Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 1 /341

Suiter Pre-season

.....................................................................................................................................................................................................6  Topicality Violations ...............................................................................................................................................7 T - Presence.................................................................................................................................................................................8 Presence not weapons - AT: Nuclear deterrence W/M.............................................................................................................13 Case List.....................................................................................................................................................................................14  Advantage Answers ...............................................................................................................................................15 ‡‡‡ Greece-Turkey War Adv. ‡‡‡...............................................................................................................................................15 Greece-Turkey War Frontline....................................................................................................................................................16 Greece-Turkey War Frontline ...................................................................................................................................................17 Greece-Turkey War Frontline ...................................................................................................................................................18 US-Greece Relations Frontline .................................................................................................................................................19 US-Greece Relations Frontline.................................................................................................................................................20 Solvency Frontline.....................................................................................................................................................................21 ‡‡‡ AKP Adv. ‡‡‡.......................................................................................................................................................................22 ..................................................................................................................................................................................................22 AKP Bad-Terrorism ..................................................................................................................................................................23 AKP Bad-Terrorism ..................................................................................................................................................................24 AKP Bad-Kurdish Terrorism ....................................................................................................................................................25 AKP Bad-Turkish Democracy [1/2]..........................................................................................................................................26 AKP Bad-Turkish Democracy [2/2]..........................................................................................................................................27 AKP Bad-Turkish Democracy...................................................................................................................................................28 AKP Bad-Turkish Democracy...................................................................................................................................................29 AKP Bad-Turkish-Israeli Relations [1/2].................................................................................................................................30 AKP Bad-Israeli-Turkish Relations [2/2].................................................................................................................................31 AKP Bad-Turkish-Israeli Relations ..........................................................................................................................................32 AKP Bad-Turkish Military.........................................................................................................................................................33 AKP Bad-Civil Liberties.............................................................................................................................................................34 AKP Bad-Civil Liberties ............................................................................................................................................................35 AKP Bad-Genocide....................................................................................................................................................................36 AKP Bad-Genocide....................................................................................................................................................................37 AKP Bad-Fascism .....................................................................................................................................................................38 ‡‡‡ Middle East Stability Adv. ‡‡‡.............................................................................................................................................39 AT: Middle East Stability Adv (1/3)..........................................................................................................................................40 AT: Middle East Stability Adv (2/3)..........................................................................................................................................41 AT: Middle East Stability Adv (3/3).........................................................................................................................................42 ‡‡‡ Accidents Adv. ‡‡‡...............................................................................................................................................................43 AT: Accidents Adv.....................................................................................................................................................................44 ..................................................................................................................................................................................................44 ‡‡‡ Syria-Israel Relations Adv. ‡‡‡...........................................................................................................................................45 Syria – Israel Frontline.............................................................................................................................................................46 Syria – Israel Frontline.............................................................................................................................................................48 Syria-Israel ext – Turkey-Israel Relations Low........................................................................................................................50 ‡‡‡ Nuclear Secrecy Bad Adv ‡‡‡...............................................................................................................................................51 Nuclear Secrecy Good................................................................................................................................................................52 Nuclear Secrecy Good................................................................................................................................................................53 ‡‡‡ Deterrence Bad Adv ‡‡‡......................................................................................................................................................54 Deterrence is Moral...................................................................................................................................................................55 Deterrence is Moral...................................................................................................................................................................56 AT: US Nukes Not Key to Deterrence.......................................................................................................................................57 AT: US Nukes Not Key to Deterrence.......................................................................................................................................58 TNW’s in Europe K2 US and Euro Defense..............................................................................................................................59 TNWs Would Be Replaced........................................................................................................................................................60 TNWs Would Be Replaced.........................................................................................................................................................61 TNWs Would Be Replaced........................................................................................................................................................62 TNWs Would Be Replaced........................................................................................................................................................63

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1

Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 2 /341

Suiter Pre-season

‡‡‡ Iran Adv ‡‡‡.........................................................................................................................................................................64 1NC Iran Adv (1/4) ...................................................................................................................................................................65 1NC Iran Adv (2/4)....................................................................................................................................................................66 1NC Iran Adv (3/4)....................................................................................................................................................................67 1NC Iran Adv (4/4)....................................................................................................................................................................68 MOSCOW, September 20 (RIA Novosti) - Israel will not strike Iran, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said. Medvedev said in an interview with CNN aired Sunday that Israeli President Shimon Peres, when on a visit to the Russian Black Sea resort of Sochi in August to discuss Russia's arms deals with Iran, told him: "Israel is not going to make any strikes on Iran, we are a peaceful country." Medvedev said Russia supplies purely defensive armaments to Iran. "Our task is not to strengthen Iran and weaken Israel or vice versa, but [to establish] a normal, quiet situation in the Middle East," he said. Asked what could happen should Israel nevertheless make a strike, Medvedev said: "This is the worst thing that could be imagined... This would be the most unwise development of events. But my Israeli colleagues told me they are not going to act like this, and I trust them." .................................................................................................................................................68 2NC Iran Ext 1—Plan Doesn’t Solve Gas Coop.........................................................................................................................69 2NC Ext 2 Relations Improving Now........................................................................................................................................70 2NC Ext 3 and 4 - New gas deal................................................................................................................................................72 2NC Ext 6-impacts non-u..........................................................................................................................................................72 2NC Ext 7—Removing TNWs Hurts US Turkey Relations ......................................................................................................74 2NC Ext 9 -won’t strike without the U.S...................................................................................................................................75 2NC Ext 9-Agreed not to strike.................................................................................................................................................76 Ext 2- Relations improving........................................................................................................................................................77 Ext 2 – Relations good..............................................................................................................................................................78 Ext 3 -No Need for Iran’s Gas...................................................................................................................................................79 Iran Proliferation Frontline......................................................................................................................................................80 Iran Relations Frontline............................................................................................................................................................81 Iran Relations Frontline............................................................................................................................................................82 Iran Relations Frontline............................................................................................................................................................83 Loose Nukes Frontline..............................................................................................................................................................84 Ext – Removal of TNW hurts Turkey Relations ......................................................................................................................85 Ext – Removal of TNW hurts Turkey Relations.......................................................................................................................87 ..................................................................................................................................................................................................88 IRAN PROLIF ADV FRONTLINE............................................................................................................................................88 Iran prolif ADV-Having Nukes Is Against Islam......................................................................................................................90 Turkey Doesn’t Fear Iran...........................................................................................................................................................91 Turkey Doesn’t Fear Iran..........................................................................................................................................................93 TNWs Deter Iran/Russia..........................................................................................................................................................94 TNWs deter Iran/Russia...........................................................................................................................................................95 TNWs Deter Iran.......................................................................................................................................................................96 ‡‡‡ Russia Adv. ‡‡‡....................................................................................................................................................................97 Turkey Doesn’t Fear Russia......................................................................................................................................................98 Turkey Doesn’t Fear Russia......................................................................................................................................................99 Turkey Doesn’t Fear Russia....................................................................................................................................................100 Removal = Russian Aggression...............................................................................................................................................101 TNWs Deter Russia.................................................................................................................................................................102 AT: US-Russia Relations Adv..................................................................................................................................................103 AT: Russian TNWs Adv...........................................................................................................................................................104 AT: TNWs Terrorism Impact (1/2).........................................................................................................................................105 AT: TNWs Terrorism Impact (2/2).........................................................................................................................................106 ‡‡‡ NATO Adv. ‡‡‡...................................................................................................................................................................107 Removal = End of NATO.........................................................................................................................................................108 NATO Good-Democracy..........................................................................................................................................................109 NATO Good-Regional Stability................................................................................................................................................110 NATO Good-Peacekeeping Operations....................................................................................................................................111 NATO Good-Caucasus Stability...............................................................................................................................................112 Caucasus Spillover (Extension)................................................................................................................................................113

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2

Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 3 /341

Suiter Pre-season

NATO Good-Security...............................................................................................................................................................114 NATO Good-Terrorism............................................................................................................................................................115 NATO Good-Terrorism (Extension)........................................................................................................................................116 NATO Good-Sea Power............................................................................................................................................................117 NATO Good-Prevents Wars.....................................................................................................................................................118 NATO Good-Soft Power...........................................................................................................................................................119 NATO Good-Proliferation.......................................................................................................................................................120 NATO Won’t Collapse..............................................................................................................................................................121 NATO Won’t Collapse..............................................................................................................................................................122 ‡‡‡ Democracy Adv. ‡‡‡...........................................................................................................................................................123 Turkey Won’t Democratize......................................................................................................................................................124 Turkey Won’t Democratize......................................................................................................................................................126 Turkey Won’t Democratize......................................................................................................................................................127 ‡‡‡ EU Adv. ‡‡‡........................................................................................................................................................................129 Turkey Wont Accede to EU.....................................................................................................................................................130 Turkey Won’t Accede to EU.....................................................................................................................................................131 Turkey Won’t Accede EU-30 Years.........................................................................................................................................132 Turkey in EU Bad: Racism (1/2).............................................................................................................................................133 Turkey in EU Bad: Racism (2/2).............................................................................................................................................135 Turkey in EU Bad: War Scenario............................................................................................................................................136 Turkey In EU Bad: War Scenario (Extension)........................................................................................................................137 Turkey EU Bad: Economy (1/2)..............................................................................................................................................138 Turkey EU Bad: Economy (2/2)..............................................................................................................................................139 Economy I/L Magnifier............................................................................................................................................................141 Economy Link: Competitiveness.............................................................................................................................................142 Turkey in EU Bad-Splits Europe.............................................................................................................................................143 ‡‡‡ European Economy Adv. ‡‡‡.............................................................................................................................................144 European Economy Resilient..................................................................................................................................................145 European Economy Resilient..................................................................................................................................................146 EU Economy Resilient.............................................................................................................................................................147 European Economy Not Key to Global Economy...................................................................................................................148 ‡‡‡ Iraq Adv. ‡‡‡......................................................................................................................................................................149 A2: Iraq Stability: A2withdrawal now.................................................................................................................................150 A2: Iraq Stability: Kuwait Solves.............................................................................................................................................151 ‡‡‡ Terrorism Adv. ‡‡‡.............................................................................................................................................................152 1NC Terrorism Frontline (1 / 3)...............................................................................................................................................153 1NC Terrorism Frontline (2 / 3)..............................................................................................................................................154 1NC Terrorism Frontline (3 / 3).............................................................................................................................................155 2NC Ext – Non-U.....................................................................................................................................................................156 2NC Ext 3-Turkey solves terrorism ........................................................................................................................................157 2NC Ext 4- Terrorists can’t do it..............................................................................................................................................158 2NC Ext 5 – Terrorist could get TNWs from Italy .................................................................................................................159 No Risk of Nuclear Terrorism.................................................................................................................................................160 A2: Terrorism: U.S. Intel fails .................................................................................................................................................161 A2: Terrorism: Israel Fills In...................................................................................................................................................162 A2: Terrorism: Troops Key to Stabilize ..................................................................................................................................163 ‡‡‡ Relations Adv. ‡‡‡..............................................................................................................................................................164 A2: US/Turkey Relations: High...............................................................................................................................................165 A2: US/Turkey Relations: High..............................................................................................................................................166 A2: US/Turkey Relations: High...............................................................................................................................................167 A2: US/Turkey Relations—SQ Sanctions Solve......................................................................................................................168 A2: US/Turkey Relations—SQ Sanctions Solve......................................................................................................................169 A2: US/Turkey Relations—SQ Sanctions Solve......................................................................................................................170 A2: US/Turkey Relations: Iran No Nukes...............................................................................................................................171 A2: US/Turkey Relations: Iran No Nukes...............................................................................................................................172

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3

Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 4 /341

Suiter Pre-season

A2: US/Turkey Relations: Iran No Nukes ..............................................................................................................................174 A2: US/Turkey Relations: Iran No Nukes...............................................................................................................................175 A2: US/Turkey Relations: Good Relations Don’t Solve..........................................................................................................176 A2: US/Turkey Relations: Good Relations Don’t Solve..........................................................................................................177 A2: US/Turkey Relations: Good Relations Don’t Solve..........................................................................................................178 A2: US/Turkey Relations: Iran Has The Bomb Now..............................................................................................................179 A2: US/Turkey Relations: Arms Control Turn.......................................................................................................................180 A2: US/Turkey Relations: Opacity Turn ................................................................................................................................181 A2: US/Turkey Relations: Opacity Turn.................................................................................................................................182 US Turkey Relations Resilient.................................................................................................................................................183 US Turkey Relations Resilient.................................................................................................................................................184 US Turkey Relations Resilient.................................................................................................................................................186 US – Turkey Relations Low – Middle East Policy..................................................................................................................187 US – Turkey Relations Low – Middle East Policy..................................................................................................................188 TNW Good – Turkish Security................................................................................................................................................189 No Solvency – No Influence....................................................................................................................................................190  DAs .......................................................................................................................................................................191 ‡‡‡ DA Links ‡‡‡.......................................................................................................................................................................191 Japan Prolif Links....................................................................................................................................................................192 Deterrence Links......................................................................................................................................................................193 Obama Good Link- Political Capital (1/2)...............................................................................................................................194 Obama Good Link- Political Capital (1/2)...............................................................................................................................195 Obama Good Link- Military Lobby.........................................................................................................................................196 Obama Bad Link- Bipart..........................................................................................................................................................197 Obama Bad Link- Public..........................................................................................................................................................198 Nato – Link..............................................................................................................................................................................199 NATO – Link...........................................................................................................................................................................200 Turkey Prolif – Link................................................................................................................................................................201 Turkey Prolif – Link................................................................................................................................................................202 Turkey Prolif – Turn...............................................................................................................................................................203 Turkey Prolif – Uniqueness....................................................................................................................................................204 Turkey Prolif – Link................................................................................................................................................................205 Turkey Prolif – Impact............................................................................................................................................................206 ‡‡‡ Turkey Proliferation DA ‡‡‡..............................................................................................................................................207 Turkey Proliferation DA 1NC..................................................................................................................................................208 Uniqueness..............................................................................................................................................................................209 Uniqueness..............................................................................................................................................................................210 Link...........................................................................................................................................................................................211 Link..........................................................................................................................................................................................212 Link..........................................................................................................................................................................................213 Link..........................................................................................................................................................................................214 Impact......................................................................................................................................................................................215 2NC Impact Scenario-Russia...................................................................................................................................................216 2NC Impact Scenario-Other Countries Proliferate.................................................................................................................217 2NC Impact Scenario-Other Countries Proliferation.............................................................................................................218 ‡‡‡ Turkey Relations DA ‡‡‡...................................................................................................................................................219 Turkey Relations DA 1NC Short (1/2)....................................................................................................................................220 Turkey Relations DA 1NC Short (2/2).....................................................................................................................................221 Turkey Relations DA 1NC Long (1/4).....................................................................................................................................222 Turkey Relations DA 1NC Long (2/4).....................................................................................................................................223 Turkey Relations DA 1NC Long (3/4).....................................................................................................................................224 Turkey Relations DA 1NC Long (4/4).....................................................................................................................................224 Uniqueness (US-Turkey Relations Good)...............................................................................................................................225 Uniqueness (US-Turkey Relations Good)...............................................................................................................................227 Uniqueness (US-Turkey Relations Good)..............................................................................................................................228

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4

Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 5 /341

Suiter Pre-season

Uniqueness (US-Turkey Relations Good)..............................................................................................................................229 Uniqueness (US-Turkey Relations Good)..............................................................................................................................230 Uniqueness (US-Turkey Relations Bad).................................................................................................................................231 Uniqueness (US-Turkey Relations Bad).................................................................................................................................233 Uniqueness (US-Turkey Relations Bad).................................................................................................................................234 Uniqueness (US-Turkey Relations Bad).................................................................................................................................235 Uniqueness (US-Turkey Relations Bad).................................................................................................................................236 Uniqueness (Russia-Turkey Relations Good).........................................................................................................................237 Uniqueness (Russia-Turkey Relations Good)........................................................................................................................238 Uniqueness (Russia-Turkey Relations Good).........................................................................................................................239 Link (Hurts Relations)............................................................................................................................................................240 Link (Hurts Relations)............................................................................................................................................................242 Link (Hurts Relations)............................................................................................................................................................243 Link (Helps Relations)............................................................................................................................................................244 Link (Helps Relations)............................................................................................................................................................245 Link (Helps Relations)............................................................................................................................................................246 Link (Hurts Turkey-US, Helps Turkey-Russo).......................................................................................................................247 Link (Hurts Turkey-US, Helps Turkey-Russo).......................................................................................................................248 Internals – Relations...............................................................................................................................................................249 Internals – Relations...............................................................................................................................................................250 Internals – Turkish Prolif........................................................................................................................................................252 Internal Link-Trades off with Turkey/Russo Relations.........................................................................................................253 Internal Link (Independent Turkey Bad)...............................................................................................................................254 US-Turkey Relations Good (Terrorism).................................................................................................................................255 US-Turkey Relations Good Ext (Terrorism)...........................................................................................................................256 US-Turkey Relations Good (Afghanistan Stability)................................................................................................................257 US-Turkey Relations Good (East-West Dialogue) ½.............................................................................................................259 US-Turkey Relations Good (East-West Dialogue) 2/2..........................................................................................................260 US-Turkey Relations Good (Middle East Stability) ½...........................................................................................................261 US-Turkey Relations Good (Middle East Stability) 2/2.........................................................................................................262 US-Turkey Relations Good Ext (Middle East)........................................................................................................................263 US-Turkey Relations Good (Caucasus)..................................................................................................................................264 Turkey-Russo Relations Good (Caucus Stability)..................................................................................................................265 Turkey-Russian Relations Good (Pipelines)...........................................................................................................................266 Turkey-Russo Relations Good (Pipelines Extension).............................................................................................................267 ‡‡‡ Politics DA ‡‡‡...................................................................................................................................................................268 Link-Plan Unpopular..............................................................................................................................................................269 Link-Plan Unpopular..............................................................................................................................................................270 Link-Plan=Win........................................................................................................................................................................271 Link-Hurts Political Capital....................................................................................................................................................272 Turkey Prolif DA 1NC (1/2).....................................................................................................................................................273 Turkey Prolif DA 1NC (2/2).....................................................................................................................................................275 A/T Turkey Won’t Proliferate.................................................................................................................................................276 START 1NC (1/2).....................................................................................................................................................................278 START 1NC (2/2)....................................................................................................................................................................279 Turkey Politics 1NC (1/2)........................................................................................................................................................280 Turkey Politics 1NC (2/2)........................................................................................................................................................281 ‡‡‡ Terrorism Intelligence DA ‡‡‡..........................................................................................................................................283 1NC – Terrorism Intelligence (1/2)........................................................................................................................................284 1NC – Terrorism Intelligence (2/2)........................................................................................................................................285 Uniqueness – US Fighting PKK Now.....................................................................................................................................286 Uniqueness – Terror Threat....................................................................................................................................................287 Uniqueness – PKK War Coming.............................................................................................................................................288 ................................................................................................................................................................................................288 Links – Terrorism ..................................................................................................................................................................289

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5

Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 6 /341

Suiter Pre-season

Links – Terrorism .................................................................................................................................................................290 Links – Terrorism ..................................................................................................................................................................291 Internals – Middle East Stability............................................................................................................................................292 ‡‡‡ Troop Withdrawal Relations DA ‡‡‡................................................................................................................................293 1NC – Troop Withdrawal (1/2)...............................................................................................................................................294 1NC – Troop Withdrawal (2/2)...............................................................................................................................................295 Internals – Incirlik Troop Withdrawal...................................................................................................................................296 Internals – Incirlik Troop Withdrawal...................................................................................................................................297 Incirlik key to Drawdown........................................................................................................................................................298 Incirlik K2 Military Operations...............................................................................................................................................299 Chaotic Withdrawal Bad.........................................................................................................................................................300 Chaotic Withdrawal Bad-Heg..................................................................................................................................................301 Instability Spills Over..............................................................................................................................................................302  CPs ......................................................................................................................................................................303 ‡‡‡ Consult NATO CP ‡‡‡.......................................................................................................................................................303 Consult NATO Solvency..........................................................................................................................................................304 ‡‡‡ Turkey CP ‡‡‡....................................................................................................................................................................305 Turkey CP 1NC........................................................................................................................................................................306 Solves Prolif.............................................................................................................................................................................307 Solves Russia reciprocation....................................................................................................................................................308 Solves International law..........................................................................................................................................................309 Solves NATO Cohesion............................................................................................................................................................310 AT: US Decides.........................................................................................................................................................................311 ‡‡‡ Turkey-Iran Relations Adv. CP ‡‡‡...................................................................................................................................312 Iran Relations - ADV CP..........................................................................................................................................................313 ‡‡‡ NPT Fuel Bank/Article IV CP ‡‡‡......................................................................................................................................314 NPT: Fuel Bank/Article IV CP Shell (1/2) ..............................................................................................................................315 NPT: Fuel Bank/Article IV CP Shell (2/2)..............................................................................................................................317 Fuel Bank CP: Fuel Bank Solves Prolif....................................................................................................................................319 Fuel Bank CP: Solvency – NPT ..............................................................................................................................................320 Fuel Bank CP: A2 – Developing Countries (Iran) Won’t Participate ....................................................................................321 Fuel Bank CP: A2 NTI/Buffet/IAEA/ SQ Fuel Banks............................................................................................................322 Fuel Bank CP: A2 – GNEP Solves...........................................................................................................................................323 Fuel Bank CP: A2- Uranium Price DA’s .................................................................................................................................324 ‡‡‡ Turkish Prolif CP ‡‡‡.........................................................................................................................................................325 Turkish Prolif Counterplan.....................................................................................................................................................326 ‡‡‡ Russian Reciprocity CP ‡‡‡...............................................................................................................................................327 Russian Reciprocity CP...........................................................................................................................................................328 ‡‡‡ “Tactical” PIC ‡‡‡..............................................................................................................................................................329 “Tactical” PIC 1NC...................................................................................................................................................................330 “Tactical” PIC 1NC...................................................................................................................................................................331 “Tactical” PIC 1NC...................................................................................................................................................................332 “Tactical” PIC- Fear of bomb good..........................................................................................................................................333 ‡‡‡ Foreign Aid CP ‡‡‡............................................................................................................................................................334 Foreign Aid CP 1nc..................................................................................................................................................................335 Foreign Aid CP-2nc Solvency..................................................................................................................................................336 Foreign Aid CP-ESF Definition...............................................................................................................................................337 ‡‡‡ Security CP ‡‡‡..................................................................................................................................................................338 Security CP 1NC (1/1)..............................................................................................................................................................339 2NC Counter Plan Solvency Extension ..................................................................................................................................340 CP Solvency Extensions...........................................................................................................................................................341

This file isn’t fat, it’s just big-indexed.

6

Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 7 /341

Suiter Pre-season

 Topicality Violations 

This file isn’t fat, it’s just big-indexed.

7

Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 8 /341

Suiter Pre-season

T - Presence
A. Interpretation – Military presence is the stationing of troops on bases Presence is Troops Random House Dictionary of the English Language, Unabridged, 2nd Ed., 1987, 1529. Presence: The military or economic power of a country as reflected abroad by the stationing of its troops, sale of its goods, etc.: the American military presence in Europe.

And this is true of Military Policy
Dictionary Of Military Terms, 3rd Ed. 2004, 187. Presence: The fact of having people or units which represent a particular country or organization within a particular area. B. Violation – The affirmative only reduces TNW’s, not troops or bases associated with thim. C. Standards 1. Limits – The resolution says military and/or police presence, it doesn’t mention nuclear weapons at all in the resolution, meaning that the aff completely explodes limits 2. Predictability – The topic paper specifically says that weapon systems are not presence, and the framer knows best, we shouldn’t have to prepare for affs like this. 3. Education – Only the negative gives a true meaning to the words military presence in order to have the most in-depth debate. D. Topicality is a voter for fairness and education and should be judged on the basis of competing interpretations. E. Reasonability is arbitrary because it justifies judge intervention.

US military presence and NATO TNWS are separate presences Lamond 9 (Claudine, Senior analyst and contributor to International Security Report, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Russian
Foreign Policy,” International Security Report, http://www.atlantic-community.org/app/webroot/files/articlepdf/140809_ISR%20%20Russian%20TNW%20C%20Lamond.pdf) MJ Recent years have signaled a low point in Russia‐US relations. NATO’s eastward expansion, the continued presence of NATO’s TNW in Europe, US military and oil presence in central Asia, and the Bush administration’s plans for new missile defense systems on Russia’s border have been seen as direct attacks on Russian influence and her ability to protect herself. In a recent
speech in Helsinki, Russian President Dimitri Medvedev said: “The rules of international law are applied selectively, on the basis of so‐called political expediency, and sometimes simply ignored. In our view, there are quite a few examples of this in contemporary Europe: the military operation in the Balkans, the recognition of Kosovo, the Caucasus crisis resulting from the attack on South Ossetia last year, and the crisis in talks on the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. These examples could be multiplied indefinitely.”12 Former President Gorbachev also complains that US behaviour since the end of the Cold War (that he played such a central role in facilitating) stymied any progress over 20 years and still has the potential to threaten a new arms race.13

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8

Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 9 /341

Suiter Pre-season

This is some pretty good Tea

T- Presence ≠ Weapons
A. Military presence means soldiers Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary 10 http://www.oxfordadvancedlearnersdictionary.com/dictionary/presence Presence: a group of people, especially soldiers, who have been sent to a place to deal with a particular situation. The government is maintaining a heavy police presence in the area.a military presence B. Violation- The aff only removes TNWs from Turkey, which is a weapons system, not troops C. Standards 1. Limits – The aff justifies squirrely weapon-of-the-week affs which are limitless because there is an infinite number of weapons systems that could be removed 2. Education – removing weapons destroys neg ground because eliminating one type of weapon isn’t predictable – we aren’t able to garner strong links to DAs 3. Bidirectional – they can claim the weapons they remove are replaced by some different type, functionally making the topic bidirectional 4. If they remove troops, they are extra-T based on their plan text – this is uniquely bad in this instance because their internal links are all based off of the explicit removal of a specific weapon – it’s an independent voter

This file isn’t fat, it’s just big-indexed.

9

Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 10 /341

Suiter Pre-season

This is some pretty good Tea

This file isn’t fat, it’s just big-indexed.

10

Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 11 /341

Suiter Pre-season

AT: We meet
1. They clearly don’t meet – weapons are not troops 2. The nuclear umbrella is distinct from military presence Kugler, 92 – senior consultant at the Center for Technology and National Security Policy (CTNSP) of the National Defense
University, he previously was a Distinguished Research Professor there (Richard, “The Future of U.S. Military Presence in Europe,” http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/2008/R4194.pdf) Conversely, any wholesale U.S. military withdrawal from Europe could leave still-existing American nuclear commitments in Europe that are no longer credible to allies or adversaries. Meanwhile, there would be no U.S. military presence in Europe to exert influence over security affairs in peace, crisis, and war. Beyond this, withdrawal could have destabilizing consequences that would reverberate across the entire continent. The NATO alliance could be weakened and perhaps fractured, thereby producing a military and political power vacuum in Europe at a time of great change, stress, and uncertainty. Deterrence could be eroded, potential aggressors would face fewer incentives to exercise restraint, and crisis management would be rendered more problematic. Prospects for democracy, free enterprise, cooperative diplomacy, and smooth trade relationships also could suffer.

3. Presence refers to physical experience, not technology (Jonathon Steur, PhD Stanford, 1992, transcriptions.english.ucsb.edu/archive/courses/liu/ english25/materials/class26notes.html)
"The key to defining virtual reality in terms of human experience rather than technological hardware is the concept of presence. Presence can be thought of as the experience of one's physical environment; it refers not to one's surroundings as they exist in the physical world, but to the perception of those surroundings as mediated by both automatic and controlled mental processes (Gibson, 1979): Presence is defined as the sense of being in an environment. Many perceptual factors help to generate this sense, including input from some or all sensory channels, as well as more mindful attentional, perceptual, and other mental processes that assimilate incoming sensory data with current concerns and past experiences (Gibson, 1966). Presence is closely related to the phenomenon of distal attribution or externalization, which refer to the referencing of our perceptions to an external space beyond the limits of the sensory organs themselves (Loomis, 1992)."

This is some pretty good Tea

This file isn’t fat, it’s just big-indexed.

11

Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 12 /341

Suiter Pre-season

T – Presence ≠ Weapons Systems
1. Definition - Presence consists of infrastructure, troops and agreements and exercises conducted with the host country but excludes weapons systems J.E. Peterson, Ph.D. Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Middle East Institute, an Adjunct Fellow at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies, worked at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, and more. 2008. “Foreign Military Presence and its Role in Reinforcing Regional Security: A Double-Edged Sword.” Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research. pp. 183-205. <http://www.jepeterson.net/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderfiles/Foreign_Military_Presence_in_the_Gulf.pdf> Table 7.2 Levels of Foreign Military Presence
o : present in the Gulf x : not present in the Gulf ? : uncertain if present in the Gulf 1. intervention and occupation" 2. proximate expeditionary force in region - power projection 3. bases and other permanent installations (ranging from full bases, with the FMP enjoying internal sovereignty, to small support functions, such as naval replenishment or technical facilities) 4. non-permanent deployed units 5. joint or multilateral exercises 6. pre-positioning and access agreements 7. offshore naval presence 8. "offshore" ready deployment capability (e.g. from neighboring countries or regions) 9. mutual or multilateral security treaties or agreements (CENTO, NATO, SEATO) 10. arms and equipment transfers 11. "technical" facilities (intelligence, space, communications) 12. aircraft over-flights (generally unseen and uncontroversial but reverses on occasion of aircraft trouble or in time of conflict or crisis) 13. surrogate forces (support for revolutionary or irredentist movements; Cuba in Africa

2. Violation- The aff only removes a weapon system 3. Standards a. Limits - The aff justifies squirrely weapon of the week affs which are unpredictable and unlimiting because the United States uses thousands of different guns, tanks, planes, and other weapons systems that could possibly be removed. They also justify removing weapon systems that aren’t explicitly within the topic countries but could be utilized within these countries like the drones in Pakistan or tomahawk missiles positioned on carriers b. Ground - They destroy key neg ground, like the redeployment and deterrence disad. Changing the troop’s tactics and weapons are key cps to test the desirability of actually removing presence 4. Topicality is a voting issue for reasons of fairness and education

This is some pretty good Tea

This file isn’t fat, it’s just big-indexed.

12

Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 13 /341

Suiter Pre-season

Presence not weapons - AT: Nuclear deterrence W/M
The nuclear umbrella is distinct from military presence Kugler, 92 – senior consultant at the Center for Technology and National Security Policy (CTNSP) of the National Defense
University, he previously was a Distinguished Research Professor there (Richard, “The Future of U.S. Military Presence in Europe,” http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/2008/R4194.pdf) Conversely, any wholesale U.S. military withdrawal from Europe could leave still-existing American nuclear commitments in Europe that are no longer credible to allies or adversaries. Meanwhile, there would be no U.S. military presence in Europe to exert influence over security affairs in peace, crisis, and war. Beyond this, withdrawal could have destabilizing consequences that would reverberate across the entire continent. The NATO alliance could be weakened and perhaps fractured, thereby producing a military and political power vacuum in Europe at a time of great change, stress, and uncertainty. Deterrence could be eroded, potential aggressors would face fewer incentives to exercise restraint, and crisis management would be rendered more problematic. Prospects for democracy, free enterprise, cooperative diplomacy, and smooth trade relationships also could suffer.

Presence refers to physical experience, not technology (Jonathon Steur, PhD Stanford, 1992, transcriptions.english.ucsb.edu/archive/courses/liu/ english25/materials/class26notes.html)
"The key to defining virtual reality in terms of human experience rather than technological hardware is the concept of presence. Presence can be thought of as the experience of one's physical environment; it refers not to one's surroundings as they exist in the physical world, but to the perception of those surroundings as mediated by both automatic and controlled mental processes (Gibson, 1979): Presence is defined as the sense of being in an environment. Many perceptual factors help to generate this sense, including input from some or all sensory channels, as well as more mindful attentional, perceptual, and other mental processes that assimilate incoming sensory data with current concerns and past experiences (Gibson, 1966). Presence is closely related to the phenomenon of distal attribution or externalization, which refer to the referencing of our perceptions to an external space beyond the limits of the sensory organs themselves (Loomis, 1992)."

This is some pretty good Tea

This file isn’t fat, it’s just big-indexed.

13

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Case List
1. Our interpretation allows for the best medium of cases based on military presence J.E. Peterson, Ph.D. Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Middle East Institute, an Adjunct Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, worked at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, and more. 20 08. “Foreign
Military Presence and its Role in Reinforcing Regional Security: A Double-Edged Sword.” Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research. pp. 183-205. <http://www.jepeterson.net/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderfiles/Foreign_Military_Presence_in_the_Gulf.pdf>
Table 7.2 Levels of Foreign o : present in the Gulf x : not present in the Gulf ? : uncertain if present in the Gulf 1. 2.

Military Presence

3. functions, such as naval replenishment or technical facilities) 4. 5.

intervention and occupation" proximate expeditionary force in region - power projection bases and other permanent installations (ranging from full bases, with the FMP enjoying internal sovereignty, to small support

non-permanent deployed units joint or multilateral exercises 6. pre-positioning and access agreements 7. offshore naval presence 8. "offshore" ready deployment capability (e.g. from neighboring countries or regions) 9. mutual or multilateral security treaties or agreements (CENTO, NATO, SEATO) 10. arms and equipment transfers 11. "technical" facilities (intelligence, space, communications) 12. aircraft over-flights (generally unseen and uncontroversial but reverses on occasion of aircraft trouble or in time of conflict or crisis) 13. surrogate forces (support for revolutionary or irredentist movements; Cuba in Africa 2. Allowing weapons be topical allows for cases that remove ANY specific type of tool the US military uses in Turkey. That means: guns, planes, tanks, stinger missiles, landmines, sniper rifles, grenades, knives, flamethrowers, rhino runner buses, and night vision goggles. 3. This doesn’t add a few cases that the neg would arguably have to research; this literally adds hundreds of cases that we would have to research, making it impossible to be prepared for.

This is some pretty good Tea

This file isn’t fat, it’s just big-indexed.

14

Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 15 /341

Suiter Pre-season Yeah!

 Advantage Answers  ‡‡‡ Greece-Turkey War Adv. ‡‡‡

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Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 16 /341

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Greece-Turkey War Frontline
1. Greece-Turkey conflict won’t escalate to war. Stephen Mann, Lieutenant, US Navy, 2001. [US Navy War College, www.hsdl.org/?
view&doc=36621&coll=public]

The basic issues in the Aegean and Cyprus have yet to be resolved, but relations between Turkey and Greece have improved, especially in the last year. Infrequent eventssuch as the Imial Kardak crisis still show the escalatory nature of their relationship, but atthe same time it is clear that both sides will almost certainly always stop short of the act of war; the risks are too great, the potential rewards to little, and the outcomes toouncertain. Both governments have some common sense in this regard and they must nowuse that common sense to move toward
resolution of the overall problem. How to movetoward that resolution is the question; many possibilities exist but some options andconsiderations, discussed in the next chapter, seem more likely to work than others.

2. Their Larrabee evidence indicates Greece-Turkey tensions have been high since 1996-no reason conflict would escalate now 3. Greece-Turkey relations are better than ever. F. Stephen Larrabee, Ph.D., Distinguished Chair in European Security at RAND, 2010. [RAND, Troubled
Partnership U.S.-Turkish Relations in an Era of Global Geopolitical Change, www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG899.pdf] However, since 1999, relations between Greece and Turkey have significantly improved.14 Today, bilateral relations are better than they have been since the Atatürk-Venizelos era in the 1930s.

Trade has increased visibly, as have tourism and people-to-people exchanges. Energy cooperation has also intensified, bolstered by the opening of a $300-million gas pipeline that creates an energy corridor connecting the rich natural-gas fields in the Caucasus with Europe. The improvement in Greek-Turkish relations has been facilitated by a significant shift in Greek policy toward Turkey’s membership in the EU. For years, Greece sought to block Turkish membership
in the EU in an effort to force changes in Turkish behavior favorable to Greek interests. Since 1999, however, Greece has become one of the strongest advocates of Turkey’s EU membership. Today, Athens sees a “Europeanized” Turkey as strongly in its own interest. From the Greek perspective, the more Turkey conforms with European norms and standards of international behavior, the better Greek-Turkish relations are likely to be.

4. Their Geramatolyos evidence is in the context of a war with Syria and Turkeynot a Greece-Turkey conflict

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Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 17 /341

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5. No war-Greece needs Turkish gas pipelines Reuters, June 2010 [UPDATE 1-Turkey, Italy and Greece sign MOU for gas pipeline, Reuters Africa] Turkey's state natural gas company Botas signed a memorandum of understanding on Thursday for a pipeline connecting Turkey with Greece and Italy. The project, to be built along with Italy's Edison and Greek state natural gas company Depa, should be completed by 2017, Turkey's Energy Minister Taner Yildiz said. Yildiz said it surplus gas Turkey imports from Azerbaijan will probably be piped to Greece
and Italy.He declined to give details on the estimated cost of the Italy-Turkey-Greece Inter-connector (ITGI) pipeline. The ITGI project is considered a possible threat to the EU-backed Nabucco pipeline project which is targeting access to the same Azeri Shah Deniz gas for its planned start-up phase.

Greece-Turkey War Frontline

6. Turkey complies with NATO security treaties now-no risk of a war

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Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 18 /341

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7. No War-Greece is dependent on Turkey

Greece-Turkey War Frontline

Dan Darling, an international military markets analyst with Forecast International Inc., an aerospace and defense research company. A graduate of Kansas State University with a degree in history, he specializes in the European and Middle Eastern regions at Forecast. His work has been cited in Defense Industry Daily, Rotorhub, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Aerospace and Defense News and the Small Wars Journal, among others. He has also contributed commentary to Defense News and has been quoted in such publications as The Financial Times, Flight Global, National Defense Magazine and the Fort Worth Star-Telegram. [Will Austerity Era Bring Change to Greece-Turkey Rivalry?, The Faster Times] June 2010

Greece, which fought its way out from under the Ottoman yoke during its war for independence (1821-1830), has long adopted a defensive mentality as that of the farthest Christian outpost on the Muslim road into Europe. Disputes regarding Cyprus and rights to the Aegean Sea have erupted periodically for decades and have brought the two NATO members to the brink of war on several occasions. Yet despite the historic enmity between the two countries the Greek financial crisis offers an opportunity to forge a new security understanding that would be advantageous to both sides. Easing some of the longstanding Aegean
disputes would provide Greece with an opportunity to tackle its budgetary issues without fear that military cutbacks will expose the country to Turkish power displays meant to coerce territorial concessions from Athens.

From Ankara’s perspective an easing of tensions with Greece would alleviate some of the political concern in Europe about bringing Turkey into its union, in the process further bolstering Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s “zero problems with neighbors” strategic policy. Additionally, this would allow the Turkish Armed Forces greater room to pursue its “Kuvvet (Force) 2014″ reform effort aimed at creating a more mobile, inter-operable military - without the potential threat of high-intensity war on its western border. But traditional skepticism dies hard. While Turkey proffered a potential disarmament deal to Greece in May, Athens remains wary. Whatever its budgetary problems, Greece is unlikely to interpret the Turkish proposal as altruistic or to suddenly view its neighbor as benign. Ultimately this leaves the Aegean neighbors stuck at square one: two members of the same security alliance who continue to pursue high-cost weapons programs in preparation for conflict with the other.

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Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 19 /341

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US-Greece Relations Frontline
1. Relations sustainable a. Terrorism Embassy of Greece 01
[“Finance minister says US - Greece cooperation exists in tackling terrorism.” Embassy of Greece.05 October, 2001. http://www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/content/en/Article.aspx? office=3&folder=326&article=8910] Finance Minister Yiannos Papantoniou said on Thursday, after meeting Prime Minister Costas Simitis, that

cooperation exists between the Bank of Greece, the Greek government and the United States in tackling terrorism. Commenting on whether there is a list at the Bank of Greece ac-cording to which there are indications of money laundering, Papantoniou said it is a classified document. Referring to the economy, Papantoniou said the Greek economy is resisting pressures following the terrorist attack in the U.S. and that if there are no more negative developments consequences for the Greek economy will be limited. On the question of the course of the economy after next week's ruling PASOK party congress, he said the congress will be one of rallying and cooperation and economic policy will remain unchanged after it. b. Energy US Embassy 08
[“US-Greece Renewable Energy Cooperation.” US Embassy 5-19-08. http://athens.usembassy.gov/energy_cooperation.html] Deputy Minister of Ukraine Iryna Zapatrina, Mr. Secretary General, Madam Special Secretary, Mr. President, Dr. Ichord, ladies and gentlemen, thank you so much for asking the U.S. Embassy to be present here tonight. It is an honor for me to be here and to represent Ambassador Speckhard, who sends his warm regards to all of you. March 12, 2007 marked a very important day in US-Greek relations. That day was the meeting of the US-Greece Economic and Commercial Cooperation Council in Athens, led by Secretary General Skylakakis on the Greek side and Deputy Assistant Secretaries [of State Matthew H.] Bryza, [USAID]

Mefford and [Commerce] Dyke on the American side. Our goal was to put our economic and commercial relations on the same high level as our political relations. It is my government’s view that our enhanced economic relations must recognize Greece’s new economic presence in the Balkans. This presence, matched with the United States’ interest in the region, provides the opportunity for us to work together, side by side, in a way that creatively advances our shared hopes for
this region’s prosperity.

2. Their Kurdistan News evidence is from 2006-US-Turkey relations should’ve killed relations with Greece 3. No impact to US occupation of Turkey-Greece empirically has helped the US occupy it US Department of State 4-28
[“Greece.” US Department of State 4-28-10. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3395.htm] Greece entered World War I in 1917 on the side of the Allies. After the war, Greece took part in the Allied

occupation of Turkey, where many Greeks still lived. In 1921, the Greek army marched toward Ankara, but was defeated by Turkish forces led by Kemal Mustapha Ataturk and forced to withdraw. In an
exchange of populations under the Treaty of Lausanne, more than 1.3 million refugees from Turkey poured into Greece, and

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Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 20 /341

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nearly 800,000 Greek Turks were sent to Turkey. This large influx of people created enormous challenges for the Greek economy and society.

US-Greece Relations Frontline
4. Their Kirisci evidence concludes negative-it indicates Third parties can’t resolve disputes between nations-means US presence in Turkey has no impact on USGreece relations 5. Alt cause-Instability in Turkey would spread to Iraq, the Caucuses and the Balkans. Roger Boyes, staff writer, 10-31-2002. [The Times (London), Challenger who gives Europe the jitters, p. ln] Europe is nervous not only about the rising popularity of Mr Erdogan's Justice and Development Party (AK), but also the whole political constellation, the uneasy geo-politics of a weakly led country bordering three of the world's most dangerous flashpoints: Iraq, the Caucasus and the Balkans. An unstable Turkey - a Nato ally pivotal in any war against Iraq - could bring crisis to our doorsteps. The critical question is whether the European Union can increase
Turkey's stability by speeding up its membership negotiations, or whether it is best left to simmer on the sidelines. Diplomats in Ankara are uncertain about Mr Erdogan. He presents himself as a moderate conservative committed to democracy and to the principles of a modern secular state as set out by Turkey's founding father, Kemal Ataturk. The AK may also have to enter a coalition with the social democrats of the Republican People's Party (CHP), whose most respected figure is Kemal Dervis - a former Economics Minister and skilled crisis-manager whom Europe trusts. But those bayoneted minarets and true-believing soldiers - the militant edge of Islam - cannot be ignored.Since Ataturk created Turkey from the rubble of the Ottoman Empire in 1923, the country has wavered between the poles of military dictatorship and

Islamicisation. It was never going to be easy to find a balance in a country that straddles Orient and Occident, fundamentalism and tolerance, planned economy and market.

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Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 21 /341

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1. Their Larrabee evidence does not make a claim of inevitability of US troop withdrawal-it just advocates shifting troops to Kuwait which the aff can’t solve 2. Incirlik not obsolete-allows for rapid flights over Syria F-16. net 01

Solvency Frontline

[DeWitt, Lieven.“American F-16 fighter jet from Incirlik made 23-minute flight over Syria.” F-16.Net 8-21-01. http://www.f-16.net/news_article678.html] By all accounts, it was a usual incident. An American F-16 flying out of Incirlik Air Base in south-central

Turkey flew for nearly half an hour over at least 150 miles of Syria last Wednesday without even a protest from Syria. But just how an American fighter jet could fly so long and far over potentially hostile Middle Eastern territory is something of a mystery. 3. Hyland evidence is from 2007-US Military would’ve abandoned Incirlik if it was unstrategic 4. Incirlik key to Middle East Security Global Security 05
[“Incirlik Air Base.” Global Security 4-26-05. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/incirlikhistory.htm] Incirlik in Turkish literally means place of the fig or fig orchard, which is what comprised a major portion of the base until 1951. Then, bulldozers and road graders cleared much of the land to make way for the runway and support facilities of a new airfield. The United States Engineering Group began construction of a 10,000foot runway at a new base 7 miles east of Adana, and approximately 250 miles southeast of Ankara, Turkey, in the spring of 1951. While work on the runway progressed, an American company, Metcalfe, Hamilton, and Grove, built base facilities and infrastructure under contract. The United States Air Force (USAF) initially

planned to use the base as an emergency staging and recovery site for medium and heavy bombers. Since Turkey shared 360 miles of common border with Soviet territory, Strategic Air Command (SAC) planners considered it an important location. The years to follow would prove the value of Incirlik's location not only in countering the Soviet threat, but also in responding to crises in the Middle East. 5. Aff doesn’t solve perception of US presence-TNWs mean Turkey will resent our military presence inevitably

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Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 22 /341

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‡‡‡ AKP Adv. ‡‡‡

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Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 23 /341

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AKP Bad-Terrorism
AKP leadership leads to terrorism-Flotilla proves The Hindu 6-30

[“Why the West cannot lose Turkey.” The Hindu 6-30-10. http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/article493793.ece? homepage=true] If Israel and its powerful lobbyists in Washington and New York are to be believed, Turkey in recent months committed two unpardonable crimes. First, it dared to support the people of Gaza, who, in the eyes of the Israeli establishment, deserve collective punishment for supporting Hamas “terrorists,” who are running the affairs of the impoverished coastal strip. Tel Aviv's problems with Ankara came to a head on May 31 when Israeli commandos attacked a Gaza-bound aid flotilla led by the Turkish charity, IHH. Despite the international outcry against the raid, Israel has been

persistent in calling Turkey's Gaza mission a fig leaf to cover its larger political goal of bolstering the Hamas, already an ally of Iran. Terrorism Causes Extinction Sid-Ahmed, political analyst 04
(Mohamed, Managing Editor for Al-Ahali, “Extinction!” August 26-September 1, Issue no. 705, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm)

What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms

race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers.

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Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 24 /341

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AKP Bad-Terrorism
AKP provides safe harbor to the IHH terrorist organization Freedman 7-2 Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins
[Freedman, Robert O. “Why the Islamic democracy rocked ties with Israel and the West.” The Jewish Times 7-2-10. http://www.jewishtimes.com/index.php/jewishtimes/news/jt/cover_story/turkeys_tarnish/19498] Most recently, in the aftermath of the recent May flotilla incident, the only ship that resisted the

Israeli takeover was organized by the IHH, an Islamic “charity” association in Turkey that had been involved in past terrorism (including, according to a French magistrate, an attempt to blow up Los Angeles International Airport, as well as ties with al-Qaida). The IHH clearly sought to provoke a conflict with Israel and Erdogan seized on the deaths of nine members of the organization to escalate his conflict with Israel. He demanded an apology from Israel, and threatened to cut all ties with
Israel unless the apology was forthcoming

AKP has links to the IHH in the flotilla incident Freedman 7-2 Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins

[Freedman, Robert O. “Why the Islamic democracy rocked ties with Israel and the West.” The Jewish Times 7-2-10. http://www.jewishtimes.com/index.php/jewishtimes/news/jt/cover_story/turkeys_tarnish/19498 Finally, the main Turkish opposition party, the CHP, has a new and vibrant leader in Kemal Kilicdaroglu. He has criticized Erdogan’s domestic policy as creating an “empire of fear” in Turkey, and has gone so far as to accuse the Erdogan government of being fascistic. He also has raised

questions about Erdogan’s links to the IHH and has suggested that the Turkish government could have prevented the flotilla confrontation. Even one of the CHP’s spiritual leaders, Fethullah Gulen,
has questioned Erdogan’s policy in the flotilla incident

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Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 25 /341

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AKP Bad-Kurdish Terrorism
AKP increases Kurdish terrorism-banning of Kurdish party in Parliament Freedman 7-2 Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins

[Freedman, Robert O. “Why the Islamic democracy rocked ties with Israel and the West.” The Jewish Times 7-2-10. http://www.jewishtimes.com/index.php/jewishtimes/news/jt/cover_story/turkeys_tarnish/19498 Second, Erdogan’s opening to the Kurds has backfired. His amnesty offer to the PKK led to a Kurdish

political rally welcoming returning PKK guerrillas, and the Kurdish party in Turkey’s parliament was banned. Even worse, the PKK rebellion has heated up with strikes against Turkish officials and army officers all over Turkey; one of the major attacks originated in Syria, and the Erdogan government
has been hard put to suppress the rebellion. Also, recent polls show that 58 percent of Turks oppose Erdogan’s Kurdish policy

AKP incites Kurd retaliation-suspension of Kurdish rights Al-Ahram Weekly 6-30
[Jenkins, Gareth. “Where's 'Plan B'? Al-Ahram Weekly. Issue 1,004. Al-Ahram Weekly 6-30. http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2010/1004/re4.htm] The upsurge in the violence came a little over a month after the PKK's founder, Abdallah Ocalan, who is currently serving a life sentence on the Turkish prison island of Imrali, issued a statement via his

lawyers threatening an escalation in the organisation's 26-year-old insurgency unless the Turkish state made substantive concessions on Kurdish rights by the end of May. No such concessions were forthcoming. On 5 June, in an interview in northern Iraq with the Firat News Agency, Murat Karayilan, the chairman of the PKK's Executive Committee, warned that the organisation would both step up its attacks in its main battlefields in the mountains of southeast Turkey and hit what he described as military and economic targets in the west of the country

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Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 26 /341

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AKP Bad-Turkish Democracy [1/2]
AKP has had a polarizing effect on Turkish democracy Department of International Relations Istanbul 09
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13629390902747376]

[Önis, Ziya. 'Conservative Globalism at the Crossroads: The Justice and Development Party and the Thorny Path to ̧ Democratic Consolidation in Turkey', Mediterranean Politics, 14: 1, 21 — 40. 2009.

Turkish politics in the recent era has been characterized by significant transformation and a considerable degree of instability. Important steps have been taken towards democratic
consolidation as part of a broader Europeanization process. At the same time, recent developments suggest that the process of democratic consolidation is far from complete. Turkey in 2008 continued to project an image of a highly polarized society. Although the recent Constitutional Court ruling not to ban the governing party on the basis of its alleged anti-secular activities created a temporary breathing space and an air of stability, this should not be interpreted as a sign of a durable consensus. The present paper builds upon and extends earlier contributions as a basis for understanding the dynamics of Turkish politics in the context of the general elections of 2007 (see O ̈ nis , 2007; O ̈ nis ̧ and Keyman, 2003). The framework developed is also used to ̧ illuminate some of the unexpected post-election developments which have been associated with considerable instability and further polarization in Turkish politics. The central claim is that traditional divisions such as left versus right, centre versus periphery and other similar distinctions have limited explanatory power in terms of understanding the Turkish party system (see Sayarı, 2007). A better conceptualization of Turkish political dynamics can be made in terms of conservative globalists versus defensive nationalists. Indeed, this conceptualization appears to provide an even better representation of the composition of the Turkish parliament after the July 2007 elections than has been the case with the earlier election of 2002. The conservative globalist label characterizes the ruling party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) whereas the main opposition parties, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) constituted the defensive nationalist bloc. Liberal globalists or social democrats with a transformationalist globalist agenda are not properly represented in this environment. A central argument, therefore, is that Turkish democracy constitutes a one-dimensional democracy where the absence of a European-style social democratic party constitutes an important democratic deficit.

Turkey is the vital internal link to democracy-it’s a model for Muslim nations Today’s Zaman 09 Citing Saudi Prince Aziz
[Aziz, Talal Bin Abdul. “Turk Demokrasisi Bolgemize Model.” Today’s Zaman 9-12-09. http://tr1.harunyahya.com/Detail/T/EDCRFV/productId/27519/TURKISH_DEMOCRACY_CAN_BE_A_MODEL_FOR _OUR_REGION]

I wish for Turkey to present a model for the region. You should protect these values so that you can maintain your role of being the center for democracy by setting a successful example in our region that needs this. The relations between the Arab world and Turkey are strengthened by the regional role played by Turkey. Turkey’s efforts to solve the Palestinian problem have a special importance.

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Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 27 /341

Suiter Pre-season Yeah!

AKP Bad-Turkish Democracy [2/2]
Democracy solves nuclear war Diamond Hoover Institution, Stanford University 1995 [ Larry, December, PROMOTING DEMOCRACY IN THE 1990S, 1p. http://www.carnegie.org//sub/pubs/deadly/diam_rpt.html] Nuclear, chemical and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty and openness. The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal

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Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 28 /341

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AKP Bad-Turkish Democracy
AKP Bad-eliminates the competition from other parties necessary for democracy Department of International Relations Istanbul 09
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13629390902747376]

[Önis, Ziya. 'Conservative Globalism at the Crossroads: The Justice and Development Party and the Thorny Path to ̧ Democratic Consolidation in Turkey', Mediterranean Politics, 14: 1, 21 — 40. 2009.

Turkey’s recent political crises also highlight the importance of effective opposition in a well-functioning democracy. The weaknesses of the opposition parties in Turkey and the absence of a European-style left-ofcentre alternative has created a representational vacuum at the very centre of Turkish politics. This in turn has resulted in a kind of one-party dominant system which placed an overload on the governing party, the AKP. Building a broad-based coalition consisting of highly diverse elements helped by the weakness of the opposition was at the heart of the AKP’s electoral success. Yet, in the post-election context, the ability to

manage this coalition proved to be far more difficult than was originally anticipated. Furthermore, the extraordinary share of the total vote provided the wrong kind of signal to the party leadership that they could press ahead with their primary agenda, namely the extension of religious freedoms, on the assumption that they enjoyed broad legitimacy and public support. This assumption was also based on a narrow, majoritarian understanding of democracy and it proved to be the wrong assumption. Obtaining a comfortable majority in

parliament was not a sufficient condition for effective governance in a highly polarized society. The AKP’s electoral success proved to be its ultimate weakness. Perhaps if the party had faced better opposition, which no doubt would also limit the magnitude of its electoral coalition, the party leadership could have pursued a more pragmatic strategy based on negotiation and compromise and the kind of serious political instability that Turkey experienced in 2007 and 2008 could have been avoided in the process. AKP kills democracy-election tactics Rodrik 6-23 Professor of International Political Economy at Harvard
[Rodrik, Dani. “The Death of Turkey's Democracy.” The Wall Street Journal 6-23-10. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704009804575308182324490568.html]

Given the trail of wrongdoings the AKP is leaving behind, it will likely do whatever it takes to avoid losing power in next summer's elections. Sadly, Mr. Erdogan's inclination will be to raise the temperature a few notches
higher, both domestically and internationally (see its recent rapprochement with Iran, or its brinkmanship against its old friend Israel). It's clear now that Turkey is no longer the liberalizing, emerging democracy under the AKP that it

was only a few years ago. It's time the U.S. and Europe stopped treating it as such—both for their own sakes, and for the sake of the Turkish people.

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Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 29 /341

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AKP Bad-Turkish Democracy
AKP results in political instability-secularist tension Department of International Relations Istanbul 09
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13629390902747376]

[Önis, Ziya. 'Conservative Globalism at the Crossroads: The Justice and Development Party and the Thorny Path to ̧ Democratic Consolidation in Turkey', Mediterranean Politics, 14: 1, 21 — 40. 2009.

The performance of the second AKP government after a few months in office, however, failed to match the favourable post-election climate. Indeed, the disappointing performance of the party
immediately post-election helped to alienate elements of liberal public opinion which had been quite impressed by the party’s moderate and reformist stance in its early years. The AKP took a series of actions during the early months of its office in late 2007 which contributed to further polarization of Turkish society and to a parallel increase in political instability. The presidential

election process involving the candidature of Abdullah Gu l, the minister of foreign affairs and a key ̈ figure in the AKP leadership, had already caused a major political turmoil and was greatly resented by key elements of the secularist establishment. The central concern was that the election of a conservative figure like Gu l to the highest echelons of the state would represent a direct violation of ̈ the secular order – one of the founding principles of the Turkish Republic. The presidential election
process initially ended in a stalemate. However, after July 2007 the AKP with its vastly increased majority and the additional support it enjoyed from the MHP deputies was comfortably placed to generate two-thirds of the vote needed in the parliament to secure Gu l’s presidency. Indeed, Gu ̈l ̈ emerged as the new president in August 2007 in a relatively smooth transition, especially when compared to the amount of controversy that had accompanied the announcement of his candidacy in the first plac

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Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 30 /341

Suiter Pre-season Yeah!

AKP Bad-Turkish-Israeli Relations [1/2]
AKP alienates Israel-increases Turkey’s Islamic fundamentalism Freedman 7-2 Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins
[Freedman, Robert O. “Why the Islamic democracy rocked ties with Israel and the West.” The Jewish Times 7-2-10. http://www.jewishtimes.com/index.php/jewishtimes/news/jt/cover_story/turkeys_tarnish/19498] In the case of Israel and Turkey, initially there were both common interests and common values when the relationship between the two countries reached its zenith in the late 1990s, as both countries opposed Syria and were the only genuine democracies in the authoritarian Middle East. In the last decade, however, and especially since the coming to power of the Islamic AKP (Justice and Development) Party in 2002, relations between the two countries have deteriorated as their

common interests disappeared, and Turkey was transformed from a secularist democracy to an increasingly intolerant Islamic state. Indeed, the future of the Turkish-Israeli relationship appears to depend upon whether the AKP is again victorious in next year’s Turkish election Relations key to Middle East Stability The Middle East Quarterly 02
[Sherman, Martin. “Formula for Stability: Turkey Plus Israel.” Volume IX. Number Four. Fall 2002. http://www.meforum.org/511/formula-for-stability-turkey-plus-israel] The dramatic events of September 11 constitute a watershed for the international system, irrefutably demonstrating the severity of the threat of international terrorism and radical Islamism to liberal democracies. Concepts such as "democratic peace" and "zero tolerance of terror," which had been mere slogans, have now been infused with new meaning. The rallying of democracies that face similar military and terrorist threats will define the world order in the coming phase. The Middle East is fast on its way to becoming the principle generator of these threats. This opens new vistas for the Israeli-Turkish relationship, as a counterweight to the menace of radical forces. The entente began in a convergence of the interests of two countries. It could well develop as the pillar

of a wider security architecture for the Middle East, encouraged by the United States and Europe, with the objective of keeping theocratic extremism and martial despotism in check. There are four major messages that the entente should convey to the region and beyond: It is aimed at providing increased security and stability in the Middle East and beyond. It demonstrates the merits (both in
moral and political terms) of democratic regimes and the benefits inherent in the effective consolidation of cooperation between them. It is not motivated by any aggressive designs and is not directed against third parties. It is open to other like-minded regional actors, thanks to its informal structure and non-aggressive objectives.

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Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 31 /341

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Mid East Instability Leads to Nuclear War Morgan, Political Writer, 07

AKP Bad-Israeli-Turkish Relations [2/2]

(Stephen J., Political Writer and Former Member of the British Labour Party Executive Committee, “Better another Taliban Afghanistan, than a Taliban NUCLEAR Pakistan!?”, 9-23, http://www.freearticlesarchive.com/article/_Better_another_Taliban_Afghanistan__than_a_Taliban_NUCLEAR_Pakis tan___/99961/0/) However events may prove him sorely wrong. Indeed, his policy could completely backfire upon him. As the war intensifies, he has no guarantees that the current autonomy may yet burgeon into a separatist movement. Appetite comes with eating, as they say. Moreover, should the Taliban fail to re-conquer al of Afghanistan, as looks likely, but captures at least half of the country, then a Taliban Pashtun caliphate could be established which would act as a magnet to separatist Pashtuns in Pakistan. Then, the likely break up of Afghanistan along ethnic lines, could, indeed, lead the way to the break up of Pakistan, as well. Strong centrifugal forces have always bedevilled the stability and unity of Pakistan, and, in the context of the new world situation, the country could be faced with civil wars and popular fundamentalist uprisings, probably including a militaryfundamentalist coup d’état. Fundamentalism is deeply rooted in Pakistan society. The fact that in the year following 9/11, the most popular name given to male children born that year was “Osama” (not a Pakistani name) is a small indication of the mood. Given the weakening base of the traditional, secular opposition parties, conditions would be ripe for a coup d’état by the fundamentalist wing of the Army and ISI, leaning on the radicalised masses to take power. Some form of radical, military Islamic regime, where legal powers would shift to Islamic courts and forms of shira law would be likely. Although, even then, this might not take place outside of a protracted crisis of upheaval and civil war conditions, mixing fundamentalist movements with nationalist uprisings and sectarian violence between the Sunni and minority Shia populations. The nightmare that is now Iraq would take on gothic proportions across the continent. The prophesy of an arc of civil war over Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq would spread to south Asia, stretching from Pakistan to Palestine, through Afghanistan into Iraq and up to the Mediterranean coast. Undoubtedly, this

would also spill over into India both with regards to the Muslim community and Kashmir. Border clashes, terrorist attacks, sectarian pogroms and insurgency would break out. A new war, and possibly nuclear war, between Pakistan and India could no be ruled out. Atomic Al Qaeda Should
Pakistan break down completely, a Taliban-style government with strong Al Qaeda influence is a real possibility. Such deep chaos would, of course, open a “Pandora's box” for the region and the world. With the possibility of unstable clerical and military fundamentalist elements being in control

of the Pakistan nuclear arsenal, not only their use against India, but Israel becomes a possibility, as well as the acquisition of nuclear and other deadly weapons secrets by Al Qaeda. Invading Pakistan
would not be an option for America. Therefore a nuclear war would now again become a real strategic possibility. This would bring a shift in the tectonic plates of global relations. It could usher in a new Cold War with China and Russia pitted against the US.

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Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 32 /341

Suiter Pre-season Yeah!

AKP Bad-Turkish-Israeli Relations
AKP refuses to cooperate with Israel and perpetuates anti-Semitism Freedman 7-2 Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins
[Freedman, Robert O. “Why the Islamic democracy rocked ties with Israel and the West.” The Jewish Times 7-2-10. http://www.jewishtimes.com/index.php/jewishtimes/news/jt/cover_story/turkeys_tarnish/19498] Erdogan then offered amnesty to members of the PKK who returned to Turkey peacefully from their bases in Iraqi Kurdistan. However, the major change in Turkey’s foreign policy came in the sharp deterioration of relations with Israel, which appears Erdogan himself carefully orchestrated. In January 2009, following Israel’s invasion of Gaza, Erdogan bitterly attacked Israeli President Shimon Peres at the Davos World Economic Forum. “When it comes to killing, you well know how to kill,” he said before storming out of the meeting. Upon returning home, Erdogan was greeted with cheers, perhaps convincing him that an anti-Israeli policy would play well in Turkish politics. Then, during 2009, an anti-Israel, anti-Semitic TV series depicting Israeli soldiers deliberately murdering Palestinian babies was telecast on Turkish national TV. Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon

confronted the Turkish ambassador about this and Erdogan responded by calling Israel “the greatest threat to peace in the Middle East.” Erdogan then canceled Israeli participation in the joint military exercise with the United States, which was to take place, in part, in Turkey.

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Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 33 /341

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AKP Bad-Turkish Military
AKP collapses the Turkish military-Ergenekon trials Freedman 7-2 Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins

[Freedman, Robert O. “Why the Islamic democracy rocked ties with Israel and the West.” The Jewish Times 7-2-10. http://www.jewishtimes.com/index.php/jewishtimes/news/jt/cover_story/turkeys_tarnish/19498] Re-elected in 2007 with 47 percent of the vote (compared to 37 percent in 2002), Erdogan set out immediately to

attack and weaken the Turkish military, which had strongly opposed his election. He commenced an investigation of the so-called Ergenekon plot of the Turkish Military, which Erdogan claimed sought to overthrow his government. Not only were high-ranking military officers arrested, so also were a number of his secular opponents. This angered and worried Turkish secularists.

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Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 34 /341

Suiter Pre-season Yeah!

AKP Bad-Civil Liberties
AKP kills civil liberties-arrests of open opponents to the party Freedman 7-2 Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins

[Freedman, Robert O. “Why the Islamic democracy rocked ties with Israel and the West.” The Jewish Times 7-2-10. http://www.jewishtimes.com/index.php/jewishtimes/news/jt/cover_story/turkeys_tarnish/19498]

Erdogan’s government imposed a multi-billion-dollar fine on the owner of a Turkish media outlet that opposed him, raising questions at home and in the EU about Turkey’s freedom of the press. Some thought this was related to attempts to stifle discussion of corruption charges against members of the AKP, which both sullied its reputation and lessened its chances to be re-elected. Erdogan then tried to push a series of amendments through the Turkish Parliament that, among other things, would enable him and the AKP majority to add their supporters to secular dominated judicial institutions such as the Turkish Supreme Court. While the effort failed, Erdogan secured sufficient
votes to put them to a national referendum, which will take place in September 2010. In foreign policy, Erdogan embarked on a more radical Islamic policy. He publicly welcomed Sudanese President Hassan al-Bashir, who had been indicted by the International Criminal Court for genocide. “It is not possible for a Muslim to commit genocide,” Erdogan said.

Violation of freedom negates the value of human existence and represents the greatest threat to human survival Rand 89 (Ayn Rand, Philosopher, July 1989, “The Virtue of Selfishness: A New Concept of Egoism,” p. 145) A society that robs and individual of the product of his effort, or enslaves him, or attempts to limit the freedom of his mind, or compels him to act against his own rational judgment, a society that
sets up a conflict between it’s ethics and the requirements of man’s nature – is not, strictly speaking, a society, but a mob held together by institutionalized gang-rule. Such a society destroys all values of human coexistence, has no possible justification, and represents, not a source of benefits, but the deadliest threat to man’s survival. Life on desert island is safer than and incomparably

preferable than existence in Soviet Russia or Nazi Germany.

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Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 35 /341

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AKP suppresses civil liberties-false evidence in court cases Rodrik 6-23 Professor of International Political Economy at Harvard
[Rodrik, Dani. “The Death of Turkey's Democracy.” The Wall Street Journal 6-23-10. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704009804575308182324490568.html] The AKP government has launched massive, politically motivated court cases against its opponents.

AKP Bad-Civil Liberties

Most glaring are the hundreds of current and retired military officers, lawyers, academics, and journalists who have been charged with membership in an armed terror organization, dubbed "Ergenekon," which aims to destabilize and topple the AKP government. Pursued by a group of specially appointed prosecutors, and loudly cheered by AKP-friendly and AKP-controlled media, these Ergenekon trials make a mockery of due process. They are based on indictments full of inconsistencies, rely on anonymous informants of questionable credibility, and evince systematic prosecutorial misconduct. The evidence behind the charges ranges from the insubstantial to the
blatantly manufactured. The main purpose of the prosecutions seems to be to discredit the accused and keep them under detention for as long as possible.

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Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 36 /341

Suiter Pre-season Yeah!

AKP Bad-Genocide
President Erdogan condones genocide-invitation to Sudanese al-Bashir to visit Turkey Freedman 7-2 Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins
[Freedman, Robert O. “Why the Islamic democracy rocked ties with Israel and the West.” The Jewish Times 7-2-10. http://www.jewishtimes.com/index.php/jewishtimes/news/jt/cover_story/turkeys_tarnish/19498] Erdogan’s government imposed a multi-billion-dollar fine on the owner of a Turkish media outlet that opposed him, raising questions at home and in the EU about Turkey’s freedom of the press. Some thought this was related to attempts to stifle discussion of corruption charges against members of the AKP, which both sullied its reputation and lessened its chances to be re-elected. Erdogan then tried to push a series of amendments through the Turkish Parliament that, among other things, would enable him and the AKP majority to add their supporters to secular dominated judicial institutions such as the Turkish Supreme Court. While the effort failed, Erdogan secured sufficient votes to put them to a national referendum, which will take place in September 2010. In foreign policy, Erdogan embarked on a more radical Islamic policy. He publicly welcomed Sudanese President Hassan al-Bashir, who had been indicted by the International Criminal Court for genocide. “It is not possible for a Muslim to commit genocide,” Erdogan said.

Genocide risks destruction on a global level – allowing future genocide causes extinction Campbell, Professor Of Political Science And International Relations –2001
(Kenneth J., University of Delaware, Assistant Genocide and the Global Village, p. 15-16) Regardless of where or on how small a scale it begins, the crime of genocide is the complete ideological repudiation of, and a direct murderous assault upon, the prevailing liberal international order. Genocide is fundamentally incompatible with, and destructive of an open, tolerant, democratic, free market international order. As genocide scholar Herbert Hirsch has explained: The unwillingness of the world community to take action to end genocide and political massacres is not only immoral but also impractical. [W]ithout some semblance of stability, commerce, travel, and the international and intranational interchange of goods and information are subjected to severe

disruptions. Where genocide is permitted to proliferate, the liberal international order cannot long survive. No group will be safe; every group will wonder when they will be next. Left unchecked, genocide threatens to destroy whatever security, democracy, and prosperity exists in the present international system. As Roger Smith notes: Even the most powerful nations—those armed with nuclear weapons—may end up in struggles that will lead (accidentally, intentionally, insanely) to the ultimate genocide in which they destroy not only each other, but [humankind] mankind itself, sewing the fate of the earth forever with a final genocidal effort. In this sense, genocide is a grave threat to the very fabric of the international system

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Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 37 /341

Suiter Pre-season Yeah!

AKP refuses to give Armenians protection against Azerbaijan Freedman 7-2 [Freedman, Robert O. “Why the Islamic democracy rocked ties with Israel and the West.” The Jewish
Times 7-2-10. http://www.jewishtimes.com/index.php/jewishtimes/news/jt/cover_story/turkeys_tarnish/19498] First, his initiative to improve relations with Armenia appears to have foundered as the Armenians

AKP Bad-Genocide

have refused to make concessions to Azerbaijan. As Turkish-Armenian relations began to deteriorate, Diaspora Armenians again raised the genocide issue in the U.S. Congress, and without the pro-Israeli
lobby willing to assist Turkey on the issue — which it is not, given Erdogan’s anti-Israeli rhetoric — the resolution now has a much greater chance of passing.

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Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 38 /341

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AKP Bad-Fascism
Turkish resistance has criticized AKP as being Fascist-rights suspensions Freedman 7-2 Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins

[Freedman, Robert O. “Why the Islamic democracy rocked ties with Israel and the West.” The Jewish Times 7-2-10. http://www.jewishtimes.com/index.php/jewishtimes/news/jt/cover_story/turkeys_tarnish/19498 Finally, the main Turkish opposition party, the CHP, has a new and vibrant leader in Kemal Kilicdaroglu. He has criticized Erdogan’s domestic policy as creating an “empire of fear” in Turkey, and has gone so far as to accuse the Erdogan government of being fascistic. He also has raised questions about Erdogan’s links to the IHH and has suggested that the Turkish government could have prevented the flotilla confrontation. Even one of the CHP’s spiritual leaders, Fethullah Gulen, has questioned Erdogan’s policy in the flotilla incident

Totalitarianism outweighs extinction because it destroys all positive value to life. Caplan Department of Economics and Center for Study of Public Choice 06
[Bryan, at George Mason University, “The Totalitarian Threat,” January 06] It is obviously harder to refine my numbers than it is to refine estimates of the probability of an extinction-level asteroid impact. The regularities of social science are neither as exact nor as

enduring as the regularities of physical science. But this is a poor argument for taking social disasters like totalitarianism less seriously than physical disasters like asteroids. We compare accuratelymeasured to inaccurately-measured things all the time. Which is worse for a scientist to lose: 1 point
of IQ, or his "creative spark"? Even though IQ is measured with high accuracy, and creativity is not, loss of creativity is probably more important. Finally, it is tempting to minimize the harm of a social disaster like totalitarianism, because it would probably not lead to human extinction. Even in Cambodia, the totalitarian regime with the highest death rate per-capita, 75% of the population remained alive after three years of rule by the Khmer Rouge. (Margolin 1999b) But perhaps an eternity of totalitarianism would be worse than extinction. It is hard to read Orwell and not to wonder: Do you begin to see, then, what kind of world we are creating? It is the exact opposite of the stupid hedonistic Utopias that the old reformers imagined. A world of fear and treachery and

torment, a world of trampling and being trampled upon, a world which will grow not less but more merciless as it refines itself. Progress in our world will be progress towards more pain. The old
civilizations claimed that they were founded on love or justice. Ours is founded upon hatred. In our world there will be no emotions except fear, rage, triumph and self-abasement. Everything else we shall destroy – everything... There will be no loyalty, except loyalty towards the Party. There will be no love, except the love of Big Brother. There will be no laughter, except for the laugh of triumph over a defeated enemy. There will be no art, no literature, no science. When we

are omnipotent we shall have no more need of science. There will be no distinction between beauty and ugliness. There will be no curiosity, no enjoyment of the process of life. All competing pleasures
will be destroyed. (1983: 220)

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Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 39 /341

Suiter Pre-season Yeah!

‡‡‡ Middle East Stability Adv. ‡‡‡

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Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 40 /341

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AT: Middle East Stability Adv (1/3)
No Iran prolif- intelligence is politicized and false SCHOENFELD, Ph.D. from Harvard University's Department of Government, July 19, 2010 (GABRIEL, The Wall
Street Journal, <<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704293604575342941580221462.html#>> DA: July 19, 2010, SL) U.S. intelligence has already had two horrendously costly lapses this decade: the failure to interdict the plot of Sept. 11, 2001, and the erroneous assessment that Saddam Hussein was amassing weapons of mass destruction. Both brought us into wars. A third failure may now be unfolding, with consequences that might dwarf the preceding two. To avoid this, we need an inquest. The status of Iran's nuclear program is the issue. In December 2007, our intelligence agencies put out a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), which in its opening sentence baldly declared that "We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program." In a stroke, this authoritative pronouncement eliminated any possibility that President Bush, then entering his final year in office, would

order a military strike against Iran's nuclear facilities. Perhaps even more significantly, it undercut White House and international efforts to tighten sanctions on Iran. After all, if the Iranian nuclear program had been halted in 2003, what would be the point? But the NIE, or at least the unclassified summary around which public discussion revolved, was badly flawed. It relegated to a footnote the all-important fact that the most difficult part of a bomb project—"uranium conversion and enrichment"—was proceeding apace. The only thing that Tehran was said by the NIE to have stopped was "weaponization," the design of an actual warhead. This is the technically least complex facet of the enterprise. Behind the scenes, the intelligence services of Germany, Great Britain, France and Israel all took issue with the NIE. It became the subject of fierce criticism in Congress and the press. It is now clear that while the U.S. dithered, Tehran forged ahead. Evidence has surfaced that the flawed 2007 NIE was the result of political cookery. Paul Pillar, a former top analyst at the CIA, has frankly acknowledged that in downgrading the Iranian nuclear threat analysts may well have had policy implications foremost in mind. The intelligence community was severely burned for its erroneous conclusion about Iraq's WMD in 2002, which the Bush administration employed to justify going to war with Iraq. As a result, Mr. Pillar stated in a January 2008 NPR interview, "estimators might have shaped [the 2007 Iran] estimate in a way that would take this military option off the table." In his book published last year, "The Inheritance," David Sanger of the New York Times quotes Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (a former CIA chief himself) declaring "that in his whole career in intelligence he had never seen 'an NIE that had such an impact on U.S. diplomacy.' He did not mean it as a compliment." Since late last year, U.S. intelligence has been preparing a new estimate of Iran's nuclear program. The critical question is whether the forces that led to politicization in 2007 have been eradicated. Will the drafters of the new Iran NIE call the shots as they are, or will they once again use intelligence as a political lever? Already some hints are emerging. In late June, CIA Director Leon Panetta flatly declared that the Iranians "clearly are developing their nuclear capability." Regarding "weaponization," he stated that "they continue to work on designs in that area." This explicit statement is an unequivocal reversal by our nation's premier spy agency. But could this stunning turnabout somehow be every bit as politicized as the 2007 NIE? This troubling possibility cannot be overlooked. Mr. Panetta, a former congressman and Bill Clinton's White House chief of staff, is a political creature to the marrow of his bones. The turnabout on Iran that he apparently has played a role in engineering may owe in part to a paradox: Intelligence that today emphasizes the Iranian

nuclear danger is useful for precisely the same political purpose for which it was employed by intelligence analysts back in 2007, namely to take the military option off the table. Such intelligence bolsters the case for internationally

agreed-upon sanctions, the Obama administration's favored policy toward Tehran and the only course that might obviate the use of force. In pressing ahead, the Obama administration has used the intelligence agencies to provide classified briefings to foreign officials. The stronger the evidence, the stronger the case for action short of war. And to be even more specific, there are various competing timelines now circulating in the intelligence world for when Iran will have passed the nuclear point of no return. The longer the time frame, the more room is left for sanctions to work their will. Israel, which may have its own reasons for coloring intelligence, contends that we might only have 12 months left. U.S. intelligence, as is clear from various public statements and congressional testimony by ranking officials, is pushing the timeline further out, to as few as two years and as many as five. What is the right number? If we and the rest of the world are not to be surprised by an Iranian detonation, it is the critical question. We need absolute confidence that the answer, even if indeterminate, is not once again based on cooked intelligence. That is why a neutral outside panel should be brought in to scrutinize the discredited 2007 NIE and the entire estimating process in this sensitive arena. Previous intelligence lapses, like those leading up to 9/11 or with Iraq's WMDs, have been thoroughly investigated by independent commissions, unleashing potential for corrective action. Who made

mistakes and why? Are those same individuals in the process of introducing errors again? The national intelligence officer who oversaw the writing of the 2007 NIE was Vann Van Diepen. Today he is a senior official at the State Department, where he "spearheads efforts to promote international consensus on WMD proliferation."

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Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 41 /341

Suiter Pre-season Yeah!

AT: Middle East Stability Adv (2/3)
Alt causes to Middle Eastern instability- Kurdistan Vela, quoting Henri Barkley, a member of the U.S. State Department Policy Planning Staff, July 18, 2010 (Justin,
Telegraph UK, “Turkey's tourist resorts threatened with terrorist campaign” <<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/turkey/7897170/Turkeys-tourist-resorts-threatened-withterrorist-campaign.html>> DA: July 19, 2010 SL)

The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a Kurdish separatist group, has said it plans a wave of violence following the breakdown of a year-long ceasefire. The PKK strategy will target major Turkish cities, rather than just army patrols and bases in the Kurdish heartlands. These are likely to include the metropolises of western Turkey, including those popular with tourists and businessmen, which have occasionally been hit by bombings in the last decade. A triple-bombing

struck the resort of Marmaris in 2006, while a year later a suicide bomber struck a popular shopping street in the capital, Ankara. Around 2.5 million British tourists visit Turkey each year. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office last night said they advised "against all but essential travel" to the south east of Turkey due to the "high threat from terrorism". Murat Karayilan, the top commander of the PKK, said he had been left with no choice but to act following Turkish bombing raids on PKK bases in Iraq. He said the PKK would soon declare "democratic autonomy" in Kurdish regions of south-east Turkey. "If Turkey does not accept this, it is their problem," he said. The war

between the Turkish government and the PKK, which has lasted 26 years and claimed 40,000 lives, has already moved into a new phase after the collapse of a ceasefire. The prime minister, Recip Erdogan, who was under attack
for making too many concessions, has ordered bombing raids on PKK bases in Iraqi Kurdistan. The most prominent of these is the remote stronghold in the Qandil Mountains, where The Daily Telegraph was escorted for the interview along back roads hidden from the army drones circling overhead. Despite the raids and the weight of one of Nato's largest armies ranged against him, Mr Karayilan said his forces could keep up the struggle for decades more. "We are deeply rooted in the mountains and hearts of the people of Kurdistan," he said. "We are able to live another 50 years like this." Mr Erdogan's strategy is to improve strategic ties with its neighbours to the east and squeeze out opposition from the Kurds, who form a significant minority in several countries. He has built bridges with the leaders of the autonomous Kurdish region of northern Iraq, which has provided a haven for the PKK for years. Business between Turkey and northern Iraq is now worth an estimated $7 billion. In return, Ankara is now demanding the Kurdish regional government hand over Mr Karayilan and 247 PKK commanders operating from their territory. Tens of thousands of Kurds have been arrested under Turkey's harsh anti-terror laws, including 1,600 Kurdish politicians and 4,000 children. Analysts say the PKK, which is considered as terrorist group by the EU and the US and is on Britain's list of proscribed groups, threats promise a major escalation of the conflict, at a time when Turkey is in the spotlight following its championing of the Palestinian cause in Gaza. "A PKK announcement of that sort really raises the ante. You will see that Kurds will respond with support. As a result there is going to be a counter wave of repression and it will increase the tension and violence," said Henri Barkey, of the Carnegie Endowment for Peace in Washington.

Non-Unique: Turkey already acts as a diplomat within the middle east region Leverett and Leverett, Director of the New America Foundation's Iran Project, Professor of IR at Penn State AND CEO of Stratega, 9 (Flynn and Hillary, Serious Turkish Diplomacy, DA: July 19, 2010, October 29, 2009,
http://gei.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2009/what_serious_diplomacy_ looks_like_in_turkey_13765, LRD) Turkey is, of course, a member of NATO and has long had a positive economic and strategic relationship with Israel. But, working from these four principles, the Erdogan government has in recent years effected major improvements in Turkey's relations with a much wider range of Middle Eastern states, including Iran, Iraq and Syria. This opening to the broader Middle East has been very strongly in Turkey's interest. Expanding trade and investment links to Iran,

Iraq, Syria and other regional states has boosted the growth of Turkey's economy and reinforced its status as an "emerging market" of international significance. Moreover, closer ties to Middle Eastern countries, along with links to Hamas and Hezbollah, have made Ankara an increasingly important player across a wide spectrum of regional issues. Erdogan wants to position Turkey to act as a mediator between its Muslim neighbors and the West - including the United States, which needs to move beyond nice speeches by Obama and undertake concrete diplomatic initiatives to repair its standing in the Middle East. But if Washington is too shortsighted to see the necessity of realigning its relations with key Middle Eastern actors such as Iran, the Erdogan government's opening to the broader Middle East gives Ankara a wider array of strategic options for pursuing Turkish interests -- the essence of successful diplomacy.

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Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 42 /341

Suiter Pre-season Yeah!

AT: Middle East Stability Adv (3/3)
Turkey can’t negotiate- bad relations with Israel Al-Ahram Weekly 7/16 The writer is associate professor in Middle Eastern history and politics at Bilkent University.
(7/16/10, " Obama's collapse ", http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2010/1007/op23.htm, gwy) Turkey has told Israel that it either apologises and pays compensation, or it agrees to a proper international inquiry. The response from Netanyahu and Lieberman has been abusive. Turkey has done its best to play a bridging role in the Middle East in line with its policy of "zero problems" on its borders. With a state like Israel this is impossible unless Turkey is to follow the example of Arab governments and do nothing. Turkey is already downgrading relations with Israel. The end point of this process may be the suspension of relations or their calibrated reduction to a bare minimum. It is a sign of the madness gripping Israel that it should now have picked a fight with the only country in the Middle East with which it had amicable relations and indeed a strategic working relationship. Obama has backed down but the message coming out of Ankara is that Turkey will not.

Sanctions solve for Iran prolif—Coughlin doesn’t assume UN involvement USA TODAY 6/17 (Aamer Madhani, 6/17/10, "U.S. announces more sanctions against Iran", lexis, MK)
Treasury Department said Wednesday that it would penalize an Iranian bank and several Iranian companies and individuals it says are deeply involved in developing Iran's nuclear program. The targets include five companies and 90 ships that Iran used to evade three previous rounds of sanctions, said Stuart Levey, Treasury's undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence. Levey said Iran even renamed and repainted some ships to try to evade recognition. "To be truly effective in ending Iran's proliferation activities and Iran's support for terrorism, we need to have in place a concerted, international approach," Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner said. He said he expects other countries to announce their own sanctions against Iran soon. "This is not something the United States can do alone." The announcement came a week after the United Nations Security Council approved a fourth round of sanctions. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said his country will not make "one iota of concessions" and said that it will build four new reactors for medical research. Iran has repeatedly claimed its nuclear work is for peaceful purposes. Ahmadinejad said he will soon set new conditions for talks with the West, but
WASHINGTON -- The first he wants to punish world powers for imposing sanctions. The U.S. has no trade with Iran, but the Treasury's move cuts off the newly designated businesses from the U.S. financial system and makes it difficult for them to do business with the rest of the world, said Gary Hufbauer, a fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics who is a former Treasury official. Hufbauer said the sanctions will be more potent if

European nations also adopt them. "What the U.S. is doing is a slap on the wrist, but if we get other countries on board it would also be a slap on the face," he said. The list also targets two individuals and four organizations tied to Iran's Revolutionary Guards Corps, which the U.S. says plays a role in Iran's missile program and supports terrorism. The new sanctions were praised by Rep. Howard Berman, a California Democrat who is chairman of House Foreign Affairs Committee. He said they would go a long way toward "persuading Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment program."

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‡‡‡ Accidents Adv. ‡‡‡

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AT: Accidents Adv
TNWs are safe- no escalation or detonation Arbman and Thornton 05 (“Russia's Tactical Nuclear Weapons Part II: Technical Issues and Policy
Recommendations,”) operational planning is intended to minimize the collateral damage that may be caused by TNW detonations, the discussion below will demonstrate that this objective is a low priority: “It should be noted that nuclear deterrence is realized by demonstrating real capabilities and the resolve to inflict sufficiently powerful strikes on the enemy leading to such damage where he cannot gain any advantages as a result of an attack on (or a continuation of aggression against) the Russian Federation and its allies. The scale of use of nonstrategic nuclear weapons must conform to the missions to be accomplished that stem above all from the degree of threat and the expected enemy reaction, with minimization of collateral damage.”38
Despite Russian claims, such as the following statement by two Russian military scholars, that its

No accidents a. locks and expert is needed to operate Arbman and Thornton 05 (“Russia's Tactical Nuclear Weapons Part II: Technical Issues and Policy
Recommendations,”) a necessary – though certainly not sufficient – condition to achieve a nuclear explosion with the acquired weapon, is to have access to an expert with sufficient knowledge about the particular type of weapon acquired. This would have to be a technically trained person, well acquainted with the physical, mechanical and electronic specifics of the warhead. Some acquaintance of the operational procedures involved in exploding it is yet another necessary requirement. Second, as elaborated in some detail in section II-3.1.4 of this report, these weapons invariably have locks that must be unlocked, in principle presenting a formidable barrier against unauthorized use. The question how easy or difficult it is to break or circumvent these locks without access to the codes necessary to unlock a particular weapon is difficult to assess.
Let us assume that a nuclear weapon has been illegally obtained one way or another. First,

b. storage is separated Arbman and Thornton 05 (“Russia's Tactical Nuclear Weapons Part II: Technical Issues and Policy
Recommendations,”) the most significant step Russia has taken, initiated during the Soviet period, is to separate a warhead’s triggering fuse from the warhead itself during storage. One retired senior military officer stated recently: “As far as storage facilities are concerned, the protection levels [for TNWs] are the same as it is for strategic nuclear weapons. The security systems, the control systems are all the same. Moreover, I will tell you a small secret. Marshall Sergeyev, when he was Minister of Defense, instituted certain technical measures for these small tactical nuclear weapons. These measures were implemented. The idea is that the hardware is kept separate from the actual nuclear weapon – they are separated in distance from each other.”87
Fourth, and perhaps

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‡‡‡ Syria-Israel Relations Adv. ‡‡‡

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Syria – Israel Frontline
1. Removing TNWs from turkey doesn’t solve – the reason Israel refuses to have talks in Turkey is because they view Turkey as biased and don’t like Israel for obvious reasons such as Flotilla. Israel has no objection that Turkey is helping out the US by holding its TNWs 2. No Internal Link to Water Wars – even if they solve the Syria-Israel any war in the middle east will be over water and they say war is inevitable – no solvency 3. Water Wars theory is wrong – Indus Basin proves how Pakistan and India were able to cooperate over shortages despite tensions and aggressive public propaganda UNDALA Z. ALAM, International Water Resources Director and research officer at Center for Water Science, 02

(“Questioning the water wars rationale: a case study of the Indus Waters Treaty”, The Geographical Journal, Vol. 168, NO. 4, December 2002, pp. 341-353) The water wars rationale would suggest that India and Pakistan should have gone to war over the Indus basin. Despite water scarcity, competitive use, Pakistan's absolute dependency upon the basin and the wider dispute involving a series of issues including Kashmir, the two countries cooperated instead. With the good offices of the World Bank, India and Pakistan negotiated the Indus Waters Treaty over a period of nine years, signing it in September 1960. The principal expla- nation for this Indo-Pakistan cooperation is based upon the finances that the Treaty brought with it in the Indus Basin Development Fund. However, the financial explanation is inadequate, as it does not explain why the countries cooperated over nine years so that there was a treaty to finance. Nor does it explain the repeated negotiations for the temporary ad hoc agreements that supplied water to Pakistan during the larger negotiations for a comprehensive agreement. An alternative explanation is that India and Pakistan cooperated because it was water rational. In other words, cooperation was needed to safe- guard the countries' long-term access to shared water. This suggests that the issues of water scarcity, competitive use and a wider conflict do not necessarily lead to war, since war cannot guarantee a country's water supply in the long term. However, the nature of the Indo-Pakistan cooperation was shaped by the wider tensions between the two countries. Therefore, it was specifically over water and did not lead to an easing of tensions over other areas of dispute such as Kashmir, and at times the negotiations were tense, with the delegations showing their reluctance to move from their established positions. That India and Pakistan did not wage war over the Indus waters, despite their prime candidacy for a water war, leads to a questioning of the water wars rationale. The rationale is based upon three principal building blocks - water scarcity, a
wider conflict and bellicose public statements. The first two blocks - water scarcity and a wider conflict have already been brought into question else- where. The use of the last building block - bellicose public statements by key decisionmakers - to fore- cast a war over water is also found wanting. From the Indus basin experience, the disconnection between political rhetoric and action by govern- ments is highlighted.

