You are on page 1of 88

!"#$%&''&()!$*+,--'$-.$)!

/)0)/#&')12/$*(#/"$$3$045678$9$$3$$:;<;=:;<<
Journal of Global Affairs
&$/8>47?4@ABC$+D@EF4
+4BE8GE6D5AHABC$%8B4>AI8
*47D5AD$DBI$EJ8$KAG8I$
$ L58@@ABC@$4M$&BDF>JN
What is a global aair? As we all watched and perhaps participated in the protests across the Middle East,
particularly Egypt, as well as the earthquake in Japan, we were experiencing global aairs. And these events,
whose ongoing eects will be unfolding for many years, certainly took hold of the media and our imaginations.
e Journal of Global Aairs is committed to providing a forum for discussions about these kinds of tremendous
occurrences. In fact, this years Journal has a piece addressing the uprising in Egypt by NYU Assistant Professor
Sinan Antoon whose research interests lie in pre-modern Arabo-Islamic culture as well as contemporary Arab
culture and politics. is work is followed by responses from his students, in line with our dedication to providing
students the opportunity to bring their thoughts out from classrooms into the wider community. As work in the
classroom includes questioning such tremendous events, so too does it extend to many events and questions not as
widely publicized. We are committed to providing a forum for these important discussions as well. We believe that
the many workings of the world are worth investigating and understanding, so we seek to publish the best work
that demonstrates the vastness of the possible answers to the question: What is a global aair?
International aairs has long been a term used to describe an approach to understanding the world through
historical and economic lenses. is is an incredibly valuable way to investigate the systems and trajectories that
contribute to a currently observable position. is years journal has excellent examples of this method including,
for example, a comparative exploration into the implementations of participative employee strategies across nations
and an assessment of the benets of statelessness, temporal and geographical, in Somalia. In the word global,
however, we hope to expand our scope to also include distinct but related approaches. ese unique perspectives
include: looking at sociology and psychology to understand gender inequality across cultures; investigating the
relationship between the culturally particular and the universal in narrative, memory and policy concerning
genocide; and documenting ones experience of a place. ese are all, we believe, valid and fruitful ways to approach
the world. In publishing works that expand possible ways of thinking about worldwide situations, we also hope to
expand possible ways of documenting and eliciting such thinking. rough poetry, narrative and photography, the
dynamics in question nd a deeper expressive power.
As the world becomes more and more connected, the questions we nd ourselves asking have less to do with
individual or even interacting nations and instead with more broad, global solutions. In particular, as the well-being
of the globe itself becomes of increasing concern and we begin to realize our connection to it, questions regarding
our responsibility will expand as well. In this years Journal, one author addresses the question of environmental
refuges in this changing world. We expect in years to come, these questions and many more will demand further
creative, curious and investigative study. We thank the contributors to this years Journal of Global Aairs and hope
that they inspire you, as they inspire us, to continue asking: What is a global aair?
Letter from the Editors
Editor in Chief
Sarah Zapiler
Executive Editor
Jenna King Brill Maggie Carter
Laura Esposito
Amanda Holpuch
Managing Editors
Colleen Veltd
Associate Editors
Creative Director
Sarah Zapiler
Mary McCullough
1
4
16
20
8
14
21
26
6
7
Singing for the Revolution
Dr. Sinan Antoon
Student Responses : Colleen Veldt and Mitchell Weaver
A Decomposing Castro
Patricia Guarch Wise
Ambush
Drew McKenzie
Oppenheimer
Danny Herman
Gender Inequality Spanning Cultures rough Triabalization:
Tribal Afghanistan and Tribal American Mormons
Shana Oppenheim
From Dirt to a Dream
Olivia Jovine
Essays on Consumerism in Asia
Laura Esposito
e Signs of Globalization
Leigh Rome
Religion, National Identity and Education in the Islamic World:
A Look at Egypt, Turkey and Saudi Arabia
Jenna King Brill
Locura
Emily Pederson
Contextualizing Genocide
Julia Burnell
Peace and Quiet
Emily Pederson
Hugo Chvez, Chavismo and
Rethinking Latin American Populism
Darius Lerup
28
33
35
72
78
It Was Just a ought
Andrew Boston
e Unmarketed Economy
Yasmin Ogale
Dreams of Ascension
Jamie Denburg
Somalia and the Mixed Blessings of Anarchy
Zachary Caceres
Under the Inuence:
Patterns of Dependency in Latin American Development
Maggie Carter
Identity
Drew McKenzie
La Bandera
Ana Radolinski
Protecting Rights and Promoting Development:
Participative Management in Germany and Argentina
Paz Petersson
Appendicies
Ekphrasis
Drew McKenzie
Chaos and Cosmos: Madidi Park, Bolivia
William Roberts
Eleuthera
Emma Young
Environmental Refugee Status:
International Reception of Climate Displacement
Jacqueline Hall
Notes
Bios
40
42
39
44
47
50
51
52
60
62
64
68
So was it Wikileaks, Facebook, or Twitter? Perhaps all
three contributed to the revolutionary winds in the Arab
world? is is one of the questions repeated ad nauseam by a
great number of commentators and parroted by many in the
United States and elsewhere in the civilized world. Others
wonder if perhaps it was Obamas speech in Cairo or even the
Bush doctrine (for Fox-infested minds and they are many).
Yes, new technologies and social media denitely played a
role and provided a new space and mode, but this discourse
eliminates and erases the real agents of these revolutions: the
women and men who are making history before our eyes.
Members of our species have done that before, you know,
before Bookface and Kleenex [Wikileaks] as Qadhdha
calls them. In a very familiar gesture displaying the discursive
cargo of colonial mentality, any positive phenomenon has to,
somehow, be traced back to this or that white man (well, in
Obamas case, its a black man, but his words are white).
As if the inhabitants of the region didnt have a long
history of struggles and revolts against all kinds of oppressors,
indigenous, but mostly foreign colonizers (white men, by
the way). As if liberationist inspiration has only one boring
trajectory always emanating from the west and then heading
east. As if the uprising in Iran wasnt an inspiration as well.
But why do I even have to expect the citizens of the civilized
world to know about the strikes, riots, uprisings, intifadas
and protests of previous decades. As if there wasnt a proud
and potent revolutionary tradition and a collective memory
crowded with symbols, martyrs, moments, poems and songs
about freedom and justice. One of the rallying chants in
Tunisia was a line from the Tunisian poet Abu l-Qasim al-
Shabbi (1909-1934) If, one day, the people want life, fate
must yield Every literate Arab knows this line by heart.
ese new revolutions are spearheaded by a new
generation and they already have their symbols and aesthetics.
If Bouazizis self-immolation was the spark in Tunisia, the
brutal beating to death of Khalid Said, a 28-year old man
from Alexandria, at the hands of two undercover policemen
back in June of 2010 angered many Egyptians and spurred
Singing for the Revolution
Dr. Sinan Antoon
1
Antoon| JGA
is piece was originally published on Jan 31, 2011 as a blog post on Jadaliyya (www.jadaiyya.com) under the same title. Antoon
is a co-founder and co-editor of Jadaliyya, an independent ezine produced by a network of writers associated with the Arab Studies
Journal. Antoon is an editor of the Arab Studies Journal as well as Banipal and Middle East Report. Antoon is a published poet,
novelist and translator and is an assistant professor at NYUs Gallatin School for Individualized Study.
demonstrations. A few days before the Day of Anger last
week, Saids mother recorded a message that was posted on
YouTube on January 23rd. She urged young Egyptians not
to stay at home and to go out on January 25th and protest
against injustice, emergency laws and torture and said she
too would protest. Facebook has a number of pages for
Khalid Said with clips and links, including one titled We
are all Khalid Said. Two days ago, the great vernacular poet,
Ahmad Fuad Nigm, was on al-Jazeera. He told the youth
who had led the revolt: Egypt is cleansing herself through
you. Nigm is one of those great symbols of resistance and
opposition, not only for Egyptians, but Arabs. Hed been an
outspoken critic of Mubarak and his regime and supported
the various opposition movements that sprang in the last
decade. In May of 2008, he recorded a YouTube message in
support of a movement called Solidarity: Project Hope.
A Message from e People's Poet, Ahmad Fuad Nigm"
People of precious Egypt. Egypt is a
bride, but it needs a groom. We all feel what
were going through. I cant imagine that
anyone is thinking alone. We all have the
same thoughts and have one concern.
I recently received a piece of paper from
a group of youth. May God save them and
multiply their numbers. It fascinated me that
there are people who think this way. ey
say that their project is called Solidarity:
Project Hope. Lets all get together,
brothers, and forget about those in power.
We have nothing to do with them. Lets
see why our country is drowning and how
we can save it. What can we do? You will
read the paper, of course, after these words.
Whoever is in agreement, just give us your
signature. Lets act to save our country. Our
country is drowning. Do we want to look
back and say: we wish what happened had
never happened? No! Its still in our hands.
ere are a lot of us. . . ere are many of us.
. . who love Egypt. Lets see what we can do
for Egypt. Lets put our hands together in
solidarity. I dont know what this solidarity
would look like? Like this? [clasps his
hands] Lets stands in solidarity to save our
country and save the future of our children.
And to save ourselves as well! (May 2008)
Nigm is one of the greatest vernacular Arab poets of the
20th century. I came across one of his books when I was still a
teenager back in Baghdad. e title was Ishi ya Masr (Egypt,
Wake Up!). A few years later, like so many across the Arab
world and beyond, I listened to his lyrics sung by al-Shaykh
Imam (1918-1995), the blind musician, with whom Nigm
formed an immortal duo. eir songs spoke to the struggles
of the poor and the downtrodden and celebrated the spirit of
resistance to dictatorship and imperialism. Imam wouldve
been leading with chants these days at al-Tahrir Square, but
he isnt alive. His songs, however, are living and can be heard
everywhere. e protestors in al-Tahrir Square are singing
them as I write this. Imams comrade, Nigm, lived to see and
take part in the revolution he wrote about for ve decades.
So many of Nigm/Imams songs are memorable and apt
these days, but the determination and resilience of Egyptians
these past few days reminded me of Ana sh-Sha`b (I am
the People):
I am the People
I am the people, marching, and I know my way
My struggle is my weapon, my determination my
friend
I ght the nights and with my hopes eyes
I determine where true morning lies
I am the people, marching, and I know my way
I am the people. My hand lights life
Makes deserts green, devastates tyrants
Raising truths, banners on guns
My history becomes my lighthouse and comrade
I am the people, marching, and I know my way
No matter how many prisons they build
Mo matter how much their dogs try to betray
My day will break and my re will destroy
Seas of dogs and prisons out of my way
I am the people and the sun is a rose in my sleeve
e days re horses galloping in my blood
My children will defeat every oppressor
Who can stand in my way?
I am the people, marching, and I know my way
Another of Imams immortal songs is Unadikum (I Call
on You). e words belong to the Palestinian poet Tawq
Zayyad (1929-1994) and the peoms title was that of Zayyads
rst collection, published in Haifa in 1966. When one of
the Egyptians protesting outside the Egyptian embassy was
asked what he wanted to say to Egyptians back home, he
recited this poem:
I Call on You
I call on you
I clasp your hands
I kiss the ground under your feet
And I say: I oer my life for yours
I give you the light of my eyes
as a present
and the warmth of my heart
e tragedy I live
is but my share of your tragedies
I call on you
I clasp your hands
I was not humiliated in my homeland
Nor was I diminished
I stood up to my oppressors
orphaned, nude, and barefoot
I carried my blood in my palm
I never lowered my ags
I guarded the green grass
over my ancestors graves
I call on you
I clasp your hands
We all clasp your hands!
2
JGA | Singing for the Revolution
3
Student Responses to Singing for the Revolution
Pioneers of Revolution in the Internet Age
Colleen Veldt
When I rst read through this article, I sympathized
with Antoons premise that the West is not the gatekeeper
of revolutions in the Arab world. To claim that this wind of
change has blown into the Middle East directly from the
West discredits the eorts of the revolutions participants
and ignores the history and political climate of the region.
Additionally, to say that Barack Obamas speech in Cairo or
the Bush doctrine led to the Arab revolutions would also be
a fallacy. However, Facebook and Twitter are not Obama and
Bush. I feel as though Antoon is implying that these social
networking websites and U.S. presidents are interchangeable
because they are Western. is could not be further from
the truth. Facebook and Twitter did play a role in the Arab
revolutions, but that role was not inherently Western and
does not in any way diminish what the people of these
nations have been able to accomplish. Social networking
cannot have an ethnicity because it is innately dependent on
the individual user. is is a revolution of people who used
social networking sites eectively, not a revolution brought
on by Facebook. Employing the Internet to work for your
cause is no small feat. In a world where everyone has a voice,
what you say into that mouthpiece is a self-dening choice.
e Arab revolutionaries deserve full credit for what they
have accomplished politically and socially, and that includes
giving credit for the compelling way tools like Facebook
and Twitter were used to spread information, videos and
inspiring words. Even more to their credit, they have been
able to maximize this potential of connecting people to
bring about incredible social change in a way that other
young people in other areas have yet to do.
impact and realness of what is actually going on. College
students and young people are not only the future, but as
the revolutionaries in the Arab world have proven they are
also the present. It only makes sense to reach youth as well
as others through the social networking sites that they
have come to depend on. Using these sites to post videos
about revolution has been the best way for revolutionaries
to spread their message to peers and sympathizers quickly,
as well as an eective way to catch the attention of young
people in other countries. rough these videos and Internet
advocacy, we have been witness to a constant stream of
information via social networking sites as well as the social
media of news networks.
In a way, the coverage of these protests and revolutions
has been comparable to the revolution that took place in the
United States during the Vietnam War. Like the television
war, these protests are being brought to us through the outlet
that we use for our news information. Unlike the television
war, however, these images, posts and videos are being
brought to us instantaneously. is is the rst revolutionary
event in history that is being digitized and spread through
outlets and mediums such as Twitter, demonstrating how
closely the world is connected. Newscasters are now
Tweeting about their experiences in the foreign countries
and posting their footage on various social media sites.
ough the instantaneous spread of information is
amazing, we cannot ignore the problematic side eects it
comes with. Desensitization comes as a result of being tuned
into social media literally almost all day. Yes, we are all aware
of what is going on; we are plugged in and knowledgeable
about the events taking place around the world, unless we
are making an eort not to use the tools available to us. But
except for those revolutionaries in the Middle East, we are
not doing much about it (unlike the wide-eyed American
youth of the 1960s and 70s). We have yet to experience the
extent to which this desensitization will aect world events.
American youth see images of the destruction taking place
around the world, but we go on living our lives. We click out
of that web page. We do not take the time to understand
the origins or results of revolutions, we do not feel for the
eort and sacrice of the people whose faces we see on
CNNs news feed. It is amazing that we can be plugged in
and seemingly know exactly what is going on and what is
happening across the globe, but it is sad that we treat it like
a television show; it is over when we turn if o. e credits
roll, and we go on to the next big thing.
e Double Edged Sword of Social Media
Mitchell Weaver
Like many aspects of our lives that social media has had
an eect on, when it comes to broadcasting the news and
current events social media is a revolution into a new way of
being informed, but it is also a desensitizer that weakens the
Veldt and Weaver | JGA
When Fidel Castro dies, when he really dies, when his
esh and bones once lled with promise for the people on
the 42,000 mile island south of the United States, and east
of Mexico, in the Caribbean north of Jamaica and south of
the Bahamas are decaying and decomposing and turning
to dust, eaten by bugs, by maggots and worms Miami will
be a party. Cubans dance to salsa music and shake their curvy
Cuban butts that dont t in the straight cut jeans made for
American girls. Cubans eat bistec empanizado and croquetas
and empanadas and platanos and an and tres leches and drink
cortaditos and coladas and mojitos. Cubans talk so fast it sounds
like theyre singing; less clean than Colombians, cleaner than
Puerto Ricans. ey forget the letter s, switch ch for sh, and
sometimes leave out syllables. ey do all this in Miami.
When Castro dies, when hes buried far, far in the
ground, Miami will see a celebration like theyve never seen.
Like eighty Super Bowls or like two hundred Fourths of July
or like twenty Macys Day Parades. For the past decade at
the tiniest rumor, or lie or misunderstanding or exaggeration
or word or indication that it could be true, Calle Ocho, home
to hookers and home-made food, is ooded with Miami-
Cubans. e exiles. ey wear ag beaded necklaces and
painted faces and have boom boxes blaring Celia Cruz and
booties shaking and mojitos and rum and Cokes owing.
ere have been rumors regarding his death since 2006; ve
years and several false alarms later, the plans are in place for
the real party.
When Castro dies, his blood is drained from his corpse
and pumped full of embalming uid. He is buried with a
face full of makeup to make him look like he is alive. ey
ll him with formaldehyde to disinfect him, keep him from
spreading any more disease, and keep the proteins in his skin
from swelling and blistering in decomposition. We consider
this part of the grieving process. e prisoners of Cuba will
probably have to pretend to pay their respects until he is safely
underground, but in Miami they will publicly and promptly
celebrate post-burial, his decay of gure and corpse.
When Castro dies, my best friends parents, Lili and
Julio, will be in the same room. eyre always in the same
room. ey are both exiles. Julio is a judge and Lili makes
the best Cuban food in Coral Gables. Once, the pressure
A Decomposing Castro
Patricia Guarch Wise
cooker exploded and formed a geyser in her kitchen so
black and full it looked like smoke and she had to clean
black beans o the ceiling crying. Lili will be pronouncing
ships as chips and chips as ships and Julio will be telling her
what he wants for dinner like a good Cuban man. Lili will
call her three kids, Carlos, Katia and Lisa, the angels of her
world, the focus of her Cuban mother neurosis, worse than
Jewish mother neurosis, and shriek to them in Spanish to
go to Calle Ocho. No matter how important it is, how life
changing, how historic, she will tell them to be careful and
ask whos driving and tell her cuchitas her preciosas her entire
vida to be careful. Because theres already one important
person in her life dead that day.
When Castro croaks, when hes crumbling in the
ground, when he couldnt recover from another heart attack
or whatever, my brother, Jorge, will be thanking Buddha. He
gave up on Catholicism or Christianity about two years into
his thirteen year Catholic education, but he prays everyday
for Castro to die before his graduation so that he can have
days o of school. His Jesuit school is run by a priest who
cant speak English and an administration of only Spanish
speakers and lled with enough rst generation students to
be in a Columbia University textbook as a case study of a
school with disproportionate success rates for immigrants
compared to the rest of the country. ey take Latin
American History as a mandatory class junior year, and the
school anthem is in Spanish. e mascot is the Wolverine.
e founders of the school, who brought it over from Cuba,
wanted it to be the little wolves but they didnt know how to
translate it from Spanish to English properly and thought it
was wolverine. At the games they cheer in Spanish bombo
chia chia chia, and theyre better at baseball than football.
When Castro is dead Jorge will have at least a week o of
school while they wait for their world to settle, and hell
hang on the beach or have an excuse to play a weeks worth
of Rock Band.
When Castro dies, when the bacteria that was eating the
food in his intestines starts eating the intestines from inside
his con, my father and mother will be the most Cuban
they have ever been. My mom will probably be sitting at
home watching Law and Order, maybe SVU. We used to
4
JGA | A Decomposing Castro
have TiVo and OnDemand and all that good stu until
someone told my dad that they could hook him up with a
stolen cable box so he wouldnt have to pay for cable. ey
installed them in every TV in the house and now theres no
guide or menu or TiVo or OnDemand, and channels have
started to disappear. Its more primitive than basic cable. No
matter how many channels disappear, theres always Law
and Order. A ticker tape announcing the breaking news will
run across the bottom of the screen the same way it did
when Princess Diana died. When Princess Diana died, I
kept watching Family Matters; when Castro dies, everyone
will get up. My dad will call her and the house phone will
ring. e one next to the couch has a broken battery so she
has to walk all the way to the kitchen. Hell tell her hes
picking her up to go to Versailles, the Mecca of the Cuban
community, a restaurant and bakery that takes up a full
block of Calle Ocho. ey will discuss how bad the parking
will be and hell pick her up to go pretend to be Cuban. He
was once called a Cubano arrepentido, or a man ashamed
of being Cuban. He said he would be Cuban the day that
Castro died. is is his big day.
When Castro dies, and the graveyard shift doesnt hear
a bell ring, the Miami-Cubans can start to visit. Mami is
Panamanian, but we eat our take-out from Versailles, and
shes been in Miami for forty-three years. She wants my
brother and I to go to Cuba so we can understand what
weve heard about forever, about the families on the island
who owned all the juice or coee or fabric or paper. ese
are things American children dont understand ownership.
An island owned by families. But weve seen it in Panama;
how they close the jewelry stores when my grandfather
walks in, how the maids at the hotel know his name. But, no
one else gets to see it because Cuba has been closed; not my
boyfriend or his mom or my college roommate or her dad.
When Castro keels over, his body will attract death
ies and houseies and blowies and they will start to
eat his esh, and the parking lot at Versailles will be full.
e Cuban restaurant and cultural hub of dominoes and
conversations of coup dtats, is decorated like a French
palace and lled with reporters from CNN, MSNBC,
FOX, NBC, ABC, CBS, CW and, of course, Univision and
Telemundo. eyve rented out parking spaces for the vans
of the major news outlets years before. My boyfriends mom,
a Spanish news anchor for Univision, who was friends with
Gloria Estefan in high school, will be there interviewing
my college roommate, Alex. Alex is Princess Versailles; her
father inherited the restaurant from his father. Alex used to
be a fat girl from eating too many pastelitos and medianoches,
but she got skinny and now she wears spandex. No matter
how skinny she gets, she cant get rid of her curves. Alex
will be wearing a tight Dolce and Gabbana dress. ey are
Miami pseudo-celebrities celebrating together with the rest.
When Castro dies, gases including hydrogen sulde,
methane, cadaverine and putrescine will be released by the
bacteria and omit putrid smelling liquids. Tata is in her bata
de casa, her house robe. She is wearing the everyday garb
of a Cuban grandmother, even though she isnt my Cuban
grandmother. I dont have a Cuban grandmother, but I have
Tata, my cousins Cuban grandmother. Tata will probably be
putting water in her husband Tutos whiskey and giving it
to him while he smokes Marlboro Reds in the garage, in his
house across the street from Julio and Lilis house. Tata has
been waiting for Castro to die for my entire lifetime. She
left and rebuilt and re-conquered and lives in a two-story
house from which shell celebrate her dictator dying with
her husband of fty-four years.
When Castro dies, though no one knows when exactly
that will be, no one will know what to do. Lili and Julio will
worry about their kids drinking too much at Versailles, and
Lisa, Katia and Carlos probably will drink too much.
Jorge will drive to Best Buy and stock up on video games
for the next week so that he can keep busy while his schools
administration recovers. When they start school again, the
boys will come back in their navy blue and white uniforms,
and the teachers will continue to threaten them by yelling
Spanish profanities at them.
My mom will still sit in her living room in Coral Gables,
Florida, with no aspiration to move to Oriente, Cuba and
soon an episode of Law and Order will pop up that is based
on a shooting, or scandal, or some other semi-ctional spin
o of some event that happened as a result of this huge
political change, so close to America, and Miami and New
York, which will most certainly cause enough controversy to
have an episode based o of it. If Anna Nicole Smith did it,
Castro can too. My Dad will feel no more Cuban because
he is dead. Its possible that he will feel less Cuban, that
his connection was to the culture that was a result of this
man, to the croquetas that he can pick up at a cafesito window
before work and not to the island; the translation of the exile
culture to America, not really the culture itself.
Well go visit. Americans will visit. If the borders open,
when the borders open, theyll go the way they do now.
eyll say, Oh, mercy me, just look at all the old cars. Its
just like being in the fties. Isnt it so cute dear? But the
Versailles celebrators will know that the Cadillac with parts
from the 1950s and the record players are sad. And the
tourists will snap pictures and perhaps pledge to preserve
the history, to keep it so cute, but anyone from Versailles will
not. Because the only reason Cuba is aesthetically so cute is
because its communist.
ey will surely celebrate at Versailles, but after that
they will wait. ey will probably want to go back, but they
wont, not right away. Because after Fidel Castro is dead,
when his body is made-up and pumped and gassed and
crumbling, there is still another Castro.
5
Guarch Wise | JGA
Having just drank a Turkish
coee, I walked down a
wide street with commercial
storefronts and trolley cars.
Much like in SoHo, the streets
were crowded with unaware
tourists and unenthusiastic
locals, everyone together
but alone. Without warning,
clapping and whistling began
to grow all around me. e
monotony of street life was
drowned out by the beat of
hands clapping and whistles
that had been distributed. e
abrupt awakening transformed
into a parade, where pink balloons appeared by the thousands. A large number of balloons were being marched down the block, while
thousands more were released from rooftops onto the crowd below. e whistles and clapping had mutated into piercing bangs as the
crowd stomped and popped the pink balloons that now came up to their waists. e public was amazed by the delightful ambush.
Children wildly popped the balloons while music played. It was like a serene war zone. e group responsible for the surprise parade
was a young organization attempting to elevate public happiness and well-being in Istanbul. Within twenty minutes, street sweepers
had removed all the deated balloons shards, the whistling had ceased and the event had passed.
Ambush
Drew McKenzie
Oppenheimer
e atom will yield its secrets to you
the kaleidoscope of ssion under blue eyes.
Rooms of ne modern art
empty like Nagasaki,
what do we all see in photographs?
Desolation they became caves
of echoes centuries old. Tears
echoing forward through childhood
photographs and photographs of you
in New Mexico.
And photographs.
But what do these say about
you in ponderance of destruction and death?
You who loved the basin and range of deserts,
you as natures antithesisyour
brain was a wave that cleared the moss
of the rock, it hit so hard.
How can photographs iterate the
wiring of your psyche?
e unwiring of thousands
of psyches, lives, eyes.
Destroyer of worlds, the
snipping of the wiring in a bright death.
Danny Herman
7
Gender Inequality Spanning Cultures rough Tribalization:
Tribal Afghanistan & Tribal American Mormons
Shana Oppenheim
8
JGA | Tribalization
When it comes to gender inequality, the American
public ranks the Muslim World at the bottom of the list,
but at the top of their priorities. From a gender education
gap of nearly zero percent between men and women in Iran
(incidentally the same as the U.S.s gender gap in higher
education) to women in Pakistan needing a 73 percent
increase in womens education to equal that of men, there is
a vast range of both gender equality and the perceptions of
gender equality in the Muslim World.
1
A fundamental question exists: What is causing
dierent levels of gender equality between Muslim nations,
when majorities in many Muslim countries believe women
should enjoy the same fundamental rights as men?
2

is paper will compare Tribal Afghanistan to Tribal
Mormonism in America on the topic of gender inequality
in relation to the theory of tribalization.
i
It will consider the
interaction between modern states and tribes as a primary
causal mechanism in the process of tribalization, and it
will make the conclusion that tribalization causes gender
inequality.
e rst section of this paper will look at the evolution
of human society as a sociological justication for the theory
that tribalization is the primary cause of gender inequality.
e second section will compare the case studies of tribal
Afghanistan with that of tribal Mormons in America
to assess the validity of state and tribe interactions in
tribalization theory as the causal factor in gender inequality
in societies that t the model.
If the theory of tribalization holds true, this paper will
show that the conict between the purest form of social
grouping, the tribe, and the evolving forms of society, the
state, created a psychological group eect called tribalization
which resulted in a shift from what was essentially an
egalitarian society to a gender repressive society.
i Tribalization is dened by Whitehead (1993) as existing in situations
where state form or expand, that this process is resisted by some sections
of an ethnic group and not by others, and that the resistant groups then
go on to become (or remain) tribal, at the periphery of the state.
eory
Tribalization, as used in this paper, is a combination of
sociological developmental theories and the psychological
eects of group consciousness that are brought about by
contact between the state and the tribe. e psychological
process of group consciousness radicalization that occurs in
the conict between the tribe and the state is tribalization.
e stages of social development, although they vary
according from author to author, are generally separated
into four stages. Although these stages are inherently awed
because of imperfections in demarcation as well as the lack
of homogeneity among the groupings,
3
dening the tribe
and the state coherently from a historical basis will later
help in comparing this papers case studies.
e rst of these stages, called bands, is the earliest
of human grouping comprised of anywhere from ve to
eight people who, as a rule, are extended relatives.
4-5
Bands
exist where there are not enough dense local resources to
permit many people to live together. Labeled the original
egalitarian society by many social theorists, bands do not
contain the formal social stratication of leadership or a
monopoly of decision-making power. At the most basic unit
of social organization, then, gender inequality is an almost
zero-sum situation
.6-8
In terms of gender equality models,
the band is the theoretical ideal that can never be recreated
in modern societies.
e next tier up the social evolutionary ladder is the
tribe. In historical terms, tribes began to emerge around
13,000 years ago in the Fertile Crescent. A tribe consists of
100 to 200 members that have moved beyond the extended
family structure of the band to a slightly more formalized
clan-based relationship. Generally they have a settled
location and more than one formally recognized kin group.
In a tribe, land and other possessions belong to particular
clans and not to the whole tribe.
9-11
Early tribes were
egalitarian to an extent. It is important to note that women
were not inherently at a disadvantage or repressed. Tribes
usually had a merit based leadership position or council,
although the position of leader was codied.
12
e modern
tribes in this papers case studies most closely resemble
9
Oppenheim | JGA
ancient tribes with a big man as the leader.
Around 5,000 BC in the Fertile Crescent, chiefdoms,
the next stage of social development between tribes and
states, began to emerge. Chiefdoms consisted of several
thousand to several tens of thousands of people who were
most notably not related. e massive gap in size between
the populations of a tribe and a cheifdom caused a problem
where strangers fell under the same authority. e solution
was the development of a Chief, who exercised a monopoly
on authority, and had the right to use force and information
to control the population.
13
States began to appear in Mesopotamia about 2,000
years after chiefdoms rst arose. From around 3,000 BC
until just over 1,000 years ago in West Africa, states evolved
from chiefdoms to become the largest and most modern
form of society.
14-16
States evolved from chiefdoms but consisted of far
larger populations. Information was conned to an elite
few, and control was centralized and monopolized. Extreme
economic specialization became the norm, and a multi-
layered bureaucracy arose as a necessity in order to maintain
control over a much larger population. e state was,
fundamentally, dierent from all earlier forms of society in
that it was organized on political and territorial lines instead
of kinship lines.
17-20
In terms of gender inequality, the
early state saw some of the largest gaps between the social
status of men and women. In the U.S. it took 144 years for
women to get the vote. In 1776 Abigail Adams famously
pleaded in her letters to John Adams, I desire you would
remember the ladies and be more generous and favorable
to them than your ancestors. Do not put such unlimited
power in the hands of Husbands.
21
Today, women are still
paid on average 77 cents to every dollar that men earn.
22

Yet through the mechanism of democracy, which is only
possible through the state structure, women have earned the
same rights as men. While some of the originally egalitarian
tribes have maintained a near-equal status for men and
women, other modern tribes have become some of the most
unequal societies in the world.
e tribe and the state are polar opposites in terms
of human organizational structures. It then follows logically
that conict would arise between these two frameworks
when they co-exist within the same societal boundaries.
23-25
In general there are two theories on how and why tribes are
formed when they come in contact with a state. e rst is
that warfare is the primary force of tribal formation. e
argument goes that modern tribes are a reaction to state
intervention, particularly colonial state intervention, into
societies that would have naturally evolved from band to
state of their own volition with far fewer tribal outliers.
26

e second theory argues that intensifying contact
between various autonomous kin groups is the primary force
for tribal formation. is theory of tribal formation is more
grounded evolutionarily and is a realistic look at how society
progresses. But the tribes that experience tribalization are
those that form either from within the state in resistance
to it or those that are already in existence and reinforced by
state force. us for the purposes of this paper, the theory
of conict in modern tribal formations is more accurate. It
is important to keep in mind that not all tribes are formed
through conict with the state, nor are all tribes unable to
reconcile their tribal identity with that of the state.
27
Psychologically a society denes itself by two broad
categories: internal and external. Essentially the individual
must be aware that (s)he belongs to a group. Once the
member is aware that (s)he belongs, then (s)he evaluates
this membership and places some sort of value connotation
on participating. Finally, the individual member associates
an emotional utility with belonging to the group. is is
bolstered by the external processes labeling them as part
of this group. An outside consensus that the group exists
is critical to psychologically belong to a coterie.
28
,
29
e
formation of group identity has often been compared to the
cognitive process of stereotyping.
30-37
Members of a group stereotype not only their
adversaries or the outside world, but also themselves.
Members of both tribes and states, and indeed of any type
of social group, form an identity for themselves that they
then are able to tie to their membership. at membership
psychologically oversimplies themselves and the opposition
in a process similar to that of stereotyping, which reinforces
the group membership.
38-45
Out of this mindset, women
within the group begin to be dened by traditional, and thus
subservient, roles. Additionally, the tribe has an incentive
to portray the women of the out-group in a negative light
(as they are portraying everything of the out-group in a
negative light in order to codify their own in-group status).
In contrast to the modern state, where there is greater
gender equality, the modern tribe takes the opposite view
point and begins to justify the repression of women.
ere are two schools of thought regarding how out-
group members are stereotyped and in turn stereotype other
groups: based on individuals non-typical or typical to the
group. e rst, supported by the works of Rothbart et al.
in their article From Individual to Group Impressions:
Availability Heuristics in Stereotype Formation, holds
that out-group members can identify groups negatively by
the actions of a few individuals, thus reinforcing in-group
stereotyping and membership.
46
e second school of thought holds that groups can
only be stereotyped (by the out-group) by the actions of
their individual members if those individual members are
typical of the group, thus reinforcing the process of group
psychology. In the book, Intergroup Relations: Essential
Readings, authors Michale A. Hogg and Dominic Abrams
make this case based on works by Johnston and Hewstone.
47

