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Acronyms…………………………………………………………………………………………..i Executive Summary………………………………………………………………………………iii Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………..1 Past and Present U.S. Policy Towards Africa………………………………………………….….2 Africa’s Security Challenges and U.S. Security Interests…..…………...……………………….16 Security Challenges in Africa……………………………………………………………16 U.S. Security Interests…………………………………………………………………… 25
Nature of the Problem………….………………………………………………………………...31 Consequences……………………………………………………………………….……31 Causes……………………………………………………………………………………40 Conditions and Trends…………………………………………………………………...40
Analysis of Policy Options………………………...…………………………………………….43 Criteria for Analyzing Policy Options……………………………………………...……44 Major Issues…………………………………………………………………………..….44
Recommendations………………………………………………………………………………..48 Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………….……52 References………………………………………………………………………………..………55 Figures…………………………………………………………………………………....……… 61 Figure 1: Non-Food Economic Aid to Africa (1996-2006)……………………………...61 Figure 2: Preexisting Command Setup New Command Setup…………………….…62
2 Figure 3: Current and Potential Effects of Environmental Degradation…………………63 Figure 4: Countries Requiring Food Assistance…………………………………………64 Figure 5: Effects of Weak Governance…………………………………………………..65 Figure 6: HIV Prevalence……………………………………………………………..…66 Figure 7: Malaria Prevalence…………………………………………………………….67 Figure 8: Youth Bulge Density…………………………………………………………..68 Figure 9: African Standby Force (Brigade Setup)………………………………...……..69
Appendix A: The Unified Combatant Command System……………………………………….70
Introduction On February 6, 2007 military organization, U.S. departmental interaction, and U.S. policy towards Africa took a controversial turn. Former President George W. Bush announced the creation of a new Unified Command, AFRICOM. He stated that the command’s purpose was to “strengthen our security cooperation with Africa and help to create new opportunities to bolster the capabilities of our partners in Africa…enhance our efforts to help bring peace and security to the people of Africa and promote our common goals of development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth in Africa”1. What appeared to be reorganization within the Department of Defense ushered in a new era of debate, focus, and
McFate, Sean. 2008. “U.S. Africa Command: A New Security Paradigm?” Military Review. JanuaryFebruary: 10.
3 analysis of U.S. foreign policy towards the African continent. On March 11, 2008 Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs Chairman, Senator Russ Feingold, stated in a hearing that, “This part of the world [Africa] is far too important for us to rely on narrow feeble policies, or half-hearted ad-hoc measures.”2 The policies and measures Feingold spoke of were components of past U.S. foreign policy towards Africa. The policy was and still is in serious need of reevaluation. The old archaic framework of African engagement that the U.S. has operated in is no longer a viable option for the strategic areas of importance the African continent plays in U.S. security interests. Africa has become strategically important to not just the United States, but to other countries around the world. This level of importance will continue to increase in the future. AFRICOM has encountered a two-front battle hindering its potential success. The first is the reception of AFRICOM within the United States. From Congress to non-profit organizations, AFRICOM has been vehemently opposed, reluctantly accepted, or heralded as an innovative approach to Africa. The second is the African response to AFRICOM. In Africa, mixed reactions from governments, institutions, and communities have created a public image and logistical nightmare for AFRICOM. The purpose of this paper is to better understand, as well as find solutions for AFRICOM’s strained reception on the continent of Africa. The U.S. Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs and Chairman, Senator Feingold, have been instrumental in holding hearings and drafting
Feingold, Russell. 2008. “Opening Statement of U.S. Senator Russ Feingold at a Hearing on Evaluating U.S. Policy Options on the Horn of Africa.” March 11. <http://feingold.senate.gov/record.cfm?id=305904
2009 from Department of State website: http://www.S. are defined by the perception each presidential administration held of the role of the U. Since the creation of AFRICOM.gov/st/peacesecenglish/2008/February/20080206163314dmslahrellek0.” 2008. policies towards Africa. Dan.-African relations. The Subcommittee is also accepting of innovative ideas to strengthen U. the inner workings of the U. USAF Institute for National Security Studies. policy from the Cold War to the present will be given a brusque overview. Through the framework of past U.pdf>. Feingold has visited the continent of Africa and met with leaders and officials a number of times. The U.” Regional Series.S. Military Involvements in Sub-Saharan Africa in the Wake of the Cold War. Broader changing policies.S.mil/df/inss/OCP/ocp18.S. the complexities of AFRICOM can be better understood. foreign policy towards Africa.america.S. Uncertain Vision: U.S. “Unchartered Paths.-African relations. and his influential role as Subcommittee Chairman enable him to be an effective force in implementing solutions for AFRICOM’s shortcomings. policy towards the African continent. government.html.S. towards Africa and the state of the international system at the time.S. Policy Towards Africa For half a century. the United States has maintained official ties with many African countries3. U.S.S. <www.”4 3 “U. 4 Henk. Retrieved March 1. 1998.4 proposals related to U.S. His understanding of Africa. has a deep history of engagement on the African continent.S. Such policy towards Africa has typically been reactive as opposed to proactive and “driven by events rather than to shape events.af.-Africa Relations Chronology.usafa. ix. which indicate the level of inconsistency that has existed in U. Senator Feingold has held and been a part of hearings structured to understand AFRICOM’s present and future role and effectiveness in U. .9545404. For the purposes of this paper. Past and Present U.
1992. Abel.113 7 “U. 6 Ibid. Foreign Affairs. further enlarged its focus on Africa through the establishment of the State Department’s Bureau of African Affairs in 19587. In 1961. 196111.S. “Remembering Africa”.S.-Africa Relations Chronology. Michael.5 Cold War Policy In 1952. North Africa was integrated in to the AOR of EUCOM5. had over increasing Soviet Influence on the African continent9. SSA was fully placed under the AOR of STRICOM in 196212.S. The first Peace Corps volunteers to work on the African continent were received in Ghana on June 4. The inclusion of more countries in Africa was due to the growing concerns the U.” 11 Ibid. This was due to the colonial history and connection between European and the African countries included in the Command6.S.114 10 “U. The U.S.S.-Africa Relations Chronology. administrations to support and ally themselves with African leaders they knew opposed communist ideology and reform. President Kennedy established USAID in order to promote development in developing countries and increase U. Other countries in Africa were integrated into perceived relevant U. Strategic Studies Quarterly. such as Africa10. with some countries in SSA included in LANTCOM in 19608. 159. influence in areas around the world. containment strategy for the Soviet Union and Communist ideology during the Cold War led U. . Spring: 113. 2008.. and could be swayed to lean towards U. interests13.S.S. 71(1). “The Iraqization of Africa: Looking at AFRICOM From a South African Perspective”. The U. which were typically autocratic and violated the 5 Esterhuyse. Much to the chagrin of many inside and outside of the African continent.S.” 8 Esterhuyse 113 9 Ibid. most leaders backed by the United States led corrupt regimes. Command structures. 12 Esterhuyse 115 13 Chege.
S. not much was said of his rigging of elections in 1985.S.S. The Journal of Modern African Studies. In the 1970’s. Due to the Cold War. and consistent human rights violator. Now the Democratic Republic of Congo 16 Chege 159 17 Volman.6 rights of many14. containment strategy on the continent18. CENTCOM and PACOM.S.S. One of the most notorious leaders to have U. Kenyan authoritarian leader. 18 Chege 160 19 Ibid. Daniel. Daniel Moi. Mobutu was crucial in ensuring that the Soviet as well as Cuban sponsored government in Angola was strategically countered by a Western ally in the same region16. policy of backing pro-American and anti-Soviet leaders continued well into the eighties. 20 Ibid. 22 Esterhuyse 115 23 Chege 156 .-African Communications network stationed in Monrovia during the 80’s19. support was Zairian15 dictator President Mobutu Sese Seko. was entrusted with ensuring the safety of the U. the ending of the Cold War decreased the geostrategic importance Africa held as an ideological and strategic battleground. 31:5. and many of his human rights violations20. Somalia became an ally to the U. Samuel K. Doe.23 Essentially. to counter Soviet ally. Somali leader Mohamed Siad Barre.17 The U. there remained few reasons as to why Africa would gain absolute importance at the top of the “global economic agenda” or strategic interests of 14 15 Ibid. he was consistently given aid.. in 1983 President Reagan divided AOR for Africa between three Commands: EUCOM. Ethiopia.S.. 21 Ibid.22 However. which totaled to approximately $550 million.S. Furthermore. “Africa and the New World Order”. Due to his strategic importance to the U. which was subsequently embezzled21. were two other African leaders who fit into the U. Former president of Liberia. and the interests of the U. 1993.
W. 28 Lawson 1 29 Ibid. “U.”26 Therefore. should have with African countries.S.28 One of the first steps was an international partnership conducted by the U.a world of ethnic antagonism. the U.S. 2007.29 This was surprising. Great Britain. spreading weaponry.S. religious tensions.”27 Bush’s “New World Order” philosophy consisted of a need to positively engage with African countries. and France tied potential aid to African countries with conditions of democratization. and help reach a settlement. national rivalries.W. Letitia. Democratic movements in Africa strengthened in 1991. for all our hope. Portugal.7 influential powers in the international system.S. which led to a shift in U. African Policy Since the Cold War.” Strategic Insights. it was essential that the U. since most of the countries involved in working to end the civil war had previously engaged in the country and perpetuated the civil war for their own gains.. “be prepared ‘to deal with a world that. Russia.24 President George H. policy towards Africa alongside a changing perception of the nature of the relationship the U.S. Bush ushered in a change of U.S. Cuba and South Africa to mediate in the Angolan civil war. Furthermore. Bush:” New World Order” Former President George H.S. was threatened by “turmoil and dangers in the developing world.S. 30 Chege 156 . Lawson.30 24 25 Ibid. personal ambitions and lingering authoritarianism.. Policy. in 1990. in a manner that was contrary to past Cold War involvement and interference. 6(1): 1 26 Volman 1 27 Ibid.25 Bush claimed that the ending of the Cold War had given way to an international system where the U. remains a dangerous place.
