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***Hegemony Bad***
***Hegemony Bad***...............................................................................................1 Frontline.......................................................................................................................................3 ***Uniqueness.........................................................................................................6 Low Now.......................................................................................................................................7 Collapse Inevitable.....................................................................................................................10 Multipolarity Inevitable..............................................................................................................17 Multilat Inevitable......................................................................................................................19 Heg  Multilat..........................................................................................................................20 Challengers Now.........................................................................................................................21 Heg Low (1/2)............................................................................................................................26 Heg Low (2/2)............................................................................................................................27 AT: Best Military Sustains.........................................................................................................29 AT: Soft Power Sustains.............................................................................................................30 AT: Economy Sustains ...............................................................................................................31 ***Alternative Uniqueness....................................................................................32 Heg Sustainable (1/2)................................................................................................................33 Heg Sustainable (2/2)................................................................................................................35 ***Heg Bad............................................................................................................37 Bad – Generic.............................................................................................................................38 Bad – China War........................................................................................................................39 XTN: China War.....................................................................................................................40 Bad – Counterbalancing.............................................................................................................41 Bad – Disease.............................................................................................................................42 Bad – Iran Strikes......................................................................................................................43 Bad – Middle East War..............................................................................................................45 AT: Heg Solves MidEast War.................................................................................................46 Bad – Proliferation.....................................................................................................................47 AT: Heg Solves Prolif..............................................................................................................49 Bad – Russia War.......................................................................................................................51 Bad – Sino-Russia Alliance........................................................................................................52 Bad – Space Weapons................................................................................................................53 Bad – Terrorism.........................................................................................................................55 Heg Fails - Terrorism.................................................................................................................57 XTN: Terrorism......................................................................................................................58 AT: Heg Solves Terror............................................................................................................59 Bad – US-EU Relations.............................................................................................................60 XTN: US-EU Relations...........................................................................................................61 Relations Good.......................................................................................................................62 Doesn’t Solve War......................................................................................................................63 Clinging to Power -> War..........................................................................................................69 Collapse =/= War.......................................................................................................................70 Retrenchment Good...................................................................................................................72 Heg Turns (1/3)..........................................................................................................................75 Heg Turns (2/3)..........................................................................................................................77 Heg Turns (3/3).........................................................................................................................78

2 of 154 ***Authors............................................................................................................80 AT: Ferguson..............................................................................................................................81 AT: Khalilzhad...........................................................................................................................82 AT: Brooks&Wohlforth..............................................................................................................83 ***Multipolarity Good...........................................................................................84 MultiPol Good – Generic...........................................................................................................85 MultiPol Good – Terror.............................................................................................................86 MultiPol Good – Iran.................................................................................................................87 Heg Unsustainable.....................................................................................................................90 Heg Unsustainable (Soft Power/Unpopular Policies)...............................................................99 Heg Decline Inevitable.............................................................................................................102 Alt Cause – Resource Collapse.................................................................................................104 Heg Collapse Inevitable (1/18).................................................................................................105 Heg Collapse Inevitable (2/18)................................................................................................106 Heg Collapse Inevitable (3/18).................................................................................................107 Heg Collapse Inevitable (4/18)................................................................................................108 Heg Collapse Inevitable (5/18).................................................................................................109 Heg Collapse Inevitable (6/18)..................................................................................................111 Heg Collapse Inevitable (7/18).................................................................................................112 Heg Collapse Inevitable (8/18).................................................................................................113 Heg Collapse Inevitable (9/18).................................................................................................114 Heg Collapse Inevitable (10/18)...............................................................................................115 Heg Collapse Inevitable (11/18)................................................................................................116 Heg Collapse Inevitable (12/18)................................................................................................117 Heg Collapse Inevitable (13/18)...............................................................................................118 Heg Collapse Inevitable (14/18)...............................................................................................119 .................................................................................................................................................120 Heg Collapse Inevitable (15/18)................................................................................................121 Heg Collapse Inevitable (16/18)...............................................................................................122 Heg Collapse Inevitable (17/18)...............................................................................................123 Heg Collapse Inevitable (18/18)...............................................................................................124 Exts – Yes China Rise...............................................................................................................126 Yes – China/Russia Counterbalancing.....................................................................................132 UQ – Yes Heg Decline..............................................................................................................133 UQ – Yes Heg Decline (Middle East) ......................................................................................138 Withdrawal K/T Sustainability................................................................................................139 Attempts to Maintain Heg Bad.................................................................................................141 Heg Bad – Iran ........................................................................................................................143 Heg Bad – Prolif ......................................................................................................................144 Offshore Balancing Good – General ........................................................................................145 Offshore Balancing Good – China............................................................................................148 Offshore Balancing Good – Middle East/Terrorism ...............................................................149 Offshore Balancing Good – Terrorism/Prolif .........................................................................150 AT Heg Solves War (General)...................................................................................................151 AT Heg Solves Asia Stability ....................................................................................................153 AT Heg Solves China ................................................................................................................154

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Primacy will be impossible to sustain – dollar, fiscal pressure, rising challengers, overstretch Layne 10 (Christopher Layne, Professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A&M's George H.W. Bush
School of Government & Public Service. "Graceful decline: the end of Pax Americana". The American Conservative. May 2010. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_7060/is_5_9/ai_n54223596/) AK

China's economy has been growing much more rapidly than the United States' over the last two decades and continues to do so, maintaining audacious 8 percent growth projections in the midst of a global recession. Leading economic forecasters predict that it will overtake the U.S. as the world's largest economy, measured by overall GDP, sometime around 2020. Already in 2008, China passed the U.S. as the world's leading manufacturing nation--a title the United States had enjoyed for over a century--and this year China will displace Japan as the world's second-largest economy. Everything we know about the trajectories of rising great powers tells us that China will use its increasing wealth to build formidable military power and that it will seek to become the dominant power in East Asia. Optimists contend that once the U.S. recovers from what historian Niall Ferguson calls the
"Great Repression"--not quite a depression but more than a recession--we'll be able to answer the Chinese challenge. The country, they remind us, faced a larger debt-GDP ratio after World War II yet embarked on an era of sustained growth. They forget that

the postwar era was a golden age of U.S. industrial and financial dominance, trade surpluses, and persistent high growth rates. Those days are gone. The United States of 2010 and the world in which it lives are far different from those of 1945. Weaknesses in the fundamentals of the American economy have been accumulating for more than three decades. In the 1980s, these problems were acutely diagnosed by a number of
writers--notably David Calleo, Paul Kennedy, Robert Gilpin, Samuel Huntington, and James Chace--who predicted that these structural ills would ultimately erode the economic foundations of America's global preeminence. A spirited late-1980s debate was cut short, when, in quick succession, the Soviet Union collapsed, Japan's economic bubble burst, and the U.S. experienced an apparent economic revival during the Clinton administration. Now the delayed day of reckoning is fast

approaching. Even in the best case, the United States will emerge from the current crisis with fundamental handicaps. The Federal Reserve and Treasury have pumped massive amounts of dollars into circulation in hope of reviving the economy. Add to that the $1 trillion-plus budget deficits that the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) predicts the United States will incur for at least a decade. When the projected deficits are bundled with the persistent U.S. currentaccount deficit, the entitlements overhang (the unfunded future liabilities of Medicare and Social Security), and the cost of the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is reason to worry about the United States' fiscal stability. As the CBO says, "Even if the recovery occurs as projected and the stimulus bill is allowed to expire, the country will face the highest debt/GDP ratio in 50 years and an increasingly unsustainable and urgent fiscal problem." The dollar's vulnerability is the United States' geopolitical Achilles' heel. Its role as the international economy's reserve currency ensures American preeminence, and if it loses that status, hegemony will be literally unaffordable. As Cornell professor Jonathan Kirshner observes, the dollar's vulnerability "presents potentially significant and underappreciated restraints upon contemporary American political and military predominance." Fears for the dollar's long-term health predated the current financial and economic crisis. The meltdown has amplified them and highlighted two new factors that bode ill for continuing reserve-currency status. First, the other big financial players in the international economy are either military rivals (China) or ambiguous allies (Europe) that have their own ambitions and no longer require U.S. protection from the Soviet threat. Second, the dollar faces an uncertain future because of concerns that its value will diminish over time. Indeed, China,
which has holdings estimated at nearly $2 trillion, is worried that America will leave it with huge piles of depreciated dollars.

China's vote of no confidence is reflected in its recent calls to create a new reserve currency. In coming years, the U.S. will be under increasing pressure to defend the dollar by preventing runaway inflation. This will require it to impose fiscal self-discipline through some combination of budget cuts, tax increases, and interest-rate hikes. Given that the last two options could choke off renewed growth, there is likely to be strong pressure to slash the federal budget. But it will be almost impossible to make meaningful cuts in federal spending without deep reductions in

Necessity . peaceful retrenchment is the most common response. and make diplomatic overtures to enemies. we find that great powers retrenched in no less than eleven and no more than fifteen of the eighteen cases.12 Retrenchment is by no means easy. "These aren't the golden 1990s." he writes in Multilateralism in Munich. In contrast. we argue that the rate of decline helps explain what forms great power retrenchment will take. increase reliance on allies or adversaries. we find that the magnitude of relative decline helps explain the extent of great power retrenchment. is under pressure to make real choices about taxes and spending. states renounce risky ties. To date there has been neither a comprehensive study of great power retrenchment nor a study that lays out the case for retrenchment as a practical or probable policy. States that retrench often regain their position in the hierarchy of great powers. and impose adjustments on domestic populations. when states fall in the hierarchy of great powers. When borrowing becomes more difficult. seek new allies or rely more heavily on old ones. Faced with diminishing resources. draw down their military obligations. we challenge the retrenchment pessimists’ claim that domestic or international constraints inhibit the ability of declining great powers to retrench.' as British minister Ed Balls put it in perhaps only slight exaggeration. choices must be made between raising taxes. none of the declining powers that failed to retrench recovered their relative position. Of the fifteen great powers that adopted retrenchment in response to acute relative decline. Americans will find themselves afflicted with hegemony fatigue. Far from being a hazardous policy. "This combination will force the Obama administration to stop cherrypicking issues on which it wants to cooperate and forging ahead on those issues it believes it can still handle alone. but necessity is the mother of invention.4 of 154 defense expenditures. International Security Spring 2011. Second. Your authors are pessimists – empirical data proves retrenchment is more peaceful than the alternatives MacDonald and Parent 11 (Paul. a range of 61–83 percent. great powers retrench for the same reason they expand: the rigors of great power politics compel them to do so. No. and cutting defense spending. 4.S. great powers moderate their foreign policy ambitions and offer concessions in areas of lesser strategic value. the absolute size of U. We examine eighteen cases of acute relative decline since 1870 and advance three main arguments. Following the dictates of neorealist theory. our analysis suggests that great powers facing acute decline are less likely to initiate or escalate militarized interstate disputes. retrenchment can be successful. even over short time spans. the capitalist West is facing defeat in Afghanistan and is on the verge of 'the worst recession in a hundred years. when U. 40 percent managed to recover their ordinal rank. we question the logic and evidence of the retrenchment pessimists. cutting non-defense spending. defense expenditures are "more likely to be decisive in the future when the U. Discretionary non-defense domestic spending accounts for only about 20 percent of annual federal outlays. retrenchment neither requires aggression nor invites predation. “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment”.) AK In this article. How fast great powers fall contributes to whether these retrenching states will internally reform. rather than conflict.S. So the United States will face obvious "guns or butter" choices. Vol. Contrary to the pessimistic conclusions of critics. In fact. and declining great powers face powerful incentives to contract their interests in a prompt and proportionate manner. Third. and Joseph. and adjustment more difficult to postpone. Great powers are able to rebalance their commitments through compromise.S. Knowing only a state’s rate of relative economic decline explains its corresponding degree of retrenchment in as much as 61 percent of the cases we examined. argues FPIF contributor Hannes Artens. 35. As Kirshner puts it. In this first decade of the 21st century.org/articles/a_multipolar_moment But times have changed. power was at its zenith. In these ways. Based on the empirical record." Faced with these hard decisions. Pages 7-44. Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College. Multiple balancing powers and internal issues make heg collapse inevitable – only abandoning unipolarity solves lashout and great power conflict John Feffer (co-director of Foreign Policy In Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies)February 2009 “A Multipolar Moment” http://www. First. Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami. When international conditions demand it. states respond to penury the same way they do to plenty: they seek to adopt policies that maximize security given available means. This article fills these gaps by systematically examining the relationship between acute relative decline and the responses of great powers.fpif. Further.

Brazil. the red ink is mounting. the bill for two wars plus the Pentagon's already gargantuan budget. and all of our nuclear weapons have done little to prevent North Korea from entering the nuclear club. Debt has been the gravedigger of many an empire. the stimulus package. in which all sides humbly accept what is realistically possible. the Pentagon is still maintaining the world's largest military force — but we have failed to defeat al-Qaeda. The European Union's expansion has been accompanied by relatively few growing pains.5 of 154 will dictate a more pragmatic multilateralism.S. The global recession is hammering the U." Are we thus witnessing the final end of the unipolar moment? China is coming up fast. economy. Or is that the sound of dirt hitting a coffin lid? . Over here. so we either evolve multilateral responses or we do a dinosaur dive into extinction. we are quagmired in Afghanistan. Global problems like climate change and financial collapse require global solutions. With the bank bailout. and South Africa) are quietly acquiring more geopolitical heft. and we might finally see the end of the dollar's reign as global currency. meanwhile. Several powerful countries in the South (particularly India. I can hear the adding machine totting up the numbers.

6 of 154 ***Uniqueness .

Clinton will finish her global circumnavigation in Hong Kong. its unhelpful stance on Kashmir and its machinations in Afghanistan. where the greatest challenges to American power are rising. 2011. and Barack Obama remains opposed to direct intervention. In Damascus. It will be notable as much for what is not said as what is. June 24th. Despite claims that Gaddafi is close to throwing in the towel. British journalist. which. has so far hedged its bets. The next stop on Clinton's grand tour – India – will take her into the sphere of superpower rivalries. Clinton's visit to financially stricken Athens on Sunday is unlikely to be of any practical assistance. Hegemony low and declining – Middle East proves Sebastian 6/23 (Tim. France.nytimes.S. Clinton's first stop is in Istanbul on Friday. For this reason Clinton cannot be expected to dwell. But while China and Russia afford him diplomatic cover. While that assessment will be publicly upheld in Istanbul. is that pressure on Muammar Gaddafi's embattled regime in Tripoli is telling. you can afford to laugh.uk/commentisfree/2011/jul/14/hillary-clinton-world-tour) Hillary Clinton's 11-day round-the-world tour is remarkable even by the high-flying standards of US secretaries of state. All three issues speak to American impotence. But paradoxically. Iran and the IsraelPalestine conflict. Clinton made waves last year when she warned China. A security conference in Bali is certain to touch on a host of territorial disputes between China and its neighbours.co. for example. Clinton said this week that the Syrian president had forfeited the legitimacy to rule. this diplomatic tour de force may unintentionally highlight the apparently inexorable decline of American power and influence. power — just look at events in the Middle East. Turkey will propose yet another "roadmap" to end the conflict. It's certain to make headlines around the globe. to stop trying to fence off the South China Sea. But Washington. http://www. Given America's own protectionist record. Much the same might be said of the effect of American strictures on North Korea. has grown more belligerent. to back up its Nato partners. Clinton's sojourn will be rounded off in south-east and east Asia. and its ever greater reliance on Chinese capital and Chinese imports. Americans seem incapable of achieving a consensus on how to address it. not leadership. Clinton can have little to say on Palestine. To confuse matters further. staff writer. July 14th. with another confrontation involving Vietnam reported only today. The US is one of the few countries with a bigger national debt than Greece. in effect. Clinton could give the interventionists a boost were she to announce US recognition of the rebel national council in Benghazi as Libya's government and release more than $30bn in regime funds frozen in US banks.com/interactive/2011/06/24/opinion/global/20110624_SUPERPOWER. the Israeli prime minister. where she is due to make a speech decrying protectionism. this piece of doorstep impudence is more likely to elicit smiles than snarls in Beijing. where she will join European and other foreign ministers in the international contact group co-ordinating the Nato-led intervention in Libya.guardian.7 of 154 Low Now American influence and dominance is diminished now – Clinton tour proves Tisdall 7-14 (Simon. if anything. “Hillary Clinton circumnavigates a sphere of diminishing US influence”. The US is now reduced to the role of disgruntled spectator as a UN vote to recognise Palestinian statehood draws near.html?ref=middleeast) There’s no doubt about the devaluation of U. The sharp crack as Israel’s prime minister slapped President Obama’s face with a refusal to halt . What will not be said is that the US increasingly views Delhi as a vital counterweight to a steadily more aggressive China. worried in part about encouraging Islamist extremists. And it is arguably USpatented transnational market capitalism that created the whole sorry mess in the first place. Her words angered Beijing but did not alter its behaviour. Clinton's Turkish leg will include bilateral talks on Syria. there is as yet no concrete sign that he will stand down – amid widening differences in approach between the US and Britain. Clinton will do well to avoid David Cameron's mistake of indulging in gratuitous Pakistan-bashing on Indian soil. there is little more the US can do other than complain. Counter-terrorism will be high on the agenda following Wednesday's bombings in Mumbai. on India's de facto support for the Burmese dictatorship. behind the scenes Clinton may hear well-rehearsed complaints that the US is not doing enough. The Guardian UK. chairman of Doha Debates. The official line. The secretary of state will say a lot about strengthening ties through strategic dialogue and commercial collaboration. Bashar al-Assad continues to ignore ever more shrill American criticism of the nationwide security crackdown. Like the Greeks. In this context. “No More Superpower?” The New York Times. Iran's recent decision to dramatically accelerate its suspect uranium enrichment programme gives the lie to claims that the Tehran regime is retreating under the US-led sanctions campaign. 2011. promulgated by France. http://www. militarily and in other ways. Italy and Russia. When you're winning. And with the Obama administration's peace plan torpedoed by Binyamin Netanyahu. and that the outlines of a negotiated settlement are beginning to emerge.

there is no peace at all. that you can murder and torture all you want — but if you go quietly when you’ve had enough. The ‘‘conflict balance’’ of the Cold War was very soon changed by global destabilization. The world is rapidly changing. the largest Ferris wheel in the world is in Singapore. competitiveness. It needs to show the world that it will no longer back leaders who abuse their own people’s freedom in the mistaken belief that it will help Americans sleep more securely back home. energy. We are living in an interesting time.html?ref=middleeast) The gradual diminishing of American influence. International terrorism was vividly painted as a conflict of civilizations. promised to restore America’s popularity. economically and scientifically. writer of the book The Post-American World: Release 2. and the rise of other power centers. power may be good for the Middle East. Don’t assume the worst. new Arab governments will have to stand on their own feet. What more powerful signal can there be to despots present and future. Now we speak not only about America’s weakened role. the European Union. But today? “The tallest building in the world is now in Dubai. America’s currency is at rock bottom in the Arab world. charts the fall of America’s dominance and the simultaneous rise of the rest of the world in his book The Post-American World: Release 2. “No More Superpower?” The New York Times. Only this time it’s not called America. and infrastructure Times of Texas 7/1 *citing Fareed Zakaria. Competitive Workforce.8 of 154 settlements still reverberates around the region.” Zakaria. not because it can’t press buttons — or find and kill Osama bin Laden — but because its policies make no sense. America will buy you a ticket.” notes Fareed Zakaria. primarily China. the United States dominated the world politically. June 24th. The term of the third post-Soviet president.com/2011/07/01/us-behind-ineducation-competitive-workforce-new-energy-digital-infrastructure/) Thirty years ago.S. http://www. Bush. The Bush presidency was marked by America’s diminishing reputation. 2011. Security Council — was. I would like it to come as soon as possible to a new balance. Digital Infrastructure”. Brazil. is a natural and logical process. After decades of American engagement in the peace process.’’ in the sense that there were no more alternatives to American leadership and values.S. America is in decline – education. So the decline of U. the biggest factory in the world is in China. enjoyed at the historic moment of the collapse of Communism and the disintegration of the Soviet state. this will ensure a steady supply for years to come. withdraw from military conflicts and focus on domestic problems and the financial crisis. the largest investment fund in the world is in Abu Dhabi. Far from stopping conflicts. and Barack Obama. fall and hopefully emerge stronger. George W. host of CNN`s Fareed Zakaria GPS and editor for Time Magazine. http://timesoftexas. stumble. where there would be several centers capable of sharing responsibility for security and development both in certain regions — for example in an expanded Europe.0. instead of just searching out its enemies. Permanent representative of Russia to NATO. Israel will have to make new accom. Unnatural was the short period of unconditional world leadership that the U. With Washington’s power diminished. scientific creations and things like that — which are really harbingers of future economic growth. The war in Iraq — started despite the protests of the allies and with no sanction of the U. American power on the decline – Iraq was a turning point Rogozin 6/23 (Dmitry. a turning point: The world saw that America was taking on too much. perhaps. the largest oil refinery is in India. It needs. including Russia — and in the entire world.0 (Time of Texas Online – “US – Behind in Education. It makes no sense to provide Israel with weapons to destroy Palestinian property and then offer assistance to put the rubble back together again. There really is a new world. New energy. and post-crisis Russia. The post-Soviet decade marked the peak of American influence and authority. Not because the vacuum will be filled by more palatable players — but because this one needs a break. But history took a different turn. It makes no sense to tell Muammar el-Qaddafi to leave Libya because of crimes against his own people — and then to help him evade international justice by touting for his safe haven in a country that doesn’t acknowledge the International Criminal Court. India. the host of CNN’s Fareed Zakaria GPS and an editor at large for Time magazine. Only the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from the Cold War brought ‘‘the only superpower’’ the authority unthinkable before: Some philosophers even started speaking about ‘‘the end of history. “And … more troublingly.com/interactive/2011/06/24/opinion/global/20110624_SUPERPOWER. during his election campaign. 2011.modations with them. to paraphrase President Clinton. started with the 9/11 catastrophe and war in Afghanistan. to find new friends. July 1st. It makes no sense to trumpet freedom and justice — belatedly — in Egypt and remain virtually silent about the gross human rights violations reported in Bahrain. which shows how the collapse of communism and the Soviet empire — as well as the rise of global markets — has leveled the . but about the enhancement of such power centers as China.N. [the United States is] also losing [its] key grip on indices such as patent creation.nytimes. Freedom is a much more inspiring teacher than oppression.

” he says.9 of 154 playing field for many other countries around the world. the more people there are producing. becomes mired in debate and cannot deal with the short-term deficit. We would go to the bottom of the pack in terms of deficit as a percentage of GDP among the rich countries in the world — we would basically solve our fiscal problems for the short term. He says America is now heading toward what he calls a “post-American” world. Zakaria says. is also starting to lag behind other countries in education. the United States economy would be in much worse shape than it is today. saving. if Congress were to do nothing. Zakaria says.” he says. “To put it in perspective. the technological connection into this market. “In economic terms. … If we didn’t have the rest of the world growing.” But Zakaria cautions that the economic growth around the world — and the benefits that global economic stability create — do not extend to the political arena. “The more countries that get rich [and] the larger the world economy. It’s not possible for two countries to be the leading dominant political power at the same time.” America’s political system. the established power — the United States.” . whose role is diminishing? Of course. building a competitive workforce. “The result is you have countries all over the world thriving and taking advantage of the political stability they have achieved.” America. “And we are all witnesses to this phenomenon. in which the United States’ share of the “global pie” is much smaller — as the rest of the globe begins to catch up. “Politics and power is a realm of relative influence.” he tells Fresh Air‘s Terry Gross.” he says. “That by itself would yield $3. consuming. and fostering new energy and digital infrastructure to support those workers — all markers of long-term economic growth. “So as China expands its role in Asia. the Bush tax cuts would expire next year.9 trillion to the federal government over the next 10 years. investing. loaning money. the rise of the rest [of the globe] is a win-win. the economic connections of a global market.

The United States of 2011 are different from 1945. http://findarticles. It is supposed to be the lender of last resort. "Graceful decline: the end of Pax Americana". the U. Indeed. Optimists contend that current worries about decline will fade once the U. trade surpluses. they say. This will require fiscal self-discipline through a combination of tax increases and big spending cuts. recovers from the recession. “Bye bye.S. Externally. it offers public goods by opening its domestic market to other states. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A&M's George H. faced a larger debt/GDP ratio after World War II. a hegemon is responsible for stabilizing key regions and guarding the global commons.S. there is reason to worry about United States’ long-term fiscal stability – and the role of the dollar.com/223-layne-christopher/231-pax-americana) AK American primacy’s end is result of history’s big.S. supplying liquidity for the world economy. The dollar’s vulnerability is the United States’ real geopolitical Achilles’ heel because the dollar’s role as the international economy’s reserve currency role underpins U. If the dollar loses that status America’s hegemony literally will be unaffordable. Professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A & M University's Bush School of Government and Public Service. The decline of American power means the end of U. But America is increasingly unable to play the hegemon's assigned role.S. many in the mainstream foreign-policy community see these as temporary setbacks and believe that U.S. But the post-war era was a golden age of U.S. primacy. The looming fiscal results from the $1 trillion plus budget deficits that the U. Americans may contract hegemony fatigue. will be compelled to retrench strategically and the Pax Americana will end. When these are bundled with the entitlements overhang (the unfunded future liabilities of Medicare and Social Security) and the cost of the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.W. Economically. The entire fabric of world order that the United States established after 1945 – the Pax Americana – rested on the foundation of U. will incur for at least a decade. After all. Militarily. the United States no longer fits the part.S. created after World War II. The American people are . will be pressured to defend the dollar by preventing runaway inflation. If so. military and economic preponderance. and yet embarked on a sustained era of growth. May 2010. industrial and financial dominance. not the biggest borrower. not cause them. China’s economy has been growing much more rapidly than the United States’ over the last two decades and continues to do so. Miss American Pie” The European Magazine Online – 3-28-2011 http://theeuropean-magazine.S.S. Even in the best case. In coming years the U. Still. Those days are gone forever. Bush School of Government & Public Service. Decline is coming – hegemony is unsustainable in its current form Layne 10 (Christopher Layne. the impact of these big historical forces is reflected in the emergence of new great powers like China and India which is being driven by the unprecedented shift in the center of global economic power from the Euro-Atlantic area to Asia. the United States will emerge from the current crisis facing a grave fiscal crisis.S.S. dominance in world politics and the beginning of the transition to a new constellation of world power.10 of 154 Collapse Inevitable The Pax Americana is unsustainable and is already crumbling – too many alt causes to save it now Layne 11 (Christopher Layne is Professor and Robert M. and providing the reserve currency. primacy will endure for years to come. empire. The Pax Americana is already crumbling in slow motion The current international order is based on the economic and security structures that the U. the U. Faced with these hard choices. The US decline reflects its own economic troubles. The American Conservative. the Pax Americana is already is crumbling in slow motion. From this unparalleled military and economic power came a Pax Americana that has endured for more than six decades. Meaningful cuts in federal spending mean deep reductions in defense expenditures because discretionary non-defense – domestic – spending accounts for only about 20% of annual federal outlays.S. A hegemon is supposed to solve international crises. It seemed the sun would never set on the U. and sustained high growth rates. Faced with wars it cannot win or quit and an economy begging rescue.com/p/articles/mi_7060/is_5_9/ai_n54223596/) AK The United States emerged from World War II in a position of global dominance. impersonal forces compounded by the United States’ own self-defeating policies.

decline means that in the 21st century.W. values. But they are illusions that "express the deepest beliefs which Americans. and latterly totalitarianism. the current era of globalization will end. http://findarticles. and powerful.com/p/articles/mi_7060/is_5_9/ai_n54223596/) AK The foundational American myth of empire is exceptionalism. just 27 percent chose the United States. better.S. May 2010. non-democratic forms of governance. 44 percent of Americans polled said that China was the leading economic power. imperialist. The consequence has been to contribute to the very imperial overstretch that is accelerating the United States' decline. and justifies endless interventions that ultimately destroy our hegemony Layne 10 (Christopher Layne. it believes it has the obligation to prevail in this global struggle. enjoyed such vast superiority for such a long time. We attempt to tame the world by exporting democracy because--we are told--democracies do not fight each other. all would be well. But when your power declines. The view that the world is doomed without hegemony is flawed – exceptionalist. "Graceful decline: the end of Pax Americana".11 of 154 awakening to a new reality more quickly than the academy. The American Conservative. if you discount the 58. looks through this prism. Bush School of Government & Public Service. the United States will pay a high price if it endlessly repeats its mistakes. is facing enormous difficulties. that the United States is a model for the world and "America's wants and values are universal"--a point George W. Indeed. Kenneth Waltz. And because the U. "When you are big. plays a less important and powerful role as a world leader than it did a decade ago. the belief.S. Americans believe that our political and economic systems provide "a prototypical solution for the world's disorders. President Barack Obama's November 2009 trip to China provided both substantive and emblematic evidence of the shift.S. Because that U.S. Intervention is thus the United States' default in foreign policy. hold about the world. genocide. We work multilaterally through international institutions because--we are told--these promote cooperation and trust among states.000 names on the Vietnam Memorial or the tens of thousands of U. "Coming at a moment when Chinese prestige is growing and the U. dating back to the Puritans. Much of America's decline can be attributed to its own self-defeating policies. We export our model of freemarket capitalism because--we are told--states that are economically interdependent do not fight each other. Obama's trip has symbolized the advent of a more multi-polar world where U. others--notably China. there is overwhelming evidence that they are wrong. These assumptions invest American foreign policy with a tendency to see the world in terms of good versus evil. stumbles. that the U." U. . as a nation. None of these propositions is self-evident.S. it had the luxury of acting on its delusions without paying too high a price. and norms of emerging powers. All these bad things. India. and morally superior to the rest of the world. America's security and way of life are purportedly endangered by the existence of hostile ideologies anywhere in the world because peace and freedom are allegedly indivisible. come from "over there. used to tell us about American foreign policy. as Edmund Stillman and William Pfaff wrote some 45 years ago. and international politics is entering a period of transition: no longer unipolar but not yet fully multipolar. you begin to pay a price for repeating your mistakes. leadership has to co-exist with several rising powers. foreign-policy elites have extrapolated from our national experience and concluded. imperialism. The epoch of American dominance is drawing to a close. Americans have always looked at the outside world suspiciously and viewed it as a source of contagion: war. This shift in the global balance of power will dramatically affect international politics: the likelihood of intense great-power security competitions--and even war--will increase.) But as my graduate school mentor. is different.S.S. military personnel who have suffered disfiguring wounds or been killed in Iraq and Afghanistan. religious intolerance. we believe. Professor and Robert M.S. (That is. According to a December 2009 Pew survey." In the same Pew study." We have long thought that we cannot live safely in a world of such imperfections and that it is therefore our national duty to cure these ills by using American power to construct a world order based on our values. Bush made repeatedly in justifying his policy of exporting democracy at the point of a bayonet. and terrorism. Mr. 41 percent of the public believes that the U. U." If we could just give the rest of the world a makeover so it looked like the United States.S. one of the towering figures in the study of international politics. and the post-1945 Pax Americana will be replaced by an international order that reflects the interests." So we cling to the idea that our hegemony is necessary for our own and everyone else's security.S. you can afford to make the same dumb mistakes over and over again. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A&M's George H. militarism. but as the U. most notably China. and Russia--are rising. To change our foreign policy--to come to grips with the end of the Pax Americana--we first need to change the way we see the world. As the Financial Times observed. strong.

By 2008. Meanwhile. “How America will collapse”. Take these as signposts of a world to come.W.S. Suddenly.S. education system. so powerful. a far-right patriot captures the presidency with thundering rhetoric. China's central bank governor suggested that the future might lie with a global reserve currency "disconnected from individual nations" (that is. Hegemony—Myth or Reality?: A Review Essay. There is no reason to believe that this trend will reverse itself. a good starting point is the National Intelligence Council’s (NIC’s) Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World. in 2020. however. 34. Treasury notes. and other powers. provocatively challenge U. a former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund. and a continuing decline in real wages. A harbinger of further decline: in 2009 the U. Iran.S.” International Security. great and regional. 10 (Alfred. Such negative trends are encouraging increasingly sharp criticism of the dollar's role as the world’s reserve currency.html) Today. Smail Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. in other words. Russian president Dimitri Medvedev insisted that it was time to end "the artificially maintained unipolar system" based on "one formerly strong reserve currency. Its key geopolitical . Unable to pay for swelling deficits by selling now-devalued Treasury notes abroad. Washington slowly pulls U. with just 11 percent of them compared to 12 percent for China and 16 percent for the European Union. thanks to a blistering 400 percent increase since 2000. Add to this clear evidence that the U. financial-military world order. http://www.to 34-year-olds with university degrees. Nearly half of all graduate students in the sciences in the U. By now.S. India. Vol. the cost of imports soars. After leading the world for decades in 25. 12/6/10. forces back from hundreds of overseas bases to a continental perimeter. and cyberspace. and of a possible attempt. Under pressure at home and abroad. In 2008. Washington is finally forced to slash its bloated military budget.S. ever-rising unemployment. Russia. "Other countries are no longer willing to buy into the idea that the U. Similarly. as economist Michael Hudson has argued.000. and the end of the dollar's privileged status as the global reserve currency. the country sank to 12th place in 2010. Faced with a fading superpower incapable of paying the bills. Adding substance to these statistics. has been falling behind its competitors.S. not staying here as once would have happened. as long expected. often over remarkably irrelevant issues. No. domestic divisions widen into violent clashes and divisive debates. dominion over the oceans. Heg unsustainable – multiple constraints ensure collapse and rise of alternatives Christopher Layne.S. are now foreigners.salon. that source of future scientists and innovators." observed Kenneth S. the decline of American technological innovation. the U. The World Economic Forum ranked the United States at a mediocre 52nd among 139 nations in the quality of its university math and science instruction in 2010. the United States had already fallen to number three in global merchandise exports. amid soaring prices. China.S.15Global Trends 2025 is not light reading. Riding a political tide of disillusionment and despair.S. expert. that it "blows away the existing No." Simultaneously. most of whom will be heading home." Economic Decline: Scenario 2020 After years of swelling deficits fed by incessant warfare in distant lands. in October China's Defense Ministry unveiled the world's fastest supercomputer.R. 1.12 of 154 Heg falling now — external threats to the economy outweigh the aff’s internal links McCoy. the Tianhe-1A. dollar). 1 machine" in America. demanding respect for American authority and threatening military retaliation or economic reprisal. but China was closing fast at 195. but it is significantly more insightful and intellectually courageous than typical government reports. American leadership in technological innovation is on the wane.S. The world pays next to no attention as the American Century ends in silence.com/news/feature/2010/12/06/america_collapse_2025/index. 09 [“The Waning of U. Rogoff. J. the United States is likely to face a critical shortage of talented scientists. hit rock bottom in ranking among the 40 nations surveyed by the Information Technology & Innovation Foundation when it came to "change" in "global innovation-based competitiveness" during the previous decade.S. it is far too late. dollar finally loses its special status as the world's reserve currency.S. Summer 2009] For an overview of trends that could affect international politics over the next two decades. three main threats exist to America’s dominant position in the global economy: loss of economic clout thanks to a shrinking share of world trade.S. Chair in National Security at the School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. was still number two behind Japan in worldwide patent applications with 232. By 2025. In mid-2009. the U. said one U.000. knows best on economic policy. the U. space. "to hasten the bankruptcy of the U. with the world's central banks holding an astronomical $4 trillion in U.

Jordan Professor of International Affairs at Texas A&M's George Bush School of Government and Public Service.17] Because of uncertainties about economics. China’s spring 2009 call to replace the dollar with a new reserve currency signals that the NIC’s long-term worries may be justified.16 As Global Trends 2025 points out. power. 29). the dollar remained strong and will continue to be the reserve currency for some time to come. economic and political constraints may undermine U. the growing dependence of the United States on foreign capital inflows “may curtail U. the United States will confront other constraints on its international role. and possibly Russia are emerging great powers. 12. in International Law from Virginia Law.D.M.D. the financial privileges conferred on the United States by the dollar’s unchallenged reserve currency status have underpinned the preeminent role of the United States in international politics since the end of World War II. At home. and especially demography. 32).).74 Brooks and Wohlforth purport to deny the possibility that America is in relative decline. "The Waning of U. LL. the rise of China and India to great power status will restore each to “the positions they held two centuries ago when China produced approximately 30 percent and India 15 percent of the world’s wealth” (p. in addition to relative decline. July 6th 2010. Hegemony—Myth or Reality? A Review Essay". financial. Ultimately. and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute (Christopher. and opportunity costs of being the world’s leader are reassessed by American voters” (p. from USC. 30). Nevertheless. Vol.77 Optimists . Although both states could encounter speed bumps that might slow—or even derail—their ascents to great power status.S. even before the meltdown. Although at the time this issue went to press.19 [End Page 153] As the NIC observes. 13–14). decline are a looming fiscal crisis and doubts about the future of the dollar as the reserve currency. global dominance” (p.S. 8–9. the United States will face a serious inflationary threat. By 2025. Yet. 23–24. Russia will also seek to reestablish its sphere of influence in the “near abroad” (pp. 34. 1.S. economic power to wane. it will have less power—and foreign policy options—than it has been accustomed to having since 1945 (ibid. p. 7). 93). energy prices. the NIC did have an inkling of the meltdown’s potential long-term implications for U. freedom of action in unanticipated ways” (p. hegemony. 82). Russia’s population is forecast to drop from 141 million to below 130 million. however. Ph.). 3. India.S. No. Because its great power status is closely tied to its ability to control both the energy resources and pipelines of Central Asia and the Caucasus. Their ascent is being propelled by “the global shift in relative wealth and economic power” from North America and the Euro-Atlantic world to Asia—a shift “without precedent in modern history” (ibid.S. 21-23) PDF The publications reviewed in this essay examine whether the United States is in (or is headed for) relative decline. the NIC believes that the “chances are good that China and India will continue to rise” (p. affecting the availability of manpower for both the military and the labor pools (pp. Summer 2009. India. military supremacy will no longer be as dominant as it has been since the Cold War’s end (p. If Russia overcomes its demographic challenge and continues its revival as a great power. China figures to have the world’s second-largest economy (measured by gross domestic product [GDP]) and will be a first-rank military power (p.S. Moreover. 97). the NIC believes it “will be a leading force in opposition to U. longterm structural weaknesses that have been accumulating for more than three decades were causing U. 97). Global Trends predicts that over the next two decades. The NIC concludes that America’s “interest and willingness to play a leadership role may be more constrained as the economic. military.S. Brooks and Wohlforth wrote their book before its effects became evident). and economic. buoyed by its strong economic growth rate. 09 – Mary Julia and George R.). China. Global Trends 2025 was published just before the full scope of the global financial and economic crisis became apparent. J. International Security.13 of 154 conclusion is that the U. U. Galileo. domestic governance issues. The United States’ soft power may diminish as its liberal model of political and economic development is challenged by authoritarian/statist alternatives (pp. both of which are linked to the fear that after recovery. 30). 31–32). the dollar’s role as the international economy’s preeminent reserve currency will erode. Thus.-dominated unipolar world will give way to multipolarity during the next two decades spurred by two causal mechanisms: the emergence of new great powers (and potentially important regional powers). Russia’s great power trajectory is more problematic than China’s or India’s (pp. 94.S. and domestic political constraints that may erode U. According to the NIC.18 Between 2009 and 2025. 93). capabilities.76 The warning signs with respect to U. In particular.75 The long-term impact of the current economic crisis largely will determine who is right (and to be fair. 32. but a growing number of analysts disagree.S. Decline is inevitable – heg is economically unsustainable Layne. will “strive for a multipolar system with New Delhi as one of the poles” (ibid. although the United States will probably be primus inter pares in a multipolar international system twenty years from now.S. in Political Science from the University of California. “the dollar’s decline may force the United States into difficult tradeoffs between achieving ambitious foreign policy goals and the high domestic costs of supporting those objectives” (pp.

the entitlements overhang. But from China's rapidly rising status as a global player.79 When the projected deficits are bundled with the persistent U.14 of 154 contend that once the United States recovers.guardian. as Eric Helleiner notes. America is facing a wide array of increasingly troubling threats. if the dollar experiences dramatic depreciation in the future. “Even if the recovery occurs as projected and the stimulus bill is allowed to expire. while struggling internally to recover from an economic collapse not seen since the Great Depression. in collapsing the Ba'athist regime of Saddam Hussein. Brooks and Wohlforth concede unipolarity can only last for 20 more years and that counterbalancing is occuring . to Russia's show of force in Georgia. as well as a political system extolled for its superiority to all other systems. it will emerge from the current crisis with serious macroeconomic handicaps. America today faces the same dilemma of the eastern Roman empire: should it attempt to regain its lost global supremacy or fortify and adapt to the new world? Will we follow Virgil's famous line from the Aeneid. there is reason to worry about the United States’ longterm fiscal stability. and recent events have magnified concerns that predated the financial and economic crisis.S. and the cost of two ongoing wars. the country will face the highest debt/GDP ratio in 50 years and an increasingly urgent and unsustainable fiscal problem. the Iraq war pushed many of our enemies to see us as a common threat where religious differences would have otherwise made cooperation impossible.80 The CBO states. 83 First. and yet embarked on a sustained era of growth. to rising tensions in South Asia and the Middle East. The United States of 2009 is far different from the United States of 1945. Like Rome. trade surpluses.”82 The dollar’s loss of reserve currency status would undermine U. protection from the Soviet threat. As Jonathan Kirshner noted on the eve of the meltdown.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2009/jan/19/barack-obama-rome-empire) By virtue of its economic and military power. was a golden age of U. there is a “risk of defections generating a herd-like momentum” away from it. the dollar faces an uncertain future because of concerns that its value will diminish over time. While the comparison to ancient Rome is imperfect. however. America has paved the way for an even less palatable Iranian dominance in the region. America has spread itself too thin and is unable to respond to new threats as they emerge with either a convincing show of military force or a skilled use of soft power to leverage its credibility in the world. The postwar era. fears of a fiscal crisis will fade: the country faced a larger debt to GDP ratio after World War II." or preserve our strength and create a framework for global cooperation in which America acts as a mediator and responsible actor rather than instigator. the other big players in the international economy now are either military rivals (China) or ambiguous “allies” (Europe) that have their own ambitions and no longer require U.84 Hegemony is unsustainable in today`s world – collapse coming The Guardian 9 (The Guardian UK. 2009. January 19. American supremacy in a post-cold war environment seems outmatched by a progressively more unstable world. there are nonetheless parallels worth considering.S. dominance. "Rome. it spells trouble ahead for the dollar. 't is thine alone. http://www. the dollar’s vulnerability “presents potentially significant and underappreciated restraints upon contemporary American political and military predominance. current account deficit.S.co. America has been the leader of the free world for the last 60 years. and the $1 trillion plus budget deficits that the Brookings Institution and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) project the United States will incur for at least a decade. with awful sway. however.S. and sustained high growth rates. Because of these two factors. which is why many economists believe that even in the best case. While the dangers we face were once diverse and scattered. Second. To rule mankind. Moreover.78 Chief among these handicaps are the increase in the money supply (caused by the massive amount of dollars the Federal Reserve and Treasury have pumped into circulation to rescue the economy). and make the world obey. industrial and financial dominance.”81 If the Congressional Budget Office is right.

The US may still be a giant. Similarly. Professor of Public Policy at the University of Maryland 10 – [Quddus Z.economic problems. No. After all. know-how. Relative power is important. According to the theory of hegemonic stability. Of course. “The Waning of U. “Systermic theory in an era of declining US hegemony. which allows other states to catch up. If it suppresses consumption. Snyder. Hegemons sprint to the front of the great power pack because of economic leadership based on productivity and technological innovation. despite their claim at the beginning [End Page 161] of World that unipolarity is robust and that U.pdf] Crucial to hegemonic stability theory is that the hegemon actually does things.43 A Superficially. it is also in the throes of a serious economic downturn. and rising powers Snyder PhD. for now at least. 1. it provided a stable international monetary system which facilitated . Keohane has argued that after World War II the US provided three major sets of benefits in the area of international political economy: First. The problem does not only stem from fact that the US is bogged down in two wars. 09 Professor. 34. the American era of unipolarity contains the seeds of its own demise.bsos. Thus far the US has maintained a massive defense budget while consumption and investment have been sustained by deficit spending. leading allies to enhance their own military capabilities. consumption. Brooks and Wohlforth actually concede that unipolarity is not likely to last more than another twenty years. these projects will gobble up massive amounts of resources and treasure at a time when America’s own recovery is being partly bankrolled by foreign powers like China.43 The point is simply that America’s unilateral assertiveness on the international scene is changing. International Security.S.’ But recent developments might justify a reevaluation of this conclusion.umd. the debate about unipolar stability is misleading. hegemony will endure well into the future. but one that. US security guarantees may prove less credible than they once were. technology. leadership costs sap the hegemon’s power and push it into decline. however. or provides benefits.umd. “Systermic theory in an era of declining US hegemony.” http://www. For example.15 of 154 Layne.all realists agree Snyder PhD. they do not engage the argument that.42 Their case is based on a freeze-frame view of the distribution of capabilities in the international system. It is unlikely that the US will have either the political will or capability to take on major international undertakings. key question is whether the early decades of the twenty-first century will witness the decline of U. If the society fails to save and reinvest a sufficient fraction of its surplus wealth in industry and agriculture.S hegemony is unsustainable.44 Not only is this a weak case for unipolarity. Because all are suffering. It is unclear when the US will fully withdraw from Iraq and Afghanistan. Professor of Public Policy at the University of Maryland 10 – [Quddus Z. and resources stretched.edu/gvpt/irworkshop/papers_fall09/snyder. seems more bound. Snyder. it is also an implicit admission that—although it has yet to bear fruit—other states are engaged in counterbalancing the United States. The classic Gilpinian dilemma provides insight into the present predicament the US finds itself in: This three-way struggle over priorities (protection. and Robert M. In this respect. the economic basis of the society and its capacity to sustain either consumption or protection will decline. Over time.S.” http://www. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service (Christopher. and this is spurring an ongoing process of multipolarization.edu/gvpt/irworkshop/papers_fall09/snyder.pdf] At the turn of the century it appeared as if we were living through a ‘hegemonic age.45 Out of Balance U. Vol. the US is still a giant in terms of relative power differentials. the US appears much weaker today than it did five years ago. like all hegemonic systems.S.With its armed forces over-extended. hegemony. the consequence can be severe internal social tensions and class conflict…If the society neglects to pay the costs of defense. military overstretch. US hegemony is unsustainable. which is not very long at all. however. everyone is getting hit. It is unclear how long this formula will work. but so is the hegemon’s ability to actually do things. But there is less to their argument than meets the eye.bsos. Summer 2009) Brooks and Wohlforth make a strong case for unipolar stability. and investment) produces a profound dilemma for society. Hegemony—Myth or Reality”. external weakness will inevitably lead to its defeat by rising powers. and managerial skills diffuse throughout the international economic system.

16 of 154 trade and payments. it provided a US helped market for goods and permitted trade on an asymmetrical basis. expansion. .”26 Virtually no realist believes that hegemony can persist indefinitely. The hegemon cannot maintain its dominance in the face of mounting costs. and inevitable overextension. and thereafter begins anew: “The conclusion of one hegemonic war is the beginning of another cycle of growth. the its allies gain access to Middle Eastern oil at stable prices.25 Sadly. all good things must come to an end. The hegemonic cycle usually ends in war. losses in relative power. and eventual decline. and third. Challengers will arise. Central to the theory of hegemonic stability is that the arrangement is ultimately unsustainable. second.