In cases of realistic contact between in and out-group
members, typical members of both groups are associated
10
JGA | Tribalization
with negative attributes to the detriment of their interaction.
In both of these arguments it is clear that psychological
group formation occurs because of how individuals are
perceived when their group interacts with other societal
formations. Where there is contact with an outside, opposing
or dierent group, there tends to be the development
of a more positive self-view and a more negative view of
others. e stereotyping goes both ways and is reinforced
by contact with individuals of the group, whether typical or
atypical.
48-50
Conicts over status, or other scarce resources, often
precipitates a greater psychological group eect. Scarce
resources can refer to land or food in less economically
developed situations or to non-material resources of rank,
status and prestige. When the norms of the social situation
encourage and legitimize this competition, there is more of
a tendency to express in-group preference.
51
When there is
already a basis for competition over the scarce resources of
status and physical gains between the in-group and the out-
group, there is more incentive for tribe members, already
stereotyping their women as the opposite of modern state
women, to decrease the status of women in order to eliminate
some of the competition for limited resources such as status
and jobs.
Tribalization is the extreme of these in-group
preferences. It is the general contact with an out-group
that provokes an inward spiral of group psychology in the
individual members, and a disinclination to assimilate into
a larger group. It is a perfect storm of stereotyping which
leads to adverse reaction against the modern gender equality
among the sexes present in the state as well as stereotyping
of intra-group demarcations, most notably that of women
into traditional roles. It leads to conict over scarce resources
(both the material and non-material) which result in women
competing with men over status and jobs in a climate already
predisposed by stereotyping to justify gender inequality.
Tribalization leads directly to the repression of women.
Experiment & Methodology
To test whether tribalization is the causal factor in
gender inequality in modern tribal societies, this paper
compares two case studies from two dierent models of
states and two dierent cultures to avoid the culture bias
claim. For the test case of Tribal Mormons in the U.S., this
paper will look at the town of Colorado City/Hildale (which
for the purposes of this paper will be referred to as Colorado
City) spanning the Arizona/Utah border. e towns contain
a combined population of about 5,000 people, almost all of
who are members of the Fundamentalist Church of the
Latter Day Saints.
52-53
e second test case is the Ghilzai Pashtun Tribe in
Afghanistan. A historically tribal group, the Ghilzai are part
of the ethnic ruling Pashtun Tribe but part of the nomadic
poorer subset that is concentrated mainly in the south and
east of Afghanistan.
54-56
Since it is dicult to nd data on
this nomadic tribe, a group that often distrusts outsiders, this
paper will concentrate on the data that does exist on the four
provinces that have the highest concentration of Ghilzai:
the Paktika, Zabul, Ghazani and Paktya provinces.
57-58
e application of the theory of tribalization as the
causal factor in gender inequality makes two assumptions.
First, the modern tribe must be in interaction with a
state, whether on the borders of an undened state (as in
Afghanistan and the Federally Administered Tribal lands
that fall between Pakistans western and Afghanistans
southeastern borders) or inside of a clearly dened state (as
in the case of Tribal Mormons living in the U.S., although
the argument can be made that their extended tribal ties
stretch to communities across parts of Mexico and Canada).
ii
Second, this modern tribe must be in the process of
resisting the state inuence, not integrating as in the studies
of West Indian and Asian children in Britain done by
Mullin (1980) as well as Davey and Norburn (1980). is
resistance, which this paper classies as tribalization, is the
causal factor in gender inequality in cases that t this model.
e independent variable in this study is whether or nor
the two case studies t within these two assumptions:
interaction with a state and tribalization. is can be
measured by looking at the history and sociological make-
up of the two case studies. e dependant variable is the
presence of severe and measurable gender inequality. is
can be measured from the limited data available on these
two societies and how they treat their women. Specic
indicators of this inequality fall under the two categories of
education level and marriage age.
e history of the mainstream Mormon Church is
one of a separatist society trying to ee the state in order
to preserve its way of life but eventually succumbing to
the pressure to integrate.
59
Whitehead (1993) gave three
options for tribal societies coming into contact with the
State: assimilation, destruction or tribalization.
60

e Colorado City Mormon Tribe belongs to e
Fundamentalist Church of the Latter Day Saints (FLDS)
which broke o from the mainstream Church of the
Latter Day Saints primarily over the issue of polygamy.
Mainstream Mormons deny that Joseph Smith, the founder
of Mormonism, practiced polygamy and was married to
at least 33 women and probably as many as 48. Polygamy
was one of the sacred credos of the early Mormon Church,
canonized as Section 132 of e Doctrine and Covenants, one
of the three holy books of the Mormon faith.
61
ii An estimated 30,000 to 100,000 members of the Fundamentalist
Church of the Latter Day Saints polygamists live in a swath from Canad
down to Mexico. Since 1830 more than two hundred schismatic sects of
Mormons have slit o from the main church (Krakauer, 2003, p. 6).
11
Oppenheim | JGA
After Smith was murdered by an Illinois mob in 1844,
Brigham Young became the leader of the Church and led the
Saints to what would become Utah, where they established
a colony that embraced polygamy.
62

e persecution of early Mormon society continued
with the Utah War in 1857, when President James Buchanan
sent the U.S. army to invade Utah to put a stop to polygamy.
e war was unsuccessful, but in 1887 the Edmuns-Tucker
Act was introduced which would disincorporate the
Mormon Church and forfeit their property, worth more
than $50,000, to the Federal Government if they did not
renounce polygamy.
63
In his book Under the Banner of Heaven Jon Kraukuer
dened the choice they faced:
Mormon Fundamentalists...believed that
acceptance into the American mainstream
came at way too high a price. ey
contend that the Mormon leaders made an
unforgivable compromise by capitulation
to the U.S. government on polygamy over
a century ago. ey insist that the Church
sold them out -- that the LDS leadership
abandoned one of the religions most crucial
theological tenants for the sake of political
expedience.
64
e early Mormon Church faced a dilemma: assimilate, be
destroyed or tribalize. Mainstream Mormonism assimilated,
while the Mormon fundamentalist groups (including the
FLDS church) tribalized.
Colorado City is home to a FLDS tribe that split from
the main LDS church in the 1920s. A few dozen families
left the LSD church and set up a community in a back
country stretch of the Arizona strip that is cut o from the
rest of the state by the 277-mile-long Grand Canyon. It
ercely resists the inuences of the state, demonizing the
outside world and defying one of the U.S.s most basic
creeds by practicing polygamy. Residents of Colorado City
are forbidden to watch television, read newspapers or have
contact with people outside of Colorado City including
family members who have left the Church.
Krakauer articulates their situation: ey live in this
patch of desert in the hope of being left alone to follow
the sacred principle of plural marriage without interference
from government authorities or the LDS Church.
65
e United Eort Plan, the business name of the
FLDS, owns all of the church assets and all of the land in
the town under the direction of Uncle Rulon, the prophet
and leader of the society and the governing board of all male
Church elders.
66
Uncle Rulon has married at least 75 women and
fathered more then 65 children. Some of his wives were
given to him when they were 13 or 14 by their fathers.
All of the public ocials in the town are FLDS members.
Every city employee, the superintendent of the school and
the police force answer solely to Uncle Rulon, eectively
cutting the town o from outside inuence.
67
Sam Roundy,
Colorado Citys police chief asserted, What goes on in our
homes here is nobodys business.
68
Colorado City is a modern tribal society that has gone
through the process of tribalization in its interaction with
the state. It has physically and mentally isolated itself from
mainstream society by cutting o contact and outing its
laws against polygamy. It has a history whereby the choice
between assimilation, destruction and tribalization plays a
large part in its societal myth.
ere is a documented pattern of abuse in Colorado
City. Frequently married early and against their will, it is not
uncommon for women, girls in truth, to be raped by their
fathers or brothers at an early age before being given to an
elder of the city as a wife.
69
e son of Mayor Barlow of
Colorado City molested ve of his daughters over a period
of ten years. Charges were never brought against him in the
closed society of the tribe. Ruth (only rst names are given
to protect identities), the wife of a Colorado City police
ocer, was given to him when she was 16 years old. She was
one of the few women that managed to escape and press
charges. But the community rallied around her husband,
and when it came time to bring him to court, Ruth backed
down under the pressure of her tribe.
70
Stories like those of
Ruth and the granddaughters of Mayor Barlow are far too
common in Colorado City.
On May 3, 1987 Ruby was born in Colorado City. She
was 14 when she was discovered kissing a boy she liked.
For this she was forced to wed an older man and was raped
so brutally that she spent her wedding night hemorrhaging
blood. She ed to her brothers house, but in May of 2001,
she was allegedly abducted by members of the FLDS
Church and brought to her stepfathers house, the second
councilor to the prophet of Colorado City. At 16 Ruby gave
birth to a child, and since the summer of 2001, nobody
outside of Colorado City has heard from her. In the view of
anti-polygamy activist Lorna Craig:
Ruby Jessop was born into a polygamous
community that has been allowed to break
state and federal laws with impunity for
many decades.... because the mayor, the
police, and the judge in Colorado City-
Hildale are themselves polygamists who
are absolutely obedient to the prophet,
there is nowhere for victims of abuse to
turn... I would say that teaching a girl that
her salvation depends on her having sexual
relations with a married man is inherently
destructive... a crime, not a religion.
71
12
JGA | Tribalization
e stories of abuse in Colorado City are indicators of
extreme abuse, but on a day-to-day basis there is also more
subtle gender inequality.
In Colorado City the percentage of women with a
bachelors degree is an average of seven percent compared
to the national average of 24.4 percent.
72
is could be
attributed to state averages. Both Arizona and Utah have
high Mormon populations. According to the Association
of Religion Data Archive, Utah is ranked rst for the most
mainstream LDS congregations while Arizona is ranked
fourth.
73
e estimated total percentage of FLDS members
in Utah as of 2003 is around 1.126 percent. So FLDS
members make up a statistically insignicant percent of the
total population of Utah, and according to the Association
of Religion Data Archive, Utahs percentage of those above
25 who are college educated is 27.9 percent, well above both
the level of Colorado City and the national average.
74-75
It
is evident that Colorado City has a much lower than usual
rate of higher education among the whole population and
especially among women.
e second measure of gender inequality falls under
the broad category of marriage. ere is no data on the age
of marriage for women in polygamous unions in Colorado
City and state-wide. e mean ages for these marriages are
not calculated because of the illegality of the unions. is
paper substitutes the average household size in Colorado
City as a possible indicator for large families and evidence of
the early polygamous unions Krakauer shows are occurring.
In Colorado City the average household size is 7.81.
76

When compared to the average household sizes of 3.14
for Utah, 2.59 for Arizona and a national average of 1.7,
it is clear that the households in Colorado City contain a
far higher number of residents.
77-78
is suggests higher
birthrates over the long term, which may lead to fewer
educational opportunities for women.
So for the case study of Mormon Fundamentalists in
the U.S., it is clear that tribalization is a causal factor in
gender inequality and even abuse. However, the eect could
be argued to be produced by the unique tribal situation or the
impact of an individual culture. To counter this argument,
the next case study is set in tribal Afghanistan.
Afghanistan has been characterized by many as a
peasant-tribal society.
79
Only 12 percent of Afghanistans
land is arable, and less than a quarter of that can hold a
permanent crop. Given the geographic and climate realities
of this region, population dispersion is naturally preferred
over centralization. Anthropologically there are two typical
types of settlement patterns: the nuclear clusters around
villages or the linear settlements along waterways and
other vital routes such as roads. Afghanistans population
is distributed in the nuclear pattern. e population is
clustered around the cultivated pockets of Kabul, Kandahar,
Mazar-i Sharif and Herat.
80
is anthropological climate
allows easier formation of isolated tribes on the edges of the
societies that defy the highly centralized government. e
stage is set for the formation of tribes.
Afghanistan is a heterogeneous country with 21
dierent identied ethnicities. e Tajik, Uzbek and
Turkomen ethnic groups straddle the borders of their
respective homelands north of the Hindu Kush Mountains
that bisect the country from east to west. e Hazaras and
some of the smaller ethnic groups have settled into the
valleys of those mountains. e tribe that is the case study
for this comparison is the Pashtun tribe, mostly located
south of the Hindu Kush Mountains.
81

e Pashtun represent the largest tribal entity in
Afghanistan, and within it the Ghilzai federation of Pashtun
has the strongest tribal institutions. Ideally a Pashtun tribe
features egalitarian, democratic decision making through
jirgah councils.
82
e four provinces that contain the greatest population
of the Ghilzai federation of Pashtun are Paktika, Zabul,
Ghazani and Paktya.
83
,
84
e Ghilzai Pashtun are a good
case study because they are not of the dominant Tajik
ethnicity that rules in Kabul, but they are part of the Pashtun
ethnicity that composes most of Kandahar, one of the most
secessionist and anti-state provinces in the country.
85

Most political scientists agree that modern Afghanistan
is composed of two types of societies: modern, those that are
clustered around city centers, and tribal, those that are spread
through the rest of the country. Where experts disagree is on
the role that tribes play in the overall society. Bernt Glatzer
(2008) argues that economics and close kinship overshadow
the role of the tribal system while Kenneth Christie (2008)
argues that common kinship, language, self-suciency and
mythology create a stronger tribe that is better able to resist
state inuences. Christies tribe is also dened as having a
high degree of internal conformity and little tolerance for
outsiders.
86
Both, however, agree that tribes in Afghanistan
have been encouraged by the modern history of a weak state
and the inuence of foreign state apparatus.
87

Whereas the FLDS members reacted against a state
already in place and tribalized based on a history as a
separate community, the Ghilzai federation of Pashtun have
been in and out of control of Afghanistan for centuries,
competing with the Durrani Pashtun and other groups for
Oppenheim | JGA
dominance.
88

Having established that both case studies fulll the
independent variable criteria of interacting with the state
and tribalization, we can now examine the dependant
variable.
Since 1959 growing numbers of women in Afghanistan,
mostly from urban backgrounds, have been joining the public
arena, participating in politics and working. Gender reform
was rst ocially introduced in the 1964 Constitution,
which enfranchised women and guaranteed them the right
to education and work. Although statistics showed by 1978
that women were joining the workforce, only about eight
percent of the female population of Afghanistan received an
income. Under the Taliban, a mostly rural Pashtun group,
conservative mujahidin leaders repealed the gains made by
women up until that point.
89

Following the Taiban, major strides have been made
in improving womens rights including the passage of the
Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in
2004. Under the second chapter of the new constitution,
Article 22 states that the citizens of Afghanistan - whether
women or men - have equal rights and duties before the
law.
90
A recent Environics survey showed that a majority
of Afghans believed that the situation of women in their
country had improved dramatically since the Taliban was
deposed. 75 percent of women in Kandahar, the mainly
Pashtun (but not Ghilzai Pashtun) province, believe that
they are better o today than they were under the Taliban.
91
Although the overall situation in Afghanistan for
womens rights is still deplorable, the situation within the
four provinces inhabited by the Ghilzai Pashtun are worse.
e Paktika, Zabul, Ghazani and Paktya provinces that
contain the largest percentage of Ghilzai Pashtun (although
it is dicult to count them because of their nomadic nature)
are ranked 20th, 21st, 14th and 10th respectively out of the
32 key provinces in Afghanistan for womens rights.
In Paktika and Zabul provinces, 5.7 percent and
1.4 percent of girls, respectively, attend primary school as
compared to the national average of 63 percent. In Paktya,
Ghazani and Zabul the female literacy rate is three, nine
and ve percent, respectively, as compared to a sub-par
national rating of 29 percent.
92
Although gender equality
in Afghanistan is among the worst in the world, within the
country the regions which the Ghilzai Pashtun inhabit have
some of the worst records. A history of traditional tribalism,
exacerbated by multiple instances of state interference, has
caused extreme tribalization in this region and the results
can be seen in the horric record for gender equality.
Findings and Limitations
At the start of this paper, I posited that tribalization
is the causal factor in gender inequality in instances that t
the model. In order to t the model, the society in question
must have undergone a process of tribalization when it
came in contact with a state.
Qualitatively, both the FLDS community of Colorado
City and the four provinces inhabited by the Tribal Ghilzai
Pashtun t the required model of having undergone
tribalization. However, this tribalization occurred in two
dierent manners. Colorado City separated from within a
state apparatus when they faced the choices of assimilation,
destruction or tribalization. e Ghilzai Pashtun have
been a formalized tribal society for centuries and have
sometimes formed the coalition necessary to control the
region. In their current iteration, they are a ercely nomadic
tribal society that has undergone repeated contact with
states, both internal and external, and radicalized as a
result. Additionally, both cases showed extreme instances
of gender inequality satisfying both the independent and
dependant variables necessary to validate the theory.
Although this author is condent in the causal logic
this paper takes, the data to prove the theory beyond a
shadow of a doubt does not yet exist. To quantitatively prove
the theory of tribalization as causing gender inequality,
statistics would be needed on the long term eects of tribes
in contact with the state and the way the treatment of
their women has evolved. Also, more than two case studies
is preferred with the condition that at least one or two of
the cases not have instances of strong religious associated
within the tribe in order to avoid the confounding eect of
religion. Further research is required in this area.
Conclusion
e original theory of this paper was that tribaliation
is the causal mechanism of gender inequality in modern
tribes. Although the theory holds for these case studies, a
lack of data as well as a necessity for more case studies and
the possibly confounding eect of religion make it dicult
to authoritatively say that tribalization is the sole cause of
gender inequality in modern tribes. But it can be condently
stated that tribalization is a causal theory in the creation
of gender inequality in modern tribes. Understanding the
underlying causes of gender inequality in these modern
tribes may help create lasting solutions to the problems
these women face.
13
1910
1967 the BPR was
renamed the Federal
Highway Administration
(FHWA)
37% of National
Mileage Surfaced
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956
wasdeeply supported by Eisenhower
and marked the birth of the (41,000 mile)
Interstate Highway System, the "greatest
Public Works Project in history"
2 0 30 4 0 5 0 6 0 7 0 8 0 9 0 2000
Oce of Road Inquiry (ORI) within
the Department of Agriculture;
Responsible for the development and
promotion of new rural roads.
1908 Henry Ford introduced
the Model T. It was aordable,
ecient and popular
Federal Highway Act of 1921 the
Bureau of Public Roads (BPR) gave
support for states to build a two-laned,
paved interstate highway system
WWII
Urban Expansion: for the
st time in American history
more people live in cities
than in rural communities
The Ford Model A Sedan
The Great
Depression
"The BigThree" auto
companies of General
Motors, Ford, and Chrysler
emerged
Military Jeep Design Contest 1939
1908 - 1916
1916
23% of National
Mileage Surfaced
By 1960 Americans
owned more cars then
the rest of the world
combined
1919 Eisenhower (Second Lieutenant)
began thinking about the nations road
system when he joined a cross-country
military convoy that took two months at
an average of 50 miles a day
Depression Era Road Projects
were administered by the BPR
to state and local governments
in order to create jobs
Funding for roads was
cut to focus on military
spending
1944 National System of Interstate
Highways Eisenhower signed legislation
that would develop a system of urban and
rural express highways. The legislation
lacked funding and failed.

1966 the growing number
of cars and roads prompted
legislation to establish the
U.S. Department of
Transportation
FHWA helped the states
create 99% of the designated
42,800-mile (expanded)
Interstate System
96% of all roads
in the U.S. (2
million miles)
are surfaced
with asphalt
10 Miles of National
Mileage Surfaced
387,000 Miles of
National Mileage Surfaced
I-44 rst contracted
Interstate Highway
using Interstate
Highway funds
Interstate is know as the Dwight D.
Eisenhower National System of
Interstate and Defense Highways
The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1938
called on the BPR to study the feasibility
of a toll-nanced system of three E - W
and three N - S superhighways
8/2/1947 Commissioner
MacDonald and Federal
Works Administrator Philip
B. Fleming announced the
selection of the rst 37,700
miles of the proposed system.
No funds allocated.
Highway Revenue Act of 1956
created the Highway Trust Fund
as a dedicated source for the
Interstate System
WWI
Ford Country Sedan
The Federal-Aid Highway
Act of 1968 authorized the
system's expansion to
42,500 miles
1991 Interstate Cost Estimate,
states may use other appropriate
classes of Federal-aid funds to
add additional capacity to their
part of the Interstate System
2/11/1998 as stated in the Federal
Register, no modications can be made
without approval from the Secretary of the
Department of Transportation
1,214 rest areas reported
to be in existence
1980 DOT recorded 1,527,295
trucks on the highway
1989 DOT recorded 2,096,487
trucks on the highway
Ford Mustang
Use of the highway grew between 1982
and 2002; vehicle miles traveled increased
by 79%, while highway lane miles only
increased 3 % during the same period
Suburbia: families start to
move to from urban areas,
creating an even greater
dependence on cars
Ford Cosworth
73,589,518 105,128,686 161,614,294 201,530,021
Number of Cars
Owned By Americans
8,000
30,000,000 7,500,000 3,500,000 31,035,420 62,020,343
From Dirt to a Dream
Olivia Jovine
is timeline is a road map (pun intended) to Americas highway history and the correlated growth of
the auto industry. e timeline begins in year 1900 and ends in year 2000. In 1910 there were only ten
miles of paved road, making it very dicult for cars to navigate the system. In the early 1900s roads
were still primarily traveled with horse drawn carriages. In 1919, Second Lieutenant Eisenhower
joined a military cross-country convoy; the trip took 2 months and averaged about 50 miles a day.
Clearly, Americas roads were dangerous, unpaved and dicult to navigate. is convoy served as
Eisenhowers inspiration for the Federal Highway Act. e Federal Highway Act was rst brought
to congress in 1921 by the Bureau of Public Roads, where it failed due to lack of funding. It then
reemerged in 1938 with the addition of a toll-nanced system and introduction of the super highway;
but the act failed once again. Only in 1952 was Eisenhowers Federal Highway Act successfully passed,
partially due to the joint Federal-Aid Highway Act that proposed funding solutions. e primary
motivation for building a federal highway system was to promote national security for the Unites
States. After the act was passed, Eisenhower and members of congress proceeded to develop the
national highway system. 1952 also marked the explosion of the auto industry, measured in number
of cars owned by Americans. My conclusion is that this is no coincidence, and that the development
of the Federal Highway System spurred the American dream to own and drive cars.
14
1910
1967 the BPR was
renamed the Federal
Highway Administration
(FHWA)
37% of National
Mileage Surfaced
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956
wasdeeply supported by Eisenhower
and marked the birth of the (41,000 mile)
Interstate Highway System, the "greatest
Public Works Project in history"
2 0 30 4 0 5 0 6 0 7 0 8 0 9 0 2000
Oce of Road Inquiry (ORI) within
the Department of Agriculture;
Responsible for the development and
promotion of new rural roads.
1908 Henry Ford introduced
the Model T. It was aordable,
ecient and popular
Federal Highway Act of 1921 the
Bureau of Public Roads (BPR) gave
support for states to build a two-laned,
paved interstate highway system
WWII
Urban Expansion: for the
st time in American history
more people live in cities
than in rural communities
The Ford Model A Sedan
The Great
Depression
"The BigThree" auto
companies of General
Motors, Ford, and Chrysler
emerged
Military Jeep Design Contest 1939
1908 - 1916
1916
23% of National
Mileage Surfaced
By 1960 Americans
owned more cars then
the rest of the world
combined
1919 Eisenhower (Second Lieutenant)
began thinking about the nations road
system when he joined a cross-country
military convoy that took two months at
an average of 50 miles a day
Depression Era Road Projects
were administered by the BPR
to state and local governments
in order to create jobs
Funding for roads was
cut to focus on military
spending
1944 National System of Interstate
Highways Eisenhower signed legislation
that would develop a system of urban and
rural express highways. The legislation
lacked funding and failed.

1966 the growing number
of cars and roads prompted
legislation to establish the
U.S. Department of
Transportation
FHWA helped the states
create 99% of the designated
42,800-mile (expanded)
Interstate System
96% of all roads
in the U.S. (2
million miles)
are surfaced
with asphalt
10 Miles of National
Mileage Surfaced
387,000 Miles of
National Mileage Surfaced
I-44 rst contracted
Interstate Highway
using Interstate
Highway funds
Interstate is know as the Dwight D.
Eisenhower National System of
Interstate and Defense Highways
The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1938
called on the BPR to study the feasibility
of a toll-nanced system of three E - W
and three N - S superhighways
8/2/1947 Commissioner
MacDonald and Federal
Works Administrator Philip
B. Fleming announced the
selection of the rst 37,700
miles of the proposed system.
No funds allocated.
Highway Revenue Act of 1956
created the Highway Trust Fund
as a dedicated source for the
Interstate System
WWI
Ford Country Sedan
The Federal-Aid Highway
Act of 1968 authorized the
system's expansion to
42,500 miles
1991 Interstate Cost Estimate,
states may use other appropriate
classes of Federal-aid funds to
add additional capacity to their
part of the Interstate System
2/11/1998 as stated in the Federal
Register, no modications can be made
without approval from the Secretary of the
Department of Transportation
1,214 rest areas reported
to be in existence
1980 DOT recorded 1,527,295
trucks on the highway
1989 DOT recorded 2,096,487
trucks on the highway
Ford Mustang
Use of the highway grew between 1982
and 2002; vehicle miles traveled increased
by 79%, while highway lane miles only
increased 3 % during the same period
Suburbia: families start to
move to from urban areas,
creating an even greater
dependence on cars
Ford Cosworth
73,589,518 105,128,686 161,614,294 201,530,021
Number of Cars
Owned By Americans
8,000
30,000,000 7,500,000 3,500,000 31,035,420 62,020,343
15
Essays on Consumerism in Asia
Laura Esposito
16
JGA | Consumerism in Asia
Consumption and Production in China and Using
Culture to Distinguish Social Class
In Xun Zhous work, Eat, Drink and Sing, and Be
Modern and Global: Food, Karaoke and Middle Class
Consumers in China,
1
and Douglas Holts Does Cultural
Capital Structure American Consumption?,
2
both authors
discuss the role of consumption in determining social class
and conveying status. However, while Holt is focused more
on the dierentiation between high versus low cultural
capital accumulation and its relation to class formation,
Zhou analyzes the Westernization of Chinese consumption
patterns and how this in turn reects emerging societal
values. Additionally, Zhous argument stresses the tension
between traditional rituals and the adoption of Western
ideas that conict with cultural and social values. Embedded
in both Zhou and Holts texts is also the idea of the adoption
of articial taste and practices in order to achieve societal
recognition as belonging to a specic class. is idea was
furthered in a radio broadcast
3
that identied the articial
representation of luxury goods as coming from sophisticated
countries, while in fact the majority of goods are produced
in China.
Zhous description of the emerging middle class of
consumers in China was particularly interesting because of
the limitations of being identied as middle class. Similar
to how Allison Pugh
4
identies the boundaries of childrens
interactions as unique enough to set one apart, but not so
unique as to be considered strange, Zhou writes that by
consumption of certain activities, consumers are not only
able to dene their individual status and identities, but
[are] also transformed into a desired social collectivethe
middle class.
5
In order to be considered part of a certain
group, one must adhere to the consumption limitations that
are imposed by that group. Another component of Chinese
consumption patterns reects the desire to be accepted on a
global scale. Zhou notes that China began importing foreign
foods because the local became a sign of backwardness,
while imported goods from France, England or Germany
were embraced as prestige symbols.
6
is corresponds
to the argument that we have constructed ideas of where
valued goods come from and which cultures produce them.
However, this construction is also contradicted by the
radio broadcast
7
that points out the irony of luxury good
production in China that still allows the luxury good to
maintain the illusion of cultural sophistication.
In Holts argument and interpretation of high versus
low cultural capital accumulation, he suggests a similar
pattern of identifying some countries as being more
sophisticated and therefore more adept at cultural capital
accumulation. However, he also points out that increased
access to cultural goods has undermined this system of class
dierentiation. Holt writes, us, as cultural hierarchies
have dramatically blurred in advanced capitalist societies,
objectied cultural capital has become a relatively weak
mechanism for exclusionary class boundaries.
8
e ability
to easily gain cultural capital threatens existing class
boundaries and is further weakened by the production of
imitation luxury goods. In addition, Holt maintains that
high levels of consumption cannot only be reached by elites,
but that now to consume in a rare, distinguished manner
requires that one consume the same categories in a manner
inaccessible to those with less cultural capital.
9
erefore, a
sign of class is consistently engaging in high cultural capital
accumulation because class can now be determined based on
how frequently one is able to consume. is is a mechanism
for the upper class to surpass the symbolic indulgence
10

of lower income families who cannot aord to maintain
consumption at such a high level, and instead are only able
to gain status by occasionally prioritizing expensive goods.
In conclusion, Zhou and Holt both address the new
ways for people to gain cultural capital accumulation and
status in society through consumption practices. Zhous
example of the emerging roles of food and karaoke in
China reect the idea that Westernization of consumption
practices signies sophistication and luxury. Holts
examination of cultural capital accumulation addresses how
class is determined based on access to culture and highly
regarded goods. However, he also argues that people with
high cultural capital accumulation can no longer rely on lack
of access to create exclusionary class boundaries. Underlying
both arguments is the idea of articiality of culture,
consumption and values that considerably clash with notions
of luxury (imitation brands and luxury production in China)
and tradition (food in China). Eventually, people will need
to reevaluate what they actually value, as opposed to what
advertising, desires for sophistication and aspirations to be
set apart dictate that they value.
e Dualities in Shoveling Smoke
In his work, Shoveling Smoke,
11
William Mazzarella
analyzes the Indian advertising industry and its role in
changing the consumer culture and mindset in post-
independence India. He begins his study by detailing the
historical context of Indias consumption how since gaining
independence and choosing to implement protectionist
economic measures, people have been faced with the
dualities of progress versus tradition, protectionism versus
liberalization, developmentalist versus consumerist, global
versus local, and the new versus the old swadeshi. Mazzarella
explains swadeshi as literally meaning, of ones own country,
but identies the new swadeshi as heightening rather than
eacing the importance of locality and local identity.
12

Using examples from the advertising industry, such as the
campaign for KamaSutra condoms, Mazzarella furthers the
idea of the new swadeshi by analyzing how local brands can
become widely consumed and how tradition and cultural
signicance enable an advertising campaign to become both
locally and globally relevant.
Mazzarella also discusses the ability to access these
new goods and brands that became available after India
opened its markets. Mazzarella writes, e tension between
individualism and standardization was justied in terms of
equity: equal access to the dream of self-transformation.
13

Part of the transition from protectionism to liberalization
involves making choices, as an individual and as a society,
as to the value of national traditions and rituals compared
to those of the rest of the world. Advertising inuences
this decision because it creates value and meaning, lling
the post-colonial and post-protectionist void. Xun Zhou
discussed this with regards to the Chinese adopting forks
and knives and reducing their use of chopsticks. e Chinese
do not need to have forks and knives, and while chopsticks
are more prevalently used, their role has been compromised
by Western values adopted by the Chinese. rough the
examples of condoms and utensils, we can identify that the
divide between incorporating local culture and dismissing it
lies in the cultures ability to withstand the standardizations
of globalization. For instance, the KamaSutra brand was
successful in merging one of Indias cultural components
with a mass-marketed product. Because the advertisers
were able to build demand for the KamaSutra condoms
through the local culture, they simultaneously strengthened
and reinforced the value of that cultural symbol. Instead
of completely replacing the condom market with a foreign
brand that would have no cultural relevance, KamaSutra
represents a brand with which people can identify.
Overall, Shoveling Smoke presents an interdisciplinary
approach to advertising and the presence of brands and
consumerism in postcolonial countries. rough his research,
Mazzarella questions the contradictions of the local and
the global and the role of tradition and culture in a global
market. As a result of globalization and the liberalization
of economies, we must learn to recognize and measure the
presence of local versus global values, brands and goods.
is will allow us to determine how consumerism and
globalization allow both the local and global to exist without
limiting or eliminating the other.
Internal and External Dualities within Globalization
In Golden Arches East,
14
the presence of McDonalds in
East Asia is shown both to globalize and localize the regions
economies and cultures. James Watson discusses how the
introduction of McDonalds in Beijing, Hong Kong, Taipei,
Seoul and Japan has created a variety of responses and has
played an integral role in merging cultural traditions with
global markets. Several aspects of the McDonaldization
process encourage development and market success that
require the negotiation of the global and the local, similar to
the advertising campaigns in Shoveling Smoke.
Watson notes that many people view McDonalds as a
form of American cultural imperialism, working its way into
popular culture. is can create the presence of an exotic
foreign brand, which in this case eventually became a staple
of local culture. With regards to Douglas Holts work on
cultural capital accumulation, McDonalds became absorbed
into local culture and thus lost its exoticism. However, this
did not diminish its appeal in East Asia, but rather allowed
it to also integrate local specicities, such as cultural and
religious dietary restrictions. In addition, Watson also
comments that McDonalds, during its initial years in the
Peoples Republic of China, was celebrated as a model of
modernization, sanitation, and responsible management.
15

