M.A., Ph.D.






Office: Bentley House, N.W.


American Branch

New York

Agents for Canada, India, and Pakistan: Macmillan

First printed


Reprinted 1952


Reprinted by offset-litho by Percy

printed in Great Britain at the University Press, Cambridge Lund Humphries Co. Ltd


years have passed

was NINE published, and the present volume has been in the press for

away since the


volume of this work

more than two years During the

seven years bad health has been

interruptions. In the first volume manu were sparingly used, but in the present work numerous scripts unpublished and almost unknown manuscripts have been referred to These could not be collected easily, and it took time to read them many of them were old and moth-eaten and it was not often easy to decipher the handwriting. It has not always been possible, how ever, to give an elaborate account of the content of all these manu scripts, for in many cases they contained no new matter and had therefore only been mentioned by name, a fact which could be ascer tained only after long and patient study, since records of them were previously unknown. A considerable delay was also caused

responsible for




in the writing of this volume what will appear in the third

by the fact that large portions of volume had to be compiled before

the manuscripts had left the author s hands. In any event, the author offers his sincere apologies for the delay.

The manuscript

of the third

barring illness

volume has made good progress and other accidents, will soon be sent to

This volume will contain a fairly elaborate account of the principal dualistic and pluralistic systems, such as the philosophy
of the Panca-ratra, Bhaskara, Yamuna, Ramanuja and his followers, Madhva and his followers, the Bhagavata-purana and the Gaudlya

school of Vaisnavism.


fourth and the




deal with the philosophy of Vallabha and some other lesser known schools of Vaisnavism, the philosophy of the Puranas, Tantras, the
different schools of Saivas, Saktas, Indian Aesthetics, the philo sophy of right and law and the religious systems that have found

of the leading vernaculars of India. of the first volume is now in the press. The impression present volume contains four chapters on Sankara Vedanta, the Medical Speculations of the Ancient Hindus, and the Philosophy
their expression in


A new

of the Yoga-vasistha

and the Bhagavad-gltd. A good deal of the Sankara Vedanta, especially in regard to its controversy with



Bhaskara, Ramanuja, Madhva and their followers, be treated in the third volume.
in a

remains to

A word of explanation may be needed with regard to the inclusion
work on Indian philosophy of the speculations of the Indian medical schools. Biology has recently played a great part in liberating philosophy from its old-world ideas. In ancient India, Biology had
not grown into a separate science whatever biological ideas were current in India were mixed up with medical, osteological and physiological speculations, the only branches of study in ancient

may be regarded as constituting an experimental was therefore thought that a comprehensive work on the history of Indian philosophy would be sadly defective without a chapter on these speculations, which introduce also some dis tinctly new ethical and eschatological concepts and a view of life which is wholly original. The biological notions of growth, de* velopment and heredity of these schools are no less interesting, and
India which


their relations to the logical categories of Nyaya are very instructive. No attempt has been made to draw any comparisons or contrasts

with Western philosophy, since in a work of this type it would most likely have been misleading and would have obscured the
real philosophical issues.


study here presented



faithful to the original Sanskrit texts within the limits

of the

present writer s capacities. Often the ground covered has been wholly new and the materials have been obtained by a direct and
first-hand study of all available texts

and manuscripts. Nevertheless


sources, containing, possibly, valuable materials, inevitably

remain unconsulted, for many new manuscripts will be discovered in future, and our knowledge of Indian philosophy must advance but slowly. In spite of the greatest care, errors of interpretation, exposition and expression may have crept in and for these the author craves the indulgence of sympathetic readers.


Since the publication of the first volume of the present work, treatises on Indian philosophy have appeared in India and

elsewhere. But

has not been possible to refer to many of these. present attempt is mainly intended to give an exposition of Indian thought strictly on the basis of the original texts and


commentaries, and not to eradicate false views by indulging in controversy and, since the author takes upon himself the responsi

bility of all the interpretations of the texts that

he has used, and since



he has drawn his materials mostly from them, it has seldom been field. possible to refer to the efforts of his fellow- workers in the however, he has had to discuss and sometimes to bor Occasionally,

row the views of other writers in the assessment of chronological facts, and he also expresses his indebtedness to such other writers who have worked upon some of the special problems of Indian thought. It has been suggested to him that it would have been better if the views of other writers had been fully criticized, but however


be, such criticism has

scope of this work, which, as at

beyond the present planned, will cover some
been considered

3000 pages when completed.
chronological views regarding the antiquity of the Gltd may appear heretical, but it is hoped that they may be deemed ex
heretical than the views of


and they are not more many distinguished writers on Indian In the chapter on the Gita, some repetition of the chronology. same views in different contexts was inevitable on account of the looseness of the structure of the Gita, which is an ethico-religious treatise and not a system of philosophy. This, however, has been
cusable, for this

an age of


studiously avoided in the other chapters. Neither the Yoga-vasistha nor the Glta are systematic works on philosophy, and yet no treatment of Indian philosophy can legitimately ignore their
claims. For in a country where philosophy and religion have been inseparably associated, the value of such writings as breathe the spirit of philosophy cannot be over-estimated, and no history of Indian philosophy worth the name can do without them. I have no words sufficient to express my gratitude to my esteemed friend, Dr F. W. Thomas, Boden Professor of Sanskrit, Oxford, who went through the proofs in two of their stages and thus co-operated with me in the trouble of correcting them. I fear that in spite of our joint efforts many errors have

escaped our eyes, but had it not been for his kind help the imperfections of the book would have been greater. I must similarly thank my friend, Mr Douglas Ainstie, for help with the proofs.


thanks are also due to



Dr M.

Eleade (Bucharest),

Janakiballabh Bhattacharyya, M.A., and my other friends, Messrs Satkari Mookerjee, M.A., Durgacharan Chatterjee, M.A., Srish Chandra Das Gupta, M.A., and my daughter, Miss Maitreyi Devi, for the assistance they rendered me in getting the manuscript



diacritical marks, comparing the ready for the press, inserting references and the like, and also in arranging the index cards. But as none of them had the whole charge of any of these tasks, and

as their help

for imperfections belongs to the author

was only of an occasional nature, the responsibility and not to them.

Calcutta, 1931

. . 1220) 19 . . 1200) . . Refutation of the Theory of the Persistence of Existing Entities (h) Refutation of Criticisms of the Non-permanency of Entities Refutation of the Nyaya Vaisesika Categories (i) .. .. 800) 10 Suresvara (A.. .... . Muni . .D. ... . ... Upanisad View of the Self . 1350) 26 Nrsimhasrama Muni (A. Suresvara and Visvarupa 9 Mandana (A. . . 182 185 .196 . 16 17 Vedanta Dialectic of rlharsa (A. 1500) ..198 204 214 216 218 220 225 Madhusudana SarasvatI (A..D.36 -73 .. 13 Sarvajnatma 14 1 Anandabodha Mahd-vidyd 5 (A. ..D.. . .. . . .. .. .. ... ..D.D.D. ... .. 46 58 . . .D. 760) as forerunners of Vedanta Dialectics of Samkhya Parindma Doctrine . 24 Ramadvaya (A. .. . . 1300) 25 Vidyaranya (A. . 1550) 28 Praka&inanda (A...D. I .D.181 ...181 .D. . . .D. 23 Vimuktatman (A. Philosophy of Badarayana and Bhartrprapanca 4 Teachers and Pupils in Vedanta 5 Vedanta Doctrine of Soul and the Buddhist Doctrine of Soullessness 2 .. 133 147 The Dialectic of Nagarjuna .D. . . . . 800) . .163 171 20 Dialectical Criticisms of (a) Criticisms (6) (c) (A. ... 1200) 21 Dialectic of .) and the Development of Logical Formalism . *.. . 1500) 27 Appaya Dlksita (A.. .CONTENTS CHAPTER XI THE ^ANKARA SCHOOL OF VEDANTA 1 The World-Appearance Thought and its Object in Buddhism and in Vedanta 3 ^ahkara s Defence of Vedanta. ..13 ..D..D.. ...187 189 ankara and Anandajnana 22 Philosophy of the Prakatdrtha-vivarana (A. .. .. 1550 29 1600) .171 . . ... . .102 . . 840) . . . .176 178 Refutation of the Soul Theory (d) Refutation of the Mimamsa Theory of the Self (e) Refutation of the Samkhya View of the Self (/) Refutation of the (g) . . .116 . . .. 11 Padmapada (A. . .. and the Vedanta Dialectic antaraksita and Kamalasila .. 77 82 87 98 .. 1150) 125 Application of the Dialectic to the Different Categories and Concepts 18 Citsukha s Interpretations of the Concepts of Isarikara Vedanta (A..... . Criticism of Isvara . . . 6 Vedantic Cosmology 7 8 arikara and his School Mandana....118 . . .179 .. . 820) 12 Vacaspati Misra (A. ..... .D. . .D.. 900) Yati (eleventh or twelfth century A. (continued) PAGE ....D.. . . . . ..106 in ..

. 3arikara Vedanta and Buddhist Vijnanavada .. .. 19 Ayur-veda Literature .. .. . 373 392 402 411 Good Life in Caraka . 4 Karma.. . . . CHAPTER XIII SPECULATIONS IN THE MEDICAL SCHOOLS Ayur-veda and the Atharva-Veda Bones in the Atharva-Veda and Ayur-veda 3 Organs in the Atharva-Veda and Ayur-veda 4 Practice of Medicine in the Atharva-Veda 5 The Foetus and the Subtle Body 1 2 6 7 8 Foetal Development Growth and Disease .. Ayur-veda Physicians? . PAGE 228 232 235 237 240 242 245 252 256 264 267 268 12 Yoga-vdsistha. 418 ...... . Did Logic Originate in the Discussions of 6 Ayur-veda Ethics 17 Springs of Action in the Caraka-samhitd 18 . .... ....... .. ... 273 284 288 293 302 ... ...... Manas and the Categories 5 6 The World-Appearance Nature of Agency Kartrtva} and the Illusion of World Creation The Stage of the Saint (Jlvan-mukta) Energy of Free-will (Paurusd) 9 Prdna and its Control 10 Stages of Progress 7 8 1 1 Methods of Right Conduct .. .. ... ....319 325 . ..x Contents CHAPTER XII THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE YOGA-VASISTHA Yoga-vdsistha 2 The Ultimate Entity 1 3 Origination .. .... ..423 . . .. . . ...... . . ...366 . . . 340 344 357 ... ...312 .... Vdyu........ .. .. . .. . ... -352 14 15 1 The Theory of Rasas and their Chemistry The Psychological Views and other Ontological Categories Logical Speculations and Terms relating to Academic Dispute ...... . Pitta and Kapha 9 Head and Heart 10 The Circulatory and the Nervous System 11 The Nervous System of the Tantras 12 13 ... . ... ... ...



The World-Appearance. The Upanisads. . The works of those commentators who wrote commentaries on the Upanisads before Sankara and tried to interpret them on the supposition that there was one uniform. I do not know of any systematic study of the system in any of the modern languages of Europe or Asia which has been based on a first-hand study of the works of the great thinkers of this school who followed Sankara and developed his system in a remarkably recondite manner. of self as the only ultimate reality. Mysore. As an example I may refer to Bhartrprapanca. Hiriyanna. commentators. systematic. and all that we can know of them is contained in the meagre references that are found in Sankara s commentaries or the works of other. theistic. The comparatively small compass of this chapter in a History of Indian Philosophy cannot be expected to fulfil adequately such a demand but still it may be expected that an attempt to bring out some of these materials by some amount of detailed study will be excusable. . who tried to give a realistic Upanisad by treating the from God or Brahman 1 . An additional justification for such a suggestion is to be found in the regrettable fact that. etc. in a short paper read at the Third Oriental Conference in Madras in 1924. though numerous elementary and half-informed treatises have been published both in this country and in Europe. But the reputation of this school of thought stands so high. pantheistic.CHAPTER THE XI (continued) THE SANKARA SCHOOL OF VEDANTA treatment of the school of Sankara Vedanta in the preceding chapter may be considered fairly sufficient for all ordinary pur poses. though it may seem slightly to disturb the general plan of this work. contain passages which indicate very different lines of thought. that it was pointed out to me that it would be desirable to go into a little more detailed study of it. creationism. later. interpretation of the Brhad-aranyaka world and souls as real emanations 1 Fragments of Bhartrprapanca from the writings of Sankara and his com mentator Anandajnana and from Suresvara s Vdrttika have been collected by Prof. called also the Vedanta. published in Madras in 1925. and so many people are interested in it. dogmatic philosophy in them are now practically all lost.

while everything else false. He was never in view. but also in his commentary on the Brahma-sutra. The main is in the preceding chapter. differed from them on the nature of this philosophy. which he propounded so elabo rately in all his commentaries on the Upanisads and the Brahmasutras. Sarikara inherited predecessors the opinion that the Upanisads teach us one consistent systematic philosophy. Judging by the sutras alone. there are afraid of indulging in realistic interpretations for he could easily get out of the difficulty by asserting that all the realistic conceptions . Vidyaratna. being under the influence of Gaudapada. 1 Advaita Philosophy by K. it does not seem to me that the Brahma-sutra supports the philosophical doctrine of Sankara. yet at least one Indian scholar has sought to prove that Sarikara s philosophy was realistic 1 That there was some amount of realism in Sarikara is proved by his own con fession. real souls and a real God as creator. Though on the basis of Sankara s own statements. when he criticizes the uncompromising Buddhistic idealists later . published by the Calcutta Univer sity Press. He was in the interested in proving that this philosophy Upanisads. 1924. and there are some sutras which Sankara himself interpreted in a dualistic manner. as well as those of his commentators and other adherents of his school. Sankara there fore introduces the distinction of a common-sense view (vyava- hdrikd) and a philosophic view (paramarthikd). passages which and no amount of linguistic trickery could convincingly show that these could yield a meaning which would support Sarikara s thesis. there is hardly any room for doubt regarding the meaning and force of Sarikara s philosophy. and explains the Upanisads on the supposition that. as has already been pointed out view that Brahman alone is the ultimate reality.2 The Sankara School of Veddnta from his [CH. (vijnana-vadins) or the so-called Buddhistic nihilists (sunya-vadins). . while there are some passages them which describe things from a purely philosophic point of many others which speak of things only from a common-sense dualistic view of a real world. found in the sutras or in the Upanisad passages were merely an estimate of things from the common-sense point of view. consists of the thesis of Sankara. Sankara has applied this method of interpretation not only in his commentary on the Upanisads. but in the Upanisads there are are clearly of a theistic was preached many and dualistic purport. but.

2 by the term samvrti here. Thus Nagarjuna says in his Madhyamika-sutras that the Buddhas preach their philosophy on the basis of two kinds of truth. edition. which we perceive and of which we speak. B. In the first of the two meanings samvrti means interdependent origination or pratltya-samutpdda. This world is not con tradicted in our world-experience but. sa ca abhidhdndbhidheya-jndna-jneyddilaksanah.&quot. samvrtih samketo loka-vyavahdrah. and tracing those again to other causes and . truth as veiled by ignorance and depending on common-sense pre suppositions and judgments (samvrti-satya) and truth as unqualified and ultimate (paramartha-satya) 1 The word samvrti literally means &quot. presents an appearance which is hidden by ignorance. . 2 dve satye samupdsritya buddhdndm dharma-desand loka-samvrti-satyam ca satyam ca paramdrthatah. which can be expressed or indicated by speech and language and which we are supposed to know and refer to in all our experiences involving the knower and the known Ibid.xi] I The World. . p. because it covers the truth of all things In this sense the whole of the world of our experience of causes and effects. But in the present section I propose to discuss Sahkara s statements.closed. and in the second it means the conventional world of common-sense. have already discussed in a general way in what sense according from the point of view of the Sankara school of Vedanta as interpreted by his later adherents.Appearance 3 to the Vedanta. This is own one of the most important points of the Sankara school of philosophy and needs a discussion in some detail. and it seems desirable that Sankara s doctrine of illusion should be treated in connection with the doctrines of illusion in those systems of Buddhistic thought which preceded Sankara. 8. &quot. as well as the statements of some of his important followers. xxiv. on the subject of the nature of world-illusion. Mddhyamika-sutra. the world is an illusion.B.closing on all sides and says that it is ignorance (ajnand) which is denoted . and as we cannot specify the nature of each one of them without referring to others which produced them or from which they originated. we see that they also introduced the distinction between limited truth and absolute truth. Ajndnam hi samantdt sarva-paddrtha-tattvdvacchddandt samvrtir ity ucyate. 492. Candrakirti explains samvrti as meaning &quot. But before I take it up. and they again by others. Taking the Sunyavdda theory of Nagarjuna and Candrakirti. Candrakirti however gives two other meanings of the word samvrti. as each and every entity of this world is produced by other things or entities. I am naturally reminded of the views of Buddhist idealism and the so-called Buddhistic nihilism. which do not seem to be so closely connected with the etymology.

Biblotheca Indica Series. and try to give a rational analysis and estimate of them. how s that it appears to have one. and so there nothing in our world-experience which has a nature of its own. rational understanding of them that one realizes their truth as being a mere flow of causes and effects devoid The appearance of the world as reality is therefore true only in a limited ance is manner during the period when the veil of ignor not removed from our eyes. mirage reflections. as distinguished from mithyd-samvrti (false ignor ance). but exist only through the coming together of different entities. a piece of rope of is But its perceived as a snake. All teachings in philosophy take for granted the world-appearances. 1 Those appearances which are due to sense-defects or other causes and are therefore contradicted in experience are called mithya-samvrta. The falsehood of the world-appearances. not possible to assert anything as to the nature or characteristic (svabhavd) of anything as it is. or when one sees a mirage in a desert). it The Sankara School of Veddnta is [CH. The apparent reality of the world has therefore the mysterious veil is of ignorance over it. Nothing is produced of itself. subjective and objective. 1902..g. or at all? how is it that the world-phenomena appear answer is Nagarjuna 1 such a question that the appearance of the world is like the To Bodhi-caryavatdra-panjtka. and this is signified by designating the truth (satya) of the world as only loka-samvrta. This is spoken of also as tatkya-samvrti (real ignorance) . can be realized only is when rupa) as a succession of essenceless their real nature (paramdrthaproducts of causal complexes properly understood. and it is only mena have no nature of their when it is understood that these pheno own that they are considered false. That which has any nature of its own cannot owe its origination to other complexes. and it is only through an experience of these world-phenomena and a of essence. a question arises if the world-appearance has no essence is it own. e. and it is this veil of ignorance which is referred to by the term loka-samvrta. properly used of the ordinary illusions and hallucinations of magic. however. This world-appearance is however relatively true when compared with the ordinary illusions of perception (when. The world holds good and remains uncontradicted and has all the appearance of reality in all our practical experiences. Things are known to us only as being the result of the combination of many entities or as product complexes. .4 so on. p. 353. etc.existent. and so the pro ducts are never by themselves self. because their falsehood is discovered in experience.

. xxm. Illusion is denned as the false appearance in some object of something Mddhyamika-sfitra. the consideration of the painful as being pleasurable. as has already been explained. the illusory appearances were no doubt objec tively known as objective presentations of which we had previously become aware experiences through which we pass. truth of the further. viz. like a lotus of the sky or the hare s which are simply non-existent (avidyamana). where there is none). . . not a mere nothing. the Buddhists emphasized the fact that. so are always falling into the error of asserting that we have per . sanram asuci-svabhdvam tatra yo sucitvena grdhah sa viparydsah. in which it is said that. 3 Candrakirti s commentary on the Mddhyamika-sutra. It was here that Sankara differed. 1 . though there is no reality on which these appearances rest or are imposed. and of that which has no soul And this error is due to ignorance (avidya). suddenly he is discovered. that illusory perception the qualities. the consideration of the momentary as eternal. . hallucinations and the like which are. but. ceived the manifold world-appearance where there is none 3 Such analogies of error naturally suggest the supposition that there must be some reality which is mistaken as some other thing . xxm. Iha catvdro viparydsd ucyante: tadyathd pratiksana-vindsini skandhaduhkhdtmake skandha-pancake yah pancake yo nityam iti grdhah sa viparydsah sukham iti viparlto grdhah so paro viparydsah.. characteristics or attributes of one thing are taken for the qualities. 13. the sense-illusions. phenomenal world (loka-samvrti-satya) there are. 8. and. Anandasrama Series. and also that which is merely non-existent. The error (viparydsd) of world-appearance is considered as being of four kinds. like the hare s horn. tries to fly for fear of his life we (thus perceiving the presence of a woman. just as a man may see in a dream that he as 2 . Candrakirti s commentary on ibid. which have no reality of their 1 own. Compare it with the Yoga-sutra. but still present an objective appearance of reality The . the consideration of the unholy as holy. 5. . 2 . is realizing that spending the night with the wife of the king. Thus there is horn.. . in dreams. not only the ultimate truth (paramdrtha) there is also the relative world is .Appearance 5 appearance of mirages or dreams. having a soul Candrakirti quotes a passage from the Arya-drdhasaya-pariprccha. xxm. contradicted in ordinary experience (aloka-samvrta or mithydsamvrta). in his introduction to the commentary on the Brahma-sutra he says is that the essence of all that one thing is mistaken for another. n. characteristics or attributes of another.panca-skandham nirdtmakam tasmin ya dtma-grdhah andtmani dtmdbhmivesah sa viparydsah. 13. Thus.xi] The World. .

17. Dreams are false for in a dream man may have when he wakes a the experience of going to distant places. tathedarn prapaficdkhyam mdyd-mdtram. not existence. and the rope-snake had no existence at all 2 . It is explained by some as being the false affirmation of the . 17. For both sets of ex periences involve the duality of subject and object. . he finds that he has been asleep for a few seconds only. Bombay. 1904. being similar to dream experiences. others think that. Nirnaya-Sagara Press. &quot. and yet. In his commentary on Gaudapada s Karika. since the universal self and since it is (pratyag-atmari) is felt through our feeling of . 2 . . This illusory imposition of the non-self and its characteristics on the universal self is called nescience (avidya). 1. It was a mere illusion. which later on became non-existent when right knowledge super vened. immediate in all experience (aparoksd).I&quot. and are therefore 1 Sarikara s Adhyasa-bhdsya on the Brahmfi-siltra. it is not absolutely un related and unindicated (avisaya) in experience. with approval Gaudapada s view that the world of common ex perience is as illusory as a dream. Rajjvdm sarpa iva kalpitatvdt na tu sa vidyate. But the waking experiences. the illusion consists in the fancying of the former entity as being endowed with strange characteristics (viparlta-dharmatva) but in all these different ways of analysis illusion fundamentally is nothing but the false appearance of one thing with the characteristics of another. experienced before. because they are contradicted by the waking experiences. Anandasrama Series. Sankara says when a piece of rope falsely appears as a snake. Gaudapada s Karika. resembling a in regard to another memory image. and has not moved a foot from his bed. The dream experiences are therefore false. are equally false. Sankara in commenting on Gaudapada s Karika explains . this is merely false imposition or appearance. others explain it of the difference between that which is wrongly apprehension apprehended and the misapprehended object which the former is characteristics of one thing as an error due to the non- wrongly supposed to be. up. I. when one thing is misapprehended as another. So also it may be that a conch-shell appears as silver or that one moon appears as two moons 1 Sankara then suggests that. . ance of the snake did not really bring into existence a snake. and consequently it is quite possible that the non-self (anatmari) and its character istics may be illusorily imposed upon the universal self. The illusory appear that.6 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH.no. hi rajjvdm bhrdntibuddhyd kalpitah sarpo vidyamdnah san vivekato nivrttah.

and will not have any existence in the end. where. Both our inner world of mind and its 1 experiences and the outer objective world are thus false creations . But Gaudapada and Sahkara in this from the Sunyavadin Buddhists that they think that even false creations must have some differ basis in truth. volitions and the outer world of objects should be considered as being illusory appearances. a man who goes to sleep after a sumptuous feast may well dream that he has been . 1-12. for the pragmatic tests of the waking experiences may is invalid well be contradicted by dream experiences. ideas. The world-experience other well-known instances of illusion the mirage. Since it had no existence in the beginning. There was nothing which had any essence. But neither Saiikara nor Gaudapada appears to have tried to show why the inner world of thoughts. emotions. of truth (dspadd) underlying them 2 Nagarjuna. there was nothing left which was not relative and interdependent.xi] The World-Appearance less 7 if fundamentally more or false. for example. therefore could be conceived as having any essence by itself. 1 ankara s 2 i. nothing which was selfevident by nature and which was intelligible by itself without reference to anything else. starving for days together. Na commentary on Gaudapada s Kdrikd. Ibid. tried to prove the falsity of all appearances on the ground of their being interdependent and not having anything which could be pointed out as their own nature. neither can it have existence in the intervening period of appearance. . the same: so that. hi nirdspadd rajju-sarpa-mrgatrsnikddayah kvacit upalabhyante. II. independently by itself without reference to something else nothing . it will be re membered. There was no basis of truth any tions. The objection that our waking experiences fulfil practical purposes and have thus associated with them the prag matic test of truth. one of them is like is the other also is false. All appearances were therefore only interdependent phantom crea and it was precisely this interdependence that proved the essencelessness of their natures. It is this interdependence and relativity of all appearances that was called nothingness&quot. 6. &quot. The dialectic being applicable to all appearances. If a rope appears as a snake. which is absent in the case of dream experiences. the false creation of the snake has some basis in the truth of the rope false : there could not be false creations and appearances without any firm basis . or sunyata by There was nothing which could be affirmed of anything Nagarjuna.