China’s spring 2009 call to replace the dollar with a new reserve currency signals that the NIC’s long-term worries may be justified. 93). Vol. The United States’ soft power may diminish as its liberal model of political and economic development is challenged by authoritarian/statist alternatives (pp. domestic governance issues.). military supremacy will no longer be as dominant as it has been since the Cold War’s end (p.17 [End Page 152] Because of uncertainties about economics. No.16 As Global Trends 2025 points out. Global Trends predicts that over the next two decades. 13–14).S. Because its great power status is closely tied to its ability to control both the energy resources and pipelines of Central Asia and the Caucasus. erosion of public support.S. hegemony. Russia’s great power trajectory is more problematic than China’s or India’s (pp. the NIC believes that the “chances are good that China and India will continue to rise” (p. The NIC concludes that America’s “interest and willingness to play a leadership role may be more constrained as the economic. 97).S. Its key geopolitical conclusion is that the U. military. and domestic political constraints that may erode U. and economic. Their ascent is being propelled by “the global shift in relative wealth and economic power” from North America and the Euro-Atlantic world to Asia—a shift “without precedent in modern history” (ibid.19 [End Page 153] As the NIC observes. 12. 93). 34. buoyed by its strong economic growth rate.18 Between 2009 and 2025. China figures to have the world’s second-largest economy (measured by gross domestic product [GDP]) and will be a first-rank military power (p.-dominated unipolar world will give way to multipolarity during the next two decades spurred by two causal mechanisms: the emergence of new great powers (and potentially important regional powers).17 of 154 Multipolarity Inevitable Multipolarity inevitable---collapse of the dollar. Russia will also seek to reestablish its sphere of influence in the “near abroad” (pp. although the United States . and Robert M. “the dollar’s decline may force the United States into difficult tradeoffs between achieving ambitious foreign policy goals and the high domestic costs of supporting those objectives” (pp. “The Waning of U.S. Ultimately. China. India. Nevertheless. the United States will confront other constraints on its international role. the growing dependence of the United States on foreign capital inflows “may curtail U.S. financial. 30). freedom of action in unanticipated ways” (p.). 8–9. the dollar’s role as the international economy’s preeminent reserve currency will erode. 30).S. 97). and especially demography. By 2025. 7). India. however. and opportunity costs of being the world’s leader are reassessed by American voters” (p. International Security. According to the NIC.S. If Russia overcomes its demographic challenge and continues its revival as a great power. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service (Christopher. in addition to relative decline. 3. a good starting point is the National Intelligence Council’s (NIC’s) Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World. 23–24. and possibly Russia are emerging great powers. Hegemony—Myth or Reality”. Russia’s population is forecast to drop from 141 million to below 130 million.15Global Trends 2025 is not light reading. the dollar remained strong and will continue to be the reserve currency for some time to come. Although both states could encounter speed bumps that might slow—or even derail—their ascents to great power status. but it is significantly more insightful and intellectually courageous than typical government reports. U. Although at the time this issue went to press. the NIC did have an inkling of the meltdown’s potential long-term implications for U. Summer 2009) For an overview of trends that could affect international politics over the next two decades. the NIC believes it “will be a leading force in opposition to U. 82). 29). will “strive for a multipolar system with New Delhi as one of the poles” (ibid. 31–32). and rising challengers Layne. In particular. 32. Thus. economic and political constraints may undermine U.S. Global Trends 2025 was published just before the full scope of the global financial and economic crisis became apparent. At home. Moreover. 32). the financial privileges conferred on the United States by the dollar’s unchallenged reserve currency status have underpinned the preeminent role of the United States in international politics since the end of World War II. 09 Professor. affecting the availability of manpower for both the military and the labor pools (pp. 94. energy prices. 1. the rise of China and India to great power status will restore each to “the positions they held two centuries ago when China produced approximately 30 percent and India 15 percent of the world’s wealth” (p. capabilities. global dominance” (p. power.

10 Analyst of Middle East Affairs (Chris. it is much more likely that international relations in the Middle East will come to reflect the multi-polar world that will follow rather than revert to a bi-polar cold war. squeezing the defiant few like Syria and Saddam Hussein's Iraq. but China. with Asia's share of GDP already outstripping that of the US or Europe. the quagmires of Iraq and Afghanistan have exposed the limits of US ambitions. Not that this era is yet upon us. the recent actions of Russia and Turkey in the Middle East do show a new assertiveness from regional powers to pursue their own path in defiance of US will. but the age of unchallenged US hegemony in the Middle East could be ending. it will have less power—and foreign policy options—than it has been accustomed to having since 1945 (ibid.). However. Saudi Arabia's growing relationship with China might signify the shape of things to come. it seems the Middle East could prove a microcosm of these international changes. In such circumstances. while the economic crisis has forced the Obama administration to focus energy elsewhere. trade agreements or diplomatic coups. A new cold war is unlikely.co.guardian. Though Washington remains the world's only superpower. US power is waning. it won't just be Russia and Turkey expanding their reach in the region. As ever. http://www. While the Bush era saw the US hegemonic in the region. whether through arms deals.uk/commentisfree/2010/may/31/us-hegemony-middle-east-ending) Yet even though the return to cold war bi-polar blocs in the Middle East is unlikely. too – presumably having fewer demands than Washington about their clients pursuing democratic reforms and peace with Israel. Stephen Walt has highlighted that this shift in power is global. Turkey and Brazil's recent nuclear deal with Iran typify this emerging new climate. today's Middle East sees a power vacuum led by partial US retreat being filled by assertive regional and middle powers. perhaps hastened by unnecessary wars and economic shortsightedness. Multipolarity coming now Phillips. the region's international relations are changing.18 of 154 will probably be primus inter pares in a multipolar international system twenty years from now. . “US hegemony in Middle East is ending”. The US remains the superpower and could still effect serious change in the region. should it desire. India and Brazil will all bid for a role. If the age of American uni-polarity is coming to an end.

He is also coauthor of State Power and World Markets (2002) and editor of America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power(2002)." Robert Keohane argues.will increase and not decrease. "Economic interdependence and multilateralism American support for multilateralism is likely to be sustained _ even in the face of resistance and ideological challenges to multilateralism within the Bush administration .in part because of a simple logic: as global economic interdependence grows. The more economically interconnected that states become the more dependent they are for the realization of their objectives on the actions of other states. Finally. if the stronger state accepts some restrictions on how it can use its power. the need for multilateral coordination of policie-s also grows. American political culture stresses the importance of the rule of law as a foundation. essentially for three reasons. . “American Power in the 21st Century”.. compared with the costs of sacrificing autonomy as a consequence of making binding agreements. Second. Strategic Restraint Wid the Rebuilding of Order after Major War (2001). weaker states are more likely to cooperate willingly and have less reason to resist the hegemony of the stronger state. which won the Schroeder/Jervis Award for best book in History and International Politics by the American Political Science Association. First. John Ikenberry 4 Ikenberry is the Albert G.even and perhaps especially by the United States . as global economic interdependence grows. social. Edited by David Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi. If this remains true in the years ahead. "the opportunity costs of not co-ordinating policy increase. it is rational for dominant powers to accept some limitations to their freedom of action in the form of multilateral institutions. and technological gains that derive from integration into the world economy. He is the author of After Victory: Institutions.43 " Multilateralism is inevitable – most authors agree unilateralism is unlikely David Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi 4 – Held is Graham Wallas Professor of Political Science @ the London School of Economics and Political Science. states have actively and consistently sought to open markets and reap the economic. it is easy to predict that the demands for multilateral agreements . "As interdependence rises. the need for multilateral coordination of policies also increases. Edited by David Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi. Archibugi is Lecturer in Global Politics in the Departments of Government and International Relations of the London School of Economics and Political Science. Over the postwar era.42 Rising economic interdependence is one of the great hallmarks of the contemporary international system. Pg 5-6 Most contributors to this volume are skeptical about the idea that the world is moving toward a new imperial order. This development is considered unlikely because they see the United States as lacking the motivation and/or the capacity to establish an empire. Milbank Professor of Politic' and International Affairs at Princeton University in both the Woodrow 'Wilson School and the Politics Department. Ikenberry emphasizes the lack of motivation: America is unlikely in the tuture to reject multilateralism and a rule-based international order.19 of 154 Multilat Inevitable Multilateralism is inevitable G.. "American Power in the 21st Century".

which won the Schroeder/Jervis Award for best book in History and International Politics by the American Political Science Association. should rein in the Bush administration ." This has been a strategy that the United States has pursued to a greater or lesser degree across the twentieth century . multilateralism . The support for multilateralism is a way to signal restraint and commitment to other states.20 of 154 Heg  Multilat US hegemony results in more multilateralism G.and it suggests that the current administration should respond to general power management incentives and limit its tilt toward unilateralism. From this perspective. "American Power in the 21st Century". Strategic Restraint Wid the Rebuilding of Order after Major War (2001). John Ikenberry 4 Ikenberry is the Albert G. He is also coauthor of State Power and World Markets (2002) and editor of America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power(2002).should increase rather than decrease with the rise of American unipolarity. It predicts that the existing multilateral order. which itself reflects an older multilateral bargain between the United States and the outside world. Milbank Professor of Politic' and International Affairs at Princeton University in both the Woodrow 'Wilson School and the Politics Department. Edited by David Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi.and it explains the remarkably durable and legitimate character of the existing international order.and the search for rule-based agreements . American hegemony and multilateralism American support for multilateralism can also stem from a grand strategic interest in preserving power and creating a stable and legitimate international order. thereby encouraging the acquiescence and cooperation of weaker states." . He is the author of After Victory: Institutions.

they tend to overlook the weaknesses of their scariest-looking rival. That was never going to happen. This Time It`s For Real”. and it is sitting on more than $2. of course. Japan. At the current pace. Yet the Chinese economy has kept growing. the Communist Party seemed to be staggering after the Tiananmen Square massacre.4) AK In the end. also experienced many years of rapid economic growth and is still an export powerhouse. It is now the world's leading exporter and its biggest manufacturer. and inflation is on the rise. by contrast. China is also stepping in to buy the bonds of financially strapped members of the eurozone. So Americans can be forgiven if they greet talk of a new challenge from China as just another case of the boy who cried wolf. Or the votes by Turkey and Brazil against America at the United Nations on sanctions against Iran. Foreign Policy Magazine. In a recent interview with the Times of London. "I do. And the country's traditional dependence on exports and an undervalued currency are coming under increasing criticism from the United States and other international actors demanding a "rebalancing" of China's export-driven economy. In the 1990s. http://www. President George W. This Time It`s For Real”. Bush suggested that China's internal problems mean that its economy will be unlikely to rival America's in the foreseeable future. France. "Do I still think America will remain the sole superpower?" he asked. it would be a big . The Communist Party is unlikely to be able to maintain its monopoly on political power forever. 1. has proved its economic prowess on the global stage. economy watchers regularly pointed to the parlous state of Chinese banks and state-owned enterprises. Those who are confident that American hegemony will be extended long into the future point to the potential liabilities of the Chinese system. former U. Its economy has been growing at 9 to 10 percent a year. In the short term. 1 well before then. the Soviet and Japanese threats to American supremacy proved chimerical. China has alarming political and economic transitions to navigate.21 of 154 Challengers Now Hegemony unsustainable – new powers are challenging America Rachman 2011 (Gideon Rachman. journalist Financial Times and formerly at The Economist – “Think Again: American Decline. a fatal flaw that was disguised for a long time because the USSR never attempted to compete on world markets. But a frequently overlooked fact about that fable is that the boy was eventually proved right.com/articles/2011/01/02/think_again_american_decline?page=0. doubling in size roughly every seven years. Foreign Policy Magazine. The flaws in the Soviet and Japanese systems became obvious only in retrospect. there is plenty of evidence that a property bubble is building in big cities like Shanghai. China's population is more than four times that of the United States. This is no Soviet-style economic basket case. The famous projection by Goldman Sachs that China's economy will be bigger than that of the United States by 2027 was made before the 2008 economic crash. The Chinese challenge to the United States is more serious for both economic and demographic reasons. Italy. Turkey. China. The wolf did arrive -. which means that the average Japanese person would have to be more than twice as rich as the average American before Japan's economy surpassed America's. That is just a taste of things to come. February 2011.Britain." But predictions of the imminent demise of the Chinese miracle have been a regular feature of Western analysis ever since it got rolling in the late 1970s. In 1989.foreignpolicy.S. China's economic prowess is already allowing Beijing to challenge American influence all over the world. http://www. on average.are slipping down the economic ranks. Chinese goods compete all over the world. it would be absurd to pretend that China does not face major challenges. The Soviet Union collapsed because its economic system was highly inefficient. Yet even if you factor in considerable future economic and political turbulence.foreignpolicy. China could be No. of course.com/articles/2011/01/02/think_again_american_decline?page=0. Brazil.5 trillion of foreign reserves. America's traditional allies in Europe -. China will overcome all obstacles – challenges the US Rachman 2011 (Gideon Rachman.and China is the wolf. By contrast. The Japanese population is less than half that of the United States. and China is threatened by water shortages and pollution. which collectively constrain America's ability to shape the world. such as Brazil and South Africa. such as Greece and Portugal. even Germany -. journalist Financial Times and formerly at The Economist – “Think Again: American Decline. Think of how India and Brazil sided with China at the global climate-change talks. The country also faces major demographic and environmental challenges: The population is aging rapidly as a result of the one-child policy.4) AK It is certainly true that when Americans are worrying about national decline. They each have their own foreign-policy preferences. New powers are on the rise: India. But it was never a plausible candidate to be No. Over the long term. Of course. The Chinese are the preferred partners of many African governments and the biggest trading partner of other emerging powers. for roughly three decades. And China is only the largest part of a bigger story about the rise of new economic and political players. February 2011.

hyperinflation.… We welcome China's efforts to play a greater role on the world stage. And when it comes to the broader geopolitical picture. albeit shorn of its imperial ambitions. the collapse of democracy. This Time It`s For Real”. but that is because both sides have nuclear weapons. which is driving up global prices. remarked pointedly that the normal rules about the mutual benefits of trade do not necessarily apply when one trading partner is practicing mercantilist or protectionist policies. Larry Summers. China is unlikely to get sucked into a world war.-China standoff. in Political Science from the University of California. despite the gauzy rhetoric of globalization that comforted the last generation of American politicians. Its economy will eventually recover. in .com/articles/2011/01/02/think_again_american_decline?page=0. We are on a collision course with China – military. but a barely submerged rivalry prevents truly effective Sino-American cooperation. but the cost of securing Chinese agreement was a weak deal that is unlikely to derail the Iranian nuclear program.S. drive to deal with "global economic imbalances" was essentially thwarted by China's obdurate refusal to change its currency policy. Fred Bergsten. foreign policy. but it is also very wary of a reunified Korea on its borders. Both sides have taken part in the talks with North Korea.S.4) AK Successive U. not because globalization has magically dissolved their differences. troops. Ph. arguing that tariffs or other retaliatory measures would be a legitimate response. Those days are over. In a nuclear age. Its military has a global presence and a technological edge that no other country can yet match. sanctions on Iran. have explicitly welcomed China's rise. the world of the future looks even more like a zero-sum game.S. rivalry between a rising China and a weakened America is now apparent across a whole range of issues. power will simply disappear. then Obama's chief economic advisor. government clearly thinks that China's undervaluation of its currency is a form of protectionism that has led to global economic imbalances and job losses in the United States. Foreign Policy Magazine.M. America's leaders are clearly beginning to have their doubts. Sheer size and economic momentum mean that the Chinese juggernaut will keep rolling forward. Once countries get the hang of economic growth. At the G-20 summit in November. It is a central tenet of modern economics that trade is mutually beneficial for both partners.S. and economy Rachman 2011 (Gideon Rachman. But that shouldn't obscure this unavoidable fact: As economic and political power moves from West to East. the Great Depression. journalist Financial Times and formerly at The Economist – “Think Again: American Decline. Growing Chinese economic and military clout clearly poses a long-term threat to American hegemony in the Pacific. http://www.foreignpolicy. new international rivalries are inevitably emerging. West Germany was once again one of the world's leading economies.S. presidents.S. China does not like Kim Jong Il's regime. But that implies the rules of the game aren't rigged. The U. Germany went through two catastrophic military defeats. It is mercifully unlikely that the United States and China would ever actually go to war. the U. Obama summarized the traditional approach when he said. The analogy to the rise of Germany from the mid-19th century onward is instructive. American leaders are right to reject zero-sum logic in public. and the destruction of its major cities and infrastructure by Allied bombs. The Chinese reluctantly agreed to a new package of U. and nations need not fear the success of another.N. such as New York Times columnist Paul Krugman and the Peterson Institute's C. Jordan Professor of International Affairs at Texas A&M's George Bush School of Government and Public Service. in particular oil. China is also competing fiercely for access to resources.D. so it will not face turbulence and disorder on remotely the scale Germany did in the 20th century. And yet by the end of the 1950s. To do anything else would needlessly antagonize the Chinese. from territorial disputes in Asia to human rights. But America will never again experience the global dominance it enjoyed in the 17 years between the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991 and the financial crisis of 2008. Just before his first visit to China. LL.22 of 154 mistake to assume that the Chinese challenge to U. For the United States has been acting as if the mutual interests created by globalization have repealed one of the oldest laws of international politics: the notion that rising players eventually clash with established powers. it takes a great deal to throw them off course. So much for the win-win world. China is counter-balancing the US now Layne. Leading economists. And whatever economic and political difficulties it does experience will not be enough to stop the country's rise to great-power status. no matter what obstacles lie in its path. "Power does not need to be a zero-sum game. particularly if the new Korea still played host to U." But whatever they say in formal speeches. and rightly so. February 2011. Speaking before the 2010 World Economic Forum. a winwin rather than a zero-sum. 09 – Mary Julia and George R. have taken a similar line. In fact. The United States still has formidable strengths. The 2009 climate-change talks in Copenhagen ended in disarray after another U. from the first Bush to Obama.

nationalinterest.50 Looking ahead. Hegemony—Myth or Reality? A Review Essay". 34. and (implicitly) Mahbubani and Zakaria—agree that China is the rising power most likely to challenge U. Summer 2009. "The PLA navy is increasing its numbers of submarines and other ships." All of this has US military planners and thinkers worried. "the cost incurred by the US military to operate in the [w]estern Pacific will likely rise sharply.. spaced-based reconnaissance. China's People's Liberation Army is building up anti-access and area-denial capabilities with the apparent goal of extending their power to the western half of the Pacific Ocean. unmanned aerial vehicles. perhaps to prohibitive levels. Galileo. Khanna. “Chinese Plans to End US Hegemony in the Pacific”. China. at a recent speech hosted by the Heritage Foundation.D. 51 China also may overtake the United States in GDP in the next ten to fifteen years. China’s already challenging U.47 The shift of economic clout to East Asia is important because it could propel China’s ascent—thus hastening the relative decline of U. “Empire Falls. power—and also because emerging regional multipolarity could trigger future major power war. there is evidence that as the NIC.) PDF Toward multipolarity? The ascent of new great powers would be the strongest evidence of multipolarization.aspx?id=20484) . The Chinese also have an emerging and muscular deep-water navy. hegemony. "Unless Beijing diverts from its current course of action.S. there are indications that the unipolar era is drawing to a close." Counterbalancing inevitable – multiple factors Pape 2k9 (Robert A. electromagnetic weapons. (Peter A.46 Here." said Admiral Gary Roughead. In 2003 Goldman Sachs predicted that China would pass the United States in GDP by 2041. Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. which extends as far as Guam and New Guinea. however. then. which already has overtaken the United States as the world’s leading manufacturer—a crown the United States wore for more than a century. Mahbubani.S.23 of 154 International Law from Virginia Law. "Navies tend to grow with economies and as trade becomes more important. But political problems and budgetary woes could kill the program before it ever gets started. http://www. Vol. to a point. p.48 Unsurprisingly. how-ever. 10 Analyst @ ISN Security Watch. Chinese military and political doctrine holds that China should rule the waves out to the second island chain of the western Pacific. and they dismiss the idea that China could become a viable counterweight to a hegemonic United States within any meaningful time frame. the trend lines appear to favor China. advanced fighter aircraft.49 Their analysis. and ballistic and cruise missiles. and the two most important indicators of whether this is happening are relative growth rates and shares of world GDP. and much sooner than many expect[. global economic power is flowing from the United States and Europe to Asia. J. surveillance and target acquisition. the United States still has an impressive lead in the categories they measure. advanced radar systems. and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute (Christopher. essentially dividing the Pacific between the US and China and ending US hegemony on that ocean. "The Waning of U..S. the Economist Intelligence Unit predicted that China’s GDP would surpass the United States’ in 2021.This situation creates a strategic choice for the United States. For sure. Khanna. July 6th 2010." said a report recently released by the Washington-based Center for Budgetary and Strategic Assessments. and many analysts— including the NIC. and that the coming decades could witness a power transition. chief of US naval operations.53 Empirically.]. in early 2009.52 And. http://oilprice.” National Interest Online.S military strength Buxbaum. its allies and partners: acquiesce in a dramatic shift in the military balance or take steps to preserve it. and. of course. Among the anti-access/area-denial (A2AD) capabilities being fielded by China include antisatellite weapons. 17-18. No. from USC. but in 2008 it revised the time frame to 2028. is static.org/Article. 1. or Washington undertakes actions to offset or counterbalance the effects of the PLA’s military buildup. International Security. a conservative Washington think tank.html) The US is developing an air-sea battle concept to counter China's military buildup. Zakaria contend. The A2AD buildup threatens the US forward presence and power projection in the region. is the poster child for Asia’s rise.com/Geo-Politics/International/Chinese-Plans-to-End-USHegemony-in-the-Pacific.. Brooks and Wohlforth are skeptical about China’s rise. 1-2209.

A healthy appreciation of our situation by American leaders may lead to policies that could mitigate. but is so relatively more powerful than any other country that it can reshape the international order according to American interests. The self-inflicted wounds of the Iraq War. Productive capacity—defined by indicators such as wealth. the more its power matters and hence the more relative economic strength it needs. FROM ROME. There is also good reason to think that. China and other major powers could seriously oppose American military power. Still. further decline in the foreseeable future. seeking to ensure peace and stability not just in its own neighborhood— the Americas—but also in Europe and Asia. our own hubris may be our downfall.S. al-Qaeda’s new sanctuary in western Pakistan. . relative decline has been. the most important of which are to defend its national interests. This is simply no longer realistic. growing government debt. As Paul Kennedy so ably describes in his classic The Rise and Fall of Great Powers.S. we will look back at the Bush administration years as the death knell for American hegemony.S.S. Great Britain and the Soviet Union to the United States today.S. increasingly negative current-account balances and other internal economic weaknesses have cost the United States real power in today’s world of rapidly spreading knowledge and technology. both at home and abroad. Although scholars have long debated its nuances. France. For the past eight years. economy in the world—has been in decline since early on in the Bush administration. Imperial China.1 But it is not only how much power a state has that matters. A successful grand strategy. the period of U. A Ford Explorer is a powerful vehicle—unless it collides with a Mack Truck. Although the immediate problems of war in Iraq and Afghanistan.S. solutions to each of them individually and all of them collectively will be heavily influenced by America’s reduced power position in the world. For nearly two decades. but in recent years American leaders have pursued far more ambitious goals than merely maintaining the status quo. along with the oil-rich Persian Gulf (as well as other parts of the world). America’s declining power means that the unipolar world is indeed coming to an end. Iran’s continued nuclear program and Russia’s recent military adventure in Georgia are high-priority issues. all believe the principal feature of the post-cold-war world is the unchallengeable dominance of American power. however. if not rectify. Like so many great powers that have come and gone before. France. the fall of American power will be more precipitous with the passage of time. In international politics. thus far. Venice. Russia. power does not ensure success. the more international commitments a state has. Over time. It is also how much power a state has relative to other states. Since the cold war. policies they oppose and that the United States will increasingly face harsh foreign-policy choices. Simply maintaining these commitments requires enormous resources. America’s power is fundamentally a result of its economic strength. From public intellectuals like Charles Krauthammer and Niall Ferguson to neoconservatives like Paul Wolfowitz and Robert Kagan.24 of 154 AMERICA IS in unprecedented decline. seeking to denuclearize North Korea and expanding America’s military allies in Europe up to the borders of Russia itself. grand strategy are necessary to prevent the decline in America’s global position from accelerating. fairly short. Spain. our policies have been based on these flawed arguments. This is true in any rough-and-tumble environment. virtually discounting the possibility that Germany. If present trends continue. without deliberate action. the rise and fall of great nations has been driven primarily by relative economic strength. U. To be sure. those convinced of U. The United States is not just the sole superpower in the unipolar-dominance school’s world. power certainly helps. The Bush administration has not just continued America’s traditional grand strategy. But. the United States has maintained a vast array of overseas commitments. but pursued ambitious objectives in all three major regions at the same time—waging wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. dominance in the international system have encouraged American policy makers to act unilaterally and seize almost any opportunity to advance American interests no matter the costs to others. the basic definition of power in international politics is simple: power is the aggregate resources a state has at its disposal to achieve its aims. At any given moment. power is heavily dependent on the size and quality of its military forces and other current power assets. America’s shrinking share of world economic production is a fact of life and important changes in U. even to academicians like Dartmouth’s William Wohlforth and Stephen Brooks. while the ultimate foundation of American power—the relative superiority of the U. Most important. must work for the long haul and so depends on the power a state is able to produce in the future. that major powers will increasingly have the strength to balance against U.

25 of 154 technology and population size—is a prerequisite for building and modernizing military forces. The United States, like any state, may choose to vary the degree to which its productive capacities are used to create military assets. But it is the economy as a whole that constrains the choice. And the size of the economy relative to potential rivals ultimately determines the limits of power in international politics. Major assessments of this relative position have long turned heavily on a single
statistic: America’s share of world economic product. Advocates of extending America’s unipolar dominance are well aware of the central importance of the economic foundations of American power and routinely present detailed statistics on the U.S. share of world product. The basic notion is simple: take U.S. domestic product in any year and divide it by the aggregate total of the gross domestic product of all states in the world. To measure gross domestic product, the unipolar-dominance school prefers to compare every country’s output in current-year U.S. dollars, a method that tends to show America is much further ahead of other countries than alternative measures. Indeed, the most recent call for America to exploit its hegemonic position (published in 2008) rests on the presumption of U.S. dominance based on the current-year dollar figures.2 By this metric, in 2006 the United States had 28 percent of world product while its nearest most likely competitor, China, had 6 percent. Looks pretty good for America, right? Alas,

single-year “snapshots” of America’s relative power are of limited value for assessing the sustainability of its grand strategy over many years. For grand-strategic concerns—especially how well the United States can balance its resources and foreign-policy commitments—the trajectory of American power compared to other states is of seminal importance. For the sake of argument, let us start with the unipolar-dominance school’s preferred measure of American hegemony, but look at the trajectory of the data over time. According to GDP figures in current U.S. dollars
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United States increased its share of world production during the 1990s, reached its apogee in 2000, and then began to steadily lose ground during the eight years of the Bush administration, with its relative power ultimately falling by nearly a quarter in the first decade of the twenty-first century. At the same time, the relative power of China, the state many consider America’s most likely future rival, has grown consistently. If we look out as far as the IMF can see

(2013), things get even worse—with the United States expected to continue declining and China to continue rising. The United States has been going through the first decade of the twenty-first century not stronger than
before, but substantially weaker. How good are the numbers? Economists commonly use two other methods to calculate GDP, constant-dollar calculations and purchasing power parity.3 Although each offers advantages and disadvantages, for our purposes what matters is that they form a lower bound of America’s relative decline. And regardless of the metric, the trend is the same. Again using IMF figures, Table 2 shows the trajectory of the share of world product for the United States and China using both alternative measures. Simply put, the United States is now a declining power. This new reality has tremendous implications

for the future of American grand strategy. THE EROSION of the underpinnings of U.S. power is the result of uneven rates of economic growth between America, China and other states in the world. Despite all the pro-economy talk from the Bush administration, the fact is that since 2000, U.S. growth rates are down
almost 50 percent from the Clinton years. This trajectory is almost sure to be revised further downward as the consequences of the financial crisis in fall 2008 become manifest. As Table 3 shows, over the past two decades, the average rate of U.S. growth has fallen considerably, from nearly 4 percent annually during the Clinton years to just over 2 percent per year under Bush. At the same time,

China has sustained a consistently high rate of growth of 10 percent per year—a truly stunning performance. Russia has also turned its economic trajectory around, from year after year of losses in the 1990s to significant annual gains since 2000. Worse, America’s decline was well under way before the economic downturn, which is likely to only further weaken U.S. power. As

the most recent growth estimates (November 2008) by the IMF make clear, although all major countries are suffering economically, China and Russia are expected to continue growing at a substantially greater rate than the United States. True, the United States has not lost its position as the most innovative country in the world, with more patents each year than in all other countries combined. However, the ability to diffuse new technology—to turn chalkboard ideas into mass-produced

applications—has been spreading rapidly across many parts of the globe, and with it the ultimate sources of state power—productive capacities. America is losing its overwhelming technological dominance in the leading industries of the knowledge economy. In past eras—the “age of
iron” and the “age of steel”—leading states retained their technological advantages for many decades.4 As Fareed Zakaria describes in his recent book, The Post-American World, technology and knowledge diffuse more quickly today, and their rapid global diffusion is a profound factor driving down America’s power compared to other countries. For instance, although the United States

remains well ahead of China on many indicators of leading technology on a per capita basis, this grossly under-weights the size of the knowledge economy in China compared to America. Whereas
in 2000, the United States had three times the computer sales, five times the internet users and forty times the broadband subscribers as China, in 2008, the Chinese have caught or nearly caught up with Americans in every category in the aggregate.5 The fact that the United States remains ahead of China on a per capita basis does matter—it means that China, with more

than four times the U.S. population, can create many more knowledge workers in the future.

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Heg Low (1/2)
American hegemony is a myth – we don’t have sufficient ground forces to project power
Mearshimer, 06 (John Mearsheimer, Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. "Conversations in International Relations - Interview with John J. Mearsheimer (Part I)," International Relations, Vol. 20, No. 1 (2006), pp. 105-124. http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0039.pdf) I think that many commentators and security experts overestimate the power of the United States. Despite all the talk about global hegemony, it is especially difficult to dominate the entire planet, not only because it is very large, but also because it is necessary to project power over large bodies of water, which is a formidable task. For sure, the United States is a hegemon in the western hemisphere. That is because the Americas are its backyard and because there is no state in the region that has the military power to stand up to the United States in a war. But dominating the rest of the globe is virtually impossible at this point in time. To accomplish that end, the United States would need immense power projection capabilities and lots more land power or boots on the ground than it now has or is likely to have anytime soon. I have a chapter in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics titled ‘The Primacy of Land Power’, where I explain why armies and the forces that support them are the core ingredients of military power. The Bush Administration made a fatal blunder in this regard. It assumed that it could use sophisticated aircraft with precision guided munitions and small ground forces to reorder the Middle East, and maybe even the whole world. Instead of relying on big battalions, the United States was going to shock and awe its way to victory. Iraq was supposed to be the first of many great triumphs. There was even much talk about creating an American empire in the Middle East. This whole scheme was delusional from the start, because there was no way that the United States could succeed in Iraq without a large army. Any state bent on reordering the world at the end of a rifle barrel better have an abundance of land power, because that task is not going to be accomplished on the cheap. The United States, however, does not have and will not have in our lifetime anywhere near enough soldiers to dominate the globe the way it dominates the western hemisphere. The unipolar moment never was and probably never will be.

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Heg Low (2/2)
U.S. power in decline
Parag Khanna 2008 (Senior Research Fellow and Director, Global Governance Initiative, New America Initiative, January 28, , New York Times Magazine, “Waving Goodbye to Hegemony,” http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2008/waving_goodbye_hegemony_6604)

There are plenty of statistics that will still tell the story of America's global dominance: our military spending, our share of the global economy and the like. But there are statistics, and there are trends. To really understand how quickly American power is in decline around the world, I've spent the past two years traveling in some 40 countries in the five most strategic regions of the planet -- the countries of the second world. They are not in the first-world core of the global economy, nor in its third-world periphery. Lying alongside and between the Big Three, second-world countries are the swing states that will determine which of the superpowers has the upper hand for the next generation of geopolitics. From Venezuela to Vietnam and Morocco to Malaysia, the new reality of global affairs is that there is not one way to win allies and influence countries but three: America's coalition (as in "coalition of the willing"), Europe's consensus and China's consultative styles. The geopolitical marketplace will decide which will lead the 21st century. The key second-world countries in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, South America, the Middle East and Southeast Asia are more than just "emerging markets." If you include China, they hold a majority of the world's foreign-exchange reserves and savings, and their spending power is making them the global economy's most important new consumer markets and thus engines of global growth -- not replacing the United States but not dependent on it either. I.P.O.'s from the so-called BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China) alone accounted for 39 percent of the volume raised globally in 2007, just one indicator of second-world countries' rising importance in corporate finance -- even after you subtract China. When Tata of India is vying to buy Jaguar, you know the landscape of power has changed. Second-world countries are also fast becoming hubs for oil and timber, manufacturing and services, airlines and infrastructure -- all this in a geopolitical marketplace that puts their loyalty up for grabs to any of the Big Three, and increasingly to all of them at the same time. Second-world states won't be subdued: in the age of network power, they won't settle for being mere export markets. Rather, they are the places where the Big Three must invest heavily and to which they must relocate productive assets to maintain influence.

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D.com/coms2/summary_028638273632_ITM. and underwrite security commitments around the globe. The diffusion of advanced military technologies. “The Pentagon's wasting assets: the eroding foundations of American power”.Professor of International Relations and History at Boston University. such as China. 09 -. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates argued in these pages for a more "balanced" U. from Harvard University and President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (Andrew F.S.29 of 154 AT: Best Military Sustains Our military is deteriorating and their authors don’t assume future threats Krepinevich. U. July 1st 2009. military's long-unfettered access to the global commons--including space and cyberspace--is being increasingly challenged. Foreign Affairs. However. .S.) THE MILITARY foundations of the United States' global dominance are eroding. one that is better suited for the types of irregular conflicts now being waged in Afghanistan and Iraq. he also cautioned. What is needed is nothing short of a fundamental strategic review of the United States' position in the world--one similar in depth and scope to those undertaken in the early days of the Cold War. access to the global commons. assure the safety of the homeland. In fact. For the past several decades. Meanwhile. policymakers are discounting real future threats. U.S. and hostile states. Recently. such as Iran. an overwhelming advantage in technology and resources has given the U. "It would be irresponsible not to think about and prepare for the future.S. This has allowed it to guarantee U.accessmylibrary." in the language of defense strategists. combined with the continued rise of new powers. thereby increasing the prospect of strategic surprises. forces to carry out their missions in areas of vital interest. military an unmatched ability to project power worldwide. will make it progressively more expensive in blood and treasure--perhaps prohibitively expensive-for U. military." Despite this admonition. including East Asia and the Persian Gulf.S. grand strategy assumes that such advantages will continue indefinitely. they are already starting to disappear. Ph. the U.. Military forces that do deploy successfully will find it increasingly difficult to defend what they have been sent to protect.S.S. Several events in recent years have demonstrated that traditional means and methods of projecting power and accessing the global commons are growing increasingly obsolete-becoming "wasting assets. http://www.

" Despite global opinion polls registering broad hostility to George W.has simply not occurred. in German terms. most notably by continuing to supply a small but.org/publications/index. 11 and the Iraq war. Germany's Afghanistan.which the realists have been anticipating for more than 15 years now -. Both trends are primarily the result of internal European politics.S. the behavior of governments and political leaders suggests America's position in the world is not all that different from what it was before Sept. meaningful number of troops.) The striking thing about the present international situation is the degree to which America remains what Bill Clinton once called "the indispensable nation. in Europe the idea has all but vanished. Nor are Europeans refusing to cooperate. It even trumpets its willingness to train Iraqi soldiers. But if they really feared American power. because Western Europeans no longer feel threatened and therefore do not seek American protection. The Washington Post. On the contrary. the current trend is toward closer cooperation. and even the project of creating a common foreign and defense policy has slowed if not stalled. It is bending over backward to show support for the mission in be a strategic partner as it was during the Cold War. Chancellor Angela Merkel promises to work closely with Washington on the question of the China arms embargo. even with an administration they allegedly despise. 06 – PhD from American University.30 of 154 AT: Soft Power Sustains Soft power is irrelevant to hegemony Kagan. Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment For International Peace and Adjunct Professor of History at Georgetown University (Robert. indicating agreement with the American view that China is a potential strategic concern. Western Europe will not new government. while still dissenting from U. policy in Iraq. For Eastern and Central Europe. and the big question remains what it was in the 1990s: Who will be invited to join NATO? .cfm?fa=view&id=17894&prog=zgp&proj=zusr.carnegieendowment. is working hard and ostentatiously to improve relations. European Union defense budgets continue their steady decline. January 15th 2006. http://www. “Still the Colossus”. the growing threat is Russia. Nevertheless. The much-anticipated global effort to balance against American hegemony -. Bush's United States. not America. Europeans would be taking more urgent steps to strengthen the European Union's hand to check it.

The report was denied by a host of countries. The report "has helped concentrate the minds of traders and investors alike. whose President Robert Zoellick recently warned that the United States should not "take for granted" the dollar's role as preeminent global reserve currency. Meanwhile at a G20 summit in Pittsburgh last month. Sha Zukang.com/2009/10/us-facing-massive-economic-power-shift-with-dollars-downward-spiral/) The dollar's position as the world's leading reserve currency faces increased pressure as the financial crisis allows emerging economies greater influence on the world stage. said "important progress in managing imbalances can be made by reducing the (dollar) reserve currency country's 'privilege' to run external deficits in order to provide international liquidity. Gulf Arabs are planning -. were considering replacing the dollar as the currency for oil deals. The dollar slumped against rivals last week in the wake of the British daily's controversial report. including Saudi Arabia. Russia and Gulf States are among nations prepared to ditch the dollar for oil trades has heightened the uncertainty surrounding the US currency's future.along with China. the shift in economic power away from the G7 economies is continuing. reported last Tuesday that Gulf states. "In the most profound financial change in recent Middle East history." added Juckes." Even so. "Three conclusions stand out very clearly. . unified currency planned for nations in the Gulf Co-operation Council." Zukang was speaking at the annual meetings of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. with bold plans to fix global imbalances and give more clout to emerging giants such as China and India. "The US dollar is being hurt by the continued talk of a shift away from a dollar-centric world. together with China. But last week the finance chief was left to watch as traders used The Independent's report as an opportunity to push lower the troubled US unit. The Independent. The Raw Story." GFT Global Markets analyst David Morrison told AFP. US Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner repeated Washington's commitment to a strong dollar. the dollar's underlying downtrend will remain in place. Russia. Qatar and Russia. an analyst at currency traders ECU Group. http://rawstory. as long as the US economy is not strong enough for any rise in interest rates to be conceivable for a long time. world leaders unveiled a new vision for economic governance. Japan and France.31 of 154 AT: Economy Sustains Every indicator goes our way – economic power is declining Agence France-Presse. the euro. And finally. October 11th 2009. under the front-page headline "The Demise of the Dollar". UN undersecretary-general for economic and social affairs. the United Nations itself last week called for a new global reserve currency to end dollar supremacy. analysts said. including Kuwait. 09 (“US facing massive economic ‘power shift’ with dollar’s downward spiral”. which had allowed the United States the "privilege" of building up a huge trade deficit.to end dollar dealings for oil. there is a growing acceptance amongst those winners that one consequence of this power shift will be to strengthen their currencies". Following the summit." wrote The Independent's Middle East correspondent Robert Fisk." added Fisk. A report last week in The Independent claiming that China. Abu Dhabi." said Kit Juckes. Russia. Japan and France -. citing Gulf Arab and Chinese banking sources. and has given them another excuse to take the dollar lower. Kuwait and Qatar. "Secondly. They would switch "to a basket of currencies including the Japanese yen and Chinese yuan. while France dismissed it as "pure speculation. gold and a new. Firstly.

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D. in International Relations.D. Beloit College.harvard. Similarly. Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund A. Location matters . No.harvard. Any second-tier state seeking to counterbalance has to contend with the existing pro-U. many scholars expect bi. http://belfercenter.pdf) The key. the aspiring counterbalancer will have to confront not just the capabilities of the unipolar state. Yale University M. M. position as an offshore power determines the nature and likely longevity of unipolarity. Even a declining offshore unipolar state will have unusually wide opportunities to play divide and rule. we must also consider its four truest allies: Canada. The balance of power between the sole pole and the second-tier states is not the only one that matters. Coordinating a counterbalance against an offshore state that has already achieved unipolar status will be much more difficult. International Security. 1. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. Yale University.Phil. I have already established the first: the sheer size and comprehensiveness of the power gap separating the United States from other states. Wohlforth. This massive power gap implies that any countervailing change must be strong and sustained to produce structural effects. None of these is likely to generate structural change in the policy-relevant future. the U. Ph. “The Stability of a Unipolar World. B. Daniel Webster Professor of Government. Summer 1999.S. Summer 1999. political science. B. 1. political science.S. Beloit College. International Security. Because they fail to appreciate the sheer size and comprehensiveness of the power gap and the advantages conveyed by geography.ksg. Just as the raw numbers could not capture the real dynamics of bipolarity. Yale University.D.D. Yale University M. pp. in Political Science.pdf) Unipolarity rests on two pillars. 99 (William C. is that the countercoalitions of the past—on which most of our empirical knowledge of alliance politics is based—formed against centrally located land powers (France. Wohlforth. If things go poorly. Ph. power indexes alone cannot capture the importance of the fact that the United States is in North America while all the other potential poles are in or around Eurasia. Ph. No.edu/files/wohlforthvol24no1. but also those of its other great power allies. Mexico.A. In addition to all the other advantages the United States possesses. As a result. All of the aspiring poles face a problem the . in International Relations. p. M. They propose three ways in which unipolarity will end: counterbalancing by other states.. The fact that Soviet power happened to be situated in the heart of Eurasia was a key condition of bipolarity. in International Relations.ksg. 99 (William C. or the differential growth in power. the threshold concentration of power necessary to sustain unipolarity is lower than most scholars assume. Vol 24. The second pillar—geography—is just as important.” MIT Press. Efforts to produce a counterbalance globally will generate powerful countervailing action locally. 28. Vol 24.33 of 154 Heg Sustainable (1/2) Heg is sustainable – power gap too large and protected location. Wohlforth. in Political Science. Wohlforth. and the Soviet Union) that constituted relatively unambiguous security threats to their neighbors. Yale University. however.. Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund A. and it may not even be the most important one for many states. the Atlantic. Local balances of power may loom larger in the calculations of other states than the background unipolar structure.Phil. Ph.” MIT Press.A.A.A. in International Relations. Germany.edu/files/wohlforthvol24no1. Empirically proven – counterbalancing not a threat to US heg. and the Pacific. 29-30. Daniel Webster Professor of Government. regional integration. Yale University. “The Stability of a Unipolar World. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University.or multipolarity to reappear quickly. http://belfercenter. bandwagon.

in each region there are smaller “pivotal states” that make natural U.S. allies the moment an unambiguous challenge to Washington’s preeminence emerges. as it did with China against the Soviet Union in the latter days of the Cold War.34 of 154 United States does not: great power neighbors that could become crucial U. . the United States’ first move in any counterbalancing game of this sort could be to try to promote such pivotal states to great power status.S. allies against an aspiring regional power. In addition. Indeed.

Many analysts have come to define unipolarity as an imperial system such as Rome where there is only one great power and all other states are satrapies or dependencies. 99 (William C. analysts changed reference points to minimize U. 1. Yale University M.D. each act of defiance of Washington’s preferences on any issue comes to be seen as the return of a multipolar world. in International Relations. power. 37-38. Wohlforth. and finally to bid unipolarity adieu after the Cold War are all examples. why do so many writers hasten to declare its demise? The answer may lie in the common human tendency to conflate power trends with existing relationships.A.” so the recovery of Europe and Japan appeared as fatal threats to the United States’ position.pdf) The distribution of material capabilities at the end of the twentieth century is unprecedented. Wohlforth.A. position circa 1946. Vol 24.edu/files/wohlforthvol24no1. “hegemony” was deªned as “the U. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. Yale University. B. However we view this venerable explanatory variable. in Political Science.ksg. As a result. In each case.35 of 154 Heg Sustainable (2/2) Unipolarity is a movement – not easily derailed. In the 1980s.S. Ph. http://belfercenter. pp. to herald the rise of Japan or China as superpowers in the 1980s and 1990s. Daniel Webster Professor of Government. Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund A. . Yale University. the current concentration of power in the United States is something new in the world. International Security. new forms of interdependence. to pronounce the United States’ decline in the 1980s. the reference point became the extremely tight alliance of the 1950s. in International Relations. “The Stability of a Unipolar World.S. And unipolarity is not a “moment. Ph.Phil. political science. The rush to proclaim the return of multipolarity in the 1960s and 1970s. M. If unipolarity is so robust.” MIT Press. Beloit College. No. Even if world politics works by the old rules—even if democracy..harvard. Summer 1999. In the bipolarity debate. so any disagreement between the United States and Europe was seen as a harbinger of multipolarity.D.” It is a deeply embedded material condition of world politics that has the potential to last for many decades. and international institutions do not matter— we should not expect a return of balance-of-power politics à la multipolarity for the simple reason that we are living in the modern world’s first unipolar system.

