Centre for Islamic Pluralism




Dr Irfan Al-Alawi * Stephen Suleyman Schwartz Kamal Hasani * Veli Sirin * Daut Dauti * Qanta Ahmed, MD
Revised and corrected edition September 2009

Centre for Islamic Pluralism
Washington * London * Köln * Sarajevo www.islamicpluralism.org www.islamicpluralism.eu www.islamicpluralism.de

BM 2394, London, WC1N 3XX, UK 1718 M Street NW #260 Washington, DC 20036 USA

UK . Istanbul 11) Birmingham Central Mosque.l/r) Houses of Parliament.eu www.islamicpluralism. Marxloh. Madrid 7) Mosque of Granada 8) Milli Goruş storefront mosque. London WC1N 3XX. The Hague.islamicpluramism. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication Data. the most prestigious mosque in Italy 4) The Knights’ Hall [aka Ridderzaal] part of the Binnenhof Parliament buildings. 5) Reichstag.top l.de First edition: May 2009 Revised and corrected edition: September 2009 Design: Asim Mesihi ISBN 978-0-9558779-2-6 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data. Paris 10) Yeni Cami (New Mosque).) Relief on Washington’s Supreme Court Building depicting the Prophet with the Qur’an in one hand and a sword in the other 2 . las Cortes Generales.islamicpluralism. Berlin 6) El Palacio del Congreso de los Diputados. Germany. A catalogue record for this book is pending with the Library of Congress Copyright © Centre for Islamic Pluralism All rights reserved The authors’ rights have been asserted This document may be reproduced and reposted by any user with acknowledgement of authorship and original publication Cover illustrations: 1 .org www. Duisburg.A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007. UK 1718 M Street NW #260 Washington.2009 Published in the United Kingdom in 2009 by the Centre for Islamic Pluralism BM 2394. DC 20036 USA www. 2009 9) French National Assembly. London 3) The Grand Mosque of Rome.

CONTENTS 1. 12. 7. 8. 11. 3. 2. EMU] The Question of “Islamic Banking” Conclusion and Recommendations Bibliography Index ii iii v 1 2 5 23 56 61 82 97 114 126 132 135 140 151 . 9. Prefatory Note Five Principles For Study of Shariah in W estern Europe Glossary of Main Organisations and Acronyms CIP and its Role Investigating Shariah in the W est Methodology Shariah Defined Case Study: Britain Appendix: Islamist Ideology at the British Bedside Case Study: Germany Case Study: The Netherlands Case Study: France Case Study: Spain ECFR and Other Transnational Islamic Organisations in Europe [FIOE. 6. 4. EMN. 13. 10. 5.

To be sure. that radical Shariah adherents promote their vision of an illiberal legal code that violates the most fundamental liberties of citizens. some Shariah laws are purely personal to Muslims. The debate described in these pages has been almost entirely veiled from non-Muslim eyes. Buckley Associate Dean and Foundation Professor George Mason University School of Law Executive Director George Mason Law and Economics Center Virginia. and the penetration of these ideas. Polygamy. This understanding of the civic duties of Muslims in non-Muslim countries has.islamicpluralism. But it is intolerable. Dietary rules and dress codes are shielded by Western constitutional protections of religious and privacy rights. These should properly be a matter of indifference to non-Muslims. socalled “honour” murders.PREFATORY NOTE The introduction of Shariah law in Western legal systems provokes widespread concern. performance of promises – should be welcomed. is in showing how moderate and liberal Muslims may give a commitment to honour Western legal rules without in any way derogating from the principles of their religion. USA ii CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. according to the authors. female genital mutilation. Other Shariah laws that promote positive morality – hospitality to strangers. forced marriages and related practices can have no part in a Western legal system. moreover. however. by the idea of a separate legal code that strengthens or weakens the penalties for criminal behaviour imposed on all citizens. and their observance cannot be thought objectionable. The value of this compendium. and will be a revelation to all.eu . F. Westerners are troubled. jihadist militancy. produced by some of the leading Western Muslim experts.H. the backing of the most authoritative Muslim juristic figures. One of the great values of this handbook is that it offers the best analysis of the goals of radical Islam with respect to the imposition of Shariah in the West.

have a limited comprehension of their religion. as cited in Case Study: The Netherlands *** EDUCATION: “The Muslims of France. as pluralistic as it is. Mufti of Marseilles. religious freedom. certain forms of intolerant isolationism do represent a particular threat: exclusivism in respect of one’s own group and parallelism.Five Principles For Study of Shariah in Western Europe LEGALITY: “If [a Muslim] has given [a non-Muslim government] a commitment – even if indirectly (as is implied in the immigration documents) – to abide by the laws of that country. because of a lack of access to religious education… only an archaic version of Islamic law has become accessible to all… today human rights. “In this light.eu iii . But if their withdrawal from society starts to endanger basic rights and freedoms of others. in their quasi-totality.” – The Dutch Intelligence Service AIVD.” – A Code of Practice for Muslims in the West. even more if the object is to recentralise the management of religious policy. Exclusivism is expressed through discrimination. But to reproduce the bilateral scheme that serves the Catholic Church does not take into account the plural and heterogeneous reality of Islam. Rector of the Grand Mosque of Paris. and laïcité are the most consensual principles. citizens retain the freedom – albeit within certain limits – to pursue their own lifestyle and to decide for themselves how they conduct their relationships with each other and with the government. Dalil Boubakeur. incitement and sowing hatred. a standard Shia Shariah manual.” – Dr. cited in Case Study: France *** PLURALISM: “To force the artificial creation of a religious actor that unifies Islam seems a priori easier for the State. seeks to impose religious laws before secular ones and tries to create enclaves in which that system rather than government authority prevails. based on the writings of the Iraqi Ayatollah Ali Sistani *** CONSENSUS: “The way of Islam states that the believer must submit to the general laws [in a country of residence]… French Muslims must take account of their presence in a nonMuslim context. cited in Case Study: France *** CIVILITY: “In a democratic society.” – Soheib Bencheikh.islamicpluralism. then they have overstepped the mark and are damaging the democratic legal order. Parallelism does not recognise the authority of government. cited in Case Study: Spain CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. it is necessary for him to fulfill his commitment. and alone in being capable of managing the whole of human society.” – Àlex Seglers Gómez-Quintero.

Dutch government body Ahmadiyyat or Ahmadis – Community of dissident Muslims. MIB. fundamentalist body involved in the foundation of ECFR FNMF – Fédération nationale des musulmans de France (National Federation of Muslims of France). spiritually affiliated with Qadiri Sufis Berbers/Amazigh – Indigenous. UK legal institution Deobandism – Sunni-aligned movement founded in 19th century British India. Moroccanaligned group iv CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. one faction. its Pakistani branch became jihadist and takfiri. produced Tabligh-i-Jamaat (TJ). and Spain BMF – British Muslim Forum. and traditional Turkish and Kurdish spiritual practices AMSUK – Association of Muslim Schools in the UK Barelvis – Sunni Muslims. UK think-tank CDA – Christen Democratisch Appèl (Christian Democratic Appeal).v.islamicpluralism. a supporter of “parallel Shariah. transnational body of authentically moderate Muslims.v. Dutch government agency AKP – AKPartisi (Justice and Development Party). claims a Sufi orientation CSC – Centre for Social Cohesion. Brussels-based “thinktank” associated with Tariq Ramadan. although fundamentalist. established in 2006 with 15 Muslim members and 15 government representatives DİTİB – Diyanet İşleri Türk-İslam Birliği.Glossary of Main Organisations. “soft fundamentalist” party in Turkey Alevilik or Alevis – Turkish and Kurdish heterodox Muslim group. Wahhabi-influenced small organisation active in media. official Muslim liaison body with Spanish government. non-Arab Muslim community in North Africa. and the MB. as well as the Afghan Taliban Deutsche-Islam Konferenz (German Conference on Islam). Dutch conservative party CFCM – Conseil français du culte musulman (French Council of the Muslim Faith). with offices in Germany and Spain. q. conservative but neither takfiri. alternative body. currently undergoing reorganisation CMO – Contactorgaan Moslims en Overheid (Contact Body for Muslims and Government). Deobandi-oriented. branch of Diyanet.v. and represented in CIE FEME – Federación Musulmana de España (Muslim Federation of Spain). extraterrorial Turkish Sunni authority in Germany and the Netherlands. (TurkishIslamic Union for Religious Affairs). believes the founder was a reformer. while a second faction. Trends and Acronyms ACVZ – Adviescommissie voor Vreemdelingenzaken (Advisory Commission on Aliens Affairs).” and with general fundamentalist Islamic tendencies EMU – European Muslim Union. with large but poorly-organised presence in the Netherlands. fundamentalist Shariah body led by Yusuf Al-Qaradawi EMN – European Muslim Network. Ahmadis. pro-Shariah Dutch Muslim organisation CPS – Crown Prosecution Service. but not a mahdi AIVD – Algemene Inlichtingen – en Veiligheidsdienst (General Intelligence and Security Service). combining Shia and Sufi doctrines. and NMR CIE – Comisión Islámica de España (Islamic Commission of Spain). Originally peaceful and spiritual. TürkischIslamische Verein der Anstalt für Religion e V. known as Qadianis. alternative Dutch Muslim organisation including Alevis.. Diyanet – State Islamic Administration of the Republic of Turkey ECFR – European Council for Fatawa and Research. France. nor jihadist. q. q. known as Lahoris. believe in the appearance of the Muslim messiah or mahdi in 19th century India. as well as Bosnia-Hercegovina and Turkey FEERI – Federación Española de las Entidades Religiosas Islámicas (Spanish Federation of Islamic Religious Bodies). representation pending in reorganised CIE FIOE – Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe.eu . non-governmental liaison body with official authorities CGI – Contact Groep Islam (Contact Group Islam). organisation influenced by Morocco. Saudi Arabia. as Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835-1908).

as well as in such European countries as Britain. Germany KRM – Koordinationsrat der Muslime (Coordination Council of Muslims in Germany). liaison body launched in 2007. Milli Goruş (operating through an Islamrat or Islam Council). Dutch socialdemocratic party Regents Park Mosque Shariah Council – Main London radical Shariah body RER – Registro de Entidades Religiosas (Registry of Religious Entities). France. IGMG. and ZMD.eu v . broadcast service affiliated with CMO NMO – Nederlandse Moslim Omroep (Dutch Muslim Broadcasting Service). or Milli Goruş Islamic Community. fundamentalist organisation that claims a leading role as a Muslim interlocutor with the UK authorities. known by its French initials). takfiri Islamist movement founded in Egypt by Hassan al-Banna (1910-1949). Algerian-based terrorist group.” extremist Turkish entity based in Köln. official Dutch anti-terrorism agency NIO – Nederlandse Islamitische Omroep (Dutch Islamic Broadcast Organisation). the Netherlands. and other Muslim lands. retitled “AlQaida in the Islamic Maghreb” Hatun und Can – German relief organisation founded in the aftermath of the notorious so-called “honour” murder of Hatun Sürücü in Berlin in 2005 Hizb-ut-Tahrir (Party of Liberation. Dalil Boubakeur GSPC – Al-Jamaa as-Salafiyya li Da’wa wa’l Qital (Salafi Group for Calling to Religion and Combat. associated with ECFR MINAB – Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board. VIK. broadcast service affiliated with CGI NMR – Nederlandse Moslim Raad (Netherlands Muslim Council). British Shariah network MB – Muslim Brotherhood. Spanish government administration for religious groups CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. HT) – Conspiratorial revolutionary Islamist group active in Arab countries. but represents a minority of mosques MIB – Marokkaanse Imam Bond (Moroccan Imams’ Union). the Netherlands Islamic Shariah Council – Shariah body in Leyton. UK government agency responsible for preventing forced marriages GMP – Mosquée de Paris (Grand Mosque of Paris). MAB – Muslim Association of Britain. and Spain MCB – Muslim Council of Britain. small fundamentalist group MAT – Muslim Arbitration Tribunal. umbrella group for the NMO broadcast network “Ni Putes Ni Soumises” (“Neither Whores Nor Submissives”) – French group protesting abuse of Muslim women PP – Partido Popular (People’s Party) – Spanish conservative party PSOE – Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party) – Social democratic party PvdA – Partij van der Arbeid (Labor Party).islamicpluralism. Wahhabi centre in Tilburg. now influential throughout the Arab world.FOSIS – Federation of Students Islamic Societies. leading French mosque headed by moderate rector. Islamitische Gemeinschaft Milli Goruş. official institution established to improve standards among British imams Al-Muhajiroun (The Migrants) – Small radical Islamist group active in Britain and supporting terrorism Muslim Law (Shariah) Council UK – Fundamentalist Shariah tribunal NCTB – Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestijding (National Coordinator for Investigation of Terrorism). including DİTİB. Iranian-funded Shia Imam Ali Mosque in Hamburg Kalifatstaat (Caliphate State) – “Kaplan conspiracy. Dr. fundamentalist group active in higher educational institutions in Britain FMU – Forced Marriage Unit.vv. UK IZH – Islamische Zentrum Hamburg. qq. Central Asia. fundamentalist Turkish Sunni group active in Germany and the Netherlands. extraterritorial Moroccan clerical authority in the Netherlands. banned in Germany ISOOK – Islamic Foundation for Education and Propagation of Knowledge (as known by its Dutch initials). member of CGI Milli Goruş (National Vision).

France. influential Islamist movement founded in India in the 1920s. i. seriously incorrect. adherents of Wahhabism. and active in numerous Muslim and nonMuslim countries. or Companions and Successors of the Prophet Muhammad. fundamentalist Spanish Muslim organisation. and who denounced Sufism and other spiritual practices. e. i. q. Moroccan-oriented member of CMO VVD – Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy). and therefore apostates from Islam. killer of the Dutch media personality Theo Van Gogh in 2004 Takfiri – Muslims who practice takfir. represented in CIE UMMON – Unie voor Marokkaanse Moslim Organisaties in Nederland (Union for Moroccan Muslim Organisations in the Netherlands).RMMN – Raad van Marokkaanse Moskeeorganisaties Nederland (Council of Moroccan Mosque Organisations in the Netherlands). moderate Muslim community group SOS – Supporters of Shariah. q. jihadist movement founded in Britain by Egyptian-born radical preacher Abu Hamza (Hamza Al-Masri) Tabligh ud-Dawa (Appeal and Call to Religion) mosque – Facility in Marseille. in that the Wahhabis are takfiri and pursue violence against non-fundamentalist Muslims and non-Muslims.e. member of CGI RMF – Rassemblement des musulmans de France (Rally of Muslims of France). Wahhabis. aligned with the radical Deobandi religious interpretation. fundamentalist-oriented group VIK – Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren (Union of Islamic Cultural Centres). however.islamicpluralism.g. French centrist political party led by Nicolas Sarkozy Union of Muslim Organisations of the UK and Ireland – Small pro-Shariah group UOIF – Union des organisations islamiques de France (Union of Islamic Organisations in France). affiliated with Tabligh-iJamaat. occasionally misrepresented or mislabeled as Salafis WRR – Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid (Dutch Scientific Council for Government Policy). reputedly Saudi-influenced organisation vi CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. Deobandis. Sufi-oriented. Moroccan-based member of CMO UMP – Union pour une Mouvement Populaire (Union for a Popular Movement). Shia Muslims do not practise takfir on the basis of disagreement or differences in religious practise TJ – Tabligh-i-Jamaat (Appeal of the Community).. Takfir wal Hijra (Religious Purge and Migration) – Wahhabi group that included Mohammed Bouyeri. takfiri movement founded in Arabia in the 18th century and now established as the state form of Islam in the kingdom of Saudi Arabia.v. MB.e.v. which has financed its global expansion and support for Deobandis and the MB. who also claim to emulate the original Muslims – their designation as Salafis is. Moroccan-oriented offshoot of FNMF “Roubaix gang” – Terrorist criminal conspiracy linked to Al-Qaida.eu . anti-secularist movement active in Turkey and the Turkish diaspora in Germany and the Netherlands VIN – Vereniging Imams Nederland (Imams’ Association of the Netherlands). active in France Salafis – 19th century modernist and reforming Muslims who claimed to emulate the aslaf. Dutch conservative party Wahhabism – Fundamentalist. official research and advisory body Women Living Under Muslim Laws – UK-based feminist group ZMD – Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland (Central Council of German Muslims). The term is now assumed by or applied to Wahhabis. popularly known as Süleymancilar. prominent in UK UCIDE – Unión de Comunidades Islámicas de España (Union of Islamic Communities of Spain). while the 19th century Salafis were neither takfiri nor violent SHO – Samenwerkende Hulporganisaties (Cooperative of Relief Organisations) – Dutch charity group SMN – Samenwerkingsverband van Marokkanen in Nederland (Cooperative Union of Moroccans in the Netherlands).. declare those not following their interpretation to be guilty of kufr or disbelief.

Sweden. the Netherlands.CIP 1. India. the Netherlands. on Islamist ideology in UK medical training. covering the UK. with correspondents. The following monograph is the product of this grant. the Balkan branch operates in that region. with research mainly coordinated by CIP International Director Irfan Al-Alawi. contributed the supplement to Case Study: Britain. Russia. CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. a physician working in New York. France. In 2007. a heterodox Shia. the German branch monitors Germany. Ireland. The CIP team comprises fully qualified Sunni and Shia experts on Shariah.islamicpluralism. Schwartz has also published The Other Islam: Sufism and the Road to Global Harmony. UK. CIP German Director Veli Sirin.. Kazakhstan. Writing and editing was carried out by CIP Executive Director Schwartz. Germany. Singapore. Germany. and was widely read and translated in the Muslim world. and a secular Muslim.eu 1 . and participants in the spiritual tradition of Sufism. Pakistan. CIP received a grant to study the penetration of Shariah or agitation for adoption of Islamic law. in Western Europe. MD. Malaysia. CIP has correspondents and contacts with other groups in Canada. Israel (including the Israeli Arab community). Pakistan. as well as a heterodox Sufi. journalists and authors. It was established in 2004 by the American writer Stephen Suleyman Schwartz. Qanta Ahmed. and Spain. a leading figure in global Sunni Islam. The book was the first exposé of the Saudi role in the origins of Al-Qaida to be published in the West. and. Iraq. and Indonesia. CIP maintains full-time websites and activities in the U. China. The Two Faces of Islam: Saudi Fundamentalism and Its Role in Terrorism. and community leaders. and Bangladesh. in the Balkans. India. France. It is therefore authentically representative of the diversity of moderate Muslim opinion. It includes believers in both Sunni and Shia interpretations of Islam. Turkey and the Kurdish lands. and CIP UK Research Director Daut Dauti. The UK branch of CIP has responsibility for British Islam as well as for Saudi Arabia and the Arab countries in general. As of 2009. who became Muslim in 1997 and is the author of a bestselling study of Saudi-financed Islamic fundamentalism (Wahhabism). CIP and its Role Investigating Shariah in the West The Centre for Islamic Pluralism (CIP) is an international network of moderate Muslim religious scholars.S. operates in more than 25 countries. Uzbekistan. CIP General Studies Director Kamal Hasani.

some of them posted on websites. and empirically observed the following: Are private Shariah-oriented elementary and secondary schools growing in number? Have demands for introduction of Islamist curricula in state schools. traditional Shariah has an opposing counterpart in the form of radical Shariah. which we exempt from analysis in that they almost never involve contradiction with or other intrusion into relations between Muslims and non-Muslims. or madhahib.” developed as a proposed separate juristic canon. or whether it is simply a trope expressing political discontent or youth rebellion. and an innovation. non-Muslim countries. including review of the Shariah textual sources employed in Western Europe.eu . such as rules for prayer. community leaders. other new phenomena have emerged among Muslims in the West. within the legal structures of Western. male circumcision. 2 (1) Family/schooling Because religious law on marriage and divorce. Shariah encompasses strictly personal religious-ritual aspects. Shariah in Islam has functioned historically through schools of Islamic law.2 This study elucidates the distinction between the two contrasting variants. and for Muslim children to be educated only in Islamic schools. Each of the case studies is structured around four key areas.islamicpluralism. have long been accepted as unthreatening to Western societies. charity. diet.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 2. and school choice. ablutions. Methodology This survey begins with basic definitions of Shariah and explanation of the origins and nature of the Shariah controversy in Western Europe.3 The monograph includes case studies assessing the impact of Shariah agitation in each of five countries. illegal. and burial. Traditional Shariah is based on a recognised canon. We have analysed the effect of Shariah agitation on family behavior and school participation as described by clerics. or informal manner among Muslim immigrants and their descendants in the West. CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. some significant elements of which have been translated and published in English. In addition. Much of the corpus of radical Shariah is now drawn from recent fatwas. We have discussed with our interlocutors. received support from parents and students? Do young people refrain from dating or other inter-gender social contact without the presence of a chaperone? Do parents express dissatisfaction with inter-gender arrangements in state schools? Has opposition to social contact and friendship with non-Muslims increased among Muslim youth and Muslims in general? We more crucially asked how much those who claim to support Shariah in the UK and elsewhere really know about Shariah. fasting.” in which radical Shariah appears in clandestine. however. and other moderate Muslim representatives as well as in Muslim and nonMuslim media. Radical Shariah agitators call for marriage and related issues to be subject to religious jurisdiction. governing Muslim affairs. such as proposed by the Muslim Council of Britain and discussed in Germany and other countries.1 But in the Islamic world and in the West. these areas are vulnerable to targeting by Shariah adherents for ideological penetration and manipulation. which we designate as “parallel Shariah. These include “shadow Shariah.

and cases of female genital mutilation (FGM). and whether recourse to Shariah authorities or courts has risen or declined in ordinary divorce cases. Moroccan and other statesponsored religious structures in the administration of mosques and community institutions. domestic violence complaints. We have documented specific phenomena and nonMuslim and Muslim public reaction to them. secular Muslims. protective agencies. we have inquired into the roles of non-Muslim courts. and whether its impact is reflected more in attitudes than in functional activities. In all four general areas of inquiry. and traditionalists. women’s groups. As a complement to these inquiries. We have examined and analysed the Islamic source materials used to develop this view. moderates. as well as opinions by radical Shariah groups and non-Muslim defenders of the establishment of Shariah jurisdiction over Muslims in Western countries. Supplemental sections discuss the religious justifications provided for intrusion of radical Shariah concepts in Western medical training and “Islamic finance” in the West. we have examined the extent to which the radical Shariah effort in the West is mainly agitation. We analysed the statements of some academics and leading government officials about past responses and perspectives on future response to radical Shariah agitation. (3) Criminal aspects Because radical Shariah advocates teach that Muslims can disregard Western law. We have examined attitudes toward “Shariah-based community mediation services” as a pretext for “parallel Shariah. so-called “honour” murder. Turkish. we inquired into the role of Islamist ideology in inciting and justifying such behavior. and some have been trained in radical Shariah attitudes. We have analysed the effects of Shariah agitation on established Western legal theory as reflected in whether Shariah adherents demand and may have obtained enforcement of Shariah judgments by non-Muslim legal systems. law enforcement. alongside common law in the West. and on that basis have evaluated the success of advocacy for “parallel Shariah” in Western European legal systems. counseling services. The major summary questions to be drawn from discussions of Shariah in Western Europe are: • How do Shariah proponents advance radical ideology and/or serve as cover for terrorist conspiracies? • How do proponents of radical or “parallel Shariah” contend with objections to their activities by women.islamicpluralism.eu . since Muslim clerics in Western Europe are often foreign. in which guarantees of fair treatment can be assured? • How can Western-trained and resident Muslim non-Shariah legal professionals 3 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. and vice versa? • Do families more frequently consult religious leaders or submit queries to Shariah websites before making decisions? • Is voluntary community mediation based on Islamic law a workable concept.” We have also inquired into the influence of Saudi. the evolution of which is recounted in various places in the survey. (4) Approach to Women We inquired extensively into victimisation of Muslim women under the pretext of Shariah in Western Europe.“Parallel” Shariah CIP (2) Institutionalisation of Shariah by nonMuslim governments (“Parallel Shariah”) The outstanding goal of the radical Shariah offensive in the West is that “parallel Shariah” be accorded official legal standing. We have investigated how extensively each country has permitted “parallel” and “shadow” Shariah institutions to function openly or in a clandestine manner. and the role of radical Islam in Western European prisons. and related bodies. leading to general jurisdiction over Muslims. the incidence of forced marriage or divorce.

Nuh Keller. Kitab Bhavan. Tr. Beltsville. In addition. Connectum. 1999 (Jafari Shia). titled Akademia Evropiane për Fetva dhe Studime.org/. Britain. The second ECFR collection has been published in English online at www. A Code of Practice for Muslims in the West. New Delhi. Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee. The number of radical Shariah websites is prodigious. rhetoric. about colonial legacies and the past or present policies of the host countries in Muslim countries.islamicpluralism. Al-Hidayah (The Guidance). M. academic and related commentaries on this controversy are discussed and cited herein. two collections of fatwas issued by the European Council for Fatawa and Research (ECFR). 2006. Recueil de fatwas. tr.com. Abdul [based on the work of Ayatollah Ali Sistani]. a common geographical position with the Muslim lands in the Mediterranean. The Essential Hanafi Handbook of Fiqh. regularly-updated editions of this volume. aside from strictly personal religious matters. 2006. Série no. Moinuddin Siddiqui. 2006 and 2008 (Balkans/Turkey/Central Asia/Pakistan/Indian Sunni). Tawhid.fatwa-online. M. by Dr.. have a place in Western Muslim life? • How have government or other official responses succeeded or failed. n.eu . Présentation [by] Yusuf AlQardawi. Éd. from diet to burial. Burhan al-Din. and two Hanafi volumes: Qazi Thanaa Ullah. annually or biennially. 3 “Shadow Shariah” is mainly reported in Western media. Fatwas are advisory for Sunni Muslims but binding for Shias. tr. by Kamal El-Helbawy. Inverness.d. American Trust Publications. Enes Ljevaković. 4 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. Sarajevo.org. tr. Lyon. n. by Bashkim Aliu. Intra-Islamic disputes in Britain and France may frequently reflect attitudes. and Spain are countries where immigration patterns have been strongly influenced by colonial histories in the Muslim world. Ibn Naqib. Aisha Bewley. Note: fatwas (fatawa) are not limited to condemnations or other punitive sentences: they are religious opinions that can address any topic under Shariah jurisdiction.. Perhaps the most popular in English is www. These issues are present but much less prominent in the Netherlands and Spain. Md. Malik. and in the latter two cases. tr. Shkup. Amal Press. Although it denounces terrorism. tr. The first ECFR collection was issued in French as Conseil europeén des fatwas et de la recherche. Préface et commentaires [by] Tariq Ramadan. 1. has almost no collective memory of a German presence among Muslims. at least. Indianapolis. Scotland. Yusuf. An Albanian edition of the second collection was issued by the fundamentalistdominated Islamic Community of Macedonia. with no recent history of colonialism in the Muslim world. Ahmad. France. tr. 2 vols. Reliance of the Traveller. Ibn Anas. Sayyid Muhammad Rizvi. and why? CIP hopes to produce. Amana Publications. NOTES 1 Five volumes of traditional Shariah may be consulted: Hadi. The Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam. Furkan ISM. Sources on “parallel Shariah “ include. the Netherlands. and Syed Shukry. Imam Ali Foundation.islamic-sharia. Germany.p. 2003.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 be assisted to form a professional lobby? • Can Shariah be modernised to function in better harmony with Western law? • Does Shariah in any form. Madinah Press. at the time of this survey. or. any Muslim will recognise its radicalism from its selection of authorities and opinions. Bristol. rev.e-cfr. An introductory point should be understood about the sociology of recent immigrant Muslims in Western Europe. A Bosnian edition includes both of the two collections: Fetve Islamskog Vijeća. Yusuf Talal Ali. 2004 (Maliki – North and West African Sunni). 1994 (Shafi’i – Arab and Southeast Asian Sunni regions). 1992. and Al-Farghani Al-Marghinani. tr... Al-Muwatta. ed. Another important website is www. 2 The main printed source on radical Shariah is AlQaradawi.

3. as well as inheritance. the hadith and the lives of the Prophet and his Companions. there is but one monotheistic religion.4 These are: The oldest. Jesus (Isa). Moses (Musa). and the obligatory. 5 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. as a term. But Shariah in Islamic countries has developed in two directions. Abu Hanifah sought to derive and codify rulings based on divine law. It is also the most influential of the several schools of legal thought in the Muslim world today. Considered in this way. Legal arguments between scholars. Islam regulates certain financial and business transactions (banning income derived from loaning money to obtain interest. Traditional Shariah includes five main schools of interpretation.E. In the general meaning. and was applied. marriage and divorce. other moral issues. the Sunnah or voluntarily virtuous.” and limited to religious observance by Muslims. Shariah Defined Shariah is typically defined as Islamic religious law. These were supplemented by new rules. and war. Shariah denotes belief in the transcendental origins to which people were called by the divine prophets. the Creator has revealed various “Shariahs. rested on the fundamental texts of Islam: Qur’an. should not interfere with the rights of non-Muslims. a) traditional and b) Islamist ideological. regarding five categories of human action: the forbidden. diet and fasting. or body of Islamic belief. or riba).eu . it represents a synonym of the Islamic (Arabic) word for faith (din). and such other matters of sacred observance as circumcision of males and burial. Pakistan. including prayer and its ablutions. based on analogy (qiyas) with a similar or parallel example of human conduct in Qur’an or the hadith. Shariah. however. five “Shariahs” have been made known: those of Noah (Nuh in Islam). Shariah may function in areas of essential ritual in a manner that. and no differences or disagreements are recognised among prophets. Through the history of monotheistic religion. the new conception of “parallel Shariah” in even its apparently least intrusive elements may become disruptive of Western society. Further. the permitted. referring to the Islamic faith or the Jewish faith. Islam promulgates Shariah as law on ritual and life matters involving the basic Muslim obligations. to all aspects of life. has two meanings: general and particular. Afghanistan. and elements of family law. Abraham (Ibrahim). Muhammad. Jurists also drew on consensus among the scholars. cleanliness and personal hygiene (especially among Shia Muslims).islamicpluralism. the provision of charity. Shariah was treated as a “universal” legal standard.) and is the most tolerant of differing opinions. In this definition. In that context. it is sometimes used instead of “faith. and India. before a judge (qadi) or in obtaining fatwas as to what is permitted and what is prohibited. to the extent possible. Further. and the Shariah of the Prophet of Islam. the Balkans.” According to Qur’an and the Sunnah. in principle. Traditional Shariah In the first seven centuries of Islamic history.” so that we find references in Islamic sources to Shari’at-ul Islam or Shari’at-ul Musa. Central Asia and Chinese Turkestan. Extreme Islamist ideology is neither traditional nor conservative. the disapproved or disliked. dominating Turkey. Traditional Shariah today is “personal. criminal justice. Hanafi school of Sunni jurisprudence was created by Abu Hanifah (699765 C. Shariah Defined CIP 3. but radical and even revolutionary.


A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009

Three other schools emerged in the generations following Abu Hanifah that also became standard in Sunni Islam and are considered of equal validity. Each has its own methodological emphasis. Malikis are named for Malik ibn Anas, a resident of Medina, the ideal city as organised by the Prophet Muhammad, and are centred on original Medinite customary and legal practices. This tradition struck deep roots in Muslim Spain and in North and West Africa, where it remains the most important Islamic legal school. Shafi’is, who follow Muhammad ibn alShafi’i, based their judgments on the hadith as well as the use of analogy. The founder of this tradition began as a student of Malik Ibn Anas. Its area of influence presently includes Egypt, the Arab states of the Middle East (except the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf), Sunni Kurds, and Muslims in the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia. Hanbalis are inspired by Ahmad ibn Hanbal, a pioneer of fundamentalist theology in Islam. His school stressed the use of authentic hadith in preference to analogy. It now dominates the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf states. Most Shias follow another school, the Jafaris. This form of jurisprudence includes decision-making based on ijtihad, or individual, inspired theological reasoning by recognised authorities. Ijtihad is seldom understood by Westerners and is often equated by them with individual reasoning in general. From Universal to Personal Shariah With the rise of the Turkic and Mongol Muslim empires in the 13th century, the status of Shariah changed in Islam. Shariah ceased to be “universal”. The Turks and Mongols accepted Islam and the authority of Shariah in ritual issues such as prayer, ablutions, diet, fasting, charity, male circumcision, and burial. But they refused to give up their own systems of customary law, which had evolved in Central Asia over millennia. The Ottoman sultan Suleyman the Magnificent (14941566) promulgated a legal code separate from Shariah, based on Turkish customary law, and 6

which removed criminal and other state administrative affairs from religious jurisdiction. For this reason, he is known to Muslims as Suleyman Kanuni or Suleyman the Lawgiver. This Ottoman “secular law” existed in conjunction with Shariah, although Ottoman Muslim clerics offered the argument that the secular laws were part of Shariah. In the Islamic discourse after the disappearance of the Baghdad caliphate (khilafah) in 1258, all law, including non-Islamic law, is considered Shariah, reflecting a variant of the view on multiple “Shariahs” stated at the commencement of this section, and of which Islamic Shariah is one, sacred expression. Because the Ottoman state was the most powerful Muslim state in history, traditional Shariah came to be identified with such a “diversity of law.” That is the basis of traditional Shariah today: a Shariah applied to the personal practice of religious observance, family issues, and finance, but not to crime or governance. The German academic Mathias Rohe (University of Nürnberg), in writing on Shariah in Europe, has summarised this relationship as follows: “Technically, there are two current definitions remarkably differing from each other and often causing misunderstanding in public discussion. In a broader sense, shari’a refers to any kind of religious and legal rule prescribed by Islam. This includes rules concerning the duties of worship or alms-giving as well as those regulating contract, family, or penal law. Most of the non-Muslims in Europe as well as many Muslims[,] especially [of] Turkish origin would understand the term shari’a in a narrower sense, confining it to the legal rules regulating personal status, family and inheritance and corporal punishment. Whereas the observation of rules concerning prayer, fasting etc. usually does not cause any problems, the application of the latter would cause serious conflicts in Europe.”5 For this reason, as well as because of the historical impact of European, Soviet, and even, in the Philippines, American colonial rule, every Muslim society in the world, except Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Sudan, today mainly relegates Shariah to religious observance and limited family affairs,



‘Personal’ Shariah


while maintaining commercial, civil, and criminal codes based on non-Muslim law. (Iran has, surprisingly, retained aspects of European law.) Turkey recognises only secular law, while the situations of many ex-Communist Muslim countries are unclear, and merit a more thorough investigation. Personal Shariah As an example of exclusively personal Shariah, all Muslims are forbidden to consume alcohol or use items containing pork and its byproducts such as gelatin or pigskin. Shia Muslims are also forbidden to eat most shellfish and some other fish, and are commanded to follow more stringent rules than Sunnis in areas of individual cleanliness or “contamination”. Shariah consultations among clerics govern what consumer goods the observant Muslim is permitted to purchase, serve to another, consume or drink, and wear (for example, a pigskin belt, which is prohibited). These are entirely individual matters in every society in the world. Muslims are seldom at risk of violating their personal commitment in these matters by participating in Western society – one negative example, however, is that of pork in food served to Muslim soldiers in non-Muslim military forces or to Muslim inmates in prisons. Shariah rules for Muslim prayer are diverse according to local standards as determined by the five most-widely recognised and mainly geographical juristic interpretations, but do not extend beyond the prayer space in mosques and homes. Shariah governs other religious customs that are not normally the subject of public law in the West – ablutions, diet, fasting, charity, male circumcision, and burial. Non-Muslims need not, in most cases, be concerned about clerical supervision of the slaughtering of meat. In this limited sense, personal Shariah already functions on a voluntary basis wherever Muslims live in the West, and poses no threat to Western legal systems. Nevertheless, an increasing trend toward accommodation of Muslim prayer in Western public facilities, especially schools and

administrative buildings, may also inject into such areas Shariah-based gender separation during prayer, as well as head scarves (hijab), which violate standards of religious non-interference in public education in France (for all girls and women) and Germany (for teachers only). Shariah-compliant funeral services prescribe washing of bodies, time limits on burial of 48 hours after death, and other such details. These last issues are essentially irrelevant to nonMuslims, although the practice of local nonMuslim medical examiners in declining to release cadavers during weekends, for interment within the prescribed 48-hour period has, as we learned, occasioned complaints in Britain. Muslims are forbidden from loaning or investing money with the intent of earning interest (riba), and many leading banks and investment houses in the West have long supported Shariah advisory boards to serve Muslim clients in a way compliant with this ban. Shariah-based investment services do not affect the lives of nonMuslims. Nevertheless, the ban on income derived from interest is a factor for institutional and legal separation of Muslims from their non-Muslim neighbors, so that the debate over interest, and the ideological origin of so-called “Islamic finance” in the West are properly within the purview of this study and are examined herein. The Main Contested Area Within Traditional Shariah: Family Law Traditional Shariah includes areas of controversy and tension, notwithstanding its personal character, because the personal includes the familial. Traditional Shariah is ambiguous regarding family matters, in that marriage, sexual relations, divorce, and remarriage are generally seen by Shariah traditionalists as determined by religious law rather than civil or customary law. Laws against polygamy, which is permitted in Islam, are generally obeyed by traditional Muslims living in non-Muslim countries, and polygamy is increasingly rare in Muslim societies. But many Muslims in the West may decline 7




A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009

Western marriage, or be prevented by Western law, as explained in the case studies, from turning to Western courts regarding divorce and inheritance. Traditional Shariah upholds women’s rights de jure in marriage, divorce, inheritance, and related affairs, and amelioration of injustices to women may, ideally, be accomplished in Muslim countries as well as in the West by recourse to different legal and other public fora, both religious and secular. But certain abuses against women remain a significant issue in many, but not all, Muslim cultures. For example, so-called “honour” murders, forced or arranged marriages, forced divorce between members of “inappropriate tribes,” and female genital mutilation (FGM) are unknown among Bosnian Muslims, who are highly European, and FGM in particular is mainly limited to Arab and African countries, with the noteworthy exception of Kurdistan. Still, traditional Shariah in the broader Muslim world is contradictory on the question of arranged or nonconsensual marriages, recommending against marriage without the consent of the bride, but lacking clear guarantees of a woman’s own choice. Contemporary Shariah texts are increasingly problematical on such issues as socalled “honour” murder and FGM. Shariah traditionalists in countries afflicted by so-called “honour” murder and FGM consider these to be tribal customs unrelated to or opposed by religious law. The European Parliament issued a report on so-called “honour” murder in 2007 6 pointing out, “Honour killing is often mistakenly believed to be an Islamic practice or a practise condoned by Islam since it often occurs in Muslim-majority societies. In actual fact honour killing is forbidden in Islam and there is no mention of this practise in the Qur’an or in the Hadiths. There is little evidence of the practice in Muslim-majority countries such as Indonesia or Malaysia”. Female genital mutilation (FGM) is a pre-Islamic practise. While we agree that abuse of women and children under colour of alleged Shariah cannot be ascribed to Islamic religious inspiration per se, we believe that the example of Saudi Arabia, which considers itself the leader of the Muslim world and where 8

so-called “honour” crime, FGM, forced marriage, forced divorce, and related customs are institutionalised, shows that their adoption in Islamic cultures, and the complicity of Muslim religious leaders in enabling them by failing to oppose them or assist victims, must be recognised. Forced marriage has mainly disappeared among the Islamic elites of the big cities of Pakistan, Turkey, and North Africa, which are the main places of origin of Muslim immigrants to Western Europe, and is viewed as a rural custom common in the poor countries and districts of South Asia, Turkey, Morocco, Algeria, and the Sub-Saharan lands. But underdeveloped regions are precisely those that often produce the largest numbers of immigrants to the West. In its own way, Wahhabi Saudi Arabia, where ultramodern cities and nomadic customs exist side-by-side, and which exports ideology and finance more than people, is an urban environment with rural values, which is one of the reasons practices inimical to women are established there. FGM is considered obligatory by adherents of Shafi’i Shariah, including many Arabs as well as Sunni Kurds, but is absent from the Shafi’i areas of the Indian Ocean and is rare or banned in Southeast Asia (e.g. it is illegal in Indonesia). It is seen as virtuous but not required by Hanbalis, and as a custom acceptable according to the desire of the husband by Hanafis. It is an implied but not a specified practice in Maliki Shariah.7 FGM is generally banned in Shia Islam. Surgeons conducting FGM reversal are now active in some countries. Traditional Shariah calls for personal modesty in men and women alike but does not demand the imposition of extreme body covering or other radical practices on women. The standing of all forms of family Shariah is presently in question in Muslim as well as non-Muslim societies. Shariah is not an immutable legal standard. How moderate and traditional Muslims will address the legal vulnerabilities of Muslim women is unpredictable. Traditional Shariah is, we emphasise, based on pluralistic debate among experts,



such prohibitions as the Islamic ban on the sale and consumption of alcohol never applied to non-Muslims. but in contrast with the situation of radical Shariah and Western law. among Muslim countries. or jihadist cadres in Pakistan. radical Shariah. “all law is Shariah”. The relationship between traditional Shariah and Western law is similarly complex. the Taliban. nor are the leaders of the Palestinian Islamist movement Hamas. to emphasise. it is necessary for him to fulfill his commitment”. Adherents of traditional Shariah have typically sought citizenship in Western countries. Shariah would not be applied to non-Muslims.9 It is also necessary to stipulate that in traditional Islam. that Shariah and secular law have coexisted in Muslim countries for centuries. but nor does it necessarily offer a solution. aside from clearly individual religious obligations and personal hygiene. In a striking expression of the principle of acceptance of Western law by traditional Muslim immigrants. and to set a good example to their non-Muslim neighbors.Traditional > Personal Shariah CIP grounded in thorough study of authorities and precedents. joined Western political parties. as well as recognition that.eu . Muslims who immigrate to nonMuslim countries are enjoined to obey the laws and customs of the land to which they move. A Code of Practice for Muslims in the West.8 This concept was restated by Rohe as follows: “with respect to the legal rules of shari’a it was broadly accepted since the Middle Ages that they cannot be applied outside ‘Islamic’ territory and that Muslims are obliged to either respect the law of the land or to leave the country and to return to countries ruled by Muslims… [this] obliges Muslims not to break the law of the land as an equivalent for being granted personal security and protection by the state of residence”. the Horn of Africa. Today. jihad or religiously-commanded armed struggle can only be summoned by a recognised.islamicpluralism. A demagogue like Osama bin Laden is not an emir and has no authority to declare jihad. although recent theorists of “parallel Shariah” have defined “setting a good example” primarily in terms of Islamic da’wa or missionization. only Saudi Arabia attempts to apply its 9 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. under Ottoman imperial rule. But Sunni Kurdish communities. as well as Saudi Arabia. a standard Shia Shariah manual. The intersection of Shariah and customary law is also contradictory. states “If [a Muslim] has given [a non-Muslim government] a commitment – even if indirectly (as is implied in the immigration documents) – to abide by the laws of that country. the millet or religious-communal system of representation provided for separate justice systems for Jews and Orthodox Christians. Ottoman secular laws. In addition. Muslim violations of and challenges to common law in Western countries were rare until the rise of radical Shariah ideology at the end of the 20th century. are considered to have represented a step away from narrow Shariah. a marja or authoritative juristic figure Iraqi Shias are required to follow. For example. based on customary law. and that some situations fall outside religious law. In addition. Attitudes toward political participation by Muslims residing in non-Muslim societies are an important marker of traditional vs. and their communities. The future of Shariah in general. and allow so-called “honour” murder and FGM. In traditional Shariah. In traditional Islam. and areas geographically near to the latter (particularly Egypt) are influenced by other varieties of customary law. such as is absent from the Muslim world today. and voted (and stood as candidates and been elected) in local balloting. The aim of this established guidance was to assure the security of individual Muslims. traditional Shariah does not permit suicide terrorism or other forms of violence against civilians. especially if a reformed traditional Shariah is presented as a harmless or even progressive factor within a wider strategy for the introduction of “parallel Shariah” in Western countries. Reform of traditional Shariah to reinforce women’s rights cannot be excluded. or “commander of the faithful”. their families. is even more difficult to predict than change in the status of Muslim women. it is not violently adversarial. based on the writings of the Iraqi Shia Ayatollah Ali Sistani. global emir.

Indonesia and Nigeria. Sudan (without great success). Impelled by radical Shariah Full body covering CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. especially among Islamophobes. further toward the mainstream of Muslim and non-Muslim opinion. Shariah should have no bearing on any aspect of non-Muslim life. as an indicator of Muslim identity and as a banner for fundamentalism. women may be vulnerable to abuse. so long as no effort is made to deny neighbours of observant Muslims the right to consume or purchase whatever they wish. The spectre of Shariah imposed on nonMuslims has become pervasive in some Western media. and where Islam is the state religion. coexisting with Western law. in which young Muslims are to be indoctrinated. Radical Shariah holds that the West is an area of unbelief and that Muslims living in Western lands cannot obey Western laws but must establish their own Islamic legal standard. appearing in public without a full and loose body covering. meeting with male non-relatives in the absence of a family member of the woman as chaperone. and must be replaced by a theocratic “Islamic state” in which Shariah is the sole legal system.islamicpluralism. In traditional Shariah. The problem in the West is less one of radical Shariah in practice.eu . but of a separate and discriminatory system to which Muslims in the West would be submitted regardless of their needs and desires.) Radical Shariah demands a regressive 10 transformation: a “Muslim-ruled state” is insufficient. new demands for “parallel Shariah”. and as explained in the following section. traditional Shariah exists in countries ruled by Muslims. But the real problem facing both Muslims and nonMuslims is not that of Shariah established against the will of non-Muslims. a genuinely shocking departure from 1. recasting them as bases for extremist agitation. the most radical Shariah state. Radical Shariah adherents manipulate issues that should be insignificant to non-Muslims. rather it involves a dual ideological discourse. In the certification of consumer items permitted for use by Muslims. either because of misguided attempts to accommodate perceived (but inaccurate) Muslim sentiments. Extremists call vaguely for institutionalisation of radical Shariah in the Muslim countries as well as in the West. demanding the institution of a “caliphate” or khilafah is typically a metonym for the reestablishment of governance similar to that based exclusively on Shariah prior to the 13th century end of the Baghdad caliphate. Visitors to Saudi Arabia in 2007 reported that women were being discouraged from prayer at the Grand Mosque in Mecca and the Prophet’s Mosque in Medina. Saudi Arabia. claims that Shariah forbids women from driving vehicles. forbidding the practise of faiths aside from Islam and imposing severe punishments on non-Muslims who drink alcohol. have emerged. (The old Turco-Mongol customary law is no longer recognised anywhere. As previously noted. At the same time. with Muslim majorities. placing customary or secular law alongside religious law. but radical Shariah supporters claim religious support for broader subordination and mistreatment of women.400 years of Islamic observance. except where it enables oppression of women. and some areas of Pakistan. but legal canons may be variable. Malaysia. Rhetoric employed by Islamist radicals.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 interpretation of Shariah to all residents. Radical Shariah Radical Shariah is institutionalised in few Muslim countries: chiefly. Traditional and radical Shariah advocates diverge in their attitudes on morals and family law. Saudi Arabia. or because of agitation by radicals. For example. and other practices that are considered matters of individual choice in most Muslim societies. Iran.

Rather. attempts to bar the neighbours of Muslims from selling. a fundamentalist movement mainly active in Egypt but present in many Muslim countries. but as long known in Saudi Arabia and the U. Equally important.11 Followers of radical Shariah also claim justification to physically degrade women. secular law may be ignored or violated.eu 11 . But there is a marked persistence on Shariah websites of inquiries as to whether it is acceptable for a Muslim to defy Western laws. and other countries. but also by their extensive polemics in justification of terrorist activities in Israel. although Shariah is not itself believed by Muslims educated in religion to be of divine origin. In the radical view.Radical Indoctrination CIP proponents. Abusive practices. as most recently exposed by UK television. rent property without fulfilling lease and other responsibilities. purchasing.g. however. Al-Qaradawi is often alleged to be the religious mentor of the Muslim Brotherhood. as represented by Western canons. such as voting or other political participation. radical Shariah proponents.. and employees. and abduct children from their separated mothers. calls for abstention from Western public institutions. in Britain. although considered abhorrent or criminalised as domestic violence and hate speech in Western Europe. indoctrinate Muslims in the belief that adherence to Islamic law exempts immigrant Muslims or their offspring from obedience to common and criminal law in Western countries. is defined by their attitudes toward women and sexuality. Iraq.S. are openly advocated in radical Shariah discourse. and then divorce them before returning to the kingdom.10 Radical Indoctrination in Abstention from Western Politics and Exemption From Criminal and Anti-Terror Laws Radical Shariah. The core argument for radical Shariah is simple and unsophisticated: the Muslim is told that human law. which shows that incitement to such behaviour in the West is serious and growing. contract student loans and default on them. and Belgium. CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. Saudi individuals may go on vacation. The radicalism of the prominent fundamentalist cleric Yusuf AlQaradawi. embodied in Shariah. marry local women for a summer. children. e. especially those involving women and sexual minorities. borrow money from nonMuslims without repaying it. and permits flouting of social and personal responsibilities contracted with non-Muslims as well as non-radical Muslims. who was born in Egypt but has operated from Ireland. and generally defy the law followed by their neighbours. Similar bans are now alleged regarding the distribution of Christian religious literature. to sum up. Specific examples of some of these practices may be mainly anecdotal or journalistic. down to such simple matters as traffic offences. Such attitudes are so common among Saudis visiting the West that late in 2007. without or in defiance of court-ordered custody assignment.islamicpluralism. Shariah represents a human application of divinely-mandated religious principles.” claiming that Saudis had spent the equivalent of USD25 million on these marriages in the previous three years. Moderate Muslims have long observed with dismay that radical Shariah advocates teach Muslim youth in the West that they may seduce or marry and abandon women (Muslim and non-Muslim). as applied to Muslims living in the West. Qatar. Afghanistan. the prominent Saudi daily Al-Watan (The Nation) condemned “tourist marriages. or even possessing pigs or alcohol are visible in some Western and Asian communities. commit identity fraud and otherwise steal property. cannot supersede a presumed divine law. and also claims exemption from Western laws against suicide terrorism and other acts of violence against civilians. and others like him.

it is not obligatory.”14 12 Al-Qaradawi has commented as follows on female genital mutilation (FGM):15 “Actually.eu . whose Shariah manual The Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam is very likely the most widely read such volume among Western Muslims.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 Female genital mutilation may be performed on girls ranging in age from 1 week to puberty. the most moderate opinion and the most likely one to be correct is in favor of practising circumcision in the moderate Islamic way indicated in some of the Prophet’s hadiths – even though such hadiths are not confirmed to be authentic. refuse sexual relations with her.13 Al-Qaradawi has written on wife-beating that when a husband “senses that feelings of disobedience and rebelliousness are rising against him in his wife. It is reported that the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) said to a midwife: ‘Reduce the size of the clitoris but do not exceed the limit. and I personally support this under the current circumstances in the modern world.” Jamal Badawi. and if that is unsuccessful. a colleague of Al-Qaradawi in the European Council for Fatawa and Research (ECFR) has produced several volumes on CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. they have been suggested to maintain the purity of the Islamic society. head of the European Council for Fatawa and Research (ECFR). Muslim countries differ over the issue of female circumcision.’ “The hadith indicates that circumcision is better for a woman’s health and it enhances her conjugal relation with her husband. whoever finds it serving the interest of his daughters should do it.”12 The Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam was banned by the French Ministry of the Interior in 1996. and AlQaradawi and Badawi are among the most influential Muslim figures in Europe today. for that is better for her health and is preferred by husbands. AlQaradawi. who is active in the UK. he argues. It has sparked off fierce debate in Egypt whereby scholars and doctors are split into proponents and opponents. Wife-Beating and Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) and Women’s Participation in Society Three of the most notable examples of explicit support for conduct criminalised in the West involve Al-Qaradawi. “The jurists of Islam have held differing opinions concerning the punishment for this abominable practice… should both the active and passive participants be put to death? While such punishments may seem cruel. with colleagues Radicals on Shariah Regarding Homosexuality. But. some countries sanction it whereas others do not. and the Spanish Muslim cleric Sheikh Mohamed Kamal Mostafá. It’s noteworthy that the Prophet’s saying ‘do not exceed the limit’ means ‘do not totally remove the clitoris’… “Actually. But whoever chooses not to do it is not considered to have committed a sin for it is mainly meant to dignify women as held by scholars. All are Egyptian by birth. it is permissible for him to beat her lightly with his hands. “If this approach fails. Yusuf Al-Qaradawi. avoiding her face and other sensitive areas. this is a controversial issue among jurists and even among doctors. has stated of homosexuals. Anyhow. the Islamic legal expert Jamal Badawi. “However.” he should first reason with her.islamicpluralism.

“[Wife-]beating must never be done in a state of exacerbated. called for such problems to be turned over to “family tribunals. he translated a Quranic reference to wife-beating as follows. Jamal Badawi represents an example of the entry of a radical Shariah exponent into Western government councils. but slim and lightweight to avoid serious injury [to the woman] and no scars. Jamal Badawi produced. “[the blows] must not be strong or hard since the aim is to inflict psychological suffering rather than humiliation or physical ill-treatment.160 for statements in his book The Woman in Islam. in a British project. At the same time. Mostafá wrote on wife-beating. breast.” Similarly. Badawi has been prominent.21 Another distinction between traditional and radical Shariah involves the sources of 13 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www.” a preaching circuit of UK Muslim communities. on the recourse of the Muslim wife living in the West in case of irresolvable family disputes. all leading Muslim countries.”18 This line of argument conflicts with the experience of Turkey. blind rage” and that “she should not be beaten on the sensitive parts of her body. he is continuously engaged in the process of decision-making pertaining to the security and well-being of his people. nor encouraged. she should be beaten on the feet and hands. some decisions require a maximum of rationality and a minimum of emotionality – a requirement which does not coincide with the instinctive nature of women. thus affecting her decision.19 The Spanish Sheikh Mohamed Kamal Mostafá was sentenced in 2004 by a court in Catalonia to a suspended prison term of 15 months and a fine of €2. such as the face. Instead. derided by moderate Muslims and non-Muslim media alike as a “roadshow. In one of his many online texts.” This fatwa presents a conflict with the establishment in the West of the right of women to services from public agencies dedicated to family problems. or any similar one. Such changes may occur during an emergency situation.Radical Shariah CIP marriage and woman in Islam.” (Qur’an 4:34). including a common moderate Muslim argument that the Prophet Muhammad himself never engaged in the practice. without considering the excessive strain which is Dr. Badawi has also become notorious for his defence of polygamy. He leads people in the prayers. Badawi wrote in 1980 in opposition to the involvement of women in politics: “According to Islam. is generally inconsistent with the physiological and psychological make-up of woman in general.20 An ECFR fatwa issued in 1998. This demanding position.” was financed by the British government as a supposed remedy for extremism. His intent was clearly to support wife-beating through an ameliorative form of editing.16 Badawi cited traditional Islamic sources which discourage wife-beating. women undergo various physiological and psychological changes. such as the Commander of the Army.islamicpluralism. or bruises are caused. Bangladesh. and Indonesia. since 2006. the head of the state is no mere figurehead.17 He argued “polygamy is neither mandatory. in including women among their political leaders. Pakistan. It is a medical fact that during their monthly periods and during their pregnancies. but merely permitted. with his own interpolations: “(and last) beat (tap) them (lightly).” The book was condemned as an incitement to domestic violence. The tour. abdomen.” In his volume The Status of Women in Islam. Moreover. the “Radical Middle Way.” with a “rod that must not be stiff. especially on Fridays and festivities.eu . and head.

for example. traditions. has no formal Islamic theological training. While the absence of an invariant Shariah is a positive value. and substitutes for them the arbitrary decisions of radical clerics. radicals abuse the previously-indicated mutability of Shariah. On radical Shariah websites.eu . and no reference at all to the common law in Western countries or to the traditional obligation of Muslim immigrants and their communities to obey the laws of non-Muslim countries.” but unlike the guidance of the Shia Sistani. and standards.islamicpluralism. another reason for the multiplication of Shariah websites. The historical outcome in which the precedents of traditional Shariah were replaced in radical Shariah by arbitrary and improvised judgments reflects the rise of Saudi Wahhabism. To fill spaces occupied in many Muslim societies by secular law. wipes out the precedents of traditional Islam and the coexistence of religious and customary or secular law. of which there are dozens in every language spoken by Muslims. Al-Qaradawi’s The Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam. precedents. Jamal Badawi. except for truncated or misrepresented citations. imams (prayer leaders). videotapes. Medina 14 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. based on their own views. says nothing about Muslim residents of a non-Muslim state. Radical Shariah texts like AlQaradawi’s The Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam or Badawi’s The Status of Women in Islam are written as if Western law were completely irrelevant or even nonexistent. Radical Shariah. They proclaim themselves to be shaykhs (pious personalities). while traditional Shariah emphasises explication and study. and websites in which they answer questions from Muslims about Shariah issues. which is also known to traditional Muslims as “la-madhdhab” or Islam without recourse to the precedents of the established schools of Islamic law. radical Shariah “experts” must constantly expand their version of Shariah. It has long been observed by Muslims trained in the religion that radical clerics and their followers are generally ignorant and even contemptuous of the heritage of the Islamic faith. includes a chapter on “Non-Muslim Residents of an Islamic State. which made a significant appearance in the West less than a quarter of a century ago. Unfortunately. The aforementioned Al-Qaradawi and Badawi are notable examples of individuals. denying precedent. for example. judgments are nearly always presented with minimal reference to the Islamic past. In this way. more ideologues than theologians. the proliferation of improvised legal decisions in defiance of precedent is negative. or muftis (administrators of religious courts) on their own authority. its precepts. is increasingly popular with young Muslims who lack religious Iraqi Shia Muslims in a 2004 march display their loyalty to Ayatollah Ali Sistani The Grand Masjid of Prophet Muhammad.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 authority for juristic opinions. this style of radical improvisation. Radical Shariah treats all queries as deserving of simple answers. who produce television broadcasts.

22 At the end of August 2007 the Saudi newspaper Al-Yaum (The Day) reported that a Riyadh court decreed 1.‘Parallel’ Shariah CIP education. the governor of Riyadh. developed after Qur’an.000 lashes for a Saudi youth in a morals offence. which cause extraordinary suffering. or small branches. and the birth of a second and third generation of Muslims in Europe in the 20th century. Qur’an prescribes flogging as an Islamic punishment for only two crimes: adultery – with proof of guilt requiring four credible eyewitnesses – and libel against the honour of a woman.23 In July 2008. positioned midway between traditional and radical forms. cloths. It differs from traditional Shariah in that it proposes a separate legal canon from established. It could also be seen as a counterapplication of the diversity present in the Turkish and Islamised Mongol empires. Islamic jurisprudence. In general.750 times for sexual relations with his sister-in-law. increasingly. in reality. no more than 100 lashes. Yet the Saudi Shariah courts have routinely delivered sentences totaling thousands of lashes. but to be enforced by the same Western authorities under which Muslims in the West heretofore have been mandated to live.” The complainant said his wife had undergone “mental torture” in the incident. a new theory of Shariah appeared. however. Also at the end of August 2007. In an incident involving Saudi Shia teenagers who resented insults directed against their sect by their radical Sunni schoolteachers. Further. We call this phenomenon “parallel Shariah”.islamicpluralism. and for libel. In addition.eu . the individual imposing the punishment was barred from striking with the full force of his arm. is known for decreeing lashings on whim. calls for 40 to 80 lashes for drinking alcohol. with the intention of humiliation rather than infliction of pain or injury. and only for these three violations of law. although exclusively by telephone. no more than 100 lashes could be administered. which was not to be extended above his own waist. (Stoning for adultery does not appear in Qur’an. The “legal” decision was based entirely on the declaration by the woman’s husband that he had divorced her exclusively because her professor repeatedly communicated with her. For adultery. “parallel Shariah” does not embody obviously radical principles. associate traditional Islam with their “outdated” or “rural” elders. “Parallel Shariah” With the growth of Muslim immigration to the West. the dailies Okaz and Al-Riyadh reported that authorities in the southern province of Jizan were investigating a case filed by a Saudi citizen against two young male members of the mutawiyin or religious militia. But under traditional Islam. only 80 were mandated. The newspapers reported that the couple were stopped in their car “on suspicion of not being related. as it is limited to personal and family law as well as. Khalid Al-Zahrani. Saudi Prince Salman. To cite some notorious examples from Saudi Arabia. if.”25 Moderate Muslims warn that this is the Shariah radicals wish to impose throughout the Muslim world and the spirit they wish to introduce into Muslim communities in the West. at all. non-Muslim law.24 Some aspects of radical Shariah as enforced in the Saudi kingdom would be amusing if the situation were not tragic. was sentenced to 600 lashes and his woman student to 350 lashes after it was “determined” that they had conducted a romantic relationship. Such sentences may be carried out over an extended period of time so as not to simply kill the individual being punished. “Parallel Shariah” appears or is presented as a compromise 15 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. flogging was to be carried out with soft straps. Prince Muqrin of Medina ordered that a dozen students be whipped 300 times each. financial transactions. and do not wish to expend the necessary time and effort to seriously study their religion. without even consulting Shariah courts. but flogging is carried out in the kingdom using wooden rods and metal cables. at the beginning of 2002 a man in Jeddah was whipped 4. often miscalled a “religious police. a Saudi biochemist.) In addition.

