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***Hegemony Bad***...............................................................................................1 Frontline.......................................................................................................................................3 ***Uniqueness.........................................................................................................6 Low Now.......................................................................................................................................7 Collapse Inevitable.....................................................................................................................10 Multipolarity Inevitable..............................................................................................................17 Multilat Inevitable......................................................................................................................19 Heg Multilat..........................................................................................................................20 Challengers Now.........................................................................................................................21 Heg Low (1/2)............................................................................................................................26 Heg Low (2/2)............................................................................................................................27 AT: Best Military Sustains.........................................................................................................29 AT: Soft Power Sustains.............................................................................................................30 AT: Economy Sustains ...............................................................................................................31 ***Alternative Uniqueness....................................................................................32 Heg Sustainable (1/2)................................................................................................................33 Heg Sustainable (2/2)................................................................................................................35 ***Heg Bad............................................................................................................37 Bad – Generic.............................................................................................................................38 Bad – China War........................................................................................................................39 XTN: China War.....................................................................................................................40 Bad – Counterbalancing.............................................................................................................41 Bad – Disease.............................................................................................................................42 Bad – Iran Strikes......................................................................................................................43 Bad – Middle East War..............................................................................................................45 AT: Heg Solves MidEast War.................................................................................................46 Bad – Proliferation.....................................................................................................................47 AT: Heg Solves Prolif..............................................................................................................49 Bad – Russia War.......................................................................................................................51 Bad – Sino-Russia Alliance........................................................................................................52 Bad – Space Weapons................................................................................................................53 Bad – Terrorism.........................................................................................................................55 Heg Fails - Terrorism.................................................................................................................57 XTN: Terrorism......................................................................................................................58 AT: Heg Solves Terror............................................................................................................59 Bad – US-EU Relations.............................................................................................................60 XTN: US-EU Relations...........................................................................................................61 Relations Good.......................................................................................................................62 Doesn’t Solve War......................................................................................................................63 Clinging to Power -> War..........................................................................................................69 Collapse =/= War.......................................................................................................................70 Retrenchment Good...................................................................................................................72 Heg Turns (1/3)..........................................................................................................................75 Heg Turns (2/3)..........................................................................................................................77 Heg Turns (3/3).........................................................................................................................78
2 of 154 ***Authors............................................................................................................80 AT: Ferguson..............................................................................................................................81 AT: Khalilzhad...........................................................................................................................82 AT: Brooks&Wohlforth..............................................................................................................83 ***Multipolarity Good...........................................................................................84 MultiPol Good – Generic...........................................................................................................85 MultiPol Good – Terror.............................................................................................................86 MultiPol Good – Iran.................................................................................................................87 Heg Unsustainable.....................................................................................................................90 Heg Unsustainable (Soft Power/Unpopular Policies)...............................................................99 Heg Decline Inevitable.............................................................................................................102 Alt Cause – Resource Collapse.................................................................................................104 Heg Collapse Inevitable (1/18).................................................................................................105 Heg Collapse Inevitable (2/18)................................................................................................106 Heg Collapse Inevitable (3/18).................................................................................................107 Heg Collapse Inevitable (4/18)................................................................................................108 Heg Collapse Inevitable (5/18).................................................................................................109 Heg Collapse Inevitable (6/18)..................................................................................................111 Heg Collapse Inevitable (7/18).................................................................................................112 Heg Collapse Inevitable (8/18).................................................................................................113 Heg Collapse Inevitable (9/18).................................................................................................114 Heg Collapse Inevitable (10/18)...............................................................................................115 Heg Collapse Inevitable (11/18)................................................................................................116 Heg Collapse Inevitable (12/18)................................................................................................117 Heg Collapse Inevitable (13/18)...............................................................................................118 Heg Collapse Inevitable (14/18)...............................................................................................119 .................................................................................................................................................120 Heg Collapse Inevitable (15/18)................................................................................................121 Heg Collapse Inevitable (16/18)...............................................................................................122 Heg Collapse Inevitable (17/18)...............................................................................................123 Heg Collapse Inevitable (18/18)...............................................................................................124 Exts – Yes China Rise...............................................................................................................126 Yes – China/Russia Counterbalancing.....................................................................................132 UQ – Yes Heg Decline..............................................................................................................133 UQ – Yes Heg Decline (Middle East) ......................................................................................138 Withdrawal K/T Sustainability................................................................................................139 Attempts to Maintain Heg Bad.................................................................................................141 Heg Bad – Iran ........................................................................................................................143 Heg Bad – Prolif ......................................................................................................................144 Offshore Balancing Good – General ........................................................................................145 Offshore Balancing Good – China............................................................................................148 Offshore Balancing Good – Middle East/Terrorism ...............................................................149 Offshore Balancing Good – Terrorism/Prolif .........................................................................150 AT Heg Solves War (General)...................................................................................................151 AT Heg Solves Asia Stability ....................................................................................................153 AT Heg Solves China ................................................................................................................154
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Primacy will be impossible to sustain – dollar, fiscal pressure, rising challengers, overstretch Layne 10 (Christopher Layne, Professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A&M's George H.W. Bush
School of Government & Public Service. "Graceful decline: the end of Pax Americana". The American Conservative. May 2010. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_7060/is_5_9/ai_n54223596/) AK
China's economy has been growing much more rapidly than the United States' over the last two decades and continues to do so, maintaining audacious 8 percent growth projections in the midst of a global recession. Leading economic forecasters predict that it will overtake the U.S. as the world's largest economy, measured by overall GDP, sometime around 2020. Already in 2008, China passed the U.S. as the world's leading manufacturing nation--a title the United States had enjoyed for over a century--and this year China will displace Japan as the world's second-largest economy. Everything we know about the trajectories of rising great powers tells us that China will use its increasing wealth to build formidable military power and that it will seek to become the dominant power in East Asia. Optimists contend that once the U.S. recovers from what historian Niall Ferguson calls the
"Great Repression"--not quite a depression but more than a recession--we'll be able to answer the Chinese challenge. The country, they remind us, faced a larger debt-GDP ratio after World War II yet embarked on an era of sustained growth. They forget that
the postwar era was a golden age of U.S. industrial and financial dominance, trade surpluses, and persistent high growth rates. Those days are gone. The United States of 2010 and the world in which it lives are far different from those of 1945. Weaknesses in the fundamentals of the American economy have been accumulating for more than three decades. In the 1980s, these problems were acutely diagnosed by a number of
writers--notably David Calleo, Paul Kennedy, Robert Gilpin, Samuel Huntington, and James Chace--who predicted that these structural ills would ultimately erode the economic foundations of America's global preeminence. A spirited late-1980s debate was cut short, when, in quick succession, the Soviet Union collapsed, Japan's economic bubble burst, and the U.S. experienced an apparent economic revival during the Clinton administration. Now the delayed day of reckoning is fast
approaching. Even in the best case, the United States will emerge from the current crisis with fundamental handicaps. The Federal Reserve and Treasury have pumped massive amounts of dollars into circulation in hope of reviving the economy. Add to that the $1 trillion-plus budget deficits that the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) predicts the United States will incur for at least a decade. When the projected deficits are bundled with the persistent U.S. currentaccount deficit, the entitlements overhang (the unfunded future liabilities of Medicare and Social Security), and the cost of the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is reason to worry about the United States' fiscal stability. As the CBO says, "Even if the recovery occurs as projected and the stimulus bill is allowed to expire, the country will face the highest debt/GDP ratio in 50 years and an increasingly unsustainable and urgent fiscal problem." The dollar's vulnerability is the United States' geopolitical Achilles' heel. Its role as the international economy's reserve currency ensures American preeminence, and if it loses that status, hegemony will be literally unaffordable. As Cornell professor Jonathan Kirshner observes, the dollar's vulnerability "presents potentially significant and underappreciated restraints upon contemporary American political and military predominance." Fears for the dollar's long-term health predated the current financial and economic crisis. The meltdown has amplified them and highlighted two new factors that bode ill for continuing reserve-currency status. First, the other big financial players in the international economy are either military rivals (China) or ambiguous allies (Europe) that have their own ambitions and no longer require U.S. protection from the Soviet threat. Second, the dollar faces an uncertain future because of concerns that its value will diminish over time. Indeed, China,
which has holdings estimated at nearly $2 trillion, is worried that America will leave it with huge piles of depreciated dollars.
China's vote of no confidence is reflected in its recent calls to create a new reserve currency. In coming years, the U.S. will be under increasing pressure to defend the dollar by preventing runaway inflation. This will require it to impose fiscal self-discipline through some combination of budget cuts, tax increases, and interest-rate hikes. Given that the last two options could choke off renewed growth, there is likely to be strong pressure to slash the federal budget. But it will be almost impossible to make meaningful cuts in federal spending without deep reductions in
As Kirshner puts it. Necessity . draw down their military obligations. we find that the magnitude of relative decline helps explain the extent of great power retrenchment. 35. a range of 61–83 percent. Multiple balancing powers and internal issues make heg collapse inevitable – only abandoning unipolarity solves lashout and great power conflict John Feffer (co-director of Foreign Policy In Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies)February 2009 “A Multipolar Moment” http://www. When international conditions demand it. Contrary to the pessimistic conclusions of critics. great powers moderate their foreign policy ambitions and offer concessions in areas of lesser strategic value. Based on the empirical record. States that retrench often regain their position in the hierarchy of great powers. the capitalist West is facing defeat in Afghanistan and is on the verge of 'the worst recession in a hundred years.' as British minister Ed Balls put it in perhaps only slight exaggeration. power was at its zenith. In this first decade of the 21st century. and impose adjustments on domestic populations. even over short time spans. International Security Spring 2011. "This combination will force the Obama administration to stop cherrypicking issues on which it wants to cooperate and forging ahead on those issues it believes it can still handle alone. Vol.S. "These aren't the golden 1990s. In fact. In contrast. Faced with diminishing resources. retrenchment can be successful.) AK In this article. To date there has been neither a comprehensive study of great power retrenchment nor a study that lays out the case for retrenchment as a practical or probable policy. great powers retrench for the same reason they expand: the rigors of great power politics compel them to do so. we challenge the retrenchment pessimists’ claim that domestic or international constraints inhibit the ability of declining great powers to retrench. When borrowing becomes more difficult. Following the dictates of neorealist theory. we argue that the rate of decline helps explain what forms great power retrenchment will take. No. Further. peaceful retrenchment is the most common response. How fast great powers fall contributes to whether these retrenching states will internally reform. First. and Joseph. we find that great powers retrenched in no less than eleven and no more than fifteen of the eighteen cases. Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami. Pages 7-44. states renounce risky ties. Far from being a hazardous policy. 40 percent managed to recover their ordinal rank. So the United States will face obvious "guns or butter" choices. Of the fifteen great powers that adopted retrenchment in response to acute relative decline. Second. and adjustment more difficult to postpone. Great powers are able to rebalance their commitments through compromise. defense expenditures are "more likely to be decisive in the future when the U.S. increase reliance on allies or adversaries. cutting non-defense spending. argues FPIF contributor Hannes Artens. Americans will find themselves afflicted with hegemony fatigue. Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College. Knowing only a state’s rate of relative economic decline explains its corresponding degree of retrenchment in as much as 61 percent of the cases we examined. when states fall in the hierarchy of great powers. Your authors are pessimists – empirical data proves retrenchment is more peaceful than the alternatives MacDonald and Parent 11 (Paul. rather than conflict.org/articles/a_multipolar_moment But times have changed." Faced with these hard decisions. when U. Discretionary non-defense domestic spending accounts for only about 20 percent of annual federal outlays. is under pressure to make real choices about taxes and spending. and cutting defense spending. Third. our analysis suggests that great powers facing acute decline are less likely to initiate or escalate militarized interstate disputes. We examine eighteen cases of acute relative decline since 1870 and advance three main arguments. none of the declining powers that failed to retrench recovered their relative position. seek new allies or rely more heavily on old ones. states respond to penury the same way they do to plenty: they seek to adopt policies that maximize security given available means.4 of 154 defense expenditures. 4. In these ways. we question the logic and evidence of the retrenchment pessimists.fpif. choices must be made between raising taxes.12 Retrenchment is by no means easy. “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment”.S. and declining great powers face powerful incentives to contract their interests in a prompt and proportionate manner. This article fills these gaps by systematically examining the relationship between acute relative decline and the responses of great powers. retrenchment neither requires aggression nor invites predation. and make diplomatic overtures to enemies. but necessity is the mother of invention. the absolute size of U." he writes in Multilateralism in Munich.
in which all sides humbly accept what is realistically possible. Brazil. the red ink is mounting. Several powerful countries in the South (particularly India. economy. and South Africa) are quietly acquiring more geopolitical heft. Debt has been the gravedigger of many an empire." Are we thus witnessing the final end of the unipolar moment? China is coming up fast. the bill for two wars plus the Pentagon's already gargantuan budget. and all of our nuclear weapons have done little to prevent North Korea from entering the nuclear club. Global problems like climate change and financial collapse require global solutions. the Pentagon is still maintaining the world's largest military force — but we have failed to defeat al-Qaeda. Over here.S. so we either evolve multilateral responses or we do a dinosaur dive into extinction. The global recession is hammering the U. the stimulus package. The European Union's expansion has been accompanied by relatively few growing pains. and we might finally see the end of the dollar's reign as global currency.5 of 154 will dictate a more pragmatic multilateralism. With the bank bailout. Or is that the sound of dirt hitting a coffin lid? . I can hear the adding machine totting up the numbers. we are quagmired in Afghanistan. meanwhile.
6 of 154 ***Uniqueness .
with another confrontation involving Vietnam reported only today. where she will join European and other foreign ministers in the international contact group co-ordinating the Nato-led intervention in Libya. The Guardian UK. where she is due to make a speech decrying protectionism.7 of 154 Low Now American influence and dominance is diminished now – Clinton tour proves Tisdall 7-14 (Simon. you can afford to laugh. The sharp crack as Israel’s prime minister slapped President Obama’s face with a refusal to halt . The US is one of the few countries with a bigger national debt than Greece. Clinton can have little to say on Palestine. Clinton will do well to avoid David Cameron's mistake of indulging in gratuitous Pakistan-bashing on Indian soil. The official line. It will be notable as much for what is not said as what is. and Barack Obama remains opposed to direct intervention. power — just look at events in the Middle East. Clinton said this week that the Syrian president had forfeited the legitimacy to rule. June 24th. Iran and the IsraelPalestine conflict. there is little more the US can do other than complain. July 14th. its unhelpful stance on Kashmir and its machinations in Afghanistan. which. But paradoxically. on India's de facto support for the Burmese dictatorship. A security conference in Bali is certain to touch on a host of territorial disputes between China and its neighbours. Despite claims that Gaddafi is close to throwing in the towel. Americans seem incapable of achieving a consensus on how to address it.uk/commentisfree/2011/jul/14/hillary-clinton-world-tour) Hillary Clinton's 11-day round-the-world tour is remarkable even by the high-flying standards of US secretaries of state. Italy and Russia. The US is now reduced to the role of disgruntled spectator as a UN vote to recognise Palestinian statehood draws near. All three issues speak to American impotence. France. And with the Obama administration's peace plan torpedoed by Binyamin Netanyahu. promulgated by France. to back up its Nato partners. Like the Greeks. for example. and that the outlines of a negotiated settlement are beginning to emerge. Given America's own protectionist record. in effect. militarily and in other ways. where the greatest challenges to American power are rising. In Damascus. Counter-terrorism will be high on the agenda following Wednesday's bombings in Mumbai.com/interactive/2011/06/24/opinion/global/20110624_SUPERPOWER. But while China and Russia afford him diplomatic cover. http://www. Hegemony low and declining – Middle East proves Sebastian 6/23 (Tim. While that assessment will be publicly upheld in Istanbul. Bashar al-Assad continues to ignore ever more shrill American criticism of the nationwide security crackdown. What will not be said is that the US increasingly views Delhi as a vital counterweight to a steadily more aggressive China. To confuse matters further.guardian.nytimes. Much the same might be said of the effect of American strictures on North Korea. Clinton's first stop is in Istanbul on Friday. “No More Superpower?” The New York Times. Clinton made waves last year when she warned China. But Washington. Clinton could give the interventionists a boost were she to announce US recognition of the rebel national council in Benghazi as Libya's government and release more than $30bn in regime funds frozen in US banks. In this context. 2011. not leadership. Clinton's visit to financially stricken Athens on Sunday is unlikely to be of any practical assistance. For this reason Clinton cannot be expected to dwell. And it is arguably USpatented transnational market capitalism that created the whole sorry mess in the first place. behind the scenes Clinton may hear well-rehearsed complaints that the US is not doing enough. to stop trying to fence off the South China Sea. there is as yet no concrete sign that he will stand down – amid widening differences in approach between the US and Britain. The secretary of state will say a lot about strengthening ties through strategic dialogue and commercial collaboration. chairman of Doha Debates.co. is that pressure on Muammar Gaddafi's embattled regime in Tripoli is telling. “Hillary Clinton circumnavigates a sphere of diminishing US influence”. Clinton's Turkish leg will include bilateral talks on Syria. 2011. The next stop on Clinton's grand tour – India – will take her into the sphere of superpower rivalries. this piece of doorstep impudence is more likely to elicit smiles than snarls in Beijing. Her words angered Beijing but did not alter its behaviour. and its ever greater reliance on Chinese capital and Chinese imports. When you're winning. has grown more belligerent. Turkey will propose yet another "roadmap" to end the conflict. Clinton's sojourn will be rounded off in south-east and east Asia. if anything.S. this diplomatic tour de force may unintentionally highlight the apparently inexorable decline of American power and influence. It's certain to make headlines around the globe. worried in part about encouraging Islamist extremists. staff writer. the Israeli prime minister. http://www. Iran's recent decision to dramatically accelerate its suspect uranium enrichment programme gives the lie to claims that the Tehran regime is retreating under the US-led sanctions campaign. British journalist.html?ref=middleeast) There’s no doubt about the devaluation of U. Clinton will finish her global circumnavigation in Hong Kong. has so far hedged its bets.
the largest Ferris wheel in the world is in Singapore. America will buy you a ticket. It makes no sense to provide Israel with weapons to destroy Palestinian property and then offer assistance to put the rubble back together again. primarily China. International terrorism was vividly painted as a conflict of civilizations. withdraw from military conflicts and focus on domestic problems and the financial crisis. fall and hopefully emerge stronger. the biggest factory in the world is in China. 2011. the largest investment fund in the world is in Abu Dhabi. American power on the decline – Iraq was a turning point Rogozin 6/23 (Dmitry.modations with them. Security Council — was. So the decline of U. enjoyed at the historic moment of the collapse of Communism and the disintegration of the Soviet state. perhaps. started with the 9/11 catastrophe and war in Afghanistan. which shows how the collapse of communism and the Soviet empire — as well as the rise of global markets — has leveled the .8 of 154 settlements still reverberates around the region. George W. We are living in an interesting time.0 (Time of Texas Online – “US – Behind in Education. It needs. Far from stopping conflicts. But history took a different turn. including Russia — and in the entire world. economically and scientifically. http://www. But today? “The tallest building in the world is now in Dubai. the host of CNN’s Fareed Zakaria GPS and an editor at large for Time magazine. Freedom is a much more inspiring teacher than oppression. It needs to show the world that it will no longer back leaders who abuse their own people’s freedom in the mistaken belief that it will help Americans sleep more securely back home. http://timesoftexas. There really is a new world. the European Union. Now we speak not only about America’s weakened role. Brazil. The Bush presidency was marked by America’s diminishing reputation. New energy.S. not because it can’t press buttons — or find and kill Osama bin Laden — but because its policies make no sense. and the rise of other power centers. and Barack Obama. and post-crisis Russia.” notes Fareed Zakaria. is a natural and logical process. The war in Iraq — started despite the protests of the allies and with no sanction of the U. The post-Soviet decade marked the peak of American influence and authority. July 1st. but about the enhancement of such power centers as China. scientific creations and things like that — which are really harbingers of future economic growth. America is in decline – education.” Zakaria. Bush. “And … more troublingly. The term of the third post-Soviet president. the largest oil refinery is in India. where there would be several centers capable of sharing responsibility for security and development both in certain regions — for example in an expanded Europe. competitiveness.0. India. there is no peace at all. Only this time it’s not called America. new Arab governments will have to stand on their own feet. during his election campaign.com/interactive/2011/06/24/opinion/global/20110624_SUPERPOWER. Digital Infrastructure”. power may be good for the Middle East. Not because the vacuum will be filled by more palatable players — but because this one needs a break. 2011. to paraphrase President Clinton. June 24th. What more powerful signal can there be to despots present and future. this will ensure a steady supply for years to come. Permanent representative of Russia to NATO.’’ in the sense that there were no more alternatives to American leadership and values. Unnatural was the short period of unconditional world leadership that the U.com/2011/07/01/us-behind-ineducation-competitive-workforce-new-energy-digital-infrastructure/) Thirty years ago. The ‘‘conflict balance’’ of the Cold War was very soon changed by global destabilization. Competitive Workforce. to find new friends. It makes no sense to trumpet freedom and justice — belatedly — in Egypt and remain virtually silent about the gross human rights violations reported in Bahrain. a turning point: The world saw that America was taking on too much. stumble. America’s currency is at rock bottom in the Arab world. With Washington’s power diminished. Don’t assume the worst. The world is rapidly changing. “No More Superpower?” The New York Times. Only the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from the Cold War brought ‘‘the only superpower’’ the authority unthinkable before: Some philosophers even started speaking about ‘‘the end of history. that you can murder and torture all you want — but if you go quietly when you’ve had enough. writer of the book The Post-American World: Release 2. Israel will have to make new accom. the United States dominated the world politically.nytimes. and infrastructure Times of Texas 7/1 *citing Fareed Zakaria. promised to restore America’s popularity. After decades of American engagement in the peace process. host of CNN`s Fareed Zakaria GPS and editor for Time Magazine. It makes no sense to tell Muammar el-Qaddafi to leave Libya because of crimes against his own people — and then to help him evade international justice by touting for his safe haven in a country that doesn’t acknowledge the International Criminal Court.S. I would like it to come as soon as possible to a new balance. instead of just searching out its enemies.html?ref=middleeast) The gradual diminishing of American influence. energy.N. [the United States is] also losing [its] key grip on indices such as patent creation. charts the fall of America’s dominance and the simultaneous rise of the rest of the world in his book The Post-American World: Release 2.
consuming. Zakaria says. “And we are all witnesses to this phenomenon. is also starting to lag behind other countries in education.9 trillion to the federal government over the next 10 years. “Politics and power is a realm of relative influence. whose role is diminishing? Of course.” he says.9 of 154 playing field for many other countries around the world.” he tells Fresh Air‘s Terry Gross. “The more countries that get rich [and] the larger the world economy. loaning money. We would go to the bottom of the pack in terms of deficit as a percentage of GDP among the rich countries in the world — we would basically solve our fiscal problems for the short term. the United States economy would be in much worse shape than it is today. Zakaria says. the Bush tax cuts would expire next year. He says America is now heading toward what he calls a “post-American” world. “To put it in perspective. the more people there are producing. and fostering new energy and digital infrastructure to support those workers — all markers of long-term economic growth.” America’s political system. the established power — the United States. becomes mired in debate and cannot deal with the short-term deficit. the technological connection into this market. “So as China expands its role in Asia. in which the United States’ share of the “global pie” is much smaller — as the rest of the globe begins to catch up.” he says. It’s not possible for two countries to be the leading dominant political power at the same time. “In economic terms. if Congress were to do nothing.” But Zakaria cautions that the economic growth around the world — and the benefits that global economic stability create — do not extend to the political arena. … If we didn’t have the rest of the world growing. the economic connections of a global market.” .” he says. building a competitive workforce. “The result is you have countries all over the world thriving and taking advantage of the political stability they have achieved. saving. “That by itself would yield $3. investing. the rise of the rest [of the globe] is a win-win.” America.
created after World War II. The dollar’s vulnerability is the United States’ real geopolitical Achilles’ heel because the dollar’s role as the international economy’s reserve currency role underpins U. From this unparalleled military and economic power came a Pax Americana that has endured for more than six decades. May 2010. and sustained high growth rates. will be pressured to defend the dollar by preventing runaway inflation.S. a hegemon is responsible for stabilizing key regions and guarding the global commons. It seemed the sun would never set on the U.S. But the post-war era was a golden age of U. Decline is coming – hegemony is unsustainable in its current form Layne 10 (Christopher Layne. Meaningful cuts in federal spending mean deep reductions in defense expenditures because discretionary non-defense – domestic – spending accounts for only about 20% of annual federal outlays.S.10 of 154 Collapse Inevitable The Pax Americana is unsustainable and is already crumbling – too many alt causes to save it now Layne 11 (Christopher Layne is Professor and Robert M. trade surpluses.S.S. Those days are gone forever. But America is increasingly unable to play the hegemon's assigned role. primacy will endure for years to come. Professor and Robert M. Externally. the Pax Americana is already is crumbling in slow motion. they say. A hegemon is supposed to solve international crises.com/223-layne-christopher/231-pax-americana) AK American primacy’s end is result of history’s big. Faced with these hard choices. and yet embarked on a sustained era of growth. dominance in world politics and the beginning of the transition to a new constellation of world power.W. primacy. empire. not cause them. The entire fabric of world order that the United States established after 1945 – the Pax Americana – rested on the foundation of U. and providing the reserve currency. Optimists contend that current worries about decline will fade once the U. China’s economy has been growing much more rapidly than the United States’ over the last two decades and continues to do so. "Graceful decline: the end of Pax Americana".S. the United States no longer fits the part. supplying liquidity for the world economy.S. the United States will emerge from the current crisis facing a grave fiscal crisis.S. the U. The United States of 2011 are different from 1945. will incur for at least a decade.S. faced a larger debt/GDP ratio after World War II. When these are bundled with the entitlements overhang (the unfunded future liabilities of Medicare and Social Security) and the cost of the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Faced with wars it cannot win or quit and an economy begging rescue. will be compelled to retrench strategically and the Pax Americana will end. It is supposed to be the lender of last resort. impersonal forces compounded by the United States’ own self-defeating policies. there is reason to worry about United States’ long-term fiscal stability – and the role of the dollar. The US decline reflects its own economic troubles. many in the mainstream foreign-policy community see these as temporary setbacks and believe that U. The looming fiscal results from the $1 trillion plus budget deficits that the U. http://findarticles. The American people are . If so. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A & M University's Bush School of Government and Public Service. This will require fiscal self-discipline through a combination of tax increases and big spending cuts. Miss American Pie” The European Magazine Online – 3-28-2011 http://theeuropean-magazine. the impact of these big historical forces is reflected in the emergence of new great powers like China and India which is being driven by the unprecedented shift in the center of global economic power from the Euro-Atlantic area to Asia. In coming years the U. recovers from the recession. If the dollar loses that status America’s hegemony literally will be unaffordable. it offers public goods by opening its domestic market to other states. Even in the best case. Militarily. Bush School of Government & Public Service. The decline of American power means the end of U.S.S. “Bye bye. the U. The Pax Americana is already crumbling in slow motion The current international order is based on the economic and security structures that the U. Indeed. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A&M's George H.S. After all. industrial and financial dominance.com/p/articles/mi_7060/is_5_9/ai_n54223596/) AK The United States emerged from World War II in a position of global dominance. Americans may contract hegemony fatigue. military and economic preponderance. Economically. not the biggest borrower. The American Conservative. Still.
W. hold about the world. But they are illusions that "express the deepest beliefs which Americans.S. and powerful. we believe. as Edmund Stillman and William Pfaff wrote some 45 years ago. We export our model of freemarket capitalism because--we are told--states that are economically interdependent do not fight each other. stumbles.11 of 154 awakening to a new reality more quickly than the academy. The consequence has been to contribute to the very imperial overstretch that is accelerating the United States' decline. genocide. and Russia--are rising. Because that U." So we cling to the idea that our hegemony is necessary for our own and everyone else's security. most notably China. President Barack Obama's November 2009 trip to China provided both substantive and emblematic evidence of the shift. used to tell us about American foreign policy." If we could just give the rest of the world a makeover so it looked like the United States. others--notably China. All these bad things.) But as my graduate school mentor. just 27 percent chose the United States. As the Financial Times observed.S. Professor and Robert M. plays a less important and powerful role as a world leader than it did a decade ago. May 2010. the United States will pay a high price if it endlessly repeats its mistakes. there is overwhelming evidence that they are wrong.S. According to a December 2009 Pew survey. and morally superior to the rest of the world. religious intolerance. Bush made repeatedly in justifying his policy of exporting democracy at the point of a bayonet. The view that the world is doomed without hegemony is flawed – exceptionalist. is facing enormous difficulties. leadership has to co-exist with several rising powers. and the post-1945 Pax Americana will be replaced by an international order that reflects the interests. imperialism. and norms of emerging powers. U. decline means that in the 21st century. Americans believe that our political and economic systems provide "a prototypical solution for the world's disorders. military personnel who have suffered disfiguring wounds or been killed in Iraq and Afghanistan. We work multilaterally through international institutions because--we are told--these promote cooperation and trust among states. Mr. 41 percent of the public believes that the U. if you discount the 58. enjoyed such vast superiority for such a long time. it had the luxury of acting on its delusions without paying too high a price. and justifies endless interventions that ultimately destroy our hegemony Layne 10 (Christopher Layne. come from "over there. "Coming at a moment when Chinese prestige is growing and the U. And because the U. all would be well. better. non-democratic forms of governance. Obama's trip has symbolized the advent of a more multi-polar world where U. values.com/p/articles/mi_7060/is_5_9/ai_n54223596/) AK The foundational American myth of empire is exceptionalism. None of these propositions is self-evident. India. as a nation.S. you begin to pay a price for repeating your mistakes.000 names on the Vietnam Memorial or the tens of thousands of U. Much of America's decline can be attributed to its own self-defeating policies. Americans have always looked at the outside world suspiciously and viewed it as a source of contagion: war. imperialist. http://findarticles. but as the U. We attempt to tame the world by exporting democracy because--we are told--democracies do not fight each other. dating back to the Puritans. "Graceful decline: the end of Pax Americana".S. and latterly totalitarianism. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A&M's George H. These assumptions invest American foreign policy with a tendency to see the world in terms of good versus evil. it believes it has the obligation to prevail in this global struggle." U. that the United States is a model for the world and "America's wants and values are universal"--a point George W. strong. and terrorism. America's security and way of life are purportedly endangered by the existence of hostile ideologies anywhere in the world because peace and freedom are allegedly indivisible." We have long thought that we cannot live safely in a world of such imperfections and that it is therefore our national duty to cure these ills by using American power to construct a world order based on our values. one of the towering figures in the study of international politics. But when your power declines. The epoch of American dominance is drawing to a close. Intervention is thus the United States' default in foreign policy.S. To change our foreign policy--to come to grips with the end of the Pax Americana--we first need to change the way we see the world. that the U. "When you are big. Bush School of Government & Public Service. looks through this prism. .S.S. Indeed. militarism. The American Conservative. you can afford to make the same dumb mistakes over and over again. the belief. foreign-policy elites have extrapolated from our national experience and concluded. is different. 44 percent of Americans polled said that China was the leading economic power." In the same Pew study. Kenneth Waltz. the current era of globalization will end.S. and international politics is entering a period of transition: no longer unipolar but not yet fully multipolar. (That is. This shift in the global balance of power will dramatically affect international politics: the likelihood of intense great-power security competitions--and even war--will increase.S.
J. and a continuing decline in real wages. Under pressure at home and abroad. Washington is finally forced to slash its bloated military budget. 10 (Alfred. China.R. however. Summer 2009] For an overview of trends that could affect international politics over the next two decades. the U.S. dollar finally loses its special status as the world's reserve currency. as long expected. The world pays next to no attention as the American Century ends in silence. the decline of American technological innovation. not staying here as once would have happened. 1 machine" in America. in 2020. By 2025. was still number two behind Japan in worldwide patent applications with 232. expert. space. a good starting point is the National Intelligence Council’s (NIC’s) Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World. most of whom will be heading home. Nearly half of all graduate students in the sciences in the U.S.S. in other words. Faced with a fading superpower incapable of paying the bills.S.S. but it is significantly more insightful and intellectually courageous than typical government reports. Russian president Dimitri Medvedev insisted that it was time to end "the artificially maintained unipolar system" based on "one formerly strong reserve currency. the United States is likely to face a critical shortage of talented scientists. with just 11 percent of them compared to 12 percent for China and 16 percent for the European Union. the U. knows best on economic policy. three main threats exist to America’s dominant position in the global economy: loss of economic clout thanks to a shrinking share of world trade. often over remarkably irrelevant issues. Hegemony—Myth or Reality?: A Review Essay.12 of 154 Heg falling now — external threats to the economy outweigh the aff’s internal links McCoy. ever-rising unemployment. provocatively challenge U. India. and the end of the dollar's privileged status as the global reserve currency. that it "blows away the existing No. Riding a political tide of disillusionment and despair." Economic Decline: Scenario 2020 After years of swelling deficits fed by incessant warfare in distant lands. has been falling behind its competitors.S. "to hasten the bankruptcy of the U.to 34-year-olds with university degrees. Washington slowly pulls U. 1. in October China's Defense Ministry unveiled the world's fastest supercomputer. Iran. great and regional. dominion over the oceans." Simultaneously. The World Economic Forum ranked the United States at a mediocre 52nd among 139 nations in the quality of its university math and science instruction in 2010. and cyberspace. After leading the world for decades in 25. 12/6/10. No. Treasury notes.S. A harbinger of further decline: in 2009 the U. said one U. Heg unsustainable – multiple constraints ensure collapse and rise of alternatives Christopher Layne. but China was closing fast at 195. There is no reason to believe that this trend will reverse itself. Such negative trends are encouraging increasingly sharp criticism of the dollar's role as the world’s reserve currency. hit rock bottom in ranking among the 40 nations surveyed by the Information Technology & Innovation Foundation when it came to "change" in "global innovation-based competitiveness" during the previous decade.S. dollar). "Other countries are no longer willing to buy into the idea that the U. By 2008. Adding substance to these statistics. domestic divisions widen into violent clashes and divisive debates. Take these as signposts of a world to come. the United States had already fallen to number three in global merchandise exports. are now foreigners.W. as economist Michael Hudson has argued. China's central bank governor suggested that the future might lie with a global reserve currency "disconnected from individual nations" (that is. Chair in National Security at the School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. 34. the cost of imports soars.S. and of a possible attempt.S. Unable to pay for swelling deficits by selling now-devalued Treasury notes abroad. demanding respect for American authority and threatening military retaliation or economic reprisal. the Tianhe-1A. In 2008.000. Suddenly. amid soaring prices. so powerful. education system. 09 [“The Waning of U." observed Kenneth S.salon.com/news/feature/2010/12/06/america_collapse_2025/index. that source of future scientists and innovators. Similarly.S. a far-right patriot captures the presidency with thundering rhetoric. a former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund. it is far too late. thanks to a blistering 400 percent increase since 2000.” International Security.15Global Trends 2025 is not light reading. American leadership in technological innovation is on the wane. Add to this clear evidence that the U.S. Russia. and other powers. the U.000. Rogoff. Smail Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. with the world's central banks holding an astronomical $4 trillion in U. financial-military world order. “How America will collapse”. forces back from hundreds of overseas bases to a continental perimeter. Vol. Its key geopolitical .S.html) Today. the country sank to 12th place in 2010. http://www. Meanwhile. In mid-2009. By now.
U. the financial privileges conferred on the United States by the dollar’s unchallenged reserve currency status have underpinned the preeminent role of the United States in international politics since the end of World War II. Ph.M. Russia’s population is forecast to drop from 141 million to below 130 million. India. In particular. the growing dependence of the United States on foreign capital inflows “may curtail U. At home. LL.S. p. Although both states could encounter speed bumps that might slow—or even derail—their ascents to great power status. military supremacy will no longer be as dominant as it has been since the Cold War’s end (p. Although at the time this issue went to press. military. will “strive for a multipolar system with New Delhi as one of the poles” (ibid. domestic governance issues. 3. 13–14). Decline is inevitable – heg is economically unsustainable Layne. According to the NIC. Because its great power status is closely tied to its ability to control both the energy resources and pipelines of Central Asia and the Caucasus. Summer 2009. affecting the availability of manpower for both the military and the labor pools (pp. Yet.S.). global dominance” (p. the rise of China and India to great power status will restore each to “the positions they held two centuries ago when China produced approximately 30 percent and India 15 percent of the world’s wealth” (p. Global Trends predicts that over the next two decades. 93). Hegemony—Myth or Reality? A Review Essay". July 6th 2010. and possibly Russia are emerging great powers. economic and political constraints may undermine U. the NIC believes that the “chances are good that China and India will continue to rise” (p. J. 97). The United States’ soft power may diminish as its liberal model of political and economic development is challenged by authoritarian/statist alternatives (pp. 30).13 of 154 conclusion is that the U. China. in addition to relative decline. 30). in International Law from Virginia Law. 34. the NIC believes it “will be a leading force in opposition to U. Moreover. "The Waning of U. however. the dollar remained strong and will continue to be the reserve currency for some time to come. both of which are linked to the fear that after recovery. and opportunity costs of being the world’s leader are reassessed by American voters” (p. 7). By 2025. 32.75 The long-term impact of the current economic crisis largely will determine who is right (and to be fair. although the United States will probably be primus inter pares in a multipolar international system twenty years from now. energy prices.17] Because of uncertainties about economics. the NIC did have an inkling of the meltdown’s potential long-term implications for U.S. Global Trends 2025 was published just before the full scope of the global financial and economic crisis became apparent. longterm structural weaknesses that have been accumulating for more than three decades were causing U.76 The warning signs with respect to U. and domestic political constraints that may erode U. power. Galileo.D. hegemony. even before the meltdown. Nevertheless. Ultimately. International Security. and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute (Christopher.S.D.77 Optimists . Brooks and Wohlforth wrote their book before its effects became evident). and especially demography.-dominated unipolar world will give way to multipolarity during the next two decades spurred by two causal mechanisms: the emergence of new great powers (and potentially important regional powers).74 Brooks and Wohlforth purport to deny the possibility that America is in relative decline. buoyed by its strong economic growth rate. Russia will also seek to reestablish its sphere of influence in the “near abroad” (pp. No.S. freedom of action in unanticipated ways” (p. Vol. Thus.S. India. economic power to wane. If Russia overcomes its demographic challenge and continues its revival as a great power. “the dollar’s decline may force the United States into difficult tradeoffs between achieving ambitious foreign policy goals and the high domestic costs of supporting those objectives” (pp. 94. but a growing number of analysts disagree.S. 31–32).18 Between 2009 and 2025. capabilities. 09 – Mary Julia and George R. The NIC concludes that America’s “interest and willingness to play a leadership role may be more constrained as the economic. 97). Russia’s great power trajectory is more problematic than China’s or India’s (pp. 12. 1. and economic. it will have less power—and foreign policy options—than it has been accustomed to having since 1945 (ibid. financial. in Political Science from the University of California.S.).19 [End Page 153] As the NIC observes. 32). 23–24. decline are a looming fiscal crisis and doubts about the future of the dollar as the reserve currency. the United States will face a serious inflationary threat.S. Their ascent is being propelled by “the global shift in relative wealth and economic power” from North America and the Euro-Atlantic world to Asia—a shift “without precedent in modern history” (ibid.16 As Global Trends 2025 points out. 93). the United States will confront other constraints on its international role.S. 8–9. from USC. 21-23) PDF The publications reviewed in this essay examine whether the United States is in (or is headed for) relative decline. the dollar’s role as the international economy’s preeminent reserve currency will erode. China figures to have the world’s second-largest economy (measured by gross domestic product [GDP]) and will be a first-rank military power (p. China’s spring 2009 call to replace the dollar with a new reserve currency signals that the NIC’s long-term worries may be justified.). Jordan Professor of International Affairs at Texas A&M's George Bush School of Government and Public Service. 29). 82).
current account deficit. and sustained high growth rates. the country will face the highest debt/GDP ratio in 50 years and an increasingly urgent and unsustainable fiscal problem. industrial and financial dominance. protection from the Soviet threat. which is why many economists believe that even in the best case. Second.S. with awful sway.78 Chief among these handicaps are the increase in the money supply (caused by the massive amount of dollars the Federal Reserve and Treasury have pumped into circulation to rescue the economy). there is a “risk of defections generating a herd-like momentum” away from it.S. American supremacy in a post-cold war environment seems outmatched by a progressively more unstable world. while struggling internally to recover from an economic collapse not seen since the Great Depression.80 The CBO states.”82 The dollar’s loss of reserve currency status would undermine U. The United States of 2009 is far different from the United States of 1945. there is reason to worry about the United States’ longterm fiscal stability. to rising tensions in South Asia and the Middle East. to Russia's show of force in Georgia. But from China's rapidly rising status as a global player. fears of a fiscal crisis will fade: the country faced a larger debt to GDP ratio after World War II. in collapsing the Ba'athist regime of Saddam Hussein. America today faces the same dilemma of the eastern Roman empire: should it attempt to regain its lost global supremacy or fortify and adapt to the new world? Will we follow Virgil's famous line from the Aeneid. and recent events have magnified concerns that predated the financial and economic crisis.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2009/jan/19/barack-obama-rome-empire) By virtue of its economic and military power. the Iraq war pushed many of our enemies to see us as a common threat where religious differences would have otherwise made cooperation impossible. and yet embarked on a sustained era of growth.”81 If the Congressional Budget Office is right. To rule mankind. Like Rome. there are nonetheless parallels worth considering. 't is thine alone. however. dominance.S. January 19. “Even if the recovery occurs as projected and the stimulus bill is allowed to expire." or preserve our strength and create a framework for global cooperation in which America acts as a mediator and responsible actor rather than instigator. was a golden age of U. http://www. America has been the leader of the free world for the last 60 years.14 of 154 contend that once the United States recovers.84 Hegemony is unsustainable in today`s world – collapse coming The Guardian 9 (The Guardian UK. Brooks and Wohlforth concede unipolarity can only last for 20 more years and that counterbalancing is occuring . While the dangers we face were once diverse and scattered. 2009. it will emerge from the current crisis with serious macroeconomic handicaps. and the cost of two ongoing wars. "Rome. as Eric Helleiner notes. if the dollar experiences dramatic depreciation in the future. trade surpluses. the dollar faces an uncertain future because of concerns that its value will diminish over time. it spells trouble ahead for the dollar. the dollar’s vulnerability “presents potentially significant and underappreciated restraints upon contemporary American political and military predominance. however. and the $1 trillion plus budget deficits that the Brookings Institution and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) project the United States will incur for at least a decade. as well as a political system extolled for its superiority to all other systems. 83 First. America has paved the way for an even less palatable Iranian dominance in the region. America is facing a wide array of increasingly troubling threats. Because of these two factors. the entitlements overhang. Moreover.guardian. The postwar era. the other big players in the international economy now are either military rivals (China) or ambiguous “allies” (Europe) that have their own ambitions and no longer require U. and make the world obey.co.S. America has spread itself too thin and is unable to respond to new threats as they emerge with either a convincing show of military force or a skilled use of soft power to leverage its credibility in the world. While the comparison to ancient Rome is imperfect.79 When the projected deficits are bundled with the persistent U. As Jonathan Kirshner noted on the eve of the meltdown.
it is also in the throes of a serious economic downturn. The classic Gilpinian dilemma provides insight into the present predicament the US finds itself in: This three-way struggle over priorities (protection. Professor of Public Policy at the University of Maryland 10 – [Quddus Z. No.45 Out of Balance U. 34.umd. and managerial skills diffuse throughout the international economic system. The problem does not only stem from fact that the US is bogged down in two wars. everyone is getting hit. which is not very long at all. the US is still a giant in terms of relative power differentials. Of course. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service (Christopher. military overstretch. the US appears much weaker today than it did five years ago. the debate about unipolar stability is misleading.” http://www. however.umd. If it suppresses consumption.44 Not only is this a weak case for unipolarity. Snyder.edu/gvpt/irworkshop/papers_fall09/snyder. According to the theory of hegemonic stability. Hegemony—Myth or Reality”. the consequence can be severe internal social tensions and class conflict…If the society neglects to pay the costs of defense. US hegemony is unsustainable.’ But recent developments might justify a reevaluation of this conclusion. know-how.43 The point is simply that America’s unilateral assertiveness on the international scene is changing. 09 Professor. “The Waning of U. the economic basis of the society and its capacity to sustain either consumption or protection will decline. Vol. Summer 2009) Brooks and Wohlforth make a strong case for unipolar stability.42 Their case is based on a freeze-frame view of the distribution of capabilities in the international system. hegemony will endure well into the future. Because all are suffering. It is unlikely that the US will have either the political will or capability to take on major international undertakings. it provided a stable international monetary system which facilitated . Hegemons sprint to the front of the great power pack because of economic leadership based on productivity and technological innovation. and resources stretched.With its armed forces over-extended. the American era of unipolarity contains the seeds of its own demise. external weakness will inevitably lead to its defeat by rising powers.all realists agree Snyder PhD. and investment) produces a profound dilemma for society. leading allies to enhance their own military capabilities.pdf] At the turn of the century it appeared as if we were living through a ‘hegemonic age.bsos. it is also an implicit admission that—although it has yet to bear fruit—other states are engaged in counterbalancing the United States.pdf] Crucial to hegemonic stability theory is that the hegemon actually does things. which allows other states to catch up. International Security. these projects will gobble up massive amounts of resources and treasure at a time when America’s own recovery is being partly bankrolled by foreign powers like China. for now at least. US security guarantees may prove less credible than they once were.bsos.S. Brooks and Wohlforth actually concede that unipolarity is not likely to last more than another twenty years. If the society fails to save and reinvest a sufficient fraction of its surplus wealth in industry and agriculture. Thus far the US has maintained a massive defense budget while consumption and investment have been sustained by deficit spending. however. Over time.economic problems. but one that. technology.edu/gvpt/irworkshop/papers_fall09/snyder. despite their claim at the beginning [End Page 161] of World that unipolarity is robust and that U.15 of 154 Layne. but so is the hegemon’s ability to actually do things. seems more bound. they do not engage the argument that. and this is spurring an ongoing process of multipolarization. “Systermic theory in an era of declining US hegemony. and Robert M. consumption.S. In this respect. For example. Keohane has argued that after World War II the US provided three major sets of benefits in the area of international political economy: First.S. like all hegemonic systems.43 A Superficially. “Systermic theory in an era of declining US hegemony. The US may still be a giant. After all. Snyder. key question is whether the early decades of the twenty-first century will witness the decline of U. It is unclear how long this formula will work. Relative power is important. Similarly. hegemony. But there is less to their argument than meets the eye.S hegemony is unsustainable. and rising powers Snyder PhD.” http://www. leadership costs sap the hegemon’s power and push it into decline. or provides benefits. Professor of Public Policy at the University of Maryland 10 – [Quddus Z. 1. It is unclear when the US will fully withdraw from Iraq and Afghanistan.
it provided a US helped market for goods and permitted trade on an asymmetrical basis.”26 Virtually no realist believes that hegemony can persist indefinitely. and inevitable overextension. Central to the theory of hegemonic stability is that the arrangement is ultimately unsustainable.25 Sadly. The hegemonic cycle usually ends in war. The hegemon cannot maintain its dominance in the face of mounting costs. Challengers will arise. and eventual decline. and third. losses in relative power. . the its allies gain access to Middle Eastern oil at stable prices. expansion. and thereafter begins anew: “The conclusion of one hegemonic war is the beginning of another cycle of growth. all good things must come to an end. second.16 of 154 trade and payments.
economic and political constraints may undermine U. the dollar’s role as the international economy’s preeminent reserve currency will erode. capabilities. the growing dependence of the United States on foreign capital inflows “may curtail U. 12. 32). 09 Professor. 32.16 As Global Trends 2025 points out. global dominance” (p. Hegemony—Myth or Reality”. “the dollar’s decline may force the United States into difficult tradeoffs between achieving ambitious foreign policy goals and the high domestic costs of supporting those objectives” (pp. 1. Nevertheless. and opportunity costs of being the world’s leader are reassessed by American voters” (p. China figures to have the world’s second-largest economy (measured by gross domestic product [GDP]) and will be a first-rank military power (p. military supremacy will no longer be as dominant as it has been since the Cold War’s end (p. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service (Christopher. Russia’s population is forecast to drop from 141 million to below 130 million.S. 30). military.). will “strive for a multipolar system with New Delhi as one of the poles” (ibid. The NIC concludes that America’s “interest and willingness to play a leadership role may be more constrained as the economic. the financial privileges conferred on the United States by the dollar’s unchallenged reserve currency status have underpinned the preeminent role of the United States in international politics since the end of World War II. 30). Although at the time this issue went to press. the NIC did have an inkling of the meltdown’s potential long-term implications for U.S. however. the United States will confront other constraints on its international role. Ultimately. erosion of public support. India. 82). and economic. but it is significantly more insightful and intellectually courageous than typical government reports. the NIC believes that the “chances are good that China and India will continue to rise” (p.S. 93). hegemony. domestic governance issues.17 of 154 Multipolarity Inevitable Multipolarity inevitable---collapse of the dollar. the rise of China and India to great power status will restore each to “the positions they held two centuries ago when China produced approximately 30 percent and India 15 percent of the world’s wealth” (p. Because its great power status is closely tied to its ability to control both the energy resources and pipelines of Central Asia and the Caucasus. “The Waning of U.15Global Trends 2025 is not light reading. China’s spring 2009 call to replace the dollar with a new reserve currency signals that the NIC’s long-term worries may be justified.). No. 3. India.S. Summer 2009) For an overview of trends that could affect international politics over the next two decades. 23–24. 97). 94. U. Global Trends predicts that over the next two decades. the NIC believes it “will be a leading force in opposition to U. Its key geopolitical conclusion is that the U. Russia’s great power trajectory is more problematic than China’s or India’s (pp. Moreover. affecting the availability of manpower for both the military and the labor pools (pp. In particular. freedom of action in unanticipated ways” (p.19 [End Page 153] As the NIC observes.S. 31–32). buoyed by its strong economic growth rate. and Robert M. Vol.18 Between 2009 and 2025. the dollar remained strong and will continue to be the reserve currency for some time to come. and rising challengers Layne. Global Trends 2025 was published just before the full scope of the global financial and economic crisis became apparent. According to the NIC. and especially demography.S. and domestic political constraints that may erode U. 7). 13–14). Their ascent is being propelled by “the global shift in relative wealth and economic power” from North America and the Euro-Atlantic world to Asia—a shift “without precedent in modern history” (ibid. China. a good starting point is the National Intelligence Council’s (NIC’s) Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World. 8–9. By 2025. If Russia overcomes its demographic challenge and continues its revival as a great power. financial. 29). although the United States . 97). Russia will also seek to reestablish its sphere of influence in the “near abroad” (pp. and possibly Russia are emerging great powers. At home.S. International Security. Although both states could encounter speed bumps that might slow—or even derail—their ascents to great power status. The United States’ soft power may diminish as its liberal model of political and economic development is challenged by authoritarian/statist alternatives (pp.17 [End Page 152] Because of uncertainties about economics. power. in addition to relative decline. 93). Thus.-dominated unipolar world will give way to multipolarity during the next two decades spurred by two causal mechanisms: the emergence of new great powers (and potentially important regional powers).S. energy prices. 34.