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Institutions. because they thought in terms of absolute. not relative. This threshold represents the maximum amount of power a state can accumulate before further increases begin to reduce its security.” International Security. on the other. (Davide. power. Neutral states realize that the moment has come to take sides. A parabola nicely illustrates the relationship between power and security that I have just described. The concept of balancing necessarily implies that there is a maximum amount of power that a state can accumulate to achieve maximum security. the control that the major partner exercises over its allies becomes stronger.mitpressjournals. where further increases in the major state’s relative power no longer compensate for the defection of its allies and the mobilization of neutral states into the enemy coalition. postdoctoral fellow in the Department of Politics.30 Obviously. the gains that a state accrues from further increases in its power will start to diminish. At some point. power maximization and security maximization become incompatible goals. Meanwhile.1162/ISEC_a_00037 Beyond a certain point. Further increases in the major partner’s power will exacerbate differences with its allies. on the one hand. In the meantime. its allies and that further increases in its power become gradually less useful. The situation eventually reaches a tipping point. The apex of the parabola corresponds to an implicit concept in realist balance of power theory: the security threshold. Classical realists did not make this point explicitly. The flow of defectors encourages the major power’s rivals. there is no amount of absolute power that can guarantee a state’s security once and for all. Beyond that threshold. . This result stems from a structural disequilibrium between allied relations. The concept must be understood in a relative sense. Spring 2011. When the state’s coalition is able to effectively discourage aggression. Further increases tilt the balance in favor of the major power’s rivals. the game is no longer worth the candle for the allies: the threat posed by their enemies is relatively less significant than the threat of growing control posed by their major partner. History at the University of Bologna. The security threshold corresponds to the quantity of power that Waltz calls “appropriate” for a state to be secure in an anarchic international system. neutral states begin to reflect on the costs of their neutrality.org/doi/pdf/10. which acquire new energy.38 of 154 Bad – Generic Hegemony and increases in military power result in backlash Fiammenghi 11.) http://www. especially if one side should defeat the other. leaving them with little choice but submission. and relations with enemies and neutrals. leaving the aspiring hegemon less secure than before. and some will leave the alliance. “The Security Curve and the Structure of International Politics. so that it can accommodate the evolution of technology and the eventuality that an arms race could frustrate a state’s expansionist efforts.

and Soviet spheres were demarcated clearly. whose actions will determine its eventual outcome. including Japan. A good illustration is the current Taipei regime's flirtation with declaring the island's independence fromChina—a move that Beijing says would compel a forcible Chinese re-sponse—which poses a real danger that the United States could be ensnared in a major war by the risk taking behavior of its Taiwanese client state. today. there are few countries in the world that will not be economically and/or militarily affected by it.27ln contrast. In any case. which increases the chances for conflict. During the crisis—which China provoked by conducting intimidatingmilitary exercises in an attempt to influence Taiwan's presidential elections—a Chinese official said that unlike the Formosa Strait crises during the1950s. would be engaged in direct deterrence to prevent U. China now was a nuclear power.lampmethod."29This comment illustrates an important point:: Taiwan matters more to China than it does to Washington (and one hopes Los Angeles matters more to U.28 As China's military power—conventional and nuclear—increases. the United Stateswould be engaged in extended deterrence to prevent China from attacking.S. it is becoming quite real. . but now that China is on the verge of possessing a survivable nuclear retaliatory capability. as well as the Pacific and even into India. in which the United States and China are the two most dominant members. Taiwan and United States are the primary actors in this scenario. other countries will not be considered in this study.pdf) A war between China.org/eCommons/Hunkovic. Moreover. Beijing's 1996 threat was. However. therefore. China-Taiwan war escalates globally and goes nuclear Hunkovic. intervention in what it regards as an internal Chinese matter. For one thing.S. In a showdown over Taiwan. Taiwan and the United States has the potential to escalate into a nuclear conflict and a third world war. If China were able to successfully annex Taiwan. instead of the cold war's clearly delineated spheres of influence. as well as all other countries in the world that participate in the global economy.” http://www. of course.decision makers "care more about Los Angeles than they do about 'Taiwan. nuclear deterrent there-fore could not prevent Beijing from using force against Taiwan. there is a real risk of the United States being dragged into a war because of a protected state's irresponsible behavior. which reduced the chances for a superpower clash. therefore. during the cold war the respective U. if China and the United States engage in a full-scale conflict. Russia. The spring 1996 crisis between China and Taiwan is illusive. Beijing. the possibility exists that they could then plan to attack Japan and begin a policy of aggressive expansionism in East and Southeast Asia. the po-tential risks to the United States of coming to Taiwan's (or Japan's) defensealso are increasing.S.S.S. which could in turn create an international standoff and deployment of military forces to contain the threat. both Koreas. In addition. Australia. 09 – American Military University (Lee.officials than does Taipei).39 of 154 Bad – China War Heg leads to draw-in to Taiwan war – alliance guarantees Layne 6 Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 167-8 Since the cold war. because U. both superpowers exercised considerable control over their major allies and thus were at minimal risk of being chain-ganged into a conflict—that is. China. because states increasingly have greater latitude to pursue theirown foreign and security policy agendas than was the case during the coldwar. however. India and Great Britain. many countries other than the primary actors could be affected by such a conflict. hollow. getting dragged into a war in which their own interests were not directly implicated because of the actions of an ally or client. East Asia's likely flash-points are contested gray areas. the strategic context affecting extended deterrence has shifted against the United States in other ways. “The Chinese-Taiwanese Conflict. and the U. if they were drawn into the war.

because the United States has the “last clear chance” to adopt a grand strategy that will serve its interests in balancing Chinese power without running the risk of an armed clash with [end page 73] Beijing. not peace. . however. 73-74 ] To be sure. the notion—propagated by Beijing—that China’s will be a “peaceful rise” is just as fanciful as claims by American policy-makers that China has no need to build up its military capabilities because it is unthreatened by any other state. Published by Routledge. If the United States continues to aim at upholding its current primacy. After all. the United States should not ignore the potential strategic ramifications of China’s arrival on the world stage as a great power. however. p. Still. depends largely on what strategy the United States chooses to adopt toward China. ISBN 0415952034. 2007 ["The Case Against the American Empire.40 of 154 XTN: China War Primacy is a collision course with China – conflict inevitable Layne 7 Christopher LAYNE. this does not mean that the United States and China inevitably are on a collision course that will culminate in the next decade or two in a war." American Empire: A Debate. Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute. Sino-American conflict is virtually certain. On this score. the lesson of history is that the emergence of new great powers in the international system leads to conflict. Whether Washington and Beijing actually come to blows.

. October 6 2003. possibly in a failed Pakistan.41 of 154 Bad – Counterbalancing US hegemony risks a geopolitical backlash. The Cost of Empire. Perhaps the proponents of America’s imperial ambitions are right and the U. The cumulative costs of fighting —or preparing to fight—guerilla wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The British found out toward the end of the 19th century that a seemingly unassailable international power position can melt away with unexpected rapidity. and elsewhere). Indeed. for example in a war with China over Taiwan. and rising great powers like China could erode America’s relative power—especially if the U. the United States seems fated to succumb to the “hegemon’s temptation. and thereby overreach themselves. is too mighty to be counter-balanced.html] As for the argument that the U. asymmetric conflicts against terrorists (in the Philippines. Don’t bet on it. Member of Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy. on its present course. suffers setbacks in future conflicts. history reminds us that things change fast in international politics. Over time. 2003 [The American Conservative.S.S. North Korea). regional powers (Iran.S. The very fact of America’s overwhelming power is bound to produce a geopolitical backlash—which is why it’s only a short step from the celebration of imperial glory to the recessional of imperial power. http://www. Counter-balancing will quickly erode US dominance Layne 3 Christopher Layne.” Hegemons have lots of power and because there is no countervailing force to stop them. will not suffer the same fate as previous hegemonic powers.com/10_06_03/cover. they are tempted to use it repeatedly.amconmag. this hegemonic muscle-flexing has a price.

Establishing an early warning system for these diseases—exactly what we lacked in the case of SARS a few years ago and exactly what we lack for avian flu today—will require a significant level of intervention into the very places that don’t want it. and several years of mounting hysteria about avian flu. the world is still not ready for a viral pandemic in Southeast Asia or sub-Saharan Africa. while it takes us decades to come up with a new generation of antibiotics. including the World Health Organization. . What’s needed is another great power to take over a piece of the work. Poor countries where humans live in close proximity to farm animals are the best place to breed extremely dangerous zoonotic disease. Professor of Political Science at UC-Berkeley and Director of the Institute of International Studies. Solutions are only possible when and where we get the upper hand. Ely Ratner. al 7. Yet the threat is too arcane and not immediate enough for the West to force the issue. These are often the same countries. January-February 2007. or other Western agencies in. Matthew Kroenig. The most likely sources of the next ebola or HIVlike pandemic are the countries that simply won’t let U. America can’t change that alone. SARS. Even after HIV. Foreign Policy. a power that has more immediate interests in the countries where diseases incubate and one that is seen as less of a threat. Humans cannot outsmart disease.S. Globalization is turning the world into an enormous petri dish for the incubation of infectious disease. Naazneen Barma. That will be true as long as international intervention means American interference.) The same is true for global public health.42 of 154 Bad – Disease Preeminence makes solving diseases like bird flu impossible – only multipolarity reduces global resentment enough to allow for responses to pandemics Weber et. Bacteria can reproduce a new generation in less than 30 minutes. because it just evolves too quickly. “How Globalization Went Bad”. As long as the United States remains the world’s lone superpower. we’re not likely to get any help. perhaps not entirely coincidentally. that feel threatened by American power. (Steven.

In this respect. Published by Routledge. Powell. the United States and Iran are on course for a showdown. it is hardly coincidental that the administration’s policy toward Tehran bears a striking similarity to its policy [end page 76] during the run-up to the March 2003 invasion of Iraq. however. it feels less secure and is spending massive amounts on armaments. Tony Blair insisted that there were "no plans" for invading Syria. ambassador to Iraq. In a real sense. determination to effectuate a radical shake-up in the politics of the Persian Gulf and Middle East. http://www.org/views03/0420-02. p. language. The third is that an aggressive move against the governments in Damascas or Tehran would probably provoke the wholesale resignation of the U. US military decline prevents attack on Iran Kennedy 3 Paul Kennedy. grand strategy—which has come to be known as the Bush Doctrine. 76-77 Iran Because of the strategy of primacy and empire. S. spending and relations with the international community? Just a few days ago. The Dutch. of course. April 20.at least not now. Recently. military repeatedly warns of overstretch and is dismayed at the hawkish calls for further adventures. The fundamental cause of tensions between the United States and Iran is the nature of America’s ambitions in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. It possesses the world's single largest national economy but faces huge trade and budget deficits and economic rivalries from an equally large European Union and a fast-growing China.can we really afford this more crumbling frontiers of insecurity. This is because the same strategic assumptions that underlay the administration’s pre- invasion Iraq policy now are driving its Iran policy. it no longer feels constrained from intervening in sensitive areas like the Middle East or Central Asia.S. Since 9/11. Iran’s nuclear program and its role in Iraq are merely the tip of the iceberg. and gaining U. should national security interests demand it. Most countries in the world. that of defining America's position in the world over the years to come. concerns about Iranian interference have been magnified. not only on the nuclear weapons issue but—ominously—with respect to regime change and democratization. however. is it not time to rein in our own "forward" school and be a little more modest in our aims. including members of the current anti-Saddam coalition. The Bush Doctrine’s three key components are rejection of deterrence in favor of preventive/preemptive military action. during the prime minister's question time in the House of Commons last week.S. Scared. but its obligations look even larger. These are reflected in current U. Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute. ISBN 0415952034. are dumbfounded at the threats against Syria and Iran made by influential members of the Bush administration. Washington Post. The key question today is whether these assumptions are correct.from our inner cities to the slaughters in central Africa -. Yet it has taken little comfort from this. I was shocked when a Dutch journalist told me that many of his countrymen were now "scared" of America. Zalmay Khalilzad.43 of 154 Bad – Iran Strikes Primacy causes conflict with Iran Layne 7 Christopher LAYNE. It is small wonder that while liberals protest soaring defense expenditures. 2003 [“The Perils of Empire: This Looks Like America’s Moment. there are at least four reasons announced recall of some of the U. Still. the U. despite the fears of liberals at home and abroad. "Big stick" .S. including its boss. Bush has stated on several occasions—in language that recalls his prewar stance on Iraq—is that a nucleararmed Iran is “intolerable. part or all of eight of the 10 U. Washington’s policy.” Beyond nuclear weapons. in the recent war on Saddam missionary zeal to remake the Middle East in our own image? We could end up merely creating for ourselves ever Hussein's regime.S. Is that a good long-term policy for the number one power in the democratic world? The Dutch aren't alone." American Empire: A Debate. Professor of History and the Director of International Security Studies at Yale University. With Iraq teetering on the brink of a sectarian civil war between Shiites and Sunnis. With all that is crying out for attention -. has accused Tehran of meddling in Iraqi affairs by providing arms and training to Shiite militias and by currying favor with the Shiite politicians who dominate Iraq’s recently elected government. The main source of conflict—or at least the one that has grabbed the lion’s share of the headlines—is Tehran’s evident determination to develop a nuclear weapons program. Secretary of State Colin L. It has taken on military commitments all over the globe.htm] This brings us to the broadest question of all. as President George W. The first is the of other military units for rest and overhaul.S. The second is that. Navy's carrier groups and the return to think we will not be marching on Damascus or Tehran -.commondreams. the U. History Should Give Us Pause”. Chief among these is Iraq. from the Balkans and Kuwait to Afghanistan and Korea. there are other important issues that are driving the United States and Iran toward an armed confrontation.S. 2007 ["The Case Against the American Empire. Its armed forces look colossal (as did Britain's in 1919). Infantry divisions were tied down in Iraq or standing by to go there. dominance over that region. The clear victor of the Cold War. And the fourth is that even the present supine Congress would bestir itself and demand that the brakes be applied. Successful in our Iraq military campaign. The United States is unchallenged militarily and sees no rival Great Power in sight. foreign service.

the United States and Iran are on course for a showdown. it is hardly coincidental that the administration’s policy toward Tehran bears a striking similarity to its policy [end page 76] during the run-up to the March 2003 invasion of Iraq. determination to effectuate a radical shake-up in the politics of the Persian Gulf and Middle East. and gaining U. The fundamental cause of tensions between the United States and Iran is the nature of America’s ambitions in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. has accused Tehran of meddling in Iraqi affairs by providing arms and training to Shiite militias and by currying favor with the Shiite politicians who dominate Iraq’s recently elected government. literary and national editor of the Atlantic. dominance over that region. grand strategy —which has come to be known as the Bush Doctrine. Zalmay Khalilzad. Washington’s policy. but neither the Marines nor the Army are about to embark on another war.S. ambassador to Iraq.S. there are other important issues that are driving the United States and Iran toward an armed confrontation. however. as President George W. In this respect.) Iran Because of the strategy of primacy and empire. . The Bush Doctrine’s three key components are rejection of deterrence in favor of preventive/preemptive military action.S. With Iraq teetering on the brink of a sectarian civil war between Shiites and Sunnis. not only on the nuclear weapons issue but—ominously—with respect to regime change and democratization. Recently. This is because the same strategic assumptions that underlay the administration’s pre-invasion Iraq policy now are driving its Iran policy. concerns about Iranian interference have been magnified. "The Case Against the American Empire.44 of 154 warnings to Syria and Iran may continue. Iran’s nuclear program and its role in Iraq are merely the tip of the iceberg. These are reflected in current U. Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute.” Beyond nuclear weapons. Bush has stated on several occasions—in language that recalls his prewar stance on Iraq—is that a nuclear-armed Iran is “intolerable. the U. The main source of conflict—or at least the one that has grabbed the lion’s share of the headlines—is Tehran’s evident determination to develop a nuclear weapons program. 64-65. Chief among these is Iraq. p. however. The key question today is whether these assumptions are correct. In a real sense." American Empire: A Debate. Review of International Studies (2009). Heg causes war with Iran Layne 7 (Christopher.

the tieing of the hands of the present administration by a series of neoliberal policies that deny fiscal authority to the government. has created a situation that ties the hands of any Iraq administration. together with the dismantling of much of the previous Iraq administrative structure. including the systematic withdrawal of US forces and elimination of US bases. Policies that sharply reduced US domination of Iraq.html. http://www. The Bush administration's attempt to hide the fact that fundamental elements of its flawed policies remain in place seems certain to add fuel to the fire. 6/30/04 “Discusson of ‘Notes From Ground Zero’: Power equity and Postwar Construction in Two Eras”. . This. the needs of the Iraqi people and society are unlikely to be met.org/fora/security/SeldonDiscussion. an electronic journal and archive on Japan and the Asia-Pacific. and the farflung base structure designed to support US primacy in the region. coupled with a stronger international presence. What can be said with confidence is that the US has embarked on a course that has brought disaster to Iraq and the region and disgrace to the United States. might create more hopeful conditions for relief. both governments and NGOs.45 of 154 Bad – Middle East War US heg causes Iraqi instability Selden 4 (Mark. including the United Nations and European nations. and the transfer of many of the most lucrative sectors of the Iraq economy to American firms. we should not of course expect peace and development to reign any time soon. Whatever the changes. It seems certain that if that multinational presence is predominantly military.nautilus. reconstruction and reform agendas that will be essential for the reconstruction of Iraq and a reduction of international tensions in a region that is super charged.000 US troops supplemented by allied troops and US mercenaries.) What policies make sense with respect to Iraq following the transfer of certain formal powers to the handpicked Iraq administration? What is most striking in my view is the continuity of the effort to sustain American domination of Iraq through the permanent stationing of 138. coordinator of Japan Focus.

Our pointless and protracted wars in Afghanistan and Iraq will be the last time we will launch a major battle in the region. . This credibility was compromised further with our irrational support of Israel's attacks on Lebanon and Gaza in 2006 and 2008/9 respectively. We have been rendered irrelevant. and is knee deep in negotiating a solution to the conflict in Darfur.and this after 19 years of a "USsponsored" peace process.Washington has lost the fundamental tools for global leadership. And no place does this impotence manifest more vividly than the modern Middle East.46 of 154 AT: Heg Solves MidEast War US has no influence in the middle east – cant mediate the conflict Narwani. There is no longer any serious "cost" for defying the United States in the global arena. 10 Senior Associate @ Oxford University (Sharmine. And now Turkey and Brazil have cajoled Iran into accepting an agreement that the US. “Washington Just Lost the Middle East in a Big Way”. England. Unable to win wars or deliver diplomatic coups . That massive show of flexing brawn over brain burst a global perception bubble about our intentions. The only breakthrough in this long-winded effort to tame Iran's nuclear aspirations was struck by Turkey and Brazil last week. And by the double standards employed over Israel's violations of international law and its illegal nuclear weapons stash . the US seems incapable of resolving even a traffic dispute in the Middle East. despite our insistence on involving ourselves with every peep heard in the Mideast. 2) The US's inability to achieve a resolution with Iran over its nuclear program. Russia and China could not.com/sharminenarwani/washington-just-lost-the_b_586222. It is Qatar that stepped in to broker a deal between Hezbollah and the Lebanese government in 2008. France. Germany.and struggling to maintain our economic equilibrium . But nothing highlights our irrelevance more than two recent developments: 1) The US's inability today to convene even perfunctory peace talks between Israelis and Palestinians.html It's official. Syria helped gain the release of prisoners in Iran and Gaza. capabilities and reason. May 24 2010. http://www. In short.huffingtonpost.particularly when viewed against the backdrop of our startling rhetoric over Iran's nuclear program. let alone push through a negotiated solution .

barely flinched when former U. Before 1989. but they are unwilling to consider serious sticks. nonproliferation today is almost entirely America’s burden. Consider the case of nuclear proliferation. 2007 “How Globalization Went Bad. to comment on the limits of conventional military force. Ely Ratner. North Korea didn’t seek nuclear weapons. Professor of Political Science and Director of the Institute for International Studies at the University of California-Berkeley.S. Pyongyang was pushing ahead full steam on plutonium reprocessing facilities. North Korea is the clearest example. In Tehran. But much of this analysis is overblown. it is fast becoming a necessity. conventional military power. Pyongyang. Having your own nuclear weapon used to be a luxury. ET AL. How would things be different in a multipolar world? For starters. al 7. America’s conventional military strength means a lot less to a nuclear North Korea. states that felt threatened by the United States could turn to the Soviet Union’s nuclear umbrella for protection. in the wake of the Iraq war. Moscow simply wouldn’t permit it. Matthew Kroenig.. and it stared continuously at tens of thousands of U. and many other capitals. Weber 7 [Steven WEBER.Q. and the United States is bearing most of the burden. with conventional force. and Ely Ratner.] The world is paying a heavy price for the instability created by the combination of globalization and unipolarity. and Kim’s son rules the country with an iron fist. military could. Consider the case of nuclear proliferation. Within five years of the Soviet collapse. It has become fashionable. But today we see the uneven and inadequate level of effort that non-superpowers devote to stopping proliferation. the only state with a tougher nonproliferation policy than the United States was the Soviet Union. But much of this analysis is overblown. In Tehran. Today. because it had the Soviet nuclear umbrella. Matthew Kroenig.S. It has become fashionable. to comment on the limits of conventional military force. with its own supply (states willing to share nuclear technology) and demand (states that badly want a nuclear weapon). “How Globalization Went Bad”. Khan. the bottom line is simple: The U. The overlap of unipolarity with globalization ratchets up both the supply and demand. And the Russians are aiding Iran’s nuclear ambitions. the bottom line is simple: The U. national security. military could. Foreign Policy) The world is paying a heavy price for the instability created by the combination of globalization and unipolarity. Kim Il Sung. Today North Korea is likely a nuclear power. Saddam Hussein’s great strategic blunder was that he took too long to get to the same place.S. and the United States is bearing most of the burden. to the detriment of U. for 40 years. however. But. But that doesn’t matter much from the perspective of a government that thinks the Pentagon has it in its sights.47 of 154 Bad – Proliferation Unipolarity makes countering proliferation impossible – only a multipolar world can solve. it was officially at war with its southern neighbor.S. January/February. The Eastern bloc was full of countries with advanced technological capabilities in every area except one—nuclear weapons. with conventional force. (Steven. conventional military power. When push comes to shove.D. Ph. The United States may not be able to stabilize and rebuild Iraq. But they can certainly hope to deter America from using it. But they can certainly hope to deter America from using it. national security. The United States may not be able to stabilize and rebuild Iraq. U. great powers could split the job of policing proliferation.S. North Korea’s founder. they turn to people like A. Professor of Political Science at UC-Berkeley and Director of the Institute of International Studies. with Naazneen Barma.S. primacy causes nuclear prolif Weber et. Issue 158. Few countries had it worse during the Cold War. nuclear-armed communist neighbors. Now. including Beijing. and many other capitals. The Europeans dangle carrots at Iran. with its own supply (states willing to share nuclear technology) and demand (states that badly want a nuclear weapon). No country in the world can dream of challenging U.S. But that doesn’t matter much from the perspective of a government that thinks the Pentagon has it in its sights. The Chinese refuse to admit that there is a problem. It’s often forgotten now that. No country in the world can dream of challenging U. and even collaborate on some particularly hard cases. There’s effectively a market out there for proliferation. to the detriment of U.S. Naazneen Barma. That brinkmanship paid off. troops on its border. President Bill Clinton’s administration readied war plans to strike his nuclear installations preemptively. There’s effectively a market out there for proliferation. January-February 2007. And the best deterrent yet invented is the .” Foreign Policy. end those regimes tomorrow if it chose to do so. The overlap of unipolarity with globalization ratchets up both the supply and demand. in the wake of the Iraq war. North Korea was surrounded by feuding. Not a single country that had a formal alliance with Moscow ever became a nuclear power. And the best deterrent yet invented is the threat of nuclear retaliation. end those regimes tomorrow if it chose to do so. Candidates at the University of California-Berkeley and Research Fellows at its New Era Foreign Policy Center. during the Cold War. including Beijing. It didn’t need to.S. Pyongyang.

North Korea is the clearest example. Kim Il Sung. Today North Korea is likely a nuclear power. for 40 years. however. Within five years of the Soviet collapse. barely flinched when former U. nuclear-armed communist neighbors. North Korea’s founder. states that felt threatened by the United States could turn to the Soviet Union’s nuclear umbrella for protection. Pyongyang was pushing ahead full steam on plutonium reprocessing facilities. America’s conventional military strength means a lot less to a nuclear North Korea. North Korea didn’t seek nuclear weapons. . Khan. But. troops on its border. North Korea was surrounded by feuding. it was officially at war with its southern neighbor.Q. Now. Before 1989. President Bill Clinton’s administration readied war plans to strike his nuclear installations preemptively. It didn’t need to. Few countries had it worse during the Cold War. That brinkmanship paid off. Saddam Hussein’s great strategic blunder was that he took too long to get to the same place. it is fast becoming a necessity. Today. and it stared continuously at tens of thousands of U.S. and Kim’s son rules the country with an iron fist. because it had the Soviet nuclear umbrella.S. Having your own nuclear weapon used to be a luxury. they turn to people like A.48 of 154 threat of nuclear retaliation.

“Stable Group Hegemony of Nuclear Arms. programs and facilities. China. Stable nuclear group hegemony is quite often challenged by those countries such as North Korea and Iran that are not in compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and other international obligations. self-restraint and costly consequences for continued pursuit of nuclear weapons. Heg doesn’t solve prolif – rogue nations don’t follow norms or rules Park 10 – director of public relations at Korean Political Science Association [Tae-woo. the world leaders are strongly urged to develop practical means and ways to keep the stable .. 4/19. though. India. determined and coordinated mobilization of other concerned states. the traditional standing members of the U. could be classified into this category of stable group hegemony of nuclear weapons.K. http://www. It is apparent that North Korea and Iran will not follow the norms and rules of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). At the nuclear summit in Washington. angered over the new U.kr/www/news/opinon/2010/07/198_64433. also spoke out against the Obama administration's revised nuclear policy by saying that ``The United States is a sinister government and cannot be trusted. nuclear weapons policy. and early formulation of a program including both incentives. The U. the possibility of nuclear terrorism will always linger around us like a “devil-dream'' embedded in our unconscious mental world.S. mounted on at least a regional basis. Even Iran's supreme leader. Security Council.co. We are not. Short of a unilateral military action--with all its unpredictable consequences—even the world's only superpower could not by itself dissuade a country firmly determined to acquire nuclear weapons. and Israel are nowadays officially recognized to be nations of nuclear weapons.” Korea Times.S. at an early stage of the nuclear challenge. reflecting these kinds of complaints. Zbigniew Brzezinski (formerly President Carter’s National Security Advisor..49 of 154 AT: Heg Solves Prolif American hegemony cannot prevent proliferation by itself.N. a stable group hegemony of nuclear weapons is to create a stable order of nuclear politics. Ayatollah Ali Khameini.'' This time. it was easy to ignore incipient proliferation in the belief that an intimidating response by the United States would eventually suffice to halt it. France and the U. and a large majority of Iranian lawmakers. In the early. counselor and trustee at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and professor of American foreign policy at the School of Advanced International Studies @ Johns Hopkins University) 2007 “Second Chance” p 103 The failure to contain nuclear proliferation in the Far East and in South Asia conveyed a sobering lesson.html] In the same context. Of course. Pakistan. North Korea is still not returning to the six-party talks. relevant materials. quite sure of the leaders' capacity to produce stern mandatory international standards or measures to stop further proliferation of nuclear weapons. Russia. have urged their government to formally complain to the United Nations in a petition that calls the United States a warmonger and threat to world peace. They also tackled how to reduce the number of thousands of poorly guarded nuclear reactors or fuel storage sites in many nations. heady days of American unilateral supremacy. A successful preventive effort would have required an early concentration of attention on the issue. The lesson bequeathed to the Clinton administration's successor was that even given the great asymmetry of power between the United States and any would-be proliferator. 47 leaders from all over the world discussed the ways and means of how to secure all weaponsuseable nuclear material within four years and how to eliminate the possibility that terrorists could buy or steal a nuclear weapon. If those challenges are not tackled properly through this kind of nuclear summit diplomacy.koreatimes. the only alternative to sear was genuine international cooperation.

50 of 154 nuclear order rooted firmly on earth with detailed plans such as how to curb North Korea and Iran's nuclear programs in the future. .

51 of 154 Bad – Russia War Heg destroys Russian relations and causes global war Press TV 9 (“Medvedev lashes out at US hegemony. attacking efforts by any party to advance what he called "utopian projects of global supremacy … 'Global Caliphate' or 'Benevolent Hegemony'"." he stressed. where he described the global economic crisis as Washington and Wall Street's "collective failure".aspx? id=106209&sectionid=351020602." he added.) Russia's President has slammed America's global dominance saying all nations have the right to remark on the policies of a state whose actions affect the world.of any illegal activities. The Russian president also lashed out at what he thought the "ill-thought-out" policies of a country that led to the global financial melt down.presstv. Medvedev did not refer to the United States by name but the target of his comments was clear.ir/detail. . Speaking at the opening of a global security conference in the central Russian city of Yaroslavl on Monday. have the potential to lead to international conflict. Medvedev's comments further developed those ideas. Dmitry Medvedev said those problems of one country. "This happens immediately and incompetence and reluctance to solve one's own problems inflict damage not only to your country but to a huge number of other countries.” Sept 15 http://www. suppression of rights and freedoms -. His remarks came shortly before the US President Barack Obama delivered a key speech in New York. There can be no "high-flown justification for military adventures. Earlier in March the Kremlin had suggested that the international community should have a say when the world's richest countries make decisions with global implications.

the aggressive posture of the Bush regime goes far beyond recklessness. In a mere 6. As the US has proven that it cannot occupy the Iraqi city of Baghdad despite 5 years of efforts. the predominance of the US in the post-Iraqi-war world. he will stand aside and permit Bush to make air strikes inside Pakistan. if not counterbalance. saying scenarios "of forceful pressure or use of force are unacceptable". Americans need to understand what the neocon Bush regime cannot: a nuclear exchange between the US. and China would establish the hegemony of the cockroach. Russia and China have now witnessed enough of the Bush administration's unprovoked aggression in the world to take neocon intentions seriously.guardian.52 of 154 Bad – Sino-Russia Alliance Heg leads to a Sino-Russia Alliance that culminates in superpower nuclear conflict Roberts 07 Economist and Former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury (Paul Craig. before he left home Mr Hu called for more military modernisation of China. In another thrust at US unilateralism. Hu Jintao.and shocked . Meeting in Moscow yesterday. Today. . about why the US must use its military superiority to assert hegemony over Russia and China. America's influence in the world is limited to its payments of tens of millions of dollars to bribed heads of foreign governments. This new potent military alliance is a real world response to neoconservative delusions about US hegemony. Cynics believe that the neocons are just shills. as he begins a foreign tour designed to revitalise Chinese diplomacy. has joined President Vladimir Putin of Russia in a call for a "multipolar world" while condemning "the use of force". The Guardian 3 5/28/2003 “China and Russia look for a counterbalance” http://www. at least in the medium term. But Chinese diplomacy is still based on seeking good relations with the US. Other countries appear ready to join the military alliance. Both the Russian and Chinese governments are trying to devote resources to their economic development. These are gratuitous acts of aggression. Neocons are people who desire war.com/roberts/?articleid=11422) This week the Russian and Chinese militaries are conducting a joint military exercise involving large numbers of troops and combat vehicles.china The new president of China. Yet. not to their militaries. Is Bush blind to the danger that he will cause an Islamic revolution within Pakistan that will depose the US puppet and present the Middle East with an Islamic state armed with nuclear weapons? Considering the instabilities and dangers that abound.antiwar. the US failures in Iraq and Afghanistan. That means the conflict toward which the neocons are driving will be a nuclear conflict.5 years the Bush regime has destroyed the world's good will toward the US. for the military-security complex and are paid to restart the cold war for the sake of the profits of the armaments industry. The Bush regime is the most irresponsibly aggressive regime the world has seen since Hitler's.by the White House's pre-emptive strategy. and now believe that China must do more to hold its own. The Bush regime even thinks that as it has bought and paid for Musharraf. His senior military advisers appear to have been impressed . Neocons believe that the US is supreme in the world and can dictate its course. just and democratic world order" on the basis of international law. such as Egypt's and Pakistan's. Reagan and Gorbachev ended the cold war. In an attempt to gain the advantage in a nuclear conflict. the neocons are positioning US anti-ballistic missiles on Soviet borders in Poland and the Czech Republic. The two presidents are trying to establish a better Sino-Russian understanding which will offset. and its criticism of the occupation of Iraq has been muted. Unilateralism leads to a Sino-Russia alliance. it most certainly cannot occupy Russia or China.co. they said that they stood for "a multipolar. They also said that the UN should be given the "central role" in Iraq's reconstruction. However. The Bush regime has initiated a propaganda war against the Russian government of Vladimir Putin. read by Russians and Chinese.uk/world/2003/may/28/russia. where China has been given observer status for the first time. Russia. This is an idiotic provocation as the Russians can eliminate anti-ballistic missiles with cruise missiles. like Bush and Cheney. “US Hegemony Spawns Russian-Chinese Military Alliance”. and Kazakstan are participating. they called for a peaceful solution on the Korean peninsula. But the fact is that the neocons actually believe their delusions about American hegemony. but know nothing about it. Kyrgkyzstan. Thus. The US gratuitously brought NATO and anti-ballistic missiles to Russia's borders. The former Soviet Republics of Tajikistan. both are being forced by America's aggressive posture to revamp their militaries. US administrations after Reagan's have broken the agreements and understandings. After a week in Russia Mr Hu will attend the G8 conference in France. The neoconservative idiots have actually written papers. http://www. Significantly.

The Bush administration immediately moved to expand offensive military capacity. These things are going to misfire. a small ABM system around Moscow. the United States. so instead of having twenty missiles targeting the United States they’ll build it up and probably have a submarine launched capacity. well that’s OK. 2006 [“The State of Space: From Strategic Reconnaissance to Tactical Warfighting to Possible Weaponsization” ed. opposing the weaponization of space. Washington D. Testimony before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces of the House Armed Services Committee. as do strategic analysts. if you increase the threat of terror. This dispute has much of its origins and motivation in the history of the ballistic missile defense debate. O’Hanlon. Computer errors are daily occurrences in the US computer system. and use of such capabilities. enter the atmosphere at the last minute so they can’t be detected and instantaneously drop highly destructive precision weaponry. These moves are deliberately. In recent years. that they’re deploying their offensive missiles. Do you think the Russians will react differently? No they’re saying straight out that they’ve adopted Bush’s first strike doctrine. The US is developing low yield nuclear weapons which is in violation of international treaties and the Russians understand. dominating the world by force and dismantling the hated welfare state measures at home. Now others react to that threat. the Russian systems are worse. In December 2001 it called for negotiations on a treaty to prevent an arms race in outer space at the Geneva Conference. It means putting space platforms in orbit from which you can launch offensive weapons. so Russian defense spending has predictably sharply increased since Bush came in. without warning and instantaneously with first strike authority. that’s important. It was also just reported that the Pentagon is developing hypersonic planes which will orbit in space. and Georgia abstained. There’s universal agreement on this by both sides. and in 2002 China and Russia jointly presented another draft that included bans on weapons based in space and on any use of weapons against objects in space. The Bush administration just announced that it is going to employ a missile defense system. which is exactly consistent with the security strategy. which in 1998 proposed that the United Nations convene a committee on outer space in its Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Everybody knows that a missile defense system is an offensive weapon. American strategic analysts call that an accident waiting to happen. it just doesn’t matter much to them. that's the way the cookie crumbles.” http://www. The air force space command immediately announced plans to move from it called control of space to ownership of space. It terminated negotiations on an enforceable bio weapons treaty. deployment. And its not that Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld and so on want the world destroyed. targeting the rear outposts with nuclear weapons so they would overwhelm any possible defense. But it has taken on a new tone in what many view as an era of American unipolarity or hegemony. They immediately moved to undermine international treaties. consciously. by American calculation it might have tripled. That sets off a new cycle.53 of 154 Bad – Space Weapons Hegemony causes a buildup of space weapons O`Hanlon 6 Michael E.htm Well the most visible and publicized implementation was the invasion of Iraq. as well as the ASAT debate of the 1980s. undermined ratification of old bio-weapons treaties. So have a number of U. You get a ripple effect. hegemony will force space weaponization which causes space racing resulting in extinction. In comparison if you threaten to blow up the world. . including Canada. June 21. for more than twenty straight years. those risks aren’t important as compared to what its important. They very pointedly said this is in response to US escalation. China and Russia have been consistently vocal in their opposition to the weaponization of space and their desire for a treaty banning the testing. Just a couple of weeks ago the Russian had their first major military maneuvers in the last two decades. The world is under very tight surveillance so you can detect if somebody is walking across the street in Ankara. that no one can challenge our total domination. raising the threat to survival. India increases it and Pakistan responds. (The vote passed by 156 to 0. so they’re going to react to it. it’s a first strike weapon. U.: Brookings Institution. most of which do not favor putting weapons in space. The Chinese are surely going to respond to a so called missile defense system since it eliminates their strategic nuclear capacity. This is extraordinarily dangerous. India responds.org/April2004/Mars0424. What does ownership of space mean? Well that’s presented in leaked plans. Think what they’re going to be like in the Russian systems. that their purpose is to attack the command bunkers that control their retaliatory nuclear systems.) In 2001 China presented an incomplete draft treaty banning the weaponization of space. The US reacted at once by targeting it with offensive nuclear weapons. Noam Chomsky 4/24/2004 “an interview with Noam Chomsky. allies. Do we want Pakistan to increase its offensive nuclear capacity? Have a look at how their missiles are controlled. You are asking for a disaster. 13] Non-American opponents of weaponizing space make many of the same arguments. The American systems which are much more sophisticated have a three minute period during which human intervention can prevent automated response. you can find them. We know how the US reacted to this when the Russians made a slight move in that direction by placing. highly destructive weapons.S.dissidentvoice.C. which they claim are much more sophisticated and are on computer controlled automated launch.S. p. The UN General Assembly has continued to pass resolutions. They also worry about a unilateralist America pursuing its own military advantage at the expense of other countries. China increases its missile capacity. but there was another one which was important and hasn’t been much discussed. in 1968. Micronesia. Israel.

54 of 154 .

it is dangerous for the US to base its strategy for combating terrorism on the belief ‘that Muslims hate and attack us for what we are and think rather than for what we do’. the actions of groups like Al-Qaeda reflect some of the key attributes of balancing. and that its links with Bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda are. In fact.tration’s inflexible determination to maintain a long-term American military presence in Iraq is exactly the wrong policy to reduce terrorism. and Jordan. After all. at the same time. or resistance. and widely popular foreign policy goals . ‘It is hardly likely that Middle Eastern radicals would be hatching schemes like the destruction of the World Trade Center if the US had not been identified so long as the mainstay of Israel. Scheurer observes that. Cambridge Journals. balancing also signifies opposition. Bush’s position seemed to soften and the administration said the US would support a ‘time horizon’ for US . for example) and their replacement by fundamentalist Islamic governments.40 Here. the acquisition of power. 5/25/9. ‘In the context of ideas bin Laden shares with his brethren. hence – in a blatant prevarication – tied AQI and the war in Iraq to 9/11. As German military strategist Carl von Clausewitz himself observed.49 When it first announced the surge.38 Terrorism. Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute. ‘War is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its political object’.55 of 154 Bad – Terrorism US Heg causes terrorism – US presence in the Middle East and 9/11 proves Layne 9 (Christopher. even when the surge itself has ended. As Michael Schuerer – who headed the CIA analytical team monitoring Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda – says.47 Here. and force Washington to alter its stance on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. To make this point. any draw-down of US forces will take place gradually. beyond connoting the idea of counterweight. engaged in ‘balancing’ the US (because balancing is a form of state behaviour). but their actions are of a kind frequently found in international politics: the use of violence against a state(s) to attain clearly defined political objectives. they are not. and conservative Arab regimes and the source of a cultural assault on Islam’.48 Bush repeatedly asserted that.43 Specifically. religious. For sure. Although the Bush administration had strongly opposed any suggestions that there should be a fixed timetable for US withdrawal from Iraq in July 2008. During 2008.’. moreover. meant to advance bin Laden’s clear. and ideological reasons. Pakistan.52 What will happen under the new US administration is unclear. . In his study of suicide terrorist groups. The Iraqi government refused to accede to the Bush administration’s desire to negotiate a long-term security agreement that would allow the US to maintain permanent bases in Iraq. and thereby compel changes in America’s Middle Eastern grand strategy. claimed that the US is fighting terrorism in Iraq. 9/11 represented a violent counterreaction to America’s policies in the Middle East – especially its drive to dominate the region both geopolitically and culturally.) Terrorist organisations like Al-Qaeda are non-state actors. The Bush administration’s deliberate fabrications were designed to win Congressional and public support for a prolonged ‘surge’.39 From this perspective. limited. Al-Qaeda seeks to undermine US primacy.ment to Iraq is long-term in nature.46 Al-Qaeda fits this pattern. . strictly speaking. Al-Qaeda wants to compel the US to remove its military presence from the Persian Gulf. Review of International Studies (2009). it is clear that the Bush administration never intended to withdraw from Iraq militarily and aimed for the US to retain permanent US military bases there. and American military planners are preparing for a long-lasting ‘post-occupation’ US presence there. in Iraq the US is fighting the same terrorists who attacked the US on 9/11. the administration said it would last through 2007. and one of its principal objectives ‘is the expulsion of American troops from the Persian Gulf and the reduction of Washington’s power in the region’.45 In other words. Instead it lasted well into 2008. Indeed the use of violence for such purposes is the hallmark of terrorism.44 Al-Qaeda’s leaders also apparently hoped that the September 11 attacks would provoke a US overreaction. President Bush’s endlessly reiterated claim that the US was attacked because Islamic radicals ‘hate us because of our freedom’ betrayed a complete misunderstanding of the dynamics that underpin the clash between the US and Middle Eastern terrorists. the government of Iraqi Nouri al-Maliki indicated that Baghdad wanted to set a timeline for US troop withdrawals. and it is likely that there will be more US forces in Iraq in January 2009 than there were prior to the surge. But that is not why the US is a target for Islamic terrorists. .42 It is the US’ attempt to impose its primacy and preferences on the Middle East that fuels groups like Al-Qaeda and fans Islamic fundamental. of course. because it is an instrument that the weak use against the strong. to a hegemon. Terrorism is a form of ‘blowback’ against America’s preponderant role in international affairs. And. the Shah of Iran. As Bruce Hoffman says. ‘irrational’ act of violence. Yet. terrorism is ‘about power: the pursuit of power. Underscoring this point. Richard K. the 9/11 attack was in keeping with the Clausewitzian paradigm of war: force was used against the US by its adversaries to advance their political objectives. tenuous. at best. who served as senior American commander in Iraq during the surge and now heads CENTCOM (the US military command with overall responsibility for the Middle East) has repeatedly emphasised that the US commit. Despicable and brutal though it was. Betts observed following the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center that. and as such. this claim overlooked the fact that AQI came into existence only after the March 2003 US invasion of Iraq. The Bush administration. the 9/11 attack was undertaken with cool calculation to achieve well-defined geopolitical objectives. focused.50 General David Petraeus. Organisations like Al-Qaeda may be non-state actors. the 9/11 assault on the US was not a random. senseless. is fundamentally an asymmetric form of conflict. the military actions of Al-Qaeda and its allies are acts of war. do hate the US for cultural. it has grossly exaggerated the links between the insurgent group Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and Osama Bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda organisation and. The US presence on the ground in the Middle East also incites terrorists to attack American interests. indeed. and the use of power to achieve political change’. Terrorists may not be able to balance against the US. “America’s Middle East grand strategy after Iraq: the moment for offshore balancing has arrived”.ism. not terrorism . the Bush adminis.41 In a similar vein. and thereby trigger an upsurge of popular discontent in the Islamic world that would lead to the overthrow of the Saudi monarchy and other proAmerican regimes in the Middle East (Egypt.51 In fact. Of course. Pape has found that ‘what nearly all suicide terrorist attacks have in common is a specific secular and strategic goal: to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from territory that the terrorists consider to be their homeland’. . literary and national editor of the Atlantic. there are Islamic radicals who. President Bush all but confirmed this in May 2007 when he said that he wanted the US to play the same kind of role in Iraq that it has in South Korea since the end of the Korean War. but they can engage in a related form of activity aimed at undermining American primacy by raising its costs.

staying in Iraq will exacerbate it.htm) What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails. Instead of solving this problem. “Extinction!. Ill.) during the 2008 US presidential campaign. tensions different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive.56 of 154 troop withdrawals from Iraq as an ‘aspirational goal’. police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights. this . and turned the entire region into a source of recruits for various radical terrorist groups.istration’s overall policy in the Middle East has inflamed anti-American sentiment.” Al Ahram Weekly. No. the presence of US troops in Iraq and the Middle East increases it by reinforcing the widespread perception in the Islamic world that the US is pursuing a neo-colonial policy in the Middle East in furtherance of its own imperial ambitions. it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. we will all be losers. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another. along with America’s policy on the Israel/Palestinian issue. 04 – Al-Ahram political analyst (Mohamed. the primary driver of Middle Eastern terrorism.istration will do about the US presence in Iraq is an open question. August/September 1. 705.) and Senator John McCain (R. from which no one will war will be without winners and losers. Ariz. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a could lead to a third world war. it seems certain that there will be a significant American Instead of reducing American vulnerability to terrorism.53 What the new US admin. This between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate.eg/2004/705/op5. http://weekly. The impact is extinction Sid-Ahmed. emerge victorious. The huge US politico-military footprint in the Middle East region – including Iraq – is. but based on the positions taken by Senator Barak Obama (D.org.ahram. military presence in Iraq for some time to come. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. Societies would close in on themselves. The admin. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet.

In the future. Secretary General of Arab Thought Forum.ahram.org. “Collapse of Empire. Arab Thought Forum. 08 (Hassan Nafaa.eg/2008/915/op1. Jordan. The American insistence on pursuing its project of global hegemony behind the guise of the war on terror was ultimately detrimental to both causes. Amman. .” http://weekly.Terrorism Heg can’t solve terrorism. with imperial ambitions. it must detach that drive from its imperial ambitions. Secretary General. which poses a real threat not just to one society or country.htm) Any incoming US president must bear in mind several lessons from the lean years of the Bush presidency.57 of 154 Heg Fails . if the US intends to deal seriously with a drive to end terrorism. The hegemonic project is on the verge of collapse after the US has been sapped of enormous resources while terrorism has become more widespread. 9/24/08. Nafaa. The first is that it is dangerous to link terrorism. Al-Ahram Weekly Online.

