Centre for Islamic Pluralism




Dr Irfan Al-Alawi * Stephen Suleyman Schwartz Kamal Hasani * Veli Sirin * Daut Dauti * Qanta Ahmed, MD
Revised and corrected edition September 2009

Centre for Islamic Pluralism
Washington * London * Köln * Sarajevo www.islamicpluralism.org www.islamicpluralism.eu www.islamicpluralism.de

BM 2394, London, WC1N 3XX, UK 1718 M Street NW #260 Washington, DC 20036 USA

A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007. Istanbul 11) Birmingham Central Mosque.islamicpluralism. UK . London WC1N 3XX.l/r) Houses of Parliament. A catalogue record for this book is pending with the Library of Congress Copyright © Centre for Islamic Pluralism All rights reserved The authors’ rights have been asserted This document may be reproduced and reposted by any user with acknowledgement of authorship and original publication Cover illustrations: 1 .de First edition: May 2009 Revised and corrected edition: September 2009 Design: Asim Mesihi ISBN 978-0-9558779-2-6 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data.top l.islamicpluramism. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication Data. the most prestigious mosque in Italy 4) The Knights’ Hall [aka Ridderzaal] part of the Binnenhof Parliament buildings. 5) Reichstag. Germany. Madrid 7) Mosque of Granada 8) Milli Goruş storefront mosque. las Cortes Generales.eu www.islamicpluralism. 2009 9) French National Assembly.org www. The Hague.2009 Published in the United Kingdom in 2009 by the Centre for Islamic Pluralism BM 2394. Duisburg.) Relief on Washington’s Supreme Court Building depicting the Prophet with the Qur’an in one hand and a sword in the other 2 . Berlin 6) El Palacio del Congreso de los Diputados. London 3) The Grand Mosque of Rome. UK 1718 M Street NW #260 Washington. DC 20036 USA www. Marxloh. Paris 10) Yeni Cami (New Mosque).

12. EMU] The Question of “Islamic Banking” Conclusion and Recommendations Bibliography Index ii iii v 1 2 5 23 56 61 82 97 114 126 132 135 140 151 . 10. 6. 11. 7. 3. Prefatory Note Five Principles For Study of Shariah in W estern Europe Glossary of Main Organisations and Acronyms CIP and its Role Investigating Shariah in the W est Methodology Shariah Defined Case Study: Britain Appendix: Islamist Ideology at the British Bedside Case Study: Germany Case Study: The Netherlands Case Study: France Case Study: Spain ECFR and Other Transnational Islamic Organisations in Europe [FIOE. 5. 4. EMN. 9. 2. 8. 13.CONTENTS 1.

forced marriages and related practices can have no part in a Western legal system. Polygamy. One of the great values of this handbook is that it offers the best analysis of the goals of radical Islam with respect to the imposition of Shariah in the West.H. performance of promises – should be welcomed. and the penetration of these ideas. The debate described in these pages has been almost entirely veiled from non-Muslim eyes. To be sure. Buckley Associate Dean and Foundation Professor George Mason University School of Law Executive Director George Mason Law and Economics Center Virginia. is in showing how moderate and liberal Muslims may give a commitment to honour Western legal rules without in any way derogating from the principles of their religion. socalled “honour” murders. and their observance cannot be thought objectionable. produced by some of the leading Western Muslim experts. USA ii CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. This understanding of the civic duties of Muslims in non-Muslim countries has. Other Shariah laws that promote positive morality – hospitality to strangers.PREFATORY NOTE The introduction of Shariah law in Western legal systems provokes widespread concern. Westerners are troubled. These should properly be a matter of indifference to non-Muslims. Dietary rules and dress codes are shielded by Western constitutional protections of religious and privacy rights. jihadist militancy. But it is intolerable. by the idea of a separate legal code that strengthens or weakens the penalties for criminal behaviour imposed on all citizens. that radical Shariah adherents promote their vision of an illiberal legal code that violates the most fundamental liberties of citizens. and will be a revelation to all. according to the authors. The value of this compendium.islamicpluralism. the backing of the most authoritative Muslim juristic figures. female genital mutilation.eu . moreover. however. F. some Shariah laws are purely personal to Muslims.

citizens retain the freedom – albeit within certain limits – to pursue their own lifestyle and to decide for themselves how they conduct their relationships with each other and with the government. seeks to impose religious laws before secular ones and tries to create enclaves in which that system rather than government authority prevails.” – Soheib Bencheikh. then they have overstepped the mark and are damaging the democratic legal order. cited in Case Study: Spain CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www.Five Principles For Study of Shariah in Western Europe LEGALITY: “If [a Muslim] has given [a non-Muslim government] a commitment – even if indirectly (as is implied in the immigration documents) – to abide by the laws of that country. it is necessary for him to fulfill his commitment. But to reproduce the bilateral scheme that serves the Catholic Church does not take into account the plural and heterogeneous reality of Islam. a standard Shia Shariah manual. and alone in being capable of managing the whole of human society. Rector of the Grand Mosque of Paris. But if their withdrawal from society starts to endanger basic rights and freedoms of others. based on the writings of the Iraqi Ayatollah Ali Sistani *** CONSENSUS: “The way of Islam states that the believer must submit to the general laws [in a country of residence]… French Muslims must take account of their presence in a nonMuslim context. as pluralistic as it is. in their quasi-totality. because of a lack of access to religious education… only an archaic version of Islamic law has become accessible to all… today human rights. and laïcité are the most consensual principles. incitement and sowing hatred. certain forms of intolerant isolationism do represent a particular threat: exclusivism in respect of one’s own group and parallelism. as cited in Case Study: The Netherlands *** EDUCATION: “The Muslims of France. even more if the object is to recentralise the management of religious policy.” – Dr.” – A Code of Practice for Muslims in the West. cited in Case Study: France *** PLURALISM: “To force the artificial creation of a religious actor that unifies Islam seems a priori easier for the State. religious freedom. cited in Case Study: France *** CIVILITY: “In a democratic society.islamicpluralism.” – Àlex Seglers Gómez-Quintero. Dalil Boubakeur. Parallelism does not recognise the authority of government.” – The Dutch Intelligence Service AIVD. “In this light. Mufti of Marseilles. have a limited comprehension of their religion. Exclusivism is expressed through discrimination.eu iii .

and NMR CIE – Comisión Islámica de España (Islamic Commission of Spain). currently undergoing reorganisation CMO – Contactorgaan Moslims en Overheid (Contact Body for Muslims and Government). official Muslim liaison body with Spanish government. q. “soft fundamentalist” party in Turkey Alevilik or Alevis – Turkish and Kurdish heterodox Muslim group. alternative Dutch Muslim organisation including Alevis. as well as Bosnia-Hercegovina and Turkey FEERI – Federación Española de las Entidades Religiosas Islámicas (Spanish Federation of Islamic Religious Bodies). fundamentalist body involved in the foundation of ECFR FNMF – Fédération nationale des musulmans de France (National Federation of Muslims of France). non-governmental liaison body with official authorities CGI – Contact Groep Islam (Contact Group Islam). a supporter of “parallel Shariah. but not a mahdi AIVD – Algemene Inlichtingen – en Veiligheidsdienst (General Intelligence and Security Service). Dutch government body Ahmadiyyat or Ahmadis – Community of dissident Muslims. with offices in Germany and Spain. alternative body. spiritually affiliated with Qadiri Sufis Berbers/Amazigh – Indigenous.v. Ahmadis. and traditional Turkish and Kurdish spiritual practices AMSUK – Association of Muslim Schools in the UK Barelvis – Sunni Muslims. conservative but neither takfiri.. with large but poorly-organised presence in the Netherlands. as well as the Afghan Taliban Deutsche-Islam Konferenz (German Conference on Islam). produced Tabligh-i-Jamaat (TJ). Wahhabi-influenced small organisation active in media. known as Lahoris. (TurkishIslamic Union for Religious Affairs). non-Arab Muslim community in North Africa. q. Diyanet – State Islamic Administration of the Republic of Turkey ECFR – European Council for Fatawa and Research. fundamentalist Shariah body led by Yusuf Al-Qaradawi EMN – European Muslim Network. its Pakistani branch became jihadist and takfiri. claims a Sufi orientation CSC – Centre for Social Cohesion. believe in the appearance of the Muslim messiah or mahdi in 19th century India. and represented in CIE FEME – Federación Musulmana de España (Muslim Federation of Spain). extraterrorial Turkish Sunni authority in Germany and the Netherlands. Brussels-based “thinktank” associated with Tariq Ramadan. transnational body of authentically moderate Muslims. Trends and Acronyms ACVZ – Adviescommissie voor Vreemdelingenzaken (Advisory Commission on Aliens Affairs).eu . TürkischIslamische Verein der Anstalt für Religion e V. and Spain BMF – British Muslim Forum. established in 2006 with 15 Muslim members and 15 government representatives DİTİB – Diyanet İşleri Türk-İslam Birliği.v. Dutch government agency AKP – AKPartisi (Justice and Development Party). France.v. UK legal institution Deobandism – Sunni-aligned movement founded in 19th century British India. believes the founder was a reformer. representation pending in reorganised CIE FIOE – Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe. Deobandi-oriented. Saudi Arabia. as Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835-1908). organisation influenced by Morocco. Moroccanaligned group iv CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. known as Qadianis.islamicpluralism. branch of Diyanet.Glossary of Main Organisations.” and with general fundamentalist Islamic tendencies EMU – European Muslim Union. UK think-tank CDA – Christen Democratisch Appèl (Christian Democratic Appeal). MIB. q. combining Shia and Sufi doctrines. one faction. Originally peaceful and spiritual. nor jihadist. Dutch conservative party CFCM – Conseil français du culte musulman (French Council of the Muslim Faith). although fundamentalist. and the MB. pro-Shariah Dutch Muslim organisation CPS – Crown Prosecution Service. while a second faction.

banned in Germany ISOOK – Islamic Foundation for Education and Propagation of Knowledge (as known by its Dutch initials).” extremist Turkish entity based in Köln. Dr. and Spain MCB – Muslim Council of Britain. Wahhabi centre in Tilburg. known by its French initials). VIK. Dalil Boubakeur GSPC – Al-Jamaa as-Salafiyya li Da’wa wa’l Qital (Salafi Group for Calling to Religion and Combat. fundamentalist group active in higher educational institutions in Britain FMU – Forced Marriage Unit.eu v . including DİTİB. takfiri Islamist movement founded in Egypt by Hassan al-Banna (1910-1949). IGMG. fundamentalist Turkish Sunni group active in Germany and the Netherlands. HT) – Conspiratorial revolutionary Islamist group active in Arab countries. Algerian-based terrorist group. and other Muslim lands. official Dutch anti-terrorism agency NIO – Nederlandse Islamitische Omroep (Dutch Islamic Broadcast Organisation). the Netherlands. or Milli Goruş Islamic Community. MAB – Muslim Association of Britain. retitled “AlQaida in the Islamic Maghreb” Hatun und Can – German relief organisation founded in the aftermath of the notorious so-called “honour” murder of Hatun Sürücü in Berlin in 2005 Hizb-ut-Tahrir (Party of Liberation. Dutch socialdemocratic party Regents Park Mosque Shariah Council – Main London radical Shariah body RER – Registro de Entidades Religiosas (Registry of Religious Entities). UK government agency responsible for preventing forced marriages GMP – Mosquée de Paris (Grand Mosque of Paris). the Netherlands Islamic Shariah Council – Shariah body in Leyton. liaison body launched in 2007.islamicpluralism. member of CGI Milli Goruş (National Vision). fundamentalist organisation that claims a leading role as a Muslim interlocutor with the UK authorities. umbrella group for the NMO broadcast network “Ni Putes Ni Soumises” (“Neither Whores Nor Submissives”) – French group protesting abuse of Muslim women PP – Partido Popular (People’s Party) – Spanish conservative party PSOE – Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party) – Social democratic party PvdA – Partij van der Arbeid (Labor Party). small fundamentalist group MAT – Muslim Arbitration Tribunal. Germany KRM – Koordinationsrat der Muslime (Coordination Council of Muslims in Germany). now influential throughout the Arab world. Iranian-funded Shia Imam Ali Mosque in Hamburg Kalifatstaat (Caliphate State) – “Kaplan conspiracy. Milli Goruş (operating through an Islamrat or Islam Council). Islamitische Gemeinschaft Milli Goruş. as well as in such European countries as Britain. leading French mosque headed by moderate rector. France.FOSIS – Federation of Students Islamic Societies. extraterritorial Moroccan clerical authority in the Netherlands. broadcast service affiliated with CGI NMR – Nederlandse Moslim Raad (Netherlands Muslim Council). British Shariah network MB – Muslim Brotherhood. and ZMD. Central Asia. UK IZH – Islamische Zentrum Hamburg. broadcast service affiliated with CMO NMO – Nederlandse Moslim Omroep (Dutch Muslim Broadcasting Service). official institution established to improve standards among British imams Al-Muhajiroun (The Migrants) – Small radical Islamist group active in Britain and supporting terrorism Muslim Law (Shariah) Council UK – Fundamentalist Shariah tribunal NCTB – Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestijding (National Coordinator for Investigation of Terrorism). associated with ECFR MINAB – Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board.vv. qq. but represents a minority of mosques MIB – Marokkaanse Imam Bond (Moroccan Imams’ Union). Spanish government administration for religious groups CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www.

official research and advisory body Women Living Under Muslim Laws – UK-based feminist group ZMD – Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland (Central Council of German Muslims).. q.RMMN – Raad van Marokkaanse Moskeeorganisaties Nederland (Council of Moroccan Mosque Organisations in the Netherlands). which has financed its global expansion and support for Deobandis and the MB. or Companions and Successors of the Prophet Muhammad. e. Takfir wal Hijra (Religious Purge and Migration) – Wahhabi group that included Mohammed Bouyeri. q. and who denounced Sufism and other spiritual practices. Sufi-oriented. takfiri movement founded in Arabia in the 18th century and now established as the state form of Islam in the kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Moroccan-oriented member of CMO VVD – Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy).islamicpluralism. in that the Wahhabis are takfiri and pursue violence against non-fundamentalist Muslims and non-Muslims. fundamentalist-oriented group VIK – Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren (Union of Islamic Cultural Centres).e. France. Moroccan-based member of CMO UMP – Union pour une Mouvement Populaire (Union for a Popular Movement). Moroccan-oriented offshoot of FNMF “Roubaix gang” – Terrorist criminal conspiracy linked to Al-Qaida. declare those not following their interpretation to be guilty of kufr or disbelief.e. aligned with the radical Deobandi religious interpretation. active in France Salafis – 19th century modernist and reforming Muslims who claimed to emulate the aslaf. occasionally misrepresented or mislabeled as Salafis WRR – Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid (Dutch Scientific Council for Government Policy). member of CGI RMF – Rassemblement des musulmans de France (Rally of Muslims of France). i. reputedly Saudi-influenced organisation vi CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. Shia Muslims do not practise takfir on the basis of disagreement or differences in religious practise TJ – Tabligh-i-Jamaat (Appeal of the Community). killer of the Dutch media personality Theo Van Gogh in 2004 Takfiri – Muslims who practice takfir.v. Deobandis. moderate Muslim community group SOS – Supporters of Shariah.. The term is now assumed by or applied to Wahhabis. who also claim to emulate the original Muslims – their designation as Salafis is.g. and active in numerous Muslim and nonMuslim countries. while the 19th century Salafis were neither takfiri nor violent SHO – Samenwerkende Hulporganisaties (Cooperative of Relief Organisations) – Dutch charity group SMN – Samenwerkingsverband van Marokkanen in Nederland (Cooperative Union of Moroccans in the Netherlands).v. Wahhabis. fundamentalist Spanish Muslim organisation. French centrist political party led by Nicolas Sarkozy Union of Muslim Organisations of the UK and Ireland – Small pro-Shariah group UOIF – Union des organisations islamiques de France (Union of Islamic Organisations in France). popularly known as Süleymancilar. adherents of Wahhabism. represented in CIE UMMON – Unie voor Marokkaanse Moslim Organisaties in Nederland (Union for Moroccan Muslim Organisations in the Netherlands). however. prominent in UK UCIDE – Unión de Comunidades Islámicas de España (Union of Islamic Communities of Spain). i. Dutch conservative party Wahhabism – Fundamentalist. anti-secularist movement active in Turkey and the Turkish diaspora in Germany and the Netherlands VIN – Vereniging Imams Nederland (Imams’ Association of the Netherlands). influential Islamist movement founded in India in the 1920s. jihadist movement founded in Britain by Egyptian-born radical preacher Abu Hamza (Hamza Al-Masri) Tabligh ud-Dawa (Appeal and Call to Religion) mosque – Facility in Marseille. seriously incorrect. MB. and therefore apostates from Islam.eu . affiliated with Tabligh-iJamaat.

and Indonesia. operates in more than 25 countries. CIP General Studies Director Kamal Hasani. Writing and editing was carried out by CIP Executive Director Schwartz. and. Pakistan. The following monograph is the product of this grant. CIP German Director Veli Sirin. It includes believers in both Sunni and Shia interpretations of Islam. Sweden. It is therefore authentically representative of the diversity of moderate Muslim opinion. Schwartz has also published The Other Islam: Sufism and the Road to Global Harmony. a leading figure in global Sunni Islam. In 2007.CIP 1.islamicpluralism. the Netherlands. and CIP UK Research Director Daut Dauti. As of 2009. The Two Faces of Islam: Saudi Fundamentalism and Its Role in Terrorism. Germany. in Western Europe.S. CIP and its Role Investigating Shariah in the West The Centre for Islamic Pluralism (CIP) is an international network of moderate Muslim religious scholars. as well as a heterodox Sufi. MD. and participants in the spiritual tradition of Sufism. Uzbekistan. Israel (including the Israeli Arab community). Malaysia. France. with research mainly coordinated by CIP International Director Irfan Al-Alawi. India. and Spain. covering the UK. and a secular Muslim. and community leaders. in the Balkans. CIP has correspondents and contacts with other groups in Canada. It was established in 2004 by the American writer Stephen Suleyman Schwartz. Germany. CIP received a grant to study the penetration of Shariah or agitation for adoption of Islamic law. and Bangladesh. UK.. a physician working in New York. India. on Islamist ideology in UK medical training.eu 1 . Qanta Ahmed. Singapore. Ireland. contributed the supplement to Case Study: Britain. Turkey and the Kurdish lands. The CIP team comprises fully qualified Sunni and Shia experts on Shariah. who became Muslim in 1997 and is the author of a bestselling study of Saudi-financed Islamic fundamentalism (Wahhabism). the Balkan branch operates in that region. and was widely read and translated in the Muslim world. journalists and authors. CIP maintains full-time websites and activities in the U. France. The UK branch of CIP has responsibility for British Islam as well as for Saudi Arabia and the Arab countries in general. The book was the first exposé of the Saudi role in the origins of Al-Qaida to be published in the West. Iraq. Pakistan. the Netherlands. Kazakhstan. the German branch monitors Germany. with correspondents. China. Russia. CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. a heterodox Shia.

We have analysed the effect of Shariah agitation on family behavior and school participation as described by clerics. governing Muslim affairs. and an innovation. within the legal structures of Western. Shariah in Islam has functioned historically through schools of Islamic law. Radical Shariah agitators call for marriage and related issues to be subject to religious jurisdiction.islamicpluralism. and other moderate Muslim representatives as well as in Muslim and nonMuslim media. community leaders. these areas are vulnerable to targeting by Shariah adherents for ideological penetration and manipulation. 2 (1) Family/schooling Because religious law on marriage and divorce. non-Muslim countries. such as rules for prayer. Much of the corpus of radical Shariah is now drawn from recent fatwas. other new phenomena have emerged among Muslims in the West.1 But in the Islamic world and in the West. or madhahib. traditional Shariah has an opposing counterpart in the form of radical Shariah.eu .3 The monograph includes case studies assessing the impact of Shariah agitation in each of five countries.2 This study elucidates the distinction between the two contrasting variants. Each of the case studies is structured around four key areas.” developed as a proposed separate juristic canon. and for Muslim children to be educated only in Islamic schools. and school choice. however. charity. Methodology This survey begins with basic definitions of Shariah and explanation of the origins and nature of the Shariah controversy in Western Europe.” in which radical Shariah appears in clandestine. CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. including review of the Shariah textual sources employed in Western Europe. which we exempt from analysis in that they almost never involve contradiction with or other intrusion into relations between Muslims and non-Muslims. have long been accepted as unthreatening to Western societies. Shariah encompasses strictly personal religious-ritual aspects. male circumcision. fasting. and empirically observed the following: Are private Shariah-oriented elementary and secondary schools growing in number? Have demands for introduction of Islamist curricula in state schools. some of them posted on websites. and burial. ablutions. These include “shadow Shariah. In addition. Traditional Shariah is based on a recognised canon. received support from parents and students? Do young people refrain from dating or other inter-gender social contact without the presence of a chaperone? Do parents express dissatisfaction with inter-gender arrangements in state schools? Has opposition to social contact and friendship with non-Muslims increased among Muslim youth and Muslims in general? We more crucially asked how much those who claim to support Shariah in the UK and elsewhere really know about Shariah. or informal manner among Muslim immigrants and their descendants in the West.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 2. illegal. or whether it is simply a trope expressing political discontent or youth rebellion. which we designate as “parallel Shariah. diet. such as proposed by the Muslim Council of Britain and discussed in Germany and other countries. We have discussed with our interlocutors. some significant elements of which have been translated and published in English.

We analysed the statements of some academics and leading government officials about past responses and perspectives on future response to radical Shariah agitation. and the role of radical Islam in Western European prisons. and related bodies. domestic violence complaints. we have inquired into the roles of non-Muslim courts.“Parallel” Shariah CIP (2) Institutionalisation of Shariah by nonMuslim governments (“Parallel Shariah”) The outstanding goal of the radical Shariah offensive in the West is that “parallel Shariah” be accorded official legal standing. leading to general jurisdiction over Muslims. We have documented specific phenomena and nonMuslim and Muslim public reaction to them. We have examined and analysed the Islamic source materials used to develop this view. We have investigated how extensively each country has permitted “parallel” and “shadow” Shariah institutions to function openly or in a clandestine manner. secular Muslims. We have analysed the effects of Shariah agitation on established Western legal theory as reflected in whether Shariah adherents demand and may have obtained enforcement of Shariah judgments by non-Muslim legal systems. women’s groups. as well as opinions by radical Shariah groups and non-Muslim defenders of the establishment of Shariah jurisdiction over Muslims in Western countries. since Muslim clerics in Western Europe are often foreign. and whether recourse to Shariah authorities or courts has risen or declined in ordinary divorce cases. and vice versa? • Do families more frequently consult religious leaders or submit queries to Shariah websites before making decisions? • Is voluntary community mediation based on Islamic law a workable concept. Turkish. and whether its impact is reflected more in attitudes than in functional activities. Moroccan and other statesponsored religious structures in the administration of mosques and community institutions. As a complement to these inquiries. protective agencies. in which guarantees of fair treatment can be assured? • How can Western-trained and resident Muslim non-Shariah legal professionals 3 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. the evolution of which is recounted in various places in the survey. moderates. and on that basis have evaluated the success of advocacy for “parallel Shariah” in Western European legal systems. In all four general areas of inquiry. law enforcement.eu . and cases of female genital mutilation (FGM). we inquired into the role of Islamist ideology in inciting and justifying such behavior. (4) Approach to Women We inquired extensively into victimisation of Muslim women under the pretext of Shariah in Western Europe.islamicpluralism. we have examined the extent to which the radical Shariah effort in the West is mainly agitation. and some have been trained in radical Shariah attitudes. counseling services. We have examined attitudes toward “Shariah-based community mediation services” as a pretext for “parallel Shariah. Supplemental sections discuss the religious justifications provided for intrusion of radical Shariah concepts in Western medical training and “Islamic finance” in the West. so-called “honour” murder. (3) Criminal aspects Because radical Shariah advocates teach that Muslims can disregard Western law.” We have also inquired into the influence of Saudi. The major summary questions to be drawn from discussions of Shariah in Western Europe are: • How do Shariah proponents advance radical ideology and/or serve as cover for terrorist conspiracies? • How do proponents of radical or “parallel Shariah” contend with objections to their activities by women. and traditionalists. alongside common law in the West. the incidence of forced marriage or divorce.

Yusuf Talal Ali. n. An Albanian edition of the second collection was issued by the fundamentalistdominated Islamic Community of Macedonia. Connectum. 1992. 2003. tr.org/. Recueil de fatwas. Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee. Although it denounces terrorism. regularly-updated editions of this volume. Burhan al-Din. and Syed Shukry. aside from strictly personal religious matters. or. Aisha Bewley. and Al-Farghani Al-Marghinani. and two Hanafi volumes: Qazi Thanaa Ullah. with no recent history of colonialism in the Muslim world. Germany. An introductory point should be understood about the sociology of recent immigrant Muslims in Western Europe. Note: fatwas (fatawa) are not limited to condemnations or other punitive sentences: they are religious opinions that can address any topic under Shariah jurisdiction. New Delhi. Moinuddin Siddiqui. 3 “Shadow Shariah” is mainly reported in Western media. Md. NOTES 1 Five volumes of traditional Shariah may be consulted: Hadi. from diet to burial. Scotland. A Code of Practice for Muslims in the West. at the time of this survey. Shkup. 1999 (Jafari Shia). and why? CIP hopes to produce. two collections of fatwas issued by the European Council for Fatawa and Research (ECFR). n. Ibn Naqib.p. Indianapolis. Britain. Furkan ISM.. by Bashkim Aliu.islamic-sharia. France. Éd. American Trust Publications. a common geographical position with the Muslim lands in the Mediterranean.. Présentation [by] Yusuf AlQardawi. These issues are present but much less prominent in the Netherlands and Spain. at least. Amal Press. has almost no collective memory of a German presence among Muslims. tr. 1994 (Shafi’i – Arab and Southeast Asian Sunni regions). 2 vols. Série no. 4 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. Reliance of the Traveller. rev. Tr. Sarajevo. Préface et commentaires [by] Tariq Ramadan. Fatwas are advisory for Sunni Muslims but binding for Shias.islamicpluralism. and in the latter two cases. Another important website is www. Lyon. Al-Muwatta. The Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam.eu . The first ECFR collection was issued in French as Conseil europeén des fatwas et de la recherche. Ahmad. A Bosnian edition includes both of the two collections: Fetve Islamskog Vijeća. Madinah Press. Kitab Bhavan. Imam Ali Foundation.d. tr. Malik. and Spain are countries where immigration patterns have been strongly influenced by colonial histories in the Muslim world. rhetoric. Bristol. M. annually or biennially. Abdul [based on the work of Ayatollah Ali Sistani].CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 be assisted to form a professional lobby? • Can Shariah be modernised to function in better harmony with Western law? • Does Shariah in any form. tr. Nuh Keller. 2004 (Maliki – North and West African Sunni). Amana Publications. Yusuf. 2006. Ibn Anas. Sayyid Muhammad Rizvi. tr.. Al-Hidayah (The Guidance). tr. by Dr. tr. Intra-Islamic disputes in Britain and France may frequently reflect attitudes. Sources on “parallel Shariah “ include. 1. by Kamal El-Helbawy. 2 The main printed source on radical Shariah is AlQaradawi.. any Muslim will recognise its radicalism from its selection of authorities and opinions. Tawhid.com. the Netherlands. Enes Ljevaković.e-cfr. academic and related commentaries on this controversy are discussed and cited herein. The second ECFR collection has been published in English online at www. about colonial legacies and the past or present policies of the host countries in Muslim countries. 2006. Beltsville. Perhaps the most popular in English is www. 2006 and 2008 (Balkans/Turkey/Central Asia/Pakistan/Indian Sunni). Inverness. The number of radical Shariah websites is prodigious. titled Akademia Evropiane për Fetva dhe Studime.org. M. In addition. The Essential Hanafi Handbook of Fiqh. have a place in Western Muslim life? • How have government or other official responses succeeded or failed. ed.fatwa-online.

criminal justice. to the extent possible. Jurists also drew on consensus among the scholars. Traditional Shariah In the first seven centuries of Islamic history. and India. Shariah may function in areas of essential ritual in a manner that. Shariah denotes belief in the transcendental origins to which people were called by the divine prophets. but radical and even revolutionary. it is sometimes used instead of “faith. the hadith and the lives of the Prophet and his Companions. It is also the most influential of the several schools of legal thought in the Muslim world today. or body of Islamic belief. In this definition. and war. or riba). Islam regulates certain financial and business transactions (banning income derived from loaning money to obtain interest. and no differences or disagreements are recognised among prophets.4 These are: The oldest. Shariah. and the obligatory. including prayer and its ablutions. a) traditional and b) Islamist ideological.” so that we find references in Islamic sources to Shari’at-ul Islam or Shari’at-ul Musa. Shariah was treated as a “universal” legal standard. it represents a synonym of the Islamic (Arabic) word for faith (din). Islam promulgates Shariah as law on ritual and life matters involving the basic Muslim obligations. Afghanistan. Moses (Musa). 5 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. and elements of family law. the permitted.) and is the most tolerant of differing opinions. Traditional Shariah includes five main schools of interpretation. as well as inheritance. should not interfere with the rights of non-Muslims. dominating Turkey. Abraham (Ibrahim). and the Shariah of the Prophet of Islam. Further. other moral issues.eu .” According to Qur’an and the Sunnah. But Shariah in Islamic countries has developed in two directions. the new conception of “parallel Shariah” in even its apparently least intrusive elements may become disruptive of Western society. Extreme Islamist ideology is neither traditional nor conservative. Central Asia and Chinese Turkestan. rested on the fundamental texts of Islam: Qur’an. based on analogy (qiyas) with a similar or parallel example of human conduct in Qur’an or the hadith. Traditional Shariah today is “personal. Hanafi school of Sunni jurisprudence was created by Abu Hanifah (699765 C. In the general meaning. and such other matters of sacred observance as circumcision of males and burial. marriage and divorce. In that context. Abu Hanifah sought to derive and codify rulings based on divine law. Legal arguments between scholars. the Balkans. before a judge (qadi) or in obtaining fatwas as to what is permitted and what is prohibited. Shariah Defined Shariah is typically defined as Islamic religious law. to all aspects of life. Further. Shariah Defined CIP 3. the provision of charity. referring to the Islamic faith or the Jewish faith. Considered in this way. as a term.islamicpluralism. cleanliness and personal hygiene (especially among Shia Muslims). These were supplemented by new rules.E. the Creator has revealed various “Shariahs. five “Shariahs” have been made known: those of Noah (Nuh in Islam). Through the history of monotheistic religion. regarding five categories of human action: the forbidden. the disapproved or disliked. the Sunnah or voluntarily virtuous. there is but one monotheistic religion.3. Muhammad. in principle. diet and fasting.” and limited to religious observance by Muslims. and was applied. has two meanings: general and particular. however. Jesus (Isa). Pakistan.


A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009

Three other schools emerged in the generations following Abu Hanifah that also became standard in Sunni Islam and are considered of equal validity. Each has its own methodological emphasis. Malikis are named for Malik ibn Anas, a resident of Medina, the ideal city as organised by the Prophet Muhammad, and are centred on original Medinite customary and legal practices. This tradition struck deep roots in Muslim Spain and in North and West Africa, where it remains the most important Islamic legal school. Shafi’is, who follow Muhammad ibn alShafi’i, based their judgments on the hadith as well as the use of analogy. The founder of this tradition began as a student of Malik Ibn Anas. Its area of influence presently includes Egypt, the Arab states of the Middle East (except the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf), Sunni Kurds, and Muslims in the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia. Hanbalis are inspired by Ahmad ibn Hanbal, a pioneer of fundamentalist theology in Islam. His school stressed the use of authentic hadith in preference to analogy. It now dominates the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf states. Most Shias follow another school, the Jafaris. This form of jurisprudence includes decision-making based on ijtihad, or individual, inspired theological reasoning by recognised authorities. Ijtihad is seldom understood by Westerners and is often equated by them with individual reasoning in general. From Universal to Personal Shariah With the rise of the Turkic and Mongol Muslim empires in the 13th century, the status of Shariah changed in Islam. Shariah ceased to be “universal”. The Turks and Mongols accepted Islam and the authority of Shariah in ritual issues such as prayer, ablutions, diet, fasting, charity, male circumcision, and burial. But they refused to give up their own systems of customary law, which had evolved in Central Asia over millennia. The Ottoman sultan Suleyman the Magnificent (14941566) promulgated a legal code separate from Shariah, based on Turkish customary law, and 6

which removed criminal and other state administrative affairs from religious jurisdiction. For this reason, he is known to Muslims as Suleyman Kanuni or Suleyman the Lawgiver. This Ottoman “secular law” existed in conjunction with Shariah, although Ottoman Muslim clerics offered the argument that the secular laws were part of Shariah. In the Islamic discourse after the disappearance of the Baghdad caliphate (khilafah) in 1258, all law, including non-Islamic law, is considered Shariah, reflecting a variant of the view on multiple “Shariahs” stated at the commencement of this section, and of which Islamic Shariah is one, sacred expression. Because the Ottoman state was the most powerful Muslim state in history, traditional Shariah came to be identified with such a “diversity of law.” That is the basis of traditional Shariah today: a Shariah applied to the personal practice of religious observance, family issues, and finance, but not to crime or governance. The German academic Mathias Rohe (University of Nürnberg), in writing on Shariah in Europe, has summarised this relationship as follows: “Technically, there are two current definitions remarkably differing from each other and often causing misunderstanding in public discussion. In a broader sense, shari’a refers to any kind of religious and legal rule prescribed by Islam. This includes rules concerning the duties of worship or alms-giving as well as those regulating contract, family, or penal law. Most of the non-Muslims in Europe as well as many Muslims[,] especially [of] Turkish origin would understand the term shari’a in a narrower sense, confining it to the legal rules regulating personal status, family and inheritance and corporal punishment. Whereas the observation of rules concerning prayer, fasting etc. usually does not cause any problems, the application of the latter would cause serious conflicts in Europe.”5 For this reason, as well as because of the historical impact of European, Soviet, and even, in the Philippines, American colonial rule, every Muslim society in the world, except Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Sudan, today mainly relegates Shariah to religious observance and limited family affairs,



‘Personal’ Shariah


while maintaining commercial, civil, and criminal codes based on non-Muslim law. (Iran has, surprisingly, retained aspects of European law.) Turkey recognises only secular law, while the situations of many ex-Communist Muslim countries are unclear, and merit a more thorough investigation. Personal Shariah As an example of exclusively personal Shariah, all Muslims are forbidden to consume alcohol or use items containing pork and its byproducts such as gelatin or pigskin. Shia Muslims are also forbidden to eat most shellfish and some other fish, and are commanded to follow more stringent rules than Sunnis in areas of individual cleanliness or “contamination”. Shariah consultations among clerics govern what consumer goods the observant Muslim is permitted to purchase, serve to another, consume or drink, and wear (for example, a pigskin belt, which is prohibited). These are entirely individual matters in every society in the world. Muslims are seldom at risk of violating their personal commitment in these matters by participating in Western society – one negative example, however, is that of pork in food served to Muslim soldiers in non-Muslim military forces or to Muslim inmates in prisons. Shariah rules for Muslim prayer are diverse according to local standards as determined by the five most-widely recognised and mainly geographical juristic interpretations, but do not extend beyond the prayer space in mosques and homes. Shariah governs other religious customs that are not normally the subject of public law in the West – ablutions, diet, fasting, charity, male circumcision, and burial. Non-Muslims need not, in most cases, be concerned about clerical supervision of the slaughtering of meat. In this limited sense, personal Shariah already functions on a voluntary basis wherever Muslims live in the West, and poses no threat to Western legal systems. Nevertheless, an increasing trend toward accommodation of Muslim prayer in Western public facilities, especially schools and

administrative buildings, may also inject into such areas Shariah-based gender separation during prayer, as well as head scarves (hijab), which violate standards of religious non-interference in public education in France (for all girls and women) and Germany (for teachers only). Shariah-compliant funeral services prescribe washing of bodies, time limits on burial of 48 hours after death, and other such details. These last issues are essentially irrelevant to nonMuslims, although the practice of local nonMuslim medical examiners in declining to release cadavers during weekends, for interment within the prescribed 48-hour period has, as we learned, occasioned complaints in Britain. Muslims are forbidden from loaning or investing money with the intent of earning interest (riba), and many leading banks and investment houses in the West have long supported Shariah advisory boards to serve Muslim clients in a way compliant with this ban. Shariah-based investment services do not affect the lives of nonMuslims. Nevertheless, the ban on income derived from interest is a factor for institutional and legal separation of Muslims from their non-Muslim neighbors, so that the debate over interest, and the ideological origin of so-called “Islamic finance” in the West are properly within the purview of this study and are examined herein. The Main Contested Area Within Traditional Shariah: Family Law Traditional Shariah includes areas of controversy and tension, notwithstanding its personal character, because the personal includes the familial. Traditional Shariah is ambiguous regarding family matters, in that marriage, sexual relations, divorce, and remarriage are generally seen by Shariah traditionalists as determined by religious law rather than civil or customary law. Laws against polygamy, which is permitted in Islam, are generally obeyed by traditional Muslims living in non-Muslim countries, and polygamy is increasingly rare in Muslim societies. But many Muslims in the West may decline 7




A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009

Western marriage, or be prevented by Western law, as explained in the case studies, from turning to Western courts regarding divorce and inheritance. Traditional Shariah upholds women’s rights de jure in marriage, divorce, inheritance, and related affairs, and amelioration of injustices to women may, ideally, be accomplished in Muslim countries as well as in the West by recourse to different legal and other public fora, both religious and secular. But certain abuses against women remain a significant issue in many, but not all, Muslim cultures. For example, so-called “honour” murders, forced or arranged marriages, forced divorce between members of “inappropriate tribes,” and female genital mutilation (FGM) are unknown among Bosnian Muslims, who are highly European, and FGM in particular is mainly limited to Arab and African countries, with the noteworthy exception of Kurdistan. Still, traditional Shariah in the broader Muslim world is contradictory on the question of arranged or nonconsensual marriages, recommending against marriage without the consent of the bride, but lacking clear guarantees of a woman’s own choice. Contemporary Shariah texts are increasingly problematical on such issues as socalled “honour” murder and FGM. Shariah traditionalists in countries afflicted by so-called “honour” murder and FGM consider these to be tribal customs unrelated to or opposed by religious law. The European Parliament issued a report on so-called “honour” murder in 2007 6 pointing out, “Honour killing is often mistakenly believed to be an Islamic practice or a practise condoned by Islam since it often occurs in Muslim-majority societies. In actual fact honour killing is forbidden in Islam and there is no mention of this practise in the Qur’an or in the Hadiths. There is little evidence of the practice in Muslim-majority countries such as Indonesia or Malaysia”. Female genital mutilation (FGM) is a pre-Islamic practise. While we agree that abuse of women and children under colour of alleged Shariah cannot be ascribed to Islamic religious inspiration per se, we believe that the example of Saudi Arabia, which considers itself the leader of the Muslim world and where 8

so-called “honour” crime, FGM, forced marriage, forced divorce, and related customs are institutionalised, shows that their adoption in Islamic cultures, and the complicity of Muslim religious leaders in enabling them by failing to oppose them or assist victims, must be recognised. Forced marriage has mainly disappeared among the Islamic elites of the big cities of Pakistan, Turkey, and North Africa, which are the main places of origin of Muslim immigrants to Western Europe, and is viewed as a rural custom common in the poor countries and districts of South Asia, Turkey, Morocco, Algeria, and the Sub-Saharan lands. But underdeveloped regions are precisely those that often produce the largest numbers of immigrants to the West. In its own way, Wahhabi Saudi Arabia, where ultramodern cities and nomadic customs exist side-by-side, and which exports ideology and finance more than people, is an urban environment with rural values, which is one of the reasons practices inimical to women are established there. FGM is considered obligatory by adherents of Shafi’i Shariah, including many Arabs as well as Sunni Kurds, but is absent from the Shafi’i areas of the Indian Ocean and is rare or banned in Southeast Asia (e.g. it is illegal in Indonesia). It is seen as virtuous but not required by Hanbalis, and as a custom acceptable according to the desire of the husband by Hanafis. It is an implied but not a specified practice in Maliki Shariah.7 FGM is generally banned in Shia Islam. Surgeons conducting FGM reversal are now active in some countries. Traditional Shariah calls for personal modesty in men and women alike but does not demand the imposition of extreme body covering or other radical practices on women. The standing of all forms of family Shariah is presently in question in Muslim as well as non-Muslim societies. Shariah is not an immutable legal standard. How moderate and traditional Muslims will address the legal vulnerabilities of Muslim women is unpredictable. Traditional Shariah is, we emphasise, based on pluralistic debate among experts,



and their communities. In a striking expression of the principle of acceptance of Western law by traditional Muslim immigrants. jihad or religiously-commanded armed struggle can only be summoned by a recognised.8 This concept was restated by Rohe as follows: “with respect to the legal rules of shari’a it was broadly accepted since the Middle Ages that they cannot be applied outside ‘Islamic’ territory and that Muslims are obliged to either respect the law of the land or to leave the country and to return to countries ruled by Muslims… [this] obliges Muslims not to break the law of the land as an equivalent for being granted personal security and protection by the state of residence”. “all law is Shariah”. The aim of this established guidance was to assure the security of individual Muslims. and voted (and stood as candidates and been elected) in local balloting. a marja or authoritative juristic figure Iraqi Shias are required to follow. joined Western political parties. For example. Ottoman secular laws. But Sunni Kurdish communities. among Muslim countries. although recent theorists of “parallel Shariah” have defined “setting a good example” primarily in terms of Islamic da’wa or missionization. states “If [a Muslim] has given [a non-Muslim government] a commitment – even if indirectly (as is implied in the immigration documents) – to abide by the laws of that country. A Code of Practice for Muslims in the West. as well as recognition that. global emir. radical Shariah. based on the writings of the Iraqi Shia Ayatollah Ali Sistani. that Shariah and secular law have coexisted in Muslim countries for centuries. Today. Reform of traditional Shariah to reinforce women’s rights cannot be excluded. such as is absent from the Muslim world today. the Taliban. under Ottoman imperial rule. and to set a good example to their non-Muslim neighbors. The future of Shariah in general. Adherents of traditional Shariah have typically sought citizenship in Western countries. Muslims who immigrate to nonMuslim countries are enjoined to obey the laws and customs of the land to which they move. are considered to have represented a step away from narrow Shariah. Shariah would not be applied to non-Muslims.islamicpluralism. such prohibitions as the Islamic ban on the sale and consumption of alcohol never applied to non-Muslims. based on customary law. it is not violently adversarial. but in contrast with the situation of radical Shariah and Western law. their families. to emphasise. and allow so-called “honour” murder and FGM. Attitudes toward political participation by Muslims residing in non-Muslim societies are an important marker of traditional vs.eu . and areas geographically near to the latter (particularly Egypt) are influenced by other varieties of customary law. aside from clearly individual religious obligations and personal hygiene. a standard Shia Shariah manual. nor are the leaders of the Palestinian Islamist movement Hamas.9 It is also necessary to stipulate that in traditional Islam. as well as Saudi Arabia. the Horn of Africa. especially if a reformed traditional Shariah is presented as a harmless or even progressive factor within a wider strategy for the introduction of “parallel Shariah” in Western countries. but nor does it necessarily offer a solution. The relationship between traditional Shariah and Western law is similarly complex.Traditional > Personal Shariah CIP grounded in thorough study of authorities and precedents. or jihadist cadres in Pakistan. The intersection of Shariah and customary law is also contradictory. and that some situations fall outside religious law. it is necessary for him to fulfill his commitment”. In addition. only Saudi Arabia attempts to apply its 9 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. traditional Shariah does not permit suicide terrorism or other forms of violence against civilians. is even more difficult to predict than change in the status of Muslim women. Muslim violations of and challenges to common law in Western countries were rare until the rise of radical Shariah ideology at the end of the 20th century. In traditional Islam. A demagogue like Osama bin Laden is not an emir and has no authority to declare jihad. In traditional Shariah. the millet or religious-communal system of representation provided for separate justice systems for Jews and Orthodox Christians. In addition. or “commander of the faithful”.

Sudan (without great success).) Radical Shariah demands a regressive 10 transformation: a “Muslim-ruled state” is insufficient. meeting with male non-relatives in the absence of a family member of the woman as chaperone. rather it involves a dual ideological discourse. in which young Muslims are to be indoctrinated. traditional Shariah exists in countries ruled by Muslims.islamicpluralism.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 interpretation of Shariah to all residents. The problem in the West is less one of radical Shariah in practice. Radical Shariah holds that the West is an area of unbelief and that Muslims living in Western lands cannot obey Western laws but must establish their own Islamic legal standard. forbidding the practise of faiths aside from Islam and imposing severe punishments on non-Muslims who drink alcohol. except where it enables oppression of women. Extremists call vaguely for institutionalisation of radical Shariah in the Muslim countries as well as in the West. Iran. and must be replaced by a theocratic “Islamic state” in which Shariah is the sole legal system. and as explained in the following section. especially among Islamophobes.eu . placing customary or secular law alongside religious law. As previously noted. In the certification of consumer items permitted for use by Muslims. demanding the institution of a “caliphate” or khilafah is typically a metonym for the reestablishment of governance similar to that based exclusively on Shariah prior to the 13th century end of the Baghdad caliphate. claims that Shariah forbids women from driving vehicles. appearing in public without a full and loose body covering. At the same time. or because of agitation by radicals. Visitors to Saudi Arabia in 2007 reported that women were being discouraged from prayer at the Grand Mosque in Mecca and the Prophet’s Mosque in Medina. Malaysia. The spectre of Shariah imposed on nonMuslims has become pervasive in some Western media. but of a separate and discriminatory system to which Muslims in the West would be submitted regardless of their needs and desires. Indonesia and Nigeria. coexisting with Western law. new demands for “parallel Shariah”. and other practices that are considered matters of individual choice in most Muslim societies. and some areas of Pakistan. so long as no effort is made to deny neighbours of observant Muslims the right to consume or purchase whatever they wish. (The old Turco-Mongol customary law is no longer recognised anywhere. the most radical Shariah state. For example. and where Islam is the state religion. Rhetoric employed by Islamist radicals. Shariah should have no bearing on any aspect of non-Muslim life.400 years of Islamic observance. recasting them as bases for extremist agitation. as an indicator of Muslim identity and as a banner for fundamentalism. Impelled by radical Shariah Full body covering CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. In traditional Shariah. but legal canons may be variable. Saudi Arabia. Radical Shariah Radical Shariah is institutionalised in few Muslim countries: chiefly. with Muslim majorities. But the real problem facing both Muslims and nonMuslims is not that of Shariah established against the will of non-Muslims. but radical Shariah supporters claim religious support for broader subordination and mistreatment of women. Traditional and radical Shariah advocates diverge in their attitudes on morals and family law. a genuinely shocking departure from 1. Radical Shariah adherents manipulate issues that should be insignificant to non-Muslims. either because of misguided attempts to accommodate perceived (but inaccurate) Muslim sentiments. women may be vulnerable to abuse. Saudi Arabia. have emerged. further toward the mainstream of Muslim and non-Muslim opinion.

The radicalism of the prominent fundamentalist cleric Yusuf AlQaradawi. calls for abstention from Western public institutions. Moderate Muslims have long observed with dismay that radical Shariah advocates teach Muslim youth in the West that they may seduce or marry and abandon women (Muslim and non-Muslim).S. rent property without fulfilling lease and other responsibilities. Rather. Such attitudes are so common among Saudis visiting the West that late in 2007. as represented by Western canons. and permits flouting of social and personal responsibilities contracted with non-Muslims as well as non-radical Muslims. CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. radical Shariah proponents. is defined by their attitudes toward women and sexuality. Shariah represents a human application of divinely-mandated religious principles. as most recently exposed by UK television. a fundamentalist movement mainly active in Egypt but present in many Muslim countries. the prominent Saudi daily Al-Watan (The Nation) condemned “tourist marriages. attempts to bar the neighbours of Muslims from selling.g. Qatar.10 Radical Indoctrination in Abstention from Western Politics and Exemption From Criminal and Anti-Terror Laws Radical Shariah.eu 11 . borrow money from nonMuslims without repaying it. although considered abhorrent or criminalised as domestic violence and hate speech in Western Europe. and employees. Al-Qaradawi is often alleged to be the religious mentor of the Muslim Brotherhood. contract student loans and default on them. Equally important. In the radical view. Afghanistan. Specific examples of some of these practices may be mainly anecdotal or journalistic. especially those involving women and sexual minorities. and Belgium.Radical Indoctrination CIP proponents. But there is a marked persistence on Shariah websites of inquiries as to whether it is acceptable for a Muslim to defy Western laws. Iraq. secular law may be ignored or violated. who was born in Egypt but has operated from Ireland.” claiming that Saudis had spent the equivalent of USD25 million on these marriages in the previous three years. indoctrinate Muslims in the belief that adherence to Islamic law exempts immigrant Muslims or their offspring from obedience to common and criminal law in Western countries. which shows that incitement to such behaviour in the West is serious and growing. and generally defy the law followed by their neighbours. purchasing.islamicpluralism. however. children.11 Followers of radical Shariah also claim justification to physically degrade women. in Britain. e. cannot supersede a presumed divine law. as applied to Muslims living in the West. marry local women for a summer. Abusive practices. Saudi individuals may go on vacation. but also by their extensive polemics in justification of terrorist activities in Israel. such as voting or other political participation. The core argument for radical Shariah is simple and unsophisticated: the Muslim is told that human law. and also claims exemption from Western laws against suicide terrorism and other acts of violence against civilians. and others like him. embodied in Shariah. without or in defiance of court-ordered custody assignment. and other countries. and then divorce them before returning to the kingdom.. down to such simple matters as traffic offences. commit identity fraud and otherwise steal property. but as long known in Saudi Arabia and the U. to sum up. or even possessing pigs or alcohol are visible in some Western and Asian communities. are openly advocated in radical Shariah discourse. and abduct children from their separated mothers. although Shariah is not itself believed by Muslims educated in religion to be of divine origin. Similar bans are now alleged regarding the distribution of Christian religious literature.

the Islamic legal expert Jamal Badawi. It’s noteworthy that the Prophet’s saying ‘do not exceed the limit’ means ‘do not totally remove the clitoris’… “Actually.”14 12 Al-Qaradawi has commented as follows on female genital mutilation (FGM):15 “Actually. But. refuse sexual relations with her.” he should first reason with her. the most moderate opinion and the most likely one to be correct is in favor of practising circumcision in the moderate Islamic way indicated in some of the Prophet’s hadiths – even though such hadiths are not confirmed to be authentic. whoever finds it serving the interest of his daughters should do it. this is a controversial issue among jurists and even among doctors.” Jamal Badawi. and I personally support this under the current circumstances in the modern world. Anyhow.islamicpluralism.13 Al-Qaradawi has written on wife-beating that when a husband “senses that feelings of disobedience and rebelliousness are rising against him in his wife. “The jurists of Islam have held differing opinions concerning the punishment for this abominable practice… should both the active and passive participants be put to death? While such punishments may seem cruel. “If this approach fails. AlQaradawi. But whoever chooses not to do it is not considered to have committed a sin for it is mainly meant to dignify women as held by scholars. for that is better for her health and is preferred by husbands.’ “The hadith indicates that circumcision is better for a woman’s health and it enhances her conjugal relation with her husband. who is active in the UK.eu . a colleague of Al-Qaradawi in the European Council for Fatawa and Research (ECFR) has produced several volumes on CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. it is permissible for him to beat her lightly with his hands. whose Shariah manual The Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam is very likely the most widely read such volume among Western Muslims. with colleagues Radicals on Shariah Regarding Homosexuality. head of the European Council for Fatawa and Research (ECFR). It has sparked off fierce debate in Egypt whereby scholars and doctors are split into proponents and opponents. has stated of homosexuals. Muslim countries differ over the issue of female circumcision. All are Egyptian by birth.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 Female genital mutilation may be performed on girls ranging in age from 1 week to puberty. “However. and AlQaradawi and Badawi are among the most influential Muslim figures in Europe today. and the Spanish Muslim cleric Sheikh Mohamed Kamal Mostafá. and if that is unsuccessful. Yusuf Al-Qaradawi. it is not obligatory. he argues. avoiding her face and other sensitive areas. they have been suggested to maintain the purity of the Islamic society. some countries sanction it whereas others do not. It is reported that the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) said to a midwife: ‘Reduce the size of the clitoris but do not exceed the limit.”12 The Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam was banned by the French Ministry of the Interior in 1996. Wife-Beating and Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) and Women’s Participation in Society Three of the most notable examples of explicit support for conduct criminalised in the West involve Al-Qaradawi.

Jamal Badawi represents an example of the entry of a radical Shariah exponent into Western government councils. she should be beaten on the feet and hands. called for such problems to be turned over to “family tribunals. This demanding position.” This fatwa presents a conflict with the establishment in the West of the right of women to services from public agencies dedicated to family problems. the head of the state is no mere figurehead. He leads people in the prayers. It is a medical fact that during their monthly periods and during their pregnancies.” a preaching circuit of UK Muslim communities. Badawi has also become notorious for his defence of polygamy.” The book was condemned as an incitement to domestic violence.16 Badawi cited traditional Islamic sources which discourage wife-beating.17 He argued “polygamy is neither mandatory. Bangladesh. he translated a Quranic reference to wife-beating as follows. Mostafá wrote on wife-beating. thus affecting her decision. but merely permitted.eu . including a common moderate Muslim argument that the Prophet Muhammad himself never engaged in the practice. Pakistan. Moreover.Radical Shariah CIP marriage and woman in Islam. on the recourse of the Muslim wife living in the West in case of irresolvable family disputes. especially on Fridays and festivities.” with a “rod that must not be stiff. with his own interpolations: “(and last) beat (tap) them (lightly). “[Wife-]beating must never be done in a state of exacerbated. “[the blows] must not be strong or hard since the aim is to inflict psychological suffering rather than humiliation or physical ill-treatment. is generally inconsistent with the physiological and psychological make-up of woman in general. and head. The tour. women undergo various physiological and psychological changes. At the same time.” (Qur’an 4:34).19 The Spanish Sheikh Mohamed Kamal Mostafá was sentenced in 2004 by a court in Catalonia to a suspended prison term of 15 months and a fine of €2. Jamal Badawi produced. some decisions require a maximum of rationality and a minimum of emotionality – a requirement which does not coincide with the instinctive nature of women. abdomen. or any similar one.20 An ECFR fatwa issued in 1998. blind rage” and that “she should not be beaten on the sensitive parts of her body. Such changes may occur during an emergency situation.21 Another distinction between traditional and radical Shariah involves the sources of 13 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. In one of his many online texts. since 2006. Badawi wrote in 1980 in opposition to the involvement of women in politics: “According to Islam. without considering the excessive strain which is Dr.”18 This line of argument conflicts with the experience of Turkey. derided by moderate Muslims and non-Muslim media alike as a “roadshow. all leading Muslim countries.” was financed by the British government as a supposed remedy for extremism. such as the face. the “Radical Middle Way. Badawi has been prominent. Instead. in including women among their political leaders.islamicpluralism. nor encouraged. His intent was clearly to support wife-beating through an ameliorative form of editing.” Similarly. he is continuously engaged in the process of decision-making pertaining to the security and well-being of his people. and Indonesia. breast.160 for statements in his book The Woman in Islam. but slim and lightweight to avoid serious injury [to the woman] and no scars. in a British project.” In his volume The Status of Women in Islam. or bruises are caused. such as the Commander of the Army.

includes a chapter on “Non-Muslim Residents of an Islamic State.eu . another reason for the multiplication of Shariah websites. and substitutes for them the arbitrary decisions of radical clerics. says nothing about Muslim residents of a non-Muslim state.islamicpluralism. this style of radical improvisation. traditions. imams (prayer leaders). who produce television broadcasts. the proliferation of improvised legal decisions in defiance of precedent is negative. Unfortunately. is increasingly popular with young Muslims who lack religious Iraqi Shia Muslims in a 2004 march display their loyalty to Ayatollah Ali Sistani The Grand Masjid of Prophet Muhammad. denying precedent. except for truncated or misrepresented citations. radical Shariah “experts” must constantly expand their version of Shariah.” but unlike the guidance of the Shia Sistani. precedents. The aforementioned Al-Qaradawi and Badawi are notable examples of individuals. While the absence of an invariant Shariah is a positive value. Radical Shariah. and websites in which they answer questions from Muslims about Shariah issues. Radical Shariah texts like AlQaradawi’s The Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam or Badawi’s The Status of Women in Islam are written as if Western law were completely irrelevant or even nonexistent. while traditional Shariah emphasises explication and study. its precepts. for example. more ideologues than theologians. judgments are nearly always presented with minimal reference to the Islamic past. Al-Qaradawi’s The Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam. for example. Jamal Badawi. radicals abuse the previously-indicated mutability of Shariah. In this way. Medina 14 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. which is also known to traditional Muslims as “la-madhdhab” or Islam without recourse to the precedents of the established schools of Islamic law. has no formal Islamic theological training. Radical Shariah treats all queries as deserving of simple answers. On radical Shariah websites.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 authority for juristic opinions. It has long been observed by Muslims trained in the religion that radical clerics and their followers are generally ignorant and even contemptuous of the heritage of the Islamic faith. They proclaim themselves to be shaykhs (pious personalities). based on their own views. To fill spaces occupied in many Muslim societies by secular law. of which there are dozens in every language spoken by Muslims. videotapes. The historical outcome in which the precedents of traditional Shariah were replaced in radical Shariah by arbitrary and improvised judgments reflects the rise of Saudi Wahhabism. which made a significant appearance in the West less than a quarter of a century ago. wipes out the precedents of traditional Islam and the coexistence of religious and customary or secular law. and standards. or muftis (administrators of religious courts) on their own authority. and no reference at all to the common law in Western countries or to the traditional obligation of Muslim immigrants and their communities to obey the laws of non-Muslim countries.

Khalid Al-Zahrani.23 In July 2008. although exclusively by telephone.) In addition.750 times for sexual relations with his sister-in-law. and the birth of a second and third generation of Muslims in Europe in the 20th century. the governor of Riyadh. no more than 100 lashes could be administered. Further. cloths. The “legal” decision was based entirely on the declaration by the woman’s husband that he had divorced her exclusively because her professor repeatedly communicated with her. developed after Qur’an. Qur’an prescribes flogging as an Islamic punishment for only two crimes: adultery – with proof of guilt requiring four credible eyewitnesses – and libel against the honour of a woman. at the beginning of 2002 a man in Jeddah was whipped 4. without even consulting Shariah courts. which was not to be extended above his own waist. only 80 were mandated. Saudi Prince Salman. at all.‘Parallel’ Shariah CIP education. if. often miscalled a “religious police. the individual imposing the punishment was barred from striking with the full force of his arm. flogging was to be carried out with soft straps. Also at the end of August 2007.24 Some aspects of radical Shariah as enforced in the Saudi kingdom would be amusing if the situation were not tragic.”25 Moderate Muslims warn that this is the Shariah radicals wish to impose throughout the Muslim world and the spirit they wish to introduce into Muslim communities in the West.islamicpluralism. which cause extraordinary suffering. and do not wish to expend the necessary time and effort to seriously study their religion. a Saudi biochemist. the dailies Okaz and Al-Riyadh reported that authorities in the southern province of Jizan were investigating a case filed by a Saudi citizen against two young male members of the mutawiyin or religious militia. financial transactions. Such sentences may be carried out over an extended period of time so as not to simply kill the individual being punished. In an incident involving Saudi Shia teenagers who resented insults directed against their sect by their radical Sunni schoolteachers.eu . with the intention of humiliation rather than infliction of pain or injury. In addition. but to be enforced by the same Western authorities under which Muslims in the West heretofore have been mandated to live. no more than 100 lashes. But under traditional Islam. It differs from traditional Shariah in that it proposes a separate legal canon from established. or small branches. It could also be seen as a counterapplication of the diversity present in the Turkish and Islamised Mongol empires. Prince Muqrin of Medina ordered that a dozen students be whipped 300 times each. (Stoning for adultery does not appear in Qur’an. For adultery. Islamic jurisprudence. The newspapers reported that the couple were stopped in their car “on suspicion of not being related. “parallel Shariah” does not embody obviously radical principles. We call this phenomenon “parallel Shariah”. positioned midway between traditional and radical forms.” The complainant said his wife had undergone “mental torture” in the incident. increasingly. Yet the Saudi Shariah courts have routinely delivered sentences totaling thousands of lashes. and only for these three violations of law. however. calls for 40 to 80 lashes for drinking alcohol. “Parallel Shariah” With the growth of Muslim immigration to the West. in reality. “Parallel Shariah” appears or is presented as a compromise 15 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www.22 At the end of August 2007 the Saudi newspaper Al-Yaum (The Day) reported that a Riyadh court decreed 1.000 lashes for a Saudi youth in a morals offence. is known for decreeing lashings on whim. but flogging is carried out in the kingdom using wooden rods and metal cables. and for libel. as it is limited to personal and family law as well as. In general. non-Muslim law. a new theory of Shariah appeared. was sentenced to 600 lashes and his woman student to 350 lashes after it was “determined” that they had conducted a romantic relationship. associate traditional Islam with their “outdated” or “rural” elders. To cite some notorious examples from Saudi Arabia.