A new cold war is unlikely.guardian. Not that this era is yet upon us. As ever. “US hegemony in Middle East is ending”. Though Washington remains the world's only superpower. While the Bush era saw the US hegemonic in the region. it will have less power—and foreign policy options—than it has been accustomed to having since 1945 (ibid. perhaps hastened by unnecessary wars and economic shortsightedness.co. However. the recent actions of Russia and Turkey in the Middle East do show a new assertiveness from regional powers to pursue their own path in defiance of US will. it seems the Middle East could prove a microcosm of these international changes. Saudi Arabia's growing relationship with China might signify the shape of things to come. today's Middle East sees a power vacuum led by partial US retreat being filled by assertive regional and middle powers. trade agreements or diplomatic coups. the region's international relations are changing. US power is waning. http://www. India and Brazil will all bid for a role.uk/commentisfree/2010/may/31/us-hegemony-middle-east-ending) Yet even though the return to cold war bi-polar blocs in the Middle East is unlikely. 10 Analyst of Middle East Affairs (Chris. If the age of American uni-polarity is coming to an end. The US remains the superpower and could still effect serious change in the region.18 of 154 will probably be primus inter pares in a multipolar international system twenty years from now. Turkey and Brazil's recent nuclear deal with Iran typify this emerging new climate. with Asia's share of GDP already outstripping that of the US or Europe. Stephen Walt has highlighted that this shift in power is global. but China. In such circumstances.). the quagmires of Iraq and Afghanistan have exposed the limits of US ambitions. while the economic crisis has forced the Obama administration to focus energy elsewhere. Multipolarity coming now Phillips. should it desire. . it won't just be Russia and Turkey expanding their reach in the region. it is much more likely that international relations in the Middle East will come to reflect the multi-polar world that will follow rather than revert to a bi-polar cold war. too – presumably having fewer demands than Washington about their clients pursuing democratic reforms and peace with Israel. whether through arms deals. squeezing the defiant few like Syria and Saddam Hussein's Iraq. but the age of unchallenged US hegemony in the Middle East could be ending.
42 Rising economic interdependence is one of the great hallmarks of the contemporary international system. the need for multilateral coordination of policie-s also grows. essentially for three reasons. Pg 5-6 Most contributors to this volume are skeptical about the idea that the world is moving toward a new imperial order.43 " Multilateralism is inevitable – most authors agree unilateralism is unlikely David Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi 4 – Held is Graham Wallas Professor of Political Science @ the London School of Economics and Political Science.in part because of a simple logic: as global economic interdependence grows.even and perhaps especially by the United States . and technological gains that derive from integration into the world economy. Edited by David Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi.will increase and not decrease. "As interdependence rises. Second." Robert Keohane argues. Milbank Professor of Politic' and International Affairs at Princeton University in both the Woodrow 'Wilson School and the Politics Department.19 of 154 Multilat Inevitable Multilateralism is inevitable G. if the stronger state accepts some restrictions on how it can use its power.. states have actively and consistently sought to open markets and reap the economic. Strategic Restraint Wid the Rebuilding of Order after Major War (2001). the need for multilateral coordination of policies also increases. This development is considered unlikely because they see the United States as lacking the motivation and/or the capacity to establish an empire. He is also coauthor of State Power and World Markets (2002) and editor of America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power(2002). He is the author of After Victory: Institutions. weaker states are more likely to cooperate willingly and have less reason to resist the hegemony of the stronger state.. American political culture stresses the importance of the rule of law as a foundation. it is rational for dominant powers to accept some limitations to their freedom of action in the form of multilateral institutions. Ikenberry emphasizes the lack of motivation: America is unlikely in the tuture to reject multilateralism and a rule-based international order. social. Edited by David Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi. which won the Schroeder/Jervis Award for best book in History and International Politics by the American Political Science Association. it is easy to predict that the demands for multilateral agreements . . Archibugi is Lecturer in Global Politics in the Departments of Government and International Relations of the London School of Economics and Political Science. "American Power in the 21st Century". "Economic interdependence and multilateralism American support for multilateralism is likely to be sustained _ even in the face of resistance and ideological challenges to multilateralism within the Bush administration . compared with the costs of sacrificing autonomy as a consequence of making binding agreements. If this remains true in the years ahead. First. The more economically interconnected that states become the more dependent they are for the realization of their objectives on the actions of other states. Over the postwar era. “American Power in the 21st Century”. "the opportunity costs of not co-ordinating policy increase. John Ikenberry 4 Ikenberry is the Albert G. Finally. as global economic interdependence grows.
and it explains the remarkably durable and legitimate character of the existing international order.and the search for rule-based agreements . It predicts that the existing multilateral order.should increase rather than decrease with the rise of American unipolarity. John Ikenberry 4 Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politic' and International Affairs at Princeton University in both the Woodrow 'Wilson School and the Politics Department. multilateralism ." This has been a strategy that the United States has pursued to a greater or lesser degree across the twentieth century . which won the Schroeder/Jervis Award for best book in History and International Politics by the American Political Science Association. which itself reflects an older multilateral bargain between the United States and the outside world. Strategic Restraint Wid the Rebuilding of Order after Major War (2001).20 of 154 Heg Multilat US hegemony results in more multilateralism G. The support for multilateralism is a way to signal restraint and commitment to other states. Edited by David Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi." .and it suggests that the current administration should respond to general power management incentives and limit its tilt toward unilateralism. American hegemony and multilateralism American support for multilateralism can also stem from a grand strategic interest in preserving power and creating a stable and legitimate international order. should rein in the Bush administration . thereby encouraging the acquiescence and cooperation of weaker states. He is also coauthor of State Power and World Markets (2002) and editor of America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power(2002). "American Power in the 21st Century". From this perspective. He is the author of After Victory: Institutions.
even Germany -.Britain. In 1989. Turkey. by contrast. a fatal flaw that was disguised for a long time because the USSR never attempted to compete on world markets. journalist Financial Times and formerly at The Economist – “Think Again: American Decline. China has alarming political and economic transitions to navigate. And China is only the largest part of a bigger story about the rise of new economic and political players. In a recent interview with the Times of London. it would be a big . Its economy has been growing at 9 to 10 percent a year. The country also faces major demographic and environmental challenges: The population is aging rapidly as a result of the one-child policy. This Time It`s For Real”. It is now the world's leading exporter and its biggest manufacturer.com/articles/2011/01/02/think_again_american_decline?page=0. Over the long term. such as Greece and Portugal. Those who are confident that American hegemony will be extended long into the future point to the potential liabilities of the Chinese system.4) AK It is certainly true that when Americans are worrying about national decline. President George W.5 trillion of foreign reserves. Yet the Chinese economy has kept growing.foreignpolicy. which collectively constrain America's ability to shape the world. "Do I still think America will remain the sole superpower?" he asked. The Chinese are the preferred partners of many African governments and the biggest trading partner of other emerging powers. The flaws in the Soviet and Japanese systems became obvious only in retrospect. journalist Financial Times and formerly at The Economist – “Think Again: American Decline. there is plenty of evidence that a property bubble is building in big cities like Shanghai. Italy." But predictions of the imminent demise of the Chinese miracle have been a regular feature of Western analysis ever since it got rolling in the late 1970s.S. doubling in size roughly every seven years. But a frequently overlooked fact about that fable is that the boy was eventually proved right. of course.and China is the wolf. Bush suggested that China's internal problems mean that its economy will be unlikely to rival America's in the foreseeable future. At the current pace. China's economic prowess is already allowing Beijing to challenge American influence all over the world. former U. This Time It`s For Real”. they tend to overlook the weaknesses of their scariest-looking rival. Japan. China is also stepping in to buy the bonds of financially strapped members of the eurozone. Foreign Policy Magazine. 1 well before then. The wolf did arrive -. China will overcome all obstacles – challenges the US Rachman 2011 (Gideon Rachman. February 2011. has proved its economic prowess on the global stage. Foreign Policy Magazine. China's population is more than four times that of the United States. for roughly three decades. That is just a taste of things to come. That was never going to happen. The Soviet Union collapsed because its economic system was highly inefficient. the Communist Party seemed to be staggering after the Tiananmen Square massacre. America's traditional allies in Europe -. So Americans can be forgiven if they greet talk of a new challenge from China as just another case of the boy who cried wolf.are slipping down the economic ranks. In the 1990s. China. Yet even if you factor in considerable future economic and political turbulence. They each have their own foreign-policy preferences. http://www. on average. Brazil. By contrast. The Japanese population is less than half that of the United States. the Soviet and Japanese threats to American supremacy proved chimerical. http://www. and it is sitting on more than $2.foreignpolicy.21 of 154 Challengers Now Hegemony unsustainable – new powers are challenging America Rachman 2011 (Gideon Rachman. "I do. The Communist Party is unlikely to be able to maintain its monopoly on political power forever. The famous projection by Goldman Sachs that China's economy will be bigger than that of the United States by 2027 was made before the 2008 economic crash. of course. But it was never a plausible candidate to be No. and inflation is on the rise.com/articles/2011/01/02/think_again_american_decline?page=0. China could be No. In the short term. economy watchers regularly pointed to the parlous state of Chinese banks and state-owned enterprises. it would be absurd to pretend that China does not face major challenges. Of course. such as Brazil and South Africa. And the country's traditional dependence on exports and an undervalued currency are coming under increasing criticism from the United States and other international actors demanding a "rebalancing" of China's export-driven economy. New powers are on the rise: India.4) AK In the end. The Chinese challenge to the United States is more serious for both economic and demographic reasons. Chinese goods compete all over the world. 1. Think of how India and Brazil sided with China at the global climate-change talks. This is no Soviet-style economic basket case. Or the votes by Turkey and Brazil against America at the United Nations on sanctions against Iran. which means that the average Japanese person would have to be more than twice as rich as the average American before Japan's economy surpassed America's. France. February 2011. and China is threatened by water shortages and pollution. also experienced many years of rapid economic growth and is still an export powerhouse.
foreignpolicy. the U. Growing Chinese economic and military clout clearly poses a long-term threat to American hegemony in the Pacific.D. In fact. the collapse of democracy.4) AK Successive U. hyperinflation. despite the gauzy rhetoric of globalization that comforted the last generation of American politicians. and nations need not fear the success of another. arguing that tariffs or other retaliatory measures would be a legitimate response. the world of the future looks even more like a zero-sum game. So much for the win-win world.22 of 154 mistake to assume that the Chinese challenge to U.S. in Political Science from the University of California.S. particularly if the new Korea still played host to U. And whatever economic and political difficulties it does experience will not be enough to stop the country's rise to great-power status. West Germany was once again one of the world's leading economies.S. rivalry between a rising China and a weakened America is now apparent across a whole range of issues. troops. remarked pointedly that the normal rules about the mutual benefits of trade do not necessarily apply when one trading partner is practicing mercantilist or protectionist policies. from territorial disputes in Asia to human rights. Fred Bergsten. "Power does not need to be a zero-sum game. but that is because both sides have nuclear weapons. To do anything else would needlessly antagonize the Chinese. Its economy will eventually recover. Germany went through two catastrophic military defeats. But that shouldn't obscure this unavoidable fact: As economic and political power moves from West to East. and rightly so. government clearly thinks that China's undervaluation of its currency is a form of protectionism that has led to global economic imbalances and job losses in the United States.-China standoff. http://www. This Time It`s For Real”. have explicitly welcomed China's rise. We are on a collision course with China – military. such as New York Times columnist Paul Krugman and the Peterson Institute's C. China is also competing fiercely for access to resources. albeit shorn of its imperial ambitions. new international rivalries are inevitably emerging. The Chinese reluctantly agreed to a new package of U. American leaders are right to reject zero-sum logic in public. sanctions on Iran. Both sides have taken part in the talks with North Korea. Those days are over. The U. China does not like Kim Jong Il's regime.N. Just before his first visit to China. have taken a similar line. It is a central tenet of modern economics that trade is mutually beneficial for both partners. it takes a great deal to throw them off course.… We welcome China's efforts to play a greater role on the world stage. then Obama's chief economic advisor." But whatever they say in formal speeches. so it will not face turbulence and disorder on remotely the scale Germany did in the 20th century. foreign policy. February 2011. Ph. The United States still has formidable strengths. but it is also very wary of a reunified Korea on its borders. journalist Financial Times and formerly at The Economist – “Think Again: American Decline. At the G-20 summit in November. from the first Bush to Obama. Jordan Professor of International Affairs at Texas A&M's George Bush School of Government and Public Service. China is unlikely to get sucked into a world war.S. China is counter-balancing the US now Layne. and economy Rachman 2011 (Gideon Rachman. America's leaders are clearly beginning to have their doubts.M.com/articles/2011/01/02/think_again_american_decline?page=0. Foreign Policy Magazine.S. but a barely submerged rivalry prevents truly effective Sino-American cooperation. the Great Depression. in . power will simply disappear. and the destruction of its major cities and infrastructure by Allied bombs. not because globalization has magically dissolved their differences. But America will never again experience the global dominance it enjoyed in the 17 years between the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991 and the financial crisis of 2008. in particular oil. a winwin rather than a zero-sum. Once countries get the hang of economic growth.S. And yet by the end of the 1950s. drive to deal with "global economic imbalances" was essentially thwarted by China's obdurate refusal to change its currency policy. For the United States has been acting as if the mutual interests created by globalization have repealed one of the oldest laws of international politics: the notion that rising players eventually clash with established powers. Its military has a global presence and a technological edge that no other country can yet match. Speaking before the 2010 World Economic Forum. Obama summarized the traditional approach when he said. which is driving up global prices. no matter what obstacles lie in its path. But that implies the rules of the game aren't rigged. Sheer size and economic momentum mean that the Chinese juggernaut will keep rolling forward. It is mercifully unlikely that the United States and China would ever actually go to war. but the cost of securing Chinese agreement was a weak deal that is unlikely to derail the Iranian nuclear program. 09 – Mary Julia and George R. LL. Larry Summers. In a nuclear age. And when it comes to the broader geopolitical picture. Leading economists. presidents. The analogy to the rise of Germany from the mid-19th century onward is instructive. The 2009 climate-change talks in Copenhagen ended in disarray after another U.
of course. and. and many analysts— including the NIC. and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute (Christopher. and the two most important indicators of whether this is happening are relative growth rates and shares of world GDP. “Chinese Plans to End US Hegemony in the Pacific”. the United States still has an impressive lead in the categories they measure. then. Hegemony—Myth or Reality? A Review Essay". July 6th 2010. at a recent speech hosted by the Heritage Foundation. International Security.].) PDF Toward multipolarity? The ascent of new great powers would be the strongest evidence of multipolarization. "The PLA navy is increasing its numbers of submarines and other ships. however.This situation creates a strategic choice for the United States. http://oilprice..46 Here. there is evidence that as the NIC. spaced-based reconnaissance. 1. global economic power is flowing from the United States and Europe to Asia.org/Article. advanced radar systems..” National Interest Online." said Admiral Gary Roughead. p. is static. China's People's Liberation Army is building up anti-access and area-denial capabilities with the apparent goal of extending their power to the western half of the Pacific Ocean. its allies and partners: acquiesce in a dramatic shift in the military balance or take steps to preserve it. hegemony. a conservative Washington think tank. 17-18. in early 2009. In 2003 Goldman Sachs predicted that China would pass the United States in GDP by 2041. Brooks and Wohlforth are skeptical about China’s rise. "Unless Beijing diverts from its current course of action. "the cost incurred by the US military to operate in the [w]estern Pacific will likely rise sharply. surveillance and target acquisition. there are indications that the unipolar era is drawing to a close. Mahbubani. Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. and (implicitly) Mahbubani and Zakaria—agree that China is the rising power most likely to challenge U. electromagnetic weapons.aspx?id=20484) .. Khanna. 1-2209.47 The shift of economic clout to East Asia is important because it could propel China’s ascent—thus hastening the relative decline of U. perhaps to prohibitive levels.49 Their analysis.D.S military strength Buxbaum. The A2AD buildup threatens the US forward presence and power projection in the region.52 And.48 Unsurprisingly. J. But political problems and budgetary woes could kill the program before it ever gets started. and much sooner than many expect[. Among the anti-access/area-denial (A2AD) capabilities being fielded by China include antisatellite weapons.html) The US is developing an air-sea battle concept to counter China's military buildup. advanced fighter aircraft. or Washington undertakes actions to offset or counterbalance the effects of the PLA’s military buildup. and they dismiss the idea that China could become a viable counterweight to a hegemonic United States within any meaningful time frame. which already has overtaken the United States as the world’s leading manufacturer—a crown the United States wore for more than a century. Galileo. but in 2008 it revised the time frame to 2028.S. For sure. China’s already challenging U. is the poster child for Asia’s rise. essentially dividing the Pacific between the US and China and ending US hegemony on that ocean. the Economist Intelligence Unit predicted that China’s GDP would surpass the United States’ in 2021. 34. http://www.23 of 154 International Law from Virginia Law. power—and also because emerging regional multipolarity could trigger future major power war. China." Counterbalancing inevitable – multiple factors Pape 2k9 (Robert A. 10 Analyst @ ISN Security Watch. 51 China also may overtake the United States in GDP in the next ten to fifteen years." said a report recently released by the Washington-based Center for Budgetary and Strategic Assessments. Chinese military and political doctrine holds that China should rule the waves out to the second island chain of the western Pacific. "Navies tend to grow with economies and as trade becomes more important.S. and that the coming decades could witness a power transition. Summer 2009. (Peter A. chief of US naval operations. the trend lines appear to favor China.nationalinterest. Vol.53 Empirically. which extends as far as Guam and New Guinea.com/Geo-Politics/International/Chinese-Plans-to-End-USHegemony-in-the-Pacific. “Empire Falls.S. unmanned aerial vehicles. how-ever. Khanna. No. "The Waning of U. Zakaria contend.50 Looking ahead." All of this has US military planners and thinkers worried. to a point. The Chinese also have an emerging and muscular deep-water navy. from USC. and ballistic and cruise missiles.
The self-inflicted wounds of the Iraq War. Although the immediate problems of war in Iraq and Afghanistan. This is simply no longer realistic. Russia. Still. the more its power matters and hence the more relative economic strength it needs. Spain. Over time. however. while the ultimate foundation of American power—the relative superiority of the U. America’s shrinking share of world economic production is a fact of life and important changes in U. It is also how much power a state has relative to other states. but is so relatively more powerful than any other country that it can reshape the international order according to American interests. even to academicians like Dartmouth’s William Wohlforth and Stephen Brooks. But. Although scholars have long debated its nuances. al-Qaeda’s new sanctuary in western Pakistan. France. that major powers will increasingly have the strength to balance against U. all believe the principal feature of the post-cold-war world is the unchallengeable dominance of American power. From public intellectuals like Charles Krauthammer and Niall Ferguson to neoconservatives like Paul Wolfowitz and Robert Kagan. China and other major powers could seriously oppose American military power. FROM ROME. For nearly two decades. If present trends continue. power does not ensure success. In international politics. The Bush administration has not just continued America’s traditional grand strategy. virtually discounting the possibility that Germany. both at home and abroad. increasingly negative current-account balances and other internal economic weaknesses have cost the United States real power in today’s world of rapidly spreading knowledge and technology. The United States is not just the sole superpower in the unipolar-dominance school’s world. the most important of which are to defend its national interests. This is true in any rough-and-tumble environment. A successful grand strategy. fairly short. Imperial China. Most important. Great Britain and the Soviet Union to the United States today. Productive capacity—defined by indicators such as wealth. . the period of U. grand strategy are necessary to prevent the decline in America’s global position from accelerating.S. At any given moment. Simply maintaining these commitments requires enormous resources. the more international commitments a state has. further decline in the foreseeable future. but pursued ambitious objectives in all three major regions at the same time—waging wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. As Paul Kennedy so ably describes in his classic The Rise and Fall of Great Powers. Venice. For the past eight years. but in recent years American leaders have pursued far more ambitious goals than merely maintaining the status quo.1 But it is not only how much power a state has that matters. without deliberate action. economy in the world—has been in decline since early on in the Bush administration. A healthy appreciation of our situation by American leaders may lead to policies that could mitigate. growing government debt.S.S. To be sure. A Ford Explorer is a powerful vehicle—unless it collides with a Mack Truck.S. those convinced of U. the rise and fall of great nations has been driven primarily by relative economic strength. France. America’s power is fundamentally a result of its economic strength. power is heavily dependent on the size and quality of its military forces and other current power assets. our own hubris may be our downfall. the United States has maintained a vast array of overseas commitments. seeking to ensure peace and stability not just in its own neighborhood— the Americas—but also in Europe and Asia. dominance in the international system have encouraged American policy makers to act unilaterally and seize almost any opportunity to advance American interests no matter the costs to others. America’s declining power means that the unipolar world is indeed coming to an end. U. There is also good reason to think that. Since the cold war. relative decline has been. we will look back at the Bush administration years as the death knell for American hegemony. Iran’s continued nuclear program and Russia’s recent military adventure in Georgia are high-priority issues. solutions to each of them individually and all of them collectively will be heavily influenced by America’s reduced power position in the world. must work for the long haul and so depends on the power a state is able to produce in the future.S. the basic definition of power in international politics is simple: power is the aggregate resources a state has at its disposal to achieve its aims. along with the oil-rich Persian Gulf (as well as other parts of the world). if not rectify. thus far.S. policies they oppose and that the United States will increasingly face harsh foreign-policy choices. seeking to denuclearize North Korea and expanding America’s military allies in Europe up to the borders of Russia itself.24 of 154 AMERICA IS in unprecedented decline. Like so many great powers that have come and gone before. the fall of American power will be more precipitous with the passage of time. our policies have been based on these flawed arguments. power certainly helps.
25 of 154 technology and population size—is a prerequisite for building and modernizing military forces. The United States, like any state, may choose to vary the degree to which its productive capacities are used to create military assets. But it is the economy as a whole that constrains the choice. And the size of the economy relative to potential rivals ultimately determines the limits of power in international politics. Major assessments of this relative position have long turned heavily on a single
statistic: America’s share of world economic product. Advocates of extending America’s unipolar dominance are well aware of the central importance of the economic foundations of American power and routinely present detailed statistics on the U.S. share of world product. The basic notion is simple: take U.S. domestic product in any year and divide it by the aggregate total of the gross domestic product of all states in the world. To measure gross domestic product, the unipolar-dominance school prefers to compare every country’s output in current-year U.S. dollars, a method that tends to show America is much further ahead of other countries than alternative measures. Indeed, the most recent call for America to exploit its hegemonic position (published in 2008) rests on the presumption of U.S. dominance based on the current-year dollar figures.2 By this metric, in 2006 the United States had 28 percent of world product while its nearest most likely competitor, China, had 6 percent. Looks pretty good for America, right? Alas,
single-year “snapshots” of America’s relative power are of limited value for assessing the sustainability of its grand strategy over many years. For grand-strategic concerns—especially how well the United States can balance its resources and foreign-policy commitments—the trajectory of American power compared to other states is of seminal importance. For the sake of argument, let us start with the unipolar-dominance school’s preferred measure of American hegemony, but look at the trajectory of the data over time. According to GDP figures in current U.S. dollars
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United States increased its share of world production during the 1990s, reached its apogee in 2000, and then began to steadily lose ground during the eight years of the Bush administration, with its relative power ultimately falling by nearly a quarter in the first decade of the twenty-first century. At the same time, the relative power of China, the state many consider America’s most likely future rival, has grown consistently. If we look out as far as the IMF can see
(2013), things get even worse—with the United States expected to continue declining and China to continue rising. The United States has been going through the first decade of the twenty-first century not stronger than
before, but substantially weaker. How good are the numbers? Economists commonly use two other methods to calculate GDP, constant-dollar calculations and purchasing power parity.3 Although each offers advantages and disadvantages, for our purposes what matters is that they form a lower bound of America’s relative decline. And regardless of the metric, the trend is the same. Again using IMF figures, Table 2 shows the trajectory of the share of world product for the United States and China using both alternative measures. Simply put, the United States is now a declining power. This new reality has tremendous implications
for the future of American grand strategy. THE EROSION of the underpinnings of U.S. power is the result of uneven rates of economic growth between America, China and other states in the world. Despite all the pro-economy talk from the Bush administration, the fact is that since 2000, U.S. growth rates are down
almost 50 percent from the Clinton years. This trajectory is almost sure to be revised further downward as the consequences of the financial crisis in fall 2008 become manifest. As Table 3 shows, over the past two decades, the average rate of U.S. growth has fallen considerably, from nearly 4 percent annually during the Clinton years to just over 2 percent per year under Bush. At the same time,
China has sustained a consistently high rate of growth of 10 percent per year—a truly stunning performance. Russia has also turned its economic trajectory around, from year after year of losses in the 1990s to significant annual gains since 2000. Worse, America’s decline was well under way before the economic downturn, which is likely to only further weaken U.S. power. As
the most recent growth estimates (November 2008) by the IMF make clear, although all major countries are suffering economically, China and Russia are expected to continue growing at a substantially greater rate than the United States. True, the United States has not lost its position as the most innovative country in the world, with more patents each year than in all other countries combined. However, the ability to diffuse new technology—to turn chalkboard ideas into mass-produced
applications—has been spreading rapidly across many parts of the globe, and with it the ultimate sources of state power—productive capacities. America is losing its overwhelming technological dominance in the leading industries of the knowledge economy. In past eras—the “age of
iron” and the “age of steel”—leading states retained their technological advantages for many decades.4 As Fareed Zakaria describes in his recent book, The Post-American World, technology and knowledge diffuse more quickly today, and their rapid global diffusion is a profound factor driving down America’s power compared to other countries. For instance, although the United States
remains well ahead of China on many indicators of leading technology on a per capita basis, this grossly under-weights the size of the knowledge economy in China compared to America. Whereas
in 2000, the United States had three times the computer sales, five times the internet users and forty times the broadband subscribers as China, in 2008, the Chinese have caught or nearly caught up with Americans in every category in the aggregate.5 The fact that the United States remains ahead of China on a per capita basis does matter—it means that China, with more
than four times the U.S. population, can create many more knowledge workers in the future.
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Heg Low (1/2)
American hegemony is a myth – we don’t have sufficient ground forces to project power
Mearshimer, 06 (John Mearsheimer, Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. "Conversations in International Relations - Interview with John J. Mearsheimer (Part I)," International Relations, Vol. 20, No. 1 (2006), pp. 105-124. http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0039.pdf) I think that many commentators and security experts overestimate the power of the United States. Despite all the talk about global hegemony, it is especially difficult to dominate the entire planet, not only because it is very large, but also because it is necessary to project power over large bodies of water, which is a formidable task. For sure, the United States is a hegemon in the western hemisphere. That is because the Americas are its backyard and because there is no state in the region that has the military power to stand up to the United States in a war. But dominating the rest of the globe is virtually impossible at this point in time. To accomplish that end, the United States would need immense power projection capabilities and lots more land power or boots on the ground than it now has or is likely to have anytime soon. I have a chapter in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics titled ‘The Primacy of Land Power’, where I explain why armies and the forces that support them are the core ingredients of military power. The Bush Administration made a fatal blunder in this regard. It assumed that it could use sophisticated aircraft with precision guided munitions and small ground forces to reorder the Middle East, and maybe even the whole world. Instead of relying on big battalions, the United States was going to shock and awe its way to victory. Iraq was supposed to be the first of many great triumphs. There was even much talk about creating an American empire in the Middle East. This whole scheme was delusional from the start, because there was no way that the United States could succeed in Iraq without a large army. Any state bent on reordering the world at the end of a rifle barrel better have an abundance of land power, because that task is not going to be accomplished on the cheap. The United States, however, does not have and will not have in our lifetime anywhere near enough soldiers to dominate the globe the way it dominates the western hemisphere. The unipolar moment never was and probably never will be.
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U.S. power in decline
Parag Khanna 2008 (Senior Research Fellow and Director, Global Governance Initiative, New America Initiative, January 28, , New York Times Magazine, “Waving Goodbye to Hegemony,” http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2008/waving_goodbye_hegemony_6604)
There are plenty of statistics that will still tell the story of America's global dominance: our military spending, our share of the global economy and the like. But there are statistics, and there are trends. To really understand how quickly American power is in decline around the world, I've spent the past two years traveling in some 40 countries in the five most strategic regions of the planet -- the countries of the second world. They are not in the first-world core of the global economy, nor in its third-world periphery. Lying alongside and between the Big Three, second-world countries are the swing states that will determine which of the superpowers has the upper hand for the next generation of geopolitics. From Venezuela to Vietnam and Morocco to Malaysia, the new reality of global affairs is that there is not one way to win allies and influence countries but three: America's coalition (as in "coalition of the willing"), Europe's consensus and China's consultative styles. The geopolitical marketplace will decide which will lead the 21st century. The key second-world countries in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, South America, the Middle East and Southeast Asia are more than just "emerging markets." If you include China, they hold a majority of the world's foreign-exchange reserves and savings, and their spending power is making them the global economy's most important new consumer markets and thus engines of global growth -- not replacing the United States but not dependent on it either. I.P.O.'s from the so-called BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China) alone accounted for 39 percent of the volume raised globally in 2007, just one indicator of second-world countries' rising importance in corporate finance -- even after you subtract China. When Tata of India is vying to buy Jaguar, you know the landscape of power has changed. Second-world countries are also fast becoming hubs for oil and timber, manufacturing and services, airlines and infrastructure -- all this in a geopolitical marketplace that puts their loyalty up for grabs to any of the Big Three, and increasingly to all of them at the same time. Second-world states won't be subdued: in the age of network power, they won't settle for being mere export markets. Rather, they are the places where the Big Three must invest heavily and to which they must relocate productive assets to maintain influence.
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“The Pentagon's wasting assets: the eroding foundations of American power”.S. combined with the continued rise of new powers. such as China.Professor of International Relations and History at Boston University." Despite this admonition.D. U. thereby increasing the prospect of strategic surprises. policymakers are discounting real future threats. This has allowed it to guarantee U. military's long-unfettered access to the global commons--including space and cyberspace--is being increasingly challenged. an overwhelming advantage in technology and resources has given the U. he also cautioned.S. Foreign Affairs. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates argued in these pages for a more "balanced" U. In fact. U. one that is better suited for the types of irregular conflicts now being waged in Afghanistan and Iraq.S. Military forces that do deploy successfully will find it increasingly difficult to defend what they have been sent to protect.. military an unmatched ability to project power worldwide. July 1st 2009. Meanwhile. they are already starting to disappear. including East Asia and the Persian Gulf." in the language of defense strategists.com/coms2/summary_028638273632_ITM.) THE MILITARY foundations of the United States' global dominance are eroding. Several events in recent years have demonstrated that traditional means and methods of projecting power and accessing the global commons are growing increasingly obsolete-becoming "wasting assets.29 of 154 AT: Best Military Sustains Our military is deteriorating and their authors don’t assume future threats Krepinevich.S. Recently. . grand strategy assumes that such advantages will continue indefinitely. What is needed is nothing short of a fundamental strategic review of the United States' position in the world--one similar in depth and scope to those undertaken in the early days of the Cold War. access to the global commons.S.accessmylibrary.S. and hostile states. will make it progressively more expensive in blood and treasure--perhaps prohibitively expensive-for U. For the past several decades. The diffusion of advanced military technologies. "It would be irresponsible not to think about and prepare for the future. However.S. assure the safety of the homeland. and underwrite security commitments around the globe. military. the U. http://www. Ph. forces to carry out their missions in areas of vital interest. from Harvard University and President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (Andrew F. such as Iran. 09 -.
It is bending over backward to show support for the mission in be a strategic partner as it was during the Cold War. Both trends are primarily the result of internal European politics. the current trend is toward closer cooperation.cfm?fa=view&id=17894&prog=zgp&proj=zusr.30 of 154 AT: Soft Power Sustains Soft power is irrelevant to hegemony Kagan. policy in Iraq. the behavior of governments and political leaders suggests America's position in the world is not all that different from what it was before Sept. Germany's Afghanistan. For Eastern and Central Europe.has simply not occurred. 06 – PhD from American University.) The striking thing about the present international situation is the degree to which America remains what Bill Clinton once called "the indispensable nation.S. Western Europe will not new government." Despite global opinion polls registering broad hostility to George W. not America. Europeans would be taking more urgent steps to strengthen the European Union's hand to check it. The Washington Post. The much-anticipated global effort to balance against American hegemony -. On the contrary. “Still the Colossus”. Chancellor Angela Merkel promises to work closely with Washington on the question of the China arms embargo. Bush's United States. indicating agreement with the American view that China is a potential strategic concern. It even trumpets its willingness to train Iraqi soldiers.org/publications/index. Nor are Europeans refusing to cooperate. But if they really feared American power. in German terms.carnegieendowment. and even the project of creating a common foreign and defense policy has slowed if not stalled. Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment For International Peace and Adjunct Professor of History at Georgetown University (Robert. European Union defense budgets continue their steady decline. January 15th 2006. meaningful number of troops. most notably by continuing to supply a small but. Nevertheless. while still dissenting from U. and the big question remains what it was in the 1990s: Who will be invited to join NATO? . http://www. is working hard and ostentatiously to improve relations. in Europe the idea has all but vanished. even with an administration they allegedly despise.which the realists have been anticipating for more than 15 years now -. the growing threat is Russia. 11 and the Iraq war. because Western Europeans no longer feel threatened and therefore do not seek American protection.
to end dollar dealings for oil." Zukang was speaking at the annual meetings of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank.com/2009/10/us-facing-massive-economic-power-shift-with-dollars-downward-spiral/) The dollar's position as the world's leading reserve currency faces increased pressure as the financial crisis allows emerging economies greater influence on the world stage. an analyst at currency traders ECU Group. Firstly. They would switch "to a basket of currencies including the Japanese yen and Chinese yuan. The Independent. "Secondly. whose President Robert Zoellick recently warned that the United States should not "take for granted" the dollar's role as preeminent global reserve currency. including Saudi Arabia. together with China. were considering replacing the dollar as the currency for oil deals. Japan and France." wrote The Independent's Middle East correspondent Robert Fisk. Sha Zukang. But last week the finance chief was left to watch as traders used The Independent's report as an opportunity to push lower the troubled US unit. Gulf Arabs are planning -. as long as the US economy is not strong enough for any rise in interest rates to be conceivable for a long time. world leaders unveiled a new vision for economic governance. the shift in economic power away from the G7 economies is continuing. the dollar's underlying downtrend will remain in place. The report "has helped concentrate the minds of traders and investors alike." Even so. 09 (“US facing massive economic ‘power shift’ with dollar’s downward spiral”. . UN undersecretary-general for economic and social affairs. "The US dollar is being hurt by the continued talk of a shift away from a dollar-centric world. Russia. the euro. The Raw Story.along with China." said Kit Juckes. analysts said. there is a growing acceptance amongst those winners that one consequence of this power shift will be to strengthen their currencies". Meanwhile at a G20 summit in Pittsburgh last month." added Juckes. Qatar and Russia. "In the most profound financial change in recent Middle East history. unified currency planned for nations in the Gulf Co-operation Council. which had allowed the United States the "privilege" of building up a huge trade deficit. and has given them another excuse to take the dollar lower." GFT Global Markets analyst David Morrison told AFP. Russia and Gulf States are among nations prepared to ditch the dollar for oil trades has heightened the uncertainty surrounding the US currency's future. reported last Tuesday that Gulf states. Japan and France -. A report last week in The Independent claiming that China. Abu Dhabi. Russia. while France dismissed it as "pure speculation. said "important progress in managing imbalances can be made by reducing the (dollar) reserve currency country's 'privilege' to run external deficits in order to provide international liquidity. with bold plans to fix global imbalances and give more clout to emerging giants such as China and India. US Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner repeated Washington's commitment to a strong dollar. the United Nations itself last week called for a new global reserve currency to end dollar supremacy. citing Gulf Arab and Chinese banking sources. http://rawstory. And finally. "Three conclusions stand out very clearly. October 11th 2009. under the front-page headline "The Demise of the Dollar". including Kuwait. The report was denied by a host of countries.31 of 154 AT: Economy Sustains Every indicator goes our way – economic power is declining Agence France-Presse." added Fisk. Following the summit. gold and a new. Kuwait and Qatar. The dollar slumped against rivals last week in the wake of the British daily's controversial report.
32 of 154 ***Alternative Uniqueness .
I have already established the first: the sheer size and comprehensiveness of the power gap separating the United States from other states. 1.A. Beloit College. Ph. we must also consider its four truest allies: Canada.pdf) The key. the Atlantic. The second pillar—geography—is just as important.D. Yale University. The fact that Soviet power happened to be situated in the heart of Eurasia was a key condition of bipolarity. the U. Daniel Webster Professor of Government. and the Soviet Union) that constituted relatively unambiguous security threats to their neighbors. Just as the raw numbers could not capture the real dynamics of bipolarity. B. political science. is that the countercoalitions of the past—on which most of our empirical knowledge of alliance politics is based—formed against centrally located land powers (France. Yale University M. http://belfercenter. in International Relations. the aspiring counterbalancer will have to confront not just the capabilities of the unipolar state. None of these is likely to generate structural change in the policy-relevant future. http://belfercenter. Summer 1999. International Security. Wohlforth.S.A.harvard.Phil. pp. B.edu/files/wohlforthvol24no1.or multipolarity to reappear quickly.” MIT Press. M. No. Mexico. Beloit College.. This massive power gap implies that any countervailing change must be strong and sustained to produce structural effects. Germany. Even a declining offshore unipolar state will have unusually wide opportunities to play divide and rule. in International Relations. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. the threshold concentration of power necessary to sustain unipolarity is lower than most scholars assume. and it may not even be the most important one for many states. They propose three ways in which unipolarity will end: counterbalancing by other states.D. Yale University. Ph. Empirically proven – counterbalancing not a threat to US heg. many scholars expect bi. Yale University. 99 (William C. Because they fail to appreciate the sheer size and comprehensiveness of the power gap and the advantages conveyed by geography. but also those of its other great power allies. Yale University. Summer 1999. Ph. Yale University M. in International Relations. political science.ksg. Vol 24.A.. in Political Science. 29-30.S. Wohlforth. No. In addition to all the other advantages the United States possesses. Wohlforth.harvard. regional integration.pdf) Unipolarity rests on two pillars. Location matters . “The Stability of a Unipolar World. 28. in Political Science. “The Stability of a Unipolar World. All of the aspiring poles face a problem the . If things go poorly.Phil. Local balances of power may loom larger in the calculations of other states than the background unipolar structure. Wohlforth. Daniel Webster Professor of Government. As a result. Efforts to produce a counterbalance globally will generate powerful countervailing action locally. position as an offshore power determines the nature and likely longevity of unipolarity. however. Ph. M.edu/files/wohlforthvol24no1. Vol 24. Coordinating a counterbalance against an offshore state that has already achieved unipolar status will be much more difficult. in International Relations. 99 (William C. Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund A. Any second-tier state seeking to counterbalance has to contend with the existing pro-U.A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. The balance of power between the sole pole and the second-tier states is not the only one that matters. power indexes alone cannot capture the importance of the fact that the United States is in North America while all the other potential poles are in or around Eurasia. bandwagon.D. p.ksg. or the differential growth in power. Similarly.D. 1.” MIT Press. and the Pacific.33 of 154 Heg Sustainable (1/2) Heg is sustainable – power gap too large and protected location. International Security. Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund A.
S. as it did with China against the Soviet Union in the latter days of the Cold War.S. . allies against an aspiring regional power. In addition.34 of 154 United States does not: great power neighbors that could become crucial U. in each region there are smaller “pivotal states” that make natural U. allies the moment an unambiguous challenge to Washington’s preeminence emerges. the United States’ first move in any counterbalancing game of this sort could be to try to promote such pivotal states to great power status. Indeed.
Wohlforth. .35 of 154 Heg Sustainable (2/2) Unipolarity is a movement – not easily derailed.Phil. In the bipolarity debate. in International Relations. Daniel Webster Professor of Government.D.” so the recovery of Europe and Japan appeared as fatal threats to the United States’ position. International Security. Yale University. 37-38. the reference point became the extremely tight alliance of the 1950s. If unipolarity is so robust. political science. “hegemony” was deªned as “the U. In the 1980s.A. The rush to proclaim the return of multipolarity in the 1960s and 1970s. Ph. Even if world politics works by the old rules—even if democracy. and finally to bid unipolarity adieu after the Cold War are all examples. to herald the rise of Japan or China as superpowers in the 1980s and 1990s. Ph. 99 (William C.ksg. “The Stability of a Unipolar World. Yale University.” MIT Press. http://belfercenter. No. In each case. M. As a result. in Political Science. B. and international institutions do not matter— we should not expect a return of balance-of-power politics à la multipolarity for the simple reason that we are living in the modern world’s first unipolar system.. power.S. so any disagreement between the United States and Europe was seen as a harbinger of multipolarity. Wohlforth. position circa 1946. Yale University M.pdf) The distribution of material capabilities at the end of the twentieth century is unprecedented. analysts changed reference points to minimize U. why do so many writers hasten to declare its demise? The answer may lie in the common human tendency to conflate power trends with existing relationships.A. Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund A.harvard. Many analysts have come to define unipolarity as an imperial system such as Rome where there is only one great power and all other states are satrapies or dependencies. Summer 1999. the current concentration of power in the United States is something new in the world. new forms of interdependence. to pronounce the United States’ decline in the 1980s. Beloit College. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. Vol 24.edu/files/wohlforthvol24no1. However we view this venerable explanatory variable. And unipolarity is not a “moment. each act of defiance of Washington’s preferences on any issue comes to be seen as the return of a multipolar world.” It is a deeply embedded material condition of world politics that has the potential to last for many decades.S. pp.D. 1. in International Relations.
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37 of 154 ***Heg Bad .
Meanwhile. the game is no longer worth the candle for the allies: the threat posed by their enemies is relatively less significant than the threat of growing control posed by their major partner. its allies and that further increases in its power become gradually less useful. At some point. leaving them with little choice but submission. History at the University of Bologna. which acquire new energy. The situation eventually reaches a tipping point. A parabola nicely illustrates the relationship between power and security that I have just described. This result stems from a structural disequilibrium between allied relations. postdoctoral fellow in the Department of Politics. so that it can accommodate the evolution of technology and the eventuality that an arms race could frustrate a state’s expansionist efforts. the control that the major partner exercises over its allies becomes stronger.” International Security. power. Spring 2011. (Davide. Further increases in the major partner’s power will exacerbate differences with its allies. the gains that a state accrues from further increases in its power will start to diminish.mitpressjournals. Neutral states realize that the moment has come to take sides. where further increases in the major state’s relative power no longer compensate for the defection of its allies and the mobilization of neutral states into the enemy coalition. This threshold represents the maximum amount of power a state can accumulate before further increases begin to reduce its security. The apex of the parabola corresponds to an implicit concept in realist balance of power theory: the security threshold. and some will leave the alliance. . The concept must be understood in a relative sense. Beyond that threshold. leaving the aspiring hegemon less secure than before. on the other. The security threshold corresponds to the quantity of power that Waltz calls “appropriate” for a state to be secure in an anarchic international system. power maximization and security maximization become incompatible goals. because they thought in terms of absolute. Classical realists did not make this point explicitly.org/doi/pdf/10.38 of 154 Bad – Generic Hegemony and increases in military power result in backlash Fiammenghi 11. neutral states begin to reflect on the costs of their neutrality. especially if one side should defeat the other. In the meantime. Further increases tilt the balance in favor of the major power’s rivals. on the one hand.) http://www. and relations with enemies and neutrals. “The Security Curve and the Structure of International Politics. When the state’s coalition is able to effectively discourage aggression. The concept of balancing necessarily implies that there is a maximum amount of power that a state can accumulate to achieve maximum security.1162/ISEC_a_00037 Beyond a certain point. not relative. Institutions. The flow of defectors encourages the major power’s rivals. there is no amount of absolute power that can guarantee a state’s security once and for all.30 Obviously.
