From Marxism to Post-Marxism?


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INTRODUCTION: Our Time and the Age of Marx


1 . Into the Twenty-first Century: The New Parameters of Global Politics 2. Twentieth-C entury Marxism and the Dialectics of Modernity 3 . After Dialectics: Radical Social Theory i n the North at the Dawn of the Twenty-first Century

66 1 11


Our Time and the Age of Marx

Karl Marx, born in 1 8 1 8, is about the same age as Latin American independence. The first calls for independence were issued in 1 8 1 0, although the decisive anticolonial battles of Mexico and Peru were fought in the 182 0 s . In Latin America, preparations for bicentenary celebrations in 20 1 0 have already begun. Marx is of course younger than the protagonists of the Latin American liberation struggles younger than, for instance, the Liberator himself, Simon Bolivar, recently revived as the spiritual guide of the revolution in Venezuela for he was born in the dark years of European reaction, of the Holy Alliance of counter-revolution. But the seeds of modernity had been deeply planted in the economic and the cultural soil of Western Europe, and Karl witnessed their first flowering. The Communist Manifesto appeared much ahead of its time, with its vision of globalized capitalism and working-class struggles during 'the Springtide of peoples', the February March revolutions of 1 84 8 . In terms of his literary counterparts, Marx i s much younger than, say, Rumi, Dante, Cervantes or Shakespeare, and as a social and political theorist younger than, for instance, Hobbes and Locke who in his day were the heroes of Cambridge academic politics not to speak of classical sages such as Plato, Aristotle, Confucius and Mencius.



Nowadays, it is much harder to determine how long an intellectual will last than to predict the likely lifespan of the average human being. What can we say of Marx's ability to endure? As we approach the bicentennial of the man's birth, is the body of work that bears his name (long?) dead, dying, ageing, or maturing? Is its resurrection possible? Certainly, it would be impossible to argue that the founder of historical materialism is timeless or eternally young. Any appropriate response would have to take into account the fact that Marx was a great articulator and a multi­ dimensional personality. He was an intellectual, a social philosopher of the radical Enlightenment, a social scientist­ cum-historian, and a political strategist and leader first of the diasporic C ommunist League and then of the Inter­ national Working Men's Association. Over the decades, these multiple personae have been assigned vastly different meanings and implications. Politics is inescapably a central piece of the legacy of Marxism, but nobody has ever claimed that Marx was a major political leader. He has served as a source of political inspiration and as a social compass for political navigation, but Marx the politician is long dead. Few, if any, social scientists and historians would deny that social and historical methodology, understanding and knowledge have progressed in the 1 25-odd years since Marx's final illness put an end to his work on the manuscript of Capital. But here matters are more complicated, because social analysis, contemporary as well as historical, continues to draw upon 'classics', not only for inspiration but also for topics of research, concepts, interesting apercyus and intriguing insights. Emile Durkheim, Alexis de Tocqueville and Max Weber are coeval classics in this sense, as are Ibn Khaldoun and Machiavelli, although several centuries older. And great philosophers never die they have their periods of hibernation as well as of flowering, which usually last a stretch of time somewhere between that of Kondratiev cycles and climatic epochs . This book is more concerned with Marx-ism than with



Marx. But as far as Marx in our time is concerned, my impression is that he is maturing, a bit like a good cheese or a vintage wine not suitable for dionysiac parties or quick gulps at the battlefront. Rather, he is a stimulating companion for profound thought about the meanings of modernity and of human emancipation. For his forthcoming bicentenary, I would p ropose three toasts . First, to Karl Marx as a proponent of emancipatory reason, of a rationalist scrutiny of the world, with a commitment to human fre edom from exploitation and oppression. Second, to his historical materialist approach to social analysis in other words, to his understanding of the present as history, with particular attention p aid to the living and working conditions of ordinary people and to the economic and political materiality of power an approach not to be followed as if laid out in a m anual, but rather as a broad directive accompanied by the motivation to pursue it further. Third, Karl should b e celebrated for his dialectical openness his sensitivity to, and comprehension of, contradictions, antimonies and conflicts in social life. Marx-ism has, I think, an uncertain future, for reasons explained below. But Marx himself is bound for the long life of alternating winters, springs, summers and autumns undergone by so many of the great thinkers of humankind, from Confucius and Plato onward. The Nature of this Study
This book is intended as a map and a compass. It is an attempt to understand the seismic social and intellectual shift between the twentieth century in an important sense the century of Marxism and the twenty-first century, which began in the years of 1 97 8 9 1 , when China turned to the market and the Soviet system collapsed in both Europe and the USSR itself. It lays no claim to being an intellectual history or a history of ideas, and may be



seen rather as a traveller's notebook, unpretentious note s jotted down after a long, arduous j ourney through the climbs, passes, descents and dead ends of twentieth- and early twenty-first-century Marxism. The book has two aims. The first is to situate the left­ wing political practice and thought of the early twenty-first century in the terrain of the previous c entury. The second is to provide a systematic p anorama of left-wing thought in the North at the beginning of this new century, an d to compare it with the Marxism of the preceding era. While abstaining from pleading for any particular path or interpretation, I do not want to hid e the fact that this work is written by a scholar who has not surrendere d his left-wing commitment. Indeed, it is that very commit­ m ent which has motivated the writing of this book. The two objectives are pursued in three different chapters, of various origins . The first, on the spaces of left-wing thought and practice, was initially presented at a conference in Mexico organized by the senators of the PRD in April 2 0 0 1 , and was then published with a post-September update in New Left Review no. 1 0 . Here it has been significantly restructured and rewritten . The second, an attempt at identifying the legacy of twentieth­ century Marxism as critical theory, derives from a contribution to the first ( 1 9 9 6) edition of Blackwell's Companion to Social Theory (edited by Bryan Turner, who also edited the second, twenty-first-century edition) . It is here reprinted with minor changes, mainly with a view to avoiding too much overlap with the subsequent essay. The third chapter� on recent radical thought, derives from my contribution to The Handbook on European Social Theory (edited by Gerard D elanty for Routledge in 2006) , which was later expanded and Atlanticized for publication in NLR no . 43 . I have updated and somewhat extended it here; some errors spotted by NLR readers and kindly conveyed to me have been corrected, and some contex­ tual arguments have been moved to other chapters .



As a scholar whose interests are global, I try to situate the Left in global space. But I admit from the outset that

a systematic overview of contemporary Southern radical thought has been beyond my linguistic competence as well
as my time constraints. I do, nevertheless, take note of the rich legacy of sophisticated left-wing thought in the South, for it is here that the future is likely to be decided.

Cambridge October-November 2007

but it is the space that largely allocates the political actors . but now far denser in its worldwide connectivity that endows these actors with their strengths and weaknesses. Skill and responsibility in the art of politics.1 Into the Twenty-first Century: The New Parameters of Global Politics Politics is thought and fought out. from the 1960s to the and their opposites remain constant. providing the p ower parameters f or confrontations between and against states. for Left and Right. luck and genius their cards. in many respects. This chapter aims to map the social space of Left Right politics. One is socio-economic. The space itself decides nothing: only actors and their actions can do that. with its prevailing patterns of beliefs and identities and the prin­ cipal means of communication. This global space comprises three major planes. The third is geopolitical. policies are forged and implemented. laying out the preconditions for the social and economic orientation of politics in other words. Space provides the coordinates of their political moves. But it is this dimension long global. political ideas wax and wane all within a global space. constraints and opportu­ nities. Another is cultural.

2 F R O M MARXISM T O P O ST MARXISM? first decade of the twenty-first century. It is an attempt to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the forces of Left and Right. two further aspects are particularly significant: the distribution of geopolitical power in the world. a few p oints of clarific ation may be needed. imply that they are literally distinct . on each side. had an important Left Right dimension that of competing socialist and c apitalist modernities. which pitted the two global superpowers against each other and entrained. in Vietnam. On the first. The overall geopolitical space will b e invoked only where it most directly affects Left Right p olitics. it is important not to confound the two. for example. The period began with the build-up to the United States ' first military defeat in its history. and the social character of interterritorial. actors . or transterritorial. among others. clients and friends . Then came the collapse of . It is neither a polit­ ical history nor a strategic programme. and not just in one direction. in a broad. however. The analytical distinction b etween the two elements does not. opportunities and options of inter­ territorial actors within the geopolitical plane are generated by a-variety of factors military might. and within emerging currents. Which of thes e two dimensions was the more important remains a controversial question. Nevertheless. of course. For the understanding of Left Right p olitics that concerns us here. The resources. The Cold War. which still bears forcefully on the present. social and geopolitical spaces are conjoined . allies. we should note that the distribution of power has changed dramatically during the last forty years. demographic weight. economic power and geographical location. As regards the underlying conceptions. although it bears s ome relevance to both. non-partisan sense both during the recent p ast. and with the ascendancy of the USSR to approximate military parity. But it also had a specifically geopolitical dynamic. In the concrete world.

instead. Japan was the world's rising economic star. movements and lobbies for global concerns that have emerged as fairly significant. the geopolitical space has not simply b ecome unipolar. of course. an age old feature of capitalism. the fiasco of the French­ British-Israeli invasion of Suez signalled the end of European military might on a world scale. Two new kinds of international actors of divergent social significance have become increasingly important during this perio d. and. The second i s a loo ser set of transnational networks. it has begun to assume new forms of complexity. The social character of interterritorial a ctors c an b e read not only from the colour of state regimes but also from the orientation and weight of non-state forces. which have jointly served as a maj or neoliberal spearhead for the Right (although the World Bank has had some dissenting voices) . currently it is fading economically and rapidly ageing socially. and the US claim to a final victo ry in the Cold War. progressive actors within the world are n a . interstate relations. I The first consists of transnational interstate organizations such as the World Bank.INTO THE TWENTY FI RST CENTURY 3 the Soviet Union. Europe has as the EU returned as both an economic great power and a continental laboratory for complex. By contrast. Multinational corporations are. Although in 1 9 56. through their international mobilizations against trade liberalization. more recently. China's still unbroken decades of spectacular growth have given economic muscle to its massive demographic weight. In brief. 1. even though the US has become the only superpower. At the beginning of the p eriod. .initially through their links with such UN mechanisms a s the human rights conventions and major international conferences on women and on population. the IMF and the WTO.

The classical Left was driven by the 'irreverent collec­ tivism' of the socialist working-class and anti-imperialist movements. for instance have 2. Irreverence and deference here refer to orientations towards existing inequalities of power. by states and markets. It may be useful here to invoke a more abstract. analytic al differentiation of social patterning than the conventional ones of class size or strength. markets and 'social pattern­ ings ' . more fundamentally. Looking at the features and. looser. It involves not only a class structure but. less capitalllabour focused may have some merit. wealth and status. or of categorical identities such as class. but with additional force of its OWO. while neither presupposing nor requiring assessments of the actual extent of the capitalist 'systemness' of states and social patterns. a rendering of variable ' classness'. .2 The first two are well-known and highly visible institutional complexes. of course. social patternings and (one or more) states. It refers to the shaping of social actors a process influenced. As current and foreseeable politics can hardly be summed up in terms of socialism vs. this conceptual apparatus broader. Capitalism itself is a system of markets. The third may require some expla­ nation.4 F R O M MARXI S M TO P O S T MARXI S M ? Socio-economic Plane The social space of modern p olitics has at least three crucial p arameters: states. gender and ethnicity.. derived from forms of livelihood and residence. The p atternings I want to highlight are sociocultural ones. while other contemporary radical currents for women's rights or human rights. with an emphasis on broad. capitalism. These variables have the advantage of opening up into empirical analytical overviews. a fruitful one of dissecting power relations and their dynamics within capitalism. socially determined cultural orientations rather than just structural categories .1). Here I suggest irreverence deference and collectivism individualism as key dimensions (sketched in Figure 1. at the interrelationships of these three dimensions is one way in my experience. collectivism and individualism to propensities high or low towards collective identification and organization. religions and family institution s . above all.

imperial rulers and representatives of It is within this triangle of states. or c1ientistically. formerly. The traditional Right was institutionally. at least until recently. experts (in particular. secondly. liberalism. Herrenvolk empires. firstly. A schematization of the full model is given in Figure 1 . collectivist. and political action occurs. the rich.INTO T H E TWENTY FIRST C E N T U RY 5 Figure 1.and. from the processes of the economic system capitalism and. actually existing socialism. markets and social patternings that political ideas gain their ascendancy. The dynamics of this space derive. both old and new. C O O RDINATES O F POLITICAL SPACE Most contemporary discussions of the state. from the outcomes of previous political contests. 2 . focus on the question of 'the nation-state' as it confronts globalization. entrepreneurial bosses. whether from Left or Right. from the input of new knowledge and techno­ logy. tends rather towards 'deferential individualism' deferring to those of supposedly superior status. managers. male chefs de famille.1: Crucial dimensions of the social patterning of actors Collectivism Irreverence Deference Individualism a more individualist character. liberal economists) . and thirdly. or on privatization as a .

not . generally speaking. but the European unemployed have.2: Social space of politics and its dynamics Social coordinates States of politics Markets Social patternings il Dynamics of the social space Political outcomes Knowledge and technology Systemic economic dynamics challenge to its institutions. the development of strong regional interstate organizations the EU. one c ould say that recent years have seen some stunning successes for state policies: the worldwide reduction indeed.6 F R O M MARXIS M TO P O ST MARXISM? Figure another. the varying structural forms of state development. ASEAN. it has not. On the first point. On the contrary. on the whole. the virtual abolition of inflation is one major example. Mercosur and NAFTA . True. These approaches tend to ignore both the reality of contemporary state policy-making and. even more importantly. the persistence of mass unemployment in the EU is a clear policy failure. the key question is: has the state's capacity to pursue policy targets actually diminished over the p ast four decades? The clear answer for developed democracies is that.

Nation-states. but that derives not so much from state-level failures as from the right­ wing tilt of the political coordinates. and the East Asian 'outward development' model. The core region of welfare statism has been Western Europe.INT O THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY 7 been pushed into American-style poverty. in their effectiveness. Policy orientations and priorities have changed. is its blindness to the development of strongly differentiated state forms over the past forty years. it was in the years after 1960 that welfare statism began to soar in about a decade. That is. a considerable number of policies fail to reach their goals. as always. which must count as at least a modest success. more than during its entire previous history.3 For the fifteen 3 . based on generous. however. Unnoticed by conventional globalization theory. For the old OE CD as a whole. while exports grew 1 1 per cent. new skills and greater flexibility may be required. for the O E CD before the recent inclusion of Mexico. South Korea and post Communist East Central Europe. But this is nothing new. That certain left-wing policies have b e c ome more difficult to implement is probably true. but I see no trend towards a generally diminished policy-making capac­ ity. publicly financed social entitlements. regions and cities will differ. the expenditure and revenue of the state suddenly expan ded. Although its European roots go back a long way. the last four decades of the twentieth century saw the developed states grow at a far greater rate than international trade . public expenditure as a proportion of GDP increased by 13 percentage points between 1 960 and 1999. as always. . where it has had an impact on all the original OECD countries. Successful State Forms The most serious flaw of conventional globalization discourse. Two models arose in the sixties: the welfare state. Both have been successfully deployed and consolidated ever since.

by full state ownership. sometimes. 29. biased towards heavy manufacturing. and registered its highest revenue ever.7 per cent of GDP. and retirement income. the corresponding figures were 18 19 percentage points and 14 per cent. . True. 1 960 data from OEeD Historical Statistics 1960-1997. 6 . about 37 per cent of GDP flowing into public coffers . Paris: OECD. Pioneered by Japan. tables 6.4 Despite the many claims to the contrary echoed on both Left and Right the welfare state still stands tall wherever it was constructed. 1 2. peak historical levels . from 2000. the expenditure share in both cases was a couple of percentage points higher during the recession years of the early nineties than at the booming end of the decade. North America. 1 9 99 data from OEeD Economic Outlook. as in Korea. characterized by state plan­ ning and control of banks and credit. The second new state form its breakthrough again coming in the sixties (following a pre-war take-off in Japan) has been that of the East Asian outward-development model: oriented towards exports to the world market. which will require the further growth of the welfare state. in 2006 the OECD b eat its own historical record of tax revenue. the public sector in the richest countries of the world stands at.8 FROM MARXI SM TO P O ST MARXISM? members of the European Union. 4. the national average of total government outlays (unweighted by population. annex tables 28. Japan and O ceania.5. a growth currently stultified by right-wing forces. By 200 5 it sto od at 44 per cent. 1 99 9 . but that should be interpreted as a largely conjunc­ tural oscillation. but exclusive of Iceland and Luxembourg) in 1960 was 24 . and indeed. For the OECD countries of Western Europe. 2000. health and social services. This is not to argue that there is not a growing need and demand for education. or has plateaued at. Whether measured by public expenditure or by revenue. For the G7. In terms of taxes. Paris: OECD. public outlays increased from 28 per cent of their total combined GDP in 1960 to 44 per cent in 2005.

and economies. China. a broken. and their political priorities have been quite distinct . dependent on exports to the world market. a decade later.INT O THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY 9 the development state soon became regional model. For the most part. the largest country on the planet. a high rate of literacy. has become history 's most successful development state. Singapore and Hong Kong blazing the trail for Thailand. a strong entrepreneurial stratum. Indonesia and. The Western European welfarist and East Asian devel­ opment states were rooted in very differently patterned societies. usually diaspora Chinese. with a twenty­ year growth rate per capita of almost 10 per cent per year. culturally and socially. Firstly. But qua states. there has been . would Vietnam . most countries Korea above all have already vigorously bounced back. with the will to implement decisive state initiatives. they have also had similar political regimes: authoritarian yet strongly committed to national economic development through international competitiveness. for instance). There is considerable variation between these stat e s and their differing forms of capitalism but all arose within a common regional context a Cold War frontier receiving a great deal of US economic (and military) assistance . On the contrary. as. This sixties legacy remains a major feature of the world today. with the possible exception of strife-torn Indonesia. All shared several features: Japan as the regional development model. with its powerful landowning oligarchy still in place. less successfully. landed oligarchy. with S outh Korea with varying combi­ a (perhaps now the nations of state intervention and capitalist enterprise archetype). they have had two important f eatures in c ommon. is some­ thing of a Latin America in Southeast Asia. they are both outward looking. Taiwan. Contrary to conventional opinion. it did not result in a lost decade. Malaysia. or absent. the Philippines (the latter. These were the examples that China would draw upon from the late seventies onward. The crisis of 1997 98 hit Korea and S outheast Asia pretty hard but.

nevertheless. In the mid nineties the Pearson correlation measure of exports and social expenditure as a percentage of GDP in the original OECD countries was 0. 5 Secondly. the US attempt to use the East Asian crisis of 1 9 97-98 5. with a 10 per cent decline of GDP and unemploy­ ment climbing to nearly 20 per cent. the state stepped in to prevent any increase in poverty. the link should be interpreted as meaning that international competitiveness has contributed. the Finnish economy is riding high again. neither the welfarist nor the development states are wide open to the winds of the world market. behind it. and consistent. By European standards. and has not been incom patible with the latter's p olicies of extending social entitlements. systems of domestic protection . While I am writing this. through growth. to the weight of progressive forces. for all their competitive edge and receptivity to the new. was hit by recession in the early nineties. The Asian development states have been more concerned with political and cultural protection against unwanted foreign influences. the greater its social generosity. thereby maintaining one of the most egalitarian income distributions in the world. whereas US inequality has risen sharply. despite Canada's close ties with its massive neighbour reinforced through NAFrA it has been able to maintain its more egalitarian income distribution over the past twenty years. . the Canadian welfare state is not particularly developed. this takes the form of social security and income redistribution. The IMF and.26.10 FROM MARXI S M T O P O S T MARXI S M ? a significant. often adopting an authori­ tarian nationalist stance . positive correlation between world-market dependence and social-rights munificence among the rich OECD countries: the more dependent a country is on exports. There is probably no direct cause and effect here. Japan and S outh Korea have waged low-key but tenacious and effective battles against incoming foreign investment. and continue to maintain. Among the welfare states. Both models have established. for instance. Rather. and Finnish Nokia currently reigns as the world leader in mobile phones. When Finland.

But the outcome has been disappointing. low-trade states. through a lack of both administrative and economic compe­ tence and a suitable national political culture. there has been a lethal crisis among economically inward-looking. Malaysia even managed to get away with imposing a set of controls on transborder capital flows. The tum towards import-substituting industri­ alization in Latin America in the fifties was not without success. S outh Asia had better initial conditions. with the help of capital from Italy. Cuba has managed to survive despite the US blockade even after the dis­ appearance of the Soviet Union . the entire region had run into a deep crisis. But it was clear by the seventies and eighties that the model had reached a dead end.largely through mutating into a tourist destination. Traditionalist. which b arely remains afloat. C anada and Spain (although that capital is curently being overtaken by Venezuelan money iri return for Cuban educa­ tional and medical aid) . China. it remains the largest poorhouse on earth. Even after India's recent moves onto a path of economic growth. Cambodia and Laos have all staked out a new course: China now has a proportionately larger block of foreign investment than Latin America. inward-oriented states . Vietnam. with the exceptio n of North Korea.INTO T H E TWENTY FI RST CENTURY 11 to force open the region's economies has met with only modest success. The shielded C o mmunist models have imploded. In Africa. economic as well as political. By then. with an exclusionary education system and low economic growth leading to an increase in the numbers of people living in poverty. the postcolonial states with national 'socialist' ambitions have failed miserably. especially in Brazil. 7 5 80 per cent of the regional population. with a qualified administrative elite. About 40 per cent of the world's p oor (living on less than $2 a day) are in South Asia. a significant domestic b ourgeoisie and a democratic culture . State Failures On the other hand.

in small. Spain took a new tack. from the US above all slacked off in its technological dynamic . but it was something the Scandinavian labour movement grew up with. then. More important than its scale. The Western post-industrial turn and the new possibilities of electronics were discovered too late by the Soviet and Eastern European planners. The period after the Second World War saw a new upturn in international trade although by the early seventies. concentrating on mass tourism and attracting foreign investment. One effect of this growth of intra-industrial trade has been a great boost to technology. in all its many incarnations in sharp contrast to the successes of the diferent versions of the two outward­ looking state forms must have some general explanation. can still assert itself and implement its own policies under current conditions of globalization provided that its economy can compete on the world market.which had always borrowed its industrial goal-models· from the West. this is a new challenge. was its chang­ ing character. Somewhere between the enthusiasm over Sputnik ( 1 9 57) and the pre­ crisis stagnation of the 1 980s. international trade has been decreasingly an exchange of raw materials against industrial commodities predominant in the Latin American age of export orientation and increasingly a competition among industrial enter­ prise s . thus. To the classical Left. As became clear by the end of the twentieth century. little-developed societies that turned . By the early eighties. A state. it had only reached the same proportion of world trade as that of 1 9 1 3 . however. countries standing aside from the world market have tended to miss out on this wave of development. when the USSR finally managed to surpass the US in steel production. It should probably be sought along the following lines. steel had become an expression of economic obsolescence rather than a signifier of industrial might. the Soviet Union . The widespread crises faced by this type of inward-looking state.12 FRO M MARXISM T O P O S T MARXI S M? such as Franco's Spain were also forced to change: begining in about 1 960.

In 1 905.L. from 1 3 to 40 per cent. too. 540. World Economic Outlook. For the UK's ten large st industrial companies. the state has outgrown the corporations.INTO THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY l3 their attention to the production of compe titive exp orts by relatively skilled labour. corporate growth is not always so outstandingly impre ssive . a balance of assets versus shares and debt of the historical record may not be quite the same as the curent accounting of corporate assets. the world's largest mobile phone operator. 'The Emergence of the Large Scale Company in Gre at Britain'. had assets equal to 1 6 per cent of GNP. Crafts. and British and US historical national accounts. 1 9 67. DC: IMF. 5 to 33 p er cent of GDP. 31 July 2000. rising from 7 . Payne. 'Globalization and Growth in the Twentieth Century'. Corporations and States The relative economic importance of the large st corpora­ tions has grown over the long historical haul creating a concentration of capital. the reverse is true). Pu blic expenditure in the US more than quadrupled between 19 1 3 and 1 9 98. in IMF. Calculations from P. The capital balance in principle. 7. Washin gt o n. the fifty largest US corporations. in the UK it trebled.1 . Perhap s sur­ pri singly. although the figures are not quite comparable. . however. and reache d 28-29 per 6. 3 5 . N.1 2 per cent of GNP i n 1 913 and 1 929. had 1 8 per cent.6 Compared with the growth of the state. and from the World B ank's World Development Repurt 2000/200 l. The capital assets of the country's three largest industrial c orporations amounted to 1 1. but that change in turn corresponds to actual corporate development. Economic History Review 20. j ust as Marx predicted. the rise was from 5 per cent of GNP in 1 905 to 4 1 per cent in 1 999 of which Vodafone. 2001. it seems that the US state has actually grown faster than industrial corporations during the course of the twentieth century (although in the UK. Supporting Studies. compared with contemporary data from Fom. the assets of the fifty largest US industrial companies amounted to 37 p er cent of GNP. by nominal capitalization.7 In Sweden. By 1999. went down to 5 per cent i n 1 948.

. their sales re venue amounted to 2 1 p er cent of US GDP. corporate re venue has no t quite kept up with the growth of core economies in the past two decades. whose p opulation was then around 1 0 5 million. it is markets transnational markets that have grown. 4 May 2000. see the Financial Times. The financing of the US war in Vietnam was probably one of the turning-points in the economic history of the twentieth century: it helped to spawn the new transnational currency market with its gigantic capital flows. and American war purchases played a crucial 8. and that of General Electric almost 6 per cent. Public taxes. whose 1 99 9 population was around 97 million people. corporate revenue was three times the GDP of Mexico. in 2006. the market value of Microsoft was almost 7 per cent of US GDP in 1 99 9 . the total revenue of the world's 500 largest corporations amounted to 43 per cent of the world product.e. relative to the world's largest national economy. growth relations b etween transnational corporations and national economies have been surprisingly nuanced. In 1 999. the stock market value of the corporation's shares on a given day. In 1 9 80. rose from 8 per cent of GNP in 1 9 1 3 to 52 per cent in 1 9 97.8 It is the wealth rather than the revenue of corporations that has increased in relation to states and national economies. in 1 9 80.9 Market Dynamics Even more than corporations.14 FROM MARXISM T O POST MARXI SM? cent in 1 99 9. on the other hand. nevertheless. in 2006. twice that of Mexico. Over the more recent period.. 24 July 2000. Contrary to current assumptions. at the very start of the downturn on the world's stock exchanges. GDP data from World Development Report 2000/200 I. We are. 9. to only 1 7 per cent. On 24 April 2000. Their annual profits alone were 29 per cent larger than the GNP of Mexico. facing big private forces. C orporations data from Fortune. Corporate account assets are more stable than market capitalization i. The revenue a measure not usually available for long-te rm comparisons of the world's ten largest corporations has decrease d.

since rose in the eighties and soared to a peak in 1 9 96. In 1 995. with the introduction of the euro and the fallout from the Asian crisis. World Development Indicators. . table 5. but exploding in the eighties was that of derivatives: betting on the future. Since the autumn of 1 998. The World Bank.4. they have surpassed it. The postwar trans­ national anchorage of the currency system. more than the GDP of the world's third largest economy.9 trillion. Gennany. 2005. and then levelling off on this altiplano . 1 998 the daily turnover of foreign-currency trading in the world was 3. volume of around reaching a the notional $34. to 53 per cent in 1 990. the first of which is the transnational currency market. however. contrived The second change has been the development of signif­ icant new objects of trade. set up at Bretton Woods. to 1 50 per cent by early 2 00 1 . amount of bets outstanding in global derivatives trading almost equalled the whole world product. stock-market turnover increased from the world product in 1 990 to 81 per cent in only probably not even mainly thanks to innovations in communications technology.2 trillion. derivatives trading multiplied fifty-six-fold.10 Transnational capital flows have speeded up to an enormous extent� not scale. currency trading has declined significantly. after peaking at around 1 80 per cent. GDP in 2006 of $2. amounting to In April 12 times world exports in 1979 and 61 times world exports in 1 9 89. Washington. collapsed in the early seventies. but because of institutional change. Cross-border flows of bonds and equities 199 8. Trans­ national transactions on bonds and equities that involved 1 0 . DC: The World Bank. Transnational currency trading soon became an enormous global casino. US stock­ market capitalization rose from about 40 per cent of GDP in 1 980.4 times larger than the Mexican GNI for the whole year. among other factors.INTO THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY 15 role in the take-off of East Asian development. Between 1 986 and 1996.000 billion. In April annual with a 2007 the daily turnover of foreign exchange markets was $3. One such invention in the seventies. On a world 2 8 per cent of 1 998 . Two examples come to mind.

Global Transformations. 208 9. In Britain the wave of privatization was initiated by Thatcher in this respect. 70th Annual Report. 1 9 99. privatization programmes have been adopted not only in post-Communist Eastern Europe but also in the largest remaining C ommunist countries. Since then. 1 2 April 200 1 . 2000. Then the trend reversed. from France to Tanzania to India. condition 1 1 . the Chilean Unidad Popular and the socialization proposals of the French and Swedish govern­ ments between the mid-seventies and the early eighties . . 2000. with failures and defeats from Sweden to Chile. It was buttressed by the might of Soviet industrialization and. more radical than her Chilean counterpart. and by virtually all social democracies not to speak of the Right.9 1 99 8 per cent of US GDP in 1975-9 more than twice US GDP before declining to 189 per cent in 1 999 .8 per cent in 6. later. there was indeed a long-term trend towards the socialization and/or public regulation of the means of production. Basle: Bank for Inter national Settlements. accompanied by a mounting crisis in the Communist coun­ tries. rapid transit) and communications (telephones and. D C: The World Bank. the Cuban revolution. after the S econd World War. sometimes a decisive. airlines.. table 5. The World Bank.16 FRO M MARXI S M T O P O ST MARXI SM? US residents rose from to 22 1. Marx foresaw a historical tendency of development that the productive forces would acquire a more social character and would thus come into increasing contradiction with the private ownership of the means of production. Pinochet. David Held et ai. transport (railways. World Development Indicators. Washington. Stanford. This was a major dynamic in the capitalist heartlands from the First World War to the beginning of the Cold War. Bank for International Settlements. China and Vietnam. CA: Stanford University Press.1 1 A hundred and fifty years ago. by the entire Communist bloc. broadcasting). Still another socializing wave came with postcolonial socialism. C3. Dagens Nyheter.2. Such programmes have become a major. From that period until about 1 980.

which 1 9 68 froze new Communist initiatives and inaugurat ed a period perestroika could not disrupt. 3. In the core capitalist countries. new source s of capital generation and management technologies challenged the capacity of the state. These three systemic tendencies coalesced in the eighties. 1. Heavy social commitments also made it increasingly difficult for even wealthy states to meet new demands for investment in infrastructure. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in of stagnation. from within .but rather something which emerged.. The development programme of the Communist states. 2. The competence and integrity of the postco lonial states turned out to be fatally inadequate to the requirements of social planning and state-sponsored economic development. dependent on mobilizing natural and human resources with the help of existing technology.favourable or unfavourable� depending on one's point of view of contingent events. the question of how to generate new technology and more productivity was never answered. was beginning to exhaust itself. Privatization then gained its own political thrust through the emergence of two particularly ruthless and strong-willed tendencies. domestic or borrowed. In neither case was privatization initially an issue . How can this historical tum from social­ iza tion to privatization be explained? What happened was a confluence of three systemic processes� under the conditions . while the explosion of financial markets generated much more private capital. both arising out of the Left's failed crisis management: Pinochetismo in Chile and Thatcherism in Britain .INTO THE TWENTY FIRST C ENTURY 17 for IMF loans. Outside the domain of the arms race with the US.beyond undoing Allende's s o cializations . This first became visible in East Central Europ e by the mid-sixties and in the S oviet Union about a decade later. early on.

69ff. Private-sector outsourcing has been a parallel development. 1 997. turned into a condition of IMF World Bank loans. 1 99 6-2006. it was vigorously pushed by interested investment bankers and business consultants. with industrial 1 2 . 13. Manufacturing employment also declined. indicates a certain stabilization at a slightly higher level. and among the 'industrial countries ' from 37 26 per cent. London: Sage Publications. Santiago de Chile: UN. table 111. mainly in telecommuni­ cations. and a fairly dramatic process of deindustrialization took place in the eighties . the industrial working-class movement reached the historical height of its size and influ­ ence in the seventies. 5 per 1 990 at 27 per cent of total employment deindustriali zation also hit old Third World industrial centres. such as Bombay. Less Class� More Irreverence Industrial employment peaked in the capitalist heartlands in the second half of the sixties. peaking in 1 . there have been some technological aspects to this shift.14 A later ILO time series. ILO. World Employment 1995. and some managerial aspe cts. CEPAL. Geneva: ILO.3. See my European Modernity and Beyond. 1 9 95. 1 99 5 . industrial employment as a proportion of world employment declined from 17 to per cent. most powerfully in South Korea where manufacturing employment soared from cent in 1 960 to 22 per cent in 1 980. 14 . 2 9 . and taken up as an ideological centrepiece by the right-wing media. Once put on track. strongly supported by ideological fashion. though. 1997. Panorama social de America Latina. As was noted. begin­ ning in 1 980 in all the more developed Latin American countries (save Mexico.18 FROM MARXI SM TO POST MARXISM? the leader's entourage. 12 While indus­ trialization and industrial working-class formation continued in East and Southeast Asia. with its US-operated maquilado­ 19 to ras)Y Between 1 96 5 and 1 990. . relatively. the privatization drive has been powered by new private capital. But overall.

if it occurs. never in the US. ten years ago. The enormous growth of Third World megacities � from Cairo to Jakarta. Clearly. however. In India. in China. De-agrarianization has been one factor here agricultural lab our declining fro m 5 7 to 48 per 1 990 cent of world employment between 1 9 6 5 and although peasants have been far from always and everywhere deferential. from Dhaka to Mexico via Kinshasa and Lagos is generating an urb an proletariat only in i the Rom an. While eventual revolt of the slums (as suggested in Mike Davis's an Planet of Slums). pre-Marxist sense of ' informal' labour and dea �rs. the great epoch of the industrial working-class movem ent has come to an end. But this is only part of the story.INTO THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY 19 employment making up 21 per cent of world employment at both end years. industrial labour came to dominate post-agrarian employ­ ment only in Europe. religious as well a s s o c iopolitical . � 23 per kent. an international slum-dwellers organization i exists. service employment is o n the verge of overtaking industrial employment in China . and it is most unlikely to happen ever a gain. has passed its high point and is now progressively weakening . their share then dropped . Classical 'irreverent c ollectivism'. in as much as post-industrial decline was offset by S outh Asian industrialization. In fa ct. they constituted a quarter. The other crucial development over this period has been the strong erosion of traditional deference. only about a tenth of the economically activ� p opulation is in the fonnal urban sector. is unlikely to fit into the classical repertoire of working-class protest and revolution. Japan or S outh Korea. town-dwellers in China now make up a good third of the population. The Netherlands provides a stark example of secul arizatio n : the explicitly religious parties received over half of all votes cast in every election from the introduction o f universal suffrage in 1918 up until 1 9 63. According to the 2000 census. Onc e more according t o the ILO. of which the industrial working­ class movement was the main historical carrier.

the urban poor in the new big-city slums of the Third World. This developmental outcome was first visible in the sixties. formal democratic rights. But there have been other trends as well . with the undermining of traditional clientelism in Latin Europe and America. 2004. One element of this erosion of deference has been the cre ation of new forms of rebellious collectivism. education. The decline of erstwhile authority has also given rise to new. . too. In India. women have worke d to build transnational feminist networks . 1 5 What we might call social modernization resulting from economic change. the downtrodden or oppressed. Indige­ nous p e oples have organized in defence of their rights and h ave become a significant political force throughout the Americas. rather than polluted untouchables. the lower castes and 'untouchables' in South Asia.20 F R O M MARXI S M T O POST MARX I S M? to one-third in the twenty years that followed. indigenous movements allied with environmentalist organizations have exerted veto power. has been significantly loosened : women's rights and questions of gender equality have appeared on the agenda virtually everywhere in the world. self-chosen brands of authoritarianism or to fundamentalism p articularly significant within American Protestantism. The grip of patriarchy. indigenous peoples on all continents. London: Routledge. affecting not only women and young people but also the salaried middle strata in most countries. and a major force in Bolivia and Ecuador. Catholics and European Protestants. from Arctic Canada to sub-Antarctic C hile. It was highlighted in the protests of 1 968 and then by the women's movement that followed in their wake. Lower castes have reshaped their collective identity as D alits. West Asian and 1 5 . One is towards what we could call ' deferential individualism' the worship of mammon and success in any form. See Part 1 of my Between Sex and Power. transnational migrations has had the effect of eroding many different kinds of deference. Family in the W orld 1 900-2000. mass communication.

at this stage. these develop­ ments do not simply provide additional resources for the Left. towards a greater irreverence in the face of inequalities and privileges. particularly those of power and status . Irreverence may also express itself in repulsive forms.INTO THE TWENTY FIRST C ENTURY 21 North African Islam and Israeli Judaism. fundamentali st currents within Judaism and US Protestantism seem rather to be driven by specific concerns of identity. The most immediate are those created by the historical outcome of previous political contests. From a left-wing perspective. however. these processes offer not only the potential reinforcement of further allies in the stand against deference but also the challenge of an indi­ vidualist or a new-collectivist questioning of the traditional collectivism of the Left and the anti-imperialist and labour movements . their exceptions. But my impression would be that the overall direction in which they have been and will be heading is not only away from traditional collectivism but also. At the very least. for instance. successes and failures. their uneven­ ness. While Islamic fundamentalism and Latin American evangelicalism have thrived on the social failures of both the secularized Left and traditional religious institutions. alliances and compromises. with their many contradictions. to draw up a balance she et of the combined effects of all these social processes. Here we shall simply list what seem to have been the most significant defeats and victories. of the past forty years for both Right and Left. It is impossible. further dynamics are at work. and more insistently. . such as xenophobic violence or crime . environmentalism and identity politics can clash head-on with the developmentalism and egalitarianism of the classical Left. DYNAMICS OF THE POLITICAL SPHERE Within these coordinates. They raise new issues and generate new questions of priorities. Most importantly. as well as noting what parameters have changed across the political field.

or that s ocial security and proper social services had now become affordable? was resoundingly won by the (refonnist) Left. for it attacked not only tradition and reaction but also the complacency of social liberalism. 2. the overthrow of ap artheid in South Africa and the defeat of US imperialism in Cuba and Vietnam were resounding left-wing victories. which altered the political space of the world in imp ortant ways . 4. The worldwide student movement o f advance for the forces of ireverence across the world. The new feminist movement questioned male radicals' leadership of movements for liberation and equality in which traditional gender roles remained unchanged.22 FROM MARXIS M TO P O S T MARXISM? Left Successes 1. the defeat of insti­ tutional racism in the US. Overall. Until the sixties. Scandinavia and the Netherlands. The discrediting of explicit racism and the fall of colonialism. It rejected the fonnula of economic growth and expanded mass education as an adequate fulfilment of the classical Left Enlightenment demands for emancipation and equality. feminism has been a movement of the Left in the broadest sense. especially in West Germany. and ratified by a series of important election results around 1 9 60. and set new agendas for human liberation and self-realization. social democracy. although more so in Western Europe and in the Third World questioning the masculinist rule of capital . The decolonization of Mrica. European colonial rule over other p eoples was still widely held to be perfectly legiti­ mate. Blacks in the US were still denied human and civil rights . Commu­ nism and national revolutions . The postwar argument over the welfare state within the did the new prosperity advanced capitalist countries mean that less so cial expenditure would be needed. 1 968 was a major 3.

in spite of the tendency of the early feminist move­ ment to align with the Left. nouveaux philosophes and the ideological stonn troopers of the Gulf and Kosovo wars. unemployment. Latin American populism and the Chilean Left were confronted with such confli cts. The rendez-vous m anque between the protesters of 1 968 and the existing labour movements. the potential for a historical renewal or refounding of the Left was lost. After its first wave of individualist iconoclasm. Thus ensued the moment of neoliberalism.INTO THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY 23 as well as of patriarchy than in the US. too in feminist and expressed. Disillusion­ ment there in turn generated a good deal of right-wing liberal renegadism. women's voting patterns tended to be more right-wing than men's. Left Failures and Defeats 1 . as well as the self ­ indulgent individualism of the Clinton kids. 2. . Western European social democracy Party above all. in the capitalist democracies. the former turned to mimetic early Bolshevik romanticism and 'party-building'. which is with us still . But because of that missed appointment. A good part of the irreverent individualism of sometimes politically 1 968 has persisted. into a female voting preference for left­ of-centre parties and candidates (very clearly marked in recent US presidential elections). Their failures paved the way for a powerful right-wing backlash violent in Latin America but within the bounds of formal democracy in North America and Western Europe . as environmentalist movements and in human-rights activism. the British Labour US liberalism. An important turning-point was the failure of the Left to cope with the distributive conflicts that broke out during the economic crises of the seventies and eighties. whi ch led to ever deeper crises of inflation. But in the course of the eighties and nineties this pattern changed. economic ungovernability and decline. In the past.

a more protracted but proportionately even more murderous struggle in Central America. The demise of Communism was neither a heroic defeat nor merely the result of an accelerating process of decay. . In the Soviet Union. the denouement came as the unintended result of the success of these reforms . but they are usually managed by foreign based capitalist enterprises. Its ingenious strategy has been to become. they were largely economic. Many if not most of the best Cuban hotels are public property. breaking loose before the latter disintegrated. the reforms were largely political and democratizing. once again. In both the Soviet Union and China. it is less clear that the 1 6 . While tourism is beach hotel can be a medium-term social model. through very different survival strategies. benefited nationalist politicians. 4. although this is hardly less personality-driven and authoritarian than what preceded it. finally. The Right's capacity for violence . Two smaller Communist regimes. Eastern Europe overtook the USSR. and C ommunist Southeast Asia followed China rather cautiously. complete with ballistic missiles and mass poverty. however. Nationalist isolation has mutated North Korean Communism into a dynastic power. they threw the planned economy into chaos and. the beginning of the end was a wave of radical and unexpected internal reforms. 16 certainly an industry of the future. In China. Cuba has survived with the revo­ lutionary integrity of its regime intact.24 F R O M MARXI S M TO P O S T MARX I S M ? 3. in both countries. for the non-Communist as well as the Communist Left: the possibility of achieving a viable noncapitalist society lost much of its credibility.fatally underestimated led to a number of bloody defeats : Indonesia by the Left in 1 9 65 . taking longer to tear socialist politics to pieces while profoundly corrupting the party-state . in fact. a major international holiday resort . an ironic twist. the S outhern Cone of Latin America in the early seventies. The implosion of Communism in the 1 990s was a negative tum on an epochal scale. have so far maintained themselves. It had.