S. in our view encompasses problematical elements even if it does not embody radical ideology. since. held in Dublin in October 1998. a “Shariah invasion”. the leading Sunni religious educational institution in the world. In the work of Al-Alwani. as a means to inevitably introduce radical Shariah into non-Muslim lands. one in Britain and the other in France. a body of opinion derived from Shariah doctrine to govern the lives of Muslim minorities in non-Muslim lands. “Fiqh for minorities/fiqh al-aqalliyat” has also been described as “a special theory of jurisprudence that was formulated originally by al-Alwani and elaborated and popularised by him. in broad terms. “Parallel Shariah” implies separation of Muslims living in the West from their nonMuslim neighbors.. “creeping Shariah”. family. But the erection of a “parallel Shariah” could also open a space for the introduction of radical Shariah principles. As will be seen in our discussion of divorce issues in the Case Study: Britain. comprising 33 members. Muslim representatives of varying orientations could gain authority. This is in itself a radical attitude.islamicpluralism.” But various non-Muslim commentators have viewed “parallel Shariah” as an “infiltration” or “usurpation” of the public legal space in the West.. but with the support of state authorities. and. and financial matters. and many others. in a Muslimonly legal structure. with the presumed aim of conquering or otherwise subduing the latter.S. located in Cairo.27 “parallel Shariah” is designated a “fiqh [Islamic legal interpretation] for minorities” [fiqh al-aqalliyat] i. notwithstanding its restricted scope. even a minimal “parallel Shariah” could come under the direction and administration of radicals who would exploit it to impose their own views. Shariah-based divorce proceedings are currently dominated by radical clerics. Al-Alwani is a graduate of Al-Azhar University. For example. ECFR decided to establish two regional authorities for fatwa issuance. formerly headquartered in Dublin and now located in Brussels. not Caeiro’s typology) emerged in the late 1990s. ECFR has played an important role in propagation of “fiqh for minorities/fiqh alaqalliyat”. “Parallel Shariah” limited to personal. While much of his work has been carried out in the U. The phenomenon of “parallel Shariah” originated with radical Islamic scholars such as AlQaradawi26 and one of his counterparts mainly living in the U.eu . the French scholar Alexandre Caeiro has pointed out that Al-Alwani’s methodology in developing the “fiqh for minorities” was adopted by Al-Qaradawi for general application when the new “parallel Shariah” (to employ our. below.e.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 A young Taha Jabir Al-Alwani Wife-beating in East Africa or accommodating institution for the “Muslim diaspora. the Iraqi-born Taha Jabir AlAlwani. “Parallel Shariah” or “fiqh for minorities/fiqh al-aqalliyat” has also been titled 16 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www.”28 Al-Qaradawi used the term fiqh al-aqalliyat in publishing the first collection of fatwas of the fundamentalist European Council for Fatawa and Research (ECFR). At its second consultative session. and led by AlQaradawi. Qaradawi.

No other power would dare attack individual Muslims or infringe the integrity of Islam… The whole world was open to them as a residence and a place of worship… The more powerful and ambitious migrants of comfortably independent means would travel even to non-Muslim lands. and easily seemed to assume an aggressive. under British and American protections for the free exercise of religion. invasive spirit. federal authorities on “reasonable accommodation” of Muslims in the U. but 17 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. incorrect in addressing the status of Muslims in the West. rather than long history. Muslim communities in southern France were of short. northern Italy. commanded that Muslim migrants obey the laws of countries in which they settled. “ ‘fiqh for minorities’ is not meant to give minorities privileges or concessions not available to Muslim majorities. it suggests that Western legal canons such as civil marriage and divorce. and the very existence of Muslim society in northern Italy is highly doubtful. Indeed.S. Al-Alwani’s “fiqh for minorities.” “reformed fiqh” and “European fiqh”. and other places. and Mongolia could never be described as countries that “feared and respected Islam. radical in its assumptions about Islamic history. Al-Alwani’s argument was also radical in that it declared traditional Shariah. religiously-inspired conscientious objectors to war or abortion are not required to participate in those acts. like those in the south of France. existing as Muslim oases or islands in the middle of the non-Muslim oceans. “Reasonable accommodation” has become an accepted legal principle in many developed nations and is embodied in U. But as Al-Alwani wrote.30 This vision of the Muslim heritage seemed redolent of an intent to subvert non-Muslim lands by the establishment of Islamic enclaves such as many non-Muslim commentators now claim to perceive in Muslim immigration to the West.” Rather. even fantastical. it aims to protect minorities as representatives or examples of Muslim society in the countries in which they live. Tibet.31 The Centre for Islamic Pluralism includes practitioners in employment law and participates as a consultant to the U.islamicpluralism. feared and respected by all nations. rather than an evocation of the past it seemed to be a prediction of the future. some religious believers are already granted exemptions for certain principles and practices of their faith so long as they do not interfere with the good order of society (Sikh policemen in Britain may wear turbans. were to survive for a long time”.Fiqh for minorities CIP “lawful Islamism.S. by attracting non-Muslims to the religion of Islam rather than protecting the rights of Muslims. might imply “reasonable accommodation” of religious belief and practice. on the contrary. let us recall. the vocabulary of Al-Alwani’s “fiqh for minorities” was maximal.” “fiqh of balances. or considerable areas of Africa. Germany. which are absent from or inconsistent in many Muslim majority societies. where they would establish their own Muslim emirates. Japan.” nor could England. Thus. as well as electoral democracy. He advocated a “new” approach that might appear original and therefore satisfying of a superficial Western call for reform in Islam. workplace.eu . Al-Alwani argued fancifully that in the past “Muslims were the dominant world power.” when unexamined.29 Al-Alwani’s presentation of the “fiqh for minorities” was elaborated in a vocabulary that was.” “fiqh of reality. which. administrative directives for protection against religious discrimination. Such a discourse far exceeds the Western concept of “reasonable accommodation.” This conception is unambiguously separatist. Indeed. firstly. but it was also absurdly fictive. This is a consistent source of tension in the discussion of Shariah in the West: while “reasonable accommodation” and traditional Shariah for immigrant-based communities in the West are founded on a de minimis standard. are inappropriate for Muslims living in the West. Al-Alwani declared candidly that a “fiqh for minorities” aimed at Islamisation of the West. and so on). Scandinavia. Some communities.S.

The Turks in particular have never been conquered by any foreign nation. according to him. traditional Shariah forbids antagonizing the local majority in non-Muslim societies. While some non-Muslim 18 commentators equate such a strategy with jihad and conquest.eu .” the latter which he left unspecified.” Al-Alwani cites obscure. Through most of Islamic history. it was applied in Muslim societies rather than the whole world. jihad against non-Muslims referred to warfare between states and armies. Thus. because there more people could be drawn to Islam by the individual’s presence. Al-Alwani’s writing may be summed up in the following comment: “Islam knows no geographic boundaries.” i.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 in reality reproduced the previously-described radical habit of rejecting precedents and promoting improvisation in juristic thought. even if he lives among a nonMuslim majority. Some Muslim scholars even criticised Al-Alwani’s “fiqh for minorities/fiqh al-aqalliyat” as providing more rights for Muslims in the non-Muslim countries than in the Muslim societies. Past Islamisation was accomplished either through armed invasion of territory and establishment of Muslim administration in which acceptance of Islam reflected various incentives. Al-Alwani wrote that classical Islamic history. earlier Islamic scholars who argued that it was preferable for a Muslim to settle and live in a non-Muslim country with free practise of religion. he would know that the Turkish sultans contracted extensive treaties with a range of European powers. In perhaps the most bizarre of Al-Alwani’s convoluted meditations. Indians. CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. or through spiritual missionization.32 the Turks. AlAlwani called for a “new methodology” because. to cite but one example. In addition.e. If Al-Alwani had even the barest knowledge of Ottoman history. perhaps predictably. In addition to calling for Muslim immigrant acceptance of non-Muslim laws and customs and declaring Shariah void of authority in non-Muslim lands. not infiltration and conspiracy.” allegedly “had no concept or experience of international law or diplomatic conventions obliging host countries to protect immigrants… except in certain distinguishing matters. But in the reactionary-utopian method of Wahhabis and other fundamentalists this dangerous mentality has been reintroduced. Islamizing goal. dar-al-Islam [the global realm of Islam] is anywhere a Muslim can live in peace and security. In yet another revelation of a superlative ignorance. In place of supporting the Algerian nationalist movement. Al-Alwani proclaimed the superiority of Shariah over other areas of Islamic thought. Yet such “distinguishing matters” were by no means trivial. traditional Islam was limited by its “introversion incompatible with the universality of Islam” and was “localised and provincial. given the greater rate of immigration of ordinary and secular Muslims to the West in search of economic opportunities as well as to escape rigid clerical and ideological dictates. and Indonesians were brought voluntarily to Islam through preaching. while the Arabs and Persians were conquered by the Muslims and adapted en masse to the power of a new ruling religion. it.islamicpluralism. writing that such an attitude reflected a “‘culture of conflict’ which Muslim minorities today can better do without”. he condemned the Algerian nationalists of the 20th century for rejecting French citizenship. including the Venetian Republic and its associated trading partners in the Adriatic. This attitude in which every Muslim is to be treated as missionary for the religion was long inconsistent with reality. has no precedent in Islamic history. Al-Alwani seems to suggest that Algerian Muslims should have accepted French nationality and then attempted to take control of France. But it seems obvious that such a scheme would have a more problematical. This argument conforms to a general tendency in the work of “parallel Shariah” advocates to allege that its introduction would unite Muslims to the West and reduce polarization. The radicals therefore would use accommodation of Islam to promote subordination to Islam. which he described as “the ancient world.

mainly in the form of adherence to the fundamentalist and separatist Deobandi interpretation of Islam. they have been recapitulated in other fundamentalist Islamic phenomena. this outlook is supported by “soft- fundamentalist” factions within the resurgent Islamist movement originating in Turkey. in Western Europe. while the others represent immigrant communities.islamicpluralism. the discussion of “parallel Shariah” began with an ECFR discussion in 1997 of the traditional Islamic ban on investment for earning of interest (riba). although Wahhabism played a role in importing such conceptions to France. Russia alone has more Muslims than many Arab states. as are mainstream French Muslims. the theory of “parallel Shariah” would extend the realm of Shariah beyond that of Islam. Bosnia-Hercegovina – an event that was largely ignored by the Bosnian Muslim public and which contrasted with Bosnian Muslim reality in that BosniaHercegovina is governed under European and post-Soviet civil law. drawn from the Indian subcontinent. as well as 12 from Arab and African countries. or exclusion from the body of Islam as disbelievers. a 2002 roster in French included the grand mufti of Albania. utilizing Arab migrants from Morocco and Algeria. between Muslims and their neighbors. The rest of its 33 members have comprised four Saudis (even though few Saudis live in Europe). in addition to less discerning commentators. In Britain. as well as the grand mufti of Bulgaria. the German Rohe seemed satisfied to summarise the conception as follows: “in our days our earth is simply ‘one house’ for mankind as a whole. in that they seek to exercise takfir. names missing from Bosnian. and is unrepresented in ECFR. the argument of Al-Alwani in favor of “fiqh for minorities” bizarrely evokes the claim of Serbian extremists that anywhere Serbs lived was Serb territory.” which we discuss as a religious question in chapter 10 of this study. This debate reflected the European introduction of “Islamic banking. and the overwhelming majority of Turks and Kurds living in Europe. mainly Arab. In Germany.and Albanian-language listing. (It should be 19 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. another significant actor in the offensive among ordinary Arabs has been the Muslim Brotherhood. a noted and proven moderate of pro-Western views.‘Parallel’ Sha ria h CIP The proposition of Al-Alwani that anywhere a Muslim lives is Islamic territory is clearly colonialistic and expansionist. But ECFR membership is difficult to confirm. Pakistani activists and recruiters. While reinforcement of separatist attitudes originates in the last three centuries with the Saudi-financed global Wahhabi movement. “parallel Shariah” would erect a new barrier of separation within non-Muslim societies. For example. The Council held its first consultative session in August 1998 in Sarajevo. against Muslims who disagree with them. the ideological environment for “parallel Shariah” agitation grew out of the British Asian Muslim community. one observes a triangular approach involving Saudi financing. ECFR. and its jihadist component. appear to have been seduced by such a “moderate” phrasing. by abolishing the traditional division between a Muslim world in which Shariah could be enforced and a non-Muslim area in which Shariah would be considered null according to traditional scholars. But in place of a separatism dividing Muslim and non-Muslim sectors of the globe. All such Sunni fundamentalists may be described as takfiris. and… every Muslim is entitled to live in any part of the world and is responsible for the sake of the society he/she is living in”. Bosnian chief cleric Mustafa efendija Cerić. Mustafa Alic Hadzhi. As outlined by Caeiro.34 The absence of these figures from Balkan area editions may be taken as an indication that these individuals did not join ECFR. some Western academics.eu . For those with experience in the Balkan Wars of 1991-99. which produced the Taliban in Afghanistan. In the United States. has consistently included only one representative of indigenous European Islamic culture. Haxhihafiz Sabri Koci. Unfortunately. and Brotherhood literature. however. Thus. plus Pakistan.33 To summarise.

Murad further expressed an ultrafundamentalist posture.eu . especially those involving economic achievement. demanding that Muslims refrain from any migration to nonMuslim lands. none of which specifically govern relations between Muslims and non-Muslim legal authorities.) ECFR members are.net reported the statement of Sheikh Husain Halawa. Tahir Mahdi.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 noted that Albania is a Muslim-majority country while Bulgaria’s Muslims are a minority. Al-Alwani’s logic. including consumption of alcohol. and three of Algerian origin. The 1999 fatwa on house mortgages appears as the beginning of the broad penetration of “parallel Shariah” in the West. the ECFR members found that payment of interest in housing transactions was permissible to improve the situation of Muslims in establishing residences in Europe. counterposed to poverty in the Islamic world. These are discussed in chapter 9 of this survey. In sum. comprising Ahmed Jaballah. Al-Arabi Bichri. and the content of which appear. however. But it was not greeted with universal enthusiasm. but to adopt Western habits. but 20 rather supported the project of Muslims to maintain a presence that would advance Islamisation. to imply no particularly aggressive attitude. since such investment is rigorously illegal in Shariah. in promulgating “fiqh for minorities” far exceeded the need to find appropriate housing. on the basis that it would serve as an obstacle to seduction by Western prosperity. condemned the ECFR fatwa on mortgages as permitting Muslims in the West not only to engage in all sorts of forbidden vices. pragmatism. in which Muslim standards may be derived from non-Muslim practice. and Unis Qurqah. Literalists condemn investment for earning of interest as extremely sinful. however.islamonline. the current ECFR secretary general: “The ECFR secretary general denied charges that the organization is hijacked by Arabs to the extent of alienating some European Muslims”. They betray. his argument has been summarised as calling for more rather than less observance of Shariah by Muslims in the West. Mahmud bin Rida Murad. contemporary attitudes among Western Muslims gravitate between literalism. while pragmatists find ways to justify it as a feature of life in the West. a Tunisian. which had previously been forbidden by most Islamic clerics in Europe. at first. the modernist Islamic intellectual Tariq Ramadan criticised the fatwa on mortgages for making possible the rise of a privileged class of property-owning “bourgeois Muslims” in the West. In addition. The ECFR issued its fatwa on payment of interest in 1999. initiated the discussion. especially by radicals. a profound fundamentalist bias. Four ECFR founders from France. as worthy of emulation by Islamic believers. it seems.islamicpluralism. In Caeiro’s description.35 ECFR has issued two volumes of fatwas. upset by claims that they want to use non-Arabs to advance a radical agenda. A Saudi shaykh close to the Muslim Brotherhood. in drawing Muslim Tariq Ramadan CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. Rohe36 has noted that in financial matters ECFR has emphasised individual religious duties rather than collective institutional canons. addressing whether Muslims could purchase homes with mortgages. By contrast. ECFR repeated the traditional argument that establishment of Islamic law is not an obligation of Muslims living in nonMuslim lands. The website www. and a liberalism based on maslaha or public betterment. Investment for earning of interest is a clear example in which Shariah and Western law conflict.

. Ramadan. Hall. New York. op. “Islamic Ruling on Female CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www.. Columbia U. 2008. than among France’s North African community. “Bishop: No-go zones for Christians. It is only within the last few years that Muslims have also tried to formulate theoretical statements to clarify their positions with regard to possible conflicts between legal and religious norms. p. called for the integration of Western law and Shariah. Globalised Islam. and Ibn Anas. Doubleday. Yusuf.” in Special Theme Issue – Shari’a in Europe. op. 12 Al-Qaradawi. New York. “Many Muslims in Europe still tend to seek practical solutions for organising their lives in accordance with the demands of European legal orders and Islamic religious commands. cit. cit. The proposed introduction of “parallel Shariah” generally assumes that Islamic law would be enforced by Western governments. 5 Rohe. Briefing Paper. 2008. 11 Al-Watan. 15 Al-Qaradawi.” Brussels. supported by powerful jihadist organizations and influence in the Pakistani government. tenaciously support their own tradition of customary law.. Policy Department External Policies. 14 Al-Qaradawi. 2008. Maher.‘Parallel’ Shariah CIP migrants away from their religion. Jonathan.” Ramadan also supports. “Application of Shari’a Rules in Europe – Scope and Limits. 6 Directorate General External Policies of the [European] Union. who may adhere to Shariah. rather. as monitored by Centre for Islamic Pluralism. 13 Roy. has observed. Malik. “Muslim Britain is becoming one big nogo area. and are characterised by significant discontent with Arab political domination. Other critics of the fatwa called for extension of “Islamic finance” as an alternative to the legitimisation of mortgages. whose views are not beyond criticism. beginning in 1991 and pitting violent Islamists against the Algerian government. “Honour Killing Its Causes and Consequences: Suggested Strategies for the European Parliament.” The Daily Express [London]. Olivier. op.” The Sunday Times [London]. 8 Hadi. 7 Ibn Naqib. NOTES 4 Schwartz. cit. This is interesting in that Islamic fundamentalism appears to have maintained a stronger hold among Britain’s majority of IndoPakistani migrants. Finally. and Berbers (Amazigh). As Rohe. January 6. Stephen. cit. Furthermore.P. August 4. which appears as little more than a variation on “parallel Shariah. “Fury at ‘no-go’ areas ruled by the fanatics. Macer. Reliance of the Traveller. 10 Wynne-Jones. Mathias. op. Ahmad. some of whom. which is alienated from radical Islam by two factors. January 13. Abdul [based on the work of Ayatollah Ali Sistani]. as an expression of universalism. the ECFR fatwa on mortgages gained more acceptance in France than in Britain.”37 This observation succinctly expresses the findings of the Centre for Islamic Pluralism about the Shariah campaign in Western Europe. reportedly originating in the Moroccan Rif mountains and the Algerian region of Kabylie. European Parliament. and to find adequate solutions for such conflicts. 2004. Others are attached to Sufi (mystic) beliefs and practices and consider the ‘superficial’ rules of mediaeval fiqh… to deserve little importance. January 7. the position of Al-Alwani according to which the whole world belongs to Islam. cit. 9 Rohe. Al-Muwatta. The first is the division of FrenchNorth African Muslims between Arabs. op. But introduction of “parallel Shariah” in countries with allowance for “reasonable accommodation” does not increase religious liberties. Shiraz. Amazigh are an indigenous people linguistically related to but long preceding the arrival in the region of Jews and Arabs. 2007. 205. a considerable number of Muslims are not particularly interested in performing religious practices while not denying their Muslim identity as such. Yusuf. The Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam.eu 21 . 2002. who has cooperated with ECFR.” The Sunday Telegraph [London]. op. 2007. 2004. it threatens to restrict them. The other matter is the aftermath of the “second Algerian war”. As an alternative. cit. Die Welt Des Islams [Leiden-Boston]. The Two Faces of Islam.islamicpluralism.

36 Rohe. “Wife beating?. 2007. 25 Okaz and Al-Riyadh.radicalmiddleway. v.htm.R. Die Welt Des Islams. July 2008. little-known in the West. 22 From reports by a human-rights monitoring group.islamonline. 22 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www.F. cit. Section 12.” La Vanguardia [Barcelona]. 35 Al-Halawani.islamawareness. op.html. 24 Unsigned. cit. 29 Caeiro. Part 1605. “Saudi appeals court upholds flogging researchers. Towards a Fiqh for Minorities. See Cleveland.htm.” Current Trends in Islamist Ideology [Washington].” El Mundo. Ali.islamonline. 31 See U. January 14. The Saudi Institute.islamfortoday. Taha Jaber. 2.. Austin. . Unsigned. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. as monitored by the Centre for Islamic Pluralism.co. Home Purchase.uk/. at www.net/Women/s_women. 19 Badawi’s biography appears at the Radical Middle Way site: www. Jamal. University of Texas Press.. 29 C. however. Va. “El imán de Fuengirola no recurre la pena por incitar a los malos tratos a la mujer. Unsigned. 2007. Alexandre. cited in Caeiro. Islam Against the West. op. as monitored by Centre for Islamic Pluralism.net/sister/wife_beating. 23 Al-Yaum. International Institute of Islamic Thought.” at www. July 30. “conversion by the sword” or other forms of compulsion in religion are explicitly banned in Qur’an.eu . 16 Badawi. “El imam de Fuengirola se proclama ‘defensor de las mujeres’ en el juicio contra él por discriminación. February 26..” at http://islamicworld. 2004. 146-148.net/. August 27. Torture in Saudi Arabia and Religious Freedom in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. “15 meses de cárcel para el imán que incitó a la violencia contra las mujeres. pp. “Fiqh Al-Aqalliyat: A Legal Theory for Muslim Minorities. 32 Notwithstanding prevalent misconceptions in the West. 33 Rohe. Recueil de fatwas.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 Circumcision. 2003. McLean. 17 See www. 2008. 26 Caeiro. 2003. 27 Al-Alwani. William L.S. Shammai. op. a Lebanese Druze intellectual prominent in pan-Islamism. 2007. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion. cit. December 9. “After the Ramadan Affair: New Trends in Islamism in the West. op. 2002. Hudson Institute.net. 1985. cit. “ECFR Marks 10 Years of European Fatwas. Série no. A somewhat benign view of “fiqh for minorities”/”fiqh al-aqalliyat” was also taken in Fishman. 2004. Religious Discrimination. 21 Conseil europeén des fatwas et de la recherche. 28 Brown. and Islamic Norms in the West. Arslani’s writings are. 34 See footnote 3 above for bibliographic references to these divergent sources. op. cit.” Reuters. and Compliance Manual. 20 Unsigned. 2005.islamicpluralism. 30 Al-Alwani cites these historical claims to the work of Shakib Arslani (1869-1946). 37 Rohe. 2006. Eric.” Washington. 1. “The Social Construction of Shari’a: Bank Interest. August 29. 18 See www.” in Special Theme Issue – Shari’a in Europe.com/polygamy5.” El Mundo [Madrid].” May 17. London/Washington.

islamicpluralism. is also Mirpuri. But the Islamist global offensive currently 23 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www.Case Study Britain CIP 1. this appeared to be little more than a bureaucratic reflex based on confidence that the situation of radical Islam in Britain was under control and that “best practices” in interfaith relations would resolve it. accounting for numerous lord mayors or former lord mayors in Bradford and other immigrant centres. This accounts for only 2. based on their traditions of free speech.600 mosques. expanding in the 1950s. The response of the authorities in Britain to radical Shariah ideology has been ambivalent. While British leaders have acted firmly against the most extreme elements in British Islam – including a group with the notable name “Supporters of Shariah” – the authorities under Tony Blair also engaged with purported “moderates” in attempting to substitute a diluted form of radical Islam for its more violent expression. Radical Shariah rhetoric is common in English cities with large Muslim communities: London (14 percent Muslim). a new phenomenon even among Mirpuris. British officials appeared to believe that. Considerable economic assets have been transferred from Britain to Mirpur. Leicester (12 percent) and Oldham (11 percent). are overrepresented in British Muslim politics. Case Study: Britain Introduction Britain has a Muslim population between 1. radical rhetoric was acceptable but radical action was not. as opposed to the Indian authorities are. Most significantly. mainly introduced from Pakistan. Radical attitudes toward the British. Because of their Kashmiri origins. Britain has become the epicentre of radical Islam in Western Europe. the original country of most British Muslims and their progenitors.eu . Lord Nazir Ahmed. however. as they are known. In some instances. many Mirpuris tend to a jihadist mentality against India. a British peer and controversial figure regarding his alignment with radicals. Mirpuris.5 and 2 million. but Muslims represent a demographic bulge in certain areas of England. Birmingham (15 percent). As much as three-quarters of the British Muslim population are said to originate in Mirpur. supporting about 1. radical Shariah agitation takes place in tandem with jihadist financing and recruitment activity. a single district of Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. Bradford (17 percent). In all these cities. Muslim immigration to Britain has taken place over three generations.5 percent of the total population of 60 million in the United Kingdom.

islamicpluralism. cannot be dealt with mechanically. But even his language regarding marital and commercial matters was speculative and appeared. introduction of Islamic arbitration or mediation does not involve the erection of a new legal forum.S. Phillips declared that family and business disputes could be submitted to Shariah mediation in Britain. Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. as we found. at the beginning of July 2008. Archbishop Williams. and capital sentences could not be imposed under Shariah in Britain. cutting off the hands of thieves. and radical Muslim advocates of using Shariah in Western countries often cite the precedent under which a Jewish religious court. when Archbishop of Canterbury Rowan Williams.” as a method for Islamisation of the non-Muslim populace. will settle such disputes between community members who agree to have them so resolved. Baron Phillips of Worth Matravers. letting religious courts handle family and business disputes through voluntary mediation might seem harmless. stoning of adulterers.eu .CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 Archbishop Rowan Williams escapes Western containment. as described in our analysis of Al-Alwani’s “fiqh for minorities. Britons were disturbed by more than Williams’s apparent naiveté.38 With the CIP survey undertaken in the immediate aftermath of Williams’ comments. The CIP mission in the UK was unintentionally but fortuitously facilitated by the eruption of controversy over Shariah in Britain in February 2008. He was careful to specify that “hudud” punishments for moral and criminal charges. The archbishop ignored how British Muslim radicals raise the demand for Shariah as an ideological banner and. Soon afterward. or beth din. In addition. At first glance. the misguided advocacy of Rowan Williams was supplemented by a similar appeal from Britain’s Lord Chief Justice. As this study was completed it remained to be seen whether the government of Prime Minister Gordon Brown would adopt a clearer and more determined policy in dealing with Islamist ideology. British Muslim interviewees were primed for comment on the issue. But his remarks were shocking to many of his religious congregants as well as other fellow-citizens. head of the Anglican Communion. unhelpful to moderate Muslims. insisting he had been 24 misunderstood. But he refused to correct what he had said. where extremism is advancing. Archbishop Williams doubtless thought he was making a positive contribution to interfaith relations when he gave a speech suggesting that some form of official recognition in Britain for elements of Shariah was “unavoidable”. and few “practices” – in a context where so far the only options for governments have been direct combat or passivity – can yet be described as “best”. blamed “our current style of electronic global communication” for the ensuing uproar. Only four days afterward. but with more latitude for public commentary. called for acceptance of some (unspecified) aspects of Shariah alongside existing civil law in the United Kingdom. Imposition of Shariah could deny these immigrants’ children opportunities to become successful in British society or elsewhere in the West. such as flogging. but extension of an existing CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www.39 The Lord Chief Justice is the rough equivalent of the U. Many Muslim immigrants came to the West to escape the excesses of Islamic ideology in countries like Pakistan.

non-Muslim advocates for Shariah are making things worse for both Muslims and non-Muslims in Britain. Bishop Nazir-Ali summarised the emergence of interreligious problems of Britain in a manner that remains relevant today. and other problems produced by practices banned in Islam. The Historical Background: Emergence of Shariah as an Issue in Britain A media discussion that would become a wide and deep stream of debate began in earnest in 1989. Jurists like Lord Chief Justice. We judge that in the name of sensitivity. “the BBC on 31 July was hugely successful in its portrayal of all religions as bigotry and of all religious people Lord Chief Justice Baron Phillips of Worth Matravers Bishop Nazir-Ali CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. Often. In our view. local Muslim leaders in Britain insistently assured us that the demand for Shariah is merely an ideological slogan to mobilise young Muslims. and merits citation at length.islamicpluralism. Baron Phillips. After the Williams statement. Yet this assumes a lack of coercion. In a visit to a mosque in Bolton.The Emergence of Shariah as an Issue in Britain CIP institution. should have listened to the many British Muslims who reject Shariah and other Islamist penetration into their community life. when Church of England bishop of Rochester Michael Nazir-Ali. some of who now refuse to attend classes on alcoholism. England. no less than his clerical counterpart. He stated. Some even refuse to wash up with alcohol – the use of which for cleaning purposes was never prohibited by Shariah (as described in the supplement beginning on page 56). the targeted audience has no idea what Shariah is. Shariah rhetoric has become a prominent topic among Muslim medical students in Britain.eu 25 . a leading daily. we were surprised when a discussion of Williams’ comments elicited a simple question from a young man who had just finished his prayer: “What is Shariah?” The young Muslim’s bafflement was unfeigned. the fixation on Shariah is commoner among members of the British Muslim and non-Muslim elite than among ordinary Muslims. sexually transmitted diseases.40 Bishop Nazir-Ali’s statement came in response to a British Broadcasting Corporation program on religion. who was born in Pakistan. In an example of its “upscale” appeal. and free recourse to the civil justice system as an alternative to “Islamic mediation. Exceptionally prescient and articulate.” while we found that such conditions seldom prevail when dealing with certain powerful and well-funded radical Islamic clerics. Even sharp critics of Islamism may be willing to accept voluntary Shariah-based mediation instead of introduction of Shariah as a settled legal structure. but some moderate Muslims consistently express concern that such mediation would enable radicals to extend their influence in the community. commented on Islam in Britain and Shariah issues in The Independent. Archbishop Williams.

are well aware of the work of these philosophers. for example. at all. “I am extremely disturbed by the way in which ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ is used in the media as a synonym for ‘Islam. people such as Muhammad Ali Jinnah. A more tolerant Islam must be fundamentally Islamic. to them.’ It must be admitted that many in the Muslim world and beyond have provided enough causes for such confusion to emerge. or Sufism. is another way which seeks to ‘interiorise’ the teachings of Islam so that the devotee is converted to personal commitment and to have a love of God and of one’s neighbour. the founder of Pakistan. that the way in which a prophet’s teaching is enforced in the society where the teaching is first given will be different from the way in which that same teaching is enforced in other societies and at other times. Though it must relate to Enlightenment ideas. Already in the eighteenth century. “In the modern period. in the name of religion. “The great reformers of the twentieth century. the founder of Pakistan as fanatical fundamentalists. Today’s Muslim leaders. CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. was not established as an Islamic state. have promoted fundamentalist Islam both at home and abroad. were more concerned with identifying those principles of development in the Shariah. political adventurers and the like. Shah Waliullah of Delhi was engaged in a hermeneutical exercise which sought to distinguish what was of eternal value in the work of a prophet from what was simply contextual.” Bishop Nazir-Ali stipulated. were deeply imbued with ideals from the Islamic liberal tradition. the Islamic liberal tradition has been concerned with the problem of relating the revelation in the Koran to the modern world. even fundamentalist leaders. “It is perhaps worth remembering that the founders of many such states. people such as Muhammad Abduh in Egypt and Allama Iqbal in India.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 Muhammad Ali Jinnah. I have in the past highlighted the extremely free-thinking attitudes of the medieval ‘Islamic’ philosophers. This is why Pakistan. however. “It is certainly the case that bigots. Also. “Waliullah points out. it cannot grow out of them. both Sir Syed Ahmad Khan and Amir Ali tried to develop an exegesis of the Koran and of prophetic traditions which was to them consonant with science and the contemporary scientific world-view. both conservative and revolutionary. if not their existence. The media. for example.eu . is at the expense of a long and honourable liberal tradition within the Islamic body-politic. it needs to be said that there have been numerous religious men and women who have encouraged creativity in the arts and in literature because of their religious convictions. In the nineteenth century. it made its impact. Newly-rich Muslim states. 26 “All of this. But this kind of sweeping condemnation of Islam is both undeserved and bound to make matters worse. At the same time. indeed. Islamic mysticism. many pioneering scientists have been religious believers and their scientific work has often been profoundly related to their religious belief. have restricted the freedom of others to express themselves with integrity or. or Islamic Law. As an exercise in polemics and as an apology for the creed of secular humanism. which would make it an effective legal instrument for the twentieth century. These people were often nationalists as well and many modern. understandably. have focused on the more dramatic consequences of these developments.islamicpluralism. Muslim states owe their present polity.

Paradoxically. ‘I handle no interest-bearing funds and our unit works in a completely separate area. “But in England there is a strong Common Law tradition. therefore. Hindus and Jews to experience the deprivation and the alienation which he felt the Muslims of undivided India had experienced. for democratic debate and complementarity41 but not for dogma and exclusivity. Today. to originate and structure morabaha and ijara transactions relating to commodities and goods. such as the emancipation of women. During the previous regime in Pakistan. which are just as much on the learning curve of Islamic banking as some of their Islamic counterparts. In some cases there have been reversals in the fortunes of the reformers but they have persisted. petrochemicals. are carving out a major niche market in short-term Islamic trade finance transactions and mediumto-longer term Islamic leasing (ijara). which are at issue in the West today.’ says one banker. There is room. six to eight weeks is normal for a morabaha transaction. educated and employed. it has often been assumed that Islam is facing the challenge of contemporary issues for the first time. ANZ Grindlays and Citibank.” In the 1990s. are adapting remarkably well and are even taking to the idea of submitting their transactions for scrutiny to a Shariah (Islamic Law) Council to check the transactions are permissible under Islamic interest-free principles. “Progressive Muslims and others in Muslim countries are struggling for the very causes. involving mainly aircraft and shipping purchases. Most of these reforms have been resisted by fundamentalists and other conservatives. racial prejudice and disadvantage have so ‘ghetto-ised’ the Muslim communities in Britain that fundamentalism has seen its opportunity and taken root in this fertile soil. This may be true of some issues but it is not of others. The rights of women have been another preoccupation. Provision has had to be made for women to be enfranchised. the Financial Times reported. the best organised lobby for the defence of human rights was that of the women’s organizations which had come together to prevent any further erosion of women’s rights and freedom. having secured a home for [the] Muslims of India. wanted it to be a home for other religious groups as well. At the same time. “Restrictions have been placed on polygamy and on arbitrary divorce by the husband.Issues of Finance CIP Jinnah. “The western banks. tankers and capital equipment. “ ‘We have regular meetings with both our clients and their Shariah Councils or experts. Indeed. a transaction could easily have taken 12 months to put together. but draw on their trade finance expertise and long-standing contacts. especially in London. new issues involving Shariah appeared in Britain. such as oil. such as Kleinwort Benson. aircraft.42 “Western banks.’ “ 27 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. Special family laws have been promulgated to protect women and children in case of divorce. they must recognise the fact that this tradition already has certain values inherent in it and also that other groups and individuals in society are trying to influence its development. In 1993.islamicpluralism.eu . agricultural products. the extent of the involvement of banks. Surely this can be developed in such a way that it both safeguards cultural identity and protects individuals from the tyranny of the group? Muslims have the right to campaign peacefully for the development of this tradition in ways which are consonant with the Shariah. The reformers have been particularly concerned that a democratic polity should develop which draws both upon Muslim tradition and modern constitutional thought. in morabaha (cost-plus financing) and ijara transactions is so large that all these banks have now set up specialised Islamic banking units. One was that of “Islamic finance”. freedom of choice and of expression and the reinterpretation of the Shariah. He did not want Christians. “In the recent debate on the place of Islam in Western societies. These operate separately from the rest of the banks’ conventional activities. In the past.

As such. where the old Grindlays bank subsidiary has been involved in Islamic banking for a number of years. for instance. especially after the then President Zia-ul-Haq decided to Islamise the entire banking sector. Keith Leach. “An Islamic capital market and interbank system would open vast new opportunities in both longer-term trade and project-related financing and in investment banking. some of these units are also researching products for the formation of an Islamic capital market. said the loans would not be considered particularly attractive to nonMuslims. sales manager of the product. This development took place at the same time as the European Council for Fatawa and Research (ECFR). Kleinwort Benson concluded its first morabaha trade transaction in 1982. its client base is strong in the Gulf.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 “Such is the commitment of these western banks to developing their Islamic banking business. allegedly in Afghanistan. “As a long-established merchant bank. such as Al-Rajhi Investment and Banking Corporation (ARABIC) of Saudi Arabia. such as Kleinwort Benson. and retailed in accord with Shariah. His appearance was notable because of his loss of both hands and an eye. that some. who justified the murder of Britons kidnapped in Yemen and stated that he organised military training for his followers inside Britain. Housing loans were made available to non-British residents who sought to purchase property in Britain. are also acquiring an in-house R&D capability in developing new Islamic trade finance and other products. He titled his organization Supporters of Shariah (SOS). called Manzil. Perhaps more importantly.44 As the 1990s came to a close. 2001. thus technically forcing western banks based in Pakistan to adapt or cease their involvement… “Islamic banks.43 In 1997 Shariah-compliant housing finance was launched in Britain. is fast becoming a major player in Pakistan. Kleinwort Benson has relationships with many of the merchant families in the Middle East. began its debate on the permissibility of interest. Egyptian-born Abu Hamza (Hamza AlMasri). He had obtained British citizenship and an engineering degree from Brighton University. as previously described. as well as in President Zia-ul-Haq industralised countries… “ANZ Grindlays. The Londonbased United Bank of Kuwait PLC announced housing loans would be offered to British Muslims without interest payments. bankers argue.islamicpluralism.eu . “The involvement of these banks in Islamic banking goes back to the petro-dollar boom years of the 1970s and early 1980s.” Al-Rajhi interests have been named in terrorism investigations since the events of September 11. although it also has structured a number of deals for clients in North Africa and Asia. and reportedly had worked as an engineer at the Sandhurst military installation. even arrange aircraft lease finance for non-Muslim clients. without which Islamic banking cannot progress beyond its current shortterm activities. radical Shariah rhetoric appeared in the agitation of a suddenly-notorious British Muslim extremist figure. 28 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www.

50 In reality. in which three Britons and an Australian died in a failed rescue.islamicpluralism. Among some sections of our community it is rife… All Muslims [sic] defer to the belief that in the shariah. More important. where many Muslims originate from Gujarat in India. and has a large centre in the town of Dewsbury. Radical Muslim author Faisal Bodi argued in The Guardian. Abu Hamza’s group. however. TJ is active throughout Britain. the body of laws defining our faith.”47 In our observation. The Sunday Telegraph’s description of Shariah was vague and 29 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. which closes the month of hajj or pilgrimage to Mecca. Muslim fundamentalist elements heightened pressure for official recognition of Islamic practices and institutions in British society. A “London School of Shariah” was implicated in recruitment of radical Muslims to fight in Afghanistan. This statistical result was produced by a poll conducted in 2006 by The Sunday Telegraph. was prominent in all such activity. the British authorities attempted to assess means to reduce Muslim extremism in the country. we have a supreme and peremptory point of reference. according to leading and authoritative media. as The Sunday Telegraph’s reporting on the poll itself showed. and the missionary group Tabligh-i-Jamaat (Appeal of the Community – TJ) have also advocated Islamic separatism and establishment of Shariah in Britain. and ensuing Western military intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq. the extremist entity AlMuhajiroun (The Migrants). at the end of the fasting month of Ramadan.45 Abu Hamza was arrested soon after his major burst of media coverage. and claimed that SOS maintained security training utilizing former British Army officers. He defined terrorism as follows: “If it means killing a few people to stop the killing of more people it is justified. Supporters of Shariah. Simultaneously. 40 percent of Muslims desired the introduction of Shariah in the country. and Shariah rhetoric predictably increased. In August 2006.48 Radical ideological tendencies such as the conspiratorial revolutionary group Hizb-ut-Tahrir (Party of Liberation – HT). using an ambiguous tone that became common in the years that followed.” He declared that SOS cooperated with the kidnappers of 16 Westerners in Yemen.49 Britain was soon shocked to learn that. “Muslims need wider help to end forced marriages… the problem of forced marriage persists. New Demands In the aftermath of the Afghanistan and Iraq interventions and the July 2005 (7/7) London metro bombings. alleged moderate Muslim leaders suddenly called for the Islamic holidays of Eid al-Fitr.eu . five of his British followers were arrested in Yemen and accused as participants in a terror conspiracy. radical Muslim agitation expanded in Britain.Abu Hamza Muhajiroun ancillary to the topic of this survey. and because of their marginal status we consider discussion of HT and Al. Founded in the 1920s in India. this assessment of the state of British Islam was far from definitive. Among these groups only TJ has gained a significant place in British Muslim life. With the events of September 11. The poll found that 41 percent of British Muslims opposed introduction of Shariah. such opinions are not and never were shared by “all Muslims”.46 The year 1999 saw the beginning of debate over the practice of forced marriage among British Muslims and its intersection with Shariah. In addition. as well as the views of an undecided 19 percent that could swing either way. This left ambiguous the nature of antiShariah sentiment. and Eid alAdha. to become national holidays (“bank holidays”) for all Britons. which we consider to be determined and committed. 2001.Britain: New Demands CIP Abu Hamza was prominent in the North London Central Mosque in Finsbury Park.


A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009

appeared deliberately alarmist. No distinction was made in the reportage between Shariah as questionable but nonviolent concepts in finance and medicine and what the newspaper described as follows: “Islamic law is used in large parts of the Middle East, including Iran and Saudi Arabia, and is enforced by religious police. Special courts can hand down harsh punishments which can include stoning and amputation.” The British non-Muslim public was left with the strong impression that nearly half of British Muslims sought the introduction of hudud punishments in the country, with the threat that such would be applied to non-Muslims. The scenario was nightmarish and, as a media projection, profoundly irresponsible. Unfortunately, this impression was reinforced by veridical reporting on informal Shariah practice in Britain. Certain British “experts” were regrettably hasty in defending Shariah. According to The Daily Telegraph, “Some lawyers welcomed the advance of what has become known as ‘legal pluralism.’ Prakash Shah, a senior lecturer in law at Queen Mary College, University of London, said such tribunals ‘could be more effective than the formal legal system…’ ”51

Soon a reaction among Muslims against Shariah promotion, even that comprising ameliorative arguments, was articulated, if in an ambivalent and inconsistent manner. In August 2006, partly in reaction to the brief IsraelLebanon war, the main Islamic organizations in Britain, reportedly following an initiative of the fundamentalist Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), addressed a letter to the government. Published as a full-page advertisement in The Times, the statement called for a change in British policy toward the U.S.-led intervention in Iraq and, by inference, British action for an immediate peace in Lebanon, to combat radical Islam as a phenomenon within British society.52 Titled “Protect Civilians Wherever They Are,” it was signed by such leading “mainstream” Islamist ideological and fundamentalist entities, in addition to MCB, as the British Muslim Forum (BMF), the Federation of Students Islamic Societies (FOSIS), and the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB). Following its appearance, Muslim representatives met with John Prescott and Ruth Kelly, prominent members of Tony Blair’s cabinet. A signatory of the 2006 advertisement, Shahid Malik, Labour member of the British

John Prescott MP, former Deputy Prime Minister

Ruth Kelly MP




Britain: New Demands


parliament for Dewsbury, a centre of radical ideological activity (in 2008, Malik bcame cabinet Minister for International Shahid Malik, MP for Dewsbury Development under Prime Minister Gordon Brown), had declared bluntly that Muslims desiring to live under Shariah should return from Britain to countries like Saudi Arabia.53 This statement is also worth reprinting in extenso. Malik wrote, “[A]fter a 90minute meeting with John Prescott, the deputy prime minister, to discuss the challenges of extremism and foreign policy, I emerged and was immediately asked by the media whether I agreed that what British Muslims needed were Islamic holidays and shariah (Islamic law). I thought I had walked into some parallel universe. Sadly this was not a joke. These issues had apparently formed part of the discussion the day before between Prescott, Ruth Kelly, the communities minister, and a selection of ‘Muslim leaders.’ I realised then that it wasn’t me and the media who were living in a parallel universe – although certain ‘Muslim leaders’ might well be. “Maybe some of these ‘leaders’ believed that cabinet ministers were being alarmist, that the terror threat posed by British extremists was exaggerated. Maybe they thought that the entire plot and threat were the ‘mother of all smokescreens,’ a bid to divert our attention from the killing fields of Lebanon. Or maybe it was another symptom of that epidemic that is afflicting far too many Muslims: denial. Out of touch with reality, frightened to propose any real solutions for fear of ‘selling out,’ but always keen to exact a concession — a sad but too often true caricature of some so-called Muslim leaders. “Other members of the Muslim community I am sure would have cringed as I did when listening to Dr. Syed Aziz Pasha, secretarygeneral of the Union of Muslim Organizations of the UK and Ireland, who explained his demand

for shariah and more holidays: ‘If you give us religious rights we will be in a better position to convince young people that they are being treated equally along with other citizens’… “Who speaks for Muslims?... As I have repeatedly said, in this world of indiscriminate terrorist bombings, where Muslims are just as likely to be the victims of terrorism as other British and U.S. citizens, we Muslims have an equal stake in fighting extremism. Hundreds of Muslims died on 9/11 and 7/7. But more importantly, given that these acts are carried out in the name of our religion — Islam — we have a greater responsibility not merely to condemn but to confront the extremists. In addition to being the targets of terrorism, Muslims will inevitably be the targets of any backlash. “…Some of the ‘Muslim leaders’… demanded shariah for British Muslims rather than the existing legal system. The call for special public holidays for Muslims was unnecessary, impracticable and divisive. Most employers already allow their staff to take such days out of their annual leave. And what about special holidays for Sikhs, Hindus, Jews?... “When it comes to shariah, Muhammad ibn Adam, the respected Islamic scholar, says: ‘It is necessary by shariah to abide by the laws of the country one lives in, regardless of the nature of the law, as long as the law doesn’t demand something that is against Islam’… [T]he prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) said: ‘It is necessary upon a Muslim to listen to and obey the ruler, as long as one is not ordered to carry out a sin.’ (Sahih al-Bukhari, no 2796 & Sunan Tirmidhi). “In Britain there are no laws that force Muslims to do something against shariah and Muslims enjoy the freedom to worship and follow their religion, as do all other faiths. Compare Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia, a shariah regime where women are forbidden to drive; or Turkey, a secular country where women are forbidden to wear the hijab; or Tunisia, where civil servants are forbidden to wear a beard… “Since I made my remarks my office has 31




A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009

been overwhelmed with support. I also know that some Muslims feel uncomfortable, not necessarily because they disagree but because they feel targeted. But what I want to say to my fellow British Muslims is that in this country we enjoy freedoms, rights and privileges of which Muslims elsewhere can only dream. We should appreciate that fact and have the confidence to fulfil the obligations and responsibilities as part of our contract with our country and as dictated by shariah law.” Although on foreign policy issues Malik wavered and accommodated the very radicals he criticised in 2006, MP Malik’s comments of that year summed up the traditional position of the first generations of Muslim immigrants to Britain. Indeed, he offered an excellent summary of the essential principles of moderate Islam in addressing these issues. As he pointed out, and as we have repeatedly stressed, authentic, established Shariah in both Sunni and Shia Islam calls on Muslims living in non-Muslim countries to accept the laws and customs of their new homes. In 2007, Policy Exchange, a British thinktank critical on multicultural issues, published a survey of Muslim attitudes in the UK, Living Apart Together.54 Policy Exchange determined: “• 62% of 16-24 year olds feel they have as much in common with non- Muslims as Muslims, compared to 71% of 55+ year olds. “• 60% of Muslims would prefer to send their children to a mixed state school, compared to 35% who would prefer to send their child to an Islamic school. There is a clear age difference. 37% of 16-24 year olds preferred to send their children to Islamic state schools, compared to 25% of 45-54 year olds and 19% of 55+ year olds. “• 59% of Muslims would prefer to live under British law, compared to 28% who would prefer to live under sharia law. 37% of 16-24 year olds prefer sharia compared to 17% of 55+ year olds. 32

“• 36% of 16-24 year olds believe if a Muslim converts to another religion they should be punished by death, compared to 19% of 55+ year olds. “• 7% ‘admire organisations like AlQaeda that are prepared to fight the West’. 13% of 16-24 year olds agreed with this statement compared to 3% of 55+ year olds. “• 74% of 16-24 year olds would prefer Muslim women to choose to wear the veil, compared to only 28% of 55+ year olds. “• 59% of Muslims feel they have as much, if not more, in common with nonMuslims in the UK as with Muslims abroad.” We note the stunning finding that fewer British Muslims over 55 support hijab (covering of women’s hair) than those in their teens, a counterintuitive fact to most non-Muslims. Based on our field research, we believe the Policy Exchange figure of 59 percent of British Muslims favoring British law, in contrast with 28 percent for Shariah, is more accurate than The Sunday Telegraph poll result of 41 percent for British law, and 40 percent for Shariah. We estimate that at present some 65 percent of British Muslims are firmly and even combatively opposed to introduction of Shariah, with pro-Shariah and neutral opinion on the issue inchoate and often uninformed. The CIP Survey of Shariah Agitation in Britain Beginning in November 2007, the Centre for Islamic Pluralism commenced a field survey of Shariah agitation and attitudes toward it in British Muslim communities. CIP investigators Stephen Suleyman Schwartz and Irfan Al-Alawi investigated Shariah sentiment in the main British Muslim communities in March-April 2008. Interviews included extensive meetings and discussions in London, Birmingham, Manchester, Bolton, Bradford, Sheffield, and Leicester. Interviewees included imams, muftis (legal authorities), spiritual shaykhs (pirs), British



Shariah Agitation in Britain


Muslim barristers and solicitors, social workers, and rank-and-file mosque attendees. The communal environment was enhanced, since the survey took place during the period of celebration of the birthday of Prophet Muhammad, a custom known as mawlid, which is common in Pakistan, the place of origin of most immigrant British Muslims, as well as in Britain. In addition, Shariah issues had been dramatised by the comments of Anglican Archbishop Rowan Williams. Islam in England was dominated for two generations by the Indian Barelvi sect, which appeals to the original cohort of immigrants and is oriented toward Sufi spiritualism, viewed as more quietist and mystical, as well as to British loyalty – notwithstanding that many Barelvis have never fully learned English or assimilated British customs.55 Barelvis are also considered amenable to better relations with Christians. Barelvism includes a Sufi order derived from the conservative Qadiri Sufi tradition, known as Razvi Sufism, and Barelvis in Pakistan have been active in taking back mosques they established, which had been subverted and brought under the control of Saudi-financed fundamentalist Wahhabis and of the Deobandi sect. Although the Deobandis, originating in India, were long viewed as peaceful and spiritual, they included students in medresas in Pakistan who assumed power in Afghanistan as the Taliban. Deobandism is also promoted by Tabligh-iJamaat (TJ). Younger British Asian Muslims, feeling more socially-dislocated because they have fully experienced Western as well as Muslim culture, may be drawn to Deobandism as a form of revivalism. The story of the radicalisation of Pakistani Deobandism, and its transformation from a religious interpretation into an ideology, is a complex one, but one thing is certain: many Deobandis in Britain are no less rigid and extreme than their mentors in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Deobandis are known for their violent condemnation of Barelvi spiritual practices. Their fundamentalism intersects with

and reinforces the anti-Indian jihadism of Mirpuris from Kashmir. Radicalisation in mosques is typically blamed not on preachers but on mosque management committees which allow radical preachers and TJ organisers access to religious facilities. Radical preaching is carried out mainly in English, while anti-radical activity, including preaching and publication, is largely effected by clerics in the immigrant languages, Urdu and Punjabi. This fact is counter-intuitive to the many non-Muslims who presume that foreign imams, speaking their original language, comprise the core of radicalism. But the young do not respond to preaching in the immigrant languages, and immigrant clergy do not learn English well enough for preaching in it. Paradoxically (or not), some leading radical preachers active in Britain are American-born converts. The language difference widens the gap between young, British-born Muslims, who show the growing influence of the Pakistani variant of Deobandism, and their parents and grandparents, who were mainly Barelvi immigrants. Young British Muslims often consider Barelvism to be oldfashioned, and Deobandism to be more political and therefore modern, although Deobandism is markedly backward-looking in its social attitudes, especially toward women and nonMuslims. Visible tension exists between established, moderate clerics of the earlier immigrant cohorts and recent immigrants promoting Deobandism. The first mosque visit by Al-Alawi and Schwartz was made during the week of mawlid at the new Madina Mosque in the city of Bolton. The Madina Mosque was established in Bolton after the takeover by Deobandis of an older mosque. When Al-Alawi and Schwartz visited the Madina Mosque for evening prayer and participation in the mawlid, attended by some 500 people, a shouting match erupted between a small group of fewer than half a dozen Deobandi interlopers and the imam of the mosque. One of the Deobandis declared that the new “shaykh” at 33




A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009

Bolton Mosque

the old mosque had “redeemed Muslims from crime” and shouted “I will kill anybody who insults my shaykh.” The Deobandi group were ejected from the Madina Mosque but remained outside the building loudly denouncing the congregation. Madina Mosque imam Muhammad Masud Qadri stated that the followers of the Deobandi shaykh claim the latter has the power of black magic, and refer to him as “Jinn Baba,” i.e. the master of supernatural beings. Among those who remained in the Madina Mosque, an adolescent asked the question “what is Shariah?” This began a lively discussion of radical demands versus traditional attitudes. In later interviews, Bolton traditional Islamic jurist Maulana Mufti Ayub Ashrafi expressed opposition to any introduction of Shariah, on the grounds that Muslims will ask why Islamic law must be introduced in nonMuslim countries when it does not function in the majority of Muslim countries. In addition, historically, and as should be recalled from prior comments herein, Shariah as a broad system never existed outside the lands of Islam, and Muslim legal scholars traditionally denied its applicability in non-Muslim societies. Britain has also recently seen the penetration of its Muslims by Wahhabism. Britain is further home to followers of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and the Pakistani radicals who adhere to the fundamentalist and exclusionary teachings of Abu’l Ala Mawdudi (1903-1979). The main British Muslim leadership organization, the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), with 34

Muhammad Abdul Bari as its General Secretary, is widely considered an MB front, but includes only about a third of Islamic congregations, or 400 mosques. The MCB has failed to attract followers from Barelvi mosques, and the 2007 Policy Exchange report, Living Apart Together, found that only six percent of the British Muslim public considered themselves represented by MCB.56 Professionals have been prominent in the Deobandi and Wahhabi milieux, mainly doctors, engineers, and lawyers. One liberal Muslim argument suggests that university curricula in these fields, without emphasis on the arts and humanities, lead to a simplistic view of religion. At the same time, it is noticeable that Muslim fundamentalists and jihadists consider themselves reformers, and have mounted a sustained attack on the inclusion of miracles, healings, relics, and shrines in the religion of Islam, much as such phenomena have come under criticism in the Judeo-Christian world. But reform may take one of two forms: modernizing, or purificationist.

Muhammad Abdul Bari, General Secretary of the MCB



Britain: Family/ Schooling


In Britain, Barelvi Islam, to emphasise, is viewed as rural and popular among the uneducated, while Deobandi and Wahhabi Islam have an “advanced” reputation. It is unsurprising, then, that the Deobandi sect flourishes in urban communities in Britain, among the educated and affluent, where activity by its missionary offshoot, Tabligh-i-Jamaat (TJ) is visible. The CIP survey was completed under the specified four headings: (1) Family/schooling (2) Institutionalization of Shariah by nonMuslim governments (Parallel Shariah) (3) Criminal aspects (4) Approach to Women (1) Family/schooling Radical Shariah advocates call for Muslim children to be educated only in Islamic schools. We analysed the effect of Shariah agitation on family behavior and school relations as described by British Muslim clerics, community leaders, and other moderate Muslim representatives. We asked: Do families more frequently consult religious leaders or submit queries to Shariah websites before making decisions? Our inquiries disclosed that traditional, anti-radical British Muslims, much more than those elsewhere in Western Europe, habitually consult imams and Sufi pirs [spiritual leaders] as they did in the past, for advice on personal problems involving employment, intergenerational disagreements, and exceptional difficulties such as health crises. Frequency of consultation with religious leaders does not correlate to sympathy with radical or antiradical ideology but is a cultural characteristic visible throughout the varieties of Islam imported into Britain from the Indian subcontinent. As previously noted, a Deobandi extremist in Bolton expressed complete dedication to a radical shaykh known as “Jinn Baba.” Radicals and Shariah extremists in particular are, however, likelier to surf Shariah websites because the latter are simpler in their answers, in line with the contrived or
Pupils at the King Fahd Academy, Acton, West London

extemporaneous nature of radical Islamist discourse, which as we have stated, repudiates precedent and promotes improvisation. In the area of health care, however, imams and Sufi pirs are more typically solicited for faith healing services by the older generation than by younger Muslims. Another of the paradoxical aspects of British Asian Islam, with its considerable Pakistani influence, is that the original generations of immigrants are traditional in their submission to British laws, but also in their devotion to folk medicine, faith healing, and related customs. As we noted in the 2008 Centre for Islamic Pluralism study, Scientific Training and Radical Islam,57 small booklets correlating the 99 Islamic names of God with different specific complaints and ailments are sold wherever Muslims are found, all over the world, and are easily encountered among British Asian Muslims. In one such, 99 Names of Allah, printed in India, we read the following: “Al-Hayy, The Everlasting: Anyone desiring sound health should recite this name 3,000 times daily. If a sick person writes this name in a bowl with musk and rose water and then washes such inscription with water and drinks the water, he will soon be cured from his illness, Insha’allah [God willing]. Alternatively, if such water is given to a person who is ill, he will be cured, Insha’allah.” The 13th century Syrian fundamentalist Muslim theologian, Ibn Qayyim Al-Jawziyya, composed a work of faith healing that remains extremely popular among Muslims today, including in the UK: Al-Tibb Al-Nabawi (The 35



60 early in 2008 the UK House of Lords addressed an “inquiry into the issues raised by the European Commission. In this volume. was issued by the Muslim Law (Shariah) Council UK… Tom Sackville.”58 British Muslims remained reluctant to participate in organ donation. in the language of the government. The application of this concept has been more rooted in cultural attitudes than strict application of Islamic (Shariah) Law. the Muslim Burial Council of Leicestershire (MBCOL) headed by Suleman Nagdi. “official approval for organ donation when a Fatwa. and policy actions to be taken at the Europe-wide level. This is the Islamic legal maxim of al-darurat tubih al-mahzurat (necessities overrule prohibition). Al-Jawziyya offers several supplications (duas. This concept has been applied in many differing ways by the Muslim community with regard to matters that relate to organ donation and transplantation. the Free Churches Moderator. These are in cases of necessity. replied to the Lords’ queries as follows: “Query 1: Please would you describe any Chair of the Council of Mosques & Imams. I would conclude that there are no real ethical barriers as such.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 Medicine of the Prophet Muhammad). Parliamentary Secretary for Health… was presented with a copy of the document by Dr. In 1995. British Muslims were granted. A Shariah body. Chairman of the Council.eu . Dr Rowan Williams particular aspects of organ donation and transplantation which are considered ethically problematic within the context of your organisation’s religious beliefs – as these are perceived: (a) within the UK or (b) in other EU Member States?” MBCOL’s Nagdi offered the following comments: “The interference and or the violation of the human body. Nagdi wrote. to religious organisations. A. the Chief Rabbi of the United Hebrew Congregations of the Commonwealth. Sir Jonathan Sacks. are prohibited in Islam. including Muslim groups. according to statistics reported from the West Midlands in 1997. to preserve the life of others and of one self. moral and ethical 36 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. The idea of people having to ‘opt out’ is in our view inappropriate when we look at the fact that ones [sic] organs are being used… We can envisage families raising legal. in response to the Lords’ citation of Muslim acceptance of “presumed consent” in Singapore. As with some of the prohibitions there is a balance that needs to be struck. Many Scholars in Islam have examined this issue and the points that flow from opinions appear to be as follows: Medical professionals should be entrusted in defining ‘death’ by clinical criteria and this is a question of medical fact rather than one of religious analysis. Dr David Coffey. “We do not believe that a system of ‘presumed consent’ would be appropriate. whether living or dead. The opinions all point to the fact that organ donation is permitted. Scientific Training and Radical Islam. the question of Shariah in organ donation attracted the attention of the British public. and the Archbishop of Canterbury. Cardinal Cormac MurphyO'Connor.” on organ donation and transplantation. M.59 As we further noted in our report. This balance is achieved by the prohibition being waived in some instances. but expressed opposition to controversial UK proposals for a “presumed consent” to organ donation. Zaki Badawi. “We should accept brain stem death as the proper definition of the end of life. or spiritual recitations and requests) along with suggestions for treating sicknesses.” Nagdi stated that Muslim objections to organ donation were cultural rather than religious.islamicpluralism. Sheikh Dr Zaki Badawi (third from left) with the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster. or religious verdict.