S. Herman Cohen. defend our vital installations. the Bush administration realized how extensive U. Mobutu. Zaire released a statement from Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs.S. there 31 32 Ibid.34 Therefore.”33 Resources towards countries. by stating.. cheered statements from the U. crowds yearning for freedom. Sudan and Zaire.S.S. maintain our access to their resources. interests in the democratization of African countries.S.”31 From 1990 to 1992. all of who were Cold War allies. protect our citizens abroad. General Alfred M.S. which were strengthening their democracies continued to increase. energy security was a second motivating factor for increased engagement on the continent. this time from domestic tyranny. stating. State Department as it distanced itself from the autocratic and unpopular leaders it once supported. energy interests in unstable African countries had become. 32 In 1991. the U.S. adhered to its policy change by cutting off aid to Liberia. the U. Gray. Marine Corps Commandant. is to have stability in these regions.”35 As the situation in Somalia began to deteriorate in the late ‘80’s and early ‘90’s. The American embassy in Kinshasa. and deter conflict…we must maintain within our active force structure a credible military power projection. summarized the various levels of interest Africa held to the U. In addition to U.8 “For the first time since the Kennedy administration's support for anti-colonial African nationalism. ended their support of one tine much-courted ally. “Mobutu has lost legitimacy and should hand over the government to an opposition-led transition.S.146 Lawson 1 33 Chege 160 34 Volman 1 35 Volman 2 . “if the U. Former U.
39 With the landing of the first U. eighteen U.38 By December. PDD-25. Clinton. launched “Operation Provide Relief” (UNOSOM-I).nvcc. Ibid.N. 1992.S. . 41 Schraeder. troops to “Operation Provide Relief”.S. 2001. soldiers were wounded and killed in Mogadishu. On December 5. 38 Snyder.N. which was intended to ensure that food aid was delivered to civilians in need.S. and other western states “adopted a hands-off attitude towards the chaos that began to engulf the country. Issue: A Journal of Opinion. Marines in Somalia in December. Ibid. R. requested aid from the U. the U. helicopter pilot hostage.42 News networks were saturated with images of Somali rebel forces dragging the corpse of an American soldier through the streets and holding a U. troops positioned in Somalia.9 was pressure on the U. due to the difficulty of delivering aid in Somalia and establishing secure roads.S.S.S.43 Finally in the spring of 1994. 6 Ibid. 36 37 Ibid. On August 15.”37 Soon.S. 1992 the U.40 “Operation Restore Hope” was the immediate African legacy Bush left for his predecessor.S. the U.” Retrieved on February 15.000 U. he sought a reduction in the number of U.edu/eli/evans/his135/Events/Somalia93/Somalia93. President William J. 2009 from http://novaonline. as the country continued to fall apart. and “Virtual Engagement” Though President Clinton continued Bush’s engagement in the African continent early on. “Operation Restore Hope/Battle of Mogadishu.. the U. Peter J. 39 40 Ibid.36 However. 1998. 42 43 Ibid. to intervene.41 In October of 1993. “Guest Editor’s Introduction: Trends and Transformation in the Clinton Administrations Foreign Policy Towards Africa (1993-1999)”. President William Clinton: “Assertive Multilateralism”. named the mission “Operation Restore Hope”.S.html#timeline. 26:2. the U. as one of his final acts as President of the United States. the number of civilian casualties and the starving Somali population could not be ignored. Bush committed 25.S.
Six guidelines for U.army. as the policy states. involvement in U. to improve U. and sometimes North Korean officials under circumstances that were easier to operate under than in their home countries.N. the Directive did allow for the U. “U. However.S.S. foreign policy.45 PDD-25 served as a an attempt to not only limit future U.” 1994. 10. .N. The directive prescribes a number of specific steps.S. Eastern European.44 In light of the Somali debacle.S. properly conceived and well-executed peace operations can be a useful element in serving America's interests. to recruit (as spies) Soviet.”49 The release of PDD-25 also met with a worsening situation in Rwanda. As the PDD-25 was released in May of 1994. .N. 2009 from http://www. Counterterrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa: Understanding Costs. to participate in peace operations that served to advance the interests of the United States around the world. Donovan C. 49 Ibid. the U.S. Culture and Conflicts. involvement in peace operations. which led to disengagement from the African continent.htm. missions. involvement in peace operations as well as the reforming of U.10 withdrew from Somalia completely. However. the CIA released plans to shut down fifteen CIA stations located in Africa.47 PDD-25 sought to ensure that peacekeeping would no longer remain a vital component of U. President Clinton issued PDD-25.S.fas. missions. Retrieved on March 2. . Due to the new Directive.46 The PDD-25 Executive Summary stated the following: Peace operations are not and cannot be the centerpiece of U.48 A CIA official stated. .” Strategic Studies Institute. 44 45 Snyder Lawson 2 46 Ibid. therefore restricting U. and UN management of UN peace operations in order to ensure that use of such operations is selective and more effective. peace operations were established. but to also limit U. Chinese.S.S. “We have never been in Africa to report on Africa.org/irp/offdocs/pdd25.S. <http://www.mil>. We went into Africa as part of the covert activity of the Cold War. foreign policy.strategicstudiesinstitute. 47 “PDD 25: Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations. Presidential Decision Directives. 48 Chau.
The U.000. US Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa.. and soon U.isn. sufficient evidence and cause did not exist for U.. 2009 from http://se1. to step in to Rwanda and suppress what was now an evident genocide.S. and the newly implemented Directive. He also requested the presence of reinforcements on the ground to circumvent a situation that appeared to be turning into genocide. the Pentagon released the report. 54 Ibid. 55 Lin. 3 52 Ibid. Retrieved on February 2.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=ISN&fileid=211C11FE1366-4429-1CD2-8D88BA4C4565&lng=en.” Institut Fur Strategie . including the U.54 In 1995. which was led by France. intervention in Rwanda. stating.N.S.und Wirtschaftsberatung. Christina Y. From the perspective of the U. were apprehensive about designating the situation in Rwanda as genocide.N. gave its approval for an intervention. 2007. forces in Rwanda. “Ultimately we see very little traditional strategic interest in Africa.51 The requests. . had requested numerous times for the monitoring of the Abuja Accords. it became imperative that the world intervene. were denied. however.. Energy Perspective. or increased military engagement in all areas of the African continent.Politik . as opposed to sending in a peacekeeping force. 50 51 Lawson 2 Ibid.52 Other powers.N.50 Commander of the U.a U.11 advocated for alternative forms of intervention in Rwanda.53 After reports came from Rwanda placing the death toll of Tutsis and moderate Hutus at a total of close to 800. General Romeo Dallaire. there was no immediate need to place much traditional security emphasis on Africa through the creation of a unified command. which were established to bring an end to the civil war between the government and the Rwanda Patriot Front.”55 Hence.S. 4 53 Ibid. “The Rise of Africa in the International Geopolitical Landscape.Sicherheits .S. troops were pulled off the ground.
had ever given to the African continent. strategic objectives and interests. yet best economic and political 'performers'”. Bush’s promised aid defied the stigma of impossibility that had plagued many who had attempted to significantly increase aid to Africa 56 57 Chau 10 Ibid. which was a five billion dollar fund “designated for developing the world's poorest.58 However. Bush’s increase of aid to Africa contradicted his campaign stances. 31(102): 698 59 Ibid.S. 58 Smith.56 The purpose of the ACRI was to create partnerships with African countries in order to strengthen the capability of African peacekeeping as well as humanitarian relief capabilities.S. 2004. Bush surprised many by stating that he would triple the amount of aid the U.57 As with most U. 61 Ibid. spent on combating the global AIDS pandemic..61 In his State of the Union Address the very same year. 62 Ibid. 2001 led to a change in the evaluation of U.12 However. Review of African Political Economy. 60 Ibid. as opposed to proactive initiatives.S. he acknowledged that Africa was a continent “with many problems”.S. and lead to the highest level of foreign aid the U.60 In March of 2002 at a Conference on Financing Development. President George W.62 The aid for combating the pandemic was delivered through Bush’s PEPFAR. policy towards Africa.59 September 11. Bush was running for president. 699 . Gayle. he stated that Africa’s strategic role in America’s overall foreign policy objectives was limited. ACRI focused more on reactive operations. Bush presented the creation of the MCA. Bush: Aid Increase and AFRICOM As Former President George W. as an effort to focus on capacity building on the continent Clinton launched the ACRI in 1996.
towards Africa through an interagency and proactive approach. Bush announced plans for the creation of a UCC65 entirely focused on Africa on February 6. it creates an easier organization of UCC AOR in Africa. government agencies and international partners. and other military operations as directed to promote a stable and secure African environment in support of U. 2007. 63 64 Ibid.S. AFRICOM.66 Defense Secretary Gates described the preexisting command structure67 for Africa as being an “outdated arrangement left over from the Cold War”.113 69 Retrieved on March 2. Second. which would remain under the AOR of CENTCOM.13 post Cold War63.. Figure 1: Non-Food Economic Aid 65 For an explanation of the Unified Combatant Command System please see Appendix A 66 Esterhuyse 117 67 Figure 2: Preexisting Command Setup and New Command Setup 68 Ibid.64 Former President George W. AFRICOM’s mission statement describes itself as a Command “in concert with other U. AFRICOM’s creation allows for more seamless operations.mil/.S. conducts sustained security engagement through military-to-military programs. 2009 from http://www. Prior to the creation of AFRICOM. which simplifies the DOD’s approach towards Africa. military-sponsored activities.africom. “69 AFRICOM serves two purposes. First. and reorganization within the UCP.. it addresses the security interests of the U.S.68 Africa would fall into the AOR of the new command. foreign policy. . with the exception of Egypt. Bush significantly increased non-food economic aid to Africa from what the previous Clinton administration had given.
fas. 2009 from http://www. 2008. EUCOM’s total AOR consisted of 93 countries and territories in Europe and Africa. EUCOM’s African AOR consisted of 42 countries (located in Western. Security Policy in Africa. Poverty does not make poor people into terrorists and murderers. taught us that weak states.”71 There was also difficulty in conducting smooth and clear operations between the three UCCs.army.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34003.mil/pubs/download.70 This was a significant amount of area to cover for one command and former EUCOM Commander General James Jones stated that in 2006 “EUCOM’s staff were spending more than half their time on Africa issues. “AFRICOM’s Dilemma: The ‘Global War on Terrorism. and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders. and America’s perception of its role and threats within the new framework. .” Congressional Research Service. Retrieved March 2.72 U.S. 2. 2002. <http://www. up from almost none three years prior. Robert G. CENTCOM’s AOR included the seven countries in the Horn of Africa. like Afghanistan. and PACOM’s AOR covered the islands off the Eastern coast of Africa.’ ‘Capacity Building.pdf. This was largely due to the change within the global security framework. can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states. security interests expanded on the African continent post 9/11.’ Humanitarianism and the Future of U. 2009 from The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves website: http://www. Retrieved on March 2.gov/pdf/library/national %20security%20strategy%20sept%202002. 2007. Yet poverty.cfm?q=827. Military in Africa.strategicstudiesinstitute.2001. weak institutions.> 7 73 National Security Strategy of the United States of America.S.14 the three UCCs that had various African countries within their AOR began to feel overextended. “Africa Command: U. According to the 2002 NSS: The events of September 11.” Strategic Studies Institute. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U. ii.cngr.S.S. Lauren.73 70 Ploch. Central and Southern Africa).pdf. 71 Ploch 2 72 Berschinski.