India and Pakistan have during the negotiations in the 1950s, and more recently in 2002, shown their commitment to cooperating over the Indus basin despite public statements made by senior decisionmakers in
government. 2 The Bank's archives are closed to the general public, though greater disclosure policies are being adopted. Thus far, access has been limited with only Gulhati (1973), as Head of the Indian delegation, using some of the material. Michel (1967), who wrote the other key text on the Indus basin negotiations, relied predominantly on interviews. 3 Water's role as integral to all environmental and societal processes has been extensively documented. Some key texts include Biswas (1986 1997); Postel (1992); Lowi (1993); Gleick (1993b); Dinar and Wolf (1994); Bingham et al. (1994); Kliot (1994); Rogers and Lydon (1994); World Bank (1994); Allan and Mallat (1995); Wolf (1995). 4 A separate dispute over the Indus waters existed prior to partition between the provinces of Punjab and Sindh. They had separately extended their irrigation networks using the Sutlej and the Indus rivers, respectively. Sindh was concerned that the Punjab's planned works on the Sutlej River would diminish the inflow to the Indus River and therefore harm its existing and planned uses. To resolve the dispute, the Government of India set up two commissions - the 1935 Anderson Commission and the 1941 Indus Commis- sion (or Rau Commission). However, partition interrupted the dispute's resolution by changing the political geogra- phy and parties involved. 5 The Indus River rises in the Himalayas, empties into the Arabian Sea and has six main tributaries - from the west, the Kabul River, and from the east, the Sutlej, Beas, Ravi, Chenab and Jhelum rivers (see Figure 1). 6 For a detailed description of the negotiations see Michel (1967); Gulhati (1973) or Alam (1998). 7 Water irrational acts jeopardize a state's long-term water security in terms of quantity and quality. For example, tapping an aquifer beyond its

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recharge rate. Or in the midst of the water-rational Indus basin negotiations, India and Pakistan continued irrigation practices that damaged the quality of their water resources in the mid- to long- term. 8 Only the Jhelum River rises in Kashmir, others flow through the province. 9 The Ravi, Beas and Sutlej rivers irrigate land in India.

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Syria – Israel Frontline
4. Their New York Times Evidence quotes the Israeli Prime Minister saying he was ''ready to go anywhere in the world, at any time, to open peace talks with Syria without preconditions.'' Contradicts there card that Israel won’t use Turkey in the Status quo. 5. Their New York Times evidence also says ''the only value truly important to [Syrian Leaders] is power.'' i.e. not water as their Darwish card speculates 6. Israel-Syrian War Inevitable – consistent back and forth threats will not end until war David Schenker 10, diector of the Program on Arab Politics at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 6/2010 (“Is Israel
Facing War with Hizbullah and Syria?”, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 22 6 April 2010 , http://www.jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/ShowPage.asp?DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=111&FID=283&PID=0&IID=3647)

In February 2010, tensions spiked between Israel and its northern neighbors. First, Syrian and Israeli officials engaged in a war of words, complete with dueling threats of regime change and targeting civilian populations. Weeks later, Hizbullah leader Hassan Nasrallah pledged to go toe-to-toe with Israel in the next war.1 Then, toward the end of the month, Israel began military maneuvers in the north. Finally, on February 26, Syrian President Bashar Assad hosted Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Nasrallah for an unprecedented dinner meeting in Damascus. Concerns about Israeli hostilities with Hizbullah are nothing new, but based on recent pronouncements from Damascus, if the situation degenerates, fighting could take on a regional dimension not seen since 1973. In January and February, Syrian officials indicated that, unlike during the 2006 fighting in Lebanon, Damascus would not "sit idly by" in the next war.2 While these statements may be bravado, it's not difficult to imagine Syria being drawn into the conflict. The Israeli government has taken steps to alleviate tensions, including, most prominently, Prime Minister Netanyahu issuing a gag order forbidding his ministers to discuss Syria.3 Still, the situation in the north remains volatile. Within a three-day span in mid-March: the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) fired at Israeli jets violating Lebanese airspace;4 four Lebanese nationals were charged with spying for Israel against Hizbullah;5 and Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi told the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that the Shiite militia was "building up its forces north of the Litani (river)." Currently, according to Ashkenazi, the border was calm, "but this can change."6 It's easy to see how the situation could deteriorate. Hizbullah retaliation against Israel for the 2008 assassination of its military leader Imad Mugniyyeh could spark a war. So could Hizbullah firing missiles in retribution for an Israeli strike against Iranian nuclear facilities. The transfer of sensitive Syrian technology to the Shiite militia could also prompt an Israeli strike. Regrettably, even if Israel continues to try and diffuse tensions in the north, given the central role Tehran has in determining Hizbullah policy, a third Lebanon war may be inevitable.

7. Even if Israel tries to work with Syria - Iran will pressure Syria to go to war David Schenker, diector of the Program on Arab Politics at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 6/2010 (“Is Israel Facing
War with Hizbullah and Syria?”, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 22 6 April 2010 , http://www.jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/ShowPage.asp?DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=111&FID=283&PID=0&IID=3647)

While it's too early to predict the timing or the trigger, on Israel's northern border there appears to be a growing sense that war is coming. Iran may have an interest in maintaining Hizbullah's arsenal until an Israeli strike. Likewise, for Hizbullah, which lately has been playing up its Lebanese identity in an effort to improve its image at home, waging war on Israel on behalf of Iran could be problematic. In any event, it is all but assured that a war on Israel's northern front will be determined, at least in part, by Tehran. In early February, Israeli Minister of Defense Ehud Barak told the IDF: "In the absence of an arrangement with Syria, we are liable to enter a belligerent clash with it that could reach the point of an all-out, regional war."21 Regrettably, regardless of what happens between Syria and Israel in the coming months, the decision of

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war or peace with Hizbullah may be out of Israel's hands.

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Syria-Israel ext – Turkey-Israel Relations Low
Israel refuses to work with Turkey on any issue – relations too tense from flotillia incident JPost, Israel’s best-selling English daily, 7/2010 (“Syria: The prospect for War grows”, The Jerusalem Post,

July, 2010, http://www.jpost.com/International/Article.aspx?id=180514) Syrian President Bashar Assad warned that the current rift in Israel-Turkey relations threatens the stability of the Middle East, and said "the chances of peace grow slim, and the prospect of war grows." Speaking at a press conference in Madrid Monday, Assad said that if "relations between Israel and Turkey are not renewed, it will be very difficult for Turkey to continue its role in the [peace] negotiations." Relations between the two countries deteriorated in the wake of Israel's raid on the ship Mavi Marmara, which resulted in the death of nine Turkish citizens. Assad called Turkey a crucial part of the peace process, saying "Turkey knows the ins and outs of the Middle East," and "there was never such a significant factor as Turkey for peace talks, and the stability of the region." Relations between Israel and Turkey frayed further today after Turkey threatened to cut ties with Israel unless Israel issued a formal apology for the flotilla raid. Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman responded that Israel had "no intention of apologizing to Turkey." Last week, reports surfaced that Industry, Trade and Labor Minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer had conducted a secret meeting with Davutoglu in Zurich, causing tensions to rise between the foreign minister and Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu. “The foreign minister views very gravely the fact that this was done without informing the Foreign Ministry,” said a statement put out by Lieberman’s office.

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‡‡‡ Nuclear Secrecy Bad Adv ‡‡‡

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Nuclear Secrecy Good
Nuclear security is necessary to prevent terrorism Kestenbaum 07 (David, bachelor’s from Yale University and doctorate from Harvard, NPR correspondent,
U.S. Nuclear Warhead Numbers Are Kept Secret, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=10816625, NPR)OLW
The U.S. government announced Thursday that it has increased the rate at which it is dismantling nuclear warheads. The actual number of weapons taken apart is classified, however, as are most numbers associated with the stockpile. Some officials and lawmakers are trying to change that. Thomas D'Agostino, an official at the National Nuclear Security Administration in Washington, oversees the dismantlement work. He says taking apart a nuclear weapon requires time and care. "I don't want to make it seem this is just grab your Phillips screwdriver and start unscrewing things and taking them apart," D'Agostino said. "These are warheads that have conventional high explosives. We worry about lightning. We worry about static electricity. And we are not about to tolerate any errors in this area." D'Agostino said crews have taken apart 50 percent more nuclear warheads in the past eight months than they dismantled all year in 2006. He said he couldn't be more specific. "I am a bit frustrated I can't tell you the details," D'Agostino said. "I think it would be a good thing for you to hear them." He said the numbers reflect that the Cold War is over and that the stockpile is shrinking. Some lawmakers have expressed frustration about the policy that keeps the numbers secret: It dates back to the 1990s. U.S. Rep. David Hobson (R-OH) said at a Congressional hearing that he wants the figures made public in order to facilitate open debate about what the total number of warheads should be. "I've been pushing this for years, and the administration has resisted. I don't know why," Hobson said. "I suspect our potential adversaries know the number of U.S. nuclear warheads much better than do the members of Congress. I think I know the number, but I can't talk about it." The Department of Defense issued a statement to NPR, saying, "The basis for the security requirement ... is to deny militarily useful information to

potential or actual enemies, to enhance the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence and to contribute to the security of nuclear weapons, especially against threats of sabotage and terrorism."

Secrecy key to security National Research Council, 5 (Committee on International Security and Arms Control, Monitoring

Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear-Explosive Materials: An Assessment of Methods and Capabilities, page 183 http://books.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11265) We concluded in Chapters 2 and 3 that procedures and technology are available to verify with high confidence declarations of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and nuclear-explosive materials (NEM) at declared sites. But undeclared nuclear weapons and NEM could exist as a consequence of retention of undeclared existing nuclear weapons and NEM or could come into existence by the clandestine production of nuclear weapons from existing NEM . In addition, undeclared NEM for weapons might be produced clandestinely or diverted covertly from peaceful nuclear power programs. Current non-nuclear weapon states and possibly terrorist groups might also acquire nuclear weapons or NEM. The potential for clandestine activities in these categories poses the largest challenges to efforts to strengthen transparency and monitoring for nuclear weapons, components, and materials on a comprehensive basis.

Nuclear secrecy key to deterrence Noonan 3/4/10 (John, staff writer, The Weekly Standard, DoD releases nuclear stockpile figures,

http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/dod-releases-nuclear-stockpile-figures) Yesterday, the Obama administration released the DoD's official nuclear stockpile figures. For decades, the size and shape of America's atomic arsenal have been deliberately kept secret, and for good reason. There's always been a calculated sense of ambiguity around our nuclear forces and our deterrence strategies, with the logic being that an enemy --if left to speculate about how, when, where, and if we'd use our nukes-- would err on the side of caution and keep his fangs tucked.

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Nuclear Secrecy Good
Classification is needed to secure the U.S. National Research Council 95 (National Academy of Sciences think tank for pub policy, A review of the
Department of Energy classification policy and practice http://books.google.com/books? id=qWettBF2ZYwC&source=gbs_navlinks_s page 1-2)
DOE’s initiatives take place within a larger, government-wide effort to reexamine classification policy in the wake of the end of the Cold War. U.S. national security policy is no longer directed against the overarching threat of the Soviet Union and its allies. The

primary concern of protecting information related to nuclear weapons has shifted to stemming the threat of nuclear proliferation. This complicates some aspects of maintaining the classification system. Protecting information about old nuclear weapons designs or outdated production techniques was formerly considered important but had a lower priority simply because a sophisticated nuclear weapons power like the Soviet Union already had such information. Now, however, protecting such information is essential because the would-be nuclear powers of the greatest proliferation concern are less technically sophisticated nations or even terrorist groups, and older (or generally simpler) design and production techniques might better match the capabilities of a potential proliferator. No forseeable new nuclear state would pose a threat to the United States and its allies comparable to the threat from the former Soviet bloc. Thus, information that could have helped the Soviet bloc war planners such as the size and composition of fissionable materials inventories or data on most past nuclear weapons activities (but not designs) that might reveal present total capability, is not longer as sensitive as it was once believed to be. Classification policy must reflect a balance of opposing values. Powerful and compelling reasons continue to exist for protecting genuinely sensitive nuclear weapons information even though considerable information is already in the public domain. Access to classified information is no longer necessary for a potential proliferator to construct a simple nuclear weapon, but such access could make it significantly easier to build such a device or to make it more effective. The Department would fail in its responsibilities if it did not protect certain design and production information, but the appropriate scope of the information that warrants such careful protection is difficult to define.

Disclosing information on stockpiles allows terrorists to seize weapons AFP 2009 (Slip-up lays bare US secret nuclear sites: NYT,
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5h8C28WJK0nKl6ADPSI4cMr1OXQmg) WASHINGTON (AFP) — The US government accidentally made public a secret report detailing its nuclear sites, programs and even exact locations of nuclear stockpiles, The New York Times reported Wednesday. "The federal government mistakenly made public (the) 266-page report ," the Times reported, noting that the blunder was revealed Monday in an online newsletter about federal secrecy. "That set off a debate among nuclear experts about what dangers, if any, the disclosures posed. It also prompted a flurry of
investigations in Washington into why the document had been made public," the Times said, adding that by late Tuesday "after inquiries from The New York Times, the document was withdrawn from a Government Printing Office Web site." House Speaker Nancy Pelosi said Wednesday she had called for an investigation into the incident. " The disclosure of information

related to nuclear facilities suggests that the current system does not provide adequate review and safeguards," she said in a statement. "Accordingly, I have asked the Government Accountability Office to
investigate immediately what led to the disclosure of this information and to make recommendations to prevent a similar disclosure in the future." Several analysts said the security breach was not devastating "given that the general outlines of the most sensitive information were already known publicly," the report said. "These screw-ups happen," the Times quoted John Deutch, a former director of central intelligence now a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, as saying. "It's going further than I would have gone but doesn't look like a serious breach." The information was described as "confidential but not classified," the Times added. David Albright, of the Institute for Science and International Security here, told the paper however that making the locations of nuclear

material available "can provide thieves or terrorists inside information that can help them seize the material, which is why that kind of data is not given out."

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‡‡‡ Deterrence Bad Adv ‡‡‡

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Deterrence is Moral
Far from being immoral, nuclear deterrence can help to prevent conflict Shaw 84 (William, Chair and Professor of Philosophy, San Jose State University, Nuclear Deterrence and Deontology p. 250-251) MAH
Suppose, however, that in order to deter Hatfield, McCoy threatens I-latfield’s family. Those who would suffer from McCoy’s threatened re- taliation would thus include some who were not guilty of launching the initial, immoral attack. This brings the analogy doser to the real world of nuclear deterrence, in which a retaliatory second strike (whether “counterforce” or "countervalue") would clearly result in the death of millions who are not culpable for the original attack. ln some circumstances nations can be viewed as corporate actors, but I know of no plausible theory of moral responsibility which, given political realities today, would hold that the citizenry of an atomic aggressor deserves decimation. Nor will any “double-think about double effect” make such a response morally permissible? McCoy may be permitted to punish Hatfield, but he cannot justifiably attack Hatfield°s innocent family in order to retaliate against Hatfield, even for the destruction of his (McCoy’s) own family. Such a response falls outside the lex talionis and would be immoral from almost any imaginable normative perspective. l shall therefore assume, though l shall not argue for it further, that it would be immoral for a nation to carry out a nuclear second strike, the threatening of which is the basis of deterrent strategy. (Note that the deontologist's case against deterrence will not get very far if this assumption is not granted, that is, if it is morally permissible to retaliate against the civilian population of the other side.) Does it follow from the above that it is immoral for McCoy to threaten to respond to Hatfield’s attack with an action which it would be immoral for him actually to carry out? A number of philosophers have held that it is indeed immoral to threaten an immoral action. Michael Walzer, for example, endorses Paul Ramsey's declaration that “whatever is wrong to do is wrong to threaten,” clearly holding that nuclear threats are immoral and that our deterrent policy is essentially a “commitment to murder." Likewise, Anthony Kenny holds that 'NATO defense policy involves a readiness to commit murder on a gigantic scale.” The threat to do so is, of course, conditional, but “one may not intend even conditionally to do what is forbidden absolutely.” lf deterrence is successful, of course, then the threatened immoral action will not in fact happen. But this is not thought to make much moral difference since we are in effect holding the civilian population of the other nation hostage. Ramsey, for example, views the targeting of cities as morally equivalent to tying children to the bumpers of cars in order to ensure that people drive carefully, and Douglas Lackey contends that nuclear deterrence is analogous to McCoy kidnapping Hatfield’s child and wiring him to explosives in order to prevent Hatfield’s attack. McCoy, he says, has no right to increase the chance of Hatfeld’s child dying. On closer inspection, however, this line of reasoning is less conclusive than Ramsey and Lackey think. First, their analogies involve kidnapping, yet “holding hostage" the opposed population with nuclear weapons in no way limits its movement or activities. The mere pointing of French ICBMs at Soviet cities, scary as it may be, restricts no Soviet citi1en’s liberty. Soviet are not being tied to bumpers or wired to explosives: their lives of joy and sorrow will unfold much the same whether or not they are “held hostage.” Second, McCoy need not claim a “right” to threaten the Hatfield child (let alone to kidnap him), in the sense of putting Hatfield under an obligation not to remove his child from that threat. Rather, McCoy need only advance the weaker claim that he has no obligation not to threaten conduct harmful to Hatlield's child in order to dissuade Hatfield from an immoral action. Does Hatfield’s child have some right, which could furnish the ground of this putative obligation, not to have his life made the basis of a threat directed at his father (indeed the child himself may not know about the threat), or do the

denizens of Leningrad have a right not to have French missiles pointed their way? Talk of rights is frequently rather loose these days, but even so it is hard to see what would be the basis of these supposed rights. Third, does McCoy's threat actually increase the chance of Hatlield's child dying, as Lackey assumes? lf McCoy’s threat were a bluff, then it would not enhance the chiId’s danger. On the other hand, if the threat is real but deters successfully, then no harm comes to the youngster. Has his chance of dying nonetheless been

increased? The answer will obviously depend upon the circumstances, but if the predictable response to Hatfield's actions involves some risk to his family in any case (perhaps they will inevitably be endangered when he is pursued), then McCoy‘s threat may in fact lower the actual. though perhaps not the perceived, risk to Hatlield’s child. Many people assume that the nuclear era has made our lives more perilous, but if it were the case that the American hydrogen arsenal has prevented not just nuclear war, but a

conventional conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union that would have occurred in a non- nuclear post-World War ll world, then it may actually have increased not only our safety, but the safety of the civilians held “hostage” in the USSR.

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Deterrence is Moral
Nuclear deterrence is not deontologically immoral Shaw 84 (William, Chair and Professor of Philosophy, San Jose State University, Nuclear Deterrence and Deontology p. 250-251) MAH
Although it is easy to be misled by current talk of limited nuclear exchanges and of the importance of winning nuclear encounters, the basis of American policy has been and continues to be the deterrence of nuclear warfare . We have grown accustomed to the concept of nuclear deterrence and to the corresponding reality of mutual balance of terror, but as the political debate grows, the strategy of deterrence deserves renewed ethical scrutiny. Technical

discussions of nuclear policy generally proceed along at least implicitly utilitarian lines. Nuclear deterrence, though widely held to be distasteful, is nonetheless presumed to be, in some form or other, justifiable as the best course of action available to us under the circumstances. Over the years, however, a number of philosophers and theologians, focusing on the moral rather than technical aspects of nuclear deterrence. have challenged it from a deontological perspective, and it is this challenge that l wish to examine. Conventional wisdom may be mistaken in supposing that
utilitarianism sanctions nuclear deterrence but such an issue involves questions of political fact and probabilities which l shall try to avoid here. In this essay I set aside the utilitarian approach in order to investigate the deontological critique of deterrence as much as possible on its own territory. After examining various grounds for rejecting a strategy of nuclear deterrence, I argue that such a strategy does not stumble over any deontological hurdles.

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AT: US Nukes Not Key to Deterrence
Claims that TNW’s no longer deter is a flawed assumption that relies on nonexistent knowledge about how future leaders will react to nuclear threats Payne 9 (Keith, President and co-founder of the National Institute for Public Policy, On Nuclear Deterrence and Assurance,
http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2009/Spring/payne.pdf) MAH

Some contemporary commentators take the plausible cases described above to the extreme and assert that US nuclear weapons now offer little or no added value for deterrence over nonnuclear capabilities. The rationale for this assertion is derived from the old balance of terror formula: predictable deterrent effect is equated to the United States’ capability to threaten the destruction of a select set of opponents’ tangible, physical targets. Consequently, if nonnuclear weapons now can threaten to destroy most or all of that set of targets, then nuclear weapons supposedly no longer are of value for deterrence. The vulnerability of the designated targets, not the specific US instrument of threat, is expected to determine the deterrent effect. The first of these propositions—that deterrent effect can be equated to target coverage—is fundamentally flawed. The second also is highly suspect; it certainly is possible to hope that US nuclear weapons no longer are critical for deterrence, just as it is possible to hope that all leaders will learn to be responsible and prudent. To assert confidently that US nuclear weapons no longer are valuable for deterrence purposes, however, is to claim knowledge about how varied contemporary and future leaders in diverse and often unpredictable circumstances will interpret and respond to the distinction between nuclear and nonnuclear threats. Those who make such a claim presume knowledge that they do not and cannot have . In addition, a popular
refrain of some commentators is that US nuclear weapons should be considered useful only for deterring nuclear attack.2 This is not, and has not been, US deterrence policy. The only apparent rationale for this assertion is to buttress the claim that the deterrence value of nuclear weapons is narrow in scope and purpose and that the commentators’ favored steps toward nuclear disarmament could eliminate even that value; if deterring nuclear threats is the only purpose for US nuclear weapons, they will then have no unique value if others move away from nuclear weapons. This

proposition is logical but artificially narrow. It misses other severe nonnuclear threats to the United States and allies that may not be deterred reliably absent US nuclear capabilities, such as threats posed by chemical and biological weapons (CBW). Commentators can claim for political reasons that US nuclear capabilities should be considered pertinent for deterring only nuclear threats but CBW threats are real and growing and there is no basis to conclude that US nonnuclear capabilities would suffice to deter them. Even if the vision of the complete worldwide elimination On Nuclear Deterrence and Assurance Strategic Studies Quarterly ♦ Spring 2009 [
45 ] of nuclear weapons were to be realized, CBW threats would remain. The most that can be said in this regard is that US nuclear weapons might or might not be necessary for this deterrence goal—hardly a robust basis for making profound policy decisions about the most fundamental security questions.

US Nuclear weapons can successfully deter threats Payne 9 (Keith, President and co-founder of the National Institute for Public Policy, On Nuclear Deterrence and Assurance,
http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2009/Spring/payne.pdf) MAH

The question in this scenario is whether US nonnuclear capabilities alone would constitute an adequate basis for this deterrence message. As noted above, there is no useful a priori answer to this question. Some plausible circumstances, however, suggest the potential unique value of nuclear threats.
For example, if a pitched conventional conflict is in progress and the opponent already has been subjected to an intense US campaign of nonnuclear “shock and awe,” could the threat of further US nonnuclear fire in response to an opponent’s CBW attack be decisive in the opponent’s decision making? The United States could threaten to set aside some targeting

limitations on its nonnuclear forces for this deterrence purpose.

Would such a nonnuclear threat dominate the opponent’s calculation of risk, cost, and gain? Or, might it look like “more of the same” and have little prospect of being decisive in the opponent’s decision making? The answers to such questions certainly are not so self-evident as to suggest that US nuclear threats would provide no unique added deterrent value.

Nuclear weapons may be so much more lethal and distinguishable from nonnuclear threats that, on occasion, they can deter an opponent who would not otherwise be susceptible to control. Strategic nuclear threats have the potentially important advantages of extreme lethality from afar and a relatively obvious firebreak. These could be important qualities to deter CBW first or second use and to help deter future third-party CBW use. Clinton administration secretary of defense Les Aspin rightly pointed to the prospective value of US nuclear weapons for the deterrence of CBW threats given the proliferation of the latter: “Since the United States has forsworn chemical and biological weapons, the role of US nuclear forces in deterring or responding to such nonnuclear threats must be considered.”

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Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 58 /341

Suiter Pre-season

AT: US Nukes Not Key to Deterrence
Even if they are not useful for fighting wars, nuclear weapons are still successful deterrents Payne 9 (Keith, President and co-founder of the National Institute for Public Policy, On Nuclear Deterrence and Assurance,
http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2009/Spring/payne.pdf) MAH

Linking the assertion that there are few, if any, necessary “combat” roles for nuclear weapons to the conclusion that nuclear weapons lack deterrence value is a non sequitur, even if true. Nuclear weapons could be deemed to have no value whatsoever for combat missions and remain absolutely key to the deterrence of war and the assurance of allies. Deterrence involves exploiting opponents’ fears and sensitivities and may have little or no connection to US preferences for the wartime employment of force for combat missions. Assurance, in turn, requires the easing of allies’ fears and sensitivities, which again may have little or nothing to do with how the United States might prefer to terminate a conflict.
Whether US nuclear capabilities are regarded as useful or not “to fight or terminate a conventional conflict” may tell us nothing about their potential value for the political/psychological purposes of assurance and punitive deterrence. Deterrence, assurance,

and war fighting are different functions with possibly diverse and separate standards for force requirements. The potentially different force standards for these different goals should not be confused. This most basic confusion was apparent during the congressional discussions of the Robust

Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP). The RNEP evolved from studies conducted during the Clinton administration and subsequently was pursued by the Bush administration as potentially important for deterrence purposes.6 Yet, some congressional opponents of the RNEP pointed to the apparent lack of a “specific military requirement” as a basis for their opposition.7 One prominent member of Congress stated that no “military requirement for a nuclear earth penetrator” has been “articulated to me.”

Israeli – Iraqi conflict proves threats can be deterred with nuclear weapons Payne 9 (Keith, President and co-founder of the National Institute for Public Policy, On Nuclear Deterrence and Assurance,

http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2009/Spring/payne.pdf) MAH Whether or not nuclear weapons are considered useful for combat missions or have been asked for by military commanders, a quick review of available evidence points toward their potentially unique value or deterrence and assurance. For example, in the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq launched 88 conventionally armed Scud missiles against targets in Israel and Saudi Arabia; those missile strikes continued until the end of the war. In Israel and the United States there was concern that Iraq would use chemical weapons.9 The anticipation of such attacks led Israeli citizens to take shelter in specially sealed rooms and to wear gas masks. Although Iraq did not employ chemical or biological warheads, Scud strikes directly inflicted more than 250 Israeli casualties and were indirectly responsible for a dozen deaths, including children, resulting from the improper use of gas masks.10 UN officials have stated that Iraqi bombs and missiles contained enough biological agents to kill hundred of thousands,11 and US officials have confirmed that if Iraq had used available biological weapons, the military and civilian casualty levels could have been horrific.12 Saddam Hussein was neither a philanthropist nor particularly humane. Why then did he not use the available chemical or biological weapons? Was he deterred by the prospect of nuclear retaliation? Israeli commentators frequently suggest that the apparent Israeli nuclear threat deterred Iraqi chemical use. In this regard it should be noted that during a CNN interview on 2 February 1991, then-US defense secretary Dick Cheney was asked about the potential for Israeli nuclear retaliation to Iraqi chemical strikes. Secretary Cheney observed that this would be a decision that ‘‘the Israelis would have to make—but I would think that [Hussein] has to be cautious in terms of how he proceeds in his attacks against Israel.” The following day, when asked about Secretary Cheney’s statement, Israeli defense minister Moshe Arens replied, “I think he said that Saddam has reasons to worry—yes, he does have reasons to worry.”13 This reply, and Secretary Cheney’s original statement—in which he did not object to the premise of the question about the possibility of Israeli nuclear retaliation, at least to Israeli analysts—was key to deterring Iraqi chemical weapons use.14

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Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 59 /341

Suiter Pre-season

TNW’s in Europe K2 US and Euro Defense
US TNW’s in Europe deter against threats McNamara, Spring 9 (Sally McNamara, Senior Policy Analyst, European Affairs, Baker Spring,
F.M. Kirby Research Fellow in National Security Policy, Presedent Obama must not remove Nuclear Weapons from Europe, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/03/President-Obama-Must-Not-Remove-Nuclear-Weapons-from-Europe) MAH From a strategic standpoint, a proactive national defense relies on the ability to defend physical

territory, as well as the ability to deter an enemy attack in the first place. In a highly dangerous world where hostile states—such as Iran and North Korea—possess both nuclear and conventional forces capable of striking the U.S. and its allies, a credible nuclear deterrence, not unilateral disarmament, is the best chance for peace. Therefore, the U.S., in consultation with its allies, should use nuclear weapons in Europe and in the U.S. to protect and defend the U.S. and its allies against strategic attack. This position is consistent with a more defensive, broader strategic posture that would
require the deployment of robust defensive systems, including ballistic missile defenses. This posture would also require modernizing the nuclear weapons in the U.S. arsenal, including their delivery systems, to make them better suited to destroying targets that are likely to be used to launch strategic attacks against the U.S. and its allies, as well as targets whose destruction requires the more powerful force of nuclear weapons. These targets could include missiles in hardened silos, deeply buried command and control facilities, and heavily protected nuclear weapons depots.

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Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 60 /341

Suiter Pre-season

TNWs Would Be Replaced
We won’t just leave Turkey undefended- TNWs would be replaced with conventional weapons Sokov 09 (Nikolai, Senior Research Associate CNS NIS Nonproliferation Program Center for Nonproliferation Studies, German

Leadership 6(4), Tactical (Substrategic) Nuclear Weapons, http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/090717_german_leadership/german_leadership_6_issue_4.pdf) The Obama administration has already raised concerns among NATO’s Eastern European members by its decision to slow deployment of the U.S. missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic. This slowdown may be particularly painful because the latter countries have invested considerable political resources to push through the decision to deploy the defenses that were perceived as highly important for Washington, but faced considerable opposition domestically in the two Eastern European states. Withdrawing TNW, a perceived symbol of U.S. commitment, in this light—and so soon after the conflict in Georgia—carries risks for alliance cohesion, regardless of the weapons’ military utility . Likewise,

the wavering response of NATO to Turkish requests for conventional deployments in the run-up to the 1991 and 2003 Iraq wars, the ongoing tension between Turkey and the EU over the former’s membership in the Union, and the bitter legacy of Turkish-U.S. relations in the Bush administration have raised questions in Ankara about NATO’s commitment to its security that would be seriously exacerbated by the removal of TNW from that country. Thus, the issue of maintaining the American security “umbrella” in the absence of TNW should be handled with utmost care, especially where “new” members of NATO and Turkey are concerned . The
congressional strategic posture commission underscored the importance of this issue in its recently released report, indicating that, “All allies depending on the U.S. nuclear umbrella should be assured that any changes in its

[nuclear] forces do not imply a weakening of the U.S extended nuclear deterrence guarantees. They could perceive a weakening if the United States (and NATO) does not maintain other elements of the current arrangement than the day-to-day presence of U.S. nuclear bombs.”30 To shore up the NATO commitment absent TNW, some experts have suggested, for example, conducting real operational contingency planning for a Russian conventional attack on the Baltics. At the same time, it is necessary to keep in mind that an attempt to create a more tangible security commitment, whether in the form of deployment of conventional forces or explicit contingency planning for response to a potential Russian attack, is likely to be seen in Moscow

as an increase in the level of threat from NATO. There is real danger of sliding into a classic security dilemma—an attempt to defend against potential Russian threat could be regarded as a threat in itself.

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Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 61 /341

Suiter Pre-season

TNWs Would Be Replaced
If TNWs were removed, the US would develop assymetrical conventional weapons Bell and Loehrke 9 (Alexandra and Benjamin, Ploughshares Fund, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-status-of-us-nuclear-weapons-turkey) BAF
Today, Turkey hosts an estimated 90 B61 gravity bombs at Incirlik Air Base. Fifty of these bombs are reportedly PDF assigned for delivery by U.S. pilots, and forty are assigned for delivery by the Turkish Air Force. However, no permanent

nuclear-capable U.S. fighter wing is based at Incirlik, and the Turkish Air Force is reportedly not certified for NATO nuclear missions, meaning nuclear-capable F-16s from other U.S. bases would need to be brought in if Turkey's bombs were ever needed. Such a relaxed posture makes clear just how little NATO relies on tactical nuclear weapons for its defense anymore. In fact, the readiness of NATO's nuclear forces now is measured in months as opposed to hours or days. Supposedly, the weapons are still deployed as a matter of deterrence, but the crux of deterrence
is sustaining an aggressor's perception of guaranteed rapid reprisal--a perception the nuclear bombs deployed in Turkey cannot significantly add to because they are unable to be rapidly launched. Aggressors are more likely to be deterred by

NATO's conventional power or the larger strategic forces supporting its nuclear umbrella. So in effect, U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Turkey are without military value or purpose .
That means removing them from the country should be simple, right? Unfortunately, matters of national and international security are never that easy.

TNWs would be replaced once withdrawn- won’t leave Turkey stranded Bell and Loehrke 9 (Alexandra and Benjamin, Ploughshares Fund, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-status-of-us-nuclear-weapons-turkey) BAF
A prescription for withdrawal. Preventing Turkey (and any other country in the region) from acquiring nuclear weapons is critical to international security. Doing so requires a key factor that also is essential to paving the way toward withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons: improved alliance relations. The political and strategic compasses are pointing to the eventual withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Europe--it's a strategy that certainly fits the disarmament agenda President Barack Obama has outlined. But to get there, careful diplomacy will be required to improve U.S.-Turkish ties and to assuage Turkish security concerns. The U.S.-Turkish relationship cooled when Turkey refused to participate in Operation Iraqi Freedom, after which Turkish support for U.S. policy declined through the end of the George W. Bush administration. Obama's election has helped to mend fences, and his visit to Turkey in April was warmly received. In fact, all of the administration's positive interactions with Turkey have been beneficial: Washington has supported Turkey's role as a regional energy supplier and encouraged Ankara as it undertakes difficult political reforms and works to resolve regional diplomatic conflicts. For its part, Turkey recently doubled its troop contribution to NATO's Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan--a boon to U.S. efforts there. By incorporating Ankara into its new European missile defense plans--intended to protect Turkey and other countries vulnerable to Iran's short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles--Washington could further shore up its military relationship with Turkey. Ship-based Aegis missile systems will

be the backbone of the strategy, with considerations left open for later deployments of mobile ground-based interceptors in Eastern Europe or Turkey. This cooperation could provide the bond with Washington and perception of security that Turkey seeks in the face of a potential Iranian bomb.

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Turkey Neg 62 /341

Suiter Pre-season

TNWs Would Be Replaced
If TNWs are removed, the US will defend Turkey with higher level technology weapons Warden 2010 (John, research assistant working with the Project on Nuclear Issues, “U.S. Nuclear Weapons in
Europe: An Ineffective Deterrent, Unnecessary for Assurance,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, http://csis.org/blog/us-nuclear-weapons-europe-ineffective-deterrent-and-unnecessary-assurance)

Fortunately, U.S. defense of Europe doesn’t rely on NSNW . To whatever extent nuclear weapons do deter adversaries, the United States (along with Britain and France) will continue protect NATO allies under the

umbrella of its strategic nuclear weapons (these are the weapons that would be actually used in an nuclear conflict anyway). The United States will also continue to station troops in Europe and give our allies access to effective missile defense technology. Opponents might argue that nuclear deployments are critical because they are the most stable U.S. commitment. While certainly a reasonable argument, there’s no reason other capabilities can’t be a more permanent part of the alliance in the future .
George Perkovich of the Carnegie Foundation identifies a number of far more effective commitments that the United States can make to defend NATO allies: Debate over the fate of the NATO-based nuclear bombs will be constructive only if it puts much-needed attention on the need to reduce threats in Europe and to deploy strategies and capabilities to deter and defeat at an appropriate scale those threats that cannot be removed. NATO nuclear bombs are no substitute for cyber defense and

deterrence; diversification of natural gas supply lines to reduce Russia’s coercive power; renovated confidencebuilding measures between Russia and NATO states to limit the scale and offensive character of military exercises, or if Russia refuses, enhanced forward deployment of defensive capabilities in new NATO states that would deter by denying Russia the prospect of a quick successful incursion. The moral hazard in Europe today is not in taking useless tactical nuclear weapons out, it is in pretending that they can protect allies from twenty-first century threats and doing too little in the meantime to develop capabilities and diplomatic strategies to deny those threats. A
second objection to withdrawing NSNW from Europe is allied proliferation. In particular, Miller, Robertson, and Schanke argue that U.S. nuclear weapons stationed in Turkey play an important role in dissuading Turkey from acquiring an arsenal of their own. This is certainly an important concern, especially as Iran continues to expand its nuclear program, while ignoring its obligations under the NPT. However, for the same reasons that NSNW are an ineffective deterrent, they are unlikely dissuade Turkish proliferation. According to Alexandra Bell and Benjamin Loehrke of the Ploughshares Fund, the readiness problem is even more pronounced in Turkey: Today, Turkey hosts an estimated 90 B61 gravity bombs at Incirlik Air Base. Fifty of these bombs are reportedly assigned for delivery by U.S. pilots, and forty are assigned for delivery by the Turkish Air Force. However, no permanent nuclear-capable U.S. fighter wing is based at Incirlik, and the Turkish Air Force is reportedly not certified for NATO nuclear missions, meaning nuclearcapable F-16s from other U.S. bases would need to be brought in if Turkey's bombs were ever needed. Other capabilities,

such as missile defense and strategic deterrence are more important in demonstrating U.S. commitment to Turkey (there are rumors that the United States will place an AN/TPY-2 radar in Turkey). According to Johan Bergenäs of the Monterey Institute of International Studies, “senior Turkish officials recently indicated that they ‘would not insist’ that NATO retain its forwarddeployed nuclear weapons, and that conventional forces were sufficient to satisfy Ankara's security requirements. Such a position is perhaps motivated by the knowledge that Turkey would still be covered by the U.S. strategic nuclear umbrella.”

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Turkey Neg 63 /341

Suiter Pre-season

TNWs Would Be Replaced
US is going to replace TNWs with even more accurate missiles Interfax 10 (information compiler for China, Russia and Eurasia, March 04, 2010 U.S. to replace tactical nukes
with non-nuke missiles – Kommersant, http://www.interfax.com/newsinf.asp?id=150270) The United States may replace its tactical nuclear weapons in Europe with planned nonnuclear missiles that would be deployed on U.S. soil but take less than an hour to reach any spot on the globe, Kommersant said on Thursday, citing American sources. This may follow a review of the American nuclear potential that the U.S. administration is preparing, the Washington correspondent for the Kommersant newspaper said. The U.S. has tactical nuclear weapons deployed at American military bases in
Germany, Italy, Belgium, Turkey, and the Netherlands, Kommersant said. The daily newspaper cited U.S. administration officials as saying these weapons serve a political rather than military purpose . Kommersant, which said a review would be published at the beginning of April at the earliest, cited experts as saying the U.S. is ready to officially abandon designing new types of nuclear weapons this year. The newspaper deduced from all this that the White House is going to opt for nonnuclear weapons. The paper said last month's Quadrennial Defense Review, a review of Defense

Department strategy and priorities, announced a plan to develop a new class of non-nuclear missiles that would take less than an hour to reach any spot on the globe. Kommersant said, citing American sources, that missiles of this class, called Prompt Global Strike, are planned to be deployed in the U.S. and that their launch pads might be open for international, including Russian, inspectors to make sure the rockets carry no nuclear warheads. Weapons of this type would be capable of massive strikes against Al Qaeda positions in Afghanistan or preventing North Korea from firing a missile. Supporters of Prompt Global Strike are sure the proposed missiles would be as effective as tactical nuclear weapons but could rule out a full-scale nuclear war ,
Kommersant said.

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Turkey Neg 64 /341

Suiter Pre-season

‡‡‡ Iran Adv ‡‡‡

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Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 65 /341

Suiter Pre-season

1NC Iran Adv (1/4)
1) No Aff solvency- alt causalities to why gas cooperation fails
Elin Kinnander, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, January, 2010, “The Turkish-Iranian Gas Relationship:Politically Successful, Commercially Problematic” http://www.oxfordenergy.org/pdfs/NG38.pdf

Natural gas cooperation between Iran and Turkey has, as described in this paper, been far from successful. The contract has run into huge problems, with disputes over both deliveries and prices. Both sides find it hard to compromise on either of these issues and, as a result, the finalization of the gas MoU continues to be delayed . Almost every year since the start of deliveries in 2001, a disruption has occurred, either because of insufficient Iranian supplies, or insufficient Turkish demand . Both countries have given different
explanations for the fact that deliveries have never reached the volume stipulated in the contract. However, this paper concludes that the most common causes have been: Iran’s lack of gas during the winter period;

Turkey’s lack of demand (or oversupply from its other sources), but also problems with securing the pipelines from terrorist attacks. In other words, Iran has not been a reliable exporter and Turkey has not been
a reliable importer. Turkey has taken Iran to arbitration over a price dispute; and Iran has threatened to take Turkey to arbitration due to failure to reach take-or-pay levels. These are very hostile acts in gas trade between any two countries. The intriguing question that this leaves us with is why both countries want to develop and expand the natural gas cooperation, given the relatively unsuccessful history and the lack of mutual trust?

2) Squo solves, Turkey and Iran relations improving now

SABRINA TAVERNISE, an American journalist who is currently the Istanbul bureau chief of The New York Times, 6/15/10, “Turkey and Iran: Strange Bedfellows?” http://www.indianexpress.com/news/turkey-and-iran-strange-bedfellows/633786/0

Viewed from Washington, Turkey and Iran are strange bedfellows. One is a NATO member with a Constitution that mandates secularism, and the other, an Islamic republic whose nuclear programme has been one of the most vexing foreign policy problems for the US in recent years . So why have the two countries been locked in a clumsy embrace, with Turkey openly defying the US last week by voting against imposing new sanctions on Iran? Defence Secretary Robert M. Gates mused that Turkey was “moving eastward,” a shift he attributed to the European Union’s tepid response to Turkey’s application to join it. But many here do not see it that way. Turkey simply disagrees with the US over how to approach the problems
in the Middle East. The Obama administration chooses sanctions, Turkey believes cooperation has more of a chance . “I would be appalled if Turkey cut itself off from the West and aligned with the Islamic world, but that’s not what’s happening,” said Halil Berktay, a historian at Sabanci University. “Turkey is saying, ‘You’ve been talking about building bridges. This is the way to build them’.” For the United States, Iran is a rogue state intent on building a bomb and crazy enough to use it. Turkey agrees that Iran is trying to develop

the technology that would let it build a weapon, but says Iran’s leaders may be satisfied stopping at that. “We believe that once we normalise relations with Iran, and it has relationships with other actors, it won’t go for the bomb,” said a Turkish official who works closely with Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Part of Turkey’s motivation in reaching out to Iran is based in realpolitik. Iran is Turkey’s neighbour and also supplies the country with a fifth of its natural gas. The approach is also part of a broader policy of economic and political integration in the region that Turkey, under Erdogan, has pursued for nearly a decade. Iranians can travel to Turkey without a visa, as can Syrians, Iraqis, Russians and Georgians. More than a
million Iranians travel to Turkey on vacation every year. The recent nuclear talks were part of that effort. They culminated in May in what Turkey, and its partner Brazil, said was a commitment by Iran to swap a portion of its low-enriched uranium with other countries. Iran would ship out part of its stockpile in exchange for a form of uranium less likely to be used for weapons.

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Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 66 /341

Suiter Pre-season

1NC Iran Adv (2/4)
3) Turkey and Europe no longer needs gas from Iran, new deal struck
Shahin Abbasov, is deputy editor-in-chief of the daily Echo, an independent newspaper based in Baku, Azerbaijan, 6/7/10, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/61234

Natural gas sales and transit agreements signed by Turkey and Azerbaijan on June 7 appear to give a long-awaited green light for Azerbaijani gas sales to Europe-bound pipeline projects. While energy executives

have welcomed the news, a source at Azerbaijan’s state energy company SOCAR tells EurasiaNet.org that the two sides failed to reach a comprehensive gas agreement. “What was signed today is more of a memorandum of understanding than a commercial contract,” said the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijani Republic (SOCAR) senior executive, who asked not to be named . The documents signed in

Istanbul by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Turkish President Abdullah Gül nevertheless allow the Azerbaijani government to open negotiations with European companies about gas sales from the second, peak

phase of gas production at its Shah Deniz field, since Baku and Ankara have reached an “agreement in principle,” the source said. Talks about “commercial details” for gas supplies and exports from this second phase, expected to kick in after 2016, will continue until the end of this year, according to the SOCAR source. The source did not elaborate. Neither Turkish nor Azerbaijani officials gave a reason for why some details remain outstanding after earlier assurances that a package agreement was a done deal. [For background see EurasiaNet’s archive]. Few details about the Istanbul agreements have been disclosed. Turkish Energy Minister Taner Yildiz stated that the new price Turkey must pay for gas from Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz project is higher than the previous price of $120 per 1,000 cubic meters (tcm). Still, Yildiz declined to provide an exact figure, Turkish media reported. A SOCAR source told EurasiaNet.org earlier that the planned price would be $250/tcm. CNNTurk, however, has reported an agreed price of $300/tcm. The two energy partners also reportedly agreed on the price

and volume of Azerbaijani gas supplies to Turkey from Shah Deniz after 2016, when the second phase of production is projected to reach 16 billion cubic meters (bcm) per year. Yildiz did not give a price, but said that Turkey had secured the right to buy 2 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas in 2016, 4 bcm in 2017 and 6 bcm in 2018. A third agreement allows Azerbaijan to set up a company in Turkey to handle issues related to gas transit to Europe via Turkish territory. A separate accord between SOCAR and BOTAS, the Turkish state-run energy transit company, established the conditions and
mechanisms for gas sales and shipment. Details were not immediately available. Despite the lack of a package deal, one key potential Azerbaijani gas client – the much-touted Nabucco pipeline–expressed satisfaction with the progress made. In a June 7 statement, the Nabucco consortium’s chief executive officer, Reinhard Mitschek, called the documents “a step in a positive direction.”

“This opens the way for the securing of supplies for European gas projects like Nabucco, ITGI (Interconnector Turkey-Greece-Italy) and TAP (Trans-Adriatic Pipeline),” declared Yildiz, the Turkish energy minister, Turkish media outlets reported. SOCAR President Rovnag Abdullayev forecast that the agreements would pave the way for new large-scale projects that could be compared with the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan or Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipelines. Helping to boost optimism, SOCAR
Officials in both Turkey and Azerbaijan similarly emphasized the positive.

announced on June 3 that it could start Phase 2 of Shah Deniz as early as 2014, the Trend news agency reported. A package gas agreement was originally expected to be signed during Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s May 16-17 visit to Baku, but the deal was delayed at the last moment. Similar last-minute hiccups may have characterized the Istanbul meeting. Just a few days before the signing of the agreements, SOCAR President Abdullayev and Vice-President Elshad Nasirov, along with BP-Azerbaijan President Rashid Javanshir, made an urgent trip to Istanbul to join discussions involving expert groups. The SOCAR source claimed that the trip took place after Turkey allegedly tried to add terms to the transit agreement that would strengthen Ankara’s position. The source did not specify the terms. Turkey’s NTV

television channel reported that the Istanbul agreements were finalized only at a June 7 meeting between President Aliyev and Turkish President Gül. For all the question marks, Baku-based energy expert Ilham Shaban said that Azerbaijan has achieved a key objective – holding talks directly with European companies about gas supplies to Nabucco, ITGI and NAP. “With about 6 bcm of gas from Stage 2 which will be supplied to Turkey, Baku still
have about 10 bcm of gas to supply to European markets,” Shaban said.

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Turkey Neg 67 /341

Suiter Pre-season

1NC Iran Adv (3/4)
4) New gas line improves relations.
Anav Silverman, the international correspondent for the Sderot Media Center, 6/9/10 “Turkey: Jihadi State Rising” http://www.aina.org/news/2010069141710.htm Back in February, the Turkish daily, Today's Zaman wrote that the Turkish State Minister, Cedvet Yilmaz stated that his government was committed to working on improving relations with its neighbor Iran . The driving force behind this commitment, indicated Yilmaz, were the mutual gas transfer projects, which both Yilmaz and Iranian Foreign Minister, Manoucheher Mottaki agreed will bring both countries to a "historical era."

Turkey and Iran have signed a number of deals to facilitate the flow of gas through Turkey to Europe, including agreements to allocate some Iran's South Pars gas field to the Turkish Petroleum Corporation, where Iranian gas will be trasported across Turkey. The Turkey-Iran pipeline transfers natural gas worth around $2 billion every year. "We believe that the projects for the tansfer of Iranian natural gas to Europe via Turkey will give a momentum to relations between the two largest economies in the world, " Yilmaz has stated. Another Turkish government official, Zafer Caglayan, stated that bilateral trade with Iran has grown to $10 billion in the past eight years
(only if they read the Isreal strike impact)

5) Iran is mad about recent sanctions -they are perceived as a threat and kills
diplomacy- proves no brink to their impact VOA news 04/09/10 (Iranian Leaders Criticize New Threat of International
Sanctionshttp://www.payvand.com/news/10/apr /1073.htm l7/10/10)

Top Iranian leaders are again lashing out at Western nations over the threats of new sanctions. It was another day of back-and-forth exchanges between Western leaders and Iran over Tehran's nuclear program. Iran President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad slammed remarks by U.S. President Barack Obama in Prague that Russia and the United States are "working together at the U.N. Security Council to pass strong sanctions on Iran."Ahmadinejad delivers a speech in the city of Oroumiyeh 540 miles northwest of Tehran, 07 Apr 2010 According to Iran's official IRNA news agency, Mr. Ahmadinejad said Iran does not welcome the idea or threat of sanctions, but would never beg to reverse them.

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Turkey Neg 68 /341

Suiter Pre-season

1NC Iran Adv (4/4)
6) Pulling out TNWs would sever ties, and destroy our relationship with turkey,
linking to their own impacts Bell and Loehrke, 09 (Benjamin, Bell is the project manager at the Ploughshares Fund and a Truman National
Security Fellow. Loehrke is a research assistant at the Ploughshares Fund and a graduate student at the University of Maryland School of Public Policy, 09 “The status of U.S. nuclear weapons in Turkey”, http://www.thebulletin.org/webedition/features/the-status-of-us-nuclear-weapons-turkey,)
In 2005, when NATO's top commander at the time, Gen. James L. Jones, supported the elimination of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, he was met with fierce political resistance. (In addition to the 90 B61 bombs in Turkey, there are another 110 or so U.S. bombs located at bases in Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the

U.S. and European officials still maintain that the political value of the nuclear weapons is enough to keep them deployed across Europe. In particular, they argue that the weapons are "an essential political and military link" between NATO members and help maintain alliance cohesion. The Defense Department's 2008 report on nuclear weapons management concurred: "As long as our allies value [the nuclear weapons'] political contribution, the United States is obligated to provide and maintain the nuclear weapon capability." Those who hold this view believe that nuclear sharing is both symbolic of alliance cohesion and a demonstration of how the United States and NATO have committed to defending each other in the event of an attack. They argue that removing the weapons would dangerously undermine such cohesion and raise questions about how committed Washington is to its NATO allies.
Netherlands.) Four years later, some

7) Israel won’t strike Iran without U.S. support-they don’t have the tactical abilities
and don’t want to sever relations
World Tribune 7/9 (“Obama expects 'no surprises': Israel won't strike Iran without U.S. permission” World Tribune – July 9, 2010 http://www.thetruthseeker.co.uk/article.asp?ID=13017)

President Barack Obama expects Israel to seek U.S. approval before attacking Iran's nuclear weapons facilities. Obama said he was confident that Israel would not attack Iran without U.S. permission. In a July 8 interview on Israeli television, Obama did not disclose whether he discussed a proposed Israeli attack on Teheran during his meeting with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu the previous day. The president
was interviewed by Israel's Channel 2 after the 90-minute session with the prime minister, which marked the first time Obama met the Israeli media since he entered office. The president, who has pursued a reconciliation policy with Teheran, said the

strategic relationship between Israel and the United States would not allow for a unilateral Israeli strike. "I think the relationship between Israel and the U.S. is sufficiently strong that neither of us try to surprise each other," Obama said. In 2010, the Obama administration, including Vice President Joseph Biden, warned Israel not to attack Iran.
Since 2007,

Netanyahu, who has urged the international community to intensify sanctions, has repeatedly assured that Israel was not planning an imminent strike on Iran.

officials said, the United States has withheld military systems that could facilitate an Israeli air strike on Iran. The banned systems were said to have included air refueling, advanced reconnaissance and buster-bunker bombs, long requested by Israel.

8) Israeli president has publicly stated they will not strike Iran
Rianovosti 09 (“Israel won’t strike Iran-Russia’s Medvedev”http://en.rian.ru/world/20090920/156195202.html7/7/10)

- Israel will not strike Iran, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said. Medvedev said in an interview with CNN aired Sunday that Israeli President Shimon Peres, when on a visit to the Russian Black Sea resort of Sochi in August to discuss Russia's arms deals with Iran, told him: "Israel is not going to make any strikes on Iran, we are a peaceful country." Medvedev said Russia supplies purely defensive
MOSCOW, September 20 (RIA Novosti) armaments to Iran. "Our task is not to strengthen Iran and weaken Israel or vice versa, but [to establish] a normal, quiet situation in the Middle East," he said. Asked what could happen should Israel nevertheless make a strike, Medvedev said: "This is the worst thing that could be imagined... This would be the most unwise development of events. But

my Israeli colleagues told me they are not going to act like this, and I trust

them."

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Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 69 /341

Suiter Pre-season

2NC Iran Ext 1—Plan Doesn’t Solve Gas Coop
Extend 1NC 1. Aff doesn’t solve. Multiple warrants 1. No Turkish demand—supplies from other sources means it doesn’t need Iranian gas. 2. Iranian gas shortage—during winter, Iran can’t produce enough gas 3. Terrorist sabotage—attacks on pipelines means gas won’t make it to Turkey, EVEN IF a deal is struck. 4. Evidence also indicates pipe lines have been disrupted for the past 9 years, we should have seen the affs impacts That’s our Kinnander evidence

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Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 70 /341

Suiter Pre-season

2NC Ext 2 Relations Improving Now
1nc 2-. Iran-Turkey relations are improving now. That’s Tavernise Turkey is “Moving eastward” because of its recent rejection from the EU They intent to improve relations to stop a possible WMD by Iran Turkey will continue to deal with Iran EVEN after sanctions Relations are high enough now, that gas trade will continue even after recent sanction which proves how resilient the gas trade is 2) Even in light of the new sanctions turkey continues dealing with Iran UPI, 7/2/10, “Energy ties with Iran stable, Turkey says” http://www.upi.com/Science_News/ResourceWars/2010/07/02/Energy-ties-with-Iran-stable-Turkey-says/UPI-16271278079811/

1. 2. 3. 4.

Ankara plans to continue activity in the Iranian energy sector because it is not restricted by U.N. sanctions, the Turkish energy minister said. The Security Council voted June 9 to place new sanctions on Iran

that allow for searches of banned goods in cargo to or from Iran and increase the number of individuals and companies subject to travel bans and an asset freeze. Turkish Energy Minister Taner Yildiz told Iran's state-

funded broadcaster Press TV that his country would continue doing business with Iran in light of the Security Council measure. "Turkey will continue to cooperate with Iran because the sanctions did not include any specific restriction on energy deals, " he said. Yildiz added that his country was waiting for the
results of technical studies to wrap up in the South Pars gas field in the Persian Gulf. "After we receive the result of this study we will decide how to move forward," Yildiz said According to Press TV, Iran exports more than

880 million cubic feet of natural gas to Turkey every day. 2) Iran and Turkey are “Friends and Brothers”, strait from the President TEHRAN TIMES, 10/27/07, “Destiny of Iran, Turkey, and Iraq intertwined: Ahmadinejad”
http://www.tehrantimes.com/index_View.asp?code=155964

President Mahmud Ahmadinejad said here on Sunday that the nations of Iran, Turkey, and Iraq are “friends and brothers.” “The destiny of all of us is intertwined,” Ahmadinejad told the visiting Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan. Ahmadinejad said the enemies are planning to dominate all countries through a long-term plan and “do not want the regional countries including Iran, Turkey, and Iraq to be powerful and live in peace.” 3) Turkey sticking to its vows, increasing its soft power with Iran, plus Nuclear deal passing The Reuter, 5/22/10 “Iran to go ahead with Turkey atom fuel swap—report”
http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKMOS23296620100522

Iran intends to go ahead with a deal reached with Turkey and Brazil for a nuclear fuel swap despite a new sanctions resolution against Tehran pending at the United Nations, an Iranian parliamentarian said on Saturday. "Iran is committed to the vows that it made and wants to make them operational and will submit its letter to International Atomic Energy Agency," Alaeddin Boroujerdi, head of parliament's Foreign Affairs and National Security Committee, was quoted as saying by semi-official news agency ISNA. "The Americans' propaganda will not have any effect on Iran's decision ... We advise those countries who want to
issue this resolution against Iran not to be manipulated by America." Iran's official news agency IRNA said on Friday Iran will hand an official letter to the IAEA's chief on Monday with details of the fuel swap agreement with Brazil and Turkey. The IAEA brokered the basis of the deal last October in talks involving Iran, France, Russia and the United States, but it soon unravelled amid Iranian demands for amendments. Turkish and Brazilian

representatives at the IAEA will accompany Iran's envoy during the meeting with the IAEA chief on

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Turkey Neg 71 /341

Suiter Pre-season

Monday, a communique from Iran's Supreme National Security Council published on Saturday in the daily Hambastegi said. Leaders of the three countries announced the agreement last Monday under which Iran will send 1,200 kg of its enriched uranium stocks -- reducing its supply of potential atomic bomb material -to Turkey in exchange for fuel rods for a Tehran medical research reactor. But the five permanent members of
the U.N. Security Council, after months of negotiations, brushed off the deal with a draft resolution on a new set of sanctions against Iran that Washington handed to the Security Council on Tuesday. A prominent Iranian lawmaker,
Mohammad Reza Bahonar, had suggested on Thursday Iran could scuttle the deal if the sanctions resolution is approved. Western powers fear that Iran is secretly trying to produce nuclear weapons, but Tehran denies this and says it is enriching uranium only to produce fuel for nuclear power stations. Under last week's surprise agreement, the first batch of Iran's uranium would arrive in

Turkey within a month, in return for fuel rods to keep a Tehran medical research reactor running.

Turkey and Brazil -- both currently non-permanent members of the Security Council -- and Iran have urged a halt to talk of further sanctions because of the deal, but Western powers suspect it is an Iranian tactic to avert or delay sanctions. The new, extended sanctions would target Iranian banks and call for inspection of vessels suspected of carrying cargo related to Iran's nuclear or missile programmes.

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Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 72 /341

Suiter Pre-season

2NC Ext 3 and 4 - New gas deal
1nc 4: New deal makes Iran’s gas um-important 1) Their evidence is significantly older, and does not take this into account 2) Although both Iran and Turkey are part of this deal, Iran is not the main exporter, so if they pull out there is no impact 3) New gas deal improves relations 4) Our evidence quotes the prime minister on his intent to improve relations 5) They both have strong economical ties to this new line, and being rational actors, will try and keep it up and running 2) Turkey, Azerbijan gas deal finalized, new gas network set up. TODAY’S ZAMAN, 6/7/10 “Turkey, Azerbaijan sign Shah Deniz gas agreement”
http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-212385-105-turkey-azerbaijan-sign-shah-deniz-gas-agreement.html

Turkey and Azerbaijan have signed a long-awaited memorandum of understanding for the shipment of 11 billion cubic meters of natural gas from Azerbaijani's Shah Deniz field to Turkey. The deal was signed by Turkish Energy and Natural Resources Minister Taner Yıldız and Azerbaijani Industry and Energy Minister Natiq Aliyev on Monday during the third summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA). Speaking at the signing ceremony, Yıldız noted that the two sides had “reached an agreement over the price and quantity of gas to be exported from the Shah Deniz II project, which will go online in 2017, to Turkey.” The minister declined to give figures immediately on the
price of the gas or on the percentage of gas for domestic consumption and for export to European countries. An agreement was also reached over the price of natural gas Turkey exports from Azerbaijan, he said. Turkey will retroactively pay for the gas it has purchased since April 15, 2008 at new prices. Turkey currently receives

some 6 billion cubic meters of gas from Azerbaijan and pumps some of that amount to Greece. 3) New deal signed, Europe and turkey no longer depended on gas from Iran or Russia World Bulletin, 6/17/10, “Turkey, Italy, Greece to sign natural gas deal”,
http://www.worldbulletin.net/news_detail.php?id=60087

Turkey's Petroleum Pipeline Corporation (BOTAS), Italy's EDISON, and Greece's DEPA will sign a memorandum of understanding for the Turkey-Greece-Italy Natural Gas Pipeline that will carry natural gas from the Caspian region to Europe. The signature ceremony will take place in Ankara's Rixos Grand Hotel. Turkish Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Taner Yildiz, President of the Executive Board and
Director General of BOTAS Fazil Senel, Vice-President of Italian Electric and Natural Gas Company EDISON Roberto Poti and President of the Executive Board of Greek State Natural Gas Company Herry Sachinis will participate in the signature ceremony. The Interconnector Turkey-Greece-Italy (ITGI) Project is

considered to be one of the EU's most crucial projects. The natural gas pipeline will be 804 kilometers long and will go into service in 2015. ITGI pipeline begins in Azerbaijan and ends in Italy. Once completed, the pipeline will carry around 10 billion cubic meters of natural gas to Greece and Italy per year. Bulgaria was the last country that joined the ITGI Project. Experts say that Serbia and Romania may join the project either directly or indirectly.

2NC Ext 6-impacts non-u
Iran officials have already spoke out against U.S. sanctions as being another western attack on Iran, tanking U.S. Irani relations which should have triggered their impacts

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Turkey Neg 73 /341

Suiter Pre-season

Recent sanctions non-unique their Mornings Star impact—even their evidence says sanctions are considered an attack which would trigger the impact Aljazeera, 6/25/10, “Iran faces fresh US sanctions”
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2010/06/201062545934360999

The US congress has approved new unilateral energy and financial sanctions against Iran, in a further effort to pressure it into curbing its nuclear programme, which the US suspects is aimed at making a bomb. The House of Representatives passed the bill 408-8 on Thursday, sending it to Barack Obama, the US president, for signing into law. The senate earlier approved the sanctions 99-0. The new measures, which come on the back of the latest UN security council and European sanctions, aim to cut off off Iran's access to imports of refined petroleum products like gasoline and jet fuel and curb its access to the international banking
system. "The UN sanctions [passed on June 9], though a good first step, are quite tepid. And they are tepid because there are other members of the security council who want to keep doing business with Iran ... the US ... has to pass these unilateral sanctions," Barbara Mikulski, a Democratic senator, said. The bill would effectively

deprive foreign banks of access to the US financial system if they do business with key Iranian banks or the Revolutionary Guards.

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Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 74 /341

Suiter Pre-season

2NC Ext 7—Removing TNWs Hurts US Turkey Relations
1NC 7: TNWs are Key to US-Turkey Relations 1) Turkey sees the TNWs as a sign of US commitment 2) They allow for a cohesive relationship, and removing them would completely undermine this 2) Nukes key to credibility Johan Bergenäs, Research Associate, Washington, DC office, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Miles Pomper, Senior Research Associate, Washington, DC office, James Martin
Center for Nonproliferation, Dr. William Potter, Director, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, et al, April 2010 “Reducing and Regulating Tactical (Non-strategic) Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Moving Forward?” http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/pdfs/reducing_tnw_april_2010.pdf accessed 7/2/10

Central and Eastern European countries, as well as the Baltic States, have historically been reluctant to support the removal of U.S. NSNW. These states generally perceive these weapons as a means of providing a highly visible deterrent to Russia and see their location and visibility as essential to assuring them of the U.S. defense commitment to Europe and of the value of NATO . To this end, Bruno Tertrais, a prominent European scholar, has stated that “a U.S. nuclear withdrawal could be perceived as a lessening of transatlantic security ties by countries which are particularly keen to shelter behind U.S. protection, such as Poland, the Baltic States and Turkey.” 46 Malcolm Chalmers and Simon Lunn writing in March 2010 cite an unidentified ambassador from a new NATO member: Nuclear deterrence by the US and through NATO and with the American presence of American warheads in Europe is the ultimate test of NATO’s credibility. If that fails, you will see a different NATO – more will follow the Poles in seeking bilateral guarantees. It is the essence of NATO membership.47 Absent the nuclear link, experts fret that the new members will see little benefit from NATO as they will perceive a lack of concern for their security from Germany and other
Western European NATO members. George Perkovich of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace recently called for Germany to reassure “NATO’s easternmost members that their security interests will be robustly protected.” 48 Discounting the possibility of a Russian attack worthy of a nuclear response, Perkovich calls on Germany to “seek collective policies to obviate the range of conventional and non-military threats such as cyber warfare and energy coercion that can lead to escalatory crises.”

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Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 75 /341

Suiter Pre-season

2NC Ext 9 -won’t strike without the U.S.
Israel can’t strike without U.S. support-the U.S. has withheld military systems needed to strike including air refueling, they also doesn’t want to sever relations-that’s our world tribune evidence Israel won’t strike independently
Harel, 09 (Amos, Israeli media expert on military and defense issues “Israel can’t launch strike against Iran on its own”30.12.09http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/opinion/israel-can-tlaunch-strike-against-iran-on-its-own-1.11017/7/10) This date with destiny has caused some Israeli leaders to adopt a messianic tone. Some even see a tempting opportunity to change the wider strategic reality in the region. Yet opinions are divided: Air force pilots, as they have stated on several occasions, are confident in their own abilities should the order to strike be given, but senior defense officials are describing their primary mission as preventing any foolish acts in the coming year. The IDF General Staff, as it did during the Gaza offensive, is likely to behave as an operational subcontractor, content merely to present the government with various military scenarios and their possible implications. It must be stated plainly: Israel does not have independent strike capability against Iran - not in the broad sense of the term. The air force is capable of delivering a certain amount of explosives to a given target and bringing most of its aircraft back home intact. But it is doubtful whether Israel can allow itself to act against the

wishes of the United States - to stand alone against an Iranian response and begin an open-ended operation against a nation of 70 million people.

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Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 76 /341

Suiter Pre-season

2NC Ext 9-Agreed not to strike
Israeli president has meet with leaders of many nations including Medyedey insuring that they will not strike Iran, and they want to resolve all conflict peacefully- that’s our Rianovisti evidence Russian President has assured the international community he will not strike Iran Humphries 09( Conor, September 20th “Kremlin says Israel promised not to strike Iran” Reuters http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE58J0NQ20090920)
"But my Israeli colleagues told me that they were not planning to act in this way and I trust them."

During a meeting in the Russian resort of Sochi in August, Israeli President Shimon Peres said Israel would not attack Iran, Medvedev said. After the meeting, Peres told journalists Medvedev had promised to reconsider a contract to sell S-300s to Iran. "When he visited me in Sochi, Israeli President Peres said something important for us all: 'Israel does not plan to launch any strikes on Iran, we are a peaceful country and we will not do this'," Medvedev said. Asked about the possible delivery of S-300s, Medvedev
said Russia had the right to sell defensive weapons to Iran.

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Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 77 /341

Suiter Pre-season

Ext 2- Relations improving
Relations fine, Turkey gas trade continues with Iran, even after new sanctions TEHRAN TIMES, 7/3/10, “Iran-Turkey energy cooperation to grow” http://news.google.com/news/url?
sa=t&ct2=us%2F0_0_s_5_0_t&usg=AFQjCNHtAfN763qUTrym8FrnScKRwo5_g&cid=0&ei=moAuTJjLDonslQeh9a6sAQ&rt=SEARCH&vm=STANDARD&url=http%3A%2F %2Fwww.tehrantimes.com%2Findex_View.asp%3Fcode%3D222437

The Turkish energy minister says the new UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions against Iran will not affect the current energy deals between the two countries. “Turkey will continue to cooperate with Iran because the sanctions did not include any specific restriction on energy deals,” Turkey’s Energy and Natural Resources Minister Taner Yildiz said in an interview with Press TV. “Energy is not part of the UN sanctions,” he added. Turkey is currently carrying out technical studies in Iran’s south pars gas field which could potentially yield prosperous investment for both countries. “After we receive the result of this study we will decide how to move forward,” Yildiz said. Iran exports 25 million cubic meters of natural gas to turkey per day and the figure could increase to 30 in the near future Turley stands up for Iran, deepening ties Tulay Karadeniz, reporter for the Reuter, 6/10/10 “Turkey says Iran sanctions "mistake"; deepens
Arab ties” http://in.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-49194320100610

Turkey called the imposition of U.N. sanctions on Iran a "mistake" on Thursday and said that it and Brazil would continue to seek a diplomatic solution to remove concerns over Iran's nuclear programme.
In a speech to an Arab and Turkish ministerial forum, Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan also announced plans to form a regional free trade zone with three Arab states -- Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. The moves will add to concerns, voiced on Wednesday by U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates, that the pivotal Western ally is in danger of swinging eastward because of resistance in Europe to its bid for membership of the European Union . Turkey

and Brazil, both non-permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, were the only members of the 15-strong council to vote on Wednesday against the imposition of new sanctions against Iran . Lebanon abstained. "We would not want to participate in such a mistake because history will not forgive us," Erdogan told a meeting attended by ministers from 22 members of the Arab League. He said Turkey intended, with Brazil, to continue engaging Tehran, having secured a nuclear fuel swap deal last month that they had hoped would head off sanctions . Western countries along with Russia and China viewed that
deal as too little too late and pressed on with a fourth round of sanctions, as Iran continued uranium enrichment that world powers fear could be used for nuclear weapons. Turkey believes that sanctions are ineffective and

that there are dangers in pushing the Islamic republic into a corner. "Isolation is not the solution to Iran's problems," Erdogan said. EAST OR WEST. Though not an Arab, Erdogan has become a hero to many in the Arab world for championing the cause of Gaza's Palestinians and putting their plight near the top of the world agenda after an Israeli commando raid on a Turkish aid ship.

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Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 78 /341

Suiter Pre-season

Ext 2 – Relations good
Iran is shipping its uranium to Turkey, this improves relations and robs Iran of Nuclear capabilities Associated Press, 4/17/10, “Russia: Iran's deal with Turkey may not be enough”
,http://www.salon.com/wires/world/2010/05/17/D9FOMAMG0_iran_nuclear/

Iran agreed Monday to ship most of its low-enriched uranium to Turkey in a surprise nuclear fuel swap deal that could ease the international standoff over the country's disputed atomic program and deflate a U.S.-led push for tougher sanctions. The deal, which was reached in talks with Brazil and Turkey, was similar
to a U.N.-drafted plan that Washington and its allies have been pressing Tehran for the past six months to accept in order to deprive Iran -- at least temporarily -- of enough stocks of enriched uranium to produce a nuclear weapon. Iran, which claims its nuclear program is peaceful, dropped several key demands that had previously blocked agreement. In return for agreeing to ship most of its uranium stockpile abroad , it would receive fuel rods of medium-enriched uranium to use in a Tehran medical research reactor that produces isotopes for cancer treatment. It was not immediately clear what would happen to the stockpile once the fuel rods were received.

Relations good enough to halt sanctions Julian Borger, diplomatic editor, 5/17/10 “Iran-Turkey nuclear swap deal 'means new sanctions

are unnecessary'” http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/may/17/iran-nuclear-uranium-swapturkey

Turkey’s prime minister said today that there was no need for fresh UN sanctions against Iran following an agreement under which Tehran would ship more than a tonne of its enriched uranium to Turkey as part an exchange deal. Iran agreed to ship 1,200 kg of low-enriched uranium (LEU) to Turkey in return for nuclear fuel rods for a medical research reactor. The deal is intended to defuse the crisis over Iran's nuclear aspirations at a time when a new round of sanctions is being discussed in the UN security council and Israel is contemplating military action. The details of the deal, mediated by Brazil, have yet to be finalised and
would have to win the backing of other nuclear powers and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) before it is implemented. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the prime minister of Turkey, which sits on the UN security council, said the deal obviated the need for new sanctions . But British officials said Iran still had to do more to prove that its nuclear ambitions were not threatening. "Iran has an obligation to assure the international community of its peaceful intentions," junior foreign minister Alistair Burt said. "The IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] has said it is unable to verify this. That is why we have been working with our partners on a sanctions resolution in the security council. Until Iran takes concrete actions to meet those obligations, that work must continue," he said.

Squo solves, Iran and turkey are improving relations now Elin Kinnander, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, January, 2010, “The Turkish-Iranian Gas
Relationship:Politically Successful, Commercially Problematic” http://www.oxfordenergy.org/pdfs/NG38.pdf This paper has presented the main features and factors influencing Turkish-Iranian natural gas relations and their current outcomes. This was done by first examining the historical evolution of Turkish-Iranian relations, the preconditions for today’s gas contract, and a detailed presentation and discussion of Turkey’s and Iran’s natural gas cooperation over the past decade. The main conclusion reached in this paper is that there exists a clear

distinction, in terms of success, between the Turkish-Iranian political relational and the commercial natural gas relationship. The political relationship is strengthening and diplomatic ties are growing stronger. Even Turkish-Iranian trade in commodities other than gas is growing rapidly, but the gas cooperation continues to be delayed and to face problems. However, both countries portray their gas cooperation as developing and growing, and of high priority. The logic behind both Turkey’s but also Iran’s
desire to expand this cooperation can be found within the framework of the countries´ foreign policy.

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Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 79 /341

Suiter Pre-season

Ext 3 -No Need for Iran’s Gas
New deal signed, Europe and turkey no longer depended on gas from Iran or Russia World Bulletin, 6/17/10, “Turkey, Italy, Greece to sign natural gas deal”,
http://www.worldbulletin.net/news_detail.php?id=60087

Turkey's Petroleum Pipeline Corporation (BOTAS), Italy's EDISON, and Greece's DEPA will sign a memorandum of understanding for the Turkey-Greece-Italy Natural Gas Pipeline that will carry natural gas from the Caspian region to Europe. The signature ceremony will take place in Ankara's Rixos Grand Hotel. Turkish Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Taner Yildiz, President of the Executive Board and
Director General of BOTAS Fazil Senel, Vice-President of Italian Electric and Natural Gas Company EDISON Roberto Poti and President of the Executive Board of Greek State Natural Gas Company Herry Sachinis will participate in the signature ceremony. The Interconnector Turkey-Greece-Italy (ITGI) Project is

considered to be one of the EU's most crucial projects. The natural gas pipeline will be 804 kilometers long and will go into service in 2015. ITGI pipeline begins in Azerbaijan and ends in Italy. Once completed, the pipeline will carry around 10 billion cubic meters of natural gas to Greece and Italy per year. Bulgaria was the last country that joined the ITGI Project. Experts say that Serbia and Romania may join the project either directly or indirectly.

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Turkey Neg 80 /341

Suiter Pre-season

Iran Proliferation Frontline
1. Removing TNWs without Turkish consent destroys relations with NATO and the US - Turkey’s relationship is key to non-proliferation efforts in the East Richard Weitz, Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis, the Hudson Institute, 4/12/10 (“The Future of NATO’s Nuclear Weapons on Turkish Soil”, Turkey Analyst, Volume 3 No. 7, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center,
http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/turkey/2010/100412A.html) The Obama administration’s decision to deploy U.S. missile defenses more closely to Turkey—and thereby ensure its protection from an Iranian nuclear attack—should help assuage Turkish concerns. But the most profitable nonproliferation tool in Turkey’s case would be to assure Turks that they will play an essential role in NATO’s security policies and that their preferences will have a major impact in shaping the alliance’s nuclear policies. Insofar as some members of Turkey’s security community are still concerned by Russia’s nearby nuclear and conventional security forces, then NATO initiatives aimed at linking any withdrawal of U.S. TNW from Turkey would presumably be welcome in Ankara. The recently concluded New START Treaty does not address TNWs, but negotiations between Russia and NATO might be warranted, with some level of Turkish participation. Above all, the allies will need to avoid the appearance of sacrificing Turkish security interests in order to achieve a nuclear deal with Iran. In 1962, the United States might have been able to agree to remove the U.S. Jupiter missiles in Turkey in return for securing Moscow’s consent to withdraw its nuclear weapons from Cuba without seeking Ankara’s approval. In today’s climate, when Ankara’s security relations with the West are already under great strain, such a deal could well precipitate an enduring break in Turkey’s security ties with NATO. If Turkish policy makers decide to seek elimination of all U.S. nuclear weapons on their soil, in return for some kind of deal with Iran or for other reasons, then that decision should be respected. But the NATO allies should not compel the Turks to keep or remove the weapons without their consent.

2. Nuclear Iran Inevitable – they show no signs of slowing down and the US has given up hope of stopping them Benjamin Kerstein is Senior Writer for The New Ledger, 10 (“The Inevitable nuclear Iran”, The New Ledger,
June, http://newledger.com/2010/06/the-inevitable-nuclear-iran/) It is now all but certain that the American administration has more or less resigned itself to a nuclear Iran. At the very least, it appears to have decided to take no military action against the Iranian nuclear program, nor even to support or encourage – publicly or discreetly – the Iranian popular opposition to the Ahmadinejad regime. The Obama administration will likely continue to pursue its policy of promoting engagement, either out of cynicism or naiveté, while simultaneously busying itself with the diplomatic give and take of arranging international support for sanctions which are unlikely to be effective. It is entirely possible, moreover, that American exhaustion from a decade of war and its public’s concentration on pressing domestic problems will effectively vitiate any political damage that might result from the emergence of a nuclear Iran. This, at any rate, is likely what Obama and the doves in his administration are counting on.

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Turkey Neg 81 /341

Suiter Pre-season

Iran Relations Frontline
1. Turkey is on the brink of breaking off its ties with the West and becoming a regional Islamist Power of the Middle East; dooming US foreign policy objectives and cooperation in the Middle East Mike Brownfield, lawyer and writer for Heritage Foundation, 6/2010 (“Turkey’s Dangerous Turn Against the
West”, The Heritage Foundation, June, 2010, http://blog.heritage.org/2010/06/08/turkeys-dangerous-turnagainst-the-west/)

This is not a new concern. In April 2009, President Barack Obama traveled to Turkey and highlighted the country as a Muslim nation that respects democracy and the rule of law, but as The Heritage Foundation’s Ariel Cohen wrote at the time, the president’s remarks may have been an overstatement. Cohen noted that the ruling Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) had a stranglehold on power and “appears to be moving Turkey away from its pro-Western and proAmerican orientation to a more Middle Eastern and Islamist one.” Cohen wrote that Turkey in 2006 became the first NATO member to host the leader of Hamas (a terrorist organization, according to the United States and the EU) and “enthusiastically” hosted Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir. Turkey also temporarily blocked U.S. warships from delivering humanitarian aid to Georgia, was cool to the U.S. withdrawing forced from Iraq through Turkey, and made moves to strengthen its relationship with Russia. Then there’s Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who has developed close ties with Ahmadinejad and openly attacked Israeli President Shimon Peres, while AKP and other Islamists “sponsored a flood of anti-Israel demonstrations, billboards and anti-Semetic rhetoric.” Erdogan also questioned calls for Iran not to produce nuclear weapons and, together with Brazil, Turkey attempted to derail U.S.-led UN sanctions against Iran. Most recently, it has been reported that Erdogan is “a hero to Palestinians for his vociferous verbal attacks on Israel” and has criticized western nations for not dealing with Hamas. Turkey’s involvement in the flotilla incident jives with the country’s alarming turn away from the West. The Heritage Foundation’s James Carafano writes: Turkey not only knowing allowed the confrontation to be organized from Turkish soil, it did everything possible to exploit the incident. The Turkish Foreign Minister declared, “this attack is like 9/11 for Turkey.” This is the same government that has turned a blind eye to the crushing of independent voices in Iran and has moved to block sanctions intended to deter Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. And as Carafano notes, that provokes the questions “Why are we are losing Turkey?” and “What will happen if Turkey is lost?”: The consequences of that are pretty not pretty. Phased and adaptive missile defense will be less of both without Turkish cooperation. Iran will be more unbound. Israel will feel more isolated. NATO will be further weakened. The Washington Post explains Turkey’s turn in foreign policy as rooted in a desire to expand business ties and become a regional player. It underemphasizes, though, the geopolitical and extremist religious roots of Turkey’s massive shift in foreign policy — the neo-Ottoman attempts to recreate a Turkish sphere of influence in the Middle East, and the AKP Muslim Brotherhood’s strategy to build an Islamic state. Whatever the cause of Turkey’s turn away from the West, it comes at the expense of U.S. interests and reveals weaknesses – if not a failure – in Washington’s Middle East policy.

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Iran Relations Frontline
2. Removal of TNWs moves Turkey closer to its new Middle East allies while alienating the West (Mustafa Kibaroglu teaches courses on arms control and disarmament in the Department of International

Relations at Bilkent University in Ankara, Turkey. He has held fellowships at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. June 2010 http://proquest.umi.com/pqdlink?Ver=1&Exp=07-202015&FMT=7&DID=2068796071&RQT=309&cfc=1) A key question for NATO’s new Strategic Concept is whether burden sharing will continue to be construed as it has had for many decades, as suggested by Turkey, or whether it will be altered in response to the combined negative stance of some western European allies regarding the forward deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons. This situation could lead to a divisive and unnecessary controversy between Turkey and its long-standing allies in the West. By insisting that the weapons remain on European territory, Turkey would not only alienate some of its Western allies that truly want to move the weapons out of their territories, but also create tension in its relations with its neighbors and newly emerging partners in the Middle East. On May 17, Turkey signed a joint declaration with Brazil and Iran, providing for the safe storage of Iran’s 1,200 kilograms of low-enriched uranium fuel in Turkey in return for the delivery by France, Russia, the United States, and the International Atomic Energy Agency of 120 kilograms of fuel needed for the Tehran Research Reactor.[26] This “nuclear fuel swap” is potentially a breakthrough in the long-standing deadlock in Iran’s relations with the West over Tehran’s nuclear program. There is no question that the degree of trust that Turkey has built with Iran, especially over the last several years with the coming to power of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey, had a significant impact on getting this result. Iran has so far adamantly refused all other offers. Hence, the Iranian political and security elites who have been closely interacting with their Turkish counterparts at every level over the past several months and years prior to the fuel swap announcement may raise their expectations in turn. They may press for withdrawal from Turkey of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, which they fear may be used against them, as a way for Turkey to prove its sincerity regarding its stance toward Iran and, more broadly, its commitment to creating a nuclearweapon-free Middle East. Turkey clearly has to tread carefully, but the risks should not be overstated. One concern might be the contingencies in which the security situation in Turkey’s neighborhood deteriorates, thereby necessitating the active presence of an effective deterrent against the aggressor(s). Yet, given the elaborate capabilities that exist within the alliance and the solidarity principle so far effectively upheld by the allies, extending deterrence against Turkey’s rivals should not be a problem. Turkey would continue to be protected against potential aggressors by the nuclear guarantees of its allies France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the three NATO nuclear-weapon states. Turkey’s reliance on such a “credible” deterrent, which will not be permanently stationed on Turkish territory, is less likely to be criticized by its Middle Eastern neighbors[27] and should not engender a burden-sharing controversy with its European allies.

3. This Makes Iran Relations impossible because their Ben-Meir and Lugar cards assume that the US has strong relations with Turkey who will be open to organizing and mediating US-Iran talks

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Iran Relations Frontline
4. US-Turkish relations key to leadership—necessary to prevent Russia/China counterbalancing. Mustafa Malik, 5/15/1997, Senior associate at The Strategy Group, an international foreign policy research

entity in Washington. “TURKEY REMAINS STRONG U.S. ALLY, WHY NOT FOR EU?” Chicago Tribune, NewsBank, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1997-05-15/news/9705150295_1_muslim-turkey-us-turkishrelations-islamist-refah // vkoneru That trepidation has eased now. Erbakan has agreed, though grudgingly, to retain Turkey's ties to Europe, the United States and Israel, and committed himself to working within the secular Turkish constitution. But American interest in Turkey has actually been heightened by a string of other events affecting U.S. strategic interests. China's economic and military resurgence is causing unease in Washington. Beijing appears to aspire for the status of a second superpower. And the Russian announcement of a new military doctrine stipulating the first use of nuclear weapons in a desperate conflict was a reminder that the honeymoon with the Russians is over. Even though President Boris Yelstin has swallowed the NATO expansion plans, the Russian parliament could hold off on ratifying the second strategic arms reduction treaty requiring Moscow to dismantle thousands of nuclear warheads. And Yeltsin recently joined Chinese President Jiang Zemin in a statement criticizing the U.S. domination of world affairs and calling for a "multipolar world." A multipolar, bi-polar world may not be around the corner, but the United States needs allies in the periphery of the world's second- and third-largest military powers that are resentful of its superpower status. Turkey is its only ally in the periphery of both. Turkish politics, however, remain extremely fluid and Islamic revivalism is far from over. The best way to promote stability and secularism in Turkey, its secular politicians and diplomats have been telling the West, is to integrate it with Western Europe politically and economically. Talbott's impassioned plea to the EU indicates that Washington is listening. Recently, a Turkish diplomat in Washington acknowledged that "the United States, happily, is showing a greater appreciation" of his country "during the last two, three months." He was quick to point out, though, that "the helicopters and frigates issue" remained unresolved. U.S.-Turkish relations have never been smooth. Under pressures from the Greek lobby, Congress has held up the delivery of 10 Super Cobra helicopters and three guided-missile frigates to Turkey. Besides, Yet (Turkish government., ) influential groups are sounding the alarm bell about the Islamists in the Turkey is likely to remain strategically important to Americans as long as they have stakes in its neighborhood.

5. Nuclear war Zalmay Khalizhad, RAND Analyst, 1995, "Losing the Moment?”, Washington Quarterly, spring, ln.
Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.

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Loose Nukes Frontline
1. No theft risk – increased security and undesirable for thieves Joshua HANDLER, scholar & nuclear analyst, 03 ["The 1991-1992 PNIs and the Elimination, Storage, and
Security of Tactical Nuclear Weapons," Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Emergent Threats in an Evolving Security Environment, ed. Brian Alexander & Alistair Millar, Brassey's Inc: Washington DC)

Ensuring the security of tactical nuclear weapons has been a major concern of many analysts and commentators. It is frequently claimed that the security of tactical nuclear weapons is somehow worse that for strategic nuclear weapons and thus, that special steps are somehow merited. However, one result of the PNIs is that tactical nuclear weapons are now approximately as secure as strategic nuclear weapons. It is now as good – or as bad – and this is a large change from the 1990-91 time frame. Tactical nuclear weapons in the United States and Russia are in many cases collocated with strategic nuclear weapons in major nuclear weapons storage facilities that contain multiple bunkers. Moreover, major changes in deployment patterns have improved the security situation for tactical nuclear weapons on land and there are no such weapons deployed on US or Russian ships or submarines. The only exception is US tactical nuclear weapons aircraft bombs based in Europe, which are now kepts in weapons storage vaults set into the floor of hangers where aircraft can be located. In the case of Russia, some tactical nuclear weapons may be located in storage areas in the vicinity of an airfield area proper. Lastly, many of the supposedly smaller and more easily transportable tactical nuclear weapons, such as artillery shells, may almost be or have been completely eliminated. Thus concerns about them being stolen are now (or soon to be) moot. If a thief has the leisure to decide, there are several reasons why tactical nuclear weapons may not provide an attractive target. In terms of ease of theft, overall, any modern nuclear weapon is not so large. If a group could gain access to a storage bunker, it would be possible for a modest number of people to carry off any type of nuclear weapon. In terms of desirability the obstacles to creating detonation of tactical nuclear weapons that have been placed in a stored configuration or retired may be the same or greater than for strategic nuclear weapons. If the goal is to obtain fissile material, a strategic nuclear weapon may contain more fissile material than a tactical one. In terms of vulnerability, a major concern is the susceptibility of nuclear weapons to theft during transport. Today, there is perhaps even less logistical movement of tactical nuclear weapons than strategic nuclear weapons. Strategic nuclear weapons may actually be more vulnerable, since they are more often transported from remote base areas.

2. No Internal Link - Weapons stolen already Alistair Millar, Vice president of Fourth Freedom Forum director of the Washington Office, 02 ( “The Pressing
Need for Tactical Nuclear Weapons Control,” May) As Representative Curt Weldon (R-PA) stated in an October 1997 hearing, “No one in the West and few in Russia know for sure whether dozens of small nuclear weapons, ideal for terrorist use are unaccounted for and perhaps in the wrong hands. The Important point is that increases in crime, corruption, incompetence, and institutional decay are so advanced in Russia that the theft of nuclear weapons, unthinkable in the Soviet war machine of the Cold War, seems entirely plausible in the Russia of today. The mere possibility that terrorists or rogue states may have acquired some Russian nuclear weapons should be a matter of gravest concern to the governments of the West.”

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Ext – Removal of TNW hurts Turkey Relations
Turkey’s TNWs are critical to Nato’s nuclear deterrence credibility and Turkey’s relationship with the alliance would suffer greatly (Mustafa Kibaroglu ‘10 teaches courses on arms control and disarmament in the Department of International
Relations at Bilkent University in Ankara, Turkey. He has held fellowships at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. June 2010 http://proquest.umi.com/pqdlink?Ver=1&Exp=07-20-2015&FMT=7&DID=2068796071&RQT=309&cfc=1)

Turkey has hosted U.S. nuclear weapons since intermediate-range Jupiter missiles were deployed there in 1961 as a result of decisions made at the alliance’s 1957 Paris summit. Those missiles were withdrawn in 1963 in the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis. Since then, no nuclear missiles have been stationed in Turkey. The only nuclear weapons that have been deployed are the bombs that would be delivered by U.S. F16s or Turkish F-100, F-104, and F-4 “Phantom” aircraft at air bases in Eskisehir, Malatya (Erhac), Ankara (Akinci/Murted), and Balikesir.[12] All such weapons, whether on U.S. or Turkish aircraft, have been under the custody of the U.S. Air Force. Turkey still hosts these U.S. tactical nuclear weapons on its territory, albeit in much smaller numbers.[13] They are limited to one location, the Incirlik base near Adana on the eastern Mediterranean coast of Turkey.[14] All other nuclear weapons have been withdrawn from the bases mentioned above.[15] Moreover, the Turkish air force no longer has any operational link with the remaining tactical nuclear weapons deployed at Incirlik.[16] F-104s have not been in service since 1994. F-4s are still in service after modernization of some 54 of them by Israeli Aerospace Industries in 1997. Yet, only the F-16 “Fighting Falcons” of the Turkish air force participate in NATO`s nuclear strike exercises known as “Steadfast Noon,” during which crews are trained in loading, unloading, and employing B61 tactical nuclear weapons.[17] The Turkish aircraft in these exercises serve as a non-nuclear air defense escort rather than a nuclear strike force.[18] There were two main reasons for Turkey to host U.S. nuclear

weapons. First and foremost has been the deterrent value of these weapons against the threat posed by the nuclear and conventional weapons capabilities of its enormous neighbor, the Soviet Union, during the Cold War. Similarly, after the Cold War, these weapons were believed by Turkish military commanders to constitute a credible deterrent against rival neighbors in the Middle East, such as Iran, Iraq, and Syria,
which used to have unconventional weapons capabilities as well as delivery vehicles such as ballistic missiles.[19] A second reason for Turkey to host U.S. nuclear weapons has been the burden-sharing principle within the alliance. Turkey has strongly subscribed to this principle since it joined NATO in 1952. In fact, Turkey had already displayed unequivocally its willingness to share the burden of defending the interests of the Western alliance by committing a significant number of troops to the Korean War in 1950, even before NATO membership was in sight. Yet, if Turkey is likely to be left as the only country, or one of only two countries, where U.S. nuclear weapons will still be deployed after a possible withdrawal of these weapons from other allies and no other NATO country will be willing to assume the burden of hosting nuclear weapons, Turkey may very well insist that the weapons be sent back to the United States. From

Turkey’s current standpoint, this would not be the desired outcome of the current deliberations within the alliance. According to a Turkish official, the principle of burden sharing should not be diluted. To live up to their commitment to solidarity, which was reaffirmed in Tallinn, the five countries that currently host these weapons should continue to do so for the foreseeable future, the official said.[20]Deterrence Against Whom? Because of the view that NATO’s deterrent will be more credible with the presence of forward-deployed U.S. nuclear weapons in the allied territories in Europe, Turkish diplomats believe that the burden of hosting these weapons should continue to be shared collectively among five allies, as has been the case over the last several decades. Even if all of Turkey’s allies accept this proposal and act accordingly, Turkey will still face a dilemma in its foreign and security policies if it sees the hosting of U.S. nuclear weapons as the only way for it to fulfill its burden-sharing obligations. Ankara’s continuing support for the presence of the U.S. weapons on Turkish territory could be justified only if there were a threat from the military capabilities of Turkey’s neighbors, the two most significant of which would be Iran and Syria, and if the Western allies
shared that threat assessment. There can be no other meaningful scenario that would justify Turkey’s policy of retaining U.S. nuclear weapons on its territory as well as leaving the door open for the deployment of U.S. missile defenses in Turkey in the future. Recent trends, however, appear to be moving from such a threat assessment by Turkey. Over the last few years, Turkey has experienced an unprecedented rapprochement with its Middle Eastern neighbors.