21 percent were estimated to come from ethnic minorities in 2008. in an attempt by the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) to introduce “parallel Shariah” in www. speak mainly English. which they indeed seemed to be.000 Muslim children between five and 15 years of age at the last census. doubts have been expressed about the nature of curricula in Muslim schools. but they are overwhelmingly Anglican or Catholic. We observed that while the parents discussed religious issues and the small daughter studied Qur’an. has become badly compromised by violence and pop-culture morality. They include 37 Jewish institutions.61 Some 15.7 million students) are religious. as if to indicate to us that his parents were oblivious to his interests. as in traffic accidents. a third (about 7.62 Of England’s 21. according to the Association of Muslim Schools in the UK (AMSUK). ten in Yorkshire. although only 68 belong to AMSUK: 22 in London. One of the boldest radical Shariah initiatives in Britain emerged.000. with the participation of (nonShariah) legal professionals. While this single incident cannot be taken as definitive. A Hindu school was announced for opening in 2008. Parents and students alike are concerned that the atmosphere in private Muslim schools. Private Shariah-oriented elementary and secondary schools are not widely-present in Britain. Still.S. however. Among 376. Children’s Services and Skills (Ofsted) responded by announcing that it would monitor independent faith schools in Britain to assure promotion of tolerance toward other cultures. two in Southeast England.islamicpluralism.” Nagdi elaborated. two Sikh.000 Jewish children currently receive instruction in private religious schools in which tuition is paid for by parents. In the religious school population. There are 127 full-time. however.64 The UK Office for Standards in Education. like that in non-religious state schools.000 Muslim youth and 11. seven Muslim. the boy commenced surfing gangster-rap sites on the Internet in our full sight. a 2009 report states that 24 Saudi-financed schools “about which little is known” and 26 fundamentalist seminaries usually referred to as a Dar ul-Uloom or “House of Religious Sciences” operate in the UK.000 state-subsidised schools. that demands for introduction of Islamic curricula in state schools receive little support from Muslim parents and students. in the interest of improving the quality of instruction. Further. privatelyfinanced Muslim schools in the UK. with 1. where the parents speak Punjabi between themselves but two primary-school age children. and were told that increasingly.65 We found. in addition to the mentioned primary and secondary institutions. one male and one female. We interviewed a Midlands British Muslim family of confirmed moderates. We heard complaints about gang activity and early pregnancy in Islamic schools. especially considering that organ donations in countries like the U. Muslim parents seek to place their children in Catholic schools. where students may be segregated from outside influences or taught negative attitudes CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) toward other communities.63 While British authorities announced plans to expand the number of officially-subsidised religious schools. that refusal of “presumed consent” should be made through detailed documentation such as wills. eight in the East Midlands.eu 37 . The potential for isolation and radicalization of Muslim students even in state schools was revealed early in 2007. no more than 1. with 17 percent of non-religious state schools representing such communities.Britain: Family/ Schooling CIP challenges against the medical profession when they are opposed to one of their loved ones [sic] bodies being used in this way. and 14 in the West Midlands.770 attend seven state-funded UK Muslim schools. it provided an example of the generational differences that are also manifested in private Muslim schools. in a system that could easily become unwieldy and obstructive. one Greek Orthodox and one Seventh Day Adventist. frequently occur after a loss of consciousness caused by severe injury. 12 in Lancashire. UK official policy has anticipated the absorption of around 100 private Muslim schools into the state sector.

i. Muslim parents in Western Europe have generally failed to heed radical demands that they place their children in religious schools. With a British Muslim leadership officially unrecognised. France. It is indicative of this situation that the debate over headscarf wear (hijab) in France was centred in state schools. The MCB has also sought to introduce anti-evolution. In other words. as in Germany. either because they lack the means to pay for private tuition. as well as introducing radical Shariah guidelines for the dress of both male and female students. a Muslim diet at meals. In line with the MCB’s Islamist ideology. What could be acceptable as a minimal “reasonable accommodation” of religious preference in state schools has already been partially transformed into a maximal demand by substitution of the concept of a Muslim “right” for that of “accommodation. such possibilities are limited and do not depend on government financing. Holland. and general anti-Western literature into British state schools. by “Shariah” in state schools. This situation. “optional” gender-segregated prayer areas. as an official institution established to improve standards among British imams. as has an ephemeral Sufi Muslim Council (SMC). as required by the most extreme Islamic interpretations. unless swimming lessons are segregated and girls provided with full body cover while being taught to swim. Muhammadiyah or Nadhatul Ulama in Indonesia) for assistance. In some Muslim countries. anti-Jewish. special consideration for students during the fasting month of Ramadan. no single Muslim organisation or institution has standing to represent the community as a whole in dealings with the government.eu . “Shadow Shariah”.66 The plan called for preventing Muslim students from being exposed to the principles of other religions.islamicpluralism. including exemption from examinations on grounds of physical weakness while fasting. emphasizing the lack of consistent provisions for public assistance in most Muslim countries. has a two-edged character. introduction of imams into state schools to conduct Friday prayer. poor families may go to radical mosques and movements (such as Hamas or the Muslim Brotherhood). or Islamic but not Islamist mass social movements (e. Sufi institutions (as in Turkey). But outside the West. notwithstanding such blandishments. Religious tribunals may handle family matters.e. and Spain. and exclusion of Muslim children from mixed-gender sports and especially from swimming instruction.g.” Interviewees also admitted frankly that they preferred the British system of social benefits to the absence of welfare programs in Muslim countries like Pakistan. mainly CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. or because Muslim schools are scarce. notwithstanding its thin roster of participating mosques (400) has attempted to assume this role. It should be recognised. and SMC. already exists in Britain. the school guidelines also called for a bar on participation in music and dancing. in that private Muslim education may be 38 replaced. that Muslim parents in Western Europe continue to mainly seek education for their children in non-Muslim state schools. (2) Institutionalisation of Shariah by nonMuslim governments (“Parallel Shariah”) In Britain. although MCB. the British government has supported a Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board (MINAB). “Towards Greater Understanding – Meeting the Needs of Muslim Pupils in State Schools: Information and Guidance for Schools”. as in the MCB scheme. In addition. reorganization of instruction periods to accommodate prayer times (especially Friday collective prayer). The much smaller British Muslim Forum (BMF) and Muslim Association of Britain (MAB) have also contended for such recognition. according to some because of the lack of such a provision for orderly relations. compulsory inclusion of nonMuslim students in Ramadan and other Islamic holiday events. special washing facilities for prayer. The Blair administration briefly extended financial assistance to MCB. nonetheless. and.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 state schools through a plan titled. informal radical Shariah. BMF.

In reality. Their lightminded remarks could aggravate. Faiz-ul-Aqtab Siddiqi stated that he anticipated utilizing the UK Arbitration Act 1996.Institutionalisation of Shariah by non-Muslim governments (“Parallel Shariah”) CIP marriage and divorce.67 “There are no official figures on the number of people in polygamous marriages in Britain. But Shariah is not a sound-bite topic. would request that the British government enforce verdicts rendered by his authorities. the growing tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims in Britain. Bradford. Shariah is a complex system of jurisprudence. but Zlakha Ahmed. Nuneaton. British social welfare practice already unofficially recognises polygamy and pays spousal benefits to second wives. principal of Hijaz College Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal (MAT). Sheikh Faiz-ul-Aqtab Siddiqi. While radical Islam. comprises an argument that traditional Muslims have fallen back into a state of jahiliyyah or pre-Islamic ignorance. failed to see that demands for Shariah in the West have little to do with increased respect for Islam and everything to do with the continuing radicalisation of Muslims. She says that women under pressure to enter into polygamous relationships often do not have anyone to turn to for help and that this can lead to mental health problems. Siddiqi said: “We realised that under the Arbitration Act we can make rulings which can be enforced by county and high courts. ignorance of Shariah among nonMuslims is matched by a similar void among the radical agitators. defining the MAT councils as arbitration tribunals. and the Hijaz College Islamic University. if both parties in the dispute agree to grant the tribunal jurisdiction in their cases. In her experience. the easier to recruit and indoctrinate believers for jihadism. Early in 2009. Warwickshire Sheikh Faiz-ul-Aqtab Siddiqi. differently applied by the four different Sunni and two Shia schools of interpretation. when they appealed in maladroit fashion for recognition of Shariah in Britain. says that the number of polygamous marriages is growing.islamicpluralism. and Manchester. near Nuneaton. they equate Shariah with their own improvised notions of religious justice. The act CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www.eu 39 . Paradoxically. with two more to be set up in Glasgow and Edinburgh. Pakistani jihadism and Deobandism. Shariah advocates in the West hope to separate Muslims from their non-Muslim neighbors. a woman’s support service based in Rotherham. is the ultimate issue in calls for adoption of a vaguely-defined Shariah. a project manager of Apna Haq. But Shariah fanatics call for something more: they want official state enforcement of religious decrees. Late in 2008. Warwickshire. the term jahili or “ignorant” may be applied with much greater accuracy to the radicals. rather than diminishing.” Archbishop Williams and Lord Chief Justice. a barrister and principal of Hijaz College Islamic University.68 MAT has established public offices in Birmingham. it is younger British-born Muslim men who are the driving force for the increase in numbers. Unschooled in Islamic law. Obligatory Shariah for Muslims. announced that a system of Shariah tribunals he directs. with rulings that could be enforced in law. BBC reporter Zubeida Malik noted. represented by Saudi Wahhabism. who chiefly seek publicity with their demands and threats. Baron Phillips. enforced by the British authorities.

said: “The MCB supports these tribunals.islamicpluralism. except for the likely appointment of radicals as arbiters.eu . Any such trends would. Inayat Bunglawala. which for Muslims is what the sharia courts are. Mohammed Ramzan. and creating a major burden on the public budget. and mosque disputes. who was a well-known antifundamentalist jurist. which is known as Britain’s main centre of Deobandism.”70 Authoritative moderate Muslim representatives in the UK have argued that any government recognition of the jurisdiction of Shariah courts over matters of common law in the West would mean either Shariah on the cheap dominated by ignorant radicals depriving British Muslims of their due rights – or an extremely elaborate system making room for the six main schools of Islamic jurisprudence. One of the most remarkable features of the CIP survey in Britain was the encounter with British Muslim solicitors and barristers. is himself a barrister CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. appeals. Many expressed fear that Shariah agitation would worsen the suspicions of nonMuslims toward the Muslim community. the Jewish beth din courts in numerous Western countries. In the city of Leicester. a principal investigator in our survey. commercial and debt disputes. assistant secretarygeneral of the Muslim Council of Britain. asked. tribunals had settled six cases of domestic violence in marriages. do not request official government backing for their decisions. by late 2008. so must the sharia ones”. in cooperation with police. He also criticised the British authorities for supporting “dialogue” with Islamic fundamentalists and stated that the problem facing British Muslims is terrorism. In Sheffield. Another. a prominent religious activist. to some extent. including the U. He declared “the demand for Shariah is a political slogan from which the Sunnis will not benefit. If the Jewish courts are allowed to flourish. and so on. treated this discussion with remarkable mildness. This method is called alternative dispute resolution. Shariah as a basis 40 for strictly voluntary mediation of family or business disputes might appear well and good. comprising Muslim divorce and inheritance issues as well as complaints between neighbors. Muhammad Islam Qadri is soliciting funds to open an anti-fundamentalist medresa.” He noted that Deobandis had entered 463 legal complaints against his father. Siddiqi said he anticipated his organization would gain jurisdiction over “smaller” criminal cases. not lack of Shariah. Several interviewees were concerned that introduction of Shariah would put Muslims in a legal limbo or ghetto. Siddiqi’s website69 states that his tribunals’ purview includes family disputes. “Who is Rowan Williams? His comments were unimportant. who they view as ignorant of Islam and whose comments left them confused as to their motives. CIP International Director Irfan Al-Alawi.K. and Canada. providing for an administrative apparatus.S. But outside Israel. Surprisingly.” he added. They were resentful of what they consider the patronizing interference of Archbishop Rowan Williams and others like him. About two-thirds of our interviewees expressed satisfaction with British civil law and articulated strong opposition to the introduction of Shariah.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 allows disputes to be resolved using alternatives like tribunals. aggravate the difficulties of British Muslims. we interviewed Muhammad Islam Qadri. “All we are doing is regulating community affairs in these cases. he was not a political leader like Tony Blair or Gordon Brown”. illegal forced marriages (banned by legislation in 2007). inheritance disputes. an article in The ABA Journal commented that Shariah “courts are controversial because they help to enforce cultural practices and traditions that may conflict.” Siddiqi first appeared as a promoter of Muslim tribunals in UK media in 2006. CIP interviewed local figure Mohammed Sadiq. These tribunals have reportedly dealt with more than 100 cases.S. Allegedly. the professional legal press in the U. certification of judges. it was repeated. with what is commonly done in the U. who stated that Muslims in Britain have more rights than non-Muslims in Saudi Arabia.

declared that Muslim opponents of the introduction of Shariah are much more sophisticated in their understanding of the distinctions between private and public law than many non-Muslim critics of Islam in Britain. Bradford.) (3) Criminal aspects A series of video documentaries by the UK television Channel 4 show Dispatches has shown that radical indoctrination in contempt for British law is prevalent in mosque education (Undercover Mosque – The Return). Sayyid Irfan Shah also stated forthrightly that Muslims have more rights to practice their religion in the West than non-Muslims have in Saudi Arabia. and stated that he is neither for Shariah in Britain.71 and that radical recruitment is widespread in British correctional institutions (From Jail to Jihad). pointed out that tens of thousands of British Muslims practice as solicitors and barristers. which must confront Saudi and Iranian political radicalism. aligned with the Pakistani jihadist milieu. British Muslim barristers and solicitors currently lack a support network or organization representing their interests. if such an intent exists. as well as fomenting hatred of the Ahmadiyya. in addition to the involvement of barristers in criminal cases. denying that it is. a Muslim solicitor. authorities in their own countries do not attack Muslims. Finally. and the Western nations.” was the scene of rioting by young Muslims in July 2001.” Nazir Begg. Some interviewed by CIP echoed the view that “parallel Shariah” would be a disaster for the Muslim community. British Muslims depend on solicitors for such essential legal services as preparation of wills and property transactions. which would be a position opposed by non-Muslims. he declared that traditional Sunnis. “Pir Habib” also defended the radical British Muslim Forum (BMF). (Irfan Shah is. Haroon Rashid. known as “Little Pakistan. which is violently anti-Shia. But “Pir Habib” denied that Lord Nazir Ahmed engages in the common Wahhabi practice of “insulting the Prophet Muhammad” by prohibiting Muslims from celebrating mawlid and otherwise denying the status of the Prophet as a speciallyenlightened personality different from normal people as well as from the monotheistic prophets preceding him. as is widely believed. it would produce legal chaos.eu . He denied that conflicts in Iraq and Israel represent an Anglo-American “war on Islam. nor against Shariah. the British and U. at the same time. CIP investigators conducted extensive interviews.72 41 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www.Institutionalisation of Shariah by non-Muslim governments (“ria h”) CIP and lecturer in criminal law at the University of London. In the city of Bradford. Sayyid Irfan Shah. and they represent a major potential bulwark against radical Shariah ideology in the country. “Pir Habib” is associated with the Muslim political figure Lord Nazir Ahmed. associated with the Hakchaaryaar (HCY) movement. Most British Muslim solicitors and barristers apparently do not desire the introduction of Shariah in the country. especially in Pakistan. who encounter religious enemies in Saudi Arabia and Iran. in that. A contrasting view was presented by Pir Habib ur-Rahman Sahib.islamicpluralism. which he argued would violate Islamic belief. a heterodox Islamic movement subjected to legal sanctions. A disciple of “Pir Habib. should find a way to form an alliance.” asking pointedly why. whom he described as a fundamentalist Wahhabi. This aspect of the Shariah debate has largely been ignored in British and global media. Muslim legal professionals observe that radicals prefer to enter the scientific and medical professions because in gaining standing therein they can avoid the participation in the British state required of solicitors and barristers. He controls a number of major mosques in Britain.” who maintains a girls’ school and holds large annual preaching assemblies. a jurist known as “The Lion of Bradford. operates a branch in Manchester of a well-known East London Shariah divorce facility.S. In Bolton. which would drastically change their professional status. who considers himself a spiritual teacher and jurist. of the type discussed in section 4) of Case Study: Britain. “Pir Habib” is a trustee of BMF. according to barrister Aseid Malik.

involving mosque instruction. kill. From Jail to Jihad reported on street gangs and inmates as part of an underworld permeated with a radical and dangerous interpretation of Islam. The crisis in Whitemoor attracted further attention in November 2008 when the Sunday Express reported that Muslim radicals had launched a “reign of terror” against other inmates in the facility. Peter Neumann of King’s College CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. the UK’s black nonMuslim population is a major target for radical Muslim recruitment. officials have expressed their concern about Islamic extremism. They are also taught to strip. may 42 target drug dealers and steal from them to support the underground Islamist movement. Officers expressed concern that prisoners increasingly were converting to Islam according to radical interpretations.S. and reassemble firearms. Muslims comprised approximately 11 percent of the UK prison population. Gang members. BBC News reported in October 200875 an official assessment warning of an environment of fear among staff dealing with radical Muslim inmates at Whitemoor. described rising “disaffection and distance” and said the problem “urgently” required official action. and on other Muslim prisoners to conform to a strict and extreme interpretation of Islamic practice. a view that conforms to Wahhabi teaching heard among young Muslims in the U. including lawbreaking ranging from robbery to killing.74 British correctional staff are untrained in distinguishing between radical and moderate Islam. commented that the Whitemoor report confirmed previous investigations findings at HM Prison Belmarsh in London.” A BBC correspondent.. Ms. Owers said: “There was a perception among officers that some Muslim prisoners operated as a gang and put pressures on nonMuslim prisoners to convert. kill. where jihadist recruits are taught to use explosives and celphones as detonators.S.76 This pattern in UK correctional institutions had become almost identical to that observed by CIP in U. Britain’s Chief Inspector of Prisons. while they made up 2.. but said that a nucleus of Al-Qaida sympathisers had compelled prisoners to become Muslims (a violation of Qur’an) and committed acts of violence against those who defied them.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 In the first case. a high-security prison in Cambridgeshire.. British officials have not wished to appear oppressive in dealing with Islamic extremism. they have feared any aggressive action might cause a backlash creating more radicalization. This datum alone illustrated the alienation of British Asian Muslims from the broader society. aggravates discontent among young Muslims. and that Muslim convicts in HMP Whitemoor were promoting a “strict and extreme” interpretation of Islamic practice. According to UK Channel 4. Prison officers warned that Muslim prison gangs sought to compel other inmates to support radical Islam.”73 The same Channel 4 video (Undercover Mosque – The Return) showed Muslim students being taught that lawbreaking is permissible when committed against nonMuslims. ex-inmates engaging in Islamist da’wa after leaving prison are an important element of the radical movement. The newspaper counted no more than 100 Muslims housed in Whitemoor. load.S. According to From Jail to Jihad. Also as in the U. female teacher Um Saleem at the Regents Park Mosque in London was recorded calling on Muslims to “ ‘Kill him. But as in the U.islamicpluralism. Anne Owers. Dr.S. kill’ homosexuals and those who abandon the faith of Islam. having become Muslims. Inside UK prisons young inmates are taught that Islam justifies their criminal activities if they are directed against non-Muslims. Many who are approached are former members of street gangs.S.5 percent of the total British population. In the UK as much as in the U. like that of many African Americans. British Muslim community life in socially-insulated enclaves. terrorist training camps are a part of an indoctrination program.eu . Inside HM Prison Brixton in London. Danny Shaw. prisons.

and suggested establishment of special prisons for jihadists. for example. “Those of a different faith or race may find it difficult to live or work there because of hostility to them and even the risk of violence. In many ways. which is perceived as an illegal imposition of separation. one after the other. Because once a thief’s hand is cut off.79 “there has been a worldwide resurgence of the ideology of Islamic extremism. the family of the victim told police it would be settled outside the ordinary British courts system. however. this is but the other side of the coin to far-Right intimidation. A British Somali community representative. This is why we say that. across the Gulf of Aden. How do these phenomena intersect with Shariah promotion? BBC Radio 4 reported in 2006 on a case in the UK Somali community.eu . said. There would be no rapist[s] at all. unknown throughout most of history and its use raises all sorts of questions about noise levels and whether non-Muslims wish to be told the creed of a particular faith five times a day on the loudspeaker.78 The broadcast described the Shariah Council at Regents Park Mosque in London. The suspects were released on bail. the call to prayer. which was paid by the families of the suspects. To some extent this is already true of arrangements for sharia-compliant banking but have the far43 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. which.Britain: Criminal Aspects CIP London recommended European governments improve monitoring of prisons to prevent their emergence as “major hubs” for terror recruitment. the main critic of this development has been Dr. “Such amplification was. we want to offer it to the British society. warned against viewing Muslims as a monoculture. Attempts have been made to impose an ‘Islamic’ character on certain areas. an assault committed with a knife was resolved by an unofficial Somali Shariah tribunal in south-east London. Sheikh Hassan. Ironically. with members ruling on every aspect of Islamic life. now two decades in the past. If only once an adulterer is stoned.” he said. One of the results of this has been to further alienate the young from the nation in which they were growing up and also to turn already separate communities into ‘no-go’ areas where adherence to this ideology has become a mark of acceptability. by insisting on artificial amplification for the Adhan. we have our own law. The Senior Judge and Secretary of the Council. of course. and the absence of a settled government in Somalia. wherever we are in the world.islamicpluralism. yes. When a group of Somali youths was arrested on suspicion of stabbing another teenage member of their community. the same facility where extremist preaching had been recorded. At the beginning of 2008. throughout its global diaspora. Michael Nazir-Ali.” British non-Muslim public opinion has expressed further dismay over the apparent transformation of ethnic enclaves into alleged “no-go” areas in towns with large Muslim populations. “There is pressure already to relate aspects of the sharia to civil law in Britain. it’s not religious – it’s just a cultural thing”. “Us Somalis. “This is happening here even though some Muslim-majority communities are trying to reduce noise levels from multiple mosques announcing this call. nobody is going to commit this crime at all. having been established for a quarter century. Bishop Nazir-Ali wrote. According to the BBC. is notably susceptible to fundamentalist and radical Islamic interpretations and ideology – a predictable outcome considering the proximity of the Arabian peninsula. said: “We know that if Shariah laws are implemented then you can change this country into a haven of peace. who in 1989. they would need more and more prisons.77 A more radical approach to Shariah in its relationship to lawbreaking was presented in another Channel 4 program. as the oldest in Britain. over quite a small geographical area. extensive Saudi influence. A hearing was called by community elders and the accused were ordered to compensate the victim by a fine. nobody is going to steal. … And if they don’t accept it. Divorce Shariah Style. “It’s not shariah.

While a marriage ceremony may be held. and therefore turn to the Shariah tribunals. what can we do?’ The image of a Muslim man pleading with his imam for a second chance with his wife. Shariah agitators demand that marriage and related issues be completely subject to religious jurisdiction. polygamy. Rather. so long as money is handed over. CIP found that the main area of vulnerability to Shariah agitation among British Muslims is that of divorce. the extent of involvement by informal. female genital mutilation (FGM). and it is considered sanctified by the presence of an imam and recitation of blessings. Muslim clerics in Western Europe may acquiesce in. ‘He has come to us to ask for help. Nikah is not a religious institution. In 2007. Some of this behaviour is derived from local cultures. Shariah authorities working in this milieu are widely considered to be radicals. As reported in The Daily Telegraph. A major Guardian reportage81 told of the situation as follows at the Islamic Shariah Council in Leyton: “In the back room of a converted corner shop in east London. because radical Muslim concepts of modesty. they cannot obtain civil divorces in the UK. British men are even perceived. Sheikh Maulana Abu Sayeed is trying to save another marriage… one of Sayeed’s colleagues at the Islamic Shariah Council in Leyton explains with a shrug. British Muslim women who cannot obtain divorces in regular courts are drawn to Shariah councils operating in East London under the domination of Deobandi fundamentalists. The decisions of these judges are typically guided only by personal whim. in traditional 44 Shariah.”80 These problems of Islamic family relations have spawned a “Muslim marriage mafia” in Britain. a specific Islamic marriage ritual or covenant is never described in Qur’an or other sources in the Sunnah. it operates on very small timescales and the process and the laws of evidence are far more lenient and it’s less awesome an environment than the English courts. But a very large number of British Asian Muslim women have been wed exclusively by nikah or marriage contract in Pakistan. violate Western canons on women’s rights. tribunals.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 reaching implications of this been fully considered?” (4) Approach to Women Family law is the most controversial aspect of Shariah. as vulnerable to appeals to become Muslims because Shariah would provide them means of gaining easier divorces. only to be told that it is his wife’s decision. There is a lack of clear definition between these councils and courts of arbitration. and offer mendacious legal interpretations to support. is not what most people would expect CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. and because their marriages are not recorded in registered mosques in Britain. the ceremony itself is not a sacrament. The manner in which “shadow Shariah” councils. be nullified by the action of either party. “shadow Shariah” tribunals in marriage and divorce was more fully exposed in British print media.islamicpluralism.eu . The clerics running the East London divorce racket extort thousands of pounds sterling from poor Muslim women to grant them “Islamic” divorces. nikah is an agreement between parties whose assets are inventoried in the nikahnama or contractual document. with limited religious training. and prevalent regulation of marriage and divorce. and the relationship can. such offences as forced marriage. the aforementioned Faiz-ul Aqtab Siddiqi said this type of court had advantages for Muslims. and the Saudi practice of “tourist marriage”. but it has been assimilated by Islamist ideology. “ ‘It operates on a low budget. Proponents of dissolving a nikah through Shariah tribunals do not address religious aspects of this practice. wife-beating. in a derisory manner. The interjection of alleged religious authority into the dissolution of a nikah is a gratuitous development introduced by Islamist ideologues.’ he said. forced divorce. but if the woman is adamant and she doesn’t want to reunite. or courts grant religious divorces to women was described incompletely in British media in 2006.

there is already legislation available to them. “shadow Shariah” courts operating in the area of divorce conform to mainstream Sunnism (Ahl as-Sunnah wa’al Jama’at or People of the Sunnah United in Consensus). then marriages solemnised will be good in civil law. which was a common practice in the pre-Islamic Arabian peninsula. they found that the first marriage was invalid as it had been conducted by an imam in an unregistered mosque. Ahmed affirmed that because Muslim women do not know their civil and traditional Islamic rights.eu . they may go to the informal Shariah courts for assistance in marriage and divorce cases. even though. or return of dowries. This has allegedly been especially common in Bradford because of the political reaction to the 2001 riots there. domestic conflict and especially divorce becomes an incentive to turn to Shariah. administers community programs to assist Muslim women with economic and social problems. Ahmed also stated that Muslim community organizations exploit the willingness of the UK and European Union authorities to finance women’s support programs. Ms. ‘It seems to me they haven’t really got a problem at the marriage end. none of the informal.. and communities.000 cases the council has dealt with since opening its doors in 1982 – and.. as noted. It considers everything… inheritance settlements and whether property deals comply with Islamic laws against accruing interest… But the overwhelming majority of cases are to do with divorce – 95% of the roughly 7. from two rooms that resemble a hard-up solicitors’ practice. from which funds may be diverted to other purposes. . and is believed to engage in such practices as multiple billing to finance social service programs. argues that much of this confusion could be swept away if shariah law on marriages and divorces were recognised under civil law. or religious judgments [sic – fatwas are judgments only among Shias.The Islamic Shariah Council. the wife of 45 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. She elaborated by saying that such women seldom attend mosque services or apply at mosques for help with their problems.. tucked away on a quiet terraced street of small family homes with roses in the front gardens. As is frequently recalled. failing to gain support in their families. But according to Lord Justice Thorpe. deputy chair of the Family Justice Council. and the husband was free to bring his second wife back to Britain as his legal spouse. and are merely opinions among Sunnis – CIP]. along with other shariah councils. Islam introduced women’s right to divorce and an equal share of property.” Tasleem Ahmed. But his case is typical of hundreds each year dealt with by a group of scholars who provide judgments on shariah law for Muslims across the country… The Muslims who consult the Islamic Shariah Council are not asking for permission to stone adulterous wives.. which has no legal authority. and others think they are properly divorced when. then flown to Pakistan and married again.Britain: Approach to Women CIP from a shariah court. After looking into the case. According to British Muslim solicitor Adeal Zahid. the latter tribunals charge large sums for decisions that are almost always improvised and typically do not adhere to traditional Islamic law. Financing from the EU is not subject to accounting.islamicpluralism. Luton police contacted [the counselling group Women Living Under Muslim Laws] after pursuing a man for bigamy who had married in Luton.’ he says. with releasing women from bad or forced Islamic marriages. “In one case. Bradford has a Council of Mosques that is considered corrupt. Qur’an expressly forbids female infanticide. issues fatwas. and that. Ms. His first wife was left with no legal protection by the family courts. they are still married. once registered. ‘All you have to do is register your place of worship and. For example. homes. a Muslim woman employed at the Bradford Advice Centre. or chop off the hands of thieves. some Muslims think they are protected by [non-Islamic] family law when they are not. specifically. Defenders of traditional Islam identify elements protecting women in the original Islamic revelation. but simply for day-to-day guidance on living in accordance with their faith… The council. in fact.

and not her siblings. ‘The imam told me to be patient. Manchester. and said many of the clerics were Wahhabis or members of Tabligh-i-Jamaat (TJ.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 the Prophet Muhammad.82 CIP International Director Al-Alawi said the organization would furnish the British government’s Home Office with a list of clerics who refused to help abused women and failed to preach in condemnation of domestic violence. For Hassan. who worked as a factory-hand to support her unemployed husband. Leeds and Birmingham. “As for what Aliyah thought of Hassan? Well. beaten. ‘I lost faith in imams because they refuse to discuss issues such as rape and abuse CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. And I couldn’t say no to him because I was raised to fear men and put up with their decisions. Not her father. who had routinely molested Aliyah in her formative years. Stoning as a punishment does not appear anywhere in Qur’an.islamicpluralism. She couldn’t seek the advice of another imam because clerics don’t usually deal with females that aren’t their students or known to them through family links. went to her local cleric to raise her concerns of being subjected to sexual abuse after her mother refused to listen to her complaints. who desperately wanted to uphold their parents’ honour and obey their demands. Aliyah – then a 20-year-old from Manchester – was a ticket out of Pakistan to join his brothers in England 46 in the hope of kick-starting a lucrative career in medicine. and is so justified in some Shariah authorities. ‘He wanted to do things in the bedroom that I didn’t want to do. but a couple of childhood photos he’d seen of her.’ she said. “ ‘I told my imam that I was suffering and that my confidence was broken. and he called for the imams to be deprived of government grant money.’ she told The Times. ‘And in the end he forcefully got what he wanted. who threatened to kill herself if Aliyah didn’t go through with the marriage. “For three years after her wedding in Pakistan in 1998 Aliyah – a practising Muslim raised in northern England. “ ‘I totally lost faith in spiritual leaders after that. who wears the hijab – was raped and emotionally abused by her husband. the debated oral commentaries of Muhammad.’ “Aliyah didn’t go back to the imam because he was a close friend of her family and she was afraid that he would relay her complaints to her parents.) He said the Home Office had promised an investigation. as well as attacks with burning cigarettes and belts by husbands who believe they have religious authority to brutalise women. rather than vice versa. no one cared. Al-Alawi ascribed the complicity by the imams in crimes against women to fear of losing their paid positions in mosques if they brought the topic before the community and public. Al-Alawi declared that an inquiry by CIP into domestic abuse disclosed incidents of sexual coercion. but is ascribed to hadith.’ Aliyah said. chose him as a spouse. The Centre for Islamic Pluralism (CIP) branch in the UK announced in September 2008 that it would publicly “name and shame” imams who provided an “Islamic” cover for domestic abuse by their silence in cases of women being burned. Al-Alawi noted documented complaints about imams who refused to act in such cases. and raped. Not her mother.’ “Aliyah. a rich merchant woman named Khadijah. Data would be drawn from interviews with dozens of female Muslim victims as well as social workers in Muslim enclaves across northern England – including in Bradford.eu . Al-Alawi provided the following as a specimen case83: “It wasn’t love that brought Aliyah and Hassan together.

eu . saying. now 30. but the advice she was given convinced her that she had to resolve her problems on her own.000 calls and develops about 300 cases annually. but children of immigrants may then be sent back to their original countries for such weddings. spokesman for the official Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board (MINAB).000 each year. a third 47 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. charities and nongovernmental organizations monitor what they describe as the growing incidence of forced marriage in their country. the latter are permitted. which is apparently considered taboo for Muslims to talk about. divorced Hassan in 2001 after she was overcome by severe depression that on more than one occasion pushed her to consider taking her own life.” Al-Alawi said. opposed public identification of these imams. “Aliyah.. She sought help from a therapist. Siddiqi’s group has used the issue of forced marriage.85 In Britain.’ Aliyah also accused her mother of ignoring her complaints about her sexually abusive father.’ “‘Aliyah’s’ name has been changed to protect her identity. “instead. with the majority involving Pakistani children who are often married to their cousins. we should encourage women to seek advice from proper imams. It was ridiculous.. Yousif al-Khoei. The British Government has established a Forced Marriage Unit (FMU) that rescued some 60 children 15 or younger between 2005 and 2008. however. “Aliyah said that clerics always put their community’s reputation ahead of women’s welfare. imams don’t want to bring up issues that involve the community because they fear that it would ruin the reputation of the Muslim community further. firstly they cannot speak English and the imam is very reluctant to have a conversation with a woman because they feel there is a barrier.84 British legal authorities similarly distinguish between forced and arranged marriages on the grounds that the latter may be consensual. arguing that while the former are banned in Islamic law. to press for official enforcement of MAT decisions by the British authorities. the total number of children forced into marriage from Britain may be 3. like that of divorce. Faiz-ul-Aqtab Siddiqi’s Muslim Arbitration Tribunal (MAT) has argued against confusing “forced” marriages with “arranged” marriages.000 children were reported to have disappeared from primary schools and were believed to have been forced to marry abroad. but described them as a minority. She said that some of her friends have gone through similar ordeals and have had complaints brushed aside by their clerics. Al- Khoei. In the UK.’ “Her tragic story is far from unique. She said: ‘When I told the therapist how I had been abused she said I needed to read self-help books. The custom is commonest in Britain among Pakistani immigrants.” In response to announcement of the CIP study. There’s a lot of sexual abuse as well. up to 2. While I didn’t want medication I just wanted someone to listen to me and to give me encouragement to build myself back up.” Forced marriage has become a major topic for discussion among British Muslim women. with the Muslim community here feeling that it’s being attacked and regularly discriminated against. “A lot of women who are brought from foreign countries to join their spouse here. “‘In the current situation. Forced marriage has been imported into Europe from tribal-based cultures. The unit receives 5.islamicpluralism. said some clerics justified domestic violence.Britain: Approach to Women CIP and refuse to speak up against it. It’s seen as an embarrassing issue for them and they won’t get involved because they think their reputation will be ruined and so would the reputation of the community.

When the girl informed a teacher in her school of her impending wedding. but it is absurd to believe that informed consent is present in a girl aged seven. after transporting her around Bangladesh to conceal her presence. who was abducted under such conditions.” CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. She was 48 Doctor Humayra Abedin. without her consent. She was beaten and drugged while her family married her to a Muslim stranger. In the British town of Luton alone. Pakistani girls as young as seven years old are sold by their parents to men in their 60s and older.islamicpluralism. The Daily Telegraph disclosed that the British High Commission in Pakistan had intervened in 131 such cases in 2007. A year before. was tricked into visiting Bangladesh. Shafaq Malik. the consent of the bride is required for the marriage to be valid. leaves court surrounded by police after the Bangladesh high court declared her free in Dhaka. in which a 33-year old Muslim woman doctor. In addition. Traditional Muslim scholars argue that these practices contravene Shariah. Photograph: STR/EPA freed after an action by the UK High Court under Britain’s Forced Marriage Act. 300 forced marriages are reported to authorities each year. reflecting increased appeals for help by victimised women. since dowries are supposed to be paid to the bride. since the girls trapped in these marriages are not old enough to make such decisions. the payment of “bride price” to the parents of the girl violates Shariah. was rescued from a village in Mirpur by two UK diplomats and returned to her British home. UK Foreign Secretary David Miliband announced that such diplomatic efforts would continue. she was at first met with disbelief. Late in 2008 a series of cases in which Muslim women were taken to Pakistan and subjected to attempts at forced marriage were exposed in British media. Humayra Abedin. around 15 percent of cases involve forcing boys into marriage. Forced marriage became illegal in Britain under the Forced Marriages (Civil Protection Act) 2007. are considered to represent a small share of the problem. which bans such unions. “to make provision for protecting individuals against being forced to enter into marriage without their free and full consent and for protecting individuals who have been forced to enter into marriage without such consent. the legal action was reaffirmed in a Dhaka court. yet they remain tolerated and even encouraged among Pakistanis living in the West. sent to Pakistan.86 Soon thereafter. another remarkable case was publicised. both female and male. not to her family. since the girls cannot be expected to assume any of the normal responsibilities of marriage. for financial motives alone. and raped and abused in a forced marriage. In 2008. Girls are not the only prey.87 In many cases. A helpline launched in April 2008 has registered an average of one case per week involving a child 16 or under. under a “consular assistance” program. a girl of 11 was rescued in Bangladesh and repatriated to Britain after an attempt to marry her to an older man. a nine-year-old from a Pakistani family in Britain was removed from parental custody after authorities learned she had been told she would be married.eu .CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 involving victims under 18. But these cases. The victims of this practice become sex slaves. before the wedding was completed. forced marriage of young girls to old men is obviously abusive and harmful to the victims. In traditional Islam. A teenage girl from a Pakistani family reported to British media that she was taken out of school at 13. 32. Finally. both physically and psychologically. her country of origin. The primary issue must be that of consent. A 15-year old.

Faiz ul-Aqtab Siddiqi has also admitted inequities in the divorce proceedings his organization administers. Siddiqi said his judges ordered nothing more than that the husbands take anger management classes and be mentored by Muslim elders. Siddiqi’s call for official enforcement of Shariah mediation elicited a strong repudiation from the UK Conservative Party’s spokesman on legal affairs. with the proviso that their decisions must be approved by a UK family court.) Applications for such orders may be made by the person to be protected. numerous Muslims have. in the Leeds area. is known in Britain. among Muslims. Bouchra Laroussi. while keeping control of Meimouna’s settlement of £1 million sterling. the division among the children would have been equal. They can’t forbid girls to attend mixed classes in school or award sons the bulk of inheritances merely because the parties agreed in advance to accept the verdict – any more than a regular court can enforce a voluntary contract of slavery or prostitution. in Morocco. they are at liberty to draft a consent order embodying the terms of the agreement and submit it to an English court.” Grieve’s comment represented a significant response to Westerners who argue that Shariah arbitration is merely a variety of contract between voluntary parties. the parties to a judgement in Sharia council wish to have this recognised by English authorities. and it is typically described as a cultural. under arbitration laws. British media reported that cabinet ministers had approved plans to allow Shariah councils to settle financial. Prentice stated that Shariah councils would have no recognised jurisdiction and that religious decrees would lack legal force.islamicpluralism. Meimouna only found out she was divorced without her consent when she learned of the second marriage and decided to separate from Kazi. enforceable at law like any other. property. Leeds. In October 2008. or any other individual. and provides for arrest of violators.” So-called “honour” murder of Muslims. He brought Laroussi to the UK and married her.90 The action was disclosed by junior minister Bridget Prentice in reply to a parliamentary question. as with other problems previously described. Kazi. Forced or otherwise illegal divorces are also known among British Muslims. Kurds. both male and female. This allows English judges to scrutinise it to ensure that it complies with English legal tenets. There was no further punishment. for 12 years.88 Khalil Kazi. rather than a religious problem. In a 1998 49 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. a payment based on a hospital malpractise complaint following an epidural abscess. criticised the clerical strata for failing to prevent such atrocities. She stipulated. Dominic Grieve. who declared. The order may be issued for a specific period of time. “If.eu .89 “arbitration tribunals can settle some disputes and have their judgments enforced. have been especially known for the practice. In January 2009. in a family dispute dealing with money or children. was sentenced to two years in prison after he “manipulated the judicial system” to divorce his seriously handicapped wife Meimouna and remarry. In six domestic violence complaints. 39 years old and a father of two. But they must act within the principles of English law. He noted that in an inheritance dispute handled by the court in Nuneaton. but the practice and related forms of abuse are also found among Hindus and Sikhs.S. forged his wife’s signature on divorce papers. the estate of a Muslim man was shared out between three daughters and two sons. whereas in a British court. a part time imam at HM Prison Armley. and the women plaintiffs ceased cooperating with police in the cases. The Shariah judges gave the sons twice as much as the daughters. but had already met another woman. a relevant third party. While there is no “official” legitimisation of so-called “honour” murder in Islam. and child-custody disputes. an imam was reported to have divorced his wife without her knowledge. as well as in the Christian and Jewish communities.Britain: Approach to Women CIP The act provides for issuance of protective orders (similar to restraining orders in the U.

Early in 2008. the preplanned and ritualised nature of much of this violence (particularly in the case of honourkillings and FGM) makes such behaviour distinct from other ad-hoc forms of violence against women. “Sana Bukhari. As we shall see. Domestic violence and ‘crimes of passion’ exist worldwide. premarital sex. based on data reported in 2003. Western countries. diminution of political prestige. drugging. to all intents and purposes. The CSC stated that humiliation based on honour may include social ostracism. Similarly. It was a telephone nikah. have become so sensitised to such issues as childhood bullying that unfortunate behavior that has existed for many generations has been transformed into a public policy issue. mutilation. precisely such bans are often at the source of so-called “honour” murder.eu . however. declared. an indigenous 50 and self-perpetuating phenomenon which is carried out by third and fourth generation immigrants who have been raised and educated in the UK… Many of these problems are common to all societies. But the CSC report also determined that Muslim girls may be withdrawn from school if it is feared that education will make them too assertive of feminist or otherwise independent attitudes. domestic violence. the Centre for Social Cohesion (CSC). and Britain in particular. CSC.92 The study included forced marriage as an “honour crime. and it was prostitution.” When she finally arrived she found out that he was disabled. Some of the consequences of loss of honour described in the CSC report. titled Crimes of the Community. which incident has been widely discussed among British Muslims. “The police and the Crown Prosecution CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www.islamicpluralism. so the mother in law decided to invite all these men over. an outreach worker at the Ashi’ana refuge in Sheffield. However.” The CSC report summarised the situation of British Muslim women in dramatic terms: “This study shows that honour killings. withdrawal from education and forced marriage by their own families. a non-religious British think-tank. he had the mental age of a five year old but the body of a 40 year old. Westernised habits including use of intoxicants. Such attitudes are unrelated to Shariah. ethnic and religious superiority. This is not a one-time problem of firstgeneration immigrants bringing practices from ‘back home’ to the UK. Instead honour violence is now. rape. published an extensive survey of socalled “honour” murder and related atrocities including female genital mutilation (FGM) in the UK. false imprisonment. do not seem to fit with criminal behavior or atrocious mistreatment. and gossip. boycott of businesses.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 fatwa. As a result of these ideas. they are difficult if not impossible to expunge from society. such as bullying of children. While typical incidents of domestic violence involve men using force against their wives. says: ‘I have one case when someone was brought over and her husband had mental health issues. honour-based abuses regularly involve a woman’s own sons.91 the fundamentalist ECFR held that husbands may prohibit wives from visiting certain women friends if the husband fears harm to the family or a risk to conjugal relations. The girl however managed to escape and go to the police. and loss of self-esteem. and this girl was very pretty. While all such phenomena may be regrettable.” CSC noted that “damage to honour” may arise from defiance of parental authority. abduction. so the girl only saw what he looked like on picture and thought “gosh he looks good. as well as members of their extended family and in-laws. forced marriage and FGM are not isolated practices but are instead part of a selfsustaining social system built on ideas of honour and cultural. which nowhere pronounces on the appropriateness of female schooling. every day around the UK women are being threatened with physical violence.” along with a description of one of the most shocking cases of abuse of a Muslim woman in Britain. Regarding so-called “honour” murder per se. brothers and sisters. honour crimes differ significantly from other outwardly similar crimes. As the report stated. death.

Only two Kurdish women are recorded as having been killed by their relatives in the UK”. and sent her to Iraq. resentment of intermarriage between religions is no more limited to Muslims than are “crimes of passion”. Media reported that the case elicited pressure on British authorities from Kurdish women across the country.Britain: Approach to Women CIP Service [CPS] have said that on average 10-12 women are killed in honour-based violence every year in the UK. for its part. an Iraqi Kurd living in Britain.94 Yones had discovered that Heshu had a Lebanese Christian boy-friend and exchanged love letters with him. it has not attracted considerable attention in Britain. who demanded that the killer be brought to justice. honour killings would amount to a relatively small proportion of the total number of murders committed annually in the UK.K. CSC stated. Yones was sentenced to life in prison.93 The EP stated. disappearances after return to native countries. the exact number of honour killings in the UK is not known – partly because there is no clear definition of what constitutes an honour killing – and many believe the true figure could be higher.islamicpluralism. pointing out “the Kurdish regions of Iraq and Turkey have among the highest rates of honour killing per capita recorded. CSC said. Hindus and Sikhs also carry out honour killings but seemingly at a proportionally lower rate. The family confiscated the letters. which she feared was an attempt to force her into an unwanted marriage. is unhelpful in assessing the prevalence of “Shariah abuse” among European Muslims. “Between 1993 and 2003 police identified 109 honour-related crimes across U. Honour killings by South Asians occur nationwide. even if it is Muslim.” Unfortunately. In 2002. If this figure is true. “Most of the honour killings known to have occurred in the UK appear to have been carried out by people of South Asian Origin. Sunni Islam permits Muslim men to marry non-Muslim women. of 51 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. although Kurdish men appeared in the courtroom to defend the accused.eu . Although many – and perhaps most – honourrelated murders are carried out by firstgeneration immigrants to the UK. CSC reinforced the sense of cultural context in so-called “honour” murder.) Islam forbids Muslim women from marrying non-Muslim men. Abdullah Yones. alleged that the incidence of so-called “honour” murder might expand statistically based on inclusion of “crimes of passion” among nonMuslims including Christian and Jewish Britons as well as Hindus and Sikhs. along with slayings committed after repatriation of immigrants to Pakistan or Kurdistan. though such intermarriage is common in some Muslim societies. abominable as they are. “there have been no recorded honour killings by Arabs in the UK – even though many women’s groups say that domestic violence among Arab immigrants is common”. In the aftermath of the Yones case.” The CSC. In a further elaboration that remains empirically elusive. A more precise estimate was offered by the European Parliament in its 2007 report on the problem. UK police examined 122 deaths and disappearances of minority women in the preceding decade.” But it also stipulated that “there are relatively few recorded cases of honour killings by Kurds in the UK.” So-called “honour” murder is often ascribed to opposition to marriage out of Islam or with a partner from a disapproved ethnic group. while Shias are allowed only to enter into “temporary marriage” (muta’a) with nonMuslim women. and Europe. compelled her to undergo a vaginal examination to confirm her virginity. (While muta’a is condemned by Sunni Muslims as well as non-Muslims as a pretext for prostitution. basing itself on news reports. a vaguely-estimated quantification of such crimes. However. an increasing number also involve people born and raised in Britain. Most of these murders are carried out by Muslims from Pakistan and Bangladesh. and suicides. 48. It is important to note that while this problematical matter is inseparable from Shariah. killed his 16-year old daughter Heshu by cutting her throat after stabbing her 18 times.

four London Boroughs participated (Newham.95 The husband turned himself into police and admitted the crime. by asphyxiation. In addition. 21 cases were brought to court and 10 ended in convictions. Bangladeshi or Indian)… Victims were almost equally likely to be male or female with most of these ‘honour’ crimes stemming from a relationship with a woman. 29 years old. and West Yorkshire. but such authority is derived from controversial hadith. “c) To inform the development of any national guidance and training for prosecutors. Home Office. CPS called for “setting up a forced marriage/so-called ‘honour’ crimes witness familiarisation programme to develop expert witnesses on these crimes. the husband mainly worked in Saudi Arabia. CPS identified 35 cases of forced marriage and/or socalled “honour” crime during the survey. managing and prosecuting these cases. and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. In the wording of the report. and most defendants were classified as Asian (Pakistani. London. on average. 21. The survey covered nine months and was concluded in March 2008. The CPS findings had been collected beginning in July 2007 with the following goals: “a) To identify the number and pattern of cases. Another so-called “honour” murder in Britain was disclosed in December 2008 when Emran Hussan. West Midlands. who herself suffered harm. Female genital mutilation (FGM) is legitimised by some scholars of Sunni Shariah. Ministry of Justice.96 The document was compiled by CPS in cooperation with the UK Departments of Health. Significantly.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 whom 81 were from the London region.” The report further commented: “One of the key issues in relation to defendant profile was the tendency for individuals to be aged under 35 years old. the fundamentalist Shariah authority Al-Qaradawi has issued a qualified endorsement of the practice. CSC further 52 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. CSC correctly notes that “almost all Muslim clerics oppose infibulations (Type III FGM)98 which they usually regard as an unlawful pre-Islamic practice” . Rubina Hussan was married at 18 and told doctors she believed she was too young to have a child. Hesha Yones Murderer: 48-year old father. 27. as previously indicated. Brent. Abdullah Yones The survey was conducted in four CPS Areas: Lancashire.” As a companion document. just under a third (10 of 33) aged 18 to 24 and just over a third (12) aged between 25 to 34 years old. The couple were cousins from Bangladesh. difficulties in securing testimony from victims and witnesses were typically responsible. the UK Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) issued a pilot report on forced marriage and honour crimes. of Bedford. where such incidents are common and effectively unimpeded.97 The report concluded that when prosecutions failed. claiming he feared she would abort their child. as well as non-governmental organizations. CPS also issued policy recommendations for dealing with these issues.islamicpluralism. In December 2008. Tower Hamlets and Ealing). “b) To identify issues facing prosecutors in accurately identifying. within a situation of male family control. “All defendants… were male. “indicating a need to address specific support systems for victims”. Children. Three defendants were aged 10 to 17.” Victim: 16-year old daughter. Schools and Family. with a minimum of 12 years. aged. Emran Hussan was found guilty of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.eu . as part of ongoing work around expert witnesses”. killed his wife Rubina.

and Eeshal. Both Jamil’s marriages were based only on nikah. suggested that Sahar had not committed suicide. or a triple declaration of divorce. while Deobandis affect a 53 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. the head of the socalled Muslim Parliament of Great Britain. a solicitor. aged 1. discovered that Jamil was already married to Narissa Amjad. “FGM is also found in non-Muslim cultures and societies – primarily in Africa. A friend of Jamil stated that he was drunk when the wedding took place and that nobody from his family was present. In Egypt. now 32. She moved out of Jamil’s house and then sought an Islamic divorce from him. shortly before her 24th birthday. A 2006 study of FGM by the UK Department of Health99 estimated that some 75.islamicpluralism. a 29-year old marketing executive. and a sex tape in which she appeared was posted on the Internet.Britain: Approach to Women CIP points out. He attempted to end the relationship by talaq. now 11. When the tragedy was reported in The Times. Sahar Daftary. leaving the woman with no rights or division of property. with whom he had two children. With immigration of Kurds from Iraq to Britain since the first Gulf war. Kurdistan with Jamil but divorced him on grounds of adultery and unreasonable behavior. and may be quite fashionable. outside the African and peninsular Arab region. Daftary had been married in Britain and had a miscarriage about two months after her wedding. Sami.000 women living in Britain had undergone the practise. Sebina Malik. who was crowned Miss Face of Asia in a beauty contest in 2007. Sufioriented Barelvi women wear loose tunics and trousers – ethnic garments that do not cover or hide the shape of the whole body. prior to immigrating to Britain. but data on the practice is lacking. allegedly because they disapproved of marriage to an Afghan woman. while traditional. Jamil reportedly contracted the earlier marriage with Amjad while married to another woman. 33. FGM may occur in the UK. Malik had a daughter. died in an apparently suicidal fall from the 12th floor of the building where her husband. by the Prohibition of Female Circumcision Act 1985 and the Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003. Daftary complained to police that she feared she was being stalked. Polygamy among British Asian Muslims was widely exposed by media at the end of 2008100 when. Sahar’s sister Mariya Massumi. FGM was outlawed twice in the UK. Barelvi men also frequently wear Western clothing. Similarly the practice is found in Christian areas of East Africa such as Ethiopia and Eritrea as well as in parts of West Africa where animalist (sic) beliefs are still prevalent. when she learned of her husband’s polygamous relationship. Regarding issues of women’s dress among Muslims in Britain. admitted that Islamic clerics performed polygamous weddings unrecognised by civil law. Kurdistan is especially known as an area of FGM. But no complaints have been brought under the 1985 or 2003 laws regarding the practise.eu . which could make the case a so-called “honour” murder. 4. 34. a model from Afghanistan. Ghayasuddin Siddiqui. Rashid Jamil.” As with so-called “honour” murder. Daftary. lived. The same outfit may be worn by Barelvi men. the practice is as common among Coptic Christians as among Muslims. a former curry restaurant owner. fundamentalist Deobandi women will typically wear hijab and even a full abaya and niqab (total covering including the face veil).

November 30. August 20.” Associated Press. Zubeida. 57 Centre for Islamic Pluralism. Washington. Sue. Music.matribunal. 65 Unsigned. Abul. April 28. Seek Different Sort of Summer Camp – Afghan.html.com. and Unsigned. July 9. Denis. 52 Full-page advertisement. Policy Exchange. In the cities of Dewsbury. “Revealed: UK’s first official sharia courts. 2008. October 22. “Wahhabis in the Old Dominion. but should not attempt to satisfy both cultural modes by mixing them. 73 Carroll. March 15.” The Guardian [London]. 2006. Bradford. 2008 (downloadable . op. 2001. ibid. March 12.” Daily Mirror [London]. “Staff ‘fears’ over Muslim inmates.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 long. 64 MacEoin. January 11. August 15. 2008. February 20. Munira. 2009. Prisons. 2007. 45 Sawer.org. and Muslim Schools in Britain. 54 Mirza. says British Muslim leader. London. Irfan. 2008. 39 Schwartz. 1997. Shahid. 50 Hennessy. “Comments on the Islamic Religion. “Faith schools set for expansion. Stephen.org. 71 Broadcast September 1. Laura. while Deobandi women may be kept at home. “Ofsted checks on school extremism. 61 www.” Daily Mail. 66 Al-Alawi.” The Sunday Times. 1997. and Other Sins: Segregation. February 20. “Happily married?. published at www. 49 Chapman. Living Apart Together: British Muslims and the paradox of multiculturalism. Pakistani Outposts Offer Military Training To ‘Defend Our Faith. “Channel 4’s Dispatches: Undercover Mosque – vile sisters of no mercy. “Muslim schools offered cash to become state-run. Scientific Training and Radical Islam. Marc. “Western banks carve niche in Islamic trade finance. accessible at www. 43 Schwartz.” The Daily Standard [Washington]. August 27. London. Muslim-Law Compliant Housing Finance Launched. Integration. Elsewhere a mix of hijab. “Shariah Comes for the Archbishop. September 19. November 23. Black America. 2008.” BBC News. 60 Scientific Training and Radical Islam. Wahhabi short pants on men. 1999. 2008.moravian. 2008. Barelvi women pursue professional careers. 2008. and Whiteman.eu . 53 Malik.’ September 2005.’ “ The Wall Street Journal. 48 Champion. 44 Unsigned. ‘Islamic Groups in Britain: A Background Paper From the Social Responsibility Committee of the Moravian Church. 2006. 42 Unsigned. August 12.com/index. 47 Bodi. 2006. 2008. 1993.” The ABA Journal [New York]. Michael. March 9. September 11. “If you want shariah law. 51 Rozenberg.abajournal.pdf) 58 Memorandum. cit.ams-uk. 76 Murray. 2002. July 5. “My men train for armed conflict. “Lack of Asian donors extends waiting time for transplants.K.” The Sunday Times.” BBC News. and Ja’far. Chess. September 2.” Dow Jones International News.uk.pdf). July 24. October 18. 2008. 1989. October 10. “Muslim Youth in U. Dominic. April 8. Faisal. James. white “Islamic” garment. Patrick and Kite. 2009. Stephen. The Times [London]. February 25.” The Independent [London]. 2007. 75 Unsigned. op. Washington/London. 72 Broadcast June 16.” The Daily Telegraph.K. cit. 62 Clark. you should go and live in Saudi. 63 Clark. Martha. “Muslim fanatics ‘hijack British prison. full body and facial covering (abaya and niqab) are notably more visible than in other British Muslim communities. cit. 78 Broadcast February 3. 68 Taher. 41 “Complementarity” may be equated with the Americanoriginated concept of “reasonable accommodation” as previously described herein. James. 40 Nazir-Ali. 12 August 2006. “Muslims call for special bank holidays. 2008 (downloadable . 2006. Civitas. op.” The Weekly Standard. Michael.” Financial Times [London]. out of public scrutiny. 1999. January 11. “Poll reveals 40pc of Muslims want shariah law in UK.” The Sunday Telegraph.” Evening Standard [London].” The Guardian. 2008.” The Daily Telegraph [London]. NOTES 38 Schwartz. 1995. “Police arrest Islamic fundamentalist under anti-terrorism law.” The Weekly Standard [Washington]. Stephen. 70 Neil. and tracksuits and sports shoes are increasingly visible.” BBC News.” Daily Mail [London]. and Radical Islam. “Islamic Court Rulings are Enforceable in the United Kingdom. Joshua. September 10. 69 www. 1977. abaya. 2008. Alison.islamicpluralism. Melissa.’” Sunday Express [London]. 77 Rozenberg. Senthilkumaran. 56 Mirza.” The Weekly Standard. arguing that Muslims should choose either Muslim or Western garments. Abi and Ja’far. 79 Nazir-Ali. “U. 2007. 1999. 46 Unsigned.” British Broadcasting Corporation. Senthilkumaran. and Leicester. and Schwartz. 2008. “Koranic codes. Traditional Muslims view such a mélange with disdain. “Multiculturalism Run Amok. 59 Daniels. 74 See Centre for Islamic Pluralism. Stephen. “Shariah law is spreading as authority wanes. “Reading and Writing and Ramadan. “Extremism flourished as UK lost Christianity. Patrick. 67 Malik. 54 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. Sarah. September 14. Crown Copyright. Zein. 55 Groves.

UK].” The Times. London.eu 55 . James. “Case study: ‘For many imams speaking against rape is embarrassing. 91 Conseil europeén des fatwas et de la recherche. 98 Type III FGM is “excision of part or all of the external genitalia and stitching/narrowing of the vaginal opening. 2008. 2008. at www. Nickerson. cited in Brandon and Hafez. “For family honour. Chris.’” Daily Mail. “ ‘Face of Asia’ death plunge model had been pregnant. a deadly defiance: ‘Honour killings’ on rise in Europe. Recommendations on Future Work on Forced Marriage and So-Called ‘Honour’ Crime.” Daily Examiner [Huddersfield. 2008. p.” op. Centre for Social Cohesion. “How Safar Daftary’s death fall exposed polygamy in Britain.” Daily Mail.” The Boston Globe. September 26. 82 Kerbaj. CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. 1. “Europe’s Sharia Question. Unsigned. Simon. 2008. Richard. cit. 89 Roughneen. “For Muslim women. They are now.” Daily Mail. 90 Hastings. Humayrah Abedin. 2008.” Daily Mail. Salam. n. London. December 25. James. 95 Britten. December 12. Spolar.” Evening Standard. Nick.” The Daily Telegraph. “Imam who secretly divorced £1m wife is jailed. 2008. 2005. 96 Crown Prosecution Service. Sue. Neil. Liberation From Forced Marriages. “A new weapon in the fight against forced marriage. 100 Naraian. 2006. 86 Unsigned. 84 Muslim Arbitration Tribunal. January 24.. 93 “Honour Killing Its Causes and Consequences: Suggested Strategies for the European Parliament.000 Asian children vanishing from school and ‘forced into arranged marriages. September 29. Recueil de fatwas.” The Times. Boffey. “Nine-year-old brides saved by authorities from being married off in Muslim weddings. December 27. 87 Blakely. London.islamicpluralism. September 26.” The Daily Telegraph. cit. Prevention of Female Genital Mutilation in the UK 2006. March 11. December 15. Switzerland]. Dan. Matthew. 2009. January 16. 2005. “Purge on Muslim clerics who turn a blind eye to the abuse of women. op. cit.d. European police weren’t looking for this kind of violence steeped in tradition. 2008. Crimes of the Community. Jaya. 2008. “In the name of the law. 2008. freed by Bangladesh court. 92 Brandon. 81 Bell. Dominic. Luton Today. 2008. 2008. and Hafez. “‘Forced marriage’ doctor. 88 Atkinson.p. 2008. December 1. “Vigil of tears for death-plunge Muslim model beauty. Kennedy.” 99 British Medical Association. Andrew. November 17. 2008.. “Sharia rulings on divorces and disputes to be rubber-stamped by English courts.” International Relations and Security Network [Zurich. 83 [—]. “Court: Husband ‘killed wife over fears she would abort baby.’” The Daily Telegraph. Rhys. 156-157. CPS Pilot on Forced Marriage and So-Called ‘Honour’ Crime – Findings.” and Miliband.” Chicago Tribune. 2008. 97 Crown Prosecution Service. November 23. October 25.com/ 85 Slack. 94 Lloyd-Roberts.Britain: Notes CIP 80 Rozenberg.matribunal. Daniel and Chapman. March 21. September 26. “Life for husband who killed wife after baby abortion fear”. op. Colin. Série no. she had to die. June 14. David. 2008.” The Guardian. “Forced marriage for 15-year-old in Pakistan is foiled. “More than 3. December 28. 2008.’” The Times. Christine. Hickley.” The Times. “Every Noise I Hear I Think He’s Coming to Kill Me. 2007. n.

eu . Policemen look on passively. Centre for Islamic Pluralism *** I glance out of the window at a dreary British afternoon slowly unraveling into early evening. Passersby with faces covered in an “Islamic” manner snatch the tapes. The same agitator was a fixture of the street. thrusting his recordings at the crowd. when questioned on this topic. more than one hundred years later. and that a patient suffering from alcoholism or a sexually-transmitted disease could become favorably disposed to Muslims if treated with correct medical care and kindness by a Muslim physician. Of course. Ahmed MD Introductory Note Because the UK is a global centre for medical training. probably of Pakistani background. green light of the Whitechapel Tube station. and employs numerous Muslim medical professionals. I am witnessing a modern tragedy: the rise of Muslim fundamentalism in Western Europe. for women. needed in the Intensive Care Unit. CIP therefore publishes the following commentary on this topic from a leading moderate Muslim doctor. Below. But I rushed away. but pulled to him by his energy. on the steps of a monument. the irony was doubtless lost on him that his hate was expressed on the steps of a monument donated to the community of Whitechapel by British Jews who had thrived there 90 years before. Others stuff the plastic cases into grubby Western-style jackets worn over an imported thobe. I become aware that while the working class British Jews who lived here had dignified the neighborhood with a monument.islamicpluralism. During our field survey. He also wears a thobe. figures in robes. anchored only by his heavy Nike sports shoes and a leaden sense of evil. a new and grotesque spectacle is drawing a crowd. “Death to America! Death to Israel” he shouts in a distinct “Geordie. 2005. pulling me out of this view into European Islamofascism and back into the world of East London critical medical care. elevated above the ankle in the manner typical of fundamentalist Wahhabi clerics.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 Appendix to Case Study: Britain Islamist Ideology at the British Bedside By Qanta A. several more British Asians gather in a thin cluster. sometimes with gloved hands that scuttle back into the obscurity of their body-concealing garments. a young British Asian Muslim. CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. he seems almost like a boat ready to set sail. Only a sprinkling of impassive 56 constables remind me I watch this scene in London – everyone else is dressed in either full body coverings. with Muslims enjoying advanced. It is eighteen months before the London bombings of July 7. working class British Muslims today are desecrating it. or thobes. hands out cassette tapes. will punish sinners. one interviewee commented. modern education but ignorant of their religion. that God. of British Muslim medical students who now refuse to attend classes on alcoholism and other problems produced by practices banned in Islam. I watch it flutter limply in the October wind. I look back at the speaker. abayas and chadors quickly swallowed up by the dank. Many rush by a small theatre without taking note of the street agitator. and it is neither pressed nor starched. unperturbed by his flailing arms and rising pitch. My pager goes off. In my first few months in London I learned that such scenes were common in the great city at the beginning of the 21st century. Across the street I sight the window of what had been the home of the tragically-deformed “Elephant Man. Around him. His head is high. appearing unsure whether to stay or go. accent. the traditional Saudi style of male dress. The cheap polyester of the garment is obvious. not doctors. specialised attention is necessary regarding encroachment of Shariah agitation in the training of UK medical personnel.” Today. so unlike the elegant Saudi men I have known in Riyadh. Inflated with hate.” or Northeast English. one fist in the air. I would see the same abhorrent scene the following Tuesday.