A brief list must suffice as a reminder. A further difficulty for the Left : neoliberal economic policies did bring some material rewards and could not credibly be denounced as a complete failure for the Right . begining in the Congo in the autumn of 1960. which surged in the wake of the mid-seventies oil crisis. Bolivia. later reproduced in the Pol Pot Vietnam conflict. divided and demoralized the Left and enormously strengthened the hand of the Right. there has been the rise of environmental politics. we must register the ways in which the parameters of the political field in general have shifted during this period. Brazil. Some privatization initiatives succeeded n o t only in providing more privileges for a few but also in encouraging investment and providing services: telecommunications is the outstanding example here. Neoliberal governments succeeded in curbing inflation. these currents have also questioned the fundamentally developmentalist perspective of the industrial Left. 6. and may prove more tolerant of unemploy­ ment and economic inequality than the traditional Left has .INTO THE TWENTY FIRST C ENTURY 25 5. a major political asset in the nineties in Argentina. The opening of world markets meant new opportunities for quite a number of people . The Sino-Soviet split. Again. In addition to these successes and failures. While generally more critical of capital than of labour. Geopolitical events at the state level have weighed heavily on the Left Right balance of world forces. Firstly. Peru and elsewhere . State breakdowns in independent Africa. there is space here only to note the effects of some of these dynamics on the balance of Right and Left. The catastrophic defeat by Israel in the 1 9 67 war discredited and demoralized the secularized Arab Left throughout the region and bred aggressive religious fundamentalisms among both Arabs and Jews. left little space for Left politics and policy on that continent a restriction camou­ flaged for a while by the geopolitical alignment of some leaders with the USSR.

ethical questions and quality of life . the disappearance of traditional working-class milieux. C ULTURE S O F C RITIQUE Critical thought depends on cultural soil to grow. for instance. the politics of ethnic and sexual identity have become considerably more important in some parts of the world.26 F R O M MARXI S M T O P O ST M ARXI S M ? been. mobile phones. Television has furthered the creation of new. home-centred social relations and of a more image-focused politics. a critique must depart from certain 1 7 . biology is once more emerging as a site for the expansion of knowl­ edge and technology. Their relation to socio-economic issues is often ambiguous critical of inequalities that affect their grouping or community. First. This loosening of public order controls may be reversed in the near future: an interesting test will be how the police authorities deal with forthcoming EU. but not of those that affect others or of inequality in general. eroding email and the Internet both public-service communication and also public-order controls . with it. more than a century after Darwin. resulting in relative deindustrialization and. . In order to make sense. Impact of Technologies New developments in scientific knowledge and technology over the past forty years have also had an impact on political space. and thereby also for cultural ideology. genetic engineering. coping with ageing. we should note the effects of technology in the acceleration of industrial productivity. WTO or World Bank summits. The technology for global surveillance and espionage already exists in the US Echelon system. Further developments in telecommunications satellite broadcasting. 1 7 Finally. the environment. have been double-edged. S econdly. The political field of the future will surely contain a larger element of 'life politics' around issues such as health.

was enshrined at the core of the Enlightenment itself - Sapere aude! (Dare to know!) Its universalistic principle of reason provided a tribunal for critical accusation. post. the culture of European modernity was a fertile breeding-ground for radical critical thought. a colonial roa d and the road of reactive modernization from above . Critical enquiry. out of the Enlightenment and. out of the French Revolution. the modem rupture with the past took different roads in different parts of the world a European road. fundamentally challenged only by C atholic clericalism in Colombia and some other p arts of Latin America. Its political culture fo cuse d on the confrontation of the people/nation against the prince. to lib erty. In the new settler worlds of the Americas after inde­ pendence. The value assigned to 'progress ' tended to undermine the b asic assumptions of conservatism. As I have argued more extensively in other contexts. and upper ranks of the clergy. the monarchical entourage of aristocracy. The main question in the Americas was not. European modernity developed. The Enlightenment and its subsequent traditions provided an ideal starting point for left-wing critical thought.1 7 89 Europe became the world's primary arena for ideological confrontation . against ancestral wisdom and the self-proclaimed heirs of the Enlightenment.INTO THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY 27 assumptions or principles embodied in its subject. a road suited to the New World of settlers. equality and fraternity under industrial capitalism and landowner p olitics ? The concept of class was forged before Marx in the first break­ through of European modernity. . in reflections on the Industrial Revolution in Britain and on the French Revolution . modern thought be came the conventional mainstream. unhampered by existing authorities and beliefs. culturally and philo­ sophically. politically. Although the forces of the status quo had strong institutional and intellectual resources to draw upon. S o what was actually happening to the rights of the people.

they had identified with the modem aggressor. private property. with a view to preserving a regime real or imagined under external imperialist threat. Creole p opulism in Cuba. Since liberty. Guatemala and Argentina in the Chilean radicalism in the 1 9 6 0 s 7 0 s . its political learning its principles of nation/people. it meant an instrumentalization of nation. science and progress. the colonial power language. because of the much less pronounced ideological divides in America. two things stand out . by contrast. left little space for radical thought. 'Who are the people?' Does 'the people ' include indigenous inhab­ itants? Black people? Uncouth recent immigrants? In a rough summary of New World political culture. Liberalism in the broad sense of the defence of liberty (private pursuits. were probably the p eople colonized modems 1 9 4 0 s . The the generation of Nehru. its culture. private beliefs) and a commitment to science and progress (to reason) has had a much firmer intellectual hold than in Europe. By definition.28 FRO M MARXI S M TO P O S T MARXI S M ? 'What are the rights of the people?' but rather. both Communist and non-Communist. Socialist radicalism. they experienced the denial of rights and self-determination to their own people. Marxist thought and p olitics have on occasion more easily melded with mainstream political currents. overshadowing socialist critiques . their intrinsic social . Reactive modernization from above. such as New Deal liberalism. equality and fraternity were predefined in the mainstream as a means of strengthening the regime. or Ho Chi Minh and Nkrumah experiencing the contradictions of liberal European moder­ nity most acutely. The anticolonial modernism of the colonized settler Creolity a perspec­ tive also adopted in Latin America by those who rejected was highly conducive to radicalism. Secondly. rights and self-determination. On the other. the haughty face and the iron fist of liberal imperialism . politics. On one hand. Sukarno. was a pervasive characteristic of post­ Second World War anticolonial nationalism. usually. if not always.

into Japan.was not inherently left­ wing. alongside modem ideas in general. and its e conomic credentials destroyed by the Depression of the 1 930s . 1 99 8 . imperialist and militaristic modernism was both defeated and utterly discredited. promulgated by Herbert Spencer among others and very influential in the US. traditionalist conservatism was increasingly supplemented. in about 1 9 80.with its commitment to reason. by and large. prevent radical currents from making their way. The latter has at least two very different originS. (Chapter 3 examines the different 'master narratives ' of modernity and their relationship to Marxism . change. and the rise of postmodernism . most clearly developed in the field of architecture as a 1 8 . ) In the latter p art of the ninete enth century. came the avalanche of post­ modernism. and in the Americas it was overtaken. This was social Darwinism and the new language of liberal imperialism. they encountered a more b arren soil. This did not. science. 1 8 One is aesthetic: a mutation of the modernist succession of avant-gardes. modernism was overwhelm­ ingly left-of-centre in all parts of the world. Turkey and the uncolonized Arab world. However. had its thesis of the antagonism between industrialism and militarism disproved by the First World War. progress and the future . Postmodernity. after Stalingrad and Auschwitz. . Modernism .INTO THE TWENTY FIRST C ENTURY 29 contradictions were kept out of sight or sidelined from the beginning. The same period that saw the eclipse of political Marxism also witnessed the denial of modernity in the name of p ostmodernity. There. except. as well as repressive vigilance. both important ingredients of twentieth-century Fascism. Non-militaristic laissez-faire social Darwinism. Then. of c ourse. this racist. by a right-wing modernism that extolled the overriding rights of the strongest and the fittest. however. See the unrivalled critical archaeology of Perry Anderson. Siam. After the Second World War. the countries involved in reactive modernization . The Origins of London: Verso.

Conversations with Zygmunt Bauman. o r Jackson Pollock and Andy Warhol changes emerging in the 1 9 6 0 s. intuitively longed for. Lyotard. say. J. Fredric Jameson. G . Thos e d evelopments warranted analyses of a new mode of cultural production. 1 99 1 . important changes had clearly taken place b etween the work of. as well as the sociocultural context. 200 1 . . J. Massumi. Minneapolis: University o f Minnesota Press. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. 22 But even the very best attempts at relating 1 9 .30 FROM MARXISM T O POST MARXISM? reaction against the austere high modernism of Mies van der Rohe and the International Style. Mies van der Rohe and Robert Venturi. with the benefit of a more sceptical hind­ sight?20 The aesthetic attraction is easily understood as. may be seen . tran s . another manifestation of the relentless modernist drive for innovation. and setting a new aesthetic tone for the coming decade s . 1 9 Why did postmodernism become such a formidable challenge? Why was postmodernity ' badly needed. Post. The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. Anti. Here. such as Fredric Jameson's Pos t­ modernism. Postmodernism. a manifestation of ex-leftist exhaustion and disenchantment . In the cultural sphere. London: Verso. Tester. 7 1 . The key figure here is the late French philosopher Jean-Fran90is Lyotard. . as an early devotee recently put it. 20. B auman and K. The other source lies in social philosophy. 22. a disillusioned former militant of the far-left grouplet Socialisme au Barbarie. '2 1 All this involved a remarkable conflation of brilliance and myopia . But the question of the theoretical and p olitical significance of p ostmodernism still remains . Alexander. NLR 1 : 2 1 0. Or. . . 82. Neo'. Jeffrey Alexander captures one salient point when he c oncludes that 'postmodern theory . F. Bennington and B . what influences its specific forms would be in opposition to its immediate predecessor/enemy. . March April 1 995. 'Modem. Z. 1 984 ( 1 979). Cambridge: Polity. and desperately sought'. as an attempt to redress the problem of meaning created by the experienced failure of "the sixties" . 2 1 . above all.

INTO THE TWENTY FI RST CENTURY 31 cultural analysis to socio-economic change never fully succeeded in articulating the connections between the two . 2 6 There were. S e e also Linda Hutcheon.25 Instead. and Pauline Marie Rosenau.a malaise within scholarly analytics. so Jameson does not discuss the 'later' post. the main elements of the theory of late capitalism were conceived in 1 9 63 6 7 . two further pillars of the new edifice of postmodernity. 8 8 . it largely addressed the Left and the ex-Left. 1 9 9 1 . The Politics of Postmodernism. London: Routledge. its Gennan edition appeared in 1 972 from Suhrkamp. 2 5 . postmodernism fed on the demoralization and uncertainty of the Left in the aftermath of late 1 960s and early 1 970s euphoria. which were intensified by the oil crises of the 1 970s and early 1 9 8 0 s . providing sustenance to academic ' cultural studies ' . Another was the critique of modernist progress that arose from ecological concerns. 1ameson himself scoffingly dismisses the doctrine's intellectual attractions: 'no one is going to persuade me that there is anything glamorous about the thought of a Milton Friedman. . 24 Outside the specific audiences of architecture and art. Princeton. NJ: Princeton University Press. Anderson. 2 6 .1 9 7 5 capitalism or the surge of right-wing neolibe ral modernism. and paid scant attention to the simultaneous rise of right-wing modernism in the form of neoliberalism or assertive capitalism . including feminism. London: Verso. According to the author's preface. see Jameson. Ernest Mandel's Late Capitalism was published in English in 1 9 75. 2 3 Despite his seminal contributions. The Origins of Postmodernity. in addition. a Hayek or a Popper in the present day and age'. Environ2 3 . which largely focused on the state regulation of capital and its insuperable limits. 24. 2002. Its critique of reason and rationality thrived on the 'machinery of images ' of the television society. One was the social restru cturing that followed from deindustrialization an epochal s o ci al change. Post-Modernism and the Social Sciences. postmodernism mutated into a set of cultural political attacks on modernity and the modern . 2002 ( 1 989). a picture of the postwar world economy orig­ inating in the 1 9 60s. Jameson bases his account on Ernest Mandel 's Late Capitalism. A Singular Modernity. 2-3 .

'Modernizing' the labour market usually means more rights for capital and employers . 'Modernizing' social services usually means the privatization of and cuts to public services. cites the asceticism of modernism. the modem attacks the target of postmodernism's has been defined in a number of ways . But were asceticism. as p o stmo dernism has turned into sociocultural studies. Rarely does the term signal more rights for employees. the unemployed and pensioners. Progressive academic culture has declined the world over. its minimalism. Against this background. The contamination of social Darwinism by Fascism is being pushed under the rug. while globalization is staged as the survival of the fittest alone. de-industrialization and ecological blowbacks provided a social echo chamber for the post­ modernist discourse of (ex-) Left disorientation. Jameson's for example. the right-wing revival of modernity p ersists. the teleology of its aesthetic. Jameson. 27 Although the intellectual wave of postmodernism has now subsided. 'Modernizing' the pension system generally means fewer rights for old people. fewer rights for capital. phallocentrism and authoritarianism really more characteristic of. it would be almost extinct. modern than pre modern cultures and societies? . a tendency that is more closely connected to dark­ ening p o litical pro spe cts extra muros than the kind of 27. but its adherents have proved receptive to postmodernism. and more universal in. 1 . free from Spencerian p acifism and accompanied instead by a loud neo-imperial drumbeat. The 'modem' is becoming the property of liberal reaction. or more public services. its phallocentrism and authoritarianism. while grimly noting A Singular Modernity. mass­ market imagery. A Singular Modernity. Indeed.32 F R O M MARXI S M TO P O S T MARXI S M ? mentalism m a y have found i t hard t o flourish i n th e esoteric ambience of postmodernist philosophizing. recent ' regressions' from an earlier 'consensu s ' around ' full p ostmodernity'. Were socialist modernism a species. its cult of genius and 'the non­ pleasurable demands ' it made on the audience or public .

which survived the great postwar boom. Emir Sader. Georgia and Ukraine. as well as at. But in the last five to ten years a new. as well as the anti-Chavista opposition in Venezuela . for instance. which have been . Academia. top universities in S ao Paulo and S eoul . though smaller. their movements have als o diversified and now include street b attalions supporting liberal-democratic. radical historiography in India seems to have lost its once impressive vibrancy. Japan's once strong university-based Marxist economics. aided by Swedish and other external public funding.INTO THE TWENTY FIRST C ENTURY 33 virulent internal anti-leftism found within French academia and certain post-C ommunist milieux. Non-conformism remains well represented at Oxbridge and in the Ivy League. pro-American 'regime change ' in Serbia. still support a wide range of Marxist and other left-wing thought. with intellectually oriented student radicals of the late sixtie s and early seventies having attained s enior professorships. however. CLACSO has b ecome an important inspiration to and financier of progressive empirical research. The continental European and Latin American mass Marxism of students and teaching a ssistants is gone . Institutional innovation has also taken place . The politically more insulated Anglo­ Saxon universities fare better in this regard than do the Latin American ones. more recently. its work includes the monitoring of protest movements in Latin America. University students have not only been depoliticized. has faded. The public universities have lost many of their brightest students to right-wing p rivate institutions. One exam­ ple is the revitalization of CLACSO (the Latin American Council of S o cial S ciences) under the leadership of Atilio Boron and. think tanks and public research institutes. Part of their strength comes from a matured generation. left-of-centre intelle ctual generation has been blossoming. and the left-wing intellectual political essay has gone out of fashion in Latin America . which are always more susc eptible to political developments and ambitions.

B oron and G. Mundializacao e cultura. to which the working-class history of E. has recently been reinvigorated. eds. one challenging the call for 'progress'. There are several such movements. Culturas Hibridas. Thomp son in England and the multi-volume Subaltern Studies of Ranajit Guha and his associates in India gave eloquent expression. right-wing defences of traditional privilege and power. and they tend to cluster in two groups . 2 9 . Mexico: Editorial Paidos. Scott's classic work was Weapons of the Weak. but his oeuvre also includes Domination and the Arts of Resistance and Seeing like a State.echini. Politicas y movimientos sociales en un mundo hegemOnico. Ortiz. it is necessary to take a systematic look. 2 9 There has always existed a strong subaltern anti­ modernism. 28. and the other questioning mundane 'rationalism' and secularism. 30. however brief. Buenos Aires: ClACSO. ' development' and 'growth'. R. however.ilo Brasilera. based in Dakar. Scott has been a sympathetic theorist. 2002. 2007. But now that the Marxian dialectic has lost most of its force. See A. Garcia Canclini. particularly from the Third World. 1 98 5 . doing excellent work while exercising diplomatic caution. C ODESRIA. Latin America has also been a major centre of thought and analysis of the cultures of globalization. as can be seen in the work of Octavio Ianni and Renato Ortiz in Brazil and of Nestor Garcia C anclini in Mexico. N.34 FROM MARXI S M TO P O ST MARXISM? staging an increasing number of actions in the 2000s. Silo Paulo: Brasiliense. at the current political implications of antimodernism. O. In the current research arms of the UN. 1 992. A sociedade global. for example . and the promotion of South-South contacts . Here we are interested in movements critical of modernism that are not. 28 Its weaker African equivalent. and of which James C. one also finds several products of an e arlier progressive era. l. . New Haven and London: Yale University Press. 1 994.30 The Marxist labour move­ ment could usually accommodate it through its socialist critique of industrial capitalism. Ianni. P. Rio de Janeiro: Civilizac.

B.INT O THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY 35 Among the critiques of progress and development. peasants. The World S o cial Forums of the 2000s have given rise to similar antimodernist protest movements from different countries and continents. . and have also given them plat­ fonus and a sympathetic hearing. small farmers. a meeting-place by far the most exciting one in the last two decades and not a movement or even a force of common action. declared a front-stage banner at the World S ocial Forum in Mumbai in 2004. New Left Review 2: 19. lack of a single control centre and truly global character. The critical culture created at the forums has been that o f resistance to neoliberal modernism. On the other hand. That defence is easily supported by an anti­ capitalist Left in opposition� and has been adopted by the current Social Forum movement: 'We do not want devel­ opment. 'On the Attack'. antidevelopment frequently frag­ ments into isolated minority battles with ineffectual and limited support. there is one that has followed the Industrial Revolution into the postindustrial world: the defence of traditional livelihoods by artisans. who were brought together with Latin flair in 2 00 1 by a diverse c oalition of Brazilian social movements and French academics and journalists grouped around Le Monde DiplomatiqueY Significant organizational infrastructure has been provided by the Workers' Party CPT) governm e nts in Porto Alegre and Rio Grande do SuI. The global amplitude of the latter's offensive engendered a wide range of losers and critics. As a movement. Januray February 2003 . Cassen. But that has been possible because WSF is a forum. who are struggling to get out of poverty. by French and other Trotskyists in the alter-globalist movement ATTAC. the WSF does represent a novel phenomenon in the world history of the Left. We just want to live'. fishermen and tribal communities. But wheri framed in strong� unqualified terms� it makes no sense to the masses of the world. But in their ideological ecumenism. a 3 1 . and by the CPI CM) in Mumbai.

C. 'The World Social Forum and the Global Left'. a kind of postmodern middle-class culture has also developed.blogspot. Open to idealistic arguments as well as to ecological and aesthetic concerns. above all in Western Europ e and North America. this is a milieu to which left-wing discourse can connect. winning coalitions have often proved feasible . http ://wsfic strategies. so that the credit for success is legitimately claimable by both Right and Left.comlZ007/08/chico whitaker crossroads do not always. this became a significant urban movement. In the 1 960s. Since then it has spread to other parts of the world.html?Itemid= 1 5 0. irreverent. The youngsters of the North who attend the World Social Forums often 3Z.32 Another current. the pollution and traffic congestion of Asian cities. Whitaker.html . against the demolition of historic city centres to make room for motorways and commercial development. and Third World cities in general. Paris and Washington DC. originally conceived as a protest against massive ugly and unhealthy urbanization. Nevertheless. my oid university town in Sweden. The radical Left and to a much lesser extent social democracy and its centre-left equivalents usually played an active role in these urban movements. which has led to tense debates within the broad International C ouncil of the WSF. unattracted by capitalism 's relent­ less drive to accumulate . as old as modernism itself. as well as in smaller places such as Lund. In some parts of the rich world. The political irony is that such coalitions have generally also included a strong right-wing component of cultural conservatives. 'Crossroads do not always close roads '. http://focusweb. and broad. It scored several important victories in big cities such as Amsterdam. most notably perhaps in California.36 FROM MARXI S M TO P O ST MARXIS M ? stimulating cultural space is not in itself transformative action. testify to the weak­ ness of and the urgent need for critical urban movements. de Sousa Santos (2007) . orgithe world social forum and the globalleft. B . its origins traceable to the youth culture of ' 1 9 6 8 ' individualistic. is driven by a commitment to a natural or aesthetic lifestyle. Cf. hedonistic but not necessarily consumerist.

33 The ecological critique of developmentalism connects rather easily with both livelihood defence and urban­ community aestheticism. Th e New Spirit of Capitalism. 2005 . Indeed. is as deaf and blind to environmental externalities as was the capitalist modernism hailed in the Communist Manifesto. Environmentalism and developmentalism have reached a modernist compromise. rather than growing into a belated ecological qualification of capitalism. N . which has been replaced by an emphasis on environmental destruction. currently centreing on the effect of man-made climate change . L. anticolo nial nation­ alism and reactive developmentalism from above . has 3 3 . along with its offshoots of settler liberalism. that concept provides an imp ortant b asis for critiques of and interventions against unfettered capitalism. but as a major movement it is more recent. Chiapello. Thrift. Its original neo­ Malthusian thrust focused on the depletion of planetary resources. it is noteworthy that the first oppositional movements in late Communist Eastern Euro pe were very often ecological movements . the secular universalism of the European Enlightenment.INTO THE TWENTY FI RST CENTURY 37 hail from here . Although its new 'spirit of c apitalism' is hardly on the verge of transforming the ruthlessness of actual world capitalism. traceable to the early 1 970s and the impact of the (recently updated) as did Limits to Growth. Cf. Knowing Capitalism. it does provide new possibilities for dialogue and debate with the Left the old Enlightenment liberalism . In this regard. London: Sage. . London: Verso. socialism would have made much more sense in the twenty-first century if conceptions of sustain­ able development had been developed out of socialist theory. But the engineers' modernism. 2006. Boltanski a n d E . To the extent that it is taken seriously. In the second cluster of challenges to modernism. at least in principle. which built the Soviet Union and is now building post-Mao China. as some enthusiastic theorizing seems to imply (with some caveats) . in the concept of sustainable development.



increasingly been challenged and undermined by ethnona­ tionalism, ethnoreligious movements and by a resurgent religious universalism. In different ways, these new cultural tendencies which make a mockery of modernity's self­ confident secular evolutionism severely restrict radical critical thought. Their unexpected emergence also calls for a reconsideration of some of the assumptions of European modernity. Marx, Engels and later great Marxists have always been much more shrewd and circumspect than textbook summaries of historical materialism would suggest. While ethnicity, nations and national conflict have no place in the latter, the former always paid attention to their strategic importance, from Marx's hypothesis on a linkage of future revolutions in Ireland and Britain to Lenin's and the Comintern's focus on national liberation. On the other hand, ethnicity as such does not promote critical and radi­ cal thought. On the contrary, ethnic/national mobilizations tend to foster ethnic cultural closure . The leadership, which usually has had a trans ethnic enculturation, may link the national struggle to global anti-imperialism and to universalistic proj ects of social change, to socialism or to communism, but their national standing is not based on this. Positions of anti-imperialism and/or socialism may therefore, under changed geopolitical circumstances, become easily discarded postures. Ethiopia and Mugabe's Zimbabwe are gaudy illustrations; another is contemporary Iraqi Kurdistan, who se regional leading family, the Barzanis, once flew the banner of Marxism-Leninism . Until certain Second World War rapprochements in the USSR and certain post-Second Vatican Council shifts in Western Europe and Latin America, Marxism had been firmly planted in the secularist, anticlerical and often atheistic strand of modernism . Where the subaltern populations have a strong religious commitment, as is the case in most of the Islamic world, this has been a major barrier between Marxism and the people. But even in Indonesia, where



a more open Islamic culture did n o t prevent the emergence of a Marxist-le d mass movement, the massacre o f 1 9 6 5 fed o n whipped-up religious fervour. The failures of secular anticolonial nationalisms spawned a strong religious comeback, thoroughly politicized in the Arab Islamic world and in maj ority Hindu India; mainly ap olitical in Christian Africa, except in the ap artheid S outh; politically active but internally divided in Latin America into currents of Christian demo cracy, liberation theology and US-exported Protestantism (either right­ wing or politically acquiescent) . This religious resurgence, which also includes a p owerful fundamentalist Christian Right in the US and an international revival

of militant

Judaism, has significantly altered the cultural parameters of the Left. Between middle- and upper-class fundamentalism whether Christian, Jewish, Muslim, Hindu o r Buddhist - and the Left there is no common language that could facilitate dialogue, as there is, deriving from the European Enlightenment, with middle- and even upper-class liberal­ ism . With the religiosity of the popular classes, however, there might b e . Historically, achieving any common understanding or any form of cooperation between strongly religious subaltern communities on the one hand and the Marxist Left and the labour movem:ent on the other has been extremely difficult and rare . The Christian s ocial movements of late nineteenth­ and early twentieth-century continental Europe were usually set up by local clergy worried about industrial secularization, of which the socialist labour movement was the most impor­ tant representative . The cultural antagonism almost always overshadowed their common social issues, poverty and misery, with which the Christian social movements were increasingly confronted. In spite of mounting friction and occasional conflict, these religious movements loyally preserved their subordination to the church hierarchy and to the political leaders blessed by it. Until the religious trade



unions secularized, as happened in Austria after the Second World War, and in the Netherlands and in France in the 1 9 60s, when the chips were down, the Christian social move­ ments sided with reactionary and anti-Left authoritarianism, in Austria in 1 927 34, in the Netherlands in 1 9 1 8 and 1 9 54, in Germany in 1 9 3 3 . I n the last third o f the twentieth century, however, there occurred a seismic shift in a part of Christianity. Mainstream C atholicism and Protestantism generally became socially progressive, and often also culturally and politically progressive . Advocates of Third World s olidarity and aid, environmental activists, poverty-alleviation proj­ ects, harassed immigrants and even religious minorities and persecuted political radicals could count on substantial support from mainstream Protestantism as well as from the C atholic Church . The Jesuits, long demonized by secular liberals and left-wingers, provided courageous support to popular struggles and to human rights, above all in Central America. Many were martyred by the local representatives of Yankee America for it. Progressive C atholics constituted a major component in the formation of the most successful labour party in Latin American history, the PT, which lifted the metallurgical trade union­ ist Lula to the presidency of Brazil . C an something similar happen in the non-Christian world? Sinhala Buddhism in Sri Lanka and Hindutva in India seem to be purely ethnoreligious political move­ ments . The Buddhist monks of Burma/Myanmar may sustain a democratic movement, but almost nothing is known of their social agenda, if any although the autumn 2007 p rotests started as a protest against price increases for fuel . In the Muslim world, by contrast, there are definitely strong social currents . Hamas in P alestine and Hizbollah in Lebanon already function as Islamic social movements, even while cornered by Israeli might that is backed by the entire North Atlantic Right. There were similar tendencies in Turkey, and still are, but the AKP



Gustice Development Party) i n its mutation into a governing party seems to take European Christian democracy as a social model, that is, seeing and presenting itself as a centre­ right party with social concerns. In Indonesia too, there is an Islamist political movement with a social perspective . Social Islamism is likely to develop further, having an almost unlimited supply of social problems in Muslim countries to nourish it. But it occupies an unstable position on a wide spectrum from theocratic fundamentalism to a politically secularized Left, and thanks to heavy S audi, US and Israeli investments in the form of money and military terror, the former is stronger and more attractive than the latter. In sum, the cultural space of the Left has altered substan­ tially in the past quarter century. On the whole that space has narrowed, but the new challenges to Enlightenment modernism indicate new tasks and possibilities for left­ wing thought and practice, as well as a call for a self-critical appraisal of the inherent limitations and lacunae of left­ wing modernism.

Political inspiration and demoralization are much influenced by state power and by the outcome of state conflicts . The Japanese victory over Russia in 1 9 05, for instance, was a source of inspiration to anticolonial nationalists not only all over Asia but also in Egypt and Morocco. After the outcome of the Stalingrad battle, European opinion from occupied France to neutral Sweden tilted left. The Vietnam War, unlike the Korean War, unleashed tremendous political repercussions on social movements throughout the world. The twenty-first century starts out with a quite new geopolitical configuration, radically different from that of the previous century. As it now stands, there are three major novelties. One is the absence of any state counterpart to the big capitalist power(s) . The Soviet Union whatever

that the end of North Atlantic world domination is approaching. The Soviet Union also lent substantial material assistance to radical states. Left and centre . the US SR provided inspi­ ration to many socialists and anti-imperialists. What this tilt of the globe will mean is still uncertain. A weak­ ening of US domination will. The rest is still open to speculation. Right. ambiguous in Brazil and South Africa. India. ruling in China and playing minor parts in the governing coalitions of the other three countries . with great help from Osama bin Laden and cheered on by Zionist politicians and ideologues both inside and outside Israel. no one is likely to take them up . Third is the de-territorialized world war launched by George W. But the meaning of left-of­ centre forces is very unclear in China. And except for intraregional Latin American actors. Bush. and to others at least a certain confidence that another kind of society than prevailing capitalism was possible. whether of hope or fear. All four countries of the Big South even have Communist parties with governmental influence. increase the prospects of peace and strengthen national sovereignty. and clearly minoritarian in India. the European Union and the extension and Asian deployment of NATO are off-Broadway shows. S econdly. except for the four years of its anti-Fascist alliance. all those roles and functions have been left vacant. . A South led by China. Communist organizations and left-wing refugees. Brazil and South Africa is replacing the Third World. there is a general feeling in the world North and South.42 FROM MARXISM TO PO ST MARXI SM? it was "really" was always perceived. As such. With the implosion of the USSR and its European dependencies. as a scandal and a provocation to all currents of the Right. Proclaimed to b e a war of annihilation with a time frame of at least a generation. as the state power of anticapitalism. ceteris paribus. Compared with the explosive economic growth of China and the new vigour of India. Left-of-centre political forces are better located in the South than in the US or in the NATO world generally. 1 94 1 4 5.

and indeed any movement p o ssessing any human decency� has no stake whatsoever except that no side should win� and that the sooner both sides are exhausted the b etter. the establishment of secret torture chambers and concentration camps. there are well-paid. More remarkable. missiles and occupations of the stronger side have killed more civilians than the other side. It has been an extraordinary war. two countries on another continent have been devastated� and the destruction of a third country. the official use of torture. On the one side. as the military jargon goes. fought by relatively small numbers. The weaker side has concentrated on the weakest element of their enemy civilian populations albeit on a much smaller scale compared to the British and American bombings of German and Japanese civilians during the Second World War. Sustained by volunteers� paid or unpaid. high-tech mercenary annies whose commanders. The cruel attack of September 1 1 by a score of fanatics unleashed a fury of cosmic proportions . showing how thin the civilized varnish of liberal democracies can be. are all funded by the taxpayers. although the political bosses of the mercenaries must ensure their own (re-) election. and by Scandinavian liberals spearheaded by the Danish government. however� are the worldwide abductions. As a result. stretched across several continents. and the official rejection of the Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war and due process of law. p rivate or public. Yet the bombs. Both sides have taken warfare to new depths of cruelty. which has participated in the wars in Mghanistan and Iraq. This extraordinary violence has been defended and even condoned by majorities of the US C ongre ss. by European s ocial-demo cratic leaders of the UK and Germany. . on the other� there are unpaid� low-tech� reli­ giously motivated fighters .INTO THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY 43 it has created a global b attlefield in which the Left. neither side depends much on wide p ublic support. has been overtly threatened . Iran. but with 'theatres'. both in-house and outsourced.

cheered on or at least defended by most left-of-centre liberals. which will have to . and onward to Bagram. Bush from inherited p olitical wealth. and rightly so. Hiroshima. Bagram and Guannmamo. But the record is there . but hardly anybo dy of significance on the Right has . So far. But a critical scrutiny of modernity must also reveal the mechanisms that drive liberal democrats to the horrors of Dresden. always easier. we have seen a vengeful repetition of historical violence by the liberal right (in the European sense of 'liberal') . Killing from a desk is. but why is the same blindness repeated in the current media-saturated liberal world concerning the four million dead in Russia in the 1 9 90s resulting from the restoration of capitalism? The answer in both cases is the same : total commitment to a cause. Guantanamo and the devastation of whole countries just by the stroke of his pen. whether Communism or capitalism. Globally. blinds one to the cost. for instance. Communists worldwide were blind to Soviet terror and famines. Tsarist oppression and the life-or-death Russian Civil War (abetted from outside) to the Gulag is no more incomprehensible than the career of George W. through the small-scale though highly symbolic September 1 1 attack. Any historical lessons regarding the costs of blank cheques of p olitical support have been postponed for an uncertain future .44 FROM MARXISM TO P O S T MARXISM? That revolutions and civil wars involve abhorrent violence has become impossible for late-born sympathizers with revolutions or with. Abu Ghraib. The starry-eyed defenders of the Yezhovschina of the 1 9 30s have been succeeded by their equally starry-eyed fellow-travellers of the Yeltsinschina of the 1 990s. The scale of terror remains different. the disappearance of the Soviet Union and the Bush war against the world mean a geopolitical situation much more unfavourable to the Left. but Stalin's road from violent poverty in the Caucasus. Yale fraternities and Texas sweetheart business deals. of course. A very large p art of the Left has now learned that lesson. Republican Spain to ignore.

political cadres) is sustaining not only the revolutions of Cuba and Venezuela. however. Chavez's idea of a Bank of the South. teachers. as in Mexico. although it remained much weaker than in Europe. and indigenous claims are getting louder all over the Americas. In Latin America. Nobel laureate and former chief economist of the World B ank. might become as significant as the Persian Gulf capital which is already making the US Congress nervous. now living through a process of reconstitution that is driven by the p residency of Evo Morales. endorsed in October 2007 by Joseph Stiglitz. although thus far they have been contained and divided in Mexico and Guatemala. it is frightening the middle classes even more . The alliance of Chavista oil money and Cuban professionals (doctors. and it broadened in the face of the Bush wars. are now facing new indigenista movements challenging the very foundations of the Creole state . the situation of the Left has been drastically ameliorated in the new century. Outside the corridors of power. there has always been a courageous current of US opposition to imperialism. The cautious weight of left-of-centre Brazil provides a certain balance to the US. This challenge has gone furthest in Bolivia. but is also providing much-needed help to Evo Morales in Bolivia. many of which actively promoted their 'Whitening' by nineteenth-century immigration. Ecuador is now entering a reconstitution phase. nurses. North A merica As the world's only superpower. Opposition to .INTO THE TWENTY FIRST C ENTURY 45 wait for the Southern tilt to become more pronounced. are more variable. Many Latin American Creole settler-states. the US is the lender of last resort to all reactionary regimes of the current world order. which is mostly preoccupied elsewhere. Regional developments. to Rafael Correia in Ecuador and to the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. and is encouraging Left forces all over the hemisphere and occasionally.

maverick idealist congressmen. The US is also the homebase of a vicious Zionist lobby with an important Christian fundamentalist wing which occa­ sional free speech defence may defy. including a campaign against 'Jimmy Carter's war against the Jews '.46 FROM MARXISM TO P O S T MARXI S M ? war made moderate. During the autumn of 2007. That the more belligerent Democrat lost to the one more willing to employ diplomacy may offer a modicum of encouragement. presumably referring to C arter's travelogue through apartheid Palestine. rather than overwhelming. although pushed by Barack Obama and John Edwards. so far. and to send several diplomats to Tehran later in the year. with the Republican contenders competing in belliger­ ence and the leading Democrat signaling her preparedness to follow the warpath into Iran. anti-imperialists and alter-globalists has not been sustained. mere speculation. the US remains the solid citadel of ruthless world power. A telling example of its viru­ lent militancy was staged in O ctober 2007. explicitly defiant of international law or concern for non-AIDerican lives. and an admirable though powerless opposi­ tion. and especially by Dennis Kucinich (the latter two of whom dropped out of the race early) . the US will remain not only the world's overwhelming military . American world influence is clearly weakening. but to extrapolate from this a 'terminal decline ' of US power is. the 1 999 Seattle coalition of protectionist trade unions. when David Horowitz launched 'Islamo-Fascism Awareness Week'. augmented by the Bush administration's decision to send a diplomat to sit in on talks in July 2008 between the ED and Iran. For the foreseeable future. a vibrant academia which still includes a quite impressive amount of intellectual dissent and critique. headway in the Democratic primaries of 2 008. As could be expected. prospects for the 2008 presidential election indicated that the American voting population learned little from the Iraq War. but which has no serious political counterpart. In spite of intrepid and undaunted j ournalists.

and the main backdrop of the unfulfilled dreams of migrants from the South. and C anadian cities such as Toronto and Vancouver in particular. North America is the main destination of worldwide migration. and with a p opular culture of film. The French political system prevented a consolidation of France's finest hour. currently under a conservative. Europe Europe is going in the opposite direction from that of Latin America. aerospace and biotechnology. Canada. with dynamic high-tech industries in electronics. This also means that the politic al ambiguity of cosmopoli­ tanism is visible most clearly in Canada. television and music of unrivalled world­ wide attraction serious competitors operating mainly in national or regional arenas .INTO THE TWENTY FIRST C ENTURY 47 power. in spite ofNAFTA. pro-US government. the political process there after 1 989 turned out to . but also the world's richest large economy. C anada in general. but in fact. has been able to preserve a more egalitarian social model.Communist Eastern Europe was bound to become pro-American and right-wing. C anada was more resilient than most European states. the current French government seems to have taken over Tony Blair's previous role in supporting American wars. b elying the untimeliness of the ' crows' cries' about the erosion of the nation-state . although now it is taking an active part in the war in Mghanistan. telecommu­ nications. Neither the social-democratic electoral tide of the late 1 990s when social-democratic p arties governed or were in the government of fourteen out of the then fifteen EU member states nor the Left social dynamic of the French and Dutch referenda of 200 5 has been sustained. have become centres of multiculturalism. on the c ontrary. when the country stood up against the attack on Iraq. One might say that post. In the run-up to the Iraq War. a member of the G7.

Their relation to left-wing interests is also completely contingent. But the ex­ Communists were all awestruck by Western power and Western money. drew on the old security apparatus. ex-Communist political leaders from Estonia to Albania staged successful comebacks. for instance. with whom a reformed Soviet Union would have been possible. which are neither antagonistic to nor identical with those of America . they were sucked into the maelstrom of NATO including contributing to the wars in Mghanistan and Iraq together with some variety of neoliberalism. In the end. as it has continuously been run by a tiny clique in the Kremlin that lived on Western advice and aid in the years o f Yeitsin. but Russia after Yeltsin has acted as a kind of brake. particularly for the young and well educated. while simultaneously presenting new opportunities.48 FROM MARXI S M TO P O S T MARXISM? be much more complex. Nationalism has trumped any social agenda. Under Putin. gas and metals prices during the Putin years . Russia recovered as a nation-state and b ecame able to pursue its own national interests. One reason was that the restoration of capitalism was far from a general success. Another was the understandable incompetence of the new anti-Communist politicians. who had few chances to learn about government during Communist times . to American belligerence. Post-Communist Russian politics has been very manip­ ulative . shed of the now irretrievably nationalist incorporations . On the contrary. and many were personally corrupt besides. including. and the Western European leaders offered them no choice of a European security system independent from the US . it resulted in a deep depression. It has never allowed any proper democratization. and thrived on high oil. massive impoverishment and unemployment. slow and ultimately inefficient. Alexander Kwasniewski beating the North Atlantic hero Lech Walesa in a presidential election . Russian nationalism was the card that Yeltsin and his managers used against Gorba chev. None of them created a robust party of social justice. As a result.

and the onset of c ooperation . O ccasionally the war became hot. With the democratization of South Africa. Russia is back a s an inde­ pendent geopolitical player. Whether their generous offers of aid rebuilding the destroyed transport infrastructure of the C ongo. the Transcaucasus. leading to phony but indigenous 'Marxist-Leninist' regimes in s everal countries.INTO THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY 49 of the Tsarist empire the Baltics. remains to be seen. Putin turned out to be more skilful and became more popular than most p eople had expected. Anti-Chechen. When Yeltsin b ecame a representative of the West. Africa Africa was dragged into the Cold War with the murder of Patrice Lumumba. the first elected prime minister of the Congo. Nigeria and several smaller c ountries. East and West. all of which were toppled or had evaporated by the early nineties . as when apartheid South Africa invaded Angola t o prevent a 'Marxist' government from coming into power and were driven out by airlifted Cuban troops. The Chinese. western Ukraine. With the help of the oil and gas revenue. The Americans kept control of the C ongo. from Ethiopia to B enin to Mozambique. the Communist opposition became mainly nationalist. are now back with a huge appetite for African raw materials. 'anti-terrorist' nationalist machinations outmanoeuvred Putin's more socially anchored and politically much more meritorious rivals . remaining so ever since and never spawning any serious so cial-democratic attempt even remotely corresponding to the utterly modest East-Central Europe an ones. B ecause of him. for instance will leave more enduring development traces than have previous projects. who ran their own race in the last decades of the Cold War. who was perceived to be 'anti-Western'. but the Soviet Union drew much attention. a dding a certain amount of pluralism to the Big Games .

there are currently hardly any explicitly left-wing political forces of any importance in Africa . AFRIC OM. very dependent on its capacity to ride the rough waves of ANC populist nationalism . plunder and misery. a certain political stability and dignity are emerging in Africa. the Communist Party of S outh Africa the only true CP ever constituted south of the S ahara is a party of trade­ union and other cadres and intellectuals. currently supported by a return of overall economic growth. Outside S outh Africa. the famous Marxist centres of 'development studies ' in Dar es Salaam and (for a brief time after Liberation) Maputo were virtually destroyed by the crises of the late seventies and the eighties . I n the north. noticeable even in p arts of francophone Mrica. In the west. The most important contingent. both the north of Mrica south as well as north of the S ahara and northeast S omalia are being drawn into the new American world war. Mrican Muslims are becoming attracted to violent Islamism. and in the south there is the unresolved crisis of Zimbabwe . and in a spiral of mutual encouragement. Ibadan in Nigeria. and the immense corruption and scam economy that persist under a thin gauze of chaotic elections . The intellectual centres of sub-Saharan Africa the universities of Ghana in Legon. More ominously. infested with violence. and Dakar always remained an important outpost of research .50 F R O M MARXI S M TO P O ST MARXI S M ? among them. S enegal and Morocco. Congo-Kinshasa is still a black hole. there are the simmering Muslim-Christian and ethnic conflicts in Nigeria. Prosperous. is being set up in Mrica. In the centre. the conflicts and internal wars o f Sudan have drawn American and Western European attention b ecause they pit Arab Muslims against Black Christians . Legon and Makerere are now returning to intellectual life. a new US military command structure. democratic and rela­ tively well-managed S outh Africa is providing some continental and progressive leadership. Makerere in Uganda. But everything positive is still very fragile and patchy.

to a large extent through the persistent efforts and commitment of S amir Amin. provided a few very significant intellectual milieux of progressivism. harboured a courageous and vivid White radicalism. Israel is the last of the European settler-states. Apartheid S outh Africa. for a people without land '. West Asia West Asia is a small part of the world. American dependence on West Asian oil makes control of the region a vital American interest. has now sucked most of the bright intellectuals. Black and Coloured in particular. and the Zionist project could not but b ecome occupation and ethnic cleansing. But that idealism could not survive the g eopolitical reality that Palestine was not a 'land without people. however. D emocracy. because of its resources and because of the complex crevices within its racist rule. it is unlikely that the sovereignty of the latter and the weapons of the fonner would have mattered much to the Bushes. The University of Fort Hare educated Blacks. including Black radicals. the Witwatersrand (Wits) in Johannesburg perhaps above all. But it has a global significance out of all proportion to its territory and popu­ lation. Israel and Mecca . Its origins lie to a large extent in a socialist Zionism characterized by a strong universalistic idealism. surviving in a hostile context only through . Oil revenue has made possible the survival into the twenty-first century of archaic dynastic regimes more similar to Tudor England than to the Georgian England that young Americans rebelled against. because of three things : oil. If Saddam Hussein and the sheikh of Kuwait had gotten rich from rice exports rather than from p etrol. Palestine was populated. some anglophone universities. which started in modem times with the conquest and re-peopling of the Americas but which may also be seen as d escending from the crusader states of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.INTO THE TWENTY FIR S T CENTURY 51 and reflection. into politics .