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Ext – Removal of TNW hurts Turkey Relations
Turkey Likes TNWs – and relations would be hurt if we removed TNWs from other countries (Mustafa Kibaroglu teaches courses on arms control and disarmament in the Department of International

Relations at Bilkent University in Ankara, Turkey. He has held fellowships at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. June 2010 http://proquest.umi.com/pqdlink?Ver=1&Exp=07-202015&FMT=7&DID=2068796071&RQT=309&cfc=1) With other NATO countries such as Luxembourg and Norway supporting them, Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands have indicated a desire to reassess the case for continued deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons on their territories. Should these countries advocate withdrawal of U.S. weapons from Europe, Turkish decision-makers might conclude that two fundamental principles of the alliance, namely solidarity and burden sharing, have been seriously weakened. Those principles have been the basis for Turkey’s agreement, since the early 1960s, to the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons on its soil. The issue is contentious within NATO, which makes its decisions by consensus—an approach that was reaffirmed by the alliance’s foreign ministers at an April meeting in Tallinn, Estonia, and by an Experts Group report released in May. Although final decisions on the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons probably are not imminent, the debate has already been joined, and Turkey should be an active participant. If Turkey continues to sit on the sidelines of that debate, as it has done until now, it could find itself in an uncomfortable spot: A decision to remove the U.S. weapons from Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands would likely leave Turkey and Italy as the only NATO members with foreign nuclear weapons on their soil.[1] Such a situation would put pressure on Turkey to reverse its long-standing policy of hosting U.S. nuclear weapons on its territory—even more so if the U.S. nuclear weapons are removed from Italy as well. Turkey’s calculus must include an additional element because it has Middle Eastern neighbors that are a source of concern to some allies but with whom Turkey is developing increasingly close diplomatic ties after a long period of animosity that extended beyond the end of Cold War rivalry. The most sensible course for Turkey is to support the efforts of other host nations to create a consensus within the alliance that would lead to a withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe. That step would help Ankara to continue cultivating relationships with its non-European neighbors and could be achieved without undermining extended nuclear deterrence.

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IRAN PROLIF ADV FRONTLINE
1. There is no link to the plan and iran proliferation – the aff doesn’t give a reason how removing gravity bombs in turkey effect iran proliferation 2. Although Iran has 20% enriched uranium, it requires at minimum 90% to make a nuclear weapon.

(Federation of American Scientist, http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/fuelcycle/centrifuges/U_production.html, google, Accessed July 5th, 2010) While low-enriched uranium (LEU) could technically mean uranium with an assay anywhere between slightly greater Than natural (0.72 percent) and 20 percent U-235, it most commonly is used to denote uranium with an assay suitable for use in a light-water nuclear reactor (i.e., an assay of less than 5 percent). Similarly, the term “highly enriched” uranium (HEU) could be used to describe uranium with an assay greater than 20 percent, but it is commonly used to refer to uranium enriched to 90 percent U-235 or higher (i.e., weapons-grade uranium). The term “oralloy” was used during World War II as a con-traction of “Oak Ridge alloy,” and it denoted uranium enriched to 93.5 percent U-235. Manhattan Project

scientists and engineers explored several uranium-enrichment technologies, and production plants employing three uranium-enrichment processes —- electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS), liquid thermal diffusion, and gaseous diffusion -- were constructed at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, during the period from 1943 to 1945. Centrifugation was tried, but the technology needed to spin a rotor at an appropriate speed was not then practical on an industrial scale. The aerodynamic separation processes developed in Germany and South Africa did not exist during World War II; neither, of course did laser isotope separation or plasma separation. The World War II Japanese nuclear program made some attempts to find a purely chemical process.

3. No iran proliferation- technicaly impossible Dan Murphy August 10 2009 http://features.csmonitor.com/globalnews/2009/08/10/us-intel-chiefsays-no-iran-nukes-possible-before-2013/ Iran will probably not have the technical ability to produce enough fuel to make a nuclear bomb before 2013, US Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair told a senate intelligence committee earlier this year. He also said that he’s seen no evidence Iran is seeking to make fuel for a bomb, and that international scrutiny appears to be deterring such efforts. The American intelligence community’s views on Iran’s nuclear program, progress in Afghanistan, and the extent of Al Qaeda’s operational abilities were all addressed in a 40- page series of answers that Mr. Blair delivered to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on February 12. But only now has it become public. The document was released to Steven Aftergood, who runs the Project on Government Secrecy for the
Federation of American Scientists following a Freedom of Information Act request. (A PDF to the full document can be found at this link.) On Iran’s nuclear program, Blair relied on the assessment of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) to say that Iran does not yet have the technical ability to produce the highly

enriched uranium (HEU) it would need for a bomb. “INR continues to assess it is unlikely that Iran will have the technical capability to produce HEU before 2013,” the memo reads. Blair said that if Iran decides to make highly
enriched uranium that it would probably use “military-run covert facilities, rather than declared nuclear sites” and that “outfitting a covert enrichment infrastructure could take years. The (intelligence community) has no evidence that Iran has yet made the decision to produce highly enriched uranium, and INR assesses that Iran is unlikely to make such a decision for at least as long as international scrutiny and pressure persist.”

4. iran is a decade away from the bomb Ted Galen Carpenter, Vice President, Defense and Foreign Policy Studies, “Keep a Cool Head,” BALTIMORE SUN, September 20, 2006, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6689,
accessed 8/25/07.
A rogue state in a critical region, weapons of mass destruction, inspections, negotiations, the threat of sanctions, indecisive multilateral bodies - haven't we seen it all before? Iran's nuclear efforts understandably make us nervous, but there is no need to panic. We still have enormous power to deter Iranian aggression, and as we've learned in Iraq, the risks of inaction are preferable to the catastrophe of starting a war. The bulk of the evidence indicates that Iran is years away from

being able to build nuclear weapons. U.S. intelligence agencies maintain that Iran will not have such a capability for another five to 10 years, and prominent independent experts agree.

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Iran prolif ADV-Having Nukes Is Against Islam
1. it’s against Islamic Principals to procure nukes, Iran only wants nuclear power for energy purposes Tehran Times Political Desk. 10 "Islamic Law Prohibits Production of Nuclear Arms:
Leader." ‫ .شماره روزنامه‬The Tehran Times, 13 Jan. 2008. Web. 05 July 2010.<http://www.tehrantimes.com/index_View.asp?code=161066>.

TEHRAN - Iran’s religious leader, Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, has stated that the Islamic Republic has repeatedly said that Iran opposes the production and use of nuclear weapons in principle from an Islamic point of view.“The Islamic

Republic of Iran has repeatedly announced that in principle, based on sharia (Islamic law), it is opposed to the production and use of nuclear weapons,” the Supreme Leader told IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei on Saturday. The Leader insisted that it is essential that the International Atomic Energy Agency remains an independent body. “In regard to the current positive international atmosphere surrounding Iran’s nuclear activities, a speedy resolution of this issue will be considered an important test and a great success for the International Atomic EnergyAgency,” Ayatollah Khamenei
underlined. Referring to Iran’s principled stance to fully observe international treaties, the Leader stated, “According to this principle, the Islamic Republic of Iran has fulfilled its commitments to the NPT.” The

Leader said the arrogant powers are not happy about the independence of the UN nuclear watchdog. “Their anger over the agency’s position that no diversion has been found in Iran’s nuclear activities is a strong indication of this,” he noted. There is no justification for Iran’s nuclear dossier to remain on the agenda of the UN Security Council, he added. The Supreme Leader
expressed hope that the remaining issues over the country’s nuclear program would be resolved as soon as possible. ElBaradei said the Islamic Republic is an important partner of the IAEA, adding that in recent months there has been good cooperation between Iran and the agency with the goal of clearing up all the ambiguities.

“Iran has the right to use nuclear energy for developing the country,”

he asserted. ElBaradei said negotiation is the only solution to the nuclear issue and voiced hope that Iran’s nuclear dossier would be returned to the International Atomic Energy Agency. The UN nuclear watchdog chief arrived in Tehran on Friday for talks over Iran’s nuclear program in line with a modality plan agreed by both sides in August last year. In a press conference with Atomic Energy Organization of Iran Director Gholamreza Aqazadeh on Friday, ElBaradei lauded the growing cooperation between the Islamic Republic and the IAEA, saying, “The positive atmosphere created through talks between Iran and the agency has had a very positive effect on the entire Middle East.” Iran regards IAEA as only partner in nuclear issue President Mahmud Ahmadinejad said on Saturday that Iran regards the IAEA as the only body authorized to investigate the country’s nuclear activities. “The Islamic Republic of Iran recognizes the agency as the only negotiating partner in the nuclear issue,” Ahmadinejad told ElBaradei in a separate meeting. The president expressed hope that the major powers’ pressure would not cause the UN nuclear watchdog to shirk its duty to carry out its mandate in a manner based on justice. “Some countries imagine that the (International) Atomic Energy Agency has been established to pursue their policies, and this conception is not fair.” “Nuclear energy is a divine gift and within the next 20 to 30 years, (all) countries’ demand for this energy will multiply. All countries should be provided with legal opportunities to utilize this clean energy,” the president stated. “The view propagated by the arrogant powers that nuclear energy means an atomic bomb” should be abandoned, Ahmadinejad added. ElBaradei said that Iran’s nuclear program is moving in the right direction. He called for further expansion of cooperation between Iran and the IAEA to clear up the remaining differences over Tehran’s nuclear activities

2. And nuclear energy often gets mistaken for proliferation Shrader-Frechette, Professor at the University of Notre Dame, 2008
(Kristin, America Magazine, June 23, “Five Myths About Nuclear Energy,” http://www.americamagazine.org/content/article.cfm?article_id=10884, Date Accessed: June 24, 2010, DMC)
Pursuing nuclear power also perpetuates the myth that increasing atomic energy, and thus increasing uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing, will increase neither terrorism nor proliferation of nuclear weapons. This myth has been rejected by both the International Atomic Energy Agency and the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment. More nuclear

plants means more weapons materials, which means more targets, which means a higher risk of terrorism and proliferation. The government admits that Al Qaeda already has targeted U.S. reactors , none of which can withstand
attack by a large airplane. Such an attack, warns the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, could cause fatalities as far away

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as 500 miles and destruction 10 times worse than that caused by the nuclear accident at Chernobyl in 1986. Nuclear energy actually increases the risks of weapons proliferation because the same technology used for civilian atomic power can be used for weapons, as the cases of India, Iran, Iraq, North Korea and Pakistan illustrate. As the Swedish Nobel Prize winner Hannes Alven put it, “The military atom and the civilian atom are Siamese twins.” Yet if the world stopped

building nuclear-power plants, bomb ingredients would be harder to acquire, more conspicuous and more costly politically, if nations were caught trying to obtain them. Their motives for seeking nuclear materials would be unmasked as military, not civilian.

Turkey Doesn’t Fear Iran
Turkey is in an alliance with Iran-doesn’t fear them Bar'el 5/18 (Zvi, Middle Eastern affairs analyst, “Why does Iran see Turkey as an 'honest broker' for a

nuclear deal?” http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/why-does-iran-see-turkey-as-an-honest-brokerfor-a-nuclear-deal-1.290874) MJ Why did Iran choose to see Turkey as an "honest broker" and make the deal with it instead of with the permanent Security Council members? The two countries' good relations are not free of suspicion, but both Iran and Turkey have adopted a policy of expanding their influence in the Middle East, influence of the sort that relies on cooperation rather than competition. The closer ties between Turkey and Syria, Iran's ally; the similar attitude that Turkey and Iran have toward Hamas; their shared interests in Iraq; and a similar view of radical Islamic terrorism all combined with Turkey's disappointment over European views of its candidacy to join the European Union to create a confluence of interests that, for the time being, trumps their disagreements. Moreover, from an ideological standpoint, Iran prefers Turkey to the U.S.: Any concession to Washington or its Security Council partners would be perceived as a surrender. The uranium transfer deal transforms Iran and Turkey into strategic allies without undermining Turkey's standing as a NATO member or as a U.S. ally in Afghanistan. It was also not conditioned on Turkey severing its ties with Israel. And if the deal surmounts all the
expected obstacles, Turkey will gain new status as a mediator, a status it will also be able to use in other conflicts in the region, and especially in the Israeli-Syrian peace process.

Turkey has embraced Iran-no fear Krieger 6/6 (Hilary, staff writer, “Oren: Turkey has embraced the leaders of Iran and Hamas,” Jerusalem
Post, http://www.jpost.com/International/Article.aspx?id=177577) MJ “Turkey has embraced the leaders of Iran and Hamas, all of whom called for Israel’s destruction,” Ambassador Michael Oren declared. “Our policy has not changed but Turkey’s policy has changed, very much, over the last few years,” he said. “Under a different government with an Islamic orientation, Turkey has turned away from the West. ” But Oren, speaking on a conference call organized by The Israel Project, held out hope for reconciliation. “We certainly do not have any desire in any further deterioration in our relations with the Turks,” he said. “It’s an important Middle Eastern power. It has been a friend in the past.”

Turkey is close to Iran Schleifer 9 (Yigal, staff writer, “Turkey-Iran ties grow, as do question marks,” Kuwait Times,
http://www.kuwaittimes.net/read_news.php?newsid=NzkxNDQ5ODg0) MJ The visit Tuesday of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan to Tehran is yet another sign of the rapidly improving relations between neighbours and regional powers Turkey and Iran. Over the last several years, the two countries have deepened their trade relations, as well as their cooperation in the areas of security and energy. But analysts suggest that Turkey and Iran's growing

relations might be put to the test by Western expectations that Turkey take a harder line on Tehran's controversial nuclear programme. I can detect a perception in the US and Europe that Turkey is softer on Iran. They would like Turkey to have a tougher profile and a tougher stance vis-a-vis Iran," says Mustafa Kibaroglu, an expert on nuclear non-proliferation issues at Bilkent University in Ankara. Relations

between NATO member Turkey and Iran have improved dramatically in recent years,

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particularly since the arrival of the ruling liberal Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP) in
2002, which has pledged to pursue a regional foreign policy of "zero problems" with its neighbours.

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Turkey Neg 93 /341

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Turkey Doesn’t Fear Iran
Turkey-Iran relationship good-Turkey supports Iran, doesn’t fear IRNA 10 (Islamic Republic News Agency, “Turkey restates support for nuclear power in Iran,” News.az,
http://www.news.az/articles/9434) MJ
Mehmet Ali Sahin was hosting a delegation led by Iran's minister of education and culture, Hamid-Reza Hajibaba’i. The delegation is visiting Turkey at the invitation of Education Minister Nemat Cubukcu. During the meeting the Turkish parliament

speaker described the two countries’ relations, especially in recent years, as satisfactory. “Turkey-Iran parliamentary relations, too, grew rapidly during this period,” he said. Sahin also expressed satisfaction at bilateral regional cooperation. “Taking peaceful advantage of nuclear energy is the natural right of any country and Turkey has a very clear stance on the matter.” He emphasized, “Iran’s nuclear dispute with the West needs to be settled by peaceful means and Turkey will do anything necessary in that respect.” Sahin reiterated that the visit of Turkish Foreign Minister

Ahmet Davutoglu to Iran on Tuesday "was aimed at securing the same objective”. He said, “So long as you pursue your righteous policies in your nuclear program, we will continue our support for you.” Hajibaba’i conveyed warm greetings from the Iranian Majlis speaker, Ali Larijani, to his Turkish counterpart. He said, “Mr Larijani is longing to receive you in Tehran.” He said that the head of the Iranian parliament’s National Security Commission, Alaeddin Boroujerdi and members of the Iran-Turkey parliamentary friendship group, were planning to visit Turkey. Referring to a protocol on cooperation in education signed on Tuesday by Iran and Turkey, Hajibaba-i said, “We have had fruitful and constructive meetings during this visit with Turkish officials.” Hajibaba’i earlier on Wednesday met Turkey’s minister of culture and tourism, deputy prime minister and the managing director of Turkey’s Religious Affairs Organization.

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Turkey Neg 94 /341

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TNWs Deter Iran/Russia
TNWs in Turkey deters Iran from attacking and Russia from increasing their stockpile Meier 08 (Olivier, Arms Control Association, Fondation pour la Rechercher Stratégique, Rechercher And
Documents, Number 2, Annexe 2 au rapport final armes nucléaires tactiques et la sécurité de l’Europe Le débat belge The German Debate on Tactical Nuclear Weapons http://www.frstrategie.org/barreFRS/publications/rd/RD_20080129.pdf) BAF
Thinking 10-15 years ahead,

a possible scenario in which it might be important to have a NATO-based nuclear deterrent would involve a nuclear-armed Iran which, after the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq, has developed friendly relations with Iraq and Lebanon. In the scenario, Israel, which has developed close relations with NATO, is calling on the Alliance to protect it against Iranian threats and terrorist activities sponsored by Tehran. In such a crisis, it might be sensible to deter Iran by nuclear means from directly threatening Israel. A credible nuclear deterrent should not be based only on U.S. nuclear assets because Europeans
might not want to depend on Washington’s decisions alone. British Trident SLMBs are not flexible enough to provide a credible deterrent and France might decide not to contribute to a NATO deterrence posture. From a European perspective, nuclear sharing

provides a forum for consultations on the one hand, and an instrument to demonstrate resolve, on the other hand. Thus, under the scenario, a deployment of dual-capable aircraft at Incirlik might signal the seriousness of NATO’s nuclear guarantees. Whether nuclear deterrence will become relevant in

the context of out-of-area deployments depends largely on whether NATO will actually become a global security provider. The larger question at stake is whether in a world in which the number of nuclear weapon states is increasing we really want to rely only on the United States, the United Kingdom and France to provide a nuclear umbrella. From the perspective of NATO non-nuclear weapon states,

the most important political reason to maintain nuclear sharing is the influence it provides on the nuclear policies of nuclear allies. If, vice versa, it should become clear that non-nuclear weapon states such as

Germany have no influence on the nuclear weapons policies of NATO nuclear powers, the rationale for maintaining nuclear sharing is gone. Then, these arrangements should be terminated. Nations that provide dual-capable aircraft do have greater influence in Alliance nuclear consultations, for example in the Nuclear Planning Group, than non- DCA nations. Alliance discussions on a new nuclear doctrine have thus far not taken place because such a debate is perceived to be politically too dangerous. NATO members fear that no new international consensus might be found on the purpose of nuclear weapons and currently no NATO member appears keen to take the initiative on the issue. From a German perspective, taking the lead on nuclear weapons issues in NATO could endanger the reputation gained in the context of EU3 negotiations with Iran . The Bush administration, on the other hand, is currently unlikely to take the initiative within NATO because it is interested in improving transatlantic relations more generally. A withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe by itself will not solve the problem

of having to decide on a nuclear-capable follow-on system for the Tornado. It would, however, be difficult to justify procurement of a nuclear-capable aircraft when nuclear weapons are no longer deployed in Europe. There is no specific date when the nuclear-capable Tornado will have to be replaced by the Eurofighter. This depends largely on procedures for certifying the nuclear capability of the

Tornado and the question will not become urgent before 2018. The Ministry of Defence is trying push a decision as far as possible into the future. From the perspective of Alliance coherence and solidarity, it is interesting to see that Europeans are refusing to grant U.S. technicians access to the Eurofighter. For financial and possibly other reasons, Germany is unable to buy the Joint Strike Fighter. Discussions between the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign Ministry on the nuclear paragraphs in the 2006 Defence White Paper

are a reflection of institutional interests and old divisions between the two bureaucracies over the relative importance of nuclear arms control vis-à-vis NATO nuclear sharing. Having an arms control dialogue with Russia on tactical nuclear weapons is the only way to work towards a reduction of these weapons. The Russian tactical nuclear weapons stockpile is the greatest problem. While NATO is transparent to some degree, we know very little about the status of Russia’s short-range nuclear weapons. It would certainly be useful to start talks on tactical nuclear weapons before the 2010 NPT Review Conference. However, expectations should be modest and there
will be no “zero option” for tactical nuclear weapons.

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Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 95 /341

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TNWs deter Iran/Russia
TNWs protect Ankara from Iran bomb and token to be traded for Russia disarmament Bell and Loehrke 9 (Alexandra and Benjamin, Ploughshares Fund, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-status-of-us-nuclear-weapons-turkey) BAF
By incorporating Ankara into its new European missile defense plans--intended to protect Turkey and other countries vulnerable to Iran's short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles--Washington could further shore up its military relationship with Turkey. Ship-based Aegis
missile systems will be the backbone of the strategy, with considerations left open for later deployments of mobile ground-based interceptors in Eastern Europe or Turkey. This cooperation could provide the bond with Washington and

perception of security that Turkey seeks in the face of a potential Iranian bomb. Because Russia weighs significantly in Turkish security calculations, reductions to Russian strategic and nonstrategic nuclear arsenals also would help improve Ankara's peace of mind. The United States and Russia soon will seek ratification of a follow-on agreement to START. And treaty negotiations in pursuit of further reductions to the U.S. and Russian arsenals should involve forward-deployed nuclear weapons, including the U.S. weapons in Turkey. During any such negotiations, Turkey must be fully confident in NATO and U.S. security guarantees. Critically, any removal of the weapons in Turkey
would need to happen in concert with efforts to prevent Iran from turning its civil nuclear energy program into a military one. Otherwise, Washington would risk compromising Turkey as a NATO ally and key regional partner. If used properly, Turkey actually

can play an important role in this complex process, and the United States and its allies should seriously consider Turkish offers to serve as an interlocutor between Iran and the West. First,

Ankara's potential influence with Tehran should not be underestimated. As Princeton scholar Joshua Walker has noted, given its longestablished pragmatic relations and growing economic ties with Iran, Ankara is in a position to positively influence Tehran's behavior.

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Turkey Neg 96 /341

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TNWs Deter Iran
TNWs and conventional force deters Iran better than strategic nukes Daley 5 (Tad, Writing Fellow, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War

1985 Nobel Peace Laureate Organization, The Non-Proliferation Treaty Fiasco The Me-Too Club, http://www.counterpunch.org/daley05312005.html)BAF During the Cold War's long atomic arms race, it became clear that nuclear weapons had little actual military value. It was difficult to conceive of any scenario where the benefits of employing a nuclear warhead could possibly exceed the almost infinite risks. Instead, nuclear arsenals
came to be seen less as usable weapons, and more as a means to persuade others not to use weapons. To some extent nuclear weapons discouraged conventional aggression. American military doctrine explicitly threatened to respond to Soviet

tank divisions crossing the Elbe River in Germany both by attacking those divisions with "tactical nuclear weapons" (an earlier generation of George Bush's oxymoronic "mininukes"), and by lobbing immensely more
powerful strategic nuclear weapons directly onto Soviet soil. This is why American presidents, Democratic and Republican, always refused to commit to "no first use." To accomplish this deterrent purpose, however, the US might need, oh, 70 invulnerable nuclear warheads or so. But during the Cold War the total number reached more than 70,000! We needed thousands of nuclear weapons, the argument ran, to dissuade our Soviet adversary from launching thousands of nuclear weapons against us. This, of course, was the logic behind the doctrine known as "mutually assured destruction," or "MAD" (surely the most appropriate acronym in history). As the Cold War ground on, it became apparent that the only rational purpose for nuclear weapons was to deter the use of nuclear weapons by others. If Iran and

North Korea acquire nuclear arsenals, their function for these regimes will be dramatically different. For Teheran and Pyongyang, the primary function of their nuclear weapons won't be to deter the use of someone else's nuclear weapons. Why not? Because Iran and North Korea aren't afraid that the U.S. is going to attack them with nuclear weapons. Iran and North Korea are afraid that the U.S. is going to attack them. Consider the outside world as viewed from Tehran and Pyongyang. George
Bush delivers his 2002 State of the Union address, and singles out three countries as constituting an "axis of evil." He announces his intention to initiate unilateral and preemptive wars against nations that his Administration subjectively determines to be a potential threat. Defying almost universal world opinion, he actually starts such a war against one of the three, and succeeds in decapitating its regime, killing its leader's sons, and driving that leader himself into a pathetic hole in the ground. In the case of Iran, he surrounds it on all sides with bristling American military power -- Iraq to the west, Afghanistan to the east, enormous new US bases in Central Asia to the north, and the unchallengeable US Navy in the Persian Gulf to the south. In the case of North Korea, he adamantly refuses to offer the non-aggression pledge that Pyongyang has repeatedly requested. And even when he tries to offer reassurances he only exacerbates fears. "This notion that the U.S. is getting ready to attack Iran is simply ridiculous," he proclaims, only to immediately follow with "that being said, all options are on the table." Does it occur to anyone in the bowels of the Bush Administration that these statements and actions might clash with their accompanying insistence that these two nations engage in immediate unilateral disarmament? Iran and North Korea, of course, cannot hope to take on the United States in a direct military confrontation. But they can aspire to deter what must seem to them to be the very real threat of American military attack. How? By developing the capability to vaporize an American military base or three abroad, or an American carrier group in the Indian Ocean or the Sea of Japan, or even an American city. And by holding out the possibility that they would respond to any assault by employing that capability immediately, before it becomes too late, following the venerable maxim: "Use them or lose them." (This, we have learned in recent years from now elderly former Soviet military officers who were on the ground during the Cuban missile crisis, is precisely what they were prepared to do with the nuclear warheads in their hands at the first hint of an American strike on Cuba.) There is, of course, only one thing that can provide these two countries with the capability to inflict that kind of damage. Hint: it's not nuclear electricity. Iran and North Korea don't need thousands of nuclear warheads to fulfill this deterrent purpose. They just need perhaps a couple of dozen, well hidden and well protected. American military planners might be almost certain that they could take out all Iranian or North Korean nuclear capabilities in a lightning "surgical strike." But "almost" isn't good enough. It is inconceivable that the anticipated benefits of an attack on Iran or North Korea could outweigh the risk of losing perhaps a million Americans - 3 times as many as during the long years of WWII, 300 times as many as on 9/11 - in the blink of an eye, the snap of a finger, the single beat of a human heart. If these states can create enough uncertainty in the minds

of a potential adversary about the possible catastrophic response to any attack, it will probably be enough to cause that adversary to pause indefinitely. It is difficult, on the other hand, to imagine any circumstances in which American

commanders would find it militarily necessary to employ nuclear weapons against Iran or North Korea. After all, the United States today spends more on its military power than all the other countries in the world put together - a situation probably unprecedented in all of world history. The US toppled the Iraqi regime in a few short weeks with conventional weaponry alone. (Securing the peace, of course, has been another matter - but no one has suggested that America's vast nuclear arsenal can do anything to help with that.) This is especially true of the US Air Force, which today can operate at will over most of the world with virtually zero risk to its aircraft or crews. If any country can exercise deterrence without having to resort to nuclear deterrence, it is us. Hence we see one of the more delicious paradoxes of the embryonic new nuclear age. Iran and North Korea need nuclear weapons to deter the United States. The United States doesn't need nuclear weapons to deter Iran or North Korea. The country that has them doesn't need them. And the countries that need them don't have them.
Perhaps. Yet.

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Turkey Neg 97 /341

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‡‡‡ Russia Adv. ‡‡‡

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Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 98 /341

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Turkey Doesn’t Fear Russia
Turkey doesn’t fear Russia-they are partners Oku 5 (Asim, AIA Turkish and Cacasian sections, “Russia - Turkey: The New Eurasian Alliance: The Quest For the Lost
Empires,” Axis and Information Analysis, http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=149) MJ

From the beginning of the new millennium Russia and Turkey started to see each other not as opponents but as partners, both economic, and political (3). As mutual fears declined , animosity to America increased . Nationalist Slavophile tendencies were more distinctly traced to the ruling Russian
establishment's policy, while the Turkish ruling party of Justice and Development persistently emphasized that the country belongs to the Muslim world. Turkey’s already unsteady relations with Israel, continue to deteriorate (4), in order to become chairman of the Organization Islamic Conference. Russia hopes to strengthen its own status in this organization. An anti-American mood

reigns in the political and intellectual elites of both countries, and simultaneously in both Moscow and Ankara nostalgia over lost influence is felt. Both Russians and Turks do not want the West to consider them as minor, "younger" partners, and they aspire to regain their influence over the borders of former empires – the Ottoman and Russian (and later - Soviet). Political

leaders and nationalist intellectuals see Turkey and Russia as carriers of the Eurasian historical tradition, compelled to resist the Atlantic cultural and political intrusion into the area. Thus two fundamental factors of Russian - Turkish relations take shape: the common aspiration to reach "strategic depth" (the term of Turkish professor Ahmet Davutoglu (5), meaning the actual return to historical spheres of influence) and unity on the ground of "

Eurasian historical commonality".

Turkey and Russia have mutual trust-no fear exists Engdahl 9 (F. William, leading researcher, economist and analyst of the New World Order, “The
Geopolitical Great Game: Turkey and Russia Moving Closer,” http://www.engdahl.oilgeopolitics.net/Geopolitics___Eurasia/Turkey___Russia/turkey___russia.html) MJ Turkish President Abdullah Gul paid a four-day visit to the Russian Federation from February 12 to 15, where he met with Russian president Dmitry Medvedev, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, and also travelled to Kazan, the capital of Tatarstan, where he discussed joint investments. Gul was accompanied by
his state minister responsible for foreign trade, and Minister of Energy, as well as a large delegation of Turkish businessmen. Foreign Minister Ali Babacan joined the delegation. The largest autonomous republic in Russian Federation

whose population mainly consists of Muslim Tatar Turks, is a sign how much relations between Ankara and Moscow have improved in recent months as Turkey has cooled to Washington foreign policy. In previous years, Moscow was convinced that Turkey was trying to establish Pan-Turanism in the Caucasus and Central Asia and inside the Russian Federation, a huge concern in Moscow. Today clearly Turkish relations with Turk entities inside the Russian Federation are not considered suspicious as it was once, confirming a new mood of mutual trust.

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Turkey Neg 99 /341

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Turkey Doesn’t Fear Russia
Turkey not afraid of Russia-friendship and cooperation between them Turkish Weekly 8 (“Turkey, Russia to work on simplified customs to overcome trade row,”

http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/59035/turkey-russia-to-work-on-simplified-customs-to-overcome-traderow.html) MJ Russia and Turkey are working on a simplified customs system in order to overcome the ongoing trade row between the countries. Russian and Turkish foreign ministers also emphasized the friendship and significant cooperation between the two neighbors. The Russian

Foreign Minister paid a one-day working visit to Turkey on Tuesday where he met his Turkish counterpart Ali Babacan in Istanbul. The two ministers had discussed the trade row, recent developments in Caucasus, and Iran and Iraq. Russia was not discriminating against Turkey in the trade relations between the countries, hit by a recent customs dispute, Lavrov told the joint

conference with Babacan, adding Russian customs authorities were working to simplify their bilateral customs system. Hundreds of trucks transporting Turkish exports to Russia have been held at the
country's checkpoints for up to four weeks, costing exporters billions of dollars in losses. The row has triggered speculation that Russia is trying to punish Turkey for allowing U.S. warships carrying aid to Georgia to pass through the Bosporus to the Black Sea. Lavrov, however, denied that stricter Russian controls on Turkish imports are politically motivated, underlining Russia's commitment to reach the 25-billion-dollars trade volume target in 2008. He said some countries had breached customs

regulations prompting Russian authorities to take more stringent measures. Babacan said he believed that trade problems between Turkey and Russia would be overcome with a flexible attitude and the cooperation of Russia. "We discussed in a sincere and constructive way the problems caused by keeping and checking Turkish products at Russian customs gates longer than usual," Babacan told the conference.

Turkey and Russia are friends-Turkey not afraid Singh 5/20 (K. Gajendra, Indian ambassador to Turkey and Azerbaijan, “Medvedev
Consolidates Russian Influence in Turkey & Syria,” http://www.boloji.com/analysis2/0599.html) MJ

Turkey and Russia with others in the region are charting a policy of friendship based on solid economic alliances. Turkey with its pre-Ottoman and Ottoman past shares ethnic, cultural and linguistic affinities with central Asia, Caucasus and Balkans. Ankara has excellent relations with East European nations and tie ups with its former Vilayats (provinces).
With economic gains as bait Ankara can even help Moscow re-enter Balkans including new states created out of Yugoslavia, from where Russia was forced out by US and NATO during 1990s. While their interests do not always coincide, the

two can help each other out in the Caucasus, as and when US power and influence ebb there. With Gul besides him, Medvedev proclaimed in Ankara, "Russia and Turkey are working together to maintain global and regional stability. Sitting in the president's office just now we spoke about the fact that the Black Sea countries themselves, and above all the region's two biggest countries, Russia and Turkey, bear direct responsibility for the situation in the region." Russia, certainly and even Turkey might want to forestall any attempt to make the Black Sea a "NATO lake". Moscow hopes

Ankara would help keep outside powers at bay. Russia itself is trying its best to limit NATO's activities in Georgia and even the East European Black Sea coast. Any Russia-Turkish attempt to create a regional security system or understanding in the South Caucasus will be resisted by Washington, which has its proxy ruling in Georgia and close relationship with Azerbaijan based on exploitations of its oil and gas reserves. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline gives US a handle to keep Baku and Georgia in line. Azerbaijan has close relations with Ankara but an agreement between Turkey and Armenia to normalise relations has sent Baku fuming. Armenia remains allied to Russia, Georgia is unlikely to join NATO any time soon after the August 2008 war between Georgia and Russia over South Ossetia. On the whole Washington’s influence is on the decline.

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Turkey Neg 100 /341

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Turkey Doesn’t Fear Russia
Turkey does not fear Russia Oku 5 (Asim, AIA Turkish and Cacasian sections, “Turkey-Russia Relations Dynamics,” Axis and Information Analysis,
http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=71) MJ

After collapse of the USSR, Moscow continued perceiving Turkey as NATO sentinel and a traditional rival in the area of the vital Russian interests: the Caucasus, the Balkans, the Central Asia and the

Middle East. Kremlin considered Ankara as a leading sponsor of Islamic and separatist movements in the Caucasus. Russian leadership was afraid that Turkey, appealing to "pan -Turkism" and wide common cultural grounds with the peoples of the Central Asia, is trying to expand its influence upon them. Turkish government was irritated by Russian counteracts against lining of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline. Both countries accused each other in supporting separatists: the Chechen - in Russia, the Kurdish - in Turkey. Revision by both states of

previously developed stereotypes begins at the end of the '90s. Ankara and Moscow start to perceive each other not as a threat, but rather as a weak and, consequently not very dangerous competitors, colliding with the same external challenges and problems. "The Default" in Russia, its military failures in the war with the Chechen resistance, its inability to defend interests of Serbia in the Balkans, reduced the fear of "Russian Bear" in Ankara. Correspondingly, political and economic crisis in Turkey at the beginning of 2001 was perceived in Moscow as a sign of weakness and instability. It lowers the level of concern about the possibility of Turkish expansion in the Central Asia and the Caucasus. Both countries aspire to benefit from mutual relations - both on political and economic level . Simultaneously, the rising of the US influence in the Caucasus leads to a rapprochement of the former adversaries.

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Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 101 /341

Suiter Pre-season

Removal = Russian Aggression
Removal of US TNW’s from Europe encourages Russian aggression, nuclear proliferation, and would be a major setback for global security Heritage Foundation 10 (President Obama Must Not Remove Nuclear Weapons from Europe,

http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/03/President-Obama-Must-Not-Remove-Nuclear-Weaponsfrom-Europe) MAH
In April 2009—less than three months into his term of office—President Barack Obama laid out the centerpiece of his foreign policy vision for his Administration: the global eradication of nuclear weapons. Citing America’s atomic strikes against the Japanese Empire during World War II, President Obama stated that America has a “moral responsibility” to walk the “road to zero.” This ideological positioning has set off a series of calls from European leaders for the removal of America’s nuclear arsenal from European soil. At this time, however, a withdrawal of America’s nuclear arsenal from Europe would send the

message that transatlantic security is no longer indivisible. It would also give Moscow a blank check to pursue its long-sought-after sphere of privileged interest and, ironically, could pave the way for further nuclear proliferation. The destabilization brought to the European continent from a premature removal of American nuclear weapons, or an unacceptable degradation of its force, would be a major setback for global security and stability.

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TNWs Deter Russia
TNWs deter Russia Wood 09 (David, staff writer and prof @ Univ. Wisconsin,
Tactical Nuclear Weapons, the Menace No One Is Talking About, Politics Daily, http://www.politicsdaily.com/2009/07/08/tactical-nuclear-weapons-the-menace-no-one-is-talking-about/) BAF In the shifting geopolitics of post-Cold War Europe, tactical

nuclear weapons play an increasingly important role in Russian military doctrine, a brute reminder of Russian power against the growing influence of the W est along its borders. instance,the Russians are working to fit tactical nuclear warheads onto submarineFor launched cruise missiles, a weapon that "will play a key role'' in Russian strategyto Vice Adm. Oleg Bursev , according of the Russian General Staff. "Their range and precision are gradually increasing,'' he said this spring. On the U.S.arsenal of tactical the side, nuclear weapons in Europe serves as a powerful symbol of Am erica's guarantee of protection to its European allies , including former Soviet satellites such as Poland and the Czech Republic. Small wonder, given the military and political clout of these armaments, that the summit agreement to reduce nuclear weapons never mentioned tactical nukes. "I'm not tactical -surprised nuclear weapons is a much tougher issue,'' said Hans Kristensen of the Nuclear Information Project at the nonpartisan , director

Federation of American Scientists. Strategic nuclear weapons are the big, obvious ones, the warheads mounted inside the nose cones of intercontinental ballistic missiles blasted from underground silos or submarines. They also include the heavy thermonuclear bombs carried by long-range bombers. These strategic weapons, hundreds of times more powerful than the 1945 Hiroshima bomb, are too terrible ever to be used. They are not for war-fighting; they are for deterrence. The United States has missiles humming away in their silos, pointed at Russia (and elsewhere), so that the Russians wouldn't dare shoot. And Medvedev has his missiles pointed at us. , say nuclear strategists, This makes us safe Tactical nukes a different matter. These bom bs carried on ordinary jets, like F-16s, and . are are mounted on short-range ballistic missiles.class of weapons might still include the nuclear land mines and nuclear artillery shells This that were deployed by the tens of thousands in Europe during the Cold War. The United States and Russia both say they've gotten rid of these weapons, but intelligence services on each side harbor doubts. U.S. tactical weapons, mostly B-61 thermonuclear bombs, are The stored in underground vaults Belgium, Holland, Germany, Italy, and in Turkey where they are under the control of U.S. Air Force ,

m unitions support squadrons. The arrangement is that in wartim e, they'd be handed over to the host nation to use in its own aircraft as part of a NATO military operation. The Air Force, in a worldwide inspection of its nuclear facilities, looked at these bases in 2007 and found that "most sites require additional resources to m eet DOD [Department of Defense] security requirem ents.'' Part of the problem, according to the Federation of American Scientists, which obtained the internal Air Force report, is that the base security provided by the host nations varies widely, with som e bases being guarded by military conscripts with little training or experience. Alm ost nothing is known publicly about Russia's tactical nuclear weapons storage sites. The exact num bers and types of tactical nuclear weapons also are secret. Kristensen puts the number of deployed Russian weapons at 2,050, with an additional 5,390 in deep storage. Deployed U.S. weapons are said to num ber "less than 500.'' "Russia enjoys a sizable numerical advantage,'' the Congressional Comm ission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, a blue-ribbon panel headed by form er Defense Secretary William Perry, reported this spring. Russia "stores thousands of these weapons in apparent support of possible m ilitary operations west of the Urals,'' the report said. Whatever the num ber, strategists are coming to consider these weapons as an increasingly destabilizing factor in Europe. Ultim ately, of course, there is concern about m iscalculation in an escalating confrontation over, say, Georgia. Many conflicts start

unintentionally, and the tactical nuclear weapons are close at hand for saber-rattling purposes. A more immediate problem looms, however. Russia and the United States reduce their strategic nuclear weapons, the As relative clout of tactical nukes rises. The existing imbalance in tactical nukes "will become m ore apparent "

and U.S. allies will be "less assured,'' the commission said. As Kristensen described it to m e, the concern is that "as you cut down the deployed strategic forces, you end up with more tactical than strategic weapons deployed and that begins to create some problem s. In the U.S., we don't have very m any non-strategic [tactical] nuclear weapons com pared to the Russians. If we agree to go down to very low levels of strategic weapons, that begins to m atter to strategists.'' Especially to strategists concerned about maintaining a strong "nuclear umbrella'' over its friends and allies in Europe. Let's say, however im probable, that Moscow and W ashington agree to throw tactical nuclear weapons into the arms reduction negotiations that Obam a and Medvedev agreed to this week. How likely is a deal? Not very, experts suggest. For one thing, tactical nukes are small and easily hidden. And their "delivery vehicles'' -- arms-

control jargon for the aircraft or missiles that carry -- are also used for other purposes. Reliably counting these weapons them

and verifying reductions is devilishly difficult, the experts say. Another reason is that the numbers are too important to each side to think seriously about reductions. Russia's conventional military forces are smaller and vastly inferior to those of the United States, and Russian analysts see their nuclear weapons as a critical counterbalance. Russia also needs its tactical nukes to deter problems along its long border with China. On the U.S. side, a

key goal is keeping Europeans reassured that Russia can't m uscle them around. It's not that W ashington would fire off its tactical nuclear weapons in a crisis, but that simply withdrawing the weapons would make some vulnerable European nations -- Lithuania comes to mind uneasy. And "uneasy'' is something to be -avoided in a crisis. The blue-ribbon commission, in laying out a proposed U.S. approach to the issue, succinctly demonstrated the problem: The United States should go after deep cuts in Russian tactical nukes, but go easy in cutting its own. "All allies depending on the U.S. nuclear umbrella,'statement ' it said in a that probably mirrors the Kremlin's own thinking, " should be assured that any changes in its forces do not imply a weakening of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrence guarantees.'' Tactical nukes, then, will stay.

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Turkey Neg 103 /341

Suiter Pre-season

AT: US-Russia Relations Adv
Relations low now- TNWs don’t solve Lamond 09 (Claudine, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Russian Foreign Policy,” International Security report)
The fundamental problem with Russian ‐America relations is a differing view of the ‘terms of engagement’; an open question remains as to whether the conflicts are disagreements in values or interests.6 The ‘value gap’ between Russia and the US is often blamed for the poor relations. Yet the disagreements between Russia and the US are not about different values, but different interests, both financial and geopolitical. What is more, the interests of America and Russia are increasingly colliding, as both seek to enhance their own power and influence, particularly in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, while diminishing the others. Despite repeated statements saying otherwise, Russia’s and America’s nuclear arsenals are still largely directed at each other. French and British nuclear arsenals are seen largely as
an irrelevance in Russia, and relations with China have improved considerably over the past two decades, with mutual leadership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, joint

. America often see tension with Russia as a conflict in values, the remains of an ideological conflict with a state whose democratic credentials still leave a lot to be desired.8 Russia did not evolve into the liberal democracy many had hoped for after the fall of the Soviet .
military exercises and weapon technology exchanges

Arms control doesn’t spillover- separate agendas ABC News 4/1/09 (“Breakthrough on U.S.-Russian Relations? "We’re Not Looking Into Anybody's Soul,"
Says U.S. Official, Previewing "Sober" Yet Optimistic Announcement,”)
Senior officials with President

the Obama administration tell ABC News that this morning, after a bilateral meeting between Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, the governments of both countries will make a major announcement relating to U.S.-Russian relations, including arms control, a statement of the future U.S.-Russian agenda and a U.S.Russian summit to take place perhaps as early as this summer. "There are very real differences between the United States and Russia, and I have no interest in papering those over," President Obama said Wednesday morning at a press conference with British Prime Minister Gordon Brown. "But there are also a set of common interests."The President listed those interests as ranging "from Afghanistan to Iran," including "reducing nuclear stockpiles … reducing the threat of terrorism ... stabilizing the world economy … and finding a sustainable path for energy and dealing with some of the threats of climate change. ... I think there's great potential for concerted action and that’s what I think we'll be pursuing." "A good place to start will be the
issue of nuclear proliferation," the president said.The announcement will include a set of instructions to arms negotiators on how to conclude a new, "post-START" agreement by the end of 2009, a senior official tells ABC News.START -- or the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty -- between the United States and then-USSR was signed in March 1991 and removed more than 75 percent of the strategic nuclear weapons in both countries' arsenals. But START is set to expire Dec. 5, 2009.Russian leaders have been making a lot of noise about rearming Russia; Russian Strategic Rocket Force Commander Nikolai Solovtsov, for example, said that Russia would start deploying next-generation RS-24 missiles after START expires at the end of the year. Wednesday's announcement could put the United States and Russia on a path to prevent that rearming. It will not be a treaty, the official cautioned ABC News. "This is just a set of instructions on how negotiators need to proceed."An Obama administration official says that the goal of the post-START negotiations would be to roughly reduce the joint

The announcement will also include a joint statement on U.S.-Russian relations. The statement will include a section on arms control, Iran, Afghanistan, European security, the United States' proposed missile defense shield, the Russian war with Georgia, the World Trade Organization, democracy and human rights.
u.S.-Russian nuclear arsenal to 3,000 missiles from the current allowable level of 4,400.

Relations resilient- empirics DesMoines Register 8/26/09 (“Renew the focus on relations of U.S., Russia,”)
In recent years, U.S.-Russia relations have again taken a turn for the worse. Both nations have routinely portrayed the other in negative terms. Mutual distrust and suspicions have grown over many political, defense and economic issues. We have returned to describing each other in stereotypes.The 50th anniversary of Khrushchev's visit is an excellent opportunity to focus again on the importance of better U.S.-Russia relations, honest dialogue and shared need to tackle nuclear and other global challenges. As President Barack Obama said in Moscow in early July, "But I believe that on the fundamental issues that will shape this century , Americans and Russians share common interests that form a basis for cooperation."

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AT: Russian TNWs Adv
Russia will keep TNWs a. security interests besides the US BBC 8/13/09 (“Russia should retain tactical nuclear arms - senior MP,”)
The United States keeps in Europe tactical nuclear warheads many in the US itself suspect are not expedient. "Our own security is a totally different matter. Tactical nuclear arms are unambiguously beneficial to us and necessary for maintaining it. I would prefer to retain them," Kokoshin said. "The availability of both strategic and tactical nuclear arms in combination with long-range smart conventional weapons will enable us to effectively manage crisis-like situations," he believes.Besides, future tactical nuclear arms reduction talks, should they ever begin, will require special control and verification measures, "far more complex that measures to control strategic offensive arms," Kokoshin said.

b. political function, expansion of NATO Podvig 06 (Pavel, “TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND TERRORISM,”
TNWs, however, do play another significant role for Russia, one that is similar to the role they play in the relationship between the United States and NATO. Although perhaps not apparent,

Russia sees various aspects of its TNWs policy as an asset and even as a bargaining chip in the various arrangements and negotiations with Europe. The current situation is such that Russia has incentives to retain this political function for its TNWs. For instance, the expansion of NATO is of major concern to Russia. Russia feels increasingly excluded from the new European security arrangements, and although it wants to participate, it believes that it is being kept from doing so. Accordingly, Russia wrongly assumes that TNWs can be used to leverage its way into these security arrangements.

c. NATOs conventional forces, France and Britain Arbman and Thornton 05 (Gunnar, Director of Research at the Swedish Defense Research Agency,

and Charles, doctoral candidate in the School of Public Affairs at the University of Maryland, Graduate Research Fellow in the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, focusing on arms control and nonproliferation issues, six years helping the US Department of Defense manage the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, MA from The George Washington University in security policy and his BA in political science from the University of California, Berkeley. Russia’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Part II: Technical Issues and Policy recommendations, February 2005, Swedish Defence Research Agency,)

What, then, would it take for Russia to seriously engage in TNW reductions? One often-cited Russian requirement would be the removal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe. For example, as an official Russian statement affirmed: “On
our part we believe that removal of the tactical nuclear weapons, for example, from Europe and elimination of respective infrastructure there would become an important practical step

, this step would seem to be insufficient. First, the number of gravity bombs that the U.S. has stored in NATO countries is relatively small compared to the estimated Russian arsenal. Although the Russians consider the U.S. weapons in Europe to be strategic in nature, this would be a highly asymmetrical equation. At the very least, Russia would want to include French and British nuclear forces into such an equation. But this would probably still be insufficient, given the relative superiority of NATO’s conventional forces. Limiting the discussion to Europe’s current nuclear force posture would also seem to be insufficient. An adjustment to the CFE Treaty may result in a less threatening front toward Russia, but Russia would certainly want assurances that NATO would not place nuclear assets in former Warsaw Pact states and former Soviet republics. Moreover, even with these added incentives such an equation would not address the threats along Russia’s southern and eastern borders.
to ultimately overcome the remnants of the Cold War period.”156 However

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AT: TNWs Terrorism Impact (1/2)
Turn- TNWs deter terrorist use of WMD Woolf 1/28/09(Amy, Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy, Congressional Research Sevice, “Nonstrategic
nuclear weapons”) , the United States has maintained the option to use nuclear weapons in response to attacks with conventional, chemical, or biological weapons. For example, Assistant Secretary of Defense Edward Warner testified that “the U.S. capability to deliver an overwhelming, rapid, and devastating military response with the full range of military capabilities will remain the cornerstone of our strategy for deterring rogue nation ballistic missile and WMD proliferation threats. The very existence of U.S. strategic and theater nuclear forces, backed by highly capable conventional forces, should certainly give pause to any rogue leader contemplating the use of WMD against the United States, its overseas deployed forces, or its allies .”28 These statements
Specifically do not indicate whether nonstrategic nuclear weapons would be used to achieve battlefield or tactical objectives, or whether they would contribute to strategic missions, but it remained evident, throughout th 1990s, that the United States continued to view these weapons as a part of its national security strategy.

Russia not key- multiple stockpiles risk terrorist acquisition The Star 5/9/09 (“Global spread of 'loose nukes' reignites disarmament efforts,”)
The order to "duck and cover" sent nervous school kids cowering under their desks in the Cold War years, as all-too-real rehearsals for a nuclear blast were held across the United States.Today

, with the era of backyard bomb shelters long buried, fears of Iran's nuclear ambitions, Pakistan's shadowy stockpile, and North Korea's atomic outbursts have taken centre stage.

TNWs are safe a. Russia adequately protects its arsenal Bleek 02 (“Report Evaluates Russian Nuclear Weapons Security,”)
Russia maintains “adequate” control over its nuclear weapons but warns that although “nuclear [weapons complex] security has been slowly improving over the last several years, risks remain.”Russia maintains “adequate security and control of its nuclear weapons, but a decline in military funding has stressed the nuclear security system,” the report states. The document characterizes an unauthorized or accidental use of a Russian nuclear weapon as “highly unlikely,” given “current technical and procedural safeguards.”
A February 2002 annual report to Congress from the National Intelligence Council concludes that

b. Reliable security Meir 08 (Oliver, Arms Control Association,“NATO Mulls Nuke Modernization, Security”)
Reports about security problems at U.S. nuclear weapons bases in Europe have led to renewed calls from parliamentarians of European allies for an end to NATO's nuclear weapons-sharing arrangements. But a senior NATO official interviewed by Arms Control Today rejected the reports about security problems, predicted a continuation of NATO's nuclear weapons policies, and called for a modernization of U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. "There is no question that nuclear weapons deployed in Europe are safe and secure," Guy Roberts, NATO deputy assistant secretarygeneral for weapons of mass destruction policy and director for nuclear policy, told Arms Control Today Aug. 14.On June 19, Hans
Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists released the classified findings of a February U.S. Air Force blue ribbon review (BRR), which he had obtained under the Freedom of

The "Air Force Blue Ribbon Review of Nuclear Weapons Policies and Procedures" found that most European sites where U.S. nuclear weapons are deployed "require significant additional resources to meet [Department of Defense] security requirements." The review had been launched following an August 2007 incident in the United States, when a B-52 bomber flew from Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota to Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana wrongly and
Information Act. unknowingly armed with nuclear cruise missiles. (See ACT, July/August 2008. )

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AT: TNWs Terrorism Impact (2/2)
Terrorism risk exaggerateda. Russia’s TNWs are under control Arbman and Thornton 05 (Gunnar, Director of Research at the Swedish Defense Research Agency,
and Charles, doctoral candidate in the School of Public Affairs at the University of Maryland, Graduate Research Fellow in the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, focusing on arms control and nonproliferation issues, six years helping the US Department of Defense manage the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, MA from The George Washington University in security policy and his BA in political science from the University of California, Berkeley. Russia’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Part II: Technical Issues and Policy recommendations, February 2005, Swedish Defence Research Agency,)

Although Russia’s TNW footprint may be much smaller than it was at the end of the Cold War, the size and capabilities of the force remain significant. Therefore, despite constant assurances from the Russian government, foreign officials and experts continue to raise concerns about the safety, security, and control of Russia’s TNWs . We have concluded in his report that, although there remains substantial cause for concern, Russia has implemented adequate procedural and technical measures to control its tactical warheads.

-No smuggling Baltimore Sun 10/7/08 (“Working with Russia to prevent nuclear terrorism,”)
U.S.-Russian cooperation also is vital for reducing nuclear terrorism risks in the rest of the world. More than 40 countries possess the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons. The United States and Russia lead the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, an effort that brings together efforts from more than 70 countries, and are working together to ship highly enriched uranium at poorly defended research reactors worldwide to secure sites. But the scope and pace of the global effort still
falls far short of the urgency of the threat, and Russia's help will be central to the accelerated needed action.Former Sen. Sam Nunn, for example, has suggested that the United States and Russia establish joint teams of nuclear security experts to help countries beef up nuclear security and accounting systems, potentially achieving far more comprehensive nuclear security worldwide. Indeed, Mr. Nunn is the force behind a new organization, the World Institute for Nuclear Security, that seeks to bolster security at thousands of nuclear installations

The good news is that cooperation to secure nuclear stockpiles and stop nuclear smuggling is moving forward despite the post-Georgia tailspin in U.S.-Russian
worldwide in an effort to prevent terrorists from getting access to atomic bomb materials. relations. Sen. John McCain and Sen. Barack

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‡‡‡ NATO Adv. ‡‡‡

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Removal = End of NATO
The removal of American TNW’s from Europe would spell the end of NATO McNamara, Spring 9 (Sally McNamara, Senior Policy Analyst, European Affairs, Baker Spring, F.M. Kirby Research Fellow in
National Security Policy, Presedent Obama must not remove Nuclear Weapons from Europe, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/03/President-Obama-Must-Not-Remove-Nuclear-Weapons-from-Europe) MAH

Not since radical leftist sentiment gripped Western Europe in the 1980s has the transatlantic relationship faced such a serious ideological challenge to the mutual security of North America and Europe. The removal of American tactical nuclear weapons from European and NATO bases would spell the end of the alliance and the concept of indivisible security. The Russian militarization of the Baltic enclave of Kaliningrad and Moscow’s recent simulation of a nuclear attack on Poland require a robust response from NATO, reinforced by America’s continued nuclear guarantee. Moscow’s simulation—in which Russian armed forces invaded Poland and its air force fired
nuclear missiles against Warsaw and acted in conjunction with Belarus to suppress Polish minorities in Belarus—was codenamed “West” and labeled Poland as the aggressor country. Following this exercise, as well as President Obama’s ill-defined

policy of “resetting” relations with Russia, Central and Eastern Europe has sought specific assurances as to the indivisibility of the alliance’s security. In addressing these concerns, Secretary of State

Hillary Clinton has stated: I want to reaffirm as strongly as I can the United States ’ commitment to honor Article 5 of the NATO treaty. No Ally—or adversary—should ever question our determination on this point. It is the

bedrock of the Alliance and an obligation that time will not erode. Our nation faces threats elsewhere in the world, but we view peace and stability in Europe as a prerequisite for addressing all of the other challenges. A nuclear pullout from Europe does not comport with Secretary Clinton’s commitments outlined above. Rather than pulling back from the alliance’s commitments, the
U.S. should honor Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty and plan against Moscow’s threat to the territorial integrity, political independence, and security of one of its members. This preparation should be underpinned by the sanctity of Article 5, America’s tactical and strategic nuclear insurance.

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NATO Good-Democracy
NATO creates stable democracies Farley 8 (Robert, Assistant Professor, “But What Does it Mean for NATO?” The American Prospect,
http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=but_what_does_it_mean_for_nato) MJ I believe that NATO has had a strongly positive impact on Eastern Europe, and that the expansion undertaken so far was well conceived. NATO and the European Union are the two major institutional components of the post-World War II European peace. This institutional settlement has been remarkably successful, as Europe has enjoyed intra-continental peace and substantial economic growth. Although NATO has included non-democratic members in the past, both NATO and the EU

now place democracy high on their list of values and thereby pushed prospective members to adopt democratic reforms. The expansion of both to Eastern Europe has helped to solidify economic and political gains in the post-Cold War era. The European Union may have played the larger role of the two, but NATO has substantially accomplished two critical goals. The first is securing the states of Eastern Europe from external coercion and attack . This assurance has allowed the former Warsaw Pact states to moderate their defense spending and to pursue political reform without the threat of outside interference.

The second accomplishment of NATO has been to acclimate the military institutions of Eastern Europe to Western norms of civil-military relations. The militaries of the Warsaw Pact, unlike NATO, were designed primarily to protect the government from the people. The ability of NATO to facilitate a shift away from this model has helped make stable democracy in Eastern Europe possible. Stable democracy is good both for the people who live in it and for the national interest of the United States.

Democracy prevents wars Diamond, 95 (Larry Diamond, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, December 1995, Promoting
Democracy in the 1990s, http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/1.htm)
OTHER THREATS This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to

proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal
obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.

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NATO Good-Regional Stability
NATO adapts to create more relationships-encourages internal and regional stability Weinrod 8 (W. Bruce Weinrod, US Defense Advisor for the US Mission to NATO, “NATO and Asia’s
Changing Relationship,” East Asia Foundation, 3(3), http://globalasia.org/articles/issue7/iss7_11.html) MJ
After extensive consideration,

NATO’s member nations chose to maintain a robust alliance of nations with shared values seeking to protect their security but at the same time adapt to a new international environment. As a crucial aspect, NATO decided to engage outside of its traditional borders with the nations of the former Warsaw Pact and the former republics of the Soviet Union. At a minimum, NATO sought to develop formal relationships to encourage internal and regional stability, and, at a maximum, sought to permanently consolidate democratic institutions and practices. For these purposes, NATO established the Partnership for Peace, which is discussed in more detail below. The PFP, which continues to function and

now has 24 members, encapsulates a range of military and political activities between NATO and participating nations. Separately, another significant evolution of NATO’s geographical reach gradually emerged after the former Yugoslavia began to disintegrate in the early 1990s. NATO eventually intervened twice militarily in the Balkans, primarily for humanitarian reasons but also to prevent a widening of the conflict. In addition, NATO established the Mediterranean Dialogue (which includes seven North African and Middle Eastern nations) and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (which includes four Persian Gulf states as members) as forums for political-military discussion and the development of military-related projects.

Need to prevent regional instability-hard to stop when upset and if unstable, destroys peace and economic stability Blank 2000 (Stephen, professor at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College. American

Grand Strategy and the Transcaspian Region, “U.S. Military Engagement with Transcaucasia and Central Asia,” World Affairs) MJ If real peace, true independence, economic stability, and the future prosperity that depends on those three factors are to endure, political stability must take root. Unfortunately, most factors here work against long-term stability. The linkage between authoritarian, personalist government and violence is a profound structural cause for regional unrest and ethnic violence. Once that violence begins, it is hard to stop for two reasons. First, ethnic wars where land, sovereignty, and the integrity of the state and of the government are at stake are intrinsically harder to stop, even more so than civil wars .81 Second, foreign powers are almost certain to try to exploit conflict and perhaps prolong it to their own advantage.

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NATO Good-Peacekeeping Operations
NATO teams up with other nations to improve the ability of peace keeping and crisis management operations Weinrod 8 (W. Bruce Weinrod, US Defense Advisor for the US Mission to NATO, “NATO and Asia’s

Changing Relationship,” East Asia Foundation, 3(3), http://globalasia.org/articles/issue7/iss7_11.html) MJ A key NATO objective with respect to Asia is to enhance national military capabilities of friendly countries so as to ensure that Asian nations choosing to engage with NATO will have military forces that can operate effectively with the military forces of NATO allies . NATO is seeking to accomplish this by developing a broad web of relationships with interested nations. As a result, NATO has worked with Central Asian nations on non-Afghanistan projects. One area of focus has been interoperability, with the goal of improving the ability of these nations to support NATO-led peacekeeping and crisis management operations. For example, Kazakhstan has created a
battalion and a brigade with the help of NATO forces and plans to establish a PFP Training/Education Center. In addition, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have declared a number of units available for possible participation in NATO operations. Another distinct but important area of cooperation has been disaster preparedness and response, known as Civil Emergency Planning in NATO parlance. Activities in this area included exercises in disaster-response hosted by Uzbekistan in 2003. Finally, there

has been collaboration in the fields of science and the environment through the NATO Science for Peace and Security Program. That program led to the development of a Virtual Silk Highway project to improve access to the Internet in Central Asia through a satellite-based network, and provided grants to Central Asian partners to improve the security of telecommunications facilities.

Peacekeeping Operations prevent internal violence and lessen the effects of war ACT 95 (The Center for Advanced command Concepts and Technology, “Operations Other Than War (OOTW):
The Technological Dimension,” http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Center_OOTW.pdf) MJ OOTW includes peace operations, as well as a wide range of other non-traditional military operations. The U.S. Army's Field Manual 100-5 defines OOTW as consisting of "support to U.S., state, and local governments,

disaster relief, nation assistance, drug interdiction, peacekeeping, support for insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, noncombatant evacuation, and peace enforcement." Peace operations, particularly those conducted under the auspices of the UN Charter, have become more common in the post- Cold War world. Because of its training and culture, the U.S. military

has been somewhat reluctant to engage in OOTW. Nevertheless, such operations are becoming more common, in many cases subsuming traditional military missions. There are many reasons for this increased involvement. Some nations and groups tend to avoid direct confrontation with the U.S. military, but they still find ways to challenge the U.S. directly or indirectly. In other cases, internal problems in foreign countries cause conditions that U.S. policymakers cannot ignore. These can include, for example, loss of government control and resulting internal violence (as in Rwanda) or concerns about the possible spill-over of ongoing hostilities (as in the former Yugoslavia). In such cases, OOTW is seen as a way to lessen the effects of war or prevent it altogether. Further, U.S. forces are increasingly being tasked to respond to other non-traditional military missions
(such as disaster relief or restoration of democracy).

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NATO Good-Caucasus Stability
NATO promotes regional stability Weinrod 8 (W. Bruce Weinrod, US Defense Advisor for the US Mission to NATO, “NATO and Asia’s Changing Relationship,” East
Asia Foundation, 3(3), http://globalasia.org/articles/issue7/iss7_11.html) MJ

Central Asia will likely continue to be a key area of NATO interest . Given that several of these nations directly

border Afghanistan, their stability could be relevant to the success of NATO’s efforts in Afghanistan. Should anti-Western extremists take power in any of these nations, this could affect not only NATO’s re-supply efforts, but also create additional fronts in the Afghanistan conflict. Conversely, the establishment of a regime in Kabul fundamentally hostile to the West might result in support for similar forces in Central Asia. Given that instability in nearby nations could add another layer of complexity to the existing challenges in Afghanistan, NATO has a strong interest in regional stability. Thus, NATO also has been promoting security sector reform,

effective management of defense institutions and civilian and democratic control of the armed forces in Central Asia. In addition, NATO has established certain structured elements to enhance its relationship with Central Asia. First, NATO has had a Special Representative to the Caucasus and Central Asia since 2004; second, NATO has a liaison officer for Central Asia who travels regularly in the region; and third, NATO has utilized a meeting format at the action-officer level that includes all 26 NATO allies plus representatives of the five Central Asian partners and Afghanistan. Most significantly, NATO has established a military-to-military relationship with Pakistan. Several years ago, a Tripartite Commission including representatives

from NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Afghanistan and Pakistan was established to provide a joint forum on military and security issues. Representatives of the commission meet regularly to discuss security matters in the four main areas of cooperation: intelligence sharing, border security, countering improvised explosive devices and initiatives related to information operations. Recently, NATO has taken the decision to enhance its interaction with Pakistan to ensure that Islamabad is aware of its concerns and interests regarding developments in Pakistan that may impact on NATO’s efforts in Afghanistan. This could be a very significant development in the months and years ahead. India, of course, is also located close to Afghanistan and has its own interests in that nation and the region. Currently, there is no formal interaction between NATO and India. There has been, however, informal discussion within NATO circles regarding the possibility of establishing formal contacts with India.

Conflict in Caucasus causes worldwide war Blank 2000 (Stephen, professor at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College. American Grand Strategy and the
Transcaspian Region, “U.S. Military Engagement with Transcaucasia and Central Asia,” World Affairs) MJ

Washington’s burgeoning military-political-economic involvement seeks, inter alia, to demonstrate the U.S. ability to project military power even into this region or for that matter, into Ukraine where NATO recently held exercises that clearly originated as an anti-Russian scenario. Secretary of

Defense William Cohen has discussed strengthening U.S.-Azerbaijani military cooperation and even training the Azerbaijani army, certainly alarming Armenia and Russia.69 And Washington is also training Georgia’s new Coast Guard. 70 However, Washington’s well-known ambivalence about committing force to Third World ethnopolitical conflicts suggests that U.S. military power will not be easily committed to saving its economic investment. But this ambivalence about committing forces and the dangerous situation, where Turkey is allied to Azerbaijan and Armenia is bound to Russia, create the potential for wider and more protracted regional conflicts among local forces. In that connection, Azerbaijan and Georgia’s growing efforts to secure NATO’s lasting involvement in the region, coupled with Russia’s determination to exclude other rivals, foster a polarization along very traditional lines.71 In 1993 Moscow even threatened World War III to deter Turkish intervention on behalf of Azerbaijan. Yet the new Russo-Armenian Treaty and Azeri-Turkish treaty suggest that Russia and Turkey could be dragged into a confrontation to rescue their allies from defeat. 72 Thus many of the conditions for conventional war or protracted ethnic conflict in which third parties intervene are present in the Transcaucasus . For example, many Third World conflicts generated by local structural factors have a great potential for

unintended escalation. Big powers often feel obliged to rescue their lesser proteges and proxies. One or another big power may fail to grasp the other side’s stakes since interests here are not as clear as in Europe. Hence commitments involving the use of nuclear weapons to prevent a client’s defeat are not as well established or apparent. Clarity about the nature of the threat could prevent the kind of rapid and
almost uncontrolled escalation we saw in 1993 when Turkish noises about intervening on behalf of Azerbaijan led Russian leaders to threaten a nuclear war in that case. 73 Precisely because Turkey is a NATO ally, Russian nuclear threats could trigger a potential nuclear blow (not a small possibility given the erratic nature of Russia’s declared nuclear strategies). The real

threat of a Russian nuclear strike against Turkey to defend Moscow’s interests and forces in the Transcaucasus makes the danger of major war there higher than almost everywhere else. As Richard Betts has observed, The greatest danger lies in areas where (1) the potential for serious instability is high; (2) both superpowers perceive vital interests; (3) neither recognizes that the other’s perceived interest or commitment is as great as its own; (4) both have the capability to inject conventional forces; and, (5) neither has willing proxies capable of settling the situation.74

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Caucasus Spillover (Extension)
Caucasus needs international community to prevent escalation to major conflicts Blank 2000 (Stephen, professor at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College. American

Grand Strategy and the Transcaspian Region, “U.S. Military Engagement with Transcaucasia and Central Asia,” World Affairs) MJ
More specifically, the Transcaspian has become, perhaps, the most important area of direct Western- Russian contention today. Those areas of contention with Russia embrace economic issues such as energy routes and pipelines, as well as classical issues of security, territorial integrity of states, and defense. They also overlay the ethnic fractures and tendencies towards conflict throughout the region. A study by Terence Hopmann of Brown University, based on interviews with regional specialists in these states and Russia, concluded that, However, it is in the Caucasus, where ethno-political separatism reflecting in part the long history

of collisions of ancient civilizations, where the greatest threats to military security are likely to develop over the next ten years. If the fractured identities within this region are reinforced by the intervention of outside parties, such as Turkey, Iran, Russia, and Western Europe, the threats to security of the region and even of the world could become quite serious. The greatest dangers are likely to be a consequence of conflicts of identity in a region where states are weak and national identities are being rediscovered or even created. The continuing crises of the economy, environment, and politics may exacerbate these underlying conflicts, even if they are not the primary cause. Concerted diplomatic efforts within the region and by the entire international community may be necessary to avert such a tragedy.23

Escalation of violence in Caucasus likely-full of overhyped media Blank 2000 (Stephen, professor at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College. American
Grand Strategy and the Transcaspian Region, “U.S. Military Engagement with Transcaucasia and Central Asia,” World Affairs) MJ The absence of effective control over armed forces both abets and reflects the widespread regional ethnic conflicts, the fourth structural factor of instability. The North Caucasus and Transcaucasia are saturated with scholarly, pseudo-scholarly, crackpot, chauvinist, and ethnographic theories masquerading as scholarship which are consciously used for nationalistic incitement and the creation of nationalist “militias” as in Nagorno-Karabakh. 61 Local media are also saturated by the mentality of zero-sum conflict, ethnic suspicion, and propaganda, and are universally regarded as state instruments for political indoctrination. Not surprisingly, ethnic tension is pervasive. The growing restiveness and rising incidence of political violence in the North Caucasus which could develop into full-fledged organized ethnic violence likewise is not surprising.62 In April 1997, renewed fighting also broke out in the war over Nagorno-Karabakh. And in mid-1998 Georgian irregulars

seeking to force their way back into Abkhazia triggered conflicts that only led to Abkhazian victories and more Georgian refugees. A few months later there was a mutiny or coup attempt from within the Georgian Army. In February 1998 the Karabakh faction of the Armenian government launched a coup that unseated the government. The issue that prompted the coup was the government’s willingness to accept a less nationalistic negotiated solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh war than the Karabakhites would have preferred.

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Turkey Neg 114 /341

Suiter Pre-season

NATO Good-Security
NATO good-largest network of security Martonyi 99 (Janos, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hungary, “TEXT: HUNGARY'S
FOREIGN MINISTER ON NATO ENTRY, MARCH 12,” USIS Washington File, http://www.fas.org/man/nato/national/99031208_tpo.htm) MJ

"NATO enlargement is not a zero-sum game, but part of a prudent strategy benefiting all nations of Europe, all members of the Atlantic Community," Hungary's Minister of Foreign Affairs Janos Martonyi said March 12 during the accession ceremony at the Truman Library. NATO is "the largest network of security that history has ever known" and by joining the alliance, Hungary is demonstrating that it wants "not to win but to prevent wars, " the Foreign Minister said. "Hungary is now a genuine and stable democracy" and is ready to enjoy the advantages of NATO membership and to meet its obligations, Minister Martonyi said. Accession into NATO will return Hungary to its "manifest destiny" which is to rejoin those with
whom it shares "the same values, interests and goals," he said. Martonyi also noted that "it is a matter of vital importance that other states of the region remain committed to joining NATO," and that Hungary will support them in their aspirations.

NATO maintains unity, security and freedom
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) enters the second decade of the twenty-first century as an essential source of stability in an uncertain and unpredictable world. Looking ahead, the Alliance has ample grounds for confidence. The democratic principles that initially brought it together remain valid. The Cold War rivalry that once stirred fears of nuclear Armageddon has long since disappeared. NATO’s role in maintaining the unity, security and freedom ofthe EuroAtlantic region is ongoing. lts status as the globe’s most successful political-military Alliance is unchallenged. Yet NATO’s past accomplishments provide no guarantee for the future. Between now and 2020, it will be tested by the
emergence of new dangers, the many-sided demands of complex operations, and the challenge of organising itself efficiently in an era where rapid responses are vital, versatility critical, and resources tight

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Turkey Neg 115 /341

Suiter Pre-season

NATO Good-Terrorism
NATO is devoted to fighting terrorism Gilmore and Williams 1 (Gerry J, American Forces Press Service, Rudi, American Forces Press Service,

“NATO Sends Radar Surveillance Planes to Protect United States,” Department of Defense, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=44663) MJ NATO has sent five of its Airborne Warning and Control Systems aircraft from Germany to Oklahoma in a historic first. The action will free America's own AWACS radar aircraft for operations against terrorism elsewhere, according to Air Force Gen. Joseph W. Ralston, supreme allied commander,
Europe. This marks the first time in NATO's 52-year history that the alliance's assets are being used to help protect the United States, NATO officials noted. The AWACS planes, plus a support aircraft, will assist U.S. continental defense operations in the wake of the Sept. 11 terror attacks in New York City and Washington, said Air Force Capt. Ed Thomas, spokesman for the North American Aerospace Defense Command, Peterson Air Force Base, Colo. The NATO aircraft began deploying Oct. 9 from Geilenkirchen, Germany, and the last of the five are expected to be in place at Tinker Air Force Base, Okla., by Oct. 11, Thomas said. The

aircraft, under NORAD command, will be flown by multinational crews from 12 NATO nations, he noted. NORAD is responsible for air defense and early air warning for North American airspace. The aircraft feature high-tech airborne surveillance, command and control, and communications systems and a crew of up to 19, depending on the mission, he
remarked. The NATO AWACS planes, he said, will be providing radar coverage and surveillance operations for NORAD combat air patrols. "They'll augment what our U.S. resources were doing ... and provide an enhanced situational awareness to NORAD," he remarked, adding that the planes would "be here as long as we need them."

After the terror attacks on America, NATO invoked Article 5 of its charter, which states that a foreign attack on one member is considered an attack on the other 18 members. Thomas said

the United States requested the assistance. NATO ambassadors, who expressed their full support for the United States and the United Kingdom's global campaign against terrorism, approved the U.S. request. Ralston said NATO naval assets taking part in an exercise off the coast of Spain have been reassigned to the Standing Naval Force Mediterranean, consisting of nine ships from eight NATO countries. "They've set sail to provide an allied military presence in the eastern Mediterranean and to demonstrate our resolve," the general said. "These two actions underline the unwavering commitment of the 19 NATO nations to fight terrorism," Ralston said. "We stand ready to provide any additional support requested by the United States, on order of the North Atlantic Council."

A terrorist getting a hold of nuclear materials is the largest and most probable threat of our time Siddiqi 4/16 (Shibil, Fellow with the Center for the Study of Global Power and Politics at Trent University,
“Terrorism: The nuclear summit’s ‘straw man’,” Asia Times Online, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/LD16Ak02.html) MJ American President Barack Obama gathered 47 national delegations for the first Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) in Washington on April 12 and 13. It was the largest gathering of world leaders in Washington since the close of World War II. The scale of the summit was meant to impress the gravity of the subject matter. In Obama's words, "This is an unprecedented gathering to address an unprecedented threat": the prevention of nuclear terrorism. In trademark style, Obama offered rhetorical flourishes to fit the occasion: "Two decades after the Cold War we face a cruel irony of history. The risk of nuclear confrontation between nations has gone down, but the risk of nuclear attack as gone up". The president said that a tiny scrap of plutonium the size of an apple was now the biggest threat to world stability , with "just the tiniest amount of plutonium" in the wrong hands posing potential for catastrophe. However, the president's assessment of global nuclear threats paper over some basic realities. The threat of nuclear confrontation remains dangerously high despite the New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) with Russia and America's passive-aggressive Nuclear Posture Review. This is particularly true along the nuclear fault-lines in the Middle East and South Asia which have existed since the Cold War. Perhaps a "dirty bomb" made out of a handful of plutonium or other radiological material forms the most significant "nuclear" threat to the US . But outside of
this Western-centric world-view, it is the threat of nuclear attack or exchange in the Middle East and South Asia - home to nearly a fourth of the world's population - that clearly remains the largest global nuclear threat.

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NATO Good-Terrorism (Extension)
NATO adapts-terrorism policy proves Ulbrich 1 (Jeffrey, Associate Press, “Prepare for worst, Rumsfeld tells NATO allies,” Army News,

http://www.armytimes.com/legacy/new/1-292925-667618.php) MJ NATO has invoked Article 5 of its founding treaty, declaring that the attacks on the United States in September should be treated as an attack on all 19. But the alliance has had no front-line role in the war in Afghanistan and none is envisaged. Though NATO’s 1999 strategic concept points to terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction among the major threats facing NATO, the alliance is still heavily geared toward fighting wars of territorial defense and not the shadowy forces of terror. Rumsfeld told fellow ministers that now is the time - while Sept. 11 is still fresh in the minds of people everywhere - to increase defense spending. Added NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson: “We must draw the necessary conclusions, even if that means additional resources for defense and security and new balances inside our defense programs.” The defense ministers are expected to task the alliance with developing a new concept for defense against terrorism, reviewing NATO’s current effectiveness in this fight, developing new capabilities to fight terrorism and the proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, and improving information-sharing, a senior NATO official said.

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Turkey Neg 117 /341

Suiter Pre-season

NATO Good-Sea Power
NATO protects the oceans with sea power Sokolsky 97 (Joel, Professor of Political Science at Royal Military College of Canada, “PROJECTING

STABILITY: NATO AND MULTILATERAL NAVAL COOPERATION IN THE POST COLD WAR ERA,” http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/95-97/sokolsky.pdf) MJ Had strategic nuclear deterrence been the sole, or even dominant, role of sea power in the Cold War, then the USN and other western navies would never have attained the size and sophistication that they did. But navies continued to be concerned with traditional roles, protection of the sea lanes of communication(SLOC), the projection of force ashore, gun-boat diplomacy, and naval presence. Even in the absence of a comparable rival Soviet high seas fleet, sea power maintained a relevance in the global balance of power. Indeed, Samuel P. Huntington

argued in 1954 that the USN’s monopoly of the seas and Soviet land power in Eurasia had resulted in a new kind of navy -- a “transoceanic” one. The USN’s role was not to prepare for a Mahanian fleet-on-fleet struggle for the high seas but to apply power on the “narrow lands and the narrow seas which like between” the “great oceans on the one hand and the equally immense spaces of the Eurasian heartland on the other.”5 This was especially the case for the NATO alliance. From its earliest days the Alliance focused on securing the seas immediately adjacent to Europe. Moreover, while it was the case as Huntington argued that the USN and its allies dominated the high seas, in the “narrow

seas” around Western Europe the Soviet Union could, even in these early years, deploy sea denial forces (principally submarines) that would have made the immediate projection of force ashore difficult. In later years when, due to the emergence of a more powerful and high seas capable Soviet fleet along with a considerable land-based naval aviation capability, NATO grew increasingly apprehensive about its ability to protect the transatlantic SLOC upon which the strategy of flexible response rested, sea power had been an essential component of collective defence.6

Sea power deters wars Conway et al 7 (James, General, U.S. Marine Corps and Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gary Roughead,

Admiral, U.S. Navy and Chief of Naval Operations, Thad W. Allen, Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard and Commandant of the Coast Guard, “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” http://www.navy.mil/maritime/Maritimestrategy.pdf) MJ No other disruption is as potentially disastrous to global stability as war among major powers. Maintenance and extension of this Nation’s comparative seapower advantage is a key component of deterring major power war. While war with another great power strikes many as improbable, the near-certainty of its ruinous effects demands that it be actively deterred using all elements of national power. The expeditionary character of maritime forces—our lethality, global reach, speed, endurance, ability to overcome barriers to access, and operational agility—provide the joint commander with a range of deterrent options. We will pursue an approach to deterrence that includes a credible and scalable ability to retaliate against aggressors conventionally, unconventionally, and with nuclear forces.

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Turkey Neg 118 /341

Suiter Pre-season

NATO Good-Prevents Wars
NATO deters war Kober 98 (Stanley, Research Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies, “NATO Expansion Flashpoint No. 3

Kaliningrad,” Foreign Policy Briefing, http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb-046.pdf) MJ NATO expansion is based on the premise that deterrence is the best way to prevent war . According to that view, NATO prevented war in Europe during the Cold War by deterring Soviet aggression, and what worked during the Cold War should work just as well, if not better, in the aftermath of the Cold War, when the military balance has shifted so decisively in favor of the United States. According to the conventional wisdom, countries embraced by NATO have an absolute guarantee of protection, since Russia would not dare challenge the United States. That pervasive belief explains the scramble of countries in the former Soviet bloc to join NATO and their fear of being left out of the alliance. According to the logic of advocates of expansion, gray areas--that is, countries not within NATO but not in the Russian orbit either-- invite aggression because "nature abhors a vacuum."

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Turkey Neg 119 /341

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NATO Good-Soft Power
NATO successfully uses soft power to stop conflicts Tarvainen 8(Tina, Doctoral research fellow, Department of Political Science, University of Turku , “NATO

and the CBRN terrorism - mission: An Overview,” Journal of Security Issues, 2(1) pg 38) Views of these threats are, therefore, not apolitical or indifferent. On the contrary, threat estimations affect on counterterrorist and non-proliferation efforts and finally even to foreign policy-making. NATO’s role is so linked with the current risk assessment and threat analyses: how severe they are and how to resist them. It is surprising, even paradoxical, that while critics of the Alliance blame it for being too militaristic organization, its counterterrorist role has still been quite moderate. It participates to the ‘global fight against terrorism’ by offering its material resources and by acting in different kind of crisis management operations, which, on the long run, can help to prevent conflicts and further radicalization. NATO does, indeed, use not only the hard power, but the soft power as well. Compared to the counterterrorist strategies of the United States, NATO’s guidelines can be described more defensive and reactive. De Nevers argues that NATO has ‘soft’ strategy in this regard due its focus on vulnerability reducing and capability-enhancing, while the United States
uses harder measures in order to prevent terrorists’ strikes against the homeland (de Nevers, 2007, p. 38). The idea behind ‘protecting the homeland’ –rhetoric is closely related to the claimed change of the current security environment.

Soft power key to prevent the spread of infectious diseases, global warming, and create democracy Nye 4 (Joseph, Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard University, “Soft power: the means to success in
world politics,” pg 17) MJ Soft power is also likely to be more important when power is dispersed in another country rather than concentrated. A dictator cannot be totally indifferent to the views of the people in his country, but he can often ignore whether another country is popular or not when he calculates whether it is in his interests to be helpful. In democracies where public opinion and parliaments matter, political leaders have less leeway to adopt tactics and strike deals than in autocracies. Thus it was impossible for the Turkish government to permit the transport of American troops across the

country in 2003 because American policies had greatly reduced our popularity in public opinion and in the parliament. In contrast, it was far easier for the United States to obtain the use of bases in authoritarian Uzbekistan for operations in Afghanistan. Finally, though soft power sometimes has direct effects on specific goals-witness the inability of the United States to obtain the votes of Chile or Mexico in the UN Security Council in 2003after our policies reduced our popularity-it is more likely to have an impact on the general goals that a country seeks. Fifty years ago, Arnold Wolfers distinguished between the specific “possession goals” that countries pursue, and their broader “milieu goals,” like shaping an environment conducive to democracy. Successful pursuit of both types of goals is important in foreign policy. If one considers various American national interests, for example, soft power may be less relevant than hard power in preventing attack, policing borders, and protecting allies. But soft power is particularly relevant to

the realization of “milieu goals.” It has a crucial role to play in promoting democracy, human rights, and open markets. It is easier to attract people to democracy than to coerce them to be democratic. The fact that the impact of attraction on achieving preferred outcomes varies by context and type of goals does not make it irrelevant, any more than the fact that bombs and bayonets do not help when we seek to prevent the spread of infectious diseases, slow global warming, or create democracy.

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Turkey Neg 120 /341

Suiter Pre-season

NATO Good-Proliferation
NATO prevents nuclear proliferation NATO 9 (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO publishes new policy to combat weapons of mass

destruction proliferation,” http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_57234.htm?selectedLocale=en) MJ The North Atlantic Council decided on 31 August 2009 to make public a new strategic policy for preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and defending against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats. The document, which stems from the
Bucharest Summit in 2008, was endorsed by Heads of State and Government at the Summit in Strasbourg/Kehl in April 2009 and constitutes a new basis for NATO’s efforts in the field of WMD. “The document is comprehensive in scope,” said Ambassador Jacek Bylica, Head of NATO’s WMD Centre. “It is guided by a clear vision: that the Alliance – its

populations, territory and forces – will be secure from threats posed by weapons of mass destruction and related materials. It provides high-level political guidance for our future activities in support of international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and regimes, as well as for military planning and capacity-building for defending against the threats posed by these weapons.” The new document highlights “strategic enablers” that will allow the Alliance to prevent the proliferation of WMD, protect against a WMD attack, and recover should an attack take place. These enablers consist of intelligence and information sharing, international outreach and partner activities, as well as public diplomacy and strategic communication. “In implementing this policy, NATO will foster cooperation with partners, and international and regional organizations in order to develop a common understanding of the WMD threat,”
Ambassador Bylica said. “It will encourage participation in and compliance with international arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation efforts.” At the 2006 NATO Summit in Riga, the spread of WMD and the possibility that terrorists will acquire them were identified as the main threats to the Alliance over the next 10-15 years

Proliferation leads to extinction Utgoff 2 (Victor A., Deputy Director of Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division, “Survival”, p.87-90)
In sum, widespread proliferation

is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed towards a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear “six shooters” on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather together on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.

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Turkey Neg 121 /341

Suiter Pre-season

NATO Won’t Collapse
There’s no identity crisis- many backgrounds allows NATO to stay together Osborn 10 (Dan, poli sci UC Berkley, Marin Forum, The Role of Identity in Security Organizations,

http://marin-forum.com/)BAF A security organization’s strength is related to the number of identity constructs present. NATO is strong because the geographic, racial, religious, historical, and ideological constructs are all present. The presence of numerous constructs allows the organization to emphasis or de-emphasis certain constructs based on the situation. Had NATO been solely a religious organization (Christian-secular) it would have been very difficult to incorporate Turkey (Islamic-secular). Instead NATO emphasized its historical and ideological constructs (along with the external threat dimension) and as a result Turkey provides the second largest standing army in the NATO alliance. The presence of more constructs makes the organization more stable since when a certain construct becomes a volatile issue the organization can quickly shift its identity to a different construct. The relationship between the internal and external formation of identity is vital for the strength of the organization. Just as the organization can shift its internal identity among its shared identity constructs, the organization can shift its emphasis between its internal and external identity formations. In the case of Turkey the threat of communism and the Soviet Union provided further reason to join NATO in the absence of shared internal identity constructs. Following the end of the Cold War NATO shifted its focus toward its internal identity formation in order to keep the alliance relevant as it lacked an external identity dimension. When both dimensions of identity are present the organization is strong as NATO was during the Cold War; if one dimension disappears than the
organization will weaken over the long term.

NATO is a permanent alliance- flawed cooperation is better than none Sloan 10 (Stanely, Director of the Atlantic Community Initiative, NATO a Permanent Alliance: Outlook for the
Future, June 16, http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/nato-permanent-alliance-outlook-future) Chances are, if the United States and the European allies continue to see transatlantic security cooperation as in their interest, they will find ways to compromise on difficult issues and to move ahead, using ad hoc coalition approaches when absolutely necessary to get around opposition to making an operation a
formal NATO mission. Respect for the sovereign decisions of member states has, of course, been the underlying problem with NATO’s operation of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. ISAF’s effectiveness was handicapped by the fact that some countries were unwilling to allow their troops to operate in parts of Afghanistan and in circumstances that would put them at greater risk. It is well understood that political realities and historical experiences have determined the approaches that nations have taken to this issue. The eventual evaluation of NATO’s performance in Afghanistan will undoubtedly reflect such problems, even if the long run produces a relatively successful outcome. Assessing the mission’s effectiveness will become part of the process of adapting the alliance to future security challenges. Will the NATO members continue to find NATO cooperation to their advantage, even with a difficult experience in Afghanistan? Only time will tell. However , history suggests that,

in spite of their differences, the United States and Europe will try to keep their act together. And today, NATO remains an important part of the script for that routine. Dealing with the threats posed by terrorism and managing most other aspects of transatlantic relations demand more effective transatlantic cooperation in political, economic, financial, and social as well as military aspects of the relationship. The bottom line, therefore, is that the transatlantic bargain will survive Afghanistan. The alliance has already shown its resilience during the early twenty-first century when decisions by the Bush administration put alliance cooperation under severe pressure. The bargain will survive in part because the security of the member states cannot be ensured through national measures alone. It will survive because the member states will continue to recognize that imperfect cooperation serves their interests better than no cooperation at all. NATO will be adapted to meet new challenges. And the value foundation of the transatlantic bargain will persist, in spite of differences over specific issues and shifting patterns of member state interests. It will survive in part because the bargain is not just NATO. In fact, recent trends suggest that there is much more creative thought and political momentum behind enhancing transatlantic cooperation rather than diminishing it. As Lawrence S. Kaplan has observed, “The transatlantic bargain still resonates in the twenty-first century.” As a result, this bargain in the hearts and minds of the member states has become as close as one could imagine to being a “permanent alliance.”