In any case.28 As China's military power—conventional and nuclear—increases. India and Great Britain. as well as all other countries in the world that participate in the global economy. therefore. Taiwan and the United States has the potential to escalate into a nuclear conflict and a third world war. in which the United States and China are the two most dominant members. Taiwan and United States are the primary actors in this scenario. In addition. nuclear deterrent there-fore could not prevent Beijing from using force against Taiwan. A good illustration is the current Taipei regime's flirtation with declaring the island's independence fromChina—a move that Beijing says would compel a forcible Chinese re-sponse—which poses a real danger that the United States could be ensnared in a major war by the risk taking behavior of its Taiwanese client state.officials than does Taipei).27ln contrast. if they were drawn into the war. and the U.S. intervention in what it regards as an internal Chinese matter. which reduced the chances for a superpower clash. the possibility exists that they could then plan to attack Japan and begin a policy of aggressive expansionism in East and Southeast Asia. hollow. For one thing. East Asia's likely flash-points are contested gray areas. .decision makers "care more about Los Angeles than they do about 'Taiwan. both superpowers exercised considerable control over their major allies and thus were at minimal risk of being chain-ganged into a conflict—that is. 09 – American Military University (Lee. During the crisis—which China provoked by conducting intimidatingmilitary exercises in an attempt to influence Taiwan's presidential elections—a Chinese official said that unlike the Formosa Strait crises during the1950s. The spring 1996 crisis between China and Taiwan is illusive. it is becoming quite real. the strategic context affecting extended deterrence has shifted against the United States in other ways. as well as the Pacific and even into India. because U. because states increasingly have greater latitude to pursue theirown foreign and security policy agendas than was the case during the coldwar. If China were able to successfully annex Taiwan. China. during the cold war the respective U. However.39 of 154 Bad – China War Heg leads to draw-in to Taiwan war – alliance guarantees Layne 6 Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 167-8 Since the cold war. therefore. which increases the chances for conflict. getting dragged into a war in which their own interests were not directly implicated because of the actions of an ally or client. including Japan. Beijing. many countries other than the primary actors could be affected by such a conflict.S.lampmethod. today. both Koreas. would be engaged in direct deterrence to prevent U. other countries will not be considered in this study. Australia.” http://www. “The Chinese-Taiwanese Conflict. Beijing's 1996 threat was. if China and the United States engage in a full-scale conflict.org/eCommons/Hunkovic. China-Taiwan war escalates globally and goes nuclear Hunkovic. and Soviet spheres were demarcated clearly. which could in turn create an international standoff and deployment of military forces to contain the threat. but now that China is on the verge of possessing a survivable nuclear retaliatory capability. Russia. of course. there are few countries in the world that will not be economically and/or militarily affected by it.S.pdf) A war between China. whose actions will determine its eventual outcome. In a showdown over Taiwan. the po-tential risks to the United States of coming to Taiwan's (or Japan's) defensealso are increasing. Moreover."29This comment illustrates an important point:: Taiwan matters more to China than it does to Washington (and one hopes Los Angeles matters more to U.S. China now was a nuclear power. however. instead of the cold war's clearly delineated spheres of influence.S. there is a real risk of the United States being dragged into a war because of a protected state's irresponsible behavior. the United Stateswould be engaged in extended deterrence to prevent China from attacking.
2007 ["The Case Against the American Empire. depends largely on what strategy the United States chooses to adopt toward China. On this score. Whether Washington and Beijing actually come to blows. 73-74 ] To be sure. however. After all. the United States should not ignore the potential strategic ramifications of China’s arrival on the world stage as a great power. If the United States continues to aim at upholding its current primacy. the lesson of history is that the emergence of new great powers in the international system leads to conflict. Sino-American conflict is virtually certain.40 of 154 XTN: China War Primacy is a collision course with China – conflict inevitable Layne 7 Christopher LAYNE. Still. Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute. Published by Routledge. the notion—propagated by Beijing—that China’s will be a “peaceful rise” is just as fanciful as claims by American policy-makers that China has no need to build up its military capabilities because it is unthreatened by any other state. p. ." American Empire: A Debate. however. this does not mean that the United States and China inevitably are on a collision course that will culminate in the next decade or two in a war. because the United States has the “last clear chance” to adopt a grand strategy that will serve its interests in balancing Chinese power without running the risk of an armed clash with [end page 73] Beijing. not peace. ISBN 0415952034.
on its present course.S. this hegemonic muscle-flexing has a price.41 of 154 Bad – Counterbalancing US hegemony risks a geopolitical backlash. Counter-balancing will quickly erode US dominance Layne 3 Christopher Layne. Over time. is too mighty to be counter-balanced. they are tempted to use it repeatedly. Don’t bet on it. asymmetric conflicts against terrorists (in the Philippines. and thereby overreach themselves. The very fact of America’s overwhelming power is bound to produce a geopolitical backlash—which is why it’s only a short step from the celebration of imperial glory to the recessional of imperial power.com/10_06_03/cover. and rising great powers like China could erode America’s relative power—especially if the U. the United States seems fated to succumb to the “hegemon’s temptation.S. suffers setbacks in future conflicts. for example in a war with China over Taiwan.S.” Hegemons have lots of power and because there is no countervailing force to stop them. October 6 2003. http://www. . North Korea). will not suffer the same fate as previous hegemonic powers. and elsewhere). The British found out toward the end of the 19th century that a seemingly unassailable international power position can melt away with unexpected rapidity. Perhaps the proponents of America’s imperial ambitions are right and the U. Indeed. The Cost of Empire.amconmag. 2003 [The American Conservative. The cumulative costs of fighting —or preparing to fight—guerilla wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. possibly in a failed Pakistan. regional powers (Iran.html] As for the argument that the U. Member of Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy. history reminds us that things change fast in international politics.
Matthew Kroenig.42 of 154 Bad – Disease Preeminence makes solving diseases like bird flu impossible – only multipolarity reduces global resentment enough to allow for responses to pandemics Weber et. SARS. (Steven. As long as the United States remains the world’s lone superpower. Foreign Policy. Humans cannot outsmart disease. These are often the same countries. Solutions are only possible when and where we get the upper hand. The most likely sources of the next ebola or HIVlike pandemic are the countries that simply won’t let U. Even after HIV. we’re not likely to get any help. January-February 2007. that feel threatened by American power. al 7. Ely Ratner. . What’s needed is another great power to take over a piece of the work. the world is still not ready for a viral pandemic in Southeast Asia or sub-Saharan Africa.S. a power that has more immediate interests in the countries where diseases incubate and one that is seen as less of a threat. Establishing an early warning system for these diseases—exactly what we lacked in the case of SARS a few years ago and exactly what we lack for avian flu today—will require a significant level of intervention into the very places that don’t want it. perhaps not entirely coincidentally. while it takes us decades to come up with a new generation of antibiotics.) The same is true for global public health. “How Globalization Went Bad”. Yet the threat is too arcane and not immediate enough for the West to force the issue. Poor countries where humans live in close proximity to farm animals are the best place to breed extremely dangerous zoonotic disease. Professor of Political Science at UC-Berkeley and Director of the Institute of International Studies. That will be true as long as international intervention means American interference. because it just evolves too quickly. America can’t change that alone. including the World Health Organization. and several years of mounting hysteria about avian flu. Bacteria can reproduce a new generation in less than 30 minutes. Globalization is turning the world into an enormous petri dish for the incubation of infectious disease. or other Western agencies in. Naazneen Barma.
And the fourth is that even the present supine Congress would bestir itself and demand that the brakes be applied. and gaining U.can we really afford this more crumbling frontiers of insecurity. there are other important issues that are driving the United States and Iran toward an armed confrontation. as President George W.from our inner cities to the slaughters in central Africa -. It is small wonder that while liberals protest soaring defense expenditures. The first is the of other military units for rest and overhaul. Its armed forces look colossal (as did Britain's in 1919). it is hardly coincidental that the administration’s policy toward Tehran bears a striking similarity to its policy [end page 76] during the run-up to the March 2003 invasion of Iraq. it no longer feels constrained from intervening in sensitive areas like the Middle East or Central Asia. I was shocked when a Dutch journalist told me that many of his countrymen were now "scared" of America. Infantry divisions were tied down in Iraq or standing by to go there. The United States is unchallenged militarily and sees no rival Great Power in sight. 76-77 Iran Because of the strategy of primacy and empire. Tony Blair insisted that there were "no plans" for invading Syria. Zalmay Khalilzad. Still. should national security interests demand it. The third is that an aggressive move against the governments in Damascas or Tehran would probably provoke the wholesale resignation of the U. The Bush Doctrine’s three key components are rejection of deterrence in favor of preventive/preemptive military action. The main source of conflict—or at least the one that has grabbed the lion’s share of the headlines—is Tehran’s evident determination to develop a nuclear weapons program.S. foreign service.S. Washington Post. there are at least four reasons announced recall of some of the U. that of defining America's position in the world over the years to come. The fundamental cause of tensions between the United States and Iran is the nature of America’s ambitions in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. including its boss. concerns about Iranian interference have been magnified. grand strategy—which has come to be known as the Bush Doctrine. however. p." American Empire: A Debate. History Should Give Us Pause”. Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute. April 20.S. determination to effectuate a radical shake-up in the politics of the Persian Gulf and Middle East. are dumbfounded at the threats against Syria and Iran made by influential members of the Bush administration. With all that is crying out for attention -. In a real sense.” Beyond nuclear weapons. 2003 [“The Perils of Empire: This Looks Like America’s Moment. however. the U. spending and relations with the international community? Just a few days ago. These are reflected in current U.org/views03/0420-02. ISBN 0415952034. S. of course. the U. language. Navy's carrier groups and the return to think we will not be marching on Damascus or Tehran -. The Dutch. The key question today is whether these assumptions are correct. Yet it has taken little comfort from this. Washington’s policy. has accused Tehran of meddling in Iraqi affairs by providing arms and training to Shiite militias and by currying favor with the Shiite politicians who dominate Iraq’s recently elected government. including members of the current anti-Saddam coalition. US military decline prevents attack on Iran Kennedy 3 Paul Kennedy. military repeatedly warns of overstretch and is dismayed at the hawkish calls for further adventures.commondreams. It has taken on military commitments all over the globe. This is because the same strategic assumptions that underlay the administration’s pre- invasion Iraq policy now are driving its Iran policy. Iran’s nuclear program and its role in Iraq are merely the tip of the iceberg. dominance over that region. "Big stick" . In this respect. Successful in our Iraq military campaign. It possesses the world's single largest national economy but faces huge trade and budget deficits and economic rivalries from an equally large European Union and a fast-growing China. Powell.at least not now. ambassador to Iraq. The second is that. Scared. Recently.S. the United States and Iran are on course for a showdown. not only on the nuclear weapons issue but—ominously—with respect to regime change and democratization. Since 9/11.htm] This brings us to the broadest question of all. Is that a good long-term policy for the number one power in the democratic world? The Dutch aren't alone. part or all of eight of the 10 U. it feels less secure and is spending massive amounts on armaments. Published by Routledge. but its obligations look even larger.43 of 154 Bad – Iran Strikes Primacy causes conflict with Iran Layne 7 Christopher LAYNE. during the prime minister's question time in the House of Commons last week. from the Balkans and Kuwait to Afghanistan and Korea. Professor of History and the Director of International Security Studies at Yale University. http://www. The clear victor of the Cold War. 2007 ["The Case Against the American Empire. Bush has stated on several occasions—in language that recalls his prewar stance on Iraq—is that a nucleararmed Iran is “intolerable. With Iraq teetering on the brink of a sectarian civil war between Shiites and Sunnis. despite the fears of liberals at home and abroad. Secretary of State Colin L.S.S. Chief among these is Iraq. in the recent war on Saddam missionary zeal to remake the Middle East in our own image? We could end up merely creating for ourselves ever Hussein's regime. Most countries in the world. is it not time to rein in our own "forward" school and be a little more modest in our aims.
This is because the same strategic assumptions that underlay the administration’s pre-invasion Iraq policy now are driving its Iran policy. there are other important issues that are driving the United States and Iran toward an armed confrontation. The key question today is whether these assumptions are correct. however. Bush has stated on several occasions—in language that recalls his prewar stance on Iraq—is that a nuclear-armed Iran is “intolerable. but neither the Marines nor the Army are about to embark on another war.” Beyond nuclear weapons. In a real sense. Washington’s policy. it is hardly coincidental that the administration’s policy toward Tehran bears a striking similarity to its policy [end page 76] during the run-up to the March 2003 invasion of Iraq. The Bush Doctrine’s three key components are rejection of deterrence in favor of preventive/preemptive military action. p. not only on the nuclear weapons issue but—ominously—with respect to regime change and democratization. Heg causes war with Iran Layne 7 (Christopher. Chief among these is Iraq. In this respect. With Iraq teetering on the brink of a sectarian civil war between Shiites and Sunnis. Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute. the United States and Iran are on course for a showdown. has accused Tehran of meddling in Iraqi affairs by providing arms and training to Shiite militias and by currying favor with the Shiite politicians who dominate Iraq’s recently elected government. Iran’s nuclear program and its role in Iraq are merely the tip of the iceberg. concerns about Iranian interference have been magnified.44 of 154 warnings to Syria and Iran may continue. Recently.S. The main source of conflict—or at least the one that has grabbed the lion’s share of the headlines—is Tehran’s evident determination to develop a nuclear weapons program. dominance over that region. as President George W." American Empire: A Debate. the U.S. "The Case Against the American Empire. Review of International Studies (2009). 64-65.) Iran Because of the strategy of primacy and empire. literary and national editor of the Atlantic. however. determination to effectuate a radical shake-up in the politics of the Persian Gulf and Middle East. These are reflected in current U. . Zalmay Khalilzad.S. and gaining U. The fundamental cause of tensions between the United States and Iran is the nature of America’s ambitions in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. grand strategy —which has come to be known as the Bush Doctrine. ambassador to Iraq.
and the transfer of many of the most lucrative sectors of the Iraq economy to American firms.nautilus. might create more hopeful conditions for relief. The Bush administration's attempt to hide the fact that fundamental elements of its flawed policies remain in place seems certain to add fuel to the fire. the needs of the Iraqi people and society are unlikely to be met. together with the dismantling of much of the previous Iraq administrative structure. coupled with a stronger international presence. both governments and NGOs. http://www. we should not of course expect peace and development to reign any time soon. 6/30/04 “Discusson of ‘Notes From Ground Zero’: Power equity and Postwar Construction in Two Eras”. including the United Nations and European nations. including the systematic withdrawal of US forces and elimination of US bases. Policies that sharply reduced US domination of Iraq. . the tieing of the hands of the present administration by a series of neoliberal policies that deny fiscal authority to the government. an electronic journal and archive on Japan and the Asia-Pacific. and the farflung base structure designed to support US primacy in the region.000 US troops supplemented by allied troops and US mercenaries.45 of 154 Bad – Middle East War US heg causes Iraqi instability Selden 4 (Mark.org/fora/security/SeldonDiscussion. It seems certain that if that multinational presence is predominantly military. This.) What policies make sense with respect to Iraq following the transfer of certain formal powers to the handpicked Iraq administration? What is most striking in my view is the continuity of the effort to sustain American domination of Iraq through the permanent stationing of 138. reconstruction and reform agendas that will be essential for the reconstruction of Iraq and a reduction of international tensions in a region that is super charged. has created a situation that ties the hands of any Iraq administration. Whatever the changes.html. What can be said with confidence is that the US has embarked on a course that has brought disaster to Iraq and the region and disgrace to the United States. coordinator of Japan Focus.
May 24 2010. Russia and China could not. Our pointless and protracted wars in Afghanistan and Iraq will be the last time we will launch a major battle in the region. and is knee deep in negotiating a solution to the conflict in Darfur. There is no longer any serious "cost" for defying the United States in the global arena.particularly when viewed against the backdrop of our startling rhetoric over Iran's nuclear program. capabilities and reason. And now Turkey and Brazil have cajoled Iran into accepting an agreement that the US.and this after 19 years of a "USsponsored" peace process.and struggling to maintain our economic equilibrium . 10 Senior Associate @ Oxford University (Sharmine. let alone push through a negotiated solution . This credibility was compromised further with our irrational support of Israel's attacks on Lebanon and Gaza in 2006 and 2008/9 respectively. England. Germany.46 of 154 AT: Heg Solves MidEast War US has no influence in the middle east – cant mediate the conflict Narwani. But nothing highlights our irrelevance more than two recent developments: 1) The US's inability today to convene even perfunctory peace talks between Israelis and Palestinians. Unable to win wars or deliver diplomatic coups .com/sharminenarwani/washington-just-lost-the_b_586222. Syria helped gain the release of prisoners in Iran and Gaza. In short.huffingtonpost. http://www.Washington has lost the fundamental tools for global leadership. It is Qatar that stepped in to broker a deal between Hezbollah and the Lebanese government in 2008.html It's official. 2) The US's inability to achieve a resolution with Iran over its nuclear program. The only breakthrough in this long-winded effort to tame Iran's nuclear aspirations was struck by Turkey and Brazil last week. the US seems incapable of resolving even a traffic dispute in the Middle East. France. And no place does this impotence manifest more vividly than the modern Middle East. “Washington Just Lost the Middle East in a Big Way”. . despite our insistence on involving ourselves with every peep heard in the Mideast. That massive show of flexing brawn over brain burst a global perception bubble about our intentions. And by the double standards employed over Israel's violations of international law and its illegal nuclear weapons stash . We have been rendered irrelevant.
The Europeans dangle carrots at Iran. Kim Il Sung.S. states that felt threatened by the United States could turn to the Soviet Union’s nuclear umbrella for protection. barely flinched when former U. Pyongyang. Within five years of the Soviet collapse. with conventional force. There’s effectively a market out there for proliferation.S. including Beijing. and many other capitals.S.Q. But that doesn’t matter much from the perspective of a government that thinks the Pentagon has it in its sights. ET AL. troops on its border. including Beijing. it is fast becoming a necessity. Ely Ratner.S. It’s often forgotten now that. because it had the Soviet nuclear umbrella. primacy causes nuclear prolif Weber et. and it stared continuously at tens of thousands of U. they turn to people like A. Now. The Eastern bloc was full of countries with advanced technological capabilities in every area except one—nuclear weapons. but they are unwilling to consider serious sticks. Ph. and the United States is bearing most of the burden. In Tehran. It has become fashionable. No country in the world can dream of challenging U. Having your own nuclear weapon used to be a luxury. Consider the case of nuclear proliferation. Foreign Policy) The world is paying a heavy price for the instability created by the combination of globalization and unipolarity. Professor of Political Science and Director of the Institute for International Studies at the University of California-Berkeley. and Ely Ratner.S. President Bill Clinton’s administration readied war plans to strike his nuclear installations preemptively. conventional military power. Pyongyang was pushing ahead full steam on plutonium reprocessing facilities. The United States may not be able to stabilize and rebuild Iraq. But much of this analysis is overblown. That brinkmanship paid off. in the wake of the Iraq war. January/February. But.” Foreign Policy. nonproliferation today is almost entirely America’s burden. But today we see the uneven and inadequate level of effort that non-superpowers devote to stopping proliferation. North Korea didn’t seek nuclear weapons. conventional military power. (Steven. to the detriment of U. military could.S. Saddam Hussein’s great strategic blunder was that he took too long to get to the same place. in the wake of the Iraq war. And the best deterrent yet invented is the . Before 1989. military could. with conventional force. North Korea was surrounded by feuding.D. the bottom line is simple: The U. Consider the case of nuclear proliferation. and Kim’s son rules the country with an iron fist.S. Today North Korea is likely a nuclear power. Weber 7 [Steven WEBER. The overlap of unipolarity with globalization ratchets up both the supply and demand. Professor of Political Science at UC-Berkeley and Director of the Institute of International Studies. The Chinese refuse to admit that there is a problem. to comment on the limits of conventional military force. But they can certainly hope to deter America from using it.S. North Korea’s founder. during the Cold War. with Naazneen Barma. When push comes to shove. and even collaborate on some particularly hard cases. and the United States is bearing most of the burden. great powers could split the job of policing proliferation.S. end those regimes tomorrow if it chose to do so. January-February 2007. however. In Tehran. for 40 years. end those regimes tomorrow if it chose to do so. Few countries had it worse during the Cold War. Moscow simply wouldn’t permit it. Matthew Kroenig. U. Today. to the detriment of U. America’s conventional military strength means a lot less to a nuclear North Korea. Not a single country that had a formal alliance with Moscow ever became a nuclear power. And the Russians are aiding Iran’s nuclear ambitions. the bottom line is simple: The U. But that doesn’t matter much from the perspective of a government that thinks the Pentagon has it in its sights. “How Globalization Went Bad”. It didn’t need to. Candidates at the University of California-Berkeley and Research Fellows at its New Era Foreign Policy Center. national security. Pyongyang. it was officially at war with its southern neighbor. But they can certainly hope to deter America from using it. the only state with a tougher nonproliferation policy than the United States was the Soviet Union. 2007 “How Globalization Went Bad. and many other capitals. Issue 158. North Korea is the clearest example. to comment on the limits of conventional military force. It has become fashionable.. national security. The United States may not be able to stabilize and rebuild Iraq. There’s effectively a market out there for proliferation. But much of this analysis is overblown. Khan.47 of 154 Bad – Proliferation Unipolarity makes countering proliferation impossible – only a multipolar world can solve. The overlap of unipolarity with globalization ratchets up both the supply and demand. with its own supply (states willing to share nuclear technology) and demand (states that badly want a nuclear weapon). How would things be different in a multipolar world? For starters. Matthew Kroenig. nuclear-armed communist neighbors. And the best deterrent yet invented is the threat of nuclear retaliation. Naazneen Barma. with its own supply (states willing to share nuclear technology) and demand (states that badly want a nuclear weapon). No country in the world can dream of challenging U. al 7.] The world is paying a heavy price for the instability created by the combination of globalization and unipolarity.
. states that felt threatened by the United States could turn to the Soviet Union’s nuclear umbrella for protection. and it stared continuously at tens of thousands of U. Pyongyang was pushing ahead full steam on plutonium reprocessing facilities. America’s conventional military strength means a lot less to a nuclear North Korea. Kim Il Sung. North Korea didn’t seek nuclear weapons. for 40 years.S.Q. it was officially at war with its southern neighbor. North Korea’s founder. North Korea was surrounded by feuding.S. It didn’t need to. President Bill Clinton’s administration readied war plans to strike his nuclear installations preemptively. Having your own nuclear weapon used to be a luxury. That brinkmanship paid off. Today. and Kim’s son rules the country with an iron fist. however. Saddam Hussein’s great strategic blunder was that he took too long to get to the same place. they turn to people like A. North Korea is the clearest example. nuclear-armed communist neighbors. Within five years of the Soviet collapse. because it had the Soviet nuclear umbrella. Few countries had it worse during the Cold War.48 of 154 threat of nuclear retaliation. troops on its border. But. Today North Korea is likely a nuclear power. barely flinched when former U. Now. Khan. it is fast becoming a necessity. Before 1989.
India.co.html] In the same context. though. could be classified into this category of stable group hegemony of nuclear weapons. angered over the new U. it was easy to ignore incipient proliferation in the belief that an intimidating response by the United States would eventually suffice to halt it.49 of 154 AT: Heg Solves Prolif American hegemony cannot prevent proliferation by itself. Ayatollah Ali Khameini. Zbigniew Brzezinski (formerly President Carter’s National Security Advisor. also spoke out against the Obama administration's revised nuclear policy by saying that ``The United States is a sinister government and cannot be trusted. determined and coordinated mobilization of other concerned states. China. The lesson bequeathed to the Clinton administration's successor was that even given the great asymmetry of power between the United States and any would-be proliferator. a stable group hegemony of nuclear weapons is to create a stable order of nuclear politics.. counselor and trustee at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and professor of American foreign policy at the School of Advanced International Studies @ Johns Hopkins University) 2007 “Second Chance” p 103 The failure to contain nuclear proliferation in the Far East and in South Asia conveyed a sobering lesson. At the nuclear summit in Washington. the world leaders are strongly urged to develop practical means and ways to keep the stable . Stable nuclear group hegemony is quite often challenged by those countries such as North Korea and Iran that are not in compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and other international obligations.S. North Korea is still not returning to the six-party talks. “Stable Group Hegemony of Nuclear Arms.N. Security Council. and early formulation of a program including both incentives. relevant materials.” Korea Times. have urged their government to formally complain to the United Nations in a petition that calls the United States a warmonger and threat to world peace. In the early. mounted on at least a regional basis.kr/www/news/opinon/2010/07/198_64433. and Israel are nowadays officially recognized to be nations of nuclear weapons. We are not. reflecting these kinds of complaints. heady days of American unilateral supremacy. 4/19. Pakistan. and a large majority of Iranian lawmakers. at an early stage of the nuclear challenge. Even Iran's supreme leader.koreatimes. France and the U. Short of a unilateral military action--with all its unpredictable consequences—even the world's only superpower could not by itself dissuade a country firmly determined to acquire nuclear weapons. Heg doesn’t solve prolif – rogue nations don’t follow norms or rules Park 10 – director of public relations at Korean Political Science Association [Tae-woo. the traditional standing members of the U. Of course. quite sure of the leaders' capacity to produce stern mandatory international standards or measures to stop further proliferation of nuclear weapons. A successful preventive effort would have required an early concentration of attention on the issue. Russia.. The U. They also tackled how to reduce the number of thousands of poorly guarded nuclear reactors or fuel storage sites in many nations. the possibility of nuclear terrorism will always linger around us like a “devil-dream'' embedded in our unconscious mental world.S. It is apparent that North Korea and Iran will not follow the norms and rules of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). self-restraint and costly consequences for continued pursuit of nuclear weapons. If those challenges are not tackled properly through this kind of nuclear summit diplomacy.'' This time. http://www.K. the only alternative to sear was genuine international cooperation. nuclear weapons policy. 47 leaders from all over the world discussed the ways and means of how to secure all weaponsuseable nuclear material within four years and how to eliminate the possibility that terrorists could buy or steal a nuclear weapon. programs and facilities.
.50 of 154 nuclear order rooted firmly on earth with detailed plans such as how to curb North Korea and Iran's nuclear programs in the future.
suppression of rights and freedoms -.) Russia's President has slammed America's global dominance saying all nations have the right to remark on the policies of a state whose actions affect the world. The Russian president also lashed out at what he thought the "ill-thought-out" policies of a country that led to the global financial melt down.presstv." he added." he stressed. Earlier in March the Kremlin had suggested that the international community should have a say when the world's richest countries make decisions with global implications. Medvedev's comments further developed those ideas. Medvedev did not refer to the United States by name but the target of his comments was clear. . Dmitry Medvedev said those problems of one country. His remarks came shortly before the US President Barack Obama delivered a key speech in New York. have the potential to lead to international conflict. Speaking at the opening of a global security conference in the central Russian city of Yaroslavl on Monday.ir/detail.51 of 154 Bad – Russia War Heg destroys Russian relations and causes global war Press TV 9 (“Medvedev lashes out at US hegemony.of any illegal activities. "This happens immediately and incompetence and reluctance to solve one's own problems inflict damage not only to your country but to a huge number of other countries.” Sept 15 http://www. There can be no "high-flown justification for military adventures. where he described the global economic crisis as Washington and Wall Street's "collective failure". attacking efforts by any party to advance what he called "utopian projects of global supremacy … 'Global Caliphate' or 'Benevolent Hegemony'".aspx? id=106209§ionid=351020602.
Neocons believe that the US is supreme in the world and can dictate its course. read by Russians and Chinese. has joined President Vladimir Putin of Russia in a call for a "multipolar world" while condemning "the use of force". and China would establish the hegemony of the cockroach. where China has been given observer status for the first time. Reagan and Gorbachev ended the cold war. just and democratic world order" on the basis of international law. Meeting in Moscow yesterday. The neoconservative idiots have actually written papers. Today. His senior military advisers appear to have been impressed . at least in the medium term. not to their militaries.guardian.52 of 154 Bad – Sino-Russia Alliance Heg leads to a Sino-Russia Alliance that culminates in superpower nuclear conflict Roberts 07 Economist and Former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury (Paul Craig. Kyrgkyzstan. Thus. This is an idiotic provocation as the Russians can eliminate anti-ballistic missiles with cruise missiles. the neocons are positioning US anti-ballistic missiles on Soviet borders in Poland and the Czech Republic. The Bush regime even thinks that as it has bought and paid for Musharraf. as he begins a foreign tour designed to revitalise Chinese diplomacy. Hu Jintao. As the US has proven that it cannot occupy the Iraqi city of Baghdad despite 5 years of efforts.antiwar. it most certainly cannot occupy Russia or China. like Bush and Cheney. This new potent military alliance is a real world response to neoconservative delusions about US hegemony. In a mere 6.by the White House's pre-emptive strategy. These are gratuitous acts of aggression. such as Egypt's and Pakistan's. Americans need to understand what the neocon Bush regime cannot: a nuclear exchange between the US. Unilateralism leads to a Sino-Russia alliance. .china The new president of China. but know nothing about it.uk/world/2003/may/28/russia. But Chinese diplomacy is still based on seeking good relations with the US. After a week in Russia Mr Hu will attend the G8 conference in France. both are being forced by America's aggressive posture to revamp their militaries. they said that they stood for "a multipolar. about why the US must use its military superiority to assert hegemony over Russia and China.and shocked . America's influence in the world is limited to its payments of tens of millions of dollars to bribed heads of foreign governments. They also said that the UN should be given the "central role" in Iraq's reconstruction. Is Bush blind to the danger that he will cause an Islamic revolution within Pakistan that will depose the US puppet and present the Middle East with an Islamic state armed with nuclear weapons? Considering the instabilities and dangers that abound. the US failures in Iraq and Afghanistan. The two presidents are trying to establish a better Sino-Russian understanding which will offset. Yet. and now believe that China must do more to hold its own. In another thrust at US unilateralism. The Bush regime has initiated a propaganda war against the Russian government of Vladimir Putin. if not counterbalance. and its criticism of the occupation of Iraq has been muted. they called for a peaceful solution on the Korean peninsula.com/roberts/?articleid=11422) This week the Russian and Chinese militaries are conducting a joint military exercise involving large numbers of troops and combat vehicles.co. “US Hegemony Spawns Russian-Chinese Military Alliance”. In an attempt to gain the advantage in a nuclear conflict. the aggressive posture of the Bush regime goes far beyond recklessness. for the military-security complex and are paid to restart the cold war for the sake of the profits of the armaments industry. Cynics believe that the neocons are just shills. Russia and China have now witnessed enough of the Bush administration's unprovoked aggression in the world to take neocon intentions seriously. Russia. The Bush regime is the most irresponsibly aggressive regime the world has seen since Hitler's. saying scenarios "of forceful pressure or use of force are unacceptable". That means the conflict toward which the neocons are driving will be a nuclear conflict. But the fact is that the neocons actually believe their delusions about American hegemony. The former Soviet Republics of Tajikistan. Other countries appear ready to join the military alliance. The Guardian 3 5/28/2003 “China and Russia look for a counterbalance” http://www. he will stand aside and permit Bush to make air strikes inside Pakistan. http://www. US administrations after Reagan's have broken the agreements and understandings. Neocons are people who desire war. Significantly.5 years the Bush regime has destroyed the world's good will toward the US. and Kazakstan are participating. However. the predominance of the US in the post-Iraqi-war world. The US gratuitously brought NATO and anti-ballistic missiles to Russia's borders. before he left home Mr Hu called for more military modernisation of China. Both the Russian and Chinese governments are trying to devote resources to their economic development.
as do strategic analysts. consciously. which in 1998 proposed that the United Nations convene a committee on outer space in its Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. . Testimony before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces of the House Armed Services Committee. in 1968. but there was another one which was important and hasn’t been much discussed. The UN General Assembly has continued to pass resolutions. (The vote passed by 156 to 0. you can find them. O’Hanlon. well that’s OK. Think what they’re going to be like in the Russian systems. Do you think the Russians will react differently? No they’re saying straight out that they’ve adopted Bush’s first strike doctrine.S. that their purpose is to attack the command bunkers that control their retaliatory nuclear systems. without warning and instantaneously with first strike authority. so they’re going to react to it.: Brookings Institution. which they claim are much more sophisticated and are on computer controlled automated launch. These things are going to misfire. if you increase the threat of terror. China increases its missile capacity. That sets off a new cycle. deployment. the United States. hegemony will force space weaponization which causes space racing resulting in extinction. undermined ratification of old bio-weapons treaties. The US is developing low yield nuclear weapons which is in violation of international treaties and the Russians understand. which is exactly consistent with the security strategy. Do we want Pakistan to increase its offensive nuclear capacity? Have a look at how their missiles are controlled. They also worry about a unilateralist America pursuing its own military advantage at the expense of other countries. Just a couple of weeks ago the Russian had their first major military maneuvers in the last two decades. for more than twenty straight years.53 of 154 Bad – Space Weapons Hegemony causes a buildup of space weapons O`Hanlon 6 Michael E. and Georgia abstained. You are asking for a disaster. They immediately moved to undermine international treaties. that no one can challenge our total domination.dissidentvoice.) In 2001 China presented an incomplete draft treaty banning the weaponization of space.C.org/April2004/Mars0424. And its not that Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld and so on want the world destroyed. Now others react to that threat. a small ABM system around Moscow. These moves are deliberately. most of which do not favor putting weapons in space. But it has taken on a new tone in what many view as an era of American unipolarity or hegemony. Micronesia. dominating the world by force and dismantling the hated welfare state measures at home. The world is under very tight surveillance so you can detect if somebody is walking across the street in Ankara. including Canada. The US reacted at once by targeting it with offensive nuclear weapons. 13] Non-American opponents of weaponizing space make many of the same arguments. In recent years.S. 2006 [“The State of Space: From Strategic Reconnaissance to Tactical Warfighting to Possible Weaponsization” ed. targeting the rear outposts with nuclear weapons so they would overwhelm any possible defense. The Chinese are surely going to respond to a so called missile defense system since it eliminates their strategic nuclear capacity. those risks aren’t important as compared to what its important. They very pointedly said this is in response to US escalation. Washington D. You get a ripple effect. It terminated negotiations on an enforceable bio weapons treaty. that’s important. India increases it and Pakistan responds. It means putting space platforms in orbit from which you can launch offensive weapons. that they’re deploying their offensive missiles. allies. India responds. and in 2002 China and Russia jointly presented another draft that included bans on weapons based in space and on any use of weapons against objects in space. Israel. This is extraordinarily dangerous. the Russian systems are worse. highly destructive weapons. What does ownership of space mean? Well that’s presented in leaked plans. So have a number of U. American strategic analysts call that an accident waiting to happen. In comparison if you threaten to blow up the world. The air force space command immediately announced plans to move from it called control of space to ownership of space. as well as the ASAT debate of the 1980s. p. In December 2001 it called for negotiations on a treaty to prevent an arms race in outer space at the Geneva Conference. so Russian defense spending has predictably sharply increased since Bush came in. This dispute has much of its origins and motivation in the history of the ballistic missile defense debate. The Bush administration immediately moved to expand offensive military capacity. opposing the weaponization of space. and use of such capabilities. Everybody knows that a missile defense system is an offensive weapon. that's the way the cookie crumbles. enter the atmosphere at the last minute so they can’t be detected and instantaneously drop highly destructive precision weaponry. There’s universal agreement on this by both sides.htm Well the most visible and publicized implementation was the invasion of Iraq. U. China and Russia have been consistently vocal in their opposition to the weaponization of space and their desire for a treaty banning the testing. The American systems which are much more sophisticated have a three minute period during which human intervention can prevent automated response. We know how the US reacted to this when the Russians made a slight move in that direction by placing. it’s a first strike weapon. Noam Chomsky 4/24/2004 “an interview with Noam Chomsky. Computer errors are daily occurrences in the US computer system. June 21. raising the threat to survival. The Bush administration just announced that it is going to employ a missile defense system. so instead of having twenty missiles targeting the United States they’ll build it up and probably have a submarine launched capacity. It was also just reported that the Pentagon is developing hypersonic planes which will orbit in space. by American calculation it might have tripled.” http://www. it just doesn’t matter much to them.
54 of 154 .
tenuous. at best. who served as senior American commander in Iraq during the surge and now heads CENTCOM (the US military command with overall responsibility for the Middle East) has repeatedly emphasised that the US commit.ism. Terrorists may not be able to balance against the US. 9/11 represented a violent counterreaction to America’s policies in the Middle East – especially its drive to dominate the region both geopolitically and culturally. As German military strategist Carl von Clausewitz himself observed. President Bush’s endlessly reiterated claim that the US was attacked because Islamic radicals ‘hate us because of our freedom’ betrayed a complete misunderstanding of the dynamics that underpin the clash between the US and Middle Eastern terrorists.48 Bush repeatedly asserted that. and force Washington to alter its stance on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. limited. and one of its principal objectives ‘is the expulsion of American troops from the Persian Gulf and the reduction of Washington’s power in the region’. and thereby trigger an upsurge of popular discontent in the Islamic world that would lead to the overthrow of the Saudi monarchy and other proAmerican regimes in the Middle East (Egypt. For sure. in Iraq the US is fighting the same terrorists who attacked the US on 9/11. it is dangerous for the US to base its strategy for combating terrorism on the belief ‘that Muslims hate and attack us for what we are and think rather than for what we do’. And. Betts observed following the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center that. and ideological reasons. terrorism is ‘about power: the pursuit of power. or resistance. and the use of power to achieve political change’. and widely popular foreign policy goals .43 Specifically. Review of International Studies (2009).50 General David Petraeus. Pape has found that ‘what nearly all suicide terrorist attacks have in common is a specific secular and strategic goal: to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from territory that the terrorists consider to be their homeland’. and as such. To make this point.42 It is the US’ attempt to impose its primacy and preferences on the Middle East that fuels groups like Al-Qaeda and fans Islamic fundamental. Although the Bush administration had strongly opposed any suggestions that there should be a fixed timetable for US withdrawal from Iraq in July 2008. do hate the US for cultural. Cambridge Journals. Terrorism is a form of ‘blowback’ against America’s preponderant role in international affairs.tration’s inflexible determination to maintain a long-term American military presence in Iraq is exactly the wrong policy to reduce terrorism.40 Here. engaged in ‘balancing’ the US (because balancing is a form of state behaviour). because it is an instrument that the weak use against the strong. any draw-down of US forces will take place gradually. . this claim overlooked the fact that AQI came into existence only after the March 2003 US invasion of Iraq. Pakistan.ment to Iraq is long-term in nature. and Jordan. During 2008. indeed. Richard K. Organisations like Al-Qaeda may be non-state actors. Indeed the use of violence for such purposes is the hallmark of terrorism. literary and national editor of the Atlantic. and American military planners are preparing for a long-lasting ‘post-occupation’ US presence there. As Bruce Hoffman says. Instead it lasted well into 2008. “America’s Middle East grand strategy after Iraq: the moment for offshore balancing has arrived”. for example) and their replacement by fundamentalist Islamic governments. claimed that the US is fighting terrorism in Iraq. they are not. not terrorism . Al-Qaeda wants to compel the US to remove its military presence from the Persian Gulf.’. the 9/11 attack was undertaken with cool calculation to achieve well-defined geopolitical objectives. President Bush all but confirmed this in May 2007 when he said that he wanted the US to play the same kind of role in Iraq that it has in South Korea since the end of the Korean War.52 What will happen under the new US administration is unclear. ‘irrational’ act of violence.51 In fact. ‘War is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its political object’. the 9/11 assault on the US was not a random. ‘It is hardly likely that Middle Eastern radicals would be hatching schemes like the destruction of the World Trade Center if the US had not been identified so long as the mainstay of Israel. The Bush administration. to a hegemon. . As Michael Schuerer – who headed the CIA analytical team monitoring Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda – says. the 9/11 attack was in keeping with the Clausewitzian paradigm of war: force was used against the US by its adversaries to advance their political objectives. .45 In other words. Scheurer observes that. Of course. and that its links with Bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda are.47 Here. Yet. at the same time. senseless. it is clear that the Bush administration never intended to withdraw from Iraq militarily and aimed for the US to retain permanent US military bases there. religious. In his study of suicide terrorist groups. strictly speaking.39 From this perspective. .49 When it first announced the surge. In fact. and conservative Arab regimes and the source of a cultural assault on Islam’. ‘In the context of ideas bin Laden shares with his brethren. The US presence on the ground in the Middle East also incites terrorists to attack American interests. the Shah of Iran. balancing also signifies opposition. Underscoring this point. beyond connoting the idea of counterweight. is fundamentally an asymmetric form of conflict. even when the surge itself has ended. Bush’s position seemed to soften and the administration said the US would support a ‘time horizon’ for US . Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute.44 Al-Qaeda’s leaders also apparently hoped that the September 11 attacks would provoke a US overreaction. 5/25/9. the military actions of Al-Qaeda and its allies are acts of war. the acquisition of power. and thereby compel changes in America’s Middle Eastern grand strategy. hence – in a blatant prevarication – tied AQI and the war in Iraq to 9/11.41 In a similar vein. and it is likely that there will be more US forces in Iraq in January 2009 than there were prior to the surge. meant to advance bin Laden’s clear. there are Islamic radicals who. The Iraqi government refused to accede to the Bush administration’s desire to negotiate a long-term security agreement that would allow the US to maintain permanent bases in Iraq. Al-Qaeda seeks to undermine US primacy. the government of Iraqi Nouri al-Maliki indicated that Baghdad wanted to set a timeline for US troop withdrawals.38 Terrorism.55 of 154 Bad – Terrorism US Heg causes terrorism – US presence in the Middle East and 9/11 proves Layne 9 (Christopher. it has grossly exaggerated the links between the insurgent group Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and Osama Bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda organisation and. Despicable and brutal though it was. but they can engage in a related form of activity aimed at undermining American primacy by raising its costs.46 Al-Qaeda fits this pattern. the actions of groups like Al-Qaeda reflect some of the key attributes of balancing. but their actions are of a kind frequently found in international politics: the use of violence against a state(s) to attain clearly defined political objectives. the Bush adminis. But that is not why the US is a target for Islamic terrorists. After all. The Bush administration’s deliberate fabrications were designed to win Congressional and public support for a prolonged ‘surge’. moreover. the administration said it would last through 2007.) Terrorist organisations like Al-Qaeda are non-state actors. of course. focused.
It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a could lead to a third world war.org.56 of 154 troop withdrawals from Iraq as an ‘aspirational goal’.ahram. 04 – Al-Ahram political analyst (Mohamed. but based on the positions taken by Senator Barak Obama (D.eg/2004/705/op5. This between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights.istration’s overall policy in the Middle East has inflamed anti-American sentiment.istration will do about the US presence in Iraq is an open question. military presence in Iraq for some time to come.) during the 2008 US presidential campaign. staying in Iraq will exacerbate it. Instead of solving this problem. No. The admin. it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living.) and Senator John McCain (R. tensions different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. Ill. Ariz. the presence of US troops in Iraq and the Middle East increases it by reinforcing the widespread perception in the Islamic world that the US is pursuing a neo-colonial policy in the Middle East in furtherance of its own imperial ambitions.” Al Ahram Weekly. Societies would close in on themselves. The huge US politico-military footprint in the Middle East region – including Iraq – is. along with America’s policy on the Israel/Palestinian issue. August/September 1. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. “Extinction!. 705. The impact is extinction Sid-Ahmed. we will all be losers. and turned the entire region into a source of recruits for various radical terrorist groups. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another. http://weekly.53 What the new US admin. the primary driver of Middle Eastern terrorism. from which no one will war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet. it seems certain that there will be a significant American Instead of reducing American vulnerability to terrorism. emerge victorious.htm) What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails. this .
it must detach that drive from its imperial ambitions. Secretary General of Arab Thought Forum.htm) Any incoming US president must bear in mind several lessons from the lean years of the Bush presidency. Secretary General. Jordan. Arab Thought Forum. The American insistence on pursuing its project of global hegemony behind the guise of the war on terror was ultimately detrimental to both causes. if the US intends to deal seriously with a drive to end terrorism.” http://weekly.eg/2008/915/op1. Al-Ahram Weekly Online. Amman. The first is that it is dangerous to link terrorism. with imperial ambitions. The hegemonic project is on the verge of collapse after the US has been sapped of enormous resources while terrorism has become more widespread. . 08 (Hassan Nafaa. which poses a real threat not just to one society or country.Terrorism Heg can’t solve terrorism. 9/24/08.org.ahram. “Collapse of Empire. In the future.57 of 154 Heg Fails . Nafaa.
D. and dissuading Washington from using its military muscle against them.S. and even culture are popular in these countries. The use of asymmetric strategies to oppose American power – especially in the Middle East where US policy has an imperial dimension – illustrates the dictum that empires inevitably provoke resistance. Finally.asp?id=2182. literary and national editor of the Atlantic. 5/25/9. targets. asymmetric strategies are another type of non. interventionist foreign policy toward the Middle East is not. It is too bad that Rev. Cambridge Journals. in Public Policy from George Washington University and Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute. Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute. .org/newsroom/article. these states seek other methods of offsetting American power. May 5. When employed by states. foreign policy causes blowback terrorism against the United States? Again. Ph. Terrorism is another asymmetric strategy – one employed by non-state actors like Al-Qaeda and similar jihadist groups – to resist US dominance.S. political and economic freedoms. however.independent. empirical studies have linked U. WMD – especially the possession of nuclear weapons – is one way these states can level the strategic playing field and deter the US from attacking them. Because they are threatened by the US. http://www. but U. foreign policy is being thrown out with his other wacky and bigoted ravings. “Reverend Wright Is Not Totally Wrong”. the facts are on his side. the chickens would not be roosting as much in the U. Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute. foreign occupation and military interventions with blowback terrorism against the U. Wright’s remarks is that if the United States militarily intervened less overseas.) But what about Wright’s implication that U. Bin Laden has repeatedly said that he attacks the United States because of its occupation of Muslim lands and its support for corrupt Middle Eastern governments. The upshot of Rev. “America’s Middle East grand strategy after Iraq: the moment for offshore balancing has arrived”. Review of International Studies (2009).S. Wright’s largely correct analysis of U.S. henhouse. technology. Heg causes terror – empirics and polls Eland 8 (Ivan. Regional powers – especially those on the US hit list like Iran and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq – cannot slug it out toe-to-toe against the US’ dominant hightech conventional forces. Poll after poll in the Arab/Islamic world indicates that U. asymmetric strategies mean the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities.S.58 of 154 XTN: Terrorism Heg causes terror Layne 9 (Layne.S.S.) In addition to soft balancing.traditional balancing that is being employed to contest US primacy.
Summer 2008. the Soviet rival is in the dustbin of history. Because conventional and nuclear military power have very little utility in stopping terrorist attacks and because the United States has an open society. practicing military restraint. Retaliation for US interventionism in the Arab-Muslim world is al Qaeda’s primary motive for attacking the United States. and even culture but hate US meddling in their world. would make Americans safer at home.59 of 154 AT: Heg Solves Terror Terrorists aren’t deterred by military power because it falls out of asymmetric power calculations Eland 08 senior fellow at the Independent Institute (ivan. The only type of attack that cannot be deterred by the US nuclear arsenal is that from terrorists — as was demonstrated on 9/11. Thus. Specifically. Naturally. at least a plausible argument could be made for some [End Page 94] US intervention overseas to counter Soviet encroachment. homeland security efforts will likely have only limited effect. it sabotages it. the utmost effort should be made to capture or kill bin Laden and eradicate al Qaeda. with thousands of miles of borders and many possible targets. Poll after poll in the Muslim world indicates that Muslims like US political and economic freedoms. Back to the Future: Rediscovering America’s Foreign Policy Traditions During the Cold War. rather than interventionism. Protecting its citizens and property should be the first goal of any government. Number 3. non-Muslim — occupation of Muslim lands and meddling in their politics by supporting corrupt dictators and Israel. Osama bin Laden’s biggest gripes are with US — that is. technology. Mediterranean Quarterly Volume 19. Empire does not equal security — in fact. But the Cold War is long over. . but in the long term the only way to effectively deal with anti – United States terrorism is to reduce the motivation of terrorists to attack America in the first place. but the US quest for an informal global empire actually undermines this objective. and the gains from interventionism have been drastically reduced while the costs have skyrocketed. in the short term.