1 982 (Lebanon) . The area is a perennial war zone. wealth and armed power. The Jewish diaspora is always able to call on American might to protect Israel. in 2 0 0 0 (the helpless Gaza Strip). Founded in war. Israel then attacked its neighbors in 1 95 6. money and weapons. for instance. and their Syrian comrades were . the conflict persists . for a new war against Iran. The Baathists killed off most of Iraq's Communists. it is of course much more comfonable to let the Palestinians pay the Euro-American debt of guilt than to let the Zionists create their ethnic state in. together with the Americans. but because of its oil interests. Israel was attacked by Egypt in 1 97 3 . And for Germans and Americans. The secular Arab Left was discredited by the crushing Israeli war against it in 1 96 7 . drawing strongly on Euro-American shame and guilt concerning the Holocaust.52 FROM MARXI S M TO PO ST MARXISM? anne d force and through resources drawn from abroad: immigrants. That imperative makes killing off or deponing all Palestinians from Palestine a genocidal Endlosung of the 'Palestine question' advocated by at least one minor party in the governing Israeli coalition politically impos­ sible. 1 9 67. Now the Israelis are preparing. but it has been projected onto the world stage for two reasons : its proximity to the dominant Western oil supp ly and the resourceful Jewish diaspora. The Zionist presence and the American guarding of the oil fields are seen as an affront to Islam. Bavaria or New York. The result is that in spite of a gradual increase of Israeli land. the US must also pay some p ositive attention to Israel's Arab neighbors . say. The Iranian Left was repressed by the Shah and then smashed during the second phase of the Islamic revolution. In itself the Palestine conflict is rather small and local. The conflict is further exac­ erbated and amplified by the proximity of Palestine and oil to the holiest shrines and the spiritual centre of world Islam. and 2006 (Hizbollah in Lebanon) . The latter has made the situation of the Zionist settlers a world issue.

West Asia emerged during the second half of the twentieth century as the major manufacturer of world trouble. The academic milieux of the region home to some excellent Turkish and Israeli universities. run largely by Indian j ournalists. if not exclusively. But so too are monarchist reaction and theocratic repression. Today. on the other hand. and a number of much less well-endowed outfits do include a few ongo­ ing currents of radical thought. offers excellent Web-based financial news . Because of the imbrication of aggressive Zionist settlers.INTO THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY 53 able t o survive only b y supporting the Assad regime. urban nationalism and rural conservatism. Several small sheikhdoms in the Arabian Peninsula. most of the region is a tragic zone of darkness. The Turkish Left. The TV station al-Jazeera is becoming a major world news medium. two main factions of the PLO. Pakistan has been drawn into the turmoil of West . against which the hedonism of upper-class life in Beirut. has been eclipsed by the social wing of the Islamic movement. it is more bloody and messy than ever. relatively resource­ ful American universities in Beirut and Cairo. Cairo and Tel Aviv appears obscene . big oil and the holy centres of Islam. Islamic . have been giving the region a dose of p ositive significance . for the Right as well as for the Left. and Palestinian Marxism the Popular Front (PFLP) and th e D emocratic Front for the Liberation of Pale stine (DFLP). as well as the Communist party in Israel .has been similarly wiped out or marginalized. and the English­ language Gulf press. South Asia Through its involvement in Mghanistan and its role in the 1 9 80s and early 1 990s as a conduit of S audi money for Islamist anti-Communism in Mghanistan and C entral Asia. always squeezed between the ever-vigilant military. The outcome is that what there are of democratic and social forces in West Asia are mainly. But on the whole.

The Communist Party of India (Marxist) the CPI (M) serves as part of the federal governmental coalition. . Nevertheless. within which it has at least some veto powers. But it is worth noting India's important role in the attempts to shape a collective geopolitical leadership of the South. too. India is now also being courted by ASEAN with the aim of forging a wider. In contrast to Bangladesh and Pakistan. it was pressured into joining the anti-Islamist crusade of the Bush regime. as far as it has reached. first by bringing together Brazil and S outh Mrica with India itself to create a democratic Southern tricontinental. To what extent it may stand up to recent American courtship. a conflict of only local interest. and later by including China and launching the G-20/G-22 group within the WTO . The Mumbai Economic and Political Weekly remains an enormously important fount of information and analysis. the geopolitics of South Asia is still largely shadowed by the Indo-Pakistani conflict over Kashmir. Indian as well as Pakistani nuclear weapons. in addition. with no international equivalent in its progressive academic austerity. India has no world leader of Nehru's stature in sight. India hosts important radical movements of universal significance. is still unresolved. Traditionally. are of local c oncern and significance only. in the face of stiff Chinese economic competition. Indian neutrality has been a force of Third World reason. thus ripping the officially Islamic but divided country further apart. Indian academia. as demonstrated at the successful World Social Forum in Mumbai in 2 0 0 4 . Mter S eptember 1 1 . whereas much less of it survives in the locally p oliticized universities of B angladesh and Pakistan. in the post-Second World War era. Aside from that. once a major world centre for Marxism. horizontal Asian framework.54 FROM MARXIS M TO P O S T MARXI S M? Asian Islamist militancy. still seems to harbour a signif­ icant amount of radical ·thought. it has for decades governed the large state of West Bengal .

For reasons not completely clear to me. No wonder that the states organization of the region. primarily in the Philippines but also in Indonesia and Thailand.INTO THE TWENTY FIRST C ENTURY 55 Southeast Asia Thi s is the part of the world where most of the postwar battles for and against Communism were fought. given the surge of Chinese markets. it is a region of victorious conservatism. is remarkably weak academically. which has now become untenable. has a conservative tenor. Singapore. although not reactionary interventionist like the Europ ean Holy Alliance . Originally ASEAN had an implicitly anti. Communists won their most resounding victories in the region those of the Vietnamese against the French in 1 954 and against the Americans in 1 97 5 . ASEAN. seeking cooperation both with India and with the Northeast Three : China. At present. As a consequence. Indonesia. Cambodia and Laos that are nonetheless fully absorbed by market developments . Bunna. there is a renewal of Communist insurgency in the Philippines. with nominally C ommunist p owers in Vietnam. the Philippines and Thailand. the largest country in the area. and in the ma ssacre of unanned civilian Communists in Indonesia in 1 96 5 . the balance of p ower is clearly turning from Japan to China. Japan a n d South Korea. Northeast Asia The geopolitical weight of this region is rapidly increasing. is the intellectual centre of the region and is investing heavily in enhancing its position.(C ommunist) -Chinese orientation. Anti­ Communism inflicted its most bloody and crushing victories in Malaya. Internally. Regional interstices may allow minor . ASEAN is now trying to recycle itself as an Asian pivot. While the region contains active and even militant forces of liberal democracy. under vigi­ lant if not totalitarian cons ervative surveillance.

capitalist takeover or towards the institutionalization of s ocialist markets. much more so than India. there is a lot of local labour and rural civic protest. Chinese world domination would allow more breathing space than Americ an domination. China remains a Communist p ower. but the centre of gravity is China. There remains a critical Marxist legacy in Chinese research centres. Japan and South Korea have both generated militant trade unions and student movements. between Korea and Japan. the Chinese world-view is much more circumspect. now undermined and eroded by localist and demo cratic Taiwanese-nationalist forces. in addition. This is a region still divided by historical resentment and distrust between China and Japan.56 FROM MARXISM T O P O ST MARXI S M? players to develop. intellectual circles in civil society and pock­ ets of the vast party apparatus. but it would not necessarily be progressive. and including the controversial status of Taiwan. Northeast Asia is the crucial world arena of the coming decades. these elements do not add up to a significant national political force. de facto an independent state but de jure a 'province of China' . although the c ountry has become one of the most income-unequal in Asia. however. which is over­ taking the US as the main export market of Japan and Korea. with its constant urge to hammer home the c orrect American view. So far. delimited and peaceful than the American missionary universalism. which means that a more socially concerned option is still possible. The opaque inner workings of the Communist Party remain the invisible key to the future of China. important though minoritarian. Seen from a global perspective. Taiwan has been a fortress of reactio n. such as the 'Korean Wave ' in p opular culture. . The path of Chinese development will be decisive whether a continuously controlled.

testifying to capitalism's reinforced vigour. The changes in the socio-economic space hold profound implications for the Marxist social dialectic . underlying the collectivization under many different political regimes of urban mass transport. Market dynamics and new means of private c apital accu­ mulation have made the once-marginalized ultraliberal . credit institutions. and the surge of belligerent Americanism is being balanced by the sociopolitically ambiguous economic tilt of the world to East Asia. and the geopolitical spaces of the twenty-first century are radically different from those of the twentieth. creating a new structural volatility of political commitments and alignments .INTO THE TWENTY FIRST C ENTURY 57 P OLITICAL SPAC E S O F T H E EARLY TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY AND A PERSPE CTIVE O F TRANS-SO C IALISM The Left is on the defensive . The new market dynamics reverse the tendency towards an increas­ ingly 'social character of the productive forces'. But it has p owerful lines of defence . The socio-economic. While economic inequality is again increasing after its historical trough in the 1 970s. coming into ever sharper conflict with the private capitalist rela­ tions of production and p ointing to a socialist solution. electricity grids. class struc­ ture of social forces is eroding. water supplies. Irreverence is dismantling traditions of deference. oases of critical culture persist across the globe. On the other hand. This tendency predicted for capital did in fact occur during the first two-thirds of the twentieth century. strategic branches of production and investments in science and technology. as traditional kinds of deference have faltered and shrunk. both individualist and collective. Markets have regained the dynamics that operated in the rich nations before the First World War and now hold sway throughout most of the world. the cultural. railways. a new field of irreverence. Class is most unlikely ever to regain anywhere the importance it had in nineteenth­ and twentieth-century Europe. has been opening up.

by the centre-Left as well as by the Right. 'informal ' sweatshop toilers and hawkers of the Third World may be more rather than less exploited than industrial workers. Nation-states are also larger and more resourceful than ever. has been seriously weakened. Boundary surveil­ lance and boundary penetration have both expanded. of which the Marxist labour movement has been a major part and which has provided a congenial milieu for radical. The Marxist view of social transformation was not predicated on compassion for 'the wretched of the earth' but on the capacity of the exploited and the oppressed to emancipate themselves through class struggle . iconoclastic art and critical social thought. More of them exist than ever. syndicalists and other labour militants. Its left and left-of-centre was particularly hard hit. A hundred years ago. and the demand for new ones contin­ ues. Dispersed service workers. Contrary to many recent comments. East and West. The postindustrial turn reverses the second basic pillar of the Marxist dialectic : that the development of capitalism generate. the former to unprecedented levels and the latter in inter­ national migration returning to the same scale as a hundred years ago. more concentrated and more unified working class . North and South. .s an ever larger. As was the case then. in terms of revenue and expenditure. by the failures and defeats of nationalist developmentalism in the South.58 F R O M MARXISM TO P O S T MARXISM? calls for unlimited private capitalism into a reality of massive privatization. but that is beside the point. by distributive conflicts in the Anglo-Saxon countries (epitomized in the British 'winter of discontent' of 1 9 78 9) . the nation-state is the social dimension which has changed the least. Current social tendencies make such struggle more difficult. S ecularized Enlightenment modernism. the 'terrorists' were Southern and Eastern European (and very often Jewish) anarchists. a small fraction of migrants turn militant and subversive. provoking large­ scale xenophobic reactions in the countries of immigration.

Even the glob alized Cold War between the US and the USSR. In the Left defensive. in the division of Berlin. not only to Communists. is unlikely to be sustainable. neither of them fully European. left­ wing labour. militant trade unionists. A perspective of 'sustainable development' by a different left-wing modernity is yet to be elaborated . adds to the de-centreing of current geopolitics although most of this violence is inscribed within the American imperial configuration.INTO THE TWENTY FIRST C ENTURY 59 and by the fundamental questioning of modernism by n on-right-wing constituencies. and by new networks of states. dissident or not. had its centre in Europe. enacted by mercenary corp orations and militant volunteers. which. Austro-Marxists. as either a by the stagnation and implosion of ruling C ommunism. . and forays into postmodernism by important currents of the intellectual avant-garde. Twenty-first-century geopolitics is becoming more open and de-centred with Americ an military superpower diverging increasingly from new economic developments. most importantly with the dis­ appearance of the Soviet Union. but also to Latin European socialists. and its end-game was played out in Eastern Europe . This is a new critical culture with an implicitly hegemonic antimodernist thrust. global neoliberal modernism has in the new millennium provided a target large enough to assem­ ble wide networks of resistance. The twentieth century was the last Eurocentric century. The ascendancy of non­ state violence. however. either against more robust religious and ethnic antimodernism or against persistent left-wing efforts to create another modern world. physically brought together by the World Social Forums. The geopolitical situation has changed fundamentally since the twentieth century. environmentalists. the USSR was a major pole of orientation of the left­ of-centre world. in Asia and elsewhere. subaltern p opular move­ m ent s. and anti-imperialist nationalists across the three continents of the Third World . For all the left-wing critiques of it.

eman­ cipation and social justice. All these changes have profound consequences and implications for left-wing politics . While alter-glob alists are protesting. They clarify the ethical issues. Marxism became a global ideological current. but wars came. neoliberalism has been both largely discredited and effec­ tively pushed back. the World Bank and the IMF continue on their path. not glob al movements . The new capi­ talist vigour. But its antimonies were too easily covered by the anticapitalist class dialectic. their general trend is to intensify the struggles for peace. The peace movement may have mobilized the people and persuaded majorities in many countries. But that may very well change . But Marxism-Leninism turned out to be an unsustainable modernism. and the situation of less class and more irreverence. Tony Blair. For the time being. for all his rhetorical and other gifts. the predomina nt actors in geop olitics are still nation-states. popular protests are neither meaningless nor powerless. In the opinion of a majority of the British public. Enlightenment modernism remains an honourable tradition from a perspective of human emancipation. The Vietnam War was decided on the battlefield. Much more certain is that the new parameters require much fundamental rethinking on the Left. and are still being planned. but the option to bomb the Vietnamese 'back to the Stone Age ' be came politically impossible because of the antiwar movement. Novel conceptions of societal transformation are needed. and its relations to non­ modernist subaltern resistance and to ecology must be reconsidered.60 FRO M MARX I S M T O POS T MARXI S M ? defense of or an attack on it. the WTO. As a global ideology. In a post- . if not decisively beaten. and can shift balances of power and force choices among policy options . calls for something that goes beyond attention to 'new social movements ' . Nevertheless. even in geopolitical contexts. However. has been irremediably soiled by the dirty war on Iraq. Via Lenin and Leninism. still continue. quite worth developing as well as defending.

But the dialectic of class conflict still operates. because it does not imply an acceptance of capitalism as the only possible game and because it implies a rejection neither of the goals of historical socialism nor of the attempts to 'build' it. . oppression. from a trans-socialist perspective. Marxism was a profoundly European movement.INTO T H E TWENTY FIRST CENTURY 61 Eurocentric world. Marxian idea that human emancipation from exploitation. This is the time to begin thinking. How the congruity or incongruity of capitalist relations of production and the force s of produc­ tion will turn out by the end of this century is impossible to tell. Trans­ socialism is a persp ective of social transformation going beyond the strategies and historical institutions of socialism. First. What might be the basis of such a trans-socialist political perspective? There are four dimensions that seem worth keeping in mind. failures and disillusions in short. it starts from an acceptance of the historical legitimacy of the vast socialist movement and its heroic epic of creativity and enthusiasm. taking into account that with its secularized class focus. there is the social dialectic of capitalism. of endurance and struggle. discrimination and the inevitable linkage between privilege and misery can c ome only from struggle by the exploited and disadvantaged themselves. but with new constellatio n s of p ower and new possibilities of resistance . of beautiful dreams and hopes as well as of blunders. It retains the fundamental . of public ownership and large-scale collective planning of production. which continues to exist. the c entrality of the working-class and the agency of the labour movement. admirers o f Marx have t o admit this and adjust their positions. of defeats as well as victories . It is not 'postsocialist'. of a world beyond capitalism and its global joint ventures of luxuriant wealth and mis ery. On the contrary. It then continues by recognizing that the twenty-first century is beginning to look very different from the twentieth not more equal and just.

it was always there in the working. The very success of capitalism still generates protest against its manifestations . For the foreseeable future. De facto.1 9 70s opens up an area of broad concern and possible argumentation . however. even for the tightly controlled immigrant workers of the Arab Gulf. Second. A similar feminist dialectic is spawned by the expan­ sion of women's education. the global spread of human rights discourse beginning in the mid.62 FROM MARXI S M TO PO ST MARXIS M ? although not necessarily with system-transcendent impli­ cations. The breakdown of well-arranged hierarchies in capitalist crises. respectively. there is also a dialectic of ethnic collective identity among oppressed or discriminated ethnic groups. Third. as they did yesterday in South Africa and Korea and as they are likely to do in Vietnam tomorrow. For all its hypocritical abuse by Anglo-American politicians. it is unlikely that this class and gender dialectic in Mrica. moral discourse. indigenous peoples of the Americas and of South Asia gain­ ing considerable access to NGO financial resources have promoted the rise of vigorous ethnic movements. Strikes and rebellions do produce better wages and conditions. . Workers' strikes and other protests are increasing today in China and Eastern Europe. which is likely to seriously undermine the obdurate patriarchy of West Asia and North Africa. of increasing importance is a dimension classically denied significance by Marxism. as well as the availability of new means of commu­ nication to the disadvantaged such as the 'scheduled castes' becoming a factor in urbanized electoral politics in India. The spread and growth of capitalism continues to strengthen the working class. concerned not only with a 'fair wage for a fair day's work'. the experience of Bolivian mine workers being a model for the struggles of Bolivian cocaleros. the spread of the Internet.class movement. but also with 'human dignity' . Eastern Europe and Latin America will carry the working class or women even to the levels they reached in Western Europe in the 1 9 70s and the 1 9 80s. other things being equal. Asia.

has shown how thin the veneer of bourgeois civility is. that all human beings have a right to grow. how easily it turns into terror­ bombing. human-rights lawyers. bomb. Violence is a denial of human rights. actions electorally endorsed in the name of liberalism. German and Dutch as well as Anglo-American generals produced in the autumn of 2007 a new NATO strategy for nuclear war 'pre-emptive nuclear attacks ' which may be translated into a new NATO slogan. applauded by Blairism. Colombia. Cheney and Blair are only gloating over a seismic shift of bourgeois and 'middle-of-the-road' opinion. Brazil and elsewhere as p eccadilloes. three. to develop. but regards the imprisonment of political dissidents in Cuba as a heinous crime while not simply turning the Washington London consensus upside down. treats the continued assassinations of trade unionists. 'Let us create two. The US Republican presidential nominee in 2008 sang 'Bomb. bomb Iran' at electoral rallies. But Bush. which may be seen as derivative of human rights . journalists and activists in Mexico.lives. of life-course choice and life-course development. to choose how to lead their . The second aspect of a moral discourse is antiviolence. abductions. .I N T O THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY 63 Two aspects of this moral discourse currently stand out as urgent. The Bush Cheney regime. This necessitates the freeing of human rights from its overpoliticized Anglo­ American c onstruction which. more than anything. for instance. This version of human rights has a venerable pedigree in labour movements and the Left: solidarity with all struggles against the denial of human social rights. torture and killing. One is a social anchoring or embedding of human rights in a conception of social rights. 'The leaders of the German Greens supported the 'humanitarian' bombing of S erbia. a hundred Hiroshimas ! ' The peaceful Danes of modern history are now making war against uppity natives in both Iraq and Mghanistan while humiliating their tiny Muslim minority at home. A consistent human-rights discourse means.

on top of a (most likely) truncated social dialectic and an enlarged but highly contested arena of moral discourse. the playful orientation of the Marxian original must reaffirm its importance . and fourthly. the twenty-first-century Left has to tap into a third root: a commitment to universal pleasure. On the one hand. anti-occupation. it is a condition of adequate institutions making opportunities accessible.64 F R O M MARXI S M TO PO ST MARXI SM? while Hillary Clinton. however. The meaning of Marxian Communism was human enjoyment. one that may hold a gre ater p otential for transcending class and national boundaries. Finally. As recent developments show. on the other. Left-wing commitment to labour. It could be argued. to anti­ violence. Alongside the ruthless. that there is now a wider field of moral argument.and missile-bombers. the humanitarian. the ludic. should also envisage a universal society of fun . phrased in terms of a nineteenth-century bucolic ideal . But after May 1 9 68. the Islamist bombers and the anti-bombing. antiviolence people on the other. The austerity of the revolutionary struggle substituted a revolutionary heroism for Marxian hedonism. terrorism of Al­ Qaeda and other footloose militants. democratic bombers. threatened Iran with 'total obliteration' . the poor suicide bombers. A crucial line of moral demarcation has emerged between the bombers on one side the rich terror. these manifestations indicate that violence has unexp e ctedly b e come the signature of the post Cold War period of the early twenty­ first century. there is no moral evolution indeed. it is a question of the right to pleasure universal rather than segregated and. What will happen in this area is of mounting significance . and the latter did not appeal to the 'respectable workers ' of social democ­ racy. one of the Democratic favourites in the primaries. the hedonistic. albeit small-scale. to s ocially meaningful human rights. currently there is a large-scale liberal regression going on and there has never been a !TIoral dialectic .

INTO THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY 65 and enjoyment. Only right-wing perverts have fun at the expense of others. Sensual festivity has been one of the crucial Brazilian contributions to the World Social Forums and to the possibility of another world. .

Marxist p arties. progressive features . for at least the hundred years from the late nineteenth to the late twentieth century. explicitly defending it. Like many oppositions. has been Her Modem Majesty's Loyal Opposition to modernity always critical of and fight­ ing against her predominant regimes. Marxism. For good or bad. Marxism simultaneously affirmed the positive. in a sociological as well as theoretical sense. the most important means to embrace the contradictory nature of modernity. movem ents and intellectual currents became. when needed.2 Twentieth-Century Marxism and the Dialectics of Modernity Students of parliamentary history are familiar with the idea of 'Her Majesty's Loyal Opposition' . right or wrong. Marxism was a legit­ imate offspring of modem capitalism and Enlightenment culture . as a social­ historical phenomenon. As a social force. Marxism has also had its stints in power. but never questioning the legitimate majesty of modernity and. Marxism is nevertheless the major manifestation of the dialectics of modernity. and only through the exercise of the pragmatics of power have they persisted. rather prone to produce doubt and disillusion. but its spells in government have been short-lived in their attractiveness and creativity.

. Traditional conser­ vatism. on the other hand. Engels. the human alienation. vol . have represented the afation of modernity and have raised no questions regarding science.TWENTIETH CENTURY MARXI S M 67 of capitalism. religious or secular. the Marxian dialectical method also paid attention to the gender and national dimensions of modern emancipation. industrialization. des Privateigentums and des Staats ( 1 884). The Nietzschean intellectual tradition. 2 1 . Once its main lines had been drawn in bold strokes in The Communist Manifesto. growth or development. post-Marxist social democracy and post­ traditional conservatism. 6 9 . 'The first class antagonism'. has sniped continually at modernity. including. in Marx Engels W erke. denounced the exploitation. Marxism was the theory of this dialectic of modernity as well as its practice. Private Property. more fully developed modernity. girded itself against the negativity of modernity. liberalism and Enlightenment rationalism. from Nietzsche himself to Michel Foucault. on the whole. and Third World populism. Berlin: Dietz Verlag. Friedrich Engels wrote in his Origin of the Family. and the State. of looking to the future instead of the past and of keeping one's eyes fixed on the ground of the present. the false ideology and the imperialism inherent in the modernization process. more recently. Fascism. alone in both hailing modernity and its breaking of the carapace of 'rural idiocy' and airing of the fumes of 'the opium of the people ' and in attacking it. Marxism defended modernity with a view to creating another. Its theory centred on the rise of capitalism as a progressive stage of historical development and on its 'contradictions' : its class exploitation. urbanization and mass literacy. F. crisis tendencies and generation of class conflict. the commodification and instrumentalization of the social. Christian and to a much lesser extent Islamic democracy. is that between man and woman. 'the first class subjection' that of women by men. accumulation. 1 972. Die Ursprung der Familie. l One of the most widely 1. Marxists were. and.

The concrete case was England. Clara Zetkin and a few others. social revolution was impossible with­ out a preceding national revolution in Ireland. Lowy and C. But the strategic vision and the political practice connecting Marxism and capital labour c onflict with anticolonial and other struggles for national self­ determination were first fully developed by Vladimir Lenin. Marx and Engels closely followed the national politics of their time. Marx and Engels concluded. . however. Haupt. Rosa Luxemburg. the German Social D emocrats. 1 848-1914.2 THE C ONCEPT O F MODERNITY I N MARX As passionate political analysts. Marxists of the multinational Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires soon had to pay more systematic theoretical attention to the concept of nation and its relation to class . Marxist social democracy was also the first male political movement to campaign for women's right to vote. Paris: Franc. M. is G. the leader of the foremost Marxist party.ois Maspero. as well as a concentrated selection of texts. Les marxistes et la question nationale. Vera Zasulich. Anna Kuliscioff. Bebel was. 1 974. Kata Dalstr6m. they did focus on a problem with far-reaching implica­ tions : how one nation's oppression of another affected the class conflict in each. Henriette Roland Holst. the most advanced capitalist country. The early Marxist labour movement.68 FROM MARXI S M T O POST MARXI S M ? diffused books of the early Marxist labour movement was August Bebel's Woman and Socialism ( 1 8 8 3) . Weill. although most of their writings about it were responses to particular circumstances.3 2. where. An excellent overview of the issues involved. of course. 3 . particularly in Central and Eastern Europe. in a series of articles written just before the First World War and then consolidated in his wartime study Imperialism ( 1 9 1 6) . Alexandra Kollontai. eds. From the late 1 8 60s onwards. involved a unique (for the era) number of women in prominent positions: Angelica Balabanoff. The major theoretical work to emerge from this effort was O tto Bauer's The Nationalities Question and Social Democracy ( 1 907) .

an expre ssion of a p eriod in which critical social theory is asserting its relative autonomy from economics and in which. Keeping hold of the two horns of modernity. 4. the negative aspect increasingly tended to be overshadowed by an evolutionary conception of growing countervailing p owers. London: Verso. more easily assumed by intellectuals than by practical politicians. vol. was to 'disclose the economic law of motion of modern society' . 1972. 'modern workers ' (twice) . a conception of modernity pervaded Marx's thought. pioneered by B erman. has been an intrinsic ally delicate task. they are not arbitrarily imposed. The Comintern or Third International ( 1 9 1 9--43) and the subsequent C ommunist tradition. The Marxist tradition has therefore tended to drift from one characterization to another in its practice of the dialectics of modernity. 'modern b ourge ois society' (twice). 'modem productive forces' and 'modern relations of production ' .rather than pre-modernity. 5 And Marx's 'ultimate purpose' in Capital.4 While never theorized or admitted into the classical Marxist canon. the emancipatory and the exploitative. However. the very value of modernity itself is being questioned from a perspective of post. focused on the negative and its p eripeteia by denouncing 4. All That Is Solid Melts Into Air.TWENTIETH CENTURY MARXI SM 69 To see Marx and Engels as dialecticians of modernity is a late-twentieth-century reading. K. 5 . Marx and F . of trade unions and working-clas s parties. in Ma7X Engels Werke. 1 983. Berman. In the first eight p ages of the W erke edition of The Communist Manifesto. Berlin: Dietz Verlag. M. . it should be emphasized that although such readings. Engels . by contrast. and once each about 'mod em state power'. the 'modern bourgeoisie ' (twice) . 462 9. In the S e c ond Inter­ national ( 1 889 1 9 1 4) and in the later social-democ ratic tradition. as he put it in his preface to the first edition. are new. we l e arn about 'modem industry' (three times) . Manifest der kommunistischen Partei ( 1 848). above all.

as it was also called. New York: Continuum.9 In the next century. focusing on the philological scrutiny of ancient texts. The purely intellectual current of critical theory or. its emancipated morality is expressed in the sado-masochistic fantasies of de Sade. 200. Adorno 's Dialectic of Enlightenment. . MOMENTS OF THE CRITICAL TRADITION Critique and criticism emerged as major intellectual endeavours in Europe in the seventeenth century.. While underlining that 'social freedom is inseparable from enlightened thought'. the anti-Semites were 'Liberals who wanted to assert their anti-liberal opinion' . Dialectic o Enlightenment.8 The Marxist dialectics of modernity thus flickered between the shadows cast by the death factories of Auschwitz and the shafts of light cast by the growth and organization of the working class . xiii. R. To them. Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. including sacred texts. 8 . in its reduction of individual differences. 7. the range broadened 6 . The classical work of this kind of thought is Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. 9 . 7 The 'ticket-thinking' of the American electoral system was in itself. Adorno. its enlightenment of the people in the 'mass deception' of the 'culture industry'. Koselleck.. Kritik und Krise. written during the Second World War by two German Jews in American exile. Frankfurt: 1 992 ( 1 9 5 9 ) . emphasized the contradictoriness and negativity of modernity without issuing any cheques for a better future . 6 The latter's calculating cunning is elaborated in the Homeric myth of Ulysses. Ibid.70 FROM MARXIS M TO POST MARXIS M? the increasing evils of capitalism and holding out the hope for a sudden revolutionary reversal. anti-Semitic. 1 997 ( 1 947). the Frankfurt School. trans. 87ff. the theme of the book is the 'self­ destruction of the Enlightenment' . Ibid. f John Cumming. 206.

namely 'the true [ezgentliche] era of critique ' . in 1 844. the place of critique in contempo rary social theory is better understoo d with refe rence to the 10. after decades of postrevolutionary reaction. Gouldner's ideal type s clearly conveyed a divid e of c ogni­ tive styles and strategies in marxisant academia at that time. Political Identity: Thinking Through Marx. A recent. In Gennany in the 1 840s. 'the critique of political e conomy' long remained a synonym for Marxism. Nevertheless. The Holy Family. London: Palgrave Macmillan 198 0 . the critical German theoretical tradition. religion and reason. Meister. Engels and Marx began their lifelong c ollaboration by writing a s atire of the Left Hegelian ' critical critique ' of Bruno B auer and others. was carried over into Marxism. post. and Marx's major work was subtitle d 'Critique of Political Economy ' . While Marx and Engel s saw no tension between science and critique. included both Kant and the Left Hegelians. I I The twentieth century has hardly lived up to the standards set by Immanuel Kant and many others for the century of Enlightenment. A.TWENTIETH C ENTURY MARXISM 71 into critiques o f politics. The 'science' to which Marx was committed thus included ' critique' as a core element. mainly anglophone. in the form of philo­ sophical critiques of religion and politics . Gouldner's 'two Marxisms' consti­ tute a moment of the critic al tradition. Yet this account gave ' critique' a narrower meaning than it had had before . more faithful elaboration of Marx's critique may b e fo und in R. Rather. criticism enjoyed further expansion. Oxford: Blackwell. and this critique was meant to be scientific . which. rather than the tradition itself. The Two Marxisms. .1 9 6 8 academic reception of Marx drew a distinction between 'critical' and 'scientific' Marxism . 1 990. the Western. Marx and Engels proclaimed themselves the heirs of German philosophy. taken broadly. After all. Gouldner. In German or German-inspired literature. 1 1 . l o Leaving aside the lineage and th e merit of such a distinction.

72 FROM MARX I S M T O P O S T MARXISM? original location and authors of critical theory: a tiny group of brilliant German-Jewish exiles living in New York in the late 1 9 30s. M . E. than a criticism of. 'Philosophie und kritische Theorie' ( 1 937). Frankfurt: Fischer. On the other hand. 1 97 . Schmidt Noerr. 13 A key notion of the Horkheimer circle. trans. when he had first become the Institute's director and editor.14 That is indeed probable. He was assisted by his associate Herbert Marcuse . vol. it had a special. 'Traditionelle und kritische Theorie' ( 1 937). 'critical theory' replaced 'materialism' . reflexive conception of ' the dialectical critique of political economy ' . Horkheimer. 1 . See also Critical Theory: Selected Essays. German-language journal. 1 4 . T . M. because Horkheimer's position towards the real b ourgeois world was rather more intransigent in 1 9 37 than it had been in 1 9 32. ' dialectical materialism ' . Negative Dialectics. 1 9 88. eds. 1 80 . A s such. 1 973. trans. later known as the Frankfurt School. From the start. B . 1 2 . 4. O'Connell. in Kultur und GesellschaJt. vol. New York: Herder and Herder 1 97 2 . Theodor W. 1 2 The meaning of the term 'critical theory' was a philosophically self-conscious. H. Marcuse. 1 3 . . Frankfurt 1 9 6 5 . Adorno. critical theory was launched in 1 93 7 by Max Horkheimer. Horkheimer was always a skilled and cautious operator. who was writing in New York for the Institute's Paris-published. J. N e w York: Seabury Press. wrote much later that the change of expression was not intended to 'make materialism acceptable but to use it to make men theoretically conscious of what it is that distinguishes materialism' . A. Adorno. i n Max Horkheimer. Horkheimer's closest intellectual associate. although not unproblematic. Gesammelre Schri ften. Ashton. THE GROUND OF CRITICAL THE O RY As a concept. Schmidt and G. director of the exiled Frankfurt Institute for Social Research. critical theory was more a code for.

the process of social change may b e accelerated . critical theorists do not stand outside or above cla ss e s . trans. there­ fore. 20 1 . offers neither short-term amelioration nor gradual material improvements . chara cterized by formal conceptualization. in the social a s well as the natural sciences. 1 5 Forty years later. in M. and 'Nachtrag' ( 1 937). which will occur only through ever sharper social c onflicts . C ritical theory is ' one single elaborate existential judgement' . Between them and 'the ruled class ' exists 'a dynamic unity'. 1 9 8 1 . M. Horkheimer. 'Traditionelle und kritische Theorie'. 1 80. Gesammelte schriften. S e e J. would argue that 'to the end. deductive logic and experiential referenc e . writ l arge . Boston: Beacon Press. in ordinary s cientific analyses. 1 90. 1 7 . It is 1 5 . Through the interaction between the theorist and the ruled class. Marxist theory itself was [its] integrating force ' . The Theory of Communicative Action. Horkheimer. 2 2 2 .TWENTIETH C ENTURY MARXIS M 73 link with the proletariat. The vocation of the critical the o rist 'is the struggle. critical the o ry is theory. McCarthy. The task of critical the ory is to contribute to 'the transfor­ mation of the so cial whol e ' . It is a 'human stance [menschliches Verhalten] " wrote Horkheimer. Habermas. first laid out in Descartes' Discourse on Method ( 1 6 3 7) and embodied in the ' sp ecial disciplines' [Fachwis­ senschaften] first of all rejected the intellectua l division of labour. to which his thinking belongs ' . 1 97 . vol . 'Traditionelle und kritische Theorie ' . 1 87ff. whe ther empiricist or not. M. T . 4. and with it all existing conceptions of the ory. 1 6 Critical theory as oppos ed to 'traditional theory'. that is. and asserted the primacy o f the economy. although that unity 'exists only a s conflict ' . who in the thirties was one of the rising stars of the Institute. Nevertheless. Individual parts of it may also operate in 'traditional ' modes of thought. . 'that has society itself as its object' . 1 6 . Herbert Marcus e. 1 7 While rejecting a role in the existing division of labour. Horkheimer. The theory.

wrote Marcuse. Rather. rather that it is taken too narrowly. . out of which developed the 'real.. The critical theorists' very wide ranging interest in empirical research comes out most clearly in the contents of the Zeitschri jar ft SozialJorschung. 2 0 'It would be false'. Lynd is also critical of the academic division of labour. similar. by a professor at C olumbia University. 'to dissolve the economic concepts into philosophical ones. 2 2 2 3 . but also with regard to the functioning of the state. The concerns and the long-term sociopolitical perspectives of the German philosopher and the American sociologist are. relevant philosophical objects are to be developed from the economic context. as the p rinted version of a lecture series at Princeton in the spring of 1 9 3 8 . but that does not mean that the economic is regarded as too important. which also served as a host for the Frankfurt Institute in exile . the journal of the Institute. and to the development of 'essential moments of real democracy and association' . 1 9 . Marcuse. M . world­ encompassing capitalist society' is in Europe . 1 02 . written almost simultaneously with Horkheimer's text. 20. H.. 2 1 .74 F R O M MARXISM TO P O S T MARXI SM? n e ither hostile to nor uninterested m empirical rese arch . The process of social formation [ Vergesellschaftung] . 20 1 . if it is taking place. in many respects. needs to be studied and analyzed not only in narrow economic terms. ' 2 1 It may be pertinent to briefly compare critical theory in its original. He criticizes empirical social science 's tendency to take contemp orary institutions for 1 8 . and in the same city. . 'Nachtrag'. Ibid. 19 Critical theory 'in many places' reduced to economism. 1 9 9 200. Horkheimer. Robert Lynd's Knowledge for What? appeared in 1 9 3 9 . 1 8 The core of critical theory as theory is the Marxian concept of exchange. Ibid. on the contrary . classical form with another programmatic formulation of the place and use of social knowledge from a radical viewpoint. 1 9 2 3. . 'Philosophie und kritische Theorie '.

namely. to institutional change . Ibid. e .. . His pragmatic conception of s ocial science 'So cial sci ence will stand o r fall on the b a sis of its service ability to men as they struggle to live'24 perspective is not one of exploitation and class is viewed although by Horkheimer with a sceptical frown. Lynd.but a sort of anthrop ology of 'human cravings '. NJ: Princeton University Press.. R. 1 939. His historical-critical he does argue that class and class conflict deserve much more consideration by US social scientists . Ibid. 2 6 Th e diferent critical idiom typical of American radicalism was carried on after Lynd most characteristically and influ­ entially by C. and the replacement of 'private capitalism ' . . 2 5 Lynd's socialism is not a vocation of struggle. 2 3 But the language and the mode of thought are very different. 23. which Mills took on with the obvious self-confidence and in The Sociological Imagination 22.S . emphasis omitted. 26. i . but presents itself as the 'hypothesis' that capitalism 'does not operate and probably cannot be made to operate. Instead. The three b asic questions of that imagination. but argues from the p erspective of the empirical issues of the day. Princeton. to assure the amount of general welfare to which the present stage of our technical skills and intelligence entitle U S ' . I bid 220. Ibid. 24. as a yardstick for appraising existing institutions . 1 92ff. 220. Wright Mills ( 1 9 5 9) . Lynd wants t o orient i t to 'what the present human carriers of tho s e institutions are groping to b ecome ' . the 'marked' extension of democracy. . 1 7 7 . Lynd does not fall back on a theoretical tradition. not only in gove rnm ent but also in industry and other forms of endeavour. .TWENTIETH C ENTURY MARXIS M 75 granted. 2 5 . Knowledge /or What?.. 1 80. 2 2 The dire ction of such change to which Lynd commits hims elf i s als o similar t o Horkheimer's.

Frisby. D. K. Mills. The formal encounter was polite. Marcus and Z. 1 9 67 ( 1 9 5 9). 1 984. 2 8 . . 6 . Popper explicitly attacked an 27. as well as much more elaborate and subtle. Popper. The critical theorists also pursued other interests than social theory. The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology. The Sociological Imagin l uion. 1 9 7 6 . would. social reflections of the Frankfurt S chool: 'What is the structure of this particular society as a whole?'. in Foundations o the Frankfurt School of Social Research.76 FROM MARXI S M TO P O S T MARXISM? straightforward directness of the New World craftsman. have turned away in disgust at the notion of a 'mechanics ' of historical change . POPPER VERSUS ADO RNO In 1 9 6 1 the German Sociological Association confronted a thorough and fundamentally antagonistic critique when it invited Karl Popper to give an address on the logic of the social sciences. with Adorno as respondent. including the theory of knowledge and the history of theory. but in Germany a heated controversy ensued which. who rej ected the 'positivist' label. to the anger of Sir Karl. the nucleus of which is a view of scientific method as consisting of 'tentative attempts at solutions' to the problems tackled. became known as the Positivismusstreit the po sitivism controversy. 'The Frankfurt School: An Autobiographical Note' . On the other hand. trans. of course. presented his viewpoint as ' criticist'. f New Brunswick: Transaction books. J. T. Mills's fast-paced prose attached no special interpretation of history to the word .. London: Heinemann. New York: Galaxy/Oxford University Press. R. Adey and G. W. H orkheimer. Adorno et al. eds. C. Marcuse et al. 2 8 Popper. 'Where does this society stand in human history? What are the mechanics by which it is changing?' and 'What varieties of men and women now prevail in this society and in this period? '27 Adorno. were the same as those underlying most of the more convo­ luted. Tar. among other things . solutions controlled by 'the sharpest criticism ' .