S. Finally. henhouse. “Reverend Wright Is Not Totally Wrong”.asp?id=2182.S. asymmetric strategies mean the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities. and dissuading Washington from using its military muscle against them.S. targets. empirical studies have linked U.traditional balancing that is being employed to contest US primacy. these states seek other methods of offsetting American power.S. but U.58 of 154 XTN: Terrorism Heg causes terror Layne 9 (Layne. and even culture are popular in these countries. however. . Because they are threatened by the US. asymmetric strategies are another type of non. It is too bad that Rev. literary and national editor of the Atlantic. Wright’s largely correct analysis of U.S. Wright’s remarks is that if the United States militarily intervened less overseas. May 5. The upshot of Rev. http://www. Regional powers – especially those on the US hit list like Iran and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq – cannot slug it out toe-to-toe against the US’ dominant hightech conventional forces. foreign policy causes blowback terrorism against the United States? Again. interventionist foreign policy toward the Middle East is not. Ph. When employed by states.org/newsroom/article.) In addition to soft balancing. Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute. Bin Laden has repeatedly said that he attacks the United States because of its occupation of Muslim lands and its support for corrupt Middle Eastern governments.D. Terrorism is another asymmetric strategy – one employed by non-state actors like Al-Qaeda and similar jihadist groups – to resist US dominance. “America’s Middle East grand strategy after Iraq: the moment for offshore balancing has arrived”. WMD – especially the possession of nuclear weapons – is one way these states can level the strategic playing field and deter the US from attacking them. 5/25/9. Poll after poll in the Arab/Islamic world indicates that U. technology. foreign occupation and military interventions with blowback terrorism against the U.S.S. the facts are on his side. Review of International Studies (2009). The use of asymmetric strategies to oppose American power – especially in the Middle East where US policy has an imperial dimension – illustrates the dictum that empires inevitably provoke resistance. in Public Policy from George Washington University and Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute. political and economic freedoms.independent.) But what about Wright’s implication that U. Cambridge Journals. the chickens would not be roosting as much in the U. Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute. foreign policy is being thrown out with his other wacky and bigoted ravings. Heg causes terror – empirics and polls Eland 8 (Ivan.

with thousands of miles of borders and many possible targets. . and the gains from interventionism have been drastically reduced while the costs have skyrocketed. practicing military restraint. the utmost effort should be made to capture or kill bin Laden and eradicate al Qaeda. Back to the Future: Rediscovering America’s Foreign Policy Traditions During the Cold War. homeland security efforts will likely have only limited effect. but the US quest for an informal global empire actually undermines this objective. Naturally. Osama bin Laden’s biggest gripes are with US — that is. it sabotages it. Protecting its citizens and property should be the first goal of any government. Number 3. Because conventional and nuclear military power have very little utility in stopping terrorist attacks and because the United States has an open society. would make Americans safer at home. But the Cold War is long over.59 of 154 AT: Heg Solves Terror Terrorists aren’t deterred by military power because it falls out of asymmetric power calculations Eland 08 senior fellow at the Independent Institute (ivan. Mediterranean Quarterly Volume 19. and even culture but hate US meddling in their world. technology. rather than interventionism. at least a plausible argument could be made for some [End Page 94] US intervention overseas to counter Soviet encroachment. The only type of attack that cannot be deterred by the US nuclear arsenal is that from terrorists — as was demonstrated on 9/11. the Soviet rival is in the dustbin of history. Poll after poll in the Muslim world indicates that Muslims like US political and economic freedoms. non-Muslim — occupation of Muslim lands and meddling in their politics by supporting corrupt dictators and Israel. Retaliation for US interventionism in the Arab-Muslim world is al Qaeda’s primary motive for attacking the United States. Empire does not equal security — in fact. in the short term. Thus. Summer 2008. Specifically. but in the long term the only way to effectively deal with anti – United States terrorism is to reduce the motivation of terrorists to attack America in the first place.

play an increasingly influential role. . b) Relations Key To Solve Disease Breakout Steinberg 3 James B. we are likely to be far more successful at meeting the new global threats. Survival. p. the US fought two large wars in Europe to stop a hegemonic Germany from threatening America's backyard.but also foster the proliferation of technology for weapons of mass destruction. 45 no. Foreign Policy Studies. During the 20th century. the Germans down and the Americans in. This is because American hegemony remains the cause of the rift. money. It is more accurate to say that America's commitment to the Atlantic alliance is about staying on top . Non-state actors .from business and NGOs to terrorists and money-launderers . a new ‘global politics’ is required to address the threats and opportunities that affect us all.php?pub_id=6001] Major combat operations in Iraq ended in April but the transatlantic rupture between the US and "old" Europe triggered by the war has not healed.60 of 154 Bad – US-EU Relations a) Hegemony hurts US-EU relations Layne 3 Christopher Layne. Steinberg. August 13. 2003 [Cato Reports.org/pub_display. not cold-war ideology . America's strategic ambitions - based primarily on economic self-interest. 113-46] Both the United States and Europe face new global threats and opportunities that. people and ideas facilitate the spread of economic opportunity . writer at the Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute in Washington. 2003 [The Brookings Institution. Porous borders and the extraordinary global flows of goods.led it to establish its own hegemony over western Europe. Summer. In the place of geopolitics. Ocean and land barriers offer little protection. from terrorism and international crime to environmental damage and disease pose an increasing danger to our well being. 2.and keeping the Europeans apart. and preserving our freedom and prosperity. can be dealt with far more successfully if we act together. vol. The struggle for supremacy has been a feature of US-European relations since America emerged as a great power in the late 19th century. than if we try to achieve these goals alone. There is a well-known quip that Nato was created to keep the Russians out. Transnational threats. If we can work together. After the second world war. Vice President and Director. Weak states threaten our security as much as powerful ones. in almost every case.cato. http://www.

php?pub_id=6001] Unsurprisingly.led it to establish its own hegemony over western Europe. More generally. Unless and until America’s foreign policy elites adopt a new foreign policy vision. 2003 [Cato Reports.61 of 154 XTN: US-EU Relations Hegemony will worsen us-eu relations Layne 3 Christopher Layne. August 13. Hegemony has forced an inevitable struggle between the US and the EU Layne 3 Christopher Layne. http://www. http://www. 2003 [Cato Reports. Washington is trying to derail the EU's plans to create.org/pub_display.cato. relations between the United States and its European allies will only continue to worsen.org/pub_display.org/pub_display. writer at the Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute in Washington. August 13.php?pub_id=6001] The struggle for supremacy has been a feature of US-European relations since America emerged as a great power in the late 19th century.cato. through the European Security and Defence Policy. . writer at the Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute in Washington. After the second world war.php?pub_id=6001] The real source of transatlantic conflict is America’s role as a global hegemon. August 13. not cold-war ideology . 2003 [Cato Reports. and the concomitant power imbalance between the United States and Europe. During the 20th century. It has encouraged the expansion of Nato and the EU in the hope that the new members from central and eastern Europe will keep in check Franco-German aspirations for a counterweight to American power. writer at the Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute in Washington. military capabilities outside Nato's aegis. the US fought two large wars in Europe to stop a hegemonic Germany from threatening America's backyard. America's strategic ambitions .based primarily on economic self-interest. one that does not presume that the United States will retain its hegemonic position in perpetuity. the Bush administration is playing a game of divide and rule to undermine the EU's sense of common purpose. http://www. The eventual rupture arising from this long-simmering dispute may ultimately prove damaging to security on both sides of the Atlantic.cato. US hegemony undermines EU stability Layne 3 Christopher Layne. Washington has tried to hamper the EU's moves towards political unity and strategic self-sufficiency.

organized and financed in Europe. This profound change helps us understand the erroneous premise of Bush’s foreign policy.S. iss. Europeans’ linguistic skills and cultural knowledge alone ensure that they can make indispensable contributions to U. NYU Law School Professor. not to mention the cleavage between America and Europe as well as the increased American-Iranian tensions. and in these respects the Europeans are anything but security pygmies. but the benefits of cooperation outweigh the costs of any compromise. disruption and apprehension for which our own unrivaled military machine is patently inadequate. Their capacities to respond effectively to today’s greatest security threats easily rival those of the United States. the European police have been acting in a perfectly Hobbesian manner. Proquest] While Russia has not stood in the way of any decisive U. despite the prevailing cliche. Kagan has apparently failed to realize the degree to which the contours of American national security have been redrawn since 9-11. 2003 [“AMERICAN PROSPECT”.62 of 154 Relations Good Relations with EU are key to solve terrorism Holmes 3 Stephen Holmes. infiltration. the current geopolitical earthquake in the Persian Gulf could jeopardize America's efforts to consolidate the independence of the Caspian Basin states. In our new security environment. despite his pose as a no-nonsense realist. the United States is not the world’s only superpower. US-EU relations are key to preventing Russia war Brzezinski 4 Zbigniew Brzezinski. 75. National-security strategy must now operate in a domain where soldiering and policing have become of coequal importance. That may not be easy to achieve. A resurgence of Muslim extremism of the Taliban variety could then even acquire a regional scope. . The home front and the foreign front have now been disconcertingly blurred.S. The National Interest. As daily press reports also reveal.S. political and military presence in Central Asia. In other words.-EU strategic collaboration with regard to Iraq and Iran. For the United States.S. it would mean less opportunity for self-serving inaction. has already tempted Moscow to resume its earlier pressure on Georgia and Azerbaijan to abandon their aspirations for inclusion in the Euro-Atlantic community and to step up its efforts to undermine any enduring U. Europe remains a frontline region in the war against terrorism just as it was in the war against communism. arresting scores of suspected terrorists. a joint approach would mean less freedom of unilateral action. They can perform essential tasks of monitoring. security. These risks could be lessened by closer U.S. 21] The September 11 attacks were partly planned. In other words. Former Diplomat at Johns Hopkins & CSIS. p. That would make it more difficult for the United States to engage the Central Asian states in a larger regional effort to combat Islamic fundamentalism in Afghanistan and Pakistan. for the European Union. military efforts to alter the strategic realities of the region. The Muslim diaspora communities into which terrorist cells can invisibly blend remain the likeliest staging grounds for future al-Qaeda attacks on the United States. American preoccupation with the mess in Iraq. 2003-2004 [“Hegemonic Quicksand”. given divergent American and European perspectives. Winter. financial and (to some degree) military support-the Euro-Atlantic community could foster a genuinely stable and possibly even democratic post-Saddam regime. But acting together-with the threat of U. military power reinforced by the EU's political. The war on transnational terrorism depends essentially on information gathering and policing.

logic of hegemonic stability theory from the very beginning.academia. http://depaul. after the cold war it has found itself more vulnerable and constrained than it was during the golden economic era after World War II. International Political Economy (Michael.) During the cold war the United States dictated the terms of adjustment. Some scholars. but hardly comparable to the threat posed by a globe-straddling Soviet Union armed with thousands of nuclear weapons. and the very success of the U. They advance arguments diametrically at odds with the primacist consensus.S. but it can no longer count on getting its own way. 1. It faces rising economic challengers with their own agendas and with greater discretion in international economic policy than America’s cold war allies had enjoyed. The United States. and forever will be. the international economy is complex and resilient. and call on other countries to play a larger role in their own defense. Western Political Science Association. specializing in Critical IR Theory. Social Movements. Ebsco. “When Hegemony Fails: British Imperialism in India and Brazil from the Nineteenth to the Early Twentieth Centuries”. episodic and frequently diagnosed as criminal. questioned the What Purpose?” http://www.edu/MichaelMcIntyre/Papers/535440/When_Hegemony_Fails) Even when the ruling alliances of colonial India or the Brazil of Empire and Old Republic were not threatened with dissolution.S.1 But preponderant capabilities across the board do not guarantee effective influence in any given arena. U. Professor of Government at Dartmouth.63 of 154 Doesn’t Solve War Heg doesn’t solve war Christopher Preble (director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute) August 2010 “U. their "success" was based on the exclusion of the vast majority of the populations of India and Brazil. 2011. A number continue to do so today. while their eruptions into the political sphere. the foreign policy establishment in Washington has no interest in exploring them. April 21. and the costs of mitigating their effects should be borne by those who stand to lose — or gain — the most.org/u-s-military-power-preeminence-for-what-purpose/ Most in Washington still embraces the notion that America is. After the cold war the outcome of adjustment struggles is less certain because the United States is no longer in a position to dictate the terms. of the universe. It is frankly absurd that we spend more today to fight Osama bin Laden and his tiny band of murderous thugs than we spent to face down Joseph Stalin and Chairman Mao. McIntyre 11—Professor at Depaul University. draw down its military power. and other capabilities. Hegemony fails—obstacles to inclusionary policies. and in the security of their respective regions. No.cato-at-liberty. Trade routes need not be policed by a single dominant power. dominance in the international security arena no longer translates into effective leverage in the international economic arena. but from the life of civil society. But while there are credible alternatives to the United States serving in its current dual role as world policeman / armed social worker. Many factors have contributed to the dramatic decline in the number of wars between nationstates. And although the United States remains a dominant international economic player in absolute terms.S. the world’s indispensable nation. Supply disruptions are likely to be temporary. Islamic extremists are scary. World Politics 61. Military Power: Preeminence for however. Heg doesn’t solve war – US lacks influence it used to have to influence conflicts Mastanduno 9 (Michael. The tangible benefits of all this military spending flow disproportionately to this tiny corner of the United States while the schlubs in fly-over country pick up the tab. and indeed. were put down with a brutality that frequently . It derived the necessary leverage because it provided for the security of its economic partners and because there were no viable alter natives to an economic order centered on the United States. The United States may continue to act its own way. it is unrealistic to expect that a new spasm of global conflict would erupt if the United States were to modestly refocus its efforts. notwithstanding its preponderant power. The claim that the United States is unipolar is a statement about its cumulative economic. military.-centered world economy has afforded America’s supporters a greater range of international and domestic economic options. not only from the pact of domination or a share in political power. no longer enjoys the same type of security leverage it once possessed. That exclusion was enforced through everyday brutality. The people here have grown accustomed to living at the center of the earth.

It did not prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons. but also localized and evanescent. the decline of American power. a poor vagrant steals to survive. Brazil. in the epoch when the ruling alliances of Brazil and India were beginning to come apart.64 of 154 crossed into blood lust. is not that it destabilizes political regimes but that it creates substantial obstacles to the creation of inclusionary polities. Negation and reversal rather than programmatic reform are its common idiom. But the proof is in the pudding. workers in the most heavily industrialized cities in both countries managed to gouge out a space for public contestation that they never gave back. Primacy tempted our leaders into a reckless war in Iraq. Despite this stringently exclusionary polity. our relationship with Russia. Criminal activity. with substantial geographical divergence and uneven enforcement. in India through the designation of certain groups as "criminal tribes. you have to remember that American foreign policy leaders during the Bush administration clung to the false promise of primacy. always at pains (with little success) to present itself to the world as a European civilization in the tropics. In India. The primary effect of the failure of cultural hegemony. with Moscow’s help. And it wrecked. the primacy strategy didn’t deliver. it was Gandhi. though some common features can be found in both contexts.39 Its categories of friend and foe are improvised. and changing. The "dangerous classes" at the bottom of the social hierarchy faced routine criminal sanction. Director of the RAND Center for Asia Pacific Policy. the reforms in property law needed to carry out such a project were enacted in weakened form after delays of decades. The excluded are therefore left with a politics of resistance.C. as was its implicit goal. who was able to incorporate relatively well-off peasants into a powerful political alliance. The Next American Century: How the U. political activity with broader aims tends to take the form of public and communal resistance: a prophetic community gathers in the Brazilian sertão (Cunha 87 1944). Mona Sutphen and I described why this was a misguided strategy in our 2008 book. however restrictively defined. the Santals of eastern India rise up to expel "outsiders" (diku). http://worldfocus. A fixation on primacy paradoxically managed to undermine the influence and authority . Senior political scientist at RAND Corporation. Not so." subject to group sanction. the belief that the lynchpin of American security was for it to remain more powerful than all other countries by a huge. could maintain its pretense only by rigidly excluding dark-skinned lower classes from political participation. 77-83). International affairs fellowship from the Council on Foreign Relations. a small landowner turns to banditry when forced off his land by a larger landowner. To understand this yearning for American policy of yore. This misreading of the politics of the dominated is not a simple misreading. both because the range of loyalties it can mobilize is geographically restricted and because its attention to signs at the expense of strategy. then. Such criminality/resistance is recurrent and endemic.S. It is a selflimiting form of resistance. It is normally a response with limited aims: slaves kill a harsh overseer. It did nothing to slow China’s influence. rather than fights. Can Thrive As Other Powers Rise. 2010. There is no reason to think of such activity as other than criminal. villagers riot to call attention to a corrupt local official. where some members of the I. In the end. fluid. a politics often read as criminality by the dominant. World Focus. National Security Council at the White House (Nina. Subordinate groups therefore have little incentive to press for incorporation into the existing alliance. fixed margin. not the British. In the end. says Robert Kagan. is one response to subordination. pressed for a deepening of the pact of domination to include an idealized sturdy yeoman peasantry alongside the large landowners who had previously formed their core 86group of allies. both British and Hindu (Guha 1983. so long as we remember that it is criminality with a distinctly limited political purpose. “The False Promise of Primacy in US Foreign Policy”. there are no channels for such an appeal to be made. in Brazil through vagrancy statutes and the criminalization of certain aspects of Afro-Brazilian life. who reveals a perverse nostalgia for the previous paradigm in his recent writings in which he argues that the Obama administration is formulating foreign policy from a perspective that accepts. Hachigan 10—Senior Fellow at American Progress. January 22. Hegemony fails—recent political climate proves. Not only would a call for incorporation be rebuffed. however.org/blog/2010/01/22/the-false-promise-of-primacy-in-us-foreignpolicy/9372/) One unquestionable success of the Obama administration so far has been to turn the page on the failed Bush foreign policy framework.S. In the absence of channels for demands of inclusion.

international architecture and traditional alliances are not mutually exclusive. It’s not because the president is looking to attend more international meetings. Kagan barely mentions these threats. in Moscow. Hachigan 10—Senior Fellow at American Progress. knowing that democratic government is the best way to achieve this goal As for primacy. and pandemics such as swine flu — the forces of disorder that can and do affect Americans right here at home. How can we get these big.N. focusing on how “to adjust” to the decline in American primacy instead of trying to reverse it. “The False Promise of Primacy in US Foreign Policy”. India. It’s still early days. America needs China — the world’s largest emitter — to cut down on its carbon. President Barack Obama’s approach is different. January 22. Kagan writes as if the Obama administration is engaging with re-emerging powers to prove an ideological point that great power strife is a relic of history. Obama dismissed that as a strategy goal in his inaugural address when he observed. Transnational threats also explain why the Obama administration is taking international institutions seriously. China not only voted for tough U. economic crises. In fact. as Kagan would imply. 2010.” Later. sanctions . World Focus. pushing for increased accountability Make basic political and economic rights available to more people. Obama elaborated on his view of great power relations. America needs Russia to secure its loose nuclear materials so terrorists cant get it. China has agreed to limit its carbon intensity. America needs all of them to contain pandemics. saying. Moreover. including with other major powers. Yet no staffer that I have ever spoken with would suggest that these relationships are beyond rivalry. Director of the RAND Center for Asia Pacific Policy. The World Health Organization led the battle against swine flu last year just as the International Monetary Fund bailed out a slew of countries headed toward financial ruin. pivotal powers and demand responsibility from them on global challenges Reinvigorate and repair existing alliances Reengage with international institutions and rules. proud countries to take these steps? Aggressive diplomacy. And. International affairs fellowship from the Council on Foreign Relations. nuclear proliferation. but the Obama approach is paying dividends. He portrays administration officials as naïve ideologues. global warming. the fact that the Bush administration embraced the notion of primacy was a comfort to the remaining Cold Warriors. global warming. the contours of the new paradigm are fairly clear: Lead the world in addressing shared challenges Treat other governments and peoples — friends and foes — with respect Forge strategic collaborations with big.” Hegemony fails—cooperation is key to prevent terrorism. Fortunately. to say the least. it’s because international rules and institutions play a vital coordinating role when threats cross borders. Russia. And America needs India to help track extremists. His political allies and his detractors can agree that Obama sees foreign policy not in terms of asserting America’s unparalleled might. “Our power alone cannot protect us. Kagan’s analyses fail to discuss two major developments that demand a new approach—the increased potency of transnational threats and the new salience of domestic policy in America’s world standing. nuclear proliferation. buttering up autocracies and forsaking our democratic allies. More importantly.65 of 154 America did have. Nevertheless. http://worldfocus. The pursuit of power is no longer a zero-sum game — progress must be shared. but of seeking common cause. for the first time last year. economic crises. any world order that tries to elevate one nation or group of people over another will inevitably fail. “a great power does not show strength by dominating or demonizing other countries…[G]iven our interdependence.org/blog/2010/01/22/the-false-promise-of-primacy-in-us-foreignpolicy/9372/) Robert Kagan now accuses President Obama of reorienting American foreign policy away from its WWII and Cold War roots. and other pivotal powers. National Security Council at the White House (Nina. these partnerships are necessary to protect Americans from common threats in terrorists. On the one-year mark of his presidency. but to keep its own people safe. Kagan does not reveal the Obama administration’s reasons for pursuing strategic collaborations with China. and pandemics. Senior political scientist at RAND Corporation.

And in our own history. governments which serve only their own power do not. however. co-chaired by the United States and Russia.org/content/Documents/US_Quest_for_Global_Hegemony. subject their actions to oversight. democracies have been America’s most enduring allies. the American military is not going to win either one of these conflicts.” They have. Hegemony fails—resistance. more than one hundred thousand Iraqi civilians have been killed. including on human rights and democracy. To make matters worse. What Others Think.C. but Beijing and Moscow did recently join in a harsh rebuke that the International Atomic Energy Agency issued.’ Washington’s pursuit of policies like assassination. to terrorize their citizens. The pain and suffering inflicted on Iraq has been enormous. the United States is now engaged in protracted wars in Afghanistan and Iraq that have so far cost well over a trillion dollars and resulted in around forty-seven thousand American casualties. provocative way that ends up being counterproductive. Of course. http://www. As anyone with a rudimentary knowledge of world events knows. The Founding Fathers understood this problem. The United States has been at war for a startling two out of every three years since 1989. is what President Obama said in Moscow: The arc of history shows us that governments which serve their own people survive and thrive. including those we once waged war with in Europe and Asia– nations that today live with great security and prosperity. Kagan is simply wrong to suggest that administration officials have failed to “continue to press Russia and China for reform. Professor at the Pennsylvania State University School of International Affairs **CEO of Strategic Energy and Global Analysis (STRATEGA) and Senior Lecturer and Senior Research Fellow at Yale University’s Jackson Institute for Global Affairs (Flynt and Hillary.7 million more have been internally displaced. and allow for independent institutions are more dependable trading partners.66 of 154 against Pyongyang. Washington has worked overtime—with no success—to shut down Iran’s uranium-enrichment capability for fear that it might lead to Tehran acquiring nuclear weapons. have been disastrous. Finally. rendition and torture over the past decade. not to mention the weakening of the rule of law at home. D. Here. every post– Cold War administration has tried and failed to settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. it also enforced them. And these nations and others agreed during the darkest days of the financial crisis to coordinate their macroeconomic moves.. as it clear from James Madison’s observation that ‘no nation can preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare. is up and running again. Iran remains a challenge. The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Moreover. countries that continuously fight wars invariably build powerful national-security bureaucracies that undermine civil liberties and make it difficult to hold leaders accountable for their behavior. unable to prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons in the first place. Since the war began in March 2003. “US Quest for Global Hegemony”. 2010. shows that their fears were justified. Governments that represent the will of their people are far less likely to descend into failed states. but it’s on the way.” Russia has allowed the United States to transport supplies through its territory into Afghanistan. for example. and there is no end in sight. despite all the phony talk about how the “surge” has worked in Iraq and how a similar strategy can produce another miracle in Afghanistan. all indicators are that this problem will deteriorate further as the West Bank and Gaza are incorporated into a Greater Israel. we continue to have differences with these pivotal powers. And the United States. roughly 2 million Iraqis have left the country and 1.htm) The results. Leverette and Leverette 10—*Senior fellow at the New America Foundation in Washington. Governments that promote the rule of law. now seems incapable of compelling Pyongyang to give them up. in fruitless pursuit of victory. and they invariably end up adopting ruthless policies normally associated with brutal dictators. in contrast to Kagan’s assertion that the administration has failed to gain “any meaningful Chinese help in North Korea. We may well be stuck in both quagmires for years to come. A successor to the START treaty to reduce our arsenal of nuclear weapons is not yet complete. The unpleasant truth is that the United States is in a world of . just not in a grandstanding. or to wage war on others. December 22.iranreview. The United States has also been unable to solve three other major foreign-policy problems. Iran Review.

disease. no serious attempt is made to prioritize U. so the more the better. or proliferation. If America makes primacy the main goal of . But as long as America’s leaders remain committed to global dominance. Of course. John Mearsheimer has given it an indispensable guide for thinking through those choices. It was also a dismal failure. p. President Bush adopted a radical grand strategy that has no parallel in American history. Bush over Al Gore in 2000 that. Bush administrations. interests. not less.” In this vein. after 9/11. America still has not faced up to its most fundamental strategic choices in a post-Cold War world. but likely to backfire in dangerous ways if it relied too heavily on military force to achieve its ambitious agenda. but most American policy makers of the early nineties and beyond were confident that would not happen. The best way for the United States to maximize the prospects of halting or at least slowing down the spread of nuclear weapons would be to stop threatening other countries because that gives them a compelling reason to acquire the ultimate deterrent. Worse than being ineffec tive with transnational threats and smaller powers. climate change. has largely embraced the same delusions of global dominance that got the United States into such trouble on the foreign-policy front under the Clinton and George W. which means making sure that the United States remains the most powerful state in the international system. 2008. before it developed hegemonic hubris. Bush took the quest for global dominance to new heights. the United States rejected [various strategic alternatives]. This triumvirate of errors doomed Washington’s effort to dominate the globe. especially in the Middle East: “By pursuing this extraordinary scheme to transform an entire region at the point of a gun. One would think that such arrogance might alienate other states. But. The Bush administration’s quest for global dominance was based on a profound misunderstanding of the threat environment facing the United States after 9/11. a strategy of maintaining primacy is counterproductive when it comes to pivotal powers. America’s military might has not been the answer to terrorism. and North Korea have become more dangerous in the last seven years. its proponents believe that the United States has the right as well as the responsibility to interfere in the politics of other countries. instead pursuing global dominance.S. and this state of affairs is only likely to get worse in the next few years. And the president and his advisers overestimated what military force could achieve in the modern world. Global dominance has two broad objectives: maintaining American primacy.” John warns that the Obama Administration. John points out that “the Bush administration’s fondness for threatening to attack adversaries (oftentimes with the additional agenda of forced democratization) encouraged nuclear proliferation. of course. While the fact of being the world’s only superpower has substantial benefits. This grand strategy is ‘imperial’ at its core. Stanford Center for International Security. in turn greatly underestimating how difficult it would be to spread democracy in the Middle East. From the Clinton administration on.67 of 154 trouble today on the foreign-policy front. 168-9 In practice. The Next American Century. and spreading democracy across the globe. in effect. and threatened its position in the world. instead believing that other countries—save for so-called rogue states like Iran and North Korea—would see the United States as a benign hegemon serving their own interests. the strategy of primacy failed to deliver. The underlying belief is that new liberal democracies will be peacefully inclined and pro-American. The alternative. as John points out. or what might alternatively be called global hegemony. on foreign policy issues. for all its talk of “change”. Primacy does not prevent a global nuclear exchange or create regional stability Nina Hachigan and Monica Sutphen. as Afghanistan and Iraq unravel and the blame game escalates to poisonous levels. they are likely to resist this advice and keep threatening states that will not follow Washington’s orders. because they are virtually limitless. Bush largely ran against the kind of liberal imperialism that Gore advocated and that the administration he served as Vice-President had practiced.” John reminds those of us who voted for George W. this means that Washington must care a lot about every country’s politics. Iran. making the world over in America’s image. a national security strategy based on suing and ratiaing primacy has not made America more secure. Iraq. It is a posture he describes as “offshore balancing”—which is actually the United States’ traditional approach to grand strategy.” John is equally clear when it comes to diagnosing the source of America’s “world of trouble” on the foreign-policy front: “The root cause of America’s troubles is that it adopted a flawed grand strategy after the Cold War. which was not just doomed to fail. undermined American values and institutions on the home front. With global dominance. is not “Fortress America” isolationism.

Bush has not alienated other nations. investment.68 of 154 its national security strategy. which has not stimulated such a response.S. http://www. foreign policy are pervasive. services. President. This is not to say that the United States under the leadership of George W. A further constraint on the emergence of great-power rivals is that many of the other major powers are dependent on the international system for their economic welfare and political stability. for the most part.flows in which the United States plays a critical role. want to disrupt an order that serves their national interests. decline has not produced hegemonic rivalry because the U. then why shouldn’t the pivotal powers do the same? A goal of primacy signals that sheer strength is most critical to security. American cannot trumpet its desire to dominate the world military and then question why China is modernizing its military. acted in a manner that has led other states to conclude that the United States constitutes a threat to their vital national interests. Those interests are closely tied to cross-border flows of goods. energy. Doubts about the wisdom and legitimacy of U. Foreign Affairs . Haass. Integration into the modern world dampens great-power competition and conflict.html?mode=print The fact that classic great-power rivalry has not come to pass and is unlikely to arise anytime soon is also partly a result of the United States' behavior. U.S.foreignaffairs. but this has tended to lead more to denunciations (and an absence of cooperation) than outright resistance. May/June 2008 . . Council on Foreign Relations.org/20080501faessay87304/richard-n-haass/the-age-ofnonpolarity.S. is not perceived as a threat. accordingly. nor do other powers want to challenge the status quo Richard N. it surely has. and technology -. people. They do not. But it has not.

because they carry the risk of entrapping the United States in great power Eurasian wars. The United States can do this by adopting an offshore balancing grand strategy.S. Although the United States. efforts to prolong it. and the strategy is not likely to work much longer in any event.another two decades? Given that American hegemony is destined to end sooner rather than later and that the costs of trying to "shape the international system" to America's liking will rise (even as the benefits of doing so diminish). At the same time. . Maintaining heg even just to shape the new multipolar system causes backlash and war – only a complete transition away solves Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 158 At the same time. understandable doubts about the credibility of U.S.S. As other states—notably China—rapidly close the gap. contrary to my 1993 prediction. Rather than fostering peace and stability in Eurasia. it doubtless is true that it will take some time for others' balancing efforts to realize their intended outcome. it is even more doubtful that U. in turn. Is it worthwhile paying the price to hang onto unipolarity for. hegemony will endure until the early 2030s. U. probably will not be challenged by great power rivals as early as 2010. In this changing geopolitical context.69 of 154 Clinging to Power -> War Mulitpolarity is inevitable – trying to retain hegemony ensures a war-filled transition Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 190 Advocates of hegemony claim that it is illusory to think that the United States can retract its military power safely from Eurasia. the costs of trying to hold on to hegemony are high and going to become higher. The answer to this assertion is that the risks and costs of American grand strategy are growing.at best. America's military commitments abroad have become a source of insecurity for the United States. hegemony is fated to end in the next decade or two regardless of U. security guarantees are driving creeping re-nationalization by America's Eurasian allies. is leading to a reversion to multipolarity. which. it would make more sense grand strategically for the United States to retrench and husband its resources for the long haul.S.

As this transition proceeds. to disguise ulterior motives for U. Europe. This threat is easily exaggerated. while at the same time working with major states in both regions to promote collective management of the global system. American grand strategy should focus on making both Europe and East Asia less reliant on U. Transition is smooth – decline in power causes global cooperation Carla Norrlof (an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto) 2010 “America’s Global Advantage US Hegemony and International Cooperation” p. Summer 2003.S. interests. so smaller states have to chip in for the good to be provided. Vol.S. security and interests inevitably will be jeopardized by a Eurasian hegemon. the possible benefits of "environment shaping" have to be weighed against the possible costs of U.70 of 154 Collapse =/= War Your evidence overestimates the US’s ability to shape the international system – doesn’t contain conflict and wont shape the new multipolar system Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 176-7 A second contention advanced by proponents of American hegemony is that the United States cannot withdraw from Eurasia because a great power war there could shape the post conflict international system in ways harmful to U.S.e.S.40 Snidal demonstrated that collective action depends as much on the hegemon’s size. Proponents of hegemony fear that if great power wars in Eurasia occur. Primacy” Database: Academic Search Premier As this new century progresses. the waning hegemon continues to be taken advantage of. First. the outcomes are going to be caused more by those states' calculations of their interests than by the presence of U.S.S. not just the hegemon. and manipulated.S. this argument is a restatement of the fear that U. 00323195. If one were to use Snidal’s production function in the revised model (i. and still find the postwar environment quite costly to its own trade and investment. Kupchan. military intervention in Eurasia. These major powers would together manage developments and regulate relations both within and among their respective regions. as well as economic. a struggle that will require patience and . or even benefit somewhat. several points need to be made. Issue 2 “The Rise of Europe. Keohane explained the persistence of cooperation in terms of states’ continued demand for regimes. unipolarity will give way to a world of multiple centers of power. and East Asia. Hence. The United States has only limited power to affect the amount of war and peace in the international system. by plugging the numbers from his production function into the revised model). distilled to its essence."sa This really is not an economic argument but rather an argument about the consequences of Eurasia's political and ideological. but it's a good bet that some will. Political Science Quarterly. and whatever influence it does have is being eroded by the creeping multipolarization under way in Eurasia. they could bring to power militaristic or totalitarian regimes. the United States "could suffer few economic losses during a war. The likelihood for cooperation increases with American decline because the hegemon can no longer singlehandedly provide the good as it declines. America's Changing Internationalism. 50 Keohane and Snidal’s predictions – that the waning of American power did not have to jeopardize cooperation – were in this context reassuring. these distributional implications haunt the literature and cast decline as inescapable and continuous Withdrawal is smooth Charles A. as it does on the size of other actors in the international system. power. By paying attention to the size of all Great Powers. Most of these will not culminate in war. There are numerous possible geopolitical rivalries in Eurasia. involvement in a big Eurasian war. While Snidal was modeling a theory he did not believe in. The ultimate vision that should guide U. Finally. Snidal opened up the possibility that a more symmetrical distribution of power might enhance the prospects for the provision of public goods. closure. thus offering a potential explanation for the otherwise puzzling persistence of cooperation in the 1980s despite America’s relative decline. and the End of U. But regardless of whether Eurasian great powers remain at peace.S. grand strategy is the construction of a concertlike directorate of the major powers in North America. 118. forces in Eurasia. They would also coordinate efforts in the battle against terrorism. As mentioned at the outset of this chapter. Second.. Mere. proponents of American hegemony overestimate the amount of influence that the United States has on the international system.

Regional centers of power also have the potential to facilitate the gradual incorporation of developing nations into global flows of trade. and East Asia on South Asia and Southeast Asia. focus on Latin America. long accustomed to calling the shots. Mustering the political will and the foresight to pursue this vision will be a formidable task. often have the strongest incentives to promote prosperity and stability in their immediate peripheries. and values. the Middle East. But the decisions taken by the United States early in the twenty-first century will play a critical role in determining whether multipolarity reemerges peacefully or brings with it the competitive jockeying that has so frequently been the precursor to great power war in the past. will find the transition an easy one. But it is far wiser and safer to get ahead of the curve and shape structural change by design than to find unipolarity giving way to a chaotic multipolarity by default. if not two. Neither American leaders. Strong and vibrant regional centers. nor leaders in Europe and East Asia. therefore. for a new international system to evolve. long accustomed to passing the buck. information. North America might. for reasons of both proximity and culture.[*] .71 of 154 steady cooperation among many different nations. The United States will need to begin ceding influence and autonomy to regions that have grown all too comfortable with American primacy. Europe on Russia. and Africa. It will take a decade.

) AK Based on our universe of cases. wars aren’t global MacDonald and Parent 11 (Paul. a significant majority of great powers of differing regime types elected to retrench. yielding parameters from 58 to 83 percent. 35. “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment”. No. there does not appear to be a strong connection between regime type and retrenchment. and recovery of lost rank was fairly frequent.72 of 154 Retrenchment Good Historically. and are slightly more likely to face acute relative declines. declining great powers demonstrate more caution and restraint in the use of force: they were involved in an average of 1.7 fewer militarized disputes in the five years following ordinal change compared with other great powers over similar periods.59 In short. International Security Spring 2011. International Security Spring 2011. eventually recovering their ordinal rank from the state that surpassed them. even with the benefit of hindsight. Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami. Short of a miracle. in six of fifteen cases. which makes comparison among groups difficult. Nor do declining great powers appear more vulnerable to external predation than other great powers.69 Far from being more likely to lash out aggressively. Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College. Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College. France. 35. Pages 7-44. Retrenchment is preferable – empirically averages fewer wars than unipolar world MacDonald and Parent 11 (Paul. By any accounting. Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami. politics is often a game of unpalatable alternatives. There are only three cases of autocracy. Nor does the evidence support the view that domestic interests constrain retrenchment. This suggests timely responses to external constraints rather than domestic intransigence. Further. states facing small declines experience levels of hostility in their militarized disputes that are two and a half .) AK With regard to militarized disputes. declining power don`t go to war – when they do. Of the twelve democracies. it is hard to say what great powers such as Britain. or because retrenchment allows vulnerable powers to effectively recover from decline and still deter potential challengers. and Joseph.67 Declining great powers also initiated fewer militarized disputes. but of these. two retrenched and one case is arguable. or 72 percent. and three are debatable. producing a range of 67–100 percent. there are few restorative solutions available. In particular. No. or the Soviet Union could have done to stay aloft. Every one of the great powers in our sample that chose to retrench did so within five years of the ordinal transition. and their disputes tended to escalate to lower levels of hostility than the baseline category (see figure 2). Moreover. Declining great powers found themselves embroiled in an interstate war in only four of the eighteen cases. These findings suggest that retrenching states rarely courted disaster and occasionally regained their prior position. evidence at the coarse-grained level tentatively supports the neorealist approach outlined above: during acute relative decline. accounting for thirteen of our eighteen cases. preventive or otherwise. great powers experiencing medium or small declines are much less likely to escalate their disputes to high levels of hostility. “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment”. we find that great powers facing acute relative decline adopted retrenchment in at least eleven and at most fifteen of the eighteen cases. the predictions of retrenchment pessimists receive little support. 4. In contrast to arguments that retrenchment is rare. this does not prove that a preferable policy existed. Pages 7-44. Moreover. declining great powers that adopted a policy of retrenchment managed to rebound. even if retrenchment was not successful. Vol. Democracies account for about two-thirds of the great powers in our study. and Joseph. two did not. a range of 61–83 percent. the rate of relative decline is associated with different levels of hostility across militarized disputes. declining states refrain from initiating and escalating military disputes.61 In many cases of decline. Vol. Wars. 4. seven retrenched.60 In addition. This may be because external predators have great difficulty assessing the vulnerability of potential victims. and in only one of these cases—1935 United Kingdom—did the declining power go to war with the power that had just surpassed it in ordinal rank. In the five years following an ordinal transition. do not appear to be a common fate for declining states. a majority of the countries in these cases retrenched shortly after their ordinal transition.68 These findings suggest the need for a fundamental revision to the pessimist’s argument regarding the war proneness of declining powers.

similar factors may work to cushion the impending SinoAmerican transition. 35. Both are large. periods of hegemonic transition do not appear more conflict prone than those of acute decline. Strategic retrenchment peaceful – leads to a balanced multipolar world MacDonald and Parent 11 (Paul. declining great powers react in a prompt and proportionate manner to their dwindling fortunes. Holding on to exposed and expensive commitments simply for the sake of one’s reputation is a greater geopolitical gamble than withdrawing to cheaper. We counter that there are deductive and empirical reasons to doubt this argument. stakes world of great power politics. Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami. Theoretically. they are no longer the top target for balancing coalitions. fearing the steady erosion of U. relatively secure continental great powers. Pages 7-44. International Security Spring 2011. and recovering hegemons may be influential because they can play a pivotal role in alliance formation. “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment”. These findings suggest that diplomatic moderation and compromise can be a particularly attractive strategy for managing moderate declines. almost by definition. Further. Third. States often curtail their commitments and mellow their ambitions as they fall in the ranks of great powers. 35. arguing that hegemonic transitions are more conflict prone than other moments of acute relative decline. No. Pages 7-44. In the high- . they should be able to more readily identify and eliminate extraneous burdens without exposing vulnerabilities or exciting domestic populations. Although China and the United States differ in regime type. including strains among rival regions. Vol. They do this for the same reason that they tend to seize opportunities to expand: international incentives are strong inducements. 4. which may complicate its ability to sustain its economic performance or engage in foreign policy adventurism. Far from encouraging further predation. It is likely to initiate and become embroiled in fewer militarized disputes than the average great power and to settle these disputes more amicably. the United States was slowly emerging from the Civil War. No. In the next few years. First.73 of 154 times less than the average great power. In addition. credibility. Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami. and Joseph. Fallen hegemons still have formidable capability. Retrenchment good – avoids violence and leads to a better state MacDonald and Parent 11 (Paul.) AK This article has advanced three main arguments. Based on the historical track record of great powers facing acute relative decline. hegemonic powers. more defensible frontiers. the United States is ripe to overhaul its military. Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College. The tenor of that transition may have been influenced by a number of factors: both states were democratic maritime empires. and work to decrease costly international commitments. shift burdens to its allies. states can seldom afford to fool themselves or pamper parochial interests when relative power is perilously slipping away. and Joseph. compromise appears to be a crucial component of retreating to a more defensible—and credible—set of commitments. Some observers might dispute our conclusions. a fact that mitigates potential geopolitical competition.S.93 China faces a variety of domestic political challenges. We believe the empirical record supports these conclusions. the United States should be able to retrench in the coming decades. which took place around 1872 and was resolved without armed confrontation. the rate of relative Second and related. 4.) AK Contrary to these predictions. Yet our analysis suggests that retrenchment need not signal weakness. which threatens grave harm to any state that tries to cross them. Some might view this prospect with apprehension. “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment”. our analysis suggests some grounds for optimism. retrenchment pessimists are incorrect when they suggest that retrenchment is an uncommon policy response to great power decline. and Great Britain could likely coast on a large lead in domestic capital stock. International Security Spring 2011. Vol. The last reversal at the pinnacle of power was the Anglo-American transition. In particular. possess more extensive overseas commitments. hegemonic powers should actually find it easier to manage acute relative decline. Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College.

the more likely states are to reform their militaries. it may be unwise to speak these conclusions too loudly. declining powers rise to the challenge of decline so well that they recapture their former glory with some regularity. . And there is a fair chance of rebound. Of course. The faster the rate of decline.74 of 154 decline explains not only the extent of retrenchment but also the form. The historical record gives little cause for despair. and refrain from using force in international disputes. but our findings suggest its benefits are overlooked. and innovation fostered. these findings suggest that retrenchment is an attractive strategy for dealing with great power decline. interest groups controlled. spending can be curbed. Taken together. we suggest that our study represents a solid first cut and that domestic political factors loom too large in discussions of power transitions and hegemonic change. Although we make no claim that the rate of relative decline explains everything. and if done intelligently this makes states better. Competition spurs states to improve themselves. Some of the invigorating effects of decline may depend on the pervasive pessimism it arouses. increase reliance on allies. Retrenchment has a bad reputation.

So how can Kim stay in power. Primacy causes other countries to try to “tame” America – 9/11 proves Walt.75 of 154 Heg Turns (1/3) U. that you are the president of France. 05 (Stephen M. How do you improve Russia's situation in a world dominated by U. Professor of International Affairs. Professor of International Affairs. economy. by rebuilding its crumbling international image." and North Korea's entire GDP is only one-twentieth the size of the U. POLICYMAKERS have spent the past decade debating how best to wield American power. by fostering greater cooperation with key allies. Professor of International Affairs. The only remnants of your country's former superpower status are an aging nuclear arsenal and membership in the UN Security Council. He rules a country that George W. Consider Kim Jong I1. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and British Prime Minister Tony Blair have worked hard to establish personal connections with U. and they have devised numerous strategies to manage and limit it. President Bush has said that " America was targeted for attack because we're the brightest beacon of freedom . much less improve his position.S. Taming American Power.org/stable/pdfplus/20031709.S.S. as the September 11. Harvard University. dominance. Walt. September 05. To be sure. Taming American Power.S. in the world .S. 05 (Stephen M.jstor. You face serious regional challengesincluding the rising power of China-but relations with Washington are sometimes prickly. presidents. Yet even Washington's close allies are now looking for ways to tame the United States' might. The United States will not and should not exit the world stage anytime soon. and your ideal world order is one in which no single state is dominant. defense budget. 2001. with the market share of U.. the debate is over how best to deal with it. For the rest of the world. terrorist attacks demonstrated.S. US dominance causes terrorism.S.org/stable/pdfplus/20031709. Professor of International Affairs. foreign policy tend to portray anti Americanism as hostility toward American values or simple resentment of U. So is the health of the U. firms declining in key overseas markets due to anti-American sentiment.S. most important of all. Walt.S. Bush has called part of an "axis of evil. many governments still value U. for a moment. given U. So what do you do about the United States? Now picture yourself as the president of Russia. And the response of other states to U. interests to advance those of India? Leaders throughout the world face similar issues. How do you deal with American power? This question is one for which every world leader must have an answer. foreign policy as often naive and overweening.S.S. You regard U. Walt. influence. Basic security is at issue.pdf) Proponents of a muscular U." He .S. Harvard University. Many countries fear U. and the United States' global dominance is disquieting.S. opposition and North Korea's Lilliputian status? On the other end of the spectrum. Harvard University. Harvard University.jstor. But it must make its dominant position acceptable to others-by using military force sparingly.S. http://www. and.. some more daunting than others. power? Or perhaps you are the prime minister of India. Israel and the United Kingdom have long relied on their special relationships with the United States. power is something Americans must care about as well. With so much power in the hands of one country-a country that considers itself destined to lead the world how should other nations respond? Imagine. September 05. Can you take advantage of parallel U. power and seek to use it to advance their own interests.pdf) U. http://www. and the political fortunes of Sharon and Blair depend on keeping these relationships strong.S. The time to worry is now.

2001. issued in March. "The terrorists who attacked our country on September 11.76 of 154 later explained. and resistance. They were protesting our existence. were not protesting our policies." . stated." And the Pentagon's new National Defense Strategy. a degree of resentment. "Our leading position in the world will continue to breed unease.

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Heg Turns (2/3)
Their heg good authors only take into account American perspectives, not overseas views.

Walt, Professor of International Affairs, Harvard University, 05
(Stephen M. Walt, Professor of International Affairs, Harvard University, September 05, Taming American Power, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/20031709.pdf)

Americans tend to see U.S. primacy as beneficial to both their country and the rest of the world. In 2002, the Pew Global Attitudes Project found that 79 percent of U.S. citizens believe it is
good that "American ideas and customs are spreading around the world," and more than 70 percent think that U.S. foreign policy takes the interests of other states into account either "a great deal" or "a fair amount." Bill Clinton has described the United States as "a beacon of hope to peoples around the world," and Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington has declared U.S. predominance to be "central to the future of freedom, democracy, open economies, and international order." In other words, without a benign hegemon maintaining a peaceful global order, many countries would not be able to enjoy the prosperity and security they have come to take for granted. Unfortunately, this rosy view of U.S. power is not shared overseas, where, according to the 2002 Pew survey, overwhelming majorities say that the United States considers the interests of others "not much" or "not at all." Between 40 percent and 6o percent of foreigners polled think the United States is waging its war on terrorism not solely out of security concerns, but also

to "control Mideast oil," "protect Israel," "target Muslim governments," or "dominate the world." A January 2005 BBC survey of 21 countries found only five-India, the Philippines, Poland,
South Africa, and South Korea-where a majority of people had "positive" attitudes toward the United States. Although the United States' global standing has rebounded slightly since the invasion of Iraq two years ago, Pew reported in June 2005 that majorities in all 15 countries it surveyed "favor another country challenging America's global military supremacy, "and that support for the U.S.-led "war on terror" is declining on every continent. Indeed, citizens in Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Russia, Spain, and the United Kingdom now hold more favorable views of China than of the United States.

Heg causes conflicts – experts agree.

Wohlforth, Ph.D, political science, Yale University, 99
(William C. Wohlforth, Daniel Webster Professor of Government, B.A. in International Relations, Beloit College, M.A. in International Relations, Yale University M.Phil., Ph.D. in Political Science, Yale University, Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, Summer 1999, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” MIT Press, International Security, Vol 24, No. 1, p. 6, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/wohlforthvol24no1.pdf) Although they disagree vigorously on virtually every other aspect of post–Cold War world politics, scholars of international relations increasingly share this conventional wisdom about unipolarity. Whether they think that the current structure is on the verge of shifting away from unipolarity or that it has already done so, scholars believe that it [unipolarity] is prone to conflict as other states seek to create a counterpoise to the overweening power of the leading state. The assumption that unipolarity is unstable has framed the wide-ranging debate over the nature of post–Cold War world politics. Since 1991 one of the central questions in dispute has been how to explain continued cooperation and the absence of old-style balance-of-power politics despite major shifts in the distribution of power.

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Hegemony causes war and is unsustainable Eland, 2007 (Ivan. Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute. Ph.D. in Public Policy from George Washington University and Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute. “A Foreign Policy that Only Tarzan Could Love.” Feb 12. http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=1911)
Republicans, however, will be happy to know that George W. Bush should not be solely blamed for this aggressive U.S. foreign policy. Although he did ensnare the United States into significant quagmires on the ground in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States’ modern-day interventionist foreign policy dates back to the Democratic Truman administration after World War II. Of all countries during the post-war period, including the authoritarian Soviet Union, the United States has been, by far, the most aggressive nation on the planet with its military. Even during the Cold War, of the two superpowers, the United States was the first-among-equals and took advantage of it to intervene militarily in all parts of the world. The United States used the fight against communism to advance its imperial tentacles into backwater countries, such as Korea, Vietnam, Angola, Nicaragua, etc. At the international security conference, the suave Secretary of Defense Gates dismissed Putin’s unanswered specific charges on U.S. missile defense in Europe, the expansion of a hostile NATO alliance to Russia’s borders, and U.S. meddling in Russia’s traditional sphere of influence by saying that the United States felt that “one Cold War was quite enough.” Yet Putin was right that the United States is pursuing another Cold War, this time an unstated one, against both Russia and China. In his most astute criticism of the lone superpower’s foreign policy, Putin noted that the power amassed by a global power “destroys it from within.” Alluding to the aggressive, militaristic U.S. foreign policy, Putin noted correctly that, “it has nothing in common with democracy, of course.” Surprisingly, Putin, a domestic autocrat himself, seems to see what the U.S. founders knew, but what the occupants of the post–World War II imperial presidency have not been able to fathom. During the Roman Republic, the concentration of power associated with a militarized foreign policy led to the disintegration of the republic itself. The same thing is happening in the United States now. Thus, to safeguard one of the greatest domestic systems in the world, U.S. citizens and policy makers should drop the Tarzan foreign policy and return to the founders’ policy of minimal interference in the affairs of other nations.