“Parallel Shariah” implies separation of Muslims living in the West from their nonMuslim neighbors. notwithstanding its restricted scope. located in Cairo.27 “parallel Shariah” is designated a “fiqh [Islamic legal interpretation] for minorities” [fiqh al-aqalliyat] i. in broad terms. a “Shariah invasion”.eu . While much of his work has been carried out in the U.islamicpluralism. but with the support of state authorities. the Iraqi-born Taha Jabir AlAlwani. as a means to inevitably introduce radical Shariah into non-Muslim lands. Muslim representatives of varying orientations could gain authority.S.”28 Al-Qaradawi used the term fiqh al-aqalliyat in publishing the first collection of fatwas of the fundamentalist European Council for Fatawa and Research (ECFR). family. formerly headquartered in Dublin and now located in Brussels. one in Britain and the other in France. At its second consultative session. and led by AlQaradawi. since. in a Muslimonly legal structure.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 A young Taha Jabir Al-Alwani Wife-beating in East Africa or accommodating institution for the “Muslim diaspora. “Parallel Shariah” limited to personal. comprising 33 members. “creeping Shariah”. In the work of Al-Alwani. even a minimal “parallel Shariah” could come under the direction and administration of radicals who would exploit it to impose their own views. the French scholar Alexandre Caeiro has pointed out that Al-Alwani’s methodology in developing the “fiqh for minorities” was adopted by Al-Qaradawi for general application when the new “parallel Shariah” (to employ our. below. The phenomenon of “parallel Shariah” originated with radical Islamic scholars such as AlQaradawi26 and one of his counterparts mainly living in the U. with the presumed aim of conquering or otherwise subduing the latter. “Parallel Shariah” or “fiqh for minorities/fiqh al-aqalliyat” has also been titled 16 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www.e.S. Al-Alwani is a graduate of Al-Azhar University. in our view encompasses problematical elements even if it does not embody radical ideology. But the erection of a “parallel Shariah” could also open a space for the introduction of radical Shariah principles. This is in itself a radical attitude. and. not Caeiro’s typology) emerged in the late 1990s. and many others. “Fiqh for minorities/fiqh al-aqalliyat” has also been described as “a special theory of jurisprudence that was formulated originally by al-Alwani and elaborated and popularised by him. ECFR decided to establish two regional authorities for fatwa issuance.. For example. As will be seen in our discussion of divorce issues in the Case Study: Britain. and financial matters. Shariah-based divorce proceedings are currently dominated by radical clerics. ECFR has played an important role in propagation of “fiqh for minorities/fiqh alaqalliyat”. held in Dublin in October 1998.” But various non-Muslim commentators have viewed “parallel Shariah” as an “infiltration” or “usurpation” of the public legal space in the West. the leading Sunni religious educational institution in the world. a body of opinion derived from Shariah doctrine to govern the lives of Muslim minorities in non-Muslim lands. Qaradawi..

” “reformed fiqh” and “European fiqh”. workplace.29 Al-Alwani’s presentation of the “fiqh for minorities” was elaborated in a vocabulary that was. were to survive for a long time”.eu . by attracting non-Muslims to the religion of Islam rather than protecting the rights of Muslims.S. it suggests that Western legal canons such as civil marriage and divorce. Al-Alwani’s argument was also radical in that it declared traditional Shariah.” This conception is unambiguously separatist. Muslim communities in southern France were of short. existing as Muslim oases or islands in the middle of the non-Muslim oceans.” “fiqh of balances. let us recall.S. Thus. and Mongolia could never be described as countries that “feared and respected Islam. Tibet. invasive spirit. and so on). “Reasonable accommodation” has become an accepted legal principle in many developed nations and is embodied in U. Indeed. Indeed. firstly. radical in its assumptions about Islamic history. Al-Alwani declared candidly that a “fiqh for minorities” aimed at Islamisation of the West. on the contrary. federal authorities on “reasonable accommodation” of Muslims in the U.30 This vision of the Muslim heritage seemed redolent of an intent to subvert non-Muslim lands by the establishment of Islamic enclaves such as many non-Muslim commentators now claim to perceive in Muslim immigration to the West. northern Italy. and easily seemed to assume an aggressive. Japan. He advocated a “new” approach that might appear original and therefore satisfying of a superficial Western call for reform in Islam. Al-Alwani argued fancifully that in the past “Muslims were the dominant world power. some religious believers are already granted exemptions for certain principles and practices of their faith so long as they do not interfere with the good order of society (Sikh policemen in Britain may wear turbans. the vocabulary of Al-Alwani’s “fiqh for minorities” was maximal.Fiqh for minorities CIP “lawful Islamism.islamicpluralism.” Rather. incorrect in addressing the status of Muslims in the West. but it was also absurdly fictive. or considerable areas of Africa. commanded that Muslim migrants obey the laws of countries in which they settled. as well as electoral democracy. Some communities. which are absent from or inconsistent in many Muslim majority societies. even fantastical. which.S. rather than an evocation of the past it seemed to be a prediction of the future. and the very existence of Muslim society in northern Italy is highly doubtful.31 The Centre for Islamic Pluralism includes practitioners in employment law and participates as a consultant to the U. Scandinavia. “ ‘fiqh for minorities’ is not meant to give minorities privileges or concessions not available to Muslim majorities. are inappropriate for Muslims living in the West. might imply “reasonable accommodation” of religious belief and practice. But as Al-Alwani wrote. administrative directives for protection against religious discrimination. and other places. No other power would dare attack individual Muslims or infringe the integrity of Islam… The whole world was open to them as a residence and a place of worship… The more powerful and ambitious migrants of comfortably independent means would travel even to non-Muslim lands. it aims to protect minorities as representatives or examples of Muslim society in the countries in which they live. where they would establish their own Muslim emirates.” “fiqh of reality. like those in the south of France. under British and American protections for the free exercise of religion. rather than long history.” when unexamined. Germany.” nor could England. religiously-inspired conscientious objectors to war or abortion are not required to participate in those acts. This is a consistent source of tension in the discussion of Shariah in the West: while “reasonable accommodation” and traditional Shariah for immigrant-based communities in the West are founded on a de minimis standard. feared and respected by all nations. but 17 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. Al-Alwani’s “fiqh for minorities. Such a discourse far exceeds the Western concept of “reasonable accommodation.

Al-Alwani seems to suggest that Algerian Muslims should have accepted French nationality and then attempted to take control of France. because there more people could be drawn to Islam by the individual’s presence. In addition to calling for Muslim immigrant acceptance of non-Muslim laws and customs and declaring Shariah void of authority in non-Muslim lands. traditional Shariah forbids antagonizing the local majority in non-Muslim societies. In place of supporting the Algerian nationalist movement. even if he lives among a nonMuslim majority. While some non-Muslim 18 commentators equate such a strategy with jihad and conquest. traditional Islam was limited by its “introversion incompatible with the universality of Islam” and was “localised and provincial. earlier Islamic scholars who argued that it was preferable for a Muslim to settle and live in a non-Muslim country with free practise of religion. perhaps predictably. it. he would know that the Turkish sultans contracted extensive treaties with a range of European powers. Some Muslim scholars even criticised Al-Alwani’s “fiqh for minorities/fiqh al-aqalliyat” as providing more rights for Muslims in the non-Muslim countries than in the Muslim societies.” the latter which he left unspecified. Islamizing goal. including the Venetian Republic and its associated trading partners in the Adriatic.islamicpluralism. Al-Alwani proclaimed the superiority of Shariah over other areas of Islamic thought.e. or through spiritual missionization. Yet such “distinguishing matters” were by no means trivial. has no precedent in Islamic history. and Indonesians were brought voluntarily to Islam through preaching.” allegedly “had no concept or experience of international law or diplomatic conventions obliging host countries to protect immigrants… except in certain distinguishing matters. which he described as “the ancient world. The Turks in particular have never been conquered by any foreign nation. Al-Alwani’s writing may be summed up in the following comment: “Islam knows no geographic boundaries. Indians. not infiltration and conspiracy. Through most of Islamic history.32 the Turks. according to him. dar-al-Islam [the global realm of Islam] is anywhere a Muslim can live in peace and security. AlAlwani called for a “new methodology” because.” Al-Alwani cites obscure.eu . writing that such an attitude reflected a “‘culture of conflict’ which Muslim minorities today can better do without”. This attitude in which every Muslim is to be treated as missionary for the religion was long inconsistent with reality. This argument conforms to a general tendency in the work of “parallel Shariah” advocates to allege that its introduction would unite Muslims to the West and reduce polarization. he condemned the Algerian nationalists of the 20th century for rejecting French citizenship. Al-Alwani wrote that classical Islamic history. In yet another revelation of a superlative ignorance. it was applied in Muslim societies rather than the whole world. In addition. The radicals therefore would use accommodation of Islam to promote subordination to Islam.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 in reality reproduced the previously-described radical habit of rejecting precedents and promoting improvisation in juristic thought. to cite but one example. Thus. jihad against non-Muslims referred to warfare between states and armies. In perhaps the most bizarre of Al-Alwani’s convoluted meditations. If Al-Alwani had even the barest knowledge of Ottoman history.” i. But it seems obvious that such a scheme would have a more problematical. CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. while the Arabs and Persians were conquered by the Muslims and adapted en masse to the power of a new ruling religion. given the greater rate of immigration of ordinary and secular Muslims to the West in search of economic opportunities as well as to escape rigid clerical and ideological dictates. But in the reactionary-utopian method of Wahhabis and other fundamentalists this dangerous mentality has been reintroduced. Past Islamisation was accomplished either through armed invasion of territory and establishment of Muslim administration in which acceptance of Islam reflected various incentives.

Russia alone has more Muslims than many Arab states.‘Parallel’ Sha ria h CIP The proposition of Al-Alwani that anywhere a Muslim lives is Islamic territory is clearly colonialistic and expansionist. which produced the Taliban in Afghanistan. “parallel Shariah” would erect a new barrier of separation within non-Muslim societies. the argument of Al-Alwani in favor of “fiqh for minorities” bizarrely evokes the claim of Serbian extremists that anywhere Serbs lived was Serb territory. This debate reflected the European introduction of “Islamic banking. one observes a triangular approach involving Saudi financing. All such Sunni fundamentalists may be described as takfiris. some Western academics. Thus. and the overwhelming majority of Turks and Kurds living in Europe. as well as the grand mufti of Bulgaria. a noted and proven moderate of pro-Western views. against Muslims who disagree with them. this outlook is supported by “soft- fundamentalist” factions within the resurgent Islamist movement originating in Turkey.34 The absence of these figures from Balkan area editions may be taken as an indication that these individuals did not join ECFR. the ideological environment for “parallel Shariah” agitation grew out of the British Asian Muslim community. ECFR. in addition to less discerning commentators. the discussion of “parallel Shariah” began with an ECFR discussion in 1997 of the traditional Islamic ban on investment for earning of interest (riba). has consistently included only one representative of indigenous European Islamic culture. a 2002 roster in French included the grand mufti of Albania. As outlined by Caeiro. But ECFR membership is difficult to confirm. in that they seek to exercise takfir. drawn from the Indian subcontinent.and Albanian-language listing. utilizing Arab migrants from Morocco and Algeria. although Wahhabism played a role in importing such conceptions to France. For those with experience in the Balkan Wars of 1991-99. Pakistani activists and recruiters. In Britain. The rest of its 33 members have comprised four Saudis (even though few Saudis live in Europe). Haxhihafiz Sabri Koci. But in place of a separatism dividing Muslim and non-Muslim sectors of the globe. the German Rohe seemed satisfied to summarise the conception as follows: “in our days our earth is simply ‘one house’ for mankind as a whole. as are mainstream French Muslims. For example. mainly in the form of adherence to the fundamentalist and separatist Deobandi interpretation of Islam. between Muslims and their neighbors. and… every Muslim is entitled to live in any part of the world and is responsible for the sake of the society he/she is living in”. they have been recapitulated in other fundamentalist Islamic phenomena. names missing from Bosnian.” which we discuss as a religious question in chapter 10 of this study. the theory of “parallel Shariah” would extend the realm of Shariah beyond that of Islam. appear to have been seduced by such a “moderate” phrasing. While reinforcement of separatist attitudes originates in the last three centuries with the Saudi-financed global Wahhabi movement. plus Pakistan. Bosnian chief cleric Mustafa efendija Cerić.eu . In Germany. Unfortunately. in Western Europe. by abolishing the traditional division between a Muslim world in which Shariah could be enforced and a non-Muslim area in which Shariah would be considered null according to traditional scholars. In the United States. while the others represent immigrant communities. however. and is unrepresented in ECFR.islamicpluralism. (It should be 19 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. Bosnia-Hercegovina – an event that was largely ignored by the Bosnian Muslim public and which contrasted with Bosnian Muslim reality in that BosniaHercegovina is governed under European and post-Soviet civil law. The Council held its first consultative session in August 1998 in Sarajevo. Mustafa Alic Hadzhi. or exclusion from the body of Islam as disbelievers. and its jihadist component. mainly Arab. as well as 12 from Arab and African countries.33 To summarise. another significant actor in the offensive among ordinary Arabs has been the Muslim Brotherhood. and Brotherhood literature.

net reported the statement of Sheikh Husain Halawa.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 noted that Albania is a Muslim-majority country while Bulgaria’s Muslims are a minority. initiated the discussion. and the content of which appear. These are discussed in chapter 9 of this survey. They betray. especially by radicals. including consumption of alcohol. demanding that Muslims refrain from any migration to nonMuslim lands. a Tunisian. In Caeiro’s description. since such investment is rigorously illegal in Shariah. Al-Alwani’s logic. the current ECFR secretary general: “The ECFR secretary general denied charges that the organization is hijacked by Arabs to the extent of alienating some European Muslims”. especially those involving economic achievement. But it was not greeted with universal enthusiasm. however.islamonline. contemporary attitudes among Western Muslims gravitate between literalism. pragmatism. as worthy of emulation by Islamic believers.) ECFR members are. in which Muslim standards may be derived from non-Muslim practice. Murad further expressed an ultrafundamentalist posture. In sum. his argument has been summarised as calling for more rather than less observance of Shariah by Muslims in the West. upset by claims that they want to use non-Arabs to advance a radical agenda. Investment for earning of interest is a clear example in which Shariah and Western law conflict. but to adopt Western habits. and Unis Qurqah.eu . Four ECFR founders from France. ECFR repeated the traditional argument that establishment of Islamic law is not an obligation of Muslims living in nonMuslim lands. none of which specifically govern relations between Muslims and non-Muslim legal authorities. however. A Saudi shaykh close to the Muslim Brotherhood. comprising Ahmed Jaballah. to imply no particularly aggressive attitude. condemned the ECFR fatwa on mortgages as permitting Muslims in the West not only to engage in all sorts of forbidden vices. The website www. The ECFR issued its fatwa on payment of interest in 1999. at first. in promulgating “fiqh for minorities” far exceeded the need to find appropriate housing. and a liberalism based on maslaha or public betterment. a profound fundamentalist bias. Al-Arabi Bichri. which had previously been forbidden by most Islamic clerics in Europe. the modernist Islamic intellectual Tariq Ramadan criticised the fatwa on mortgages for making possible the rise of a privileged class of property-owning “bourgeois Muslims” in the West. Tahir Mahdi. and three of Algerian origin.islamicpluralism. addressing whether Muslims could purchase homes with mortgages. but 20 rather supported the project of Muslims to maintain a presence that would advance Islamisation. Literalists condemn investment for earning of interest as extremely sinful. in drawing Muslim Tariq Ramadan CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. By contrast. In addition. the ECFR members found that payment of interest in housing transactions was permissible to improve the situation of Muslims in establishing residences in Europe. it seems. counterposed to poverty in the Islamic world. while pragmatists find ways to justify it as a feature of life in the West. The 1999 fatwa on house mortgages appears as the beginning of the broad penetration of “parallel Shariah” in the West.35 ECFR has issued two volumes of fatwas. on the basis that it would serve as an obstacle to seduction by Western prosperity. Rohe36 has noted that in financial matters ECFR has emphasised individual religious duties rather than collective institutional canons. Mahmud bin Rida Murad.

supported by powerful jihadist organizations and influence in the Pakistani government. 2007. “Fury at ‘no-go’ areas ruled by the fanatics. rather. But introduction of “parallel Shariah” in countries with allowance for “reasonable accommodation” does not increase religious liberties. Yusuf. Die Welt Des Islams [Leiden-Boston]. The Two Faces of Islam. cit. The proposed introduction of “parallel Shariah” generally assumes that Islamic law would be enforced by Western governments. Ahmad. 2004. Amazigh are an indigenous people linguistically related to but long preceding the arrival in the region of Jews and Arabs. Furthermore. tenaciously support their own tradition of customary law. which appears as little more than a variation on “parallel Shariah. op. 2008.” The Sunday Telegraph [London]. “Islamic Ruling on Female CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. some of whom. Hall. January 13. 2007. and Berbers (Amazigh). 15 Al-Qaradawi. and are characterised by significant discontent with Arab political domination. whose views are not beyond criticism. Maher. 8 Hadi.islamicpluralism. Stephen. August 4. Macer. and Ibn Anas. 2008. a considerable number of Muslims are not particularly interested in performing religious practices while not denying their Muslim identity as such. who may adhere to Shariah. “Bishop: No-go zones for Christians.P. “Many Muslims in Europe still tend to seek practical solutions for organising their lives in accordance with the demands of European legal orders and Islamic religious commands.”37 This observation succinctly expresses the findings of the Centre for Islamic Pluralism about the Shariah campaign in Western Europe.” The Sunday Times [London]. who has cooperated with ECFR. It is only within the last few years that Muslims have also tried to formulate theoretical statements to clarify their positions with regard to possible conflicts between legal and religious norms. 14 Al-Qaradawi. cit. the ECFR fatwa on mortgages gained more acceptance in France than in Britain. Ramadan. “Muslim Britain is becoming one big nogo area.” The Daily Express [London]. Doubleday. called for the integration of Western law and Shariah.. cit. As an alternative. 11 Al-Watan.” in Special Theme Issue – Shari’a in Europe. 6 Directorate General External Policies of the [European] Union. op. 10 Wynne-Jones. Olivier. 5 Rohe..‘Parallel’ Shariah CIP migrants away from their religion. New York. the position of Al-Alwani according to which the whole world belongs to Islam. Reliance of the Traveller. 2002. than among France’s North African community. as monitored by Centre for Islamic Pluralism. 2008. p. op. cit. “Honour Killing Its Causes and Consequences: Suggested Strategies for the European Parliament. Policy Department External Policies. This is interesting in that Islamic fundamentalism appears to have maintained a stronger hold among Britain’s majority of IndoPakistani migrants. Jonathan. The Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam. as an expression of universalism. which is alienated from radical Islam by two factors. cit. The first is the division of FrenchNorth African Muslims between Arabs. The other matter is the aftermath of the “second Algerian war”. Columbia U. Other critics of the fatwa called for extension of “Islamic finance” as an alternative to the legitimisation of mortgages. Finally. “Application of Shari’a Rules in Europe – Scope and Limits. op. As Rohe. Mathias.” Brussels. op. reportedly originating in the Moroccan Rif mountains and the Algerian region of Kabylie. Globalised Islam. 2004. cit. Briefing Paper. 9 Rohe. 205. beginning in 1991 and pitting violent Islamists against the Algerian government. January 7. European Parliament. NOTES 4 Schwartz. Shiraz. 7 Ibn Naqib. Others are attached to Sufi (mystic) beliefs and practices and consider the ‘superficial’ rules of mediaeval fiqh… to deserve little importance. 13 Roy.eu 21 . it threatens to restrict them. New York. Abdul [based on the work of Ayatollah Ali Sistani]. January 6. has observed..” Ramadan also supports. 12 Al-Qaradawi. Yusuf. op. Al-Muwatta. Malik. and to find adequate solutions for such conflicts.

2007. pp.islamonline.net/sister/wife_beating. little-known in the West.net/Women/s_women.” in Special Theme Issue – Shari’a in Europe. 2008. 37 Rohe.” Reuters. 2004.” El Mundo. cit. Va. 22 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. 22 From reports by a human-rights monitoring group. op. International Institute of Islamic Thought. Eric. “El imán de Fuengirola no recurre la pena por incitar a los malos tratos a la mujer.com/polygamy5. London/Washington. A somewhat benign view of “fiqh for minorities”/”fiqh al-aqalliyat” was also taken in Fishman. cit. op. Alexandre. 24 Unsigned.htm. “Fiqh Al-Aqalliyat: A Legal Theory for Muslim Minorities. “conversion by the sword” or other forms of compulsion in religion are explicitly banned in Qur’an. and Compliance Manual. Austin. Arslani’s writings are. 2007. 27 Al-Alwani. 28 Brown.” at http://islamicworld. Home Purchase. December 9. op. 29 C.islamfortoday. “ECFR Marks 10 Years of European Fatwas. August 29. Taha Jaber.” La Vanguardia [Barcelona]. 2003. 2007. 33 Rohe.S. 16 Badawi. Série no. The Saudi Institute. University of Texas Press.. and Islamic Norms in the West. 19 Badawi’s biography appears at the Radical Middle Way site: www. 1.islamicpluralism. August 27. 30 Al-Alwani cites these historical claims to the work of Shakib Arslani (1869-1946). “El imam de Fuengirola se proclama ‘defensor de las mujeres’ en el juicio contra él por discriminación. Shammai. 20 Unsigned. Unsigned. Torture in Saudi Arabia and Religious Freedom in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. “After the Ramadan Affair: New Trends in Islamism in the West. 31 See U. . Religious Discrimination. “Saudi appeals court upholds flogging researchers. as monitored by the Centre for Islamic Pluralism. “The Social Construction of Shari’a: Bank Interest. 21 Conseil europeén des fatwas et de la recherche. 26 Caeiro. cit. 35 Al-Halawani. 2005.R. 18 See www. a Lebanese Druze intellectual prominent in pan-Islamism.” May 17. 146-148. Towards a Fiqh for Minorities. Die Welt Des Islams. McLean.” at www. 2. v. July 30. cited in Caeiro. 23 Al-Yaum.radicalmiddleway.net. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion. 2004. Hudson Institute.uk/.htm. op. Unsigned. at www.” Washington. “Wife beating?. 2002.” Current Trends in Islamist Ideology [Washington]. op. 1985. 36 Rohe.. as monitored by Centre for Islamic Pluralism. Islam Against the West.co.islamawareness. “15 meses de cárcel para el imán que incitó a la violencia contra las mujeres.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 Circumcision. however. cit. 34 See footnote 3 above for bibliographic references to these divergent sources. Ali.. 29 Caeiro. 17 See www.net/.islamonline. Recueil de fatwas.eu . William L. cit.” El Mundo [Madrid].F. Jamal. 25 Okaz and Al-Riyadh. See Cleveland. July 2008. February 26. Part 1605.html. 32 Notwithstanding prevalent misconceptions in the West. Section 12. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 2003. 2006. January 14.

a British peer and controversial figure regarding his alignment with radicals. radical Shariah agitation takes place in tandem with jihadist financing and recruitment activity. based on their traditions of free speech. This accounts for only 2. But the Islamist global offensive currently 23 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. British officials appeared to believe that.eu . a new phenomenon even among Mirpuris. Considerable economic assets have been transferred from Britain to Mirpur. In some instances. as they are known.islamicpluralism.600 mosques. Mirpuris. The response of the authorities in Britain to radical Shariah ideology has been ambivalent. many Mirpuris tend to a jihadist mentality against India.Case Study Britain CIP 1. Case Study: Britain Introduction Britain has a Muslim population between 1. the original country of most British Muslims and their progenitors. as opposed to the Indian authorities are.5 percent of the total population of 60 million in the United Kingdom. As much as three-quarters of the British Muslim population are said to originate in Mirpur. mainly introduced from Pakistan. a single district of Pakistan-controlled Kashmir.5 and 2 million. Because of their Kashmiri origins. however. but Muslims represent a demographic bulge in certain areas of England. radical rhetoric was acceptable but radical action was not. expanding in the 1950s. In all these cities. Muslim immigration to Britain has taken place over three generations. this appeared to be little more than a bureaucratic reflex based on confidence that the situation of radical Islam in Britain was under control and that “best practices” in interfaith relations would resolve it. are overrepresented in British Muslim politics. Radical attitudes toward the British. accounting for numerous lord mayors or former lord mayors in Bradford and other immigrant centres. Britain has become the epicentre of radical Islam in Western Europe. is also Mirpuri. Lord Nazir Ahmed. While British leaders have acted firmly against the most extreme elements in British Islam – including a group with the notable name “Supporters of Shariah” – the authorities under Tony Blair also engaged with purported “moderates” in attempting to substitute a diluted form of radical Islam for its more violent expression. Bradford (17 percent). Birmingham (15 percent). Most significantly. supporting about 1. Leicester (12 percent) and Oldham (11 percent). Radical Shariah rhetoric is common in English cities with large Muslim communities: London (14 percent Muslim).

cutting off the hands of thieves. Only four days afterward. unhelpful to moderate Muslims.islamicpluralism. Archbishop Williams. or beth din. At first glance. but extension of an existing CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. As this study was completed it remained to be seen whether the government of Prime Minister Gordon Brown would adopt a clearer and more determined policy in dealing with Islamist ideology.” as a method for Islamisation of the non-Muslim populace. and few “practices” – in a context where so far the only options for governments have been direct combat or passivity – can yet be described as “best”. and capital sentences could not be imposed under Shariah in Britain. letting religious courts handle family and business disputes through voluntary mediation might seem harmless. blamed “our current style of electronic global communication” for the ensuing uproar.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 Archbishop Rowan Williams escapes Western containment. insisting he had been 24 misunderstood. Archbishop Williams doubtless thought he was making a positive contribution to interfaith relations when he gave a speech suggesting that some form of official recognition in Britain for elements of Shariah was “unavoidable”. at the beginning of July 2008. but with more latitude for public commentary. Many Muslim immigrants came to the West to escape the excesses of Islamic ideology in countries like Pakistan. Imposition of Shariah could deny these immigrants’ children opportunities to become successful in British society or elsewhere in the West.38 With the CIP survey undertaken in the immediate aftermath of Williams’ comments. and radical Muslim advocates of using Shariah in Western countries often cite the precedent under which a Jewish religious court. British Muslim interviewees were primed for comment on the issue. stoning of adulterers. But even his language regarding marital and commercial matters was speculative and appeared. Britons were disturbed by more than Williams’s apparent naiveté. as we found. He was careful to specify that “hudud” punishments for moral and criminal charges.eu . as described in our analysis of Al-Alwani’s “fiqh for minorities. But his remarks were shocking to many of his religious congregants as well as other fellow-citizens. when Archbishop of Canterbury Rowan Williams. called for acceptance of some (unspecified) aspects of Shariah alongside existing civil law in the United Kingdom. where extremism is advancing. cannot be dealt with mechanically. will settle such disputes between community members who agree to have them so resolved.39 The Lord Chief Justice is the rough equivalent of the U. The CIP mission in the UK was unintentionally but fortuitously facilitated by the eruption of controversy over Shariah in Britain in February 2008. such as flogging. the misguided advocacy of Rowan Williams was supplemented by a similar appeal from Britain’s Lord Chief Justice. But he refused to correct what he had said. Soon afterward. Baron Phillips of Worth Matravers. introduction of Islamic arbitration or mediation does not involve the erection of a new legal forum. In addition. Phillips declared that family and business disputes could be submitted to Shariah mediation in Britain.S. head of the Anglican Communion. The archbishop ignored how British Muslim radicals raise the demand for Shariah as an ideological banner and. Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.

England.islamicpluralism. commented on Islam in Britain and Shariah issues in The Independent. Often. non-Muslim advocates for Shariah are making things worse for both Muslims and non-Muslims in Britain. should have listened to the many British Muslims who reject Shariah and other Islamist penetration into their community life. Archbishop Williams. In an example of its “upscale” appeal. Baron Phillips. Yet this assumes a lack of coercion. when Church of England bishop of Rochester Michael Nazir-Ali. Even sharp critics of Islamism may be willing to accept voluntary Shariah-based mediation instead of introduction of Shariah as a settled legal structure. We judge that in the name of sensitivity. “the BBC on 31 July was hugely successful in its portrayal of all religions as bigotry and of all religious people Lord Chief Justice Baron Phillips of Worth Matravers Bishop Nazir-Ali CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www.” while we found that such conditions seldom prevail when dealing with certain powerful and well-funded radical Islamic clerics. a leading daily. no less than his clerical counterpart. but some moderate Muslims consistently express concern that such mediation would enable radicals to extend their influence in the community. and free recourse to the civil justice system as an alternative to “Islamic mediation. the fixation on Shariah is commoner among members of the British Muslim and non-Muslim elite than among ordinary Muslims. He stated. In our view.The Emergence of Shariah as an Issue in Britain CIP institution. Bishop Nazir-Ali summarised the emergence of interreligious problems of Britain in a manner that remains relevant today. who was born in Pakistan. In a visit to a mosque in Bolton. and merits citation at length.40 Bishop Nazir-Ali’s statement came in response to a British Broadcasting Corporation program on religion.eu 25 . local Muslim leaders in Britain insistently assured us that the demand for Shariah is merely an ideological slogan to mobilise young Muslims. Jurists like Lord Chief Justice. The Historical Background: Emergence of Shariah as an Issue in Britain A media discussion that would become a wide and deep stream of debate began in earnest in 1989. Some even refuse to wash up with alcohol – the use of which for cleaning purposes was never prohibited by Shariah (as described in the supplement beginning on page 56). sexually transmitted diseases. and other problems produced by practices banned in Islam. the targeted audience has no idea what Shariah is. some of who now refuse to attend classes on alcoholism. Exceptionally prescient and articulate. Shariah rhetoric has become a prominent topic among Muslim medical students in Britain. we were surprised when a discussion of Williams’ comments elicited a simple question from a young man who had just finished his prayer: “What is Shariah?” The young Muslim’s bafflement was unfeigned. After the Williams statement.

or Islamic Law. Newly-rich Muslim states. the Islamic liberal tradition has been concerned with the problem of relating the revelation in the Koran to the modern world. have focused on the more dramatic consequences of these developments. 26 “All of this. is another way which seeks to ‘interiorise’ the teachings of Islam so that the devotee is converted to personal commitment and to have a love of God and of one’s neighbour. for example.eu .CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 Muhammad Ali Jinnah. are well aware of the work of these philosophers. if not their existence. were more concerned with identifying those principles of development in the Shariah. “I am extremely disturbed by the way in which ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ is used in the media as a synonym for ‘Islam. “Waliullah points out. Muslim states owe their present polity. I have in the past highlighted the extremely free-thinking attitudes of the medieval ‘Islamic’ philosophers. is at the expense of a long and honourable liberal tradition within the Islamic body-politic. Already in the eighteenth century. even fundamentalist leaders. Islamic mysticism. or Sufism. have restricted the freedom of others to express themselves with integrity or. understandably. CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. many pioneering scientists have been religious believers and their scientific work has often been profoundly related to their religious belief. At the same time. people such as Muhammad Ali Jinnah. were deeply imbued with ideals from the Islamic liberal tradition. the founder of Pakistan. A more tolerant Islam must be fundamentally Islamic.’ It must be admitted that many in the Muslim world and beyond have provided enough causes for such confusion to emerge. it needs to be said that there have been numerous religious men and women who have encouraged creativity in the arts and in literature because of their religious convictions. both conservative and revolutionary. it cannot grow out of them.” Bishop Nazir-Ali stipulated. Also. These people were often nationalists as well and many modern. for example. “It is perhaps worth remembering that the founders of many such states. it made its impact.islamicpluralism. to them. “In the modern period. As an exercise in polemics and as an apology for the creed of secular humanism. have promoted fundamentalist Islam both at home and abroad. people such as Muhammad Abduh in Egypt and Allama Iqbal in India. “It is certainly the case that bigots. that the way in which a prophet’s teaching is enforced in the society where the teaching is first given will be different from the way in which that same teaching is enforced in other societies and at other times. This is why Pakistan. Today’s Muslim leaders. indeed. Though it must relate to Enlightenment ideas. was not established as an Islamic state. both Sir Syed Ahmad Khan and Amir Ali tried to develop an exegesis of the Koran and of prophetic traditions which was to them consonant with science and the contemporary scientific world-view. “The great reformers of the twentieth century. Shah Waliullah of Delhi was engaged in a hermeneutical exercise which sought to distinguish what was of eternal value in the work of a prophet from what was simply contextual. political adventurers and the like. But this kind of sweeping condemnation of Islam is both undeserved and bound to make matters worse. The media. however. which would make it an effective legal instrument for the twentieth century. In the nineteenth century. at all. the founder of Pakistan as fanatical fundamentalists. in the name of religion.

Special family laws have been promulgated to protect women and children in case of divorce. such as oil. such as Kleinwort Benson. In 1993. One was that of “Islamic finance”. This may be true of some issues but it is not of others. “But in England there is a strong Common Law tradition. aircraft.islamicpluralism.42 “Western banks. petrochemicals. but draw on their trade finance expertise and long-standing contacts. the extent of the involvement of banks. Most of these reforms have been resisted by fundamentalists and other conservatives. racial prejudice and disadvantage have so ‘ghetto-ised’ the Muslim communities in Britain that fundamentalism has seen its opportunity and taken root in this fertile soil. During the previous regime in Pakistan. for democratic debate and complementarity41 but not for dogma and exclusivity. “The western banks. “Progressive Muslims and others in Muslim countries are struggling for the very causes. such as the emancipation of women. are adapting remarkably well and are even taking to the idea of submitting their transactions for scrutiny to a Shariah (Islamic Law) Council to check the transactions are permissible under Islamic interest-free principles.” In the 1990s. agricultural products. in morabaha (cost-plus financing) and ijara transactions is so large that all these banks have now set up specialised Islamic banking units. In some cases there have been reversals in the fortunes of the reformers but they have persisted. freedom of choice and of expression and the reinterpretation of the Shariah. Hindus and Jews to experience the deprivation and the alienation which he felt the Muslims of undivided India had experienced. having secured a home for [the] Muslims of India. Surely this can be developed in such a way that it both safeguards cultural identity and protects individuals from the tyranny of the group? Muslims have the right to campaign peacefully for the development of this tradition in ways which are consonant with the Shariah. wanted it to be a home for other religious groups as well. to originate and structure morabaha and ijara transactions relating to commodities and goods. a transaction could easily have taken 12 months to put together. Paradoxically.’ “ 27 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. tankers and capital equipment. they must recognise the fact that this tradition already has certain values inherent in it and also that other groups and individuals in society are trying to influence its development. ‘I handle no interest-bearing funds and our unit works in a completely separate area. are carving out a major niche market in short-term Islamic trade finance transactions and mediumto-longer term Islamic leasing (ijara). especially in London. involving mainly aircraft and shipping purchases. He did not want Christians.’ says one banker. it has often been assumed that Islam is facing the challenge of contemporary issues for the first time. Provision has had to be made for women to be enfranchised. These operate separately from the rest of the banks’ conventional activities. the best organised lobby for the defence of human rights was that of the women’s organizations which had come together to prevent any further erosion of women’s rights and freedom. The reformers have been particularly concerned that a democratic polity should develop which draws both upon Muslim tradition and modern constitutional thought. At the same time. therefore. Today. “Restrictions have been placed on polygamy and on arbitrary divorce by the husband. the Financial Times reported. In the past.eu . “In the recent debate on the place of Islam in Western societies. The rights of women have been another preoccupation. educated and employed. There is room. which are just as much on the learning curve of Islamic banking as some of their Islamic counterparts. which are at issue in the West today. Indeed.Issues of Finance CIP Jinnah. ANZ Grindlays and Citibank. six to eight weeks is normal for a morabaha transaction. “ ‘We have regular meetings with both our clients and their Shariah Councils or experts. new issues involving Shariah appeared in Britain.

He had obtained British citizenship and an engineering degree from Brighton University. without which Islamic banking cannot progress beyond its current shortterm activities.eu . radical Shariah rhetoric appeared in the agitation of a suddenly-notorious British Muslim extremist figure. His appearance was notable because of his loss of both hands and an eye. for instance. called Manzil.islamicpluralism. that some. This development took place at the same time as the European Council for Fatawa and Research (ECFR). Egyptian-born Abu Hamza (Hamza AlMasri). and retailed in accord with Shariah. “As a long-established merchant bank. “An Islamic capital market and interbank system would open vast new opportunities in both longer-term trade and project-related financing and in investment banking. although it also has structured a number of deals for clients in North Africa and Asia. began its debate on the permissibility of interest.” Al-Rajhi interests have been named in terrorism investigations since the events of September 11. Keith Leach.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 “Such is the commitment of these western banks to developing their Islamic banking business. bankers argue. 28 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. is fast becoming a major player in Pakistan. even arrange aircraft lease finance for non-Muslim clients. as previously described. especially after the then President Zia-ul-Haq decided to Islamise the entire banking sector. As such. The Londonbased United Bank of Kuwait PLC announced housing loans would be offered to British Muslims without interest payments. said the loans would not be considered particularly attractive to nonMuslims. its client base is strong in the Gulf. Kleinwort Benson has relationships with many of the merchant families in the Middle East.43 In 1997 Shariah-compliant housing finance was launched in Britain. sales manager of the product. Housing loans were made available to non-British residents who sought to purchase property in Britain. “The involvement of these banks in Islamic banking goes back to the petro-dollar boom years of the 1970s and early 1980s. such as Kleinwort Benson. 2001. thus technically forcing western banks based in Pakistan to adapt or cease their involvement… “Islamic banks. He titled his organization Supporters of Shariah (SOS). and reportedly had worked as an engineer at the Sandhurst military installation. allegedly in Afghanistan.44 As the 1990s came to a close. Perhaps more importantly. where the old Grindlays bank subsidiary has been involved in Islamic banking for a number of years. are also acquiring an in-house R&D capability in developing new Islamic trade finance and other products. who justified the murder of Britons kidnapped in Yemen and stated that he organised military training for his followers inside Britain. some of these units are also researching products for the formation of an Islamic capital market. Kleinwort Benson concluded its first morabaha trade transaction in 1982. as well as in President Zia-ul-Haq industralised countries… “ANZ Grindlays. such as Al-Rajhi Investment and Banking Corporation (ARABIC) of Saudi Arabia.

however. Abu Hamza’s group.” He declared that SOS cooperated with the kidnappers of 16 Westerners in Yemen. Among some sections of our community it is rife… All Muslims [sic] defer to the belief that in the shariah. according to leading and authoritative media. He defined terrorism as follows: “If it means killing a few people to stop the killing of more people it is justified. radical Muslim agitation expanded in Britain. the extremist entity AlMuhajiroun (The Migrants). 2001. the body of laws defining our faith. in which three Britons and an Australian died in a failed rescue. Radical Muslim author Faisal Bodi argued in The Guardian. TJ is active throughout Britain. which we consider to be determined and committed.50 In reality. More important. where many Muslims originate from Gujarat in India. The Sunday Telegraph’s description of Shariah was vague and 29 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. Among these groups only TJ has gained a significant place in British Muslim life.45 Abu Hamza was arrested soon after his major burst of media coverage.48 Radical ideological tendencies such as the conspiratorial revolutionary group Hizb-ut-Tahrir (Party of Liberation – HT). to become national holidays (“bank holidays”) for all Britons. This left ambiguous the nature of antiShariah sentiment. and Eid alAdha.”47 In our observation. Simultaneously.49 Britain was soon shocked to learn that. 40 percent of Muslims desired the introduction of Shariah in the country. A “London School of Shariah” was implicated in recruitment of radical Muslims to fight in Afghanistan. and ensuing Western military intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq. using an ambiguous tone that became common in the years that followed.islamicpluralism. this assessment of the state of British Islam was far from definitive. The poll found that 41 percent of British Muslims opposed introduction of Shariah. as well as the views of an undecided 19 percent that could swing either way. as The Sunday Telegraph’s reporting on the poll itself showed. In August 2006. alleged moderate Muslim leaders suddenly called for the Islamic holidays of Eid al-Fitr. such opinions are not and never were shared by “all Muslims”. and claimed that SOS maintained security training utilizing former British Army officers. at the end of the fasting month of Ramadan. and Shariah rhetoric predictably increased. In addition.Britain: New Demands CIP Abu Hamza was prominent in the North London Central Mosque in Finsbury Park. With the events of September 11. and has a large centre in the town of Dewsbury. and the missionary group Tabligh-i-Jamaat (Appeal of the Community – TJ) have also advocated Islamic separatism and establishment of Shariah in Britain.eu . “Muslims need wider help to end forced marriages… the problem of forced marriage persists. the British authorities attempted to assess means to reduce Muslim extremism in the country. was prominent in all such activity. five of his British followers were arrested in Yemen and accused as participants in a terror conspiracy.Abu Hamza Muhajiroun ancillary to the topic of this survey. which closes the month of hajj or pilgrimage to Mecca. we have a supreme and peremptory point of reference. This statistical result was produced by a poll conducted in 2006 by The Sunday Telegraph. and because of their marginal status we consider discussion of HT and Al. Supporters of Shariah. Founded in the 1920s in India. Muslim fundamentalist elements heightened pressure for official recognition of Islamic practices and institutions in British society. New Demands In the aftermath of the Afghanistan and Iraq interventions and the July 2005 (7/7) London metro bombings.46 The year 1999 saw the beginning of debate over the practice of forced marriage among British Muslims and its intersection with Shariah.


A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009

appeared deliberately alarmist. No distinction was made in the reportage between Shariah as questionable but nonviolent concepts in finance and medicine and what the newspaper described as follows: “Islamic law is used in large parts of the Middle East, including Iran and Saudi Arabia, and is enforced by religious police. Special courts can hand down harsh punishments which can include stoning and amputation.” The British non-Muslim public was left with the strong impression that nearly half of British Muslims sought the introduction of hudud punishments in the country, with the threat that such would be applied to non-Muslims. The scenario was nightmarish and, as a media projection, profoundly irresponsible. Unfortunately, this impression was reinforced by veridical reporting on informal Shariah practice in Britain. Certain British “experts” were regrettably hasty in defending Shariah. According to The Daily Telegraph, “Some lawyers welcomed the advance of what has become known as ‘legal pluralism.’ Prakash Shah, a senior lecturer in law at Queen Mary College, University of London, said such tribunals ‘could be more effective than the formal legal system…’ ”51

Soon a reaction among Muslims against Shariah promotion, even that comprising ameliorative arguments, was articulated, if in an ambivalent and inconsistent manner. In August 2006, partly in reaction to the brief IsraelLebanon war, the main Islamic organizations in Britain, reportedly following an initiative of the fundamentalist Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), addressed a letter to the government. Published as a full-page advertisement in The Times, the statement called for a change in British policy toward the U.S.-led intervention in Iraq and, by inference, British action for an immediate peace in Lebanon, to combat radical Islam as a phenomenon within British society.52 Titled “Protect Civilians Wherever They Are,” it was signed by such leading “mainstream” Islamist ideological and fundamentalist entities, in addition to MCB, as the British Muslim Forum (BMF), the Federation of Students Islamic Societies (FOSIS), and the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB). Following its appearance, Muslim representatives met with John Prescott and Ruth Kelly, prominent members of Tony Blair’s cabinet. A signatory of the 2006 advertisement, Shahid Malik, Labour member of the British

John Prescott MP, former Deputy Prime Minister

Ruth Kelly MP




Britain: New Demands


parliament for Dewsbury, a centre of radical ideological activity (in 2008, Malik bcame cabinet Minister for International Shahid Malik, MP for Dewsbury Development under Prime Minister Gordon Brown), had declared bluntly that Muslims desiring to live under Shariah should return from Britain to countries like Saudi Arabia.53 This statement is also worth reprinting in extenso. Malik wrote, “[A]fter a 90minute meeting with John Prescott, the deputy prime minister, to discuss the challenges of extremism and foreign policy, I emerged and was immediately asked by the media whether I agreed that what British Muslims needed were Islamic holidays and shariah (Islamic law). I thought I had walked into some parallel universe. Sadly this was not a joke. These issues had apparently formed part of the discussion the day before between Prescott, Ruth Kelly, the communities minister, and a selection of ‘Muslim leaders.’ I realised then that it wasn’t me and the media who were living in a parallel universe – although certain ‘Muslim leaders’ might well be. “Maybe some of these ‘leaders’ believed that cabinet ministers were being alarmist, that the terror threat posed by British extremists was exaggerated. Maybe they thought that the entire plot and threat were the ‘mother of all smokescreens,’ a bid to divert our attention from the killing fields of Lebanon. Or maybe it was another symptom of that epidemic that is afflicting far too many Muslims: denial. Out of touch with reality, frightened to propose any real solutions for fear of ‘selling out,’ but always keen to exact a concession — a sad but too often true caricature of some so-called Muslim leaders. “Other members of the Muslim community I am sure would have cringed as I did when listening to Dr. Syed Aziz Pasha, secretarygeneral of the Union of Muslim Organizations of the UK and Ireland, who explained his demand

for shariah and more holidays: ‘If you give us religious rights we will be in a better position to convince young people that they are being treated equally along with other citizens’… “Who speaks for Muslims?... As I have repeatedly said, in this world of indiscriminate terrorist bombings, where Muslims are just as likely to be the victims of terrorism as other British and U.S. citizens, we Muslims have an equal stake in fighting extremism. Hundreds of Muslims died on 9/11 and 7/7. But more importantly, given that these acts are carried out in the name of our religion — Islam — we have a greater responsibility not merely to condemn but to confront the extremists. In addition to being the targets of terrorism, Muslims will inevitably be the targets of any backlash. “…Some of the ‘Muslim leaders’… demanded shariah for British Muslims rather than the existing legal system. The call for special public holidays for Muslims was unnecessary, impracticable and divisive. Most employers already allow their staff to take such days out of their annual leave. And what about special holidays for Sikhs, Hindus, Jews?... “When it comes to shariah, Muhammad ibn Adam, the respected Islamic scholar, says: ‘It is necessary by shariah to abide by the laws of the country one lives in, regardless of the nature of the law, as long as the law doesn’t demand something that is against Islam’… [T]he prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) said: ‘It is necessary upon a Muslim to listen to and obey the ruler, as long as one is not ordered to carry out a sin.’ (Sahih al-Bukhari, no 2796 & Sunan Tirmidhi). “In Britain there are no laws that force Muslims to do something against shariah and Muslims enjoy the freedom to worship and follow their religion, as do all other faiths. Compare Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia, a shariah regime where women are forbidden to drive; or Turkey, a secular country where women are forbidden to wear the hijab; or Tunisia, where civil servants are forbidden to wear a beard… “Since I made my remarks my office has 31




A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009

been overwhelmed with support. I also know that some Muslims feel uncomfortable, not necessarily because they disagree but because they feel targeted. But what I want to say to my fellow British Muslims is that in this country we enjoy freedoms, rights and privileges of which Muslims elsewhere can only dream. We should appreciate that fact and have the confidence to fulfil the obligations and responsibilities as part of our contract with our country and as dictated by shariah law.” Although on foreign policy issues Malik wavered and accommodated the very radicals he criticised in 2006, MP Malik’s comments of that year summed up the traditional position of the first generations of Muslim immigrants to Britain. Indeed, he offered an excellent summary of the essential principles of moderate Islam in addressing these issues. As he pointed out, and as we have repeatedly stressed, authentic, established Shariah in both Sunni and Shia Islam calls on Muslims living in non-Muslim countries to accept the laws and customs of their new homes. In 2007, Policy Exchange, a British thinktank critical on multicultural issues, published a survey of Muslim attitudes in the UK, Living Apart Together.54 Policy Exchange determined: “• 62% of 16-24 year olds feel they have as much in common with non- Muslims as Muslims, compared to 71% of 55+ year olds. “• 60% of Muslims would prefer to send their children to a mixed state school, compared to 35% who would prefer to send their child to an Islamic school. There is a clear age difference. 37% of 16-24 year olds preferred to send their children to Islamic state schools, compared to 25% of 45-54 year olds and 19% of 55+ year olds. “• 59% of Muslims would prefer to live under British law, compared to 28% who would prefer to live under sharia law. 37% of 16-24 year olds prefer sharia compared to 17% of 55+ year olds. 32

“• 36% of 16-24 year olds believe if a Muslim converts to another religion they should be punished by death, compared to 19% of 55+ year olds. “• 7% ‘admire organisations like AlQaeda that are prepared to fight the West’. 13% of 16-24 year olds agreed with this statement compared to 3% of 55+ year olds. “• 74% of 16-24 year olds would prefer Muslim women to choose to wear the veil, compared to only 28% of 55+ year olds. “• 59% of Muslims feel they have as much, if not more, in common with nonMuslims in the UK as with Muslims abroad.” We note the stunning finding that fewer British Muslims over 55 support hijab (covering of women’s hair) than those in their teens, a counterintuitive fact to most non-Muslims. Based on our field research, we believe the Policy Exchange figure of 59 percent of British Muslims favoring British law, in contrast with 28 percent for Shariah, is more accurate than The Sunday Telegraph poll result of 41 percent for British law, and 40 percent for Shariah. We estimate that at present some 65 percent of British Muslims are firmly and even combatively opposed to introduction of Shariah, with pro-Shariah and neutral opinion on the issue inchoate and often uninformed. The CIP Survey of Shariah Agitation in Britain Beginning in November 2007, the Centre for Islamic Pluralism commenced a field survey of Shariah agitation and attitudes toward it in British Muslim communities. CIP investigators Stephen Suleyman Schwartz and Irfan Al-Alawi investigated Shariah sentiment in the main British Muslim communities in March-April 2008. Interviews included extensive meetings and discussions in London, Birmingham, Manchester, Bolton, Bradford, Sheffield, and Leicester. Interviewees included imams, muftis (legal authorities), spiritual shaykhs (pirs), British



Shariah Agitation in Britain


Muslim barristers and solicitors, social workers, and rank-and-file mosque attendees. The communal environment was enhanced, since the survey took place during the period of celebration of the birthday of Prophet Muhammad, a custom known as mawlid, which is common in Pakistan, the place of origin of most immigrant British Muslims, as well as in Britain. In addition, Shariah issues had been dramatised by the comments of Anglican Archbishop Rowan Williams. Islam in England was dominated for two generations by the Indian Barelvi sect, which appeals to the original cohort of immigrants and is oriented toward Sufi spiritualism, viewed as more quietist and mystical, as well as to British loyalty – notwithstanding that many Barelvis have never fully learned English or assimilated British customs.55 Barelvis are also considered amenable to better relations with Christians. Barelvism includes a Sufi order derived from the conservative Qadiri Sufi tradition, known as Razvi Sufism, and Barelvis in Pakistan have been active in taking back mosques they established, which had been subverted and brought under the control of Saudi-financed fundamentalist Wahhabis and of the Deobandi sect. Although the Deobandis, originating in India, were long viewed as peaceful and spiritual, they included students in medresas in Pakistan who assumed power in Afghanistan as the Taliban. Deobandism is also promoted by Tabligh-iJamaat (TJ). Younger British Asian Muslims, feeling more socially-dislocated because they have fully experienced Western as well as Muslim culture, may be drawn to Deobandism as a form of revivalism. The story of the radicalisation of Pakistani Deobandism, and its transformation from a religious interpretation into an ideology, is a complex one, but one thing is certain: many Deobandis in Britain are no less rigid and extreme than their mentors in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Deobandis are known for their violent condemnation of Barelvi spiritual practices. Their fundamentalism intersects with

and reinforces the anti-Indian jihadism of Mirpuris from Kashmir. Radicalisation in mosques is typically blamed not on preachers but on mosque management committees which allow radical preachers and TJ organisers access to religious facilities. Radical preaching is carried out mainly in English, while anti-radical activity, including preaching and publication, is largely effected by clerics in the immigrant languages, Urdu and Punjabi. This fact is counter-intuitive to the many non-Muslims who presume that foreign imams, speaking their original language, comprise the core of radicalism. But the young do not respond to preaching in the immigrant languages, and immigrant clergy do not learn English well enough for preaching in it. Paradoxically (or not), some leading radical preachers active in Britain are American-born converts. The language difference widens the gap between young, British-born Muslims, who show the growing influence of the Pakistani variant of Deobandism, and their parents and grandparents, who were mainly Barelvi immigrants. Young British Muslims often consider Barelvism to be oldfashioned, and Deobandism to be more political and therefore modern, although Deobandism is markedly backward-looking in its social attitudes, especially toward women and nonMuslims. Visible tension exists between established, moderate clerics of the earlier immigrant cohorts and recent immigrants promoting Deobandism. The first mosque visit by Al-Alawi and Schwartz was made during the week of mawlid at the new Madina Mosque in the city of Bolton. The Madina Mosque was established in Bolton after the takeover by Deobandis of an older mosque. When Al-Alawi and Schwartz visited the Madina Mosque for evening prayer and participation in the mawlid, attended by some 500 people, a shouting match erupted between a small group of fewer than half a dozen Deobandi interlopers and the imam of the mosque. One of the Deobandis declared that the new “shaykh” at 33




A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009

Bolton Mosque

the old mosque had “redeemed Muslims from crime” and shouted “I will kill anybody who insults my shaykh.” The Deobandi group were ejected from the Madina Mosque but remained outside the building loudly denouncing the congregation. Madina Mosque imam Muhammad Masud Qadri stated that the followers of the Deobandi shaykh claim the latter has the power of black magic, and refer to him as “Jinn Baba,” i.e. the master of supernatural beings. Among those who remained in the Madina Mosque, an adolescent asked the question “what is Shariah?” This began a lively discussion of radical demands versus traditional attitudes. In later interviews, Bolton traditional Islamic jurist Maulana Mufti Ayub Ashrafi expressed opposition to any introduction of Shariah, on the grounds that Muslims will ask why Islamic law must be introduced in nonMuslim countries when it does not function in the majority of Muslim countries. In addition, historically, and as should be recalled from prior comments herein, Shariah as a broad system never existed outside the lands of Islam, and Muslim legal scholars traditionally denied its applicability in non-Muslim societies. Britain has also recently seen the penetration of its Muslims by Wahhabism. Britain is further home to followers of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and the Pakistani radicals who adhere to the fundamentalist and exclusionary teachings of Abu’l Ala Mawdudi (1903-1979). The main British Muslim leadership organization, the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), with 34

Muhammad Abdul Bari as its General Secretary, is widely considered an MB front, but includes only about a third of Islamic congregations, or 400 mosques. The MCB has failed to attract followers from Barelvi mosques, and the 2007 Policy Exchange report, Living Apart Together, found that only six percent of the British Muslim public considered themselves represented by MCB.56 Professionals have been prominent in the Deobandi and Wahhabi milieux, mainly doctors, engineers, and lawyers. One liberal Muslim argument suggests that university curricula in these fields, without emphasis on the arts and humanities, lead to a simplistic view of religion. At the same time, it is noticeable that Muslim fundamentalists and jihadists consider themselves reformers, and have mounted a sustained attack on the inclusion of miracles, healings, relics, and shrines in the religion of Islam, much as such phenomena have come under criticism in the Judeo-Christian world. But reform may take one of two forms: modernizing, or purificationist.

Muhammad Abdul Bari, General Secretary of the MCB



Britain: Family/ Schooling


In Britain, Barelvi Islam, to emphasise, is viewed as rural and popular among the uneducated, while Deobandi and Wahhabi Islam have an “advanced” reputation. It is unsurprising, then, that the Deobandi sect flourishes in urban communities in Britain, among the educated and affluent, where activity by its missionary offshoot, Tabligh-i-Jamaat (TJ) is visible. The CIP survey was completed under the specified four headings: (1) Family/schooling (2) Institutionalization of Shariah by nonMuslim governments (Parallel Shariah) (3) Criminal aspects (4) Approach to Women (1) Family/schooling Radical Shariah advocates call for Muslim children to be educated only in Islamic schools. We analysed the effect of Shariah agitation on family behavior and school relations as described by British Muslim clerics, community leaders, and other moderate Muslim representatives. We asked: Do families more frequently consult religious leaders or submit queries to Shariah websites before making decisions? Our inquiries disclosed that traditional, anti-radical British Muslims, much more than those elsewhere in Western Europe, habitually consult imams and Sufi pirs [spiritual leaders] as they did in the past, for advice on personal problems involving employment, intergenerational disagreements, and exceptional difficulties such as health crises. Frequency of consultation with religious leaders does not correlate to sympathy with radical or antiradical ideology but is a cultural characteristic visible throughout the varieties of Islam imported into Britain from the Indian subcontinent. As previously noted, a Deobandi extremist in Bolton expressed complete dedication to a radical shaykh known as “Jinn Baba.” Radicals and Shariah extremists in particular are, however, likelier to surf Shariah websites because the latter are simpler in their answers, in line with the contrived or
Pupils at the King Fahd Academy, Acton, West London

extemporaneous nature of radical Islamist discourse, which as we have stated, repudiates precedent and promotes improvisation. In the area of health care, however, imams and Sufi pirs are more typically solicited for faith healing services by the older generation than by younger Muslims. Another of the paradoxical aspects of British Asian Islam, with its considerable Pakistani influence, is that the original generations of immigrants are traditional in their submission to British laws, but also in their devotion to folk medicine, faith healing, and related customs. As we noted in the 2008 Centre for Islamic Pluralism study, Scientific Training and Radical Islam,57 small booklets correlating the 99 Islamic names of God with different specific complaints and ailments are sold wherever Muslims are found, all over the world, and are easily encountered among British Asian Muslims. In one such, 99 Names of Allah, printed in India, we read the following: “Al-Hayy, The Everlasting: Anyone desiring sound health should recite this name 3,000 times daily. If a sick person writes this name in a bowl with musk and rose water and then washes such inscription with water and drinks the water, he will soon be cured from his illness, Insha’allah [God willing]. Alternatively, if such water is given to a person who is ill, he will be cured, Insha’allah.” The 13th century Syrian fundamentalist Muslim theologian, Ibn Qayyim Al-Jawziyya, composed a work of faith healing that remains extremely popular among Muslims today, including in the UK: Al-Tibb Al-Nabawi (The 35



Sir Jonathan Sacks. These are in cases of necessity. was issued by the Muslim Law (Shariah) Council UK… Tom Sackville. moral and ethical 36 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. and policy actions to be taken at the Europe-wide level. replied to the Lords’ queries as follows: “Query 1: Please would you describe any Chair of the Council of Mosques & Imams. Sheikh Dr Zaki Badawi (third from left) with the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster. in response to the Lords’ citation of Muslim acceptance of “presumed consent” in Singapore. The application of this concept has been more rooted in cultural attitudes than strict application of Islamic (Shariah) Law. In this volume. M. Many Scholars in Islam have examined this issue and the points that flow from opinions appear to be as follows: Medical professionals should be entrusted in defining ‘death’ by clinical criteria and this is a question of medical fact rather than one of religious analysis. Chairman of the Council.60 early in 2008 the UK House of Lords addressed an “inquiry into the issues raised by the European Commission. the Free Churches Moderator. the Chief Rabbi of the United Hebrew Congregations of the Commonwealth. and the Archbishop of Canterbury. I would conclude that there are no real ethical barriers as such. the Muslim Burial Council of Leicestershire (MBCOL) headed by Suleman Nagdi. whether living or dead. This concept has been applied in many differing ways by the Muslim community with regard to matters that relate to organ donation and transplantation. in the language of the government. the question of Shariah in organ donation attracted the attention of the British public. Cardinal Cormac MurphyO'Connor. This balance is achieved by the prohibition being waived in some instances. The idea of people having to ‘opt out’ is in our view inappropriate when we look at the fact that ones [sic] organs are being used… We can envisage families raising legal.eu . This is the Islamic legal maxim of al-darurat tubih al-mahzurat (necessities overrule prohibition). “We do not believe that a system of ‘presumed consent’ would be appropriate. to preserve the life of others and of one self. or religious verdict. Dr David Coffey. “We should accept brain stem death as the proper definition of the end of life. Dr Rowan Williams particular aspects of organ donation and transplantation which are considered ethically problematic within the context of your organisation’s religious beliefs – as these are perceived: (a) within the UK or (b) in other EU Member States?” MBCOL’s Nagdi offered the following comments: “The interference and or the violation of the human body. Al-Jawziyya offers several supplications (duas. “official approval for organ donation when a Fatwa.”58 British Muslims remained reluctant to participate in organ donation. As with some of the prohibitions there is a balance that needs to be struck. The opinions all point to the fact that organ donation is permitted. A Shariah body.” on organ donation and transplantation. British Muslims were granted.59 As we further noted in our report. or spiritual recitations and requests) along with suggestions for treating sicknesses. are prohibited in Islam. Zaki Badawi. In 1995. according to statistics reported from the West Midlands in 1997. Nagdi wrote. Parliamentary Secretary for Health… was presented with a copy of the document by Dr.” Nagdi stated that Muslim objections to organ donation were cultural rather than religious. A.islamicpluralism. Scientific Training and Radical Islam. but expressed opposition to controversial UK proposals for a “presumed consent” to organ donation.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 Medicine of the Prophet Muhammad). to religious organisations. including Muslim groups.

a 2009 report states that 24 Saudi-financed schools “about which little is known” and 26 fundamentalist seminaries usually referred to as a Dar ul-Uloom or “House of Religious Sciences” operate in the UK. Children’s Services and Skills (Ofsted) responded by announcing that it would monitor independent faith schools in Britain to assure promotion of tolerance toward other cultures. however. especially considering that organ donations in countries like the U. and were told that increasingly. We heard complaints about gang activity and early pregnancy in Islamic schools. in a system that could easily become unwieldy and obstructive.S. although only 68 belong to AMSUK: 22 in London. Further. as if to indicate to us that his parents were oblivious to his interests. no more than 1. a third (about 7. speak mainly English.” Nagdi elaborated.islamicpluralism.770 attend seven state-funded UK Muslim schools. as in traffic accidents. While this single incident cannot be taken as definitive. eight in the East Midlands.000 Muslim children between five and 15 years of age at the last census. where the parents speak Punjabi between themselves but two primary-school age children. In the religious school population.000 state-subsidised schools. that demands for introduction of Islamic curricula in state schools receive little support from Muslim parents and students. which they indeed seemed to be. Muslim parents seek to place their children in Catholic schools. There are 127 full-time.eu 37 . however. one Greek Orthodox and one Seventh Day Adventist. One of the boldest radical Shariah initiatives in Britain emerged.65 We found. and 14 in the West Midlands. has become badly compromised by violence and pop-culture morality.000. that refusal of “presumed consent” should be made through detailed documentation such as wills. with 17 percent of non-religious state schools representing such communities.000 Muslim youth and 11. We interviewed a Midlands British Muslim family of confirmed moderates. Parents and students alike are concerned that the atmosphere in private Muslim schools. like that in non-religious state schools. ten in Yorkshire. two in Southeast England. 12 in Lancashire.62 Of England’s 21.7 million students) are religious. Private Shariah-oriented elementary and secondary schools are not widely-present in Britain. it provided an example of the generational differences that are also manifested in private Muslim schools. Among 376. in an attempt by the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) to introduce “parallel Shariah” in www.63 While British authorities announced plans to expand the number of officially-subsidised religious schools. in the interest of improving the quality of instruction. They include 37 Jewish institutions. doubts have been expressed about the nature of curricula in Muslim schools.Britain: Family/ Schooling CIP challenges against the medical profession when they are opposed to one of their loved ones [sic] bodies being used in this way. with the participation of (nonShariah) legal professionals. but they are overwhelmingly Anglican or Catholic. in addition to the mentioned primary and secondary institutions. 21 percent were estimated to come from ethnic minorities in 2008. according to the Association of Muslim Schools in the UK (AMSUK). where students may be segregated from outside influences or taught negative attitudes CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) toward other communities. two Sikh. one male and one female. The potential for isolation and radicalization of Muslim students even in state schools was revealed early in 2007.64 The UK Office for Standards in Education. privatelyfinanced Muslim schools in the UK. UK official policy has anticipated the absorption of around 100 private Muslim schools into the state sector.61 Some 15. Still. frequently occur after a loss of consciousness caused by severe injury. the boy commenced surfing gangster-rap sites on the Internet in our full sight. A Hindu school was announced for opening in 2008. We observed that while the parents discussed religious issues and the small daughter studied Qur’an. seven Muslim. with 1.000 Jewish children currently receive instruction in private religious schools in which tuition is paid for by parents.

