President Obama should begin moving the region into a new era of less security dependence on Washington. promote respect for human rights. The president should
treat Japan as a full partner. Washington should withdraw its garrisons from Japanese soil and turn defense responsibility for Japan over to Tokyo. maintains one-sided "mutual" defense treaties with Japan and South Korea. The most important relationship for the 21st century will be that between the existing superpower and the potential superpower.org/pub_display. foreign policy. emphasizing economic integration while promoting military detachment. Washington must forge a
cooperative relationship on difficult regional issues like North Korea. An improved bilateral relationship is more likely than isolation
to encourage greater respect by Beijing for the liberty of its citizens.S. also should encourage
greater cooperation between Japan and its neighbors. is losing its financial ability to do so. will be most secure if
friendly states in East Asia work together to confront sources of instability. Seoul has the most at stake in maintaining a peaceful peninsula.S. The Obama administration should coordinate South Korea. The U.S. Moreover. it also has much to gain from taking the lead in promoting diplomatic solutions of regional problems. a transformational agenda. America still has a major economic role to play. But Washington no longer has any need to attempt to preserve regional military hegemony. but should increasingly
devolve defense responsibilities on countries in the region. rather than merely adjusting its controversial Status of Forces Agreement. 2009. apart from the U.153 of 154
AT Heg Solves Asia Stability
Heg decline doesn’t cause East Asian conflict -. steps back from its dominant military role. However. Washington should allow the Republic of Korea to lead the
nonproliferation campaign.S.S. the ROK and its neighbors should step forward.php?pub_id=11015) The potential for conflict remains.S. The U. intervention along its border is treated as a threat to American security. And at a time of economic crisis the U.S. In economics.S. policies regarding Pyongyang. The U. called the East Asian Community. In Washington.” http://www.S. without any link to a global hegemonic competitor like the Soviet Union.cato. senior fellow at the Cato Institute. Washington should seek to tighten regional economic integration.S. Washington should strengthen economic and trade ties with China.multilateral cooperation solves. Washington should engage North Korea over its nuclear program. must remain militarily dominant is taken for granted.
S. there is the question of whether China will wish to emulate the U. A significant role in America's decline
has been played by its strategic over-extension. even if China becomes the world's largest economy this
will by no means automatically equate to an ability to rival the U. Senior Research Fellow. the Chinese may well be approaching the point where they can drive the U. and Pakistan could become the same. in terms of global power or learn from U. In Africa.S. Finally. Pakistan – and North Korea is more a ghastly liability than an ally. Neither the Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO)
nor the loose economic consultative grouping of BRICS resemble military alliances..S. and with the possible exception of Pakistan. but so far these are for commercial use. this is one of the most complex of all military-industrial undertakings. China
would wish to infuriate and frighten India by turning them into Chinese military bases. In addition. China may be able to make a better contribution to the continent's development than the West has done.Russian Relations and the Rise of China. it is not likely that the host countries India is after all a great deal closer to them than China is. Chinese managers and workers are already facing increased local hostility in some areas.” http://www. interests. China's only true ally in the world is
Soviet Union discovered during the Cold War. Moreover. In terms of military power. and certainly of the wars in Vietnam and Iraq. from effectively defending Taiwan. not to dominate.
.154 of 154
AT Heg Solves China
Decline in heg doesn’t mean Chinese rise or conflict – structural barriers and interdependence OR china can’t compete – military disparity is still too great Lieven 11 – Anatol. China has gone from being one of the Western system's greatest victims in the 19th Century to being one of the greatest beneficiaries of the global market system created
by the British Empire and the United States. and China. as a global superpower. but as the lacks stable and extensive alliance systems.S.S. Indeed.S.net/publications/policy/us_russian_relations_and_the_rise_of_chi na) There is no necessity that the rise of China will lead to increased tension or conflict between the U. and thereby to the stability of the Chinese political system and the rule of the Communist Party. and embroilment in local wars which in the end had little to do with real U. China is working on what has been called its "string of pearls" strategy to develop ports around the Indian Ocean. 2011.3 Secondly. “U. but it will also run into the same immense barriers to development that African states have faced up to now. due
both to harsh managerial practices and the commercial competition of Chinese workers and traders. American Strategy Program. China makes a conflict over Taiwan much less likely.2 When it comes to global power projection China suffers from two huge drawbacks and is likely to do so for a long time to come. and the Chinese are only at the very early stages. navy away from China's coasts and prevent the U.newamerica. The yuan has a very long way to go before it even begins to rival the pound or the yen as a global currency.S. The first is its lack of aircraft carriers. The destruction of that system through economic conflict or war would deal a shattering blow to the Chinese economy.S. but by reducing any possibility of a Taiwanese declaration of independence at the same time. the whole greater Middle East looks like an area that any sensible great power
will in future try to avoid. This was arguably true of the Korean and Afghan Wars. let alone the dollar or the euro.S. In fact. former senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (July 11. it is a rather striking comment on China's international strategic weakness that apart from North Korea. compared to the U. Beijing is now devoting great effort to developing these. mistakes.