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The nations that avoided the fates of India. say. Mexico. author and professor emeritus of the University of California. p. the British did not go far enough in enforcing their ideas. China." When Mao Zedong introduced Soviet-style collective farms into China and did not get satisfactory results." This Great Leap Forward of the late 1950s produced a famine that took some thirty million Chinese lives. San Diego. and their current status as "late developers"? Students of communism will not be surprised by the answer. Canada lies not in British exploitation but rather in the insufficient scale of British interference in the Indian economy. In India. . the explanation for India's underperformance compared with. 2006. The historical evidence suggests a strong correlation exists between being on the receiving end of imperialism and immisseration. Ferguson argues. and the Philippines did so by throwing off foreign rule early—as did the United States—or by modernizing militarily in order to hold off the imperialists (and ultimately join them)—as did Japan. a monument to communist extremism similar to the extremes of laissez-faire that the British dogmatically imposed on their conquered territories—and that Ferguson would have preferred to be yet more extreme. NEMESIS: THE LAST DAYS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC. he did not abandon them but turned instead to truly gigantic collectives called "communes. "If one leaves aside their fundamentally different resource endowments. how do analysts like Ferguson and Friedman explain the nineteenth-century poverty of India and China. the several dozen Holocaust-sized famines in both countries while food sat on the docks waiting to be exported. 84 After all their arguments have been deployed.81 of 154 AT: Ferguson Ferguson ignores the fact that imperialism promoted holocausts and famines Johnson 6 Chalmers Johnson.

April 17.counterpunch.html] More importantly. an analyst with the Carnegie Endowment for Peace in Washington. 2003 [“The Neocon’s Bagman to Baghdad”.org/issam04172003. Counterpunch.counterpunch. Counterpunch. however. Khalilzad's impeccable credentials make him a natural for membership in the neo-conservatives cabal which is the driving force behind Washington's Iraq policy. http://www. Frequent Writer on Arab Issues. 2003 [“The Neocon’s Bagman to Baghdad”. "[Zalmay thinks of] security to the exclusion of everything else. US-Based Director of Deir Yassin Remembered. "He has a narrow of view of the Middle East and South Asia." . April 17.html] His many critics point out." Khalilzad’s theories are wrong Nashashibi 3 Isaam M. "he would have been sacked long ago. that Khalilzad has been wrong as often as he has been rightgoing back to the days when he advocated arming the same Afghani groups that later spawned the Taliban. perhaps. http://www." said Anatol Lieven. not the last policy option.org/issam04172003. US-Based Director of Deir Yassin Remembered. Nashashibi." his former associate stressed. Nashashibi.82 of 154 AT: Khalilzhad Khalilzad’s views are single minded Nashashibi 3 Isaam M. Frequent Writer on Arab Issues. "If he was in private business rather than government. He tends to look at military solutions as the first.

and managerial skills diffuse throughout the international economic system. Brooks and Wohlforth concede that even today the member states of the European Union collectively exceed the United States in gross domestic product. it is also an implicit admission that—although it has yet to bear fruit—other states are engaged in counterbalancing the United States. they do not engage the argument that. After all. Japan.44 Not only is this a weak case for unipolarity.D. and Russia. In this respect. Levy (Board of Governors’ Professor at Rutgers University and former president of both the International Studies Association and the Peace Science Society) and William R. J. KONTOPOULOS) PDF Superficially. former president of the International Studies Association. July 6th 2009. like all hegemonic systems. however. Similarly. Vol. Rogers Professor of Political Science at Indiana University. Brooks 10 and Wohlforth’s argument that the balancing hypothesis applies only to states that are growing and threatening to achieve a position of hegemony but not to established hegemons such as the United States raises the question of why other leading states did not balance against the United States when it was a rising great power but before it established a position of primacy— perhaps in the late 1940s. which is not very long at all.42 Their case is based on a freeze-frame view of the distribution of capabilities in the international system.ksg. "The Waning of U. Thompson (Donald A. weakens their explanation for nonbalancing after the end of the Cold War.D.45 Brooks and Wolforth concede that coalitional balancing will work against the US Jack S.edu/files/Balancing_on_Land_and_at_Sea. Brooks and Wohlforth’s inability to provide a convincing explanation for the absence of coalition formation against the United States in the early Cold War period. in International Law from Virginia Law. China. when such behavior would not have been so risky. reinforced by nuclear deterrence. the debate about unipolar stability is misleading. technology. Hegemons sprint to the front of the great power pack because of economic leadership based on productivity and technological innovation. then there were plenty of opportunities for a counterbalancing coalition to form against the United States throughout the Cold War period.harvard. know-how. Instead. 15. and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute (Christopher. which allows other states to catch up. and they joined the United States in a defensive balancing coalition against the Soviet Union. LL. International Security. Hegemony—Myth or Reality? A Review Essay". 09 – Mary Julia and George R. could form an effective balancing coalition against the United States if it was seen as so threatening. But there is less to their argument than meets the eye. most of the great powers perceived that the greatest threat to their interests came from the Soviet Union. 34.S. Ph. hegemony will endure well into the future. Brooks and Wohlforth actually concede that unipolarity is not likely to last more than another twenty years.M. not from the United States. despite their claim at the be-ginning of World Out of Balance that unipolarity is robust and that U. Summer 2009.S.S.77 . leadership costs sap the hegemon’s power and push it into decline.43 A key question is whether the early decades of the twenty-first century will witness the decline of U. in Political Science from the University of California.pdf In addition. 1. No. Over time. p. hegemony. and Managing Editor of International Studies Quarterly) Summer 2010 “ Balancing on Land and at Sea Do States Ally against the Leading Global Power?” http://belfercenter. and this is spurring an ongoing process of multipolarization. from USC. and the combination of the European Union. Galileo. If the hypothesis that great powers balance against aspiring hegemons is unconditionally valid. the American era of unipolarity contains the seeds of its own demise. Brooks and Wohlforth make a strong case for unipolar stability.83 of 154 AT: Brooks&Wohlforth Reject Brooks and Wohlforth – their analysis is based off a freeze frame of IR and doesn't into account other factors that cause hegemonic decline Layne. Jordan Professor of International Affairs at Texas A&M's George Bush School of Government and Public Service. and if the only issue is the distribution of material capabilities.

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is America's next grand strategy. hegemony is a game that no longer is worth the candle. thus causing the United States to become imperially overstretched and involving it in unnecessary wars that will reduce its power.S. The United States is far removed from powerful rivals and shielded from them both by geography and its own hard power. the United States would reap security advantages from a reversion to multipolarity. Its quest for hegemony is driven instead by an ideational. The United States does not need to be an extraregional hegemon to be secure. Fall." International Security. rather than arising from any direct threat to the United States itself. To reduce the fear of U. If the United States fails to adopt an offshore balancing strategy based on multipolarity and military and ideological self-restraint. Attempts to uphold hegemony only erode primacy faster – only acceptance of multipolarity guarantees a peaceful transition Layne. Paradoxically. and avoid being automatically engulfed in Eurasian conflicts because of its alliance commitments. the United States must accept some reduction in its relative hard power by adopting a multipolar—and essentially unilateral—offshore balancing strategy that accommodates the rise of new great powers. at some point. as an insular great power. and it could—and should—insulate itself from possible future Eurasian great power wars. Unilateral offshore balancing.S. offshore balancing would take advantage of the unique geostrategic advantages that allow the United States to benefit from multipolarity. For the United States. the United States should begin to retrench strategically and capitalize on the advantages accruing to insular great powers in multipolar systems.S. 130 It also must rein in the scope of its extravagant ambitions to shape the international system in accordance with its Wilsonian ideology. An America [End Page 40] that has the wisdom and prudence to contain itself is less likely to be feared than one that begs the rest of the world to stop it before it expands hegemonically again. "The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States' Unipolar Moment. primacy may well hasten its end by stimulating more intensive efforts to balance against the United States. 131 Thus. Maintaining U. interests. power. especially given that U. exercise a free hand strategically. allies. Number 2. primacy may already be in the early stages of erosion.85 of 154 MultiPol Good – Generic U. the risk of conflict and the possible exposure of the American homeland to attack. it probably will. 2006 (Christopher. Rather than risking these outcomes. Volume 31. deterritorialized conception of security divorced from the traditional metrics of great power grand strategy: the distribution of power in the international system and geography. . indeed. which is a potentially dangerous strategy. derive directly from the overseas commitments mandated by hegemony's all-encompassing definition of U. As an offshore balancer. have to fight to uphold its primacy. the United States is far less vulnerable to the effects of "instability" than are the major powers of Eurasia. attempting to sustain U. Consequently. to reduce others' concerns about its power.S.S. Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 170 By devolving full responsibility for their defense to U.S. withdrawal and a concurrent shift to multipolarity would prevent American involvement in major power wars. Project Muse) The United States has a hegemony problem because it wields hegemonic power. the United States must practice self-restraint (which is different from choosing to be constrained by others by adopting a multilateral approach to grand strategy).S. Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute.

Foreign Affairs.86 of 154 MultiPol Good – Terror Multilateralism key to reducing threats from terrorism Nye 3 Joseph Nye. the partial nature of the success in Afghanistan illustrates the continuing need for cooperation. military power is essential to global stability and is a critical part of the response to terrorism. the American military success in Afghanistan dealt with the easiest part of the problem: toppling an oppressive and weak government in a poor country. 2003.S. unspectacular civilian cooperation with other countries in areas such as intelligence sharing.S. U. But all the precision bombing destroyed only a small fraction of al Qaeda's network. Issue 4. Volume 82. and border controls. which retains cells in some 60 countries. The best response to transnational terrorist networks is networks of cooperating government agencies. tracing financial flows. they make important mistakes that will ultimately undercut the implementation of the new security strategy. . And bombing cannot resolve the problem of cells in Hamburg or Detroit. EBSCO Although the new unilateralists are right that maintaining U. Their first mistake is to focus too heavily on military power alone. But the metaphor of war should not blind Americans to the fact that suppressing terrorism will take years of patient. Harvard. For example. police work. July. Rather than proving the new unilateralists' point. military strength is crucial and that pure multilateralism is impossible.

So what more could the Obama Administration have done to prevent Bushehr from coming online? The answer is simply . State Department spokesman Darby Holladay stated that since Russia had agreed to supply nuclear fuel and remove spent fuel rods. Sure in the short run manufacturing will briefly return but sooner or later markets become saturated and we're right back to where we are now. U. global interconnected markets. such is the multi-polar world. there are in fact limits to growth whether you're global or isolated.S. The U. In short.7 billion in US treasury securities. Latin America. Russia. In a game of carrot and stick. China. Had Israel attacked Bushehr they would have lost the war before the battle had even begun in the court of world opinion. they didn't have to. and health care experience as a licensed clinical social worker. With countries scattered across the globe armed with intercontinental ballistic missiles it behooves every serious country to at best. trade deficit with China widened to $26. tread lightly. the highest since October 2008. “Nuclear Iran and the multi-polar world”. the US also has to contend with the economic realities of the multi-polar world.S. masters degree in social work (msw) and 10 years of social work. We're not going to embargo China or any country that really matters because doing so will only hurt us in the long run. There were indicators that this was a possibility as the Saudi's had given Israel permission to fly over their country in the event they planned to actually attack Iran. Once Bill Clinton and the Republican congress started us down the free trade path they left the proverbial barn door open and there's no closing it now. then there was no reason to bomb it in the first place. for example. why didn't the Israeli's make good on a decade of threats and blow the place up? More to the point. etc. envoy to the United Nations John Bolton told the Israeli's and the world via Fox News that if Israel was going to launch an attack on Bushehr. not only did Iran begin to bring Bushehr online but also days later they even debuted an unmanned attack drone and announced plans for the mass production of high-speed missile-launching assault boats. what more could the United States have done to prevent this event from occurring? The answers lies in the political-economic structure of the multi-polar world we are now living in. It is one thing when only two countries have nuclear weapons and neither are particularly invested in your best interest and quite another when a number of countries have nuclear weapons and have a vested interest in your survival.87 of 154 MultiPol Good – Iran Multipolarity solves Iran better than unipolarity Radulich. opted to do something of a "cowboy-like" nature like bomb Iran or invade Taiwan.htm) Prior to this event former U. war isn't something anyone is really interested in and therefore there's only so much any one country can do when another opts to flout international concerns. http://www. the times they have a-changed.2 billion in June. the economic repercussions to both countries would be far worse and much faster than anything else besides nuclear oblivion. both nuclear and conventional. The dominoes that fell after they hit Iraq didn't register on the radar of the superpower that was the US. No Osirak-like mission was to be had. as imports from there jumped according to the Commerce Department earlier this month. But the week passed and there was no assault. we've buried the stick and hope that lots of carrots work. and frankly given the world of the early 80's. As I stated earlier. The US and China are the two biggest economies in the world. The first and easiest to understand reason why the Israeli's didn't attack Bushehr is that the US deemed it not to be a proliferation risk. this is indeed the New Normal. Despite the assertions of boisterous radio personalities. 8/23/10 (Mark. Besides war. So the question is. mental health. Of course. Attacking Iran leads to military conflict with China. you are forced to just live with it and that's a reality for both the US and Israel. Russia and at least a third of Latin America. professional blogger on global events since 2004. When the Israeli's bombed Osirak they didn't bother to even warn the US. if either the US or China.411mania. holds roughly $843. in a situation like this once you've run out of carrots and there is no stick to use. it needed to do it before the 21st. there was minimal risk the plant would be used to make nuclear weapons. lest they risk radioactive fallout from blowing up a live nuclear reactor. Now. if we've learned anything from the recent adventure in Iraq it's that the world has neither little stomach nor patience for preemptive war. if the rationale for bombing it was to prevent weapons from being made there. In fact. Negligible economic progress will probably occur but for the most part.com/politics/columns/150306/Nuclear-Iran-and-the-Multi-Polar-World. In addition. And you can make this case the world over with the EU. Despite some of the crazy rhetoric we hear on cable news and even from the mouths of certain leaders across the world. as of June 2010. not to mention most of the Middle East as they are all tied together both militarily and financially.S.

embargoes. etc. Mutually Assured Destruction for everybody and nobody. Essentially a multi-polar world with every country seated at the round table means that for the most part. with no checkmate in sight. We're not alone in that respect because quite frankly so is the rest of the sane. That answer doesn't change if or when a Republican becomes president. we're all locked into an eternal state of check.88 of 154 nothing. trade wars. . aren't a viable option either. Military action isn't a viable option. civilized world. sanctions. Welcome to the real New World Order. The latest episode with Iran shows us that the US is more or less impotent.

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Heg Unsustainable
Decline is inevitable -- soft power, defense spending, China rise. Geeraerts 11 – Gustaaf, professor of international relations at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel and director of the Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies (European Review, Vol. 19, No. 1, 57–67, 2011, “China, the EU, and the New Multipolarity,” http://www.vub.ac.be/biccs/site/assets/files/apapers/China,%20the%20EU%20and %20Multipolarity-2.pdf) The structure of the international system is changing with the evaporation of America’s unipolar moment. ‘The decline of U.S. primacy and the subsequent transition to a multipolar world are inevitable,’ Wang Jisi wrote in 2004. 2 More recently John Ikenberry stated that ‘The United States’ ‘‘unipolar moment’’ will inevitably end.’ 3 Not only has the influence of the lonely superpower severely been affected by the expensive wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; its economic clout too has declined faster than ever before and its soft power is increasingly contested. At the same time, China is undeniably becoming a global power. Since
the cautious opening up of China’s door by Deng Xiaoping in 1978, her economy has quadrupled in size and some expect it to double again over the next decade. China is about to become the second most

important single economy in the world. At the most recent G20 meeting in Pittsburgh, Hu Jintao, China’s president was the only one to arrive at the head of a major economy still enjoying strong growth, having the luxury of substantial financial reserves. But China is not only growing economically, its military clout is also on the rise. 4 In 2008 China evolved into the world’s second highest military spender. 5 It is the only country emerging both as a military and economic rival of the US and thus generating a fundamental shift in the global distribution of power and influence. Such power transitions are a recurring phenomenon in
international politics and have always constituted episodes of uncertainty and higher risk. They contain the seeds of fierce strategic rivalry between the up-and-coming state and the residing leading power, thereby increasing the likelihood of contention and conflict. No wonder that China’s spectacular economic growth and increasingly assertive diplomacy have incited other key-players to ponder how Beijing will seek to manage this transition and even more how it will use its leverage afterwards. Notwithstanding that China still sees itself partly as a developing country, it is becoming more confident in its rising power and status. As its economic interests abroad

are expanding rapidly, so will the pressure increase to safeguard them more proactively. National security is no longer solely a matter of defending sovereignty and domestic development. It also becomes necessary for China to back up its growing interests overseas with a
more robust diplomacy and security policy. To be sure, the US is still the most important single economy in the world. It also remains the world’s largest military power. While the EU has developed into an even

larger economy and has become the most important entity in terms of external trade flows, politically and militarily it performs far below its potential and is no match either for the US or China. The EU’s foreign policy is confronted with a collective action problem of sorts, and as a result is lacking in bot strategic vision and assertiveness. Although still smaller than the other two, China has grown into the world’s second largest national economy and also the one that grows most quickly. According to some estimates, China will move on a par with the US in 2020 and
become the world’s biggest economy in 2030 (see Table 1). Moreover China is steadily increasing its military power. In Beijing’s view, economic prowess is not sufficient for a state to become a first rank power. ‘What is important is comprehensive national power, as shown by the ability of the Soviet Union to balance the much wealthier US in the Cold War and the continuing inability of an economically powerful Japan to play a political role’. 6 This view is very much in line with the neorealist conception that to be considered a ‘pole’ a country must amass sufficient power in all of Waltz’s categories of power: ‘size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence.’ 7

Heg structurally unsustainable -- economics and rising powers. Petras 10 – James, retired Bartle Professor (Emeritus) of Sociology at Binghamton University in Binghamton, New York and adjunct professor at Saint Mary's University

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(4/28/10, “Rising and Declining Economic Powers: The Sino-US Conflict Deepens,” http://lahaine.org/petras/b2-img/petras_sinous.pdf) The US has a trade deficit with at least 91 other countries besides China, demonstrating that the problem is embedded in the structure of the US economy. Any punitive measure to restrict China’s exports to the US will only increase Washington’s deficit with other competitive exporters. A decline of US imports from China will not result in an increase for US manufacturers because of the under-capitalized nature of the latter, directly related to the pre-eminent position of finance capital in capturing and allocating savings. Moreover, “third countries” can re-export Chinese made products, putting the US in the unenviable
position of starting trade wars across the board or accepting the fact that a finance –commercial led economy is not competitive in today’s world economy. China’s decision to incrementally divert its trade surplus

from the purchase of US Treasury notes to more productive investments in developing its “hinterland” and to strategic overseas ventures in raw materials and energy sectors will eventually force the US Treasury to raise interest rates to avoid large scale flight from the dollar. Rising interest rates may benefit currency traders, but could weaken any US recovery or plunge the country back into a depression. Nothing weakens a global empire more than having to repatriate overseas investments and constrain foreign lending to bolster a sliding domestic economy. The pursuit of protectionist policies will have a major negative impact on US MNC in China since the bulk of their products are exported to the US market: Washington will cut its nose to spite its face. Moreover, a trade war could spill over and adversely affect US auto corporations producing for the Chinese market. GM and Ford are far more profitable in China than the US where they are running in the red 44 . A US trade war will have an initial negative impact on China until it adjusts and takes advantage of the potential 400 million consumers in the vast interior of the country. Moreover, Chinese economic policymakers are rapidly diversifying their trade toward Asia, Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, Russia and even in the EU. Trade protectionism may
create a few jobs in some uncompetitive manufacturing sectors in the US but it may cost more jobs in the commercial sector (Wal-Mart) which depends on low priced items to low income consumers. The bellicose trade rhetoric on Capitol Hill and confrontational policies adopted by the White House are dangerous posturing, designed to deflect attention from the profound structural weaknesses of the domestic foundations of the empire. The deeply entrenched financial sector and the equally dominant military metaphysic which directs foreign policy have led the US down the steep slope of chronic economic crises, endless costly wars, deepening class and ethno-racial inequalities as well as declining living standards. In the new competitive multi-polar world order, the

US cannot successfully follow the earlier path of blocking a rising imperial power’s access to strategic resources via colonial dictated boycotts. Not even in countries under US occupation, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, can the White House block China from signing lucrative investment and trade deals. With countries in the US sphere of influence, like
Taiwan, South Korea and Japan, the rate of growth of trade and investment with China far exceeds that of the US. Short of a full scale unilateral military blockade, the US cannot contain China’s rise as a world

economic actor, a newly emerging imperial power. The major weakness in China is internal, rooted
in class divisions and class exploitation, which the currently entrenched political elite profoundly linked through family and economic ties, might ameliorate but cannot eliminate 45 . Up to now China has been able to expand globally through a form of “social imperialism”, distributing a portion of the wealth generated overseas to a growing urban middle class and to upwardly mobile managers, professionals, real estate speculators and regional party cadre. In contrast the US, military directed overseas conquests have been costly with no

economic returns and with long term damage to the civilian economy both in its internal and external manifestations. Iraq and Afghanistan do not reward the imperial treasury in anyway comparable \\to what England plundered from India, South Africa and Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). In a world increasingly based in market relations, colonial style wars have no economic future. Huge military budgets and hundreds of military bases and military based alliances with neo-colonial states are the least efficient means to compete successfully in a globalized market place. That is the reason why the US is a declining empire and China, with its market driven approach is a newly emerging empire of a ‘new sort’ (sui generis).

” The Times writes. The Economy in Crisis.2 per cent of gross domestic product – up massively from 3. Ensinger ’10. which represented just 33 per cent of GDP in 2001.” http://asiasecurity. cyber and blue-water naval capabilities.6 trillion. The problem is exacerbated by the political impasse in America. Cook et al 10 – Malcolm.3 trillion in the 2011 fiscal year . significant negative trends are emerging for America’s global role and its strategic position in Asia over the longer term. There is widespread agreement that the US fiscal situation is unsustainable. je) The sun may finally be setting on the American Century. Perhaps even more worrying. and the Obama administration has raised concerns in Asia by decisions such as imposition of a punitive tariff on Chinese tyres. “Power and Choice: Asian Security Futures. Absent a change in national priorities.expected to be 1. The Obama administration has already announced cuts to real defence spending.S. even as Washington’s margin of conventional superiority diminishes. the US defence budget is likely to come under serious pressure from 2016. particularly in Asia. 10 Plus. albeit gradual. space. MacArthur Foundation and the Lowy Institute.macfound. By the end of the decade. “[Obama’s] budget draws a picture of a nation that like many American homeowners simply cannot get above water. according to The New York America‘s massive and unsustainable debt will be the cause of waning influence around the world in the near future.2 per cent in 2008 and the highest figure since the Second World War. Raoul Heinrichs. China held $790 billion of U.org/images/uploads/blog_attachments/Asian_security_futur es_-_final_version. high deficits. President Obama’s election was greeted with a wave of enthusiasm and hope for the future. This represents 11. Andrew Shearer. http://economyincrisis. in which each Times. capabilities in domains which will become increasingly important. it is likely to face capacity constraints in the medium to long term. The US Congressional Budget Office (CBO) conservatively estimates the US federal budget deficit for 2009 will reach US$ 1. Dustin. Although his popularity has dipped. Even worse.but the nation’s projected long-term debt is even more unsustainable.1000 Zumwalt destroyer will be terminated. Rory Medcalf. The economy is showing signs of a recovery. China’s rapid military modernisation program is likely to continue unabated during this period.Bachelor of Arts in Journalism and Political Science (2/2/10. The CBO estimates that public debt. “Huge Deficits Altering U. As of September 2009. East Asia Program Director at the Lowy Institute for International Policy (June 2010. will continue to grow to 68 per cent of GDP by 2019. Major weapons programs such as the F-22 advanced Raptor fighter and the DDG. Protectionist sentiment is growing.org/content/hugedeficits-altering-us-hegemony.Journalist for Economy in Crisis. but no consensus on the kinds of long-term solutions that need to be enacted. much of that debt is borrowed from foreign central banks. deficits are projected to rise to over five percent of gross domestic product. especially Asian powers Japan and China. nuclear weapons are being assigned a more limited role in US defence planning. A strong US global role remains the orthodoxy on both sides of American politics and across the foreign policy elite. and uncertainties remain as to the long-term direction of space and missile defence programs. Even if the United States retains the will to remain Asia’s hegemon.pdf) Such a domestic crisis in the United States seems unlikely. There is evidence that the United States is entering one of its inward-looking phases – a consequence of the economic downturn and costly wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. public sentiment could constrain Washington from continuing to provide the two things that Asia most wants from America: open markets and security. which claims that . Nonetheless.92 of 154 Decline is inevitable in the status quo – US isolationist attitudes and US spending unsustainably. debt while Japan held roughly $752 billion. Beyond the next decade an ageing population and rising healthcare costs will increase America’s fiscal challenges. with a particular focus on missile. a Pew poll released in December 2009 showed isolationist sentiment in the United States surging to a four-decade high.S. 100 Should these trends continue. many of them intended to deny US forces access in realms where American power has previously been unchallenged. Not only is the deficit out-ofcontrol . Hegemony”.

For nearly two decades. without deliberate action.S. the U. will not be able to maintain its current pace of economic growth long enough to pass the U. fairly short.S. if not rectify.” http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_99/ai_n32148803/? tag=content. we will look back at the Bush administration years as the death knell for American hegemony.col1 originally from The National Interest) America is in unprecedented decline. Some side is firmly entrenched in an unwavering ideological battle. the period of U. but is so relatively more powerful than any other country that it can reshape the international order according to American interests. as the world’s largest economy. From public intellectuals like Charles Krauthammer and Niall Ferguson to neoconservatives like Paul Wolfowitz and Robert Kagan. accounted for nearly half of all the world’s military expenditures. Since the cold war. To be sure. Professor of political science at the University of Chicago (Jan-Feb. Although the immediate problems of war in by Iraq and Afghanistan. seeking to denuclearize North Korea and expanding America's military allies in Europe up to the borders of Russia itself. The United States is not just the sole superpower in the uni-polar-dominance school's world. “Empire Falls.S. Others point out that America’s military might is still unmatched around the world. America's shrinking share of world economic production is a fact of life and important changes in U. increasingly negative current-account balances and other internal economic weaknesses have cost the United States real power in today's world of rapidly spreading knowledge and technology. our policies have been based on these flawed arguments. The next closest was China at just eight percent. unsustainable trade deficits and concerns about the strength of the dollar have all caused some experts to question America’s place in the world and suggest that American influence may be rapidly dwindling. 2009. relative decline has been. there needs to be a combination of both. Russia. solutions to each of them individually and all of them .93 of 154 Republicans refuse to even entertain the idea of any tax increase while Democrats chafe at the though of entitlement cuts. economy is still by far the largest. thus far. those convinced of U. Still. China and other major powers could seriously oppose American military power. believe that China.S.S.. along with the oil-rich Persian Gulf (as well as other parts of the world). This is simply no longer realistic. to put America back on a path of fiscal sanity and ensure that America remains a hegemony. seeking to ensure peace and stability not just in its own neighborhood--the Americas--but also in Europe and Asia. all believe the principal feature of the post- cold-war world is the unchallengeable dominance of American power. If present trends continue. but pursued ambitious objectives in all three major regions at the same time--waging wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. France. For the past eight years. followed by Russia at five percent. and that the U. further decline in the foreseeable future. Iran's continued nuclear program and Russia's recent military adventure in Georgia are high-priority issues. dominance in the international system have encouraged American policy makers to act unilaterally and seize almost any opportunity to advance American interests no matter the costs to others. The Bush administration has not just continued America's traditional grand strategy. the fall of American power will be more precipitous with the passage of time.S. the United States has maintained a vast array of overseas commitments. And since the 1960s America’s gross domestic product has represented roughly 20 to 25 percent of the global economy. long thought of as America’s top competitor for superpower status. others see America’s imminent demise.wars and economic power decline Pape 9 – Robert A. A healthy appreciation of our situation American leaders may lead to policies that could mitigate. grand strategy are necessary to prevent the decline in America's global position from accelerating. while the ultimate foundation of American power--the relative superiority of the U. the decline of America’s manufacturing base. economy in the world--has been in decline since early on in the Bush administration. Simply maintaining these commitments requires enormous resources. An extremely low savings rate.S. virtually discounting the possibility that Germany. but in recent years American leaders have pursued far more ambitious goals than merely maintaining the status quo. The self-inflicted wounds of the Iraq War. that believe America will remain the world’s preeminent power for some time. As of 2009. however. Heg is unsustainable -. even to academicians like Dartmouth's William Wohlforth and Stephen Brooks. Still. There is also good reason to think that. al-Qaeda's new sanctuary in western Pakistan. In reality. There are some analysts and experts. growing government debt.

On trade. cannot lead the world out of it.S. and at a federal environmental policy until recently in denial about global warming. with the collapse of the Washington consensus. It is not clear that he is an economic liberal. Montague Burton Professor in the Department of International Relations (March 25. When the world looks at American health and welfare policies. it now more easily asks not just whether the US is a questionable model. It has neither the economic resources. the financial world took on a globalised life of its own. even if he is. at a seeming US inclination to use force as the first-choice policy instrument. The EU model looks more attractive to some. as well as its fierce resistance to the International Criminal Court. March 2011 vol. the ideological authority to do so. however. . At this point. at the influence of religion and special interest lobbies in US domestic politics. Under Clinton and Bush. There was a very substantial element of hypocrisy in this position during the Cold War. and. and whether the US economic model is either sustainable or desirable. and. competitors to the dollar as reserve currency were on the rise.” International Relations. Even before the current economic crisis. That claim has long been based on the US championing of political liberal values in the form of democracy and human rights.’ 26 If attempts to get the global economy going again fail. policies they oppose and that the United States will increasingly face harsh foreign-policy choices. other ideas about how to run the global political economy are in play. then the emergence of a more regionalized world political economy becomes more likely (more on this later). it will have to be done collectively (e. Obama’s options are massively constrained by the magnitude of the economic crisis. are now both more open to serious question. US abuses of human rights at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo. So America’s claim to represent the (liberal) future is now blighted both by its own failures and by the shortcomings of the liberal model itself. badly damaged itself. collectively will be heavily influenced by America's reduced power position in the world. many Democrats in Congress look likely to be even less enthusiastic about further trade liberalisation than the Bush Republicans were. the US had largely ceased to lead anyway.94 of 154 Most important. via the G20 and other suchlike groups of leading powers). the US is losing its claim to be a model and to own the future. and economic liberal values in the form of free(r) trade and financial liberalization. the GWoT means that Washington is still under pressure to prefer antiterrorist governments to democratic ones. Heg is unsustainable -. much was done. In terms of economic liberalism. there is little scope left for the US to legitimize its leadership by appealing to liberal values either political or economic. With the Washington consensus discredited. that major powers will increasingly have the strength to balance against U. giving bigger voices to other players. and its weakening position in Congress does not augur well. and internal conflicts Buzan 11 – Barry. On the political side.g. 25 no. its policy of ‘extraordinary renditions’ and acceptance of de facto torture. nor. 2011. 25 The truth of Bromley’s observation has been amplified by recent events: ‘US economic leadership power exists but it is a wasting asset … governance of the world economy is something that would have to be accomplished collectively if it is to be accomplished at all. or are too protracted and costly. our own hubris may be our downfall. and US indebtedness was weakening its position. 1 3-25) In addition to standing increasingly on its own in the main areas of international policy. have gutted Washington’s credibility to say much about human rights.international legitimacy. at the financial mess. and the Beijing consensus. but whether it has become a serious part of the problem. The Obama administration has a huge amount of damage to repair before it can present the US as a beacon of political liberalism. Whether an unsustainable ‘American way of life’ is an appropriate model for the rest of the world. In some ways the ‘civilian power’ EU is now a better representative of political liberal values. Like so many great powers that have come and gone before. yet. both European social markets. economic influence. Waltz Annual Lecture A World Order Without Superpowers : Decentred Globalism. at a US government that under Bush was openly comfortable with the use of torture and was reelected. “The Inaugural Kenneth N. The US led the world into this recession. If the world economy can be managed globally at all. America's declining power means that the unipolar world is indeed coming to an end. its weakening economic position making it more protectionist. the Obama inheritance is even worse. even so.

The US is no longer the only model of the future in play. The basic notion is simple: take U.col1 originally from The National Interest) True. Whereas in 2000. Indeed. in 2006 the United States had 28 percent of world product while its nearest most likely competitor. Tech diffusion = heg unsustainable. For grand-strategic concerns--especially how well the United States can balance its resources and foreign-policy commitments--the trajectory of American power compared to other states is of seminal importance. population.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_99/ai_n32148803/? tag=content. and with it the ultimate sources of state power--productive capacities. had 6 percent. America is losing its overwhelming technological dominance in the leading industries of the knowledge economy. China. and is being turned around by Obama. share of world product. However. The Post-American World. 2009. 2009. religious. The US is much more culturally conservative. “Empire Falls. five times the internet users and forty times the broadband subscribers as China.relative economic decline.col1 originally from The National Interest) Advocates of extending America's unipolar dominance are well aware of the central importance of the economic foundations of American power and routinely present detailed statistics on the U. right? Alas. the unipolar-dominance school prefers to compare every country's output in current-year U. while its individualism and anti-statism set it apart from Asia. the most recent call for America to exploit its hegemonic position (published in 2008) rests on the presumption of U. “Empire Falls. For the sake of argument. technology and knowledge diffuse more quickly today. although the United States remains well ahead of China on many indicators of leading technology on a per capita basis. in 2008. domestic product in any year and divide it by the aggregate total of the gross domestic product of all states in the world. dollars. the ability to diffuse new technology--to turn chalkboard ideas into mass-produced applications--has been spreading rapidly across many parts of the globe. this grossly under-weights the size of the knowledge economy in China compared to America. Pape 9 – Robert A. Professor of political science at the University of Chicago (Jan-Feb. the United States has not lost its position as the most innovative country in the world. For instance. the United States increased its share of world production during the 1990s. the United States had three times the computer sales. and it is far from clear that it will ever be able to recover the leading position that it once possessed. and then began to steadily lose ground during the eight years of the Bush administration. single-year "snapshots" of America's relative power are of limited value for assessing the sustainability of its grand strategy over many years.S. individualistic and anti-state than most other parts of the West.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_99/ai_n32148803/? tag=content. (5) The fact that the United States remains ahead of China on a per capita basis does matter--it means that China. Its religiosity. Looks pretty good for America. let us start with the unipolar-dominance school's preferred measure of American hegemony.” http://findarticles. dominance based on the current-year dollar figures. dollars from the International Monetary Fund (IMF)..S.95 of 154 and the emergent Chinese model to others. According to GDP figures in current U. Professor of political science at the University of Chicago (Jan-Feb. Pape 9 – Robert A..S. (4) As Fareed Zakaria describes in his recent book. To measure gross domestic product. US heg not sustainable -. with more than four times the U. can create many more knowledge workers in the future. but look at the trajectory of the data over time. with its relative power ultimately falling by nearly a quarter in the first .S. the Chinese have caught or nearly caught up with Americans in every category in the aggregate. reached its apogee in 2000. with more patents each year than in all other countries combined.” http://findarticles. many of the deeper issues are structural. (2) By this metric. cultural conservatism and antistatism set it apart from most of Europe. a method that tends to show America is much further ahead of other countries than alternative measures.S. In past eras--the "age of iron" and the "age of steel"--leading states retained their technological advantages for many decades. While some of this negative image was specific to the Bush administration. and their rapid global diffusion is a profound factor driving down America's power compared to other countries.S.

2 percent.” http://findarticles. (3) Although each offers advantages and disadvantages. which is likely to only further weaken U. Assuming the rest of the world continued at its actual rate of growth. Again using IMF figures. the relative power of China. As Table 3 shows.96 of 154 decade of the twenty-first century.1 percent. the United States is now a declining power.2 percent instead of its actual 23. This trajectory is almost sure to be revised further downward as the consequences of the financial crisis in fall 2008 become manifest. over the past two decades.7 percent--the assumed marginal gain of 1. And regardless of the metric. These estimates suggest that roughly a quarter of America's relative decline is due to .S. power. What would happen if we assumed that the United States grew during the Bush years at the same rate as during Clinton's? What would have happened had the world continued on its same trajectory. Simply put. “Empire Falls. The answers are pretty straightforward. At the same time. Heg decline inevitable and irreversible. At the same time. As the most recent growth estimates (November 2008) by the :ME make clear. and the United States and the rest of the world continued along their actual path of economic growth since 2000. America's decline was well under way before the economic downturn. but we assume China did not grow at such an astounding rate? Of course. Professor of political science at the University of Chicago (Jan-Feb. America's share of world product in 2008 would be 24. decline. but substantially weaker. China and Russia are expected to continue growing at a substantially greater rate than the United States. Russia has also turned its economic trajectory around.S. one can gain a rough weighting of the factors behind America's shrinking share of world production by asking a few simple counterfactual questions of the data. decline. growth has fallen considerably.1 percent of world product amounts to some 27 percent of the U. The erosion of the underpinnings of U. which leave out all manner of technical problems like "interaction effects.S. China and other states in the world. 2009. from year after year of losses in the 1990s to significant annual gains since 2000. How good are the numbers? Economists commonly use two other methods to calculate GDP. these are merely thought experiments.S. decline due to the global diffusion of technology.S.7 percent per year from 2000 to 2008 instead of the (Bush) rate of 2. Table 2 shows the trajectory of the share of world product for the United States and China using both alternative measures.S. This new reality has tremendous implications for the future of American grand strategy. or 1. although all major countries are suffering economically. Despite all the pro-economy talk from the Bush administration.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_99/ai_n32148803/? tag=content. If so. economic weaknesses under Bush or Chinas superior economic performance? Although precise answers are not possible. How much does China matter? Imagine the extreme case--that China had not grown.3 percent.S. U.7 percent--the assumed marginal gain of 2. The United States has been going through the first decade of the twenty-first century not stronger than before. (6) When compared to the share of gross world product lost by the United States from 2000 to 2008--7. for our purposes what matters is that they form a lower bound of America's relative decline." Still. the fact is that since 2000. growth rates are down almost 50 percent from the Clinton years. the United States would have had a bigger economy in absolute terms and would have lost less power relative to others. how much is U. Worse. things get even worse--with the United States expected to continue declining and China to continue rising.. constant-dollar calculations and purchasing power parity. When compared to the share of world product lost by the United States from 2000 to 2008--7. these back-of-the-envelope approximations serve as useful starting points. the average rate of U. from nearly 4 percent annually during the Clinton years to just over 2 percent per year under Bush. Had the American economy grown at the (Clinton) rate of 3.2 percent of world product accounts for about 15 percent of the U. China has sustained a consistently high rate of growth of 10 percent per year--a truly stunning performance.col1 originally from The National Interest) So. If we look out as far as the IMF can see (2013). U. America's share of world product in 2008 would have risen to 25. the state many consider America's most likely future rival.S. Pape 9 – Robert A.2 percent more than today. has grown consistently. power is the result of uneven rates of economic growth between America. the trend is the same.

downfall is indeed extraordinary. America's relative decline since 2000 of some 30 percent represents a far greater loss of relative power in a shorter time than any power shift among European great powers from roughly the end of the Napoleonic Wars to World War II. the national deficit moved past the $10 trillion mark. (February 18. and the fact that the largest potential rival to US hegemony in the twenty-first century. China. predominantly Japan and China.S. UK and a research fellow of the Globalisation and World Cities research network based at Loughborough University. without the need to exercise the hard coercive unilateral military or economic power upon the rest of the world. For the USA. Issue 2) However. one which is fraught with difficulties. and Obama’s carefully crafted speech at Cairo University in June 2009 aimed at easing tensions with the Muslim world. can change well-practised unilateral US foreign policies or solve deep-rooted national anxieties. a sixth to Chinas superior performance and just over half to the spread of technology to the rest of the world.97 of 154 U. both by making the decline steeper and faster and crowding out productive investment that could have stimulated innovation to improve matters.). The effects of US neoimperialism reach so extensively across the world that US elections are everyone’s business. both signalled a sharp break with the previous Bush administration and have strengthened the global wave of diplomatic and popular goodwill (see Black 2009. “US Hegemony and the Obama Administration: Towards a New World Order?. no matter how well supported. But I shall end this intervention on a note of optimism. current-account deficits. and that we will begin to see the emergence of a new world order. the costs could be far higher than a simple percentage drop in share of world product. lecturer in Human Geography at Staffordshire University. It is difficult to see how one man. along with a number of oil exporting countries. it becomes clear both that the U. It is one of the largest relative declines in modern history. rescuing private finance with public finance. If we end up believing in the wishful thinking of unipolar dominance forever. and the . The above discussion suggests that the fundamental principles of US engagement with the rest of the world will change very little under an Obama-led US administration. during this election. All of this has led to one of the most significant declines of any state since the midnineteenth century. The election of the first black president of the USA was after all an historic event. tax cuts. UK. the signing of the executive order to close the controversial Guantanamo Bay detention facility. In an attempt to save the US economy from recession. The timing of this policy effectively forced the following Obama administration to continue down the same path. the unexpected internal collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Economic collapse and debt. And when one examines past declines and their consequences. it now seems that US hegemony is in decline. economically and politically. It gives the USA a chance to re-invent itself as a more open and tolerant nation and practice what may be termed as a “moral hegemony” (see Kobayashi and Peake 2000). A significant amount of this debt is held by foreign governments. holds so much of the US debt.S. and undoubtedly the effects will continue to ripple around the world. For once.S. the financial crisis of late 2008 and early 2009 has acted to undermine both the US and global economy. in size. the largest problem has been the state’s own financial situation. In other words. economic weaknesses (spending on the Iraq War. When the $700 billion bailout package for private financial institutions was passed through Congress. etc. the previous administration. The US economy continues to be squeezed by the interest on the capital borrowed. 2010.” AntipodeVolume 42. self-inflicted wounds of the Bush years significantly exacerbated America's decline. Watson 10 – Allan. The United States has always prided itself on exceptionalism. took the unprecedented step of pursuing a “financial socialism” (Taylor et al 2009). Finn 2008). Indeed. it is clearly surpassed by only one other great-power decline. it seemed like it mattered what the rest of the world thought about American politics. and the U. Something fundamental has changed. led by the most right-wing president in living memory. is something that will sit uncomfortably even with a less conservative Obama administration. Given this. From this perspective. The USA can no longer hope to keep China subordinate through economics alone. fall is remarkable and that dangerous instability in the international system may lie ahead. and that our opposition to the imposition of American power. Relying on foreign governments in this way comes with risks that are now starting to bite.

a loss of competitiveness in merchandise trade and an overdependence on financial activities looks to political retribution. unending wars and increased reliance on the tools of political subversion. Empires do not die peacefully. depends on securing markets via economic competitiveness – market power – not military conquest. 49 Propaganda. systemic economic crises have been converted into private individual maladies. driven by an elite free to engage the world on its own terms. it need not conquer and exploit foreign colonized labor. China rising and domestic issues. They have not stopped all of China’s neighbors from expanding economic ties with it. Only time will tell how long the American people will endure the dispossession of homes. Unlike Japan it has a vast multitude of workers. China’s market driven empire building is attuned to modern times. The economic decay and the entrenched political and social elites have effectively depoliticized discontent. There are no prospects that this will change in the near future. fifth column colonization and military driven empire building based on domestic decay.98 of 154 associated vision of what constitutes our “security” (see Sidaway 2008). militarism and Zionist power will so bleed and isolate the United States that necessity will induce a forceful response … The longer it takes the more violent the rebirth of the republic. The US Empire will continue to wallow in chronic stagnation. promoting separatist regimes which predictably collapse or are overthrown. New York and adjunct professor at Saint Mary's University (4/28/10. nor do financial elites embedded in extraordinary wealth and power surrender their privileged positions peacefully. military alliances and trade restrictions to slow its demise.org/petras/b2-img/petras_sinous. the mass of the US working class is at a loss as to how it can move from a military driven empire toward a productive republic. China. We live in a post-colonial world where the vast majority of regimes will trade and invest with whoever pays the market price. unlike Japan. “Rising and Declining Economic Powers: The Sino-US Conflict Deepens. was finally having an effect. . The US unlike the established colonial powers of an earlier period cannot deny China access to strategic raw materials as was the case with Japan. I continue to share the sense of excitement and hope for change that has been so widely infectious since the election.pdf) As in the past. looking for Obama to be the president to guide the USA into a new age of multilateralism. Despite the reservations expressed in this intervention. whipping up chauvinist emotions by scapegoating the rising new imperial state and forging military alliances to “encircle” China have absolutely no impact. retired Bartle Professor (Emeritus) of Sociology at Binghamton University in Binghamton. China will push ahead with double digit growth. Over the long run. unlike the US plagued by financial speculators who eat away and erode the economy. Petras 10 – James. If the US imperial elite at present is at a loss as to how it can contain China’s rise to world power. employer servitude. something will have to break.” http://lahaine. ravaging industrial centers and turning abandoned houses into parking lots. a declining imperial power faced with profound internal imbalances. The world continues to watch hopefully.

and this seems set to continue. 1 3-25) Disagreements over policy in the Middle East already rank as one of the conspicuous areas of disaffection between the US and Europe. a. This festering sore has grown steadily worse. Montague Burton Professor in the Department of International Relations (March 25. to obstructionism on controlling climate change and the use of torture. but even that is undermined by the hypocrisy of the US turning a blind eye to Israel’s substantial nuclear arsenal while seeking to forbid Arab states and Iran from acquiring their own deterrents. through its unquestioning support for Israel and its occupation of Iraq. From Cuba. The main point for the question of US superpower legitimacy is that many of the US interventions in the Middle East. China and climate change – shows how the US stands ever more alone.” International Relations. During the Cold War the unattractive elements of US policy in the Middle East were masked by the general agreement on the need to contain the Soviet . “The Inaugural Kenneth N. not only feeding the terrorist problem. and replace it with a rational choice logic of immediate and specific shared interest. The US had rather limited success in selling the GWoT as a global macro-securitization to replace the Cold War.three examples: Buzan 11 – Barry. though here it has to be said that Europeans are just as culpable. Middle East Buzan 11 – Barry. the impact of particular disaffections was offset by the widespread general sense that the West and its hangers-on were a lot better off with US leadership than without it.99 of 154 Heg Unsustainable (Soft Power/Unpopular Policies) Heg is unsustainable -. 2011. The Obama administration’s more robust line on the necessity of a two-state solution faces such daunting domestic and regional obstacles that its chances do not look promising. has never been short of unpopular foreign policies. US policy has often been controversial among its friends. and to an extent in the 1990s.” International Relations. partly because there is no longer any great ideological struggle to sustain it. Vietnam and Chile. Waltz Annual Lecture A World Order Without Superpowers : Decentred Globalism. “The Inaugural Kenneth N. 25 no. 1 3-25) The US. with Israel creating ever more difficult facts on the ground. A striking symbol of this was the replacement of talk about ‘friends and allies’ or ‘the free world’ with a harsher instrumental line about ‘coalitions of the willing’. Perhaps only on the question of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons does US policy in the Middle East enjoy much support. are widely perceived to have been counterproductive. There has never been a golden age when the US was universally admired by the rest of the world. Waltz Annual Lecture A World Order Without Superpowers : Decentred Globalism. The occupation of Iraq in 2003 looks set to generate far more and bigger problems than it has solved. But during the Cold War. March 2011 vol. 17 The Middle East is a profound mess and is likely to remain so. 25 no. 2011. and assisting in the self-destruction of its Palestinian negotiating partner. This rhetorical shift seemed to abandon any US interest or belief in long-term friendships and alliances. March 2011 vol. unshielded by the mediating effects of any overarching common cause or closely shared identity. both those of the Bush administration and those more long-standing. 16 and. More or less unconditional US support for Israel is a perennial Washington idiosyncrasy that inspires little enthusiasm elsewhere. of course. 18 but also deepening the many tragedies in the region. A brief look at three key policy areas – the Middle East/GWoT. the particular policies of the US now stand largely on their own terms. US support for the Saudi regime helps keep in power a government whose domestic deals with Wahabi Islamists recycles large sums of oil money into the support of Islamic fundamentalism. and partly because of the conspicuous turn to self-interested unilateralism that marked the eight years of the Bush administration. Montague Burton Professor in the Department of International Relations (March 25. Over the last decade that general sense has weakened rapidly. and has so far hamstrung the US from pushing decisively towards a twostate solution to the Israel–Palestine problem. as a consequence.unpopularity isolates the US -. and limited nuclear war.