Perhaps stemming from previous development theories that
used immigration of Europeans to spur industrialization,
McDonalds is providing the same eciency and
standardization of the labor process. McDonalds, therefore,
can be utilized as a development technique, able to socialize
17
Esposito | JGA
McDonalds and Westernization in order to completely
understand the role of McDonalds and how it has shifted
cultural norms and family dynamics.
Wus research also suggests that the food tensions that
arise within states are a result of a preexisting political or
social hierarchical tension. e presence of globalization
and localization becomes completely intertwined with
businesses, trade, the political and social structures of
countries. In Golden Arches East, the cultural specicities
of a global brand are explained and detailed in relation
to its success. McDonalds depends upon local success to
create aggregate success, which is why the convergence of
globalization and localization is integral to its presence and
success in the global market.
e Commoditization of Buddhism
In Penetrating the Tangle
20
by Stephanie Kaza and
Marketing the Dharma
21
by ubten Chdrn, both
authors discuss the commoditization of Buddhism and the
conicts between Buddhist and consumerist culture and
ideologies. Kaza analyzes the moral issues that arise because
of the Buddhist principle to not cause harm. Ultimately, her
solution encourages more self-awareness of the processes by
which we engage in consumerism what is motivating our
desires and are we happier or more satised by obtaining
them? Chdrn, in contrast, discusses the commoditization
of Buddhism and how the practice has evolved into a
18
JGA | Consumerism in Asia
and educate citizens in the Western manner (which Watson
also refers to as consumer education.)
16

Another aspect of Golden Arches East focuses on
the invariability of one product coupled with the cultural
specicity or locality of another. For example, Mazzarellas
KamaSutra condoms combined Indian culture with a
common, global product. McDonalds accomplishes a
similar outcome: its French fries represent the standardized
product, while the hamburger portion varies depending on
the countrys preferred food.
In his chapter on Taipei,
17
David Wu discusses a
dierent tension that arose from food and the globalization
of McDonalds one that is specic to Taiwans role as a
post-colonial state and its strained relationship with China.
He describes eating as a political act, one that distinguishes
mainlanders from Taiwanese and prompted the revitalization
of ethnic culture through consumption of betel nuts. Wu
explains this connection further: Whereas McDonalds is a
reection of the globalization process that has transformed
Taiwan into a modern industrial power and a center of world
business, betel-nut chewing is associated with the symbolic
revival of a Taiwanese rural lifestyle among people who are
searching for ways to construct a new national identity.
18

As Wu discusses the success of McDonalds in Taiwan, he
also notes the demographics and how McDonalds growth
has been steady because of generational absorption into
local culture, which is somewhat dependent on parents
and children being educated in the U.S.
19
is contributes
to how McDonalds lost its exoticism by becoming a local
xture for future generations. Additionally, present and
future generations must develop a connection between
19
Esposito | JGA
consumer/market-oriented relationship instead of a
spiritual one. In addition, she discusses the many similarities
between Buddhism and consumerism how they cultivate
and express taste and connoisseurship, the individual versus
the community mindset, the use of numbers to determine
success and the loss of genuine meaning or authentic
Buddhism.
Kazas arguments for moralistic decisions within
the consumerist framework are very similar to other texts
that discuss the negative consequences of consumerism.
While Kaza is primarily concerned with the environmental
repercussions of harmful and destructive actions taken by
large companies, her analysis of the need for morals can also
be applied to discussions on culture and authenticity. For
example, what are the moral consequences of a homogenized
culture, i.e. the McDonaldization of the rest of the world?
Who is responsible for these choices and changes? In
addition, Kaza notes the perpetual cycle of consumerism
and encourages individuals to take responsibility for the
unsustainable and harmful eects of their consumption. For
Kaza, this has signicant implications on the formation of
self-identity and allows the individual to take full advantage
of spiritual practices that may be neglected by the desire to
consume.
Building upon Kazas idea of prioritization of the
individual and spirituality over consumerist vices, Chdrn
discusses a variety of factors that hinder the ability to engage
in healthy consumerist practices. For example, Chdrn
describes the commoditization of Buddhism, which allows
it to appeal to more people and gain more support within
popular culture. However, the very methods that enable
Buddhism to grow are deeply consumerist ideals and
practices that conict with Buddhist ideology. Chdrn
writes, We dont give to support earnest practitioners who
dont teach. Instead, we give to teachers when weve received
their services.
22
e idea of exchange receiving some
good or service for ones personal benet has replaced the
previous Buddhist practice of giving because one wants to
give (which is intended to create positive karmic energy).
She also evaluates the Wests inability to form communities
because of a lack of commitment, which allows us to
neglect responsibility and continue the on-going search for
satisfaction through material gain.
23
Chdrns argument is
also similar to Bill McKibbens
24
and Tim Kassers
25
because
she identies the lack of happiness and fulllment that
results from the commoditization of spiritual life. What was
once above the market and its money-oriented motivations
is now subjected to the same consumerist standards.
Kaza and Chdrns discussions of the role of
Buddhism in a consumerist culture are both fascinating
and devastating. Both fear that Buddhism could become
susceptible to consumerism and success as determined by
numbers if it continues to grow within popular culture.
e commoditization of Buddhist ideals and spiritual life,
as shown by Kaza and Chdrn, corresponds to all other
aspects of consumerism that we have previously discussed.
Both on individual and communal levels, it requires that
people reevaluate the happiness and satisfaction that they
receive from real Buddhism as compared to the market-
motivated Buddhism.
Africas sign culture is fascinating and demonstrates the reality of global systems of cultural
production. ese images of signs taken throughout East and West Africa range from
advertisements for local businesses to public service announcements. e West often perceives
Africa as disconnected, but implicit in these signs is a demonstrated awareness of popular
culture worldwide, repurposed to serve the aims of African proprietors. Signs are an indicator of
social conscience since they must adhere to norms in order to be understood by their intended
audience what is on a sign reveals what resonates with the people. erefore, these signs from
Africa evidence participation in a globalized culture far beyond continental boundaries.
e Signs of Globalization
Leigh Rome
King Brill | JGA
Religion, National Identity and Education in the Islamic World:
A Look at Egypt, Turkey and Saudi Arabia
Jenna King Brill
INTRODUCTION
In 2007, 35 percent of people in the Arab world did
not know how to read or write.
2
Couple this with a
population growing at an estimated rate two times that of
the rest of the worlds already quickly increasing population,
and there is a clear challenge presented to governments of
these countries hoping to put their future generations in a
position to be competitive in the global market.
3
Education
has consistently played a central and highly valued role in
Islamic culture throughout its history. Seeking knowledge
is framed as an honor and an obligation.
4
During the early
years of Islam, before its spread across the Near East and
North Africa, learning was focused solely within religious
centers such as mosques and kuttabs (small schools where
the Quran was taught and memorized, and sometimes
supplemented with other subjects of learning). Quickly
though, as Islams inuence spread to surrounding areas, the
natural sciences too became a center of focus and prestige.
e colonial era marks a pivotal point in the
development of Islamic history generally, and the upheaval
of the educational systems is an example of the societal
restructuring that took place at the hands of reigning
colonial powers at this time. With independence, the newly
sovereign countries were faced with a choice, in developing
new systems of infrastructure, between the progress and
modernity of the West and their own history of cultural
and religious development. ere is now a debate within the
Islamic world about the best way to build a generation able
to compete in the global political and economic markets
while also maintaining a morally and culturally Islamic
society. Over the past few decades, leaders have also had to
respond to a return to religion by younger generations as
a reaction to the Westernization of the colonial and post-
colonial years of their parents generation. Recent popular
Islamic resurgences in all three of our case countries, Egypt,
Turkey and Saudi Arabia, oer a new challenge to the
formation of education policy, and government responses to
these challenges have shifted the discourse between religion
and secularism in the larger Islamic world.
Education policy reects and in turn impacts everything
from cultural development to political movements and
unemployment levels. How a country develops and
structures its educational system is a signicant indicator
of its broader goals and values. us, there is an unlimited
number of ways to approach a discussion of education. As
case studies, these three countries together oer particular
insight into the relationship between government policy on
education and on religion. Egypt and Turkey oer two very
dierent examples of a mainly secular education system,
while Saudi Arabia will oer a brief look into the challenges
and complexities of an education system that is outwardly
and staunchly religious.
In the West, we often make the mistake of analyzing
everything within the Islamic world in religious terms. is
is a trap that this paper will do its best to avoid. ere are an
unlimited number of inuences and events that have made
the educational systems of these countries what they are
today. is paper is a brief, limited look at how a developing
sense of Islamic identity in these three countries plays out in
their educational systems.
Egypt
e Egyptian educational system is comprised primarily
of a central public school system, rst developed under
British colonial rule and now attended by the large majority
of Egyptian students. ere is also a parallel primary through
university system under the auspices of al-Azhar University,
a global center of learning for Sunni Islam, which less than
In no other sphere of social life does the question of Islam make itself more starkly apparent than
within the national education systems of Islamically-oriented nations.
1
21
four percent of the student population attends. If someone
wants to become a religious scholar they must enter this
system, but it also provides a basic modern education and
oers advanced degrees in non-religious subjects (such as
medicine).
5
In all systems, nine years of primary education
are compulsory,
6
after which students can attend either an
academic (preparatory) or vocational school. If a student
earns a diploma from one of the general or academic
secondary schools, they are eligible to enroll in a university.
Exam scores at the end of the primary and secondary levels
determine which further schools a student is eligible to
apply to. us, for instance, if a student is not among the
top scorers on their Basic Education exam, they are not
allowed to attend an academic secondary school and will be
far less likely to have the opportunity to enroll in university.
All levels of education (even university) are paid for by the
government, except for the approximately eight percent of
students who attend private school. Curricula in the public,
private and al-Azhar systems are entirely government
mandated and regulated, and its main goal is to cultivate a
strong national identity within its younger generations.
7
Turkey
Like Egypt, the Turkish national educational system is
centralized, with all decisions concerning the management
of the school system, such as curriculum and textbook
development, coming from the Ministry of National
Education. Education in Turkey, as in Egypt, is compulsory
through primary school, though in Turkey this is equivalent
to eight rather than nine years. is primary education is
extremely intensive, putting a students level in math at the
end of ve years on par with what would be expected of an
eighth-year student in some parts of Europe.
8
Post primary
education there is, as in the Egyptian system, a general
preparatory and a vocational or technical track and it is
dicult, though not impossible, to enter university from the
vocational track.
9

Saudi Arabia
As in Egypt and Turkey, the Saudi government fully
funds education at all levels. In fact, it spends more than any
other country in the region on the education and training
of its citizens (19.3 percent of total government spending
in 2008, down from 38.5 percent in 2003).
10
However,
education is no longer compulsory, even at the primary level.
Despite this, Saudi Arabia maintains enrollment rates on
par with (if not higher than) the rest of the region. Where
it fails to compete is in its university completion rates.
Intermediate education oers a specialized religion track
to male students, but Islamic studies play a central role in
curricula at all levels.
EGYPT
% of Govt Spending 11.9
% Literacy 66.4
Primary Secondary
(Vocational or
Academic)
University
Free & Compulsory Free Free
79.3%
Enrollment of gross
99.7%
Enrollment of gross
28.5%
Enrollment of gross
TURKEY
14.7
88.7
82.0%
Enrollment of gross
99.3%
Enrollment of gross
38.4%
Enrollment of gross
SAUDI ARABIA
19.3
85.5
94.6%
Enrollment of gross
98.4%
Enrollment of gross
29.9%
Enrollment of gross
i
ii (2006)
(2007) (2004)
(1994)
(2007)
% of Govt Spending
% Literacy
Primary Secondary
(Vocational or
Academic)
University
Free & Compulsory Free Free
% of Govt Spending
% Literacy
Primary Secondary
(Vocational or
Academic)
University
Free Free Free
22
i All percentages are from the World Banks World Development Indicators,
(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator), 2008 except where otherwise noted
ii Literacy rates are for adults age 15 and above
JGA | Education in the Islamic World
THE ISSUES
Egypt: Nationalism vs. Secularism
Egypt is not only an example of, but in many ways is
central to, the history of and current debate over educational
systems in the Arab and larger Islamic world. Education
was key to the development of a larger culture of Arab
nationalism that began in the 1940s and began to decline
after Egypts defeat at the hands of Israel in 1967.
11
In
the West, our recent emphasis on the importance of
understanding and analyzing Islamic culture and history
has lead to an upsurge in focus on issues of education and
secularism in our own press and academic circles. Far before
this, however, Egypt, along with much of the post-colonial
world, had turned to education as the instrument through
which it would rebuild its place in the post-colonial world.
In 1952 the Free Ocers party overthrew the
parliamentary government in a military coup. e
subsequent restructuring of the educational system under
Gamal abd al-Nassers government reected a wider societal
transformation that was taking place. is restructuring was
characterized by standardization of curriculum and teaching
philosophies and a centralization of administrative control
within the hands of the new military government. In Nassers
Egypt the focus was on building the identity of a nation
that was increasingly inuential and competitive within the
global community. us, the focus from secondary school
on was overwhelmingly on science and technology. Arabic
became the main vehicle for the shaping of this identity and
the unication, not just of Egypt, but also of the larger Arab
world. e language itself received overwhelming emphasis
in Nassers new educational system.
12
As the character of Egypts international involvement
began again to change, with the loss of the Arab-Israeli war
in 1967, followed by the signing of the Camp David accords
in 1978, the government had to respond to a fear of many
Egyptians that their country would revert to a position
subservient to the West.
13
Failure within the educational
system, compounded by issues such as an overtaxed
economy and steep population growth, had helped form a
society poised to turn elsewhere for a solution. Religion (in
addition to nationalism) became the focus of this search.
14

e character of religious identity within Egypt was brought
to a startling new light in the wake of the 1981 assassination
of President Sadat by members of the Muslim Brotherhood.
at same year, the government instituted a ve-year process
of signicant education expansion and reform.
As mentioned above, the majority of Egyptian students
today attend secular public schools. e focus of Nassers
education reforms was the development of an Arab, not an
Islamic, identity. Yet, Egypts population is overwhelmingly
Muslim. e largest minority, Coptic Christians, make
up about 10 percent of the population.
15
Even in Nassers
Egypt, there was a required three hours of religious
education each week, either Muslim or Christian, built
into the primary curriculum. However, with the increased
emphasis on religious interests in the political sphere over
the past few decades, the government has felt pressured to
adjust and clarify the role religion plays in society at large
and in the educational system specically. Before the recent
uprisings, it had become politically important to Mubaraks
government, in a way it had not been for Nassers, that it
assure the population of its dedication to maintaining the
signicant role Islamic history and religion play in the
Egyptian national identity.
In the West, one of our popular fears is of a system
which, combining religion with government, may leave itself
vulnerable to inltration by forces of violent extremism.
Mamoun Fandy makes the argument that extremist
religious tendencies among todays Egyptian youth are a
result of the Egyptian government losing control of its own
xenophobic nationalist rhetoric and policies that created
a system of education with the sole purpose of generating
regime support.
16
In the early 90s the government sought
to rectify this situation, ring 3,000 teachers, apparently
for holding radical views that they were passing on to their
students.
17
Interestingly, most Egyptian extremists were
educated, not in the al-Azhar religious system, but in the
secular schools and universities, receiving their religious
education from other places, such as mosques.
18

e pre-February 2011 Egyptian government believed
that it was not secularism, but a proper understanding of
religious values, that would successfully combat religious
extremism.
19
A Ministry of Education publication in 1996
stated that: Religious and moral values should be deeply
ingrained among our children. Religious instruction should
push our children to adhere to lofty values and morals.
20

e government had also instituted a set of non-religious
ethics classes at the primary level. As of 2003 the lessons
included: cleanliness, hygiene and environment, honesty,
love, sense of beauty and order, peace and tolerance, among
others.
21
In the textbooks for these lessons is an overarching
sense of patriotism and national unity. It will be interesting
in the wake of the recent the uprising to see what the result
of a national revolution centered on popular, universal rights
will have on an education system that currently has the dual
focus of promoting tolerance and stalling resistance.
Turkey: National vs. Islamic Identity
e 1923 revolution that marked the formation of the
Turkish Republic signicantly shaped the priorities and
methods of the new government. e Turkish government
has used education as one of the most important tools not
just with which to modernize but also to secularize. us,
the system is inherently political and often acts as the
stage of the larger secular versus religious debate. After
23
King Brill | JGA
the revolution, Turkish became the required language of
instruction, whereas before minorities were taught in their
own languages. In 1928 the Arabic alphabet was replaced
with a Western one, and Islamic history was removed from
school curriculums. e adoption of Islam, a force portrayed
as innately Arab, was touted as the pivotal point in the
downfall of the Ottoman Empire and thus religion was
seen as a threat to the survival and prosperity of the Turkish
state.
22
e West and modernization became the new goal
and education was, as in Nassers Egypt, the central force
through which Ataturk, the Republics new leader, sought
to formulate a new national identity. By 1965 education
was second only to defense in the national budget.
23
In
many ways, this approach worked. Literacy rates went from
nine to 48 percent between 1924 and 1965 and are now
somewhere near 90 percent. Today Turkey has a higher
university enrollment rate than either Egypt or Saudi
Arabia. e system still faces problems, especially in terms
of access to education in many non-urban areas.
24
Overall,
however, in terms of national development the educational
system in Turkey appears to have been generally successful.
Some of the biggest changes in the education system
over the past three decades have stemmed from a rethinking
of the importance of Islam to the Turkish identity. e
qualication of modernity as inherently secular and Islam
as anti-Turkish was called into question by a group of
intellectual Islamists, know as the Intellectuals Hearth, who
gained access to power in the aftermath of a military coup
in 1980. ese scholars, and other thinkers like them, put
forth the idea that the clash between Western modernism
and Ottoman tradition had occurred, not because Islam or
religion are antithetical to modernity, but because Western
culture and the way it conceptualizes the individual does not
t with traditional Islamic and Turkish values.
25
Like Egypt, the primary goal of Turkeys educational
system is to foster a sense of Turkish unity and inimitability.
e eect of the loosening of staunch secularism, which
began in 1980, is simply that this uniqueness is now taught
as stemming from a natural connection between Turkish
tradition and Islam. In textbooks and classrooms Turkey
is now portrayed as having been vital to the successes of
the Islamic world. Post-revolutionary history has been
rewritten to portray Ataturk as having exemplied this
special Turkish-Islamic relationship.
26
Out of this has come
a sense of a uniquely Turkish Islam. It is this Islam, and
only this Islam, that the government allows to be taught
within the school system. Secularism is still ingrained in
the constitution of the state, and what exactly Turkish
Islam looks like is constantly being debated. Headscarves
for instance, the universal symbol by which the world often
mistakenly judges the Islamic fervor of any given society, are
still strictly banned within schools and universities.
27
Saudi Arabia: Religion vs. National Advancement
e basic principles of Islam are integral to Saudi
education, and courses in religion and Islamic culture form
a core curriculum for students of all ages.
28

e story of Saudi Arabian education has been one of
late and rapid growth. Despite its signicance as a religious
center of the Islamic world, for a long time it was far behind
in the development of a modern educational system. In 1925
(two years after the Revolution in Turkey), the Directorate of
Education was founded. Until this point education had been
dispersed and unregulated, left largely up to kuttab. 1926
heralded the establishment of an entirely new educational
system. Much like during the reforms in Egypt and Turkey,
elementary education became free and compulsory for all
males of student age.
29
Education, along with textbooks,
health services and travel costs are all still free today, though
no level is compulsory.
30
By 2001 there were more than four
million students in over 23,000 institutions throughout the
country,
31
compared to just 10,000 students in 65 schools
in 1947.
32
In the same year, the literacy rate for youth ages
15 to 24 was 93.1 percent, likely a consequence of the 94
percent of children who had attended ve or more years of
school.
33
Dierent from both Turkey and Egypt, the Saudi system
of education is professedly religious. e Saudi Ministry
of Education sets out several principles, which outline its
goals for its education system. Among them is the intent
to, strengthen faith in God and Islam, and in Mohammed
as Gods prophet and envoy.
34
Similar to Turkey, Islam in
Saudi Arabia, at least as it is put forth by the government,
is uniquely Saudi. e monarchys close, interdependent
relationship with the countrys leading Wahhabi ulama (who
represent a very fundamental, orthodox version of Islam)
leaves the educational system vulnerable to inltration of
extremist ideologies. For example, because of the deciency
of its own system, when it began to institute reforms in the
1920s, Saudi Arabia had to bring in teachers from other
Arab countries to teach in their schools. In 1975, 51 percent
of Saudi teachers were foreigners.
35
Because of the strict
religious standards of the ulama, the only teachers that
qualied to teach in a Wahhabi system ended up being largely
members of the Muslim Brotherhood, a violent extremist
party founded in Egypt. Once hired, these teachers, as in
Egypt, tended to use the classroom to propagate their own
views.
36
By 2000 the number of foreign teachers in Saudi
Arabia had still only lowered to 25 percent, which signies
to a certain extent a failure of the Saudi system to become
fully self-sucient.
37
Part of this failure is the problematic level of Saudi
unemployment rates. Although at 29.9 percent, Saudi
university enrollment seems comparable to Egypts 28.5
percent,
38
the dropout rate in Saudi Arabia is extremely
24
JGA | Education in the Islamic World
high. Additionally, over 40 percent of those enrolled in
university choose to major in Islamic studies.
39
us,
many graduates are largely unqualied for anything except
religious positions, leading to estimated unemployment
rates far above 10 percent,
40
and a nearly $9,000 drop in the
average per capita income between 1980 and 2001.
41
us,
despite its claimed intent to build a generation able to raise
the nations standard of living,
42
the Saudi government is
struggling to reconcile this goal with its own emphasis on
the importance of religion above all else.

CONCLUSION
e educational systems of Egypt, Turkey and Saudi
Arabia oer insight into the debate on the role of religion
in the modern Islamic state. e integration of religious and
government institutions does not have the contradictory
connotation in these countries (even, it seems, in Turkey)
that it tends to in the West and, if taught right, religion
has the possibility of oering a strong and unifying moral
structure. Yet as the Saudi case especially teaches us, in
order to benet the progression of the state, education for
the majority of students must lead somewhere other than
a high degree of religious knowledge. ere are some who
believe that Egypts al-Azhar system is an encouraging
example of a religious education system that also oers
advanced technical degrees. However, the complicated
histories Egypt and Saudi Arabia have with extremism act
as a warning of what can happen when governments do not
adequately monitor the ideas being disseminated through
their curricula.
Religious thought is an inherently personal process and
yet what these three countries teach us is that it is also a
powerful political tool. In all three cases Islam has been used,
and often reinvented (most clearly in the case of Turkey),
throughout history to t the needs of a threatened or overly
ambitious government. Education is just one of the spheres
in which religion takes its political form. is politicization
of religion is, of course, not a uniquely Islamic process. It
is however one that, with the recent popular upsurge of
orthodox religious identication, especially among its youth,
the Islamic world is being forced once again to confront.


25
King Brill | JGA
When I was in Peru in the month of July 2007, all the teachers and taxi drivers went
on strike, and for a few days the roads leading to Cuzco, the ancient Incan capital, were
blocked by burning tires. Soldiers started patrolling the streets more and more because of
the unrest in the city. I was drawn to the people who were authorized by the government
to use violence, to record their faces, but also show them as everyday people who smile
and fall asleep in the sun. e second photograph is of a festival in a small town called
Paucartambo that celebrates its patron saint with a notorious esta every summer. At
nightfall the town square is full of bonres and giant homemade rework towers, and
dancers and musicians careen around leaping over the res. ese photographs are
memories of two dierent sides of Peru, the total chaos and joy of a small town in the
middle of the night and the political fever watched over by soldiers under the bright sun.
Locura
Emily Pederson
Contextualizing Genocide:
An Examination of Complexities in Cambodia and Guatemala
Julia Burnell
Why Study Genocide
Genocide is an immediate and visible expression
of mass human aggression. And it is perhaps due to the
extreme nature of such violence that it is often characterized
as unthinkable or as an anomaly. is characterization often
allows for genocide to be dismissed as outside of historys
trajectory.
1
However, genocide is not a spontaneous event
but rather the manifestation of historical constructions,
politics and economic stressors, whose conuence within
the right context can be disastrous. Although these factors
can shape genocide, the violence itself is not the only form
in which they are present in a community, and they do
not dissipate when the violence nally abates. In this way,
contextualizing genocide becomes a project in pursuit of
clarifying genocide itself, and also those inuences and the
legacies it leaves in its wake. Because genocide requires some
level of popular participation and aects all layers of society,
there are many divergent experiences and accounts of events
and their signicance. ese dierences further complicate
narratives surrounding the violence, and these nuances have
concrete implications for genocide prevention, for post-
genocidal societies and their relationship to the past.
Although a convenient response to this complexity
would be dismissal, the extreme nature of the violence as
well as the complexities themselves beg examination and
contextualization. ese nuances can provide insight into
questions that historians, human rights workers and policy
makers have to confront when working with societies that are
moving forward from extreme violence. Questions regarding
what can cause such violence, how people are galvanized
into participation and what role historical legacies play in
shaping the violence are of paramount concern. Although
genocides are destabilizing, they do have specic political
goals, whether they are the maintenance of the status quo,
a return to an historical order or a revolutionary shift in
relations. Further, the way that groups are delineated, how
justice is conceived of and how some histories are told
while others are silenced all have concrete implications for
peoples lives. I am not introducing new stories of genocide,
but rather taking a critical look at the way that genocides
are understood and portrayed. rough this examination I
will work to draw out a space where cultural and contextual
specicity and institutional mechanisms can inform each
other rather than compete, as well as demonstrate how
cultivating awareness of a specic context has the potential
to strengthen institutional responses.
Approach and Purpose
In order to delve into questions regarding causes,
narratives and responses to genocide, I focus on two specic
cases: Cambodia and Guatemala. Both countries had
centralized civilizations prior to being colonized by European
powers. Similarly, after independence both countries
struggled with economic, social and political instability and
eventually devolved into genocide. ese were particularly
complex cases in which historical narratives, international
political environments, economic stressors and perceptions
of ethnicity and ideology converged and emerged as violent
ssures in society. Indeed, my examination of genocide
in Cambodia and Guatemala highlights that genocide is
supported by deep historical legacies of inequality that are
inamed through changing political currents and struggles
over resources.
In order to gain an understanding of how to mitigate
the destructive nature of these forces, I examine how they
evolved. Both of these countries have colonial pasts that
cultivated legacies of inequality based on the marginalization
of many. However, these legacies preexisted the genocides
and do not seem sucient to constitute a singular
explanation for the violence that was perpetrated using
ideological language. Neither historical legacies nor political,
economic and ideological struggles for supremacy are solely
responsible for genocide. Rather, popular participation gives
those legacies power by acting upon them, while conversely
popular participation in the violence looks to those legacies
as justication. e genocides of Cambodia and Guatemala
demonstrate how these legacies can be wielded to galvanize
and legitimize a policy of violence and the elimination of a
group of people. Because of the power that narratives wield,
institutional responses to genocide should work to render
28
JGA | Contextualizing Genocide
them impotent through a process of examination and
deconstruction. In this way, an examination of genocides
in both countries will sharpen the understanding of their
underlying processes. Indeed, these genocides have many
similarities. However, their rhetoric is driven by specic
conditions and historical legacies that have traction within
their social contexts.
Elongating the Lens
In an eort to understand these complex processes,
explanations for genocides tend to truncate history or
dismiss its relationship to the violence altogether. In his
book, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism,
and the Genocide in Rwanda, Mahmood Mamdani
challenges understandings of genocide as either spontaneous
or inevitable.
2
When genocidal violence is divorced from
the forces it sprung from, broader culpability as well as
comprehension is inhibited. e genocides and political
upheaval in both Cambodia and Guatemala have been
met with such horror that they have similarly been severed
from the social roots that sustained them. Not only does
such a limited vision preclude functional responses to the
violence, it establishes certain countries and their associated
ethnicities as inherently violent. is perspective is not only
incorrect but also dangerous. erefore, the context out
of which each period of genocide erupted is an essential
element of the picture.
Prior to the arrival of Spanish colonizers, the Mayan
empire as well as an array of other indigenous societies called
contemporary Guatemala their home. With the arrival of the
Spanish, both indigenous appearance and practices became
markers of lower social standing. However, the Spanish also
constructed a class of intermediaries. By raising such groups
as the indigenous Kiche and the Ladino class above others,
the Spanish simultaneously cultivated resentment and a
system of self-sustaining repression.
3
ese class divisions,
which relied heavily on the rhetoric of indigeneity, persisted
after independence. Although Guatemalas independence
was recognized by Spain in 1850, the majority of citizens
continued to live in abject poverty without the possibility
for political participation.
As in other countries in the region, the early and
middle 20th century saw increasing organizations of those
seeking to reform their marginalization and exploitation.
is movement, comprised primarily of peasants, students,
teachers, military reformers and emerging middle class,
succeeded in ousting the dictator Jorge Ubico. His removal
ushered in a decade of democracy known as the ten years of
spring, during which time successive governments worked
to alter the socio-economic structure of the country through
land reform, increased transparency and participation.
4,5

However, these changes were dangerously destabilizing for
elites who benetted from the old order. Indeed, Guatemalas
archbishop Mariano Rossel y Arellano cited his concern
that this democracy and the resulting structural shifts were
encouraging the emergence of a political outspokenness
that was distinctly undesirable.
6
is shifting social
landscape was deeply destabilizing for those who beneted
from the traditional power structure. Indeed, faced with an
unprecedented challenge to their authority, the state, the
military and the oligarchy, supported by the United States,
identied Indians as the collective enemy and launched a
wave of repression that the United Nations has classied as
genocide.
7
e Khmer Empire (800 AD 1200 AD), which
ourished in what is contemporary Cambodia, is central
to Cambodians understanding of their past. e legendary
strength and advancement of that society continues to
carry nationalist weight in Cambodia today.
8
However,
even before the French colonized the area as part of French
Indochina, Cambodia was the center of border disputes
and competing spheres of inuence including those of
China and Vietnam.
9
Once France gained control of the
area, it brought large numbers of Vietnamese settlers into
Cambodia to work as civil servants, teachers and laborers.
10

Indeed, the French developed a colonial system based on
elevating Vietnamese above either Cambodians or Laotians
who they regarded with distain.
11
In this context, many
Cambodians felt pride regarding their historical inheritance
and simultaneous resentment for their degradation under
the French.
ese competing narratives of greatness and
inferiority cultivated a growing sense of nationalism among
Cambodians in general and ethnic Khmer especially.
12
e extreme nature of World War II meant that France
was greatly occupied with domestic policy and became
increasingly absent from its colonies in Asia. Japan occupied
Cambodia during this time, and the shift in power provided
a window that nationalist movements seized upon.
13
In
this way, Cambodia gained its independence from France
in 1953 but quickly plunged into political turmoil. In
the greater Cold War context, armed struggle over the
leadership of Cambodia, territory, resource and ideological
disputes became increasingly volatile. It is within this
context that the Khmer Rouge came to power in 1975. eir
four years in power saw the deaths of approximately two
million people as they, based upon these historical narratives
and resentments to justify genocide, aimed at purging non-
ethnically Khmer residents and other undesirables.
rough the use of a longer lens that can incorporate
historical legacies as well as contemporary forces, the
structures that support genocide come into focus. is
expanded lens of engagement accentuates the ways in which
a circumscribed approach to context alters the understanding
of violence itself, but more importantly, the legitimacy of
29
Burnell | JGA
its causes. When confronting a society marked by genocide,
this approach provides space to simultaneously question
assumptions such as those that construct distinctions within
societies as well as give credence to constructed narratives,
insofar as they have power to incite action and dictate
interactions.
Cultivating Divisions of Convenience
e construction and juxtaposition of two groups
as inherently antagonistic is present in both the cases of
Cambodia and Guatemala. In Cambodia, a central tenet of
the Khmer Rouge regime in the 1970s was the creation of a
country only populated by those deemed true Cambodians
through the elimination of other groups and the creation
of a Khmer State. eir image of the ideal Khmer State
was based on the conation of Khmer ethnicity and Khmer
Rouge communist ideology. In this way, the division between
enemies and supporters of this violent state was negotiable,
but conversely, one could be targeted either because they
were not ethnically Khmer or because they did not embody
the agrarian Khmer ideal.
14

is negotiability created a sense of arbitrary fate
that has shaped the lives of the survivors portrayed in the
documentary e Khmer Rouge Killing Machine.
15