Muhammadiyah or Nadhatul Ulama in Indonesia) for assistance. informal radical Shariah. It should be recognised. France.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 state schools through a plan titled. anti-Jewish. The MCB has also sought to introduce anti-evolution. by “Shariah” in state schools. as an official institution established to improve standards among British imams. has a two-edged character. i. as in Germany. and Spain. although MCB. in that private Muslim education may be 38 replaced.66 The plan called for preventing Muslim students from being exposed to the principles of other religions. “Shadow Shariah”. and SMC. a Muslim diet at meals.islamicpluralism. nonetheless. reorganization of instruction periods to accommodate prayer times (especially Friday collective prayer). and. The much smaller British Muslim Forum (BMF) and Muslim Association of Britain (MAB) have also contended for such recognition. according to some because of the lack of such a provision for orderly relations. With a British Muslim leadership officially unrecognised. the British government has supported a Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board (MINAB). as in the MCB scheme. This situation. no single Muslim organisation or institution has standing to represent the community as a whole in dealings with the government. Religious tribunals may handle family matters. including exemption from examinations on grounds of physical weakness while fasting. special consideration for students during the fasting month of Ramadan.eu . It is indicative of this situation that the debate over headscarf wear (hijab) in France was centred in state schools. such possibilities are limited and do not depend on government financing. notwithstanding its thin roster of participating mosques (400) has attempted to assume this role. Sufi institutions (as in Turkey). already exists in Britain. notwithstanding such blandishments. mainly CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. The Blair administration briefly extended financial assistance to MCB. In some Muslim countries.” Interviewees also admitted frankly that they preferred the British system of social benefits to the absence of welfare programs in Muslim countries like Pakistan. emphasizing the lack of consistent provisions for public assistance in most Muslim countries. In addition. as required by the most extreme Islamic interpretations. special washing facilities for prayer. or Islamic but not Islamist mass social movements (e. “optional” gender-segregated prayer areas. introduction of imams into state schools to conduct Friday prayer. “Towards Greater Understanding – Meeting the Needs of Muslim Pupils in State Schools: Information and Guidance for Schools”. What could be acceptable as a minimal “reasonable accommodation” of religious preference in state schools has already been partially transformed into a maximal demand by substitution of the concept of a Muslim “right” for that of “accommodation. Muslim parents in Western Europe have generally failed to heed radical demands that they place their children in religious schools.g. poor families may go to radical mosques and movements (such as Hamas or the Muslim Brotherhood). and exclusion of Muslim children from mixed-gender sports and especially from swimming instruction. as has an ephemeral Sufi Muslim Council (SMC). (2) Institutionalisation of Shariah by nonMuslim governments (“Parallel Shariah”) In Britain. and general anti-Western literature into British state schools. the school guidelines also called for a bar on participation in music and dancing. or because Muslim schools are scarce. as well as introducing radical Shariah guidelines for the dress of both male and female students. In line with the MCB’s Islamist ideology. BMF. Holland. But outside the West. In other words. either because they lack the means to pay for private tuition. unless swimming lessons are segregated and girls provided with full body cover while being taught to swim. that Muslim parents in Western Europe continue to mainly seek education for their children in non-Muslim state schools. compulsory inclusion of nonMuslim students in Ramadan and other Islamic holiday events.e.

comprises an argument that traditional Muslims have fallen back into a state of jahiliyyah or pre-Islamic ignorance. they equate Shariah with their own improvised notions of religious justice. While radical Islam. a project manager of Apna Haq. Sheikh Faiz-ul-Aqtab Siddiqi. Early in 2009. represented by Saudi Wahhabism. Shariah advocates in the West hope to separate Muslims from their non-Muslim neighbors. it is younger British-born Muslim men who are the driving force for the increase in numbers. enforced by the British authorities. Baron Phillips. and the Hijaz College Islamic University. says that the number of polygamous marriages is growing.” Archbishop Williams and Lord Chief Justice. announced that a system of Shariah tribunals he directs. near Nuneaton. Nuneaton. Paradoxically. Unschooled in Islamic law. The act CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. In her experience. with two more to be set up in Glasgow and Edinburgh. But Shariah is not a sound-bite topic.67 “There are no official figures on the number of people in polygamous marriages in Britain. She says that women under pressure to enter into polygamous relationships often do not have anyone to turn to for help and that this can lead to mental health problems. Late in 2008. Obligatory Shariah for Muslims. Pakistani jihadism and Deobandism. BBC reporter Zubeida Malik noted. In reality. Warwickshire Sheikh Faiz-ul-Aqtab Siddiqi. Bradford. Warwickshire. British social welfare practice already unofficially recognises polygamy and pays spousal benefits to second wives. defining the MAT councils as arbitration tribunals. principal of Hijaz College Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. rather than diminishing. would request that the British government enforce verdicts rendered by his authorities. ignorance of Shariah among nonMuslims is matched by a similar void among the radical agitators. and Manchester. Their lightminded remarks could aggravate. Faiz-ul-Aqtab Siddiqi stated that he anticipated utilizing the UK Arbitration Act 1996. Siddiqi said: “We realised that under the Arbitration Act we can make rulings which can be enforced by county and high courts. but Zlakha Ahmed. a woman’s support service based in Rotherham. is the ultimate issue in calls for adoption of a vaguely-defined Shariah. differently applied by the four different Sunni and two Shia schools of interpretation. the easier to recruit and indoctrinate believers for jihadism. the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal (MAT). the growing tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims in Britain. with rulings that could be enforced in law. failed to see that demands for Shariah in the West have little to do with increased respect for Islam and everything to do with the continuing radicalisation of Muslims. if both parties in the dispute agree to grant the tribunal jurisdiction in their cases. when they appealed in maladroit fashion for recognition of Shariah in Britain. Shariah is a complex system of jurisprudence.islamicpluralism. who chiefly seek publicity with their demands and threats. the term jahili or “ignorant” may be applied with much greater accuracy to the radicals.68 MAT has established public offices in Birmingham. But Shariah fanatics call for something more: they want official state enforcement of religious decrees. a barrister and principal of Hijaz College Islamic University.Institutionalisation of Shariah by non-Muslim governments (“Parallel Shariah”) CIP marriage and divorce.eu 39 .

He declared “the demand for Shariah is a political slogan from which the Sunnis will not benefit. About two-thirds of our interviewees expressed satisfaction with British civil law and articulated strong opposition to the introduction of Shariah. with what is commonly done in the U.K. and creating a major burden on the public budget. “Who is Rowan Williams? His comments were unimportant.” Siddiqi first appeared as a promoter of Muslim tribunals in UK media in 2006. which is known as Britain’s main centre of Deobandism. Inayat Bunglawala. is himself a barrister CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. the Jewish beth din courts in numerous Western countries. and Canada.”70 Authoritative moderate Muslim representatives in the UK have argued that any government recognition of the jurisdiction of Shariah courts over matters of common law in the West would mean either Shariah on the cheap dominated by ignorant radicals depriving British Muslims of their due rights – or an extremely elaborate system making room for the six main schools of Islamic jurisprudence. certification of judges. inheritance disputes. In the city of Leicester. Mohammed Ramzan. Many expressed fear that Shariah agitation would worsen the suspicions of nonMuslims toward the Muslim community. illegal forced marriages (banned by legislation in 2007). not lack of Shariah. we interviewed Muhammad Islam Qadri. Siddiqi’s website69 states that his tribunals’ purview includes family disputes. treated this discussion with remarkable mildness. Surprisingly.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 allows disputes to be resolved using alternatives like tribunals. They were resentful of what they consider the patronizing interference of Archbishop Rowan Williams and others like him. In Sheffield. tribunals had settled six cases of domestic violence in marriages. the professional legal press in the U. commercial and debt disputes. he was not a political leader like Tony Blair or Gordon Brown”. do not request official government backing for their decisions. in cooperation with police. and mosque disputes. asked. who they view as ignorant of Islam and whose comments left them confused as to their motives. Another. assistant secretarygeneral of the Muslim Council of Britain. Muhammad Islam Qadri is soliciting funds to open an anti-fundamentalist medresa. who stated that Muslims in Britain have more rights than non-Muslims in Saudi Arabia.” he added. “All we are doing is regulating community affairs in these cases. CIP International Director Irfan Al-Alawi. If the Jewish courts are allowed to flourish. One of the most remarkable features of the CIP survey in Britain was the encounter with British Muslim solicitors and barristers. and so on.eu . a prominent religious activist. which for Muslims is what the sharia courts are. This method is called alternative dispute resolution. But outside Israel. Siddiqi said he anticipated his organization would gain jurisdiction over “smaller” criminal cases.” He noted that Deobandis had entered 463 legal complaints against his father.islamicpluralism. CIP interviewed local figure Mohammed Sadiq. including the U. Several interviewees were concerned that introduction of Shariah would put Muslims in a legal limbo or ghetto. These tribunals have reportedly dealt with more than 100 cases. so must the sharia ones”. who was a well-known antifundamentalist jurist. it was repeated. providing for an administrative apparatus. Any such trends would. He also criticised the British authorities for supporting “dialogue” with Islamic fundamentalists and stated that the problem facing British Muslims is terrorism. except for the likely appointment of radicals as arbiters. to some extent. by late 2008. appeals. said: “The MCB supports these tribunals. aggravate the difficulties of British Muslims.S. comprising Muslim divorce and inheritance issues as well as complaints between neighbors.S. Allegedly. a principal investigator in our survey. an article in The ABA Journal commented that Shariah “courts are controversial because they help to enforce cultural practices and traditions that may conflict. Shariah as a basis 40 for strictly voluntary mediation of family or business disputes might appear well and good.

Sayyid Irfan Shah also stated forthrightly that Muslims have more rights to practice their religion in the West than non-Muslims have in Saudi Arabia. British Muslim barristers and solicitors currently lack a support network or organization representing their interests. which would be a position opposed by non-Muslims. should find a way to form an alliance. who considers himself a spiritual teacher and jurist.72 41 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. Finally. a jurist known as “The Lion of Bradford. known as “Little Pakistan. denying that it is. of the type discussed in section 4) of Case Study: Britain. nor against Shariah.eu .islamicpluralism. he declared that traditional Sunnis. “Pir Habib” also defended the radical British Muslim Forum (BMF). CIP investigators conducted extensive interviews. a heterodox Islamic movement subjected to legal sanctions. aligned with the Pakistani jihadist milieu. Muslim legal professionals observe that radicals prefer to enter the scientific and medical professions because in gaining standing therein they can avoid the participation in the British state required of solicitors and barristers. associated with the Hakchaaryaar (HCY) movement. the British and U. which would drastically change their professional status. which is violently anti-Shia. But “Pir Habib” denied that Lord Nazir Ahmed engages in the common Wahhabi practice of “insulting the Prophet Muhammad” by prohibiting Muslims from celebrating mawlid and otherwise denying the status of the Prophet as a speciallyenlightened personality different from normal people as well as from the monotheistic prophets preceding him. in that. Haroon Rashid. according to barrister Aseid Malik. Most British Muslim solicitors and barristers apparently do not desire the introduction of Shariah in the country. especially in Pakistan. as is widely believed. This aspect of the Shariah debate has largely been ignored in British and global media. In Bolton. declared that Muslim opponents of the introduction of Shariah are much more sophisticated in their understanding of the distinctions between private and public law than many non-Muslim critics of Islam in Britain. in addition to the involvement of barristers in criminal cases.” asking pointedly why. if such an intent exists. and they represent a major potential bulwark against radical Shariah ideology in the country. which he argued would violate Islamic belief. operates a branch in Manchester of a well-known East London Shariah divorce facility. He denied that conflicts in Iraq and Israel represent an Anglo-American “war on Islam. authorities in their own countries do not attack Muslims.S. and stated that he is neither for Shariah in Britain. which must confront Saudi and Iranian political radicalism. In the city of Bradford.” who maintains a girls’ school and holds large annual preaching assemblies. A disciple of “Pir Habib.Institutionalisation of Shariah by non-Muslim governments (“ria h”) CIP and lecturer in criminal law at the University of London. who encounter religious enemies in Saudi Arabia and Iran. British Muslims depend on solicitors for such essential legal services as preparation of wills and property transactions. whom he described as a fundamentalist Wahhabi. He controls a number of major mosques in Britain.” was the scene of rioting by young Muslims in July 2001.) (3) Criminal aspects A series of video documentaries by the UK television Channel 4 show Dispatches has shown that radical indoctrination in contempt for British law is prevalent in mosque education (Undercover Mosque – The Return). and the Western nations. “Pir Habib” is a trustee of BMF. at the same time. A contrasting view was presented by Pir Habib ur-Rahman Sahib.” Nazir Begg. it would produce legal chaos.71 and that radical recruitment is widespread in British correctional institutions (From Jail to Jihad). Sayyid Irfan Shah. as well as fomenting hatred of the Ahmadiyya. Bradford. pointed out that tens of thousands of British Muslims practice as solicitors and barristers. a Muslim solicitor. Some interviewed by CIP echoed the view that “parallel Shariah” would be a disaster for the Muslim community. (Irfan Shah is. “Pir Habib” is associated with the Muslim political figure Lord Nazir Ahmed.

5 percent of the total British population. described rising “disaffection and distance” and said the problem “urgently” required official action. In the UK as much as in the U. Dr. involving mosque instruction. Owers said: “There was a perception among officers that some Muslim prisoners operated as a gang and put pressures on nonMuslim prisoners to convert. Gang members. officials have expressed their concern about Islamic extremism. According to From Jail to Jihad. The crisis in Whitemoor attracted further attention in November 2008 when the Sunday Express reported that Muslim radicals had launched a “reign of terror” against other inmates in the facility. kill. The newspaper counted no more than 100 Muslims housed in Whitemoor. a high-security prison in Cambridgeshire. load.S.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 In the first case. From Jail to Jihad reported on street gangs and inmates as part of an underworld permeated with a radical and dangerous interpretation of Islam.S. Officers expressed concern that prisoners increasingly were converting to Islam according to radical interpretations. and reassemble firearms. having become Muslims. Anne Owers..74 British correctional staff are untrained in distinguishing between radical and moderate Islam. where jihadist recruits are taught to use explosives and celphones as detonators. Inside HM Prison Brixton in London. This datum alone illustrated the alienation of British Asian Muslims from the broader society. Inside UK prisons young inmates are taught that Islam justifies their criminal activities if they are directed against non-Muslims. Ms.76 This pattern in UK correctional institutions had become almost identical to that observed by CIP in U. ex-inmates engaging in Islamist da’wa after leaving prison are an important element of the radical movement. Muslims comprised approximately 11 percent of the UK prison population. They are also taught to strip. kill’ homosexuals and those who abandon the faith of Islam..S. Danny Shaw. may 42 target drug dealers and steal from them to support the underground Islamist movement. they have feared any aggressive action might cause a backlash creating more radicalization. female teacher Um Saleem at the Regents Park Mosque in London was recorded calling on Muslims to “ ‘Kill him. BBC News reported in October 200875 an official assessment warning of an environment of fear among staff dealing with radical Muslim inmates at Whitemoor.S. kill. Britain’s Chief Inspector of Prisons. British officials have not wished to appear oppressive in dealing with Islamic extremism. Peter Neumann of King’s College CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. Many who are approached are former members of street gangs.”73 The same Channel 4 video (Undercover Mosque – The Return) showed Muslim students being taught that lawbreaking is permissible when committed against nonMuslims. According to UK Channel 4. and on other Muslim prisoners to conform to a strict and extreme interpretation of Islamic practice. prisons.. like that of many African Americans. aggravates discontent among young Muslims.S. while they made up 2. terrorist training camps are a part of an indoctrination program. including lawbreaking ranging from robbery to killing. and that Muslim convicts in HMP Whitemoor were promoting a “strict and extreme” interpretation of Islamic practice. commented that the Whitemoor report confirmed previous investigations findings at HM Prison Belmarsh in London. But as in the U.islamicpluralism.eu . Also as in the U. the UK’s black nonMuslim population is a major target for radical Muslim recruitment. but said that a nucleus of Al-Qaida sympathisers had compelled prisoners to become Muslims (a violation of Qur’an) and committed acts of violence against those who defied them. Prison officers warned that Muslim prison gangs sought to compel other inmates to support radical Islam.” A BBC correspondent. a view that conforms to Wahhabi teaching heard among young Muslims in the U. British Muslim community life in socially-insulated enclaves.

Sheikh Hassan. which. extensive Saudi influence. The suspects were released on bail. now two decades in the past. over quite a small geographical area. The Senior Judge and Secretary of the Council. In many ways. it’s not religious – it’s just a cultural thing”. … And if they don’t accept it. Divorce Shariah Style. the main critic of this development has been Dr. wherever we are in the world. by insisting on artificial amplification for the Adhan. this is but the other side of the coin to far-Right intimidation. with members ruling on every aspect of Islamic life. we have our own law. and suggested establishment of special prisons for jihadists. for example. Bishop Nazir-Ali wrote. According to the BBC.” British non-Muslim public opinion has expressed further dismay over the apparent transformation of ethnic enclaves into alleged “no-go” areas in towns with large Muslim populations. “It’s not shariah. “There is pressure already to relate aspects of the sharia to civil law in Britain. There would be no rapist[s] at all. Because once a thief’s hand is cut off. At the beginning of 2008. yes. “This is happening here even though some Muslim-majority communities are trying to reduce noise levels from multiple mosques announcing this call. the family of the victim told police it would be settled outside the ordinary British courts system. across the Gulf of Aden. One of the results of this has been to further alienate the young from the nation in which they were growing up and also to turn already separate communities into ‘no-go’ areas where adherence to this ideology has become a mark of acceptability. nobody is going to steal. they would need more and more prisons. “Us Somalis. “Those of a different faith or race may find it difficult to live or work there because of hostility to them and even the risk of violence.77 A more radical approach to Shariah in its relationship to lawbreaking was presented in another Channel 4 program. Ironically. who in 1989.78 The broadcast described the Shariah Council at Regents Park Mosque in London. When a group of Somali youths was arrested on suspicion of stabbing another teenage member of their community. having been established for a quarter century. A hearing was called by community elders and the accused were ordered to compensate the victim by a fine. warned against viewing Muslims as a monoculture.eu . unknown throughout most of history and its use raises all sorts of questions about noise levels and whether non-Muslims wish to be told the creed of a particular faith five times a day on the loudspeaker. the same facility where extremist preaching had been recorded. the call to prayer.79 “there has been a worldwide resurgence of the ideology of Islamic extremism. How do these phenomena intersect with Shariah promotion? BBC Radio 4 reported in 2006 on a case in the UK Somali community. nobody is going to commit this crime at all. throughout its global diaspora. This is why we say that. is notably susceptible to fundamentalist and radical Islamic interpretations and ideology – a predictable outcome considering the proximity of the Arabian peninsula. which was paid by the families of the suspects. one after the other. which is perceived as an illegal imposition of separation. and the absence of a settled government in Somalia. Attempts have been made to impose an ‘Islamic’ character on certain areas. “Such amplification was. A British Somali community representative. we want to offer it to the British society.islamicpluralism.Britain: Criminal Aspects CIP London recommended European governments improve monitoring of prisons to prevent their emergence as “major hubs” for terror recruitment. however. To some extent this is already true of arrangements for sharia-compliant banking but have the far43 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. an assault committed with a knife was resolved by an unofficial Somali Shariah tribunal in south-east London. Michael Nazir-Ali. said: “We know that if Shariah laws are implemented then you can change this country into a haven of peace. as the oldest in Britain. of course. said. If only once an adulterer is stoned.” he said.

and it is considered sanctified by the presence of an imam and recitation of blessings.islamicpluralism. the ceremony itself is not a sacrament. ‘He has come to us to ask for help. and because their marriages are not recorded in registered mosques in Britain. There is a lack of clear definition between these councils and courts of arbitration. British Muslim women who cannot obtain divorces in regular courts are drawn to Shariah councils operating in East London under the domination of Deobandi fundamentalists. a specific Islamic marriage ritual or covenant is never described in Qur’an or other sources in the Sunnah. such offences as forced marriage.”80 These problems of Islamic family relations have spawned a “Muslim marriage mafia” in Britain. A major Guardian reportage81 told of the situation as follows at the Islamic Shariah Council in Leyton: “In the back room of a converted corner shop in east London.’ he said. and the Saudi practice of “tourist marriage”. it operates on very small timescales and the process and the laws of evidence are far more lenient and it’s less awesome an environment than the English courts. Some of this behaviour is derived from local cultures. As reported in The Daily Telegraph. British men are even perceived. and therefore turn to the Shariah tribunals. in traditional 44 Shariah. tribunals. the aforementioned Faiz-ul Aqtab Siddiqi said this type of court had advantages for Muslims. but it has been assimilated by Islamist ideology. forced divorce. they cannot obtain civil divorces in the UK. polygamy. and prevalent regulation of marriage and divorce. The interjection of alleged religious authority into the dissolution of a nikah is a gratuitous development introduced by Islamist ideologues. but if the woman is adamant and she doesn’t want to reunite. in a derisory manner. or courts grant religious divorces to women was described incompletely in British media in 2006. Rather. Shariah agitators demand that marriage and related issues be completely subject to religious jurisdiction. The clerics running the East London divorce racket extort thousands of pounds sterling from poor Muslim women to grant them “Islamic” divorces. is not what most people would expect CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. But a very large number of British Asian Muslim women have been wed exclusively by nikah or marriage contract in Pakistan. Proponents of dissolving a nikah through Shariah tribunals do not address religious aspects of this practice. Nikah is not a religious institution. so long as money is handed over. female genital mutilation (FGM). and offer mendacious legal interpretations to support. While a marriage ceremony may be held. violate Western canons on women’s rights. what can we do?’ The image of a Muslim man pleading with his imam for a second chance with his wife. The manner in which “shadow Shariah” councils. because radical Muslim concepts of modesty. Muslim clerics in Western Europe may acquiesce in. Sheikh Maulana Abu Sayeed is trying to save another marriage… one of Sayeed’s colleagues at the Islamic Shariah Council in Leyton explains with a shrug. and the relationship can. The decisions of these judges are typically guided only by personal whim. “shadow Shariah” tribunals in marriage and divorce was more fully exposed in British print media. In 2007. as vulnerable to appeals to become Muslims because Shariah would provide them means of gaining easier divorces. nikah is an agreement between parties whose assets are inventoried in the nikahnama or contractual document. Shariah authorities working in this milieu are widely considered to be radicals. CIP found that the main area of vulnerability to Shariah agitation among British Muslims is that of divorce.eu . wife-beating. only to be told that it is his wife’s decision. be nullified by the action of either party. “ ‘It operates on a low budget. the extent of involvement by informal. with limited religious training.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 reaching implications of this been fully considered?” (4) Approach to Women Family law is the most controversial aspect of Shariah.

then flown to Pakistan and married again. For example. ‘All you have to do is register your place of worship and. domestic conflict and especially divorce becomes an incentive to turn to Shariah. homes. This has allegedly been especially common in Bradford because of the political reaction to the 2001 riots there. Defenders of traditional Islam identify elements protecting women in the original Islamic revelation. some Muslims think they are protected by [non-Islamic] family law when they are not. even though. After looking into the case. but simply for day-to-day guidance on living in accordance with their faith… The council. Financing from the EU is not subject to accounting.The Islamic Shariah Council. tucked away on a quiet terraced street of small family homes with roses in the front gardens.’ he says. which was a common practice in the pre-Islamic Arabian peninsula. ‘It seems to me they haven’t really got a problem at the marriage end. they are still married. the latter tribunals charge large sums for decisions that are almost always improvised and typically do not adhere to traditional Islamic law. and the husband was free to bring his second wife back to Britain as his legal spouse. It considers everything… inheritance settlements and whether property deals comply with Islamic laws against accruing interest… But the overwhelming majority of cases are to do with divorce – 95% of the roughly 7. Ahmed also stated that Muslim community organizations exploit the willingness of the UK and European Union authorities to finance women’s support programs.islamicpluralism..000 cases the council has dealt with since opening its doors in 1982 – and. Ms. . “shadow Shariah” courts operating in the area of divorce conform to mainstream Sunnism (Ahl as-Sunnah wa’al Jama’at or People of the Sunnah United in Consensus). along with other shariah councils. none of the informal. and are merely opinions among Sunnis – CIP]. a Muslim woman employed at the Bradford Advice Centre. and others think they are properly divorced when. argues that much of this confusion could be swept away if shariah law on marriages and divorces were recognised under civil law. they found that the first marriage was invalid as it had been conducted by an imam in an unregistered mosque. “In one case. there is already legislation available to them. from two rooms that resemble a hard-up solicitors’ practice. As is frequently recalled.Britain: Approach to Women CIP from a shariah court. But his case is typical of hundreds each year dealt with by a group of scholars who provide judgments on shariah law for Muslims across the country… The Muslims who consult the Islamic Shariah Council are not asking for permission to stone adulterous wives. once registered. administers community programs to assist Muslim women with economic and social problems. She elaborated by saying that such women seldom attend mosque services or apply at mosques for help with their problems. the wife of 45 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. and that. Bradford has a Council of Mosques that is considered corrupt. Qur’an expressly forbids female infanticide.. specifically.. Islam introduced women’s right to divorce and an equal share of property.eu . deputy chair of the Family Justice Council. Ahmed affirmed that because Muslim women do not know their civil and traditional Islamic rights. issues fatwas. they may go to the informal Shariah courts for assistance in marriage and divorce cases. and is believed to engage in such practices as multiple billing to finance social service programs. in fact. But according to Lord Justice Thorpe. His first wife was left with no legal protection by the family courts. failing to gain support in their families. as noted. or religious judgments [sic – fatwas are judgments only among Shias. According to British Muslim solicitor Adeal Zahid. which has no legal authority. with releasing women from bad or forced Islamic marriages. or return of dowries. Luton police contacted [the counselling group Women Living Under Muslim Laws] after pursuing a man for bigamy who had married in Luton. or chop off the hands of thieves.” Tasleem Ahmed. from which funds may be diverted to other purposes. and communities. then marriages solemnised will be good in civil law. Ms..

chose him as a spouse. For Hassan. Al-Alawi declared that an inquiry by CIP into domestic abuse disclosed incidents of sexual coercion. rather than vice versa. who desperately wanted to uphold their parents’ honour and obey their demands.) He said the Home Office had promised an investigation. “ ‘I told my imam that I was suffering and that my confidence was broken. ‘And in the end he forcefully got what he wanted.’ “Aliyah. The Centre for Islamic Pluralism (CIP) branch in the UK announced in September 2008 that it would publicly “name and shame” imams who provided an “Islamic” cover for domestic abuse by their silence in cases of women being burned. Not her father. and is so justified in some Shariah authorities. who worked as a factory-hand to support her unemployed husband. Data would be drawn from interviews with dozens of female Muslim victims as well as social workers in Muslim enclaves across northern England – including in Bradford. who wears the hijab – was raped and emotionally abused by her husband.’ Aliyah said. Leeds and Birmingham.’ “Aliyah didn’t go back to the imam because he was a close friend of her family and she was afraid that he would relay her complaints to her parents.’ she told The Times. a rich merchant woman named Khadijah. and raped. “For three years after her wedding in Pakistan in 1998 Aliyah – a practising Muslim raised in northern England. but a couple of childhood photos he’d seen of her. She couldn’t seek the advice of another imam because clerics don’t usually deal with females that aren’t their students or known to them through family links. the debated oral commentaries of Muhammad. Al-Alawi provided the following as a specimen case83: “It wasn’t love that brought Aliyah and Hassan together. Not her mother.eu . and said many of the clerics were Wahhabis or members of Tabligh-i-Jamaat (TJ.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 the Prophet Muhammad. and not her siblings. Aliyah – then a 20-year-old from Manchester – was a ticket out of Pakistan to join his brothers in England 46 in the hope of kick-starting a lucrative career in medicine. And I couldn’t say no to him because I was raised to fear men and put up with their decisions.islamicpluralism. beaten. Manchester.’ she said. Al-Alawi ascribed the complicity by the imams in crimes against women to fear of losing their paid positions in mosques if they brought the topic before the community and public. as well as attacks with burning cigarettes and belts by husbands who believe they have religious authority to brutalise women. “As for what Aliyah thought of Hassan? Well. and he called for the imams to be deprived of government grant money. ‘He wanted to do things in the bedroom that I didn’t want to do. who had routinely molested Aliyah in her formative years. “ ‘I totally lost faith in spiritual leaders after that. ‘I lost faith in imams because they refuse to discuss issues such as rape and abuse CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. no one cared. Stoning as a punishment does not appear anywhere in Qur’an. ‘The imam told me to be patient. Al-Alawi noted documented complaints about imams who refused to act in such cases. went to her local cleric to raise her concerns of being subjected to sexual abuse after her mother refused to listen to her complaints.82 CIP International Director Al-Alawi said the organization would furnish the British government’s Home Office with a list of clerics who refused to help abused women and failed to preach in condemnation of domestic violence. but is ascribed to hadith. who threatened to kill herself if Aliyah didn’t go through with the marriage.

” Forced marriage has become a major topic for discussion among British Muslim women.000 children were reported to have disappeared from primary schools and were believed to have been forced to marry abroad. firstly they cannot speak English and the imam is very reluctant to have a conversation with a woman because they feel there is a barrier.85 In Britain. which is apparently considered taboo for Muslims to talk about. now 30. “instead. we should encourage women to seek advice from proper imams. spokesman for the official Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board (MINAB). Faiz-ul-Aqtab Siddiqi’s Muslim Arbitration Tribunal (MAT) has argued against confusing “forced” marriages with “arranged” marriages. the total number of children forced into marriage from Britain may be 3. a third 47 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www.eu . like that of divorce.’ “‘Aliyah’s’ name has been changed to protect her identity. saying. Yousif al-Khoei. but children of immigrants may then be sent back to their original countries for such weddings.” Al-Alawi said. charities and nongovernmental organizations monitor what they describe as the growing incidence of forced marriage in their country. said some clerics justified domestic violence.islamicpluralism.” In response to announcement of the CIP study..’ “Her tragic story is far from unique. opposed public identification of these imams. to press for official enforcement of MAT decisions by the British authorities. Forced marriage has been imported into Europe from tribal-based cultures. “Aliyah. In the UK. It’s seen as an embarrassing issue for them and they won’t get involved because they think their reputation will be ruined and so would the reputation of the community..000 each year. While I didn’t want medication I just wanted someone to listen to me and to give me encouragement to build myself back up.’ Aliyah also accused her mother of ignoring her complaints about her sexually abusive father. She said: ‘When I told the therapist how I had been abused she said I needed to read self-help books. however. “A lot of women who are brought from foreign countries to join their spouse here.000 calls and develops about 300 cases annually. Al- Khoei. It was ridiculous. but the advice she was given convinced her that she had to resolve her problems on her own. The British Government has established a Forced Marriage Unit (FMU) that rescued some 60 children 15 or younger between 2005 and 2008. “Aliyah said that clerics always put their community’s reputation ahead of women’s welfare. the latter are permitted. She said that some of her friends have gone through similar ordeals and have had complaints brushed aside by their clerics. “‘In the current situation.Britain: Approach to Women CIP and refuse to speak up against it. imams don’t want to bring up issues that involve the community because they fear that it would ruin the reputation of the Muslim community further. Siddiqi’s group has used the issue of forced marriage. There’s a lot of sexual abuse as well. with the Muslim community here feeling that it’s being attacked and regularly discriminated against. with the majority involving Pakistani children who are often married to their cousins. The unit receives 5.84 British legal authorities similarly distinguish between forced and arranged marriages on the grounds that the latter may be consensual. The custom is commonest in Britain among Pakistani immigrants. arguing that while the former are banned in Islamic law. divorced Hassan in 2001 after she was overcome by severe depression that on more than one occasion pushed her to consider taking her own life. She sought help from a therapist. but described them as a minority. up to 2.

In traditional Islam. Humayra Abedin. Girls are not the only prey. The victims of this practice become sex slaves. 300 forced marriages are reported to authorities each year. She was beaten and drugged while her family married her to a Muslim stranger. since the girls trapped in these marriages are not old enough to make such decisions. A teenage girl from a Pakistani family reported to British media that she was taken out of school at 13.” CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. another remarkable case was publicised. the legal action was reaffirmed in a Dhaka court. sent to Pakistan.eu . and raped and abused in a forced marriage. “to make provision for protecting individuals against being forced to enter into marriage without their free and full consent and for protecting individuals who have been forced to enter into marriage without such consent. was tricked into visiting Bangladesh. Photograph: STR/EPA freed after an action by the UK High Court under Britain’s Forced Marriage Act. the consent of the bride is required for the marriage to be valid. But these cases. but it is absurd to believe that informed consent is present in a girl aged seven. was rescued from a village in Mirpur by two UK diplomats and returned to her British home. The Daily Telegraph disclosed that the British High Commission in Pakistan had intervened in 131 such cases in 2007. reflecting increased appeals for help by victimised women.86 Soon thereafter. in which a 33-year old Muslim woman doctor. yet they remain tolerated and even encouraged among Pakistanis living in the West. under a “consular assistance” program. Shafaq Malik. for financial motives alone. When the girl informed a teacher in her school of her impending wedding. forced marriage of young girls to old men is obviously abusive and harmful to the victims. she was at first met with disbelief. are considered to represent a small share of the problem. after transporting her around Bangladesh to conceal her presence. a nine-year-old from a Pakistani family in Britain was removed from parental custody after authorities learned she had been told she would be married. both physically and psychologically. since dowries are supposed to be paid to the bride. 32. Traditional Muslim scholars argue that these practices contravene Shariah. A 15-year old. Forced marriage became illegal in Britain under the Forced Marriages (Civil Protection Act) 2007. In 2008.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 involving victims under 18. She was 48 Doctor Humayra Abedin. before the wedding was completed. The primary issue must be that of consent. Late in 2008 a series of cases in which Muslim women were taken to Pakistan and subjected to attempts at forced marriage were exposed in British media. not to her family. around 15 percent of cases involve forcing boys into marriage. A year before.islamicpluralism. both female and male. A helpline launched in April 2008 has registered an average of one case per week involving a child 16 or under. Finally. since the girls cannot be expected to assume any of the normal responsibilities of marriage. her country of origin. Pakistani girls as young as seven years old are sold by their parents to men in their 60s and older. without her consent. leaves court surrounded by police after the Bangladesh high court declared her free in Dhaka. which bans such unions.87 In many cases. UK Foreign Secretary David Miliband announced that such diplomatic efforts would continue. a girl of 11 was rescued in Bangladesh and repatriated to Britain after an attempt to marry her to an older man. In addition. the payment of “bride price” to the parents of the girl violates Shariah. who was abducted under such conditions. In the British town of Luton alone.

In January 2009. While there is no “official” legitimisation of so-called “honour” murder in Islam. “If. Dominic Grieve. This allows English judges to scrutinise it to ensure that it complies with English legal tenets. The order may be issued for a specific period of time. 39 years old and a father of two.Britain: Approach to Women CIP The act provides for issuance of protective orders (similar to restraining orders in the U. among Muslims. the estate of a Muslim man was shared out between three daughters and two sons.islamicpluralism. whereas in a British court. She stipulated.S. both male and female.88 Khalil Kazi. as with other problems previously described. There was no further punishment. a payment based on a hospital malpractise complaint following an epidural abscess.eu . In October 2008. under arbitration laws. Faiz ul-Aqtab Siddiqi has also admitted inequities in the divorce proceedings his organization administers. an imam was reported to have divorced his wife without her knowledge. Kazi. the parties to a judgement in Sharia council wish to have this recognised by English authorities. who declared. a relevant third party. Siddiqi’s call for official enforcement of Shariah mediation elicited a strong repudiation from the UK Conservative Party’s spokesman on legal affairs. or any other individual. enforceable at law like any other. British media reported that cabinet ministers had approved plans to allow Shariah councils to settle financial. in Morocco. property. In six domestic violence complaints. and provides for arrest of violators. He noted that in an inheritance dispute handled by the court in Nuneaton.” So-called “honour” murder of Muslims. Bouchra Laroussi. but the practice and related forms of abuse are also found among Hindus and Sikhs. while keeping control of Meimouna’s settlement of £1 million sterling. Kurds. have been especially known for the practice. He brought Laroussi to the UK and married her. the division among the children would have been equal. in a family dispute dealing with money or children. is known in Britain. they are at liberty to draft a consent order embodying the terms of the agreement and submit it to an English court. forged his wife’s signature on divorce papers. and it is typically described as a cultural. Leeds. Prentice stated that Shariah councils would have no recognised jurisdiction and that religious decrees would lack legal force. rather than a religious problem. In a 1998 49 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. criticised the clerical strata for failing to prevent such atrocities. was sentenced to two years in prison after he “manipulated the judicial system” to divorce his seriously handicapped wife Meimouna and remarry. numerous Muslims have. The Shariah judges gave the sons twice as much as the daughters. with the proviso that their decisions must be approved by a UK family court. They can’t forbid girls to attend mixed classes in school or award sons the bulk of inheritances merely because the parties agreed in advance to accept the verdict – any more than a regular court can enforce a voluntary contract of slavery or prostitution. and child-custody disputes. for 12 years. but had already met another woman. and the women plaintiffs ceased cooperating with police in the cases. Meimouna only found out she was divorced without her consent when she learned of the second marriage and decided to separate from Kazi. Siddiqi said his judges ordered nothing more than that the husbands take anger management classes and be mentored by Muslim elders.89 “arbitration tribunals can settle some disputes and have their judgments enforced.” Grieve’s comment represented a significant response to Westerners who argue that Shariah arbitration is merely a variety of contract between voluntary parties. a part time imam at HM Prison Armley. Forced or otherwise illegal divorces are also known among British Muslims. But they must act within the principles of English law. as well as in the Christian and Jewish communities.) Applications for such orders may be made by the person to be protected. in the Leeds area.90 The action was disclosed by junior minister Bridget Prentice in reply to a parliamentary question.

to all intents and purposes. The CSC stated that humiliation based on honour may include social ostracism. precisely such bans are often at the source of so-called “honour” murder. titled Crimes of the Community. so the mother in law decided to invite all these men over. CSC. Such attitudes are unrelated to Shariah. brothers and sisters. he had the mental age of a five year old but the body of a 40 year old. they are difficult if not impossible to expunge from society.” When she finally arrived she found out that he was disabled. and loss of self-esteem. the Centre for Social Cohesion (CSC). But the CSC report also determined that Muslim girls may be withdrawn from school if it is feared that education will make them too assertive of feminist or otherwise independent attitudes. As we shall see. While all such phenomena may be regrettable. and it was prostitution. abduction. diminution of political prestige. so the girl only saw what he looked like on picture and thought “gosh he looks good. Regarding so-called “honour” murder per se. domestic violence. “Sana Bukhari. Early in 2008. and this girl was very pretty. premarital sex. false imprisonment. as well as members of their extended family and in-laws. drugging.eu . death. However. While typical incidents of domestic violence involve men using force against their wives. mutilation. do not seem to fit with criminal behavior or atrocious mistreatment. Domestic violence and ‘crimes of passion’ exist worldwide. forced marriage and FGM are not isolated practices but are instead part of a selfsustaining social system built on ideas of honour and cultural. which nowhere pronounces on the appropriateness of female schooling. every day around the UK women are being threatened with physical violence.islamicpluralism. published an extensive survey of socalled “honour” murder and related atrocities including female genital mutilation (FGM) in the UK. Westernised habits including use of intoxicants. “The police and the Crown Prosecution CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. an indigenous 50 and self-perpetuating phenomenon which is carried out by third and fourth generation immigrants who have been raised and educated in the UK… Many of these problems are common to all societies.” CSC noted that “damage to honour” may arise from defiance of parental authority. As the report stated.” along with a description of one of the most shocking cases of abuse of a Muslim woman in Britain. boycott of businesses. rape. a non-religious British think-tank. honour crimes differ significantly from other outwardly similar crimes. Some of the consequences of loss of honour described in the CSC report. however. honour-based abuses regularly involve a woman’s own sons. The girl however managed to escape and go to the police. says: ‘I have one case when someone was brought over and her husband had mental health issues. declared.92 The study included forced marriage as an “honour crime. the preplanned and ritualised nature of much of this violence (particularly in the case of honourkillings and FGM) makes such behaviour distinct from other ad-hoc forms of violence against women. based on data reported in 2003. an outreach worker at the Ashi’ana refuge in Sheffield.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 fatwa. such as bullying of children. Similarly. Instead honour violence is now.” The CSC report summarised the situation of British Muslim women in dramatic terms: “This study shows that honour killings. which incident has been widely discussed among British Muslims. have become so sensitised to such issues as childhood bullying that unfortunate behavior that has existed for many generations has been transformed into a public policy issue. It was a telephone nikah. As a result of these ideas. Western countries.91 the fundamentalist ECFR held that husbands may prohibit wives from visiting certain women friends if the husband fears harm to the family or a risk to conjugal relations. and Britain in particular. withdrawal from education and forced marriage by their own families. ethnic and religious superiority. This is not a one-time problem of firstgeneration immigrants bringing practices from ‘back home’ to the UK. and gossip.

“there have been no recorded honour killings by Arabs in the UK – even though many women’s groups say that domestic violence among Arab immigrants is common”. a vaguely-estimated quantification of such crimes. However. is unhelpful in assessing the prevalence of “Shariah abuse” among European Muslims. compelled her to undergo a vaginal examination to confirm her virginity. In a further elaboration that remains empirically elusive. abominable as they are. Honour killings by South Asians occur nationwide. In 2002.) Islam forbids Muslim women from marrying non-Muslim men.” But it also stipulated that “there are relatively few recorded cases of honour killings by Kurds in the UK. Abdullah Yones. “Between 1993 and 2003 police identified 109 honour-related crimes across U. CSC said.eu . resentment of intermarriage between religions is no more limited to Muslims than are “crimes of passion”. (While muta’a is condemned by Sunni Muslims as well as non-Muslims as a pretext for prostitution. Sunni Islam permits Muslim men to marry non-Muslim women. Yones was sentenced to life in prison. The family confiscated the letters. Although many – and perhaps most – honourrelated murders are carried out by firstgeneration immigrants to the UK. killed his 16-year old daughter Heshu by cutting her throat after stabbing her 18 times. It is important to note that while this problematical matter is inseparable from Shariah. CSC stated. CSC reinforced the sense of cultural context in so-called “honour” murder. disappearances after return to native countries. 48. an increasing number also involve people born and raised in Britain. Most of these murders are carried out by Muslims from Pakistan and Bangladesh. of 51 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. which she feared was an attempt to force her into an unwanted marriage.94 Yones had discovered that Heshu had a Lebanese Christian boy-friend and exchanged love letters with him. an Iraqi Kurd living in Britain. though such intermarriage is common in some Muslim societies.” The CSC. and suicides. Hindus and Sikhs also carry out honour killings but seemingly at a proportionally lower rate.” So-called “honour” murder is often ascribed to opposition to marriage out of Islam or with a partner from a disapproved ethnic group. alleged that the incidence of so-called “honour” murder might expand statistically based on inclusion of “crimes of passion” among nonMuslims including Christian and Jewish Britons as well as Hindus and Sikhs. “Most of the honour killings known to have occurred in the UK appear to have been carried out by people of South Asian Origin. although Kurdish men appeared in the courtroom to defend the accused. Only two Kurdish women are recorded as having been killed by their relatives in the UK”.islamicpluralism. UK police examined 122 deaths and disappearances of minority women in the preceding decade. pointing out “the Kurdish regions of Iraq and Turkey have among the highest rates of honour killing per capita recorded. and sent her to Iraq. A more precise estimate was offered by the European Parliament in its 2007 report on the problem. for its part. Media reported that the case elicited pressure on British authorities from Kurdish women across the country. In the aftermath of the Yones case. it has not attracted considerable attention in Britain. and Europe.” Unfortunately.93 The EP stated. while Shias are allowed only to enter into “temporary marriage” (muta’a) with nonMuslim women. basing itself on news reports.K. along with slayings committed after repatriation of immigrants to Pakistan or Kurdistan. the exact number of honour killings in the UK is not known – partly because there is no clear definition of what constitutes an honour killing – and many believe the true figure could be higher. who demanded that the killer be brought to justice. If this figure is true.Britain: Approach to Women CIP Service [CPS] have said that on average 10-12 women are killed in honour-based violence every year in the UK. even if it is Muslim. honour killings would amount to a relatively small proportion of the total number of murders committed annually in the UK.

Hesha Yones Murderer: 48-year old father.97 The report concluded that when prosecutions failed. Female genital mutilation (FGM) is legitimised by some scholars of Sunni Shariah. within a situation of male family control. on average. Significantly. London. where such incidents are common and effectively unimpeded. Ministry of Justice. and most defendants were classified as Asian (Pakistani. four London Boroughs participated (Newham. Rubina Hussan was married at 18 and told doctors she believed she was too young to have a child. aged. West Midlands. the fundamentalist Shariah authority Al-Qaradawi has issued a qualified endorsement of the practice. “indicating a need to address specific support systems for victims”. “b) To identify issues facing prosecutors in accurately identifying. and West Yorkshire.eu . as part of ongoing work around expert witnesses”. The couple were cousins from Bangladesh.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 whom 81 were from the London region. Schools and Family. Tower Hamlets and Ealing). of Bedford. just under a third (10 of 33) aged 18 to 24 and just over a third (12) aged between 25 to 34 years old. managing and prosecuting these cases. 29 years old.95 The husband turned himself into police and admitted the crime. CPS identified 35 cases of forced marriage and/or socalled “honour” crime during the survey. Emran Hussan was found guilty of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.” As a companion document. In the wording of the report. 27.islamicpluralism. CSC further 52 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. “c) To inform the development of any national guidance and training for prosecutors. with a minimum of 12 years. “All defendants… were male. In addition. who herself suffered harm. but such authority is derived from controversial hadith. Three defendants were aged 10 to 17. Bangladeshi or Indian)… Victims were almost equally likely to be male or female with most of these ‘honour’ crimes stemming from a relationship with a woman.” The report further commented: “One of the key issues in relation to defendant profile was the tendency for individuals to be aged under 35 years old. the UK Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) issued a pilot report on forced marriage and honour crimes. as well as non-governmental organizations. The CPS findings had been collected beginning in July 2007 with the following goals: “a) To identify the number and pattern of cases. Home Office. The survey covered nine months and was concluded in March 2008. by asphyxiation. as previously indicated. the husband mainly worked in Saudi Arabia. In December 2008. killed his wife Rubina. CPS called for “setting up a forced marriage/so-called ‘honour’ crimes witness familiarisation programme to develop expert witnesses on these crimes. Children. Abdullah Yones The survey was conducted in four CPS Areas: Lancashire. 21 cases were brought to court and 10 ended in convictions. CPS also issued policy recommendations for dealing with these issues. and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.” Victim: 16-year old daughter. 21. Brent. Another so-called “honour” murder in Britain was disclosed in December 2008 when Emran Hussan. claiming he feared she would abort their child. CSC correctly notes that “almost all Muslim clerics oppose infibulations (Type III FGM)98 which they usually regard as an unlawful pre-Islamic practice” .96 The document was compiled by CPS in cooperation with the UK Departments of Health. difficulties in securing testimony from victims and witnesses were typically responsible.

Kurdistan is especially known as an area of FGM. who was crowned Miss Face of Asia in a beauty contest in 2007. When the tragedy was reported in The Times. outside the African and peninsular Arab region. 34. the practice is as common among Coptic Christians as among Muslims. Regarding issues of women’s dress among Muslims in Britain. a former curry restaurant owner.islamicpluralism. In Egypt. discovered that Jamil was already married to Narissa Amjad. Sahar’s sister Mariya Massumi. and Eeshal. which could make the case a so-called “honour” murder. now 32. Sami. Sebina Malik.” As with so-called “honour” murder. Sufioriented Barelvi women wear loose tunics and trousers – ethnic garments that do not cover or hide the shape of the whole body. shortly before her 24th birthday. a 29-year old marketing executive. leaving the woman with no rights or division of property. FGM was outlawed twice in the UK.Britain: Approach to Women CIP points out. He attempted to end the relationship by talaq. She moved out of Jamil’s house and then sought an Islamic divorce from him. A friend of Jamil stated that he was drunk when the wedding took place and that nobody from his family was present. “FGM is also found in non-Muslim cultures and societies – primarily in Africa. Similarly the practice is found in Christian areas of East Africa such as Ethiopia and Eritrea as well as in parts of West Africa where animalist (sic) beliefs are still prevalent. Malik had a daughter. Ghayasuddin Siddiqui. Barelvi men also frequently wear Western clothing. prior to immigrating to Britain. Polygamy among British Asian Muslims was widely exposed by media at the end of 2008100 when. while traditional. 33. FGM may occur in the UK. and a sex tape in which she appeared was posted on the Internet. while Deobandis affect a 53 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. But no complaints have been brought under the 1985 or 2003 laws regarding the practise. suggested that Sahar had not committed suicide. a solicitor. The same outfit may be worn by Barelvi men.000 women living in Britain had undergone the practise. by the Prohibition of Female Circumcision Act 1985 and the Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003. or a triple declaration of divorce. allegedly because they disapproved of marriage to an Afghan woman. fundamentalist Deobandi women will typically wear hijab and even a full abaya and niqab (total covering including the face veil). and may be quite fashionable. but data on the practice is lacking. the head of the socalled Muslim Parliament of Great Britain. lived. A 2006 study of FGM by the UK Department of Health99 estimated that some 75. Daftary had been married in Britain and had a miscarriage about two months after her wedding. With immigration of Kurds from Iraq to Britain since the first Gulf war. aged 1. Kurdistan with Jamil but divorced him on grounds of adultery and unreasonable behavior. Rashid Jamil. now 11. admitted that Islamic clerics performed polygamous weddings unrecognised by civil law. 4. Sahar Daftary.eu . a model from Afghanistan. when she learned of her husband’s polygamous relationship. Jamil reportedly contracted the earlier marriage with Amjad while married to another woman. with whom he had two children. Both Jamil’s marriages were based only on nikah. died in an apparently suicidal fall from the 12th floor of the building where her husband. Daftary complained to police that she feared she was being stalked. Daftary.

Washington. Abi and Ja’far. August 20. and Schwartz. “Faith schools set for expansion. and tracksuits and sports shoes are increasingly visible. Melissa. September 10. Seek Different Sort of Summer Camp – Afghan. 71 Broadcast September 1.” The Weekly Standard [Washington]. full body and facial covering (abaya and niqab) are notably more visible than in other British Muslim communities. Wahhabi short pants on men. 44 Unsigned.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 long. Music. Black America. 2006. “Happily married?. out of public scrutiny.org. 2008. 64 MacEoin. and Whiteman. 2008. 2006. “Revealed: UK’s first official sharia courts. “If you want shariah law.ams-uk. “Staff ‘fears’ over Muslim inmates. and Unsigned. Zubeida. “Muslim fanatics ‘hijack British prison. 1999. August 27.” BBC News.” Evening Standard [London].” The Guardian [London]. 1997. February 25.” British Broadcasting Corporation.abajournal. 2002. arguing that Muslims should choose either Muslim or Western garments. Bradford.’” Sunday Express [London]. “Islamic Court Rulings are Enforceable in the United Kingdom. “My men train for armed conflict. ibid. 2001. 2008. 74 See Centre for Islamic Pluralism. “Shariah Comes for the Archbishop. Patrick.org. 1997.’ September 2005. “Muslims call for special bank holidays. Shahid.” Associated Press. July 24.” The Daily Telegraph. and Other Sins: Segregation. November 23. Integration. 76 Murray. Joshua. Chess. says British Muslim leader. Michael. July 9. James. Living Apart Together: British Muslims and the paradox of multiculturalism. September 19. 60 Scientific Training and Radical Islam. op. op. 2008. “Channel 4’s Dispatches: Undercover Mosque – vile sisters of no mercy.com/index. 50 Hennessy. 63 Clark.” The Sunday Telegraph. 77 Rozenberg. Crown Copyright. “Koranic codes.K. “Lack of Asian donors extends waiting time for transplants. 1993. accessible at www. 2008. but should not attempt to satisfy both cultural modes by mixing them. 61 www. 75 Unsigned. ‘Islamic Groups in Britain: A Background Paper From the Social Responsibility Committee of the Moravian Church. 2006.” Financial Times [London]. 12 August 2006. “U. 78 Broadcast February 3. April 28. 51 Rozenberg. 1995. Sue. 52 Full-page advertisement. Laura. September 2.moravian. “Muslim Youth in U. James.com. 79 Nazir-Ali. Senthilkumaran. 1999. 65 Unsigned. February 20. and Leicester. Stephen. 54 Mirza. In the cities of Dewsbury.” BBC News. November 30. September 11. Munira. “Poll reveals 40pc of Muslims want shariah law in UK. Elsewhere a mix of hijab. April 8. published at www. “Reading and Writing and Ramadan. February 20. Civitas. Marc. 43 Schwartz. 1989. 57 Centre for Islamic Pluralism. Washington/London. “Muslim schools offered cash to become state-run.” The Sunday Times. 2008 (downloadable . 2008.” The Guardian. March 12. Prisons. July 5. 2008. Abul. 2007. 62 Clark. Michael. 66 Al-Alawi. “Shariah law is spreading as authority wanes.html. Alison. Stephen. “Ofsted checks on school extremism. “Extremism flourished as UK lost Christianity. 39 Schwartz. August 15. 2008. Martha. Policy Exchange. 42 Unsigned. 2008. cit.K. January 11. Zein. 54 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www.” Daily Mail [London]. “Police arrest Islamic fundamentalist under anti-terrorism law. 2008. 55 Groves. Stephen. January 11. 2007. 2006. 59 Daniels.pdf) 58 Memorandum.” The Weekly Standard. Muslim-Law Compliant Housing Finance Launched. Senthilkumaran. 45 Sawer. September 14.” The Independent [London]. 70 Neil.” The Weekly Standard.” Daily Mirror [London]. 2008. Barelvi women pursue professional careers. March 9. 48 Champion. Faisal. NOTES 38 Schwartz. 68 Taher. August 12. op.matribunal. and Radical Islam. 1977. Patrick and Kite. 2008 (downloadable .islamicpluralism. 56 Mirza. Pakistani Outposts Offer Military Training To ‘Defend Our Faith. 2007. October 10. cit. October 18. October 22. “Western banks carve niche in Islamic trade finance. March 15. “Comments on the Islamic Religion.” The Sunday Times. 53 Malik. while Deobandi women may be kept at home. 2008. The Times [London]. Denis. 2009. abaya. 41 “Complementarity” may be equated with the Americanoriginated concept of “reasonable accommodation” as previously described herein.” The Daily Telegraph [London]. Sarah. London. Traditional Muslims view such a mélange with disdain. and Muslim Schools in Britain.” Daily Mail. 69 www. 40 Nazir-Ali. Irfan. 46 Unsigned. 73 Carroll. 47 Bodi.eu . 49 Chapman.pdf). 1999. you should go and live in Saudi. 72 Broadcast June 16. white “Islamic” garment. 2009. and Ja’far.uk. Scientific Training and Radical Islam.” BBC News.’ “ The Wall Street Journal. “Multiculturalism Run Amok.” The Daily Standard [Washington]. “Wahhabis in the Old Dominion. 67 Malik.” Dow Jones International News. Dominic. cit. Stephen. London.” The ABA Journal [New York].

Simon.” Evening Standard. 81 Bell. 2008. September 26. Chris. “More than 3. Switzerland]. 1. Nick. “A new weapon in the fight against forced marriage. Crimes of the Community. UK]. CPS Pilot on Forced Marriage and So-Called ‘Honour’ Crime – Findings. 2006. December 28. 2008. “Imam who secretly divorced £1m wife is jailed. Kennedy. Recueil de fatwas. 91 Conseil europeén des fatwas et de la recherche. 83 [—]. London. “How Safar Daftary’s death fall exposed polygamy in Britain. cit.” and Miliband. Liberation From Forced Marriages. Sue.’” The Times. “For family honour. March 11. 2008. 156-157. 2008. “‘Forced marriage’ doctor. October 25.” The Daily Telegraph. 94 Lloyd-Roberts. January 16. 93 “Honour Killing Its Causes and Consequences: Suggested Strategies for the European Parliament. December 15.’” Daily Mail. James. cit. cited in Brandon and Hafez.” The Times.” The Daily Telegraph. 89 Roughneen. n. Neil.” The Times. “Sharia rulings on divorces and disputes to be rubber-stamped by English courts.d. “Purge on Muslim clerics who turn a blind eye to the abuse of women.matribunal.” 99 British Medical Association. December 25. September 26.” Daily Mail. November 23. Boffey. “Case study: ‘For many imams speaking against rape is embarrassing. 88 Atkinson. she had to die. 2008. 2008. 92 Brandon. December 1. December 12. Salam..’” The Daily Telegraph. n. 87 Blakely. European police weren’t looking for this kind of violence steeped in tradition.com/ 85 Slack. “Forced marriage for 15-year-old in Pakistan is foiled. op.eu 55 . David. 2008. 2005. December 27.” op.. CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. Série no. p. 2005. Nickerson. Luton Today.islamicpluralism.” The Guardian. Spolar. They are now. “Vigil of tears for death-plunge Muslim model beauty. “ ‘Face of Asia’ death plunge model had been pregnant. 97 Crown Prosecution Service. Prevention of Female Genital Mutilation in the UK 2006. 2008. Humayrah Abedin. Jaya. 2008. at www. 2009. Hickley. “Every Noise I Hear I Think He’s Coming to Kill Me. June 14. September 26.” Daily Mail.p. “For Muslim women.” The Times. 95 Britten. Dominic. 82 Kerbaj. March 21. September 29. 2008. a deadly defiance: ‘Honour killings’ on rise in Europe. “Life for husband who killed wife after baby abortion fear”. 90 Hastings. Richard. London. “Court: Husband ‘killed wife over fears she would abort baby.Britain: Notes CIP 80 Rozenberg. James. and Hafez. 2008. 2008. 96 Crown Prosecution Service. “Europe’s Sharia Question. 100 Naraian. Dan. 2008.” The Boston Globe.000 Asian children vanishing from school and ‘forced into arranged marriages. London. Colin. Rhys. 2008. “Nine-year-old brides saved by authorities from being married off in Muslim weddings.” Daily Mail. Daniel and Chapman. 2008. Andrew. op.” Daily Examiner [Huddersfield. Matthew. Unsigned. Christine. 2007. freed by Bangladesh court.” International Relations and Security Network [Zurich. “In the name of the law. 98 Type III FGM is “excision of part or all of the external genitalia and stitching/narrowing of the vaginal opening. 2008. cit. 84 Muslim Arbitration Tribunal. 86 Unsigned. November 17. Recommendations on Future Work on Forced Marriage and So-Called ‘Honour’ Crime. January 24. Centre for Social Cohesion.” Chicago Tribune.

Passersby with faces covered in an “Islamic” manner snatch the tapes. the traditional Saudi style of male dress. he seems almost like a boat ready to set sail. I would see the same abhorrent scene the following Tuesday. will punish sinners. Many rush by a small theatre without taking note of the street agitator. 2005. hands out cassette tapes. He also wears a thobe. modern education but ignorant of their religion. probably of Pakistani background. But I rushed away. CIP therefore publishes the following commentary on this topic from a leading moderate Muslim doctor. His head is high. and it is neither pressed nor starched.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 Appendix to Case Study: Britain Islamist Ideology at the British Bedside By Qanta A. “Death to America! Death to Israel” he shouts in a distinct “Geordie.eu . green light of the Whitechapel Tube station. abayas and chadors quickly swallowed up by the dank. a new and grotesque spectacle is drawing a crowd. I become aware that while the working class British Jews who lived here had dignified the neighborhood with a monument. I watch it flutter limply in the October wind. Policemen look on passively. Centre for Islamic Pluralism *** I glance out of the window at a dreary British afternoon slowly unraveling into early evening. working class British Muslims today are desecrating it. specialised attention is necessary regarding encroachment of Shariah agitation in the training of UK medical personnel. figures in robes. that God. thrusting his recordings at the crowd. appearing unsure whether to stay or go. In my first few months in London I learned that such scenes were common in the great city at the beginning of the 21st century. Around him. accent. elevated above the ankle in the manner typical of fundamentalist Wahhabi clerics. The cheap polyester of the garment is obvious. not doctors. of British Muslim medical students who now refuse to attend classes on alcoholism and other problems produced by practices banned in Islam. for women. or thobes. anchored only by his heavy Nike sports shoes and a leaden sense of evil.” or Northeast English. more than one hundred years later. unperturbed by his flailing arms and rising pitch. so unlike the elegant Saudi men I have known in Riyadh. and that a patient suffering from alcoholism or a sexually-transmitted disease could become favorably disposed to Muslims if treated with correct medical care and kindness by a Muslim physician. but pulled to him by his energy.” Today. Only a sprinkling of impassive 56 constables remind me I watch this scene in London – everyone else is dressed in either full body coverings. several more British Asians gather in a thin cluster. and employs numerous Muslim medical professionals. pulling me out of this view into European Islamofascism and back into the world of East London critical medical care. Inflated with hate. when questioned on this topic. The same agitator was a fixture of the street. needed in the Intensive Care Unit. Below. the irony was doubtless lost on him that his hate was expressed on the steps of a monument donated to the community of Whitechapel by British Jews who had thrived there 90 years before. Others stuff the plastic cases into grubby Western-style jackets worn over an imported thobe. with Muslims enjoying advanced. My pager goes off. one fist in the air. It is eighteen months before the London bombings of July 7. sometimes with gloved hands that scuttle back into the obscurity of their body-concealing garments. Ahmed MD Introductory Note Because the UK is a global centre for medical training. CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. one interviewee commented. a young British Asian Muslim. I am witnessing a modern tragedy: the rise of Muslim fundamentalism in Western Europe. I look back at the speaker. Across the street I sight the window of what had been the home of the tragically-deformed “Elephant Man. Of course.islamicpluralism. During our field survey. on the steps of a monument.