Adorno found. T. Thi s did not. 1 2 5 . At the end of the latter. in which Popper should have said that the difference between him and Adorno might be that he. 30 Adorno 's main divergence fro m Popper concerned the object of criticism or critique in German. Maus and F. Adorno admitted that he found it difficult to assume that there had been no better epoch than the one which had spawned Auschwitz. to his surprise. Furstenberg. While saying that the evil of societies was always difficult to judge. The contrast between the elegant fencing of Adorno and the unpleasant after the event arrogance of Poppe r comes through in Adorno's abstinence from any personal attacks in his 1 9 6 9 introduction as well as in his 1 9 6 1 Korreferat. Adorno. 'Die Logik der Sozialwissenschaften'. 'Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften'. many things to agree with in Popper's criticist positio n. which does not. . true. in Der PosinVismusstreit in der deutschen Soziologie. 1 4 2 . 'The Frankfurt School'. eds. is what it comes to in a sociology. 3 1 . 30. For Popper. Popper afterwards gave vent to a tirade of invective. like most of its proj ects. H. Neuwied and Berlin: Luchterhand 1 9 6 2 . limit itself to purposes of public and private administration . and that he was equally hostile to a 'standpoint' theory.TWENTIETH CENTURY MARX I S M 77 inductivist and naturalist conception of science. and his argument was more a further reflection on Popper's theses than the presentation of a set of antitheses. in Der Positivismusstreit in der deutschen Soziologie. 1 20. . the same word is used for both. Adorno referred to a correspondence preceding the meeting. 1 0 6-7. Only wh en we can conceive of society as being different from wha t it is does the present society become a problem for us: 'only through what it is not will it disclose itself as it is. believed that they lived in the best of worlds but Adorno did not. which may be summed up as: Adorno 'has nothing whatever to say. 1 4 1 2. the target of criticism was proposed solutions to scientific problems. blunt his characteristic critical edge .29 As a dialectician. See ibid. 1 2 8 . and recog­ nized the value of an interpretative method of the 'logic of the situation' in the social sciences . I would assume. Popper. K R. Popper. . however. Popper. Ibid. 1 67 . and that. ' 3 1 The dialectic of critical theory developed beyond the 2 9 . but for Adorno critique had to extend to the totality of society. and he says it in Hegelian language' .

instead he and Adorno put together a collection of essays and fragments. Marcuse. centred on the critique of instrumental reason. of which Stalinism was also a variant. One Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society. 597. Horkheimer abandoned his plan to write a major treatise on dialectics. the self-destruction of the Enlightenment written from a commitment to 'salvaging the enlightenment' . in Horkheimer. Boston: Beacon. Freud and his cultural critique were also incorporated in postwar critical theory. Horkheimer and T. 'Das Verschwinden der K1assengeschichte in der Dialektik der Aufkliirung: Ein Kommentar zu den Textvarianten der Buchausgabe von 1 947 gegeniiber der Erstveroffentlichung von 1 944'. a process which is already evident in the changes between the unpublished and the work. Gesammelte Schri ften. Gesammelte Schri ften. and it was eminently present in 3 2 . 3 2 This was still seen as an extension of Marxism. vol. but Friedrich Pollock's interpretation of Fascism as state capitalism. W. After the war. During the war. in Horkheimer. became a central critical concept. 1 944 version of Dialectic of Enlightenment 1 947 Amsterdam edition. Yet the umbilical cord to po sitive dialectical outcome the Marxian critique of remained. This critique political economy was never cut. . 34. Dialectic of Enlightenment ( 1 944) . 5. Braunsen. Adorno. 'die verwaltete Welt'.33 Horkheimer's last major The Eclipse of Reason ( 1 947). The theme set the tone for the postwar Frankfurt S chool namely. the tragic timbre of which is unmusically rendered in English as 'the administered world'. tended to push the classical Marxian economic categories into the background. 5 . most elaborately in Herbert Marcuse's Eros and Civilization ( 1 955) .78 FROM MARXIS M TO P O S T MARXISM? Marxian critique of political economy. van Reijen and J. H . 34 It was present in Adorno 's polemic with Popper. Dialektik der Aufklarung ( 1 944). 1 9 64. even if little hope of any provided the baseline for Marcuse's critique of 'the ideol­ ogy of industrial society ' . 3 3 . when Adorno became the foremost critical theorist. M. vol.

In a series of lectures and essays in the course of the 1 9 60s. Habermas. Theory of Communicative Action. GOdde. Wright Mills to task for remaining so tied to the ruling conventions of sociology that he neglected the analysis of economic processes . 3 6 . Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Habermas has not seen or presented himself. For the Marxian concepts of forces and relations of production Marx's theory of the social dialectic the key concepts of Habennas substituted 'labour'. his Theory of Communicative Action and his theory of law. Einleitung in die Soziologie. and later with a conflict between the social system and the 'life-world' . or even without obj ection allowed others to present him. Here he took C . however. his spring 1 9 6 8 lectures p resenting an introduction to sociology. J . 37. Technik und Wissenschaft als 'Ideologie'. In spite of some quite valid claims to legitimacy. Habennas laid out a new theoretical terrain. Adorno 's assistant and protege and Horkheimer's successor to the Frankfurt chair of philosophy and sociology. JUrgen Habermas. science and technology. taking the critical project out of Marxian political economy. ed. These new developments were originally motivated by changes in capitalism itself.TWENTIETH C ENTURY MARXI S M 79 Adorno 's final work.37 Habermas abandoned the systemic contradiction analyzed by Marxist theory. 1 993. as the 35. T. 237 8 . which involved both instrumental action and rational choice. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1 9 68 .36 on which he was later to erect his great theoretical constructions. replacing it first with a distinction between different kinds of action and knowledge interests. Habermas. C . which produced new roles for politics. . and 'symbolically mediated interaction' or 'communicative action' . Adorno. was already at work. 3 5 ' HABERMAS S NEW T ERRAIN By 1 9 68. J.

4 0 . in Autonomy and Solidarity. Habermas's way of developing his work through long presentations and discussions of work by others resem­ bles Marx more than Adorno . wanted to establish the legitimacy of Marxist theory where. See J. now appears jejune. Habennas. but with the discourse of his predecessors in other ways. 1 9 85 . 'Critical Theory and Frankfurt University'. On the other hand. 5 6 . Cambridge : MIT Press. Horkheimer nor Marcuse. . F. or as continuing the work of the Frankfurt School. ed. ' critical social theory' of a wider sort is something which he has continued to practice 'in an unreservedly self-correcting and self-critical mode ' . the differences o f substance appeared paramount to someone who. New Left Review 1: 67. Leipzig: Reclam. Habennas. His conceptions of commu­ nicative rationality and 'domination-free communication' constitute an attempt to provide a nonnative foundation for his own critical position. trans. 3 8 . Lawrence. The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. H abermas. P. 'Jiirgen Habennas : A New Eclecticism '. the dismissive p olemical tone adopted then. there remains. reflection on and elaboration of Marx's critique of political economy. However. 4 1 . Therborn. J. 2 1 2 . J. as well as science. London: Verso. Indeed. 3 9 . 'Ideologies and Society in the Postwar World'. something with which neither Adorno.39 Historically or sociologically. Dews. from the viewpoint of an Anglo Saxon and Scandinavian student and young academic. 3 8 A critical defence of modernity has remained central to that practice . 4o Habermas broke not only with the critique of political economy. and Die Modeme ein unvollendetes Projekt. then. I still think the distinctions made then were correct with regard to content.80 FROM MARXISM TO POST MARXISM? heir o f critical theory. never bothered. A quarter o f a century ago. an affinity between Marx and H abermas . See G. 69 83 . 4 1 Critical theory is a philosophical reception of. across all differences of substantial theory. and even that a defence of Marxism at that time was a positive contribution to social thought as critique. 1 992. in Autonomy and Solidarity. this was instituti onally denied. steeped in the classical tradition of German idealism. May June 1 97 1 . 1 99 2 . He has abandoned their 'fragmentary' Essafstik for elaborate critical confrontations with other modes of thought. prior to 1 9 68.

Until 1 968 Horkheime r also refused the entreaties of his publisher. critic al theory expresses a strand of radical reflexivity in the European road through modernity.TWENTIETH C ENTURY MARX I S M 81 set in the context o f the traumatic events betw e en 1 9 1 4 and 1 9 8 9 . not only by competing world­ views but also by the critical theorists themselves . Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. also by Fischer. was kept in a locked coffer in the basement of the Institute. Horkheimer's two volume Fischer edition o f Kritische Theone i n 1 96 8. Critical theory's classical texts were written on the run. in obscure editions and increasingly in code . 1 9 8 1 . Zeitschri jar Sozialj jt orschung. in ]. becoming rector of the Goethe University in Frankfurt and Honorary Citizen of the city. Fischer. and the classical texts were for the first time published for a wide audience . the Depression. and T.42 When critical theory resurfaced. The affinity was closest with radical American academia. in exile from the machinery of annihilation. 4 1 5 . it was in the context of media­ prominent anti-colonial revolts and the rise of a mass student body. M . Horkheimer s Dialektik der Aufklarung in 1 9 69.43 The reception had its special irony: the encounter of a young generation of revolutionary hope with an old one of revolutionary defeat. 42. practice held out more promise than critique. from the slaughter of the First World War. Philosophisch-politische Pro file. the abortive revolution in the West and its crippled birth in Russia. To the latter. Adorno's and M. Habermas. Horkheimer insisted on and managed to keep an American passport and an Institute retreat in New York. which always had much less reason to harbour any practical hope than its European comrad e s . They were hidden from view in the 1 9 5 0 s and 1 9 60s. and the victory of Fascism with its institutionalization and rationalization of the pogrom that was the Holocaust . In its own very special tonality. ' ' . In spite of his triumphal return to Germany. the Second World War and the one-dimensionality of the Cold War. See 'Max Horkheimer: Die Frankfurter Schule in New York . to republish his prewar essays in book form. S. has told us th at the the 1 9 30s journal of the Institute. who in the late fifties was Adorno's assistant. 4 3 . holding o ut against hope . whether the rise of Big Organizations.

Marxism's sombre thinkers of 44. 'the legacy of Marxism ' . which once seemed obsolete. lives on because the moment to realize it was missed. Marx. the critical critique by the 'Holy Family' of the early 1 840s might appear closer than the later Marxian critique of political economy. the Frankfurt moment has returned. 'State. socialism. namely. .82 FROM MARXIS M T O P O ST MARXI SM? the practice of the existing working-class and labour move­ ments or the practice of guidance by the new vanguards being constructed. Religion and Party' more familiar than those of Engels and Marx materialism. Engels and K. . While twentieth­ century Marxism is infinitely richer and broader than the tiny Western intellectual coterie that promulgates critical theory. The original editorial assignment of critical theory was something much broader than critical theory in the literal sense. it might be argued that. Bruno Bauer's concerns 'The Jewish Question'. in Marx Engels Werke. vol. Thing of Freedom '. . THE RELEVANCE O F THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL REVIVED Now. critical theory has been the grandchild of Marx that most explicitly and persistently expressed an aspect of the historical quintessence of Marxism its reflection on the dialectics of modernity. communism'. becomes a defeatism of reason after the attempt to change the world had miscarried. F . Adorno 's words are much closer to the radical mood of 2 0 0 8 than that of 1 9 6 8 : 'Philosophy. Negative Dialectics. 4 5 . Die heilige Familie o der Kritik de r kritischen Kritik ( 1 844). Adorno. The summary judgement that it had merely interpreted the world . T. in this second fin-de-siec1e. 'The Good sound 'revolution. 3 . critical theory is a metonym.45 In any case. 2 . in this context. '44 To people of the twenty-first century. for all its limitations.

]ephcotc. who ironically referred to Soviet criticism of himself. T. a positive but special reaction. 1 955. . H. while Dialectic of Enlightenment� Minima Moralia� Negative Dialectics and One-Dimensional Man represent another. beginning with Georg Lukacs's Consciousness educated and Karl Kors ch ' s History and Class Marxism and Philosophy. 47 . 46 C ritical theory is usually regarded as part of a larger subdivision of twentieth-century Marxism called 'Western Marxism '. 1 974. In creating the label of Western Marxism. Les avenlUres de la dia1ectique. Kautsky represents one no less and no more than the po sitive class diale ctic perspective.F. M. E.N. a term launched in the mid. Merleau Ponty. Adorno and Marcuse in particular. London: New Left Books. 47 'Western Marxism' has generally b e en treated as a p antheo n of individuals and individual works that express a certain intellectual mood. Lukacs and two other Hungarian intellectu als. Both were prominent C ommunists in the abortive revolutions in Hungary and Germany. both were criticized as leftis t s an d p hil o sop hic a l deviants by their comrades. The set of Western Marxists has always been fuzzy. Lukacs was a German­ H ungari an philosopher an d aesthetician. who h as sometimes been included in it himself. chaps. Adorno.a German professor of law. as a Western European reaction to it. and Korsch . and Korsch was excluded from the German C ommunist Party in 1 9 2 5 . Paris: Gallimard. Marcuse. trans. the current started after the October Revolution. 46. Negative Dialectics. although by general a greement. Adorno.1 9 5 0 s by Maurice Merleau-Ponty. both publis h ed in 1 9 2 3 in German . rather than as a tradition or a movement . One Dimensional Man. Merleau-P onty took his cue from Korsch.TWENTIE T H C EN TURY MARXISM 83 th e negative dialectic who embraced individualist refusal. capture this dialectic held out by Karl Kautsky's The Social Revolution ( 1 902) and The Road to Power ( 1 9 09) . 2 and 3. T. Minima Moralia.

contrasting his work. Revai. O. 1 9 64. A. 49. It is generally agree d that another distinguished member of the first generation was Antonio Gramsci. Korsch himself did not attach any importance to the label. It might also be added that the Soviet polemic with Lukacs. Korsch. The main Soviet critic of Lukacs and 'his disciples'. with ironic quotation marks. It first appeared on 24 November 1 9 1 7 under the title 'The Revolution Against Capital ': 'The revolution of the Bolsheviks has materialized out of ideologies rather than facts . et al. in G. 40. . took place before Stalinism. This is the revolution against the Capital of Karl Marx. 2 6 5 . Milan: II Saggiatore. 1 9 2 and passim). Paris: Editions de Minuit. Negt. Most of his written work is contained in his Notebooks. does not use it at all. Abram Deborin ('Lukacs und seine Kritik des Marx ismus' ( 1 924). ed. . which include a wide range of lucid and original political. Marxism and Philosophy. in Kontroversen aber dialektischen und mechanistischen Materialisus.84 FROM MARXI S M TO P O ST MARXISM? Jozef Revai and Bela Fogarasi . 1 9 64. . 4 8 Merleau-Ponty applied it mainly to Lukacs. As such. Gallo. to which he refers only obliquely. it is differentiated both from the Marxisms of other parts of the world and from the practically institutionalized 48. Korsch's main work. to the o rtho dox C ommunist tradi­ tion. Axelos. vol. Perhaps his most famous article dealt with the October Revo­ lution. appeared in two editions in the USSR in 1 924. 1. penned whilst incarcerated in a Fascist prison from 1 926 onwards. K. Gerrata and N. '49 WESTERN AND OTHER MARXISMS A sociologist of knowledge or an ecumenical historian of i d e a s might define Western Marxis m as a politically autonomous Marxist trend of thought in the advanced capitalist countries after the O ctober Revolution . eds. cultural and social analyses. Gramsci. particularly Lenin 's Materialism and Empirio-Criticism ( 1 9 08) . trans. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. 2000 Pagine di Gramsci. strongly influ­ enced by Max Weber. who b ecame the leader of the Italian C ommunist Party in 1 924. 1 969. See Marxisme et philosophie ( 1 923). And what Korsch ironically referred to was not Western Marxism but "'West ern" Communists'. 'La rivoluzione contro il Capitale' ( 1 9 1 7) .

50 The defining boundary is. Antonio Gramsci. 1 8 8 5 ) . Starting from the latter. Louis Althusser and Lucio Colletti (b . Thus. but whose positions consolidated after the Second. 1 984. in order of age. Martin Jay sees Western Marxism as 'created by a loose circle of theorists who took their cue from Lukacs and the other founding fathers of the immediate p o st-World War I era. Perry Anderson lists. Lucien Goldmann. Jay. He also contrasts West­ ern Marxism with Trotskyism.TWENTIETH C ENTURY MARXI S M 85 Marxism of p arties or political groupings . we shall here try to situate the phenomenon connoted by 'Western Marxism' somewhat differently. Max Horkheimer. generational. Jean-Paul Sartre. Horkheimer and Marcuse. Adorno. The best treatments of Western Marxism have tended to work from rosters of individuals . of which he designates Ernest Mandel as a theoretically eminent exp onent. and points out that the following were frequently admitte d to their ranks : Bertolt Brecht. Henri Lefebvre. 1 976. Marxism and T otality. and Ernst Bloch' . . Walter Benj amin. Western Marxism is a However. London: New Left Books. Wilhelm Reich. Anderson. Herbert Marcuse. 3 . To Anderson. Theodor W. Benjamin. Western Marxism thus consists of a set of theorists who matured politically and theoretically only after the First World War. 51 After Adorno. Georg Lukacs (b . from a more distant vantage-point . as significant definitions. Antonio Gramsci. Galvano D ella Volpe. 25 6 . 5 1 . 'the hidden hallmark' of Western Marxism i s defeat. post hoc construction. a characteristic which is intelligible only in t erms of his somewhat specialized periodization. M. having a particular meaning even in the least partisan and most erudite versions . Berkeley: University of California Pres s. 1 924) . he adds Leo LOwenthal (also of the Frankfurt School) and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Karl Korsch. Erich Fromm. Karl Korsch. the Council 5 0 . first of all. P. Considerations on W estern Marxism.

Merleau Ponty. in 1940. a group and a journal published in 1 9 49 65 called Sacialisrne au Barbarie. 80. economics and labour-movement institutions to academia and philosophy. all the survivors Gramsci and Benjamin had. Claude Lefort and Cornelius Castoriadis . certain broad themes have emerged. Kostas Axelos. Edgar Morin and others) . M. the A rguments group in France (in the l ate 1 9 5 0 s . Benjamin killed himself while on the run from the Nazis. And still others like Alfred Sohn-Rethel. and its inability to 'express the inertia of the infrastructures. its contrast to a scientific conception of Marxism. from which also came the later theorist of postIDodernism Jean FranlYois Lyotard. 5 4 . Anton Pannekoek and others) . b y nine years i n Italian imprisonment. After the Second World War. of the resistance of economic and even natural conditions. and second-generation Frankfurt School members like Jiirgen Habermas and Alfred Schmidt. 5 3 . Franz Jakubowski. were the key figures of a splinter from Trotskyism. been hunted to death by Fascist regimes54 were academic philosophers of professorial rank. From these roll-calls.86 F R O M MARXISM T O P O S T MARXI SM? Communists in Holland (Herman Gorter. 5 2 While pointing out that Western Marxism had previously meant largely Hegelian Marxism. i n 1 9 37. Jay basically accepts Anderson's more sociological definition . Gramsci's frail health was finally broken. 8 8 . Les aventures de la dialectique. Leo Kofler. who had left a budding academic career to be a [l'enlisement] in 5 2 . Merleau-Ponty wanted to remind his readers of 'the youth of revolution and of Marxism' manifested by Lukacs's 'lively and vigorous essay'. . of how "personal relations" become bogged down "things" ' . The last two. except Sartre. who became quite influential in France after 1 9 68. its attention to the ' superstructure'. 53 Anderson highlights the shifts of these intellectuals from work on politics. in different ways.

88. a post hoc construction. Anderson. . rather than a domination of. Livingstone. which seems non-controversial. namely. 56. Anderson and Jay makes possible a somewhat different historical posi­ tioning of Western Marxism. emphasis omitted. London: Merlin Press Ltd. Nevertheless. and the recourse to Freud . trans. and History and Class Consciousness as the central text. among which Anderson stresses Gramsci's concept of hegemony. . 55 Martin Jay's work uses the concept of totality a s his 'compass' through the territory of Western Marxism. Lukacs. P. History and Class Consciousness. If we take Lukacs as the key figure. Considerations on Western Marxism. The movement's 'most striking single trait . Jay explicitly refrains from arguing that totality is the only possible compass for such purposes. 1 97 1 . but since it was empha­ sized by Lukacs. G. . . REREADING WESTERN MARXIS M IN RETROSPECT However defined. we can locate the origin of Western Marxism with some exactitude. as a common tradition is . 'Western Marxism' is a Nachkonstruktion. while also making thematic innovations in Marxist discourse. perhaps the constant pressure and influence on it of successive types of European idealism'. it has certainly been at the centre of Western Marxism and has been submitted to various definitions.TWENTIETH CENTURY MARX I S M 87 writer. which Jay pursues with great skill. nature. 56. as another historical reading open to empirical falsification. Running through all these innovations is a 'common and latent pessimism'. The work of the Western Marxists concentrated particularly on epistemology and aesthetics. not a self-recognized group or current. a somewhat more distanced perspective than those of Merleau-Ponty. R. . elaborations and applications. the Frankfurt vision of liberation as a reconciliation with. 56 The original text was 5 5 .

423. 4 1 9. . . Is it possible to achieve good by condemnable means? Can freedom be attained by means of oppression?57 In that article. before Lukacs joined the new Hungarian Communist Party. class struggle and socialism . 'In the past'. it has often been overlooked that the two constitutive elements of his system. If the latter is true. his views were diametrically opposed to it. Marx's philosophy of history has seldom been sufficiently separated from his sociology. 'Bolshevism as a Moral Problem' ( 1 9 1 8) . . a useful tool to be employed . . on the 57. It poses with exemplary lucidity the issue of its title : whether democracy is believed to be a temporary tactic of the socialist movement. . 1 9 77. Lukacs. In 1 9 1 8 Lukacs was not at all attached to 'Western Marxism' in the sense of his 1 92 3 book and its later reception indeed. . or if democracy indeed is an integral part of socialism. But all those who fall under the sway of its fascination might not be fully aware of the consequences of their decision . . Lukacs wrote in 1 9 1 8. Marcus. Social Research 44: 3. Lukacs left the questions hanging. . Bolshevism offers a fascinating way out in that it does not call for compromise . trans. It is called 'Bolshevism as a Moral Proble m ' . but his Western Marxism was an oblique way of answering 'yes' to the last two . As a result. S ocialism. are closely related but by no means the product of the same conceptual system. .88 FROM MARXI S M TO PO ST MARXISM? written in 1 9 1 8. democracy cannot be forsaken without considering the ensuing moral and ideological consequences . G . J. The former is a factual finding of Marxian sociology .

1 9 67. Lesziik and P. Lukacs. though the article was written b efore the short­ lived S oviet Republic. Karl Renner and others in its ranks . in part left-wing. which is attacked in the 5 8 . Ludz. is Austro-Marxism. Its first adumbration is Lukacs 's first article after his return to Hungary as a Communist. transcending. ' 5 9 The immediate target in Karl Korsch's Marxism and Philosophy. . if you prefer. Here. Rudolf Hilferding. 'Tactics and Ethics'. It ends on a note. later expanded. very much prese nt in the Max Weber circle in Heidelberg of which Lukacs was then a part. in Soziologische Texte. 58 This is a Marxism filtered by neo-Kantianism. on reification and the consciousness of the proletariat: 'This calling to the salvation o f socie ty is the world-historical role of the proletariat and only thro ugh the class consciousness of the prolet arians can you reach the knowledge and the understanding of this road of humanity. which had develope d in Vienna in the decade prior to the First World War and included Otto Bauer. Neuwied and Berlin: Luchterhand. 420. G. the second canonical text of Western Marxism. M. particularly in the key essay History and Class Consciousness. Marxism by Max Adler and the whole tendency of ' Austro -Marxi s m ' . exemplified by Rud o lf Hilferding and his Finance Capital ( 1 909). 5 9 . morally correct action is made dependent on knowledge of the ' hi s t orical philosophical situation'. Ludz. I bid . trans. 'Taktik und Ethik' ( 1 9 1 9). P. on class consciousness. is the utopian postulate of the Marxian philosophy of history: it is the ethical obj e ctive of a coming world order.TWENTIETH C ENTURY MARXI S M 89 other hand. the distinction between science and ethics with a Hegelian dialectic of class consciousness. emphasis omitted. or. . The birth of Western Marxism consisted in conflating. and grafte d onto an orthodox. 1 9 . ed.

Lukacs. and by North Americans somewhat later. K. S . of course. 60 C RITICAL THEORY AND THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION On the basis of this brief sketch a documentation which could and should have been largely extended in a more specialized context we may draw some conclusions . To link Western Marxism with 'the anti-Leninist movement of this century' is American leftists' 'false consciousness ' . 62 On the other hand. to which Lukacs paid homage in 1 9 1 9. 62. against Capital and against facts according to Gramsci. against whi ch Western Marxism was implicitly contrasted. but clearly included the C o mmunist Party canon and the rival orthodoxies of S oviet post­ Stalin i s m . S ino-Stalinism. was seen in many different forms. Aronowitz. 6 1 .61 and from whom Korsch borrowed the motto of his Marxism and Philosophy. xiii. Marxisme et philosophie. The Crisis in Historical Materialism: Class. Western Marxism arose as a European intellectual reception of the October Revolution. L. Maoism and o rganized Trotskyi s m . Korsch. always implied an Eastern demarcati o n .90 FR O M MARXISM TO P O S T MARXISM? name of a Hegelian dialectic that rejects Austro-Marxism's dissolution of the 'unitary theory of social revolution' into scientific study and political prises de position. hailing Lenin's leadership. overcoming both moral and scientific problems according to Lukacs and Korsch. the construction. 1 9 8 1 . H ailing the October Revolution also meant. The 'East ' . . 1 9 . where theoretical and conceptual issues 60. The main function of 1 9 6 0s Western Marxism was to open up an intellectual horizon and a field of reflection. diffusion and perception of a Western Marxism by Western Europ ean intellectuals in the late 1 9 5 0 s and 1 9 6 0s. The latter was interpreted as a successful abbreviation of Marxist thought. 'Taktik und Ethik'. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 92ff. Politics and Culture in Marxist Theory.

The remaining two. but in the p ostwar period always within the circuit of proletarian revolution. but was clearly sympathetic to the USSR before the Second World War and afterwards never heeded the sirens of Cold War anti­ C ommunist mobilization. and p otentially critical. indeed. aspect of Soviet social philo s o phy. all the members of his list became Marxists because they regarded the O ctober Revolution as a decisive. with four m embers on Anderson's list. always stayed aloof from tangible political connections. seven were Communists lifelong adherents. or could possibly have. While it is true that the prospect of revolution west of Russia receded after 1 9 2 3. but Anderson's characterization now appears to take too narrow or specialist an angle . Goldmann and Sartre. Rather. Adorno and Horkhe imer both sneered at the authoritarian regime s in Eastern Europe but without openly denouncing them. Sartre circling the French Communist Party at varying distances. B ecause of the importance of the October Revolution and the US S R to the two classical generations o f Western Marxism. and Herbert Marcuse wrote a sober and scholarly critical study of Soviet Marxism ( 1 963) which ended by pointing out the rati onal. Not only was this obviously untrue of its founding moment. world­ historical event.1 9 9 1 .TWENTI ETH C ENTURY MARXI S M 91 could be dis cussed without being foreclosed by p arty­ line polemics or divisive political loyalties . except for Korsch and Colletti. The Horkheimer circle. no one has. While there are a number of figures of the ' 1 968 generation' who might be called into service or who might rally to a continuation of something they would c all Western Marxism. I think it makes most sense to draw a line after the recent death of Henri Lefebvre. the s ame . in mid. I do not think it is very illuminating to characterize Westetn Marxism as a theory marked by defeat. also moved in the orbit of the October Revolution Goldmann as a fervent disciple of the young Lukacs. Of the thirteen names on Anderson's list.

and. what we see here. as every academic knows. THE PHILOSOPHICAL TURN This account has not dealt with the question of whether all or most Western Marxists were philosophers. at best. 63. It should first be remembered that a number of intellectual paths and careers were not open to those who identified early with the October Revolution. with the possible and partial exceptions of Benjamin and Gramsci. philosophers were prevalent in 1 9 1 7. . It may be that Anderson's argument is circular. In other words. but how do we know that individuals other than philosophers stood a fair chance of joining the list? Jay's roster is also philosopher-dominated.92 FROM MARXI SM TO POST MARXI S M ? relationship to the possibility of a working-class revolution or to any remotely similar mixture of faith and disillusion. Yet. All his names. is the interaction of two factors: the intellectual climate in Europe at the time of the reception of the October Revolution. Reich and Fromm were above all psychoanalysts. and among the Dutch Council Communists. Merleau-Ponty and others are. Gorter was a poet and Pannekoek an astronomer. I would suggest. broke out of the 'tacit orthodoxy' of the Frankfurt School onto new ground exemplifies this . Adorno 's former assistant. and latter-day Marxists have wanted to listen to philosophers. why. 63 The absence of social scientists and historians is virtlially complete . are philoso­ phers. which. Jay. and the later Western European and North American image of 'Western Marxism' . Sohn Rethel might b e called a n economic historican. if so. is a qualified compliment. as reliable as the verdict of an academic nominating committee. Here the lists of Anderson. though Brecht was a playwright. The way Habermas. given the post hoc construction of 'Western Marxism'. Empirical social science was little if at all established in Europe .

as Sarte saw it (Critique de la raison diakctique. Horkheimer and Marcuse. Friedmann became. but were still dominated by venerable tradition. 65 But. Philosophy was rela­ tively remote from the powers and interests of the day. 1 53) . tho ugh usualy without abandoning their academic origins. 1 960. Western Marxism is� of course.TWENTIETH CENTURY MARXISM 93 Sociology remained strung between 'the politics of the bour­ geois revolutions and the economics of the proletarian revolution'. like twentieth-century philosophers in general. Adorno and the Frankfurt Institute went into social psychology an d group and industrial sociology. Furthennore. Science. history. and lived a precarious institutional existence . It seems that in the heartlands of Europe. the founder of French industrial sociology. Henri Lefebvre embarked upon a philosophical sociology of 'everyday life' (Critique de la vie quotidienne. this sociological turn is clearly discernible in Adorno. 64 Economics departments were usually hostile to the critique of economics. and in Sartre . in addition. it was clearly non-paradigmatic. Law faculties covered much of what would later branch out into social disciplines. 64. philosophy was the academic discipline most open to peop l e who had welcomed the dawn of O ctober 1 9 1 7 . London: New Left Books. In 1 964. one might say. the Gramsci Institute in Italy organized an important symposium on Marxism and sociology. in Henri Lefebvre and his original comrade Georges Friedmann. Therborn. which involved a run critical dialogue with existing sociology. Historiography was still overwhelmingly hostile to any social-scientific intrusion. only one strand of twentieth-century Marxism. harbouring a number of schools. 1 94 8-6 1 ) . It was the medium in which the most general and important issues of humankind were discussed life. G. Paris: Grasset. Marxist philosophers tended over time to move in the direction of sociology. Maurice Godelier went from philosophy to anthropology. Political science was only beginning to move into social studies of politics. 6 5 . Sartre was concerned with demonstrating the value of the dialectical method to the 'sciences of man'. Paris: Editions Gallimard. Class and Society. 2 vols. morals. 1 97 6 . knowledge. But. however defined. . After the Second World War.



any critical perspective on the latter must take into account that Marxism is not a self-contained universe of its own theories, practices and polemics. Marxism, and with it critical theory, has been part of an intellectual and sociopolitical history, with alternatives, rivals and opponents. Within such a history, the proper location of critical theory in the narrow or specific sense can b e ascertained.

Marxism is not just any old theoretical corpus. As a distinc­ tive cognitive p ersp ective on the modern world, ' it is surpassed in social significance in terms of numbers of adherents only by the great world religions . As a modem pole of identity, it is outdistanced only by nationalism. 66 Marxism acquired its very special historical importance by becoming, from the 1 8 8 0 s till the 1 970s,67 the main intellectual culture of two major social movements of the dialectics of modernity: the labour movement and the anticolonial movement. In neither case was Marxism without important rivals, nor was its diffusion universal, uniform or without defeats. But none of its competitors had a comparable reach and persistence . Marxism was also significant t o feminism, from the times of Clara Zetkin and Alexandra Kollontai to those of Simone de Beauvoir and, later, Juliet Mitchell, Frigga Haug and Michele Barrett. But in spite of their uniquely profeminist stance among male-dominated movements, Marxist parties and currents were regularly overshadowed

66. There is not yet a study quite level with this enonnous subject. But the best there is, which is excellent in many of its contributions, particularly by the main editor himself, is Eric Hobsbawm et aI. , Stona del marxismo, 4 vols, Turin: Einaudi, 1 978 8 2 . 6 7 . A s far a s the labour movement i n the most developed capitalist countries is concerned, the terminus ad quem is rather the 1 9 60s.



by religious and other conservative movements when it came to attracting mass support among women. Marxism had its origin in Europe, and its dialectical conception of history corresponded best to the European route to and through modernity, the road of e n dogenous change through fully internal conflicts between forces for and against modernity, however conceived. Within Euro­ pean modernity, Marxism gained where competing forces for the allegianc e of the working class were weak and had become discredited by defeat. To its immediate right was liberalism or, in the Latin countries, radicalism . In Britain the former was strong and vigorous; in France and, to some extent, in the Iberian peninsula, the latter. On the right also was Christian democracy, but it b egan after Marxism and b ecame important only in countries with strong churche s that were autonomous from the state bureaucracy, which meant the C atholic Church in the Low Countries, the Rhineland, Southern Germany and Italy, and the militant (Gereformeerde) C alvinis t churches of the Netherlands . To Marxism's left were anarchism, anarchosyndicalism and Russian populism. The anarchists were soon marginalized in most places except Andalusia; the anarchosyndicalists were largely defeated in Italy and France, holding on mainly in Spain; and the populists suffered severe defeats in late nineteenth-century Russia. The Marxist strongholds were Central running north south from S candinavia to central Italy and Eastern Europe, where a working class was being formed without prior modern ideological experience . In autocratic Russia, with little intellectual freedom of expressi o n for any modern ideas, Marxism became, after the defeats o f populism, the main language of th e intelligentsia. German social democracy was the undisputed centre of gravity of European, and world, Marxism before 1 9 1 4 . German was Marxism's main language, either directly or as the source of translation, even in countries whose cultural orientation was predominantly Russian, such as Serbia o r Bulgaria,



or French, such as Romania. Karl Kautsky's Die Neue Zeit (New Times) was the leading journal . The First World War and its end had a strong but complex effect on European Marxism . The O ctober Revolution attracted a significant cohort of workers and intellectuals to Marxism, and the new C ommunist parties started a vigorous programme of publication and diffusion of works by Marx and Engels . In Germany a certain academic opening occurred, p articularly in social­ democratically-governed Prussia, to which Frankfurt belonged. But the Marxism of social democratic parties was ebbing away in C entral and Northern Europe, giving way to pragmatic reformism save in Austria - until the fascist takeover in 1 934 and in Norway, where a lively Marxism led by a set of bright historians-cum-politicians suddenly flourished in and around a much radicalized Labour Party. In France and in B ritain, it took time for the new Marxist recruits to mature, helped neither by the contin­ uingly vigorous non-Marxist traditions of the domestic labour and progressive movements nor by the sectarian instability of the new C ommunist parties . In Italy, Fascism soon forced Marxists into prison, exile or silence . In Bolshevik Russia, Marxism blossomed, backed by generous academic endowments. Beginning in the early 1 9 30s, however, Stalinist terrorist orthodoxy produced a prolonged stifling of creative thought. Well before that, the original authoritarian features of the revolution had constrained the intellectual debate, leading, for instance, Georges Gurvitch and Pitirim Sorokin to leave Russia to become prominent (non-Marxist) sociologists in Paris and Cambridge, Massachusetts, respectively. In the rest of Eastern Europe, the prospects for Marxism darkened. Most of the successor states to the fallen multinational empires were or soon became author­ itarian, with little tolerance of any form of Marxism or other radical thought, except for Czechoslovakia, which remained an increasingly beleaguered, nationalistically



challenged left-of-centre democracy with a strong left­ wing intellectual avant-garde, more aesthetic than theo­ retical . In any case, a pervasive nationalism marginalized Marxism among students and intellectuals.


The Second World War and its immediate aftennath changed the intellectual landscape of Europe . The new Communist regimes opened Eastern Europe to an institutionalization of Marxism, but under political regimes which furthered it neither as critical theory nor a s science. A creative, abstract philosophical Marxism nevertheless developed from Yugoslavia to Poland, where it also managed, after the demise of Stalinism, to link up with so ciology and class analysis in the works of Julian Hochfeld, S tefan Ossowski and others . In East Germany the economic historian Jiirgen Kuczynski put together a monumental work of social history and statistics in forty volumes, History

of the W orking Class under Capitalism.
or abandoned . 6 8

But after 1 9 68, most

creative Marxism in Eastern Europe was silenced, exiled I n Central a n d Northern Europe i n th e aftermath of the Second World War, there was an intellectual turn towards America. This was the time when American empirical social science, particularly sociology, political science and social psychology, were received and adopted in Europe, stimulated by generous American scholarships . 69 What caught on most e asily were the more empiricist and conser­ vative variants of

US social science . Marxism was pu shed

68. There were exceptions, such as the perceptive work on the trajectory of national movements by the Czech historian Miroslav Hroch. 69. Adorno, freshly returned from America, was also playing the empirical card in these years and was listened to as someone introducing empirical opinion research in West Germany. See R. Wiggershaus, Die Frankfurter Schule, Munich: Auflage, 1 9 8 6 , 50 lf

or a dialogue with Marxism. The postwar Marxist historians included Christopher Hill. 1 979. Large and resourceful Communist parties backed it up. After 1 945. Philosophy remained on its intellectual throne. Marxism reaped the fruits of the Resistance. B ernal. Before that. S . became the dominant mode of discourse. In 1 949 the writings of Antonio Gramsci were published. historians of science and ancient historians. though for a long time only in Italy. crucially inspired by the visit of Boris Hessen and a Soviet delegation of historians of science in 1 93 1 . J. adding an original body of thought to the Marxist tradition. the group had successfully launched the scholarly j ournal Past and Present. Joseph Needham and others.7o Britain. which is still thriving. by contrast. and Marxism was also the theoretical language spoken in the socialist parties. Marxism guided postwar French historiography on the Revolution.98 FROM MARXIS M TO P O S T MARXISM? to the margins of far-left politics . In France and Italy. 7 0 . its core was the Historians' Group of the Communist Party. . 7 1 . Culture and intellectuals were thereby placed in the centre of analyses of politics and class power. among French and Italian intellectuals. B .71 Britain's was the most important strand of empirical Marxism in Europe after the First World War. 3 vols. Paris: Armand C olin. which broke up in 1 9 5 6. D . Gordon Childe. academically consecrated by Georges Lefebvre's and Albert Soboul's successive incumbencies of the Sorbonne Chair on the History of the French Revolution. J. Haldane. also benefiting from the greater resilience of Latin high culture in the face of Americanization. Marxism. A significant Marxist current gradually emerged from Communist student politics of the late 1 930s and early 1 940s. Civilisation materielle. It was also pertinent to the great Annales school of historians. had its own empirical traditions and so was not drawn into the American intellectual scene after the war. economie et capitalisme: XV e­ XVllle siecies. preceded by a cohort of distinguished natural scien­ tists. finally. One of the best examples of a deep affinity with Marxism is the rather later work by Femand Braudel.

72 While largely driven by it. The Communist parties were ageing and isolated. all came out of the student move­ ment. The unexpected postwar boom was not merely continuing.74 72. 'British Marxist Historians. In France the upheavals of 1 96 8 did not change the landscape of estab­ lished serious left wing journals. Neue Kritik. Maurice Dobb and George Thoms on.73 The London-based New Left Review. West Gennan and Swedish social-democratic parties divested their programmes of any Marxist traces in 1 95 8 60 . of Sartre's Critique in 1 97 6 . La Pensee was under tight Communist Pany control. . New Left Review 1: 1 20 . So was the left wing Catholic Esprit. However. The Austrian. social theory is not synchronized with political and social history. but was in a literary essay mould. English language editions o f Althusser's cited works appeared in 1 9 6 9 (For Marx) and 1 97 0 (Reading 'Capital '). with roots in 1 9 5 6 dissident Communism. The late 1 9 50s and the first half of the 1 960s saw political Marxism in Western Europe at an ebb. as an historian and biographer of Trotsky and Stalin he fits well into the picture of British Marxism. Jean-Paul Sartre's Critique of Dialectical Reason ( 1 960). Edward Thompson's The Making of the English W orking Class ( 1 9 63) . The West German equivalents. 7 4 . and in this milieu moved Raymond Williams. See further R. Critica marrista. 73. which was to become the world's intellectually leading Marxist journal. Isaac Deutscher's trilogy on Trotsky ( 1 9 54-63). was the intellectually dominant journal. none of which was very conducive to creative Marxist theory. was founded in 1 9 60.TWENTIETH CENTURY MARXISM 99 Eri c H obsbawm and Edward Thompson. 1 8 80 1 980: Part One'. While Isaac Deutscher had a different background an d p olitics. founded by Sartre right after the war. it was accelerating. was probably the journal most open to new Marxist thought. The most imponant Italian Marxist j ournal. 2 1 96 . March April 1 980. Prokla and others. French socialism had discredited itself in the Algerian war and therewith its official Marxism. began publication in 1 962. issued b y th e Communist Pany. some of the most influential works of Western European Marxism appeared at this time : Louis Althusser's For Marx and Read­ ing 'Capital' ( 1 965). Les T emps Modernes. L'Homme et la Societe. Das Argument. Samuel.

and also inspired by China's 'Cultural Revolution' . G. Cohen's Karl Marx 's Theory of History ( 1 9 7 8 ) . At about the same time. This neo-Marxism was a much larger wave than the original 'Western Marxism' but produced hardly anything as spectacular. The theoretical and scholarly works.75 S electing the most impressive works of th eory and scholarship from the neo-Marxist current in Europe is much more difficult and controversial . Paris: Maspero. One reason for this was that politics and theory had become much more differentiated. 7 5 . The best among the former genre are undoubtedly Regis Debray's writings on the revolutionary endeavours in Latin America. But Perry Anderson's monumental historical works. the drying up of the labour markets paved the way for a resurgence of class conflict. as well as the domestic socio-economic functioning of Western democ­ racy. R. . Even the most brilliant and reflective political writings of this period are largely empirical.A. even of politically active people. They illustrate my argument very well. Marxism became both the political language and the theoretical perspective for a generation of radicals who found in it the best way to understand the phenomena of colonial wars and underdevelopment. and Nicos Poulantzas's Political Power and Social Classes ( 1 9 6 8) will be on most people's short lists . Debray.1 00 FROM MARXI S M TO P O S T MARXISM? A BRIEF RESURGENCE The political situation then changed dramatic ally with the student revolt an outcome of the new mass universities and the Vietnam War combined. 2 vols. Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism and Lineages of the A bsolutist State (both 1 974) . 1 974. 1 967. are very academic . and La critique des armes. The rapidly expanding subject of sociology provided the main academic battleground. Revolution dans la revolution?. Paris: Editions du Seuil.