Germany under 74 75 Ibid. 2009 from www. education. Preventative and proactive action would be the best policy course to maintain the security of Americans at home and abroad. 76 Quadrennial Defense Review. Retrieved on March 2. DoD Directive 3000.. organizations. There was a realization that it was necessary the United States begin to look at places such as Africa as more of a strategic interest in maintaining U. and planning. viewed security and the maintenance of U. personnel.”75 The 2006 QDR added on to the change in thinking and stressed the importance of “shifting from conducting activities ourselves to enabling partners to do more for themselves76. and global security.05 and the 2006 QDR. .S.S. training.15 The 2002 NSS went on to state that “America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones. facilities.05.S.S. September 11 had brought about a shift in how the U.05 affirmed that “stability operations are a core U. 2006. Department of Defense.dtic. Following Bush’s 2007 announcement. Department of Defense. 2009 from www. leadership. the command commenced as a sub-unified command at the Kelly Barracks in Stuttgart.defenselink. Retrieved on March 2. 1 Department of Defense Directive: 3000.mil/qdr/report/Report20060203. 2005. The documents represented a change in the Bush administration’s view of simply maintaining a heavily aid based and military to military policy towards Africa.mil/whs/directive/corres/pdf/300005p. materiel. security and stability around the world. exercises.pdf. DoD Directive 3000.pdf.” The 2002 NSS. military mission” and would be “given priority comparable to combat operations and the be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine. all laid the framework for the type of thinking that went in to the creation of AFRICOM.”74 In 2005.
2009. which focus on combat prevention and developmental initiatives. Retrieved March 1. much policy towards Africa has existed mainly on a military and developmental level.81 The Obama administration has inherited AFRICOM. 2009 from Department of State website: http://www.16 EUCOM. Thus. programs conducted with or through AFRICOM include all aspects of the three D’s: Defense. Much of the work would be done through “Phase Zero” operations. While the Commander is a General (General Ward) one of his two deputies is from the DOS (Ambassador Mary C. AFRICOM’s purpose is to prevent war and conflict. Defense Secretary Robert Gates announced in November of 2008 that no decision regarding headquarters would be made until at least 2012.state. Policy in Africa in the 21st Century”. placing an emphasis on working “with” Africa as opposed to working “on” Africa. and not much has been explicitly stated by the Obama administration to indicate concrete policy towards Africa.77 In October of 2008.giv/p/af/rls/rm/2009/117326.80 Through an interagency approach with the Department of State and USAID. and serves as the Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Activities. 80 Chau 17 81 Ibid. Due to the amount of criticism and controversy caused by the potential placement of AFRICOM in Africa. as opposed to engaging in war and conflict. Yates).S. Development and Diplomacy. with the intent of maintaining an environment that will not be a breeding ground for combat or security threats. .78 AFRICOM altered much of the vocabulary towards Africa. AFRICOM was finally launched as a fully operation UCC.79 The organization of AFRICOM focused more on an interagency approach imbedded within the functions of each office. However. 77 78 Ploch 8 Ibid. 79 “U.htm.
39. representing the Strategy.asp?art=1793. As stated by journalist James Crawley. 2008. gold.” Regional Priorities.17 Through AFRICOM. AFRICOM is considered “a testing ground for a more integrated military-civilian approach to address some of the long-term. “AFRICOM: Scenesetter .7 million miles (75% of which are uninhabited).S. Quite diverse. Retrieved on February 15. 85 Ibid.mil/getArticle. Command for Africa. which has driven much security and developmental related debate about the continent for decades.” Cooke.>. diamonds and coltan. subregional organizations. “Hap”.S. The continent spans an impressive 11. 84 Harlow.S. 2008. and a vast amount of land and resources.” AFRICOM presentation by Lieutenant Colonel Harlow.”86 In light of Africa’s diversity.84 Filled with resources such as oil. caused by nature and man. more than 1000 languages are spoken by over 3000 ethnic groups. Center for Strategic and International Studies.”83 Africa’s Security Challenges and U. “A New U. many of the countries on the continent share similar broad challenges.org/index.85 Despite a burgeoning population. the African continent is very resource rich. Policy in Africa in the 21st Century.africom. 2009 from http://www. and member states as they work to stand up the Africa Standby Force. “Africa is on the front burner with its humanitarian crises. Understanding the source of security challenges and underdevelopment on the continent of Africa is a “Chicken-Egg” question. underlying causes of insecurity on the continent.php? option=com_csis_pubs&task=view&id=4208.”82 Through its interagency and preventative approach. Africa is the site of many humanitarian crises and security challenges. Plans and Programming division of AFRICOM. Africa is a massive and complex continent. <http://www. the Obama administration plans to “continue to work with the AU. and Kathleen Hicks. Jennifer G. 86 Chau 10 . Does 82 83 “U.Prospects and Challenges. Security Interests Security Challenges in Africa.csis.
” 2008. More so. 90 Hillier.oxfam. wherein the term “human security” was which encompassed “economic. June 8-10. 2007. Oxfam. personal. 5. thus making them difficult to control and diminish. .uk/download/? download=http://www.” Asia-Pacific Center. Since 1990.org/Publications/Transnational%20Report%20version%2020%20Dec%202000. Africa’s many security challenges range from transnational challenges to internal and regional challenges. Retrieved on February 15.. the connection between security and development is evident. The majority of these threats can be described as “nonmilitary threats that cross borders and either threaten the political and social integrity of a nation or the health of that nation’s inhabitants.apcss.org.18 underdevelopment increase the likelihood of insecurity and instability? Or.uk/resources/policy/conflict_disasters/downloads/bp107_africa_missin g_billions. These security issues affect the continent as a whole. This is detrimental to African states that are incapable of providing their citizens with the least amount of public and civil services.90 Such a large sum shrinks the economy of African states experiencing conflict by fifteen percent. 8. does insecurity and instability allow for underdevelopment? It is not the purpose of this paper to form an argument for one side of the debate. 9 89 Berlin. Africa’s Missing Billions: International Arms Flows and the Cost of Conflict.”89 Conflicts An estimated eighteen billion dollars a year goes towards armed conflict in African states. environmental. 2000.87 In 1994. which present security challenges on the African continent. Debbie. Centre for Conflict Resolution: Policy Advisory Group Seminar Report. however. and affect the stability of all regions. achieving peace and security on the continent would produce increased development and stability.oxfam.”88 All are forms of security. 88 Ibid. an estimated $300 billion has been 87 “Security and Development in Southern Africa. “Transnational Security Threats in Asia: Conference Report. Smith. food. community and political security. 2009 from http://www. <http://www.html. health.pdf>.org. Don and Paul J. the UNDP released the annual Human Development Report. and cross boundaries.
placing a strain on them either due to illicit trading or damage caused by the fighting. June 22. 2007.91 Armed conflicts have a significant impact on the economical expansion of African states. . Environmental degradation has led to conflict in many African countries and regions. and institutional systems are not able to adapt. or their being forced to work to makeup for lost family income due to the conflict’s effects.”94 When the demand of scarce resources exceeds the available supply.19 spent on armed conflicts alone in Africa by African states.”93 Steiner went on to state "conflicts ultimately become inevitable if systems become so pressurized and social. such as Sudan.>. noted that there existed a strong “inescapable linkage between environmental degradation and worsening economic and social conditions. See Figure 3 for Map of current and potential effects of environmental degradation/climate change 93 Schlein. Environmental Degradation92 Executive Director of the UNEP. conflict typically ensues. and diminishes the ability of social mechanisms to provide for the population. <http://www. Young people are affected by the shutting down of schools. Armed conflict causes societies to disintegrate.voanews. the young are forced to become child soldiers. 94 Ibid. Rainfall decline over the past 91 92 Ibid. Lisa. economic. Conflicts also have a devastating effect on natural resources.cfm.com/english/archive/2007-06/2007-06-22-voa50. Achim Steiner. “UN Program Finds Environment Degradation Triggers Conflict in Sudan.” Voice of America. Massive flows of civilian populations attempting to flee conflicts increase the number of IDPs and refugees. In worst-case scenarios.
99 “Millions Face Food Crisis in Africa. 100 See Figure 5 for diagram of effects of weak governance .” BBC News Online. which require further assistance.stm>. January 31. See Figure 4 for map of countries requiring food assistanc 97 Plaut. Martin. <http://news.bbc.20 30 years in Darfur led to land degradation.95 Food Security/Crisis 2006 was one of the worst years for food security around the world. weakening ability of governments to respond. Poor governance and a lack of accountability or transparency in government leads to “corruption. Challenges combined with other challenges create more challenges.co. Particularly in Africa96. Good Governance/Accountability100 Many of the security challenges confronting the African continent can be traced to poor governance and a lack of accountability in governments across the continent. which pushed many pastoralists and farming communities southward where conflict erupted between the new migrants and settled communities.” 2005. Retrieved on April 3. 2006. CARE. 2009 from http://www. nepotism and 95 96 Ibid.care. 98 Ibid.uk/2/hi/africa/4662232.srch=1. close to 300 million experienced a food crisis of disastrous proportions. there is more than one source of the problem. “Africa’s Hunger-A Systemic Crisis.97 A total of 27 countries were in need of external food aid. which constituted of 1/3 of the total number of people going hungry worldwide.98 The United Nations considers the following to be three sources of food security issues in Africa: “poor harvest due to erratic rainfall.org/newsroom/articles/2005/10/20051006_africahunger.”99 Like so many security challenges on the continent.asp? source=170740270000&WT. growing impact of the AIDS epidemic.
7 billion a year in revenue.edu/ctnsp/NCW_course/Bittrick_20080219_MarSec_NDU.21 patronage systems that are fragile and often the target of insurgencies. 2009 from www. 106 Redfern.com/stories/200805010790. Mike. 2007. African Security Challenges: Now and Over the Horizon."106 The prevalence of piracy (discussed further on in this paper) affects global trade.ndu. 102 Harlow 103 Bittrick. 2008. “Africa: Confronting Complex Threats.html>. Paul. 2008. which diminishes food supply for over 200 million and recedes the income of more than ten million. British Trade and Development Minister. Maritime Security in Africa. 104 Ibid.pdf. “Africa: Illegal Fishing Costs Continent Sh62 Billion.” International Peace Academy.104 Also of concern are the effects of illegal dumping off the coastlines of Africa. Jennifer Borchard and Jessica Piombo. 12. . 2008 presentation.” The Nation (Nairobi). The Defense Threat Reduction Agency: January 2009 Workshop Report.105 In describing the extent of the problem. approximately $1 Billion in revenue is lost each year.107 Generating an exact number of the amount 101 Perry. Retrieved on February 15. February 19.” however. Jennifer. and the impact on ecosystems and the health of surrounding communities. and impacts the ability of countries to do business. 102 Fisheries are a major exporting commodity for many African countries. Proliferation of SA/LW The proliferation of SA/LW is a major security challenge in Africa that is difficult to control and prevent. Kwesi. <http://allafrica.103 Due to illegal fishing. 105 Ibid. however. Gareth Thomas stated that fisherman were once able to “get money…send their children to school. May 2. “they are not able to give to their family. and account for $2. 2009. 107 Aning.”101 Maritime Security Maritime Security consists of issues ranging from illegal fishing to piracy.