Transnational threats. Non-state actors .org/pub_display. we are likely to be far more successful at meeting the new global threats. August 13. 2003 [Cato Reports. money. After the second world war. In the place of geopolitics. 45 no. b) Relations Key To Solve Disease Breakout Steinberg 3 James B.from business and NGOs to terrorists and money-launderers . the Germans down and the Americans in. people and ideas facilitate the spread of economic opportunity . During the 20th century. 2. in almost every case. p.led it to establish its own hegemony over western Europe. There is a well-known quip that Nato was created to keep the Russians out. than if we try to achieve these goals alone. It is more accurate to say that America's commitment to the Atlantic alliance is about staying on top . Ocean and land barriers offer little protection. The struggle for supremacy has been a feature of US-European relations since America emerged as a great power in the late 19th century. Survival. Weak states threaten our security as much as powerful ones.but also foster the proliferation of technology for weapons of mass destruction.60 of 154 Bad – US-EU Relations a) Hegemony hurts US-EU relations Layne 3 Christopher Layne. 2003 [The Brookings Institution. and preserving our freedom and prosperity.and keeping the Europeans apart. 113-46] Both the United States and Europe face new global threats and opportunities that. . Vice President and Director. the US fought two large wars in Europe to stop a hegemonic Germany from threatening America's backyard.cato. vol. This is because American hegemony remains the cause of the rift. a new ‘global politics’ is required to address the threats and opportunities that affect us all.php?pub_id=6001] Major combat operations in Iraq ended in April but the transatlantic rupture between the US and "old" Europe triggered by the war has not healed. from terrorism and international crime to environmental damage and disease pose an increasing danger to our well being. Porous borders and the extraordinary global flows of goods. not cold-war ideology . If we can work together. can be dealt with far more successfully if we act together. Summer. Foreign Policy Studies.play an increasingly influential role. http://www. writer at the Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute in Washington. Steinberg. America's strategic ambitions - based primarily on economic self-interest.
During the 20th century. military capabilities outside Nato's aegis. not cold-war ideology . http://www.cato. 2003 [Cato Reports. one that does not presume that the United States will retain its hegemonic position in perpetuity. the Bush administration is playing a game of divide and rule to undermine the EU's sense of common purpose.cato. and the concomitant power imbalance between the United States and Europe.org/pub_display. It has encouraged the expansion of Nato and the EU in the hope that the new members from central and eastern Europe will keep in check Franco-German aspirations for a counterweight to American power.cato. Hegemony has forced an inevitable struggle between the US and the EU Layne 3 Christopher Layne. 2003 [Cato Reports.61 of 154 XTN: US-EU Relations Hegemony will worsen us-eu relations Layne 3 Christopher Layne.org/pub_display.based primarily on economic self-interest. . After the second world war. http://www.org/pub_display.led it to establish its own hegemony over western Europe. Washington is trying to derail the EU's plans to create.php?pub_id=6001] The real source of transatlantic conflict is America’s role as a global hegemon.php?pub_id=6001] The struggle for supremacy has been a feature of US-European relations since America emerged as a great power in the late 19th century. writer at the Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute in Washington. America's strategic ambitions . through the European Security and Defence Policy. Unless and until America’s foreign policy elites adopt a new foreign policy vision. the US fought two large wars in Europe to stop a hegemonic Germany from threatening America's backyard. Washington has tried to hamper the EU's moves towards political unity and strategic self-sufficiency. relations between the United States and its European allies will only continue to worsen. http://www.php?pub_id=6001] Unsurprisingly. writer at the Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute in Washington. More generally. August 13. US hegemony undermines EU stability Layne 3 Christopher Layne. The eventual rupture arising from this long-simmering dispute may ultimately prove damaging to security on both sides of the Atlantic. writer at the Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute in Washington. August 13. August 13. 2003 [Cato Reports.
75.S. the European police have been acting in a perfectly Hobbesian manner.S. Winter. The war on transnational terrorism depends essentially on information gathering and policing. has already tempted Moscow to resume its earlier pressure on Georgia and Azerbaijan to abandon their aspirations for inclusion in the Euro-Atlantic community and to step up its efforts to undermine any enduring U. Proquest] While Russia has not stood in the way of any decisive U.-EU strategic collaboration with regard to Iraq and Iran. The home front and the foreign front have now been disconcertingly blurred.62 of 154 Relations Good Relations with EU are key to solve terrorism Holmes 3 Stephen Holmes. 21] The September 11 attacks were partly planned. 2003-2004 [“Hegemonic Quicksand”. That would make it more difficult for the United States to engage the Central Asian states in a larger regional effort to combat Islamic fundamentalism in Afghanistan and Pakistan. despite his pose as a no-nonsense realist. They can perform essential tasks of monitoring. But acting together-with the threat of U. military power reinforced by the EU's political.S. arresting scores of suspected terrorists. These risks could be lessened by closer U. not to mention the cleavage between America and Europe as well as the increased American-Iranian tensions. In other words. As daily press reports also reveal. Kagan has apparently failed to realize the degree to which the contours of American national security have been redrawn since 9-11. despite the prevailing cliche. That may not be easy to achieve. the current geopolitical earthquake in the Persian Gulf could jeopardize America's efforts to consolidate the independence of the Caspian Basin states. For the United States. American preoccupation with the mess in Iraq. organized and financed in Europe. The Muslim diaspora communities into which terrorist cells can invisibly blend remain the likeliest staging grounds for future al-Qaeda attacks on the United States. given divergent American and European perspectives. US-EU relations are key to preventing Russia war Brzezinski 4 Zbigniew Brzezinski. and in these respects the Europeans are anything but security pygmies. disruption and apprehension for which our own unrivaled military machine is patently inadequate. p. Former Diplomat at Johns Hopkins & CSIS. financial and (to some degree) military support-the Euro-Atlantic community could foster a genuinely stable and possibly even democratic post-Saddam regime.S. Europe remains a frontline region in the war against terrorism just as it was in the war against communism. In other words. for the European Union. A resurgence of Muslim extremism of the Taliban variety could then even acquire a regional scope. it would mean less opportunity for self-serving inaction. The National Interest. political and military presence in Central Asia. National-security strategy must now operate in a domain where soldiering and policing have become of coequal importance. a joint approach would mean less freedom of unilateral action. but the benefits of cooperation outweigh the costs of any compromise. Europeans’ linguistic skills and cultural knowledge alone ensure that they can make indispensable contributions to U. This profound change helps us understand the erroneous premise of Bush’s foreign policy. Their capacities to respond effectively to today’s greatest security threats easily rival those of the United States. 2003 [“AMERICAN PROSPECT”. the United States is not the world’s only superpower.S. . security. military efforts to alter the strategic realities of the region. infiltration. iss. In our new security environment. NYU Law School Professor.
No.edu/MichaelMcIntyre/Papers/535440/When_Hegemony_Fails) Even when the ruling alliances of colonial India or the Brazil of Empire and Old Republic were not threatened with dissolution. Social Movements.cato-at-liberty.S. specializing in Critical IR Theory. the international economy is complex and resilient. Military Power: Preeminence for however. http://depaul. Western Political Science Association. logic of hegemonic stability theory from the very beginning. Hegemony fails—obstacles to inclusionary policies.63 of 154 Doesn’t Solve War Heg doesn’t solve war Christopher Preble (director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute) August 2010 “U. and the costs of mitigating their effects should be borne by those who stand to lose — or gain — the most. But while there are credible alternatives to the United States serving in its current dual role as world policeman / armed social worker. Some scholars. but hardly comparable to the threat posed by a globe-straddling Soviet Union armed with thousands of nuclear weapons. were put down with a brutality that frequently . and indeed.org/u-s-military-power-preeminence-for-what-purpose/ Most in Washington still embraces the notion that America is.) During the cold war the United States dictated the terms of adjustment. And although the United States remains a dominant international economic player in absolute terms. 2011. and the very success of the U. “When Hegemony Fails: British Imperialism in India and Brazil from the Nineteenth to the Early Twentieth Centuries”. The tangible benefits of all this military spending flow disproportionately to this tiny corner of the United States while the schlubs in fly-over country pick up the tab. It derived the necessary leverage because it provided for the security of its economic partners and because there were no viable alter natives to an economic order centered on the United States. and call on other countries to play a larger role in their own defense. World Politics 61. The United States. U. Supply disruptions are likely to be temporary. Islamic extremists are scary. The United States may continue to act its own way. questioned the What Purpose?” http://www. but it can no longer count on getting its own way. their "success" was based on the exclusion of the vast majority of the populations of India and Brazil. no longer enjoys the same type of security leverage it once possessed. but from the life of civil society. notwithstanding its preponderant power. April 21. it is unrealistic to expect that a new spasm of global conflict would erupt if the United States were to modestly refocus its efforts. The claim that the United States is unipolar is a statement about its cumulative economic. and in the security of their respective regions. dominance in the international security arena no longer translates into effective leverage in the international economic arena. Trade routes need not be policed by a single dominant power. That exclusion was enforced through everyday brutality. The people here have grown accustomed to living at the center of the earth.-centered world economy has afforded America’s supporters a greater range of international and domestic economic options. military.1 But preponderant capabilities across the board do not guarantee effective influence in any given arena. the world’s indispensable nation. A number continue to do so today. episodic and frequently diagnosed as criminal. Many factors have contributed to the dramatic decline in the number of wars between nationstates. after the cold war it has found itself more vulnerable and constrained than it was during the golden economic era after World War II. They advance arguments diametrically at odds with the primacist consensus. Heg doesn’t solve war – US lacks influence it used to have to influence conflicts Mastanduno 9 (Michael. International Political Economy (Michael. McIntyre 11—Professor at Depaul University.academia. Ebsco. while their eruptions into the political sphere. of the universe. the foreign policy establishment in Washington has no interest in exploring them. and forever will be. draw down its military power. and other capabilities. Professor of Government at Dartmouth. 1.S. It faces rising economic challengers with their own agendas and with greater discretion in international economic policy than America’s cold war allies had enjoyed.S. It is frankly absurd that we spend more today to fight Osama bin Laden and his tiny band of murderous thugs than we spent to face down Joseph Stalin and Chairman Mao. After the cold war the outcome of adjustment struggles is less certain because the United States is no longer in a position to dictate the terms. not only from the pact of domination or a share in political power.
January 22. To understand this yearning for American policy of yore. a poor vagrant steals to survive. 2010. the Santals of eastern India rise up to expel "outsiders" (diku). It did nothing to slow China’s influence. Not so. who reveals a perverse nostalgia for the previous paradigm in his recent writings in which he argues that the Obama administration is formulating foreign policy from a perspective that accepts. the decline of American power. In India. however restrictively defined. There is no reason to think of such activity as other than criminal. rather than fights. could maintain its pretense only by rigidly excluding dark-skinned lower classes from political participation.S. then.C. you have to remember that American foreign policy leaders during the Bush administration clung to the false promise of primacy. But the proof is in the pudding.S. Senior political scientist at RAND Corporation. there are no channels for such an appeal to be made. The primary effect of the failure of cultural hegemony.39 Its categories of friend and foe are improvised. Negation and reversal rather than programmatic reform are its common idiom. And it wrecked. National Security Council at the White House (Nina. the primacy strategy didn’t deliver. a politics often read as criminality by the dominant. This misreading of the politics of the dominated is not a simple misreading. though some common features can be found in both contexts. The Next American Century: How the U. Hachigan 10—Senior Fellow at American Progress. always at pains (with little success) to present itself to the world as a European civilization in the tropics. A fixation on primacy paradoxically managed to undermine the influence and authority . Director of the RAND Center for Asia Pacific Policy. but also localized and evanescent. in the epoch when the ruling alliances of Brazil and India were beginning to come apart. as was its implicit goal. workers in the most heavily industrialized cities in both countries managed to gouge out a space for public contestation that they never gave back. Can Thrive As Other Powers Rise.org/blog/2010/01/22/the-false-promise-of-primacy-in-us-foreignpolicy/9372/) One unquestionable success of the Obama administration so far has been to turn the page on the failed Bush foreign policy framework. 77-83). It did not prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons." subject to group sanction. Such criminality/resistance is recurrent and endemic. and changing. however. with Moscow’s help. “The False Promise of Primacy in US Foreign Policy”. Primacy tempted our leaders into a reckless war in Iraq. both British and Hindu (Guha 1983. fixed margin. fluid. is one response to subordination. International affairs fellowship from the Council on Foreign Relations. political activity with broader aims tends to take the form of public and communal resistance: a prophetic community gathers in the Brazilian sertão (Cunha 87 1944). is not that it destabilizes political regimes but that it creates substantial obstacles to the creation of inclusionary polities. a small landowner turns to banditry when forced off his land by a larger landowner.64 of 154 crossed into blood lust. who was able to incorporate relatively well-off peasants into a powerful political alliance. so long as we remember that it is criminality with a distinctly limited political purpose. pressed for a deepening of the pact of domination to include an idealized sturdy yeoman peasantry alongside the large landowners who had previously formed their core 86group of allies. In the absence of channels for demands of inclusion. The excluded are therefore left with a politics of resistance. where some members of the I. In the end. with substantial geographical divergence and uneven enforcement. Not only would a call for incorporation be rebuffed. the belief that the lynchpin of American security was for it to remain more powerful than all other countries by a huge. in Brazil through vagrancy statutes and the criminalization of certain aspects of Afro-Brazilian life. Mona Sutphen and I described why this was a misguided strategy in our 2008 book. in India through the designation of certain groups as "criminal tribes. the reforms in property law needed to carry out such a project were enacted in weakened form after delays of decades. Despite this stringently exclusionary polity. Subordinate groups therefore have little incentive to press for incorporation into the existing alliance. http://worldfocus. villagers riot to call attention to a corrupt local official. says Robert Kagan. Criminal activity. our relationship with Russia. it was Gandhi. The "dangerous classes" at the bottom of the social hierarchy faced routine criminal sanction. World Focus. In the end. both because the range of loyalties it can mobilize is geographically restricted and because its attention to signs at the expense of strategy. It is normally a response with limited aims: slaves kill a harsh overseer. It is a selflimiting form of resistance. not the British. Hegemony fails—recent political climate proves. Brazil.
pivotal powers and demand responsibility from them on global challenges Reinvigorate and repair existing alliances Reengage with international institutions and rules. Fortunately. National Security Council at the White House (Nina. Director of the RAND Center for Asia Pacific Policy. China has agreed to limit its carbon intensity. Obama elaborated on his view of great power relations. any world order that tries to elevate one nation or group of people over another will inevitably fail. saying.65 of 154 America did have. Kagan writes as if the Obama administration is engaging with re-emerging powers to prove an ideological point that great power strife is a relic of history. The pursuit of power is no longer a zero-sum game — progress must be shared. President Barack Obama’s approach is different. Senior political scientist at RAND Corporation.” Later. as Kagan would imply. India. but of seeking common cause. Russia. Moreover. America needs Russia to secure its loose nuclear materials so terrorists cant get it. His political allies and his detractors can agree that Obama sees foreign policy not in terms of asserting America’s unparalleled might.” Hegemony fails—cooperation is key to prevent terrorism. sanctions . Transnational threats also explain why the Obama administration is taking international institutions seriously. And America needs India to help track extremists. nuclear proliferation. Yet no staffer that I have ever spoken with would suggest that these relationships are beyond rivalry. and pandemics such as swine flu — the forces of disorder that can and do affect Americans right here at home. for the first time last year. in Moscow. On the one-year mark of his presidency. “a great power does not show strength by dominating or demonizing other countries…[G]iven our interdependence. America needs all of them to contain pandemics. nuclear proliferation. “Our power alone cannot protect us. knowing that democratic government is the best way to achieve this goal As for primacy. America needs China — the world’s largest emitter — to cut down on its carbon. buttering up autocracies and forsaking our democratic allies. the fact that the Bush administration embraced the notion of primacy was a comfort to the remaining Cold Warriors. Kagan’s analyses fail to discuss two major developments that demand a new approach—the increased potency of transnational threats and the new salience of domestic policy in America’s world standing. It’s still early days. including with other major powers. pushing for increased accountability Make basic political and economic rights available to more people. More importantly. 2010. focusing on how “to adjust” to the decline in American primacy instead of trying to reverse it. international architecture and traditional alliances are not mutually exclusive. China not only voted for tough U. Obama dismissed that as a strategy goal in his inaugural address when he observed. global warming. these partnerships are necessary to protect Americans from common threats in terrorists. How can we get these big. Kagan barely mentions these threats. The World Health Organization led the battle against swine flu last year just as the International Monetary Fund bailed out a slew of countries headed toward financial ruin. “The False Promise of Primacy in US Foreign Policy”.N. Kagan does not reveal the Obama administration’s reasons for pursuing strategic collaborations with China. economic crises. the contours of the new paradigm are fairly clear: Lead the world in addressing shared challenges Treat other governments and peoples — friends and foes — with respect Forge strategic collaborations with big. World Focus. And. Nevertheless. It’s not because the president is looking to attend more international meetings. proud countries to take these steps? Aggressive diplomacy. to say the least. http://worldfocus. He portrays administration officials as naïve ideologues. January 22. Hachigan 10—Senior Fellow at American Progress. but the Obama approach is paying dividends. but to keep its own people safe. global warming. In fact.org/blog/2010/01/22/the-false-promise-of-primacy-in-us-foreignpolicy/9372/) Robert Kagan now accuses President Obama of reorienting American foreign policy away from its WWII and Cold War roots. economic crises. it’s because international rules and institutions play a vital coordinating role when threats cross borders. International affairs fellowship from the Council on Foreign Relations. and pandemics. and other pivotal powers.
unable to prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons in the first place. provocative way that ends up being counterproductive. have been disastrous. What Others Think. governments which serve only their own power do not. The United States has been at war for a startling two out of every three years since 1989. And in our own history. http://www. rendition and torture over the past decade. but it’s on the way.C. Washington has worked overtime—with no success—to shut down Iran’s uranium-enrichment capability for fear that it might lead to Tehran acquiring nuclear weapons. Governments that represent the will of their people are far less likely to descend into failed states. for example. subject their actions to oversight. in fruitless pursuit of victory. The pain and suffering inflicted on Iraq has been enormous. Here.” Russia has allowed the United States to transport supplies through its territory into Afghanistan. including on human rights and democracy. And these nations and others agreed during the darkest days of the financial crisis to coordinate their macroeconomic moves. to terrorize their citizens. Iran Review.7 million more have been internally displaced. December 22.htm) The results. Hegemony fails—resistance.iranreview. roughly 2 million Iraqis have left the country and 1. Kagan is simply wrong to suggest that administration officials have failed to “continue to press Russia and China for reform. Since the war began in March 2003. Finally. it also enforced them. or to wage war on others. The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. To make matters worse. and there is no end in sight. not to mention the weakening of the rule of law at home. just not in a grandstanding. despite all the phony talk about how the “surge” has worked in Iraq and how a similar strategy can produce another miracle in Afghanistan. co-chaired by the United States and Russia. all indicators are that this problem will deteriorate further as the West Bank and Gaza are incorporated into a Greater Israel.. “US Quest for Global Hegemony”. but Beijing and Moscow did recently join in a harsh rebuke that the International Atomic Energy Agency issued. now seems incapable of compelling Pyongyang to give them up. 2010. the American military is not going to win either one of these conflicts. including those we once waged war with in Europe and Asia– nations that today live with great security and prosperity. and allow for independent institutions are more dependable trading partners.” They have. As anyone with a rudimentary knowledge of world events knows. The unpleasant truth is that the United States is in a world of . Iran remains a challenge. shows that their fears were justified. every post– Cold War administration has tried and failed to settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. in contrast to Kagan’s assertion that the administration has failed to gain “any meaningful Chinese help in North Korea. Professor at the Pennsylvania State University School of International Affairs **CEO of Strategic Energy and Global Analysis (STRATEGA) and Senior Lecturer and Senior Research Fellow at Yale University’s Jackson Institute for Global Affairs (Flynt and Hillary.’ Washington’s pursuit of policies like assassination.66 of 154 against Pyongyang. is up and running again. Governments that promote the rule of law. Moreover. The United States has also been unable to solve three other major foreign-policy problems. more than one hundred thousand Iraqi civilians have been killed. A successor to the START treaty to reduce our arsenal of nuclear weapons is not yet complete. countries that continuously fight wars invariably build powerful national-security bureaucracies that undermine civil liberties and make it difficult to hold leaders accountable for their behavior. The Founding Fathers understood this problem. the United States is now engaged in protracted wars in Afghanistan and Iraq that have so far cost well over a trillion dollars and resulted in around forty-seven thousand American casualties. Leverette and Leverette 10—*Senior fellow at the New America Foundation in Washington. We may well be stuck in both quagmires for years to come. Of course. we continue to have differences with these pivotal powers. however. And the United States. as it clear from James Madison’s observation that ‘no nation can preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare. and they invariably end up adopting ruthless policies normally associated with brutal dictators. D. is what President Obama said in Moscow: The arc of history shows us that governments which serve their own people survive and thrive. democracies have been America’s most enduring allies.org/content/Documents/US_Quest_for_Global_Hegemony.
of course. but likely to backfire in dangerous ways if it relied too heavily on military force to achieve its ambitious agenda. as John points out. The best way for the United States to maximize the prospects of halting or at least slowing down the spread of nuclear weapons would be to stop threatening other countries because that gives them a compelling reason to acquire the ultimate deterrent. especially in the Middle East: “By pursuing this extraordinary scheme to transform an entire region at the point of a gun. or what might alternatively be called global hegemony. and this state of affairs is only likely to get worse in the next few years. a strategy of maintaining primacy is counterproductive when it comes to pivotal powers. But as long as America’s leaders remain committed to global dominance. and spreading democracy across the globe. The Bush administration’s quest for global dominance was based on a profound misunderstanding of the threat environment facing the United States after 9/11. interests. the United States rejected [various strategic alternatives]. so the more the better. The underlying belief is that new liberal democracies will be peacefully inclined and pro-American. One would think that such arrogance might alienate other states. While the fact of being the world’s only superpower has substantial benefits. Stanford Center for International Security. the strategy of primacy failed to deliver. which was not just doomed to fail. has largely embraced the same delusions of global dominance that got the United States into such trouble on the foreign-policy front under the Clinton and George W.” John warns that the Obama Administration. Bush took the quest for global dominance to new heights. after 9/11. With global dominance. is not “Fortress America” isolationism. But. they are likely to resist this advice and keep threatening states that will not follow Washington’s orders. This triumvirate of errors doomed Washington’s effort to dominate the globe. The Next American Century. no serious attempt is made to prioritize U. in effect. instead believing that other countries—save for so-called rogue states like Iran and North Korea—would see the United States as a benign hegemon serving their own interests. Bush administrations. which means making sure that the United States remains the most powerful state in the international system. Bush largely ran against the kind of liberal imperialism that Gore advocated and that the administration he served as Vice-President had practiced. a national security strategy based on suing and ratiaing primacy has not made America more secure. this means that Washington must care a lot about every country’s politics. and threatened its position in the world. but most American policy makers of the early nineties and beyond were confident that would not happen. on foreign policy issues. because they are virtually limitless. America still has not faced up to its most fundamental strategic choices in a post-Cold War world. Global dominance has two broad objectives: maintaining American primacy. And the president and his advisers overestimated what military force could achieve in the modern world. From the Clinton administration on. If America makes primacy the main goal of . and North Korea have become more dangerous in the last seven years. disease. undermined American values and institutions on the home front.67 of 154 trouble today on the foreign-policy front. making the world over in America’s image.” John reminds those of us who voted for George W. John Mearsheimer has given it an indispensable guide for thinking through those choices. Of course. Primacy does not prevent a global nuclear exchange or create regional stability Nina Hachigan and Monica Sutphen. not less. It was also a dismal failure. Bush over Al Gore in 2000 that. as Afghanistan and Iraq unravel and the blame game escalates to poisonous levels. before it developed hegemonic hubris. Iran. in turn greatly underestimating how difficult it would be to spread democracy in the Middle East. John points out that “the Bush administration’s fondness for threatening to attack adversaries (oftentimes with the additional agenda of forced democratization) encouraged nuclear proliferation. Iraq. for all its talk of “change”. or proliferation. its proponents believe that the United States has the right as well as the responsibility to interfere in the politics of other countries.” John is equally clear when it comes to diagnosing the source of America’s “world of trouble” on the foreign-policy front: “The root cause of America’s troubles is that it adopted a flawed grand strategy after the Cold War. p. 168-9 In practice. instead pursuing global dominance. It is a posture he describes as “offshore balancing”—which is actually the United States’ traditional approach to grand strategy. Worse than being ineffec tive with transnational threats and smaller powers. America’s military might has not been the answer to terrorism. climate change. The alternative.S. 2008.” In this vein. This grand strategy is ‘imperial’ at its core. President Bush adopted a radical grand strategy that has no parallel in American history.
for the most part. They do not. Haass. accordingly. people. services. U. it surely has.S. . then why shouldn’t the pivotal powers do the same? A goal of primacy signals that sheer strength is most critical to security.S.68 of 154 its national security strategy. but this has tended to lead more to denunciations (and an absence of cooperation) than outright resistance. May/June 2008 .html?mode=print The fact that classic great-power rivalry has not come to pass and is unlikely to arise anytime soon is also partly a result of the United States' behavior. Council on Foreign Relations.flows in which the United States plays a critical role. acted in a manner that has led other states to conclude that the United States constitutes a threat to their vital national interests. This is not to say that the United States under the leadership of George W. decline has not produced hegemonic rivalry because the U. http://www. investment. is not perceived as a threat. and technology -. Doubts about the wisdom and legitimacy of U. A further constraint on the emergence of great-power rivals is that many of the other major powers are dependent on the international system for their economic welfare and political stability.org/20080501faessay87304/richard-n-haass/the-age-ofnonpolarity. Bush has not alienated other nations. energy. want to disrupt an order that serves their national interests. Foreign Affairs . President.foreignaffairs. But it has not. American cannot trumpet its desire to dominate the world military and then question why China is modernizing its military. Integration into the modern world dampens great-power competition and conflict. Those interests are closely tied to cross-border flows of goods.S. foreign policy are pervasive. nor do other powers want to challenge the status quo Richard N. which has not stimulated such a response.
understandable doubts about the credibility of U. Rather than fostering peace and stability in Eurasia.S. hegemony is fated to end in the next decade or two regardless of U. U. . Is it worthwhile paying the price to hang onto unipolarity for.S. In this changing geopolitical context. contrary to my 1993 prediction. it is even more doubtful that U.another two decades? Given that American hegemony is destined to end sooner rather than later and that the costs of trying to "shape the international system" to America's liking will rise (even as the benefits of doing so diminish). America's military commitments abroad have become a source of insecurity for the United States. Although the United States. which. The United States can do this by adopting an offshore balancing grand strategy. hegemony will endure until the early 2030s.at best. because they carry the risk of entrapping the United States in great power Eurasian wars. is leading to a reversion to multipolarity. probably will not be challenged by great power rivals as early as 2010. As other states—notably China—rapidly close the gap. in turn. it doubtless is true that it will take some time for others' balancing efforts to realize their intended outcome. The answer to this assertion is that the risks and costs of American grand strategy are growing. and the strategy is not likely to work much longer in any event. Maintaining heg even just to shape the new multipolar system causes backlash and war – only a complete transition away solves Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 158 At the same time. it would make more sense grand strategically for the United States to retrench and husband its resources for the long haul. the costs of trying to hold on to hegemony are high and going to become higher. security guarantees are driving creeping re-nationalization by America's Eurasian allies. efforts to prolong it. At the same time.S.69 of 154 Clinging to Power -> War Mulitpolarity is inevitable – trying to retain hegemony ensures a war-filled transition Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 190 Advocates of hegemony claim that it is illusory to think that the United States can retract its military power safely from Eurasia.S.
Europe. American grand strategy should focus on making both Europe and East Asia less reliant on U. Issue 2 “The Rise of Europe. power. The ultimate vision that should guide U. while at the same time working with major states in both regions to promote collective management of the global system. 00323195. these distributional implications haunt the literature and cast decline as inescapable and continuous Withdrawal is smooth Charles A. Kupchan. but it's a good bet that some will. These major powers would together manage developments and regulate relations both within and among their respective regions. The United States has only limited power to affect the amount of war and peace in the international system. Summer 2003. or even benefit somewhat. Vol. Finally.S. not just the hegemon. Hence. closure.S. Snidal opened up the possibility that a more symmetrical distribution of power might enhance the prospects for the provision of public goods.S. and still find the postwar environment quite costly to its own trade and investment. Primacy” Database: Academic Search Premier As this new century progresses. military intervention in Eurasia. as it does on the size of other actors in the international system. proponents of American hegemony overestimate the amount of influence that the United States has on the international system. unipolarity will give way to a world of multiple centers of power. security and interests inevitably will be jeopardized by a Eurasian hegemon.e. The likelihood for cooperation increases with American decline because the hegemon can no longer singlehandedly provide the good as it declines. forces in Eurasia.S. to disguise ulterior motives for U. distilled to its essence.S. By paying attention to the size of all Great Powers.S.S. As this transition proceeds. Political Science Quarterly. This threat is easily exaggerated. the outcomes are going to be caused more by those states' calculations of their interests than by the presence of U..S. If one were to use Snidal’s production function in the revised model (i. But regardless of whether Eurasian great powers remain at peace. Second. First. the waning hegemon continues to be taken advantage of. by plugging the numbers from his production function into the revised model).70 of 154 Collapse =/= War Your evidence overestimates the US’s ability to shape the international system – doesn’t contain conflict and wont shape the new multipolar system Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 176-7 A second contention advanced by proponents of American hegemony is that the United States cannot withdraw from Eurasia because a great power war there could shape the post conflict international system in ways harmful to U. As mentioned at the outset of this chapter. they could bring to power militaristic or totalitarian regimes. Mere. grand strategy is the construction of a concertlike directorate of the major powers in North America. There are numerous possible geopolitical rivalries in Eurasia. the possible benefits of "environment shaping" have to be weighed against the possible costs of U. the United States "could suffer few economic losses during a war. 50 Keohane and Snidal’s predictions – that the waning of American power did not have to jeopardize cooperation – were in this context reassuring. as well as economic. interests. this argument is a restatement of the fear that U. America's Changing Internationalism. a struggle that will require patience and . They would also coordinate efforts in the battle against terrorism. Transition is smooth – decline in power causes global cooperation Carla Norrlof (an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto) 2010 “America’s Global Advantage US Hegemony and International Cooperation” p."sa This really is not an economic argument but rather an argument about the consequences of Eurasia's political and ideological. involvement in a big Eurasian war. thus offering a potential explanation for the otherwise puzzling persistence of cooperation in the 1980s despite America’s relative decline. and the End of U. several points need to be made. and manipulated. While Snidal was modeling a theory he did not believe in. and whatever influence it does have is being eroded by the creeping multipolarization under way in Eurasia. so smaller states have to chip in for the good to be provided.40 Snidal demonstrated that collective action depends as much on the hegemon’s size. Keohane explained the persistence of cooperation in terms of states’ continued demand for regimes. and East Asia. Proponents of hegemony fear that if great power wars in Eurasia occur. Most of these will not culminate in war. 118.
if not two.[*] . Regional centers of power also have the potential to facilitate the gradual incorporation of developing nations into global flows of trade. North America might. But the decisions taken by the United States early in the twenty-first century will play a critical role in determining whether multipolarity reemerges peacefully or brings with it the competitive jockeying that has so frequently been the precursor to great power war in the past. focus on Latin America. will find the transition an easy one. therefore. and Africa. Neither American leaders. Mustering the political will and the foresight to pursue this vision will be a formidable task.71 of 154 steady cooperation among many different nations. long accustomed to calling the shots. long accustomed to passing the buck. for a new international system to evolve. Strong and vibrant regional centers. the Middle East. Europe on Russia. The United States will need to begin ceding influence and autonomy to regions that have grown all too comfortable with American primacy. and values. It will take a decade. But it is far wiser and safer to get ahead of the curve and shape structural change by design than to find unipolarity giving way to a chaotic multipolarity by default. for reasons of both proximity and culture. and East Asia on South Asia and Southeast Asia. nor leaders in Europe and East Asia. often have the strongest incentives to promote prosperity and stability in their immediate peripheries. information.
“Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment”. which makes comparison among groups difficult. and Joseph.60 In addition.72 of 154 Retrenchment Good Historically. even with the benefit of hindsight. and their disputes tended to escalate to lower levels of hostility than the baseline category (see figure 2). International Security Spring 2011.68 These findings suggest the need for a fundamental revision to the pessimist’s argument regarding the war proneness of declining powers. two did not. Pages 7-44. a significant majority of great powers of differing regime types elected to retrench. Short of a miracle. International Security Spring 2011. the predictions of retrenchment pessimists receive little support. Democracies account for about two-thirds of the great powers in our study. and recovery of lost rank was fairly frequent. we find that great powers facing acute relative decline adopted retrenchment in at least eleven and at most fifteen of the eighteen cases. Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami. great powers experiencing medium or small declines are much less likely to escalate their disputes to high levels of hostility. 4. Pages 7-44. even if retrenchment was not successful. it is hard to say what great powers such as Britain. Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami. There are only three cases of autocracy. declining states refrain from initiating and escalating military disputes.61 In many cases of decline. Nor do declining great powers appear more vulnerable to external predation than other great powers. and Joseph. Vol. Wars. Declining great powers found themselves embroiled in an interstate war in only four of the eighteen cases. In particular. 4. do not appear to be a common fate for declining states. Nor does the evidence support the view that domestic interests constrain retrenchment. Retrenchment is preferable – empirically averages fewer wars than unipolar world MacDonald and Parent 11 (Paul. Vol. 35. No. seven retrenched. Moreover. declining power don`t go to war – when they do. Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College.69 Far from being more likely to lash out aggressively. a range of 61–83 percent. Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College. and are slightly more likely to face acute relative declines.7 fewer militarized disputes in the five years following ordinal change compared with other great powers over similar periods. declining great powers that adopted a policy of retrenchment managed to rebound. preventive or otherwise. the rate of relative decline is associated with different levels of hostility across militarized disputes. or the Soviet Union could have done to stay aloft. this does not prove that a preferable policy existed. In contrast to arguments that retrenchment is rare. declining great powers demonstrate more caution and restraint in the use of force: they were involved in an average of 1. yielding parameters from 58 to 83 percent. producing a range of 67–100 percent.67 Declining great powers also initiated fewer militarized disputes. In the five years following an ordinal transition. a majority of the countries in these cases retrenched shortly after their ordinal transition. eventually recovering their ordinal rank from the state that surpassed them. accounting for thirteen of our eighteen cases.59 In short. Every one of the great powers in our sample that chose to retrench did so within five years of the ordinal transition. or 72 percent. wars aren’t global MacDonald and Parent 11 (Paul. 35. Of the twelve democracies. and three are debatable. These findings suggest that retrenching states rarely courted disaster and occasionally regained their prior position. there does not appear to be a strong connection between regime type and retrenchment. but of these. No. This may be because external predators have great difficulty assessing the vulnerability of potential victims. France. there are few restorative solutions available. By any accounting. politics is often a game of unpalatable alternatives. and in only one of these cases—1935 United Kingdom—did the declining power go to war with the power that had just surpassed it in ordinal rank. Moreover. Further. evidence at the coarse-grained level tentatively supports the neorealist approach outlined above: during acute relative decline. in six of fifteen cases. This suggests timely responses to external constraints rather than domestic intransigence. two retrenched and one case is arguable.) AK Based on our universe of cases. “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment”.) AK With regard to militarized disputes. or because retrenchment allows vulnerable powers to effectively recover from decline and still deter potential challengers. states facing small declines experience levels of hostility in their militarized disputes that are two and a half .
credibility. compromise appears to be a crucial component of retreating to a more defensible—and credible—set of commitments. the rate of relative Second and related. which took place around 1872 and was resolved without armed confrontation. In particular. stakes world of great power politics. Yet our analysis suggests that retrenchment need not signal weakness. Both are large. Some observers might dispute our conclusions. Vol.) AK Contrary to these predictions. a fact that mitigates potential geopolitical competition. 35. Some might view this prospect with apprehension. Pages 7-44. Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College. No. “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment”. Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami. Strategic retrenchment peaceful – leads to a balanced multipolar world MacDonald and Parent 11 (Paul. states can seldom afford to fool themselves or pamper parochial interests when relative power is perilously slipping away. In the high- . 4. International Security Spring 2011. Third. 4. Based on the historical track record of great powers facing acute relative decline. possess more extensive overseas commitments. and recovering hegemons may be influential because they can play a pivotal role in alliance formation. similar factors may work to cushion the impending SinoAmerican transition. and work to decrease costly international commitments.) AK This article has advanced three main arguments. These findings suggest that diplomatic moderation and compromise can be a particularly attractive strategy for managing moderate declines.S. International Security Spring 2011. shift burdens to its allies. hegemonic powers should actually find it easier to manage acute relative decline. The tenor of that transition may have been influenced by a number of factors: both states were democratic maritime empires. declining great powers react in a prompt and proportionate manner to their dwindling fortunes. almost by definition. Although China and the United States differ in regime type. 35. The last reversal at the pinnacle of power was the Anglo-American transition. the United States should be able to retrench in the coming decades. they should be able to more readily identify and eliminate extraneous burdens without exposing vulnerabilities or exciting domestic populations. the United States was slowly emerging from the Civil War. No.73 of 154 times less than the average great power. We counter that there are deductive and empirical reasons to doubt this argument. Retrenchment good – avoids violence and leads to a better state MacDonald and Parent 11 (Paul. Theoretically. they are no longer the top target for balancing coalitions. and Joseph. the United States is ripe to overhaul its military. Fallen hegemons still have formidable capability. First. “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment”. States often curtail their commitments and mellow their ambitions as they fall in the ranks of great powers. more defensible frontiers. which may complicate its ability to sustain its economic performance or engage in foreign policy adventurism. Further. our analysis suggests some grounds for optimism. It is likely to initiate and become embroiled in fewer militarized disputes than the average great power and to settle these disputes more amicably. In the next few years. Holding on to exposed and expensive commitments simply for the sake of one’s reputation is a greater geopolitical gamble than withdrawing to cheaper. retrenchment pessimists are incorrect when they suggest that retrenchment is an uncommon policy response to great power decline. arguing that hegemonic transitions are more conflict prone than other moments of acute relative decline. We believe the empirical record supports these conclusions. Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College. relatively secure continental great powers. and Joseph. Far from encouraging further predation. periods of hegemonic transition do not appear more conflict prone than those of acute decline. They do this for the same reason that they tend to seize opportunities to expand: international incentives are strong inducements. fearing the steady erosion of U. Pages 7-44. and Great Britain could likely coast on a large lead in domestic capital stock.93 China faces a variety of domestic political challenges. In addition. including strains among rival regions. which threatens grave harm to any state that tries to cross them. hegemonic powers. Vol. Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami.
Competition spurs states to improve themselves. and innovation fostered. and if done intelligently this makes states better. The historical record gives little cause for despair. increase reliance on allies. and refrain from using force in international disputes. Retrenchment has a bad reputation. it may be unwise to speak these conclusions too loudly. Although we make no claim that the rate of relative decline explains everything.74 of 154 decline explains not only the extent of retrenchment but also the form. . spending can be curbed. Of course. the more likely states are to reform their militaries. these findings suggest that retrenchment is an attractive strategy for dealing with great power decline. but our findings suggest its benefits are overlooked. The faster the rate of decline. interest groups controlled. Some of the invigorating effects of decline may depend on the pervasive pessimism it arouses. we suggest that our study represents a solid first cut and that domestic political factors loom too large in discussions of power transitions and hegemonic change. declining powers rise to the challenge of decline so well that they recapture their former glory with some regularity. Taken together. And there is a fair chance of rebound.
How do you improve Russia's situation in a world dominated by U. Taming American Power. many governments still value U. power? Or perhaps you are the prime minister of India.S. Professor of International Affairs.S. For the rest of the world. Harvard University. Bush has called part of an "axis of evil. Walt. and the political fortunes of Sharon and Blair depend on keeping these relationships strong. and your ideal world order is one in which no single state is dominant. economy. POLICYMAKERS have spent the past decade debating how best to wield American power. and the United States' global dominance is disquieting. September 05. Professor of International Affairs.org/stable/pdfplus/20031709. Consider Kim Jong I1. power and seek to use it to advance their own interests. You regard U.S. Basic security is at issue.org/stable/pdfplus/20031709. The time to worry is now.pdf) Proponents of a muscular U. Yet even Washington's close allies are now looking for ways to tame the United States' might.S. So is the health of the U. presidents.S. Professor of International Affairs. Walt. You face serious regional challengesincluding the rising power of China-but relations with Washington are sometimes prickly. Israel and the United Kingdom have long relied on their special relationships with the United States. foreign policy tend to portray anti Americanism as hostility toward American values or simple resentment of U. Can you take advantage of parallel U. much less improve his position. The United States will not and should not exit the world stage anytime soon.S.S. in the world . terrorist attacks demonstrated.S. http://www. given U. How do you deal with American power? This question is one for which every world leader must have an answer. firms declining in key overseas markets due to anti-American sentiment. 05 (Stephen M. Harvard University." and North Korea's entire GDP is only one-twentieth the size of the U. and they have devised numerous strategies to manage and limit it. So how can Kim stay in power. US dominance causes terrorism.S.S. Professor of International Affairs.S.S. the debate is over how best to deal with it. that you are the president of France. most important of all. President Bush has said that " America was targeted for attack because we're the brightest beacon of freedom . Taming American Power. for a moment. Harvard University.S. http://www. dominance... interests to advance those of India? Leaders throughout the world face similar issues. foreign policy as often naive and overweening. Many countries fear U.jstor. Harvard University. So what do you do about the United States? Now picture yourself as the president of Russia. some more daunting than others. To be sure. defense budget. Walt. 2001. He rules a country that George W. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and British Prime Minister Tony Blair have worked hard to establish personal connections with U. The only remnants of your country's former superpower status are an aging nuclear arsenal and membership in the UN Security Council. 05 (Stephen M.pdf) U. opposition and North Korea's Lilliputian status? On the other end of the spectrum. with the market share of U.S. by rebuilding its crumbling international image.75 of 154 Heg Turns (1/3) U. influence. But it must make its dominant position acceptable to others-by using military force sparingly. by fostering greater cooperation with key allies. and. Primacy causes other countries to try to “tame” America – 9/11 proves Walt.jstor. And the response of other states to U." He . as the September 11. September 05.S. power is something Americans must care about as well. With so much power in the hands of one country-a country that considers itself destined to lead the world how should other nations respond? Imagine.
" And the Pentagon's new National Defense Strategy.76 of 154 later explained. and resistance. issued in March. "Our leading position in the world will continue to breed unease." . were not protesting our policies. stated. They were protesting our existence. 2001. "The terrorists who attacked our country on September 11. a degree of resentment.
77 of 154
Heg Turns (2/3)
Their heg good authors only take into account American perspectives, not overseas views.
Walt, Professor of International Affairs, Harvard University, 05
(Stephen M. Walt, Professor of International Affairs, Harvard University, September 05, Taming American Power, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/20031709.pdf)
Americans tend to see U.S. primacy as beneficial to both their country and the rest of the world. In 2002, the Pew Global Attitudes Project found that 79 percent of U.S. citizens believe it is
good that "American ideas and customs are spreading around the world," and more than 70 percent think that U.S. foreign policy takes the interests of other states into account either "a great deal" or "a fair amount." Bill Clinton has described the United States as "a beacon of hope to peoples around the world," and Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington has declared U.S. predominance to be "central to the future of freedom, democracy, open economies, and international order." In other words, without a benign hegemon maintaining a peaceful global order, many countries would not be able to enjoy the prosperity and security they have come to take for granted. Unfortunately, this rosy view of U.S. power is not shared overseas, where, according to the 2002 Pew survey, overwhelming majorities say that the United States considers the interests of others "not much" or "not at all." Between 40 percent and 6o percent of foreigners polled think the United States is waging its war on terrorism not solely out of security concerns, but also
to "control Mideast oil," "protect Israel," "target Muslim governments," or "dominate the world." A January 2005 BBC survey of 21 countries found only five-India, the Philippines, Poland,
South Africa, and South Korea-where a majority of people had "positive" attitudes toward the United States. Although the United States' global standing has rebounded slightly since the invasion of Iraq two years ago, Pew reported in June 2005 that majorities in all 15 countries it surveyed "favor another country challenging America's global military supremacy, "and that support for the U.S.-led "war on terror" is declining on every continent. Indeed, citizens in Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Russia, Spain, and the United Kingdom now hold more favorable views of China than of the United States.
Heg causes conflicts – experts agree.
Wohlforth, Ph.D, political science, Yale University, 99
(William C. Wohlforth, Daniel Webster Professor of Government, B.A. in International Relations, Beloit College, M.A. in International Relations, Yale University M.Phil., Ph.D. in Political Science, Yale University, Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, Summer 1999, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” MIT Press, International Security, Vol 24, No. 1, p. 6, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/wohlforthvol24no1.pdf) Although they disagree vigorously on virtually every other aspect of post–Cold War world politics, scholars of international relations increasingly share this conventional wisdom about unipolarity. Whether they think that the current structure is on the verge of shifting away from unipolarity or that it has already done so, scholars believe that it [unipolarity] is prone to conflict as other states seek to create a counterpoise to the overweening power of the leading state. The assumption that unipolarity is unstable has framed the wide-ranging debate over the nature of post–Cold War world politics. Since 1991 one of the central questions in dispute has been how to explain continued cooperation and the absence of old-style balance-of-power politics despite major shifts in the distribution of power.
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Hegemony causes war and is unsustainable Eland, 2007 (Ivan. Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute. Ph.D. in Public Policy from George Washington University and Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute. “A Foreign Policy that Only Tarzan Could Love.” Feb 12. http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=1911)
Republicans, however, will be happy to know that George W. Bush should not be solely blamed for this aggressive U.S. foreign policy. Although he did ensnare the United States into significant quagmires on the ground in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States’ modern-day interventionist foreign policy dates back to the Democratic Truman administration after World War II. Of all countries during the post-war period, including the authoritarian Soviet Union, the United States has been, by far, the most aggressive nation on the planet with its military. Even during the Cold War, of the two superpowers, the United States was the first-among-equals and took advantage of it to intervene militarily in all parts of the world. The United States used the fight against communism to advance its imperial tentacles into backwater countries, such as Korea, Vietnam, Angola, Nicaragua, etc. At the international security conference, the suave Secretary of Defense Gates dismissed Putin’s unanswered specific charges on U.S. missile defense in Europe, the expansion of a hostile NATO alliance to Russia’s borders, and U.S. meddling in Russia’s traditional sphere of influence by saying that the United States felt that “one Cold War was quite enough.” Yet Putin was right that the United States is pursuing another Cold War, this time an unstated one, against both Russia and China. In his most astute criticism of the lone superpower’s foreign policy, Putin noted that the power amassed by a global power “destroys it from within.” Alluding to the aggressive, militaristic U.S. foreign policy, Putin noted correctly that, “it has nothing in common with democracy, of course.” Surprisingly, Putin, a domestic autocrat himself, seems to see what the U.S. founders knew, but what the occupants of the post–World War II imperial presidency have not been able to fathom. During the Roman Republic, the concentration of power associated with a militarized foreign policy led to the disintegration of the republic itself. The same thing is happening in the United States now. Thus, to safeguard one of the greatest domestic systems in the world, U.S. citizens and policy makers should drop the Tarzan foreign policy and return to the founders’ policy of minimal interference in the affairs of other nations.