8 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. How did the world-appearance of essenceless interdependent phenomena show itself? Sankara did not try to prove with a keen logical dialectic that the world-appearance was false he simply took it : for granted. they are all false. This self is the being of pure intelligence.&quot. which is the only thing that is permanent. changing and illusory predications.I am &quot. the changing ap pearances must have some unchanging basis on which they are imposed and this basis is the self (atman).false Brahma-sutras is that there 1 is a force or s power or potency Gaudapada Karika. like the conch-shell silver. pratltyasamutpada. &quot.I am born. and the entire manifold of appearances it is urged at the same time that these must have some basis of truth.&quot. By applying the dialectic of mutual interdependence.I &quot. it is self-luminous and self-manifesting.&quot. Nagarjuna tried to prove that there was nothing which could be pointed out as the essence of anything as it is. Just as the false creation of snake so all such judgments as I am rope. which is one identical unit. old. perceive. or Brahman. or non-existing. But false creations dvaya-rUpena) case of the unhappy. associated with the self. appears in the &quot. The self is entirely different from all such predications.&quot. who wrote the commentary known as Panca-padika on the first four sutras of Sankara s commentary on the Erahmasutras. negating all differences and duality (visuddha-vijnapti-matra-satta- is declared to be false. shining independently by itself. ButPadmapada. and it is only the self which remains permanent with a through all such judgments. but he did not explain how the appearances which were nothing more than phantom creations came to be what they were.&quot.. . Their main point seems to consist in a dogmatic statement that all appearances or experiences are false just as dream experi ences are false. since the Upanisads proclaimed Brahman as the ultimate reality. &quot.I ignorant. conception commentary on the (sakti) of &quot. I &quot. says that the precise meaning of the term (mithya-jndnd) in Sankara s introduction to his &quot.&quot. 1 &quot. 17. .I am am am are all merely false predications body. etc. &quot.&quot. &quot. unchanging and real. But it how did the world-appearance manifest itself? this question and simply over in asserting that this world-appearance is all due passes to ignorance (avidya) it could not be spoken of as either existing Sankara does not seem to go deeply into . u. happy. The imperfect analogy of waking experiences is made into an argument. it was merely illusory.&quot. &quot.

. 4. it is not . 1892. ajnana or nescience is It which and the world of objects have subjective psychological experiences come into being. The concept of subjectivity stands here as materiality. with the trans cendent or universal self (pratyak-citi). 3 atah sd pratyak-citi brahma-svarupdvabhdsam pratibadhndti ahamkdrddy-atad-rupa-pratibhdsa-nimittam ca bhavati. asmat-pratyaye yo nidam-amsas cid-eka-rasah tasmims tad-bala-nirbhdsitatayd laksanato yusmad-arthasya manusydbhimdnasya sambhedaivdvabhdsah sa eva adhydsah. on the other hand.&quot. transforms itself into the various concepts associated with the psychological self of our ordinary 3 experience The illusion consists in the association of the psycho and. This a man 2 . Thus. willing. Ibid. etc.xi] The World-Appearance 9 nescience which constitutes materiality (jadatmika avidya-saktih). the Vizianagram Sanskrit Series. expressed or manifested by the ego-hood is underlying pure intelligence with which it is falsely associated. the Vizianagram Sanskrit 2 1 some kind Series. and the other.I thus causing the judgment am&quot. Thus.I. on the one hand. arrests the revelation of its true nature as Brahman.I am of pure intelligence. p. or &quot. feeling. which is illuminated. avidya-sakti. p. one can only act when one has attachments. 3. 1 only the objective world that constitutes the world of appearance. 1891. These psychological deter all mutually connected with one another. according to Sankara s philosophy. or objec tivity. logical qualities of thinking. Ibid. or power of avidya. but also the subjective world of all experiences and predicates that this may be associated with the self. . which is made to float up by the power &quot. when one says &quot. 4 Prakasatman s Panca-pddikd-vivarana. pure in telligence or pure consciousness. and one can have attachments and desires only when one has experienced joys and sorrows so these psychological determinations in a beginning- minations are always naturally associated with the transcendent self-luminous self 4 less cycle are . antipathies and desires. and this adhyasa.&quot. 5. i. should be clear from the foregoing discussion that. subsists in the pure self and. of indefinable stuff out of the transformations of Panca-padikd. analysed as involving two parts the one. to be able to enjoy pleasures. as Padmapada or Prakasatman explains. and that it is this potency which transforms itself into the stuff It is well to remember in (upaddnd) of the world-appearance this connection that. a wrong notion or misconception. or illusion. This ajnana is not the ajnana of the Buddhists. p. p. the concept of subjectivity.e. one must first act. 10.

but a substance or entity which has certain powers by which it transforms itself into the cosmic appearances.io is The Sankara School of Veddnta not the viparyaya of Nagarjuna for here . Atma-kdranatva-nirvodhrtvdd dtma-para-tantratvd ca sakti3 2 inatydm apt sakti-sabda upacdritah. which is the cause as being the two distinct characteristics. jective called a power. (satta) from Brahman and from Maya. being also an effect. 1 power. but in spite of its self-luminosity it can be reacted upon by the ajnana with veiled its manifold powers in such a way that . &quot.. .I comprehended by implication The fact that ajnana or avidyd is spoken of as a power inherent in the transcendent self shows that it is dependent thereon avidyd is not. . as the materiality (jddyd) unchanging basis of the Maya.&quot. it is a positive power Thus Prakasatman argues that all effects have at their back some cause. 11-12. is such a material cause This avtdyd-potency in the transcendent self is positive in its nature. 1901. 65. because of its dependence on the transcendent self. saktir ity dtma-para-tantratayd dtmanah sarva-kdryopdddnasya nirvodhrtvam. 1902. must have some stuff out of which it has evolved or was made up. subjective and ob inferred or 2 .lt. and hence it is that in the world-appearance there are &quot. sarvam ca kdryam sopdddnam bhdva-kdryatvdt ghatddivad ity anumanat mithydrtha-taj-jndndlmakam mithyd-bhutam adhydsam updddnakdrana-sdpekam mithyd-jndnam eva adhydsopdddnam Panca-pddikd-vivarana. p. all effects the cosmic appearances of the world and the mind 3 The self thus not only holds the ajnana within it as a dependent function. 4 atah svaprakdse pi dtmani vidtra-sakti-bhdva-riipdvidyd-prayuktam dvaranam durapahnavam. 13. 16. referring in his Siddhdnta-lesa to the view of all the writer of the Paddrtha-tattva. p. the worldappearance. Ibid. 1 . 13. Benares. p. which forms their stuff or material. and it is in consideration (para-tantrata) of the entire dependence of avidyd and its transformations on the . or sakti.2/nawa-transformations Appaya Dlksita. lying in the trans or stuff. a power. and ajnana. Chow khamba Sanskrit Book Depot. Ibid. and can also be ceptions as cendent self as a separate . p. .being&quot. . . Brahman is the cause. Ramananda Sarasvati s Vivaranopanydsa. yet it is self that the self is regarded as the material cause of . summarizes the matter thus: Brahman and Maya form together the material cause (ubhayam updddnam). however. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Book Depot. This positive ajnana is directly perceived in such immediate per do not know myself or others. Akhandananda Muni s Tattva-dlpana. it can be worldby this ajnana and made the underlying basis of 4 appearances of &amp. pp.. Benares. [CH.tasmdn .

i. i. Series. . 1904. Bhau ^astri Siddhdnta-lesa. n stuff that actually undergoes transformation 1 Vacaspati Misra also conceives Brahman. Anirvdcydvidyd-dvitaya-sacivasya prabhavato vivartd yasyaite viyad-anilatejob-avanavah. as being in association with its companion. Series. 1890. He never faced squarely the difficulties that are naturally connected with the theory. Bhamati on aiikara s Bhdsya. 334. Nirnaya-Sagara Press.Appearance . they could appear.S. maya*. when Brahman is spoken of as cause. Siddhdnta-lesa. He did not it worth while to explain anything definitely regarding the nature of avidya and its relation with Brahman. V. p. jointly with its avidya. p. p. the indefinable avidya. and was not therefore concerned to explain the definite relation of maya to Brahman in connection with the production of the phantom show of the universe. so that. the production of the world-appearance are mere scholastic dis putes over words or modes of expression. for Brahman. and Brahman was the basis of truth on which these illusions appeared for even illusions required something on which tions think . The author of the Siddhanta-muktdvall is referred to by Appaya Diksita as holding that it is the may a and may a alone that forms the stuff of the world-appearance and that Brahman is not in any way the material cause of the universe. The world was an illusion. this can only be in a remote and modified sense (upalaksana) through the instrumen being absolutely changeless. ibid. . s edition. 13. 4 5 Samksepa-sdnraka. the unchanging cause of the entire objective universe 3 Sarvadoes not wish to give may a the same degree jnatma Muni. to be the material cause of the world (avidya-sahita-brahmopadanam) 2 In his adora tion hymn at the beginning of his Bhamati he describes Brahman . and considers the latter to be the itself real material cause of the world through the instrumentality of Maya. be considered as cause. these ques do not seem to have arisen in Sankara s mind. 12. I. i. 2.S. cannot by . but that it is the basis of the subsistence of maya and is only from that only 5 point of view spoken of as being the material cause It is clear that the above differences of view regarding the nature of the relation between maya and the self or Brahman in tality of . however. 1890. As has already been said. and the part that it played in supplying the material stuff of the universe. and have but little philosophical significance. Brahman. The natural objection against such views is that the term 1 &quot. of co-operation in the production of the world-appearance as .xi] The World. 333. V.

p. the hypothesis is upon the Vedantists is . substance-stuff of anything. p.) bhdvah) or false knowledge (mithyd-jndnam) and in neither of these meanings can it be supposed to behave as the material cause or . a mere instru mental cause cannot explain the origination of the substratum of the effect. is The beginningless and indefinable (anddy-anirvdcydvidydsraacceptance of such a category is a hypothesis which one is justified in holding as valid. avidya signifies particularly the unintelligibility of this category 3 Anandabodha points out that the acceptance of . but a special technical category. is called avidya or nescience because is it is category which neither is&quot. sad-asad-ubhaydnubhayddi-prakdraih anirvacanlyatvam eva hy avidydndm avidydtvam. we cannot garded either as existing or as non-existing. pp. 1901. be anything which naturally forced this false So. 122. that the material cause of is neither existent world-appearance nor non-existent 2 Anandabodha in his Pramdna-mdld quotes ap provingly from the Brahma-tattva-samlksd of Vacaspati to show that an entity which avidya. merely the logical consequence of indicating some possible cause of the world-appearance considering the nature of the world-appearance as it is. again. 1907. since the material cause of the world can neither be true nor is absolutely non-existent. since it Effects must have some cause behind them. nor can they have for their material cause that which is absolutely non-existent. Chow khamba Sanskrit Book Depot. but what we understand by such avidya is say. 3 2 1 . but this does not avidya hi vidyabhavo mithyd-jnanam vd na cobhayam kasya cit samavdyikdranam adravyatvdt. for a false knowledge cannot be a substance out of which other things are made 1 The answer given by Anandabodha Bhattaraka to such an objection is that this avidya is not a psychological ignorance. Anandabodha s Nydya-makaranda.&quot. the logical of such a category merely indicate that that which is requirements the material cause of this false world-appearance cannot be re a category. 122-124.is not. it is plainly unintelligible. Benares. 10. Benares. avidya (formed by compounding the negative particle a and may mean either absence of knowledge (vidydvidyd knowledge &quot. and a hypothetic is therefore unintelligible. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Book Depot. its cause can only be something which neither is nor is not.12 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. Ibid. which yandt). effects which are not true cannot have for their material cause (updddna-kdrana) that which is true. nor &quot. Brahma-tattva-samlksd as quoted in Pramdna-mdld. and explains the facts. .

Thought and to ultimate reality its Object in Buddhism and in Vedanta. Pramdna- mdld. there is a blue object. This ultimate is pure intelligence. I viously may remember that I had seen but. think.xi] Thought and this its Object in Buddhism and Vedanta 1 . identical with the fact of revelation found are in in all our conscious some sense events involving both . relation The revelation appearance in a certain not the product of a certain which happens to subsist at any time between the character-appearance and the object. The Vedanta takes a twofold view and the second first view refers to appearance. The revelation is self-evident and stands unique by itself. But what is the nature of this cognizing? Is it an act or a fact? When I see a blue colour. when I do this. as identical with pure bliss and pure reality being. This is called ultimately real in the sense that it is regarded as changeless. is Our apprehensions inwardness or immediacy which non-temporal and changeless. it reveals and of a certain thing called the blue it When a revelation occurs in perception. The fact that we see. or feel. Whether I see. p. there is a peculiar revelation of an appearance as blue and a revelation of the as perceiver. what . remember is equi valent to saying that there are various kinds of cognizings. a certain character as blue object. with certain temporal 1 and spatial relations. which arises or Vailaksanya-vdco-yuktir hi tv pratiyogi-niriipandd yauktikatva-prakatanaity phald na evam-rupatdydh sdmanjasya-sampddandya avocdma. for both the characterappearance as blue and the object are given in revelation. feel. of things the . jective content of objects a subjective and an ob but their special feature in every case is a revelatory states.I&quot. hear. or hear. touch. The revelation is such that it is both a revelation of &quot. . This pure in telligence is pure immediacy. I a blue object five minutes pre perceive is the image of a blue object. or change. the fact remains that there is some sort of an awareness which does not change. its is is one and both the object and character as blue. 13 make of avidya is concept either intelligible or consistent The concept thus plainly unintelligible and inconsistent. Awareness is ever present by itself and does not undergo the changes that its contents undergo. By pure intelligence the Vedanta does not mean the ordinary cognitional states. 10. for these have a subjective and an objective content which are extraneous to them.

&quot. that. but in relation to a sense of ness. though ever present in its immediacy. was the same it is absolutely ubi quitous and homogeneous. Identity thus understood is different from what to the limitations of identity as a relation. And it is because it is not self-contained that it we understand by can be called a relation. There cannot be any such thing as the awareness of an awareness or the awareness of the awareness of an awareness.such or &quot. &quot. &quot. becomes revealed. a diversity of contents: it is simply the one itself and devoid of any numerical or other kinds of difference. that only means that I have an image of the way across the commons. for distinction is always based on content and not on is revelation. For consciousness as such. through Church Street and Trinity Street my movements through them are temporally pushed backward. It is A owing is grammatical terminology that identity thus described.there. But the former revelation could not be held to be distinct from the present one . &quot. though we may multiply such phrases in language at our pleasure. revelation. one revelation cannot be the object of another. &quot. absolutely free from now and &quot. If we conceive . of the English a function of thought not first letter opponency or other same thing amidst essence identical in &quot. or that that it had the same shape or alphabet. But revelation has no otherness in it. but the revelation itself cannot be revealed again. means that one becomes itself over again. since this is so. is then.not such and this or &quot.A is A&quot. Revelation as such identical and.&quot. but I cannot be conscious of con sciousness. it When it is said that A is identical with A. I cannot say that this present image in any way reveals that particular image as the object of the present revelation. but all this is a revelation as image at the present moment and not a revelation of a past . It is incorrect to say that &quot. It here &quot. I may be conscious.&quot.14 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. Consciousness of the self-shining self taken in this way cannot be regarded as the relation of an appearance to an object. Identity understood as a relation presupposes some difference or otherness and thus is not self-contained. means that it on all the various occasions or contents in which it A appeared always signified the same thing. &quot. But the identity of revelation of which we are speaking does not mean that the revelation signifies the Identity in this sense is existing by itself. but it is the fact of the revelation or the entity of the self. and &quot. &quot.&quot. When I re member that I have been to Trinity College this morning. cannot become an object of any other consciousness.

I&quot. This question is not admissible for the mental states do not form part of revelation. All unique relations and characters are revealed in it. I has no definite real a mode referring of mind to an which existing entity. Whether we dream or wake.I I&quot. revelation is always we cannot for. If we look at any mental state as possessing certain characters and can be looked at relations to its objects. it ultimate truth call it either an act or a fact. This category is the ultimate in the sense in which self or ego reality.xi] Thought and its Object in Buddhism and Veddnta 15 of revelation in this way. But. if the mental states are may taken away. It is not impossible that any particular objective content may be revealed at any time &quot. look at our mental states. &quot. but the fact of the . whether we experience an. as changing as content particular any other objective content. as The &quot. we must speak of them as acts or events. It is not self or subject is ordinarily understood. with other changing contents of the . 11 Before this can be answered Is cognizing an act or a fact? the point to be made clear is what is meant by cognizing. This revelation is identical with the self-shining self to which everything else has to be related in order to be known. ego or the a content of the perception of the moment as any other objective content. is there. being explicitly does not refer to an at the same time. we have to speak of these aspects. they are rendered conscious by coming into relation with revelation. they do not constitute revelation or form any part of it. it is self-evident and is at once in and beyond them all. from the point of view of temporal or qualitative change of character. it is an error to make any distinction in revelation as the revelation of the past or the revelation of the present moment. is as much revealed without the corresponding perceive&quot. Apart from this there is a continuity in our conscious life. we find that they are always changing. For moments are revealed as objects are re vealed. and unchangeable in itself. illusion or a truth. By When we Vedanta apprehends not any sort of coherence permanence of revelation. but this is so only with reference to the contents. but is only is often associated. as revelation. For what is ordinarily understood as the this continuity the in our ideas. If we ignore the aspect of revelation and speak of mental states which &quot. The notion of ego or everlasting abiding independent self or person for this notion is &quot. as a relatively abiding content. its if we and look at cognizing from the point of view of reality as revelation. It be asked what remains of revelation. .

and their nature or essence. decay. is being constantly revealed.or of a substanceless indefinable stuff called mdya. but yet there is &quot. thine . As such. out of connection it. The principle of revelation is one for there is nothing else like it. that things exist only when they are perceived and dissolve into nothingness as soon as we cease to perceive them . It is infinite in the sense that no finitude can form part of it. Apart from this principle of revelation. . All other objects are dependent upon this principle of revelation for their manifestation. as changeable as is any other object. It has sometimes been atman. But. all that mine &quot. all else is constituted neither in my .I mind. thou &quot.I. or fall outside it . and the the revealing far as the revelation it is &quot. It is all-pervading in the sense that no spatial or temporal limits can be said to affect it in any way. It is finitude head nor in my body nor in the space before me nowhere that it is not. a doctrine which has been . only means that there this&quot. since revelation cannot in reality be individuated. this&quot. the principle of revelation and all that which is re vealed by it. is a revelation which at one &quot. It is absolute in the sense that there is no growth. but are only expressed by coming into some sort of relation with this principle. &quot. cannot be defined or described. and it is perfectly complete in itself. falls outside having some indefinite existence of we may say about or it are all contents They their own and revealed by this &quot. .&quot. In some schools of Sankara Vedanta it is said that all is pure and simple illusion.&quot. though through it all cannot be either subjective tions of subject or objective. There are thus two principles. They are not self-evident. or &quot. We have already seen that this principle with For all considera and do not in any object way qualify it. .1 6 The Sankara School of Veddnta it is [CH.&quot. but are only revealed by it.I. it alone is real in the highest and truest sense. know sweep reveals both the appears as and the So this&quot. evolution or change in it. &quot. manifested in a subjective mental state having a particular conscious centre different from other similar centres. principle of revelation under certain conditions.I&quot. though all these are being constantly revealed by it. this school has been designated the Drsti-srsti school. but only in the sense of denoting designated as the&quot. This principle of revelation thus has a reality in quite a different sense from that which is used to designate the existence of any other object. Self its nature as the supreme essence and transcendent reality of all the Brahman.

D. 487-490) that Prakasanubhava is the same as Prakasatman and Nrsimha the same as Nrsimhasrama Muni. who is said to have converted Appaya Dlksita to Sarikara Vedanta. yet it would not be wrong to suppose that he lived sometime towards the latter half of the sixteenth century. In this list he mentions the names of Prakasanubhavananda. in a commentary on the Siddhdnta-muktdvali. Appaya Dlksita (A. it must depend upon itself involved as a con stituent in the object&quot. 477-478. vol. I. a follower of the school of Prakasananda and author of the Siddhdnta-dlpikd. 1890. he argued that. 1922. by S. 1200) Pancapddikd-vivaranaand Sarvajnatma Muni s (A. Though it would be difficult to settle his time so precisely and definitely.xi] Thought and its Object in Buddhism and Vedanta . 2 Prakasananda refers to the arguments of Prakasatman s (A. it has to be assumed that. such as &quot.difference-between-awareness-and-its- directly and immediately as saying that awareness becomes which comes aware of to the itself same thing by being aware of itself. to assert the contrary would be a fallacy of self-dependence (atmasrayatva). Nana Dlksita. being wedged in between Nrsimha and Appaya. .D. and thinks that Prakasananda lived in the last quarter of the sixteenth century. 900) Sarnksepa-sdrlraka and refers approvingly to Suresvara. If the apprehended difference is a complex. N. Prakasananda may thus be believed to have lived in the latter half of the sixteenth century. 17 1 One of briefly explained in the tenth chapter of the present work the most important texts of this school is the Siddhdnta-muktdvali by Prakasananda 2 Prakasananda seems to have taken his inspiration . the awareness itself was not competent to grasp this quality in the object.72). Examining the capacity of perception as a proof to establish this difference be tween perception and its object. gives a list of Vedanta teachers. Dasgupta. the author of the Naiskarmya-siddhi. since the difference between the awareness and its object was a quality of the awareness. Prakasananda s doctrine of Drsti-srsti is apparently unknown to the earlier Vedantic works and even the Veddnta-paribhdsd. pp. a work of the early sixteenth century. 1620) refers toPra.&quot. pp. and it appears that the earliest mention of his name can be traced only to Appaya. published by the Cambridge University Press. Venis thinks (see The Pandit. and he denied the existence of things when show had they are not perceived (ajnata-sattvanabhyupagama). and if this complex is a quality which is apprehended as existing in the object. from the Yoga-vasistha. vindi cated or established.kasanandainhisSiddhdnta-lesa(pp.D.differencebetween-awareness-and-its-object. this is impossible and is called the logical fallacy of self- 1 A History of Indian Philosophy. as it was one of the constituents of the complex quality involving a difference of the awareness and its object. Nrsimha and Raghavendra Yati. He tried to that there were no grounds for holding that external objects existed even when a reality they were not perceived or that external objects independent of their perceptions. complex &quot. who lived in the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries.i3. in order that the nature of awareness may be realized. ^does not seem to be aware of him.