In the lm, documentarian Rithy Panh brings the artist
Vann Nath and fellow ex-prisoner, Chum Mey, back to the
notorious Tuol Sleng prison (S21). e two not only revisit
the prison itself but also confront former guards and their
families in order to probe their justications for taking part
in genocide.
It quickly becomes apparent that Chum Mey is deeply
troubled by the fact that he survived when so many others
did not. Further, the guards inability to defend their actions
or even communicate a consistent reasoning for their
participation augmented the sense of arbitrary fate. Nath
similarly expresses survivors guilt through his matter of
fact assertions that he survived because the Khmer Rouge
wanted a portrait artist and he fullled their requirements.
Even though they were intent on eliminating those elites
deemed detrimental to the creation of an agrarian peasant
utopia, such as artists, he was saved. In this way, Naths
fate was determined based on Khmer ideology, selectively
implemented. His status as ethnically Khmer could have
categorized him as part of the Khmer State. However, he was
an artist, an intellectual, and therefore a target. Ultimately,
the Khmer desire for his elite art imbued him with the
usefulness necessary to survive. Naths survival demonstrates
the permeability of categories in this context of ruthless
violence, and this instability of categories continues to haunt
Cambodians on both sides of the violence. Further, Naths
story reveals the ideological justications for genocide to be
debatable, even among its strongest proponents.
Although there was some level of negotiability
within the categories in genocide, for many the narratives
of historical and colonial legacies placed them in one
group or another. One of the groups that was targeted for
elimination in Cambodia was the ethnic Vietnamese, who
were a remnant of uctuating borders and French Colonial
practices of divisive rule. Despite their status as long-term
residents of Cambodia, groups of Vietnamese were deemed
occupiers and therefore targeted for elimination. Other
groups were also targeted, such as the Chams, whose claim
to residency in Cambodia was challenged by the Khmer
Rouge.
16
is discrimination had traction among many
Cambodians, and has survived and been fortied by the
presence of an actual Vietnamese Occupation in the wake of
Khmer Rouge rule. Delineating social divisions in this way
gives credence to underlying social tensions through the use
of an ahistorical or a circumscribed historical perspective.
is removal of history allows constructed identities to be
abstracted, naturalized and then easily politicized.
Similar logic was also deployed in the case of
Guatemala where divisions relied on racial, ethnic, economic
and ideological indicators. However, discriminatory
identication was not depicted as being solely on the basis
of origins but rather on a desire for a new, modernizing
Guatemala. is desire to enter the world stage and market
did not include the rights of the majority of the nation
where colonial legacies and systematic disenfranchisement
created a state reliant on manipulation and repression.
However, the early and middle 20th century saw increasing
organizations of indigenous groups seeking to reform their
marginalization and exploitation through challenging
those in power. ese contentions and challenges were
not mitigated by the state. Indeed, the exclusionary nature
of the state rendered it incapable of achieving social
consensus around a national project [and] concomitantly,
it abandoned its role as mediator between divergent social
and economic interests.
17
It was within this context that
indigenous Guatemalans were depicted as stagnating the
progress of Guatemala becoming a modern state.
18
In this
way, indigeneity became synonymous with movements
against Ladino power and therefore contrary to a modern
Guatemala. Although the 1894 census in Guatemala
dened Ladino as a mixture of European and Indians, the
term signied more than a racial category.
19
Over the years
it evolved to refer rst to Indians who mastered enough
Latin to participate in the Catholic mass and later to those
who mastered enough Spanish to circulate and negotiate
the world of the Spaniards.
20
Ladinos therefore found
themselves negotiating two worlds and were often used as
the gatekeepers who maintained the demarcation between
categories, but they also represented the vision of progress
that was synonymous with the erasure of indigenous
30
JGA | Contextualizing Genocide
practices and identities but relied on propertied citizenship.
In this way, those indigenous to the area were transformed
into the illegitimate residents and the settlers legitimized
their own presence through an ingenuitive narrative that
promoted neoliberal market values.
21
Neither the divisions in Guatemala nor those in
Cambodia were omnipotent and some members of groups
targeted for elimination negotiated their social position and
were reclassied. is negotiability reveals ethnic categories
to be undergirded by ideology and struggles for power.
Indeed, these categorizations were carefully deployed and
manipulated as mechanisms in struggles for power and land.
eir use as political tools is apparent in their deployment
when convenient. In Cambodia, members of targeted
groups were exempt from the violence if they rose in the
ranks of loyal Khmer Rouge.
22
Similarly, in Guatemala, the
division between Ladino and Maya and other indigenous
populations was negotiated, exploited and reproduced by
the Kiche elites who garnered power through their ability
to circulate between social categories.
23
However, genocide
was a means to assert or reassert control over the relaxing
categories and their corresponding claims to power. In
Guatemala, as this middle ground gained salience in the
political system, its destabilizing nature led to a repression
in which the most virulent aspects of Ladino nationalism
metastasized into a counterinsurgency that, while it had
many causes and purposes, singled out Indians in its rural
campaign of repression and murder.
24

e ability of some to manipulate the divisions
that demarked who was targeted for state violence is
an indication of the role that other factors had in the
production of genocide. Both Cambodia and Guatemala
were in the process of redening and solidifying the state
apparatus when the violence escalated into genocide.
Indeed, economic and political struggles were paramount
to both of these cases. e context of political and social
transformation allowed for genocidal policies. However,
the tenuous conditions persisted after genocide had ended.
erefore, neither Cambodia nor Guatemala has employed
large-scale, state-sanctioned policies of memorialization,
recognition or compensation. In Cambodia there is little
more than ocial silence on the genocide and in Guatemala
the government has repeatedly negated accounts legitimated
by international bodies.
Looking Beyond Constructed Narratives
In both countries, the international community has
played a key role in pursuing justice and producing an
account of the events so as to ll the gap left by ocials
in the countries themselves. In Guatemala, a report was
issued by the Comisin para el Esclarecimiento Histrico
(CEH) that details and historicizes the civil war and
genocide. However, the CEHs mandate was circumscribed
by the limits of Guatemalas dubious political transition.
25

is limitation created the potential for a more nuanced
approach; because the CEH was unable to pursue
retributive justice, it was able to look deeper into the past
and at complex causalities that do not put perpetrators in
prison but do shed light on how human beings and nations
can marginalize a group so that an incitement to genocide
has traction. Similarly, the United Nations has been
instrumental in the creation of Extraordinary Chambers
in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) to prosecute human
rights abuses that occurred under the Khmer Rouge regime.
However it has received little support from the government
and has not received widespread recognition.
26
Indeed,
the predominance of ocial silence in both Cambodia
and Guatemala has meant that the role of recounting,
memorializing and documenting genocide has fallen to
international institutions, non-governmental organizations,
communities and individuals such as Rithy Panh, director of
the documentary S21: e Khmer Rouge Killing Machine.
In this way, personal accounts of violence and the lives that
it touched are integral to understandings of genocide.
rough interviews compiled and edited by Elisabeth
Burgos-Debray, Rigoberta Menchu shares her story as
a politically active, poor Guatemalan Indian woman in I,
Rigoberta Menchu.
27
rough her story, Menchu presents
herself as depicting and, indeed, exemplifying the experience
of all poor, indigenous Guatemalans. Although her ability to
share her story with a world audience demonstrates that her
life is not like the majority of those whose voices she claims,
she is saddled with the responsibility of shedding light
on the systematic injustice that Indians organized against
and were subsequently killed to maintain. To this end, her
nuanced depictions of the circumstances in which Indians
live and the discrimination that they faced humanize them
and legitimates their claims against landowners. rough
her personal negotiations with the expectations of specic
categories, Menchu deploys and simultaneously challenges
such conations as indigeneity and poverty.
As resistance to the political violence directed at
indigenous Guatemalans, Menchu works to claim a space
for Indian traditions and practices. However, this pursuit
is sometimes in conict with her goals of shifting their
systematic economic marginalization. Menchu declares that
Indian society does not privilege one gender over the other
and that all are celebrated, respected and expected to share
amongst each other.
28
However, her story also reveals that
her work outside of the home and community, as well as the
decision not to have children, were all deeply antithetical
to Indian tradition and only acceptable because of the
repression they were facing that was causing increased
demand for mobilization. Indeed, when Menchu became an
31
Burnell | JGA
active political organizer she came into conict with fellow
Indians who did not want to be under the leadership of a
woman.
29
In response, she directly challenges the men who
exhibit this opinion. In this example of her own tenacity,
Menchu criticizes her compaeros for being too indigenous.
is episode reveals a tension between two understandings of
indigeneity. e understanding of indigeneity that Menchu
attempts to cultivate respect for in her pursuit of economic
justice conicts with Guatemalan societys construction of
indigeneity as inextricably identied with poverty. In this
way, challenging the economic circumstances of indigenous
Guatemalans also presented a challenge to practices that
had been codied as tradition. However, it is not only within
her community that this tension was negotiated. Menchus
realization that Ladinos and tourists think our costumes are
beautiful because it brings in money, but its as if the person
wearing it doesnt exist, underscores how fundamental the
performance of ones role was to Guatemalan society.
30

erefore, transgressing the performance of indigeneity was
dangerously destabilizing for the system of exploitation that
Guatemala was founded on. e state and its elites were
deeply invested in maintaining the categorization of people
into narrowly dened groups with correlated behaviors.
erefore, an increased movement to organize collectively
challenged these categories so that those in power reacted
with extreme violence to retrench them. Because of the
absence of ocial accounts regarding the civil war and
genocide in Guatemala, accounts such as these join the
public narrative.
Similarly, accounts of the genocide in Cambodia such
as that of the S21 survivors in S21: e Khmer Rouge
Killing Machine become a part of the public narrative of
genocide. roughout the documentary, both the survivors
and the director seem to be searching for an understanding
of why young men would support, join and kill for the Khmer
Rouge; they also seem to be in pursuit of an admission of
guilt. However, the process of creating this narrative means
that the guards are also able to challenge their position
as perpetrators and claim victimhood. As these guards,
and indeed most of the Khmer Rouge rank and le, were
peasants or workers living in extreme poverty, they asserted
that their choice was to cooperate with the regime or
starve. It is then left to the public, who will circulate these
competing narratives of victimhood, to weigh what they see.
In this way, S21: e Khmer Rouge Killing Machine
clearly depicts a concrete challenge for countries after
genocide. Not only are many of the same narratives
of discrimination still present, but the dire economic
conditions that led to such desperation continue to leave
many of the former perpetrators with no means to support
their families. Within this context, the lack of an ocial
policy regarding genocide, its participants and its legacies
leaves social vulnerabilities unaddressed. In the absence
of an ocial narrative, informal historicization, such as
this documentary, remains an avenue through which
communities engage their history of genocide.
Living Inheritance
As time passes and new generations come into
communities with the inequalities and ideologies
that fostered genocidal policies, questions regarding
memorialization become paramount. How does this
history get passed on and how does it live in communities?
Whether cultivated by a government, an international
committee or individuals and their communities, history
and memory are inherently political and personal. In the
creation of any narrative, some experiences are privileged
over others, and through this process, identities can be
further entrenched. In the wake of genocidal violence,
the divisive ethnic categories and colonial hierarchies
can remain salient. Both Guatemala and Cambodia
have had external forces shaping their memorialization,
and often people from elsewhere cannot understand the
complexity of memory but are still intent on the project of
memorialization as a healing process. Although there are
few projects to address the genocide in Guatemala that are
actually created by Guatemalans, those that do exist have
to carefully negotiate indigenous traditions, nationalist
rhetoric, international pressures and the continual
knowledge that perpetrators of war crimes are still at
large.
31
Whether memory is a tool for healing, a means to
shed light on inequalities and ideologies or a tool in new
political projects, its presence in post-genocide society is
the tool through which the complexities of genocide can
be contextualized and examined.
As the international community leans on the judicial
structures of organizations such as the United Nations to
dole out justice, it is all too easy to dismiss underlying causes
of genocide that are particular to a place and its past, which
are inherited through narratives of struggle and rearmed
in daily practices. However, relying solely on history as an
explanation for genocide does not recognize that these
legacies only boil into violence when human beings are
moved to kill. It is for this reason that I am calling for an
approach to genocide that does not negate either approach
but can conceive of them as deeply intertwined and
mutually dependent. An over universalization of genocide
can erase the particularities of a place and therefore leave
the motives of those actors unaddressed and vulnerable for
future exploitation. Conversely, the dismissal of universality
would shrink our understanding of genocide and make
invisible those commonalities such as a colonial past
that should be recognized so as to create a nuanced and
informed understanding of this phenomena.
32
JGA | Contextualizing Genocide
What touched me the most
about Eastern Europe was the
mysteriousness that suused
every little thing. Time seemed
dierent, slower, older. In
these places that have been
Nazi puppet states and Soviet
territories with dissent pushed
deep underground, there is as
much beauty as darkness. Out
the windows of the trains are
miles and miles of farms, forests,
open elds and hills sprinkled
with ramshackle villages, no
superhighways or strip malls of
chain stores like on the roads of
the U.S. I kept thinking about
all the madness the people
and places had known. In the
markets and streets, elderly
women old enough to have lived
through all of it sold owers.
Younger women worked
behind the counters of the meat
markets, wearing makeup and
tiny lacy hats. Eastern Europe
today is at peace, but there is still
a deep sense of bleakness there.
e ghosts are just beneath the
surface of what our eyes can see.
Peace and Quiet
Emily Pederson
Hugo Chvez, Chavismo and Rethinking
Latin American Populism
Darius Lerup
Introduction
In the mid-twentieth century, Latin America saw a
boom in the emergence and appeal of populist governments.
e success and sustainability of the populist political
platform was derived largely from the vast chasm between
the upper and working classes resultant of a history of
widespread colonialism. Furthermore, the socio-political
structure established by colonizers seemed to endure into
the post-colonial world. is meant that there was a small
social elite controlling the majority of a countrys capital
leading to widespread poverty, illiteracy and continued
exploitation of the working classes. us, Latin America
became fertile ground for a political movement focused on
pitting el pueblo, or the people (referring to the working and
middle classes), against the elite and aiming to restructure
this archaic governmental paradigm. One must ask, however,
whether it sucient to dene populism simply as a reaction
to a draconian system of cultural exploitation?
e denition of populism is still largely debated.
Nevertheless, there seems to be a degree of consensus in
the conclusion that populism is loosely identied by three
characteristics: 1) A Manichaean discourse pitting the
people against an elite, 2) the notion of a singular popular
will (mediated through democracy) and 3) a charismatic
leader who establishes a rhetoric that appeals to the
dialectical class tension and is synthesized with the popular
will to create a functional political entity. However, such a
vague denition raises a critical question: what distinguishes
one manifestation of populism from another? An analysis
of writings from Daniel James, Kirk Hawkins, Carlos de la
Torre and other scholars of populist politics suggests that it
is the leader who, through embodying and shaping the will
of the people, denes and dierentiates the various forms
populism has taken in Latin America over the last century.
is essay aims to establish a common understanding of the
term populism, as well as investigate which characteristics
dierentiate populist movements.
Against this backdrop, one of the most intriguing
contemporary manifestations of populism has been that of
Chavismo and its namesake, Venezuelan President Hugo
Chvez. Political scientist Kirk Hawkins goes as far as
to proclaim Chavismo to be a paradigmatic example of
populism,
1
and as such a necessary case study for students
of the phenomenon. Furthermore, the writing of Hawkins,
and of journalists Christian Parenti and Jon Lee Anderson,
testify not only that Chvez is the quintessential populist
leader, but also that his personality and personal agenda
have eectively dened Chavismo as a manifestation of
both populism and present day Venezuela. Finally, the case
of Chvez and Chavismo will be considered as evidence
supporting the claim that it is the charismatic leader who
characterizes the movement.
Dening Populism
So far, scholars have been unable to agree on one
comprehensive denition of the term populism. In his
article Populism in Venezuela: the rise of Chavismo,
Hawkins suggests that, much of this confusion results from
a tendency to lump together a set of social, economic and
political phenomena that occurred together during the early
part of the 20th century.
2
As such, he describes the populism
of the 20th century as a populism without adjectives,
3

implying that although there is a general understanding of
what populism is, it has little to do with the characteristics
that dierentiate its numerous manifestations.
In Populist Seduction in Latin America: e Ecuadorian
Experience, Carlos de la Torre describes populism as a style
of political mobilization based on strong rhetorical appeals
to the people and crowd action on behalf of a leader... It
is a rhetoric that constructs politics as a moral and ethical
struggle between el pueblo and the oligarch.
4
By juxtaposing
politics with the struggle for freedom from countless years
of oppression, populism creates a moral and ethical binary
casting a dialectical tension, not only between classes, but
also between those who want freedom (the people) and those
who do not (the elite). Implicit in the construction of this
Manichean discourse is the democratic notion of equality on
which Hawkins elaborates: e very word populism refers
to a modern democratic context, a situation in which almost
35
Lerup | JGA
all adults in society are accorded equal political value.
5

erefore, as equals, the people not only have the power to
overthrow the elite, but also a personal responsibility to do
so. However, as Hawkins notes, one must keep in mind that
the populist appeals to an exaggerated notion of popular
sovereignty, one that in Rousseau-like fashion presumes
the existence of a single popular will.
6
Here, Hawkins
references Rousseaus work Du Contrat Social, in which he
suggests each person has both a personal and general will,
and that the mystical, general will is the key to freedom.
Furthermore, Rousseau posits that the general will can only
realize itself through democratic self-legislation. erefore,
Hawkins aptly observes that a fundamental characteristic
of populism, the singular will, is strikingly similar to the
notion put forth by Rousseau. However, Hawkins rightfully
points out that it is an exaggeration of Rousseaus original
formulation, in that within populism the importance of the
existence of the singular will overshadows the importance of
its institutionalization and democratization a characteristic
of paramount importance within Rousseaus work.
e presumption of a single popular will is of particular
note when juxtaposed with the Manichaean discourse;
together they presume that if indeed this popular will exists,
the elite (those nding themselves on the anti-freedom
side of the binary) somehow fall outside of the populace.
is seems broadly to be a remnant of the disdain still
felt for foreign colonizers who instigated generations of
exploitation. Casting the elite as foreign intruders serves to
further strengthen the bond between el pueblo as a nationally
unifying force. Furthermore, the assumption of a popular
will requires that there be someone to communicate and
administer it, a role lled by the charismatic leader.
e populist leader de la Torre states that, Charisma is
understood as a double-sided interactive social process that
allows us to understand how populist leaders are created by
their followers and how they have constructed themselves
into leaders.
7
e notion that the followers construct the
leaders (at least initially) is key to understanding how leaders
function within the country as cultural icons. e process
of becoming a populist leader entails the transformation of
the leader into a vacuous icon, achieving public support by
allowing the people to create multiple uniquely appealing
conceptions of the leader on an individual basis. us the
leader simultaneously becomes the face and the shaping
characteristic of the movement. erefore, perhaps it is
the leader who becomes the adjective of his or her unique
manifestation of populism.
ese fundamental characteristics aside, some populist
movements bear little similarity to one another. For
example, this adjective-less political entity does little in
terms of oering insight into the intricacies of Chavismo.
Accordingly, it is critical to understand populist movements
on an individual basis, rather than trying to capture a
universal concept of the function and manifestation of
this political enigma. is in turn begs the question: what
characteristics distinguish populist movements? e
discussion above seems to suggest that it is the leader who
is largely responsible for the expression of the fundamental
struggle within populism. Since the leader simultaneously
attempts to understand, shape, uphold and become an eternal
symbol of the popular will, he or she becomes the face of
that movement. Moreover, the leader is largely responsible
for dening the elite (those which el pueblo oppose) as well
as formulating the rhetoric that demonizes them. erefore,
one can surmise that understanding the leader is key to
understanding the populist movement.
Hugo Chvez, Chavismo and Venezuela
e conclusion that populism is characterized more
by the element of leadership rather than political structure
and institutionalization seems to sit well in the context of
Latin American politics. e case of Venezuela provides
convincing evidence that it has been Chvez his personality,
background, politics and rhetoric that has come to
distinguish Chavismo as a populist movement. For instance,
his uncompromising vilication of the international elite is
undoubtedly a reection of traditional populist discourse.
However, upon closer investigation one can see that he
himself has a deep personal resentment towards the role of the
oligarchy in his country. In his biography of Chvez entitled
Hugo!, historian Bart Jones reveals that Chvez grew up in
utter destitution in a house that had no refrigerator, no fan,
no running water, no indoor bathroom.
8
Since his parents
were too poor to support him, he and his brother grew up
with his grandmother Rosa Ins Chvez in the small town
of Sabaneta, located in los llanos, a vast expanse of sparsely
populated marshlands that were Venezuelas version of the
Great Plains of the United States
9
Chvez recounts: At
Rosas side I got to know humility, poverty, pain, sometimes
not having anything to eat. I saw the injustices of this
world I learned with her the principles and the values
of the humble Venezuelan, those that never had anything
and who constitute the soul of my country.
10
His youth
spent in los llanos once a battleground for freedom ghter
Eziquiel Zamora left a lasting impression on him and
ultimately laid the foundation for the worship of his idols:
Simn Bolvar, Zamora and Simn Rodrguez three men
who stand as symbols of the Venezuelan struggle against
oppression. With this in mind, it is clear that the burning
conviction behind Chvez venomous rhetoric is rooted in
his childhood and is thereby a reection of his own personal
struggle. Furthermore, an investigation of his rise to power
and political administration will reveal that Chavismo is a
reection of Chvez, rather than of some abstract populist
political entity. Moreover, this investigation will suggest that
perhaps it is the dierences between populist leaders that
36
JGA | Chavismo and Populism
should come to identify populism as a political entity rather
than the similarities across movements.
Eventually, Chvez left Sabaneta; driven by his passion
for baseball, he applied to the military academy in Caracas
in what he hoped would be a stepping-stone on the road to
baseball stardom. However, in the academy he found that
his true passions lay in the army. In the years following his
graduation, he discovered the body of Marxist and Leninist
literature that formed the basis for his desire to reform
Venezuelan politics. e catastrophic election of President
Carlos Andrs Prez in 1989 was the proverbial straw that
broke the camels back. e Prez administrations clear
abuse of power led Chvez and the MBR-200 (Movimiento
Bolivariano Revolucionario 200) to organize Operation
Zamora a military coup-dtat to overthrow the Prez
administration. Although the coup failed, it gave Chvez
the opportunity to address the Venezuelan people in what
has become the famed por ahora (for now) speech.
Chvez has polarized his critics with his sharp tongue,
but it is hard to imagine his words invoking such profound
resonance without his monumental charisma. His por
ahora speech is often cited not only as his entry into the
political scene but also as the rst time that he initiated a
charismatic link with the Venezuelan people. Venezuelan
economist Moises Nam commented that although brief,
his appearance that day contributed more to destabilizing
Venezuelan democracy in two minutes than all the shots
red through the night.
11
Journalist Christian Parenti,
writing about the dynamics of populism in the Chvez
presidency, suggests that Chvezs post-coup speech did
two things in particular that garnered popular appeal: First,
he took personal responsibility for the botched coup. is
seemed to many viewers like a signicant break from the
standard political tradition of lying and blaming others
for failure. en, in explaining the defeat, Chvez said,
For now, the objectives that we have set for ourselves have
not been achieved.
12
Powerful words, undoubtedly aided
by his oratory skill, on which writer Jon Lee Anderson
comments, Chvez has a gospel preachers deftness with
language and an actors ability to evoke emotions. Within
a single soliloquy, he comes up with rhymes, breaks into
song, ris on his own words, gets angry, cracks jokes, and
loops back to where he started.
13
us, from the beginning
Chvez has wielded the gleaming gift of charisma a gift
that has become a hallmark of Chavismo. e Venezuelan
presidents unwaveringly direct approach to oration is clearly
reected in Chavista policies: the immediacy with which
relief was provided for the barrios (slums), the formation
of an assembly to reform the Venezuelan constitution, the
establishment of Bolivarian missions aimed at improving
social and economic conditions; the list goes on.
Reecting on his presidency, it is clear that Chvezs
unique charismatic qualities have essentially superseded
conventional governmental structure. Hawkins is quick to
point out that in Chavismo, the rule-based structure is much
less important than the voice of Chvez.
14
e exaggerated
importance of Chvez himself has been evident since his
campaign for democratic election in which he represented
the Movimiento V [Quinta] Repblica (MVR) party. His
current role seems to be largely due to the fact that far
more people supported MVR because of their identication
with Chvez than because of their identication with the
party.
15
However, the lack of signicance of the party is,
at least in part, due to the fact that the party relied on two
symbols a red paratroopers beret and a silhouette of a
soldiers face under the beret that represented Chvezs
role as leader of the February 1992 coup.
16
us the MVRs
reliance on the image of Chvez as its gurehead led to the
development of Chav-ismo rather than MVR-ismo. us,
it is clear that although the appeal of Chavismos political
goals are rooted in populist discourse, Chavezs success in
Venezuela is fundamentally due to his charisma and his
mediated image.
As previously discussed, the desire to understand and
uphold a singular popular will is one of the fundamental
characteristics of a populist leader, and understanding
the popular will was exactly what Chvez set out to do.
In the years following the failed coup, he underwent a
programme of self-education in the countrys problems
and its possible solutions by traveling around the country,
meeting Venezuelans, and studying books and ideas
17

is served as preparation for the broader project of
democratic revolution, in which he would represent
the MVR and be elected president of Venezuela in 1998
after receiving a presidential pardon for his involvement
in the coup. However, Chvezs program of self-education
was inevitably colored by his position in the Manichaean
discourse
i
his desire to help the poor and oppose the
elite.
ii
Literally this meant representing certain sectors
of the Venezuelan population and alienating others. is
intentional polarization has been reected in the reception,
both in Venezuela and internationally, of Chavismo: it is
either loved and revered or disdained and criticized.
ere is no greater testament to the importance of
Chvez himself as the sole guiding force behind Chavismo
than his televised program Al Presidente (Hello President).
Anderson recounts an installment in which government
action literally occurred during the show: [Chvez] called
out to Rafael Ramrez, the president of P.D.V.S.A [Petrleros
de Venezuela, S.A., a Venezuelan state-owned petroleum
company] and he promptly stood up and began taking
i is underlies an overarching point: that the populist leaders duty to
represent the popular will necessarily implies a reection of the populist
leader, since the understanding of popular will will always be colored by
the personal views and goals of the leader.
ii Chvezs desire to help the poor being a reection of his youth,
rather than of the Manichaean discourse; their agreement being largely
coincidental.
37
Lerup | JGA
notes, nodding furiously. is was not a rehearsed moment;
to an unusual degree Al Presidente is Chvezs government
in action, and it is a government that Chvez does not so
much administer as perform live.
18
Andersons suggestion
that Chavismo is a performance more than administration
is an odd concept, though it is not totally farfetched. To
continue with Andersons analogy, Chvezs charisma puts
him at center stage in the global political theater and his
inammatory character has cast him as the lead in a very
real political drama. However, the political drama playing
out in Venezuela is peculiar in that its lead actor is also its
director.
Conclusion
What is the importance of understanding populism?
And thereby, what is the importance of understanding
Chvez? e dwindling status of the worlds oil reserves
have set into motion an immense number of social, political
and economic shifts that have only just started to manifest
themselves. e shifts that have begun to occur suggest
that an understanding of populism will, for specic reasons,
be of paramount importance in the coming future. For
example, the most abundant regional source of oil in recent
history has been the Middle East. However, there is now
growing evidence that the oil reserves in Saudi Arabia
(though they account for approximately 25 percent of the
worlds oils reserves) are drying up. is, in turn, means that
if and when the Middle East is unable to provide oil as it
has, Venezuela may become a cornerstone in the oil-based
global economy. Considering that all of Venezuelas oil is
state-controlled, understanding Chvez and populism will
be key to accessing that resource. Moreover, Chvez is one
of the only Latin American leaders who has successfully
taken a stand against American imperialism. erefore, in
order to access Venezuelan oil, it would be necessary to alter
the relationship between the United States and Venezuela,
which in reality means altering the relationship between the
U.S. and Latin America more broadly.
Keep in mind that these developments are largely
speculative; Venezuela could run out of oil, or the global
economy could nd an alternative to oil. However, modern
circumstances aside, populism plays an important role in
the ongoing struggle for human freedom. Erich Fromm
addresses this timeless struggle in Escape From Freedom, in
which he writes: While a class was ghting for its own
liberation from domination, it believed itself to be ghting
for human freedom as such and thus was able to appeal
to an ideal, to the longing for freedom rooted in all who
are oppressed.
19
Which is to say, as long as freedom from
oppression is considered an inalienable human right and
populism demonstrates itself as an appeal toward that ideal,
understanding it will be of great importance.
With such heavy reliance on a Manichaean discourse
and the clear presence of a charismatic leader who purports
to represent a singular popular will, there is little doubt
that Chavismo is fundamentally populist; but how does
Chavismo inform an understanding of populism? Chavismo
sets itself apart from other manifestations of populism
in a disregard for traditional party structure, replaced by
a reliance on Chvez himself as the sole commanding
political entity. In doing so, Chvez has created a political
system that is a direct reection of his own personal agenda.
It is precisely because his personal agenda agrees with the
common understanding of populism that Chavismo is, in
fact, a populist movement. erefore, the above analysis of
Chavismo suggests that perhaps it is more helpful to rethink
our understanding of populism in terms of the dierences
in the element of leadership rather than in the political
similarities across movements. To be sure, in a Manichaean
discourse the presumption of a singular popular will and
a charismatic leader to enact that will are undoubtedly
characteristics of populism. However, it seems to be more
informative to focus on the leader as the basis for political
structure rather than the aforementioned characteristics.
Ultimately, the case of Chvez and Venezuela suggests that
perhaps focusing on the element of leadership can dispel
Hawkins assertion that 20th century populism is, in fact, a
populism without adjectives.
20
38
JGA | Chavismo and Populism
It Was Just a ought
1.
No matter how bad you think things are going
eyre probably going much worse.
And isnt it for the best
at youve never been elected mayor
Of a small central Arizona town
Or asked to decide
Who would sit next to who
At the Potsdam Conference?
2.
Ive known people whove disappeared
In a completely everyday way.
e only time I suspected foul play
Was when I was asked to examine myself.
3.
I think that a simple history is whats needed,
But a precise if pockmarked history.
Too much responsibility
Is given to the sunburnt and clueless.
We need to delegate someone
To be in charge of the mashed potatoes.
4.
When the committee adjourned,
I had already cut you a large slice of papaya
And you were giving me lessons in bear baiting.
When I touched your hand, it was an afterthought.
When I kissed your foot, it was a thought experiment.
When I cuddle up to you in the night
It will be somewhere between a television show
And a psalm
And I do not know exactly what it will feel like.
Andrew Boston
39
e Unmarketed Economy
Yasmin Ogale
In Accra, Ghana, markets are the one-stop-shop for
locals and visitors alike, but that does not necessarily mean
one-price-ts-all. Bias, at a micro-level, abounds and could
mean diculties for the economy of the developing nation.
Accras Kaneshie Market is a three-story complex
bright yellow and jaundiced. A mammoth among markets,
micro-economics swarms within. It is infested with things
living, dead and inanimate, ranging from soap, salt, tilapia,
fabric, peanut butter, pigs feet, papayas and then some.
Transactions of buyers and sellers can be heard across tables,
dozens of which are piled high, littered identically with
merchandise.
Traversing through obscure walkways, Western
conceptions of economic speculation of buyers reading
prices before purchases or sellers reading demand corollary
to supply become extinct. It is the buyer, not the good,
which is speculated by the seller; love or hate at rst sight.
According to experience, bias, rather than regulation,
determines prot margins in the Ghanaian marketplace.
Like most markets in Ghana, in the dismembered
Kaneshie capita is not xed by price tags or stamps, but by
word of mouth. Bargaining is an integral part of Ghanaian
culture; value can inate or deate at will, by the ip of the
tongue.
Not unique to Kaneshie by any means, haggling over
everything from goats heads to notebooks is commonplace.
In an ideal situation, a potential customer walks past a neatly
displayed table. A particular article piques his curiosity.
He stops to make an initial inquiry as to the cost, which
is subsequently nagled over (upwards and downwards and
occasionally backwards) until a mutually accepted price is
established. e seller rolls her prize into the folds of her
pelvic cloth, and the buyer leaves with his polythened item:
both players happy with their equal share.
But reality on the micro level is dierent.
With prices not xed, uctuation is implied, and thus
economics is subjective on the sellers behalf.
I think that is prejudice, it is denitely prejudice, says
local Godwin Ofori-Attah, director of the Micronance and
Community Development Organization, because if you [as
the vendor] look at me and feel that, because of the way I
look, the way I dress, [then] I have money, it is prejudice.
Godwin was educated in Ghana and has worked
in Kaneshie for over nine years, but he spends weeks at a
time traveling around the world for business meetings and
conferences. Locally, he engages the market climate on the
small-small scale, educating and organizing susu boxes for
market women to deposit and store a percentage of their
incomes.
But despite his expertise, even Godwin has felt the
judgment of his own customers: most of the time, the
market women look at you and weigh you, they say like,
well I know this person can aord like, this price. Rarely
does he venture into the moisture of the marketplace for his
groceries; rather, he sends his female coworkers to negotiate
for him.
For Godwin, the pandemic gets physical: When it
comes to men, men do not have time to be bargainingso
men are always quoted a higher price [than women].
As a female, however, I do not feel immune to price
hikes. However, it is not sexism Ive experienced, but an-
ever-so slight racism.
Lighter-skinned than most vendors in the market, I
have frequently experienced personal economic frustration
to nd that a loaf of sweet bread, usually 50 pesewas for a
local, has been quoted as 1.5 GHS for me (a 300 percent
price increase). Godwin empathizes, remembering a time
when one of his interns wanted to get his hair weaved and
was told a price more than 100 times the norm.
It is true that the ignorance of foreigners has been and
always will be taken advantage of, but I have been living in
Ghana for the past four months. I know what the value of
bananas, pencils and sh should be. Furthermore, I am well
versed and practiced in the various quirks like ntoso (too
soh), or dashing, in which a little more is given, topping
o your purchase, at no extra cost.
Aware of buyers manipulation, however, I am still
cheated. Because of my dress, my look, my skin the price
of any tabletop commodity swells.
As soon as they see [you], they know that oh! [you]
came from the West, or [youre] somebody who could have
money, says Godwin, between good natured bouts of
40
JGA | Unmarketed Economy
they-told-me-so laughter, as if hearing the experiences of
an obruni (foreigner) reinforced the legends of his youth.
But this prejudgment, sexist, classist or racist, was
current. And not exclusively to me.
ey [the market vendors] think that if they charge
me a certain way, I will just go with it, says California native
Ashley Millhouse, who has spent the last three months in
Accra as a part of a New York University Study Abroad
program. Honestly, the markets are just a ood of the
sensesIt isnt worth the time and the haggling; I would
rather go to a store where everything is in one place and
the price is the same for everyone that goes there, obruni or
local.
No longer shopping at local markets or kiosks, Ashley
now buys her packaged produce and marked goods from
formal retail stores, like Koala Market and Shop-Rite (eerily
similar to the squeaky-tiled American ShopRite).
But homegoods seller, eresa Quaye, would
disagree. In her opinion, the price adjustment philosophy
is not practiced in Kaneshie; it is a bad habit germinating
elsewhere.
To her, the burgeoning formal sectors of Accra pose
no threat: they dont disturb our business, no, they dont
do that. We, too, we dont disturb them. Her business
philosophy is based on friendship and trust: you have to
be nice to your customers so that they bring more people to
come and buy and then you get money
But even friendliness may be subjective: some people
can also pretend, they can act, says Godwin, who has fallen
victim to pay-more-in-sympathy tricks, too.
Unregulated prices give the sellers the power in the
hundreds of markets like Kineshie.
And although there are some honest vendors, like
eresa, their existence, according to Godwin, is isolated.
He notes, even if someone quotes you the direct price,
somebody will feel that, well, the price should be less, and
I will have to bargain. So it has become a culture that the
sellers or those who sell in the market, always quote you a
higher price.
Godwin, who doubles as a private micronance
consultant outside the market, says that the biases might
in fact be aecting the economics of the shopping center
and the developing economy of Ghana: it is not helping
the economy, because there is no xed pricewhen a
commodity becomes scarceautomatically the price will
go up, and when the price goes up, then only the rich people
can aord, and the poor people will be left out.
Not only would this increase social division, but
the bargaining and biased market culture would attract
future sellers to the informal sector, wherein regulation is
nonexistent and taxes are often evaded.
Some buyers, too, would be lured by the belief that
goods are cheaper in the marketplace (not considering the
condition, quality or sanitation of such things rst).
is can have potentially harmful eects in the long
term, according to Godwin. While sellers may read males/
females, obrunis/friends or people who travel in private cars/
trotros (shared taxis) dierently, an inux of the stereotypical
more expensive customers, would only bandage poverty:
more tourists would stimulatebut the danger is that it
would make the tourists mistrust because they will always
feel like they are being cheated.
What can be done to eliminate the prejudice and price
uctuations of the micro-market economy, according to
Godwin, is a regulation of prices.
If we can change our attitude, and educate our
market women to call a spade a spade, and always insist
on the normal price [then that would prevent mistrust and
cheating].
Financial literacy and governmental control would
have to be gradual, however, and would not be met without
their diculties; but they might clean up the catacombs of
the markets like Kineshie, for a more user-friendly, if still
putrid, atmosphere.
But it would also geld the place. While government
regulation would likely eliminate the gumming ies and
lack of electricity, it may also mean imbedded taxes, higher
rental fees, monopolized businesses and perhaps even job
loss. Not to mention an overhaul of the nations economic
system.
[With price tags] you will get a little money, says
eresa, still faithfully beside her kiosk, meanwhile the
government will tax you big money. No, I dont want price
tags. I want to bargain with the person.
Shopping in the market would no longer be a way to
connect and satisfy material needs as well as social networks.
Like in the West, it would risk becoming a chore.
Such is the price of progress. Prejudice in Kaneshie,
although a microbe of what it could be, still contaminates
the Ghanaian national body. Solving it would deliver a civil
right, but also remove what is perceived as right by some of
civil society.
Even though I personally do not like going to the
market, I dont think markets should be regulated, says
Ashley with a box of Special K Red Berries. I think being
overcharged is part of the experience of coming to Africa.
[B]eing overcharged makes you realize and understand that
you are dierent or a minority, and that is vital.
41
Ogale | JGA
While the serenity of
daily life in Buddhism seems
common throughout the
region of Southeast Asia, the
peacefulness of the Burmese
people particularly inspires
me. Myanmar (still commonly
known as Burma) has a
history of oppressive regimes.
From British colonialism, to
Japanese invasion, to the harsh
militaristic single-party rule
established in 1962 and ending
just this spring, the Burmese
people have endured endless
trials and injustices. Yet they are
the most resilient, harmonious
of people and their faith in
the spiritual and in humanity
is unwavering. My intention
was to capture moments when a
personal interaction helped me
understand and take in a little of
the magnicence and breadth of
a magical place and people. All
the places I visited and all the
people I met still reverberate in
my consciousness. ese images
are the notes of an experience
in careful observation, sincere
admiration and respect.
e cover of this years
journal is part of this photo
essay.
Dreams of Ascension
Jamie Denburg
Somalia and the Mixed Blessings of Anarchy
Zachary Caceres
44
JGA |Somalia
Somalia is a nation riven by tragedy. Although once
lined with bustling ports frequented by Arabic merchants
in North Africa, it is perhaps best known today for
piracy, domestic lawlessness and its stubborn resistance
to international development eorts. Somalias troubles
throughout history can largely be traced back to the
actions of both intervening foreign powers and domestic
political actors. Subsequently, as Somalia lapses further into
statelessness,
i
its development can be best understood as a
return to indigenous, pre-colonial institutions, which oer
at least a partial escape from generations of violence and
predation.
At the turn of the 20th century, Somalia was colonized
by both England in the north, and Italy in the South.
Britain administered the colony as part of its interests in
India, mostly concerning itself with cattle exports despite
Somalias mineral and oil wealth.
1,2
However, Italy settled
southern Somalia, with its legal apparatus in tow.
3
Neither
imperial power consolidated total control over its territory;
each allowed customary Somali law to exist alongside British
Common Law and Italian civil codes. is preserved native
institutions by allowing customary law to arbitrate certain
disputes, despite the presence of foreign occupiers.
In 1960, Britain and Italy merged their colonies to
create the independent Somali Republic. Unfortunately,
much of the colonial machinery remained and the
government of independent Somalia became an engine of
patronage and corruption.
4