30. 100 million are located in Africa. the DRC. Retrieved on February 15.org/publications/policy-papers>.” Global Ministries: The United Methodist Church. Mulegwa. However.cfm?articleid=4542.htm>. Of the 33 million living with HIV around the world. 67% are located in SSA. African Union: Peace and Security Council. 2008. 10. 2009 from http://gbgmumc.22 of SA/LW in circulation around the world is near impossible. “Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferating in Africa. political and economic mechanisms. 2009 from <http://www.org/root/au/AUC/Departments/PSC/Small_Arms. Retrieved on February 15. 110 Ibid.” 2007. 2009 from <http://www.org/en/KnowledgeCentre/HIVData/GlobalReport/2008/2008_Global>. while only 28% of the affected population has access to the medicines needed.109 The larger part of victims killed by violent acts in Africa are killed by SA/LW. 2000. 1.” 2001.ipaacademy. and Somalia. May 29-30.108 SA/LW constitute for the majority of weapons utilized in ongoing conflicts in countries such as Sudan.113 75% of all AIDS related deaths occurred in SSA. 111 “Southern Africa: Building an Effective Security and Governance Architecture for the 21st Century. Retrieved on March 1. 112 See Figure 6 for map of HIV prevalence map 113 Status of the Global HIV Epidemic: 2008 Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic. it is estimated that out of roughly 500 million SA/LW in circulation. World Health Organization.unaids. 30-62.africaunion. Centre for Conflict Resolution: Policy Advisory Group Seminar Report. “The availability of [SA/LW] is now so widespread throughout Africa that the price for an AK-47 is less than $20 in Somalia. 108 “Small Arms and Light Weapons.org/global_news/full_article. 114 Ibid. 109 Zihindula .111 HIV prevalence in Africa112 poses various threats to the security and development of seriously afflicted regions and countries.114 The sheer number of those infected with HIV/AIDS place a heavy strain on public <http://www. .”110 Public Health Crises Major public health challenges such as HIV/AIDS and Malaria affect various social systems and the infrastructural capabilities of social.
For example.” 2009. the Senegalese organization.120 Political Islam is not always negative and can produce positive results. provided support for the “democratic and secular 115 116 Harlow Ibid. 2009 from <http://www. 117 See Figure 7 for Malaria prevalence map.org/malaria/malaria-statistics>. the activities conducted by various groups to voice grievances are of concern. 118 “Malaria Statistics. 119 Ibid. specifically Malaria is the leading cause of mortality for children under the age of five. Nets For Life. a 2. In nations with an HIV prevalence rate of 20% or more.6% loss in GDP is experienced.23 healthcare and resources as well as lowering the potential number of healthcare workers and peacekeepers that could be working.115 GDP is strained as well. Approximately 90% of all Malaria deaths occur in Africa.netsforlifeafrica. While serving “as a medium for political activism and/or mobilization”. and it is estimated that in the next two years GDP loss might rise to 17%. Retrieved on February 15.118 Accounting for 40% of total public health expenditure in Africa.119 Political Islam/Radical Islam Political and radical Islam has been an increasing national and regional security challenge in Africa.116 The highest prevalence of Malaria infections and deaths occur in Africa117. 120 Aning 5 . Sufi Brotherhood. close to $12 billion in productivity is lost due to the impact of Malaria on the workforce and social structure.
for example. 124 Ibid.126 Though not much action has been seen from the cells.14 126 Ibid.122 Political Islam is also altering the landscape of various localities.”121 Contrarily. Wahhabism has become more popular. Security capacity is essential for the development of programs to enhance peace and security in Africa.123 Further complicating the ability to generate a clear distinction between moderate and extreme organizations is the complex mixture of political Islam.125 Eastern and Southern Africa have also joined the counterterrorism periphery.org/content/thinktank/Lyman_chapter_Terrorism. “The War on Terrorism in Africa. organizations adverse to the interests of many in Africa are gaining a foothold in local areas. radical Islam and anti-Americanism that has developed in Africa. as well as confronting rising and ongoing violent threats. . 123 Ibid.127 Security Capacity The capacity of countries and regions to encounter security threats and challenges is lacking in many cases. In 2007. 127 Ibid. 2008.” In Africa in World Politics. 125 Lyman. specifically in the Horn of Africa. Zambia and Comoros) there appears to be a network of terrorist cells. In Nigeria. Algeria and Morocco experienced terrorist attacks.124 Increasingly. there exists a fear that the unchecked cells could potentially harbor international terrorists. Weak procedures and resources have stalled the ability of “mediators and other actors to prevent 121 122 Ibid. <http://www. Ibid.pdf >. shari’a law has been adopted in one-third of the states. Princeton N.cfr.24 government. Along the coast of East and Southern Africa (Tanzania.
” In Africa Policy in the George W. Jakaya. 2009. <http://www.133 Many countries in Africa also serve as transit points for drug trafficking. is smuggled “from South Asia across Africa to Europe and North America.php? option=com_content&task=view&id=1930&Itemid=5821. “China’s Engagement in Africa. motor vehicle theft. as well as points of origin for drug production. 2 132 Kikwete.”132 Tanzanian President. 131 Ibid.130 According to estimates from the International Labor Organization (ILO) around 1. 32% of who are African. David H. therefore presenting continental wide challenges in confronting TNC. 134 Shinn. Bush . commented in an Op-Ed that the “structures and institutions” in African governments are “grossly inadequate”. Heroin. other human beings.” 1.129 These groups mainly engage in the trafficking of drugs.2 million humans are victims of human trafficking. and money laundering.25 manage and resolve conflicts.bdafrica. credit card fraud…cyber crime. for example.131 Other activities perpetrated by these groups consist of illegal smuggling of refugees and aliens.com/index. 2007. The activities engaged in by various illicit organizations and groups not only destabilize affected regions.> 133 Ibid.”128 Transnational Crime (TNC) Transnational Crime (TNC) in Africa is a growing threat to security and stability. Jakaya Kikwete.” Business Daily.. Ibid. “Comment: Transnational Organised Crime a Major Threat To Our Security. but also aid in the financing of ongoing and future operations. and SA/LW. “illegal trade in human organs. July 16. 129 130 Ibid.”134 128 “Southern Africa: Building an Effective Security and Governance Architecture for the 21st Century.
26 Youth Bulge135 As of early 2009, Africa has an estimated population of 1 billion (14.8% of the world population) and an annual population growth rate of 2.2%.136 Africa is predicted to have the “highest long term population growth”.137 Societies experiencing “youth bulge” share high birth rates and a high proportion of the population between 15 and 29 years of age. According to demographers, many countries with high birthrates tend to be more prone to conflict.138 From 1970 to 1990, an estimated 80% of all the world’s civil conflicts took place in states where the total population of those less than 30 years of age was 60%.139 In SSA, 15-29 year olds make up an average of 40% of the population.140 Some countries have more extreme cases of youth bulge. In Zimbabwe, for example, 70% of the population is under the age of 30.141 In the U.S. the same demographic makes up for 21.1% of the population and less so in Germany where youth make up 14.8% of the population.142 Considering that Africa has the highest predicted long term growth trend, the “youth bulge” suggests an increased labor workforce in the future.
Years: Recommendations for the Obama Administration. Center for Strategic and International Studies. <http://www.csis.org/component/option.com_csis_pub/task,view/is,5217/type,1/.> 11. 135 See Figure 8 for map of youth bulge density 136 World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision Population Database. 2009. <http://esa.un.org/unpp/p2k0data.asp> 137 Ibid. 138 Beehner, Lionel. 2007. “The Battle of the ‘Youth Bulge’.”CFR: Daily Analysis. April 27. Retrieved on March 2, 2009 from http://www.cfr.org/publication/13094/battle_of_the_youth_bulge.html? breadcrumb=%2Fissue%2Fpublication_list3%Fid%3D129. 139 Ibid. 140 Gavin, Michelle D. 2007. “Africa’s Restless Youth.” Current History. May: 220-226. 141 Ibid. 142 Harlow
27 Therefore, Africa needs to be capable of generating a sufficient number of jobs for the expanding labor force.143 Most SSA countries are predicted to experience a growth in their labor force of 100% to 157% between 2005 and 2030.144 “Large populations of young people can act as engines for economic growth, but only in contexts in which they have access to education and labor markets are able to absorb them.”145 Hence, if current trends continue in the development of educational infrastructure and capacity and job creation, there is a fear that the mechanisms needed to support the expanding labor force will not be present. U.S. Security Interests. As previously stated, Africa has never been the center of U.S. foreign policy or defense policy.146 Yet, Africa is now a continent of more importance to U.S. foreign and defense policy goals. Why? China, global trade and oil, and terrorism are three main areas of concern to the United States where Africa concerned. China’s engagement with Africa, while not new, has increased over the past three to four years and affects the role of the U.S. in Africa and around the world. Global trade between the U.S. and Africa is increasing. The U.S. has an interest in ensuring that trade routes are secure, and partners are sufficiently stable in order to maintain or increase trading potential. As the U.S. begins to import more oil from African countries, it is in the interest of the U.S. that access to the markets remain stable as well as open and not too affected by competition.
Gavin, Michelle D. 2009. “Africa’s Looming Mega-Challenges.” In Africa Policy in the George W. Bush Years: Recommendations for the Obama Administration. Center for Strategic and International Studies. <www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/090127_africa_review_megachallenges_draft.pdf.> 2. 144 Ibid. 145 Ibid. 146 Chau 2
28 China Chinese engagement on the continent of Africa is not a new occurrence. In 1956, China launched bilateral assistance programs to African countries.147 From 1957 to 2008, over 800 projects on the African continent were financed by the PRC.148 However, the PRC has aggressively expanded its level of engagement and influence on the continent in the past three to four years, which has impacted African countries and the United States of America. It is estimated that Chinese development assistance to Africa in this current decade has been $1-2 Billion a year.149 Chinese businesses have diversified their “economic and commercial engagements” in Africa significantly, in the past three to four years.150 In 2000, bilateral trade totaled $10 Billion, however, 2007 estimates indicated an increase to around $70 Billion.151 Such growth has propelled China into becoming Africa’s second largest trading partner, with the U.S. being the largest.152 China’s increased presence on the African continent has impacted both the United States and Africa. For both, there have been positive and negative consequences. Due to the level of strategic importance that the continent holds for the United States, it is to be expected that a more engaged China would have some impact on U.S. -African policy and relations. This should come as no surprise considering the areas where the political and economic philosophies of the U.S. and the PRC conflict. In Africa, while there are economic benefits to strengthened engagement on the behalf of the PRC, there are economic, governmental and social consequences as well.