And by linking up with the neo-Ricardian work of Gramsci's friend Piero Sraffa. Godelier.TWENTIETH C EN TURY MARXI S M 101 Neo-Marxism achieved Marx's inclusion in th e classical canon o f sociology and m ade Marxist or marxis a n t perspectives legitimate albeit minority views in most academic social science and humanities dep artments . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. R. 1 973. See further G . 77 The whole issue of the dialectic s 76.7 6 But when the radical political thrust began to peter out in the second half of the 1 970s. trajets marxistes en anthropologie. M. Massachusetts. 1 960. It has sustained itself best in sociology and historiography. 'The Right to Vote and the Four World Routes to/through Modernity'. 62 92. P. economists mounted the first serious theoretical challenge to triumphant marginalism. S. London: S age. Featherstone. Maspero. in Global Modernities. the theoretical and practical struggle for modernity was largely external. Neither the internal conflict of historical forces nor the class formation of the forces in action were as important as they were in Europe . Harmondsworth: Penguin. against colonial Europe and by the colonized aliens against the colonists . political Marxism evaporated rapidly. 77.F.against Cambridge. Capital and Growth. Torstendahl. London: Sage. 1 24-39 . Academic Marxism also receded significantly. . Paris: F. Harcourt and N. Marxism entered anthropology primarily through the work of French anthropologists Maurice Godelier. Claude Meillassoux. England on the side of Ricardo and Marx . MARXISM IN THE NEW WORLD S In the New Worlds created by early modem conquest and mass migration. 1 995. Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities. pitting C ambridge. eds. Laing. Emmanuel Terray and others . Horizon. in State Theory and State History. G. M. Lash and R Robertson. sometimes abandone d for more novel theoretical 'isms'. 1 992. eds. sometimes submerged into ecumenical disciplinary practices . Therborn. ed. Sraffa. 'Routes to/through Modernity'. 1 97 1 .

in p articular its class dialectic.78 However. Becker. Nevertheless. around the turn of the century. Chile and perhaps Cuba are the main ones. after the S econd World War. 1 99 3 . There was also a remarkable lack of creative individual contributions . a maj or intercontinental centre for the dissemination of Marxism in English. the first English translations of the second and third volumes of Capital. wa s less significant in the Americas and in O ceania. Guyana. and then late. We should therefore expect Marxism to have played a much more modest role in the modern history of the New Worlds . It was with reference to his 'Shining Path' that Abimael Guzman named his notorious guerilla move­ ment Sendero Luminoso . Argentina had a translation of Capital well before Sweden and Norway. Marxist parties of any social significance arose as rare exceptions. Athens. . but the only creatively original work of N ew-World Marxism in its first half-century or more was probably Jose Carlos Mariategui's Seven Essays of Interpretation of Peruvian Reality ( 1 928).102 F R O M MARXISM T O P O S T MARXIS M ? of modernity. for example. similar to that of science and scholarship in general. Ohio: Ohio University Press. putting out. Kerr became. only after the Second World War. among other things. Sidney Hook's Toward the Understanding of Karl Marx ( 1 933) and Paul Sweezy's The Theory of Capitalist Development ( 1 942) were solid and distinguished exegeses. See further M. where. Immigrants spread Marxism to Latin America. The Chicago publisher Charles H. Mariategui ( 1 8 9 5 1 9 3 0) was the founder of Peruvian Communism. a remarkable combination of radical European thought including Pareto and Sorel with a Leninist Marxism and Latin American cultural vanguardism applied to a whole spectrum of issues from economics to literature. Marxist scholarship also underwent a tilt to the West. Mariategui and Larin A merican Marxist Theory. a figure with many similarities to Gramsci. Marxism did not establish significant roots. although in the 78. and in part inspired by the same intellectual ambience from a visit to Italy and Europe in 1 9 1 9 23 .

The late 1960s upheavals on the North American academic scene seem. H. American Marxism received little from the anti-Fascist refugees. these being assembled under 79. Faletto. Cardos080 . New York: Monthly Review Press. P. Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America. Paul Sweezy set up Monthly Review and the Monthly Review Press. on the whole. Brenner's explicit and orthodox historical materialist perspective was asserted and sustained in a series of confrontations with other expert historians on the importance of class conflict to the emergence of industrial capitalist Europe. as one constituent pole. Cardoso and E. arguing that underdevelopment was not lack of development. from its argument that as the Latin American underdevelopment depended on its relations to the metropoles of capitalism. Baran.TWENTIETH-CENTURY MARXISM 103 former case it took longer to mature. New York: Monthly Review Press. A. F. so he stayed in the US. 1967. na America . in the works of Paul Baran (1957) and Andre Gunder Frank (1967). Frank. the two most successful of whom are rivals. apart from his later works.G. 1957. which became the most important international platfonn for serious critiques of political economy. The new Marxist theory of the underdevelopment of capitalism came to centre around MR.79 From Latin America in the mid-sixties came more sociologically oriented work on underdevelopment . The Political Economy of Growth.above all. but rather something which had developed out of global capitalism. One is the historiographical work of Robert Brenner on the relevance of class struggle to the rise of modernity. H. A. 1970. Marcuse was not given a very attractive offer to return to Germany. Dependencia e desenvolvimento Latina. 80. that of the Brazilian F. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar. to have been more intellectually productive and innovative than parallel events in Europe or elsewhere. Highly creative contri­ butions were suddenly made by a number of North American Marxists.often referred to dependency school.

here unjustly but necessarily omitted) . this time arguing anew for the class character of the English Civil War. The Brenner Debate. przeworski and J. H . H. The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. Braverman. C ambridge : C ambridge University Press. 1 979. Durhum: Duke University Press. T. 1 98 5 . New York : Academic Press. F. 1 974. a current within the American Sociological Association and a global network of collaborators . 1 9 76 onwards. Chicago : University of Chicago Press. 8 3 . M. whose sociologically informed works of scholarly synthesis may be more controversial than those of Brenner. Postmodernism. Manu facturing Consent. London: Verso. 1 9 86. London: Verso. Classes. 8 2 . 84 Critical theory. The Modern World System. again in conflict with each other (Braverman and Burawoy) . Jameson. H. Wallerstein. Princeton: Princeton U niversity Press. and The Politics of Production. aside from the work of Raymond Williams. I . New York: Monthly Review Press. E. Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century. A History of Electoral Socialism. then. 1 985. A. but whose academic entrepreneurial acumen and achievements have had only one comparable Marxist parallel Max Horkheimer. Wallerstein launched his project of 'world-systems analysis ' the examination of the largest conceivable social totality around which he has built a research institute. 82 The other is Immanuel Wallerstein. 1 9 9 1 . E . the most ambitious analyses of class (Przeworski and Sprague.1 04 FROM MARXI S M TO P O S T MARXISM? the title The Brenner Debate. 1 9 9 3 . Sprague. O . eds. the most innovative cultural inquiries ( Jameson and many others. Paper Stones. 1 9 8 5 . This extraordinary creativity i n North American Marxism also includes some very penetrating analyses of the labour process. Chicago : University of Chicago Press. or. Merchants and Revolution. 3 vols. 84. 8 1 More recently. 83 In 1 9 7 6 . and. . Brenner has made yet another major contribution to a central issue of historiographical debate. Brenner. has been received most warmly by left-wing academia in North 8 1 . R. Wright. and Wright) . Burawoy. Wallerstein's dialec­ tic of the capitalist world-system was explicitly directed against the then widespread evolutionary theory of the 'modernization' of separate societies . Philpin. Aston and C.

Of Cririeal Theory and Its Theorists. 1 987). New York: Collier­ Macmillan. 1 962. such as A. Cambridge. Legum. London: Dobson. Brown. and Marxism and Totality. Pan Africanism or Communism. 3 vols. However. Vietnam and French-ruled Indochina generally trans­ formed a reception of French Marxism. Bronner. It was the Comintern that made possible and propagated through the Congres s of Oppressed Peoples in Baku in November 1 920.85 In this. But the outcome of all this was markedly more nationalists who used a Marxist vocabulary than actual Communists. with its fulcrum around the relationship of the conquered to the conquest and to the conqueror. eds. Padmore. Pan Africanism. But it was also very important on the Indian subcontinent . from the Algerian FLN to the Zimbabwean ZANU. C. Carrere d'Encausse and S. The Dialeerical Imaginarion. 1 97 3 . critical theory. see also S. 86. See H. Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers. Paris: Armand Colin. Etzioni ( The A erive Society. New York: Free Press. E. rather th an of. 1 994. the works of Martin Jay are exemplary. with a preface by S artre. Schram.especially in secularized India and in Indonesia. The most creative American critical social theories have come from outside the Marxist tradition. 1 965. whose The Wretched of the Earth first appeared in 1 9 6 1 . 87 Marxism became the language of anticolonial movements and po stcolonial powers. culture and Communist political education into a variety of original forms. London: Pal Mal Press. the formation of the Anti-Imperialist League. Jay. M. the global instigation of anticolonial Communist p arties a Marxist interpretation of colonialism and an anticolonial­ ist identification with Marxism. Le marxisme et l'Asic 18531964. . in Mrica particularly. Probably no one has captured the violent traumata involved better than Frantz Fanon. 86 Modernity in the colonial zone has been p articularly traumatic. Cambridge ork University Press. G. its best output has been ab out.TWENTIETH C ENTURY MARX I S M 1 05 Am erica. 1 9 5 6. 1 988) and R Unger (Poliries: A W in Canstruerive Social Theory. from phenomenological philosophy to the literally 8 5 . Boston: Little. 1 9 6 8 and The Moral Dimension. pushed very early by an extra­ ordinary group of Dutch leftists led by Henricus Sneevliet . 87.

Marxism has been physically liquidated. Western Marxism became the idiom of the anti­ col onial movement whi ch. very distant from the Marxian dialectic of modernity. been out-ranked by Islam. The maoisant tum of the French left-wing intelligentsia in the late 1 9 60s burnt most of the remaining bridges between the mandarinates of Paris and Hanoi. In Pakistan it has. where Marxism became incorporated into a peculiar cult of the leader. often of American academic inspiration. on the whole. Paris: Editions Anthropos. Amin. India. such as Samir Amin. both of Indian descent. in one of the most extensive political pogroms ever staged (in 1 9 65 6) . White South African academia has also included an embattled left-wing current from the late 1 9 60s onwards . Korea had the unique experience of becoming a non­ Western Gapanese) colony from as early as 1 9 1 0 . . S. In Indonesia. has not (yet) been able to sustain any significant Marxist intelligentsia. both as an intellectual current and as a social force. on the other hand. established a people's republic in the North.lO6 FROM MARXISM T O P O ST MARXI SM? avuncular national C ommunism of Ho Chi Minh (Uncle Ho) and beyond to the sinister deliriums of Pol Pot. and the leadership of the South African C ommunist Party which greatly influenced the ANC who are mainly white . Here again. in the social sciences and in literary studies . The most important Marxist intellectuals of Africa tend to be non-blacks. 1 970.88 two East African class analysts of politics and law. Black African culture. has preserved a significant and sophisticated 8 8 . an Egyptian Dakar-based development economist of world fame. L'accumulation a l 'echelle mondiale. The harsh class struggles and conflicts over democracy in the booming capitalist South have been conducive to fostering recent intellectual currents of Marxism. with S o vi e t a s sistance. in an anything but fair competition. Mahmood Mamdani and Issa Shivji.

and Bipan Chandra. Syed. On the other hand. Harbans Mukhia9 1 and the formidable gro up ­ Subaltern Studies. Oommen and P. 93 China was never fully colonized and therefore largely trave ll e d the fourth main road through modernity. O xford: Oxford Univers ity Press. 93. which originally entered the c ountry from the US . J. eds. directed by Ranajit Guha . Irfan Habib. B ombay: University of B ombay. kept at bay by the modernizing faction in power and larg e ly alien to the populace dragged into modernity by the rulers. Kosambi. put China under acute colonial thr ea t. 90. G. Harcourt and Laing. The larger those two factors. Pari s : Cujas. 89 There is a tradition of high l evel Marxist or marxisant - e c ono mics. Mukherji. which gave rise t o a highly original political Marxism in the 1 940s. 8 9 . 1 98 6 .TWENTIETH C ENTU RY MARXI SM 1 07 Marxism. the less Marxism there was . 9 0 Above all. . eds. p. 1 9 8 5 . A. induding the m a th ematician historian-polymath D. D. Haupt and M. 1 98 8 . Kosambi on History and Society. there is a lively and widespread historiographical t r ad i tio n. Bombay: P opular Prakashan. however.. highlighted by the fact that the only non North Atlantic economists included in the Cambridge C ambridge controversy referred to ab ove were two Italians and three Indians . Reberioux. C . The relative signifi c anc e of the two tendenci e s should depend on the amount of m odernizing continuity and the amount of repression. 1 9 7 9 . 9 2 . we should expect Marxism to have led a marginal existence. Capital and Growth. La Deuxieme Internationale et l'Orient. eds.D. 9 1 . The Japanese invasions of 1 93 1 and 1 937 did. Guha and G. 360. T. the opening to the importatio n of ideas should also have led to an ea rly imp ort ati on of Marxi sm and other radical ideas by whatever pro-modern factions are out of power. ed. th eo r eti c al ly as well as practically under the leadership of Mao Z ed o n g In the countries of externally induced modernization. D. . New Delhi: Orient Longman. Spivak. Selected Subaltern Studies. Indian Sociology. as well a s Bipan Chandra.K. 1 9 67.N. Nationalism and Colonialism in Modern India. R . Marxism seems to have played a lesser role . 9 2 In Indian sociology.

'La diffusione e la volgarizzazione del marxismo'. 95 The historical routes to and through modernity and their political dynamics have largely determined the trajectory of twentieth-century Marxism . Marx's Economics: A Dual Theory of V alue and Growth. Theoretically. 1 979. M. . THE FUTURE OF DIALE CTICS As an interpretation. NJ: Princeton University Press. was more than merely the first relay of Marxism into Asia. a government of modernity. as a socially mediated rather than an economically direct critique of political economy. F. theoretical or p olitical . 1 99 0 . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. allow­ ing for the delayed impact of crucial generational events . 95 . New York: Monthly Review Press. Storia del marxisme. Itoh. But within the 'normal' 94 . Torino: Giulio Einaudi. on the other hand. 1 9 7 3 . 2. eds. Andreucci. The former is on the continuist side of the spe ctrum and has never spawned any significant Marxism. Silverberg. vol. it has been characterized by a strong orthodox critique of political economy. Changing Song: The Marxist Manifestos of Nakano Shigeharo. as s ociology. later. spearheaded by the works o f Kozo Uno and more recently expressed by Mishio Morishima.1 08 FRO M MARXI S M TO P O S T MARXI S M? The former Ottoman Empire Turkey. in E. 1 980. Marxism is without rival among modern conceptions of society. an analysis and. Hobs bawn et al. V alue and Crisis: Essays o n Marxian Economics i n Japan. M . although the governmental record of p oliticians with Marxist claims is today widely regarded as full of failures . Morishima. a critique.not so much its substantial contents as its periods of expansion and contraction. Marxism has maintained and developed itself primarily as historiography and. In intellectual terms. occasion­ ally. Japan. 94 Its catastrophic defeat in 1 945 opened the terrain to at least a socially significant middle-class Marxism centered around the Communist and socialist parties and the student move­ ment. M. cf. Princeton. Makoto Itoh and others . Iran and the Arab heartlands of Islam and Sino-Japanese East Asia are the two maj or civilizations on this route to/through modernity.

albeit a very important one. Critical theory is only a Western moment of this global history. . already inherent in reality. Marxist philosophy has been a proto-sociology. perhaps more than any other variant.TWENTIETH C ENTURY MARXI S M 109 pursuits of scholarship and science. the division of humanity's saga into history and post-history makes no sense. after the exhaustion of the October Revolution and the decline of the industrial working class. all 'isms ' are bound to disappear sooner or later. global interdependence and global chasms of misery and affiuence are growing simultaneously. Alternatively. 96 As such. the future relevance of the Marxian dialectic of modernity has to be thought anew. It was only when the latter could be written off that the crucial moment of antiscientific critique emerged. from Max Adler to Louis Althusser and G. Fukuyama. 1 97 8 ) . with Henri Lefebvre and Jean-Paul S artre. F. the problematic of Marxism as a dialectic of modernity. from Engels and Kautsky via the Austro-Marxists to Loui s Althusser and his disciples. in the actually existing labour movement. Its true philosophical oeuvre. Althusser (Pour Marx. Vienna 1 904) to Adorno (Negative Dialectics) . 9 7 . A. The End of History. 1 965.97 On the contrary. 1 99 2 . 9 6 . N e w York: Penguin. bringing out. Polarizations of life chances. The scientific claims and self-confidence of Marxists. Oxford: Oxford University Press. has centred on understanding Marx and Marxism itself. whose first items were For Marx and Reading 'Capital'. Althusser (For Marx and Reading 'Capital ' ) and C ohen (Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence. as intended 'to define and explore the field of a philosophy conceived as Theory of the production of knowledge'. Cohen. they did address more general epistemological problems. At this juncture in history. so to speak. True. The conventional controversy of Marxism as a science or as a critique misses a decisive point. But in fact there is a narrowing focus towards s elf examination in Marxism and its dialectic. rested upon the assumption that the critique was. If there is anything valid in ideas about the processes of economic and cultural globalization. if we go from Adle r (Kausalitit und Teleologie im Streit urn die Wissenscha/t. it has b een an in-house philosophy. back cover) originally presented the series. Paris: Fran�ois Maspero.

there is a good chance that men and women concerned with critical social thought will tum with increasing interest to the great philosopher-historian of hope. 98 The most obvious way forward for social theorizing inspired by Marx will be to look at what is currently happening to the venerable couplet of the forces and relations of production on a global scale and their conflictual effects on social relations . pace Habermas. with the return of socialism from science to utopia. are building in the develope d metropoles. The Principle of Hope ( 1 95 9). vol. emphasis omitted. But again. This is a new moment of critique. Paris: Galilee. trans. 1 370. takes the fairy-tale seriously. sometimes against all odds. 9 8 . Ernst Bloch. lacking the s cientific backdrop of class as well as the apo calyptics of Korsch and Lukacs. 1 9 86. Bloch. N . S . 1 9 9 3 . Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd. 9 9 . '99 The free society without exploitation and alienation which the critical dialecticians hoped for.110 F R O M MARX I S M TO P O S T MARXISM? if not of rival powers. takes the dream of a Golden Age practically. in all its analyses the coldest detective. E. 3. Since neither capitalism nor its polarizations of life courses appear very likely to disappear in the foreseeable future. . and requiring a human commitment b eyond the academic division of labour. Derrida. a critique of prevailing e c onomics seems to be called for more urgently than a the ory of communicative action. See J. Plaice. Finally. there is a good chance that the spectre of Marx will continue to haunt social thought. who pointed out that 'Marxism. hardly less than at the time of Karl Marx. Plaice and P. Knight. Spectres de Marx. Marxism may no longer have any solutions ready to hand. is perhaps not so much a failure of the past as something that has not yet come to pass . A dialectical understanding of this unity of opp osites is called for today. but its critical edge is not necessarily blunted.

Russia. Germany. focusing on the question of 'Post Marxism and the Left'. in a loose ecumenical sense. This text grew from an initial invitation to contribute to a collection on different aspects of European social theory. and was later expanded for New Left Review. Socialism and Communism exercised 1 . France. Britain. Indonesia. virtually every major c ountry of the globe. It was embraced at least as a rhetorical goal by a range of locally powerful parties from Arctic social democrats to African nationalists . Mexico. . Any survey of a field as broad as this will be liable to omissions and overs ights. S outh Africa in fact. as well as to the political.3 Afte r Dialectics: Radical Social Theory in the North at the Dawn of the Twenty-first Century If socialism and liberalism have both been central to modem political and social thought. Japan. China. India. personal and generational inclinations of its author. 1 Socialism was emblazoned on the banners of mass parties in Brazil. Italy. with the exception of Nigeria and the US . then during the twentieth century it was socialism. that was the more successful of the two in terms of intellectual attraction and public support.

In Latin America the C uban Revolution inspired a hemispheric surge of revolutionary socialist politics. who wrote a manifesto entitled 'Why Socialism?' for the founding issue of the US Marxist journal Monthly Review.1 9 7 0 s . Militant working-class movements of strikes. different but allied. varieties of socialism reached their maximum influence and transformational ambition. if not its sole. Trade-union movements in the most developed countries reached their highest levels of affiliation in the mid. The Chinese Cultural Revolution was the largest attempt at radical social change ever carried out. and was seen as a dazzling red beacon by many p eople all over the world. followed by another example. Picasso was a Communist. In Western Europe and the oceanic antipodes. from Romain Rolland to Elfriede Jelinek. who designed the logo of post-Second World War Communist-led peace movements. In the 1 9 60 s and 1 9 70s. which in Europe had historically been mainly right-wing. theoretical canon: Marxism . demonstrations and workplace occupations shook France in May 1 968 and Italy in the autumn of 1 9 6 9 . as did socialism's central.1 12 F R O M MARXI SM TO P O S T MARXIS M ? a powerful attraction over some of the most brilliant minds of the last century: Einstein was a socialist. In Sweden from 1 9 6 8 to 1 9 7 6 . and in France between 1 9 78 and 1 9 8 1 . social democracy was marching forward. social democrats presented their most radical concrete plans ever for social change . following two springtides in the aftermaths of the twentieth century's two world wars. Student m ovements. which was defeated by the Vietnamese Communists . In spite of its conservatively defined original task and its own staunchly conservative traditions. Africa north of the Limpopo was swept by decolonization and embarked on projects of socialist nation-building. emerged as powerful leftist forces . Geopolitically. both electorally and in its reform programme. in Chile . the S oviet Union attained parity with the US. the Swedish Academy has allotted the Nobel Prize for literature to a series of left-wing writers.

The explanation of this sudden turn. is a task far beyond the scope of this brief overview of the landscape of Left social theory after the neoliberal ' disaster' .AFTER DIALECTICS 113 across Europe. in tum. must be given of the changing p arameters within which such theorization has taken place. A major reason for studying the present is to understand the power it exercises. Such hope. the Americas. and O ceania. however. not only liberal capitalism but also empire and imperialism have staged a triumphant return. At the dawn of the twenty-first century. achieving a strong influence there. dependent on the hope of a possible different world. if not absolutely. many of them proving ramshackle or fake in the process. however faint. Socialist c onstructions were kno cked down. the Arab North. in less pronounced forms. Then. suddenly. the high water withdrew and was followed by a neoliberal tsunami. depends on the visibility. and with them the world­ views of the Belle Epoque . Marx and Marxism pushed open the doors to the a cademy in some of the major capitalist countries. Asia from Istanbul to Bangkok and Tokyo. the IMF and the World B ank. and why it happened in the last two decades of the twentieth century. THE TURN O F MOD ERNITY Whether its analysis tends towards celebration and a ccept­ ance or towards critique and rejection. socialist ideas and Marxist theories were engulfed in the deluge . of some alternative power or force with the potential to carry . even if they were never hegemonic in any significant intellectual c entre outside Italy and France. formul ated in the Washington C onsensus of the US Treasury. Some outline. Privatization became the global order of the day. and critiques of it are largely. before a summary picture of responses can be provided. large parts of Afric a from South Africa to Ethiopia and. social theorization depends on the social world it theorizes .

a new layer of leftists is emerging from the World Social Forums. On the contrary. the main powers that were supposedly 'building socialism' adopted different strategies . When the new economic doctrine turned out to be an unexpectedly aggressive challenge. the antiglobalization movement and the Indo­ American mobilizations from Chiap as to B olivia and beyond. While the inequalities of capitalism were increasing in most countries. and while the brutality of the rulers of the main capitalist states was reaffirmed again and again. Existing theory still mainly registers the response of this preceding generation to the tum of the 1 9 80s and 1 990s.1 14 FROM MARXISM TO P O S T MARXISM? the critique forward into active change. I n the rich capitalist countries. The ideas of most contem­ porary theorists were actually formed during earlier conjunctions of hope and power. What happened to socialism and Marxism in the 1 9 80s and 1 990s was that the alternative forces appeared to melt away. overwhelming. the dialectic of capitalism was imploding. Capital's new push was accompanied not by any strengthening of the working­ class and anticapitalist movements. nor by the opening of a systemic exit into another mode of production at least not from a perspective visible to the naked eye . by any measure. The global confluence of left-wing political defeats and social meltdowns in the last two decades of the twentieth century was. at the same time. while the global gap between rich and poor was widening. the structural tum to deindustrialization and the mishandling by the centre-left of the difficult conjuncture of mass unemployment and soaring inflation during the 1 9 70s prepared the way for the revenge of neoliberalism. labour was weakened and embryonic systemic alternatives either fell apart or were completely marginal­ ized. the sociopolitical meaning of the new Muslim anti-imperialism is yet to be determined . however. spearheaded in industrial­ ization's country of origin. has to take into account the slow work of time. Meanwhile. That of the S oviet . Any analytical assessment.

although the ANC does provide an example of working democracy in Africa. African client states of Cold War Communism turned their coats with the disappearance of their patrons . and later the Vietnamese. an Indian state with a population the size of Germany's. the moderate AKEL. we are going to run it. took the 'free-market' road: if capitalism is the only show on earth. Perhaps with the exception of the latter. The Chinese. has continued to re-elect its C ommunist government. and by the largest p arty of Greek Cyprus. But West Bengal. revivified by recent developments in Venezuela and Bolivia. these are p arties of testimony rather than of hope.AFTER DIALE C T I C S 1 15 Union would prove suicidal : trying to placate political liberalism while letting the economy spiral downwards by tolerating increasingly aggressive b arracuda b ites . Socialist hopes of p ost-apartheid South Africa have also come to nothing. corrupt or both. In Latin America. The social-democratic aspirations of post-Communist Europe have come to little. In Europe. never recovered from the blow of 1 9 7 3 . both socialist and Communist. The huge Indonesian Communist Party had literally been massacred in 1 9 6 5 . Chilean Marxism. The left-wing tum of Latin American countries in the 2000s owes little to classical socialist or Marxist thought. Red banners are still kept flying by sizeable minorities in southern Europe. deriving more inspiration from radical C atho licism in the . from Portugal to Greece. its parties have tended to be either liberal. After the failures and moral hollowness of the Chinese Cultural Revolution. the PCI has dissolved itself. the Chinese Communist Party for all its former Maoist diatribes against 'capitalist roaders ' was the political force that was most committed to following that route. and a C aribbean Castroism has managed to survive. the successful Israeli attack in 1 9 67 had shattered the secular Left. and the PCF has shrunk to the size of a large sect. In the Arab world. however. both reformist and revolutionary hopes had been quenched in blood by the end of the 1 9 70s.

Marxism 's Broken Triangle As a minimum framework for situating recent turns of left-wing social theory. and particularly in the Bolivian case.1 16 FRO M MARXI S M TO P O ST MARXISM? case of Brazil. from Latin American populism in Argentina and Venezuela and from indigenous peoples' mobilization in B olivia . from Islamist democracy to sectarian terrorism . of varying distances from each other. and a whole gamut of political manifestations of Islam. But the old cartography of 'roads to socialism' has lost its bearings. New compasses of the Left have to be made. This entails. comparable to the social Catholicism of Europe from the Netherlands to Austria a century ago . The most interesting of these. it should be expected that this will take some time. waves of migration throwing up immigrants' movements in the 'First World'. The 'ism' has three different poles. and therefore affected by the vicissitudes of the latter. Nevertheless. first. that of modernity. growing out of both the historical situation and the extraordinary range of interests of its founding fathers . Secondly. crucial for coming developments. Marxism and socialism should be recognized as parts of a wider cultural ensemble. not to mention varying pole­ coalitions . we need to look at how Marxist and socialist thought has been embedded in cultural history. a look at the specific construction of Marxism as an ' ism' and at the forces bearing upon that structure. may be the advent of a social Islamism. New radical forces continue to emerge : populist movements in Indo-America. Intellectually. there is an articulate left-wing socialist component. The world has not yet been made entirely safe for liberalism. in each. Marxism was first of all a historical . The history of Marxism may best be seen as a triangulation.although the Movement to S o cialism of President Evo Morales was largely built by former cadres from the left-wing miners' union.

such qualities were also an expression of the early modernity of the late nineteenth century. Any serious attempt at understanding 'post-Marxism' will . Secondly. in the broad Germanic sense of WissenschaJt. each in his own way. Marxis m was a mode of politics of a socialist. on historical developments determined 'in the last instance' by the dynamics of the forces and relations of production. a socialist class politics . Marx. with the Marxian critique of political economy. no less than ethical implications . when intellectual discourse had as yet scarcely been subdivided into separate disciplines. Historical materialism. making the 'ism' a social current. it was always political power which gained the upper hand. although political leadership during the first two generations after Marx usually required a cap acity for theoretical argumentation. the length of the sides of the triangle would be increasingly extended. The politics was the overdetermining apex of the triangle. too. fo cused on the operation of capitalism and. Stalin and Mao. In the course of the twentieth century. In Marx-ism.AFTER D IALE C T I C S 1 17 social science. historiography and philosophy were always asymmetrical . If and when political leadership was differentiated from theoretical leadership. Engels. but these were usually conne cted to symp athies with. Thirdly. with epistemological and ontological ambitions. providing a compass and a road-map to the revolutionary overthrow of the existing order. dabbled in all three. Kautsky the chief theoretician of the social-democratic Second International and Lenin. and materialist dialectics. it was a philosophy of contradictions or dialectics. had their intrinsic intellectual attractions. mastered all three genres . working-class kind. and o ften commitment to. more generally. and of the natural preponderance of politics. with the social philosophy of alienation and commodity fetishism. not just an intelle ctual lineage . the relation of politics to science. However impressive the intellectual-cum-political versatility and expertise of these founding generations.

but the view that they at least constituted an ongoing social construction site even if temporarily stagnant or perhaps decaying . Considerations on W estern Marxism. even in the early 1 980s. even if its exponents were linked by party member­ ship. such as the British Labour Party and continental Western European social democracies . Sartre) . European Marxist philosophers in this p eriod hardly ever engaged intellectually with Marxist social scientists or historians . This made what perhaps may be called the 'natural' Marxist coalition of politics and social science difficult and rare . A Marxist mode of politics never attracted enough support to become consolidated in Western Europe as a distinctive political practice. S e e P. Lefebvre. It was always open to oppor­ tunistic enterprise and to authoritarian legitimation. 1 9 7 6 . one important link: the political commitment to socialism. The Marxism that emerged in Western Europe after the First World War was b asically philosophical in approach. as in the first two cases . 1 97 0s. In the 1 9 60s. Socialist politics. in the ambiguous senses referred to. this was a commitment not only of radical intellectuals and youthful revolutionaries. of course. two of them very powerful. were 'building socialism' . London: New Left Books. in the historical sense of a different kind of society. it later either stood discreetly aloof from it (the Frankfurt School) or was only indirectly related to it (Althusser. 2 In spite of the hard soci­ ological lessons of the Frankfurters in US exile. politics and philosophy. and of the scientific thrust of the Althus serians. Korsch. . There was. 2. Belief in their achievement was limited.was widespread. There was also the 'actually existing' fact that a sizeable group of states.1 18 FROM MARXISM T O P O ST MARXISM? have to deal with this triangle of social science. It was professed by mass parties or by significant currents within them. Anderson. originally eschatologically connected to revolu­ tionary politics (Lukacs. Gramsci) .

its analyses losing any discernible potential audience . main­ taining a link to marginal revolutionary politic s . electorally crushed in Britain and pushed onto the defensive in S candinavia. By the standards of physics or biology. came to rely on academic appointments. like historiography and social science. Marx-ism is unlikely to exercise an attraction as social science or historiography for post. while many previously neglected political subjects are coming to the fore. support for such a politics oscillates between 5 and 20 per cent o f the national vote. they nevertheless represent enormous strides forward since the . Political ideologies and orientations have their ups and downs. abruptly turning rightwards for geopolitical and other reasons in Southern Europe. politics and philos­ ophy has been broken in all likelihood. the advances of social science and historical scholarship may look modest. irremediably. together with the social restructuring of capitalist societies. esp ecially in parts of Latin Europe. Marxist philosophy. This pulled the carpet from under Marxism as a social science. But the under­ development of Marxist political theory. Where the electoral system allows its expression. philosophy managed b etter. The Marxist triangle of social science. socialist society. even if there was little in it of specifically Marxist intent. have disappeared. Under non-repressive conditions. This is not to say that socialist politics. already crushed under the militarist boot in Latin America. abandoned or fatally under­ mined in Communist Eurasia.AFTER DIALE C T I C S 1 19 kept the Marxist triangle together. but it could grow. Perhaps because it was immune to empirical disproof. But socialist politics disintegrated in the course of the 1 980s: b o gged down and driven to surrender in France. and postsocialism may soon be overshadowed by some new socialism. makes it unlikely that an ascendant socialist politics would be very Marxist. The zenith of the industrial working class has passed.1 9 9 0s cohorts of committed socialist s cholars. premised on claims for a different.

What might be the contribution from an analytical p ersp ective of historiography and empirical sociology? Obviously. which usually implies a respect for etymological meaning and an abstention from 3. Paris: Galilee. bent over their predecessors. are habitually. it seems most likely that Marx will be rediscovered many times over in the future. novel interpretations will b e made and new insights found though conducive t o little ism-ish identification . Aristotle and Confucius is an open question. but the possibility cannot be ruled out. . While p o stmodernism derived from the arts and from cultural philosophy. rather than o ccasionally. Challenge of Postmodernism Left and Marxist social theory must also be situated within the broader cultural framework of modernity within which it was first articulated. 3 The history of philosophy tends ever to generate new techniques of reading. as we have previously noted. 1 993. Spectres de Marx. But the most fruitful definitions of concepts taken from general language tend to be the least arbitrary and idiosyncratic ones. 1 63 . it has also claimed to sp eak about society. A ghost never dies. then. about culture in an anthropological sense and about history and the current historical situation of humankind . as Derrida said. and by whose vicissitudes it will inevitably be affected. Yet. Philosophers. on the other hand.120 FRO M MARXI S M T O P O S T MARXI SM? age of Das Kapital. J. there is no single correct definition of moder­ nity and the modern. Whether Marx will achieve the 2. There is. an area of encounter and contest with contemporary historiography and social science. Derrida.5 00year longevity of Plato. Just such a framework appeared around 1 9 80 in the challenge of postmodernism. since each generation of social s cientists tends to find fresh sources of inspiration among the classics of social thought.

as it was phrased in the old GDR and in post-independence Ghana. Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne. . otherwise easily neglected. Habermas. 6 Modernity directs attention to important semantic shifts. the traditional. Koselleck. Modem man/woman. 4. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. 1 979. Take the word 'revolution'.AFTER D IALECTICS 121 loading the definition with a priori connotations. V ergangene Zukunft. Modernity should thus be seen as a temporal orientation o nly.the old. or. Alexander. 3 1 4ff. it is more useful to deploy it solely as a temporal signifier. back­ wards never' . for example. civilization have a direction: 'forward'. novel horizon. 4 Rather than trivializing the concept of modernity by attempting to translate it into a set of concrete institutions. Modernization was a particular sociocultural theory of historical evolution. looking away from capitalism. Neo'. 5 . 'Forward ever. extra-economic connotations . See R. but for its methodological nationalism and its rosy idealist evolutionism. Anti. A cultural history of. Post. Berliner Moderne is hardly synonymous with a history of capitalism in Berlin. or into a particular conception of rationality or agency so that it can more easily be philosophically targeted. J. 1 9 85. whether of capitalism or p olitics. the passe and looking into the future as a reachable. Nor should social modernism be equated with the postwar social theory of 'modernization'. say. 'rolling back'. attacked by Wallerstein and others not from an 'antimodem' position. A Singular Modernity. colonialism and 'the development of underdevelopment'. As a premodern concept it p ointed back­ wards. F . See J. New Left Review 1 : 2 1 0. 'Modem. as Jeffrey Alexander proposed some years ago. and not necessarily o f illegitimate interest. 14 15. or to recurrent cyclical motions. Suhrkamp. Frankfurt. 2 1 5 . March-April 2005 . exploitation. Moder­ nity is a culture claiming to be modem. Jameson. in the sense of turning its back on the past . What would be the use of modernity the German Aloderne in this sense? Why not follow Jameson's advice of 'substituting capitalism for modernity'?5 Modernity is useful to many because of its broader. in order to allow it to retain its analytical edge . society. 6 .

progres­ sive and reactionary. and this was crucial. the very core of Marxian thought. See M. with its external premodern Others both the corrupt country of origin and the local natives. Only after 1 7 8 9 did 'revolution ' become a door to the future. invoking the term again and again in The Communist Mani­ festo and Capital. Marx and Marxism were quite modem in this sense. a time concept of modernity is also a way of grasping the significance of postmodernity. we have entered a postmodern world. London: Verso. Finally. another 're-' term : 'reform' . pioneered by Japan. the New World path of settlement. It affirmed the progressive nature of capitalism. as did. As a historical concept. the traumatic road of colonial conquest and anticolonial nationalism. Insofar as 'forward' and 'backward'. in which the main entry refers to clocks and clock-making . a little later. even of capitalist imperialist rule (in ways 7. or a loss of belief in. as a questioning of. it was a dialectical conception of modernity. as Marx put it in his preface to the first edition of volume one . consequences. the future narratives of the modem. but at the same time attacked as exploitative and alienating. if not unalterable. 1 9 8 3 . The modernity of capitalism and of the bourgeoisie were hailed.1 22 F R O M MARXI SM TO P O ST MARXI SM? as in Copernicus's On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres or the French Enlightenment Encyclopedie. 7 However. four major roads to and through modernity may be discerned: the European one of civil war and internal conflict. All That Is Solid Melts Into Air. seen as inherently contradictory. in a sense. and the 'reactive modernization ' from above. the 'ultimate purpose of which' was to 'disclose the economic law of motion of modem society'. B ennan. . This dialectical understanding of modernity was. As was explored in the preceding chapter. have lost all meaning. of the b ourgeoisie. with their enduring. modernity also requires us to distinguish and analyze different routes towards it.

B But if Marxism in this core cultural sense (as well as the recent challenges to it) can only be understood in terms of its dialectical conception of modernity. imitative Let US take the points in Table 3 . superstition. Is witchcraft a major source of sickness and death? Is penetration of a virgin a cure for AIDS? S econdly. it should be recognized that it remains at the centre of such important controversies as. individual enlightenment Emancipation/liberation: collective Growth. Firstly. development Survival of the fittest Creative vitality Conditions of nolless competition Rule bound. stagnation THE FUTURE: Emancipation: rational. 1 in order. progress. subservience Oppression. unfreedom Poverty. disease. The most influential of these might be summarized as follows : Table 3 . 1 : Master Na rratives of Modernity THE PAST: Ignorance. the concept of collective emancipation or 8. this latter also needs to be located in contradistinction to other important 'master narratives of modernity'. prevent and cope with HIV/AIDS and other lethal diseases in Mrica and other parts of the world. if the Kantian notion of rational enlightenment has lost much of its appeal by the early twenty-first century. See Chapter 2 in this volume. . how to explain. In broad cultural-historical terms. Marxism may be seen as Her Maj esty Modernity's Loyal Oppo siti o n . for example. while at the same time not only denouncing them but also organizing the resistance against them .AFTER D I ALE CTICS 1 23 that many would now find insensitive to the victims of colonialism) .

gays and lesbians and. what distinguished Marx and Marxism from other strands of modernist thought was a fo cus on the contradictory character of the modern era. . But it has not disappeared. Fourthly. It re-emerges today in militant liberal-democratic discourse. other than older modernists . women. Thirdly. Fifth and finally.1 24 FROM MARX I S M TO P O S T MARXI SM? liberation has undergone a remarkable mutation over the p ast few decades as p art of the process of postmoderniza­ tion.C ommunist. itself a form of right-wing modernism. The modern conflict between the avant-garde and tradition has been replaced by a succession of fashions. the collapse of rule-bound artistic academicism has left artistic modernism without a target. its earlier socialist horizons of emancipation from capitalism . It has largely lost its former social referents the working class. where it now refers to liberation from a select group of 'anti-Western' authoritarian regimes : C ommunist. including the reigning neoliberalism . after their postfascist quarantine . emancipation has acquired a new social urgency as indigenous p opulations raise demands for a more equitable division of resources . the colonized. In Indo-Latin America. Against the linear liberal proj ects of individualization. post. However. Marx harboured all the above modern p erspectives. According to this view. on the other hand. only the fittest and the meanest will deserve to survive the free-for-all of global competition. or Muslim and Arab . and on these contradictions and conflicts as its most important dynamics . above all. horizons of growth and progress still govern the exp ectations of all modern economies. erstwhile ' constructions of socialism ' as well as every variety o f capitalism. although collective human emancipation and economic development were most central to him . Growth and progress also constitute the continuing story that s cience tells of itself and form the creed of all contemporary academic authorities. the survival of the fittest and social Darwinism have been given a new impetus by neoliberal globalization.