1889.the object is different from its own awareness. though it is arguable that in an object is necessary. pp. then directly perceived in the ob has to be assumed that the complex quality existed in the object even before the pro duction of the awareness. dependence ject said held that the complex quality is it &quot. 2 . p. and. and this would involve the impossible supposition that the complex quality of which the awareness was a constituent was already present even before such an awareness had already come into being. Prakasananda raises the question whether such an impli cation of an object as conditioning knowledge refers to the pro duction (utpatti) of knowledge. . 1 a fact which shows that the presence of not indispensable for the production of know As regards the persistence of knowledge it is said Siddhanta-muktdvali. for. If perception or direct awareness cannot be said to prove the difference between the awareness and its object. 247-249. It can by no means be urged that the presence of an external object is in all cases necessary for the of knowledge. as printed in the Pandit. its persistence cognition. no one will suggest that an perception external object is to be considered necessary in the production of production inferential knowledge is an external object ledge as such. difference(&quot. since a difference between an awareness and its object was contested and could not be proved it by perception or any other means ? Prakasananda further says that the argument by implication (arthapatti). 252. there can be no inference which may be supposed to do it. In proving the invalidity of the supposition that knowledge necessarily implies an object. because it is associated with 2 But how entirely different kinds of qualities or characteristics . the process of cognition can itself be regarded as a sufficient cause for alternative Prakasananda says that consciousness is ever-existent and is its production.&quot.) of-awareness-from-the-object through the senses. because there cannot be any know ledge without a corresponding object. even if it is regarded as a product. that awareness involves the acceptance of something different from the awareness of which the awareness is affirmed.1 8 1 . vimato visayah sva-visaya-jndndd bhidyate tad-viruddha-dharmdsrayatvdt Ibid. (sthiti) or its secondary As regards the first according to the Vedanta never a product. could be known that the object has qualities of an entirely different character from its awareness. is invalid. The Sankara School of Veddnta If it is [CH. For such an inference has to take form thus &quot.

280-360). proved by the possibility of our knowing a past or a future object). It could not legitimately be held that awareness (pratlti) was different from its object (pratyetavya). in other words. without there being any real objects behind them which manifest themselves in different ways of awareness and their objects.xi] Thought and its Object in Buddhism and Vedanta 19 that awareness has not the object that it knows for its locus or sub stance (asrayd). where knowledge is regarded as an attribute of the self and the self is then regarded as the substance or locus (asrayd) of knowledge. if knowledge is supposed to be persisting in anything. As dreams are nothing but mere awareness. cannot be logically established that awareness of blue and blue are two different objects. there cannot be any such concomitance between the two that it would be right for any one to infer the external presence of an object because of there being a subjective cognition or awareness. The whole universe. Vimsatika and Trimsikd. but is mere cognition or mere aware is ness (vijndna-matra or bhdva-matrd). This scheme of Vedanta philosophy to the idealism of surprisingly similar Vimsatika with (A. 258. in such a way that the absence of the object. is nothing but cognition without there being any object corresponding to it. In the above account of Prakasananda s views clear that he does not attempt to give any positive proof in support of his thesis that the world-appearance and all objects contained in it have no existence while they are not perceived or that the being of it He only tries to show that all objects cognized is their percipi.D. Vijnapti-mdtratd-siddhi. p. as we perceive it. as apart from the awareness. or. that something would not be a cognized object. . Vasubandhu with a commentary by Sthiramati 2 According to this idealism pratyetavya-pratltvos ca bhedah prdmdnikah kutah pratlti-mdtram evaitad bhdti visvam cardcaram z jndna-jneya-prabhedena yathd svdpnam pratlyate vijndna-mdtram evaitat tathdjdgrac cardcaram. So he argues that there is no proof that cognition and cognized it is objects are different. no independent substratum. containing two treatises. Siddhdnta-muktdvali. but the cognizer itself as in the Nyaya view. that it cannot be proved that the cognized object is different from its cognition. would make it impossible for the awareness to persist and. as taught in his a short commentary of his own and in his Trimsika . so also is the world of awaking consciousness 1 The world has thus . Since again cognition and its object do not exist in the same space or in the same time (this is .

such cases where the awarenesses are significant (arthavati) there no entity or reality represented by them. be of the nature of combinations of atoms. taking visual perception as an example. p. that implies that the atoms have parts. Ibid. is should not be interpreted as a denial of the principle of intelligence or pure knowledge as such. . if the objects of awareness and perception were only wholes. Vasubandhu then undertakes to show that the perceptual evidence of the existence of the objective world cannot be trusted. (vijnana-vadd) of Vasubandhu all appearances tions of the principle of consciousness by its inherent are but transforma sponding . He says that. to it. 280-360 rather in the first volume of the present work. 420-500 as held by . So they have are one as a since wholes . we may ask ourselves if the objects of the visual perception whole or many as atoms. would imply parts they cannot be of the nature of since such atoms are not separately perceived they cannot atoms.D. if however six atoms combine with one another at one identical point. Just as in dreams one experiences different objects at different places and countries without there being any objective existence of them. See B. and none of our cognitions are produced by any external objects which to us seem to be existing outside of us and generating our ideas. p. which the saints realize. is also It is possible that the awareness of anything may become false 1 the object of a further awareness. Bhattacharya 1 s foreword to the Tattva-samgraha. . 6. movement. Commentary on Vimsatikd. if six atoms combine from six sides. 2 Ndpi te samhatd visayt-bhavanti. Paris. but that does not mean that pure non-conceptual (anabhilapyenatmana) thought. me Vasubandhu flourished in A. since the existence of atoms cannot be proved 2 For. yasmdt paramdnur ekam dravyam na sidhyati. so what seems to be a real world of facts and external objects may well be explained as a mere creation of the principle of intelligence without any objective basis at all. yo bdlair dhdrmdndm svabhdvo grdhya-grdhakddih parikalpitah tena kalpitendtmand tesdm nairdtmyam na tv anabhildpyendtmand yo buddhdndm visaya iti. All that we know as subjective or objective is mere ideation or entity corre (vijnapti) and there is no substantive reality. . 7. Again. then succession and sequence would be inexplicable. that would mean that the combined group would not have a size larger than that of one atom and would therefore be invisible. They cannot be mere wholes.20 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. and that of another but in all . this.D. or as in dreams many people may come together and perform various actions. and our perception of separate and distinct things would remain unaccountable. however. 1925 It seems probable that than in A.

Commentary on Vimsatikd.xi] Thought and its Object in Buddhism and Veddnta 21 no real objective existence. and in their dreams they construct the objective world. Thus the idea of killing of a certain type may produce such a disturbance of the vital powers of another as to produce a cessation of the continuity of the thought-processes. People are dreaming of the world of objects in the sleep of the sub-conscious habit of false imaginative construction (vitatha-vikalpabhyasa-vasana-nidraya). 2 kdrana-ksana-nirodha-sama-kdlah kdrana-ksana-vilaksana-kdryasya dtmaIdbhah parindmah. must be some kinds of external characteristics. p. Sthiramati s commentary on Trimsika. which is called death 1 So also the ideas of one may influence the ideas of another for good. p. etc. have been made upon the transformations of pure intelligence 3 Both Vasubandhu and Sthiramati repudiate the suggestion of those extreme idealists 1 who para-vijnapti-visesddhipatydt paresdm jlvitendriya-virodhirii kdcit rikriyd utpadyate yayd sabhdga-santati-viccheddkhyam maranam bhavati. In such a view there is no objective material world. 10. and our cognitions are not influenced by external objects how then are our minds influenced by good instructions . since none of us have any real physical bodies. it is only when they become awake with the transcendent indeterminate knowledge (lokottaranirvikalpa-jnana-labhat prabuddho bhavati) that they find the world-construction to be as false as the dream-construction of diverse appearances. good In the Trimsika of Vasubandhu and its commentary by Sthir- amati this idealism is more or. na hi nirdspadd mrgatrsnikadayah. The transformation (parinama) of pure intelligence means the production of an effect different from that of the causal moment simultaneously with the cessation neither externality nor subjectivity in pure intelligence. and associations? and. Compare Sarikara s commentary on Gaudapada s Kdrikd. there it which is mistaken for something cannot be erroneous impositions on mere vacuity. self. 16. Ibid. as ex soul (or the knower) and ternal objects existing outside of us are but transformations of pure clearly explained. . though perception leads us to believe that they have. but these are imposed upon it (vijnana-svarupe parikalpita eva atma dharmas ca) All erroneous impositions imply of the causal . It is said that all that it knows as subjective ideas both the intelligence (vijnana-parinama) . 3 . how can one kill another? Vasubandhu explains this by the theory that the thought-currents of one person can sometimes determine the thought-currents of another. upacdrasya ca nirddhdrasydsambhavdd avasyam vijndna-parindmo vastuto upagantavyo yatra dtma-dharmopacdrahpravartate.&quot. that there else. so has to be admitted that these erroneous impositions of various entity . sty &quot. moment 2 There is .

on the other hand. ness (pratydtma-vedya) and omniscience (sarvajnatd] as it is divested limitations (dvarana). . kdya ity ucyate).sarva-dharma-vibhutva-ldbhatas ca dharma- 2 ayam . and. is 2 . which again produces the two other kinds of transformations as the inner psychoses of mental operations (manana) and as the perception of the so-called external sensibles (visaya-vijnapti). Kyoto. it is. . for what is not eternal is happy When . being fixed (pratisthita) in this pure consciousness (vijnapti-mdtrd)^ the tendency to dual thought of the subjective and the objective (grdhya-grdhakdnusaya) ceases and there dawns the pure indeterminate (nir-vikalpa) and transcendent (lokottara) consciousness. This ulti relativity (samvrti) . 3 Alaya-vijndna in this ultimate state of pure consciousness (vijnapti-mdtrata) is called the cause (dhdtii) of all virtues. pure self-conscious . 1 dhruvo nityatvdd aksayatayd. is it is unique in itself 3 This pure consciousness called the container of the seed of all (sarva-bija). because it is the repository of all experiences. mate consciousness is a permanent entity. 44.transformations and Thus Lankdvatara. being the ultimate state in which the dharmas or characterized appearances have lost all their limitations it is called the dharma-kdya of the Buddha (mahd-munih bhumi-pdramitddi-bhdvanayd klesa-jneydvarana-prahdndt. deny also the dependence or pure intelligence on grounds of inter 1 Vasubandhu holds that pure consciousness (vijnapti-mdtrata) is the ultimate reality. The ultimate consciousness (vijnapti-mdtrd) which suffers all these modifications is called alaya-vijndna in its modified transformations. . which by its inherent power (sakti) undergoes threefold transformations as the inherent indeterminate inner change (vipakd). p. Ibid. See Lankdvatara. the duality of perceivers and the perceived. It is divested of all afflictions (klesd) or touch of vicious tendencies and is therefore called andsrava. published by the Otani University Press. sukho nityatvdd eva yad anityam tad duhkham ca nitya iti asmdt sukhah. and. because of all It is unthinkable and on the one hand. The apprehension of all appearances or characterized entities (dharma) as cognized objects and that of selves as cognizers.22 The Sankara School of Veddnta reality of [CH. p. 1923. It is a state in which the ultimate pure consciousness returns from its transformations and rests in itself. undemonstrable. 46. The ultimate principle of consciousness is regarded as absolutely permanent in itself and is consequently also of the nature of pure happiness (sukhd) eternal. Sthiramati s commentary on Trimsikd. manana and visaya-vijnapti. denies the real transformation of the pure intelligence or dlaya-vijndna. when its first indeterminate and inde finable transformations rouse the psychosis. and this. one of the most important works on Buddhistic idealism. a saint s mind becomes painful. are due to the threefold transformations of vipdka. and.

They are also associated in another mode with sense-modifications involving the triune of the sense (indriyd). The differentiation of feeling as pleasurable or as painful takes place only as a further determination of the basic entity of feeling evolved in the vipdka transformations of good and bad deeds (subhdsubha- karma. avasyam vijndna-parindmo vastuto sty upagantavy oyatrdtmadharmopacdrah pravarttate. called vipdka. . the painful and the pleasurable. as has been pointed out.xi] Thought and its Object in Buddhism and Veddnta 23 also the transformations as sense-perceptions. In this view thought (vijnana) is regarded as a real substance. sense-object (visaya) and cognition (and each of these triunes is again associated with a characteristic affective tone two members of the triune . The vipdka transformations contain within them the seeds of the constructive instincts (vikalpa-vasana) of the selves as cognizers. etc. p. p. corresponding to the effective tones of the other in a one-to-one relation). sounds. Ibid. Ibid. and it is therefore undifferentiated in it as pleasure or pain and is hence called &quot. 3 Fee\mg(vedand) is distinguished here as painful. festations of the other which contain the indeterminate materials out of which the mani two transformations appear. and there are here no 1 2 tac ca varttate srotasaughavat. and its transformations are also regarded as real. pleasurable and as the basic entity which is neither painful nor pleasurable. Good and bad (subhdsubha} are to be distinguished from moral and immoral as potential and actual determinations of virtuous and vicious actions. the substantive basis (dsraya) of the attribution of these twofold constructive instincts. 21. Here the vipdka transformations are regarded as evolving the basic entity of feeling. This feeling per se must be distinguished again from the non-pleasurable-painful feeling existing along with the two other varieties. .the constructive instincts of colours. these mutually act and react against one another. as well as the sense-faculties and the localization of space-determinations (sthdna-vijnapti or bhajana-loka-sannivesa-vijnapti)..feeling as indifference (upeksdy and undifferentiated (avydkrtd). attention (manaskdra). volition (cetana) and feeling 3 The vipdka transformations have no determinate or (vedand) limited forms (aparicchinndlambandkdra). these three different types of trans already formations again mutually determine one another. where each is as much the product of others as well as the generator of others 1 . and it is these transformations that are manifested as the selves and the charac terized appearances 2 The first type of transformations. and thus the different series rise again and again and mutually determine one another. 16. is in a way the ground of the other two transformations. These trans formations are like waves and ripples on the ocean. which is feeling per se (vedand anubhava-svabhdvd sd punar visayasya dhlddaka-paritdpaka-tadubhaya-kara- vivikta-svarupa-sdksdtkarana-bheddt). discrimination (samjnd).vipdka). But.

etc. memory attentive wisdom (prajna]. etc. There are here the constructive tendencies of selves as perceivers. may be pointed out here that in this system of philosophy the eternal and unchangeable thought-substance undergoes by eternal It virtue of its inner dynamic three different orders of superficial changes. and from this ignorance about forms. such as desire (chandah) for different kinds of sense-experiences. etc. . which are compared to constantly changing streams and waves. antipathy or the like. These references engendered self-love (atma-sneha) and egoism (atmaare again associated with the fivefold universal categories of sense-functioning. the second by the original ignorance and false attribution of self-hood to non-self elements. the self is The second mana). alaya-vijnana is given to all these three types of transformations. feeling. attention. sounds. as the permanent passive ground. volition and sense-func But none of these have any determinate and actualized grade of transformations. The first of these represents the basic change which later starts the process of the psychosis and objective possibilities.. are evolved in the first stage of transformations and these determines all subjective . Then comes the third grade of trans formations. and in the third grade we have all the concrete mental and extra-mental facts. reflection (samadhi). The fundamental categories which make the possibility of mind.. mental processes and the extra-mental relations. actualized emotional states of attachment. the actual evolution of moral and immoral emotions. reasoning. tioning. etc.24 The Sankara School of Vedanta [en. the and unchangeable pure thought (vijnapti-mdtrata). which are associated with the actual pleasurable or painful feelings. the objective con structive tendencies of colours. The term good (sraddha). faith and firm will for the shamefulness (hri) for the bad. discrimination. feeling. . The and its vipaka transformations thus give us the basic concept of mind principal functions with all the potentialities of determinate subject-object consciousness and its processes. called manana. the sense-faculties. but there is underneath it. attention.. represents it is here that the mind is set in motion by the ignorant references to the mental elements as the self. voli tion and discrimination. decisions (adhimoksd) in conclusions firmly established by perceptions. self-love and egoism. which is associated with the fivefold universal cate gories together with the special manifestations of concrete senseperceptions and the various kinds of intellectual states and moral and immoral mental states.


Thought and


Object in Buddhism and Veddnta


abide through the other two stages of transformations and become more and more complex and concrete in course of their association

with the categories of the other transformations. In analysing the knowledge situation Vasubandhu does not hold that our awareness
only a modification of the awareness," but he thinks that an awareness has always two relations, a relation with the
of blue


subject or the

knower (grahaka-grahd) and a relation with the object




Blue as an object


essential for

making an awareness of blue possible; for the awareness is not blue, but we have an awareness of the blue. But Vasubandhu
argues that this psychological necessity is due to a projection of objectivity as a necessary function of determinate thought, and it does not at all follow that this implies that there are real external
objects existing outside of it and generating the awareness as external agent. Psychological objectivity does not imply ontological objectivity. It is argued that, if the agency of objective

production of sense-knowledge be admitted, there could not be any case where sense-knowledge could be admitted to
entities in the

since in

universally regarded as being produced without the causal operation of such objective entities, no causal operation can be conceded to the objective entities for the production of sense-knowledge.

be produced without the operation of the objective dreams and illusions such sense-knowledge




Sankara, in attempting to refute the Buddhist idealism in his commentary on the Brahma-sutra, n. ii. 28, seems to refer to a school of idealism which is the same as that described by
Santaraksita in his Tattva-samgraha (commented upon by Kamalasila), but largely different from that described in Vasubandhu s

Trimsika. The positive arguments against the impossibility of an But external world constituted by partless atoms are the same 1

Vacaspati, however, in his Bhdmatl commentary, II. ii. 28, introduces some points. He says that spatial extension, as perceived in visual perception, cannot be due to the perception of partless atoms. Nor can it be said that the colour particles produced in uninterrupted succession generate the notion of spatial extension, though there is no spatial extension in the individual atom; for it is not possible that the groups of colour particles are not interrupted by taste, smell and the tactual particles. So it has to be admitted that the colour particles are at some distance from one another and are interrupted by other particles, and that the continuous appearance of colour in spatial distribution is a false appearance, like the appearance of continuous trees from a distance con stituting a forest (gandha-rasa-sparsa-paramdnv-antaritd hi te rupa-paramdnavo na nirantardh; tasmdd drat sdntaresu vrksesu eka-ghana-pratyayavad esa sthulapratyayah paramanusu sdntaresu bhrdnta evd).



The Sankara School of Veddnta


is further argued on behalf of the Buddhist idealists that the awareness of a pillar, the awareness of a wall or of a jug or of a

piece of cloth, implies that these individual awarenesses are mutually different in nature among themselves; and that consequently

the apparent differences among objects are but differences among the ideas; and that therefore the objects are of the same nature as the particular ideas by which we are supposed to know them

that be so, the hypothesis of an external world of objects becomes unnecessary. Moreover the fact that both the idea of the



object and the object are taken at one and the same moment proves that both the object and the idea are identical, just as the illusory second moon perceived simultaneously with the moon is identical

one of them is not perceived the other also is not were by nature separate and different, there would be no reason why there should be such a uniform and invariable relation between them. The reason for the diversity of our ideas is to be sought not in the diversity of external objects which are ordinarily supposed to produce them, but in the bewith




If they

ginningless diversity of the instinctive sub-conscious roots (vasana)

which produce all our ideas in the waking state, just as they produce dreams during sleep as dreams are admitted by all to be produced

without any external objects, so are



produced without
ideas are just the

any external

real objects


for as ideas the


both cases there are the in stinctive sub-conscious roots (vasana), without which no ideas, w hether in the dream state or in the waking state, can be produced
as the







so these, being invariably present in are the cause of all ideas 2


cases of production of ideas,



This simile is adduced by Vacaspati probably from a quotation from sahopalambha-niyamdd abhedo riila-tad-dhiyoh bhedas ca bhranti-

vijnanair drsyetenddv ivddvaye. Since both the blue and the idea of the blue are taken at the same moment, they are one and the same for any two things which are taken simultaneously are identical. As one moon appears as two in an illusory manner, so the dif ference between the idea and the object is also perceived only illusorily. This

argument of sahopalarnbha-niyama


absent in Vasubandhu


Vimsatika and

2 Vacaspati summarizes in this connection the inference of the Sautrantikas for the existence of an external world of objects as the causes of the corre sponding ideas. The argument of the Sautrantikas runs thus: When, the old

causes remaining the same, there is a new effect, that new effect must be due new cause. Now, though it should be admitted that in the passing series of inner consciousness each particular moment generates the succeeding one, and that this power of productivity is called vasana (tat-pravrtti-vijndna-janana-sakto a


Thought and


Object in Buddhism and Veddnta



untenable because

Saiikara in refuting the above position says that such a view it contradicts our experience, which always

distinguishes the subject and the object from the awareness. are directly aware of our sense-contact with external objects


which we perceive, and the object of awareness and the awareness are not one and the same. Our awareness itself shows that it is different from its object. The awareness of a pillar is not the same
as a pillar,

but a


only an object of the awareness of a external objects, the Buddhist idealists denying
pillar is

have to say that what is knowable only within appears as if it was 1 Sankara argues thus: if externality is absolutely existing outside

non-existent, how can any sense-cognition appear as external? Visnumitra cannot appear as the son of a barren woman. Again, the fact that an idea has the same form as its object does not imply
that there are

no objects; on the other hand,


there were


objects, how could any idea have the same form as its corresponding object? Again, the maxim that any two things which are taken

simultaneously are identical is false; for, if the object and its awareness are comprehended at the same moment, the very fact
that one

taken along with the other shows that they cannot be Moreover, we find that in all our awarenesses of blue

or yellow, a jug or a wall, it is the qualifying or predicative factors of objects of knowledge that differ; awareness as such remains
just the same.


objects of knowledge are like so



traneous qualities attributed to knowledge, just as whiteness or blackness may be attributed to a cow; so whether one perceives blue or red or yellow, that signifies that the difference of
perception involves a difference in objects and not in the awareness itself. So the awareness, being one, is naturally different from the objects, which are many and, since the objects are many,

vdsana), and that its tendency to effectuate itself is called its power of fruition (paripdka), even then it would be difficult to understand how each particular moment should have a power altogether different from other moments for, since there is nothing else to change the character of the moments, each moment is just as much a moment as any other. So it has to be admitted that there are other things which make one moment different in its power of effectuation from any other; and these are the external objects. 1 Saiikara says yad antar-jneya-rupam tad bahirvad avabhdsate. This seems to be a quotation from Diiinaga. Dihnaga s verse, as quoted by Kamalaslla in his commentary on the Tattva-samgraha, verses 2082-2084, runs as follows:

yad antar-jneya-rupam


bahirvad avabhdsate

This shows

rtho vijndna-rupatvdt tat-praiyayataydpi ca. that S~ahkara had Diiinaga in his mind when he attempted to

refute the Buddhist idealists.