As I studied the rolling screen of X rays.” he declared as he moved swiftly towards the water faucets. “Oh no. my fellow physicians (almost universally Muslim) came from all over the Middle East. Dr Ahmed. I soon discovered the extent of my own ignorance. organ transplantation. others were Omanis. I wondered if he was aware that Muslim men are not permitted to wear gold (gold being reserved only for Muslim women).islamicpluralism. even special. When asked. I will wash my hands in the sink. Pakistanis. as I was surprised to learn. in emulation of the Prophet Muhammad sallallahu-wa-aleyhisallam (peace be upon him). For all other purposes. every sign in the hospital appears in English and Bengali. I doubted this was accidental. His wispy beard was untrimmed. His scrubs were a fraction too short above his surgical clogs. “No thank you. he responded he was fasting for Ramadan and therefore not permitted to swallow his saliva. Working in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. in recognition of illiteracy in the community. I had previously worked with him. Riyadh.Appendix: Islamist Ideology at the British Bedside CIP The Royal London Hospital serves as a major trauma facility in one of the most densely populated Bengali communities in the UK. I had been called to attend a patient in distress. I pointed out the device to Faisal. Some of the fundamentalist doctrines of this religious outlook defy a normal imagination. non-alphabetic “speaking Bengali” signs. likely from his ablutions before afternoon prayer. The hospital serves many Muslim patients.eu . While many were Saudis. the gentle young medical assistant at my side.” he said. The long-lashed eyes of Faisal. Some of the Saudis were themselves scholars of Wahhabi Islam. Inside the East London ICU unit. suggesting he do the same. had prepared me well for East London. As I moved away from the Xrays. Lebanese. I recall a patient who insisted. I considered myself uniquely prepared for ministering to this population in Britain’s capital. Noticing my colleague had overlooked this. most of whom are profoundly dedicated to Islamic practice. Or if. you don’t follow. trained in Islamic theological schools before pursuing their medical degrees and subspecialty training – the latter often in centers of known excellence in the West. As a Muslim physician myself. I am a Muslim. Yet their attitudes were remarkably diverse. 57 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. alcohol handrub is preferred as a more effective protection against bacteria. Whitechapel seemed effectively Wahhabised. in the manner believed by Wahhabis to be proper. I squeezed some alcohol hand rub from the wall-dispenser. recently returned from practicing intensive care in Saudi Arabia. I was unprepared for the presence of radical Islam among my medical colleagues in London. like blood. yet even in these he revealed his Islamic identity.” and had spent two years navigating these belief systems while dealing with the initiation of critical care. Faisal. and decisions about the end of life. he had not realised I understood he was Muslim. As usual he was dressed in operating room scrubs. on expectorating all his saliva. were framed by gold-rimmed Cartier eye-glasses.. I suddenly wondered if he had failed to recognise my Muslim character. the anesthesiologist. which he carefully sealed in a plastic bottle and stored in his pocket. I was familiar with Muslim patients adhering to Wahhabism or “Salafism. and Indians. even worse. The hems of his trousers were damp. Syrians. cleaning my hands on the way to see the patient. He looked at me apologetically. Dr Ahmed. I asked the anesthesia resident to read the films. a startling juxtaposition of consumerism (again very common among prosperous Saudis) with his otherwise-ascetic habits. was known to be a caring doctor. during an interview with me. Jordanians. I began explaining that revised recommendations on hand hygiene for doctors suggested hand washing with antibacterial soap and water only when hands are overtly soiled with bodily fluids. Sensitive to the needs of its patients.

we collected anecdotal observations and tried to sort out these issues.102 to 58 dispel commonly held but mistaken beliefs about the mere act of touching alcohol. in my view. worked there.” I was amazed. This passivity in Saudi Arabia toward evolving medical practices could be a product of Saudi patients’ and Saudi physicians’ acceptance of whatever is dictated to them under the Wahhabi interpretation of Shariah. “necessities overrule prohibition”. Additionally. Indeed. This was personally and consistently confirmed for me. he had graduated from a British medical school. Nor did any family member object to its use prior to examination of a relative. as universally extreme adherents of Islamic fundamentalism. where experience in the ICU was a required component of his training. The absence of this resistance to alcohol hand rub is striking in the Saudi kingdom itself. a blood thinning agent) were also made available in the kingdom and are used when indicated for Saudi patients. Patients in Saudi Arabia also show almost universal and unwavering belief in physicians’ recommendations. or mutawiyin. Despite my being an uncovered woman in Western dress while practicing critical care medicine.eu . during two years’ practise in Riyadh. in the realm of medicine. it is unlikely that rejecting alcoholcontaining agents is an isolated occurrence. the Saudi capital. In the same context.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 “It is haram [banned in Islam] for me to touch alcohol. one of the oldest and most distinguished medical colleges in the UK. most CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. irrespective of the doctors’ own religious beliefs – including those of both Christian and Muslim practitioners. He was of the same ethnic heritage as mine. in 2006. for some time. are. I never encountered a Saudi physician or surgeon refusing to use alcohol hand rub. Further. a radical interpretation I had not encountered even among Saudi physicians who claimed to participate in the Wahhabi religious militia. with the arrival of new technologies and treatments. practitioners or Islamic clerics. her face fully covered by niqab in public. in keeping with the traditional Shariah principle that in the interest of preserving life. Official Saudi Wahhabi authorities ruled in favor of these medications. Medical workers in Australia have conducted studies documenting the lack of systemic absorption of alcohol through topical use. his education was more elite than mine. always with their informed consent. His refusal of the most basic means to control infection was based on his religious ideology. even illiterate Bedouin women accepted my counsel without objection. and in related urgencies.101 Far from being a phenomenon remote from the patient’s bedside. Islamist ideology now intrudes on basic practices of Western medicine. the leading British medical journal. a very well prepared and mature populace ready to pragmatically modulate their belief systems. Disturbed by his attitude to the hand rub. Like me. Saudis. We had met while he was early on his way to becoming a consultant anesthesiologist in Britain. but ten years after I obtained my degree. I mentioned the incident to friends at an international scientific symposium in Riyadh. whether by patients.islamicpluralism. while often viewed unfairly. How had he acquired these beliefs? He had been brought up in the Saudi commercial center of Jeddah while his parents had. He had married at an early age and his Pakistani wife was secluded at home. in a brief report published in The Lancet. While the extent of this problem is unknown. even medications derived from pork materials (including porcine low-molecular weight heparin. The use of alcohol-based hand hygiene was introduced throughout the kingdom with no resistance or need for special permission. I joined some foreign and Saudi experts in infection control and hand hygiene. a few months later. yet extraordinarily different in his views. “I can’t use alcohol hand rub on my skin. he had attended Barts.” he continued. He was British by birth and Pakistani by background.

The rejection of alcohol hand rub represents something even more extreme than a retreat into jahiliyyah. perhaps reinforcing the population’s confidence in the medical hierarchy as a helpful. Muslim-majority states as well as in the West. Islamists use this term to refer to a fall back into “pre-Islamic oblivion.islamicpluralism. as distinct and apart. This ideology supports a negative.Appendix: Islamist Ideology at the British Bedside CIP practitioners in Saudi society. particularly in its arrival in 21st Century London. much is based on refusing behavior prevalent in both the wider Muslim mainstream and among non-Muslim Westerners – such as women working outside the home. Western Europe has seen a growing politicization of Islam. although there is no basis for these claims in Qur’an. before returning to what Islamists may refer to as the lands of jahiliyyah or pre-Islamic ignorance. the term refers simply to lack of knowledge. or like other youngsters sent to Pakistan or other areas for a “better grounding in Islam. Additionally these young British Muslims may also feel an exaggerated need to express an overt religious identity by limiting their beliefs. but a more nuanced and complicated society in which differing interpretations of Islam exist. Both are denounced by the radicals. although in traditional Islam. made up of South Asians who had come to Britain seeking work after the massive immigration of West Indians. meriting trust. The British Muslim physician may be in a unique position to contribute to this dialogue and support the dismantling of misconceptions that are both theologically questionable and scientifically disproven. non-Muslim societies may not feel protected by society. whether growing up in Jeddah as in Faisal’s experience. even if that society supports and nurtures their right to a unique religious identity. Islamist ideology has encroached on the Western medical workplace and presents new challenges to leaders and policy-makers in health care. This is a way to compensate for feelings of inadequacy. On returning to Western Europe. positive and benevolent force within the kingdom. In the medical profession. These doctors may consider themselves “conservative” Muslims first Among pockets of Islamist ideology in the West. In contrast. Despite brief exposure to other societies. easily missing those of us who supposedly appear nonMuslim because of our “assimilation” or heterodox interpretations of Islam – interpretations which were once almost universal in the small British Muslim establishment. fear of submersion in Western culture.” equated with an obviously non-Western appearance.” they rely instead on the diminished guidance provided by zealous clerics with extreme views. They encounter distorted interpretations during these sojourns. Particularly ironic is the adoption of Saudi attire by untraveled British Muslims who are unaware that Saudi Arabia is not the monolithic country commonly believed to be. feeling excluded and apart from these radicalised Muslims.eu . The widespread adoption of both Saudi and Palestinian scarves by male and female British Muslims seems especially strange in that many of the young are Pakistani from the London East End with no direct relation either to Saudi Arabia or the Palestinians. or listening to music.” there is a tendency for many to acquire new “Islamic” identities. 59 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. tend to be Muslims. Muslims raised primarily in Western. I sensed an intangible disadvantage among them in dealing with prevailing social norms. Young Muslim physicians today may feel they lack senior professionals with whom they can relate and. rigid definition of “being Muslim.” allegedly present in nonIslamist-ruled. or. perhaps. the adoption of archaic Arab male attire and the peculiar Wahhabi beard being others. discounting guidance from mature professionals simply if the latter are “non-Muslim. as un-Islamic. they may believe they lack Muslim role models. so as to feel their Islam is sufficiently different from Western values. whether locals or expatriates. the case of hijab being one bit of evidence. regardless of the fundamentalism of its Wahhabi clerics. and by Sunni conservatives.

islamicpluralism. with a specific focus on Islamist ideology in Western Europe. Antimicrobial Agents and Chemotherapy [Washington. Allgranzi. K. who have successfully navigated many of the obstacles within their restrictive society.. “Muslim Health Care Workers and Alcohol-Based Handrubs.. a dissonance is present between this religious doctrine and the careful and mature views of Saudi medical NOTES 101 Ahmed. DC]. D. Gamon. 2007. T. Bowkett. Tester.. While Saudi Arabia is often and justly criticised for its extremist Wahhabi Islam. Gerostamoulos. D. “Can Alcohol-Based Hand-Rub Solutions Cause You To Lose Your Driver’s License? Comparative Cutaneous Absorption of Various Alcohols”.. B. The Daily Telegraph professionals. M.” The Lancet [London].L. R. G. S. London. Most significantly. 60 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www.. the unanswered question remains: why are illiterate Bedouin women more accepting of Western medicine than highly educated British Muslim graduates training in London? Medical school curricula could benefit from courses on the impact of physicians’ belief systems on health care delivery. Martin. Z..A.. Pittet. Brown.. Hosking.eu . L. Q.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 (Top and left) Muslim female medical staff. Memish..C. and Grayson. however..A. 2006. P..L. 102 T.

of 84 million Germans. 225. and for this reason Shariah agitation has been a limited phenomenon among them. are or are descended from immigrants from Turkey. who began arriving in Kurdistan in Germany Germany in significant numbers in the 1960s. Turks are speakers of an Altaic language. Case Study: Germany CIP 5. and traditional Turkic and Kurdish cultural elements. almost a third. after the French Muslims. and represents the second largest Western European Turkey in Germany Muslim population. a Dutch scholar and author of a 61 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. or four percent. known in Turkish as Alevilik and in German as Aleviten.000 Arabs (excluding Iraqis). and Bosnian Muslims in Germany are overwhelmingly secular in their outlook. or 700. Turkish nationals in Germany may be of Turkish or Kurdish ethnicity. Case Study: Germany Introduction The German Muslim population totals approximately three million. Shia-influenced Sufism. completely different. Manchu. they were mainly selfidentified as secularists.eu .000 Africans. Alevis defined themselves as a religious community only recently.islamicpluralism. Kurds are speakers of an Indo-European language related to Persian. with an agglutinative grammar. are adherents of the Alevi Community. Within this aggregate.103 Alevis mainly come from Turkey.5. Here it must be clearly and unqualifiedly stated that Turkish and Kurdish ethnic identities are. and smaller numbers of Afghans and Pakistanis. 125.104 Turkish. it is generally accepted that two million. Kurdish. and perhaps Korean and Japanese.000 Bosnian Muslims. Turks and Kurds are nonetheless justifiably grouped together in Germany because of their origin in the same country. previously. Germany is also the home of some 300. notwithstanding propaganda by the Turkish government.000 Iranians and Iraqis. As immigrants to Western Europe. Alevis are a heterodox phenomenon combining Shia Islam. related to Mongolian. 120. Of two million Turkish-Kurdish Muslims in Germany. Floris Vermeulen. They are unrelated to the Syrian Alawite sect or the obscure but influential Sunni Alawi orders of Sufis. a majority.000.

At the same time. Its German title is TürkischIslamische Verein der Anstalt für Religion e V. through the Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs. and opposition movements set up groups of their own. Diyanet. DİTİB finances the construction and maintenance of Sunni mosques and employs their imams and hatips – the latter being preachers of sermons at Friday congregational prayer. Turkish versus Kurdish. a practice which they publicly condemn and combat through mediation as a spcific element of their ritual observance (described in section 4 of Case Study: Germany. furthering the proliferation of Turkish religious immigrant organisations”. First. There were leftwing political movements and oppositional Turkish Islamic movements (of which the most important were banned in Turkey) as well as Islamic organisations that were supported by the Turkish government. In Rohe’s previous citation. hence the number of new Turkish organisations exploded. Alevis and certain other Sufis recognise Shariah as an abstract definition of religion or Islam in general but frequently do not observe or promote it as a set of rules.) Alevis are “feminist” in their acceptance and even promotion of female equality. representatives of the Turkish state played significant roles. Because of its main roots in Turkey. founded in the late sixties and early seventies. “Muslims[.105 has written. it was correctly stated. Kurdish Alevis in Germany are well-informed on socalled “honour” murder.] especially [of] Turkish origin would understand the term shari’a in a narrower sense. No group could afford to stay behind. and religious versus secular.eu . The major polarities were radical left versus radical right.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 Mustafa Kemal.106 It should here be emphasised that this narrow definition lends itself to a critical attitude toward Shariah. “This ideological rivalry had a dramatic impact on the establishment of new Turkish organisations in Western Europe. family and inheritance and corporal punishment”. were mainly leftist and rightist political workers’ organisations that were strongly focused on Turkey and on each other… left-right political polarisation was imported from Turkey… Civic organisations were banned in Turkey in 1980 [and] oppositional and marginal groups set up organisations abroad to resist the power of the Turkish state. “The first Turkish immigrant organisations in Western Europe.. Sunnis versus Alevis. confining it to the legal rules regulating personal status. In all the organisational disputes arising from these struggles.islamicpluralism. The Turkish state founded and supported pro-state organisations. It counts almost 900 62 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. Turkish Islam in Germany is closely aligned with the Republic of Turkey’s state Islamic administration. and it is headquartered in Ankara. founder of the Turkish Republic dissertation comparing Turkish immigration in Berlin and Amsterdam. oriented toward secularism and shared with non-Muslims. The emerging oppositional Islamic movements in Turkey set up their own branches in Western Europe. but its acronym is based on its Turkish equivalent: Diyanet Işleri Türk-Islam Birliği. German Islam continues to face a multiply contradictory situation. A wide array of political and religious movements jockeyed for power in the growing Turkish communities in Western Europe. known as DİTİB.

Bosnian Muslims living in Western Europe are directed by the official ulema of Bosnia-Hercegovina. AKP is widely perceived as a Shariah-oriented component of Turkish politics. and. AKP in 63 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. Diyanet also functions in this manner in the Netherlands. DİTİB clerics are widely criticised for speaking only Turkish and obstructing integration of German Muslims. if anything. non-state body.islamicpluralism. but unofficially. as represented by the AKPartisi or Justice and Development Party (hereinafter AKP). in effect. Second. but the latter is an independent. French Muslims are influenced by the Moroccan and Algerian authorities.Case Study: Germany CIP affiliated mosques and cultural centres. Turkish Islam in Germany now reflects the heightened struggle within Turkey itself between the secular legacy established by Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) and the rise of “softfundamentalist” Sunnism in politics. as do representatives of the official Moroccan Islamic clergy.108 This makes Germany an example of a Western European country in which a large grouping of Muslim immigrants and their offspring are influenced by the governmental ulema (clerical institution) of a foreign country. notwithstanding repeated pledges that it will not infringe on the established secular order in Turkey.eu .107 DİTİB has been described in a rigorously objective. somewhat understated report by the International Crisis Group as. a political agency maintaining ideological conformity among Turkish Muslims in Germany: “a satellite apparatus of the Turkish state and an instrument of its attempt to guard against the possible growth of opposition in the Turkish diaspora”.

DİTİB can be expected to replicate this perspective in Germany. The anthropologist Martin Sökefeld has summarised this reality concisely:113 “On the one hand Alevis are acclaimed by the Kemalist elite as unequivocal supporters of secularism. is forced to moderate its ideology by the requirements of political power. and employment of the latter in both Turkey and Germany. further. are victims of aggressive Sunnism in Turkey.109 It is credited with affiliation of some 400-600 “prayer spaces”. popularly known as Süleymancilar. are a Sufi-oriented. Kurdish. presses an Islamist agenda inside Turkey. was accompanied by Sunni-centrism in religious affairs.111 Milli Goruş declines cooperation with non-Muslim media and other outside interviewers and refused our request to meet its German representatives. some observers perceive a tension between DİTİB and Milli Goruş. although extremely devoted to their religious practice.112 Milli Goruş and a smaller and less political movement. aligned with AKP. Known in German as the Islamitische Gemeinschaft Milli Goruş (IGMG) or Milli Goruş Islamic Community. VIK. founded by the anti-Jewish Islamist politician Necmettin Erbakan in the 1970s and allegedly rooted in DİTİB. however. education of clerics. It is therefore questionable whether the activities of DİTİB will contribute to an orderly relationship between German Muslims and the broader German society or will aggravate differences. but on the other hand Kemalism itself refuses legal recognition of Alevis as a religious or cultural minority because such recognition is seen as a violation of the principle of a united and homogeneous Turkish nation”.110 Milli Goruş has been associated with ECFR since the third consultative session of Al-Qaradawi’s group. but support for Alevi meeting houses (cems or cemevi) and clerics (dedeler) has never been included in the 64 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. which established the principle that only Turks lived in Turkey. illustrating its interest in Europe-wide expansion. Armenian. In 2008 it contributed the modest sum of €5.eu . Thus. held in Köln in 1999. Today. It is a paradox of Turkish history that the “Jacobin”.000 adherents in Germany.islamicpluralism. the Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren or Union of Islamic Cultural Centres (VIK). or Sephardic Jewish in their background. regardless whether they were Greek. VIK is viewed by Alevis as problematical because of its hostility to secularism.000 to the education of children of Bosnian Muslims killed in the Srebrenica massacre of 1995. the latter movement is currently reported to have 200. Diyanet and DİTİB pay for Sunni mosques. If AKP. as many anticipate. centralist Turkism of the Kemalist era. It operates a headquarters in the Netherlands. Alevis. including private premises rather than mosque structures. originally overshadowed DİTİB. and many immigrated to Germany to gain a cultural and religious freedom they found absent in their native land. while the Alevis considered themselves beneficiaries of Kemalist secularism. in that DİTİB. the role of Diyanet and DİTİB in a European Union with which the Turkish Republic seeks affiliation is an unexamined but challenging aspect of Turkish EU entry. which similarly declined to speak with us. anti-Kemalist movement with some 300 affiliated mosques.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 Sehitlik (Martyrs’) Mosque in Berlin © cosmonautirussi Germany is reported by members of the Turkish ethnic community to be actively associated with the fundamentalist Milli Goruş or National Vision movement. Third.

As an indicator of the complex nature of the Iranian community in Germany. where radicalism has been prominent. One is the populist and unacceptable Islamophobic solution. and some profess to have abandoned religion. if they interact with Europeans and live as if they were themselves European… A very high percentage of Muslim immigrants live in parallel societies. no prudent person can turn a blind eye to the emerging of Islamic parallel societies. “3. “Recently. But the activities of the Hamburg group were in our view more indicative of a preference among Islamist extremists for work in Germany. Pluralism of cultures and religions in 65 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. the other is multiculturalism. Tibi commented in March 2008. In an unpublished text. Alevis reject Shariah except in the abstract sense previously noted. Among the remaining Muslims in Germany – Iranians. etc.114 Dr. Democracy – not only as electoral procedure based on voting. A significant trend within Alevism is associated with the radical left in politics. – religious radicalism is largely absent. which are enclaves within Europe… “What can be done to make Muslim immigrants true European citizens? “An integration limited to civic values and to the workplace can be made compatible with a reformist interpretation of Islam adapted to cultural modernity. other Arabs. Iranians in Germany are frequently refugees from the clerical regime in Iran. Germany is the home of Dr Bassam Tibi. émigré Iranian leftist newspapers are as easily available in the country’s newsstands as are daily newspapers and magazines from Iran itself. the inter-European television station ‘Arte’ aired the inflammatory preaching by an influential imam at the large alQuds mosque in Hamburg.islamicpluralism. “Euro-Islam is based on the Islamic legitimacy of five pillars of civil society: “1. both in Turkey and Germany. where a radical milieu is absent and terrorist preparations would not have drawn attention. The Hamburg cell involved in the Bassam Tibi attacks of September 11 used to meet there. understood as an attitude that ‘anything goes. Turkish rightist nationalism and Kurdish leftist nationalism have both presented more serious problems in Germany than radical Islam. The ardent imam was warning Muslims against losing their faith. This is the substance of the concept of ‘Euro-Islam’ as I imagine it. Iraqis. than in Britain. Pakistanis. They will do so. but as a political culture of civil society. Separation between religion and politics (secularity. Individual human rights.] the ‘space for Islam in Europe’ claimed by some imams is a resistance to integration and an endorsement of the existing enclaves… “A Wahhabi.Case Study: Germany CIP budget of either Diyanet or DİTİB.’ But outside these extremes. and under wide scrutiny. The Islam prevailing in these ‘ghettos’ resembles the Wahhabism purveyed in mosques like the one in Hamburg… “Among those who deal with these issues there are two extreme positions. Attention has been focused on radical Islam in Germany since the investigation of AlQaida preparations for the attacks of September 11. “[By contrast. that they are willing to abandon the jihadisation and shari’a-isation of Islam and become receptive to the idea of a civil Islam. 2001 exposed the functioning of the notorious “Hamburg cell” led by Egyptian-born Mohammed Atta. or any shari’a-based Islam is not acceptable to Europe and contradicts its structures of democracy… “Euro-Islam requires. “4. the Syrian-born theoretician of a moderate form of “Euro-Islam”. from prodemocracy Muslims first. and they argue that Turkish Sunni hatred of them is based on reaction against this attitude. increasing. not to be confused with the ideology of secularism). in the form of Euro-Islam. he claimed.eu . “2. and professor of international relations at the University of Göttingen.

and that women rarely attended mosque services or related activities. Wahhabi centre like the Al-Quds mosque in Hamburg – a city known for its cosmopolitan population – is characteristic of German Islam in broader terms. the accession to power of AKP in Turkey and the extension of its influence in Germany make such rhetoric a challenge to the present situation. a periodical allegedly published by Milli Goruş – an affiliation the organisation disclaims115 – stated in August 2001. The newspaper pointed out that Islamic observance had hitherto been mainly restricted to “backroom mosques”. The newspaper argued that DİTİB had made consciousness of Turkish identity equal in priority to religion. where mainly secular-oriented Turkish and Kurdish immigrants are concentrated in monoethnic neighbourhoods. and submitting to foreign control from Turkey. The word ‘Cliche’ was printed on one of the men. the diversity of Islamic entities in Hamburg (and in Berlin) contrasts distinctly with the “ghettoisation” visible in the Ruhr Valley. blamed the leaders of the mosque for reinforcing separation. including the propriety of erecting a graveyard in the vicinity of a supermarket. and the loudspeaker amplification of the call to prayer. Interviewed by Suddeutsche Zeitung. But Suddeutsche Zeitung also noted separatist tendencies and apparent resistance to integration. If anything. a German political scientist who worked in an integration project at the Yavuz Sultan Selim mosque in Mannheim.islamicpluralism. but based on equality”. Arab. Tolerance. or urgency to that recorded and observed in Britain. the respected daily Suddeutsche Zeitung117 published a survey article on Islam in Germany. while the other bore the word ‘Reality’. operating in uncontrolled (and often unmarked) residential and commercial properties. and thereby impeded integration. variety of issues. Dusseldorf: The Central Council of Muslims in Germany condemned a float featuring fibreglass models of two bearded men wearing turbans and explosives belts and brandishing guns. that DİTİB clerics typically returned to Turkey after a short tour in Germany during which they acquired little understanding of German society. not in the Islamic understanding of treating Jews/Christians [as] monotheists [and] protected minorities/dhimmi.116 To further emphasise. The Historical Background: Emergence of Shariah as an Issue in Germany German media discussion of Shariah is far inferior in volume. “5. promoting fundamentalism. The allegiance of a Muslim to Sharia cannot be questioned”. that radical Shariah activism does not exist in Germany. We do not believe that the preaching in a single. Our observation of the German Muslim community suggests that Wahhabism and other Shariah-centric interpretations of Islam have much more limited influence in that country than in Britain. “a religious Muslim is also at the same time an 66 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. but that a wave of major mosque construction had begun in Germany. in the failure of DİTİB to educate mosque functionaries in the German language. Milli Gazete. The state. He attempted to Cologne Carnival. however. Building of large structures elicited numerous questions about Shariah matters. the media.eu .CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 advocate for Sharia. the courts have no right to intervene. Early in 2001. Reiner Albert. The depiction of Islam was ‘barefaced lies’ and the float used ‘negative images to seek attention’. One cannot argue. that the content of sermons was seldom disclosed to the broader public. the Central Council's Secretary-General Aiman Mazyek told the Westdeutsche Zeitung society.

spiritual shaykhs (pirs). In 2005. the majority of Muslim children are educated in state schools. We would be remiss in failing to point out that barriers to integration or assimilation of German Muslims are not restricted to the Muslim side. as in Britain. As reported in the daily Frankfurter Rundschau. Aachen. while Turkish and Bosnian Muslims. social workers. Interviews included extensive meetings and discussions in Duisburg. and Hamburg. and respect for human rights and the established culture in Germany. The majority of Turkish and Kurdish Muslims who have migrated to Germany currently lack German citizenship. state their conviction that Germans in their majority do not wish to allow eligibility for full membership as citizens of the national community to Muslims. Hamm. being typically secular and often avid to become as a German as possible. (1) Family/schooling Germany has fewer Islamic schools than Britain. She further called for requirements to be imposed on immigrants including pledges of loyalty to the German constitution. and frequently exercise the option of sending their children back to Pakistan. Germany long resisted abolition of the status of immigrant Muslims as “guest workers” (gästarbeiter) excluded from naturalisation as German citizens.The Emergence of Shariah as an Issue in Germany CIP establish classes on Islam in German. and discriminatory against women and non-Muslims. who founded and now direct a CIP group in Germany. The best known Islamic educational institutions are the Förderverein der Islamischen Grundschule in Berlin [www. who have only spoken German throughout their lives.de] and the König-Fahd-Akademie Bonn. She (incorrectly) described Shariah as an invariant form of jurisprudence. Such an attitude contrasts with the demonstrable pressure by British and French non-Muslims to gain acceptance from Muslims for citizenship. have generally been educated in state. the Christian Democratic politician Kristina Kohler called on Muslims in Germany to abandon Shariah. Interviewees included. but said he was insulted and ostracised. mosque representatives. or Bangladesh for schooling. acceptance of separation of religion and the state. 67 www. based in the Ruhr Valley. CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan The CIP Survey of Shariah Agitation in Germany The Centre for Islamic Pluralism carried out its field survey of Shariah agitation and attitudes toward it in German Muslim communities in July 2008. This phenomenon contributes to the dependence of the German authorities on DİTİB as an intermediary in dealing with the Turkish Sunnis. Köln.eu . India. the latter supported by Saudi Arabia.islamischegrundschule. CIP investigators Stephen Schwartz and Kamal Hasani investigated Shariah sentiment in the main German Muslim communities with the cooperation of Alevi community activists Ali and Veli Sirin. and who refer to themselves as among “we Germans”.islamicpluralism. This outlook extends to those born in Germany. who make up three-quarters of the German Muslim population.119 Even Alevis. and said that Muslim immigrants must abandon any attachment to its superior validity. An important difference between the pedagogy of the Islamic communities in Britain and Germany is that many subcontinental immigrants to the former country have been educated in medresas or are only semi-literate. for economic and political reasons. and rank-and-file mosque attendees. in contrast with laws that are changeable by secular courts. Berlin. notwithstanding the persistence of economic discrimination against Muslims in both the latter countries.118 Bundestag deputy Kohler spoke in Wiesbaden. and criticised Shariah as incompatible with democracy.

Bayern. Azzaoui is a member of the Central Council of German Muslims [Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland – ZMD]. Orthodox Christianity. Thus. including Islam. But our interviewee. The Aachen mosque. argued when we interviewed him that inclusion of Islam as an option in the state religion/ethics classes favors integration. should also provide an opportunity for Alevi religious instruction. headscarves are only banned for women teachers. designated class time devoted to either the Catholic or Protestant sects. Kurdish has never been linguistically normatised and possesses at least three main dialects.S. Azzaoui.islamicpluralism. While Bosnians may send their children back to their native country for schooling in a small network of Islamic primary schools and high schools. where instruction in Kurdish is banned. which pays teachers trained in Turkey to deliver religious instruction in the state schools of Niedersachsen. He also stated that some Muslim parents object to sex education classes and mixedgender swimming instruction. as they presently do in five German states. CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. and is considered influenced by Saudi Arabia. in a manner similar to that reflected in the proposals of the Muslim Council of Britain (described above in Case Study: Britain).120 Azzaoui noted that Germany had experienced a debate over permission for Muslim girls to wear hijab. one of which. Judaism. One of several obstacles to such a goal is the involvement in curricula of Diyanet and DİTİB. said the mosque is still viewed by media and federal authorities as a Brotherhood facility. an Arab representative of the Bilal 68 King Fahd-Academy in Bonn-Bad Godesberg Mosque and Islamic Centre of Aachen.000 members. states). which train Sunni clerics. with a choice of curricula and regular. all German students are taught about religions in general.eu . but that no federal or general intervention had been proposed to deal with the situation. German courts have ruled that responsibility for regulation of religious activities belongs to the Länder (federal units equivalent to U. was built in 1963 and was historically associated with the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. Al-Attar broke with the MB because of its justification of violence. Zazas are about 50 percent Alevis. While Muslim parents favor an Islamic option in the dedicated religion/ethics class time in the German state schools. or ethics classes for nonreligious students. Kurdish Muslims living in Germany may suffer past exclusion from or have boycotted schools in Turkey. as well as participation of Muslim children in school trips. and Falaturi left the Aachen mosque. In addition. Abdoldjavad Falaturi. Eesam Al-Attar. its founders were an adherent of the Syrian MB. its adoption has not become universal. which have left them with a notably higher level of literacy. Zaza. Kurdish Muslims in Germany possess an even stronger incentive than ethnic Turks to seek education in German state schools for their children. Alevis are concerned that religion/ethics classes in state schools.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 secularist institutions in their own countries. religiously inclined Turkish Muslims only possess the option of application to the Turkish imam-hatip secondary schools. which includes 400 nonTurkish mosques. and BadenWürttemburg. is widely spoken in Germany and is the basis for a trend among Zazas to define themselves as a separate ethnicity. along with an Iranian. In addition. currently with 3. if they include an Islamic option. Mounir Azzaoui. Germany currently maintains religious instruction in state schools. Attendance at such classes is optional according to the student’s decision and choice among the available curricula.

The Nurcu schools offer one to two year residencies. including Arabic language lessons. or Arabs.islamicpluralism. He said most of the students did not speak German well and were unfamiliar with the German alphabet. IZH has been directed by two of the most prominent figures in the recent history of Iranian 69 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. many German Turkish children now attend afternoon religious classes outside the state school system. IZH describes itself as the “most important” Shia mosque in Europe. Christian representatives. part of a global network of schools established by followers of Gülen © Carolyn Drake In addition. in the panorama of German Islam. with its building completed in 1963. Some German Muslim children also study at “Nurcu schools” based on the teaching of the modernist Sufi Said Nursi (1877-1960). science. which tutored them in German.122 IZH has. It is therefore considered by some to be a radical. paralleling an independent system in Turkey. The Iranian-funded Shia Imam Ali Mosque and Islamic Centre in Hamburg (Islamische Zentrum Hamburg – IZH].Germany: Family/Schooling CIP Fethullah Gülen Courtyard of the PakTurk school in Karachi.eu . The latter. which differs from the Turkish Latin alphabet introduced by Mustafa Kemal. He ascribed these failings to recent immigration of the children from Turkey. but has been criticised by Shia observers for catering exclusively to Iranians.121 has been described by outside monitors as “a hub of Shiism in Europe that has distributed the anti-Israeli statements of President Ahmadinejad” while promoting Hezbollah in Lebanon. with 35. the main area of Alevi residence because of historic immigration for industrial employment. and said that the Nurcu movement seeks to build a larger institution in the city.000 members. operates such afternoon schools. European Union officials. a major Alevi centre in Germany. located in the Ruhr. He also stated that he had been dismissed from teaching at the school over a Shariah issue: his wearing of Western-style shorts. Kurds. representing 100. and was paid nine euros for each 45-minute teaching session.000 members in 34 communities in the state. and mathematics. also held high-profile meetings with local Jewish leaders. Kahraman informed us that he had worked for three months in a Gülen school in Duisburg. a Turkish imam now living in America. Gülen’s supporters have set up schools at multiple educational levels throughout the Muslim world. if not a jihadist element. Yilmaz Kahraman is president of the Alevi Youth Movement in the state of NordrheinWestfalen. however. The “soft Islamist” mass movement led by Fethullah Gülen. Kahraman said about 200 students attended the Gülen classes. are a larger Muslim community in Hamburg than Turks. founded in 1953. which are rare in Turkish schools. and the Dalai Lama. Kahraman described two Nurcu schools in Duisburg.

Falaturi’s texts are notable for their reasonable idiom and historical accuracy. and head of the country’s judicial system. the Academy was merged with IZH.islamicpluralism. Falaturi’s Muslim Thoughts presents a compendium of clarifying definitions of the basic themes discussed in any school curriculum on Islam. In 1965-70 it was managed by Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti. Beheshti became a major figure in the Iranian Islamic Revolution. and even to demand its abolition. perhaps ominously. when 70 leading members of the Iranian regime died in a bomb attack by radical leftists. this applies particularly to the areas of family law.123 were both written by Abdoldjavad Falaturi. A Guide further states. The exchange between Jews and Muslims in the area of religious teaching and law was more intensive than between Christianity and Islam”. In Hamburg. or even to demand the one-sided adoption of Western legal standards. in Muslim Thoughts we find the following comment under the heading “Relationship Between Muslims. “To ignore the continuing concern of Islamic scholars to mobilise the inner power of Islamic jurisprudence. Jews and Christians At [the] Cultural Level”: “The spread of Muslim science to the Christian West (particularly Sicily and Andalusia) would not have taken place without the intervention of Jewish merchants. rather than a curriculum for an Islamic option in religion/ethics classes. the Iranian formerly associated with the Bilal Mosque and Islamic Centre in Aachen. and also to overlook the opportunity it gives people to fashion their own lives freely and in accordance with the age in which they live. Falaturi had moved his Cologne Islamic Academy. the following: “[J]udging the Shari’ah on the basis of a narrow understanding… to equate it with an ‘Islamic lawbook’. A Guide condemns as “incorrect”. an outstanding modern Shia theologian. in order to do justice to the changes in society in the Islamic world in accordance with Islamic principles. The handbooks distributed by IZH. as well as its complexity.eu . business law and public law”. which he had founded in 1978. an extremely charismatic and popular cleric assassinated in Tehran in 1981. including the definition of Islam and discussion of Muslim missionisation and fundamentalism. Muslim Thoughts for Teachers and Textbook Authors (hereinafter Muslim Thoughts) and A Guide to the Presentation of Islam in School Textbooks. A student of Allameh Tabatabaei. criminal law. In the realm of Shariah. (A Guide to the Presentation of Islam in School Textbooks was coauthored by Udo Tworuschka). “To ignore the many-sided nature of the Shari’ah.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 Islamic Centre. and furthermore to take into consideration only its criminal law aspects. from God to interreligious dialogue. and after his unexpected death in 1995. For example. to describe the Shari’ah as a whole in a negative way and as medieval. he was a mentor to Hojjatolislam Seyyed Mohammad Khatami. “Nowadays in the whole of the 70 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. A Guide to the Presentation of Islam in School Textbooks addresses those matters that Muslims most often complain are distorted in public instruction. The scientific encounter of the different high cultures was characterised by mutual adaptations and further development. This documentation is aimed at establishing a standard for instruction about Islam. IZH distributes handbooks with guidelines on how to teach about Islam in general classes on religions. to Hamburg in 1995. who headed the IZH from 1978 to 1980 and was reformist president of Iran from 1997 to 2005. in German state schools. Hamburg (IZM) religious affairs.

It has been criticised for seeking political solutions to the problems of Islam in Germany when. The probability of complete separation of religion from education does not exist in Germany. German law from 1995 to 2002 presented a problem for Muslims in its treatment of the dietary issue of halal slaughtering of meat. In 2002. The only exemption was religious. This is the case even in those countries that have applied them in recent times. a new body. The family court judge held that issuance of a protective order would be sufficient relief for 71 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. the government in Berlin can call that elusive phone number”. a German court banned halal slaughtering because it did not specify the stunning of animals before they were killed. In 2007. and VIK (Süleymancilar). and left political issues to civil society. mainly because of economic disadvantage. In 2006. the German debate on education of Muslim children has concentrated on introduction of religious instruction in state schools rather than establishment of separate religious schools. DİTİB and Milli Goruş are mere “religious associations” under German law. according to our interviewee Mounir Azzaoui. may be described as traditionalist and resistant to full assimilation of Muslims into Western culture. the Deutsche-Islam Konferenz or German Conference on Islam was established as an institution of 15 Muslim members and 15 government representatives.eu . as mandated by German law. None of the latter three has official standing as a consultative body to government.“Parallel” Shariah CIP Islamic world… there is a tendency to interpret the phraseology in the spirit of the age and to prevent the application of harsh punishments. But nowhere does it suggest the adoption or establishment of Shariah as a parallel legal system governing Muslim conduct in the West. bringing together DİTİB. less out of Islamic conviction than for political reasons”. to facilitate official consultations. however. In 1995.islamicpluralism.126 The opinion was delivered in a case brought by a Moroccan-born woman against her Moroccan-born husband. following a civil complaint by an ethnic Turkish butcher. Late in 2007. the German constitutional court struck down the ruling as an undue interference with the right of butchers to exercise their profession. it should have been exclusively concerned with religious problems. as might be expected from an Iranian. Falaturi’s work. Alevi participation is absent from KRM. In all cases. composed at the beginning of the 1990s. the Koordinationsrat der Muslime or Coordination Council of Muslims in Germany (KRM) was launched. As a matter of private life. and the court had determined that consumption of meat slaughtered according to religious rules was not obligatory for Muslims. ZMD. given the Jewish ban on pork. at last.124 (2) Institutionalisation of Shariah by nonMuslim governments (“Parallel Shariah”) There have been no demands for or significant initiatives in the direction of institutionalised Shariah in Germany. German Muslims then imported halal meat from neighbouring countries. Butchery according to religious rules in Islam resembles the canon of kashrut in Judaism. except that invocation of God is continuous throughout Islamic killing of animals. The weekly newsmagazine Der Spiegel described the motive for KRM’s founding as follows:125 “Henry Kissinger once famously quipped: ‘Who do I call if I want to call Europe?’ The German government has long had the same problem when it came to pursuing dialogue with its own Muslim community: Who to call? Now the four leading groups representing Muslims in Germany have banded together so that. Qur’an specifies that Muslims are permitted to eat food prepared by Jews. Milli Goruş (operating through an Islamrat or Islam Council). Unfortunately. except for the acceptance of DİTİB as an informal partner by the state. a family court judge in Frankfurt caused a sensation when she (unnamed in media according to German practice) ruled that Qur’an supported the right of husbands to beat their wives. however. while the Alevis are recognised as a “religious community”.

They simply did it. “Nobody asked the Muslims if we wanted this change in the law. It originated among German Turks and has been reported to include some 800 members. Its most 72 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. has to do with religion or community customs. In July 2008. the hajj pilgrimage. Georg Barfuß. who withdrew an earlier demand for a divorce. We don’t want such problems in our community”. based in Köln. An outcry against the opinion followed. having been married only by nikah in Pakistan. as described in the succeeding section of Case Study: Germany. aside from so-called “honour” murder. said. In all these instances. After widespread debate on the case. to take effect at the beginning of 2009.127 But marriages in churches and mosques. rights of inheritance. the family judge was threatened with professional sanctions. The latter stated that legal decisions should conform to the German constitution rather than Qur’an. from all German political parties of the right and left. The persistence of these problems was underscored in late 2008 when a politician representing the Free Democratic Party. as with the commentaries by Archbishop Rowan Williams and Lord Chief Justice. Barfuß did not seem aware of German Alevi criticism of the institutionalisation of Sunni standards for prayer and fasting and Diyanet financing of mosques in the Turkish diaspora. and now we are trying to figure out how to respond. more lax standard. little crime involving Muslims. One exceptional case is that of the Kalifatstaat (Caliphate State) or “Kaplan conspiracy”.eu . Aside from the conspiratorial activities of the September 11 terrorists in Hamburg. as well as ZMD. some to fight outside Germany.128 He specified that personal areas of Shariah such as prayer. The “Kaplan conspiracy” was banned in 2001. would permit religious weddings to be solemnised without civil registration. Baron Phillips in Britain. Mounir Azzaoui. Azzaoui further stated that the proposed legal change had been introduced because no penalty for unregistered marriages had ever been established. and affirmed the right of Muslims to construct mosques unhindered.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 Milli Goruş ally Necmettin Erbakan the plaintiff.islamicpluralism. including Albanians and Moroccans. involves numerous Turks and other Muslims. if compatible with the Constitution. The group openly called for the overthrow of democratic institutions in Germany and Turkey. according to nonMuslim public opinion. and sporadic recruitment of jihadists. would exclude the parties from recourse to the courts for divorce. and it was therefore easy for politicians to introduce a new. (3) Criminal aspects Criminal activity in Germany. opined that Shariah could be established in his home state of Bavaria. and other civil remedies – precisely the negative situation of Muslim women in the UK who. non-Muslim public figures seemed motivated by ignorance and a patronising attitude in “offering” Muslims a Shariah the believers themselves did not necessarily or uniformly desire. Nobody consulted with us. and that mistreatment is a basis for divorce in Islam. Our Aachen interviewee. another controversy began when German authorities announced that a new marriage law. cannot obtain civil divorces in Britain and are lured to Shariah tribunals. and fasting are areas subject to Muslim religious law that would not be problematical. if not registered civilly. much like the Supporters of Shariah led by Abu Hamza in Britain.

130 The family were Albanian Muslim political refugees from Kosova who settled in Germany in 1989 after the onset of Serbian repression in the territory and the arrest of Kosovar protestors. was charged with the strangling in his home of Ulerika. Northern 73 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. that the DİTİB clergy in Germany and the Netherlands have failed to intervene in such a way that moderate Islamic standards in family relations would alleviate such persistent social pathologies as so-called “honour” murder.. At the end of 2003. built by DİTİB and opened in 2008. Latif Z. The general question of urban-rural dissonance in Turkey is visible in the confrontation of the AKP. it is among these communities. and. a youth with an Albanian father and Bosnian Muslim mother. however. or. showed that literature on sale to congregants was almost totally limited to Sufi and similar devotional material of a positive nature. secular. seeking asylum. followed by a third trial for attempted subversion of the Turkish constitutional order. and that Wahhabistyle beards and costumes were absent. further unidentified according to German law. that arguments identifying such brutalising customs as phenomena distinct from Islamic observance and religiosity have wide currency. and Sufi interpretation of Sunnism. The alleged cause of the death was the daughter’s romantic liaison with Sead. As we noted in Case Study: Britain. had come to Germany from Turkey in 1983. socalled “honour” murder is often based on resentment of betrothals or marriages involving partners outside Islam. the “Caliph of Köln”.129 The “Kaplan conspiracy” has been the most notable example of Shariahdriven criminal behavior in Germany. whose corpse was found dumped in a quarry pond.Germany: Approach to Women CIP Arrest of Metin Kaplan. was found guilty of treason to Turkey in 2004. as well as Alevi traditions (although they also are mainly rural). the“Caliph of Köln” notorious leader. 42. but Kaplan was retried. Another factor in the frequency of crimes against women in the German Muslim community may be the origin of many immigrants in a rural environment where the state-mandated secularism and official interpretation of Islam established in Turkish cities. in the city of Tübingen. in Saudi Arabia. one Ibrahim Sofu. Kaplan was convicted in Germany of incitement to murder in 2000. (4) Approach to Women So-called “honour” murder has been the main topic for discussion of Muslim women’s rights in Germany. with the secularist social and military establishment. In 1995 he took over the Kalifatstaat group from his predecessor. Information on radical Islamist infiltration of German prisons is lacking. which is considered a rural party. The verdict was overturned by a Turkish appeals court in 2006. including the accused. after lifting of his asylee status and his extradition by Germany to his native country. Kaplan called for Sofu’s death. have failed to penetrate. It appears unarguable. The first major family-relations case to gain public attention in Germany involved a Balkan. in which these values are even more pronounced.islamicpluralism. more than elsewhere in Europe. rather than a Turkish or Kurdish Muslim family. which resulted in a prison sentence for life in 2005. Metin Kaplan. “inappropriate” tribal membership. Given that Turkish Islam in Germany is dominated by Diyanet and DİTİB. and Sofu was slain in 1997. A visit to the Duisburg mosque. as well as by Alevilik. which are historically committed to a modernising. and currently the largest mosque in Germany. 16 and the oldest of four daughters.eu . and those in the Netherlands. The same may be true of “disfavoured” ethnic groups.

A sense of Albanian affiliation with Turks was exploited in the mid-20th century to organise the involuntary Yugoslav deportation of some tens of thousands of Albanians to Turkey. Daut Dauti. and the latter category.132 It comprises an extensive and elaborate system for the resolution of grievances over honour. Although marriage between Muslims and Serbs became common in Bosnia-Hercegovina under the former Yugoslav regime. such as Bosnians. apparently developed by the Catholic highlanders of northern Albania as an alternative to justice dispensed in Ottoman Shariah courts or the tribunals of the Christian millet or minority. Albanians view Muslim Slavs. which were controlled by Orthodox Christian ecclesiastics without Catholic representation. were the main targets of violence. even Latin Americans and Chinese”. as “an ancient unwritten code of justice and governance that functioned as the de facto Albanian Constitution for centuries”.islamicpluralism. often labelled as Slav. in terms of their linguistic association with the other Slavic nations rather than a common membership in the Islamic ummah. and speak archaic dialects of Turkish. In the 19th century. bride price. for many generations. it is said today that some 40.000 men cannot leave their homes because of their vulnerability in blood feuds. relationships between Albanians and Slavs were and remain almost unknown in Kosova and other Albanian-speaking areas. and have developed a strong sense of the propriety of ethnically-endogamous love and marriage relationships. In the late 1980s blood feuds (gjakmarrja) over honour.131 The Kanun was compiled and issued in print by a Franciscan priest. In the sole common exception to this ethnocentric pattern. who together brought about the resolution of more than 1. handed over in arranged marriages. Under the traditional Kanun. Wives are commanded to maintain the 74 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. An Albanian interviewee commented that “in the old generation the world was seen as divided between Albanians and enemies. but resentment at perceived favoritism to the Bosnians and other Muslim Slavs in Titoite Yugoslavia. constituted a primary element of enculturation. where some urban-dwelling Albanians (qytetars) continue to identify themselves as Turkish rather than Albanian. were mainly abolished in Kosova through a dedicated campaign by two Catholic figures. According to the Kanun a women who rejects an arranged marriage may be killed with the complicity of her parents. was set at the amount to be paid if a woman were killed. The ideology of Albanian honour is allpervasive and.eu . while Albanian nationalism in the late 19th and early 20th century was articulate in its opposition to Ottoman power. administered under the Kanun. their own Kanun based on honour. however. Albanians do intermarry with Turkish-speaking inhabitants of Kosova and Macedonia. This sentiment reflects not only rivalries under Ottoman rule. where Albanians remain an important émigré community today. The Albanian Kanun has been defined by a contributor to our study. In Northern Albania. Albanians are known to opine that “the worst Slav is a Muslim Slav”. men. wives may be killed for adultery and “betrayal of hospitality” if the two acts occur together. Dom Lush Gjergji and Anton Çetta. but young women may also become victims.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 Dom Lush Gjergji and Anton Çetta Albanians have maintained a code of customary law.200 such conflicts. Father Shtjefën Kryeziu Gjeçovi (18741929). included any foreigners. until recently. rather than women. including abuse of Albanian Muslims by Bosnian clerics and the use of Bosnian Muslim police to suppress Albanian demonstrations in the last decades of Yugoslav Communism. Additionally.

Germany: Approach to Women CIP honour of their husbands. Young women may not be abducted and married. But the Kanun is contradictory on women’s rights. rather than his daughter. the defendant blamed his wife. which he never learned to speak adequately. who got her navel pierced and died her hair blonde. Still. and widows cannot be compelled to accept marriages against their free will or vacate their dead husbands’ property. Western Macedonia. are generally safe from the scourge of kidnapping and forced marriage endemic among Italian Christians in those areas. the German judge rejected characterisation of the crime as a socalled “honour” murder. Hanife Gashi. Wives may not be beaten or otherwise mistreated for offences such as theft from a husband. and food for the abandoned wife. and most Albanian marriages today.islamicpluralism. the accused Latif Z. they must explain their conduct to the wife’s family. and a Bosnian consultant in our study condemned Albanian customary law as an “un-Islamic” expression of local particularism alien to the universalist spirit of Islam. older customs may prevail in diaspora communities. while providing shelter. as well as his daughter. the friends who visited his café deserted him. are love matches. although the husband may leave her. The low esteem held for women in the Kanun is summarised in the clause. and western Montenegro). In the 2003 Tübingen case. shoes. If a wife is abandoned with a nursing child.133 During the Communist period in Albania as well as in the Albanian-speaking Yugoslav lands (Kosova. and the night before the murder of his daughter he was alone. Yet men are strictly barred from taking women as concubines. for causing trouble in his household. because marriage by abduction remains so significant a violation of Albanian customary law. and girls who are supported in their refusal of an arranged marriage by their parents are expected to remain unmarried. His wife. were commonplace. young brides are required by it to submit to arranged marriages. was sentenced to life imprisonment. however. made to endure”. the husband must leave the child in her custody. South Serbia. Latif Z. While working as a heating technician. acknowledgement of so-called “honour” murder was rare in Germany. A major principle of Kanun is that a married woman’s parents are responsible for her honour. In this regard it should be noted that Albanian-speaking Christian women living in Calabria and Sicily. was described in news reporting as a nationalist “fanatic” who resented his wife and daughters’ superior acquisition of German. descended from refugees who fled to the Italian peninsula before the Turkish advance in the Balkans in the 15th century. “A woman is a sack. Nothing in this family tragedy has to do with Islam as a faith. an argument supported by the greater prevalence of 75 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. had provided the daughter and her boyfriend with money for a vacation in Kosova. where Albanocentric views.134 During the trial. arranged marriages declined precipitously. rather than the woman herself. it was disclosed that the father had repeatedly beaten his daughter. At the time. she and her sister had been married without their choice to Latif and his brother. The defendant repudiated a confession. but are barred from marriage to various classes of individuals with whom they have endogamous tribal relations. although they may involve contractual negotiations between families. and stated that the convicted acted from “base motives”. he set up a private café in his basement. Hanife Gashi also provided an example of the abuse of women’s rights under color of customs. But his rage at his wife. clothing. on pain of expulsion of the men from the community and destruction of their property. Eventually.eu . but a mother considered “vexatious” may be expelled from her home by her son. as well as comments reinforcing the ideology of honour. Husbands may beat their wives but if they draw blood. and the defence lawyer argued for a charge of manslaughter rather than murder. In an unanticipated outcome. In the period before his trial. festered.

She disclosed that anal sex had become a common method of contraception because of the absence of adequate sex education. The cited interview with Ateş took place three weeks after the slaying of Hatun Sürücü. according to journalist Jan Feddersen. she described Turkish Muslim women in Germany as “sometimes not even knowing where they are. noting that only girls are excluded from such classes. During the Seyran Ates.137 The crime was particularly atrocious. but with patriarchal social conditions”. and demanded stronger legal restrictions on arranged marriages.000 people against violence against women. 24.136 In October 2006. who interviewed Ateş. “Thanks a lot for this outstandingly impressive signal to Turkish women in Germany. The Sürücü case led to a demonstration of 1. The pretext was the victim’s desire to live in a German way.135 At that point. on February 7. along with representatives of leftist parties and human rights groups. Ateş replied sarcastically. an Iraqi from Munich identified only as Kazim M. and brought together German non-Muslim as well as Muslim women. locked up… forbidden to leave the house… slaves offered in the Muslim marriage market”. was charged with killing his ex-wife. on the 76 pretext of chastity.eu . because. Ateş specifically denounced ethnologists who. by her three brothers. 2005. As the victim crossed the street and stopped a passing car. Turkish-German lawyer CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. the defendant poured gasoline over her and ignited it. a German Turkish woman. in response to charges that she was a troublemaker worthy of condemnation. 23. The six-year old child witnessed the entire incident. “well-disposed toward Muslims. say that honour killings are connected not with Islam. Sürücü was killed with three gunshots at a bus stop in Berlin. lethal punishment. the pretext of “cultural imprinting” had been introduced into the legal process. Only multi-culti fanatics are interested in this distinction – and use it to distract from other problems”. 41. Ateş commented.. She criticised members of the Green party and leftists for their failure to protect women. And that is how this crime should be punished”. It is not instinctive… It is a severe. Honour killing has nothing to with cultural imprinting – as if one couldn’t change that.islamicpluralism. who was born in Turkey but forced to leave her family so she could “live as a German”. The defendant stabbed the victim 12 times in the head and upper body. Sazan B.. such cases were treated as “second degree murders”. In 2005. beginning in the Berlin neighbourhood of Neukölln. 36. She further assailed Muslim parents who object to participation of their daughters in sexeducation classes in schools. “They cannot be separated. the German female lawyer Seyran Ateş. called for greater severity in German law governing so-called “honour” murder. having purchased a knife and can of gasoline and stabbed and set fire to her only hours after their legal separation commenced.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 Kanun among Catholics. But for this and other reasons the Islamic community in which Latif Z resided did not provide counseling or other services or incentives to integration into the German social system that might have prevented the crime from taking place. Although affirming that she is a religious believer. in that the defendant lay in wait for the victim while she walked in the street holding her 6-year old child by the hand. Honour killing of women is typically premeditated and organised.

he readily confessed to the act. but escaped again within hours of the wedding. The defendant admitted in court his intention to kill her. not before. Peter Boie. but. Morsal Obeidi. Her flight took place only two weeks after the slaying of a 16-year old Afghan woman. as in the 2003 Tübingen case of the Albanian Latif Z. having been tracked down. in a parking lot. It is interesting to note that her father was a former air force pilot serving the Soviet puppet regime in Afghanistan. and sent briefly to Morocco where she was kept in isolation. in Hamburg. The victim had obtained a protective order against her husband in late 2005 because of domestic violence.. 23 and the daughter of immigrants with university educations.islamicpluralism. A bride price of €32. In June 2008.. Kazim M. He declared his contempt for the German legal system and bragged that he had been arrested after. Islam and Shariah cannot be directly implicated in a situation where learning the language of one’s new home is considered an offence against honour. a Moroccan-born woman. founded after the death of Hatun Sürücü to assist women in such cases and advertised on German television. He had a Memorials to Hatun Aynur Sürücü CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. expressed no remorse.Germany: Approach to Women CIP legal proceeding it was disclosed that the marriage had been arranged in Iraq after a halfhour meeting between the couple. 23. a contributing factor was the disparity in learning German between the victim and the husband. She was beaten for coming home late and being seen with strangers. Indeed. She was critical of her own naivete in believing that her family would eventually understand and accept her motive in fleeing. described the crime as a so-called “honour” murder but said the defendant was deluded in his beliefs. but after that failed. paid to the woman’s family. in that no concept of honour was involved in the case and it was necessary for the German state to take a strong stand against such crimes. Leyla H. Muslim authorities did not intervene in a conflict that had attracted government attention. and was divorced one year afterward. and some jewelry changed hands. Leyla H. In this incident. “I am very happy to have committed this act”. after having had makeup applied for the ceremony. as in other such cases. and then migrated to Germany. when the Moscow-backed Kabul regime fell. The crime took place after repeated beatings by her father and sister as well as her brother. threatened with a knife at her throat.eu 77 . a bodybuilder. She expressed fear that further contact with her family would lead to her death in short order. She was returned to Germany and told by her family that she must accept marriage with an immigrant from rural Morocco. described to Der Spiegel how she had fled her family at 16 to avoid a forced marriage. required a German translator throughout his trial. and was described as grinning with satisfaction throughout the trial.139 Obeidi was stabbed to death 20 times by her brother Ahmad-Sobair Obeidi. The prosecutor. who had fled first to the ex-Soviet Union.000. Hatun und Can. who were middle-class immigrants and had lived in Germany for 13 years. she returned to her family.138 She lived in women’s shelters and attempted to establish a family with a Turkish man. Her brother surrendered to police 12 hours after the crime. took refuge with a German relief organisation. the fatal assault. He said.

islamicpluralism. born in Germany but of Turkish ethnicity. had also undergone an attempt to impose a forced marriage on her. A legal agreement between Germany and Turkey provides for such expulsion. the killer and his family committed violent outbursts in the courtroom. Ahmad Obeidi was convicted of murder140 in February 2009 and sentenced to life imprisonment. citing aggravated “sibling rivalry”. regarding a so-called “honour” murder. believed he had inherited total authority over them. the Berlin municipality of Tempelhof unveiled a plaque commemorating the death of Hatun Sürücü – more than three years after she was slain. which. The revelation that the killer’s father was a “Soviet Afghan” refugee implied that the Obeidi family was liberated from “honour” prejudices. the women had obtained protective orders. In a remarkable outcome. The determination that he could be deported was appealed. involving in this case study. Leyla H. a court in Stuttgart determined that the perpetrator of a so-called “honour” murder in 2004. when the judge in the case commented that Obeidi would likely have been found guilty in Kabul. the usually-conservative German weekly Der Spiegel suggested that the crime was not a so-called “honour” murder.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 long history of assaults.eu .144 Özhan K. “A woman killing a man who rapes her daughter may be described as a defence of honour. He had killed the victim with 40 knife-blows. Almost simultaneously with publicity about the fears of Leyla H. which proved of limited utility. because the convicted individual remained tied to a Turkish. In this case. that Hatun Sürücü was killed because “she did not submit to compulsion 78 and suppression by her family. Family mourners came from the Netherlands as well as Germany. rather than a German. She had repeatedly fled the family but returned to it and to new attacks. Özhan K. and the pretext for the crime was the fact that his sister had separated from her husband but had not been divorced. The ethnic Turkish victim Hatun Sürücü has become a symbol of the overall problem of so-called “honour” murder. way of life. an Afghan. on the basis of his birth in Germany. aggressors including an Albanian. with a car. a Pakistani. Still. Within hours. the judge in Stuttgart declared that an appeal based on birthplace should not be entertained. with Obeidi cursing the judge. hit his exwife. the appeal was referred to the higher court in the CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. but only if the convicted criminal shows a propensity for repetition of a crime. In a troubling development. 2008. as was later revealed. because she had left home. knows no ethnic limits. expressed remorse for his act and appealed to the court against deportation. 57. who had refused to wear hijab after reaching puberty. but led a life according to her own free will”. two such crimes were attempted in Berlin. including complaints by Morsal. And the series of such crimes has not abated. a Moroccan. Turks. producing serious injuries to the victims. On June 11. an attempted murder of a 17year old Iraqi girl by her 21-year old brother in Trier led to removal of her parents’ guardianship over her. and a Tunisian. however. the girl’s mother and younger brother overpowered the assailant.142 The plaque reads. but brothers killing their sisters for disobeying them has nothing to do with honour”. In July 2008. Iraqis. In both cases. could be deported to Turkey as soon as he completed his sentence for the crime. while the CIP team was visiting Germany. Özhan K. who had been separated from him for three years. replied articulately. in German and Turkish. the slayer shouted that he would be a free man in Kabul. In August 2008. and.143 The girl was stalked by her brother and assaulted in the street with a paving stone and then kicked in the head and face. as may be seen. The father of the family had died and Özhan K. and was condemned to nine years in juvenile detention in 2005. was 18 when he stabbed the male friend of his sister to death. a 33-year old Tunisian immigrant stabbed his 40-year old German ex-wife. Nevertheless. Questioned as to whether she believed such crimes should be called “honour killings”.141 A Pakistani man..

if there is reason for hope in the panorama of life among Muslim women in Germany. failed because her father demanded that five years of her professional income after her graduation from school (with law as her intended course of study) should be paid to him (her male parent). the leftist newspaper die tageszeitung147 reported on a study of forced marriage in Hamburg. who said she would tell Aydan’s father her whereabouts. Kaya defined so-called “honour murder” as a community rather than a religious problem. the previously mentioned Alevi Youth leader. had also attracted the attention of German media to forced marriages. Before the ritual can proceed such conflicts have to be solved and mutual consent… has to be established within the congregation”. and. produced at the instance of legislators from the Christian Democratic Union. Yilmaz Kahraman. in which marriage serves as an institution of social control. she was then threatened by Sahin’s mother. all communal conflicts are resolved by appeal of the clerics or dedeler. and she idealised immigration to Germany and the opportunity to live with her father. threatening to burn her alive with gasoline. a German Turkish girl then 19 years old. in contrast. the victims 79 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. The anthropologist Martin Sökefeld described the Alevi system of mediation. representing the conservative Shafi’i school of jurisprudence. although the former practice has elicited less extensive or prominent commentary. and barred her from marrying him. During her childhood in Turkey. Even fatal violence between Alevi men may be settled by payment of a fine. but included cases beginning in 2005. the Stuttgarter Zeitung146 described the case of Aydan. but the relationship failed and no marriage took place. He stated that. Germany’s main conservative party. In a single year. it should also be noted that the Zaza Kurdish-born sociologist Asiye Kaya. Aydan was frequently beaten by her uncle. Only when I compare it to my current life: I can come home now and can do what I want. In 2002. to a male for whom Aydan felt no romantic attraction. An attempt at an arranged marriage in Turkey. The case of Morsal Obeidi.islamicpluralism. and was forced to escape again. but her father considered him too modern. “As long as one lives in it. who had fled her family to avoid a forced marriage and took up residence with three other girls whose situation was similar.eu . after Aydan entered puberty. he forbade her to visit her birth mother. during the Alevi religious ceremony or cem. described an environment of cultural conditioning in which many young Turkish women had no awareness of the real character of their victimisation. In addition. In June 2008. 210 incidents of forced marriage were handled by local counseling centres. a foundation. The study was initiated in 2006. Sahin. Aydan commented. previously described. echoing the sentiments of Seyran Ateş. of the Humboldt University in Berlin. one is not aware at all how bad the whole problem is. and conducted by the Johann Daniel Lawaetz Stiftung. asserted that socalled “honour” murder is markedly common among Sunni Kurds. her father had remarried.Germany: Approach to Women CIP state of Baden-Württemberg. When she moved to Germany. In 169 cases. Aydan. especially: I no longer feel afraid”. She developed a relationship with a German-born Muslim relative. He also strictly supervised her daily activities to avoid contact with boys. And. While so-called “honour” murder is known to be frequent among Kurdish immigrants in Europe. Aydan ran away from home and lived for a year with Sahin. whose affection for her during visits to her birthplace contrasted with her ill-treatment at the hands of her father’s brothers. strongly denied that Shariah authorities among the Kurds.145 Forced marriage was brought to the fore of German non-Muslim attention prior to discussion of so-called “honour” murder. had legitimised such crimes. known as halk mahkemesi or “the popular tribunal” as “a particular element of the initial phase of cem in which all participants are called to disclose conflicts and strained relationship(s) among them. it is found among the Turkish and Kurdish Alevis. when interviewed by CIP.