Postmodernism attacked all the grand narratives of modernity.imperi alist revolts rationalization and growth a s the bases for 'modernization'. the anticolonial liberation movements and 'actually existing' socialist countries. The lab our movement in capitalist countries. it has scarcely been dented by postmodernist arguments . But all its sociopolitical advances. alienation Exploitation and d i stri butive pola rization Outgrowing existin g relations of production Capita l i st exte nsion G l obal ization Proletarian u n ification and stre n gthen i n g Anti. of a modernist proj ect of emancipation. were against the modernist Left . By the 1 9 9 0s. according t o Marx. as noted. Marxism set a dialectical p erspective of emancipation explicitly affirming that capitalism and colonialism were forms of exploitation as well as of p rogress. while usually ignoring the dialectical concep­ tio n of Marxism . . the socialist-feminist movement. At the same time. however. The Marxist p erspective also differed from the Weberian notion of the rationalization of markets and bureaucracies as an 'iron cage ' . right-wing modernism defeated almo s t all its traditionalist conservative rivals. as c an be seen in Table 3 . were harbingers of radical change . 2 : M arxi a n Dialectics of Capitalist M odern ity ADVA N C E : I n d ividualizatio n Productivity development CONTRA D I CT I ON/CO N F L I CT: Atom ization . were seen as carriers of a different future. all its conquests of ideological space.AFTER D IALECTI C S 125 Table 3 . that belief in the future had been fundamentally shattered . The contradiction s o f mo dernity. what­ ever their faults. 2 . m o st successfully in Thatcher's Britain for neoliberalism may be seen as a high modernism of the Right and.

its basic blindness to what 1 0 . The Right Nation. its critical edge is blunted by two feature s: first. Risk Society. . Ulrich Beck has gone so far as to proclaim a 'second modernity' . C ambridge : Polity. Oxford: WileyBlackwell. did provide a possible b asis for a new conception of modernity: 'Risk may be def med as a systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernization itself. However. U. Callinicos.1 26 FROM MARXISM TO P O ST MARX I S M? The reinvigorated American Right is a vivid illustration of the current entanglements of modernity. ' 1 2 This is an important societal conceptualization a key concept of economics risk being that also found a political resonance in environmental circles . 346ff. brew modernism and religious fundamentalism . Lash. But the sociopolitical challenge across the whole Left Right spectrum has scarcely begun to be confronted. l o worldly success by mainstream Christian evangelicalism of course. See for example J. . 1 1 In a well-funded research and publishing programe at the German publisher Suhrkamp Verlag. London: Sage Publications. italics omitted. London. The Illusions of Postmodernism. while the Left's commitment to so cial revolution has been silenced or muted. are politically reflexive . 1 989. 1 994. U . Against Postmodernism. which it sees as itself. 1 99 6 . Modernity has not been abandoned a s an intellectual position. Reflexive Modernization. 9 While the American Right recruits its storm troopers from Christian fundamentalists. In fact. 2004. belonging to facilitates. Habermas. Giddens and S . J. 1 2. the American Right is trumpeting ' regime change ' . 1992. Eagleton. I I . A. A . ) S ignificantly. its hegemonic tenor arises from its (The theological this p owerful celebration of of secular 'willingne s s to embrace the future ' . first published in 1 986 and a major theoretical work of recent decades. Beck. Cambridge: Palgrave Macmillan. P enguin. Beck's Germany in Risk Society. It has been defended by theorists both from the 'Third Way' and from the old Far Left. Beck. Wooldridge. Risks . . Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne. T. Micklethwait and A. 2 1 .

. and as a form of myopia towards the world beyond the North Atlantic . the 'release ' of individuals from time-frame open to charges of arbitrary selectivity. which has not b een over­ come . but p olitically triumphant well before its Second. The future as novelty. modernity industrial institutions unreliability. 1 3 . Liquid Modernity. the return to and the re-establishment of all kinds of old things' . Cambridge: Polity. as a symptom of the disorientation of the (ex-) Left. but it should be subjected to a symptomatic rather than a literal reading. Z . has turned to p eddling 'liquid modernity' instead of postmo dernity. disappe ared behind a smokescreen. the aforementioned rise of right-wing liberal modernism initially less strong in Germany than in the Anglo-Saxon world. as a questioning of non-dialectical conceptions of modernity. as one of its former publicists put it in a second-edition epilogue . postmodernism may even be ' over'. A Singular Modernity. 1 4.AFTER D IALE C T I C S 1 27 was happening rightwards of the centre on the p olitical s c ale. At the fre nzied p ace of aesthetic discourse. The Politics of Postmodernism. as difference. empirical enthronement in the most recent Grosse Koalition. 1 3 In 2002 Jameson noted the end of the p o s t­ modern 'general agreement'. Bauman. Postmodernist discourse has something important to teach. l ater 'second'. the two decades of postmodernism. and 'in the last few years . 1 4 B auman. 1 5 Nevertheless. the 1 9 8 0 s and 1 9 9 0s. . the specific institutional content of Beck's 'new'. The postmodernization of the world remains very uneven. . 1 . 1 66 . Hutcheon. or b oth . in advanced age still tuned to the shift­ ing sirens of the times. itself a symptom of the politico-economic times. 1 5 . produced a rift in cultural so cial thought. full employment lays his perceptive grasp of a changed and the nation-state. 2000. the demise of class. Jameson.

we may say that modernity turned at the end of the twentieth century. . or the coloniality of anticolonial nationalism. in a country like Bolivia. often 'tribal ' p e ople and ecologists against modern dam and other developmentalist proj ects. in diluted forms. development and progres s have become significant side-currents in the centres of capitalism enlightened lib eralism often incorporated. They Just Want to Live ' . President Evo Morale s and Vice-President A lvaro Garcia Linera. if usually in a somewhat uneasy alliance with modernist nationalism. but in s everal directions : to the right. blazing a new trail for Marxism in the Andes. evidenced in the country's long p ost-independence history of racist politics and proj ects of economic and cultural 'modernization' that left the indige­ nous maj ority out in the cold and poverty of the altiplano. with a respectful bow to the Peruvian social theorist Anibal Quij ano. However. the attack on devel­ opmentalism appears less convincing. a main-stage banner proclaimed 'People D o Not Want D evelopment. however. modernist nor p o st­ modernist. it is a b old attempt at clearing a path to an alternative modernity.1 28 FROM MARXISM TO P O ST MARXI S M ? While ecological and feminist critique s of modernist visions of growth. exemplified in the coop eration between Gandhi and Nehru. the coloniality of modernity is more palpable. This made some sense to the many recent Indian social movements pitting local. the coloniality of modernity. into postmodernism. This has always been an important theme in Indian thought. into the mainstream of Third World critiques of what we may call. Intellectually as well as politic ally impressive. At the Mumb ai S ocial Forum in 2004. is neither traditionalist. The platform of the current elected leadership of B olivia. and into the oretical and political searches for new modernities . have hardly penetrat e d the walls of North Atlantic s ocial theory. S e en alongside the terrible Mumbai slums. In summary.

86. p roviding a comprehensive explanatory frame­ work for a set of s o cial phenomena. on the other. centred o n the present. there remains a further preliminary question t o be asked before we can c onsider the current shap e of the field: What is so cial theory? The definition deployed here s e e s social theory a s strung between two ambitious poles: o n the one hand. Reponses. Paris: Seuil. In terms of the s e c ond pole. Sinnstijtung. It should be underlined at the outset that what follows is by no means a general survey of the intellectual produc­ tion of the c ontemporary Left. 1 992. and thereby some of the most gifted minds of the international Left . for instance. 1 6 Attention will also b e given to that kind of theory in scientific acti on. but the guiding compass of empirical investigation . In other words.AFTER DIALECTI C S 129 Definitions Now that the broader politic al and cultural-intellectual parameters of recent social theorizing have be�n laid out. Bourdieu. philosophy and politics. and the former's far greater resilience to empirical developments. it should perhaps be reit­ erated that theory is not a separate field or a subdiscipline. mean that the contri­ butions of p olitical and so cial philo sophy are of particul ar imp ortance to an ove rvie w of recent s o cial the o ry emanating from the Left. the more important the constitution of meaning. a form of research-free armchair thinking. In terms of the 'sense-making' pole. the later salience of philosophy in the classical Marxist triangle of social science. .and to the more wide-ranging. this is an ecumenical conception of 'theory' that applies both to explanation . Another fruitful area for the Left during re cent years has 16. 1 3 6ff. It was in these terms that Pierre B ourdieu. 'making sense of' such phenomena . must exclude the work of historians and scholars of intellectual history. See P. A strict definition of social theory. criticized current Anglo­ S axon conceptions of social theory. that of empirical social science.

The yearbook Socialist Register has been a central focus in this field. which fall outside the scope of this article. ' MODES O F THE LEFT S RESPONSE Europe 's Theological Turn The most surprising theoretical development in left-wing social philosophy in the past decade has been a new 1 7 . summed up his own field by saying that 'in medieval economic and social history. I have opted for a regional road-map. mainly restricted to Western Europe and North America . the fact that in raphy: Alive. Peter Gowan. this involves little social theorizing as such Y However. as the academy's president put it in his introduction. Leo Panitch. Aijaz Ahmad. but again. and then attempt to locat e some of the general shifts in their the o retico­ p olitical positionings . Bob S utcliffe and Ellen Wood. Noam Chomsky. David Harvey. Colin Leys. The answer that clearly resonated was 'Alive ! '. publishing work by. S ince restrictions of space permit neither lengthy exp ositions nor elaborate analyses of these variations. the great Oxford medieval historian Chris Wickham. The editor of the ensuing volume. among others. with the qualification that what was alive was Marx 'the diagnostician' and not the 'prophet'.1 30 F R O M MARXI S M TO P O S T MARXI SM? been that of geopolitics and interstate relations. Disregarding cases o f actual flight from radical thought. far from Marxist ideas being dead or moribund. John Saul. Sam Gindin. 2004 the British Academy significant organized an official conference titled 'Marxist Historiog­ Dead or Moribund? ' was a theoretical event. I will first track new thematics in the responses of left-of-centre scholars. they are everywhere ' . The challenges t o left-wing social thought p osed by postmodernity and by the neomodern Right have been met in very different ways . yielding important new work on imp erialism and imp erial power. .

L e feu sacre. 200 3 . Debray. Debray. 1 9 8 3 . beyond Debray writes: 'Three things have occupied my life [as a thinker] . which was a religious commitment to social justice led by ordained Catholic priests. London: Verso. to religion or to a religious figure as when Regis Le feu sacre (2003) and God: An Itinerary ( 2 0 0 4 ) . a work he read while imprisoned as a revolu­ tionary in the small B olivian town of C amiri. In contrast to the Latin American theology of liberation. had first developed these themes in his Critique of Political Reason ( 1 9 8 1 1 1 9 8 3 ) . R. displacement and organization'. . Paris: Fayard. poetic and personal relationship to Saint Paul. has turne d his literary talents to original scholarly investigations into the structures of the Judeo-Christian narratives. called upon to succeed the one installed by Lenin ' . ' 1 8 Rather. and the re-lit fires of religion around the world. God: A n Itinerary. however. art and religion. although some fonner left-wing intellectuals have come to affirm an ethnoreligious Jewishness. 20 left militant as well as a philosopher. this has not meant an embrace of religious faith. considera­ tions on the religious unconscious in politic s and political forms of the sacred. 1 9 . refers to Alain B adiou. the European form is a theology of discourse. to whom he turns in his ' search for a new militant figure . in belief.AFTER DIALE C T I C S 131 the olo gical turn. Critique of Political Reason. and there is often an indication of a particular personal relation. the religious 'procedures of memorization. 1 9 Debray. . where Christian texts were the only uncensored reading matter. . London: Verso. R. 20. the theological turn has manifested itself in a scholarly interest in religion and in a use of religious examples in philosophical and political argumentation. Debray. Badiou ' s 1 8 . a former Maoist and still an active far­ an old. 2004. R. The principal work here is that of Debray who. In the main. war. he began his adult religious studies with a biography of the eleventh-century Pope Gregory. in fact.

accepting claims that his conception of language and communicative action 'nourishes itself from the legacy of Christianity' . '26 When the Soviet Union was crumbling. M. 1 60 . for his part. as 'perhap s the first m odern critique of ideology ' . Cambridge: Polity. Ibid. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri hold out as an illumination of 'the future life of communist militancy' the milder religious example of Saint Francis of Assisi .. coexist abstemiously with the former. J . . 2 5 . . 22 Meanwhile. 22 .1 32 FROM MARXI S M TO P O ST MARXI S M ? apostle supposedly laid the 'foundations of universalism' in his letter to the Galatian s : 'There is neither Jew nor Greek. Jiirgen Habermas has also paid his respects to religion: 'As long as no better words for what religion can s ay are found in the medium of rational discourse. . Badiou. the German 2 1 . Religion and RationaliIy. Empire. 2 4 . Habermas. . The ruthle s sness of Lenin and of radical religious fundamentalists is thus presented as admirable. 2 6 . '24 Haberm a s has gone even further. it [commu­ nicative reason] will . 9 . 2 3 . Galatians 3: 28. neither male nor female . Hardt and A . MarxlLenin and Freud/Lacan. . 2 4 . 4 1 3 . 2000. 'the basic concepts of philosophical ethics . 2 002. Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism. 1 6 1 . Daly. Cambridge. he writes. Negri. MA: MIT Press. S. The Book of Job has also become a topic of fascination for Z izek. MA : Harvard University Press. Conversations with Zitek. in Empire. 1 62. neither supporting it nor comb ating it. But his main point in On Belief (200 1 ) is to argue the authentic ethical value of political rather than religious unconditional belief making no compromises and including what Kierkegaard called 'the religious suspension of ethics ' . ZiZek and G . Stanford: Stanford University Press. 23 In his own sober way. 2 5 'For me'. '2 1 Slavoj Z izek. 2003. 2004. neither slave nor free. fail to c apture all the intuitions that have already found a more nuanced expression in the language of the Bible . C ambridge. Ibid. elaborates the parallels b etween Paul and Lenin into three pairs of guides : Christ/Paul. . quoted in A.

what become important are roots. who with typical stylistic acrobatics cast the church father together with the early twentieth-century American Wobblies ( 'From this p erspective the IW is the great Augustinian project of modern times ') . a maturation in a non­ secular milieu. for which p ostmo dernity seems to serve as a good label. and his introduction to The Gospels in Verso's Revolutions ! Series. 27 The same work is also referred to by H ardt and Negri. Haug. in resonanc e with Latin American liberation theology. 30. has returned to the left-wing Catholicism of his youth. writing on Jesus C hrist and the Gospels in the light of the question of social revolution. F. mainly Christian. 29 This remarkable theological genre among a section of the European intellectual Left has also rec e ntly been bolstered by Roland Boer's wide-ranging treatment of 'biblical Marxists' and Marxist grapplings with religion. M. 29. a dedicate d admirer of Gorbachev's attempts at reform. sat down to read Augustine's City of God in its original Greek that is to say. Criticism of Heaven: On Marxism and Theology. As an alternative future disappears or dims. Hardt and A. and a middle age at a safe distance from any demands of faith make Christianity a natural historical experience to look at. may be taken as an indicator of a broad cultural mood. ' . Most recently. A classical European education. 207. from Gramsci and Bloch to Eagleton and Z ize k . Terry Eagleton. a tough and unrep entant Marxist literary and cultural theorist. London Review of Books. defending C hristianity against atheistic onslaught and. W. a great theologian's reflections on the fall of Rome . . 1 9 October 2006. Ne gri . Empire. 30 27. R. Mispunching'.AFTER DIALE C T I C S 133 Marxist philosopher Wolfgang Fritz Haug.28 This widespread fascination with religion and religious examples. experience and background. 2007 . personal communication. 28. Boer. Leiden: BRILL. See his Lunging Flailing.

the most striking of which is a new utopianism. While waiting for new forms of political agency to emerge. Jameson emphasizes. although the African­ American Left still has p owerful political preachers such as Jesse Jackson and the o logi an-intellectu als such as C ornel West. 33 Jameson is only the most recent exponent in a spectac­ ular arc of creative American utopianism. 3 3 . a variety of American radical thinkers have turned their critical intelligence and creative energies towards utopia. and the second is systemic and apocalyptic. analyzing utopian fantasy and utopian writing with his characteristic critical brilliance. 347. Cornel West: A Critical Reader. 'in that it forces us precisely to concentrate on the [utopian] break itself: a meditation on the impo ssible. eruditio n and galac­ tic range of associations. Yet among some of its best minds. 3 1 While European leftists are referring to Christian icons of the past. It has two remarkable currents. 'there is no alternative to Utopia'. expectations for the future have survived both the postmodernist onslaught and the collapse of C o mmunism. 200 1 . xii. Ibid. on the unrealizable in its own right'. and have asserted themselves in a new futurism. self-characterized as a 'Chekhovian Christian' . Archaeologies of the Future. Oxford: Blackwell.. 3 2 . Yancy.. In the last decade. G. its 3 1 .1 34 FROM MARXI SM TO P O ST MARXISM? American Futurism In the much more religious US. ed. 232. as Fredric Jameson has put it in a masterly contribution to the field. London: Verso 2006. of which he stands at one pole. F. focusing on the utopian 'desire'. Jameson. There the Bible has been more or less monopolized by the Right. 3 2 Utopia serves a vital political function today. their American comrades are peering ever further into the future short-term prospects never having looked very rosy for the North American Left. no comparable Left theo­ logical turn is visible . .

1 99 5 . London: Verso. which will be published as Envisioning Real Utopias. Thus John Roemer. Wright. Rogers. Recasting Egalitarianism: New Rules o Accountability and Equity in Markets. London: Verso. Both are fascinated by utopian imagination. above all science fiction. Wright. Associations and Democracy. the s ociol ogist Erik Olin Wright launched the Real Utopias Pro j e ct in the early 1 9 9 0s. eds. ]. Roemer. O . ' Compass Points'. London: Verso. A. Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance. often remarkably modest. The economic sections are classically utopian in their abstract evocations of a good society and general abstention from strategic thinking about how existing society can be changed. At the same time. 34 Despite its impressive scale. whil e Wright himself is writing an ambitious strategic conclusion that proposes an understanding of socialism 'as an alternative to capitalism. a large-scale collective enterprise of radical drawing-board social engineering and formalized norma­ tive economics a subgenre different from Jameson's but not as much as their contrasting styles and references may suggest. Redesigning Distribution. as a process of social empowerment over state and economy'. E. ft . on the o ther hand. eds. particularly to northwestern Europeans. the Real Utopias Project has produced five books. New Le Review 4 1 . and defiant stand against the headwind of the times. A. 1 996. But they are. S. O . Cohen and J. presents an ingen­ ious scheme for coupon socialism. B. the science fiction . ed. Sept Oct 2006. perhaps overmodest. Gintis. Bowles and H. other as a writer So far. a market society where property rights are invested in the coupon-holding adult citizenry. for instance. he finds the already existing 34. 2006. Ackerman. in their targets. eds. one as an analyst of science and promoter of (social) fiction. 2003.AFTER D IALECTI C S 135 'disruption' of the future and its literary forms. States and Communities. Van Parijs. London: Verso. the design of the project may l o o k somewhat odd. Fung and E. . J. Equal Shares: Making Market Socialism W ork. In quite another register. Alstott and P. f 1 998. eds. London: Verso.

136 FROM MARXI S M TO P O ST MARXI S M ? Nordic redistribution by taxation too radical to emulate : 'I doubt that large heterogeneous societies will. a critical voice (also American) concludes the following from a comparison with actually existing Sweden: 'The fully developed welfare state d e s e rves priority over B a sic Income b e caus e it acc omplishes what B asic Income does not: it guarantees that certain specific human needs will be met. in Equal Shares. J.. Bergmann. presents some interesting utopian p rinciples for an 'insurgent architect at work'. 1 9 3-4. devoted to b asic income schemes and to 'stake­ holder grants ' for all young adults.38 However. Roemer. D. 'A Swedish Style Welfare State o r Basic Income? Which Should Have Priority?'. B . Whil e US-centre d globalization may be in 'disarray'. '36 As utopianism. discrep ancies between ideological promises and economic delivery. ' 35 In another volume. the political aspect of the proj ect is more innovative in that it presents and discusses. in Ackerman et ai. 37 The geographer and urban historian David Harvey has attempted a bold 'dialectical utopianism' in Spaces of Hope (2 0 0 0) . vote to redistribute income as much through the taxation system as the Nordic s o cieties have . eds. Deepening Democracy. 14 1 . or ' diffi­ culti e s ' created by market externalities. Roemer. 'A Future for Socialism'. Redesigning Distribution. in our life­ time. 2000. hardly constitute contradictions in the Marxian sense of structural inter­ dependencies-cum-incompatibilities. ranging from Chicago to West Bengal . Harvey. ed. 3 7 . Its proposed transcendence of the nine­ te enth-century gap between Marxian historical dialectics and utopian constructions may not convince everybody who is in principle symp atheti c . Harvey. theoretical 'correctn e s s ' is a minor point here . who still proudly teaches Marx's Capital. J. four actually existing experiments with local p articipatory democracy. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Spaces of Hope. . 3 5 . 3 6 . theoretically and in different voices. 3 7 . eds. 3 8 . See Fung and Wright.

that the world was in fact passing from c apitalism to something else. Wallerstein. then also at Binghamton. in S. Ernst Bloch's three-volume Principle of Hope. In the 1 990s. Hopkins and I. and the zones op en to human creativity' . 40 Giovanni Arrighi. New York: The New Press. one should also take note of the 2000 issue of the annual Socialist Register on 'Necessary and Unnec­ essary Utopias' and the captivating twentieth century history of East West utopias and their passing. The Long T wentieth Century. 1 99 6 . G. Arighi saw three possible outcomes to the 'ongoing crisi s of the regime of accumulation'41 firstly. that the 'old centres' terminate capitalist history 'through the formation of a truly 39. A collective research project had already summarized the character of the times in the same terms: see The Age of Transition: Trajectory of the W orld System 1 94�2025. London 2000.39 Once. the message came from Binghamton. From the rich North American fascination with utopias. In the current context. the character of which was still uncertain.AFTER D IALECTICS 137 and appends a B ellamy-inspired utopian walk through Baltimore in 2020. the capitalist world economy. 'We are living in the transition from our existing world­ system. Immanuel Wallerstein proclaimed in Utopistics. 355 6. the constraints on what they can be. Wallerstein. Central European Marxism produced a singular masterpiece on utopian thinking and 'anticipatory consciousness'. T. however. New York. eds. MA: MIT Press. a work which defined its aim as 'the sober. when most people discussing 'transitions' were thinking about the Eastern European shift from social­ ism to capitalism. . London: Verso. rational and realistic evaluation of human social systems. NJ: Zed Books. Arrighi. Atlantic Heights. ran a parallel research project that reached similar if yet more dramatic conclusions. 1 998. 1 9 94. Buck Morss's Dreamworld and Catastrophe. 1 2. 35. Cambridge. From his reading of world-system history. 4 1 . to another world-system or systems'. in its darkest hours. Utopistics. 40. on which he self-critically reflects. I. published in Germany in 1 9 54 but written much earlier. the genre has not been flourishing on the eastern side of the Atlantic.

the current financial expansion of capitalism is an expression of. As in the past. a profound crisis of existing world-system hegemony. in this view. 446. that a new guard a rise s but lacks the necessary ' stateand war-maki ng capabilities '. after five hundred years. secondly. 5 9 . there are few places left to run to ' . whereupon ' capitalism (the "anti-market") would wither away'. and thirdly. Luxemburg. . W. has been 'the relocation of given sectors to other zones of the world economy that are on the average lower-wage areas ' . Capitalism is threatened from two side s : by a long-term strengthening of the p ower of workers ization through global deruralization and proletarian­ and by the weakening of states and of their discrediting and delegitimation of state capacity for capital protection and social mediation. The A ccumulation of Capital. the US. Wallerstein. R . a result of the reformism (what Wallerstein calls 'lib eralism ') . 43. the principal mechanism by which capitalists have been able to limit the ' political pressure' caused by the secular historical trend towards increasing working-class strength. According to Wallerstein. Luxemburg was 42. The Decline of American Power: the US in a Chaotic World. 228. '43 At the time. has been in irreversible decline since the 1 9 7 0 s . 4 2 Wallerstein is here giving a new twist to Rosa Luxemburg's capitalism: 1 9 1 3 argument about the breakdown of ' C apitalism needs non-capitalist s ocial organizations as the setting for its development. Norton.138 F R O M MARXIS M T O POST MARXISM? global world emp ire '. and vehicle for. 1 9 63. But 'the problem today is that. London: W. 1. [but] it proceeds by assimilating the very conditions which alone can ensure its existence. A crucial element of the world-system. The current incumbent. is the role of its economic­ cum-political hegemon. through democratiza­ tion and other channels. that ' capitalist history come to an end' by being burnt up 'in the horrors (or glory) of escalating violence' . 2003. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

but hardly the most convincing. New Left Review 20. Brenner and D. March April 2003. The overpowering historical importance of a relay race of capi­ talist hegemons continues to be assumed from Fernand Braudel rather than unassailably argued to an audience of the not (yet) convinced. . New Le Review 40. even on the Left. Chaos and Governance in the Modern World System ( 1 999). and 'The Curve of American Power'. None o f those theses has attracted any wide agreement. New Le Review 32. New Left Review 22. 'Hegemony Unravelling 1 '.45 In a comparable vein. 'Hegemony Unravelling 2 '. The most tangible argument. For example see I . Later formulations by Arrighi have been much less apo calyptic. Harvey in 'Tracking Global Turbulence'. The final step from the capitalist world-system to geop olitics and 44. 'Entering Global Anarchy'. May-June 200 5 . See G. is the proposition that a scaling down of US power after its peaking meant a systemic crisis of world capitalism. the Egyptian economist S amir Amin 's recent Beyond US Hegemony (2006) is a sober global analysi s with a pragmatic left-wing geo strategic programme . and a post-American hegemony has become more plausible with the continuing rise of China and the emergence of India as a majo r player. Wallerstein. 44 Wallerstein sticks to his long-term-transition p erspective. March April 2005. 4 5 . in spite of the general intellectual respe ct for their authors . but his analytical light seems to have become concentrated on the global geopolitics of the next twenty years rather than on systemic extinction. New ft Left Review 33. July August 2003. The comparative work on hegemonic transitions by Giovanni Arrighi and Beverly Silver.AFTER DIALECTI C S 139 thinking about non-capitalist areas a s necessary exp o rt markets and as providers of cheap foodstuffs . ft July August 2006. Arighi's discussion of R. while not predicting any necessary termination of capitalism . concludes with a set of plausible propositions about the likely implications of a new shift.

Frank. recent Bourdieu-inspired studies of cultural practices and 4 6 . G. and pointing to the impor­ tance of competing interpretations and dis cursive p olitics. throughout his life a scholarly heretic and iconoclast: 'best forget about it [capitalism] and get on with our inquiry into the reality of universal history ' . 1 9 98. A. standard Anglo-Saxon inequality discourse. . Class persists. An n Arbor. 3 5 2 . but also because the develop­ ments of p o st-industrial demography have dislo dged it from its previous theoretical or geographical centrality. and with its philosophical right to existence contested. was originally a a way to sharp en the focus of class analysis . Eley and K. The Future of Class in History. through the latter's own defeat in the cap italist class struggle . as part of the indispensable triad of class. Berkeley: University of California Press. ReOrient. 46 Displacements of Class Class. gender and race.1 40 FROM MARXI S M TO P O ST MARX I S M ? geo-economics has been taken only by the late Andre Gunder Frank. G . studies of social mobility. 1 94 . formerly among the most imp ortant concepts in Left discourse. MI: University of Michigan Press. as Edward Thompson held in his marvellous and for two decades immensely influential The Making of the English Working Class ( 1 9 63) . as Gareth Stedman Jones and Joan S cott did in the 1 9 8 0s. Problematizing class identity as class action deriving directly from exp e­ rience. but without a secure abode. 47. ironic ally. two prominent historians who particip ated in the ' cultural tum' of social history have found it necessary to plead with their colleagues for an acknowledgement of 'the persistence of class as a predis­ cursive or nondiscursive formation' Y Class remains a central descriptive category in several arenas : mainstream sociology. Nield. But twenty years later. has been displaced in recent years in part. 2007.

Its contact with the extramural world is through selected illustrations only. ZiZek. The social appearance of class has bec o me almost unrecognizable after being dropped into the acid of pure p olitics. and S. 'Structure. But most of the links between this descriptive mainstream. Thus. whether in terms of 'people' or 'class'. eds. and the Political'. they are all. discursively mobilized. On the other hand. beyond the Streit der Fakultaen there is much in Laclau's work that rewards efforts to penetrate the sometimes dense veil of jargon. which brings together his old interest in Peronism and Latin American populism. ZiZek. Hegemony. and that the success or failure of this mobilization is contingent.48 'Antagonism' becomes the new central concept. History. Universality. as a philosophy it fails to provide any tools for analyzing actual processes of social mobilization or explaining different outcomes. have been snapped.AFTER D IALE CTICS 141 consumption (Mike S avage e t al . Laclau's p olitical philosophy has been further developed in his recent On Populist Reason (2005). as in the political philosophy of discursive hegemony developed in Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe's Hegemony and Socialist Strategy ( 1 9 8 5 ) . in J. E. Laclau dismisses Slavoj Z izek's invocation of class and the class struggle as 'just a succession of dogmatic assertions ' . While peoples and other social forces cannot be constructed at random limits which a philosophy of social 'logics ' has difficulties coping with it is important to bear in mind that. for example. as Laclau points out. . See E. arguably the most intellectually powerful contribution of po st­ Marxist p olitical theory. his post-Marxist political philosophy and a newer immersion in Lacan. Ladau and S. on the other. ) . classes included. Contingency. on the one hand. ' C lass Struggle or Postmodemism? Yes Please'. Buder. Ladau. London: Verso 2000. A heavy read at times. that social change brought about by resistance or insurrection 4 8 . and collective s ocial action and radical theorizing of such action.

A maj or journal on public health. L. 242. did not answer its own question in any clearly post-Marxist mode. 1 997. and that popular mobilizations of the excluded. Class is well established. K. 50. Balibar also concluded that the 'class struggle can and should be thought as one determining struc­ ture. 1 998. which have become a technically advanced but intellectually isolated subdiscipline .1 42 FRO M MARXIS M TO P O S T MARXIS M ? has an irreducible political moment of articulation and l eadership. La crainte des masses. London: Routledge. once Althusser's star pupil. pays persistent. the exploited or the underprivileged can take different forms. The Transnational Capitalist Class. Transnational Classes and International Relations. There is as yet no global class analysis corresponding to the many national class maps produced by Marxists of the 1 9 60s and 1 970s. 200 1 . Oxford: WileyBlackweU. systematic attention to class dimensions of (ill) health and mortality though the fact that its e ditor. has stayed closer to the Marxist tradition. and these earlier pictures may well be seriously challenged. republished in 1 997. Sklair. 2003 . based at Johns Hopkins. As a category of distribution. for example. While stressing the wider 'univ­ ersality of antagonism'. as a central concept of intergenerational mobility studies. covering social practices. without being the only one. 50 The reconnection of class with race 49 . gender and rac e ' . E. class retains its place in sociology. . Standard American sociological discourse on distribution and inequality always refers to ' class. was part of the anti­ Franco underground in Spain may not be irrelevant here . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. including fascist ones. Paris: GaliU:e. B alibar. Silver o n the working class. Etienne B alibar. '49 To the recent philosophy of struggle without classes corresponds the sociology of classes without struggle. Forces of Labor. Although see. b oth in alphab etical and in non­ alphab etical order. His important 1 987 essay 'From the Class Struggle to the Struggle without Classes?'. largely thanks to the analytical edge and empirical tenacity of John Goldthorpe. Vicente Navarro. and B . emphasis in the original. van der Pijl on North Atlantic class relations.

Balibar. is a theoretical advance. the People of Europe?. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2004. bo rder. Third W ave Feminism. 2004. Politics and the Other Scene. the prince the aristocracy and the higher clergy. the commoners. Princeton. S . the 'nation'.AFTER D IALE C T I C S 1 43 and nation. We. La crainte des masses. his contemporary social analysis has focused rather on the issues of nation. European class mobilization and politics and Europ ean working-class movements became models for the rest of the world. the people . NJ: Princeton University Press. London: Verso. and on the other. on one hand. class has been faring better in North America. Munford. Because of its enduring Eurocentrism. typically. E. 22 1 50. the bourgeoisie. 1 988. 2002. E. which emerged early on the European road to modernity in internal conflicts between. G. Wallerstein. the post­ modernist onslaught has largely put an end to feminist articulations of sex and gender presented in relation to class. nation. Paris: La Decouverte. class and class emancipation are no longer central concerns . 52. the Third Estate. Balibar and I. . Marxist theory has never properly acknowledged or taken into proper comparative account the fact that Marx and later socialists inherited a class discourse from the French Revolution and from the p olitical economy of the British Industrial Revolution. Europe still has significant parties claiming to represent labour. Howie and R. citizenship and Europe. 5 3 Europe provided the origins of the concept and the theory of class. In a characteristically incisive conceptual analysis. Balibar has demonstrated the curiously under­ developed position of the proletariat in Capital. 53. a recent overview of 'third-wave feminism' makes no reference to class whatsoever. and trade unions remain a substantial social force there . in terms of analysis and social theory. Gillies. Nevertheless. druse. but he has not taken it up a s a challenge.52 On the other hand. eds. 5 1 . Race. largely suspended after the generation of Lenin and Otto Bauer. but the emphasis is now very differentY Compared with 'contemp orary racism ' .

subjectively locate themselves and others within a structure of inequality? Life chances: What explains inequalities in life chances and material standards of living? Antagonistic conflicts: What social cleavages systematically shape overt conflicts? Historical variation: How should we characterize and explain the variations across history in the social organization of inequalities? Emancipation: What sorts of transformations are needed to eliminate oppression and exploitation within capitalist societies?54 • • • • • Wright then defines his own work. Approaches to Class Analysis. The question is. O . What are the principal forces maintaining. It is not. E. Nor is it. however. Wright. for instance. a recent contribution structures the issue by asking. capitalist 5 4 . In a characteristically elegant approach.1 44 FROM MARXI S M TO P O S T MARXI S M? The work of Erik Olin Wright has played a central role in securing a legitimate location for Marxist class analysis within academic sociology. If class is the answer. ed.. and that of Marxism generally. . 200 5 . what is the question? Wright discerns six types of question which will frequently have 'class' as part of their answers : • Distributional location: How are p e ople objectively located in distributions of material inequality? Subjectively salient groups: What explains how people. as primarily concerned with answering the last question. individually and collectively. What social process is crucial to the elimination of capitalist oppression and exploitation? To which the classical Marxist answer has been: class struggle . formulated in a remark­ ably oblique way. or capable of changing and ending. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. while other approaches concern themselves with the rest.

'Forget about c apitalism ' . but his major new work.rather than post-Marxist. or the global working-class overview in Socialist Register 2002. S al ient examples would be Beverly Silver's theoretically innovative Forces of Labour. Adam Smith in Beijing. relations that Smith hoped would become more equal and mutually resp e ctful with world trade. There is no discussion about whether new 'inter-civilizational relations ' would mainly be a rapprochement of capitalists. or about the prospects of a new post-Marxist slogan. more starkly capitalist character may have removed it from the fro ntie r o f intellectual curiosity. there has also been a displacement. Giovanni Arghi is less provocative. managers and professionals across continents and civilizations. of class in some late offshoots of world­ system analysis. 'Upper and upp er-middle classes of the world. and most of that interest has melted away. or at least a marginalization. India and other large Asian countries will become . A decisive question for the future of capital and labour in the world is how strong and capable the new masses of urban labour in China. unite ! You can best preserve your privileges by sticking together! ' Exits from the State In the 1 9 60s and 1 9 70s.AFTER DIALE C T I C S 145 o ppression and exploitation? To which Marxists have answered: the bourgeoisie (o r the capitalist class) and the working class. What exists of recent work on class struggles in the world tends to come fro m North Ameri c a . However. although Claus Offe's post-Marxist critical . Such was the implication of Gunder Frank's characteristically heretical slogan referred to above. pre. respectively. obscuring it with perspectives focused on continents and continental populations. is ultimately concerned with relations 'among peoples of European and non-European descent'. Its current. the state was a major object of contending Marxist the orization .

as a referent for 5 5 . the bold claims of loss of state sover­ eignty have so far never been properly empirically argued. it may even be s eriously questioned. Cambridge: Polity.146 FROM MARXI S M TO P O ST MARXI S M ? analyses p resent a significant exception. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verla g KG. Insofar as this involves a step away from 'methodological nationalism'. 56. 1 98 8 . or even raised. Beck. However. London: Verso.56 the shift is warranted . political interest has turned to globalization and 'imperial' global networks . J. U. Firstly. In any time perspective longer than a few decades. we could distinguish the move from analysis of the national capitalist state and its modes of class rule to the global network. Offe. ch. Perhaps a global analysis of contemporary states would be more fruitful than focus­ ing on a stateless globe? This is not the place to answer such questions only to take notice of their not being properly answered. in Latin America? How sovereign were the then-new B alkan states? Were not the state boundaries of travel and migration much more porous . It soon gained a worldwide reception. as the best site for new social constructions . C. . Under the assumption that the nation­ state. 2002. 1 99 6 . 57 The old concept whose distinction from the state goes back to Hegel was revived by anti­ Communist dissidence in the f mal years of the decompo­ sition of Eastern European C ommunism. 2 . by the mainstream shift in the centre of theoretical gravity. Another move away from the state has involved a turn to civil society. 55 But there have been many different exits from the state . Keane. Democracy and Civil Society. 5 7 . in more utopian visions. or at least its 'sovereignty'. Macht und Gegenmacht im globalen Zeitalter. has declined in signifi­ cance. Left and Right. What was national sover­ eignty a hundred years ago in Africa. in Asia. as a basis for opposition to authoritarian rule and.a century ago than today? Nor can the current world situation be properly understood before the position and capacity of the nation-state of the US have been seriously investigated. Modernity and the State.

Aux bords du politique. 'Politics and Philosophy: An Interview with Alain Badiou'. civil-society dis course als o had th e function o f keeping out any serious discussion about political economy and the restoration of capitalism until the latter had become a fait accompli. 59. the most circumspect and perhaps the most influential among them. xvii. A seminal work here. J. Locke. Drawn from completely different sources of philosophical inspiration. 1 984-87. in relation to modes of production and to class structures. London: Verso. with its sophisticated treatment of the classical political-philosophy problem of universalism and particularism. 200 1 . The autonomy or specificity of the political. Moufi"e. Ethics. Fichte) and on the political theorization 58. Ideas. Classes. was Laclau and Mouffe 's Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. A. MA: Beacon Press. A tyranny of concepts? See E. Ranciere. Rousseau. J. 59 Balibar. The Theory of Communicative Action. Paris: Gallimard 1 990. Habennas. Badiou. New York: Routledge 1 994. and their discursive substitution of the hegemonic struggles of particular interests for the struggle of classes . has been a central theme of several major thinkers . In Eastern Europe. Ladau and C. 5 8 Fonner disciples of Louis Althusser have made distinctive new contributions to radical political philosophy. Masses. once again. London: Verso. 2000. . Boston. C ivil society as a concept has had a programmatically idealistic career. A third exit from state theory was provided by moving to the more abstract level of political philosophy. Ladau and Moufe dismiss Habennas's ideal of a non exdusive public sphere of rational argument as a 'conceptual impossibility'.AFTER DIALE C TI C S 147 many different movements and strivings for CIVIC autonomy. Balibar. Badiou. association and collective conflict. has brought skilled textual readings to bear both on pre-Marxian political philosophy eSpinoza. appendix to A. rather than having furthered analyses of variable patterns of sociability. In an interesting abstention from argument. Habermas's grand theory of communicative action presented a normative programme of a universalistic dialogical politics. 2nd edition. E. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. 2 vols.

Zizek. 206. as a former Communist turned anti­ Communist dis sident. this provoked an ill-tempered exchange between him and Laclau. ch. Conversations with Zitek. Alongside the traditional left-wing politics of emancipation and transformation. even dubious. rather than in the cathartic form discussed by Sartre and Fanon. 5 0. London: Verso. His Tito-era Slovenian b a c kground. La crainte des masses. Universality. is not afraid of the 'necessary dirty work' . Contingency. The Ticklish Subject. provides him at the same time with a classical left-wing political formation and with impec­ cably respectable liberal credentials . S . 62 More noteworthy is an acknowledged ambivalence in Z izek's political position. E. London: Verso. with a seemingly inexhaustible supply of cinematic and other contemporary cultural apercyus. 1 . Z izek has become an emblematic figure of contemporary radical iconoclasm. 6 3 60. Z izek's anticapitalist project is very vague. eds. ed. each accusing the other o f a political project meaning 'nothing at all ' . Revolution a t the Gates. 2002. ibid . E. 236. 3 2 1 . like the British Empire Tories admired by Kipling. 6 0 Violence here appears more physically tangible and more ambiguous. His fascination with Lenin is accompanied by a seemingly equivalent admiration of the 'authentic conservative' who..148 F R O M MARX I S M TO POST MARXIS M? of violent antagonisms. Balibar. 'Holding the Place'.1 . in Butler et aI. History and the Political'. 6 3 . in meaning. Zizek. 6 1 Like that of most other radical philosophers today. Balibar has reflected on a politics of ' civility'. 'Structure. 1 999.. While the anticapitalist nature of his project is very explicit and his philosophical erudition conspicuous. Zizek. Hegemony. Slavoj Z izek's political philosophy appears more like a stance than a reasoned deduction. S . 62. Ladau. A compulsively produc­ tive writer and formidable polemicist. . 6 1 . . S . regulating 'the conflict of identifications ' . This combination has in recent years made Z izek the only Leninist with an admiring Western following.

65 But the givenness of sex has more recently come under attack. Under the impact of this. M. Oakley. 6 5 . A. as well as the imp act of globalization discourse on the new impo ­ tence o f the state. It should be added that while (post-) Marxists have played truant from the state. Oxford: WileyB1ackwell. 1 972.AFTER D IALE CTI C S 1 49 Marxist state theory was more than anything else a critique of capitalist democracy. sterling contributions to analyzing the making of the European nation-states have been made from different perspectives by Michael Mann and Charles Tilly. C ambridge: C ambridge University Press. vol. Coercion. a project pushed b y the philosopher Chantal Mouffe and best manifested by the lusophone legal-cum-political theory developed by the B razilian Roberto Mangabeira Unger and the Portuguese Boaventura de Sousa S antos . Tilly. Capital and European States. it has felt no need of such drapery. 1 9 93. and the question of the construction and transformation of gender constituted a key theoretical focus for socialist and mainstream feminism in the 1 9 70s and 1 9 80s. The intellectual reas sertion 64. S ince about 1 9 80. Sex. C. Gender and Society. radical political thought h a s paid increasing attention to potentials for 'radical dem o c racy ' . 2. sometimes in ways similar to the questioning of any non­ discursive givenness of class . . AD 990 1 990. 64 Return of Sexuality The distinction between (biological) sex and ( social) gender was first elaborated by Ann Oakley in 1 9 7 2. asserting itself in its own right and explicitly seeking to rein in existing liberal democracy by making central banks independent of it and by trying to restrict economic policy options a priori by c onstitutional or equivalent clauses. and had its sharpest analytical edge when capitalism was trying to take cover under liberal democracy. 1 99 0 . The Sources of Social Power. Mann. London: MT Smith.