The Sankara School of Veddnta


they are different from the one, the awareness. The awareness is one and it is different from the objects, which are many 1 Moreover, the argument that the appearance of world objects may be ex

plained on the analogy of dreams
great difference


also invalid; for there



between our knowledge of dreams and of worldly dreams are contradicted by the waking experience, but objects the waking experiences are never found contradicted. It is curious to note here the contradictions in Sankara s ow n statements. It has been already pointed out that he himself in his

commentary on Gaudapada
the non-existence of

Karika built a powerful argument for objects of waking experience on the analogy

of the non-existence of the objects of

dream experience. Santarak-

and Kamalasila (A.D. 728) in refuting a position similar to that of the view of Sankara that consciousness is one and unchangeable and that all objects are changing, but that the
(A.D. 705)


change of objects does not imply any change of the consciousness argue that, had this been so, then that would imply that all sensibles of different kinds of colours, sounds, etc. were known at one and the same time, since the consciousness that would reveal

those objects is constant and unchangeable 2 Kamalasila there fore holds that consciousness is not unchangeable and one, but
that there are only the changeable ideas of the sensibles and each idea is different from the other which follows it in time. Sahkara s

view that consciousness
that are


only one and that

it is

only the objects

on a separation due to an arbitrary abstraction. If the commentary on Gaudapada s Karika be admitted to be a work of Sankara, then it may be urged that Sankara s views had undergone a change when he was writing the commentary on the Brahma-sutra\ for in the commentary on

many seems

to be based

Gaudapada s Karika he seems again and again to emphasize the view that the objects perceived in waking experience are as false and as non-existent as objects of dream experience. His only realism there consisted in the assertion that the world was but the
result of a false illusory imposition

on the


Brahman, since

dvdbhydm ca bheda ekasya siddho bhavati ekasmdc ca dvayoh; tasmdd artha-jnanayor bhedah. Ankara s Bhdsya, n. ii. 28, Nirnaya-Sagara Press, Bombay, 1904. 2 tad yadi nityaika-jndna-pratibhdsdtmakd ami sabdddayah syus tadd vicitrdstarana-pratibhdsavat sakrd eva pratibhdse ran ; tat-pratibhdsdtmakasya jndnasya sarvadd vasthitatvdt Kamalaslla s commentary on the Tattva-samgraha, si. 331. Gaekwad s Oriental Series, 1926. Neither Santaraksita nor Kamalasila seems to be familiar with Sankara.


Thought and


Object in Buddhism and Veddnta



must have some underlying basis upon which they are imposed. But in the commentary on the Brahma-sutra the world of objects and sensibles is seen to have an existence of some sort outside individual thought. Vacaspati in his Bhamati commentary distinguishes the position of Saiikara from that of Buddhist idealism by saying that the Vedanta holds that the blue is not an idea of the form of blue, but the blue is 1 merely the inexplicable and indefinable object In discussing the views of Vasubandhu in the Vimsatika and Trimsika it has been pointed out that Vasubandhu did not try to
such as mirage,




repudiate the objectivity of the objects of awareness, but he re pudiated the idea that objects of awareness existed outside of thought and produced the different kinds of awareness. His idea



have been that the sensibles are made up of thought-

stuff and,

though they are the psychological objects of awareness, do not exist outside of thought and determine the different they ideas that we have of them. But both the sensibles and their ideas are determined by some inner law of thought, which determines the nature and methods of the whole process of the growth and development of the psychosis, and which determines not only its cognitional character, but also its moral and emotional character. All the arguments of Sarikara in which he emphasizes the psychological duality of awareness and its object would have no force against Vasubandhu, as Vasubandhu admits it himself and holds that (mid) is different from the idea of blue; the blue is an object (alambana) and the idea of the blue is an awareness. Ac cording to him thought splits itself into subject and object; the

idea therefore expresses itself as a subject- object awareness. The subject and the object are as much products of thought as the idea

the fact that he considers the blue to be thought does not


that he denies the objectivity of the blue or that the only existence of the blue is the blue-idea. The blue is objectively present before the idea of blue as a presentation, just as there is the

subject to perceive




somewhere outside thought

but this objectivity does not imply that the in the space outside for even

space-locations are thought-products, and so there is no sense in attributing the sensibles of presentation to the outside world. The
sensibles are objects of awareness, but they are not the excitants
1 na hi brahma-vadino nllddydkdram vittim abhyupagacchanti kintu anirvacanlyam nildditi. Bhdmati, II. ii. 28.


The Sankara School of Veddnta


of the corresponding awareness. It does not seem that Sankara says anything to refute such a view. Sankara s position in the

commentary on Gaudapada


Kdrika seems


have been the same

sort of view as that of Dinnaga, which he takes so much pains to refute in the Brahma-sutra-bhasya, and as such it was opposed

view of Nagarjuna that there must be some essence or reality on which the illusory impositions are made. But in the Brahmasutra-bhasya he maintains the view that the objective world, as it appears to our consciousness, is present before it objectively and
to the


only its ultimate nature is inexplicable. The difference of the objects from the awareness and their inde

pendent existence and activity have been accepted by most of the later Vedanta teachers of the Sankara school; and it is well known that in sense-perception the need of the mind-contact with
the object of perception through the specific sense





Prakasatman (A.D. 1200) in his Panca-padikd-vivarana raises this point and says that the great difference between the Mahayanists and the Vedantins consists in the fact that the former hold that the objects (visaya) have neither any separate existence nor any
independent purpose or action to fulfil as distinguished from the momentary ideas, while the latter hold that, though the objects are
with the one pure consciousness, yet they can independent purposes or functions and have separate, abiding and uncontradicted existences 2 Both Padmapada and Prakasatman argue that, since the awareness remains the same while there is
in essence identical


constant variation of



and therefore that which

remains constant (anuvrtta) and that which changes (vydvrttd) cannot be considered identical, the object cannot be regarded
as being only a modification of the idea 3

It is

suggested that the

the object (e.g. blue) urges that, from the awareness, it cannot be revealed in it, and,



the blue

can be revealed in the awareness, at that moment all the other things of the world might as well be revealed for there is no such

See Vedanta-paribhasd, ch. I, Srivenkatesvar Press, Bombay, 1911. tattva-darsinas tu advitiydt samvedandt abhede pi visayasya bhedendpi arthakriyd-sdmarthya-sattvam sthdyitvam cdbddhitam astlti vadanti. Panca-pddikd-vivarana, p. 73. In addition to this work Prakasatman also wrote two inde pendent commentaries on Brahma-sutra called dnraka-mimdmsd-nydya-sam2


graha and Laukika-nydya-muktdvall. 3 anuvrttasya vydvrttdn no. bhedo nuvrttatvdd dkdsa-ghatddivat.
pddikd-vivarana, p. 73.



Thought and


Object in Buddhism and Veddnta


specific relation

in consciousness at that

with the blue that the blue alone should appear moment. If it is urged that the blue

produces the awareness of the blue, then what would be the function of the visual organ? It is better, therefore, the Buddhist suggests, to admit a natural and unique relation of identity of the idea and the object 1 The Vedantist objects to this and says that

such a supposition cannot be true, since we perceive that the subject, object and the idea are not one and the same. To such an objection

supposed to reply that these three do not form a but arise at three successive moments of time, and complex unity, then by virtue of their potency or root-impression a complex of the three appears and this complex should not therefore be inter
the Buddhist

preted as being due to a relationing of three distinct entities Thus the fact that I perceive blue" is not to be interpreted as a



conscious relationing of

"the blue" and the awareness, but one particular point of time, involving all the three constituents in it. Such a supposition is necessary, be cause all appearances are momentary, and because the relationing of the three as three independent entities would necessarily be

an ideation arising


impossible without the lapse of some time for their operation of relationing. The theory of momentariness naturally leads us to the

above supposition, that what appears as relationing is nothing but one momentary flash, which has the above three as its constituent elements so the Buddhist is supposed to admit that, psychologic;

tasmdt svdbhdvikdsddharandbhedasambandhdd eva vijndne nllam avabhdsate. Panca-pddikd-vivarana, p. 74. Arguing from a similar point of view, Santaraksita and Kamalaslla urge that, if the object was not identical with the awareness, there must be some im mutable law why they should appear simultaneously. This law according to the Buddhists could only be either of identity (tdddtmyd) or of causality as invariability of production (tad-utpatti) The first alternative is what the Buddhists here are contending for as against the Vedantists. There cannot be the law of causality here for there cannot be any operation of the law of causality as production between two entities which are simultaneous. Tattva-samgraha and Panjikd, 2030, 2031. 2 tad vdsand-sameta-samanantcra-pratyaya-samuttham sankalandtmakam pratyaydntaram etan neha sambandhdgamah. Padmapada s (A.D. 820) Panca-pddikd p. 25. This work exerted the greatest influence on the development of Vedantic thought for about six or seven centuries, and several commentaries were written on it. Most important of these are Prakasatman s Pancapddikd-vivarana, Pafica-pddikddhydsa-bhdsya-vydkhyd, Panca-pddikd- sdstra- darpana by Amrtananda, Tattva-dtpana by Amrtanandanatha, and also a commentary by Anandapurna Yati. Prakasatman s commentary on it, called Pancapddikd-vivarana, was com mented upon by Akhandananda Muni in his Tattva-dlpana, by Ramananda SarasvatI in his Vivaranopanydsa, and by Nrsimhasrama in his Panca-pddikdvivarana-bhdva-prakdsikd.





The Sankara School of Veddnta


the awareness and its object seem to be different, but such a psychological appearance can at best be considered as a mental illusion or fiction; for logically the Buddhist cannot admit that a

momentary appearance could

subsist long



have the

possibility of being relationed to the self and the awareness, as in I know the blue ; and, if the blue was not considered to be

identical with awareness, there would remain no way to explain the possibility of the appearance of the blue in the awareness Padmapada points out that the main point with the Buddhists is the doctrine of causal efficiency (artha-kriya-karitva), or the maxim

that that alone exists

which can prove





some purpose or



hold further that this criterion of

existence can be satisfied only if all existents are momentary and if all things are momentary; the only epistemological view that

can consistently be accepted is the identity of the awareness and the object. The main reason why only momentary existents can satisfy the criterion of causal efficiency is that, if the existents were
not assumed to be momentary, they could not effect any purpose

Padmapada urges in refutation of this that, if causal means the productivity of its own awareness (sva-visayajnana-jananani), then an awareness or idea has no existence; for it

or action 2


does not produce any other knowledge of itself (samvidam sva-visaya-

jnana-jananadasallaksanatvam), and the awareness of one cannot be known by others except by inference, which again would not be
If causal efficiency means the production of direct cognition another moment, then the last moment, having no other moment to produce, would itself be non-existent; and, if the last moment


proved to be non-existent, then by turns all the other moments would be non-existent. Existence is a nature of things; and even when a thing remains silent after an operation it does not on that account cease to exist 4 On such a basis Prakasatman points out

samvedandd abhinnam nllam brumah kintu vijndnena nilasya pratibhdsdnyathdnupapattyd ; ksanikasya tv dgantuka-sambandhdbhdve pratibhdsa eva na sydt. Panca-pddikd-vivarana, p. 74. 2 See the first volume of this work, pp. 163-164, where the reasons in







justification of the doctrine are briefly stated.

which however hardly appears

derives the possibility of one s being aware of an awareness, to be convincing. He thinks that an awareness, being of the nature of light, does not stand in need of any other light to illuminate na ca samvit samvido viayah samvid-dtmand bheddbhdvdt pradipasyeva it.




Panca-pddikd, p. 27. ndrtha-kriyd-kdritva-laksanam sattvarn kintu svdbhdvikam itisakrt kdryyam krtvdtusrflmbhutasydpisthdyinah sattvarn na virudhyate. Panca-pddikd-vivarana,

p. 80.


Thought and


Object in Buddhism and Veddnta


that the supposed three notions of "awareness" and the are really not three distinct notions appearing as one on object

the three are joined together in one identical subject-object-awareness which does not involve the

account of their similarity, but

three successive stages which the Buddhists suppose. This identity is proved by the fact that they are recognized (pratyabhijnd) to be

We are,



in all our


conscious of our own identity, that we persist states of consciousness, and that, though our

ideas are continually changing with the changing objects, we remain unchanged all the same and this shows that in knowing ourselves


pure awareness we are successively connected with the changing objects. But the question arises who is to be convinced of this

which can be produced only by a relationing of the previous existence (through sub-conscious impressions of memory) to the existence of the present moment; and this cannot be done by the Vedantic self, which is pure self-revealing
identity, a notion of

made an object of any other conscious state; for it is unchangeable, indestructible, and there cannot be in it a consciousness of relationing between a past
consciousness that cannot further be


a present state


The mere

through the sub-conscious impressions of persistence of the same consciousness is not

the recognition of identity for the recognition of identity would be a relation uniting the past as past with the present as present;

and, since there


no one

appearance of identity

is false.

to perceive the relation of identity, the The Vedantic answer to such an

is that, though the pure consciousness cannot behave as an individual, yet the same consciousness associated with mind (anlahkarana-visista) may behave as an individual who can

recognize his

own identity as well as that of others. The mind associated with the sub-conscious impressions of a felt ego

(ahamvrtti-samskara-sahitam), due to the experience of the self as associated with a past time being responsible for the experience of the self as associated with the present time, it produces the notion
of the identity of the self as persisting both in the past and in the natural objection against such an explanation is that, present.


since the Vedanta does not admit that one awareness can be the

object of another awareness, the revival of a past awareness


purvdnubhava-samskdra-sahitdd iddmmtana-vastu-pramiti-kdrandj jdtam ekasya kdla-dvaya-sambandha-visayakam pratyaksa-jndnam pratyabhijnd iti cet, na tarhi dtmani sd sambhavati .jndndntavijnana-svabhdvasya hy dtmanah r agamy atvdt. Panca-pddikd-vivararia, p. 75.
. .
. .





The Sankara School of Vedanta


impossible, without which recognition of identity would be im possible. The answer of the Vedantist is that, just as an idea is
its sub-conscious impressions, so, though of identity was absent in the preceding moment, yet recognition it could arise through the operation of the sub-conscious im at a later moment 1 pressions According to the Vedanta the pure

remembered through


the only unchanging substance underlying; it is this consciousness associated with mind (antahkarana) that behaves

as the knower or the subject, and it is the same consciousness associated with the previous and later time that appears as the objective self with which the identity is felt and which is known


be identical with the knower the mind-associated conscious We all have notions of self-identity and we feel it as am

can be explained is on same"; the basis of the fact that consciousness, though one and universal, can yet be supposed to perform diverse functions by virtue of the

and the only way



itself as the

its associations, by which it seems to transform knower and the thousand varieties of relations and objects which it knows. The main point which is to be noted in

diverse nature of

connection with this realization of the identity of the

self is that

the previous experience and its memory prove that the self existed in the past but how are we to prove that what existed is also existing

thing different

of identity of the self is some self in the past and in the But the process consists in this, that the two experiences present. manifest the self as one identical entity which persisted through
at the present

moment? Knowledge

from the experience of

both the experiences, and


new experience makes the self known

in the aforesaid relation of identity. Again, when I remember a past experience, it is the self as associated with that experience that

remembered; so



the self as associated with the different

time relations that
of self.



an experience of the identity



these discussions one thing that

comes out



that according to the Sankara Vedanta, as explained by the Vwar ana school of Padmapada and his followers, the sense-data and the
objects have an existence independent of their being perceived; and there is also the mind called antahkarana, which operates in its own way for the apprehension of this or that object. Are objects

already there and presented to the pure consciousness through the

Panca-pddika-vivarana, p. 76.


Thought and


Object in Buddhism and Veddnta


mind? But what then
is is

are the objects? and the Sankarite s answer that they in themselves are unspeakable and indescribable. It easy to notice the difference of such a view from that of the

Buddhistic idealism of Dinnaga or the Lankavatdra on the one hand and that of Vasubandhu in his Trimsika on the other. For in the case of the former there were no objects independent of their being perceived, and in the case of the latter the objects are trans formations of a thought-principle and are as such objective to the subject which apprehends them. Both the subject and the object are grounded in the higher and superior principle, the principle of thought. This grounding implies that this principle of thought and its transformations are responsible for both the subject and the object, as regards material and also as regards form. According to the Sankara Vedanta, however, the stuff of worldobjects, mind, the senses and all their activities, functionings and the like are but modifications of may a, which is indescribable (anirvdcya) in itself, but which is always related to pure con sciousness as its underlying principle, and which in its forms as material objects hides from the view and is made self-conscious by the illuminating flash of the underlying principle of pure con sciousness in its forms as intellectual states or ideas. As already
described, the Sunyavadins also admitted the objective existence of all things and appearances; but, as these did not stand the test
of criticism, considered them as being essenceless (nihsvabhava) The only difference that one can make out between this doctrine

of essencelessness and the doctrine of indescribableness of the

Sankara school


that this

"indescribable" is

yet regarded as an

indescribable something, as

some stuff which undergoes changes and

itself into all the objects of the world. The idealism of the Sahkara Vedanta does not believe in the sahopalam-

which has transformed

bha-niyama of the Buddhist idealists, that to exist is to be perceived. The world is there even if it be not perceived by the individual it has an objective existence quite independent of my ideas and

sensations; but, though independent of my sensations or ideas, it is not independent of consciousness, with which it is associated

dependent. This consciousness is not ordinary psychological thought, but it is the principle that underlies all conscious thought. This pure thought is independent and selfrevealing, because in all conscious thought the consciousness

and on which

it is

shines by itself;

all else is

manifested by this consciousness and


The Sankara School of Veddnta



considered apart from it, is inconceivable and unmeaning. This independent and uncontradicted self-shiningness constitutes

being (abadhita-svayam-prakasataiva asya satta)


All being


pure consciousness, and

appearance hangs on it as something which is expressed by a reference to it and apart from which it has no conceivable status or meaning. This is so not only

epistemologically or logically, but also ontologically. The objectforms of the world are there as transformations of the indescribable

maya, which is not being," but dependent on "being *; but they can only be expressed when they are reflected in mental states and presented as ideas. Analogies of world objects with dream objects or illusions can therefore be taken only as popular
stuff of


examples to make the conception of mayd popularly intelligible this gives the Vedantic idealism its unique position.


Sarikara s Defence of Vedanta; Philosophy of


and Bhartrprapanca.

defensive arguments consisted in the refutation of

the objections that may be made against the Vedantic conception of the world. The first objection anticipated is that from the
followers of

must be

Samkhya philosophy. Thus it is urged that the effect largely of the same nature as the cause. Brahman, which

believed to be intelligent (cetana) and pure (suddha), could not be the cause of a world which is unintelligent (jada and acetana) and impure (asuddhd). And it is only because the world is so
different in nature

from the


Two things which

intelligent spirits that it can be useful are identical in their nature can hardly

be of any use to each other two lamps cannot be illuminating to each other. So it is only by being different from the intelligent
spirits that the


world can best serve them and exist for them. answer to this objection is that it is not true that the should in every way be similar to the cause there are

instances of inanimate hair and nails growing from living beings, and of living insects growing out of inanimate objects like cow-

dung. Nor can it be denied that there is at least some similarity between Brahman and the world in this, that both have being.
It cannot be urged that, because Brahman is intelligent, the world also should be intelligent; for there is no reason for such

Vacaspati Misra


Bhamatt, p. 13, Nirnaya-Sagara edition, 1904.

Sankara refutes it by pointing out two sets of instances in which the effects do not affect the causal state when they return to it.xi] Sankara s Defence of Veddnta 37 an expectation. Another objec supposed to be raised by Samkhya against Vedanta is that at the time of dissolution (pralaya). for such ultimate truths can be discovered not The whole by reason. The magical creations of a magician are controlled by him and. silver. resume his normal vocation in life. the impurities of the worldly tion state might also make the causal state of Brahmahood impure. These arguments of Sankara in answer to a supposed objection 1 kirn hi yac caitanyendnanvitam tad abrahma-prakrtikam drstam iti brahmavddinam praty uddhriyeta samastasya vastujdtasya brahma-prakrtikatvdbhyupagamdt. when they vanish in this way. Of these. as a man may in deep sleep pass into a state where there is no trace of his mundane experiences and may yet. since the Upanisads assert that Brahman is the cause of the world. is So magician himself. Again. other instance is to be found in the manifestation of magic them with The by a magician. material states as affect unformed gold and and are not seen to their specific peculiarities as formed articles. i. 6. but by the testimony of the Upanisads. so after the dissolution of the world into its causal state there may again be the same kind of creation as there was before the dissolution. The converse of it also has not been found to be true it has not been found that what is unintelligent has been known to have been derived from a source other than Brahman 1 . when the world of effects will dissolve back into Brahman the cause. . So there can be no objection that the world of impure effects will affect the pure state of Brahman at the time of dissolution or that there could be no creation after dissolution. the apparent incompatibility of the production of an impure and unintelligent world from the intelligent and pure Brahman has to be explained away . n. So the reality touched by the changing as all one which remains altogether un states. they cannot in any way affect the reality. be found in those cases where are melted back into their original silver. point of this argument seems to lie in the fact that. Sarikara s Bhasya. the changing states is mere false show (mdyd-matram) like the appearance of a rope as a snake. when he becomes awake. The appearance of this reality . one set of instances is to articles of gold. for the magical creations have no also a dreamer is not affected by his dreams when he is awake. etc.

38 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. that the world of effects. his example of the magic and the magician would be quite out of place. If the parindma view of causation is to be adopted. the best him was to rush straight to his own view of effects as no substantiality or essence and not to adopt the parindma having view of real transformations of causes into effects to show that the effects could be largely dissimilar from their causes. The sutras here which could only yield a seem to be so convincingly ultimate reply to the suggested incompatibility of the production of effects dissimilar from their causes is found in the fact that the Upanisads hold that this impure and unintelligent realistic that the world had come out of Brahman assert it. If the world of effects mere may a and magic and has no essence (vastutva). is course for Brahman would have objection the objection that the impure world could not come out of pure at once fallen to the ground. the vivaria view is to be given up. how magical creations may vanish without affecting the fit nature of the magician. . Had he started with the reply that the effects had no real existence and that they were merely magical creations and a false show. since the it no objection can be raised against Upanisads on grounds of reason. if his examples of realistic transformations were to hold good. and it is surprising how Sankara failed to see that. who did not believe in the reality of effects sopher at all. This example. Side by side with this he gives another instance. does not at all in with the context. however. yet they have . It seems however that Sankara here was obliged to take refuge in such a confusion of issues by introducing stealthily an example of the vivaria view of unreality of effects in the commentary on sutras realistic interpretation. could not have been the product of pure and intelligent Brahman are not only weak but rather uncalled for. though the waves are identical with the sea. for such an would have validity only with those who believed in the a philo real transformations of effects like from causes. and that. Instead of doing that he proceeded to give examples of the realistic return of golden articles into gold in order to show that the peculiar defects or other characteristics of the effect cannot affect the purity of the cause. Thus. and not with Sankara. impure and unintelligent as it is. causes In the next section the theory of realistic transformation of is further supported by the sutra which asserts that in spite of the identity of effects with their cause their plurality or diversity may also be explained on the analogy of many popular illustrations.

14.xi] Sankara s Defence of Vedanta Here 39 also an existence in their plurality and diversity as well. when Brahman is under the conditioning phenomena of a world-creation. which is decidedly says that the world in favour of a realistic transformation. etc. In the next section the sutras seem plainly to assert the identity of cause and effect. because the cause exists. but yet. Saiikara has to follow the implication of the sutra in his interpre He. the creator of the world have thus only a limited validity for they depend upon the relative reality of the world. na. Saiikara. ^aiikara s Bhdsya on Brahma-sutra. however. The omniscience of Brahman and His being . there is room for apparent diversity and plurality. the cause. There cannot therefore be any real transformation of causes into effects. is not a result of any real transformation of Brahman as effect. however. that such a supplementary explanation is wholly incom patible with the general meaning of the rule.g. n. because the effect exists in the cause and is due to an elaboration of the cause and also for other reasons and the testimony of the Upanisads. i. but not on vivarta real transformation It is lines. or the theory that the effect is already existent in the cause. This theory is indeed common both to the He however parinama view of two different ways. introduces an argument in support of the sat-karya-vada theory. tation. and the vivarta view. Brahman alone exists. in curious however that he should support the sat-karya-vada theory on parinama lines. with the general meaning of the previous sections. which is true. Such a meaning is quite in keeping &quot. It may be pointed out. . tattvdsrayam tu tad ancnyatva-sutram.). avidydtmaka-ndma-rupa-blja-vydkarandpeksaivdt sarvajnatvasya. na tdttvikam aisvaryyam sarvajnatvam ca brahmanah kintv avidyopddhikam iti taddsrayam pratijnd-sutram. however. . 1 where effects are treated as non-existent and false. mrttiketyeva satyam. also It is unfortunate that here Sankara does not give any reason for his supplementary remark. in concluding his commentary on this sutra. as against the genera tive view of a-sat-karya-vdda of the Nyaya. Bhdmati on the above Bhdsya. because of the possibility of the effect. Thus he kuta-stha-brahmatma-vadinah ekatiiaikdntydt isitrlsitavyabhavah isvarakdrana-pratijnd-virodha iti cet.&quot. alone interprets the sutra as meaning that it is Brahman. From the absolute point of view therefore there is no Isvara who is the omniscient creator of the world 1 Saiikara supports this generally on the ground of the testimony of some Upanisad texts (e. which is not in keeping with the general spirit of the sutra and the interpretation which he himself gave of it.