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. the several dozen Holocaust-sized famines in both countries while food sat on the docks waiting to be exported. he did not abandon them but turned instead to truly gigantic collectives called "communes. 84 After all their arguments have been deployed. and the Philippines did so by throwing off foreign rule early—as did the United States—or by modernizing militarily in order to hold off the imperialists (and ultimately join them)—as did Japan. the explanation for India's underperformance compared with. San Diego." When Mao Zedong introduced Soviet-style collective farms into China and did not get satisfactory results. The historical evidence suggests a strong correlation exists between being on the receiving end of imperialism and immisseration. Canada lies not in British exploitation but rather in the insufficient scale of British interference in the Indian economy. and their current status as "late developers"? Students of communism will not be surprised by the answer. NEMESIS: THE LAST DAYS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC. Mexico. how do analysts like Ferguson and Friedman explain the nineteenth-century poverty of India and China. a monument to communist extremism similar to the extremes of laissez-faire that the British dogmatically imposed on their conquered territories—and that Ferguson would have preferred to be yet more extreme. Ferguson argues. China.81 of 154 AT: Ferguson Ferguson ignores the fact that imperialism promoted holocausts and famines Johnson 6 Chalmers Johnson." This Great Leap Forward of the late 1950s produced a famine that took some thirty million Chinese lives. p. author and professor emeritus of the University of California. In India. the British did not go far enough in enforcing their ideas. say. "If one leaves aside their fundamentally different resource endowments. The nations that avoided the fates of India. 2006.
counterpunch. Khalilzad's impeccable credentials make him a natural for membership in the neo-conservatives cabal which is the driving force behind Washington's Iraq policy. http://www.org/issam04172003.82 of 154 AT: Khalilzhad Khalilzad’s views are single minded Nashashibi 3 Isaam M. US-Based Director of Deir Yassin Remembered. Nashashibi. that Khalilzad has been wrong as often as he has been rightgoing back to the days when he advocated arming the same Afghani groups that later spawned the Taliban." Khalilzad’s theories are wrong Nashashibi 3 Isaam M. Counterpunch. Frequent Writer on Arab Issues. April 17. "He has a narrow of view of the Middle East and South Asia. Nashashibi." said Anatol Lieven.html] More importantly. Frequent Writer on Arab Issues. He tends to look at military solutions as the first. April 17." his former associate stressed. not the last policy option. US-Based Director of Deir Yassin Remembered.org/issam04172003. 2003 [“The Neocon’s Bagman to Baghdad”. an analyst with the Carnegie Endowment for Peace in Washington. however. perhaps.counterpunch. 2003 [“The Neocon’s Bagman to Baghdad”. "[Zalmay thinks of] security to the exclusion of everything else.html] His many critics point out. "If he was in private business rather than government. http://www. Counterpunch." . "he would have been sacked long ago.
July 6th 2009. in Political Science from the University of California. J. 09 – Mary Julia and George R. 15.pdf In addition.S. Brooks and Wohlforth make a strong case for unipolar stability. Jordan Professor of International Affairs at Texas A&M's George Bush School of Government and Public Service. could form an effective balancing coalition against the United States if it was seen as so threatening. and this is spurring an ongoing process of multipolarization. and if the only issue is the distribution of material capabilities. former president of the International Studies Association.77 .S. not from the United States. it is also an implicit admission that—although it has yet to bear fruit—other states are engaged in counterbalancing the United States.D. then there were plenty of opportunities for a counterbalancing coalition to form against the United States throughout the Cold War period. 1.43 A key question is whether the early decades of the twenty-first century will witness the decline of U. technology. If the hypothesis that great powers balance against aspiring hegemons is unconditionally valid. and Russia.45 Brooks and Wolforth concede that coalitional balancing will work against the US Jack S. KONTOPOULOS) PDF Superficially. the American era of unipolarity contains the seeds of its own demise. p. Rogers Professor of Political Science at Indiana University. reinforced by nuclear deterrence. Brooks and Wohlforth concede that even today the member states of the European Union collectively exceed the United States in gross domestic product. in International Law from Virginia Law. In this respect. and Managing Editor of International Studies Quarterly) Summer 2010 “ Balancing on Land and at Sea Do States Ally against the Leading Global Power?” http://belfercenter. Instead. Hegemons sprint to the front of the great power pack because of economic leadership based on productivity and technological innovation. and they joined the United States in a defensive balancing coalition against the Soviet Union. 34. Over time. No.ksg. Similarly. Thompson (Donald A. like all hegemonic systems.44 Not only is this a weak case for unipolarity. most of the great powers perceived that the greatest threat to their interests came from the Soviet Union. weakens their explanation for nonbalancing after the end of the Cold War. Vol. LL. Brooks and Wohlforth’s inability to provide a convincing explanation for the absence of coalition formation against the United States in the early Cold War period. however. and the combination of the European Union.42 Their case is based on a freeze-frame view of the distribution of capabilities in the international system. Brooks 10 and Wohlforth’s argument that the balancing hypothesis applies only to states that are growing and threatening to achieve a position of hegemony but not to established hegemons such as the United States raises the question of why other leading states did not balance against the United States when it was a rising great power but before it established a position of primacy— perhaps in the late 1940s. hegemony will endure well into the future. leadership costs sap the hegemon’s power and push it into decline. despite their claim at the be-ginning of World Out of Balance that unipolarity is robust and that U. and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute (Christopher. "The Waning of U. when such behavior would not have been so risky. know-how. Brooks and Wohlforth actually concede that unipolarity is not likely to last more than another twenty years. After all. Levy (Board of Governors’ Professor at Rutgers University and former president of both the International Studies Association and the Peace Science Society) and William R.S.D. they do not engage the argument that. Galileo. But there is less to their argument than meets the eye. which is not very long at all. International Security.harvard. Japan. the debate about unipolar stability is misleading. which allows other states to catch up. Summer 2009. China. Hegemony—Myth or Reality? A Review Essay". hegemony. from USC.M.83 of 154 AT: Brooks&Wohlforth Reject Brooks and Wohlforth – their analysis is based off a freeze frame of IR and doesn't into account other factors that cause hegemonic decline Layne.edu/files/Balancing_on_Land_and_at_Sea. Ph. and managerial skills diffuse throughout the international economic system.
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Paradoxically. interests. Volume 31. at some point. the United States must accept some reduction in its relative hard power by adopting a multipolar—and essentially unilateral—offshore balancing strategy that accommodates the rise of new great powers.S. primacy may well hasten its end by stimulating more intensive efforts to balance against the United States. offshore balancing would take advantage of the unique geostrategic advantages that allow the United States to benefit from multipolarity.85 of 154 MultiPol Good – Generic U. "The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States' Unipolar Moment. exercise a free hand strategically. If the United States fails to adopt an offshore balancing strategy based on multipolarity and military and ideological self-restraint. The United States does not need to be an extraregional hegemon to be secure. 131 Thus. deterritorialized conception of security divorced from the traditional metrics of great power grand strategy: the distribution of power in the international system and geography. the risk of conflict and the possible exposure of the American homeland to attack. Unilateral offshore balancing. An America [End Page 40] that has the wisdom and prudence to contain itself is less likely to be feared than one that begs the rest of the world to stop it before it expands hegemonically again. indeed. have to fight to uphold its primacy. allies. it probably will.S. Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute. withdrawal and a concurrent shift to multipolarity would prevent American involvement in major power wars. power. as an insular great power. and it could—and should—insulate itself from possible future Eurasian great power wars. Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 170 By devolving full responsibility for their defense to U.S. Maintaining U.S. 2006 (Christopher. the United States is far less vulnerable to the effects of "instability" than are the major powers of Eurasia. hegemony is a game that no longer is worth the candle.S. thus causing the United States to become imperially overstretched and involving it in unnecessary wars that will reduce its power. The United States is far removed from powerful rivals and shielded from them both by geography and its own hard power. the United States would reap security advantages from a reversion to multipolarity. 130 It also must rein in the scope of its extravagant ambitions to shape the international system in accordance with its Wilsonian ideology. to reduce others' concerns about its power. Project Muse) The United States has a hegemony problem because it wields hegemonic power. the United States should begin to retrench strategically and capitalize on the advantages accruing to insular great powers in multipolar systems. and avoid being automatically engulfed in Eurasian conflicts because of its alliance commitments. rather than arising from any direct threat to the United States itself. primacy may already be in the early stages of erosion.S. Attempts to uphold hegemony only erode primacy faster – only acceptance of multipolarity guarantees a peaceful transition Layne. especially given that U.S. . Fall. As an offshore balancer. For the United States. derive directly from the overseas commitments mandated by hegemony's all-encompassing definition of U. which is a potentially dangerous strategy. the United States must practice self-restraint (which is different from choosing to be constrained by others by adopting a multilateral approach to grand strategy)." International Security. To reduce the fear of U. Its quest for hegemony is driven instead by an ideational. attempting to sustain U. Consequently. Rather than risking these outcomes. is America's next grand strategy. Number 2.
.S. 2003. the American military success in Afghanistan dealt with the easiest part of the problem: toppling an oppressive and weak government in a poor country. police work. Their first mistake is to focus too heavily on military power alone. Foreign Affairs. Volume 82. which retains cells in some 60 countries. Issue 4. The best response to transnational terrorist networks is networks of cooperating government agencies. military strength is crucial and that pure multilateralism is impossible. tracing financial flows. EBSCO Although the new unilateralists are right that maintaining U. For example. July. Harvard.86 of 154 MultiPol Good – Terror Multilateralism key to reducing threats from terrorism Nye 3 Joseph Nye. And bombing cannot resolve the problem of cells in Hamburg or Detroit. But the metaphor of war should not blind Americans to the fact that suppressing terrorism will take years of patient. they make important mistakes that will ultimately undercut the implementation of the new security strategy. But all the precision bombing destroyed only a small fraction of al Qaeda's network. U.S. Rather than proving the new unilateralists' point. unspectacular civilian cooperation with other countries in areas such as intelligence sharing. military power is essential to global stability and is a critical part of the response to terrorism. and border controls. the partial nature of the success in Afghanistan illustrates the continuing need for cooperation.
as of June 2010. and frankly given the world of the early 80's. In addition.S. Now. there are in fact limits to growth whether you're global or isolated. if we've learned anything from the recent adventure in Iraq it's that the world has neither little stomach nor patience for preemptive war. China. professional blogger on global events since 2004. No Osirak-like mission was to be had. The first and easiest to understand reason why the Israeli's didn't attack Bushehr is that the US deemed it not to be a proliferation risk. not to mention most of the Middle East as they are all tied together both militarily and financially. opted to do something of a "cowboy-like" nature like bomb Iran or invade Taiwan. Despite some of the crazy rhetoric we hear on cable news and even from the mouths of certain leaders across the world. trade deficit with China widened to $26. war isn't something anyone is really interested in and therefore there's only so much any one country can do when another opts to flout international concerns. tread lightly. Besides war. It is one thing when only two countries have nuclear weapons and neither are particularly invested in your best interest and quite another when a number of countries have nuclear weapons and have a vested interest in your survival. mental health. http://www. There were indicators that this was a possibility as the Saudi's had given Israel permission to fly over their country in the event they planned to actually attack Iran. As I stated earlier. U. The US and China are the two biggest economies in the world. it needed to do it before the 21st. Negligible economic progress will probably occur but for the most part. such is the multi-polar world. So the question is. With countries scattered across the globe armed with intercontinental ballistic missiles it behooves every serious country to at best. But the week passed and there was no assault.7 billion in US treasury securities. global interconnected markets. what more could the United States have done to prevent this event from occurring? The answers lies in the political-economic structure of the multi-polar world we are now living in. we've buried the stick and hope that lots of carrots work.S. etc. Of course. the highest since October 2008. Once Bill Clinton and the Republican congress started us down the free trade path they left the proverbial barn door open and there's no closing it now. Despite the assertions of boisterous radio personalities. We're not going to embargo China or any country that really matters because doing so will only hurt us in the long run. 8/23/10 (Mark. this is indeed the New Normal. the times they have a-changed. the economic repercussions to both countries would be far worse and much faster than anything else besides nuclear oblivion. Russia and at least a third of Latin America. not only did Iran begin to bring Bushehr online but also days later they even debuted an unmanned attack drone and announced plans for the mass production of high-speed missile-launching assault boats. in a situation like this once you've run out of carrots and there is no stick to use. “Nuclear Iran and the multi-polar world”. Attacking Iran leads to military conflict with China.S. In short. lest they risk radioactive fallout from blowing up a live nuclear reactor. there was minimal risk the plant would be used to make nuclear weapons. When the Israeli's bombed Osirak they didn't bother to even warn the US. why didn't the Israeli's make good on a decade of threats and blow the place up? More to the point. as imports from there jumped according to the Commerce Department earlier this month. In fact. State Department spokesman Darby Holladay stated that since Russia had agreed to supply nuclear fuel and remove spent fuel rods. Sure in the short run manufacturing will briefly return but sooner or later markets become saturated and we're right back to where we are now.htm) Prior to this event former U.2 billion in June. then there was no reason to bomb it in the first place. masters degree in social work (msw) and 10 years of social work. you are forced to just live with it and that's a reality for both the US and Israel. The U. In a game of carrot and stick. Had Israel attacked Bushehr they would have lost the war before the battle had even begun in the court of world opinion. Latin America. envoy to the United Nations John Bolton told the Israeli's and the world via Fox News that if Israel was going to launch an attack on Bushehr.87 of 154 MultiPol Good – Iran Multipolarity solves Iran better than unipolarity Radulich. the US also has to contend with the economic realities of the multi-polar world. for example. both nuclear and conventional. And you can make this case the world over with the EU. Russia.411mania. holds roughly $843. if the rationale for bombing it was to prevent weapons from being made there. they didn't have to. So what more could the Obama Administration have done to prevent Bushehr from coming online? The answer is simply . and health care experience as a licensed clinical social worker. The dominoes that fell after they hit Iraq didn't register on the radar of the superpower that was the US.com/politics/columns/150306/Nuclear-Iran-and-the-Multi-Polar-World. if either the US or China.
we're all locked into an eternal state of check.88 of 154 nothing. embargoes. . etc. trade wars. Welcome to the real New World Order. with no checkmate in sight. Mutually Assured Destruction for everybody and nobody. We're not alone in that respect because quite frankly so is the rest of the sane. aren't a viable option either. The latest episode with Iran shows us that the US is more or less impotent. sanctions. Essentially a multi-polar world with every country seated at the round table means that for the most part. Military action isn't a viable option. civilized world. That answer doesn't change if or when a Republican becomes president.
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Decline is inevitable -- soft power, defense spending, China rise. Geeraerts 11 – Gustaaf, professor of international relations at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel and director of the Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies (European Review, Vol. 19, No. 1, 57–67, 2011, “China, the EU, and the New Multipolarity,” http://www.vub.ac.be/biccs/site/assets/files/apapers/China,%20the%20EU%20and %20Multipolarity-2.pdf) The structure of the international system is changing with the evaporation of America’s unipolar moment. ‘The decline of U.S. primacy and the subsequent transition to a multipolar world are inevitable,’ Wang Jisi wrote in 2004. 2 More recently John Ikenberry stated that ‘The United States’ ‘‘unipolar moment’’ will inevitably end.’ 3 Not only has the inﬂuence of the lonely superpower severely been affected by the expensive wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; its economic clout too has declined faster than ever before and its soft power is increasingly contested. At the same time, China is undeniably becoming a global power. Since
the cautious opening up of China’s door by Deng Xiaoping in 1978, her economy has quadrupled in size and some expect it to double again over the next decade. China is about to become the second most
important single economy in the world. At the most recent G20 meeting in Pittsburgh, Hu Jintao, China’s president was the only one to arrive at the head of a major economy still enjoying strong growth, having the luxury of substantial ﬁnancial reserves. But China is not only growing economically, its military clout is also on the rise. 4 In 2008 China evolved into the world’s second highest military spender. 5 It is the only country emerging both as a military and economic rival of the US and thus generating a fundamental shift in the global distribution of power and inﬂuence. Such power transitions are a recurring phenomenon in
international politics and have always constituted episodes of uncertainty and higher risk. They contain the seeds of ﬁerce strategic rivalry between the up-and-coming state and the residing leading power, thereby increasing the likelihood of contention and conﬂict. No wonder that China’s spectacular economic growth and increasingly assertive diplomacy have incited other key-players to ponder how Beijing will seek to manage this transition and even more how it will use its leverage afterwards. Notwithstanding that China still sees itself partly as a developing country, it is becoming more conﬁdent in its rising power and status. As its economic interests abroad
are expanding rapidly, so will the pressure increase to safeguard them more proactively. National security is no longer solely a matter of defending sovereignty and domestic development. It also becomes necessary for China to back up its growing interests overseas with a
more robust diplomacy and security policy. To be sure, the US is still the most important single economy in the world. It also remains the world’s largest military power. While the EU has developed into an even
larger economy and has become the most important entity in terms of external trade ﬂows, politically and militarily it performs far below its potential and is no match either for the US or China. The EU’s foreign policy is confronted with a collective action problem of sorts, and as a result is lacking in bot strategic vision and assertiveness. Although still smaller than the other two, China has grown into the world’s second largest national economy and also the one that grows most quickly. According to some estimates, China will move on a par with the US in 2020 and
become the world’s biggest economy in 2030 (see Table 1). Moreover China is steadily increasing its military power. In Beijing’s view, economic prowess is not sufﬁcient for a state to become a ﬁrst rank power. ‘What is important is comprehensive national power, as shown by the ability of the Soviet Union to balance the much wealthier US in the Cold War and the continuing inability of an economically powerful Japan to play a political role’. 6 This view is very much in line with the neorealist conception that to be considered a ‘pole’ a country must amass sufﬁcient power in all of Waltz’s categories of power: ‘size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence.’ 7
Heg structurally unsustainable -- economics and rising powers. Petras 10 – James, retired Bartle Professor (Emeritus) of Sociology at Binghamton University in Binghamton, New York and adjunct professor at Saint Mary's University
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(4/28/10, “Rising and Declining Economic Powers: The Sino-US Conflict Deepens,” http://lahaine.org/petras/b2-img/petras_sinous.pdf) The US has a trade deficit with at least 91 other countries besides China, demonstrating that the problem is embedded in the structure of the US economy. Any punitive measure to restrict China’s exports to the US will only increase Washington’s deficit with other competitive exporters. A decline of US imports from China will not result in an increase for US manufacturers because of the under-capitalized nature of the latter, directly related to the pre-eminent position of finance capital in capturing and allocating savings. Moreover, “third countries” can re-export Chinese made products, putting the US in the unenviable
position of starting trade wars across the board or accepting the fact that a finance –commercial led economy is not competitive in today’s world economy. China’s decision to incrementally divert its trade surplus
from the purchase of US Treasury notes to more productive investments in developing its “hinterland” and to strategic overseas ventures in raw materials and energy sectors will eventually force the US Treasury to raise interest rates to avoid large scale flight from the dollar. Rising interest rates may benefit currency traders, but could weaken any US recovery or plunge the country back into a depression. Nothing weakens a global empire more than having to repatriate overseas investments and constrain foreign lending to bolster a sliding domestic economy. The pursuit of protectionist policies will have a major negative impact on US MNC in China since the bulk of their products are exported to the US market: Washington will cut its nose to spite its face. Moreover, a trade war could spill over and adversely affect US auto corporations producing for the Chinese market. GM and Ford are far more profitable in China than the US where they are running in the red 44 . A US trade war will have an initial negative impact on China until it adjusts and takes advantage of the potential 400 million consumers in the vast interior of the country. Moreover, Chinese economic policymakers are rapidly diversifying their trade toward Asia, Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, Russia and even in the EU. Trade protectionism may
create a few jobs in some uncompetitive manufacturing sectors in the US but it may cost more jobs in the commercial sector (Wal-Mart) which depends on low priced items to low income consumers. The bellicose trade rhetoric on Capitol Hill and confrontational policies adopted by the White House are dangerous posturing, designed to deflect attention from the profound structural weaknesses of the domestic foundations of the empire. The deeply entrenched financial sector and the equally dominant military metaphysic which directs foreign policy have led the US down the steep slope of chronic economic crises, endless costly wars, deepening class and ethno-racial inequalities as well as declining living standards. In the new competitive multi-polar world order, the
US cannot successfully follow the earlier path of blocking a rising imperial power’s access to strategic resources via colonial dictated boycotts. Not even in countries under US occupation, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, can the White House block China from signing lucrative investment and trade deals. With countries in the US sphere of influence, like
Taiwan, South Korea and Japan, the rate of growth of trade and investment with China far exceeds that of the US. Short of a full scale unilateral military blockade, the US cannot contain China’s rise as a world
economic actor, a newly emerging imperial power. The major weakness in China is internal, rooted
in class divisions and class exploitation, which the currently entrenched political elite profoundly linked through family and economic ties, might ameliorate but cannot eliminate 45 . Up to now China has been able to expand globally through a form of “social imperialism”, distributing a portion of the wealth generated overseas to a growing urban middle class and to upwardly mobile managers, professionals, real estate speculators and regional party cadre. In contrast the US, military directed overseas conquests have been costly with no
economic returns and with long term damage to the civilian economy both in its internal and external manifestations. Iraq and Afghanistan do not reward the imperial treasury in anyway comparable \\to what England plundered from India, South Africa and Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). In a world increasingly based in market relations, colonial style wars have no economic future. Huge military budgets and hundreds of military bases and military based alliances with neo-colonial states are the least efficient means to compete successfully in a globalized market place. That is the reason why the US is a declining empire and China, with its market driven approach is a newly emerging empire of a ‘new sort’ (sui generis).
2 per cent of gross domestic product – up massively from 3. and uncertainties remain as to the long-term direction of space and missile defence programs. There is widespread agreement that the US fiscal situation is unsustainable. je) The sun may finally be setting on the American Century. nuclear weapons are being assigned a more limited role in US defence planning.Journalist for Economy in Crisis. Dustin. Even worse. President Obama’s election was greeted with a wave of enthusiasm and hope for the future. East Asia Program Director at the Lowy Institute for International Policy (June 2010. The problem is exacerbated by the political impasse in America. Protectionist sentiment is growing. “[Obama’s] budget draws a picture of a nation that like many American homeowners simply cannot get above water. space. much of that debt is borrowed from foreign central banks. and the Obama administration has raised concerns in Asia by decisions such as imposition of a punitive tariff on Chinese tyres. China’s rapid military modernisation program is likely to continue unabated during this period. MacArthur Foundation and the Lowy Institute.S. according to The New York America‘s massive and unsustainable debt will be the cause of waning influence around the world in the near future. significant negative trends are emerging for America’s global role and its strategic position in Asia over the longer term. especially Asian powers Japan and China. Even if the United States retains the will to remain Asia’s hegemon. The economy is showing signs of a recovery. The US Congressional Budget Office (CBO) conservatively estimates the US federal budget deficit for 2009 will reach US$ 1. which claims that . The Obama administration has already announced cuts to real defence spending. As of September 2009. in which each Times. Ensinger ’10. deficits are projected to rise to over five percent of gross domestic product. Hegemony”. A strong US global role remains the orthodoxy on both sides of American politics and across the foreign policy elite. http://economyincrisis. Rory Medcalf. “Power and Choice: Asian Security Futures. Cook et al 10 – Malcolm. Beyond the next decade an ageing population and rising healthcare costs will increase America’s fiscal challenges.3 trillion in the 2011 fiscal year . Major weapons programs such as the F-22 advanced Raptor fighter and the DDG. Perhaps even more worrying. a Pew poll released in December 2009 showed isolationist sentiment in the United States surging to a four-decade high. it is likely to face capacity constraints in the medium to long term. particularly in Asia. debt while Japan held roughly $752 billion.6 trillion. “Huge Deficits Altering U. high deficits.org/content/hugedeficits-altering-us-hegemony. but no consensus on the kinds of long-term solutions that need to be enacted. Andrew Shearer.org/images/uploads/blog_attachments/Asian_security_futur es_-_final_version. albeit gradual. the US defence budget is likely to come under serious pressure from 2016.” http://asiasecurity.pdf) Such a domestic crisis in the United States seems unlikely. Absent a change in national priorities.macfound. public sentiment could constrain Washington from continuing to provide the two things that Asia most wants from America: open markets and security. The Economy in Crisis. 100 Should these trends continue. By the end of the decade. Raoul Heinrichs. China held $790 billion of U. The CBO estimates that public debt. Nonetheless. capabilities in domains which will become increasingly important. will continue to grow to 68 per cent of GDP by 2019.” The Times writes. many of them intended to deny US forces access in realms where American power has previously been unchallenged.S. even as Washington’s margin of conventional superiority diminishes. with a particular focus on missile. which represented just 33 per cent of GDP in 2001.1000 Zumwalt destroyer will be terminated. cyber and blue-water naval capabilities. There is evidence that the United States is entering one of its inward-looking phases – a consequence of the economic downturn and costly wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.92 of 154 Decline is inevitable in the status quo – US isolationist attitudes and US spending unsustainably. 10 Plus.expected to be 1. Not only is the deficit out-ofcontrol .2 per cent in 2008 and the highest figure since the Second World War. Although his popularity has dipped. This represents 11.but the nation’s projected long-term debt is even more unsustainable.Bachelor of Arts in Journalism and Political Science (2/2/10.
If present trends continue. dominance in the international system have encouraged American policy makers to act unilaterally and seize almost any opportunity to advance American interests no matter the costs to others. our policies have been based on these flawed arguments. Russia. but in recent years American leaders have pursued far more ambitious goals than merely maintaining the status quo. Some side is firmly entrenched in an unwavering ideological battle. without deliberate action. seeking to ensure peace and stability not just in its own neighborhood--the Americas--but also in Europe and Asia. As of 2009. even to academicians like Dartmouth's William Wohlforth and Stephen Brooks. “Empire Falls. Still.S. Heg is unsustainable -. believe that China. and that the U. Others point out that America’s military might is still unmatched around the world. And since the 1960s America’s gross domestic product has represented roughly 20 to 25 percent of the global economy. From public intellectuals like Charles Krauthammer and Niall Ferguson to neoconservatives like Paul Wolfowitz and Robert Kagan. the period of U. economy is still by far the largest. Iran's continued nuclear program and Russia's recent military adventure in Georgia are high-priority issues. to put America back on a path of fiscal sanity and ensure that America remains a hegemony. China and other major powers could seriously oppose American military power. In reality. we will look back at the Bush administration years as the death knell for American hegemony. growing government debt. along with the oil-rich Persian Gulf (as well as other parts of the world). An extremely low savings rate. further decline in the foreseeable future. A healthy appreciation of our situation American leaders may lead to policies that could mitigate. The next closest was China at just eight percent. 2009. economy in the world--has been in decline since early on in the Bush administration. thus far.” http://findarticles.S. To be sure. increasingly negative current-account balances and other internal economic weaknesses have cost the United States real power in today's world of rapidly spreading knowledge and technology. The self-inflicted wounds of the Iraq War.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_99/ai_n32148803/? tag=content.S. solutions to each of them individually and all of them .wars and economic power decline Pape 9 – Robert A. that believe America will remain the world’s preeminent power for some time. followed by Russia at five percent. there needs to be a combination of both.93 of 154 Republicans refuse to even entertain the idea of any tax increase while Democrats chafe at the though of entitlement cuts. America's shrinking share of world economic production is a fact of life and important changes in U. others see America’s imminent demise. will not be able to maintain its current pace of economic growth long enough to pass the U. the decline of America’s manufacturing base. long thought of as America’s top competitor for superpower status. The United States is not just the sole superpower in the uni-polar-dominance school's world. relative decline has been. The Bush administration has not just continued America's traditional grand strategy. Simply maintaining these commitments requires enormous resources. virtually discounting the possibility that Germany. al-Qaeda's new sanctuary in western Pakistan. however.col1 originally from The National Interest) America is in unprecedented decline. fairly short. all believe the principal feature of the post- cold-war world is the unchallengeable dominance of American power. grand strategy are necessary to prevent the decline in America's global position from accelerating. seeking to denuclearize North Korea and expanding America's military allies in Europe up to the borders of Russia itself.S. the fall of American power will be more precipitous with the passage of time. Professor of political science at the University of Chicago (Jan-Feb. but is so relatively more powerful than any other country that it can reshape the international order according to American interests. Still. the U.S. if not rectify. There is also good reason to think that. For the past eight years.. For nearly two decades. Although the immediate problems of war in by Iraq and Afghanistan. accounted for nearly half of all the world’s military expenditures. There are some analysts and experts. France. those convinced of U. unsustainable trade deficits and concerns about the strength of the dollar have all caused some experts to question America’s place in the world and suggest that American influence may be rapidly dwindling. but pursued ambitious objectives in all three major regions at the same time--waging wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. as the world’s largest economy. the United States has maintained a vast array of overseas commitments. This is simply no longer realistic.S.S. while the ultimate foundation of American power--the relative superiority of the U. Since the cold war.
On trade. at a US government that under Bush was openly comfortable with the use of torture and was reelected. 25 no.’ 26 If attempts to get the global economy going again fail.international legitimacy. the GWoT means that Washington is still under pressure to prefer antiterrorist governments to democratic ones.g. at the influence of religion and special interest lobbies in US domestic politics. 1 3-25) In addition to standing increasingly on its own in the main areas of international policy. badly damaged itself. at the financial mess. and internal conflicts Buzan 11 – Barry. Waltz Annual Lecture A World Order Without Superpowers : Decentred Globalism. or are too protracted and costly. and economic liberal values in the form of free(r) trade and financial liberalization. the US is losing its claim to be a model and to own the future. It is not clear that he is an economic liberal. America's declining power means that the unipolar world is indeed coming to an end. competitors to the dollar as reserve currency were on the rise. and the Beijing consensus.94 of 154 Most important. 2011. So America’s claim to represent the (liberal) future is now blighted both by its own failures and by the shortcomings of the liberal model itself. there is little scope left for the US to legitimize its leadership by appealing to liberal values either political or economic. even if he is. the financial world took on a globalised life of its own. but whether it has become a serious part of the problem. the US had largely ceased to lead anyway. the ideological authority to do so. via the G20 and other suchlike groups of leading powers). many Democrats in Congress look likely to be even less enthusiastic about further trade liberalisation than the Bush Republicans were. The US led the world into this recession. it will have to be done collectively (e. In terms of economic liberalism. . yet. economic influence. In some ways the ‘civilian power’ EU is now a better representative of political liberal values. other ideas about how to run the global political economy are in play. our own hubris may be our downfall. “The Inaugural Kenneth N. collectively will be heavily influenced by America's reduced power position in the world. March 2011 vol. Even before the current economic crisis. Like so many great powers that have come and gone before. Montague Burton Professor in the Department of International Relations (March 25. that major powers will increasingly have the strength to balance against U. it now more easily asks not just whether the US is a questionable model. That claim has long been based on the US championing of political liberal values in the form of democracy and human rights. and whether the US economic model is either sustainable or desirable. much was done. 25 The truth of Bromley’s observation has been amplified by recent events: ‘US economic leadership power exists but it is a wasting asset … governance of the world economy is something that would have to be accomplished collectively if it is to be accomplished at all. Under Clinton and Bush. On the political side. and US indebtedness was weakening its position. policies they oppose and that the United States will increasingly face harsh foreign-policy choices. nor. giving bigger voices to other players. even so. and at a federal environmental policy until recently in denial about global warming. cannot lead the world out of it. its policy of ‘extraordinary renditions’ and acceptance of de facto torture. as well as its fierce resistance to the International Criminal Court. then the emergence of a more regionalized world political economy becomes more likely (more on this later). US abuses of human rights at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo. There was a very substantial element of hypocrisy in this position during the Cold War. have gutted Washington’s credibility to say much about human rights. with the collapse of the Washington consensus. At this point.” International Relations. When the world looks at American health and welfare policies. and. are now both more open to serious question. and its weakening position in Congress does not augur well. and. The Obama administration has a huge amount of damage to repair before it can present the US as a beacon of political liberalism. It has neither the economic resources. at a seeming US inclination to use force as the first-choice policy instrument. With the Washington consensus discredited. the Obama inheritance is even worse. The EU model looks more attractive to some.S. Heg is unsustainable -. Whether an unsustainable ‘American way of life’ is an appropriate model for the rest of the world. Obama’s options are massively constrained by the magnitude of the economic crisis. both European social markets. If the world economy can be managed globally at all. its weakening economic position making it more protectionist. however.
To measure gross domestic product.col1 originally from The National Interest) Advocates of extending America's unipolar dominance are well aware of the central importance of the economic foundations of American power and routinely present detailed statistics on the U. many of the deeper issues are structural.S. in 2006 the United States had 28 percent of world product while its nearest most likely competitor. Its religiosity.. dollars. and then began to steadily lose ground during the eight years of the Bush administration.S. the Chinese have caught or nearly caught up with Americans in every category in the aggregate. dollars from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Pape 9 – Robert A. the United States had three times the computer sales.95 of 154 and the emergent Chinese model to others.. had 6 percent. the unipolar-dominance school prefers to compare every country's output in current-year U. reached its apogee in 2000. and is being turned around by Obama. let us start with the unipolar-dominance school's preferred measure of American hegemony. and their rapid global diffusion is a profound factor driving down America's power compared to other countries. For grand-strategic concerns--especially how well the United States can balance its resources and foreign-policy commitments--the trajectory of American power compared to other states is of seminal importance. the most recent call for America to exploit its hegemonic position (published in 2008) rests on the presumption of U. America is losing its overwhelming technological dominance in the leading industries of the knowledge economy. with its relative power ultimately falling by nearly a quarter in the first . The basic notion is simple: take U. religious. and with it the ultimate sources of state power--productive capacities. For instance. The Post-American World. the United States has not lost its position as the most innovative country in the world. domestic product in any year and divide it by the aggregate total of the gross domestic product of all states in the world. The US is no longer the only model of the future in play. Professor of political science at the University of Chicago (Jan-Feb. with more than four times the U. individualistic and anti-state than most other parts of the West. The US is much more culturally conservative.” http://findarticles.col1 originally from The National Interest) True. For the sake of argument. but look at the trajectory of the data over time. technology and knowledge diffuse more quickly today. (4) As Fareed Zakaria describes in his recent book. Indeed. with more patents each year than in all other countries combined. (2) By this metric. can create many more knowledge workers in the future.relative economic decline. single-year "snapshots" of America's relative power are of limited value for assessing the sustainability of its grand strategy over many years. 2009. US heg not sustainable -. In past eras--the "age of iron" and the "age of steel"--leading states retained their technological advantages for many decades. the ability to diffuse new technology--to turn chalkboard ideas into mass-produced applications--has been spreading rapidly across many parts of the globe. Looks pretty good for America. five times the internet users and forty times the broadband subscribers as China. right? Alas.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_99/ai_n32148803/? tag=content. share of world product. although the United States remains well ahead of China on many indicators of leading technology on a per capita basis.S. the United States increased its share of world production during the 1990s. a method that tends to show America is much further ahead of other countries than alternative measures. Professor of political science at the University of Chicago (Jan-Feb. this grossly under-weights the size of the knowledge economy in China compared to America. while its individualism and anti-statism set it apart from Asia.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_99/ai_n32148803/? tag=content.” http://findarticles.S. and it is far from clear that it will ever be able to recover the leading position that it once possessed. (5) The fact that the United States remains ahead of China on a per capita basis does matter--it means that China. Tech diffusion = heg unsustainable. in 2008. 2009. China. population. cultural conservatism and antistatism set it apart from most of Europe. “Empire Falls. According to GDP figures in current U. dominance based on the current-year dollar figures. Pape 9 – Robert A. While some of this negative image was specific to the Bush administration. However. Whereas in 2000. “Empire Falls.S.S.
col1 originally from The National Interest) So. How good are the numbers? Economists commonly use two other methods to calculate GDP. from nearly 4 percent annually during the Clinton years to just over 2 percent per year under Bush. the fact is that since 2000. constant-dollar calculations and purchasing power parity. Pape 9 – Robert A. This new reality has tremendous implications for the future of American grand strategy.7 percent--the assumed marginal gain of 2. decline.2 percent of world product accounts for about 15 percent of the U.2 percent instead of its actual 23. growth has fallen considerably. Despite all the pro-economy talk from the Bush administration. and the United States and the rest of the world continued along their actual path of economic growth since 2000. these are merely thought experiments. things get even worse--with the United States expected to continue declining and China to continue rising. power is the result of uneven rates of economic growth between America. U.S. U.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_99/ai_n32148803/? tag=content. Table 2 shows the trajectory of the share of world product for the United States and China using both alternative measures. As Table 3 shows. how much is U. which leave out all manner of technical problems like "interaction effects. which is likely to only further weaken U. China has sustained a consistently high rate of growth of 10 percent per year--a truly stunning performance. The United States has been going through the first decade of the twenty-first century not stronger than before. the trend is the same. Heg decline inevitable and irreversible. Simply put. This trajectory is almost sure to be revised further downward as the consequences of the financial crisis in fall 2008 become manifest.7 percent per year from 2000 to 2008 instead of the (Bush) rate of 2. or 1. the United States is now a declining power.S.S. economic weaknesses under Bush or Chinas superior economic performance? Although precise answers are not possible. What would happen if we assumed that the United States grew during the Bush years at the same rate as during Clinton's? What would have happened had the world continued on its same trajectory. If we look out as far as the IMF can see (2013). The answers are pretty straightforward.” http://findarticles. although all major countries are suffering economically.1 percent.S. (6) When compared to the share of gross world product lost by the United States from 2000 to 2008--7. The erosion of the underpinnings of U. If so. but we assume China did not grow at such an astounding rate? Of course. Assuming the rest of the world continued at its actual rate of growth. decline due to the global diffusion of technology. the average rate of U.96 of 154 decade of the twenty-first century. These estimates suggest that roughly a quarter of America's relative decline is due to . “Empire Falls..2 percent more than today." Still. one can gain a rough weighting of the factors behind America's shrinking share of world production by asking a few simple counterfactual questions of the data. America's decline was well under way before the economic downturn. the state many consider America's most likely future rival. And regardless of the metric.2 percent. growth rates are down almost 50 percent from the Clinton years. China and other states in the world. At the same time.S. power. America's share of world product in 2008 would have risen to 25. Again using IMF figures.S. the United States would have had a bigger economy in absolute terms and would have lost less power relative to others. When compared to the share of world product lost by the United States from 2000 to 2008--7. China and Russia are expected to continue growing at a substantially greater rate than the United States.1 percent of world product amounts to some 27 percent of the U. 2009. over the past two decades. At the same time. As the most recent growth estimates (November 2008) by the :ME make clear. from year after year of losses in the 1990s to significant annual gains since 2000. Russia has also turned its economic trajectory around. Professor of political science at the University of Chicago (Jan-Feb. the relative power of China. these back-of-the-envelope approximations serve as useful starting points. Had the American economy grown at the (Clinton) rate of 3.3 percent.S. has grown consistently. How much does China matter? Imagine the extreme case--that China had not grown. Worse. (3) Although each offers advantages and disadvantages. but substantially weaker.7 percent--the assumed marginal gain of 1. for our purposes what matters is that they form a lower bound of America's relative decline. America's share of world product in 2008 would be 24.S. decline.
and undoubtedly the effects will continue to ripple around the world. and the . took the unprecedented step of pursuing a “financial socialism” (Taylor et al 2009). The above discussion suggests that the fundamental principles of US engagement with the rest of the world will change very little under an Obama-led US administration. along with a number of oil exporting countries. the national deficit moved past the $10 trillion mark. fall is remarkable and that dangerous instability in the international system may lie ahead. it now seems that US hegemony is in decline. the signing of the executive order to close the controversial Guantanamo Bay detention facility. without the need to exercise the hard coercive unilateral military or economic power upon the rest of the world. the costs could be far higher than a simple percentage drop in share of world product. the previous administration.S. it is clearly surpassed by only one other great-power decline. economic weaknesses (spending on the Iraq War. Indeed. led by the most right-wing president in living memory. “US Hegemony and the Obama Administration: Towards a New World Order?. 2010. a sixth to Chinas superior performance and just over half to the spread of technology to the rest of the world. lecturer in Human Geography at Staffordshire University.S. UK. economically and politically. Something fundamental has changed. both signalled a sharp break with the previous Bush administration and have strengthened the global wave of diplomatic and popular goodwill (see Black 2009. and that our opposition to the imposition of American power. predominantly Japan and China. during this election. Issue 2) However. no matter how well supported. In an attempt to save the US economy from recession. it becomes clear both that the U. in size. (February 18. Economic collapse and debt. The effects of US neoimperialism reach so extensively across the world that US elections are everyone’s business. It gives the USA a chance to re-invent itself as a more open and tolerant nation and practice what may be termed as a “moral hegemony” (see Kobayashi and Peake 2000). downfall is indeed extraordinary. But I shall end this intervention on a note of optimism. For once. the financial crisis of late 2008 and early 2009 has acted to undermine both the US and global economy. Relying on foreign governments in this way comes with risks that are now starting to bite. one which is fraught with difficulties. For the USA. can change well-practised unilateral US foreign policies or solve deep-rooted national anxieties. The USA can no longer hope to keep China subordinate through economics alone. tax cuts. And when one examines past declines and their consequences.” AntipodeVolume 42. If we end up believing in the wishful thinking of unipolar dominance forever. From this perspective. Watson 10 – Allan. All of this has led to one of the most significant declines of any state since the midnineteenth century. The timing of this policy effectively forced the following Obama administration to continue down the same path. the unexpected internal collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. rescuing private finance with public finance. and the fact that the largest potential rival to US hegemony in the twenty-first century. In other words. is something that will sit uncomfortably even with a less conservative Obama administration. China. The US economy continues to be squeezed by the interest on the capital borrowed. and the U. The United States has always prided itself on exceptionalism. The election of the first black president of the USA was after all an historic event. etc. It is one of the largest relative declines in modern history. holds so much of the US debt.). Given this. it seemed like it mattered what the rest of the world thought about American politics. America's relative decline since 2000 of some 30 percent represents a far greater loss of relative power in a shorter time than any power shift among European great powers from roughly the end of the Napoleonic Wars to World War II. A significant amount of this debt is held by foreign governments.S. UK and a research fellow of the Globalisation and World Cities research network based at Loughborough University. self-inflicted wounds of the Bush years significantly exacerbated America's decline.97 of 154 U. Finn 2008). and Obama’s carefully crafted speech at Cairo University in June 2009 aimed at easing tensions with the Muslim world. both by making the decline steeper and faster and crowding out productive investment that could have stimulated innovation to improve matters. It is difficult to see how one man. When the $700 billion bailout package for private financial institutions was passed through Congress. current-account deficits. and that we will begin to see the emergence of a new world order. the largest problem has been the state’s own financial situation.
militarism and Zionist power will so bleed and isolate the United States that necessity will induce a forceful response … The longer it takes the more violent the rebirth of the republic. Only time will tell how long the American people will endure the dispossession of homes. Unlike Japan it has a vast multitude of workers. nor do financial elites embedded in extraordinary wealth and power surrender their privileged positions peacefully. looking for Obama to be the president to guide the USA into a new age of multilateralism. a loss of competitiveness in merchandise trade and an overdependence on financial activities looks to political retribution. employer servitude. promoting separatist regimes which predictably collapse or are overthrown. . a declining imperial power faced with profound internal imbalances. driven by an elite free to engage the world on its own terms. China’s market driven empire building is attuned to modern times. unlike the US plagued by financial speculators who eat away and erode the economy. They have not stopped all of China’s neighbors from expanding economic ties with it. something will have to break. China rising and domestic issues. military alliances and trade restrictions to slow its demise. unlike Japan. New York and adjunct professor at Saint Mary's University (4/28/10.org/petras/b2-img/petras_sinous. China. The US unlike the established colonial powers of an earlier period cannot deny China access to strategic raw materials as was the case with Japan. whipping up chauvinist emotions by scapegoating the rising new imperial state and forging military alliances to “encircle” China have absolutely no impact. I continue to share the sense of excitement and hope for change that has been so widely infectious since the election. the mass of the US working class is at a loss as to how it can move from a military driven empire toward a productive republic. Despite the reservations expressed in this intervention.” http://lahaine.pdf) As in the past. was finally having an effect. ravaging industrial centers and turning abandoned houses into parking lots. Petras 10 – James. it need not conquer and exploit foreign colonized labor. depends on securing markets via economic competitiveness – market power – not military conquest. Over the long run. If the US imperial elite at present is at a loss as to how it can contain China’s rise to world power. China will push ahead with double digit growth. We live in a post-colonial world where the vast majority of regimes will trade and invest with whoever pays the market price. systemic economic crises have been converted into private individual maladies. unending wars and increased reliance on the tools of political subversion. fifth column colonization and military driven empire building based on domestic decay. The world continues to watch hopefully.98 of 154 associated vision of what constitutes our “security” (see Sidaway 2008). The economic decay and the entrenched political and social elites have effectively depoliticized discontent. There are no prospects that this will change in the near future. The US Empire will continue to wallow in chronic stagnation. retired Bartle Professor (Emeritus) of Sociology at Binghamton University in Binghamton. “Rising and Declining Economic Powers: The Sino-US Conflict Deepens. 49 Propaganda. Empires do not die peacefully.
and replace it with a rational choice logic of immediate and specific shared interest. of course. and partly because of the conspicuous turn to self-interested unilateralism that marked the eight years of the Bush administration. both those of the Bush administration and those more long-standing.99 of 154 Heg Unsustainable (Soft Power/Unpopular Policies) Heg is unsustainable -. and assisting in the self-destruction of its Palestinian negotiating partner. March 2011 vol. are widely perceived to have been counterproductive. The US had rather limited success in selling the GWoT as a global macro-securitization to replace the Cold War. 2011. and this seems set to continue. But during the Cold War. though here it has to be said that Europeans are just as culpable. to obstructionism on controlling climate change and the use of torture. Montague Burton Professor in the Department of International Relations (March 25. The Obama administration’s more robust line on the necessity of a two-state solution faces such daunting domestic and regional obstacles that its chances do not look promising. The main point for the question of US superpower legitimacy is that many of the US interventions in the Middle East. China and climate change – shows how the US stands ever more alone. as a consequence. The occupation of Iraq in 2003 looks set to generate far more and bigger problems than it has solved. “The Inaugural Kenneth N. and to an extent in the 1990s. 25 no. Middle East Buzan 11 – Barry. “The Inaugural Kenneth N. A brief look at three key policy areas – the Middle East/GWoT. not only feeding the terrorist problem. 16 and. More or less unconditional US support for Israel is a perennial Washington idiosyncrasy that inspires little enthusiasm elsewhere. partly because there is no longer any great ideological struggle to sustain it. US policy has often been controversial among its friends. and has so far hamstrung the US from pushing decisively towards a twostate solution to the Israel–Palestine problem. This festering sore has grown steadily worse. and limited nuclear war. During the Cold War the unattractive elements of US policy in the Middle East were masked by the general agreement on the need to contain the Soviet .unpopularity isolates the US -. This rhetorical shift seemed to abandon any US interest or belief in long-term friendships and alliances. unshielded by the mediating effects of any overarching common cause or closely shared identity.three examples: Buzan 11 – Barry. a. 1 3-25) Disagreements over policy in the Middle East already rank as one of the conspicuous areas of disaffection between the US and Europe. There has never been a golden age when the US was universally admired by the rest of the world. the particular policies of the US now stand largely on their own terms. 17 The Middle East is a profound mess and is likely to remain so.” International Relations. through its unquestioning support for Israel and its occupation of Iraq.” International Relations. Waltz Annual Lecture A World Order Without Superpowers : Decentred Globalism. but even that is undermined by the hypocrisy of the US turning a blind eye to Israel’s substantial nuclear arsenal while seeking to forbid Arab states and Iran from acquiring their own deterrents. From Cuba. Perhaps only on the question of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons does US policy in the Middle East enjoy much support. 18 but also deepening the many tragedies in the region. with Israel creating ever more difficult facts on the ground. Montague Burton Professor in the Department of International Relations (March 25. 25 no. Over the last decade that general sense has weakened rapidly. the impact of particular disaffections was offset by the widespread general sense that the West and its hangers-on were a lot better off with US leadership than without it. 1 3-25) The US. Waltz Annual Lecture A World Order Without Superpowers : Decentred Globalism. 2011. US support for the Saudi regime helps keep in power a government whose domestic deals with Wahabi Islamists recycles large sums of oil money into the support of Islamic fundamentalism. Vietnam and Chile. A striking symbol of this was the replacement of talk about ‘friends and allies’ or ‘the free world’ with a harsher instrumental line about ‘coalitions of the willing’. has never been short of unpopular foreign policies. March 2011 vol.