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NATO Won’t Collapse
NATO won’t collapse- Obama building stronger relations leading to a greater NATO role Konurov 9 (Andrei, Оrbis Terrarum writer, Strategic Culture Foundation Barack and NATO,
http://en.fondsk.ru/article.php?id=1962)BAF
And now the time of Barack Obama has come. There are so many expectations for this man that it is just frightening. It seems that only Antichrist would be met on Earth with more exaltation. Obama has plans regarding Iran, Africa and even Fidel Castro said a couple of good words about him let alone traditional allies of the US. Their expectations are getting stronger thanks to the presence of such symbolic figure from Bill Clinton’s team as Hillary Clinton at the post of State secretary. Will it mean the new thriving of NATO and the comeback of the good old days? It is known that political carrier of Barack Obama was very impetuous and its recent period before he became the president did not relate to US’ international relations. That is why both experts and wide audience learnt about Obama’s views on US foreign policy only during his election campaign. Obama had repeatedly spoken about his

views on the foreign policy issues including the transatlantic relations. Obama called for the strengthening of these relations it would be strange if he did the opposite. In his election program he stated that once he was elected as the US president he would strengthen the current alliances and form new ones for the US. In his program he also made it clear that he expected NATO to provide US more active support regarding US actions in Afghanistan . But

neither his election program nor his speeches make an impression that NATO will become the key issue of his foreign policy agenda. On the contrary - Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Palestine – it has been said and written more about any of these countries than about NATO. In general it looks like in his foreign policy program Obama plans to reduce the use of force and to lay stress on diplomacy to achieve US foreign policy goals. It is enough to remember his promise to open American consulates even in very remote countries. Until the last moment all weekly addresses of the president to his nation were dedicated to the US economy rescue plan he has signed recently. By now there have been only two meetings with foreign leaders - Obama has visited Canada on the invitation of Prime Minister Stephen Harper and Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso at the White House. And though Canada is a member of NATO the talks’ main topics were the power sector and the climate change. In his first address to the Congress, on February, 25, Obama was speaking almost exclusively about the economic crisis and gave only five minutes of his one hour speech to the international relations. He mentioned Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Israel, China, Japan, Korea and Germany. Of all these states only Germany is a member of NATO but the president only mentioned it saying that the US is inferior to Germany in terms of solar batteries use. Again Obama did not say a single word about NATO. Meanwhile the people in Obama’s team who are in charge of national

security and foreign policy issues have experience in US-Europe interaction within NATO framework and know how to use NATO to promote American interests. First of all it is Joe Biden who before his election as the Vice President was the head of The United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations . Then it is Hillary Clinton who, as evil tongues say, had great influence on US foreign policy in the times of her being the First Lady. Not to forget about James Jones, Obama’s national security advisor who before his resignation was in charge for NATO forces in Europe. That is why it can be expected that the relations between US and Western Europe will improve and no collapse of NATO, which in fact took place in times of Bush’s presidency, will take place.

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‡‡‡ Democracy Adv. ‡‡‡

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Turkey Won’t Democratize
No democratization----secularization NYT 07 (New York Times, Democracy in Turkey http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/01/opinion/01sat4.html) BAF

The election of Abdullah Gul, an observant Muslim, to the Turkish presidency was a victory for democracy. The military, which has a habit of defending Turkish secularism at the expense of Turkish democracy, tried to block his candidacy last spring. Rather than bow to the generals, the government took
the issue to the people, who delivered Mr. Gul’s party a mandate in July’s Parliamentary elections, smoothing the way for lawmakers to overwhelmingly approve Mr. Gul for the presidency. Though nearly all of Turkey’s 70 million people identify

themselves as Muslim, the Turkish Constitution calls for strict secularity in public life. The insistence on secularism, in place since the country’s founding in 1923, was intended to counter what were viewed as anti-modern strains within Islam that impeded development. Over time, however, it led to the entrenchment of a secular ruling elite and the exclusion of more openly devout Muslims.
In recent years, that observant group — which also accounts for much of the Turkish middle class — has fought back at the ballot box and scored victories. Secular Turks have been understandably anxious about the ascendancy of Mr. Gul’s

Justice and Development party. Widely known for its Islamist roots, the party now holds all the top offices in government. Mr. Gul himself has attracted a great deal of attention because his wife wears the Muslim headscarf, a visceral affront to some secularists. They fear that religion may creep into government and then into their own lives, encroaching on precious freedoms such as women’s rights. Mr. Gul and his party have pledged to maintain a secular government, and their five-year record in

power so far — a time of economic growth and legal reforms that have brought Turkey closer to joining the European Union — suggests that they will keep their word. The military, which has toppled four elected governments since 1960, waves the banner of Turkey’s founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, in its ferocious embrace of secularism.

But Ataturk’s ultimate goal was for Turkey to become a Western-style democracy. And in such a democracy, the military exists to serve the government, not the other way around. The generals, who treasure Turkey’s ties to the West as a member of NATO, have yet to grasp this. On Tuesday, they disrespected the very notion of democratic development by boycotting Mr. Gul’s inauguration. Like their counterparts in other NATO countries, they need to help the elected government to succeed — by staying out of politics.

No democratization- Shariah history impedes Ozgunes 08 (Ahmet A., Istanbul Staff correspondent, Turkey and democracy; The American model,

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/01/opinion/01iht-edlet.html) BAF Democracy in Turkey is still not in good order. The Islamic sects and the civil and military bureaucracies still exert undue influence on the political process, and basic liberties are not secured. Why does the democratization process prove to be so slow and problematic? The answer lies in the history. Like all traditional Islamic states, the Ottoman Empire was governed by a coalition of autocratic rulers and the religious class. Shariah, the Islamic law, was supreme and provided authority and legitimacy to the rulers. The judiciary was in the hands of the religious scholars. This happy arrangement functioned well in keeping the general population subservient until the 19th century when the ideas and the increasingly powerful armies of the West convinced the rulers that the old order was obsolete and the empire had to modernize. This new situation led to centralization of authority in the hands of the bureaucrats, taking also the judiciary out of the hands of the religious class. After the establishment of the Turkish republic, Shariah was deemed the main obstacle to progress and banished from the public domain. However, the religious class never agreed to its new modest position, and ever since has been fighting to regain its former power and glory. Democracy was established in Turkey after the World War I, and since then the power struggle between the secular state establishment and the religious class has been the underlying current of Turkish politics. Recently, the chief prosecutor asked the constitutional court to close down the ruling Islamist-oriented Justice and Development Party, or AK, and ban its leaders from politics on the grounds that they undermine the secular principles of the republic. This latest political crisis once again demonstrates the power of these underlying currents. The AK Party came to power in 2002 with the realization that the great majority of the Turkish people wanted more prosperity and more liberty. They carried out sweeping economic and political reforms, the
economy boomed and they came to power again in 2007 with almost half of the electorate voting for them. Since this election, we have observed a mysterious change of mood in AK; the reforms have stalled and apparently more radical elements in the party have been given a free hand in their efforts to re-Islamize the country. Could this latest crisis teach AK leaders a lesson or two to

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continue with their reform agenda rather than surrender to the Islamist elements in their midst? The ordeals of Turkish democracy are not over.

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Turkey Neg 126 /341

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Turkey Won’t Democratize
Democracy won’t flourish soon- Turkey encroaches on citizen freedoms Rodrick 10 (Dani, prof. of Int’l Poli Econ at Harvard University, Wall Street Journal, The Death of Turkey's

Democracy, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704009804575308182324490568.html) It wasn't so long ago that the country seemed to be taking significant strides in the direction of human rights and democracy. During its first term in government, between 2002 and 2007, Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdogan's Justice and Development Party (AKP) worked hard to bring the country into the European Union, to reform its legal regime, and to relax restrictions on Kurds. But more recently, the same government has been responsible for a politics of deception, dirty tricks, fear, and intimidation that couldn't present a sharper contrast to its rhetoric on democracy. Several Turkish intellectuals abroad who have expressed critical

views have told me they are afraid to return to Turkey. Eavesdropping has reached such levels that even housewives refrain from chatting about "sensitive" matters on the phone. The AKP government has launched massive, politically motivated court cases against its opponents. Most glaring are the hundreds of current and retired military officers, lawyers, academics, and journalists who have been charged with membership in an armed terror organization, dubbed "Ergenekon," which aims to destabilize and topple the AKP government. View Full Image rodriklt Associated
Press Ultra-nationalist supporters holding a banner identifying the "real" villain in the Ergenekon affair: "The plot will be foiled, America will lose, Turkey will win." rodriklt rodriklt Pursued by a group of specially appointed prosecutors,

and loudly cheered by AKP-friendly and AKP-controlled media, these Ergenekon trials make a mockery of due process. They are based on indictments full of inconsistencies, rely on anonymous informants of questionable credibility, and evince systematic prosecutorial misconduct. The evidence behind the charges ranges from the insubstantial to the blatantly manufactured. The main purpose of
the prosecutions seems to be to discredit the accused and keep them under detention for as long as possible. My personal wake-up call came in February when retired General Cetin Dogan, my father in law, was arrested in a parallel case. Mr. Dogan, an outspoken critic of the AKP, was charged with being the leader of an elaborate coup plot to overthrow the newly elected government in 2002-2003. The documents backing the charges, produced as usual by an anonymous informant, were full of anachronisms, discrepancies, and mistakes, raising serious questions about their authenticity. None of this derailed the government. Prosecutors ignored all indications of forgery, a government-controlled scientific body produced a patently misleading report lending support to the charges, and the pro-AKP media launched a vicious campaign of character assassination against Mr. Dogan. Mr. Erdogan and his circle joined in the chorus of attacks while denigrating judges that would dare rule in favor of the defendants. Mr. Dogan was kept for months in jail pending trial, along with tens of other active-duty and retired officers, despite the absence of credible evidence and obvious signs of fabrication. Inexplicably, many supposed Turkish democrats and liberals

have made common cause with the AKP government and have acted as cheerleaders for these cases. Their hope seems to be that the Ergenekon trials will bring the so-called "deep state"—clandestine networks of the military and their civilian allies—to account. There is little doubt that Turkey's pre-AKP

secular order featured strong anti-democratic undercurrents. But the AKP government has shown little interest in uncovering actual crimes or bringing real culprits to justice. Even though some of the Ergenekon suspects may be guilty of transgressions, they have been indicted not for specific, demonstrable offences, but for nebulous or fictitious crimes unlikely to result in convictions in a fair trial. Moreover, in these and other cases the government engages in exactly the kinds of activities that the liberals decry and want to bring to justice.

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Turkey Neg 127 /341

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Turkey Won’t Democratize
Turkey far from consolidating democracy- infringing on voting rights, personal freedoms, and an independent government Tezcur 07 (Gunes Murat, prof of poli sci @ Loyola Univ. Chicago, Open Democracy, Turkey divided: politics,
faith and democracy, http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-turkey/turkey_divided_4593.jsp)BAF A convulsive crisis is gripping Turkey. At stake is not just the choice of the next president or even the future political
direction of the country, but the fundamental identity of the Turkish state and society. How this crisis is resolved will determine the evolution of this pivotal nation for years to come, and will - whatever the outcome - have repercussions far beyond Turkey's borders.

A crisis which has exposed the profound rifts in Turkish society began with the decision of the ruling Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (Justice & Development Party / AKP) to have the new president elected in advance of the parliamentary elections scheduled for November 2007. Turkey's 1982 constitution specifies that the
president in Turkey is elected by parliament; although the prime minister is the main executive officer, the president is the highest political authority and wields some substantial veto powers. This makes the presidency, currently held by Ahmed Necdet Sezer, a coveted political position. It has long been speculated that the prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan - an exIslamist centre-right politician whose party has been in power since the election of November 2002 - sought to parachute himself to the presidency, a process that would start with a nomination from his AKP party by the scheduled date of 26 April 2007. The AKP leadership was aware of the widespread opposition to Erdoğan's promotion, and decided to wait until the last moment to announce its candidate in order to expedite the project. The plan failed, as hundreds of thousands of secular Turks rallied against his candidacy in Ankara on 14 April in the first of a series of massive demonstrations. Erdoğan's default move was to promote as an alternative the candidacy of his foreign minister and longstanding ally, Abdullah Gül. This failed to appease the opposition, but the proposal came to the parliament for the first round of voting on 27 April. According to the constitution, Gül needed two-thirds of legislators (367 votes) in the first two rounds and 276 in the third round to be elected president. In the event - after a boycott by opposition MP's who sought to abort the process by making the vote inquorate - 361 parliamentarians participated in the voting, of whom 357 of them voted for Gül. The main opposition party, the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People's Party / CHP) argued that the voting was unconstitutional on the grounds that the constitution requires a quorum of 367 parliamentarians; it then appealed to the constitutional court to rule on the validity of the process. The very same night, a major player in all Turkish constitutional issues - the army - announced its presence in the drama. On its website, the Turkish general staff published a stern memorandum stating that certain groups were relentlessly exploiting sacred religious feelings for their sinister goals and challenging the state's authority. The memo made clear that the armed forces would not stay neutral: as guardian of the state's secular character, it would uncompromisingly defend the principle of secularism. The government responded by criticising the memorandum while adopting a conciliatory tone towards the military. Two days later, hundreds of thousands again marched in Istanbul in support of secularism, and denounced Gül's candidacy. On 1 May, the constitutional court considered the CHP's application and ruled that the vote for the president in the parliament was invalid. The government's response was swift: prime minister and AKP chairman Erdoğan, called for early parliamentary elections. On 3 May, the parliament in Ankara supported him by voting to hold elections on 22 July rather than November. On 4 May, Erdogan held a two-hour meeting with the Turkish military's chief-of-staff, Yasar Buyukanit. At this stage, it still appears that the newly elected parliament will elect the eleventh president of the Turkish republic. The roots of crisis The current conflict has its deeper roots in the late Ottoman period when a group of highly educated modernisers identified popular traditions and Islamic practices as the cause of their society's backwardness. Their vision of secularism - more strictly, laicism - entailed not only separation between state and religion, but more importantly strict restrictions on public expressions of Islamic identity and the state's control over Islamic organisations. They consolidated their rule with the establishment of the Turkish republic in 1923 and engaged in an ambitious modernisation project. The military and the judiciary gradually became the self-declared guardians of the republic. As the new state became consolidated in the 1940s, an alternative elite started to emerge: loyal to the republican order, but promoting a more inclusive and tolerant version of secularism. The introduction of free multiparty elections in 1950 brought this elite to power. Over time the conflict between two competing versions of the role of Islam in Turkey's socio-political affairs crystallised into the division between centre-left and centre-right parties. Centre-right parties have been predominant in Turkey; they won nine of the fourteen elections held between 1950 and 2002. But during the 1990s - partly under pressure of frenetic social change and economic dislocation - the support-base of the centre-right parties started to erode, and religious and xenophobic nationalistic parties rose to fill the vacuum. The electoral victory of the Islamist, but not extreme, AKP in the 2002 elections seemed to restore the pivotal position of the centre-right in Turkish politics, but it did not mend the great rift of Turkish politics. The AKP and the secular republic The AKP government has a successful record in many respects. It inaugurated an era of political stability that translated into sustainable growth rates, major democratic reforms, increasing linkages with the European Union, and growing influence in the middle east. However, the AKP also came to resemble the decaying centre-right parties it had replaced. It rapidly matured into a patronage-distributing and hierarchical organisation with very limited pluralism and grassroots participation in decision-making. Moreover, the AKP has proved unable to overcome the military's

hegemony over Turkey's Kurdish policy and take bold initiatives that would contribute to the peaceful solution of the endemic Kurdish problem in the southeast of the country (and accentuated by

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developments in Iraq).

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It refused to reduce a 10% threshold of guaranteed seats, which had the effect of excluding Kurdish nationalists from the Turkish parliament and making the body unrepresentative of the full spectrum of political loyalties in the country. This uneasy relationship to democracy also became apparent in its consistent rejection of the idea of having the president elected by direct popular vote of the Turkish people - until it became clear that Abdullah

Gül would not be elected by parliament, when it executed an immediate u-turn. The implications of the events of the last week are twofold. First, it has become clear that Turkish democracy is far from being consolidated .

Consensus on even the basic constitutional rules is non-existent and major political actors have little trust in each other. The military left no doubt that it would not tolerate the assumption of the presidency by an ex-Islamist activist and founder of the AKP whose wife (as does the prime minister's) wears a headscarf. It did not matter to the army that Abdullah Gül has been a staunch advocate of Turkey's democratisation and membership of the EU since the early 2000s. Second, the Turkish citizens who marched in the streets and are backed by the guardians of the state are fearful of the AKP not because of its perceived undemocratic agenda but because of its perceived majoritarianism. They are anxious in a political system where the AKP leaders occupy the three top elected positions - presidency, prime ministry and the speaker of parliament - they would be completely marginalised . It may seem hard to understand that these citizens are afraid
of a party that enthusiastically supports Turkey's membership of the European Union, has acted within the parameters of the republic's laws, and is committed to political and economic liberalisation. But their attitude also fits the logic of

Turkey's modern political development, where the main categories of identification - state and society, left and right, secular and religious - resist easy or rigid classification. In this light, it would be too easy to dismiss the protestors' concerns as being unfounded. In their view, secularism does not only mean the separation of state and religion but also a mindset that categorically resists religious communalism and conformism. They may not be right in associating those tendencies with the AKP. Nonetheless, the strength of laicism in Turkey has been a strong factor in taming illiberal forms of Islam.
Freedom from religion would have better prospects in the Muslim world if defenders of "secularism" were to march also in Cairo, Islamabad, or Tehran.

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Turkey Neg 129 /341

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‡‡‡ EU Adv. ‡‡‡

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Turkey Neg 130 /341

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Turkey Wont Accede to EU
Turkey is unlikely to be allowed in EU after they froze eight chapters Head 6/30

Candidate countries have to open and then close 35 chapters of talks bringing their own laws and institutions in line with the EU's. The opening of Turkey's 13th chapter - on food and veterinary safety - may turn out to be the last. Cyprus joined the EU in 2004, but Turkey backs its breakaway north. The northern part of the island is still governed by an unrecognised administration. The Greek-Cypriot government vetoed a plan to allow the Turkish part to trade with EU member states. Turkey retaliated by blocking access to its ports for Cypriot ships, which led the EU to freeze eight negotiating chapters.

Turkey is not going to finish the chapters to get into EU Jones 9 (Dorian, Chief Information Officer, at Illinois Department of Public Health, “Turkey sees growing
reservations over EU bid,” http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,4790731,00.html) MJ
However, Bagis' optimism is increasingly meaningless, according to Professor Cengiz Aktar, head of European Union studies at Istanbul's Bachesehir University. Aktar said such reports from the EU executive were merely becoming an academic exercise. He said the results represented "total schizophrenia." "On the one hand, Turkey is now moving with this Kurdish opening and this opening towards Armenia," Aktar told Deutsche Welle. "It's all in line with EU membership and yet, the negotiations are completely stalled. It is like day and night." Aktar said the rest of Europe was absent. "The

European Commission is there, but the European Union member states are not," he said. "They are not supporting Turkey in its endeavors." Currently, various EU members are blocking 15 of the 35 chapters - areas where reforms may be necessary to bring a country in line with EU legislation - that Turkey must complete to achieve membership. With only a handful of chapters remaining, the entire process is threatening to grind to a halt.

Turkey won’t be acceded into EU-won’t open ports to Cyprus Jones 9 (Dorian, Chief Information Officer, at Illinois Department of Public Health, “Turkey sees growing
reservations over EU bid,” http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,4790731,00.html) MJ Many of the chapters are blocked because of an impasse over the divided Mediterranean island of Cyprus. Turkey has refused to open its ports and airports to the Greek Cypriots until the EU lifts its embargo against the Turkish side of the island. The EU accession report warned that Turkey must meet its obligations to all EU members - including Cyprus. But Suat Kiniklioglu, spokesman for the Turkish parliamentary foreign affairs committee, said Turkey won't back down despite the EU requirements that it open direct trade with Cyprus. "There is no way we are going to open the ports to Greek Cyprus," Kiniklioglu said. The row over the ports could come to a head at the end of this
year. Under a protocol signed by Turkey with the EU, it risks having the talks suspended unless it opens its ports to Cyprus by December. Richard Howitt, a member of the European Parliament's committee on Turkey, said

that Ankara was in danger of throwing away all the good work it had achieved with this year's report. "I warn them that there isn't too much ambiguity, I would even argue no ambiguity in that legal text agreed by the council ministers," Howitt said. "So don't underestimate the threat of the talks being suspended altogether." But such a threat does not carry the weight it once did. For with French President Nicholas Sarkozy, who opposes
Turkey's bid to join the 27-nation bloc on principle, there is a growing belief both among the people and politicians that its bid is doomed to forever remain just that: a bid.

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Turkey Neg 131 /341

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Turkey Won’t Accede to EU
Turkey will not accede into EU-won’t accept SAPA 4 (South African Press Association, “Turkey won't join EU on conditions,”

http://za.mg.co.za/article/2004-12-15-turkey-wont-join-eu-on-conditions) MJ Turkey will not accept entry to the European Union on any conditions, Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul said in a newspaper interview published on the eve of a key EU decision on the issue. "We will not say yes at any price. We have told the EU that," Gul told the Milliyet daily, in comments published on Wednesday. Gul's comments echoed those of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who on Tuesday told diplomats from EU states that his country will reject conditions posed by the EU authorities in Brussels if it considers them contrary to its interests. During an EU summit in Brussels on Thursday and
Friday, the 25-nation grouping is due to set a date for the long-awaited opening of negotiations on Turkey's application. In his interview, Gul laid down what he said are four "red lines" that Turkey will not cross:

Negotiations must have as their final aim complete EU membership for Turkey. The EU must not oblige Turkey to extend diplomatic recognition to the Republic of Cyprus, which became an EU member in May this year. The decision to open membership negotiations with Turkey -- expected to be taken at the Brussels summit -- must be very clear, and not conditional on any subsequent decision by EU leaders. There should be no special conditions imposed permanently on Turkey. "Turkey will not accept an injustice," Gul said, adding that to impose special
conditions -- as demanded by some EU countries -- would "violate European law". Gul was later due to fly to the summit in Brussels.

Chapters key to Turkey accession are blocked by Greek Cypriots and France Doğan 10 (Yonca Poyraz Doğan, Istanbul Kultur University, Global Political Trends Center, “Cyprus conflict
could interrupt Turkey’s EU accession ,” http://www.gpotcenter.org/news/426) MJ “[Greek Cypriots] believe that Turkey will give in at the end when it becomes a member of the EU. But this is not a realistic option for the Greek Cypriots. They should realize that they lost leverage in the EU because many chapters are being blocked by them and France,” he told Today’s Zaman for Monday Talk. Akgün added that Turkey has lost its desire to become a member of the EU and is not ready to make any sacrifice. “Even in the reform process, EU membership is a non-issue. Look
at the debate on and around the Kurdish problem -- you won’t see any reference to the Copenhagen political criteria,” he said.

Turkey won’t accede EU-won’t open ports Hawley 6 (Charles, staff writer, “Is Ankara Gambling Away its EU Future?” Spiegel Online,
http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,446107,00.html) MJ
And what's at stake? If Turkey loses, its decades-long dream of European Union membership could finally fizzle out. Forty-six

years of waiting, negotiating, reforming, convincing: wasted. No more future within the world's most powerful economy. It's a huge gamble and Ankara has shoved all of its chips to the center of the table. Problem is, Turkey's hand is terrible. The issue, of course, is Cyprus. Less than a week before the European Commission releases a report on Turkey's progress toward joining the EU, the country still hasn't fulfilled what would seem to be an elemental requirement: opening up its ports to all EU members. Cypriot ships remain unwelcome in Turkey. The EU is not impressed -- and Turkey's going to hear about it on Nov. 8. "If this situation continues, Turkey's accession is doomed to failure," said Heinz Kramer, an expert on Turkish progress toward EU membership
with the German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin, referring to the ongoing stalemate over Cyprus.

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Turkey Neg 132 /341

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Turkey Won’t Accede EU-30 Years
Its unlikely Turkey will accede into EU-if they do, it won’t be for 30 years Birch 9 (Nicholas Birch, specialist in Turkey, Iran and the Middle East, “Turkey: Is Ankara Trying to Tame

the Russian Bear?” Eurasianet.org, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav081409a.shtml) MJ Public opinion appears to be helping rapprochement efforts. Polls show 70 percent of Russians to have a positive view of Turkey, a ratio that the influx of Russian tourists into Turkey (2.8 million last year) is likely to bolster. In
Turkey, meanwhile, recent Pew Research Center polls show that the replacement of George Bush by Barack Obama has had a negligible impact on anti-Americanism in the country. And while polls still show a majority of Turks

supporting the country's struggling European Union accession process, few Turks believe Europe will ever let them in. A prominent advisor to Vladimir Putin, Sergei Markov shares that opinion. "Turkey won't get into the EU for another 30 years," he said in February, adding

that Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus and Turkey should form an economic union parallel to the EU. It's a suggestion that raises polite smiles in Ankara. The architect of Turkey's new multilateral foreign policy, Ahmet Davutoglu may appear more at home in the Middle East, but he insists European Union accession remains Turkey's "number one priority."

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Turkey in EU Bad: Racism (1/2)
1) Turkey is too different from the EU- kills EU unity Parker 02 (Randall, Professor of Economics at East Carolina University, Should Turkey Join The European Union?,
ParaPundit, http://www.parapundit.com/archives/000790.html)
Woollacott mentions the growth of the imam hatip schools in Turkey as a means that the Islamists have used to expand their ranks. They apparently seek to teach a new generation of Turks to be fundamentalist Muslims. This brings up an important question: Is there a higher percentage of Turkish school children attending Islamist schools than was the case 10 or 20 years ago? Is that percentage rising or falling? Will the AKP government increase funding for Islamist schools? Will the desire to achieve EU membership cause the military to hold back from blocking this move? There is a very basic question that should be asked: Is the Islamist influence in Turkey growing or declining? A follow-up question: If Turkey joins the EU will the Islamist influence be more likely to grow or decline? Many in the pro-membership camp assume that EU membership will increase the power of the secular faction in Turkey. But it is by no means obvious that Turkey's membership in the EU will help ensure the secularization of Turkish government and society. If EU demands for greater religious freedom translate into greater latitude for the Islamists to get control of cultural and education institutions it is quite possible that EU membership will have the opposite effect . A Turkey outside of

the EU is a Turkey whose military will be free to stomp down on the Islamists when Islamist influence begins to grow too strong. A Turkey inside the EU will be one whose historical protector of its secular character - the Turkish military - will no longer be able to perform that function. Jonny Dymond finds young Turks in Istanbul cafes who doubt Turkey's suitability for EU membership. It is not the grand clash of civilisations that disturbs, said Verda, it is that being Muslim means you embrace change more slowly, that you are culturally different. 'Muslims have a lot of traditions; they are not leaving their traditions, they are keeping them. A lot of my Muslim friends, despite being highly educated, think that they are not suitable for the EU. 'The reason is that they are Muslim, they have their own culture, their own lifestyle, and it is too hard to change it.' Istanbul, said Verda, is different - not really Turkey at all, the cosmopolitan city has a history of European civilisation and intermingling of cultures. All the same, she says, it is not Europe either. 'It's like the combination of East and West together - one day you feel you are very European, very modern, the next you wake up and find out that you are from the Middle East.' The EU is demanding greater civilian control over the Turkish military. The EU has so far refused to start membership talks with Turkey until the government meets minimum requirements on human rights and democracy. But Mr Erdogan argued that tougher standards were being applied to Ankara than to other nations vying to join the EU. Although Turkey has passed laws banning the death penalty and granting more rights to its Kurdish minority, the EU has noted shortcomings in human rights, including restrictions on freedom of expression, the torture of prisoners and insufficient civilian control over its military. Is that wise? The one institution that
is most loved and respected by the Turkish people is their military. The Turkish military has protected the secular state and Turkey would be nowhere near ready to join the EU in the first place if the Turkish military hadn't played its role of constitutional protector for about 80 years. If Islamism grows as a force in Turkey and Turkey is admitted to the EU then what will the

EU be able to do to stop the growth of a religious state within its borders? German opposition leader Edmund Stoiber predicts EU membership for Turkey will destroy the political union.
“Membership for Turkey would spell the end of political union in Europe. We do not have that kind of integrative strength,” Herr Stoiber, the Christian Democratic opposition leader, said. “We want a proper political union, not just a free trade zone,

yet that is what we would end up with if we let in Turkey.”Germany and France agreed a “conditional rendezvous
clause”, allowing the start of entry talks with Turkey in July 2005, providing Ankara satisfied the EU that it had met standards on minority rights, judicial and prison reform, institutional democracy and market economics. “If you set 2005 as a possible date for talks, as Chancellor Schröder has done, then you will not be able to hold up the process,” Herr Stoiber said yesterday. When he talks about a political union versus a free trade zone he's making an important point: In order to achieve a political union one needs a lot of common values.

The EU already faces enormous obstacles brought about lack of a common language, differences in historical experiences and differences in cultures between the existing EU members. There are large differences in living standards, levels of corruption, and the strength of civil society among the EU members. The addition of Turkey as a member would make the differences even greater and the number of issues on which a consensus can be formed would be reduced. Dr. John Casey, a fellow of Gonville & Caius, Cambridge, believes that there are cultural differences that make Turkey incompatible with the EU. The Turkish question is a much more acute version of a problem that could in the long run bring to nought the dreams of those who seek "ever closer union" in Europe itself. How can there be a European "state" - how can there be a common sense of allegiance among citizens of the EU - where there is no common language, where there is such cultural diversity, and where the political and legal traditions of at least one important European country - the United Kingdom - differ so radically from those of many of the others? Yet the European idealists can point to two great facts to
oppose the sceptics. Almost all of Europe has a Christian inheritance, which means that the great majority of us, whether believers or not, are profoundly shaped by up to two millennia of Christian culture. You can only think this does not matter profoundly if you fail to see how culture

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overwhelmingly makes us what we are, and does help give us a sense of European identity despite the manifold differences. John O'Farrell says the Europeans really need to figure out what they want to accomplish.

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Turkey Neg 135 /341

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Turkey in EU Bad: Racism (2/2)
2) Disunity leads to racism Castle 06 (Stephen, Middle East specialist, The Independent, Muslims on front line as racism rises across EU,
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/muslims-on-front-line-as-racism-rises-across-eu409325.html)BAF Racism, xenophobia and far-right extremism are on the rise across Europe, according to a comprehensive survey which found that Muslim communities face mounting discrimination and prejudice. The report, by non-governmental organisations in 20 EU countries, criticises governments for losing interest in the battle against racism, and says the political reaction to terrorist attacks has made life harder for ethnic minorities. The inquiry by the European Network against Racism highlights a trend towards "increased tolerance for discriminatory behaviour particularly against immigrants and Muslims". It adds that "a lack of political will to address racism is sometimes evident and disturbing". The section on the UK, compiled by the Runnymede Trust, chronicles the reaction to the July 7 terror attacks in

London last year concluding that new immigration and security policies have helped create a situation in which racism has flourished. The report on France describes immigration policies as being "at the heart of institutional racism" in the country. In Germany almost 15,000 refugees had their asylum claims revoked last year, compared with 577 in 1998. Anti-terror crackdowns have led to racial profiling which, by the nature of stereotyping, impacts on the wider ethnic minority groups, the report says. "Since January 2005 police in the Netherlands can ask for proof of identity. The UK also reports an increase in the disproportionate use of 'stop and search' against minority groups. "Muslim women were disproportionately

affected by an ordinance proposed by the Mayor of Treviso [Italy] in 2004 that forbade the covering of one's face on municipal territory." Across the Continent researchers found evidence that police forces have failed in their duty to investigate and prevent racist crime. "Sometimes racially motivated crime is simply not taken seriously," says the document, adding that police are "reluctant to record a crime as such, as highlighted for instance in the reports on Hungary and Lithuania. In some cases police might not recognise the racist element and treat an incident as hooliganism." Even more worrying is the growth of extremist political forces. The report notes: "A rise of right-wing extremism, as well as other forms of nationalism, is evident in a number of countries, such as Denmark, Sweden, Germany, Latvia, Malta and Slovak Republic. "The use of the internet as a tool for the dissemination of racist sentiment, crime and propaganda is particularly worrying given that internet crime is not often recorded and the legal difficulties that have been experienced in challenging internet-based criminal activity." Victims of racism range from Europe's Jewish communities to its Roma minorities. But a separate document on Islamophobia reports a dramatic increase in incidents against Muslims, particularly in France. It says: "The rise of intolerance and discrimination towards Muslims has risen in the last year and the underlying tones of Islamophobia have infiltrated all forms of public and private lives for Muslims in Europe."

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Turkey Neg 136 /341

Suiter Pre-season

Turkey in EU Bad: War Scenario
1) People reject Turkey ascension- divides Europe BBC 05 (EU opens Turkey membership talks, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4305500.stm)
Monday saw Austria

put under intense pressure, as it, alone among the EU's 25 members, demanded that the draft framework for entry talks should be rewritten. The EU's member states must unanimously approve a negotiating mandate before talks can begin. Austrian Foreign Minister Ursula Plassnik said her country was "listening to the people" by questioning full membership for Turkey. "There are moments when we have to say that such fundamental things
are at stake that a compromise is not possible," she warned. But after a series of meetings with Mr Straw, it appeared she gave way.

There is deep popular opposition in Austria and other European countries to Turkey's accession to the EU, with sceptics citing Turkey's size, poverty, and main religion - Islam - as reasons to keep it at a distance. Austrian Chancellor Wolfgang Schuessel has said he wants the EU to acknowledge popular concerns over its expansion. But Mr Straw warned of a "theological-political divide, which could open up even further down the boundary between so-called Christian-heritage states and those of Islamic heritage"

2) Disunity in the EU stops effective policymaking Luskin 8 (Robert C. (University of Texas at Austin) James S. Fishkin (Stanford University) Stephen Boucher
(Notre Europe, Paris) Henri Monceau (Notre Europe, Paris) Deliberative Poll, Considered Opinions on Further EU Enlargement: Evidence from an EU-Wide Deliberative Poll* http://cdd.stanford.edu/research/papers/2008/EU-enlargement.pdf) BAF We begin with the post-deliberation attitudes toward enlargement in general. Participants who thought that adding a Muslim country would improve the EU’s relations with the Muslim world or that adding more countries would help its economy or its security smiled distinctly more on the idea of enlargement. Those who thought that adding a Muslim country would make the EU too diverse frowned distinctly more on it. The one significant but apparently anomalous coefficient estimate in these results belongs to the empirical premise that adding more countries would make it more difficult for the EU to make decisions. The more the participants endorsed this proposition, the more they wanted to see the EU admit new member states. The anomaly disappears for the equation
explaining the pre- to post-deliberation change in attitudes toward enlargement in general, does not appear in either of the equations explaining attitudes toward admitting Turkey, but then reappears in the equation explaining post-deliberation attitudes toward admitting Ukraine. We are unsure what to make of this, but one possibility is that some segment of the sample would

prefer that the EU have a hard time making decisions—that decision making rest as much as possible with the individual member states. From that point of view, admitting more countries, if it impaired EU level decision–making, might be a plus. It may be worth noting that this effect appears to be confined to old-member-state
participants. But what of the change from pre-deliberation attitudes? Here too a belief that adding a Muslim country would improve the EU’s relations with the Muslim world was important. Those who came to believe this more came to approve more of enlargement. So did those who came to place a higher value on traditionalism or their personal economic security. In addition, the more the participants believed their country could take care of its own security, the more favorably they viewed the prospect of enlargement. It is worth noting that the effect of personal was confined to the participants from the new member states, suggesting that part of the slide in support for enlargement was a matter of these participants realizing that their countries’ contributions from the EU might be reduced if they had to be shared with additional new member states.

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Turkey In EU Bad: War Scenario (Extension)
Unity in policymaking key to stop war The Economist 4 (Peace in our time, http://www1.economist.com/surveys/displaystory.cfm?

story_id=E1_PTJQPGV) Many of the European Union's most ardent supporters still see the EU as a crucial bulwark against the return of war to Europe. In pressing the case for monetary union, Mr Kohl argued that adopting the euro was ultimately a question of war and peace in Europe. When efforts to write a European constitution looked like stalling, Elmar Brok, a prominent German member of the EU's constitutional convention (and confidant of Mr Kohl), gave warning that if Europe failed to agree on a constitution, it risked sliding back into the kind of national rivalries that had led to the outbreak of the first world war. Remember the bad old days? Such arguments resonate particularly
strongly among an older generation of French and German politicians, but also have wider currency. Timothy Garton Ash of St Antony's College, Oxford, one of Britain's most astute observers of European affairs, says in a recent book that the Union is

needed “to prevent us falling back into the bad old ways of war and European barbarism which stalked the Balkans into the very last year of the last century.” Mr Garton Ash concedes that “we can never prove that a continent-wide collection of independent, fully sovereign European democracies would not behave in the same broadly pacific way without the existence of any European Union. Maybe they would, but would you care to risk it?” Believers in the pacifying effects of the drive for European unity acknowledge the contributions to peace in post-war Europe made by American troops and by the spread of prosperity and democracy. But they argue that the EU has played the central role, by forcing European leaders to co-operate intensively and continuously, by proving that membership of the Union brings prosperity and by demanding that all EU countries adhere to basic principles of democracy, human rights and the peaceful resolution of disputes.

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Turkey Neg 138 /341

Suiter Pre-season

Turkey EU Bad: Economy (1/2)
1)Turkish ascension into the EU leads to instability The Economist 4 (Peace in our time, http://www1.economist.com/surveys/displaystory.cfm?

story_id=E1_PTJQPGV) At a time when relations between the West and the Islamic world are so delicate, most EU leaders seem to feel that refusing to admit a large Islamic country into the Union would be seen as a disastrous confirmation of the “clash of civilisations”. European diplomats, for their part, hope

that admitting Turkey to the EU will bring confirmation that Islam is not incompatible with western values. They point out with some pride that the prospect of EU membership has already driven forward reforms in Turkey such as increased political and civil rights for the Kurdish minority and the abolition of the death penalty. Many citizens fear that rather than exporting stability, the EU will import instability. For geo-strategic thinkers sitting in foreign ministries in London, Paris and Berlin, the arguments for using the EU to spread peace and democratic stability seem compelling. But ordinary European citizens find them much less convincing. Many fear that rather than exporting stability, the EU will import

instability. In western Europe, public debate about EU enlargement has tended to concentrate on fears about competition from low-cost labour and waves of immigration. So far
such fears have proved containable, and the admission of the new members from central Europe has not caused too much of a fuss.

But the new central European members, though poorer than the European average, are smallish (except for Poland), and all are predominantly Christian. Turkey, which on current trends will have a larger population than any current EU member by 2020, is a different proposition. Because all EU citizens are free to live and work anywhere in the EU, there could be serious resistance to Turkish membership in France, Germany and the Netherlands, where the rapid growth of Muslim populations in the past 30 years is already a highly sensitive issue. Even without such worries, the traditional arguments for European integration as a “peace project” have anyway been losing force with the passing years. The
current generation of EU leaders still has some memories of the depredations of war in Europe. Gerhard Schröder, the German chancellor, never knew his father, who was killed in the second world war; Jacques Chirac, the French president, lived through the war as a child. But for most younger Europeans, the threat of war in western Europe now seems almost unimaginably remote..

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Turkey Neg 139 /341

Suiter Pre-season

Turkey EU Bad: Economy (2/2)
2. Member unity key to solve the econ crisis Tucker 10 (James, journalist specializing in int’l econ, AFP, Global Elites Struggle to Keep EU,
http://www.prisonplanet.com/global-elites-struggle-to-keep-eu-euro-intact.html) BAF
Bilderberg members pushed hard in a frantic attempt to save the euro during the recent weekend-long economic summit in Toronto, but this action was ignored by the major media, which is under control of the secret group of international financiers and political czars. “ As the euro faces a challenge like none before, the question is whether it will last ,” wrote Neil Irwin of the Bilderberg-controlled Washington Post way over in Frankfurt, Germany, as heads of state were gathering in Ontario, Canada’s largest city. “The debt crisis that began in Greece and menaces half a dozen other European nations has caused the euro to lose 15 percent of its value relative to the dollar since January,” he wrote. “Some economists consider it obvious that the currency union will not survive in its present form, that

one or more southern European nations could end up reverting to liras, pesetas and drachmas.” What Irwin failed to write is that this is what was being said inside the Toronto G-20 summit. As we go about our busy lives, the future of the euro and the European Union itself is being addressed in Toronto and Paris, with most leaders acting in unison in an effort to save the euro —which was high on

the Bilderberg agenda in early June at their secretive meeting in Spain Saving the euro appears to be critical to Bilderberg’s overall plans. Their shadowy schemes have been seriously set back in recent years, to maintain the European Union’s role as a single superstate and to create a parallel “American Union” that also would use a continental currency, the “amero.” In a glass skyscraper in Paris, a Bilderberg-connected banker named Jean-Claude Trichet and his 16,000 employees are struggling to save the euro and promote the “amero.” The European Central Bank

is under heavy pressure to save the euro. So Trichet’s bank is buying billions of euros worth of government bonds in an effort to stabilize markets. But this has generated new tensions as Germany objects, saying it is a violation of the central bank’s rules. Unlike Ben Bernanke’s Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank must strictly monitor inflation and is limited in the amount of euros it can loan into circulation. As the economy fizzled further, Trichet decided that the goal of European unity was more important than the law and presented a compromise: They would buy bonds on the open market, not directly from governments, ducking the prohibition on funding government debt. At the same time, they would take other steps to avoid increasing the money supply to ease inflationary pressures. In Toronto, Bilderberg-linked participants strongly supported Trichet’s money plan. “It’s the only way to save the euro, and
without the euro, the European Union falls apart and the American Union never comes into existence” said one, echoing the agony expressed at Bilderberg’s meeting in Spain. “We can’t let that happen, ever.” “Euro-area governments have effectively thrown away the rule book,” moaned Volker Wieland, an economist at Goethe University Frankfurt. “It’s a complete regime change. No bailouts and individual fiscal responsibility have been replaced with mutual guarantees” for government debt. Bilderberg also is reportedly supporting strong international regulations on banks, as a step toward creating a world treasury department, which gained much approval in Toronto. “The stakes are so high, I think the incentives are high to sort it out,” Wieland said.

3. Unstable EU market leads to world economic downturn\ Schneider and Irwin 10 (Howard and Neil, Stony Brook University prof of journalism, Washington Post, One false move in
Europe could set off global chain reaction, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/05/23/AR2010052304170_pf.html)BAF But the knife-edge psychology currently governing global markets has put the future of the U.S. economic recovery in the hands of politicians in an assortment of European capitals. If one or more fail to make the expected progress on cutting budgets, restructuring economies or boosting growth, it could drain confidence in a broad and unsettling way. Credit markets worldwide could lock up and throw the global economy back into

recession. For the average American, that seemingly distant sequence of events could translate into another hit on the 401(k) plan, a lost factory shift if exports to Europe decline and another shock to the banking system that might make it harder to borrow. "If what happened in Greece were to

happen in a large country, it could fundamentally mark our times," Angelos Pangratis, head of the European Union delegation to the United States, said Friday after a panel discussion on the crisis in Greece sponsored by the Greater Washington Board of Trade. That

local economic development boards are sponsoring panels on government debt in Greece is perhaps proof enough that Europe's problems are the world's. That the dominoes can tumble fast was shown Thursday when a new and narrowly drawn stock-trading policy in Germany helped trigger a sell-off on Wall Street. It marks a change, Barclays Capital chief European economist Julian Callow wrote in a Friday analysis, from a situation in which the bonds of European countries were considered to carry virtually zero risk to a "brave new world" where sovereign default in one of the world's core economic areas is a tangible threat. Bank holdings of European debt are now being studied with the same focus given to
holdings of U.S. mortgage-backed securities as the global financial crisis unfolded in 2008 -- and with the same suspicion that problems in one part of the world could wreck others. The most vulnerable European countries -- Greece, Spain, Portugal and

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Turkey Neg 140 /341

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represent only about 4 percent of world economic activity, but "the debt crisis and its ripple effects are bad news for all corners of the world," said Cornell University economist Eswar Prasad.

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Turkey Neg 141 /341

Suiter Pre-season

Economy I/L Magnifier
It just takes one country to pull out or be pushed out of the eurozone to collapse the econ Fernando 10 (Vincent, adviser to the multi-strategy fund Railay Capital Partners, The Business Insider, Why A
Eurozone Break-Up Would Trigger The Mother Of All Financial Crises, http://www.businessinsider.com/eurozone-break-up-would-trigger-the-mother-of-all-financial-crises-20105#ixzz0syGJzNe1) No matter how much some may want a nation to leave the euro, the cost of leaving is just too great now. Just preparing for a euro-exit would trigger the 'mother of all financial crises' according to Mr. Eichengreen writing at VOX EU:. The economic costs: 'A country that leaves the euro area because of problems of competitiveness would be expected to devalue its newly-reintroduced national currency. But workers would know this, and the resulting wage inflation would neutralise any benefits in terms of external competitiveness. Moreover, the country would be forced to pay higher interest rates on its public debt. Those old enough to recall the high costs of servicing the Italian debt in the 1980s will appreciate that this can be a serious problem.' The political costs: 'A country that reneges on its euro commitments will antagonise its partners. It will not be welcomed at the table where other European Union-related decisions were made. It will be treated as a second class member of the EU to the extent that it remains a member at all.' The infrastructure adjustment costs: 'Reintroducing the national currency would require essentially all contracts – including those governing wages, bank deposits, bonds, mortgages, taxes, and most everything else – to be redenominated in the domestic currency. The legislature could pass a law requiring banks, firms, households and governments to redenominate their contracts in this manner. But in a democracy this decision would have to be preceded by very extensive discussion. And for it to be executed smoothly, it would have to be accompanied by
detailed planning. Computers will have to be reprogrammed. Vending machines will have to be modified. Payment machines will have to be serviced to prevent motorists from being trapped in subterranean parking garages. Notes and coins will have to be positioned around the country. One need only recall the extensive planning that preceded the introduction of the physical euro.' The market costs: 'Market participants would be aware of this fact. Households and firms anticipating that domestic deposits would be redenominated into the lira, which would then lose value against the euro, would shift their deposits to other euro-area banks. A system-wide bank run would follow. Investors anticipating that their claims on the Italian government would be redenominated into lira would shift into claims on other euro-area governments, leading to a bond-market crisis. If the precipitating factor was parliamentary debate over abandoning the lira, it would be unlikely that the ECB would provide extensive lender-of-last-resort support. And if the government was already in a weak fiscal position, it would not be able to

borrow to bail out the banks and buy back its debt. This would be the mother of all financial crises.' Thus the market effects of an exit from the euro-zone are the main challenge. A eurozone exit can't be done overnight since a lot of preparationg would be required. Hence the argument is that markets would push an exiting nation into financial crisis as they tried to trade ahead of the euro-exit. Thing is, does this only apply to financially-weak Eurozone nations? What about nations that might be far better off outside of the eurozone, such as Germany? We feel a nation such as Germany might be able to avoid the negative market effects described above.

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Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 142 /341

Suiter Pre-season

Economy Link: Competitiveness
Turkey’s economy lags behind the EU creating a brain drain, crashing competitiveness Parker 02 (Randall, Professor of Economics at East Carolina University, Should Turkey Join The European

Union?, ParaPundit, http://www.parapundit.com/archives/000790.html) Update: The economic disparity between the existing and new EU members is already taxing the limits of the generosity of the taxpayers of the richer EU states. Martin Walker reports that the new EU members together produce less than the 16 million people in the Netherlands. The 10 new members have a combined population of 75 million, but a combined GDP of just $338 billion -- less than that of Holland. The EU is increasing its population by almost a quarter, but increasing its wealth by just
4 percent. The EU's GDP per head last week was around $25,000, close to that of the United States. The new, enlarged EU's GDP per head next week will be just $20,000 -- uncomfortably close to that of South Korea. According to the chart at the bottom of this article Turkey has a per capita GDP that is lower than that of all the 10 new EU members.

While Turkey is ahead of Bulgaria and Romania they weren't let into the EU in the latest round either. Therefore money is a big obstacle to the acceptance of Turkey as an EU member. When West Germany merged with East Germany it was in a far better position to fund the reconstruction of East

Germany than the EU is to fund the new Eastern European EU members, Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey. Yet, as Martin Walker points out, in spite of the large amount of money spent on East Germany East Germany still lags

West Germany by a large margin and there is a brain drain and youth brain of the brighter and more capable East Germans toward West Germany. Imagine what would happen with a much larger income gradient between Turkey and Western Europe if Turkey was allowed into the EU with full labor mobility.

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Turkey Neg 143 /341

Suiter Pre-season

Turkey in EU Bad-Splits Europe
EU members don’t want Turkey- splits Europe creating conflict Cooper 10- (Zaki, staff writer, Should Turkey join the European, theo think tank, Union?
http://www.theosthinktank.co.uk/Should_Turkey_join_the_European_Union.aspx? ArticleID=2116&PageID=47&RefPageID=11)
Against this background of enhanced faith-based diplomacy, the issue of Turkish membership of the EU has been boiling away.

Turkey was officially recognised as a candidate for membership in 1999 and opened its accession negotiations with the EU in October 2005. The country, with its 97% Muslim population, has

harboured European ambitions for decades. Indeed it has been an associate member of the EU and its predecessors since 1964.

However, not everyone is enamoured by the prospect of Turkish membership. The issue has split Europe. Many in the UK have been suppotive of Turkey's membership, and the accession talks were launched as a result of the British government's push in 2005. On the other hand, British public opinion has been less enthusiastic, as the issue of Turkish accession has become linked to migration concerns. Elsewhere in Europe, leaders have been less keen than British politicians. French President Nicolas Sarkozy has been outspoken in his opposition to Turkey's full membership, as has Anegla Merkel, the German Chancellor. Their reservations are surpassed by other member states, in particular Austria, which tried to block the accession talks and where the climate of opinion is implacably against Turkey's membership. The issues around Turkish membership are extremely complex. There is the dispute over Cyrpus, human rights issues, including treatment of the Kurds, and Turkey's position on the Armenian genocide, to name three leading issues. All these will need to be dealt with in the talks, which will conclude by 2014 at the earliest and probably much later.

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Turkey Neg 144 /341

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‡‡‡ European Economy Adv. ‡‡‡

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Turkey Neg 145 /341

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European Economy Resilient
The European economy is resilient Sisci 2 (Francesco, Director of the Institute of Italian Culture in Beijing, “Crisis in confidence: The China factor,”
Asia Times, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/DG24Ad04.html) MJ This is the essence of the failure of confidence US Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan in his recent testimony to Congress spoke about, and this is the reason for the failure of the dollar vis-ŕ-vis the euro. According to figures, the US economy still outperforms the European economy at the moment, but are these figures true? Investors asked that question as they became more confident in the European economy, which had little or no experience with the new economy and creative accounting, and which had endured terrorism for decades without any September 11-type nervous breakdown. In a sentence: the US economy proved more volatile, for internal and external reasons, while the European one proved more resilient. That said, it is also true that the European market lacks the US market's ability to face its ghosts, be it the new economy, creative accounting or terrorism, and to bounce back: its volatility is also vitality. No failures in a technologybased economy or accounting have occurred in Europe, yet no technological leaps have taken place either. Despite the failures of new accounting, America's fresh ways of doing business, when not taken to the extreme, made it possible to see the potential of new business and growth; and it forced businesses to look for resources inside and outside the company in order to reap this potential. Little of the kind happened in Europe.

European Economy is resilient Gumbel 8 (Peter, journalist and foreign correspondent, “Europe's Economy: Falling Down,” Time,
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1821234,00.html) MJ Over the past year, at a time when the world economy has been buffeted by the U.S. housing and financial crisis, slowing growth in most developed nations and soaring inflation everywhere, one of the big surprises has been Europe's relatively strong performance. The picture has been uneven, with countries such as Spain and Italy — and increasingly the U.K. — running into problems. But overall growth, especially in the 15 nations that use the rapidly appreciating euro, has confounded the skeptics. In early June, the International Monetary Fund actually revised its 2008 growth forecast for the euro area sharply upwards, declaring that it had become "a zone of stability in the international economy." Likewise, in late May, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development praised the European economy for its "resilience."

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Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 146 /341

Suiter Pre-season

European Economy Resilient
European Economy proves resilient among global recession Investment International 9 (“Emerging European economies resilient in the face of global recession,”

http://www.investmentinternational.com/news/business/emerging-european-economies-resilient-in-the-faceof-the-global-recession-3044.html) MJ The resilience of the underlying economies in Emerging Europe has been one of the more positive surprises to come out of the global recession. Matthias Siller, manager of Baring Emerging Europe plc (BEE) says, “During the recent results season, earnings across the Emerging Europe universe generally beat expectations. At the same time, the economic growth outlook for the region has been revised up. Indeed, it looks as though some parts of Emerging Europe, specifically Poland, central Europe’s largest economy, will not shrink in 2009.” Matthias explains: “The Emerging European economies are strengthening in part due to the massive monetary stimulus in markets across the region. Since late 2008, Turkish interest rates have been cut dramatically and interest rates in Central Europe have also fallen, albeit not to the same extent. In Russia, interest rates have been slashed recently. Importantly, whilst these economies were fighting significant global headwinds, domestic governments, particularly the Russian government, had the money to spend on economic support initiatives. “A buoyant export sector and domestic market also add to the region’s resilience. The export sector has improved due to Germany’s quick economic recovery (much of Central Europe’s export industry is focused on Germany) and the continuous opportunities arising from the urbanisation of China. We expect those sectors relying on exports to experience volatility in the short term but the long term story remains promising.” Matthias continues: “The domestic market in the Emerging European region is also proving resilient. Whilst consumers in the West are over-burdened with debt, the situation across most of our investment universe is completely different. Consumers in Central and Eastern Europe carry a fraction of the level of debt of their western counterparts. Furthermore, consumption has held up quite well during the crisis; consumers may be down but they are definitely not out.”

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Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 147 /341

Suiter Pre-season

EU Economy Resilient
EU economy resilient McCreevy 8 (Charlie, Commissioner for Internal Market And Services, “The International Financial Crisis:

Its causes and what to do about it,” http://www.alde.eu/fileadmin/webdocs/key_docs/Finance-book_EN.pdf) MJ But the problems have not been limited to the financial markets. They have also spilled into the real economy. Evidence suggests that the economic situation in the US is deteriorating. Against this background, the Federal
Reserve has continued to ease monetary policy, a substantial fiscal stimulus has been agreed and there has been a governmentsponsored rescue package for holders of sub-prime mortgages. In the EU, the economic situation and prospects

appear less worrying. The ECB has played a decisive role in stabilizing conditions in the Euro-area interbank markets, while at the same time maintaining a clear focus on its primary objective – price stability. For the moment the EU economy seems to be quite resilient but a slow-down in European growth is inevitable given the inter-linkages with the US economy. With almost daily reports of further deterioration in the US housing market and weakening consumer demand it requires something of a leap of faith to be confident that the jump in loan defaults in the US mortgage and consumer credit markets will not spread to include highly leveraged corporate given the more challenging economic environment in which they will be operating in the months ahead.

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Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 148 /341

Suiter Pre-season

European Economy Not Key to Global Economy
European Economy Not Key to Global Economy-Other countries will fill in ACUS 4 (The Atlantic Council of the United States, “The Transatlantic Economy in 2020: A Partnership for the Future?”

http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/82/0411-Transatlantic_Economy_2020_Partnership_Future.pdf) MJ Despite the fact that the transatlantic economy seems to grow ever larger and more closely knit, problems of a serious order may lie ahead. The United States and the European Union confront serious macroeconomic issues and

a looming demographic crunch, which will place a strain on pension, unemployment, and health insurance schemes. If current trends in growth, productivity, and demographics continue uninterrupted — particularly in Europe — the strong economic foundation for the transatlantic partnership may become seriously eroded. The United States faces great challenges in terms of
reducing deficits and absorbing new security costs. But in Europe, where the demographic crunch is likely to be much more severe, prosperity can only be maintained by reducing government expenditures, stimulating faster economic growth, and increasing labor utilization. Despite the impressive achievements of the single market and the euro — and the promise of the new, reform-oriented European Commission under José Manuel Barroso — there is reason to question whether the European Union will once again be able to accomplish what is necessary to renew its economy. At the same time that the United States and the EU

find that their economies are moving in different directions, China, India, and others are likely to experience strong economic growth and to lay claim to a bigger role in economic decision making, challenging the traditional joint stewardship of the United States and Europe. In sum, the conditions that allowed transatlantic political relations to flourish over the past fifty years and fostered U.S. and European joint leadership of the world economy may no longer exist by the year 2020.

European Economy not key to global economy-US turns for others for cooperation ACUS 4 (The Atlantic Council of the United States, “The Transatlantic Economy in 2020: A Partnership for the Future?”
http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/82/0411-Transatlantic_Economy_2020_Partnership_Future.pdf) MJ

The future of the transatlantic economy has implications not only for global economic governance, but also for the close political and economic linkages between the two sides of the Atlantic that have been fundamental to international stability for the last fifty years. Those

links are expressed through cooperation in institutions like NATO and the UN, in continuing U.S.-EU undertakings in the framework of the New Transatlantic Agenda, and via bilateral U.S. relations with individual European states. If the European economy

continues to lose ground, not only will Europe become more inward looking, but the EU will not have the resources or inclination to play a larger international role and to join the United States as a partner in dealing with some of the strategic challenges around the world. The United States may well try to turn elsewhere, and with the likely rise of new global players such as China and India, the United States will have alternatives. These potential partners are unlikely to share
fully the democratic values that have been at the core of transatlantic cooperation, but that will be less important if these partnership arrangements are temporary and aimed at specific issues. Over time, the U.S. reflex of turning first to Europe

when seeking cooperation may fade.

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Turkey Neg 149 /341

Suiter Pre-season

‡‡‡ Iraq Adv. ‡‡‡

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Turkey Neg 150 /341

Suiter Pre-season

A2: Iraq Stability: A2withdrawal now
No Iraqi withdrawal, multiple obstructions present Wood 7, (Withdrawal of Troops, Supplies Could Take at Least 20 Months, Officials Say, Baltimore Sun.
http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/239/37845.html) WDK

But others doubt that all will go smoothly. A new report by the Government Accountability Office, the analysis agency of Congress, found severe problems in the U.S. Central Command logistics system, which will handle the withdrawal. The GAO found fragmented lines of authority, a shortage of skilled logisticians, and computer systems that can't connect with each other.

Even if US begins withdrawals, delays are inevitable Chulov 10, (Martin, The Guardian, Published on Wednesday, May 12, 2010 by The Guardian/UK

http://www.commondreams.org/headline/2010/05/12-3) WDK The United States is likely to delay the withdrawal of the first large phase of combat troops from Iraq for at least a month after escalating bloodshed and political instability in the country. The US Commanding General Ray Odierno had been due to give the order within 60 days of the general election held in Iraq on 7 March, when the cross-sectarian candidate Ayad Allawi edged out the incumbent leader, Nouri alMaliki. US officials had been prepared for delays in negotiations to form a new government, but now appear to have balked after Maliki's coalition aligned itself with the theocratic Shia bloc to the exclusion of Allawi, who attracted the bulk of the minority Sunni vote. There is also concern over interference from Iraq's neighbours, Iran, Turkey and Syria.

Withdrawal won’t do much, at best 50,000 troops will remain as peace-keepers Friedman 10, (George, Chairman, co-founder, intelligence officer at Strategic Forecasting Inc. (StratFor), The
U.S. Withdrawal From Iraq March 5, 2010 | 2147 GMT http://web.stratfo r.com/images/write rs/IRAQ_WITHDRAWAL.pdf?fn=2815454939) WDK That said, the United States is not leaving Iraq completely. Some 50,000 non-combat troops will still be there in late 2010 even under the most optimistic scenarios, and future agreements could keep an American military presence in the country long after the current Status of Forces Agreement requires they be withdrawn.

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Turkey Neg 151 /341

Suiter Pre-season

A2: Iraq Stability: Kuwait Solves
The majority of supplies will be shipped via Jordan/Kuwait, NOT Turkey Carter 9, (Chelsea J, Associated Press, 8/31/2009 12:43 PM, U.S. ramps up withdrawal from Iraq, Republished
with Permission by: USA Today, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2009-08-30-withdrawal_N.htm) WDK The military has identified more than 1.5 million pieces of equipment, from tanks to antennas, that need to be shipped out of Iraq, Brown said. Under the plan, much of that equipment would go by ground to Kuwait, 330 miles south of Baghdad, and to Jordan's Aqaba port, more than 500 miles southwest of Baghdad, where it would either be shipped back to the states or sent to troops in Afghanistan, Brown said. Some will likely go through Turkey as well.

151

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Turkey Neg 152 /341

Suiter Pre-season

‡‡‡ Terrorism Adv. ‡‡‡

152

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Turkey Neg 153 /341

Suiter Pre-season

1NC Terrorism Frontline (1 / 3)
1. Nuclear Terrorism is non-Unique
Steve Chapman, member of the Chicago Tribune editorial board since 1981, 2/8/08 “The Implausibility of Nuclear Terrorism,” http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2008/02/the_implausibility_of_nuclear.html, accessed 7/2/10

Why are we worried? Bomb designs can be found on the Internet. Fissile material may be smuggled out of Russia. Iran, a longtime sponsor of terrorist groups, is trying to acquire nuclear weapons. A layperson may figure it's only a matter of time before the unimaginable comes to pass. Harvard's Graham Allison, in his book "Nuclear Terrorism," concludes, "On the current course, nuclear terrorism is inevitable." But remember: After Sept. 11, 2001, we all thought more attacks were a certainty. Yet al-Qaida and its ideological kin have proved unable to mount a second strike. Given their inability to do something simple -- say, shoot up a shopping mall or set off a truck bomb -- it's reasonable to ask if they have a chance at something much more ambitious. Far from being plausible, argued Ohio State University professor John Mueller in a recent presentation at the University of Chicago, "the likelihood that a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems to be vanishingly small." 2. Nuclear Weapons are safe from terrorists
John Mueller, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, April 30, 2009, “The Atomic Terrorist?” International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, http://www.icnnd.org/latest/research/Mueller_Terrorism.pdf accessed 7/2/10 There has also been great worry about “loose nukes,” especially in post-Communist Russia—weapons, “suitcase bombs” in particular, that can be stolen or bought illicitly. However, both Russian nuclear officials and experts on the Russian nuclear programs have adamantly denied that al-Qaeda or any other terrorist group could have bought such weapons. They further point out that the bombs, all built before 1991,are difficult to maintain and have a lifespan of one to three years, after which they become “radioactive scrap metal.” Similarly, a careful assessment conducted by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies has concluded that it is unlikely that any of these devices have actually been lost and that, regardless, their effectiveness would be very low or even non-existent because they (like all nuclear weapons) require continual maintenance. Even some of those most alarmed by the prospect of atomic terrorism have concluded that “It is probably true that there are no ‘loose nukes’, transportable nuclear weapons missing from their proper storage locations and available for purchase in some way.”10 It might be added that Russia has an intense interest in controlling any weapons on its territory since it is likely to be a prime target of any illicit use by terrorist groups, particularly Chechen ones of course, with whom it has been waging a vicious on-and-off war for well over a decade. The government of Pakistan, which has been repeatedly threatened by terrorists, has a similar very strong interest in controlling its nuclear weapons and material—and scientists. Notes Stephen Younger, former head of nuclear weapons research and development at Los Alamos National Laboratory , “regardless of

what is reported in the news, all nuclear nations take the security of their weapons very seriously.” Even if a finished bomb were somehow lifted somewhere, the loss would soon be noted and a worldwide pursuit launched. And most bombs that could conceivably be stolen use plutonium which emits a great deal of radiation that could relatively easily be detected by sensors in the hands of pursuers.12 Moreover, as technology has developed, finished bombs have been outfitted with devices that will trigger a non-nuclear explosion that will destroy the bomb if it is tampered with . And there are other security techniques: bombs can be kept disassembled with the component parts stored in separate high security vaults, and things can be organized so that two people and multiple codes are required not only to use the bomb, but to store, to maintain, and to deploy it.

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1NC Terrorism Frontline (2 / 3)
Card Continues—No Text Removed

If the terrorists seek to enlist(or force) the services of someone who already knows how to set off the bomb, they would find, as Younger stresses, that “only few people in the world have the knowledge to cause an unauthorized detonation of a nuclear weapon.” Weapons designers know how a weapon works, he explains, but not the multiple types of signals necessary to set it off, and maintenance personnel are trained only in a limited set of functions.13There could be dangers in the chaos that would emerge if a nuclear state were utterly to fail, collapsing in full disarray—Pakistan is frequently brought up in this context and sometimes North Korea as well. However, even under those conditions, nuclear weapons would likely remain under heavy guard by people who know that a purloined bomb would most likely end up going off in their own territory, would still have locks (and, in the case of Pakistan would be disassembled), and could probably be followed, located, and hunted down by an alarmed international community. The worst case scenario in this instance requires not only a failed state, but a considerable series of additional permissive conditions including consistent (and perfect) insider complicity and a sequence of hasty, opportunistic decisions or developments that click flawlessly in a manner far more familiar to Hollywood script writers than to people experienced with reality. 3. SQ solves-Turkey government has begun to take anti-terrorist measures
Ankara 6/25 (ERCAN YAVUZ ANKARA “Turkey walks fine line in fight against terror, stakes high” Today’s Zaman http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-214158-turkey-walks-fine-line-in-fight-against-terror-stakeshigh.html)

The National Security Council (MGK), bringing together the president, the prime minister and some members of the Cabinet with top military brass, convened yesterday to talk about new measures to take against the increase in terrorist attacks of the outlawed PKK. The meeting started in the afternoon under the
chairmanship of President Abdullah Gül at the War Academies Command in İstanbul. The outcome of the meeting has not yet been made public officially, but the generals and the government were expected to talk

about a number of possible measures including assigning special roles to police special operations teams in the fight against terrorism and perhaps a change in Turkey's southeastern border with Iraq to allow better control of the areas infested by the PKK. Chief of General Staff Gen. İlker Başbuğ, force
commanders and Gül arrived at the War Academies Command yesterday hours before the start of the MGK meeting to attend a conference to be delivered by Gül. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan also started his preparations early, arriving at the Prime Ministerial Office inside Dolmbahçe Palace in İstanbul with those ministers who are members of the MGK. State Ministers and Deputy Prime Ministers Bülent Arınç, Cemil Çiçek and Ali Babacan, Interior Minister Beşir Atalay, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, Justice Minister Sadullah Ergin, Defense Minister Vecdi Gönül and Public Order and Safety Undersecretary Muammer Güler met with the prime minister here. Turkey may suggest changes to the country's existing borders with Iraq in order to

more effectively fight terrorists hiding out in the mountains that line the border. Government officials and top commanders brought up the possibility in a key security and anti-terrorism meeting yesterday

As they talked, Gül was giving a conference at the War Academy. During his speech, Gül said terrorism is Turkey's foremost issue. “There have been deep-rooted changes in our country, from politics and the economy to commerce and the system of law. The real target of this transformation is to keep up with the times, not lag behind the necessities of the age,” he said.

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1NC Terrorism Frontline (3 / 3)
4. Terrorists wouldn’t be able to acquire, develop, and deliver the nuclear weapon Steve Chapman, member of the Chicago Tribune editorial board since 1981, 2/8/08 “The Implausibility of
Nuclear Terrorism,” http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2008/02/the_implausibility_of_nuclear.html, accessed 7/2/10
The events

required to make that happen comprise a multitude of Herculean tasks. First, a terrorist group has to get a bomb or fissile material, perhaps from Russia's inventory of decommissioned warheads. If that were easy, one would have already gone missing. Besides, those devices are probably no longer a danger, since weapons that are not scrupulously maintained (as those have not been) quickly become what one expert calls "radioactive scrap metal." If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other safeguards designed to prevent unauthorized use . As for Iran, no nuclear state has ever given a bomb to an ally -- for reasons even the Iranians can grasp. Stealing some 100 pounds of bomb fuel would require help from rogue individuals inside some government who are prepared to jeopardize their own lives. The terrorists, notes Mueller, would then have to spirit it "hundreds of miles out of the country over unfamiliar terrain, and probably while being pursued by security forces." Then comes the task of building a bomb. It's not something you can gin up with spare parts and power tools in your garage. It requires millions of dollars, a safe haven and advanced equipment -- plus people with specialized skills, lots of time and a willingness to die for the cause. And if al-Qaida could make a prototype, another obstacle would emerge: There is no guarantee it would work, and there is no way to test it. Assuming the jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil. Sure, drug smugglers bring in contraband all the time -- but seeking their help would confront the plotters with possible exposure or extortion. This, like every other step in the entire process, means expanding the circle of people who know what's going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up. Mueller recalls that after the Irish Republican Army failed in an attempt to blow up British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, it said, "We only have to be lucky once. You will have to be lucky always." Al-Qaida, he says, faces a very different challenge: For it to carry out a nuclear attack, everything has to go right. For us to escape, only one thing has to go wrong. That has heartening implications. If Osama bin Laden embarks on the project, he has only a minuscule chance of seeing it bear fruit. Given the formidable odds, he probably won't bother. None of this means we should stop trying to minimize the risk by securing nuclear stockpiles, monitoring terrorist communications and improving port screening. But it offers good reason to think that in this war, it appears, the worst eventuality is one that will never happen. 5. Terrorists could just as easily steal from Italy, Aff evidence not specific Claudine Lamond, Research Intern at British American Security Information Council, 2009
http://www.basicint.org/gtz/gtz11.htm

Italy hosts two nuclear bases. With the shift of attention to southern and eastern Europe, Italy features in NATO plans for expansion. The United States may wish to close a base in Germany and move four infantry battalions to Vicenza, making it Europe's largest US base, and include a possible increase of TNWs stationed in Italy. Public discontent with these proposals was vividly shown in 2007 when there was a demonstration of over 100,000 people against the
Vicenza military base and the proposed expansion.[14] The presence of nuclear weapons on Italian soil at another US base, Aviano, is also deeply unpopular. As a consequence, the Italian Berlosconi Government has voiced its own hesitation over nuclear sharing.[15] Italy has capable Joint Strike Fighter, but under budgetary pressures, the government announced its decision to op-out from the JSF program in October 2008. It is unclear whether the Typhoon will be modified to carry B-61s.

taken delivery of 121 dual-capable Typhoon aircraft since early 2006.[16] It was also planning to purchase the dual-

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2NC Ext – Non-U
1nc 1: Terroists cant attack-They would have attacked by now or even tried to if they can actually steal a bomb 1) Terrorists wont attack
John Mueller, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, April 30, 2009, “The Atomic Terrorist?” International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, http://www.icnnd.org/latest/research/Mueller_Terrorism.pdf accessed 7/2/10 Alarm about the possibility that small groups could set off nuclear weapons have been repeatedly raised at least since 1946 when atomic bomb maker J. Robert Oppenheimer contended that if three or four men could smuggle in units for an atomic bomb, they could “destroy New York.” Thirty years later, nuclear physicist Theodore Taylor proclaimed the problem to be “immediate,” and explained at length “how comparatively easy it would be to steal nuclear material and step by step make it into a bomb.” At the time he thought it variously already too late to “prevent the making of a few bombs, here and there, now and then,” or “in another ten or fifteen years, it will be too late.”3 Three decades after Taylor, we continue to

wait for terrorists to carry out their “easy” task. In the wake of 9/11, concerns about the atomic terrorist surged even though the attacks of that day used no special weapons. By 2003, UN Ambassador John Negroponte judged there to be a “a high probability” that within two years al-Qaeda would attempt an attack using a nuclear or other weapon of mass destruction. And it is in this spirit that Graham Allison in 2004 produced a thoughtful, influential, and well-argued book, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, relaying his “considered judgment” that “on the current path, a nuclear terrorist attack on America in the decade ahead is more likely than not.” He had presumably relied on the same inspirational mechanism in 1995 to predict that “In the absence of a determined program of action, we have every reason to anticipate acts of nuclear terrorism against American targets before this decade is out.”4 He has quite a bit of company in his perpetually alarming conclusions. However, thus far terrorist groups seem to have exhibited only limited desire and even less progress in going atomic. This may be because, after brief exploration of the possible routes, they, unlike generations of alarmists, have discovered that the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to be successful.

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2NC Ext 3-Turkey solves terrorism
1NC 3: National Security Council brought together all key Turkey leaders to address recent threats of terrorist attacks and have taken measures and assigned special operations to fight terrorist in their country-that’s our Ankara evidence Recent terrorist threats continue to fuel Turkey
Today’s Zaman 7/8( “Diplomacy top priority for government in fight against PKK” http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-215357-103-diplomacy-top-priority-for-government -in-fightagainst-pkk.html 7/10/2010)

As the death toll rises due to a recent increase in terrorist attacks on Turkish military targets by the terrorist Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), with about 50 soldiers killed during the past month, Turkey has stepped up its military operations in both the east and southeast of the country, as well as in the north of Iraq, where the PKK is based. However, recent statements by state officials indicate

that the government would like to try a diplomatic solution first, particularly talks with northern Iraqi leaders. A total of 246 terrorists have been killed in the past 45 days, but it is not yet clear whether Turkey will be carrying out a full-scale military campaign into northern Iraq to eradicate PKK bases. Recent statements suggest that the government is likely to opt for a diplomatic route before taking any drastic military measures.

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2NC Ext 4- Terrorists can’t do it
1NC 4: Terrorists can’t get or set off a TNW, multiple warrants 1) If it was easy to steal a bomb it would have happened already 2) If not maintained then they “expire” and are useless 3) They would be easy to follow because of the radiation emitted from the bomb 4) They don’t have the technicians to operate it 5) THEY ONLY HAVE TO MESS UP ONCE, it would be more complex than a Hollywood movie heist

2) Terrorists can’t USE the nukes even if they get them
Scott Peterson, Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor, April 15, 2004 “Old weapons, new terror worries” http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0415/p06s02-woeu.html, accessed 7/2/10 Many Russian experts argue, though, that even if a terror group seized a nuclear weapon, they would not be able to use it. American and most Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles have various safeguards that can permanently disable a weapon if it is tampered with, or require an actual missile launch to arm the warhead. "We can't exclude terrorists seizing a missile, but that will be the end of this terrorist act, because they will not be capable of launching it - never," says Dvorkin, who also discounts chances of an inside job. "There is not a single worker next to a nuclear weapon who is capable of giving this information, because the codes are only known to the highest command."

3) no of inside job low; security solves
Scott Peterson, Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor, April 15, 2004 “Old weapons, new terror worries” http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0415/p06s02-woeu.html, accessed 7/2/10
Tentative first signs of such collusion are already raising red flags, though making the link hasn't been easy, says Matthew Bunn, a nuclear expert at Harvard's Project on Managing the Atom. "The connection between the guy in a position to

steal, and Al Qaeda, is a pretty difficult step," says Mr. Bunn. "It's not like you can walk in wearing a white turban waving a million dollars around, and expect to get anywhere." Last year, however, a Russian businessman was found to have offered $750,000 for weapons-grade plutonium, and contacted scientists at a key Russian institute, Bunn says. They deceived him by selling him a canister of mercury. The days of the "desperate insider" of the 1990s - when guards at nuclear sites left their posts to forage for food, or electricity to alarms and weapons systems was cut because bills had gone unpaid - are now giving way to the "greedy insider," Bunn adds.

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2NC Ext 5 – Terrorist could get TNWs from Italy
1nc 4: TNWs in Italy are being increase 1) The aff’s Kibaroğlu evidence is not specific to turkey, it merely uses turkey as an example, but is talking about all TNW holding countries. Italy is right around the corner from turkey, and will soon hold significantly more TNWs than it. There is no reason that the terrorists wont steal from Italy where they have a better chance. 2) The aff’s Tümer evidence is not talking about terrorist trying to attack the specific base in turkey. It implies that IRAN might send a MISSLE to hit the base, not that the PKK will try and steal a TNW. There is no reason that pulling out of turkey would help, only increase the chance of terrorism in Italy where we CANT get involved.

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No Risk of Nuclear Terrorism
No risk of terrorism: nuclear weapons secure Knops 10 (Raymond, Netherlands representative, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 048 DSCFC 10 E - U.S.

NON-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE: A FUNDAMENTAL NATO DEBATE, http://www.natopa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=2083) Recent incidents have also raised questions regarding the safety and security of U.S. nuclear weapons installations in Europe and whether the potential for theft, diversion or other loss of control exists. Indeed, a 2008 high level U.S. Air Force panel determined that most sites used for deploying nuclear weapons in Europe did not meet the Department of Defense’s security requirements.(26) The problems cited at the bases included inadequate fencing and security systems, staffing shortages, and inadequately trained security personnel.(27) Despite these reports, NATO believes that “there is no question that nuclear weapons deployed in Europe are safe and secure,” according to Guy Roberts, NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary-General for Weapons of Mass Destruction Policy and Director for Nuclear Policy. Roberts told Arms Control Today in August 2008 that the above-cited U.S. Air Force report contained no new concerns that NATO was not aware of, and that NATO was implementing “a number of enhancements” in response to its internal oversight procedures.

Nuclear Weapons are secure Kristensen 05 (Hans, Natural Resources Defense Council, U.S. Nuclear
Weapons in Europe, http://www.nukestrat.com/pubs/EuroBombs.pdf)
Schlesinger’s views were partially influenced, according to one recent account, by the outbreak of war in July 1974 between two nuclear-equipped NATO countries, Turkey and Greece. Schlesinger wanted to know if the U.S. nuclear weapons were secure and asked his director of telecommunications and command and control systems, Thomas C. Reed, if he could talk to the U.S. officers holding the keys to the weapons. Reed reported back that the U.S. custodians were in charge, but at one Air Force base “things got a little dicier.” “The local Army troops outside the fence wanted in. Their Air Force countrymen inside wanted them kept out. The nukes on alert aircraft were hastily returned to bunkers as the opposing commanders parleyed under a white flag. Soon both sides went off to dinner, but through it all we held out breath.” 39 Fears about the physical security of the

weapons had been raised during the military coup d’état in Greece in 1967, where “political tension in the vicinity of some of our nuclear storage facilities” had caused concern in Washington. 40 As a result of the Turkish-Greek war, the United States removed its nuclear bombs from Greek and Turkish alert

fighterbombers and transferred the nuclear warheads from Greek Nike Hercules missile units (see Figure 9) in the field to storage. Greece saw this as another pro-Turkish move by NATO and responded by withdrawing its forces from NATO’s military command structure. This forced Washington to contemplate whether to remove its nuclear weapons from Greece altogether, but in the end the Ford administration decided against it after the State Department warned that removal would further alienate the Greek government from NATO. 41 U.S. Nothing was said about this nuclear dilemma in the final communiqué from NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) that met in December 1974. The group remarked it had “discussed the recent legislation in the United States calling for an examination of the doctrine for the tactical use of nuclear weapons and of NATO's nuclear posture….” 42 Other than that, the public was kept in the dark. The Turkish and Greek episode and the discoveries at Pacific Command led to

immediate improvements in the command and control of the forward-deployed nuclear weapons. A wave of terrorist attacks in Europe at the time added to the concerns. By the end of 1976, all U.S. tactical nuclear weapons were equipped with Permission Action Links (PALs). The June 1975 NPG meeting made a vague reference to this by stating that, “actions [were taken] to enhance the security of nuclear weapons stored in NATO Europe.” 43

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A2: Terrorism: U.S. Intel fails
U.S. intel is useless to Turks fighting PKK. Turkey can now provide its own intel. Yuvuz 10 (Ercan, journalist, “U.S intelligence-sharing against terror not ‘real-time’, evidence shows” Today’s
Zaman, http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-213347-us-intelligence-sharing-against-terror-notreally-real-time-evidence-shows.html) MKB The real-time intelligence-sharing agreement reached between Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and former US President George W. Bush on Nov. 5, 2007, which was supposed to aid the Turkish military in air and land strikes on Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) terrorist camps in northern Iraq have turned out to be neither “real-time” nor “effective .” MHP Adana deputy Kürşat Atılgan, a longtime major general in the Turkish Air Forces, said the real-time nature of the intelligence is overly exaggerated. It is believed that real-time intelligence is provided immediately. This is not how it works. The US does not provide raw footage, it submits filtered images,” Atılgan said. Nearly

260 PKK members have reportedly been killed during air strikes thanks to the US’ real-time intelligence sharing. Political sources said intelligence-sharing, which previously could only be provided with a 24-hour lag, is now being provided in 45 minutes due to negotiations between Turkish authorities and their American counterparts. However, 45 minutes is not enough for the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) to hit moving targets. Because of this, fighter planes and helicopters in Diyarbakır and Batman must stay ready all the time to effectively hit moving targets. Those air forces not on a constant state of high alert need

at least an hour to be ready to take off. Even if the location of moving targets is detected, at least two hours are required to be ready -- enough time for terrorists to escape and hide.
Atılgan, who served as a pilot in many similar operations in the past, notes that the intelligence provided to Turkey by the US does not allow the military to hit moving targets. “Real-time intelligence is significant. But American intelligence-sharing is not enough. The fact that American intelligence is not enough was revealed in the Aktütün attack in

2008. The biggest problem is that the US does not provide the raw images that its intelligence planes record. The images are transmitted to General Staff headquarters with a 45-minute delay and then
transferred to Diyarbakır or Batman to scramble the air force against the terrorists. It takes two or sometimes three-and-a-half hours for the air forces to take off and attack targets. This in turn makes it easier for moving terrorists to escape and hide,” the former pilot said. Turkey has fought the terrorist PKK since it was formed in 1984 with the goal of establishing an autonomous Kurdish state in the eastern and southeastern parts of Turkey. More than 40,000 soldiers and civilians have been killed in the clashes thus far. The PKK has been declared a terrorist organization by the international community, including the US and the EU. The United States has shared intelligence with Turkey since 2007, and former Chief of General Staff retired Gen. Yaşar Büyükanıt once praised this intelligence sharing, saying that the intelligence on PKK movements and camps resembled the footage available of the reality TV show “Big Brother.” Büyükanıt’s remarks were met with criticism by all opposition parties, particularly former Republican People’s Party (CHP) leader Deniz Baykal. The aptness of this reaction was proved on Oct. 3, 2008, when

the Aktütün outpost on the Turkish-Iraq border was attacked by 350 PKK terrorists, leaving 17 soldiers dead. The Taraf daily published shocking evidence on Oct. 13 of that year that security flaws played a large role in the deaths of the 17 soldiers. Chief of General Staff Gen. İlker Başbuğ, surrounded by high-ranking

commanders during a press briefing, did not respond to questions raised by Taraf but lashed out at the media for publishing classified information, saying this was “an attack” on the military, on Oct. 28, 2008. He also said the military was taking legal action over the leak of reports on the attack of Oct. 3 on the Aktütün outpost. Although the probe was concluded, its findings have never been publicly announced. Today’s Zaman has learned from political sources that the TSK has organized operations against the terrorists without finding any, raising the eyebrows of Turkish intelligence agencies, too. It was revealed that images provided to Turkey were not live clips; rather, they were provided with a six-hour delay. In fact, a deal reached with the US on realtime intelligence sharing did not initially include providing live intelligence to Turkey. The images were originally submitted to Turkey with a 24-hour delay, which was then reduced to six hours. Turkish intelligence units understood that the intelligence was filtered before it was handed out to Turkish authorities subsequent to the Aktütün attack. To remedy this situation, Turkish officials restarted negotiations with the US to obtain intelligence images more quickly. As a result of closed-door talks, the US has started to provide intelligence with a 45-minute delay. After this change, images showing Turkish fighter planes hitting PKK camps in northern Iraq were unveiled by General Staff. Considering the weaknesses it perceives in intelligence shared by the US, the General Staff started preparations to obtain its own unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). It decided to purchase 10 Heron UAVs from Israel in 2007 but only one or two of them have been delivered to Turkey due to delays and a diplomatic crisis between Turkey and Israel. Despite issues with Turkey’s first Israel-made UAVs during trial flights in Batman, the TSK was for the first time able to get its own images of northern Iraq. As a result of this, Turkey detected intelligence weaknesses in the intelligence provided by the US.

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A2: Terrorism: Israel Fills In
U.S. intel is useless to Turks fighting PKK. Turkey can now provide its own intel. Yuvuz 10 (Ercan, journalist, “U.S intelligence-sharing against terror not ‘real-time’, evidence shows” Today’s
Zaman, http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-213347-us-intelligence-sharing-against-terror-notreally-real-time-evidence-shows.html) MKB Considering the weaknesses it perceives in intelligence shared by the US, the General Staff started preparations to obtain its own unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). It decided to purchase 10 Heron UAVs from Israel in 2007 but only one or two of them have been delivered to Turkey due to delays and a diplomatic crisis between Turkey and Israel. Despite issues with Turkey’s first Israelmade UAVs during trial flights in Batman, the TSK was for the first time able to get its own images of northern Iraq. As a result of this, Turkey detected intelligence weaknesses in the intelligence provided by the US. Some rumors said that the biggest problem with the Herons was that some hackers affiliated with the PKK had reportedly acquired the Heron software programs. In security operations in 13 cities and provinces including İstanbul and Diyarbakır, 13 PKK members were arrested for allegedly working on a program that would make the Herons crash. Turkish security forces are figuring out where these hackers received their computing education -- there are rumors that some of them were educated in Greece and in Israel but they have yet to be confirmed. These reports also damaged the trust of the TSK in the Herons. The crash of even one Heron during operations is a cause of concern for the military.

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A2: Terrorism: Troops Key to Stabilize
The US cannot afford an upset of the balance in Turkey, troops or otherwise Giachetti 8, (David M. UNITED STATES MILITARY RELATIONS WITH TURKEY, A Research Report

Submitted to the Faculty In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements 15 February 2008, https://www.afresearch.org/skins/rims/display.aspx?rs=enginespage&ModuleID=be0e99f3-fc56-4ccb-8dfe670c0822a153&Action=downloadpaper&ObjectID=9692bb4e-a132-48c0-b7b3-03ea195ec95c) WDK
As stated at the outset, the issues that link the U.S. and Turkey in the current environment cannot be dealt with in isolation but there are many issues of mutual interest that the U.S. and Turkey can concentrate on to solidify the relationship. The most important in the current context is cooperation on the way ahead for engagement with the PKK and northern Iraq. Turkey sees the battle against the PKK as a sine qua non of U.S.-Turkish cooperation in Iraq. A stabilized northern Iraq is in the national interest of Turkey

and the U.S. in terms of border security and stopping the incursions of the PKK and the overall stabilization of Iraq. Currently the most stable region in Iraq, the U.S. cannot afford for this delicate balance to be upset.

Turkey will counterbalance Iran Tait 10. Robert, the Guardian's correspondent for Tehran. Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty. June 21, 2010.

http://www.rferl.org/content/Iran_and_Turkey_Friends_Today_Rivals_Tomorrow/2078363.html (LRH) Far from being the gateway to a long-standing alliance, Turkey's new engagement with the Middle East and vocal support for the Palestinians could trigger Iranian suspicions and eventually restore the formerly competitive relationship between the two countries. Meir Javedanfar, an Iranian-born analyst with the MEEPAS think tank in Israel, believes Turkey's new Middle East-centered foreign policy -- which includes rapprochement with Iran's close ally, Syria -- is a threat to Tehran's desire to be the Islamic world's dominant power. "Both countries are rivals for the same title, which is leader of the Islamic world," Javedanfar says. "And the Iranians have a set of economic and political advantages to offer any country who wants to side with them, and the Turks have another set of advantages which are far more than the Iranian ones.

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‡‡‡ Relations Adv. ‡‡‡

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A2: US/Turkey Relations: High
US/Turkey Relations have been warming since Bush Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs March 10 (http://www.state.gov

/r/pa/ei/bgn/3432.htm U.S. Department of State Diplomacy in Action.) WDK Turkish relations focus on areas such as strategic energy cooperation, trade and investment, security ties, regional stability, counterterrorism, and human rights progress. Relations were strained when Turkey refused in March 2003 to allow U.S. troops to deploy through its territory to Iraq in Operation Iraqi Freedom, but regained momentum steadily thereafter and mutual interests remain strong across a wide spectrum of issues. On July 5, 2006, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul signed a Shared Vision Statement to highlight the common values and goals between our two countries and to lay out a framework for increased strategic dialogue. President George W. Bush welcomed Prime Minister Erdogan to Washington for a White House visit on November 5, 2007, during which he committed to provide greater assistance to Turkey in its fight against terrorism from the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK or Kongra Gel), which he characterized as a "common enemy" of Turkey, Iraq, and the United States. He reiterated this commitment during President Gul's January 8, 2008, White House visit. Turkey allows the use of Incirlik Air Base for the transport of non-lethal cargo in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Turkey is lever against Russia The Library of Congress Country Studies; CIA World Factbook 95
(http://www.photius.com/countries/turkey/national_security/turkey_national_security_military_cooperation~ 2468.html republished from Library of Congress, with permission) Kind of a shitty card in terms of dates, still useful. WDK During the postwar era, Turkey's foremost ally has been the United States. Because of Turkey's strategic location in the Middle East, its proximity to the Soviet Union's military installations and test sites, and its control of the Black Sea straits, military ties with the United States were a crucial factor in the East-West confrontation. The alliance originated soon after the end of World War II, when Soviet dictator Josef V. Stalin

made a series of demands on Turkey that the Turkish government and the Western powers interpreted as a possible prelude to military action. The begrudging withdrawal of Soviet occupation forces from northern Iran in May 1946 and communist guerrilla warfare in Greece heightened fears of a Soviet drive into the Middle East. The United States responded with proclamation of the Truman Doctrine in March 1947. Both Greece and Turkey were provided with aid to resist the Soviet threat. Because of

concerns over extending a United States military commitment to the Middle East, the United States initially was not convinced that Turkey's admission to NATO should be approved. Turkish troops' noteworthy participation in the Korean War changed this view; Turkey entered NATO in 1952. In accordance with bilateral defense arrangements under NATO auspices, the United States has developed and maintained several major military installations on Turkish bases. Of particular significance are several electronic intelligence posts considered vital for monitoring Russian weapons and Moscow's compliance with strategic arms limitation agreements. A long-range radar system has been established at Pirin�lik,
near Diyarbakir, to monitor Russian missile testing. At Belbasi, near Ankara, nuclear testing can be monitored by means of seismic data collection.

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A2: US/Turkey Relations: High
Relations are resilient—even if there is a crisis it would never lead to a break Schleifer 6/28/10 (Yigal, US-Turkish Relations Appear Headed for Rough Patch,

http://www.eurasianet.org/node/61426 )AC Analysts are warning that relations between Turkey and the United States may be heading for a period of volatility, particularly in the wake of the botched May 31 Israeli commando raid on a Gaza aid flotilla, along with Ankara’s recent decision to vote “no” in the United Nations Security Council on sanctions against Iran. “There is a ceiling above which Turkish-American relations cannot improve, and there’s a floor which it can’t go below. But we are getting pretty close to the floor and the ability of the two countries to improve their relations really has a huge question mark over it. We are now talking about an undeclared crisis in the relations,” said

Bulent Aliriza, director of the Turkey Project at Washington’s Center for Strategic and International Studies. Indeed, in a recent interview with The Associated Press, Philip Gordon, the State Department’s top official for European and

Eurasian affairs seemed to echo that assessment. Gordon suggested that Turkey needed to take demonstrable action to affirm its commitment to both the United States and the Atlantic Alliance. Ankara, in recent years, has been plotting an increasingly independent and ambitious foreign policy course, one that sees an increased role for itself in regional and even global affairs. But observers say Turkey’s role in the Gaza flotilla incident and its subsequent harsh rhetoric against Israel, as well as its decision regarding the Iran sanctions vote, have brought into sharper relief some of the differences between Ankara’s and Washington’s approach on some key issues. [For background see EurasiaNet’s archive]. “I think the administration realizes it has a problem with Turkey, but it’s not a major rift. It’s subtler than that. I think what they will do is start looking at Turkey at a more transactional level
for a while, meaning ‘What are you doing for me?’ and ‘This is what I can do for you,’” said Henri Barkey, a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington. “In the past we would have jumped through hoops for the Turks, but the Turks need to start being more sensitive to our concerns,” Barkey added.