This intimate relation con power or capacity (sakti) in the cause (e. If the whole exists wholly in each of the same time. does not require any further relation to connect it with anything it may well be asked in reply how &quot. just as a class-concept (e. it may well be replied that the experience of wholes is not like the experience of class-concepts. being a rela tion. the curd). The class-concept of cow is realized in each and every cow. If it exists successively in each of the parts. the whole as such would be in visible. he says that. say a whole. then.g.g. The conception of samavaya connecting substances with their qualities is unnecessary for the latter always . is supposed to be existing in the cause. If a power determines the nature of the must be already existent in the cause as the essence of the Arguing against the Nyaya view that the cause is different effect. cow) exists wholly in each of the individuals and yet is not many. if the same questions be again repeated. then one has to conceive other parts of the whole different from its constituent parts. these parts should have other parts and these others. though they are mutually connected in an insepar able relation of inherence (samavaya). (samyoga). the parts. from the then this also may require a further something to connect the samavaya with the cause or the effect and that another and that another adinfinitum. If the whole exist only in the totality of the parts. the milk). and so at that time the functions of the whole would be absent in the other parts. is which of inherence (samavaya) to connect also regarded as a relation. else. appear identified with the former (tadatmya-pratiti). but . If the whole exist in the parts in parts. then the whole would at one time be existent only in one part. This the very essence of the cause. If it be a vicious parts at the said that. says that the fact that curd is produced from milk and not from mud shows that there is some such intimate relation of curd with milk which sists in it the special has not with anything else. and.g.conjunction&quot. which can produce the special is is it power power effect. and the very essence of this the effect itself. If it is urged that samavaya. since all the parts cannot be assembled together. effect. and thus there would infinite. should require the relation it with the objects which are in conjunction (samyogiri). effect (e. If the effect. so a whole may also be is wholly existent in each of the parts. it must exist in them all taken together or in each of the separate parts.40 The Sankara School of Vedanta [CH. then there would be many wholes. if such a samavaya is deemed necessary to connect the cause with the effect.

since being non-existent.xi] Sankara is s Defence of Veddnta 41 not realized in each and every part. it cannot be the agent of its production. if the world is a direct product of the intelligent Brahman. it cannot be related to its cause. there is no reason why such an intelligent being should which is full of misery and is a prison-house to himself. production is not defined as an action. if the effect is non-existent before its production. production being an action. . which is a whole for. such an action would have nothing as its agent. so an effect also is to be regarded as an expansion of the cause and as such identical with it. But the siitras gave him no occasion for such a remark. no such objection that the creator should not have created an undesirable world for its own suffering is valid. is as yet But. a relationing of an effect with its cause (svakarana-satta-samavaya) then also it may be objected that a relation is only possible when there are two terms which are related. here also his may a theory is not in keeping even with his general interpretation of the sutras. however. and his remarks have appended as a note which hangs loosely and which does not appear to have any relevancy to the general meaning and purport to be of the siitras. easily answered by pointing out that the transcendent creator is far above the mundane spirits that suffer misery in the prison-house of the world. if the effect is already existent. then. as was the case with the create a world is previous sections. such a production would be either itself non-existent or would be without impossible duction. but as . since the effect is non-existent before its pro could not be the agent of its production. what then is the necessity of the causal operation (karaka-vyapara)t The answer to such a question tion is to be found in the view that the its effect is of the cause into effect. is not already existing In the first There are seven other smaller sections. in spite of such a transformation the effect in the cause as its potency or power. since the effect non-existent. it any agent. If . and. The effect is thus only a transformed state of the cause and hence the causal operation is necessary for bringing about this transformation but . since there is no real creation and the whole world is but a magical appearance. of these the objection that. . and. so that indeed. Just as a man may but an elabora sit with his limbs collected together or stretched out and yet would be considered the same man. Here also Sankara adds as a supple mentary note the remark that. Again.

never forgets to sing his old song theory. going the transformation has parts. The above discussion seems to prove convincingly that Badarayana s philosophy was some kind of bhedabheda-vada or a theory of transcendence and immanence of God (Brahman) even in the light of Saiikara s own commentary. raised that Brahman cannot . A reply to such an objection is to be found in the analogy of the human self. with regard to the purpose of the sutras. there is Sankara. yet remains unchanged and unaffected as a whole by such transformations. such objections may be levelled against the objectors themselves. The world was thus a real transformation of God s powers. however irrelevant it may be. where one has nothing to gain and yet one is pleased to indulge in it. since Brahman is partless. So Brahman also creates the world by His In another section in Himself. without the help of any other accessory agents create the world the reply to such an objection is found in the fact that Brahman has all powers in Himself and can as such create the world out of Himself without the help of anything else. when He has nothing to gain by it. since Brahman is complete no reason why He should create this great world. In the next section an objection is raised that. however. God Himself was not exhausted by such a transformation and always remained as the master creator who by His play created the world and who could by His own powers create the world without any extraneous assistance. though remaining immanent in the . after interpreting the sutra as Ilia or play. though transforming itself into various kinds of dream experiences. he remarks that it ought not to be forgotten that all the world-creation is but a fanciful appearance is due to nescience and that the ultimate reality the identity of the self and Brahman. the transformation must apply to the whole of Brahman for a partial transformation is possible only when the substance which is under . then. which is in itself formless and. or rather of His powers and energies (sakti). Moreover. while He Himself. which he himself could not avoid following.42 The Sankara School of Veddnta In the next section an objection is [CH. for Samkhya also admits the transformation of the formless prakrti. if the world is a transformation of Brahman. The reply is based on the analogy of play. He believed that the world was the product of a real transformation of Brahman. of the mdya attributing the world-creation to God s playful activity. it is urged that. Thus in this section.

. is referred to as a quotation from Dramidacarya in Ramanuja s Veddrtha-samgraha. 1924. . is On the spiritual side Brahman is transformed into the antaryamin and the jiva. and jati and pinda.antargund bhagavatl paradevateti&quot. In the commentary of Sarvajnatma Muni s Samksepa-sdriraka. &quot. viraj and devata. 138. ii. and remained as its controller. but vehemently opposed by ^aiikara. and as vrttikara and Upavarsa by Sarikara. 221. 1. the Vakyakara referred to by Sarvajnatma Muni as Atreya has been identified with Brahmanandin or Tanka and the bhasyakara (a quotation from whose Bhasya appears in Samksepa-sdnraka. S. 23 and in. The commentators on arikara s Bhasya say that. 1924. From the views of Upavarsa referred to in these sutras it appears that Upavarsa believed in the theory of jndna-kanna-samuccaya. Madras. i. in his commentary on Sarikara s commentary. 23. and to Dramidacarya. transcended it at the same time. The as it doctrine of bhedabheda-vada is is certainly prior to Sarikara. Kuppusvami isastrl. . The doctrine of Bhartr prapanca is monism. It seems probable also that Bhartrprapanca refers to Bodhayana. as that between Brahman and the is one of identity in difference. sutra. The relation between Brahman and thejiva. quotes a passage from Verikata s Tattva-tlka on Ramanuja s com mentary on the Brahma-sutras. in. who wanted to repudiate the idea of his opponents that the performance of sacrificial and Vedic duties could be conceived as a preliminary preparation for making oneself fit for Brahma-knowledge. and it is of the bhedabheda type. An implication of this view that both thejiva and the physical world evolve out of Brahman. referred to by Sarikara and 1 Ramanuja all held some form of bhedabheda doctrine Bhartrpra panca has been referred to by Sankara in his commentary on the Brhadaranyaka Upanisad and Anandajnana. in an article read before the Third Oriental Conference. Third Oriental Congress Hiriyanna collected these fragments in a paper read before the in Madras. referred to as vrttikara who is by Ramanuja. and there he describes Bhartrprapanca s philosophy as follows. who wrote a commentary on Brahmanandin s Chdadogyopanisad-vdrttika . he refers to Upavarsa by name. world. i. which are all cosmic. by Nrsimhasrama. Pandit edition) is identified with Dramidacarya. the dominant view of most of the puranas. References to Dramidacarya s commentary on the Chdndogya Upanisad are made by Anandagiri in his commentary on ^ahkara s commentary on the Chdn dogya Upanisad. p. Prof. \ M. on the physical side into avyakta. in. held also by Bhaskara (an adherent of the bhedabheda theory). gives a number of extracts from Bhartrprapanca s Bhasya on the Brhadaranyaka Upanisad. 217-227. 9. in which he says that Upavarsa is a name of Bodhayana vrttikdrasya Bodhdyanasvaiva hi Upavarsa iti sydn ndma Pro ceedings of the Third Oriental Conference. 53. which are not 1 Prof. when he refers to Vrttikara in I. so that the doctrine may be described as Brahma-parinama-vada.xi] Philosophy of Bddardyana and Bhartrprapanca 43 world through His powers. and punished or rewarded the created mundane souls in accordance with their bad and good deeds. i. Ramanuja and others. iii.

soul and matter. whereas Brahman remains always unchanged. Thus Appaya Dlksita in his Siddhdnta-lesa refers to the author of Paddrtha-nirnaya as saying that . which are often inconsistent with the general drift of his own commentary and the context of the sutras. it is (parindma) of the contended that there is a real transformation mdyd stuff. This means of reaching either stage is jndna-karma-samuccaya.44 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. If. They are again classified into three rdsis. . cosmic. and re present the eight classes into which the variety of the universe may be divided. while the possessor of the sakti (or the saktimat. and. jiva-rasi and murttdmurtta-rasi. These are the avasthas or modes of Brahman. but there is very little doubt that it was some special type of bheddbheda doctrine. God. then how is one to know that in the ultimate point of view all effects are false and unreal? If. so far as it can be made out from such a context) shows that it was so. para- mdtma-rdsi. dvaitddvaita. It is indeed difficult to say what were the exact characteristics of Badarayana s bheddbheda doctrine of Vcdanta. The former vouches for the reality of variety and the latter for that of unity (as taught in the Upanisads). how then can the sakti of Brahman as well as its transformations be regarded as unreal and false. however. as well as with their purpose and meaning. Brahman) is regarded as real and absolute? There is a great diversity of opinion on this point among the Vedantic writers of the Sankara school. which is a corollary on the practical side to pramdna-samuccaya on the theoretical side. is conceived as being achieved two stages the first leading to apavarga. which correspond to the triple subject-matter of Religion and Philosophy. Bhartrprapanca recognized what is known as pramana-samuccaya. however. viz. in Hence the ultimate truth is Moksa. If experience always shows the causal transformation to be real. be one sutra where the absolute (paraof view is given but no such sutra has been dis mdrthikd) point covered even by Sankara himself. where samsara is overcome through the overcoming of asanga\ and the second leading to Brahmahood through the dispelling of avidyd. it is contended that this view of real transformation is only from a relative point of view (vyavahdrika) then there must at least . even Sankara s own commentary (if we exclude only his parenthetic remarks. and if mdyd is regarded as the power (sakti) of Brahman. by which it follows that the testimony of common experience is quite as valid as that of the Veda. as has already been repeatedly pointed out. or life s end.

xi] Vivarta and Parindma in Veddnta 45 Brahman and mdyd ance Brahman the are both material causes of the world-appear vivarta cause. 1 Vacaspati Misra flourished in about A. and mdya the parindma cause. Ibid. 61. Samksepa-sdrlraka. whereas Brahman is the real vivarta cause The author of the Siddhdnta-mukt avail. 62.D. Ibid. updyam dtisthati purvam uccair upeyam dptum Janata yathaiv a srutir muriindras ca vivarta. 840. Nydya-ratna-tlkd. His important works are Tattva-bindu. So from two different points of view both Brahman and mdya are the cause of the world. n. Yukti-dlpikd Brahma-tattva-samhitoddlparii. . vikdra-vddam Kapilddi-paksam upetya vddena tu sutra-kdrah srutis ca samjalpati pilrvabhumau sthitvd vivarta-pratipddandya. In addition to his Bhdmatl commentary on the Brahma-sutra he wrote many other works and commentaries on other systems of philosophy. 2 He lived about A. Prakasananda. Vacaspati Misra holds that mdyd is only an acces 1 sory cause (sahakdri). Others are said to find a definition of causation intermediate between vivarta and parindma by defining material cause as that which can produce effects which are not different from itself (svdbhinna-kdryajanakatvam updddnatvam) The world is identical with Brahman inasmuch as it has being. as hinted in sutra n. Brahman is unchangeable and is the support of mdyd and is thus the cause of the world in a remote sense. if the arrangement of the sutras was . the purpose 2 The difficulty that many of the sutras of Badarayana give us a parindma view of causation was realized by for . and mdyd to be only an instrument . who tried to explain it away by suggesting that the parindma theory was discussed approvingly in the sutras only because this theory w as nearest to the vivarta. n. i4 3 This explanation could have some probability.D. Samkhya-tattvakaumudi. 900 during the reign of King Manukuladitya and was a pupil of 3 Devesvara. 64. Nyaya-varttika-tatparya-ffka. (Samkhyd). Veddnta-tattva-kaumudi. Sarvajnatma Muni. and by initiating r people to the parindma theory it would be easier to lead them to the vivarta theory. however. n. . i. Tattva-samlksa Brahma. thinks that it is the mdyd energy (mdyd-sakti) which is the material cause of the world and not Brahman. vivarta-vddasya hi purva-bhumir veddnta-vdde parindma-vddah vyavasthite smin parindma-vdde svayam samdydti vivarta-vddah. Tattvavaisdradl (yoga).siddhi-itkd. and it is identical with nescience inasmuch as it has its characteristics of materiality and change. however. Nydya-kanika on Vidhi: viveka. Nydya-tattvdloka. believes Brahman alone to be the vivarta cause. Sarvajnatma Muni.siddhyai vikdra-vddam vadatas tathaiva. .

if the content be taken into consideration. This. and that even the sutra n. and later Vedanta writers have understood it differently. &quot. bliss and being. all instilled by the right teacher. understand the meaning and medi that one learns for the first time that one ought to listen tate&quot. which does not await the performance of any of the obligatory Vedic duties for its realiza tion. think to the right path. Another question arose re duties. i. that the Upanisads direct men to this view is technically called niyama-vidhi.revealed identity of pure consciousness. The central emphasis of Sankara s philosophy of the Upanisads and the Brahma-sutra is on Brahman.that art thou&quot. however. holds that it is mandate of the Upanisads (such as &quot. consistently support the parinama view. Different Mlmamsa writers empha sized in different ways the necessity of the association of duties with Brahma-wisdom and a brief reference to some of these has been made in the section on Suresvara. which was ultimately definitely approved as the true view but it has been shown that the content of almost all the sutras of n. 14 cannot be explained as holding the vivarta view of causation as the right one.) to the vidhi. . Teachers and Pupils in Vedanta.That art thou. since the other sutras of the same section have been explained by Sankara himself on the parinama view and.g. was directly against the Mlmamsa view of the obligatoriness of certain and Sankara and his followers had to fight hard on this point with the Mimamsakas. people might themselves in reading all kinds of texts in their attempts to attain engage salvation and that they might go on the wrong track and it is just that . viz.) of the Vedanta. who probably only by shouldst listen to these texts. A right realization of such Upanisad texts as &quot. Thus the author of the Prakatartha. i. such as to support the view that the parinama view was intro duced only to prepare the reader s mind for the vivarta view. . is by itself sufficient to dispel the false illusions of world-appearance. .thou Vedanta texts a view which is technically called apurva- Others.&quot. virtue of the flourished in the twelfth century. garding the nature of the obligation of listening to the unity texts (e.46 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. the self. listen to the unity texts to draw them on . that of listening to the unity texts of the Upanisads. however. this sutra also has to be explained on the parinama view of bhedabheda type.

maintain that there can in no sense be a duty in regard to the attainment of wisdom of Brahma-knowledge. Suresvara and Muni. its relation with may a and the phenomenal world of world-appearance. however. through which may the one Brahman appeared as many. think that no obliga tion of duties in the is implied in these commands they . Suresvara and his pupil Sarvajnatma Muni a was only an instrument (dvara). think that the force of the obligation lies in directing the student of Vedanta steadily to realize the truth of the Vedanta texts without any interruption. and it was held its object and its support. and the may a only hangs on it like a veil of illusion which makes this one thing . and with individual persons. Sarvajnatma we have who represent three distinct tendencies in the monistic interpre tation of the Vedanta. as a means of advancement in the Vedantic course of progress. and that therefore many divergent views have sprung up on the subject.xi] Teachers and Pupils in Veddnta 47 The followers of Sarvajnatma Muni. and this view is technically called parisamkhya-vidhi. and the force of the duty lies in enjoining the holding of discussions for the clarification of one s understanding. and many passages work show tendencies which could be more or less diversely interpreted. however. that is that It is may a had. Vacaspati Misra and his followers. Thus shortly after of the self and the Sankara s death his pupil four important teachers. Padmapada and Vacaspati Misra. and had its real nature hidden held that from the gaze of individual appearances as individual persons. though it its was regarded as positive. means that one should hold proper discussions for the clarifi cation of his intellect. Sankara s own writings do not always manifest the same uniform and clear answer. and the meaning of the obligatory sentence &quot. both for the pure Brahman the real cause underlying all appearances. however. and neglected to explain clearly the order of phenomenal appearance. But the central philosophical problem of the Vedanta is the conception of Brahman the nature of its causality. are simply put form of commands in order to show the great importance of listening to Vedanta texts and holding discussions on them.thou shouldst listen to&quot. the Brahman. Appaya Dlksita in different parts of his notes in the beginning of his Siddhanta-lesa that the ancients were more concerned with the fundamental problem of the identity Brahman. In this view may a was hardly recognized as a substance. though of course the general scheme was always more or less well-defined. Other followers of Suresvara.

It is easy to see that this view ignores altogether the importance of giving philosophical explanations of phenomenal appearance. who are again dependent on mdyd. appear as many unreal appearances. no writer of great expand through the later centuries in the writers that . or the other of these schools reputation is known to us to have lived in this period. In other fields of philosophical development also this century was more or . and. excepting probably Jnanottama Misra. re as the stuff which contains the double activity or power garding of cognitive activity and vibratory activity. Thus in the same century we have four distinct lines of Vedantic development. But the third view. though the nature of its existence is inexplicable and inde scribable and at the time of dissolution of the world (or pralayd) . so it is the Brahman that appears as individual persons through beginningless avidyd] the individual persons so formed again delusively create the world-appearance through their own avidyd. will remain hidden in avidyd. Thus in the Brhaddranyaka-bhdsya he says that. which began to that followed one and some additional tendencies also developed. as an accessory through the operation of which the creation of world-appearance is possible mdyd hides the Brahman as its object. The world-appearance is not mere subjective ideas or sensations. but it has an objective existence. The tenth century seems to have been very barren in the field of the Vedanta. who wrote a commentary on Suresvara s Vdrttika. otherwise called creation. but it rests on individual persons. It will be pointed out in a later section Mandana also elaborated the same tendency shortly after Sankara in the ninth century. and regarding Brahman in association with mdyd. with these two powers as Isvara. its constitutive stuff. and mdyd on . one determining the psychical process and the other the physical process. gives mdyd a little more substantiality. it may be pointed out that.48 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. leaving aside theories of limitation (avaccheda) or reflec tion (pratibimba). namely that of Padmapada. them. as the son of Kunti is the same as Radheya. Vacaspati s view gives a little more substantiality to mdyd in the sense that he holds that mdyd is coexistent with Brahman. and is only concerned to emphasize the reality of Brahman as the only truth. to be revived again at the time of the next world- appearance. in a beginningless cycle. But the roots of a very it thoroughgoing subjective idealism also may be traced even in the writings of Sankara himself. as the root cause of the world. psychical and physical.

that quite a large number of Vedantic writers must have worked on referred to for refutation the Vedanta before Anandabodha. There were. Prajnakara Gupta of Vikramasila. but the present writer had the good fortune of Mr going through it from a manuscript in the Adyar Library. In the Siddhdnta-lesa of Appaya Dlksita we D II 4 . and a short account of its philosophical views is given below in a separate section. Acarya Jetari of Rajshahi. According to Govindananda s statement in his Ratna-prabhd. its full commentary on Sankara s Bhdsya. excepting Udayana and Srldhara in NyayaVaisesika. 311. probably began from some time in the eleventh century. and Ratna Vajra. But it is certain century. Utpala in Astronomy and Abhinavagupta in Saivism. a few Buddhistic writers of repute in this period. and. and these were often by Vedantic writers till the fourteenth as will be pointed out in a later section.xi] less Teachers and Pupils in Veddnta 49 barren. however. Jina. Citsukha in his com mentary on the Nydya-makaranda points out (p. The eleventh century also does not seem to have been very fruitful for Vedanta philosophy. Anandabodha says in his Nydya-makaranda that work was a compilation (samgrahd) from a large number of Vedantic monographs (nibandha-puspdnjali). the author of the Yukti-prayoga. (called also Janardana) wrote his Tattvdloka on the lines of Vedantic Tripathi says in his introduction interpretation of this work. such as Candragomin (junior) of Rajshahi. The only author of great reputation seems to have been Anandabodha Bhattarakacarya. Ratnaklrti. author of Pramana-vartikalankara and Sahopalambha-niscaya. the author of Nydya-loka-stddhi. The author of the Prakatdrtha may thus be believed to have lived either in the eleventh or in the twelfth century. The mahdvidyd syllogisms of Kularka Pandita. p. although trace his we cannot properly them now. who appears to have lived probably in the latter half of the eleventh century and the first half of the twelfth century. Amalananda of the thirteenth century refuted a view of the author of the Prakatdrtha. probably no other persons of great reputation can be mentioned. the author of Hetu-tattvopadesa. Dharma-dharmiviniscaya and Bdldvatdra-tarka. however. and name was Sdrlraka-bhdsya-prakatdrtha and Anandajnana It was a . 346) that Ananda bodha was refuting a view of the author of the Brahma-prakdsikd. the author of the Apoha-siddhi t Ksana-bhanga-siddhi and Sthira-siddhi-dusana. the author of Pramdnavdrtikdlankdra-tikd. to the Tarka-samgraha that a copy of this work is available in Tekka Matha.

and being may therefore be attributed to them and being is the same what . Anandajnana s position was very much like that of Sarvajnatma Muni. p. yet the general views of Anandajnana were not the same as those of the author thereof. His work. But the way in which Anandajnana refers to Mundaka. Gangapuri Bhattaraka also lived earlier than as Citsukha points out. lived either towards the latter part of the tenth century or the first It is probable that half of the eleventh century. nor did he admit any difference between may a and avidyd. who wrote commentaries on most of the important commentaries of the Prakatdrtha in Sankara. . Ac cording to him both may a and Brahman are to be regarded as the cause of the world. Brahman is thus the changeless cause in the world or the vivarta-kdrana. It is not improbable that he may have been a senior contemporary of Anandabodha. therefore. It may be surmised. However it may be. shows that he was either the author of the Prakatdrtha or had written some commentary to it. was commented on by Anandajnana. it is quite unlikely that the work should have been written later than the middle of the twelfth century 1 . But he could not have been the author of this work. so Isvara is omniscient by knowing everything through may a modifications.50 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. so it seems very probable that he had written a commentary to it. and he did not admit many ajndnas. though Anandajnana wrote his Tattvdloka on the lines of the Prakatdrtha. hear of a commentary on it called Prakatartha-vivarana. But it is surprising that Anandajnana. But. and Kena. since he refers to it as the model on which his Tattvdloka was written. The views of the author of the Prakatdrtha regarding the nature of vidhi have already been noted. But the author of the Prakatdrtha.gaveaseparate place to the antahkaranas of individual persons and thought that. 32. All kinds of world-phenomena exist. Gangapuri must then have Anandabodha. 23. just as the jivas could be cognizers through the reflection of pure intelligence in the antahkarana states. so far as can be judged from references to him in the Siddhdnta-lesa. should also trouble himself to write another commentary on the Prakatdrtha. that he had some special reasons for respecting it. and it may have been the work of some eminent teacher of his or of someone in his parental line. but all the ever may be 1 See Tripathi s introduction to the Tarka-samgraha . which is itself a commentary on Sankara s commentary. Paddrtha-tattva-nirnaya. the nature of things that exist. p.