Martin. cit. Islamic Scientific Academy. Abdoldjavad. Martin. Der Spiegel (Hamburg). although 11 percent had an occupation.. tr. Struggling for Recognition: The Alevi Movement in Germany and in Transnational Space. New York and Oxford. Série no. 126 Köhnlein. cit. 133 Ibid.. n. The Immigrant Organising Process. 111 Conseil europeén des fatwas et de la recherche. [Hamburg. 2007. A Guide to the Presentation of Islam in School Textbooks. Oslobođenje [Sarajevo]. 2008. “What is Euro-Islam? Could it Avert the Islamic Self-Ghettoisation in the European Diaspora?” Unpublished. Daut. December 10. many still of school age. 114 Tibi. Collective Decision Making Around the World: Essays on Historic Deliberative Practices. Abdoldjavad and Udo Tworuschka. Cologne. In the breakdown of ethnic origin. Berghahn Books. siblings. Kanuni i Lekë Dukagjinit/The Code of Lekë Dukagjini. New York. 128 Unsigned. German ed. or the Middle East. op. pp. were married while travelling abroad – in so-called “holiday weddings”.. 110 International Crisis Group. 109 Roughneen. cit. in Marin. 108 Ibid. Köln. July 5. 1988. Georg-Eckert-Institut. n. “Pet hiljada eura studentima”. Gjonlekaj. 124 Unsigned. cit. 104 International Crisis Group.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 themselves asked for help. Herbert Schultze. 118 Unsigned. “German court ends Muslim slaughter ban”. Islamic Scientific Academy. 125 Unsigned. 1989. “Frankfurter Familienrichterin sorgt mit Koran-Verweis für Empörung”. cit. 1990. BBC News. Suddeutsche Zeitung. January 15. March 2008. between 200 and 300 cases were recorded. 2007 127 Schwartz. p.eu . The Hamburg study concluded that 53 of the 210 cases examined involved immigrants to Germany.d. In 39 cases foreign men had obtained forced marriages with women living in Germany. 120 International Crisis Group. 106 See footnote 5. 117 Unsigned. op. Leonard Fox. 119 International Crisis Group. 2008. Muslim Thoughts for Teachers and Textbook Authors. 2001. 129 International Crisis Group. January 20. op cit. op cit. op. October 30. while in 42 incidents young women. “Erster Koalitionsstreit um Äußerungen zur Scharia”. Islam and Identity in Germany. 2006. ibid.. 2002. Bassam. Croydon. Frankfurter Rundschau. while in the remainder friends. including publication of a poster that directs young people seeking help to publicly-funded counseling centres. In October 2008 CDU politicians in Hamburg began an official campaign to oppose forced marriage. Floris F. April 11. with a note that in Berlin alone. Michael Walpole. cit. op. families of those who asked for assistance came most often from Turkey (54 percent). 112 Unsigned. “Germany’s Muslims Band Together: New Umbrella Group Founded”. other relatives.d. The remaining cases came from South Asia. Associated Press German Worldstream. Der Islam in Unterricht. 122 International Crisis Group. Stephen. op. “Europe’s Sharia question”. brides were “imported” to Germany. since the women often spoke no German and were treated as household slaves. 2008. op. The study was considered incomplete. cit. June 25. 130 Bernklau. 115 International Crisis Group. “Tödliche Tradition”.. 80 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. and teachers made complaints. Africa. Amsterdam University Press.islamicpluralism. German ed. Recueil de fatwas. In 45 cases. 123 Falaturi. Five percent of the victims in forced marriages were male. op. 121 Unsigned. 2008. 2007. 105 Vermeulen. September 26. op. Kettering Foundation. Braunschweig. 37-38. “Köhler fordert Muslime zu Absage an Scharia auf”. “Im Hinterzimmer der Traditionen”. Simon. 2003. 113 Sökefeld. 131 Dauti. 1991. ISN Security Watch [Zurich]. “Multiculturalism Run Amok”. Dayton. the Hamburg study found that these were the worst cases in terms of abuse. cit. 132 Gjeçovi. 2006. tr. Ileana. IZH]. during the same period. 116 Roughneen. March 22.148 NOTES 103 A useful ethnographic study of Alevism in Germany is Sökefeld. Falaturi. Amsterdam. Islamische Wissenschaftliche Akademie. die tageszeitung [Berlin]. Shtjefën. The Islamic Centre Hamburg – A Presentation. 35. Hindus accounted for five percent. Stephan. “Ancient Public Deliberation and Assembly in the Code of Lekë Dukagjini”. Suddeutsche Zeitung [Munich]. More than 80 percent were Muslim. ed. 107 International Crisis Group. None of the women involved in the cases under examination had an independent income. Afghanistan (16 percent) or Kurdistan (9 percent). 1. and Christians one percent. tr. 2005. the former Yugoslavia.

December 22. cit. Kaija. 2005. 2008. Frankfurter Rundschau.was die Polizei tun kann. nicht der Liebe”. 2009. “Nach ‘Ehrenmord’: Gericht weist Klage gegen Ausweisung ab”. nicht ertragen – Sie flehte. die tageszeitung. Der Tagesspiegel [Berlin]. “ ‘Ehrenmord-Prozess’ – ‘Ich bin sehr froh. 138 Ataman. Gisela. Jan-Eric. 136 Schultz. 139 Linder. October 10. Sebastian. Balasko. Jan. 2003. CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. The study itself was conducted by Thomas Mirbach. 2009. war ein lebensfrohes Mädchen – das konnte Ahmad O. “Lebenslange Haft für Mord an Tochter”. Associated Press German Worldstream. “Doubts About German ‘Honour Killing. Eva. Stuttgarter Zeitung.Germany: Notes CIP 134 Unsigned. die tageszeitung (national edition). Eusterhus. Der Spiegel. 143 Unsigned. “Eine Frage der Ehre. 2008. 2007. “Angst vor Ehrenmord – Leyla flieht vor der eigenen Familie”. “Nach versuchtem Ehrenmord wird Eltern die Vormundschaft entzogen”. “Plakatieren gegen Zwangsheirat”. 146 Schollbach. Die Welt [Hamburg]. 2008. June 9. 2008. 140 Unsigned. October 18. Hamburger Abendblatt. 2008. Kaija.’ ” Der Spiegel. doch ihr Bruder stach 20-mal zu”. Ulla. “Multikulti ist verantwortungslos”.’” Der Spiegel. July 17. October 18. “Das Schicksal einer jungen Türkin”. Ferda. Unsigned. Hendrik. AP German Worldstream. “ ‘Ehrenmord’ verhindert”. um die Opfer zu schützen”. July 17. Oliver. and Reinhard. June 6. 137 Fischer. 135 Feddersen. “Nach Ehrenmord: Hunderte demonstrieren gegen Gewalt an Frauen”. dass ich die Tat begangen habe. May 17. August 5. 2002. 141 Beikler. June 11. Der Tagesspiegel. 2008. Simone Müller and Katrin Triebl. 144 Schmale. Sabine. February 5. Der Spiegel. “Ehrenmord: Morsal O. February 28. “Gedenktafel für ermordete Hatun Sürücü”.eu 81 . English text. Paula. “German Court Convicts Afghan Man for Stabbing Sister”. 2008. March 7. 2008. DDP News Agency. December 30. die tageszeitung (national edition).islamicpluralism. 147 Kutter. 2008. “Zwangsheirat erstaunlich häufig”. June 4. Die Welt. February 13. Friedrichsen. 142 Unsigned. 145 Sökefeld. 148 Kutter. Sascha. 2005. op. “Manchmal hilft nur eine neue Identität // Zwei Mordanschläge gegen Frauen . 2008.

and who was assassinated by a nonMuslim ethnic Dutch native. who declared his unqualified opposition to the presence of Muslims.S. 2004. but episodes in the first decade of the 21st century have arguably made Islam a more volatile topic in Dutch society than elsewhere in the West. Such events included the rise of the anti-immigrant politician Pim Fortuyn (1948-2002). the majority of Dutch Muslims are Surinamese (migrants from the former Dutch colony on the northern coast of South America151) and Turkish immigrants. Mohammed Bouyeri. following France and Germany. the Netherlands may very well prove a key “backup” country for mobilising moderate Muslims. and threats.eu .149 In addition. Takfir wal Hijra (Religious Purge and Migration). an anti-Islam reaction more serious than any other in Europe so far occurred in the Netherlands. Case Study: The Netherlands Introduction Muslims comprise between 800. warned against the alleged advance of Shariah in the country. in apparent reprisal. has moved to the U. who has publicly renounced Islam. or seven percent in a national population of 17 million. who received threats from Muslim extremists in the aftermath of the Van Gogh affair. vandalism. targeted by arson. with 106 mosques and other Muslim establishments. Indeed. 13 Christian churches were targeted in counterattacks. a friend of Fortuyn. Bouyeri was a supporter of an Egyptian movement associated with Wahhabism. as well as individuals.islamicpluralism. by a Moroccan-born extremist of Berber ethnicity.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 6. In the weeks following the killing of Van Gogh on November 2. the Netherlands has the third largest Muslim share of population in Western Europe.000 and one million residents of the Netherlands. Demographically. served by 400-500 mosques. and that after the incidents of 2004 tensions have decreased in the country. Van Gogh had directed a short film titled Submission with the Somali-born author and political figure Ayaan Hirsi Ali. It should be noted that while such atrocious and difficult incidents gave the impression of an Islamist siege of the Netherlands. whose outlook has been heterodox or secular. even as the UK Mohammed Bouyeri CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. This traumatic event was followed by the 82 murder in Amsterdam of the film-maker Theo Van Gogh (1957-2004).150 Hirsi Ali.

WRR called for the Netherlands and the European Union to recognise and begin negotiations with the Egyptian core of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Lebanese Hezbollah movement.islamicpluralism. two Muslims were appointed as ministers in the Dutch cabinet. but little analysis was dedicated to the ultimate aim of the MB.152 The WRR recommendations may. followed by Surinamese in second place and Turks in the third. WRR even called for the organisation of an Islamic political party or parties in the Netherlands.. CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. which was seen to have failed because of Muslim self-segregation.153 The Netherlands also has a long-existing but small community of Indonesian Muslims. Moroccans are the leading demographic element. 34 in the Greater Hague (Den Haag). Nebahat Albayrak. be deemed by some to be excessive in their advocacy for accommodation with Muslims who are believed to be moving in a democratic direction. In 2007.eu 83 . which is to establish an Islamic fundamentalist state.Case Study: The Netherlands CIP remains the main frontline country against radical Islam in Western Europe. the subtext of this controversy may have mostly to do with frustration over altruistic government policies that were ineffective or otherwise thwarted. a woman of Turkish origin. the Dutch Scientific Council for Government Policy (Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid – WRR) had issued a report to the national cabinet.154 Many Indonesians in the Netherlands are. Already in 2004. 36 in Greater Utrecht. who were Dutch nationals. and 15 percent Surinamese. Ahmed Aboutaleb was installed as mayor of Rotterdam and the first Muslim mayor in the country. based on three years’ research and titled Dynamiek in islamitisch activisme (Dynamics in Islamic Activism). Dutch mosques included. in 2004. In Amsterdam. Thus. Prior to the main Surinamese influx during the 1970s. of a total of 436. and 57 in Greater Rotterdam (Rijnmond).S. however. Among other points. but because it is the only Western European country with large numbers of Turkish and Kurdish Alevis as well as a significant community of Maghrebi Berbers/Amazigh – many of whom despise radicals and firmly oppose imposition of Shariah. was named State Secretary [Minister] for Social Affairs. representing the social-democratic Labor Party (Partij van der Arbeid – PvdA): Ahmed Aboutaleb. however. 35 percent Moroccan. The crucial role of the Netherlands could emerge based not only on the dramatic events that have transpired there. in which it criticised Dutch politicians for “scapegoating” and “repeatedly baiting” Muslims. It may argued that much of the Dutch non-Muslim reaction has reflected disillusionment with the long-standing commitment of the government to a multicultural policy. In 2009. The ratio of affiliation is 50 percent Turkish. Balkan Muslims also arrived in the Netherlands. however. 52 in the Greater Amsterdam region. Turkish immigrants began settling in the Netherlands in the mid-1960s. and enjoyed better opportunities as immigrants than the more recent working-class migrants. a surprising outcome in Ahmed Aboutaleb that this port was considered a centre of antiIslamic sentiment and even labeled a “Fortuyn city”. while the faith of Islam is widely debated. born in Morocco and Berber/Amazigh in origin. We have examined the Alevis in Case Study: Germany and will analyze the situation of the Berbers/Amazigh in this and the remaining Case Studies. in which much attention was focused on the strategic turn of the MB toward electoral politics. The tone of this debate on the Egyptian MB markedly resembled a similar and inconclusive discussion in the U. Christian. became State Secretary for Justice. acquainted with Dutch culture. In a suggestion that produced no effect to date. mainly beginning in the 1990s.

was originally more influential there than in Germany. Diyanet. A second faction. known as Milli Goruş-Noord and Milli Goruş-Zuid. has been expelled from its (currently uncompleted) Amsterdam mosque project. because Milli Goruş and the Süleymancilar had taken stronger initiatives in the latter country. Nonetheless. which controls 140 mosques in the Netherlands. the Ahmadi community of 84 dissident Muslims includes a faction. But the country also has a significant Alevi community. that believe in the appearance of the Muslim messiah or mahdi in 19th century India. former director of Milli Goruş-Noord. Shias are required to believe in the future arrival of the mahdi in the form of the 12th. Ahmadis of both factions represent a paradoxical element in the Muslim panorama because they are repressed and subjected to takfir (excommunication from Islam) in Pakistan and barred from making pilgrimages (hajj) to Mecca.islamicpluralism. the Netherlands must contend with the activities of the Turkish government’s Diyanet. as Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835-1908).E.eu . Ahmadis remain condemned by the Muslim majority because of the Qadiani belief that a mahdi has appeared in recent times. believes the founder was a reformer. but not a mahdi. Finally. known as Lahoris. Haci Karacaer. and a more extreme branch in the south. The Lahori faction of Ahmadis have drifted toward prescriptive Sunnism. and have become susceptible to the lure of political power. Sunnis are CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. Lahori Ahmadis are well-represented in the Netherlands and have been active in Muslim community affairs. “hidden” imam. who was born in 868 C. Ahmadiyya and Wahhabism were both introduced to the Netherlands by Indian Muslims from Suriname. but at the same time they condemn common Muslim spiritual practices such as the celebration of the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad (mawlid) and prayer at shrines. and disappeared in “occultation” at the age of five.155 Milli Goruş in the Netherlands is divided between a more moderate wing in the north of the country. Milli Goruş is considered less militant in the Netherlands than in Germany. as well as Milli Goruş and the Süleymancilar. which may in the future assume a more aggressive pro-Shariah posture in line with the ideology of the AKP.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 The Historical Background: Emergence of Shariah as an Issue in The Netherlands Like Germany. mainly because they enjoy a superior social status in Pakistan thanks to their commitment to secular education. Still. These attitudes are shared by Ahmadis and Wahhabis. Indeed. Hasan Ibn Ali. known as Qadianis.

followed by the As-Soennah mosque in Den Haag and the Islamic Foundation for Education and Propagation of Knowledge. Saudi institutions and foundations established mosques in the country that “have dominated the ultra-orthodox debate within the Dutch Islamic community since the mid-1990s”.islamicpluralism. Suhayb Salaam. According to AIVD. in the wording of the AIVD. Syria and Sudan. The AIVD identifies the original centres of Saudi-financed radicalism in the Netherlands at the Al-Tawheed mosque in Amsterdam and the Al-Fourkaan mosque in Eindhoven. whose father was also of Syrian origin.157 have issued authoritative reports on the appearance of Wahhabi-oriented extreme and violent interpretations of Sunni Islam in the Netherlands. a Syrian named Jneid Fawaz. these mosques have been under the ideological direction of Arabic-speaking preachers originally from countries like Egypt. Two Dutch government agencies. The agency states that. has preached in favour of polygamy. “Muslim radicalism in the Netherlands is most successful in reaching young Dutch citizens of Moroccan origin and young members of other immigrant communities with their origins in the Middle East and Somalia. These documents generally refer to Wahhabism by the more “politically-correct” term “Salafism”. “Since the mid-1990s. the General Intelligence and Security Service (Algemene Inlichtingen. affiliated with a mosque in Tilburg. Radical Shias predict the coming of a mahdi in the shorter rather than the longer perspective of history. The imam of the As-Soennah mosque. and known by its Dutch initials as ISOOK. as well as white converts”. or apocalyptic end of time. had distinguished himself by his violent preaching against Theo Van Gogh and Ayaan Hirsi Ali. but do not claim such a figure has lately emerged.en Veiligheidsdienst – AIVD)156 and the National Coordinator for Investigation of Terrorism (Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestijding – NCTB).eu 85 . North Holland Rotterdam Mosque CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. since the coming of the mahdi would be accompanied by signs of the “last days”. Ijmuiden Mosque.The Emergence of Shariah as an Issue in The Netherlands CIP recommended to believe in the eventual arrival of a mahdi but are not required to so believe and do not identify the mahdi with a specific historic personage. ISOOK’s imam. from the 1980s forward. They emphasise that. but educated in Saudi Arabia… or at least familiar with Saudi… religious dogmas”.

similarly. wearing a ‘strict’ Islamic dress. fundamentalism appears an easy and therefore attractive form of affirmation. Turkish. “• Deliberately attempting to disrupt the relationships between religious or ethnic communities. Surinamese. directed by Stephen Schwartz and Kamal Hasani. The group which has taken up this lifestyle is much larger than [the] hard core of ‘true’ Islamic radicals. the more liberally minded and suspected non-believers are most likely [to] be confronted by this tactic. community and communications representatives.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 marriage by nikah without civil registry. “• Attempting to convince or intimidate people in the immediate vicinity. These schools are organised on the basis of religion rather than ethnicity. This attitude is sometimes prompted by the feeling that there exists a genuine threat to the Islamic community”. and other Muslim children are educated together in them. homosexuals.islamicpluralism. using certain body language and observing the separation of the sexes.eu . AIVD has analyzed the following tactics by which radical Islamists currently pursue their aims in the Netherlands. The CIP Survey of Shariah Agitation in The Netherlands The Centre for Islamic Pluralism completed its field survey of Shariah agitation and attitudes toward it in Dutch Muslim communities in the second half of 2008. Interviews included extensive meetings and discussions in Amsterdam and Leiden. neighbourhood or wider Islamic community to display loyalty to their own faith group alone. neighbourhood or wider Islamic community not to participate in some or all of the institutions of the democratic legal order. social workers. as well as academic experts and journalists. observes that the emerging radical Islamist “culture often deviates from the traditional culture of Dutch Muslims. who has lectured at Leiden University.158 State subsidy for Muslim schools represents an extension of the long-established Dutch policy of “pillarisation” (verzuiling) under which differing religious communities – CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. this has led to some Moroccan youths in particular rebelling” against the moderate. trying to prevent them taking up a 86 government job. Islamic primary and secondary schools were established in the Netherlands. with special assistance from Irfan Al-Alawi. the reason being that they find it a ‘cool’ way of life without having any deep-seated convictions”. For example. For example. or to create other forms of social tension. using threats or persuasion to prevent them voting. AIVD further discerns in this milieu “the adoption of highly ritualistic patterns of behaviour – for example. Women. and the ascendancy of Shariah. Interviewees included imams. “• Forcing people in the immediate vicinity. In practice. and Moroccan. neighbourhood or wider Islamic community not to work for or provide services to the institutions of the democratic legal order. all of which resemble Shariah agitation as seen in Britain: “• Forcing people in the immediate vicinity. and now total 40. For example. and rank-and-file mosque attendees. discouraging contact with those who hold different views and cultivating hostile thinking. neighbourhood or wider Islamic community to conform to one’s own strict standards of behaviour. and sometimes to their own ethnic faith group alone. established Moroccan Islam of their families. “• Attempting to convince or intimidate people in the immediate vicinity. Here we note a phenomenon visible among many young Muslims: because it is simplistic. while also inciting Muslims against Hirsi Ali. (1) Family/schooling Beginning in 1989. The NCTB.

Family/Schooling in The Netherlands CIP Top:boy pupils at an Islamic primary school Left: window at Hidaya Islamic primary school in Nijmegen.islamicpluralism. with the diminution of religiosity in Dutch culture. representing the conservative Christian Democratic Appeal (Christen Democratisch Appèl – CDA) party. criticised Islamic schools established through “pillarisation”. however. medical. in that Muslims remained on the margin of society. commented in 1999. usually referred to by his last name. in their economic status no less than in attitudes. In 2003 Dutch Prime Minister Jan Pieter Balkenende. Buddhists. as an obstacle to assimilation. Interestingly enough. “Pillarisation” originally extended to the broader environment. although they included such debated topics as the appropriateness of Qur’an translations from Arabic to other languages (considered fully legitimate in official Turkish Islam but challenged by many Arab and other 87 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. including subsidies for specialised professional media training. Hindus. according to one journalistic investigation. but Muslims in particular continued to take advantage of the Christian precedent in law. The Dutch writer Herman Pleij. On the contrary: it produced a pacified and enormously thriving society”. and media facilities. Dutch opinion in the 1990s judged “pillarisation” for Muslims and multiculturalism in general to have failed. Islamic teaching materials for use in the Muslim public school “pillar” did not. “Holland was the most segregated country in the world until the 1960s. Islamic public school lessons concentrated on positive aspects of the religion in general. in addition to such smaller Christian denominations as the Evangelicals. and Humanists all have benefited from government-mandated aid for their own special media enterprises. we did not knock each other’s brains out. neither of them organised distinct party or labor sections. in that Dutch political parties and trade unions were also supported for Catholics and Protestants on a separate basis.eu . but Jews. Jews and Muslims were drawn into “pillarisation” in a more limited way because of the smaller size of their communities. Holland originally Catholics and Protestants – were provided separate educational. include proShariah or otherwise controversial topics. and was supported by then-member of parliament Hirsi Ali. elected by the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie – VVD).159 As we have suggested. Christian “pillarisation” underwent rapid decline during the 1960s. Muslims.

a large Dutch financial-services cooperative. UK and elsewhere. radicalised “boys and girls are clashing with their environment because they refuse to shake hands with the opposite sex and because girls want to wear veils at school. The NCTB describes the current situation with admirable clarity. a Moroccan political system that is seen. Issues of Mzine include numerous images of young Muslim women without covering. and information about such events as a 2008 beauty pageant titled “Inspiration for Integration”.S. even by moderates and especially by many people of Berber/Amazigh ethnicity – a probable numerical majority in Morocco – as antidemocratic and oppressively restrictive of the Amazigh culture. Mecca Cola. State propaganda. opened in Amsterdam. The Dutch Ministry of State ordered that the Muslim schools be placed under close supervision by the official Schools Inspectorate.islamicpluralism. At the same time. In addition. The situation of Dutch Moroccan youth is illustrated by publicity in the monthly magazine Mzine. with an elaborate hijab. may often include provision for corporal punishment and anti-Western 161 In November 2008. Hema. as we ourselves have observed. • by contrast. McArabia halal fast food (minced lamb in pita).CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 fundamentalist Muslims). halal baby food.eu . has announced that it will offer “Islamic finance” products in response to proposals for “interest free” housing purchases. Plasterk described the coverings as “disadvantageous to women” and liable to “make integration difficult”. El Hema. modernist. and Sufi-oriented. and that is overwhelmingly moderate. while the quality of education in half of them was considered “weak”. most remarkably. CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. which is published in Dutch. a doll produced in Syria. both for girls and visiting mothers. Secretary for Education Ronald Plasterk of the Labor Party proposed162 that the abaya or burqa and niqab be banned from primary and secondary schools. A Barbie doll in hijab was a featured product.166 Other commercial considerations affect Dutch Islam. Muslims have taken note of the overproduction of halal meat in the Netherlands.163 the Dutch Ministry of Education alleged that 86 percent of Islamic primary and secondary schools had engaged in financial fraud by submitting fake bills.164 The Commission for Equal Treatment is an official anti-discrimination agency comparable to such agencies in the U. Rabobank. for work that was not accomplished. the periodical features such Islamic consumer products as alcohol-free cosmetics. Moroccan Muslim youth in the Netherlands therefore reproduce the widelydescribed paradigm of a new generation caught between competing influences. and unauthorised student trips. with the Islamic butchering industry having become a source of export income for the country. Aside from the disaffection visible in the murder of Van Gogh and threats against Hirsi Ali. and discussion of the headscarf and wearing of jeans.. These include: 88 • a dominant Moroccan Islamic tradition legitimised by the Moroccan royal authorities. as well as debates on fundamentalist Islam and advertisements for Muslim recruitment to the Amsterdam police force and the Dutch army.160 The public schools in the Islamic “pillar” have also been strongly defended as an alternative to mosque instruction which. At the end of 2008. • and a Dutch popular culture that seeks to minimise foreign religious and ethnic loyalties among immigrants.165 In 2007. Halal Barbie. The increase in the number of disputes about these subjects which are being submitted to the Commission for Equal Treatment (Commissie Gelijke Behandeling) illustrates this development”. in contrast with a rating of “weak instruction” for only 11 percent of nonMuslim schools. an art experiment representing an Arab-oriented version of a Dutch department store. and. A second El Hema operated in Rotterdam at the end of 2008. school transportation.

where no such elaborate efforts have been made to include Muslims in special official structures. it is frequently asserted. the influence of the Moroccan government stretches so far that the imams immediately pack their bags when Rabat [the Moroccan capital] calls upon them”. While reliable statistics are unavailable. Within the Dutch-Moroccan community. The Dutch government recognises a Contact Body for Muslims and Government (Contactorgaan Moslims en Overheid – CMO) as a representative of Muslim interests. as well. Members of a community group. “I’ve been told that they were recalled for instructions. the Cooperative Union of Moroccans in the Netherlands (Samenwerkingsverband van Marokkanen in Nederland or SMN) complained about this action. UMMON).eu 89 . occupies a place in the Moroccan diaspora in Holland similar to that of the DİTİB in the Turkish communities abroad. and in our view credible. Berber immigrant demography reflects the reality in the country of origin. in that the former is subjected to considerable public scrutiny as an expression of “dual loyalty” among DutchMoroccan Muslims. It is unacceptable that Morocco interferes this way with Moroccans working in the Netherlands. “The imams get paid by the mosques. as an extraterritorial religious authority. and the Imams’ Association of the Netherlands (Vereniging Imams Nederland. For example. have no independent state territory. (Kurdish flags are seldom seen in Germany or CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. an agency of the Moroccan government. and is associated with the fundamentalist Pakistani-Deobandi interpretation.168 some 40 imams were suddenly called back to Morocco for consultations. A lot of them do not want this. but the CMO is viewed by moderates as pro-Shariah. As described in our Case Studies: France and Spain.islamicpluralism. the role of the MIB is also a source of dissension between Moroccan Arabs and Berbers/Amazigh. and Spain. France. while no such attention has been focused on Dutch-Turkish Muslims. MIB imams in the Netherlands are exclusively Arab. which maintains the Taiba Jama mosque in Amsterdam. but have adopted a national flag that is displayed in Muslim communities in the Netherlands. CMO comprises. Similar comments were forthcoming from Dutch non-Muslim politicians of both left and right. Some Dutch-Moroccans complain that involvement of clerics in the Netherlands with the Moroccan authorities interferes with Dutch-Moroccan Muslim religious life. even when serving Berber congregations. Labor Party legislator Jeroen Dijsselbloem said. that at least half of Moroccan Muslims in the Netherlands are Amazigh from the Rif mountain region. a similar or greater Berber demographic representation is probable among French and Spanish Muslims. but especially from those in Germany. in being more extensive and expensive. somewhat like Kurds in relation to Turks. the World Islamic Mission (Stichting World Islamic Mission Nederland).Institutionalisation of Shariah by non-Muslim Governments —“Parallel” Shariah CIP (2) Institutionalisation of Shariah by nonMuslim governments (“Parallel Shariah”) “Pillarisation” in the Netherlands differed significantly not only from policies in Britain. But Moroccan and other Muslims in the Netherlands also complain that a double standard is visible in the differing treatment of the MIB and the DİTİB. a Surinamese-Indian grouping. training of clerics for service in Dutch mosques is paid for by the government.167 In a model similar to that of “pillarisation”. In all cases involving Moroccans in Europe. in October 2008. However. Berbers/Amazigh. The Moroccan Imams’ Union (Marokkaanse Imam Bond or MIB). VIN). SMN director Farid Azarkan declared. CMO includes Milli Goruş. Madeline van Toorenburg of the CDA condemned the action as evidence that the Moroccan government exercises undue pressure over Moroccans in the Netherlands. the Union for Moroccan Muslim Organisations in the Netherlands (Unie voor Marokkaanse Moslim Organisaties in Nederland. they want to integrate”.

such as the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). Berbers also do not practise FGM. the Dutch government has assumed a posture identical to that of the German federal power in calling for the establishment of a single Muslim organisation. the Contact Group Islam (Contact Groep Islam — CGI) brings together the two main heterodox Muslim tendencies in the Netherlands. Deobandi. In October 2007. CMO and CGI each maintain their own media enterprises: CMO manages the Dutch Islamic Broadcast Organisation (Nederlandse Islamitische Omroep — NIO) and CGI member group NMR runs the Dutch Muslim Broadcasting Service (Nederlandse Moslim Omroep — NMO). claiming the mantle of Sunnism. France. the Media Commission (Commissaariat voor de Media — CvdM). that the Netherlands could adopt Shariah as law if twothirds of its parliament voted to do so. to have one “telephone number” as a means of reference for non-Muslim leaders. Berbers may commit so-called “honour” murder in North Africa. Unfortunately. and Spain. the Lahori faction of Ahmadiyya and the Alevis. however. anticipated similar debates in Britain and Germany. a similar trend toward homogenisation. but Alevi and Ahmadi personnel were reportedly expelled from NMO. An alternative to CMO. Kabyle Amazigh. and heterodox spiritual and ethnic communities like the Alevis and Berbers. But Berber customary law denies traditional Islamic rights of inheritance and division of property to divorced women. In addition.) Finally. Berber customary law does not produce so-called “honour” murder in Europe.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 the Netherlands.170 Donner’s remark did not refer specifically to either a special legal system for Dutch Muslims. or. to simplify relations between non-Muslim authorities and the Muslims. is visible in France and Spain. Donner commented somewhat insouciantly. and other fundamentalist groups. with other small entities. Dutch Justice Minister Piet Hein Donner. that Shariah could be imposed on CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. like Kurds. Nevertheless. representing the CDA. Although a systematic analysis of Berber legal systems remains to be completed in the West. two years in advance. the Berber attachment to customary law could represent a bulwark against the penetration of Shariah agitation among Moroccan and Algerian Muslims in the Netherlands. are especially known for their dedication to their own customary law.169 Dutch media stated that the subversion of NMO was a product of a policy decision by an official monitoring agency. in a magazine interview. was corrected early in 2009 following a court order. The goal is.eu . as cited in Case Study: Germany above. the Centre for Islamic Pluralism condemned the reported seizure of NMO by Islamist radicals. as in Germany. which may seem positive to immigration experts but which we consider an obstacle to the defeat of radical Islam. rather than Shariah. NMO was previously run by Dutch members of the Alevi movement. and the report of the supposed takeover. In a marked and promising contrast with Kurdish customary law. and also included representatives of the Ahmadi sect. such a requirement ignores the substantial differences between Wahhabi. but in Europe they have imported traditional procedures for reconciliation. as numerous Islamophobic commentators suggested. except at political demonstrations. uniting all groups. Subsequent investigation by CIP in the Netherlands indicated that the charge of such expulsions was unfounded.islamicpluralism. which originated with the Dutch Nova TV network. including the Council of Moroccan Mosque Organisations in the Netherlands (Raad van Marokkaanse Moskeeorganisaties Nederland — RMMN) and the Netherlands Muslim Council (Nederlandse Moslim Raad — NMR). according to our informants. Late in 2006. had provoked an uproar that. which dictated that NMO be 90 combined with the “orthodox” NIO so that Muslims would have a single broadcast service in the Netherlands.

the Rotterdam Essalaam mosque has attracted opposition from local Muslims as well as non-Muslims. Dow Jones International News pointed out that the proposed law would ban Islamist parties. Finally. Dr. introduced legislation banning any political party with doctrines inimical to the Dutch constitution. Such rhetoric was identical to similar exaggerated claims made by radicals in England. which were already legal for female prison employees to wear.islamicpluralism. instead of putting forward the opinion that such conceptions could become part of our democracy”. although none exist openly in the Netherlands. Donner’s intention in 2006 was defended by one of the leading scholars of Islamic studies in the Netherlands. as a means to advance integration. It is. the murderer of Theo Van Gogh. in contrast with subdued Muslim interest in Shariah in the Netherlands. Donner argued that a standard headscarf would be safer than individual headscarves. had asserted that in the future.Institutionalisation of Shariah by non-Muslim Governments —“Parallel” Shariah CIP non-Muslims as well as Muslim subjects. As is the case with the Merkaz megamosque proposed for London (with a site near the Olympic Village serving the 2012 Games). however. In Rotterdam. The same news service recalled that Bouyeri.e. Annemarike Stremelaar of the Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World (ISIM) at Leiden University. not long after his Shariah controversy. shared by Islamophobes and Islamists. Donner had provoked an outcry in 2004 when he ordered that uniform headscarves be required for all female Muslim guards and related personnel in Dutch prisons. In addition.171 In 2007. But Donner also stated that he would be pleased to see Muslim extremists serve in the Dutch parliament. i. which is supported by the Deobandi missionary movement Tabligh-iJamaat (TJ) and is designed to hold 12. Muslim demonstrators have protested against the prospective control of the Essalaam mosque by CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. “The parliament will be renamed a Sharia court and the chairman’s gavel will fall to ratify Islamic [criminal] sentences”. and in both countries. Stremelaar. called on him to take a stand against Shariah. In the aftermath of Donner’s inarticulate statements. when interviewed by CIP researchers. especially large religious buildings like the projected Essalaam mosque in Rotterdam. to which Donner belongs. said Donner merely sought to widen “the space for accommodation of immigrants”. But his excursion into Shariah as an appropriate legal standard for the Netherlands was not his first involvement in such a dispute. following his admission of partial responsibility for a fire in a jail at Schiphol airport in which 11 immigrants waiting to be deported had died. Donner returned to high political responsibility as State Secretary for Piet Hein Donner Social Affairs and Employment. The CDA party.000 worshippers. according to the American legal idiom. Also like the London Merkaz mosque. the arguably ludicrous blandishments of extremists provided fodder for the fantasy. of a Muslim takeover. including those from his own party. and that he intended to warn against Shariah. “The Minister of Justice should dedicate his energy to combating these attitudes. the Rotterdam mosque has been promoted as the largest mosque in Europe. a reasonable accommodation. doubtful any structure in Western Europe will surpass mosques in European Turkey and in Russia in size. Donner later argued that he had merely engaged in a spontaneous meditation on the nature of democracy.eu 91 . as that of seeking a means to better integrate Muslims into Dutch society. Dr. which position he occupied at the time of the current study. Labor Party representative Joeren Dijsselbloem commented. Piet Hein Donner resigned from office not long afterward. greater problems have attended the construction of mosques. Dutch parliamentarians. Stremelaar pointed out that. he ordered adoption of the institutional headscarf.

Exclusivism is expressed through discrimination. as cited in Case Study: Britain. judicial CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. in Britain moderate Muslims argue that the number of existing mosques is sufficient for the community’s needs. professional associations. then they have overstepped the mark and are damaging the democratic legal order. into garages. Informal “prayer spaces” are often publically advertised. German policy experts have therefore encouraged the construction of mosques to remove religious observancy from semi-clandestinity. but do not exhibit minarets.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 the Dubai-based Al-Maktoum Foundation. as follows:173 “b. idiom as voluntary self-segregation. “poses no threat to that order as such. AIVD has put forward a reasonable and accurate summation of the problem represented by “parallel Shariah” – above all. although many such also exist in France and Spain. Parallelism does not recognise the authority of government. “In this light. below. AIVD declares “some forms of radicalism are permissible within the boundaries of the democratic legal order”. small commercial facilities. and Case Study: France. spreading false rumours or conspiracy theories. and similar private spaces. which would be described in the U. incitement and sowing hatred. Still.S. “• Using persuasion or intimidation to implement a Sharia-based legal system within a particular community or neighbourhood. that it will foster separatism and Shariah enclaves. if they are Muslim origin. Two extremes have developed regarding this issue. 92 “• Attempting to gain influence within political parties or other social organisations with a view to taking them over in the long term. bribery or. Islamic architectural features. branding them as traitors to the faith and their own community”. The AIVD intelligence directorate has predicted a new radical campaign in favor of “parallel Shariah”.174 “• Deliberately attempting to disrupt social harmony or to create tensions by. Stremelaar voiced the common argument for construction of new mosques. student bodies and consultative organs. homes. AIVD goes on to warn that “isolationism”. religious observances will be driven underground. or other markers facilitating their recognition by the non-Muslim public. including on the Internet. seeks to impose religious laws before secular ones and tries to create enclaves in which that system rather than government authority prevails. “• Attempting to influence political officeholders through intimidation. Tactics which are being considered: “• Attempting to gain influence inside political parties. above. drawing on the essentially pluralist principles of Dutch politics. for example.eu . the judicial system and other social organisations such as trade unions. “Under certain conditions. citizens retain the freedom – albeit within certain limits – to pursue their own lifestyle and to decide for themselves how they conduct their relationships with each other and with the government. In a democratic society. certain forms of intolerant isolationism do represent a particular threat: exclusivism in respect of one’s own group and parallelism. Dutch concern about such communal entities echoes commentary about “no-go” areas. while in Germany the proliferation of unofficial “prayer spaces” is especially notable. But if their withdrawal from society starts to endanger basic rights and freedoms of others. which is that in their absence. including by means of clandestine entryism. The Netherlands appears to be closer to the German example than to the British case. In pointing to the danger of “a Shariabased legal system within a particular community or neighbourhood”.172 Dr. expressing fear of excessive Arab influence as well as concern over an alleged lack of transparency in the mosque’s financial accounting.islamicpluralism.

Hasan K. because of a romantic relationship between Hasan K. Movisie. neighbourhood or wider Islamic community into certain forms of civil disobedience. In October 2008. The NCTB suggested that cooperation with such figures would bind them closer to the established system. In 2003. however. simultaneous with the acrimonious exchanges caused by his remarks on the permissibility of Shariah as a Dutch legal standard. that the Dutch monarch was accustomed to such a ban in meeting with Orthodox Jewish rabbis. survived the attack.175 Or when parallelism actually results in the imposition of an alternative system of justice”. in our observation. For example. not paying taxes. the case was motivated by an alleged offence to the honour of a daughter. where 17-year old Ali D.Approach to Women CIP intervention against these forms of isolationism is possible and the government can impose proscriptions.S. Afghan. Dutch official efforts to contend with radical activities by cooptation.) We view this attitude as dismaying and counter-productive. in accordance with radical Shariah. however. have not ended.) Ahmed Akgunduz. who claims inspiration from the Nurcu movement in Turkey. The family of the aggressor disapproved of the victim because the latter was considered of inferior social status in Turkey. Iranian.. of a shooting at a school in the town of Veghel. that unfortunately does not produce materials in English.’s sister. exclusivist isolationism leads to actual discrimination. although radicalism is. a substantial reportage in a local Dutch newspaper quoted a woman of ethnic Turkish origin. by her father. and stated that restrictions on the movements of females were observed among Turkish.islamicpluralism. on the pretext of “honour”. In 2006.eu . who has investigated so-called “honour” murder for a Dutch organisation. Pakistani. incitement and expressions of hatred. limited in scope. “Attempting to encourage people in the immediate vicinity. nihilism. vandalism or criminality”. Somali. hooliganism. a girl from the town of Almelo. rector of the Islamic University of Rotterdam. during a royal visit to a mosque in Den Haag. The latter habits recapitulate attitudes toward crime among Wahhabi Muslims in Britain and the U.176 the aforementioned National Coordinator for Investigation of Terrorism (NCTB) published a paper calling on the authorities to pay more attention to the preaching of Wahhabi radicals. (3) Criminal aspects AIVD has also reported “there are ‘peripheral’ groups which try to use their supposed Islamic radicalism to justify what simply could be characterised as escapism. has become known for his defence of wife-beating. and limit the influence of “more violent” Wahhabis (still referred to as “Salafis” in Dutch official discourse. and Surinamese-Indian residents.178 The article appeared soon after the shooting of 18-year old Zarife (family name undisclosed). Piet Hein Donner defended a Dutch imam for refusing to shake hands with Queen Beatrix. The existing radical Islamist agenda includes. and Ali D. 93 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www.177 (It might be expected. The problem of so-called “honour” murder among Muslims in the Netherlands has been dramatised by the writings and other public advocacy of Ayaan Hirsi Ali. Sezai Aydogan. Although the victim was a male. When. providing incorrect details when applying for a student grant or loan and withholding information from the police”. Aydogan at that time estimated that 20 so-called “honour” murders of girls occurred each year in the Netherlands. A large percentage of the Dutch Muslim prison population is reportedly of Moroccan origin. Aydogan’s interviewer described the impact in the Netherlands of the case. shot 19-year old Hasan K. according to the agency. based in Utrecht. for instance. in 1999. (4) Approach to Women Minor incidents and details in inter-group relations have caused considerable controversy in the Netherlands. removing children from school. as offering “useful criticism of Dutch society”.

since it emphasises separation of the sexes. She assembled and reviewed a significant number of case studies. was found to occur in nearly all Muslim communities in the Netherlands. (Balkan Muslims were. Belgium. then religion”. the Netherlands. In 2005. a Turkish-born male in his ‘20s. but the perpetrator.) But ACVZ could not quantify the incidence of forced marriage. Turkish and Kurdish organisations in the Netherlands launched a 94 national petition against so-called “honour” murder. ACVZ called on Dutch diplomats to act against forced marriage through scrutiny of immigration applications. but without publically separating out fatalities. and that the crime could be considered a so-called “‘honour’ murder of the wrong person”. through the Cooperative of Relief Organisations (Samenwerkende Hulporganisaties – SHO).eu . ACVZ called for Dutch adoption of legislation banning forced marriages. including Turkish. Clementine van Eck.182 Forced marriage has also gained attention in Dutch media. who also comes from Almelo. honour comes first. He asks himself how Turkish Muslims can claim that the Koran requires you to kill your wife if she has an affair. significantly. and included the stipulation. People think twice before becoming involved with a young woman” if the latter is viewed as compromised in the Turkish value system. The Dutch authorities recorded 470 incidents of so-called “honour-related violence” in 2007 alone.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 Aydogan stated that while so-called “honour” murder may not be inspired by Muslim religious principles. like similar documentation elsewhere. titled Forced Into Marriage (Tot het huwelijk gewongen). CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. In 2004.184 The ACVZ study. and at the end of the same year. “Islamic society creates an atmosphere conducive to honour killings. France. above. Surinamese-Indian. the Dutch Advisory Commission on Aliens Affairs (Adviescommissie voor Vreemdelingenzaken – ACVZ) issued a report.islamicpluralism.181 The centre was duly established. However. Iranian Kurdish. ACVZ disclosed that forced marriage. As in the UK.179 Van Eck acknowledged that so-called “honour” murder occurs in Turkey at the rate of six per month. “Some honour killers are aware that Islam does not condone honour killing. she wrote. considered the alleged dishonour to be a product of conduct by the victim and her friends. Van Eck thus made an important point: “Honour killings of third parties are rare. 25 EU countries met in Rotterdam to confer on problems of forced marriage. pious Turkish Muslims do invoke their faith when committing an honour killing”. had registered a marked increase in the number of case reports. The petition was signed by Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Nebahat Albayrak.183 The following year. Somali. but is also found in Germany. But it also supported the model seen in British interventions in Pakistan and specific emulation of the British government’s Forced Marriage Unit. Sweden. A 2003 study by a scholar at the University of Amsterdam. based on a pilot project in Den Haag. Moroccan. and Afghan people. According to the psychologist’s report in the [Kemalettin] Utlu case study: ‘Utlu broods over the Koran. Van Eck noted that in the Utlu case the victim was not the original target. the fear of being killed is very real.’ ” Kemalettin Utlu. FGM. as in other cases. among other political figures. and domestic violence. offered a distinction between forced and arranged marriages. like so-called “honour” murder. killed the female friend of his teenaged girlfriend after the latter had an abortion. Nevertheless. as described in the Case Study: Britain.180 A plan for establishment of a national response centre to deal with so-called “honour” murder was announced in 2007. Citing a particular case by the name of its perpetrator. the last presumably non-Muslim. “Although the sharia (Islamic law) neither prescribes nor condones honour killing as carried out among Turks. based on the presumption of consent in the latter. thoroughly analyzed the phenomenon among Turkish Muslims. It doesn’t say that anywhere in the Koran. as well as among Chinese. and Denmark. Kurdish. apparently free of the problem. many victims were schoolgirls.

nisnews.. with Turkish-Moroccan marriages becoming commoner. cit. 154 Vermeulen. “Crisis around new mosque deepens”. July 11. Leiden. September 11. 100% Business”. and Sport observed that no proceeding in an FGM complaint had yet been undertaken in the country. 2003. May 2008.islamicpluralism. while Muslim-Muslim marriages remained a norm. In addition. “Parliament Asks Dutch Min[ister] To Defend Remark On Islamic Law”. 172 Unsigned. but had come under the pressure of social disapproval. The Amsterdam Times. “Burqa and nikab banned from higher education”. 2008. The Amsterdam Times. 163 Unsigned. when traveling to their native lands. and Hindus. “Lespakket zou te weinig ingaan op de angst die er bestaat voor de islam . “100% Halal. 162 Unsigned.p.nl/ 170 Unsigned.186 At the end of 2008. and Ethiopia.. Pakistanis. and that the Dutch Ministry of Health. 2006. Aaldert. 174 “Entryism” is a political-ideological term dating from the 1930s and referring to infiltration of hostile organisations by operatives with a concealed agenda. 152 Unsigned. op. 2004. the city of Amsterdam initiated a special research project on forced marriage. working with local Islamic groups. The Netherlands]. November 13. ethnic identification had declined in significance. claiming FGM had taken place in the Netherlands. Utrechts Nieuwsblad [Utrecht]. Mzine [Waalwijk.com. Amel. 155 Vermeulen. 2008. Salafism in the Netherlands. The Netherlands]. June 26. Ontwikkelingen na de moord op Van Gogh. n. October 31. The practise of FGM has not been notable in the Netherlands. 158 Vermeulen. 165 Bali.p. 153 Vermeulen. In February 2009 a Moroccan man living in Haarlem was arrested for the genital mutilation of his daughter. “Morocco recalls fifty imams”. 151 The Netherlands continues to control six islands in the West Indies (Aruba and the Netherlands Antilles) with small Muslim communities but little involvement in Dutch Islam. two Dutch anthropologists. October 31. “Negen op tien islamitische scholen sjoemelt met geld”. ANP. 2006. cit. reported187 that forced marriages had become noticeably less common among Turkish and Moroccan residents of Amsterdam. cit. May 19. April 10. Earlier in the same month. Peter R. including Somalia. 44 reports were submitted to child-abuse hotlines. The Radical Dawa in Transition. aged five. 161 Unsigned. ANP. n. 160 Van Soest. 2008. The Rotterdam Times.en Veiligheidsdienst – AIVD. “Vogelaar wil onderzoek onderwijs in moskeeën”. NOTES 149 European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia. Paul. be required to sign an oath to refrain from the practise. 2007. cit.. ibid. De Twentsche Courant Tubantia [Twente. Amsterdam. 2007. 157 Ministry of Internal Affairs and Governmental Relations. The Rotterdam Times. CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. 2004. at www. 2006. September 14. 169 Unsigned. 166 Unsigned. November 15. Arranged marriages were still found among Kurds. “Public Broadcaster in Hands of Radical Muslims”.p. “Geen hiërarchie in Grondwet”. Anne Frank Stichting.walidin. op. ANP. 150 Van Donselaar. and Rodrigues. Afghans were the only group in which the practice was effectively unchallenged. September 12. Muslims in the European Union: Discrimination and Islamophobia. op.185 and in 2008 Rotterdam. “Donner hekelt toon integratiedebat”. Algemeen Nederlands Persbureau (Dutch Press Agency – ANP). Sudan. October 13..’” De Twentsche Courant Tubantia. of the Free University of Amsterdam. Welfare. and Universiteit Leiden.Approach to Women CIP In 2007. Edien Bartels and Oka Storms. 168 Unsigned. “El Hema store opened”. Islamist “entryism” in Dutch parties and unions would vitiate any need for separate such entities under “pillarisation”. “WRR: stop islam-bashen”. Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestijding. Unsigned.‘Lespakket islam preek voor eigen parochie. with criminal penalties for violation of the agreement. launched a campaign against the custom. 2006. 159 Koopman. But another stated189 that the prosecutor in Haarlem said the authorities had no experience with such cases. One Dutch media source188 stated that in 2007-08. “Huiver voor islamitische zuil is misplaatst en on-Nederlands”. 156 Algemene Inlichtingen. Jaap. op. 2008. n. Dow Jones International News. 164 Salafism in the Netherlands. 2008. 167 The World Islamic Mission maintains a website at www. 171 Unsigned. November 28.eu 95 . 2008. 2007. 173 The Radical Dawa in Transition. [2007]. ibid. Labor Party State Secretary for Health Jet Bussemaker called for a regulation under which Dutch residents from countries with a high risk of FGM.

while U. 2009.nieuws. 177 Unsigned. Clementine. 2004. 183 Unsigned. ANP. Radio Netherlands Worldwide English. law only penalises crimes motivated by hate. 2008. “Luister naar wens radicale moslims’: Pleidooi in rapport NCTb”.islamicpluralism. Movisie maintains a Dutch-language website at www. cit. 2008. “Landen van EU pakken misbruik vrouwen aan”. “Landelijk expertise centrum eerwraak”. “Tot het huwelijk gedwongen”. December 13. 189 Unsigned. 179 Van Eck. 2005 181 Unsigned. February 7. 2008. ANP. 186 Unsigned. Henk. “Landelijke actie Turken en Koerden tegen eerwraak”. 2009. 176 De Haas. Amsterdam University Press. “Onderzoek naar gedwongen huwelijken in Amsterdam”. ANP.S. 178 Van Schuppen. November 29. “Netherlands: Man arrested for circumcising daughter”. 188 Unsigned. op.nl. Joost. “Fatale flirt: Lonkende blik kan al genoeg zijn om de familie-eer te schaden”. “Meer eerwraak door emancipatie vrouwen”. November 5. 2007. accessible at http://binnenland. 180 Unsigned. July 8. “Rotterdam vestigt aandacht Europa op huwelijksdwang”. October 10. 182 Unsigned. De Telegraaf [Amsterdam]. December 5. 2003. 2007. 185 Unsigned. March 8. 2005. February 7. De Twentsche Courant Tubantia. ANP. ANP. September 8. 2007. Purified by Blood: Honour Killings Among Turks in the Netherlands. ANP.movisie. Provinciale Zeeuwse Courant [Rotterdam]. 187 Unsigned.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 175 It should here be recalled that the Dutch and general European legal philosophy criminalises hate speech as well as hate crime.nl/ 96 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. May 14. “Gedwongen huwelijken steeds minder normal”. “Donner hekelt toon integratiedebat”. “Man arrested for genital mutilation”. ANP. 184 Unsigned.eu . March 2. 2003.

France underwent the shortest period of Arab invasion.e. Case Study: France CIP 7.7. prior to the substantial penetration of the Muslim countries by European colonialism (rather than Crusader campaigns). i. French Polynesia. extending from 711 to 1492 C. but its collective memory includes Muslim defeat at the battle or Tours in 732. Spanish Arab literary influence in the development of troubadour poetry and Provençal courtly life.eu . and Portugal. took place in Portugal and continue to evince a visible impress on the society. unlike the North European countries of Britain. is one of four Western European nations. Of these four. that. 97 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. Paris still governs overseas départements and territories (the “DOM-TOM”. the Caribbean islands of Martinique. this is the largest Muslim share of population in Western Europe. with Spain. or Islamic West). Germany. and Réunion in the Indian Ocean. as well as other islands in the Indian Ocean. Similar developments. North African immigration to France began in the aftermath of the first world war. in response to labor shortages in the metropole. although less studied. Spain has the longest and deepest legacy of Muslim occupation. and the Netherlands.islamicpluralism. Italy. and political alliance in the 16th century. Total functioning mosques are currently estimated at around 1. especially Morocco and Algeria (the core of the region known as the Maghreb. and territory in Antarctica. Guadeloupe. Martin (shared with the Netherlands). France controlled a number of majority-Muslim foreign possessions until recently (such as the Comoro Islands in the Indian Ocean and Djibouti in the Horn of Africa). Guyane in South America.600. military.E. Demographically. The intellectual heritage of Southern Italy was transformed by Arab rule. the very great majority of French Muslims are migrants and their descendants. France today includes between four and six million Muslims. North America. and the commencement of a FrancoOttoman commercial. originating from North Africa. While some of these overseas regions include Muslims who are considered French citizens but contribute to Islamic immigration into the metropole. and Italian life was profoundly altered again with the rise of Ottoman-Venetian trade after the fall of Constantinople in 1453. the activity of Muslim merchants and shepherds from Spain in the country. Case Study: France Introduction France. had direct experience with Islam. and St. from the eighth to the end of the 13th century. comprising up to 10 percent of its population. and from the former French colonies in West Africa and the Comoros.

but has yet to carry out actions in France itself. and many in the late 20th century came to Britain with a commitment to a general “British Commonwealth” identity (sometimes legitimised by recognition of Commonwealth passports). an important factor in Algerian immigration to France has been the impact of the “second Algerian war”. and East African Muslims moved to Britain. produced another entity. even against aggressive government prosecution. the claim is often heard. Indian. Chad. Algerian refugees from such atrocities are therefore active in France. although doubtless sincere. In France. as are the formerly French-ruled West African nations of Guinea. Bangladeshi. Finally. and continue to do so. but has maintained a tenacious presence in France. and Niger.. the Armed Islamic Group (generally known by its French initials as the GIA). Algerian and Black African supporters of this movement are present in the metropole but function in deep clandestinity. and Mauritania. some of whom.eu . Pakistani. and (very few) Balkan Muslim immigrants. because of broad economic and social relations between the empire and the former colonies. many Muslim immigrants arrived in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of French rule in countries like Algeria. Turkish. is designated a terrorist group by the U. Sénégal. formerly known as the Salafi Group for Calling to Religion and Combat (al-Jamaa asSalafiyya li Da’wa wa’l Qital – French initials GSPC). was often based more on necessity than sentiment. by contrast. While reliable statistics on their population are unavailable. Black African Muslim countries of Mauritania. Mali. which aligned itself with the former regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. The main combat group within the broader fundamentalist movement in Algeria. France has also attracted Pakistani.islamicpluralism. as well as Iranian exiles. France has experienced significant outbreaks of urban violence involving youths of Maghrebi and Black African background. in turn. Morocco is a global centre of Sufism. may define themselves as ex-Muslims. These are known as “banlieue riots” because they originate in the Parisian and other suburbs (“banlieues”) mainly occupied by Maghrebis and Black 98 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. and along wth a small representation in the Netherlands. while also penetrating the sub-Saharan. their interest in becoming French. Yet a major distinction should be observed. from 1991-2000. The controversial Iranian Marxist anti-government group People’s Mujahidin (Mujahidin-e-Khalq – MEK). many of them presumably born in France.S. Mali. are divided between Arabs and Berbers. like other Maghrebis in Europe. An unknown but large number of French Muslims of North African and African origin are affiliated with powerful Sufi orders. as in the Netherlands and Spain (see following Case Study) that Berbers constitute the Maghrebi majority in France. as in Germany.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 The Maghreb Maghrebi immigrants to France. We have described Britain and France as the two countries in which the European colonial heritage most definitively influences the pattern of Muslim immigration. The GSPC has. including raids and related actions to restrict or expel it. “Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb” has continued its terror activities in Algeria. in which Islamist extremists influenced by Saudifinanced Wahhabism carried on a terrorist campaign confronting the Algerian government and against ordinary Muslims. been retitled “AlQaida in the Islamic Maghreb” and has drawn some recruits from Morocco. and were stigmatised in their countries of origin as “harkis” or French collaborators.

banlieue discontent is more widely blamed on discrimination in employment and lack of other opportunities for upward mobility than on religion-based ideology.7. At the same time. Kamel Kabtane. While media reporting outside France has sometimes hastily traced the resentment of banlieue youth to a conflict between Islamic identity and the French constitutional principle of laïcité. While the Dutch Muslim community is the most diverse in Western Europe. who inherited his clerical post in Paris from his father. although children of Christian immigrants as well as ethnic French youth have also participated in them. The paradoxical nature of this debate illustrates the internal complexities of French Islam. reported to bear Algerian diplomatic status. and the rector of the Lyon Mosque (Mosquée de Lyon). into a single French identity in which they would be subordinated to an Arab Islamist interpretation. which has been linked to Saudi financing. or strict secularism. some moderate Muslim leaders. if only for police. and a contrasting public pursuit of an Islamic state in the West. Boubakeur is an Algerian-born physician by profession. But some elements of “communautarisme” may prove indispensable for the defeat of radical Islam in France. and as described further below. issued a fatwa in November 2005190 condemning the riots and telling Muslim youth “it is formally forbidden to any Muslim seeking satisfaction and divine grace to participate in any action that strikes in a blind manner at private or public property or which may harm the life of another person”. however. the French Muslims are the most deeply riven by insurmountable rivalries. The Union of Islamic Organisations in France (Union des organisations islamiques de France – UOIF).S. French non-Muslim opinion has adopted as a watchword the condemnation of “communautarisme”. For example. Si Hamza Boubakeur. The French sociologist Olivier Roy192 has drawn a distinction between a personal “reIslamisation” in which believers displaced from their original societies to the West seek to deepen their commitment to Shariah in their daily lives. including the rector of the Grand Mosque of Paris (Mosquée de Paris – GMP) and former president of the now-defunct Supreme Muslim Council of France (Haut Conseil des Musulmans de France). Case Study: France CIP The banlieue riots of 2007 Africans. Dr.) Some nonMuslim commentators have even alleged that the banlieues have become “no-go” areas.191 Dr.eu . (In part. meaning the fragmentation of French society into different cultural and ethnic groups – somewhat as “multiculturalism” is currently assailed in the U. Based on the conflict between Roy’s conception of such a “re-Islamisation” and 99 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. criticised the action of the UOIF as a religious usurpation of authority regarding a civil issue. The main banlieue riots took place in 2005 and 2007. there is little empirical or official evidence to support such perceptions. The abolition of any form of “communautarisme” might submerge Kabyle Berbers/Amazigh. and is threatened by radical infiltration (although less than in the UK).islamicpluralism. Dr. Still. the ECFR and the Muslim Brotherhood. Boubakeur and Kabtane have been rivals but succeeded in forming a partnership in opposing the banlieue intervention of the UOIF. and are now Shariah districts. Dalil Boubakeur. who are now a bulwark against radical Shariah. this and other problems of social analysis are complicated by the ban on collection of religious statistics of any kind under laïcité.

like Alevis. AlQaradawi’s Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam was. including legal sanctions. During the hijab contretemps. a preparatory school. the number of poll respondents favoring “instruction in the history of religions” had fallen from 65 percent in 1988 to 57 percent in 2000. Schwartz’s command of French and knowledge of the French Muslim environment proved sufficient for Case Study: France to be completed.) In 2000. as previously noted. Although the investigation was less easily accomplished than in England. as in the Netherlands and Germany. for whom a “fiqh for minorities” [fiqh alThe banlieue riots. and other theorists. The CIP Survey of Shariah Agitation in France The CIP field survey of France was completed in November-December 2008 by Stephen Suleyman Schwartz. Germany. The French controversy over wearing of the headscarf by Muslim girls. Spanish) Muslims in that. typically and mistakenly referred to as a “veil”. the authoritative daily Le Monde reported193 on a poll showing changes in attitude about such issues in the previous dozen years. 55 percent expressed their opposition to special menus (e. for Muslim girls to be excused from mixed-gender gymnastics and swimming lessons. French Muslim children are therefore almost entirely educated in state schools. any rhetoric calling for a breach with laïcité is bound to provoke immediate reaction from the French political elite. and a school for training midwives. and the Netherlands. and “parallel Shariah”. but not always. calls for permission for the wearing of hijab were heard from Muslim parents. Further. In such an environment. It may be noted that construction of the Grand Mosque of Paris was completed in 1922 as an homage to the service of Maghrebi Muslims in the French army during the first world war. The rector of the Grand Mosque of Paris stated that while he would prefer the option of halal food in schools.islamicpluralism. “universal” Islam on the fundamentalist. banned.g. Shariah is a source of contention among French (and. should be called niqab. separatism. 100 (1) Family/schooling France possesses only four private Islamic high schools: two ordinary high schools. distinguishes between the two. at present no such CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. the headscarf is properly called hijab. although the integration of religious materials into history classes had been effected in 1996. and other issues of conduct in public schools. Also as the century ended. mainly because of the strong commitment of the country and it institutions to laïcité. the moderate position of Dalil Boubakeur was articulately expressed. Roy himself admits that “re-Islamisation” requires a purified. have rejected Islamic law in favor of customary law. a veil. and 72 percent were against authorised absences from class on religious holidays. along with demands familiar in other European countries. even when it does not command immediate defiance of the legal order in France. stripped of local culture and civilisational components. Given that in accord with laïcité any form of religious instruction was barred from French schoolrooms. we judge this distinction to be artificial.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 the arguments of Yusuf Al-Qaradawi. Taha Jaber AlAlwani. as we shall see. covering the face. “re-Islamisation” implies radicalisation. historically. In the present Islamist ideological discourse. 2007 aqalliyat] leads to the expansion of Islamic territory. was the first debate over an element of Shariah in the West to gain worldwide attention. French journalistic and political discourse sometimes. halal food) in school cafeterias.eu . Wahhabi model. (While the fatwas of Al-Qaradawi and the ECFR are printed and sold in France.) The Historical Background: Emergence of Shariah as an Issue in France Public advocacy for establishment of Shariah as a legal standard is almost unknown in France. known in French as a foulard or scarf. In the latter year. Berbers. (As previously defined.