Butler. The surge of literary-philosophical p ostmodernism in feminist discourse broke most of the links between feminist theory and the Left that had earlier come under the heading of socialist feminism. 6 8 . The latter has achieved a certain specific the oretical presence in Anglo-S axon academia under the b anner of 'queer theory' . . 1 900-2000. 2004. Oakley and J . eds. Therbom. S e e A. neither tendency is likely. 69 Scandinavian welfare-state-oriented feminists experienced the encounter with postmodernist feminism as a shock. K. inequalities between heterosexual men and women have b een overshadowed by discourses on homo. While raising awareness of human and social complexity in important ways. Hildur Ve and Karin Waemess. Mitchell. 'A Brief History of Gender'. London: Routledge.1 50 FROM MARXISM TO POST MARXISM? Judith Butler of sexuality has come from the American philosopher and 'sex itself is a gendered category' 66 in theorizations from the French battleground of philos­ ophy and p sychoanalysis .70 The cosmopolitan literary theorist Toril Moi has felt compelled to provide an answer to the question 'What is a woman?' for academic feminist milieux 66. J. Between Sex and Power: Family in the World. 7 . Gender Trouble. eds. A. A. 6 7 . 6 7 O akley herself has conceded the untenability of the sex gender distinction. in Who 's Afraid of Feminism?. Mitchell. Oliver. oral communication. the displacement of gender has a noteworthy similarity with the displacement of class . Again. 70. to be a helpful contribution to human emancipation. 1 997. Oakley and J. 6 9 . French Feminist Theory: An Introduction. 2000. 29 5 5 . Cavallaro. see G. New York: Routledge. 6 8 Politically. London 2003 . London: Continuum. In a large body of theory. 1 990. French Feminism Reader. Who 's Afraid of Feminism? For a global materialist account of sex. constituting new though extremely minori­ tarian theoretical fields. Oakley. qua displacement. gender and reproductive relations over the past century. D . the givenness of sex has been powerfully challenged by assertive homosexuality. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield.and trans sexuality.

Identity and Control. Rule. from vacancy chains t o sexual contacts and global city patterns. Sex. E. Balibar. distinguishing 'associa­ tion' from 'community'. Mid-twentieth-century sociology concentrated on the 'group'. ch. 1 997.7 1 Yet it is also striking that feminism is today far more salient than the Left in the Euro-American world. Belatedly. 2005. Politics and the Other Scene. T. Moi. J. From the 1 9 60s on. in its eager pre o ccupation with psychoanalysis. . 1 9 92. whether 'primary' or 'secondary'. Gender and Body. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. The concept was also used in US studies of the diffusion of ideas . and on organizations. 7 3 . Z izek was trained as a Lacanian. 7 2 . Princeton. 72 Homage to Networks Classical nineteenth-century sociological the ory fo cused on modes of social connectivity. Lac1au's recent work on populism is much interested in Lacan's objet petit a and other topics of the master. White. Ideas. 7. The key theoretical figures have been Harrison White and his students. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Nl: Princeton University Press. 5 . Masses.73 The notion of the network reached a wider public in the 1 9 80s 7 1 . H. The return of sexuality is also manifest in current Marxist and post-Marxist philosophy.AFTER D I ALE CTICS 151 apparently disoriented a s to the answer. diffusion and power structure s i n an expanding number of areas. ch. Althusser. into studies of Freud and Lacan for instance in his 'Three Concepts of Politics' albeit in a cautious and selective manner. the network has replaced the concept of structure or organization in s ocial theory. Theory and Progress in Social Science. Balibar has followed his teacher. it was used to develop math­ ematical models for access. Classes. Network analysis of social connectivity has a b ackground in social p sychology. above all in the 'sociometric' studies of friendships in school milieux and in postwar community studies by anthropologists and family s ociologists . More recently.

152 F R O M MARXISM T O P O ST MARXISM? through business-management studies that attempted to grasp and generalize the success of Toyota and other Japanese corporations . Further interest was stimulated. They focus on individual actors and their resources. Their rise to centre-stage in contemporary social theory and analysis should be seen not only as deriving from intellectual discovery. 1 99 6 9 8 . though loosely used. Mann. of course. . tying together complex. Two volumes have b een published thus far. rather than on constituted collectivities. concept in his monumental work on power. the 'network' itself has no political affiliation. networks are highly imp ortant social connections. by the electronic revolution and the Internet. The Inf ormation Age: Economy. 7 5 . Oxford: WileyBlackwell. Cambridge: C ambridge University Press. M. and they form channels for markets as well as for bureau­ cracies. Nor has it been subjected to any analyt­ ical critique or any scrutiny of its relative acumen and the 74.75 Since then it has become a key analytical concept in the influential neo­ Marxist enterprise of Hardt and Negri's Empire (2000) and Multitude (2004) . in which both the global sovereign and its opposition are presented as network powers. movements and classes. On the other hand. 1 9 86 . M. loosely coupled social systems. with a view to avoiding any systemic or bounded notion of 'society' . As such.and neo­ Marxist s o cial theorizing. 3 vols. setting out from new management concep­ tions and information technology without trying to relate it to previous sociological theory. Sources of Social Power. It was the post-Marxist sociologist Manuel C astells who articulated the 'network society' in a magisterial work of social analysis. Society and Culture. Michael Mann made 'networks of interaction' a central. Castells. while crucial to recent p ost.74 Networks are looser and more open than both groups and organizations . but also as indicating changes in social relations .

I t i s a conc ept still enjoying its honeymoon undisturbed. has always contained a strong current of critical political economy. it has also proved stimulating to colleagues outside. world-systems analysis has been a vital force for critical social analysis. Egon Matzner carried on the classical Central European Marxis t tradition of e conomic analys i s . Though pioneered by so ciologists. Its major achievements in recent years have tended to derive from creative dis ciplinary cro s s ­ fertilizations of e conomics and history. . Developed from the mid.AFT E R DIALECTI C S 153 boundaries of its indubitable fruitfulness. and currently being extended in new directions by Arrighi. Anglo. 76 Until his premature death a few years ago. versus Cambridge. the analysis is predominantly economic 76. While the spirited and forceful engagement with liberal economics by British left-wing neo-Ricardians of the 1 9 60s the aforementioned C ambridge.1 9 7 0 s by Wallerstein and o thers. e c onomics and political science. England. Marxist as well a s non-Marxist. Der Preis des Wohlstands oder Umweltpliinderung und neue W elt(un) ordnung. Exceptions to the rule endure. E. among them the ecologically oriented world-economic analyses of Elmar Altvater.S axon radicalism. 1 9 9 2 . Massachusetts. S elf-consciously heterodox. debate on capital theory does not seem to have sustained any enduring encroach­ ments on the dominion and self-confidence of liberalism. by contrast. and it is not surprising that this should have widened over recent decade s . For example. Political Economies European 'Western Marxism' had always regarded politic al economy from something of a distanc e. Altvater. and economics and philo sophy. and often in disagreement with. the schoo l . radical political economy in the Anglo-Saxon world is still very productive . Munster: Verlag Westfalisches Dampfboot.

The Brenner Debate. 2006. the rise of a number of different approaches to global studies is to be expected. Two other maj or. h a s now produced a n economic history of p ostwar advanced capitalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. discussed in chapter 2. H . From Oxford. To date. Wallerstein. 'The Rise and Future D emise of World Systems Analysis '. 7 8 . while its attention to global power relations adds a crucial political dimension. 200 6 . 1 99 8 . 77 One may add that once the planetary world has been recognized as a central. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1 985. Aston and C . London: Verso. xxi: 1. Glyn. Review. E . Robert Brenner. Glyn saw declining prospects for rich-country workers and ended by questioning the 7 7 . Wallerstein has already warned his followers and collaborators of the project's coming demise. A. Brenner. eds. who first made his name with an account of the origins of capitalism so striking and iconoclastic as to engender 'the Brenner debat e ' . the late Andrew Glyn has provided a succinct and highly readable overview of recent capitalist development and its effects on human welfare . much more down-to-earth combinations of economics and history avoid epochal power-shift theses or specu­ lations . See T . The Economics of Global Turbulence. the basis for his prediction was precisely its degree of success and its implicit recognition as a viable global analysis . H .79 Brenner envisages continuing turbulence. . Philpin. indeed as the most important. 7 9 . focus for social analysis. With a unique sense of the limits of the self in history. 78 The driving analytical forces here p owering through a wealth of empirical detail and its temporal vicissitudes are the tendency to overcapacity and a decline in profit rate . The imminent-end-of-capitalism theses of Arrighi and Wallerstein have b een noted above . it has proved a more fruitful approach than recent plunges into theories of globalization. Capitalism Unleashed. The Economics of Global Turbulence (2006) . R.1 54 F R O M MARXIS M TO P O S T MARXI S M ? and historical. I.

This is not just because of the size and velocity of C hines e economic growth. Arrighi shows how S mith the market economist was enveloped by Smith the Enlightenment moral p hilosopher concerned with global justice . opting for that curious utopia of resignation. occasionally even falling into slavelike conditions. at least to some extent.80 as Robert Brenner also has argued. but also because of its character. Arghi. New York: Verso. Arghi argues that ' [t] he separation of agricultural producers from the means of production has been more a consequence of capitalism's creative destruction than one of its precondi­ tions'. Secondly. Arrighi has recently returned t o Adam S mith in his major work on the new significance of C hina. driven by market opportunities without dispossession of the direct produc­ ers on the land and by intensive. falling by the 80. Arrighi argues that the failure of the Project for a New American C entury and the ris e of C hina have brought the world closer to inter-national. without dispossessing the rural p opulation of their means of subsis­ tence. Adam Smith in Bei jing. Current Chinese manufacturing triumphs certainly appear to be based on the labour of a dispossessed working class. the 'Basic Income ' . the aforementioned Adam Smith in Beijing. inter-civilizational equality 'than it ever was ' . But whether this warrants Arghi's historical and contemporary extrapolations is more doubt­ ful. Starting from an analysis of recent China. low-cost but healthy and educated labour. G . while rural education and health care are. which is a different path of development from that of European capitalism. 365 . 2007.AFTER D IALECTI C S 1 55 meaning of further growth. The Chinese economy took off from the late 1 970s with household agrarian production and with Township and Village Enterprises for the (domestic) market. In a c onvincing rereading of The W ealth of Nations.

previously within an explicitly Marxist approach.1 56 F R O M MARXISM TO P O S T MARXIS M? wayside with the introduction of fees which put them beyond the reach of the poor. edited by Pranab B ardhan (an economist at Berkeley) . highly ambitious project at S anta Fe aims to produce a radical political economy by bringing together economics and political science . A penetrating investigation of the French housing market. The tum of John Roemer from mathematical economics to 'radical economic ethics' from A General Theory of Exploitation and Class ( 1 9 82) to Theories of Distributive Justice ( 1 9 9 6) is an interesting trajectory and remains. But it is also noteworthy for two other reasons : first. its main output is Globalization and Egalitarian Redistribution. For all its equations and diagrams. Arrighi has written a tour de force. Economics and sociology were brought together in Les structures sociales de l'economie. So far. Samuel Bowles (an economist and the director of the Behavioral S ciences Program at the Santa Fe Institute) and Michael Wallerstein (a political scientist at Yale) . from a Left viewpoint. but there have b e e n many interfaces between analytical philosophy and analytical economic s . national models of progres sive political economy have become much harder to sell . such as the 'habitus' of dispositions and the 'field' of force and conflict. but in the twenty-first century. A recent. the generous mainstream economic backing from the Russell S age Foundation for a project on 'Persistent Inequality in a Competitive World' . both in the empirical research - . an honourable one . the p ower of its political-cum-economic modelling. The main straddler of economics and philosophy is probably Amartya S en. it deploys some of his key concepts. has proved masterful. the editors conclude may not be that novel . on which one participant. the work's 'lessons' on the possibilities for redistributive policies under global constraints fairly substantial. Adam Przeworski. and second. one of the last major works of Pierre B ourdieu .

R. while steering clear of the twin temptations of apology and denunciation. UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. 1 9 9 1 . Saillard. this is still largely situated within economics. Reberioux. !toh and N. Basingstoke. G. Paris: Seuil. which builds on Rudolf Meidner's proposal for a share levy from corp orations to finance social development. Aglietta and A. Banking on Death. 2005. non-Marxist but usually left-of­ centre . Gunnar Myrdal. London: Verso. UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Blackburn. Many of its modern classics are now submerged under neoliberal lava: Ragnar Frisch. 84 THE REPERTOIRE OF P O SITIONS S ocial theorizing is still related to indeed. as well as evolutionary theory. In France. but also benefits from elements of sociological inquiry. Contemporary Capitalism: The Embeddedness of Institutions. the main school has been 'regulation theory'. Theorie de la regulation. Paris: La Decouvette. Robin Blackburn has produced an ambitious left-of-centre recasting of pension strategy for an ageing society. Jan Tinbergen. 8 1 . G. Corporate Governance Adri ft. Boyer and Y. UK: Palgrave Macmillan. M. R. 82.AFTER D I ALECTI C S 1 57 and in a generalizing theoretical critique . committed to specific political positions. 1 9 9 5 . After Marx a n d Sraffa. 1 99 7 . eds. 200 1 . Bourdieu. Robert Boyer and Antoine Reberioux. 8 3 . 8 2 P olitical economy also includes what is usually labelled 'institutional economics '.83 In Britain. Hodgson. Age Shock: How Finance is Failing Us. Britain and France. 84. the post-Marxist Geoffrey Hodgson has returned to consider the relations between economics and history. R. M. Les structures sociales de l'economie. central representatives have included Michel Aglietta. But below the pantheon there is still a vibrant subculture of critical institutional economics. Hollingsworth and R. J. Cheltenham. In its main centres. 2006. Hodgson. . Cheltenham. Yokokawa. Boyer. London: Verso. 8 1 In Banking on Death and Age Shock. eds. and a sociological history of the field must give some account of these. P. 2002. 2 000. C ambridge : Cambridge University Press. Capitalism in Evolution.

Elaborating a conception of a socialist alternative has become a minority concern among the intellectual Left. as an intellectual tradi­ tion. a ctually attainable type of so ciety. it suggests a new distance from socialism.158 FROM MARXI S M T O P O ST MARXI S M? Fig u re 3 . The other is political: socialism. The diagram should. be seen as a very approx­ imate map. even among politically committed social theorists . One is theoretical: Marx and Marxism. . though the results should not be seen as a permanent address book. 1 distinguishes two p oles. Secondly. aiming to convey relative positions correctly but making no claims about the scale of distances . although this does not. ('Socialism' has looser meanings too. 1 : Current Left Theoretico-Political Positions Resilient Marxism Neo-Marxism Marxism ! M a rxo l ogy & S c i e n t i fi c Marxism Post Marxism Socia l ism Non-Ma rxist Capitalism Left Postsocia l ism Non-Marxist Left Thought Figure 3 . which may be deployed as a heuristic searching device.) The two axes form a system of coordinates. imply a step into the capitalist fold. of course. What it shows first of all is that theory and politics are two different dimensions. in the sense of a distinctive. but they do not pertain here. in relation to which the politics of recent left-wing thought might be located. in most cases. whose goal is a social order distinctively different from capitalism.

but is now. Mike Davis . Deterring Democracy. but they have survived. New York: Verso. M. 1 's meridian than their European equivalents. tend to be more to the left of Figure 3 .) The great 'right tum' occurred earlier in the US. Davis. like Monthly Review and Science and Society. The remainder of the American Left was never hopeful about the immediate future. It is the US that has produced such intran­ sigent left-wing best-selling writers as Noam Chomsky and. Postsocialism If a certain distanc e from any explicit socialism has characterized most of the Euro-American Left recently.AFTER DIALE C T I C S 1 59 In a continental comparison. the defeats of Eurocommunism and the surrenders of Eurosocialism . more recently. with elements of the 1 9 4 0 s and 1 9 5 0 s trotskisant Left becoming cold warriors by the early 1 970s. On the whole. both Marxist and non-Marxist. 1 9 9 1 . Chomsky. edited from Toronto . Recent meetings of the American Sociological Association have been much more explicitly radical than the European meetings. 85 The annual Socialist Regis ter was launched in the mid. European left­ wing academics have more opportunities for extramural practice. the elaboration of a postsocialist left-of-centre agenda has 85. The huge American academic culture is still capable of sustaining a range of Left publications . London: Verso. may now be shadows of their former selves. in the new millennium. left-of-centre intellectual currents in North America.1 960s as a very British enterprise. The classical left-wing journals of the US. 2006. the resilience of the small North American Left stands out in comparison with the larger but much softer and more often disheartened forces of Europe . (True. spawning a generation of rabid neoconservatives. Planet of Slums. N. . and would also be further removed from the blows and reverberations of the Soviet implosion.

J. the sociological theorist Anthony Giddens proclaimed his move 'Beyond Left and Right' in a book full of Thatcherite sneers at social democracy and the welfare state. Cambridge: Polity.1 60 FROM MARXISM TO P O S T MARXISM? become a specific project. One effort was John Keane's celebration of 'civil society'. although of a different kind to that presupposed by the Marxist-socialist 'triangle ' dis cussed above . I t should be noted that. Keane. a decade of capitalist immiseration of large parts of Eastern Europe following 1 9 8 9 elicited no qualification. or even comment. Giddens. dubbed the 'Third Way' . 86 In the last years of the Cold War this p osition was riding high. The wasteland of triumphant Thatcherism was a natural breeding-ground for 'postso­ cialis m ' . as scornful of social democracy and its 'unwork­ able model of state-administered socialism' as it was of 'totalitarian communism'. this proj ect did compris e a genuine relation between social theory and politics. Giddens became the officious theoretician of the British prime minister and his New Labour regime. 88 Brusquely dismissing the notion that there could be any 'third way' in the classic leftist sense b etween 'welfare socialism' and ' Communism' Giddens in fact turned out to have prepared the ground for a short-lived but nevertheless contemporarily unique politico-theoretical p ostsocialist alliance that was soon. 87 A few years later. Democracy and Civil Society. 88. For some years. J. 1 994. in its turn. Keane. giving an intellectual gloss to a party that had lost or rather severed any connection to 'first way' social democracy. For a time. 2 6 . Democracy and Civil Society. 87. from the author. 'Introduction t o th e New Edition'. in the wake of a series of traumatizing defeats dealt by a ruthless (though always civically minoritarian) neoliberalism . . the attractions of the Third Way ended with the Realpolitik 8 6 . A. 73ff. i n Europe at least (there may still be some East Asian interest) . Beyond Left and Right.

V. Giddens 's defence of the Third Way six years later provided an exemplary summary. of the most important criticisms that had been levelled against it. The Third Way. Non-Marxist Left Social democracy. 407. David. Reinventing the Left. accurate yet concise. In the same year his son. Ulrich Beck is a radical cosmopolitan democrat.91 The 1 9 9 8 autodissolution of Italy's Democratic Party of the Left and its eventual merger into the Democratic Party in 2007 constitute. even more of a disavowal of social-demo cratic leanings than the Blair­ Brown proj ect of 'New Labour ' . at least in form. A. 90. i n which Giddens tabled a postsocialist agenda. 89 Ideological controversy aside. 90 A sometime collaborator of Giddens. . In 1 994. a prominent Marxist political scientist. Its courtier-theorist does not seem to b e in sight yet . 1 99 8 . 9 1 . Beck. Giddens. edited an anthology. 2000. has produced few theoreticians of wide ambition in recent years . Risk Society. Postsocialism has also had a generational dimension. the tanks were headed out of the country and into Iraq. Miliband's unrepentant Socialism for a Sceptical Age ( 1 994) was published posthumously. The Third Way and Its Critics. The work of the Swedish sociologist Walter Korpi has largely centred on empirical analysis of social-policy institutions. who was to b ecome foreign secretary. by far the maj or component of the non­ Marxist Left. author of The State in Capitalist Society ( 1 969). to which he responded with a wide range of social-scientific references . with the Blair government a leading force in the aggression. for whom the Communism and socialism of Europe's 'first modernity' are now 'used­ up ' ideas. but his explanatory 89. Cambridge: Polity. Ralph Miliband died. Cambridge: Polity.AFTER DIALECTICS 161 o f invading tanks although i n contrast to Cze choslovakia in 1 96 8 . and Macht und Gegenmacht.

nor did he ever condone the existing order.1 62 FROM MARXISM TO P O S T MARXI SM? theorizations of power resources and the 'democratic class struggle'. Korpi has remained a staunch social democrat. Bourdieu et al . too. French sociology has generally remained 'left-of-centre '. 93. 94 There has been little radical programmatic thinking in social democracy anywhere since the ambitious but politically ill-fated wage-earner-funds p roposal by the Swedish blue-collar unions. 1 99 8 . Most distressing has been the absence of any significant s ocial-democratic visions in Eastern Europe . It is instead a B razilian­ American legal philosopher. even while the media and the principal intelle ctual platforms in Paris have veered sharply to the right. 92. not only in France but in Europe generally. But on the whole. Paris: Liber Raions d' agir. Paris: La S euil.. are important contributions to s ocial theory. 2 00 1 . American Sociological Review 6 3 : 5 . 1 993 ( The W of the W orld. Oxford: Polity. hitting the Danes above all . The Democratic Class Struggle. S candinavian social democracy has had its share of recent defeats and demoralizations. the most outstanding contribution was that of Pierre Bourdieu . 'The Paradox of Redistribution and Strategies of Equality'. P. P. for a while reluctantly adopted by the Swedish Social Democratic Party. La misere du monde. 1 998 (Firing Back: Against the T yranny of the Market. Bourdieu built up a fonnidable reputa­ tion as a top-class social researcher before emerging late in life as the foremost intellectual spokesman of the anti­ capitalist Left. Contre-feux. Korpi and J. 92 Politically. Touraine. S tanford 1 999). New York: New Press. Beyond Neoliberalism. together with his scientifically robust defence of the welfare state. London: Routledge. Bourdieu. Roberto Mangabeira Unger. His was a powerful voice against the capitalist 'misery of the world' even though he did not hold out the prospect of a socialist horizon. Korpi. W. W. . 2003) . A. it is still a major force left-of-centre. 1 9 83. 9 3 During the 1 99 0s. Palme. Out of the spotlight in the heyday of rue d'Ulm Marxism. eight 94.

9 7 . Tarrow and C. D. made a sterling contribution in trying to analyze and interpret this complex and heterogeneous movement. Mangabeira Unger. The Culture of the New Capitalism. one of the most important and inspiring developments in left-wing p olitics in the new millennium. Dynamics of Contention. social policy based on empowerment and capacity. 200 1 . Reinventing Social Emancipation: Towards New Manif estos. highly literary and descriptive. See the Verso series. 2006 and forthcoming.AFTER DIALE C T I C S 1 63 who has had the imagination to write W'hat Should the an answer to that very question. a universal responsibility for c aring work. themes of inequality or working conditions under capitalism. always rigorously system­ atic. R. CT: Yale University Press. 1 66. . 2005. Sennett. 24-3 1 . have also been theorized in radical ways outside it . the Portuguese legal scholar B oaventura de Sousa S antos has. S. London: Verso. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tilly. 1 9 98. New York: Allen Lane. R. with many doorways. These are guided by five 'institutional ideas ' : high domestic savings and taxation as a basis for national independence. Sennett. 9 6 . Durable Inequality. The c ontrasting approaches of Richard Sennett. 97 Radical social theory remains a big house. have so far spawned little social theory. McAdam.96 At the same time. 95 The World Social Forums. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2003. R. What Should the Left Propose?. Left Propose? 95. 2006. long central to the Left. Tilly. provide two powerful examples . democ­ ratization of the market economy and achievement of ' an upward tilt in the return to labour' . and a 'high-energy democratic politics'. and of Charles Tilly. New Haven. C. But his proposals for institutional change are potentially far-reaching. however. London: Verso. His appeal to the petty-bourgeois longing 'for a condition of modest prosperity and independence ' and to a 'universal desire' for 'national sovereignty' may sound timid. Respect in a World of Inequality.

out of joint with the Marxism of any contemporary move­ ments . The last years of the twentieth century saw two remark­ able synthetic readings of Marx: Specters ofMarx by Jacques Derrida ( 1 9 9 3) and The Postmodern Marx by Terrell C arver ( 1 9 9 8) . while taking an agnostic position as to whether any postcapitalist social order is possib l e . Turner. while illuminating his 9 8 . Pace Burawoy and Wright. the political significance of Marx. in a sympathetic yet critical way. Burawoy and E.98 Given the normal cultural-political emb eddedness of social science. It is logically possible. within a certain spirit of Marxism'. but as a historical figure. how­ ever. O. he has written a spirited account of the dynamics of capitalism. both underlined. Derrida now placed his own whole oeuvre of deconstruction 'within a certain tradition of Marxism. Here we may als o situate British Academy Marxist historiography. appointed by Tony Blair to the House of Lords. 1 is not necessarily empty. such a position is not necessarily degenerate. The most salient contemporary example of this po sition is the Indian-British economist Meghnad Desai. in the plural. originally inspired by a rereading of Lenin and the classical Marxist economists. J. . Wright. today more than ever. 484. Marx's Revenge (20 0 2) is a rehabilitation of Marx the social scientist of capitalist political economy. ed. 2002. With the help of its library. we should expect this field to b e very spars ely populated. cynical or pessimistic . in Handbook of Sociological Theory. Derrida and Carver both saw Marxes. M. 'Sociological Marxism'.1 64 FROM MARX I S M TO P O S T MARXIS M? Marxology and Scientific Marxism The northeastern quadrant of Figure 3 . New York: Springer. to abstain from any anticapitalist practice or ideological stance while nonetheless finding Marx to b e an insightful and intellectually stimulating analyst of capitalism . in which Marx j oins hands with H ayek.

the term 'neo-Marxist' will be used only for theoretical projects which both signal a significant departure from classical Marxism and retain an explicit commitment to it. whose recent work has gone beyond Marxist problematics and who do not publicly claim a continuing Marxist commit­ ment. See also the discussion of Derrida's book in Ghostly Demarcations. But the crux of their project 99. 1998. but only on amicable terms . nor does it include denunciation or renegacy. Mouffe. The Postmodem Marx. It is not tantamount to ex-Marxism. maybe even divorce. Spectres de Marx. Ladau and Mouffe. ed. however.AFTER DIALECTI C S 165 reading with literary pyrotechnics . 1 0 1 Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. 1 0 1 . T . the authors toil through classical Marxist political theory. Here. accepting a post-Marxist label. and some important writers E tienne Balibar. referring to writers with an explicitly Marxist background.and neo-Marxism have become blurred in recent times. yes. no critical evaluation is invested in the grouping. refer to 'the reappropriation of an intellectual tradition. which did not c onfront modernity o r the Enlightenment and manifested itself mainly in a perceptive analysis of Marx's language and writing strate­ gies in various texts . Carver. 1 5 1 . Ladau and C . discussed above. 99 Carver's postmodernism was a 'mild' one. development and new desires. from German and Russian social democracy to Gramsci. Sprinker. for example may well be listed under both rubrics. Deploying a series of formidable abstractions. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. 1 99 9 . may be regarded as one of the most important contributions from this position. 1 00 Post-Marxism Post-Marxism is used here in an open sense. 2 . J. E . Derrida. The boundaries between post. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 1 0 0 . as well as the process of going beyond it' . London: Verso. . M. ix.

In the context of the invasion of Iraq. once Habermas ' s student. 1 04 The current professorial successor of the Frankfurt School is Axel Honneth. 1 04. His most important work has 1 02 . Chicago : University of Chicago Press. as a prominent political scientist. from Marx and Lenin to Gramsci and the call for 'radical democracy'. he has grappled with the m oral issues surrounding genetic engineering and has struggled to come to terms with the increasingly violent and disagreeable implications of a Westbindung with the US a b ond to which Habermas. among other things taking it into the post-C ommunist states of Eastern Europe. is one of the few who. Habermas. Theory of Communicative Action. 1 03 . has always been committed.1 66 FROM MARXI S M TO P O S T MARXISM? remains the French Revolution in itself a venerable tradition. as a German anti­ nationalist. J. however. Modernity and the State. in which a 'socialist dimension' is to be achieved by 'deepening the democratic revolution' . 1 03 Claus Offe. 2003. Der Philosophische Diskurs der Moderne. 1 02 For this overview. loftily explicit in the work of Jirgen Habermas . . it is Habermas's programme of dialogical politics laid out in his magnum opus on communicative action and his defence of moder­ nity as an 'unfinished project' that have to be underlined. C. Borradori. has continued the 1 9 60s 7 0s Marxist preoccupation with the state. politically implicit in the frozen silence of Adorno and Horkheimer after the Second World War. b ecoming a left-of-centre conscience of the West German nation far less radical than Sartre but more widely hearkened to . In recent years. As a post-Marxist. Offe. G. Habermas has remained an intellectual and theoretician of a liberal (in the American sense) Left. there occurred an interesting. and a long-time post-Marxist. German critical theory was arguably the first major current of post-Marxism. more Europeanist rapprochement between Habermas and Derrida. Philosophy in a Tim e of T error: Dialogues with Jurgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida.

'recognition' may be seen as a crucial aspect of existential equality. Honneth. 1 08 . G.AFTER D IALE CTI C S 1 67 conc erned the struggl e for recognition. noted ab ove. Two of the most extraordinary works to emerge from a Marxist background are the landmark sociological analysis of world society by Manuel Castells. New York: Columbia University Press. Inequalities of the World. given Honneth's background. R. one of three fundamental dimensions of (in) equality. l 0 5 In a debate with the American philosopher Nancy Fraser. ed. Fraser and A. 1 9 96.. Honneth has further differentiated this into three spheres : l ove. London: Verso. . it may equally well take the form of new empirical forays or social commentary. or the 'mechanics of [cultural] transmission'. l 06 From an egalitarian perspective. London: Verso 2003. 'Understanding and Explaining Inequality'. Transmitting Culture. 1 27 . and an engagement with the Althus serian dis cussion of 'ide ological state apparatuses '. the modernist optimism of his obser­ vations on 'moral progress' may also be worth noting. who was spurred by strident US 'identity politics ' into defending redistribution. Honneth. 1 06. London: Verso. 2006. initiated as a topic for modern social philo sophy by Hegel 's analysis of the dialectic of the master slave relatio n . The latter begins from a critique of the Marxist concept of ideology. and the strikingly ambitious historical 'mediology' o f Regis Debray. Cambridge. opening out onto a longue duree exploration of the materiality of mediated commu­ nication. Honneth argued for a nonnative theory of experiences of injustice that would be broader than the 'more or less utilitarian anthro p o l o gy ' of M arxism . A. Media Manifestos. The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflict. Redistribution o r Recognition?. law and solidarity. 1 07 . 1 99 5 . 1 07 Po st-Marxism has not been limited to textual reinter­ pretation. Therborn. 1 86ff. 2000. N . MA: Polity. with a particular focus on Judaism and Christianity. Debray. as I have argued elsewhere. i n Therbom. I DS 1 0 5 .

they are outstanding achieve­ ments. 4. See respectively: Did Somebod Say T y otalitarianism?. . 1 9 92. these works are first of all contributions to social analysis rather than to social theory. London: Verso. the prolific output of social commentary by Zygmunt B auman has had a strong transnational resonance. Z izek's oeuvre includes a spirited defence of classical modernity and the extensive use of popular cinema in cultural-philosophical commentaries. as such. Z. with commentary. Liquid Modernity. at heart. a new selection of Lenin's writings from 1 9 1 7 . Ticklish Subject. He has flown in the face of conventional wisdom to the extent of introducing. but borne up by an unusual life wisdom. this is a sociological variety of p ost­ modernism .1 68 FRO M MARXIS M TO P O ST MARXI S M ? Theoretically original and skilfully crafted. burdened neither by research nor by the oretical analytics. 2002. The last decade has seen the emergence of at least two highly original. Intimations of Postmodernity. 1 09 . 1 1 0 Z izek's exhortation to 'repeat Lenin' posits an openness to the possibilities for radical social change in an app arently hop eless situation. the intellectual creattvIty of Marxism has not come to an end. hard­ hitting discourses. 1 09 Neo-Marxism For all its political defeats. Revolution at the Gates. the First World War and the breakup of the Second International . We have already noted the irreverent philosophical p olitics of Slavoj Z izek. Finally. a trained observer's eye and a fluent pen. Bauman's recent writings travel light. following disastrous defeat in Lenin's case. B auman. London: Routledge. who has not only radically renewed Marxist cultural criticism but vigorously defends an iconoclastic Marxism against ' conformist liberal scoundrels ' . 1 1 0. which explicitly derive from and build upon Marxist legacies.

1 l 1 Hardt and Negri also refer to the Lenin o f State and of Revolution as an inspiration for the 'destruction sovereignty'. 2004. the extraordinary accumulation of grievances and reform propo sals must at s ome point be transformed by a strong event. xi. The two bodies of work have several features in common. 4 1 3. H ardt and Negri 's Empire and Multitude. Respectively: M. . . displaying an impressive erudition and a capacity for association which encompasses a great 1 1 1 . a radical insurrectionary demand . ' Or again : The p o ssibility of democracy on a global scale is emerging today for the first time . Multitude.Marxism. . MA: Penguin Putnam. Cambridge. Both are essentially works of political philosophy if one accepts that Z izek's main b ooks are The Sublime Object of - Ideology ( 1 9 89) and The Ticklish Subject ( 1 999) rather than of social theory. . Empire. italics omitted. in addition to their upbeat radicalism and international publishing success. claims to have found the revolutionary exit of the twenty-first century: 'This is a revolution that no p ower will contro l because bio-power and communism. Negri and Zizek are p rofessional philosophers. 358. In time. . Hardt and A. in l ove. This is the irrepre ssible lightness and joy of b eing c ommunist. though here combined with the Madisonian conception of checks and balances. Negri. while Negri's former Paris student Hardt is a literary theorist with a philosophical orientation. . an event will thrust u s like an arrow into that [already] living future . and also inno cence. After this long season o f violence and contradictions .AFTER D IALE CTICS 1 69 The s e c o n d maj o r manifestation o f n e o . simplicity. co-op eratio n and revolution remain together. Both sets of authors write with verve and gusto in a baroque style of assemblage. .

253ff. . and a meandering Slovenian C ommunism-cum-dissidence. Zizek. The Parallax View. presents itself as his 'most substantial work in many years ' . 2 0 0 6 . his respectful scepticism towards Alain Badiou's 'exalted defence' of revolutionary terror. and the philosophy of Spinoza in the case of Negri. MA: MIT Press. Different variants of dissident C ommunism. but also a philosophical spectrum with Heidegger at its centre in the case of Z izek.:us out of his hat.1 70 F R O M MARXI S M TO P O S T MARXI SM? number of fields and traditions. their dazzling style as thinkers has attracted readers far removed from their own political or philosophical stance. Moreover. or his Napoleonic analogy in support of his thesis of 'the historical necessity of the Stalinist outcome' of the O ctober Revolution. anecdotes. cinematography and polemical shock. 292 3. also shows the diminishing returns of this sort of free-wheeling critique. at high speed and with little time for historical contextualization or empirical inves­ tigation. One of Z izek's most recent books. I 1 2 1 1 2 . Cambridge. While Z izek still draws some inter­ esting apen. They are also in line with Western Marxist practice in the sense of reading and using Marx through the lenses of other great European intellectual traditions primarily the psychoanalysis of Lac an. and a more similar mainstream-Communist family of origin. S . in the author's usual style of far-ranging associations. 326ff. his patient rebuttal of the Lacanian Jean-C laude Milner's Zionist ranting. It revolves around a well-chosen metaphor: parallax i s 'the apparent displacement of an object (the shift of its position against a background) caused by a change in observational position that provides a new line of sight' . many of his thematic discus­ sions lack both a cutting edge and analytical depth for example. But this ambitious volume. the spontaneist and violent Italian Far Left. The Parallax View. form the political backgrounds of Negri and Z izek: respec­ tively.

1 1 5 . 3 5 8 . Hardt and Negri inter­ pret Spinoza's imperium simply as sovereignty. Conversations with Ziiek. 'a future that is already living' . The multitude is similarly comprised of all the planet's workers and 'poors '. Respectively: M . the Roman or the British empires. In contrast to one global multitude 'in an expanding. there is a diagnostic simi­ larity between Hardt and Negri's work and the empirically grounded. and in this sense is 'a step forward '. and in their work the concept has nothing of the material concreteness of. . 350. 1 1 3 the work of Hardt and Negri does directly pertain to social analysis their Fran co-Italian philosophical mode of writing notwithstanding. 1 I 5 Castells defines the 'truly fundamental social cleavages of the Information Age ' : 1 1 3 . Empire and multitude. 3 3 6 . Its expanding practice will bring about global democracy. as these authors of a self-proclaimed postmodemity assert in a typically modernist way. end-of-millennium analysis by C astells. virtuous spiral ' of commonality. Rather. Multitude. Multitude. 1 1 4 . especially as the new locus for sovereignty. Z izek and G . Hardt a n d A. which here replaces the Marxist 'prole­ tariat' and the 'people ' of classical democratic theory. by common kn o wledge and common relationships . 348-50. Hardt and A. ' I have nothing whatso ever to do with sociology'. Negri. The most important divergence between them concerns social differentiation. 1 1 4 In their emphasis on information and networks. Their approach centres around two key concepts. The 'mass workers' of Negri 's ultraleft Italy of the 1 9 60s 7 0s are now writ (globally) large as 'mass intellectuality ' . The concomitant to Empire is the 'multitude ' . Daly. Socialism remains absent from this prophetic vision. now increasingly interrelated across a 'smoothed' world space of withering civil s o ciety and declining national boundaries. 4 3 . say. S . M .AFTER DIALECTICS 171 While Z izek may say. 3 2 . Empire. it is a global network to which sovereign power has migrated from the nation-states. Negri . both taken from Spinoza .

. like those of Z izek. and whose relevance as p eople is ignored. unmapped terrain. The London-based New Left Review. M. cutting its path through thickets of adversity across an altered. sociologically minded readers at least are likely to be sceptical of the former's invocation of Spinozan claims that 'prophetic desire is irresistible' and that 'the prophet can produce its [sic] own people ' . Silver. 346. 6 5 . 1 1 7 . gender) . citizenship. Castells. Negri. M. the social exclusion of a significant segment of society made up of the discarded individuals whose value as workers/consumers is used up.. 1 77 . concludes on a note similar to C astells's: there is no reason to expect that just because capital finds it profitable to treat all workers as interchange­ able equivalents. Forces of Labor. 3.172 F R O M MARXI S M T O POS T MARXISM? First. alluded to above. Hardt and A . having become the generally recognized 1 1 6 . Secondly.g. B. Empire. 1 1 7 While the best-sellers o f Hardt and Negri. Rather. 1 1 6 A major empirical work on the workers of the world. Silver's Forces of Labor. the internal fragmentation of labour between informational producers and replaceable generic labour. 1 1 8 . workers would themselves find it in their interests to accept this. The Information Age. italics omitted. testify to the continuing creativity and attractiveness of Marxist traditions. l 1 s A Resilient Left The recent traj ectory of Marxism also includes a mode of resilience. race. insecure human beings (including workers) have good reasons to insist on the salience of non-class borders and boundaries (e. vol.

1 20. . Some other important mouthpieces of European Marxism have also survived above all. Brilliance and radicalism have been the NLR criteria for publication. This comes at a price of short-term political insignificance. 1 983. Prokla and Sozialismus (originally entitled ' Contributions to Scientific Socialism'). London: Verso. New Left Review 2: 1. from the student movement of the 1 9 60s to the altennondialiste movements of the 2000s. 1 992. Anderson. And NLR's outspoken political radicalism has not prevented its being included in the Social S cience Citation Index. The 1 1 9 . is not only a major Marxist historical scholar but also a master of intellectual critique. never orthodoxy of whatever kind. In the Tracks of Historical Materialism. always keen on theoretical innovations. which have yet to confront a generational succession. which joins its Italian. P. 'Renewals'. 1 998. 1 2 0 Historically. three German publications. P. including in the francophone and hispanophone worlds (there is now a Spanish edition. 1 1 9 Perry Anderson. of 'uncompromising realism' . the guid­ ing spirit of the NLR for more than forty years as well as the pilot of the relaunch. London: Verso. London: Verso. but also the British j ournal Capital and Class. with a muted enthusiasm for straight political economy and plainly uninterested in exegesis and concomitant polemics . although the journal has always cultivated contributions from and on radical social movements. A Zone ofEngagement. the NLR might best be called a neo-Marxist j ournal. Das Argument. and is capable of applying those critical powers to Marxism itself. 1 4 . Greek and Turkish stable-mates) successfully relaunched itself in 2000 with a manifesto of intransigence. at least in the Anglo­ phone world and in fact hors pair in other language areas.AFTER D IALE CTI C S 1 73 flagship of left-wing social thought. Anderson. The Origins OfPoslmodernity. January February 2 000.

often with powerful publishers ' backing. In Italy. Even France has a couple of postcrisis j ournals. philosophically oriented Actuel Marx. as do the two remaining 'orthodox' parties. the Greek and the Portuguese. The once very lively British publication Marxism Today folded with the ending of the Soviet Union. which is now also taking over the relaunched (although still under its old editor) late Cold War anti­ S oviet journal Critique as a 'Journal of Socialist Theory' . The American-based Rethinking Marxism is published by Routledge. Historical Materialism is put out by the Dutch academic publisher Brill in Leiden. such as the banner-flying. the Rivista del Manifesto gave up in 2004. The once largest Western European C P. Insofar as they have soldiered on. and the economist Elmar Altvater guides Prokla (an acronym for 'Problems of Class Struggle') . The Great Encyclopaedia of resilient Marxism is the Historisch-Kritisches Worterbuch des Marxismus. The French Les T emps Modernes survived the death of Sartre and de Beauvoir but is no longer a major Left publication. however. has. the European Communist parties and their successors have mostly shown little intellectual Marxist resilience.174 F R O M MARXI S M TO P O S T MARXISM? philosophical-feminist couple Wolfgang Fritz and Frigga Haug still direct Das Argument. The innovative and self­ critical East German fonner PDS and its Rosa Luxemburg Foundation. do retain some commitment to Marxism. Most of the Eastern European ex-CPs have situated themselves well to the right of Scandinavian social democracy. rec ently broke with social democracy to embrace plain 'demo cracy' . as we have noted. the Italian. directed by . The originally British annual Socialist Register is now edited from Toronto . American Cold War survivors Monthly Review and Science and Society have also weathered the American victory. New journals have also been started up. More generally intellectual or directly politically oriented journals have been more vulnerable.