If China is relatively benign in the sense of not using violence against its neighbours. possibly none. however. Unless China turns nasty and threatening.” International Relations. 21 If they can carry off their design for a ‘peaceful rise’. Russia has worries about Chinese designs on the sparsely populated territories of the Russian Far East. will be crucial to whether others share US perceptions of China as a threat. containment of China was part of the East–West struggle. it is far from clear that other powers will feel threatened by China’s challenge to US hegemony. leaving the main economic and political costs of balancing China to the US. Europe will not care much about its rise. aggressive and militarist. and will not feel threatened by it. Japan will face very difficult choices. might welcome China’s rise. China. Japan is the toughest problem facing China’s ‘peaceful rise’ strategy. But the Chinese leadership is determined to avoid the mistakes made by Germany. After the Iraq fiasco and the Afghan quagmire. Given both the deep divisions and antagonisms in the Middle East. which are often in competition with those of the US. on the level of society and pubic opinion. however. Union. The nature of the China that rises. Japan and the Soviet Union in their rising period. but the US securitizes it anyway. is that the long-standing drumbeat of concern in Washington about rising China as a peer competitor will get louder as China does indeed grow in power. 22 have many useful economic complementarities. must appear threatening to the US. and US cultivation of China after 1971 helped to weaken the Soviet Union. and the US retains its commitment to not tolerating any peer competitors. 1 3-25) US policy on China. which since the end of the Cold War has not only maintained. also benefited from the masking effects of shared interests. getting worse. If it stays with the US. whether peaceful or not. Waltz Annual Lecture A World Order Without Superpowers : Decentred Globalism. then it becomes possible that US perceptions of China as threatening will not be shared widely. The US tie to Israel looks unlikely to change and will continue to poison Washington’s position in the region and much of the rest of the world. bad and. Unpopular US policies and competing interests in the region from other powers provide no foundations for legitimising US leadership. Russia. 25 no. But if China conducts its peaceful rise successfully. 20 To the extent that realist thinking dominates in Washington. its alliance with the US. middle-ground position between Washington and Beijing. “The Inaugural Kenneth N. b. and whose relationship with China remains deeply clouded by unsettled historical issues. Yet the two countries have developed a quite stable strategic partnership. underneath their formal political correctness. Russia may well want to continue to bandwagon with China against the US. of the other great . shared by few. and its effective fragmentation by the West. then a rising China. India will probably try to continue to play the US and China against each other as it does now. this US concern will be a parochial one. though less controversial than that on the Middle East. but somewhat strengthened. it would find itself being the front line in a new Cold War between Washington and Beijing. Japan and increasingly India have their own interests there. and share an interest in non-intervention and regime security. Those many voices currently in opposition to US hegemony. then it could well be that others would share US perceptions. China Buzan 11 – Barry. If a rising China becomes ultra-nationalist. but also amplified differences between the US and its allies. What is now in prospect. March 2011 vol. India has to balance a growing economic relationship with China against some still sensitive territorial disputes and a desire not to be overshadowed in status terms by China. A considerable weight of expert opinion thinks that Sino-Japanese relations are. In the absence of any common cause. and speaking of the need for a more multipolar world order. even ever-faithful Britain would have trouble joining in any new US intervention in this region. 24 If China’s rise is benign. 23 The big question mark is Japan. 2011. with both governments in different ways to blame. 19 the possibility of regional stability looks remote. That might not look attractive compared with the options of either resolving the history problems and bandwagoning with China or following India into a more independent. Montague Burton Professor in the Department of International Relations (March 25. The US role in facilitating China’s ‘reform and opening up’ since 1978 has also been broadly popular. if at all. During the Cold War. and staying broadly within the rules of the global economic order.100 of 154 The GWoT not only failed to extend this cover.

1 3-25) Climate change is a relatively new issue with only slight links back to the Cold War. Yet the US is already unpopular on climate change. This could easily become the dominant issue for world politics.101 of 154 powers. c. it could put the US more on its own in relation to great power politics than it has been since before the First World War. It poses questions of common fate for all of humankind and. March 2011 vol. Montague Burton Professor in the Department of International Relations (March 25. 2011. “The Inaugural Kenneth N. and even denial that there was a problem. though developments in the private sector and at the level of state and city governments might well restore some US credibility in this area. If China plays its hand cleverly. though the scientific uncertainties are still sufficient that the exact timing and unfolding of it are difficult to predict. for the US to avoid remaining a big part of the problem . However. if not impossible. has in the eyes of many made the US more a part of the problem than of the solution. if rising temperatures and sea levels are to be controlled. The commitment of Americans to a high consumption lifestyle. 25 no. Climate change Buzan 11 – Barry.” International Relations. whether domestic or international. and the Bush administration’s resistance to serious pollution and emission controls. Waltz Annual Lecture A World Order Without Superpowers : Decentred Globalism. requires collective action of a kind with serious economic consequences. it is less clear that there is any fix for the problem of the unsustainable American lifestyle. and the polarization of US politics will make it difficult. Obama’s enthusiasm for green energy as a fix for both the environment and the economy has already been checked by the polarization in US politics.

what we see gradually happening in climate-change negotiations (as in Bali in December) — and need to see more of in the areas of preventing nuclear proliferation and rebuilding failed states — is a far greater sense of a division of labor . America is isolated. with Western ideals neither transferable nor relevant. The web of globalization now has three spiders. Just as there is a geopolitical marketplace. Asia is shaping the world’s destiny — and exposing the flaws of the grand narrative of Western civilization in the process. America must quickly accept and adjust to this reality. senior research fellow in the American Strategy Program of the New America Foundation. Instead. there is a marketplace of models of success for the second world to emulate. Maintaining America’s empire can only get costlier in both blood and treasure. and as Toynbee also pithily noted.html? _r=3&oref=slogin&pagewanted=all) Karl Marx and Max Weber both chastised Far Eastern cultures for being despotic. “Accidental empire” or not.nytimes. Australia and Thailand.U. It isn’t worth it. and history promises the effort will fail. because the answer is unfolding before our eyes. South Korea. may uphold the principles of the United Nations that America once dominated. Despite the “mirage of immortality” that afflicts global empires. will replace the U.U. Would the world not be more stable if America could be reaccepted as its organizing principle and leader? It’s very much too late to be asking. Oswald Spengler saw it differently. but how much longer will it do so as its own social standards rise far above this lowest common denominator? And why should China or other Asian countries become “responsible stakeholders. by certain measures. proliferation. When America dominated NATO and led a rigid Pacific alliance system with Japan. while Europe and China occupy two ends of the great Eurasian landmass that is the perennial center of gravity of geopolitics.com/2008/01/27/magazine/27world-t.” in former Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick’s words. whether the United States or the United Nations. the most money of any region in the world. Globalization resists centralization of almost any kind. “Waving Goodbye to Hegemony” http://www. I believe that a complex. As the historian Arnold Toynbee observed half a century ago. With or without America. but it did not assure that the West would dominate forever — materially or morally. rather all three will constantly struggle to gain influence on their own and balance one another. Neither China nor the E. lacking the ingredients for organizational success. and Turkey. as the world’s sole leader. Western imperialism united the globe. it has been shunned by the E. it successfully managed the Herculean task of running the world from one side of it. Europe will promote its supranational integration model as a path to resolving Mideast disputes and organizing Africa. As Europe’s and China’s spirits rise with every move into new domains of influence. America must make itself irresistible to stay in the game. arguing that mankind both lives and thinks in unique cultural systems. the only direction to go from the apogee of power is down.U. is unwelcome in much of the Middle East and has lost much of East Asia’s confidence. Now its very presence in Eurasia is tenuous. multicultural landscape filled with transnational challenges from terrorism to global warming is completely unmanageable by a single authority. The E. in an American-led international order when they had no seat at the table when the rules were drafted? Even as America stumbles back toward multilateralism. others are walking away from the American game and playing by their own rules. The rise of China in the East and of the European Union within the West has fundamentally altered a globe that recently appeared to have only an American gravity — pro or anti. the only reliable rule of history is its cycles of imperial rise and decline. while China will push a Beijing consensus based on respect for sovereignty and mutual economic benefit. agrarian and feudal. What makes America unique in this seemingly value-free contest is not its liberal democratic ideals — which Europe may now represent better than America does — but rather its geography. not least the Chinese model of economic growth without political liberalization (itself an affront to Western modernization theory). It already has. Today the Asian landscape still features ancient civilizations but also by far the most people and.102 of 154 Heg Decline Inevitable Hegemonic decline is inevitable – a transition now towards multipolarity solves conflict. and climate change Khanna. The self-deluding universalism of the American imperium — that the world inherently needs a single leader and that American liberal ideology must be accepted as the basis of global order — has paradoxically resulted in America quickly becoming an everlonelier superpower. America’s spirit is weakened.S. 08 (Parag Khanna.

The arbitrarily composed Security Council is not the place to hash out such a division of labor. . a concrete burden-sharing among them by which they are judged not by their rhetoric but the responsibilities they fulfill.103 of 154 among the Big Three. The big issues are for the Big Three to sort out among themselves. Neither are any of the other multilateral bodies bogged down with weighted voting and cacophonously irrelevant voices.

“The Big Picture: Resource Collapse. and opens up new niches of influence. as ultimately the most effective responses to resource collapse will come from revolutions in technology and socio-economic behavior. Senior Fellow of Institute for Emerging Ethics and Technologies (IEET). .104 of 154 Alt Cause – Resource Collapse Resource collapse is important factor in hegemonic collapse.” http://ieet. Senior Fellow. It triggers conflict. The climate and resource crises of the 2010s and 2020s will be compounded by a vacuum of global leadership.php/IEET/more/cascio20080407/) Resource collapse isn’t the cause of the rise of the post-hegemonic world. Right now. none of the leading great power nations seem well-suited to discover and adopt such new models.org/index. 08 (Jamais Cascio. setting the mighty against the mighty. Most importantly. it sets up the conditions for the emergence of new models of power. It weakens the powerful. IEET. 4/8/08. It reveals vulnerabilities. but it’s an important driver. Cascio. degree in Political Science. Those actors adopting the new successful models will find themselves disproportionately powerful. The same can be said of the leading global corporate powers.

may it not be that any power wishing to exercise hegemony in the region would have to go to war at regular intervals in defence of its authority or its local clients? Furthermore. this is something that American policymakers -. It is important to note that this US weakness affects not only the ambitions of the Bush administration. intended to create regional coalitions against potential aggressors and.but fiscally equally damaging -. Even a limited US-Chinese clash over Taiwan would be likely to produce catastrophic economic consequences for both sides.Democrat and Republican. http://www. the US wealthy classes have gained a grip over the state that allows them to escape taxation. In Asia. as presently conceived by the overwhelming majority of the U. In the Middle East. however. The Bush administration deserves to be savagely criticised for the timing and the conduct of the Iraq war.supported by both parties -. the results would not have been significantly less awful. Despite the lessons of Iraq. central to what is happening is the greed and decadence of the imperial elites.realisticforeignpolicy. really serious war risks US economic disaster. “Decadent America Must Give Up Imperial Ambitions” 11-29-05. For it is pointless to dream of long maintaining an American empire for which most Americans will neither pay nor fight. prove inescapable in a generation's time. The result is that the empire can no longer pay for enough of the professional troops it needs to fulfil its self-assumed imperial tasks. When. it could mean backing Japan and other countries against any Chinese aggression. The empire can no longer raise enough taxes or soldiers. it is increasingly indebted and key vassal states are no longer reliable. but also geopolitical stances wholly shared by the Democrats. My fear though is that.php) U. however.be sustained permanently without war? Indeed. it becomes clear how utterly unacceptable much of this approach would be to the entire existing US political order. but direct military commitments and alliances should be avoided wherever possible. the desirable US response to its imperial overstretch is simple and has been advocated by some leading independent US thinkers such as Professor Stephen Walt of Harvard. with potentially awful consequences for the world. one traces what this might mean in practice in various parts of the world. is unsustainable. but also defusing the threat of confrontation with China by encouraging the reintegration of Taiwan into the mainland. Mass acquiescence in this has to be bought with much smaller -. it could involve separating US goals from Israeli ones and seeking detente with Iran. however. it could mean accepting a qualified form of Russian sphere of influence. Not just a direct military presence. Like so many of their predecessors. Impossible today. senior research fellow at the New America Foundation and a member of the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy. The basic reasons why the American empire is bust are familiar from other imperial histories. It can defeat other states in battle easily enough but it cannot turn them into loyal or stable allies. when possible. in the course of which American global power will not be qualified but destroyed altogether. some at least of these moves may. Future historians may. civilian and military -.org/archives/2005/11/index. 05 (Anatol Lieven. In theory. such as in Iraq. unlike in 1917 or 1941.105 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (1/18) Hegemony is unsustainable – slow decline now avoids a disastrous collapse later Lieven. . this process may occur through disastrous defeats. It is to fall back on "offshore balancing". global power. given the nature of the Middle East. can present US strategy against Iran -. War therefore means simply creating more and more areas of anarchy and breeding grounds for terrorism. The result is that the US is incapable of waging more wars of occupation. establishment. For that matter. conclude that President Bill Clinton's strategy of the 1990s would also have made the conquest of Iraq unavoidable sooner or later.S.S. regional consensuses in support of order and stability.still find extremely difficult to think about.cuts to taxes on the middle classes. and that given the realities of Iraqi society and history. To place American power on a firmer footing requires putting it on a more limited footing. In the former Soviet Union. In an equally classical fashion. rather than as a result of carefully planned and peaceful strategy. It cannot introduce conscription because of the general demilitarisation of society and also because elite youths are no longer prepared to set an example of leadership and sacrifice by serving themselves. the relative decline in US economic independence means that.

from Canada to Cuba to Chávez’s Venezuela. into its orbit. “Waving Goodbye to Hegemony” http://www.html? _r=3&oref=slogin&pagewanted=all) The East Asian Community is but one example of how China is also too busy restoring its place as the world’s “Middle Kingdom” to be distracted by the Middle Eastern disturbances that so preoccupy the United States.106 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (2/18) Hegemonic decline is inevitable – China rivals US influence and acts as a stabilizing force in Asia Khanna. no country — friend of America’s or not — wants political tension to upset economic growth. Aided by a 35 millionstrong ethnic Chinese diaspora well placed around East Asia’s rising economies. Asians are insulating themselves from America’s economic uncertainties. while China has slashed tariffs and increased loans to its Southeast Asian neighbors. In Africa. pinning America down while filling whatever power vacuums it can find. Without firing a shot. they plan to launch their own regional monetary fund. resulting in America’s grip on the Pacific Rim being loosened one finger at a time. In America’s own hemisphere. economic or strategic lifeline from China. Every country in the world currently considered a rogue state by the U. China is not only securing energy supplies. its manifest destiny pushing its Han pioneers westward while pulling defunct microstates like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. but increasingly they rally toward it out of Asian cultural pride and an understanding of the historical-cultural reality of Chinese dominance. as well as oil-rich Kazakhstan. And in the former Soviet Central Asian countries — the so-called Stans — China is the new heavyweight player. now enjoys a diplomatic. senior research fellow in the American Strategy Program of the New America Foundation. From Thailand to Indonesia to Korea. a Greater Chinese CoProsperity Sphere has emerged. 08 (Parag Khanna. a set of Asian security and diplomatic institutions is being built from the inside out. Iran being the most prominent example. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization gathers these Central Asian strongmen together with China and Russia and may eventually become the “NATO of the East. dam-builders and covert military personnel. it is deploying tens of thousands of its own engineers. China is doing on its southern and western peripheries what Europe is achieving to its east and south.com/2008/01/27/magazine/27world-t. it is also making major strategic investments in the financial sector. To the Western eye. At the same time. Trade within the India-Japan-Australia triangle — of which China sits at the center — has surpassed trade across the Pacific. it is a bizarre phenomenon: small Asian nation-states should be balancing against the rising China. Under Japanese sponsorship. aid workers.nytimes. The whole world is abetting China’s spectacular rise as evidenced by the ballooning share of trade in its gross domestic product — and China is exporting weapons at a rate reminiscent of the Soviet Union during the cold war. China is cutting massive resource and investment deals. Like Europeans.S.” . Across the globe.

” 36 Even the most ardent primacists know this to be true. because that would imply a freezing of the differentiated pattern of growth rates. primacy to multipolarity may be much closer than primacists want to admit. which is why they concede that American primacy won’t last forever. that—at best—the United States will not be able to hold onto its primacy much beyond 2030. at some point within the next decade or two.38 For sure. Indeed. no great power ever has been able “to remain permanently ahead of all others. There are indications. as Paul Kennedy has observed. however. with impacts potentially as dramatic as those of the previous two. To put it slightly differently. . p. the primacists are correct. and transition from U. In a similar vein.S. But if the ongoing shift in the distribution of relative power continues. It will take some time before any other state emerges as a true “peer competitor” of the United States. For example. new great power rivals to the United States will emerge. there is a yawning gap between the United States and the next-ranking powers. 64-65] Can the United States Be Caught? Up to a point. in its survey of likely international developments up until 2020. In the same way that commentators refer to the 1900s as the American Century. In terms of hard power. Nevertheless."The Case Against the American Empire. American primacy cannot be sustained indefinitely. Christopher LAYNE 2007. the CIA’s National Intelligence Council’s report Mapping the Global Future notes: The likely emergence of China and India as new major global players—similar to the rise of Germany in the 19th century and the United States in the early 20th century—will transform the geopolitical landscape. that American primacy could end much sooner than that. new poles of power in the international system are likely to emerge during the next decade or two. the leading primacists acknowledge." American Empire: A Debate. a recent study by the CIA’s Strategic Assessment Group projects that by 2020 both China (which Mapping the Global Future pegs as “by any measure a first-rate military power” around 2020) and the European Union will come close to matching the United States in terms of their respective shares of world power. Thus. Already there is evidence suggesting that new great powers are in the process of emerging . which means that at any point in time some states are gaining in relative power while others are losing it. This is what the current debate in the United States about the implications of China’s rise is all about. [Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute. technological advance. not static. but how soon it will end. the early 21st century may be seen as the time when some in the developing world led by China and India came into their Own. The real issue is not if American primacy will end.107 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (3/18) We control uniqueness – collapse of primacy is inevitable by 2030. The relative power position of great powers is dynamic. there are always potential pitfalls in projecting current trends several decades into the future (not least is that it is not easy to convert economic power into effective military power). But China isn’t the only factor in play. and military developments which has existed since time immemorial.

Morgenthau and Waltz have highlighted the dangers that await if the United States gives in to the temptations of hegemonic power and have counseled instead that the United States pursue a grand strategy based on prudence and self-restraint. America's real realists--George F. but also that it must differentiate between desirable objectives and attainable ones. 131 Thus. Kennan. An America [End Page 40] that has the wisdom and prudence to contain itself is less likely to be feared than one that begs the rest of the world to stop it before it expands hegemonically again. is America's next grand strategy. [Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute. To reduce the fear of U. and will remain so even if it no longer is a hegemon. thus causing the United States to become imperially overstretched and involving it in unnecessary wars that will reduce its power. Heg is unsustainable Christopher Layne 2006. it probably will. Maintaining U. Rather than risking these outcomes. National Interest. power. They not only recognized that a wise grand strategy must balance ends and means. 64-65] The United States has a hegemony problem because it wields hegemonic power. Unilateral offshore balancing. Hegemony is not only a costly grand strategy. the real realists have understood the true paradox of American power: Precisely because of its power and geography.S. attempting to sustain U. Walter Lippmann and Kenneth Waltz-- always warned of the dangers that a hegemonic United States would over-reach itself and. have to fight to uphold its primacy. The United States does not need to be an extraregional hegemon to be secure. Hans Morgenthau. . deterritorialized conception of security divorced from the traditional metrics of great power grand strategy: the distribution of power in the international system and geography. provoke opposition to it. Americans would do well to pay heed to these admonitions as they debate how the United States should alter its grand strategy as the unipolar era inexorably draws to a close." American Empire: A Debate.S. the United States must practice self-restraint (which is different from choosing to be constrained by others by adopting a multilateral approach to grand strategy). Most of all. Real realists like Lippmann. the United States should begin to retrench strategically and capitalize on the advantages accruing to insular great powers in multipolar systems. If the United States fails to adopt an offshore balancing strategy based on multipolarity and military and ideological self-restraint.S. They understood that the world is not malleable and will not respond to American-imposed social engineering. Kennan. especially given that U."The Case Against the American Empire.S.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_85/ai_n16832448 The United States is a very powerful state. but also one that ultimately is unsustainable. primacy may already be in the early stages of erosion. Fall http://findarticles.108 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (4/18) Collapse of hegemony and transition to off-shore balancing inevitable – delaying it just causes war Christopher LAYNE 2007. 130 It also must rein in the scope of its extravagant ambitions to shape the international system in accordance with its Wilsonian ideology. which is a potentially dangerous strategy. primacy may well hasten its end by stimulating more intensive efforts to balance against the United States. by asserting its power heavy-handedly. to reduce others' concerns about its power. the United States must accept some reduction in its relative hard power by adopting a multipolar—and essentially unilateral—offshore balancing strategy that accommodates the rise of new great powers. yet the very fact of its overwhelming capabilities has been a constant temptation for American policymakers to intervene abroad unwisely in the pursuit of unattainable goals (nation building or democracy promotion). there is very little the United States needs to do in the world in order to be secure. Its quest for hegemony is driven instead by an ideational. indeed. hegemony is a game that no longer is worth the candle. Paradoxically. p. at some point.

.” What’s more. In its National Security Strategy. including war. Such states also see these weapons as their best means of overcoming the conventional superiority of the United States. the risk of nuclear war could actually rise. speech to West Point’s graduating class. is to speak loudly (extended deterrence) and cut up and scatter Washington’s inadequate stick all over the place. As political scientist Frank Russell once wrote: “Rome . never was interested . Certainly. .” 92 (Although the president used the word “preemptive. and “we have to be ready for preemptive action” because “if we wait for threats to fully materialize. In practice this idea will bring preventative efforts. such as India and Pakistan.” 91 In his June 2. Rome certainly was not interested in a balance of power for the very reason she was interested in a monopoly of power.” said Bush. if other nations. The echo of Rome is clear. The logic of empire therefore dictates that as few states as possible should be allowed to gain a defensive footing with the United States. 2002. I think it would be better not to do that. obtains them. to make sure WMD proliferation is stopped at all costs. the strategy of empire is unlikely to function if all sorts of states are allowed to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as a deterrent against the power projection of the United States. for example. “The Empire Strikes Out: The ‘New Imperialism’ and its Fatal Flaws”. . whereby the efforts of weaker states to increase their relative security undermines.” which says that striking early is less difficult than striking later. I favor the Teddy Roosevelt approach to foreign policy: Speak softly and carry a big stick. But supporting preventative or preemptive action could shift the rules of the world order against peace and stability. That’s because the doctrine of prevention or preemption is predicated on the “ideology of the offensive. we will have waited too long. thus triggering a spiral of security competition that . [its] military strengths beyond challenge. “is that we all expect certain rules.000 question is whether or not it makes sense to stand on the rooftops and announce loudly to the world that this is your doctrine. the United States currently has the world’s most powerful military. however. which raises what John Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago has called the “stopping power of water.” which means taking military action before an imminent attack by an adversary. A balance of power system is essentially a device for keeping the power of different states within limits by a system of checks and balances. or appears to undermine. The Bush administration’s National Security Strategy boldly asserts that “our best defense is a good offense.” 96 (continued from previous page – nothing cut) Consequently. which are things an empire cannot accept if it is committed to maintaining supremacy.109 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (5/18) Collapse is inevitable – sustaining hegemony only causes war and proliferation Eland 2002 (Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute. the exceptions justify it—lest we establish precedents that others will emulate. What’s more. offense-minded states are apt to be war-prone because they believe the prospects for victory are very favorable to them. the security of the offense-minded state. In other words. in preserving a balance of power. and it spends much more on its defense than all its rivals combined. and intends to keep. That’s because accepting the principle of noninterference is an impediment to a dominant state seeking to make other nations conform to its will. But it costs far more for the United States—a relatively secure nation separated from most of the world by two vast oceans—to project its power across the seas than it does for states located on other landmasses to project their power regionally.” 94 “There’s no question that great powers like the United States [can] launch preventative wars or preemptive strikes whenever they conclude it’s in their interests. the Bush administration notes: “These weapons may . . offense-minded states have a tendency to incite security dilemmas. That’s a blueprint for trouble if there ever was one. p.” says a skeptical Bush administration official.) That approach is consistent with the strategy of empire. adopted preemption as their official policy. State sovereignty also allows for the formation of multiple loci of power and the prospect of power balancing. Over the long run the strategy of empire will likely prove unsustainable and ultimately self-defeating. 93 Indeed. allow [end page 13] these states to attempt to blackmail the United States and our allies to prevent us from deterring or repelling the aggressive behavior of rogue states. the strategy of empire necessarily leads to a devaluation of other states’ sovereignty. Nov 26. It will also increase the likelihood of war. But the “$64. President Bush laid out his vision of a future in which the United States more or less monopolizes global military power through preemption if necessary: “America has. We just have to be careful that if we create exceptions to those rules. “One of the reasons there is not a constant state of war.” From this perspective. .” the belief that “the presence of oceans on much of the earth’s surface makes it impossible for any state to achieve global hegemony. in many cases the United States might launch a preventive attack to stop an incipient threat before it is even realized. before a nation working on WMD.” adds Mearsheimer. . such as Iraq. proximity matters.” 95 The strategy of empire.18) The answer is probably no.

97 For example. how will Washington prove that an attack might have happened? Surely some foreign and domestic critics will discount the threat afterward. as China’s economy grows. The expansion of Chinese influence in that region may run afoul of a United States. The doctrine of prevention or preemptive intervention could actually create a greater incentive for other states to try to acquire WMD secretly as an insurance policy against American military might.110 of 154 can culminate in confrontation or war. 98 Hence there is a paradox. The other major problem with the doctrine of prevention or preemption is that in the absence of actual aggression against the United States. which could in turn spur even more U. And other states will worry that the doctrine could be used against them. it may want more ability to control its security environment within East Asia. Inevitable mistakes will lead to recrimination and suspicions about America’s motives.S. . which has a defense perimeter that is far forward and a military doctrine that is very preventive or preemptive.

not that interventionism necessarily solves problems. The primary danger is from an interventionist foreign policy that makes enemies who are resourceful and willing move into and exploit failed states. a recent top-secret Pentagon war game. According to the New York Times. would affect the military’s ability to wage and win a new regional war. today’s advocates of empire are unable to break out of their consolidating logic. In coming years. Accordingly. to avoid confrontation with the Axis powers over the Spanish Civil War. or deeply buried facilities. and the stress of ongoing operations in Afghanistan. 102 The strategic implications are potentially enormous. H. in other words. and launching wars to transform countries like Iraq “into a beacon of hope. for ramping up U. . has revealed that. Failed states are already an example of those self-reinforcing phenomena.S. The commitments were almost literally worldwide. London was not in a position to rebuff a rising Nazi Germany early on because Britain was overstretched . preventive attacks on installations associated with those superweapons often founder on a lack of intelligence on the location of such clandestine small mobile.” says Bell. Empires get into trouble because they get bogged down fighting protracted small wars in the hinterland.” The strategy of empire could make the United States less secure in another major way as well—by dispersing and overtasking its military personnel and equipment. Western Europe and the British Isles were all under some kind of threat as the 1930s went on. to make only the most cautious response to Japanese aggression in China—all this followed in large part from the need to diminish the number of one’s enemies. to find the basis of a settlement with Germany. the security threat posed by failed states is really a second-order issue. in short. policy or assuming a lower profile. Thus. southwest Asia and the Sinai.” 105 Empire. The Joint Chiefs of Staff subsequently recommended postponing an attack against Iraq.) The unintended consequence of interventionism. M. Malaya and Singapore. promulgating foreign educational and health care programs. As former Reagan adviser and Cato Institute senior fellow Doug Bandow warns: “With the growing ability of small political movements and countries to kill U.” 99 Yet it was such nation building that led to the attack on U.111 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (6/18) [Card continued without omission] prevention or preemption. telling other states and aspiring states who their leaders should be.” 101 The conclusion was that the American military would be stretched very thin. Britain’s chiefs of staff produced a gloomy assessment of London’s security prospects. (Yet as President Clinton [end page 14] found out in 1998 during Operation Desert Fox. the United States could conceivably lose one or more large cities to demented or irrational retaliation for American intervention. code named Prominent Hammer. The Dominions. that is. America and its citizens will become an even greater lightning rod for the world’s political malcontents. One of the primary reasons Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain appeased Adolf Hitler at Munich in 1938 was that much of Britain’s strength was diffused throughout its far-flung empire. still relied on her for protection. and accumulating manifold security and treaty commitments they are obliged to honor. Their conclusion was that England should not make new enemies. “To reach an accommodation with Italy in the Mediterranean. the fact that so many people in the Muslim world dislike America’s meddling is not seen as an argument for rethinking U. though asserting their independence of the mother country. In fact. the risks of foreign entanglements increase. but that interventionism can create altogether new ones. could be more interventionism. shows. Nevertheless. Thus . “The war game measured how the strains of new commitments to domestic defense. . economic aid. the United States may find that its alliances and commitments around the world may sap its strength for dealing with any rising power—perhaps China. citizens and to threaten mass destruction. 104 In 1937. expanding the campaign against terrorism to a country like Iraq would place severe strains on personnel and cause deep shortages of certain critical weapons. those advocates see it as an argument for deeper involvement. like the proverbial man who finds himself stuck in a hole. that is. even now. today’s advocates of empire recommend more digging.S. . in other words. Australia and New Zealand. The very problem of failed states. But digging will neither get the man out of the hole nor make the United States safer. “The policy of ‘appeasement’ should never be appraised without recalling this sternly realistic recommendation. the demands of long-term deployments in places like the Balkans and South Korea.S. . reduced Britain’s options in the face of a horrible danger. the danger posed by failed states is a consequence of something other than state failure per se. forces in Somalia. garrisoning myriad outposts.S. that is. Bell: [end page 15] The fundamental problem was the disparity between Britain’s commitments and her resources. Instead. 103 According to British historian P. And over the longer term there is the issue of being ready to fight a major theater war if necessary. Similarly. Failed states matter to today’s advocates of empire because the existence of such states raises the specter that interventionist foreign policies in one place can have a deadly price tag made possible by individuals willing to take advantage of the situation in another place. the Middle East and Mediterranean.

however. but is still far short of the resources needed to prevail. for example. In the face of this unaccustomed constraint. credit comes increasingly from states whose indefinite accumulation of dollars seems contrary to their own long-term interests. The American military loathes this kind of fighting and. has not been very good at it. to date. Director of the European Studies Program. subsidises its own imports. while the United States' external deficit is bigger than ever. with a good part of the exchange costs of America's world role eventually covered by others who accumulated the surplus dollars. China. 73-8) Given our future's high potential for discord and destruction. Survival. the United States will face the tougher choices between guns and butter it has long been able to avoid. these others were allies dependent on American military protection. having a hegemonic superpower already installed might seem a great good fortune.112 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (7/18) Unipolar hegemony is unsustainable and doesn’t solve the terminal impacts Calleo. by continuing to add to its already immense reserves of surplus dollars. The United States is now spending heavily to compensate for its deficiencies. like countering guerrilla warfare and suicidal terrorism. it seems unreasonable to expect China to continue this practice indefinitely. pursuing a hegemonic agenda in today's world requires different capabilities for more primitive forms of combat. Today. credit to finance it no longer depends on allies in urgent need of protection. While the United States is lavishly outfitted for high-technology warfare. University Professor of The Johns Hopkins University. together with American consumption and investment. and prepared for high casualties. Given the growing protectionism against its exports. Controlling hostile populations will demand extensive linguistic and policing skills. American power counts for less than expected. Put to the test. This current shortage of means is a further blow to America's hegemonic expectations. recent experience also reveals that America's global predominance has been seriously overestimated. trained for intimate contact with the enemy. 2007 (Dean Acheson Professor. p. If credit from China is restricted. but at the expense of its own more balanced internal development.with more and cheaper troops. Financial experience during the Cold War accustomed the United States to abundant credit from the world economy. Greater success would seem to require a different sort of military . Yet. Instead. how long will America's enthusiasm for hegemony endure? . During the Cold War.

and build support for anti-U. The EU has some economic weight to throw around when it disagrees with U. the specific economic relationship between the European Union (EU) and the United States does not fit the general pattern of U.conventional weapons. then. even if the EU lacks the military might to engage in military disagreements. Second.S. Even the U nited States. a few actors look for shortcuts to overcome the massive imbalance in military capabilities. While terrorism has long been seen as a weapon of the weak. violence. Iran. economic dictates. and images does not simply reflect the will and ideas of the strongest country. chemical. policy in an effort to win the verbal war for hearts and minds at home and abroad. In projecting American military power around the globe. the war of words. and rogue states Pressman 2004 (Jeremy Pressman. hegemony.edu/publication/2943/if_not_balancing_what_forms_of_resis tance_to_american_hegemony. The EU can thus engage. symbols. “If Not Balancing. http://belfercenter.S.html) What. the United States has created the impression that non-conventional weapons are the best form of defense against the American empire. it does suggest several different avenues by which states and disaffected peoples will resist U.harvard. They may hope to sway the American public . which opens the door to American-European economic confrontations. perhaps the most dominant great power in history. Third. Fourth. recent events in Iraq. First. Other countries utilize rhetorical attacks and symbolic protests against U. are these forms of resistance? While the past decade of U. dominance.S.ksg.S.S. . and biological weapons may now be seen as a way of deflecting unwanted attention from Washington. still needs cooperation from far weaker states on a host of issues such as the intelligence and police work needed to combat global terrorism. anti-American resentment. states can resist by withholding cooperation. economic policy or wants to resist U.S. in trade wars with the United States. Anti-American actors rely in part on words to overcome material inferiority to the United States. for example.S.113 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (8/18) Many factors challenge American hegemony including terrorism. Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Connecticut in Storrs. and North Korea are shedding light on the various ways in which nuclear. hegemony does not offer a crystal clear road map. This gives those who are needed some leverage over the United States. win recruits. They resort to two tactics of the weak: terrorism and the possession of non. What? Forms of Resistance to American Hegemony”.

edu/publication/2943/if_not_balancing_what_forms_of_resis tance_to_american_hegemony. non-cooperation by less powerful states hurts U. when they share the U. military greater access was based largely on the geographic cards Turkey holds.html) When other countries disapprove of U. http://belfercenter. drug trafficking or intelligence-sharing.S. Although the United States is dominant in many realms.S. approach. http://belfercenter.S. some states have unique assets that the United States covets. If the United States is too aggressive or dismissive of local concerns. allies sometimes have different objectives. certain nearby real estate became very important. In other words. they often favor a different policy to realize that interest. withholding funds for the post-war reconstruction of Iraq. allies like France or Germany. Iraq assisted UN inspectors just enough so that some countries believed inspections were working even as Britain and the United States continued to decry Iraqi non. but Turkey held out for much more. Pakistan. interest. Iraqi policy contributed to non. a hyperpower still needs cooperation in some areas. For instance. For counter-terrorism. the door was open for meaningful non. What? Forms of Resistance to American Hegemony”.S. the United States can pressure other countries to cooperate. Iraq appeared very aware of the possibility that its potential opponents could be divided by carefully calibrated Iraqi actions. What? Forms of Resistance to American Hegemony”. putative allies may not feel inhibited about undermining the U. once the United States decided to target Iraq in 2002-03. evidence. Spain. But the depth of cooperation is always going to be in part a reflection of how willing the American partner is to cooperate.S. efforts.compliance. By virtue of geography. If other countries always had the same interests and policies as the United States.S.harvard. policy. Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Connecticut in Storrs. as the United States experienced in the Philippines and more recently in Okinawa. or. Whether based on different interests or different policy preferences to pursue shared interests.html) The dilemma of non-cooperation was also exemplified in other ways during the buildup to a war with Iraq. Such support is essential for gathering intelligence and conducting international police work. Kuwait was quick to support the U. Once the United States asked for things like UN support for the war. effort.harvard.cooperation by standard U. Longtime U. Opponents of the war on Iraq used the threat of non-cooperation to slow the drive to war.ksg. or suspects. and Uzbekistan. Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Connecticut in Storrs.S. bases are not immune to opposition either. the war against al-Qaeda is illustrative. The United States has worked with a wide range of states including Britain.ksg.cooperation. withholding cooperation would be counterproductive.114 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (9/18) America’s policy of aggression tanks cooperation efforts which are key to sustainable heg Pressman 2004 (Jeremy Pressman. The importance of the Turkish parliamentís vote against granting the U. interests.edu/publication/2943/if_not_balancing_what_forms_of_resis tance_to_american_hegemony. countries often drag their feet and slow the flow of information. They may judge and prioritize threats differently. To some extent. preferences. Yet even close U. “If Not Balancing. .S. Syria. This would be especially true when siding too closely with Washington could increase domestic political opposition and mobilize a strong challenge to regime survival. and NATO involvement in getting ready. they can resist by reducing cooperation that is essential for the advancement of U. “If Not Balancing.S. No sustainable Heg—Policies like Iraq have tanked cooperation with important US allies Pressman 2004 (Jeremy Pressman.S. On cooperation more generally. Vetoing UNSC resolutions. or preventing military preparations in Turkey under the NATO umbrella are all ways of resisting U.S. financial support for reconstruction.

policies. The open American system. With the right message. Iraq. opponents can range from longtime allies like France and Germany to the very target of the war. any bit player can lambaste the United States.S.U. Rhetorical assaults can increase the impact of other tactics such as non-cooperation. or. words are free if the topic is of interest to the international media.S. asymmetric warfare. http://belfercenter.S. At the end of the day.html) Another effect of words and symbols is that they can be used to undermine both domestic and international support for U. As became clear with Iraq.ksg. policy are trying to convince the U. as we see in the next section. In a system that values debate and the clash of ideas. States from getting the UN blessing for the war on Iraq. “If Not Balancing. words and symbols can be used to make it harder for the United States to pursue and protect its interests. for example.115 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (10/18) International media and propaganda spur strong anti-American resentment tanking heg Pressman 2004 (Jeremy Pressman. supporters in other countries. What? Forms of Resistance to American Hegemony”.S. policy to win over both segments of the American public and U. Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Connecticut in Storrs.edu/publication/2943/if_not_balancing_what_forms_of_resis tance_to_american_hegemony. and foreign lobbying create opportunities for those opposed to U.S. peoples. foreign opponents of U. even if the words are not backed by material capabilities. public as well as non. international media.harvard. stopped the United the absence of the United Nations or some form of the international community meant the loss of access to Turkey during the war and greater difficulty getting aid and personnel to provide security and help with reconstruction.S. Words.S. support. The battle for hearts and minds is a two way street: while Washington is trying to build domestic support and win non-U. . In hindsight.

In advocating an offshore balancing strategy. "and therefore it is in our interest that as little should happen as possible.S. grand strategy must use these criteria to assess the comparative merits of both the current grand strategy and its competitors. is that bad things--perhaps far worse things--could happen if the United States stays on its present strategic course.S. Indeed. power and the corresponding rise of new great powers-will render the strategy of preponderance untenable. America 's grand strategy will no longer be preponderance. . seldom acknowledged by champions of preponderance. Visiting Associate Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School [World Policy Journal. the advocates of preponderance want to keep the world the way it is. the degree of risk they entail.116 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (11/18) U." Salisbury said. The United States could be hegemonic only because the Soviet threat caused others to accept American preeminence as prefer. hegemony prevents us from emerging as an offshore balancer – hegemonic decline is inevitable – it is better to let it decline now so we can choose our strategic position in the world Christopher Layne 1998. International politics is dynamic." The conditions that made American preponderance possible are changing rapidly." However. that is only half of the argument. The changing distribution of power in the inter. American hegemony cannot be maintained much beyond that period. Summer. their cost. Simply put. "What ever happens will be for the worse.able to Soviet domination. The time is rapidly approaching when the strategy of preponderance will be unable to pass these tests. Over time. This is unsurprising. however. "It simply has not been given to any one society to remain permanently ahead of all the oth. The United States could enjoy the relative predictability and stability of the bipolar era only be. I do not deprecate those who believe that bad things (increased geopolitical instability) could happen if the United States were to abandon the strategy of preponderance. Grand strategies must be judged by the amount of security they provide. This strategy is also being undermined because the credibility of America 's extended deterrence strategy is eroding rapidly. “Rethinking American grand strategy: Hegemony or balance of power in the twenty-first century?” vol. The other half. The suggestion that the days of American hegemony are numbered no doubt will be met with disbelief by advocates of the current grand strategy. American grand strategists view the prospect of change in international politics in much the same way that British prime minister Lord Salisbury did toward the end of the nineteenth century. Make no mistake: sometime in the early decades of the twenty-first century. events will force it to do so. 15 iss. Any serious debate about U..ers. it is the very fact of the Soviet Union 's collapse that has knocked the props out from under the strategy of preponderance. If the United States does not choose now to begin making the transition to a new grand strategy better suited to the new century's emerging international realities.cause of the effects of bipolarity itself. whether they are sustainable. and their tangible and intangible domestic effects.national system-specifically.. the relative decline of U. they may. 2.S. the costs and risks of the strategy of preponderance will rise to unacceptably high levels. without the Cold War. proquest] My argument for adopting an alternative grand strategy is prospective: although it may be sustainable for perhaps another decade.. not static. The time to think about alternative grand strategic futures is now--before the United States is overtaken by events. As Paul Kennedy has observed. America will not be able to preserve its Cold War preponderance or stability. Having fulfilled their hegemonic ambitions following the Soviet Union 's collapse.

as long as eligible states calculate that the benefits of free riding outweigh the constraints imposed on them by American hegemony. Other states underpay for security. so will U. Such a strategy articulates a vision of an American-led international order." But there is more to it than that. hegemony and. This has led primacists to conclude that there has been no balancing against the United States. In February 1992. Harvard professor Joseph S. “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise”. Over time. No doubt. 124 Several weeks later. The fate of nineteenth-century Britain. which eventually weakens the internal foundation of its external position. George Bush's New World Order and Bill Clinton's apparent commitment to assertive projection of America's democratic and human rights values reflect America's desire to "press its preferred policies" on others.S. Nye. A strategy of more or less benign hegemony does not prevent the emergence of new great powers. No new great powers have emerged to restore equilibrium to the balance of power by engaging in hard balancing against the United States—at least. contrary to the predictions of Waltzian balance of power theorists. then-Vice President Dan Quayle linked the continuance of America's security commitment to NATO with West European concessions in the GATT negotiations. The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming of the United States' Unipolar Moment. Unipolarity is the foundation of U. Vol. however. However.117 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (12/18) Collapse inevitable – free-riding Christopher Layne 1993 (Visiting Associate Professor at Naval Postgraduate school. not yet.4 1993) Inevitably. No. International Security. Other states can justifiably infer that Washington's unipolar aspirations will result in the deliberate application of American power to compel them to adhere to the United States' policy preferences.S. p. 125 Such a "leverage strategy" is no mere abstraction. the effect is to erode the hegemon's preeminence. . For example. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. Bush said that because the United States had taken the leader's role in the Gulf militarily. suggested that the deployment of United States forces in Europe and Japan could be used as a bargaining chip in trade negotiations with those countries. Jr. is illustrative. America's renewed credibility would cause Germany and Japan to be more forthcoming in their economic relations with Washington. Associate Professor at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A & M. a strategy of preponderance will fail. if it ends. Moreover. A hegemon tends to overpay for security. which allows them to shift additional resources into economically productive investments. the strategy of preponderance could prolong unipolarity somewhat. such a policy will accelerate the hegemon's relative decline. unipolarity persists. differential growth rates trigger shifts in relative economic power that ultimately result in the emergence of new great powers. 17. primacy. There is another reason why a strategy of preponderance will not work. the primacists' focus on both the failure of new great powers to emerge and the absence of hard balancing distracts attention from other forms of behavior— notably leash-slipping—by major second-tier states that ultimately could lead to the end of unipolarity. benign hegemony facilitates the diffusion of wealth and technology to potential rivals. Over time. Fall. 31 To be sure. A strategy of benign hegemony allows others to free-ride militarily and economically. which followed such a strategy. Heg collapse inevitable – leash slipping Christopher Layne 2006. As a consequence. in a February 1991 address to the New York Economic Club.

but just right-strong enough to defend American interests. and increase the probability that balancing behavior would be directed against the United States. 17. Vol. we will know who was right and who was wrong. This approach would heighten others' concerns about the malign effects of unchecked American power. . too. Rather than vainly and counterproductively pursuing a strategy of preponderance. American policymakers need to remember that other states balance against hegemons and they should not want the United States to be seen by others as a "sprawling giant with gouty fingers and toes. Relative decline has internal and external causes. In coming years. No doubt neorealism's critics will continue to point to second image factors as reasons to take an optimistic view of the future. and (5) if differential growth rate effects allow Japan to challenge America's leading position. and probably much sooner. the international system will provide a definitive field test of the contending views of inter national politics offered by neorealists and their critics. Relative decline can be addressed by policies that focus on either or both of these causes. and (2) enable the United States to do as well as possible in a multipolar world . traditional patterns of great power competition will reemerge not withstanding the effect of secondimage factors. an American strategy of preponderance or an attempt to perpetuate unipolarity is doomed to failure . not too weak. But this one is not fated to drag on inconclusively. bipolar. the United States-Japan relationship will become highly competitive and the possibility of hegemonic war will be present . Although vigorous internal renewal might cause frictions with others over economic policy. It would be counterproductive for the United States to attempt to maintain its relative power position by attempting to suppress the emergence of new great powers. which would invite others to exploit American vulnerabilities. (2) unipolarity will stimulate the emergence of eligible states as great powers . which probably would accelerate the rise of new great powers. International Security. energies on redressing the internal causes of relative decline would be perceived by others as less threatening than a strategy of preponderance. “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise”. the debate between neorealists and their critics will continue. International Security. it is pointless to debate the comparative merits of unipolar. which would frighten others into balancing against the United States.118 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (13/18) Multipolarity is inevitable only a shift in US strategy to independence will solve the turns Christopher Layne 1993 (Visiting Associate Professor at Naval Postgraduate school.4 1993) The coming years will be ones of turmoil in international politics. 17. Fifty years from now. (3) unipolarity will cause other states to balance against the United States." A policy that concentrates U. the United States needs to design a strategy that will (1) safeguard its interests during the difficult transition from unipolarity to multipolarity.4 1993) Because multipolarity is inevitable . Structural realists can be confident that events will vindicate their predictions: ( 1) Because of structural factors. (4) in a multipolar system. America's optimal strategy is to make its power position similar to Goldilocks' porridge : not too strong. without pro voking others. Vol. Unipolarity will inevitably collapse the US must switch to a multipolar strategy to avoid the harms Christopher Layne 1993 (Visiting Associate Professor at Naval Postgraduate school. No doubt. it is less likely to have negative geopolitical repercussions than a policy that aims at perpetuating unipolarity.S. and multipolar systems . Systemic change occasioned by the rise and fall of great powers has always been traumatic. The transition from unipolarity to multipolarity will challenge the United States to devise a policy that will arrest its relative decline while minimizing the chances that other states will be provoked into balancing against the United States. “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise”. No. No.