Turkey and the us are currently resolving their diplomatic issues Anatolia News 10 (Turkish premier, Obama discuss PKK, Iran, Turkish-Israeli ties, June 27, Lexisnexis) AC
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on Saturday [26 June] met with US President Barack Obama in Toronto, Canada where they attended the G20 summit. Erdogan and Obama discussed a wide range of issues from Turkish-US cooperation against PKK to Iran's nuclear programme and relations between Israel and Turkey, diplomats said. On cooperation against the terrorist
Toronto, 27 June: organization PKK, leaders focused on benefits of tripartite mechanism of Turkey, United States and Iraq and they underscored the need to continue the mechanism. Turkey voiced its expectations from the United States and US

officials pledged to continue to support Turkey against PKK. On relations between Turkey and Israel, Obama said United States was uneasy about what happened recently between Turkey and Israel which he described as two ally countries. Turkish-Israeli relations strained after a 31 May Israeli raid on a flotilla carrying humanitarian aid to Gaza which killed eight Turks and an American of Turkish origin. Obama said United States would continue to contribute to efforts for a solution to problem between the two countries , diplomats said. Turkey reiterated its demands that Israel apologize, pay damages and lift blockade on Gaza. Erdogan also thanked for US
help in bringing back Turkish citizens after ships were seized by Israel. Iran's nuclear programme was also on the agenda of the meeting of Erdogan and Obama, , diplomats said, adding that the two sides discussed the issue in detail and explained their positions on it. Source: Anatolia news agency, Ankara, in English 0659 gmt 27 Jun 10

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Turkey Neg 167 /341

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A2: US/Turkey Relations: High
Turkey’s vote in the UN Security Council didn’t create a relations crisis. Anatolia News 10 (Deputy premier says Turkey's Iran vote at UN not to affect relations with USA, June 11,
Lexisnexis)AC
Ankara, 11 June: Turkish

State Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arinc said on Friday [11 June] that Turkey's stance in the United Nations was a consequence of Turkey's principles and its decisive and honest position pursued in foreign policy. "Those who think that Turkey's previous stance (during voting in UN regarding sanction on Iran) was very pursuant and salutary should not be astonished about Turkey's negative vote. This is a result of principled position and definitely Turkish-US relations will not be affected," Arinc said speaking at his meeting with Hasan Bozer, parliament Speaker of the [selfdeclared] Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Asked to comment on the criticisms whether Turkey was reconsidering its place in the region and if an axis shift was in question, Arinc underlined that this was certainly not an axis shift.

"Negative votes of Turkey and Brazil in UN were not considered as extraordinary. Earlier, they thanked Turkey over the swap deal. They said Turkey made steps that may resolve the crisis. However, later this was not accepted by atomic energy in Austria and UN Security Council made decision to impose sanction on Iran with the insistence of the United States," Arinc said. Referring to the views that had been stated after rejection of a
motion in the Turkish parliament, pertaining to dispatch US ships, planes and troops via Turkey to open a front in Iraq, that the United States would refuse Turkey, would not answer its phones, value of the US dollar would rise and that Turkey would be isolated, Arinc said, "However, common sense prevailed after the crisis and relations between Turkey and

the United States were settled on better ground. I believe that neither the United States nor the other countries would wish disruption of relations with Turkey against such an issue." Arinc said Turkey was trying to keep away from the elements which threaten both the regional and the world peace and make its statements honestly and in a determined way. "The UN Security Council made a decision with 12 votes in favour but at the same time it is the right of other countries to oppose this decision. This is not an axis shift definitely. Turkey is in a multilateral foreign policy but on the one side it is careful for balances in Asia and on the other side sees African fact. Turkey also assesses well the crisis points in the Middle East. I believe that Turkey's negative vote in the UN Security Council is an indication of Turkey's decisive and honest stance and will yield positive results for Turkey and the world peace. Furthermore, whoever addressed the Security Council he eulogized Turkey's efforts and
stated that swap deal made with Iran should also be on the table. Turkey had to give negative vote, not abstained, to display its decision because only an honest country could do this." Source: Anatolia news agency, Ankara, in English 1040 gmt 11 Jun 10

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Turkey Neg 168 /341

Suiter Pre-season

A2: US/Turkey Relations—SQ Sanctions Solve
Signs of success are already showing. Benhorin 10 (Yitzhak, journalist, “U.S.: Sanctions having an effect” YNET, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3909180,00.html) MKB
WASHINGTON – First signs of success: The

latest sanctions against Iran have been slammed for not being firm enough, yet US officials are saying that the punitive steps are already having an effect. The latest round of UN sanctions prompted several private sector companies to cut their ties with the Ayatollah regime, US Undersecretary of Treasury Stuart Levey said Tuesday "The impact of these actions on Iran has been significant and is deepening as a result of Iran's own conduct," he said. Levey, who is the architect of the financial boycott against Iran in the Treasury, told Senate's Foreign Affairs Committee that private sector companies are joining banks in ending their ties with Iran. Virtually all major financial institutions have either completely cut off or dramatically reduced their ties with Iran," he said. "We are now starting to see companies across a range of sectors, including insurance, consulting, energy, and manufacturing make similar decisions," Levey said, adding that ties with Iran are increasingly feared because of the "reputational risk" inherent in such contacts.

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Turkey Neg 169 /341

Suiter Pre-season

A2: US/Turkey Relations—SQ Sanctions Solve
Sanctions cut off Iran’s ability to get the bomb for many years. Lopez 10 (George, chair at Kroc institute for international peace studies, “On the Issues: Iran Sanctions” United
States Institute for Peace, http://www.usip.org/resources/the-issues-iran-sanctions) MKB The new U.N. resolution captures the important policy subtlety that sanctions must pressure for compliance, not punish for capitulation. It provides an effective balance between a sanctions bite that hurts and a style of imposition that rejects isolating Iran. Instead, these targeted sanctions rightly aim to refocus Tehran on internationally accepted standards of atomic energy development and use. The resolution’s first strength is that it undermines real assets and capabilities that Iran might use for weapons production. The document astutely mixes compulsory and voluntary measures targeted at the diverse economic sectors that bolster Iranian uranium enrichment and missile development. These measures will complicate further progress in both areas, and may extend significantly the time that Iran would need to develop an actual weapon. This resolution also underscores why and how sanctions constitute the cornerstone, rather than the entire edifice, of a nuclear rollback policy. The past successful cases of Ukraine, South Africa and Libya illustrate that an astute application of narrowly targeted sanctions are the critical first step of a larger policy process, the second

element of which is engaged negotiation between imposers of sanctions and their targets. Rather unique in this week’s sanctions resolution is a section providing six full paragraphs expressly dealing with engagement. The resolution also includes as an annex the 2008 incentives package crafted primarily by the EU3 (France, Britain and Germany), which lays out a workable path for Iran to develop peaceful nuclear energy. The resolution’s conventional arms embargo may be the most extensive imposed on a nation not embroiled in civil war. The measures prohibit Iranian purchases of missiles, naval ships, tanks, artillery and armored vehicles, as well as an array of aircraft, most notably attack helicopters. In addition, the draft resolution puts real teeth into the

missile system restrictions that first appeared in earlier U.N. resolutions, while also prohibiting other states from supplying training, spare parts or other assistance for any of these arms.

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Suiter Pre-season

A2: US/Turkey Relations—SQ Sanctions Solve
Sanctions are highly effective. Cole 10 (Rocky, University of Georgia- International Affairs, “The case for sanctions against Iran” Roosevelt

Institute, http://www.rooseveltcampusnetwork.org/blog/case-sanctions-against-iran-some-simple-analytics) MKB

The research, inspired by President Obama's recent attempts to secure international support for tougher sanctions laws against Iran, seeks to determine if economic sanctions can stop states from acquiring nuclear weapons. After an exhaustive study that

included both rigorous quantitative and qualitative analysis of all instances of sanctions used for nonproliferation purposes, we reached the following conclusions. Security concerns within a target state--meaning a state that is the target of the sanctions--do not affect sanction outcomes. Since nuclear weapons often play an important role in state security, this is an incredible finding for nonproliferation purposes. Essentially, it means that arguments positing sanctions as ineffective because states are more concerned about deterring conventional or nuclear military threats than their economic health are simply not true. The total cost of the economic sanctions to the target is by far the most important variable in determining sanction outcomes. In all our models, this variable consistently remained statistically significant and important. Episodes of sanction busting--third-party

states taking advantage of sanctions by increasing trade volume with a sanctioned state--negatively affect sanction outcomes. This is an important finding, as it means that international cooperation is indeed important in determining sanction outcomes; however, the number of states participating in sanctions is not what matters. It's how strongly they uphold the sanctions laws. Now that we've developed this extremely accurate model, what will it say about Iran? Here are some simple analytics using findings from our research at UGA. Let's consider sanctions against Iran's oil supply. Iran is one of the world's leading exporters of crude, exporting roughly 2560 thousand bbl/day. Thirty eight

percent of Iran's GDP is trade; eighty percent of Iran's exports are crude; therefore, roughly sixteen percent of Iran's GDP is oil exports. Now, let's consider three scenarios in which states agree to reduce their consumption of Iranian oil by various amounts. In the first, only states that strongly support stronger sanctions on Iran (as determined by coding statements made by public officials) give up twenty five percent of their Iranian oil consumption. In the second, the top ten consumers of Iranian oil give up 25 percent of their consumption. In the third, only states that strongly support sanctions against Iran give up all of their consumption. When these calculations are finished, and if the price of a barrel of oil is pegged at $90 (the average for the last year), the different sanction scenarios would impact Iranian GDP by following amounts: %GDP- 3.66 Effectiveness Score- 41.02. % GDP 2.36 Effectiveness Score- 26.71- % GDP 1.66 Effectiveness Score- 18.99. Since sanction success scores only go to 16, it's pretty obvious that sanctions against Iran, if legislated and targeted correctly, could have a serious impact on Iran's strategic calculus.

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Suiter Pre-season

A2: US/Turkey Relations: Iran No Nukes
Iran lacks materials for nuclear weapons, and isn’t attempting to get them. Mikkelsen 9 (Randall, Journalist, “Iran lacks weapons-grade nuclear material” Reuters, http://in.reuters.com/article/idINWAT01111620090310) MKB
March 10 (Reuters) - Iran

lacks weapons-grade highly enriched uranium and has not yet made a decision on whether to produce any, U.S. intelligence officials told Congress on Tuesday. The officials -- Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair and Defense Intelligence Agency Director Lt. Gen. Michael Maples -- also said recent Iranian missile tests were not directly related to its nuclear activities. They said the two programs were believed to be on separate development tracks

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A2: US/Turkey Relations: Iran No Nukes
The probability of Iran getting the bomb is very low and the timeframe is very long. Cirincione et al 10 (Joseph, Pres of Ploughshares focused on nuclear weapons policy, “How Iran can build a bomb” Foreign Policy,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/07/01/how_iran_can_build_a_bomb?page=0,0) MKB In fact, it is much harder to build a deliverable weapon than most pundits assume. Panetta's leans toward the worst-case scenario, in which the weapons-building process proceeds

estimate perfectly smoothly. But the best expert assessments indicate that it would actually take Iran about three to five years to develop a nuclear bomb. Here's how that process would probably unfold -- and the reasons why it's not likely to happen in the timeline the doomsayers would have you believe. Step 1: The Decision Iran is certainly moving to acquire the
technology that would enable it to make a weapon. But, as a 2009 Joint Threat Assessment by the EastWest Institute concludes, "[I]t is not clear whether [Iran] has taken the decision to produce nuclear weapons. "The regime must weigh the political and security costs of developing nuclear weapons before moving ahead. And Iran might decide, like Japan, that its needs are best served by approaching the threshold of building a bomb (acquiring the technical capability and know-how) but not actually crossing the line and risking an arms race among its rivals or a pre-emptive attack from the United States or Israel. "Nobody knows if Iran has taken this decision," Sharon Squassoni, director of the Proliferation Prevention Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, told Agence France-Press on June 28. "It's more in their interest to have this ambiguity." Step Two: The Right Stuff Should Iran decide to proceed, it

must accumulate a sufficient quantity of the indispensable component for the core of the bomb -- highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium. Iran is pursuing production paths for both, though its uranium enrichment
capabilities are years ahead of its plutonium reprocessing plans. There are two ways for Iran to produce HEU, uranium that includes 90 percent of the isotope U-235. Using its centrifuges at the Natanz facility, it could take natural uranium, composed of 0.07 percent U-235, and steadily enrich it to weapons-grade material. This would be a flagrant violation of its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). If Iran chose this route, it would have to withdraw from the treaty and kick out international inspectors. Running full tilt at Natanz, it then would take Iran about one year to enrich enough uranium for one bomb. More likely, Iran could continue its current path of increasing its stockpile of low-enriched uranium (3 percent U-235), which it claims is for peaceful purposes. At some point, Iran could then leave the NPT, kick out the inspectors, and pump the uranium back through the centrifuges to enrich it to higher levels. The Joint Threat Assessment estimates this path could produce one bomb's worth of HEU within three to six months. Panetta seemed to say that, using this method, Iran could have enough HEU to construct two bombs in one year. Still, recent technological difficulties could prolong the process: In February, the Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security reported that the number of working Iranian centrifuges, the machines that enrich uranium, had decreased since mid-2009. Although Iran continues to install centrifuges, it operates nearly 1,000 fewer centrifuges than it did in May 2009. Recently, Iran has enriched uranium to about 20 percent, purportedly as fuel for its research reactor. If Iran accumulated enough 20 percent-enriched uranium -- it had 11 kilograms at the end of May -- and used this as source material, it could produce weaponquality HEU even more quickly. In all cases, it would take Iran an additional six months to convert the HEU from its current gaseous form into metal for a bomb. Step 3: The Gadget The technical path to a bomb does not end with HEU. To produce a crude nuclear device would take an additional year, assuming Iran has a workable design and the components to build it . But the leap to a sophisticated nuclear warhead, one that could be used as a weapon, could take an additional two to five years. During this period, Iran would need to manufacture the nonnuclear components, test and refine them, and ultimately, conduct one or more nuclear explosive tests. Troubleshooting the nonnuclear components might go undetected, but global monitors would detect any nuclear test explosion, surely leading to increased pressure on Iran. Vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. James Cartwright, confirmed this timeline before the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 14. He said a "deliverable weapon that is usable tactically" would take "another two to three, potentially out to five years." Step 4: Honey, I Shrunk the Warhead Iran could make a very heavy crude nuclear device, deliverable by truck, approximately one year after it produced the HEU. But this heavier device, though useful as a weapon, would be too large to deliver on Iran's planes or missiles , which can't carry a weapon that weighs over 1,000 kilograms. A smaller, more sophisticated weapon is needed if Iran is to develop a credible nuclear deterrent -- and shrinking a nuclear warhead doesn't happen overnight. Retired U.S. Gen. Eugene Habiger says that "the

miniaturization of a nuclear warhead is probably the most significant challenge that any proliferant would have to face." Habiger noted: The first U.S. ICBM's [intercontinental ballistic missiles], the warheads on those ICBM's, were in the 4,000-5,000 kg range. That's the best we could come up with when we first started ... Only after six to eight years, of very intensive engineering development and aggressive testing, did we get down to 1,000 kg. Step 5: Deliverance Iran would also have to develop a re-entry vehicle for its weapon. A ballistic missile follows a parabolic

trajectory, shooting up through the atmosphere, traveling a short distance through outer space, and re-entering the atmosphere to strike its target. The warhead must be sturdy enough to survive the extreme conditions it encounters

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along this flight path,

Turkey Neg 173 /341

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and developing this technology is no small task. It is one thing to test a nuclear weapon in carefully controlled conditions. It is another to build a weapon that can withstand the fierce vibrations, G-forces, and high temperatures of launch and re-entry into the atmosphere. Iran has not demonstrated the capability to build such a re-entry vehicle thus far. Step 6: Range Matters Today, Iran's ballistic missiles can reach targets no more than 1,600 kilometers from Iran's borders, carrying bombs that weigh no more than 750 kilograms. That's barely enough range to hit even Iran's closest neighbors. A new report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies concludes that Iran won't be able to field long-range missiles capable of hitting Western Europe, approximately 3,700 kilometers away, before 2014 or 2015 . The report also extends the timeline for an Iranian ICBM, suggesting that Tehran must first field an intermediate-range missile before embarking on a program that could develop a missile capable of striking the United States, which is 9,000 kilometers away. Thus, the report concludes that an Iranian ICBM "is more than a decade away from development." Iran could accelerate this timeline if it received foreign assistance. An April report by the Pentagon on Iran's military potential estimated that with foreign assistance, Iran could develop an ICBM capable of reaching the United States by 2015. However, continued efforts to isolate Iran and work with key states, including Russia and China, to restrict of the spread of nuclear and missilerelated technologies help reduce the likelihood of this assistance.

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Turkey Neg 174 /341

Suiter Pre-season

A2: US/Turkey Relations: Iran No Nukes
Iran’s nuclear program remains static. It’s still not nuclear capable. Stewart 10 (Phil, Journalist, “Iran not nuclear weapons capable for at least a year- Gates” Reuters,

http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSWBT01379320100413) MKB Iran is not expected to be capable of producing nuclear weapons for at least a year, maybe more, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates said on Tuesday. Asked about reported comments that Iran might be able to join the nuclear club in months, Gates said: "I don't believe it." "I think that most estimates that I've seen, haven't changed since the last time we talked about it, which is probably at least a year, and maybe more," Gates told reporters on a flight to South America.

The threat of nuclear weapons in Iran is media hype. The IAEA confirms that it is for peaceful uses. Global Research 7 (“IAEA confirms the ‘peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear activities” Global Research,

http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=6655) MKB The mainstream media has failed to report the agreement reached between the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Iranian government in regards to the Iranian nuclear energy program. An understanding has been reached between the two. The IAEA has given Iran's nuclear program a clean bill of health. Why is the U.S. media not reporting on this matter? Why do the U.S. and its Western allies continue to threaten Iran with punitive bombings for its alleged noncompliance, when everything indicates that Iran has a bona fide nuclear energy program and does not have the capabilities of developing nuclear weapons? The following are highlights from the document: Article IV (1): These modalities cover all remaining issues and the Agency [meaning IAEA] confirmed that there are no other remaining issues and ambiguities regarding Iran's past nuclear program and activities. Article IV (3): The Agency's delegation is of the view that the agreement on the above issues shall further promote the efficiency of the implementation of safeguards in Iran and its ability to conclude the exclusive peaceful nature of the Iran's nuclear activities. Article IV (4): The Agency has been able to verify the non-diversion of the declared nuclear materials at the enrichment facilities in Iran and has therefore concluded that it remains in peaceful use. The Director-General of the IAEA has also confirmed in an interview published by Profil, an Austrian magazine that it is highly unlikely that Iran would pursue the development of a nuclear weapons program. The document is a slap in the face for the Bush Administration. In light of these developments, it is no

surprise that the Washington is now seeking to justify military action on the grounds that Iran is allegedly behind the killings of American troops in Iraq. The fact of the matter is that the U.S. and its Coaltion partners, as confirmed by several reports, are in an "advanced state of readiness" to wage a military operation directed against Iran. What they now require is a new fabricated pretext which portrays Iran, in the eyes of public opinion, as a threat to world peace. The Western media bears a heavy

burden of responsibility in the current wave of disinformation regarding Iran.

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Turkey Neg 175 /341

Suiter Pre-season

A2: US/Turkey Relations: Iran No Nukes
The threat of nuclear weapons in Iran is media hype. The IAEA confirms that it is for peaceful uses. Derhally 10 (Massoud, Journalist, “ ‘Show the world Iran’s nuclear program is peaceful’ ” Press TV, http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=118568&sectionid=351020104) MKB
Tehran has urged brotherly states, and Turkey above all, to make efforts to help convince the international community that Iran's nuclear activities are totally peaceful. They should say that not even a single case of deviation from peaceful nuclear activities has ever been found, Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Ramin Mehmanparast told the Trend news agency on Saturday. “Iran's nuclear activities have been of a peaceful nature at all times. The Islamic Republic has pursued its nuclear program through transparent measures, and relevant clean bills of health put the seal of approval on such a claim,” Mehmanparast noted. He added that the Islamic Republic of Iran has been committed to its obligations in its civilian nuclear activities and strives to fulfill all its duties in this regard.

On Tuesday, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu stated that he believes there is still common ground for talks between Iran and the parties involved in the nuclear negotiations. Ankara still wants to see a diplomatic solution to the dispute over Iran's nuclear program, he stated shortly after Iranian nuclear technicians set dozens of centrifuges spinning to begin enriching uranium stocks to a level of 20 percent purity in a move which heightened tension in some quarters. Davutoglu said he believes that diplomatic routes have not yet been exhausted and there may still be a window of opportunity. Turkey has been taking all options into consideration and holding talks on various formulae to help resolve the dispute, he added. The Turkish foreign minister will arrive in Tehran on February 16 for an official visit, during which he is scheduled to meet President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki, and other senior Iranian officials. Iran says that as a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, it

is entitled to the peaceful application of nuclear energy. The country expects to generate 17.5 percent — 20,000 megawatts — of the country's electricity demand through nuclear energy over the
next two decades. Over the years, Washington and its allies have accused the Islamic Republic of pursuing a military nuclear program. However, the International Atomic Energy Agency has conducted numerous inspections of Iran's nuclear

facilities and has found no evidence of the diversion of nuclear material.

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Suiter Pre-season

A2: US/Turkey Relations: Good Relations Don’t Solve
The U.S., Turkey, and Iran won’t enter an alliance because of lack of interest. Even if they did, it would take too long to solve the issue. Larison 10 (Daniel, Journalist, “The U.S., Turkey, and Iran” Eunomia,
http://www.amconmag.com/larison/2010/07/03/the-u-s-turkey-and-iran/) MKB Improbable as it may seem right now, given the current regime in Iran, a partnership that unites Turkey, Iran, and the United States is the future and makes sense for two reasons: The three

countries share strategic interests, and their people share values. Our evolving relationship with a changing Turkey offers a model for the kind of relationship we might one day–not necessarily tomorrow–have with a changing Iran. This is the tantalizing possibility of a new way for the U.S. to engage with the Middle East in the 21st century.I am quite skeptical whenever someone tries to justify a present or future alliance even in part by invoking shared “values.” This is usually added to the mix when supporters of the alliance cannot point to any tangible or significant benefit from the alliance for the U.S. For example, pro-Georgian enthusiasts here in the U.S. have to lean heavily on Georgian democracy and Georgia’s marketoriented economic reforms to make sense of U.S. support for Georgia, which is in almost every other respect a stategic liability. There may be no American interest served in sending aid or selling weapons to Georgia, and it does complicate and sometimes damage relations with Russia to do these things, but if Georgians share our “values” then that makes everything all right. This doesn’t apply in the cases of Turkey and Iran, whose strategic importance is obvious but whose respective “values” are not entirely ours. That said, I find Kinzer’s proposal interesting. Over the last few years, I have made it pretty clear that I think rapprochement with Iran is the obvious and wise course to pursue, and in the last month I have been emphasizing the value of the Turkish alliance at a time when many Americans seem to have decided that Turkey is no longer an ally. The trouble for Kinzer’s proposal and for my arguments is that much of the political class has been turning against Turkey partly because Turkey has become too accommodating with Iran. As Kinzer will have noticed, “our evolving relationship with a changing Turkey” has meant a deteriorating

relationship with an increasingly alienated Turkey, and the relationship has deteriorated in no small part because Turkey has already started improving ties with Iran right now. Ankara isn’t waiting for the far-off day when the Iranian opposition becomes organized and effective enough to force some internal political change in Iran, in part because its “zero problems” approach does not require that Turkey’s neighbors share “values” with the Turks. Kinzer is not quite so bold as to argue that this triple alliance will exist anytime soon:A new triangular relationship involving the United States, Turkey, and Iran cannot emerge overnight. In order to become a reliable American partner, Iran would have to change dramatically. Turkey would also have to change, although not nearly as much. So would the United States. Our world, however, advances only as a result of strategic vision. First must come a
grand concept, a destination; once the destination is clear, all parties can concentrate on finding the way to reach it. Unfortunately, leaving it to Iran to “change dramatically” before this realignment or new “triangle” of relationships could be established guarantees that it will not happen for decades. If we are going to wait until Iran dramatically changes, it may never happen at all.

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Suiter Pre-season

A2: US/Turkey Relations: Good Relations Don’t Solve
Turkey’s role as a mediator is highly dangerous and could isolate Turkey from the West and end up being a tool for Iran. Sobecki 10 (Nichole, Journalist, “Turkey caught in U.S- Iran Nuke Rift” News Max World,
http://www.newsmaxworld.com/europe/Turkey_US_Iran/2010/05/04/314985.html) MKB And despite warming relations between the two neighbors, Ankara has its own fears about Iran’s nuclear ambitions. “If Iran continues on this path there is long-term potential for cascading nuclear proliferation and regional instability,” said Ian Lesser, an expert on Turkey and Iran at the Washingtonbased German Marshall Fund. “I see no good news for Turkey coming from Iran’s current position.” If their efforts to resolve this crisis through mediation fail, Turkey is likely to face a tough choice between historic Western alliances and newfound friends in Tehran. “It is clear that if he [Davutoglu] can pull it off and ease the international tension over Iran, then both his and Turkey’s international prestige will increase greatly,” wrote Semih Idiz, a Turkish columnist, in the Turkish paper Hurriyet Daily News. “But if he cannot, then Turkey will not just have been isolated in NATO and Europe, but will also end up having been used by Iran to buy time against the West.”

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A2: US/Turkey Relations: Good Relations Don’t Solve
Turkey will only be mediator if it is explicitely asked to do so. Iran refuses to do so. Uslu 9 (Emrullah, Journalist, “Would Iran want Turkey as a mediator for U.S.- Iranian Negotiations?” Eurasia
Daily Monitor, Volume 6, Issue 46 ) MKB While encouraging Iran to hold discussions with the United States, Turkey is not going so far as to declare itself a mediator between Washington and Tehran. Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan said that he would not carry a message from the United States to Iranian officials on his current visit. Turkey would, however, consider serving as a mediator if both sides requested it (Today's Zaman, March 10). Clinton stated that "the United States would ask Turkey to help push forward President Obama's plan to engage Iran" (Iran
Daily, March 9).

The Iranian side,

however, does not seem as enthusiastic about opening up contacts with the United States. Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki said, "We are closely pursuing all the current developments in Washington's policies. However, we have seen no revolution as a result of Barack Obama's change motto" (Tehran Times, March 10). To understand Iran's attitude, one must remember its long history of mistrust toward the United States. The official Iranian News Agency IRNA quotes a UK-based Iranian political analyst Bijan Zhand Shakibi as saying, "I remain

skeptical that the U.S. will make any dramatic moves. The domestic political climate in America and the geopolitical situation in the Middle East play a major role in the U.S. inability or unwillingness to make a dramatic move toward Iran" (Tehran Times, March 9). The Iranian side says that the United States should take the first step toward Iran. Mottaki stated that "The prospects for the establishment of relations between Iran and the U.S. will not be bright until the U.S. changes its approach" (Tehran Times, March 9). Iranian leaders see the U.S. attitude as aggressive. Mottaki describes the differences in approach between the United States and Iran with an analogy to
American football and a game of chess. "We have no interest in American football. Rather, we are interested in a fair chess match, which requires fortitude and patience because in chess an unnecessary or illogical move will lead to defeat" (Tehran Times, March 9). With this "chess game" mentality, Iranians misunderstand Hillary Clinton's recent visit to Ankara "as a calculated move to reduce tensions between the two sides" (Siaset-e Rouz [Iranian Daily], quoted in Iran Daily, March 9). One of the challenges between Ankara and Washington that Siaset-e Rouz lists is the "differences between the two countries regarding regional developments, in particular how to interact with Iran, Palestine, and Iraq, plus the excessive demands of the U.S. in its relations with the Turks" (Iran Daily, March 9). While the United States seizes every opportunity, including Turkey's good relations with Iran, to end Iran's nuclear weapons program, Iranians think that Clinton visited Turkey to reduce the tension with the United States. Overcoming Iran's

misunderstanding of world politics, even Turkish-U.S. relations, will be Ankara's biggest problem in convincing Tehran to come to the negotiating table, if such a mediatory role is requested by both sides. Moreover, Iran's "chess game" with the world would make a Turkish role even more difficult. On February 26, for example, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan revealed that Iran had asked Turkey to mediate between the United States and Iran during the Bush administration (Hurriyet, February 26); but a week later Hasan Gasgavi, the Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman, told the conservative Iranian daily Kayhan that "Iran has asked neither Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan nor any other foreign dignitary to serve as a mediator between Iran and the United States" (www.byegm.gov.tr, March 4). Gasgavi added that "In the last 30 years there is no channel that [has been] closed. In addition, there is no unexpected development that [would] require someone to open [a] channel. If needed, Iran and the U.S. [can] officially share their views in a diplomatic manner" (www.byegm.gov.tr, March, 4). Iran's reluctant attitude indicates two things: First, negotiations between Iran and the United States would be a major policy shift for Iran, requiring political and psychological preparation on a societal as well as a leadership level. Iran's zigzag attitude about whether it wants Turkey to be a mediator shows hesitancy in the Iranian leadership. Given that the Foreign Ministry spokesman denied to a conservative newspaper that Iran had asked Turkey to serve as a mediator indicates that conservative segments of Iranian society and the leadership may be resisting the idea of negotiations with the United States. In fact, Gul's planned meeting with Ali Khamenei may have been planned for the purpose of convincing the conservative leadership to accept negotiations. Second, requesting Turkish mediation would harm Iran's selfproclaimed role of being a regional power. If Turkey successfully convinced Iran and the United States to begin negotiations, it would make Ankara and Tehran competitors for the role of regional power. Such a peace agreement would make Turkey appear as an absolute regional power while Iran would seem to be jumping on the Turkish bandwagon. For this reason, Iran would not want Turkey to be the peace broker and the policy maker of the region, however necessary it might be. Tehran would want direct talks with the
United States only if it would clearly serve Iran's national interests.

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A2: US/Turkey Relations: Iran Has The Bomb Now
Top U.S. officials admit that Iran has nuclear weapons. World Net Daily 9 (“Axelrod claims Iran has nuclear weapons” World Net Daily, http://www.wnd.com/?
pageId=102520) MKB President Obama's senior adviser David Axelrod stated during an interview yesterday there are nuclear weapons in Iran which are a threat to the entire world. No country has ever claimed Iran

currently has a nuclear arsenal. A 2007 U.S. intelligence estimate previously claimed Iran halted its nuclear weapons-related work in 2003, although that report was highly criticized. Other American agencies have stated Iran could obtain nukes by 2013 or later.

Israel maintains Iran could have enough enriched uranium to produce a nuclear weapon in less than a year, although other Israeli estimates put the timeline at 2012. Axelrod, meanwhile, said yesterday in little noticed comments to ABC News that there are already nuclear weapons in Iran. "I think the president's sense of solicitude with those young people has been very, very clear, and we're very mindful of that," said Axelrod."We are also mindful of the fact that the nuclear weapons in Iran and the nuclearization of that whole region is a threat to that country, all countries in the region, and the world. And we have to address that. We can't let that lie," he said. Axelrod was
responding to a question from ABC News' Chief Washington Correspondent George Stephanopoulos about whether U.S. talks with Iran's leadership would undermine the opposition movement in Tehran. The White House did not immediately respond to a WND query about whether the U.S. has new information indicating Iran possesses nuclear weapons.

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A2: US/Turkey Relations: Arms Control Turn
Arms control destroys deterrence and increases the probability of conflict. Schofield 10 (Julian, journalist, “Arms Control Failure and the Balance of Power” Canadian Volume of Political
Science, Volume 33, page 769) MKB This calculus may work for conventional weapons, but the destructive potential of nuclear weapons may overpower any deterrent threat inherent in the balancing function of the international system. Albert Wohlstetter has argued that with certain technologies, such as nuclear weapons, stability is far more delicate than commonly believed. It' is here that the logic of secure deterrent forces and arms control can compensate for the weakness of the balance of power. In this context, arms control policies enhance the security of both parties in a rivalry by stabilizing their forces.92By stabilization I mean the creation of deterrent postures and procurements that do not encourage surprise attacks or first strikes, decapitatior~attacks, pre-emption, offensive advantages, a launch-on-warning response system, military action without confirmation, weapons which are difficult to control, fait accompli attacks, or the deployment of vulnerable use-it-or-lose-it sys- tems. These measures may be taken unilaterally, as in the deployment of secure second-strike systems (this is the justification for the deploy- ment of nuclear missile-armed submarines). Other measures may be taken co-operatively, such as the 1972 SALT I AntiBallistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, that actually sought to minimize instability by preserving the status quo vulnerability of the superpower countervalue targets. Arms control that makes pre-emptive escalation or war impossi- ble may, perversely, lead to still greater conflict. This is because it is the fear of a conflict escalating to a nuclear war that creates fear, and thereby restraint. Glenn Snyder's stability-instability paradox hypoth- esizes that perfect strategic stability (certain retaliation) creates opportu- nities for violence at lower levels. The practice of informal arms control measures by India and Pakistan in Kashmir has not stemmed the persistent infiltrations and exchanges of artillery fire between these two nuclear-armed states. Arms control must, therefore, never under- mine the threat of escalation that creates the fear of initial provocation. Arms control can also increase the likelihood of war if it prohibits an offensive weapon that a state needs to guarantee the extended deterrence of an ally.

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A2: US/Turkey Relations: Opacity Turn
A. The NPT causes opaque proliferation and waists resources that are better spent on arms control that are responsive to circumstances in the Middle East. Wesley 5 (Michael, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 59( 3), It’s time to scrap the NPT) KGL

The NPT was always a flawed regime, based on an unequal distribution of status and security. Its apparent effectiveness in containing nuclear proliferation was largely due to other factors. The events of the past 15 years have only magnified the NPT’s flaws. The end of the Cold War decoupled the possession of nuclear weapons from the global power structure. While many commentators were applauding the expansion of the number of NPT signatories, and South Africa, South Korea, Brazil and Argentina renounced plans to acquire nuclear weapons, deeper and more insistent proliferation pressures were building among the emerging great powers of Asia. The succession of Persian Gulf wars demonstrated to many insecure states that only nuclear*/not chemical or biological*/weapons deter conventional military attack. The international community was repeatedly surprised by the extent and sophistication of Iraq’s, Pakistan’s, North Korea’s and Libya’s progress in acquiring nuclear materials and know-how, each time underlining the inadequacies of the non-proliferation regime. After the 1998 South Asian nuclear tests, India’s highly effective rhetorical defence of its policy and the world’s half-hearted and short-lived sanctions against India and Pakistan damaged the moral authority of the NPT regime, perhaps terminally. Even worse than being ineffective, the NPT is dangerous, because it increases the pressures for opaque proliferation and heightens nuclear instability. Equally flawed, I argue, is the current counter-proliferation doctrine of the United States. I advocate scrapping the NPT (and the doctrine of counter-proliferation) and starting again, because the NPT is a failing regime that is consuming diplomatic resources that could be more effectively used to build an alternative arms control regime that is responsive to current circumstances. We need to confront the practicalities of scrapping the NPT*/the positives and the negatives*/and think clearly about the requirements of a replacement regime.

Opaque Proliferation makes nuclear war and detonation inevitable due to accidents, miscal, terrorism, and preemption Wesley, Professor of Strategic Studies, 5 (Michael Wesley, Professor Michael Wesley is director of

the Griffith Asia Institute at Griffith University. Prior to taking this position he was the Assistant DirectorGeneral for Transnational Issues at the Office of National Assessments, Australian Journal of International Affairs Vol. 59, No. 3, pp. 283/299, ‘It’s time to scrap the NPT” September 2005) By prohibiting proliferation, without the capacity or moral authority to enforce such a prohibition, the NPT makes opaque proliferation the only option for aspiring nuclear weapons states.4 Opaque proliferation is destabilising to regional security. It breeds miscalculation*/both overestimation of a state’s nuclear weapons development (as shown by the case of Iraq), and underestimation (in the case of Libya)*/that can force neighbouring states into potentially catastrophic moves. Even more dangerous, argues Lewis Dunn, is the likelihood that states with covert nuclear weapons programs will develop weak failsafe mechanisms and nuclear doctrine that is destabilising: In camera decision making may result in uncontrolled programs, less attention to safety and control problems and only limited assessment of the risks of nuclear weapon deployments or use. The necessary exercises cannot be conducted, nor can procedures for handling nuclear warheads be practised, nor alert procedures tested. As a result, the risk of accidents or incidents may rise greatly in the event of deployment in a crisis or a conventional conflict. Miscalculations by neighbours or outsiders also appear more likely, given their uncertainties about the adversary’s capabilities, as well as their lack of information to judge whether crisis deployments mean that war is imminent (1991: 20, italics in original).

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A2: US/Turkey Relations: Opacity Turn
Nuclear-Capable states operate under secrecy because of other states that already have nuclear weapons, not because of the NPT Leaver 5 (Richard, Prof of Int’l Relations at Flinders U., ‘The failing NPT,’ Australian Journal of
International Affairs) KGL The problem of covert proliferation is, of course, very real. But it is, in my view, much too simple to lay it at the feet of the NPT. There is not one of today’s nine nuclear-capable states that chose to develop their early capacities under anything other than conditions of maximum secrecy. And the reason they all opted against transparency had very little to do with the incentive to cheat created by the NPT. Secrecy was, above all, dictated by the possible reactions of those already in ‘the nuclear club’. So, for example, both the United States and the USSR individually gave thought at different points in time during the 1960s to the possibility of making a preventive strike against China’s embryonic nuclear and missile programs. In both cases, they both drew back from the brink not because of fears of the Chinese response, but primarily because they could not be certain that their superpower adversary would remain passively on the sidelines throughout the exercise. It seems reasonable to think that such experiences can only multiply as the size of the nuclear-armed crowd increases. Equally, it would be shortsighted to think that a world without the NPT would be more transparent about the birth of new nuclear powers.

The NPT makes proliferation more dangerous because it encourages secrecy in proliferating states, which causes regional instability in the Middle East Wesley 5 (Michael, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 59( 3), It’s time to scrap the NPT) KGL

By prohibiting proliferation, without the capacity or moral authority to enforce such a prohibition, the NPT makes opaque proliferation the only option for aspiring nuclear weapons states.4 Opaque proliferation is destabilising to regional security. It breeds miscalculation both overestimation of a state’s nuclear weapons development (as shown by the case of Iraq), and underestimation (in the case of Libya)*/that can force neighbouring states into potentially catastrophic moves. Even more dangerous, argues Lewis Dunn, is the likelihood that states with covert nuclear weapons programs will develop weak failsafe mechanisms and nuclear doctrine that is destabilising: In camera decision making may result in uncontrolled programs, less attention to safety and control problems and only limited assessment of the risks of nuclear weapon deployments or use. The necessary exercises cannot be conducted, nor can procedures for handling nuclear warheads be practised, nor alert procedures tested. As a result, the risk of accidents or incidents may rise greatly in the event of deployment in a crisis or a conventional conflict. Miscalculations by neighbours or outsiders also appear more likely, given their uncertainties about the adversary’s capabilities, as well as their lack of information to judge whether crisis deployments mean that war is imminent (1991: 20, italics in original).And because both the NPT and the current US counterproliferation doctrine place such emphasis on preventing and reversing the spread of nuclear weapons, states such as Pakistan, which desperately need assistance with both failsafe technology and stabilising nuclear doctrine, have been suspicious of US offers of assistance (Pregenzer 2003). As the dramatic revelations of the nature and extent of the A. Q. Khan network showed, some states undertaking opaque proliferation have been prepared to rely on transnational smuggling networks to gain vital components, materials and knowledge. Quite apart from the incapacity of the NPT regime to deal with this new form of proliferation (Clary 2004), such non-state networks raise very real risks that for the right price, criminals or other facilitators could pass nuclear

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US Turkey Relations Resilient
Turkey-U.S. relations strong: will stay together over Middle East conflict Walker 10 (Joshua, Fellow at the Transatlantic Academy, Foreign Policy, Turkey: still America’s best ally in the
Middle East?, http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/06/25/turkey_still_america_s_best_ally_in_the_middle_east)B AF
Listening to the Beltway rhetoric one would think that Turkey is a newly emerging threat to the United States and interests in the Middle East. The speed with which Washington has gone sour on its self-declared "model partner" is astonishing and should be cause for concern. Having just returned from Turkey and with meetings with Turkish officials, it is clear that Turkey has not suddenly "switched sides" but rather still objectively represents America's best ally. Not because Ankara blindly goes along with Western policies or is subservient to America, but because it offers the U.S. more strategic possibilities and support than any other state in the region. Unlike Arab allied governments which lack legitimacy among their own populations and Israel that is besieged on all sides, Turkey is a truly democratic, independent, and powerful ally to be courted, not demonized by the U.S. Today, Turkey

represents a critical partner to the U.S. on its three most urgent strategic issues: Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran. On Afghanistan, Turkey is better placed culturally and militarily than any other NATO ally to play a leading role in Kabul; in this respect, it is America's ideal partner on Afghanistan. The soft and hard power advantages that the Turks enjoy among the Afghan population offer a sorely needed bright spot in an otherwise dark struggle for America. On Iraq, there is renewed impetus to resolve the long-simmering Kurdish issue given the battle against the PKK and continued incursions into northern Iraq. Without Turkey's constructive engagement, America's vital interests and the future of Iraq cannot be secured. Short of coercive action, Ankara is determined to prevent a nuclear Iran and has been attempting its own trilateral diplomacy with the help of Brasila to deal with Tehran. Unfortunately, these attempts -- which were
originally encouraged by the Obama administration -- have led to a divide on the means necessary for the same end goal of a nuclear weapon-free Iran. Given the timing of the Mavi-Marmara incident in the lead-up to the Iran sanction vote at the UN, former friends of Turkey are linking the two events and blaming the AKP's "Islamist" roots rather than looking at the tough domestic realities confronting Turkey's leaders. While the AKP has admittedly gone over the top in its rhetoric given the

domestic pressures it faces from a resurgent nationalist movement and upcoming national elections, its actions speak much louder than its words. Diplomatic relations remain intact with Israel despite the killing of nine Turkish citizens (one of whom was a dual American citizen) and Turkey remains actively engaged in all of its Western commitments and institutions.

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US Turkey Relations Resilient
US-Turkey relations resilient- empirically gotten through differences Kirisci 98 (Kemal, prof of poli sci Bogazici University, Middle East Review of International affairs, TURKEY AND THE UNITED

STATES: AMBIVALENT ALLIES http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1998/issue4/jv2n4a3.html#author)BAF Since so much of the U.S.-Turkish relationship was based on the situation of the Cold War years, their partnership has undergone important changes in the new era. By focusing on different issues and emphases, however, their association has adjusted quite well, despite continuing divergences on several issues. Given the enormous strategic significance of the region surrounding Turkey in the post-Cold War era, TurkishU.S. relations will remain extremely important.Specific incidents and disagreements in bilateral

relations have at times displeased both sides without negating the alliance's impressive strategic achievements. Most of their joint objectives have been fulfilled, achieving a great deal in contributing to peace and stability both in Europe and the Middle East.It would probably be wrong to
describe the bilateral relationship simply as a function of cooperation against a common enemy or threat. The Turkish modernist commitment to developing a Western-oriented secular state in a predominantly Muslim country accompanied by a democratization process beginning in the 1940s provided a basis of shared values. Still, the link between the U.S.-Turkish alliance's origins and the Cold War could not be clearer. In April 1946, as Winston Churchill was warning an American audience that an iron curtain was dividing Europe and a Cold War starting, the U.S. warship Missouri arrived in Istanbul. That visit is often cited as the symbolic event signaling the start of this bilateral strategic relationship. This was not a new idea for Turkish leaders. Even during the early 1920s, during the Turkish war of liberation, they had been seeking U.S. cooperation in an effort to counterbalance Britain in the region. But given American isolationism and limited interests in the area, relations between the two countries did not even start until 1927. As late as in 1945 the United States was supporting Soviet demands to revise the Montreux Agreement governing the status of the Turkish Straits, a situation extremely wearing for Turkish decisionmakers. The situation worsened when Soviet leader Joseph Stalin made territorial demands on the Straits and two Turkish provinces bordering the USSR. Thus, it was only when the United States came to regard the Soviet Union as an expansionist power that Turkey's geo-strategic significance became an invaluable asset for U.S. policy. Following the USS Missouri's visit, U.S.-Turkish relations took off and Turkey became a beneficiary of both the Truman Doctrine of 1947 and the Marshall Plan launched the following year. Subsequently, especially with Turkey's participation the in the Korean War on the side of U.S.-led UN forces did the United States sponsor Turkey's membership to NATO in 1952. During the ensuing Cold War decades, the two countries developed an intimate strategic relationship. Turkey provided critical base facilities for the U.S. military while, in turn, the

United States provided extensive economic and military aid to Turkey. A symbol of this relationship--and how it has changed in the post-Cold War era--were the U.S. military and
intelligence bases in Turkey. During the Cold War, U.S. and NATO bases provided a major strategic advantage toward the Soviet Union. However, these bases often became sources of tension especially during the 1970s when both the Turkish government and public wanted to see their closure. On the hand Turkey resisted U.S. demands to be able to use them for their rapid deployment operations in the Gulf area during the 1980s creating considerable disappointment and frustration in U.S. circles. Yet, with the end of the Cold War the United States dismantled most of its military bases in Turkey often to the great disappointment of local communities for whom the bases were an important source of income. Paradoxically, the Turkish government has welcomed the U.S. decision for domestic political reasons but at the same time recognized that this has left it without an important source of leverage over the United States. Furthermore, the bases were also seen as a symbol of U.S.

commitment to Turkey. The only remaining major U.S./NATO military base of strategic and military significance is the one in Incirlik not far from the Syrian border. This base as well as other Turkish air force
bases had played a pivotal role during the allied operations against Iraq during the Gulf crisis. The safe zone in northern Iraq continues to be enforced from Incirlik. All indications are that the United States would like to maintain its presence at this base. The

cooperation between Turkey and the United States over the use of this base will be very much a function of Turkish domestic politics and Turkish decisionmakers perception of their own security needs. Most important, in the back of their minds there will be the concern of how to balance the need to have U.S. support for Turkish security but not get drawn into a situation where the base is used by the United States for a regional intervention which Turkey is not ready to support. This was for example the case in February 1998 when Turkey refused the United States the use of the base to compel Iraq to cooperate with UN arms inspectors. However, the relationship, with the exception of the 1950s and early 1960s, has been marred with difficulties and Turkish mistrust of American friendship and intentions.
This resulted from three developments: First, was the U.S. decision to remove Jupiter missiles from Turkey following the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. The Turkish elite's view that this result from a bargain made by two superpowers behind its back fostered doubt about the U.S. commitment to Turkish security. Second, in 1964 then Prime Minister Ismet Inonu, a founders of the Turkish republic and a national hero, received what was considered a humiliating letter from President Lyndon Johnson. The letter, during a Cyprus crisis jeopardizing the Turkish minority there, warned Turkey not to use U.S. weapons in Cyprus and that if its involvement there provoked a Soviet military response Turkey could not count on U.S. support. Third, the United States imposed arms supply sanctions on Turkey after the 1974 Cyprus crisis when Turkish forces captured one-third of the island. Contemporary areas of conflict include fundamental differences over the U.S. policy of dual containment and frequent disagreements over the future of Cyprus, Greek-Turkish relations, Turkish weapons acquisition programs, and Turkish human rights problems. Nevertheless, the alliance remains quite strong. On the

strategic level, the two countries share common objectives on many issues as varied as expanding NATO's membership, Turkish accession to the European Union, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or missiles, to the opening of new oil pipeline

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routes from the Caspian basin to the West, avoiding both Russian and Iranian territory. What are the issues over which Turkey and the
United States have a convergence of interest and policy as opposed to issues that generate conflict of interest?

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US Turkey Relations Resilient
US- Turkey alliance is resilient: rely on each other for too much James 9 (Jeffery, Ankara ambassador for the US, Embassy of the United States, “Ask the Ambassador”,

http://turkey.usembassy.gov/ask_ambassador_jeffrey.html) Turkey and the United States have been friends since 1923, and allies in Korea and NATO for fifty-eight years. Ours is a special partnership, a relationship that is important to both Washington and Ankara. It’s a partnership that has undergone significant change as the

international political landscape has evolved. It is a far broader relationship than I experienced during my first assignment here in 1983. Then, security concerns dominated. Security cooperation is still an important dimension of our

partnership, but now we work closely on issues as wide ranging as energy, trade, fighting international drug trafficking, and promoting ties between Turkish and American universities. The strains that developed over our Iraq policy are a less welcome change in the Turkish-American relationship. The downturn in Turkish attitudes about U.S. policy and the United States has been a source of deep concern to policymakers in the U.S. and to me personally. I believe that we’ve made some progress in reversing this trend since President Bush and Prime Minister Erdogan opened a new chapter in counterterrorism cooperation last year. We share the same view of the PKK. It’s a terrorist organization that’s a common enemy of Turkey, the United States and the broader international community. We have backed up our verbal commitment to assisting Turkey in its efforts to counter the PKK threat with deeds. We’re sharing information and supporting Turkey’s political and economic steps to counter the PKK’s propaganda. We
have a lot more work to do to expand Turkish-American cooperation and further improve our relations. I’m committed to doing this and I’m interested in talking to you about how to go about doing it. I’m interested in your ideas about how we can better understand each other and work together. Close friends will always disagree on some issues, but the U.S. and

Turkey cannot and will not let such differences stand in the way of cooperation that serves both our countries. The Turkish-American relationship is too important and offers too much promise for doing good in the region and beyond.

Relations resilient- both countries support each other despite challenges Muhammad 9 (Jenin, staff writer, Hurriyet, Obama says Turkey is a critical ally; declares not at war with
Islam, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/domestic/11376078.asp)
"Some people have asked me if I chose to continue my travels to Ankara and Istanbul to send a message. My answer is simple: Evet ('Yes' in Turkish). Turkey is a critical ally. Turkey is an important part of Europe. And Turkey and the

United States must stand together – and work together – to overcome the challenges of our time," Obama told in his 45-minutes-long speech. The U.S. and Turkey had disagreements time to time, but the two countries have stood together through many challenges over the last sixty years and because of the strength of this alliance and the endurance of this friendship, both America and Turkey are stronger, and the world is more secure, Obama added.

"So in meeting the challenges of the 21st century, we must seek the strength of a Europe that is truly united, peaceful and free. Let me be clear: the United States strongly supports Turkey’s bid to become a member of the European Union. We speak not as members of the EU, but as close friends of Turkey and Europe. Turkey has been a resolute ally and a responsible partner in transatlantic and European institutions. And Turkey is bound to Europe by more than bridges over the Bosporus," Obama said in his speech. Obama praised Turkey's reforms in its EU accession bid but urged more steps to be taken . He urged for the reopening of Halki seminary and the strengthening of minority rights. The two democracies are confronted by an unprecedented set of challenges, Obama said and defined them as an economic crisis that recognizes no borders; extremism that leads to the killing of innocent men, women and children; strains on our energy supply and a changing climate; the proliferation of the world’s deadliest weapons, and the persistence of tragic conflict. Messages to the Islamic world The

president declared that the U.S. is not at war with Islam and it will never be. "In fact, our partnership with the Muslim world is critical in rolling back a violent ideology that people of all faiths reject. But I also want to be clear that America’s relationship with the Muslim world cannot and will not be based on opposition to al Qaeda. Far from it. We seek broad engagement based upon mutual interests and mutual respect," he added. He pledged to be respectful, even when there are disagreements and

to convey America's deep appreciation for the Islamic faith, which has done so much over so many centuries to shape the world for the better. "The United States has been enriched by Muslim Americans. Many other Americans have Muslims in their family, or have lived in a Muslim-majority country – I know, because I am one of them," he added.

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US – Turkey Relations Low – Middle East Policy
Opposing Middle East policies hurt US/Turkey relations Trend Daily News, 2010(U. Sadikhova, Trend Daily News, 1/4, LexisNexis, 6/24/10, SLE) <As we saw with recent visits of Erdogan to Iran and the Turkish-Brazilian Nuclear deal, Turkey is playing a leadership role in the region's conflicts. The U.S does not want to provoke it into leading a revolt of the middling powers against U.S policy, Landis said. Director of the Institute for Middle East Studies at George Washington University Nathan J. Brown believes that the current crisis in the relations of Turkey and Israel will provoke real problems for the U.S. "The U.S-Turkish alliance is as actually even older than the U.SIsrael alliance and it is more formal (since Turkey is a member of NATO and Israel is not). This crisis presents real problems for the US for that reason, since both sides will look very much to the US for support and it can not satisfy both at the same time," Brown told Trend via e-mail. He said that the Turkish-Israeli relationship is under severe stress and the Turkish-U.S relationship under less severe but still serious stress. Director of the Program on Arab Politics at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, David Schenker, said that the recent actions of Turkey in the Middle East are increasingly contrary to U.S. policy in the region. The support for international humanitarian convoy is one of them. "The Turkish-sponsored flotilla to Gaza complicates the newly resumed U.S-brokered proximity talks between Israelis and Palestinians. A few weeks before that, Ankara brokered a problematic deal with Brazil and Iran, which would allow Tehran
to continue enriching Uranium, and make it more difficult for Washington to build a coalition to sanction Iran, " Schenker told Trend via e-mail. The flotilla incident will not necessarily deepen the rift between Ankara and Washington.

But it is important, because this Turkish provocation and other recent Turkish initiatives that seem geared toward frustrating Administration policies in the Middle East are indicative of how deep the rift between Washington and Ankara has already become, he said. However, U.S political analysts do not think that Turkey will leave Western anti-terrorism coalition, led by the U.S. in the Middle East. Landis said that Turkey is trying to play a leading role while solving a problem in the Middle East. The fact that it headed to the east testifies its
diplomatic and economic interests. George Washington University Professor Brown believes that Turkey is trying to contain any fallout in U.S-Turkish ties. So, Ankara is unlikely to fully reconsider its policy.>

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US – Turkey Relations Low – Middle East Policy
Competition in the Middle East is killing US/Turkey relations Katcher, Policy Analyst for the American Strategy Program, 2010 (Ben, The Washington Note, 6/3, LexisNexis, 6/24/10, SLE)
<Cook says: The Obama administration has yet to grapple with the ways the structural changes in the international system have affected U.S.-Turkey relations. All the talk about strategic cooperation, model partnership, and strategic importance cannot mask the fundamental shift at hand. The stark reality is that while Turkey and the United States are not

enemies in the Middle East, they are fast becoming competitors. Whereas the United States seeks to remain the predominant power in the region and, as such, wants to maintain a political order that makes it easier for Washington to achieve its goals, Turkey clearly sees things differently. The Turks are willing to bend the regional rules of the game to serve Ankara's own interests. If the resulting policies serve U.S. goals at the same time, good. If not, so be it... Given the mythology that surrounds the relationship, the divergence between Washington and Ankara has proved difficult to accept. Once policymakers recognize what is really happening, Washington and Ankara can get on with the job of managing the decline in ties with the least possible damage. Obama's goal should be to develop relations with Turkey along the same lines the United States has with Brazil or Thailand or Malaysia. Those relations are strong in some areas, but fall short of strategic alliances. "Frenemy" might be too harsh a term for such an arrangment, but surely "model partnership" is a vast overstatement. It's time to recognize reality.>

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Suiter Pre-season

TNW Good – Turkish Security
TNWs key to US/Turkey relations- security commitment. Nuclear Threat Initiative 2009 (Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Turkey Profile”, June 09, http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/turkey/index.html, Accessed June 26, 2010 MM) Turkey signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state in 1969, ratifying it in 1980, and is subject to extensive IAEA compliance monitoring through both its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and its voluntary membership in the Additional Protocol. Ankara has also ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and participates in nuclear export control efforts such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Zangger Committee. As part of NATO's nuclear umbrella, Turkey continues to host approximately 90 U.S. tactical nuclear weapons on its territory at Incirlik Air Base.[4] There is some speculation in the Turkish press regarding possible conflict between Turkey's leaders and the United States should President Obama's commitment to "seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons" lead to the near-term withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Turkey.[5] While the weapons serve little strategic purpose, they provide tangible evidence of a continued American commitment to Turkish security.

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No Solvency – No Influence
Tension over contrasting opinion over Georgia decreasing Turkey influence BBC Newspaper, 2008,( Turkey's Caucasus stability initiative driven by own interests - Azeri agency, September 19, LexisNexis.com, June 24, S.M) Turkey has been heavily hit by the conflict between Russia and Georgia, an analytical piece by APA news agency has concluded. Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan initiated hastily a platform to rescue the situation in the region and minimize negative impact on his country, the article said, adding that too many problems between the regional countries create obstacle for this initiative to be realized. The author adds that that Armenia and Russia are also against keeping Iran aloof from the platform which the West is suspected to be behind. The following is the text of Vuqar Masimoglu report by private Azerbaijani news agency APA news agency on 15 September headlined "Caucasus Stability Pact Turkey's attempts to defend itself from consequences of confrontation between the West and Russia"; subheadings as published: Baku: APA: The recent events in Georgia have brought to the surface the confrontation between the West and Russia that has been going on in a disguised form for a long time. So far the sole consequence of the confrontation between the superpowers has been the fact that Turkey has found itself in the centre of this rivalry. Having felt pressure by the West and Russia, Ankara has stepped up diplomatic activities for the purpose of self-defence. In this context, the proposed by Turkey platform can undoubtedly be assessed as a means of self-protection

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 DAs  ‡‡‡ DA Links ‡‡‡

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Japan Prolif Links
Undermining the US nuclear weapons presence in Europe casts doubt on credibility of the US  nuclear umbrella over Japan:

The US nuclear weapons presence in Europe as a link to US strategic nuclear    forces   The remaining US nuclear weapons in Europe—reduced by more than 97 per cent from the high level reached     

David Yost, 2009 (Assurance and US extended deterrence in NATO, International Affairs 85:  4 (2009) 755–780; accessed via EBSCO)

during the Cold War—have been regarded as sufficient for assurance and extended deterrence owing in part 

to the continuing link to US strategic nuclear forces.37 According to the 1999 Strategic Concept, one of  the important functions of the US nuclear weapons presence in Europe is to provide linkage to the  strategic forces that constitute the ultimate deterrent to aggression or coercion. Ever since the Soviet  Union launched Sputnik in 1957 and developed the world’s first ICBMs, the alliance has been subject to  periodic crises of confidence—in essence, European doubts about America’s will to defend its allies,  given the risk of prompt intercontinental nuclear retaliation from Russia. These doubts have been aggravated whenever  Americans have expressed anxieties about US strategic capabilities—as during the ‘bomber gap’ and  ‘missile gap’ controversies in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and the debates about ICBM vulnerability  in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  Given this historical pattern, if a new debate emerged in the United  States about the adequacy of the US nuclear force posture for national security, allied experts and 

  officials would probably ask questions about the implications for NATO—   and for Japan and   
debate may be on the horizon.38 A polarizing internal US debate (perhaps stimulated by the forthcoming Nuclear Posture  Review) could lead to public questions about the reliability of US nuclear forces, and      

other beneficiaries of US nuclear guarantees. The recent Perry–Schlesinger report suggests that such a  this could   

  undermine allied confidence in US extended deterrence   .
Japan monitors US decisions about NATO nuclear posture closely as a barometer of US extended  deterrence: David Yost, 2009 (Assurance and US extended deterrence in NATO, International Affairs 85:  4 (2009) 755–780; accessed via EBSCO)  Australian and Japanese officials and experts are, for example, monitoring US decisions about extended deterrence globally; and they see US decisions about NATO’s nuclear posture and policy as  emblematic of the US extended deterrence commitment to their own security. A loss of confidence in  the reliability of the protection provided by US extended deterrence could lead some US allies and  security partners to consider seeking their own national nuclear forces or to invest more in potential hedging measures such as air and missile defences and/or enrichment and reprocessing capabilities.

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Deterrence Links
TNWs key to extend US deterrence guarantees Politics Daily 7/8/09 (“Tactical Nuclear Weapons, the Menace No One Is Talking About,”)
As Russia and the United States reduce their strategic nuclear weapons, the relative clout of tactical nukes rises. The existing imbalance in tactical nukes "will become more apparent" and U.S. allies will be "less assured,'' the commission said.As Kristensen described it to me, the concern is that "as you cut down the deployed strategic forces, you end up with more tactical than strategic weapons deployed and that begins to create some problems. In the U.S., we don't have very many non-strategic [tactical] nuclear weapons compared to the Russians. If we agree to go down to very low levels of strategic weapons, that
A more immediate problem looms, however. begins to matter to strategists.''Especially to strategists concerned about maintaining a strong "nuclear umbrella'' over its friends and allies in Europe. Let's say, however improbable, that Moscow and Washington agree to throw tactical nuclear weapons into the arms reduction negotiations that Obama and Medvedev agreed to this week. How likely is a deal? Not very, experts suggest.For one thing, tactical nukes are small and easily hidden. And their "delivery vehicles'' -- arms-control jargon for the aircraft or missiles that carry them -- are also used for other purposes. Reliably counting these weapons and verifying reductions is devilishly difficult, the experts say. Another reason is that the numbers are too important to each side to think seriously about reductions. Russia's conventional military forces are smaller and vastly inferior to those of the United States, and Russian analysts see their nuclear weapons as a critical counterbalance. Russia also needs its tactical nukes to deter problems along its long border with China.On the U.S. side, a key goal is keeping Europeans reassured that Russia can't muscle them around. It's not that Washington would fire off its tactical nuclear weapons in a crisis, but that simply withdrawing the weapons would make some vulnerable European nations -Lithuania comes to mind -- uneasy. And "uneasy'' is something to be avoided in a crisis. The blue-ribbon commission, in laying out a proposed U.S. approach to the issue, succinctly

"All allies depending on the U.S. nuclear umbrella,'' it said in a statement that probably mirrors the Kremlin's own thinking, "should be assured that any changes in its forces do not imply a weakening of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrence guarantees.''
demonstrated the problem: The United States should go after deep cuts in Russian tactical nukes, but go easy in cutting its own.

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Obama Good Link- Political Capital (1/2)
Tacticals initiatives require expenditure of political capital Jon Brook Wolfsthal Deputy Director Non-Proliferation Project, FDCH, 9/14/03

Russia's commitment to accept dismantlement of many weapon systems and to secure and even eliminate some of the nuclear weapons released by those agreements has been linked to the legal implementation of the START I and other arms control agreements. We should be concerned that with the Treaty of Moscow, the legal basis for Russia's implementation of some CTR programs is undermined, and at the very least promising areas for cooperation are left un-addressed. I offer the example of concerns over tactical nuclear weapons in Russia, which have been cited by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld directly. The United States previously sought to establish a nonstrategic nuclear weapon transparency regime, which would include details on how many such weapons existed. Such an effort was envisioned under the 1997 Helsinki statement but was never implemented. But whether under one name or another, a legal basis for transparency and control over sub-strategic weapons would be helpful is addressing this gaping security issue. This issue has been raised by the Bush administration in its efforts with Russia, to the detriment of progress in this important area.[5] If progress is to be made in this field, it will require direct presidential leadership. Cont…Political support for threat reduction activities is not sufficiently deep in the United States, Russia, and Europe. High- level and consistent political support added to the expenditure of political capital are essential for real progress to be maintained on the threat reduction agenda. Threat reduction lacks a coordinated and understandable strategy. Many pressing future threat reduction programs will focus on activities with more intangible results than those of the past decade. Financing for some key threat reduction activities is inadequate. Financing is not the only impediment to progress. Access to facilities and transparency of information are essential. Economics and threat reduction are inextricably linked but not well integrated, and the connection is not well understood. Re-employment programs for scientists generally are not working well in any of the WMD complexes. The relationship between arms control agreements and threat reduction needs to be better defined. There is a need to expand threat reduction to include new activities. Threat reduction already covers a wide range of activities, but there are additional areas where it could be expanded: attack submarine dismantlement; warhead dismantlement; export and border control; cooperation on early warning; missile de-targeting and de- alerting; and ways to induce the United States and Russia to begin discussions of their sub-strategic nuclear weapons. Our past efforts show that the United States can make significant and even quick progress in reducing the proliferation risk from the former Soviet Union's weapons complex when we make a high level and sustained commitment in terms of prestige and financing. This effort must be communicated and followed up from the very highest levels, including between the presidents. Moreover, to be successful, the efforts must

be clearly communicated to, understood and supported by the Congress to ensure funding, oversight and to avoid political hurdles which have routinely hampered the implementation of some
security efforts.

No domestic support for removing tacticals – political support for keeping weapons in Europe outweighs concern over Russian weapons Cirincionne and Podvig, ’01 (Joseph and Pavel, Foreign Policy In Focus, 11/27, http://www.fpif.org/presentations/wmd01/pconf.html)
Of course they serve no military purpose whatsoever. It is difficult to conceive of any scenario under which the United States would use a tactical nuclear weapon stationed in Europe for any reason. So those also should be withdrawn. I don't believe Europe is any longer so insecure that it will feel the withdrawal of those nuclear weapons would somehow present a decrease in U.S. commitment to Europe. There were supposed to be talks between the United States and Russia on tactical nuclear weapons. This was part of the 1997 agreement between Clinton and Yeltsin. START III, which was going to reduce the levels of strategic weapons, was also supposed to start, for the first time, actual negotiation on tactical nuclear weapons, in which the U.S. would talk about the thousands of Russian tactical weapons, and Russia would get to talk about the sea-launched, nuclear-tipped cruise missiles. They are of concern to Russia. Unfortunately, this vital issue has been dropped from the agenda. No one in the United States, or Russia for that matter, is raising this issue of tactical nuclear weapons. It is precisely these weapons that pose some of the most serious security concerns. Primary I'm thinking of the Russian arsenal, but as your colleagues in Moscow says, there also are some concerns with the European-based weapons the United States has. Other comments here? Bill Hartung: Yes, Pavel Podvig. Pavel Podvig: Let me add just a few words. I think Joe is absolutely right. The tactical nuclear weapons in Europe serve no military purpose or any purpose whatsoever, and I'm speaking about U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, as well as Russian ones. But these serve as a very good illustration of what's wrong with the current situation. Because if we look at the politics of these tactical weapons, then we see that in fact in the United States and in Europe, there are concerns about the safety and security of Russian tactical nukes. People would argue that they are not very well-secured. But at the same time, we see that for some reason, the United States and its European allies value having the U.S. weapons in Europe much higher than their concern about Russian nuclear weapons. So basically, my point is that this is the choice the U.S. and its European allies must make themselves. Whether it is more important to keep tactical weapons in Europe--as a means of holding together a NATO alliance, or for whatever other conceivable purpose. Or to try to open negotiations with Russia on how to eliminate and control and secure all tactical nuclear weapons, including Russian ones, if there are concerns about their security.

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Obama Good Link- Political Capital (1/2)
Plan drains capital- nuclear weapons cuts face bureaucracy Ritchie, ’08 (Nick, Oxford Research Group, “US Nuclear Weapons Policy After the Cold War”)

Incentives to change nuclear weapons policy have been significantly reduced by the absence of broad bipartisan post Cold War consensus on the future of nuclear weapons policy and the long term role and requirements of nuclear weapons. This is reflected in the three competing idea sets examined in the previous chapter. This absence of consensus has affected and been affected by the sense that no major procurement decisions were needed, the secondary importance of nuclear weapons policy to senior political and military leaders, and a conservative inertia within the nuclear policy bureaucracy. There have consequently been few incentives to entice sustained investment of scarce political capital by senior political leaders in government and Congress to overcome either the reality of the nuclear weapons policy presented by the nuclear policy community or the divergent views within and between Congress and the executive. When decisions have been required the management of these domestic divisions was, according to Nolan, ‘an increasingly important determinant of policy choices.’ Overcoming these divisions would require a compelling strategic vision for American nuclear forces to be articulated at the highest levels of government. There have been incentives for incremental change to adapt
nuclear weapons policy to the post-Cold War environment. These have ranged from reducing the perceived risk of nuclear conflict, reducing spending, reinforcing the non-proliferation regime through American restraint, reorienting military force and posture to new strategic realities and redressing the impact of ageing complex facilities, warheads, delivery platforms and expertise. Occasional senior – level executive, congressional and military engagement has therefore been forthcoming, but there has been little sustained desire to take policy in a different direction following the end of the Cold War.

Costs capital- unilateral nuclear cuts ensure congressional backlash Krepon, ’01 (Michael, President Emeritus @ Stimson Center, International Institute Strategic Studies, Survival, Summer)

The alternative would be to rely on unilateral, or so called ‘reciprocal’ nuclear force reductions. Such measures would be easier to implement than treaties, but they would also be easier to reverse. Intrusive monitoring arrangements for treaties are spelled out; they would be voluntary or non – existent for unilaterally or reciprocal initiatives. If unilateral steps are pursued entirely as a substitute for treaties many new problems could result. Even dramatically ambitious reassurance initiatives could be undermined or completely nullified by other initiates, such as moves to deploy space – based weapons or to expand NATO to the Russian border. The abrupt replacement of treaties with unilateral initiatives will not be reassuring and could generate a strong backlash at home and abroad. The demise of bilateral treaties would spill over and undermine multilateral accords, such as the Non – Proliferation Treaty. The net effect of jettisoning treaties could be profoundly unsettling, including the sharp curtailment of cooperative threat reduction initiatives now underway in Russia. Heavy reliance on unilateral measures could have another negative consequence: making the intended recipients of reassurance measures the central arbiters of their utility. National leaders could stress an absence of reassurance in order to prompt further initiatives to alleviate their expressed concerns. The informal nature of reassurance arrangements – and the ability of states to reverse course relatively quickly – could retard the desired transition to CTR. Congressional prerogatives would also need to be taken into account for a strategy that seeks to replace treaties with reassurance measures . If initiatives are not reciprocated fully, the

US Congress could become disenchanted with the process.

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Obama Good Link- Military Lobby
Pentagon lobbies for NATO tactical nuclear weapons Gertz, 9/3/09 (bill, national security reporter for Washington times, www.gertzfile.com/gertzfile/InsidetheRing.html)

The administration requested the money for a study about upgrading the B61, an aircraft-delivered tactical nuclear bomb that both the Pentagon and the Energy Department say is needed to defend Europe as part of what the military calls "extended deterrence." The matter is urgent for the Pentagon because the study is needed now to meet a 2017 deadline for outfitting the bomb on the new F-35 jet. Current F-16 jets that carry B61s will be phased out of service in eight years. The B61 is dropped by bombers and has a parachute in the tail to slow its descent and allow detonation above the ground. The B61 money was cut by the House Appropriations subcommittee on energy and water development. Subcommittee Vice Chairman Ed Pastor, Arizona Democrat, said in a June 23 statement that the B61 money was zeroed out because the administration "has yet to meet the requirement for nuclear strategy, stockpile and complex plans that we first directed in fiscal year 2008." The Senate version of the energy bill contains the B61 money, and differences between the two versions will be worked out in a House-Senate conference in the coming weeks. The White House issued a policy statement July 14 on the cut, stating that the funding elimination would cancel the B61 upgrade for needed "end-of-life components." "Without refurbishment of these components, the sustainment of the B61 bomb family, a key component of our deterrence strategy, will be in jeopardy," the statement said. The administration is set to lobby House subcommittee members to restore the funds. A letter is planned from Thomas P. D'Agostino, head of the Energy Department's National Nuclear Security Administration, and U.S. Strategic Command commander Gen. Kevin P. Chilton. The two leaders are expected to tell House members that fixing the B61, the oldest weapon in the U.S. nuclear arsenal, is urgently needed. A recent blue-ribbon commission of experts found major problems with the entire U.S. nuclear stockpile, specifically the triggering packages and electronics of older nuclear weapons, including some, like the B61, that were built in the 1960s. According to a Senate aide, the B61 funding cut was pressed by staff members on the subcommittee without close supervision by the chairman, Rep. Peter J. Visclosky, Indiana Democrat, who is under investigation by federal authorities investigating lobbying by the PMA Group. Because of the investigation, Mr. Visclosky is not working on the fiscal 2010 bill and turned over subcommittee leadership on that issue to the vice chairman, Mr. Pastor. House Appropriations Committee spokesman Ellis Brachman said Mr. Visclosky recused himself because "he did not want [the investigation] to get in the way of this year's business." Mr. Pastor was fully versed on the issues in the bill, including the B61 money, Mr. Brachman said. "This is a long-standing position of the subcommittee that we would like to see the administration finalize its plans for the nation's nuclear strategy and stockpile," Mr. Brachman said. Strategic Command spokeswoman Maj. Regina Winchester said Gen. Chilton is prepared to go to Capitol Hill this month to lobby for the B61 money, along with Mr. D'Agostino. "The B61 is the oldest weapon in the nuclear weapons stockpile and requires urgent upgrades to remain in service, incorporate modern safety and security features, and increase long-term confidence in weapon reliability," she said, The bomb's life extension "is essential to provide our NATO allies with a visible sign of our extended deterrent commitment and to maintain a credible strategic air-delivered nuclear deterrent capability," she noted.

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Obama Bad Link- Bipart
New Bipartisan movement against TNWs Krieger 07 (president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, David Krieger, January 5, 2007, A Bipartisan Plea For Nuclear
Weapons Abolition, http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2007/01/05_krieger_plea.htm)

A number of steps need to be taken to lay the groundwork for a world free of nuclear threat, including dealerting nuclear arsenals; reducing the size of nuclear arsenals; eliminating tactical nuclear weapons; achieving Senate
ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and encouraging other key states to also do so; securing nuclear weapons and weapons-usable materials everywhere in the world; and halting production of fissile materials for weapons, ceasing to use enriched uranium in civil commerce and removing weapons-usable uranium from research reactors. For many of us committed to the global effort to abolish nuclear weapons, there is nothing new in their arguments. They are arguments that many civil society groups have been making since the end

McNamara and General George Lee Butler, former head of the US Strategic Command, have also made such arguments. What is new is that these former Cold Warriors have joined together in a bipartisan spirit to publicly make these arguments to the American people. This means that the perspectives of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, the Global Security Institute, the Nuclear Policy Research Institute and other dedicated civil
of the Cold War. Other former officials, such as Robert society groups are finally being embraced by key former officials who once presided over Cold War nuclear strategy.

Bipartisan support for TNW cuts Estabrooks 04 (Sarah Estabrooks, Winter 2004, The Ploughshares Monitor, Funding for new nuclear programs eliminated,
http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/monitor/mond04f.htm)
The 2004 Energy budget request included two high-profile projects that were interpreted as demonstrating interest in developing new nuclear technologies and enhancing available capacity. The Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator program sought to develop high-yield earth-penetrating nuclear weapons commonly referred to as bunker busters, modifying available penetrating technologies.

A parallel initiative, the Advanced Concepts Initiator, called for research into new low-yield, or tactical, nuclear weapons. Funding for these ‘bunker busters’ and ‘mini-nukes’ programs was heavily criticized as running counter to multilateral nuclear arms control and disarmament efforts and agreed commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty . In the 2005 budget appropriation, both of these projects were zeroed out completely. A significant turnaround, this cut had bipartisan support. In House committee negotiations, Republican Energy and Water Development Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman, Rep. David Hobson, led the move to eliminate funding for the programs. Despite Senate approval of the funding, the House version of the bill garnered support from Democrat Senators and the cut was included in the final spending bill. Democrat Representative Edward Markey, a critic of the programs and supporter of the House cut, has gone so far as to call this move
“the biggest victory that arms control advocates in Congress have had since 1992, when we were able to place limits on nuclear testing. If we are to convince other countries to forego nuclear weapons, we cannot be preparing to build an entire new generation of nuclear weapons here in the U.S. ” (Ruppe 2004).

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Obama Bad Link- Public
Public and pentagon support of TNW removal Claudine Lamond and Paul Ingram – BASIC- British American Security Information Council, 1-15-2009
“Politics around US tactical nuclear weapons in European host states” d.a. 7-19-2010 http://www.basicint.org/gtz/gtz11.htm

There has been for some time a growing inclination within the Pentagon to scale back or end the stationing of US TNWs in Europe, and rationalizing, as a mid-term move, warheads to one or two bases. Despite its Nuclear Posture Review of 2001
that appeared to expand the roles for nuclear weapons, the Bush Administration has actually been looking to replace roles by more flexible conventional weapons. However, the United States does not want to be seen as acting unilaterally and reneging on its commitments to NATO. [29] The Obama Administration is as committed as any NATO member to moving on this issue with a unified Alliance and will look to test opinion across the Alliance beyond only the host states before making any significant changes. Nevertheless, the new Administration is also committed to producing a new Nuclear Posture Review in late 2009 or early 2010, and will be looking at revisions to its own nuclear strategy and arsenals. This is likely to include a reduced role for nuclear weapons, possibly restricting the doctrine only to deterring the use of nuclear weapons by hostile states against the United States and its allies. This would be an ideal time for NATO to conduct its review alongside the United States. Recent polls suggest 87% of the US population believe the government should negotiate an agreement to eliminate nuclear weapons.[30] Over half also believe that the government's practice of sharing its TNWs with NATO members could be a violation of the NPT and should cease.[31]

Public supports Tactical withdrawal Avery 1/23/09 (John, “The Way Is Open for a Nuclear Weapon-Free Northern Europe,” Nuclear Age Peace
Foundation)
NWFZ; but From the standpoint of an NWFZ in Northern Europe, the recommendation that all short-range nuclear weapons be destroyed is particularly interesting. The US nuclear weapons currently stationed in Holland, Belgium and Germany prevent these countries from being (at present) part of a de-facto Northern European

with an Obama Administration in the United States, and with John Holdren advising President Obama, this situation might be quickly altered. Both public opinion and official declarations support the removal of US tactical nuclear weapons from Europe [12]. Indeed the only argument for their retention comes from NATO, which stubbornly maintains that although the weapons have no plausible function, they nevertheless serve as a “nuclear glue”, cementing the alliance.

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Nato – Link
TNW debate divides NATO Penketh, writer at The Independent, 2010 (Anne, The Independent, April 5, http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/annepenketh-edging-towards-a-nuclearfree-world-1935993.html, 6/29/10, JX)
Russia certainly isn't trembling at the thought of these obsolete weapons in need of refurbishment stored on US bases around Europe. So it should be easy to get rid of them, right? Wrong. The German foreign minister, Guido Westerwelle, and four of his European counterparts, have at least succeeded in having Nato discuss the issue for the first time at a foreign ministers' meeting in Tallinn, Estonia, later this month. In a letter to Nato secretary-general Anders Fogh Rasmussen in February, the five urged the Western military alliance to move its own nuclear doctrine closer to the US President's overall objective of a world free from nuclear weapons. The alliance itself is bitterly divided, with the former Soviet bloc

states wary of a perceived concession to Moscow. They had become used to seeing the weapons stationed in Western Europe as a way of coupling the United States to European security and as protection against the Russian bear – which has an estimated 2,000 to 5,000 tactical weapons of its own.

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NATO – Link
Incirlik Air Base is key to NATO and US operations Migdalovitz, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs, 2008 (Carol, CRS Report, August 29, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL34642.pdf , 6/29/10, JX) Turkey’s geostrategic importance for the United States depends part y on Incirlik Air Base, located l about 7 miles east of Adana in southeast Turkey.31 The United States constructed the base and the U.S. Air
Force began using it during the height of the Cold War in 1954. The Turkish government transferred control of the base to its military in 1975 in response to an arms embargo that Congress imposed on Turkey in reaction to Turkey’s intervention/invasion of Cyprus in 1974. The base continued to fulfill its NATO missions. After the embargo ended, the U.S. and Turkey signed a bilateral Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA)nin 1980 to govern U.S. use of the base and a DECA, under a NATO umbrella, continues to allow the U.S. air force to use it for training purposes. As an executive agreement, the DECA does not require congressional or Turkish parliamentary approval. U.S. requests to use of the base for other purposes are made separately and may require Turkish parliamentary authorization.

Incirlik is an invaluable instrument for the execution of NATO and U.S. policies in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere in the Middle East. It offers a 10,000-foot main runway and a 9,000 foot alternate runway able to service large cargo planes. Some 74% of all air cargo into Iraq transits Incirlik. The U.S. Air Force prizes the efficiency of the use of the base: six C-17 aircraft based at Incirlik move
the same amount of cargo that 9 to 10 aircraft used to carry from Rhein-Main Air Base in Germany, saving about $160 million a year. In addition, thousands of U.S. soldiers have rotated out of Iraq via use of Incirlik for

transit. KC-135 tankers operating out of Incirlik have delivered more than 35 million gallons of fuel to U.S. fighter and transport aircraft on missions in Iraq and Afghanistan .
On more than one occasion, Turkey has authorized the temporary deployment of U.S. Air Force F-16's from Germany to Incirlik for training. In addition, in 2005, Incirlik served as an air-bridge for the Pakistan Earthquake

Relief Effort of seven NATO countries and, in 2006, U.S. forces from Incirlik helped with the evacuation of some 1,700 Americans from Lebanon during the Israeli-Hezbollah war.

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Turkey Prolif – Link
Removing TNW’s from Turkey will cause proliferation Weitz, 10 Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at the Hudson Institute, 2010 (Richard Weitz, Turkey Analyst, April 12, http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/turkey/2010/100412A.html, Accessed 06/23/2010, Accessed 06/23/2010, N.P.) Attempting to withdraw the nuclear weapons from Turkey could present serious problems. Many Turkish policy makers already doubt the credibility of U.S. and NATO security commitments due to
several earlier incidents following the end of the Cold War. Before both wars against Iraq, some European members of NATO proved reluctant to meet Turkish requests to deploy air and missile defenses to protect Turkey from Iraqi missile strikes. Although the United States did offer some protection, the Turkish government and public were unenthusiastic about their forced involvement in the wars, which was inevitable due to the proximity of the battlefields to Turkish territory. The unpopularity only increased after Washington’s support for the Iraqi Kurds, which raised concerns in Turkey that similar aspirations among Turkey’s Kurdish minority might be encouraged. Turks have also been disappointed by fellow NATO member’s reluctance to support its military operations against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). Iran is another

issue that could affect the future nuclear weapons policies of Turkey. Thus far, neither the Turkish nor the Iranian government has publicly linked Iran’s nuclear policies and “Turkey’s” nuclear weapons. In principle, the connection could run in various directions.
On the one hand, Turkey’s ruling Justice and development party (AKP) deny that Iran is seeking nuclear weapons, in which case either the status quo or the elimination of Turkey’s TNWs might be acceptable. On the other hand, those members of Turkey’s national security establishment concerned about Tehran’s nuclear ambitions might either seek to retain the nuclear weapons on Turkish soil as a security hedge or demonstratively eliminate them to encourage Tehran to behave similarly. The

United States and other countries might also need to consider how removing the weapons might affect Turkey’s calculations about whether it might develop its own nuclear deterrent, which would contribute to the feared proliferation wave in the greater Middle East that could undermine the non-proliferation agenda of the Obama administration and other NATO governments. Some Turkish officials see having physical access to TNWs as part of their bargain with the United States and the other allies for not developing an independent Turkish nuclear arsenal.

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Turkey Prolif – Link
TNW removal leads to Turkey Prolif Bell and Loehrke, Staff Writers, 09 (Alexandra and Benjamin, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 23, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-status-of-us-nuclear-weapons-turkey) there is the issue of Tehran's nuclear program, which seriously complicates any discussion of the United States removing its tactical nuclear weapons from Turkey. An Iranian nuclear capability could spark an arms race in the Middle East and bring about a "proliferation cascade," which could cause Turkey to reconsider its nuclear options-especially if the United States pulls its nuclear weapons from Incirlik. When asked directly about its response to an Iranian nuclear weapon, a high-ranking Foreign Ministry official said that Turkey would immediately arm itself with a bomb. This isn't
Then Ankara's official policy, but it seems to indicate a general feeling among its leaders. Whether Turkey is primarily concerned about security or prestige, the bottom line is that it would not sit idly by as Iran established a

regional hegemony.

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Turkey Prolif – Turn
Turn – Turkey prolif: A. Turkey is on the brink of proliferation – US security guarantees are vital to constraining Turkey’s nuclear program.. Dunn Senior Vice President and Deputy Group Manager at Science Applications International Corporation, 2007 (Lewis, IFRI Security Studies Center, Proliferation Papers, Summer , http://www.ifri.org/files/Securite_defense/Deterrence_Today_Dunn_2007.pdf)
Growing fears that it will not be possible to head-off Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons are creating new nuclear insecurities among that country’s neighbors and others across the Middle East. Widespread statements of concern about Iran’s nuclear ambitions by officials in Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, and elsewhere are but one example of that nuclear insecurity. Sometimes those concerns are more general; at other times, off-the-record remarks directly link Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons to other nations’ rethinking of their own non-nuclear postures, e.g., in the case of Turkey.9 New found expressions of interest all across the region from Turkey to Egypt in nuclear energy and power are openly acknowledged to be another signal of heightened nuclear insecurity.10 In turn, there has been periodic speculation – often from reliable sources though officially denied –
about Saudi nuclear intentions, including that the Saudi regime already is thinking about how to acquire “dual-key” nuclear warheads from Pakistan if Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons cannot be stopped.11 If Iran acquires nuclear weapons, outside extended nuclear

deterrence almost certainly will play an important part in any attempt to prevent a proliferation cascade across the Middle East – including Israel’s open deployment of nuclear weapons. Here, too, the prospect that the United States and other countries
would act to counter the potential political-military benefits of Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons could be an incentive for that country to stop short of the bomb. Indeed, there is some evidence that within the Iranian elite one of the questions now being debated is whether going all the way to the bomb ultimately would prove counter-productive, stimulating reactions by neighbors and other countries that would make Iran more insecure.

B. Withdrawing TNWs pushes Turkey to develop their own arsenal starting a regional proliferation. Sherwood-Randall, Sr. Advisor of the Preventative Defense Project, 2007 (Elizabeth,“ TheBelferCenter, Fall, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/17425/tend_to_turkey.html, )
There is another security dynamic to consider :

Experts focused on diminishing the threat of nuclear proliferation are debating whether the United States should withdraw its nuclear weapons from Europe. While in the future this may be plausible if fully supported by all NATO members, this is not the time to raise further questions about America’s commitment to extended deterrence or the reliability of the security guarantees that undergird its alliances and provide reassurance. Otherwise, countries like Turkey may seek to develop their own nuclear programs, which will not only set back nonproliferation goals but could stimulate others to follow suit.

C. A nuclear Turkey destabilizes the Middle East – flips the case Deliso, Balkan-based Journalist, 2005 (November21, http://www.antiwar.com/deliso/? articleid=8091)

Proud Turkey has always wanted to be seen as an important country. Were it to declare itself a nuclear one, it would become, for a time at least, the most important country in the world. The entire balance of power in Europe and the Middle East would be radically altered overnight, and the overall side results would not at all be positive for Turkey or anyone else – except of course for those cashing in on illicit nuclear sales. Nevertheless, the country is probably technologically capable by now. A new question that has thus arisen, as articulated recently by Turkish scholar Mehmet Kalyoncu on
Balkanalysis.com, is the following: "If the U.S. and the EU do not approve of Turkey having nuclear weapons, what do they have to offer Turkey instead?"

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Turkey Prolif – Uniqueness
Turkish nuclear plans are purely energy related in the SQ. Al-Marashi and Goren, Associate Dean of International Relations at IE School of Communication-IE University in Spain & Instructor, College of Arts and Sciences Koc University, 2009 (Ibrahim and Nilsu, Strategic Insights, Center for Contemporary Conflict, http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2009/Apr/marashiApr09.asp)
By 2015, Turkey expects to complete the construction of three nuclear power stations based on energy needs , being subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguard measures and inspections. These plans have generated controversy within the country among anti-nuclear activists and opposition members of the Turkish parliament.[50] As official state policy, Turkey complies with the Nonproliferation Treaty, Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions, Comprehensive testban Treaty (CTBT), and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Even if Turkey were to build a nuclear arsenal it would not be able to deploy nuclear weapons without disrespecting the rule of international law , i.e. noncompliance with the international regimes it has adhered to. In this case, the benefits of acquiring nuclear weapons do not outweigh the costs of economic and political sanctions that the country would face leaving the NATO umbrella and breaking its strategic alliance with United States. During an interview on the Al-Jazeera Satellite Channel’s program “Today’s Encounter” in

February 2006 the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan was asked: “Regarding the Iranian nuclear file, we know that the issue is now heading toward escalation, but we also know that Turkey is preparing to launch a nuclear energy program. What are the limits of this nuclear program?” Erdogan responded that: “We have not announced our nuclear program yet, but it is designed for peaceful and humanitarian purposes.” He emphasized that the program was designed for Turkey to secure an energy source without depending on its neighbors.[51]

Current plans are peaceful but could shift quickly. Al-Marashi and Goren, Associate Dean of International Relations at IE School of Communication-IE University in Spain & Instructor, College of Arts and Sciences Koc University, 2009 (Ibrahim and Nilsu, Strategic Insights, Center for Contemporary Conflict, http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2009/Apr/marashiApr09.asp)
Within Turkey, the agreement fanned debate over the future of nuclear energy in the country. So

far, that debate has been framed in terms of the country’s energy needs and safety and environmental concerns. It is possible, however, that national security issues will also become a factor in the discussion, with some elements in Turkey arguing that mastering nuclear technology through a peaceful nuclear power program will provide an essential foundation upon which Turkey could build, if at some future time it became necessary for it to develop an independent deterrent to counter a nuclear-armed Iran. Such national security considerations, it may be noted, appear to be a factor motivating Egypt’s recently
announced plans to restart its nuclear power program.[60]

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Turkey Prolif – Link
TNW are a key assurance against Iranian proliferation. Blechman, Stimson Distinguished Fellow 2009 (Barry, Stimson, 2/28 http://www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?ID=811 )
In Europe, US nuclear commitments were made credible during the Cold War by the stationing of thousands of US nuclear weapons on the continent. Although only a few hundred US nuclear weapons remain in Europe, NATO’s new “strategic concept” may require that difficult decisions be made about them. Maintaining a credible extended deterrent in Europe requires spending money to modernize storage facilities, ensuring that the weapons themselves remain safe and reliable, and replacing the aircraft that had been planned to deliver them with more modern fighters with special electronics required for nuclear attack capabilities. Some of the newer NATO members, especially those who previously were occupied by Soviet forces, worry about a resurgent nationalist Russia which, itself, has thousands of short-range nuclear weapons on its European territory , and argue that the weapons and the

policy should be retained to deter Russian nuclear-use in the event of conflict. The strong possibility that Iran will soon have nuclear weapons adds another motivation as Turkey, a NATO member with US nuclear weapons on its soil, sees their presence as deterring any future Iranian aggressiveness. The problem is that most of the NATO allies would

hate to see the issue debated in their parliaments, as might result from the new “strategic concept,” or would certainly result if appropriations were requested for nuclear-related facilities or aircraft. European publics are generally strongly anti-nuclear, so while the officials of defense and foreign ministries may wish to retain the policy, their political masters are desperate to avoid any action that might renew public debate on nuclear weapons and adversely affect elections for sitting governments.