who in the third quarter of the twelfth century for the first time attempted to refute the entire logical apparatus of the Naiyayikas. and great as Jayanta and Udayana in the ninth and tenth had been vigorously introducing logical methods in philo sophy and were trying to define all that is knowable. wrote his Bheda- dhikkdra-satkriyd. giving a summary of Vaisesika and Vedanta philosophy respectively. the lines of Vedanta interpretation which started with Suresvara. mentaries The names of these commentators have been mentioned in the sections on Sriharsa. Tarka-viveka and Siddhdnta-viveka are the names of two chapters of this book. Interest arguments was continuously kept up by com written on these works all through the later centuries. 16. p. It was Sriharsa Nyaya authors such centuries . by Anandajnana in the latter part of the same century in his Tarka-samgraha and by Nrsimhasrama Muni in his Bheda-dhikkdra On in the sixteenth century. the last-named a pupil. The view of Gaiigapuri in the Paddrtha-tattva-nirnaya just referred to seems to have been definitely rejected by Anandabodha in his Pramdnamdld. manifests both aspects. called Bhedadhikkdra.xi] Teachers and Pupils in Veddnta 51 changing contents or individual existents must also be regarded as products of the transformation of some substance. and this had a sub-commentary. The world ways (Brahmamdydcaityubhayopdddnam\ sattva-jddya-rupobhayadharmdnugaty-upapattis ca). Aryadeva. Moreover. the Vedantic doctrine that all that is knowable is indefinable was probably losing its hold and it is probable that works like Anandabodha s Pramdna-mdld and Nydya-dipdvali in the eleventh century or in the early part of the twelfth century were weakly attempting to hold fast to the Vedantic position on logical grounds. the aspect of changeless being and that of changing materiality so both mayd and Brahman form the material cause of the world in two different . and in this sense may a is to be regarded as the parinami-karana of the world. Narayanasrama. Candraklrti.satkriyojjv aid. Padmapada and Vacaspati were vigorously 4-2 . Nagarjuna. Sriharsa s work was carried on in Citsukha s Tattva-pradipikd in the early part of the thirteenth century. Citsukha and Anandajnana. The beginnings of the dialectical argu ments can be traced in these dialectical to Sankara and further back to the great etc. When Kularka had started the mahd-vidyd syllogisms. Thus the world has Brahman as its vivarta-karana and mayd as its parinami-karana. Buddhist writers.

in which the author tries to show the mutual relation of the verses of it as yielding a consistent meaning. except Prakasananda in the sixteenth century and his pupil Nana Dlksita. pupil of Nrsimhasvarupa. called the Trayyantabhdva-pradipikd. 2 commentary on the Bhdmati. Many independent works were also written by persons holding more or less the same kinds of views as Sarvajfiatma Muni 3 The philosophy of drsti-srsti-vada Vedanta. by Ramananda. pupil of Vedadhyaksa-bhagavat-pujyapada. Thus in the middle of the thirteenth century Vacaspati s Bhdmati was commented on by Amalananda in his Kalpa-taru and this Kalpa-taru was again commented on by Appaya Dlksita in the latter part of the sixteenth century and the . wrote a of the main contents of the Panca-pddikd-vivarana in six chapters (varnaka). The Veddnta-kaumudi is an important work which is 1 Allala Svari. There are. and the Ttkd-ratna by Anandapurna. Panca-pddikd was commented on by Prakasatman in the thirteenth century in his Panca-pddikd-vivarana^y Akhandananda in the fourteenth century in his Tattva-dipana.52 The Sankara School of Vedanta [CH. Nrslmhasrama also wrote a commentary on the Samksepa-sdriraka. wrote a called the Bhdmatl-tilaka. two other commentaries on the Panca-pddikd called Panca-pddikd-vydkhyd (by an_author whose name is not definitely known) and the Prabandha-parisodhim by Atmasvarupa. is 3 . and this work is called by two names. son of Trivikramacarya. pupil of Girvanendra (A. pupil of Bharati Tlrtha. by Anandapurna and Nrsimha in the sixteenth century and by Rama Tlrtha in the seventeenth century 2 The line of Suresvara . called the Tattvabodhinl. however. One Sarvajna tma Bhagavat wrote a small Vedantic work. too. called the Panca- summary : padika-tlkd. and by Laksminrsimha in his Abhoga towards the end of the seventeenth century or the 1 beginning of the eighteenth . there another work called the Samkepa-sdrlraka-sambandhokti by Vedananda. son of Janardana Sarvajna and pupil of Svamindrapurna. continued in commentaries and in independent works through out the later centuries.D. and also in the commentaries on the Samksepa-sdriraka from the sixteenth cen tury onwards. called Pancapraktiya. by Vidya- Padmapada s ranya in the same century in his Vivarana-prameya-samgraha. also continued in the tika-sdrd) by summary of his great Vdrttika (called VdrtVidyaranya and its commentaries. but it is not probable that he is the same as Sarvajnatma Muni. but we do not meet with any notable writer on this line. The Riju-vivarana had again another commentary on it. which was probably started by Mandana. Advaita-bhusana and Vivaranaprameya-samgraha. Apart from the two published commentaries on the Samkfepa-sdrlraka. Dharmarayadhvarlndra also wrote a commentary on Panca-pddikd. Samyagbodhendra Samyamin. 1450). had doubtless some adherents . There are again two other commentaries on Prakasatman s Panca-pddikd-vivarana the Riju-vivarana by Visnubhatta. first quarter of the seventeenth century.


Teachers and Pupils in Veddnta


referred to

by Appaya Dlksita

in his Siddhanta-lesa. In this in the fact that the


the omniscience of

sciousness as

that exists either as actually transformed or as potentially transformed, as future, or as latently transformed, as the past in the maya\ and it is the Paramesvara

Brahman consists Brahman manifests all

pure con


manifests Himself as the underlying consciousness

(saksiri) in

individual persons, manifesting the ajnana transformations in them, and also their potential ajnana in dreamless sleep. Many other

important Vedanta views of an original character are expressed in this book. This work of Ramadvaya has been found by the present writer in the Govt. Oriental MSS. Library, Madras, and a separate
section has been devoted to




references in

to followers of




be assumed that the Vedanta-

in the fourteenth century. the fourteenth century, however, we have a large number of Vedanta writers in all the succeeding centuries; but with the notable exception of Prakasananda, Madhusudana SarasvatI in his

kaumudi was written probably


Advaita-siddhi (in which he tried to refute the objections of Vyasa Tlrtha against the monistic Vedanta in the sixteenth century) and

probably Vidyaranya


Vivarana-prameya-samgraha and Dhar-

Paribhasa, and its Sikhamani commentary by Ramakrsna, there are few writers who can be said to reveal any great originality in Vedantic interpretations. Most of the writers of
this later period

were good compilers, who revered


sorts of past

Vedantic ideas and collected them in well-arranged forms in their works. The influence of the Panca-pddikd-vivarana, however, is very strong in most of these writers, and the Vivarana school of thought probably played the most important part in Vedantic thought

throughout all this period. These Vedantic writers grew up in particular circles inspired by particular teachers, whose works were carried on either in their


families or


among their pupils Thus Jagannathasrama was a



few examples may make


great teacher of south India in

the latter half of the fifteenth century he had a pupil in Nrsimhasrama, one of the most reputed teachers of Vedanta in the early half of the sixteenth century. He was generally inspired on the one

hand by the Vivarana and on the other by Sriharsa and Citsukha and Sarvajnatma Muni: he wrote a number of Vedanta works,
such as Advaita-dipika
(his pupil, Narayanasrama, wrote a com mentary called Advaita-dlpikd-vivarana on it), Advaita-panca-


The Sankara School of Vedanta


ratna, Advaita-bodha-dipikd, Advaita-ratna-kosa, Tattva-bodhinl, a commentary on the Samksepa-sdriraka, Tattva-viveka (which had

two commentaries, Tattva-viveka- dipana of Narayanasrama and Tattva-vivecana of Agnihotra, pupil of Jnanendra Sarasvati), Panca-pddikd-vivarana-prakdsikd,Bheda-dhikkdra,Advaita-ratna-vyd-



commentary on Mallanarodlya


Advaita-ratna), and

also on the Vivarana, and work on dialectic Vedanta on the (a lines of Sriharsa s dialectical work) shows the syncretistic ten dencies of the age, in which the individual differences within the school were all accepted as different views of one Vedanta, and in which people were more interested in Vedanta as a whole and felt no hesitation in accepting all the Vedantic ideas in their works. Nrsimhasrama had a pupil Dharmarajadhvarindra, who wrote a

The fact that he both on Sarvajnatma Muni s work and

could write commentaries

also write a


Veddnta-paribhdsd, a commentary called Tarka-cuddmani on the Tattva-cintdmani of Gangesa, and also on the Nyaya-siddhantadipa of Sasadhara Acarya, and a commentary on the Panca-padika of Padmapada. His son and pupil Ramakrsna Dlksita wrote a com

mentary on the first, called Veddnta-sikhdmani\ and Amaradasa, the pupil of Brahmavijnana, wrote another commentary on this Sikhamani of Ramakrsna 1 Ramakrsna had also written a com mentary on Rucidatta s Tattva-cintamani-prakasa, called Nydyasikhamani, and a commentary on the Veddnta-sdra. Other authors, such as Kasmatha Sastrin and Brahmendra Sarasvati, had also written separate works bearing the name Veddnta-paribhdsd after

the Veddnta-paribhdsd of Dharmaraja in the seventeenth century. Under the sphere of Nrsimha s influence, but in the Saiva and

Mimamsaka family of Rangaraja Adhvarin ,was born Appaya Dlksita who became one of the most reputed teachers of the sixteenth and
the seventeenth centuries.
section devoted to him.


His works have


been noted in the
ritual (smrti)

He again was a teacher of Bhattoji


in addition to

many works on grammar, law and

wrote two important works on Vedanta, called Tattva-kaustubha and Veddnta-tattva-dipana-vydkhyd, the latter a commentary on
the commentary, Tattva-viveka-dipana.oi Narayanasrama (a pupil of Nrsimhasrama) on the latter s work, Vedanta-tattva-viveka.

This Narayanasrama had also written another commentary on
1 Petta Diksita, son of Narayana Dlksita, also wrote a the Vedanta-paribhdsa, called Vedanta-paribhdsd-prakasikd.

commentary on


Teachers and Pupils in Veddnta


Nrsimhasrama s Bheda-dhikkara, called Bheda-dhikkara-satkriya\ and later on in the eighteenth century another commentary was written on Nrsimha s Bheda-dhikkara, called Advaita-candrika, by Narasimha Bhatta, pupil of Ramabhadrasrama and Nagesvara in the eighteenth century. Bhattojl Diksita s son Bhanujl Diksita was a commentator on the Amara-kosa (Vyakhya-sudha or Subodhinl).
Bhattojl was, however, a pupil not only of Appaya, but also of Nrsimhasrama Muni. Bhattojl s younger brother and pupil, Rangojl Bhatta, wrote two works, the Advaita-cintamani and the Advaita-sdstra-saroddhara, more or less on the same lines, containing
a refutation of Vaisesika categories, a determination of the nature of the self, a determination of the nature of ajnana and the nature of

the doctrine of reflection, proofs of the falsity of world-appearance and an exposition of the nature of Brahman and how Brahmahood

to be attained. His son

who wrote

Konda Bhatta was mainly a grammarian, on Vaisesika. Again Madhusudana Sarasvati, who

,was a pupil of Visvesvara Sarasvati (pupil of Sarvajna Visvesa and pupil s pupil of Govinda Sarasvati), lived in the early half of the sixteenth century and was probably under the influence of

Nrsimhasrama, who
Sarasvatl s
least three pupils,


reputed to have defeated Madhusudana


Madhusudana had


Purusottama, who wrote on Madhusudana





Siddhanta-tattva-bindu-tika 1


others were

Sesagovinda (the

latter of

whom wrote

Balabhadra and commentary on Sankara s

Sarva-darsana-siddhanta-samgraha, called Sarva-siddhanta-rahaAgain Sadananda, the author of the Vedanta-sara, one of the most popular and well-read syncretistic works on Vedanta,

was a contemporary of Nrsimhasrama; Nrsimha Sarasvati wrote in 1588 a commentary thereon, called Subodhinl. Devendra, the author of the Svanubhuti-prakasa, was also a contemporary of Nrsimhasrama. It has already been pointed out that Prakasananda was probably a contemporary of Nrsimhasrama, though he does not seem to have been under his influence. This shows how some of the foremost Vedanta writers of the sixteenth and seven
teenth centuries grew up together in a Vedantic circle, many of whom were directly or indirectly under the influence of Nrsim

hasrama and Appaya Diksita.

Brahmananda wrote on the Siddhanta-bindu another commentary,




The Sankara School of Veddnta


Passing to another circle of writers, we see that Bhaskara Dlksita, who lived in the latter half of the seventeenth century,
his teacher

wrote a commentary, Ratna-tulika, on the Siddhanta-siddhanjana of Krsnananda. The Siddhanta-siddhanjana is an excellent

work on Vedanta, which contains most of the im Vedanta doctrines regarding the difference of dharma-vicar a portant and brahma-vicara, the relation of Mlmamsa theories of commands, and the need of Brahma-knowledge it introduces many Mlmamsa subjects and treats of their relations to many relevant Vedanta It also introduces elaborate discussions on the nature of topics. knowledge and ignorance. It seems, however, to be largely free from the influence of the Vivarana, and it does not enter into theories of perception or the nature of the antahkarana and its vrtti. It is thus very different from most of the works produced in the sixteenth century in the circles of Nrsimha or Appaya. Krsnananda lived probably in the middle of the seventeenth century. He had for teacher Ramabhadrananda and Ramabhadrananda was taught
; ;

by Svayamprakasananda, the author of the Vedanta-naya-bhusana, a commentary on the Brahma-sutra on the lines of Vacaspati MiSra s
Bhdmatl. This Svayamprakasa must be distinguished from the other Svayamprakasa, probably of the same century, who was a pupil of Kaivalyananda Yogindra and the author of the Rasdbhivyanjika, a

commentary of Advaita-makaranda of Laksmldhara

Kavi. Ramabhadrananda had as his teacher



the author of the Vedanta-siddhanta-candrika, on which a commen tary was written by Gangadharendra SarasvatI (A.D. 1826), pupil of

Ramacandra SarasvatI and pupil s pupil of Sarvajna SarasvatI, and author of the Samrajya-siddhi with its commentary, the Kaivalyakalpadruma. Prakasananda was a pupil of Advaitananda, author of

commentary on Sankara s SanrakaAdvaitananda was a disciple of Ramatlrtha, author of the bhasya Anvaya-prakasika (a commentary on the Samksepa-sariraka of Sarvajnatma Muni) and a disciple of Krsnatirtha, a contemporary of Jagannathasrama, the teacher of Nrsimhasrama. Ramatlrtha s Anvaya-prakasika shows an acquaintance with Madhusudana s
the Brahma-vidyabharana, a

Advaita-siddhi; and he may thus be considered to have lived in the middle of the seventeenth century. Svayamprakasananda, again, had
for pupil Mahadevananda, or Vedantin Mahadeva, the author of the Advaita-cinta-kaustubha or Tattvanusandhdna. It seems very
clear that these writers of the seventeenth

and the

early eighteenth


Teachers and Pupils in Veddnta


centuries flourished in a different circle of Vedantic ideas, where the views of Vacaspati, Suresvara and Sarvajnatma Muni had

Vivarana school of Vedanta. Another important syncretistic Vedanta writer is Sadananda Kasmlraka, author of the Advaita-brahma-siddhi,vf\\o lived in the early part of the eighteenth century. The Advaita-brahma-siddhi is an excellent summary of all the most important Vedanta doc
trines, written in an easy style and explaining the chief features of the Vedantic doctrines in the different schools of Advaita teachers.

greater influence than the authors of the




may be mentioned


one of the important

products of the

eighteenth century

sort of relationship of teachers and students in particular circles that has been pointed out holds good of the earlier authors



it is

difficult to trace


as well as can

be done


the later years, since many of the earlier books are now missing and the footprints of older traditions are becoming more and more

pointed out that Vidyaranya was a con temporary of Amalananda in the fourteenth century, as both of them


may be

A number of other important Vedanta works, written mostly during the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries, may also be mentioned. Thus Lokanatha, son of Sarvajnanarayana and grandson of Nrsimhasrama, wrote a metrical work in three chapters refuting the views of the dualists, called Advaita-muktdsdra with a commentary on it called Kanti; Brahmananda Sarasvati wrote the Advaita-siddhanta-vidyotana Gopalananda Sarasvati, pupil of Yogananda, wrote the Akhanddtma-prakdsikd; Harihara Paramahamsa, pupil of Sivarama, pupil of Visvesvarasrama, wrote the Anubhava-vildsa, and early in the nineteenth century Samin, a pupil of Brahmananda, wrote a big work in twelve chapters, called Brahmdnanda-vildsa. In this connection it may not be out of place to

mention the names of some important works of Vedanta dialectics in refutation of other systems of philosophical views more or less on the lines of those dialec tical writings which have been noticed in the present volume. Thus Anandapu na (A.D. 1600), who commented on S"r!harsa s Khandana-khanda-khddya, wrote the Nydya-candrikd in four chapters, refuting the views of the Nyaya, Mlmamsa and Vaisesika Anandanubhava, pupil of Narayana Jyotisha, who lived probably in the same century, wrote a similar work, called Paddrtha-tflttva-nirnaya; Jaiinaghana, who probably lived in the thirteenth century, wrote an elaborate dialectical work in thirty-three chapters (prakarana), called Tattva-suddhi; S~rmivasa Yajvan, who probably lived in the sixteenth century, wrote the Vdddvall in twenty-six chapters in refutation of Visistadvaita and Dvaita views;

Bhavanisarikara also wrote a similar dialectical work, called Siddhdnta-dlpikd. of a syncretistic type, such works as the Tattva-bodha of Vasudevendra, the Guna-traya-viveka of Svayarnprakasa Yoglndra, the Jagan-mithydtva-dlpikd of Ramendra Yogin, the Ananda-dlpa of vananda Yati (which had a commentary called Ananda-dipa-nkdr by Ramanatha) the Svdtma-yoga-pradipa by Yoglsvara (which had a commentary by Amarananda) and the Veddnta-hrdaya (on the lines of the Yoga-vdsistha and Gaudawas probably later p<lda) by Varada Pandita may be mentioned. This latter work than Prakasananda s Veddnta-siddhdnta-muktdvali, which followed the same line of thought.

As examples of semi-popular Vedanta works




The Sankara School of Veddnta


were pupils of Sankarananda and Anubhavananda respectively; these in turn were both pupils of Anandatman. Sankarananda was the author of the Gltd-tatparya-bodhinl and of a number of commentaries on the various Upanisads, and also of a summary


of the Upanisads, called Upanisad-ratna. Amalananda, however, as teacher not only Anubhavananda, but also Sukhaprakasa

Muni, who again was
Gaudesvara Acarya

a disciple of Citsukha, himself a disciple of (called also Jnanottama).

Vedanta Doctrine of Soul and the Buddhist
Doctrine of Soullessness.

most important points of Sankara s criticism of directed against its denial of a permanent soul which could unite the different psychological constituents or could behave
of the



as the enjoy er of experiences and actions.

and the controller of



The Buddhists argue

that for the production of sense-cognition,

as the awareness of a colour or sound, what is required in addition to the sense-data of colours, etc. is the corresponding sensefaculties, while the existence of a soul cannot be deemed indispens

able for the purpose 1 Vasubandhu argues that what is experienced is the sense-data and the psychological elements in groups called skandhas. What one calls self (atmari) cannot be anything more

than a mere apparent cognitional existence (prajnapti-sat) of what in reality is but a conglomeration of psychological elements. Had
the apparent self been something as different from the psycho logical elements as colours are from sounds, it would then be

regarded as an individual (pudgald) but, if its difference from these psychological elements be of the same nature as the difference of

the constituents of milk from the appearance of milk, then the self could be admitted only to have a cognitional existence (prajnapti2




self has, in fact,

only a cognitional appearance of

separateness from the psychological elements; just as, though The arguments here followed are those of Vasubandhu, as found in his

Ahhidharma-kosa, and are based on Prof. Stcherbatsky s translation of the ap pendix to ch. viii of that work, called the Pudgala-viniscaya, and Yasomitra s commentary in manuscript from Nepal, borrowed from Visvabharati, Santiniketan, Bengal. 2 yadi yathd rupddih sabddder bhdvdntaram abhipreyate pudgala iti abhyupagato bhavati bhinna-laksanam hi rupam sabddd ityddi kslrddivat samuddyas cet prajnaptitah. Abhidharma-kosa-vydkhyd, Visvabharati MS. p. 337.




Veddnta and Buddhism


milk appears to have a separate existence from the proper
bination of


more than


constituent elements, yet it is in reality nothing definite kind of combination of its constituent

elements, so the self is nothing more than a certain conglomeration of the psychological elements (skandhd), though it may appear to

have a separate and independent existence. The Vatsiputrlyas, however, think that the individual is something different, from the skandhas or psychological entities, as its nature is different from
Vatsiputrlyas deny the existence of a permanent soul, but believe in momentary individuals (pudgala) as a category separate and distinct from the skandhas. Just as fire

the nature of them.


something different from the fuel that conditioned it, so the individual" (pudgala) is given to something conditioned 1 by the skandhas at a given moment in a personal life Vasubandhu, however, argues against the acceptance of such an individual and says that there is no meaning in accepting such an individual. Rain and sun have no effects on mere vacuous space, they are of



use only to the skin; if the individual is, like the skin, a deter miner of the value of experiences, then it must be accepted as external if it is like vacuous space, then no purpose is fulfilled

The Vatsiputrlyas, however, thought that, just as the fuel conditioned the fire, so the personal elements conditioned the individual. By this conditioning the Vatsiputrlyas meant that
by accepting it

the personal elements were some sort of a coexisting support 3 What is meant by saying that the pudgala is conditioned by the

personal elements is that, when the skandhas or psychological elements are present, the pudgala is also present there 4 But Vasubandhu urges that a mere conditioning of this kind is not

an individual; the visual sense, light and is conditioned by attention in such a way that, these being present, there is the
sufficient to establish the cognitional existence of

for even colour

perception of light


but can anybody on that ground consider the

Stcherbatsky s translation of the Pudgala-viniscaya, Bulletin de V Academic des Sciences de Russie, p. 830. The exact textof Vasubandhu, as translated from Tibetan in a note, runs thus grhita-pratyutpanndbhyantara-skandham updddya pudgala-prajnaptih Ibid, p 9 5 3 .

Vdtsiputriydndm ttrthika-drstih prasajyate nisprayojanatvam ca varsdta-pdbhydm kirn vyomnas carmany-asti toyoh phalam carmopamas cet sa nityah khatulyas ced asatphalah. MS. of Yasomitra s commentary, p. 338. 3 dsraya-bhutah saha-bhutas ca. Ibid. 4 rupasydpi prajnaptir vaktavyd caksur-ddisu satsu tasyopalambhdt, tdni caksur-ddJny updddya rilpam prajndpyate. Ibid.