Using evidence of widespread political corruption
as a rallying cry, General Mohamed Siad Barr staged a
successful military coup in 1969. He adopted an explicitly
Marxist, state-led mode of development, believing
Scientic Socialism would bring Somalia wealth and
industry.
5,6
But Barrs process of nationalization was also
rife with corruption: land was allocated on 50-year leases to
useful political coalitions and those nearest Barr plundered
the treasury and extorted Somalias poorest.
7,8,9
Barr
i e terms state and statelessness thorough the paper should be
understood as distinct from nation-state which refers to a geographical
area on a map. State refers to the political machinery used for coercion
within a nation-state and statelessness its relative absence.
also aggressively sent his military to Kenya and Ethiopia,
believing Somali-inhabited land in these nations were
rightfully his own.
10
He also forbade clanism
ii
--deeply at
odds with Somali history and their legal heritage--and
resorted to outright repression to control recalcitrant groups
well into the 1980s.
11
During WWII, Italy brought modern weapons to
Somalia and armed bands of Somalis to be unleashed onto
British lands. is, combined with the policies of the U.S.
and other foreign powers throughout the later part of Barrs
regime, spurred a culture of perpetual violence in Somalia,
as well as drawing the international arms trade into the
country.
12,13

After WWII, Barr was courted by both the Soviet
Union and the U.S. as part of their proxy feuds during
the Cold War. As his early Scientic Socialism proved
economically moribund, he broke ties with the Soviet Union.
e USSR had provided Barr with trained development
advisors as well as military aid; but after Barr realigned
with the U.S., he opted instead for outright militarism
backed by the US -- to maintain his oppressive regime.
Much of the funds for this activity were provided by aid
programs through the IMF and other international bodies.
As one author described it, Barr moved from Scientic
Socialism to IMF-ism using structural adjustment loans
to privatize national assets, typically putting them in
the hands of powerful, ancillary political actors.
14
While
nominally these were market reforms, Somalia like many
other African nations became increasingly militarized by
redirecting social spending to fund the military.
iii
Barrs
rather modest economic achievements under Socialism
swiftly retrogressed.
15

By the mid 1980s, Somalias entire development
budget was funded by foreign powers and 50 percent of its
operating costs came from international loans and grants.
ii A form of societal organization based on kinship, real or ctive.
iii Frequently when governments implement structural reform
programs, they are required to reduce government spending. is at
times results in less funding going towards social programs. In the case
of Somalia, the funding previously allocated to social programs was re-
appropriated by Barr to fund the military.
45
Zachary Caceres | JGA
Indeed, foreign aid counted for 57 percent of Somalias Gross
National Product.
16
Most of this was spent on reining in and
arming Barrs rapacious military.
17
e USSR, Italy, U.S.,
Egypt and China all provided Barrs regime with various
degrees of military support according to the vicissitudes of
world geopolitics.
18
Despite Somalias poverty and relatively
small size, Barr elded one of the largest standing armies in
Africa, which he used to protect a massive and corrupt civil
service from an unruly populace.
19
Barrs policies favored some clans over others,
causing disproportionate suering and resentment amongst
other groups. Somali economist Jamil A. Mubarak writes
that towards the end of Barrs rule, the political base of
[his] government narrowed down to his own clan, which
dominated most of the key positions in government. Barr
and his favored few had, committed so many atrocities
against various clans that he was no longer capable of
introducing political reform even if he wanted to.
20
is
helped seed the violent relations between some clans in
contemporary Somalia; today, they vie for control over
centralized political institutions.
In January 1991, as the Cold War wound to a close,
the U.S. drastically cut military aid to Barrs regime.
Violent militias that had intermittently sparred with Barr
during the last 10 years of his rule were waiting in the wings;
they forced Barr from Mogadishu and then skirmished
amongst themselves to ll the political vacuum. e specter
of a failed state invited international attention from the
United Nations and the U.S. e years following Barrs
fall were riddled with foreign interventions, including the
infamous Black Hawk Down incident in which 19 U.S.
soldiers were killed after a failed assassination.
21
Worse still,
this upswing in civil strife occurred during a deadly famine,
which claimed the lives of about 300,000 Somalis.
22

Despite incursions by Ethiopia, the U.N. and the U.S.,
Somalia settled into a baing statelessness by the mid-
1990s. Indeed, by as early as 1994, Somalia was mostly
peaceful especially outside nodes of political power like
Mogadishu.
23

e violence that remains in modern Somalia is
disproportionately centered in areas most aected by foreign
intervention. e structural dierences between Italian and
British colonialism in Somalia carry to the present day.
e site of greatest civil strife, violence and clan-feuds for
control of Somalia is in and around Mogadishu, where the
Italian state brought its settlers and built legal and physical
infrastructure for its colonies. In contrast, in the Northern
province of Somaliland, which was once the British
Somaliland Protectorate, the only mildly stable quasi-state
in modern Somalia has formed.
24
Despite British control
over this area being relatively loose historically, even under
colonialism, is, Somaliland has declared itself an independent
nation. While unrecognized and weak, its state maintains
internal order while skirmishing on its borders. ese two
areas, with their occasional are-ups and attempted coups,
stand in stark contrast to the rural majority of Somalia,
which is stateless and largely peaceful.
25,26

But even in Mogadishu and on the fringes of
Somaliland, a stateless or near-stateless militia equilibrium
has repeatedly emerged in the absence of foreign
intervention. Andre Le Sage explains, e power base
of Somalias warlords declined further as a result of the
limited resources at their disposal. Opportunities for
plunder gradually disappeared and the amount of foreign
aid available for diversion dwindled e large clan-based
militias the basis for the worst ghting in Somalia in the
early and mid-1990s became dicult to maintain.
27

Western governments and much of the press see in
Somalia nothing but the very denition of a failed state,
invoking images from Hobbes.
28
Perhaps regrettably,
these images of anarchic Somalia as violent and barbaric
seared their way into the popular mind.
29
But economists
studying the nation nd that Stateless Somalia signicantly
outperforms its governed predecessors. Economist Peter
Little explains: Indicators of Somali welfare remain low
in absolute terms, but compared to their status under
government show a marked advance. Under statelessness
life expectancy in Somalia has grown, access to health
facilities has increased, infant mortality has dropped, civil
liberties have expanded, and extreme poverty (less than $1
PPP/day) has plummeted.
iv
,
30
is growth in humanitarian
indicators has moved at a faster pace than in surrounding
African nations governed by central, predatory states.
31,32

For many Somalis, states are synonymous with
corruption, plunder and oppression; their experiences
historically have taught nothing else. e inability
for democracy to take hold in Somalia, despite all the
interventions nominally aimed at that end, is in large part
because warlords rush to claim the state apparatus for
themselves because of the potential gains from using it to
exploit the population. Indeed, in some parts of the country,
citizens are safer than theyve been in three decades, and
atrocities against civilians are now almost unheard of.
33,34

In fact, violence is worse across the governed Kenyan
border than in nearby Somalia.
35
Perhaps the strongest
endorsement of relative safety in stateless Somalia comes
from its citizens themselves: 400,00 Somali refugees voted
with their feet
v
by returning to Somalia in the same year
that Barrs government fell.
36
Moments of protracted violence in Somalia tend to
follow attemptsusually foreignto re-unify or establish a
iv Other improvements have occurred in immunizations, access to
water, sanitation, birth weight, maternal mortality, ownership of TVs,
radios, telephones, measles fatalities and physicians per 100,000 people.
v Voting with their feet has nothing to do with ballots. People are
opting to return to Somalia, which can be interpreted as an endorsement
of statelessness over previous regimes.
46
JGA |Somalia
Somali state. ese moments, unsurprisingly, receive more
press-coverage than long periods of relative stability and
growth. After botched early attempts, the U.N. in 2000
organized a Transitional National Government, which was
promptly expelled by scuing clan militiasall of whom were
vying for control over the Federal apparatus.
37
Again in 2002,
heads of states began planning to establish a Transitional
Federal Government. Immediately, armed clashes aimed
at control over Mogadishu spiked and continued for the
next two years.
vi
,
38
In 2006, the U.S. sponsored an Ethiopian
invasion of Somalia, which also caused a spike in clan
violence.
39
One economist studying Somalias currency has
noted that after U.N. troops evacuated in 1995, the Somali
economy, rather than deteriorating, actually improved.
40

Jamil Mubarak argues that the relative success of
statelessness in Somalia during the low-points between
interventions is the fruit of a long tradition of informal
legal and economic institutions. Under colonialism, and
then under Siad Barrs regime, black markets ourished
behind state-central planning and corruption. As Barrs
state toppled and the subsequent war to ll his placereached
a stalemate, these markets burgeoned. Mubarak declares,
In communities which provide a peaceful environment,
private sector economic activities have thrived and
opened new opportunities for growth and prosperity. In the
local economies of these communities, no-government has
proven to be far better than the repressive government of
Siad Barr.
41

Just as informal markets sustain economic activity in
Stateless Somalia, informal legal institutions maintain law
and order. Legal disputes, especially in the peaceful regions
beyond Mogadishu, are typically settled using customary law
called Xeer. In fact, the most peaceful regions in Somalia
are those areas most thoroughly governed by traditional
Xeer.
42

is tribal law uses numerous levels of restitution
according to the severity of the crime instead of punitive
punishment. Somalis all belong to a diya group, a familial
insurance pool, which is held responsible for the crimes
of its members. Once a trial is held with neutral elder
arbitrators, the criminal is expected to provide restitution
(priced in livestock or their money equivalent) to the victim.
vi Other ghting has occurred because of U.S. nancing of particular
warlords for the War on Terror. is destroys the balance of power in
Somalia and encourages warlords to try to expand their territory (Somali
Criticizes US Terror Moves BBC).
e diya is responsible if a convicted criminal in their
midst refuses to pay restitution. is encourages clans to
force its members to uphold the Xeer. If a member still will
not comply, a clan can declare that he is no longer in their
insurance group, eectively making him an outlaw and
unprotected by the clan. is system, while intricate and
imbued with traditional religious sentiment, still functions
well in modern Somalia to adjudicate both civil and criminal
disputes.
43

Even piracy, now the international watchword for
Somalia, is testament to the robustness of traditional
Somali law. One Somali pirate, when interviewed, called
foreigners the real pirates. He complained that illegal
trawlers from surrounding nations oversh and dump
toxic waste, robbing Somali shermen of their subsistence
and livelihoods. Pirating, he claims, was the last resort
of a desperate industry to secure rights to shing waters.
Moreover, Somali pirates generally do not prey on Somalis
and, indeed, a vast network of support industries have
emerged from land-dwellers to support their piratical
countrymen.
44,45

Somalia, in many ways, has come full-circle. Having
started as a trade center it is, despite many handicaps,
slowly regaining its former stature as an exporter, as a duty-
free port and even as a center for small-scale nance.
vii

It should be no surprise that Somalis have proven nearly
ungovernable in recent years. ey suered tremendous
hardship at the hands of states for generations. While one
cannot romanticize Stateless Somalia, which remains poor
and troubled, one should not brand it as an abject failure
in desperate need of political and military intervention. In
a world of imperfect alternatives, statelessness in Somalia
should not be dismissed. Somalias indigenous institutions,
though confusing to some Western eyes, have proven robust
and conducive to peace and economic growth. Moreover,
they are a return to an era that preceded the actions of
irresponsible states that condemned Somalia to a century
of blood and poverty.
vii Somalia currently has several competing currencies from
past regimes as well as the U.S. dollar and notes from Somaliland.
Interestingly, the only currency that risks complete destruction through
hyperination is Somalilands the only currency (other than the U.S.
dollar) that is supported by a State-entity. A massive market in foreign
remittances from Middle-East economies provides free-owing credit to
Somali businessmen. See (Mubarak, A Case of Private Supply)
Under the Inuence:
Patterns of Dependency in Latin American Development
Maggie Carter
Latin American colonialism ended with the hard-
won independence of its nations, however it remains to
be seen if these countries have truly become independent
and escaped the legacy of oppression the colonizers set
in motion. e colonialists maximized the output of the
colonies by strategically dividing production into dierent
areas of the continent. ough this was a successful tactic
for the colonizers looking to exploit the land, when
individual nations rose out of the struggle for independence,
it left each country economically dependent on the one
or few commodities it already produced. In its struggle to
overcome this and become self-sucient, Latin America
has repeatedly looked outward to the developed world, and
consequently invited new forms of colonialism that have
kept its head underwater for centuries.
As colonialism fell, Latin America gained its freedom,
but was also left without the nancial support of its former
oppressors. As Spain and Portugal moved out, England,
France and the United States provided a new market, eager
to pick up where the others left o, and quickly gained
control of trade in Latin America. ey began investing
in transportation technologies such as railroads and steam
engines, as well as developing port cities in order to eciently
export the products. However, the trade relationship created
was by no means an equal one. Dependency and Development
in Latin America,
1
by Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo
Faletti, illustrates how colonialism worked to oppress Latin
America, even after the end of the Spanish and Portuguese
empires:
When Latin America emerged from its
colonial dependence and entered a period
of dependence on Great Britain, Britain
sought support from national producers of
export commodities who, because of the
growth of their economic base already
under way in the colonial situation
could eect a new accommodation with
emergent dominant forces at world
level. anks to this they gained, if not
absolute control, at least a privileged
position in local structures of power.
2

ough they proted during colonialism and neocolonialism,
the landowners and producers, the domestic elite, were
dependent on whoever could purchase their products and set
up the infrastructure to export them, which allowed foreign
control. Out of the common desire to become prosperous
independent nations, which was expected to come with the
wealth brought in by the export boom, Latin America dug
itself deeper into a circular pattern of dependency. Due to
Latin Americas export-based economy, established during
colonialism, the majority of commodities had to be supplied
by importation. After gaining independence, the only way
these poor, newly formed nations could aord these imports
was by continuing the production of their export goods,
which was enabled by foreign investment. e developed
countries with a new stake in Latin America brought with
them modernization but only in order to make exportation
more ecient. e railroads only ran from the plantations
to the port cities, and cities and towns were chiey
commercial, administrative, and service centers.
3
ese
new developments only entrenched Latin Americas export-
based economy more deeply, as now the continents entire
infrastructure was designed to support it. Soon foreign
investors owned or controlled much of Latin Americas
production industries and with the modernization came a
price: Progress brought a new brand of imperialism from
Great Britain and the United States. e same countries
that modeled progress for Latin America helped install
it there, so to speakand sometimes owned it outright.
4

e new era of modernization and advancement had not
elevated the inferior position of Latin America, and though
the powers shifted during neocolonialism, Latin America
could still not claim sovereignty.
Neocolonialism brought Latin America a vision of
progress rooted in technological advancements, and many
held these developed nations to be models for the future
of Latin America. e great proponent of neocolonialism,
Juan Baptista Alberdis essay, Immigration as a Means of
Progress,
5
described as his utopian representation of the
future, suggests that Latin America cannot become great
without signicant European inuence. He asks, How and
in what form will the reviving spirit of European civilization
come to our land? Just as it has always come. Europe will
bring us its fresh spirit, its work habits, and its civilized ways
with the immigrants it sends us.
6
To Alberdi, Europe, as
Carter | JGA
47
the developed world, represents civilization that will come,
just as it has always come, which historically refers to
colonization, the original force that brought Europeans to
the South American shores. He almost blatantly condones
colonialism, but with a nationalist argument. He believes that
the nations of Latin America can only become civilized by
embracing the qualities of English liberty, French culture,
and the industriousness of men from Europe and the United
States.
7
Clearly, foreign inuence in Latin America was
not limited to the importation of modern technologies but
extended to the importation of new ideals. Alberdi wants
freedom, culture and eciency, which he believes result
from development. However, this is not development in the
general sense, but a very specic kind development. After
his plea for Europeanization, he outlines his plan to achieve
this, stating, Important advice to men of South American
countries: Primary schools, high schools, universities, are, by
themselves alone, very poor mean of progress without large
manufacturing enterprises that are the fruits of great numbers
of men.
8
He undervalues education of the public, a necessity
of equality, which cultivates both skill and culture, and instead
emphasizes industrialization. is tendency to rst implement
the physical aspects of progress, assuming that the social ones
will follow, is commonly repeated throughout the course of
Latin American development. At least for the duration of
neocolonialism, this strategy failed to reorganize society. As
Chasteen writes, Despite many transformations, neither
Latin Americas subordinate relationship to Europe nor its
basic social hierarchy created by colonization had changed.
Hierarchical relations of race and class, in which those at the
top derive decisive prestige and advantage from their outside
connections, remained the norm.
9
Ultimately, the progress
promised by neocolonialism was unable to improve the lives
of most Latin Americans, and instead upheld the superior
status of the wealthy elites.
e period of neocolonialism solidied Latin Americas
dependence on exports, so when depression and war struck its
market, its products piled up with no buyers and the nations
of Latin America were forced to completely restructure their
economies. is led to the widespread implementation of
Import-Substituting Industrialization (ISI) in Latin America.
ISI was an eort to free Latin American countries from
dependency on foreign nations, and by creating a domestic
industry and enforcing trade protection, it attempted to keep
out foreign inuence, a signicant change from neocolonialism.
However, I argue that ISI only redened Latin Americas
economic and ideological dependence on the developed world.
In terms of economic dependence, though Latin America
was no longer importing nished products, it still had to
import the raw materials and machinery needed to create
them. More notably, it remained dependent on the developed
world for technological advances in the manufacturing of
their products, as the technologies they used were simply
imported and knowledge did not extend past operation. In
Albert O. Hirschmans extensive analysis of ISI, e Political
Economy of Import-Substituting Industrialization in Latin
America,
10
he describes this problem: ISI thus brings in
complex technology, but without the sustained technological
experimentation and concomitant training in innovation
which are characteristic of the pioneer industrial countries.
11

is recalls Alberdis mistaken assessment that education
and its benets will follow from large-scale industrialization,
rather than the other way around. In Latin America, the
physical aspect of progress and development are installed, but
the social ones are again neglected.
e circumstances surrounding the failure of ISI
provide even greater evidence for the rearmation of Latin
American foreign dependency. Cardoso and Faletti present
the perspective that industrial capitalism is a modern
manifestation of the colonial model of the exploitation of
peripheries by the core:
It has been assumed that the peripheral
countries would have to repeat the evolution
of the economies of the central countries in
order to achieve development. But it is clear
that from its beginning the capitalist process
implied an unequal relation between the
central and the peripheral economies. Many
underdeveloped economies as is the case
of the Latin American were incorporated
into the capitalist system as colonies and later
as national states, and they have stayed in the
capitalist system throughout their history.
ey remain, however, peripheral economies
with particular historical paths when
compared with central capitalist economies.
12

rough industrialization, Latin America attempted to
mimic the model of development that was responsible for
its own oppression and exploitation during colonialism. It
was ultimately unsuccessful because it has been and remains
a periphery, without peripheries of its own where it could
exploitatively extract raw materials and export its surplus. is
problem is evidenced by the fact that Import substituting
industry is aected by seemingly congenital inability to move
into export markets,
13
meaning that at some point, once
the domestic market has been saturated, ISI is no longer
protable. Another disappointment of ISI was its failure to
create social derivatives. Hirschman writes:
Progressive Latin Americans had long
hoped that industry would introduce new,
much needed disciplines into the behavior
of their governments. e very nature of
industrial operations their precision, the
need for exact timing, punctuality, reliability,
predictability and all-around rationality
was expected to infuse these same
qualities into policy-making and perhaps
JGA | Latin American Development
48
Carter | JGA
even into the political process itself.
14
Here again is another example of the tendency to rst install
the visible aspects of development and expect the values and
practices commonly associated with it to follow. Rationality
was expected to come out of industrialism, and yet the frequent
irrationality in policymaking contributed to its downfall.
Hirschmans conclusion makes the point: Industrialism
was expected to change the social order and all it did was
to supply manufactures!
15
At the top of this long-standing
social order of Latin America was the elite class, which
retained its superior position and imposed upon the entire
society an orientation based on its own interests.
16
During
the periods of ISI and neocolonialism, the dreams and ideals
of Latin Americans were rooted in the modernization and
technological developments that the worlds most powerful
countries had already harnessed, which seemed to be markers
of inuence and importance on the global scale. Latin
America chose to emulate these countries rather than take a
path of development that responded to its own problems and
preexisting structure and cultural foundations, a habit that
has historically and repeatedly hindered its great potential.
e failings of ISI led to the accumulation of vast
amounts of debt by Latin American countries, but by the time
the repayment was due, the nations had not gained enough
prots to pay it back. In response, the U.S. created a set of
conditions that must be accepted by any country prior to the
dispersal of more loans. In his article What Washington
Means by Policy Reform, John Williamson writes that the
objectives that the Washington Consensus wishes to achieve
by its implementation in developing countries are growth,
low ination, a viable balance of payments, and an equitable
income distribution.
17
However, despite its intentions, the
Washington Consensus presents the obvious problem of a
developed country imposing conditions upon and dictating
the terms of its relationship with developing countries. is is
again a replication of colonial structures, where the developed
country has the upper hand. In this scenario, it is hard to
believe that the U.S., the dominant power, is not exploiting
its superior position. Williamson notes that though it is
understood that the U.S. is only interested in the growth and
prosperity of Latin America, the most obvious exception
to this perceived harmony of interests concerns the U.S.
national interest in continued receipt of debt service from
Latin America.
18
e Washington Consensus presents the
two objectives as parallel, as prosperity in Latin American
countries would enable them to pay o their debts, but some
of the policies suggest evidence of the U.S.s prioritization
of debt repayment. For example, the Washington Consensus
promotes the policy of debt-equity swaps, on the argument
that this can simultaneously further the twin objectives of
promoting FDI and reducing debt.
19
However, though debt-
equity swaps do allow nations to pay back their debt quickly
and acquire more loans, it is at the expense of state-owned
industry. Alberdi, wrote, Grant foreign investors what they
require: investment capital is the sure arm of progress for our
countries.
20
If a country does not own its industry, nor have
any power to dictate its own terms of development, it might
as well be a colony.
e question remains, then, can Latin America gain
true independence? In response to the strict conditions of
the Washington Consensus, a new economic policy has
risen out of Latin America in an eort to escape this latest
attempt at imperialism. e Bolivarian Alliance for the
Americas (ALBA), spearheaded by Venezuelan President
Hugo Chvez, was developed as an alternative to the Free
Trade Agreement of the Americas and aims to create a
self-sustainable and independent Latin America through
regional cooperation and assistance. ough it is a viable
attempt to deny the conditions of the rst world, it possesses
characteristics that embody the very process it condemns.
e economic foundation of ALBA is based on a system of
bartering that promotes trade between countries specializing
in certain areas in order to gain each nation access to resources
they do not produce. For example, Venezuelas contribution
is oil, Bolivias is natural gas and Argentina, should they
choose to join, would oer livestock to the equation. is
model comes dangerously close to reproducing the colonial
system that made these countries so dependent in the rst
place, conditioning their industries to produce only one
export. It is important to note that Venezuelas reasons for
participating cannot be purely economic as the gain from
the trade in most cases signicantly favors the other nation.
For example, Bolivias contribution is mainly natural gas,
practically useless to the oil rich Venezuela. But what Chvez
loses economically, he gains politically. By oering to pay
the debts of Latin American countries, Chvez implements
his own kind of debt-equity swaps, gaining not nancial
ownership, but political allegiance as well as acceptance of
the conditions of ALBA. e relationship of Venezuela to
the other nations involved is also reminiscent of the colonial
model, as Venezuela, the core, extracts vast amounts of
oil with its expansive industry, exports its surplus to the
periphery, and gains raw products from their less developed
industries.
21
In this sense, Venezuela overcomes the problem
of industrialization in developing nations that Cardoso and
Faletti present.
Ultimately, ALBA is unable to escape the inuence of
colonialism because its existence is born out of a desire to
resist the Washington Consensus. As long as Latin America
continues to respond to its colonial legacy, whether by
embracing it through neocolonialism, reversing it through
ISI or blatantly refusing it through ALBA, progress will
be impossible. If Latin America desires independence, it
must turn to an organic model of development that is itself
independent of a past stained with oppression; one cannot
move forward while looking backwards.
49
To Spaniards, the ag is of great social relevance, even
today. Its association with Franco and the transition into
a national democracy heighten its social connotations
and its political statement. e photo is of Plaza de
Coln, in the heart of Madrid. In it, the commanding
Spanish ag billows above the entire plaza, including the
concrete macro-sculptures by Joaqun Vaquero Turcios.
For months, I spent every afternoon here skateboarding.
It is here that I became friends with local skateboarders,
whose extension and acceptance gave me insight into
the Madrileo youth.
Identity
Drew McKenzie
50
(La Bandera)
Espaa sangrante.
Empeorando, se recupera Es posible?
El optimismo
ota sobre el desierto del
dolor.
Las cicatrices
gotean bajo el vendaje
mojado de las memorias
que no se pueden contener.
Ana Radolinski
(e Flag)
Bleeding Spain.
She worsens, she recovers. Possibly?
Optimism
oats over the desert of
pain.
e scars
drip below the bandage
drenched in memories
that cannot be contained.
51
Protecting Rights and Promoting Development:
Participative Management in Germany and Argentina
Paz Petersson
52
Since the advent of Human Resources theory, the valuing
of employees as individuals has been at the top of the list of
things to do to create a happy, productive work environment.
To what degree this theory is actually practiced, and to what
degree it aects nancial sustainability and growth is a set
of questions all its own. Some have contended that a High
Road
i
business model, with great degrees of employee
participation and more skilled workers creates both a happier
work environment and greater nancial growth, serving as a
golden goose for some of the problems faced by enterprises.
1