Finally.197 While these comments may seem digressive in a discussion of Shariah in France. they are significant in that Dr. known in the West as Averroës) that the sphere of rational awareness and that of spiritual awareness are separate. (Positivist philosophy is by no means widely popular among Muslims. But the existence of this sacred has a dual consequence: “2. in that my personality would have been confiscated by a religious authority… That did not prevent me from believing in my religion”. is to develop love for others”. The sacred also exists in the relations among humanity”. the police prefecture of Paris included only six recognised abbatoirs for such use.194 Further. Dr. Boubakeur specified. Boubakeur stated that there was no need for any change in the existing French laws on laïcité in schools. Boubakeur affirmed the belief of the Spanish Islamic philosopher Ibn Rushd (1126-1198. the Muslim child I once was would never have been able to receive an impartial education. The sacred exists in the relationship of man with God. “If not for laïcité. He declared. exercising a role unseen in any other Western European country. Dr.France: Family/Schooling CIP Above: the Grand Mosque of Paris. and an academic. Dr. if only because the production of halal food in France was complicated by the inadequacy of slaughtering laws and facilities. Dalil Boubakeur. Philippe Joutard. adding that laïcité promotes respect for the sacred. Boubakeur thus affirmed the position that we have underscored as that of traditional Shariah. Dr. the Catholic philosopher Philippe Capelle. “The way of Islam states that the believer must submit to the general laws [in a country of residence]… French Muslims must take account of their presence in a nonMuslim context”. “the most urgent problem in the question of religious instruction. He further wrote. Boubakeur wrote in 2003196 in firm support of laïcité. and supported the positivist philosophy that motivated the establishment of laïque schools.islamicpluralism. Right: Dr. The sacred exists in humanity as well as in God. Dr. in 2002.eu . describing it as “an excellent thing” in a collection of essays prepared with rabbi René-Samuel Sirat. titled The Teaching of Religion in Secular Schools (L’Enseignement des religions à l’École laïque). he concluded his 101 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. Boubakeur argued against an essential division between secular and religious values in the lives of individuals: “a secular person can possess a favorable image of a religious person and a good religious person can view laïcité in a positive light and his send his children to the laïque school”. Dr. for example.195 Dr. Boubakeur has borrowed three principles from the Jewish philosopher Emmanuel Lévinas: “1. Rector of the Grand Mosque of Paris measure was possible. Boubakeur is by far the most respected Muslim leader in France. in that the French Positivists are seen by many as responsible for the fall of the Ottoman caliphate [khilafah]). “3.

discussion of the headscarf began to occupy considerable space in French media. Education of Muslim youths in Catholic schools is an established tradition in many countries. which had banned hijab in universities for decades. as will be explained below. as well as a trend toward the “youthful” and radical fundamentalist simplification of religion. although Christian symbols such as icons and crosses are displayed within them. Le Courrier de L’Atlas. permits the wearing of hijab. 202 agricultural high schools. The president additionally declared his opposition to the inclusion of the Muslim celebration of Eid-alAdha. a Shariah issue. reported200 at some length that in French working-class neighbourhoods.619 ordinary high schools. if they wish”. Catholic schools in France comprise 97 percent of all private schools. but a reflection of past political influence over French law. and hijab remains forbidden. Many commentators. Boubakeur. French president Jacques Chirac pronounced198 his firm opinion against the presence of religious symbols in state schools. Some “modernist” Muslim women also defend hijab as a form of feminist security against harassment by men. similar to the improvised doctrines seen among British Muslim radicals and the “cool” Wahhabism noted in Case Study: The Netherlands. both Muslim and non-Muslim. But notwithstanding nonMuslim miscomprehension. Late in 2008 a community periodical popular among Maghrebis.eu . As with French public schools.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 remarks on education and laïcité in arguing. In December 2003. similar to participation in the banlieue riots. and therefore as innocuous in the long term. strictly speaking. interpret the adoption of hijab as a marker of identity. the publication of caricatures of Muhammad in Denmark. But CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. But Chirac said that students should not be penalised if they individually took these days off school. in 2007. with lively media coverage worldwide. and the Jewish observance of Yom Kippur. and that school examinations should not be scheduled in conflict with them. a phenomenon of which we also found empirical evidence in Britain. “We should make tomorrow’s citizen someone who assimilates the essence of the religions to live by the best of all faiths. Dr. Muslim parents were increasingly enrolling their children in Catholic schools. But we view the politicisation of hijab as a dangerous tendency toward cultural separatism. mothers in hijab or niqab remained outside the Catholic facilities when their sons and daughters entered to begin school hours. 1. in the calendar of school holidays. this is not. and was not easily resolved. as well as kippot and large Christian crosses from state schools. The issue of the headscarf in schools provided a major test for the conceptions of Dr. These religious schools operate under contract to the state. A British television journalist predicted that the ban would be extended to turbans worn by Sikhs. (The four Islamic schools operating in France do not maintain contracts with the state. This may quickly transmute into religious separatism.020 at primary level. rather than an affirmation of religion. He has taken positions on controversies like that of Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses and. the feast of sacrifice at the conclusion of the hajj or pilgrimage month (known as Eid-alKebir in France and Spain and as Kurban Bayram among Turkish Muslims in Germany and the Netherlands). a statement that was interpreted as referring in the main to hijab. which is too convoluted to be easily addressed here. Boubakeur. however. but in February 2004199 the French parliament voted to ban hijab. is not an unequivocal figure. totalling 5. Chirac’s comments led to demonstrations in support of hijab in France as well as in Britain and various Muslim lands.) A minority of Catholic schools. that reveal the dissonance in France between a commitment to free expression and laws against alleged defamation of ethnic and religious communities. especially since much reportage in French media recounted the similar political discord in Turkey. As 2003 gave way to 2004. and 576 high schools for professional training. although Chirac 102 also called for a ban on wearing of the Jewish kippah or skullcap by boys.islamicpluralism.

Kawthar also expressed satisfaction with the particularly strict rules of the Catholic institution: “The merest insults are punished. and eight percent declined to comment. field observation of Muslim attitudes in France shows a majority favoring traditional. in the UK journalistic style. we have a common vision of the educational goal”. in that it clearly distinguished between the traditional Shariah guidance calling for acceptance by immigrant Muslims of the laws and customs of non-Muslim lands to which they move. scholarly achievement. a bimonthly magazine associated with the prominent daily. such as fasting by children during Ramadan. originally seen in the U. 75 percent expressed their support for it.S. hooded sweatshirts [both of which are markers of gang culture.islamicpluralism. and 14 percent pronounced themselves French first (four percent declined to answer. without perceiving a contradiction between the two. Denis. sharing.eu . Catholic institutions are well-known in France for the elevated quality of their instruction.202 The poll contrasted notably with media efforts in Britain. and the success of their graduates in gaining access to prestigious higher institutions – making the interest of Muslim parents in them understandable. 103 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. while 22 percent believed themselves to be Muslim first. published a new opinion poll taken among French Muslims. said. 68 percent of respondents said that a strong hostility to Islam exists in France. On the question of laïcité.“Parallel” Sha ria h CIP Catholic educators. correctly argue that hijab has a separatist significance that is inappropriate in a Christian school where a hostile attitude toward Muslims is forbidden. rather than. some clothing styles are forbidden. and rigorous instruction. while 37 percent declared that elements of it could be applied if they were adapted to French law.Institutionalisation of Shariah by non-Muslim Governments . and even wearing jeans tucked into boots”.201 The school’s director. Only 17 percent claimed that Shariah should have jurisdiction in all countries. pointed out that the Catholic church and the Islamic community possess some common values. A Muslim mother of three children. Jean-Baptiste-de-la-Salle-Notre Dame de la Compassion. and is markedly reassuring as to the moderation of the French Islamic majority. in our view. a Catholic school in the historic proletarian banlieue of St. on the issue of Shariah. To emphasise. our research on this issue in Britain found Muslim opinion more closely conforming to think-tank surveys – i. Catholic schools also have an incentive to take in Muslim students to keep their enrollments at a level required for maintenance of their state subsidy. a neighbourhood known for ethnic conflicts.e. such as baggy pants. and now worldwide]. The poll found that 60 percent of French Muslims considered themselves both French and Muslim. moderate Islamic positions.) At the same time. we believe in a single God. 75 percent supported the traditional view of Shariah: 38 percent said Islamic law does not apply in non-Muslim countries. The poll in Le Monde des Religions appears reliable. now counts half of its students as Muslims. but which a person of another faith certainly will find in their own Book”. Most important. This aspect of French Muslim life was underscored at the end of 2008 when Le Monde des Religions. She specified that the values maintained by both Catholics and Muslims in France included respect for others. “We share the same values. Kawthar. simply asking the “up and down” or “yes/no” question as to whether Muslims were “for” or “against” Shariah in Britain. 17 percent affirmed varying degrees of opposition to it. showing around 65 percent of British Muslims opposed to introduction of Shariah as a separate legal standard. (2) Institutionalisation of Shariah by nonMuslim governments (“Parallel Shariah”) Notwithstanding the international media panic generated by the 2005 and 2007 banlieue riots. The Catholic schools adapt to certain aspects of Muslim life. Marie-Claude Tribout. “which we Christians find in the Gospels. and eight percent declined to answer. who was interviewed on this topic. and radical demands for the spread of Shariah.

Nevertheless. For example. In addition. Radical Islam can. a Moroccan national and general secretary of the UOIF. On its face. With its inauguration in 2001. But in our view. along with complaints about Dr. after two years of discussion. During the events leading to the full establishment of the CFCM.203 As the structuring of the CFCM proceeded.S. and the threat of a takeover of French Islam by Wahhabis. The aforementioned Kamel Kabtane. Denying that Moroccan diplomats had injected themselves into the mechanism. stated that Moroccan. and was so condemned by various non-Muslim commentators. the ECFR. on September 11. and in recent times their impact has been aggravated by the financial support of the Wahhabi cult in Saudi Arabia as well as the ideological encouragement of the Ahmadinejad regime in Iran. One may take comfort that radicals are a minority or become alarmed that they exist at all. and that only Tunisians had stayed out of the proceedings. laïcité does not apply to France’s overseas possessions. allowed various exemptions from the principle of complete separation of religion and the state. constitutional law was and remains intended to permit the unhindered development of religious life. Constitution. but responded to the same need of the nonMuslim authorities for “a single contact telephone number to handle Muslim issues”.S. in our view. This contrasts with the separation of religion and the state embodied in the U. only be defeated by the mobilisation of authentic Muslim moderates. whose spirit was always considered hostile to that of established Maghrebi Islam. the creation of the 104 CFCM appeared to represent a break with laïcité. rector of the Lyon Mosque. 2001. rival mosque leaders expressed other anxieties regarding alleged foreign manipulation of the process. Such reproaches. and to some extent appeared to influence the creation of its Dutch and German counterparts. the existence of overwhelming majorities favoring moderate Islam. which inherited and still observes German law on state subsidy for three Christian denominations and Judaism. which participated in the talks leading to creation of the CFCM while being aligned with Saudi Arabia. Dalil Boubakeur stood out for his objections to what he described as a bias in the consultations in favour of fundamentalist representatives. Algerian. while U. while permitting cooperation with religious charities and accommodation of religious requirements of American military personnel. which has been interpreted until very recently to forbid any involvement of government with religion. he charged that Algerians sought to maintain domination over French Islam. and of significant minorities embodying radicalism. with the growing debate over the place of Islam in French life. Boubakeur’s Algerian background. or to Alsace-Lorraine. may be interpreted differently. complained about the involvement of foreign diplomatic representatives in the consultations. even under the most secure republican governments. Radical interpretations of Islam have always existed. the CFCM preceded the foundation of the Dutch Contactorgaan Moslims en Overheid in 2004 and the German Koordinationsrat der Muslime in 2007. French laïcité has never been absolute. however. and the Muslim Brotherhood.islamicpluralism.S. French laïcité in great part reflects the heritage of the French Revolution and of violent political conflicts in the 19th century. along with accusations of personal CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. Threats by Algerian diplomats were also reported. preparations for full operation of the CFCM were accelerated by the terrorist assaults in the U. the French Council of the Muslim Faith (Conseil français du culte musulman – CFCM) as an organisation for liaison with the French authorities. and Turkish diplomats were all involved in the development of CFCM. to expect all Muslims to be moderate is unrealistic.204 Fouad Alaoui. which led to the diminution of church power. except in prevention of criminal activity under cover of religion.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 As in Britain. the French government decided to facilitate the emergence of a body.eu . the French authorities have repeatedly.

S. following the direction of Sarkozy.206 Boubakeur and Bencheikh have since become recognised as the main moderate Muslim leaders in Western Europe. A second legal case against Charlie Hebdo. with two vice-presidents: Mohammed Bechari.210 Dr.“Parallel” Shariah CIP ambition. five named by 1. As rector of the Grand Mosque of Paris (GMP). who is the current French president. Boubakeur was then replaced as head of the CFCM by Mohammed Moussaoui. Boubakeur was again named head of the CFCM in 2005. Boubakeur had warned that the elections as then conceived would result in a victory for the UOIF. Dr. grand mufti of Marseille.207 In 2003. CFCM has never advocated introduction of Shariah in France. while the “Moroccan” FNMF gained 20 and the fundamentalist UOIF 19. although Dalil Boubakeur provoked criticism from other Muslim moderates when. titled Non! l’Islam n’est pas une politique (No! Islam Is Not A Political Position). Boubakeur to recall his boycott of the CFCM elections.208 In the period preceding the vote. one of them grand mufti Bencheikh. also known in the U. of the RMF. viewed as pro-Moroccan. have been attached to Dr. voting for the CFCM was completed.. with Dalil Boubakeur placed at its head by direction of the government. in which he had denounced ideological Islamism. while the UOIF gained 13. and two outstanding personalities.205 But Dr. the Coordinating Committee of Turkish Muslims in France (Comité de coordination des musulmans turcs de France – CCMTF) obtained four. he was loudly criticised for this position. A letter questioning his attitude on this question was published in the newspaper Libération211 with the signatures of six well-known French Muslim figures. Others who criticised Dr. also associated with Morocco.islamicpluralism. 15 seats were taken by representatives of Dr. and the journalist Mohamed Sifaoui. still considered sympathetic to Algeria. with some additional works produced by French cartoonists. Neither participates in the ECFR. Dr. Boubakeur as its chief. The case against Charlie Hebdo resulted in the exculpation of the periodical. A second-generation French citizen and a Kabyle Amazigh by origin. The unelected CFCM comprised a wider executive of 16 members. Boubakeur and the GMP refused to participate in its new voting cycle. by then-interior minister Nicolas Sarkozy. Prior to that decision. Dr. most significantly the political leader Rachid Kaci. the FNMF one. Boubakeur included the philosopher Abdelwahab Meddeb. Boubakeur and the “federation” affiliated with his GMP. but most mosques were said to be directed by Moroccans. and the council was provisionally inaugurated in 2002. representing the National Federation of Muslims of France (Fédération nationale des musulmans de France – FNMF). and both have published major books. Boubakeur was joined in his position by Soheib Bencheikh. Kaci is a vociferously free-market oriented member of Sarkozy’s Union for a Popular Movement (Union pour une Mouvement Populaire – UMP) and at present a member of the Sarkozy administration. the Rally of Muslims of France (Rassemblement des musulmans de France – RMF).eu . he put forward an allegation of racism against the satirical weekly Charlie Hebdo for reprinting the caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad originally published in the Danish daily Jyllands-Posten. and supported by Sarkozy. Boubakeur through much of his recent career. and to treat the controversy over the Muhammad caricatures in a similar manner. with nine representing Muslim federations. In the final results. in which Dr. Algerians formed the plurality of French Muslims. and three were designated “independent” or “various”. and Fouad Alaoui of the UOIF. At the time. The signatories appealed to Dr. The CFCM elections were subject to several delays. but in May 2008 Dr.Institutionalisation of Shariah by non-Muslim Governments .209 He continued as president of the CFCM. in 2007. Boubakeur published a book of interviews. a split from the FNMF.500 affiliated mosques. In the third poll. received 20 administrative council seats. Boubakeur once more 105 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. The appointed CFCM leadership included Dr.

and TJ. which Kaci charged had favoured the radicals of UOIF and FNMF when it should have restricted their influence. Boubakeur has published several further books. grand mufti of Marseille. With Marseille having long been the main gateway for African entry into France.C. the latter not visible from the street. Boubakeur and Bencheikh alike refer to Saudi-financed fundamentalists as “Wahhabis”.islamicpluralism. Its maritime and cosmopolitan nature. Mosques. Identity among Marseille Muslims. and are closed except at prayer times. including The Challenges of Islam (Les Défis de l’Islam). Bencheikh’s situation is remarkable in that Marseille is a city with a strongly Islamic aspect. Soheib Bencheikh. In this way. a selection from Qur’an. illustrates the advanced nature of French Islam when compared with its other Western European rivals. In a minor victory for transparency.214 in which he referred to the CFCM as a “shipwreck”. they reflect reality: the global majority of antiradical Muslims call the Saudi agents “Wahhabis”. a historical review with appendices from classic Islamic poetry and other literature. Boubakeur. Kaci followed up this polemic with a second book. well-founded and even inspiring handbook of the ideological divisions within and broad problems facing French Islam. directed to a mainly non-Muslim intellectual reading public.212 Kaci has written in severe criticism of Sarkozy. Open Letter to Demagogues (Lettre ouverte aux demagogues).CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 supported the complaint. it is a brilliant. or rather prayer spaces. make it. founded in the 6th century B. which became a bestseller as a French paperback. has been yet more eloquent in his opposition to radical Islam and defence of laïcité. and North African banks operate branches on the main Boulevard d’Athènes. Bencheikh’s 1998 volume. rather than following the politicallycorrect Western academic habit of granting the bogus title “Salafi” to the extremists. France stands out from the other Western countries in that discussion of the future of Islam has focused on political writings of a high order. as recent arrivals. Muslim immigration to the city gives the impression of a natural tidal overflow from the Maghreb more than the kind of economically-motivated settlement seen elsewhere. issued in vest-pocket size and titled The Tolerant Qur’an (le Coran tolérant). including the manœuvres of UOIF. a stimulant of radicalism. distinctive Wahhabi beards. similarly failed in 2008. like Barcelona in the past. seem more an extension of the North African culture area than a core European city. has a front decorated with modernist star motifs and a minaret.000+ is Muslim. 106 Merchants in the small shops of Marseille’s Old Port (Vieux-Port) will often address customers in Arabic without bothering to find out if the visitor speaks the language. The very existence of a volume like Marianne et le Prophète. and often found at the end of long and difficult journeys.215 Among the French Islamic clergy. most interestingly. Dr. along with its old districts filled with narrow streets. but is also open only at prayer times. a quarter of its population of 825. do not have minarets. are often unmarked. Although now a decade old.eu . In a book titled The Republic of Cowards (La Republique des Lâches). Dr. not “Salafis”. FNMF. The Tabligh ud-Dawa mosque in the Old Port. might seem. But hijab and niqab are rare. although some men sport long. affiliated with TJ. and Muslim men from Black Africa are visible in their own traditional robes. Marianne and the Prophet: Islam in Secular France (Marianne et le Prophète: L’Islam dans la France laïque)216 takes its title from the female figure that officially symbolises the French Republic. by Greeks. Marseille is also one of the oldest cities in the western Mediterranean. and.213 Kaci lashed Sarkozy for his direct involvement in the creation of CFCM. but the example of Bencheikh shows otherwise. we may say that while British Islam is intellectually the lowest in intellectual quality in CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. and has an atmosphere of exclusiveness bordering on suspicion of visitors. to some non-Muslims.

He blames the division between such groups as the GMP in its then-form. a distinguished author on Iranian 107 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. although the latter has managed to extend its tentacles into the weakened environment of Balkan Islam. but which may.Institutionalisation of Shariah by non-Muslim Governments . in its attempted application. “the Muslims of France. In 2004. Yet outstanding figures like Dr.S. significant documentation has been published in France – more in the specialist and penological manner of the Netherlands than in accord with the sensationalist habits of British media. with the intervening rise in Saudi financing of radicalism. the cenacle of AlQaradawi. 2001 and their aftermath. Tariq Ramadan. especially among non-Muslims. the UOIF. This provides a lesson: the Islam of Bencheikh and that of. since he interprets laïcité as a protection of religion from government interference. has reproduced the anxiety common in the British and Dutch media about the role of Islamist extremism in crime and within prisons.S. finally. to mention its European “pop star”.“Parallel” Shariah CIP Western Europe (terrorism issues aside). the FMNF. French Islam stands highest. and laïcité are the most consensual principles. do not participate in the ECFR. his conception of laïcité is much closer to the noninterference of the state with religion in American constitutional doctrine (“neutrality”) than to the appearance of militant irreligion often seen in the French practice of “separation” of the two. in particular. the events of September 11. It remains to be seen which will. (3) Criminal aspects French public and expert opinion. But he goes on to condemn excessive simplification.islamicpluralism. and the growth of the Muslim Brotherhood. and extremist infiltration of correctional institutions. which has created a situation in which “only an archaic version of Islamic law has become accessible to all. cannot be directly investigated without special access to prisons. which CIP lacks. But Bencheikh declares. religious freedom. have a limited comprehension of their religion. enjoy greater influence in European Islam. A peculiar belief exists among many non- Muslims that Muslims are well-educated in their religion and that. as pluralistic as it is”. radicals have been deeply indoctrinated in the requirements of their extremist interpretation. the French sociologist Farhad Khosrokhavar. gains more intensive attention in Western Europe than in the U. Boubakeur and Bencheikh are seldom invited to international academic or clerical conclaves on the future of Islam. Bencheikh offers a sharply critical review of the political development of French Muslim leadership. coherent in itself and offering a global vision of things”. and common crime. He affirms. “today human rights. As in Britain and the Netherlands.. with its deviant interpretation of Shariah as a license for lawbreaking in non-Muslim lands.eu . the sharpening of rivalries between Wahhabis and their opponents. juristic. and alone in being capable of managing the whole of human society. We observe that such worry is based on conditions also present in the U. but we find that radical Islam as a pathology supporting common crime and gangs. information on the intersection of radical Islam. or political differences. represent two clear opposites. We judge that this analysis is now less apt than it was 10 years ago. As noted further here. He expresses regret that French public discourse too often stresses the latter rather than the former. produce “madness”. and. the ally of Al-Qaradawi. in the period anterior to the emergence of CFCM. He not only rejects the importation of Shariah as a separate legal standard for Muslims in France. Bencheikh’s volume underscores many points we have made in this survey. as noted. because of a lack of access to religious education”. and the French branch of TJ more on personal ambition than on theological. He partially blames this situation on the domination of academic specialists in French intellectual life. in their quasi-totality. Ramadan represents an especially retrograde position on the situation of women. or terrorism per se. Nevertheless.

eu . One named Omar blamed his bad situation in France on victimisation of Muslims worldwide. Bin Laden woke them up on September 11”. Muslim prisoners share a cell in Fresnes topics. a convert to Islam named Lionel Dumont.’ out of fear of the penal authorities associating them with these dangerous individuals.’ Fortunately my father felt they were not clean. Spain. I cannot have a child. UK. 323 paid as full-time employees. a French Maghrebi aged 34. as we shall see in the following study. The system included 513 Catholic priests (181 paid for their work). Nevertheless. which is a plus for them. He ascribed their approach to him as follows: “I was unmarried. Kamel. Avoiding the ‘bearded’ can begin very quickly”. including Dumont himself. and Russia. Prison activities by radical imams appear to be as problematical as in the U. the great majority of those detained avoid the Islamists. 267 Protestants (82 subsidised). the “Roubaix gang” committed an armed robbery and bombing in 1996.S. Israel. Khosrokhavar stated that a lack of imams was an obstacle in the struggle against radical Islam. Three Orthodox Christians and two Buddhists similarly served. he declared “In prison. had attempted to enlist him at a mosque in Roubaix. For example. because “to the degree that the detained have no access to the imam – and many among them complain about CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. and only 69 Muslims. expressing hatred of America. Other inmates who spoke with Khosrokhavar were more extreme. as well as because of their own reservations on the subject of this fundamentalist or extremist version of Islam. “Prisoners are in fact rather numerous in declaring themselves little interested in a thundering return to religion. marriage does not interest me. Omar stated. where he had gone to pray. and. who were mainly Algerian and linked to Al-Qaida. The group’s head.217 a thorough study of Muslims incarcerated in France. People must waken. Khosrokhavar quoted an interviewee. and 411 auxiliary chaplains. Khosrokhavar noted in 2003 that French prisons then counted 918 chaplains (aumôniers). love leaves me cold as does compassion… Everywhere is injustice. In the vicinity of the depressed northern city of Lille. Four of the group. and some dozens more were later tried in French courts. He told me to stop 108 going there and to pray for myself and my life… They sent others to commit various illegal acts in Afghanistan”. published Islam in Prison (L’islam dans les prisons). was sentenced to 30 years imprisonment in France in 2003..CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 Muslim prisoner studies Qur’an in jail. Most of them are even somewhat secular (laïcs)”.218 Kamel told Khosrokhavar that the group. They wanted me to place bombs… Their arguments were ‘we have to kill the yahud [Jews] and the kuffar [disbelievers]. although no figures were offered on Jewish personnel. were killed in a shootout with police. whom they often call the ‘bearded. who had “escaped” an attempt to recruit him into the “Roubaix gang” of terrorists.islamicpluralism. “I am ill. of which 30 were monetarily compensated. Some of his findings were counter-intuitive to the presumptions of Western media. with 272 part-time. according to Khosrokhavar.

Khosrokhavar has more recently estimated that half of French convicts are Muslim. when. of the need for moderate Muslim clerics in prison work. however. French Interior Minister Michele Alliot-Marie estimated the number of “hardcore” Muslim extremists in French jails at only 100.S. In 2003. At the end of September 2008 the European Union held a seminar in France on this topic. a brief attempt to establish permission for Muslim women to obtain driver’s licences with photographs showing their faces 109 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. other EU countries show Muslim incarceration rates to be disproportionately larger than the total national census figures. German. at which a manual on radical Islam for guidance of correctional officers. and covering of Muslim women in general has been the main item on the public agenda regarding treatment and abuse of Muslim women in France. has warned in a moderate spirit that radicals may avoid detection by not growing Wahhabi beards or evincing other signifiers of radicalism.219 Journalistic reportage warned that radicalism could support recruitment for terrorism. In a close parallel to problems seen in the U. was distributed. Among Berber women faces are almost never covered. 79 percent of Muslims who responded expressed their lack of agreement with the suggestion that wives should submit to their husbands. But Moulay el Hassan Alaoui-Talibi. and acquisition of radical literature.eu . disclaimed any such intention. at the same time 70 percent affirmed their support for “the veil”. who is in charge of Muslim chaplains in France. which are required in France.islamicpluralism. radicals and fundamentalists become their interlocutors”. also paralleling a similar issue in the U.000 inmates) are now almost entirely radicals who have appeared to fill a gap caused by previous neglect. niqab. long usage of such a mask leaves a tint on the flesh that has led Berbers to be called “the blue men”. during the “second Algerian war”.S.. while Berber men. based on numbers updated from Khosrokhavar’s survey in 2003. The EU manual on radical Islam in prisons. Like France. In the U. may protect their faces with cloth typically dyed blue. and National Prison Administration Director Claude d’Harcourt lowered the figure to 80. Still. indicated by Khosrokhavar. a fresh source of controversy. terrorists on the offensive in North Africa used France as a rearguard. The UOIF. with more than 95 percent serving sentences and the remainder awaiting trial. hijab. This dissonance may in some part reflect the argument among many Muslims that women’s covering is a voluntary act and a marker of identity rather than faith. and stated that France had 1. that the country’s recent total of 117 Muslim prison chaplains (out of 1. and Austrian governments. while we are critical of the exploitation of hijab in the interest of separatism and of a simplification of religion leading to fundamentalism. who work outside in windy desert environments. refusal of social mixing with non-Muslims (including in showers).155 terror suspects behind bars.France: Approach to Women CIP this – they tend to confide in whoever comes to them first… It is thus that often.S. But sources on these problems are contradictory.100 chaplains serving in 195 institutions.. as in the Roubaix affair. and 70 percent supported the legal ban on polygamy. (4) Approach to Women The internationally-reported debate over the headscarf. appeared when then-minister of the interior Sarkozy alleged220 that the UOIF would demand that Muslim women be granted the right to wear the “veil” when photographed for issuance of national identity cards. which far exceeds the 10 percent share of the general population we credit. it is currently estimated.. French arrests of Islamist radicals began in earnest in 1995. jointly developed by the French. which is not intended for public release and which we have as yet been unable to examine. In the previouslydiscussed Le Monde des Religions poll of November-December 2008. identifies such evidence of radicalisation as growth of the distinctive long and specially-trimmed Wahhabi beard. housing 63.

believed Muslim women were forbidden to work with men or to teach male children. who had two wives living in France with him. 52-year old Wahhabi imam working at the Al-Furqan mosque in the town of Vénissieux near Lyon in eastern France.000 Muslim women marched against gang rape and other abuses suffered by their peers living in the banlieue and especially in housing projects. which appeared impracticable no less than extraordinary. 23.000 to the victim’s family. It is enough for someone to speak a little Arabic to proclaim himself an Imam. France had also been shocked in 2002 when Hani Ramadan. a département near Paris. as she was known to the whole population. and aims of the 110 protestors.000 and a jail term of two months. The proposal was introduced221 by Jacques Myard. He was arrested and expelled from France. and occasionally violence impose their tribal and clannish interpretation of religion. some 30. intimidation. and declared that Muslim husbands were justified in beating their wives for adultery. was burned alive in 2002 in a cellar at Vitry-surSeine.223 The movement.224 Amara was later appointed a junior minister for urban affairs in the Sarkozy presidential administration.islamicpluralism. Stoning is never mentioned in Qur’an but has been assimilated into Shariah. considered a banlieue community. with punishment by a fine of €15. on grounds of violation of his professional status as a schoolteacher in promoting violation of human rights. in 2007. Thus the moderate Muslims – the great majority in France – do not see themselves in these Islamists. Jamal Derrar. a criminal offence that could not reasonably be associated with the faith of Islam. A Maghrebi woman. But the protest was extended to opposition of all forms of masculine aggession present in the banlieue. where he and his brother were born. The movement did not engage with Shariah per se. The article led to Hani Ramadan’s suspension and then his dismissal from his job as a high school teacher in Switzerland. Swiss law prohibits public school instructors from also exercising religious responsibilities. French Muslims were confronted in September 2008 by a project for criminalisation of all Islamic covering of women in public institutions and on the street. and an accomplice. that he favoured polygamy. So-called “honour” murder has apparently been rare in France. led by Sohane’s sister Kahina Benziane. Abd al-Qadr Bouziane. who described Bouziane as a “self-proclaimed imam”. Sohane Benziane. Soheib Bencheikh commented even more harshly. 2003 (International Women’s Day). as well as firing from his job as imam at the Islamic Centre of Geneva. “What is occurring in France is very serious. On March 8. by her former boyfriend.226 In 2004. Tony Rocca. except for its prevalence among disaffected youth in the banlieue. The crime scandalised the entire country. a specialist in Islam. a deputy in Sarkozy’s party representing Yvelines. CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. But the death of Sohane. Myard was criticised as an ultra-rightist for this scheme. while Rocca received ten years in prison. Derrar was sentenced to 25 years and ordered to pay €140.227 Bouziane.222 a Kabyle Amazigh. Lyon Mag. A 17-year old girl. entitled Ni Putes Ni Soumises. told a local periodical. brother of the academic Tariq Ramadan. which adopted the slogan “Ni Putes Ni Soumises” (“Neither Whores Nor Submissives”) mainly focused on gang rape.eu . These imams. among others. published an essay in Le Monde225 justifying stoning as a punishment for adultery. Fadela Amara. an Algerian-born. because of pressure. was considered the main Wahhabi figure in the Lyon region. and seemed guaranteed to produce a major new difficulty in relations between French Muslims and non-Muslims. experience. published a short book explaining the background. declaring. an action supported by then-CFCM president Boubakeur. stimulated mass protest by French Muslim women. the politicians have favored these men. 22. and Derrar and Rocca received prison terms. But because of their attitudes.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 covered ended with repudiation of the proposal.

111 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. stating that Islam was not involved in the matter. of the women’s rights group Safia. and a French-born woman. and widespread criticism of Dati. A court later found that the journalists at Lyon Mag had engaged in selective editing of the interview. the woman who performed the “operation”. When a girl wants to go out in public on her own.232 As 2008 ended.230 FGM. fertility. In a strange development. in that Shariah values other female qualities. leader of the ultrarightist Front National (FN). who have not been named in international press coverage. As of May 1.eu . or bear children out of wedlock. including Hawa Greou. known in French as “excision” and mainly practiced by Black Africans. Burkina Faso. 70. And Dati was nearly correct. 2009 the Muslim couple in Lille had not disclosed how they would proceed in their difficult situation. Defence lawyers claimed that the accused did not speak French or realise that “excision” is illegal in France. Côte-d’Ivoire.000 women were at risk of “excision” in the central-west French region of Poitou-Charentes.231 In 2008 a newspaper report claimed 1. Hadda Zouareg. a high court in Lille granted the man’s petition for annulment on grounds that he legitimately expected his bride to be a virgin. a Moroccan-born man naturalised as a French citizen. Jean-Marie Le Pen. They are afraid their daughters will sleep with whoever they wish. the moderates have no place to express themselves because the most extremist comments get the most media attention”. a woman of Maghrebi origin appointed to serve in Sarkozy’s government. a good character and disposition. French opinion was convulsed by a case in which state institutionalisation of Shariah and ill-treatment of women were apparently combined. as delivered in his Lyon Mag interview.000 potential victims had been cited in a 2004 investigation of forced marriage among Maghrebi and Turkish girls in France. however. The main reason for this may be that France is one of few countries in the world to actively prosecute perpetrators of this atrocious custom. the French parliament adopted a law against domestic abuse that was also intended to obstruct forced marriages.000 French girls were vulnerable. according to a governmental source.islamicpluralism. argued that the custom was not linked to Islam. Sénégal and Togo. She eloquently summarised the intention of many forced marriages: “The parents are afraid that their children will be lost in the Western world. A 1999 trial charged 30 defendants. But his status became more urgent after his comments on the status of women. above virginity. they threaten her with marriage. condemned the expulsion of Bouziane229 for what appeared to be no more than a “crime of opinion”. on that occasion. In March 2006. Rachida Dati. In April 2008.233 But the husband repudiated his wife on their wedding night.France: Approach to Women CIP Unfortunately. upheld the ruling. and Dati then reversed herself.228 The expulsion of Bouziane was based on a judicial order issued two months before the interview and originating with his suspected association with terrorist conspirators. In Lille. to which. This resulted in a wave of anti-Islamic rhetoric. lose their virginity before marriage. Bouziane’s involvement with terrorist activity or threat to the interests of the French state could not be proven.234 French non-Muslim opinion. has allegedly declined markedly in France. Parents from Mali were sent to jail for permitting “excision” in 2002 and 2004. as well as the Black African countries of Bénin. Their countries of origin were said to be Egypt. because of the woman’s lack of virginity. Forced marriage is also an issue in France.235 The same figure of 70. which has experienced a renewed influence of the Shafi’i school of Shariah that requires FGM. considered an extreme Islamophobe. responded to the case as an imposition of Shariah. intelligence. attacks on Muslim monuments. including religiosity “which takes precedence over anything else”. and a good family. were married. declaring the annulment annulled and the marriage legal. and he then returned to the country at state expense. including issuance of a fatwa supporting suicide terrorism in Iraq.

17 ans. February 22. Farhad. Rachid. Paris. 2008. Capelle.islamicpluralism. October 7. 2007. 2004. Paris. op. 207 Unsigned. Bouras. 2002. 2007. 2003.un accord au forceps”. 215 Boubakeur. December 21. Éditions des Syrtes. December 12. 217 Khosrokhavar. October 21. Taycir. Libération. Le Monde. 191 Coroller. “Meurtre de Sohane: 10 ans pour le complice”. 222 Durand. 193 Ternisien. and le Coran tolérant. November-December 2008. February 11. “Manual outlines Muslim radicalisation in prisons”. NOTES 190 Unsigned. Kaci. Dr. Entretiens avec Virginie Malabard. Le Figaro. Ouest France [Brittany]. May 14. 2002. Daniel. 2007. Dalloz. “Le Conseil français du culte musulman en assemblée constitutive”. Balland. 208 Unsigned. and Lamarki. 2002. which is permitted to Moroccans living in Morocco!”236 “They threaten her with marriage” (“la menaçant d’un mariage”) is a phrase that incomparably sums up the atrocious situation in which many young Muslim women in Western Europe now find themselves. Boubakeur expressed a preference for the attitude of Pascal over that of Voltaire. Unsigned. “Acting on the Outrage”. Messaoud. L’Est Républicain [Nancy]. 2008 220 Gabizon. 205 De Larminat. Paris. Xavier. 210 Unsigned. 202 Barbier-Bouvet. Libération. Abdelwahab. “Photos d’identité et voiles . 2003. Libération. “Nicolas Sarkozy souhaite modifier les modalités de l’élection du Conseil français du culte musulman”. “Culte musulman: le RMF obtient 43. Rachid. 212 Unsigned. cit. 213 Kaci. 216 Bencheikh. November 2008. This problem cannot be distanced from that of the abdication of responsibility by Muslim religious leaders who should act to strengthen marriage and families through mutual love. 2002. Jacky. 224 Amara. 2000. Ni Putes Ni Soumises. November 8. Grasset. 201 Ibid. Catherine. 2008. 2005. and Joutard. 204 Ternisien. Salvator. with the collaboration of Sylvia Zappi. Leila. Les Défis de l’Islam. Crumley. Desclée de Brouwer. Bruce. 218 Unsigned. Meddeb. Paris. 195 Ibid. stability. “‘Cette affaire a été traitée sans incident majeur’. “Ne succombez pas à l’islamisme”. “Le carnet de route de la Marche des femmes”. TIME Europe. “Les musulmans français et la citoyenneté”. Reuters. Associated Press. 214 Kaci. Le Courrier de L’Atlas is distributed in Morocco as well as in France. “Une nouvelle ‘affaire de voile’ en perspective?’. 1998. Sifaoui.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 Further. Philippe. René-Samuel. “La justice française sur la trace des filières djihadistes entre Europe et Asie”. Éditions des Syrtes. The title of this article was somewhat misleading in that while Voltaire was an admirer of Islam. 198 Canadian Press-Associated Press. 199 Wyatt. Globalised Islam. Le Courrier de L’Atlas [Paris]. immolée au bas d’une HLM”. 197 Ibid. Hannane. April 24. December 18. October 1. June 22. 192 Roy. Non! l’Islam n’est pas une politique. Rachid. respect. 2003. October 29. 2008. Mohamed. 2001. Le Courrier de L’Atlas. 112 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. Xavier. Le Monde [Paris]. 2003. Ganley. Dalil. 223 Unsigned. “Nouvelle barrière au sacrifice du mouton”. October 2. “Jacques Chirac dit non aux symboles religieux ostensibles dans les écoles”. 211 Achour. Cécilia.le flou de la loi”. Le Monde ses Religions [Paris]. “Ils ont choisi l’école catholique”. 203 Licht. Boubakeur. Dalil. November 2008. and legality between spouses – as dictated by moderate Islam. November 30. “Jailhouse jihad”. constate Me Szpiner”. 2005. 221 Harrath. 209 Boubakeur. Le Nouvel Observateur [Paris]. The Economist [London]. Babès. Paris. Flammarion. 2001. Le Monde.’ ” Le Figaro [Paris].24% des voix”. September 18. Soheib. 196 Sirat. Nadia. Lettre ouverte aux demagogues. March 8. 2006.eu . “Dalil Boubakeur – ‘Non à des élections favorisant l’extrémisme. 200 Ben Naser. “Nous sommes prêts à être des Voltaire de l’islam”. 194 Licht. “Les consulats algériens et marocains veulent peser sur la désignation des représentants musulmans”. 2008. 206 Ternisien. Daniel. Éditions la Découverte. 2002. Fadela. L’islam dans les prisons. Paris. “French headscarf ban opens rifts”. May 3. Xavier. BBC News. February 28. June 8. 2003. 2004. Jean-François. Marianne et le Prophète: L’Islam dans la France laïque. “Le silence assourdissant du CFCM dans les banlieues”. “Culte musulman . 219 Unsigned. Paris. La Republique des Lâches. Paris. 2002. Sud-Ouest [Charente]. September 16. “École — concilier laïcité et particularismes”. Libération. Philippe. Le Figaro. some girls now want to marry nonMuslims. 2003. Agence France Press (AFP). L’Enseignement des religions à l’École laïque. June 15. Le Monde. 2003. Elaine. Caroline. 2004. November 19. “L’UOIF appelle à l’apaisement”. Libération [Paris]. Astrid. Rachid. Dalil. “Sohane.

2002. “Le Charia incomprise”. “Considéré comme un imam trop bavard. The Washington Post. “Cinq ans de prison avec sursis pour avoir fait exciser ses filles”. 2002. 2004. April 21. Cecile.. cit. 229 C. 234 Ahmad ibn Naqib. December 19. 235 Levy. 230 Kaci.d. 2004. 2008.islamicpluralism. AFP. Sandrine. Sylvie and Cabut. op.’ ” AFP. La Charente Libre [Cognac]. Une coutume qui ne passe pas la barre”.gouv. at www. Libération. August 26. Le Monde. Baraille. “La France est un des seuls pays à faire des procès pour excision”. cit. Audrey. Libération.. “A Private Feud Turns Into a National Issue”. Le Temps [Geneva].G. March 18. “Mutilations sexuelles: un combat au quotidien”. Hani Ramadan sera licencié par le gouvernement genevois”. 231 Unsigned.fr/ 236 Unsigned. CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www.D. 2004. op. Frederic. “Ces jeunes filles que l’on marie de force”. “Dalil Boubakeur du Conseil français du culte musulman”. April 21. 225 Ramadan. Emmanuelle. 226 Michel. “No to Forced Marriages!”. “COUR D’ASSISES DE SEINE-SAINT-DENIS . 2004. Le Monde. February 5. AFP. “Le Pen ‘s’étonne’ de l’expulsion de l’imam Bouziane pour ‘délit d’opinion. Reliance of the Traveller. Chambon. Hani. 2008. January 14.. 228 Unsigned.France: Notes CIP second ed. 2002. M. 232 Carin. September 10.eu 113 .V. 233 Cody. April 17. 2005. 2004. February 26. 1999. Briet.Des peines de prison avec sursis pour les parents des fillettes maliennes excisées”. France Ouest.diplomatie. Edward. n.. December 26. Sylviane. 227 Unsigned. “L’ excision aux assises de Paris. May 18. February 3. 2004. 2004. “Baisse de la pratique de l’excision en France. mais le risque demeure”. “Les certitudes de l’imam de Vénissieux”. Lettre ouverte aux demagogues. Le Progrès [Lyon]. Le Figaro.

except that several important 114 Spanish autonomous regions also have official languages distinct from Castilian. • 335. • 40. an agricultural area with close geographical proximity to the strait of Gibraltar and North Africa. Muslim immigration first attracted Spanish attention in Catalonia in the late 1970s. An Islamic element in Spain’s main cultural heritage is powerful and undeniable. and the autonomías are not equal in status. as well as residents of the two Spanish-ruled cities on the Moroccan coast.000). Case Study: Spain Introduction Spain has a Muslim community of more than one million. the historic industrial and commercial centre of the country. Spain comprises 17 autonomous regions and two autonomous overseas cities (the aforementioned Ceuta and Melilla).E. when Moroccans and Black Africans were encouraged to come to work in agriculture.000 others.239 Of the leading countries of Western Europe.000 born in Morocco and 24.000 Algerians.237 counted the constituent elements of Spanish Islam in 2005 as follows: • 357.islamicpluralism.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 8. El islam en la España actual. educational. and German states in their political. The Spanish autonomías are roughly equivalent to U. taxing. Catalonia.000 Muslims in 2006.000 Sénégalese and Gambians. The largest concentration of Spanish Muslims is found in Catalonia. The remaining major areas of Muslim residence are Madrid.000 born in Spain or descended from families of Spanish nationality. Ceuta and Melilla. with about 250. and a shortage of local labor. but 332 prayer spaces. and nationalised subjects. José Luis Sánchez Nogales. and Galicia – all with their own linguistic identities – are smaller in size but have much greater discretionary authority than. or two percent out of a total population of about 45 million people in 2008. Islam is nothing new in Spain. the national capital and a growing economic power. In sum.238 In 2006. • 18. • 27. the national idiom. The designation of the Spanish Muslim dominions as Al-Andalus survives in the name of Andalusia. as well as significant industrial and commercial development. Spain had only 12 full-sized mosques. Spanish Islamic philosophy and mysticism deeply marked CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www.000. also with major agricultural assets. The Muslim invasion of Spain began in 711 C. the southern autonomous region of Andalusia (176. and Valencia (115. Spain is that in which the Islamic past has the greatest influence. the Basque Country or Euzkadi.S. and similar powers. for example Andalusia. with some 200. and Maghrebi rule over parts of the country did not end until 1492.eu .000 Pakistanis.000). A reliable if controversial study published by a Catholic priest.

in contrast with the rest of the Iberian peninsula. along with Spanish rule in the former Spanish Sahara and present-day Equatorial Guinea. the role of Morocco as a neighbour has consistently affected Spanish history. Thousands of combatants in native Moroccan colonial levies (tabores) played an important psychological role in the ranks of Generalísimo Francisco Franco’s military rebellion against the second Spanish Republic. to Catalan entrepreneurial dynamism. Moroccan Islamic authorities supported their action by declaring the struggle against the Republic a jihad against irreligion. Gran Via. Málaga (© Sochor) Christianity in the country. continued until the 1970s. since that principality was the first territory recovered from the Muslims. from interchanges between the differing religious cultures in AlAndalus to the persistence of Muslim literary inspiration in the reconquered and re-Christianised provinces. since the Republic was politically and socially secular. Although its frontier with Spain is also maritime.eu . having lost all its American and Pacific Ocean possessions by the end of the 19th century. The large Muslim presence in Catalonia today represents an apparent paradox. Although their story is less well-known. during the civil war of 1936-39. mainly in the east.) The close links between Catalonia and the rest of Europe that began at the time. may also be credited. Spain. along with maritime trade along the Western Mediterranean littoral. long after the expulsions of Muslims. by the Franks in 801. when it was designated the Marca Hispanica or Spanish March. (Asturias was the only Iberian region never conquered by Muslims. Muslim believers continued to reside in the country under special legal agreements until their final expulsion in 1614. Granada Muslims outside the Assalam Mosque. attempted to regain its position as a colonial power by occupying northern Morocco in the first third of the 20th – an enterprise that. the Great Mosque of Córdoba The Mosque. around 115 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. Barcelona La Mezquita.240 Descendants of converted Muslims remained in some areas of Spain.islamicpluralism.8. Case Study: Spain CIP Mosque.

enjoys good relations across the Strait. Morocco. radical elements on the Republican side argued that a declaration of the liberation of Morocco from Spanish administration would support the anti-Franco cause by undermining the loyalty of the tabores. In the carnage.eu . A Palestinian Arab Communist. But such a measure would have met with considerable dismay by the French government. The first major Islamist terrorist action in the West following the atrocities of September 11. Algerian. Sidki left Spain after realising that only the Spanish anarchists – who viewed the Islamic global umma as a universal area of rebellion against oppression – and the anti-Stalinist Workers Party of Marxist Unification (Partit Obrer d’Unificació Marxista – POUM). Spain occupies a number of small territories on the Moroccan coast. which many citizens and foreign observers expected would be won by the conservative Popular Party (Partido Popular – PP) of José María Aznar. mainly the cities of Ceuta and Melilla. much leftist propaganda about the role of the Moroccans in Franco’s ranks assumed a racist character that today would be called Islamophobic. between Spanish king Juan Carlos and Moroccan king Mohammed VI.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 1. as well as the Catalan nationalist left. 2004. and Syrian Muslims. Sidki was. The explosions occurred only three days before voting in Spanish national elections. Spanish Muslims vote overwhelmingly for the Spanish Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español – PSOE) currently led by president (prime minister) José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. In addition. Nayati Sidki. Workingclass resentment of Muslim immigrants as competitors for employment was also visible. The latter outcome did not take place until 1956. supported the decolonisation of Spanish Morocco. 2001 came on March 11. which are claimed by Morocco. however.242 present in Moscow when the Spanish war began. CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. was sent by the Soviets to Spain to conduct propaganda directed at the Moroccans. of which Ceuta has 30.S. as reflected in government subsidies for high-level academic studies of Islam.800 were injured. leftist bias against Moroccans.000 Muslim inhabitants (37 percent of its population) while Melilla has 33. however. although. and the international powers then administering Tangier.islamicpluralism. The assault was organised by a group of Moroccan. The Spanish public interpreted the terrorist bombings as an attempt to convince Spain that its troops should leave Iraq. with visible success as reported by the Soviet journalist Mikhail Koltsov. as it came to be known. and preached. nevertheless. demoralising problems in Spanish domestic politics. Ceuta and Melilla.000 (39 percent).241 Throughout the civil war. 192 people were killed and some 1. because it is 116 friendly to the claims of immigrants. when a series of explosions struck the metro system of Madrid. that those serving Franco were enemies of Islam. as well as. But the Iraq war was unpopular in Spain. treated badly by the Spanish Communist leaders. according to representatives of the Spanish Islamic community. Aznar and the PP had committed the Spanish Army to continued participation in the U.000 Moroccans and Algerians also fought for the Republicans during the Spanish civil war. in the militias of which George Orwell served. Ceuta. represent the territories with the proportionately largest Muslim demographic shares in the European Community. with the achievement of Moroccan sovereignty and conclusion of French control. seeking access to the European mainland. The 3/11 crime. which possesses the most profound antimilitarist tradition in Europe. which controlled the rest of Morocco. Spanish rightist sympathy for the Francoist Moroccans. had a direct impact on Spanish foreign policy and caused long-term. Spain. and Melilla all must contend with the attempts of foreign migrants to utilise their territories for travel by boat to Spain. until recently.-led intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq. who preferred to see all Muslims as brethren of Franco’s cohorts. remained significant motifs in Spanish life long after the conclusion of the civil war.

Melilla. in the latter case probably because of the overwhelming presence of Catholic culture in social affairs. minister (conseller) of education in the Generalitat de Catalunya. Recent Spanish law provides for Islamic religious instruction to be offered to Muslim children in state schools. Libya maintains the Al-Fateh Arab School of Madrid (Escuela El Fateh Árabe de Madrid) and Iraq supports the Iraqi School of Madrid (Escuela Iraqui en Madrid). All these institutions mainly serve the children of diplomats. in a manner that fostered conspiracy theories. (1) Family/schooling Spanish Muslim children are overwhelmingly educated in state and Catholic schools. With the embitterment and deepening of polarisation in Spanish politics.Spain: Family/Schooling CIP Aznar responded to the horrific events in a confused manner. The Historical Background: Emergence of Shariah as an Issue in Spain Public advocacy for establishment of Shariah as a legal standard is. whose actual numbers are unknown but whose representatives claim to account for half of the Moroccan Muslims in Spain. Aznar and the PP have continued to implicitly blame the events on Basque radicals and their domestic leftist allies. officially titled the Islamic Cultural Centre (Centro Cultural islámico). Andalusia. Ernest Maragall. The investigation was easier to carry out than in France. but this proposal has yet to produce a practical outcome. Schwartz’s command of Catalan and Spanish and knowledge of the main Spanish cities. was inaugurated in 2001 and nicknamed the “M-30 mosque” because of its location near a major motorway.eu . attempting to divert attention away from Islamist rage and to blame the deaths on Basque terrorism. aside from those enrolled in a very small number of private Arab-sponsored institutions. unhealed wound in Spanish political life. handed an electoral victory to the opposition Socialists under Zapatero. Rif Berbers/Amazigh. but implementation of this proposal has been slow. A large and elaborate Saudi-financed mosque in Madrid. may frequently reject Islamic law in favor of customary law. the Saudi authorities declared their intention to purchase Catholic schools and similar facilities for reopening as Islamic schools.244 In 2008. at the end of 2006. withdrew the Spanish contingent from Iraq. given the chaos and even political disgrace that Islamist radicals have sown in the country. because of prior CIP contact with Spanish Muslim leaders. on April 19.243 In addition. almost unknown in Spain. Spain has. Spanish voters repudiated this posture and.S. historically. and Aragon. the same instruction was offered in the Basque Country. The 3/11 atrocities have left a deep. the autonomous government of the Catalan principality. reflecting a rapid shift in public opinion.islamicpluralism. 2004. suffered the most damage to its internal cohesion from Islamist aggression. Shariah is also problematical among local Muslims in that. even after the trial of 28 accused ended in 2007 with guilty verdicts against 21 defendants. That year. announced the establishment of four special schools for the children of 117 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. after the U. separate Muslim religious education was furnished to students in Ceuta. In the 2005-06 school year. Spain has not experienced a rise in fear of Islam. allowed Case Study: Spain to be conducted efficiently.. as in France. In Spain proposals for new religious customs and regulations are rare and put forward with delicacy. who five weeks after the election. Its Saudi Academy of Madrid (Colegio Saudi de Madrid – colegio is one of several titles for a secondary school in the Hispanic world) reportedly educated 350 pupils in 2006. most of them Maghrebis. It is difficult to explain this absence. As in the Netherlands and France. The CIP Survey of Shariah Agitation in Spain The CIP field survey of Spain was completed in November-December 2008 by Stephen Suleyman Schwartz. Nevertheless. Barcelona and Madrid.