The Sankara School of Veddnta


existence of colour to be a cognitional one ?
entities deserve to

And would cognitional

may be



be enumerated as separate categories? Again it such an individual exists, how is it experienced?

be experienced by any of the senses, it must be a sensedatum: for the senses can grasp only their appropriate sense-data, and the individual is no sense-datum. Therefore, just as milk is
if it

nothing but the collected sense-data of colour, taste, etc., so also the so-called individual is nothing more than the conglomerated
1 psychological elements

The Vatsiputrlyas argue that, since the the sense-data, etc., are the causes of our psychological elements, experience of the individual, the individual cannot be regarded as being identical with these causal elements which are responsible

for their experience; if it were so, then even light, eye, attention, etc., which are causes of the experience of the sense-data, would

vidual 2

have to be regarded as being identical in nature with the indi But it is not so maintained the sense-datum of sounds and


from the individual, and one always distinguishes an individual from a sense-datum and 3 But says "this is sound," "this is colour" and "this is individual the individual is not felt to be as distinct from the psychological elements as colour is from sound. The principle of difference or

always regarded as being different


distinctness consists in nothing but a difference of moments; a colour is* different from a sound because it is experienced at a

moment, while the psychological elements and the indi vidual are not experienced at different moments 4 But it is argued in reply that, as the sense-data and the individual are neither

different nor identical (ratio essendi), so their cognition also is neither different nor identical in experience (ratio cognoscendi) 5 But Vasubandhu says that, if such a view is taken in this case, then



as well

be taken in


cases wherever there


any con

glomeration Moreover, the separate senses are all limited to their special fields, and the mind which acts with them is also limited
1 yathd rupddlnyeva samastdni samuditdni ksiram iti udakam iti vdprajndpyate, tathd skandhds ca samastd pudgala iti prajndpyate, iti siddham. MS. of Yasomitra s commentary, p. 339 A. 2 yathd riipam pudgalopalabdheh kdranam bhavati sa ca tebhyo nyo na vaktavyah dloka-caksur-manaskdrd api rupopalabdheh kdranam bhavati tad api

tad-abhinna-svabhdvah pudgalah prdpnoti. Ibid. 4 svalaksandd api ksandntaram any ad ity uddhdryam.


Ibid. p. 3 398.


yathd rupa-pudgalayor anydnanyatvam avaktavyam evarn tadupalabdhyor

api anydnanyatvam avaktavyam.

yo yam siddhdntah pudgala eva vaktavyah api avaktavyam iti krtvd. Ibid.



bhidyate samskrtam




Veddnta and Buddhism


to the data supplied by them; there is, therefore, no way in which the so-called individual can be experienced. In the Ajita sermon visual consciousness depends upon Buddha is supposed to say



the organ of sight and a visible object. When these three (object, sense organ and consciousness) combine, a sensation is produced.

accompanied by a feeling, a representation and a volition. Only so much is meant, when we are speaking of a human being. To these (five sets of elements) different names are given, such
It is

as a sentient being, a man, Manu s progeny, a son of child, an individual, a life, a soul. If with respect to



them the

is used he sees the object with his own eyes/ it is false imputation (there being in reality nobody possessing eyes of his own). In common life such expressions with respect to them are


current as that is the name of this venerable man, he belongs to such a caste and such a family, he eats such food, this pleases him, he has reached such an age, he has lived so many years, he has died at such an age. These O brethren! accordingly are mere

words, mere conventional designations.
Expressions are they, (but not truth) Real elements have no duration



makes them combine

In mutually dependent apparitions 1


The Vatslputrlyas however refer to the Bhara-hara-siitra, in which Buddha is supposed to say O brethren, I shall explain unto you the burden (of life), and moreover I shall explain the taking up of the burden, the laying aside of it and who the carrier is. ...What is the burden ? All the five aggregates of elements the substrates of personal life. What is meant by the taking up of the burden?



force of craving for a continuous


accompanied by pas

sionate desires, the rejoicing at many an object. What is the laying aside of the burden? It is the wholesale rejection of this craving for a continuation of life, accompanied as it is by passionate desires

and rejoicings
it, its


many an

object, the getting rid of




it in every an aversion suppression,


is the carrier? must restraint, its disappearance. this venerable man having this it is the individual, i.e.



name, of such

a caste, of

pleasure or displeasure at

such a family, eating such food, finding such things, of such an age, who after a
V Academic
des Sciences deRussie.



translation in Bulletin de


The Sankara School of Veddnta
of such length will pass


1 away having reached such an age But Vasubandhu points out that the carrier of the burden is not to be supposed to be some eternal soul or real individual. It is


momentary group of elements

of the preceding



designated as the burden, and the immediately succeeding the carrier of the burden (bhdra-hdra) 2


Vatsiputrlyas again argue that activity implies an active agent, and, since knowing is an action, it also implies the knower who knows, just as the walking of Devadatta implies a Devadatta





But Vasubandhu s reply to such a contention is that nowhere such a unity. There is no individual like Devadatta

what we




but a conglomeration of demerits.



metaphorical designation for an un of a series of flashing flames. When this interrupted production production changes its place, we say that the light has moved.
light of a




Similarly consciousness


a conventional


for a chain of

changes place (i.e. appears in co-ordination with another objective element), we say that it ap prehends that object. And in the same way we speak about the
is produced, it between existence and the element which does exist. The same applies to consciousness (there is nothing that cognizes, apart from the evanescent flashing

conscious moments.


existence of material elements.


say matter

but there




of consciousness
It is




easy to see that the analysis of consciousness offered by the Vedanta philosophy of the Sankara school is entirely different from
is entirely as the assemblage of the physical or physiological conditions antecedent to the rise of any cognition, as for instance, the presence of illumination, sense-


The Vedanta

holds that the fact of consciousness


from everything

So long

object contact, etc.,
it is


being prepared, there


no knowledge, and

only at a particular



This cognition


in its nature so

that the cognition of an object much different from each



ditions, that

the elements constituting the so-called assemblage of con it cannot in any sense be regarded as the product of
s translation.


Yasomitra points out that there is no carrier of the burden different from the collection of the skandhas bhdrdddnavan na skandhebhyo rthdntara-bhutah pudgala ity arthah. Abhidharma-kosa-vydkhyd, VisvabharatI MS. 3 Stcherbatsky s translation in Bulletin de V Academic des Sciences de Russie, pp. 938-939-





Veddnta and Buddhism


any collocation of conditions. Consciousness thus, not being a product of anything and not being further analysable into any constituents, cannot also be regarded as a momentary flashing. Uncaused and unproduced, it is eternal, infinite and unlimited. The main point in which consciousness differs from everything else is the fact of its self- revelation. There is no complexity in consciousness. It is extremely simple, and its only essence or


self- revelation.





of consciousness

momentary, that it rises next moment, but to the

due to the fact that it is into being and is then destroyed the
fact that the objects that are revealed it from time to time. But the conscious

are reflected through

always steady and unchangeable in itself. The immediacy (aparoksatva) of this consciousness is proved by the fact that, though

everything else is manifested by coming in touch with it, it itself is never expressed, indicated or manifested by inference or by

any other process, but is always self-manifested and self- revealed. All objects become directly revealed to us as soon as they come in touch with it. Consciousness (samvid) is one. It is neither identical
its objects nor on the same plane with them as a constituent element in a collocation of them and consciousness. The objects of consciousness or all that is manifested in consciousness come

in touch with consciousness

and themselves appear

as conscious in touch

ness. This appearance



when they come

with consciousness, they themselves flash forth as consciousness, though that operation is nothing but a false appearance of the nonconscious objects and mental states in the light of consciousness,
as being identical with it. But the intrinsic difference between consciousness and its objects is that the former is universal (pratyak)

and constant (anuvrtta), while the latter are particular (apratyak) and alternating (vyavrttd). The awarenesses of a book, a table, etc. appear to be different not because these are different flashings of
knowledge, but because of the changing association of conscious ness with these objects. The objects do not come into being with the flashings of their awareness, but they have their separate

and spheres of operation 1
it is




one and




the objects get associated with


tattva-darsl tu nityam advittyam vijndnam vifayas ca tatrddhyastdh prthagartha-kriyd-samarthds tesdm cdbddhitam sthdyitvam astlti vadati. Vivaranaprameya-samgraha, p. 74, the Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, Benares, 1893.


The Sankara School of Veddnta


they appear in consciousness and as identical with it in such a way that the flashing of an object in consciousness appears as the flashing of the consciousness itself. It is through an illusion that
the object of consciousness and consciousness appear to be welded together into such an integrated whole, that their mutual difference escapes our notice, and that the object of consciousness, which is

only like an extraneous colour applied to consciousness, does not appear different or extraneous to it, but as a specific mode of the

but different aware nesses, as book-cognition, table-cognition, are not in reality different awarenesses, but one unchangeable consciousness suc cessively associated with ever-changing objects which falsely appear

Thus what appear


to be integrated with it and give rise to the appearance that quali tatively different kinds of consciousness are flashing forth from

moment to moment. Consciousness cannot be regarded as momen
tary. For,







it is

nesses are arising at

would have appeared different at every urged that, though different conscious each different moment, yet on account of

extreme similarity



this is not noticed; then it maybe replied that, difference between the two consciousnesses of two


moments, then such difference must be grasped either by a different consciousness or by the same consciousness. In the first alternative the third awareness, which grasps the first two awarenesses and their difference, must either be identical with them, and in that case the difference between the three awarenesses would vanish; or it may be different from them, and in that case,
another awareness be required to comprehend their difference and that requires another and so on, there would be a vicious infinite. If the difference be itself said to be identical with the nature of the consciousness (samvit-svarupa-bhuto bhedah), and if there is nothing to apprehend this difference, then the nonif

appearance of the difference implies the non-appearance of the consciousness itself; for by hypothesis the difference has been held
to be identical with the consciousness itself.

The non-appearance of

difference, implying the non-appearance of consciousness, would mean utter blindness. The difference between the awareness of


moment and

another cannot thus either be logically proved,

or realized in experience, which always testifies to the unity of awareness through all moments of its appearance. It may be held
that the appearance of unity

erroneous, and that, as such,


if the existence of difference and similarity between the urged awarenesses of two different moments can be proved to be false. &quot. for that is limited to the present moment and prove cannot refer to past experience and unite it with the experience of the present moment. If it that recognition is due to present perception as asso suggested ciated with the impressions (samskara) of previous experience. But. . kevale ciddtmani janya-jndna-tat-samskdrayor asambhave py antahkaranavisiste tat-sambhavdd ukta-pratyabhtjnd kirn na sydt. there is nothing which can even 1 It cannot be suggest that the appearance of unity is erroneous that. which is of the self as &quot. They hold that perception It reveals the existence of things at the moment of perception. Its evidence can be challenged only if the existence of difference between the awarenesses and their similarity be otherwise proved.xi] Recognition in Veddnta and Buddhism 65 presumes that the awarenesses are similar. 2 . To this the Vedantic reply is that. . The unity of awareness is a recognition of the identity of the awarenesses (pratyabhijna). for without such a similarity there could not have been the erroneous appearance of unity. unless the difference of the awarenesses and their similarity be previously proved. then such a recognition of identity would not prove the identity by perception. and this cannot be apprehended is limited to the present moment only. and so recognition is possible 2 But it may be objected that the complex of the self and mind would then be playing the double role of knower and the known for it . Ibid. whereas recognition involves the supposition of their existence through a period of past time. The Buddhists on their side deny the existence of recognition as the perception of identity.that&quot. then only can the appearance of unity be proved to be true for the appearance of unity is primary and directly proved by experience. .- yet the self as associated with the mind (antahkarand) can well have impressions (samskara). consciousness as the flash cannot any identity. though there cannot be any impressions in the self as pure consciousness. which is self-evident. has also been pointed out that the Buddhists give a different analysis of the fact of recognition. 76. p. 76. p. I am he &quot. and think that it is in reality not one but two concepts an d and not a separate experience of the identity of the self as per sisting through time.J&quot. is the 1 mind containing the impressions and the self that together Vivarana-prameya-samgraha.for in the self-luminous self there cannot be any impressions. The mere &quot.

if it is argued that memory. and hence the real and abiding self cannot owe its present reality or existence merely to a psychological notion of the moment.I Again. &quot. If it is urged that. for the self which abides through the past and exists in the present cannot be said to depend on a momentary concept of recognition of self-identity. then the assertion that all knowledge is momentary also involves two concepts. But in reply to this Vidyaranya Muni urges that all systems of philosophy infer the existence of soul as different from the body. whereas the recognized entity 1 is constituted of the self as qualified by past and present time that .. as such an inference is made by the self. that the existence of the &quot. in permanent accordance with the Prabhakara view. Nor can it be supposed. is admitted merely on the strength of the recognizing notion of &quot. shows that the self was existing time had an at the past the book was perceived. at two moments and hence momentariness cannot be ascribed to know ledge. but two concepts occurring . since recognition of identity of self involves two concepts. The mere existence of self at two moments of time does not prove that the self had persisted through the intervening times. and it is exactly those impressions together with the self that form the content of recognition also and hence in this view the agent and the object have to be regarded as one. such as awareness of a book. 77. play the part of the recognizer. . The notion of self-identity is only a momentary notion.this self&quot. it may be replied that such and previous experience may prove the past existence of memory the self. it also involves two moments. antahkarana-visistatayaivdtmanah pratyabhijnatrtvam purvdpara-kdla-viVivarana-prameya-samgraha.66 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. for momentariness cannot be regarded as being identical with knowledge. Thus the recognition of self-identity does not strictly involve the fact of the oneness of the agent and its object. but it cannot prove that the self that was existing in the past is identical with the self that is now experiencing. and. If such a maxim is accepted. then the theory that all knowledge is momentary cannot be admitted as one concept. Two notions of 1 when sistatayd ca pratyabhijneyatvam. which lasts only at the time. as is done by the Buddhists.&quot.self-identity&quot. the self is thus both the agent and the object of such inferences. Vidyaranya says it may further be urged that the recognizer is constituted of the self in association with the mind. p. The complexity of a concept does not mean that it is not one but two different concepts occurring at two different moments.

there is no &quot. So.I am he. very remembrance proves that the self the time when one remembers it the self at the time of such is felt had an experience. The main point that is Vidyaranya Muni urges in his Vivarana-prameya-samgraha is that the fact of recognition or the experience of self-identity cannot be explained by any assumption of two separate concepts. since the self itself cannot be perceived.&quot. the cognizer on is whom this is no longer the past awareness had to rest itself also absent. it neither requires a cognizer on which it has to rest nor actually reveals such a cognizer. svayamprakasamdnam visayatayd para-prakdsyam.I he. its cognizer is not manifested with its remembrance So the self which experienced an awareness in the past can be referred to only through the mediation of memory. then that would mean that the Buddhist admits that one can recognize himself as am It cannot be said that. when a cognition is mediated through 1 memory. p. when the Prabhakaras hold that the existence of the self is realized through such a complex notion as it &quot.revealed. when remembered. it has to be admitted that only through the process of recognition (pratyabhijna) that the persistence of the self is established. Though at I memory as the perceiver and not as the object of that self-perception. But the past awareness which is supposed to be remembered is past and lost and.&quot. when one remembers &quot.&quot. If it is argued that it is only the past awareness that is the object of memory and this awareness. for. 78. such as the memory 1 of a past cognition or cognizer hi and the present awareness. which presupposes the notion of persistence. then to this it may be replied that since at the time of remembering there awareness. ex presses the self as its cognizer. 5-2 . If it were held that the two notions produce the notion of self-persistence through the notion of recognition. but. as such. an awareness is remembered. then the awareness which is remembered is only made an object of present awareness which is self. It is only the self-revealed cognition that also immediately reveals the cognizer with its own revelation. It is only when an awareness on reveals itself that if it also reveals the cognizer whom it rests. that was perceived. But. samvedanam dsrayam sddhayati na tu smrtiVivarana-prameya-samgraha. yet at the time of the previous experience which is now being remembered the self must have been itself the object of the per ception. possibility of the perception of the identity of the self through recognition .xi] Recognition in Veddnta and Buddhism 67 two different times cannot serve to explain the idea of recognition.

but only because. if the self is only an entity which has to be presupposed as the possessor of cognition. there is nothing which could unite them together in the &quot. Again. then that would not explain our ex perience relation have known this. will and feeling presuppose some entity which they belong and that it is this entity that is called self. as has already been shown. were the case. If this was done at different points of time. For such a notion implies a between the knower and the known. For. if the knower and the known were grasped in knowledge at two different points of time.68 The Sankara School of Veddnta all feel [CH. etc. for the same awareness cannot comprehend two different kinds of objects at the same time.I . for the self is not only cognized as an object of self-consciousness. For it is true that the cognition of the self and that of the book take place at the same point of time. The Buddhist attempts at explaining this notion of self-identity by the supposition of the operation of two separate concepts are wholly inadequate. then no one would be able to distinguish his own self from that of others. It is not true that the cognition of the self occurs after the cognition of the book or at any different time from it. for. the self is an object of the cognizing operation (samvit-karma) But this is hardly valid. without admitting the self to be self-luminous in all experience the difference between an experience as being my own and as belonging to others could not be explained. The self cannot be also regarded as being manifested by ideas or percepts. the existence of self is not to be argued merely through the inference that cognition. but also in itself in all cognitional operations. supposing that the self exists and persists through time. The perception of selfidentity can therefore be explained only on the basis of a per manently existing self.&quot. in self-consciousness.. and. then how does one recognize one s own cognition of things as differing from that of others? What is it that distinguishes my experience from that of others? My self must be immediately to if that perceived by me in order that I may relate any experience to myself. We that our selves are persisting through time and that I who experienced pleasure yesterday and I who am experiencing new pleasures to-day are identical and the only theory by which this notion of self-persistence or self-identity can be explained is by . will. . It may be objected by some that the self is not self-luminous by itself. So the self must be admitted as being self-manifested in all ex perience.

For from the same mind-contact there cannot be two different awarenesses of the type discussed. samvid-adhina-prakdsah samvit-karmatdm antarena aparokis satvdt samvedanavat. cognition. p. Nor can it be held that there is some other mental cognition (occurring either simultaneously with the awareness of the object or at a later moment) by which the awareness of the awareness of the object is further cognized. and again another mind-activity and the rise of another mind-contact. that would is imply many intervening moments. when the awareness which it has to reveal is already passed. there mind-activity. p. If anyone is asked whether he has seen a certain person or not. he is sure about his own knowledge that he has seen him and never doubts it.yo The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. and there is no functioning of it by which it has to affect itself. the cognition is itself revealed as well. cessation of one mind-contact. it manifests itself also. it may be replied that. there is not the yellow awareness for apart from the blue awareness. Nyaya-makaranda. Just as light removes darkness. though it manifests its objects. 1 samveditd no. while manifesting other objects. on the ground that. is like . 135. borrowed . says that. if it were so. 85. if it is held that cognition does not manifest itself. then it might require some other cognition and that another and so on ad infinitum\ and thus there is a vicious infinite. when there is the blue awareness. when an object is revealed by any cognition. This cognition cannot be described as being mere momentary flashes. It is therefore certain that. then. it is self-manifested 1 object of cognition . It has therefore to be admitted that cognition is itself self-luminous and that. The objection raised is that the self or the cognition cannot by its own functioning (vrtti) the reply is that cognition light and has no intervening operation by which it affects itself or its objects. the affect itself . If at a later moment. light. This argument verbatim by Vidyaranya in his Vivarana-prameya-samgraha. and thus the cognition which is supposed to cognize an awareness of an object would take place at a much later moment. and immediate without being an self-luminosity of cognition is argued by Anandabodha. helps the of the eye and illuminates the object and manifests itself operation all in one moment without any intervening operation of any other so cognition also in one flash manifests itself and its objects. The He then at the time when an object is cognized the cognizer would have doubted if he had any cognition at the time or not. If it is argued that such a cognition is revealed by some other cognition.

xi] Self as pure Consciousness 71 yellow awareness or the white awareness there is also the natural basic awareness or consciousness. had there been only a series of particular awarenesses. So the best would be to admit the self to be of the nature of pure consciousness. For. Each awareness in the series would be of a particular and definite char acter. then there would be nothing by which their differences could be realized. differed amongst themselves. more than on such react a series of passing ideas or particular awarenesses for would be impossible states to explain how we can upon our mental and note their differences. volitions or feelings belong.that self&quot. and. and thus there would be no way by which their differences could be noticed. had it how could one own and as different from my own experiences shows distinguish his own experiences as his those of others? The internalness of that they are directly intuited as as my belonging to some self who was the possessor of his experiences.&quot. even though the object of awareness. who believed neither in the existence of the self nor in the nature of any pure permanent consciousness. so that there passed away. The Buddhist objection that there was no permanent self could be well warded off by the Vedanta by appealing to the verdict of our notion of self-identity which could not be explained on the Buddhist method by the supposition of two separate notions of a past &quot. Nor can a theory it consciousness be regarded as being nothing . that would explain how the difference of a blue awareness and a yellow awareness could be apprehended. For inference cannot reveal the own. such as blue and yellow. and not merely supposed Vr \vV v . as it again to another. fail to It will appear from the above discussion that the Vedanta had to refute three is opponents in establishing its doctrine that the self of the nature of pure consciousness and that it is permanent and not momentary. which cannot be denied. for. The first opponent was the Buddhist. the Vedanta urges that the self is not the inferred object to which awarenesses. and that would be no way of distinguishing one awareness from another. but not been so.I am. is directly and immediately intuited. Against the second opponent. would give place to another. the Naiyayika. and the present &quot. for according to the theory under discussion there is no consciousness except the passing awarenesses. Conscious ness has thus to be admitted as permanent. It would be wrong to say that there are only the particular aware nesses which appear and vanish from moment to moment. for.

there is the manifestation nating of God. But. that thought as a self-revealing entity revealed the self and the objects as different from it. This self as pure consciousness is absolutely impersonal.72 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. is yet the underlying principle which . though always untouched and un attached in its own nature. when the pure consciousness is reflected through sciousness the impure parts of rajas and tamas. goes by the name of mdyd and avidyd and forms the con ditioning factors (upddhi) of the pure consciousness. The identity of the self and thought and the self-revealing character of it are also the urged and it is shown by a variety of dialectical reasoning that such a supposition is the only reasonable alternative that is left . it is supposed that it manifests itself differently through the veil of may a. The same prakrti in its two aspects. it is . when this pure consciousness is reflected through the when beginningless. it is called Isvara. Whereas. as domi over other impure parts of prakrti. In order to make it possible that this one self should appear as many individuals and as God. it is called Isvara or God.revealing character belongs to the self which is identical with thought as against Mimamsa view. But they go to show in establishing the supreme that the principal interest of the Vedanta lies reality of a transcendental principle of pure consciousness. according to the Siddhdnta-lesa. and. internalness of any cognition or feeling. predominating in sattva and as predominating in rajas and tamas. to us. it is reflected through the limited parts of mdyd containing powers of veiling and of diverse creation (called avidyd). when reflected through mind (antahkarana) it is called jiva. the Vedanta urges that the self. un limited and infinite. it is said in the Prakatdrthavivarana that. Sarvajnatma Muni thinks that. various methods of accounting for the origin of indi These vidual selves and God have but little philosophical significance. which. as dominating over the sattva part of prakrti (called also avidyd). when this pure con is reflected through the pure sattva qualities. when the pure consciousness is reflected through avidyd. which on account of the different characters of the conditioning factors of mdyd and avidyd appear as the omniscient God and the ignorant individual souls. It is again said in the Tattva-viveka of Nrsimhasrama that. the Mlmamsaka. there are the manifestations of individual souls or jivas. Against the third opponent. there are the manifestations as of the individual selves orjivas. Thus. indescribable mdyd.