While in theory, and in many real cases, the High Road
is clearly the better option for businesses, the majority of
global businesses still follow the hierarchical, low worker-
involvement, Low Road model. is begs the question: if
High Road Participative Management (PM) systems are so
desirable, why do more companies not adopt them? ere
are a number of obvious reasons, including resistance from
powerful employers and managers in hierarchical workplaces
and lack of general government assistance. Additionally, the
High Road model has not been widely recognized in the
global economy as the better option. Keeping this in mind,
I will look at the specic debate for PM in the workplace,
focusing on the history of two very distinct examples, which
clarify some of the reasoning for High Road models and
some of the reasons why they do or do not prevail in societies.
Namely, I will analyze in detail the lauded German model of
Codetermination, dating back to the end of WWII, and the
much smaller and more contentious worker-run enterprises
in Argentina, appearing during and immediately after the
national economic crisis of 2001. ese examples, and their
contrasting progressions, bring light to the discussion of
what worker participation can mean for businesses and
show how it can manifest in very dierent ways.
Before detailing the two examples, I will introduce
some of the arguments for and against greater employee
participation in the workplace and its implication for
business. e two examples I will focus on were chosen
i ere are many qualities, which characterize the High Road model,
all of them, deeply interdependent. For the purposes of this paper, I am
focusing particularly on the essential aspect of participative management
in any High Road model. For a delineation of the characteristics of a High
Road vs. Low Road model, please see Appendix 1.
because of their similar outcome of high levels of employee
participation despite huge dierences in scale and in the way
they came about. Germany, on the one hand, has established
a mainstream, national, government-supported business
model in which workers are given a voice. Argentina, on
the other hand, has experienced a small-scale movement in
which unemployed workers forcefully claimed a voice after
their situation became unbearable, and they have managed
to maintain that voice and maintain the businesses without
bosses. ese two examples will be detailed individually and
then compared in the last section in terms of their inception,
productivity and eciency over time and their relationship
with their respective governments in order to illuminate
what lessons they can teach us about the future of the High
Road model.
Worker Participation in Management eory
As mentioned above, the established argument for
employee participation in the workplace dates back to the
rst shift in industrial relations theory with the creation of
Human Resources theory.
ii
Pioneered by Dengler, Likert
and McGregor towards the middle of the 20th century, its
basic idea is that humans are resources in and of themselves,
and treating them as such will increase their motivation and
productivity, whereas treating them as expendable will do
the opposite. is now widely accepted theory came as a
stark contrast to Classic industrial relations theory, which
characterizes employees as unwilling actors who work only
because they have to and whose eort only reects wages.
iii

While Human Resources departments in the workplace
have become mainstream, there is still a huge disconnect
from the actual theory and the way that Human Resources
are dealt with in businesses.
2
In many ways, the comparison
of Classic vs. Human Resources industrial relations theory
is very similar to the newer contrasting Low Road vs. High
Road industrial relations systems, especially regarding PM.
ii ese are some texts that argue for participative management much
earlier than this. See, for example, Ben Selekman. Sharing Management
with the Workers, New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1924].
iii For a detailed description of these theories, see: John Sheldrake.
Management eory, (London: omson Learning, 2004) chpt. 2, 16, 25.
JGA | Participative Management
53
ese terms encompass a variety of characteristics (See
Appendix 1), but most importantly, High Road systems
include high worker involvement and less hierarchy in the
workplace with fewer lay-os, while Low Road systems
result in the opposite.
3
Classic examples of successful High
Road systems include the Japanese and German models, in
which employees have a signicant voice in the workings
of their business (which is guaranteed by the government
in Germany) and are generally more skilled. Classic Low
Road examples are competitive factories and sweatshops,
most well-known in China, among many others, in which
employees are highly expendable, with few necessary skills
and with little or no say in the workings of their business.
Just as Human Resource theory was lauded in its time,
so too, almost as a continuation of this, is the High Road
model of PM valued today. Part of the appeal of PM is that
it has been shown to have a positive eect on productivity,
4

and a strong positive eect on worker satisfaction.
5
Aside from its eect on productivity and satisfaction, PM
provides a solution to the inherent principal-agent problem
found in hierarchical businesses. As economist Joseph
Stiglitz describes, managers have imperfect incentives to
ensure that [workers and shareholders] are well-aligned.
6

Stiglitz describes this aspect of hierarchical businesses as
not only unfavorable, but also as a cause of market failure in
the East Asian economic crisis. As he explains, leading up to
that crisis, outcomes were clearly not in workers interests
and were probably not even ecient.
7
Eciency plays an
important role in PM, since participative businesses often
involve a higher level of skill and job rotation than more
hierarchical ones. e basic idea is that workers know how
to do more and therefore can do more than one simple task.
iv
When describing High Road vs. Low Road industrial
relations systems, the High Road clearly emerges as the ideal
option. Yet on the ground, the Low Road, less participative
model is more likely to be used. is is true across the board,
and is not dependent on the level of development of a
country (as can be seen ny the U.S.s Low Road structure).
McCarey et al. have argued that barriers to participative
systems are embedded in social, economic and political
principles and that these are where attention needs to be
focused to facilitate a transition to greater participative
management.
8
e prevailing principles in Low Road
systems, driven by dierential wages, tend to incentivize
personal advancement, a by-product of this being that those
on top in Low Road systems will most likely be the strongest
resisters of any transfer of power towards a less hierarchical,
iv Recalling the discussion of Classic vs. Human Resources theories,
another facet of the Classic theory was that work should be based on
tasks. Human Resources theory took the opposite approach, emphasizing
the importance of workers ability to carry out entire processes, and
therefore have more understanding, ability and personal-meaning added
to the work they are doing. is added personal-value was argued to
increase eciency.
High Road system. is ts in line with McCarey et
al.s principle, but still leaves unanswered the question of
how to change those principles. To answer this question,
lessons must be learned from successful cases. is brings
us to Germany and Argentina, both of which managed a
transition to a High Road system via rather unique moments
in the histories of their countries. In each example those on
top lost their power prior to the shift to PM. While this
was the case in these examples, it is certainly not the only
way to make the transition. Nonetheless, they do provide an
idea of what does and does not work, both in the transition
and in overall functioning of a PM model.
Codetermination in Germany
Germanys industrial relations model has been lauded
for its high levels of productivity, worker-involvement and
its general successful High Road structure. Often grouped
with Japan in discussions of High Road models, both
nations current participative industrial relations models
date back to the end of WWII, when each national economy
essentially had to recreate itself under close international
observation after losing the war. In Germanys case, the top
priority was to make a system that would never allow for
the kind of centralized power that had occurred under the
Nazi regime. As it turned out, this ended up including many
aspects of the pre-Nazi Weimar regime, in which workers
committees and Works Councils (essentially business-
level micro-unions) were legally included in the industrial
relations system. Abolished under Hitler, a new version of
these structures would appear after the death of his regime.
ese structures form the current industrial relations system
in Germany, called Codetermination, in which workers hold
50 percent of the seats on the supervisory board of their
companies, and Works Councils are present in all sizable
businesses so that workers voices enter into management
and decision-making. is model, supported and protected
by the German state, is designed to directly address the
conicting interests of workers and employers. It has so far
been successful in doing so, in many ways redening the role
of collective bargaining.
e term Codetermination, or Mitbestimmung in
German, is dened in the Oxford American Dictionary
as cooperation between management and workers in
decision-making, especially by the representation of workers
on boards of directors. Although Codetermination as
we know it today originated as a Post-WWII model, the
concept of worker involvement began early in Germanys
history, even prior to WWI. e very rst eorts toward
worker-involvement legislation were in 1848 when factory
committees made demands for participation rights and
improved working and living conditions. ese eorts went
unanswered, their success hampered by employers fearing
Petersson | JGA
54
an erosion of their power of decision.
9
About 70 years later,
under the Weimar Republic Constitution, labor legislation
was passed which gave workers and sta equal rights to
participate together with the company in the regulation of
wages and working conditions, as well as in the complete
economic development of the producing powers
10
via
Works Councils. Works Councils are organizations run
by workers for workers rights at the shop-oor level. ey
essentially function as micro-unions within each business,
safeguarding employee interests and carrying out at the
business-level what trade unions carried out at the national
and industry level. e Works Councils Act set the stage
for another act two years later that introduced worker
representation at the high level of supervisory boards. ese
legislations facilitated a high worker involvement system, and
functioned well until a number of external and other factors
led to the fall of the Weimar regime and the rise of the Nazi
regime. In 1934, under Hitler, all of these labor legislations
were repealed under the Act to Regulate National Work.
11

One of its many negative eects of the Nazi regime was
to leave Germanys economy in shambles. Emerging out of
the destruction of war, Germany now has one of the largest
global economies and is the highest exporter after China.
v

is trajectory is a story worth studying.
Under Allied occupation starting in 1945, a revived
emphasis was put on industrial democracy and worker
participation. By 1946, the Allied Control Council Act
No 22 was put in place, directly modeled after the 1920
Works Councils Act.
12
Over the next 30 years, a number
of new legislations came into place, each of them increasing
PM by provisioning for Works Councils in every workplace,
culminating in the Codetermination Act of 1976 which
universalized Codetermination in Germany. is law
stipulated that businesses with over 2,000 employees have
50 percent of the seats on the supervisory board allocated to
employee representatives.
13
While this law certainly diers
greatly from most countries industrial relations legislation,
it passed with an overwhelming majority in Germany.
Workers and unions were not incredibly enthusiastic, since
all sides regarded it as a compromise.
14
is scenario only
further emphasizes the unique political-economic context
in Germany.
Since 1976, the legislation has not changed drastically,
but it has been amended a few times in the 2000s. e
only signicant change in industrial legislation was the
1988 Executives Committee Act, which provided a legal
basis for executive interests at the establishment level.
15

Compared to the legislation of 1976 and earlier, this Act
slightly modied the system in favor of employers.
e conicting interests of employers and workers in
most of the world, and the conventionally high level of power
v e Germany focused on here refers to West Germany until 1989,
and then the greater nation from there on.
that employers have, is what creates the need for collective
bargaining by workers in order to have their demands met.
In Germany, Codetermination operates on a company level,
while collective bargaining...is conducted on an industry
level, therefore alleviating the inherent conict between
worker and manager. Nathan goes on to describe this as
one of the reasons for Germanys success.
16
is argument
adds a piece to the puzzle, but as McPherson holds, contrary
to Reich, industry level collective bargaining does indeed
occur in other countries, yet managers have still shown no
interest in transitioning to a Codetermination system.
17
e
main dierence in Germany is the labor legislation, which
bolsters the two-leveled structure, separating shop-oor
conicts from industry conicts through the existence of
Works Councils at the plant level and trade unions at the
industry level.
at the German model succeeded and made leaps and
bounds is no question since Germany still remains one of
the largest economies in the world. It is, however, true that
its economic trajectory over time has not been a continuous
upward shoot. e miraculous growth in the 1970s and
1980s changed speed in the 1990s when the worlds economy
was experiencing a decline, and globalization was applying
new pressures on national economies. As Jacobi describes
in Renewal of the Collective Bargaining System?, the
once lauded German model took on a new name in the
1990s decline, the German Disease, due to inexibility
in German industry in the face of worldwide competition
and demographic change.
18
In the face of this slow decline,
Jacobi argues that while Germany did indeed experience
decline due to political and labor inexibility, new social
and political reforms were already beginning to take place
to adjust to these.
19
e cause of this decline was new international
competition under globalization, which hurt many world
economies in the 1990s. e common approach to this
problem was to restructure the labor market. For Germany
(and Japan), this meant becoming Americanized. For the
U.S., this meant the inclusion of new Human Resources
management practices (PM being among these).
20

Another aspect of the German decline, and the entire
German system in general, is that Germany has relatively
high unemployment levels compared to the U.S. A question
for future research would be to look into how Germanys
PM system aects unemployment.
Despite the slight decline, the German model is still
highly praised and has been recognized and introduced
on some level in a number of European countries:
[e]mployees in 18 of the 25 European member states have
the right to have their interests represented in their companys
top administrative and management bodies.
21
At an event
celebrating the 30th anniversary of the Codetermination
laws, the General Secretary of the European Trade Union
Confederation called Germanys model a remarkable
JGA | Participative Management
55
piece of economic democracy and participation and went
on to say: [w]hat we need...is the Europeanization of a
coherent concept of participative democracy in the social
and economic context.
22
is overview of Codetermination in Germanys history
and present provides some answers and many lessons
regarding how and why an economy can and should develop
a high participation industrial relations system.
Argentinas Worker-Run Factories
Argentinas recent nancial crisis in 2001 was
devastating on a number of levels, with unemployment
reaching 25 percent at its peak, unemployment and
underemployment combined reaching 35 percent, while
60 percent of the population lived below the poverty
line.
23
Out of this economically precarious state emerged a
national movement of unemployed workers, characterized
by widespread protest and a socio-economic phenomenon:
the worker takeover of factories. Laid-o workers, whose
factories had been shutdown, came together to reclaim their
old jobs by occupying their closed factories and going back
to work under their own management. e worker-run
factory, or Empresa Recuperada por sus Trabajadores (ERT),
essentially a very egalitarian, individual-level cooperative,
became a global example of economic democracy and
employee participation. Worker-run factories became a
small portion of the economy towards the peak of the
crisis in December 2001. In June of 2002, the countrys
center-right wing newspaper reported 80 ERTs with nearly
10,000 employees,
24
and by January 2003, the number of
factories had reached 140 (with the number of employees
not changing drastically).
25
A study published in 2006
(conducted by professors and students at the University of
Buenos Aires) located 200 recovered factories employing
10,000 workers.
26
More recently, an article published in
January 2009 by the countrys left-wing newspaper reported
150 operating ERTs employing 13,000 workers.
27
In a country of 40 million, the worker-run factory
represents a minuscule portion of the economy, yet it
stands as a very dierent, very organic example of PM.
Its smallness in scale also reinforces how impressive it is
that the factories managed to maintain business, and even
grow a little, in the last (economically grueling) ten years in
Argentina. Unlike the German model, which was planned
and organized over time, and existed within the system of
its national government, the Argentine case was a form of
protest in reaction to its nations failure to maintain a stable
nancial system in which people could hold onto their
jobs. To understand the existence of ERTs, I will present
a description of the political economic context followed by
specic examples and nally an analysis of media coverage
and the international discourse surrounding these factories.
e recent economic crisis in Argentina resulted from
a history of dictatorship, combined with poor neo-liberal
policies in the 1990s, pressure from international banks
and an unsustainable peso to dollar convertibility law, all of
which led to the explosive devaluation of the currency and
the freezing of bank accounts in 2001. is crisis included
the classic symptoms of investor withdrawal and widespread
unemployment, which became common at end of the 1990s
as business-owners on a micro level were closing down their
businesses, in some cases because they were unable to pay
back their own debts and in others because they recognized
the decline and chose to get out before things got worse.
Protests by mainly lower class citizens had begun
towards the end of the 1990s, but at the peak of the crisis
in 2001, the number of unemployed had risen so high that
protests became ubiquitous, uniting the lower and middle
classes. ese national protests caused the resignation of the
then president on December 21, 2001, and in the following
11 days the nation saw four new presidents come and go,
essentially run out by the protesting nation that had lost
faith in its government. e fourth new president only stayed
a year before resigning. e sovereignty and competence of
the state was clearly compromised, and with no one else
to turn to, and no one to legitimately stop them, workers
simply went back to work. is was not restricted to one
industry, but famously spanned across a variety of factory
industries.
28
Ironically, the ERTs were not well supported by
Argentinas labor unions. Yet they still managed to survive,
and thrive, mainly through help from fellow factories.
29

A 2002 news article reported that some self-managed
(autogestionada) factories
30
achieved salaries higher than
their historical average and had also managed to hire new
employees.
31
is nancial stability continues today, yet it
still functions, in many cases, outside of the law and outside
of the norm of any standing business model. Over the years,
some legal concessions have been made, including a law on
bankruptcy and expropriations, making it possible for some
factories to legally own their businesses. Notwithstanding
these examples, a large number of factories continue to
face claims by previous owners, or previous creditors who
attempt to regain ownership of the factories. Nonetheless,
business continues.
Since the seized, self-managed factory is a relatively
new concept, it is by no means a homogeneous, clear-cut
model, yet there are some overarching characteristics which
appear in most ERTs. e most well-known, well-studied
aspect is that these factories are run by direct democracy,
with frequent (in most cases, weekly) meetings in which
employees vote equally on decisions.
32
Also, employees take
on new positions and rotate jobs, becoming more exible
and skilled workers (embodying the High Road model).
is structure is like a grassroots version of the German
model, having a similar positive psychological eect to
what Codetermination fostered years before. Ranis, after
Petersson | JGA
56
researching and visiting a number of ERTs, noted that
[w]orking for the enterprise is no longer seen as external to
the worker. is view is supported in a number of accounts,
along with a feeling that workers have not only rescued their
lost jobs, but have also entered into a much better arrangement
than their previous one.
33
Although in the beginning things
were dicult, these ERTs are now economically stable
and competitive, all the while experiencing irreplaceable
economic solidarity. One factory even managed to open up
a health clinic in its neighborhood.
34
Many academics and alternative media journalists, along
with some factory members themselves, proudly chronicle
these events as anti-neoliberal and anti-capitalist.
35
While
this reading is understandable, especially regarding the
question of private property rights, it is much more
productive to interpret it as a political movement of social
rights that ts into our capitalist framework. To say that it is
anti-capitalist to ght for the social right to employment is
to ignore the actual workings of some of the most capitalist
modern societies. If we take the U.S. for example, even with
its high employment rates, welfare is still oered to those
who cannot nd work. China also oers a good example,
since employment there is seen as a fundamental right. In his
seminal work e Great Transformation, Polanyi gives some
insights into the emergence and importance of social rights
in the capitalist economy.
36
He looks back to the origins
of industrialization and describes that, as the world became
industrialized and labor commodied, the economy came to
the forefront and society became dependent upon it, whereas
historically, economy had been secondary to society. is
shift made possible huge violations of social rights, and out
of this grew the political need to protect those social rights,
and account for the harshness of the economy. With this in
mind, we may recall the situation in Argentina and see that
neither the employers, nor the creditors, nor the government
were doing anything substantial to protect the social rights
of the thousands of employees who were laid o. Despite all
of this inaction, the people still had the political impetus to
protect their social right to work. And when they did nally
begin working again, the factories neither went bankrupt
nor shrunk in size, but rather stabilized and even grew. In
this sense the workers actions are ultimately capitalist, by
generating gains on means of production that would have
otherwise not necessarily have been used at all.
Argentina stands as a case in point of how PM and
economic democracy can occur organically, and thrive doing
so. Yet its very specic context limits it to being a model
to learn from, not necessarily to implement elsewhere. In
contrast, the German, and also the Japanese, model, have
desirable, replicable qualities.
Comparative Analysis and Conclusions
Now that the two examples have been historicized
and described in detail, we may compare them and think
about what worked and what did not work in each, looking
separately at their beginnings, their overall performance, the
experience of the workers and their relationship with the
state.
e beginnings of each example are quite dissimilar,
mainly on the level of the states role and each countrys
place in the world economy. Whereas Germany had
just experienced the end of Nazism and was receiving
controlled support from other nations for its restructuring,
Argentina was in economic crisis as a result of its own bad
policies combined with pressure from global banks. e
similarity in the examples origins is that they arose out
of a malfunctioning system. is suggests the tentative
conclusion that PM systems are more likely to prevail when
the contemporaneous system is not doing well. Without this,
it becomes dicult to imagine a scalable implementation of
the model, since hierarchical employers will do their best to
resist this.
e eect of PM and a High Road structure on
productivity and eciency remains a debated question.
Many have argued a positive or insignicant correlation,
while others have contested it.
vi
A recurring contestation
is that it is basically impossible to measure whether or
not higher productivity is causing higher performance
and satisfaction, or vice versa (as proponents of PM want
to prove).
37
Although this classic correlation problem can
never be fully solved, one way of addressing this question
is by comparing like businesses with dierent management
systems. Researchers Locke and Romis do just this in a
recent research paper on work conditions in global supply
chains and oer promising ndings.
38
Comparing two shirt factories in Mexico (both Nike
suppliers) of roughly the same size and age...and producing
more or less the same product and subject to the same
labor regulations, the authors nd that their dierent
management systems (one more High Road, the other
more Low Road) lead to a dierence in working conditions,
worker satisfaction, wages and even eciency, with the High
Road factory doing better in all of these areas. is adds
important empirical evidence to the debate by bridging the
vi For support of positive or insignicant correlation, see: Addison,
Schank, Schnabel, Wagner. Do Works Councils Inhibit Investment?
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 60:2 ( January 2007):187-
203.; Ichniowski et al., 1996; Tyson, David and Levine, DAndrea .
Participation, Productivity, and the Firms Environment, 1990, quoted
in Stiglitz, Democratic Development, 12.; and Osterman and Kochan,
2006. For contestation, see: William H. Form. Auto Workers and
eir Machines: A Study of Work, Factory, and Job Satisfaction in Four
Countries, Social Forces, 52:1 (September 1973): 1-15. Hall; Jones. Why
Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker an
Others? e Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114:1 (February 1999): 83-116.
JGA | Participative Management
57
question of eciency and of worker experience, since the
better management of one factory led to better treatment
of workers and better eciency. More studies such as Locke
and Romis would help to clarify the debate and bring
concrete conclusions.
While the debate on productivity remains, very few
disagree that worker satisfaction increases greatly when
workers themselves participate in decision-making and
have personal stake in their workplace. Additionally,
the eect of PM on collective bargaining is undeniably
benecial for all parties. Recalling Stiglitzs discussion of
the principal-agent problem, we see that in both examples
this problem was gracefully dealt with. In the Argentine
case, the classic principal-agent problem does not exist,
since workers became the sole actors in the business (this
would probably change if the Argentine model grew in
scale and became more institutionalized and if investors
became more interested). By doing this, the Argentines now
only need to use collective bargaining when dealing with
the state. e prices they receive are entirely based on the
market. Germany, by making workers both principals and
agents (principals because they are part of the decision-
making process and are also receiving their livelihoods;
agents because they are representing the interests of their
investors as well) and by separating plant-level conicts
from industry-wide ones (with Works Councils and trade
unions), managed to create a less conict-ridden collective
bargaining system. e help of the state was essential in
making this an established structure.
Looking at Germanys success and Argentinas example
brings two main ndings. First, that PM works and can
appear in virtually any society. Second, for PM to become
successfully established in an economy, labor legislation
is needed to overcome resistance from self-interested
employers. e most signicant dierence between the two
examples was that in Germany, PM had the state behind it,
whereas in Argentina it was the failure of the state which
caused people to act. Germanys model became nationally
ubiquitous, while Argentinas remained localized.
Argentinas ERTs and the Mexican shirt factory are two
isolated examples of successful High Road systems, proving
that PM works even when it is not the established model.
Germany, however, provides lessons for how to establish this
desirable model. In e Mutual Gains Enterprise: Forging
a Winning Partnership Among Labor, Management and
Government, the authors make clear that any successful High
Road business must include the three groups mentioned:
labor, management and government.
39
Without government
support, there is not a strong enough impetus for employers
and managers to cede power for the greater good of their
corporation.
ere is a particular aspect of the PM systems role in
the public eye in both these examples and in general
that deserves some attention here. A prevailing opinion of
high worker involvement workplaces is that they are part
of a system which shies away from capitalism and moves
towards something much more socialist. e worker-run
factories in Argentina, to give an extreme example, have
been regarded both by outsiders and even by people within
the movement as anti-capitalist. When looked at more
closely, we can see that this line of thinking is wrong, both
intuitively and in practice. High worker involvement does
not mean that work and wage is standardized and equalized
by a sovereign power, but rather that wages become a true
reection of the market. By having PM systems, businesses
manage to avoid possible monopolies by rent seeking
employers. ese potential micro-monopolies of labor in
hierarchical workplaces are deemed impossible in situations
of high worker involvement. A quote from an Argentine
recovered factory worker perfectly highlights my point: we
are going to ght with everything to maintain the levels of
production.
40, vii
Overall, these two examples are inspiring manifestations
of highly participative systems, one becoming very successful
and established, the other remaining tiny but resilient.
Comparing the German and Argentine cases brings new
insights because of their extreme dierences. Among these
insights are some lessons for the future, of what to do (and
what not to do) when making the transition to a High Road
PM model. Of course, many economies are far from making
that transition, although as Ichniowski et al. describe in
What Works at Work, new high-involvement, high-skill
trends have been slowly appearing in the United States and
other countries since the 1990s.
41
Also, international media
and the supranational European Union have begun to pay
attention to Germanys successful social market economy,
especially in the face of the most recent economic crisis.
42
On every count, Germany embodies an ideal successful
model worth emulating. e fact that the Argentine
example even exists, however, speaks greatly to the value of
participative management in any workplace.
In many ways, the fact that these examples of successful
PM arose out of mal-functioning economic systems makes
it dicult to imagine their expansion on a global scale.
However, history is beginning to tell a dierent story, with
examples like the Mexican factory and increased worker
involvement in a number of economies. On a last note, the
fact of the recent economic crisis may indeed represent just
enough economic mal-functioning to see a global transition
to a more stable, and more satisfying, social market economy.
vii For a further theoretical discussion of this, see Appendix 2
Petersson | JGA
Appendix 1: High Road and Low Road