The debate between advocates of preponderance and offshore balancing.S. grand strategists view the prospect of change in international politics in much the same way that British Prime Minister Lord Salisbury did toward the end of the nineteenth century. nation over empire. is about more than strategy. “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy”. such a policy is indeed self-interested and most assuredly moral. not a pejorative: Offshore balancing is a twenty-firstcentury grand strategy consistent with America’s interests and its values. U. in fact. Vol. offshore balancing—an innenpolitik grand strategy that posits the primacy of domestic over foreign policy—is ethically driven: America’s mission lies at home. And it should do so.” No doubt. it is also about values. not abroad. some would maintain that offshore balancing is both selfish and immoral. As Paul Kennedy has observed. U. the United States can pursue an alternative grand strategy without sacrificing its security. “and therefore it is in our interest that as little should happen as possible. In this sense. As George F.22 Issue. “it simply has not been given to any one society to remain permanently ahead of all the others…” Thus the strategy of preponderance must be reassessed. should it wish to do so. there is nothing wrong with taking advantage of that Cold War’s end to focus on economic and social challenges at home: “What we should want. is the minimum. hegemony cannot last indefinitely. I have attempted to demonstrate that. International Security. America First is an imperative. in these circumstances. . however.S. is dynamic not static.” International politics. In fact.119 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (14/18) Heg collapse inevitable Layne 97 (Christopher Layne is Visiting Associate Professor at Naval Postgraduate school.” Salisbury said. 1 Summer 1997) It is unsurprising that having fulfilled their hegemonic ambitions following the Soviet Union’s collapse. not the maximum. however. preponderance’s advocates want to keep the world the way it is. Kennan says. of external involvement. “What ever happens will be for the worse. and an emphasis on domestic needs over external ambitions. it could choose to restraint over intervention. The United States is secure enough from external threat that.

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History demonstrates that every empire has collapsed – cannot be sustained through force without public legitimacy
Carl Boggs 2005 (Social Science Professor National University (L.A.) , Planetary Politics: human rights, terror, and global society, ed. Stephen Eric Bronner)

The long history of empire aspiring to tyrannical rules over mass populations, hoping to expand their domain by overwhelming political coercion and military force, has been saturated with fierce resistance, deep quagmires, and humiliating failure: Rome, Spain, France under Napoleon, England, the brief twentieth-century global ventures of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. All at some point combined an unshakable political hubris with faith in armed violence as a means for building empire – and all had dazzling periods of success before disintegrating or being vanquished. Previous imperial regimes violated the basic Machiavellian premise that power without broad popular consent is destined to either implode or be overthrown. A corollary is that imperial domination by its very logic cannot easily secure much popular legitimacy, if any. By the 1940s the very idea of imperial control based upon foreign occupation had become historically obsolete, swept away by a series of postwar (and earlier) anticolonial struggles. The French colonial wars intended to retain control of Indochina and parts of Africa amounted to a final desperate reliance on brute force as the famous European “civilizing” mechanisms of religion, culture, and legal codes met with increasingly violent resistance. Dien Bien Phu and the Battle of Algiers symbolized the final eclipse of a colonial era in which European powers had recognized few limits to the use of military violence, much of it directed against civilian populations. The very ideology of imperial domination had been assaulted and destroyed in the name of ideals mainly imported from Europe itself—national self-determination, cultural autonomy, democracy.

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Heg Collapse Inevitable (16/18)
Drive for empire contains its own seeds of destruction through resistance and blowback
Carl Boggs 2005 (Social Science Professor National University (L.A.) , Planetary Politics: human rights, terror, and global society, ed. Stephen Eric Bronner) An urgent question for the fate of the planet is whether US ruling elites can for long sustain their drive toward global domination—that is, whether they can prevail in an arena where military force and political coercion have become the chosen methods of supremacy. We know that what governing regimes may require for popular support domestically may not readily extend to the sphere of world politics, where Hobbesian chaos tends to block normal mechanisms of legitimacy and order. US efforts to impose corporate and geopolitical agendas through military power, which of course it has in great abundance, will depend upon conditions of effective popular mobilization—needed to justify the costs and sacrifices of empire—but those very conditions (e.g. patriotism) quickly lose their ideological rationale beyond the national territory. Such conditions are in fact more likely to breed opposition and resistance to empire, including diverse expression of blowback. Signs of expanding opposition to empire have become increasingly visible; global terrorism and the events of 9/11, flourishing of an international antiwar movement during 2002 and 2003, growth of antisystem forces such as the World Social Forum, diffusion of anti-American sentiment in Europe the Muslim world, Asia, and elsewhere. To the degree that those ideological factors generating legitimacy for a new American militarism are bound to be counterproductive globally, imperial stability will more likely be reinforced by “postmodern” conditions involving widespread depoliticization, mass apathy, and privatized retreat ensuring greater elite autonomy. No doubt the rulers of empire would prefer a quieter, more atomized, depoliticized universe smoothly governed by routine economic transactions, the market, and consumerism, the ideal of an American-managed neoliberal hegemony grounded in a peaceful, more or less consensual imperial order. The problems here are twofold—the neoliberal model itself generates massive social contradictions while globalized, aggressive US military power works against the trajectory of single world hegemon, hoping to extend its rule over the entire planet, these contradictions are bound to significantly worsen.

the global terrain with its vast mélange of competing nation-states. . ed. Strong elements of “national-popular” consent underlying US empire. Yet it is not too difficult to see how the unique conditions of domestic support for US worldwide economic and military power might run counter to requirements for global hegemony.) . A system of global domination resting largely upon military force. and dedicated to ruling the globe by force. expansive scope. As the lone superpower with a huge seemingly invincible military apparatus. the United States has already lost much of its room to maneuver even as it wins immediate victories by means of economic and diplomatic leverage combined with military power—the same power that may soon become a double-edged sword. Stephen Eric Bronner) While Gramsci never systematically brought the concept of hegemony into the realm of international politics. insights can be gleaned from several passages in the Prison Notebooks.123 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (17/18) Military power undermines US heg and leadership – spurs resistance and is unsustainable Carl Boggs 2005 (Social Science Professor National University (L. Planetary Politics: human rights.A. rooted in a strong patriotism. and virtual absence of governing mechanisms differs radically from the state system that commanded most of Gramsci’s attention. terror. and global society. Of course. including those referred to above. will naturally conflict with the multiplicity of competing interests and wills across the globe— interests and wills leading often to anti-imperial resistance and opposition just as predictably as any law of physics. nor can it smooth over the harsh dysfunctions and conflicts endemic to the corporate world economy by mobilizing forms of hegemony such as nationalism and consumerism that work so fluidly in domestic politics. cannot in the scheme of things consolidate its rule on a foundation of legitimating beliefs and values. or threat of force.

from the Pakistani port of Gwadar. too. So now. multicivilizational. Democrats and Republicans are bickering about where and how to intervene. This is geopolitics in the 21st century: the new Big Three. and there is precious little Clinton or McCain or Obama could do to resist its growth. they mean little. lagging decades behind China in both development and strategic appetite. but that was also a decade adrift. rather than bestriding the globe. America’s unipolar moment has inspired diplomatic and financial countermovements to block American bullying and construct an alternate world order. and you could be forgiven for thinking it’s 1999.” http://www. European and Chinese worldviews. and each assertion of power has awakened resistance in the form of terrorist networks.. we are competing — and losing — in a geopolitical marketplace alongside the world’s other superpowers: the European Union and China. they were signs of imperial overstretch.” but it has no permanent friends either. lead it to collective security and prosperity? Indeed. “The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order. in fact. Condoleezza Rice has said America has no “permanent enemies. the more we will see the planetary stakes of the new global game. as well as substantial nuclear energy. was not truly an “East-West” struggle. “Waving Goodbye to Hegemony. America’s unipolar moment lasted through the 1990s.124 of 154 Heg Collapse Inevitable (18/18) Hegemonic collapse inevitable Khanna 8 (Parag Khanna is a senior research fellow in the American Strategy Program of the New America Foundation. And the others are left to choose their suitors in this post-American world. despite them. The cold war. Russia and the Caspian Sea. This essay is adapted from his book. on the Arabian Sea. The European Union has expanded to well over 30 members and has secure oil and gas flows from North Africa. as well as warships anchored at Bahrain and an Air Force presence in Qatar.000 troops in the independent state of Kurdistan. Maybe the best way to understand how quickly history happens is to look just a bit ahead. whether to do it alone or with allies and what kind of world America should lead. Many saw the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq as the symbols of a global American imperialism. and should. not an incoherent Islam embroiled in internal wars. Democrats believe they can hit a reset button. The more we appreciate the differences among the American. and the Hillary Clinton or John McCain or Barack Obama administration is nearing the end of its second term. But the distribution of power in the world has fundamentally altered over the two presidential terms of George W. That new global order has arrived. both because of his policies and. America has pulled out of Iraq but has about 20.gov.> . The Geopolitical Marketplace At best. Iran is nuclear.nytimes. for the first time in history. an increasingly depopulated expanse run by Gazprom. The postcold-war “peace dividend” was never converted into a global liberal order under American leadership. America’s standing in the world remains in steady decline.” to be published by Random House in March.html? _r=1&oref=slogin&ref=magazine&pagewanted=print) <Turn on the TV today. Every expenditure has weakened America’s armed forces. It is 2016.com/2008/01/27/magazine/27world-t. it remained essentially a contest over Europe. Why? Weren’t we supposed to reconnect with the United Nations and reaffirm to the world that America can. insurgent groups and “asymmetric” weapons like suicide bombers. and Republicans believe muscular moralism is the way to go. Not Russia. improvements to America’s image may or may not occur. but either way. What we have today. The Big Three make the rules — their own rules — without any one of them dominating. more significant. multipolar battle. Previous eras of balance of power have been among European powers sharing a common culture. China has absorbed Taiwan and is steadily increasing its naval presence around the Pacific Rim and. Afghanistan is stable. Bush. It’s as if the first decade of the 21st century didn’t happen — and almost as if history itself doesn’t happen. is a global. and not India.

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without directly confronting the military mission promoted by Obama. rather than proactive and offensive especially during the first decade of its advance toward global power status. More recently in April 2010.commodityonline. Overall the US imperial strategy to stem its decline and block China’s growth as a world power has failed. While attending “summits” and bilateral conferences it refuses to make concessions which prejudice its overseas markets. Given the overall growth of China.” http://lahaine. namely to its low level of savings. the most dynamic countries. however. China’s policy toward US attacks and threats was reactive and defensive. retired Bartle Professor (Emeritus) of Sociology at Binghamton University in Binghamton. “Futurology: Why US hegemony will decline?”. USA is still the largest economy with a GDP of $14 trillion. “Rising and Declining Economic Powers: The Sino-US Conflict Deepens. for example. Over time Asia is replacing the US as the fastest growing trading partner of Beijing. have ignored Washington’s warnings of China as a “security threat” and expanded their trade and economic ties with their neighbor. pointing to the structural weaknesses in the US economy.126 of 154 Exts – Yes China Rise Decline is inevitable . China does little to directly constrain US overseas expansion. capital formation and loss of competitiveness. in the first quarter of 2010 China grew at 12%. Commodity Online. China affirmed that is exchange rate was an “internal matter” and even acceded to US demands and revalued its currency (2006 – 2008) by 20%. Raghavan ‘10. PriceWaterHouse Coopers and Goldman Sachs have come out with their set of predictions – China will become the largest economy by 2020 and on some parameters India will overtake Japan in . When Washington protested at China’s violation of the human rights of Tibetan and Uigher separatists.7% recording $4. borrowing technology and upgrading its high tech industries. http://www. China. White House policymakers and financial detractors of Beijing have ignored the formidable foundations of Chinese empire building and its capacity to rectify internal imbalances to sustain dynamic expansion. (since Washington does a good job at self-destruction) rather it focuses on enhancing its own economic based strategy of increasing overseas investments. Later China responded by pointing out that the currency brouha had little to do with the US trade deficit. Nothing challenges the “crises” propaganda emitted by US embedded experts as the reports that. China will overtake the US by 2020 -. je) Last week China released their GDP growth figures for 2009 which showed it grew 8. either denying the charges or claiming they were internal affairs. Most strikingly in Asia. By 2010.91 trillion likely to overtake Japan to second position. six times the projected growth of the US 37 .pdf) A rising economic powers’ most formidable and effective response to the established imperial powers’ efforts to block its advance is … to keep on growing at double or triple the rate of growth of its declining adversary. the corporate penetration does not enhance US power rather it provides China with a lobby in Washington opposing protectionist measures. New York and adjunct professor at Saint Mary's University (4/28/10.org/petras/b2-img/petras_sinous. China went on the offensive.demographic trends. refuses to join its sanctions campaign against Iran and develops investment ties in Afghanistan while the US military occupation costs billions and alienates most Afghans including its client regime 39 . despite pressure from Washington. Beijing has encouraged the US MNC to invest in China and export back to the US.China is rising at unprecedented rates and US scare tactics can’t undermine its credibility Petras 10 – James. Sreekumar. Initially. publishing its own documented inventory of US domestic human right violations 38 . China refuses to lend support to Obama’s military centered strategy to buttress the empire.com/news/Futurology-Why-US-hegemony-will-decline25056-3-1.html. China rebuked Washington’s interference in China’s internal affairs and threatened to take reprisals which led Washington to drop its crusade.Staff Writer for Commodity Online (1/24/10. China merely protested at US human rights attacks. India have voiced concern over its trade imbalances with China and entered in negotiations to increase its exports.

James. China has been equally obstinate in pressing specious ‘territorial’ claims to virtually the entire South China Sea.’ In 1974. knowledge capital. China . China failed to comply with its obligations under international law to show due regard for the rights of vessels and aircraft of other nations operating in the East and South China Seas.127 of 154 2012.key to overall global primacy. into the South China Sea to assert China’s ‘rights and interests. In 2003. The greater issue. obstetric care and other trends from the National Center for Health Statistics Natality Data Sets. Beginning in 2000. Working in tandem with an intelligence ship. In the summer of 2001. resulting in the loss of the jet and pilot. The study. “China Set for Naval Hegemony”.S. In each of these cases. analyzed data on birth weight. reversing a decades-long upward trend in birth weights. is how China has invested decades in a patient and aggressive campaign to slowly push other countries out of the East China Sea and South China Sea." Instead. The Diplomat. and again in 2002. the Yuzheng 311. and even started using armed oceanographic ships and fisheries enforcement vessels to try to disrupt routine US military survey missions in the East China Sea. however. "Previous studies [covering periods into the early 1990s] have shown that birth weights have increased steadily during the past half-century. two commercial cargo ships crossed the bow of Impeccable. China initiated increasingly provocative warship and aircraft maneuvers. capitalism and innovative spirit. which were operating in the East China Sea. Chinese ships and aircraft harassed and threatened the USNS Bowditch and the USNS Sumner. All of it will be lost if indeed. such as trends in mothers' diets. ‘nine-dotted line’ that laid claim to 80 percent of the South China Sea. of course. also found white." Emily Oken of Harvard Medical School said in a statement. The fighter jet collided with the US aircraft. babies born at full-term between 1990 and 2005. The researchers looked at data from 36. The heavily damaged EP-3 made an emergency landing on the island. Kraska ’10. President Obama dispatched the USS Chung-Hoon to provide armed escort for the surveillance ship. physical activity. for example. In 1953. a similarly aggressive intercept occurred. Levie Chair of Operational Law at the U. If China or India emerges stronger. an affiliate of Harvard Medical School. Future research may identify other factors not included in the current data that might contribute to lower birth weight.com/2010/05/06/china-ready-to-dominate-seas/4/. political and military pressure—and sometimes aggression—to gradually bring the littoral seas under Chinese domination. published in February's Obstetrics & Gynecology.83 ounces between 1990 and 2005. US new borns are getting smaller which is to be studied in detail by the medical fraternity in the coming years.Howard S. USA which states that during the past 15 years. Chinese maritime forces stalked the USNS Impeccable ocean surveillance ship.S. "We expected to see a continuation of those increases. Oken and her colleagues found birth weights had decreased by an average of 1. China issued an infamous map with a U-shaped. stress and exposure to environmental toxins. as it’s the largest obstacle to Beijing’s strategy. debatable.” So apart from factors such as industrial production. The causes of this decline remain unclear and babies born small not only face short-term complications but increased risk as adults. In response. China sent its largest and most modern ocean surveillance patrol ship. Who knows biological reasons may be the critical factor that determines how long USA will remain the world’s largest economy. an oceanographic ship and a fisheries enforcement vessel. utlising their human and natural resources in an efficient manner. Researchers at the Harvard Pilgrim Health Care Institute's department of population medicine. the USNS Victorious was harassed. I feel the above report on US new borns indicate that biological reasons could also cause US hegemony to be threatened by emerging nations of China. Harvard researchers say.’ These three cases are only the tip of the iceberg. the line is derisively called ‘the cow tongue. In 2001. a new generation of kids are born who are underweight who could face increased risk in their adult life as well.828 U.[1] Soon after the Impeccable incident. maternal and neonatal characteristics. stopping directly in front of the ship. the obvious reason is because they produce more goods and services. newborns have gotten smaller during the past 15 years. natural resources. China will overtake naval heg -.78 ounces less at birth during the study period. I am quoting the report in full before coming to my theory of why US hegemony will end in another 20-30 years as predicted by futurologists. je) The prospects for a Chinese surprise attack are. The result: a well-coordinated campaign of legal. well-educated. innovation.827. After all the US economy was built on free enterprise.S. Russia and India. a Chinese fighter jet aggressively intercepted a US Navy propeller-driven EP-3 surveillance aircraft 75 miles from Hainan Island. At the same time. Today. In another of the many instances of harassment of US naval and air forces. Naval War College and Senior Fellow at Foreign Policy Research Institute (5/6/10. married women who didn't smoke. The US Navy is the main target. http://thediplomat. on March 7 of 2009. received early prenatal care and delivered vaginally with no complications had babies who weighed an average of 2. The fact that the finding has come from Harvard Medical School is sure to ignite further research into causes leading to low birth weight babies and how to correct them. But the ‘Futurogist’ in me couldn’t ignore the following report from Massachussets. “U.

Then. China again attacked Vietnamese forces on Johnson Reef and occupied six features in the Spratly Islands. with short and secure internal lines of communication. it was Steinberg. oftentimes Washington has no other carrier in theater. about to abandon its position of maritime superiority. in combination with a space-based maritime surveillance and targeting system. In one incident in October 2006. the Philippines. the US Navy battle force. So accustomed to being militarily superior. China seized 33 Vietnamese fishing boats and 433 crew members near the Paracel Islands. This occurred only two days after a Chinese helicopter flew within 90 feet of a MSDF destroyer monitoring the battle group. which included two submarines. raising the danger that China was willing to endanger the safety of one of its aircraft to make a point. The Chinese fleet is about 260 vessels. the United States is under the delusion that it could maintain sea control in Asia. Ironically. Steinberg that China would not tolerate ‘foreign interference’ in its ‘territory’ in the South China Sea. Ironically. a longtime Clinton associate. on the other hand. On April 10 of this year. The second US war was the First Barbary War of 1804. The Chinese Navy. after suffering an embarrassing indignity in 1996 when President Bill Clinton ordered the Nimitz and Independence carrier battle groups into the Taiwan Strait. is a force multiplier. the Vietnam War. Beijing’s maritime bullying. Are you starting to see a pattern here? But China has made uncanny progress on its dogged trek to transition from an obsolete 1950s-style coastal defense force to a balanced blue water fleet. By comparison. As a maritime nation with worldwide responsibilities.’ They also lie far from China and within the 200-mile economic zones of neighboring Vietnam. This isn’t new. and then surge actual forces in the event of a crisis. The US fleet will be absence. The United States believes it can be ‘virtually present’ everywhere. and particularly maritime mobility. another Okinawa Prefecture island.128 of 154 seized the Paracel Islands from Vietnam. including 75 major warships and more than 60 submarines. Beijing has elevated the ‘the cow tongue’ to a vital national interest. and the prospect of intercepting a maneuvering ballistic missile reentry vehicle is daunting. the key US issue was ensuring freedom of the seas. on April 13 a Chinese Navy destroyer performed the menacing act of aiming its rapid-fire guns at a Japanese MSDF P-3C plane. China has mastered quiet air-independent propulsion (AIP) power plants for its new Type 041 Yuan-class boats. the elusive AIP diesel electrics are equipped with wake-honing torpedoes and anti-ship cruise missiles. Likewise. which was on a regular patrol mission in international airspace. an ultra-quiet Song–class AIP submarine surfaced inside the protective screen of the aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk. But ‘virtual presence’ is actual ragged with global responsibilities. These maritime disputes are cast against the backdrop of decades of Chinese naval build-up. farther north. Last year. Reportedly quieter than the US fast attack Los Angeles-class boats. Second. China’s grand effort to convert large swaths of the oceans into an area under Chinese suzerainty is a dangerous game that risks naval war. This is unlike any threat ever faced by the US Navy.’ China is reaching far beyond its shores. a 10-ship Chinese flotilla. Malaysia and Brunei. the New York Times reported that Chinese officials had told Deputy Secretary of State James B. run hard-pressed to maintain a force of 11 carriers. China’s geographic position. transited between Okinawa Island and Miyakojima. the third US conflict was the War of 1812. 88 major surface combatants and 48 submarines. For the first time. The first war fought by an independent United States was over the issue of freedom of the seas—the 17981800 Quasi-War with France. But in March. In February. In 1988. While the United States has the forward-deployed USS George Washington on a short tether. demonstrating its ability to shoot down the aircraft. Chinese ground . 31 amphibious warfare ships. Third. most of the rocks and reefs of the Spratly and Paracel chains are merely navigational hazards and not ‘islands. the United States devotes only 26 percent of its defense budget to the Navy and Marine Corps. AIP extends underwater endurance from a few days to one month. and the fourth war involving the United States was the Second Barbary War. meaning that even two or three Chinese carriers operating in the area likely will exceed the number of US flattops. China is working feverishly on a new weapon that will alter the strategic calculus—the 1. The cornerstone of American power and security is global access. All of Beijing’s warships and land-based aircraft and submarines already are present in theater. the Center for Naval Analysis issued a report suggesting that none of this is hyperbole: the US Navy is at the tipping point.500-mile range DF-21 ASBM. But by claiming the South China Sea as its ‘territory. China has embarked on a program to build a powerful surface fleet. The DF-21 will be armed with a maneuverable reentry vehicle (MARV) that. and the US strategy is tacit recognition that the Navy that had approached 600 ships in the 1980s is incapable of maintaining even half that number. in the Gulf of Tonkin. which will include aircraft carriers. attracts more than 33 percent of the nation’s military spending. and in 1994 Beijing captured Mischief Reef from the Philippines. specifically designed to decapitate US carrier strike groups. who notably coined the phrase ‘strategic reassurance’ to describe the idea that the United States should reassure China that its rise to prominence is welcome. and the country’s intransigent and tireless peddling of patently illegal maritime claims. and the entire force is complemented by hundreds of fast cruise-missiles shooting offshore patrol vessels and land-based aircraft. the issue of freedom of the seas helped precipitate US involvement in two world wars and. while China should in turn reassure its neighbors that its rise is peaceful. Fourth. Several factors are in play as China unveils a stable of advanced and emerging systems. Taiwan. For each of these conflicts. and enables submarines to sprint underwater—greatly increasing their attack radius. all spread thinly throughout the world. can be used to strike moving warships at sea. has shrunk by 20 percent since 2001. First.

was a "product of the past. China is riding a wave of national overconfidence at the same time many regard the United States as preoccupied with counterinsurgency in central Asia. These emotions fuel a ballooning sense of past wrongs to be compensated and future entitlements to be seized. Beijing has used a complicated system of foreign currency controls to effectively shield the renminbi from global capital flows. “China Plans Path to Economic Hegemony”. As of last week. in its global shopping spree. In written interviews with the Wall Street Journal and the Washington Post.spiegel. If that happens. upon suddenly experiencing a growth spurt. Secret Lectures on Reserve Currencies Years ago. China would have to give up all of this. Even before he left Beijing. Brimming with uncontained satisfaction—even joy—at its relentless ascent. clumsily begins to throw around his weight. the prospect is remote that the US Navy alone will recalibrate the balance of sea power. The occasion for the new superpower's confident campaign was the state visit of President Hu Jintao.html. This suggests two outcomes. Dollar heg -. Caught up in the fanfare of the country’s meteoric rise. The United States superseded the British Empire after World War II.129 of 154 command and control is connected by spoof-proof hard-wire landlines. with US President Barack Obama. dominant not only on land." China's long-term goal is to become a country with an anchor currency.yuan will overtake it.de/international/business/0. Today the renminbi -. their stars and the super-rich will appear 300 times a day in a giant advertisement for the People's Republic. strategically listless and brooding. hardly a week goes by in which China does not launch new pilot projects to "internationalize" the yuan in the long term.741303. Nevertheless. Wagner ’11. Moreover. It would have to gradually appreciate its currency. The second possibility is that other nations—foremost among them Japan and India—but also including virtually every other nation in the region from Russia to Vietnam. 68. http://www. Fifth. Wieland.Writer for Spiegel International (1/26/11. but in the Western Pacific.cannot even be freely exchanged into another currency. perhaps even allowing it to float freely. China has a lot on its plate. as the United States buckles under the strain of enormous budget deficits.00. In order to have a reserve currency. such as in the commodities markets. These developments don’t leave a lot of room for optimism. when the dollar replaced the British pound as the dominant currency in the global financial system. forcing other countries to maintain reserves of Chinese money and providing significant advantages for Beijing.1518. Hu and the Politburo attended secret lectures in which Chinese professors explained the history of the rise and fall of major powers. They have made it to the heart of American capitalism. which the Chinese believe has irrevocably harmed their American rival. China could then use its own currency to conduct transactions. This explains why Beijing has pursued the internationalization of the yuan since the outbreak of the global financial crisis. The first is that China will indeed achieve its goal of becoming the Asian hegemonic power. China rise inevitable – US tactics to undermine Chinese credibility have failed and increased Chinese confidence to project power Petras 10 – James. je) China would like to make the yuan one of the world's anchor currencies. will begin to think more overtly about collective measures and how they can balance the growing power of Beijing. gaining more favorable terms as a result. New York and adjunct professor at Saint Mary's University ." which is adorned with a portrait of Mao -. China behaves like the gangly teenager who.the official name in China for the "people's money. Until now. the dollar and the euro. other countries will have to maintain reserves of the yuan instead of the current reserve currencies. the Chinese leaders realized that no modern country has ever become a superpower without a reserve currency. Yet the country cannot continue to keep the value of its currency artificially low if it hopes to become the world's dominant economic power. During these sessions. China is overflowing with ethnic and cultural pride and itching to ‘teach lessons’ and settle old scores. Any maritime conflict with the United States (or Japan) will push China teetering over the edge of a war fever not seen since the Guns of August. the images of Chinese astronauts and athletes. This would make the country's exports substantially more expensive and would drastically curb growth. To keep the prices of its exports artificially low. the country also essentially links the exchange rate of its currency to the dollar. For four weeks. the Chinese leader said that the world's monetary system. so that the exchange rate could be based on the real value of the currency and the strength of China's economy. retired Bartle Professor (Emeritus) of Sociology at Binghamton University in Binghamton. Spiegel International. the pioneers in China's race to the top have been displayed on a giant electronic billboard in New York's Times Square. with the US dollar as its reserve currency. the visiting head of state had predicted that the dominant capitalist power could expect to see a redistribution of global power.

specializes in business and government technology and security (5/31/10.” http://lahaine. spaced-based reconnaissance. Among the anti-access/area-denial (A2AD) capabilities being fielded by China include anti-satellite weapons. essentially dividing the Pacific between the US and China and ending US hegemony on that ocean. its allies and partners: acquiesce in a dramatic shift in the military balance or take steps to preserve it. recognizing it as a “world power” which has to “share responsibilities” 33 . Washington demands China support sanctions to weaken and degrade Iran to enhance US military power in the Gulf 34 .html. like the US today. China Will End US Hegemony in the Pacific Buxbaum ’10. While human rights propaganda serves as the stick to beat back China’s economic advance. surveillance and target acquisition. to allow the US to gain trade advantages to reduce (“rebalance”) its trade deficit. while China has invested billions in joint ventures with Iran and has developed a growing lucrative trading relation. Likewise. US diplomats frame this approach by emphasizing “treating China as an equal”. on climate. and ballistic and cruise missiles. at a recent speech hosted by the Heritage Foundation. the two determining powers in the world. the White House has promoted a “united front” with the EU against China’s supposedly “protectionism”. deflect attention from its worldwide long term and large scale violation of human rights accompanying its global empire building and build an anti-China coalition. “currency manipulation” and other “unfair” economic practices 35 . For example. chief of US naval operations. while ignoring its own massive offenses and downplaying those of its allies like the Jewish state of Israel. US .org/petras/b2-img/petras_sinous. seduce. By discrediting China internal politics. at the expense of China’s economic interests.freelance journalist based near Washington. unmanned aerial vehicles.130 of 154 (4/28/10. Oil Price. Alternating between positive symbolic gestures. At international gatherings like the recent Copenhagen Conference on climate warming. or Washington undertakes actions to offset or counterbalance the effects of the PLA’s military buildup.com/Geo-Politics/International/Chinese-Plans-to-End-US-Hegemony-in-the-Pacific. The A2AD buildup threatens the US forward presence and power projection in the region.C.pdf) Established empires in decline.This situation creates a strategic choice for the United States. if we translate the meaning of the White House’s demand for China to “assume responsibility” for “rebalancing the world economy” it boils down to telling Beijing to reduce its dynamic growth.]." said a report recently released by the Washington-based Center for Budgetary and Strategic Assessments. Over time this imperial offensive to slow its decline has provoked an increasingly aggressive response as China gains confidence in its capacity to project power. and much sooner than many expect[. perhaps to prohibitive levels. have a repertoire of levers designed to discredit. which extends as far as Guam and New Guinea." All of this has US military planners and thinkers worried. But political problems and budgetary woes could kill the program before it ever gets started. The Chinese also have an emerging and muscular deep-water navy. “Rising and Declining Economic Powers: The Sino-US Conflict Deepens. je) The US is developing an air-sea battle concept to counter China's military buildup. Chinese military and political doctrine holds that China should rule the waves out to the second island chain of the western Pacific. the State Department hopes to inflate US moral authority.. "The PLA navy is increasing its numbers of submarines and other ships. "Navies tend to grow with economies and as trade becomes more important. Peter. isolate and contain rising world powers like China and put it on the defensive. advanced fighter aircraft. highlighting China’s human rights violations. advanced radar systems. Washington also attempts to induce China’s cooperation in slowing down its decline. "the cost incurred by the US military to operate in the [w]estern Pacific will likely rise sharply. a conservative Washington think tank. China should give up its market driven economic expansion to share “responsibility” in policing the world in which the US is supreme. "Unless Beijing diverts from its current course of action. China's People's Liberation Army is building up anti-access and area-denial capabilities with the apparent goal of extending their power to the western half of the Pacific Ocean." In response to the Chinese challenge. Behind this diplomatic rhetoric is an effort to harness China to a policy of collaborating and following US empire building strategies as a junior partner. D. the GATT meeting on trade liberalization and the UN meeting on Iran. One of the longest standing political ploys is Washington’s human rights propaganda campaign. In other words. deflecting attention from the facts of Chinese compliance in setting standards superior to the US 36 . Washington attempts to satanize China as the main obstacle in reaching global accords. http://oilprice. opposing protectionism and seeking a negotiated settlement with Iran. such as references to the US and China as the (G-2)." said Admiral Gary Roughead. electromagnetic weapons.. “Chinese Plans to End US Hegemony in the Pacific”.

a new capability for them.. short-range over than long-range strike systems. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill." he added. "Carrier operations are very complex. especially in light of the budget squeeze. "To win one 100 victories in 100 battles is not the acme of skill.. is to deny adversaries a quick victory. such as greater integration between the US Navy and Air Force. The US also faces the problem of bolstering the confidence of its allies. as reflected in the Quadrennial Defense Review released earlier this year. As a recent article in the Washington Post noted. "the bigger questions are what the intentions of the Chinese are and how the carriers will be used. The Art of War. at a recent Washington gathering. and a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. involving the development of specific military capabilities. Admiral Roughead noted that the US Navy has a strong operational relationship with the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force." noted Senator Joseph Lieberman. In a speech earlier this month. China could win a war on the Pacific without firing a shot. CSBA president and report co-author Andrew Krepinevich told ISN Security Watch." he said." advocates "a more Asia-centric view of Japan's place in the world. an independent from Connecticut. But the program has its political dimension as well: to reassure US allies. DoD continues to invest in capabilities that assume that the status quo will prevail in the western Pacific. In fact. multifaceted defense posture. US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned military commanders not to expect to get everything they ask for. AirSea Battle. the JMFDS could easily develop a closer relationship with the Chinese navy. That position does not promote sharp decision making that allocates scarce resources to emerging threats.131 of 154 strategic planners and thinkers are exploring a concept known as 'AirSea Battle. "Besides. and keep them from succumbing to Chinese pressure despite the apparent decline of US capabilities in the western Pacific. "Admiral Roughead is conducting an AirSea Battle study inside the Pentagon. Spurring the need for AirSea Battle. "It took us 70 years to get where we are.]. "only the second opposition party to take power in nearly 50 years. for example." But the US may already be losing the hearts and minds of the Japanese.' the subject of the new CSBA report. Roughead acknowledged reports that the Chinese are planning to deploy one or more aircraft carriers to the Pacific.[R]ealistically." . But if the Asia-centric attitudes in Japan prevail." But US allies in the region might not see things that way. but dismissed any potential threat to US interests. particularly the Japanese. real or perceived. according to the CSBA report. The big squeeze Looming in the background are the budgetary constraints now being placed on the Pentagon. is a complex set of concepts. and operating concepts. including coercion or aggression. towards developing a balanced." Although the immediate crisis on the Korean peninsula is having the effect of cementing US-Japanese relations-the Japanese government has accepted a plan it once rejected to relocate a US Marine base on Okinawa-it is not clear how long that attitude will last." A key objective of AirSea Battle. The projection of Chinese power on the Pacific may be enough for them to perceive their interests differently. "The gusher has been turned off. to defend its allies and partners could lead to regional instability. emphasizing. Gates has displayed a proclivity. is that "China will attempt to achieve a quick victory by inflicting such damage that the US would choose to discontinue the fight or driving a major US ally out of the war. Japan's current government. "Most US allies in the region and lack strategic depth and must be supported and defended from the sea. as outlined in the CSBA report. As Sun Tzu said in his classic." said Krepinevich." he said." Pursuing AirSea Battle would require a reordering of Pentagon priorities. then. If US allies fold in the face of increasing Chinese power. it is highly unlikely that we will achieve the real [budget] growth rates necessary to sustain the current force structure. that would offset the Chinese buildup. US inability. "US success will depend heavily on Japan’s active participation as an ally. such as long-range strike systems. "and will stay off for a good period of time[.

We also need to make sure we have enough of those big floating boats they land them on too.000 new helicopters. "As long as China seeks to rise to become world number one ." Liu writes in his newly published Chinese-language book. je) While we are busy cutting our military budget the Russians are following the lead of the Chinese and building up.com/article/2010/03/01/us-china-usa-military-exclusiveidUSTRE6200P620100301. Russia Still Believes They Are A Superpower. dominance”. the U. “China PLA officer urges challenging U. Tibet. then even if China is even more capitalist than the U. We need to make the commitment to maintain the dominant military that keeps us all safe. director of the independent Interfax-Military News Agency. There are plenty of folks in Congress salivating over the size of the program and dreaming of all the other things they could spend that money on. His 303-page book stands out for its boldness even in a recent chorus of strident Chinese voices demanding a hard shove back against Washington over trade. http://bigpeace. Jim.reuters." writes Liu. It would be naive to pretend that a Russia run by Putin is not a threat or that the Chinese will not take advantage of the leverage they have due to well owning us." writes Liu. it is not healthy to emasculate our ability to deter our enemies. . risking war despite Beijing's hopes for a "peaceful rise. then inevitably it will become a straggler that is cast aside. the top power. "The China Dream.Editor of Big Peace focusing on the practitioners of our national security policies on the groundserved as a Weapons Sergeant in 1st Special Forces Group across most of the Pacific Rim.writes and produces videos for the award-winning military site Blackfive (3/3/11. says it could create “a whole new ballgame. and 8 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines.S." "If China in the 21st century cannot become world number one. http://www. cannot become the top power. 600 combat planes. needs strong conventional forces to reduce its overreliance on its aging Soviet-era nuclear missile deterrent.S. Moscow – The graying bear is getting a make-over. Valentin Rudenko.. the self-ruled island Beijing claims as its own. Reuters News. Liu Mingfu.Staff Writer for Reuters News (2/28/10. 100 warships. Now as much as I like spending cuts. Russia and China are Challenging US Power Hanson ’11. who warns that his nation's ascent will alarm Washington. including a $650 billion program to procure 1. while already the world’s fifth-largest military spender.. a professor at the elite National Defense University.com/jhanson/2011/03/03/russia-still-believes-they-are-a-superpower/. which trains rising officers. Russia’s military is launching its biggest rearmament effort since Soviet times. The call for China to abandon modesty about its global goals and "sprint to become world number one" comes from a People's Liberation Army (PLA) Senior Colonel. Analysts say Russia.” Yeah a ball game where we decided to sit out a few innings. je) China should build the world's strongest military and move swiftly to topple the United States as the global "champion." a senior Chinese PLA officer says in a new book reflecting swelling nationalist ambitions. human rights. and arms sales to Taiwan. Buckley ’10.132 of 154 Yes – China/Russia Counterbalancing China’s counterbalancing US dominance. Chris.S. We already canceled the F-22 and the real concern is whether we will support the F-35 program now that it is our main fighter.." "China's big goal in the 21st century is to become world number one. will still be determined to contain it. Big Peace.

like Libya. independently from the US. Yet. Yet the direction of such foreign policy remains unclear. “The vote on Libya reflects to a certain extent the new international order that is taking shape”EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 5 The vote on Libya offered an encouraging signal with Russia and China constructively abstaining rather than using their veto power. but remain prudent enough to avoid endangering their rise by investing too much in revisionist postures. This international order in the making is less dominated by Washington as it becomes more multipolar. Emerging powers have become sufficiently assertive to confront the West on some issues (sometimes individually. after the disastrous experiences in Afghanistan and in Iraq – both conflicts which were supposed to end quickly. The US is now less interventionist by choice and by necessity – in this new international order. The Libyan crisis was a first illustration of what happens when the US takes a backseat. they are more likely to develop a sophisticated foreign policy. First characteristic of the new international order: it seems less and less American as illustrated by the relatively discrete profile adopted by Washington on the whole Libyan crisis – and the Arab uprisings in general.edu/32037/1/SPB20-Libya-in-new-worldorder. As the 2012 presidential election is nearing. The era of “you are with us or against us” is inevitably over. Could they be next in the driving seat? Second characteristic: the emerging global order is probably more fragmented than during the previous bipolar era. US influence and ability to mediate conflicts is declining. Europe and the emerging powers are just discovering what this “post-American world” means in practice. Global interdependence per se is not new.pdf) The vote on Libya reflects to a certain extent the new international order that is taking shape. Obama seems also unwilling to wage another unpopular war. .” http://aei. The soft-spoken American posture is a clear political choice related to domestic pressures but it is also a matter of necessity. This is a world of strategic opportunities where established and emerging powers can increasingly pursue their own agenda. This fragmentation makes international cooperation to solve global challenges more difficult. let alone to lead.pitt. world leaders are contemplating this new American posture with interest. and it is less predictable as emerging powers grasp new strategic opportunities to push forward their influence and ultimately their interests. Another important explanatory factor is the American reluctance to commit to another potential long war. the world is increasingly interdependent and interconnected as largely illustrated by the recent economic crisis.133 of 154 UQ – Yes Heg Decline Shift to multipolarity now Renard 11 – Thomas. but according to some scholars today’s interdependence is creating favourable conditions for international cooperation. For now. Research Fellow in the Europe in the World Program at Egmont – Royal Institute for International Relations (April 2011. at the moment. Europe is in the driving seat and in spite of the chaotic ride due to intraEuropean divisions. As emerging powers continue to build their global footprint and to develop global interests. But from Brasilia to Beijing. Part of the explanation for this discrete profile lies in the personality of Barack Obama who has developed a much more cautious approach to international problems in comparison with his predecessor. Whether this constructive posture will develop as the rule or will remain an exception remains to be seen. particularly in the Arab world. sometimes as a bloc). notably due to the so called multipolarization of the international order. the tension between factors of fragmentation (possibly leading to a fracture?) and cohesion maintains the international system in flux and makes it less predictable. as the phantoms of military and economic overstretch are present in all minds. there is inevitably a third explanation for America’s discrete profile on Libya: the US is slowly losing its uncontested hegemony in international security. Washington must choose carefully its priorities in terms of foreign policy for it is simply no longer able to be present simultaneously on every front. This looks very much like the “post-American world” described by Fareed Zakaria. On the other hand. for there is simply no alternative to address some of the most pressing global challenges. Thus. “Libya and the Post-American World: Implications for the EU. America still feels pretty safe.

Non-U. eight of the ten largest motor vehicle makers and electric and gas utilities. A nation can run deficits in its trade in goods and still be in overall balance in its dealings with foreign countries. irregularly and with periodic revivals. merchandise deficit has become too big to be paid for by services sold to foreigners plus remittances on investments. seven of the ten largest petroleum refiners. capital has in it.S. the share of private world savings held in European currencies increased from 13 percent to 37 percent. In global finance. and the Netherlands. Japan had sixteen. while the European Union (EU) had 23 percent—40 percent if intra-EU exports were counted. royalties. with a combined gross domestic product (GDP) seven-tenths that of the United States. dividends. “U. Slow Merge Ahead: Hegemony Since the 1970s An idea of the decline of American economic power can be formed from the following:1 In 1950 the United States supplied half the world’s gross product. the share of EU-based companies increased from 41 to 46 percent. as was the case for Britain in South Africa (1899–1902) and the United States in Vietnam (1962–1975). almost constantly in surplus from 1895 to 1977. the United Kingdom. http://monthlyreview. four of seven airlines. Twenty-one percent of the world’s stock of direct investment in other countries was American in 2001. Since 1971. Germany. together.org/2003/12/01/u-s-hegemony-continuing-decline-enduring-danger. telecommunications. Deficits in trade in goods can be offset by having a positive balance in sales of services abroad (financial. And since 1990. balance of international payments is chalking up record deficits. Of the twenty-five largest mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in the United States in 1998–2000. twenty-three were American. regulating.S. the positive balance on investment income has been shriveling as foreign investment in the United States has grown faster than U. they accounted for 5 percent of the value of all M&A deals during these years. Half the foreign exchange reserves held by the world’s central banks were composed of dollars in 1990 compared to 76 percent in 1976. je) “Global hegemony” might be defined as a situation in which one nation-state plays a predominant role in organizing. The weak link is the dollar. and the like). Forty-four percent of new bonds have been issued in euros since the new currency was introduced in 1999.S. (General Electric and Citigroup). The use of armed force has always been an inseparable part of hegemony.S. Hegemony: Continuing Decline. the fastest growing part of the world economy.S. the proportion rose back to 68 percent in 2001 because of the phasing out of ecus (reserves issued to European banks by the European Monetary Institute) to make way for the euro. interest.S. compared with 47 percent in 1960. is now deteriorating sharply. stood at 24 percent in 2001. The U. Of the top twenty corporations involved in cross-border M&As from 1987 through 2001. insurance. while the dollar’s share fell from 67 to 40 percent. Even during the golden days of 1944–1971 the United States was unable to avoid military defeat in Vietnam and a draw in Korea. 17 percent of all new direct investment abroad came from the United States and 16 percent from Great Britain. and is of dubious value in preserving the global economic order and the stake that U. only two were U. In 2002. 25 percent in 1999. accounting for nine of the ten largest electronics and electrical equipment manufacturers. Bryn Mawr College (7/13/11. five of ten pharmaceutical firms. two German). whose status as the world’s key currency has been eroding since the 1970s. France. although the two largest were Citigroup and Bank of America. the share of U. six of ten telecommunications companies. five involved takeovers by foreign multinationals (three British. against 21 percent at present.S. The United States still has immense—unequalled—power in international economics and politics. when the United States had a deficit in its trade in goods (merchandise) for the first time in seventy-eight years.S. nineteen were non-U. The U. Of the top one hundred corporations in the world in 2000 ranked by foreign-held assets.S. but vulnerable. the balance turned negative: for the first time the United States is paying foreigners more investment income from their . and stabilizing the world political economy.S. and between the two world wars was no longer able to function as underwriter to the world system. Of the twentyfive largest banks in the world. Issue 07 (December).S. hegemony began during the Second World War and peaked some thirty years later. share of exports of commercial services. current account (the sum of the balances in trade in goods and services plus net income from overseas investment). exports have exceeded imports only in 1973 and 1975. Monthly Review. but even as the sole superpower it finds itself less able than it once was to influence and control the course of events abroad. Enduring Danger”. the United States is not only less dominant. France and Belgium-Luxembourg supplied 21 percent. During the 1990s. and it raises the danger of imperial overreach. It cannot be deployed to answer every threat to geopolitical and economic interests.S. banks. Between 1981 and 1995. four of six chemical producers. Volume 55. Richard. But the U. Its military supremacy is no longer matched in the economic and political spheres. Britannia ruled the waves from 1815 to 1913. but by the 1890s she was under economic challenge from the United States and Germany.134 of 154 DuBoff ’11Professor Emeritus of Economics. but military power depends upon the economic resources at the disposal of the state. Together. Sixty percent of the world’s manufacturing production in 1950 came from the United States. had forty. multinationals in the foreign sales of the world’s one hundred largest multinationals decreased from 30 to 25 percent. U. the merchandise deficit has become too big to be paid for by services sold to foreigners. companies dominated major industries in 2002.2 For the first time since the Second World War there is another source of universally acceptable payment and liquidity in the world economy —at a moment when the U. investment abroad. closing in on the 48 percent issued in dollars. During 1996–2001. advertising and other business services) and/or income from overseas investments (profits.