Christensen, Thomas J. 2008. “China in Africa: Implications for U.S. Policy.” Senate Foreign Relations Committee Testimony retrieved on February 15, 2009 from http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=1786. 148 Ibid. 149 Ibid. 150 Ibid. 151 Ibid. 152 Ibid.
.” Bloomberg.157 Every year. have led to indirect consequences for U. J.156 In 2007.com_csis_pubs/task. with 18% of its oil 153 Morrison.29 Direct negative consequences of Chinese engagement on the African continent. “Oil Trades Near $64 in New York on Rising Demand for Gasoline. trade between the U. 158 Gismatullin. little technology transfer of job creation in Africa.5217/type.org/component/option. lax attention to environmental and workers rights standards. U.” National Geographic Magazine. 159 Ploch 63 160 Lin 3 161 McFate 12 . 2 156 Roberts.com/print/2008/06/world-oil/roberts-text>. the majority of the natural resources imported are energy resources. <http://ngm. Paul. 2009.S. imports many natural resources from Africa.csis. “The United States’ Big Leap on HIV/AIDS in Africa: What’s the Next Act?” In Africa Policy in the George W.S.com/apps/news? pid=20601072&sid=a2UbRX_oHs4Q&refer=energy>. “World Oil. 154 Lin 6 155 Ibid. Direct consequences consist of the “dumping of low priced goods in Africa.”153 As part of its conditions for economic aid and investment. 157 Ibid. and Africa has increased.154 Global Trade and Oil Through AGOA.S. thus strategically dismantling official recognition of Taiwan.bloomberg. 2007.159 Nigeria is the fifth largest supplier of oil to the United States. strategic interests. China requires African countries to agree to the “One-China” policy.160 According to the CIA.1/>. the IEA released a study forecasting a daily global demand of 116 million barrels by 2030. Bush Years: Recommendations for the Obama Administration. June. by 2015 the source of 25% of all oil imports to the U. will be Africa.158 Though the U. <http://www. Stephen and Phillip Nieburg. demand for gasoline grows by at least one percent. Center for Strategic and International Studies. Eduard.155 The global output of oil is approximately 85 million barrels a day.S. <http://www. and China’s willingness to look the other way in dealing with non-democratic regimes with poor human rights records.view/id.161 Africa already supplies the U. 2008.S.nationalgeorgraphic.S.
Pirate Leader Says. to ensure that sea and trade routes are off the coasts of Africa are stable and secure. The 162 163 Lin 3 Ploch 63 164 Roberts 165 Ploch 63 166 Lin 3 167 Ibid.”168 Piracy mainly occurs in the Gulf of Aden. Former President George W.30 imports. push the price to over $70 a barrel.164 Ultimately.interview/index. released by the Bush administration in 2005.com/2008/WORLD/africa/12/01/pirate.163 In 2006. It is estimated that output of oil from Nigeria has been reduced by as much as 25% due to instability.S. The National Strategy for Maritime Security. Retrieved on March 17.html 170 Ibid.166 One month later. Bush pledged a reduction of oil imports from the Middle East by 75%.162 There exists.S.cnn.”170 Effectively controlling and battling crimes that occur in the waters of the coast of Africa is an arduous task for all governments involved. According to the IMB. as well.165 In April of 2007. in the absence of alternative energy. . If Africa will continue to become a major exporter of oil to the U. stability in oil exporting countries is in the interest of the U. Chronic insecurity and instability in the Delta region poses a threat to uninterrupted flow of oil in Nigeria. 2009 from http://edition. the increase in oil.” CNN.169 “Kenya's foreign minister.. which would come from potential deep water drilling in the Gulf of Guinea. estimates the pirates have been paid more than $150 million in the past. attacks on Nigerian oil pipelines. David. . Gulf of Guinea and the Indian Ocean. highlighted “freedom of the seas and the facilitation and defense of commerce as top national priorities.S. 2008.167 It is in the interest of the U. 168 Ploch 13 169 McKenzie. before Congress. dependency on Middle Eastern oil will shift to other areas around the world (notably Africa). “No Way to Stop Us. in 2008 an estimated 90 pirate attacks occurred in East Africa alone. Moses Wetangula. the contested national elections in Nigeria caused the price of oil around the world to rise above $60 a barrel.
171 Indicative of developmental issues in the region. .174 In 2008. has placed much of its military and counterterrorism resources. the ages of the four pirates ranged from 17-19.. bombed areas in the southern part of Somalia. An American ambassador was killed and the Saudi Arabian embassy was bombed.S. the U.”173 The Horn of Africa has been the area of the most U. 12 177 Ibid. 173 Lyman 3 174 Ibid. counterterrorism activity on the continent of Africa.177 At the request of Hassan al-Turabi.S. backed Ethiopia’s invasion of Somalia in order to topple a radical Islamic government that had taken control over Mogadishu. the United States has stationed between 1. Devlin.S.31 first American ship to be hijacked by Somali pirates occurred in April of 2009.S. since such areas are potential “breeding grounds” for terrorist organizations.S. <http://www. through intelligence and equipment aid.172 Terrorism “Ungoverned” lands and weak states in Africa are of concern to the U.” Associated Press. the U.gopusa. Osama bin Laden was invited to visit Sudan in 1991 where he remained until 171 Barrett.200 to 18.S. Sudan is noted as being the first African country to have become entrenched in terrorism on an international level. embassy in 1998 had surfaced. leader of the National Islamic Front. 172 Ibid. 175 Ibid.. The Horn of Africa is considered to be the “Bridge to the Middle East” and is an area where the U. April 14.com/news/2009/april/0414_pirates_teens. “Gates: Pirates ‘Untrained Teens With Heavy Weapons’.176 In the 1980’s. In 2006. based on intelligence that one of the bombers of the U. 2009.shtml>. 176 Ibid.175 Also in the Horn of Africa is Sudan. terrorist activity perpetrated by Palestinian terrorists occurred. “Since 2002.000 troops in Djibouti under the Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTFHOA).
Defense Intelligence. the history of military leadership on the continent. Consequences The byzantine structure of past U. there was an issue of sovereignty.179 Currently. 13 181 Lin 3 . Third. foreign policy towards Africa has created distrust in Africa towards the influence and involvement of America and other western countries on the African continent. “More rhetorical than material”. which occurred in both countries. it is the ongoing civil war in Darfur that is also of concern. First. the situation in Darfur still poses as a threat for the potential uprising of terrorist organizations. Nature of the Problem Considering the convergence of Africa’s security challenges and the effects of those challenges on America’s security interests.32 approximately 2006. as well as current military leadership created a unified fear of what AFRICOM would mean for civilian and military led governments.178 It is from Sudan that he was able to create financial and supportive terrorist networks and operations.180 Concern is not just limited to the Horn of Africa.S. 180 Ibid. Ibid. “According to U.. Second. The reaction of Africans to the creation of AFRICOM was based on five areas of concern.S.181 Especially in light of the 2007 terrorist attacks. which many Africans feared AFRICOM would violate. Morocco and Algeria is the source of a significant number of foreign fighters in Iraq. the failure of AFRICOM to effectively address issues marring its potential success is obstacle severely limiting the Command. but to North Africa as well. the ambiguous introduction of AFRICOM led to questions and 178 179 Ibid.
“If you know the politics of Africa. 184 Ploch 23 185 Ibid.org/empire/intervention/regionafrica/2008/0601africom. June 1. 22 .33 criticism about the transparency in the new Command. The response of Africa to AFRICOM has been mixed.. “U. 2008. and the initial lack of a presentation of how Africa would benefit from AFRICOM. 183 Ibid.185 The ASF has followed the economic regional structure in Africa.”183 Two of the countries he alluded to were South Africa and Nigeria.” Washington Post. Kenyan retired Lt. one major theme has been the disapproval of many leaders. the “truth” behind mixed messages. we are not interested in having a headquarters here.htm>. <http://www. Africans voiced concern that AFRICOM showed a lack of confidence and western acceptance of “African solutions for African problems”. Finally. In October of 2007 the Pan-African Parliament body of the AU “voted in favor of a motion to prevail upon all African Governments through the African Union (AU) not to accede to the United States of America’s Government’s request to host AFRICOM anywhere in the African continent.). “Very little was really known by the majority of the people or countries in Africa who were supposed to know before such a move was made. Karen. Africa Command to Trim Its Aspirations. Daniel I Opande explained that African reactions to AFRICOM were based on a minute amount of information received. governments and civil organizations to the potential positioning of AFRICOM’s headquarters on the African continent.globalpolicy.”182 He added.”184 AU leadership advised that AFRICOM should better articulate and consider the role AFRICOM would play in complementing the regional structure and organs.S. no. such as the PSC and ASF. and is expected to be 182 DeYoung. Fourth. there was a fear of a neo-colonialist or Cold War era styled showdown between the East (China) and the West (U. Gen. you know there are certain very powerful countries who said. However.S.
there is a certain sense that Africa has to avoid the presence of foreign forces on its soil.2-11-1447_2173503. . military presence on the continent. especially within the SADC. 189 Ibid. the announcement of AFRICOM and the initial understanding of its function violated the idea that many African leaders and civil organizations had about future absolute self-sufficiency. The South African government has vehemently opposed the presence of AFRICOM’s headquarters in Africa.S. and botched humanitarian interventions have translated into hardship for the African people. Lekota 186 187 Esterhuyse 123 “AFRICOM ‘Should Stay Off Africa’. Therefore.”186 Colonialism.html.com/News24/AnanziArticle/0.”188 Lekota expressed concern over the impact AFRICOM would have on the dynamics of the SADC and that a presence of a base in one of the member countries would “affect the relations between the sister countries. or in a sense. The ASF is the embodiment of the idea of “African solutions for African problems”.”189 Botswana had initially expressed openness to hosting AFRICOM’s headquarters. the SADC placed a tremendous amount of pressure on the country’s leadership not to host the headquarters.00.. Retrieved on February 15. South African Defence Minister Mosioua Lekota stated that the “United States Africa Command should stay out of the African continent. African leadership felt weary initially accepting what appeared to an increased U. the Cold War. 188 Ibid. as the US had always had some kind of focus on the African continent…at some point.34 functional by 2010. It is the idea of many in Africa that “for too long Africa’s future has been dictated by outsiders.” 2007. 2009 from http://www.news24. And with increasing engagement in the continent by rising powers around the world. such as China and India. and not encourage an atmosphere.”187 He further went on to say “AFRICOM was not really a new development. of security. however.