Turkey’s security hinges on a robust US nuclear presence – any cuts could spark overreaction. Guray First Lieutenant, Turkish Army, 2001(Al, Naval Post Graduate School, http://theses.nps.navy.mil/Thesis_01dec_Al.pdf, December)
U.S. extended deterrence commitments with a robust nuclear presence in Turkey remain essential elements of Turkey’s security. Therefore, NATO’s security guarantees, which hinge ultimately on the U.S. nuclear presence and U.S. extended deterrence commitments in Europe, and Turkey’s own national defense and deterrence posture must remain convincing and credible to Turkey and to nations that possess WMD and potential WMD proliferators in the region. As Duygu
Dramatic changes have occurred in Turkey’s security environment, but NATO’s security guarantees and Bazoglu Sezer, a prominent professor of international relations at Bilkent University of Ankara, has observed, “Turkey needs to be reassured that it would be protected against proliferation if and when it indeed occurs.”379

A failure to meet the commitment to credibly defend Turkey will lead to speedy nuclearization. Clawson Deputy Director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy 2003 (Patrick, http://www.npec-web.org/Essays/Presentation030401%20Clawson%20Nuclear%20Prolif%20TB.pdf, April) Historically Turkey has been at peace with Iran, and the two countries have generally paid relatively little attention to each other, compared to what one might expect from two neighbors with considerable economic interaction. That said, Turkey has many reasons to worry about meddling by an Islamic Republic which is ideologically opposed to Ankara’s secular policies. If Turkey faces
serious internal problems – be it from Islamists or from Kurds – Iran might seek to take advantage of that situation, and Iranian nuclear weapons would make Turkey think long and hard about how much it could complain about such Iranian meddling. In other words, an Iranian nuclear capability could make the Turkish General Staff nervous. Faced with a nuclear-armed Iran, Turkey’s first instinct will be to

turn to NATO. Turkey places extraordinary value on its NATO membership,

which symbolizes the West’s acceptance of Turkey – a delicate issue for a country which feels it is excluded from the EU on civilizational grounds more than for any other reason. The cold reality is that NATO was not designed to defend Turkey : assisting Turkey faced with a general

It is not clear how much NATO members want to take on this burden . It will be only natural for Turkey to wonder how much it can rely on NATO. Were Turkey to decide that it had to proliferate in order to defend itself, it has good industrial and scientific infrastructures which it could draw upon to build nuclear weapons on its own. It would be difficult to prevent a determined Turkey from building nuclear weapons in well under a decade
Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe is one thing; defending Turkey when it alone faces a threat is an altogether different matter.

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Turkey Prolif – Impact
Turkish proliferation collapses the NATO nuclear umbrella and cause regional war Kibaroglu, Professor at Bilikent University 2005 (Mustafa, February 9, “http://www.iranwatch.org/privateviews/WINEP/perspex-winep-beyondiran-rapporteur-021505.htm)
An additional factor is the perceived weakness of NATO, which is seen as being in a protracted process of soul searching since the
end of the Cold War. Moreover, NATO, which used to be the international organization most trusted by the Turks, turned down Turkey's request to enact Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty in the days leading up to the United States war in Iraq. Furthermore, a huge number of Turks are unhappy with the policies of the United States toward the Kurdish groups in northern Iraq, a region that was ruled by the Turks for centuries and then lost to the British after the demise of the Ottoman Empire. Many believe that the United States is helping the Kurds build an independent state, regardless of what the American diplomats are asserting publicly. Some even argue that a confrontation with the United States over northern Iraq is a scenario, if a far-fetched one. Having heard what was said and written in U.S. media after the failure of the troopbasing resolution in the Turkish Parliament on March 1, 2003, many that Turks maintain Turkey must be powerful against the United States.

Turkey should not develop a nuclear weapons capability. Turkey does not need to possess nuclear weapons to protect itself from its rivals. A Turkish nuclear weapons capability would lead to the closure of NATO's nuclear umbrella, which is still a credible deterrent. Also, such an eventuality could, in the future, bring more trouble to Turkey in the form of war by proxy by the country's neighbors.

NATO nuclear umbrella is the lynchpin to prevent global proliferation Klein US Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs 2004 (Dale, May 10, http://www.csdr.org/2004book/Klein.htm)

Before I discuss this threat in more detail, I would like to point out some positive action that has already been taken. It is my opinion that

the NATO nuclear umbrella agreement has prevented more countries from developing nuclear weapons than all the treaties we have developed. Many, if not all, of the original NATO countries had the technical and financial ability to design and build a nuclear weapon. However, by participating in the NATO agreement, the need to do so, both perceived and real, was reduced. There are no similar agreements in the Middle East and other regions. Therefore, we have seen the desire of several countries, including Iran, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, India, and North Korea, to develop nuclear weapons. In fact, since the end of the Cold War the
number of countries that possess the knowledge, materials, and technical capability to produce nuclear weapons has nearly doubled.

That leads to extinction Utgoff, Deputy Director of the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of the Institute for Defense Analysis 2002 (Victor A , Survival Vol 44 No 2 Proliferation, Missile Defence and American Ambitions, Ebsco, accessed 6/29 widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear 'six-shooters' on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.
In sum,

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‡‡‡ Turkey Proliferation DA ‡‡‡

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Turkey Proliferation DA 1NC
Turkey sees the presence of TNWs as an incentive to not acquire nukes Matishak 9 (Martin, reporter at Global Security Newswire, “U.S. Could Pull Back Europe-Based Nukes,
State Department Official Says,” Global Security Newswire, http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20090805_4929.php) MJ
The military value of the Europe-based tactical weapons has "dropped precipitously since the days of the Cold War," Einhorn said. However, they continue play a role in the "cohesion" of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, he added without elaborating. In addition, "at least one" ally country believes the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons on it soil reduces the incentive for it to acquire its own nuclear weapons capability, Einhorn told the audience. Kristensen told Global Security Newswire yesterday in a telephone interview that Einhorn was referring to Turkey. In

its final report to lawmakers in May the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States said that the requirements of "extended deterrence in Europe are evolving, given the changing relationship with Russia" and the perception of some allies that they are "keenly vulnerable to Russian military coercion." Nations located near Russia believe that U.S. nonstrategic forces in Europe remain necessary to prevent the Kremlin from using its nuclear arsenal as a means of coercion against them, according to the report. It warns that the United States should not abandon "strategic equivalency with Russia" and should not cede to Moscow "a posture of superiority in the name of de-emphasizing nuclear weapons in U.S. military strategy."

If nuclear weapons were removed from Turkey, they would proliferate Khaleej Times 10 (“NATO debates future of U.S. nuclear arms in Europe,” Khaleej Times Online,
http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticle08.asp? xfile=data/international/2010/April/international_April1246.xml&section=international) NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said that while the 28-member Western security alliance must debate the matter, he personally thought U.S. nuclear weapons must stay in Europe. “I do believe that the presence of American nuclear weapons in Europe is an essential part of a credible deterrent,” he told reporters. Clinton to explain principles A senior U.S. official said
Clinton would lay out some guiding principles during the dinner meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Tallinn, the Estonian capital. Washington and Rasmussen have stressed the need for unity among the 28 NATO states and while no agreement is expected in Tallinn, the alliance aims to set out its nuclear stance in a new strategic vision due to be approved at a summit in November. Analysts say tactical nuclear arms have little military rationale in a post-Cold War world, especially since readiness had been so reduced that they would take months to deploy. But a key concern is that any move to remove NATO nuclear weapons

could prompt Turkey to develop its own deterrent, given its worries about nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.

A nuclear Turkey would cause nuclear confrontations Deliso 5 (Christopher, American journalist and travel writer, “Plame, Pakistan, a Nuclear Turkey, and

the Neocons, http://www.antiwar.com/deliso/?articleid=8091) MJ An even more frightening prospect is a nuclear Turkey. The country has been militarily subsidized even more than Pakistan; mass military aid and technology transfer were justified first of all by Turkey's status as a key Cold War ally and thereafter as a bulwark of secular Islam, holding the wall against Syria, Iran, and Iraq. However, the very same American leaders who have been arming Turkey and allowing, in some cases even profiting from, nuclear smuggling there have also ruined the delicate balance of regional power with the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and brought the world far closer to nuclear confrontations. In the former case, they put huge strain on the "pro-Western" Musharraf government, strengthening the hand of fundamentalist Islamists in both the mosque and in the armed forces. Musharraf has survived multiple assassination attempts, but there is no guarantee that he will enjoy lucky
escapes forever. If he goes, what then? Any coup by a populist, fundamentalist-based leader would instantly put both Pakistan and India on high alert, taking us back to previous near-apocalyptic nuclear showdowns. Mired in numerous other bloody commitments of its own making, there's no certainty that the U.S. could finesse the situation as it did in 1990.

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Uniqueness
Turkey feels comfortable in the status quo because of the protection of nuclear weapons Bell 9 (Alexandra, Project Manager at the Ploughshares Fund, “Turkey’s Nuclear Crossroads,”
http//www.good.is/post/turkeys-nuclear-crossroads/) MJ At the moment, Turkey seems alright with the status quo. It does not have a nuclear adversary , and in addition to being covered by NATO’s strategic security umbrella, it also houses an estimated 50 to 90 tactical nuclear weapons. Turkish officials were cagey about discussing these weapons. A former Air Force general, following what
seemed to be the official line, denied that there were nuclear weapons in Turkey, saying they were removed at the end of the Cold War. This differed from the other officials I met, whose wink-wink references basically confirmed the presence of the nukes. They also

hinted that the weapons would be critically important if a certain neighbor got the bomb. Polling I had seen previously indicated ample public support in Turkey for giving up these weapons, but my trip there made it clear that polling, papers, and news reports are no substitute for actually going to a country and meeting with people. Most Turks I met would answer disarmament questions in entirely different ways, depending on whether or not Iran was referenced.

Removing tactical nuclear weapons from Turkey will be difficult, but not impossible. In order to move towards a world free of nuclear weapons, U.S. policy makers have to start thinking about how things are connected . Countries like Turkey rely on

nuclear weapons for political and security reasons. To feel comfortable without nukes, these countries must be convinced that their neighbors will not acquire them. That means efforts to reduce
nuclear stockpiles—including tactical nukes—and efforts to stop the creation of new nuclear programs must happen in concert.

No proliferation in Turkey because of US nuclear umbrella Barkey 9 (Henri, international relations professor-Leigh University, “Turkey's Perspectives on Nuclear

Weapons and Disarmament,” Carnegie Middle East Center, http://carnegie-mec.org/publications/? fa=23975&lang=en) MJ Turkey lacks a coherently articulated national policy vis-à-vis nuclear weapons. This is partly due to the fact that as a member of NATO it is a direct beneficiary of the US nuclear umbrella and because the United States maintains a number of nuclear weapons at the Incirlik Air Force base in southern Turkey. The absence of such a policy is also the result of the unclear demarcation of lines of authority between civilian and military leaders on issues of national defense. While this may not have been a problem in the past, civil-military relations have been strained under the

current ruling government, led by the Justice and Development Party (AKP). Until recently, when it came to setting national priorities, the military establishment’s role could best be described as primus inter pares. The AKP’s preoccupation with expanding Turkey’s role in the region and its push to reform Turkish state structures, including the military’s prerogatives, are radically challenging the military’s control of the national security agenda.

Turkey is not proliferating because of US tactical nuclear weapons Harvey 6/24 (Henri, professor at Lehigh University and visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, Global Insider: Turkey's Nuclear Ambitions, World Politics Review, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/5881/global-insider-turkeys-nuclear-ambitions) MJ Technically, it should not matter to the proliferation debates. Turkey is unique, in that it does not need nuclear weapons because it enjoys the NATO and American nuclear umbrella that includes some 90 tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Turkey proper. A Turkish nuclear energy program would, on the other
hand, help reduce dependence on imported gas and oil. But even here, one nuclear plant would not make much of a difference, given the growing Turkish economy and the corresponding increase in its energy needs.

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Uniqueness
Turkey thinks the security relationship is important Larrabee 10 (F. Stephen, National Security Council, Troubled partnership : U.S.–Turkish relations in an

era of global geopolitical change, Rand, pg 4) The security relationship remains important for Turkey as well. Turkey lives in a tough and volatile neighborhood and has disputes with several neighbors (i.e., Syria, Iraq, Greece, and Armenia). It also is within range of missiles fired from Iran and Iraq. Thus, Turkey views its security relationship with the United States as an important insurance policy against its growing exposure to risks coming from the Middle East. Although U.S. involvement in the Middle East also entails risks for Turkey, on balance, Turkey benefits from the U.S. military presence in adjacent regions. The United States is also Turkey’s most important arms supplier. Despite recent efforts at diversification,

Turkey still conducts roughly 80 percent of its defense-industrial activity with the United States. Large numbers of Turkish officers have been trained in the United States.3 This has allowed the Turkish armed forces to develop close ties to their American counterparts and obtain a deeper knowledge of U.S. military operational doctrine and thinking.

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Link
Nuclear withdrawal leads countries like Turkey to proliferation Laird 9 (Burgess, national security analyst, “A Guide to the Challenges Facing President Obama's Nuclear Abolition Agenda,” Carnegie

Council, http://www.cceia.org/resources/articles_papers_reports/0025.html) MJ Many disarmament advocates have argued for a withdrawal of U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons from Europe for quite some time. The argument is that these weapons no longer have any operational utility as they were deployed to offset the sizeable advantage enjoyed by Soviet conventional forces—a quantitative advantage that disappeared with the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union—and that their number, size and geographic dispersal makes both the U.S. and Russian weapons difficult and costly to control and secure. In short, they are proliferation nightmares. Critics point out that such arguments neglect the views of our allies, who see these weapons as concrete symbols of U.S. extended deterrence guarantees. And to be sure, the high value of these weapons has been frequently reaffirmed, most emphatically, in NATO's 1999 "Strategic Concept." The Strategic Concept asserts that "The Alliance will maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces based in Europe…The Alliance's conventional forces alone cannot ensure credible deterrence. Nuclear weapons make a unique

contribution in rendering the risks of aggression against the Alliance incalculable and unacceptable. Thus, they remain essential to preserve the peace." Many U.S. allies, the argument proceeds, especially the newer member states of NATO as well as Turkey and Japan would interpret a withdrawal of the non-strategic nuclear weapons as a significant weakening of U.S. security commitments and, in response, some allies might well undertake nuclear weapons programs of their own to ensure their security.

If the United States removes the tactical nuclear weapons, Turkey would proliferate. Global Security Newswire 10 (“U.S. Urged to Remove Tactical Nukes in Europe,” NTI,
http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20100422_3466.php) MJ “Nuclear deterrence based in Europe must remain , as it preserves close trans-Atlantic ties and allows for greater flexibility in deterrence," Estonian Foreign Minister Urmas Paet said as the NATO summit

began. While not specifically touching on nuclear weapons, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reaffirmed Washington's commitment to providing a strong defense to its partners. "Let me be clear," Clinton said to journalists in Tallinn, "our commitment to Estonia and our other allies is a bedrock principle of the United States and we will never waver from it." NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen suggested in an interview he believed the tactical arms should remain in Europe. "If we look at today's world, then there is no alternative to nuclear arms in NATO's deterrent capability," Rasmussen said. "My personal opinion is

that the stationing of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe is part of deterrence to be taken seriously," he said (Agence France-Presse/Raw Story, April 22). NATO hopes to finalize its nuclear position at a meeting next
November in Portugal, Reuters reported. On Monday, Rasmussen said, "No [nuclear] decision will be taken in Tallinn." "But I do think the principles of NATO's nuclear discussion are already clear: first that no ally will take unilateral decisions and second that as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, NATO will need a nuclear deterrent." Belgian Foreign Ministry spokesman Patrick Deboeck said the alliance must be in full agreement on whatever is decided. "We think it is important to maintain the credibility of nuclear deterrence, but we also see the possibility to go further" on nuclear arms reductions, he said. "NATO has a role to play on tactical nuclear weapons." The Center for European Reform's Tomas Valasek said that some NATO members in Central Europe could see the removal of the U.S. gravity bombs as "a unilateral step taken by their big Western allies that puts Russia's concerns ahead of theirs ... so it will be a divisive question." There are also concerns that such a pullout could lead Turkey

to seek its own nuclear weapons as a hedge against potential nuclear arms held by other Middle Eastern states (David Brunnstrom, Reuters/Washington Post)

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Link
Tactical Nuclear Weapons removal causes Allied prolif—nuclear umbrella Spring and McNamara 10 (Baker, F.M. Kirby Research Fellow in National Security Policy, Sally, Senior

Policy Analyst in European Affairs, “President Obama Must Not Remove Nuclear Weapons from Europe,” Heritage Foundation) MJ The vast majority of America’s allies in Europe have not sought to join the club of nuclear weapons powers, largely because they enjoy the comfort of the U.S.’s nuclear umbrella. However, America’s unilateral nuclear disarmament may prompt some nations—particularly Poland in light of Moscow’s war gaming and Warsaw’s general sense of a transatlantic distancing— to seek alternate security insurance. Indeed, Turkey and countless other non-nuclear powers under the NATO umbrella could further be tempted to fill the security vacuum created by America’s unilateral disarmament by seeking their own weapons or forming alliances with other nuclear powers. The removal of American tactical nuclear weapons could also encourage a hostile nation to seek similar weapons if it perceives America’s indifference to the transatlantic alliance. Russia and rogue states such as Iran and Syria could be emboldened by America’s retreat from its security commitments to Europe. Russia has already proved itself to be an
authoritarian power, seeking to regain influence over its former satellites. In short, the ramifications of this measure are unpredictable and likely to be contrary to President Obama’s goal of nuclear disarmament.

The removal of US TNWs would lead to corrosive internal debate in NATO and nuclear Turkey Podvig 10 (Pavel, researcher at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University,
“What to do about tactical nuclear weapons,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, http://www.thebulletin.org/webedition/columnists/pavel-podvig/what-to-do-about-tactical-nuclear-weapons) MJ However, change is in the air. While the presence of U.S. nonstrategic weapons in Europe (based in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey specifically) has always had nongovernmental critics, now some of these individual governments are raising questions as well. Germany was the first to break
ranks; its officials began speaking favorably about the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe several years ago. And last November, Berlin officially committed itself to the removal of U.S. weapons from German territory. Similarly, in early February, the Polish and Swedish foreign ministers urged both the United States and Russia to reduce the number of tactical weapons in Europe. Most recently, Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Norway announced that they will demand that the United States remove the weapons from Europe. Nonetheless, there are still influential players who want the weapons to

remain in Europe. Their key argument is that if the U.S. nuclear weapons are removed, NATO members would no longer trust Washington's commitment to protecting Europe. Such a move, the argument goes, will lead to all kinds of negative consequences--from triggering "a corrosive internal debate" within NATO to Turkey deciding to pursue its own nuclear weapon capability.

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Link
Turkey is afraid of Iran-wants to keep US TNWs Sokolski 7 (Henry, Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, “What Nuclear

Challenges Might the EU Meet?,” http://www.npolicy.org/files/20070616-Sokolski-Talk-AixEnProvenceConference.pdf) MJ Many officials within NATO are inclined to draw down the number of US tactical nuclear weapons Europe. If such reductions were occasioned by Russia’s reduction or elimination of the number of such weapons it
has deployed, by a NATO commitment to prepare for the possible redeployment such weapons in time of war or crisis, and by deployment of European missile defenses against the emerging Iranian missile threat, then the optimal number of forward-deployed US tactical systems might be zero. One country that might disagree with this view, though, is Turkey. It

is trying to figure out how to live with a nuclear weapons armed neighbor, Iran; is disappointed by its inability to be fully integrated into the EU; and is toying with getting its own nuclear capabilities. Whether or not Turkey does choose to go its own way and acquire a nuclear weapons-option of its own will depend on several factors, including Ankara’s relations with Washington, Brussels, and Tehran. To a very significant degree, though, it also will depend on whether or not the EU Members States are serious about letting Turkey join the EU. The dimmer these prospects look, the greater is the likelihood of that Turkey will chose to hedge its political, economic, and security bets by seeking a nuclear weapons-option of its own. This poses a difficult choice for the EU. Many
key members are opposed to letting Turkey join the EU. There are arguments to favor this position. Yet, if Turkey should conclude that its interests are best served by pursuing such a nuclear weapons-option, it is almost certain to fortify the conviction of Egypt, Algeria, and Saudi Arabia to do the same. This will result in the building up a nuclear powder keg on Europe’s doorstep and significantly increase the prospect for nuclear terrorism and war.

Turkey is being threatened by Iran Kalyoncu 5 (Mehmet, international relations analyst, “How to Handle Turkey’s Legitimate Nuclear

Aspirations (Turkey with Nuclear Weapons?, http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1527797/posts) MJ It is more obvious than ever that as long as it is headed by a man who does not hesitate to publicly pronounce his aspirations to wipe another sovereign country off the map, nuclear Iran will continue to be a major threat to Turkey. Even if Iran does not directly target Turkey, its nuclear confrontation with third parties equally threatens Turkey’s national security because the effects of nuclear warfare are not limited geographically as in conventional warfare. In this case, Iran’s confrontation with ever-vigilant Israel is a perfect threat for Turkey. Iran is rapidly rolling back from former President Khatami’s tolerant discourse, towards the revolutionary

discourse of the 1980’s. On October 26, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad declared the annihilation of the Zionist regime as one of his government’s priorities during his speech at the “World without Zionism” conference. Referring to Iran’s revolutionary leader Ayatollah Khomeini, Mr. Ahmedinejad insisted “As the Imam said; Israel must be wiped off the map.”[i] One could reasonably attribute such an extreme statement to Mr. Ahmadinejad’s political inexperience and ignorance of diplomacy. Nonetheless, it represents a major shift for Iran from Mr. Khatami’s moderation back to the revolutionary doctrine. More importantly, Mr. Ahmedinejad is not exhibiting an attitude original to him and his government. As he puts it in his statements, he justifies his antiIsraeli attitude by referring to earlier statements of Iran’s revolutionary leader Ayatollah Khomeini. That makes the case even more critical and threatening. Both Tel-Aviv and Washington have responded in a relatively calmer mood to Mr. Ahmedinejad’s radical statements. Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman Mark Regev, likening Mr. Ahmedinejad to another extremist and Hamas leader Mahmoud Zahar, noted “[t]he problem with these extremists is that they followed through on their violent declarations with violent actions.”[ii] Similarly, White House press secretary Scott McClellan added “[I]t confirms what we have been saying about the regime in Iran. It underscores the concerns we have about Iran’s nuclear intentions.”[iii] Although calm, these responses might set the stage for another legitimized “freedom operation” next to Turkey’s border. Even if Turkey is not likely to be a direct

target of any nuclear attack, it may still want to have nuclear weapons to deter attacks between its neighbors that would indirectly and yet extensively affect Turkey, especially indirect effects such as trans-border conflicts and forced migrations. A nuclear arms race reciprocated by other regional powers such as Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iraq would only increase Turkey’s legitimate desire to obtain nuclear weapons. However, just as was the case in the 1980s

and 1990s, Turkey is highly likely to face strong international opposition against its nuclear aspirations, most notably from the US and the EU.

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Link
Turkey Fears Nuclear Iran-would lead to regional catastrophe Bell 9 (Alexandra, Project Manager at the Ploughshares Fund, “Turkey’s Nuclear Crossroads,”
http://www.good.is/post/turkeys-nuclear-crossroads/) MJ
I recently returned from a trip to Turkey, coordinated by the Truman National Security Project, an institute that recruits, trains, and positions a new generation of Americans to lead on national security. In discussions with government officials,

civil servants, retired military personnel, academics, and businessmen, two things became clear: First, that it is difficult to be positioned at a geographical and societal crossroads, and second, that you are stuck with your neighbors. The Turks look around them and see conflicts and threats in most directions. I was interested in what the Turks saw when they looked towards Tehran. Specifically, I asked about the threat, perceived or real, from the Iranian nuclear program. The answers varied sharply . Some dismissed the threat, noting that the Turks and the Persians had not been in conflict for 500 years. Others shuddered at the mention of a nuclear Iran. But regardless of the official line that Iran is an important trading partner and a regional ally, I think the Turks would not abide a nuclear Iran. In fact, when asked directly about the response to Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon, a high-ranking official from the Foreign Ministry said that Turkey would follow suit—immediately. I took this as a confirmation of the oft-repeated theory that if Iran attains a nuclear weapon, surrounding nations will acquire them too, resulting in a “cascade of proliferation.” Throwing multiple nuclear arsenals into a region with many long-standing tensions, disputed borders, and conflicting ethno-religious sects is a recipe for catastrophe.

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Impact
Nuclear Turkey would offset power in Europe and the Middle East Deliso 5 (Christopher, American journalist and travel writer, “Plame, Pakistan, a Nuclear Turkey, and the

Neocons, http://www.antiwar.com/deliso/?articleid=8091) MJ Proud Turkey has always wanted to be seen as an important country. Were it to declare itself a nuclear one, it would become, for a time at least, the most important country in the world. The entire balance of power in Europe and the Middle East would be radically altered overnight, and the overall side results would not at all be positive for Turkey or anyone else – except of course for those cashing in on illicit nuclear sales. Nevertheless, the country is probably
technologically capable by now. A new question that has thus arisen, as articulated recently by Turkish scholar Mehmet Kalyoncu on Balkanalysis.com, is the following: "If the U.S. and the EU do not approve of Turkey having nuclear weapons, what do they have to offer Turkey instead?"

Turkey proliferation creates regional instability AHMP 99 (American Hellenic Media Project, “Community Urged to Protest Against A Nuclear Turkey,”

http://www.ahmp.org/Nuketurk.html) MJ The media has been characteristically silent on an issue that could radically transform the geopolitical landscape of Europe, the Middle East and Central Asia: Turkey's program to construct nuclear reactors on its southern coastline. American, Canadian and European companies are

bidding for the right to sell sensitive nuclear reactor technology to Turkey. In 1981, Israeli fighter jets bombed Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor on the grounds that the reactor constituted the key to developing an Iraqi nuclear weapons program, and thus a threat to regional stability. Given Turkey's increasingly expansionist agenda towards EU and NATO-

member Greece, its belligerent posture towards neighbors Armenia and Syria, and its selfimage as a regional superpower -- which led to a coup attempt against Azerbaijan's government in 1995 -- a far larger threat to regional stability would be posed by a nuclear Turkey. The development of a Turkish nuclear capability will arguably constitute the most significant geostrategic crisis to face Hellenism, Armenia, and the development of democracy in the Balkans and southwestern Asia in the coming century. As reported by Economist
correspondent Marcia Kurop in The Christian Science Monitor ("Accommodating Turkey", 7/31/98), Turkey's nuclear aspirations are an axial reason underlying the Turkish state's dogged determination to make its occupation of Cyprus permanent: " the Turks - in

contrast to what the United States tries to portray as a local, Balkan-type conflict - openly admit their strategic argument for wanting an independent north: shipping to Turkey's southern coast;
the development of nuclear facilities in southern Turkey; oil shipping ports to be based in Ceyhan; fortified bases at Adana and Iskanderun; military relations with Israel. All are part of their need for an independent north."

Nuclear Turkey will create nuclear arms race in Balkans and Mideast Spyropoulos 99 (P.D., Executive Director of American Hellenic Media Project, Boston Globe, p.
http://www.ahmp.org/bosglob8.html 2/18/10) Many are now convinced that a nuclear Turkey, already among the most highly militarized states in the world, will be the surest way to usher in a nuclear arms race in the Balkans and Mideast, two of the world's most volatile regions, and both at Europe's doorstep. Turkey's military adventurism in the Balkans, Cyprus, Central Asia and the Middle East should further underscore the fact that placing nuclear power into the hands of governments that have not yet developed the maturity to harness it can soon develop into the greatest global security threat of the coming century.

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2NC Impact Scenario-Russia
If US pulls their weapons, Russia will fill in Global Security Newswire 10 (“U.S. Urged to Remove Tactical Nukes in Europe,” NTI,

http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20100422_3466.php) MJ Calls to pull the U.S. weapons from Europe could lead certain NATO states to seek corresponding action by Russia, which is believed to hold a significantly larger stockpile of tactical nuclear bombs within its borders. A high-level U.S. official said it was important for NATO to come to a
single position on the issue. "Our principle, and most important guidepost for moving into this discussion is that we don't want to divide the alliance on this issue," the official said. Some NATO members from Eastern Europe, such as

Estonia, favor keeping the weapons in Europe as a safeguard against Russia, which has moved to modernize its own nuclear forces and has placed them at the center of its broader deterrence strategy (see GSN, Feb. 17).

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2NC Impact Scenario-Other Countries Proliferate
If US removes TNWs, Turkey with face a direct threat from Iranian missiles Warren and Kelleher 9 (Scott, Director of General Citizen, Helen, Professor at University of Maryland,

“Getting to Zero Starts Here: Tactical Nuclear Weapons,” Arms Control Association, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_10/Kelleher) MJ The principal issues with the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons are political and conceptual, rather than straightforwardly military, with the single but critical exception of the risk of terrorist seizure. The notion of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, with tactical weapons serving as a real or potential down payment on a security commitment, particularly in Europe, still has significant traction within the Obama administration. Key factions in the Pentagon and perhaps in the Department of State
argue that the United States must still provide allies substantial security support, especially with Iran and North Korea deeply engaged in nuclear programs. This is the case despite the indifference of many NATO allies toward technical

weapons or, in some cases, direct demands for elimination. Some European countries, especially elites in the newer central and eastern European member states, attach a high symbolic importance to the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons on European soil as evidence of U.S. security guarantees. Turkey also is thought to be particularly concerned about any withdrawal because it faces a more direct threat from Iranian missiles, although it is now included in the new U.S. plan for a European missile defense system.

Nuclear weapons are critical to protect Turkey from neighbors with the bomb Bell 9 (Alexandra, Project Manager at the Ploughshares Fund, “Turkey’s Nuclear Crossroads,”
http://www.good.is/post/turkeys-nuclear-crossroads/) MJ At the moment, Turkey seems alright with the status quo. It does not have a nuclear adversary, and in addition to being covered by NATO’s strategic security umbrella, it also houses an estimated 50 to 90 tactical nuclear weapons. Turkish officials were cagey about discussing these weapons. A former Air Force general, following what seemed to be
the official line, denied that there were nuclear weapons in Turkey, saying they were removed at the end of the Cold War. This differed from the other officials I met, whose wink-wink references basically confirmed the presence of the nukes. They also hinted that the

weapons would be critically important if a certain neighbor got the bomb. Polling I had seen previously indicated ample public support in Turkey for giving up these weapons, but my trip there made it clear that polling, papers, and news reports are no substitute for actually going to a country and meeting with people. Most Turks I met would answer disarmament questions in entirely different ways, depending on whether or not Iran was referenced.

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2NC Impact Scenario-Other Countries Proliferation
US presence key to defend against Middle East threats Kirisci 98 (Kemal, Department of Political Science Boğaziçi University, MERICA, TURKEY AND THE UNITED
STATES: AMBIVALENT ALLIES, 2(4)) MJ
Turkey's full backing for U.S. efforts in the Kuwait crisis and the building of close links with Israel in the 1990s marked a sharp change in this policy. When Iraq seized Kuwait, following thinly veiled threats from Saddam Hussein directed against Turkey, the Turkish government supported UN sanctions and allied military operations against Iraq. While that decision at the time engendered considerable differences and criticism within Turkey it signalled a U.S.-Turkish convergence of opinion in the Middle East. President Turgut Ozal also actively sought to participate in the Madrid peace process and had already advocated the idea of building water pipelines from Turkey across the Middle East as a project to help promote peace in the area. Although Turkey was not

invited to the Madrid talks it did later take, with U.S. support and urging, an active part in the multilateral talks' working groups. This also coincided with a period when Turkey began to develop relations with Israel, especially after the September 1993 Israel-PLO agreement. Since then this relationship

has expanded considerably and clearly receives active U.S. support, including U.S. participation in the first naval exercise between Israel and Turkey in January 1998. The United States did object, though, to certain aspects of Israeli-

Turkish military cooperation particularly in the area of anti-missile technology. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East is another common concern to both Turkey and the United States. Turkish defense strategy is based on deterrence, including its NATO membership and air force strike capability. But during the Kuwait crisis, U.S. and NATO anti-missile batteries had to be deployed in southeastern Turkey to defend against potential Iraqi missile attacks. Clearly, the absence of Turkish anti- missile capability makes Turkey vulnerable to its three Middle Eastern neighbors amply equipped with weapons of mass destruction. The Turkish military is paying growing attention to this threat and countering it is an important part of Israel-Turkish military cooperation. In contrast, U.S. strategy has focused mostly on preventing proliferation by pressuring exporters--Russia, China and North Korea--not to supply these countries. In Iraq's case, the sanctions regime succeeded in destroying stockpiles where possible.

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‡‡‡ Turkey Relations DA ‡‡‡

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Turkey Relations DA 1NC Short (1/2)
1. How the US deals with the PKK is the litmus test for relations Larrabee 8 (F Stephen, Fellow at RAND,

http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG694.sum.pdf, AD: 6/27/10) jl Turkish officials will be watching closely to see how U.S. strategy toward Iraq evolves. Ankara does not want to see a precipitous withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq because that could lead to greater sectarian violence and draw in other outside powers—especially Iran and Syria, but possibly also Saudi Arabia. However, Turkey is adamantly opposed to increased deployment of U.S. troops in northern Iraq. Turkish officials have warned that such a move would sharply reduce Turkish cooperation with the United States and exacerbate strains in U.S.–Turkish relations. The strains in Turkey’s relations with the European Union are likely to affect U.S.–Turkish relations. In the past, when its relations with the European Union were bad, Turkey could always turn to the United States for support. But this option is no longer available. For the first time in decades, Turkey’s relations with both Washington and Brussels are strained at the same time. The simultaneous deterioration of relations with the United States and the European Union has reinforced a growing sense of vulnerability and nationalism in Turkey. Turkey increasingly feels that it cannot count on the support of its traditional allies and must rely on its own devices (see pp. 22– 23). In short, the United States will need to get used to dealing with a more independent-minded and assertive Turkey—one whose interests do not always coincide with U.S. interests, especially in the Middle East. The Kurdish issue in particular could cause new divergences. How the United States handles this issue is likely to be a litmus test of the value of the U.S.–Turkish alliance in Turkish eyes. If the United States fails to take action to deal more resolutely with the PKK issue, U.S.–Turkish relations are likely to deteriorate further, and anti-Americanism in Turkey, already strong, is likely to grow.

2. Closer relations with the US stop Turkish proliferation Kibaroglu 8 [Mustafa, Middle East Policy, 12-22-2008, http://www.articlearchives.com/asia/western-asiasaudai-arabia/2282012-1.html]
Even though there is much talk in Turkey about why the state should develop nuclear weapons among those who approach the issue from the perspective of national pride and prestige as well as security, most decision makers are quite aware that the possible consequences of going nuclear would mean violation of Turkey's international obligations. Outside powers point to the difficulties Turkey may have to endure, but it also is state practice in institutions such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the military. These entities have always formulated and conducted Turkey's foreign and security

policies in line with Ataturk's dictum, "peace at home, peace in the world." Against this backdrop, one should not expect Turkey to embark upon a rushed nuclear weapons program, even if Iran crosses the critical threshold. Should this happen, however, what will keep Turkey from developing nuclear weapons will not simply be responsible state practice. The extent to which Turkey's allies are willing and able to allay its fears emanating from the worsening regional security situation will also have a decisive effect on policy makers. Improving relations with the United States and the EU, as well as strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime, will make the greatest impact in this regard.

3. A nuclear Turkey destabilizes the Middle East Deliso 5 (Christopher, Balkan-based Journalist, November 21, 2005 http://www.antiwar.com/deliso/?
articleid=8091)
Proud Turkey has always wanted to be seen as an important country. Were

it to declare itself a nuclear one, it would become, for a time at least, the most important country in the world. The entire balance of power in Europe and the Middle East would be radically altered overnight, and the overall side results would not at all be positive for Turkey or anyone else – except of course for those cashing in on illicit nuclear sales. Nevertheless, the country is probably technologically capable by now. A new question that has thus arisen, as articulated recently by Turkish scholar Mehmet Kalyoncu on Balkanalysis.com, is the following: "If the U.S. and the EU do not approve of Turkey having nuclear weapons, what do they have to offer Turkey instead?"

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4. That goes nuclear. Steinbach, ‘2 [John Centre for Research on Globalisation 2002 Israeli Nuclear weapons: a threat to peace, 3/3
http://www.converge.org.nz/pma/mat0036.htm] Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is
gaining momentum (and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major (if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon- for whatever reason- the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration

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Turkey Relations DA 1NC Long (1/4)
Relations improving -leading talks between Turkey and Israel AFP 7-1

[“US welcomes Turkey-Israel talks to ease rift.” AFP 7-1-10. http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jVlecxPq1_wz14K98Mwk4cYvsRAA]

The United States welcomed Thursday secret talks by Israel and Turkey to repair relations, saying its two allies have played a "valuable" role by working together. State Department spokesman Philip Crowley said the United States has spoken with each country about their relationship, which was badly damaged by a deadly Israeli raid on a Turkish aid flotilla of pro-Palestinian activists. "A relationship between Turkey and Israel is not only in the best interest of the region, it... supports our interests in the region as well," Crowley told reporters. He said Turkey and Israel had often worked together in the past in what he called a "valuable relationship." "We certainly support this kind of dialogue that hopefully can help repair the fractures that have existed in recent weeks and months," the spokesman added.
He did not elaborate on US involvement. But a senior Israeli source quoted in the Haaretz daily said the White House had been directly involved in pushing the talks, of which Israel's hawkish Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman was not informed. Turkey's Hurriyet daily said "the ground for the secret talks was laid" last week when Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan met with US President Barack Obama in Toronto. Turkey is one of the few Muslim-majority nations to recognize the Jewish state. But Ankara withdrew its ambassador, canceled military exercises and twice denied use of its airspace to Israeli military aircraft following the raid that killed eight Turks and a dual US-Turkish citizen. The secret talks in Brussels came days before Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visits Washington for a meeting with Obama, with whom he has had rocky ties. Crowley said he anticipated Netanyahu would give Obama "a report on the early stages of the Israeli investigation into the flotilla tragedy" and that the two would discuss "recent progress" on the Gaza Strip. In the wake of international outrage over the flotilla raid, Israel said it would lift its embargo on the crowded Palestinian coastal enclave -- which is ruled by the Islamist movement Hamas -- but maintain a naval embargo to keep out weapons. Crowley acknowledged it would take more time to start direct negotiations between Israel and Palestinian president Mahmud Abbas, who is based in the West Bank. Obama, meeting on Tuesday with Saudi King Abdullah, called for "bold" action in the Middle East to establish a Palestinian homeland alongside a secure Israel. "Having both sides commit to direct negotiations would, in fact, be the kind of bold step that we are looking for," Crowley said.

TNW removal kills US/Turkish relations Larrabee and Lesser, RAND, 02
[30 Dec, F. Stephen, Ian O. “Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty” http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1612/MR1612.ch7.pdf] The strategic relationship with the United States and the NATO se- curity guarantee (the two have traditionally been closely linked in Turkish perception) remain indispensable in relation to Russian risks. The NATO nuclear guarantee is still an essential part of this equation for Ankara. Turkish

attitudes toward nuclear questions are among the most conservative in NATO, because these questions are seen against a backdrop of heightened concern about Russia and WMD and ballistic missile risks emanating from the Middle East. In each case, the United States, together with Israel, is Turkey’s key partner in the management of these problems

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US-Turkey relations key to solve conflict in Central Asia, terrorism, trade, Iraq and dependence on Russian oil. Wimbush et al 07.

[Monroe J. Rathbone Professor of International Relations, Lehigh University Fellow, New America Foundation and Director, Center for Future Security Strategies, Hudson Institute. “Is The United States Losing Turkey?” Hudson Institute, 3-25-07. http://www.hudson.org/files/pdf_upload/Turkey%20PDF.pdf.]

If Turkey, a key friend and ally, turns away from the United States, the damage to American interests will be severe and long lasting. Turkey remains exceptionally important to the United States, arguably
even more so than during the Cold War. Here are some of the most important reasons why this is true:• Turkey is the top of an arc that starts in Israel and wends its way through Lebanon, Syria, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Iran. It abuts, or is proximate to, countries pivotal to American foreign policy and national security, whether because they are allies and friends, adversaries, or loci of instability. • Turkey’s critical

location means that instability within it could spill beyond its borders, with the unpredictable ripple effects traveling across its neighborhood, particularly the Middle East. 3 These examples are

noted in Phillip Gordon and Omer Taspinar, “Turkey on the Brink,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Summer 2006), pp. 65-66. 3• Turkey sits astride critical waterways and narrows (the Caspian Sea, the Black Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Bosporus and Dardanelles) that are channels for trade and the flow of energy to global markets. • Turkey is a passageway for the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, and its Mediterranean port of Ceyhan, is the terminus. Turkey is therefore essential to American efforts to reduce the dependence of Azerbaijan, and potentially Kazakstan and Turkmenistan, on Russia’s energy pipelines.•Turkey’s substantial economic and political ties with Georgia and Azerbaijan contribute to the stability of these countries, whose strategic significance far exceeds their standing in commonplace measures of power. Georgia is not only a corridor for the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, its stability is under threat because of its testy relationship with Russia and its conflicts with the Russian-supported secessionist statelets, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Azerbaijan is not only a major energy producer, but also a fellow Turkic country, whose territorial dispute with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh could boil over into war, just as it did in the 1990s, possibly igniting a wider conflagration that draws in Turkey (Azerbaijan’s ally) and Russia (Armenia’s patron) and putting the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline at risk. • Turkey is a democratic and secular Muslim, and its alliance with the United

States helps demonstrate that the United States can maintain friendly and productive ties with an array of Muslim countries—that America’s does not oppose Islam per se, but rather the violent extremists
who invoke it to justify their violence against innocents and their retrograde, intolerant agenda. This is crucial if the American campaign against terrorism is not to be seen by the world’s 1.3 billion Muslims, as Islamic terrorist groups would like it to be, as a war against Islam itself.• Turkey’s cooperation is essential to any durable political settlement in Iraq, particularly because it borders Iraq’s Kurdish north and fears that the emergence there of a Kurdish state would increase the already-considerable violence and resilient separatist sentiment in its own Kurdish-populated southeast. The fragmentation of Iraq could therefore very likely prompt

Turkish military intervention, which in turn could deal a death blow to the US-Turkish alliance, perhaps even culminating in Turkey’s exit from NATO. (Turkish forces intervened in northern Iraq to
attack the camps of the Kurdish separatist guerillas in the aftermath of the 1991Gulf War; in March 2003 roughly 1,500 Turkish troops entered this region, and Turkish Special Forces have reportedly carried out covert operations in post-Saddam Iraq.)• Turkey’s disillusionment with the West could prompt a reorientation of its foreign policy—away from the United States, the European Union (EU), and NATO, and toward a new multi-azimuth Gaullist strategy that looks to China, India, Iran, Russia, and Syria. Such a shift is already being discussed in Turkey, and the assumption that it amounts to bluff and bluster may prove short- sighted. The new strategic landscape created by the end of the Cold War may pose new threats to Turkey, but it also provides it a choice of new partners as well. While a rethinking of Turkish grand need not in itself undermine the alliance between Turkey and the United States, it could certainly do so if the force driving it is an anti-Western nationalism. •Turkey and the

United States both face the threat of terrorism, and Turkey’s cooperation is essential to any truly effective American policy against global terrorist networks. More specifically, Turkey could also serve
as a corridor that militant Islamists use to infiltrate Iraq and Turkey’s other neighbors

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Balkan destabilization causes global nuclear war Baker Former Secretary of State 95 (James, , http://www.hri.org/news/forpapers/95-04-30.frp) The first great European conflict of this century began in the Balkans. Unless we are careful, so may the last. Three years after the beginning of war in Bosnia, international attention remains riveted
on the fate of that tragic nation. But Macedonia is perhaps an even more dangerous fash point in the Balkans. Unless the international community takes strong action we could see the outbreak of a general Balkan war that could draw in the European powers and even the United States . And there will be no such strong action without firm U.S. leadership. The strategic importance of Macedonia transcends its size, about that of Vermont, and its population, just a fraction more than 2 million. It looms large because of the Balkans' unforgiving geography and Macedonia's own volatile ethnic mix. Tension between the country's Macedonian majority and Albanian minority -estimated at between 20% and 40%- already runs high. Should this tension escalate into civil war, it might prompt intervention from Albania to the west. Conflict could spread across Macedonia's northern border with Serbia -where there is a large and restive Albanian population in Kosovo. Greece, already consumed by an angry dispute with Macedonia, might be tempted to become involved. Turkey, Bulgaria and others could follow. Under such a scenario, the West Europeans, the United States and even Russia could be forced to pick sides -with disastrous consequences for the peace of Europe . The Clinton Administration is clearly aware of the risks in Macedonia but appears unwilling to take decisive action necessary to address them. <Card Continues> If we do not move quickly, there could be a repeat of the Bosnian humanitarian nightmare, as Macedonia plunges into chaos. But there is far more than humanitarianism at issue for U.S. policy-makers. The U.S. has fought three European wars in

the century -two hot and one cold- and three are enough. We should have learned by now that we cannot ignore a fundamental challenge to continental stability. If general instability occurs in Europe -and a deterioration of the situation in Macedonia risks precisely that- the U.S. will become involved whether we like it or not. It is better to accept the cost of deterrence now than pay
the price of broader conflict later.

Terrorism Causes Extinction Sid-Ahmed, political analyst 04
(Mohamed, Managing Editor for Al-Ahali, “Extinction!” August 26-September 1, Issue no. 705, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm)

What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also

speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers.

Turkey Relations DA 1NC Long (4/4)

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Trade wars cause global war Spicer, Olin Foundation, 96 (The Challenge from the East and the Rebirth of the West, p. 121)
The problem about the second approach is not simply that it won’t hold: satellite technology alone will ensure that consumers will begin to demand those goods that the East is able to provide most cheaply. More fundamentally, it will guarantee the emergence of a fragmented world in which natural fears will be fanned and inflamed . A world divided into rigid trade

blocs will be a deeply troubled and unstable place in which suspicion and ultimately envy will possibly erupt into a major war. I do not say that the converse will necessarily be true, that in a free trading world there will be an absence of all strife. Such a proposition would manifestly be absurd. But to trade is to become interdependent, and that is a good stop in the direction of world stability. With nuclear weapons at two a penny, stability will be at a premium in the years ahead. Civil War in Iraq escalates to Middle-East War Frazier 8(Derrick V, Assistant Professor, Political Science; and Robert Stewart-Ingersoll, Assistant Professor, Grand Valley State
University, “Another Inconvenient Truth: Why a U.S. Withdrawal from Iraq Would Be a Mistake,” The Illinois International Review, 5/2/08, http://www.ips.uiuc.edu/ilint/mt/iir/online/2008/07/frazier.html)

Perhaps nowhere are such ripe conditions for ethnic conflict more apparent than in Iraq right now,
where a repressive regime that represented and benefited the minority Sunni population has given way to a government that favors the interests of the majority Shia, as well as providing more influence for the Kurds, both of whom have withstood brutal repression and discrimination for several decades. Such transition represents an opportunity for previously disadvantaged groups to reap the benefits that they perceive as justifiably due, increasing the losses for the Sunni population so long in control of Iraq. Accentuating this loss for the Sunnis is the fact that they also happen to primarily occupy the part of Iraq that does not possess a wealth of oil resources, diminishing their ability to sustain a prosperous life by themselves in the near future. Given this, Iraq is ripe for a major sectarian conflict that exceeds the levels of violence witnessed thus far. Without the imposition of security (in physical, economic, political, and social terms), largely guaranteed by the U.S., the possibility of escalation into a full-scale civil war remains very real. As two prominent international security experts put it in 2006, “The only thing standing between Iraq and a descent into a Lebanon- or Bosnia-style maelstrom is 140,000 American troops, and even they are merely slowing the fall at this point.” Moreover, the conflict within Iraq to a large degree mirrors both the identity conflict as well as the traditional power politics game that defines the region as a whole. To be certain, this simplifies the Iraqi conflict quite a bit, given the in-fighting between sects of the same identity groups as well. However, in terms of the broader strategic interests of the regional powers, the defining fault-line in Iraq is centered on the recession of Sunni control over a core part of the Middle East, as well as the rise of Shiism, as evidenced by the changes in Iraq and the growth of Iranian power. Such a rise, if indeed led by Iran, would represent a severe threat to U.S. interests. Included in this threat is the one potentially directed toward Saudi Arabia, a regime who has lost some or all of its credibility among Sunnis and extremist Sunni groups like Al Qaeda. The overall strategic importance of the Iraq conflict is thus very high at the regional level, making it likely that without a strong U.S. presence, states like Iran and Saudia Arabia, as well as non-state actors like Al Qaeda will make greater efforts to intervene in Iraqi affairs than they are currently making. To these strategic regional considerations, we should also consider what would happen if a full scale civil war were to break out. Civil

wars tend to spread in disease-like fashion to surrounding countries, particularly if these countries possess similar dynamics of ethnic unrest. Unfortunately, in the Middle East countries surrounding Iraq do exhibit characteristics that make them susceptible to civil conflicts. These characteristics include persistent economic, political, and social grievances that seem to correlate highly with ethnic identities and repressive police states that lack popular legitimacy or peaceful means through which to resolve these grievances. Thus, we would expect that escalated conflict in Iraq will lead to outright conflict in these countries or widespread destabilization. Into this dangerous mix of conditions , several important spillover effects tend to occur. First, masses of refugees flow into neighboring countries . This is already occurring in the case of Iraq but would certainly increase if hostilities escalated. These mass flows lead to two further spillover effects: a straining of the host’s resources and a potential radicalization of neighboring populations through the dissemination of information regarding grievances and tales of brutality. Both increase the likelihood of destabilization in the host country and may lead to calls for the host government to intervene, a scenario likely to create further

Uniqueness (US-Turkey Relations Good)

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U.S.-Turkey relations haven’t deteriorated- working through the flotilla and Iran disagreements Rozen 10 (Laura, masters in politics-harvard, CSM correspondent, Politico, June 21, Obama’s Turkey Bind,
http://www.politico.com/blogs/laurarozen/0610/Obamas_Turkey_dilemma_.html?showall)BAF But in a region where the U.S. is stretched thin and short of even semireliable allies, the Obama administration is keeping its public criticism of Turkey muted and trying to move forward. The Obama administration “is in the worst of all worlds,” Eric Edelman, former U.S. ambassador to Turkey, told POLITICO. “The fundamental problem, I believe, which hasn’t been addressed, is that at this stage, the Turks believe we need them more than they need us. But they need us for a lot of things, too .” President Barack Obama and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan will both attend the G-20 meeting in Canada later this week. But U.S. officials were still vague about whether the two will meet on the sidelines, saying no meeting had been firmed up. Meanwhile, officials suggested that the Obama administration might try to use the quiet visit of Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak to Washington this week as an opportunity “to try to patch things up,” if possible, between Israel and Turkey, which have had strong defense ties. Turkey’s highly regarded envoy to Washington, Namik Tan, could be a constructive intermediary
for Washington but may have limited room for maneuver given the government he serves. A veteran diplomat who served as Turkey’s ambassador to Israel from 2007 to 2009, Tan is a colleague and friend to many senior officials in Israel’s Foreign Ministry. In an interview with POLITICO, Tan described being on the phone with Israel’s ambassador to Washington, Michael Oren, late last month to arrange a meeting between Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that was supposed to take place in Washington on June 1. A few hours after they set up the meeting, and as Davutoglu was sitting on the tarmac in Brazil waiting for his flight to the United States, Israeli commandos intercepted the Gaza aid flotilla, in an operation in which eight Turks and one Turkish-American were killed. .... But Tan insisted there has been no breach in the U.S.-Turkey

relationship in the wake of either the flotilla episode or Turkey’s vote against the Iran sanctions resolution. ... Tan said Turkey shares the United States’ concern about the prospect that Iran could get a nuclear weapon. But he said Turkey’s vote against the Iran sanctions resolution will allow Turkey to remain an intermediary with Iran and therefore enable the U.S. and the international community “to keep the door open to” Iran’s returning to the negotiating table. ... “We don’t doubt Turkey’s sincerity in trying to find a diplomatic way forward and a genuine way to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons, ” a senior administration official told POLITICO. “And they assert that what they were doing is consistent with our objectives.”

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Uniqueness (US-Turkey Relations Good)
US-Turkey relations stable: opposing ideas doesn’t mean relations have collapsed Katcher 6/3/10 (Ben, Policy Analyst, American Strategy Program, Are the U.S. and Turkey Still Allies?,

Washington Note, http://www.thewashingtonnote.com/archives/2010/06/conceptualizing) BAF Fellow Steven Cook, writing in Foreign Policy, suggests that the Flotilla incident is the latest evidence that dreams of a "model partnership" between the United States and Turkey are mere fantasy. Cook suggests conceiving of Turkey as something closer to a "strategic competitor" with interests that sometimes converge but often diverge from those of Washington, particularly in the Middle East. Cook says: The Obama administration has yet to
grapple with the ways the structural changes in the international system have affected U.S.-Turkey relations. All the talk about strategic cooperation, model partnership, and strategic importance cannot mask the fundamental shift at hand. The stark

reality is that while Turkey and the United States are not enemies in the Middle East, they are fast becoming competitors. Whereas the United States seeks to remain the predominant power in the region and, as
such, wants to maintain a political order that makes it easier for Washington to achieve its goals, Turkey clearly sees things differently.

The Turks are willing to bend the regional rules of the game to serve Ankara's own interests. If the resulting policies serve U.S. goals at the same time, good. If not, so be it... Given the mythology that surrounds the relationship, the divergence between Washington and Ankara has proved difficult to accept. Once policymakers recognize what is really happening, Washington and Ankara can get on with the job of managing the decline in ties with the least possible damage. Obama's goal should be to develop relations with Turkey along the same lines the United States has with Brazil or Thailand or Malaysia. Those relations are strong in some areas, but fall short of strategic alliances. "Frenemy" might be too harsh a term for such an arrangement, but surely "model partnership" is a vast overstatement. It's time to recognize reality. I
agree with much of Cook's analysis. He is certainly correct that Turkey and the United States are on opposing sides in the IsraelPalestine issue. The United States remains steadfastly committed to Israel, while Turkey under Prime Minister Erdogan has clearly distanced itself from the Jewish state and embraced the Palestinian cause. I also can see how disagreements between Washington and Ankara over Syria are likely to widen in the event of another conflict along Israel's northern border. On the other hand, there are

areas of significant cooperation including, most significantly, in Iraq. Ankara's influence there is widely considered constructive. On Iran, yes there are differences between the Turkish and American positions, particularly in light of the recent uranium fuel-swap agreement. But Turkey can be forgiven for seeking to chart its own path given that U.S. policy toward Iran has failed for decades. I think Turkey is sincere that it does not want Iran to have a nuclear weapon and time will tell whether there is, in fact, less distance between the Turkish and American positions than may appear at the moment.

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Uniqueness (US-Turkey Relations Good)
US Turkey relations fine- have their differences but so far not dividing Ghattas 6/13/10 (Kim, American University of Beirut BBC correspondent, BBC, Are regional issues splitting US
and Turkey, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/us_and_canada/10305519.stm) BAF In an interview with the BBC, US State Department official Phil Gordon said Washington was "disappointed
that (Turkey) didn't stand with the United States as a longstanding Nato ally". The assistant secretary of state for Europe and Eurasia said he did not doubt that Turkey was sincere in wanting to work with the international community to prevent Iran from pursuing a nuclear programme. Turkey voting against UN sanctions on Iran - 9 June 2010 Turkey voted against a US-backed resolution on tougher sanctions on Iran But he added Turkey

clearly had different views about the sanctions resolution. Despite the disappointment, US officials have tried to sound sanguine about the disagreements with Turkey. "Turkey and the United States have never been without their differences, and we have some important differences now, but we also have a lot in common that we're working together on," said Mr Gordon. Foreign policy evolving However, the tension raised questions in Washington about whether the US is losing Turkey as an ally. While the relationship may be changing, so far no one either here or in Turkey is worried about a breakdown. But everybody is closely watching Turkey's evolving foreign policy. Defence Secretary Robert Gates made comments in London that suggested Turkey was turning away from the West. While he did not quite state it as an established fact, he did make clear why he thought Ankara could be going in that direction. "I personally think that if there is anything to the notion that Turkey is, if you will, moving eastward," said Mr Gates, "it is, in my view, in no small part because it was pushed, and pushed by some in Europe refusing to give Turkey the kind of organic link to the West that Turkey sought." If this is the view in Washington, then it is likely the Obama administration will be careful not to act in a way that could further push Turkey towards the Arab and Islamic world. The US also needs Turkey in places like Iraq and Afghanistan . Turkey extending ties Turkey has also rejected the notion that it is looking more East with such a vehemence it seems to suggest it is worried about sending the wrong signals to the West . Continue reading the main story Nuh Yilmaz Seta (Turkish think-tank) Turkey is simply trying to "diversify its relations," says Nuh Yilmaz, the Washington DC director of the Turkish political think-tank Seta. It is pursuing ties with countries with which it had limited or bad contact before, he said. Turkey's vote at the UN was not about embracing Iran even if that was the impression it left. "We had no choice but to vote like this," said Mr Yilmaz. "Not because Iran is right, but because we had to stand by the deal that we reached with Iran, together with Brazil."

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Uniqueness (US-Turkey Relations Good)
U.S.-Turkey relationships increasing- already communicating “axis shift” problems
TÜRKÖNE 6/19/10 (MÜMTAZ’ER, Gazi University Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Today’s Zaman, Business group sees communication gap between US, Turkey, http://www.todayszaman.com/tzweb/news-213563-100-business-group-sees-communication-gap-between-us-turkey.html) BAF Ankara and Washington need to be more careful in conducting a healthy dialogue that does not allow for misunderstanding or a lack of communication, Ümit Boyner, the president of the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association (TÜSİAD), stated after talks with senior US officials in Washington, including US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, on Thursday. “I believe dialogue should continue in a way that does not allow for misunderstandings between parties and it should be normalized; that is to say, there is a need to avoid a sharp and accusatory discourse, one which could harm diplomatic relations and sensitivities,” Boyner was quoted as saying by the Anatolia news agency while speaking at a press

conference held at the TÜSİAD office in Washington. In addition to a 40-minute meeting with Clinton, a TÜSİAD delegation led by Boyner also had talks on Thursday with Philip Gordon, assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs, and US experts on Turkey. Gordon met on Wednesday with a delegation from the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) led by Adana deputy Ömer Çelik, the AK Party’s chairperson for external affairs. But the AK Party delegation did not meet with Clinton. Çelik, speaking to private NTV television late on Thursday, said his delegation had not requested a meeting with Clinton, responding to media speculation that the lack of contact with the US secretary of state was a sign of tension between the Turkish and US governments. Talk of Turkey’s “axis shift” away from the West is highly popular in the US capital, Boyner said in response to a question, Anatolia reported. She, however, noted that this issue was not clearly discussed during the meeting with Clinton. The agenda of this meeting was widely occupied by Turkey’s vote against a US-backed UN Security Council resolution for tougher sanctions on Iran, adopted on June 9, as well as the deadly May 31 raid by Israeli naval forces that led to the deaths of nine people on an aid flotilla in the eastern Mediterranean. According to Boyner, a letter sent by US President Barack Obama to Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was interpreted differently by Turkish and US officials. The

letter came ahead of a uranium swap that was jointly brokered by Turkey and Brazil and that Iran agreed to on May 17 prior to a US resolution seeking further sanctions against Iran. “I can openly say that it is not possible to say we are living through a very good period in regards to Turkish-American relations. There are concerns. However, we also got the impression that there are serious misunderstandings and communication problems,” Boyner said of the talks in
Washington.

Turkey-U.S. relations good- Turkish East and West ties good
TÜRKÖNE 6/12/10 (MÜMTAZ’ER, Gazi University Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Today’s Zaman, Is Turkey weaning itself off the us? http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-212874-109-centeristurkey-weaning-itself-off-the-us-bribyi-brmumtazerturkonecenter.html) BAF The nuclear swap deal signed by and between Turkey, Brazil and Iran, the Gaza crisis and the ensuing no-vote on the sanctions package on Iran at the United Nations Security Council have refueled the debate over whether Turkey is shifting direction away from the US. This question is familiar to observers of Turkey, who can answer immediately. Turkey is not distancing itself from the US. There are no major changes in Turkey’s foreign policy. Turkey is not experiencing any deviation in its relations with the Western world in general and with the US in particular. What it is doing is actually pursuing an active foreign policy in its region by complying with its alliance with the West. It closely monitors the balances in the region and makes finely tuned interventions. In the first instance, it is not very likely that Turkey will change its axis because there is no alternative to the current axis. As a strategic ally of the US, Turkey is becoming more influential and powerful in its immediate region. There are visible contributions of Turkey’s growing influence and power over policies concerning the region. With Obama’s election, the US has started to recover its damaged image in the Muslim world. And the policies Turkey is pursuing make this rising image of the US more visible. The enhanced reputation of Turkey in the region implies more security for Israel. It will be more difficult for the Muslim world to show hostility towards Israel at the expense of offending a Turkey that has good relations with Israel. Despite the crisis in Gaza, Turkey’s position vis-a-vis and its value for Israel have not changed. On a global scale the question “Is Turkey distancing itself from the US?” is all the more meaningless. However, this question is particularly important for the domestic political players who
seek to gain an advantage over the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party). Indeed, the different answers to this question have different effects on internal political balances.

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Uniqueness (US-Turkey Relations Good)
Relations high Hamiliton 10 (Lee, Dir. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars dir. of the Center on Congress at
Indiana University, Indiana Star, Staying friends with Turkey, June 28, http://www.indystar.com/article/20100628/OPINION12/6280305/1002/OPINION/Staying-friends-withTurkey)BAF On his first presidential trip abroad in April 2009, Barack Obama, addressing the Turkish parliament, said: "Turkey and the United States must stand together -- and work together -- to overcome the challenges of our time." But a few weeks ago Turkey, in a U.N. Security Council vote, opposed a sanctions resolution against
Iran, one of the Obama administration's top foreign-policy priorities. The no vote, in addition to the fallout from the deaths of eight Turks and an American at the hands of Israeli commandos aboard the Gaza-bound Mava Marmara, has many raising questions about the U.S.-Turkey relationship and the direction of Turkish foreign policy. Turkey has been a staunch NATO ally

since 1952, fields its second largest military, and is the alliance's sole Muslim member-state. It has nearly 2,000 noncombat troops serving in Afghanistan. Bases along its southern border with Iraq are a crucial transit point for the American military, and it has played an important role in maintaining stability in the region. The U.S.-Turkey relationship is not in freefall. Turkey is an emerging power of 90 million people in transition. The economy will grow at close to 7 percent this year, and Turkey could even pass Japan, France and Germany to become the world's ninth largest economy in the distant future. The origins of Turkey’s rapid economic ascent were free-market

reforms in the 1980s that gave rise to a more conservative and religious middle class in central and eastern Anatolia, in contrast to the historically secular power-brokers of Istanbul and Ankara. With economic clout came political clout, manifesting itself in the election of the Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002, led by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. This was a significant development in a country whose founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, enforced a strict state-sponsored secularism to signify what he called Turkey's "place in the modern world." The AKP has

sought to redress the historic power imbalance between weak politicians and a strong, interventionist military -- the guardian of Ataturk's secularist legacy -- through a series of constitutional reforms and legal
actions. However, other Turks, more secular and moderate -- though not well organized as an opposition-- have charged the government with abusing power and are skeptical of the AKP's commitment to a secular state and strong relations with the West.

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Uniqueness (US-Turkey Relations Bad)
U.S. Turkey relations are already deteriorated- Gaza flotilla and Iran relations prove Butler June 26, 10(DESMOND, journalist, Associated Press, “US: Turkey must demonstrate commitment to West”,
http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5infX83Qg20idVFtW3FcluMFJNncgD9GIR8780)

The United States is warning Turkey that it is alienating U.S. supporters and needs to demonstrate its commitment to partnership with the West. The remarks by Philip Gordon, the Obama administration's top diplomat on European affairs, were a rare admonishment of a crucial NATO ally. "We think Turkey remains committed to NATO, Europe and the United States, but that needs to be demonstrated," Gordon told The Associated Press in an interview this week. "There are people asking questions about it in a way that is new, and that in itself is a bad thing that makes it harder for the United States to support some of the things that Turkey would like to see us support ." Gordon cited Turkey's vote against a U.S.-backed United Nations Security Council resolution on new sanctions against Iran and noted Turkish rhetoric after Israel's deadly assault on a Gaza-bound flotilla last month. The Security Council vote came shortly after Turkey and Brazil, to Washington's annoyance, had brokered a nuclear fuel-swap deal with Iran as an effort to delay or avoid new sanctions. Some U.S. lawmakers who have supported Turkey warned of consequences for Ankara since the Security Council vote and the flotilla raid that left eight Turks and one Turkish-American dead. The lawmakers accused Turkey of supporting a flotilla that aimed to undermine Israel's blockade of Gaza and of cozying up to Iran.

Relations bad- went sour over genocide vote Kinzer 10 (Stephen, Northwester Univ journalism, The Guardian, Genocide Harms US Turkey Relations,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/mar/05/turkey-armenia-genocide-us-vote)

For the US house of representatives foreign affairs committee to decide that the killing of Armenians by Ottoman Turks in 1915 constituted genocide, as it did Thursday by a one-vote margin, would be acceptable and even praiseworthy if it were part of a serious historical effort to review all the great atrocities of modern history. But the singling out of Turks for censure, among all the killers of the 20th century, is something quite different. This vote was a triumph of emotion, a victory for ethnic lobbying, and another example of the age-old American impulse to play moral arbiter for the world. Turkey recalled its ambassador in Washington immediately after the vote, which was broadcast live on Turkish television. The resolution now goes to the full House of Representatives . Given the pull of moneyed politics, and President Obama's unwillingness or inability to bring Congress to heel on this issue, as Presidents Bush and Clinton did, it could pass. That would provoke much anger in Turkey, and might weaken the US-Turkish relationship at the precise moment when the US needs to strengthen it. In the past few years, Turkey has taken on a new and assertive role in the Middle East and beyond. Turkey can go places, talk to factions, and make deals that the US cannot. Yet it remains fundamentally aligned with western values and strategic goals. No other country is better equipped to help the US navigate through the region's treacherous deserts, steppes and mountains. Would it be worth risking all of this to make a clear

moral statement? Perhaps. What emerged from Washington this week, though, was no cry of righteous indignation. Various considerations, including the electoral power of Armenian-Americans, may have influenced members of Congress. It is safe to surmise, however, that few took time to weigh the historical record soberly and seek to place the Ottoman atrocity in the context of other 20th century massacres. Two questions face Congress as it considers whether to call the 1915 killings genocide. The first is the simple historical question: was it or wasn't it? Then, however, comes an equally vexing second question: is it the responsibility of the US Congress to make sensitive judgments about events that unfolded long ago? The first question is debatable, the second is not. Congress has neither the capacity nor the moral authority to make sweeping historical judgments. It will not have that authority until it sincerely investigates other modern slaughters – what about the one perpetrated by the British in Kenya during the 1950s, documented in a devastating study that won the 2006 Pulitzer prize? – and also confronts aspects of genocide in the history of the United States itself. Doing this would require an enormous amount of largely pointless effort. Congress would be wiser to

recognise that it does not exist to penetrate the vicissitudes of history or dictate fatwas to the world. This vote has already harmed US-Turkish relations because it has angered many Turks. If the resolution proceeds through Congress, it will cause more harm. This is lamentable, because declining US-Turkish relations will be bad for both countries and for the cause of regional stability. Just as bad, the vote threatens to upset the fragile reconciliation that has been underway between Turkey and Armenia in recent months. In this episode is encapsulated one of the timeless truths of diplomacy. Emotion is the enemy of

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sound foreign policy; cool consideration of long-term self-interest is always wiser. Congress seems far from realising this.

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Uniqueness (US-Turkey Relations Bad)
U.S.-Turkey relations have hit rock bottom- Turkey proving independent of the U.S. Schleifer 10 (Yigal, Istanbul freelance reporter in New York Times, Wash Post, and CSM, Eurasianet, US-

Turkish Relations Appear Headed for Rough Patch, June 28, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/61426) BAF Analysts are warning that relations between Turkey and the United States may be heading for a period of volatility, particularly in the wake of the botched May 31 Israeli commando raid on a Gaza aid flotilla, along with Ankara’s recent decision to vote “no” in the United Nations Security Council on sanctions against Iran. “There is a ceiling above which TurkishAmerican relations cannot improve, and there’s a floor which it can’t go below. But we are getting pretty close to the floor and the ability of the two countries to improve their relations really has a huge question mark over it. We are now talking about an undeclared crisis in the relations,” said Bulent Aliriza, director of the Turkey Project at Washington’s Center for Strategic and International Studies. Indeed, in a recent interview with The Associated Press, Philip Gordon, the State Department’s top official for European and Eurasian affairs seemed to echo that assessment. Gordon suggested that Turkey needed to take demonstrable action to affirm its commitment to both the United States and the Atlantic Alliance. Ankara, in recent years, has been plotting an increasingly independent and ambitious foreign policy course, one that sees an increased role for itself in regional and even global affairs . But observers say Turkey’s role in the Gaza flotilla incident and its subsequent harsh rhetoric against Israel, as well as its decision regarding the Iran sanctions vote, have brought into sharper relief some of the differences between Ankara’s and Washington’s approach on some key issues.

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Uniqueness (US-Turkey Relations Bad)
Relations bad- flotilla and Iran conflict just the beginning Stanek 10 (Steven, foreign correspondent UC Berkley, US ties with Turkey in doubt after raid, The National

(UAE national newspaper), June 5, http://www.thenational.ae/apps/pbcs.dll/article? AID=/20100606/FOREIGN/706059928/1002) The contrast between the forceful Turkish condemnation of the Israeli flotilla raid and the muted American response reflects a broader splintering between the two countries’ policies that has raised new doubts about the health of the US-Turkey relationship , some analysts have said. While Turkish officials denounced the raid in blunt terms – the prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, called it a “bloody massacre” – the White House has tread more cautiously, issuing only a mild public rebuke and signing on to a UN statement expressing “deep regret” at the loss of life and calling for a transparent investigation. Turkish officials, including Ahmet Davutoglu, the foreign minister, publicly criticised the US position as too weak. Meanwhile, Hillary Clinton, the US secretary of state, urged Turkey and other countries to tone down the rhetoric, saying that the situation “requires careful, thoughtful responses from all concerned”. Officials on both sides deny that the public disagreement is a sign that relations have frayed . But many observers say the friction over the flotilla incident, in which nine activists died, including a dual US-Turkish citizen, is only the latest in a series of foreign policy clashes between two countries that are vying for influence in the Middle East. Henri Barkey, a professor of international relations at Lehigh University in Pennsylvania, said US-Turkey relations were already strained and the flotilla incident was “icing on the cake”. “There are very severe tensions,” said Mr Barkey, a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “I think there’s a real crisis in the air.” In May, Turkey – along with Brazil – brokered a deal with Iran to ship much of Iran’s low-enriched uranium to Turkey in exchange for 20 per cent-enriched uranium to fuel a medical reactor. The deal was hailed by Turkey as an “historic turning point” and was viewed as an important step in the country’s bid to assert itself as a regional power broker. But the deal irked US and European officials because it allows Iran to keep enough enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon and continue to enrich fuel. The White House also fears the deal could disrupt its efforts to build international consensus for a new round of United Nations sanctions. The day after the deal was announced, in fact, the United States and Europe submitted a sanctions resolution at the UN Security Council. The move was timed to convey their dissatisfaction with fuel swap deal, analysts said. That resolution, in turn, prompted Mr Erdogan to send letters to 26 countries opposing the sanctions and seeking support for deal. A vote on the sanctions is expected to occur this week. Steven Cook, who specialises in Turkish politics at the Council on Foreign Relations, an independent think tank that advises the US government, said the tit-for-tat is a sign of the increased competition between the two countries. He pointed to several other foreign policy issues on which Turkey and the United States have disagreed. Turkey, he noted, has criticised the US-led peace process for excluding Hamas and focusing almost exclusively on the West Bank. The United States, meanwhile, has objected to some of Mr Erdogan’s rhetoric on Israel. Ankara also has developed an increasingly cozy relationship with Damascus, raising the prospect of the United States and Turkey falling on opposite sides of a potential Israeli conflict with Syria, Mr Cook said. “There’s a host of questions about what would happen in that scenario and I think that the Turks would probably end up on a different side” than the United States, he said. “They just calculate interests differently than we do from where they sit

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Uniqueness (US-Turkey Relations Bad)
U.S. Turkey relationships have been bad since the Iraq war Cook 2006 (Steven, Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies, Council on Foreign Relations,

U.S.-Turkey Relations Seriously Damaged by Iraq War, Finds Council Special Report http://www.cfr.org/publication/10934/usturkey_relations_seriously_damaged_by_iraq_war_finds_council_sp ecial_report.html) “The growing schism between the West and the Islamic world is one of the primary challenges confronting American foreign and defense policymakers. As a consequence, the relationship between the United States and Turkey—a Western-oriented, democratizing Muslim country—is strategically more important than ever,” asserts a new Council on Foreign Relations Special Report. While Turkey has the potential to be an invaluable partner as Washington seeks to improve its standing in the Muslim world, U.S.-Turkey relations have been severely damaged by the war in Iraq. “Turks believe that the Bush administration committed two sins.” Before the war, “Washington dismissed Ankara’s warnings about the consequences of invading Iraq .” And now,
“Turks believe the United States has not taken sufficient care to address Turkey’s security concerns” about the emergence of an independent Kurdistan, which could stoke nationalist sentiment among Turkey’s Kurdish minority. “Time is growing short to build new momentum in the U.S.-Turkey relationship. Over the course of the next two years, both countries will face a series of tough foreign policy questions concerning Iraq, Iran, the Middle East, and Cyprus just as politicians in both capitals are entering election cycles,” says the report, Generating Momentum for a New Era in U.S.-Turkey Relations

U.S.-Turkey relations in downward spiral Bell and Loehrke 9 (Alexandra and Benjamin, Ploughshares Fund, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,

http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-status-of-us-nuclear-weapons-turkey) BAF But NATO's post-Cold War struggles with cohesion are a result of far more than disagreement over tactical nuclear deployments. NATO has given Turkey plenty of reasons to doubt its members' commitment to Ankara on several recent occasions. For example, before both Iraq wars, some NATO members hesitated to provide Turkey with air defenses or to assist it with displaced persons who had fled into its territory. Moreover, Turkey, which values NATO as a direct connection to Washington, witnessed the United States completely ignore its vehement opposition to the most recent Iraq War. Additionally, Ankara is dismayed by the reluctance of some of its NATO allies to label the Kurdistan Workers' Party, which has caused violent chaos along the Turkish border, as a terrorist organization. Then there is the issue of Tehran's nuclear program, which seriously complicates any discussion of the United States removing its tactical nuclear weapons from Turkey. An Iranian nuclear capability could spark an arms race in

the Middle East and bring about a "proliferation cascade," which could cause Turkey to reconsider its nuclear options--especially if the United States pulls its nuclear weapons from Incirlik. When asked directly about its response to an Iranian nuclear weapon, a highranking Foreign Ministry official said that Turkey would immediately arm itself with a bomb. This isn't Ankara's official policy, but it seems to indicate a general feeling among its leaders. Whether Turkey is primarily concerned about security or prestige, the bottom line is that it would not sit idly by as Iran established a regional hegemony.

235

Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 236 /341

Suiter Pre-season

Uniqueness (US-Turkey Relations Bad)
Turkey and U.S. divided over nuclear policy, Iran, Israel, and Iraq Wagner 6/17/10 (Daniel, Managing Dir. of Country Risk Solutions, “Brazil and Turkey's Message,”

Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-wagner/brazil-and-turkeysmessag_b_615848.html) BAF Turkish public opinion is divided between pressuring the government to assert itself against Iran - which many see as a competitor to Turkey's own regional political and economic ambitions - and opposing Western influence and security alliances. With both Iran and Russia becoming
increasingly aggressive in international relations, Turkey feels pressure to assert itself on the global stage. Given that France, the UK, Russia, and Israel already possess nuclear weapons, and with Iran on an obvious path in that direction, Ankara has made its

ambition to obtain nuclear weapons clear in recent months through a lobbying effort in Western capitals. The U.S. is torn on one hand between succumbing to the seemingly legitimate defense-related requests of an important strategic ally and Iranian neighbor -that can act as a counter-balance to a future nuclear armed Iran -- and on the other hand by promoting the nuclear proliferation it seeks to prevent . Just last year President Obama referred to the U.S. and Turkey's bilateral relationship as a "model partnership", but bilateral relations have been deteriorating since the Gulf War, when President Bush was unsuccessful in facilitating Turkish action against Iraq. Tension has risen for weeks between the two countries over the Iran issue and more recently the Turkish flotilla to Palestine. Turkey has expressed disappointment over Washington's failure to condemn Israel's attack on the flotilla. Anti-U.S. sentiment among the Turkish public is now comparable to that of Pakistan - not exactly what Washington would expect from a 60-year post-war alliance.

236

Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 237 /341

Suiter Pre-season

Uniqueness (Russia-Turkey Relations Good)
Russia and Turkey relations include multiple facets of engagement, and both countries are looking to increase their involvement with each other Baku 10, (Dmitry Medvedev: “Russia-Turkey relations are very important for the solution of regional problems” [ 13 Jan 2010 15:55 ]
http://en.apa.az/news.php?id=113843)
WDK The meeting was held in the Russian President’s residence in Barvikha.

Medvedev said Russia-Turkey relations were developing. “These are indeed the relations of the strategic partners. Though last year was not so easy, it was a successful year for our relations. We developed our economic relations. Despite some delays, these relations are very important,” he said. Dmitry Medvedev said Russia and Turkey were implementing large projects especially in the field of energy, expressed his confidence that one more step would be taken to strengthen these relations during Erdogan’s visit. “This is very important for the solution of problems,
including regional problems that we regularly discuss with you. Our countries are neighbors. The microclimate in the region depends on the proximity of our positions,” he said. Erdogan said the relations between the two countries had reached culmination. “Political, economic and defense cooperation is developing. As you have said, the energy is of great importance. We have model cooperation in this context. We believe that there are many opportunities in various spheres – not only in the field of natural gas, but also in the field of oil, we can improve our cooperation in these fields,” he said.

237

Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 238 /341

Suiter Pre-season

Uniqueness (Russia-Turkey Relations Good)
Turkey-Russia relations on the rise, with the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict expanding them rapidly Asbarez 9, (Russia-Turkey Relations Will Have Positive Impact on Karabakh, Says Davutoglu Monday, August

10th, 2009 http://asbarez.com/69232/russia-turkey-relations-will-have-positive-impact-on-karabakh-saysdavutoglu/) WDK The strengthening of relations between Russia and Turkey will have a positive impact of the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, said Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu in a television interview over the weekend. During his visit to Turkey last week, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said active steps were being taken to resolve the Karabakh conflict. “Serious work is being done to settle the Nagorno-Karabakh

conflict and there is serious progress in this regard. Moscow is eager to see quick resolution of the conflict,” Putin added. Davutoglu praised what he called positive steps taken by Russia in the conflict resolution process. During his visit to Turkey, Putin signed several energy agreements, including an agreement to ensure Turkey’s participation in a planned Russian oil and gas pipeline, known as the South Stream, which is designed to rival the Western-backed Nabucco pipeline. Turkey is also participating in the construction of the Nabucco pipeline, which is a US and European venture, sidestepping Russia, to ensure the flow Caspian natural resources to the West. Both proposed projects side-step Armenia. While on a weekend visit to his hometown of Konya, Davutoglu was asked whether two major pipeline projects in which Turkey will play an integral role, Nabucco and South Stream, were rivals. “No. As we stressed several times before, we do not see such strategic projects as rivaling

each other but instead as complementary to one another. We look at all developments in the fields of energy, transportation, economy and trade with different perspectives,” Davutoğlu was quoted as saying by the Anatolia news agency in response. Turkey’s course and priorities have not changed,” said a senior Turkish official on Friday, responding to suspicions likely to arise in the wake of Thursday’s deal, under which Turkey has allowed Russia to carry out feasibility studies in its exclusive territorial waters in the Black Sea for construction of the South Stream pipeline. Furthermore, Davutoğlu stressed that Turkey is not a place for rival projects but
complementary ones, while noting that Turkey will serve as a secure energy route, strengthening both regional economic integration and global economic structure. “Any cooperation with the European Union and the Nabucco project, which connects the European Union and Turkey, is a strategic priority for Turkey. It should be assessed as a whole. The Nabucco project that we signed in July demonstrated Turkey’s central importance for energy suppliers and energy consumers between the East and West,” Davutoğlu said.

Russia and Turkey relations include multiple facets of engagement, and both countries are looking to increase their involvement with each other Baku 10, (Dmitry Medvedev: “Russia-Turkey relations are very important for the solution of regional problems” [ 13 Jan 2010 15:55 ]
http://en.apa.az/news.php?id=113843)
WDK The meeting was held in the Russian President’s residence in Barvikha.

Medvedev said Russia-Turkey relations were developing. “These are indeed the relations of the strategic partners. Though last year was not so easy, it was a successful year for our relations. We developed our economic relations. Despite some delays, these relations are very important,” he said. Dmitry Medvedev said Russia and Turkey were implementing large projects especially in the field of energy, expressed his confidence that one more step would be taken to strengthen these relations during Erdogan’s visit. “This is very important for the solution of problems,

including regional problems that we regularly discuss with you. Our countries are neighbors. The microclimate in the region depends on the proximity of our positions,” he said. Erdogan said the relations between the two countries had reached culmination. “Political, economic and defense cooperation is developing. As you have said, the energy is of great importance. We have model cooperation in this context. We believe that there are many opportunities in various spheres – not only in the field of natural gas, but also in the field of oil, we can improve our cooperation in these fields,” he said.

238

Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 239 /341

Suiter Pre-season

Uniqueness (Russia-Turkey Relations Good)
Turkey and Russia are investing heavily in each other, becoming closer every day Liang 8, (Yan, Turkey wishes to strengthen relations with Russia 2008-07-02 22:34:27, http://news.xinhuanet.c
om/english/2008-07/02/content_8478479.htm) WDK
ANKARA, July 2 (Xinhua) -- Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan said Wednesday Turkey

is aimed to enhance relations with Russia to make it a "multidimensional and intensified partnership." Babacan made the remarks at a
joint news conference with visiting Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov following their meeting in the Turkish capital of Ankara. "Our objective for Turkey-Russia relations is a multidimensional and intensified partnership," he said, noting that both sides have the willingness to further improve bilateral relations as they "have considerable affinities in their approaches regarding international and regional issues." Babacan underlined economic relations between the two countries, saying that "trade

volume between Turkey and Russia reached 28 billion U.S. dollars in 2007, making Russia the second biggest trade partner of Turkey." Turkish investment in Russia surpassed 6 billion dollars last year while Russian investment in Turkey amounted to 4 billion dollars, he said, adding that "more than 2.5 million Russian people visited Turkey" in 2007.

Turkey and Russia relations are multiplying Catalano 10, (Arianna, [JTW Analysis-Dr. Guner Ozkan] Russia’s President to visit Turkey: Which prospects for an already ‘strategic’
partnership? http://www.usak.org.tr/EN/haber.asp?id=373) WDK Certainly, several issues can be assumed as reasons for disagreement but today

Turkey and Russia “are much more willing to cooperate and get benefits from the relation…they’re more prone to cooperate rather than compete.” Instability in Southern Caucasus seems to be the area upon which both countries have politically divergent stances.
Russia would favour the settlement of frozen conflicts, like the dispute between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno- Karabakh, but contemporarly she still holds the influence to shape the course of peace negotiations. On the contrary, in this regard Turkey has a smaller manouvering room. But as regard to the Black Sea region both actors agree on any further NATO presence. A

pragmatic approach then appears to dominate: “political and geopolitical problems are there but Russia and Turkey want to make the prospect of cooperation beyond the disagreement….they just keep those issues aside and try to get benefits as much as possible from ‘soft issues”, Dr. Ozkan affirms. Hence, not only economic interdependence but also cooperation in different term, widening the range of cooperation to “social and cultural areas as well,” for instance. According to Dr. Guner Ozkan the establishment of tighter and deeper relations not just limited to the area of trade and energy but also involving wider sectors of Turkish and Russian society cannot but contributing to improve this already positive
‘atmosphere.’

239

Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 240 /341

Suiter Pre-season

Link (Hurts Relations)
TNWs key to U.S.-Turkey cohesion Bell and Loehrke 9 (Alexandra and Benjamin, Ploughshares Fund, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,

http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-status-of-us-nuclear-weapons-turkey) BAF Roadblocks to removal. In 2005, when NATO's top commander at the time, Gen. James L. Jones, supported the elimination of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, he was met with fierce political resistance. (In
addition to the 90 B61 bombs in Turkey, there are another 110 or so U.S. bombs located at bases in Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands.) Four years later, some U.S. and European officials still maintain that the political value of the nuclear weapons is enough to keep them deployed across Europe . In particular, they argue PDF that the weapons are "an essential political and military link" between NATO members and help maintain alliance cohesion. The Defense Department's 2008 report PDF on nuclear weapons management concurred: "As long as our allies value [the nuclear weapons'] political contribution, the United States is obligated to provide and maintain the nuclear weapon capability." Those who hold this view believe that nuclear sharing is both symbolic of alliance cohesion and a demonstration of

how the United States and NATO have committed to defending each other in the event of an attack. They argue that removing the weapons would dangerously undermine such cohesion and raise questions about how committed Washington is to its NATO allies.

US TNW withdraw damages US-Turkey relations Gormley, Lewis, et al 9 (Dennis M. Gormley, Patricia M. Lewis, Miles A. Pomper, Lawrence Scheinman, Stephen Schwartz,

Nikolai Sokov, Leonard S. Spector, Four Emerging Issues in Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation: Opportunities for German Leadership, http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/090717_german_leadership/german_leadership_full.pdf On the other hand, Turkey and new NATO members in Eastern Europe are more eager to retain American

tactical nuclear weapons to insure against a resurgent Russia or a more capable Iran, just as they show greater interest in the European leg of the U.S. missile defense system . They also see the
presence of the weapons as a means of insuring that the alliance remains focused on territorial defense rather than shifting to out-of-area efforts, such as the conflict in Afghanistan or the effort to inject NATO into areas such as arms control and nonproliferation. The

Obama administration has already raised concerns among NATO’s Eastern European members by its decision to slow deployment of the U.S. missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic. This slowdown
may be particularly painful because the latter countries have invested considerable political resources to push through the decision to deploy the defenses that were perceived as highly important for Washington, but faced considerable opposition domestically in the two Eastern European states. Withdrawing TNW, a perceived symbol of U.S. commitment, in this light—

and so soon after the conflict in Georgia—carries risks for alliance cohesion, regardless of the weapons’ military utility. Likewise, the wavering response of NATO to Turkish requests for conventional deployments in the
run-up to the 1991 and 2003 Iraq wars, the ongoing tension between Turkey and the EU over the former’s membership in the Union, and

the bitter legacy of Turkish-U.S. relations in the Bush administration have raised questions in Ankara about NATO’s commitment to its security that would be seriously exacerbated by the removal of TNW from that country.

Removal of US tnw’s from Europe encourages Russian aggression, nuclear proliferation, and would be a major setback for global security Heritage Foundation 10 (President Obama Must Not Remove Nuclear Weapons from Europe,
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/03/President-Obama-Must-Not-Remove-Nuclear-Weaponsfrom-Europe) MAH
In April 2009—less than three months into his term of office—President Barack Obama laid out the centerpiece of his foreign policy vision for his Administration: the global eradication of nuclear weapons. Citing America’s atomic strikes against the Japanese Empire during World War II, President Obama stated that America has a “moral responsibility” to walk the “road to zero.” This ideological positioning has set off a series of calls from European leaders for the removal of America’s nuclear arsenal from European soil. At this time, however, a withdrawal of America’s nuclear arsenal from Europe would send the

message that transatlantic security is no longer indivisible. It would also give Moscow a blank check to pursue its long-sought-after sphere of privileged interest and, ironically, could pave the way for further nuclear proliferation. The destabilization brought to the European continent from a premature removal of American nuclear weapons, or an unacceptable degradation of its force, would be a major setback for global security and stability.

240

Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 241 /341

Suiter Pre-season

241

Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 242 /341

Suiter Pre-season

Link (Hurts Relations)
US TNW withdraw damages US-Turkey relations Gormley, Lewis, et al 9 (Dennis M. Gormley, Patricia M. Lewis, Miles A. Pomper, Lawrence Scheinman, Stephen Schwartz,

Nikolai Sokov, Leonard S. Spector, Four Emerging Issues in Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation: Opportunities for German Leadership, http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/090717_german_leadership/german_leadership_full.pdf On the other hand, Turkey and new NATO members in Eastern Europe are more eager to retain American

tactical nuclear weapons to insure against a resurgent Russia or a more capable Iran, just as they show greater interest in the European leg of the U.S. missile defense system. They also see
the presence of the weapons as a means of insuring that the alliance remains focused on territorial defense rather than shifting to outof-area efforts, such as the conflict in Afghanistan or the effort to inject NATO into areas such as arms control and nonproliferation.

The Obama administration has already raised concerns among NATO’s Eastern European members by its decision to slow deployment of the U.S. missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic.

This slowdown may be particularly painful because the latter countries have invested considerable political resources to push through the decision to deploy the defenses that were perceived as highly important for Washington, but faced considerable opposition domestically in the two Eastern European states. Withdrawing TNW, a perceived symbol of U.S.

commitment, in this light—and so soon after the conflict in Georgia—carries risks for alliance cohesion, regardless of the weapons’ military utility. Likewise, the wavering response of NATO to
Turkish requests for conventional deployments in the run-up to the 1991 and 2003 Iraq wars, the ongoing tension between Turkey and the EU over the former’s membership in the Union, and the bitter legacy of Turkish-U.S. relations in the Bush

administration have raised questions in Ankara about NATO’s commitment to its security that would be seriously exacerbated by the removal of TNW from that country.

Turkey wants nukes- removing of TNWs causes U.S.-Turkey conflict NTI 09 (Turkey Profile, Monterey Institute of International Studies James Martin Center,

http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/turkey/index.html) As part of NATO's nuclear umbrella, Turkey continues to host approximately 90 U.S. tactical nuclear weapons on its territory at Incirlik Air Base.[4] There is some speculation in the Turkish press regarding possible conflict between Turkey's leaders and the United States should President Obama's commitment to "seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons" lead to the near-term withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Turkey.[5] While the weapons serve little strategic purpose, they provide tangible evidence of a continued American commitment to Turkish security. Although Turkey's interest in nuclear technology dates to at least 1956, when the government founded the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority (TAEK), Ankara's nuclear capabilities never moved beyond the research and development stages. Thus while Turkey conducts sophisticated nuclear fuel cycle research—primarily at the Cekmece Nuclear Research and Training Centre (CNRTC) and the Istanbul Technical University—it does not possess nuclear power reactors or industrial-scale enrichment or reprocessing capabilities.[6] Ankara possesses only two small research reactors, the TRIGA Mark II 250-KWt reactor and the TR-2 5MWt
reactor—the former operates on 20% U-235 fuel, while the latter possesses a mixed HEU/LEU core that will soon be fully converted to run on LEU.[7] While past decades have witnessed numerous attempts by the government to acquire power reactors, all failed for a variety of political, diplomatic, and economic reasons.[8] However, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's

AKP-led government is aggressively pursuing nuclear energy. While the government's announcement in 2006 that it would install 5,000MW nuclear energy by 2015 (3 reactors) has encountered numerous feasibility problems—and may not yield even one reactor by that date—the AKP remains unwaveringly politically committed to the endeavor.[9] After a troubled tender process in 2008, the government began assessing the sole bid for construction of the first nuclear plant. The offer from Russian-led consortium Atomstroyexport-Inter Rao-Park Teknik is still under consideration.