Some of the fundamentalist doctrines of this religious outlook defy a normal imagination. I squeezed some alcohol hand rub from the wall-dispenser. As I moved away from the Xrays. you don’t follow. recently returned from practicing intensive care in Saudi Arabia. I am a Muslim. While many were Saudis.” he declared as he moved swiftly towards the water faucets. Dr Ahmed. on expectorating all his saliva. I had been called to attend a patient in distress. When asked. Noticing my colleague had overlooked this. I asked the anesthesia resident to read the films. His wispy beard was untrimmed. The long-lashed eyes of Faisal.” and had spent two years navigating these belief systems while dealing with the initiation of critical care. was known to be a caring doctor. the anesthesiologist. “Oh no. every sign in the hospital appears in English and Bengali. like blood. and Indians. I suddenly wondered if he had failed to recognise my Muslim character. in emulation of the Prophet Muhammad sallallahu-wa-aleyhisallam (peace be upon him). during an interview with me. I recall a patient who insisted.. I had previously worked with him. Yet their attitudes were remarkably diverse. in recognition of illiteracy in the community. yet even in these he revealed his Islamic identity. likely from his ablutions before afternoon prayer.eu . others were Omanis.” he said.Appendix: Islamist Ideology at the British Bedside CIP The Royal London Hospital serves as a major trauma facility in one of the most densely populated Bengali communities in the UK. 57 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. alcohol handrub is preferred as a more effective protection against bacteria. most of whom are profoundly dedicated to Islamic practice. he had not realised I understood he was Muslim. I doubted this was accidental. and decisions about the end of life. Or if. I began explaining that revised recommendations on hand hygiene for doctors suggested hand washing with antibacterial soap and water only when hands are overtly soiled with bodily fluids. Sensitive to the needs of its patients. I soon discovered the extent of my own ignorance. Dr Ahmed. he responded he was fasting for Ramadan and therefore not permitted to swallow his saliva. Syrians. Faisal. I wondered if he was aware that Muslim men are not permitted to wear gold (gold being reserved only for Muslim women). Pakistanis. organ transplantation. I pointed out the device to Faisal. As I studied the rolling screen of X rays. I was familiar with Muslim patients adhering to Wahhabism or “Salafism. the gentle young medical assistant at my side. Some of the Saudis were themselves scholars of Wahhabi Islam. Riyadh. Working in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Whitechapel seemed effectively Wahhabised. Inside the East London ICU unit. His scrubs were a fraction too short above his surgical clogs. Lebanese. The hospital serves many Muslim patients. He looked at me apologetically. suggesting he do the same. As a Muslim physician myself. a startling juxtaposition of consumerism (again very common among prosperous Saudis) with his otherwise-ascetic habits. I was unprepared for the presence of radical Islam among my medical colleagues in London. which he carefully sealed in a plastic bottle and stored in his pocket. were framed by gold-rimmed Cartier eye-glasses. I will wash my hands in the sink. Jordanians. as I was surprised to learn. As usual he was dressed in operating room scrubs. even worse. cleaning my hands on the way to see the patient. “No thank you. The hems of his trousers were damp. I considered myself uniquely prepared for ministering to this population in Britain’s capital. trained in Islamic theological schools before pursuing their medical degrees and subspecialty training – the latter often in centers of known excellence in the West. non-alphabetic “speaking Bengali” signs. my fellow physicians (almost universally Muslim) came from all over the Middle East. in the manner believed by Wahhabis to be proper. even special. had prepared me well for East London.islamicpluralism. For all other purposes.

He was British by birth and Pakistani by background. This passivity in Saudi Arabia toward evolving medical practices could be a product of Saudi patients’ and Saudi physicians’ acceptance of whatever is dictated to them under the Wahhabi interpretation of Shariah. Nor did any family member object to its use prior to examination of a relative. Patients in Saudi Arabia also show almost universal and unwavering belief in physicians’ recommendations.islamicpluralism. Medical workers in Australia have conducted studies documenting the lack of systemic absorption of alcohol through topical use. In the same context. the leading British medical journal. a blood thinning agent) were also made available in the kingdom and are used when indicated for Saudi patients. His refusal of the most basic means to control infection was based on his religious ideology. the Saudi capital. worked there. Official Saudi Wahhabi authorities ruled in favor of these medications. Saudis. during two years’ practise in Riyadh. yet extraordinarily different in his views. Despite my being an uncovered woman in Western dress while practicing critical care medicine. a radical interpretation I had not encountered even among Saudi physicians who claimed to participate in the Wahhabi religious militia. “I can’t use alcohol hand rub on my skin. I never encountered a Saudi physician or surgeon refusing to use alcohol hand rub. whether by patients. one of the oldest and most distinguished medical colleges in the UK. as universally extreme adherents of Islamic fundamentalism. while often viewed unfairly. his education was more elite than mine. even medications derived from pork materials (including porcine low-molecular weight heparin. “necessities overrule prohibition”. where experience in the ICU was a required component of his training. always with their informed consent. he had attended Barts. her face fully covered by niqab in public. we collected anecdotal observations and tried to sort out these issues. or mutawiyin. How had he acquired these beliefs? He had been brought up in the Saudi commercial center of Jeddah while his parents had. it is unlikely that rejecting alcoholcontaining agents is an isolated occurrence. Indeed. a few months later. I joined some foreign and Saudi experts in infection control and hand hygiene. We had met while he was early on his way to becoming a consultant anesthesiologist in Britain. a very well prepared and mature populace ready to pragmatically modulate their belief systems. in a brief report published in The Lancet.eu .” he continued. most CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. but ten years after I obtained my degree. Further. he had graduated from a British medical school.” I was amazed. I mentioned the incident to friends at an international scientific symposium in Riyadh.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 “It is haram [banned in Islam] for me to touch alcohol.102 to 58 dispel commonly held but mistaken beliefs about the mere act of touching alcohol.101 Far from being a phenomenon remote from the patient’s bedside. and in related urgencies. practitioners or Islamic clerics. While the extent of this problem is unknown. in 2006. He had married at an early age and his Pakistani wife was secluded at home. in my view. Islamist ideology now intrudes on basic practices of Western medicine. He was of the same ethnic heritage as mine. in keeping with the traditional Shariah principle that in the interest of preserving life. in the realm of medicine. The use of alcohol-based hand hygiene was introduced throughout the kingdom with no resistance or need for special permission. Like me. even illiterate Bedouin women accepted my counsel without objection. The absence of this resistance to alcohol hand rub is striking in the Saudi kingdom itself. This was personally and consistently confirmed for me. irrespective of the doctors’ own religious beliefs – including those of both Christian and Muslim practitioners. for some time. Additionally. with the arrival of new technologies and treatments. Disturbed by his attitude to the hand rub. are.

The British Muslim physician may be in a unique position to contribute to this dialogue and support the dismantling of misconceptions that are both theologically questionable and scientifically disproven. These doctors may consider themselves “conservative” Muslims first Among pockets of Islamist ideology in the West. In contrast. or listening to music. rigid definition of “being Muslim. the term refers simply to lack of knowledge. easily missing those of us who supposedly appear nonMuslim because of our “assimilation” or heterodox interpretations of Islam – interpretations which were once almost universal in the small British Muslim establishment. perhaps reinforcing the population’s confidence in the medical hierarchy as a helpful. This is a way to compensate for feelings of inadequacy.” equated with an obviously non-Western appearance. meriting trust. Particularly ironic is the adoption of Saudi attire by untraveled British Muslims who are unaware that Saudi Arabia is not the monolithic country commonly believed to be. Muslims raised primarily in Western. tend to be Muslims.Appendix: Islamist Ideology at the British Bedside CIP practitioners in Saudi society. The rejection of alcohol hand rub represents something even more extreme than a retreat into jahiliyyah. Islamists use this term to refer to a fall back into “pre-Islamic oblivion. Young Muslim physicians today may feel they lack senior professionals with whom they can relate and. they may believe they lack Muslim role models.” allegedly present in nonIslamist-ruled. or like other youngsters sent to Pakistan or other areas for a “better grounding in Islam. but a more nuanced and complicated society in which differing interpretations of Islam exist. Muslim-majority states as well as in the West.” they rely instead on the diminished guidance provided by zealous clerics with extreme views. although there is no basis for these claims in Qur’an. or. 59 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. particularly in its arrival in 21st Century London.islamicpluralism. made up of South Asians who had come to Britain seeking work after the massive immigration of West Indians.” there is a tendency for many to acquire new “Islamic” identities. This ideology supports a negative. and by Sunni conservatives. non-Muslim societies may not feel protected by society. even if that society supports and nurtures their right to a unique religious identity.eu . Both are denounced by the radicals. as distinct and apart. discounting guidance from mature professionals simply if the latter are “non-Muslim. although in traditional Islam. I sensed an intangible disadvantage among them in dealing with prevailing social norms. The widespread adoption of both Saudi and Palestinian scarves by male and female British Muslims seems especially strange in that many of the young are Pakistani from the London East End with no direct relation either to Saudi Arabia or the Palestinians. the case of hijab being one bit of evidence. much is based on refusing behavior prevalent in both the wider Muslim mainstream and among non-Muslim Westerners – such as women working outside the home. They encounter distorted interpretations during these sojourns. the adoption of archaic Arab male attire and the peculiar Wahhabi beard being others. so as to feel their Islam is sufficiently different from Western values. positive and benevolent force within the kingdom. feeling excluded and apart from these radicalised Muslims. Islamist ideology has encroached on the Western medical workplace and presents new challenges to leaders and policy-makers in health care. On returning to Western Europe. In the medical profession. as un-Islamic. Despite brief exposure to other societies. regardless of the fundamentalism of its Wahhabi clerics. Additionally these young British Muslims may also feel an exaggerated need to express an overt religious identity by limiting their beliefs. fear of submersion in Western culture. perhaps. Western Europe has seen a growing politicization of Islam. whether growing up in Jeddah as in Faisal’s experience. before returning to what Islamists may refer to as the lands of jahiliyyah or pre-Islamic ignorance. whether locals or expatriates.

. While Saudi Arabia is often and justly criticised for its extremist Wahhabi Islam. DC]. Memish.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 (Top and left) Muslim female medical staff.. K. with a specific focus on Islamist ideology in Western Europe.” The Lancet [London].L. G. Z. London. Pittet. Most significantly. L. Allgranzi. Hosking. “Muslim Health Care Workers and Alcohol-Based Handrubs. Gerostamoulos. Gamon. Martin... B.. S. however. Q.A. M. a dissonance is present between this religious doctrine and the careful and mature views of Saudi medical NOTES 101 Ahmed. “Can Alcohol-Based Hand-Rub Solutions Cause You To Lose Your Driver’s License? Comparative Cutaneous Absorption of Various Alcohols”. The Daily Telegraph professionals. 102 T... and Grayson. R.. T. Antimicrobial Agents and Chemotherapy [Washington. Brown. D.C. who have successfully navigated many of the obstacles within their restrictive society. the unanswered question remains: why are illiterate Bedouin women more accepting of Western medicine than highly educated British Muslim graduates training in London? Medical school curricula could benefit from courses on the impact of physicians’ belief systems on health care delivery.eu . D. 2007. 2006. 60 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www.. P. Bowkett.L... Tester.A.islamicpluralism.

Manchu.000 Bosnian Muslims. it is generally accepted that two million. are or are descended from immigrants from Turkey. and traditional Turkic and Kurdish cultural elements. Germany is also the home of some 300. Here it must be clearly and unqualifiedly stated that Turkish and Kurdish ethnic identities are. Turks and Kurds are nonetheless justifiably grouped together in Germany because of their origin in the same country. 120.islamicpluralism. and for this reason Shariah agitation has been a limited phenomenon among them. Kurdish. Alevis defined themselves as a religious community only recently. after the French Muslims. who began arriving in Kurdistan in Germany Germany in significant numbers in the 1960s. related to Mongolian. Of two million Turkish-Kurdish Muslims in Germany. Case Study: Germany Introduction The German Muslim population totals approximately three million.000 Arabs (excluding Iraqis). of 84 million Germans. known in Turkish as Alevilik and in German as Aleviten. Alevis are a heterodox phenomenon combining Shia Islam. Within this aggregate. almost a third. they were mainly selfidentified as secularists. Kurds are speakers of an Indo-European language related to Persian. with an agglutinative grammar. or four percent. previously. or 700. Floris Vermeulen. and Bosnian Muslims in Germany are overwhelmingly secular in their outlook. a Dutch scholar and author of a 61 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. Shia-influenced Sufism.eu . 125. Case Study: Germany CIP 5. a majority. completely different. They are unrelated to the Syrian Alawite sect or the obscure but influential Sunni Alawi orders of Sufis. 225. are adherents of the Alevi Community.103 Alevis mainly come from Turkey. Turkish nationals in Germany may be of Turkish or Kurdish ethnicity.000 Iranians and Iraqis.000. and smaller numbers of Afghans and Pakistanis. and represents the second largest Western European Turkey in Germany Muslim population. Turks are speakers of an Altaic language.000 Africans. notwithstanding propaganda by the Turkish government.104 Turkish. and perhaps Korean and Japanese.5. As immigrants to Western Europe.

and religious versus secular.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 Mustafa Kemal. In all the organisational disputes arising from these struggles.) Alevis are “feminist” in their acceptance and even promotion of female equality. furthering the proliferation of Turkish religious immigrant organisations”. but its acronym is based on its Turkish equivalent: Diyanet Işleri Türk-Islam Birliği. Turkish Islam in Germany is closely aligned with the Republic of Turkey’s state Islamic administration. founder of the Turkish Republic dissertation comparing Turkish immigration in Berlin and Amsterdam. it was correctly stated. a practice which they publicly condemn and combat through mediation as a spcific element of their ritual observance (described in section 4 of Case Study: Germany. A wide array of political and religious movements jockeyed for power in the growing Turkish communities in Western Europe. through the Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs. “Muslims[. representatives of the Turkish state played significant roles. First. No group could afford to stay behind. confining it to the legal rules regulating personal status. It counts almost 900 62 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www.] especially [of] Turkish origin would understand the term shari’a in a narrower sense.eu . family and inheritance and corporal punishment”.105 has written. and it is headquartered in Ankara. “This ideological rivalry had a dramatic impact on the establishment of new Turkish organisations in Western Europe. “The first Turkish immigrant organisations in Western Europe. were mainly leftist and rightist political workers’ organisations that were strongly focused on Turkey and on each other… left-right political polarisation was imported from Turkey… Civic organisations were banned in Turkey in 1980 [and] oppositional and marginal groups set up organisations abroad to resist the power of the Turkish state. In Rohe’s previous citation. Sunnis versus Alevis. Because of its main roots in Turkey. Kurdish Alevis in Germany are well-informed on socalled “honour” murder. The Turkish state founded and supported pro-state organisations. The major polarities were radical left versus radical right. German Islam continues to face a multiply contradictory situation.. Diyanet.106 It should here be emphasised that this narrow definition lends itself to a critical attitude toward Shariah. Alevis and certain other Sufis recognise Shariah as an abstract definition of religion or Islam in general but frequently do not observe or promote it as a set of rules. hence the number of new Turkish organisations exploded. At the same time. DİTİB finances the construction and maintenance of Sunni mosques and employs their imams and hatips – the latter being preachers of sermons at Friday congregational prayer. There were leftwing political movements and oppositional Turkish Islamic movements (of which the most important were banned in Turkey) as well as Islamic organisations that were supported by the Turkish government. known as DİTİB. Its German title is TürkischIslamische Verein der Anstalt für Religion e V. Turkish versus Kurdish. and opposition movements set up groups of their own.islamicpluralism. founded in the late sixties and early seventies. oriented toward secularism and shared with non-Muslims. The emerging oppositional Islamic movements in Turkey set up their own branches in Western Europe.

Case Study: Germany CIP affiliated mosques and cultural centres. Second.108 This makes Germany an example of a Western European country in which a large grouping of Muslim immigrants and their offspring are influenced by the governmental ulema (clerical institution) of a foreign country. DİTİB clerics are widely criticised for speaking only Turkish and obstructing integration of German Muslims. and. French Muslims are influenced by the Moroccan and Algerian authorities. if anything. in effect. non-state body. Turkish Islam in Germany now reflects the heightened struggle within Turkey itself between the secular legacy established by Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) and the rise of “softfundamentalist” Sunnism in politics.107 DİTİB has been described in a rigorously objective. Bosnian Muslims living in Western Europe are directed by the official ulema of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Diyanet also functions in this manner in the Netherlands. a political agency maintaining ideological conformity among Turkish Muslims in Germany: “a satellite apparatus of the Turkish state and an instrument of its attempt to guard against the possible growth of opposition in the Turkish diaspora”.eu . notwithstanding repeated pledges that it will not infringe on the established secular order in Turkey.islamicpluralism. AKP is widely perceived as a Shariah-oriented component of Turkish politics. as represented by the AKPartisi or Justice and Development Party (hereinafter AKP). as do representatives of the official Moroccan Islamic clergy. but unofficially. AKP in 63 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. somewhat understated report by the International Crisis Group as. but the latter is an independent.

aligned with AKP. held in Köln in 1999. are a Sufi-oriented. It is a paradox of Turkish history that the “Jacobin”. anti-Kemalist movement with some 300 affiliated mosques. If AKP.111 Milli Goruş declines cooperation with non-Muslim media and other outside interviewers and refused our request to meet its German representatives. which established the principle that only Turks lived in Turkey. centralist Turkism of the Kemalist era. regardless whether they were Greek. education of clerics.000 to the education of children of Bosnian Muslims killed in the Srebrenica massacre of 1995. which similarly declined to speak with us. is forced to moderate its ideology by the requirements of political power.109 It is credited with affiliation of some 400-600 “prayer spaces”. while the Alevis considered themselves beneficiaries of Kemalist secularism.eu . illustrating its interest in Europe-wide expansion. the role of Diyanet and DİTİB in a European Union with which the Turkish Republic seeks affiliation is an unexamined but challenging aspect of Turkish EU entry. It operates a headquarters in the Netherlands.islamicpluralism.000 adherents in Germany. and many immigrated to Germany to gain a cultural and religious freedom they found absent in their native land.110 Milli Goruş has been associated with ECFR since the third consultative session of Al-Qaradawi’s group. Alevis. some observers perceive a tension between DİTİB and Milli Goruş. or Sephardic Jewish in their background. Known in German as the Islamitische Gemeinschaft Milli Goruş (IGMG) or Milli Goruş Islamic Community. and employment of the latter in both Turkey and Germany. the latter movement is currently reported to have 200. founded by the anti-Jewish Islamist politician Necmettin Erbakan in the 1970s and allegedly rooted in DİTİB. originally overshadowed DİTİB. VIK. Today. It is therefore questionable whether the activities of DİTİB will contribute to an orderly relationship between German Muslims and the broader German society or will aggravate differences. are victims of aggressive Sunnism in Turkey. DİTİB can be expected to replicate this perspective in Germany. was accompanied by Sunni-centrism in religious affairs. Third. In 2008 it contributed the modest sum of €5. however. presses an Islamist agenda inside Turkey. The anthropologist Martin Sökefeld has summarised this reality concisely:113 “On the one hand Alevis are acclaimed by the Kemalist elite as unequivocal supporters of secularism. Thus. including private premises rather than mosque structures. further. but support for Alevi meeting houses (cems or cemevi) and clerics (dedeler) has never been included in the 64 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. Kurdish. popularly known as Süleymancilar. but on the other hand Kemalism itself refuses legal recognition of Alevis as a religious or cultural minority because such recognition is seen as a violation of the principle of a united and homogeneous Turkish nation”. Armenian.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 Sehitlik (Martyrs’) Mosque in Berlin © cosmonautirussi Germany is reported by members of the Turkish ethnic community to be actively associated with the fundamentalist Milli Goruş or National Vision movement. the Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren or Union of Islamic Cultural Centres (VIK). as many anticipate. although extremely devoted to their religious practice.112 Milli Goruş and a smaller and less political movement. Diyanet and DİTİB pay for Sunni mosques. in that DİTİB. VIK is viewed by Alevis as problematical because of its hostility to secularism.

Alevis reject Shariah except in the abstract sense previously noted. in the form of Euro-Islam.] the ‘space for Islam in Europe’ claimed by some imams is a resistance to integration and an endorsement of the existing enclaves… “A Wahhabi. etc. “3. Tibi commented in March 2008. This is the substance of the concept of ‘Euro-Islam’ as I imagine it. if they interact with Europeans and live as if they were themselves European… A very high percentage of Muslim immigrants live in parallel societies. where a radical milieu is absent and terrorist preparations would not have drawn attention. “Recently. Democracy – not only as electoral procedure based on voting. A significant trend within Alevism is associated with the radical left in politics. or any shari’a-based Islam is not acceptable to Europe and contradicts its structures of democracy… “Euro-Islam requires. the inter-European television station ‘Arte’ aired the inflammatory preaching by an influential imam at the large alQuds mosque in Hamburg. than in Britain.Case Study: Germany CIP budget of either Diyanet or DİTİB. which are enclaves within Europe… “What can be done to make Muslim immigrants true European citizens? “An integration limited to civic values and to the workplace can be made compatible with a reformist interpretation of Islam adapted to cultural modernity. that they are willing to abandon the jihadisation and shari’a-isation of Islam and become receptive to the idea of a civil Islam. One is the populist and unacceptable Islamophobic solution. But the activities of the Hamburg group were in our view more indicative of a preference among Islamist extremists for work in Germany. As an indicator of the complex nature of the Iranian community in Germany.114 Dr. “Euro-Islam is based on the Islamic legitimacy of five pillars of civil society: “1. increasing. no prudent person can turn a blind eye to the emerging of Islamic parallel societies. Pakistanis. and under wide scrutiny. where radicalism has been prominent. not to be confused with the ideology of secularism). Germany is the home of Dr Bassam Tibi. Separation between religion and politics (secularity. Turkish rightist nationalism and Kurdish leftist nationalism have both presented more serious problems in Germany than radical Islam.islamicpluralism.eu . and they argue that Turkish Sunni hatred of them is based on reaction against this attitude. from prodemocracy Muslims first. In an unpublished text. the Syrian-born theoretician of a moderate form of “Euro-Islam”. both in Turkey and Germany. The ardent imam was warning Muslims against losing their faith. understood as an attitude that ‘anything goes. but as a political culture of civil society.’ But outside these extremes. The Hamburg cell involved in the Bassam Tibi attacks of September 11 used to meet there. “2. Iraqis. Among the remaining Muslims in Germany – Iranians. Iranians in Germany are frequently refugees from the clerical regime in Iran. 2001 exposed the functioning of the notorious “Hamburg cell” led by Egyptian-born Mohammed Atta. and some profess to have abandoned religion. Individual human rights. and professor of international relations at the University of Göttingen. other Arabs. “4. émigré Iranian leftist newspapers are as easily available in the country’s newsstands as are daily newspapers and magazines from Iran itself. the other is multiculturalism. “[By contrast. They will do so. Attention has been focused on radical Islam in Germany since the investigation of AlQaida preparations for the attacks of September 11. The Islam prevailing in these ‘ghettos’ resembles the Wahhabism purveyed in mosques like the one in Hamburg… “Among those who deal with these issues there are two extreme positions. Pluralism of cultures and religions in 65 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. – religious radicalism is largely absent. he claimed.

variety of issues. the Central Council's Secretary-General Aiman Mazyek told the Westdeutsche Zeitung society. Tolerance. The depiction of Islam was ‘barefaced lies’ and the float used ‘negative images to seek attention’. promoting fundamentalism. The word ‘Cliche’ was printed on one of the men. the courts have no right to intervene. not in the Islamic understanding of treating Jews/Christians [as] monotheists [and] protected minorities/dhimmi. where mainly secular-oriented Turkish and Kurdish immigrants are concentrated in monoethnic neighbourhoods. or urgency to that recorded and observed in Britain. but that a wave of major mosque construction had begun in Germany. We do not believe that the preaching in a single. the media. Milli Gazete. however. a German political scientist who worked in an integration project at the Yavuz Sultan Selim mosque in Mannheim. If anything. operating in uncontrolled (and often unmarked) residential and commercial properties. The state. “a religious Muslim is also at the same time an 66 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. that radical Shariah activism does not exist in Germany.islamicpluralism. that DİTİB clerics typically returned to Turkey after a short tour in Germany during which they acquired little understanding of German society.eu . the respected daily Suddeutsche Zeitung117 published a survey article on Islam in Germany. Interviewed by Suddeutsche Zeitung. blamed the leaders of the mosque for reinforcing separation. Dusseldorf: The Central Council of Muslims in Germany condemned a float featuring fibreglass models of two bearded men wearing turbans and explosives belts and brandishing guns. a periodical allegedly published by Milli Goruş – an affiliation the organisation disclaims115 – stated in August 2001. and that women rarely attended mosque services or related activities. the diversity of Islamic entities in Hamburg (and in Berlin) contrasts distinctly with the “ghettoisation” visible in the Ruhr Valley. But Suddeutsche Zeitung also noted separatist tendencies and apparent resistance to integration. that the content of sermons was seldom disclosed to the broader public. but based on equality”. and the loudspeaker amplification of the call to prayer. Building of large structures elicited numerous questions about Shariah matters. and submitting to foreign control from Turkey.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 advocate for Sharia. the accession to power of AKP in Turkey and the extension of its influence in Germany make such rhetoric a challenge to the present situation. Arab. The Historical Background: Emergence of Shariah as an Issue in Germany German media discussion of Shariah is far inferior in volume. in the failure of DİTİB to educate mosque functionaries in the German language. One cannot argue. including the propriety of erecting a graveyard in the vicinity of a supermarket. Our observation of the German Muslim community suggests that Wahhabism and other Shariah-centric interpretations of Islam have much more limited influence in that country than in Britain. The newspaper pointed out that Islamic observance had hitherto been mainly restricted to “backroom mosques”. The newspaper argued that DİTİB had made consciousness of Turkish identity equal in priority to religion. while the other bore the word ‘Reality’. and thereby impeded integration. Reiner Albert. The allegiance of a Muslim to Sharia cannot be questioned”. Wahhabi centre like the Al-Quds mosque in Hamburg – a city known for its cosmopolitan population – is characteristic of German Islam in broader terms. Early in 2001. He attempted to Cologne Carnival.116 To further emphasise. “5.

but said he was insulted and ostracised. Interviewees included. as in Britain. who founded and now direct a CIP group in Germany. mosque representatives. This phenomenon contributes to the dependence of the German authorities on DİTİB as an intermediary in dealing with the Turkish Sunnis. The best known Islamic educational institutions are the Förderverein der Islamischen Grundschule in Berlin [www. the majority of Muslim children are educated in state schools. In 2005.The Emergence of Shariah as an Issue in Germany CIP establish classes on Islam in German. and respect for human rights and the established culture in Germany. Interviews included extensive meetings and discussions in Duisburg. 67 www. Aachen. Berlin. The majority of Turkish and Kurdish Muslims who have migrated to Germany currently lack German citizenship. who make up three-quarters of the German Muslim population. the Christian Democratic politician Kristina Kohler called on Muslims in Germany to abandon Shariah. Köln. and said that Muslim immigrants must abandon any attachment to its superior validity. CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan The CIP Survey of Shariah Agitation in Germany The Centre for Islamic Pluralism carried out its field survey of Shariah agitation and attitudes toward it in German Muslim communities in July 2008. who have only spoken German throughout their lives. for economic and political reasons. have generally been educated in state. Germany long resisted abolition of the status of immigrant Muslims as “guest workers” (gästarbeiter) excluded from naturalisation as German citizens. and rank-and-file mosque attendees. based in the Ruhr Valley. or Bangladesh for schooling.119 Even Alevis. As reported in the daily Frankfurter Rundschau. Such an attitude contrasts with the demonstrable pressure by British and French non-Muslims to gain acceptance from Muslims for citizenship. being typically secular and often avid to become as a German as possible. while Turkish and Bosnian Muslims. and criticised Shariah as incompatible with democracy. Hamm. acceptance of separation of religion and the state. notwithstanding the persistence of economic discrimination against Muslims in both the latter countries. India. social workers. We would be remiss in failing to point out that barriers to integration or assimilation of German Muslims are not restricted to the Muslim side. She further called for requirements to be imposed on immigrants including pledges of loyalty to the German constitution.islamischegrundschule. spiritual shaykhs (pirs). in contrast with laws that are changeable by secular courts. An important difference between the pedagogy of the Islamic communities in Britain and Germany is that many subcontinental immigrants to the former country have been educated in medresas or are only semi-literate.118 Bundestag deputy Kohler spoke in Wiesbaden. CIP investigators Stephen Schwartz and Kamal Hasani investigated Shariah sentiment in the main German Muslim communities with the cooperation of Alevi community activists Ali and Veli Sirin. and who refer to themselves as among “we Germans”.islamicpluralism.de] and the König-Fahd-Akademie Bonn. and frequently exercise the option of sending their children back to Pakistan. This outlook extends to those born in Germany. state their conviction that Germans in their majority do not wish to allow eligibility for full membership as citizens of the national community to Muslims. and Hamburg. (1) Family/schooling Germany has fewer Islamic schools than Britain. and discriminatory against women and non-Muslims. She (incorrectly) described Shariah as an invariant form of jurisprudence. the latter supported by Saudi Arabia.eu .

While Muslim parents favor an Islamic option in the dedicated religion/ethics class time in the German state schools. German courts have ruled that responsibility for regulation of religious activities belongs to the Länder (federal units equivalent to U. said the mosque is still viewed by media and federal authorities as a Brotherhood facility. along with an Iranian.islamicpluralism. But our interviewee. or ethics classes for nonreligious students. headscarves are only banned for women teachers. Judaism.S. an Arab representative of the Bilal 68 King Fahd-Academy in Bonn-Bad Godesberg Mosque and Islamic Centre of Aachen. which pays teachers trained in Turkey to deliver religious instruction in the state schools of Niedersachsen. Orthodox Christianity. currently with 3. as well as participation of Muslim children in school trips. if they include an Islamic option. and Falaturi left the Aachen mosque. argued when we interviewed him that inclusion of Islam as an option in the state religion/ethics classes favors integration. He also stated that some Muslim parents object to sex education classes and mixedgender swimming instruction. Zazas are about 50 percent Alevis.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 secularist institutions in their own countries. which have left them with a notably higher level of literacy. Azzaoui is a member of the Central Council of German Muslims [Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland – ZMD]. in a manner similar to that reflected in the proposals of the Muslim Council of Britain (described above in Case Study: Britain). One of several obstacles to such a goal is the involvement in curricula of Diyanet and DİTİB. as they presently do in five German states. and BadenWürttemburg. where instruction in Kurdish is banned. and is considered influenced by Saudi Arabia. In addition. The Aachen mosque. with a choice of curricula and regular. Germany currently maintains religious instruction in state schools. Eesam Al-Attar. Abdoldjavad Falaturi. Zaza. including Islam. all German students are taught about religions in general. Kurdish Muslims in Germany possess an even stronger incentive than ethnic Turks to seek education in German state schools for their children.120 Azzaoui noted that Germany had experienced a debate over permission for Muslim girls to wear hijab. was built in 1963 and was historically associated with the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. Kurdish has never been linguistically normatised and possesses at least three main dialects. CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. In addition. religiously inclined Turkish Muslims only possess the option of application to the Turkish imam-hatip secondary schools. Thus. its founders were an adherent of the Syrian MB. states). Azzaoui. but that no federal or general intervention had been proposed to deal with the situation. designated class time devoted to either the Catholic or Protestant sects. is widely spoken in Germany and is the basis for a trend among Zazas to define themselves as a separate ethnicity.000 members. which includes 400 nonTurkish mosques. While Bosnians may send their children back to their native country for schooling in a small network of Islamic primary schools and high schools. Kurdish Muslims living in Germany may suffer past exclusion from or have boycotted schools in Turkey.eu . Attendance at such classes is optional according to the student’s decision and choice among the available curricula. Alevis are concerned that religion/ethics classes in state schools. its adoption has not become universal. should also provide an opportunity for Alevi religious instruction. one of which. Mounir Azzaoui. which train Sunni clerics. Bayern. Al-Attar broke with the MB because of its justification of violence.

eu .000 members in 34 communities in the state. which differs from the Turkish Latin alphabet introduced by Mustafa Kemal. with its building completed in 1963. Some German Muslim children also study at “Nurcu schools” based on the teaching of the modernist Sufi Said Nursi (1877-1960). which are rare in Turkish schools. but has been criticised by Shia observers for catering exclusively to Iranians. or Arabs. however. IZH describes itself as the “most important” Shia mosque in Europe. located in the Ruhr. science. Kahraman informed us that he had worked for three months in a Gülen school in Duisburg. many German Turkish children now attend afternoon religious classes outside the state school system. in the panorama of German Islam. including Arabic language lessons. The latter. He also stated that he had been dismissed from teaching at the school over a Shariah issue: his wearing of Western-style shorts. and was paid nine euros for each 45-minute teaching session. a Turkish imam now living in America. Kahraman described two Nurcu schools in Duisburg. IZH has been directed by two of the most prominent figures in the recent history of Iranian 69 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. Gülen’s supporters have set up schools at multiple educational levels throughout the Muslim world. and the Dalai Lama. He ascribed these failings to recent immigration of the children from Turkey. He said most of the students did not speak German well and were unfamiliar with the German alphabet. The Iranian-funded Shia Imam Ali Mosque and Islamic Centre in Hamburg (Islamische Zentrum Hamburg – IZH]. part of a global network of schools established by followers of Gülen © Carolyn Drake In addition. also held high-profile meetings with local Jewish leaders.islamicpluralism. European Union officials. It is therefore considered by some to be a radical. the main area of Alevi residence because of historic immigration for industrial employment.Germany: Family/Schooling CIP Fethullah Gülen Courtyard of the PakTurk school in Karachi. The Nurcu schools offer one to two year residencies. Kahraman said about 200 students attended the Gülen classes. Kurds. are a larger Muslim community in Hamburg than Turks.000 members. paralleling an independent system in Turkey. which tutored them in German. representing 100. with 35.121 has been described by outside monitors as “a hub of Shiism in Europe that has distributed the anti-Israeli statements of President Ahmadinejad” while promoting Hezbollah in Lebanon. if not a jihadist element. Yilmaz Kahraman is president of the Alevi Youth Movement in the state of NordrheinWestfalen. a major Alevi centre in Germany. operates such afternoon schools. Christian representatives. and said that the Nurcu movement seeks to build a larger institution in the city. and mathematics. founded in 1953. The “soft Islamist” mass movement led by Fethullah Gülen.122 IZH has.

In Hamburg. A Guide condemns as “incorrect”. (A Guide to the Presentation of Islam in School Textbooks was coauthored by Udo Tworuschka). This documentation is aimed at establishing a standard for instruction about Islam. to Hamburg in 1995. Falaturi had moved his Cologne Islamic Academy. including the definition of Islam and discussion of Muslim missionisation and fundamentalism. rather than a curriculum for an Islamic option in religion/ethics classes. IZH distributes handbooks with guidelines on how to teach about Islam in general classes on religions. in German state schools.eu . an outstanding modern Shia theologian. or even to demand the one-sided adoption of Western legal standards. A Guide to the Presentation of Islam in School Textbooks addresses those matters that Muslims most often complain are distorted in public instruction. this applies particularly to the areas of family law. Falaturi’s texts are notable for their reasonable idiom and historical accuracy. “Nowadays in the whole of the 70 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. and furthermore to take into consideration only its criminal law aspects. “To ignore the many-sided nature of the Shari’ah. and after his unexpected death in 1995. and even to demand its abolition. For example. criminal law. Hamburg (IZM) religious affairs. an extremely charismatic and popular cleric assassinated in Tehran in 1981. Beheshti became a major figure in the Iranian Islamic Revolution.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 Islamic Centre. business law and public law”. from God to interreligious dialogue. A student of Allameh Tabatabaei. when 70 leading members of the Iranian regime died in a bomb attack by radical leftists. The exchange between Jews and Muslims in the area of religious teaching and law was more intensive than between Christianity and Islam”. to describe the Shari’ah as a whole in a negative way and as medieval. Falaturi’s Muslim Thoughts presents a compendium of clarifying definitions of the basic themes discussed in any school curriculum on Islam.islamicpluralism. The scientific encounter of the different high cultures was characterised by mutual adaptations and further development. Jews and Christians At [the] Cultural Level”: “The spread of Muslim science to the Christian West (particularly Sicily and Andalusia) would not have taken place without the intervention of Jewish merchants. perhaps ominously. he was a mentor to Hojjatolislam Seyyed Mohammad Khatami.123 were both written by Abdoldjavad Falaturi. A Guide further states. “To ignore the continuing concern of Islamic scholars to mobilise the inner power of Islamic jurisprudence. who headed the IZH from 1978 to 1980 and was reformist president of Iran from 1997 to 2005. and head of the country’s judicial system. Muslim Thoughts for Teachers and Textbook Authors (hereinafter Muslim Thoughts) and A Guide to the Presentation of Islam in School Textbooks. the following: “[J]udging the Shari’ah on the basis of a narrow understanding… to equate it with an ‘Islamic lawbook’. in Muslim Thoughts we find the following comment under the heading “Relationship Between Muslims. which he had founded in 1978. as well as its complexity. and also to overlook the opportunity it gives people to fashion their own lives freely and in accordance with the age in which they live. the Academy was merged with IZH. in order to do justice to the changes in society in the Islamic world in accordance with Islamic principles. the Iranian formerly associated with the Bilal Mosque and Islamic Centre in Aachen. In 1965-70 it was managed by Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti. In the realm of Shariah. The handbooks distributed by IZH.

and left political issues to civil society. the Koordinationsrat der Muslime or Coordination Council of Muslims in Germany (KRM) was launched. In 2007. As a matter of private life. Unfortunately. the Deutsche-Islam Konferenz or German Conference on Islam was established as an institution of 15 Muslim members and 15 government representatives. German Muslims then imported halal meat from neighbouring countries. In 2006. Butchery according to religious rules in Islam resembles the canon of kashrut in Judaism. a German court banned halal slaughtering because it did not specify the stunning of animals before they were killed. Milli Goruş (operating through an Islamrat or Islam Council). however. The only exemption was religious.islamicpluralism. The probability of complete separation of religion from education does not exist in Germany. however. In all cases. This is the case even in those countries that have applied them in recent times. composed at the beginning of the 1990s. as mandated by German law. except that invocation of God is continuous throughout Islamic killing of animals. In 2002. following a civil complaint by an ethnic Turkish butcher. while the Alevis are recognised as a “religious community”.124 (2) Institutionalisation of Shariah by nonMuslim governments (“Parallel Shariah”) There have been no demands for or significant initiatives in the direction of institutionalised Shariah in Germany. the German constitutional court struck down the ruling as an undue interference with the right of butchers to exercise their profession. given the Jewish ban on pork. bringing together DİTİB. and VIK (Süleymancilar).“Parallel” Shariah CIP Islamic world… there is a tendency to interpret the phraseology in the spirit of the age and to prevent the application of harsh punishments. Alevi participation is absent from KRM. may be described as traditionalist and resistant to full assimilation of Muslims into Western culture. The family court judge held that issuance of a protective order would be sufficient relief for 71 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. Late in 2007.126 The opinion was delivered in a case brought by a Moroccan-born woman against her Moroccan-born husband. It has been criticised for seeking political solutions to the problems of Islam in Germany when. as might be expected from an Iranian. Falaturi’s work. according to our interviewee Mounir Azzaoui. a new body. In 1995. it should have been exclusively concerned with religious problems. the German debate on education of Muslim children has concentrated on introduction of religious instruction in state schools rather than establishment of separate religious schools. at last. Qur’an specifies that Muslims are permitted to eat food prepared by Jews. But nowhere does it suggest the adoption or establishment of Shariah as a parallel legal system governing Muslim conduct in the West. a family court judge in Frankfurt caused a sensation when she (unnamed in media according to German practice) ruled that Qur’an supported the right of husbands to beat their wives. to facilitate official consultations. DİTİB and Milli Goruş are mere “religious associations” under German law. The weekly newsmagazine Der Spiegel described the motive for KRM’s founding as follows:125 “Henry Kissinger once famously quipped: ‘Who do I call if I want to call Europe?’ The German government has long had the same problem when it came to pursuing dialogue with its own Muslim community: Who to call? Now the four leading groups representing Muslims in Germany have banded together so that. mainly because of economic disadvantage. None of the latter three has official standing as a consultative body to government.eu . the government in Berlin can call that elusive phone number”. except for the acceptance of DİTİB as an informal partner by the state. less out of Islamic conviction than for political reasons”. German law from 1995 to 2002 presented a problem for Muslims in its treatment of the dietary issue of halal slaughtering of meat. and the court had determined that consumption of meat slaughtered according to religious rules was not obligatory for Muslims. ZMD.

the hajj pilgrimage. Mounir Azzaoui. and affirmed the right of Muslims to construct mosques unhindered.eu . Its most 72 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www.128 He specified that personal areas of Shariah such as prayer. and fasting are areas subject to Muslim religious law that would not be problematical. It originated among German Turks and has been reported to include some 800 members. as well as ZMD. according to nonMuslim public opinion. much like the Supporters of Shariah led by Abu Hamza in Britain. to take effect at the beginning of 2009. rights of inheritance.islamicpluralism. The latter stated that legal decisions should conform to the German constitution rather than Qur’an. including Albanians and Moroccans. said. In all these instances. from all German political parties of the right and left. The persistence of these problems was underscored in late 2008 when a politician representing the Free Democratic Party. After widespread debate on the case. opined that Shariah could be established in his home state of Bavaria. and it was therefore easy for politicians to introduce a new. Barfuß did not seem aware of German Alevi criticism of the institutionalisation of Sunni standards for prayer and fasting and Diyanet financing of mosques in the Turkish diaspora. Georg Barfuß. if not registered civilly. involves numerous Turks and other Muslims. non-Muslim public figures seemed motivated by ignorance and a patronising attitude in “offering” Muslims a Shariah the believers themselves did not necessarily or uniformly desire.127 But marriages in churches and mosques. “Nobody asked the Muslims if we wanted this change in the law. would exclude the parties from recourse to the courts for divorce. and that mistreatment is a basis for divorce in Islam. the family judge was threatened with professional sanctions. Aside from the conspiratorial activities of the September 11 terrorists in Hamburg. as with the commentaries by Archbishop Rowan Williams and Lord Chief Justice. In July 2008.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 Milli Goruş ally Necmettin Erbakan the plaintiff. One exceptional case is that of the Kalifatstaat (Caliphate State) or “Kaplan conspiracy”. another controversy began when German authorities announced that a new marriage law. has to do with religion or community customs. based in Köln. some to fight outside Germany. We don’t want such problems in our community”. The “Kaplan conspiracy” was banned in 2001. They simply did it. if compatible with the Constitution. who withdrew an earlier demand for a divorce. and sporadic recruitment of jihadists. would permit religious weddings to be solemnised without civil registration. little crime involving Muslims. Nobody consulted with us. An outcry against the opinion followed. and other civil remedies – precisely the negative situation of Muslim women in the UK who. aside from so-called “honour” murder. more lax standard. cannot obtain civil divorces in Britain and are lured to Shariah tribunals. having been married only by nikah in Pakistan. and now we are trying to figure out how to respond. The group openly called for the overthrow of democratic institutions in Germany and Turkey. Azzaoui further stated that the proposed legal change had been introduced because no penalty for unregistered marriages had ever been established. Baron Phillips in Britain. (3) Criminal aspects Criminal activity in Germany. as described in the succeeding section of Case Study: Germany. Our Aachen interviewee.

Northern 73 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. It appears unarguable. was charged with the strangling in his home of Ulerika. and those in the Netherlands. and that Wahhabistyle beards and costumes were absent. and Sofu was slain in 1997.130 The family were Albanian Muslim political refugees from Kosova who settled in Germany in 1989 after the onset of Serbian repression in the territory and the arrest of Kosovar protestors. In 1995 he took over the Kalifatstaat group from his predecessor. secular. seeking asylum. the “Caliph of Köln”. (4) Approach to Women So-called “honour” murder has been the main topic for discussion of Muslim women’s rights in Germany. showed that literature on sale to congregants was almost totally limited to Sufi and similar devotional material of a positive nature. 42. in the city of Tübingen. that arguments identifying such brutalising customs as phenomena distinct from Islamic observance and religiosity have wide currency. Information on radical Islamist infiltration of German prisons is lacking. “inappropriate” tribal membership. the“Caliph of Köln” notorious leader. Kaplan called for Sofu’s death. which are historically committed to a modernising. but Kaplan was retried.islamicpluralism. one Ibrahim Sofu. had come to Germany from Turkey in 1983. which is considered a rural party. 16 and the oldest of four daughters. rather than a Turkish or Kurdish Muslim family. including the accused.. as well as by Alevilik. whose corpse was found dumped in a quarry pond. The first major family-relations case to gain public attention in Germany involved a Balkan. it is among these communities. Another factor in the frequency of crimes against women in the German Muslim community may be the origin of many immigrants in a rural environment where the state-mandated secularism and official interpretation of Islam established in Turkish cities. The verdict was overturned by a Turkish appeals court in 2006. in Saudi Arabia. At the end of 2003. with the secularist social and military establishment. Metin Kaplan. Given that Turkish Islam in Germany is dominated by Diyanet and DİTİB. The alleged cause of the death was the daughter’s romantic liaison with Sead. A visit to the Duisburg mosque. and. and Sufi interpretation of Sunnism. have failed to penetrate. followed by a third trial for attempted subversion of the Turkish constitutional order. more than elsewhere in Europe. a youth with an Albanian father and Bosnian Muslim mother. socalled “honour” murder is often based on resentment of betrothals or marriages involving partners outside Islam. The general question of urban-rural dissonance in Turkey is visible in the confrontation of the AKP. after lifting of his asylee status and his extradition by Germany to his native country. and currently the largest mosque in Germany.Germany: Approach to Women CIP Arrest of Metin Kaplan.129 The “Kaplan conspiracy” has been the most notable example of Shariahdriven criminal behavior in Germany. as well as Alevi traditions (although they also are mainly rural). As we noted in Case Study: Britain. Latif Z. in which these values are even more pronounced. Kaplan was convicted in Germany of incitement to murder in 2000.eu . that the DİTİB clergy in Germany and the Netherlands have failed to intervene in such a way that moderate Islamic standards in family relations would alleviate such persistent social pathologies as so-called “honour” murder. which resulted in a prison sentence for life in 2005. further unidentified according to German law. The same may be true of “disfavoured” ethnic groups. built by DİTİB and opened in 2008. however. was found guilty of treason to Turkey in 2004. or.

where some urban-dwelling Albanians (qytetars) continue to identify themselves as Turkish rather than Albanian. and speak archaic dialects of Turkish. often labelled as Slav. for many generations. wives may be killed for adultery and “betrayal of hospitality” if the two acts occur together. but resentment at perceived favoritism to the Bosnians and other Muslim Slavs in Titoite Yugoslavia. Although marriage between Muslims and Serbs became common in Bosnia-Hercegovina under the former Yugoslav regime.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 Dom Lush Gjergji and Anton Çetta Albanians have maintained a code of customary law. According to the Kanun a women who rejects an arranged marriage may be killed with the complicity of her parents. such as Bosnians. This sentiment reflects not only rivalries under Ottoman rule.131 The Kanun was compiled and issued in print by a Franciscan priest. were the main targets of violence. Daut Dauti. Wives are commanded to maintain the 74 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. constituted a primary element of enculturation. it is said today that some 40. until recently. A sense of Albanian affiliation with Turks was exploited in the mid-20th century to organise the involuntary Yugoslav deportation of some tens of thousands of Albanians to Turkey. as “an ancient unwritten code of justice and governance that functioned as the de facto Albanian Constitution for centuries”. and have developed a strong sense of the propriety of ethnically-endogamous love and marriage relationships. were mainly abolished in Kosova through a dedicated campaign by two Catholic figures. relationships between Albanians and Slavs were and remain almost unknown in Kosova and other Albanian-speaking areas. apparently developed by the Catholic highlanders of northern Albania as an alternative to justice dispensed in Ottoman Shariah courts or the tribunals of the Christian millet or minority. Albanians view Muslim Slavs. and the latter category. who together brought about the resolution of more than 1.200 such conflicts. bride price. Albanians are known to opine that “the worst Slav is a Muslim Slav”. An Albanian interviewee commented that “in the old generation the world was seen as divided between Albanians and enemies. Dom Lush Gjergji and Anton Çetta. however. was set at the amount to be paid if a woman were killed.eu . men. while Albanian nationalism in the late 19th and early 20th century was articulate in its opposition to Ottoman power. Under the traditional Kanun. In the 19th century. The ideology of Albanian honour is allpervasive and. including abuse of Albanian Muslims by Bosnian clerics and the use of Bosnian Muslim police to suppress Albanian demonstrations in the last decades of Yugoslav Communism. but young women may also become victims. included any foreigners. where Albanians remain an important émigré community today.132 It comprises an extensive and elaborate system for the resolution of grievances over honour. even Latin Americans and Chinese”. In Northern Albania.000 men cannot leave their homes because of their vulnerability in blood feuds. in terms of their linguistic association with the other Slavic nations rather than a common membership in the Islamic ummah. Albanians do intermarry with Turkish-speaking inhabitants of Kosova and Macedonia.islamicpluralism. The Albanian Kanun has been defined by a contributor to our study. administered under the Kanun. In the late 1980s blood feuds (gjakmarrja) over honour. In the sole common exception to this ethnocentric pattern. which were controlled by Orthodox Christian ecclesiastics without Catholic representation. handed over in arranged marriages. Father Shtjefën Kryeziu Gjeçovi (18741929). Additionally. rather than women. their own Kanun based on honour.

shoes. and a Bosnian consultant in our study condemned Albanian customary law as an “un-Islamic” expression of local particularism alien to the universalist spirit of Islam. A major principle of Kanun is that a married woman’s parents are responsible for her honour. are generally safe from the scourge of kidnapping and forced marriage endemic among Italian Christians in those areas. and food for the abandoned wife.134 During the trial. and most Albanian marriages today. where Albanocentric views. which he never learned to speak adequately. But his rage at his wife. Hanife Gashi. clothing. If a wife is abandoned with a nursing child. as well as his daughter. was described in news reporting as a nationalist “fanatic” who resented his wife and daughters’ superior acquisition of German. Nothing in this family tragedy has to do with Islam as a faith. had provided the daughter and her boyfriend with money for a vacation in Kosova.133 During the Communist period in Albania as well as in the Albanian-speaking Yugoslav lands (Kosova. and western Montenegro). rather than the woman herself. although they may involve contractual negotiations between families. In the period before his trial.eu . the German judge rejected characterisation of the crime as a socalled “honour” murder. Wives may not be beaten or otherwise mistreated for offences such as theft from a husband. Still. was sentenced to life imprisonment. Latif Z. the accused Latif Z. but a mother considered “vexatious” may be expelled from her home by her son. Yet men are strictly barred from taking women as concubines. are love matches. for causing trouble in his household.Germany: Approach to Women CIP honour of their husbands. were commonplace. and the defence lawyer argued for a charge of manslaughter rather than murder. on pain of expulsion of the men from the community and destruction of their property. “A woman is a sack. and widows cannot be compelled to accept marriages against their free will or vacate their dead husbands’ property. he set up a private café in his basement. older customs may prevail in diaspora communities. South Serbia. In an unanticipated outcome. the friends who visited his café deserted him. In this regard it should be noted that Albanian-speaking Christian women living in Calabria and Sicily. young brides are required by it to submit to arranged marriages. but are barred from marriage to various classes of individuals with whom they have endogamous tribal relations. the defendant blamed his wife. and stated that the convicted acted from “base motives”. made to endure”. as well as comments reinforcing the ideology of honour. In the 2003 Tübingen case. the husband must leave the child in her custody. descended from refugees who fled to the Italian peninsula before the Turkish advance in the Balkans in the 15th century. Western Macedonia. Hanife Gashi also provided an example of the abuse of women’s rights under color of customs. and the night before the murder of his daughter he was alone. rather than his daughter. and girls who are supported in their refusal of an arranged marriage by their parents are expected to remain unmarried. But the Kanun is contradictory on women’s rights. arranged marriages declined precipitously. they must explain their conduct to the wife’s family. an argument supported by the greater prevalence of 75 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. At the time. however. His wife. it was disclosed that the father had repeatedly beaten his daughter. festered. Husbands may beat their wives but if they draw blood. Young women may not be abducted and married. Eventually. she and her sister had been married without their choice to Latif and his brother. While working as a heating technician. The low esteem held for women in the Kanun is summarised in the clause.islamicpluralism. while providing shelter. The defendant repudiated a confession. although the husband may leave her. acknowledgement of so-called “honour” murder was rare in Germany. who got her navel pierced and died her hair blonde. because marriage by abduction remains so significant a violation of Albanian customary law.

lethal punishment. It is not instinctive… It is a severe. who was born in Turkey but forced to leave her family so she could “live as a German”. but with patriarchal social conditions”. and brought together German non-Muslim as well as Muslim women. Sazan B. by her three brothers. locked up… forbidden to leave the house… slaves offered in the Muslim marriage market”.137 The crime was particularly atrocious. the defendant poured gasoline over her and ignited it. The defendant stabbed the victim 12 times in the head and upper body. an Iraqi from Munich identified only as Kazim M. Ateş commented. because. She further assailed Muslim parents who object to participation of their daughters in sexeducation classes in schools. having purchased a knife and can of gasoline and stabbed and set fire to her only hours after their legal separation commenced. Honour killing of women is typically premeditated and organised. noting that only girls are excluded from such classes. In 2005. on February 7. the German female lawyer Seyran Ateş. and demanded stronger legal restrictions on arranged marriages. was charged with killing his ex-wife. 23. beginning in the Berlin neighbourhood of Neukölln.eu . The cited interview with Ateş took place three weeks after the slaying of Hatun Sürücü. Sürücü was killed with three gunshots at a bus stop in Berlin.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 Kanun among Catholics. such cases were treated as “second degree murders”. Only multi-culti fanatics are interested in this distinction – and use it to distract from other problems”. on the 76 pretext of chastity. Honour killing has nothing to with cultural imprinting – as if one couldn’t change that.. who interviewed Ateş.136 In October 2006. in that the defendant lay in wait for the victim while she walked in the street holding her 6-year old child by the hand. 41. The six-year old child witnessed the entire incident. She disclosed that anal sex had become a common method of contraception because of the absence of adequate sex education. Although affirming that she is a religious believer.135 At that point. “They cannot be separated. The pretext was the victim’s desire to live in a German way. Ateş specifically denounced ethnologists who.000 people against violence against women. 36. along with representatives of leftist parties and human rights groups. And that is how this crime should be punished”. She criticised members of the Green party and leftists for their failure to protect women. she described Turkish Muslim women in Germany as “sometimes not even knowing where they are. Turkish-German lawyer CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. say that honour killings are connected not with Islam. 2005. 24. But for this and other reasons the Islamic community in which Latif Z resided did not provide counseling or other services or incentives to integration into the German social system that might have prevented the crime from taking place. a German Turkish woman. As the victim crossed the street and stopped a passing car. the pretext of “cultural imprinting” had been introduced into the legal process.. Ateş replied sarcastically. “well-disposed toward Muslims. During the Seyran Ates. The Sürücü case led to a demonstration of 1.islamicpluralism. “Thanks a lot for this outstandingly impressive signal to Turkish women in Germany. according to journalist Jan Feddersen. in response to charges that she was a troublemaker worthy of condemnation. called for greater severity in German law governing so-called “honour” murder.

but escaped again within hours of the wedding. but after that failed.islamicpluralism.138 She lived in women’s shelters and attempted to establish a family with a Turkish man. having been tracked down. paid to the woman’s family. in Hamburg.. she returned to her family. a bodybuilder. threatened with a knife at her throat..eu 77 . as in other such cases. Leyla H. described to Der Spiegel how she had fled her family at 16 to avoid a forced marriage. required a German translator throughout his trial. who had fled first to the ex-Soviet Union. and was divorced one year afterward. He declared his contempt for the German legal system and bragged that he had been arrested after.139 Obeidi was stabbed to death 20 times by her brother Ahmad-Sobair Obeidi. She was critical of her own naivete in believing that her family would eventually understand and accept her motive in fleeing. Her flight took place only two weeks after the slaying of a 16-year old Afghan woman. expressed no remorse. took refuge with a German relief organisation. The prosecutor. when the Moscow-backed Kabul regime fell. “I am very happy to have committed this act”. In this incident. Hatun und Can. a contributing factor was the disparity in learning German between the victim and the husband. In June 2008. Indeed. in that no concept of honour was involved in the case and it was necessary for the German state to take a strong stand against such crimes. who were middle-class immigrants and had lived in Germany for 13 years. described the crime as a so-called “honour” murder but said the defendant was deluded in his beliefs. a Moroccan-born woman. Her brother surrendered to police 12 hours after the crime. Morsal Obeidi. and then migrated to Germany. 23 and the daughter of immigrants with university educations. Muslim authorities did not intervene in a conflict that had attracted government attention. after having had makeup applied for the ceremony. and was described as grinning with satisfaction throughout the trial. He had a Memorials to Hatun Aynur Sürücü CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. The defendant admitted in court his intention to kill her. the fatal assault. he readily confessed to the act.000. and sent briefly to Morocco where she was kept in isolation. as in the 2003 Tübingen case of the Albanian Latif Z. He said. She was returned to Germany and told by her family that she must accept marriage with an immigrant from rural Morocco. Islam and Shariah cannot be directly implicated in a situation where learning the language of one’s new home is considered an offence against honour.Germany: Approach to Women CIP legal proceeding it was disclosed that the marriage had been arranged in Iraq after a halfhour meeting between the couple. Peter Boie. in a parking lot. The crime took place after repeated beatings by her father and sister as well as her brother. It is interesting to note that her father was a former air force pilot serving the Soviet puppet regime in Afghanistan. 23. but. founded after the death of Hatun Sürücü to assist women in such cases and advertised on German television. Kazim M. Leyla H. and some jewelry changed hands. She was beaten for coming home late and being seen with strangers. She expressed fear that further contact with her family would lead to her death in short order. not before. A bride price of €32. The victim had obtained a protective order against her husband in late 2005 because of domestic violence.