194 Ibid. 6. 195 Reed 7 196 Ploch 22 . Nigerian Foreign Minister Ojo Mauekwe stated.”192 In reaction to the speculation of AFRICOM’s headquarters being based in Nigeria and President Yar’Adua’s acceptance of the Command. It spells doom for the security of this country…it means the country will not only become attractive to terrorists groups. but also the African continent to actualize its peace and security initiative [ASF].com/dynamicpage. 191 “AFRICOM ‘Should Stay Off Africa’.”195 He later explained.” 192 Ploch 22 193 Agbodo. “If the Command is about stationing troops on African soil. “the issue of its location in the continent” was cause for concern. “‘A Big Image Problem Down There:’ Prospects for an African Headquarters for AFRICOM. “We are not comfortable with that. we feel there is no need for that. “We shall partner with AFRICOM to assist not only Nigeria.cdi.”194 In reply. 2009 from <www.” The Nation. Retrieved on February 15. December 12.org/pdfs/reedAFRICOM. <http://www. however. Jeff Amechi.”193 He argued that the United States has a “hidden agenda” to become “the most powerful nation in the world” and would “stop at nothing in achieving that.C.”196 190 Reed.”190 He later clarified that the consensus across the African continent was not disapproval of the programs AFRICOM could offer.pdf>.” Center for Defense Information.35 stressed that any member state of the SADC that offered to host AFRICOM headquarters “would suffer negative consequences from SADC fellows.. D.asp?id=40605>. Nigerian President Umaru Yar’Adua stated. “President Yar’Adua’s statement on the proposed AFRICOM is consistent with Nigeria’s well-known position on the necessity for Africa to avail itself of opportunities for enhanced capacity for the promotion of peace and security in Africa. 2007.191 After a 2007 visit to Washington. 2007. Valerie. “Senator Cautions Yar’Adua on AFRICOM. Nigerian Senator Anthony Agbo stated.thenationonlineng. but would indirectly give unlimited access to the US to spy on the country.
197 198 Reed 6 Ibid. 32.201 Zambian newspaper. military on Algerian soil within the framework of the “war on terrorism. Ulla.36 Algerian Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci expressed disinterest in having the presence of U. and expressed that the United States was seeking “a site with good health and education services. Morocco offered to host AFRICOM. military base in his country. 199 Ploch 21 200 Holm. 2008. “It is like allowing a giant to settle in your home. Ambassador Carmen Martinez had issued a confirmation that the U. a low level of bribery.S. The UMA has expressed its opposition to the presence of any foreign military in Africa conducting operations.200 Due to the pressures of its regional neighbors. 202 Reed 6 203 DeYoung .S. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies.198 According to Moroccan newspaper.”199 However. little of which many African governments have for the presence of stationed troops in their countries. reported U. North Africa: A Security Problem for Themselves for the EU and for the U. In response to the request.S.202 Zambian Chief Government Spokesman Michael Mulongoti further clarified his country’s stance saying. Libya and Algeria expressed strong opposition to AFRICOM’s headquarters being hosted in any country in the region.S. Attajdid. And what would you do if you find him with your wife?”203 It is a matter of trust.S. had approached Zambia about establishing an Africa Command Office. and a good human rights record. the late Zambian President Levy Mwanawasa responded that he was against the establishment of a U. 201 Ibid. Morocco changed its position and in June of 2007 the Foreign Minister of Morocco stated that Morocco was averse to hosting AFRICOM’s headquarters.”197 Both Algeria and Libya are against other countries within the region hosting AFRICOM’s headquarters. The Post.
-Liberia relationship of the 1980’s. which did not bode well for the majority of Liberians seeking a democratized.” Africa Faith and Justice Network. military presence on the continent. would never leave.S.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute which found that “every armed group that plundered Liberia over the past 25 years had its core in these U.” 208 She refers to the U.S. Tuckey mentioned the lingering effect of the U.205 For the past eight years.- 204 205 Smith 19 Esterhuyse 123 206 Ibid. there was an initial fear that once the U. Beth. but African people as well.207 Beth Tuckey. support for illegitimate or corrupt regimes. Africans have witnessed a more “aggressive” U. which would be a permanent fixture. the defenseless”. and fear it making its way on to the African continent.204 Taking note of permanent U. 2008.206 The Minister of Defense from Liberia. Retrieved on February 15.’ role in security reform in Liberia by citing a report from the U. There is also the perception of the U. the weak.S. testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee In June of 2008 on AFRICOM and its potential impact on Liberia. 120 207 Ploch 8 208 Tuckey. which was solidified by the invasion of Iraq by the U. and accountable government. it has a very bad history in Africa – a history that harkens back to the proxy wars of the Cold War and U. Many civic groups in Africa perceived AFRICOM to be an increase in U.S. was allowed in the U.S. Samukai.S. “The ‘train and equip’ idea is not new.S. a staff member for the Africa Faith and Justice Network. 2009 from <http://www..S. Brownie J. “June 2008 Testimony: House Foreign Affairs Committee.S. as a “bully of the small. military bases around the world. “In fact. transparent.afjn.html> .S.37 Governments were not the only African institutions to regard AFRICOM with distrust. suggested that AFRICOM do more to explain the purpose of AFRICOM to not just African leaders.S.org/frontpage_features/frontpage_feature/afjn_briefs_house_staff_on_africom. military.” she stated.
38 trained Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) soldiers. “I believe the explanation the President has given should put fade to the speculation. stated that ECOWAS ultimately had the “final say” on any of the member states hosting the headquarters. 212 Ibid. “but this does not meant that is to the exclusion of African ones. building security capacity. President Kufour stated. one. “If it is good (AFRICOM) we will take it.”210 President Johnson-Sirleaf urged that AFRICOM’s purpose was to provide African states with the ability to “develop a healthy security environment through embracing good governance.” Johnson-Sirleaf stated. and developing good civil-military relationships. 213 Ploch 7 .”212 After a November 2008 meeting between General Ward and Ethiopian officials. Liberian President Johnson-Sirleaf replied. so that the relationship between us and the United States will grow stronger and with 209 210 Ibid.” further noting. “AFRICOM is undeniably about the projection of American interests. General Andrew Azazi. President Bush visited with Ghanaian President John Kufour.”209 Liberian President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf attempted to convince other African states in opposition to AFRICOM’s presence to reconsider mutual benefits that could exist through an effective partnership with the new Command. “I am happy. for the President dispelling any notion that the United States of America is intending to build military bases on the continent of Africa.”213 In an attempt to rally support for AFRICOM. the Chief of Defense for ECOWAS.”211 In response to Liberia’s offer to host AFRICOM’s headquarters. Prime Minister Meles Zanawi stated that Ethiopia was “ready to work with AFRICOM” and that “the command could contribute a lot to ensuring peace and stability in Africa. After a meeting. but if not we will not take it. Reed 6 211 Ibid.
“has said he would allow AFRICOM on Ugandan soil only on a ‘temporary basis’ and only for a mission ‘that is acceptable to the [Ugandan] government’. 2008.reuters.”215 The Prime Minister of Uganda. 222 Ibid. African analysts have argued that AFRICOM will only push China to begin to militarize its relations with Africa. its enemies—Russia. September 30. Yoweri Museveni. Pascal.”216 Many on the African continent have expressed concern that increasing U. Iran and China—will definitely come too.217 Furthermore. Africa Command: Aid Crusader or Meddling Giant?” Reuters..218 Brig. 2007. an unemployed worker residing in Somalia. which thus far have been centered on economic partnerships. 22 Ibid. “U. .com/article/latestCrisis/idUSL30300688>. expressed concern that the AFRICOM would only “bring more harm to Africa. “Africa’ s Growing Strategic Relevance. and it’s all about partnership. South African Institute for International Affairs analyst viewed much of the criticism 214 215 Ibid. 27 216 Reed 7 217 Cooke 39 218 Giroux.39 mutual respect.”220 Bile Abdi. <http://www. 219 Reed 8 220 Fletcher. 3(38): 3. and Chinese engagement in Africa will lead to a “colonial-era competition”.” CSS Analyses in Security Policy. Ismail Maaref Ghalia stated that AFRICOM’s focus was on “weakening the increased presence of other powers like China..S.”221 “If America spreads itself in Africa. Gen Robert Winful from Ghana expressed concern that AFRICOM would cause an influx of militarized presence from countries outside of Africa. “I have had had a chance to hear [U. 221 Ibid. Jennifer.S.”222 Kurt Shillinger.”214 Ghanaian Air Vice Marshall Julius Boateng affirmed.S. “What happens if China wants an AFRICOM?” Winful posed. officials] explain what is the reasoning behind the command.219 Algerian professor of Political Science. which does not bode well for African success in the future.
James Kimonyo.S.”228 Lt. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs. would eventually settle over time.”227 Rwanda’s Ambassador to the U. 226 Esterhuyse 118 227 DeYoung 228 Ploch 8 . Gen Tsadkan Gebretensae of Ethiopia “stressed that the United States must take into account that its interests are not always African interests (and vice versa). a headquarters location on the continent…that’s work that’s down the road. the American bureaucratic intricacies were difficult to comprehend. An AFRICOM officer noted that AFRICOM “was seen as a massive infusion of military might onto a continent that was quite proud of having removed foreign powers from its soil. On October 15 2008.223 Conflicting messages coming from the U. Ploch 4 225 Ibid.”224 Four days prior. “we (AFRICOM) have pretty much got a potential location in each region…a couple of countries have approached us about hosting and we’ve responded with preliminary dialogue.226 The political process involved in the creation of AFRICOM and its perception in the United States was also an enigma for the African understanding of AFRICOM. however. General Ward stated that discussions had not been conducted regarding “a basing – correction. government in reference to the positioning of AFRICOM on the continent certainly did not aid in captivating the trust of African countries opposed to its presence on the continent. Theresa Whelan. “noted the importance of explaining that the United States will not make decisions or engage in combat on behalf of African forces. 223 224 Ibid.”225 Other than mixed messages about bases and the mission of the Command.40 towards AFRICOM as “neo-imperialistical conspirational objections” which.. stated.S.