242

Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 243 /341

Suiter Pre-season

Link (Hurts Relations)
Pulling out TNWs kills Turkey-U.S. relations Kelleher and Warren 09 (Catherine and Scott, snr fellow at Brown and prof @ brown univ., Arms Control
Association, “Getting to Zero Starts Here: Tactical Nuclear Weapons”, October, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_10/Kelleher#bio) The role of tactical nuclear weapons in these discussions has not loomed large in much of the public or private Washington discourse. It has received more informal play in Brussels, where the efforts to craft a new NATO strategic concept quickly ran into private concerns about the ultimate fate of tactical weapons. Several new working papers circulated by opponents of continued tactical nuclear deployment in
Europe have garnered quiet support from others. Germany, in particular, stimulated the push for elimination of tactical weapons, as Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, who also was a candidate for chancellor in the September 2009 elections, advocated the elimination position. Turkey, however, has reportedly suggested in internal conversations that a

decision by the United States to reduce its tactical nuclear weapons further would mark the end the grand alliance bargain of the 1960s: Turkey, like other hosts, would have the U.S. nuclear shield and would share in the physical control of the weapons in return for Ankara’s promise not to develop its own nuclear weapons

243

Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 244 /341

Suiter Pre-season

Link (Helps Relations)
Pulling TNWs good for U.S. Turkey relations- public and government want weapons out Political Affairs Magazine, 05 (Marxist thought magazine-turkish sector, Incirlik Base must be closed,
http://www.politicalaffairs.net/article/view/982/1/89/)BAF Incirlik Base has been a trouble for Turkey. This base has been a jumping board for both NATO and the USA. This base has also been a center for the anti-popular character and missions of the rule of capital in

Turkey. Only the capitalist class can ask a foreign country to bring and deploy its nuclear weapons to be used against the people in its own country if necessary. Like any other weapons, nuclear weapons in Incirlik are kept ready not only to attack the peoples of Middle East, but also the workers in Turkey . Working class of Turkey, its party TKP (Communist Party of Turkey), is demanding the disarmament of Incirlik. In this sense, the problem cannot be reduced to the "supervision by Turkish officers" or "permission by the Turkish government”. What are the Turkish officers going to supervise? How can an organization, whose primary concern has been getting top

positions in the NATO projects and USA's plans for a long time, defend the country's interests? Again, it is none of our concern that the government of capitalists wants to check on the acts of the USA. In the
formulas developed by Prime Minister Erdogan and his friends, it is possible to see some points, which aim to soften possible reactions. However, that the USA notifies Turkish government and military authorities doesn't have a practical reality. This is all cheating. After all, saying "let the parliament to discuss that" doesn't mean anything but supporting CHP's, the opposition party's, attempt to be part of the game. In summary, the legal status of Incirlik doesn't bear importance anymore. Working class of Turkey, its party TKP demands that Incirlik shall be closed at once . Of course, the problem doesn't consist of Incirlik. Today, there is not a single military base, which is not open to NATO and the USA. The demand for Incirlik to be closed doesn't mean the acceptance of this situation. On the contrary, the closing of Incirlik would be a challenge by the working class of Turkey against the treason and collaboration of capitalists and against imperialism. The revolution in Turkey will also be the process of purification of our country from imperialism. Working class of Turkey, its party TKP, is struggling for the purification of Incirlik from imperialism. The response to usual accusations like that the closing of a

military base will endanger the "country's security" is clear. Whose security? The security of local and foreign monopolies, which possess the most important institutions of our country?
The security of a handful of people, who live in extravagance through the poverty of tens of millions? The security of gangs, murderers and drug dealers? The security of IMF collectors? Whose security? If these are not the country's security, and

they are obviously not, then Incirlik is clearly threatening the country's security. Incirlik not only threatens our people's security, but also the security of Palestinians, Iraqis and Iranians. Working class of Turkey, its party TKP, want to hinder Incirlik from being an element of threat. Sooner or later, working class of Turkey will take the power. And then, if it is necessary for the defense of an honorable and independent country, the revolutionary power, its revolutionary armed forces will turn Incirlik once again into a military base. But now, on our agenda is the closing of a base, which symbolizes the dependency of Turkey. Incirlik must be closed.

244

Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 245 /341

Suiter Pre-season

Link (Helps Relations)
U.S. NTW presence in Turkey unpopular Lindborg 07 (Chris, co-director of Foreign Policy In Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies, Foreign policy in
focus, Iraq and the Transatlantic Alliance, http://www.fpif.org/articles/iraq_and_the_transatlantic_alliance) BAF A long-time member of NATO, Turkey has been put in a particularly precarious situation because of the Iraq War. Turkey’s strategic position between Europe and the Middle East makes it a valuable U.S. ally. Yet Turks strongly opposed the war and felt that the United States had not consulted sufficiently with Turkish leaders. Turks have also feared the impact that the war might have on Kurds who live in Iraq and Turkey. While over half of Turks polled support the bid to join the EU, Turkey’s road to membership may be long and difficult. Ankara’s foreign policy perceptions and interests are shifting eastward, and the Iraq War has clearly hastened this movement. The United States will no longer be able to take this strategic ally for granted.

TNWs are a stopgap for Turkish leadership Lamond and Ingram 9 (Claudine, Senior analyst and contributor to ‘International Security Report’ and Paul analyst for British
American Security Information Council’ (BASIC), London, Politics around US tactical nuclear weapons in European host states http://www.atlantic-community.org/app/webroot/files/articlepdf/CLamondTNWinNATO.pdf)BAF

There is a rising sentiment amongst the population for the removal of US nuclear weapons from Turkish territory. In a recent survey,20 more than half the respondents stated that they are against nuclear weapons being stationed in Turkey. Almost 60% of the Turkish population would support a government request to remove the nuclear weapons from their country, and 72% said they would support an initiative to make Turkey a nuclear-free zone.21 There may be several causes behind this sentiment, including the Iraq War, Turkish relations with neighboring states, budget expenditure and the moral concern over nuclear weapons. The historic precedence of Greece, a NATO member and Turkey’s historic rival, ending its commitment to nuclear sharing in NATO may have further strengthened this tendency. There have been public expressions of resentment towards the US military presence in Turkey ever since the lead up to the US war with Iraq. The United States insisted on the government allowing American troops to use Turkey as a staging post, despite overwhelmingly antiwar Turkish public and political opinion. Limited permission was granted after heavy debates and delay in the Turkish parliament. Turkey’s location has added an element of both risk and opportunity to NATO nuclear sharing. Turkey’s close proximity to states deemed potentially hostile, such as Iran and Syria, make Turkey a preferred NATO base for tactical nuclear weapons. The risk, of course, is that stationing tactical nuclear weapons in Turkey might provoke a pre-emptive strike upon NATO bases. Turkish parliamentarians have expressed to NATO the difficulty of explaining the continued presence of US tactical nuclear weapons on Turkish territory to Muslim and Arab neighbors. There is a fear that they undermine Turkey’s clear diplomatic objectives to act as a mediator within the region. Turkey has a unique opportunity to play a positive role in promoting nonproliferation. Ending nuclear sharing and fully complying with the NPT would act as a powerful example to neighboring states and strengthen Turkey’s legitimacy. Moreover, efforts by the Turkish government to play a leading role in the elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction would receive overwhelming public support

245

Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 246 /341

Suiter Pre-season

Link (Helps Relations)
Removing the nuclear weapons would be popular with Turkey and improve Turkey’s relations with neighboring states Clamond and Ingram 9 (Claudine, Southeast Asian Security Analyst, Paul, BASIC, “Politics around US

tactical nuclear weapons in European host states,” British American Security Information Council, http://www.basicint.org/gtz/gtz11.htm) MJ There is a rising sentiment amongst the population for the removal of US nuclear weapons from Turkish territory. In a recent survey,[20] more than half the respondents stated that they are against nuclear weapons being stationed in Turkey. Almost 60% of the Turkish population would support a government request to remove the nuclear weapons from their country, and 72% said they would support an initiative to make Turkey a nuclear-free zone. [21] There may be several causes behind this sentiment, including the Iraq War, Turkish relations with neighboring states, budget expenditure and the moral concern over nuclear weapons. The historic precedence of Greece, a NATO member and Turkey's historic rival, ending its commitment to nuclear sharing in NATO may have further strengthened this tendency. There have been public expressions of resentment towards the US military presence in Turkey ever since the lead up to the US war with Iraq. The United States insisted on the government allowing American troops to use Turkey as a staging post, despite overwhelmingly antiwar Turkish public and political opinion. Limited permission was granted after heavy debates and delay in the Turkish parliament.

246

Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 247 /341

Suiter Pre-season

Link (Hurts Turkey-US, Helps Turkey-Russo)
US presence in the Middle East and Turkey hurts US-Turkey relations and significantly boosts Turkey-Russia relations Oku 5, (Asim, 12.05.2005 Turkey-Russia Relations Dynamics Asim Oku, AIA Turkish section. The 90s: from "image of enemy" to "feeble
partner" http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=71) WDK Russia and Turkey today share much deeper understanding of geopolitical issues.

After the intrusion of the USA in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the increase of the American military presence in the Eastern and Southern Europe, both states demonstrate obvious anti-American shift in their policy. Turkey aspires to enter the EU with its aversion to "US Hegemony", while Russia tries to strengthen ties with France and Germany – the principal conductors of the anti-American policy in Europe. Russia is extremely concerned about the loss of influence in Ukraine and Georgia, and Turkey is worried by the attempts to restrain its presence in the Balkans. Both countries emphasize their "Eurasian nature " (this phrase

belongs to the ambassador of Russia in Turkey Alexander Lebedev), are dissatisfied with their minor role in the world, and look for the new allies in Asia, approaching Iran, China and India. Relations between Ankara and Damascus improved to a great extent after the Turkish Justice and Development Party came to power Kremlin also revives its "special relations" with the Syrian regime in economic and military sphere. Both Turkey and Russia refused to support the US military operation in Iraq in

2003. Growing concurrence of interests between Turkey and Russia leads to the signing, in 2001 in New York, of the "Eurasian cooperation agreement". Ankara in a pointed manner stays out of the US and NATO attempts to "entrench" on the Russian borders. In return Russia supports Turkish position on Cyprus. Frank anti-American moods dominate in the intellectual and political elite of both countries ("Edinaya Rossiya" - United Russia and Turkish Justice and Development Party). Both
countries gradually chill off the cooperation with Israel – the main US ally in the Middle East, while simultaneously building partnership with Israel's sworn enemy - Syria. Both Ankara and Moscow indefatigably repeat that they "aspire only to defend their national interests". In the ''real politic'' it is expressed by the attempts to regain influence, which both countries possessed throughout the blossoming era of the empires: the Russian - the Soviet and the Ottoman. With regard of the aforesaid, there is a tendency between the parties to coordinate the opposition to Washington and to create the Eurasian alignment to ''counterbalance'' the American "Atlantism".

US-Turkey relations trade off with Turkey-Russo relations, this seriously damages the Caucus pipelines Enghdal 9, (F William, Apr 16, 2009. Editor for Asia Times, Middle East, http://www.atime
s.com/atimes/Middle_East/KD16Ak01.html) Turkey is the key link in this complex game of geopolitical balance of power between Washington and Moscow. If Turkey decides to collaborate with Russia, Georgia's position becomes very insecure and Azerbaijan's possible pipeline route to Europe is blocked. If Turkey decides to cooperate with Washington and at the same time reaches a stable agreement with Armenia under US guidance, Russia's entire position in the Caucasus is weakened and an alternative route for natural gas to Europe becomes available, reducing Russian leverage against Western Europe.

Russia-Turkey and Turkey-US relations are based on zero sum, trade off is certain Torbakov 8, (Igor, THE GEORGIA CRISIS AND RUSSIA-TURKEY RELATIONSPublished in the United
States by The Jamestown Foundation http://www.jamestown. org/uploads/medi a/Georg iaCrisisTorbakov.pdf) WDK One cannot fail to notice that Russian planners view the Caucasus Pact blueprint in general and Russia-Turkey relations in particular through the prism of a zero-sum game with the Americans. As the influential Kommersant newspaper put it in a recent commentary, the most important feature of the CSCP is that it “will allow Moscow and Ankara to strengthen their positions in the Caucasus thereby weakening Washington’s influence in the region.”

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Suiter Pre-season

Link (Hurts Turkey-US, Helps Turkey-Russo)
Western alienation, especially US’, has opened the door for Turkey-Russia relations Hallinan 10, (Conn, Friday, June 25, 2010 by Foreign Policy in Focus Turkey, America, and Empire's Twilight
http://www.commondreams.org/view/2010/06/25-8) WDK
The most common U.S. interpretation of the joint Turkish-Brazilian peace plan for Iran, as well as Ankara's falling out with Israel over the latter's assault on the Gaza flotilla, is that Turkey is "looking East." Rationales run the gamut from rising Islamism

to U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates' explanation that the West alienated Turkey when it blocked Ankara from joining the European Union (EU). While Turkey's rise does indeed reflect internal developments in that country, its growing influence mirrors the ebb of American power, a consequence of the catastrophic policies Washington has followed in the Middle East and Central Asia. From Ankara's point of view, it is picking up the tab for the chaos in Iraq, the aggressive policies of the Israeli government, and the growing tensions around the Iranian nuclear program. As Sedat Laciner, director of the International Strategic Resource Center in Ankara, told The New York Times, "The Western countries do things and Turkey pays the bill." While the Cold War is over, argues Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, "a new
global" order has yet to emerge. Until those "mechanisms" are in place, "It will therefore fall largely to nation-states to meet and create solutions for the global political, cultural, and economic turmoil." Davutoglu's observation about "a new global" order is an implicit critique of a UN Security Council dominated by the veto power of the "Big Five": the United States, Britain, France, Russia, and China. Increasingly countries like Turkey, Brazil, and India are unhappy with the current setup. They either want a place at the table or a reduction of the Council's power. The latest Iran sanctions passed 12 to 2 (with one abstention) in the Council. The sanctions would have failed a vote in the General Assembly. Turkey has expanded ties with Iran and worked closely with Russia on energy and trade. It has even tried to thaw relations with Armenia. It has mediated between Damascus and Tel Aviv, brokered peace talks between Sunnis and Shiites in Iraq, and Serbians and Bosnians in the Balkans, and tried to reduce tension in the Caucasus. It has also opened 15 embassies in Africa and two in Latin America.

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Suiter Pre-season

Internals – Relations
Turkish involvement in an Iraqi-Kurdistan invasion would gut US-Turkey relations Brookes 7 (Peter, Heritage Foundation sr Fellow and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, June 4,
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/opedcolumnists/item_8YUKOtM6XKgHdbV53paHaJ/1) LL TURKEY could send troops into Iraq any day now. It's massing ground forces on its southeastern border for a possible strike against the terrorist/separatist group the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). Turkish special ops are likely already on the ground in Iraq. This is the last thing we - or the Iraqis - need. Preventing it must be a top priority of America , Iraq and Europe. The Kurdish area is the most stable and pro-American part of Iraq; neither Washington nor Baghdad can afford to have it become a new item on the "problem" list. The Turks wouldn't go in unopposed, either. Besides the PKK, Iraqi

Kurds have promised to resist any Turkish incursion into Iraq. The Kurdish Peshmerga militia troops - just recently integrated into the Iraqi national army - are no slouches, meaning plenty of bloodshed in a donnybrook with the Turks. Baghdad has also warned against any Turkish action. It needs Kurdish/Iraqi troops focused on fighting its bad guys: al Qaeda, foreign jihadists and other insurgents. Fighting between Turks and Kurds in Iraq could also spread to Turkey's large Kurdish population of about 15 million. Even an accidental engagement with U.S. troops would damage U.S.Turkish relations, including Turkish air-base access for supplying U.S. forces in Iraq and Ankara's support to Coalition efforts in Afghanistan. All that said, the Turks have good cause for being agitated. The PKK, numbering 4,000 in Iraq and 2,000 in Turkey, is a vicious bunch. Since 1984, when it began pushing for an independent homeland in southeastern Turkey, over 30,000 have been killed in insurgent, terrorist and Turkish force operations; the PKK killed 600 in 2006 alone. It stepped up attacks recently, killing 20 soldiers and civilians in the last two weeks. A suicide bombing in Ankara in late May killed six and wounded more than 100. The Turks blame the PKK; the Kurdish rebels deny responsibility. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan noted: "Our patience has run out . . . necessary steps will be taken when needed." The Turkish chief of the General Staff said the army is ready - all he needs is the "go-ahead." The Turkish public seems up for a strike, too. An incursion into Iraq against the PKK wouldn't be unprecedented. Turkish forces crossed the border a decade ago; they came close to doing so again last year after the PKK ended a self-imposed cease-fire. But Turkey isn't entirely innocent here, either. Ankara has ruled the Kurds, 20 percent of Turkey's population, with a heavy hand. Kurdish autonomy across the border in Iraq hasn't gone unnoticed. And then there's the issue of Turkish domestic politics. The current ruling political party, the AKP, has been down on its political luck lately. It might see a little jingoism in the form of military action as just the ticket to boost its flagging popularity before upcoming elections. Still, it could all be a bluff - a warning. Turkey is fed up with the PKK and wants the United States (its NATO ally) and Iraq to do something about it. A military buildup sends a clear signal that Turkey wants - indeed, demands - action. In the mean time, maneuvers on the border could pacify the Turkish domestic audience. But if the PKK attacks in Turkey continue as they have, Ankara may just give the army the dreaded green light. That could mean a limited attack - targeting PKK strongholds in the Qandil mountains, using aircraft and helicopter gunships. Worse, Turk special ops could target Kurdish leaders they believe are turning a blind eye to the PKK. But that could escalate, too. Turkish ground troops might pour over the border, setting up a buffer zone in Iraqi territory along a portion of the 200-mile dividing line to prevent PKK infiltration into Turkey. So what to do? Call on the Turks to exercise restraint. Kick diplomacy into high gear, using all channels possible. Our current special envoy, Gen. Joseph Ralston (ret.), can use the uniform to appeal to the politically powerful Turkish military. NATO can do some arm-twisting of its fellow alliance member, too. And the European Union should act - shutting down the numerous PKK networks there. (The European Union can also remind Turkey that good behavior would help its chances of membership, although interest in joining among Turks is waning.) Iraq's leading Kurds need to do their share. President Bush's meeting last week with Iraqi President Jalal Talibani, an influential Kurd, could help move things off dead center. Fortunately, there's been some word out of the Kurdish Regional Government, leaning in the direction of a crackdown on the PPK. We need to see some action, not just words, on that front. If all else fails, U.S. and Iraqi forces could move against the PKK - a group on the U.S. terrorist list - closing camps and ending cross-border raids into Turkey . Not ideal, but better than a showdown with Ankara. More violence in Iraq, especially involving a major power and a strategic

ally like Turkey, would make our challenges there even more difficult. A Turkish-PKK war in Iraq must be avoided at all costs.

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Suiter Pre-season

Internals – Relations
US-Turkey relations key to solve terrorism—Turkish invasion of Iraq is the devastates the alliance Menon and Wimbush 7 (Rajan and S. Enders, Prof of IR @ Lehigh, Fellow, New America Foundation and
Director, Center for Future Security Strategies, Hudson Institute, Mar 25, http://www.hudson.org/files/pdf_upload/Turkey%20PDF.pdf) LL The alliance between the United States and Turkey, which has endured since the 1947 Truman Doctrine and has contributed to the security of both countries, is now in serious trouble. What is worse, neither
side is facing up to this reality, let alone taking serious remedial measures, nor even making concerted efforts to understand the new political currents within each other’s societies. If this neglect continues, the price paid by both sides will be

steep. It is becoming increasingly clear that Washington and Ankara see the world and define their interests in divergent ways. If allowed to continue, this trend could well undo the alliance. The good news is that there is still time to act , providing senior leaders on both sides move with dispatch. It is urgent that they do so, for despite the end of the Cold War, which provided a clear rationale for their alliance for four decades, Ankara and Washington still need each other, perhaps more so because they now face multiple and unfamiliar threats, not least those posed by terrorism. The most important source of discord between Turkey and the United States is the war in Iraq. Ankara fears that Iraq will break up as a result of the war and that a separate Kurdish state will arise, creating even greater disorder and stoking separatist sentiment in

Turkey’s southeast, and increasing paramilitary and terrorist attacks by the Kurdish separatist organization, the PKK. Washington, for its part, feels betrayed by the Turkish parliament’s rejection of its request to open a second front from Turkey’s territory against Saddam Hussein’s army in the run-up to the 2003 war. But more fundamentally, the Bush administration is preoccupied by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and seems to have relegated Turkey to the back burner—or so it appears to many Turks. The widespread belief among Turks that the

United States undertook the Iraq war without regard to the consequences for Turkey’s security and that Washington now seeks to punish it for the Turkish parliament’s vote has created enormous resentment toward the United States. This sentiment is reflected across the political

spectrum. It is evident among elites, including the leadership of the Turkish military, arguably the country’s most influential institution, but also pervades society more generally. Opinion polls show that Turks, who once viewed the United States as an ally and friend, increasingly see it as not just unfriendly, but as a direct threat to their national security. As a result, influential Turks, government officials and foreign policy experts alike, are discussing a strategic reassessment. This reorientation would involve building deep ties with new partners, among them Russia, China, Iran, and Syria and would, moreover, abandon the longstanding premise that the United States remains the indispensable ally. It would be mistaken for the United States to dismiss these discussions as bluster. Turkey remains a crucial ally in the struggle against terrorism; it is a secular and

democratic Muslim country; it sits atop an arc extending from Israel to Central Asia, a zone of actual or potential upheaval and war; it abuts waterways critical to the flow of commerce, particularly oil; its territory is a corridor for the strategically important Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline; and its cooperation is key to a durable settlement in Iraq and to an effective policy to counter the challenges
posed by a resurgent (and potentially nuclear-armed) Iran.

Terrorism causes extinction Alexander 3 (Yonah, Inter-University for Terrorism Studies Director,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2003/aug/27/20030827-084256-8999r/, AD: 6/27/10) jl Last week's brutal suicide bombings in Baghdad and Jerusalem have once again illustrated dramatically that the international community failed, thus far at least, to understand the magnitude and implications of the terrorist threats to the very survival of civilization itself.
Even the United States and Israel have for decades tended to regard terrorism as a mere tactical nuisance or irritant rather than a critical strategic challenge to their national security concerns. It is not surprising, therefore, that on September 11, 2001, Americans were stunned by the unprecedented tragedy of 19 al Qaeda terrorists striking a devastating blow at the center of the nation's commercial and military powers. Likewise, Israel and its citizens, despite the collapse of the Oslo Agreements of 1993 and numerous acts of terrorism triggered by the second intifada that began almost three years ago, are still "shocked" by each suicide attack at a time of intensive diplomatic efforts to revive the moribund peace process through the now revoked cease-fire arrangements [hudna]. Why are the United States and Israel, as well as scores of other countries affected by the universal nightmare of modern terrorism surprised by new terrorist "surprises"? There are many reasons, including misunderstanding of the manifold specific factors that contribute to terrorism's expansion, such as lack of a universal definition of terrorism, the religionization of politics, double standards of morality, weak punishment of terrorists, and the exploitation of the media by terrorist propaganda and psychological warfare. Unlike their

historical counterparts, contemporary terrorists have introduced a new scale of violence in

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terms of conventional and unconventional threats and impact. The internationalization and brutalization of current and future terrorism make it clear we have entered an Age of Super Terrorism [e.g. biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear and cyber] with its serious implications concerning national, regional and global security concerns.

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Suiter Pre-season

Internals – Turkish Prolif
Decline in relations pushes Turkey into going nuclear—and spurs nuclear war Sokolski 7 [Henry, the Non-proliferation policy education center, Jun 14, http://www.npecweb.org/Presentations/20070616-Sokolski-Talk-AixEnProvence-Conference.pdf] Whether or not Turkey does choose to go its own way and acquire a nuclear weapons-option of its own will depend on several factors, including Ankara’s relations with Washington, Brussels, and Tehran. To a very significant degree, though, it also will depend on whether or not the EU Members States are serious about letting Turkey join the EU. The dimmer these prospects look, the greater is the likelihood of that Turkey will chose to hedge its political, economic, and security bets by seeking a nuclear weapons-option of its own. This poses a difficult choice for the EU. Many key members are opposed to letting Turkey join the EU. There are arguments to favor this position. Yet, if Turkey should conclude that its interests are best served by pursuing such a nuclear weapons-option, it is almost certain to fortify the conviction of Egypt, Algeria, and Saudi Arabia to do the same. This will result in the building up a nuclear powder keg on Europe’s doorstep and significantly increase the prospect for nuclear terrorism and war.

A failure to credibly defend Turkey will lead to speedy nuclearization Clawson, ‘3 [Patrick, Deputy Director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, “Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East: Who is next after Iran,
April, 2003, http://www.npec-web.org/Essays/Presentation030401%20Clawson%20Nuclear%20Prolif%20TB.pdf]

Historically Turkey has been at peace with Iran, and the two countries have generally paid relatively little attention to each other, compared to what one might expect from two neighbors with considerable economic interaction. That said, Turkey has many reasons to worry about meddling by an Islamic Republic which is ideologically opposed to Ankara’s secular policies. If Turkey faces serious internal problems – be it from Islamists or from Kurds – Iran might seek to take advantage of that situation, and Iranian nuclear weapons would make Turkey think long and hard about how much it could complain about such Iranian meddling. In other words, an Iranian nuclear capability could make the Turkish General Staff nervous. Faced with a nuclear-armed Iran, Turkey’s first instinct will be to turn to NATO. Turkey places extraordinary value on its NATO membership , which symbolizes the West’s acceptance of Turkey – a delicate issue for a country which feels it is excluded from the EU on civilizational grounds more than for any other reason. The cold reality is that NATO was not designed to defend Turkey : assisting Turkey faced with a general Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe is one thing; defending Turkey when it alone faces a threat is an altogether different matter. It is not clear how much NATO members want to take on this burden . It will be

only natural for Turkey to wonder how much it can rely on NATO. Were Turkey to decide that it had to proliferate in order to defend itself, it has good industrial and scientific infrastructures which it could draw upon to build nuclear weapons on its own. It would be difficult to prevent a determined Turkey from building nuclear weapons in well under a decade.

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Internal Link-Trades off with Turkey/Russo Relations
US-Turkey relations trade off with Turkey-Russo relations, this seriously damages the Caucus pipelines Enghdal 9, (F William, Apr 16, 2009. Editor for Asia Times, Middle East, http://www.atime

s.com/atimes/Middle_East/KD16Ak01.html) Turkey is the key link in this complex game of geopolitical balance of power between Washington and Moscow. If Turkey decides to collaborate with Russia, Georgia's position becomes very insecure and Azerbaijan's possible pipeline route to Europe is blocked. If Turkey decides to cooperate with Washington and at the same time reaches a stable agreement with Armenia under US guidance, Russia's entire position in the Caucasus is weakened and an alternative route for natural gas to Europe becomes available,
reducing Russian leverage against Western Europe.

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Turkey Neg 254 /341

Suiter Pre-season

Internal Link (Independent Turkey Bad)
Independent Turkey leads to cooperation with China and Russia Sariibrahimoglu 1 (Lale, Eurasia analyst, Turkish Daily News, “US fears Turkey becoming another Israel,”
http://gbulten.ssm.gov.tr/arsiv/2001/06/12/01_1.htm) MJ
U.S. sources speaking to the Turkish Daily News say that Washington was ready to give Turkey 90 percent of the software source code of mission computer systems. "We (U.S.) can not transfer the remaining 10 percent of the software source code because it would reveal the vulnerability of the weapons systems," said the same source. Turkey has been negotiating with U.S. Bell for the coproduction of 145 helicopters in three batches worth about $4 billion. U.S. fears that Turkey may set an example by

becoming another Israel, which built its indigenous systems on U.S. products but then started cooperating with many countries including U.S.'s adversary China, enlarging its options in developing indigenous technologies. The United States has mounted pressure on Israel to stop arms exports, as well as cooperation with countries like China and Russia. The U.S. pressures being imposed on Ankara come at a time when Turkey has been signalling closer military ties with China and South Korea, Russia is also very keen to enter the Turkish arms market in terms of coproduction projects.

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US-Turkey Relations Good (Terrorism)
US-Turkey Relations key to fight terrorism Cook 2 (Steven, Brookings Institute Research Fellow, “U.S.-Turkey Relations and the War on Terroris,”
http://bianet.org/english/english/6013-u-s--turkey-relations-and-the-war-on-terroris) MJ

In the hours before U.S. and British forces first launched attacks on Taliban and al Qaeda targets, Vice President Dick Cheney telephoned Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer to inform him of operation "Enduring Freedom." Sezer, in response and befitting the ties between close NATO partners, underscored Turkey's support and wished the United States success. The phone call reflects Turkey's importance to the United States as Ankara has become a pivotal ally in Washington's new battle against terrorism. While much of the Bush administration's diplomatic efforts have focused on the Arab Middle East, Turkey-a NATO

ally, Muslim country, and aspirant to full-membership in the European Union-can offer the United States support in a range of areas where Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf states are either unable or reluctant to assist. Unlike Washington's Arab allies, Turkey

has signaled clearly to the Bush administration its belief that a confluence of interests in fighting global terrorism exists between Washington and Ankara. The Turkish government needed little
persuading that Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda network were responsible for the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. On October 3, Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit, in reference to Washington's presentation of evidence linking bin Laden to the attacks told the Turkish press, "The fact that the U.S. found it persuasive persuades us also."

Moreover, once the United States and Great Britain began military operations in Afghanistan, Ankara apparently dropped whatever reservations it may have harbored concerning its own commitment of forces to the effort. Turkey's largest circulation daily, Hurriyet, reported

that after a meeting in the early hours of October 8, Turkey's political and military leaders affirmed that they would support any NATO decision made within the framework of Article 5 of the North Atlantic treaty. Sezer's words on the eve of war-as well as those of Ecevit, Foreign Minister Ismail Cem, Chief of Staff Hussein Kivrikoglu, and other Turkish leaders-should not, however, be interpreted as blanket Turkish support for the U.S. action in Southwest Asia and the Middle East. Since September 11, the Turkish leadership has fashioned a policy that can only be characterized as guarded-receptive to Washington in some areas, but clearly wary of others. To be sure, Ankara is and will remain a valuable ally of the United States, yet it is important to recognize that Turkey's fragile domestic political situation and complex regional interests dictate caution. Underneath the public bilateral assurances to each other, there will be significant sensitivities and pressure points in the U.S.-Turkish relationship as the situation in Afghanistan develops and Washington more fully elaborates its practical response to terrorism.

A terrorist getting a hold of nuclear materials is the largest and most probable threat of our time Siddiqi 4/16 (Shibil, Fellow with the Center for the Study of Global Power and Politics at Trent University,
“Terrorism: The nuclear summit’s ‘straw man’,” Asia Times Online, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/LD16Ak02.html) MJ American President Barack Obama gathered 47 national delegations for the first Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) in Washington on April 12 and 13. It was the largest gathering of world leaders in Washington since the close of World War II. The scale of the summit was meant to impress the gravity of the subject matter. In Obama's words, "This is an unprecedented gathering to address an unprecedented threat": the prevention of nuclear terrorism. In trademark style, Obama offered rhetorical flourishes to fit the occasion: "Two decades after the Cold War we face a cruel irony of history. The risk of nuclear confrontation between nations has gone down, but the risk of nuclear attack as gone up". The president said that a tiny scrap of plutonium the size of an apple was now the biggest threat to world stability , with "just the tiniest amount of plutonium" in the wrong hands posing potential for catastrophe. However, the president's assessment of global nuclear threats paper over some basic realities. The threat of nuclear confrontation remains dangerously high despite the New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) with Russia and America's passive-aggressive Nuclear Posture Review. This is particularly true along the nuclear fault-lines in the Middle East and South Asia which have existed since the Cold War. Perhaps a "dirty bomb" made out of a handful of plutonium or other radiological material forms the most significant "nuclear" threat to the US . But outside of
this Western-centric world-view, it is the threat of nuclear attack or exchange in the Middle East and South Asia - home to nearly a fourth of the world's population - that clearly remains the largest global nuclear threat.

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Suiter Pre-season

US-Turkey Relations Good Ext (Terrorism)
U.S.-Turkey relations key to fighting terrorism
HurriYet Daily 10 (Turkish newssource, “Turkish PM Erdoğan asks for more than ‘intelligence sharing’”, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=turkey-asks-more-than-8216intelligence-sharing8217-2010-06-28) BAF An anti-terror mechanism set up between Turkey, Iraq and the United States should include functions other than “intelligence sharing,” according Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. “This is being negotiated within the trilateral mechanism. I think that the steps to be taken in this regard will be implemented,” Erdoğan told reporters at a press conference before his departure from Toronto early Monday where he attended a G-20 summit and held a bilateral meeting with U.S. President Barack Obama. The issues Erdoğan and Obama focused on were the joint fight against the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, the disagreement over Iran sanctions and the ongoing dispute between Turkey and Israel. Erdoğan said he mentioned the PKK’s recently launched terror campaign and asked Obama to enlarge their ongoing cooperation. The U.S. has been providing Turkey with actionable intelligence since late 2007 and initiated the establishment of what they call the trilateral mechanism – a broad cooperative measure between Turkey, Iraq and the U.S. intended to restrict the movement of terror agents in the region. However Turks seem unsatisfied with its function, a
feeling Erdoğan voiced after his meeting with Obama.

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Suiter Pre-season

US-Turkey Relations Good (Afghanistan Stability)
US-Turkey relations key to Afghanistan stability Erman 10 (Aydemir, Turkey’s special coordinator for Afghanistan, Christian Science Monitor, How Turkey can help NATO in
Afghanistan, http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2010/0209/How-Turkey-can-help-NATO-in-Afghanistan)

At the recent London Conference on Afghanistan, the United States, its NATO allies, and Afghanistan’s regional neighbors agreed to more closely align civilian and military efforts to stabilize that nation so foreign forces can withdraw and local Afghan forces can take over security. Skip to next paragraph Related Stories On the civilian side, a new emphasis was placed on the key importance of building up Afghan institutions that can attract the allegiance of those who now stand with the Taliban. As a historically trusted friend of the Afghan people, Turkey, alone among members of the NATO alliance, has a “soft power” ingredient in its arsenal that is key to winning the hearts and minds of the population. It is said in Afghanistan that “no Afghan was ever killed by a Turkish bullet” and “no Afghan trained by Turks has ever betrayed his country.” Turks have aided the Afghan government and its people since the days of Amir Abdur Rahman Khan, the “Iron Amir” who unified the country during his reign from 1880 to 1901 and embarked on a path of modernization. Afghanistan was the second country to recognize modern Turkey in 1921 after the USSR. Modern Turkey was instrumental in
establishing the military academy, medical school, Kabul University and its faculty of political sciences, the music conservatory, and the public health service of Afghanistan. Good relations between Turks and Afghans are based on three

factors: First, we do not share a common border and thus have no disputes on that score. Second, as a young republic that was a successor to a great empire, Turkey never displayed any imperial overtones as it embraced the young Afghan nation, which had suffered at the hands of the British and
Russian empires, after independence. Undergoing its own process of modernization at the time, Turkey treated Afghanistan as an absolute equal. We never had a special agenda and had relations with all elements of the Afghan nation. Third, we share the religion of Islam. Unlike many other members of the international community, Turkey did not neglect Afghanistan in the

years preceding 9/11 but was silently active.

In my contacts with the Taliban during those years as Turkey’s special coordinator for Afghanistan, we pulled no punches. I explicitly told the Taliban leaders that we would not extend recognition to their regime. Turkey recognized the rump government of President Barhanuddin Rabbani that remained in only a small part of Afghanistan, mainly Badakshan Province and the Panshir Valley, until he was replaced by Hamid Karzai after the Taliban were driven from power by the US after 9/11. We openly criticized the Taliban’s lack of governing capacity, their profiteering from the opium trade, their support for terror organizations like Al Qaeda, and their treatment of their own people. Despite all this criticism, the Taliban nonetheless gave my colleagues and me free access to travel the country. I was always respected, and we were able to perform humanitarian work all over the Taliban-controlled

parts of Afghanistan. I was told on several occasions by the Taliban leaders that as much as they may scorn my remarks, as a Turk I was
welcomed. Shaped by our historical relationship with all parts of Afghan society, Turkey’s involvement there since 9/11 has quite consciously been a matter of “soft power projection.” As a NATO ally true to its obligations, Turkey sent troops to Afghanistan

after 9/11 on the condition that they would not take part in combat operations. Despite pressure from allies, Turkey sticks strictly to this policy. Our presence in Afghanistan, both military and civilian, has been based on treating people with respect and as equals, not with paternalism or the imperial arrogance of an occupying power. Turkish troops deployed to Kabul have been
under strict orders to treat Afghans with dignity. They have not broken into homes. Most patrols are conducted on foot and not in armored carriers. Troops wear no sunglasses in order to maintain eye contact. Touching women is totally taboo. Medical personnel serve Afghan people as well as their own forces. Turkish troops have thus not only contributed to the security of Kabul but became an unobtrusive part of Afghan daily life. In the critical province of Wardak, Turkey today is also operating the only civilian-led Provincial Reconstruction Team. Generally, PRTs are operated by NATO soldiers. Since 2006, the Turkish government has spent $20 million in the province funding a police training academy, building schools, restoring a mosque, and setting up a medical clinic. Halim Fedai, the governor of Wardak Province, has said: “The Turkish programs are very well received and readily

accepted by Afghans because they work within Afghan culture. They are sensitive to Afghan values. We have very good, strong, historical relationships with Turkey. ” Clearly, the crescent and star have
once again proved as reliable a trademark in Afghanistan today as in the past. Because of this success, the Turkish government will soon set up another PRT elsewhere in Afghanistan. The Turkish lesson in Afghanistan is clear: Winning hearts and minds requires better understanding and respect for local values. Handing out cans of soda with colonial airs won’t yield tangible results. For many of these same reasons – our historical relationships in the region and deep understanding of local values and cultures – Turkey may be one of the few countries, if not the

only country, that can bring Afghanistan and Pakistan together to sort out their differences. President Karzai made a point at the London Conference of stressing Turkey’s mediating role, following upon the “trilateral” Turkey-Afghanistan-Pakistan meeting he had earlier attended in
January in Istanbul with Pakistani President Asif Zardari. Unfortunately, India’s absence so far in this process has weakened the Turkish initiative. It is critical to get them on board because the Afghan problem cannot be solved unless India and Pakistan come to terms over their interests in Afghanistan. The international community in general, and the allies in particular, should lend their

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support to Turkey. Turkey’s NATO membership and historical soft-power capacity can make a critical difference in Afghanistan.

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US-Turkey Relations Good (East-West Dialogue) ½
1) Relations key to east west dialogue Gresser 2 (Edward, director of PPI’s Project on Trade and Global Markets, Policy Report, A New U.S. Trade

Relationship with Turkey, http://www.tusiad.us/Content/uploaded/TRADE_TURKEY_9021.PDF)BAF The administration’s QIZ proposal is, of course, well motivated. It may have some important short-term benefits in particular industries, and would be at least a symbolic vote of confidence in the Turkish reform effort. But in its present form, it is a secondary measure rather than a step that—to use the administration’s phase—will put economic ties with Turkey on a strategic level. The stakes are high enough to demand something more. Turkey has a long and honorable record as a NATO member and a contributor to western and international security. In reforming its economy, liberalizing domestic politics, and seeking to join the EU, Turkey adds something more. These steps, whose success is as yet uncertain, can make Turkey the first majority-Muslim country to commit itself fully to a common destiny with the West. This is a process of genuine and profound importance—one an American administration should be willing to take some risks to support. A slight change in the bill, adding the laborintensive goods now excluded, would require the administration to spend some political capital. But the benefits to Turkey’s reform effort would be far greater than the domestic risk, and that is what counts. Half-measures don’t often make history.

259

Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 260 /341

Suiter Pre-season

US-Turkey Relations Good (East-West Dialogue) 2/2
2) East West dialogue key to Turkish stance on terrorism, economy and democracy Gresser 2 (Edward, director of PPI’s Project on Trade and Global Markets, Policy Report, A New U.S. Trade Relationship with Turkey, http://www.tusiad.us/Content/uploaded/TRADE_TURKEY_9021.PDF)BAF
The United States has a long list of requests for Muslim countries these days—from support for the war on terrorism to commitment to domestic liberalization and economic reform through peace in the Middle East. What do we do when a government says yes to all of the above? This question is not hypothetical—the country in question is Turkey. Over the past year, Turkey’s cooperation

against terrorism has included commitment of its own soldiers in Afghanistan. At home, the economic and political liberalization program overseen by Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit and his former economic policy chief, former World Bank executive Kemal Dervis, is a remarkable counterpoint to the closed economies and polities of much of the Middle East. Its specifics include trade and financial reform, the opening of Kurdish language schools, and even the abolition of the death penalty; unifying these individual policies is a drive for full integration with the values and institutions of the West. Such a program, building on a longstanding commitment as a NATO member, is of extraordinary importance as a vision for Turkey and as an example for Muslim nations elsewhere. The Bush administration, to its credit, has recognized the importance of support for such policies. But the plan it has
developed in response— a partial duty-free program, a much more limited version of the U.S.-Jordan Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZ) project of 1997-2001—seems less than the moment requires. The Context as a NATO member, Turkey has been a

strategic partner to the United States for many years. Most recently, American and British aircraft have maintained the no-fly zone in northern Iraq from a base in southern Turkey, and Turkish soldiers are serving as peacekeepers in post-Taliban Afghanistan. Barring a major change in Turkey’s political outlook, this strategic relationship will remain fundamental to Western security policy for many years to come: Turkey has the second largest military force of any NATO member state and a relatively stable democratic political system, and Turkish governments since the 1920s have been viscerally opposed to threats from religious fundamentalism. Turkey’s economic and social reforms, however, represent something new. Aimed at membership in the European Union, they mark the first time a major Muslim nation has committed itself to the complete spectrum of Western economic and legal political institutions. As such, reform in Turkey is an unusual endeavor in modern history, and one with significant strategic meaning for the United States. But just as the Turkish reform is a unique effort, it also faces
some unique challenges. A convenient point of reference is the set of reform policies adopted in Southeast Asia after the financial crisis of 1997-1999. Like Turkey’s current program, they emerged in the aftermath of economic trauma and represent an internationalist, prowestern view of the future. But the Asian countries have some advantages Turkey lacks—notably a cooperative regional self-help effort in the ASEAN Free Trade Area, as well as China’s entry into the World Trade Organization as a spur to reform and a new market for regional exports. Most of Turkey’s neighbors, by contrast, have policies far removed from self-

help. To the south, Iraq, in refusing to comply with Gulf War ceasefire agreements, has sealed itself off from the world by sanctions for 10 years. The Middle East as a whole, fragmented by trade barriers and political conflict , is little more promising. To the north and west, the Caucasus and the Balkans have their own deeply rooted troubles. In such an environment, reform, growth, and recovery from recession are harder; the role of Western policy correspondingly becomes more important and perhaps more decisive. Much of the responsibility lies with the European Union, which will
meet in December to decide on membership for 10 or more aspiring neighbors. Turkey’s politicians and public alike view EU membership as one of the reform program’s major goals. And, although the reforms have added momentum to Turkey’s bid, the prospects and possible dates for EU accession remain uncertain. So, as the administration recognizes, the United States can also make a contribution. According to Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz: “The

United States sees our partnership with Turkey extending to the economic field…We want to help in Turkey’s recovery. We want to help promote Turkey’s economic growth, and we want to help Turkey become competitive in the global economy. President Bush has raised our economic relations with Turkey to a strategic level; we are pursuing every effort to increase our trade and investment from a base that is admittedly too low.”

260

Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 261 /341

Suiter Pre-season

US-Turkey Relations Good (Middle East Stability) ½
A. US-Turkey relation key to Middle east stability and terrorism Menon and Wimbush 7 (Rajan, Professor of International Relations at Lehigh University, S. Enders,

Vice President for International Programs and Policy at Hudson Institute, The US and Turkey: The End of an Alliance?” Survival, 49(2), pg 129-144) MJ If Turkey, a key friend and ally, turns away from the United States, the damage to American interests will be severe and long lasting. Turkey remains exceptionally important to the United States, arguably even more so than during the Cold War. Turkey is the top of an arc that starts in Israel and wends its way through Lebanon, Syria, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Iran. It abuts, or is proximate to, countries pivotal to American foreign policy and national security, whether allies and friends, adversaries, or loci of instability. Turkey’s critical location means that instability within it could spill beyond its borders, with unpredictable effects rippling across its neighbourhood, particularly the Middle East. Turkey sits astride critical waterways and narrows (the Caspian Sea, the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, and the Bosporous and Dardanelles) that are channels for trade and the flow of energy to global markets. Turkey’s Mediterranean port of Ceyhan is the terminus of the
Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. Turkey is therefore essential to American efforts to reduce the dependence of Azerbaijan, and potentially Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, on Russia’s energy pipelines. Turkey’s substantial economic and political ties

with Georgia and Azerbaijan contribute to the stability of these countries, whose strategic significance far exceeds their standing in commonplace measures of power. Georgia is a corridor for
the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, and its stability is under threat because of its testy relationship with Russia and its conflicts with the Russian-supported secessionist stateless Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Azerbaijan is not only a major energy

producer, but also a fellow Turkic country, whose territorial dispute with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh could boil over into war, just as it did in the 1990s, possible igniting a wider conflagration drawing in Turkey (Azerbaijan’s ally) and Russia (Armenia’s patron) and putting the BakuCeyhan pipeline at risk. Turkey is a democratic and secular Muslim state, and its alliance with the United States helps demonstrate that the United States can maintain friendly and productive ties with an array of Muslim countries – that America does not oppose Islam per se,

but rather the violent extremists who invoke it to justify their violence against innocents and their retrograde, intolerant agenda. This is crucial if the American campaign against terrorism is not to be seen by the world’s 1.3 billion Muslims, as Islamic terrorist groups would like it to be, as a war against Islam itself. Turkey’s cooperation is essential to any durable political

settlement in Iraq, particularly because it borders Iraq’s Kurdish north and fears that the emergence there of a Kurdish state would increase the already-considerable violence and resilient separatist sentiment in its own Kurdish-populated south-east. The fragmentation of Iraq

could therefore prompt Turkish military intervention, which in turn could deal a death blow to the US-Turkish alliance, perhaps even culminating in Turkey’s exit from NATO. (Turkish forces intervened in northern Iraq to attack the camps of the Kurdish separatists guerillas in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War; in March 2003 roughly 1, 500 Turkish troops entered this region; and Turkish Special Forces have reportedly carried out covert operations in post-Saddam Iraq.) Turkey’s disillusionment with the West could prompt a reorientation of its foreign policy away from the United States, the European Union and NATO, and toward a new strategy that looks to China, India, Iran, Russia and Syria. Such a shift is already being discussed in Turkey, and the assumption that it amounts to bluff and bluster may prove short sighted. The new strategic landscape created by the end of the Cold War may pose new threats to Turkey, but it also provides it a choice of new partners as well. While a rethinking of Turkish grand strategy need not in itself undermine the alliance between Turkey and the United States, it could certainly do so if the force driving it is an anti-Western nationalism. Turkey

and the United States both face the threat of terrorism, and Turkey’s cooperation is essential to any truly effective American policy against global terrorist networks. More specifically, Turkey could also serve as a corridor for militant Islamists to infiltrate Iraq and Turkey’s other neighbours. Turkey’s participation in the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, a military coalition that for a time was commanded by a Turkish general, demonstrates that Ankara and Washington can cooperate in promoting stability and enabling economic development in war-torn countries, although Turkey’s military forces in Afghanistan are small and are not deployed in the south, the

central theatre of the anti-Taliban war. (Turkey is no different in this respect than the vast majority of other contributors to the force). Turkey is a member of NATO, and the air bases in its southeast, primarily Incirlik but also Batman, Diyarbakir, Maltya and Mus, remain important to the United States. The value of Turkish airfields was revealed after the 1991 Gulf War, when a no-fly zone was established over northern Iraq to protect the Kurds from Saddam Hussein’s military machine. Moreover, despite Washington’s inability to open a second front from the Turkish territory against Iraqi forces in March 2003, American aircraft were permitted to use Turkish airspace for operations in Iraq, and Turkish installations are important for providing logistical support to US forces in Iraq.

261

Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 262 /341

Suiter Pre-season

US-Turkey Relations Good (Middle East Stability) 2/2
B. Need to prevent regional instability-hard to stop when upset and if unstable, destroys peace and economic stability Blank 2000 (Stephen, professor at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College. American
Grand Strategy and the Transcaspian Region, “U.S. Military Engagement with Transcaucasia and Central Asia,” World Affairs) MJ If real peace, true independence, economic stability, and the future prosperity that depends on those three factors are to endure, political stability must take root. Unfortunately, most factors here work against long-term stability. The linkage between authoritarian, personalist government and violence is a profound structural cause for regional unrest and ethnic violence. Once that violence begins, it is hard to stop for two reasons. First, ethnic wars where land, sovereignty, and the integrity of the state and of the government are at stake are intrinsically harder to stop, even more so than civil wars.81 Second, foreign powers are almost certain to try to exploit conflict and perhaps prolong it to their own advantage.

C. A terrorist getting a hold of nuclear materials is the largest and most probable threat of our time Siddiqi 4/16 (Shibil, Fellow with the Center for the Study of Global Power and Politics at Trent University,
“Terrorism: The nuclear summit’s ‘straw man’,” Asia Times Online, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/LD16Ak02.html) MJ American President Barack Obama gathered 47 national delegations for the first Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) in Washington on April 12 and 13. It was the largest gathering of world leaders in Washington since the close of World War II. The scale of the summit was meant to impress the gravity of the subject matter. In Obama's words, "This is an unprecedented gathering to address an unprecedented threat": the prevention of nuclear terrorism. In trademark style, Obama offered rhetorical flourishes to fit the occasion: "Two decades after the Cold War we face a cruel irony of history. The risk of nuclear confrontation between nations has gone down, but the risk of nuclear attack as gone up". The president said that a tiny scrap of plutonium the size of an apple was now the biggest threat to world stability, with "just the tiniest amount of plutonium" in the wrong hands posing potential for catastrophe. However, the president's assessment of global nuclear threats paper over some basic realities. The threat of nuclear confrontation remains dangerously high despite the New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) with Russia and America's passive-aggressive Nuclear Posture Review. This is particularly true along the nuclear fault-lines in the Middle East and South Asia which have existed since the Cold War. Perhaps a "dirty bomb" made out of a handful of plutonium or other radiological material forms the most significant "nuclear" threat to the US. But outside of
this Western-centric world-view, it is the threat of nuclear attack or exchange in the Middle East and South Asia - home to nearly a fourth of the world's population - that clearly remains the largest global nuclear threat.

262

Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 263 /341

Suiter Pre-season

US-Turkey Relations Good Ext (Middle East)
Turkey-US cohesion key to Middle East stability- Iran, Afghanistan and Israel prove Goodenough 09 (Patrick, International editor, CNS news, As Turkey Tilts Away From the West, Obama Hails
Erdogan As ‘Friend’, https://mail.google.com/mail/?shva=1#inbox/129bac1c6791f10e) BAF President Obama said Monday Turkey could be “an important player” in efforts to prod Iran to keep its nuclear program peaceful – although an increasingly assertive Ankara has tilted perceptibly towards Tehran this year in its standoff with the West. Characterizing Turkey as “a great country” and visiting Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan as a personal friend, Obama said he was optimistic about the prospect of “stronger and stronger” bilateral ties in the future. Turkey, a Muslim but officially secular member of NATO which aspires to join the European Union, is currently a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. It was among the handful of countries in Afghanistan. Turkey recently doubled the number of troops deployed in the NATO-led mission there to about 1,750, although none are combat troops. Turkey has the second-largest standing army in NATO (after the U.S.), more than twice the size of that of Britain, which has

Obama visited in his first presidential trip outside North America last April. Speaking after their meeting – which Turkish media noted with enthusiasm had lasted for two hours – Obama praised Turkey for its “outstanding contributions”

almost 10,000 troops in Afghanistan. The warm words at the Oval Office came despite recent trends in Turkey, including its criticism of the West’s handling of the Iran issue and a significant cooling in relations with Israel since last winter’s military offensive against Hamas in Gaza. At a time when the West is edging closer to tightening sanctions against Iran, Turkey is pushing in the other direction. Erdogan’s government last week did not support an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) resolution censuring Iran for its uranium enrichment activities and referring the matter to the U.N. Security Council. Addressing a press conference at a Washington hotel after the White House meeting, Erdogan reiterated his opposition to sanctions. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan addresses lawmakers in Ankara on Tuesday, Dec. 1, 2009. (AP Photo) “We have specifically stated that the [Iran nuclear] question can be resolved through diplomacy and diplomacy only,” he said. U.S. ‘disappointed’ by Turkey’s stance in IAEA vote In a background briefing ahead of the visit, a senior administration official stressed the importance of U.S.-Turkey relations, but also hinted at some of the problem areas. “We have no problem with Turkey reaching out to Iran, talking to Iran,” he

said. “But it is important to us that the message be the same” as that of “the rest of the international community.” The official said the U.S. believed sanctions would be most effective if broad and “multinationally imposed,” and that “Turkey would be an important player on this issue.” He said Ankara’s decision
to abstain rather than vote in favor of the Nov. 27 IAEA resolution had “disappointed” the U.S., which would continue to encourage Turkey and others to join “what we hope will be a common line.” In the vote by the 35-member board of IAEA governors, three countries – Venezuela, Cuba and Malaysia – voted against the resolution and Turkey was joined by Afghanistan, Egypt, Pakistan, Brazil and South Africa in abstaining. Although Turkey has traditionally had better ties with Israel than any other important country in the Muslim world, that changed dramatically this year, with Ankara positioning itself as a leading critic of the Jewish state. On

ties with Israel, a second administration official at the briefing said that if the Turks wished to play a constructive role in Mideast peace efforts, “they need to be seen by all relevant participants in such a dialogue as an honest broker.” If Turkey did not return to the “very strong and cooperative relationship” it previously had with Israel, the official said, “it’s going to be harder for them to lead in the way they would like to lead.”

263

Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 264 /341

Suiter Pre-season

US-Turkey Relations Good (Caucasus)
Without US-Turkey Relations, US would be one-sided on issues in Caucasus, causes instability Aydin and Erhan 4 (Mustafa, Head of the Department of International Relations, Çağrı , Assitant Professor

at Ankara University, Turkish-American relations: past, present and future, pg 98) MJ The US and Turkish approaches to security issues in the Caucasus region have contained the elements of both convergence and divergence. In the early 1990s, Washington did not share Turkish concerns about Moscow’s efforts to reassert its influence over the former Soviet Union’s possessions in the region. Intent on integrating Russia into the Western community of nations and optimistic about its political and economic transformation, the US adopted a policy of benign neglect toward Moscow’s effort to implement its ‘near abroad’ doctrine through overt and covert actions. Ankara’s objections to the Russian violations of the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty in the northern Caucasus

and the restationing of Russian forces along Turkey’s borders in Georgia and Azerbaijan did not receive a sympathetic hearing in Washington. However, the US gradually modified its policy in the wake of the conflict in Chechnya and adopted a discernibly more cautious approach to Russian policies in the Caucasus. The US support for Baku-Ceyhan pipeline project and the Americanbacked ‘east-west energy corridor’ represented this new approach, which closely aligned US and Turkish policies after the mid-1990s. The only major exceptionto the convergence of views between Ankara and Washington was the continued US tilt toward Armenia in its conflict with Azerbaijan. The Armenian diaspora in the US, through its powerful lobby in Washington, has influenced the shaping of US policy on the Azeri-Armenian conflict. After Israel, Armenia has been the second highest recipient of US foreign aid on a per capita basis despite its occupation of more than one-fifth of Azeri territory. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, has been excluded from US assistance by Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act. Turkey has voiced its opposition to this imbalance in US policies and has repeatedly called on Washington to adopt a more even-handed approach.

Conflict in Caucasus causes worldwide war Blank 2000 (Stephen, professor at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College. American

Grand Strategy and the Transcaspian Region, “U.S. Military Engagement with Transcaucasia and Central Asia,” World Affairs) MJ Washington’s burgeoning military-political-economic involvement seeks, inter alia, to demonstrate the U.S. ability to project military power even into this region or for that matter, into Ukraine where NATO recently held exercises that clearly originated as an antiRussian scenario. Secretary of Defense William Cohen has discussed strengthening U.S.-Azerbaijani military cooperation and
even training the Azerbaijani army, certainly alarming Armenia and Russia.69 And Washington is also training Georgia’s new Coast Guard. 70 However, Washington’s well-known ambivalence about committing force to Third World ethnopolitical conflicts suggests that U.S. military power will not be easily committed to saving its economic investment. But this ambivalence about committing forces and the dangerous situation, where Turkey is allied to Azerbaijan and Armenia is bound to Russia, create the potential for wider and more protracted regional conflicts among local forces. In that connection, Azerbaijan and Georgia’s growing efforts to secure NATO’s lasting involvement in the region, coupled with Russia’s determination to exclude other rivals, foster a polarization along very traditional lines.71 In 1993 Moscow even threatened World War III to deter Turkish intervention on behalf of Azerbaijan. Yet the new Russo-Armenian Treaty and Azeri-Turkish treaty suggest that Russia and Turkey could be dragged into a confrontation to rescue their allies from defeat. 72 Thus many of the conditions for conventional war or protracted ethnic conflict in which third parties intervene are present in the Transcaucasus. For example, many Third

World conflicts generated by local structural factors have a great potential for unintended escalation. Big powers often feel obliged to rescue their lesser proteges and proxies. One or another big power may fail to grasp the other side’s stakes since interests here are not as clear as in Europe. Hence commitments involving the use of nuclear weapons to prevent a client’s defeat are not as well established or apparent. Clarity about the nature of the threat could prevent the
kind of rapid and almost uncontrolled escalation we saw in 1993 when Turkish noises about intervening on behalf of Azerbaijan led Russian leaders to threaten a nuclear war in that case. 73 Precisely because Turkey is a NATO ally, Russian nuclear threats could trigger a potential nuclear blow (not a small possibility given the erratic nature of Russia’s declared nuclear strategies). The real threat of a Russian nuclear strike against Turkey to

defend Moscow’s interests and forces in the Transcaucasus makes the danger of major war there higher than almost everywhere else. As Richard Betts has observed, The greatest danger lies in areas where (1) the potential for serious instability is high; (2) both superpowers perceive vital interests; (3) neither recognizes that the other’s perceived interest or commitment is as great as its own; (4) both have the capability to inject conventional forces; and, (5) neither has willing proxies capable of settling the situation.74

264

Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 265 /341

Suiter Pre-season

Turkey-Russo Relations Good (Caucus Stability)
Creation of Russo-Turkish pipelines are key to Abhkazi peace talks Aparanjedze and Welt 4, (George and Cory, A Georgian-Russian Pipeline: For Peace or Profit?,
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav030904.shtml)
The proposal, however, contains one obvious obstacle: securing a pact that determines Abkhazia's political status. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Talks are currently at an impasse. Despite the public expressions of good will that surrounded Saakashvili's February 10-12 visit to Moscow, Russia and Georgia have been unable for more than a decade to find consensus on the Abkhazia question. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. In addition, Abkhaz leaders have shown no willingness to accept Georgia's current offer of broad autonomy within the Georgian state. In UN-hosted talks with Georgian representatives last month -- the first in three years -- Abkhazia maintained its demands for full independence. Abkhazia also refused to take part with Georgia in peace talks sponsored by Britain, Germany, Russia and the United States last month in Geneva. For Moscow, the timing

may be right for both Abkhaz peace and a pipeline. Russia has taken a dim view of growing US influence in Georgia.

Caucus stabilty key to preventing further Ossetia invasions and preventing war in Chechnya Peut 5, (Jean-Christophe, Caucasus/Central Asia: Analysts Expect Security, Economic Gains From BTC
Pipeline, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1058989.html)
The leaders of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, and Kazakhstan gathered near Baku today to inaugurate the $4 billion Baku-TbilisiCeyhan (BTC) pipeline. The project is generally viewed as the key element of an overall plan to turn the

Caucasus region into a transport corridor connecting Central Asia to Western Europe. But regional experts say that by helping make the region safer, the project's expected economic benefits might eventually outweigh its geostrategic importance. [For coverage of the ceremony, see "Caspian-Mediterranean Oil Pipeline Launched In Baku".] I believe that the idea of regional security is what prevails here," Tvalchrelidze said. "Had this pipeline been under construction in the years 1991 to 1992, for example, Georgia would never have gone into trouble with [its separatist republics] of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The reactions of the world community to these conflicts would have been totally different -- maybe even similar to that we've seen [recently] in Iraq." Tvalchrelidze also said he believes BTC might even have a positive impact of the war in Chechnya, since the pipeline could help cut many potential channels of oil contraband -- one of the main sources of revenues for both Russian army generals and Chechen fighters.

265

Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 266 /341

Suiter Pre-season

Turkey-Russian Relations Good (Pipelines)
A. Turkey-Russian relations are the foundation of pipelines and stability in the Caucuses Bhadrakumar 10, M K, Asia Times Coordinator and Staff Writer, Central Asian segment, May 15, 2010,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/LE15Ag01.html)

A tempo has been steadily building up over the past two decades for Russian-Turkish relations to develop into a strategic partnership between the two rivals who constantly jostled or even fought bloody wars against each other through centuries. Their post-Cold War
However, an historic breakthrough in Russia's ties with Turkey does not quite fall into this category. "reset" - as much at Ankara's initiative as Moscow's - in actuality by far predates the Obama era, and is based on wellthought-out foundations of hardcore mutual interests. Medvedev's visit to Ankara this week has

cemented this phenomenal transformation in the ties and launches it onto a far higher trajectory. A relationship that was heavily based on economic interests so far is rapidly acquiring political content. As Medvedev pointed out on Wednesday, "Russia and Turkey are strategic partners, not only in words but genuinely." Russia already meets close to 70% of Turkey's energy needs, and the established cooperation is also expected to grow. The two countries are discussing Russia's possible involvement in the north-south 550-kilometer oil pipeline to connect the Black Sea and the eastern Mediterranean, which was envisaged as a Turkish-Italian project. In effect, Russia is helping Turkey realize its ambition to become a global hub for energy transportation, while Moscow expects Ankara not to promote pipeline projects that rival Russia's. The two countries are inching closer to cooperation in the Moscow-backed South Stream gas pipeline project that binds the south European markets to Russia's energy sources. In geopolitical terms, among other things,
Turkey is playing a role in facilitating the return of Russia to its Slavic backyard in the Balkans from where it was rudely evicted in the 1990s with the West's dismantling of the former state of Yugoslavia, as well as in buttressing Russia's lead role in supplying energy to Europe. The developing Russia-Turkish coordination of positions over the South Caucasus aims at creating a regional security system. Arguably, the process is also subject to the US's acceptance and the climate of a US-Russia "reset" will have a bearing. As a Turkish report pointed out, "Azerbaijan is leaning toward Turkey, Armenia has embraced Russia, and Georgia has been seeking rapprochement with NATO and the US. When these countries lean (or are prodded) toward different supports, it usually ends badly, as proved by the August 2008 war between Georgia and Russia over South Ossetia."

B. Caucus stabilty key to preventing further Ossetia invasions and preventing war in Chechnya Peut 5, (Jean-Christophe, Caucasus/Central Asia: Analysts Expect Security, Economic Gains From BTC
Pipeline, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1058989.html)
The leaders of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, and Kazakhstan gathered near Baku today to inaugurate the $4 billion Baku-TbilisiCeyhan (BTC) pipeline. The project is generally viewed as the key element of an overall plan to turn the

Caucasus region into a transport corridor connecting Central Asia to Western Europe. But regional experts say that by helping make the region safer, the project's expected economic benefits might eventually outweigh its geostrategic importance. [For coverage of the ceremony, see "Caspian-Mediterranean Oil Pipeline Launched In Baku".] I believe that the idea of regional security is what prevails here," Tvalchrelidze said. "Had this pipeline been under construction in the years 1991 to 1992, for example, Georgia would never have gone into trouble with [its separatist republics] of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The reactions of the world community to these conflicts would have been totally different -- maybe even similar to that we've seen [recently] in Iraq." Tvalchrelidze also said he believes BTC might even have a positive impact of the war in Chechnya, since the pipeline could help cut many potential channels of oil contraband -- one of the main sources of revenues for both Russian army generals and Chechen fighters.

266

Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 267 /341

Suiter Pre-season

Turkey-Russo Relations Good (Pipelines Extension)
Pipelines in the Caucuses are key to stopping the Karabakh conflict and assisting millions of refugees, leeches that are impairing the Caucuses’ stability Azerbaijan News 10, (Azerbaijan key for South Caucasus energy stability Sat 05 June 2010 | 07:03 GMT

http://www.news.az/articles/16946) Emphasizing regional security in the South Caucasus, Veliyev said mediation for the NagornoKarabakh enclave was essential for securing the energy supply in the region and to Europe. Veliev warned of instability and a “polarized South Caucasus,” citing over 1 million refugees from the Karabakh conflict and an influx of radicals from Asia and the Northern Caucasus trying to settle in Azerbaijan. He also lamented the lack of acceptance of the Madrid principle by Armenia, which
he said would be a step toward solving the conflict.

Creation of Russo-Turkish pipelines are key to Abhkazi peace talks Aparanjedze and Welt 4, (George and Cory, A Georgian-Russian Pipeline: For Peace or Profit?,
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav030904.shtml)
The proposal, however, contains one obvious obstacle: securing a pact that determines Abkhazia's political status. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Talks are currently at an impasse. Despite the public expressions of good will that surrounded Saakashvili's February 10-12 visit to Moscow, Russia and Georgia have been unable for more than a decade to

find consensus on the Abkhazia question. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. In addition, Abkhaz leaders have shown no willingness to accept Georgia's current offer of broad autonomy within the Georgian state. In UN-hosted talks with Georgian representatives last month -- the first in three years -- Abkhazia maintained its demands for full independence. Abkhazia also refused to take part with Georgia in peace talks sponsored by Britain, Germany, Russia and the United States last month in Geneva. For Moscow, the timing may be right for both Abkhaz peace and a pipeline. Russia has taken a dim view of growing US influence in Georgia.

267

Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 268 /341

Suiter Pre-season

‡‡‡ Politics DA ‡‡‡

268

Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 269 /341

Suiter Pre-season

Link-Plan Unpopular
Withdrawal is unpopular with the senate, due to Obama’s flip flop on military deployment MacAskill et al 9, (Ewen MacAskill , Washington, Richard Norton-Taylor and Nicholas Watt, The Guardian

London Edition December 3, 2009, Thursday, Afghanistan: Obama's friends and enemies line up to hit out at withdrawal date: President faces struggle to sell $30bn plan to Congress as Democrats, Republicans and UK military question strategy) WDK Obama's new Afghanistan plan met widespread skepticism yesterday from both Democrats and Republicans who challenged him over the troop escalation and the planned date for the start of withdrawal. US allies, in particular British military commanders, also questioned the wisdom of setting a withdrawal date
and described US projections for expanding the Afghan army and police as optimistic. Obama sent the secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, the defence secretary, Robert Gates, and the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, Mike Mullen, to Congress yesterday as part of a charm offensive. But Democrats and Republicans on the Senate armed services committee

challenged Obama.

Republicans find many logical fallacies within withdrawal plans, Afghanistan as the empirical example MacAskill et al 9, (Ewen MacAskill , Washington, Richard Norton-Taylor and Nicholas Watt, The Guardian London Edition

December 3, 2009, Thursday, Afghanistan: Obama's friends and enemies line up to hit out at withdrawal date: President faces struggle to sell $30bn plan to Congress as Democrats, Republicans and UK military question strategy) WDK Obama's security team. The Republican John McCain described the plan as "logically incoherent". He said it made no sense to announce a date. "That gives the wrong impression to our friends, it's the wrong impression to give our enemies." The opposition on Capitol Hill underlined the hard sell that lies ahead for Obama as he needs congressional approval for the $30bn plan. He announced he was to send 30,000 extra troops, bringing the US total to 100,000, while also setting July 2011 as the date for the start of US withdrawal, though with no end date fixed.

Republicans dislike military withdrawal, preferring uninterrupted troop movements by the president

Yan 10, (Editor at Xianshian News Online, U.S. Republicans blast Obama's Afghanistan withdrawal date, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2010-06/28/c_13372358.htm) WDK In this political climate, debate rages over which branch of government ought to control the military. Republicans generally favor a strong Executive capable of conducting war without congressional interference.' Democrats tend to favor a reserved Executive unable to use military force in most instances without congressional consent.'' In support of these views, each party has claimed the high ground as the true guardian of the Constitution. The left claims to be protecting the Constitution's separation of powers.' The Right
claims fidelity to the Constitution's understanding of the President as commander in chief."

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Link-Plan Unpopular
Plan would divide his base—Dems want Incirlik Air Force Base The Hill 7

Democrats torn over Turkey resolution - TheHill.com, http://thehill.com/homenews/news/13384-democratstorn-over-turkey-resolution, By Jackie Kucinich - 10/17/07 08:26 AM ET Senior House Democrats, including House Armed Services Committee Chairman Ike Skelton (Mo.), have begun a campaign to oppose a resolution that would condemn Turkey for the Armenian genocide that occurred during World War I. Skelton and Rep. Solomon Ortiz (D-Texas) asked their colleagues on Oct. 11 to sign a letter to Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) objecting to the resolution, arguing its passage could harm U.S. security interests in the Middle East. The nonbinding resolution would require the president to call the killing of an estimated 1.5 million Armenians between the years 1915 and 1923 “genocide.” The House Foreign Affairs panel passed the resolution 27-21 on Oct. 10. “The government of Turkey, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, eight former Secretaries of State, and the three former Secretaries of Defense have warned us that congressional recognition of genocide claims will lead to a review by Turkey of the entire U.S.-Turkey relationship,” Skelton wrote. “Over half the cargo flown into Iraq and Afghanistan comes through Incirlik Air Base,” the letter continued. “Additionally, the U.S. military’s use of Incirlik Air Base will be an invaluable component to a successful and safe redeployment of our troops when the time comes.”

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Link-Plan=Win
Withdrawing from Incirlik would be a win for Pelosi—It has been on her agenda for years The Hill 7
Democrats torn over Turkey resolution - TheHill.com, http://thehill.com/homenews/news/13384-democratstorn-over-turkey-resolution, By Jackie Kucinich - 10/17/07 08:26 AM ET Pelosi and Majority Leader Steny Hoyer (D-Md.), longtime human rights supporters, both favor the resolution. Hoyer told reporters on Tuesday that he hoped a vote could take place before Nov. 16, although he said he would confer among other Democrats first. “[Democrats] seem more interested in declaring an Armenian genocide than then they are interested in stopping funding for the war. This could almost be Terri Schiavo,” Rep. Tom Davis (R-Va.) said. Skelton and Ortiz are not the only Democrats concerned about the vote. Pelosi ally Rep. John Murtha (D-Pa.) will hold a press conference with four other Democrats on Wednesday to try and persuade their leadership to keep the legislation from coming to the House floor. Democratic Reps.
Alcee Hastings (Fla.), Robert Wexler (Fla.), Steve Cohen (Tenn.), and John Tanner (Tenn.) will also participate in the news conference “This happened a long time ago. I don’t know if it was a massacre or a genocide,” said Murtha, who chairs the House Appropriations Defense subcommittee. “But we’ve got to deal with today’s world.” Murtha said he had discouraged Pelosi from bringing the bill to a vote six months ago. “Turkey is a valuable ally,” Murtha said, noting he had helped lead the fight against the resolution in 1987 as well. “Thirty percent of our material goes through Turkey.” Rep. Jane Harman (D-Calif.) on Tuesday also voiced her opposition to the resolution, calling it “highly destabilizing.” Despite the growing opposition, Pelosi has her allies. Foreign

Affairs Committee Chairman Tom Lantos (D-Calif.) strongly backs the bill, a reversal from his prior stance. In 2000, he said that “Saddam Hussein will be the prime beneficiary of this legislation.” Lantos’s office did not return a call for comment. Turkish officials have said the resolution would harm relations between Turkey and the United States. Turkey acknowledges that hundreds of thousands of Armenians died as modern Turkey grew out of the crumbling Ottoman Empire, but it contends the killings were part of a civil war and that atrocities were committed on both sides.

Plan is a win for Obama—it reverses Bush’s aggressive foreign policy Kevin Tuma 4-2 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-creamer/ten-rules-fordemocratic_b_521574.html The midterms will see dramatic Democratic losses...passage of Obamacare insured what was already a very high likelihood of losses. The key problem for this administration is that a silent majority of US

voters wants two things: A.) A better economy, and B.) Less government intrusion in their lives. Obama deserves some sympathy for his failure to quickly reverse the economy's downward trend since that was caused by 35 years of Keynesianism and too much Bush Administration spending, especially on foreign wars. On the other hand, Obama's surge in Afghanistan and his

foolish decision to continue neo-con foreign policy in Iraq, instead of ending the war, insured even more gluttonous military spending with no end in sight. As far as the Patriot Act and other Draconian civil liberties issues, the performance of Obama and the current Congress can be described as nothing less than a 'betrayal'. It is obvious peace on Earth and civil liberties are, to Democrats in Washington, just another empty campaign issue to be ignored at best after getting into office. The midterms will be a disaster; at the very minimum as bad as Clinton's midterms in 1994.

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Link-Hurts Political Capital
Weak foreign policy positions hurt Obama’s standing
STAROBIN 2 – 1 – 10 National Journal Contributor
[Paul Starobin, Obama's Weakened Position: What Does It Mean For U.S. Foreign Policy?, http://security.nationaljournal.com/2010/02/obamas-weakened-position-what.php]

President Obama is in a rough political patch with the apparent demise of his top domestic priority, universal health care; with the loss of a 60-vote Democratic supermajority in the Senate; with improved Republican prospects for the midterm elections in November; and with his once sky-high approval rating now below 50 percent. So, what does his weakened position mean for

his handling of foreign affairs and for the tack that allies, rivals and outright enemies take toward the U.S.? With his focus on "jobs, jobs, jobs," Obama devoted a grand total of nine minutes to national security issues in his State of the Union address. Does this suggest less activism on the foreign policy front? If so, Obama would be going against the historical pattern, which suggests that a president weakened on the domestic front is likely to become more energetic in foreign affairs as the realm that is less subject to congressional and political control at home (Bill Clinton and Richard Nixon are examples). In any case, what is the best course for Obama at this juncture? Should he try to improve his standing at home with a prestige-enhancing triumph abroad? Are there such opportunities out there -- for example, a bold
deal with the Russians on nuclear disarmament, a tough package of sanctions against Iran, a breakthrough on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? Are the Russians, the Chinese, the Pakistanis, the Iranians, the Indians, the Japanese, the Europeans, likelier to be tougher or more accommodating with Obama facing troubles at home? (Or to put it another way: Do any of them want to see Obama fail?) Is a weakened Obama in danger of being seen as another Jimmy Carter -- that is, as an ineffectual president not likely to serve another term? (The analyst Les Gelb of the Council on Foreign Relations is already likening Obama to Carter.) Is his damaged domestic position likely to matter in any way to Al Qaeda and other anti-U.S. Islamic militant groups? Any and all speculations on this theme are welcome.

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Turkey Prolif DA 1NC (1/2)
Turkey’s committed to nonproliferation now—strong NATO nuclear commitment is key. Tarik Oguzlu, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of International Relations, Bilkent University, July 2009. [SETA
Foundation for Political Economic and Social Research Policy Brief No. 33, Turkey and the Transformation of NATO, http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-182507-159-turkey-and-the-transformation-of-nato.html] Today, there is an intra-alliance consensus that contemporary threats concern transnational terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, drug trafficking, organized crime, cyber-terrorism, the spreading of epidemics, piracy, environmental pollution, and the lack of good governance in failed or weak states. From the contemporary perspective, the maintenance of standing mass armies in anticipation of conventional territorial attacks no longer serves to address today’s global and soft security challenges. The old strategies of deterrence and containment do not suffice in dealing with the asymmetrical threats posed by non-state actors. This consensus, however, does not relieve Turkey of anxiety regarding the question of whether NATO’s transformation will erode its traditional territorial/nuclear security commitments. Two occasions in the recent past appear to have led Turkish decision-makers to doubt whether the European members of the alliance continue to view Turkey’s territorial defense as part of their responsibilities. Both took place in the context of Turkey’s proximity to Iraq. First, although in 1991 and 2003 Turkey asked NATO to deploy early warning systems and Patriot missiles to Turkish territory against the possibility of an Iraqi attack, some European members of the alliance initially hesitated to respond to Turkey’s demands positively. Second, the reluctance of some western European members of the alliance to recognize the PKK as a terrorist organization or to commit to ending the PKK’s activities in their territories has worried Turkey. As long as Turkish public opinion remains convinced that the PKK owes its existence, at least in part, to support coming from European countries, Turkey’s commitment to NATO will be bound to decrease in the years to come.4 Turkey has signed on to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and has thus far adopted a position of non-nuclearization in its foreign policy. However, the changing nature of regional politics in the Middle East in the wake of the latest war in Iraq might pose challenges in this regard. For example, Iran’s nuclear ambitions raise strong concerns that it may acquire the technology to produce nuclear weapons. It is no secret that other countries in the region might then follow suit. Turkish decision-makers will find it hard to resist domestic calls for nuclearization if NATO prevaricates in offering a full nuclear commitment to Turkey.

Turkish TNWs are key to protect from the Iranian threat – removal of TNWs would infuriate Turkey and spur proliferation Alexandra Bell, Project Manager at the Ploughshares Fund and a Truman National Security Fellow, 8/25/09
(“Turkey’s Nuclear Crossroads,” August 25) The Turks look around them and see conflicts and threats in most directions. I was interested in what the Turks saw when they looked towards Tehran. Specifically, I asked about the threat, perceived or real, from the Iranian nuclear program. The answers varied sharply. Some dismissed the threat, noting that the Turks and the Persians had not been in conflict for 500 years. Others shuddered at the mention of a nuclear Iran. But regardless of the official line that Iran is an important trading partner and a regional ally, I think the Turks would not abide a nuclear Iran. In fact, when asked directly about the response to Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon, a high-ranking official from the Foreign Ministry said that Turkey would follow suit—immediately. I took this as a confirmation of the oft-repeated theory that if Iran attains a nuclear weapon, surrounding nations will acquire them too, resulting in a “cascade of proliferation.” Throwing multiple nuclear arsenals into a region with many long-standing tensions, disputed borders, and conflicting ethno-religious sects is a recipe for catastrophe. Turkey has a vastly superior military force and would not be directly threatened by Iran (a few people I spoke to flippantly noted that it was Israel who would be in trouble). Nevertheless, nations acquire nuclear weapons not only for security, but also for pride and prestige. Having a nuclear capability elevates a nation into an elite, if dubious, club. At the moment, Turkey seems alright with the status quo. It does not have a nuclear adversary, and in addition to being covered by NATO’s strategic security umbrella, it also houses an estimated 50 to 90 tactical nuclear weapons. Turkish officials were cagey about discussing these weapons. A former Air Force general, following what seemed to be the official line, denied that there

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were nuclear weapons in Turkey, saying they were removed at the end of the Cold War. This differed from the other officials I met, whose wink-wink references basically confirmed the presence of the nukes. They also hinted that the weapons would be critically important if a certain neighbor got the bomb.

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Turkey Prolif DA 1NC (2/2)
Turkish proliferation would snowball in the middle east leading to Nuclear War and Terror Henry Sokolski, Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, 6-14-07, “The EU Facing
Nuclear Weapons Challenges” http://www.npolicy.org/files/20070616-Sokolski-Talk-AixEnProvenceConference.pdf
One country that might disagree with this view, though, is Turkey. It is trying to figure out how to live with a nuclear weapons armed neighbor, Iran; is disappointed by its inability to be fully integrated into the EU; and is toying with getting its own nuclear capabilities. Whether or not Turkey does choose to go its own way and acquire a nuclear weapons-option of its own will depend on several factors, including Ankara’s relations with Washington, Brussels, and Tehran. To a very significant degree, though, it also will depend on whether or not the EU Members States are serious about letting Turkey join the EU. The dimmer these prospects look, the greater is the likelihood of that Turkey will chose to hedge its political, economic, and security bets by seeking a nuclear weapons-option of its own. This poses a difficult choice for the EU. Many key members are opposed to letting Turkey join the EU. There are arguments to favor this position. Yet, if Turkey should conclude that its interests are best served by

pursuing such a nuclear weapons-option, it is almost certain to fortify the conviction of Egypt, Algeria, and Saudi Arabia to do the same. This will result in the building up a nucjlear powder keg on Europe’s doorstep and significantly increase the prospect for nuclear terrorism and war.

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A/T Turkey Won’t Proliferate
Turkey could proliferate fast - Turkey is developing nuclear energy because of Iran risks Bradley Bowman, Major and strategic plans and policy officer in the U.S. Army and International Affairs Fellow at CFR, 08 (Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report, http://www.saudi-us-relations.org/factbook/documents/2008/080315-arms-race.pdf) One impact of Iran’s nuclear program has been to catalyze Turkey’s nuclear energy development efforts. Turkey is moving aggressively toward the development of domestic nuclear power generation, but nuclear power plants will probably not come on line before 2015. Much of Turkey’s move toward nuclear energy appears to be driven by legitimate energy needs, but Turkey also seeks to match Iran’s nuclear progress and to ensure future flexibility that will allow adaptation to Iran’s actions. In the past, when the government has made initial moves toward nuclear energy it has sparked strong domestic opposition. As one Turk put it, ‘‘Politically speaking, it hasn’t been possible to go ahead so far, but now because of Iran, the nuclear energy option is on the table.’’ In effect, the Iranian nuclear program has strengthened the position of nuclear energy advocates in Turkey. While significant popular opposition to nuclear energy still exists in Turkey due primarily to environmental concerns, the government seems determined to move forward in its development of a nuclear energy program. As a result of these developments, if Iran crosses the nuclear threshold in 5 to 10 years, Turkey will already have a significantly stronger technological foundation should it choose to pursue a nuclear weapons capability.

Without a U.S. security guarantee, concerns about Iran will spur Turkish prolif Bradley Bowman, Major and strategic plans and policy officer in the U.S. Army and International Affairs Fellow at CFR, 08 (Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report, http://www.saudi-us-relations.org/factbook/documents/2008/080315-arms-race.pdf) Turkey’s perception of the reliability of the NATO and U.S. security guarantees will play a decisive role in Turkey’s response to an Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons. An Iranian acquisition of a nuclear weapon would dramatically and historically shift the balance of power between Turkey and Iran. Turkey’s two major options would include a reliance on U.S. and NATO security guarantees or the development of a Turkish nuclear weapon to balance Iran. To the degree that the two irritants degrade Turkish perceptions of its relations with the United States and the reliability of the U.S. security guarantee, they will have an indirect but significant impact on Turkey’s nuclear weapons decision. Therefore, these two irritants to the bilateral relationship require additional analysis. Overwhelmingly, in meeting after meeting, Turkish officials and scholars expressed sincere distress regarding PKK violence and Kurdish separatism. The PKK has conducted periodic terrorist attacks against Turkey, killing more than 1,500 Turks since 2004.2 While the PKK represents an immediate and tangible concern to Turkey, the deeper Turkish anxiety relates to Kurdish separatism. Most Turks fear that an autonomous Kurdish region in northern Iraq might evolve into a ‘‘Kurdistan’’ that would subsume much of southeast Turkey where a large number of Kurds reside. Several individuals interviewed expressed an apparently widespread concern that Kurdish leaders Barzani and Talabani—despite their statements to the contrary—view the current Kurdish semiautonomous region in northern Iraq as a temporary stepping stone to establishment of a ‘‘Kurdistan.’’ The recent foreign oil contracts signed by the Kurdish regional authority, as opposed to the central government in Baghdad, confirmed the fears of many Turks. When Baghdad chastised the Kurdish regional authority for bypassing the central government, the Kurdish oil minister responded by calling for the resignation of the Oil Minister in Baghdad.3 From the perspective of many Turks, this incident confirmed their fears regarding Kurdish separatism. Some Turks also expressed the view that Kurdish efforts to control Kirkuk and its associated oil resources provide evidence of a Kurdish desire to move toward the establishment of a ‘‘Kurdistan.’’

Turkey will not proliferate if confident in U.S. security assurances and NATO protection Bradley Bowman, Major and strategic plans and policy officer in the U.S. Army and International Affairs Fellow at CFR, 08 (Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report, http://www.saudi-us-relations.org/factbook/documents/2008/080315-arms-race.pdf) Based on meetings with Turkish officials and U.S. Embassy personnel in Ankara, staff believes the state of United States-Turkey relations and Turkish perceptions regarding the reliability of NATO will serve as

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the decisive factors in Turkey’s decision regarding nuclear weapons. If the bilateral relationship with the United States is strained and Turkey’s trust in NATO low, Turkey would be more likely to respond to Iranian nuclear weapons by pursuing nuclear weapons as well. However, a restored bilateral relationship with the United States and a restored Turkish trust in NATO could decisively discourage Turkey from purusing nuclear weapons. The United States and NATO would need to take tangible steps to reassure and secure Turkey, but a healthy Turkish relationship with the United States and NATO provides the best means to discourage a Turkish pursuit of nuclear weapons.

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START 1NC (1/2)
START will pass, but Obama’s capital is key The Hill, 7-23-10, http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/110549-kerry-confident-senate-willratify-start-this-year The chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee expressed confidence Friday that the upper chamber will ratify a key nuclear arms treaty with Russia before the year is up. Sen. John Kerry (DMass.) acknowledged Republicans concerns over the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) that the Obama administration hoped would pass quickly after it was signed three months ago. But Kerry assured that it would pass before the new year. In an interview with Bloomberg News to air this weekend, the Massachusetts senator was asked if the Senate could ratify the treaty before the November midterm elections. "I don’t want to get into the odds-making on it," he replied. "What is important is the Senate will pass it." Pressed on whether the Senate would vote this year, Kerry replied, "I believe we will pass it this year." START has been put on the backburner in the midst of a hectic Senate schedule as the August recess approaches and with election-year politics at play. But President Obama has made it clear that passing the treaty is a priority, especially in light of his effort to "reset" the U.S.'s diplomatic relationship with Russia. The vote, however, appears to be a heavy lift. It takes 67 senators to ratify a treaty, meaning that all Democrats plus eight Republicans would need to support it. But aside from Foreign Relations Committee ranking member Richard Lugar (R-Ind.), no other GOP senators back the treaty.

Bipartisan Congressional opposition to TNW withdrawal – they’re committed to extended deterrence Sokov 2009 [Nikolai, PhD, senior research assoc. @ James Martin Center for Non-proliferation Studies,
Tactical Nuclear Weapons, German Leadership 6, Issue 4 http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/090717_german_leadership/german_leadership_6_issue_4.pdf] If some in the Obama administration support withdrawal of the weapons once the arms control agenda allows the issue to come forward, some politically powerful figures outside the administration are taking the opposite point of view. The bipartisan congressional commission on the U.S. strategic posture in its report referenced above stressed the value of “extended deterrence” and said that this mission could force the United States to retain weapons it does not need for its own security. The report gave considerable weight to the opinion of those allies in Europe who consider these weapons essential to prevent coercion by Russia and Iran. It should be noted that recent studies and interviews with representatives of these countries challenge the accuracy of this representation of their countries’ views by the commission. 35 The strong emphasis on the argument that some European countries are staunchly opposed to the withdrawal of TNW is widely attributed to commission co-chairman James Schlesinger, who has been championing this theme of late.36 Still, the political salience of this message, particularly among congressional Republicans is undeniable.

Pushing controversial issues drains Obama’s capital Mark Seidenfeld, Associate Professor, Florida State University College of Law, Iowa Law Review, October 1994
In addition, the propensity of congressional committees to engage in special-interest-oriented oversight might seriously undercut presidential efforts to implement regulatory reform through legislation. n198 On any proposed regulatory measure, the President could face opposition from powerful committee members whose ability to modify and kill legislation is well-documented. n199 This is not meant to deny that the President has significant power that he can use to bring aspects of his legislative agenda to fruition. The President's ability to focus media attention on an issue, his power to bestow benefits on the constituents of members of Congress who support his agenda, and his potential to deliver votes in congressional elections increase the likelihood of legislative success for particular programs. n200 Repeated use of such tactics, however, will impose economic costs on society and concomitantly consume the President's political capital. n201 At some point the price to the President for pushing legislation through Congress exceeds the benefit he derives from doing so. Thus, a President would be unwise to rely too heavily on legislative changes to implement his policy vision.

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START 1NC (2/2)
START key to prevent nuclear war Blanchfield 9 Mike Blanchfield, staff writer, 7-4-2009. [Montreal Gazette, “Duck and cover or a world without nukes?” http://www.montrealgazette.com/story_print.html?id=1759991&sponsor=]

Still, Blair and many others say the need for the U.S. and Russia to show leadership is even more pressing, to remove not only the ever-present Cold War possibility of a world-ending nuclear accident, but the 21st-century threat of nukes falling into terrorist hands. Much has been made of the need to press the "reset" button on the strained relations of late between the White House and the Kremlin. Medvedev struck a conciliatory note this week when he called for a new era in relations with Washington, based on a "purely pragmatic" agenda. Thomas Graham, a retired U.S. diplomat and Clinton-era arms-control ambassador, said Russian and U.S. co-operation on arms control, including a new START treaty, would pay dividends in a much broader sense. "For too long in this post-Cold War world, the two former Cold War adversaries have remained in a semi-hostile relationship," Graham said. "There could be a serious threat of broader nuclear-weapon proliferation. Many people are concerned about the Iranian nuclear program. ... This administration, I believe, correctly understands that we cannot effectively deal with either of those issues, and many others as well, without close co-operation with the Russian Federation." Officials from both countries are already hammering out the details of an agreement that would replace the START 1 treaty, which expires Dec. 5. Though the MoscowWashington relationship is tangled in a web of tension over the U.S. missile-defence-shield plans for Europe, and NATO's eastward expansion, positive signals emerged from the Kremlin yesterday on one front: Medvedev's spokesman said he and Obama would sign a side deal that would allow the U.S. military transit of goods through Russian territory to Afghanistan. The main goal would be a new START framework that would essentially see both sides slashing their nuclear-warhead stockpiles by onequarter, down to about 1,500 warheads each. Despite the spread of nuclear-weapons arsenals to such countries as China, Pakistan, India and elsewhere, nine out of every 10 nuclear bombs on the planet are under the control of the White House and the Kremlin. Lilia Shevtsova, of the Moscow office of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, suggests that a renewed version of START will not necessarily make the world a safer place. "When you start counting nukes, you start talking disarmament and verification procedure. It's a sign not of mutual trust - it's rather a sign of lack, an absence of mutual trust," Shevtsova said. Charles Ferguson, a senior fellow with the Council on Foreign Relations, says if Russia and the U.S. were to go so far as to cut their arsenals down to 1,000 each, other nuclear countries could begin to compete with them. For Blair, it's well past the time to abandon longheld suspicions and animosities. After walking his Ottawa luncheon crowd through his Paris doomsday vision, Blair piles on more scenarios. If there were an accidental launch of weapons that triggered all-out nuclear war between Russia and the U.S., 119 million people in each country would die in the initial exchange. That would include 15 million around the Kremlin in Moscow. A city like Chicago or Ottawa would be gone within the hour. "We've pushed our luck as far as we can; now we need a policy. So to put it bluntly, there are two paths that stretch before us: We either bury our weapons or we're buried by them," Blair said.