Moishe Postone 's Time. now provided with a choreography of dialectical investigation. 1 69 . . Urbana. de . IL: University of Illinois Press. but also read across a wide sociocultural register. To take some random examples. Bertell Ollman's Dialectical Investigations ( 1 9 93) . Dance of the Dialectic. which appeared in 2004. it is planned to extend to some fifteen or more volumes . into a conception of social domination reminiscent of Max Weber's 'iron cage' of rationalization which 'subjects people to impersonal. the project will b e completed in 2022 . At its planned two-year pace. Postone summarizing his own book. ' 1 2 2 As 1 2 1 . Oilman has continued his dialectical teaching into the new millennium. its eight hundred collaborators include Etienne Balibar. 'Marxism' here is not only understood in its broadest ecumenical sense. and a valiant and pedagogical defence of dialectical thinking by another American. increasingly rationalized structural imperatives and constraints that cannot adequately be grasped in terms of class domination . the Dictionary is a unique exemplar of the refusal to surrender. took us u p to 'Justice ' . double-work and Dummheit in der Musik (stupidity in music) . 1 2 1 Postone's reading takes the concepts of value and commodity one level of abstraction further from socio-economic analysis. In its high-level intellectual doggedness. It has no determinate locus. 1 22 . Although largely a Gennan project.hkwm . Labor and Social Domination ( 1 99 3). .AFTER D IALE CTI C S 175 the Haugs and published by Das A rgument in Hamburg. C onceived in the 1 980s and launched in 1 994. Volume 6 . 5 9 . 2003. Historical Materialism 1 2 : 3. there are entries on Brecht. The 1 990s also saw an ambitious attempt at an exegetical 'reconstruction' of Marx's critique of political economy. in cooperation with the Free University of Berlin and the Hamburg University of Economics and Politics . Pablo Gonzalez C asanova and other international figures. It has a bilingual website : www. 'Critique and Historical Transforma tion'. 2004. .

put out by the j ournal Historical Materialism and edited by the French philosophers Jacques Bidet and Stathis Kouvelakis . once again. . though of less than encyclopaedic format. one might also cite the multivolume 'Retrospective' on Marx and his work put out by Routledge in the 1 99 0 s. Jessop and C . Karl Marx's Social and Political Thought. B. 1 2 4 almost eight hundred pages long. Brill: Leiden. Individual examples of resilience are plentiful and. Alex Callinicos is probably the most prolific 123. The Companion has a predominantly French philosophical tone and is published with subsidies from the Ministere fran9aise charge de la culture. of which the eight volumes on Marx's social and political thought. albeit not explanatory. in spite of being put out in English in the Netherlands but covers a wide ground. are the most pertinent here. Malcolm Brown. London: Routledge. Daniel Bensa'id is a leading Trotskyist cadre and the author of the well-written Marx for Our Times. as philosophical theory and as scholarship. London: Routledge. Among the few political survivors of the French evenements of 1 9 68. edited by Bob Jessop. mainly of textual explication and contemporary intellectual history. Its most interesting contribution is a detailed. eds. 1 24 . extend across a far wider disciplinary field than that of social theory. 4 vols. 1 9 9 9 .and organization-b ased 'matrix of modernity' . But two deserve to be added to this inevitably p artial and limited selection . 1 2 3 A monumental document of resilience. Bidet has made another large-scale attempt at a 'reconstruction' of Marxism. 1 990. on the basis of the du al m arket.1 76 FROM MARXI S M TO P O S T MARXISM? commercial evidence for a resilient interest in Marxism. eds. second series. Bob Jessop and Russell Wheatley. overview by Andre Tosel of the recent fate of Marxism. On the other side of the Channel. is the Critical Companion to Contemporary Marxism (2007) . in Italy and France.

The Disobedient Generation. Burawoy and Wri ght 's s o ci o l o gical Marxism has an explicitly normative a s well as scientific commitment. . though shorn essentially. with a research agenda that follows fro m a the ory of 'the c ontradictory repro­ duction of contradictory class relations' logical institutions. cl ass 1 2 5 . 1 2 In a recent. Intrinsic here i s th e assumption that th e capitalist dialectic i s still operating. Against Postmodernism. 1 2 6 Burawoy. Cambridge: Polity. theoretically driven ethnographer of work. A. 459 86. though in a somewhat smoothed-over fashion: First. and Wright� the no less theoretically driven researcher of class structures� have also signalled a joint project to build 'sociological Marxism'.' An Anti Capitalist Manifesto. see. the dynamics of capitalist devel opment generate changes in technology. 200 5 . Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Sica and S . s ocial and p olitical bibliography. keep the banner of Marxism flying. with great potential . for example. 20 06. 'Sociological Marxism'. the labour process. eds. 1 2 7 How far this will develop in practice remains to be seen. Callinicos. 1 2 7 . but as a plan it is the most ambitious scholarly pro ject of resilient Marxism. As a small sample. makes 'resilient' a more apt epithet here than 'neo ' . While innovative in intention 'building' its reassertion of the Marxist political agenda as well as its c ore analytics. by Michael Burawoy and Erik Olin Wright. linked to 'the political project of challenging capitalism as a social order ' . Turner. Burawoy and Wright. minus the theory of value.AFTER DIALE CTI C S 177 o f contemporary Marxist writers. A. with a wide-ranging 5 philosophical. two in particular. a o riginal ' s Marxian analysis of capitalism and its p olitical and ide o ­ of the historico-philo s o phical wrapping . s omewhat unsystematic collection of auto­ biographies by s ociologists of the 1 9 6 0 s cohort. 1 2 6 . The Resources of Critique. an incisive. Its sociological core is the concept of class as exploitation.

Ibid . Over time. the 'universal basic income'. class actors adapt their strategie s in order to take advantage of the weaknesses in existing institutional arrange­ ments. . but that should not detract from the immense value of their concise. with a few local exceptions in Indo-Latin America) . and these changes continually pose new problems of social reproduction . as a sympathetic observer of Kerala. While aware of the implications attendant upon a nineteenth-century 'ism'. 4 7 3 . Tripura or 1 28 . concrete and j argon-free restatement of Marxism as a contemporary science. ' 1 29 Instead of going on to demonstrate the p ower of this programme. these adaptive strategies tend to erode the ability of institutions of social reproduction to effectively regulate and contain class struggles . in which those who are harmed will try to change the relation in que stion. 1 3 0 LOOKING AHEAD What emerges. 474. In the North Atlantic region (and the rest of the world is not so different. Marxist politics has either disappeared or become completely marginalized.178 FRO M MARXI S M T O P O ST MARXISM? structure. markets. . 1 28 Reproduction is especially problematic and conflictual for class relations : ' S ocial relations within which antagonistic interests are generated will have an inherent tendency to generate conflicts. at best. Ibid . 1 29 . . and other aspects of capitalist relations. first of all. . the authors veer off into one of their pet utopias. Ibid. Second. Burawoy and Wright retain it as a marker of belonging to and continuing a tradition. from this overview is the uneven effect of the broken triangle of classical Marxism politics. 460n. . 1 3 0 . social science and philosophy. .

even the more recent moments of Althus ser. has not surrendered. from Kautsky to Lenin. a sense of outrage . But whether they will see the dawn of a different future in the same colours is uncertain. formative generational experiences tend to have enduring effects. Twenty-first-century anti­ capitalist resisters and critics are unlikely to forget the socialist and communist horizons of the past two hundred years . Its greatest moments may have passed : not only the moment of Marx and Engels. noted above. Coming philosophers are almo st certain to publish new readings of Marx. The value o f the thematic changes in discourse. particularly of thos e radicalized before the romantic moment of 1 968. but they do not appear to be promising objects of denun­ ciation. bright red just three decades ago. forty or fifty years ago . On the other hand. and will continue to produce. What abo ut the prospects ahead? C apitalism still produces. of Eastern and Southern Marxism from Mao to Mariategui. perhap s even improbable . and this writer's critical distance is. The left-wing generation of the 1 9 60s. it has been suspended. but it does nevertheless include rallying points for ne arly everybody on the Left. say.AFTE R DIALE C T I C S 179 West Bengal might put it. is debatable. a line of continuity from the nineteenth through the twentieth and twenty­ first centuries will remain. left-wing intellectual creativity has not ceased. about his comrades or former comrades . New cohorts of anticapitalist social scientists . His views are those of someone from the 1 9 60s generation. of Western Marxism from Lukacs to Gramsci. of course. But there is much m ore of an intellectual Left production today than. To that extent. The socialist horizon. However. The existing repertoire of positions is unlikely to please everyone. in resistance as well as in critique. suspect. but also th at of the Second International. has vanished. writing about his contempo raries. Bourdieu and their different national equivalents.

Hence the extraordinary imp ortance of global theorizing and. and many will read Marx. The new radical elan of Latin America awaits its major analyses.1 80 FROM MARXI S M TO PO ST MARXISM? will certainly emerge. That is still the base whence the most deadly bombers and missiles take off. The small left-wing Chinese intelligentsia has the incomparable advantage of a front-row seat for the current turn of world history. of global empirical investigations . even more. This was the generation that lived b oth the peak of working-class strength in develope d capital­ ism and the beginning of its decline. and criticized. From the cross-fertilization of domestic place­ holding Indian Marxism and the 'postcolonial' creativity of South Asia's brilliant intellectual diaspora should come something which rises to the level of the region's rising impo rtance and intriguing complexity. in 1 968. but it may b e doubted whether many will find it meaningful to call themselves Marxists . It was the generation which lived through. In the current situation. a certain defiant humility seems . but it is no longer the chief front on which the destiny of capitalism in the twenty-first c entury will b e decided. a perspective that had opened up in 1 78 9 and 1 9 1 7 . it experienced the genuine sex and gender revolution of the late twentieth century. It saw both the image of revolution. In the interim. and the implosion of the revolu­ tionary perspective in 1 9 89-9 1 . the climax of North Atl antic capitalism and which went on to witness the return of East and S outh Asia to the front stage of the world. These are s ources from which invaluable contributions can be expected to spring. For contingent. practical rea sons spaceltime availability and linguistic limitations this overview has been confined to the North AtlanticlNorth American area. not only towards b etter understandings of the world but also towards perspectives of change . The classical Marxist triangle has been broken and is most unlikely to be restored. The resilience of the 1 960s Left spans an important historical caesura.

AFTER D IALECTICS 181 t o be the most adequate intellectual stance. Humility before the coming new world and the learning and unlearning that it will call for. Defiance before the forces of capital and emp ire . . however powerful .

Theodor W. 1 1 . 49-5 1 AFRIC OM (United States Africa Command) . 1 2 1 -6n6 al-Jazeera. 9 2 . Giovanni. Elmar. 79 Popper and. 1 00 anticolonialism. 7 2 Mills and. Louis. 5 0 AKP Gustice and Develop­ ment Party [Turkey] ) . 1 00 Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism. 9 1 materialism and. 83 Negative Dialectics. 8 5 . 1 5 5-56 . 1 37-3 8 . 9 1 . 1 06 Anti-Imperialistic League. 1 66 Eastern European regimes and. 1 09. 9 9 . Jeffrey. 1 5 3. 77n30 Minima Moralia. 1 3 9 anarchism. 1 4 5. 85 Adorno. 9 5 Anderson. 5 1 . 5 3 Althusser. 1 00. 1 7 4 Adam Smith in Beijing (Arghi). 1 74 Arrighi. Das (journal) . 70. 1 1 8. Actuel Marx (journal) . 1 7 3re Anderson. critical theory and. 1 09 Adorno. 7 6-77 sociology and. 95 anarchosyndicalism. Theodor W. 78. Samir. Perry. Perry: Works Lineages of the A bsolutist State. 34-3 8 Argument. 1 26 American Sociological Association. 145. 83 Africa. 89. 1 73. 1 3 9. 1 59 Amin. 105 antimodernism.Index Locators in italics indicate illustrations . : Works Dialectic of Enlightenment. Max. 83 Korreferat. 1 55 Adler. 1 5 3 . 1 47 Altvater. 8 5 . 40-4 1 Alexander. 93 Western Marxism and. 1 06. 30. 1 74 American Right. 1 05 .

1 2 6. 1 7 6 Binghamton (NY) . 9 2 Bensa'id. Tony. 1 4. 1 0. Walter. E tienne. Hugo. 1 68 Beauvoir. 1 1 5-1 6 Central European Marxism. 1 37 Bin Laden. 63 China . 48. 1 3 9 Chavez. 63-64 Butler. 1 79 capitalist modernity. 1 1 3 Benjamin. 1 47-48. 1 3n6 capitalism. George W. 1 55 Brenner Debate. 1 3 1-32 Balibar. 1 27. 69. Ulrich: Works Gross Koalition. 1 27 . 1 30 British Industrial Revolution. 1 42 . 8 5 . Judith. 4n2. Pierre. Robert. 1 5 0 Callinicos. 7 1 . 4 6 . Ernst. 1 29 . 1 62 Bowles. 94 Bauer. 1 7 6-7 7 Calvinist churches. Samuel. 1 3 3 B olivar. 1 0 3 Bardhan. 5 5 Canada. 68. 45 Cheney. Daniel. Simone de. 88 Boron. 40. 1 67. 68 Beck. 60. Alain. 54. 1 22 Cardoso. Nestor Garcia. 9 8-9 9 British Academy. 1 02. 6 3 Bush administration. 6 1 -62. Fernand. Fernando Henrique. 1 5 3 Chandra. 1 7 1 -72 Catholic ChUrch. Michele. 42. 1 2 5 Capital (Marx) . 1 7 3 capital balance. 89 Bauman.1 84 INDEX ASEAN (Association of South­ east Asian Nations) . 20 Badiou. 1 04 Bretton Woods. 1 3 8-3 9. 4 2 Blair. 1 2 6 Belle Epoque. 9 5 Cambodia. 1 6 1 Beck. August. 3 5 Augustine. Saint. Roland. 1 5 6. 4 5 Baran. 1 5 2. 139 Bidet. Terrell. 95 Catholicism. 1 60 Beyond US Hegemony (Amin). 9 6 . 40 Burawoy. Atilio. 5 5 ATTAC (Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions for the Aid of Citizens). 1 65 Bank of the South. 1 03-4. 1 1 0. 86. Bipan. .1 6 Capital and Class (journal) . 1 3 9 Brazil. 1 7 6 Beyond Left and Right (Giddens) . Michael. Paul. 1 27 Risk Society. 47 Candini. 4 5 Brenner. Dick. 1 5 1 . 44. 33 Bourdieu. 1 6. 1 5 Britain. Manuel. 1 03 Carver. 1 54. 1 07 Chaos and Governance in the Modem World System (Arrighi and Silver) . vii 'Bolshevism as a Moral Problem' (Lukacs) . Jacques. 1 64 Castells. 1 7 7 Bush. 1 5 6 Barrett. The (Brenner) . Osama. Otto. Pranab. 89 authoritarianism. 34 capital. Zygmunt. Simon. 1 43 Buddhism. 1 43 . Ulrich. 6 3 Bloch. transnational. 1 5 6 Braudel. Alex. 1 37 Boer. 8 5 . 1 3 3 Austro-Marxism. 94 Bebel. 1 1 3.

1 0 9 C old War. 1 6. 1 00. Lucio. 1 1 2 Czechoslovakia. 69-7 0. 9 5 Christianity. 34 Cohen. 1 3 1 Cuba. x democracy Christian. 3 2 Davis. 9 1 colonialism. 45 Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (C ODESRIA) . 1 74 Critique of Dialectical Reason (Sartre) . 1 67 Debray. 56 Cultural Revolution. 5 6 Marxism in. 80 reception of. 5 6 . 3 1 -32 Delanty. 1 1 2. 40 City of God (Augustine). 1 3 1 . 1 5 9 Debray. 1 4 0-4 5 Clinton. 1 1 Cuban Revolution. 85. 1 02n78 Communist Manifesto. 1 66 classical texts of. 5 5 . 3 3-34 class. 1 3 5 CPI (M) (Communist Party of India [Marxist] ) . 7 7-7 8 German critical theory. 64. 1 05 Comintem. 72-73. 1 3 1 God. eds). Darwinism. 4-5. 1 5 9 Christian democracy. 56. ed. 5 6 economics and.). 1 3. 1 00. 34 coupon socialism. Regis. 49 Communism in. 1 6 1 -6 3 . 1 46. 50. 1 66 Marcuse and. 56. Hillary. 7 0-72. 1 3 1 deference. 9. 70-72. 1 9-2 1 deindustrialization. 1 22 Communist Party. 8 2 development of. Rafael. The (Marx) . Nicolaus. x Congo-Kinshasa. 3n l . 1 0 5 Communism. 24. 7 7-78 critique. Mike. Noam. 90-92 political economy and. 27. 49 collectivism. Gerard.1 4 C orreia. 20 Colletti. 1 . 29. 7 2 73 October Revolution and. 1 7 6 critical theory Adorno and. vii. 4-5. 9 5 social. 1 07 Chomsky. 5 3 . 9 6-97 .IN D E X 185 Africa and. 69. 1 3 3 civil society. 24. 1 04-5 Western Marxism and. 1 1 2 development in. 1 1 . 1 8. Gerald Allan. 54 Companion to Social Theory (Turner. 131 feu sacre. 2 6-27. 5 0 C ongress o f Oppressed Peoples. 5 4 in Mumbai. 67. 7 7-78 Critique (journal) . 1 9. 1 05 Copernicus. 83-84 criticism. 1 66 Horkheimer and. Le. 1 22 corporations. 1 60 ClAS C O (Latin American Council of Social Sciences). 1 5 5-5 6 geopolitics in. 3 5 Critical Companion to Contemporary Marxism (Bidet and Kouvelakis. Regis: Works Critique of Political Reason. 64 CODES RIA (Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa) . 99 Critique of Political Reason (Debray) .

8 3 dialectics. 1 0 8. Western Europe European Left. 1 5 6 . Rene. Jacques. 1 5 9. 2 1 Fanon. 70. 1 62 feu sacre. Terry. 1 4 9-5 1 Forces o Labour (Silver). 5 3 Democratic Party (Italy) . 53 Dialectical Investigations (Oilman) . 1 32. 70. Nancy. 1 8 0 Ecuador. 1 17 enlightenment.1 1 E astern Europe. 9 8 . 7 8 . 4 5 Edwards.1 86 Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) . 1 4 3 Friedmann. 9 9 development. 1 6 1 D errida. 1 43 . 7 1 environmentalism. 1 64 Descartes. 1 3 5-3 6 Eros and Civilization (Marcus e) . 1 53-57. 22-23. Eclipse of Reason. 1 7 5.1 9 General Theory of Exploitation and Class. Frantz. 1 8. 68. The (Horkheimer) . 9 7. 7 3 Deutscher. 1 45 Frankfurt S chool. 1 74 'From the Class Struggle to the Struggle without Classes' (Balibar) . 94-95 . Andre Gunder.1 0 1 . 1 8 East Asian outward-development model. A (Roemer) . 73 Dobb. Isaac. 9 9 France. 67. 83-84 feminism. 1 0 5 the Liberation of Palestine) . 7 2 . Maurice. Georges. Albert. 9 1 . 2 7 . 5 8-59. 1 4 2 fundamentalism. 1 49-5 0 Economics of Global Turbulence. Wolfgang. 71. 60. 47-4 9 . 4 6 Einstein. 9 3 Fritz. 1 74 See also Eastern Europe. 1 64. 20-2 1 futurism. Bela. 1 3 3 East Asia. 8 9-90 Fogarasi. 1 45. 1 54 economies. 1 1 2 empire. 1 69 employment. Le (Debray) . 1 7 5 Dialectic of Enlightenment (Horkheimer and Adorno ) . 1 6 6 Desai. 27. 8.1 0 Discourse o n Method (Descartes ) . 9 6-9 7 . 1 08. The (Brenner) . 1 6. 3 8 . political. John. 3 7 DFLP (Demo cratic Front for INDEX Encyclopedie. 1 1 3 Empire (Hardt and Negri) . 1 72 f For Marx (Althusser) . 1 59 European Marxism. 9 6 . 78 Europe. 3 7 develop mentalism. 3 7 Envisioning Real Utopias (Wright) . 7 8 1 67 French Revolution. 9 9 Eagleton. 8 2-84 Fraser. 1 5 2. 67. 1 73 evangelicalism. 1 40. 1 03. 1 6 1 Democratic Party of the Left (Italy) . 1 3 4-40 gender. 3 1 -32. Meghnad. Friedrich. 1 3 1 Finance Capital (Hilferding) . 1 3 0-3 3 . 1 2 2 Engels. 1 1 2 Frank. 47-48. 9 6 .

1 3 3 . 7 1 homosexuality. 9 6 Habermas. 9 6 68n2 G-20/G-22. Jiirgen. 9 2 . 8 9-90 Hill. Globalization and Egalitarian Redistribution (Bardhan. 92. 9 7 Gross Koalition (Be c k) . 1 6 6 Horkheimer. 40 1 3 2. ) . Hochfeld. Georges. 1 47 . 4 0 God (Debray) . Irfan. Eric. 9 1 Handbook on European Social Theory. 1 74. 9 8 Social Democratic Party of. 38. 7 5 so ciology and. 94. 1 0 7 Gulf Press. 47-4 9 in North America. 1 6 5 'Her Maj esty's Loyal Opposition'. 1 3 6-37 Frigga. 5 5. Haug. 4 0 Hobsbawm. 1 04 Western Marxism and. 8 5 . 34. 83 and. 1 1 7 Historical Materialism (journal) . Michael. 7 2 . The (Engels and Marx) . Habib. 1 27 Guha. 9 7 Hizbollah. 9 3 Wallerstein and. 8 6 Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (La cl au and M ouffe ) . Antonio. 1 3 2 . 1 42 Goldmann. 85 Horkheimer. Andrew. John. 84. Christopher. 6 3 Germany. The (Delanty. 1 02 critical theory and. 90. 1 5 4. 98 historical materialism. 1 4 1 . Ho Chi Minh. Wolfgang Fritz. 1 3 3 1 5 2. x Hardt. 1 3 1 Godelier. 5 3 Gurvitch. ed .7 3 . Alvin Ward. Lucien. 7 1 Gramsci. 1 2 3 . 4 8 Gouldner. ) . 4 1 -45 in West Asia. Sidney. Julian. Maurice. 1 66-67 Hook. Ranajit. 1 69.IND EX 1 87 geo p oli tic s in Mrica. 70. 5 3. 1 0 6 Holy Family. 78. 8 7 . 1 60 H ege lian Marxism. 9 9 86.5 5 in Southeast Asia. 5 4 glo baliz ati on. Anthony. Harvey. 9 1 Gorbachev. 156 Glyn. Max 166 Eastern European regimes social s c i e nc e and. 8 5 . Mikhail. ed. 1 0 1 Go l dth o rp e . 9 8 History and Class Consciousness (Lukacs) . 1 47. 8 3 . 66. 1 7 1 . 8 9 History of the Condition of the W orking Class under Capitalism (Kuczynski) . D avid. 1 23 Hi1ferding. 1 07 Hamas. 79-82. Axel.5 5 Historian 's Group of the Communist Party (Great Britain). 1 74 Haug. 1 5 0 Honneth. Max: Works Dialectic of Enlightenment. 5 5 after the Soviet Union. 4 5-47 in Northeast Asia. 1 7 6 Historisch-Kritisches Worterbuch des Marxismus (encycl opaedia) .5 6 in South Asia. Rudolf. 32 Giddens. 87-8 8 . 1 74-7 5 Hindutva. 5 1 -5 3 German Greens. 4 9-5 1 in Europe.

1 1 6 Islamo-Fascism Awareness Week. 1 5 9 resilience of. 77n30 Korsch. 1 00 Kashmir. 9 1 . 3 3-34 Lefebvre. 1 80 non-Marxist Left. 9 6 Road to Power. The. Bob. 47 irreverence. Karl. 1 6 5-66 Laos. 46 Kuczynski. 3 3 interterritorial actors. 1 1 5. 1 7 2-78 successes of. Immanuel. 1 7 6 Jones. 28. 1 1 6 See also neoliberalism Limits on Growth (Meadows). 1 48. 60. 1 8 imperialism. 1 0 India. 1 69 Leninism. 1 07 Kouvelakis. Alexandra. 4-5 . 89. Gareth Stedman. 1 5 9 failures and defeats of. 68 income redistribution. 83. D . 74-75 Kollontai. Octavio. 5 4 Kautsky. 7 1 Lenin. 9 8 Itoh. Alexander. 1 09 Left. 3.188 INDEX The Eclipse of Reason. 1 60 Kerr. 3 1 Latin America. Makoto. 8 3 Social Revolution. 6 0-6 1 liberalism. 5 3 Italy. Fredric. 1 1 1 . 1 4 1 . 1 0 8 Jay. D . David. 1 47 . 68.1 6. 8 5 . 8 5 . 1 76 Kucinich. 87. 46 Israel. 3 Iraq war. John. Vladimir Ilyich. 97 Kwasniewski. 9 1 Kosambi. 1 7. 4-5 . 7 2-73 . 2 3-25 1 960s generation. Dennis. 9 6 . 1 5 8 Left Hegelians. 40-4 1 Kant. The. 20 Indonesia. 1 7 9. 54. 1 5 1 . Ernesto. 75 Horowitz. Die. 84. the European. Martin. 3 0-3 1 . 3 4 IMF (International Monetary Fund). 2. 46 Ianni. 22 Islamism. 5 5 . 1 0 2 Knowledge for What? (Lynd) . 1 08 Jameson.. 1 06 industrialization. 1 8-2 1 . 1 06-7 individualism. 9 6 . 1 34-3 5 Japan. 32. Stathis. 1 40 Justice and Development Party (AKP [Turkey] ) . 5 5 Late Capitalism (Mandel) . 1 2 1 . . 4 8 LacIau. 92. 8 3 Keane. 9 5 . 1 8 See also deindustrialization industrial working-class movement. 90. 94 Korpi. Karl: Works Neue Zeit. 1 27. 1 1 . 1 6 1-63 North Americans. 9 3 . 52. Walter. 1 0 5 Jessop. 85. 67. 56. 1 1 3 Imperialism (Lenin) . 4 1 . Karl. 37 . 1 9 institutional innovation. 98. Charles H. 1 1 7 . Jurgen. 1 80 Latin American Council of Social Sciences (CLAS CO). 1 3 1 . 1 1 7 Kautsky. 1 6 1-62 Korreferat (Adorno). 22-23 theoretico-political positions of. 7 1 Karl Marx 's Theory of History (Cohen) . 83. Henri.

1 73 feminism and. 8 5 Lukacs. 89 in Britain. 83 Soviet Marxism. 8 5 . 78 One-Dimensional Man. 88 History and Class Consciousness. 1 24 Habermas and. 1 1 3. 97-1 0 1 . 1 02. 6 9 . Ernest. 89 'Tactics and Ethics'. 1 2 8 Lowenthal. Mahmood. 96. The (Thompson) . 99. 96-97 in Eastern Europe. 1 1 7 Marcuse. 9 8 in Japan. 8 6 history of. 1 08 language of. 49 Luxemberg. 3 3. 1 1 7. 90 Lukacs. 1 05 in Czechoslovakia. 9 6 Hegelian Marxism. viii Leninism and. 3 8. 1 00 Linera. 1 53 in China.INDEX 1 89 Lineages of the Absolutist State (Anderson). 1 5 8-5 9 in Italy. 56. Rosa. 1 30. 1 1 0. 1 06 as an intellectual tradition. 8 0 historical materialism and. 1 2 2 The Holy Family. 1 1 7 m odernity and. Michael. 8 5 Marcuse. transnational.1 8 . Jean-Fran�ois. 1 5 2 Mao Zedong. Karl: Works Capital. 1 40 Mamdani. 7 1 critique of political economy. 89 Lumumba. 68-9.5 8 markets. 1 7 5 developmental history and. 3 0 Making of the English Working Class. 9 5 legacy of. 87-88. 1 79 Marxism and. 1 76 Marxism in academia. 94-95 in France. 1 02 market dynamics. 1 1 7 . 1 6. 9 1 Mariategui. Jose Carlos. 1 1 6-20. 1 03 Western Marxism and. 1 4. 1 0 1 anticolonialism and. 1 64. Georg.1 6 Marx. 96-9 7 European Marxism. vii. 1 22 theory of social dialectic. Georg: Works 'Bolshevism as a Moral Problem' . ix. 1 0 5 Austro-Marxism. 98 in Germany. 1 07 colonialism and. 94-97. 1 22 The Communist Manif esto. 1 4. vii. 1 7 8. Robert. 83. 7 1 Marx for Our Times (Bensai'd). Alvaro Garcia. 87-89. 8 6 . 67. 176. 9 6. Herbert critical theory and. 9 3 i n the US. 1 75. 74-7 5 Lyotard. 60-6 1 Marx and. 1 3 8-39 Lynd. 7 3 sociology and. 8 5 Mann. Herbert: Works Eros and Civilization. Leo. 3 1 . 7 1 . 1 1 7 legacy. vii-ix critique and science. 1 06 Mandel. 83-84. 79 Marx. 1 20. Karl. 1 4 9 . 72. 98-99 Central European Marxism. Patrice. 69. 5 7. 1 0 6-7 in Indonesia. 96. 1 07. 9 6. 1 80 in India.

1 0 1 . 1 28 definition of. 1 1 7 Materialism and Empirio-Criticism (Lenin) . 1 64-6 5 Marx's Revenge (Desai). 83 . Juliet. 79 Minima Moralia (Adorno) . 94-9 7. 84 Matzner. 6 8 Navarro. p ostmodernism modernity American Right and. 1 2 1 n6 See also antimodernism. 1 74 Monthly Review Press. 1 08 Mouffe. 1 1 3-1 6 modernization. 66-70. 1 1 6. 1 1 2 in 1 980s and 1 99 0s. 38 modernity and. 1 06. 1 2 0-2 2 Her Majesty's Loyal Opposition and. Mishio. 2 8-29. 8 3-92. 1 5 0 Monde Diplomatique. Toril. 7 5-76. 37 Meillassoux. vii. 9 7 political economy and. Maurice. 5 8 i n Western Europe. 8 3 . 1 5 9. 68-69. 86 migration. 1 69 Mumbai Economic and Political Weekly. 1 1 3. 89. 1 2 3 Ottoman Empire and. 1 2 5 and colonialism. 1 2 8 Morishima. 9 6 O ctober Revolution and. 1 1 8 in P oland. 3 8 . 1 4 1 . 62-65 Morales. 1 2 5 right-wing revival of. 1 07. Vicente. Wright. 66-70. Evo. 1 08 postmodernism and. 1 5 3 Meadows. 9 7 See also post-Marxism Marxism and Philosophy (Korsch) . 5 4 Mumbai Social Forum. 1 09. 83-84. 3 5 Monthly Review (journal) . 66 as intellectual position. 1 09. 1 0 1-8 in 1 960s and 1 970s. 9 9 . 1 2 5 i n Russia. 83 Mitchell. D onella H. 1 64 materialism. 1 05 . Harbans. 1 49. 1 09. 1 64-6 5 social transformation and. 3 8 . Egon. 1 0 1 Merleau-Ponty. 45. 1 03 moral discourse. 3 2 tum of. 1 1 2. 90 Marxism Today (journal) . 1 2 6-2 7 Marx and. 1 07.190 INDEX modernism and. 1 5 2. 1 68-7 2 in the New Worlds.. C.1 4 i n Norway. 7 2. 1 53 in Yugoslavia. 1 22-25 neo-Marxisrn. 1 22-2 5 narratives of. 32. The (Bauer) . 85. 1 0 8 postmodernism and. 94-97. 9 6 Scientific Marxism. 12 1n6 Moi. Le (journal). 1 28 Nationalities Question and Social Democracy. 1 3 0 Marxology. 1 6 5-6 6 Mukhia. 27-2 9 . 1 47. 1 0 7 Multitude (Hardt and Negri) . 94 modernism. 1 00. 1 1 8 Western Marxism. 1 42 Negative Dialectics (Adorno) . 47 Mills. Chantal. 9 6 i n Pakistan. 1 2 6 capitalist modernity. Claude. 1 6 5 . 1 74 Marxist Historiography (conference) . 20. 1 0 3. 1 0 6 philosophers of. 1 2 2 Marxism and.

1 49. 1 6 8-7 2 neo-Ricardians. Renato. 3 4 Ossowski. 1 00 political spaces. 1 7 5 On Belief (Z izek) . 5 7-6 5 political sphere. 1 5 1-53 Ortiz. 1 6 5-68 postmodernism. 1 2 5 neo-Marxism. 5 0 Nobel Prize. y and the State (Engels). Stefan. 1 3 1 -32 Persistent Inequality in 1 56 Peruvian Communism. 67 See also modernism .5 6 North Korea. 4. 5 1 -52 OIlman. 1 02n78 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PLFP). 1 7 1 neoliberalism. 4 5-47 North American Left. 9 7 Ottoman Empire. 5 4 Oakley. a C ompetitive World (proj ect) . Jackson. 1 9 . l On5 Offe. 1 00. Ann. Private Property. The (Z izek) . 9 7 political economy. 1 2 2 Positivismusstreit. 4 6 O ctober Revolution. 1 2 5. 1 69-7 0. x. Karl. 2 1 -2 6 Pollock. Die (Kautsky) . 191 1 65. 1 6 6 oil. 80. Bertell. 5-7. 5 3-54. Pablo. 1 5 0 O bama. 1 3 2 Parallax View. Origin of the Famil . 1 27 1 20-28. 9 5 6.1 0 1 . 90-9 2. 30 Popper. 1 7 5 . 1 3 3 . 83 On Populist Reason (Laclau) . 1 6 1 -6 3 North Mrica. 6 2 North America. Saint. 1 7 2-73 New Worlds. 1 4 1 On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres (Copernicus) . 1 0 6 Palestine. Political Power and Social Classes (Poulantzas). 1 3 2 . 5 3 Poland. 42 Northeast Asia. 1 6 Planet of Slums (Davis) .INDEX Negri. 99. 1 00 Past and Present (journal) . 1 5 3-5 7 . 1 1 2 non-conformism. 1 9 PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) . 2 0 . 1 0 1 -8 Nigeria. 7 8 Pollock. 1 5 2. 1 0 8 Pakistan. 5 3 Passages from A ntiquity to Feudalism (Anderson ) . Claus. 1 5 3 Netherlands. 1 4 5. 1 80 1 08. 6 2 Paul. Antonio. 96 New Left Review (j ournal) . 5 5. Friedrich. 60. 3 3 non-Marxist Left. 1 5 9 North Atlantic world domination. 29-32. 7 6-79 populism. dynamics of. 96 nuclear weapons. 7. 1 69 Organization (PLO). One-Dimensional Man (Marcuse) . Augusto. 9 8 patriarchy. 8. 96 OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) . 1 12 Pinochet. 7 6 post-Marxism. 5 1-5 2 Palestine Liberation Neue Zeit. 24 Norway. Barack. 5 3 Picasso. 2 0 networks.

9 5 . Mies van der. 1 09 Science and Society (journal). 1 2 1 -2 2 Right. 32 slums. 1 5 6 Russia. 1 2 6 Risk Society (Beck) .1 4. 35 socialism. James C . 1 1 2. Nicos. Beverly. 9 1 . 48-49. 93. 1 28 racism. 1 5 6 public-order controls. 5 5 Singular Modernity. Jozef. Vladimir. 1 9 Smith. 156 Rohe. Jean-Paul. 1 06 Silver. 1 5 0 Quijano. 1 5 5 Sneevliet. 79 social formation. 9 9 . 1 3 5-3 6 Renner. distribution of. 1 6. 98 social Darwinism. 1 6. 1 3 7 Prison Notebooks (Gramsci ) . 3 2 social democracy. 49 queer theory. 86-87. 1 6 1 -63 social dialectic. 9 6 Sader. 38. 1 74 socialization. 1 5 3 Reading Capital (Althusser) . John. Joan. Amartya. Emir. 1 7 3 . 1 6. 3 4 Scott. 4 3 Seven Essays of Interpretation of Peruvian Reality (Mariategui). Moishe. Issa. 8 9 Rethinking Marxism (journal) . 1 64-6 5 Scott. 1 1 8 See also coupon socialism. 74 Social Forum movement. 1 7 4 Scientific Marxism. 1 40 Second International. 1 64 Postone. 1 63 September 1 1 . 69. Albert. 30 Socialist Register (journal). 1 3 5-36. 1 2 1 n6 Social Revolution. 1 45 . 83 . 29. 40 Przeworski. 1 1 7 secularization. 3 0-3 1 Postmodern Marx (C arver) . 1 0 5 Soboul. 3 3 Sartre. 1 74 revolution. Karl. The (Kautsky) . John: Works General Theory of Exploitation and Class. 30 Russell Sage Foundation. Henricus. Adam. . 1 26 Road to Power. 8 5 . 1 00 power. A. trans­ socialism Socialisme ou Barbarie (France). 1 74 Revai. American. 200 1 terrorist attacks. 1 5 9-6 1 Poulantzas. 1 4 3 radicalism. 1 5 6 Roemer. 1 02 sexuality.1 7 social modernism. 1 7 5 postsocialism. A Gameson). 1 5 6 Theories of Distributive Justice. 1 74 Protestantism. 1 1 3 Prokla (journal) . 1 4 5 . 1 9 Sen. Adam. 8 3 Revista del Manifesto (journal) . 1 5 9. theory of. 99 Real Utopias Project (series) . Richard. 26 Putin. postsocialism. 1 5 6 Sennett. 1 7 2 Singapore.192 INDEX Postmodernism Gameson) . 1 49-5 1 Shivji. 1 59 . The (Kautsky) . 1 3 9. 1 4 5 . 84 privatization. Anibal. 1 1 1 . 83 Roemer.1 8. 2-3 Principle of Hope (Bloch) .

1 6 transnational markets. 1 6 theology. 1 8. Pitirim. 1 02. 1 3 4-40 Uno. Les (Bourdieu) . George. 2 9 Sraifa. 5 3-5 5 Southeast Asia. Bryan. 1 0 3 . Labor and Social Domination (Postone) . 1 62 Sorokin. 9 2 . 69-70. 1 60-6 1 Thompson. 45-4 7 . international. 1 0 1 Stalin. 7 3 transnational capital. 1 49. 1 5 1 Ticklish Subject. Piero. 85 Turner. 1 1 7 State and Revolution (Lenin) . 1 7 3 Spaces of Hope (Harvey) . 1 30-3 3. 79 Third International. 1 69 Suez invasion. 1 2 traditional theory. 1 3 6 Spain. 1 7 6 totality. 1 49. 9 9 . Emmanuel. Edward. 1 63 South Africa. The (Sweezy) . 1 29. 1 69 states. Kazo. 1 6 United States. 9 3. 1 34-0 Theories of Distributive Justice (Roemer) . x Unger. 2 Trotskyism. 89 technologies. Boaventura de. 1 08 urbanization. 1 69 Tilly. 1 64 social security. 3 Suhrkamp Verlag (publisher) . 1 57-5 9. Joseph. 1 63 Time. 1 05 Third Way. 3 6 . 50 South Asia. 1 3. 1 1 2 Sweezy.INDEX 193 social sciences. 1 0 1 Thatcher. 1 07 Subaltern Studies (Guha) . 49 Sozialismus (jaurnal). 7-1 5. 43 Tosel. 1 5 6 Theory of Capitalist Development. 6 1-65 transterritorial actors. Herbert. 1 06. 1 40 Thomson. Roberto Mangabeira. 26 television. 1 64 Spencer. The Clizek). The (Mills) . 9 9 'Three C oncepts of Politics ' (Balibar) . 34. 1 1 . 2 6 Temps Modernes. 7 5 .1 4. 1 49. 1 6 2-63 Unidad Popular (Chile). Margaret. 1 7 5 torture. 1 02 Theory of Communicative Action (Habermas) . 4 1 --4 5 . 24. 1 45-49 Stiglitz. 1 8 . 1 26 sustainable development. 7 7 . 1 4. 1 5 6 Subaltern Studies (group). Paul. Les (journal). 1 74 Terray. 1 0 social theory. 5 5 South Korea.1 6 trans-socialism. 26 telecommunications. 1 03 'Tactics and Ethics' (Lukacs). 1 2 Specters of Marx (Derrida) . 1 0 2 trade. 45 structures sociales de l 'economie. Charles. 75-7 6 sociology. 87 T oward the Understanding of Karl Marx (Hook). Joseph. 9 1 Soviet Union. 1 63 Sociological Imagination. 34 Sublime Object of Ideology. Andre. The (Zizek) . 9 7 . 5 6 Soviet Marxism (Marcuse) . 3 7 Sweden. 1 4. 96 Sousa Santos.

1 1 7 Wobblies. 94 Zizek. 1 0 5 Wright. 1 3 3 Woman and Socialism (Bebel). 1 5 3-54. 1 69 Ticklish Subject. 68 Workers' Party (PT [Brazil] ) . 1 5 1 . 6 2 West Asian Islamist militancy. Robert. 5 3-5 4 Western Europe. 4 8 Wallerstein. 2 2 West Asia. 97 Zeitschri for Sozia/forschung ft (journal) . 153 "What Should the Left Propose? (Unger). 40 World Bank. 163 world-systems analysis. 63-64. 1 1 8 Western Marxism. 1 32. 89. 1 69-70 Zizek. 1 48. 48-49 Yugoslavia. 3 0 W ealth of Nations. 155 Weber. 1 3 0 Williams. 3. 1 5 1 'Why S ocialism?' (Einstein) . Slavoj. 3 5-36. 1 3 5-36. 4 9 utopia. 5 5 violence. 1 5 3-54 Wretched of the Earth. 1 1 2. Erik Olin. 3. 177 WTO (World Trade O rganization). 1 6 9 . 1 69 Sublime Object of Ideology. Max. 3 0 Vietnam. 99. 1 1 2 Wickham. 99. Chris. 1 7 5 welfare statism. 7-8. 1 32 Parallax View. Boris. 1 34-3 7 Utopistics (Wallerstein) . 1 06.1 94 INDEX USSR. Lech. Andy. 1 04. 1 3 7 . 1 3 9. The (Smith). 84. Clara. 4 1 -45. The. 1 6 8. 1 44. 1 4 1 . 1 3 Volpe. 54 Yeltsin. Immanuel. The. 1 8 World Social Forums. Slavoj: Works On Belief. 1 3 8. 24. 1 04 Wissenschaft. 8 3-92. 8 1 n42 Zetkin. 5 1 -53. Raymond. Harrison. Galvano Della. 1 6 3 White. 3 5 . The. 8 5 Walesa. 1 37 Venturi. 1 5 6 Warhol. 1 48 Vodafone. The (Fanon) .

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