First.asp?section=104&article=61658>. Appearing before Congress. a decision as to the permanent location of AFRICOM’s headquarters has yet to be decided and articulated. considering and better articulating feasible options is still essential. Conditions and Trends Location Though reactions are mixed. <http://www. and the importance of the knowledge required to increase the value of engagement has been given little importance. but the possibility of the location of its headquarters in Africa. Vandiver.” Stars and Stripes. General Ward explained that AFRICOM was focusing more on building programs and implementing initiatives. as opposed to searching for a host country for AFRICOM headquarters on the continent.230 Though Secretary Gates announced that no decisions regarding AFRICOM’s headquarters would be made until 2012. John. the nature of the interagency cooperation built into AFRICOM’s organizational structure and its ability to provide cohesive policy has not been adequately accepted and explained.41 so AFRICOM must build on common interests between the two. As of now. the majority of African perceptions towards AFRICOM are not a negative reaction to the Command itself. “AFRICOM Pleased With Capitol Hill Trip.stripes.com/article. March 29. Few countries want to see the headquarters established on the continent. three options exist for the location of 229 230 Ibid. This has manifested itself in AFRICOM’s challenges three ways. . an understanding of the level of engagement on the continent is hazy. 2009.”229 Causes The main cause of AFRICOM’s failed reception is the insufficiency by decision makers to effectively apply America’s changed security framework to AFRICOM’s core structuring. Second. Third.
The style of interagency coordination has yet to be sufficiently explained by officials 231 232 “Security and Development in Southern Africa. health. AFRICOM could accept the invitation of one of the African countries willing to host. 2007.232 If AFRICOM is effective in gaining more African trust in the next two years. The AU has seen success and efficiency in utilizing regional and sub-regional organizations in order to resolve challenges as they arise. “its mandate and personnel” does not intrinsically provide the DOD with the ability to initiate or effectively understand sources of underdevelopment and various levels of instability on the African continent. crime and poverty are all pieces of the security environment.cgdev.org/content/publications/?type=48>.233 As stated by Vice Admiral Moeller. “We’ve understood for a long time that the challenges of Africa cannot be solved by the military alone. The “Stuttgart +5” is a third option.”234 Confronting security challenges in Africa undoubtedly relies on the utilization of a three D’s strategy. .42 AFRICOM’s headquarters.231 The ASF has divided itself in to five regional brigades. “The Pentagon and Global Development: Making Sense of the DoD’s Expanding Role. and build the headquarters in Africa. The first option would be to maintain the headquarters in Stuttgart with no plans for a move elsewhere.” Center for Global Development. Kaysie and Stewart Patrick.S. <http://www. military is specialized in a vast array of skills. Thus. Second. which AFRICOM could consider. Interagency Approach While the U. responsive governance.” 12 See Figure 9 for ASF regional brigade structure 233 Brown. it would be a possibility to follow the ASF’s regional plan and create five regional offices. Economic development. 12 234 Ibid. the sub-regional system has been utilized by the AU’s ASF through the PSC.
235 Though there has been support for a whole government approach from other agencies. as well as by supporters within DoS and USAID.D. “AFRICOM Struggles to Improve Image of U. policy towards Africa. Charlie. Despite disagreements.S.. 11 Chau vii 237 Coon. however. Smith. or a whole government approach. and the magnitude of the input gained from each level. They would prefer a consultation-based approach to interagency coordination.236 Descriptions of how AFRICOM will engage with Africa have not been presented in a cohesive and coordinated manner. asks. others have voiced their disagreement with the idea of the military taking on developmental and/or diplomatic initiatives.”237 235 236 Ibid. bilateral and local.com/article. <http://www. Five levels of possible engagement exist: continental. 2007. . how such efforts will work seamlessly has yet to be truly expanded upon. C. Hence.stripes. regional. disagreement within departments on the Department of Defense’s new role has created mixed messages and confusion. we misinterpret.S. yet no transparent mechanism exists to define the benefits of operating on a specific level. July 10. AFRICOM’s interagency coordination can either be defined by a consultation-based approach. sub-regional.. from the Department of Defense’s African Center for Strategic Studies.” Stars and Stripes. many in all three agencies have explained how interagency cooperation would benefit U. Engagement on the African continent The first issue regarding AFRICOM’s engagement on the African continent is concerned with the level of engagement. we don’t get at the heart of the issue.43 from AFRICOM. The second issue is the quality of knowledge of Africa’s cultural framework possessed by those engaging on any level.asp?section=104&article=54827&archive=true>. Various programs have been implemented in each level. “Do we see what the Africans see?” He further commented that “in a lot of cases. we don’t understand.
”241 Throughout Africa.com/. cultural intelligence (CQ) is defined as “a person’s capability to function effectively in situations characterized by cultural diversity. ethnic. vi. Christopher and Laura Varhola.”238 According to the Cultural Intelligence Center. Culture Intelligence Center. 2009 from http://www. Criteria for Analyzing Policy Options The following criteria will be utilized to analyze potential options in each issue: 238 239 Chau. Rather than offering various policy “packages” as courses of action AFRICOM can implement. “Avoiding the Cookie Cutter Approach to Culture: Lessons Learned From Operations in East Africa.”240 The “various tribal. which “exist below the surface of the immediate perception. 2006.” Military Review. the three major structural issues will each be analyzed according to the chosen criteria. 241 Chau 53 . but more often coexisting within dynamic fields of interaction and conflict. Therefore.44 Engaging on all levels in Africa requires an apprehension of the existing “cultural values. Analysis of Policy Options AFRICOM’s status as a nascent Command places it in a position to confront major issues as they occur. which are much different from America’s. November-December: 73. 240 Varhola.culturalq. LLC. Retrieved on April 1. and religious forces” that are present in Africa are cultural elements.”239 More so. occasionally coming together in large systemic configuration. a suitable option within each issue can be placed together to create one feasible package. local populations and central governments have views. culture is defined as “multiple discourses.
Only one African country has been . resource availability.45 1. or creating regional offices in Africa and maintaining the headquarters in Stuttgart (Stuttgart +5). 3. Germany. Absorption Feasibility: Assesses the acceptance of the policy option’s intended target group and others directly affected by the selected policy option. Tests if the selected policy option will be capable of being sustained and absorbed into the structure of the target group. A “litmus test” is whether or not the actor/stakeholders acceptance of the policy option creates a policy that is upheld on paper only or actualized. three options for the location of AFRICOM’s headquarters currently exist: Remaining in Stuttgart. Political Feasibility: Assesses the political will and “power” of involved actors/stakeholders in implementing policies. Identifies the level of influence wielded by actors/stakeholders in ensuring the chosen policy option is encourages and executed. 2. and “load-bearing” capabilities of the intended decision makers/policymakers. Major Issues Location As previously stated. Administrative Feasibility: Assesses the capability of existing administrative structures within an organization/department to execute the implementation of the selected policy option. Analyzes the decision-making mechanisms. organizational structures. programs and initiatives. a move to Africa. Absorption Feasibility: The location of AFRICOM’s headquarters affects those in Africa (if physical structures are placed on the continent) and those who operate out of the headquarters.
Political Feasibility: As previously stated. especially. A move to Africa would require time spent and manpower to pick an approved location. Many in congress have accepted the African reaction to the headquarters’ positioning on the continent. Amicable partnerships would fall under heavy strain. The military. which is not a necessity as long as the headquarters remains where it is currently located with full operating status. More so.S. Regional offices would require more administration to maintain seamless integration between all five offices. The rest have been vehemently opposed.46 open to hosting the headquarters. which is not feasible at this point in time. and initiate the planning and construction of headquarters. Governments would perceive AFRICOM in a very negative light. would not be willing to fund such a venture. . is currently overstretched. and a location in Africa would require increased security personnel. and would view the headquarters as an intrusion and flexing of U. All other countries have strongly denied any building of AFRICOM’s offices or headquarters within the boundaries of their location. to build an office in Zambia was still opposed. Administrative Feasibility: The location of the current headquarters is still effective in managing AFRICOM’s daily operations.S. which reflected the majority of Africa’s government’s opinions on the matter. funding for a new location would have to come from increased resources. and as they hold the power of the purse. The request by the U. which is not a likely occurrence. there exists very small political will in Africa to have the headquarters stationed there. Liberia is the only country open to hosting AFRICOM’s headquarters. military source. Unless sovereignty is imposed upon.
African governments have focused on security sector development. it would set back programs. The capabilities exist and are already in the works for a whole government approach. Programs already exist in Africa that create linkages between security. From the civilian Deputy. However. whole government based approach is a matter of will. the intrinsic nature of AFRICOM is to operate on a whole government approach. a consultation based approached could also be followed. To initiate a consultation based approach would require restructuring AFRICOM’s organizational structure. Administrative Feasibility: AFRICOM has been structured to operate on a whole government approach. to the presence of USAID offices within AFRICOM. However. Therefore. Political Feasibility: Senator Feingold and other members of congress . development and diplomatic engagement. More so. a whole government based approach towards partnerships between AFRICOM and African organizations.47 Interagency Approach Absorption Feasibility: Security issues in Africa have strongly supported the evidence of linkages between security and developmental issues. which already exist within the framework of many programs in Africa. The whole government approach would be easily absorbed. governments and communities would be beneficial. which is composed of integration between security and development. Thus. a consultation vs.
Civilian organizations and local communities have also approached AFRICOM’s potential as a partner in program implementation and evaluation as possibility. Engagement Absorption Feasibility: The programs offered by AFRICOM have been accepted by IGO’s such as the African Union. Thus. which shows their willingness and approval of such an approach. The DoS approved of one of their own joining the Command as a Deputy.48 have called for a whole government based approach towards America’s foreign policy engagement. and most governments. Administrative Feasibility: Ambassador Yates serves as AFRICOM’s Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military affairs. It is a question of how deeply connected AFRICOM would like to be in Africa. Each possible level of engagement has mechanisms that are already working on confronting Africa’s security challenges. and USAID agreed to the building of an office within AFRICOM’s structure. Her entire office is built for engagement between AFRICOM and governments as well as civil . Those “in charge” of ensuring it occurs are for its implementation. the intended targets in Africa would easily absorb any level of engagement. it would appear that the political will of those holding the power over either approach have chosen a whole government approach. regional and sub-regional organizations. The DoD has designed a new command based on this approach. Thus. that would be filled by a representative from USAID.