Source: Stiglitz, Joseph E. Democratic Development as the Fruits of Labor. Keynote Address,
Industrial Relations Research Association (IRRA), Boston: January 2000
JGA | Participative Management | Appendix
LABOR MARKET
Inducement to high eort
High unemployment and eciency wage High involvement induces eort even with low
unemployment
Compensation
Contractual wages Wages plus prot sharing
Wage dierentials
High dierentials as incentive for individual
adavancement
Low dierentials for increased group solidarity
and cohesiveness
Employment security
Low; dismissal is credible threat for discipline High security to promote identication with
enterpise
Training costs
Paid by individual to increase marketability Paid by rm as long-term human capital
investment
Macro-environment
Can adjust to and contribute to larger reces-
sions with layos
Works better with and contributes to fewer and
smaller recessions by avoiding layos
PRODUCT & FACTOR
MARKETS
Relationship
Arms-lengh, market-oriented, and competitive Long-term relation based on commitment, trust,
and loyalty
Product
Standardized (to foster competition) Customized to buyer or seller
Curb to opportunism
Exit and competition Voice, commitment, and trust
CAPITAL MARKET
Relationship
Arms-lengh, market-oriented nance Long-term relational nance
Time perspective
Short-term since hard-to-monitor; human
capital investments downplayed
Long-term and patient to reap returns to human
capital investments
Debt/equity ratios
Need low D/E ratio to provide exibility in
face of unforgiving market
Can have higher D/E ratios with patient rela-
tionhp to nancial sources and with involved,
more exible workers
Low costs of equity
Low costs since no sharing of income or control
rights with workers
Lower costs for internal equity since workers
already share some income & control rights
Enterprise
Characteristic Low Road High Road
58
Appendix 2: Philosophical Underpinnings of PM
e argument that Amartya Sen makes for successful development, claiming that there is more to it than simple
economic growth (although this growth is by all means a part of the equation), can be shrunken down to the level of the
corporation.
50
When we ask ourselves what is a successful business or corporation? the automatic answer is one that
sustains economic growth. With this deeply entrenched assumption, suddenly it becomes very radical to argue that there is
more to success than money. Even worse, when one references this argument, proponents of the economic gains argument
(both on the global development and on the individual business level) automatically shoot it down, as if one were arguing to
compromise nancial gain for some other metric of success. is is not the case, nor is it a complete impossibility. Happiness
and having a voice are some qualities that have been valued by humans for longer than money has even existed, and although
they cannot be measured as money can, there are ways of beginning to take them into account. What is radical about
thinking of these? As it turns out, when brought into the model of a business, they have been shown to complement eorts
at economic growth, either by maintaining the same level that would have otherwise been or by promoting higher growth.
If nancial growth is not at stake, it seems the only thing that is at stake is the hierarchical power structure in which those
at the top gain considerably more than those at the bottom. Restructuring this model and spreading power more equally is
certainly the greatest obstacle in switching to a more pleasing model for all employees. As I understand it, the question of
worker-participation in corporations is like a micro version of the question of whether to choose democracy or some more
authoritarian form of government. Of course, when it comes to entire societies and nations, much more is at stake, but
the universal practicality of including the voices of all those involved in and beneting from their society or job still holds.
inking about the way power is organized, it seems almost impossible that those on top would ever cede any of their wealth,
and arguments have certainly been made that these higher paid higher-ups have no moral obligation to do so. However,
examples in life (outlined in this paper) have shown systems in which the economy is successful and the power of those on
top is greatly diminished. is brings me to an argument made by G.A. Cohen, in his recent philosophy book Rescuing Justice
and Equality, in response to Rawls argument for dierential incentives:
In 1988 the ratio of top executive salaries to production worker wages was 6.5 to 1 in West Germany and 17.5
to 1 in the United States. Since it is not plausible to think that Germanys lesser inequality was a disincentive
to productivity, since it is plausible to think that an ethos that was relatively friendly to equality protected
Germany productivity in the face of relatively modest material incentives, we can conclude that the said ethos
caused the worst paid to be better paid than they would have been under a dierent culture of reward.
51
When thinking of participative management in terms of economics, at least theoretically, it is arguably a better way of
fully realizing capitalism than the prevailing capitalist structure in most of the world. is is because more equally distributed
wages and more worker involvement in the actual production process leads to a free market-driven system, since the market,
instead of the employer, determines wages. Even the most classical free-market economists have argued against monopolies,
and in many ways, hierarchical businesses with huge wage dierentials can be interpreted as micro-monopolies, in which
employers are controlling labor for personal gain. An economy run by the social market, which has been touted in Germany,
is still very much a capitalist one, even though it appears strange to see a capitalist society with low levels of inequality and
low wage dierentials. In many ways, this looks like a dierent, anti-capitalist model (especially when we compare it to other
instances of high worker-involvement, such as in Argentina, which were treated by the press as anti-capitalist). However, as
a 2009 BBC article stated, [o]fcourse there is a big dierence between the social market and socialism.
52
is is certainly
quite a stretch from our current understanding of capitalism, yet when conceptualizing the German goal of social capitalism,
it is important to remember that this is indeed a model of capitalism, not some other economic system. We see this in the
mentioned quote by a worker from a prominent Argentine ERT: we are going to ght with everything to maintain the
levels of production.
53
A whole book could be written on the philosophic underpinnings of a high worker-involvement structure, but what
is most important to note here is that the Participative Management High Road model is both theoretically desirable and
theoretically (and realistically) plausible.
Appendix | Petersson | JGA
59
France presents itself to the artist and always has. Amidst the vast canon of the Louvres permanent
collection, I caught a glimpse out the window, where the cityscape contextualized its importance in
art history. Overlooking the Tuileries gardens (created in 1564 by Catherine de Medici) in Paris 1st
District, the Louvre is a beacon of arts past and inspiration for its future. On this warm summer day,
the monumental architecture of Paris blends together seamlessly into a greater representation of the
city as a whole.
Having felt the creative atmosphere in Paris, I caught a train to the South of France to seek out iconic
artistic inspiration. I explored the small town of Aix en Provence, the home and primary inuence of
painter Paul Czanne (1839-1906). His most famous series of landscapes are of Mount Saint Victoire,
pictured here. Everyday, Czanne carried paints, canvas and rations to the mountainside. He died from
pneumonia, caused from ceaseless ventures to the mountain. I hiked from a bus stop for an afternoon of
solitude, wine, cheese and cigarette in hand, where I spent the day drawing under a tree in a vineyard.
Ekphrasis
Drew McKenzie
Chaos and Cosmos:
Madidi Park, Bolivia
William Roberts
Don Bruno, as the locals call him, has spoken to every
plant in his garden. His old, wiry body can be seen, covered
by nothing but a loincloth, roaming through tall sugar cane
stalks spun with poroto vines as he furiously picks weeds.
He smells the leaves of a palm and pauses while his gray
eyes twitch back and forth. Spinning through the mental
Rolodex of his extensive seed bank, he announces the
legume that will provide the nitrogen that the plant has just
requested. His farm sits on a 10-hectare plot at the edge
of Madidi National Park, one of the worlds most diverse
ecosystems. It is lled with over seventy nutritious, food-
bearing trees including coee, citrus (for wine), cacao,
mangoes, sugar, eight varieties of banana, beans, grains and
corn. His collection of medicinal plants provides remedies
for such ailments as rheumatism and swollen prostate and
can be used to disinfect wounds and reduce fevers. A bright
orange fruit that hangs from a purple ower helps children
who have trouble learning to speak. He even once used the
thick vines of the Ua de Gato that stands stoically in the
middle of the garden to cure his friend of cancer.
Bruno is an outstanding community organizer. He
knows the nutritive needs of every plant that he lives with
and takes pleasure in matching them with their suited
counterparts. In return, the grateful plants take care of Bruno
with bountiful harvests year round that ll his wooden
dinner bowl without outside supplement. And, when I set
up my tent in his garden and picked the rst weed from the
foot of a lone corn stalk, I too became part of this ecosystem,
invited to share all of its secrets.
I rst saw Bruno arguing in French-accented Spanish
with a bus driver over whether there was room for all of his
construction supplies on top of the bus. His eyes turn silver
when he is mad. Despite his accomplishments in innovative
horticulture (he has written three published books on
permaculture), Bruno has a pale emptiness inside of him,
which often surfaces in his interactions with people. He has
isolated himself in the jungle for nearly thirty years, living
in solitude with the plants in an environment where his
mind can function like his garden. He calls it Chaos and
Cosmos: a functional, disorganized mania of harmonious
balance. I think that it bothers him that the rest of the world
sees the two ideas as incompatible. His inspiration comes
from the delicate reciprocity of the plants and bugs in his
garden, all living interspersed and interconnected.
e banana trees shade the coee and tea. Yucca,
pineapples and corn ll empty space, with peanuts and other
legumes covering the soil, oering nitrogen and crowding
out weeds. e system is bountiful and completely self-
sustaining. As a farmer, he must do little more than harvest
the ingredients that he needs for each meal. Agriculture is
more than a profession; it is his worldview, his way of being.
He lives intimately with the ora, waking every morning
to the shadows of mangoes and oranges on his canvas tent.
e diverse ecosystem supports both him and the crops. All
distinction is lost between the interests of the plants and
his self-interest. e wisdom of being in the presence of the
trees brings the blue out from behind the clouds in his eyes.
He is a modern day Dionysus, as his only income is from his
delicious citrus wine and heirloom seeds.
We took an all terrain bus early in the morning,
over the at Antiplano and onto steep valley roads crossed
with deep rivers, to the entrance of Madidi Park. ere, we
loaded our gear and Brunos equipment onto the back of a
hired pickup truck and sat on top, holding on through deep
potholes and more river crossings. ere was a new moon
that I would see wax every night until it was a full disk. Our
path was lit by brilliant stars. Orion and Pleiades sparkle
even in the Southern Hemisphere. It was nice to see old
friends.
Adjusting to life on the farm took some patience.
Insect bites all over my body, back pain from long days in the
eld and lack of bathrooms made me question my decision
to come. On my second night, a furious windstorm sent
me rolling in my tent, snapping a pole and smashing some
instruments. I was humbled by the force of the elements and
suddenly unconcerned by the scorpions and tarantulas that
crept in the night. I was reminded that beginning something
new is always dicult. Like starting a re: sometimes you
must suer through smoke in your eyes in order to enjoy a
warm dinner.
e days at Brunos proved to be tranquil and
constructive. Tasks varied from weeding to planting,
62
JGA | Chaos and Cosmos
construction to cooking. I preferred working in the eld where
I could acquaint myself with the plants by name and get my
hands dirty. Some days I would ll seed bags with saplings,
others I would spend hacking dead leaves o of banana palms
with a machete. Work would end every day when the sun
was at its highest, after which we would jump into the deep
river to wash ourselves. When we dried o, lunch would be
waiting on the table outside. Meals were delicious, simple
concoctions of the variety of grains, vegetables and roots
from the garden. We reserved eating meat for our Sundays
o, as cooking a chicken entailed nding one, decapitating
it, removing its feathers and roasting it all day over hot coals.
e process of cooking and working the land was our closest
relation to our community. Old recipes and agricultural
wisdom, passed down through the generations from the
Bolivian and other cultures represented by the international
community on the farm, were shared as a testament to our
heritage. e food system, on this small communal scale, was
an integral aspect of our identity, our connection with the
land and our ancestors.
As the days went on I became more familiar with life
on the farm. I began to recognize the fruit of each tree, the
call of each bird and even the bites of each bug. I got to
know the other workers as well, and what a wild bunch they
were. ere was Mike, a ery kid from Utah with a bushy
red beard that matched his spirit. He wrote songs about his
bike trips across North America, and was thumbing his way
back to the States with 150 bucks in his pocket. ere was
Will, the singing sailor from Holland who woke up every
morning with a beer can in his hand and never once left
the construction site to enter the garden: I prefer to touch
trees after theyre dead, thank you very much, he would
explain. And his French girlfriend, who had a warrior soul
and arms like tree branches. ere was Raul, the dreadlocked
intellectual from Spain. Noah the Goof was taking time o
from studying abroad in Chile. Andrew showed up wearing
a Greenpeace Klearcut T-shirt; he had worked on the same
campaign as me on the other side of the country. e young
French couple, who claimed to be anarchists and were
certainly in love, were so impressed by the valley that they
decided on their second day to buy some land and raise their
own crops.
I woke up early the morning I was leaving and took
one last swim in the river with Bruno before walking around
camp with a guitar, waking everyone with a rendition of
Leaving on a Jet Plane. We said sentimental goodbyes over
a big pot of thick, black coee and traded gifts and words
of appreciation. Bruno sent me o with a two-liter bottle of
orange wine and a big kiss right on the lips.
Youll come back, right? he insisted.
Many times, I assured him.
Bueno, and make sure you bring some cute California
girls with you when you do!
And with a grand promise to see each other again, in
this life or the next, I strapped my possessions to my back
and began my long walk back to civilization.
e dirt road climbed over the surrounding hillsides,
oering a bleak contrast to the ourishing life that I was
leaving on the farm. Years of relentless logging have left
the peripheries of the park infertile and barren as far as the
roads will carry the trucks. e low grass can hardly cover
the dry brown of the dirt hills, the timber companies having
usurped the green from Eden. Despite Brunos most valiant
eorts at conserving and reforesting the area, he will have
little inuence once the mining and drilling companies catch
wind of the abundant gold and oil deposits in the park. eir
representatives will arrive in fancy cars, promising schools
and hospitals that will never be delivered. e mosquito
hums a pretty song in ight. e farm, however, will survive.
I will sleep more soundly for the rest of my nights knowing
that a slice of paradise is being well guarded. If the world
should ood again, perhaps Brunos garden will be our ark.
63
Roberts | JGA
Eleuthera
Emma Young
e site of memory: a place. e Pink House. Where
lives converge, where time moves faster than the current and
stands as still as a breezeless hot summer night.
Here I left one part of my life and pickled another,
an intermediate phase, that fermented and grew new life
within itself. We bottled it like guava jelly, stored it in the
sand and set it adrift at sea, a sealed map of memory.
e clis, where we saw the bull sharks circling below
us, 20 feet down. Up there on the limestone, with our
parents, Cade and I were safe. e setting sun and crashing
waves sent mystery through the air as the twelve foot sharks
shoved their ns and noses out of the water towards us.
Our parents held our hands as we all stood silent up there,
watching this wild force below us churn up the dark Atlantic
blue.
e clis of Eleuthera Island are stunning. e
backbone of a skeletal island, they have been beaten clean
for years by hurricanes and astonishing waves, leaving them
jagged and gnarly and lunar. Standing out on these brave
clis against the Atlantic, I have often tried to connect with
the incredible force I feel beneath my feet as water trickles
through the limestone and circles again back into the
ocean, turning white and cerulean. e ritual of absorbing
the power of Whale Point. Out on those clis, facing the
horizon, the wild seeps into every part of life. Naked power,
a kind that has traveled from Africa and surges from the
depths to move boulders across dry land, to send a wall of
seawater fty feet into the air with no explanation and no
apology on any given day.
To build a house on the end of a tiny, jutting peninsula
is to align with a vector of energy. Once, my father was
ying in on a small prop-engine airplane that makes the
trip down from Florida, when visibility became poor due
to a Caribbean thunderstorm. Shaking in the air, the plane
circled blindly as the pilot tried to coordinate the location of
the islands tiny airport. Lightning was striking all around.
As the plane dropped and jumped back up, the door to the
cockpit swung open wide, and my father says that the ladies
aboard took out rosaries and crossed themselves. Some
made use of the vomit bags in front of them. He kept his
eyes out the window. en, he says, a pointed roof appeared
out of the gray. My house! he shouted. ats my house!
Its at the end of Whale Point. e airport is due west! And
so he was able to direct the pilot to a safe landing.
at is the kind of story that can happen on an island
like Eleuthera. e island itself is shaped like a mystery,
its skinny, knobby points trickling down in a backwards-c
shape, cupping the turquoise Carribean Sea directly across
the half-mile-long sliver of mainland rock, on the other side
of the deep and brooding Atlantic. is gentle water seems
to reach no more than ten feet deep for miles and miles as
it stretches towards Florida. It is as calm as glass, and you
can see straight through the water, especially on calm days.
Oftentimes when I am ying into North Eleuthera airport,
I look for sharks or giant manta rays in the bay. My cousin
claims to have seen an entire shipwreck from the air.
e American painter Winslow Homer spent a good
deal of his career depicting the Bahamian islands, and his
works of Eleuthera are, not surprisingly, my favorites. He,
too, seems to have been captivated by Glass Windows
Bridge, a natural arch made of rock that stretches thirty feet
and allows its passengers to essentially straddle these sister
seas. To the north, the deep, midnight-colored Atlantic;
southwards, the gemlike Caribbean. Humans did not
create Glass Windows, though slaves from the pineapple
plantations used to cross it from Gregory Town to the East
in order to get fresh water in Upper Bogue, westward. What
must they have thought about this striking example of
balance in nature, of a more civilized wilderness?
As with the rest of the Caribbean and Latin America,
the Spanish and then the English colonized the Bahama
islands as centers of export, bringing slaves from Africa
and establishing large plantations. Eleuthera, in particular,
was used for pineapple production from the early 18th
century, with its peak in the mid-19th. e Dole Companys
attention later shifted to Hawaii with its establishment as
a state in the U.S. With the massive growth of the tourism
industry and Bahamian independence in 1973, agriculture
ceased to be the main economic feature of the Bahamas.
Today, Eleuthera is lined with rolling elds of arable land,
64
JGA | Eleuthera
empty silos now grown to their tops with weeds and vines.
!
It has been years since my family went to Whale Point
together. e past few times I have been, very frequently
in the last two years, were all college trips with friends, my
partner and my father. But, being there, I feel the passage
of time and its beautiful malevolence tear at me as I go
through every room of the house. Cades little, tiny hats. She
had always had a big head, but how could these be so small?
Sunglasses our parents had given us for Christmas. e
driftwood curtain rods we had made the rst summer after
we built the house; their same, thin white curtains hazily
swaying in the breeze from the ceiling fan.
Looking through the few pieces of clothing that my
mom left in her armoire upstairs in the pink house, I felt as if
I was sorting through memories, or the clothes of somebody
who no longer exists. I caught myself saying, is was my
moms, though, of course, it still is my moms; I called her to
ask if she wanted me to bring these things back to Florida.
e orange skirt with small Hawaiian gures surng across
the fabric, a plain gray tee-shirt to wear on the boat I
can picture it now, the full ensemble, her white baseball
cap shining over sporty black sunglasses and her beautiful
painted toenails in blue ip ops. A blue paisley spaghetti-
strap dress, a red oral spaghetti-strap dress; a summer
wardrobe.
I wore her clothes, the last time I was there. We slept
in their bed, omaz and I, and that rst night alone felt
like we had become my parents. Upstairs in that huge room,
surrounded by water on all sides, with every window open
and the sound of waves crashing around us. It is an intense
experience to live on Whale Point.
Memory: a feeling of intense joy and sadness at once,
of knowing that this had been our home, that we had made
it together. I know its nuances (no glass in the upstairs
shower window), its secrets (two roofs) and its smell (the
most comforting hint of salt spray and mildew). is house
was never nished completely, and, like many projects of
my parents, perhaps never will be. But it is the absence of
the glass in the window, that smell of mildew that I love; of
knowing, this is a place where time is present, where nature
comes in, like the ants seething into the Buenda familys
home in One Hundred Years of Solitude.
So much signicance in a gray tee-shirt. So much
depending on those clothes resting within that cabinet,
waiting for Mom to return and wear them again. Waiting
for my childhood to commence again, to run on the pink
sand beaches with my parents and make bonres at night.
How I long for my mother wearing those simple sundresses
on Bahamian afternoons.
!
Whale Point. Whales. Cetaceans. Distant, imaginary
Leviathans swimming o of those ragged clis. eir
migration has stopped. Long ago, they were overshed.
65
Young | JGA
Suering as always from insomnia, when I was young,
crawling into my mothers side of the bed. Soothing me,
she would say, imagine whales. A mother whale and a baby
whale, swimming together in the comfort and safety of the
deep. Singing to each other. I would, and still do, imagine
their songs before drifting o to that other place of memory,
where the subconscious pulls apart memories in order to re-
member them, to put them back together.
But those imaginary whales, both of my dreams and my
waking life, have a large presence and great meaning for my
family. Leviathan Light, my father named his lighthouse a
large, cylindrical, shell-shaped studio he built overlooking
the great clis and natural pool they have formed on the
Atlantic side, up where we saw the sharks. e lighthouse,
a crazy, beautiful project interrupted. Unlike his paintings,
this site of creation is perpetually a work in progress. One
day, he says, hell put a light in there. A beacon
for the lost whales, calling them back to their
migratory home. ose imaginary whales, soft,
delicate, and so spiritual, so strong. Like so
much of the Caribbean, they were taken for the
use of others.
But like my memories of childhood, they
swim swiftly through the temperate waters.
What must it have been like to immigrate to a
tiny island? My great great grandmother came
from Israel with her sister and her mother, who
abandoned her when she fell in love with a black
man. Youd never know, looking at me, that my
grandfather was the descendent of Africans, and
of Lucayan Indians, who came to the Caribbean
after being chased through South America by
the Caribs, an indigenous group now known for
their supposed cannibalism.
You might know, looking at me, that my
grandmothers distant ancestors were Irish.
Only recently did I learn of an incredible
family story: that my grandmothers ancestors,
sixteen generations back, were on the voyage
of the Eleutherian Adventurers, an extremely
well-known story in the Bahamas. ough I
had believed my family rst went to Abaco, as
history would have it, they rst shipwrecked
o of Spanish Wells, in North Eleuthera, at
Preachers Cave. eir plaque, dated 1648, is still
amazingly there, telling of their survival until
they were rescued by a search team of sailors
from Harvard University in Boston. I had no
idea. It is a staggering revelation. is is our
DESTINY! my father writes me in an e-mail
when I wrote to him, excitedly, nearly out of
breath, that this was my familys history, that my
family named the island Eleuthera, for freedom.
So tting it is, that my father would end up painting
the black gure. His watercolors, so vibrant, an unmatched
realism with the medium, reect our larger family in their
forms. rough my mother, he has claimed the Bahamas as
his own, noting that my mothers ancestors shipwrecking
in Eleuthera is part of our destiny one he cannot be
separated from. His own family, coming from the United
States South, traveling through states of racism from
Georgia to Alabama, Texas, Hawaii, where my dad was the
outsider, the unwanted, and back to Florida faced a reality
we study in college today. In painting the black gure, my
father paints this history; one that is larger than any of us,
and yet contains pieces of him, of my mother, of me and my
sister. We come from many places, and even Cade and I are
only half-Bahamians. But this place, this site of memory,
66
holds a convergence of our lives. Here we spent summers,
spent time o from school in Florida, but my parents kept us
there every day; my dad in his paintings, mum in her accent
and knowledge of the most nourishing type of cooking the
meals that connect you to a place that is part of you.
Entering the Pink House through the kitchen screen
door: the familiar smell of a musty, painted house. Eleuthera
ages as it is reborn. is little yellow kitchen, such a welcoming
entrance to my youth the past and yet a place of active
creation. Most of my favorite Bahamian memories involve
food. Spending the day on the boat, pulling a conch right
out of the water on a sandy beach, dicing it up, adding limes,
sour orange, raw onions and tomatoes and eating the freshest
conch salad in the world while the sun sets; the smell of my
mothers Johnny Cake as it came out of the oven, getting us
girls up for a day of exploration; waking up the morning after
my cousins wedding a few years ago and enjoying boiled sh
n grits with my whole family.
Johnny Cake,
a simple Afro-Caribbean bread
- 2 cups our
- 1 tablespoon baking powder
- Salt
- 4 tablespoons sugar
- 1/2 stick of butter + 4 tablespoons oil
- Water
Combine the dry ingredients, press the
butter into the our until it looks like peas,
then stir in the oil. Add enough water until
it gets the consistency of cake batter, but not
quite as wet. Bake at 425 until brown (about
20-25 minutes).
Mums accent. My dad called it cute when they met,
and she said, Fuck o. A Bahamian girl who came to the
States at sixteen to attend college; living in New York for
a year and then coming back south, to study printing at
Ringling School of Art before heading back to work for her
fathers printing press in Freeport. at night, at some party,
when my parents met, something changed for my dad, who
met his muse. e next week, they saw each other in the
laundry room, and my mum ended up doing dads laundry
because he didnt know how. My parents, so young to marry,
so beautiful in their art and ambitions, in their love of the
Bahamas. ey waited eight years to have children, both
of us conceived beneath my fathers painting table. One of
their biggest projects, followed by constructing our house in
Jupiter, Florida, in the State Park, where we were brought up
in nature, then continued by the Pink House.
e Pink House, where we havent gone back to visit
together in nearly seven years, is dierent from our beautiful,
comfortable home in Florida. e Pink House holds danger,
holds adventure, holds a mysterious and deep type of art and
nourishment. It is a house of celebration, of change the
place where I rst got my period, where learning to drive, I
ran over a dog with a car and yet it is a place that remains
unchanged where Cade and I were best friends, before we
returned to Florida to grow apart. e feeling is palpable, in
the air of Cades bedroom, and our living room, out on the
dock and along the swimming path to our favorite reef, that
we are sisters and are forever connected to each other.
Family takes work. It is not just a given; the way we
have naturalized the idea of family and the nuclear unit.
But my family is all of me. e Pink House, the clis, the
sister seas, Preachers Cave; Eleuthera. A home that stands
strong through hurricanes and oers protection from the
sharks, but a connection to whales. A place we all loved
together.
67
Young | JGA
Environmental Refugee Status:
International Reception of Climate Displacement
Jacqueline Hall
68
JGA | Environmental Refugees
In the past few decades, the world has become
increasingly aware of anthropogenic harm to the
environment that may signicantly alter and deteriorate
our quality of life and necessitate serious remedial eorts.
Environmental issues, including man-made and natural
disasters, have driven people away from their communities
throughout history. e projected eects of climate change
have the potential to aggravate these kinds of disasters as
well as raise a whole host of new problems that will force
unprecedented numbers of people to leave their homes and
seek new lives internally or internationally. ese problems
will disproportionately aect the developing world
which necessitating multilateral agreements to guarantee
protection for those who can no longer sustain their lives
in their current locations. Unfortunately, there is no legal
protection for persons eeing their homes for environmental
reasons. e international community of developed nations
has put up a hostile front to extending refugee status to those
aected by climate change. is reaction does not morally
stand up to agreed upon values of human rights and rejects
responsibility for transnational environmental damage.
Environmental refugees is not an ocial term, but
it is widely used and can be dened as, people who have
been forced to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily or
permanently, because of marked environmental disruption
(natural and/or triggered by people) that jeopardized their
existence and/or seriously aected their quality of life.
1

Temporary or reversible environmental damage could
include natural disasters or industrial incidents, and long-
term or irreversible change could include anything from dam
construction to sea level rise. Another category of migrants
unmentioned in the denition includes those who migrate
to seek a better quality of life because their resource base has
been depleted by causes like soil salination or deforestation.
As stated, causes for migrations include ooding,
drought, soil erosion, deforestation, earthquakes and toxic
spills. e poster child consequence of climate change,
however, is sea level rise. e Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change forecasts nearly as much as a two feet rise
in sea level in the next century due to the melting of glaciers
and ice sheets and thermal expansion caused by rising
temperatures. Half of the worlds population is crowded into
coastal zones and about 10 million of those people are at
constant risk of ooding. A one meter rise in sea level would
uproot 20 million people in Bangladesh alone.
2
A rising sea
level presents a very real threat, as it has the potential to
destroy entire nations. In the Pacic, the Northern Group
islands of the Cook Islands, and the many islands of Kiribati,
Tokelau, Tuvalu, the Federated States of Micronesia and the
Marshall Islands are set to disappear before the end of this
century, and will become uninhabitable long before that.
3

ese nations will become uninhabitable because rising
sea levels salinate the soil and destroy its capacity to grow
food. Tuvalu has already experienced damaging oods and
is seen as the nation most likely to sink due to sea level
rise because, at its highest, it is only two meters above sea
level.
4
Although there are only 11,000 Tuvaluans, their
populations combined with the rest of the vulnerable small
island nations represent a sizable group of people who will
be forced to move because of climate change.
ough the most publicized, sea level rise is only
one of the problems caused by environmental damage and
climate change. A United Nations survey predicts that a
third of the worlds land is becoming infertile, and other
studies foresee that 100 million of 135 million people living
in areas of desertication will be displaced in the next 20
years. In Kazakhstan, the receding of the Aral Sea caused a
30-fold increase in disease amongst locals. Estimates vary,
but the most commonly cited study, published in 1993 by
Dr. Norman Myers, predicts that there will be 150 million
environmental refugees by the middle of this century. In this
estimate, he predicts 30 million refugees each from China
and India, 15 million from Bangladesh, 14 million from
Egypt, 10 million from other Delta areas, and one million
from island states. In 2005, he updated this study to 200
million climate refugees by 2050. Bangladesh is amongst the
especially high risk countries because it is so vulnerable to
increasingly intense storms and oods, sea level rise causing
salinization and river erosion. Additionally, it is one of the
most densely populated nations in the world.
5
Another sizable demographic feeling pressure to
migrate for environmental reasons is the rural poor, who are
69
Hall | JGA
reliant on agriculture or other resource-based livelihoods
for both income and subsistence. Internal migration in
the developing world means many people will move to
already resource-strained megacities, making them no less
vulnerable than the refugees forced to leave their countries.
When moving to cities, environmental refugees often end
up in shantytowns and slums, where it is not only unhealthy
and dangerous, but also dicult to nd employment. Slums
are characterized by lack of social services and opportunity,
and often violence related to the scarcity of resources. Over
90 percent of the residents of Korail, one of Dhakas biggest
slums, never leave because they cannot aord to.
6
Internal
migrants to cities face hardships in similar ways as those
migrating across borders. ere are resource constraints,
challenges to social cohesion, and limited infrastructure,
which lead to increases in urban slums.
7
e political discussion regarding environmental
refugees revolves most commonly around their lack of legal
status. ey do not t within the UNs denition of a refugee,
so there is no international or national legislation that
explicitly recognizes or denes climate or environmental
refugees and there is no governing body with a mandate
to oer them protections.
8
A refugee is dened in the UN
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees as a
person who, as a result of events occurring before 1 January
1951, and owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion, is outside the
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that
country: or who, not having a nationality and being outside
the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such
events, is unable, or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return
to it.
9
e Protocol to the Refugee Convention in 1967
adapted this denition to remove the pre-1951 condition.
Environmental refugees do not t into this denition. First,
they are often still within their country of residence, but
not necessarily by choice. Secondly, they do not usually fall
under the category of those fearing persecution for reasons
of race, nationality, religion, or membership of a particular
social group or political opinion. It can be argued, though,
that environmental degradation is a kind of persecution, as
Andrew Simms explains in a letter to a member of the UN
High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). Simms writes,
being forced to live in worsening poverty on land that
without warning could ood or turn into dust [...] Whether
deliberately or due to sins of omission, these consequences
are the result of economic and political decisions.
10