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Turkey Politics 1NC (1/2)
If the elections happened today, Erdogan would lose. Gil Ronen, IsraelNationalNews staff writer, Last Updated, 6/6/2010, “Erdogan Poised to Lose Next

Election, Expert Says,” http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/news.aspx/137906 // vkoneru Turkey's foreign policy shift away from friendship with Israel and the West may be a ploy by the country's prime minister to gain popularity for his party, which stands to lose the next election in July 2011, says a top expert on the region. The hostile stance taken by Turkey towards Israel is part of a major transformation of Turkey’s foreign policy, according to Begin-Sadat Center Director Prof. Efraim Inbar. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is turning away from the West, he explained, and moving closer to countries such as Sudan, Syria and Iran. However, “it is not a foregone conclusion that Turkey will persist in this direction,” Inbar said in a position paper: “Among Turkish society many still support the secular parties, which are far from pleased with the rush towards the Muslim world. Even among moderate Muslim quarters there is a sense of unease regarding the government’s policy pushing Turkey to join radical Islamic elements such as Hamas and Iran. One should also recall that Shiite Iran was an historic rival of the Sunni Turks.” (For an article on Turkey under Erdogan written by an Iranian freedom activist, click here.) Public support for the ruling Islamic party is in decline, the expert added, mostly due to corruption and abuse of civil rights. “Were elections held last week, the Islamist party would lose many seats, and two secular parties would possibly have made up the coalition. If current public opinion is held till the next elections, scheduled for July 2011, it is likely that Turkey will emerge with a new prime minister. It is possible that precisely due to his domestic situation as reflected in the polls, Erdogan has decided to exacerbate his relations with Israel in order to gain public support.” Prof. Inbar concludes that Israel “should stand its ground on Israeli vital interests” vis-a-vis Turkey. “Moreover, Israel should not tolerate insults. This will only be perceived as a weakness. Israel should distinguish between the Turkish state and society, and the current government that deserves a strong riposte. Firm, level-headed responses will be of assistance to proWestern Turks in their domestic debate.”

TNWs and staging posts unpopular with the public – 72% against US presence Claudine Lamond and Paul Ingram, British American Security Information Council, January 23, 2009,

“Politics around US tactical nuclear weapons in European host states,” BASIC Getting to Zero Paper, www.atlanticcommunity.org/app/webroot/files/articlepdf/CLamondTNWinNATO.pdf // vkoneru There is a rising sentiment amongst the population for the removal of US nuclear weapons from Turkish territory. In a recent survey,[20] more than half the respondents stated that they are against nuclear weapons being stationed in Turkey. Almost 60% of the Turkish population would support a government request to remove the nuclear weapons from their country, and 72% said they would support an initiative to make Turkey a nuclear-free zone.[21] There may be several causes behind this sentiment, including the Iraq War, Turkish relations with neighboring states, budget expenditure and the moral concern over nuclear weapons. The historic precedence of Greece, a NATO member and Turkey's historic rival, ending its commitment to nuclear sharing in NATO may have further strengthened this tendency. There have been public expressions of resentment towards the US military presence in Turkey ever since the lead up to the US war with Iraq. The United States insisted on the government allowing American troops to use Turkey as a staging post, despite overwhelmingly antiwar Turkish public and political opinion. Limited permission was granted after heavy debates and delay in the Turkish parliament.

Erdogan will get credit for the plan Lale Kemal, staff writer and columnist for today’s zaman, 6/20/2010, “What will Erdoğan do over nukes at the
İncirlik base?,” http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/columnists-207467-what-will-erdogan-do-over-nukes-atthe-incirlik-base.html // vkoneru Erdoğan urged, once again, during a speech in Washington on Monday that a nuclear-free zone be established in Turkey's region, i.e., the Middle East, which in particular will include Israel. Erdoğan also said that Turkey does not want Iran or any other nation to have nuclear weapons.

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Turkey Politics 1NC (2/2)
CHP win key to EU accession The Jerusalem Post, May 31, 2010, “Turkey’s game changer?,” lexis

The CHP has failed to come up with its version of moving Turkey forward, instead merely opposing the AKP. Subsequently, and ironically for a leftist party, the CHP has become the party opposing change - the party of "no." The implications of the dirty tactics against Baykal aside, the shake-up in the CHP's leadership presents the party with an unprecedented opportunity - Turkish leaders do not quit politics until they die - to introduce New Kemalism, a forward vision for a European Turkey. Kilicdaroglu has already voiced support for EU accession, and the talk in Ankara is that he is wooing prominent liberal, pro-EU Turkish diplomats who feel disgruntled with the AKP's foreign policy to join the CHP. If the CHP becomes the party of change, it can even mold Turkey in the image of leftist parties that took Portugal and Spain into the European Union while transforming and liberalizing their societies. New Kemalism's aim would be to boost traditional Kemalism's commitment to Turkey's European vocation while reguiding it toward more liberal values. In the early 20th century, Kemal Ataturk wanted Turkey to go West, and that remains Kemalism's goal. Europe, however, has moved even further West since then. Joining this new Europe, the EU of liberal values, has to be New Kemalism's driving mantra.

Turkey’s accession into the EU is key to peace and stability in Cyprus Stefan Nicola, Staff writer for United Press International, June 13, 2005, United Press International, Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars, “Cyprus backs Turkey’s EU bid,” http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=109941&fuseaction=topics.item&news_id=132754 // vkoneru The accession of Turkey into the European Union is essential to solve the Cyprus problem, a senior Cypriot diplomat in Washington said Monday. "We are in favor of Turkey joining the EU," said Euripides Evriviades, ambassador of the Republic of Cyprus, at a luncheon hosted by the Nixon Center, a Washington-based think tank. "The EU solves problems by embracing them," he said, "it has managed to reunify the French and the Germans, and it will do it for Cyprus...Turkey joining the Union is fundamental for peace and stability and long-term prosperity in the region."A former British colony, Cyprus has been divided into the Republic of Cyprus -- the Greek Cypriot south -- and a Turkish-occupied north since Turkey invaded the Mediterranean island in 1974. Although only the internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus joined the EU on May 1, 2004, every Cypriot carrying a passport has the status of a European citizen. EU laws, however, do not apply to the north, which has so far been recognized by Turkey alone. Evriviades said he hopes the rejection of the EU constitution in France and the
Netherlands does not influence the timetable of the EU-accession talks with Ankara, which are scheduled to start Oct. 3. EU foreign ministers also approved an agreement on Monday adapting its customs union with Turkey to the 10 new EU member states, including Cyprus, bringing accession talks with Ankara a big step closer. Once Turkey signs the document, it will have met all the conditions to start the talks. In those talks, Cyprus hopes it will not get overlooked, as the issue is one that EU leaders have repeatedly stated they would like to be solved if Turkey wants to join the Brussels-based club. But the strategic interest of the United States in Turkey, a country that borders Iran and Iraq, might be disadvantageous to such a small country as Cyprus, the ambassador said. Evriviades criticized U.S.-lawmakers for what he felt would be an unjust foreign policy towards Nicosia: The ambassador said that in a Congress hearing earlier this year, it was said that "one politically risk-free option...for the United States to improve its relations with Turkey, is for the U.S. basically to deliver Cyprus." "How do you think I feel as a Cypriot," Evriviades asked, "if my own country is being used as an extension and a trump card for somebody else's foreign policy?" The Cypriot issue, which has seen repeated sparks of violent outbreaks over the last four

decades, is also on the to-solve list of the United Nations. A U.N.-endorsed reunification plan facilitated direct talks between the leaders of both parties that culminated in a referendum last April. But while the Turkish north backed the plan, Greek Cypriotes overwhelmingly rejected the proposal.

Cyprus instability escalates to nuclear war Tony Barber, Independent Staff Writer, 1/23/1997 “Europe's coming war over Cyprus: After 22 years of

diplomatic stalemate, the world's most densely militarised confrontation zone may be about to explode, writes Tony Barber,” http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/europes-coming-war-over-cyprus-1284661.html // vkoneru Just as EU foreign ministers sit down over lunch in Brussels to thrash out what to do, word arrives that four Greek Cypriots have been killed along the Green Line dividing government-held southern Cyprus from the Turkishoccupied north. The government, backed by Greece, retaliates by vowing to take delivery within a week of a batch of Russian S-300 anti- aircraft missiles ordered in January 1997. As a Russian-Greek naval convoy carrying the warheads and launchers edges towards the eastern Mediterranean, the Turkish armed forces swing into action.

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Troop reinforcements pour into northern Cyprus. Planes raid the Greek-built missile base near Paphos in southwestern Cyprus. The Turkish navy prepares to blockade the island. Greece declares Turkey's actions a cause for war and, angry at lukewarm EU support, invokes the secret defence clause of a recently signed treaty with Russia. Fighting on Cyprus spreads to disputed Aegean islands on Turkey's coastline. The United States warns Russia not to get involved. President Alexander Lebed, with Chinese support, tells the US to mind its own business. All three powers go on nuclear alert. Like Cuba, another island involved in a missile dispute 36 years before, Cyprus has brought the world to nuclear confrontation.

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‡‡‡ Terrorism Intelligence DA ‡‡‡

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1NC – Terrorism Intelligence (1/2)
PKK war on the brink now BATMAN AND DIYARBAKIR 6/24 (Jun 24th 2010 Economist
http://www.economist.com/node/16439205?story_id=16439205 TBC 6/28/10) Some 16 Turkish soldiers have been killed in recent attacks, as militants of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) escalate their 25-year-old war. On June 22nd four soldiers and the daughter of an officer died when the PKK’s urban arm, the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons, detonated a bomb on a bus carrying soldiers in Istanbul. “For the first time, there is a real risk that the PKK will carry the war outside the south-east,” says Henri Barkey of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Pressure is building on Turkey’s prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, to respond. Devlet Bahceli, leader of the nationalist opposition party, has called for martial law to be reimposed in the south-east. Sezgin Tanrikulu, a Kurdish human-rights lawyer, mutters of a “last exit” before Turks and Kurds go their separate ways.

US troops defend and suppress PKK violence – Turkey expects full support from Obama Uslu 8 (Emrullah, November 26, 2008 5 (40), Terrorism Focus, http://www.jamestown.org/single/? no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=34185)KFC
The strategic relationship between Turkey and the United States entered into a new phase on November 5, 2007, when President Bush pledged real-time intelligence sharing with the Turkish military while condemning the Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan - PKK): "The PKK is a terrorist

organization. They're an enemy of Turkey, they're an enemy of Iraq and they're an enemy of the United States” (Turkey.usembassy.gov, November 5, 2007). Since then, Turkish-U.S. intelligence sharing has been very productive in targeting the PKK camps in northern Iraq over the last year. This week, Iraq’s parliament is voting on approval of the Status-of-Forces Agreement (SOFA), an accord that spells out the conditions of the U.S. occupation and provides a timetable calling for a full withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq by December 31, 2011. Approval of the accord will open yet another chapter to shape Ankara’s counterterrorism polices against the PKK. Turkish journalist Fikret Bila, who is well known for his close relations with the Turkish military and whose work usually reflects the views of influential institutions in Ankara, is not expecting a total American withdrawal from Iraq: [U.S. President-Elect Barack] Obama would not seek to withdraw all American troops from Iraq. The U.S. would not give up its interests in Iraq. It would not change its traditional policy to control energy corridors and oil fields in the Middle East and the Caucasus. One of the options before Obama is to redeploy American troops into northern Iraq (Milliyet, November 2). It is a common belief among the Turkish

security bureaucracy that the United States will not want to withdraw its troops from Iraq.

PKK intensifying – threatens middle east instability Salih 8 (Mohammed A June 8 http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/JF03Ak03.html TBC
6/28/10) WASHINGTON - An intensifying fight between Turkey and a reorganized Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) threatens to introduce a new element of instability to the Middle East. And this at a time when some of the most serious crises in the region are taken on by regional actors, ironically with Turkey itself playing a key role as a peace mediator. That has left the United States in a dilemma over whether to continue with its traditional policy of giving a green-light for a militaristic approach by Turkey to deal with the long-standing Kurdish issue, or to pressure its longtime ally to try harder for a political solution.

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1NC – Terrorism Intelligence (2/2)
Destabilization in the middle east goes nuclear and causes extinction Steinbach 2 (John, Researcher for the Centre for Research on Globalisation,
http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/STE203A.html, AD: 6/26/10) jl Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum(and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major(if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon- for whatever reason- the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration." (44)

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Suiter Pre-season

Uniqueness – US Fighting PKK Now
The US is actively helping the fight against the PKK in Turkey Asbarez 6/21(June 21st, 2010, http://asbarez.com/82334/us-reiterates-support-for-turkeys-war-onpkk-as-troops-deploy-along-iraqi-border/)KFC
The United States actively supports the efforts of its Turkish allies to defeat the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the U.S. ambassador to Turkey said Monday after Turkish troops deployed along the Iraqi border to stage fresh attacks against Kurds in Northern Iraq. Twelve Turkish soldiers were killed in PKK attacks over the weekend, with most of the deaths occurring when members of the outlawed group assaulted a border unit at the Iraqi frontier.

Turkish state media said elite troops rappelled down from helicopters and poured out of mechanized infantry units Monday to mount an operation to surround the Kurds. Meanwhile, security sources were quoted as saying helicopter gunships bombed suspected PKK positions in the provinces of Hakkari and Sirnak, bordering Iraq. U.S. Ambassador James Jeffrey said the United States would “urgently” consider any requests from Ankara asking for help fighting the PKK, which Washington considers a terrorist group. “We stand ready to review urgently any new requests from the Turkish military or government regarding the PKK,” Jeffrey said in a written statement, echoing remarks made Sunday by an embassy spokeswoman. Following the weekend attacks there had been speculation that the U.S. might not

have passed on actionable intelligence in its possession regarding PKK movements toward the border. While Turkey’s “no” vote on fresh U.N. sanctions against Iran and a simmering crisis with Israel has sparked concern in Turkey that the United States may withhold support from Ankara’s struggle against the PKK, Jeffrey stressed “there has been no change in the level of U.S.-Turkey intelligence sharing regarding the PKK in northern Iraq.” Describing the PKK as a terrorist group and a “common enemy” to both Ankara and Washington,
Jeffrey said the U.S shared Turkey’s grief at the loss of its heroic troops and police in the joint struggle against terrorism. “Our sincere condolences go out to the families of the victims,” he said.

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Suiter Pre-season

Uniqueness – Terror Threat
Terror is at an all time high in Turkey İstanbul 9 (Zaman, 02 May 2009, http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do? load=detay&link=174116)KFC

The report stated that among the terrorist groups operating in Turkey, the PKK is taking the lead in terms of the frequency and impact of its attacks, targeting civilians as well as Turkish security forces. The explosions in Diyarbakır on Sept. 12, 2006, and in the Güngören district of İstanbul on July 27, 2008, were specifically referenced in the report presented to the US Congress. Two bombs exploded within minutes of each other in a crowded pedestrian area in Güngören, killing 17 people and wounding 154 others in the deadliest terror attack seen in Turkey in over five years; in Diyarbakır, the explosion of a bomb planted in a parked car on one of the city's main avenues caused the deaths of 10 people, including seven children. The US report also mentioned an ongoing investigation into Ergenekon, a shadowy network accused of plotting against the civilian government and trying to pave the way for a military coup. "Investigations into an organization named Ergenekon, allegedly composed of former military officials, bureaucrats, politicians, journalists, and underworld figures, began in 2007, leading to arrests in the summer of 2008," the report noted. "Alleged members of Ergenekon were on trial for a number of crimes including terrorism charges; the details of the case were murky, however, and Ergenekon's status as a terrorist organization remained under debate at year's end."

Turkey is angry over the lack of attention of the terror threat. Hyland 7 (Frank, Terrorism Focus, 4 (42), December 19, 2007, http://www.jamestown.org/single/? no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=4619)KFC
Nevertheless, there has been recent political and popular pressure within Turkey to use the importance of Incirlik as a means of leverage in relations with the United States. As tensions in the relationship increased in October over the Armenian genocide bill and U.S. inaction over the PKK threat, Turkish officials stated that, while there was no official decision to impede operations, “there has been a move toward restrictions and slowing things down in procedures that we carry out on a regular basis.” These included a limitation in the number of authorizations granted for U.S. overflights of Turkish airspace, including those of U.S. military flights in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan (Milliyet, October 22). At the same time, Gündüz Aktan, a retired ambassador and a leading MP of Turkey’s Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), issued a call for Turkey to “shut down Incirlik Air Base” (Turkish Daily News, October 16). There was little opposition to such calls from Turkish trade unions whose members work at the base: “We accept being unemployed if the nation’s interests are at stake” (Turkish Daily News, October 16).

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Suiter Pre-season

Uniqueness – PKK War Coming
Turkey has failed – PKK issue on the brink now Kamal 6/22 (Lale 2010 http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/columnists-213827-turkey-at-turningpoint-on-terror.html TBC 6/28/10) But this is Turkey, a member of NATO and a candidate member to the EU, which has failed to find a solution to its terror problem. The outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) has increased its violence and this past weekend it attacked a unit on the border with Iraq near the township of Şemdinli in the war-stricken, Kurdish-dominated Southeast, killing 11 Turkish soldiers. There are various reasons behind the surge of PKK violence, including the government’s failure to turn the Kurdish reform, or democratic initiative process, into a meaningful one, initiating legal changes in laws that would increase political room for maneuver while lessening PKK violence. The blame should equally fall on the opposition parties, including the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), for failing to turn the democratic initiative into a viable process. I will focus, though, on the deeprooted reasons for the continuation of the fight against the PKK.

PKK influence up – puts us on the brink Salih 8 (Mohammed A June 8 http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/JF03Ak03.html TBC
6/28/10) "We are at the threshold of a most critical era in terms of the PKK's influence," wrote Mehmet Ali Birand, a prominent Turkish columnist, in the May 29 English-language Turkish Daily News, acknowledging the potentially destabilizing consequences of the current conflict. While Turkey appeared triumphant after the capture of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan in 1999, it has witnessed an escalation of attacks by Kurdish insurgents since 2007, raising fears that the country might be plunged into a new era of intra Turk-Kurd fighting reminiscent of the 1980s and the 1990s. The fight between the PKK and Turkey has claimed about 40,000 lives over two decades. The PKK is considered a terrorist group by Ankara and dozens of Western countries, including the US and European Union members. Now, after years of relative inaction, all signs indicate the PKK has made a strong comeback and is gaining renewed momentum in Turkey and abroad. "It's clear that PKK has reorganized itself. I was in Europe recently ... and I was amazed how much stronger the PKK is," said Aliza Marcus, a journalist and author of Blood and Belief: The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence. "[PKK] has regained the support of many Kurds who are not necessarily outright PKK supporters but do not see another option," Marcus said.

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Suiter Pre-season

Links – Terrorism
Not protecting Turkey from the PKK undermines the War on Terror. Rubin 4 (Michael, August 05, 2004, http://old.nationalreview.com/rubin/rubin200408051220.asp)KFC

The continued PKK presence in northern Iraq is an embarrassment to the United States. Under terms of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1483, the United States assumed legal responsibility as occupying power for the territory of Iraq. While our legal responsibility ended with the June 28, 2004, transfer of authority, moral responsibility continues. That a terrorist group — listed as such by the State Department since such designations were first made — operated with impunity from an area under U.S. responsibility undercuts the moral authority of the White House in waging the global war on terrorism. The Bush administration's failure to address the PKK presence in Iraq creates a dangerous precedent. It legitimizes the Lebanese government's decision to allow Hezbollah to conduct terrorist operations with impunity, for example, despite Lebanon's responsibilities under terms of U.N. Security Council Resolution 425. U.S. toleration of the PKK threatens to emerge as a hot issue in coming weeks. Since the PKK ended its ceasefire on June 1, southeastern Turkey has suffered a renewed wave of roadside bombs and assassinations. On July 27, PKK fighters killed a Turkish policeman and a soldier in the southeastern province of Bingol. On August 2, Turkish soldiers and PKK fighters clashed in southeastern Turkey. Those incidents that Turkish newspapers report may be the tip of the iceberg. In Konya and Kayseri, Turkish students spoke of a recent PKK execution of three Turkish conscripts along the Iranian border.

The US is the key fighter of the PKK UPI 6/35 (June 25, 2010, http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2010/06/25/US-aiding-in-PKKfight-envoy-says/UPI-93801277491977/)KFC
United States is not "all-powerful," it is looking for ways to help Turkey tackle the problem of Kurdish militants, the U.S. envoy to Turkey said. Ankara has struggled to control a Kurdish militancy led by the separatist Kurdistan Workers' Party, or PKK, for decades. The U.S. military since the invasion of Iraq in 2003 has helped Ankara tackle the PKK with intelligence information as the insurgent group is spread throughout the border regions . U.S. Ambassador to Turkey James Jeffrey told Turkey's daily newspaper Hurriyet that opinions of the United States in Turkey are down because Washington is not playing what some see as a more active role in the region. "We're looking at ways to improve that, and we've been looking at ways to improve this even before (recent PKK attacks)," he said. PKK militants are accused of launching attacks on military installations and interests in Turkey in recent weeks. Jeffrey said, however, that
ANKARA, Turkey, June 25 (UPI) -- While the Washington did not have a magic wand in terms of counter-terrorism efforts in the Middle East. "We may be the most important country, but that doesn't mean that we are infallible or all-powerful," he said. "If we could deal with terrorists the way Turkey would like, then we would have dealt with Osama bin Laden a long time ago."

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Suiter Pre-season

Links – Terrorism
US pull out sends the signal of severing cooperation on PKK intelligence Zaman 8 (Amberin, Real Clear World,

http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2008/11/turkey_and_us_under_obama.html, AD: 6/28/10) jl
One of the biggest reasons why Turks continue to dislike America (not Americans) in large numbers1 is because they believe that the United States is surreptitiously working to es¬tablish an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq that will eventually comprise fat chunks of southeastern Turkey. The “proof,” their argument runs, lies in the refusal by the United States to take military action against some 5,000 rebels of the separatist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) based in northern Iraq. The suspicions persist even though the

United States has been providing the Turkish army with real time intelligence on the PKK since November 2007, and has been allowing Turkish fighter jets to strike PKK bases across the border. It hasn’t helped that the PKK is mounting increasinglyaudacious attacks, killing an ever-growing number of Turk¬ish soldiers each time. It would help for the new administra¬tion to call very publicly on the Iraqi Kurds to do more to prevent the PKK from moving so freely in areas under their control. At
the same time, the notion that withdrawal from Iraq means abandoning the Iraqi Kurds should be firmly dispelled. Ankara’s recent overtures to the president of the Kurdish regional government, Massoud Barzani, should be encouraged, as should his efforts to peacefully disarm the PKK. Yet, America’s intentions will remain in question so long as it sits on the fence on a purportedly new separatist Kurdish group, the Party for Free Life in Kurdistan (Pejak), that is fighting for Kurdish autonomy inside Iran. It is an open secret that Pejak and the PKK are one and the same. Yet the U.S. Department of State does not label Pejak a terrorist group as it does the PKK. Not surprisingly, Iran (a country that in the past used to arm and shelter the PKK in an effort to undermine Turkey) is now helping Turkey hunt them down. The Obama administration would gain much sympathy in Turkey if it were to call Pejak by its real name—terrorists—and rouse the mettle to condemn their mischief in Iran. Talk of U.S. double standards would sub¬side, Turkish-Iranian military cooperation would be nipped in the bud, and Iran would have one less reason to believe the United States is committed to overthrowing its regime.

Withdrawal collapses attempts at successful PKK counter-intelligence Turks dot US 8 (May 01 2008, http://www.turks.us/article.php?story=20080501075639609)KFC
Bush has committed to provide Turkey "real-time, actionable intelligence" to counter terrorist organization PKK in the north of Iraq. PKK directs its forces to
A U.S. report on terrorism said U.S. President George W. target mainly Turkish security forces, the report said. The annual "Country Reports on Terrorism 2007," released on Wednesday by the U.S. Department of State, said the terrorist organization PKK, with a "separatist" agenda, operated from bases in the north of Iraq and directed its forces to target mainly Turkish security forces. "In 2005 and 2006, PKK violence claimed hundreds of Turkish lives. This persisted in 2007, when the PKK continued its terrorist tactics," it said, and added that PKK terrorists were discovered in late May in Turkish provinces Istanbul, Adana, Konya, and Mardin with explosive materials designed to carry out suicide attacks. "The Turkish parliament on October 17 overwhelmingly passed a motion authorizing cross-border military operations against PKK targets in northern Iraq. Turkish forces carried out extensive operations along the Turkey-Iraq border in the latter part of the year. On November 5th, President Bush committed to provide Turkey 'real-time, actionable intelligence' to counter the PKK in northern Iraq," the report said.

US support of Turkey is key to suppressing the PKK Onay 8 (Abdulkadir, visiting military fellow in The Washington. Institute's Turkish Research Program,
http://www.bitterlemons-international.org/previous.php?opt=1&id=224, AD: 6/28/10) jl
Last month, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani visited Ankara for a meeting with his Turkish counterpart Abdullah Gul to discuss, among other things, the PKK issue. The PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) currently controls a terror enclave in northeastern Iraq. The Iraqi Kurdish parties--Talabani's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party--flank the PKK enclave. The United

States is currently cooperating with Turkey in its operations against the PKK by providing intelligence support. But this cooperation will not be successful unless the Iraqi Kurds, who have the ability to block the PKK
enclave, come on board and take a stand against the group. What can Iraqi Kurds do in this regard and how would this affect their relationship with Turkey? The Iraqi Kurds reaped the benefits of an alliance with the United States in 2003 by providing assistance to the US against the Saddam Hussein regime. Since then, the KDP and PUK have resisted increasing US pressure to take action against the PKK enclave in northeastern Iraq, from where the PKK has carried out terror attacks against Turkey. The Iraqi Kurds cooperated with Turkey significantly against the PKK in the 1990s; during that time Turkey provided the Iraqi Kurds with vital commercial and physical access to the outside world, bypassing the Saddam Hussein regime. Turkey also supplied the Iraqi Kurds with crucial protection and access to

US military support against Saddam from the Incirlik base in southern Turkey.

However, since the start of the Iraq war in 2003, and with the end of Saddam's rule and the United States occupation of Iraq, the KDP and PUK have ignored their deal with Turkey. In due course, they suspended cooperation with Ankara against the PKK. Furthermore, according to western security contractors in Iraq, Kurdish local forces are now protecting the PKK and its franchise groups by facilitating or providing logistics support.

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Suiter Pre-season

Links – Terrorism
Withdrawal removes US commitment to cooperation against the PKK İstanbul 9 (Zaman, 02 May 2009, http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do? load=detay&link=174116)KFC

Cooperation in counterterrorism is a key element in America's strategic partnership with Turkey, the US Department of State said in an annual report, which also praised the Turkish contributions to the US efforts to

stabilize Iraq and Afghanistan. By April 30 of each year, the secretary of state provides Congress a comprehensive report on terrorism with particular references to more than 100 countries worldwide. This year's report, titled "Country Reports on Terrorism," was released on Thursday and examines the issue of terrorism in 139 countries. Turkey and the US are continuing their strategic partnership, including, but not limited to, the field of security policy. Whereas Turkey allows the US to use the İncirlik Air Base in Adana as an aircraft refueling hub for the transportation of non-lethal cargo to its troops in Afghanistan and Iraq, the US in return provides intelligence about the activities of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), one of the aforementioned 44 terrorist organizations. "Almost 60 percent of the air cargo for US troops in Iraq transits via İncirlik. The establishment of this hub allows six C-17 aircraft to transport the amount of goods it took nine to 10 aircraft to move from Germany, and it saves the United States almost $160 million per year. Between one-third and two-thirds of the fuel destined for the Iraqi people and more than 25 percent of fuel for the Coalition Forces transits from Turkey into Iraq via the Habur Gate border crossing," read the report, articulating the importance of Turkey for the US and NATO forces.

US withdrawal destroys cooperation with Turkey which is key to solving PKK terrorism Aras 8 (Bulent, expert on Middle Eastern and Caucasian Affairs, http://www.bitterlemonsinternational.org/previous.php?opt=1&id=224, AD: 6/28/10) jl Turkey has a new strategy in its war against Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) terror. This new strategy is based on three principles: domestic peace, regional legitimacy and coordination with the United States and the

European Union. This conceptualization guides Turkish policy to follow a new course at domestic, regional and international levels and has implications for relations with the Kurdish regional government in northern Iraq and the Iraqi state. An analysis of the strategy will help in understanding the future course of Turkish foreign policy toward Iraq. The Kurdish question is a serious domestic problem for Turkey. If one adds the terror dimension, it may be considered a more vital threat to domestic peace than political Islam. Turkey's EU membership process widened the boundaries of the political system and initiated a number of reforms for Kurdish language and cultural rights. However, the pace of reforms has slowed and subsequent crises over the presidential elections and AK Party closure cases have held Turkish politics hostage to domestic political considerations. The reforms as they were, did not go far enough to satisfy the demands of Kurdish parties in Turkey. The Democratic Society Party (DTP) formed a group in parliament after being elected as independent MPs, thus overcoming the 10 percent national threshold obstacle. But the ruling party still received more support than the DTP in populated Kurdish regions. Government reforms and voter preferences had created a relatively suitable environment for a solution to the Kurdish problem. The AK Party targets a normalization of its security-dominated agenda to preserve a peaceful atmosphere to address the problem. This was evident during the Turkish military incursion into northern Iraq to destroy PKK bases. There is speculation that the AK Party has a comprehensive package of measures to solve the domestic Kurdish problem, but the party has to date only announced some economic investment plans in Kurdish populated southeastern Turkey. Turkey's new strategy in the war against terror prioritizes regional legitimacy to draw the support of Iraq's neighbors and other influential states on this sensitive issue. Turkey utilizes the formalized meetings of Iraq's neighboring states to pursue regional diplomacy to make its case with the countries of the region. The Extended Iraqi Neighbors meeting in Istanbul in early November was a sign of Turkey's ability to pursue regional diplomacy for the Iraqi cause. Turkish sensitivities regarding the territorial unity of Iraq and PKK terror dominated the agenda at the meeting and generated support from Iraq's neighbors as well as US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon. The final declaration emphasized the urgent need for cooperation against terrorist groups in Iraq. Turkey's military incursions, meanwhile, did not raise serious criticism in the region where there were only expressions of concern during the operation. Turkey has created a diplomatic channel with the countries of the region and is likely to preserve its dialogue with them in the war against PKK terror. Turkey also

pursues international diplomacy and prioritizes coordination and cooperation with the US and EU. Recent months have witnessed a high level of Turkish diplomatic activity vis-a-vis the US and EU, including Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's meetings with US President George W. Bush and the heads of several European countries. Turkey secured US support in the war against the PKK and received intelligence support during the operations in northern Iraq. The single digit sympathy for the US in Turkish public opinion rose to double digits as a result. The US response to the operation was balanced and Turkish-American cooperation in this respect is likely to continue. Turkey also aims to prevent the diplomatic and financial activities of the PKK in
Europe and, compared to recent years, EU support for Turkey in the struggle against PKK terror is more visible while there are new measures against PKK proxies in different European countries.

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Suiter Pre-season

Internals – Middle East Stability
PKK instability kills US interests in the region and spills over into Iraq Salih 8 (Mohammed A June 8 http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/JF03Ak03.html TBC
6/28/10) With Turkey's strategic weight increasing in the eyes of policy-makers in Washington among other things, due to the need for a more solid partnership with Turkey over Iran's nuclear program and rising influence in the Middle East, and US pressure on Turkey to contribute more troops to fight a resurgent Taliban in Afghanistan - any prospects of instability within its North Atlantic Treaty Organization ally's borders could significantly harm US designs for the region as a whole. There is a strong likelihood that the fighting may spill over to neighboring Iraq, where the PKK's headquarters are based. The evidence for that is ongoing as Turkey continues on a regular basis to conduct air raids into Iraq's Kurdistan region in the north. That could drag Iraqi Kurds into the conflict as well. Turkey launched a ground incursion in February into Iraqi Kurdistan amid initially consenting but increasingly apprehensive international reactions. Fearing that the operation could destabilize the one relatively safe part of Iraq, Washington finally stepped in and US Defense Secretary Robert Gates anxiously warned Turkey that if it did not blend military operations with "economic and political measures", then "at a certain point the military efforts become less and less effective".

292

Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 293 /341

Suiter Pre-season

‡‡‡ Troop Withdrawal Relations DA ‡‡‡

293

Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 294 /341

Suiter Pre-season

1NC – Troop Withdrawal (1/2)
Incirlik used for troop withdrawal HELICKE 4 (JAMES C. Jan 12 http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1056129/posts TBC
6/28/10) The American military has begun using an air base in southern Turkey for a massive rotation of troops in and out of Iraq, a U.S. official told The Associated Press on Sunday, in a sign of improved U.S.-Turkish relations. Turkish permission to use its Incirlik air base marks a sharp contrast to last year, when the country - opposed to the invasion to oust Saddam Hussein - refused to allow U.S. troops on its territory for the war against its southern neighbor. It also comes as NATO ally Turkey is increasingly eager to win favor with the United States amid concerns over Iraqi Kurdish demands for greater autonomy in oil-rich northern Iraq. Turkey, and neighbors Syria and Iran, fear Iraqi Kurds might eventually push for independence and bring instability to their borders. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is expected to raise Turkey's concerns about Iraq during talks with President Bush in Washington later this month. The use of Incirlik helps the United States as it deals with the largest movement of troops in decades. The military is preparing to send some 130,000 U.S. troops in Iraq home over the coming months, replacing them with a more mobile, less heavily armed force of about 110,000.

Transfer of troops key to US-Turkey relations SARIİBRAHİMOĞLU 9 (LALE 23 March http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?
load=detay&link=170385 TBC 6/28/10) Davutoğlu's remarks have given a strong indication, among others, that Turkey may even soften its existing policy of not allowing arms and heavy military equipment to be transported through Turkey's İncirlik air base in the south, which has played a central role as a cargo hub in the US's war in Iraq. Prime Minister Erdoğan said earlier that Turkey could allow US troops to use İncirlik for their withdrawal but cannot permit the transport of military equipment. As Foreign Minister Ali Babacan stated previously, Erdoğan, as the head of the government, will decide on the issue of opening up Turkish soil for the US withdrawal. But government sources stated that Turkey's approach to any formal US demand of using Turkish soil for both troop withdrawal and arms shipment will form one of the legs and an important aspect of the new period in Turkish-US relations. "This means that Turkey will talk to the US without any prejudice -- i.e., including the possible transfer of arms via İncirlik," they said

294

Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 295 /341

Suiter Pre-season

1NC – Troop Withdrawal (2/2)
US-Turkey relations key to solve terrorism—Turkish invasion of Iraq is the devastates the alliance Menon and Wimbush 7 (Rajan and S. Enders, Prof of IR @ Lehigh, Fellow, New America Foundation and Director, Center for
Future Security Strategies, Hudson Institute, Mar 25, http://www.hudson.org/files/pdf_upload/Turkey%20PDF.pdf) LL

The alliance between the United States and Turkey, which has endured since the 1947 Truman Doctrine and has contributed to the security of both countries, is now in serious trouble. What is worse, neither side is facing
up to this reality, let alone taking serious remedial measures, nor even making concerted efforts to understand the new political currents within each other’s societies. If

this neglect continues, the price paid by both sides will be steep. It is becoming increasingly clear that Washington and Ankara see the world and define their interests in divergent ways. If allowed to continue, this trend could well undo the alliance. The good news is that there is still time to act, providing senior leaders on both sides move with dispatch. It is urgent that they do so, for despite the end of the Cold War, which provided a clear rationale for their alliance for four decades, Ankara and Washington still need each other, perhaps more so because they now face multiple and unfamiliar threats, not least those posed by terrorism. The most important source of discord between Turkey and the United States is the war in Iraq. Ankara fears that Iraq will break up as a result of the war and that a separate Kurdish state will arise, creating even greater disorder and stoking separatist sentiment in Turkey’s southeast, and increasing paramilitary and terrorist attacks by the Kurdish separatist organization, the PKK. Washington, for its part, feels betrayed by the Turkish parliament’s rejection of its request to open a second front from Turkey’s territory against Saddam Hussein’s army in the run-up to the 2003 war. But more fundamentally, the Bush administration is preoccupied by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and seems to have relegated Turkey to the back burner—or so it appears to many Turks. The widespread belief among Turks that the United States undertook the Iraq war without regard to the consequences for Turkey’s security and that Washington now seeks to punish it for the Turkish parliament’s vote has created enormous resentment toward the United States. This sentiment is reflected across the political
spectrum. It is evident among elites, including the leadership of the Turkish military, arguably the country’s most influential institution, but also pervades society more generally. Opinion polls show that Turks, who once viewed the United States as an ally and friend, increasingly see it as not just unfriendly, but as a direct threat to their national security. As a result, influential Turks, government officials and foreign policy experts alike, are discussing a strategic reassessment. This reorientation would involve building deep ties with new partners, among them Russia, China, Iran, and Syria and would, moreover, abandon the longstanding premise that the United States remains the indispensable ally. It would be mistaken for the United States to dismiss these discussions as bluster. Turkey

remains a crucial ally in the struggle against terrorism; it is a secular and democratic Muslim country; it sits atop an arc extending from Israel to Central Asia, a zone of actual or potential upheaval and war; it abuts waterways critical to the flow of commerce, particularly oil; its territory is a corridor for the strategically important BakuCeyhan oil pipeline; and its cooperation is key to a durable settlement in Iraq and to an effective policy to counter the
challenges posed by a resurgent (and potentially nuclear-armed) Iran.

Terrorism causes extinction Alexander 3 (Yonah, Inter-University for Terrorism Studies Director,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2003/aug/27/20030827-084256-8999r/, AD: 6/27/10) jl

Last week's brutal suicide bombings in Baghdad and Jerusalem have once again illustrated dramatically that the international community failed, thus far at least, to understand the magnitude and implications of the terrorist threats to the very survival of civilization itself. Even the
United States and Israel have for decades tended to regard terrorism as a mere tactical nuisance or irritant rather than a critical strategic challenge to their national security concerns. It is not surprising, therefore, that on September 11, 2001, Americans were stunned by the unprecedented tragedy of 19 al Qaeda terrorists striking a devastating blow at the center of the nation's commercial and military powers. Likewise, Israel and its citizens, despite the collapse of the Oslo Agreements of 1993 and numerous acts of terrorism triggered by the second intifada that began almost three years ago, are still "shocked" by each suicide attack at a time of intensive diplomatic efforts to revive the moribund peace process through the now revoked cease-fire arrangements [hudna]. Why are the United States and Israel, as well as scores of other countries affected by the universal nightmare of modern terrorism surprised by new terrorist "surprises"? There are many reasons, including misunderstanding of the manifold specific factors that contribute to terrorism's expansion, such as lack of a universal definition of terrorism, the religionization of politics, double standards of morality, weak punishment of terrorists, and the exploitation of the media by terrorist propaganda and psychological warfare.

Unlike their historical counterparts, contemporary terrorists have introduced a new scale of violence in terms of conventional and unconventional threats and impact. The internationalization and brutalization of current and future terrorism make it clear we have entered an Age of Super Terrorism [e.g. biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear and cyber] with its serious implications concerning national, regional and global security concerns.

295

Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 296 /341

Suiter Pre-season

Internals – Incirlik Troop Withdrawal
Incirlik used for troop withdrawal HELICKE 4 (JAMES C. Jan 12 http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1056129/posts TBC
6/28/10) said Incirlik "has been used and will be used, because the transportation of certain soldiers is more secure through Incirlik ."
Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul said Friday there was "nothing new" at the base but A U.S. spokesman at Incirlik refused to comment about the rotations Sunday, citing security concerns. U.S. forces had based some 50 warplanes at Incirlik after the 1991 Gulf War to patrol a no-fly zone over northern Iraq. But the U.S. withdrew its forces last year as tension escalated between Washington and Ankara. Since the Iraq war's end, Turkey has again agreed to open Incirlik and other sites to the U.S.-led coalition for logistical support as part of efforts to improve ties with Washington. Turkey even offered to send peacekeepers to Iraq, but that offer was shelved amid strong Iraqi opposition. Iraqi Kurds, for example, feared Turkish troops might threaten the autonomy they enjoyed in northern Iraq after the Gulf War. Turkey fought a 15-year war with Kurdish rebels in southeastern Turkey and fears a Kurdish state at its borders could spark new fighting. The 1,400 U.S. soldiers at Incirlik - half as many as before the war - have been supporting the Iraq operation with tankers to fuel aircraft in Iraq and by delivering supplies to Iraq, a U.S. military official at Incirlik air base said on condition of anonymity. The base has also occasionally sent U.S. troops to help support the Iraq mission, he added. During a visit to Ankara last month, U. S.

Undersecretary of State Marc Grossman said the U.S. military wanted to continue using Incirlik as it realigns American troops and bases to better respond to new threats such as

terrorism. The realignment is likely to close or scale down many of the permanent bases set up in Germany and other NATO nations to face the Soviet threat.

Troops leave through Turkey Watson 9 (Ivan march 22
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/03/22/turkey.iraq.us/index.html TBC 6/28/10) ANKARA, Turkey (CNN) -- Turkey's prime minister said Saturday he would be receptive to the possibility of allowing American troops to withdraw from Iraq across Turkish territory, if the United States asks for permission. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan says he's "positive" on the idea of U.S. troops crossing his country. "With regard to the exit of the American soldiers, we are positive on that issue," said Recep Tayyip Erdogan, speaking through an interpreter. In an exclusive interview with CNN at the headquarters of his Justice and Development Party, Erdogan indicated he had not yet received an official request from his American ally for permission to move troops across Turkish soil. "If weapons and ammunition are going to come out, it has to be clear where they are going to be heading," Erdogan said. "If we are informed about where this military equipment would be going precisely, then we can make a proper evaluation." Watch Turkish prime minister's response »

296

Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 297 /341

Suiter Pre-season

Internals – Incirlik Troop Withdrawal
Iraq withdrawal happening now – We leave through Turkey Kemal 9 (Lale March 3 http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/columnists-168486-is-turkey-vital-for-usexit-strategy-from-iraq.html TBC 6/28/10)
Turkey is an important ally for the US, mainly due to its geographic location at the strategic junction of the Middle East, the Caucasus and the Balkans. Due to this location, Turkey, a NATO ally, plays an important role in serving US national interests in this volatile region. In the words of a Western diplomat, if Turkey were not located in this critical geography, it would not have had any importance for the US. This is a realistic analysis that also dictates the relationship among the nations. That also explains why Turkish-US relations soured significantly when Parliament rejected a motion on March 1, 2003 -- soon before the US invasion of Iraq -- that would have opened Turkish soil to use by this NATO ally. Despite rejecting the motion allowing US soldiers to enter Iraq via Turkey, which would have eased the US invasion by providing it a second front, Ankara later allowed the US and other

coalition forces to use İncirlik Air Base in the south as a cargo hub for non-lethal goods as well as for strategic airlifts to Afghanistan. The nearby port of İskenderun has also become
vital for US forces; the port is used to meet a number of needs, from stockpiling arms to procuring other goods required for a warring nation. But the Turkish motion led to irreparable damage among the two allies, rightly or wrongly, since it marked a serious loss of confidence in particular on the part of Washington towards both Ankara's political leadership as well as towards the Turkish military, with which it has enjoyed privileged relations for decades. The US's supply of real-time intelligence to Turkey since November 2007, which has enabled the Turkish military to accurately pinpoint the bases of outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) terrorists in northern Iraq, preventing serious collateral damage, helped restore the damage inflicted on the bilateral relations. Now that

US President Barack Obama has made his final decision and announced on Feb. 27 that the US would withdraw most of its military forces from Iraq by mid-2010, the routes the US will use to evacuate its forces from the country are on the agenda. There
are approximately 142,000 US troops in Iraq, according to the US Defense Department. A residual force of between 35,000 and 50,000 US troops will remain in Iraq into 2011 with the primary mission of training, equipping and advising Iraqi security forces; conducting targeted counterterrorism missions; and protecting US civilian and military efforts. The only thing that could alter the withdrawal timetable would be a new outbreak of insurgent violence. As US exit routes have begun to be

discussed, the Turkish side has denied reports that Turkey and the US have started informal talks about using Turkish soil for US troop withdrawal. Despite these denials, using Turkish territory, among other routes, for US troop withdrawal will be on the agenda sooner or later.

297

Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 298 /341

Suiter Pre-season

Incirlik key to Drawdown
Incirlik is key to a stable drawdown out of Iraq Lubold 9 (Gordon, Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor February 18,
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Foreign-Policy/2009/0218/p02s01-usfp.html TBC 6/28/10)
The American military has been quietly shipping construction materials, food, fuel, and other nonlethal items into Iraq through Turkey using a two-lane commercial border crossing known as the Habur Gate in southeastern Turkey. But as the US

considers its options for pulling out of Iraq – and the pace of that redeployment – the route through Turkey may play a conspicuous part, defense officials say. In addition to Kuwait, and probably Jordan,
Turkey would give the US military an alternative exit as it attempts to move thousands of trucks, Humvees, and as many as 120,000 shipping containers back home. "Basically, nothing is off the table," says one American defense official, referring to the role Turkey might play. The country, which hosts a large US airbase at Incirlik , could also be a major hub for the United States as it ramps up operations in Afghanistan. Earlier this month the government of Kyrgyzstan announced it would no longer allow the US to operate a key base there. That presents a prickly logistical challenge as the US prepares to send as many as 30,000 new troops to Afghanistan. Today, some 1,000 commercial trucks cross the Turkish border into Iraq every day, many of which carry goods for the US military. That's a reverse from 2003, when Turkey, which opposed the American-led invasion of Iraq, refused to allow US troops to use the country for the invasion, despite a generous incentive package offered by the US. The US 4th Infantry Division, led by then-Maj. Gen. Ray Odierno, was to have entered Iraq through Turkey but instead mobilized through Kuwait. General Odierno

is now senior commander in Iraq and will preside over the massive drawdown of troops and equipment. Relations between the US and Turkey cooled for years until the two allied in response to the growing threat posed by
the PKK, the militant Kurdish nationalist group operating along the Turkish-Iraqi border. The US and Turkey created a joint intelligence center in 2007 to help target the militants, and the two countries have worked on other issues concerning Iraq as well. The dusty, busy supply line through Turkey illustrates the new ties between the two countries. "It is so much more than that right now," says one Turkish diplomat, who spoke on the condition of anonymity. "This issue is just a mere proof of us being allies. This is as it should be." The supply line would give the US a ground exit in northern Iraq that probably would not be as hostile as the two other likely exit points, Kuwait and Jordan. "Turkey is going to be very instrumental in terms of the withdrawal from Iraq," says Stephen Flanagan, a senior analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. US and Turkish officials have tried to kept a low profile regarding the Habur Gate. But in 2007 about 25 percent of the fuel for "coalition forces" entered Iraq through it. The crossing is also a boon to the local economy. Turkish officials say they would welcome an expanded use of the Habur Gate should the US decide to leave Iraq through it. "Postconflict stability" is in the Turks' best interest , Mr. Flanagan notes. But there is a limit to what they will support the US doing in Turkey, he says. "They don't want to give us a blank check for staging counterinsurgency operations."

Incirlik key to American withdrawal from Iraq Zalewski 10 (Piotr 20 April Turkey’s Genocide Diplomacy: What’s in a word? Center for European Policy
Studies freelance journalist and researcher at European Stability Initiative The Turkish response to the House vote was fast and furious. Within a day's time, the government recalled its ambassador from Washington. (He has since returned.) Soon thereafter, officials in Ankara began to warn that Turkey might reconsider its contribution to the NATO coalition in Afghanistan and restrict US forces* access to the Incirlik airbase. a step that would hinder the American withdrawal from Iraq in 2011. Finally, on 16 March. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayip Erdogan made headlines all over the world by threatening to expel 100,000 Armenians from Turkey. "In my country there arc 170,000 Armenians." said Erdogan. "70.000 of them are citizens. We tolerate 100.000 more. So, what am I going to do tomorrow'? If necessary I will tell the 100,000: okay, time to go back to your country. Why? They are not my citizens. I am not obliged to keep them in my country."1

298

Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 299 /341

Suiter Pre-season

Incirlik K2 Military Operations
Incirlik key to military operations Cagaptay 7 (Soner senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and an Ertegun
professor at Princeton February 22 http://www.cagaptay.com/730/armenian-genocide-folly TBC 6/28/10) For starters, the Incirlik Air Base in southern Turkey, an invaluable asset for U.S. military operations in the Middle East, would come under pressure. Three-quarters of all air cargo bound for Iraq transits Incirlik, and Turkey provides blanket clearance for military overflights supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. For instance, KC-135 tankers operating out of Incirlik have flown 3,400 sorties and delivered 35 million gallons of fuel to U.S. fighter and transport aircraft on missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. With its proximity to Iraq, Incirlik also helps defray the cost of American operations there. Six U.S. C-17 cargo aircraft based at Incirlik do the job of nine or 10 military aircraft based in Germany, saving the United States $160 million per year.

299

Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 300 /341

Suiter Pre-season

Chaotic Withdrawal Bad
Chaotic withdrawal causes civil war Salih 6 (Khaled Edition 38 Volume 4 - October 12, Stay the course? independent analyst and consultant
based in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq. He is former senior advisor to the prime minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government. http://www.bitterlemons-international.org/previous.php?opt=1&id=152 TBC 6/28/10) There is no doubt that an American withdrawal will happen; the question is when and how. From Kurdistan's perspective, it is difficult to see how any quick and messy US military and political withdrawal could bring about a better alternative to the current situation. A premature withdrawal plunges Iraq's major political processes into more chaos and deeper conflicts. Under such circumstances the Sunni Arab insurgency would escalate, with hopes to recapture Iraq's political, military and security institutions. Iraq's Shi'ite political forces and population would do their utmost to avoid failing in their historic opportunity to come to power and rule themselves. Kurdistan's achievement in terms of self-rule, stability and prosperity could easily fade away. Inevitably, more violent killings would follow as a consequence of haphazardly abandoning the emerging political arrangements based on Iraq's negotiated constitution
under US and coalition protection. The idea of a federal, democratic and pluralistic Iraq can hardly survive without long-term American military, political and security commitments. On the contrary, a more likely outcome would be intervention by neighboring countries and terrorist groups to promote their own interests, exact revenge or punish those who sided with the Americans against Saddam Hussein's regime or dared to dream of a better and democratic future. In such circumstances, Kurdistan would pay a much higher price than we can anticipate: not only is the Kurdish leadership seen to be actively supporting redrawing Iraq's political system, but the entire population is viewed as supporting foreign forces, ideas and values. An American withdrawal before Iraq's political, military, security and economic institutions can survive on their own would invite extremist groups to penetrate Iraq's borders and cause more destruction than we have seen. Kurdistan is particularly vulnerable in such a scenario because of its geographic location and in view of the difficulties implied in controlling the region's mountains. If extremist groups managed to survive in Afghanistan, create a rule of horror and extend their influence across continents before they were confronted militarily, Kurdistan can potentially function in the same way for anti-Kurdish, anti-US, anti-western and anti-democratic forces. Panicked, unplanned and

chaotic withdrawal is not the only answer to criticisms and demands for a different course of action in Iraq. It is not difficult to imagine the US rearranging its military and political presence but still remaining in Iraq.
One option is to withdraw more from Baghdad and other cities in the hope that Sunnis and Shi'ites conclude that they cannot eliminate each other and therefore must find a modus vivendi.

Chaotic withdrawal kills Heg BOOT 7 (MAX JULY 12 SENIOR FELLOW IN NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES, THE COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS1 BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS TBC 6/28/10) To make my own position clear from the outset, I believe we should maintain the surge (160,000 troops, or 21 Brigade Combat Team equivalents) as long as militarily possible, then move to the pre-surge force of 140,000 troops (15 BCT’s), and then, when events on the ground permit, gradually transition to a force of perhaps 80,000-100,000 troops (4-6 BCT’s plus advisory, Special Forces, and logistics elements) focused primarily on assisting the Iraqi Security Forces for many years to come. That isn’t as dramatic as pulling all U.S. troops out of Iraq as soon as possible. But even if wanted to implement such a retreat it would be hard to do right away; estimates from within the military suggest that an orderly departure would take six to twelve months. It would certainly be possible to leave faster than that, but that would require a precipitous abandonment of allies and equipment. In such a scenario U.S. forces would probably have to fight their way out of the country, with insurgents determined to inflict a final humiliation on a defeated superpower. This pell-mell scramble would likely produce traumatic images along the lines of the last helicopter lifting off the Saigon roof.

300

Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 301 /341

Suiter Pre-season

Chaotic Withdrawal Bad-Heg
Chaotic withdrawal kills Heg, causes Terror, and Middle East instability BOOT 7 (MAX JULY 12 SENIOR FELLOW IN NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES, THE COUNCIL ON

FOREIGN RELATIONS1 BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS TBC 6/28/10)

In short, neither calls for a diplomatic offensive nor calls for the partition of Iraq nor even calls for a military dictatorship offer a serious prospect for lessening the shock if all or almost all American troops were to leave Iraq anytime soon. It is, of course,

impossible to know what would happen if we were to pull out anyway, without a stable political and security structure in place, but few serious analysts in or out of uniform think that the results would be pretty. Some advocates of withdrawal airily predict that if the U.S. were to leave the “Iraqis

would get their act together,” and with American troops no longer acting as a crutch, they would have to resolve their differences through political compromise. Such rosy scenarios are highly improbable if not entirely impossible. Far more likely would be

an all-out civil war. This would be a humanitarian tragedy for which the U.S. would bear indirect responsibility. We would have blood on our hands—the blood of countless Iraqis who trusted us with their lives only to
have that commitment cruelly betrayed, as in generations past we betrayed the South Vietnamese, the Cambodians, the Hungarians, and too many others. Beyond the troubling moral implications there are equally troubling strategic implications. Advocates of withdrawal pretend that this would not constitute defeat. They call it “redeployment.” The world would not be fooled. In particular our enemies would see through such transparent public-relations ploys. If we are seen as the losers in Iraq—and we would be if we withdraw anytime soon--al Qaeda and the

Islamic Republic of Iran would be seen as the winners. The perception of American weakness fed by a pullout would surely lead to increased terrorism against the U.S. and our allies, just as occurred following our ineffectual response to the Iran Hostage Crisis in 1979, the murder of our Marines in Beirut in
1983, the taking of additional hostages in Lebanon in the 1980s, the ambush of our Special Operations Forces in Mogadishu in 1993, the bombing of our African embassies in 1998, and numerous other outrages perpetrated by Islamist hate groups over the past several decades. Besides the general psychological boost for radical Shiite and Sunni extremists

around the world and the concomitant blows to American prestige and credibility, there would also be a concrete price to be paid on the ground. In the chaos that would follow an American pullout, it is quite possible, even probable, that al Qaeda would succeed in turning western Iraq into a Taliban-style base for international terrorism. Although the momentum at the
moment is running against al Qaeda in Anbar Province, the tribal forces that are now cooperating with the Iraqi government would be incapable of defeating al Qaeda on their 7 own. If the U.S. were to pull out, the tribes would likely go back to cooperating with al Qaeda for the sake of self-preservation. Meanwhile, in the Shiite south of the country, Iran would likely expand its imperial influence. That is only one of many possible effects of an Iraqi civil war that we need to contemplate before making the fateful decision to give up the fight. Daniel Byman and Kenneth Pollack of the Brookings Institution, two serious Democratic analysts, issued a sobering study in January called "Things Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover From an Iraqi Civil War" that should be required reading for anyone calling for a pullout. Byman and Pollack studied a number of civil wars stretching back to the 1970s in countries from Congo to Lebanon, and found that they are never confined within the borders drawn neatly on maps. Civil wars export

refugees, terrorists, militant ideologies and economic woes that destabilize neighboring states, and those states in turn usually intervene to try to limit the fallout or to expand their sphere of influence. "We found that 'spillover' is common in massive civil wars; that while its intensity can vary considerably,

at its worst it can have truly catastrophic effects; and that Iraq has all the earmarks of creating quite severe spillover problems," they write. No surprise: After all, Iraq, with its oil wealth, has far more to fight over than Congo or Lebanon or Chechnya.

Chaotic withdrawal kills US oil access Rogers 4 (Paul, 25 May 2004, http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict/article_1920.jsp)TBC

This is the current situation, but what also has to be remembered is that this is a snapshot rather than the indicator of a trend. To assess the likely circumstances a generation or two ahead , the signs indicate that Gulf oil reserves will become steadily more important, especially as demand from China and India continues to grow. Put simply, whoever can exert the most influence over the Persian Gulf region , especially if that extends to a capability for military control, will wield quite extraordinary international power. For that reason alone, if current American policy in Iraq does fail and the result is a disorganised and chaotic withdrawal, the extent of the foreign policy disaster that will unfold will be much greater even than any immediate sense of victory felt by al-Qaida and its affiliated paramilitaries. It could set back US control of the world’s richest energy sources for well over a decade. In short, it is no exaggeration to say that what happens in Iraq over the next year could have a defining impact on global security trends well into the third

decade of the 21st century.

301

Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 302 /341

Suiter Pre-season

Instability Spills Over
Instability caused by withdrawal spreads to the region Barkey 10 (Henri J. visiting scholar in the Carnegie Middle East Program May
http://www.usip.org/files/resources/SR237_Turkey's%20New%20Engagement%20in%20Iraq.pdf TBC 6/28/10) The advent of the Obama administration confirmed and accelerated the Bush Administration‘ s decision to withdraw from Iraq. This decision, taken without any assurance that the new regime in Baghdad will survive and not perish under the weight of sectarian, ethnic, and regional rivalries, is as transformative as the initial decision to invade. The regional powers, which had to anticipate the effects of an Iraq that conformed to the American imagination, now have to contend with an uncertain future in Iraq. This uncertainty is even greater because the United States may decide to pull out sooner than expected or be asked to leave earlier by the Iraqis themselves.2 An unstable Iraq is likely to export its instability to the region. Whether such exports take the form of fundamentalist or jihadist organization and violence or nationalist stirrings, the repercussions will create opportunities for both regional cooperation and rivalries that may exacerbate conditions on the ground. Even if Iraq managed to emerge as a stable state—albeit one with limited influence in the medium term as it rebuilds from years of war and ravage—the fact of the matter is that the United States and the countries of the region would continue to pursue policies predicated on warding off the worst

302

Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 303 /341

Suiter Pre-season

 CPs  ‡‡‡ Consult NATO CP ‡‡‡

303

Dowling Debate 2010-2011

Turkey Neg 304 /341

Suiter Pre-season

Consult NATO Solvency
Strong pressure from NATO members for US to consult over TNW removal Lamond and Ingram ’09 [Claudine and Paul, Jan. 23, “Politics around US tactical nuclear weapons in European host states”
http://www.basicint.org/gtz/gtz11.pdf]

Increasing pressure from parliamentarians, pressure groups, budgets and public opinion from within host member states may yet provide an important catalyst for the US and NATO members to discuss the future of US nuclear sharing in Europe. The likely review of NATO’s Strategic Concept starting in 2009 represents an opportunity for the Alliance to reconsider its dependency on nuclear sharing and come up with alternative, more valuable measures that demonstrate commitment. Any changes in nuclear policy in Europe should only be done after extensive consultation with  NATO: Sam Nunn, 8/5/2009 (co­chair and chief executive officer of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, 
http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20090805_4929.php)

Nations located near Russia believe that U.S. nonstrategic forces in Europe remain necessary to prevent  the Kremlin from using its nuclear arsenal as a means of coercion against them, according to the report.  It warns  that  the United States should not abandon "strategic equivalency with Russia" and should not cede to  Moscow "a posture of superiority in the name of de­emphasizing nuclear weapons in U.S. military  strategy."     Balance   "does   not   exist   in   nonstrategic   nuclear   forces,   where   Russia   enjoys   a   sizable  numerical advantage," the report states, adding "the current imbalance is stark and worrisome to some U.S. allies in Central Europe."  Einhorn cautioned that any changes to the United States' nuclear deployments in Europe "should only    be considered after    extensive consultations    and    consensus­building     within" NATO.  

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‡‡‡ Turkey CP ‡‡‡

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Turkey CP 1NC
Text: Turkey should end its commitment to nuclear sharing agreement with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization by ending Turkey’s technical capability to employ tactical nuclear weapons in times of war. CP solves proliferation, deterrence and NATO cohesion Nassauer 02 (Otfried, the director of the Berlin Information- center for Transatlantic security, “NATO’s
nuclear posture review should Europe end nuclear sharing?” BITS policy note)
approach: This policy note does not pretend to solve that dilemma by suggesting a possible European conceptual approach. It discusses a single measure that could become part of such an

Should Europe’s non-nuclear NATO members that are participating in NATO nuclear sharing give up the technical capability to employ sub-strategic nuclear weapons in times of war? This questions runs counter to those questions likely to be raised during NATO’s nuclear review. However, it represents one option for working on a European approach. 2. The proposal The simple answer is: Yes. Those European nations having a capability to use U.S. nuclear weapons in times of war, should and could revoke that capability. They can do so. If they would do so, for the first time non-nuclear nations – beyond rejecting to become nuclear powers - would make a substantial contribution to support the declared common goals of strengthening nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. Those non-nuclear NATO members that have the technical capacity to use nuclear weapons in times of war can renounce it without losing security or political influence – and ought to do so in accordance with the Alliance’s 2000 Summit Communiqué as well as the results of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Nevertheless, they could continue to play their role in NATO nuclear planning. All six nations concerned can jointly take that decision. If a joint decision is not reached, important NATO members like Germany should pioneer the idea. According to this policy note , such a step would constitute a central new impulse for nuclear disarmament. It would facilitate the process towards additional steps of nuclear disarmament which could for the first time open the way for dismantling thousands of sub-strategic nuclear weapons that are no longer needed or usefu l; would be an important contribution to strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime since it removes the cause for doubts whether nuclear sharing is in compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (Art I and II); would contribute to reducing the role of nuclear weapons in NATO's strategy. The Alliance's
nuclear policy could be better brought in line with the 1996 ru-ling of the International Court of Justice. This policy note presents additional findings important for European

Nuclear consultation rights remain in effect if non-nuclear NATO members renounce the technical capability to use nuclear weapons in case of war. Nuclear deterrence remains effective, as does intra-Alliance solidarity which finds its expression in sharing the risks, roles, and responsibilities resulting from NATO’s nuclear strategy. The internal cohesion of the alliance will benefit since the repeated debates about zones of different security will become irrelevant once all non-nuclear NATO members are participating in the Alliance’s nuclear policy in a homogeneous way. Finally, the divergent national nuclear interests within NATO to some extent will be harmonized; this can be used constructively to reinforce the nonproliferation and disarmament policies of the Alliance.
governments having to consider such a move:

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Solves Prolif
CP solves prolif better than the aff Nassauer 02 (Otfried, the director of the Berlin Information- center for Transatlantic security, “NATO’s
nuclear posture review should Europe end nuclear sharing?” BITS policy note) NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements have been a burden on the nuclear non-proliferation regime. This is true especially for the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the core part of the regime. For many years the non-aligned states have considered nuclear sharing as a violation of the NPT. During war times nuclear sharing would permit the use of nuclear weapons by states that have joined the NPT as nonnuclear states. This directly contradicts the obligations described in article II of the NPT, while the U.S. as nuclear state would violate Article
I of the NPT. Aside from criticizing the lack of interest in speedy nuclear disarmament on the part of nuclear states, this argument about the possible violation of the NPT in times of war has recently become a continuously raised point of contention. [5] The last review conference on the NPT was held in New York City in April 2000. More than one hundred states again criticized the nuclear sharing arrangements within NATO. NATO’s member states were called upon to abandon nuclear sharing [6], in order to fully comply with their obligation under Articles I and II

The non-aligned states consider the transfer of control over nuclear weapons in case of war as a special case of proliferation, becoming visible for instance if U.S. nuclear weapons were flown to their
of the NPT. Nuclear sharing was criticized as a loophole to circumvent the restrictions of the NPT. targets by German Tornado pilots. They remind NATO that Articles I and II of the NPT permit no exceptions, and that the NPT is equally binding for all parties to the treaty in times of peace and war.[7] Both the U.S. and its NATO partners reject that interpretation and emphasize that nuclear sharing is legal under the NPT. They contend that during peacetime, the nuclear warheads remain strictly under U.S. control. According to their view, in case of war the NPT is no longer binding. There has never been a serious attempt to overcome these conflicting views.

NATO nuclear sharing undermines the credibility of the NPT. The doubts of the non-aligned states can only be put aside if one were to share the conviction of NATO that the cryptic formulations in additional interpretations which some NATO partners produced when signing the treaty, and which the U.S. stated in the national ratification process, can justify the lawfulness of nuclear sharing. In that case the NPT would be even more seriously weakened: The legality of the NPT ratification process could be called into question by many parties to the treaty, since they were unaware of these interpretations, their relevance, and their true meaning when they signed and ratified the NPT . It would mean a considerable strengthening of the NPT if the non-nuclear members of NATO were to take the initiative to remove these obstacles to the credibility of the NPT by renouncing their capability to use nuclear weapons in times of war. They could remove any doubts about their willingness to comply with NPT regulations. The need to forge agreement among the NPT members about whether nuclear sharing constitutes breach of the treaty or not would disappear. Even more importantly , the credibility of the non-proliferation regime would be seriously strengthened at a time when many fear that the results of the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review will – in the mid to longer term – seriously weaken world-wide non-proliferation efforts by enhancing the likelihood of proliferation. As a case in point, members of the Bush administration have publicly discussed whether the U.S. should stick to its politically binding obligations
under the Negative Security Assurances, which were both crucial and instrumental to obtaining the unconditional and unlimited extension of the NPT in 1995.A non-proliferation regime with different rights and obligations cannot be stable in the longer term.

Therefore a renunciation of the technical aspect of nuclear sharing presents an unequivocal signal that NATO member states recognize the universal validity of the NPT. Their voluntary renunciation would be a strong indication to all parties to the NPT that the role of nuclear weapons within NATO strategy is being reduced, not expanded.

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Solves Russia reciprocation
We solve NATO- Russia relations and Russian reciprocation Nassauer 02 (Otfried, the director of the Berlin Information- center for Transatlantic security, “NATO’s
nuclear posture review should Europe end nuclear sharing?” BITS policy note)
decides to be favorable, the European NATO members have an ongoing interest in continued nuclear disarmament. The renunciation of the technical capability to employ nuclear weapons under NATO nuclear sharing could also prove a major contribution to nuclear disarmament. While the Bush administration is deeply skeptical about or even against entering new legally binding arms-control agreements limiting U.S. flexibility to do whatever the administration

European and U.S. interests meet, when it comes to eliminating thousands of tactical or sub-strategic nuclear warheads representing remnants of the Cold War. The majority of these weapons rests (and rusts) in Russia’s arsenal. Western proliferation concerns often concentrate on these weapons. NATO’s non-nuclear members can facilitate the necessary bilateral U.S.-Russian process of discussing reductions to these arsenals. In 1997 in Helsinki, Russia and the
United States for the first time announced their intention to talk about further measures to reduce tactical nuclear systems, as well as verifiable nuclear warhead dismantling. Yet concrete and visible steps are still to be announced. While the Bush administration’s proposal for a new strategic framework for cooperation with a no longer hostile Russia should ease a solution,

U.S. reluctance to enter legally binding agreements makes such an endeavor more complicated at the same time. If the non-nuclear NATO states declare their willingness to give up their capability to use nuclear weapons, the process of including tactical nuclear weapons into disarmament could be eased. Their move could open the option to withdraw most if not all remaining U.S. sub-strategic nuclear warheads from Europe and thus send a positive signal to Russia: Russia’s long-standing demand to eliminate sub-strategic nuclear weapons that can reach Russian territory could be granted and thus, in turn, could entice Moscow to begin discussions about increased transparency on and mutual reductions of tactical nuclear weapons.Despite their relatively small number, the tactical nuclear
warheads still deployed in Europe do have a high symbolic value in this context. This would also apply to their withdrawal. To facilitate it will be a signal that European security

This would be an important confidence-building measure and might open the perspective to de-nuclearize NATO-Russia relations. In the past, the fact that important non-nuclear states in Europe have retained the ability to use American nuclear weapons in case of war, be it for political or status reasons, has been one of the principle political obstacles standing in the way of U.S.-Russian negotiations about reducing or eliminating tactical nuclear weapons. These non-nuclear states have thus made their peculiar contribution to prevent negotiations about a reduction or elimination of these weapons from
after the end of the East-West conflict does no longer depend on the deployment of American nuclear weapons in Europe . occurring. Today they can similarly contribute, but in a positive fashion, to make possible such negotiations and facilitate a successful outcome. The precondition would be that these states, in recognizing the changed situation after the end of the Cold War, declare their political will to give up the technical aspects of nuclear sharing.

Counterplan solves Russia reduction and verification measures Nassauer 02 (Otfried, the director of the Berlin Information- center for Transatlantic security, “NATO’s
nuclear posture review should Europe end nuclear sharing?” BITS policy note) Indirectly this step would have even greater significance. It could be decisive for the final outcome of the next round of U.S.-Russian nuclear arms reductions. Will it contain only some further modest limits to strategic launch systems? In this case it would further reduce the number of operational nuclear weapons by a few thousand, yet it would not determine what happens with the nuclear warheads themselves. This is the character of the unilateral moves suggested by the Bush administration in the context of the Nuclear Posture Review. Or will future new agreements be more comprehensive and far-reaching? The possibility to include tactical nuclear weapons and verifiable warhead dismantling is not yet entirely foreclosed. It is up to the European non-nuclear NATO members to push this door open. In addition, progress has been made on developing warhead dismantling verification technologies. It should be technically possible to conduct nonintrusive verification based on surveying the warhead containers entering a dismantling facility and the pitcontainers leaving that facility.Such a move could comprise thousands of additional nuclear warheads and include them in the process of dismantling. Since the economic situation is making it difficult for Russia to put a priority on financing expensive arms
reduction measures, an offer of technical and financial support to accompany such a move would be appropriate. U.S. Senator Richard Lugar has made this suggestion for years.

This could increase Russia's willingness to make its tactical arsenal transparent and to promote its reduction with Western support. It is exactly here that the non-nuclear states of NATO would act in their own best interest if they would contribute to such an offer.Abandoning the technical aspects of nuclear sharing would not only have a positive impact on the nuclear arms reduction process, it would also strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

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Solves International law
Counterplan solves international law and ICJ credibility Nassauer 02 (Otfried, the director of the Berlin Information- center for Transatlantic security, “NATO’s
nuclear posture review should Europe end nuclear sharing?” BITS policy note) According to the legal opinion published by the International Court of Justice, the present operational plans for nuclear sharing violate international law. This 1996 decision not only categorizes any use of nuclear weapons as a grave violation of international law, it includes already the threat of nuclear strikes. [9] This ruling by the ICJ delegitimizes the nuclear policy of the past 50 years . A renunciation of nuclear capability by the non-nuclear NATO states would contribute to making NATO regulations more congruent with international law. However, complete congruence would not yet be achieved. The ICJ opinion is not a binding legal ruling regarding norms of international law. Rather the ICJ, according to the UN-Charter, is carefully evaluating on the basis of constitutional criteria what is compatible with international law and what is not. As an international organization, NATO cannot afford to dismiss these norms. With regard to the political legitimacy, which is tied to legal norms, it is equally essential that nuclear sharing with non-nuclear NATO members is restricted to nuclear planning and consultations. This would make it easier for NATO to return to a policy of using nuclear weapons as a "means of last resort", as stated in London in 1990, in case the existence of one or more NATO members was threatened with physical annihilation. This is the only situation in which the judges of the ICJ have not unanimously ruled the threat of using nuclear weapons to be illegal . To conclude that it would be legal, however, would contradict both
the letter and the spirit of the ICJ ruling.

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Solves NATO Cohesion
CP solves NATO cohesion- member states continue to participate in nuclear planning without nuclear weapons Nassauer 02 (Otfried, the director of the Berlin Information- center for Transatlantic security, “NATO’s
nuclear posture review should Europe end nuclear sharing?” BITS policy note)
Consequently, the non-nuclear allies in NATO could abandon their nuclear weapons employment capability and continue to participate in nuclear planning and consultation of the alliance without being afraid to lose influence over NATO nuclear policy or be held responsible for an insufficient assumption of roles, risks and responsibilities[4] or inevitably provoke a discussion about the withdrawal of U.S. troops

Such a step would lead to a harmonization of the European non-nuclear states' participation in NATO’s nuclear strategy. At the same time it would signal that these non-nuclear states continue to bear political responsibility for the concept of nuclear deterrence and to represent their nuclear weapons-related interests in the Nuclear Planning Group. They thereby would increase the internal coherence of the Alliance and its political capacity to act. In the longer term the non-nuclear members might become aware of their common interests with respect to NATO’s nuclear policy and thus could prepare joint positions on the future role of nuclear weapons within the Alliance. Concerns by new member states about
from Europe. being sufficiently involved in NATO's nuclear policy would prove to be superfluous, as would any endeavors on their part to increase their status through the purchase of nuclear-

There will be no inner circle of non-nuclear members left, that are more involved than others in the Alliance's nuclear policy. A crucial and burdensome factor in NATO-Russia relations will lose its relevance for the decisions about the future of NATO
capable aircraft. enlargement expected for the Alliance’s Prague Summit in November 2002.

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AT: US Decides
Greece proves that it’s within Turkish jurisdiction Claudine Lamond and Paul Ingram – BASIC- British American Security Information Council, 1-15-2009
“Politics around US tactical nuclear weapons in European host states” d.a. 7-19-2010 http://www.basicint.org/gtz/gtz11.htm

There is a rising sentiment amongst the population for the removal of US nuclear weapons from Turkish territory. In a recent survey,[20] more than half the respondents stated that they are against nuclear weapons being stationed in Turkey. Almost 60% of the Turkish population would support a government request to

remove the nuclear weapons from their country, and 72% said they would support an initiative to make Turkey a nuclear-free zone.[21] There may be several causes behind this sentiment, including the Iraq War, Turkish relations with neighboring states, budget expenditure and the moral concern over nuclear weapons. The historic precedence of Greece, a NATO member and Turkey's

historic rival, ending its commitment to nuclear sharing in NATO may have further strengthened this tendency. There have been public expressions of resentment towards the US military presence in Turkey ever since the lead up to
the US war with Iraq. The United States insisted on the government allowing American troops to use Turkey as a staging post, despite overwhelmingly antiwar Turkish public and political opinion. Limited permission was granted after heavy debates and delay in the Turkish parliament. Turkey's location has added an element of both risk and opportunity to NATO nuclear sharing. Turkey's close proximity to states deemed potentially hostile, such as Iran and Syria, make Turkey a preferred NATO base for TNWs. The risk, of course, is that stationing TNWs in Turkey might provoke a pre-emptive strike upon NATO bases. Turkish parliamentarians have expressed to NATO the difficulty of explaining the continued presence of US TNWs on Turkish territory to Muslim and Arab neighbors. There is a fear that they undermine Turkey's clear diplomatic objectives to act as a mediator within the region. Turkey has a unique opportunity to play a positive role in promoting non-proliferation. Ending nuclear sharing and fully complying with the NPT would act as a powerful example to neighboring states and strengthen Turkey's legitimacy. Moreover, efforts by

the Turkish government to play a leading role in the elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction would receive overwhelming public support.[22]

Allies decide if US can continue forward deployment- US only controls capability for the future Chris Lindborg, BASIC Analyst 7 April 2010 “Considering NATO’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons after the U.S.
Nuclear Posture Review” d.a. 7-19-2010 The new NPR5 essentially leaves open for allies to decide whether to continue the forward deployment of the nuclear bombs in Europe, but makes clear that the United States will maintain all capabilities necessary for their deployment for the future whatever the decision by allies: “The United States will

consult with our allies regarding the future basing of nuclear weapons in Europe, and is committed to making consensus decisions through NATO processes. In cooperation with allies and partners, the NPR has determined that the following steps will be taken. … The Air Force will retain a dual-capable fighter (the capability to deliver both conventional and nuclear weapons) as it replaces F-16s with the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. … the United States will also conduct a full scope B-61 (nuclear bomb) Life Extension Program to ensure its functionality with the F-35 and to include making surety – safety, security, and use control – enhancements to maintain confidence in the B-61. These decisions ensure that the United States will retain the capability to forward-deploy non-strategic nuclear weapons in support of its Alliance commitments. These decisions do not presume the results of future decisions within NATO about the requirements of nuclear deterrence and nuclear sharing, but keep open all options.” (pp. 27-28)

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‡‡‡ Turkey-Iran Relations Adv. CP ‡‡‡

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Iran Relations - ADV CP
CP: The United States federal government deliver the One-Hundred-Twenty kilograms of fuel to the Tehran Research Reactor in accordance with Turkey’s joint declaration with Brazil and Iran. nuclear fuel swap is key for US-Iran relations and more important than removing TNWs Mustafa Kibaroglu, ’10 Teacher at Department of International Relations at Bilkent University in Ankara, Turkey, Fellow at Harvard
University, Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of Internation Studies, International Atomic Energy Agency, and United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, June 10, “Reassessing the Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Turkey”, Arms Control Association, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_06/Kibaroglu#25])

On May 17, Turkey signed a joint declaration with Brazil and Iran, providing for the safe storage of Iran’s 1,200 kilograms of low-enriched uranium fuel in Turkey in return for the delivery by France, Russia, the United States, and the International Atomic Energy Agency of 120 kilograms of fuel needed for the Tehran Research Reactor. This “nuclear fuel swap” is potentially a breakthrough in the long-standing deadlock in Iran’s relations with the West over Tehran’s nuclear program. There is no question that the degree of trust that Turkey has built with Iran, especially over the last several years with the coming to power of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey, had a significant impact on getting this result. Iran has so far adamantly refused all other offers. Hence, the Iranian political and security elites who have been closely interacting with their Turkish counterparts at every level over the past several months and years prior to the fuel swap announcement may raise their expectations in turn. They may press for withdrawal from Turkey of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, which they fear may be used against them, as a way for Turkey to prove its sincerity regarding its stance toward Iran and, more broadly, its commitment to creating a nuclear-weapon-free Middle East. Turkey clearly has to tread carefully, but the risks should not be overstated. One concern might be the contingencies in which the security situation in Turkey’s neighborhood deteriorates, thereby necessitating the active presence of an effective deterrent against the aggressor(s). Yet, given the elaborate capabilities that exist within the alliance and the solidarity principle so far effectively upheld by the allies, extending deterrence against Turkey’s rivals should not be a problem. Turkey would continue to be protected against potential aggressors by the nuclear guarantees of its allies France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the three NATO nuclear-weapon states. Turkey’s reliance on such a “credible” deterrent, which will not be permanently stationed on Turkish territory, is less likely to be criticized by its Middle Eastern neighbors and should not engender a burden-sharing controversy with its European allies.

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‡‡‡ NPT Fuel Bank/Article IV CP ‡‡‡

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NPT: Fuel Bank/Article IV CP Shell (1/2)
Text: The United States will create an international low enriched uranium fuel bank and reprocessing capabilities which will provide affordable nuclear fuel and waste reprocessing to to any state which promises to verifiably forgo developing an indigenous nuclear fuel cycle. The United States will also provide favorable trade agreements to participant countries who maintain full compliance. The IAEA exclusively will determine eligibility to receive fuel bank assistance. Funding and enforcement guaranteed. Counterplan is not topical, competes via net benefits.

Solvency: A fuel bank conditioned on abandoning indigenous enrichment fortifies the NPT, solves and proliferation, prevents cheating and solving Iran.
Senator Evan Bayh, United States Senator, Memo to da Prez, January 15, 2009 http://www.dlc.org/ndol_ci.cfm? kaid=450020&subid=900203&contentid=254843 nsa We can ill afford to allow rising demand for nuclear energy to become a pretext for rogue nations seeking to acquire a nuclear military capability. Yet that is precisely what is happening right now in Iran. And if that nation succeeds in defying the international community's legitimate demands that it desist from developing nuclear capacities, other countries will follow suit. That's why I urge you, Mr. President, to put nuclear nonproliferation at the top of your energy-security agenda. I believe the threshold question is this: How do we respond to valid and growing demands for civilian nuclear energy worldwide without permitting more countries to acquire nuclear weapons? The answer, in my view, is to set up an international nuclear-fuel bank that would supply fuel to any country that agrees not to develop its own enriching and reprocessing facilities. The fuel bank works like this: Developing nations seeking civilian nuclear power for peaceful purposes are given access to a reliable and affordable supply of nuclear fuel. In return, they must agree to forgo enriching uranium themselves. They must also submit to rigorous inspections of their civilian reactors to guard against North Korean and Iranian-style cheating. This approach makes both economic and national-security sense. We have learned a lot about the economics of nuclear power since the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (often referred to as the Nonproliferation Treaty, or NPT) was negotiated more than three decades ago. For starters, there is an enormous surplus of uranium in existing enrichment facilities worldwide. Due to bigger economies of scale, it is now much cheaper for countries lacking enrichment capacity to purchase fuel from a central repository than to mine, enrich, and reprocess it themselves. Even a small enrichment facility would cost at least $1 billion to build and more than $100 million to operate each year. But an international nuclear fuel bank could supply the same amount of fuel at market prices for roughly $15 million a year.1 An international nuclear-fuel bank would thus provide affordable fuel to countries genuinely interested in pursuing civilian nuclear power. It would allow countries to draw fuel for use in their own civilian nuclear reactors and then return the spent fuel for safe reprocessing under the oversight of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) . By removing incentives for developing countries to create their own fissile materials, we would reduce the prospect of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of the world's most dangerous regimes. Such a bank would help to close what many regard as a dangerous loophole in the NPT. The treaty has been widely interpreted to allow non-nuclear weapons states to develop uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing facilities if their use is intended exclusively for civilian nuclear energy. The problem, according to leading defense experts Ashton Carter and Stephen LaMontagne, is that "enrichment and reprocessing facilities allow states to cross into a proliferation 'red zone,' putting them dangerously close to a nuclear weapons capacity."2 The loophole in question lies in the NPT's Article IV, which recognizes the "inalienable right of all Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes." Iran claims to be exercising this "inalienable right" today as it enriches uranium for what it says are strictly civilian uses. We should not forget, however, that North Korea used precisely the same tactic to realize its nuclear ambitions, and we are perilously close to seeing history repeat itself -- this time with an oil-rich nation that is deeply hostile to the United States and actively
supporting international terrorist groups. Once this genie gets out of the bottle, there is no putting it back. At a minimum, allowing Iran to obtain a nuclear warhead would be a regionally destabilizing event certain to spark a Middle East arms race. At worst, it would be a global security catastrophe in which Tehran obtains the means to blackmail its European neighbors and threaten Israel's destruction. As Carter and LaMontagne point out, the NPT is clear that the right it confers to peaceful atomic power can only be exercised in conformity with the nonproliferation obligations that Iran and other nuclear aspirants assumed when they signed it.

The solution to the red zone problem is to provide states with a multinational alternative to an indigenous nuclear fuel cycle. This will involve creating a multinational supply regime to provide enrichment and spent fuel removal services to states that abstain from domestic enrichment and reprocessing, submit to strict safeguards (such
They add: " as those stipulated in the IAEA Additional Protocol), and reaffirm their intention not to purse nuclear weapons."3 Last year, I co-authored legislation with Sen. Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) that would create exactly this kind of "multinational supply

The establishment of a fuel bank would cut short the debate over nuclear-technology development rights. Every nation would have access to civilian nuclear power so long as they are willing to abide by conditions that protect global security.
regime." Recently, several provisions of that legislation were signed into law. The centerpiece of our approach was the first major federal investment in the creation of an international civilian nuclear-fuel bank.

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Countries that refuse fuel-bank services would come under immediate suspicion about their weapons intentions. Iran contends that it is pursuing a civilian nuclear program to reduce domestic oil consumption and sell its excess oil on the global market. If this claim is true, then surely Iran would leap at the opportunity for a more affordable supply of nuclear fuel. After all, fuel-bank services would provide it with a faster and cheaper path toward achieving its stated objective of a purely civilian nuclear program. Of course, if Tehran's pursuit of civilian nuclear power is a disingenuous ruse, as I strongly suspect, then its true ambitions will be revealed. This evidence will make it easier to rally world opinion for more aggressive international action against Iran before it's too late.

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NPT: Fuel Bank/Article IV CP Shell (2/2) Article IV is key to the NPT- its strength is central to incentivizing compliance with all other NPT provisions.
LEWIS A. DUNN, Arms Control Consultant, a senior vice president of Science Applications International Corp., Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 16, No. 2, July 2009 http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/npr_16-2_dunn.pdf nsa
In light of the current controversies over Article IV*and concern about an ‘‘Article IV loophole’’ under which countries can pursue nuclear weapons while claiming only to be exercising their Article IV right to peaceful uses*it is important to look back at the origins of the ‘‘inalienable right’’ obligation. The

negotiating record shows that Article IV was one of the essential underlying bargains of the NPT, and, as stated by one U.S. negotiator, ‘‘In the course of the negotiations, a number of countries expressed the strong view that neither their renunciation of nuclear weapons nor the concomitant safeguards should prejudice their opportunity to share in the peaceful atom.’’ Two sets of countries pressed hard on the peaceful uses issue: on the one hand, developed countries that needed to be reassured that the NPT would in no way prejudice their future access or use of nuclear energy (including countries in Europe as well as Japan, all of whose adherence was critical to the success of the NPT); and on the other hand, developing countries (thereby resulting in the specific reference in Article IV to ‘‘due consideration for the needs of the developing countries’’). With today’s growing interest in nuclear energy, the importance of Article IV, in sustaining support for and legitimizing the NPT, is likely to increase.

Finally, Iranian proliferation leads to multiple scenarios of terrorism and nuclear war
Kurtz 2006 (Stanley. National Review, “Our Fallout-Shelter Future.” Aug. 28) Rosen assumes (rightly I believe) that proliferation is unlikely to stop with Iran. Once Iran gets the bomb, Turkey and Saudi Arabia are likely to develop their own nuclear weapons, for self-protection, and so as not to allow Iran to take de facto cultural-political control of the Muslim world. (I think you've got to at least add Egypt to this list.) With three, four, or more nuclear states in the Muslim Middle East, what becomes of deterrence? A key to deterrence during the Cold
War was our ability to know who had hit whom. With a small number of geographically separated nuclear states, and with the big opponents training satellites and specialized advance-guard radar emplacements on each other, it was relatively easy to know where a missile had come from. But what if a nuclear missile is launched at the United States from somewhere in a fully nuclearized Middle East, in the middle of a war in which, say, Saudi Arabia and Iran are already lobbing conventional missiles at one another? Would we know who had attacked us? Could we actually drop a retaliatory nuclear bomb on someone without being absolutely certain? And as Rosen asks, What if the nuclear blow was delivered against us by an airplane or a cruise missile? It might be almost impossible to trace the attack back to its source with certainty, especially in the midst of an ongoing conventional conflict. More Terror We're familiar with the horror scenario of a Muslim state passing a nuclear bomb to terrorists for use against an American city. But imagine the same scenario in

a multi-polar Muslim nuclear world. With several Muslim countries in possession of the bomb, it would be extremely difficult to trace the state source of a nuclear terror strike. In fact, this very difficulty would encourage states (or ill-controlled elements within nuclear states -- like Pakistan's intelligence services or Iran's Revolutionary Guards) to pass nukes to terrorists. The tougher it is to trace the source of a weapon, the easier it is to give the weapon away. In short, nuclear proliferation to multiple Muslim states greatly increases the chances of a nuclear terror strike.
Right now, the Indians and Pakistanis "enjoy" an apparently stable nuclear stand-off. Both countries have established basic deterrence, channels of communication, and have also eschewed a potentially destabilizing nuclear arms race. Attacks by Kashmiri militants in 2001 may have pushed India and Pakistan close to the nuclear brink. Yet since then, precisely because of the danger, the two countries seem to have established a clear, deterrence-based understanding. The 2001 crisis gives fuel to proliferation pessimists, while the current stability encourages proliferation optimists. Rosen points out, however, that a multi-polar nuclear Middle East is unlikely to follow the South Asian model. Deep mutual suspicion between an

expansionist, apocalyptic, Shiite Iran, secular Turkey, and the Sunni Saudis and Egyptians (not to mention Israel) is likely to fuel a dangerous multi-pronged nuclear arms race. Larger arsenals mean more chance of a weapon being slipped to terrorists. The collapse of the world's non-proliferation regime also raises the chances that nuclearization will spread to Asian powers like Taiwan and Japan. And of course, possession of nuclear weapons is likely to embolden Iran, especially in the transitional period before the Saudis develop weapons of their own. Like Saddam, Iran may be tempted to take control of Kuwait's oil wealth, on the assumption that the United States will not dare risk a nuclear confrontation by escalating the conflict. If the proliferation optimists are right, then once the Saudis get nukes, Iran would be far
less likely to make a move on nearby Kuwait. On the other hand, to the extent that we do see conventional war in a nuclearized Middle East, the losers will

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be sorely tempted to cancel out their defeat with a nuclear strike. There may have been nuclear peace during the Cold War, but there were also many "hot" proxy wars. If conventional wars break out in a nuclearized Middle East, it may be very difficult to stop them from

escalating into nuclear confrontations.

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Fuel Bank CP: Fuel Bank Solves Prolif A fuel bank solves: rebalances the NPT non proliferation bargain.
LAWRENCE SCHEINMAN 04, of the Monterey Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies, June 7, 2004 http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/No5.pdf nsa

Perhaps the lesson to draw from this is that going down the path of denial without adequate incentives is a path not to be taken. It also puts the emphasis on incentives that would attract others to a particular course of action. In terms of multinationalization of certain fuel cycle activities it is arguable that an arrangement that embraced all states, not just a class of states, would have a better chance of success- i.e. an approach that involved the existing technology holders for uranium enrichment and that brought them under the same regime as others. This could be done by offering inward investment in existing facilities to states that would (a) provide them with priority assurance of supply of low enriched uranium on a timely basis and at competitive market prices; and (b) give them a formal legal relationship to the enterprise involving membership on the entity board of directors with voting rights on such matters as general policy, pricing, investment strategy, and a right to share in corporate profits. In exchange, and to support nonproliferation objectives, states that entered into such arrangements would formally and verifiably foreswear developing enrichment on a national basis whether by the technology involved in the multinational
enterprise or any other technology. In so far as the enterprise itself was concerned, investing states would limit their role to oversight, general policy, and management, but not be involved in operations or have access to the technology being used. On the other hand, the technology holder would be placing itself under a legal arrangement that brought a multinational dimension to its activities with formal responsibilities to its partners and a sharing of management and decision-making. De facto approaches to the problem could focus on assurance of nuclear supply. That could be achieved in a variety of ways ranging from measures to reinforce the existing global enrichment market to the establishment of consortia of nuclear fuel suppliers now predominating the international market that would provide concurrent assurances on the consistency of supply on a timely basis for states foreswearing national enrichment and reprocessing, to the instituting of a nuclear fuel bank or banks. These could i