Almost simultaneously with publicity about the fears of Leyla H. the usually-conservative German weekly Der Spiegel suggested that the crime was not a so-called “honour” murder. however. expressed remorse for his act and appealed to the court against deportation. two such crimes were attempted in Berlin.eu .. a court in Stuttgart determined that the perpetrator of a so-called “honour” murder in 2004. as may be seen. She had repeatedly fled the family but returned to it and to new attacks. the killer and his family committed violent outbursts in the courtroom. producing serious injuries to the victims. an attempted murder of a 17year old Iraqi girl by her 21-year old brother in Trier led to removal of her parents’ guardianship over her. He had killed the victim with 40 knife-blows. the Berlin municipality of Tempelhof unveiled a plaque commemorating the death of Hatun Sürücü – more than three years after she was slain. in German and Turkish. Leyla H. Ahmad Obeidi was convicted of murder140 in February 2009 and sentenced to life imprisonment. and. believed he had inherited total authority over them. a Pakistani. In both cases. Özhan K. 2008. In this case. including complaints by Morsal. A legal agreement between Germany and Turkey provides for such expulsion. and the pretext for the crime was the fact that his sister had separated from her husband but had not been divorced. Özhan K. but only if the convicted criminal shows a propensity for repetition of a crime. the girl’s mother and younger brother overpowered the assailant. could be deported to Turkey as soon as he completed his sentence for the crime. which. because the convicted individual remained tied to a Turkish.143 The girl was stalked by her brother and assaulted in the street with a paving stone and then kicked in the head and face. hit his exwife. the judge in Stuttgart declared that an appeal based on birthplace should not be entertained. a Moroccan. the women had obtained protective orders.islamicpluralism. On June 11. knows no ethnic limits. Questioned as to whether she believed such crimes should be called “honour killings”. but brothers killing their sisters for disobeying them has nothing to do with honour”. born in Germany but of Turkish ethnicity. that Hatun Sürücü was killed because “she did not submit to compulsion 78 and suppression by her family. and was condemned to nine years in juvenile detention in 2005. citing aggravated “sibling rivalry”. The revelation that the killer’s father was a “Soviet Afghan” refugee implied that the Obeidi family was liberated from “honour” prejudices. In a troubling development. way of life. was 18 when he stabbed the male friend of his sister to death. with Obeidi cursing the judge. as was later revealed. The determination that he could be deported was appealed. which proved of limited utility. 57. Nevertheless. and a Tunisian. The father of the family had died and Özhan K. a 33-year old Tunisian immigrant stabbed his 40-year old German ex-wife. “A woman killing a man who rapes her daughter may be described as a defence of honour. replied articulately. the slayer shouted that he would be a free man in Kabul. The ethnic Turkish victim Hatun Sürücü has become a symbol of the overall problem of so-called “honour” murder. while the CIP team was visiting Germany.141 A Pakistani man. regarding a so-called “honour” murder. In August 2008. who had been separated from him for three years. because she had left home. aggressors including an Albanian. the appeal was referred to the higher court in the CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. had also undergone an attempt to impose a forced marriage on her. Family mourners came from the Netherlands as well as Germany. Still. Iraqis.144 Özhan K. In July 2008. involving in this case study. rather than a German. Within hours. with a car. on the basis of his birth in Germany. when the judge in the case commented that Obeidi would likely have been found guilty in Kabul. but led a life according to her own free will”.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 long history of assaults. who had refused to wear hijab after reaching puberty. And the series of such crimes has not abated. In a remarkable outcome. Turks.142 The plaque reads. an Afghan.

previously described. who had fled her family to avoid a forced marriage and took up residence with three other girls whose situation was similar. strongly denied that Shariah authorities among the Kurds. a German Turkish girl then 19 years old. one is not aware at all how bad the whole problem is. In a single year. had also attracted the attention of German media to forced marriages. whose affection for her during visits to her birthplace contrasted with her ill-treatment at the hands of her father’s brothers. asserted that socalled “honour” murder is markedly common among Sunni Kurds. who said she would tell Aydan’s father her whereabouts. it should also be noted that the Zaza Kurdish-born sociologist Asiye Kaya. he forbade her to visit her birth mother. Sahin. An attempt at an arranged marriage in Turkey. representing the conservative Shafi’i school of jurisprudence. During her childhood in Turkey. and conducted by the Johann Daniel Lawaetz Stiftung. the Stuttgarter Zeitung146 described the case of Aydan. of the Humboldt University in Berlin. She developed a relationship with a German-born Muslim relative. In 169 cases. the leftist newspaper die tageszeitung147 reported on a study of forced marriage in Hamburg. but the relationship failed and no marriage took place. the victims 79 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. her father had remarried. Aydan. but included cases beginning in 2005. Only when I compare it to my current life: I can come home now and can do what I want. Aydan ran away from home and lived for a year with Sahin. In addition. He also strictly supervised her daily activities to avoid contact with boys. and. the previously mentioned Alevi Youth leader.Germany: Approach to Women CIP state of Baden-Württemberg. “As long as one lives in it. And. failed because her father demanded that five years of her professional income after her graduation from school (with law as her intended course of study) should be paid to him (her male parent). to a male for whom Aydan felt no romantic attraction. it is found among the Turkish and Kurdish Alevis. although the former practice has elicited less extensive or prominent commentary. The study was initiated in 2006. known as halk mahkemesi or “the popular tribunal” as “a particular element of the initial phase of cem in which all participants are called to disclose conflicts and strained relationship(s) among them. produced at the instance of legislators from the Christian Democratic Union. 210 incidents of forced marriage were handled by local counseling centres.islamicpluralism. if there is reason for hope in the panorama of life among Muslim women in Germany. in which marriage serves as an institution of social control. all communal conflicts are resolved by appeal of the clerics or dedeler.145 Forced marriage was brought to the fore of German non-Muslim attention prior to discussion of so-called “honour” murder. and barred her from marrying him. Aydan was frequently beaten by her uncle. In June 2008. In 2002. and she idealised immigration to Germany and the opportunity to live with her father. The case of Morsal Obeidi. a foundation. He stated that. in contrast. Aydan commented. While so-called “honour” murder is known to be frequent among Kurdish immigrants in Europe. described an environment of cultural conditioning in which many young Turkish women had no awareness of the real character of their victimisation. and was forced to escape again. during the Alevi religious ceremony or cem. threatening to burn her alive with gasoline. Germany’s main conservative party. When she moved to Germany. had legitimised such crimes. especially: I no longer feel afraid”. Kaya defined so-called “honour murder” as a community rather than a religious problem. The anthropologist Martin Sökefeld described the Alevi system of mediation. after Aydan entered puberty.eu . Before the ritual can proceed such conflicts have to be solved and mutual consent… has to be established within the congregation”. but her father considered him too modern. echoing the sentiments of Seyran Ateş. she was then threatened by Sahin’s mother. when interviewed by CIP. Yilmaz Kahraman. Even fatal violence between Alevi men may be settled by payment of a fine.

Struggling for Recognition: The Alevi Movement in Germany and in Transnational Space. September 26. cit. 133 Ibid. In 39 cases foreign men had obtained forced marriages with women living in Germany. were married while travelling abroad – in so-called “holiday weddings”. between 200 and 300 cases were recorded. 124 Unsigned. 114 Tibi. while in the remainder friends. Floris F. although 11 percent had an occupation.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 themselves asked for help. “What is Euro-Islam? Could it Avert the Islamic Self-Ghettoisation in the European Diaspora?” Unpublished. op cit. Stephen. 105 Vermeulen. Islamische Wissenschaftliche Akademie. in Marin. pp. 111 Conseil europeén des fatwas et de la recherche. January 15. and teachers made complaints. “Ancient Public Deliberation and Assembly in the Code of Lekë Dukagjini”. “Köhler fordert Muslime zu Absage an Scharia auf”. 116 Roughneen.. Collective Decision Making Around the World: Essays on Historic Deliberative Practices. tr. op. cit. “Pet hiljada eura studentima”. and Christians one percent. Suddeutsche Zeitung. In the breakdown of ethnic origin. 2008. Köln. other relatives. German ed.d. 1988. The study was considered incomplete. 2008. Frankfurter Rundschau. “Germany’s Muslims Band Together: New Umbrella Group Founded”. 1989. brides were “imported” to Germany. 110 International Crisis Group. 2007 127 Schwartz. p. Georg-Eckert-Institut. Shtjefën. 80 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. 2003. cit. op cit. IZH]. None of the women involved in the cases under examination had an independent income. Ileana.d. 1990. ibid.eu . Kanuni i Lekë Dukagjinit/The Code of Lekë Dukagjini. 104 International Crisis Group. op. Herbert Schultze. The Immigrant Organising Process. many still of school age. 119 International Crisis Group. the former Yugoslavia. 130 Bernklau. Hindus accounted for five percent. 2001. 131 Dauti.. 35. during the same period. cit. Kettering Foundation. March 22. Abdoldjavad. 106 See footnote 5. “German court ends Muslim slaughter ban”. Falaturi. the Hamburg study found that these were the worst cases in terms of abuse. BBC News. 129 International Crisis Group. while in 42 incidents young women. 109 Roughneen. December 10. n. The remaining cases came from South Asia. Martin. op. Islamic Scientific Academy. 2007. 113 Sökefeld. “Tödliche Tradition”. tr. Der Spiegel (Hamburg).148 NOTES 103 A useful ethnographic study of Alevism in Germany is Sökefeld. 1991. 2005. Croydon. 125 Unsigned. In 45 cases. Simon. Afghanistan (16 percent) or Kurdistan (9 percent). Der Islam in Unterricht. op. 123 Falaturi. March 2008. “Multiculturalism Run Amok”. A Guide to the Presentation of Islam in School Textbooks. 108 Ibid. 126 Köhnlein. ISN Security Watch [Zurich].. Associated Press German Worldstream. families of those who asked for assistance came most often from Turkey (54 percent). Dayton. since the women often spoke no German and were treated as household slaves. Five percent of the victims in forced marriages were male. Daut. June 25. New York and Oxford. Stephan. op. 1. including publication of a poster that directs young people seeking help to publicly-funded counseling centres. Muslim Thoughts for Teachers and Textbook Authors. 2007. 2008. cit. Amsterdam University Press. 2008. 120 International Crisis Group. Islam and Identity in Germany. op. [Hamburg. Cologne. April 11. ed. January 20.. or the Middle East. German ed. 2006. siblings.islamicpluralism. 37-38. The Hamburg study concluded that 53 of the 210 cases examined involved immigrants to Germany. 2002. The Islamic Centre Hamburg – A Presentation. Africa. Gjonlekaj. cit. “Frankfurter Familienrichterin sorgt mit Koran-Verweis für Empörung”. cit. 117 Unsigned. Amsterdam. n. Martin. Suddeutsche Zeitung [Munich]. 118 Unsigned. Recueil de fatwas. More than 80 percent were Muslim. 2006. 112 Unsigned. die tageszeitung [Berlin]. tr. 132 Gjeçovi. Islamic Scientific Academy. “Erster Koalitionsstreit um Äußerungen zur Scharia”. Oslobođenje [Sarajevo]. October 30. “Europe’s Sharia question”. cit. 107 International Crisis Group. 128 Unsigned. New York. Bassam.. Leonard Fox. Abdoldjavad and Udo Tworuschka. op. In October 2008 CDU politicians in Hamburg began an official campaign to oppose forced marriage. Michael Walpole. with a note that in Berlin alone. Berghahn Books. 121 Unsigned. 122 International Crisis Group. “Im Hinterzimmer der Traditionen”. Braunschweig. July 5. 115 International Crisis Group. op. Série no.

October 18. 2008. Die Welt [Hamburg]. Kaija. op. June 4. die tageszeitung. Sabine. February 28. Der Spiegel. 137 Fischer. 2008. “Nach versuchtem Ehrenmord wird Eltern die Vormundschaft entzogen”. Simone Müller and Katrin Triebl. 2008. DDP News Agency. Balasko. English text. war ein lebensfrohes Mädchen – das konnte Ahmad O. 2009. “Lebenslange Haft für Mord an Tochter”. “Ehrenmord: Morsal O. 2003. “Gedenktafel für ermordete Hatun Sürücü”. 142 Unsigned. 2009. Jan-Eric.’” Der Spiegel. “Multikulti ist verantwortungslos”. 2005. December 30. and Reinhard. December 22. October 18. Ulla. 2008. October 10. Eva. “Angst vor Ehrenmord – Leyla flieht vor der eigenen Familie”. Friedrichsen. “Das Schicksal einer jungen Türkin”. “Nach ‘Ehrenmord’: Gericht weist Klage gegen Ausweisung ab”. 2008. Gisela. CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. June 6. “ ‘Ehrenmord’ verhindert”. “Plakatieren gegen Zwangsheirat”. Hendrik.islamicpluralism. Frankfurter Rundschau. die tageszeitung (national edition). “Doubts About German ‘Honour Killing. um die Opfer zu schützen”. Der Tagesspiegel. “German Court Convicts Afghan Man for Stabbing Sister”. June 11. AP German Worldstream. May 17. June 9. 148 Kutter. nicht der Liebe”. Hamburger Abendblatt. 143 Unsigned. February 5. July 17. 139 Linder. 2008. Ferda. dass ich die Tat begangen habe. “Manchmal hilft nur eine neue Identität // Zwei Mordanschläge gegen Frauen . Jan.was die Polizei tun kann. Associated Press German Worldstream. Die Welt. February 13. 2008.’ ” Der Spiegel. 136 Schultz. Unsigned. “ ‘Ehrenmord-Prozess’ – ‘Ich bin sehr froh. Oliver. Stuttgarter Zeitung. nicht ertragen – Sie flehte. 135 Feddersen. July 17. August 5. “Nach Ehrenmord: Hunderte demonstrieren gegen Gewalt an Frauen”. 2007. Der Spiegel. 146 Schollbach. The study itself was conducted by Thomas Mirbach. 145 Sökefeld. cit. 2002. Der Tagesspiegel [Berlin]. “Eine Frage der Ehre. doch ihr Bruder stach 20-mal zu”. 2008. 140 Unsigned. 2005.Germany: Notes CIP 134 Unsigned. 141 Beikler. 2008. Eusterhus. 2008.eu 81 . 147 Kutter. 144 Schmale. Paula. die tageszeitung (national edition). March 7. Kaija. 138 Ataman. Sebastian. Sascha. “Zwangsheirat erstaunlich häufig”.

or seven percent in a national population of 17 million. Bouyeri was a supporter of an Egyptian movement associated with Wahhabism. targeted by arson. Case Study: The Netherlands Introduction Muslims comprise between 800. Indeed. who has publicly renounced Islam.eu . and who was assassinated by a nonMuslim ethnic Dutch native.islamicpluralism. with 106 mosques and other Muslim establishments. In the weeks following the killing of Van Gogh on November 2. has moved to the U. a friend of Fortuyn. in apparent reprisal. Such events included the rise of the anti-immigrant politician Pim Fortuyn (1948-2002). as well as individuals.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 6. served by 400-500 mosques.000 and one million residents of the Netherlands. following France and Germany. warned against the alleged advance of Shariah in the country.150 Hirsi Ali. 13 Christian churches were targeted in counterattacks. Van Gogh had directed a short film titled Submission with the Somali-born author and political figure Ayaan Hirsi Ali. 2004. Takfir wal Hijra (Religious Purge and Migration). but episodes in the first decade of the 21st century have arguably made Islam a more volatile topic in Dutch society than elsewhere in the West. even as the UK Mohammed Bouyeri CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www.S.149 In addition. It should be noted that while such atrocious and difficult incidents gave the impression of an Islamist siege of the Netherlands. and threats. by a Moroccan-born extremist of Berber ethnicity. an anti-Islam reaction more serious than any other in Europe so far occurred in the Netherlands. whose outlook has been heterodox or secular. the majority of Dutch Muslims are Surinamese (migrants from the former Dutch colony on the northern coast of South America151) and Turkish immigrants. who received threats from Muslim extremists in the aftermath of the Van Gogh affair. Demographically. who declared his unqualified opposition to the presence of Muslims. This traumatic event was followed by the 82 murder in Amsterdam of the film-maker Theo Van Gogh (1957-2004). the Netherlands has the third largest Muslim share of population in Western Europe. vandalism. Mohammed Bouyeri. and that after the incidents of 2004 tensions have decreased in the country. the Netherlands may very well prove a key “backup” country for mobilising moderate Muslims.

34 in the Greater Hague (Den Haag).S. In 2009. It may argued that much of the Dutch non-Muslim reaction has reflected disillusionment with the long-standing commitment of the government to a multicultural policy.154 Many Indonesians in the Netherlands are. 35 percent Moroccan. but little analysis was dedicated to the ultimate aim of the MB. In Amsterdam. in 2004. in which it criticised Dutch politicians for “scapegoating” and “repeatedly baiting” Muslims. Ahmed Aboutaleb was installed as mayor of Rotterdam and the first Muslim mayor in the country. who were Dutch nationals. Dutch mosques included. 36 in Greater Utrecht. Turkish immigrants began settling in the Netherlands in the mid-1960s.Case Study: The Netherlands CIP remains the main frontline country against radical Islam in Western Europe. and 57 in Greater Rotterdam (Rijnmond). 52 in the Greater Amsterdam region. WRR called for the Netherlands and the European Union to recognise and begin negotiations with the Egyptian core of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Lebanese Hezbollah movement. which was seen to have failed because of Muslim self-segregation. representing the social-democratic Labor Party (Partij van der Arbeid – PvdA): Ahmed Aboutaleb.152 The WRR recommendations may.153 The Netherlands also has a long-existing but small community of Indonesian Muslims. and 15 percent Surinamese. In a suggestion that produced no effect to date. Prior to the main Surinamese influx during the 1970s. while the faith of Islam is widely debated.. Already in 2004. and enjoyed better opportunities as immigrants than the more recent working-class migrants.islamicpluralism. The tone of this debate on the Egyptian MB markedly resembled a similar and inconclusive discussion in the U. We have examined the Alevis in Case Study: Germany and will analyze the situation of the Berbers/Amazigh in this and the remaining Case Studies. followed by Surinamese in second place and Turks in the third. born in Morocco and Berber/Amazigh in origin. of a total of 436. acquainted with Dutch culture. two Muslims were appointed as ministers in the Dutch cabinet. In 2007. a surprising outcome in Ahmed Aboutaleb that this port was considered a centre of antiIslamic sentiment and even labeled a “Fortuyn city”.eu 83 . based on three years’ research and titled Dynamiek in islamitisch activisme (Dynamics in Islamic Activism). became State Secretary for Justice. WRR even called for the organisation of an Islamic political party or parties in the Netherlands. The ratio of affiliation is 50 percent Turkish. but because it is the only Western European country with large numbers of Turkish and Kurdish Alevis as well as a significant community of Maghrebi Berbers/Amazigh – many of whom despise radicals and firmly oppose imposition of Shariah. the subtext of this controversy may have mostly to do with frustration over altruistic government policies that were ineffective or otherwise thwarted. be deemed by some to be excessive in their advocacy for accommodation with Muslims who are believed to be moving in a democratic direction. Moroccans are the leading demographic element. however. mainly beginning in the 1990s. in which much attention was focused on the strategic turn of the MB toward electoral politics. The crucial role of the Netherlands could emerge based not only on the dramatic events that have transpired there. Thus. however. however. Among other points. Nebahat Albayrak. the Dutch Scientific Council for Government Policy (Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid – WRR) had issued a report to the national cabinet. was named State Secretary [Minister] for Social Affairs. Christian. Balkan Muslims also arrived in the Netherlands. CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. which is to establish an Islamic fundamentalist state. a woman of Turkish origin.

former director of Milli Goruş-Noord. was originally more influential there than in Germany. The Lahori faction of Ahmadis have drifted toward prescriptive Sunnism. Still.eu . the Ahmadi community of 84 dissident Muslims includes a faction. but at the same time they condemn common Muslim spiritual practices such as the celebration of the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad (mawlid) and prayer at shrines. believes the founder was a reformer. But the country also has a significant Alevi community. Finally. mainly because they enjoy a superior social status in Pakistan thanks to their commitment to secular education.islamicpluralism. Hasan Ibn Ali. and a more extreme branch in the south. known as Qadianis. known as Lahoris. who was born in 868 C. that believe in the appearance of the Muslim messiah or mahdi in 19th century India.E. “hidden” imam. These attitudes are shared by Ahmadis and Wahhabis. Nonetheless. Ahmadis remain condemned by the Muslim majority because of the Qadiani belief that a mahdi has appeared in recent times. as Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835-1908). has been expelled from its (currently uncompleted) Amsterdam mosque project. because Milli Goruş and the Süleymancilar had taken stronger initiatives in the latter country. Milli Goruş is considered less militant in the Netherlands than in Germany. Diyanet. Haci Karacaer. Indeed. A second faction.155 Milli Goruş in the Netherlands is divided between a more moderate wing in the north of the country. and disappeared in “occultation” at the age of five. which controls 140 mosques in the Netherlands. and have become susceptible to the lure of political power.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 The Historical Background: Emergence of Shariah as an Issue in The Netherlands Like Germany. known as Milli Goruş-Noord and Milli Goruş-Zuid. but not a mahdi. Sunnis are CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. which may in the future assume a more aggressive pro-Shariah posture in line with the ideology of the AKP. Lahori Ahmadis are well-represented in the Netherlands and have been active in Muslim community affairs. as well as Milli Goruş and the Süleymancilar. Ahmadis of both factions represent a paradoxical element in the Muslim panorama because they are repressed and subjected to takfir (excommunication from Islam) in Pakistan and barred from making pilgrimages (hajj) to Mecca. Shias are required to believe in the future arrival of the mahdi in the form of the 12th. the Netherlands must contend with the activities of the Turkish government’s Diyanet. Ahmadiyya and Wahhabism were both introduced to the Netherlands by Indian Muslims from Suriname.

en Veiligheidsdienst – AIVD)156 and the National Coordinator for Investigation of Terrorism (Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestijding – NCTB). According to AIVD. The AIVD identifies the original centres of Saudi-financed radicalism in the Netherlands at the Al-Tawheed mosque in Amsterdam and the Al-Fourkaan mosque in Eindhoven. a Syrian named Jneid Fawaz. The imam of the As-Soennah mosque. had distinguished himself by his violent preaching against Theo Van Gogh and Ayaan Hirsi Ali. These documents generally refer to Wahhabism by the more “politically-correct” term “Salafism”. but educated in Saudi Arabia… or at least familiar with Saudi… religious dogmas”.157 have issued authoritative reports on the appearance of Wahhabi-oriented extreme and violent interpretations of Sunni Islam in the Netherlands. North Holland Rotterdam Mosque CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. Ijmuiden Mosque. Radical Shias predict the coming of a mahdi in the shorter rather than the longer perspective of history. Two Dutch government agencies. these mosques have been under the ideological direction of Arabic-speaking preachers originally from countries like Egypt. or apocalyptic end of time. followed by the As-Soennah mosque in Den Haag and the Islamic Foundation for Education and Propagation of Knowledge. “Muslim radicalism in the Netherlands is most successful in reaching young Dutch citizens of Moroccan origin and young members of other immigrant communities with their origins in the Middle East and Somalia. The agency states that. ISOOK’s imam. from the 1980s forward. “Since the mid-1990s. the General Intelligence and Security Service (Algemene Inlichtingen.eu 85 . since the coming of the mahdi would be accompanied by signs of the “last days”. affiliated with a mosque in Tilburg. but do not claim such a figure has lately emerged.islamicpluralism. whose father was also of Syrian origin.The Emergence of Shariah as an Issue in The Netherlands CIP recommended to believe in the eventual arrival of a mahdi but are not required to so believe and do not identify the mahdi with a specific historic personage. in the wording of the AIVD. They emphasise that. and known by its Dutch initials as ISOOK. Suhayb Salaam. Syria and Sudan. Saudi institutions and foundations established mosques in the country that “have dominated the ultra-orthodox debate within the Dutch Islamic community since the mid-1990s”. has preached in favour of polygamy. as well as white converts”.

For example. community and communications representatives. discouraging contact with those who hold different views and cultivating hostile thinking. neighbourhood or wider Islamic community not to work for or provide services to the institutions of the democratic legal order. similarly. while also inciting Muslims against Hirsi Ali. established Moroccan Islam of their families. For example. who has lectured at Leiden University. and now total 40. and the ascendancy of Shariah. (1) Family/schooling Beginning in 1989. neighbourhood or wider Islamic community to display loyalty to their own faith group alone. The group which has taken up this lifestyle is much larger than [the] hard core of ‘true’ Islamic radicals. as well as academic experts and journalists. This attitude is sometimes prompted by the feeling that there exists a genuine threat to the Islamic community”. homosexuals. wearing a ‘strict’ Islamic dress. using threats or persuasion to prevent them voting. Here we note a phenomenon visible among many young Muslims: because it is simplistic. observes that the emerging radical Islamist “culture often deviates from the traditional culture of Dutch Muslims. and rank-and-file mosque attendees. and Moroccan. The NCTB. Women. the reason being that they find it a ‘cool’ way of life without having any deep-seated convictions”. Interviewees included imams. or to create other forms of social tension. trying to prevent them taking up a 86 government job. “• Forcing people in the immediate vicinity. social workers. this has led to some Moroccan youths in particular rebelling” against the moderate. neighbourhood or wider Islamic community not to participate in some or all of the institutions of the democratic legal order. and sometimes to their own ethnic faith group alone. directed by Stephen Schwartz and Kamal Hasani. Surinamese. neighbourhood or wider Islamic community to conform to one’s own strict standards of behaviour. For example. Islamic primary and secondary schools were established in the Netherlands.158 State subsidy for Muslim schools represents an extension of the long-established Dutch policy of “pillarisation” (verzuiling) under which differing religious communities – CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 marriage by nikah without civil registry. Turkish. “• Attempting to convince or intimidate people in the immediate vicinity. using certain body language and observing the separation of the sexes. These schools are organised on the basis of religion rather than ethnicity. AIVD further discerns in this milieu “the adoption of highly ritualistic patterns of behaviour – for example. the more liberally minded and suspected non-believers are most likely [to] be confronted by this tactic. AIVD has analyzed the following tactics by which radical Islamists currently pursue their aims in the Netherlands.islamicpluralism. Interviews included extensive meetings and discussions in Amsterdam and Leiden. “• Attempting to convince or intimidate people in the immediate vicinity. all of which resemble Shariah agitation as seen in Britain: “• Forcing people in the immediate vicinity. fundamentalism appears an easy and therefore attractive form of affirmation. “• Deliberately attempting to disrupt the relationships between religious or ethnic communities.eu . with special assistance from Irfan Al-Alawi. In practice. The CIP Survey of Shariah Agitation in The Netherlands The Centre for Islamic Pluralism completed its field survey of Shariah agitation and attitudes toward it in Dutch Muslim communities in the second half of 2008. and other Muslim children are educated together in them.

Jews and Muslims were drawn into “pillarisation” in a more limited way because of the smaller size of their communities. as an obstacle to assimilation.islamicpluralism. in that Dutch political parties and trade unions were also supported for Catholics and Protestants on a separate basis. On the contrary: it produced a pacified and enormously thriving society”. criticised Islamic schools established through “pillarisation”. Interestingly enough.159 As we have suggested. Islamic public school lessons concentrated on positive aspects of the religion in general. in that Muslims remained on the margin of society. representing the conservative Christian Democratic Appeal (Christen Democratisch Appèl – CDA) party. with the diminution of religiosity in Dutch culture. “Pillarisation” originally extended to the broader environment. including subsidies for specialised professional media training. and was supported by then-member of parliament Hirsi Ali. Holland originally Catholics and Protestants – were provided separate educational.eu . Muslims. Buddhists. The Dutch writer Herman Pleij. medical. and Humanists all have benefited from government-mandated aid for their own special media enterprises. and media facilities.Family/Schooling in The Netherlands CIP Top:boy pupils at an Islamic primary school Left: window at Hidaya Islamic primary school in Nijmegen. however. include proShariah or otherwise controversial topics. we did not knock each other’s brains out. Hindus. according to one journalistic investigation. Dutch opinion in the 1990s judged “pillarisation” for Muslims and multiculturalism in general to have failed. Christian “pillarisation” underwent rapid decline during the 1960s. “Holland was the most segregated country in the world until the 1960s. Islamic teaching materials for use in the Muslim public school “pillar” did not. but Muslims in particular continued to take advantage of the Christian precedent in law. elected by the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie – VVD). although they included such debated topics as the appropriateness of Qur’an translations from Arabic to other languages (considered fully legitimate in official Turkish Islam but challenged by many Arab and other 87 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. in addition to such smaller Christian denominations as the Evangelicals. neither of them organised distinct party or labor sections. In 2003 Dutch Prime Minister Jan Pieter Balkenende. commented in 1999. but Jews. in their economic status no less than in attitudes. usually referred to by his last name.

Halal Barbie. Hema. as we ourselves have observed. and unauthorised student trips. as well as debates on fundamentalist Islam and advertisements for Muslim recruitment to the Amsterdam police force and the Dutch army. and.160 The public schools in the Islamic “pillar” have also been strongly defended as an alternative to mosque instruction which. At the end of 2008. and discussion of the headscarf and wearing of jeans. even by moderates and especially by many people of Berber/Amazigh ethnicity – a probable numerical majority in Morocco – as antidemocratic and oppressively restrictive of the Amazigh culture. and Sufi-oriented. A second El Hema operated in Rotterdam at the end of 2008.165 In 2007. for work that was not accomplished. McArabia halal fast food (minced lamb in pita).eu . A Barbie doll in hijab was a featured product. The increase in the number of disputes about these subjects which are being submitted to the Commission for Equal Treatment (Commissie Gelijke Behandeling) illustrates this development”. Moroccan Muslim youth in the Netherlands therefore reproduce the widelydescribed paradigm of a new generation caught between competing influences. opened in Amsterdam. Secretary for Education Ronald Plasterk of the Labor Party proposed162 that the abaya or burqa and niqab be banned from primary and secondary schools.islamicpluralism. State propaganda.. The situation of Dutch Moroccan youth is illustrated by publicity in the monthly magazine Mzine. Mecca Cola. In addition.S. These include: 88 • a dominant Moroccan Islamic tradition legitimised by the Moroccan royal authorities. most remarkably. halal baby food. while the quality of education in half of them was considered “weak”. Muslims have taken note of the overproduction of halal meat in the Netherlands. radicalised “boys and girls are clashing with their environment because they refuse to shake hands with the opposite sex and because girls want to wear veils at school. • by contrast. both for girls and visiting mothers. Issues of Mzine include numerous images of young Muslim women without covering. Plasterk described the coverings as “disadvantageous to women” and liable to “make integration difficult”. CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. The Dutch Ministry of State ordered that the Muslim schools be placed under close supervision by the official Schools Inspectorate. which is published in Dutch. UK and elsewhere.163 the Dutch Ministry of Education alleged that 86 percent of Islamic primary and secondary schools had engaged in financial fraud by submitting fake bills. school transportation. in contrast with a rating of “weak instruction” for only 11 percent of nonMuslim schools. The NCTB describes the current situation with admirable clarity. has announced that it will offer “Islamic finance” products in response to proposals for “interest free” housing purchases. Rabobank. El Hema. and information about such events as a 2008 beauty pageant titled “Inspiration for Integration”. Aside from the disaffection visible in the murder of Van Gogh and threats against Hirsi Ali. a large Dutch financial-services cooperative. a Moroccan political system that is seen. modernist. • and a Dutch popular culture that seeks to minimise foreign religious and ethnic loyalties among immigrants.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 fundamentalist Muslims).164 The Commission for Equal Treatment is an official anti-discrimination agency comparable to such agencies in the U. and that is overwhelmingly moderate. At the same time. with an elaborate hijab. with the Islamic butchering industry having become a source of export income for the country. may often include provision for corporal punishment and anti-Western 161 In November 2008. the periodical features such Islamic consumer products as alcohol-free cosmetics. an art experiment representing an Arab-oriented version of a Dutch department store.166 Other commercial considerations affect Dutch Islam. a doll produced in Syria.

the Union for Moroccan Muslim Organisations in the Netherlands (Unie voor Marokkaanse Moslim Organisaties in Nederland. Berber immigrant demography reflects the reality in the country of origin. even when serving Berber congregations. it is frequently asserted. For example. Within the Dutch-Moroccan community. As described in our Case Studies: France and Spain. and in our view credible. a similar or greater Berber demographic representation is probable among French and Spanish Muslims. the influence of the Moroccan government stretches so far that the imams immediately pack their bags when Rabat [the Moroccan capital] calls upon them”. The Dutch government recognises a Contact Body for Muslims and Government (Contactorgaan Moslims en Overheid – CMO) as a representative of Muslim interests. While reliable statistics are unavailable. (Kurdish flags are seldom seen in Germany or CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. SMN director Farid Azarkan declared. somewhat like Kurds in relation to Turks. a Surinamese-Indian grouping. but especially from those in Germany. A lot of them do not want this. in that the former is subjected to considerable public scrutiny as an expression of “dual loyalty” among DutchMoroccan Muslims. Some Dutch-Moroccans complain that involvement of clerics in the Netherlands with the Moroccan authorities interferes with Dutch-Moroccan Muslim religious life. in October 2008.Institutionalisation of Shariah by non-Muslim Governments —“Parallel” Shariah CIP (2) Institutionalisation of Shariah by nonMuslim governments (“Parallel Shariah”) “Pillarisation” in the Netherlands differed significantly not only from policies in Britain. VIN). CMO comprises. that at least half of Moroccan Muslims in the Netherlands are Amazigh from the Rif mountain region. but the CMO is viewed by moderates as pro-Shariah. But Moroccan and other Muslims in the Netherlands also complain that a double standard is visible in the differing treatment of the MIB and the DİTİB.islamicpluralism. MIB imams in the Netherlands are exclusively Arab. Berbers/Amazigh. as an extraterritorial religious authority. and the Imams’ Association of the Netherlands (Vereniging Imams Nederland. while no such attention has been focused on Dutch-Turkish Muslims. in being more extensive and expensive. the World Islamic Mission (Stichting World Islamic Mission Nederland). Labor Party legislator Jeroen Dijsselbloem said. In all cases involving Moroccans in Europe. Similar comments were forthcoming from Dutch non-Muslim politicians of both left and right. and Spain. “The imams get paid by the mosques. occupies a place in the Moroccan diaspora in Holland similar to that of the DİTİB in the Turkish communities abroad.168 some 40 imams were suddenly called back to Morocco for consultations. which maintains the Taiba Jama mosque in Amsterdam. Members of a community group. training of clerics for service in Dutch mosques is paid for by the government. The Moroccan Imams’ Union (Marokkaanse Imam Bond or MIB). as well. but have adopted a national flag that is displayed in Muslim communities in the Netherlands. an agency of the Moroccan government. have no independent state territory. “I’ve been told that they were recalled for instructions. However.167 In a model similar to that of “pillarisation”. Madeline van Toorenburg of the CDA condemned the action as evidence that the Moroccan government exercises undue pressure over Moroccans in the Netherlands. and is associated with the fundamentalist Pakistani-Deobandi interpretation. they want to integrate”.eu 89 . the Cooperative Union of Moroccans in the Netherlands (Samenwerkingsverband van Marokkanen in Nederland or SMN) complained about this action. CMO includes Milli Goruş. France. where no such elaborate efforts have been made to include Muslims in special official structures. It is unacceptable that Morocco interferes this way with Moroccans working in the Netherlands. the role of the MIB is also a source of dissension between Moroccan Arabs and Berbers/Amazigh. UMMON).

The goal is.eu . France. however. the Berber attachment to customary law could represent a bulwark against the penetration of Shariah agitation among Moroccan and Algerian Muslims in the Netherlands. or. as in Germany. except at political demonstrations. An alternative to CMO.170 Donner’s remark did not refer specifically to either a special legal system for Dutch Muslims. including the Council of Moroccan Mosque Organisations in the Netherlands (Raad van Marokkaanse Moskeeorganisaties Nederland — RMMN) and the Netherlands Muslim Council (Nederlandse Moslim Raad — NMR). and heterodox spiritual and ethnic communities like the Alevis and Berbers.islamicpluralism. that Shariah could be imposed on CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. a similar trend toward homogenisation. Dutch Justice Minister Piet Hein Donner. such as the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). claiming the mantle of Sunnism. the Media Commission (Commissaariat voor de Media — CvdM). Subsequent investigation by CIP in the Netherlands indicated that the charge of such expulsions was unfounded. In October 2007. to simplify relations between non-Muslim authorities and the Muslims. are especially known for their dedication to their own customary law. but Alevi and Ahmadi personnel were reportedly expelled from NMO. and also included representatives of the Ahmadi sect.169 Dutch media stated that the subversion of NMO was a product of a policy decision by an official monitoring agency. uniting all groups. Although a systematic analysis of Berber legal systems remains to be completed in the West. was corrected early in 2009 following a court order. the Lahori faction of Ahmadiyya and the Alevis. with other small entities.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 the Netherlands. NMO was previously run by Dutch members of the Alevi movement. the Centre for Islamic Pluralism condemned the reported seizure of NMO by Islamist radicals. to have one “telephone number” as a means of reference for non-Muslim leaders.) Finally. two years in advance. Berber customary law does not produce so-called “honour” murder in Europe. the Contact Group Islam (Contact Groep Islam — CGI) brings together the two main heterodox Muslim tendencies in the Netherlands. and Spain. CMO and CGI each maintain their own media enterprises: CMO manages the Dutch Islamic Broadcast Organisation (Nederlandse Islamitische Omroep — NIO) and CGI member group NMR runs the Dutch Muslim Broadcasting Service (Nederlandse Moslim Omroep — NMO). But Berber customary law denies traditional Islamic rights of inheritance and division of property to divorced women. Berbers also do not practise FGM. had provoked an uproar that. the Dutch government has assumed a posture identical to that of the German federal power in calling for the establishment of a single Muslim organisation. Kabyle Amazigh. which originated with the Dutch Nova TV network. and other fundamentalist groups. Late in 2006. in a magazine interview. which may seem positive to immigration experts but which we consider an obstacle to the defeat of radical Islam. Unfortunately. and the report of the supposed takeover. rather than Shariah. according to our informants. Donner commented somewhat insouciantly. representing the CDA. as numerous Islamophobic commentators suggested. Berbers may commit so-called “honour” murder in North Africa. like Kurds. as cited in Case Study: Germany above. Nevertheless. anticipated similar debates in Britain and Germany. In a marked and promising contrast with Kurdish customary law. In addition. which dictated that NMO be 90 combined with the “orthodox” NIO so that Muslims would have a single broadcast service in the Netherlands. but in Europe they have imported traditional procedures for reconciliation. Deobandi. is visible in France and Spain. such a requirement ignores the substantial differences between Wahhabi. that the Netherlands could adopt Shariah as law if twothirds of its parliament voted to do so.

in contrast with subdued Muslim interest in Shariah in the Netherlands. Dutch parliamentarians. Donner returned to high political responsibility as State Secretary for Piet Hein Donner Social Affairs and Employment. Such rhetoric was identical to similar exaggerated claims made by radicals in England. doubtful any structure in Western Europe will surpass mosques in European Turkey and in Russia in size. as that of seeking a means to better integrate Muslims into Dutch society. as a means to advance integration. especially large religious buildings like the projected Essalaam mosque in Rotterdam. shared by Islamophobes and Islamists. however. The CDA party.171 In 2007. although none exist openly in the Netherlands.eu 91 . not long after his Shariah controversy. which position he occupied at the time of the current study. called on him to take a stand against Shariah. the murderer of Theo Van Gogh. Stremelaar. Muslim demonstrators have protested against the prospective control of the Essalaam mosque by CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. But his excursion into Shariah as an appropriate legal standard for the Netherlands was not his first involvement in such a dispute. But Donner also stated that he would be pleased to see Muslim extremists serve in the Dutch parliament. It is. Dr. of a Muslim takeover. Donner’s intention in 2006 was defended by one of the leading scholars of Islamic studies in the Netherlands. and that he intended to warn against Shariah. which is supported by the Deobandi missionary movement Tabligh-iJamaat (TJ) and is designed to hold 12. he ordered adoption of the institutional headscarf. Annemarike Stremelaar of the Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World (ISIM) at Leiden University. “The Minister of Justice should dedicate his energy to combating these attitudes. In addition. and in both countries. Stremelaar pointed out that. As is the case with the Merkaz megamosque proposed for London (with a site near the Olympic Village serving the 2012 Games). said Donner merely sought to widen “the space for accommodation of immigrants”. Donner had provoked an outcry in 2004 when he ordered that uniform headscarves be required for all female Muslim guards and related personnel in Dutch prisons.000 worshippers. the Rotterdam mosque has been promoted as the largest mosque in Europe. Donner later argued that he had merely engaged in a spontaneous meditation on the nature of democracy. instead of putting forward the opinion that such conceptions could become part of our democracy”. Finally.e. had asserted that in the future. In Rotterdam. The same news service recalled that Bouyeri. Labor Party representative Joeren Dijsselbloem commented. Donner argued that a standard headscarf would be safer than individual headscarves. according to the American legal idiom. the arguably ludicrous blandishments of extremists provided fodder for the fantasy. Piet Hein Donner resigned from office not long afterward. including those from his own party.Institutionalisation of Shariah by non-Muslim Governments —“Parallel” Shariah CIP non-Muslims as well as Muslim subjects. i. Dow Jones International News pointed out that the proposed law would ban Islamist parties. which were already legal for female prison employees to wear. a reasonable accommodation.islamicpluralism. Also like the London Merkaz mosque. “The parliament will be renamed a Sharia court and the chairman’s gavel will fall to ratify Islamic [criminal] sentences”. In the aftermath of Donner’s inarticulate statements. to which Donner belongs. when interviewed by CIP researchers. the Rotterdam Essalaam mosque has attracted opposition from local Muslims as well as non-Muslims. following his admission of partial responsibility for a fire in a jail at Schiphol airport in which 11 immigrants waiting to be deported had died. greater problems have attended the construction of mosques. Dr. introduced legislation banning any political party with doctrines inimical to the Dutch constitution.

and Case Study: France. as follows:173 “b. “• Using persuasion or intimidation to implement a Sharia-based legal system within a particular community or neighbourhood. small commercial facilities. 92 “• Attempting to gain influence within political parties or other social organisations with a view to taking them over in the long term. Informal “prayer spaces” are often publically advertised. AIVD has put forward a reasonable and accurate summation of the problem represented by “parallel Shariah” – above all. idiom as voluntary self-segregation.174 “• Deliberately attempting to disrupt social harmony or to create tensions by. that it will foster separatism and Shariah enclaves. including by means of clandestine entryism. Exclusivism is expressed through discrimination. in Britain moderate Muslims argue that the number of existing mosques is sufficient for the community’s needs. or other markers facilitating their recognition by the non-Muslim public. judicial CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www.172 Dr. homes. although many such also exist in France and Spain. Two extremes have developed regarding this issue. and similar private spaces. German policy experts have therefore encouraged the construction of mosques to remove religious observancy from semi-clandestinity. the judicial system and other social organisations such as trade unions. certain forms of intolerant isolationism do represent a particular threat: exclusivism in respect of one’s own group and parallelism. But if their withdrawal from society starts to endanger basic rights and freedoms of others. spreading false rumours or conspiracy theories. AIVD goes on to warn that “isolationism”. Still. which is that in their absence. In pointing to the danger of “a Shariabased legal system within a particular community or neighbourhood”. “• Attempting to influence political officeholders through intimidation. citizens retain the freedom – albeit within certain limits – to pursue their own lifestyle and to decide for themselves how they conduct their relationships with each other and with the government.islamicpluralism. student bodies and consultative organs. for example. Islamic architectural features. The Netherlands appears to be closer to the German example than to the British case. The AIVD intelligence directorate has predicted a new radical campaign in favor of “parallel Shariah”. while in Germany the proliferation of unofficial “prayer spaces” is especially notable. if they are Muslim origin. above. Dutch concern about such communal entities echoes commentary about “no-go” areas. religious observances will be driven underground. then they have overstepped the mark and are damaging the democratic legal order. seeks to impose religious laws before secular ones and tries to create enclaves in which that system rather than government authority prevails. “poses no threat to that order as such. drawing on the essentially pluralist principles of Dutch politics. Tactics which are being considered: “• Attempting to gain influence inside political parties. but do not exhibit minarets. professional associations. Parallelism does not recognise the authority of government. AIVD declares “some forms of radicalism are permissible within the boundaries of the democratic legal order”. expressing fear of excessive Arab influence as well as concern over an alleged lack of transparency in the mosque’s financial accounting. into garages. branding them as traitors to the faith and their own community”.eu . incitement and sowing hatred. bribery or.S.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 the Dubai-based Al-Maktoum Foundation. which would be described in the U. Stremelaar voiced the common argument for construction of new mosques. including on the Internet. “In this light. as cited in Case Study: Britain. In a democratic society. “Under certain conditions. below.

In October 2008. The latter habits recapitulate attitudes toward crime among Wahhabi Muslims in Britain and the U. Hasan K.eu . Aydogan at that time estimated that 20 so-called “honour” murders of girls occurred each year in the Netherlands. Piet Hein Donner defended a Dutch imam for refusing to shake hands with Queen Beatrix. survived the attack. providing incorrect details when applying for a student grant or loan and withholding information from the police”. vandalism or criminality”. shot 19-year old Hasan K. A large percentage of the Dutch Muslim prison population is reportedly of Moroccan origin. because of a romantic relationship between Hasan K.) Ahmed Akgunduz. simultaneous with the acrimonious exchanges caused by his remarks on the permissibility of Shariah as a Dutch legal standard. where 17-year old Ali D. 93 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. the case was motivated by an alleged offence to the honour of a daughter.Approach to Women CIP intervention against these forms of isolationism is possible and the government can impose proscriptions.176 the aforementioned National Coordinator for Investigation of Terrorism (NCTB) published a paper calling on the authorities to pay more attention to the preaching of Wahhabi radicals. have not ended. however. and limit the influence of “more violent” Wahhabis (still referred to as “Salafis” in Dutch official discourse. The existing radical Islamist agenda includes. Aydogan’s interviewer described the impact in the Netherlands of the case. who claims inspiration from the Nurcu movement in Turkey.S.178 The article appeared soon after the shooting of 18-year old Zarife (family name undisclosed). that the Dutch monarch was accustomed to such a ban in meeting with Orthodox Jewish rabbis. during a royal visit to a mosque in Den Haag. Sezai Aydogan. based in Utrecht. by her father. and Surinamese-Indian residents. For example. Iranian. who has investigated so-called “honour” murder for a Dutch organisation. for instance. limited in scope. although radicalism is. In 2006. and stated that restrictions on the movements of females were observed among Turkish. incitement and expressions of hatred. Although the victim was a male. and Ali D. removing children from school. In 2003. in accordance with radical Shariah. in 1999. (3) Criminal aspects AIVD has also reported “there are ‘peripheral’ groups which try to use their supposed Islamic radicalism to justify what simply could be characterised as escapism.) We view this attitude as dismaying and counter-productive. has become known for his defence of wife-beating. Pakistani. Dutch official efforts to contend with radical activities by cooptation. The problem of so-called “honour” murder among Muslims in the Netherlands has been dramatised by the writings and other public advocacy of Ayaan Hirsi Ali. that unfortunately does not produce materials in English. (4) Approach to Women Minor incidents and details in inter-group relations have caused considerable controversy in the Netherlands. When. on the pretext of “honour”. exclusivist isolationism leads to actual discrimination.. a substantial reportage in a local Dutch newspaper quoted a woman of ethnic Turkish origin. “Attempting to encourage people in the immediate vicinity. however. not paying taxes. Somali. as offering “useful criticism of Dutch society”. according to the agency. a girl from the town of Almelo. neighbourhood or wider Islamic community into certain forms of civil disobedience.175 Or when parallelism actually results in the imposition of an alternative system of justice”. Afghan.177 (It might be expected.islamicpluralism. in our observation.’s sister. The NCTB suggested that cooperation with such figures would bind them closer to the established system. nihilism. The family of the aggressor disapproved of the victim because the latter was considered of inferior social status in Turkey. Movisie. rector of the Islamic University of Rotterdam. of a shooting at a school in the town of Veghel. hooliganism.

184 The ACVZ study. and that the crime could be considered a so-called “‘honour’ murder of the wrong person”.eu . ACVZ disclosed that forced marriage. Turkish and Kurdish organisations in the Netherlands launched a 94 national petition against so-called “honour” murder. she wrote. Nevertheless. who also comes from Almelo. thoroughly analyzed the phenomenon among Turkish Muslims. including Turkish. but without publically separating out fatalities. honour comes first. the Netherlands. considered the alleged dishonour to be a product of conduct by the victim and her friends. a Turkish-born male in his ‘20s. ACVZ called for Dutch adoption of legislation banning forced marriages. The petition was signed by Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Nebahat Albayrak.islamicpluralism.180 A plan for establishment of a national response centre to deal with so-called “honour” murder was announced in 2007.179 Van Eck acknowledged that so-called “honour” murder occurs in Turkey at the rate of six per month. Somali. The Dutch authorities recorded 470 incidents of so-called “honour-related violence” in 2007 alone.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 Aydogan stated that while so-called “honour” murder may not be inspired by Muslim religious principles. “Some honour killers are aware that Islam does not condone honour killing. Moroccan. Van Eck noted that in the Utlu case the victim was not the original target. “Although the sharia (Islamic law) neither prescribes nor condones honour killing as carried out among Turks. According to the psychologist’s report in the [Kemalettin] Utlu case study: ‘Utlu broods over the Koran. But it also supported the model seen in British interventions in Pakistan and specific emulation of the British government’s Forced Marriage Unit. CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. and included the stipulation. (Balkan Muslims were. Clementine van Eck. He asks himself how Turkish Muslims can claim that the Koran requires you to kill your wife if she has an affair.181 The centre was duly established. Van Eck thus made an important point: “Honour killings of third parties are rare. and Denmark. FGM. as well as among Chinese. “Islamic society creates an atmosphere conducive to honour killings.183 The following year. had registered a marked increase in the number of case reports. In 2005.’ ” Kemalettin Utlu. People think twice before becoming involved with a young woman” if the latter is viewed as compromised in the Turkish value system. Surinamese-Indian. above. 25 EU countries met in Rotterdam to confer on problems of forced marriage. Sweden. the Dutch Advisory Commission on Aliens Affairs (Adviescommissie voor Vreemdelingenzaken – ACVZ) issued a report. but is also found in Germany. titled Forced Into Marriage (Tot het huwelijk gewongen). In 2004. through the Cooperative of Relief Organisations (Samenwerkende Hulporganisaties – SHO). as in other cases. and Afghan people. since it emphasises separation of the sexes. Iranian Kurdish. apparently free of the problem. then religion”.182 Forced marriage has also gained attention in Dutch media. France. like so-called “honour” murder. the fear of being killed is very real. significantly.) But ACVZ could not quantify the incidence of forced marriage. based on a pilot project in Den Haag. as described in the Case Study: Britain. like similar documentation elsewhere. As in the UK. Belgium. Kurdish. and at the end of the same year. killed the female friend of his teenaged girlfriend after the latter had an abortion. ACVZ called on Dutch diplomats to act against forced marriage through scrutiny of immigration applications. pious Turkish Muslims do invoke their faith when committing an honour killing”. offered a distinction between forced and arranged marriages. but the perpetrator. was found to occur in nearly all Muslim communities in the Netherlands. and domestic violence. However. many victims were schoolgirls. among other political figures. based on the presumption of consent in the latter. Citing a particular case by the name of its perpetrator. It doesn’t say that anywhere in the Koran. A 2003 study by a scholar at the University of Amsterdam. She assembled and reviewed a significant number of case studies. the last presumably non-Muslim.

159 Koopman. “Burqa and nikab banned from higher education”. Utrechts Nieuwsblad [Utrecht]. 154 Vermeulen. Paul. 166 Unsigned.p. op. and Ethiopia. 169 Unsigned. Earlier in the same month. and Rodrigues. One Dutch media source188 stated that in 2007-08. [2007]. “Vogelaar wil onderzoek onderwijs in moskeeën”. ibid. launched a campaign against the custom. “WRR: stop islam-bashen”. “Lespakket zou te weinig ingaan op de angst die er bestaat voor de islam . “Crisis around new mosque deepens”. 164 Salafism in the Netherlands. In February 2009 a Moroccan man living in Haarlem was arrested for the genital mutilation of his daughter. 158 Vermeulen. “100% Halal. Salafism in the Netherlands. Muslims in the European Union: Discrimination and Islamophobia. 171 Unsigned. Amel. 2007. 150 Van Donselaar. Pakistanis. n. cit. cit. 157 Ministry of Internal Affairs and Governmental Relations. Welfare.’” De Twentsche Courant Tubantia. 173 The Radical Dawa in Transition. 2004. Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestijding. at www. Leiden. 2008. “Donner hekelt toon integratiedebat”. with criminal penalties for violation of the agreement. “Public Broadcaster in Hands of Radical Muslims”.. Sudan. NOTES 149 European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia. The Radical Dawa in Transition. 2007. 2006. Afghans were the only group in which the practice was effectively unchallenged. Arranged marriages were still found among Kurds. The Amsterdam Times. The practise of FGM has not been notable in the Netherlands. Mzine [Waalwijk. ANP. Unsigned. 2007. op. “Parliament Asks Dutch Min[ister] To Defend Remark On Islamic Law”. n. Anne Frank Stichting.islamicpluralism. Ontwikkelingen na de moord op Van Gogh. Jaap. 100% Business”. but had come under the pressure of social disapproval. the city of Amsterdam initiated a special research project on forced marriage. CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www.eu 95 . two Dutch anthropologists. 160 Van Soest. Amsterdam. ANP. 156 Algemene Inlichtingen.nl/ 170 Unsigned. “Negen op tien islamitische scholen sjoemelt met geld”. In addition. aged five. 161 Unsigned. April 10. working with local Islamic groups.nisnews. with Turkish-Moroccan marriages becoming commoner. 2008. October 13. November 28.Approach to Women CIP In 2007. 2006. ibid.p.185 and in 2008 Rotterdam. “Morocco recalls fifty imams”. ANP.. 163 Unsigned. “El Hema store opened”. De Twentsche Courant Tubantia [Twente. November 15. 172 Unsigned. “Huiver voor islamitische zuil is misplaatst en on-Nederlands”. 2008. The Amsterdam Times.186 At the end of 2008. July 11. May 19. “Geen hiërarchie in Grondwet”. The Rotterdam Times. October 31. May 2008. But another stated189 that the prosecutor in Haarlem said the authorities had no experience with such cases.. The Rotterdam Times. and Universiteit Leiden.walidin. Labor Party State Secretary for Health Jet Bussemaker called for a regulation under which Dutch residents from countries with a high risk of FGM.‘Lespakket islam preek voor eigen parochie. Edien Bartels and Oka Storms. claiming FGM had taken place in the Netherlands. reported187 that forced marriages had become noticeably less common among Turkish and Moroccan residents of Amsterdam. including Somalia. while Muslim-Muslim marriages remained a norm. 44 reports were submitted to child-abuse hotlines. be required to sign an oath to refrain from the practise. Dow Jones International News. and Sport observed that no proceeding in an FGM complaint had yet been undertaken in the country. when traveling to their native lands. cit. and Hindus. September 11. of the Free University of Amsterdam. n. 2008. June 26. 153 Vermeulen. The Netherlands]. 174 “Entryism” is a political-ideological term dating from the 1930s and referring to infiltration of hostile organisations by operatives with a concealed agenda. 152 Unsigned. November 13. 2008. 155 Vermeulen. 2003. September 12. Algemeen Nederlands Persbureau (Dutch Press Agency – ANP).en Veiligheidsdienst – AIVD. 2004. 168 Unsigned..com. Islamist “entryism” in Dutch parties and unions would vitiate any need for separate such entities under “pillarisation”. The Netherlands]. Peter R. 2006. September 14. 167 The World Islamic Mission maintains a website at www. and that the Dutch Ministry of Health. 162 Unsigned. cit. op. October 31. 165 Bali. op. 151 The Netherlands continues to control six islands in the West Indies (Aruba and the Netherlands Antilles) with small Muslim communities but little involvement in Dutch Islam. 2008. Aaldert.p. ethnic identification had declined in significance. 2006.

2005. “Meer eerwraak door emancipatie vrouwen”. 189 Unsigned. December 13. Radio Netherlands Worldwide English. November 29. September 8. 188 Unsigned. Amsterdam University Press. while U. “Landelijk expertise centrum eerwraak”. 2007. “Tot het huwelijk gedwongen”. “Onderzoek naar gedwongen huwelijken in Amsterdam”.S. 2008. March 8. “Luister naar wens radicale moslims’: Pleidooi in rapport NCTb”.eu . 2008. ANP.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 175 It should here be recalled that the Dutch and general European legal philosophy criminalises hate speech as well as hate crime. 187 Unsigned. ANP. October 10. “Fatale flirt: Lonkende blik kan al genoeg zijn om de familie-eer te schaden”. May 14. De Twentsche Courant Tubantia. Henk. 179 Van Eck. op.nl/ 96 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. 180 Unsigned. ANP. 177 Unsigned. 2007. “Netherlands: Man arrested for circumcising daughter”. cit. “Donner hekelt toon integratiedebat”. 2005 181 Unsigned. 2009. 182 Unsigned. 186 Unsigned. 178 Van Schuppen. ANP. 2007. 2003. March 2. “Landelijke actie Turken en Koerden tegen eerwraak”. 183 Unsigned. July 8. Clementine. February 7.islamicpluralism. “Rotterdam vestigt aandacht Europa op huwelijksdwang”. ANP. 2008. Purified by Blood: Honour Killings Among Turks in the Netherlands. 2003. 2004. ANP. “Man arrested for genital mutilation”. Provinciale Zeeuwse Courant [Rotterdam]. February 7. “Landen van EU pakken misbruik vrouwen aan”.nieuws. accessible at http://binnenland. November 5. Movisie maintains a Dutch-language website at www. 2009.nl. 176 De Haas. Joost. “Gedwongen huwelijken steeds minder normal”. 184 Unsigned. De Telegraaf [Amsterdam]. ANP.movisie. December 5. law only penalises crimes motivated by hate. 185 Unsigned.

While some of these overseas regions include Muslims who are considered French citizens but contribute to Islamic immigration into the metropole. and Italian life was profoundly altered again with the rise of Ottoman-Venetian trade after the fall of Constantinople in 1453. prior to the substantial penetration of the Muslim countries by European colonialism (rather than Crusader campaigns). Total functioning mosques are currently estimated at around 1. Case Study: France Introduction France. the Caribbean islands of Martinique.eu . Martin (shared with the Netherlands). Paris still governs overseas départements and territories (the “DOM-TOM”. military. The intellectual heritage of Southern Italy was transformed by Arab rule. Italy. unlike the North European countries of Britain. that. Guadeloupe. France underwent the shortest period of Arab invasion. 97 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. is one of four Western European nations. and political alliance in the 16th century.600. Germany. had direct experience with Islam. and territory in Antarctica. Spain has the longest and deepest legacy of Muslim occupation. North America. or Islamic West). comprising up to 10 percent of its population. in response to labor shortages in the metropole. originating from North Africa. and the commencement of a FrancoOttoman commercial.E.e. and Réunion in the Indian Ocean. Demographically. Guyane in South America. but its collective memory includes Muslim defeat at the battle or Tours in 732. the very great majority of French Muslims are migrants and their descendants. Case Study: France CIP 7. as well as other islands in the Indian Ocean. France today includes between four and six million Muslims. extending from 711 to 1492 C. and the Netherlands. although less studied. Similar developments. and Portugal.7. and St.islamicpluralism. took place in Portugal and continue to evince a visible impress on the society. France controlled a number of majority-Muslim foreign possessions until recently (such as the Comoro Islands in the Indian Ocean and Djibouti in the Horn of Africa). and from the former French colonies in West Africa and the Comoros. Of these four. from the eighth to the end of the 13th century. North African immigration to France began in the aftermath of the first world war. with Spain. especially Morocco and Algeria (the core of the region known as the Maghreb. this is the largest Muslim share of population in Western Europe. French Polynesia. the activity of Muslim merchants and shepherds from Spain in the country. Spanish Arab literary influence in the development of troubadour poetry and Provençal courtly life. i.

Mali. Bangladeshi. but has maintained a tenacious presence in France. and East African Muslims moved to Britain. We have described Britain and France as the two countries in which the European colonial heritage most definitively influences the pattern of Muslim immigration. “Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb” has continued its terror activities in Algeria. France has also attracted Pakistani. while also penetrating the sub-Saharan. because of broad economic and social relations between the empire and the former colonies. which aligned itself with the former regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. by contrast. an important factor in Algerian immigration to France has been the impact of the “second Algerian war”. like other Maghrebis in Europe. While reliable statistics on their population are unavailable. are divided between Arabs and Berbers. may define themselves as ex-Muslims. including raids and related actions to restrict or expel it. Yet a major distinction should be observed. their interest in becoming French.islamicpluralism. Indian. in turn. These are known as “banlieue riots” because they originate in the Parisian and other suburbs (“banlieues”) mainly occupied by Maghrebis and Black 98 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. Finally. been retitled “AlQaida in the Islamic Maghreb” and has drawn some recruits from Morocco. and Mauritania. as in Germany. and (very few) Balkan Muslim immigrants.eu . the Armed Islamic Group (generally known by its French initials as the GIA). and continue to do so. some of whom. although doubtless sincere. many of them presumably born in France.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 The Maghreb Maghrebi immigrants to France. Black African Muslim countries of Mauritania. is designated a terrorist group by the U. produced another entity. The GSPC has. and Niger. Pakistani. Morocco is a global centre of Sufism. France has experienced significant outbreaks of urban violence involving youths of Maghrebi and Black African background. as in the Netherlands and Spain (see following Case Study) that Berbers constitute the Maghrebi majority in France. and along wth a small representation in the Netherlands. the claim is often heard. The main combat group within the broader fundamentalist movement in Algeria. Turkish. Algerian refugees from such atrocities are therefore active in France. Algerian and Black African supporters of this movement are present in the metropole but function in deep clandestinity.S. Mali. from 1991-2000.. The controversial Iranian Marxist anti-government group People’s Mujahidin (Mujahidin-e-Khalq – MEK). formerly known as the Salafi Group for Calling to Religion and Combat (al-Jamaa asSalafiyya li Da’wa wa’l Qital – French initials GSPC). was often based more on necessity than sentiment. and were stigmatised in their countries of origin as “harkis” or French collaborators. many Muslim immigrants arrived in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of French rule in countries like Algeria. but has yet to carry out actions in France itself. Chad. even against aggressive government prosecution. as well as Iranian exiles. Sénégal. and many in the late 20th century came to Britain with a commitment to a general “British Commonwealth” identity (sometimes legitimised by recognition of Commonwealth passports). in which Islamist extremists influenced by Saudifinanced Wahhabism carried on a terrorist campaign confronting the Algerian government and against ordinary Muslims. as are the formerly French-ruled West African nations of Guinea. In France. An unknown but large number of French Muslims of North African and African origin are affiliated with powerful Sufi orders.