The 2008 plan called for a second and third such establishment in Reus. Other critics noted that the EBE were developed outside the regular school system and alleged that they represented a violation of Spanish law. The Christian country with the longest history of official representation for Islam is Russia. another agricultural centre. But the Spanish Socialists and other left or secularist parties have never consistently succeeded in establishing a standard comparable to French laïcité. Tamazight (Berber). includes articles in Romanian and advertisements in Bulgarian (the language of another recent EU member) as well as Spanish and Arabic. A monthly periodical issued for the immigrant readership. French. as well as Spanish and English. The million Muslims in Spain comprise only 20 percent of immigrants.245 Alejandro Font de Mora.246 As such efforts indicate. although fortune-telling by local clerics is fairly widespread in the Muslim world. through leaflets distributed in Arabic. and others.080 students in 2007-08 and that in Vich accepted 400. and Toumaï.islamicpluralism. Europeans. Spain is also one of four European non-Muslim countries that have state recognition of Islam as a faith. immigrants from that country. and Vich. and would be open throughout the year. under which children with learning problems must receive special assistance while attending a regular course of study. Spain is officially a secular state.247 (2) Institutionalisation of Shariah by nonMuslim governments (“Parallel Shariah”) Although it is overwhelmingly Catholic. in a winegrowing region with a high demand for immigrant labor. The Spanish national ministry of education announced that it would assure that the role of the EBE would be restricted and that education would generally remain inclusive. governing the Catalan-speaking autonomía of Valencia. since the French CFCM is a non-governmental body. have also appeared in numbers. Pilot projects had been created in the previous year. The EBE were to be structured to accommodate different levels of need. With the accession of Romania to the European Union. without a summer break. but on the very next page began a feature article on the practices of black magic and fortune-telling among Latin American and other immigrants. the immigrant population in Spain. where a Muslim board of religious deputies was CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. Such practices are banned in Islam. Germany. but the concept was denounced by the Catalan branch of the socialist-led Teachers Union (Federació de Treballadors d’Ensenyament d’UGT de Catalunya) as “discriminatory” and “leading to segregation”. the two main languages of Spain. and organisations in the UK.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 immigrants to open at the beginning of the school term in September. to better promote integration through learning Catalan. with its name derived from sub-Saharan Africa. But the Catalan Generalitat has been notable for its initiatives independent of national law. which accounts for some five million or nine percent of the overall population. The magazine advertised “Club Toumaï” trips to Morocco for the end of Ramadan. 118 is extremely diverse. and local authorities have been assiduous in promoting study of Catalan by immigrants. the conservative (Popular Party) conseller of education in the Generalitat Valenciana. condemned the Catalonian plan as “illegal” and supporting the creation of “ghettos”.eu . based on a constitutional doctrine loosely known as “deconfessionalisation” (“desconfesionalización”). and Chinese. with much greater representation by Latin Americans. Le Courrier de L’Atlas) we have examined. Toumaï (a Chadian term meaning “hope of life”) illustrated this multicultural situation in a recent issue. and the Netherlands also lack official standing. whose native language is a Romance one and who therefore find it easy to learn Spanish and Catalan. The EBE in Reus accommodated 1. Urdu. but such a mélange would not appear in the Dutch. or other specialty periodicals for immigrants (MZine. officially titled Educational Welcome Spaces (Espais de Bienvenida Educativa – EBE) but generally known as “welcome centres” (centres d’acollida) with one each in the towns of Reus.

then a Habsburg dominion. an institution that. A third group. in Croatia. Denmark. As in the Netherlands. nevertheless. FEME. avoids the Moroccan ulema in Spain. some of which are one-person “communities”. is one of two joint presidents of CIE. Said Hamduni in Reus.248 Relations between the Spanish government and Muslims are administered by the Islamic Commission of Spain (Comisión Islámica de España – CIE). on the 500th anniversary of fall of the Granada. It claims some 50 affiliated mosques. Our interviewees informed us that UCIDE. Its current representative as vicepresident in the CIE is Félix (Mohamad Amin) Herrero. some of its members were formerly involved in FEERI. and Hungary. a report that from 2004 to 2008 the number of Wahhabi prayer spaces in Catalonia had doubled.Spain: Family/Schooling CIP established by Empress Catherine II in 1788. FEME’s president is a Moroccan Berber by origin.249 Spanish Muslim congregations could affiliate with the CIE through either the UCIDE or FEERI. Bangladeshis. however. Islam was granted official standing in Austria in 1878. or directly. Moroccan Muslim clerics in Spain have been criticised for their subordination to an extraterritorial authority and their imposition on Berber believers. Ayad Tachfine Elharchi. for example. a cleric from Málaga. in 1916. along with Belgium. The first trend in CIE is the Union of Islamic Communities of Spain (Unión de Comunidades Islámicas de España – UCIDE). Shia Muslims. a Madrid-based cleric. so long as they were listed in the government’s Registry of Religious Entities (Registro de Entidades Religiosas – RER). In releasing its first collection of fatwas. founded by Riay Tatary. with some 200 affiliated prayer spaces. with the Habsburg occupation of BosniaHercegovina. which signed an Accord of Cooperation (Acuerdo de Cooperación) with the Spanish state. as follows: “It is evident that the CIE was not born as the fruit of an imposition by the Spanish political power.eu . claimed the figure was closer to 50. plans for reform of CIE were underway. an offshoot from UCIDE. One Saudi-lining imam. merits a of the Unión de Comunidades serious historical Islámicas de España: Riay Tatary and Helal Abboshi investigation (see Case Study: Germany). a professor of ecclesiastical law at the University of Barcelona. the last Muslim-ruled redoubt in the peninsula. FEERI was described to CIP in local interviews as under Saudi and Moroccan control. but many of these appear to be nonfunctioning. which includes 41 mosques. The origin of the regulation of stateMuslim relations by the CIE has been described by Àlex Seglers Gómez-Quintero. is mainly composed of Pakistanis. and in Spain in 1992 – in the latter case. reducing its probable membership to 20 or 30. the need to consolidate it as unique interlocutor has ended with its conversion into a kind of artificial 119 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. with a promise of new regulations and participation of FEME and of regional Muslim federations in place of the two-organisation model. and Sufi (spiritual) groups. In 2009. The subject of Wahhabism has attracted attention with. is the Muslim Federation of Spain (Federación Musulmana de España – FEME). on President and Secretary General balance. The CIE comprises two main tendencies. as European countries that have “recognised the Muslim religion and the rights of Muslims”. Tatary. the ECFR directed by Yusuf Al-Qaradawi praised Spain.islamicpluralism. from 15 to 30. the second major component of the CIE was the Spanish Federation of Islamic Religious Bodies (Federación Española de las Entidades Religiosas Islámicas – FEERI). and it has replaced the latter as the second most important Muslim organisation in Spain. with a significant component aligned with the MB. previously unrepresented in the CIE. In the past. a Syrian associated with the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and formerly involved in the Bilal Mosque and Islamic Centre of Aachen.

locations and ministers “associated with its distinct denominations and functions”. from the conception of “parallel Shariah” as we have described it. María Teresa Fernández de la Vega. marginal. in all these cases. perhaps because of its Berber influence. visible in Germany. was rejected by the Spanish authorities as a vague conception insufficient to define a body of dogma and a “specifically doctrinal” differentiation. the erection of an Islamic structure as an official religious institution alongside the Catholic hierarchy gives an unmistakable impression that Islam seeks to impinge upon and usurp the status of the established religion of the country.e. While the registration of Wahhabi. with the Federation of Evangelical Religious Entities of Spain (Federación de Entidades Religiosas Evangélicas de España – FEREDE) and the Federation of Israelite Communities of Spain (Federación de Comunidades Israelitas de España – FCIE).CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 church. and the presence of a significant number of believers. Seglers also pointed to the distinction between the long historical evolution that produced the Catholic hierarchy as it now exists. in the minds of many nonMuslims. a liturgy “which brings together the rites and ceremonies constituting the cult”. Seglers notes a peculiar gap in the administration of the RER. religious bodies are required to demonstrate their adherence to a “universal religious phenomenology” shared by all religions: these include a doctrine belonging to the particular faith. the Netherlands. parallel to the Catholic [church]… To force the artificial creation of a religious actor that unifies Islam seems a priori easier for the State.251 Tatary and Herrero. and have accepted principles of mutual respect among themselves. Deobandi. the Netherlands.islamicpluralism. without sectarian or other additions. and other extremist mosques or prayer spaces may not consistently demonstrate “respect [for] the limits of the exercise of religious freedom”. “which expresses the religious beliefs that are professed and which are intended to be offered to others”. immediately called on the CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. This markedly open and unrestrictive interpretation of Islam. Rather. But Germany. In mid-2008. i. The Islamic Community of Ceuta. a “parallel Islamic church” alongside Spanish Catholicism is not very different. Seglers did not take up this issue. even more if the object is to recentralise the management of religious policy. according to the administration. which we believe has. But given the immense Catholic majority in Spain. with a large Berber element. Spain has concluded agreements similar to that governing CIE. the Catalan author pointed out that the Islamic Community of Ceuta. and the ad hoc creation of the CIE to serve as a signatory of the Accord of Cooperation. in its definition of 120 religious communities permitted to register with it. But to reproduce the bilateral scheme that serves the Catholic Church does not take into account the plural and heterogeneous reality of Islam”. religious goals “that respect the limits of the exercise of religious freedom”. To avoid the penetration of Spain by “new religions”. was denied registration because it did not present evidence of its own “body of dogmas and doctrines”. and France. and France feature religious cultures in which Catholics and Protestants or secularists have maintained a general parity of power. the vice president of the Zapatero government. defines itself only by reference to “diffusion of the Islamic faith and the Sunnah through the teachings of the holy book of Qur’an as a guide and norm for all Muslims”. support pluralism and protect freedom of conscience through revision of the state’s Organic Law on Religious Freedom (Ley Orgánica de Libertad Religiosa – LOLR).eu . esoteric and personal “cults” (better known in Europe as “sects”). announced a legal reform that would. Although this is not a Shariah issue per se. worked to the advantage of powerful fundamentalist or neofundamentalist elements. acting on behalf of CIE.250 Here we see again the syndrome of seeking a “single” contact or “telephone number” for communication with the Muslims.

constructed for 50. to avoid the emergence of radical prayer leaders from the ranks of the incarcerated. in Spanish correctional institutions. in the autonomous region of Aragón. In 2005. The facility is the “most obsolete” in Andalusia and was built to accommodate only 650 prisoners. the government stated that it would hire Muslim clerics to serve in the correctional system. Spain has also been challenged by the problem of Islamic religious personnel serving prisoners. and Bonxe. But in 2008 14 of those convicted were exonerated by the Spanish Supreme Court. In 2005. specifically putting Islam on the same level with the Catholic church. The prison of Almería.252 At the time of our survey no action had been fulfilled to implement this demand. Boussouf’s comments followed a colloquium in the Moroccan city of Fez. had become a “ghetto” of 130 Muslims. had distributed an 89-page manual advising prison personnel on how to identify Islamist radicals. (3) Criminal aspects With a significant North African and West African immigrant population. called for the election of Muslim leaders in Spain. “Mohamed Achraf” was sentenced to 14 years in prison as leader of an armed gang. Spanish media disclosed that Mercedes Gallizo Llamas. was described in a major reportage focusing on the badlyovercrowded prison of Topas. had occupied the former educational facility inside the prison. the problem of radical Islam among convicts. According to a journalistic account. as a separate topic from the legal offensive against terrorism. including a large underclass. from behind bars. a followup reportage255 alleged that correctional institutions in Andalusia had become filled with Muslim extremist activity. In 2004. which appears to resemble that 121 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. housed 350 Muslims (mainly Moroccans and Algerians) out of 1. Abderrahman Tahiri. Spanish media253 reported that Abdellah Boussouf. resulting in charges against 20 suspects. Spanish General Director of Penitentiary Institutions. it is unsurprising that Muslims are represented beyond their national demographic ratio.261 But the manual.257 The prison at Topas further provided an example of something relatively rare in other countries: recruitment to and formulation of an elaborate but failed terrorist conspiracy.Spain: Criminal Aspects CIP Spanish government to establish complete equality of all faiths. Vocal calls to prayer from the new “mosque” were said to have disturbed other prisoners. The crimes were prevented by a police action titled “Operation Nova”. in the autonomous region of Galicia. using it for Quranic study and for religious services. Later in 2004.259 Spanish media reporting on the “Operation Nova” affair260 stated that in addition to those recruited to extremism as convicts in Topas. and were presented as an appeal for greater democracy in Spanish Muslim life.258 the “Topas Group” led by “Achraf” had joined with members of the Algerian GSPC (see Case Study: France) to create a group called Martyrs of Morocco (Mártires de Marruecos) which planned a series of attacks on judicial institutions within two months of the 3/11 bombings. a city on the southeastern coast with close proximity to North Africa.256 The killer had been taught radical ideology at Topas after meeting Achraf. As 2008 ended. alias “Mohamed Achraf”. Teixeiro. In 1994.100 inmates. he had been invited to eat at the home of a Moroccan compatriot. One wing.eu . in the autonomous region of Castilla and León. A Lama has attained notoriety similar to that of Topas as a centre of radical Islamist agitation. an official body maintained by the Moroccan state. an identified Muslim died while incarcerated in the prison of Zuera. according to the model adopted in France. The case of “Achraf” in Topas was specifically cited in this context.254 There it was reported that a group of Muslims led by an Algerian. whom he doused with gasoline and burned to death.islamicpluralism. In March 2009. general secretary of the Council of the Moroccan Community Abroad. others had served time in the institutions of A Lama.

women may be as prone to settling conflicts by physical means as men. and threats by a man against a woman are criminalised. the Spanish right supported a powerful women’s movement. in many areas. women troops played a controversial but significant role. however. The rural populace. It is doubtful that such a ban could be imposed. without the reverse being unlawful. and the Netherlands).CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 produced by the European Union and described in Case Study: France. the “Islamic rosary” used for recitation of praise to God. was known until the close of the 20th century. similarly. the Federation of Divorced and Separated Women (Federación de Mujeres Divorciadas y Separadas – 10 affiliated groups). Spanish women have. Today’s Spain is. the book was published by the president of the Islamic Federation of Catalonia (Federació Islámica de Catalunya).g. and the volume was mainly CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. and has adopted 122 discrimination in favor of women as a constitutional principle. according to a leading non-Muslim. imam of the Sohail Islamic Cultural Centre (Centro Cultural Islámico Sohail) at Fuengirola in the Andalusian district of Málaga. included some markers of radicalism that would be common among spiritual Sufis and ordinary Muslims. as well as by Catholics and the PP. Abuse inflicted on Muslim women has attracted far less attention in Spain than in the northern countries (the UK. remains. which would view it as a sign of political weakness. This could be explained by the continuing general subordination of women in Spain’s masculinist culture. in legal terms.islamicpluralism. favors activities of proselytism and radicalisation”. and the possession of tesbih. Catholic and conservative on such issues. especially those originating from the Maghreb.. or in France. conservative journalist interviewed for this survey. Conceptions of “honour” and violent. the wearing of hijab (known as a pañuelo or kerchief) by Muslim girls is not banned in Spain. no less than among Muslims. The plaintiffs included the Women’s Council of the Region of Madrid (Consejo de la Mujer de la Comunidad de Madrid) with 80 constituent groups. Germany. In addition. It would be opposed by the Socialists as discriminatory. (4) Approach to Women Although it has been the subject of vivid discussion. Written in 1997. Mowafak Kanfach. The Spanish left of that time had the most developed women’s political organisations in southern Europe. in which landowners had the privilege of taking the virginity of an employee’s new bride. but such an analysis would be faulty in various ways. and during the civil war of the 1930s. sometimes lethal punishment for violations of them are seen in the Christian cultures of the Mediterranean. The overall situation is extremely complex.eu . been known for fighting alongside or in advance of men in combat. The manual discussed the Topas case and summarised the situation of radical Islam in Spanish prisons in an idiom commonly heard in Spain: “The present high concentration of Muslims kept in penitentiaries. and a leading Spanish Muslim cleric. as well as extremists. but in Spain. Spain has legalised same-sex weddings and adoptions. was denounced by a group of Spanish feminist organisations. e. since Roman times. one of the most “feminist” countries in the world. in some isolated locations the so-called “right of the first night”. In 2000 the issue of domestic violence by Muslim men came before the Spanish public when Mohamed Kamal Mostafá. particularly in Italy. other atrocious practices persist from centuries past. the Association of Maghrebi Women of Catalonia (Amal). While FGM does not exist among Spanish Christians. Spain mandates parity of men and women in governmental employment. The cause for criticism was Mostafá’s publication in Barcelona of his book Woman in Islam (La mujer en el Islam). such as the repetition of passages from Qur’an while working. Elite opinion deplores violence against women. and the Association for Aid to SexuallyAssaulted Women (Asociación de Asistencia a Mujeres Agredidas sexualmente).

Some. with a “rod that must not be stiff.C. A Pakistani immigrant woman in her late teens. London. and his book was condemned as an incitement to domestic violence. known as Roxana. in that it has little or no sense of social segregation among those who come to visit it. and is now known as the Barri Gòtic or Gothic Quarter. she should be beaten on the feet and hands”.E. with many expressing satisfaction with the verdict.islamicpluralism. “[the blows] must not be strong or hard since the aim is to inflict psychological suffering rather than humiliation or physical ill-treatment”. although Barcelona has never had a large Chinese community. afflicted with petty crime. who choose to settle there. and the Casa del Libro Árabe. a powerful alcoholic drink that causes dementia after long use.eu . the family of Hannibal. located to the west of the Rambles. from which he had been expelled in 1992. Catalans refer to Spanish immigrants to the principality as xarnegos. such as the face. notable for its sexual exhilaration and a constant.262 Spanish Muslim opinion on the case was split. Basques refer to non-Basques as maketo. year-around stream of youthful visitors. the geographically lower and poorer district of the old city of Barcelona. but slim and lightweight to avoid serious injury [to the woman] and so that no scars. it is difficult to imagine foreign tourists in Amsterdam. Similarly. In Roman times. After some confusion over jurisdiction. for a major daily. A case publicised in Barcelona in 2002 demonstrated the difference between the Catalan capital and other European tourist centres. In addition. but differs from Amsterdam. Therein. argued that Mostafá had been the object of persecution because of an attempt by him to gain the presidency of FEERI. the district was rehabilitated for the 123 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. Mostafá commented. The association of the neighbourhood with Chinese has been explained by Barcelona historians as a corrupted reference to the Carthaginians. other side of the Rambles. Mostafá was sentenced to fifteen months in jail (with prison time suspended) and a fine of €2. The Barri Gòtic remains the central location of Barcelona’s municipal and Catalonia’s autonomous regional governments. known as a focus of anarchist politics as well as such vices as the consumption of absemta. aside from Muslims. Although in its old incarnation El Raval was beloved by Barcelonese and many discerning visitors for its picturesque and historic quality. Instead. El Raval was always a sub-proletarian area. Yazmin Alami. or main street in the historic section. or bruises are caused”. El Raval was formerly known as the Barri Xinès or “Chinatown”. London. but also underscored the problems of Muslim women throughout Western Europe. abdomen.160. and head. a bookshop in Barcelona. In this respect it somewhat resembles Amsterdam. an aristocratic “upper town” was built on the eastern. Until the Barcelona Summer Olympics of 1992. may observe a certain alienation between their communities. the imam of Fuengirola was brought before a court in Barcelona and charged with sexual discrimination in 2003. “[Wife] beating must never be done in a state of exacerbated. who founded Barcelona as the victory city of the Barcas. or Paris. a racist insult. Mostafá’s own mosque in Fuengirola. if not decrepit. Native Catalans and immigrant workers.Spain: Approach to Women CIP distributed at the Saudi-financed Islamic Cultural Centre in Madrid. in terms of its openness.264 The incident was described by a woman reporter. while in Barcelona visitors develop relationships with local residents. except that in Amsterdam foreign visitors tend to liaise with one another. worked as cashier in a food store owned by her family in El Raval. or Paris making social contacts with Muslim women that might lead to deeper relations. late at night. El Raval was also shabby.) But Barcelona is a city of Mediterranean passion. however. whether from elsewhere in Spain or other parts of the world. breast. blind rage” and that “she should not be beaten on the sensitive parts of her body.263 Barcelona is one of Western Europe’s tourism capitals. and accusing Mostafá of a deviant interpretation of Islam. including many foreigners. and. in the third century B. (Similarly.

P. Egypt is the only major Muslim country with a high rate of FGM. “Our society. But Roxana’s family disapproved of the frequent visits of the young Nordic to their store. Dr. as happened to Roxana. few have nameplaques. 2008. 245 Unsigned. lack of knowledge. “Els alumnes immigrants no tindran un temps d’estada màxim en els centres de benvinguda educatives”.islamicpluralism. A 2008 Spanish media report266 described FGM as “a custom still deeply rooted in the SubSaharan countries [from which many current immigrants to Spain have come]. 2005. from the Department of Gynecology. July 11. which are seldom easy to locate. and forced marriages. 2008. Notwithstanding its practise in Saudi Arabia. however. 244 Sánchez Nogales. 2004. none have minarets. 238 Ibid. detest this form of mutilation… But is is no less certain that in our society. The problem of FGM also has a low profile in Spain. Islam y Guerra Civil Española. but also combines the issues of so-called “honour” crime. The main point of the reportage was. L. 241 Sánchez Ruano. such as Indonesia. Alami. El Raval has at least 12 mosques. circumcisions are practiced as a matter of routine”. without charge. The reporter. Madrid. Madrid. The immigrant woman must travel with a family watching her closely. to note that a Catalan physician. 239 Ibid. El islam en la España actual. who had come to Catalonia to learn Spanish. 243 Unsigned. “The case of Roxana is not something rare in Spain. El islam en la España actual. Ms. where it is known as “circuncisión femenina” or “ablación genital femenina”. La Esfera de los Libros.265 although some Islamic countries. violence against Muslim women. the Spanish public was informed that Egypt had classified “female genital surgery” as a legitimate medical specialisation. as “justified” by previously cited Shafi’i Shariah norms and a fatwa by Al-Qaradawi. and the sole medical expert qualified to do so in Spain. op. and Reproduction of the USP Institut Universitari Dexeus. as well as women who have been the object of them throughout their lives. had succeeded in performing the first successful operations to reverse the effects of FGM. Agencia Mexicana de Noticias [México]. 242 Ibid. El Raval has become a centre for artists and other young visitors. cit. Pere Barri Soldevila. July 30. And. Francisco.eu . Muslims in Spain: 1500 to 1614.. or are open outside prayer times. NOTES 237 Sánchez Nogales. the problem of Roxana began when she developed a romantic attachment to a blond and blue-eyed German tourist named Hans. Unsigned. Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos. In this regard the situation in Barcelona resembles that in Marseille. “Planea Arabia Saudita abrir escuelas islámicas en España”. Chicago.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 Olympics and now appears gentrified. In 2006. for diverse reasons (religious. had already banned the procedure. as well as Muslim immigrants. “UGT rebutja els centres d’acollida d’immigrants per CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. The text continued. 2006. and Sénégal. especially Maghrebis and Pakistanis. Alami wrote. traditional. a prohibition in which Egypt itself 124 followed suit. with numbers that currently oscillate in the vicinity of two million operations per year”. This reportage seems unique in recent Spanish journalism. unfamiliar with these rituals. adultery is a motive for family extradition and a later and brutal traditional punishment in the country of origin of the women found to have committed an offence”. stated that Roxana had been beaten with a belt by her male relatives before being left alone to recuperate and then sent to her native country. The therapy was provided to two women of Black African origin. and sent their daughter back to Pakistan for an arranged marriage with a cousin. As described by the 2002 reportage. to whom she had been betrothed as a child. Obstetrics. Europa Press. Sudan. To find a mosque in El Raval one must inquire in Muslim shops. José Luis. or incorrect stereotypes). But society and the police are unaware that honour codes do not recognise borders. 240 Harvey. University of Chicago Press. Ms. the main private hospital in Barcelona.

La directora general de Instituciones Penitenciarias. “15 meses de cárcel para el imán que incitó a la violencia contra las mujeres”. 256 Unsigned. El Mundo. Madrid. 247 Toumaï [Madrid]. El Mundo [Valencia ed. Presos musulmanes. p. Barcelona. Ajuntament de Barcelona. 2008. 258 Marraco.A. 2004.]. 2004. Europa Press. 263 Unsigned.. 2008. Yazmin. 251 Unsigned. “VALENCIA. La Voz de Galicia. January 20. “Cataluña creará centros específicos para los inmigrantes recién llegados”. El Mundo [Andalusia ed. “Marruecos reclama una reforma de la Comisión Islámica de España”. 2006. Esther. 2008. El Mundo. “El Gobierno pone límites al plan para segregar alumnos en Cataluña”. 2008. 2003. December 9. May 8. 2008. 266 Unsigned. EFE [News Agency]. El País [Madrid]. 1. November 8. July 13. 2008. Tres millones de niñas sufren cada año algún tipo de mutilación genital. Eduardo. “Absueltos 14 de los 20 condenados en la Operación Nova”. 264 Alami. Del Barrio. Laura L. Antonio. March 17. collected in Barcelona. Ana. Angle Editorial. El Mundo. 249 Baquero. March 22. cit. 2004. CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. El Periódico [Barcelona]. “Un manual confidencial revela a los funcionarios códigos y claves para frenar el ‘yihadismo’ en las cárceles”. El Mundo. El caso de Roxana que se enamoró de un alemán. El Mundo. práctica que afecta a 130 millones de féminas en el mundo”. El Mundo. Inmigración. Àlex.. 2008. February 19. Julio M. February 28. “Musulmanes captados para la causa yihadista en las prisiones”. El Mundo. Islam. Ana. Mercedes Gallizo. Recueil de fatwas. La Vanguardia. Unsigned. Europa Press.Spain: Notes CIP ‘discriminatoris’ i encaminats a la ‘segregació’ ”. “Lucha contra el terrorismo islamista: Operaciones Nova”. “Ablación. Ruiz. 2006. 254 Del Barrio. “Cárceles. May 7.. Educación. “El imán de Fuengirola no recurre la pena por incitar a los malos tratos a la mujer. 246 Aunion. El Periódico de Aragón [Zaragoza]. “Los musulmanes de España aplauden la condena”. November 2008. February 28. July 15. 2008. Unsigned. October 5. La Vanguardia. op. Manuel. El conseller de Educación. El Mundo.opera cit.. August 8. “La reconstrucción del clítoris y la circuncisión ritual: paradojas de las civilizaciones”. 2005. 2008. February 26. 2009. Barcelona. Europa Press. July 15. 255 Del Campo. November 2008. 2004. “El imam de Fuengirola se proclama ‘defensor de las mujeres’ en el juicio contra él por discriminación”. December 28. 253 Del Barrio. La Voz de Galicia [A Coruña]. March 15. 2009. 257 El Barrio. 2005. “Marruecos pide elecciones para que los musulmanes elijan a sus líderes en España”. “El Gobierno financiará a los imames para que acudan a las cárceles con el fin de dirigir el rezo de los reclusos musulmanes”. Ana. “Los líderes musulmanes de España piden al Gobierno una reforma legal que les equipare con la Iglesia Católica”. “Mujeres. “Sevilla. 2004. El Mundo. Ana. Unsigned. February 25. 265 Alvarado. “El convertido”. 261 Unsigned. 2008.islamicpluralism. 260 Unsigned. 2008. “De la Vega anuncia la revisión de la ley orgánica de libertad religiosa”. Los funcionarios denuncian la falta de personal y medios para evitar que el integrismo prospere entre rajas”. dará prioridad a los internos árabes en los trabajos que se realizan en prisión”. 2002. El País. 39. llengua d’acollida”. January 14. 250 Seglers. July 15. January 14. October 7. “El català. El Mundo. rechaza la iniciativa del Gobierno catalán de crear aulas de acogida para inmigrantes”.]. J.eu 125 . 259 Lázaro. 262 Unsigned. Musulmans a Catalunya: El repte de l’integració i la llibertat religiosa. 2004. Série no. 248 Conseil europeén des fatwas et de la recherche. 252 Unsigned. leaflet. Alejandro Font de Mora. July 20. fue golpeada y repatriada”. “L’islam ultraortodox duplica les mesquites a Catalunya en 4 anys”.

4) ECFR points out that early Islamic scholars denied that an apostate should be subjected to a death sentence unless the individual preached apostasy. and the believers. except that reflecting whether house mortgages involving interest income are permitted for Muslims. would reflect on Muslim relations with non-Muslims. This argument is based on the presumption that a Muslim may find himself in “an environment where he fears for his religion. and insulted the Creator. the Prophet Muhammad. The spirit of this fatwa The present survey includes frequent mention of the activities of the European Council for Fatawa and Research (ECFR) in formulating Shariah for Muslims in Europe. in the language of the text. EMU) have admitted them and. and the question of death sentences against apostates from Islam. 1 states that Muslims are obligated to leave non-Muslim lands. The accompanying ECFR recommendations reaffirm the traditional Islamic injunction to obey the laws of the countries that 126 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. it is noticeable that few of them. to avoid applying for public assistance or welfare payments if they have jobs or operate businesses. The rest of the fatwas in the first collection deal with various topics. and that local groups and mosques should avoid concerning themselves with it. for himself and for his family”. which says that application of death sentences for apostates can only be decided by an Islamic state. fatwa No.eu . the Muslim lives “without a Muslim identity”. In an examination of two volumes of fatwas published by the group. The same text permits emigration to non-Muslim societies as “hoped for and desired” if to “an environment that offers a greater possibility of respecting the prescriptions of religion”. ECFR states that “apostasy” should be considered a crime similar to “high treason”. unless the Muslim can find no other solution for pursuit of a life. if. The latter problem is treated ambiguously by ECFR. sought to divide the Muslims. ECFR’s First Fatwa Collection The 43 fatwas in the first collection published by ECFR267 are composed in a language that often appears moderate. At the same time. specifically.islamicpluralism. Finally. however. it is justifiable in cases of leaving Islam.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 9. These include definition of the “saved” sect among Muslims – a common issue in Islamic fundamentalism. repentance of sin. EMN. In the same fatwa (No. in a fundamentalist vein. ECFR and Other Transnational Islamic Organisations in Europe (FIOE. with the implication that since some Western countries impose capital punishment for the latter crime.

• endowment of mosques. • whether fathers are required to oversee disciplining of children. • employment in restaurants serving alcohol or pork. 19: Whether husband alone can determine if a woman falsely declared her virginity before marriage. • the post-partum right of mothers to rest from their ordinary activities. • the right of women to open bank accounts. • whether it is required for a person who becomes Muslim to adopt a Muslim name. • whether men can forbid their wives to attend courses in the faith of Islam. and Saudi Arabia). • differences in interpretations of Islamic tradition between husband and wife. • purchase and use of fireworks. 5) deals with the traditional requirement for a new Sunni Muslim (“convert”) to choose an affiliation with one of the four traditional Sunni schools of Islamic law. 29: Recourse of the Muslim wife living in the West in case of irresolvable 127 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. But the first collection’s fatwas deal with a number of issues in gender relations. This represents a dangerously separatist attitude toward non-Muslim societies. • whether a Muslim wife should serve as the sole financial support of a husband. 6 in the first series calls on Muslim women to maintain hijab so as to set themselves apart from non-Muslims and Muslims who do not practice their religion. • marriages of convenience. • whether married women can speak to men to whom they are not married. • participation of Muslims in elections held by Western governments. • administration of charity payments. • whether riding a bicycle endangers a girl’s virginity. No.islamicpluralism. pronouncing on: • whether dogs are unclean (they are not. Another fatwa in the first series (No. ECFR denies that this is necessary. • pork byproducts in food. 21: The right of women to cut their hair without permission from their husbands. Fatwa No. • employment of Muslim medical personnel in disposal of bodies by cremation. • abortion. • payment of profits on investment. None of these evince a rigid or repressive spirit. • permission for small children to participate in simple dances at school. reflecting the fundamentalist and reformist habits of the Wahhabi movement. These include: No. • the definition of “religious” marriage. • the right of non-Muslim women married to Muslim men to maintain close relations with their non-Muslim families.eu . • qualification for leading Muslim prayer. • disposition of minor interest paid on bank accounts in non-Islamic institutions. • use of non-interest-charging credit cards issued by charitable organisations (some of them backed by banks in Kuwait. • masturbation. according to the Maliki and Hanafi schools of Islamic law). Qatar. No. • whether wives must entertain visitors when their husbands are sick. A new hair style is discouraged by ECFR if the change is too surprising to the husband.ECFR’s First Fatwa Collection CIP conflicts directly with European and international conventions on freedom of religion. The remaining fatwas in the first series appear innocuous. • the presence of husbands at the bedside during childbirth. which attempts to wipe out the precedents established by the four schools. Unsupported claims on this matter are discouraged by ECFR. • prayers for the dead.

for Muslims living in Europe. however.islamicpluralism. 1 of the second collection. 32: The right of a husband to forbid his wife from visiting a female friend. Some of the first ECFR collection’s fatwas reflect a fundamentalist intolerance but cannot be said to interfere with Western social or legal canons. • determination of the direction of prayer (qibla) in a building where there is no indication of the geographical relationship to Mecca. ECFR calls for such problems to be turned over to “family tribunals”. the surviving communities of the original People of the Book (Ahl ul-Kitab) described in Qur’an. public change in the attitudes of a major Muslim authority toward non-monotheistic believers. Fatwa No. other Islamic organisational activities. As with the first collection. • permission for transfer of interest earned from Western bank accounts to Islamic charities. on “interfaith dialogue”. Some of them repeat or reinforce the content of fatwas in the first collection. It legitimises relations between Muslims and adherents of “divine faiths [that] acknowledge the concept of deity. with each pair merged into a single prayer. • permission for acceptance of charitable donations from non-Muslims as long as the source of funds does not originate in the production of pork or alcohol. The rest of the second collection comprises fatwas on: • affirmation of the right of women to work in public functions. No. and in the second when summer makes the astronomical indicators of prayer times difficult to observe – the ECFR warns. No. is benign in appearance but includes some fundamentalist assumptions. and few have to do with Muslim relations with non-Muslim legal authorities. the July 2008 Madrid interreligious meeting represented a historic. ECFR holds that husbands may prohibit wives from visiting certain women friends if the husband fears harm to the family or a risk to conjugal relations. which are described in this study. ECFR’s Second Fatwa Collection The second ECFR collection268 comprises 37 fatwas. When King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia held interreligious talks in Madrid in July 2008. No. and present a serious conflict with Western services to women by public agencies dedicated to family problems. however. this religious opinion may be utilised to justify violent actions against such allegedly illicit friendships. • combination of the two midday (zuhr and asr) and two evening prayers (maghrib and isha). As we have stated in discussing so-called “honour” murders. the Saudi monarch 128 secured the participation of figures representing faiths never previously considered worthy of respect by Muslim fundamentalists such as the majority of ECFR members. including mosque and charity administration. • method of fixing the time at which the Ramadan fast begins and ends. including Buddhists. against making the practise habitual. • observance of the age of a sacrificed CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 family disputes.eu . prophethood and the hereafter” – implying discussion only with Jews and Christians. many of these are written in a moderate style. and holding of public office. and Taoists. and doubt as to its real utility. Confucians. 33 declares that members of the Druze sect are apostates and that religious Muslims should not eat with them. although they embody fundamentalist attitudes that are problematic in the Western context. of the required daily observance. • the payment of zakat (obligatory charity). Notwithstanding serious problems at the conference itself. In the first instance the practise is justified because winter shortens the hours of the day. 36 discourages mixed gender activities at weddings.

while prohibiting participation in non-Muslim religious festivities. the question in itself reveals the gap between the mentality of ECFR and Western legal and social norms. vehicles and businesses. Affirmation of the right of Muslim 129 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. The question of life insurance was deferred. • permission to purchase insurance on mosques. • permission for human organ donation. • prohibition on employees diverting the facilities of their employers for their own use. ECFR acknowledged that traditional Shariah scholars considered this requirement arguable. on the basis that the assets are hers. but that mature women need not submit their marriage decisions to a guardian. 13. who were born in the 13th century C. At the same time. • encouragement for Muslims to deliver good wishes to non-Muslims on the holidays observed by the latter. • prohibition on consumption of meat that is not slaughtered according to Islamic law. schools. • permission for Muslims to be buried in non-Muslim cemeteries if no Muslim cemetery is available. following the opinions of the notorious fundamentalists Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim. as well as personal homes. which can hardly be assumed in every case. • definition of vinegar derived from alcohol as a non-intoxicant and therefore permissible for use in food. • prohibition on breaking a contract after it has been undertaken. No.islamicpluralism. except when girls were under the age of puberty. especially given the widespread abuse of women as described in this survey.eu .E. • support for the right of a woman to divorce her irreligious husband. • formal affirmation of the equality of husbands and wives. • assignment of a deceased woman’s wealth to her heirs. and health insurance. Nevertheless. and Muslims were encouraged to establish “Islamic cooperative insurance” programs. • permission for a man and women who have both committed adultery to become married and be considered free of sin after their wedding. • legitimacy of divorces ordered by nonMuslim judges in the West. • encouragement to participate in sports. • permission to destroy embryos collected for in vitro fertilisation if they become unnecessary because of a natural pregnancy. unless consummated in an illegitimate manner.ECFR’s Second Fatwa Collection CIP animal. • permission for inheritances to Muslims from their non-Muslim relatives. • permission for Muslims to attend the funerals of non-Muslim relatives. the fatwa places no limit on participation in patriotic or other non-religious holidays honoured by non-Muslims. 12. Fatwas from the second collection that conflict with Western legal standards include: No. • permission to consume soft drinks that allegedly contain small amounts of alcohol so long as they do not cause intoxication when consumed in large quantities. But ECFR blandly states that women’s guardians “wish only for their best interest and that they marry good men rather than deceitful and illheart (sic) suitors”. and other Islamic facilities. ECFR further recommends that in the absence of such guardians the mosque should assume guardianship. • exclusion of feelings of love by a woman for a man from consideration as sinful. Requirement for women to obtain permission from a male legal guardian for marriage.

ECFR was created with the support of the Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe (FIOE). and makes the initiation of divorce by women dependent on judicial authorities. The fatwa is interesting in that it declares Jerusalem to be the property of all Muslims. This is the fatwa on house purchase produced by the debate described ad extenso in chapter 3 of this study. but with the stricture that men must not be present. or if the purchaser has assets that make the mortgage contract unnecessary. in our view. It further states that non-Muslim women who do not swim in the presence of men should be considered virtuous. This fatwa grants permission for Muslim women to expose the area from the navel to the knee to non-Muslim women while engaged in swimming. Requiring women to inform their husbands if they leave the house. FIOE maintains a website with minimal content in English and French. 24. and also for non-Muslims. 130 The fatwa bans unmarried men and women from meeting alone. especially when compared with the various national organisations described in the Case Studies. and to travel in the company of a chaperone (mehram). The fatwa also calls for gender segregation in public meetings. it reinforces the exclusive right of men to initiate divorce. and demands that women meeting men to whom they are not married cover their entire bodies except for their faces and hands. an assertion that does not. the CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. and is exceptionally long and detailed. as well as physical contact between them. Prohibition of gender mixing. Ruling on women initiating divorces. comprises small entities in most European countries. The second collection also includes a fatwa (No.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 men to four wives. 34. mean much. at least de jure.) While this fatwa does not impend on the relations of Muslims with Western legal systems it most certainly reveals the orientation of ECFR toward a radical position on Palestinian issues and reinforces the observation that ECFR is Arab-dominated. FIOE. Such practices are not banned in the West. whether Arab or not.islamicpluralism. Prohibition of boxing between human beings (as opposed to practicing with a dummy). No. this opinion represents a stark difference from canons for women’s rights in the West. (It ignores the cultural fact that some Jews who speak Arabic and lived in Arab countries define themselves as “Arab Jews”. The fatwa specifically bans contracting a mortgage to buy a house that the owner will not use. in the West. Permission for mortgages in house purchase. Exposure of women’s bodies during swimming. ECFR states that a woman may initiate a divorce if a provision for such an action was written into her marriage contract. although it is disappearing in most of the Muslim world and is illegal. which was founded in 1989. in our judgement. the latter claim being one that cannot be considered legimately enforceable in a non-Muslim country. No. A similarly skeletal organisation. No. Like the preceding fatwa. a second home. but obviously conflict with Western customs. The latter represents. No. No. and all Arabs. Otherwise. ECFR asserts that Shariah bans boxing for Muslims.269 The real extent of its influence in European Muslim life is doubtful. No.eu . 36) against the surrender of any part of Jerusalem or sale of Palestinian land to nonArabs. but claims to be “the largest Islamic organisation on the European level”. ECFR produced a classic fundamentalist defence of polygamy. 35. 16. whether Muslims or Christians. 26. an excessive religious intrusion into ordinary social relations. 32. and should be called to Islam by Muslim women.

and branches in Granada.ECFR’s Second Fatwa Collection CIP Muslim concentration Europe. Série no.net. op. 1. 271 www. NOTES 267 Conseil europeén des fatwas et de la recherche. Africa and Asia European Muslim Network (EMN).euro-muslims. 270 www. EMU’s objectives rest clearly on non-interference with Western social and legal norms. 269 www. Sarajevo.270 describes itself as a “think-tank” headquartered in Brussels and is associated with the controversial intellectual Tariq Ramadan. The European Muslim Union (EMU)271 is another and quite different organisation.org/.org.islamicpluralism. with headquarters in Köln. Recueil de fatwas. Berlin. and Istanbul. It has no pretensions to the introduction of Shariah-based or other separate law in Europe.eu.e-cfr. We have observed EMU at some length and judge it to be an authentically moderate Muslim body. 268 Published in English at www. CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www.euro-muslim.emunion. cit.eu 131 . EMN calls for a campaign against forced marriages and claims to support “nonviolent resistance” by Palestinians but draws support from the fundamentalist Islamic milieu.

investment for earning of interest.The Question of ‘Islamic Banking’ The intersection of Islam. as a haven from speculative excess. we noted the development of so-called “Shariah-compliant financial products”. Whether payment of mortgage interest should be acceptable for Muslims to gain better housing and more secure residence was a key component in the debate in the ECFR beginning in 1997. and other financial issues is also a repeated topic in this survey.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 10. arguments in favor of Islamic banking have been aired before the nonMuslim public. For example.’ said David Testa. chief executive of Gatehouse Bank.help to fill the liquidity gap. ‘The current global market condition has given Islamic finance a great opportunity to show what it can do . And they are playing up the contrast to scalded shareholders. In addition. interpretation and debate over this prohibition is convoluted and confusing.eu . The message may have particular resonance in the West after the crumbling of the U. that with the coming of the economic crisis of 2008 in the West. The authors of this study are concerned CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. bondholders and borrowers and fearful depositors. and we have exempted it from detailed examination here. over whether it could harm non-Muslim society. While “Islamic banking” has recently produced a vivid controversy in the West. as offered by British banks and investment firms. it is a subject requiring specialised knowledge of financial practices. the option of 132 submitting financial disagreements to “parallel Shariah” tribunals has been a significant theme in the British discussion over introduction of such a system of mediation.S. We should note. While conventional banks worldwide are nursing losses of more than $400 billion from the credit crisis. While income based on the loan of money or commodities with repayment accompanied by an increase in value after a delay in time is specifically banned in Islam.’ he said”. “The global credit crisis presents the $1 trillion Islamic finance industry with an opportunity to expand its appeal beyond Muslim investors.islamicpluralism. which began operations in April [2008] as the fifth Islamic bank in Britain. Islamic banks are virtually unscathed. mortgage market left banks holding hundreds of billions of dollars of nearly worthless credit instruments tied to home loans by a web of complex structures. a Reuters journalist272 reported. ‘It’s very much a return to oldfashioned conservative lending. In the Case Study: Britain. however.

In addition. Muslims who deposit funds with banks that pay interest on accounts may also choose to donate the money so earned to educational and other institutions.islamicpluralism. At the same time. professor of economics and law and King Faisal professor of Islamic thought and culture at the University of Southern California. derived from criminal activity or directed to support of terrorism. providing that no laws are broken and the source and use of funds is not itself illegal – e. which is considered usury. He argues that Islamist ideology “like other fundamentalisms… carries the potential of harming the global economy”. have always been divided on the merits of the market”. has written an authoritative study of financial issues in Islam. similar to that observed in Britain in the area of divorce. decisions on how.g. or under what conditions individuals deposit or invest their money is a matter of free personal choice. investment for the sole purpose of earning interest. Traditional Islam does not clearly ban all interest income. Kuran has outlined the various issues involved in the Muslim discussion of interest. he warns that “Islamist leaders who… desire to restrict international trade or regulate the composition of private investment will have little difficulty justifying their actions in religious terms”. Muslims who wish to invest money in enterprises that are not involved with forbidden products such as pork or alcohol may ascertain for themselves the activities of businesses. without recourse to “Islamic banking”. This is only partially explained by the role of London as a global financial centre. non-Muslim UK and European population and the Muslim minority. While he observes that “Islamists. Prof. Kuran has traced the origin of the present-day doctrine of “Islamic banking” to the extremist interpretation of Islam promoted in India and Pakistan by the jihadist movement 133 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. where. including Islamic economists. “Islamic banking” has been noticeably accepted in Britain more than elsewhere in the countries we examined. financial practices. He points out that “the promotion of Islamic banking is a standard element of every Islamist economic agenda”. the increasingly-unavoidable nature of this question was addressed by the ECFR consultations on mortgage purchase described in this survey. it would support a greater sense of segregation between the broader.273 Prof. Worse. Timur Kuran. there is so far no evidence that such practices have had any negative effect on Western society.eu . We also recognise that for most Westerners. But the matter had previously been widely argued by Muslim and non-Muslim commentators. Is abolition of the traditional Islamic ban on investment for earning of interest necessary for the progress of the global Islamic community? In a distorted manner.Islamic Banking CIP that submission of “Islamic finance” disputes to “parallel Shariah” tribunals could increase the influence of radical clerics. but rather. we observe that while some Western financial institutions have offered “Shariah-compliant” banking and investment products for almost three decades. titled Islam and Mammon. and so-called “Islamic banking”.

We judge that radical Shariah in both Muslim and non-Muslim societies represents the creation of just such “communal shells” and erects a system of barriers to the progress and prosperity of Muslims. 134 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www.P. Muslim Spain.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 founded by Mawdudi and then imported into the UK.eu . and that we believe provides a much sounder basis for economic justice and efficient development among Muslims: “The history of various Muslim peoples feature extended periods of steady economic growth. emerged. Kuran. August 19. He describes this ideology as separatist and purificationist: according to Mawdudi. scientific creativity. their bellies and private parts. which we do not consider to be essentially Islamic or appropriate for Muslims.. and Mughal India… To invoke the glories of these cosmopolitan states would have undermined the argument that Muslims do best when they withdraw into their own communal shells”.islamicpluralism. This is the context from which the ideology of “Islamic banking”. Kuran’s book also embodies an important lesson for Westerners in their examination of radical Islam. 273 Kuran. International Herald Tribune. Timur. One need only think about the high periods of the Abbasid Caliphate. NOTES 272 Desai. 2004. Princeton U. Prof. “A minority of Muslims were ‘true Muslims. Umesh.’ But the majority barely practiced Islam… The latter group of ‘partial Muslims’ had never accomplished anything of value.’ as they were ‘completely immersed in Islam. according to Mawdudi”. Further. the Ottoman Empire. 2008. and artistic [efflorescence]. “Credit crisis gives Islamic finance a chance to shine”. Safavid Iran.’ Religion fully controlled ‘their heads and hearts. Islam and Mammon: The Economic Predicaments of Islamism. as paraphrased by Prof. in the nonMuslim West such obstacles between communities represent a threat of increased social discord and radical influence.

is not. Severing financial links. have organised opposition against the radicals. a product of social or political grievances. but is of secondary utility. Aside from women. moderates. and the doctrines of the Muslim Brotherhood – that have enjoyed funding support from established or failing states. and definitely ignore secular Muslims. secular Muslims. How do proponents of radical or “parallel Shariah” contend with objections to their activities by women. Deobandism. “soft” fundamentalism in Turkey. and traditionalists. however. Western European governments have taken measures leading in exactly the opposite direction. but of specific ideologies – mainly Wahhabism. Groups that agitate for radical Shariah or “parallel Shariah” inevitably serve as friendly environments in enlistment for. the non-radical elements in European Islam are treated by Shariah agitators as presumptive apostates from Islam. Conclusion and Recommendations The CIP survey of Shariah in Western Europe has produced a number of conclusions by the investigators that. with seven recommendations. France. and media. which may or may not be legitimate. and moderates in Germany. in our view. Conclusions and Recommendations CIP 11. Moderates in Germany and the 135 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www.11. and completion of terrorist operations. and Spain. are necessary to abate radicalisation and prevent terrorism. academics. and vice versa? • While groups such as the ECFR and EMN adopt an ameliorative idiom and apparently moderate arguments in addressing issues involving women. generated recommendations for the use of governmental authorities. As we have observed. the Netherlands. and defeating these ideologies within the Muslim communities. • In response. and organisation. there is considerable European Muslim opposition to radicalism.eu . preparation. separate legal standard. The first conclusion we derive from our study is that notwithstanding the widespread image among non-Muslims of Europe as a continent under an irresistible Islamic siege. Muslim women in all five of the named Western European countries. both as it deals with Shariah and in support of terrorism. moderates. and traditionalists in their discourse. • Radical Islamic agitation in the West. dialogue about alleged grievances is useful regarding local complaints of discrimination. in turn.islamicpluralism. How do Shariah proponents advance radical ideology and/or serve as cover for terrorist conspiracies? • Radical Shariah ideology is an essential element in the recruitment and incitement of terrorists in Western Islamic milieux. they tend to exclude women. including to the introduction of some form of Shariah as a special. We therefore offer the following responses to the questions posed at the beginning of this document. since such beliefs call for separation of Muslims from their non-Muslim neighbours and rejection of Western institutions. Western governments should support the anti-radical tendencies among Muslims. legitimising radicals as partners in public affairs and excluding anti-radical tendencies.

These professionals have received little or no CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. Community mediation. without consulting religious authorities. moderates are unorganised or minimally organised but represent an articulate alternative in France. we found little evidence that ordinary Muslim parents tend to resort to them for assistance in making decisions. Muslim lawyers working in the established. One such involves the failure of non-Muslim state authorities to adequately enforce established standards. But we note with concern the absence of knowledge among non-Muslim authorities regarding Berber community alternatives to Shariah. Do families more frequently consult religious leaders or submit queries to Shariah websites before making decisions? • While Shariah queries to religious leaders and websites appear a popular method of improvised religious selfeducation among younger European Muslims. non-Muslim family law or social welfare agencies. How can Western-trained and resident Muslim (non-Shariah) legal professionals be assisted to form a professional lobby? • As we saw most clearly in Britain.eu . because of their support to French state secularism. in which guarantees of fair treatment can be assured? • As demonstrated by the Albanian Catholic example of mediation to end honour conflicts and the Alevi practice of settlement of disagreements by “popular tribunals”.islamicpluralism. Another and greater danger is that of the control of such processes by extremists. who could serve as the basis of moderate opposition to the radicals in Britain. • Alevis and Berbers suffer in Western Europe from the syndrome of neglect as “minorities within minorities”. are disorganised or fractured in that country. which are dominated by Deobandi radicals. The majority of non-radical Muslims seem to make family and related decisions based on religious habits they imported from their countries of origin or inherited from their immigrant parents. In the mainly-Berber Muslim communities in the Netherlands. which comprise the majority of British Muslims. France. and Spain. non-Muslim legal system represent an important resource for opposition to “parallel Shariah” schemes and radical Islam in general. under the pretext of minority accommodation. • Moderate resources for community mediation exist in the Alevi communities among Turkish and Kurdish Muslims in the West. • In the British case. could be an acceptable institution for Western European Muslims. we are dismayed by official ignorance of the capacity of Barelvi mosques and communities. representing heterodox Muslim identities submerged in the general atmosphere of “established” Islamic culture and vulnerable to discrimination by “official” as well as radical Muslim leaders. and the potential for such practices appears realistic among Berbers in the Netherlands. as we see in Shariah divorce tribunals in the UK. Such mediation 136 among the majority of Muslims living in the West nevertheless embodies certain risks. both described above in Case Study: Germany. Traditionalists. if it is truly voluntary and monitored by established. France and Spain.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 Netherlands enjoy more advantageous positions because of Turkish state secularism and Alevi community advocacy among Muslim immigrants and their descendants. religious functionaries can play a positive role in community mediation. Is voluntary community mediation based on Islamic law a workable concept. to provide moderate choices for religiousbased mediation.

need not occupy the attention of Western European authorities. has been advanced by some “soft fundamentalists”. Western European governments should abandon the inappropriate quest for a Kissingeresque “single telephone number” for Islam in any European state. but cannot even be adequately defined in England and Spain. French. Some non-Muslims respond to the emergence of radical Islam in Western Europe by insisting that Muslims adopt established local identities as uniform British. and equally rigid alternatives: monolithic assimilation. not 137 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www.islamicpluralism.Conclusions and Recommendations CIP support from official Western institutions. Western European Muslims today appear to be faced with two false. Such a policy. We therefore formulated Recommendation 2. This conception. Dutch. While an end of the Wahhabi religious monopoly in Saudi Arabia may be near and could contribute to the diminution of radical influence in Western Europe. From the global unification facilitating Islamisation as conceived by Taha Jaber AlAlwani274 and described in chapter 3 of this survey to “official Islam” in each Western European country is a small leap. German. and Spanish citizens. as it involves the same imposition of a false homogeneity that would create “official Islam” under radical domination. as a combination of traditional Shariah and contemporary Western law. accompanied by exclusion of the above-mentioned advocates for “minorities within minorities”. have a place in Western Muslim life? • The concept of “moderate Shariah”. as well as certain ideological figures in Iran. aside from that governing strictly personal religious matters. and the Netherlands. to describe it diplomatically. How have government or other official responses succeeded or failed. Assimilation and integration of Muslims in Western Europe will be accomplished by maintaining multiple lines of communication. as in our view. below. Germany. and why? • Western European governments have generally failed in their response to radical Islam and particularly to Shariah agitation. British and Spanish cultures are not themselves monolithic – are Muslims asked to become Scots if they live in Glasgow and Welsh if they immigrate to Cardiff? A most important example is that of the Spanish autonomous region of Catalonia. given the superior economic resources of the latter. has been the mistaken acceptance of the dominant Sunni community leaders as sole legitimate representatives of Islam in Western Europe. • The Western European authorities have effectively enabled the establishment of a “state” or “official” Islam in each of their countries. The primary factor in this policy stalemate.eu . We believe this approach is bound to fail. as in Turkey. such experiments with Shariah should not be applied in the West. which calls on Muslim immigrants to become Catalans. The question of “Islamic finance” as a form of “parallel Shariah” remains to be more fully debated. nevertheless. Monolithic assimilation could superficially succeed in France. or monolithic multiculturalism in the form of European “state Islam”. Whether Shariah may be modernised in this manner in Islamic countries is a worthwhile topic for discussion among Muslim and non-Muslim experts. Can Shariah be modernised to function in better harmony with Western law? Does Shariah in any form. A unitary “official Islam” in Western Europe will necessarily be dominated by Saudi-financed and other radicals. which ignores the pluralism and diversity of Islam. has never been and would never be applied in official relations with Christianity or Judaism. there cannot be a policy of waiting for such a change to occur in the Muslim lands.

condemnation was expressed in British media of both “Little Pakistans” and “Little Polands” (the latter inhabited. That is. Thorough examination and analysis of options for Berber/Amazigh mediation processes remain to be completed by European government and academic investigators.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 Castilians or “Spaniards”. NOTES 274 Al-Alwani. But not all immigrant enclaves are equally problematical and the equation of all immigrant enclaves in Western Europe as bad is absurd. just as radicals. Taha Jaber. by Christian immigrants from Eastern Europe). Western Europeans often appear as disturbed by Christian immigration from Poland. But this equation ignores that radicals do not agitate or support terrorist ideologies in Polish immigrant communities. “reformers” – a term often used by the radicals to describe themselves – or secularists? Barelvis. Discussion of Western European Islam is also negatively affected by what may be called the “noise syndrome”. as isolated communities resisting immediate assimilation. as by Muslim immigration. obviously. op. op. traditional. yet who are not “liberals”. Alevis and Berbers do not easily fit into the liberal or secularist categories even though they may share some attitudes with them. loyal to Western law. who may be mobilised to defeat the fundamentalists and other radicals in Western Europe. Towards a Fiqh for Minorities. but from specific interpretations of Qur’an. especially in a situation of economic distress such as emerged in 2007-08. 275 MacEoin. RECOMMENDATION 2: Government and non-governmental organisations concerned to oppose Shariah intrusion and radical Islam should carry out serious work to assist non-Shariah Muslim legal professionals in organising and maintaining a trans-national professional guild or lobby. In the aftermath of the Mumbai terrorist assault late in 2008. have tended to occupy the space for official consultation with Muslims in Western Europe. religious fundamentalists who are Koranic literalists but not violent. Denis. with the assistance of Whiteman. “four groups are important: violent extremists. by Catholics who may attend mass regularly. Western European governments should assure the representation of such “minorities within minorities” in all official deliberations involving Islam. liberal Muslims who want to reform Islam to make it compatible with liberal-democracy. Critics of Muslim isolation often focus attention on the negative effects caused by the persistence of Muslim enclaves in Western Europe. what about the majority of moderate. In our observations. “Quranic literalism” is mainly a Western myth based on misapprehensions about the nature of fundamentalist and traditional thought in Islam.islamicpluralism. cit. 138 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. cit. For example. in reporting on intra-Muslim debate only “loud” Muslims from the anti-radical side are heard. But more important. This indicates that problems of cultural assimilation and social rivalry may prove more enduring than those of religious conflict. but should be the subject of a major policy study. conservative Muslims. Recommendations RECOMMENDATION 1: Alevi community mediation should be provided with official support from the German and Dutch governments. because of their financial and other assets. and secular Muslims”. even the most extreme radicals do not argue from literalism.eu . the British analyst275 Denis MacEoin argues that among Muslims in the UK.

Adherents of radical Islam will condemn such a policy as a Western effort to divide Muslims. as well as Latin Americans in the U. in our view.eu 139 . and today nobody in the U. and of the contrast between the two variants. Tabligh-i-Jamaat. We recognise as a methodological principle that authorities should make analytical distinctions. the Turkish Diyanet. would suggest that a “Koreatown” represents a threat to American identity. and continue among some groups.Conclusions and Recommendations CIP RECOMMENDATION 3: We hold to the traditional Muslim position: Muslims who migrate to Western countries are. While radical activities were observed among European and Asian immigrants to the U. We deem it justified to recognise an existing diversity rooted in centuries of Islamic history. rather than confusing them. and Iran for radical Islamic groups should be interdicted.S. but the radicals propose to artificially. charity. including Barelvism. and as we have sought to show.islamicpluralism. is necessary. based on recognition of and support for the described anti-radical trends. RECOMMENDATION 4: We propose a strategy of authentically pluralistic integration. male circumcision. notwithstanding its informal cultural separatism. Alevism. fasting. and Sufism. will advance social stability. and even violently. should be required to affirm by a signed and sacred oath their obedience to local laws in non-Muslim countries in which they desire to reside. they diminished. integration.S. both of which are most notable in France. Turkey. the Maghrebi state clerical institutions. and the positive example of the North American-style melting pot. RECOMMENDATION 7: Foreign Islamic institutions in Western Europe. conforms to traditional Muslim legal thought. RECOMMENDATION 5: Western European governments need to understand the transitional character of assimilation. as well as moderate and traditional Sunnism. Milli Goruş. Financial support from Saudi Arabia. or spiritual Islam. ablutions. rather than vacillating between exclusionary enclavisation and compulsory assimilation. Western European governments should encourage the rational integration of immigrant communities. in Western Europe or any other non-Muslim territory. We oppose the erection of “state Islam” in Western Europe. Muslims living in Western Europe must recognise and accept that the protection of Muslim women from abuse is better secured through Western marriage and family law than through Shariah schemes. and Canada. including religious functionaries. should be closely monitored. CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. during the 19th and 20th centuries. Pakistan.S. and Shariah for them must be limited to strictly personal matters of prayer. obliged to obey the laws and accept the customs of the countries in which they take up residence. diet. and Berber/Amazigh identity. as a separate legal standard. such as the European Council for Fatawa and Research (ECFR). Such a rule is fair. and burial. but believe a historical examination of the more positive outcomes for “state Islam” in Russia and the post-Habsburg states. Shiism. Muslim immigrants. RECOMMENDATION 6: There should be no “parallel Shariah”. and enclaves. impose unity among Muslims. and other bodies.

Washington. by Bashkim Aliu. Muslims in the European Union: Discrimination and Islamophobia.p. CPS Pilot on Forced Marriage and So-Called ‘Honour’ Crime – Findings. Recommendations on Future Work on Forced Marriage and So-Called ‘Honour’ Crime. Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee. Non! l’Islam n’est pas une politique. London. and Radical Islam. 2007.e-cfr. Crimes of the Community. Paris. James. The Radical Dawa in Transition. collected in Barcelona. Grasset. 1985.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 Bibliography Books. 2003. tr. Paris. n. 2 vols. Sarajevo. Akademia Evropiane për Fetva dhe Studime. AlHidayah (The Guidance). William L. 2006 [Bosnian edition]. Towards a Fiqh for Minorities. 2008. 2006 [Albanian edition. Islam Against the West. Enes Ljevaković. Les Défis de l’Islam. Marianne et le Prophète: L’Islam dans la France laïque. Dalloz. tr. n. Conseil europeén des fatwas et de la recherche. Éditions la Découverte. Furkan ISM.p. Desclée de Brouwer.p. Television Documentaries: Ajuntament de Barcelona. Brandon. Documents. Dalil. Bencheikh. [——]. Centre for Social Cohesion.. Soheib. Présentation [by] Yusuf Al-Qardawi. 2006 and 2008. 2008. [——]. Centre for Islamic Pluralism. 2004. 140 [——]. Sylvia. November 2008. 2008. Briefing Paper. 2002 [——]. Boubakeur. University of Texas Press. Brussels. Entretiens avec Virginie Malabard. London.islamicpluralism.. CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. “El català. Lyon. [European Council for Fatawa and Research]. Washington/London. Black America. 1998. Burhan al-Din.. Recueil de fatwas. 2006. Éd. Fetve Islamskog Vijeća. International Institute of Islamic Thought. Taha Jaber. [——]. Ni Putes Ni Soumises. “Honour Killing Its Causes and Consequences: Suggested Strategies for the European Parliament”. tr. 2007. Amara. 2008. Scientific Training and Radical Islam. Paris. le Coran tolérant.eu . 2003. Prisons. Amal Press. second ed. with the collaboration of Zappi. Tawhid. second collection]. Préface et commentaires [by] Tariq Ramadan. 2003. Crown Prosecution Service. 1. Bristol. Directorate General External Policies of the [European] Union. n. Al-Farghani al-Marghinani. Flammarion. llengua d’acollida”. Shkup. Algemene Inlichtingen. European Parliament.en Veiligheidsdienst – AIVD... n. London. accessible at www. by Dr. Second Collection. Connectum. Série no. London/Washington. European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia.org. Policy Department External Policies. Paris. 2008.d. [——]. Fadela. 2007. Austin. Al-Alwani.. Salam. and Hafez. Cleveland.. Resolutions and Fatwas. leaflet.

Rachid. tr. Abi and Ja’far.uk.d Muslim Law (Shariah) Council UK.. Music. Yusuf Talal Ali. Islamic Scientific Academy. tr. Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestijding. The Essential Hanafi Handbook of Fiqh. [——].islamicpluralism. and Syed Shukry.p. Mirza..org. ‘Islamic Groups in Britain: A Background Paper From the Social Responsibility Committee of the Moravian Church. A Code of Practice for Muslims in the West. Fishman. M. Munira. 2004. published at www. n. 1994. Scotland. Balland. Salafism in the Netherlands. Muslim Arbitration Tribunal. Imam Ali Foundation.moravian. “Fiqh Al-Aqalliyat: A Legal Theory for Muslim Minorities”. Gjeçovi. 2008. Gjonlekaj. tr.d. Herbert Schultze. Ibn Naqib. n. Tr. [——]. Kanuni i Lekë Dukagjinit/The Code of Lekë Dukagjini.. Inverness. Islam and Mammon: The Economic Predicaments of Islamism. Aisha Bewley. Ibn Anas.P. Lettre ouverte aux demagogues. Islamic Scientific Academy. Paris. Al-Qaradawi. Denis. Living Apart Together: British Muslims and the paradox of multiculturalism. Paris.. Sayyid Muhammad Rizvi. Cologne. José Luis. Islam and Identity in Germany. Groves. and Udo Tworuschka. L. Civitas. Michael Walpole. Indianapolis. Croydon. Timur. 141 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. Nuh Keller. A Guide to the Presentation of Islam in School Textbooks. Hudson Institute. 2004. Moinuddin Siddiqui. M. Leonard Fox. Shammai. Kaci. Globalised Islam. Muslims in Spain: 1500 to 1614. Chicago. Abdoldjavad. rev. 1990. n. Kuran. Md. Muslim Thoughts for Teachers and Textbook Authors. Madrid. and Muslim Schools in Britain. La Republique des Lâches. University of Chicago Press. New York. tr. and Other Sins: Segregation. Integration. Malik. Zein. Madinah Press.. London. L’islam dans les prisons. by Kamal El-Helbawy. 1977.. Éditions des Syrtes. Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos.eu . n. n. 1992 Roy. 1988. German ed. 2004. Princeton U. London. Amana Publications. Reliance of the Traveller. Sarah. 2006. ed. MacEoin. International Crisis Group. Chess. Ahmad. Senthilkumaran. n. Washington. Columbia U. New Delhi. 2007. Köln. Éditions des Syrtes. tr.d. “Memorandum on Organ Donation”. Qazi Thanaa Ullah. tr. Khosrokhavar. Georg-Eckert-Institut. 1989.. Islamische Wissenschaftliche Akademie. 1995. Policy Exchange. 1991. 2003. Al-Muwatta. American Trust Publications. 2006. The Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam. tr. Olivier. [2007]. October 18. Sánchez Nogales. 2005. Paris. Der Islam in Unterricht. Beltsville.Bibliography CIP Falaturi. Dominic. New York. and Whiteman. Netherlands Ministry of Internal Affairs and Governmental Relations. Ali [based on the work of Ayatollah Ali Sistani].p.’ September 2005. 1999. 2004. 2009. Farhad.P.P.p. El islam en la España actual. Liberation From Forced Marriages. Hadi. Yusuf. Braunschweig.. German ed. Shtjefën. Kitab Bhavan.. Harvey.