However valid this argument, it is unlikely environmental
refugees would be accepted under this rationale, and so they
are categorically excluded from UN protection.
Karen McNamara traces the origins of UN inaction
through interviews with ambassadors and senior diplomats.
Overall, there seems to be no lack of research on the topic
and she nds that the term is certainly not unfamiliar.
ere is, however, a distinct lack of any policy or potential
to establish policy for the protection of environmental
refugees. McNamara nds that a common view amongst
interviewees is a negative reaction to the terminology.
Environmental refugee is a contested term because it is
seen as impossible to extract as an isolated condition. e
term environmental does not adequately describe reasons
for migration (more frequently cited reason are war or
family connections), which is why this description receives
little attention from UN or like-minded organizations that
address refugee status and displacement. Environmental
refugees are almost always moving for a combination of
reasons, including social and political, but ecological and
environmental research is suggesting that environmental
triggers most signicantly inuence their migration
decisions. is ambiguity does not justify dismissing the
importance of environmental factors on these decisions.
11
Another response found in McNamaras interviews
was, You do not take in people because they cant make a
living somewhere.
12
is is indicative of the contemporary
discussion surrounding immigration, which focuses on
migrants potential economic utility or harm. National
policies have revised immigration laws to this discussion,
disadvantaging the lower skilled migrants, which happens
to correlate with the type of people who are most vulnerable
to climate related displacement.
e UN Environment Programme (UNEP) had done
some research on environmental refugees (they actually
coined the term in 1985) but has shifted its focus to the
impact of refugees and preventative strategies to protect
the environment from refugee movements. e attitude
of the UNEP has shifted because refugee protection
is too sensitive a political issue to be included in their
responsibilities. e UNCHR stands strictly by its mandate
to protect refugees as dened by the Convention, and does
not see environmental migrants as legal or legitimate
refugees.
13
e language of the UNHCR further excludes
certain people by describing such migration as being
inherently voluntary. One likely reason for the UNHCRs
strict stance is its lack of donor support and a tight budget,
which forces it to prioritize.
McNamara concludes that some of the hostility to
the idea of protecting environmental refugees has emerged
because of this prioritization; the United Nations has
other, more demanding and higher publicized, issues to
deal with, such as the Iraq war and sub-Saharan poverty.
Additionally, McNamara notes a growing hostility towards
current Convention-dened refugees. Refugee status in the
post-war period was once highly respected, but over the
years countries like the United States, the United Kingdom,
Australia and Germany have moved towards a position
70
JGA | Environmental Refugees
where they claim they are being inundated by illegitimate
refugees. In this climate, a sympathetic approach from UN
member states on extending refugee status to other displaced
persons is unlikely.
14
McNamara explains this shift, stating,
changes in attitude towards multilateralism are likely to
be a consequence of fear and the increasingly xenophobic
nature of domestic policies in the West. Fear from images
of escalating numbers of environmental refugees has led
governments to be convinced of the need to protect their
state borders.
15
Another growing sentiment amongst many Western
states is a move away from accepting responsibility for
transnational environmental pollution, though some
individual nations have taken action to protect climate
refugees. Australia and New Zealand are two examples, in
part because of their adjacency to vulnerable small island
nations. In Australia, the Labour Party recognized some
responsibility for environmental refugees by oering aid
to those aected by sea level rise. e government has also
established an international coalition to accept climate
change refugees when a country becomes uninhabitable
and provide assistance to preserve the cultural heritage
of those who are evacuated. In response to the Tuvaluan
governments request for help, New Zealand created the
Pacic Access Category, allowing 75 residents from Tuvalu
and Kiribati as well as 250 residents from Tonga to migrate
to New Zealand each year. However, applicants must be
between the ages of 18 and 45, have an acceptable oer
of employment and meet a minimum English language
requirement.
16
In Africa, refugee agreements were also
reached that include climate migrants. e Accord of
the Organization of African Unity (OAU) recognizes
as grounds for asylum, external aggression, occupation,
foreign domination, or events seriously disturbing public
order. Environmentally displaced persons for reasons such
as drought or other natural disasters were not intended to
be included by the Accord but because the scope of this
expanded denition is habitually applied to those for whom
economic protection by the state is not forthcoming, a
restrictive interpretation excluding victims of ecological and
man-made disaster is by no means precluded.
17
ough
these policies are a start, they are scattered and not inclusive
enough. Even specic instances of natural disasters are not
addressed in any international agreement that obligates the
international community to provide relief. Overall, people
in humanitarian need for environmental reasons are not well
protected. National policies cannot be counted on because
they are not cohesive enough and, as in the New Zealand
agreement, can exclude migrants deemed to be undesirable,
regardless of need. National policies are also subject to
change with electoral patterns.
e discussion of environmental refugees is largely
aimed at the UN because it remains the only institution
capable of multilaterally establishing human rights standards.
Simms argues that if there is a lack of an ocial UN status
for environmental refugees, they will be condemned by
71
Hall | JGA
a global problem to a national economic and geographic
lottery and to the patchwork availability of resources and
the application of immigration policies.
18
Advocates argue
that the denition of a refugee is grounded in human rights,
which include the right to an adequate standard of living
and access to food. e kind of suering associated with
environmental degradation is clearly a violation of these
rights. It can also be argued that because climate change
is caused by humans, the state is obligated to protect its
citizens from them. In the case that a state cannot protect
its citizens, victims qualify for the international assistance
given to refugees.
19
Although the future impact of climate change is
foggy and speculative, it is clear that the world is facing an
unprecedented prospect of seeing the land of several nations
wiped out. is daunting fate cannot be faced with unclear
policy regarding those aected by it. A lack of multilateral
action could potentially dissolve faith in the UN entirely.
David Corlett astutely sums up the questions the world faces
as we head into this hazy situation: Does the possibility
of hundreds of millions of people on the move in search
of protection, some crossing international borders, force
a reconceptualisation of the state as a territorially dened
political entity related to a distinct nation? How can national
belonging remain meaningful while there is the potential
for some states to disappear o the face of the earth?
20
e UNs desire for a clear-cut denition of refugee
is excluding a large group of highly vulnerable people. is
term ought to be analyzed for eectiveness and adapted, as
conditions and reasons for migration are too expansive to be
conned to a narrow denition invented as a prescription
for specic circumstances. It remains a right of states to
exert power over those who inhabit their space, but climate
change clearly indicates that states have the power to
degrade and even destroy the geography of others. In this
case, the responsibilities usually held by states to protect
their citizens become international. e international
communitys ability to protect and assist environmental
refugees is heavily reliant on a states willingness to recognize
them as both a political and a human problem.
21
e excuse
that environmental is an ambiguous term by no means
undermines the fact that people who migrate have powerful
motivations that are heavily associated with environmental
conditions. Additionally, internal migration should not
be belittled; in terms of the urgency of aid needed, those
migrating to cities and elsewhere within their countries
face equal hardship breaking into established communities,
seeking employment and obtaining increasingly scarce
resources. Although it may be a more immediately eective
strategy for vulnerable nations to form partnerships with
potential host nations early, a UN agreement is the only
chance at an eective solution. If the developed world cannot
shake its disinclination towards accepting responsibility
for environmental damage, the developing world will be
further condemned to hardships far beyond the economic
challenges they are already facing.
Gender Inequality Spanning Cultures through Triabalization
Tribal Afghanistan & Tribal American Mormons R pg 8-13
1 John L. Esposito & Dalia Mogahed. (2008). What do Muslim Women Want? An excerpt from the book Who Speaks for Islam? Gallup. Retrieved
from http://www.gallup.com/poll/105214/What-Muslim-Women-Want.aspx
2 Jared Diamond. (1999) Guns, Germs and Steel. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company.
3 Frederic Engels. (2010). e origin of the family, private property and the state. General Books LLC. (Original work published 1876).
4 Eisla Sebastian. (2005). An anthropological view of bands, tribes, chiefdoms, and states. Associated Content. Retrieved fromhttp://www.
associatedcontent.com/article/12144/an_anthropological_view_of_bands_tribes.html?cat=37
5 John H. Bodley. Anthropology and contemporary human problems. Retrieved from http://books.google.com/books?id=WuqTqq9xk7gC&pg=P
A15&lpg=PA15&dq=ancient++tribal+societies&source=bl&ots=PBy2OWvOQ&sig=FHHZuZNaPd8j4bgw8Xlbpt91Fq4&hl=en&ei=rk3gS4C8IsGq-
lAfS2pnCCA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=9&ved=0CDAQ6AEwCA#v=onepage&q=ancient%20%20tribal%20societies&f=false
6 omas Hobbes. Leviathan. Retrieved from http://books.google.com/books?id=-
Q4nPYeps6MC&printsec=frontcover&dq=Leviathan+hobbes&source=bl&ots=_vXu2DrF03&si
g=KA3XxhQ_j6y2YsD3sdblaqFZsaU&hl=en&ei=RojkS4bXNoO88gb0hZxp&sa=X&oi=book
_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CBwQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q&f=false
7 Abigail Adams, John Adams) (2003). e letters of John and Abigail Adams. New York , NY Penguin Classics (original work published 1776).
8 National Womens Law Center. (2008). Falling short in every state: e wage gap and harsh economic realities for women persist. Retrieved from
http://www.nwlc.org/fairpay/statefacts.html
9 R. Brian Ferguson & Neil L. Whitehead. (1993) War in the tribal zone: Expanding states and indigenous warfare. (1st ed.). Oxford: School of
American Research.
10 Anthony Hyman. (2002) Nationalism in Afghanistan. Int. J. Middle East Studies. Retrieved from http://journals.cambridge.org/download.phple=/
MES/MES34_02/S0020743802002088a.pdf&code=f53e306f64597cdce6bbfbf916a408e1
11 Tajfel, H. (1982). Social psychology of intergroup relations. Annual Review of Psychology., 33.
Retrieved from http://arjournals.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev.ps.33.020182.000245?cookieSet=1
12 Donald M. Tayloy & Frances E. Aboud. (1973). Ethnic stereotypes:Is the concept necessary? Can. Psychol (14), 330-38)
13
14 Michael A. Hogg and Dominic Abrams. (2001) Intergroup relations: Essential readings. Philadelphia, PA: Psychology Press
15 Myron Rothbart, Solomon Fulero, Christine Jensen, John Howard, Pamela Birrell. (1978) From individual to group Impressions: Availability heuristics
in stereotype formation. J. Exp. Soc. Psychol, 14. (237-55)
16 United States Census Bureau. (2000) Retrieved from http://www.census.gov/
17 Jon Krakauer. (2003). Under the banner of heaven: A story of violent faith. New York, NY: Random House Inc.
18 Captain H. Christian Breede. (2008) A socioeconomic prole of Afghanistan. Canadian Army Journal. Retrieved from
http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol_11/iss_3/CAJ_Vol11.3_full_e.pdf#pag e=55
19 Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission. (2009). AIHRC annual report. Retrieved from http://www.aihrc.org.af/English/Eng_pages/
Reports_eng/Annual_Rep/2009/Final%20AIHRC%20Annual%20Report%202009.pdf
20 UNICEF. (2009) UNICEF Afghanistan Statistics 2009. Retrieved from http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/afghanistan_statistics.html#70
21 e Association of Religion Data Archives (n.d.) Retrieved from http://www.thearda.com/
22 Louis Dupree. (1974) Afghanistan: Problems of a peasant-tribal society. New York: Praeger.
23 Peter R. Blood. (2001) Afghanistan: A country study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress.
24 Environics Research Group. (2007) 2007 survey of Afghans: Summary report. Retrieved from https://docs.google.com/viewer?url=http://www.
afghanconictmonitor.org/Environics_2007_Survey_of_Afghans.pdf
25 Barnett Rubin. (2004). Crafting a constitution for Afghanistan. Journal of Democracy, 15. (3), 5-19.
From Dirt to a Dream R pg 14-15
Source Material:
Model T Car: http://static.lfgss.com/attachments/4451d1231429571-model-t.gif
Number of Cars in the US: http://hypertextbook.com/facts/2001/MarinaStasenko.shtml
American History: http://kclibrary.lonestar.edu/decade00.html
1940 Car: http://www.idcow.net/idcow/products/jd2050.jpg
Crossly Regis: http://www.crossley-motors.org.uk/history/1930/regis/Regis.html
U.S. Depatrtment of Transportation/ Motor Vehicle Registration: http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ohim/hs00/mv1.htm
Interstate System: http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/programadmin/interstate.cfm
Society in the 1950s: http://www.shmoop.com/1950s/society.html
Department pf Transportation Ocial Site: http://www.dot.gov/
A Historical Perspective on American Roads: http://inventors.about.com/library/inventors/blcar3.htm
American History: http://www.sparknotes.com/history/american/depression/section2.rhtml
US Industrilization: http://www.puhsd.k12.ca.us/chana/stapages/eichman/adult_school/us/fall/industrialization/1/us_industrialization.htm
Ford Sierra RS Cosworth: http://artofwheels.wordpress.com/2010/06/15/
Essays on Consumerism in Asia R pg 16-19
1 Xun Zhou, Eat, Drink and Sing, and Be Modern and Global: Food, Karaoke and Middle Class Consumers in China, in Christophe Jarelot and
Peter van der Veer, eds., e Patterns of Middle Class Consumption in India and China (New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 2008), 170-185.
Notes
72
2 Douglas B. Holt, Does Cultural Capital Structure American Consumption? in Juliet B. Schor and Douglas B. Holt, eds., e Consumer Society Reader
(e New Press, 2000), 212-252.
3 at luxury item may be Made in China, American Public Media, February 2, 2009, http://marketplace.publicradio.org/display/web/2009/02/02/
pm_made_in_china/
4 Allison Pugh, Longing and Belonging (University of California Press, 2009).
5 Zhou, 172.
6 Zhou, 174.
7 at luxury item may be Made in China, http://marketplace.publicradio.org/display/web/2009/02/02/pm_made_in_china/
8 Holt, 220.
9 Holt, 221.
10 A term used by Alison Pugh in her work, Longing and Belonging, to distinguish between two types of consumerist behaviors that parents use with
their children.
11 William Mazzarella, Shoveling Smoke (Duke University Press, 2003).
12 Mazzarella, 5.
13 Mazzarella, 89.
14 James Watson, ed., Golden Arches East: McDonalds in East Asia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006).
15 James Watson, Introduction: Transnationalism, Localization, and Fast Foods in East Asia, in James Watson, ed., Golden Arches East: McDonalds in
East Asia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 4.
16 Watson, 27.
17 David Y.H. Wu, McDonalds in Taipei: Hamburgers, Betel Nuts, and National Identity, in James Watson, ed., Golden Arches East: McDonalds in
East Asia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 110-135.
18 Wu, 115.
19 Wu, 120.
20 Stephanie Kaza, Penetrating the Tangle, in Stephanie Kaza, ed., Hooked!: Buddhist Writings on Greed, Desire, and the Urge to Consume (Boston:
Shambhala Publications, 2005), 139-151.
21 ubten Chdrn, Marketing the Dharma, in Stephanie Kaza, ed., Hooked!: Buddhist Writings on Greed, Desire, and the Urge to Consume (Boston:
Shambhala Publications, 2005), 63-75.
22 Chdrn, 66.
23 Chdrn, 67.
24 Bill McKibben, Deep Economy (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2007).
25 Tim Kasser, e High Price of Materialism (MIT Press, 2003). Both McKibben and Kasser discuss the eects of materialism on happiness, suggesting
that an increased desire for material goods has a negative eect on peoples lives.
Religion, National Identity and Education in the Islamic World:
A Look at the Educational Systems of Egypt, Turkey and Saudi Arabia pg 21-25
1 Cook, Bradley James. Egypts National Education Debate. Comparative Education 36.4 (2000): 477-90. JSTOR. Web. 13 Dec. 2010. p477.
2 Fandy, Mamoun. Enriched Islam: e Muslim Crisis of Education. Survival 49.2 (2007): 77-98. Informaworld. Routledge. Web. 10 Dec. 2010. p79
3 Fandy, p79.
4 Education in Saudi Arabia. Washington, D.C.: Saudi Arabian Cultural Mission in the United States of America, 1991. Print. p2-3
5 Fandy, p82-83.
6 Cochran, Judith. Educational Roots of Political Crisis in Egypt. Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2008. Print. p96
See also Arab Republic of Egypt Education Sector Review: Progress and Priorities for the Future (In Two Volumes) Volume I: Main Report. Rep. no. 24905-
EGT. Human Development Group Middle East and North Africa Region e World Bank, October 2002. Web. 16 Dec. 2010. p8
7 ED.gov. U.S. Department of Education. Web. 16 Dec. 2010. <http://www2.ed.gov/oces/OUS/PES/int_egypt.html>.
See also Neill, Charlotte M. Islam in Egyptian Education: Grades K12. Religious Education 101.4 (Fall 2006): 481-503. ProQuest International
Academic Research Library. Web. 10 Dec. 2010.
8 Yildiran, Guzver. An Overlook at the Turkish Educational System. Recent Perspectives on Turkish Education. Bloomington: Indiana University
Turkish Studies Publications, 1997. 1-12. Print. p3
9 Nohl, Arnd-Michael, Arzu Akkoyunlu-Wigley, and Simon Wigley. Education in Turkey. Mnster: Waxmann, 2008. Print. p43.
10 Bosbait, Mohammed, and Rodney Wilson. Education, School to Work Transitions and Unemployment in Saudi Arabia. Middle Eastern Studies 41.4
(2005): 533-46. Informaworld. Web. 13 Dec. 2010. p533.
Also See Figure 1, Indicators | Data. Data | e World Bank. Web. 16 Dec. 2010. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator>.
11 Fandy, p77.
12 Cochran, Judith. Educational Roots of Political Crisis in Egypt. Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2008. Print. p67-69, 73.
13 Cochran, p76.
14 Cochran, p91.
15 Neill, Charlotte M. Islam in Egyptian Education: Grades K12. Religious Education 101.4 (Fall 2006): 481-503. ProQuest International Academic
Research Library. Web. 10 Dec. 2010.
16 Fandy, Mamoun. Enriched Islam: e Muslim Crisis of Education. Survival 49.2 (2007): 77-98. Informaworld. Routledge. Web. 10 Dec. 2010. p81.
17 Fandy, p84.
18 Fandy, p83.
19 Cook, Bradley James. Egypts National Education Debate. Comparative Education 36.4 (2000): 477-90. JSTOR. Web. 13 Dec. 2010. p482.
20 Cook, p482.
21 Pink, Johanna. Nationalism, Religion and e Muslim-Christian Relationship: Teaching Ethics and Values in Egyptian Schools Egypt. CESNUR
- Centro Studi Sulle Nuove Religioni - Center for Studies in New Religions. Web. 16 Dec. 2010. <http://www.cesnur.org/2003/vil2003_pink.htm>.
22 Kaplan, Sam. e Pedagogical State: Education and the Politics of National Culture in Post-1980 Turkey. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2006. Print. p73-89.
23 Frey, James S. Turkey: a Study of the Educational System of Turkey and a Guide to the Academic Placement of Students from Turkey in United States
73
Contextualizing Genocide:
An Examination of Complexities n Cambodia and Guatemala pg 28-32
1. Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001, 7.
2. Mamdani.
3. Greg Grandin, e Blood of Guatemala: A History of Race and Nation, Duke University Press, 2000.
4. Luis Cardoza and Aragon, La Revolucin Guatemalteca, Guatemala: Editorial del Pensativo, 1994, 52.
5. Grandin, 199.
6. Grandin, 56.
7. Grandin, 233.
8. Shawn Crispin and Seth Meixner, Boiling Mad, Far Eastern Economic Review V.166 No. 6 (February 13, 2003) P.18, 166.6 (2003): 18.
9. William J. Duiker, Ho Chi Minh: A Life, New York: Hyperion, 2000, 439.
10. Henry Kamm, Cambodia: Report from a Stricken Land, New York: Arcade publishing, Inc., 1998, 75.
11. Kamm, 75.
12. Kenton Clymer, Cambodge, e Historian V. 70 No. 4 (Winter 2008) P. 813-14, 70.4 (2008): 813-14.
13. Kamm, 3.
14. Mahdev Mohan, Reconstituting the Un-Person: e Khmer Krom and the Khmer Rouge Tribunal, Singapore Year Book of International Law and
Contibutors, 2010, 47.
15. Panh, Rithy. S21: e Khmer Rouge Death Killing Machine 2003. Film.
16. Dinah PoKempner, Cambodia at War, 68.
17. Grandin, 8.
18. Grandin, 140.
19. Daniel Wilkinson, Silence on the Mountain: Stories of Terror, Betrayal, and Forgetting in Guatemala, New York: Houghton Miin Company, 2002, 169.
20. Wilkinson, 169.
21. Wilkinson, 198.
22. PoKempner, 78.
22. Greg Grandin, 78.
23. Guatemala: Historical Memory, Genocide, and the Culture of Peace, 77.
24. Greg Grandin, 219.
25. Elizabeth Oglesby, Educating Citizens in Postwar
26. Mahdev Mohan, 44.
27. Rigoberta Menchu, I, Rigoberta Menchu: An Indian Woman in Guatemala, Ed. Elisabeth Burgos-Debray, Trans. Ann Wright, London: Verso, 1987.
28. Rigoberta Menchu, 14.
29. Rigoberta Menchu, 164.
30. Rigoberta Menchu, 209.
31. Momostengango, Holistic Healing: A Better Approach to Civil-War Recovery, e Economist October 14, 2004.
Educational Institutions, 1972. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microlms International, 1979. Print. p10-12.
24 Frey, p12-13.
25 Kaplan, Sam. e Pedagogical State: Education and the Politics of National Culture in Post-1980 Turkey. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2006. Print. p76-77
26 Kaplan, p78-89.
27 Tavernise, Sabrina. Youthful Voice Stirs Challenge to Secular Turks. e New York TImes. 14 Oct. 2008. Web. 10 Dec. 2010.
28 Education in Saudi Arabia. Washington, D.C.: Saudi Arabian Cultural Mission in the United States of America, 1991. Print. p6
29 Education in Saudi Arabia, p4.
30 Oliver, E. Eugene. Saudi Arabia: a Study of the Educational System of Saudi Arabia and a Guide to the Academic Placement of Students in Educational
Institutions of the United States. Washington, D.C.: American Association of Collegiate Registrars and Admissions Ocers, 1987. Print. p4.
31 Bosbait, Mohammed, and Rodney Wilson. Education, School to Work Transitions and Unemployment in Saudi Arabia. Middle Eastern Studies 41.4
(2005): 533-46. Informaworld. Web. 13 Dec. 2010. p533.
32 Education in Saudi Arabia, p4.
33 Bosbait and Wilson, p533.
34 Education in Saudi Arabia, p6-7.
35 Fandy, p85.
36 Fandy., p86.
37 Fandy, p85.
38 See Figure 1.
39 Bosbait and Wilson, p533-46.
40 Bosbait, p534.
41 Fandy, p86.
42 Education in Saudi Arabia, p6-7.
Hugo Chvez, Chavismo and Rethinking Latin American Populism pg 35-38
1 Kirk Hawkins, Populism in Venezuela: e Rise of Chavismo, ird World Quarterly 24.6 (Dec. 2003): 1137-160, JSTOR, Web, 18 Apr, 2010, 1145.
2 Hawkins, 1138.
3 Hawkins, 1138.
4 Carlos De La Torre, Populist Seduction in Latin America: the Ecuadorian Experience. Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 2000, 4.
5 Hawkins, 1139.
6 Hawkins, 1139.
74
7 De La Torre, 10.
8 Bart Jones,Hugo!Hanover, New Hampshire: Steerforth, 2007, Print, 22.
9 Jones, 21.
10 Jones, 24-25.
11 Moises Nam, Paper Tigers and Minotaurs: e Politics of Venezuelas Economic Reforms, New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
1993, Print, 101.
12 Christian Parenti, Hugo Chvez and Petro Populism, e Nation, No. 14, 11 March 2005, 280.
13 Jon Lee Anderson, Fidels Heir: e Inuence of Hugo Chvez, e New Yorker, 23 June 2008, Print, 4.
14 Hawkins, 1151.
15 Hawkins, 1150.
16 Hawkins, 1150.
17 Hawkins, 1142.
18 Anderson, 4.
19 Erich Fromm,Escape from Freedom, New York: H. Holt, 1994, Print, 1.
20 Hawkins, 1138.
Somalia and the Mixed Blessings of Anarchy pg 44-46
1 omas R. Yager, e Mineral Industry of Somalia, in US Geological Survey Minerals Yearbook (2004).
2 Jamil A. Mubarak, From Bad Policy to Chaos in Somalia (Westport: Praeger, 1996).
3 Consolidation in A Country Study: Somalia, Library of Congress, 27 July 2010 <http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/sotoc.html>.
4 Jamil A. Mubarak, e Hidden Hand behind the Resilience of the Stateless Economy of Somalia, in World Development 25:12 (1997): 2028.
5 e Hidden Hand, 50.
6 Somalias Dicult Decade, in A Country Study: Somalia, Library of Congress, 27 July 2010 <http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/sotoc.html>.
7 Bad Policy, 103.
8 e Hidden Hand, 2028.
9 Andre Le Sage, Stateless Justice in Somalia Formal and Informal Rule of Law Initiatives (Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2005): 20.
10 Foreign Relations, in A Country Study: Somalia, Library of Congress, 27 July 2010 <http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/sotoc.html>.
11 Le Sage, 19.
12 Somalia during WWII, in A Country Study: Somalia, Library of Congress, 27 July 2010 <http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/sotoc.html>.
13 P. Leeson, Better o Stateless: Somalia before and after Government Collapse, in Journal of Comparative Economics 35:4 (2007): 5-8.
14 Scientic Socialism to IMF-ism, in A Country Study: Somalia, Library of Congress, 27 July 2010 <http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/sotoc.html>.
15 Tom Hewitt, Half a Century of Development, in Alan omas, Tim Allen, eds., Poverty and Development into the 21st Century (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2000): 303.
16 Ken Menkhaus and Lou Ortmayer, Somalia: Misread Crises and Missed Opportunities, in Bruce W. Jentleson, ed., Preventative Diplomacy in the
Post-Cold War World: Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized, and Lessons to be Learned (Maryland: Rowman and Littleeld, 1999).
17 Leeson, 9.
18 Foreign Military Assistance, in A Country Study: Somalia, Library of Congress, 27 July 2010 <http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/sotoc.html>.
19 Le Sage, 21.
20 Bad Policy, 15.
21 Hassan Barise, BBC News | AFRICA | Somalis Cheer Black Hawk Down, in BBC News - Home (22 January 2002) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
africa/1777435.stm>.
22 Bad Policy, 17.
23 Kenneth J. Menkhaus, Political Order in a Stateless Society. Current History 97 (1998): 220-24.
24 e Hidden Hand, 2035-2038.
25 Leeson, 10.
26 e Hidden Hand, 2027.
27 Le Sage, 23-24.
28 Andrew Cockburn, Somalia, A Failed State? in National Geographic Magazine <http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/ngm/0207/feature3/index.
html>.
29 BBC NEWS | Africa | Living in Somalias Anarchy, in BBC News - Home <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4017147.stm>.
30 Peter Little, Somalia: Economy without State (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003).
31 Leeson; 2, 10-16.
32 Kenneth J. Menkhaus, Somalia: State Collapse and the reat of Terrorism (Oxford: Oxford UP for the International Institute for Strategic Studies,
2004).
33 Leeson; 2, 10-16.
34 Kenneth J. Menkhaus, State Collapse in Somalia: Second oughts, inReview of African Political Economy30:97 (2003): 4.
35 Menkhaus, State Collapse.
36 Leeson, 10.
37 Leeson, 29-30.
38 Le Sage; 24-25, 30-31.
39 David Herbert, Whos Afraid of Somali Pirates, in National Journal (16 May 2009): 52-53 <http://www.peterleeson.com/NationalJournal.pdf>.
40 Peter Little, qtd. in Leeson, 10.
41 e Hidden Hand, 2038.
42 Menkhaus, State Collapse, 8-9.
43 Le Sage 32-38.
44 Tristan McConnell, Foreigners Are the Real Pirates, Says Former Somali Fisherman - Times Online, in e Times | UK News, World News and
Opinion (12 June 2009) <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/africa/article6481875.ece>.
45 Herbert.omas R. Yager, e Mineral Industry of Somalia, in US Geological Survey Minerals Yearbook (2004).
75
Under the Inuence:
Patterns of Dependency in Latin American Development pg 47-49
1 Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletti, Dependency and Development in Latin America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979).
2 Ibid., 25.
3 John Charles Chasteen, Born in Blood and Fire: A Concise History of Latin America (2nd ed., New York: W.W. Norton, 2006), 182.
4 Ibid., 182.
5 Juan Bautista Alberdi, Immigration as a Means of Progress, in Gabriella Nouzeilles and Graciela Montaldo, eds., e Argentina Reader (Durham:
Duke Press, 2002).
6 Ibid., 95.
7 Ibid., 95.
8 Ibid., 96.
9 Chasteen, 182.
10 Albert O. Hirschman, e Political Economy of Import-Substituting Industrialization,
in Quarterly Review of Economics (1968).
11 Ibid., 7-8.
12 Cardoso and Faletti, 23.
13 Hirschman, 13.
14 Ibid., 12.
15 Ibid., 32.
16 Cardoso and Faletti, 12.
17 John Williamson, What Washington Means by Policy Reform, in Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened? (Washington: Institute
for International Economics, 1990), par. 4.
18 Ibid., par. 6.
19 Ibid., par. 31.
20 Alberdi, 100.
21 David Harris and Diego Azzi, ALBA: Venezuelas answer to free trade: e Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas, in Occassional Paper no. 3
(Bangkok: Focus on the Global South, 2006), 3.
Protecting Rights and Promoting Development:
Lessons from Germany and Argentina in Participative Management pg 52-59
1 Casey Ichniowski et al. What Works at Work: Overview and Assessment, (original article published in 1996) in C. Ichniowski et al. e American
Workplace: Skills, Compensation and Employee Involvement, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000 and Paul Osterman; omas Kochan. e mutual
gains enterprise: forging a winning partnership among labor, management and government, Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press, 2006.
2 David McCarey, Sue Faerman and David Hart. e Appeal and Diculties of Participative Systems, Organization Science, 6:6 (November 1995):
603-627.
3 Joseph E. Stiglitz. Democratic Development as the Fruits of Labor. Keynote Address, Industrial Relations Research Association (IRRA), Boston: January
2000.
4 Tyson, David and Levine, DAndrea . Participation, Productivity, and the Firms Environment, 1990, quoted in Stiglitz, Democratic Development,
12.
5 One such study is: Soonhee Kim, Participative Management and Job Satisfaction: Lessons for Management Leadership. Public Administration Review,
62:2 (March 2002): 231-241.
6 Kim.
7 Kim.
8 McCarey et. al, e Appeal and Diculties of Participative Systems.
is argument ts in the framework of G.A. Cohens philosophical arguments against dierential incentives, outlined in detail in Appendix 2.
9 Rebecca Page. Codetermination in Germany: A Beginners Guide, Arbeitspapier 33 (Germany: Hans-Bckler Stiftung Foundation, 2006), <http://
www.boeckler.de/show_product_hbs.html?productle=HBS-004494.xml> (accessed April 24, 2010).
10 Weimar Republic Constitution, in Page, Codetermination: A Beginners Guide, 6.
11 Weimar Republic Constitution.
12 Page, 6.
13 Hans Joachim-Mertens; Erich Schanze. e German Codetermination Act of 1976. Journal of Comparative Corporate Law and Securities Regulation,
2, (1979): 75.
14 Mertens and Schanze.
15 Page, 7.
16 Nathan Reich. Codetermination in Practice, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 9:3 (April 1956):468.
17 William H. McPherson. Codetermination: Germanys Move toward a New Economy, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 5:1 (October 1951):
20-32.
18 Otto Jacobi. Renewal of the Collective Bargaining System?, in eds. Walther Mller-Jentsch, Hansjrg Weitbrecht. e changing contours of German
industrial relations. (Munich: Rainer Hampp Verlag, 2003): 15.
19 Jacobi.
20 MA Huselid and JT Delaney. e impact of human resource management practices on perceptions of organizational performance, Academy of
Management, 39:4 (1996): 949.
21 Dr. Norbert Kluge, Head of the SEEUROPE Project Codetermination in Europe European Trade Union Institute for Research, Education, Health and
Safety, Brussels published in Page, Codetermination in Germany: A Beginners Guide.
22 John Monks (General Secretary of European Trade Union Confederation), John Monks speech on 30th anniversary of the German
76
Environmental Refugee Status:
nternational Reception of Climate Displacement pg 68-71
1 Richard Black, Geography and Refugees: Patterns and Processes of Change ( John Wiley and Sons Ltd., 1993).
2 Mark Townsend, Environmental Refugees in e Ecologist 32 (2002) 22-25.
3 Emma Brindal, Justice for Climate Refugees in Alternative Law Journal 32 (2007) 240-241.
4 David Corlett, Stormy Weather: e Challenge of Climate Change and Displacement (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2008).
5 Joanna Kakissis, Environmental Refugees Unable to Return Home in e New York Times 4 January 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/04/
world/asia/04migrants.html?scp=1&sq=environmental%20refugees%20unable%20to%20return%20home&st=cse>.
6 Kakissis, 1-3.
7 Mey Akashah, e Fight and Flight of Environmental Change in Environment Magazine 52 (2010) 6-7.
8 Brindal, 240-241.
9 Karen Elizabeth McNamara, Conceptualizing Discourses on Environmental Refugees at the United Nations in Population and Environment 29
(2007) 12-24.
10 Andrew Simms & Aziz Ahamed. Should the UN Actively Embrace the Concept of Environmental Refugees in e Ecologist 32 (2002) 18-21.
11 Akashah, 6-7.
12 Akashah, 6-7.
13 Akashah, 6-7.
14 Akashah, 6-7.
15 Akashah, 6-7.
16 Brindal, 240-241.
17 Black
18 Simms & Ahamed, 18-21.
19 Black
20 Corlett
21 Akashah, 6-7.
Mittbestimmungsgesetz. Hans-Bckler Stiftung Foundation. Berlin: August 30, 2006. <http://www.boeckler.de/181.html> (accessed April 24, 2010)].
23 Peter Ranis. Factories without Bosses: Argentinas Experience with Worker-Run Enterprises. Labor Studies in Working-Class Histories of the Americas,
3:1 (2002):14.
24 Capital Humano, La Nacin, 30 June 2002. <http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=221907> (accessed April 15, 2010).
25 Un modelo viable para recuperar el empleo, La Nacin, 15 January 2003. <http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=466209> (accessed April 15,
2010).
26 Julian Rebn; Ignacio Saavedra. Empresas Recuperadas. (Buenos Aires: Capital Intelectual, 2006).
27 Laura Vales. Fbricas recuperadas que aprendieron caminas solas, Pagina/12 20 January 2010. <http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/
elpais/1-118569-2009-01-20.html> (accessed April 16, 2010).
28 Ranis, Factories without Bosses, 17.
29 Jos Luis Coraggio. A path to the social economy in Argentina: worker takeovers of bankrupt companies in ed. Ash Amin. e Social Economy.
London/New York: Zed Books, 2009), 145.
30 this is just another term used for ERTs, autogestion best translating to mean self-management.
31 La Nacin, 30 June 2002.
32 Ranis, Factories without Bosses].
33 see Coraggio, 2009, Rebn, 2006 and Ranis, 2002.
34 Naomi Klein and Avi Lewis. Argentina: Where Jobless Run Factories, e Nation, 16 July 2007. <http://www.thenation.com/doc/20070730/klein_
lewis> (accessed April 27, 2010)].
35 see in bibliography, authors: Ranis, Klein and Lewis, Coraggio.
36 Karl Polanyi. e Great Transformation: e Political and Economic Origins of Our Time, (Boston: Beacon Press, originally published 1944, reprinted 2001).
37 Hall; Jones. Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker an Others?
38 Richard Locke; Monica Romis. Improving Work Conditions in a Global Supply Chain, MIT Sloan Management Review, 48:2 (Winter 2007): 54-62.
39 Osterman, Paul; Kochan, omas. e mutual gains enterprise: forging a winning partnership among labor, management and government, (Cambridge:
Harvard Business School Press, 2006).
40 vamos a pelear con todo para mantener los niveles de produccin quoted in Laura Vales. Fbricas recuperadas que aprendieron caminas solas
41 Ichniowski et al., 2
42 Steve Rosenberg. Germanys orderly social market, BBC News, Berlin 19 January 2009. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/from_our_own_
correspondent/7837266.stm> (accessed April 30, 2010)
43 Sen, Amartya. Development as Freedom, New York: Anchor Books, 1995.
44 Mishel & Frankel, e State of Working Class America, 1988 quoted in G.A. Cohen Rescuing Justice and Equality: 143
45 Steve Rosenberg Germanys orderly social market BBC News, Berlin January 19, 2009 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/from_our_own_
correspondent/7837266.stm>].
46 vamos a pelear con todo para mantener los niveles de produccin quoted in Laura Vales. Fbricas recuperadas que aprendieron caminas solas.
77
Jacqueline Hall
Danny Herman
IS FROM Washington, DC AND WILL GRADUATE IN May 2012 FROM NYU College of Arts and Sciences WITH A MAJOR IN
English
Andrew Boston
IS FROM Boulder, CO AND WILL GRADUATE IN May 2011 FROM NYU Gallatin WITH A CONCENTRATION IN Specicity and
Universalism in Justice
Julia Burnell
IS FROM Ocean City, MD AND WILL GRADUATE IN May 2011 FROM NYU Gallatin WITH A CONCENTRATION IN Politics,
Philosophy and Economics
Zachary Caceres
IS FROM Antigua, GT AND WILL GRADUATE IN May 2014 FROM NYU Gallatin WITH A CONCENTRATION IN Photography, art
history, writing, lm and possibly marketing
Jamie Denburg
Darius Lerup
IS FROM Topseld, MA AND WILL GRADUATE IN May 2012 FROM NYU Gallatin WITH A CONCENTRATION IN Socioecological
Urban Design and Planning
IS FROM Hanover, NH AND WILL GRADUATE IN May 2012 FROM NYU Gallatin WITH A CONCENTRATION IN Environmental
and Metropolitain Policies for a Globalized World
Olivia Jovine
IS FROM Charleston, SC AND WILL GRADUATE IN May 2011 FROM NYU College of Arts and Sciences WITH A MAJOR IN
Art History AND A MINOR IN Business Studies
Drew McKenzie
IS FROM Los Angeles, CA AND WILL GRADUATE IN May 2011 FROM NYU Gallatin WITH A CONCENTRATION IN Social and
Psychological Analysis in/of Shakespeare
Leigh Rome
IS FROM Middletown, DE AND WILL GRADUATE IN May 2012 FROM NYU Gallatin WITH A CONCENTRATION IN The Broadcast
Narrative
Yasmin Ogale
IS FROM New Hope, PA AND WILL GRADUATE IN May 2011 FROM NYU Gallatin WITH A CONCENTRATION IN Political
Theater: An exploration of international politics, game theory & al-Qaeda
Shana Oppenheim
IS FROM Rhode Island AND WILL GRADUATE IN May 2012 FROM NYU Gallatin WITH A CONCENTRATION IN Photography
and Portuguese
Emily Pederson
IS FROM Old Chatham, NY AND WILL GRADUATE IN May 2011 FROM NYU Gallatin WITH A CONCENTRATION IN International
Sustainable Development
Paz Petersson
IS FROM Minneapolis, MN AND WILL GRADUATE IN May 2011 FROM NYU College of Arts and Sciences WITH A MAJOR IN
Environmental Studies AND MINORS IN Politics AND Spanish
Ana Radolinski
IS FROM Berkeley, CA AND WILL GRADUATE IN May 2012 FROM University of California, Davis WITH A MAJOR IN
International Relations AND A CONCENTRATION IN Land and Energy Use in Latin America
William Roberts
IS FROM Denver, CO AND WILL GRADUATE IN May 2011 FROM NYU Steinhardt WITH A MAJOR IN Communications AND A
CONCENTRATION IN Film and Politics
Mitchell Weaver
IS FROM Miami, FL AND WILL GRADUATE IN May 2011 FROM NYU Gallatin WITH A CONCENTRATION IN Image Construction
and Representation
Patricia Guarch Wise
IS FROM Larchmont, NY AND WILL GRADUATE IN May 2012 FROM NYU Gallatin WITH A CONCENTRATION IN Law as a Means
to Sustainable Development in Africa
Contributor Bios
IS FROM Berkeley, CA AND GRADUATED IN January 2011 FROM NYU Gallatin WITH A CONCENTRATION IN Philosophy of
education AND A MINOR IN Psychology
78
NOTE
e articles that appear in the NYU Gallatin Journal of Global Aairs ( JGA) represent the views of a wide-
ranging group of students and scholars. ey in no way reect the views of NYU, the Gallatin School of
Individualized Study or the JGA. While all reasonable precautions have been taken by the authors and
editors to ensure the quality of work, the JGA makes no representations or warranties as to the accuracy or
completeness of material within. While we may not agree with all of the observations and diagnoses of our
writers, we support their pursuit of serious university-level academic research and the fruits it yields. We hope
that the thoughts and arguments found in this journal serve as a stimulus for further debate and discussion.
Staff Bios
IS FROM Oakland, CA AND WILL GRADUATE IN May 2011 FROM NYU Gallatin WITH A CONCENTRATION IN International
Conict and the Middle East
Jenna King Brill
IS FROM Dallas, TX AND WILL GRADUATE IN May 2012 FROM NYU Gallatin WITH A CONCENTRATION IN Anthropology of
Latin America
Maggie Carter
IS FROM Bethesda, MD AND WILL GRADUATE IN May 2011 FROM NYU Gallatin WITH A CONCENTRATION IN International
Development through Time and Space
Laura Esposito
IS FROM Sacramento, CA AND WILL GRADUATE IN December 2012 FROM NYU Gallatin WITH A CONCENTRATION IN
Reconstruction of American Journalism
Amanda Holpuch
IS FROM Mankato, MN AND WILL GRADUATE IN January 2013 FROM NYU Gallatin WITH A CONCENTRATION IN Public Policy
and International Development
Sarah Zapiler
IS FROM Jenison, MI AND HOPES TO GRADUATE IN May 2014 FROM NYU Gallatin WITH A CONCENTRATION IN Violence
in Religion, Public Policy and Creative Non-Fiction Writing AND FROM NYU Wagner WITH A Masters of Public
Administration
IS FROM Jupiter, FL AND WILL GRADUATE IN May 2012 FROM NYU Gallatin WITH A CONCENTRATION IN Food Anthropology
and Writing
IS FROM Denver, CO AND WILL GRADUATE IN May 2011 FROM NYU Gallatin WITH A CONCENTRATION IN The science,
philosophy, art and love of Language
Mary McCullough
Colleen Veldt
Emma Young
79
Journal of Global Affairs
NYU GALLATIN SCHOOL OF INDIVIDUALIZED STUDY Volume 6 2010 - 2011