S. But some elements of “communautarisme” may prove indispensable for the defeat of radical Islam in France. which has been linked to Saudi financing. or strict secularism. into a single French identity in which they would be subordinated to an Arab Islamist interpretation.191 Dr. The abolition of any form of “communautarisme” might submerge Kabyle Berbers/Amazigh. While media reporting outside France has sometimes hastily traced the resentment of banlieue youth to a conflict between Islamic identity and the French constitutional principle of laïcité. For example. At the same time. The main banlieue riots took place in 2005 and 2007. who inherited his clerical post in Paris from his father.7. reported to bear Algerian diplomatic status. if only for police. criticised the action of the UOIF as a religious usurpation of authority regarding a civil issue. including the rector of the Grand Mosque of Paris (Mosquée de Paris – GMP) and former president of the now-defunct Supreme Muslim Council of France (Haut Conseil des Musulmans de France). Dalil Boubakeur. and a contrasting public pursuit of an Islamic state in the West. Boubakeur and Kabtane have been rivals but succeeded in forming a partnership in opposing the banlieue intervention of the UOIF. Still.islamicpluralism. Case Study: France CIP The banlieue riots of 2007 Africans. Boubakeur is an Algerian-born physician by profession. although children of Christian immigrants as well as ethnic French youth have also participated in them. Kamel Kabtane. The French sociologist Olivier Roy192 has drawn a distinction between a personal “reIslamisation” in which believers displaced from their original societies to the West seek to deepen their commitment to Shariah in their daily lives. and as described further below. banlieue discontent is more widely blamed on discrimination in employment and lack of other opportunities for upward mobility than on religion-based ideology. and are now Shariah districts. Dr. and is threatened by radical infiltration (although less than in the UK). this and other problems of social analysis are complicated by the ban on collection of religious statistics of any kind under laïcité. Si Hamza Boubakeur. (In part. French non-Muslim opinion has adopted as a watchword the condemnation of “communautarisme”. issued a fatwa in November 2005190 condemning the riots and telling Muslim youth “it is formally forbidden to any Muslim seeking satisfaction and divine grace to participate in any action that strikes in a blind manner at private or public property or which may harm the life of another person”.eu . meaning the fragmentation of French society into different cultural and ethnic groups – somewhat as “multiculturalism” is currently assailed in the U. Dr. The paradoxical nature of this debate illustrates the internal complexities of French Islam. there is little empirical or official evidence to support such perceptions. While the Dutch Muslim community is the most diverse in Western Europe. the French Muslims are the most deeply riven by insurmountable rivalries. who are now a bulwark against radical Shariah. Based on the conflict between Roy’s conception of such a “re-Islamisation” and 99 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. however. and the rector of the Lyon Mosque (Mosquée de Lyon). some moderate Muslim leaders. the ECFR and the Muslim Brotherhood.) Some nonMuslim commentators have even alleged that the banlieues have become “no-go” areas. The Union of Islamic Organisations in France (Union des organisations islamiques de France – UOIF).

mainly because of the strong commitment of the country and it institutions to laïcité. typically and mistakenly referred to as a “veil”. including legal sanctions. 55 percent expressed their opposition to special menus (e. Schwartz’s command of French and knowledge of the French Muslim environment proved sufficient for Case Study: France to be completed. separatism. and other theorists. In the present Islamist ideological discourse. should be called niqab. for whom a “fiqh for minorities” [fiqh alThe banlieue riots. distinguishes between the two. calls for permission for the wearing of hijab were heard from Muslim parents.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 the arguments of Yusuf Al-Qaradawi. historically. known in French as a foulard or scarf. In the latter year. 100 (1) Family/schooling France possesses only four private Islamic high schools: two ordinary high schools. the authoritative daily Le Monde reported193 on a poll showing changes in attitude about such issues in the previous dozen years. as we shall see. as in the Netherlands and Germany. French journalistic and political discourse sometimes. as previously noted. the moderate position of Dalil Boubakeur was articulately expressed. covering the face. 2007 aqalliyat] leads to the expansion of Islamic territory. “re-Islamisation” implies radicalisation. a preparatory school. we judge this distinction to be artificial. It may be noted that construction of the Grand Mosque of Paris was completed in 1922 as an homage to the service of Maghrebi Muslims in the French army during the first world war. During the hijab contretemps. halal food) in school cafeterias.islamicpluralism. was the first debate over an element of Shariah in the West to gain worldwide attention. Further. but not always. and other issues of conduct in public schools. French Muslim children are therefore almost entirely educated in state schools. like Alevis. (As previously defined. although the integration of religious materials into history classes had been effected in 1996. The CIP Survey of Shariah Agitation in France The CIP field survey of France was completed in November-December 2008 by Stephen Suleyman Schwartz. The French controversy over wearing of the headscarf by Muslim girls. “universal” Islam on the fundamentalist. and “parallel Shariah”. Spanish) Muslims in that. for Muslim girls to be excused from mixed-gender gymnastics and swimming lessons. Wahhabi model.eu . Although the investigation was less easily accomplished than in England. along with demands familiar in other European countries. the headscarf is properly called hijab.) In 2000. and 72 percent were against authorised absences from class on religious holidays. The rector of the Grand Mosque of Paris stated that while he would prefer the option of halal food in schools. Given that in accord with laïcité any form of religious instruction was barred from French schoolrooms. have rejected Islamic law in favor of customary law. and a school for training midwives. even when it does not command immediate defiance of the legal order in France. at present no such CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. (While the fatwas of Al-Qaradawi and the ECFR are printed and sold in France. Germany. the number of poll respondents favoring “instruction in the history of religions” had fallen from 65 percent in 1988 to 57 percent in 2000. AlQaradawi’s Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam was. In such an environment. banned.g. Roy himself admits that “re-Islamisation” requires a purified. Also as the century ended. any rhetoric calling for a breach with laïcité is bound to provoke immediate reaction from the French political elite.) The Historical Background: Emergence of Shariah as an Issue in France Public advocacy for establishment of Shariah as a legal standard is almost unknown in France. stripped of local culture and civilisational components. Berbers. Taha Jaber AlAlwani. Shariah is a source of contention among French (and. and the Netherlands. a veil.

known in the West as Averroës) that the sphere of rational awareness and that of spiritual awareness are separate. and an academic. and supported the positivist philosophy that motivated the establishment of laïque schools. the police prefecture of Paris included only six recognised abbatoirs for such use. But the existence of this sacred has a dual consequence: “2. they are significant in that Dr. Boubakeur thus affirmed the position that we have underscored as that of traditional Shariah. the Catholic philosopher Philippe Capelle. Dr. The sacred also exists in the relations among humanity”. Dr. Dr. the Muslim child I once was would never have been able to receive an impartial education.197 While these comments may seem digressive in a discussion of Shariah in France.194 Further. describing it as “an excellent thing” in a collection of essays prepared with rabbi René-Samuel Sirat. Dr. Finally. Philippe Joutard. exercising a role unseen in any other Western European country. in that my personality would have been confiscated by a religious authority… That did not prevent me from believing in my religion”. Boubakeur has borrowed three principles from the Jewish philosopher Emmanuel Lévinas: “1. adding that laïcité promotes respect for the sacred.195 Dr.eu . Boubakeur is by far the most respected Muslim leader in France. Dalil Boubakeur. in that the French Positivists are seen by many as responsible for the fall of the Ottoman caliphate [khilafah]).France: Family/Schooling CIP Above: the Grand Mosque of Paris. Boubakeur affirmed the belief of the Spanish Islamic philosopher Ibn Rushd (1126-1198. “If not for laïcité. “the most urgent problem in the question of religious instruction. “3. Rector of the Grand Mosque of Paris measure was possible. for example. “The way of Islam states that the believer must submit to the general laws [in a country of residence]… French Muslims must take account of their presence in a nonMuslim context”. titled The Teaching of Religion in Secular Schools (L’Enseignement des religions à l’École laïque). Dr. He declared.islamicpluralism. Dr. Boubakeur stated that there was no need for any change in the existing French laws on laïcité in schools. He further wrote. (Positivist philosophy is by no means widely popular among Muslims. The sacred exists in humanity as well as in God. Boubakeur wrote in 2003196 in firm support of laïcité. Boubakeur argued against an essential division between secular and religious values in the lives of individuals: “a secular person can possess a favorable image of a religious person and a good religious person can view laïcité in a positive light and his send his children to the laïque school”. is to develop love for others”. The sacred exists in the relationship of man with God. Right: Dr. he concluded his 101 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. in 2002. Boubakeur specified. if only because the production of halal food in France was complicated by the inadequacy of slaughtering laws and facilities.

discussion of the headscarf began to occupy considerable space in French media. but a reflection of past political influence over French law. Dr. a phenomenon of which we also found empirical evidence in Britain. But we view the politicisation of hijab as a dangerous tendency toward cultural separatism. rather than an affirmation of religion. Boubakeur. reported200 at some length that in French working-class neighbourhoods. and hijab remains forbidden. and was not easily resolved. and the Jewish observance of Yom Kippur.619 ordinary high schools.eu . the publication of caricatures of Muhammad in Denmark. Late in 2008 a community periodical popular among Maghrebis. although Chirac 102 also called for a ban on wearing of the Jewish kippah or skullcap by boys. The issue of the headscarf in schools provided a major test for the conceptions of Dr. especially since much reportage in French media recounted the similar political discord in Turkey. as well as kippot and large Christian crosses from state schools. Muslim parents were increasingly enrolling their children in Catholic schools.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 remarks on education and laïcité in arguing. Catholic schools in France comprise 97 percent of all private schools. permits the wearing of hijab. But notwithstanding nonMuslim miscomprehension. a statement that was interpreted as referring in the main to hijab. although Christian symbols such as icons and crosses are displayed within them. Boubakeur. in the calendar of school holidays. which is too convoluted to be easily addressed here. a Shariah issue. (The four Islamic schools operating in France do not maintain contracts with the state. Some “modernist” Muslim women also defend hijab as a form of feminist security against harassment by men. These religious schools operate under contract to the state. “We should make tomorrow’s citizen someone who assimilates the essence of the religions to live by the best of all faiths. This may quickly transmute into religious separatism. and 576 high schools for professional training. 202 agricultural high schools. As 2003 gave way to 2004. in 2007. strictly speaking. Education of Muslim youths in Catholic schools is an established tradition in many countries. similar to participation in the banlieue riots. this is not. however. the feast of sacrifice at the conclusion of the hajj or pilgrimage month (known as Eid-alKebir in France and Spain and as Kurban Bayram among Turkish Muslims in Germany and the Netherlands). which had banned hijab in universities for decades. that reveal the dissonance in France between a commitment to free expression and laws against alleged defamation of ethnic and religious communities.020 at primary level. As with French public schools. mothers in hijab or niqab remained outside the Catholic facilities when their sons and daughters entered to begin school hours. But CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. as well as a trend toward the “youthful” and radical fundamentalist simplification of religion. The president additionally declared his opposition to the inclusion of the Muslim celebration of Eid-alAdha. Le Courrier de L’Atlas. 1. totalling 5. similar to the improvised doctrines seen among British Muslim radicals and the “cool” Wahhabism noted in Case Study: The Netherlands. A British television journalist predicted that the ban would be extended to turbans worn by Sikhs. is not an unequivocal figure. interpret the adoption of hijab as a marker of identity. as will be explained below. and that school examinations should not be scheduled in conflict with them.) A minority of Catholic schools. He has taken positions on controversies like that of Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses and. Chirac’s comments led to demonstrations in support of hijab in France as well as in Britain and various Muslim lands. both Muslim and non-Muslim. But Chirac said that students should not be penalised if they individually took these days off school. and therefore as innocuous in the long term. with lively media coverage worldwide. Many commentators. In December 2003.islamicpluralism. if they wish”. French president Jacques Chirac pronounced198 his firm opinion against the presence of religious symbols in state schools. but in February 2004199 the French parliament voted to ban hijab.

eu . pointed out that the Catholic church and the Islamic community possess some common values. a Catholic school in the historic proletarian banlieue of St. a bimonthly magazine associated with the prominent daily.islamicpluralism. To emphasise. A Muslim mother of three children. a neighbourhood known for ethnic conflicts. and even wearing jeans tucked into boots”. simply asking the “up and down” or “yes/no” question as to whether Muslims were “for” or “against” Shariah in Britain. Most important. and eight percent declined to comment.“Parallel” Sha ria h CIP Catholic educators. our research on this issue in Britain found Muslim opinion more closely conforming to think-tank surveys – i. while 22 percent believed themselves to be Muslim first. published a new opinion poll taken among French Muslims. correctly argue that hijab has a separatist significance that is inappropriate in a Christian school where a hostile attitude toward Muslims is forbidden. field observation of Muslim attitudes in France shows a majority favoring traditional. rather than. such as baggy pants. The Catholic schools adapt to certain aspects of Muslim life. Only 17 percent claimed that Shariah should have jurisdiction in all countries. on the issue of Shariah. (2) Institutionalisation of Shariah by nonMuslim governments (“Parallel Shariah”) Notwithstanding the international media panic generated by the 2005 and 2007 banlieue riots. Denis. without perceiving a contradiction between the two. moderate Islamic positions. and the success of their graduates in gaining access to prestigious higher institutions – making the interest of Muslim parents in them understandable. and 14 percent pronounced themselves French first (four percent declined to answer. hooded sweatshirts [both of which are markers of gang culture. Kawthar. She specified that the values maintained by both Catholics and Muslims in France included respect for others. we have a common vision of the educational goal”. some clothing styles are forbidden. This aspect of French Muslim life was underscored at the end of 2008 when Le Monde des Religions. 75 percent expressed their support for it. Jean-Baptiste-de-la-Salle-Notre Dame de la Compassion.Institutionalisation of Shariah by non-Muslim Governments . we believe in a single God. in the UK journalistic style. who was interviewed on this topic. Marie-Claude Tribout. while 37 percent declared that elements of it could be applied if they were adapted to French law. 17 percent affirmed varying degrees of opposition to it. and rigorous instruction. and is markedly reassuring as to the moderation of the French Islamic majority. “We share the same values. originally seen in the U. and radical demands for the spread of Shariah. showing around 65 percent of British Muslims opposed to introduction of Shariah as a separate legal standard. 103 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. sharing. On the question of laïcité. 68 percent of respondents said that a strong hostility to Islam exists in France. but which a person of another faith certainly will find in their own Book”. “which we Christians find in the Gospels.) At the same time. Kawthar also expressed satisfaction with the particularly strict rules of the Catholic institution: “The merest insults are punished. Catholic institutions are well-known in France for the elevated quality of their instruction. and now worldwide].202 The poll contrasted notably with media efforts in Britain. The poll found that 60 percent of French Muslims considered themselves both French and Muslim. such as fasting by children during Ramadan. now counts half of its students as Muslims. The poll in Le Monde des Religions appears reliable. said. Catholic schools also have an incentive to take in Muslim students to keep their enrollments at a level required for maintenance of their state subsidy. 75 percent supported the traditional view of Shariah: 38 percent said Islamic law does not apply in non-Muslim countries.e. in our view. and eight percent declined to answer.201 The school’s director. scholarly achievement. in that it clearly distinguished between the traditional Shariah guidance calling for acceptance by immigrant Muslims of the laws and customs of non-Muslim lands to which they move.S.

while permitting cooperation with religious charities and accommodation of religious requirements of American military personnel. which inherited and still observes German law on state subsidy for three Christian denominations and Judaism. Boubakeur’s Algerian background. the creation of the 104 CFCM appeared to represent a break with laïcité. allowed various exemptions from the principle of complete separation of religion and the state. after two years of discussion. Denying that Moroccan diplomats had injected themselves into the mechanism. French laïcité in great part reflects the heritage of the French Revolution and of violent political conflicts in the 19th century. rector of the Lyon Mosque. 2001. Radical interpretations of Islam have always existed. But in our view. laïcité does not apply to France’s overseas possessions. and the threat of a takeover of French Islam by Wahhabis. the CFCM preceded the foundation of the Dutch Contactorgaan Moslims en Overheid in 2004 and the German Koordinationsrat der Muslime in 2007. or to Alsace-Lorraine. the existence of overwhelming majorities favoring moderate Islam. to expect all Muslims to be moderate is unrealistic.S. The aforementioned Kamel Kabtane. Nevertheless. however. French laïcité has never been absolute. Radical Islam can. the French government decided to facilitate the emergence of a body. In addition. and of significant minorities embodying radicalism. rival mosque leaders expressed other anxieties regarding alleged foreign manipulation of the process. while U. and was so condemned by various non-Muslim commentators.eu . Algerian. which has been interpreted until very recently to forbid any involvement of government with religion. stated that Moroccan. along with accusations of personal CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. Threats by Algerian diplomats were also reported. Dalil Boubakeur stood out for his objections to what he described as a bias in the consultations in favour of fundamentalist representatives. only be defeated by the mobilisation of authentic Muslim moderates.S. constitutional law was and remains intended to permit the unhindered development of religious life.204 Fouad Alaoui.S. complained about the involvement of foreign diplomatic representatives in the consultations. a Moroccan national and general secretary of the UOIF. along with complaints about Dr. even under the most secure republican governments. For example. the ECFR. and to some extent appeared to influence the creation of its Dutch and German counterparts. he charged that Algerians sought to maintain domination over French Islam. and that only Tunisians had stayed out of the proceedings. may be interpreted differently. This contrasts with the separation of religion and the state embodied in the U. Constitution.203 As the structuring of the CFCM proceeded.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 As in Britain. whose spirit was always considered hostile to that of established Maghrebi Islam. the French authorities have repeatedly. Such reproaches. in our view. on September 11. During the events leading to the full establishment of the CFCM. except in prevention of criminal activity under cover of religion. with the growing debate over the place of Islam in French life. which participated in the talks leading to creation of the CFCM while being aligned with Saudi Arabia. and in recent times their impact has been aggravated by the financial support of the Wahhabi cult in Saudi Arabia as well as the ideological encouragement of the Ahmadinejad regime in Iran. which led to the diminution of church power. preparations for full operation of the CFCM were accelerated by the terrorist assaults in the U. but responded to the same need of the nonMuslim authorities for “a single contact telephone number to handle Muslim issues”. One may take comfort that radicals are a minority or become alarmed that they exist at all.islamicpluralism. and Turkish diplomats were all involved in the development of CFCM. With its inauguration in 2001. the French Council of the Muslim Faith (Conseil français du culte musulman – CFCM) as an organisation for liaison with the French authorities. On its face. and the Muslim Brotherhood.

but in May 2008 Dr. one of them grand mufti Bencheikh. in which Dr. by then-interior minister Nicolas Sarkozy.S. Boubakeur was again named head of the CFCM in 2005. with Dalil Boubakeur placed at its head by direction of the government. Prior to that decision. Boubakeur had warned that the elections as then conceived would result in a victory for the UOIF. received 20 administrative council seats. Boubakeur and the GMP refused to participate in its new voting cycle. following the direction of Sarkozy. and Fouad Alaoui of the UOIF. The case against Charlie Hebdo resulted in the exculpation of the periodical. most significantly the political leader Rachid Kaci. with nine representing Muslim federations. in which he had denounced ideological Islamism. Dr. in 2007. five named by 1.208 In the period preceding the vote. still considered sympathetic to Algeria. and the council was provisionally inaugurated in 2002.“Parallel” Shariah CIP ambition. have been attached to Dr. but most mosques were said to be directed by Moroccans. and two outstanding personalities. although Dalil Boubakeur provoked criticism from other Muslim moderates when. voting for the CFCM was completed.eu . At the time.205 But Dr. and three were designated “independent” or “various”. 15 seats were taken by representatives of Dr.207 In 2003. the Rally of Muslims of France (Rassemblement des musulmans de France – RMF). he put forward an allegation of racism against the satirical weekly Charlie Hebdo for reprinting the caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad originally published in the Danish daily Jyllands-Posten. and to treat the controversy over the Muhammad caricatures in a similar manner. Boubakeur was joined in his position by Soheib Bencheikh. Kaci is a vociferously free-market oriented member of Sarkozy’s Union for a Popular Movement (Union pour une Mouvement Populaire – UMP) and at present a member of the Sarkozy administration. The signatories appealed to Dr. of the RMF. titled Non! l’Islam n’est pas une politique (No! Islam Is Not A Political Position). with some additional works produced by French cartoonists. In the third poll. Others who criticised Dr. A second-generation French citizen and a Kabyle Amazigh by origin. Boubakeur published a book of interviews.206 Boubakeur and Bencheikh have since become recognised as the main moderate Muslim leaders in Western Europe.210 Dr. also associated with Morocco.209 He continued as president of the CFCM. The unelected CFCM comprised a wider executive of 16 members. also known in the U. while the UOIF gained 13. As rector of the Grand Mosque of Paris (GMP). with two vice-presidents: Mohammed Bechari. Boubakeur to recall his boycott of the CFCM elections.islamicpluralism. and the journalist Mohamed Sifaoui. Algerians formed the plurality of French Muslims. Neither participates in the ECFR.. The CFCM elections were subject to several delays. viewed as pro-Moroccan. Boubakeur included the philosopher Abdelwahab Meddeb. while the “Moroccan” FNMF gained 20 and the fundamentalist UOIF 19. he was loudly criticised for this position. the FNMF one. Boubakeur as its chief.500 affiliated mosques. Boubakeur and the “federation” affiliated with his GMP. The appointed CFCM leadership included Dr. Dr. CFCM has never advocated introduction of Shariah in France. Boubakeur once more 105 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. grand mufti of Marseille. and both have published major books. A second legal case against Charlie Hebdo. In the final results. representing the National Federation of Muslims of France (Fédération nationale des musulmans de France – FNMF). who is the current French president. and supported by Sarkozy. Dr.Institutionalisation of Shariah by non-Muslim Governments . Boubakeur was then replaced as head of the CFCM by Mohammed Moussaoui. the Coordinating Committee of Turkish Muslims in France (Comité de coordination des musulmans turcs de France – CCMTF) obtained four. Boubakeur through much of his recent career. A letter questioning his attitude on this question was published in the newspaper Libération211 with the signatures of six well-known French Muslim figures. a split from the FNMF.

The Tabligh ud-Dawa mosque in the Old Port.215 Among the French Islamic clergy. including The Challenges of Islam (Les Défis de l’Islam). Marseille is also one of the oldest cities in the western Mediterranean. they reflect reality: the global majority of antiradical Muslims call the Saudi agents “Wahhabis”.C. Marianne and the Prophet: Islam in Secular France (Marianne et le Prophète: L’Islam dans la France laïque)216 takes its title from the female figure that officially symbolises the French Republic. 106 Merchants in the small shops of Marseille’s Old Port (Vieux-Port) will often address customers in Arabic without bothering to find out if the visitor speaks the language. Open Letter to Demagogues (Lettre ouverte aux demagogues). has a front decorated with modernist star motifs and a minaret. Identity among Marseille Muslims. Boubakeur has published several further books. Bencheikh’s situation is remarkable in that Marseille is a city with a strongly Islamic aspect. a selection from Qur’an. make it.213 Kaci lashed Sarkozy for his direct involvement in the creation of CFCM.000+ is Muslim. not “Salafis”. to some non-Muslims. and has an atmosphere of exclusiveness bordering on suspicion of visitors. although some men sport long. illustrates the advanced nature of French Islam when compared with its other Western European rivals.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 supported the complaint. are often unmarked. well-founded and even inspiring handbook of the ideological divisions within and broad problems facing French Islam. by Greeks. a quarter of its population of 825. the latter not visible from the street. and are closed except at prayer times. Its maritime and cosmopolitan nature. Bencheikh’s 1998 volume. which Kaci charged had favoured the radicals of UOIF and FNMF when it should have restricted their influence. The very existence of a volume like Marianne et le Prophète. directed to a mainly non-Muslim intellectual reading public. a stimulant of radicalism. In a minor victory for transparency. including the manœuvres of UOIF. grand mufti of Marseille. like Barcelona in the past. affiliated with TJ. and Muslim men from Black Africa are visible in their own traditional robes. most interestingly. do not have minarets. Although now a decade old. In a book titled The Republic of Cowards (La Republique des Lâches). Soheib Bencheikh. Dr. In this way. or rather prayer spaces. FNMF. rather than following the politicallycorrect Western academic habit of granting the bogus title “Salafi” to the extremists. has been yet more eloquent in his opposition to radical Islam and defence of laïcité. and often found at the end of long and difficult journeys.214 in which he referred to the CFCM as a “shipwreck”. and North African banks operate branches on the main Boulevard d’Athènes. Muslim immigration to the city gives the impression of a natural tidal overflow from the Maghreb more than the kind of economically-motivated settlement seen elsewhere. along with its old districts filled with narrow streets. as recent arrivals. With Marseille having long been the main gateway for African entry into France. Dr. Mosques. a historical review with appendices from classic Islamic poetry and other literature. it is a brilliant. seem more an extension of the North African culture area than a core European city. But hijab and niqab are rare. issued in vest-pocket size and titled The Tolerant Qur’an (le Coran tolérant). similarly failed in 2008.eu . but the example of Bencheikh shows otherwise. distinctive Wahhabi beards. but is also open only at prayer times. Boubakeur. Kaci followed up this polemic with a second book. founded in the 6th century B. and. Boubakeur and Bencheikh alike refer to Saudi-financed fundamentalists as “Wahhabis”.islamicpluralism. might seem.212 Kaci has written in severe criticism of Sarkozy. France stands out from the other Western countries in that discussion of the future of Islam has focused on political writings of a high order. we may say that while British Islam is intellectually the lowest in intellectual quality in CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. and TJ. which became a bestseller as a French paperback.

As in Britain and the Netherlands. in their quasi-totality. coherent in itself and offering a global vision of things”. and laïcité are the most consensual principles.S. (3) Criminal aspects French public and expert opinion. as noted. but we find that radical Islam as a pathology supporting common crime and gangs. significant documentation has been published in France – more in the specialist and penological manner of the Netherlands than in accord with the sensationalist habits of British media. enjoy greater influence in European Islam. especially among non-Muslims. We observe that such worry is based on conditions also present in the U. “the Muslims of France. We judge that this analysis is now less apt than it was 10 years ago.Institutionalisation of Shariah by non-Muslim Governments . This provides a lesson: the Islam of Bencheikh and that of. French Islam stands highest. the events of September 11. But he goes on to condemn excessive simplification. He affirms. religious freedom. He not only rejects the importation of Shariah as a separate legal standard for Muslims in France.eu . because of a lack of access to religious education”. represent two clear opposites. or political differences. finally. He expresses regret that French public discourse too often stresses the latter rather than the former. in particular. has reproduced the anxiety common in the British and Dutch media about the role of Islamist extremism in crime and within prisons. Bencheikh’s volume underscores many points we have made in this survey.. the cenacle of AlQaradawi. do not participate in the ECFR. have a limited comprehension of their religion. Yet outstanding figures like Dr. As noted further here. although the latter has managed to extend its tentacles into the weakened environment of Balkan Islam. but which may. Ramadan represents an especially retrograde position on the situation of women. It remains to be seen which will. 2001 and their aftermath. and extremist infiltration of correctional institutions. the French sociologist Farhad Khosrokhavar. Boubakeur and Bencheikh are seldom invited to international academic or clerical conclaves on the future of Islam. and alone in being capable of managing the whole of human society. and common crime. But Bencheikh declares. Tariq Ramadan. Bencheikh offers a sharply critical review of the political development of French Muslim leadership.“Parallel” Shariah CIP Western Europe (terrorism issues aside). information on the intersection of radical Islam. Nevertheless. the ally of Al-Qaradawi. with its deviant interpretation of Shariah as a license for lawbreaking in non-Muslim lands. produce “madness”. In 2004.islamicpluralism. “today human rights. which CIP lacks. and the French branch of TJ more on personal ambition than on theological. since he interprets laïcité as a protection of religion from government interference. cannot be directly investigated without special access to prisons. juristic. radicals have been deeply indoctrinated in the requirements of their extremist interpretation. a distinguished author on Iranian 107 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www.S. the FMNF. He partially blames this situation on the domination of academic specialists in French intellectual life. in the period anterior to the emergence of CFCM. as pluralistic as it is”. or terrorism per se. to mention its European “pop star”. with the intervening rise in Saudi financing of radicalism. and the growth of the Muslim Brotherhood. A peculiar belief exists among many non- Muslims that Muslims are well-educated in their religion and that. He blames the division between such groups as the GMP in its then-form. in its attempted application. which has created a situation in which “only an archaic version of Islamic law has become accessible to all. gains more intensive attention in Western Europe than in the U. the sharpening of rivalries between Wahhabis and their opponents. the UOIF. his conception of laïcité is much closer to the noninterference of the state with religion in American constitutional doctrine (“neutrality”) than to the appearance of militant irreligion often seen in the French practice of “separation” of the two. and.

Some of his findings were counter-intuitive to the presumptions of Western media. Khosrokhavar quoted an interviewee. and. For example. who had “escaped” an attempt to recruit him into the “Roubaix gang” of terrorists. I cannot have a child. although no figures were offered on Jewish personnel. whom they often call the ‘bearded. Prison activities by radical imams appear to be as problematical as in the U. including Dumont himself. a French Maghrebi aged 34. a convert to Islam named Lionel Dumont. The group’s head. where he had gone to pray. the “Roubaix gang” committed an armed robbery and bombing in 1996. Three Orthodox Christians and two Buddhists similarly served. Other inmates who spoke with Khosrokhavar were more extreme. and some dozens more were later tried in French courts.eu . the great majority of those detained avoid the Islamists. and 411 auxiliary chaplains. Israel. Nevertheless. Muslim prisoners share a cell in Fresnes topics. Spain. Omar stated. Khosrokhavar noted in 2003 that French prisons then counted 918 chaplains (aumôniers). had attempted to enlist him at a mosque in Roubaix. as well as because of their own reservations on the subject of this fundamentalist or extremist version of Islam. expressing hatred of America. Bin Laden woke them up on September 11”. with 272 part-time. People must waken. He told me to stop 108 going there and to pray for myself and my life… They sent others to commit various illegal acts in Afghanistan”. One named Omar blamed his bad situation in France on victimisation of Muslims worldwide.’ out of fear of the penal authorities associating them with these dangerous individuals. marriage does not interest me. Avoiding the ‘bearded’ can begin very quickly”. he declared “In prison. love leaves me cold as does compassion… Everywhere is injustice. as we shall see in the following study.217 a thorough study of Muslims incarcerated in France. Most of them are even somewhat secular (laïcs)”. which is a plus for them. of which 30 were monetarily compensated. 267 Protestants (82 subsidised).. Kamel.’ Fortunately my father felt they were not clean. “I am ill. were killed in a shootout with police.218 Kamel told Khosrokhavar that the group. and Russia. 323 paid as full-time employees. because “to the degree that the detained have no access to the imam – and many among them complain about CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. who were mainly Algerian and linked to Al-Qaida.S. published Islam in Prison (L’islam dans les prisons). and only 69 Muslims. Four of the group. was sentenced to 30 years imprisonment in France in 2003.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 Muslim prisoner studies Qur’an in jail. Khosrokhavar stated that a lack of imams was an obstacle in the struggle against radical Islam. They wanted me to place bombs… Their arguments were ‘we have to kill the yahud [Jews] and the kuffar [disbelievers]. “Prisoners are in fact rather numerous in declaring themselves little interested in a thundering return to religion. according to Khosrokhavar. The system included 513 Catholic priests (181 paid for their work). In the vicinity of the depressed northern city of Lille.islamicpluralism. He ascribed their approach to him as follows: “I was unmarried. UK.

which is not intended for public release and which we have as yet been unable to examine. French Interior Minister Michele Alliot-Marie estimated the number of “hardcore” Muslim extremists in French jails at only 100. at which a manual on radical Islam for guidance of correctional officers. also paralleling a similar issue in the U. while we are critical of the exploitation of hijab in the interest of separatism and of a simplification of religion leading to fundamentalism.eu .. that the country’s recent total of 117 Muslim prison chaplains (out of 1.100 chaplains serving in 195 institutions. In the previouslydiscussed Le Monde des Religions poll of November-December 2008. Among Berber women faces are almost never covered. who work outside in windy desert environments. which far exceeds the 10 percent share of the general population we credit.S. and stated that France had 1.France: Approach to Women CIP this – they tend to confide in whoever comes to them first… It is thus that often.S. has warned in a moderate spirit that radicals may avoid detection by not growing Wahhabi beards or evincing other signifiers of radicalism. based on numbers updated from Khosrokhavar’s survey in 2003. a brief attempt to establish permission for Muslim women to obtain driver’s licences with photographs showing their faces 109 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. a fresh source of controversy. while Berber men. at the same time 70 percent affirmed their support for “the veil”. 79 percent of Muslims who responded expressed their lack of agreement with the suggestion that wives should submit to their husbands. appeared when then-minister of the interior Sarkozy alleged220 that the UOIF would demand that Muslim women be granted the right to wear the “veil” when photographed for issuance of national identity cards. In the U. The UOIF. was distributed. refusal of social mixing with non-Muslims (including in showers). and 70 percent supported the legal ban on polygamy. identifies such evidence of radicalisation as growth of the distinctive long and specially-trimmed Wahhabi beard. indicated by Khosrokhavar. But Moulay el Hassan Alaoui-Talibi. Like France. French arrests of Islamist radicals began in earnest in 1995. with more than 95 percent serving sentences and the remainder awaiting trial. hijab. Khosrokhavar has more recently estimated that half of French convicts are Muslim.islamicpluralism. In 2003. This dissonance may in some part reflect the argument among many Muslims that women’s covering is a voluntary act and a marker of identity rather than faith.000 inmates) are now almost entirely radicals who have appeared to fill a gap caused by previous neglect. of the need for moderate Muslim clerics in prison work. disclaimed any such intention. and covering of Muslim women in general has been the main item on the public agenda regarding treatment and abuse of Muslim women in France. it is currently estimated. however. as in the Roubaix affair. German. other EU countries show Muslim incarceration rates to be disproportionately larger than the total national census figures. In a close parallel to problems seen in the U. and Austrian governments..155 terror suspects behind bars. At the end of September 2008 the European Union held a seminar in France on this topic. Still. (4) Approach to Women The internationally-reported debate over the headscarf. during the “second Algerian war”. radicals and fundamentalists become their interlocutors”. may protect their faces with cloth typically dyed blue.S. who is in charge of Muslim chaplains in France. jointly developed by the French. and National Prison Administration Director Claude d’Harcourt lowered the figure to 80.219 Journalistic reportage warned that radicalism could support recruitment for terrorism. and acquisition of radical literature.. But sources on these problems are contradictory. niqab. terrorists on the offensive in North Africa used France as a rearguard. which are required in France. housing 63. The EU manual on radical Islam in prisons. when. long usage of such a mask leaves a tint on the flesh that has led Berbers to be called “the blue men”.

told a local periodical.222 a Kabyle Amazigh. brother of the academic Tariq Ramadan. led by Sohane’s sister Kahina Benziane. a deputy in Sarkozy’s party representing Yvelines. which appeared impracticable no less than extraordinary. published an essay in Le Monde225 justifying stoning as a punishment for adultery. which adopted the slogan “Ni Putes Ni Soumises” (“Neither Whores Nor Submissives”) mainly focused on gang rape. as well as firing from his job as imam at the Islamic Centre of Geneva.000 Muslim women marched against gang rape and other abuses suffered by their peers living in the banlieue and especially in housing projects. was burned alive in 2002 in a cellar at Vitry-surSeine. who described Bouziane as a “self-proclaimed imam”. by her former boyfriend. and an accomplice. 2003 (International Women’s Day). Lyon Mag. The movement did not engage with Shariah per se.227 Bouziane. while Rocca received ten years in prison. But the death of Sohane. considered a banlieue community. So-called “honour” murder has apparently been rare in France. published a short book explaining the background. some 30. experience. a criminal offence that could not reasonably be associated with the faith of Islam. “What is occurring in France is very serious. and aims of the 110 protestors. the politicians have favored these men. 23.226 In 2004. believed Muslim women were forbidden to work with men or to teach male children. He was arrested and expelled from France. Tony Rocca. that he favoured polygamy.000 to the victim’s family. Myard was criticised as an ultra-rightist for this scheme. who had two wives living in France with him.000 and a jail term of two months. intimidation. entitled Ni Putes Ni Soumises. declaring.223 The movement. A Maghrebi woman. and Derrar and Rocca received prison terms. an Algerian-born. in 2007. Soheib Bencheikh commented even more harshly.eu . and occasionally violence impose their tribal and clannish interpretation of religion. and seemed guaranteed to produce a major new difficulty in relations between French Muslims and non-Muslims. stimulated mass protest by French Muslim women. as she was known to the whole population.224 Amara was later appointed a junior minister for urban affairs in the Sarkozy presidential administration. These imams. It is enough for someone to speak a little Arabic to proclaim himself an Imam. The crime scandalised the entire country. Abd al-Qadr Bouziane. with punishment by a fine of €15. On March 8. France had also been shocked in 2002 when Hani Ramadan. The article led to Hani Ramadan’s suspension and then his dismissal from his job as a high school teacher in Switzerland. among others. French Muslims were confronted in September 2008 by a project for criminalisation of all Islamic covering of women in public institutions and on the street. Swiss law prohibits public school instructors from also exercising religious responsibilities. a département near Paris. CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. where he and his brother were born. was considered the main Wahhabi figure in the Lyon region. A 17-year old girl. But because of their attitudes. The proposal was introduced221 by Jacques Myard. Derrar was sentenced to 25 years and ordered to pay €140. because of pressure. But the protest was extended to opposition of all forms of masculine aggession present in the banlieue. Jamal Derrar. Stoning is never mentioned in Qur’an but has been assimilated into Shariah. a specialist in Islam. an action supported by then-CFCM president Boubakeur. Fadela Amara.islamicpluralism. and declared that Muslim husbands were justified in beating their wives for adultery.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 covered ended with repudiation of the proposal. 52-year old Wahhabi imam working at the Al-Furqan mosque in the town of Vénissieux near Lyon in eastern France. except for its prevalence among disaffected youth in the banlieue. 22. Thus the moderate Muslims – the great majority in France – do not see themselves in these Islamists. on grounds of violation of his professional status as a schoolteacher in promoting violation of human rights. Sohane Benziane.

eu . including issuance of a fatwa supporting suicide terrorism in Iraq. to which. Forced marriage is also an issue in France. and Dati then reversed herself. a woman of Maghrebi origin appointed to serve in Sarkozy’s government. and he then returned to the country at state expense. Parents from Mali were sent to jail for permitting “excision” in 2002 and 2004. Côte-d’Ivoire. and a good family.000 potential victims had been cited in a 2004 investigation of forced marriage among Maghrebi and Turkish girls in France. including Hawa Greou. lose their virginity before marriage. has allegedly declined markedly in France. a Moroccan-born man naturalised as a French citizen. In a strange development.230 FGM.231 In 2008 a newspaper report claimed 1. the French parliament adopted a law against domestic abuse that was also intended to obstruct forced marriages. leader of the ultrarightist Front National (FN). were married. As of May 1. 111 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. argued that the custom was not linked to Islam. as delivered in his Lyon Mag interview.islamicpluralism. above virginity. considered an extreme Islamophobe. And Dati was nearly correct.233 But the husband repudiated his wife on their wedding night.234 French non-Muslim opinion. upheld the ruling. Rachida Dati. a good character and disposition. Jean-Marie Le Pen. In Lille. declaring the annulment annulled and the marriage legal. French opinion was convulsed by a case in which state institutionalisation of Shariah and ill-treatment of women were apparently combined. which has experienced a renewed influence of the Shafi’i school of Shariah that requires FGM. however. intelligence. in that Shariah values other female qualities. Burkina Faso. She eloquently summarised the intention of many forced marriages: “The parents are afraid that their children will be lost in the Western world. of the women’s rights group Safia. Hadda Zouareg.000 French girls were vulnerable.235 The same figure of 70.000 women were at risk of “excision” in the central-west French region of Poitou-Charentes. and widespread criticism of Dati. In April 2008. stating that Islam was not involved in the matter. This resulted in a wave of anti-Islamic rhetoric.France: Approach to Women CIP Unfortunately. who have not been named in international press coverage. according to a governmental source. The main reason for this may be that France is one of few countries in the world to actively prosecute perpetrators of this atrocious custom. A court later found that the journalists at Lyon Mag had engaged in selective editing of the interview. They are afraid their daughters will sleep with whoever they wish. fertility. In March 2006. Defence lawyers claimed that the accused did not speak French or realise that “excision” is illegal in France. or bear children out of wedlock. they threaten her with marriage. the moderates have no place to express themselves because the most extremist comments get the most media attention”. the woman who performed the “operation”. as well as the Black African countries of Bénin. Their countries of origin were said to be Egypt. But his status became more urgent after his comments on the status of women. Bouziane’s involvement with terrorist activity or threat to the interests of the French state could not be proven. condemned the expulsion of Bouziane229 for what appeared to be no more than a “crime of opinion”. attacks on Muslim monuments. responded to the case as an imposition of Shariah.232 As 2008 ended. including religiosity “which takes precedence over anything else”. a high court in Lille granted the man’s petition for annulment on grounds that he legitimately expected his bride to be a virgin. because of the woman’s lack of virginity. 70. and a French-born woman. on that occasion. 2009 the Muslim couple in Lille had not disclosed how they would proceed in their difficult situation.228 The expulsion of Bouziane was based on a judicial order issued two months before the interview and originating with his suspected association with terrorist conspirators. known in French as “excision” and mainly practiced by Black Africans. Sénégal and Togo. When a girl wants to go out in public on her own. A 1999 trial charged 30 defendants.

207 Unsigned. Le Monde. 209 Boubakeur. 205 De Larminat. immolée au bas d’une HLM”. 194 Licht. Libération. “‘Cette affaire a été traitée sans incident majeur’. Le Figaro. Crumley. Dr. 2007. 2008. Philippe. 198 Canadian Press-Associated Press. Daniel. 219 Unsigned. “La justice française sur la trace des filières djihadistes entre Europe et Asie”. Non! l’Islam n’est pas une politique. 2005.24% des voix”. Marianne et le Prophète: L’Islam dans la France laïque. November 30. Éditions des Syrtes. Lettre ouverte aux demagogues. constate Me Szpiner”. “Ne succombez pas à l’islamisme”. “École — concilier laïcité et particularismes”. Catherine. Paris. Dalil. “Les musulmans français et la citoyenneté”. 2003. 2003. 199 Wyatt. stability. Libération [Paris]. Reuters. “Le carnet de route de la Marche des femmes”. November 2008. Boubakeur expressed a preference for the attitude of Pascal over that of Voltaire. “French headscarf ban opens rifts”. Associated Press. 2004. 222 Durand. Soheib. “Manual outlines Muslim radicalisation in prisons”. “Meurtre de Sohane: 10 ans pour le complice”. Globalised Islam.islamicpluralism. “Ils ont choisi l’école catholique”. “Le Conseil français du culte musulman en assemblée constitutive”. 224 Amara. 193 Ternisien. Le Courrier de L’Atlas. Balland. 2002. Dalil. Boubakeur. This problem cannot be distanced from that of the abdication of responsibility by Muslim religious leaders who should act to strengthen marriage and families through mutual love. November-December 2008. Ni Putes Ni Soumises. Le Monde. October 7. Bruce. L’Enseignement des religions à l’École laïque. 211 Achour. Xavier. Libération. Libération. “Nouvelle barrière au sacrifice du mouton”. 2007. 2006. BBC News. NOTES 190 Unsigned. Xavier. Le Monde. and legality between spouses – as dictated by moderate Islam. Paris. “Dalil Boubakeur – ‘Non à des élections favorisant l’extrémisme. 223 Unsigned. 204 Ternisien. 2004. Rachid. 2008. May 3. Le Monde [Paris]. December 12. Flammarion. Éditions la Découverte. November 2008. “Sohane. 202 Barbier-Bouvet. Desclée de Brouwer. “Culte musulman . October 21. La Republique des Lâches. 195 Ibid. 2002. 2008 220 Gabizon. Salvator. Grasset. and Lamarki. “Nous sommes prêts à être des Voltaire de l’islam”. The Economist [London]. October 29. June 15. 191 Coroller. “Photos d’identité et voiles .un accord au forceps”. Agence France Press (AFP). December 18. Babès. March 8. 2003. Ouest France [Brittany]. Rachid. Entretiens avec Virginie Malabard. 2004. 2002. 197 Ibid. some girls now want to marry nonMuslims. May 14. Bouras. 2003. Le Monde ses Religions [Paris]. Jean-François. 213 Kaci. Messaoud. 196 Sirat. November 8. Fadela. April 24. Abdelwahab. respect. 208 Unsigned. L’islam dans les prisons. 192 Roy. Rachid. “Une nouvelle ‘affaire de voile’ en perspective?’. Mohamed. “Culte musulman: le RMF obtient 43. 221 Harrath. which is permitted to Moroccans living in Morocco!”236 “They threaten her with marriage” (“la menaçant d’un mariage”) is a phrase that incomparably sums up the atrocious situation in which many young Muslim women in Western Europe now find themselves. Le Courrier de L’Atlas [Paris]. “Jailhouse jihad”. 2003. 2001. December 21. 2007. Nadia.’ ” Le Figaro [Paris]. 214 Kaci. 2003. Rachid. 2002. 210 Unsigned. L’Est Républicain [Nancy]. February 11. Paris. Elaine. 2003. Sifaoui. 201 Ibid. Paris. Paris. Jacky. “L’UOIF appelle à l’apaisement”. Astrid. September 18. Taycir. Unsigned. 218 Unsigned. Dalil. with the collaboration of Sylvia Zappi. 1998. The title of this article was somewhat misleading in that while Voltaire was an admirer of Islam. 112 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. Hannane. “Le silence assourdissant du CFCM dans les banlieues”. “Nicolas Sarkozy souhaite modifier les modalités de l’élection du Conseil français du culte musulman”. Meddeb. Le Courrier de L’Atlas is distributed in Morocco as well as in France. Leila. cit. Éditions des Syrtes. February 28. 212 Unsigned. and Joutard. “Jacques Chirac dit non aux symboles religieux ostensibles dans les écoles”. Kaci. Libération. Ganley. Capelle. October 1. June 8. Le Nouvel Observateur [Paris]. 206 Ternisien.le flou de la loi”. Paris. Dalloz. 216 Bencheikh. 2002. and le Coran tolérant. 2001. 2000. September 16. 2008. Caroline. November 19. 2002. Cécilia. Farhad. Philippe. 203 Licht. February 22. 2008. Le Figaro. 2005. Daniel. 200 Ben Naser. 17 ans. 215 Boubakeur. 217 Khosrokhavar. TIME Europe. Paris. Xavier. Sud-Ouest [Charente]. “Acting on the Outrage”. op. October 2. “Les consulats algériens et marocains veulent peser sur la désignation des représentants musulmans”. June 22. René-Samuel.eu . Paris.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 Further. Les Défis de l’Islam.

Hani. Libération. 2004. “L’ excision aux assises de Paris. 225 Ramadan.. Cecile. 2004. April 21. Emmanuelle. 231 Unsigned. Reliance of the Traveller..Des peines de prison avec sursis pour les parents des fillettes maliennes excisées”. “Le Charia incomprise”. 229 C. April 17. December 26. Hani Ramadan sera licencié par le gouvernement genevois”. 234 Ahmad ibn Naqib. Libération. 2005. “Baisse de la pratique de l’excision en France. “A Private Feud Turns Into a National Issue”.V. 1999. “COUR D’ASSISES DE SEINE-SAINT-DENIS . La Charente Libre [Cognac]. “Dalil Boubakeur du Conseil français du culte musulman”.fr/ 236 Unsigned. Sylvie and Cabut. Le Monde. “Ces jeunes filles que l’on marie de force”.G. Sylviane. 227 Unsigned. 233 Cody. “Le Pen ‘s’étonne’ de l’expulsion de l’imam Bouziane pour ‘délit d’opinion. CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www.islamicpluralism. Briet. Sandrine. Le Figaro. 2002.France: Notes CIP second ed.. February 26. France Ouest. cit. 230 Kaci. Le Monde. Audrey. Edward. March 18. n. op. 232 Carin. 2004. May 18. at www. Chambon. op. 2004. “Cinq ans de prison avec sursis pour avoir fait exciser ses filles”. 2002. 2002. Baraille. December 19..’ ” AFP. January 14. “Mutilations sexuelles: un combat au quotidien”.diplomatie. September 10. 235 Levy.D. AFP. April 21. Une coutume qui ne passe pas la barre”. 2004. The Washington Post.eu 113 . “La France est un des seuls pays à faire des procès pour excision”. 2008. February 3. “Les certitudes de l’imam de Vénissieux”. mais le risque demeure”. “Considéré comme un imam trop bavard. Le Temps [Geneva]. 228 Unsigned. AFP. August 26. cit. “No to Forced Marriages!”. February 5.gouv. 2004. Frederic. M. Le Progrès [Lyon]. 2004. Lettre ouverte aux demagogues. 2008.d. 226 Michel.

and similar powers. the historic industrial and commercial centre of the country. and the autonomías are not equal in status. Muslim immigration first attracted Spanish attention in Catalonia in the late 1970s. The designation of the Spanish Muslim dominions as Al-Andalus survives in the name of Andalusia. as well as residents of the two Spanish-ruled cities on the Moroccan coast.000).000). taxing. Spanish Islamic philosophy and mysticism deeply marked CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. Spain is that in which the Islamic past has the greatest influence. and Galicia – all with their own linguistic identities – are smaller in size but have much greater discretionary authority than. with about 250. and German states in their political.000 Algerians.000 born in Spain or descended from families of Spanish nationality. Islam is nothing new in Spain. • 335.S. the national idiom. Case Study: Spain Introduction Spain has a Muslim community of more than one million. with some 200. as well as significant industrial and commercial development. An Islamic element in Spain’s main cultural heritage is powerful and undeniable. but 332 prayer spaces. José Luis Sánchez Nogales. and a shortage of local labor.000 Muslims in 2006. A reliable if controversial study published by a Catholic priest. • 27. the southern autonomous region of Andalusia (176. El islam en la España actual. except that several important 114 Spanish autonomous regions also have official languages distinct from Castilian.000 Sénégalese and Gambians. the national capital and a growing economic power. and Maghrebi rule over parts of the country did not end until 1492.237 counted the constituent elements of Spanish Islam in 2005 as follows: • 357.islamicpluralism.000 others. also with major agricultural assets.E. educational. and Valencia (115. The largest concentration of Spanish Muslims is found in Catalonia.000 Pakistanis. when Moroccans and Black Africans were encouraged to come to work in agriculture. the Basque Country or Euzkadi.239 Of the leading countries of Western Europe. an agricultural area with close geographical proximity to the strait of Gibraltar and North Africa. • 40. The Spanish autonomías are roughly equivalent to U. and nationalised subjects. Spain comprises 17 autonomous regions and two autonomous overseas cities (the aforementioned Ceuta and Melilla). for example Andalusia. • 18. The remaining major areas of Muslim residence are Madrid. Spain had only 12 full-sized mosques. Ceuta and Melilla.000 born in Morocco and 24.000.eu . The Muslim invasion of Spain began in 711 C. Catalonia. In sum.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 8. or two percent out of a total population of about 45 million people in 2008.238 In 2006.

having lost all its American and Pacific Ocean possessions by the end of the 19th century.islamicpluralism.240 Descendants of converted Muslims remained in some areas of Spain. mainly in the east. along with Spanish rule in the former Spanish Sahara and present-day Equatorial Guinea. Case Study: Spain CIP Mosque. attempted to regain its position as a colonial power by occupying northern Morocco in the first third of the 20th – an enterprise that. Moroccan Islamic authorities supported their action by declaring the struggle against the Republic a jihad against irreligion. the Great Mosque of Córdoba The Mosque. Gran Via. Thousands of combatants in native Moroccan colonial levies (tabores) played an important psychological role in the ranks of Generalísimo Francisco Franco’s military rebellion against the second Spanish Republic. during the civil war of 1936-39. long after the expulsions of Muslims. Although their story is less well-known. when it was designated the Marca Hispanica or Spanish March. in contrast with the rest of the Iberian peninsula.eu . since that principality was the first territory recovered from the Muslims. around 115 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. The large Muslim presence in Catalonia today represents an apparent paradox.) The close links between Catalonia and the rest of Europe that began at the time. since the Republic was politically and socially secular. by the Franks in 801. Barcelona La Mezquita. may also be credited. the role of Morocco as a neighbour has consistently affected Spanish history. along with maritime trade along the Western Mediterranean littoral. from interchanges between the differing religious cultures in AlAndalus to the persistence of Muslim literary inspiration in the reconquered and re-Christianised provinces. Although its frontier with Spain is also maritime. (Asturias was the only Iberian region never conquered by Muslims. to Catalan entrepreneurial dynamism. Málaga (© Sochor) Christianity in the country. Spain. continued until the 1970s.8. Granada Muslims outside the Assalam Mosque. Muslim believers continued to reside in the country under special legal agreements until their final expulsion in 1614.

The explosions occurred only three days before voting in Spanish national elections. 2004. Algerian. which many citizens and foreign observers expected would be won by the conservative Popular Party (Partido Popular – PP) of José María Aznar. treated badly by the Spanish Communist leaders. had a direct impact on Spanish foreign policy and caused long-term. radical elements on the Republican side argued that a declaration of the liberation of Morocco from Spanish administration would support the anti-Franco cause by undermining the loyalty of the tabores. of which Ceuta has 30. The 3/11 crime. according to representatives of the Spanish Islamic community. with the achievement of Moroccan sovereignty and conclusion of French control. Spanish rightist sympathy for the Francoist Moroccans. The assault was organised by a group of Moroccan. Spain occupies a number of small territories on the Moroccan coast. demoralising problems in Spanish domestic politics.000 Muslim inhabitants (37 percent of its population) while Melilla has 33.000 (39 percent). with visible success as reported by the Soviet journalist Mikhail Koltsov. remained significant motifs in Spanish life long after the conclusion of the civil war.S. until recently. The latter outcome did not take place until 1956.800 were injured. nevertheless. which possesses the most profound antimilitarist tradition in Europe. which are claimed by Morocco. Workingclass resentment of Muslim immigrants as competitors for employment was also visible. In the carnage. 2001 came on March 11. supported the decolonisation of Spanish Morocco. much leftist propaganda about the role of the Moroccans in Franco’s ranks assumed a racist character that today would be called Islamophobic.241 Throughout the civil war. leftist bias against Moroccans. Ceuta. between Spanish king Juan Carlos and Moroccan king Mohammed VI. however. Nayati Sidki. because it is 116 friendly to the claims of immigrants. Aznar and the PP had committed the Spanish Army to continued participation in the U. mainly the cities of Ceuta and Melilla. when a series of explosions struck the metro system of Madrid. Ceuta and Melilla. and Syrian Muslims. The Spanish public interpreted the terrorist bombings as an attempt to convince Spain that its troops should leave Iraq. however. which controlled the rest of Morocco. A Palestinian Arab Communist.-led intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq. The first major Islamist terrorist action in the West following the atrocities of September 11.000 Moroccans and Algerians also fought for the Republicans during the Spanish civil war. But the Iraq war was unpopular in Spain. Spanish Muslims vote overwhelmingly for the Spanish Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español – PSOE) currently led by president (prime minister) José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. and Melilla all must contend with the attempts of foreign migrants to utilise their territories for travel by boat to Spain. was sent by the Soviets to Spain to conduct propaganda directed at the Moroccans. as it came to be known. as well as. that those serving Franco were enemies of Islam. although. Morocco. as well as the Catalan nationalist left. as reflected in government subsidies for high-level academic studies of Islam.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 1. Spain. who preferred to see all Muslims as brethren of Franco’s cohorts. Sidki was.242 present in Moscow when the Spanish war began.islamicpluralism. 192 people were killed and some 1. But such a measure would have met with considerable dismay by the French government. In addition. enjoys good relations across the Strait. and preached. seeking access to the European mainland. CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. and the international powers then administering Tangier.eu . represent the territories with the proportionately largest Muslim demographic shares in the European Community. Sidki left Spain after realising that only the Spanish anarchists – who viewed the Islamic global umma as a universal area of rebellion against oppression – and the anti-Stalinist Workers Party of Marxist Unification (Partit Obrer d’Unificació Marxista – POUM). in the militias of which George Orwell served.

who five weeks after the election. Rif Berbers/Amazigh. The Historical Background: Emergence of Shariah as an Issue in Spain Public advocacy for establishment of Shariah as a legal standard is. Ernest Maragall. allowed Case Study: Spain to be conducted efficiently. the autonomous government of the Catalan principality. handed an electoral victory to the opposition Socialists under Zapatero.. unhealed wound in Spanish political life. even after the trial of 28 accused ended in 2007 with guilty verdicts against 21 defendants. attempting to divert attention away from Islamist rage and to blame the deaths on Basque terrorism. The 3/11 atrocities have left a deep. because of prior CIP contact with Spanish Muslim leaders. With the embitterment and deepening of polarisation in Spanish politics. Its Saudi Academy of Madrid (Colegio Saudi de Madrid – colegio is one of several titles for a secondary school in the Hispanic world) reportedly educated 350 pupils in 2006. Barcelona and Madrid. reflecting a rapid shift in public opinion. in the latter case probably because of the overwhelming presence of Catholic culture in social affairs.Spain: Family/Schooling CIP Aznar responded to the horrific events in a confused manner. after the U. whose actual numbers are unknown but whose representatives claim to account for half of the Moroccan Muslims in Spain.islamicpluralism. separate Muslim religious education was furnished to students in Ceuta. as in France. minister (conseller) of education in the Generalitat de Catalunya. (1) Family/schooling Spanish Muslim children are overwhelmingly educated in state and Catholic schools. the Saudi authorities declared their intention to purchase Catholic schools and similar facilities for reopening as Islamic schools. Spanish voters repudiated this posture and. In Spain proposals for new religious customs and regulations are rare and put forward with delicacy. Libya maintains the Al-Fateh Arab School of Madrid (Escuela El Fateh Árabe de Madrid) and Iraq supports the Iraqi School of Madrid (Escuela Iraqui en Madrid). given the chaos and even political disgrace that Islamist radicals have sown in the country. on April 19. the same instruction was offered in the Basque Country. All these institutions mainly serve the children of diplomats. As in the Netherlands and France. aside from those enrolled in a very small number of private Arab-sponsored institutions. historically. most of them Maghrebis. but implementation of this proposal has been slow. but this proposal has yet to produce a practical outcome. suffered the most damage to its internal cohesion from Islamist aggression. announced the establishment of four special schools for the children of 117 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. A large and elaborate Saudi-financed mosque in Madrid. The investigation was easier to carry out than in France. In the 2005-06 school year. almost unknown in Spain. withdrew the Spanish contingent from Iraq. Spain has. 2004.S. in a manner that fostered conspiracy theories. The CIP Survey of Shariah Agitation in Spain The CIP field survey of Spain was completed in November-December 2008 by Stephen Suleyman Schwartz. Spain has not experienced a rise in fear of Islam. officially titled the Islamic Cultural Centre (Centro Cultural islámico). Nevertheless. Melilla. at the end of 2006. Aznar and the PP have continued to implicitly blame the events on Basque radicals and their domestic leftist allies. Schwartz’s command of Catalan and Spanish and knowledge of the main Spanish cities. That year. It is difficult to explain this absence.eu .244 In 2008. Shariah is also problematical among local Muslims in that.243 In addition. was inaugurated in 2001 and nicknamed the “M-30 mosque” because of its location near a major motorway. Recent Spanish law provides for Islamic religious instruction to be offered to Muslim children in state schools. may frequently reject Islamic law in favor of customary law. Andalusia. and Aragon.

to better promote integration through learning Catalan. the two main languages of Spain. 118 is extremely diverse. the conservative (Popular Party) conseller of education in the Generalitat Valenciana. or other specialty periodicals for immigrants (MZine. With the accession of Romania to the European Union.246 As such efforts indicate. have also appeared in numbers. French. whose native language is a Romance one and who therefore find it easy to learn Spanish and Catalan.080 students in 2007-08 and that in Vich accepted 400. under which children with learning problems must receive special assistance while attending a regular course of study. which accounts for some five million or nine percent of the overall population. but on the very next page began a feature article on the practices of black magic and fortune-telling among Latin American and other immigrants. and Chinese. based on a constitutional doctrine loosely known as “deconfessionalisation” (“desconfesionalización”). although fortune-telling by local clerics is fairly widespread in the Muslim world. but such a mélange would not appear in the Dutch. But the Catalan Generalitat has been notable for its initiatives independent of national law.245 Alejandro Font de Mora. Urdu. another agricultural centre. Such practices are banned in Islam. and organisations in the UK.islamicpluralism. immigrants from that country. Spain is officially a secular state. with much greater representation by Latin Americans. Toumaï (a Chadian term meaning “hope of life”) illustrated this multicultural situation in a recent issue. without a summer break. where a Muslim board of religious deputies was CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. Spain is also one of four European non-Muslim countries that have state recognition of Islam as a faith. The EBE in Reus accommodated 1. A monthly periodical issued for the immigrant readership. But the Spanish Socialists and other left or secularist parties have never consistently succeeded in establishing a standard comparable to French laïcité. and Toumaï. and the Netherlands also lack official standing. governing the Catalan-speaking autonomía of Valencia. The EBE were to be structured to accommodate different levels of need. The magazine advertised “Club Toumaï” trips to Morocco for the end of Ramadan. Le Courrier de L’Atlas) we have examined. and others. the immigrant population in Spain. since the French CFCM is a non-governmental body. The million Muslims in Spain comprise only 20 percent of immigrants.247 (2) Institutionalisation of Shariah by nonMuslim governments (“Parallel Shariah”) Although it is overwhelmingly Catholic. and would be open throughout the year. through leaflets distributed in Arabic. condemned the Catalonian plan as “illegal” and supporting the creation of “ghettos”. Europeans. Tamazight (Berber). with its name derived from sub-Saharan Africa. The 2008 plan called for a second and third such establishment in Reus.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 immigrants to open at the beginning of the school term in September. The Spanish national ministry of education announced that it would assure that the role of the EBE would be restricted and that education would generally remain inclusive. The Christian country with the longest history of official representation for Islam is Russia. Pilot projects had been created in the previous year. and Vich. Germany.eu . as well as Spanish and English. officially titled Educational Welcome Spaces (Espais de Bienvenida Educativa – EBE) but generally known as “welcome centres” (centres d’acollida) with one each in the towns of Reus. but the concept was denounced by the Catalan branch of the socialist-led Teachers Union (Federació de Treballadors d’Ensenyament d’UGT de Catalunya) as “discriminatory” and “leading to segregation”. Other critics noted that the EBE were developed outside the regular school system and alleged that they represented a violation of Spanish law. and local authorities have been assiduous in promoting study of Catalan by immigrants. in a winegrowing region with a high demand for immigrant labor. includes articles in Romanian and advertisements in Bulgarian (the language of another recent EU member) as well as Spanish and Arabic.