“Mujeres. Neil. Tres millones de niñas sufren cada año algún tipo de mutilación genital. Van Donselaar. Section 12. “Muslim Health Care Workers and AlcoholBased Handrubs”. práctica que afecta a 130 millones de féminas en el mundo”.S. Madrid. June 4. July 2008. Àlex. 2008.. Aunion. D. IZH]. [——]. and Schwartz. Angle Editorial. Part 1605. and Universiteit Leiden. Ataman.F. “Ne succombez pas à l’islamisme”.. The Lancet [London]. July 15.. January 24. McLean. Philippe. Divorce Shariah Style. From Jail to Jihad. Libération [Paris] February 28. Amsterdam University Press. Jamal. Rachid. Paris. Dalil. Abdelwahab. McLean. www.A. Broadcast February 3. Boubakeur. Berghahn Books. [——]. 2006.. Mohamed. Kaci. Meddeb. Ontwikkelingen na de moord op Van Gogh. Islam. Religious Discrimination. Sirat. Purified by Blood: Honour Killings Among Turks in the Netherlands. Undercover Mosque – The Return. Anne Frank Stichting.R. Allgranzi. February 19. [Biog. 2004. Babès. Floris F. René-Samuel. Bouras. Va. 2002. Articles: Achour. U. fue golpeada y repatriada”. “Reading and Writing and Ramadan”. The Weekly Standard [Washington]. n. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion. Stephen. El Mundo [Madrid]. Sökefeld. 2008. Badawi. Pittet. Sifaoui. Alvarado. Salvator. El caso de Roxana que se enamoró de un alemán. El Mundo. Francisco. “Ablación. Amsterdam. Barcelona. 2003. Torture in Saudi Arabia. L’Enseignement des religions à l’École laïque. 2004. Barcelona. Stephen. Martin.A. Memish. Philippe. [Hamburg. Z. 2006. Al-Alawi. Islam y Guerra Civil Española. Messaoud. UK]. New York and Oxford. Seglers. Musulmans a Catalunya: El repte de l’integració i la llibertat religiosa..radicalmiddle 142 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. Clementine.]. Amsterdam University Press. 2008. La Esfera de los Libros. Alami. Broadcast June 16. 2002. March 12. and Joutard. El País [Madrid]. Religious Freedom in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. B. 2004. “El Gobierno pone límites al plan para segregar alumnos en Cataluña”. J.d. and Compliance Manual. “Imam who secretly divorced £1m wife is jailed”.. Atkinson. Schwartz.. Daily Examiner [Huddersfield.A. Broadcast September 1. 2007. The Islamic Centre Hamburg – A Presentation. 29 C. Van Eck. Unsigned. 2008. Yazmin. The Two Faces of Islam. 2009. Rachid.islamicpluralism. Peter R.eu . 2002. UK TV Channel 4 Dispatches. Q. 2003. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Esther. 2006. Saudi Institute. 2008. Ferda. 2007. January 20.. Doubleday. Capelle.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 Sánchez Ruano. Ahmed. Struggling for Recognition: The Alevi Movement in Germany and in Transnational Space. Der Spiegel [Hamburg]. “Angst vor Ehrenmord – Leyla flieht vor der eigenen Familie”. Leiden. Jaap. The Immigrant Organising Process.. New York. Va. Amsterdam. 2008. Irfan. and Rodrigues. Vermeulen. 2002 [——]. Leila.

“Cinq ans de prison avec sursis pour avoir fait exciser ses filles”. August 15. Brown. “Manchmal hilft nur eine neue Identität // Zwi Mordanschläge gegen Frauen . “L’islam ultraortodox duplica les mesquites a Catalunya en 4 anys”. Der Tagesspiegel [Berlin]. Home Purchase.C. Carroll.com/polygamy5. Nick. Le Courrier de L’Atlas [Paris].. December 1.. The Guardian.L. and Islamic Norms in the West”. November-December 2008. 2005. Andrew. Bali. Tester. Champion. Eric. T. www. Frederic. Amel. June 6. The Times [London]. The Guardian [London]. Briet. May 2008. “Channel 4’s Dispatches: Undercover Mosque – vile sisters of no mercy”. Gamon.Des peines de prison avec sursis pour les parents des fillettes maliennes excisées”. The Netherlands]. La Charente Libre [Cognac]. die tageszeitung [Berlin]. Martin. 2005. and Grayson. Ben Naser. Baquero. Le Monde des Religions [Paris]. and Lamarki. February 5. Current Trends in Islamist Ideology. Bodi.islamfortoday. Antimicrobial Agents and Chemotherapy [Washington. Bernklau. March 18. Faisal. Carin. “Les musulmans français et la citoyenneté”. Daniel and Chapman. K. December 28. 2008. “Tödliche Tradition”. December 10. 2003. January 14. M. July 13.net/women/s_women. R. July 24. Le Monde [Paris]. February 26. Sandrine. freed by Bangladesh court”. “Koranic codes”. Caeiro. at http://islamic-world. December 15. [——]. “ ‘Face of Asia’ death plunge model had been pregnant”. Taycir.eu . Humayrah Abedin. “Mutilations sexuelles: un combat au quotidien”. Brown.was die Polizei tun kann. 2008. “Wife beating?”.. Daily Mirror [London]. Daily Mail [London]. G. AFP. Dan. v. Hosking.net/. June 14. 2008. “After the Ramadan Affair: New Trends in Islamism in the West”.. Sylvie and Cabut. Mzine [Waalwijk.. “COUR D’ASSISES DE SEINE-SAINT-DENIS .Bibliography CIP way. “Ils ont choisi l’école catholique”. 1999. September 2. 100% Business”. 2007. Seek 143 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. El Periódico [Barcelona]. Antonio. Barbier-Bouvet. in Special Theme Issue – Shari’a in Europe. P. 2004. Rhys. November 2008. Chapman. Nadia. Gerostamoulos. Brill [Leiden-Boston]..’” The Daily Telegraph [London]. Cecile. Die Welt Des Islams. Sylviane. um die Opfer zu schultzen”. “Can Alcohol-Based HandRub Solutions Cause You To Lose Your Driver’s License? Comparative Cutaneous Absorption of Various Alcohols”.co.islamawareness. 2008. Bell. James. S.htm. “Muslims call for special bank holidays”.islamicpluralism. “100% Halal. Daily Mail.. 2004. Sabine. “In the name of the law”. “The Social Construction of Shari’a: Bank Interest. www. Alexandre. 2008. Sue.L.html [——]. “Court: Husband ‘killed wife over fears she would abort baby. D.uk/. “‘Forced marriage’ doctor.K. 2006. Martin. Blakely. 2008. DC]. Marc. Chambon. Bowkett. Jean-François. “Muslim Youth in U. Boffey. Britten. 2 [Washington]. 2002. [——]. 2007. “La France est un des seuls pays à faire des procès pour excision”. 2008. Libération. Beikler. Baraille.

October 18. May 17. 17 ans. September 11. 2005. August 19. December 26. 2009. nicht der Liebe”. dará prioridad a los internos árabes en los trabajos que se realizan en prisión”.eu . Ganley.’ ” AFP. immolée au bas d’une HLM”. Astrid. “Eine Frage der Ehre. Edward. Laura. October 7.’ “ The Wall Street Journal [New York]. Hall. “Sohane. Catherine. El Barrio. February 28. 2007. dass ich die Tat begangen habe. 2004. Daily Mail. Eusterhus. The Guardian. 2005. Le Figaro. Presos musulmanes. 2008. Joost. 2002. Crumley. De Larminat. Del Barrio. Gabizon. “El Gobierno financiará a los imames para que acudan a las cárceles con el fin de dirigir el rezo de los reclusos musulmanes”. El Mundo. “ ‘Ehrenmord-Prozess’ – ‘Ich bin sehr froh. “Sevilla. October 10. “Ancient Public Deliberation and Assembly in the Code of Lekë Dukagjini”. February 5. April 24.net/. April 21. Gisela. October 1.islamonline.]. 2008. January 7. La directora general de Instituciones Penitenciarias. Daut. 2007. “Le Pen ‘s’étonne’ de l’expulsion de l’imam Bouziane pour ‘délit d’opinion. 2001. October 2. 2008.. Fischer. February 28. Eduardo. “‘Luister naar wens radicale 144 moslims’: Pleidooi in rapport NCTb”. Dauti.. De Telegraaf [Amsterdam]. Clark. May 14. Feddersen. Daniels. 2007. “Muslim schools offered cash to become state-run”. die tageszeitung.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 Different Sort of Summer Camp – Afghan. “Photos d’identité et voiles .’ ” Le Figaro [Paris]. Pakistani Outposts Offer Military Training To ‘Defend Our Faith. 2005. 2004.D. July 5. C. ed. 2004. 2008. Die Welt [Hamburg]. Coroller. Sebastian. The Washington Post. Elaine. Jacky. 2002. Cécilia. International Herald Tribune. Los funcionarios denuncian la falta de personal y medios para evitar que el integrismo prospere entre rajas”. October 10.’ ” Der Spiegel. “Cárceles. “ECFR Marks 10 Years of European Fatwas”. Desai. El Mundo. “Le silence assourdissant du CFCM dans les banlieues”. 2003.G. Ana. “Lack of Asian donors extends waiting time for transplants”. October 5. Ali. Ana. TIME Europe. Jan. Ileana. Eva. “Multikulti ist verantwortungslos”. “Acting on the Outrage”. “Manual outlines Muslim radicalisation in prisons”. “Doubts About German ‘Honour Killing. Del Campo. “A Private Feud Turns Into a National Issue”. CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. Kettering Foundation. 2008. Umesh.le flou de la loi”. Al-Halawani. “Credit crisis gives Islamic finance a chance to shine”. De Haas. Friedrichsen. 1997. November 8. 2008.islamicpluralism. Dayton. Durand. Libération. November 19. El Mundo [Andalusia ed. Libération. The Daily Express [London]. 2004. at www. Collective Decision Making Around the World: Essays on Historic Deliberative Practices. 2006. “Dalil Boubakeur – ‘Non à des élections favorisant l’extrémisme. Cody.’” Der Spiegel. Bruce. Mercedes Gallizo. Alison. Macer. Associated Press. “Fury at ‘no-go’ areas ruled by the fanatics”. October 22. in Marin.

2002. The Sunday Times [London]. Levy. 2008. 2008. “Huiver voor islamitische zuil is misplaatst en on-Nederlands”. February 20. October 7. doch ihr Bruder stach 20-mal zu”.Bibliography CIP Harrath. CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. 2008. May 17. Licht. Malik. Kerbaj. 2006. Michel. “Nous sommes prêts à être des Voltaire de l’islam”.eu 145 . you should go and live in Saudi”. BBC News. “Case study: ‘For many imams speaking against rape is embarrassing. Ulla: “Ehrenmord: Morsal O. 2008. The Daily Telegraph. 2007. 2008. “Plakatieren gegen Zwangsheirat”.’ “ The Times.diplomatie. Kutter. Zubeida. “Nine-year-old brides saved by authorities from being married off in Muslim weddings”. Shahid. Koopman. “Happily married?”. 2006. 2008. Chris. 2008. at www. “How Safar Daftary’s death fall exposed polygamy in Britain”. Evening Standard [London]. 2003. November 15. 2001. “Absueltos 14 de los 20 condenados en la Operación Nova”. 2008.gouv. “Muslim Britain is becoming one big no-go area”. “Purge on Muslim clerics who turn a blind eye to the abuse of women”. Daily Mail. February 22. 2008. Köhnlein. Hamburger Abendblatt. August 20. Hastings. [——].d. The Times. September 26. 2009. Sascha. [——].islamicpluralism. Libération. “Every Noise I Hear I Think He’s Coming to Kill Me”. The Daily Telegraph. Malik. n. September 29. Audrey. El País. Hannane. October 25. Patrick and Kite. Miliband. Le Courrier de L’Atlas. Emmanuelle. The Sunday Times. December 19. Shiraz. Marraco. October 18. “Frankfurter Familienrichterin sorgt mit Koran-Verweis für Empörung”. Paul. Sue. “No to Forced Marriages!”. March 22. Maher. David. Lázaro. Jan-Eric. Richard. 2008. October 29. Hani Ramadan sera licencié par le gouvernement genevois”. March 21. “Une nouvelle ‘affaire de voile’ en perspective?’. “Poll reveals 40pc of Muslims want shariah law in UK”. Dominic. “If you want shariah law. March 22. 2002. Linder. September 26. “Lucha contra el terrorismo islamista: Operaciones Nova”. 2006. Stephan. and Reinhard. Kennedy. Hennessy. November 23. June 9. Libération. Associated Press German Worldstream. The Times. “Zwangsheirat erstaunlich häufig”. Balasko. November 2008. Melissa. De Twentsche Courant Tubantia [Twente. Hickley. December 27. The Daily Telegraph. Le Temps [Geneva]. Julio M. Matthew. “Sharia rulings on divorces and disputes to be rubber-stamped by English courts”. Lloyd-Roberts. die tageszeitung (national edition). war ein lebensfrohes Mädchen – das konnte Ahmad O. “Nouvelle barrière au sacrifice du mouton”. die tageszeitung (national edition). Kaija.fr/. January 13. El Mundo. February 20. Manuel. [——]. 2005... “Considéré comme un imam trop bavard. “A new weapon in the fight against forced marriage”. Daniel. The Netherlands]. nicht ertragen – Sie flehte. 2008.

Martha. Colin. James. [——]. Le Monde. January 11. “Baisse de la pratique de l’excision en France. Mathias. January 11. Okaz and Al-Riyadh [Saudi Arabia]. [——]. 2008. The Boston Globe. Roughneen. “Comments on the Islamic Religion”. “Shariah Comes for the Archbishop”. Al-Qaradawi. 2008. February 25. “For Muslim women. Switzerland]. 12 August 2006. Muslim Council of Britain. November 30. “Le Charia incomprise”. The Weekly Standard. “Extremism flourished as UK lost Christianity”.net/.islamicpluralism.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 Murray. Daily Mail. International Relations and Security Network [Zurich. Schollbach. The ABA Journal [New York]. 2007. [——]. [——].. April 8. Schmale. AP German Worldstream. James. Al-Watan [Saudi Arabia]. 1999. August 27. “Islamic Court Rulings are Enforceable in the United Kingdom”. “Cataluña creará centros específicos para los inmigrantes recién llegados”.. 2007. Simon. “Europe’s Sharia Question”. Full-page advertisement on Lebanon. September 10. “Application of Shari’a Rules in Europe – Scope and Limits”. Stephen. Nazir-Ali. “Vigil of tears for death-plunge Muslim model beauty”. September 26. at www. May 18. et al. “Nach Ehrenmord: Hunderte demonstrieren gegen Gewalt an Frauen”. August 12. in Special Theme Issue – Shari’a in Europe. Laura L. Oliver. Rozenberg. Die Welt Des Islams. Schultz. “Muslim fanatics ‘hijack British prison. as monitored by the Centre for Islamic Pluralism. 2004. December 25. Joshua. July 9. Die Welt. 2005. Michael. AFP.’ ” Sunday Express [London]. Sawer. The Weekly Standard. The Independent [London]. “Multiculturalism Run Amok”. August 4. says British Muslim leader”. Slack.. August 29. “Das Schicksal einer jungen Türkin”. Hani. Hendrik. 2002. a deadly defiance: ‘Honour killings’ on rise in Europe”. Al-Yaum [Saudi Arabia]. Naraian. Evening Standard. November 23. mais le risque demeure”. 2008. 2008. Reportage on Saudi Holiday Marriages. as monitored by Centre for Islamic Pluralism. 2002. 2006. December 30. August 5. Jaya. “Wahhabis in the Old Dominion”. Schwartz. “Nach ‘Ehrenmord’: Gericht weist Klage gegen Ausweisung ab”. 2008. The Daily Telegraph.islamonline. January 16.eu . “Shariah law is spreading as authority wanes”. 2004. The Times. March 7. M. 2008. 2008. Rohe. 2008 Nickerson.V. Neil. September 19. Ramadan. “Islamic Ruling on Female Circumcision”. 2008. Ruiz. “My men train for armed conflict. Patrick. 2006. Paula. as monitored by Centre for Islamic Pluralism. Reportage on Floggings in Saudi Arabia. The Daily Standard [Washington]. La Voz de Galicia [A Coruña]. Stuttgarter Zeitung.000 Asian children 146 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. “More than 3. 1989. The Sunday Telegraph [London]. Yusuf. 2002. 2007. July 20.

October 21. “Faith schools set for expansion”. The Rotterdam Times. July 17. “Donner hekelt toon integratiedebat”.’ ” Daily Mail. Der Tagesspiegel. August 26.islamicpluralism. “What is Euro-Islam? Could it Avert the Islamic Self-Ghettoisation in the European Diaspora?” Unpublished. Ouest France. September 16. 2000. “Les consulats algériens et marocains veulent peser sur la désignation des représentants musulmans”. La Vanguardia [Barcelona]. “El imán de Fuengirola no recurre la pena por incitar a los malos tratos a la mujer”. Unsigned. October 30. El Periódico de Aragón [Zaragoza]. Unsigned. 2008. Unsigned. “De la Vega anuncia la revisión de la ley orgánica de libertad religiosa”. The Sunday Times. Bassam. November 30.Bibliography CIP vanishing from school and ‘forced into arranged marriages. BBC News. Ouest France [Brittany]. October 31. March 11. April 21. Unsigned. Taher. The Daily Telegraph. Tibi.concilier laïcité et particularismes”. December 9. 2001. “Nicolas Sarkozy souhaite modifier les modalités de l’élection du Conseil français du culte musulman”. Unsigned. “École . Le Monde. “Forced marriage for 15-year-old in Pakistan is foiled”. Madrid. 2002. 2004. 2005. July 11. Chicago Tribune. 2008. [——]. February 26. Unsigned. 2004. “Revealed: UK’s first official sharia courts”. “For family honour. ANP. 2008. Unsigned. she had to die. Unsigned. 2002. Christine. “El Hema store opened”. 2004. Abul. June 8. Unsigned. Unsigned. 2008. 2008. 2003. Unsigned. Europa Press. November 17. “El convertido”. 2008. constate Me Szpiner”. July 11. They are now”. December 21.eu . November 23. 2008. “Culte musulman : le RMF obtient 43. “El imam de Fuengirola se proclama ‘defensor de las mujeres’ en el juicio contra él por discriminación”. September 10. “Els alumnes immigrants no tindran un temps d’estada màxim en els centres de benvinguda educative”. 2005. Unsigned. “‘Cette affaire a été traitée sans incident majeur’. November 28. 2006. Xavier. Unsigned. Suddeutsche Zeitung [Munich]. “Culte musulman . 2008. [——]. Unsigned. Unsigned. September 14. Unsigned.24% des voix”. EFE [News Agency]. L’Est Républicain [Nancy]. “Ces jeunes filles que l’on marie de force”. European police weren’t looking for this kind of violence steeped in tradition. “Crisis around new mosque deepens”. 2008. “Erster Koalitionsstreit um Äußerungen zur Scharia”. Le Progrès [Lyon]. June 11. Unsigned. Agence France Press (AFP). El Mundo. 2008. February 25. March 2008. 147 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. May 7. Le Monde. 2008 Unsigned. 2008. Frankfurter Rundschau. The Amsterdam Times. June 22. 2008. Le Monde. 2007. “Gedenktafel für ermordete Hatun Sürücü”. Ternisien. The Rotterdam Times.un accord au forceps”. “ ‘Ehrenmord’ verhindert”. “Burqa and nikab banned from higher education”. September 12. Unsigned. Spolar. “Dalil Boubakeur du Conseil français du culte musulman”.


A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009

Unsigned, “Gedwongen huwelijken steeds minder normal”, ANP, November 5, 2008. Unsigned, “Geen hiërarchie in Grondwet”, Utrechts Nieuwsblad [Utrecht], May 19, 2004. Unsigned, “German Court Convicts Afghan Man for Stabbing Sister”, Der Spiegel, English text, February 13, 2009. Unsigned, “German court ends Muslim slaughter ban”, BBC News, January 15, 2002. Unsigned, “Germany’s Muslims Band Together: New Umbrella Group Founded”, Der Spiegel, April 11, 2007. Unsigned, “Im Hinterzimmer der Traditionen”, Suddeutsche Zeitung, January 20, 2001. Unsigned, “Jacques Chirac dit non aux symboles religieux ostensibles dans les écoles”. Canadian Press-Associated Press, December 18, 2003. Unsigned, “Jailhouse jihad”, The Economist [London], September 18, 2008. Unsigned, “Köhler fordert Muslime zu Absage an Scharia auf”, Frankfurter Rundschau, June 25, 2005. Unsigned. “La justice française sur la trace des filières djihadistes entre Europe et Asie”, Le Monde, December 12, 2008. Unsigned, “Landelijk expertise centrum eerwraak”, Algemeen Nederlands Persbureau (ANP), Dutch Press Agency, March 8, 2007. Unsigned, “Landelijke actie Turken en Koerden tegen eerwraak”, ANP, November 29, 2005. Unsigned, “Landen van EU pakken misbruik vrouwen aan”, Provinciale Zeeuwse Courant [Rotterdam], July 8, 2004.

Unsigned, “La reconstrucción del clítoris y la circuncisión ritual: paradojas de las civilizaciones”, El Mundo, August 8, 2008. Unsigned, “Lebenslange Haft für Mord an Tochter”, Associated Press German Worldstream, December 22, 2003. Unsigned, “Le carnet de route de la Marche des femmes”, Le Figaro, March 8, 2003. Unsigned, “Le Conseil français du culte musulman en assemblée constitutive”, Reuters, May 3, 2003. Unsigned, “Les certitudes de l’imam de Vénissieux”, Le Figaro, April 17, 2004. Unsigned, “L’ excision aux assises de Paris. Une coutume qui ne passe pas la barre”, Libération, February 3, 1999. Unsigned, “Life for husband who killed wife after baby abortion fear”, Luton Today, December 12, 2008. Unsigned, “Los líderes musulmanes de España piden al Gobierno una reforma legal que les equipare con la Iglesia Católica”, Europa Press, May 8, 2008. Unsigned, “Los musulmanes de España aplauden la condena”, La Vanguardia, January 14, 2004. Unsigned, “L’UOIF appelle à l’apaisement”, Le Nouvel Observateur [Paris], November 8, 2005. Unsigned, “Man arrested for genital mutilation”, Radio Netherlands Worldwide English, February 7, 2009. Unsigned, “Meer eerwraak door emancipatie vrouwen”, ANP, December 13, 2007. Unsigned, “Meurtre de Sohane: 10 ans pour le complice”, Sud-Ouest [Charente], June 15, 2007.






Unsigned, “Morocco recalls fifty imams”, The Amsterdam Times, October 31, 2008. Unsigned, “Musulmanes captados para la causa yihadista en las prisiones”, La Voz de Galicia A Coruña, February 28. 2008. Unsigned, “Nach versuchtem Ehrenmord wird Eltern die Vormundschaft entzogen”, DDP News Agency, July 17, 2008. Unsigned, “Negen op tien islamitische scholen sjoemelt met geld”, ANP, November 13, 2008. Unsigned, “Netherlands: Man arrested for circumcising daughter”, February 7, 2009, accessible at http://binnenland.nieuws.nl/. Unsigned, “Onderzoek naar gedwongen huwelijken in Amsterdam”, ANP, December 5, 2007. Unsigned, “Parliament Asks Dutch Min[ister] To Defend Remark On Islamic Law”, Dow Jones International News, September 14, 2006. Unsigned, “Pet hiljada eura studentima”, Oslobođenje [Sarajevo], July 5, 2008. Unsigned, “Planea Arabia Saudita abrir escuelas islámicas en España”, Agencia Mexicana de Noticias [México], July 30, 2006. Unsigned, “Police arrest Islamic fundamentalist under anti-terrorism law”, Associated Press, March 15, 1999. Unsigned, “Public Broadcaster in Hands of Radical Muslims”, October 13, 2007, at www.nisnews.nl/. Unsigned, “15 meses de cárcel para el imán que incitó a la violencia contra las mujeres”, El Mundo, January 14, 2004. Unsigned, “Rotterdam vestigt aandacht Europa op huwelijksdwang”, ANP, May 14, 2008.

Unsigned, “Saudi appeals court upholds flogging researchers”, Reuters, July 30, 2008. Unsigned, “Staff ‘fears’ over Muslim inmates”, BBC News, October 10, 2008. Unsigned, “Tot het huwelijk gedwongen”, ANP, September 8, 2005. Unsigned, “UGT rebutja els centres d’acollida d’immigrants per ‘discriminatoris’ i encaminats a la ‘segregació’ ”, Europa Press, July 15, 2008. Unsigned, “U.K. Muslim-Law Compliant Housing Finance Launched”, Dow Jones International News, April 28, 1997. Unsigned, “Un manual confidencial revela a los funcionarios códigos y claves para frenar el ‘yihadismo’ en las cárceles”, Europa Press, December 28, 2008. Unsigned, “VALENCIA. Educación. Inmigración. El conseller de Educación, Alejandro Font de Mora, rechaza la iniciativa del Gobierno catalán de crear aulas de acogida para inmigrantes”, El Mundo [Valencia ed.], July 15, 2008. Unsigned, “Vogelaar wil onderzoek onderwijs in moskeeën”, ANP, June 26, 2008. Unsigned, “Western banks carve niche in Islamic trade finance”, Financial Times [London], August 27, 1993. Unsigned, “WRR: stop islam-bashen”, ANP, April 10, 2006. Van Schuppen, Henk, ““Fatale flirt: Lonkende blik kan al genoeg zijn om de familie-eer te schaden”, De Twentsche Courant Tubantia, March 2, 2003. Van Soest, Aaldert, “Lespakket zou te weinig ingaan op de angst die er bestaat voor de islam ‘Lespakket islam preek voor eigen parochie,’” De Twentsche Courant Tubantia, September 11, 2007. 149




A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009

Wyatt, Caroline, “French headscarf ban opens rifts”, BBC News, February 11, 2004. Wynne-Jones, Jonathan, “Bishop: No-go zones for Christians”, The Sunday Telegraph, January 6, 2008. Periodical: Toumaï [Madrid], November 2008.

Websites: www.ams-uk.org. www.e-cfr.org www.emunion.org www.euro-muslim.net www.euro-muslims.eu www.fatwa-online.com www.islamic-sharia.org www.matribunal.com www.movisie.nl www.walidin.com




Reiner. 90 Amjad. 68. Eesam. 68 Al-Azhar University. 139. 84 Ahmadi. 52 banlieue riots. biblical figure. 11-12. 121. 98 Ashi’ana refuge. 53. 86 Al-Alwani. “second war”. Nazir. 39 “apostasy”. secular. 28 Apna Haq support group. 92 Al-Muhajiroun (The Migrants). Maulana Mufti Ayub. 24 Al-Attar. 99-100. 41. Netherlands. FGM. Mohammed. 75. 21. 40 Abduh. Germany.. customary law. Mohammed. 50 Aydogan. Western military intervention. Qanta. 56 Ahmed. 66 alcohol: consumption punishments. 65 Algeria: emigrants. 137. 87 Bangladesh. Michele. José María. 26 Alliot-Marie. 124 Al-Zahrani. 83. 94 Albert. 27. 102-3 Barcelona: El Raval district. Ibn Qayyim. hospital hand-rub hygiene. 65. 35. 1 Al-Qaradawi. 14. 116 Azzaoui. 29 Al-Qaida. 116 anti-Muslim sentiment. Free university. 61. 64. 16-21. Shia Muslims. Ahmed. 79 Atta. 15 Afghanistan. 104-5 Alaoui-Talibi. 36 Baghdad caliphate (khilafah). 89 Aznar. 19 Balkenende. dress code. 109 Alawites. 61 Albania: dispora communities. 104 Ahmed. Saudi role. “harkis”. Mirza Ghulam. 98-9.CIP Index ABA Journal. Zlakha. 11. 117 BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation). 67. 23. Lahori faction. 41. 19. Syrian. 79. 85 Al-Jawziyya. 95 Basque radicals. Spain. 136. 76. Shariah rejection. Pakistan role. 53 Amsterdam. 83. Shariah understanding. 34 Bartels. 34 Association for Aid to Sexually Assaulted Women. 123-4 Alaoui. 65 authority. 25 Bechari. Georg. 105. Mahmoud. Kabylie region. Taha Jaber. 98. Fadela. Narissa. 62. Tasleem. Yazmin. 95. Edien. Ahmed. 12-14 Badawi. 109 Ali. Northern Catholic. 54. mosques. Germany political refugees. Islamic community. Rotherham. 93 Al-Alawi. M. 93-4 Azarkan. parental. 83 Abraham (Ibrahim). 15 Alami. 33. 18. 1. 47 Al-Maktoum Foundation. Fouad. 136 Barfuß. 119 Barelvi Islam. 122 Association of Muslim Schools in the UK. 84. 69. 122 Association of Maghrebi Women of Catalonia. 69-70. Kurdish. 15. community mediation. 71 Badawi. 138. 16. Humayra. 68. 48 Aboutaleb. “Hamburg cell”. 88. 42 agricultural labour. Qadianis. 90. nationalists. 71-2. Al-Tawheed mosque. 82 ANZ Grindlays: Islamic finance. Cairo. Netherlands. 10 Alevis. Seyran. 94 analogy (qiyas). 50 Ashrafi. Sezai. 85. 108. 123-4. 83. 123. 35-6. 20. 105 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. 129 Al-Khoei. Irfan. 5 adultery. 62. 110 Amazigh culture. non-Muslim prohibition. Spain. 6. 5-6 anarchists. Muhammad Abdul. 109 Almeria prison. Muhammad. 29 Africa. 46-7. 84 Ahmadinejad. University of. 73. 16 Al-Fourkaan mosque. 8 African-Americans. 40 Amara. Moroccans. 13. Khalid. 32-3. 1990s. 39 Akgunduz. Spain. Amir. GSPC. 114 Ahmad. Muslims. Nebahat. 71. 74 Albayrak. 72 Bari. Eindhoven. 119. use of. 26 Abedin. 139. 45 Ahmed. 48. 18.islamicpluralism. 41 Ahmed. University. Farid. Jan Pieter. Zaki.eu 151 . Moulay el Hassan. 121 ‘alternative’ dispute resolution. 107. imprisoned. 1. Yusuf. 10 Balkan Wars. Europe. 64. 100. fiqh. Yousif. 37 Ates. in the “Islamic Maghreb”. Sheffield. Mounir. Jamal. 57-9.A. 126-7 Armed Islamic Group (GIA). 98. Spanish.

38. Daut. Sikh policemen. 90 Cooperative of Relief Organisations (SHO). 132.”Radical Middle Way” project. Jeroen. 20 Bunglawala. 99-107. 119. 44. 20 Birmingham. 119 Bin Laden. 8. 100. Jet. 111 Dauti. Netherlands. 19. Gordon. Wahhabi penetration. Turkish women. 88. Abd al-Qadr. black non-Muslim population. Muslim lawyers. 43. 19-20 Capelle. customary law. 89-90. 85 Deobandi Islam. 27 Cologne Islamic Academy. 24 Bichri. Leicester centre. 48 Dalai Lama. 89 Coordinating Committee of Turkish Muslims in France. Muslim immigration. Tony. 71 Council of Moroccan Mosque Organisations in the Netherlands. 41 Beheshti. mosques. 19. 17 Centre for Social Cohesion. Srebrenica massacre. 63. Inayat. 105-7. 50 Bulgaria. 41 Brown. 31. medical personnel. 17. 33. UK. 136. 120. European communities. 13. 91 Dispatches. UK. 57 Benziane.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 Begg.eu . 131 beth din. 44. state schools religious preference. 89. 67-8. issue of. legacies. 74 “deconfessionalisation”. health care. 20 Bilal Mosque and Islamic Centre. 136. 70. fatwa issuance. 34. 68. Calude. 63. UK. 40 Bussemaker. 49. 74 Ceuta. iii. 23. Jamal. English common law tradition. 10 D’Harcourt. 61. Bradford. 37. 35. 41. Islamic finance. culture. Pakistan variety. 34 British Muslim Forum (BMF). Peter. Kabyle. 39. 69 Dati. 51-2 cultural conditioning. 1. 4 Commission for Equal Treatment. Muslim medical students. 76. Al-Arabi. 79 cultures. 114-15 Central Council of German Muslims. 110 Benziane. 35. 70 Belgium. 1. Mahmud. 83. 110 Berber/Amazigh. Anton. 19 Cetta. 35. 109 Berlin. Muslim groups support. UK Channel 4. 30. fall of. 135. 68 Centre for Islamic Pluralism (CIP). 139. Albanian. Si Hamza. 109 Daftary. 99. Spain. 103. 89 Contact Group Islam (CGI). civil. 16. 21. 89 divorce. 136. Habsburg annexation. EMU branch. 24.islamicpluralism. Whitechapel. 41. family court. Deobandi extremism. 3940. 40 Bukhari. 74. 27. 71. 64 Boubakeur. Islamic banking. Arbitration Act 1996. 95 Caeiro. 40. 17. 102 Christian Democratic Appeal party. 108 Bin Rida Murad. 118. 42. 105. Rachida. Asian women. As-Soennah mosque. 53 Derrar. non-fundamentalist. 77 Britain (United Kingdom). 107. 120 Charlie Hebdo 105-6 Chirac. East London 152 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. 23. 54. Netherlands. 110. 136. 111 Bradford. Mustafa ef. UK. 45 Council of the Moroccan Community Abroad. 50-3 Ceric. tribal-based. Mohammad. UK class composition. 89. 29 Dijsselbloem. 35. 38 Bodi. 77 Bolton. 46. Jewish religious courts. elite. Soheib. 16. TJ centre. Nazir. 87 Citibank. 42. 99 Boussouf. 31. 91 Bouziane. 105 Coordination Council of Muslims in Germany. 90 Council of Mosques. 45 bride price. Kahina. 33-4 Bosnia-Hercegovina. 1. 121 Bouyeri. 56. 98. Dalil. 46 Blair. 73. Joren. 82. 47 customary law. Ceuta influence. women. Medina mosque. women. 25. 117. 30. 38. Islamic schools demand. Muslim prison population. Muslim population. 24. 116. Somali community. identity. Spain. Islamic Community of. 88 Contact Body for Muslims and Government(CMO). Turco-Mongol. 101 Catalonia: Generalitat. 118 Den Haag. 110 Dewsbury. 54. 70 colonialism. 9. 9. UK. 94. Abdellah. 2001 riots. Forced Marriage Unit. Netherlands. UK divorce tribunals dominance. 41 DITIB (Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs). 23. 119. Alevis. 134 community mediation. 120. 23. iii. 33. Shariah controversy. 40. 121 Crown Prosecution Service(CPS). 27. 42. 44-5. Sana. 25. Alexandre. 4. 110. Philippe. 110 Boubakeur. 132-3. Islamic understanding level. 114. 11 Bencheikh. Muslims. 138 Constantinople. Netherlands. Alevi. 117. 45. 88 “communal shells”. private Shariah-oriented schools. Aachen. 53 Daily Telegraph. Islamic. Muslims. Jacques. 21. 65-8. Netherlands. 15. 110 Bengali communities. Sahar. Sohane. Advice Centre. Osama. Mohammed. 94 Cooperative Union of Moroccans in the Netherlands. 90. 97 consumer products. Faisal. 30. Pakistani immigrants. 29 Boie.

Free Democratic Party. 69 Gujarat. Muslim prisoner scale. 20. Ministry of the Interior. Ayad Tachfine. María Teresa. 129. 74 Gjeçovi. Piet Hein. 94 Dutch Muslim Broadcasting Service. blood feuds. ECFR fatwas. 51. “soft”. 41. 64. 16. divorce. Alejandro. 127 fatwas. 65 Europe: immigrant enclaves. state education. France. UK. Netherlands. 119 Grand Mosque of Paris. meat slaughtering. 135. 16-20.Index CIP Sharia facility. public education. Muslim pupils in Catholic schools. 9. UK. 83 ECFR. 84. fall of. Black African countries. see also. Union (EU). 122 Federation of Evangelical Religious Entities of Spain. 92 “ghettoisation”. 72 Donner. “think-tank”. Shariah interpretation. 52 Hatun und Can. 122. 5-6. 67. Catalonia. 7. establishment of. 139. 37 gang rape. 104-5. Islamisation aim. 52 Hadzhi. 30 female genital mutilation (FGM). 48 Fortuyn. Husain. Jan. 12 Eid Islamic holidays.eu 153 . 131 faith (din). 1. 119 elites. Alic. Hanife. 63. 12. 67. 12. Act 2003 UK. Abu (Hamza Al-Masri). 71 Germany. 75 Gatehouse bank. apostasy accusation. 19. 132-3 education. 8. Abu. 71 Halawa. 45 Fawaz. 90-1. Francisco. “soft fundamentalist” factions. 120 Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe (FIOE). Netherlands. 65. forced. 137. 52. 95. 61. Muslims from. 120 financial regulation. 29 El Hema art experiment. 38. 86. thobe. citizenship denial. 64 ethnic enclaves. 92 German Conference on Islam. 131. 45 “family tribunals”. 124. 8. Pim. Indonesia banned. hijab debate. fatwa issuance. 122. 49 Gülen. 82 France. 19. ECFR. 109. Jneid. mosque financing. Sunni-Shia difference. Muslim demography. Abdoldjavad. Félix (Mohamed Amin). 90. 102 Franco. Mercedes. Moroccan troops. 19. 41 halal. Green Party. 85-6. 68. 128-9. 76. 70-1 Family Justice council. 19. 99-100. 119-20 Hezbollah. 69. 5-6. 84 Hakchaaryaar movement (HCY). 35 Educational Welcome Spaces (EBE). 56. 107. 45 Islamic law agitation. Spain equality. 126 Hasani. unofficial “prayer spaces”. al-Quds mosque. 119 Hamza. 121 gender relations. Ahmad ibn. 120 Federation of Students Islamic Societies (FOSIS). 50. UK. 139. Muslim immigrants. Jerusalem. 111. pre-Islamic practice. 104 fundamentalism: glib use of. 28. 130. 5 Falaturi. 135. 28. 20 Hamas. Mecca pilgrimage. Lionel. 99-100.islamicpluralism. 100 flogging. see also. 115-16 French Council of the Muslim Faith (CFCM). 29 hadiths. ECFR HQ. 100. school of Islamic law. hijab. Emran. marriage General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD). 12. Germany. Köln HQ. 8 Hanifah. Kamal. 2. 5 fiqh (Islamic legal interpretation). 135 European Muslim Union (EMU). German Relief Organisation. 73. 49. 118. 90 Dutch Scientific Council for Government Policy (WWR). 74 Granada: EMU branch. Iranian refugees. 68. 138. 73 Hanbal. 126-9. composition of. radical Islamic diaspora. 4. 99-100. Muslim. 110 Gashi. 80. Christian Democratic Union. 4. 108 Dutch Advisory Commission on Aliens Affairs. 132 Gazillo Llamas. UK seminaries. 127. 12. 76 Federation of Divorced and Separated Women. 77 Herrero. 16. 16 Dumont. 67. 129 Federation of Israelite Communities of Spain (FCIE). Dom Lush. 136 Diyanet. 17 European Muslim Network (EMN). Fethullah. 53 Fernández de la Vega. 1. 62-3. mortgage purchase debate. 35. Moroccan immigrants. Spain. 38 Hamburg. Turkish state Islamic Administration). niqab Druze. 119. Islamic. 88 Elharchi. 43 “Euro-Islam”. UK. 13. 66 Gjakmarrja. Hawa. 12. 83 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. (European Council for Fatawa and Research). 19. 15 Font de Mora. 53. fatwas. Shtjefën Kryeziu. Parliament. 74 Gjergji. 26. Spain. 35 Erbakan. “family tribunals” demand. 126. 118 Egypt: FGM banned. 64. 52 Hassan. UK tribunals. immigrant. 72. 105 Greou. 68. 118 Forced Marriage Act 2007. 85 Feddersen. 50. 1. 28-9. 17. Islamic law agitation. Turkish immigrants. 4. 5. 9. Necmettin. 97. 93 dress code. 2. 71. 86 Hassan. 117. 124. 19. 111 Grieve. Said. 65-6 Handuni. 127 Dublin. Dominic. Rubina. 3. 8. 50. 25. 19 Hajj. Brussells HQ.

10 infection control. Turkish official. 100 Le Pen. 11. reasoning concept. 29 HM Prison Armley. 67 Koltsov. 91. 49 Kazi. 7. Köln “conspiracy”. 70. 89 immigrants. 49. 26 Khatami. Germany. 27 Joutard. 69. fatwa concerning. language learning. individual. 100. 90. FGM. 58 inheritance disputes. 85-7. 83. 68. 39 Hirsi Ali. Hojjatolislam Seyyed Mohammad. 5-6. 84 Kabtane. 89. 73. 93-4. Iraqi School of Madrid. Farhad. Muslims of. Kamel.eu . 119-20 Islamic Cultural Centre. 72 Karacaer. 85 Islamic Sharia Council of Leyton. 75. 120. 105-6 Kahraman. Saddam. political radicalism. 20 Jamil. Ahmed. 44-5 isolationism. 110 Islamic Commission of Spain (CIE). 69 Khadijah. Bouchra. Timur. 84 laïcité. 5 jihad. Western military intervention. non-ideological. 63-6. Islamic forbidden. 103 Le Monde. 129 ijara. “honour” crimes. French controversy. UK. Ruth. 30-1 Kemal. Mikhail. Berlin. Syed Ahmad. 78. dispensations. issue of. 107. Allama. 49 Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World. see also. 132. Albanian honour code. 91 interest earning/charging(riba). 6. 122 Hijaz College Islamic University. Meimouna. 126. Shariah interpretation. 49-53. Khalil. 6 Ibn Rushd (Aerroës). 41. Yilmaz. 131 Italy. 41. EMU branch. 11 Islam: Balkan. 8. 90. 108-9 King‘s College. Muhammad. 49 lawyers. 88 Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT). Malik. 137. 43 Kleinwort Benson. 122 “Islamic finance”. 18.71 Kaya. Asiye. 11. 110 “hudud” (punishments). 46 Khan. 133 International Crisis group. 43 HM Prison Brixton. 27 Indonesia. 91 Islamic Centre of Geneva. 117. 7. 28. 18. 45. Mustafa (Atatürk). Shariah interpretation.islamicpluralism. 18. 7. 19. 42 “honour” crimes. 40. 74 Kuran. 53. 9. 124. Istanbul. 38. Rachid.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 hijab (headscarf). British involvement. beth din courts. 27-8. biblical figure. Muhammad Ali. Spain issue. 116 Kosova. customary law. Shia. 93-4. 92-3 Israel. 88 Lahori Ahmadis. 2. Deobandi. Netherlands. Turkish speakers. UK 49 HM Prison Belmarsh. 79 Kazi. 102 Le Monde des Religions. 49 Kelly. 79. 42-3 “holiday weddings”. Kristina. Mowafak. 38. Rashid. 72-6. suicide terrorism fatwa. 80 homosexuality. 122 Kanun. 41 Le Courrier de L’Atlas. Haci. authority motivated. 26 Iran. 10. 29. Moroccan clergy. schools of law (madhahib). 101 Ibn Taymiyya. 9 Labor Party. religious liberality of. 133. Sunni communities. 79. “veil” debate. Muslims. 63 Intra-Islamic disputes. European law retention. Pakistani jihadism. 106-7. see also. 51. 117 Ireland. 84 kashrut. 111. 30. 68. 79 Kanfach. 123 Islamic Federation of Catalonia. 134 Jinnah. Nuneaton. 8. 84 Ibn Anas. Sunni. 4 Iqbal. 53. 62. 26. 3. 10. 20. Jean-Marie. interest earning Islamic Foundation for Education and Propagation of Knowledge. Wahhabi Islamophobes. Islamic finance. Muhammadiyah. 53 Jerusalem. 77 India. 101-4. poll. 104 Kaci. 111 154 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. Kurds. British. Metin. 132. 70 Khosrokhavar. -Lebanon War. Ayaan. 41 Iraq. UK 42 HM Prison Whitemoor. Turkey. 94. radical Sharia regions. 102-3. 77-8. 79 Hussein. Islamic revolution. Philippe. strength of. 133 Kurds/Kurdistan. 98 Ibn Adam. 63. 63. 12. 31 Ibn al-Shafi’i. Hasan. age demography. 74-5 Kaplan. 101 Justice and Development Party (AKP). 129 Jesus (Isa). 39. intolerant. 17 itjihad. murder. 107. UK. banking. 118 Laroussi. 13. 6 Ibn Ali. 117. heterogenous nature. 87. 7. 32. 24 Humboldt University. 82. colonial legacy. 99. 126. 73. Alevis. threats against. London. 99. 27 Imam’s Association of the Netherlands(VIN). Madrid. 8. 6 Jaballah. 27-8 Kohler. 122. British Muslim.

German law. 85-8 93 National Federation of Muslims of France. 29. Shafiq. 48 Milli Goruş (National Vision). 89 Morocco. murder of.islamicpluralism. 90 Nursi. 63. colonial impact(s). forced marriages. 46. Sebina. Netherlands. 38. 46 legal theory. 29. 23 Libya. 105 multiculturalism. 77-9 Oldham. 36-7 National Coordinator for Investigation of Terrorism (NCTB ). 24-5 medical training. Rif mountains. 65 Nazir-Ali. 38. 87. 88. 104. 5 “noise syndrome”. biblical figure. the Prophet. 38 Muslim Brotherhood. 19-20. 8. 68 Muslim Burial Council of Leicestershire. 71. Pakistan. 21. Syrian. 46 Maragall. 65-66. 68 Muslim Federation of Spain. Al-Fateh Arab School of Madrid. 84. 33 Melilla. 41 Malik. issue of. 117 Marianne et le Prophète. 138 Madrid: Saudi financed Mosque. 34. 10 nikah (marriage contract). 7 Muslim society. 110 Nadhatul Ulama. 33 missionisation. 23. 28 Lebanon. Peter. 15. 31. 86. 38-9. Indonesia. 2004 metro bombing. 53 Muslim prayers. 89. 94-5. Aseid. Western public facilities accommodation. 121. Abdelwahab. 117 London. 134 mawlid. 111-12. forced. 105 Movisie organisation. 127 Mahdi. Mohamed Kamal. Islamic (da’wa). France. Emmanuel. 84-5 Mahdi. 10 medresas. 75. 30. 39 Manchester. 74 MacEoin. 77-8 Obeidi. Utrecht. Islamic Schools. need for. 90. 23. Egyptian core. 138 North African immigration. 6 Myard. 2. Turkish speakers. 64. 34. (communautarisme). 89. Prophet’s Mosque. 139 Mirpur region. Western. 83. 67. 105 nationalism. radical Shariah regions. 99 multiple lines of communication. 92 Noah (Nuh). 10 Malik. 33. 43 Nigeria. 76 Neumann. 91. movement of. 29. 3. -Spain relations. Muslim-Serb. 109 “no-go” areas. 36 Muslim legal professionals. 27 Moroccan Imams Union. Western. 116 Miliband. 53 Malik. 84. 79-80. proposed Merkaz megamosque. biblical figure. 39. Regent’s Park Mosque. Keith. 40. Shahid.eu 155 . 3 Leicester. Mariya. 120 Muslim Federation of Spain (FEME). Abu’l ala. Kurdish. 9. 119. 31 Leeds. 5. 48 Martyrs of Morocco. 48 Malik. Kanun code. 138 Muslim Arbitration Tribunal. 41. 12-13. 30. 30-1 Malik.Index CIP Lévinas. 132 Moses (Musa). 69 Obeidi. 42-43. 2008 terrorist attack. government pressure in the Netherlands. 74 Nova TV network. 116. 106 Massumi. 52. 36 Muslim Council of Britain (MCB). 33 Mecca. 53-4. 3 Medina. 17. 23 “Operation Nova”. Morsal. Netherlands. 65. 10 Meddeb. 56. Neukölln. Hamburg. 44. 25-6. Grand Mosque. 91. Said. by abduction. 38. 119 Muslim Law (Shariah) Council UK. Turkey. 122 Moussaoui. “tourist”. Suleman. 4. 86 niqab (full cover dress). 21. 43 Netherlands. Ahmad-Sobair. Shariah Council. Tahir. 137 Mumbai. 12. 5 Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board (MINAB). Netherlands. David. 126. Netherlands. civil. 34. Finsbury Park Central Mosque. 72. July 2005 bombings. youth in Netherlands. 107. 5 morabaha (cost-plus financing). Jacques. radical Shariah regions. 105 mediation: community-based Shariah. 138 Muslim Parliament of Great Britain. 97 Northern Albanians. anti-Indian jihadism. 86-8 mortgage interest. 2008 interreligious meeting. Ernest. 121 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. Denis. Diyanet. 28. caricatures of. 118. Mohammed. 74. 47 mosques: London. 53 Mawdudi. 114. 44 Marseille. coming of. 93 Muhammad. 6 monotheism. 83. 101 Leach. 47 Muslim Association of Britain (MAB). 106 marriage: arranged. 42-43 Luton. 117. Zubeida. 11. 115-16. 8. 70 Mongol Muslim empires. Saudi financing. 135. 121 Macedonia. 47. Spain. 3. 38 Nagdi. Berlin neighbourhood. 20 Malaysia. Michael. 85 Mostafá. 99. 48.

8. 8. 130 “Parallel Shariah”. 116-17 pork. 40 Qadri. 5. 127. 49 156 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. 41 Shariah(s). Nicolas. 48. 67. 34 polygamy. 130 Ramzan. non-Muslims. 19 Sadiq. 42 Shia Imam Ali Mosque and Islamic Centre (IZH). women’s organisations.islamicpluralism. 120. 6. non-observance rationalisations. 40 Safia. 40. 12. 15. 137 Sayeed. 2. 69-70 Shia Islam. Stephen Suleyman. 100. 138. Turkish emigrants. organ donation. 8.eu . courts. 37. 119 September 11th 2001 events. 129. 40-1. UK state-subsidised. Bridget. misogyny. 119. 17 religious law: courts. Olivier. 112 Salaam. 17 Registry of Religious Entities. 135. “re-Islamisation” concept. 10 Rally of Muslims of France. José Luis. 6-7. 8. 19. 37 Organic law on Religious Freedom. 121. 9. 31 Serbs. Satanic Verses. 62 Seglers Gómez-Quintero. 118 Rotterdam. mosque financing. modernity theorising. 52. Spain. Wahhabi financing. Haroon. British elite fixation. 9. 114 Sarajevo. 40 Rashid. 83. 110. tribal discrimination. Catalonia. Alex. 100. personal practice. 2 Shaw. Um. 27. 30-1 “presumed consent”. Netherlands. defence of.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 organ donation: “presumed consent”. 30 Shaha. 74. 42. King Abdullah. 109. 28 Saudi Arabia. 1. 32. Mohammed. 39 Popular party. public advocacy for. 111. Shariah oriented. 139 separatist implication. 3 Reus. projected Essalaam mosque. 87-9 Plasterk. flogging. support for. Jaf’ari legal school. FGM forbidden. 25. 14-15. 15-16. 10. 41. 42 Sánchez Nogales. Maulana Abu. UK. 72 “Pillarisation”. 44-6. Faiz-ul-Aqtab. 36 Qadri. 8. UK think-tank. 9-10. 108. Danny. 9. British immigrant origin. 15 Rocca. 30 Qur’an. 32-3. 33. 100. British shools financing. 7 pre-Islamic oblivion (Jahiliyyah). 45 Shah. 19 “shadow Shariah“. fundamentalism exporting. radical. 67. 91 “Roubaix gang”. Spain. Shariah rituals and rules. 37. 15. 98. Muhammad Islam. 10-11. 28 Phillips. Iranian Marxist group. 31 People’s Mujahidin (MEK). 98 People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy. 116 Ottoman caliphate (Khilafah). Prakash. 1. Islamist extremism. 28. 5. Jihadis. 17 Pasha. 6. 127. Muslim deaths. 87 petro-dollar boom. 42 prohibitions. influence of. 85 Salafi Group for Calling to Religion and Combat (GSPC). women’s rights group. Syed Aziz. Spain. 34 Qatar. radical Sharia regions. state-sponsored. Netherlands. 16-17. 42 Pakistan. 110. 2 religious structures. scope of. 31. Anne. 20 Rabobank. theocratic state goal. UK. 2-3. 59. 107. 44 schools. 6 Siddiqi. 19-22. Mathias. 71-2. 85. Spain. 39-40. personal and family law. in Spain. 131 Sarkozy. 118-19 Riyadh. 21. 39. Hani. Wahhabi Islam. 121 Orwell. 57. Islam official recognition. 118 Sabri Koci. 7. radical Islamic recruiting. 7 religious discrimination. 124. Herman. Haxhihafiz. 88 Pleij. 106. misogyny. Unis. 53. 11 Queen Mary College. 44. 117 secular law. 27 Palestine: ECFR radical position. 37. 2-3. 3. Islamised banking system. 107. 91. 100. University of London. Tariq. 87. 105 Ramadan. complex jurisprudence. 15. “Islamic finance” products. 9. 19. 19. 121 Saleem. Dutch religious policy. 122. Shariah debate. 88 radical Islam/Shariah: Britain. literalism. Iraqi. 86. 11. Mohammed. 102 Russia. 13. 9. 41 “reasonable accommodation”. precedent denial. 29. 5. see below. 10. iii. historical fantasies of. 23. 105-6. cities. 5. 118. 59 Prentice. 110 Ramadan. 62 Romanians. 84-5. Muhammad Masud. 47. 19-21. Suhayb. 87 Policy Exchange. Ronald. 71. 99 Rushdie. 101 Ottoman empire: millet. British High Commission. John. 108 Roy. 26 Qurqah. 49 Prescott. 36 prisons. 24. 107. Tony. radical Islam ignorance of. USA. 109-10 Saudi Academy of Madrid. 44. 119 religious customs. necessity overrules. Shaf’i school. 92. 11 secular politics. West Europe agitation for. 117 Saudi Al-Rajhi Investment and Banking Corporation. France. 24-5. EMU branch. 120. 39. 110 Rohe. Salman. 37 Schwartz. Hamburg. 18 Owers. George. 14. Nicholas. Sayyid Irfan. migration from extremism. 38. 68. 51.

19. 73. 93 Waliullah. 6. 82 Taliban. Spain. 26. 76-7. 135. 122 Soldevila. 98. “soft fundamentalism”. 121-2. 97. 65. hijab issue. cities. free exercise of religion. 62 Stiftung. 121 Toumaï. 43 Spain. 58 State Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs. 88. Nayati. Abderrahman (“Mohamed Achraf”). 46. 117. 137. 73. 38 Sufism. 133 Ur-Rahman Sahib. 31 United Bank of Kuwait PLC. 51 Wahhabi version of Islam. 89 Union for a Popular Movement. 116 Sofu. 82. the. 116 Sifaoui. 124 Somalia. Johann Daniel Lawaetz. 73 Supporters of Shariah (SOS).islamicpluralism. 33. 119-20 Teachers Union. 64. Theo. Ibrahim. 118 violence. male beards. 63. 73 Sohail Islamic Cultural Centre. 1. 78 Sudan. 24-5. 135. 139. 79 Socialist Party. 14. 89 Venetian Republic. 137. 116. DITIB Tworuschka. 33. 25 The Lancet. 93 rightist nationalism. 135 Testa. Floris. 32 Sunnah. 33. migrants to Netherlands. Altaic language. 17. 40. 36 Sirat. 64 Union of Islamic Organisations. 91. secular law. 56-9. 118 terrorism. Fuengirola. Martin. 28-9 Surinamese immigrants Netherlands. 99. mortgage market. elite appeal. 98. 21. iii. 95 Stremelaar. 137. government absence. France. France (UOIF). Ali. 118 traditional Shariah. 120. Udo. 117-18 Spanish Federation of Islamic Religious Bodies (FEERI). Catalonia. urban-rural dissonance. “honour” murder. 121 Tatary. 14. Madeline. Muslim rule period. 139 Takfir wal Hijra (Religious Purge and Migration).Index CIP Siddiqi. Annemarike. 67 Sistani. Ayatollah Ali. 28 University of Göttingen. 29. 82-4 Tabatabaei. 104. 45 Women’s Council of the Region of Madrid. 35. 9. 74. reactionary utopianism. 53 Sidki. 42 USP Institut Universitari Dexeus. 122 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www. misogynist. Shah of Delhi. 132 The Independent. see also. 19. Saudi. diaspora. 31 Turkey. 94. Ghayasuddin. Pir Habib. prisons. 119. 80 Storms. 38. 59. Mohamed. customary law. 62 Suleyman the Magnificent (Lawgiver). 102. 66 Sufi Muslim Council (SMC).eu 157 . 35 Williams. Veli. 3. 124 Utlu. 120. 132. 45 Tibi. UK. 14 Sökefeld. 106-7. Morocco. fundamentalists (takfiris). 33. 46. beards issue. Spanish socialist. plaque to. British class composition. 85. 90. beard style. “cool”. Bassam. 8. prisons. Nurcu movement. 65 University of Leiden. civil war. 67 Sirin. 105 Singapore. Riay. 119. 105 Union of Islamic Communities of Spain (UCIDE). 70 Union for Moroccan Muslim Organisations in the Netherlands. 91 Van Toorenburg. 19. 29-30. 31. 35. 39-40. 63. 41 USA (United States of America): Constitution. 7. Sufi interpretation. 845. 4. 10 Suddeutsche Zeitung. 8 Tribout. 73. 94 Van Eck. 3. 18. 18 Vermeulen. 1. 65-6. 114-15. 61. Arab occupation legacy. Razvi. 121 St Bartholomews medical college. 104. 18 tribal customs. 28 University of Brighton. 62. 120 Sunni Islam: community leaders. Shariah understanding. 1. Saudi global-financed. 91 University of London. 106-7. 58 Thorpe. 6 Sunday Telegraph. 107. Hatun. 9. Rowan. 119 Union of Islamic Cultural Centres (VIK). 101 Sirin. 82. 91-2 Sürücü. 105-7. UK. 5. 19 Tahiri. non-Muslim society rules. 85. 13. 34. Albanian emigres. 119. Allameh. integration example. 70 Tabligh-i-Jammat (TJ) (Appeal of the Community). Spain. 61 Vich. 30. René-Samuel. 41. Islam official recognition. 94 Van Gogh. Pere Barri. 126. 39. state establishment. State schools. 44. 26 websites radical Shariah. 103 “true Muslims”. David. 109 Union of Muslim Organisations of UK and Ireland. 41 University of Southern California. 18. Clementine. “honour”-based. 86. Lord Justice. Islamaphobia absence. Marie-Claude. 65 Topas prison. mosques. Oka. 8. 6. Organic Law on Religious Freedom. 134 Tunisia. 72 Women Living under Muslim Laws group. 106. periodical. Kemalettin. 5. 8.

crimes against. 53. 66 Yemen. Spain. 51 Zahid. 27 Workers Party of Marxist Unification (POUM). 89 Yavuz Sultan Selim mosque. Abdullah. kidnappings. 44-50. 28-9 Yones. 116-17. 109. abuses of. Kanun honour code. 116 World Islamic Mission.eu . 28 Zouareg. Muslim victimisation. 9. Adeal. Muslim vulnerabilities. Mannheim. 68 Zia-ul-Haq. rights of. José Luis Rodriguez. Kurdish. Heshu. 51 Yones. 73. Hadda. 3. 120 Zaza dialect. 8. 75. 45 Zapatero.islamicpluralism. dress codes. Berber. 111 158 CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC PLURALISM (CIP) www.CIP A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009 women.


The fatwa was delivered at a Montreal news conference of prominent Shia Muslims on behalf of Ayatullah Sayyed Ali As-Sistani." the statement read.Centre for Islamic Pluralism C IP OBEY YOUR COUNTRY’S LAWS! Marje Sistani urges Muslims in West By Mohamed Ali MONTREAL.00 2009 ISBN 978-0-9558779-2-6 .00 • US$150. Canada: Iraq's Al-Marje Al-Alaa Ali Sistani sent a message to Muslims in Western nations.00 • €125. Washington. Centre for Islamic Pluralism (CIP) BM 2394. LONDON. urging them to obey the laws of the countries in which they live. It condemned all acts of violence and encouraged imams to keep a watchful eye on what's going on inside their mosques. DC 20036. USA £100. "Muslims have undertaken to obey the laws of the country of their residence and thus they must be faithful to that undertaking. WC1N 3XX. UK 1718 M Street NW #260.

Master your semester with Scribd & The New York Times

Special offer for students: Only $4.99/month.

Master your semester with Scribd & The New York Times

Cancel anytime.