China. 25 no. Russia. it is far from clear that other powers will feel threatened by China’s challenge to US hegemony. bad and. Unpopular US policies and competing interests in the region from other powers provide no foundations for legitimising US leadership. and share an interest in non-intervention and regime security. Japan is the toughest problem facing China’s ‘peaceful rise’ strategy. Japan and the Soviet Union in their rising period. 24 If China’s rise is benign. and speaking of the need for a more multipolar world order. is that the long-standing drumbeat of concern in Washington about rising China as a peer competitor will get louder as China does indeed grow in power. which are often in competition with those of the US. In the absence of any common cause. India will probably try to continue to play the US and China against each other as it does now. whether peaceful or not. and US cultivation of China after 1971 helped to weaken the Soviet Union. but also amplified differences between the US and its allies. The US role in facilitating China’s ‘reform and opening up’ since 1978 has also been broadly popular. That might not look attractive compared with the options of either resolving the history problems and bandwagoning with China or following India into a more independent. but somewhat strengthened. China Buzan 11 – Barry. on the level of society and pubic opinion. Yet the two countries have developed a quite stable strategic partnership. and whose relationship with China remains deeply clouded by unsettled historical issues. which since the end of the Cold War has not only maintained. but the US securitizes it anyway. though less controversial than that on the Middle East. this US concern will be a parochial one. After the Iraq fiasco and the Afghan quagmire. also benefited from the masking effects of shared interests. of the other great . its alliance with the US. even ever-faithful Britain would have trouble joining in any new US intervention in this region. Russia may well want to continue to bandwagon with China against the US. But the Chinese leadership is determined to avoid the mistakes made by Germany. and will not feel threatened by it. leaving the main economic and political costs of balancing China to the US. 20 To the extent that realist thinking dominates in Washington. and staying broadly within the rules of the global economic order. middle-ground position between Washington and Beijing. b. Russia has worries about Chinese designs on the sparsely populated territories of the Russian Far East. underneath their formal political correctness. Unless China turns nasty and threatening. will be crucial to whether others share US perceptions of China as a threat. What is now in prospect.” International Relations. If a rising China becomes ultra-nationalist. Europe will not care much about its rise. aggressive and militarist. 1 3-25) US policy on China. with both governments in different ways to blame. 21 If they can carry off their design for a ‘peaceful rise’. however. March 2011 vol. During the Cold War. and the US retains its commitment to not tolerating any peer competitors. 22 have many useful economic complementarities. Japan and increasingly India have their own interests there. If China is relatively benign in the sense of not using violence against its neighbours. 2011. If it stays with the US. then a rising China. India has to balance a growing economic relationship with China against some still sensitive territorial disputes and a desire not to be overshadowed in status terms by China. getting worse. Those many voices currently in opposition to US hegemony. must appear threatening to the US.100 of 154 The GWoT not only failed to extend this cover. possibly none. Waltz Annual Lecture A World Order Without Superpowers : Decentred Globalism. it would find itself being the front line in a new Cold War between Washington and Beijing. then it could well be that others would share US perceptions. and its effective fragmentation by the West. shared by few. containment of China was part of the East–West struggle. The nature of the China that rises. then it becomes possible that US perceptions of China as threatening will not be shared widely. Japan will face very difficult choices. Union. Montague Burton Professor in the Department of International Relations (March 25. however. if at all. The US tie to Israel looks unlikely to change and will continue to poison Washington’s position in the region and much of the rest of the world. might welcome China’s rise. 19 the possibility of regional stability looks remote. A considerable weight of expert opinion thinks that Sino-Japanese relations are. Given both the deep divisions and antagonisms in the Middle East. But if China conducts its peaceful rise successfully. 23 The big question mark is Japan. “The Inaugural Kenneth N.
Waltz Annual Lecture A World Order Without Superpowers : Decentred Globalism. March 2011 vol.” International Relations. and even denial that there was a problem. whether domestic or international. Obama’s enthusiasm for green energy as a fix for both the environment and the economy has already been checked by the polarization in US politics. 1 3-25) Climate change is a relatively new issue with only slight links back to the Cold War. requires collective action of a kind with serious economic consequences. Climate change Buzan 11 – Barry.101 of 154 powers. c. if rising temperatures and sea levels are to be controlled. if not impossible. it is less clear that there is any fix for the problem of the unsustainable American lifestyle. 25 no. it could put the US more on its own in relation to great power politics than it has been since before the First World War. The commitment of Americans to a high consumption lifestyle. “The Inaugural Kenneth N. However. If China plays its hand cleverly. 2011. though developments in the private sector and at the level of state and city governments might well restore some US credibility in this area. and the Bush administration’s resistance to serious pollution and emission controls. Montague Burton Professor in the Department of International Relations (March 25. and the polarization of US politics will make it difficult. Yet the US is already unpopular on climate change. has in the eyes of many made the US more a part of the problem than of the solution. It poses questions of common fate for all of humankind and. This could easily become the dominant issue for world politics. though the scientific uncertainties are still sufficient that the exact timing and unfolding of it are difficult to predict. for the US to avoid remaining a big part of the problem .
America must quickly accept and adjust to this reality. but how much longer will it do so as its own social standards rise far above this lowest common denominator? And why should China or other Asian countries become “responsible stakeholders. but it did not assure that the West would dominate forever — materially or morally. It already has.com/2008/01/27/magazine/27world-t. will replace the U. “Accidental empire” or not. while Europe and China occupy two ends of the great Eurasian landmass that is the perennial center of gravity of geopolitics. South Korea. what we see gradually happening in climate-change negotiations (as in Bali in December) — and need to see more of in the areas of preventing nuclear proliferation and rebuilding failed states — is a far greater sense of a division of labor . lacking the ingredients for organizational success. it successfully managed the Herculean task of running the world from one side of it. and history promises the effort will fail. it has been shunned by the E. What makes America unique in this seemingly value-free contest is not its liberal democratic ideals — which Europe may now represent better than America does — but rather its geography. and climate change Khanna. Now its very presence in Eurasia is tenuous. the most money of any region in the world. Western imperialism united the globe. America is isolated.102 of 154 Heg Decline Inevitable Hegemonic decline is inevitable – a transition now towards multipolarity solves conflict.U. others are walking away from the American game and playing by their own rules. Today the Asian landscape still features ancient civilizations but also by far the most people and. Maintaining America’s empire can only get costlier in both blood and treasure. When America dominated NATO and led a rigid Pacific alliance system with Japan.U. Instead. Neither China nor the E. the only direction to go from the apogee of power is down. The self-deluding universalism of the American imperium — that the world inherently needs a single leader and that American liberal ideology must be accepted as the basis of global order — has paradoxically resulted in America quickly becoming an everlonelier superpower. America’s spirit is weakened. not least the Chinese model of economic growth without political liberalization (itself an affront to Western modernization theory). The rise of China in the East and of the European Union within the West has fundamentally altered a globe that recently appeared to have only an American gravity — pro or anti.html? _r=3&oref=slogin&pagewanted=all) Karl Marx and Max Weber both chastised Far Eastern cultures for being despotic. agrarian and feudal. and Turkey. in an American-led international order when they had no seat at the table when the rules were drafted? Even as America stumbles back toward multilateralism. Despite the “mirage of immortality” that afflicts global empires. The web of globalization now has three spiders. as the world’s sole leader. by certain measures. may uphold the principles of the United Nations that America once dominated.” in former Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick’s words. Just as there is a geopolitical marketplace.S. while China will push a Beijing consensus based on respect for sovereignty and mutual economic benefit. multicultural landscape filled with transnational challenges from terrorism to global warming is completely unmanageable by a single authority. Would the world not be more stable if America could be reaccepted as its organizing principle and leader? It’s very much too late to be asking. The E. Australia and Thailand. because the answer is unfolding before our eyes. I believe that a complex. Europe will promote its supranational integration model as a path to resolving Mideast disputes and organizing Africa. 08 (Parag Khanna. rather all three will constantly struggle to gain influence on their own and balance one another. arguing that mankind both lives and thinks in unique cultural systems. the only reliable rule of history is its cycles of imperial rise and decline. Asia is shaping the world’s destiny — and exposing the flaws of the grand narrative of Western civilization in the process. proliferation. America must make itself irresistible to stay in the game. It isn’t worth it.U. With or without America. As Europe’s and China’s spirits rise with every move into new domains of influence. with Western ideals neither transferable nor relevant. Oswald Spengler saw it differently. there is a marketplace of models of success for the second world to emulate. senior research fellow in the American Strategy Program of the New America Foundation. Globalization resists centralization of almost any kind. whether the United States or the United Nations. is unwelcome in much of the Middle East and has lost much of East Asia’s confidence. and as Toynbee also pithily noted. As the historian Arnold Toynbee observed half a century ago. “Waving Goodbye to Hegemony” http://www.nytimes.
The arbitrarily composed Security Council is not the place to hash out such a division of labor. Neither are any of the other multilateral bodies bogged down with weighted voting and cacophonously irrelevant voices. The big issues are for the Big Three to sort out among themselves. . a concrete burden-sharing among them by which they are judged not by their rhetoric but the responsibilities they fulfill.103 of 154 among the Big Three.
and opens up new niches of influence. It reveals vulnerabilities. . it sets up the conditions for the emergence of new models of power. Right now. It weakens the powerful. setting the mighty against the mighty. The climate and resource crises of the 2010s and 2020s will be compounded by a vacuum of global leadership. but it’s an important driver. Cascio.php/IEET/more/cascio20080407/) Resource collapse isn’t the cause of the rise of the post-hegemonic world. It triggers conflict. The same can be said of the leading global corporate powers. IEET. Senior Fellow. 08 (Jamais Cascio. “The Big Picture: Resource Collapse. as ultimately the most effective responses to resource collapse will come from revolutions in technology and socio-economic behavior. Most importantly. Those actors adopting the new successful models will find themselves disproportionately powerful.104 of 154 Alt Cause – Resource Collapse Resource collapse is important factor in hegemonic collapse.” http://ieet. 4/8/08. degree in Political Science. none of the leading great power nations seem well-suited to discover and adopt such new models. Senior Fellow of Institute for Emerging Ethics and Technologies (IEET).org/index.
It cannot introduce conscription because of the general demilitarisation of society and also because elite youths are no longer prepared to set an example of leadership and sacrifice by serving themselves. In the former Soviet Union.supported by both parties -. unlike in 1917 or 1941. global power. this is something that American policymakers -.php) U. In an equally classical fashion. The result is that the US is incapable of waging more wars of occupation. For it is pointless to dream of long maintaining an American empire for which most Americans will neither pay nor fight. It is important to note that this US weakness affects not only the ambitions of the Bush administration. It is to fall back on "offshore balancing". but also geopolitical stances wholly shared by the Democrats. however. establishment.S. Mass acquiescence in this has to be bought with much smaller -.cuts to taxes on the middle classes. can present US strategy against Iran -. but also defusing the threat of confrontation with China by encouraging the reintegration of Taiwan into the mainland. Impossible today. this process may occur through disastrous defeats.org/archives/2005/11/index. regional consensuses in support of order and stability. it becomes clear how utterly unacceptable much of this approach would be to the entire existing US political order. really serious war risks US economic disaster. intended to create regional coalitions against potential aggressors and. To place American power on a firmer footing requires putting it on a more limited footing. when possible. is unsustainable. The empire can no longer raise enough taxes or soldiers. Even a limited US-Chinese clash over Taiwan would be likely to produce catastrophic economic consequences for both sides. “Decadent America Must Give Up Imperial Ambitions” 11-29-05. it could mean accepting a qualified form of Russian sphere of influence. Despite the lessons of Iraq. In the Middle East. one traces what this might mean in practice in various parts of the world. The Bush administration deserves to be savagely criticised for the timing and the conduct of the Iraq war. some at least of these moves may. but direct military commitments and alliances should be avoided wherever possible. and that given the realities of Iraqi society and history. Future historians may. Like so many of their predecessors. Not just a direct military presence. the US wealthy classes have gained a grip over the state that allows them to escape taxation. In Asia.105 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (1/18) Hegemony is unsustainable – slow decline now avoids a disastrous collapse later Lieven. however. civilian and military -. senior research fellow at the New America Foundation and a member of the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy.Democrat and Republican. http://www. it could involve separating US goals from Israeli ones and seeking detente with Iran. in the course of which American global power will not be qualified but destroyed altogether.but fiscally equally damaging -. as presently conceived by the overwhelming majority of the U. rather than as a result of carefully planned and peaceful strategy. prove inescapable in a generation's time. central to what is happening is the greed and decadence of the imperial elites. however. The basic reasons why the American empire is bust are familiar from other imperial histories. it is increasingly indebted and key vassal states are no longer reliable. It can defeat other states in battle easily enough but it cannot turn them into loyal or stable allies. given the nature of the Middle East. the relative decline in US economic independence means that. When. the desirable US response to its imperial overstretch is simple and has been advocated by some leading independent US thinkers such as Professor Stephen Walt of Harvard. with potentially awful consequences for the world. War therefore means simply creating more and more areas of anarchy and breeding grounds for terrorism. My fear though is that. such as in Iraq. For that matter.be sustained permanently without war? Indeed.realisticforeignpolicy. conclude that President Bill Clinton's strategy of the 1990s would also have made the conquest of Iraq unavoidable sooner or later.still find extremely difficult to think about. The result is that the empire can no longer pay for enough of the professional troops it needs to fulfil its self-assumed imperial tasks. the results would not have been significantly less awful. it could mean backing Japan and other countries against any Chinese aggression. may it not be that any power wishing to exercise hegemony in the region would have to go to war at regular intervals in defence of its authority or its local clients? Furthermore.S. . In theory. 05 (Anatol Lieven.
China is cutting massive resource and investment deals.html? _r=3&oref=slogin&pagewanted=all) The East Asian Community is but one example of how China is also too busy restoring its place as the world’s “Middle Kingdom” to be distracted by the Middle Eastern disturbances that so preoccupy the United States. From Thailand to Indonesia to Korea. 08 (Parag Khanna. Like Europeans. To the Western eye. it is also making major strategic investments in the financial sector.106 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (2/18) Hegemonic decline is inevitable – China rivals US influence and acts as a stabilizing force in Asia Khanna. it is a bizarre phenomenon: small Asian nation-states should be balancing against the rising China. while China has slashed tariffs and increased loans to its Southeast Asian neighbors.com/2008/01/27/magazine/27world-t. In America’s own hemisphere. Trade within the India-Japan-Australia triangle — of which China sits at the center — has surpassed trade across the Pacific. Aided by a 35 millionstrong ethnic Chinese diaspora well placed around East Asia’s rising economies. And in the former Soviet Central Asian countries — the so-called Stans — China is the new heavyweight player. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization gathers these Central Asian strongmen together with China and Russia and may eventually become the “NATO of the East. it is deploying tens of thousands of its own engineers.” . aid workers. Across the globe.nytimes. no country — friend of America’s or not — wants political tension to upset economic growth. “Waving Goodbye to Hegemony” http://www. Asians are insulating themselves from America’s economic uncertainties. from Canada to Cuba to Chávez’s Venezuela. Under Japanese sponsorship.S. China is not only securing energy supplies. pinning America down while filling whatever power vacuums it can find. but increasingly they rally toward it out of Asian cultural pride and an understanding of the historical-cultural reality of Chinese dominance. now enjoys a diplomatic. dam-builders and covert military personnel. senior research fellow in the American Strategy Program of the New America Foundation. Iran being the most prominent example. its manifest destiny pushing its Han pioneers westward while pulling defunct microstates like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. as well as oil-rich Kazakhstan. resulting in America’s grip on the Pacific Rim being loosened one finger at a time. At the same time. into its orbit. they plan to launch their own regional monetary fund. a Greater Chinese CoProsperity Sphere has emerged. economic or strategic lifeline from China. The whole world is abetting China’s spectacular rise as evidenced by the ballooning share of trade in its gross domestic product — and China is exporting weapons at a rate reminiscent of the Soviet Union during the cold war. In Africa. Without firing a shot. a set of Asian security and diplomatic institutions is being built from the inside out. Every country in the world currently considered a rogue state by the U. China is doing on its southern and western peripheries what Europe is achieving to its east and south.
the early 21st century may be seen as the time when some in the developing world led by China and India came into their Own. at some point within the next decade or two. there are always potential pitfalls in projecting current trends several decades into the future (not least is that it is not easy to convert economic power into effective military power). the primacists are correct. a recent study by the CIA’s Strategic Assessment Group projects that by 2020 both China (which Mapping the Global Future pegs as “by any measure a first-rate military power” around 2020) and the European Union will come close to matching the United States in terms of their respective shares of world power. that—at best—the United States will not be able to hold onto its primacy much beyond 2030. and military developments which has existed since time immemorial. not static. The relative power position of great powers is dynamic. p. American primacy cannot be sustained indefinitely." American Empire: A Debate. [Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute. The real issue is not if American primacy will end. as Paul Kennedy has observed. Thus. It will take some time before any other state emerges as a true “peer competitor” of the United States.38 For sure. the CIA’s National Intelligence Council’s report Mapping the Global Future notes: The likely emergence of China and India as new major global players—similar to the rise of Germany in the 19th century and the United States in the early 20th century—will transform the geopolitical landscape. the leading primacists acknowledge. that American primacy could end much sooner than that. new poles of power in the international system are likely to emerge during the next decade or two. which means that at any point in time some states are gaining in relative power while others are losing it. however. but how soon it will end.” 36 Even the most ardent primacists know this to be true. technological advance. Christopher LAYNE 2007. primacy to multipolarity may be much closer than primacists want to admit.S. But China isn’t the only factor in play. because that would imply a freezing of the differentiated pattern of growth rates."The Case Against the American Empire. In a similar vein. there is a yawning gap between the United States and the next-ranking powers. In the same way that commentators refer to the 1900s as the American Century. For example. no great power ever has been able “to remain permanently ahead of all others. which is why they concede that American primacy won’t last forever. There are indications. To put it slightly differently. 64-65] Can the United States Be Caught? Up to a point. . Indeed. In terms of hard power. new great power rivals to the United States will emerge. But if the ongoing shift in the distribution of relative power continues. This is what the current debate in the United States about the implications of China’s rise is all about. in its survey of likely international developments up until 2020.107 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (3/18) We control uniqueness – collapse of primacy is inevitable by 2030. Already there is evidence suggesting that new great powers are in the process of emerging . Nevertheless. and transition from U. with impacts potentially as dramatic as those of the previous two.
which is a potentially dangerous strategy. it probably will. indeed. Maintaining U." American Empire: A Debate.S. attempting to sustain U. Walter Lippmann and Kenneth Waltz-- always warned of the dangers that a hegemonic United States would over-reach itself and. Americans would do well to pay heed to these admonitions as they debate how the United States should alter its grand strategy as the unipolar era inexorably draws to a close. p. 130 It also must rein in the scope of its extravagant ambitions to shape the international system in accordance with its Wilsonian ideology. by asserting its power heavy-handedly. the real realists have understood the true paradox of American power: Precisely because of its power and geography. They not only recognized that a wise grand strategy must balance ends and means. The United States does not need to be an extraregional hegemon to be secure. the United States must practice self-restraint (which is different from choosing to be constrained by others by adopting a multilateral approach to grand strategy). is America's next grand strategy. hegemony is a game that no longer is worth the candle. . They understood that the world is not malleable and will not respond to American-imposed social engineering. Kennan. An America [End Page 40] that has the wisdom and prudence to contain itself is less likely to be feared than one that begs the rest of the world to stop it before it expands hegemonically again.S. Rather than risking these outcomes. Fall http://findarticles.S. National Interest. power. Kennan. If the United States fails to adopt an offshore balancing strategy based on multipolarity and military and ideological self-restraint. yet the very fact of its overwhelming capabilities has been a constant temptation for American policymakers to intervene abroad unwisely in the pursuit of unattainable goals (nation building or democracy promotion). especially given that U. provoke opposition to it. 64-65] The United States has a hegemony problem because it wields hegemonic power. America's real realists--George F. 131 Thus. and will remain so even if it no longer is a hegemon.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_85/ai_n16832448 The United States is a very powerful state. Its quest for hegemony is driven instead by an ideational. primacy may already be in the early stages of erosion.S. thus causing the United States to become imperially overstretched and involving it in unnecessary wars that will reduce its power. Morgenthau and Waltz have highlighted the dangers that await if the United States gives in to the temptations of hegemonic power and have counseled instead that the United States pursue a grand strategy based on prudence and self-restraint. deterritorialized conception of security divorced from the traditional metrics of great power grand strategy: the distribution of power in the international system and geography. Paradoxically. [Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute. have to fight to uphold its primacy. Unilateral offshore balancing. Heg is unsustainable Christopher Layne 2006. there is very little the United States needs to do in the world in order to be secure. at some point. primacy may well hasten its end by stimulating more intensive efforts to balance against the United States. To reduce the fear of U. Real realists like Lippmann. Hans Morgenthau. but also one that ultimately is unsustainable."The Case Against the American Empire. but also that it must differentiate between desirable objectives and attainable ones. Most of all. the United States should begin to retrench strategically and capitalize on the advantages accruing to insular great powers in multipolar systems. to reduce others' concerns about its power.108 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (4/18) Collapse of hegemony and transition to off-shore balancing inevitable – delaying it just causes war Christopher LAYNE 2007. the United States must accept some reduction in its relative hard power by adopting a multipolar—and essentially unilateral—offshore balancing strategy that accommodates the rise of new great powers. Hegemony is not only a costly grand strategy.
p. in preserving a balance of power. the strategy of empire is unlikely to function if all sorts of states are allowed to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as a deterrent against the power projection of the United States. offense-minded states are apt to be war-prone because they believe the prospects for victory are very favorable to them.” From this perspective. [its] military strengths beyond challenge. That’s because the doctrine of prevention or preemption is predicated on the “ideology of the offensive. the risk of nuclear war could actually rise. .) That approach is consistent with the strategy of empire. and “we have to be ready for preemptive action” because “if we wait for threats to fully materialize. That’s because accepting the principle of noninterference is an impediment to a dominant state seeking to make other nations conform to its will. But the “$64. . is to speak loudly (extended deterrence) and cut up and scatter Washington’s inadequate stick all over the place.” 91 In his June 2. President Bush laid out his vision of a future in which the United States more or less monopolizes global military power through preemption if necessary: “America has.” 96 (continued from previous page – nothing cut) Consequently. the exceptions justify it—lest we establish precedents that others will emulate. proximity matters.” 94 “There’s no question that great powers like the United States [can] launch preventative wars or preemptive strikes whenever they conclude it’s in their interests.” What’s more. thus triggering a spiral of security competition that .109 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (5/18) Collapse is inevitable – sustaining hegemony only causes war and proliferation Eland 2002 (Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute.” said Bush. . or appears to undermine. Nov 26. we will have waited too long. . Certainly. whereby the efforts of weaker states to increase their relative security undermines. The logic of empire therefore dictates that as few states as possible should be allowed to gain a defensive footing with the United States. As political scientist Frank Russell once wrote: “Rome . the strategy of empire necessarily leads to a devaluation of other states’ sovereignty. to make sure WMD proliferation is stopped at all costs. adopted preemption as their official policy. including war. The Bush administration’s National Security Strategy boldly asserts that “our best defense is a good offense.” 95 The strategy of empire.” which means taking military action before an imminent attack by an adversary.18) The answer is probably no.” adds Mearsheimer. Such states also see these weapons as their best means of overcoming the conventional superiority of the United States. It will also increase the likelihood of war. obtains them. I think it would be better not to do that. We just have to be careful that if we create exceptions to those rules. and intends to keep. in many cases the United States might launch a preventive attack to stop an incipient threat before it is even realized. Rome certainly was not interested in a balance of power for the very reason she was interested in a monopoly of power. however. if other nations. the Bush administration notes: “These weapons may .000 question is whether or not it makes sense to stand on the rooftops and announce loudly to the world that this is your doctrine. offense-minded states have a tendency to incite security dilemmas. before a nation working on WMD. In other words. speech to West Point’s graduating class.” the belief that “the presence of oceans on much of the earth’s surface makes it impossible for any state to achieve global hegemony. which are things an empire cannot accept if it is committed to maintaining supremacy. allow [end page 13] these states to attempt to blackmail the United States and our allies to prevent us from deterring or repelling the aggressive behavior of rogue states. State sovereignty also allows for the formation of multiple loci of power and the prospect of power balancing. . In its National Security Strategy. 93 Indeed. What’s more. such as Iraq. “The Empire Strikes Out: The ‘New Imperialism’ and its Fatal Flaws”. such as India and Pakistan. In practice this idea will bring preventative efforts. for example. “One of the reasons there is not a constant state of war. A balance of power system is essentially a device for keeping the power of different states within limits by a system of checks and balances. Over the long run the strategy of empire will likely prove unsustainable and ultimately self-defeating. never was interested . The echo of Rome is clear.” which says that striking early is less difficult than striking later. which raises what John Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago has called the “stopping power of water. and it spends much more on its defense than all its rivals combined. I favor the Teddy Roosevelt approach to foreign policy: Speak softly and carry a big stick. the security of the offense-minded state. That’s a blueprint for trouble if there ever was one.” 92 (Although the president used the word “preemptive. “is that we all expect certain rules.” says a skeptical Bush administration official. 2002. . But supporting preventative or preemptive action could shift the rules of the world order against peace and stability. the United States currently has the world’s most powerful military. But it costs far more for the United States—a relatively secure nation separated from most of the world by two vast oceans—to project its power across the seas than it does for states located on other landmasses to project their power regionally.
. The other major problem with the doctrine of prevention or preemption is that in the absence of actual aggression against the United States. 97 For example.110 of 154 can culminate in confrontation or war. 98 Hence there is a paradox. it may want more ability to control its security environment within East Asia. The doctrine of prevention or preemptive intervention could actually create a greater incentive for other states to try to acquire WMD secretly as an insurance policy against American military might. which has a defense perimeter that is far forward and a military doctrine that is very preventive or preemptive. which could in turn spur even more U. And other states will worry that the doctrine could be used against them. The expansion of Chinese influence in that region may run afoul of a United States.S. as China’s economy grows. Inevitable mistakes will lead to recrimination and suspicions about America’s motives. how will Washington prove that an attack might have happened? Surely some foreign and domestic critics will discount the threat afterward.
expanding the campaign against terrorism to a country like Iraq would place severe strains on personnel and cause deep shortages of certain critical weapons.” 105 Empire. The primary danger is from an interventionist foreign policy that makes enemies who are resourceful and willing move into and exploit failed states. Western Europe and the British Isles were all under some kind of threat as the 1930s went on.) The unintended consequence of interventionism. the United States could conceivably lose one or more large cities to demented or irrational retaliation for American intervention. the Middle East and Mediterranean. to make only the most cautious response to Japanese aggression in China—all this followed in large part from the need to diminish the number of one’s enemies. telling other states and aspiring states who their leaders should be. could be more interventionism. .” 99 Yet it was such nation building that led to the attack on U. that is. The commitments were almost literally worldwide. Thus.” 101 The conclusion was that the American military would be stretched very thin. in other words.S. or deeply buried facilities. 104 In 1937. like the proverbial man who finds himself stuck in a hole. the demands of long-term deployments in places like the Balkans and South Korea. One of the primary reasons Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain appeased Adolf Hitler at Munich in 1938 was that much of Britain’s strength was diffused throughout its far-flung empire. policy or assuming a lower profile. . garrisoning myriad outposts. for ramping up U. The Joint Chiefs of Staff subsequently recommended postponing an attack against Iraq. M. (Yet as President Clinton [end page 14] found out in 1998 during Operation Desert Fox. Empires get into trouble because they get bogged down fighting protracted small wars in the hinterland. The Dominions. a recent top-secret Pentagon war game. and accumulating manifold security and treaty commitments they are obliged to honor. Bell: [end page 15] The fundamental problem was the disparity between Britain’s commitments and her resources. code named Prominent Hammer. to avoid confrontation with the Axis powers over the Spanish Civil War. As former Reagan adviser and Cato Institute senior fellow Doug Bandow warns: “With the growing ability of small political movements and countries to kill U. H. that is. “The war game measured how the strains of new commitments to domestic defense. Their conclusion was that England should not make new enemies. today’s advocates of empire are unable to break out of their consolidating logic.” says Bell. in other words. . southwest Asia and the Sinai. And over the longer term there is the issue of being ready to fight a major theater war if necessary.S. to find the basis of a settlement with Germany. economic aid. London was not in a position to rebuff a rising Nazi Germany early on because Britain was overstretched . citizens and to threaten mass destruction. the United States may find that its alliances and commitments around the world may sap its strength for dealing with any rising power—perhaps China. and launching wars to transform countries like Iraq “into a beacon of hope. Instead. promulgating foreign educational and health care programs. reduced Britain’s options in the face of a horrible danger. Failed states are already an example of those self-reinforcing phenomena. America and its citizens will become an even greater lightning rod for the world’s political malcontents. even now.S. Australia and New Zealand. but that interventionism can create altogether new ones. Failed states matter to today’s advocates of empire because the existence of such states raises the specter that interventionist foreign policies in one place can have a deadly price tag made possible by individuals willing to take advantage of the situation in another place.” The strategy of empire could make the United States less secure in another major way as well—by dispersing and overtasking its military personnel and equipment. But digging will neither get the man out of the hole nor make the United States safer. 103 According to British historian P. Britain’s chiefs of staff produced a gloomy assessment of London’s security prospects. According to the New York Times. those advocates see it as an argument for deeper involvement. the fact that so many people in the Muslim world dislike America’s meddling is not seen as an argument for rethinking U. “To reach an accommodation with Italy in the Mediterranean. and the stress of ongoing operations in Afghanistan. in short. shows. not that interventionism necessarily solves problems. has revealed that. Similarly. the danger posed by failed states is a consequence of something other than state failure per se. would affect the military’s ability to wage and win a new regional war. .111 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (6/18) [Card continued without omission] prevention or preemption. Nevertheless. 102 The strategic implications are potentially enormous. the security threat posed by failed states is really a second-order issue. The very problem of failed states. though asserting their independence of the mother country. that is. the risks of foreign entanglements increase. forces in Somalia.S. still relied on her for protection. In coming years. preventive attacks on installations associated with those superweapons often founder on a lack of intelligence on the location of such clandestine small mobile. Accordingly. In fact. Thus . Malaya and Singapore. “The policy of ‘appeasement’ should never be appraised without recalling this sternly realistic recommendation. today’s advocates of empire recommend more digging.
During the Cold War. together with American consumption and investment. Controlling hostile populations will demand extensive linguistic and policing skills. how long will America's enthusiasm for hegemony endure? . while the United States' external deficit is bigger than ever. to date. and prepared for high casualties. This current shortage of means is a further blow to America's hegemonic expectations. has not been very good at it. it seems unreasonable to expect China to continue this practice indefinitely. like countering guerrilla warfare and suicidal terrorism. for example. China. Today. The American military loathes this kind of fighting and. trained for intimate contact with the enemy. Survival. Director of the European Studies Program. having a hegemonic superpower already installed might seem a great good fortune. American power counts for less than expected. the United States will face the tougher choices between guns and butter it has long been able to avoid. Put to the test. Given the growing protectionism against its exports.112 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (7/18) Unipolar hegemony is unsustainable and doesn’t solve the terminal impacts Calleo. In the face of this unaccustomed constraint. If credit from China is restricted. Financial experience during the Cold War accustomed the United States to abundant credit from the world economy. Yet. subsidises its own imports. these others were allies dependent on American military protection. p.with more and cheaper troops. recent experience also reveals that America's global predominance has been seriously overestimated. however. pursuing a hegemonic agenda in today's world requires different capabilities for more primitive forms of combat. Greater success would seem to require a different sort of military . with a good part of the exchange costs of America's world role eventually covered by others who accumulated the surplus dollars. by continuing to add to its already immense reserves of surplus dollars. credit to finance it no longer depends on allies in urgent need of protection. Instead. but is still far short of the resources needed to prevail. The United States is now spending heavily to compensate for its deficiencies. University Professor of The Johns Hopkins University. credit comes increasingly from states whose indefinite accumulation of dollars seems contrary to their own long-term interests. 73-8) Given our future's high potential for discord and destruction. While the United States is lavishly outfitted for high-technology warfare. but at the expense of its own more balanced internal development. 2007 (Dean Acheson Professor.
the specific economic relationship between the European Union (EU) and the United States does not fit the general pattern of U. The EU can thus engage. Even the U nited States. it does suggest several different avenues by which states and disaffected peoples will resist U. and North Korea are shedding light on the various ways in which nuclear. http://belfercenter. What? Forms of Resistance to American Hegemony”. Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Connecticut in Storrs.conventional weapons. states can resist by withholding cooperation. Iran. First. The EU has some economic weight to throw around when it disagrees with U. This gives those who are needed some leverage over the United States. Fourth.S. . the United States has created the impression that non-conventional weapons are the best form of defense against the American empire. then. They resort to two tactics of the weak: terrorism and the possession of non. economic dictates. anti-American resentment. symbols. and rogue states Pressman 2004 (Jeremy Pressman.edu/publication/2943/if_not_balancing_what_forms_of_resis tance_to_american_hegemony.html) What. Third.S. still needs cooperation from far weaker states on a host of issues such as the intelligence and police work needed to combat global terrorism.ksg. are these forms of resistance? While the past decade of U. In projecting American military power around the globe. a few actors look for shortcuts to overcome the massive imbalance in military capabilities. economic policy or wants to resist U. the war of words.113 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (8/18) Many factors challenge American hegemony including terrorism. While terrorism has long been seen as a weapon of the weak. hegemony does not offer a crystal clear road map. chemical. and biological weapons may now be seen as a way of deflecting unwanted attention from Washington. hegemony. Other countries utilize rhetorical attacks and symbolic protests against U. violence.S. recent events in Iraq. dominance. for example. in trade wars with the United States. which opens the door to American-European economic confrontations. They may hope to sway the American public . policy in an effort to win the verbal war for hearts and minds at home and abroad. “If Not Balancing.harvard. Anti-American actors rely in part on words to overcome material inferiority to the United States. win recruits. even if the EU lacks the military might to engage in military disagreements.S.S. and images does not simply reflect the will and ideas of the strongest country. Second.S. and build support for anti-U.S. perhaps the most dominant great power in history.
Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Connecticut in Storrs.S. They may judge and prioritize threats differently.114 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (9/18) America’s policy of aggression tanks cooperation efforts which are key to sustainable heg Pressman 2004 (Jeremy Pressman. Syria. and NATO involvement in getting ready. To some extent. once the United States decided to target Iraq in 2002-03. the door was open for meaningful non. “If Not Balancing. http://belfercenter. No sustainable Heg—Policies like Iraq have tanked cooperation with important US allies Pressman 2004 (Jeremy Pressman. or suspects. effort. a hyperpower still needs cooperation in some areas. interests. This would be especially true when siding too closely with Washington could increase domestic political opposition and mobilize a strong challenge to regime survival. financial support for reconstruction. allies sometimes have different objectives. but Turkey held out for much more. evidence.harvard.S. Although the United States is dominant in many realms.harvard.cooperation by standard U.edu/publication/2943/if_not_balancing_what_forms_of_resis tance_to_american_hegemony. certain nearby real estate became very important.S. Longtime U. Iraq assisted UN inspectors just enough so that some countries believed inspections were working even as Britain and the United States continued to decry Iraqi non. In other words.ksg. On cooperation more generally.ksg.S. interest. Kuwait was quick to support the U. Iraqi policy contributed to non.compliance. For instance.S. they often favor a different policy to realize that interest. putative allies may not feel inhibited about undermining the U.edu/publication/2943/if_not_balancing_what_forms_of_resis tance_to_american_hegemony. drug trafficking or intelligence-sharing.S. policy. Vetoing UNSC resolutions. the war against al-Qaeda is illustrative. or. Opponents of the war on Iraq used the threat of non-cooperation to slow the drive to war. bases are not immune to opposition either. preferences. Iraq appeared very aware of the possibility that its potential opponents could be divided by carefully calibrated Iraqi actions. The importance of the Turkish parliamentís vote against granting the U. when they share the U. military greater access was based largely on the geographic cards Turkey holds. If other countries always had the same interests and policies as the United States.S. Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Connecticut in Storrs. Pakistan. countries often drag their feet and slow the flow of information. withholding cooperation would be counterproductive. Once the United States asked for things like UN support for the war.cooperation. The United States has worked with a wide range of states including Britain. efforts. some states have unique assets that the United States covets.html) The dilemma of non-cooperation was also exemplified in other ways during the buildup to a war with Iraq. non-cooperation by less powerful states hurts U. But the depth of cooperation is always going to be in part a reflection of how willing the American partner is to cooperate. or preventing military preparations in Turkey under the NATO umbrella are all ways of resisting U. “If Not Balancing. What? Forms of Resistance to American Hegemony”. Yet even close U. Whether based on different interests or different policy preferences to pursue shared interests. .S. the United States can pressure other countries to cooperate. Spain.S. they can resist by reducing cooperation that is essential for the advancement of U. http://belfercenter. By virtue of geography. Such support is essential for gathering intelligence and conducting international police work.S.html) When other countries disapprove of U. allies like France or Germany. For counter-terrorism. approach.S. What? Forms of Resistance to American Hegemony”. and Uzbekistan. withholding funds for the post-war reconstruction of Iraq. as the United States experienced in the Philippines and more recently in Okinawa. If the United States is too aggressive or dismissive of local concerns.
http://belfercenter.S. Rhetorical assaults can increase the impact of other tactics such as non-cooperation. even if the words are not backed by material capabilities. asymmetric warfare. words and symbols can be used to make it harder for the United States to pursue and protect its interests. international media.S. The battle for hearts and minds is a two way street: while Washington is trying to build domestic support and win non-U.S.ksg. In a system that values debate and the clash of ideas. foreign opponents of U. States from getting the UN blessing for the war on Iraq. support. In hindsight. What? Forms of Resistance to American Hegemony”. public as well as non. policy are trying to convince the U.edu/publication/2943/if_not_balancing_what_forms_of_resis tance_to_american_hegemony.115 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (10/18) International media and propaganda spur strong anti-American resentment tanking heg Pressman 2004 (Jeremy Pressman. opponents can range from longtime allies like France and Germany to the very target of the war. The open American system.harvard.S. supporters in other countries. Words. . stopped the United the absence of the United Nations or some form of the international community meant the loss of access to Turkey during the war and greater difficulty getting aid and personnel to provide security and help with reconstruction. At the end of the day. As became clear with Iraq.U.S. words are free if the topic is of interest to the international media. policies. policy to win over both segments of the American public and U. “If Not Balancing. Iraq. peoples. for example. Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Connecticut in Storrs. With the right message.S. as we see in the next section. any bit player can lambaste the United States.html) Another effect of words and symbols is that they can be used to undermine both domestic and international support for U.S. and foreign lobbying create opportunities for those opposed to U. or.
American hegemony cannot be maintained much beyond that period. Make no mistake: sometime in the early decades of the twenty-first century. The United States could be hegemonic only because the Soviet threat caused others to accept American preeminence as prefer. The changing distribution of power in the inter. If the United States does not choose now to begin making the transition to a new grand strategy better suited to the new century's emerging international realities. and their tangible and intangible domestic effects. . without the Cold War. is that bad things--perhaps far worse things--could happen if the United States stays on its present strategic course. events will force it to do so. I do not deprecate those who believe that bad things (increased geopolitical instability) could happen if the United States were to abandon the strategy of preponderance. Summer. The time to think about alternative grand strategic futures is now--before the United States is overtaken by events. Over time. Simply put. The other half. that is only half of the argument. International politics is dynamic.116 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (11/18) U.. whether they are sustainable." The conditions that made American preponderance possible are changing rapidly. American grand strategists view the prospect of change in international politics in much the same way that British prime minister Lord Salisbury did toward the end of the nineteenth century. The suggestion that the days of American hegemony are numbered no doubt will be met with disbelief by advocates of the current grand strategy. grand strategy must use these criteria to assess the comparative merits of both the current grand strategy and its competitors. "What ever happens will be for the worse.S. Indeed. As Paul Kennedy has observed.. the relative decline of U. they may. “Rethinking American grand strategy: Hegemony or balance of power in the twenty-first century?” vol. In advocating an offshore balancing strategy. power and the corresponding rise of new great powers-will render the strategy of preponderance untenable. hegemony prevents us from emerging as an offshore balancer – hegemonic decline is inevitable – it is better to let it decline now so we can choose our strategic position in the world Christopher Layne 1998. The United States could enjoy the relative predictability and stability of the bipolar era only be. "It simply has not been given to any one society to remain permanently ahead of all the oth. the advocates of preponderance want to keep the world the way it is. their cost. the costs and risks of the strategy of preponderance will rise to unacceptably high levels. 15 iss. America 's grand strategy will no longer be preponderance. seldom acknowledged by champions of preponderance. Grand strategies must be judged by the amount of security they provide.S.. Having fulfilled their hegemonic ambitions following the Soviet Union 's collapse." Salisbury said. however.cause of the effects of bipolarity itself. it is the very fact of the Soviet Union 's collapse that has knocked the props out from under the strategy of preponderance. This is unsurprising. not static. The time is rapidly approaching when the strategy of preponderance will be unable to pass these tests. America will not be able to preserve its Cold War preponderance or stability. Visiting Associate Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School [World Policy Journal." However. proquest] My argument for adopting an alternative grand strategy is prospective: although it may be sustainable for perhaps another decade.S.able to Soviet domination.national system-specifically. the degree of risk they entail.ers. Any serious debate about U. "and therefore it is in our interest that as little should happen as possible. This strategy is also being undermined because the credibility of America 's extended deterrence strategy is eroding rapidly. 2.
Associate Professor at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A & M." But there is more to it than that. Unipolarity is the foundation of U. so will U. 17. America's renewed credibility would cause Germany and Japan to be more forthcoming in their economic relations with Washington.117 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (12/18) Collapse inevitable – free-riding Christopher Layne 1993 (Visiting Associate Professor at Naval Postgraduate school. International Security. benign hegemony facilitates the diffusion of wealth and technology to potential rivals. unipolarity persists. Vol. primacy. . Moreover. “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise”. 31 To be sure. p. 125 Such a "leverage strategy" is no mere abstraction. George Bush's New World Order and Bill Clinton's apparent commitment to assertive projection of America's democratic and human rights values reflect America's desire to "press its preferred policies" on others. Over time.S. which allows them to shift additional resources into economically productive investments. No doubt. Heg collapse inevitable – leash slipping Christopher Layne 2006. The fate of nineteenth-century Britain.4 1993) Inevitably. Harvard professor Joseph S. However. Over time. A hegemon tends to overpay for security. if it ends. the effect is to erode the hegemon's preeminence. Fall. as long as eligible states calculate that the benefits of free riding outweigh the constraints imposed on them by American hegemony. No new great powers have emerged to restore equilibrium to the balance of power by engaging in hard balancing against the United States—at least. As a consequence. The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming of the United States' Unipolar Moment. suggested that the deployment of United States forces in Europe and Japan could be used as a bargaining chip in trade negotiations with those countries. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. a strategy of preponderance will fail. in a February 1991 address to the New York Economic Club. There is another reason why a strategy of preponderance will not work. Other states can justifiably infer that Washington's unipolar aspirations will result in the deliberate application of American power to compel them to adhere to the United States' policy preferences. Other states underpay for security. This has led primacists to conclude that there has been no balancing against the United States. however. Bush said that because the United States had taken the leader's role in the Gulf militarily. is illustrative. the strategy of preponderance could prolong unipolarity somewhat. No. Jr. not yet. Nye. the primacists' focus on both the failure of new great powers to emerge and the absence of hard balancing distracts attention from other forms of behavior— notably leash-slipping—by major second-tier states that ultimately could lead to the end of unipolarity. contrary to the predictions of Waltzian balance of power theorists. which followed such a strategy. differential growth rates trigger shifts in relative economic power that ultimately result in the emergence of new great powers. 124 Several weeks later. which eventually weakens the internal foundation of its external position. In February 1992. A strategy of benign hegemony allows others to free-ride militarily and economically. hegemony and.S. then-Vice President Dan Quayle linked the continuance of America's security commitment to NATO with West European concessions in the GATT negotiations. such a policy will accelerate the hegemon's relative decline. Such a strategy articulates a vision of an American-led international order. For example. A strategy of more or less benign hegemony does not prevent the emergence of new great powers.
No. Fifty years from now. and increase the probability that balancing behavior would be directed against the United States. No doubt neorealism's critics will continue to point to second image factors as reasons to take an optimistic view of the future. which would invite others to exploit American vulnerabilities. International Security. bipolar. too. the United States needs to design a strategy that will (1) safeguard its interests during the difficult transition from unipolarity to multipolarity. The transition from unipolarity to multipolarity will challenge the United States to devise a policy that will arrest its relative decline while minimizing the chances that other states will be provoked into balancing against the United States. Unipolarity will inevitably collapse the US must switch to a multipolar strategy to avoid the harms Christopher Layne 1993 (Visiting Associate Professor at Naval Postgraduate school." A policy that concentrates U. . Structural realists can be confident that events will vindicate their predictions: ( 1) Because of structural factors. No doubt. “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise”. the international system will provide a definitive field test of the contending views of inter national politics offered by neorealists and their critics. Vol. (4) in a multipolar system. it is less likely to have negative geopolitical repercussions than a policy that aims at perpetuating unipolarity. it is pointless to debate the comparative merits of unipolar.4 1993) The coming years will be ones of turmoil in international politics. 17. This approach would heighten others' concerns about the malign effects of unchecked American power. we will know who was right and who was wrong. energies on redressing the internal causes of relative decline would be perceived by others as less threatening than a strategy of preponderance. but just right-strong enough to defend American interests. and multipolar systems . Vol.118 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (13/18) Multipolarity is inevitable only a shift in US strategy to independence will solve the turns Christopher Layne 1993 (Visiting Associate Professor at Naval Postgraduate school. America's optimal strategy is to make its power position similar to Goldilocks' porridge : not too strong. and (2) enable the United States to do as well as possible in a multipolar world . Although vigorous internal renewal might cause frictions with others over economic policy. 17. not too weak. and probably much sooner. But this one is not fated to drag on inconclusively. In coming years. Relative decline has internal and external causes. traditional patterns of great power competition will reemerge not withstanding the effect of secondimage factors.S. No. an American strategy of preponderance or an attempt to perpetuate unipolarity is doomed to failure . International Security. (2) unipolarity will stimulate the emergence of eligible states as great powers . It would be counterproductive for the United States to attempt to maintain its relative power position by attempting to suppress the emergence of new great powers. “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise”. Relative decline can be addressed by policies that focus on either or both of these causes. Systemic change occasioned by the rise and fall of great powers has always been traumatic.4 1993) Because multipolarity is inevitable . and (5) if differential growth rate effects allow Japan to challenge America's leading position. the United States-Japan relationship will become highly competitive and the possibility of hegemonic war will be present . which probably would accelerate the rise of new great powers. which would frighten others into balancing against the United States. Rather than vainly and counterproductively pursuing a strategy of preponderance. (3) unipolarity will cause other states to balance against the United States. without pro voking others. American policymakers need to remember that other states balance against hegemons and they should not want the United States to be seen by others as a "sprawling giant with gouty fingers and toes. the debate between neorealists and their critics will continue.