with a promise of new regulations and participation of FEME and of regional Muslim federations in place of the two-organisation model. Bangladeshis. The CIE comprises two main tendencies. Moroccan Muslim clerics in Spain have been criticised for their subordination to an extraterritorial authority and their imposition on Berber believers. It claims some 50 affiliated mosques. nevertheless. as European countries that have “recognised the Muslim religion and the rights of Muslims”. As in the Netherlands. Said Hamduni in Reus. then a Habsburg dominion. One Saudi-lining imam.248 Relations between the Spanish government and Muslims are administered by the Islamic Commission of Spain (Comisión Islámica de España – CIE). merits a of the Unión de Comunidades serious historical Islámicas de España: Riay Tatary and Helal Abboshi investigation (see Case Study: Germany). an institution that. previously unrepresented in the CIE. however. Islam was granted official standing in Austria in 1878.Spain: Family/Schooling CIP established by Empress Catherine II in 1788. as follows: “It is evident that the CIE was not born as the fruit of an imposition by the Spanish political power. but many of these appear to be nonfunctioning. from 15 to 30. the last Muslim-ruled redoubt in the peninsula. in 1916. FEERI was described to CIP in local interviews as under Saudi and Moroccan control. Ayad Tachfine Elharchi. In 2009. with the Habsburg occupation of BosniaHercegovina. or directly. In releasing its first collection of fatwas. with a significant component aligned with the MB. and it has replaced the latter as the second most important Muslim organisation in Spain. The origin of the regulation of stateMuslim relations by the CIE has been described by Àlex Seglers Gómez-Quintero. which signed an Accord of Cooperation (Acuerdo de Cooperación) with the Spanish state.eu . reducing its probable membership to 20 or 30. a Madrid-based cleric. Shia Muslims. and Sufi (spiritual) groups. Our interviewees informed us that UCIDE. which includes 41 mosques. founded by Riay Tatary.islamicpluralism. and Hungary. FEME’s president is a Moroccan Berber by origin. on the 500th anniversary of fall of the Granada. some of its members were formerly involved in FEERI. in Croatia. a report that from 2004 to 2008 the number of Wahhabi prayer spaces in Catalonia had doubled. the need to consolidate it as unique interlocutor has ended with its conversion into a kind of artificial 119 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. Its current representative as vicepresident in the CIE is Félix (Mohamad Amin) Herrero. the second major component of the CIE was the Spanish Federation of Islamic Religious Bodies (Federación Española de las Entidades Religiosas Islámicas – FEERI). In the past. along with Belgium. Tatary. some of which are one-person “communities”. The subject of Wahhabism has attracted attention with. a Syrian associated with the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and formerly involved in the Bilal Mosque and Islamic Centre of Aachen. a cleric from Málaga. with some 200 affiliated prayer spaces. claimed the figure was closer to 50. so long as they were listed in the government’s Registry of Religious Entities (Registro de Entidades Religiosas – RER). for example. and in Spain in 1992 – in the latter case. is the Muslim Federation of Spain (Federación Musulmana de España – FEME). the ECFR directed by Yusuf Al-Qaradawi praised Spain. Denmark. plans for reform of CIE were underway. on President and Secretary General balance. FEME. A third group. is mainly composed of Pakistanis. is one of two joint presidents of CIE.249 Spanish Muslim congregations could affiliate with the CIE through either the UCIDE or FEERI. avoids the Moroccan ulema in Spain. a professor of ecclesiastical law at the University of Barcelona. an offshoot from UCIDE. The first trend in CIE is the Union of Islamic Communities of Spain (Unión de Comunidades Islámicas de España – UCIDE).

immediately called on the CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. Seglers did not take up this issue.251 Tatary and Herrero. While the registration of Wahhabi. locations and ministers “associated with its distinct denominations and functions”. announced a legal reform that would. and France feature religious cultures in which Catholics and Protestants or secularists have maintained a general parity of power. defines itself only by reference to “diffusion of the Islamic faith and the Sunnah through the teachings of the holy book of Qur’an as a guide and norm for all Muslims”. without sectarian or other additions. support pluralism and protect freedom of conscience through revision of the state’s Organic Law on Religious Freedom (Ley Orgánica de Libertad Religiosa – LOLR). The Islamic Community of Ceuta. even more if the object is to recentralise the management of religious policy. was rejected by the Spanish authorities as a vague conception insufficient to define a body of dogma and a “specifically doctrinal” differentiation. the Catalan author pointed out that the Islamic Community of Ceuta. the Netherlands. marginal. with the Federation of Evangelical Religious Entities of Spain (Federación de Entidades Religiosas Evangélicas de España – FEREDE) and the Federation of Israelite Communities of Spain (Federación de Comunidades Israelitas de España – FCIE). “which expresses the religious beliefs that are professed and which are intended to be offered to others”. acting on behalf of CIE. parallel to the Catholic [church]… To force the artificial creation of a religious actor that unifies Islam seems a priori easier for the State. esoteric and personal “cults” (better known in Europe as “sects”).250 Here we see again the syndrome of seeking a “single” contact or “telephone number” for communication with the Muslims. in the minds of many nonMuslims. and the ad hoc creation of the CIE to serve as a signatory of the Accord of Cooperation. visible in Germany. perhaps because of its Berber influence. and the presence of a significant number of believers. from the conception of “parallel Shariah” as we have described it.islamicpluralism.e. was denied registration because it did not present evidence of its own “body of dogmas and doctrines”.eu . Seglers notes a peculiar gap in the administration of the RER. i. religious bodies are required to demonstrate their adherence to a “universal religious phenomenology” shared by all religions: these include a doctrine belonging to the particular faith. with a large Berber element. Deobandi. religious goals “that respect the limits of the exercise of religious freedom”. Although this is not a Shariah issue per se. But to reproduce the bilateral scheme that serves the Catholic Church does not take into account the plural and heterogeneous reality of Islam”. according to the administration. in its definition of 120 religious communities permitted to register with it. in all these cases. But Germany. To avoid the penetration of Spain by “new religions”. and have accepted principles of mutual respect among themselves. worked to the advantage of powerful fundamentalist or neofundamentalist elements. and other extremist mosques or prayer spaces may not consistently demonstrate “respect [for] the limits of the exercise of religious freedom”. María Teresa Fernández de la Vega. But given the immense Catholic majority in Spain. Rather. a “parallel Islamic church” alongside Spanish Catholicism is not very different. the vice president of the Zapatero government. Spain has concluded agreements similar to that governing CIE. and France. This markedly open and unrestrictive interpretation of Islam. the Netherlands. the erection of an Islamic structure as an official religious institution alongside the Catholic hierarchy gives an unmistakable impression that Islam seeks to impinge upon and usurp the status of the established religion of the country. which we believe has.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 church. Seglers also pointed to the distinction between the long historical evolution that produced the Catholic hierarchy as it now exists. a liturgy “which brings together the rites and ceremonies constituting the cult”. In mid-2008.

from behind bars. constructed for 50.258 the “Topas Group” led by “Achraf” had joined with members of the Algerian GSPC (see Case Study: France) to create a group called Martyrs of Morocco (Mártires de Marruecos) which planned a series of attacks on judicial institutions within two months of the 3/11 bombings.eu . it is unsurprising that Muslims are represented beyond their national demographic ratio. The crimes were prevented by a police action titled “Operation Nova”. including a large underclass. Abderrahman Tahiri. as a separate topic from the legal offensive against terrorism. in Spanish correctional institutions. whom he doused with gasoline and burned to death. Later in 2004. In 2004. was described in a major reportage focusing on the badlyovercrowded prison of Topas. which appears to resemble that 121 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. alias “Mohamed Achraf”. In 2005. he had been invited to eat at the home of a Moroccan compatriot.257 The prison at Topas further provided an example of something relatively rare in other countries: recruitment to and formulation of an elaborate but failed terrorist conspiracy.259 Spanish media reporting on the “Operation Nova” affair260 stated that in addition to those recruited to extremism as convicts in Topas. the government stated that it would hire Muslim clerics to serve in the correctional system. according to the model adopted in France. specifically putting Islam on the same level with the Catholic church. In 1994. Spain has also been challenged by the problem of Islamic religious personnel serving prisoners. in the autonomous region of Galicia.256 The killer had been taught radical ideology at Topas after meeting Achraf. had occupied the former educational facility inside the prison.261 But the manual. using it for Quranic study and for religious services. Boussouf’s comments followed a colloquium in the Moroccan city of Fez. resulting in charges against 20 suspects. and were presented as an appeal for greater democracy in Spanish Muslim life.252 At the time of our survey no action had been fulfilled to implement this demand. to avoid the emergence of radical prayer leaders from the ranks of the incarcerated. The case of “Achraf” in Topas was specifically cited in this context. and Bonxe. the problem of radical Islam among convicts. housed 350 Muslims (mainly Moroccans and Algerians) out of 1. in the autonomous region of Aragón. an official body maintained by the Moroccan state. According to a journalistic account. had become a “ghetto” of 130 Muslims. A Lama has attained notoriety similar to that of Topas as a centre of radical Islamist agitation. Spanish General Director of Penitentiary Institutions. The prison of Almería.254 There it was reported that a group of Muslims led by an Algerian. But in 2008 14 of those convicted were exonerated by the Spanish Supreme Court. Vocal calls to prayer from the new “mosque” were said to have disturbed other prisoners. In March 2009. “Mohamed Achraf” was sentenced to 14 years in prison as leader of an armed gang. in the autonomous region of Castilla and León. The facility is the “most obsolete” in Andalusia and was built to accommodate only 650 prisoners. Spanish media disclosed that Mercedes Gallizo Llamas. (3) Criminal aspects With a significant North African and West African immigrant population.Spain: Criminal Aspects CIP Spanish government to establish complete equality of all faiths. In 2005. a city on the southeastern coast with close proximity to North Africa. others had served time in the institutions of A Lama. Spanish media253 reported that Abdellah Boussouf. general secretary of the Council of the Moroccan Community Abroad. One wing.islamicpluralism.100 inmates. Teixeiro. called for the election of Muslim leaders in Spain. had distributed an 89-page manual advising prison personnel on how to identify Islamist radicals. a followup reportage255 alleged that correctional institutions in Andalusia had become filled with Muslim extremist activity. an identified Muslim died while incarcerated in the prison of Zuera. As 2008 ended.

in which landowners had the privilege of taking the virginity of an employee’s new bride. While FGM does not exist among Spanish Christians. and threats by a man against a woman are criminalised. The plaintiffs included the Women’s Council of the Region of Madrid (Consejo de la Mujer de la Comunidad de Madrid) with 80 constituent groups.eu . remains. such as the repetition of passages from Qur’an while working. the book was published by the president of the Islamic Federation of Catalonia (Federació Islámica de Catalunya).islamicpluralism. The manual discussed the Topas case and summarised the situation of radical Islam in Spanish prisons in an idiom commonly heard in Spain: “The present high concentration of Muslims kept in penitentiaries. as well as extremists. Elite opinion deplores violence against women. similarly. the Spanish right supported a powerful women’s movement. imam of the Sohail Islamic Cultural Centre (Centro Cultural Islámico Sohail) at Fuengirola in the Andalusian district of Málaga. one of the most “feminist” countries in the world. This could be explained by the continuing general subordination of women in Spain’s masculinist culture. and the possession of tesbih. the Federation of Divorced and Separated Women (Federación de Mujeres Divorciadas y Separadas – 10 affiliated groups). and during the civil war of the 1930s. and the volume was mainly CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. as well as by Catholics and the PP. Catholic and conservative on such issues. was known until the close of the 20th century. The overall situation is extremely complex. the “Islamic rosary” used for recitation of praise to God. the Association of Maghrebi Women of Catalonia (Amal). but such an analysis would be faulty in various ways. The rural populace. included some markers of radicalism that would be common among spiritual Sufis and ordinary Muslims. and a leading Spanish Muslim cleric. Conceptions of “honour” and violent. been known for fighting alongside or in advance of men in combat.. In addition. e. women troops played a controversial but significant role. was denounced by a group of Spanish feminist organisations. and the Netherlands). and the Association for Aid to SexuallyAssaulted Women (Asociación de Asistencia a Mujeres Agredidas sexualmente). conservative journalist interviewed for this survey. according to a leading non-Muslim. no less than among Muslims. Spanish women have. in some isolated locations the so-called “right of the first night”. without the reverse being unlawful. especially those originating from the Maghreb. Abuse inflicted on Muslim women has attracted far less attention in Spain than in the northern countries (the UK. the wearing of hijab (known as a pañuelo or kerchief) by Muslim girls is not banned in Spain. Mowafak Kanfach. but in Spain. women may be as prone to settling conflicts by physical means as men. favors activities of proselytism and radicalisation”. in many areas. which would view it as a sign of political weakness. In 2000 the issue of domestic violence by Muslim men came before the Spanish public when Mohamed Kamal Mostafá. The cause for criticism was Mostafá’s publication in Barcelona of his book Woman in Islam (La mujer en el Islam). particularly in Italy. Today’s Spain is. The Spanish left of that time had the most developed women’s political organisations in southern Europe. Written in 1997. It would be opposed by the Socialists as discriminatory. (4) Approach to Women Although it has been the subject of vivid discussion.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 produced by the European Union and described in Case Study: France. in legal terms. or in France. other atrocious practices persist from centuries past. since Roman times. however. and has adopted 122 discrimination in favor of women as a constitutional principle.g. Spain mandates parity of men and women in governmental employment. Spain has legalised same-sex weddings and adoptions. sometimes lethal punishment for violations of them are seen in the Christian cultures of the Mediterranean. It is doubtful that such a ban could be imposed. Germany.

a racist insult.E. an aristocratic “upper town” was built on the eastern. she should be beaten on the feet and hands”.Spain: Approach to Women CIP distributed at the Saudi-financed Islamic Cultural Centre in Madrid. other side of the Rambles. in terms of its openness. except that in Amsterdam foreign visitors tend to liaise with one another. aside from Muslims.) But Barcelona is a city of Mediterranean passion.eu . late at night. The association of the neighbourhood with Chinese has been explained by Barcelona historians as a corrupted reference to the Carthaginians. who choose to settle there. Although in its old incarnation El Raval was beloved by Barcelonese and many discerning visitors for its picturesque and historic quality. worked as cashier in a food store owned by her family in El Raval. or Paris. or Paris making social contacts with Muslim women that might lead to deeper relations. the family of Hannibal. such as the face. the geographically lower and poorer district of the old city of Barcelona. Mostafá was sentenced to fifteen months in jail (with prison time suspended) and a fine of €2. Therein. located to the west of the Rambles. known as Roxana. (Similarly.C. it is difficult to imagine foreign tourists in Amsterdam. with many expressing satisfaction with the verdict. and head. Native Catalans and immigrant workers.262 Spanish Muslim opinion on the case was split. including many foreigners. “[Wife] beating must never be done in a state of exacerbated. or bruises are caused”. In addition. Instead. from which he had been expelled in 1992.264 The incident was described by a woman reporter. Until the Barcelona Summer Olympics of 1992.160. abdomen. a powerful alcoholic drink that causes dementia after long use. known as a focus of anarchist politics as well as such vices as the consumption of absemta. The Barri Gòtic remains the central location of Barcelona’s municipal and Catalonia’s autonomous regional governments. afflicted with petty crime.islamicpluralism. A Pakistani immigrant woman in her late teens. but also underscored the problems of Muslim women throughout Western Europe. in the third century B. argued that Mostafá had been the object of persecution because of an attempt by him to gain the presidency of FEERI. In Roman times. A case publicised in Barcelona in 2002 demonstrated the difference between the Catalan capital and other European tourist centres. in that it has little or no sense of social segregation among those who come to visit it. and his book was condemned as an incitement to domestic violence. El Raval was formerly known as the Barri Xinès or “Chinatown”. After some confusion over jurisdiction. El Raval was also shabby. with a “rod that must not be stiff. Yazmin Alami. who founded Barcelona as the victory city of the Barcas. breast. London. Mostafá commented. Basques refer to non-Basques as maketo. whether from elsewhere in Spain or other parts of the world. if not decrepit. and. and the Casa del Libro Árabe. London. year-around stream of youthful visitors. while in Barcelona visitors develop relationships with local residents. although Barcelona has never had a large Chinese community. In this respect it somewhat resembles Amsterdam. for a major daily. and accusing Mostafá of a deviant interpretation of Islam. but differs from Amsterdam. notable for its sexual exhilaration and a constant. the district was rehabilitated for the 123 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. the imam of Fuengirola was brought before a court in Barcelona and charged with sexual discrimination in 2003. or main street in the historic section. a bookshop in Barcelona. “[the blows] must not be strong or hard since the aim is to inflict psychological suffering rather than humiliation or physical ill-treatment”. but slim and lightweight to avoid serious injury [to the woman] and so that no scars. and is now known as the Barri Gòtic or Gothic Quarter. El Raval was always a sub-proletarian area. Some. may observe a certain alienation between their communities. Similarly. blind rage” and that “she should not be beaten on the sensitive parts of her body. Mostafá’s own mosque in Fuengirola. however. Catalans refer to Spanish immigrants to the principality as xarnegos.263 Barcelona is one of Western Europe’s tourism capitals.

El Raval has at least 12 mosques. Islam y Guerra Civil Española. In this regard the situation in Barcelona resembles that in Marseille. Obstetrics. 240 Harvey. lack of knowledge. as well as women who have been the object of them throughout their lives. 2006. and sent their daughter back to Pakistan for an arranged marriage with a cousin. 238 Ibid. none have minarets. Agencia Mexicana de Noticias [México]. Alami wrote. July 30. Chicago. Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos. La Esfera de los Libros. and Reproduction of the USP Institut Universitari Dexeus.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 Olympics and now appears gentrified. 243 Unsigned.265 although some Islamic countries. El Raval has become a centre for artists and other young visitors. Unsigned. few have nameplaques. from the Department of Gynecology. José Luis. University of Chicago Press. but also combines the issues of so-called “honour” crime. as well as Muslim immigrants.eu . Notwithstanding its practise in Saudi Arabia. Madrid. stated that Roxana had been beaten with a belt by her male relatives before being left alone to recuperate and then sent to her native country. Ms. and forced marriages. “Planea Arabia Saudita abrir escuelas islámicas en España”. In 2006. And. and the sole medical expert qualified to do so in Spain. a prohibition in which Egypt itself 124 followed suit. “The case of Roxana is not something rare in Spain. had already banned the procedure. 242 Ibid. for diverse reasons (religious. Alami. had succeeded in performing the first successful operations to reverse the effects of FGM. Dr. 2008. the main private hospital in Barcelona. Egypt is the only major Muslim country with a high rate of FGM. Madrid. July 11. NOTES 237 Sánchez Nogales. El islam en la España actual. To find a mosque in El Raval one must inquire in Muslim shops. But Roxana’s family disapproved of the frequent visits of the young Nordic to their store. Ms. “UGT rebutja els centres d’acollida d’immigrants per CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. adultery is a motive for family extradition and a later and brutal traditional punishment in the country of origin of the women found to have committed an offence”. This reportage seems unique in recent Spanish journalism. Europa Press. “Els alumnes immigrants no tindran un temps d’estada màxim en els centres de benvinguda educatives”. Pere Barri Soldevila. the problem of Roxana began when she developed a romantic attachment to a blond and blue-eyed German tourist named Hans. circumcisions are practiced as a matter of routine”.P. to whom she had been betrothed as a child. cit. 245 Unsigned. 241 Sánchez Ruano. The text continued. without charge. Francisco. detest this form of mutilation… But is is no less certain that in our society. The main point of the reportage was.. El islam en la España actual. As described by the 2002 reportage. who had come to Catalonia to learn Spanish. The problem of FGM also has a low profile in Spain. where it is known as “circuncisión femenina” or “ablación genital femenina”. as happened to Roxana. violence against Muslim women. the Spanish public was informed that Egypt had classified “female genital surgery” as a legitimate medical specialisation. and Sénégal. or are open outside prayer times.islamicpluralism. Sudan. But society and the police are unaware that honour codes do not recognise borders. op. or incorrect stereotypes). 239 Ibid. 244 Sánchez Nogales. A 2008 Spanish media report266 described FGM as “a custom still deeply rooted in the SubSaharan countries [from which many current immigrants to Spain have come]. Muslims in Spain: 1500 to 1614. The immigrant woman must travel with a family watching her closely. with numbers that currently oscillate in the vicinity of two million operations per year”. traditional. 2008. 2005. to note that a Catalan physician. which are seldom easy to locate. however. especially Maghrebis and Pakistanis. 2004. The therapy was provided to two women of Black African origin. such as Indonesia. unfamiliar with these rituals. “Our society. as “justified” by previously cited Shafi’i Shariah norms and a fatwa by Al-Qaradawi. L. The reporter.

October 7. 2008. Esther. 256 Unsigned. 1. 2008. leaflet. 257 El Barrio. cit. La Vanguardia. 264 Alami. práctica que afecta a 130 millones de féminas en el mundo”. July 15. 2006. J. November 2008. Barcelona. February 19. 2004. 259 Lázaro. 2008. 2009. “El convertido”. 2009. El Mundo. El Mundo. November 8. Mercedes Gallizo.Spain: Notes CIP ‘discriminatoris’ i encaminats a la ‘segregació’ ”. January 14.A. op. Unsigned. 2002. Los funcionarios denuncian la falta de personal y medios para evitar que el integrismo prospere entre rajas”. “De la Vega anuncia la revisión de la ley orgánica de libertad religiosa”. “Ablación. 2008. La directora general de Instituciones Penitenciarias. EFE [News Agency]. “Los líderes musulmanes de España piden al Gobierno una reforma legal que les equipare con la Iglesia Católica”. October 5. El Mundo. Europa Press. Laura L. “15 meses de cárcel para el imán que incitó a la violencia contra las mujeres”. Ana. Ana. El Mundo. 2008. July 15. El Periódico de Aragón [Zaragoza]. 261 Unsigned. 2005. February 25. “Cárceles. July 20. Unsigned. 255 Del Campo. 2008. Ruiz.islamicpluralism. El Mundo. February 28. 2006. 250 Seglers. “Lucha contra el terrorismo islamista: Operaciones Nova”. Série no. 2003. “El imam de Fuengirola se proclama ‘defensor de las mujeres’ en el juicio contra él por discriminación”. July 13. 251 Unsigned. January 14.eu 125 . La Voz de Galicia. “El Gobierno pone límites al plan para segregar alumnos en Cataluña”. El Mundo [Andalusia ed. 253 Del Barrio. Europa Press. 2005. Del Barrio. Alejandro Font de Mora. El Periódico [Barcelona].. Madrid. “El Gobierno financiará a los imames para que acudan a las cárceles con el fin de dirigir el rezo de los reclusos musulmanes”. El Mundo. 2004. May 8. rechaza la iniciativa del Gobierno catalán de crear aulas de acogida para inmigrantes”. La Voz de Galicia [A Coruña]. Unsigned. 252 Unsigned. Recueil de fatwas. El País. 2004. “L’islam ultraortodox duplica les mesquites a Catalunya en 4 anys”. “Los musulmanes de España aplauden la condena”. Tres millones de niñas sufren cada año algún tipo de mutilación genital. 258 Marraco. 262 Unsigned. “Cataluña creará centros específicos para los inmigrantes recién llegados”. 2004. May 7. 2008. 2004. El Mundo. “Absueltos 14 de los 20 condenados en la Operación Nova”. Manuel. “Musulmanes captados para la causa yihadista en las prisiones”. “Sevilla. Islam. Barcelona. Ajuntament de Barcelona. Àlex. Presos musulmanes.. “Marruecos reclama una reforma de la Comisión Islámica de España”.opera cit. p. collected in Barcelona. El Mundo. Angle Editorial. February 28. “VALENCIA. fue golpeada y repatriada”. Yazmin. 265 Alvarado. Antonio. 263 Unsigned. “El català. 248 Conseil europeén des fatwas et de la recherche. El Mundo [Valencia ed. 2008. El País [Madrid].. dará prioridad a los internos árabes en los trabajos que se realizan en prisión”. “Mujeres. 266 Unsigned. December 9. 249 Baquero. March 22. March 15. El Mundo. llengua d’acollida”. 2008. 2004. “El imán de Fuengirola no recurre la pena por incitar a los malos tratos a la mujer. Educación. Inmigración. “La reconstrucción del clítoris y la circuncisión ritual: paradojas de las civilizaciones”. El Mundo.]. “Marruecos pide elecciones para que los musulmanes elijan a sus líderes en España”. CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. July 15. December 28. August 8.]. February 26. “Un manual confidencial revela a los funcionarios códigos y claves para frenar el ‘yihadismo’ en las cárceles”. 39. Ana. January 20. Eduardo. 260 Unsigned. El conseller de Educación. Europa Press. Musulmans a Catalunya: El repte de l’integració i la llibertat religiosa. 246 Aunion. Ana. 254 Del Barrio. 2008.. March 17. Julio M. 247 Toumaï [Madrid]. El caso de Roxana que se enamoró de un alemán. November 2008. 2008. La Vanguardia.

and insulted the Creator. At the same time.islamicpluralism. unless the Muslim can find no other solution for pursuit of a life. The accompanying ECFR recommendations reaffirm the traditional Islamic injunction to obey the laws of the countries that 126 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. ECFR states that “apostasy” should be considered a crime similar to “high treason”. which says that application of death sentences for apostates can only be decided by an Islamic state. Finally. These include definition of the “saved” sect among Muslims – a common issue in Islamic fundamentalism. and that local groups and mosques should avoid concerning themselves with it. to avoid applying for public assistance or welfare payments if they have jobs or operate businesses. and the question of death sentences against apostates from Islam. The spirit of this fatwa The present survey includes frequent mention of the activities of the European Council for Fatawa and Research (ECFR) in formulating Shariah for Muslims in Europe. it is justifiable in cases of leaving Islam. 4) ECFR points out that early Islamic scholars denied that an apostate should be subjected to a death sentence unless the individual preached apostasy. specifically. and the believers. would reflect on Muslim relations with non-Muslims. The rest of the fatwas in the first collection deal with various topics. EMN. 1 states that Muslims are obligated to leave non-Muslim lands. fatwa No. however. ECFR’s First Fatwa Collection The 43 fatwas in the first collection published by ECFR267 are composed in a language that often appears moderate. repentance of sin. except that reflecting whether house mortgages involving interest income are permitted for Muslims.eu . EMU) have admitted them and. it is noticeable that few of them. the Muslim lives “without a Muslim identity”. The latter problem is treated ambiguously by ECFR. in a fundamentalist vein. for himself and for his family”.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 9. in the language of the text. if. In an examination of two volumes of fatwas published by the group. the Prophet Muhammad. sought to divide the Muslims. ECFR and Other Transnational Islamic Organisations in Europe (FIOE. with the implication that since some Western countries impose capital punishment for the latter crime. The same text permits emigration to non-Muslim societies as “hoped for and desired” if to “an environment that offers a greater possibility of respecting the prescriptions of religion”. This argument is based on the presumption that a Muslim may find himself in “an environment where he fears for his religion. In the same fatwa (No.

• purchase and use of fireworks.eu . Another fatwa in the first series (No. • qualification for leading Muslim prayer. A new hair style is discouraged by ECFR if the change is too surprising to the husband. • employment in restaurants serving alcohol or pork.islamicpluralism. • use of non-interest-charging credit cards issued by charitable organisations (some of them backed by banks in Kuwait. These include: No. Qatar. reflecting the fundamentalist and reformist habits of the Wahhabi movement. • whether it is required for a person who becomes Muslim to adopt a Muslim name. 5) deals with the traditional requirement for a new Sunni Muslim (“convert”) to choose an affiliation with one of the four traditional Sunni schools of Islamic law. according to the Maliki and Hanafi schools of Islamic law). No. Unsupported claims on this matter are discouraged by ECFR. • the presence of husbands at the bedside during childbirth. which attempts to wipe out the precedents established by the four schools. 29: Recourse of the Muslim wife living in the West in case of irresolvable 127 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. pronouncing on: • whether dogs are unclean (they are not. • participation of Muslims in elections held by Western governments. None of these evince a rigid or repressive spirit. • whether wives must entertain visitors when their husbands are sick. • pork byproducts in food. • permission for small children to participate in simple dances at school. ECFR denies that this is necessary. • the right of non-Muslim women married to Muslim men to maintain close relations with their non-Muslim families. and Saudi Arabia). • the post-partum right of mothers to rest from their ordinary activities. • abortion. • prayers for the dead. • payment of profits on investment. • whether riding a bicycle endangers a girl’s virginity. Fatwa No. • masturbation. • the right of women to open bank accounts. • endowment of mosques. 21: The right of women to cut their hair without permission from their husbands. This represents a dangerously separatist attitude toward non-Muslim societies. • differences in interpretations of Islamic tradition between husband and wife. • disposition of minor interest paid on bank accounts in non-Islamic institutions. • marriages of convenience.ECFR’s First Fatwa Collection CIP conflicts directly with European and international conventions on freedom of religion. The remaining fatwas in the first series appear innocuous. • whether fathers are required to oversee disciplining of children. • the definition of “religious” marriage. 19: Whether husband alone can determine if a woman falsely declared her virginity before marriage. • whether men can forbid their wives to attend courses in the faith of Islam. 6 in the first series calls on Muslim women to maintain hijab so as to set themselves apart from non-Muslims and Muslims who do not practice their religion. • whether married women can speak to men to whom they are not married. • employment of Muslim medical personnel in disposal of bodies by cremation. No. • administration of charity payments. But the first collection’s fatwas deal with a number of issues in gender relations. • whether a Muslim wife should serve as the sole financial support of a husband.

No. on “interfaith dialogue”. 1 of the second collection. and Taoists. and few have to do with Muslim relations with non-Muslim legal authorities. and present a serious conflict with Western services to women by public agencies dedicated to family problems. ECFR’s Second Fatwa Collection The second ECFR collection268 comprises 37 fatwas. • permission for transfer of interest earned from Western bank accounts to Islamic charities. of the required daily observance. public change in the attitudes of a major Muslim authority toward non-monotheistic believers.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 family disputes. Notwithstanding serious problems at the conference itself. the July 2008 Madrid interreligious meeting represented a historic. As with the first collection. Some of them repeat or reinforce the content of fatwas in the first collection. for Muslims living in Europe. and doubt as to its real utility. with each pair merged into a single prayer. prophethood and the hereafter” – implying discussion only with Jews and Christians. In the first instance the practise is justified because winter shortens the hours of the day. the surviving communities of the original People of the Book (Ahl ul-Kitab) described in Qur’an. When King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia held interreligious talks in Madrid in July 2008. is benign in appearance but includes some fundamentalist assumptions. • observance of the age of a sacrificed CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. No. which are described in this study. • method of fixing the time at which the Ramadan fast begins and ends. Fatwa No. No. the Saudi monarch 128 secured the participation of figures representing faiths never previously considered worthy of respect by Muslim fundamentalists such as the majority of ECFR members. including Buddhists. and holding of public office. Confucians. against making the practise habitual. ECFR holds that husbands may prohibit wives from visiting certain women friends if the husband fears harm to the family or a risk to conjugal relations. • determination of the direction of prayer (qibla) in a building where there is no indication of the geographical relationship to Mecca. including mosque and charity administration. this religious opinion may be utilised to justify violent actions against such allegedly illicit friendships. As we have stated in discussing so-called “honour” murders. 32: The right of a husband to forbid his wife from visiting a female friend. although they embody fundamentalist attitudes that are problematic in the Western context.eu .islamicpluralism. • combination of the two midday (zuhr and asr) and two evening prayers (maghrib and isha). 33 declares that members of the Druze sect are apostates and that religious Muslims should not eat with them. other Islamic organisational activities. • the payment of zakat (obligatory charity). ECFR calls for such problems to be turned over to “family tribunals”. 36 discourages mixed gender activities at weddings. • permission for acceptance of charitable donations from non-Muslims as long as the source of funds does not originate in the production of pork or alcohol. The rest of the second collection comprises fatwas on: • affirmation of the right of women to work in public functions. Some of the first ECFR collection’s fatwas reflect a fundamentalist intolerance but cannot be said to interfere with Western social or legal canons. It legitimises relations between Muslims and adherents of “divine faiths [that] acknowledge the concept of deity. and in the second when summer makes the astronomical indicators of prayer times difficult to observe – the ECFR warns. many of these are written in a moderate style. however. however.

islamicpluralism. But ECFR blandly states that women’s guardians “wish only for their best interest and that they marry good men rather than deceitful and illheart (sic) suitors”. • permission for a man and women who have both committed adultery to become married and be considered free of sin after their wedding. as well as personal homes.ECFR’s Second Fatwa Collection CIP animal. No. Nevertheless. while prohibiting participation in non-Muslim religious festivities. unless consummated in an illegitimate manner. • assignment of a deceased woman’s wealth to her heirs. • permission to purchase insurance on mosques. Requirement for women to obtain permission from a male legal guardian for marriage. and Muslims were encouraged to establish “Islamic cooperative insurance” programs. At the same time. the fatwa places no limit on participation in patriotic or other non-religious holidays honoured by non-Muslims. • encouragement for Muslims to deliver good wishes to non-Muslims on the holidays observed by the latter. • permission for Muslims to attend the funerals of non-Muslim relatives. • legitimacy of divorces ordered by nonMuslim judges in the West. • prohibition on consumption of meat that is not slaughtered according to Islamic law. • permission to consume soft drinks that allegedly contain small amounts of alcohol so long as they do not cause intoxication when consumed in large quantities. • prohibition on employees diverting the facilities of their employers for their own use.E. • permission for human organ donation. • encouragement to participate in sports. • support for the right of a woman to divorce her irreligious husband. • permission for Muslims to be buried in non-Muslim cemeteries if no Muslim cemetery is available. vehicles and businesses. except when girls were under the age of puberty. which can hardly be assumed in every case. ECFR acknowledged that traditional Shariah scholars considered this requirement arguable. schools. • definition of vinegar derived from alcohol as a non-intoxicant and therefore permissible for use in food. and other Islamic facilities. especially given the widespread abuse of women as described in this survey. The question of life insurance was deferred. Affirmation of the right of Muslim 129 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. ECFR further recommends that in the absence of such guardians the mosque should assume guardianship. on the basis that the assets are hers. • permission to destroy embryos collected for in vitro fertilisation if they become unnecessary because of a natural pregnancy. and health insurance. the question in itself reveals the gap between the mentality of ECFR and Western legal and social norms. who were born in the 13th century C. 13. Fatwas from the second collection that conflict with Western legal standards include: No. 12.eu . • formal affirmation of the equality of husbands and wives. • prohibition on breaking a contract after it has been undertaken. • permission for inheritances to Muslims from their non-Muslim relatives. • exclusion of feelings of love by a woman for a man from consideration as sinful. following the opinions of the notorious fundamentalists Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim. but that mature women need not submit their marriage decisions to a guardian.

130 The fatwa bans unmarried men and women from meeting alone. It further states that non-Muslim women who do not swim in the presence of men should be considered virtuous. ECFR asserts that Shariah bans boxing for Muslims. but claims to be “the largest Islamic organisation on the European level”. which was founded in 1989. No. and demands that women meeting men to whom they are not married cover their entire bodies except for their faces and hands.) While this fatwa does not impend on the relations of Muslims with Western legal systems it most certainly reveals the orientation of ECFR toward a radical position on Palestinian issues and reinforces the observation that ECFR is Arab-dominated. The second collection also includes a fatwa (No. in our view. and also for non-Muslims.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 men to four wives. (It ignores the cultural fact that some Jews who speak Arabic and lived in Arab countries define themselves as “Arab Jews”. a second home. an assertion that does not. 16. an excessive religious intrusion into ordinary social relations.islamicpluralism. Prohibition of gender mixing. whether Muslims or Christians. in our judgement. it reinforces the exclusive right of men to initiate divorce.269 The real extent of its influence in European Muslim life is doubtful. ECFR produced a classic fundamentalist defence of polygamy. and all Arabs. ECFR states that a woman may initiate a divorce if a provision for such an action was written into her marriage contract. and to travel in the company of a chaperone (mehram). at least de jure. and makes the initiation of divorce by women dependent on judicial authorities. FIOE maintains a website with minimal content in English and French. Requiring women to inform their husbands if they leave the house. Otherwise. The fatwa also calls for gender segregation in public meetings. Permission for mortgages in house purchase. the CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. 32. FIOE. The fatwa is interesting in that it declares Jerusalem to be the property of all Muslims. but with the stricture that men must not be present. The latter represents. 26. this opinion represents a stark difference from canons for women’s rights in the West. No. Such practices are not banned in the West. or if the purchaser has assets that make the mortgage contract unnecessary. 34. the latter claim being one that cannot be considered legimately enforceable in a non-Muslim country. mean much. No. The fatwa specifically bans contracting a mortgage to buy a house that the owner will not use. Like the preceding fatwa. This fatwa grants permission for Muslim women to expose the area from the navel to the knee to non-Muslim women while engaged in swimming. as well as physical contact between them. although it is disappearing in most of the Muslim world and is illegal. 24. No. A similarly skeletal organisation. and should be called to Islam by Muslim women. This is the fatwa on house purchase produced by the debate described ad extenso in chapter 3 of this study. Exposure of women’s bodies during swimming. and is exceptionally long and detailed. comprises small entities in most European countries. in the West. 36) against the surrender of any part of Jerusalem or sale of Palestinian land to nonArabs. ECFR was created with the support of the Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe (FIOE). 35.eu . whether Arab or not. Prohibition of boxing between human beings (as opposed to practicing with a dummy). Ruling on women initiating divorces. but obviously conflict with Western customs. No. No. especially when compared with the various national organisations described in the Case Studies.

271 www. EMN calls for a campaign against forced marriages and claims to support “nonviolent resistance” by Palestinians but draws support from the fundamentalist Islamic milieu.org/. CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. EMU’s objectives rest clearly on non-interference with Western social and legal norms. 269 www. cit. with headquarters in Köln.270 describes itself as a “think-tank” headquartered in Brussels and is associated with the controversial intellectual Tariq Ramadan.net. The European Muslim Union (EMU)271 is another and quite different organisation.e-cfr.eu. We have observed EMU at some length and judge it to be an authentically moderate Muslim body. and Istanbul. 1. 270 www. Africa and Asia European Muslim Network (EMN). NOTES 267 Conseil europeén des fatwas et de la recherche.ECFR’s Second Fatwa Collection CIP Muslim concentration Europe. 268 Published in English at www.euro-muslim.euro-muslims.emunion. op. It has no pretensions to the introduction of Shariah-based or other separate law in Europe. and branches in Granada.org.islamicpluralism.eu 131 . Recueil de fatwas. Berlin. Série no. Sarajevo.

‘It’s very much a return to oldfashioned conservative lending. In addition. The authors of this study are concerned CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. The message may have particular resonance in the West after the crumbling of the U. While income based on the loan of money or commodities with repayment accompanied by an increase in value after a delay in time is specifically banned in Islam. which began operations in April [2008] as the fifth Islamic bank in Britain. “The global credit crisis presents the $1 trillion Islamic finance industry with an opportunity to expand its appeal beyond Muslim investors. While “Islamic banking” has recently produced a vivid controversy in the West. arguments in favor of Islamic banking have been aired before the nonMuslim public.The Question of ‘Islamic Banking’ The intersection of Islam.S. And they are playing up the contrast to scalded shareholders. interpretation and debate over this prohibition is convoluted and confusing. ‘The current global market condition has given Islamic finance a great opportunity to show what it can do .CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 10.islamicpluralism. as a haven from speculative excess. mortgage market left banks holding hundreds of billions of dollars of nearly worthless credit instruments tied to home loans by a web of complex structures.eu . the option of 132 submitting financial disagreements to “parallel Shariah” tribunals has been a significant theme in the British discussion over introduction of such a system of mediation. investment for earning of interest. Whether payment of mortgage interest should be acceptable for Muslims to gain better housing and more secure residence was a key component in the debate in the ECFR beginning in 1997. over whether it could harm non-Muslim society. a Reuters journalist272 reported.’ he said”.’ said David Testa. Islamic banks are virtually unscathed. chief executive of Gatehouse Bank. that with the coming of the economic crisis of 2008 in the West. While conventional banks worldwide are nursing losses of more than $400 billion from the credit crisis. we noted the development of so-called “Shariah-compliant financial products”. We should note. bondholders and borrowers and fearful depositors. In the Case Study: Britain. it is a subject requiring specialised knowledge of financial practices.help to fill the liquidity gap. however. and we have exempted it from detailed examination here. For example. as offered by British banks and investment firms. and other financial issues is also a repeated topic in this survey.

Traditional Islam does not clearly ban all interest income. where. has written an authoritative study of financial issues in Islam. Worse. derived from criminal activity or directed to support of terrorism. have always been divided on the merits of the market”. At the same time. titled Islam and Mammon. Kuran has outlined the various issues involved in the Muslim discussion of interest. we observe that while some Western financial institutions have offered “Shariah-compliant” banking and investment products for almost three decades.273 Prof. Timur Kuran. but rather. non-Muslim UK and European population and the Muslim minority. it would support a greater sense of segregation between the broader. In addition. without recourse to “Islamic banking”. Muslims who wish to invest money in enterprises that are not involved with forbidden products such as pork or alcohol may ascertain for themselves the activities of businesses. investment for the sole purpose of earning interest. “Islamic banking” has been noticeably accepted in Britain more than elsewhere in the countries we examined. similar to that observed in Britain in the area of divorce. including Islamic economists. there is so far no evidence that such practices have had any negative effect on Western society. He argues that Islamist ideology “like other fundamentalisms… carries the potential of harming the global economy”.islamicpluralism.g. or under what conditions individuals deposit or invest their money is a matter of free personal choice. he warns that “Islamist leaders who… desire to restrict international trade or regulate the composition of private investment will have little difficulty justifying their actions in religious terms”. professor of economics and law and King Faisal professor of Islamic thought and culture at the University of Southern California. This is only partially explained by the role of London as a global financial centre. But the matter had previously been widely argued by Muslim and non-Muslim commentators. and so-called “Islamic banking”. which is considered usury.Islamic Banking CIP that submission of “Islamic finance” disputes to “parallel Shariah” tribunals could increase the influence of radical clerics. We also recognise that for most Westerners. While he observes that “Islamists. providing that no laws are broken and the source and use of funds is not itself illegal – e. He points out that “the promotion of Islamic banking is a standard element of every Islamist economic agenda”. financial practices. Muslims who deposit funds with banks that pay interest on accounts may also choose to donate the money so earned to educational and other institutions. Kuran has traced the origin of the present-day doctrine of “Islamic banking” to the extremist interpretation of Islam promoted in India and Pakistan by the jihadist movement 133 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www.eu . the increasingly-unavoidable nature of this question was addressed by the ECFR consultations on mortgage purchase described in this survey. decisions on how. Is abolition of the traditional Islamic ban on investment for earning of interest necessary for the progress of the global Islamic community? In a distorted manner. Prof.

273 Kuran. International Herald Tribune. and that we believe provides a much sounder basis for economic justice and efficient development among Muslims: “The history of various Muslim peoples feature extended periods of steady economic growth. Umesh. Islam and Mammon: The Economic Predicaments of Islamism. We judge that radical Shariah in both Muslim and non-Muslim societies represents the creation of just such “communal shells” and erects a system of barriers to the progress and prosperity of Muslims. according to Mawdudi”.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 founded by Mawdudi and then imported into the UK.’ But the majority barely practiced Islam… The latter group of ‘partial Muslims’ had never accomplished anything of value.’ Religion fully controlled ‘their heads and hearts. “A minority of Muslims were ‘true Muslims. in the nonMuslim West such obstacles between communities represent a threat of increased social discord and radical influence. August 19. scientific creativity. Timur. and Mughal India… To invoke the glories of these cosmopolitan states would have undermined the argument that Muslims do best when they withdraw into their own communal shells”. as paraphrased by Prof.islamicpluralism. 2008. 134 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. This is the context from which the ideology of “Islamic banking”. He describes this ideology as separatist and purificationist: according to Mawdudi. their bellies and private parts. NOTES 272 Desai. emerged. Kuran’s book also embodies an important lesson for Westerners in their examination of radical Islam. One need only think about the high periods of the Abbasid Caliphate. Kuran. Prof. Further. 2004..eu .P. Muslim Spain. “Credit crisis gives Islamic finance a chance to shine”.’ as they were ‘completely immersed in Islam. the Ottoman Empire. Princeton U. and artistic [efflorescence]. which we do not consider to be essentially Islamic or appropriate for Muslims. Safavid Iran.

11. but of specific ideologies – mainly Wahhabism. they tend to exclude women. both as it deals with Shariah and in support of terrorism. moderates. dialogue about alleged grievances is useful regarding local complaints of discrimination. Moderates in Germany and the 135 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. in turn.islamicpluralism. moderates. Western European governments have taken measures leading in exactly the opposite direction. • In response. and the doctrines of the Muslim Brotherhood – that have enjoyed funding support from established or failing states. As we have observed. and traditionalists. We therefore offer the following responses to the questions posed at the beginning of this document. secular Muslims. How do Shariah proponents advance radical ideology and/or serve as cover for terrorist conspiracies? • Radical Shariah ideology is an essential element in the recruitment and incitement of terrorists in Western Islamic milieux. academics. Aside from women. in our view. Conclusions and Recommendations CIP 11. and Spain. including to the introduction of some form of Shariah as a special. Muslim women in all five of the named Western European countries. with seven recommendations. are necessary to abate radicalisation and prevent terrorism. the non-radical elements in European Islam are treated by Shariah agitators as presumptive apostates from Islam. but is of secondary utility. and definitely ignore secular Muslims. which may or may not be legitimate. and organisation. however. • Radical Islamic agitation in the West. The first conclusion we derive from our study is that notwithstanding the widespread image among non-Muslims of Europe as a continent under an irresistible Islamic siege. legitimising radicals as partners in public affairs and excluding anti-radical tendencies. and media. preparation. Western governments should support the anti-radical tendencies among Muslims. Severing financial links. a product of social or political grievances.eu . there is considerable European Muslim opposition to radicalism. and traditionalists in their discourse. generated recommendations for the use of governmental authorities. and vice versa? • While groups such as the ECFR and EMN adopt an ameliorative idiom and apparently moderate arguments in addressing issues involving women. the Netherlands. since such beliefs call for separation of Muslims from their non-Muslim neighbours and rejection of Western institutions. and defeating these ideologies within the Muslim communities. France. Deobandism. and completion of terrorist operations. “soft” fundamentalism in Turkey. Conclusion and Recommendations The CIP survey of Shariah in Western Europe has produced a number of conclusions by the investigators that. Groups that agitate for radical Shariah or “parallel Shariah” inevitably serve as friendly environments in enlistment for. have organised opposition against the radicals. How do proponents of radical or “parallel Shariah” contend with objections to their activities by women. is not. and moderates in Germany. separate legal standard.

and Spain. How can Western-trained and resident Muslim (non-Shariah) legal professionals be assisted to form a professional lobby? • As we saw most clearly in Britain. are disorganised or fractured in that country. because of their support to French state secularism. France. But we note with concern the absence of knowledge among non-Muslim authorities regarding Berber community alternatives to Shariah. and the potential for such practices appears realistic among Berbers in the Netherlands.eu . we are dismayed by official ignorance of the capacity of Barelvi mosques and communities. Traditionalists. without consulting religious authorities. Another and greater danger is that of the control of such processes by extremists. religious functionaries can play a positive role in community mediation. if it is truly voluntary and monitored by established. Do families more frequently consult religious leaders or submit queries to Shariah websites before making decisions? • While Shariah queries to religious leaders and websites appear a popular method of improvised religious selfeducation among younger European Muslims. which comprise the majority of British Muslims. Is voluntary community mediation based on Islamic law a workable concept. These professionals have received little or no CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. • Alevis and Berbers suffer in Western Europe from the syndrome of neglect as “minorities within minorities”. both described above in Case Study: Germany. moderates are unorganised or minimally organised but represent an articulate alternative in France. under the pretext of minority accommodation. as we see in Shariah divorce tribunals in the UK. non-Muslim legal system represent an important resource for opposition to “parallel Shariah” schemes and radical Islam in general. Muslim lawyers working in the established. non-Muslim family law or social welfare agencies.islamicpluralism. could be an acceptable institution for Western European Muslims.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 Netherlands enjoy more advantageous positions because of Turkish state secularism and Alevi community advocacy among Muslim immigrants and their descendants. The majority of non-radical Muslims seem to make family and related decisions based on religious habits they imported from their countries of origin or inherited from their immigrant parents. who could serve as the basis of moderate opposition to the radicals in Britain. • In the British case. In the mainly-Berber Muslim communities in the Netherlands. to provide moderate choices for religiousbased mediation. we found little evidence that ordinary Muslim parents tend to resort to them for assistance in making decisions. in which guarantees of fair treatment can be assured? • As demonstrated by the Albanian Catholic example of mediation to end honour conflicts and the Alevi practice of settlement of disagreements by “popular tribunals”. Community mediation. • Moderate resources for community mediation exist in the Alevi communities among Turkish and Kurdish Muslims in the West. Such mediation 136 among the majority of Muslims living in the West nevertheless embodies certain risks. France and Spain. which are dominated by Deobandi radicals. One such involves the failure of non-Muslim state authorities to adequately enforce established standards. representing heterodox Muslim identities submerged in the general atmosphere of “established” Islamic culture and vulnerable to discrimination by “official” as well as radical Muslim leaders.

has been advanced by some “soft fundamentalists”. accompanied by exclusion of the above-mentioned advocates for “minorities within minorities”. The primary factor in this policy stalemate. Germany. and Spanish citizens. and the Netherlands. have a place in Western Muslim life? • The concept of “moderate Shariah”. Dutch. but cannot even be adequately defined in England and Spain. to describe it diplomatically. Such a policy. Assimilation and integration of Muslims in Western Europe will be accomplished by maintaining multiple lines of communication. aside from that governing strictly personal religious matters. not 137 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. and why? • Western European governments have generally failed in their response to radical Islam and particularly to Shariah agitation. has never been and would never be applied in official relations with Christianity or Judaism. British and Spanish cultures are not themselves monolithic – are Muslims asked to become Scots if they live in Glasgow and Welsh if they immigrate to Cardiff? A most important example is that of the Spanish autonomous region of Catalonia. as it involves the same imposition of a false homogeneity that would create “official Islam” under radical domination. While an end of the Wahhabi religious monopoly in Saudi Arabia may be near and could contribute to the diminution of radical influence in Western Europe. or monolithic multiculturalism in the form of European “state Islam”.Conclusions and Recommendations CIP support from official Western institutions. Western European governments should abandon the inappropriate quest for a Kissingeresque “single telephone number” for Islam in any European state. How have government or other official responses succeeded or failed.islamicpluralism. We believe this approach is bound to fail. as well as certain ideological figures in Iran. as a combination of traditional Shariah and contemporary Western law. From the global unification facilitating Islamisation as conceived by Taha Jaber AlAlwani274 and described in chapter 3 of this survey to “official Islam” in each Western European country is a small leap. has been the mistaken acceptance of the dominant Sunni community leaders as sole legitimate representatives of Islam in Western Europe. Western European Muslims today appear to be faced with two false. Can Shariah be modernised to function in better harmony with Western law? Does Shariah in any form. The question of “Islamic finance” as a form of “parallel Shariah” remains to be more fully debated. which calls on Muslim immigrants to become Catalans. German. nevertheless. • The Western European authorities have effectively enabled the establishment of a “state” or “official” Islam in each of their countries. We therefore formulated Recommendation 2. A unitary “official Islam” in Western Europe will necessarily be dominated by Saudi-financed and other radicals. Whether Shariah may be modernised in this manner in Islamic countries is a worthwhile topic for discussion among Muslim and non-Muslim experts. and equally rigid alternatives: monolithic assimilation. which ignores the pluralism and diversity of Islam. This conception. there cannot be a policy of waiting for such a change to occur in the Muslim lands. Monolithic assimilation could superficially succeed in France. as in our view. French. such experiments with Shariah should not be applied in the West. Some non-Muslims respond to the emergence of radical Islam in Western Europe by insisting that Muslims adopt established local identities as uniform British.eu . below. as in Turkey. given the superior economic resources of the latter. need not occupy the attention of Western European authorities.

cit. op. But this equation ignores that radicals do not agitate or support terrorist ideologies in Polish immigrant communities. RECOMMENDATION 2: Government and non-governmental organisations concerned to oppose Shariah intrusion and radical Islam should carry out serious work to assist non-Shariah Muslim legal professionals in organising and maintaining a trans-national professional guild or lobby. For example. by Christian immigrants from Eastern Europe). because of their financial and other assets. In our observations. cit. In the aftermath of the Mumbai terrorist assault late in 2008. Western European governments should assure the representation of such “minorities within minorities” in all official deliberations involving Islam.islamicpluralism. That is. This indicates that problems of cultural assimilation and social rivalry may prove more enduring than those of religious conflict. yet who are not “liberals”. Taha Jaber. have tended to occupy the space for official consultation with Muslims in Western Europe. especially in a situation of economic distress such as emerged in 2007-08. condemnation was expressed in British media of both “Little Pakistans” and “Little Polands” (the latter inhabited. conservative Muslims. Recommendations RECOMMENDATION 1: Alevi community mediation should be provided with official support from the German and Dutch governments. liberal Muslims who want to reform Islam to make it compatible with liberal-democracy. even the most extreme radicals do not argue from literalism. “Quranic literalism” is mainly a Western myth based on misapprehensions about the nature of fundamentalist and traditional thought in Islam. obviously. Denis. Alevis and Berbers do not easily fit into the liberal or secularist categories even though they may share some attitudes with them. Critics of Muslim isolation often focus attention on the negative effects caused by the persistence of Muslim enclaves in Western Europe. Discussion of Western European Islam is also negatively affected by what may be called the “noise syndrome”. with the assistance of Whiteman. But more important. But not all immigrant enclaves are equally problematical and the equation of all immigrant enclaves in Western Europe as bad is absurd. Thorough examination and analysis of options for Berber/Amazigh mediation processes remain to be completed by European government and academic investigators. Western Europeans often appear as disturbed by Christian immigration from Poland. 138 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. as by Muslim immigration. religious fundamentalists who are Koranic literalists but not violent. who may be mobilised to defeat the fundamentalists and other radicals in Western Europe.eu . traditional. by Catholics who may attend mass regularly. and secular Muslims”. in reporting on intra-Muslim debate only “loud” Muslims from the anti-radical side are heard. just as radicals. NOTES 274 Al-Alwani. what about the majority of moderate. but should be the subject of a major policy study. the British analyst275 Denis MacEoin argues that among Muslims in the UK. “reformers” – a term often used by the radicals to describe themselves – or secularists? Barelvis. loyal to Western law. “four groups are important: violent extremists. op.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 Castilians or “Spaniards”. but from specific interpretations of Qur’an. as isolated communities resisting immediate assimilation. Towards a Fiqh for Minorities. 275 MacEoin.

and as we have sought to show. We oppose the erection of “state Islam” in Western Europe. Muslims living in Western Europe must recognise and accept that the protection of Muslim women from abuse is better secured through Western marriage and family law than through Shariah schemes. Turkey. as well as moderate and traditional Sunnism. including religious functionaries. based on recognition of and support for the described anti-radical trends. they diminished. and even violently. would suggest that a “Koreatown” represents a threat to American identity. notwithstanding its informal cultural separatism. Adherents of radical Islam will condemn such a policy as a Western effort to divide Muslims. conforms to traditional Muslim legal thought. impose unity among Muslims. and Canada.S.S. RECOMMENDATION 6: There should be no “parallel Shariah”. CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. and Iran for radical Islamic groups should be interdicted. and continue among some groups. but believe a historical examination of the more positive outcomes for “state Islam” in Russia and the post-Habsburg states.S. Pakistan. including Barelvism. should be closely monitored. integration. but the radicals propose to artificially. is necessary. Alevism. We deem it justified to recognise an existing diversity rooted in centuries of Islamic history. While radical activities were observed among European and Asian immigrants to the U. RECOMMENDATION 4: We propose a strategy of authentically pluralistic integration. will advance social stability. Muslim immigrants. We recognise as a methodological principle that authorities should make analytical distinctions. obliged to obey the laws and accept the customs of the countries in which they take up residence. rather than confusing them. both of which are most notable in France. rather than vacillating between exclusionary enclavisation and compulsory assimilation. in Western Europe or any other non-Muslim territory.Conclusions and Recommendations CIP RECOMMENDATION 3: We hold to the traditional Muslim position: Muslims who migrate to Western countries are. Shiism. the Maghrebi state clerical institutions. ablutions. and Shariah for them must be limited to strictly personal matters of prayer.islamicpluralism. during the 19th and 20th centuries. in our view. such as the European Council for Fatawa and Research (ECFR). and of the contrast between the two variants. RECOMMENDATION 5: Western European governments need to understand the transitional character of assimilation. and the positive example of the North American-style melting pot. or spiritual Islam.eu 139 . Milli Goruş. and Sufism. Such a rule is fair. the Turkish Diyanet. and today nobody in the U. and burial. male circumcision. and other bodies. charity. should be required to affirm by a signed and sacred oath their obedience to local laws in non-Muslim countries in which they desire to reside. and Berber/Amazigh identity. Western European governments should encourage the rational integration of immigrant communities. diet. Financial support from Saudi Arabia. as a separate legal standard. fasting. RECOMMENDATION 7: Foreign Islamic institutions in Western Europe. Tabligh-i-Jamaat. and enclaves. as well as Latin Americans in the U.

Les Défis de l’Islam. [European Council for Fatawa and Research]. Akademia Evropiane për Fetva dhe Studime. Marianne et le Prophète: L’Islam dans la France laïque. Centre for Islamic Pluralism.d. Washington/London. n. Resolutions and Fatwas. Flammarion. CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. Paris. Crimes of the Community. European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia. Lyon.. 2004. le Coran tolérant. London. Paris. Centre for Social Cohesion. Dalil. Prisons. tr. 2003. 1. Boubakeur. Recommendations on Future Work on Forced Marriage and So-Called ‘Honour’ Crime. Paris. Washington. Éd. Entretiens avec Virginie Malabard. Paris. Amara. 2 vols. Fetve Islamskog Vijeća.eu . Television Documentaries: Ajuntament de Barcelona. 2006 [Bosnian edition]. Furkan ISM. 2007. [——].e-cfr. European Parliament. by Dr. Connectum. 2006 and 2008. Al-Alwani. n. Towards a Fiqh for Minorities. 2008. Ni Putes Ni Soumises. 2008. Cleveland. [——]. London. London. 140 [——]. Non! l’Islam n’est pas une politique. William L.p. “Honour Killing Its Causes and Consequences: Suggested Strategies for the European Parliament”. 2008. 2003. Salam. Austin. CPS Pilot on Forced Marriage and So-Called ‘Honour’ Crime – Findings. Amal Press. accessible at www. and Hafez. llengua d’acollida”. tr. Burhan al-Din. Bristol. Islam Against the West. Algemene Inlichtingen. Al-Farghani al-Marghinani. leaflet. tr. n.. Black America. Scientific Training and Radical Islam. Sarajevo. Série no. Shkup.. Directorate General External Policies of the [European] Union. Tawhid.. Policy Department External Policies. Muslims in the European Union: Discrimination and Islamophobia.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 Bibliography Books. The Radical Dawa in Transition. Bencheikh. Grasset. Conseil europeén des fatwas et de la recherche. Préface et commentaires [by] Tariq Ramadan. with the collaboration of Zappi. Sylvia. James. Taha Jaber.p. “El català. second collection].islamicpluralism. Recueil de fatwas. by Bashkim Aliu. Fadela. [——].. November 2008. Enes Ljevaković.org.. and Radical Islam. Soheib. 1985. second ed. 1998. [——]. n. International Institute of Islamic Thought. Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee. 2006. 2003. 2008. Dalloz. 2007. Crown Prosecution Service. Briefing Paper. 2006 [Albanian edition. London/Washington. Documents. 2002 [——]. collected in Barcelona. Brandon. AlHidayah (The Guidance). 2008..en Veiligheidsdienst – AIVD. 2007.p. Éditions la Découverte. Desclée de Brouwer. Présentation [by] Yusuf Al-Qardawi. Second Collection. Brussels. University of Texas Press.

org.. 2004. Der Islam in Unterricht. Leonard Fox. 2004. Georg-Eckert-Institut. tr.. 2006. Civitas. Farhad. Reliance of the Traveller. Shammai. ed. London. London. Muslim Thoughts for Teachers and Textbook Authors.uk. 1992 Roy. Harvey.P. L. and Other Sins: Segregation. 2008. Braunschweig.islamicpluralism.p.P.P. 1994. n. tr. Senthilkumaran. Köln. Tr. Columbia U. Globalised Islam. tr. ‘Islamic Groups in Britain: A Background Paper From the Social Responsibility Committee of the Moravian Church. Hudson Institute. MacEoin. American Trust Publications. Fishman. n. Herbert Schultze. Liberation From Forced Marriages. Yusuf Talal Ali. n.d. Ibn Naqib. Kitab Bhavan. El islam en la España actual. Muslim Arbitration Tribunal. Kuran.. Al-Muwatta.moravian. 1990. Imam Ali Foundation. Chess. La Republique des Lâches. Salafism in the Netherlands. Munira. Zein. Michael Walpole. 2004. M. Sarah. Sayyid Muhammad Rizvi. Gjonlekaj. Ibn Anas. Hadi. Ahmad. Paris. 2007. Indianapolis. Gjeçovi. 1991. 141 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. Living Apart Together: British Muslims and the paradox of multiculturalism.d. 1995. and Syed Shukry. Timur. 2006. tr. Princeton U. Inverness. Balland. 1989. tr. Md. by Kamal El-Helbawy. October 18. rev. Groves. Muslims in Spain: 1500 to 1614. 2003..eu . and Whiteman. Islamic Scientific Academy.d Muslim Law (Shariah) Council UK. New Delhi. Olivier. 2004. The Essential Hanafi Handbook of Fiqh. Mirza. Netherlands Ministry of Internal Affairs and Governmental Relations. Abi and Ja’far. Nuh Keller.. 2005. Islam and Identity in Germany. German ed. New York. Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestijding. Dominic. Paris. Al-Qaradawi. Music. 2009. [——]. International Crisis Group.. Amana Publications. L’islam dans les prisons. Policy Exchange. Madrid. Yusuf. Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos. Moinuddin Siddiqui. tr. n. Qazi Thanaa Ullah. Croydon. The Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam. Éditions des Syrtes. A Guide to the Presentation of Islam in School Textbooks. Éditions des Syrtes. “Fiqh Al-Aqalliyat: A Legal Theory for Muslim Minorities”. Abdoldjavad. German ed. Paris. 1988. [2007]. published at www. Cologne.’ September 2005.p. and Udo Tworuschka. Islamic Scientific Academy. University of Chicago Press. New York. tr.. and Muslim Schools in Britain. José Luis. Malik. Ali [based on the work of Ayatollah Ali Sistani]. Aisha Bewley. M. A Code of Practice for Muslims in the West. “Memorandum on Organ Donation”. Scotland. n.. Denis. Beltsville. Washington. Chicago. [——]. Islam and Mammon: The Economic Predicaments of Islamism. Integration. 1977. Islamische Wissenschaftliche Akademie. Sánchez Nogales. Khosrokhavar. Lettre ouverte aux demagogues. Madinah Press. n. Rachid. Shtjefën. Kanuni i Lekë Dukagjinit/The Code of Lekë Dukagjini.Bibliography CIP Falaturi.p. 1999.. Kaci.