Therefore. and fear such presence would only invite more harm. Germany. There has been no indication that AFRICOM’s leadership is willing to focus on less than the five possible levels of engagement. thus there already exists a functioning administrative and operating base. The DoD spent $100 million to renovate the Kelly Barracks in Stuttgart for AFRICOM’s use. Bottom line. policy towards Africa. the administrative capability to function on all levels exists. AFRICOM is currently conducting programs that involve developmental projects. The “power of the purse” to pursue building of . Civil organizations and the people view the presence of AFRICOM’s headquarters on the continent as evidence of America’s militarization of U. Political Feasibility: Decision makers within AFRICOM have explored all options for level of engagement. it appears as if the chosen option by the “power holders” within AFRICOM has been to engage in all five levels. and have collaborated with various stakeholders on each level of engagement. Recommendations Location It is my recommendation that AFRICOM remain in Stuttgart. Therefore.49 organizations.S. African governments are against the building of AFRICOM’s headquarters or regional offices on the African continent. General Ward has engaged with leaders from African governments and Ambassador Yates has participated in discussions with civil organizations and visited the worksites of local and national NGOs in order to understand work that is being done on the ground.
In meetings with governmental officials and civilian organizations. Absorption X Administrative X Political X Stuttgart Africa Stuttgart +5 AFRICOM should indicate that there are no plans to build AFRICOM’s headquarters in Africa. AFRICOM’s officials should state a commitment to a complete focus on building effective programs in Africa and not on hoping to earn enough “trust capital” to build AFRICOM’s headquarters or offices on the continent. and there is no indication that there would be a willingness to accept the building of AFRICOM’s headquarters or offices in Africa. the administrative structure of AFRICOM was designed around a whole government based approach to interagency coordination.50 new headquarters elsewhere is mainly held by Congress. or establish regional offices. It should be made clear to stakeholders in Africa that the current location of the headquarters will be permanent. Though African stakeholders could absorb both approaches. Absorption X Administrative Political Consultation . Furthermore. the ability for AFRICOM to have been created and funded with a whole government approach in mind signals the political will of those in power to utilize this approach and gauge its effectiveness. Interagency Coordination Approach A whole government approach is the most viable option for interagency coordination. To move towards a consultation-based approach would alter the defining characteristics of the Commands’ new approach towards America’s security framework.
“America’s Role in the World: Foreign Policy Choices for the Next President.edu/Americas_Role_in_the_World. attention should be paid to the amount of funding directed to USAID and the security assistance budget within the DoS. goals. It would be in the best interest of AFRICOM and the DoD to establish a joint report amongst all three departments outlining the common vision. .pdf>. Engagement All three criteria allow for AFRICOM to format its level of engagement according to any 242 Pickering. Thomas R. without creating a divisive breach of departmental “territory”. offices that share mostly the same mission within each department/agency could operate together more efficiently. Crocker. Major criticism from officials within the two has stemmed from what is perceived as disproportionate and inadequate funding. 44. <http://isd. objectives. Therefore. while implementation efforts are carried out by the existing manpower within the DoD. ed.51 Whole Government X X X The Institute for the Study of Diplomacy’s report suggests interagency cooperation could be effective if “new levels of integration.242 Thus. and plans of action shared by all. and Chester A. Establishing coherent goals shared by all three stakeholders should be the first step in effectively explaining the whole government approach the Command is taking. the State Department’s Bureau for Reconstruction and Stabilization.” Institute for the Study of Diplomacy.georgetown. a transparency would exist that could diffuse the confusion and doubt presently in the minds of most Africans. developmental projects should be headed by USAID and DoS. 2008. linking tightly together such entities as DOD’s Defense Threat Reduction Agency. Second. Third. and USAID’s Bureau for Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance” were paid more attention to.
Thus.”244 Engaging on all levels is essential to successful AFRICOM programs. Absorption X X X Administrative X X X Political X X X All Levels Continent Continent. “Understanding the perceptions of individuals and groups on these various levels” would benefit AFRICOM’s mission tremendously. As previously stated. implementation and evaluation of all programs. it would be wise to gauge what engagement option would be the most effective in allowing AFRICOM’s interests to be well received and understood in Africa. 245 Chau vii . Regional and Sub-regional Therefore.245 By doing so. U.52 of the three options.243 “Due to its grassroots engagement. many civil organizations are capable of understanding local and community wide security challenges. the U. Such engagement will also allow AFRICOM use various partners in each level for successful planning. Civil society in Africa has proven to be capable of addressing many security challenges. people and institutions in Africa do not share the same perception of the world. The lens through which 243 244 Aning 10 Ibid. it has been able to work effectively in areas where some international organizations are reluctant to venture.S. policymaking in Africa falls of short of the comprehension that governments. will be capable of understanding the social and political dynamics in African countries and regions.S. listening to their perspectives and gaining knowledge of their needs and successful strategies is an imperative element to AFRICOM’s progress.
Part of understanding culture in Africa. Africa’s complexity does not allow for the simplification of sources of conflict and definitions of social and political interaction. AFRICOM’s potential effectiveness as a suitable policy solution will be fruitless. vii Varhola 73 248 Munson. . Instead.246 “In the past.”248 In military education institutions and civil policymaking departments and agencies. 2008.S. is gaining awareness of the increasing need and support of “African solutions for African problems”. one-hour cultural briefs conducted during preparation for deployment often misrepresented the culture and diminished its importance in planning operations. and never truly develop a complete understanding of the intricate composition of a country’s cultural makeup. Answers to the complex challenges on the African continent cannot be expected to be found within the Western or American cultural perception and framework. FSOs in the DoS spend short stints in countries around the world. are not defined by Western cultural norms. Robert. “Do We Want to ‘Kill People and Break Things’ in Africa?” Strategic Studies Quarterly. a greater amount of study must be geared towards understanding the cultural complexities of the 246 247 Chau. but in other departments as well. as well as create innovative solutions is of much value. they exist in the minds and hearts of most Africans who want to see a stabilized and developed Africa. As long as policy and military leaders in the U. Spring: 99.53 beliefs. The art of this understanding will be in how effective AFRICOM will be in coinciding “American interests” with those of “traditional allies and partners in Africa. continue to view Africa through a “homogeneous lens”. Increasing the capacity of African militaries and civil organizations to maintain peace and security..”247 It is not just in AFRICOM and the DoD where an understanding of heterogeneous culture on the African continent is lacking. values and mental outlooks are shaped.
It is a resource rich continent with a high population growth trend. Senator Feingold should push for increased communication between all U. Africa will become a key global player in the future.54 African continent. and diverse African approaches. or a footnote in a report. governmental officials expected to interact with African governments and civilians. “one meaningful visit means much more than 10 terse PowerPoint-driven briefings. policy towards Africa. The ambition of African countries to achieve self-sufficiency will lead to a new Africa that is more capable and stable. Other countries that have taken a more serious engagement in the continent prove this fact. should increase the success and positive perception of AFRICOM in all levels on the African continent. .”250 Cultural intelligence cannot be a one-liner during a briefing.S. traditions. a report outlining and 249 250 Chau 56 Ibid. Future leaders “must learn early on and often about the cultures. As the continent begins to effectively resolve security challenges that deter many countries from actualizing their economic and political potential. if implemented. What can be strongly concluded is that Africa is rising as an area of geostrategic importance in the international system. all officials in various governmental departments that are expected to deal with Africa must be better educated and prepared to understand different cultural elements on the African continent. Conclusion Many topics raised in this paper present challenging issues that warrant further research and focus. Within the framework of the above recommendations.S. stakeholders involved in AFRICOM and U.S. Rather.”249 For U. All recommendations.
policy perception towards Africa.S.S. military is currently overstretched. military. hold the fate of U. On March 11. or in the level of importance Africa is to U.”251 The old archaic framework of African engagement that the U. The political will and effort of policymakers in the U. <http://feingold.S. is the political will of decision makers in the U.55 expanding upon elements of U. Russell.S. Senator Russ Feingold at a Hearing on Evaluating U. policy towards Africa should be created. However. stated in a hearing that.S. it is in the 251 Feingold.S.gov/record. Is Africa an essential military commitment? How will the U. The U. the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have recreated the two major regional conflict scenarios outlined in the BUR. Senator Russ Feingold.S.-African policy in their hands. and emphasize the role of Africa as a partner as opposed to a spectator. Second.S.S. to address all of its future security needs. balance all of its military commitments around the world? The answer to these questions cannot be found in the reactions of Africans to a new command. it is not just the African perception of AFRICOM that dictates the effectiveness the new command will have in being a new policy direction. “This part of the world [Africa] is far too important for us to rely on narrow feeble policies. or half-hearted ad-hoc measures. has operated in and is still in danger of repeating is no longer a viable option.S. It should outline the complimentary roles each agency will play.S. 2008 Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs Chairman. must create a cohesive policy goal and commitment towards Africa.S. Various goals and stances exist making it difficult to ascertain one main U. Rather.” March 11.S. 2008. Two other areas of concern exist. The U.cfm?id=305904 .senate. Many questions remain about the ability of the U. security interests. is the physical capability of the U. Though the QDR replaced the BUR and its overlapping two war structure. First. Policy Options on the Horn of Africa.S. “Opening Statement of U.
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62 Figure 1: Non-Economic Aid to Africa (1996-2006) fpc.gov/documents/organization/62657.state.pdf .
org/wikipedia/commons/8/85/USAFRICOM_United_States_Africa_Command_Map _Draft_.63 Figure 2: Preexisting Command Setup New Command Setup http://upload.jpg .wikimedia.
64 Figure 3: Current and Potential Effects of Environmental Degradation .
org/image/GEO4_ch6_fig_6.eoearth.7.jpg Figure 4: Countries Requiring Food Assistance .65 http://www.
9.org/image/GEO4_ch6_fig_6.eoearth.jpg Figure 5: Effects of Weak Governance .66 http://www.
67 Harlow. 2008. “Hap”. Figure 6: HIV Prevalence .
2008 Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic Figure 7: Malaria Prevalence .68 World Health Organization.
itg.be/itg/Uploads/MedServ/malariaworld2005.jpg Figure 8: Youth Bulge Density .69 http://www.
“Hap”.70 Harlow. 2008. Figure 9: African Standby Force (Brigade Setup) .
A UCC is “a military command which has a broad.71 Appendix A: The Unified Combatant Command System The Unified Combatant Command (UCC) system was created National Security Act of 1947. .
S. Europe Command (EUCOM) • U.htm Ibid.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) • U. . Special Operations Command (SOCOM) U.S. Geographical Commands • U.S. delineates geographic areas of responsibility for geographic combatant commanders.S. there are six geographic commands and four functional commands. “The UCP establishes combatant command missions. and force structure. Pacific Command (PACOM) • U. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) U.globalsecurity.72 continuing mission under a single commander and which is composed of forces from two or more military departments.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) • U.S.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) • U.”253 Currently. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) 252 253 http://www. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) U.”252 Changes to the UCC system are done so through the UCP (Unified Command Plan). Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) • • • • Functional Commands U.S.org/military/agency/dod/unified-com. and specifies functional responsibilities for functional combatant commanders.S. responsibilities.
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