119 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (14/18) Heg collapse inevitable Layne 97 (Christopher Layne is Visiting Associate Professor at Naval Postgraduate school. in these circumstances. “What ever happens will be for the worse. “and therefore it is in our interest that as little should happen as possible. And it should do so. such a policy is indeed self-interested and most assuredly moral. not abroad. however. The United States is secure enough from external threat that.S. 1 Summer 1997) It is unsurprising that having fulfilled their hegemonic ambitions following the Soviet Union’s collapse. . As Paul Kennedy has observed.” International politics. the United States can pursue an alternative grand strategy without sacrificing its security. International Security.” Salisbury said. hegemony cannot last indefinitely. preponderance’s advocates want to keep the world the way it is. In fact. not a pejorative: Offshore balancing is a twenty-firstcentury grand strategy consistent with America’s interests and its values. The debate between advocates of preponderance and offshore balancing. of external involvement.” No doubt. U. is the minimum. is about more than strategy. Vol. America First is an imperative.22 Issue. not the maximum. however. “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy”. in fact. should it wish to do so. is dynamic not static. U.S. there is nothing wrong with taking advantage of that Cold War’s end to focus on economic and social challenges at home: “What we should want. Kennan says. it could choose to restraint over intervention. some would maintain that offshore balancing is both selfish and immoral. In this sense. it is also about values. grand strategists view the prospect of change in international politics in much the same way that British Prime Minister Lord Salisbury did toward the end of the nineteenth century. I have attempted to demonstrate that. and an emphasis on domestic needs over external ambitions. As George F. offshore balancing—an innenpolitik grand strategy that posits the primacy of domestic over foreign policy—is ethically driven: America’s mission lies at home. “it simply has not been given to any one society to remain permanently ahead of all the others…” Thus the strategy of preponderance must be reassessed. nation over empire.
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History demonstrates that every empire has collapsed – cannot be sustained through force without public legitimacy
Carl Boggs 2005 (Social Science Professor National University (L.A.) , Planetary Politics: human rights, terror, and global society, ed. Stephen Eric Bronner)
The long history of empire aspiring to tyrannical rules over mass populations, hoping to expand their domain by overwhelming political coercion and military force, has been saturated with fierce resistance, deep quagmires, and humiliating failure: Rome, Spain, France under Napoleon, England, the brief twentieth-century global ventures of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. All at some point combined an unshakable political hubris with faith in armed violence as a means for building empire – and all had dazzling periods of success before disintegrating or being vanquished. Previous imperial regimes violated the basic Machiavellian premise that power without broad popular consent is destined to either implode or be overthrown. A corollary is that imperial domination by its very logic cannot easily secure much popular legitimacy, if any. By the 1940s the very idea of imperial control based upon foreign occupation had become historically obsolete, swept away by a series of postwar (and earlier) anticolonial struggles. The French colonial wars intended to retain control of Indochina and parts of Africa amounted to a final desperate reliance on brute force as the famous European “civilizing” mechanisms of religion, culture, and legal codes met with increasingly violent resistance. Dien Bien Phu and the Battle of Algiers symbolized the final eclipse of a colonial era in which European powers had recognized few limits to the use of military violence, much of it directed against civilian populations. The very ideology of imperial domination had been assaulted and destroyed in the name of ideals mainly imported from Europe itself—national self-determination, cultural autonomy, democracy.
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Heg Collapse Inevitable (16/18)
Drive for empire contains its own seeds of destruction through resistance and blowback
Carl Boggs 2005 (Social Science Professor National University (L.A.) , Planetary Politics: human rights, terror, and global society, ed. Stephen Eric Bronner) An urgent question for the fate of the planet is whether US ruling elites can for long sustain their drive toward global domination—that is, whether they can prevail in an arena where military force and political coercion have become the chosen methods of supremacy. We know that what governing regimes may require for popular support domestically may not readily extend to the sphere of world politics, where Hobbesian chaos tends to block normal mechanisms of legitimacy and order. US efforts to impose corporate and geopolitical agendas through military power, which of course it has in great abundance, will depend upon conditions of effective popular mobilization—needed to justify the costs and sacrifices of empire—but those very conditions (e.g. patriotism) quickly lose their ideological rationale beyond the national territory. Such conditions are in fact more likely to breed opposition and resistance to empire, including diverse expression of blowback. Signs of expanding opposition to empire have become increasingly visible; global terrorism and the events of 9/11, flourishing of an international antiwar movement during 2002 and 2003, growth of antisystem forces such as the World Social Forum, diffusion of anti-American sentiment in Europe the Muslim world, Asia, and elsewhere. To the degree that those ideological factors generating legitimacy for a new American militarism are bound to be counterproductive globally, imperial stability will more likely be reinforced by “postmodern” conditions involving widespread depoliticization, mass apathy, and privatized retreat ensuring greater elite autonomy. No doubt the rulers of empire would prefer a quieter, more atomized, depoliticized universe smoothly governed by routine economic transactions, the market, and consumerism, the ideal of an American-managed neoliberal hegemony grounded in a peaceful, more or less consensual imperial order. The problems here are twofold—the neoliberal model itself generates massive social contradictions while globalized, aggressive US military power works against the trajectory of single world hegemon, hoping to extend its rule over the entire planet, these contradictions are bound to significantly worsen.
123 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (17/18) Military power undermines US heg and leadership – spurs resistance and is unsustainable Carl Boggs 2005 (Social Science Professor National University (L. the global terrain with its vast mélange of competing nation-states. A system of global domination resting largely upon military force. cannot in the scheme of things consolidate its rule on a foundation of legitimating beliefs and values. Strong elements of “national-popular” consent underlying US empire. rooted in a strong patriotism. Stephen Eric Bronner) While Gramsci never systematically brought the concept of hegemony into the realm of international politics. or threat of force.) . Planetary Politics: human rights. Yet it is not too difficult to see how the unique conditions of domestic support for US worldwide economic and military power might run counter to requirements for global hegemony. insights can be gleaned from several passages in the Prison Notebooks. nor can it smooth over the harsh dysfunctions and conflicts endemic to the corporate world economy by mobilizing forms of hegemony such as nationalism and consumerism that work so fluidly in domestic politics. terror. including those referred to above.A. will naturally conflict with the multiplicity of competing interests and wills across the globe— interests and wills leading often to anti-imperial resistance and opposition just as predictably as any law of physics. As the lone superpower with a huge seemingly invincible military apparatus. . and global society. Of course. and dedicated to ruling the globe by force. and virtual absence of governing mechanisms differs radically from the state system that commanded most of Gramsci’s attention. the United States has already lost much of its room to maneuver even as it wins immediate victories by means of economic and diplomatic leverage combined with military power—the same power that may soon become a double-edged sword. ed. expansive scope.
and each assertion of power has awakened resistance in the form of terrorist networks. lead it to collective security and prosperity? Indeed.000 troops in the independent state of Kurdistan. The more we appreciate the differences among the American. both because of his policies and. they mean little.124 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (18/18) Hegemonic collapse inevitable Khanna 8 (Parag Khanna is a senior research fellow in the American Strategy Program of the New America Foundation. and should. and there is precious little Clinton or McCain or Obama could do to resist its growth. China has absorbed Taiwan and is steadily increasing its naval presence around the Pacific Rim and. The postcold-war “peace dividend” was never converted into a global liberal order under American leadership. from the Pakistani port of Gwadar.> . Afghanistan is stable.html? _r=1&oref=slogin&ref=magazine&pagewanted=print) <Turn on the TV today. whether to do it alone or with allies and what kind of world America should lead. multipolar battle. rather than bestriding the globe. That new global order has arrived. America has pulled out of Iraq but has about 20. we are competing — and losing — in a geopolitical marketplace alongside the world’s other superpowers: the European Union and China. Democrats and Republicans are bickering about where and how to intervene. European and Chinese worldviews. It is 2016. Bush. America’s unipolar moment has inspired diplomatic and financial countermovements to block American bullying and construct an alternate world order. The Geopolitical Marketplace At best. but either way. This essay is adapted from his book. Every expenditure has weakened America’s armed forces. more significant. This is geopolitics in the 21st century: the new Big Three.” but it has no permanent friends either. an increasingly depopulated expanse run by Gazprom. not an incoherent Islam embroiled in internal wars. is a global.” http://www. multicivilizational. and not India. The European Union has expanded to well over 30 members and has secure oil and gas flows from North Africa. What we have today. The Big Three make the rules — their own rules — without any one of them dominating. for the first time in history. Why? Weren’t we supposed to reconnect with the United Nations and reaffirm to the world that America can. America’s standing in the world remains in steady decline. Russia and the Caspian Sea.gov. Many saw the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq as the symbols of a global American imperialism. was not truly an “East-West” struggle.” to be published by Random House in March.nytimes. Maybe the best way to understand how quickly history happens is to look just a bit ahead. too. So now. insurgent groups and “asymmetric” weapons like suicide bombers. as well as warships anchored at Bahrain and an Air Force presence in Qatar. “The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order. on the Arabian Sea. America’s unipolar moment lasted through the 1990s. and the Hillary Clinton or John McCain or Barack Obama administration is nearing the end of its second term. The cold war. improvements to America’s image may or may not occur. despite them. Not Russia. as well as substantial nuclear energy. in fact.. and you could be forgiven for thinking it’s 1999. And the others are left to choose their suitors in this post-American world. But the distribution of power in the world has fundamentally altered over the two presidential terms of George W. they were signs of imperial overstretch. but that was also a decade adrift. Iran is nuclear.com/2008/01/27/magazine/27world-t. and Republicans believe muscular moralism is the way to go. Previous eras of balance of power have been among European powers sharing a common culture. “Waving Goodbye to Hegemony. it remained essentially a contest over Europe. the more we will see the planetary stakes of the new global game. Democrats believe they can hit a reset button. It’s as if the first decade of the 21st century didn’t happen — and almost as if history itself doesn’t happen. Condoleezza Rice has said America has no “permanent enemies. lagging decades behind China in both development and strategic appetite.
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Staff Writer for Commodity Online (1/24/10. (since Washington does a good job at self-destruction) rather it focuses on enhancing its own economic based strategy of increasing overseas investments. New York and adjunct professor at Saint Mary's University (4/28/10. namely to its low level of savings. however.org/petras/b2-img/petras_sinous. refuses to join its sanctions campaign against Iran and develops investment ties in Afghanistan while the US military occupation costs billions and alienates most Afghans including its client regime 39 . have ignored Washington’s warnings of China as a “security threat” and expanded their trade and economic ties with their neighbor. rather than proactive and offensive especially during the first decade of its advance toward global power status. China’s policy toward US attacks and threats was reactive and defensive. Most strikingly in Asia. Beijing has encouraged the US MNC to invest in China and export back to the US. China rebuked Washington’s interference in China’s internal affairs and threatened to take reprisals which led Washington to drop its crusade. China affirmed that is exchange rate was an “internal matter” and even acceded to US demands and revalued its currency (2006 – 2008) by 20%. White House policymakers and financial detractors of Beijing have ignored the formidable foundations of Chinese empire building and its capacity to rectify internal imbalances to sustain dynamic expansion. China does little to directly constrain US overseas expansion.commodityonline. in the first quarter of 2010 China grew at 12%.com/news/Futurology-Why-US-hegemony-will-decline25056-3-1.html. PriceWaterHouse Coopers and Goldman Sachs have come out with their set of predictions – China will become the largest economy by 2020 and on some parameters India will overtake Japan in . the most dynamic countries. without directly confronting the military mission promoted by Obama. capital formation and loss of competitiveness. China will overtake the US by 2020 -. “Futurology: Why US hegemony will decline?”. China refuses to lend support to Obama’s military centered strategy to buttress the empire. By 2010. either denying the charges or claiming they were internal affairs. Given the overall growth of China. India have voiced concern over its trade imbalances with China and entered in negotiations to increase its exports. the corporate penetration does not enhance US power rather it provides China with a lobby in Washington opposing protectionist measures. Over time Asia is replacing the US as the fastest growing trading partner of Beijing. pointing to the structural weaknesses in the US economy. je) Last week China released their GDP growth figures for 2009 which showed it grew 8.pdf) A rising economic powers’ most formidable and effective response to the established imperial powers’ efforts to block its advance is … to keep on growing at double or triple the rate of growth of its declining adversary. “Rising and Declining Economic Powers: The Sino-US Conflict Deepens. publishing its own documented inventory of US domestic human right violations 38 . six times the projected growth of the US 37 . retired Bartle Professor (Emeritus) of Sociology at Binghamton University in Binghamton.126 of 154 Exts – Yes China Rise Decline is inevitable . for example.7% recording $4. Nothing challenges the “crises” propaganda emitted by US embedded experts as the reports that. borrowing technology and upgrading its high tech industries.demographic trends.China is rising at unprecedented rates and US scare tactics can’t undermine its credibility Petras 10 – James. Raghavan ‘10. China.” http://lahaine. Later China responded by pointing out that the currency brouha had little to do with the US trade deficit. http://www. Sreekumar.91 trillion likely to overtake Japan to second position. despite pressure from Washington. When Washington protested at China’s violation of the human rights of Tibetan and Uigher separatists. Commodity Online. Overall the US imperial strategy to stem its decline and block China’s growth as a world power has failed. China merely protested at US human rights attacks. More recently in April 2010. While attending “summits” and bilateral conferences it refuses to make concessions which prejudice its overseas markets. USA is still the largest economy with a GDP of $14 trillion. China went on the offensive. Initially.
Oken and her colleagues found birth weights had decreased by an average of 1. "We expected to see a continuation of those increases. In the summer of 2001. In response.S. China . President Obama dispatched the USS Chung-Hoon to provide armed escort for the surveillance ship. China sent its largest and most modern ocean surveillance patrol ship. stopping directly in front of the ship. as it’s the largest obstacle to Beijing’s strategy.com/2010/05/06/china-ready-to-dominate-seas/4/. But the ‘Futurogist’ in me couldn’t ignore the following report from Massachussets. Levie Chair of Operational Law at the U. "Previous studies [covering periods into the early 1990s] have shown that birth weights have increased steadily during the past half-century. Who knows biological reasons may be the critical factor that determines how long USA will remain the world’s largest economy. Soon after the Impeccable incident. a new generation of kids are born who are underweight who could face increased risk in their adult life as well. China initiated increasingly provocative warship and aircraft maneuvers.83 ounces between 1990 and 2005. the USNS Victorious was harassed. At the same time. Working in tandem with an intelligence ship. reversing a decades-long upward trend in birth weights.S. The US Navy is the main target." Emily Oken of Harvard Medical School said in a statement. Researchers at the Harvard Pilgrim Health Care Institute's department of population medicine. “U. Chinese maritime forces stalked the USNS Impeccable ocean surveillance ship. The study. innovation. In 2001. received early prenatal care and delivered vaginally with no complications had babies who weighed an average of 2. China failed to comply with its obligations under international law to show due regard for the rights of vessels and aircraft of other nations operating in the East and South China Seas.” So apart from factors such as industrial production. the Yuzheng 311.’ These three cases are only the tip of the iceberg. “China Set for Naval Hegemony”. Chinese ships and aircraft harassed and threatened the USNS Bowditch and the USNS Sumner. also found white. I feel the above report on US new borns indicate that biological reasons could also cause US hegemony to be threatened by emerging nations of China.78 ounces less at birth during the study period. and even started using armed oceanographic ships and fisheries enforcement vessels to try to disrupt routine US military survey missions in the East China Sea. Naval War College and Senior Fellow at Foreign Policy Research Institute (5/6/10. After all the US economy was built on free enterprise. the obvious reason is because they produce more goods and services. well-educated. US new borns are getting smaller which is to be studied in detail by the medical fraternity in the coming years.S. The greater issue.827. physical activity. into the South China Sea to assert China’s ‘rights and interests. knowledge capital. The Diplomat. The heavily damaged EP-3 made an emergency landing on the island. China will overtake naval heg -. babies born at full-term between 1990 and 2005. In 1953. The fighter jet collided with the US aircraft. China has been equally obstinate in pressing specious ‘territorial’ claims to virtually the entire South China Sea. published in February's Obstetrics & Gynecology. a Chinese fighter jet aggressively intercepted a US Navy propeller-driven EP-3 surveillance aircraft 75 miles from Hainan Island. an affiliate of Harvard Medical School. USA which states that during the past 15 years. a similarly aggressive intercept occurred. je) The prospects for a Chinese surprise attack are." Instead. Future research may identify other factors not included in the current data that might contribute to lower birth weight. for example. of course. analyzed data on birth weight. resulting in the loss of the jet and pilot. I am quoting the report in full before coming to my theory of why US hegemony will end in another 20-30 years as predicted by futurologists. is how China has invested decades in a patient and aggressive campaign to slowly push other countries out of the East China Sea and South China Sea.127 of 154 2012.828 U. stress and exposure to environmental toxins.key to overall global primacy. capitalism and innovative spirit. The causes of this decline remain unclear and babies born small not only face short-term complications but increased risk as adults. maternal and neonatal characteristics. Today. utlising their human and natural resources in an efficient manner. which were operating in the East China Sea. http://thediplomat. natural resources.’ In 1974. The researchers looked at data from 36. In another of the many instances of harassment of US naval and air forces. and again in 2002. ‘nine-dotted line’ that laid claim to 80 percent of the South China Sea. married women who didn't smoke. The fact that the finding has come from Harvard Medical School is sure to ignite further research into causes leading to low birth weight babies and how to correct them. political and military pressure—and sometimes aggression—to gradually bring the littoral seas under Chinese domination. Harvard researchers say. Kraska ’10. such as trends in mothers' diets. however. on March 7 of 2009. Russia and India. China issued an infamous map with a U-shaped. obstetric care and other trends from the National Center for Health Statistics Natality Data Sets. The result: a well-coordinated campaign of legal. the line is derisively called ‘the cow tongue. Beginning in 2000. In 2003.Howard S. an oceanographic ship and a fisheries enforcement vessel. James. If China or India emerges stronger. newborns have gotten smaller during the past 15 years. debatable. two commercial cargo ships crossed the bow of Impeccable. In each of these cases. All of it will be lost if indeed.
raising the danger that China was willing to endanger the safety of one of its aircraft to make a point. Several factors are in play as China unveils a stable of advanced and emerging systems. Third. the elusive AIP diesel electrics are equipped with wake-honing torpedoes and anti-ship cruise missiles. farther north. run hard-pressed to maintain a force of 11 carriers. As a maritime nation with worldwide responsibilities. most of the rocks and reefs of the Spratly and Paracel chains are merely navigational hazards and not ‘islands. Then. the US Navy battle force. First. and the entire force is complemented by hundreds of fast cruise-missiles shooting offshore patrol vessels and land-based aircraft. demonstrating its ability to shoot down the aircraft. China has mastered quiet air-independent propulsion (AIP) power plants for its new Type 041 Yuan-class boats. the third US conflict was the War of 1812. Likewise. a 10-ship Chinese flotilla. about to abandon its position of maritime superiority. and particularly maritime mobility. Ironically. This is unlike any threat ever faced by the US Navy. In one incident in October 2006. a longtime Clinton associate. is a force multiplier. after suffering an embarrassing indignity in 1996 when President Bill Clinton ordered the Nimitz and Independence carrier battle groups into the Taiwan Strait. The Chinese fleet is about 260 vessels. So accustomed to being militarily superior. The US fleet will be absence. all spread thinly throughout the world. the Center for Naval Analysis issued a report suggesting that none of this is hyperbole: the US Navy is at the tipping point. 31 amphibious warfare ships. with short and secure internal lines of communication. Reportedly quieter than the US fast attack Los Angeles-class boats.128 of 154 seized the Paracel Islands from Vietnam. and the fourth war involving the United States was the Second Barbary War. The cornerstone of American power and security is global access. China’s geographic position. has shrunk by 20 percent since 2001. on April 13 a Chinese Navy destroyer performed the menacing act of aiming its rapid-fire guns at a Japanese MSDF P-3C plane. China seized 33 Vietnamese fishing boats and 433 crew members near the Paracel Islands. 88 major surface combatants and 48 submarines. the United States devotes only 26 percent of its defense budget to the Navy and Marine Corps. which will include aircraft carriers. and enables submarines to sprint underwater—greatly increasing their attack radius. in combination with a space-based maritime surveillance and targeting system. which included two submarines. In February. This occurred only two days after a Chinese helicopter flew within 90 feet of a MSDF destroyer monitoring the battle group. For each of these conflicts. and the prospect of intercepting a maneuvering ballistic missile reentry vehicle is daunting. the Vietnam War. and the country’s intransigent and tireless peddling of patently illegal maritime claims. The United States believes it can be ‘virtually present’ everywhere. China has embarked on a program to build a powerful surface fleet. All of Beijing’s warships and land-based aircraft and submarines already are present in theater. For the first time. transited between Okinawa Island and Miyakojima. Are you starting to see a pattern here? But China has made uncanny progress on its dogged trek to transition from an obsolete 1950s-style coastal defense force to a balanced blue water fleet. an ultra-quiet Song–class AIP submarine surfaced inside the protective screen of the aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk. The second US war was the First Barbary War of 1804. China’s grand effort to convert large swaths of the oceans into an area under Chinese suzerainty is a dangerous game that risks naval war. the key US issue was ensuring freedom of the seas. By comparison. on the other hand. Fourth. The DF-21 will be armed with a maneuverable reentry vehicle (MARV) that. This isn’t new. But ‘virtual presence’ is actual ragged with global responsibilities. The Chinese Navy. Beijing has elevated the ‘the cow tongue’ to a vital national interest. including 75 major warships and more than 60 submarines.’ China is reaching far beyond its shores. But by claiming the South China Sea as its ‘territory. In 1988. it was Steinberg. the New York Times reported that Chinese officials had told Deputy Secretary of State James B. in the Gulf of Tonkin. Steinberg that China would not tolerate ‘foreign interference’ in its ‘territory’ in the South China Sea.’ They also lie far from China and within the 200-mile economic zones of neighboring Vietnam. Chinese ground . China is working feverishly on a new weapon that will alter the strategic calculus—the 1. These maritime disputes are cast against the backdrop of decades of Chinese naval build-up. another Okinawa Prefecture island. which was on a regular patrol mission in international airspace. who notably coined the phrase ‘strategic reassurance’ to describe the idea that the United States should reassure China that its rise to prominence is welcome. the Philippines. meaning that even two or three Chinese carriers operating in the area likely will exceed the number of US flattops. Malaysia and Brunei. and then surge actual forces in the event of a crisis. Ironically. Taiwan. Second. Beijing’s maritime bullying. AIP extends underwater endurance from a few days to one month.500-mile range DF-21 ASBM. specifically designed to decapitate US carrier strike groups. China again attacked Vietnamese forces on Johnson Reef and occupied six features in the Spratly Islands. But in March. can be used to strike moving warships at sea. oftentimes Washington has no other carrier in theater. while China should in turn reassure its neighbors that its rise is peaceful. The first war fought by an independent United States was over the issue of freedom of the seas—the 17981800 Quasi-War with France. the issue of freedom of the seas helped precipitate US involvement in two world wars and. the United States is under the delusion that it could maintain sea control in Asia. Last year. On April 10 of this year. and in 1994 Beijing captured Mischief Reef from the Philippines. attracts more than 33 percent of the nation’s military spending. and the US strategy is tacit recognition that the Navy that had approached 600 ships in the 1980s is incapable of maintaining even half that number. While the United States has the forward-deployed USS George Washington on a short tether.
Spiegel International. The United States superseded the British Empire after World War II. During these sessions.the official name in China for the "people's money. the pioneers in China's race to the top have been displayed on a giant electronic billboard in New York's Times Square. China behaves like the gangly teenager who. To keep the prices of its exports artificially low.html. with the US dollar as its reserve currency. New York and adjunct professor at Saint Mary's University . It would have to gradually appreciate its currency. The second possibility is that other nations—foremost among them Japan and India—but also including virtually every other nation in the region from Russia to Vietnam.yuan will overtake it. so that the exchange rate could be based on the real value of the currency and the strength of China's economy.129 of 154 command and control is connected by spoof-proof hard-wire landlines. Wagner ’11. but in the Western Pacific." which is adorned with a portrait of Mao -. their stars and the super-rich will appear 300 times a day in a giant advertisement for the People's Republic. when the dollar replaced the British pound as the dominant currency in the global financial system. je) China would like to make the yuan one of the world's anchor currencies." China's long-term goal is to become a country with an anchor currency.Writer for Spiegel International (1/26/11. perhaps even allowing it to float freely. In written interviews with the Wall Street Journal and the Washington Post. Any maritime conflict with the United States (or Japan) will push China teetering over the edge of a war fever not seen since the Guns of August. The occasion for the new superpower's confident campaign was the state visit of President Hu Jintao. Secret Lectures on Reserve Currencies Years ago.1518. clumsily begins to throw around his weight. Fifth. the Chinese leader said that the world's monetary system. This explains why Beijing has pursued the internationalization of the yuan since the outbreak of the global financial crisis. such as in the commodities markets. http://www. forcing other countries to maintain reserves of Chinese money and providing significant advantages for Beijing. dominant not only on land. which the Chinese believe has irrevocably harmed their American rival. China is riding a wave of national overconfidence at the same time many regard the United States as preoccupied with counterinsurgency in central Asia. Caught up in the fanfare of the country’s meteoric rise. They have made it to the heart of American capitalism. gaining more favorable terms as a result.741303. In order to have a reserve currency. Today the renminbi -. the country also essentially links the exchange rate of its currency to the dollar.spiegel. the Chinese leaders realized that no modern country has ever become a superpower without a reserve currency. The first is that China will indeed achieve its goal of becoming the Asian hegemonic power. Hu and the Politburo attended secret lectures in which Chinese professors explained the history of the rise and fall of major powers. For four weeks. Dollar heg -. China could then use its own currency to conduct transactions. was a "product of the past. upon suddenly experiencing a growth spurt. in its global shopping spree. These developments don’t leave a lot of room for optimism. Nevertheless. other countries will have to maintain reserves of the yuan instead of the current reserve currencies. This suggests two outcomes. China is overflowing with ethnic and cultural pride and itching to ‘teach lessons’ and settle old scores.00. Moreover. Wieland. This would make the country's exports substantially more expensive and would drastically curb growth. as the United States buckles under the strain of enormous budget deficits. Even before he left Beijing. retired Bartle Professor (Emeritus) of Sociology at Binghamton University in Binghamton. 68. Beijing has used a complicated system of foreign currency controls to effectively shield the renminbi from global capital flows. As of last week. with US President Barack Obama. If that happens. the visiting head of state had predicted that the dominant capitalist power could expect to see a redistribution of global power. the dollar and the euro.cannot even be freely exchanged into another currency. hardly a week goes by in which China does not launch new pilot projects to "internationalize" the yuan in the long term. “China Plans Path to Economic Hegemony”. the prospect is remote that the US Navy alone will recalibrate the balance of sea power. China would have to give up all of this. Yet the country cannot continue to keep the value of its currency artificially low if it hopes to become the world's dominant economic power. the images of Chinese astronauts and athletes. strategically listless and brooding. Brimming with uncontained satisfaction—even joy—at its relentless ascent.de/international/business/0. will begin to think more overtly about collective measures and how they can balance the growing power of Beijing. Until now. China has a lot on its plate. China rise inevitable – US tactics to undermine Chinese credibility have failed and increased Chinese confidence to project power Petras 10 – James. These emotions fuel a ballooning sense of past wrongs to be compensated and future entitlements to be seized.
a conservative Washington think tank. One of the longest standing political ploys is Washington’s human rights propaganda campaign. China's People's Liberation Army is building up anti-access and area-denial capabilities with the apparent goal of extending their power to the western half of the Pacific Ocean. and much sooner than many expect[. “currency manipulation” and other “unfair” economic practices 35 . "Navies tend to grow with economies and as trade becomes more important. At international gatherings like the recent Copenhagen Conference on climate warming. The Chinese also have an emerging and muscular deep-water navy. US diplomats frame this approach by emphasizing “treating China as an equal”. have a repertoire of levers designed to discredit. the two determining powers in the world. In other words. Washington attempts to satanize China as the main obstacle in reaching global accords. such as references to the US and China as the (G-2). deflecting attention from the facts of Chinese compliance in setting standards superior to the US 36 . “Chinese Plans to End US Hegemony in the Pacific”.” http://lahaine. specializes in business and government technology and security (5/31/10. like the US today. electromagnetic weapons.. on climate. Over time this imperial offensive to slow its decline has provoked an increasingly aggressive response as China gains confidence in its capacity to project power. deflect attention from its worldwide long term and large scale violation of human rights accompanying its global empire building and build an anti-China coalition.freelance journalist based near Washington. spaced-based reconnaissance. Peter.This situation creates a strategic choice for the United States.130 of 154 (4/28/10. Likewise." said Admiral Gary Roughead.com/Geo-Politics/International/Chinese-Plans-to-End-US-Hegemony-in-the-Pacific. which extends as far as Guam and New Guinea. surveillance and target acquisition. the GATT meeting on trade liberalization and the UN meeting on Iran. and ballistic and cruise missiles. while ignoring its own massive offenses and downplaying those of its allies like the Jewish state of Israel. or Washington undertakes actions to offset or counterbalance the effects of the PLA’s military buildup. Among the anti-access/area-denial (A2AD) capabilities being fielded by China include anti-satellite weapons. Behind this diplomatic rhetoric is an effort to harness China to a policy of collaborating and following US empire building strategies as a junior partner.html. China should give up its market driven economic expansion to share “responsibility” in policing the world in which the US is supreme.org/petras/b2-img/petras_sinous.C. essentially dividing the Pacific between the US and China and ending US hegemony on that ocean. “Rising and Declining Economic Powers: The Sino-US Conflict Deepens. chief of US naval operations. opposing protectionism and seeking a negotiated settlement with Iran. http://oilprice. the White House has promoted a “united front” with the EU against China’s supposedly “protectionism”. Alternating between positive symbolic gestures. "The PLA navy is increasing its numbers of submarines and other ships.pdf) Established empires in decline. to allow the US to gain trade advantages to reduce (“rebalance”) its trade deficit. China Will End US Hegemony in the Pacific Buxbaum ’10. at a recent speech hosted by the Heritage Foundation. if we translate the meaning of the White House’s demand for China to “assume responsibility” for “rebalancing the world economy” it boils down to telling Beijing to reduce its dynamic growth. While human rights propaganda serves as the stick to beat back China’s economic advance. highlighting China’s human rights violations. But political problems and budgetary woes could kill the program before it ever gets started. its allies and partners: acquiesce in a dramatic shift in the military balance or take steps to preserve it. Washington demands China support sanctions to weaken and degrade Iran to enhance US military power in the Gulf 34 . Washington also attempts to induce China’s cooperation in slowing down its decline. advanced radar systems. For example. the State Department hopes to inflate US moral authority. unmanned aerial vehicles. "the cost incurred by the US military to operate in the [w]estern Pacific will likely rise sharply. advanced fighter aircraft." In response to the Chinese challenge. seduce. US . "Unless Beijing diverts from its current course of action. recognizing it as a “world power” which has to “share responsibilities” 33 . D. Chinese military and political doctrine holds that China should rule the waves out to the second island chain of the western Pacific." said a report recently released by the Washington-based Center for Budgetary and Strategic Assessments.]. The A2AD buildup threatens the US forward presence and power projection in the region. isolate and contain rising world powers like China and put it on the defensive.. je) The US is developing an air-sea battle concept to counter China's military buildup. at the expense of China’s economic interests. while China has invested billions in joint ventures with Iran and has developed a growing lucrative trading relation. Oil Price. perhaps to prohibitive levels. By discrediting China internal politics." All of this has US military planners and thinkers worried.
In fact. Admiral Roughead noted that the US Navy has a strong operational relationship with the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force. "and will stay off for a good period of time[. "It took us 70 years to get where we are. multifaceted defense posture. it is highly unlikely that we will achieve the real [budget] growth rates necessary to sustain the current force structure." But US allies in the region might not see things that way." . But the program has its political dimension as well: to reassure US allies. and operating concepts. is a complex set of concepts. is that "China will attempt to achieve a quick victory by inflicting such damage that the US would choose to discontinue the fight or driving a major US ally out of the war. "Besides." Although the immediate crisis on the Korean peninsula is having the effect of cementing US-Japanese relations-the Japanese government has accepted a plan it once rejected to relocate a US Marine base on Okinawa-it is not clear how long that attitude will last." said Krepinevich. particularly the Japanese. then.]. "the bigger questions are what the intentions of the Chinese are and how the carriers will be used.131 of 154 strategic planners and thinkers are exploring a concept known as 'AirSea Battle. DoD continues to invest in capabilities that assume that the status quo will prevail in the western Pacific. for example. As a recent article in the Washington Post noted. Spurring the need for AirSea Battle. AirSea Battle." noted Senator Joseph Lieberman. Japan's current government. according to the CSBA report. In a speech earlier this month. The projection of Chinese power on the Pacific may be enough for them to perceive their interests differently. the JMFDS could easily develop a closer relationship with the Chinese navy. Gates has displayed a proclivity." he said. "Most US allies in the region and lack strategic depth and must be supported and defended from the sea. a new capability for them. an independent from Connecticut. involving the development of specific military capabilities. "To win one 100 victories in 100 battles is not the acme of skill. as reflected in the Quadrennial Defense Review released earlier this year. CSBA president and report co-author Andrew Krepinevich told ISN Security Watch." he said. The big squeeze Looming in the background are the budgetary constraints now being placed on the Pentagon. towards developing a balanced. That position does not promote sharp decision making that allocates scarce resources to emerging threats. But if the Asia-centric attitudes in Japan prevail." he added. The Art of War.' the subject of the new CSBA report. is to deny adversaries a quick victory. emphasizing. "only the second opposition party to take power in nearly 50 years. "The gusher has been turned off. such as greater integration between the US Navy and Air Force. real or perceived. The US also faces the problem of bolstering the confidence of its allies." advocates "a more Asia-centric view of Japan's place in the world. "Admiral Roughead is conducting an AirSea Battle study inside the Pentagon. Roughead acknowledged reports that the Chinese are planning to deploy one or more aircraft carriers to the Pacific. especially in light of the budget squeeze. and a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned military commanders not to expect to get everything they ask for." But the US may already be losing the hearts and minds of the Japanese. and keep them from succumbing to Chinese pressure despite the apparent decline of US capabilities in the western Pacific.. at a recent Washington gathering." Pursuing AirSea Battle would require a reordering of Pentagon priorities." A key objective of AirSea Battle. If US allies fold in the face of increasing Chinese power.[R]ealistically. China could win a war on the Pacific without firing a shot. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill. US inability. such as long-range strike systems.. including coercion or aggression. as outlined in the CSBA report. As Sun Tzu said in his classic. short-range over than long-range strike systems. but dismissed any potential threat to US interests. to defend its allies and partners could lead to regional instability. "US success will depend heavily on Japan’s active participation as an ally. "Carrier operations are very complex. that would offset the Chinese buildup.
writes and produces videos for the award-winning military site Blackfive (3/3/11. it is not healthy to emasculate our ability to deter our enemies. then even if China is even more capitalist than the U. Liu Mingfu. and 8 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. http://www. We already canceled the F-22 and the real concern is whether we will support the F-35 program now that it is our main fighter. human rights. a professor at the elite National Defense University. will still be determined to contain it." writes Liu.Staff Writer for Reuters News (2/28/10. There are plenty of folks in Congress salivating over the size of the program and dreaming of all the other things they could spend that money on. His 303-page book stands out for its boldness even in a recent chorus of strident Chinese voices demanding a hard shove back against Washington over trade.com/jhanson/2011/03/03/russia-still-believes-they-are-a-superpower/. "As long as China seeks to rise to become world number one . Russia Still Believes They Are A Superpower. while already the world’s fifth-largest military spender. including a $650 billion program to procure 1. Tibet.S. Reuters News. The call for China to abandon modesty about its global goals and "sprint to become world number one" comes from a People's Liberation Army (PLA) Senior Colonel. je) While we are busy cutting our military budget the Russians are following the lead of the Chinese and building up. and arms sales to Taiwan. 100 warships. je) China should build the world's strongest military and move swiftly to topple the United States as the global "champion. Moscow – The graying bear is getting a make-over. Now as much as I like spending cuts. Russia’s military is launching its biggest rearmament effort since Soviet times.com/article/2010/03/01/us-china-usa-military-exclusiveidUSTRE6200P620100301. the self-ruled island Beijing claims as its own. the top power.. http://bigpeace. who warns that his nation's ascent will alarm Washington. risking war despite Beijing's hopes for a "peaceful rise." "If China in the 21st century cannot become world number one.132 of 154 Yes – China/Russia Counterbalancing China’s counterbalancing US dominance. Jim. dominance”. “China PLA officer urges challenging U. "The China Dream.. needs strong conventional forces to reduce its overreliance on its aging Soviet-era nuclear missile deterrent.. Buckley ’10. says it could create “a whole new ballgame. Russia and China are Challenging US Power Hanson ’11." writes Liu. We also need to make sure we have enough of those big floating boats they land them on too.Editor of Big Peace focusing on the practitioners of our national security policies on the groundserved as a Weapons Sergeant in 1st Special Forces Group across most of the Pacific Rim.000 new helicopters. 600 combat planes.S. Analysts say Russia. Big Peace. cannot become the top power.” Yeah a ball game where we decided to sit out a few innings. Chris." Liu writes in his newly published Chinese-language book. the U.reuters." a senior Chinese PLA officer says in a new book reflecting swelling nationalist ambitions. director of the independent Interfax-Military News Agency. then inevitably it will become a straggler that is cast aside. which trains rising officers.S. . It would be naive to pretend that a Russia run by Putin is not a threat or that the Chinese will not take advantage of the leverage they have due to well owning us." "China's big goal in the 21st century is to become world number one. Valentin Rudenko. We need to make the commitment to maintain the dominant military that keeps us all safe.
notably due to the so called multipolarization of the international order. Europe and the emerging powers are just discovering what this “post-American world” means in practice. and it is less predictable as emerging powers grasp new strategic opportunities to push forward their influence and ultimately their interests. for there is simply no alternative to address some of the most pressing global challenges. there is inevitably a third explanation for America’s discrete profile on Libya: the US is slowly losing its uncontested hegemony in international security. For now. but remain prudent enough to avoid endangering their rise by investing too much in revisionist postures. As the 2012 presidential election is nearing.pdf) The vote on Libya reflects to a certain extent the new international order that is taking shape.edu/32037/1/SPB20-Libya-in-new-worldorder. Yet the direction of such foreign policy remains unclear. sometimes as a bloc). particularly in the Arab world. This is a world of strategic opportunities where established and emerging powers can increasingly pursue their own agenda. Whether this constructive posture will develop as the rule or will remain an exception remains to be seen. This international order in the making is less dominated by Washington as it becomes more multipolar. But from Brasilia to Beijing. at the moment. “Libya and the Post-American World: Implications for the EU. Emerging powers have become sufficiently assertive to confront the West on some issues (sometimes individually. Europe is in the driving seat and in spite of the chaotic ride due to intraEuropean divisions. let alone to lead. US influence and ability to mediate conflicts is declining. Research Fellow in the Europe in the World Program at Egmont – Royal Institute for International Relations (April 2011. world leaders are contemplating this new American posture with interest. This looks very much like the “post-American world” described by Fareed Zakaria. independently from the US. as the phantoms of military and economic overstretch are present in all minds.” http://aei. The soft-spoken American posture is a clear political choice related to domestic pressures but it is also a matter of necessity. the tension between factors of fragmentation (possibly leading to a fracture?) and cohesion maintains the international system in flux and makes it less predictable. after the disastrous experiences in Afghanistan and in Iraq – both conflicts which were supposed to end quickly. On the other hand. like Libya. but according to some scholars today’s interdependence is creating favourable conditions for international cooperation.133 of 154 UQ – Yes Heg Decline Shift to multipolarity now Renard 11 – Thomas. First characteristic of the new international order: it seems less and less American as illustrated by the relatively discrete profile adopted by Washington on the whole Libyan crisis – and the Arab uprisings in general. This fragmentation makes international cooperation to solve global challenges more difficult. . “The vote on Libya reflects to a certain extent the new international order that is taking shape”EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 5 The vote on Libya offered an encouraging signal with Russia and China constructively abstaining rather than using their veto power. Another important explanatory factor is the American reluctance to commit to another potential long war. As emerging powers continue to build their global footprint and to develop global interests. they are more likely to develop a sophisticated foreign policy. Part of the explanation for this discrete profile lies in the personality of Barack Obama who has developed a much more cautious approach to international problems in comparison with his predecessor. The era of “you are with us or against us” is inevitably over. the world is increasingly interdependent and interconnected as largely illustrated by the recent economic crisis. The US is now less interventionist by choice and by necessity – in this new international order. The Libyan crisis was a first illustration of what happens when the US takes a backseat. Yet. Thus. Obama seems also unwilling to wage another unpopular war. Washington must choose carefully its priorities in terms of foreign policy for it is simply no longer able to be present simultaneously on every front.pitt. America still feels pretty safe. Could they be next in the driving seat? Second characteristic: the emerging global order is probably more fragmented than during the previous bipolar era. Global interdependence per se is not new.
and the Netherlands. the fastest growing part of the world economy. but military power depends upon the economic resources at the disposal of the state. The United States still has immense—unequalled—power in international economics and politics. insurance. current account (the sum of the balances in trade in goods and services plus net income from overseas investment). the share of private world savings held in European currencies increased from 13 percent to 37 percent. the proportion rose back to 68 percent in 2001 because of the phasing out of ecus (reserves issued to European banks by the European Monetary Institute) to make way for the euro. And since 1990. but even as the sole superpower it finds itself less able than it once was to influence and control the course of events abroad. the share of EU-based companies increased from 41 to 46 percent. stood at 24 percent in 2001. Of the twentyfive largest banks in the world. four of six chemical producers.S. telecommunications. and it raises the danger of imperial overreach. Enduring Danger”. and stabilizing the world political economy. the United States is not only less dominant. compared with 47 percent in 1960. Together. Deficits in trade in goods can be offset by having a positive balance in sales of services abroad (financial. six of ten telecommunications companies. regulating. Half the foreign exchange reserves held by the world’s central banks were composed of dollars in 1990 compared to 76 percent in 1976. Its military supremacy is no longer matched in the economic and political spheres. Japan had sixteen.S. Germany. multinationals in the foreign sales of the world’s one hundred largest multinationals decreased from 30 to 25 percent. investment abroad. Richard. Non-U. Between 1981 and 1995. and the like). against 21 percent at present. twenty-three were American. and between the two world wars was no longer able to function as underwriter to the world system. Since 1971. five of ten pharmaceutical firms. banks.S. Britannia ruled the waves from 1815 to 1913. Monthly Review. hegemony began during the Second World War and peaked some thirty years later. as was the case for Britain in South Africa (1899–1902) and the United States in Vietnam (1962–1975). but vulnerable. dividends. http://monthlyreview. It cannot be deployed to answer every threat to geopolitical and economic interests.2 For the first time since the Second World War there is another source of universally acceptable payment and liquidity in the world economy —at a moment when the U. In global finance. “U. advertising and other business services) and/or income from overseas investments (profits.S. Of the top one hundred corporations in the world in 2000 ranked by foreign-held assets. Forty-four percent of new bonds have been issued in euros since the new currency was introduced in 1999.org/2003/12/01/u-s-hegemony-continuing-decline-enduring-danger. while the European Union (EU) had 23 percent—40 percent if intra-EU exports were counted. In 2002.S. five involved takeovers by foreign multinationals (three British. share of exports of commercial services. France and Belgium-Luxembourg supplied 21 percent. they accounted for 5 percent of the value of all M&A deals during these years. Slow Merge Ahead: Hegemony Since the 1970s An idea of the decline of American economic power can be formed from the following:1 In 1950 the United States supplied half the world’s gross product. A nation can run deficits in its trade in goods and still be in overall balance in its dealings with foreign countries. four of seven airlines. the positive balance on investment income has been shriveling as foreign investment in the United States has grown faster than U. Even during the golden days of 1944–1971 the United States was unable to avoid military defeat in Vietnam and a draw in Korea. U.S.S. Issue 07 (December). During the 1990s.S. but by the 1890s she was under economic challenge from the United States and Germany. merchandise deficit has become too big to be paid for by services sold to foreigners plus remittances on investments. is now deteriorating sharply. Hegemony: Continuing Decline. seven of the ten largest petroleum refiners. when the United States had a deficit in its trade in goods (merchandise) for the first time in seventy-eight years. companies dominated major industries in 2002. Of the top twenty corporations involved in cross-border M&As from 1987 through 2001. interest. Sixty percent of the world’s manufacturing production in 1950 came from the United States. together. Twenty-one percent of the world’s stock of direct investment in other countries was American in 2001. The weak link is the dollar.134 of 154 DuBoff ’11Professor Emeritus of Economics. while the dollar’s share fell from 67 to 40 percent. The use of armed force has always been an inseparable part of hegemony. The U. the merchandise deficit has become too big to be paid for by services sold to foreigners. accounting for nine of the ten largest electronics and electrical equipment manufacturers. and is of dubious value in preserving the global economic order and the stake that U. the share of U. only two were U. royalties. balance of international payments is chalking up record deficits. (General Electric and Citigroup). But the U.S. Of the twenty-five largest mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in the United States in 1998–2000. During 1996–2001. irregularly and with periodic revivals.S. The U. Bryn Mawr College (7/13/11. with a combined gross domestic product (GDP) seven-tenths that of the United States. France. two German). eight of the ten largest motor vehicle makers and electric and gas utilities. the balance turned negative: for the first time the United States is paying foreigners more investment income from their .S.S. nineteen were non-U. 25 percent in 1999. 17 percent of all new direct investment abroad came from the United States and 16 percent from Great Britain. the United Kingdom. had forty. although the two largest were Citigroup and Bank of America. exports have exceeded imports only in 1973 and 1975. almost constantly in surplus from 1895 to 1977. closing in on the 48 percent issued in dollars. capital has in it. Volume 55. je) “Global hegemony” might be defined as a situation in which one nation-state plays a predominant role in organizing. whose status as the world’s key currency has been eroding since the 1970s.