El Mundo [Madrid]. Angle Editorial. fue golpeada y repatriada”. Articles: Achour. Esther. Daily Examiner [Huddersfield. New York and Oxford. Leila. Ataman. Amsterdam University Press. Amsterdam. Abdelwahab. [Hamburg. Van Eck. Part 1605. 2008. 2004.. L’Enseignement des religions à l’École laïque. Allgranzi. Philippe. McLean. UK TV Channel 4 Dispatches. Pittet. Yazmin. 2008. El País [Madrid]. Paris. U. [——]. Bouras. Ahmed.. René-Samuel. Van Donselaar. Philippe. Stephen. 2006. Der Spiegel [Hamburg]. Babès. The Lancet [London]. June 4. Àlex. Amsterdam.A. July 15. The Two Faces of Islam. “Angst vor Ehrenmord – Leyla flieht vor der eigenen Familie”. Leiden. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 2006. Al-Alawi.eu . “El Gobierno pone límites al plan para segregar alumnos en Cataluña”. Broadcast February 3. The Immigrant Organising Process. B. 2002. Atkinson.. Vermeulen. Alami.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 Sánchez Ruano. 2004. El Mundo. Religious Discrimination. Unsigned. New York.R. Amsterdam University Press. and Rodrigues. 2008. Purified by Blood: Honour Killings Among Turks in the Netherlands. El caso de Roxana que se enamoró de un alemán. Madrid. Schwartz. 2009. Barcelona. 2002 [——].A. n. [Biog. Religious Freedom in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 2008. 2003. Badawi.F. “Imam who secretly divorced £1m wife is jailed”. Berghahn Books. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion. 29 C. Ferda. and Compliance Manual. Capelle. “Ablación. Sirat. www. Barcelona. and Joutard. 2004. UK].. 2002. Musulmans a Catalunya: El repte de l’integració i la llibertat religiosa. Q. January 20. Irfan. Francisco.. [——]. Dalil. Neil.radicalmiddle 142 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. Salvator. McLean. Torture in Saudi Arabia. Broadcast June 16. and Schwartz. práctica que afecta a 130 millones de féminas en el mundo”. Mohamed. Floris F. “Reading and Writing and Ramadan”. Doubleday. Rachid. Messaoud. Seglers. “Mujeres. “Muslim Health Care Workers and AlcoholBased Handrubs”. Islam y Guerra Civil Española. Rachid.A. IZH]. Ontwikkelingen na de moord op Van Gogh. Anne Frank Stichting.d. Martin. July 2008. Divorce Shariah Style. 2002. 2007. The Weekly Standard [Washington]. 2003. March 12. Undercover Mosque – The Return. D. Clementine. Jaap. 2008. Z. Libération [Paris] February 28. Alvarado. The Islamic Centre Hamburg – A Presentation. 2008. Kaci. Va. La Esfera de los Libros. “Ne succombez pas à l’islamisme”. Struggling for Recognition: The Alevi Movement in Germany and in Transnational Space. Boubakeur.]. J. Sifaoui. Memish. Stephen.. Va. January 24. February 19. Islam. Sökefeld. Peter R. Saudi Institute.islamicpluralism.. and Universiteit Leiden. 2007.S. Tres millones de niñas sufren cada año algún tipo de mutilación genital.. 2006. Broadcast September 1. From Jail to Jihad. Meddeb. Aunion.. Section 12. Jamal.

2007. v. “After the Ramadan Affair: New Trends in Islamism in the West”. Home Purchase. December 1. Barbier-Bouvet. 2007. at http://islamic-world. Nadia. “Cinq ans de prison avec sursis pour avoir fait exciser ses filles”. The Netherlands]. December 28. and Grayson. 2003. Amel. Daily Mail. “The Social Construction of Shari’a: Bank Interest. freed by Bangladesh court”. Martin.com/polygamy5. Bowkett. February 5. “‘Forced marriage’ doctor.. March 18.islamicpluralism. G. “L’islam ultraortodox duplica les mesquites a Catalunya en 4 anys”.Bibliography CIP way. Die Welt Des Islams.. S. [——]. [——].. Brown. February 26. die tageszeitung [Berlin]. January 14. June 14. www. Antonio. and Islamic Norms in the West”. The Guardian. Andrew. “Court: Husband ‘killed wife over fears she would abort baby. 2008.. in Special Theme Issue – Shari’a in Europe. 2008. May 2008.’” The Daily Telegraph [London]. 2006. Marc. “100% Halal. 2005. D. “Koranic codes”. Seek 143 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. Brown. Chambon. Taycir. Humayrah Abedin. El Periódico [Barcelona]. Le Courrier de L’Atlas [Paris]. Alexandre. Beikler. November 2008. AFP.net/. Blakely. 2004.uk/. “ ‘Face of Asia’ death plunge model had been pregnant”. Britten.C. Dan. Martin. 2004. Chapman. Caeiro. Bernklau. 2002. La Charente Libre [Cognac].net/women/s_women.. James. The Times [London]. Bell. Ben Naser. 2008. P. “La France est un des seuls pays à faire des procès pour excision”. Sandrine.eu . Gamon. www. August 15. September 2. Antimicrobial Agents and Chemotherapy [Washington. Nick. Sylviane.islamfortoday. 2005. “Tödliche Tradition”. Daily Mail [London]. DC]. “Ils ont choisi l’école catholique”. Jean-François. Baraille. Le Monde des Religions [Paris]. Champion. K. Tester. R. “Muslim Youth in U. “Mutilations sexuelles: un combat au quotidien”.islamawareness. “Les musulmans français et la citoyenneté”. Carroll. Daniel and Chapman. “Muslims call for special bank holidays”. Cecile.htm.co. Current Trends in Islamist Ideology. July 13. 100% Business”. Der Tagesspiegel [Berlin]. June 6. 2 [Washington].html [——]. Boffey. T. Hosking. um die Opfer zu schultzen”. and Lamarki. Faisal. 2008. M.L. Briet. “Wife beating?”.was die Polizei tun kann. The Guardian [London]. Gerostamoulos.. 2008. Baquero. Frederic. Libération. Brill [Leiden-Boston]. Bodi.. July 24. “Can Alcohol-Based HandRub Solutions Cause You To Lose Your Driver’s License? Comparative Cutaneous Absorption of Various Alcohols”.Des peines de prison avec sursis pour les parents des fillettes maliennes excisées”. November-December 2008. “Channel 4’s Dispatches: Undercover Mosque – vile sisters of no mercy”. Rhys. Sylvie and Cabut. “Manchmal hilft nur eine neue Identität // Zwi Mordanschläge gegen Frauen .L. December 10. December 15. Sabine. Daily Mirror [London]. “COUR D’ASSISES DE SEINE-SAINT-DENIS . Mzine [Waalwijk. 2008. “In the name of the law”. Eric. Sue.K. Bali. 1999. Le Monde [Paris]. Carin. 2008.

February 28. at www. Alison.’ ” AFP. “ECFR Marks 10 Years of European Fatwas”. El Mundo [Andalusia ed.eu . 2008. Fischer. “Dalil Boubakeur – ‘Non à des élections favorisant l’extrémisme. Jacky. International Herald Tribune. dass ich die Tat begangen habe. Feddersen. “Cárceles. 2004. Ali. April 24. Libération. Catherine. immolée au bas d’une HLM”. Desai. Del Campo. 2008. October 5. Clark.’ ” Le Figaro [Paris]. Cody. Daut. Eduardo. November 19. “ ‘Ehrenmord-Prozess’ – ‘Ich bin sehr froh. 2004. Friedrichsen. “Sohane.’ “ The Wall Street Journal [New York]. “Photos d’identité et voiles . October 18.net/. Associated Press. Macer. 2006. El Mundo. 2007. 2008. “Manual outlines Muslim radicalisation in prisons”. 2003. May 14. 2008. The Guardian.le flou de la loi”. De Haas. Dayton.’” Der Spiegel. October 22. October 1. De Larminat. October 2. Le Figaro. “‘Luister naar wens radicale 144 moslims’: Pleidooi in rapport NCTb”. De Telegraaf [Amsterdam]. La directora general de Instituciones Penitenciarias. Eusterhus. Durand. 2007. Del Barrio. January 7. “A Private Feud Turns Into a National Issue”. Ganley. Pakistani Outposts Offer Military Training To ‘Defend Our Faith. October 10. TIME Europe. February 28. Bruce. Cécilia. “Acting on the Outrage”. The Daily Express [London]. Gisela. in Marin. nicht der Liebe”. 2002. Eva. Libération. Elaine.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 Different Sort of Summer Camp – Afghan. November 8. Hall. October 10.islamonline. ed. 2008. Ana. The Washington Post. February 5.G. El Barrio. Die Welt [Hamburg]. “Lack of Asian donors extends waiting time for transplants”. Daniels. Collective Decision Making Around the World: Essays on Historic Deliberative Practices.islamicpluralism. 17 ans. Laura.]. Kettering Foundation. May 17. Joost.. 2001. “Muslim schools offered cash to become state-run”. September 11. Sebastian. “Eine Frage der Ehre. “Doubts About German ‘Honour Killing. CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. Daily Mail. “Credit crisis gives Islamic finance a chance to shine”. 2007. “Le Pen ‘s’étonne’ de l’expulsion de l’imam Bouziane pour ‘délit d’opinion. Edward. August 19.’ ” Der Spiegel. “Ancient Public Deliberation and Assembly in the Code of Lekë Dukagjini”. Ileana. 2005. December 26. Gabizon. 2005. Jan. “Sevilla. Mercedes Gallizo. Los funcionarios denuncian la falta de personal y medios para evitar que el integrismo prospere entre rajas”. “Multikulti ist verantwortungslos”. El Mundo. October 7. Coroller. July 5. Presos musulmanes. dará prioridad a los internos árabes en los trabajos que se realizan en prisión”. Dauti. 2008. die tageszeitung. Al-Halawani. 2004. 2005.D. April 21. Umesh.. “Le silence assourdissant du CFCM dans les banlieues”. 2004. “El Gobierno financiará a los imames para que acudan a las cárceles con el fin de dirigir el rezo de los reclusos musulmanes”. Astrid. Ana. 2009. 2002. 1997. Crumley. “Fury at ‘no-go’ areas ruled by the fanatics”. C.

“Considéré comme un imam trop bavard. “No to Forced Marriages!”. Kennedy. Maher. 2008. 2008. “Nouvelle barrière au sacrifice du mouton”. Linder. [——]. Lloyd-Roberts. February 22. and Reinhard. El País. Stephan. 2006. “Frankfurter Familienrichterin sorgt mit Koran-Verweis für Empörung”. “Zwangsheirat erstaunlich häufig”. January 13. “Muslim Britain is becoming one big no-go area”. September 29. 2008. Marraco. Hani Ramadan sera licencié par le gouvernement genevois”.gouv. Shiraz. 2006. Emmanuelle. December 27. Chris. Le Courrier de L’Atlas. 2005. “A new weapon in the fight against forced marriage”. June 9. November 15.. “Sharia rulings on divorces and disputes to be rubber-stamped by English courts”. Michel. Hennessy. Libération. Melissa. “If you want shariah law. 2009. October 18. November 23. Sascha. Ulla: “Ehrenmord: Morsal O. Hastings. “Absueltos 14 de los 20 condenados en la Operación Nova”. Sue. March 22. Licht. 2007. October 7. Libération. you should go and live in Saudi”. Audrey. Kaija. “Huiver voor islamitische zuil is misplaatst en on-Nederlands”. 2008. 2008. 2006.fr/. BBC News. The Sunday Times [London]. “Nine-year-old brides saved by authorities from being married off in Muslim weddings”. Daniel. Koopman. De Twentsche Courant Tubantia [Twente. Malik. 2001. February 20. war ein lebensfrohes Mädchen – das konnte Ahmad O. November 2008. “How Safar Daftary’s death fall exposed polygamy in Britain”. 2008. “Nous sommes prêts à être des Voltaire de l’islam”. The Daily Telegraph. “Case study: ‘For many imams speaking against rape is embarrassing. The Sunday Times. The Daily Telegraph. September 26. at www. Hickley. Kutter. Jan-Eric.’ “ The Times. October 29. Malik. “Happily married?”. Le Temps [Geneva]. Manuel. “Poll reveals 40pc of Muslims want shariah law in UK”. 2008. 2008. El Mundo. Zubeida. David.islamicpluralism. “Une nouvelle ‘affaire de voile’ en perspective?’. May 17. 2008. “Lucha contra el terrorismo islamista: Operaciones Nova”. “Every Noise I Hear I Think He’s Coming to Kill Me”. die tageszeitung (national edition). Balasko. Hamburger Abendblatt. “Purge on Muslim clerics who turn a blind eye to the abuse of women”.d. doch ihr Bruder stach 20-mal zu”. The Daily Telegraph. October 25.. 2008. 2002.Bibliography CIP Harrath. n. The Netherlands]. August 20. “Plakatieren gegen Zwangsheirat”.eu 145 . nicht ertragen – Sie flehte.diplomatie. 2003. The Times. Köhnlein. The Times. CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. 2002. Miliband. Lázaro. Paul. Matthew. 2008. [——]. Dominic. Evening Standard [London]. Hannane. December 19. Julio M. Associated Press German Worldstream. Patrick and Kite. Richard. Kerbaj. Levy. Shahid. September 26. March 22. March 21. Daily Mail. die tageszeitung (national edition). February 20. [——].

“Le Charia incomprise”. Full-page advertisement on Lebanon.V. at www. 2007. 2002. Ramadan. 2008. “Europe’s Sharia Question”. says British Muslim leader”. August 27. Jaya. Reportage on Floggings in Saudi Arabia. September 10. Evening Standard. January 11. [——]. August 12. 2007. Hendrik. AP German Worldstream.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 Murray. Switzerland]. 2008. Slack. La Voz de Galicia [A Coruña]. August 5. 2008. Stephen. December 30. [——]. Simon. The Sunday Telegraph [London]. a deadly defiance: ‘Honour killings’ on rise in Europe”. Muslim Council of Britain. as monitored by the Centre for Islamic Pluralism. Rohe. Al-Yaum [Saudi Arabia]. Rozenberg. The Times. “Baisse de la pratique de l’excision en France. “My men train for armed conflict. April 8. James. Paula. “Comments on the Islamic Religion”.. November 30. 1989. Die Welt. “More than 3. mais le risque demeure”. January 11. Oliver. 2008. November 23. 2008. February 25. The Boston Globe. May 18. 2008. et al. Schultz. “Muslim fanatics ‘hijack British prison. Nazir-Ali. Okaz and Al-Riyadh [Saudi Arabia]. International Relations and Security Network [Zurich. Schollbach. 2006. March 7. James. 2008. “Das Schicksal einer jungen Türkin”. 2002. 2004.000 Asian children 146 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. The Daily Telegraph. Colin. Sawer. Schmale. 2007. Stuttgarter Zeitung. July 9. “Extremism flourished as UK lost Christianity”.islamonline. “Shariah law is spreading as authority wanes”. Hani. “Nach ‘Ehrenmord’: Gericht weist Klage gegen Ausweisung ab”.eu . August 4. September 26. “Wahhabis in the Old Dominion”. Ruiz. 2004. Die Welt Des Islams. “Multiculturalism Run Amok”. 2008 Nickerson. “Nach Ehrenmord: Hunderte demonstrieren gegen Gewalt an Frauen”.. as monitored by Centre for Islamic Pluralism. Mathias. December 25. AFP. “Cataluña creará centros específicos para los inmigrantes recién llegados”. as monitored by Centre for Islamic Pluralism. Le Monde. The Weekly Standard.. Daily Mail. Naraian. “For Muslim women. 12 August 2006. Joshua. “Application of Shari’a Rules in Europe – Scope and Limits”. 2006. Neil. Al-Watan [Saudi Arabia]. Schwartz. “Islamic Ruling on Female Circumcision”.net/. [——]. “Shariah Comes for the Archbishop”. January 16. The Weekly Standard. August 29. Yusuf. The Independent [London]. M. Al-Qaradawi. 1999.’ ” Sunday Express [London]. September 19. [——].islamicpluralism. 2002. July 20. The ABA Journal [New York]. Roughneen. in Special Theme Issue – Shari’a in Europe. Michael. Patrick. “Islamic Court Rulings are Enforceable in the United Kingdom”. 2005. Laura L. Martha. The Daily Standard [Washington]. 2008. Reportage on Saudi Holiday Marriages. “Vigil of tears for death-plunge Muslim model beauty”.

September 16. “‘Cette affaire a été traitée sans incident majeur’. Unsigned. 2008 Unsigned. 2006. BBC News. February 25. “Els alumnes immigrants no tindran un temps d’estada màxim en els centres de benvinguda educative”. Unsigned. The Rotterdam Times. The Sunday Times.24% des voix”. Der Tagesspiegel. November 17. “Faith schools set for expansion”. “Nicolas Sarkozy souhaite modifier les modalités de l’élection du Conseil français du culte musulman”. Unsigned. Unsigned. Unsigned.un accord au forceps”. Le Progrès [Lyon].concilier laïcité et particularismes”. “What is Euro-Islam? Could it Avert the Islamic Self-Ghettoisation in the European Diaspora?” Unpublished. Unsigned. June 8. 2004. she had to die. “Revealed: UK’s first official sharia courts”. October 31. El Mundo. 2002. 2008. November 23. April 21. August 26. Ouest France. September 10. Unsigned. 2002. Taher. Unsigned. El Periódico de Aragón [Zaragoza]. Tibi. July 11. L’Est Républicain [Nancy]. Unsigned. March 2008. “Donner hekelt toon integratiedebat”. Ternisien. March 11. June 22. Europa Press. “Dalil Boubakeur du Conseil français du culte musulman”. “Crisis around new mosque deepens”.Bibliography CIP vanishing from school and ‘forced into arranged marriages. “Ces jeunes filles que l’on marie de force”. Frankfurter Rundschau. 2008. Ouest France [Brittany]. 147 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. “Les consulats algériens et marocains veulent peser sur la désignation des représentants musulmans”. Suddeutsche Zeitung [Munich]. December 9. “El Hema store opened”. 2004. Unsigned. Spolar. February 26. “École . “De la Vega anuncia la revisión de la ley orgánica de libertad religiosa”. Unsigned. “El imán de Fuengirola no recurre la pena por incitar a los malos tratos a la mujer”. 2004. November 28.eu . “El imam de Fuengirola se proclama ‘defensor de las mujeres’ en el juicio contra él por discriminación”. “Burqa and nikab banned from higher education”. “Forced marriage for 15-year-old in Pakistan is foiled”. 2000.’ ” Daily Mail. Chicago Tribune. “El convertido”. 2003. 2008. 2008. Le Monde. Agence France Press (AFP). “Culte musulman : le RMF obtient 43. Abul. “ ‘Ehrenmord’ verhindert”. 2008. May 7. Unsigned. Unsigned. La Vanguardia [Barcelona]. constate Me Szpiner”. European police weren’t looking for this kind of violence steeped in tradition. “Erster Koalitionsstreit um Äußerungen zur Scharia”. June 11. Unsigned. July 11. They are now”. The Rotterdam Times. September 14. [——]. The Daily Telegraph. Unsigned. Le Monde. Bassam. ANP. 2007. Unsigned. The Amsterdam Times. Unsigned. 2005. October 30. Unsigned. 2008. Madrid. Christine. 2008. 2008. EFE [News Agency]. December 21. [——]. Xavier.islamicpluralism. 2008. 2001. November 30. “Gedenktafel für ermordete Hatun Sürücü”. 2008. 2005. October 21. Le Monde. 2008. 2008. “For family honour. September 12. July 17. “Culte musulman .


A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009

Unsigned, “Gedwongen huwelijken steeds minder normal”, ANP, November 5, 2008. Unsigned, “Geen hiërarchie in Grondwet”, Utrechts Nieuwsblad [Utrecht], May 19, 2004. Unsigned, “German Court Convicts Afghan Man for Stabbing Sister”, Der Spiegel, English text, February 13, 2009. Unsigned, “German court ends Muslim slaughter ban”, BBC News, January 15, 2002. Unsigned, “Germany’s Muslims Band Together: New Umbrella Group Founded”, Der Spiegel, April 11, 2007. Unsigned, “Im Hinterzimmer der Traditionen”, Suddeutsche Zeitung, January 20, 2001. Unsigned, “Jacques Chirac dit non aux symboles religieux ostensibles dans les écoles”. Canadian Press-Associated Press, December 18, 2003. Unsigned, “Jailhouse jihad”, The Economist [London], September 18, 2008. Unsigned, “Köhler fordert Muslime zu Absage an Scharia auf”, Frankfurter Rundschau, June 25, 2005. Unsigned. “La justice française sur la trace des filières djihadistes entre Europe et Asie”, Le Monde, December 12, 2008. Unsigned, “Landelijk expertise centrum eerwraak”, Algemeen Nederlands Persbureau (ANP), Dutch Press Agency, March 8, 2007. Unsigned, “Landelijke actie Turken en Koerden tegen eerwraak”, ANP, November 29, 2005. Unsigned, “Landen van EU pakken misbruik vrouwen aan”, Provinciale Zeeuwse Courant [Rotterdam], July 8, 2004.

Unsigned, “La reconstrucción del clítoris y la circuncisión ritual: paradojas de las civilizaciones”, El Mundo, August 8, 2008. Unsigned, “Lebenslange Haft für Mord an Tochter”, Associated Press German Worldstream, December 22, 2003. Unsigned, “Le carnet de route de la Marche des femmes”, Le Figaro, March 8, 2003. Unsigned, “Le Conseil français du culte musulman en assemblée constitutive”, Reuters, May 3, 2003. Unsigned, “Les certitudes de l’imam de Vénissieux”, Le Figaro, April 17, 2004. Unsigned, “L’ excision aux assises de Paris. Une coutume qui ne passe pas la barre”, Libération, February 3, 1999. Unsigned, “Life for husband who killed wife after baby abortion fear”, Luton Today, December 12, 2008. Unsigned, “Los líderes musulmanes de España piden al Gobierno una reforma legal que les equipare con la Iglesia Católica”, Europa Press, May 8, 2008. Unsigned, “Los musulmanes de España aplauden la condena”, La Vanguardia, January 14, 2004. Unsigned, “L’UOIF appelle à l’apaisement”, Le Nouvel Observateur [Paris], November 8, 2005. Unsigned, “Man arrested for genital mutilation”, Radio Netherlands Worldwide English, February 7, 2009. Unsigned, “Meer eerwraak door emancipatie vrouwen”, ANP, December 13, 2007. Unsigned, “Meurtre de Sohane: 10 ans pour le complice”, Sud-Ouest [Charente], June 15, 2007.






Unsigned, “Morocco recalls fifty imams”, The Amsterdam Times, October 31, 2008. Unsigned, “Musulmanes captados para la causa yihadista en las prisiones”, La Voz de Galicia A Coruña, February 28. 2008. Unsigned, “Nach versuchtem Ehrenmord wird Eltern die Vormundschaft entzogen”, DDP News Agency, July 17, 2008. Unsigned, “Negen op tien islamitische scholen sjoemelt met geld”, ANP, November 13, 2008. Unsigned, “Netherlands: Man arrested for circumcising daughter”, February 7, 2009, accessible at http://binnenland.nieuws.nl/. Unsigned, “Onderzoek naar gedwongen huwelijken in Amsterdam”, ANP, December 5, 2007. Unsigned, “Parliament Asks Dutch Min[ister] To Defend Remark On Islamic Law”, Dow Jones International News, September 14, 2006. Unsigned, “Pet hiljada eura studentima”, Oslobođenje [Sarajevo], July 5, 2008. Unsigned, “Planea Arabia Saudita abrir escuelas islámicas en España”, Agencia Mexicana de Noticias [México], July 30, 2006. Unsigned, “Police arrest Islamic fundamentalist under anti-terrorism law”, Associated Press, March 15, 1999. Unsigned, “Public Broadcaster in Hands of Radical Muslims”, October 13, 2007, at www.nisnews.nl/. Unsigned, “15 meses de cárcel para el imán que incitó a la violencia contra las mujeres”, El Mundo, January 14, 2004. Unsigned, “Rotterdam vestigt aandacht Europa op huwelijksdwang”, ANP, May 14, 2008.

Unsigned, “Saudi appeals court upholds flogging researchers”, Reuters, July 30, 2008. Unsigned, “Staff ‘fears’ over Muslim inmates”, BBC News, October 10, 2008. Unsigned, “Tot het huwelijk gedwongen”, ANP, September 8, 2005. Unsigned, “UGT rebutja els centres d’acollida d’immigrants per ‘discriminatoris’ i encaminats a la ‘segregació’ ”, Europa Press, July 15, 2008. Unsigned, “U.K. Muslim-Law Compliant Housing Finance Launched”, Dow Jones International News, April 28, 1997. Unsigned, “Un manual confidencial revela a los funcionarios códigos y claves para frenar el ‘yihadismo’ en las cárceles”, Europa Press, December 28, 2008. Unsigned, “VALENCIA. Educación. Inmigración. El conseller de Educación, Alejandro Font de Mora, rechaza la iniciativa del Gobierno catalán de crear aulas de acogida para inmigrantes”, El Mundo [Valencia ed.], July 15, 2008. Unsigned, “Vogelaar wil onderzoek onderwijs in moskeeën”, ANP, June 26, 2008. Unsigned, “Western banks carve niche in Islamic trade finance”, Financial Times [London], August 27, 1993. Unsigned, “WRR: stop islam-bashen”, ANP, April 10, 2006. Van Schuppen, Henk, ““Fatale flirt: Lonkende blik kan al genoeg zijn om de familie-eer te schaden”, De Twentsche Courant Tubantia, March 2, 2003. Van Soest, Aaldert, “Lespakket zou te weinig ingaan op de angst die er bestaat voor de islam ‘Lespakket islam preek voor eigen parochie,’” De Twentsche Courant Tubantia, September 11, 2007. 149




A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009

Wyatt, Caroline, “French headscarf ban opens rifts”, BBC News, February 11, 2004. Wynne-Jones, Jonathan, “Bishop: No-go zones for Christians”, The Sunday Telegraph, January 6, 2008. Periodical: Toumaï [Madrid], November 2008.

Websites: www.ams-uk.org. www.e-cfr.org www.emunion.org www.euro-muslim.net www.euro-muslims.eu www.fatwa-online.com www.islamic-sharia.org www.matribunal.com www.movisie.nl www.walidin.com




26 Alliot-Marie. Free university. Jan Pieter. Qanta. 1 Al-Qaradawi. Spain. 68. 50 Aydogan. 139. Farid. Nazir. 104-5 Alaoui-Talibi. 8 African-Americans. 34 Bartels. 41 Ahmed. 36 Baghdad caliphate (khilafah). Western military intervention. 16. 94 analogy (qiyas). hospital hand-rub hygiene. 64. nationalists. Yusuf. 95 Basque radicals. 137. 71 Badawi. 98-9. 93 Al-Alawi. 1990s. 98. 119 Barelvi Islam. Reiner. 75. Mahmoud. imprisoned. 56 Ahmed. M. 53 Amsterdam. 92 Al-Muhajiroun (The Migrants). 33. 24 Al-Attar. 88. 10 Alevis. 79 Atta. Taha Jaber. 86 Al-Alwani. 61 Albania: dispora communities. 110 Amazigh culture. Europe. Spain. 76. 123-4 Alaoui. 109 Ali. 122 Association of Muslim Schools in the UK. Amir. Seyran. Kurdish. 116 anti-Muslim sentiment. 90. 129 Al-Khoei. “harkis”. 23. 14. 34 Association for Aid to Sexually Assaulted Women. 19. José María. Fouad. Spain. 48. Rotherham. Humayra. Zlakha. 74 Albayrak. Moulay el Hassan. 109 Alawites.. 5 adultery. 37 Ates. 98 Ashi’ana refuge. 62. 87 Bangladesh. 18. Sheffield. 32-3. 15. Spanish. 66 alcohol: consumption punishments. non-Muslim prohibition. 94 Albert. 53. FGM. 6. 108. 73. 50 Ashrafi. Saudi role. Nebahat. 99-100. 71-2. 67. 65 authority. 1. 119. 54. customary law. “second war”. 82 ANZ Grindlays: Islamic finance. 68 Al-Azhar University. 5-6 anarchists. 15 Alami. 20. Al-Tawheed mosque. 84 Ahmadinejad. 46-7. 19 Balkenende. 124 Al-Zahrani. 52 banlieue riots. Irfan. Narissa. Yazmin. 27. Muhammad Abdul. 83. biblical figure. Edien.CIP Index ABA Journal. Eindhoven. Netherlands. Mohammed. Fadela. use of. 139. 39 Akgunduz. 45 Ahmed. 109 Almeria prison. Ahmed. 65. 29 Africa. Ibn Qayyim. 40 Abduh. 39 “apostasy”. 40 Amara. 85 Al-Jawziyya. 117 BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation). 41. 83. 71. 42 agricultural labour. 114 Ahmad. Ahmed. Eesam. 100. 95. 68. 29 Al-Qaida. University of. GSPC. Michele. Netherlands. 47 Al-Maktoum Foundation.eu 151 . Lahori faction. 64. dress code. 11. 72 Bari. “Hamburg cell”. 41. community mediation. Khalid. 105 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. 105. 26 Abedin. parental. 28 Apna Haq support group. 35-6. Islamic community. 116 Azzaoui. fiqh. Kabylie region. 121. 93-4 Azarkan. 10 Balkan Wars. Shia Muslims. 62. 35.islamicpluralism. 11-12. 90 Amjad. 15 Afghanistan. 136. Yousif. Mirza Ghulam. 57-9. 102-3 Barcelona: El Raval district. 65 Algeria: emigrants. 18. University. Germany political refugees. Zaki. 1. Shariah rejection. 69-70. 89 Aznar. 123-4. Pakistan role. 48 Aboutaleb. Mounir. Maulana Mufti Ayub. Muhammad. Qadianis. 123. Georg. Northern Catholic. secular. 84. 85. Moroccans. 138. mosques. 136 Barfuß. 21. 13. Muslims. Sezai. 107. Cairo. in the “Islamic Maghreb”. Mohammed. 79. 61. 25 Bechari. Shariah understanding. Syrian. 121 ‘alternative’ dispute resolution. 83. 98. 84 Ahmadi. Tasleem. 12-14 Badawi. 126-7 Armed Islamic Group (GIA). 83 Abraham (Ibrahim).A. Jamal. 69. 16-21. Germany. 122 Association of Maghrebi Women of Catalonia. 104 Ahmed. 16 Al-Fourkaan mosque.

63. 136. 17. Aachen. 118 Den Haag. 38 Bodi. 34 British Muslim Forum (BMF). Pakistan variety. Netherlands. 16. 89 Coordinating Committee of Turkish Muslims in France. 70 colonialism. 68 Centre for Islamic Pluralism (CIP). 51-2 cultural conditioning. 48 Dalai Lama. 114. Calude. 21. 110 Dewsbury. Muslim medical students. Alevi. 1. 97 consumer products. 110 Berber/Amazigh. 38. UK. Muslim prison population. Spain. Mustafa ef. 50-3 Ceric. 53 Daily Telegraph. 74 “deconfessionalisation”. 24. 24 Bichri. Forced Marriage Unit. fatwa issuance. UK. 17 Centre for Social Cohesion. 70 Belgium. 121 Bouyeri. 33. Sahar. 4. Somali community. 99 Boussouf. 105-7. 35. 43. 70. 99. Muslims. 54. 65-8. civil. Pakistani immigrants. English common law tradition. 37. 91 Dispatches. Turkish women. 41. Mohammed. Arbitration Act 1996. 108 Bin Rida Murad. 35. Rachida. 41 Beheshti. 105. 44-5. Jeroen. Muslim groups support. 40. Abd al-Qadr. culture. Osama. state schools religious preference. 24. Wahhabi penetration. Leicester centre. Peter. 15. 109 Berlin. 89. 110 Boubakeur. 25. Jewish religious courts. 49. 44. Faisal. EMU branch. 30. 105 Coordination Council of Muslims in Germany. Netherlands. tribal-based. 27. 34. 74 Ceuta. 85 Deobandi Islam. Sana. 119 Bin Laden. TJ centre. 45. 46. 41. 83. family court. 101 Catalonia: Generalitat. 9. As-Soennah mosque. 73. 19. 67-8. Netherlands. 19 Cetta. Spain. 47 customary law. Mohammad. Jet. 79 cultures. 1. Al-Arabi. 1.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 Begg. Muslim population. identity. Alexandre. 53 Derrar. Islamic finance. 45 Council of the Moroccan Community Abroad. 111 Dauti. 20 Bilal Mosque and Islamic Centre. 38. 136. 99-107. Muslim immigration. UK. 46 Blair. 33. 88 “communal shells”. Bradford. 118. 111 Bradford. 117. 119. Muslims. 89 Contact Group Islam (CGI). Sikh policemen. 110. Alevis. 132. 69 Dati. Abdellah. Srebrenica massacre. women. 77 Bolton. Islamic banking. 88. 110 Benziane. 89-90. UK class composition. 76. East London 152 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. Whitechapel. 90 Cooperative of Relief Organisations (SHO). 19. elite. Dalil. 8. Jamal. Mahmud. 100. 139. 35. 4 Commission for Equal Treatment. 94. 63. Islamic understanding level. 89. 29 Dijsselbloem. Advice Centre.”Radical Middle Way” project. 23. 42. 107. 10 D’Harcourt. 30. non-fundamentalist. 56. UK. Habsburg annexation. Si Hamza. 117. 35.islamicpluralism. 87 Citibank. European communities. 138 Constantinople. UK. 40. Ceuta influence. 88 Contact Body for Muslims and Government(CMO). 74. Medina mosque. Islamic schools demand. 89 divorce. 39. 98. 20 Bunglawala. 13. Nazir. 27 Cologne Islamic Academy. 11 Bencheikh. 114-15 Central Council of German Muslims. 103. Soheib. 121 Crown Prosecution Service(CPS). 61. 21. 31. Islamic. 102 Christian Democratic Appeal party. private Shariah-oriented schools. UK divorce tribunals dominance. Islamic Community of. 94 Cooperative Union of Moroccans in the Netherlands. 17. 135. Tony. 19-20 Capelle. 30. Joren. 9. 71. 77 Britain (United Kingdom). 42. 54. 119. Philippe. Muslim lawyers. 136. 134 community mediation. Jacques. 31. 57 Benziane. Netherlands. 25. 42. Kahina. 120. 41 Brown. Asian women. 82. 95 Caeiro. issue of. Sohane. Gordon. 27. 120. 110 Bengali communities. 40 Bukhari. Anton. 120 Charlie Hebdo 105-6 Chirac. 23. 29 Boie. Netherlands. Turco-Mongol. 16. 40 Bussemaker. 23. fall of. health care. 41 DITIB (Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs). Daut. legacies. iii. 68. 50 Bulgaria. customary law. 116. 110. 132-3. 109 Daftary. 131 beth din. 45 bride price. 91 Bouziane. 2001 riots. Inayat. Deobandi extremism. 71 Council of Moroccan Mosque Organisations in the Netherlands.eu . women. UK Channel 4. 64 Boubakeur. 136. 90 Council of Mosques. 90. 23. black non-Muslim population. 33-4 Bosnia-Hercegovina. Shariah controversy. medical personnel. Kabyle. 20 Birmingham. mosques. iii. Albanian. 44. 3940.

29 El Hema art experiment. 8. Pim. 4. Alic. UK. establishment of. 45 Islamic law agitation. fall of. 120 financial regulation. 38. 86. school of Islamic law. 73. 137. 93 dress code. 132-3 education. 19. 130. 71 Germany. 128-9. 67. 37 gang rape. hijab. 71 Halawa. 19. 124. 74 Gjergji. Ministry of the Interior. Moroccan troops. 1. Green Party. 49 Gülen. state education. Spain. 12. 90-1. mosque financing. Rubina. al-Quds mosque. 52 Hatun und Can. Free Democratic Party. 68. Brussells HQ. Abdoldjavad. mortgage purchase debate. fatwas. 16. 7. 68. 83 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. 68. 100 flogging. 19. “soft”. 29 hadiths. 45 Fawaz. 73 Hanbal. 52 Hassan. 104-5. 92 German Conference on Islam. 50. 17 European Muslim Network (EMN). 139. Muslim prisoner scale. Husain. UK tribunals. 9. 35 Educational Welcome Spaces (EBE). 131 faith (din). 56. 107. 99-100. Spain. Parliament. 95. 90 Dutch Scientific Council for Government Policy (WWR). Dom Lush. see also. 3. 76 Federation of Divorced and Separated Women. 5-6. 102 Franco. divorce. 28. 30 female genital mutilation (FGM). Netherlands. marriage General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD). 99-100. UK. 12. 65 Europe: immigrant enclaves. 119 elites. 119 Grand Mosque of Paris. Said. blood feuds. 80. 129. 64. 2. 138. 77 Herrero. Muslims from. 62-3. Turkish immigrants. 5-6. 64. 84. Mecca pilgrimage. ECFR HQ. 5. 12 Eid Islamic holidays. Netherlands. 67. 119. 67. 70-1 Family Justice council. 50. 118 Forced Marriage Act 2007. Jneid. 105 Greou. unofficial “prayer spaces”. 135 European Muslim Union (EMU). Piet Hein. Union (EU). meat slaughtering. 72 Donner. 129 Federation of Israelite Communities of Spain (FCIE). ECFR. Dominic. 1. 61. 139. 41. 85-6. citizenship denial. 20. Hanife. Turkish state Islamic Administration). thobe. 122. UK. Black African countries. 16 Dumont. 28-9. 115-16 French Council of the Muslim Faith (CFCM). 126. 108 Dutch Advisory Commission on Aliens Affairs. 19. 16. 5 Falaturi. Islamisation aim. 99-100. 84 Hakchaaryaar movement (HCY). 110 Gashi. 52 Hadzhi. 118 Egypt: FGM banned. 4. Moroccan immigrants. 74 Gjeçovi. 20 Hamas. Necmettin. 122. pre-Islamic practice. 86 Hassan. 53. Félix (Mohamed Amin). 2. “think-tank”. Abu. 111 Grieve. Islamic. composition of. 124. Köln HQ. 5 fiqh (Islamic legal interpretation). ECFR fatwas. 15 Font de Mora. 64 ethnic enclaves. 120 Federation of Students Islamic Societies (FOSIS). 65-6 Handuni. Alejandro. 85 Feddersen. 69.Index CIP Sharia facility. 119-20 Hezbollah.eu 153 . 17. Jan. 65. 76. Muslim. 92 “ghettoisation”. Islamic law agitation. 19 Hajj. 45 “family tribunals”. 132 Gazillo Llamas. Catalonia. France. 127 Dublin. 135. 66 Gjakmarrja. Christian Democratic Union. Ayad Tachfine. Hawa. 119 Hamza.islamicpluralism. UK seminaries. 94 Dutch Muslim Broadcasting Service. 12. Mercedes. Germany. niqab Druze. 121 gender relations. 16-20. 41 halal. 12. German Relief Organisation. 52. 72. Emran. Indonesia banned. UK. 75 Gatehouse bank. “soft fundamentalist” factions. hijab debate. 35 Erbakan. Muslim demography. 82 France. 43 “Euro-Islam”. Lionel. 8 Hanifah. 126-9. 63. Iranian refugees. fatwa issuance. 120 Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe (FIOE). 19. 48 Fortuyn. Shariah interpretation. Sunni-Shia difference. apostasy accusation. 38 Hamburg. 49. radical Islamic diaspora. Muslim immigrants. 51. 136 Diyanet. Ahmad ibn. Abu (Hamza Al-Masri). 100. 25. Francisco. 4. 1. “family tribunals” demand. public education. forced. 13. 28. 53 Fernández de la Vega. 26. 19. 9. 12. 104 fundamentalism: glib use of. (European Council for Fatawa and Research). 74 Granada: EMU branch. 126 Hasani. Kamal. 117. 118. 8. 90. 50. Muslim pupils in Catholic schools. María Teresa. 127. 83 ECFR. 127 fatwas. see also. 109. 8. Jerusalem. 97. 69 Gujarat. 122 Federation of Evangelical Religious Entities of Spain. 135. 111. 35. Spain equality. Shtjefën Kryeziu. immigrant. 71. 131. 88 Elharchi. Act 2003 UK. Fethullah.

6 Jaballah. UK 42 HM Prison Whitemoor. Western military intervention. Timur. Köln “conspiracy”. 79. Philippe. reasoning concept. 129 ijara. Malik. Albanian honour code. 111. 5-6. 99. 77-8. Syed Ahmad. British. 6. Berlin. Hojjatolislam Seyyed Mohammad. 85 Islamic Sharia Council of Leyton. 12. 38. 83. 10. 107. 10 infection control. 133. 84 kashrut. 88 Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT). 88 Lahori Ahmadis. 94. 103 Le Monde. authority motivated. -Lebanon War. 18. 8. 9. 51. 89. see also. Kristina. 72 Karacaer. 93-4. 79 Kazi. Saddam. 111 154 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. 28. suicide terrorism fatwa. 49 Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World. 131 Italy. 129 Jesus (Isa). 100. Muhammad. 133 International Crisis group. 79 Hussein. Wahhabi Islamophobes. 29. 133 Kurds/Kurdistan. 117. Nuneaton. fatwa concerning. Bouchra. 70 Khosrokhavar. 49 Kazi. colonial legacy. 69 Khadijah. 73. 78. 72-6. 41 Iraq. Turkey. Rachid.islamicpluralism. 20. 106-7. Netherlands. Alevis. banking. 24 Humboldt University. Islamic forbidden. 63. Moroccan clergy. 38. 93-4. 100 Le Pen. customary law. 101 Justice and Development Party (AKP). poll. Khalil. 134 Jinnah. threats against. 46 Khan. 42-3 “holiday weddings”. 27-8 Kohler. 45. 26 Khatami. Yilmaz. 53. UK. Metin. 101-4. 19. Shariah interpretation. 90. 63-6. Muslims of. political radicalism. Mowafak. 41. 80 homosexuality. 32. Ayaan. 104 Kaci. 122 Kanun. beth din courts. 101 Ibn Taymiyya. 84 laïcité. 117. Turkish speakers. 29 HM Prison Armley. 17 itjihad. 63. 102 Le Monde des Religions. biblical figure. 118 Laroussi. 122 “Islamic finance”. 105-6 Kahraman. 27-8. 49 lawyers. Sunni communities. 44-5 isolationism. Jean-Marie. 87. 98 Ibn Adam. 3. radical Sharia regions. Meimouna. 116 Kosova. Shia. 30. 126. 132. 89 immigrants. Rashid. 27 Imam’s Association of the Netherlands(VIN). 119-20 Islamic Cultural Centre. Ruth. 132. 58 inheritance disputes. 26 Iran. 90. 7. 137. 27 Indonesia. UK 49 HM Prison Belmarsh. 10. 18. 49 Kelly. 99. 42 “honour” crimes. “veil” debate. 11. see also. 123 Islamic Federation of Catalonia. “honour” crimes. 18. religious liberality of. 62. 4 Iqbal. 30-1 Kemal. 79 Kanfach. Haci. 84 Kabtane. Germany. 63 Intra-Islamic disputes. 124. 49-53. 9 Labor Party. 39. 120. Turkish official. 7. Muslims. 27 Joutard. Kamel. UK. issue of. 75. 13. 68. language learning. 122. individual. strength of. FGM. 92-3 Israel. European law retention. murder. 43 Kleinwort Benson. 108-9 King‘s College. 74 Kuran. 74-5 Kaplan. 79. 5 jihad. Madrid. dispensations. Sunni. Mustafa (Atatürk). 7. 91 Islamic Centre of Geneva. 117 Ireland. British Muslim. Hasan. Asiye. 91 interest earning/charging(riba). 110 Islamic Commission of Spain (CIE). 53. 84 Ibn Anas. 67 Koltsov. 85-7. Iraqi School of Madrid. 8. heterogenous nature. 68. 26. 41.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 hijab (headscarf). Allama. 31 Ibn al-Shafi’i. French controversy. Kurds. 49. EMU branch. 6 Ibn Rushd (Aerroës). Farhad. 39 Hirsi Ali. 53 Jerusalem. 2. interest earning Islamic Foundation for Education and Propagation of Knowledge. 11. schools of law (madhahib). 82.eu . 91. London. 41 Le Courrier de L’Atlas. 107. 43 HM Prison Brixton. Ahmed. 126. 8. Deobandi. 110 “hudud” (punishments). 7. 122 Hijaz College Islamic University. 70. Pakistani jihadism.71 Kaya. Muhammad Ali. intolerant. Muhammadiyah. 20 Jamil. 73. Islamic finance. 40. Istanbul. non-ideological. 77 India. Mikhail. Islamic revolution. 11 Islam: Balkan. Shariah interpretation. 102-3. Spain issue. 69. 6 Ibn Ali. age demography. British involvement.

23 Libya. 138 Madrid: Saudi financed Mosque. 46 Maragall. 6 monotheism. Ernest. Al-Fateh Arab School of Madrid. biblical figure. 47. 44 Marseille. 77-9 Oldham. 47 Muslim Association of Britain (MAB). 64. 25-6. Mariya. 83.islamicpluralism. 6 Myard. (communautarisme). 88. Diyanet. 53 Malik. Western. 5 “noise syndrome”. 7 Muslim society. 74. 72. 115-16. 99. 89. 8. 68 Muslim Federation of Spain. civil. 41 Malik. 21. Rif mountains.Index CIP Lévinas. 47 mosques: London. anti-Indian jihadism. Ahmad-Sobair. Islamic (da’wa). 33 missionisation. 99 multiple lines of communication. Neukölln. 76 Neumann. 10 nikah (marriage contract). need for. 31. 19-20. 138 Muslim Arbitration Tribunal. 65-66. Saudi financing. 117 Marianne et le Prophète. 20 Malaysia. Morsal. Muslim-Serb. 94-5. 33. 104. 109 “no-go” areas. 23. 43 Netherlands. 29. 70 Mongol Muslim empires. Peter. 2008 interreligious meeting. by abduction. 31 Leeds. 85-8 93 National Federation of Muslims of France. 84. 101 Leach. 84. 21. 12. 53-4. movement of. forced. 12-13. Grand Mosque. Mohammed. 24-5 medical training. 38. caricatures of. 52. 75. 3 Leicester. 30-1 Malik. Netherlands. 74 Nova TV network. 122 Moussaoui. forced marriages. German law. 43 Nigeria. Turkey. Said. Egyptian core. July 2005 bombings. Abu’l ala. proposed Merkaz megamosque. 39 Manchester. murder of. 91. 111-12. coming of. 118. 79-80. Mohamed Kamal. 5. 86-8 mortgage interest. 135. 93 Muhammad. 105 multiculturalism. 137 Mumbai. 105 nationalism. Netherlands. 117 London. Suleman. 30. Finsbury Park Central Mosque. 38. 5 Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board (MINAB). 83. Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. 90 Nursi. 9. 90. 87. 69 Obeidi. 2004 metro bombing. Netherlands. 105 mediation: community-based Shariah. 120 Muslim Federation of Spain (FEME). radical Shariah regions. 36 Muslim legal professionals. 132 Moses (Musa). 53 Mawdudi. youth in Netherlands. 29. 39. 67. 34. 30. 27 Moroccan Imams Union. 65 Nazir-Ali. -Spain relations. Tahir. Shariah Council. 116. Berlin neighbourhood. 71. the Prophet. 41. Kanun code. Michael. Shahid. David. Aseid. Jacques. 53 Muslim prayers. 106 marriage: arranged. 86 niqab (full cover dress). “tourist”. 10 Malik. 5 morabaha (cost-plus financing). 15. 106 Massumi. Western. 11. 44.eu 155 . 10 medresas. Emmanuel. 42-43 Luton. 40. 127 Mahdi. 134 mawlid. 56. 3 Medina. 36 Muslim Council of Britain (MCB). 65. 8. Sebina. 92 Noah (Nuh). issue of. Abdelwahab. 48 Martyrs of Morocco. Western public facilities accommodation. 48 Malik. Shafiq. 46. Regent’s Park Mosque. Denis. 46 legal theory. 121 Macedonia. Zubeida. 107. 138 North African immigration. 17. 105 Movisie organisation. Keith. 74 MacEoin. 28. 116 Miliband. 38-9. 114. Syrian. 121 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. 48. 10 Meddeb. 89. 36-7 National Coordinator for Investigation of Terrorism (NCTB ). 86. 3. 119 Muslim Law (Shariah) Council UK. 33 Melilla. 38 Muslim Brotherhood. 2. 34. 97 Northern Albanians. Pakistan. 138 Muslim Parliament of Great Britain. Islamic Schools. 63. Prophet’s Mosque. 139 Mirpur region. 42-43. Netherlands. France. Turkish speakers. biblical figure. 33 Mecca. Kurdish. Spain. 77-8 Obeidi. 28 Lebanon. 38. 2008 terrorist attack. 89 Morocco. 91. Indonesia. Hamburg. 110 Nadhatul Ulama. 48 Milli Goruş (National Vision). 34. 85 Mostafá. 84-5 Mahdi. 29. 68 Muslim Burial Council of Leicestershire. 119. 23 “Operation Nova”. 121. 4. 126. 3. 23. government pressure in the Netherlands. 38 Nagdi. colonial impact(s). Utrecht. 117. radical Shariah regions.

Islamised banking system. 40 Rashid. Jaf’ari legal school. 8. 119. 108. Mathias. Iranian Marxist group. 105-6. 98 People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy. 116 Ottoman caliphate (Khilafah). 111. 109. 18 Owers. 88 radical Islam/Shariah: Britain. 2-3. 68. 2. 34 polygamy. British High Commission. 84-5. personal practice. Sayyid Irfan. 87. 15. Syed Aziz. 37 Schwartz. 37.islamicpluralism. Wahhabi financing. Danny. 49 Prescott. 24-5. 33. 119 religious customs. 49 156 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. 1. 122. iii. 8. 135. 51. 88 Pleij. 44. 24. 53. 44 schools. Herman. 5. 11. 9. Turkish emigrants. migration from extremism. literalism. 36 Qadri. 5. José Luis. 131 Sarkozy. 30 Shaha. Stephen Suleyman. historical fantasies of. 1. non-observance rationalisations. 62 Seglers Gómez-Quintero. 8. Muslim deaths. 117 Saudi Al-Rajhi Investment and Banking Corporation. 42. 27 Palestine: ECFR radical position. 114 Sarajevo. Wahhabi Islam. 37. personal and family law. 40 Qadri. 19. Tony. 30 Qur’an. Anne. 19. FGM forbidden. 39. public advocacy for. 19-21. 27. 10. 116-17 pork. 31 Serbs. Catalonia. Shariah rituals and rules. 99 Rushdie. 17 Pasha. 8. Hani. Shaf’i school. 120. 13. 7 pre-Islamic oblivion (Jahiliyyah). 91 “Roubaix gang”. France. Haxhihafiz. Prakash. Mohammed. Maulana Abu. 102 Russia. 59 Prentice. Muhammad Islam. 7 religious discrimination. 44-6. 62 Romanians. UK think-tank. 92. Mohammed. 8. “Islamic finance” products. 39-40. British elite fixation. British immigrant origin. West Europe agitation for. 47. 2 Shaw. 41 “reasonable accommodation”. 57. women’s rights group. defence of. 41 Shariah(s). 40. 118-19 Riyadh. 15. 16-17. radical Sharia regions. Spain. support for. 107. 121. UK. 28 Saudi Arabia. misogyny. 10. EMU branch. 124. Alex. 28 Phillips. 85 Salafi Group for Calling to Religion and Combat (GSPC). 6. 72 “Pillarisation”. tribal discrimination. 40-1. organ donation. Spain. UK. 42 Sánchez Nogales. Bridget. 67. 7. cities. 6. 121 Saleem. scope of. 32-3. Faiz-ul-Aqtab. 100. 107. Muhammad Masud. John. 20 Rabobank. 100. 130 Ramzan. 31. Netherlands. 120. see below. 42 prohibitions. non-Muslims. state-sponsored. 40 Safia. misogyny. Nicholas. 127. 2 religious structures. theocratic state goal. 23. 14. Spain. Tariq. 71. 48. 118 Sabri Koci. Hamburg. George. 26 Qurqah. 9. 17 religious law: courts. 100. 98. 5.eu . radical Islamic recruiting. 85. 38. 19 Sadiq. 10 Rally of Muslims of France. Haroon. 91. 5. 2-3. 11 secular politics. 100. 42 Shia Imam Ali Mosque and Islamic Centre (IZH). 14-15. 83. 87-9 Plasterk. Islam official recognition. Spain. 37. Shariah debate. 39 Popular party. precedent denial. Jihadis. 130 “Parallel Shariah”. 59. Um. 9. necessity overrules. UK state-subsidised. Shariah oriented. complex jurisprudence. Dutch religious policy. 110. 110 Rohe. mosque financing. 32. 112 Salaam. 87 Policy Exchange. 137 Sayeed. 31 People’s Mujahidin (MEK). Unis. 6 Siddiqi. 44. 37 Organic law on Religious Freedom. 6-7. 118 Rotterdam. 139 separatist implication. radical. 15-16.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 organ donation: “presumed consent”. 118. 42 Pakistan. 110. 67. Islamist extremism. courts. British shools financing. 34 Qatar. 74. University of London. Olivier. King Abdullah. Salman. Netherlands. 9. 30-1 “presumed consent”. 19. modernity theorising. 19 “shadow Shariah“. 12. 119 September 11th 2001 events. 9. 11 Queen Mary College. 71-2. 121 Orwell. 105 Ramadan. USA. 129. 109-10 Saudi Academy of Madrid. 127. 106. 25. 10-11. radical Islam ignorance of. 138. in Spain. flogging. projected Essalaam mosque. influence of. 41. 87 petro-dollar boom. 69-70 Shia Islam. 110 Ramadan. Suhayb. 108 Roy. 19-22. 117 secular law. women’s organisations. 15 Rocca. Ronald. Nicolas. 36 prisons. 107. Iraqi. “re-Islamisation” concept. 39. 52. 86. fundamentalism exporting. Satanic Verses. 101 Ottoman empire: millet. 3. 3 Reus. 45 Shah. 9-10. 28. 17 Registry of Religious Entities. 29. 15. 21.

19. male beards. 89 Union for a Popular Movement. 132 The Independent. 120. 91-2 Sürücü. 91. 105 Union of Islamic Communities of Spain (UCIDE). plaque to. 116. 18. Ibrahim. beard style. 29. 122 Soldevila. British class composition. 14. 82-4 Tabatabaei. Veli. 35. Theo. 121-2. 28-9 Surinamese immigrants Netherlands. 118 traditional Shariah. 62. 74. 106-7. 18. 89 Venetian Republic. 64. 8. 114-15. 76-7. 104. 117-18 Spanish Federation of Islamic Religious Bodies (FEERI). Razvi. secular law. 45 Women’s Council of the Region of Madrid. 78 Sudan. Marie-Claude. 118 violence. 65. hijab issue. 33. 107. “soft fundamentalism”. Udo. 94. Mohamed. Spain. integration example. Oka. 121 Toumaï. 31. 6. 63. 67 Sirin. 6 Sunday Telegraph. 21. 5. Ghayasuddin. 124 Somalia. 94 Van Gogh. diaspora. 126. 98. 80 Storms. 19. 116 Sofu.islamicpluralism. 64 Union of Islamic Organisations. 3. “honour” murder. 38. Muslim rule period. 7. 5. 41 USA (United States of America): Constitution. 91 University of London. 82. 44. Shariah understanding. Bassam. 79 Socialist Party. beards issue. 121 St Bartholomews medical college. 41. 25 The Lancet. free exercise of religion.Index CIP Siddiqi. 59. Morocco. 116 Sifaoui. 105-7. 67 Sistani. 82 Taliban. prisons. 117. civil war. Albanian emigres. David. 105 Singapore. 137. 24-5. 18 tribal customs. 73 Supporters of Shariah (SOS). 31 Turkey. 51 Wahhabi version of Islam. periodical. Spanish socialist. 135. state establishment. 73. 3. 19. 73 Sohail Islamic Cultural Centre. 119-20 Teachers Union. 8. 88. 121 Tatary. “cool”. Ali. 61 Vich. 40. 65 University of Leiden. prisons. Nurcu movement. 39. Rowan. 119 Union of Islamic Cultural Centres (VIK). 70 Union for Moroccan Muslim Organisations in the Netherlands. 38 Sufism. Arab occupation legacy. 137. 28 University of Brighton. Lord Justice. France. fundamentalists (takfiris). 35 Williams. the. 58 Thorpe. 43 Spain. 17. 36 Sirat. 93 Waliullah. 1. 101 Sirin. 120. UK. 135. Saudi global-financed. Allameh. 28 University of Göttingen. Floris. 118 terrorism. 97. mosques. 124 Utlu. 1. 91 Van Toorenburg. iii. Spain. Shah of Delhi. Clementine. 46. 137. 61. 6. 95 Stremelaar. 10 Suddeutsche Zeitung. 134 Tunisia. 93 rightist nationalism. Johann Daniel Lawaetz. 102. 62 Suleyman the Magnificent (Lawgiver). Madeline. 106-7. 845. Kemalettin. Pere Barri. Altaic language. Saudi. Abderrahman (“Mohamed Achraf”). 1. 33. 4. 98. 73. 13. 8 Tribout. 119. Ayatollah Ali. government absence. 32 Sunnah. “honour”-based. 82. 18 Vermeulen. 119. 99. 45 Tibi. 14. 132. 53 Sidki. 73. Martin. reactionary utopianism. 85. migrants to Netherlands. Islam official recognition. 31 United Bank of Kuwait PLC. customary law. 135 Testa. 56-9. 41 University of Southern California. 63. 65 Topas prison. Riay. 33. 29-30. see also. Fuengirola. urban-rural dissonance. 120 Sunni Islam: community leaders. 35. 62 Stiftung. 65-6. 26 websites radical Shariah. 8. 85. 46. 122 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. 103 “true Muslims”. Annemarike. elite appeal. Organic Law on Religious Freedom. State schools. 90. 70 Tabligh-i-Jammat (TJ) (Appeal of the Community). 86. Nayati. Catalonia. Sufi interpretation. 30. France (UOIF). cities. 19 Tahiri. 119. non-Muslim society rules. DITIB Tworuschka. Islamaphobia absence. 133 Ur-Rahman Sahib. 9. 33. 66 Sufi Muslim Council (SMC). 34. 94 Van Eck. misogynist. 39-40. 26. 109 Union of Muslim Organisations of UK and Ireland. 139. René-Samuel.eu 157 . Hatun. Pir Habib. 104. 9. 106. mortgage market. 14 Sökefeld. UK. 58 State Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs. 139 Takfir wal Hijra (Religious Purge and Migration). 42 USP Institut Universitari Dexeus. 72 Women Living under Muslim Laws group.

Mannheim. 44-50. 28 Zouareg. 89 Yavuz Sultan Selim mosque. Adeal. Berber. José Luis Rodriguez.eu . 68 Zia-ul-Haq. 3.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 women. Hadda. Heshu. 120 Zaza dialect. dress codes. Abdullah. 51 Zahid. 66 Yemen. kidnappings. 73. 116 World Islamic Mission. 8. 116-17. 27 Workers Party of Marxist Unification (POUM). 111 158 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. 9. crimes against. abuses of. Muslim vulnerabilities. Spain. 45 Zapatero. rights of.islamicpluralism. 75. 53. 51 Yones. 109. Kurdish. Kanun honour code. Muslim victimisation. 28-9 Yones.


DC 20036.00 2009 ISBN 978-0-9558779-2-6 . UK 1718 M Street NW #260. WC1N 3XX. LONDON. "Muslims have undertaken to obey the laws of the country of their residence and thus they must be faithful to that undertaking. Canada: Iraq's Al-Marje Al-Alaa Ali Sistani sent a message to Muslims in Western nations." the statement read. It condemned all acts of violence and encouraged imams to keep a watchful eye on what's going on inside their mosques.Centre for Islamic Pluralism C IP OBEY YOUR COUNTRY’S LAWS! Marje Sistani urges Muslims in West By Mohamed Ali MONTREAL. urging them to obey the laws of the countries in which they live.00 • US$150. Washington. USA £100. Centre for Islamic Pluralism (CIP) BM 2394.00 • €125. The fatwa was delivered at a Montreal news conference of prominent Shia Muslims on behalf of Ayatullah Sayyed Ali As-Sistani.

Sign up to vote on this title
UsefulNot useful