Interest rates in the United States might surge. Great Britain’s current account was in surplus. the current account deficit is covered by borrowing. sterling.” Thus. 2011. ceasing to invest in U. The EU. U. “OPEC will not discount entirely the possibility of adopting euro pricing and payments in the future. South Africa. stocks and bonds.3 So far the global investor class has seemed willing to finance America’s external deficits. when income from services and foreign investment was larger than its merchandise trade deficits. rents were shrinking when converted from dollars back home. corporate bonds and stocks. Multipolarity now -. Yet their weight is such that it is key for the first tier players to take them in account. Norway and Britain. German investments in choice office properties in New York. Treasury bonds. The deficits are exerting a downward drag on the dollar. In any event the dollar is now perceived to be as risky an asset as the euro and possibly two or three other currencies (yen.S. and elsewhere were cut back sharply in 2003. and 13 percent of corporate stock. Japan. political system and stage of development. it poses a challenge to the era of Western hegemony at the level of system values and rules of the game. but it may not be forever. and real estate). No. Like most gaps between income and expenses. Vol. In a speech in Spain in April 2002. 24 percent of all U. they can use them to buy American assets (U. “China. In 2002.” http://www. governments). residents (individuals. companies are continuing to invest abroad. because of its share of world GDP and world trade could be a first tier actor. China’s ascent engenders a fundamental change in yet another sense.S.S. 1.S.S. Russia. the head of OPEC’s Market Analysis Department. The Euro-zone has a bigger share of global trade than the US and…a more balanced external accounts position. the integration of Japan a generation ago.8 percent of GDP.” Adoption of the euro by Europe’s principal oil producers. Treasury marketable debt. so why go to the United States.be/biccs/site/assets/files/apapers/China. professor of international relations at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel and director of the Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies (European Review. and consumers would pay more for imported goods. but unlike the British Empire in the decades before the First World War.-owned assets abroad. San Francisco.%20the%20EU%20and %20Multipolarity-2. the ‘integration of China into the existing global economic order will thus be more difficult than was. companies. and the New Multipolarity. foreigners owned 41 percent of U.pdf) The emerging multipolar structure is a multilayered one: it consists of two tiers (see Table 2). corporate bonds. averaging 3 to 4 percent of GDP every year from 1850 to 1913. Swiss franc). 57–67. 19. borrowing money would become harder. Iraq switched to the euro in 2000 (presumably terminated with extreme prejudice in March 2003).vub.’ 3 China’s rise is not . Brazil. the large European states and the remaining members of the G20. but to fully qualify it would have to upgrade its hard power base: economic capability. arousing suspicion that the United States favors a cheaper dollar to help pay off its ballooning trade deficit. political competence and military strength. Because of China’s being different in terms of culture. While the buildings were becoming cheaper in euros. the United States is unable to finance those investments from its current account. As the dollar declines in value. the United States borrowed $503 billion from abroad. Javad Yarjani. could create “a momentum to shift the oil pricing system to euros.5 trillion more than U. By contrast. Therefore.”5 If foreign investors get cold feet. This is how the United States turned into a debtor nation in 1986. 8 The second tier comprises most regional powers like India. In the first tier we have the US and an ever more powerful China. A dollar rout could cause skittish investors to dump U.S. foreign-owned assets in the United States are now worth $2. They matter in a number of important international issue areas but are lacking in comprehensive power. industries or selling off their dollar holdings. By mid-2003. draining income from other purchases and dampening the economy. the dollar would start falling faster. All these differences reduce the likelihood that Beijing will easily accept the systemic responsibilities that Western key players associate with great power status. Geeraerts 11 – Gustaaf. “We can get the same return in Britain and the Nordic countries. and Iran has considered a conversion since 1999. where the currency risk is greater?” asked the chief investment officer of a Munich-based property fund. saw little chance of change “in the near future…[but] in the long run the euro is not at such a disadvantage versus the dollar.S. sending Wall Street into a dive.rising powers. history. economy. When foreigners receive dollars from transactions with U.135 of 154 holdings here than it receives from its own investments abroad.S. a record 4. concluded Yarjani. companies. the EU.4 Until recently all Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) sold their oil for dollars only.ac. the return to foreign investors on dollar-denominated assets falls. say.

S. LexisNexis) The biggest secret to be revealed by WikiLeaks should have been the easiest to spot without the website's classified document dump: U. There is . and Iranian nuclear ambitions. Some expect that China too will inevitably go down this road. Journalist and economist for Reuters Breakviews (November 30. the EU. That underscores a heightened risk for global investors that without U. hegemony.136 of 154 only changing the distribution of power in the system.” National Post's Financial Post & FP Investing. they expect multilateralism to be a crucial ingredient of Beijing’s foreign policy. the US and the EU would prefer to integrate China in the global governance structures they established and safeguarded in the past few decades and hope for a reproduction of the existing system.S. Some point out that. 57–67. Then after 1873 the decline of Britain's relative economic strength and the later build-up of the German navy reduced Britain's power and led to increased protectionism. British hegemony pushed the global economy toward free trade and defused regional rivalries and armaments wars. It's hard to avoid the overall impression from the disclosure of 250.Europe and China are filling in. In the early and middle 19th century. professor of international relations at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel and director of the Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies (European Review. The outcome is that Iran's attempts to establish a nuclear capability and North Korea's aggression against its southern neighbour have been met with no effective response. hegemony is on the wane. Understandably. 10 Heg is on the decline -. As a consequence of increased international engagement and increasing economic interests abroad.S. Others point out that China is developing within a system with strongly established international institutions. regional rivalries may turn nasty. South Korea and Panama free trade deals. “China. provided its intentions are reasonably benevolent. leadership. which it makes ample use of to sustain its growth. Europe and China are geopolitically more proximate than ever before. hence its petty retaliation against certain Chinese exports and its monetary policies perceived as mercantilist that encourage other countries to erect barriers to free movement of goods and capital. Geeraerts 11 – Gustaaf. and the New Multipolarity. 2010.it will foster cooperation and stability -. Yet the question remains to what extent Beijing will use its growing influence to transform the international system and bring its rules and institutions more in line with the country’s national interests.vub.000 secret State Department cables that the 1990s vision of U. it also engenders a change in the distribution of identities. 10 As China is already firmly integrated in the current international regimes and benefits from their smooth functioning.%20the%20EU%20and %20Multipolarity-2.pdf) China and Europe are both regional powers with broad global interests. while the Doha global free trade talks are stone dead.US multilateral actions and wikileaks prove Hutchinson 10 – Martin.” http://www. No. supremacy and peaceful globalization is irrevocably ending. Beijing actually has a profound interest in seeing that the international rules and institutions function effectively. The United States can no longer afford to act as an unquestionably benign trade hegemon. Yet it is far from clear how Beijing will seek to manage its position in the evolving international system and how it will strike the balance between power politics and multilateralism. Vol. the United States led the way toward global trade expansion.S. Multipolarity coming -. 9 They expect power politics to gradually take the upper hand. The WikiLeaks documents show the United States attempting to assemble regional alliances to address problems like North Korea's continued isolation from the global community. increasing risk premiums in their respective regions and across the globe. 2011. In previous decades. There are a number of risk-reducing advantages to the world in having a clearly defined hegemon. 1. precisely during critical power transitions. armaments wars and eventually decades of global conflict and violence. trade barriers rise and fiscal policies destroy wealth. for example.be/biccs/site/assets/files/apapers/China. many emerging powers in the past have relinquished their resistance against imperialist policies by gradually starting to apply the very strategies themselves: the use of coercion to chase unequal economic gains.ac. “WikiLeaks exposes waning U. 19. the creation of spheres of influence and the formation of alliances to prevent hostile powers from obstructing these ventures. Today there appears no longer to be a Congressional consensus to ratify even the limited Colombia. Yet its efforts in these areas have been ineffectual as the nation's power to coerce and cajole has been reduced by its relative economic and military decline. as did Britain in the 19th century.

midasletter. As the unipolar moment fades.137 of 154 an important joint interest to promote stability and sustainable development in those regions that we share in our extended neighbourhoods. nothing. and Greenspan/Bernanke administrations. draining wars. Associate Director of the Frederick A. and others. the weakening of its military due to a series of unproductive.'s brief reign as world superpower has been marked by the continuing application of No long-term strategies. . and enhance maritime security. global hegemony was its manufacturing base. to guarantee that our policies benefit lasting stability and development. Erb Institute for Global Sustainable Enterprise (4/18/09. a strategic axis between China and Europe built on mutual benefit and understanding will be indispensable. There is a strong need to work together to enhance security. je) The U. If Beijing and Brussels are serious about changing the nature of great power politics. Successful bilateral cooperation will be key in promoting global peaceful development. This area was rock-solid during the 50s and 60s. Rubin/Summers/Lindsay/Snow/Paulson/Geithner. We have to avoid that these regions develop into a belt of insecurity that endangers our development. Midas Letter. tackle non-traditional security threats. doing what it takes to get reelected.S. no game plans. Europe and China could be in the vanguard here as well. and South-Central Asia. Andy. which will be key in boosting positive power vis-a`-vis others. and Barbara M. Just politicians being politicians. Africa. All along the "foundation" of U. Thanks to the natural weakening of this foundation. but this should be cooperative and aim at sharing the costs of maintaining security. but effective multilateralism also implies that all parties are committed to overcoming diverging expectations and trying to reach a pragmatic consensus on how to make foreign policies complementary and mutually supportive. Such a contest would severely weaken the two player’s chances for sustainable internal development. In this order the major powers will have to balance between meeting increasing international expectations and persistent strong internal needs. http://www.S. with the hope that things will get better. China.com/commentary/090418-2_US-hegemonythe-beginning-and-the-end.S. multilateral organizations need to reflect the emerging new international order. both sides need each other if they are to develop an alternative for harsh international anarchy. In spite of all the friction and misunderstanding. to limit the impact of environmental hazards. and the growth of more significant manufacturing powers such as Japan. It is legitimate that growing interests bring the need to exert influence. to invest in the safety of our energy supplies. “U. but has proven to be fleeting in the 90s and 00s due to the decline in America's finances. to support effective governance. there are no longer anymore viable "band-aids" to apply. It will also give them the scope to strengthen their internal unity. We are moving steadily towards a new multipolar world order. Europe and China have shown themselves anxious not to slide into another era of great power rivalry. horribly counterproductive actions taken during Clinton/Bush/Obama. This is particularly the case of the Middle East. Global Hegemony .php. The emerging multilayered and culturally diversified multipolarity will make global governance much more complex and is by no means a guarantee for multilateralism. To be effective.Professor of Sustainable Enterprise at the University of Michigan.The Beginning and the End”. US Hegemony is Ending Hoffman ’09. as well as the short-term "band-aids" to try and buy time.

S. Coupled with the costly military intervention in Iraq.S. can continue calling the shots in the Middle East by holding the hands of Hosni Mubarak. Obama not only recognizes that the U.S. 2011. understands that . is constrained in its ability to determine outcomes in the Middle East. He also the continuing U. Not unlike Winston Churchill who insisted that Britain could retain its empire after 1945.S. Indeed. by establishing a No-Fly Zone in Libya.S.S." And without the U. some Americans (and Israelis) fantasize that the U. waltzing with Hosni or threatening to shoot down Kaddafi's planes or imposing more sanctions on Ahmenajid will only create expectations for renewed U. leadership that are not going to be fulfilled.138 of 154 UQ – Yes Heg Decline (Middle East) US heg is irreversibly declining -. support for imposing a no-fly zone in Libya is based on the assumption that France and Britain are going to take up the leading military role in the operation with the Americans providing some limited tactical support in enforcing the zone and is "not going to deploy ground troops into Libya. preoccupation with that region doesn't allow Washington to invest the required time and resources in maintaining its position in East Asia where core interests U.S. willing to deploy its troops in new military interventions. the U.S. while a recent Washington Post polls suggested that 64 percent of Americans believe that the war in Afghanistan is not worth fighting. and the diverging U.” http://www. In fact. cannot be described as anything other than a devastating blow to U. can do to reverse this process. or by taking a tougher line against Iran. “Obama Turns Failure into Success in the Middle East. strategic interests.org/pub_display. there is no support in Washington for opening a new military front in the region.php? pub_id=12903) The downfall of the pro-American autocrats in Tunisia and Egypt and the growing threat to regimes that are either allied with Washington (Bahrain) or doing business with it (Yemen). are at stake. the deadlocked Israeli-Palestinian peace process." as Obama stressed over the weekend. a Gallup poll indicated that 50 percent of the public supports the notion that the U.S. "should mind its own business internationally and let other countries get along the best they can on their own.Middle East and North Africa Hadar 11 – Leon.S.cato. and Turkish interests — it becomes obvious that the age of U. the inconclusive war in Afghanistan. But with a military overstretched in Iraq and Afghanistan and with a budget deficit rising to the stratosphere.S.S. research fellow at the Cato Institute (March 22. hegemony in the Middle East is over. Iran's nuclear military program. And there is not much that the U.

Confiscatory taxes on the millionaire/billionaires especially the entire ‘Wall Street” ruling elite. Ending political links and billion dollar subsidies to militarized states like Israel and lifting sanctions on major economic markets like Iran will decrease outflows from the US treasury and enhance economic inflows and opportunities for productive sectors throughout the 1.” http://lahaine. uneven regional development. corroded by a corrupt political elite beholden to a parasitic speculator economic elite. ‘marketing’ and speculation into social services like comprehensive national health plans high skill engineering and advanced industrial training to increase efficiency and competitiveness in the domestic market. To expand overseas markets. can the ruling elite recognize that its empire is not sustainable (let alone desirable)? The US can increase its exports to China and its share of world trade to balance its accounts.139 of 154 Withdrawal K/T Sustainability Decline is more than inevitable – to maintain our power we would need to restructure our entire country and withdraw our military forces from across the world. The transfer of a trillion dollars in military spending from colonial wars could easily finance the reconversion to a civilian economy producing quality goods for local and overseas consumption. industry would have to lower its profits. Washington must end boycotts and military subservience to Israel. private wealth and public corruption and discriminatory treatment of migrants as second grade citizens (a dual citizenship system) will be resolved internally as the socio-economic divisions translate into class struggle. China’s internal “imbalances” are profound and pervasive and over time can weaken the pillars of external expansion. Up to now manufacturers have bought into or been bought out by financial institutions: they have lost their distinct character as a productive sector. Substituting trade missions for military bases.5 billion muslim world. What passes for the current US private manufacturing sector shows no appetite for such a historic change. New York and adjunct professor at Saint Mary's University (4/28/10. The transition from empire to republic requires a profound rebalancing of social power and a deep restructuring of the US economy. The “blame” China campaign for what are in reality internally caused US structural imbalances must be confronted before it leads us into new. to become competitive in domestic and overseas markets. China’s class. including merchandise and commodities reducing toxic chemical and environmentally damaging sources of energy. “Rising and Declining Economic Powers: The Sino-US Conflict Deepens. to a productive republic with a balanced economy and competitive sector requires fundamental political changes and a profound ideological revolution. deepens the domestic market and expands social services. Fundamental . The key is to rebalance the US economy from finance driven to industrial centered: but any such shift requires class warfare against entrenched power on Wall Street and in Washington 46 . pushed by the pro-Israel fifth column embedded in top financial and political institutions and in control of the legislature 47 . which would reduce charges to industry and state. Nothing short of a political and economic revolution can reverse the decline of the US. Ending military directed empire building will open the flow of public financing toward civilian technological innovations. Petras 10 – James. The transition from a militarist imperialist power. retired Bartle Professor (Emeritus) of Sociology at Binghamton University in Binghamton. costly and selfdestructive trade wars or worse. Even assuming that there is a political shift toward re- industrializing the US. Only then will the US be able to compete economically with China in the world economy. ending restrictions on overseas technology sales can further reduce trade deficits. only if it carries out deep political and economic changes.org/petras/b2-img/petras_sinous. could increase inflows to the US and reduce outflows abroad. To bring about this political and economic revolution requires a new configuration of the state which pursues public investments creating competitive industries. while upgrading local production to competitive levels. inequalities. and a cap on all income over one million dollars can finance social security and comprehensive public national health system. increase its investments in applied research and development and vastly improve the quality of its products. To more forward requires a head-on confrontation with the ideologues of finance capital and a rejection of their efforts to deflect attention from their role in destroying America. will create new jobs and lower the cost of living while enhancing living standards. Vast sums need to be reallocated from wars. Focusing investment on the growing market for clean energy and technology for domestic and overseas economies.pdf) In the face of the US’s demonstrable economic decline.

. but these changes require a revival of the class struggle against state and private vested interests.140 of 154 changes in the privatized health system toward a comprehensive national public health system are essential.

Either the nation can come to terms with the reality of the process that is under way and seek to finesse it in the smoothest way possible.141 of 154 Attempts to Maintain Heg Bad Status quo heg is a sinking ship that will facilitate a peaceful decline – but a drastic increase in attempts to maintain our hegemony incites conflicts Quinn 11 – Adam. President Obama’s approach. it is inconceivable that he would explicitly declare his strategy to be one of managed American decline. 100 No doubt sensibly. 101 In contemplating the diminished and diminishing weight of the United States upon the scales of . as some genuine dissidents from the prevailing foreign policy discourse would wish. the narratives of America’s decline and Obama’s restraint are distinct but also crucially connected. a good president to inaugurate an era of managed decline. ‘I … have an unyielding belief that all people yearn for certain things. He is. trimming ambitions in line with the fact that the nation can no longer act on the global stage with the wide latitude once afforded by its superior power. in suggesting that he is ‘weak’ and that a ‘tougher’ policy is needed. they implicitly suppose that the resources will be available to support such a course. In his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech in December 2009 he made it clear. government that is transparent and doesn’t steal from the people. it can. University of Birmingham (July 1.’ he declared. confidence in the rule of law and the equal administration of justice. refusing to accept the waning of its primacy. preserving influence to the maximum extent possible through whatever legacy of norms and institutions is bequeathed by its primacy. makes him ideologically and temperamentally well suited to the former course in a way that. as those who seek to qualify the decline thesis have suggested.” International Affairs Volume 87. to cite one example. As part of such a project. Nevertheless. not for the first time. a costly effort to consistently apply principles of military interventionism. Facing this incipient period of decline. Examination of his major foreign policy pronouncements reveals that he remains within the mainstream of the American discourse on foreign policy. Evidently this is not a president who wishes to break signally with the mainstream. that he is no pacifist. The alternative course involves the initiation or escalation of conflictual scenarios for which the United States increasingly lacks the resources to cater: provocation of a military conclusion to the impasse with Iran. 2011. this is a president who. Issue 4) As noted in the opening passages of this article. Those who vocally demand that the President act more boldly are not merely criticizing him. the freedom to live as you choose. These are not just American ideas. embraces caution and restraint to the greatest extent that one could hope for without an epochal paradigm shift in the intellectual framework of American foreign policymaking. President Obama does not by any means represent a radical break with the traditions of American foreign policy in the modern era.’ 99 His Westminster speech repeated these sentiments. spelling out his view that ‘the instruments of war do have a role to play in preserving the peace’. Adam Quinn. 97 If the United States can embrace the spirit of managed decline. Lecturer in International Studies. commitment to continuing the campaign in Afghanistan for another decade. defined by restraint and awareness of limits. America’s leaders may walk one of two paths. he also endorsed with only slight qualification the liberal universalist view of civil liberties as transcendent human rights. use the significant resources still at its disposal to smooth the edges of its loss of relative power. deliberate escalation of strategic rivalry with China in East Asia. ‘The ability to speak your mind and have a say in how you are governed. given the likely political reaction at home. In doing so they set their faces against the reality of the coming American decline. either by advocating a radical shrinking of America’s military strength as a good in itself or by disavowing liberal universalist global visions. “The Art of Declining Politely. in short. his predecessor was not. within the confines of the mainstream. even as he sought distance from his predecessor with the proclamation that ‘no system of government can or should be imposed by one nation on any other’. then this will clear the way for a judicious retrenchment. and that ‘the United States of America has helped underwrite global security for more than six decades with the blood of our citizens and the strength of our arms’. 98 In his Cairo speech in June the same year. Or it can ‘rage against the dying of the light’. regime change and democracy promotion in response to events in North Africa.

. it is important not to conflate the question of what will be with that of what we might prefer. Alternatively. that the prospect of increased global power for a state such as China should not. on reflection. or continues to be drawn into wars with middle powers or on the periphery in spite of its shrinking capacity to afford them. fill any westerner with glee. leaders who can master the art of declining politely. as critics of the decline thesis sometimes observe. Which outcome occurs will depend on more than the choices of America alone. resulting in a new order that functions with peace and stability even in the absence of American primacy. It may well be.142 of 154 global power. whatever reservations one may have held regarding US primacy. But the likelihood that the United States can preserve its prosperity and influence and see its hegemony leave a positive legacy rather than go down thrashing its limbs about destructively will be greatly increased if it has political leaders disposed to minimize conflict and consider American power a scarce resource—in short. At present it seems it is fortunate enough to have a president who fits the bill. It is also important not to be unduly deterministic in projecting the consequences of American decline. It may be a process that unfolds gradually and peacefully. it may result in conflict. if the United States clashes with rising powers as it refuses to relinquish the prerogatives of the hegemon.

because "talks in an environment of pressure. Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamene'i is opposed to talks with the US because they want to push any negotiation to the way they want and they halt it unilaterally if it is not favourable to them. "If they [the US] stop their threats and sanctions the Islamic Republic will enter talks with them as it has said before. Ayatollah Khamene'i also warned the US against launching an attack against Iran and said if Washington chooses to resort to military means against Iran.143 of 154 Heg Bad – Iran Heg prevents Iran talks – top officials’ statements BBC 10 – BBC Monitoring International Reports (August 24. 2010." he further explained. a top Iranian lawmaker has said. the Leader added. . negotiations are impossible under these conditions. the US tries to impose its will on the world nations. deputy head of the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission of Iran's Parliament (Majlis) Hoseyn Ebrahimi said on Monday [23 August]. threats and intimidation are not talks. shortly after the victory of the Islamic Revolution in 1979. therefore. “Iranian MP says US 'hegemony' makes talks impossible. the confrontation will not be restricted to the region alone." Mehr news agency quoted Ebrahimi as saying.” BBC through Lexis) 24 August: The Islamic Republic will not enter talks with the United States unless the Americans stop their hegemony." There may be room for talks if the US drops sanctions and a threatening language against the Islamic Republic. On 18 August. "Based on its hegemonic attitude. Washington severed all diplomatic ties with Tehran in the aftermath of the US embassy takeover in Iran. Ayatollah Khamene'i said that Iran could not engage in negotiations with the US.

Taught by the superpowers that nuclear weapons equal political power and that warheads prevent wars. Since the dawn of the nuclear age. And they have repeatedly attempted to preserve U. From the Baruch Plan to national missile defense. and the PRC. Print) Throughout the nuclear age. found the resources to produce limited nuclear arsenals. even states that could not provide their citizenry with a decent standard of living. author of multiple books concerning American Foreign Relations. no president has proven capable of producing the right political mixture to yield a viable nonproliferation accord. such as India. As the technology became cheaper and more easily available. North Korea. the United States has squandered opportunities to forge cooperative ventures to halt proliferation. The superpowers remained so convinced of the correctness of their respective privileged positions in the world system that they refused to make mutual concessions to achieve arms control. nuclear hegemony by undercutting their own professed commitment to nuclear nondissemination.S. combined with arrogance and a Hobbesian worldview. catalyzed nuclear nationalism in other states and helped break the bonds of Washington’s influence. Other nations also chose military strength over cooperation and in the process diminished Washington’s and Moscow’s power in the international system. .144 of 154 Heg Bad – Prolif US hegemony spurs other countries to acquire nuclear weapons and ultimately undermines American influence – turns case Maddock 10 (Shane J. other states built the bomb when they could afford to. Americans have remained infatuated with unilateral and technological solutions to the atomic threat. The University of North Carolina Press. A paradoxical equation derived from this practice. Pakistan. PhD from the University of Connecticut in US history and teacher at Stonehill College. “Nuclear Apartheid”. American hegemony.

Offshore balancing is based on the assumption that the most vital US interests are preventing the emergence of a dominant power in Europe and East Asia – a ‘Eurasian hegemon’ – and forestalling the emergence of a regional (‘oil’) hegemon in the Middle East. But it protect its interests in areas of little strategic importance. Robert M. Europe and the Gulf. This is the best way to ensure American primacy. je) President Obama is making a serious mistake heading down this road. to the world. the US would rely on the tried and true dynamics of the balance of power to thwart any states with hegemonic ambitions. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. serves on the Advisory Council of The National Interest (12/16/10. which invariably leads to no end of trouble. 3 Its proponents believe that offshore balancing can do a better job than primacy of enhancing American security and matching US foreign policy objectives with the resources available to support them. the United States should concentrate on making sure that no state dominates Northeast Asia.R.org/article/imperial-by-design-4576?page=show. not military force. Once the potential hegemon is checked. America’s strategy of primacy increases US vulnerability to a geopolitical backlash – whether in the guise of countervailing great power coalitions. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University (2009. or terrorist attacks – and alienates public opinion in large swaths of the globe. nuclear proliferation or a traditional great-power rival. and that it remains the world’s only regional hegemon.org/action/displayFulltext? type=1&fid=3291804&jid=RIS&volumeId=35&issueId=01&aid=3291800&bodyId=&me mbershipNumber=&societyETOCSession=) Primacy’s neorealist critics have outlined an alternative grand strategy that increasingly resonates with the American public: offshore balancing. Jan-Feb 2011 Issue.145 of 154 Offshore Balancing Good – General Offshore balancing solves war and maintains US power best. We should build a robust military to intervene in those areas. including Europe and the Middle East. Mearsheimer ’11. This behavior. which violates the all-important principle of selfdetermination. In general terms. American troops should go back over the horizon. Washington should also get out of the business of trying to spread democracy around the globe. “Imperial by Design”. In the event a potential hegemon comes on the scene in one of those regions. Offshore balancing does not mean that the United States should ignore the rest of should maintain a substantially lower profile outside of Northeast Asia. The National Interest. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. As an offshore balancer. An offshore balancing strategy would permit the US to withdraw its ground forces from Eurasia (including the Middle East) and assume an over-the- . Europe or the Persian Gulf. A regional hegemon in the Middle East could imperil the flow of oil upon which the US economy. which has served this country well for most of its history and offers the best formula for dealing with the threats facing America—whether it be terrorism. Offshore balancing is key to prevent any conflict through deterrence and hard power if necessary – it avoids political backlash and increases soft power Layne 9 – Christopher. he R. but it should be stationed offshore or back in the United States.” Review of International Studies (2009). Washington should rely on local forces to counter it and only come onshore to join the fight when it appears that they cannot do the job themselves. not only generates resentment toward the United States. 35: 5-25. and more generally acting as if we have the right and the responsibility to interfere in the domestic politics of other countries. He should instead return to the grand strategy of offshore balancing. John. and it should rely on diplomacy and economic statecraft. The driving factor behind offshore balancing is its proponents’ recognition that the US has a ‘hegemony’ problem. but also gets us involved in nation building. He is on the Advisory Council of The National Interesthttp://nationalinterest. and the economies of the advanced industrial states depend. online at http://journals. Only a Eurasian hegemon could pose an existential threat to the US.cambridge. “America’s Middle East grand strategy after Iraq: the moment for offshore balancing has arrived.

146 of 154 horizon military posture. implications of China’s rapid ascent are – at the very least – an implicit acknowledgment that the days of unchallenged US dominance in world affairs are numbered. soft balancing efforts to rein-in American power may help the other major states learn to cooperate in ways that will the open the door to future hard balancing against the US. Most of all it is a strategy that fits within the broad realist tradition because it recognises the difference between. and is based on prudence and self-restraint in the conduct of US strategy. some would argue. Primacy is based on the belief that it is better for the US to defend its allies and clients than to have them defend themselves. offshore balancers recognise that one of the few ironclad rules in international politics is that when one great power becomes too powerful – when it bids to achieve hegemony – it is defeated by the counter-balancing efforts of the other major powers in the international system. The reason is simple: the basic motivation of all major states is to survive. recent studies by the CIA offer compelling evidence that by 2020 the era of America’s unipolar ascendancy will be drawing to a close as new poles of power in the international system approach the US share of world power. 4 Yet. Second. Regional powers – . and a possible armed confrontation between the US and Iran. on the other hand. asymmetric strategies are another type of nontraditional balancing that is being employed to contest US primacy. Russia and China to forestall the US invasion of Iraq by withholding United Nation’s Security Council authorisation is one example of soft balancing. there are new forms of balancing with which Washington already is contending. on the other hand. under Kaiser Wilhelm II). Germany. and policies must be judged on their consequences. it is so much more powerful than its nearest possible competitors. including so-called soft balancing. they fundamentally agree on the strategy’s basic premises. believe for an insular great power like the US. Spain under Philip II. they indicate that other major states regard US geopolitical dominance as a problem that needs to be addressed. First. not on the intentions that underlie them. of course. the best strategy is to rely on a balance of power approach that devolves to other states the costs and risks of their defense. balances ends and means. multiple poles of power. on one hand. Offshore balancing is a realist strategy because it eschews the ideological crusading on behalf of democracy that is endemic to Wilsonianism. 7 In addition to soft balancing. as the only great power in a ‘unipolar’ system. or military – counter-balancing that the US will face in coming years. The attempt by France. the ethic of responsibility. In foreign policymaking the road to hell is paved with good intentions. First. Even if soft balancing efforts fail. Offshore balancers believe the US must adjust to incipient multipolarity because they understand that – unless the US is prepared to fight an unending series of preventive wars – new great powers inevitably will emerge in the next decade or two. Failure is the fate of hegemons. France under Louis XIV and Napoleon. 5 And. A second point upon which offshore balancers agree is that in addition to the traditional kind of – ‘hard’. as well as economic. what the sociologist Max Weber called the ethic of conviction and. Another example is the effort of the same nations and Britain to promote a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue that will avoid the imposition of UN sanctions on Teheran. and Germany under Hitler (and. Offshore balancing contrasts sharply with primacy because primacists fear a world with independent. and when one among them threatens to gain preponderant power. When employed by states. The history of the modern international state system (which dates back to about 1500) is littered with the wreckage of great powers that tried an failed to achieve geopolitical primacy: the Hapsburg Empire under Charles V. defines US interests in terms of what is vital rather than simply desirable. growing apprehensions about the military. asymmetric strategies mean the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities. Some primacists believe that the US is immune to being counter-balanced because. If – and only if – regional power balances look to be failing would the US re-insert its troops into Eurasia. they are important for two reasons. Offshore balancers. The Bush administration’s disastrous policies in Iraq and the Middle East are a much needed reminder that this is a test Wilsonianism too often fails. Although there are some nuanced differences among offshore balancing’s proponents. the security of the others is threatened. 6 The most notable manifestation of soft balancing is the use by other major states of diplomacy and international institutions to try to restrain American actions.

Terrorism is another asymmetric strategy – one employed by non-state actors like Al-Qaeda and similar jihadist groups – to resist US dominance. WMD – especially the possession of nuclear weapons – is one way these states can level the strategic playing field and deter the US from attacking them. Because they are threatened by the US. The use of asymmetric strategies to oppose American power – especially in the Middle East where US policy has an imperial dimension – illustrates the dictum that empires inevitably provoke resistance. .147 of 154 especially those on the US hit list like Iran and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq – cannot slug it out toe-to-toe against the US’ dominant high-tech conventional forces. these states seek other methods of offsetting American power. however. and dissuading Washington from using its military muscle against them.

. because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves. on the other hand. Mearsheimer ’11.R. Offshore balancing. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. but an America no longer weakened by unnecessary foreign intervention will be far more capable of checking Beijing’s ambitions. Another virtue of offshore balancing is its emphasis on getting other countries to assume the burden of containing an aspiring regional hegemon. It almost always makes good sense to get other countries to pay as many of those costs as possible while preserving one’s own power. in contrast. The National Interest. je) Of course. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. The United States will have to play a key role in countering China. For starters. America would check China’s rise even if it were pursuing global dominance. but also makes it difficult to concentrate its forces against China. He is on the Advisory Council of The National Interesthttp://nationalinterest. is better suited to the task. attempting to dominate the globe encourages the United States to fight wars all around the world. especially if war breaks out. John. Global dominators.org/article/imperial-by-design-4576?page=show. is committed to staying out of fights in the periphery and concentrating instead on truly serious threats. This is why Beijing should hope that the American military remains heavily involved in Afghanistan and Iraq for many years to come. serves on the Advisory Council of The National Interest (12/16/10. But this is not a smart strategy because the human and economic price of checking a powerful adversary can be great. “Imperial by Design”.148 of 154 Offshore Balancing Good – China Offshore balancing solves China rise. however. he R. Offshore balancing. see the United States as the indispensable nation that must do almost all of the heavy lifting to make containment work. which not only wears down its military in peripheral conflicts. Jan-Feb 2011 Issue.

and globally. online at http://journals. 56 The Pew survey’s results suggest that. This is a striking turnabout from summer 2002. ‘The US does have important interests in the Middle East – including access to oil and the need to combat terrorism – but neither objective is well served by occupying the region with its own military forces’.cambridge. Stephen Walt – who also favours a US offshore balancing strategy in the Middle East – observes. 57 It is time to begin a long overdue debate on future US strategy after Iraq. more Americans believe that the best way to reduce the threat of terrorist attacks on the US is to decrease. “America’s Middle East grand strategy after Iraq: the moment for offshore balancing has arrived. there are signs that Americans already accept offshore balancing’s key premises. 54 Similarly. 35: 5-25. One huge disaster is enough – more than enough – for any grand strategy. The same Pew survey also found that: ‘An increasing number of Americans see nonmilitary approaches – such as decreasing US dependence on Middle East oil and avoiding involvement with the problems of other countries’ as effective strategies for reducing the terrorist threat to the US. not increase. it will become apparent that a neorealist strategy of offshore balancing is the best candidate to become America’s next grand strategy – both in the Middle East. As Robert Pape argues. And.” Review of International Studies (2009). .149 of 154 Offshore Balancing Good – Middle East/Terrorism Offshore balancing is comparatively the best strategy to prevent terrorism and middle east escalation Layne 9 – Christopher. In the Middle East. primacy means that the US is headed for a train wreck with China. offshore balancing ‘is America’s best strategy for the Persian Gulf’ because the ‘mere presence of tens of thousands of US troops in the region is likely to fuel continued fear of foreign occupation that will fuel anti-American terrorism in the future’. America’s military presence overseas’. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University (2009. 55 The Bush administration’s policy of maintaining a dominating American military presence in the Persian Gulf and overthrowing nasty Middle Eastern regimes increased the terrorist threat to the US instead of reducing it. an offshore balancing strategy would contribute importantly to lowering the terrorist threat to the US. A military collision between the US and Iran is still a possibility. outside of the Middle East. the American people are drawing the correct grand strategic lessons from the Iraq debacle.org/action/displayFulltext? type=1&fid=3291804&jid=RIS&volumeId=35&issueId=01&aid=3291800&bodyId=&me mbershipNumber=&societyETOCSession=) By lowering America’s politico-military profile in the region. Robert M. the strategic setbacks will not end with Iraq. For example. a recent 32 per cent margin. As this debate gathers steam. when 48 per cent of those surveyed believed that the best defense against terrorism was to increase US military involvement abroad. If the new administration wants to reduce US vulnerability. the pursuit of geopolitical and ideological dominance ‘over there’ has increased the terrorist threat over here. And if the US continues to pursue a strategy of primacy. As Americans come to realise that the strategy of primacy makes the US less secure. Indeed. covert operations. they are becoming more receptive to the arguments for an offshore balancing strategy. and by strengthening America’s homeland defences. the best way to do so is to adopt an offshore balancing strategy and fight terrorists discreetly with good intelligence (including collaboration with US allies). unlike primacists.

R. attack. Furthermore. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago.org/article/imperial-by-design-4576?page=show. killing 241 service members.150 of 154 Offshore Balancing Good – Terrorism/Prolif Solves terrorism and prolif. there is no reason that it cannot extend its nuclear umbrella over its allies in those areas. because offshore balancing calls for Washington to help local powers contain aspiring regional hegemons in Northeast Asia. But all things considered. the United States would be less threatening to other countries. America would still carry a big stick with offshore balancing but would wield it much more discreetly than it does now. Jan-Feb 2011 Issue. And it is worth noting that the perpetrators of this act did not pursue us after we withdrew.S. Mearsheimer ’11. offshore balancing is the best grand strategy for ameliorating our terrorism problem. It has two main virtues. He is on the Advisory Council of The National Interesthttp://nationalinterest. Reagan had the good sense to quickly pull the remaining marines out of Lebanon and keep them offshore. Remember what happened after President Ronald Reagan sent marines into Beirut in 1982? A suicide bomber blew up their barracks the following year. The National Interest. John. thus diminishing their need to have their own deterrents. which would lessen their need to acquire atomic weapons to protect themselves from a U. the strategy is not perfect: some allies will want their own nuclear weapons out of fear that the United States might not be there for them in a future crisis. As a result. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. as University of Chicago professor Robert Pape’s research shows. Europe and the Gulf. “Imperial by Design”. and some of America’s adversaries will still have powerful incentives to acquire a nuclear arsenal. Certainly. he R. Placing American troops in the Arab and Muslim world is a major cause of terrorist attacks against the United States. . offshore balancing is still better than global dominance for keeping proliferation in check. only as a matter of last resort. je) Specifically. Offshore balancing is also a better policy than global dominance for combating nuclear proliferation. It calls for using military force in only three regions of the world. and even then. serves on the Advisory Council of The National Interest (12/16/10.

while others see a hot one with China in the offing. This is neither naive nor utopian. A decline in heg won’t cause conflict – we have sufficient deterrence and policymakers exaggerate foreign troubles with security threats Friedman and Preble 10 – Benjamin.cato. the true source of U.cato. fought chiefly by non-military means. that military power keeps us safe. and that more power will keep us safer. erroneously. How likely is it that the so-called war on terrorism will be looked upon through the long lens of history as comparable to the world wars of the 20th century? Not very. It always has been. Those prospects cannot be dismissed lightly. Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute (May 20. Some worry of a new cold war with Russia. Christopher.structure of the international system checks. which claimed far fewer lives but lasted nearly five times longer than the two world wars combined? Again. Preble 9 – Christopher. no.S. our generosity and our ingenuity is expressed in countless ways. The casualties caused by international terrorist incidents since September 11 pale in comparison to the death and destruction that took place between 1914 and 1918. But the true strength of the United States. excluding funds for the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. we can make space for the other forms of human interaction that facilitate security and prosperity over the long term. perhaps over Taiwan. we sometimes seem a long way from that noble goal. By reducing the size of our military to a level more consistent with our own needs. what of war between peoples.org/pub_display. peoples disconnected from any particular nation-state or peoples united by ideologies that transcend national boundaries? What if al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations are but the tip of the iceberg? Newspapers and opinion journals are littered these days with apocalyptic predictions of an impending — or even ongoing — world war. is its people. and the prospects for future casualties. And the scale of violence that would have been unleashed had U. French or British) decision makers lost their cool would have caused far more death and destruction than Osama bin Laden can muster in the darkest reaches of his imagination. and again between September 1939 and August 1945.” http://www. Congress is poised to pass the largest military budget since World War II — roughly $550 billion. “Drop Pretension to Supremacy. President Barack Obama is expected to sign it. but the fact remains that the major powers have managed to avoid the very sorts of cataclysms that claimed the lives of an estimated 100 million people in the first half of the 20th century. Despite Obama's professed concern about the huge budget deficit.org/pub_display. power. research fellow in defense and homeland security at the Cato Institute. pale in comparison to the death and destruction that took place between August 1914 and November 1918. or Soviet (or Chinese. 2001. Perhaps we've all learned something? Even if major war between nations seems more remote than ever before. and by encouraging others to become more self-reliant.php?pub_id=10228) For too long. Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute (September 21. The world is a dangerous place.S. Both are ideological struggles. Although we aspire to a time when disputes are settled peacefully. Does Military Power Keep Us Safe? (Part II).151 of 154 AT Heg Solves War (General) Heg doesn’t solve war -. The casualties caused by international terrorist incidents since September 11. Can it even be compared with the Cold War. Our spirit. The violence and bloodshed that can be deployed by non-state actors is an order of magnitude smaller than what could be caused by even a mediumsize modern industrial state.php? pub_id=12156&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed %3A+CatoRecentOpeds+(Cato+Recent+Op-eds) With the Senate close to voting on the defense authorization bill.” http://www. the president has taken . 2009. pending resolution of minor disputes like funding for the alternative Joint Strike Fighter engine. but the threat of global thermonuclear war hung over every aspect of Cold War diplomacy. most of which have nothing to do with our military prowess. We have come to believe. we have defined our strength as a nation by our capacity for waging war.

S. however. less strained and far less expensive.S. Sending large armies to occupy — and try to manage the politics of — hostile Muslim countries is not effective counterterrorism policy. the Pentagon could spend less — at least $1. If our military had less to do. ambitions.S. Substantially reducing military spending means reducing U. Hawks and defense industry trade groups say this spending is essential to U.S. Fewer missions. Geography. forces. the Pentagon could cut force structure — reducing personnel. security. Making large spending cuts without reducing military commitments is a recipe for overburdening service members. . along with advances in strike technology. would also allow for reductions in the Air Force and Navy. In nearly all cases. In most cases. Policymakers exaggerate the capability of existing enemies and invent new ones by defining traditional foreign troubles — geopolitical competition among states and instability within them. The resulting force would be more elite. It would reduce the possibility of fighting unnecessary wars. Nor should Washington embrace strategic restraint just for budgetary reasons. Citing the need for austerity. Not exactly a revolution of fiscal discipline. By shedding missions. it is counterproductive. because it could enhance security. remove an impetus for nuclear weapons proliferation and prevent foreign peoples from resenting us for occupying their countries. Washington confuses what it wants from its military (global primacy or hegemony) with what it needs (safety). But much of Washington's military spending is geared toward defending others and toward the dubious proposition that global stability depends on U.S. wealth and nuclear weapons provide us with a degree of safety that our ancestors would envy. Pentagon officials have a goal of 1 percent real growth in the Defense Department budget over the next decade. according to a Cato Institute report released Tuesday. military deployments. A force reduction strategy would make sense even without deficits. security threats. they are not. for example — as major U. weapons and vehicles procured and operational costs. Because a less active military can make conventional and counterinsurgency warfare less likely.152 of 154 no meaningful steps to rein in military spending.22 trillion less over the next 10 years. we recommend cutting the Army and Marine Corps by roughly one-third. limit the number of countries that build up their military to balance U.

Washington should seek to tighten regional economic integration. At the same time. What has ever been must ever be appears to be the basis of U.S.S.multilateral cooperation solves. 2009. without any link to a global hegemonic competitor like the Soviet Union. the People's Republic of China's apparent determination to create a military capable of deterring U. engagement with the North. Washington should strengthen economic and trade ties with China.S. The Japanese government apparently is interested in promoting a regional order. However. World War II ended more than six decades ago: The Japanese do not have a double dose of original sin and America should no longer play geopolitical wetnurse for nations that long ago developed the means to protect their own interests. However. The most important relationship for the 21st century will be that between the existing superpower and the potential superpower. apart from the U. senior fellow at the Cato Institute. and encourage the peaceful settlement of disputes.php?pub_id=11015) The potential for conflict remains.S. The Obama administration should coordinate South Korea.cato. The PRC has much at stake on a stable Korean Peninsula. promote respect for human rights.org/pub_display. Japanese. while recognizing America's limited ability to influence the PRC's behavior. Washington should speak frankly about the importance of human rights. intervention along its border is treated as a threat to American security. The president should treat Japan as a full partner. China. and Russia as well. Moreover. should inform the North that full international integration requires the participation of South Korea. policies regarding Pyongyang. foreign policy. Washington should engage North Korea over its nuclear program. He is a former special assistant to President Reagan (November 29.S. The U.S. America's cultural and economic ties are long-lasting and mutually beneficial. also should encourage greater cooperation between Japan and its neighbors. Bandow 9 – Doug. the ROK and its neighbors should step forward.S.S. And at a time of economic crisis the U. Japan.S. Washington should allow the Republic of Korea to lead the nonproliferation campaign. That the U. emphasizing economic integration while promoting military detachment. and U. Yet Washington's Cold War alliance structure remains essentially unchanged.S.S. The U. On defense. will remain engaged in East Asia. But Washington no longer has any need to attempt to preserve regional military hegemony. is losing its financial ability to do so.S. The Obama administration should pursue a different course. it also has much to gain from taking the lead in promoting diplomatic solutions of regional problems. such instability would pose little threat to the U. “Policy Change for East Asia. In economics. As the U. Washington should withdraw its garrisons from Japanese soil and turn defense responsibility for Japan over to Tokyo. . The starting point should be a push to ratify the FTA with South Korea. Seoul has the most at stake in maintaining a peaceful peninsula. the U. steps back from its dominant military role. The U. that means proposing a free trade agreement. President Obama needs to promote a changed attitude as much as offer new policies. called the East Asian Community. a transformational agenda.S. At the same time. but should increasingly devolve defense responsibilities on countries in the region. The U. maintains one-sided "mutual" defense treaties with Japan and South Korea.” http://www. In Washington. An improved bilateral relationship is more likely than isolation to encourage greater respect by Beijing for the liberty of its citizens. Washington should embrace rather than resist such an approach.153 of 154 AT Heg Solves Asia Stability Heg decline doesn’t cause East Asian conflict -. Such a cooperative venture also would help channel China's rise in peaceful directions. America still has a major economic role to play.S. must remain militarily dominant is taken for granted. President Obama should begin moving the region into a new era of less security dependence on Washington. The president should press for a more active PRC policy to support reinvigorated U. rather than merely adjusting its controversial Status of Forces Agreement. will be most secure if friendly states in East Asia work together to confront sources of instability. Washington must forge a cooperative relationship on difficult regional issues like North Korea.

newamerica. Moreover. this is one of the most complex of all military-industrial undertakings. and thereby to the stability of the Chinese political system and the rule of the Communist Party.S. not to dominate. China makes a conflict over Taiwan much less likely.S. from effectively defending Taiwan.Russian Relations and the Rise of China. In terms of military power. navy away from China's coasts and prevent the U.net/publications/policy/us_russian_relations_and_the_rise_of_chi na) There is no necessity that the rise of China will lead to increased tension or conflict between the U. and Pakistan could become the same. The first is its lack of aircraft carriers. but as the lacks stable and extensive alliance systems. In addition. In fact. there is the question of whether China will wish to emulate the U. let alone the dollar or the euro. American Strategy Program. it is a rather striking comment on China's international strategic weakness that apart from North Korea. Finally. .S.” http://www. due both to harsh managerial practices and the commercial competition of Chinese workers and traders. The destruction of that system through economic conflict or war would deal a shattering blow to the Chinese economy. Senior Research Fellow. China's only true ally in the world is Soviet Union discovered during the Cold War. A significant role in America's decline has been played by its strategic over-extension. This was arguably true of the Korean and Afghan Wars. Pakistan – and North Korea is more a ghastly liability than an ally. China would wish to infuriate and frighten India by turning them into Chinese military bases. The yuan has a very long way to go before it even begins to rival the pound or the yen as a global currency. 2011.S.. in terms of global power or learn from U.3 Secondly.S. interests. “U. Indeed. compared to the U.S.154 of 154 AT Heg Solves China Decline in heg doesn’t mean Chinese rise or conflict – structural barriers and interdependence OR china can’t compete – military disparity is still too great Lieven 11 – Anatol.S.S. former senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (July 11. and China.2 When it comes to global power projection China suffers from two huge drawbacks and is likely to do so for a long time to come. but so far these are for commercial use. In Africa. and embroilment in local wars which in the end had little to do with real U.S. as a global superpower. even if China becomes the world's largest economy this will by no means automatically equate to an ability to rival the U. but by reducing any possibility of a Taiwanese declaration of independence at the same time. and the Chinese are only at the very early stages. China may be able to make a better contribution to the continent's development than the West has done. Beijing is now devoting great effort to developing these. the Chinese may well be approaching the point where they can drive the U. Chinese managers and workers are already facing increased local hostility in some areas. mistakes. China has gone from being one of the Western system's greatest victims in the 19th Century to being one of the greatest beneficiaries of the global market system created by the British Empire and the United States. Neither the Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO) nor the loose economic consultative grouping of BRICS resemble military alliances. China is working on what has been called its "string of pearls" strategy to develop ports around the Indian Ocean. and certainly of the wars in Vietnam and Iraq. and with the possible exception of Pakistan. it is not likely that the host countries India is after all a great deal closer to them than China is. but it will also run into the same immense barriers to development that African states have faced up to now. the whole greater Middle East looks like an area that any sensible great power will in future try to avoid.