1. When foreigners receive dollars from transactions with U. China’s ascent engenders a fundamental change in yet another sense. Swiss franc).%20the%20EU%20and %20Multipolarity-2.S. Japan. because of its share of world GDP and world trade could be a ﬁrst tier actor.4 Until recently all Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) sold their oil for dollars only. it poses a challenge to the era of Western hegemony at the level of system values and rules of the game. companies are continuing to invest abroad. the ‘integration of China into the existing global economic order will thus be more difﬁcult than was.S.pdf) The emerging multipolar structure is a multilayered one: it consists of two tiers (see Table 2). where the currency risk is greater?” asked the chief investment officer of a Munich-based property fund. Like most gaps between income and expenses. Brazil. the integration of Japan a generation ago. By mid-2003.S. No. 8 The second tier comprises most regional powers like India. political system and stage of development.”5 If foreign investors get cold feet. draining income from other purchases and dampening the economy. San Francisco.135 of 154 holdings here than it receives from its own investments abroad. In the ﬁrst tier we have the US and an ever more powerful China. U. residents (individuals. “China. but to fully qualify it would have to upgrade its hard power base: economic capability.” http://www. averaging 3 to 4 percent of GDP every year from 1850 to 1913. Geeraerts 11 – Gustaaf. companies. and 13 percent of corporate stock. Iraq switched to the euro in 2000 (presumably terminated with extreme prejudice in March 2003). German investments in choice office properties in New York. The EU. and real estate). concluded Yarjani. the dollar would start falling faster.5 trillion more than U. Multipolarity now -. and consumers would pay more for imported goods.rising powers. They matter in a number of important international issue areas but are lacking in comprehensive power. foreigners owned 41 percent of U.” Thus. saw little chance of change “in the near future…[but] in the long run the euro is not at such a disadvantage versus the dollar.ac. In 2002. Treasury bonds. Norway and Britain. the head of OPEC’s Market Analysis Department. While the buildings were becoming cheaper in euros. Interest rates in the United States might surge. economy. The Euro-zone has a bigger share of global trade than the US and…a more balanced external accounts position. when income from services and foreign investment was larger than its merchandise trade deficits. All these differences reduce the likelihood that Beijing will easily accept the systemic responsibilities that Western key players associate with great power status.vub. rents were shrinking when converted from dollars back home. arousing suspicion that the United States favors a cheaper dollar to help pay off its ballooning trade deficit. the United States borrowed $503 billion from abroad. political competence and military strength.S. Yet their weight is such that it is key for the ﬁrst tier players to take them in account. the return to foreign investors on dollar-denominated assets falls. industries or selling off their dollar holdings. the United States is unable to finance those investments from its current account. and the New Multipolarity.3 So far the global investor class has seemed willing to finance America’s external deficits. corporate bonds. The deficits are exerting a downward drag on the dollar. As the dollar declines in value.-owned assets abroad. Russia. South Africa. a record 4. 2011. “We can get the same return in Britain and the Nordic countries. they can use them to buy American assets (U. A dollar rout could cause skittish investors to dump U. 24 percent of all U. Great Britain’s current account was in surplus. In any event the dollar is now perceived to be as risky an asset as the euro and possibly two or three other currencies (yen. 19. and Iran has considered a conversion since 1999.” Adoption of the euro by Europe’s principal oil producers. stocks and bonds. so why go to the United States. history. corporate bonds and stocks.be/biccs/site/assets/files/apapers/China. By contrast. In a speech in Spain in April 2002.’ 3 China’s rise is not . ceasing to invest in U. the EU. professor of international relations at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel and director of the Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies (European Review. could create “a momentum to shift the oil pricing system to euros. but it may not be forever. sterling. but unlike the British Empire in the decades before the First World War. the current account deficit is covered by borrowing.S.S. 57–67.S. governments).8 percent of GDP. Therefore. the large European states and the remaining members of the G20. say. companies. Because of China’s being different in terms of culture. and elsewhere were cut back sharply in 2003. Vol.S. Javad Yarjani. Treasury marketable debt. borrowing money would become harder. sending Wall Street into a dive. foreign-owned assets in the United States are now worth $2. This is how the United States turned into a debtor nation in 1986. “OPEC will not discount entirely the possibility of adopting euro pricing and payments in the future.
US multilateral actions and wikileaks prove Hutchinson 10 – Martin. the creation of spheres of inﬂuence and the formation of alliances to prevent hostile powers from obstructing these ventures. hegemony is on the wane.S. “WikiLeaks exposes waning U. 19. That underscores a heightened risk for global investors that without U. supremacy and peaceful globalization is irrevocably ending. There is . Europe and China are geopolitically more proximate than ever before. The WikiLeaks documents show the United States attempting to assemble regional alliances to address problems like North Korea's continued isolation from the global community.” National Post's Financial Post & FP Investing. 2010. The outcome is that Iran's attempts to establish a nuclear capability and North Korea's aggression against its southern neighbour have been met with no effective response.S. Some point out that. which it makes ample use of to sustain its growth. 2011. precisely during critical power transitions. It's hard to avoid the overall impression from the disclosure of 250. In the early and middle 19th century. and the New Multipolarity. As a consequence of increased international engagement and increasing economic interests abroad. In previous decades. Geeraerts 11 – Gustaaf. Understandably. South Korea and Panama free trade deals. trade barriers rise and fiscal policies destroy wealth. hence its petty retaliation against certain Chinese exports and its monetary policies perceived as mercantilist that encourage other countries to erect barriers to free movement of goods and capital. Multipolarity coming -. hegemony. Yet the question remains to what extent Beijing will use its growing inﬂuence to transform the international system and bring its rules and institutions more in line with the country’s national interests. “China. Others point out that China is developing within a system with strongly established international institutions. 10 As China is already ﬁrmly integrated in the current international regimes and beneﬁts from their smooth functioning.Europe and China are filling in. armaments wars and eventually decades of global conflict and violence. 57–67. the US and the EU would prefer to integrate China in the global governance structures they established and safeguarded in the past few decades and hope for a reproduction of the existing system. for example. and Iranian nuclear ambitions. The United States can no longer afford to act as an unquestionably benign trade hegemon. Beijing actually has a profound interest in seeing that the international rules and institutions function effectively. Journalist and economist for Reuters Breakviews (November 30. many emerging powers in the past have relinquished their resistance against imperialist policies by gradually starting to apply the very strategies themselves: the use of coercion to chase unequal economic gains. 10 Heg is on the decline -. Today there appears no longer to be a Congressional consensus to ratify even the limited Colombia.S. No. as did Britain in the 19th century. regional rivalries may turn nasty.000 secret State Department cables that the 1990s vision of U. LexisNexis) The biggest secret to be revealed by WikiLeaks should have been the easiest to spot without the website's classified document dump: U. 1. increasing risk premiums in their respective regions and across the globe. Yet its efforts in these areas have been ineffectual as the nation's power to coerce and cajole has been reduced by its relative economic and military decline.S. Some expect that China too will inevitably go down this road. professor of international relations at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel and director of the Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies (European Review. it also engenders a change in the distribution of identities. they expect multilateralism to be a crucial ingredient of Beijing’s foreign policy. Then after 1873 the decline of Britain's relative economic strength and the later build-up of the German navy reduced Britain's power and led to increased protectionism.it will foster cooperation and stability -. the United States led the way toward global trade expansion. 9 They expect power politics to gradually take the upper hand. Vol.pdf) China and Europe are both regional powers with broad global interests. the EU. provided its intentions are reasonably benevolent.be/biccs/site/assets/files/apapers/China. There are a number of risk-reducing advantages to the world in having a clearly defined hegemon.136 of 154 only changing the distribution of power in the system. Yet it is far from clear how Beijing will seek to manage its position in the evolving international system and how it will strike the balance between power politics and multilateralism.ac. leadership.” http://www. while the Doha global free trade talks are stone dead.vub.%20the%20EU%20and %20Multipolarity-2. British hegemony pushed the global economy toward free trade and defused regional rivalries and armaments wars.
and South-Central Asia. Europe and China could be in the vanguard here as well. doing what it takes to get reelected.The Beginning and the End”. Global Hegemony .137 of 154 an important joint interest to promote stability and sustainable development in those regions that we share in our extended neighbourhoods. The emerging multilayered and culturally diversiﬁed multipolarity will make global governance much more complex and is by no means a guarantee for multilateralism. There is a strong need to work together to enhance security. horribly counterproductive actions taken during Clinton/Bush/Obama. It will also give them the scope to strengthen their internal unity. but has proven to be fleeting in the 90s and 00s due to the decline in America's finances. If Beijing and Brussels are serious about changing the nature of great power politics. This area was rock-solid during the 50s and 60s. Erb Institute for Global Sustainable Enterprise (4/18/09. We are moving steadily towards a new multipolar world order. and enhance maritime security. nothing. Rubin/Summers/Lindsay/Snow/Paulson/Geithner. but this should be cooperative and aim at sharing the costs of maintaining security. http://www. with the hope that things will get better. China. Thanks to the natural weakening of this foundation. and Greenspan/Bernanke administrations. to limit the impact of environmental hazards. and the growth of more significant manufacturing powers such as Japan. tackle non-traditional security threats. there are no longer anymore viable "band-aids" to apply. Successful bilateral cooperation will be key in promoting global peaceful development. no game plans. global hegemony was its manufacturing base. multilateral organizations need to reﬂect the emerging new international order. the weakening of its military due to a series of unproductive. Midas Letter. to invest in the safety of our energy supplies. Africa. We have to avoid that these regions develop into a belt of insecurity that endangers our development. Such a contest would severely weaken the two player’s chances for sustainable internal development. To be effective. as well as the short-term "band-aids" to try and buy time. to guarantee that our policies beneﬁt lasting stability and development. je) The U. In this order the major powers will have to balance between meeting increasing international expectations and persistent strong internal needs.Professor of Sustainable Enterprise at the University of Michigan. Andy. It is legitimate that growing interests bring the need to exert inﬂuence.midasletter. a strategic axis between China and Europe built on mutual beneﬁt and understanding will be indispensable.S. but effective multilateralism also implies that all parties are committed to overcoming diverging expectations and trying to reach a pragmatic consensus on how to make foreign policies complementary and mutually supportive. This is particularly the case of the Middle East.com/commentary/090418-2_US-hegemonythe-beginning-and-the-end. All along the "foundation" of U. to support effective governance. Europe and China have shown themselves anxious not to slide into another era of great power rivalry. both sides need each other if they are to develop an alternative for harsh international anarchy. In spite of all the friction and misunderstanding. US Hegemony is Ending Hoffman ’09. Just politicians being politicians.S. and Barbara M. and others. “U.'s brief reign as world superpower has been marked by the continuing application of No long-term strategies. . Associate Director of the Frederick A. which will be key in boosting positive power vis-a`-vis others.S.php. As the unipolar moment fades. draining wars.
a Gallup poll indicated that 50 percent of the public supports the notion that the U. And there is not much that the U.S.S. by establishing a No-Fly Zone in Libya. the inconclusive war in Afghanistan. some Americans (and Israelis) fantasize that the U. the deadlocked Israeli-Palestinian peace process. willing to deploy its troops in new military interventions.S. He also the continuing U. hegemony in the Middle East is over. understands that . "should mind its own business internationally and let other countries get along the best they can on their own. preoccupation with that region doesn't allow Washington to invest the required time and resources in maintaining its position in East Asia where core interests U." And without the U. In fact. support for imposing a no-fly zone in Libya is based on the assumption that France and Britain are going to take up the leading military role in the operation with the Americans providing some limited tactical support in enforcing the zone and is "not going to deploy ground troops into Libya. are at stake.S. research fellow at the Cato Institute (March 22.Middle East and North Africa Hadar 11 – Leon. cannot be described as anything other than a devastating blow to U. while a recent Washington Post polls suggested that 64 percent of Americans believe that the war in Afghanistan is not worth fighting. and Turkish interests — it becomes obvious that the age of U.S.php? pub_id=12903) The downfall of the pro-American autocrats in Tunisia and Egypt and the growing threat to regimes that are either allied with Washington (Bahrain) or doing business with it (Yemen). the U. there is no support in Washington for opening a new military front in the region. Indeed.” http://www.S.cato. Iran's nuclear military program. 2011.S.S. Obama not only recognizes that the U. leadership that are not going to be fulfilled. can do to reverse this process. and the diverging U.S. can continue calling the shots in the Middle East by holding the hands of Hosni Mubarak. waltzing with Hosni or threatening to shoot down Kaddafi's planes or imposing more sanctions on Ahmenajid will only create expectations for renewed U. or by taking a tougher line against Iran. But with a military overstretched in Iraq and Afghanistan and with a budget deficit rising to the stratosphere.138 of 154 UQ – Yes Heg Decline (Middle East) US heg is irreversibly declining -. “Obama Turns Failure into Success in the Middle East.S. Coupled with the costly military intervention in Iraq.S.org/pub_display.S. Not unlike Winston Churchill who insisted that Britain could retain its empire after 1945. is constrained in its ability to determine outcomes in the Middle East." as Obama stressed over the weekend. strategic interests.
” http://lahaine. increase its investments in applied research and development and vastly improve the quality of its products. Substituting trade missions for military bases. What passes for the current US private manufacturing sector shows no appetite for such a historic change. “Rising and Declining Economic Powers: The Sino-US Conflict Deepens. The transition from a militarist imperialist power. To expand overseas markets. deepens the domestic market and expands social services. Fundamental . The transfer of a trillion dollars in military spending from colonial wars could easily finance the reconversion to a civilian economy producing quality goods for local and overseas consumption. which would reduce charges to industry and state. to become competitive in domestic and overseas markets. New York and adjunct professor at Saint Mary's University (4/28/10.139 of 154 Withdrawal K/T Sustainability Decline is more than inevitable – to maintain our power we would need to restructure our entire country and withdraw our military forces from across the world. retired Bartle Professor (Emeritus) of Sociology at Binghamton University in Binghamton. industry would have to lower its profits. while upgrading local production to competitive levels. and a cap on all income over one million dollars can finance social security and comprehensive public national health system. Washington must end boycotts and military subservience to Israel. Focusing investment on the growing market for clean energy and technology for domestic and overseas economies. including merchandise and commodities reducing toxic chemical and environmentally damaging sources of energy. pushed by the pro-Israel fifth column embedded in top financial and political institutions and in control of the legislature 47 . Even assuming that there is a political shift toward re- industrializing the US. corroded by a corrupt political elite beholden to a parasitic speculator economic elite. The key is to rebalance the US economy from finance driven to industrial centered: but any such shift requires class warfare against entrenched power on Wall Street and in Washington 46 . Petras 10 – James. Only then will the US be able to compete economically with China in the world economy. can the ruling elite recognize that its empire is not sustainable (let alone desirable)? The US can increase its exports to China and its share of world trade to balance its accounts. To more forward requires a head-on confrontation with the ideologues of finance capital and a rejection of their efforts to deflect attention from their role in destroying America. Ending military directed empire building will open the flow of public financing toward civilian technological innovations. Confiscatory taxes on the millionaire/billionaires especially the entire ‘Wall Street” ruling elite. ending restrictions on overseas technology sales can further reduce trade deficits. To bring about this political and economic revolution requires a new configuration of the state which pursues public investments creating competitive industries.org/petras/b2-img/petras_sinous. uneven regional development.pdf) In the face of the US’s demonstrable economic decline. The transition from empire to republic requires a profound rebalancing of social power and a deep restructuring of the US economy. Up to now manufacturers have bought into or been bought out by financial institutions: they have lost their distinct character as a productive sector. Nothing short of a political and economic revolution can reverse the decline of the US. only if it carries out deep political and economic changes. Ending political links and billion dollar subsidies to militarized states like Israel and lifting sanctions on major economic markets like Iran will decrease outflows from the US treasury and enhance economic inflows and opportunities for productive sectors throughout the 1. costly and selfdestructive trade wars or worse. China’s class. China’s internal “imbalances” are profound and pervasive and over time can weaken the pillars of external expansion. will create new jobs and lower the cost of living while enhancing living standards. could increase inflows to the US and reduce outflows abroad. to a productive republic with a balanced economy and competitive sector requires fundamental political changes and a profound ideological revolution. inequalities. ‘marketing’ and speculation into social services like comprehensive national health plans high skill engineering and advanced industrial training to increase efficiency and competitiveness in the domestic market.5 billion muslim world. private wealth and public corruption and discriminatory treatment of migrants as second grade citizens (a dual citizenship system) will be resolved internally as the socio-economic divisions translate into class struggle. Vast sums need to be reallocated from wars. The “blame” China campaign for what are in reality internally caused US structural imbalances must be confronted before it leads us into new.
but these changes require a revival of the class struggle against state and private vested interests. .140 of 154 changes in the privatized health system toward a comprehensive national public health system are essential.
As part of such a project. Facing this incipient period of decline. He is. embraces caution and restraint to the greatest extent that one could hope for without an epochal paradigm shift in the intellectual framework of American foreign policymaking. that he is no pacifist. Examination of his major foreign policy pronouncements reveals that he remains within the mainstream of the American discourse on foreign policy. In his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech in December 2009 he made it clear. this is a president who. trimming ambitions in line with the fact that the nation can no longer act on the global stage with the wide latitude once afforded by its superior power. use the significant resources still at its disposal to smooth the edges of its loss of relative power. Lecturer in International Studies. Nevertheless. as those who seek to qualify the decline thesis have suggested. the narratives of America’s decline and Obama’s restraint are distinct but also crucially connected. and that ‘the United States of America has helped underwrite global security for more than six decades with the blood of our citizens and the strength of our arms’. even as he sought distance from his predecessor with the proclamation that ‘no system of government can or should be imposed by one nation on any other’. 2011. “The Art of Declining Politely. University of Birmingham (July 1. Those who vocally demand that the President act more boldly are not merely criticizing him. 101 In contemplating the diminished and diminishing weight of the United States upon the scales of . refusing to accept the waning of its primacy. within the confines of the mainstream.’ 99 His Westminster speech repeated these sentiments. he also endorsed with only slight qualification the liberal universalist view of civil liberties as transcendent human rights. confidence in the rule of law and the equal administration of justice. These are not just American ideas. commitment to continuing the campaign in Afghanistan for another decade. ‘The ability to speak your mind and have a say in how you are governed.’ he declared. defined by restraint and awareness of limits. The alternative course involves the initiation or escalation of conflictual scenarios for which the United States increasingly lacks the resources to cater: provocation of a military conclusion to the impasse with Iran.141 of 154 Attempts to Maintain Heg Bad Status quo heg is a sinking ship that will facilitate a peaceful decline – but a drastic increase in attempts to maintain our hegemony incites conflicts Quinn 11 – Adam. preserving influence to the maximum extent possible through whatever legacy of norms and institutions is bequeathed by its primacy. in suggesting that he is ‘weak’ and that a ‘tougher’ policy is needed. President Obama does not by any means represent a radical break with the traditions of American foreign policy in the modern era. regime change and democracy promotion in response to events in North Africa. 97 If the United States can embrace the spirit of managed decline. as some genuine dissidents from the prevailing foreign policy discourse would wish. not for the first time. to cite one example. government that is transparent and doesn’t steal from the people. given the likely political reaction at home. Evidently this is not a president who wishes to break signally with the mainstream. 100 No doubt sensibly. President Obama’s approach. a good president to inaugurate an era of managed decline. Either the nation can come to terms with the reality of the process that is under way and seek to finesse it in the smoothest way possible. makes him ideologically and temperamentally well suited to the former course in a way that. then this will clear the way for a judicious retrenchment. Adam Quinn. deliberate escalation of strategic rivalry with China in East Asia. America’s leaders may walk one of two paths. it is inconceivable that he would explicitly declare his strategy to be one of managed American decline. In doing so they set their faces against the reality of the coming American decline. a costly effort to consistently apply principles of military interventionism.” International Affairs Volume 87. 98 In his Cairo speech in June the same year. Issue 4) As noted in the opening passages of this article. spelling out his view that ‘the instruments of war do have a role to play in preserving the peace’. ‘I … have an unyielding belief that all people yearn for certain things. it can. in short. they implicitly suppose that the resources will be available to support such a course. the freedom to live as you choose. his predecessor was not. Or it can ‘rage against the dying of the light’. either by advocating a radical shrinking of America’s military strength as a good in itself or by disavowing liberal universalist global visions.
it may result in conflict. it is important not to conflate the question of what will be with that of what we might prefer. .142 of 154 global power. whatever reservations one may have held regarding US primacy. It may well be. It is also important not to be unduly deterministic in projecting the consequences of American decline. resulting in a new order that functions with peace and stability even in the absence of American primacy. At present it seems it is fortunate enough to have a president who fits the bill. fill any westerner with glee. or continues to be drawn into wars with middle powers or on the periphery in spite of its shrinking capacity to afford them. It may be a process that unfolds gradually and peacefully. Alternatively. Which outcome occurs will depend on more than the choices of America alone. if the United States clashes with rising powers as it refuses to relinquish the prerogatives of the hegemon. on reflection. But the likelihood that the United States can preserve its prosperity and influence and see its hegemony leave a positive legacy rather than go down thrashing its limbs about destructively will be greatly increased if it has political leaders disposed to minimize conflict and consider American power a scarce resource—in short. as critics of the decline thesis sometimes observe. leaders who can master the art of declining politely. that the prospect of increased global power for a state such as China should not.
“Iranian MP says US 'hegemony' makes talks impossible. deputy head of the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission of Iran's Parliament (Majlis) Hoseyn Ebrahimi said on Monday [23 August]. "If they [the US] stop their threats and sanctions the Islamic Republic will enter talks with them as it has said before.” BBC through Lexis) 24 August: The Islamic Republic will not enter talks with the United States unless the Americans stop their hegemony. Ayatollah Khamene'i said that Iran could not engage in negotiations with the US. "Based on its hegemonic attitude. . Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamene'i is opposed to talks with the US because they want to push any negotiation to the way they want and they halt it unilaterally if it is not favourable to them. Washington severed all diplomatic ties with Tehran in the aftermath of the US embassy takeover in Iran. shortly after the victory of the Islamic Revolution in 1979. therefore. a top Iranian lawmaker has said. because "talks in an environment of pressure." There may be room for talks if the US drops sanctions and a threatening language against the Islamic Republic." he further explained. the US tries to impose its will on the world nations. 2010.143 of 154 Heg Bad – Iran Heg prevents Iran talks – top officials’ statements BBC 10 – BBC Monitoring International Reports (August 24. Ayatollah Khamene'i also warned the US against launching an attack against Iran and said if Washington chooses to resort to military means against Iran. On 18 August." Mehr news agency quoted Ebrahimi as saying. negotiations are impossible under these conditions. the Leader added. the confrontation will not be restricted to the region alone. threats and intimidation are not talks.
found the resources to produce limited nuclear arsenals. The superpowers remained so convinced of the correctness of their respective privileged positions in the world system that they refused to make mutual concessions to achieve arms control. Print) Throughout the nuclear age. The University of North Carolina Press. Taught by the superpowers that nuclear weapons equal political power and that warheads prevent wars. North Korea. A paradoxical equation derived from this practice. catalyzed nuclear nationalism in other states and helped break the bonds of Washington’s influence.144 of 154 Heg Bad – Prolif US hegemony spurs other countries to acquire nuclear weapons and ultimately undermines American influence – turns case Maddock 10 (Shane J. . and the PRC. Americans have remained infatuated with unilateral and technological solutions to the atomic threat. And they have repeatedly attempted to preserve U. no president has proven capable of producing the right political mixture to yield a viable nonproliferation accord.S. such as India. PhD from the University of Connecticut in US history and teacher at Stonehill College. Pakistan. American hegemony. even states that could not provide their citizenry with a decent standard of living. As the technology became cheaper and more easily available. “Nuclear Apartheid”. the United States has squandered opportunities to forge cooperative ventures to halt proliferation. Other nations also chose military strength over cooperation and in the process diminished Washington’s and Moscow’s power in the international system. combined with arrogance and a Hobbesian worldview. other states built the bomb when they could afford to. Since the dawn of the nuclear age. author of multiple books concerning American Foreign Relations. From the Baruch Plan to national missile defense. nuclear hegemony by undercutting their own professed commitment to nuclear nondissemination.
the United States should concentrate on making sure that no state dominates Northeast Asia. and the economies of the advanced industrial states depend. “Imperial by Design”. and it should rely on diplomacy and economic statecraft. Only a Eurasian hegemon could pose an existential threat to the US. The driving factor behind oﬀshore balancing is its proponents’ recognition that the US has a ‘hegemony’ problem.cambridge. Robert M. He is on the Advisory Council of The National Interesthttp://nationalinterest. the US would rely on the tried and true dynamics of the balance of power to thwart any states with hegemonic ambitions. Mearsheimer ’11. which violates the all-important principle of selfdetermination. Oﬀshore balancing is based on the assumption that the most vital US interests are preventing the emergence of a dominant power in Europe and East Asia – a ‘Eurasian hegemon’ – and forestalling the emergence of a regional (‘oil’) hegemon in the Middle East. including Europe and the Middle East. but it should be stationed offshore or back in the United States. The National Interest. Offshore balancing is key to prevent any conflict through deterrence and hard power if necessary – it avoids political backlash and increases soft power Layne 9 – Christopher. but also gets us involved in nation building. Europe or the Persian Gulf. Europe and the Gulf. He should instead return to the grand strategy of offshore balancing. not only generates resentment toward the United States. serves on the Advisory Council of The National Interest (12/16/10. online at http://journals. As an oﬀshore balancer. In general terms. 3 Its proponents believe that oﬀshore balancing can do a better job than primacy of enhancing American security and matching US foreign policy objectives with the resources available to support them.org/action/displayFulltext? type=1&fid=3291804&jid=RIS&volumeId=35&issueId=01&aid=3291800&bodyId=&me mbershipNumber=&societyETOCSession=) Primacy’s neorealist critics have outlined an alternative grand strategy that increasingly resonates with the American public: oﬀshore balancing. America’s strategy of primacy increases US vulnerability to a geopolitical backlash – whether in the guise of countervailing great power coalitions. or terrorist attacks – and alienates public opinion in large swaths of the globe. American troops should go back over the horizon. which has served this country well for most of its history and offers the best formula for dealing with the threats facing America—whether it be terrorism. which invariably leads to no end of trouble. Once the potential hegemon is checked. and that it remains the world’s only regional hegemon. Jan-Feb 2011 Issue. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. We should build a robust military to intervene in those areas. “America’s Middle East grand strategy after Iraq: the moment for oﬀshore balancing has arrived. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago.” Review of International Studies (2009). Washington should also get out of the business of trying to spread democracy around the globe. A regional hegemon in the Middle East could imperil the ﬂow of oil upon which the US economy. In the event a potential hegemon comes on the scene in one of those regions.org/article/imperial-by-design-4576?page=show. and more generally acting as if we have the right and the responsibility to interfere in the domestic politics of other countries. 35: 5-25. Washington should rely on local forces to counter it and only come onshore to join the fight when it appears that they cannot do the job themselves.145 of 154 Offshore Balancing Good – General Offshore balancing solves war and maintains US power best.R. to the world. An oﬀshore balancing strategy would permit the US to withdraw its ground forces from Eurasia (including the Middle East) and assume an over-the- . This is the best way to ensure American primacy. not military force. Offshore balancing does not mean that the United States should ignore the rest of should maintain a substantially lower profile outside of Northeast Asia. nuclear proliferation or a traditional great-power rival. This behavior. je) President Obama is making a serious mistake heading down this road. But it protect its interests in areas of little strategic importance. he R. John. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University (2009.
of course. what the sociologist Max Weber called the ethic of conviction and. the best strategy is to rely on a balance of power approach that devolves to other states the costs and risks of their defense. including so-called soft balancing. When employed by states. A second point upon which oﬀshore balancers agree is that in addition to the traditional kind of – ‘hard’. 4 Yet. The attempt by France. recent studies by the CIA oﬀer compelling evidence that by 2020 the era of America’s unipolar ascendancy will be drawing to a close as new poles of power in the international system approach the US share of world power. Some primacists believe that the US is immune to being counter-balanced because. not on the intentions that underlie them. they are important for two reasons. multiple poles of power. Oﬀshore balancers. on one hand. and is based on prudence and self-restraint in the conduct of US strategy. Most of all it is a strategy that ﬁts within the broad realist tradition because it recognises the diﬀerence between. 7 In addition to soft balancing. on the other hand. First. soft balancing eﬀorts to rein-in American power may help the other major states learn to cooperate in ways that will the open the door to future hard balancing against the US. and a possible armed confrontation between the US and Iran. Regional powers – . Even if soft balancing eﬀorts fail. Second. Germany. The history of the modern international state system (which dates back to about 1500) is littered with the wreckage of great powers that tried an failed to achieve geopolitical primacy: the Hapsburg Empire under Charles V. 6 The most notable manifestation of soft balancing is the use by other major states of diplomacy and international institutions to try to restrain American actions. Spain under Philip II. Oﬀshore balancing contrasts sharply with primacy because primacists fear a world with independent. asymmetric strategies mean the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities. and Germany under Hitler (and. it is so much more powerful than its nearest possible competitors. under Kaiser Wilhelm II). believe for an insular great power like the US. 5 And. some would argue. The Bush administration’s disastrous policies in Iraq and the Middle East are a much needed reminder that this is a test Wilsonianism too often fails. the security of the others is threatened. they indicate that other major states regard US geopolitical dominance as a problem that needs to be addressed. and policies must be judged on their consequences. as the only great power in a ‘unipolar’ system. Russia and China to forestall the US invasion of Iraq by withholding United Nation’s Security Council authorisation is one example of soft balancing. balances ends and means. the ethic of responsibility. they fundamentally agree on the strategy’s basic premises. implications of China’s rapid ascent are – at the very least – an implicit acknowledgment that the days of unchallenged US dominance in world aﬀairs are numbered. there are new forms of balancing with which Washington already is contending. Primacy is based on the belief that it is better for the US to defend its allies and clients than to have them defend themselves. The reason is simple: the basic motivation of all major states is to survive. or military – counter-balancing that the US will face in coming years. Failure is the fate of hegemons. deﬁnes US interests in terms of what is vital rather than simply desirable.146 of 154 horizon military posture. and when one among them threatens to gain preponderant power. Another example is the eﬀort of the same nations and Britain to promote a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue that will avoid the imposition of UN sanctions on Teheran. asymmetric strategies are another type of nontraditional balancing that is being employed to contest US primacy. In foreign policymaking the road to hell is paved with good intentions. as well as economic. on the other hand. Although there are some nuanced diﬀerences among oﬀshore balancing’s proponents. growing apprehensions about the military. First. oﬀshore balancers recognise that one of the few ironclad rules in international politics is that when one great power becomes too powerful – when it bids to achieve hegemony – it is defeated by the counter-balancing eﬀorts of the other major powers in the international system. If – and only if – regional power balances look to be failing would the US re-insert its troops into Eurasia. Oﬀshore balancing is a realist strategy because it eschews the ideological crusading on behalf of democracy that is endemic to Wilsonianism. Oﬀshore balancers believe the US must adjust to incipient multipolarity because they understand that – unless the US is prepared to ﬁght an unending series of preventive wars – new great powers inevitably will emerge in the next decade or two. France under Louis XIV and Napoleon.
Because they are threatened by the US.147 of 154 especially those on the US hit list like Iran and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq – cannot slug it out toe-to-toe against the US’ dominant high-tech conventional forces. these states seek other methods of oﬀsetting American power. and dissuading Washington from using its military muscle against them. however. . The use of asymmetric strategies to oppose American power – especially in the Middle East where US policy has an imperial dimension – illustrates the dictum that empires inevitably provoke resistance. Terrorism is another asymmetric strategy – one employed by non-state actors like Al-Qaeda and similar jihadist groups – to resist US dominance. WMD – especially the possession of nuclear weapons – is one way these states can level the strategic playing ﬁeld and deter the US from attacking them.
on the other hand. Global dominators. je) Of course. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. he R. Another virtue of offshore balancing is its emphasis on getting other countries to assume the burden of containing an aspiring regional hegemon. For starters. attempting to dominate the globe encourages the United States to fight wars all around the world. Offshore balancing. because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves. It almost always makes good sense to get other countries to pay as many of those costs as possible while preserving one’s own power.org/article/imperial-by-design-4576?page=show. which not only wears down its military in peripheral conflicts. This is why Beijing should hope that the American military remains heavily involved in Afghanistan and Iraq for many years to come.R. Mearsheimer ’11. The National Interest. see the United States as the indispensable nation that must do almost all of the heavy lifting to make containment work. is committed to staying out of fights in the periphery and concentrating instead on truly serious threats. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. but also makes it difficult to concentrate its forces against China. serves on the Advisory Council of The National Interest (12/16/10. . John. in contrast. “Imperial by Design”.148 of 154 Offshore Balancing Good – China Offshore balancing solves China rise. Offshore balancing. The United States will have to play a key role in countering China. Jan-Feb 2011 Issue. But this is not a smart strategy because the human and economic price of checking a powerful adversary can be great. however. He is on the Advisory Council of The National Interesthttp://nationalinterest. is better suited to the task. America would check China’s rise even if it were pursuing global dominance. especially if war breaks out. but an America no longer weakened by unnecessary foreign intervention will be far more capable of checking Beijing’s ambitions.
“America’s Middle East grand strategy after Iraq: the moment for oﬀshore balancing has arrived. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University (2009. As Americans come to realise that the strategy of primacy makes the US less secure. the pursuit of geopolitical and ideological dominance ‘over there’ has increased the terrorist threat over here. And if the US continues to pursue a strategy of primacy. 54 Similarly. 35: 5-25. As Robert Pape argues. For example. As this debate gathers steam. Indeed. online at http://journals.149 of 154 Offshore Balancing Good – Middle East/Terrorism Offshore balancing is comparatively the best strategy to prevent terrorism and middle east escalation Layne 9 – Christopher. In the Middle East. when 48 per cent of those surveyed believed that the best defense against terrorism was to increase US military involvement abroad. it will become apparent that a neorealist strategy of oﬀshore balancing is the best candidate to become America’s next grand strategy – both in the Middle East. 55 The Bush administration’s policy of maintaining a dominating American military presence in the Persian Gulf and overthrowing nasty Middle Eastern regimes increased the terrorist threat to the US instead of reducing it. unlike primacists. 57 It is time to begin a long overdue debate on future US strategy after Iraq. and by strengthening America’s homeland defences. oﬀshore balancing ‘is America’s best strategy for the Persian Gulf’ because the ‘mere presence of tens of thousands of US troops in the region is likely to fuel continued fear of foreign occupation that will fuel anti-American terrorism in the future’.org/action/displayFulltext? type=1&fid=3291804&jid=RIS&volumeId=35&issueId=01&aid=3291800&bodyId=&me mbershipNumber=&societyETOCSession=) By lowering America’s politico-military proﬁle in the region. America’s military presence overseas’. they are becoming more receptive to the arguments for an oﬀshore balancing strategy. outside of the Middle East. primacy means that the US is headed for a train wreck with China.cambridge. more Americans believe that the best way to reduce the threat of terrorist attacks on the US is to decrease. an oﬀshore balancing strategy would contribute importantly to lowering the terrorist threat to the US. a recent 32 per cent margin. If the new administration wants to reduce US vulnerability. This is a striking turnabout from summer 2002. there are signs that Americans already accept oﬀshore balancing’s key premises. Robert M. covert operations. ‘The US does have important interests in the Middle East – including access to oil and the need to combat terrorism – but neither objective is well served by occupying the region with its own military forces’. the American people are drawing the correct grand strategic lessons from the Iraq debacle. Stephen Walt – who also favours a US oﬀshore balancing strategy in the Middle East – observes. 56 The Pew survey’s results suggest that. . One huge disaster is enough – more than enough – for any grand strategy.” Review of International Studies (2009). the best way to do so is to adopt an oﬀshore balancing strategy and ﬁght terrorists discreetly with good intelligence (including collaboration with US allies). A military collision between the US and Iran is still a possibility. not increase. and globally. And. the strategic setbacks will not end with Iraq. The same Pew survey also found that: ‘An increasing number of Americans see nonmilitary approaches – such as decreasing US dependence on Middle East oil and avoiding involvement with the problems of other countries’ as eﬀective strategies for reducing the terrorist threat to the US.
Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago.150 of 154 Offshore Balancing Good – Terrorism/Prolif Solves terrorism and prolif. Furthermore. Europe and the Gulf. and some of America’s adversaries will still have powerful incentives to acquire a nuclear arsenal. But all things considered. Mearsheimer ’11. Offshore balancing is also a better policy than global dominance for combating nuclear proliferation. As a result. . thus diminishing their need to have their own deterrents. It has two main virtues. as University of Chicago professor Robert Pape’s research shows. It calls for using military force in only three regions of the world. offshore balancing is still better than global dominance for keeping proliferation in check. Reagan had the good sense to quickly pull the remaining marines out of Lebanon and keep them offshore. Jan-Feb 2011 Issue. John. Remember what happened after President Ronald Reagan sent marines into Beirut in 1982? A suicide bomber blew up their barracks the following year.R. he R. The National Interest. And it is worth noting that the perpetrators of this act did not pursue us after we withdrew. Certainly. Placing American troops in the Arab and Muslim world is a major cause of terrorist attacks against the United States. attack.org/article/imperial-by-design-4576?page=show. there is no reason that it cannot extend its nuclear umbrella over its allies in those areas. killing 241 service members. “Imperial by Design”. only as a matter of last resort. He is on the Advisory Council of The National Interesthttp://nationalinterest.S. offshore balancing is the best grand strategy for ameliorating our terrorism problem. the United States would be less threatening to other countries. je) Specifically. and even then. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. the strategy is not perfect: some allies will want their own nuclear weapons out of fear that the United States might not be there for them in a future crisis. serves on the Advisory Council of The National Interest (12/16/10. which would lessen their need to acquire atomic weapons to protect themselves from a U. because offshore balancing calls for Washington to help local powers contain aspiring regional hegemons in Northeast Asia. America would still carry a big stick with offshore balancing but would wield it much more discreetly than it does now.
cato. President Barack Obama is expected to sign it. We have come to believe. power. we can make space for the other forms of human interaction that facilitate security and prosperity over the long term. Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute (September 21. perhaps over Taiwan.” http://www. is its people. the true source of U.” http://www. most of which have nothing to do with our military prowess. French or British) decision makers lost their cool would have caused far more death and destruction than Osama bin Laden can muster in the darkest reaches of his imagination.151 of 154 AT Heg Solves War (General) Heg doesn’t solve war -. while others see a hot one with China in the offing. And the scale of violence that would have been unleashed had U.php? pub_id=12156&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed %3A+CatoRecentOpeds+(Cato+Recent+Op-eds) With the Senate close to voting on the defense authorization bill. How likely is it that the so-called war on terrorism will be looked upon through the long lens of history as comparable to the world wars of the 20th century? Not very. Both are ideological struggles. Congress is poised to pass the largest military budget since World War II — roughly $550 billion. no. peoples disconnected from any particular nation-state or peoples united by ideologies that transcend national boundaries? What if al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations are but the tip of the iceberg? Newspapers and opinion journals are littered these days with apocalyptic predictions of an impending — or even ongoing — world war.org/pub_display. Some worry of a new cold war with Russia. but the fact remains that the major powers have managed to avoid the very sorts of cataclysms that claimed the lives of an estimated 100 million people in the first half of the 20th century. The casualties caused by international terrorist incidents since September 11.S.php?pub_id=10228) For too long.structure of the international system checks. Does Military Power Keep Us Safe? (Part II). that military power keeps us safe. our generosity and our ingenuity is expressed in countless ways. the president has taken . By reducing the size of our military to a level more consistent with our own needs. pending resolution of minor disputes like funding for the alternative Joint Strike Fighter engine.S. we sometimes seem a long way from that noble goal. But the true strength of the United States. It always has been. we have defined our strength as a nation by our capacity for waging war. The violence and bloodshed that can be deployed by non-state actors is an order of magnitude smaller than what could be caused by even a mediumsize modern industrial state. Can it even be compared with the Cold War. Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute (May 20. 2009. research fellow in defense and homeland security at the Cato Institute. erroneously. Although we aspire to a time when disputes are settled peacefully. and the prospects for future casualties. and again between September 1939 and August 1945. Christopher. fought chiefly by non-military means. The world is a dangerous place. Despite Obama's professed concern about the huge budget deficit. Our spirit. This is neither naive nor utopian. which claimed far fewer lives but lasted nearly five times longer than the two world wars combined? Again. excluding funds for the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. Preble 9 – Christopher. “Drop Pretension to Supremacy. 2001.cato.org/pub_display. A decline in heg won’t cause conflict – we have sufficient deterrence and policymakers exaggerate foreign troubles with security threats Friedman and Preble 10 – Benjamin. pale in comparison to the death and destruction that took place between August 1914 and November 1918. and that more power will keep us safer. or Soviet (or Chinese. and by encouraging others to become more self-reliant. Perhaps we've all learned something? Even if major war between nations seems more remote than ever before. but the threat of global thermonuclear war hung over every aspect of Cold War diplomacy. Those prospects cannot be dismissed lightly. what of war between peoples. The casualties caused by international terrorist incidents since September 11 pale in comparison to the death and destruction that took place between 1914 and 1918.
The resulting force would be more elite.152 of 154 no meaningful steps to rein in military spending.22 trillion less over the next 10 years. remove an impetus for nuclear weapons proliferation and prevent foreign peoples from resenting us for occupying their countries. Sending large armies to occupy — and try to manage the politics of — hostile Muslim countries is not effective counterterrorism policy.S. according to a Cato Institute report released Tuesday. limit the number of countries that build up their military to balance U. Making large spending cuts without reducing military commitments is a recipe for overburdening service members.S. Citing the need for austerity. would also allow for reductions in the Air Force and Navy. In nearly all cases. because it could enhance security. Policymakers exaggerate the capability of existing enemies and invent new ones by defining traditional foreign troubles — geopolitical competition among states and instability within them. military deployments. Pentagon officials have a goal of 1 percent real growth in the Defense Department budget over the next decade. Geography.S. along with advances in strike technology. Fewer missions. Hawks and defense industry trade groups say this spending is essential to U. It would reduce the possibility of fighting unnecessary wars. In most cases. Nor should Washington embrace strategic restraint just for budgetary reasons.S.S. Not exactly a revolution of fiscal discipline. . the Pentagon could spend less — at least $1. Because a less active military can make conventional and counterinsurgency warfare less likely. ambitions. for example — as major U. the Pentagon could cut force structure — reducing personnel. less strained and far less expensive. weapons and vehicles procured and operational costs. it is counterproductive. security. But much of Washington's military spending is geared toward defending others and toward the dubious proposition that global stability depends on U. they are not. A force reduction strategy would make sense even without deficits. Substantially reducing military spending means reducing U. By shedding missions. Washington confuses what it wants from its military (global primacy or hegemony) with what it needs (safety). however. security threats. wealth and nuclear weapons provide us with a degree of safety that our ancestors would envy. If our military had less to do. we recommend cutting the Army and Marine Corps by roughly one-third. forces.
should inform the North that full international integration requires the participation of South Korea. while recognizing America's limited ability to influence the PRC's behavior. The U. rather than merely adjusting its controversial Status of Forces Agreement. The president should press for a more active PRC policy to support reinvigorated U. World War II ended more than six decades ago: The Japanese do not have a double dose of original sin and America should no longer play geopolitical wetnurse for nations that long ago developed the means to protect their own interests. Moreover. engagement with the North. will remain engaged in East Asia. but should increasingly devolve defense responsibilities on countries in the region. maintains one-sided "mutual" defense treaties with Japan and South Korea. Washington should engage North Korea over its nuclear program. An improved bilateral relationship is more likely than isolation to encourage greater respect by Beijing for the liberty of its citizens. Japanese. But Washington no longer has any need to attempt to preserve regional military hegemony. Bandow 9 – Doug. However. the ROK and its neighbors should step forward. is losing its financial ability to do so. Japan.S. At the same time.153 of 154 AT Heg Solves Asia Stability Heg decline doesn’t cause East Asian conflict -. The U. President Obama should begin moving the region into a new era of less security dependence on Washington.S. promote respect for human rights. Washington should speak frankly about the importance of human rights. He is a former special assistant to President Reagan (November 29.S. The starting point should be a push to ratify the FTA with South Korea. The Obama administration should pursue a different course. it also has much to gain from taking the lead in promoting diplomatic solutions of regional problems.S. the People's Republic of China's apparent determination to create a military capable of deterring U. In Washington. The U. Washington should strengthen economic and trade ties with China. That the U. intervention along its border is treated as a threat to American security. The most important relationship for the 21st century will be that between the existing superpower and the potential superpower.S. Seoul has the most at stake in maintaining a peaceful peninsula. However. The Obama administration should coordinate South Korea.S. will be most secure if friendly states in East Asia work together to confront sources of instability. The U. and Russia as well.multilateral cooperation solves. and encourage the peaceful settlement of disputes. steps back from its dominant military role.S. “Policy Change for East Asia. Washington must forge a cooperative relationship on difficult regional issues like North Korea.S.S. senior fellow at the Cato Institute. without any link to a global hegemonic competitor like the Soviet Union. must remain militarily dominant is taken for granted. What has ever been must ever be appears to be the basis of U.S. America still has a major economic role to play. apart from the U. emphasizing economic integration while promoting military detachment.php?pub_id=11015) The potential for conflict remains. such instability would pose little threat to the U.” http://www. Such a cooperative venture also would help channel China's rise in peaceful directions. America's cultural and economic ties are long-lasting and mutually beneficial. China.S. The PRC has much at stake on a stable Korean Peninsula. . policies regarding Pyongyang. Washington should withdraw its garrisons from Japanese soil and turn defense responsibility for Japan over to Tokyo. Yet Washington's Cold War alliance structure remains essentially unchanged. The president should treat Japan as a full partner. a transformational agenda. On defense. called the East Asian Community. At the same time.S. In economics.org/pub_display. Washington should seek to tighten regional economic integration. the U. 2009. The Japanese government apparently is interested in promoting a regional order. also should encourage greater cooperation between Japan and its neighbors. and U.S. foreign policy. President Obama needs to promote a changed attitude as much as offer new policies. Washington should embrace rather than resist such an approach.S.cato. that means proposing a free trade agreement. Washington should allow the Republic of Korea to lead the nonproliferation campaign. As the U. And at a time of economic crisis the U.
The destruction of that system through economic conflict or war would deal a shattering blow to the Chinese economy. In terms of military power. but by reducing any possibility of a Taiwanese declaration of independence at the same time. navy away from China's coasts and prevent the U. and the Chinese are only at the very early stages. In fact.S. not to dominate. as a global superpower. Finally. The first is its lack of aircraft carriers. it is not likely that the host countries India is after all a great deal closer to them than China is. but so far these are for commercial use. The yuan has a very long way to go before it even begins to rival the pound or the yen as a global currency. even if China becomes the world's largest economy this will by no means automatically equate to an ability to rival the U. 2011. and embroilment in local wars which in the end had little to do with real U. Pakistan – and North Korea is more a ghastly liability than an ally. and thereby to the stability of the Chinese political system and the rule of the Communist Party.newamerica. let alone the dollar or the euro.S. Indeed. interests. Neither the Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO) nor the loose economic consultative grouping of BRICS resemble military alliances. mistakes. from effectively defending Taiwan. and certainly of the wars in Vietnam and Iraq. China may be able to make a better contribution to the continent's development than the West has done. China would wish to infuriate and frighten India by turning them into Chinese military bases.S.S. it is a rather striking comment on China's international strategic weakness that apart from North Korea. Moreover. but it will also run into the same immense barriers to development that African states have faced up to now. there is the question of whether China will wish to emulate the U. Senior Research Fellow. this is one of the most complex of all military-industrial undertakings. “U. due both to harsh managerial practices and the commercial competition of Chinese workers and traders. compared to the U.Russian Relations and the Rise of China. China's only true ally in the world is Soviet Union discovered during the Cold War.” http://www. . American Strategy Program.3 Secondly.S. and China. In addition..net/publications/policy/us_russian_relations_and_the_rise_of_chi na) There is no necessity that the rise of China will lead to increased tension or conflict between the U.S. in terms of global power or learn from U. the whole greater Middle East looks like an area that any sensible great power will in future try to avoid. In Africa. China has gone from being one of the Western system's greatest victims in the 19th Century to being one of the greatest beneficiaries of the global market system created by the British Empire and the United States. the Chinese may well be approaching the point where they can drive the U. This was arguably true of the Korean and Afghan Wars. China makes a conflict over Taiwan much less likely.S. Beijing is now devoting great effort to developing these. and with the possible exception of Pakistan. A significant role in America's decline has been played by its strategic over-extension. former senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (July 11. but as the lacks stable and extensive alliance systems.S. China is working on what has been called its "string of pearls" strategy to develop ports around the Indian Ocean.S.154 of 154 AT Heg Solves China Decline in heg doesn’t mean Chinese rise or conflict – structural barriers and interdependence OR china can’t compete – military disparity is still too great Lieven 11 – Anatol. and Pakistan could become the same. Chinese managers and workers are already facing increased local hostility in some areas.2 When it comes to global power projection China suffers from two huge drawbacks and is likely to do so for a long time to come.