1916. be it an individual self or an individual object of awareness. Subodhini on Veddnta-sdra. and on the other hand. its limited nature. mysterious stuff. self its self- The appears as limited. Just as through the creative power of ignorance a piece of vastuto jndnasydtmdchddakatvdbhd ve pi pramdtr-buddhimdtrdchddakatvena ajndnasydtmdchddakatvam upacdrdd ucyate. p. It is this ajnana which called avidya in itself on the one hand forms on the subjective plane the mind and the senses (the self alone being Brahman and ultimately real). eternal and limitless. . may. is ness which absolutely and ultimately real. Bombay. in Its which philosophy and science are only interest is to prove that the worldthe existence of a principle of pure conscious process presupposes equally interested. bound to sense-cognitions and sense-enjoy ments and functioning as individual selves 1 It is through this covering power of ajnana that the self appears as an agent and an enjoyer of pleasures and pains and subject to ignorant fears of . by veiling unchangeable luminosity veiling of the self means veiling the shining unchangeable self-perception of the self. rebirth. 1 . as infinite. the whole of the objective universe. on the objective plane. The Vedanta is both unwilling and incapable of explaining the nature of the worldprocess in all its details. This ajnana has two powers. 13. as it is immediate Reality means what is not determined by anything else and in this sense pure consciousness is the only reality and all else is indescribable neither real nor unreal and the Vedanta and intuitive. the power of veiling or covering (avarand) and the power of creation (viksepa). Nirnaya-Sagara Press. which as an effect of such veiling as cognizer. The power of veiling. though small. All that is limited. Vedantic Cosmology. in spite of cover up the infinite. like a little cloud veiling the sun with a diameter of millions of miles. is in some sense or other an illusory imposition of the modification of a non-conscious principle on the principle of consciousness. like the illusory perception of a piece of rope in darkness as a snake. pure consciousness.xi] Veddntic Cosmology 73 can explain all the facts of the enlivening and enlightening of all our conscious experiences. but also an ontological existence as well. . is not interested to discover what may be its nature. From what (also has been said above or is it is evident that mayd an indefinable ajnana) which has not merely a psychological existence.

Then the original first half of each element is combined with the two quarters of other two elements.revealing aspect of the self. can pure being is left appearance is created be regarded as an important causal agent (nimitta). subtle bodies 1 out of these that the grosser materials are evolved as also the The subtle bodies are made up of seventeen parts. This view is supported by the Vedanta-paribhaa and its Sikhamani commentary. a causal agent. then the three half parts of the three subtle elements are again each divided into two halves. rope. for they think that there is no point in admitting that air and akasa have also parts of other elements integrated in them. The trivrt-karana means that fire. As the ajnana is supposed to veil by its veiling power (avarana-sakti) only the self-cognizing and self. . and the other half of it is constituted of the one-fourth of each of the other elements (i. so far as it weaves its web. can be regarded as the material cause of the web. so far as it supplies from its own body the materials of the web. when its body aspect is emphasized. veiled as it is by ajnana with its two powers. It is like a spider. rajas and tamas. the ajnana. The pure consciousness. and.e. and then the first half of each subtle element is combined with the one-fourth of each half of all the other elements excepting the element of which there is the full half as a constituent. when the emphasis is put on its covering part. With the pure consciousness as the basis and with the associated creative power of ajnana predominating in tamas.74 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. space (akasa) is first produced from akasa comes . thus producing two equal parts of each. 363. and then one of the two halves of these five elements is divided again into four parts. from water earth. and the Vedic texts speak of trivrt-karana and not of panel. which. Thus each element has half of itself with two quarter parts of other two elements. from air fire. the trivrt-karana and the pancikarana. The creative powers (viksepa-sakti) of ajnana are characterized as being threefold. as sattva. one-eighth of each of the other four elements). the other aspect of the self as open as the basis on which the entire worldby the creative power thereof. viz. when its nature pure consciousness forming the basis of the creation of the worldappearance is emphasized it can be regarded as the material cause. p. . can be regarded as as . appears as a snake. Thus each element is made up of one-half of itself. Vacaspati and Amalananda prefer trivrt-karana to panct-karana. so does ignorance by its creative power create on the hidden self the manifold world-appearance. and thus each element has at least some part of other elements integrated into it. the real nature of which is hidden from view. It is It is these elements in their fine and uncompounded state that in the Samkhya and the Puranas are called tan-matras. water and earth (as subtle elements) are each divided into two halves. from fire water. The pafjcl-karana theory holds that the five subtle elements are divided firstly into two halves.karana. 1 As to how the subtle elements are combined for the production of grosser elements there are two different theories. thus producing two quarter parts of each. after the manner of Samkhya prakrti. air.

the activity of coughing. ahamkara citta and ahamkara are regarded as the same as buddhi and manas. the vomiting troydnes activity.doubt. sheath of manas (manomaya-kosa). 2 smarandkdra-vrttimad untahkaranam cittam (Veddnta-paribhdsd-Maniprabhd. 17. manas.xi] Veddntic Cosmology 75 excluding the subtle elements. These prdnas 1 The Veddnta-sdra speaks of sankalpa and vikalpa. the five vayus or biomotor activities. Though they are elemental. and are called sUksma-sarira or Unga-sarlra. 17). p. are derived from the sattva of the five elements. and this is explained by the Subodhinl as meaning doubt. buddhi. happy or unhappy. Udana or the upward activity and Samdna or the digestive activity. the nourishing activity. But the Veddnta-paribhdsd says that manas. since they are produced from the compounded sattva parts of all the elements. p. . agni. It is the self as associated with Manas with the vijnanamaya-kosa that feels itself as the agent. See Veddnta-paribhdsd. anayor eva cittdhamkdrayor antarbhdvah (Veddnta-sdra. all four. This subtle body is composed of the five cognitive senses. the auditory. 89). p. or affirmation (niscayatmika antahkarana-vrtti). the five conative senses. See Vedanta-sara and Subodhinl. 88-89 and 358. ahamkara and citta. the two mental functions of vikalpa and sankalpa or of sankalpa alone resulting in doubt 1 The function of mind determination Manas means (citta) . See pp. and olfactory senses. 88. and the function of egoism (ahamkara) are included in buddhi and manas 2 They are all produced from the sattva parts of the five elements and are therefore elemental. means the mental state of respectively. they have the re vealing function displayed in their cognitive operations. But since the Veddnta-paribhdsd only mentions buddhi and manas as constituents of the subtle body. and Dhananjaya. together with the five subtle elements in tanmatric forms. visual. The Veddnta-paribhdsd and its commentators speak of sankalpa as being the only unction of manas. enjoyer. yet. Krkala. There are some who add another five vayus such as the Naga. buddhi (intellect) and manas.&quot. vdyu. The five vayus or biomotor activities are called Prana or the breathing activity. Buddhi . one need not think that there is ultimately any difference between it and the Veddnta-sdra. The Veddnta-sdra however does not count four functions buddhi. but it means &quot. or intellect. constitute the inner organ (antahkarand). the individual self (jlva) that passes through worldly experience and rebirth. gustatory The five cognitive senses. the activity of Apdna yawning. Thus according to the Veddnta-sdra there are only two categories. ap and prthivl parts Buddhi. Kurma. p. Devadatta. tactile. the reflex activity of opening the eyelids. The conative senses are produced from the rajas parts of the five elements. citta. . akasa. with the cognitive senses is called the sheath of knowledge the cognitive senses is called the (vijndnamaya-kosa).

involving as they do all the sub conscious impressions from which our conscious experience is de dream (jccgrad-vasanamayatvatsvapna). and a third part between the two and connected with them both as one whole. another part in touch with the sense-objects. the vijnanamaya. process of the formation of the gross elements from the subtle parts of the elements is technically called pancikarana. . being extremely transparent. the individual is called Visva. Sutala. The ajnana as constituting antahkarana or mind. there is one part inside the body. function therefore regarded as having an instrumental the pranamaya sheath represents the motor functions. There the bodies. and. together with the cognitive senses form the active sheath of prana (pranamaya-kosa). . the individual who presides over each one of combined Virat. and it is through the states of these antahkaranas that the veil over the self and the objects are removed. and. the vijnanamaya sheath plays the part of the active agent (kartr-rupah) the manomaya is the source of all desires .Janah. Rasatala. It is through such a process of com pounding that each element possesses some of the properties of The entire universe consists of seven upper worlds (Bhuh. It is made up of the sattva parts of the five rudimentary elements. Mahar. Tapah and Satyam). There is a cosmic deity who presides over the physical bodies of all beings. It being a material stuff. Vitala. is always associated with the self. involving the operative functions of buddhi and manas. it is by the difference of these antahkaranas that one self appears as many individual selves. who (also called Sutrdtma or prana) is over the combined subtle bodies of all living presides Individually each subtle body is supposed to belong to Hiranyagarbha every being. the god beings. and as a result of this there is the cognition of objects. These three sheaths.76 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. Talatala. the other elements. Bhuvah. comes into touch with the sense objects through the specific senses and assumes their forms. Svar. in this aspect. and volition. which it thoroughly pervades. and this deity is called is also the person. and is These three sheaths make up together the subtle body or the suksma-sarira. Of these three sheaths. The antahkarana is situated within the body. It consists in a compounding of the elements in which one half of rived. seven lower worlds (Atala. mano- maya andpranamaya. Mahdtala and Patala) and all the gross bodies of all living beings. are therefore called a The each rudimentary element is mixed with the eighth part of each other rudimentary element.

objects. while the second is removed only in perceptual perceptual knowledge. on the basis of which all the cosmic creations of may a are made. I give here a list of those books that seem to me to be his genuine works. yet it manifests the three different parts of the antahkarana in three different ways. is of two kinds. as the tion. cognitive operation (pramdna) and the cogni In each of the three cases the reality is the part of the pure consciousness. Sarasvatl s Nydya-ratnavalt. The difference between the individual consciousness (jiva-caitanyd) and the brahman-con sciousness (brahma-caitanya) is that the former represents pure consciousness. 132-150. has the function of making them manifested in knowledge as its objects. viz. brahman. There is little doubt that quite a number of books attributed to Sankara were not written by him. The &quot. or inferential. that implies subjective ignorance as signified by do not know.xi] Sankara and his School 77 The interior part of the antahkarana is the ego or the agent. It is diverse in kind according to the form removal of the and content of the sense-objects. Srividya Press. through which the particular 1 cognition arises . called also vrtti-jnana. The intervening part has the action of knowledge. subjective ignorance and objective ignorance. Kumba- . though 1 it is extremely s difficult to be absolutely certain. cognizer (pramatr). The antahkarana of three parts being transparent. The third part. pp. and objective ignorance as referring to the book. 1893.&quot. for the breaking of which the operation of the antahkarana is deemed necessary. It is difficult to say exactly how many books were written by Sankara himself.I first is a precondition of all kinds of knowledge. Though pure consciousness is one. which at the time of cognition is transformed into the form of the sense. as forming their substance. The covering of avidya. as conditioned by or as reflected through the antah karana. When I say that I do not know a book. 132-150. as it expresses itself through the three different modifications of the antahkarana. while the latter is the unentangled infinite consciousness. pp. and each perceptual cognition removes only one specific ignorance. or the percept (pramiti). See Madhusudana Sarasvatl Siddhanta-bindu. The sense-objects in themselves are but the veiled pure consciousness. Sankara and his School. and Brah- mananda konam. pure consciousness can well be manifested in it.

The Mimdakopanisad-bhasya has two commentaries. by Anandajnana and Abhinavanarayanendra Sarasvatl. because there was another writer of the same name. Katha. and a commentary by Anan dajnana. called Gaudapddiya-bhdsya or Agamaby Suddhananda and one by Anandajnana. by the other Sankara Acarya. Prasna. by Anandajnana and by Purnananda Tirtha. Abhinavanarayana. Dipika. The main reasons why a number of works which probably were not written by him were attributed to him seem to be twofold first. The Mandukyopanisad-bhasya has two commentaries. Taittiriya. the tendency of Indian writers to increase the dignity of later works by attributing of tradition behind . Aitareya.e. by Candesvara Varman (Anubhava-dipika). also a number of commentaries these have been noticed . Chdndogya and Brhad-dranyaka and the Sdriraka-mimdmsd-bhdsya. The most works of Sankara are his commentaries on the ten important Upanisads. The Prasnopanisadbhdsya has two commentaries. His commentary on Gaudain the section Mdndukya-kdrikd. and second. The ChandogyopanisadhsiS two commentary commentaries. called Mandukyopanisadbhdsydrtha-samgraha. by Sankara Acarya. by Balagopala. or simply Vdrttika. HisAtma-jndnopadesa has two commentaries. have chosen only those works which have been commented on by other writers. Sankaracarya. and Visvesvara Taittirlyopanisad-bhasya seems to have only one on it. The Aitareyopanisadbhdsya has six commentaries. by Anandajnana and Mathuranatha Sukla. Vyasa Isopanisadbhdsya has one commentary by Anandajnana and another. His Kenopanisad-bhdsya has two commentaries. i. The Kdthakopanisad-bhdsya has two commentaries. since this shows that these have the strength them to support their authenticity. has two commentaries. on Suresvara. by Anandajnana. Balakrsnadasa. called Bhasya-tippana. Puranas Sankara s by Anandajnana and by Balagopala Yoglndra. Kena. Nrsimha Acarya. by Anandajnana and Narayanendra Sarasvatl. Isa. His Aparoksdnubhava has four commen taries. Tirtha.78 I The Sankara School of Vedanta [CH. Jnanamrta Yati. The Brhad-dranyakopanisad-bhasya has a commentary by Anandajnana and a big independent work on it by Suresvara. Mdndukya. The which has called Brhad-aranyakopanisad-bhasya-vdrttika. and a summary. Mundaka. one . by Anandajnana. Kenopanisad-bhasya-vivarana and a commentary by Anandajnana. them to great writers of the past. and by Vidyaranya. by Raghavananda. the Eka-sloka has a pada s sdstra-vivarana. to illustrates this The attribution of all the very clearly.

Ramananda Tlrtha. Pandkarana-tlkd- tattva-candrikd. Brahmananda (Bhavartha-dipika). by Padma- pada. Sankara s Drg-drsya-prakarana was com mented on by Ramacandra Tlrtha his Panclkarana-prakriyd has again a number of commentaries that by Suresvara is Pancikarana-vdrttika. Ramabhadra. Pancikarana-tdtparya-candrikd and Panclkarana- vivarana by Anandajnana. by Svayamprakasa Yati no com mentary ho wever is attributed to the Viveka-cudamani. Dlksita. Purusottama Sarasvati (Siddhanta-bindu-sandipana) Purnananda . Bhasurananda. such as the Siddhanta-tattva-bindu by Madhusu dana Sarasvati. called also Cid-ananda-dasaslokl or simply Dasa-slokt. The Atmopadesa-vidhi is said to have a commentary by Anandajnana. Gauda Brahmananda s commentary. by Rama yojanika). Goplkanta Sa. Malla Bhatta. Bodha-vidhi by a pupil of Vidyadhaman. called Pancl. such as Narayana Yati (Laghu-tika). Purnananda Tlrtha. Sayana and Svayamprakasa Yati. Laksmldhara Desika and Visvambhara and Srlkantha Bhatta and another called Vidvan-manorama. has also a number of commentaries and sub- commentaries. Kaviraja. Kaivalyasrama (Saubhagya-vardhim). Kesava- bhatta. The Upadesa-sahasri has at least four commentaries. Siddhdnta-bindu-nyayawas further commented on by Krsnakanta (Siddhantanydya-ratna-pradipika). Sarasvati (Tattva-viveka). Madhusudana s commentary was commented on by a number of persons. five commentaries. Gauda Brahmananda dhanta-bindu-nyaya-ratnavali). Pancikarana-vivarana by Svayam prakasa Yati and by Prajrianananda. and a sab-commentary called Tattva-candrikd. lahari-tari). Sankara also commented on the Bhagavad- .xij Sankara and his School . pupil of Jnanendra Sarasvati. by Anandajfiana. Mahadeva Vidyavaglsa. by Appaya dipikd). which seems to be genuinely attributed to Sankara the Atma-bodha has at least . (Bhava-prakdsika). Krsna Acarya (Manju-bhasini). the Ananda-lahari has about twenty-four commentaries. Goplrama. Bodhendra . and this has a further commentary. Gangahari (Tattva- Gangadhara. by ratndvall. and Tlrtha (Padaby Sankara- carya.rvabhauma(AnandaJagannatha Pancanana. by Abhinavanarayanendra Sarasvati. 79 commentary called Tattva-dipana. His Cid-ananda-stava-raja. Mahadeva Vaidya. Narasimha. karana-varttikdbharana. Other commentaries on the Panclkarana- prakriyd are Panclkarana-bhdva-prakdsikd. Sarasvati (SidSaccidananda and Sivalala Sar- man. by Advayananda. Jagadisa?. Madhusudana Sarasvati and RamanandaTlrtha The Atmdnatma-viveka has at least four commentaries. Ramacandra.

and not by the mysterious power of apurva admitted by the Mimamsists. He starts his Vdkya-vrtti in the same manner as Isvarakrsna starts his Sdmkhyakdrikd. and another. suffering from the threefold sorrows of life. The answer. by the present volume. He concludes this short work of fifty-three verses by insisting on the fact that. is as that given in so many other places. where external objects are considered have an indescribable existence. of course. that lectual process as implied is by relations of identity. called Vdkya-vrtti-prakdsikd. of the nature of pure consciousness self. yet their main force is in the direct and immediate apperception of the pure self without any intel &quot. as being helpful for the realization of the true nature of self.8o gltd\ this The Sankara School of Veddnta commentary has been examined in [CH. (Brahman) art thou. namely by stating that. and another commentary. by Visvesvara Pandita. called Laghuvdkya-vrtti-prakdsikd. and external objects are deemed to have no existence whatsoever. a procedure which one does not find in his Brahma-sutra-bhdsya. Suresvara in his Naiskarmya-siddhi also starts in the same manner and thus gives a practical turn to the study of philosophy. very different from dream- . his Vdkya-vrtti has a commentary by Anandajnana. he also declares here that the effects of one s deeds are disposed extraneous to which by God (Isvara). may have a verbal construction that implies some kind of duality. give rise to some doubts regarding the true authorship of the Aparoksdnubhiiti. Bhagavad-gltd has a commentary called Puspanjali. He then goes on to show that the same all is external things and all that is is called mind or mental or psychical . divergences of attitude are also noticeable in his thoroughgoing idealism in his waking commentary on Gaudapada s Kdrikd.&quot. the pupil approaches a good teacher for instruction regarding the ways in which he may be liberated from them. in the chapter on the His Laghu-vdkya-vrtti Ramananda SarasvatI. being absolutely like dream-perceptions as contrasted with his life is to Sdriraka-mimdmsd-bhdsya. The Vdkya-vrtti thus conceived differently from the Aparoksdnubhiiti^ where yoga processes of posture and breath-regulations are described. the superior illusory form of Brahman. This may. of course. such as though the unity texts (advaita-sruti) of the Upanisads. that one is liberated the proper realization of the Upanisad texts that declare only by the unity of the self with Brahman. though it may be explained as being due to the different stages of the development of Sankara s own mind. where the regarded as being exactly the same as dream life.

1 D II . which in its nineteen chapters contains only six hundred and seventy-five stanzas. Atma-bodha. realization of the Vedantic unity texts. As an illustra .. called Nydya-mdld or Adhikarana-mdld.&quot. The Atma-bodha was commented upon by Padmapada in his commentary Atma-bodha-vydkhydna. greater emphasis is laid on the proper creations. such as Vaidyanatha Dlksita. the commentators have found an excuse for extracting from them Vedantic doctrines which cannot be said to follow directly from them. tion of this. however. Anandajnana in the thirteenth. In some cases.xi] Sankara and his School 81 The Upadesa-sahasri. as means to the attainment of Brahmahood. etc.that art thou. and Govindananda in the four teenth century. also wrote topical summaries of the main lines of the general arguments of the Brahma-sutra on the lines of Sankara s com mentary. is more in a line with the Vakya-vrtti) and. There are also a number of short poems and hymns attributed to Sankaracarya. Commentaries on Vacaspati s commentary will be noticed in the section on Vacaspati Misra. Many other persons. But Sankara s most important work is the Brahma-sutra-bhdsya which was commented on by Vacaspati Misra in the ninth century. it may be pointed out that out of the ten slokas of Sankara Madhusudana made a big commentary. such as the Advaitanubhuti. Thus &amp. Praudhdnubhuti.. while there are many others which may not be so. But many other persons were inspired by Sankara s commentary (or by the com mentaries of Vacaspati Misra and other great writers of the Sankara school) and under the name of independent commentaries on the Brahma-sutra merely repeated what was contained in these. such as &quot. called also Veddnta-sara.gt. Tattvopadesa. in which he tried to deal with the general arguments of the Brahma-sutra on the lines of Sankara s commentary. but in the absence of further evidence 1 it is difficult to come to These hymns any decisive conclusion do not contain any additional philosophical materials. Subrahmanya wrote a verse summary of Sankara s commentary which he calls Bhasyarthanydya-mdld\ and BharatI Tirtha wrote also the Vaiydsika-nydyamdld. etc. Devarama Bhatta. some of which are undoubtedly his. though the well-known Vedanta topics are all slightly touched upon. and Brahmananda SarasvatI wrote another big commentary on that of Madhusudana and elaborated many of the complex doctrines of the Vedanta which have but little direct bearing upon the verses themselves.. but are intended to stir up a religious fervour and emotion in favour of the monistic faith.

Veddnta-kaustubha by Sitarama none of which seem to be earlier than the sixteenth century. by a pupil of Ramananda. There is little doubt that Suresvara was of these commentaries are Brahma-sutra-bhdsydrtha-samgraha by Yati. 1200). son of Gauri and Siva. Sdrlraka-mlmdmsd- sutra-siddhdnta-kaumudl by Subrahmanya Agnicin Makhlndra. Brahma-sutra-vrtti (called also Mitdksara) by Annam Bhatta. but also Visvarupa (vm. 63). called Sdrlraka-mlmdmsd-samgraha. where Mandana is spoken of as being named not only Umbeka. Jacob Suresvara in his introduction to the second edition of the Naiskarmya-siddhi seems willing to believe this tradition. he received from him the name Suresvara. Brahma-tattva-prakdsikd (which is different from an earlier called Brahma-prakdsikd) by Sadasivendra Sarasvati. and Krsnanubhuti. called Sdriraka-mimdmsd-nydya-samgraha. But Ananyanubhava. Mandana. Hari Dlksita wrote his Brahma-sutra-vrtti. Brahma-sutroby Ramesvara Bharati. when Mandana became a follower of Sankara. Suresvara and Visvarupa. pupil of Jfianaghana. Sankarananda his Brahma-sutra-dipika and Brahmananda his Vedanta-sutra-mukta- Amalananda wrote commentary on Sankara independent interpretations of the Brahma-sutra. Prakasatman himself also wrote a metrical summary of the main contents of Sahkara s Bhasya . and it is certainly very risky to believe any of its statements.82 The Sankara School of Veddnta his Sdstra-darpana imitating the s s [CH.D. called Sdrlraka-nydya-manimdld. 4 of the same work that. Brahma. But the Sankara-dig-vijaya is a mythical biography. but these written mainly on the lines of Sankara s own commentary. in which for the most part he summarized the views of Vacaspati s Bhdmati commentary. wrote a similar metrical summary. In addition to these some more commentaries may be mentioned. unless corroborated by other reliable evidences. Sutra-bhdsya-vydkhydna (called also Brahmavidyd-bharana} by Advaitananda. such as Brahma-sutra-vrtti by Dharma Bhatta. G. The peculiarity of this last work is that it is the only commentary on the eka-jlva-vdda line that the present writer could trace. and Brahma-sutra-bhdsya-vydkhyd (called also Vidyd-sri) by Jnanottama Bhattaraka. pupil of Ramananda and pupil s pupil of : 1 Some Brahmananda Brahmananda. and Col. .siitrdrtha-dlpikd by Verikata. General tradition has always identified Mandana with and Visvarupa. A. prakasa also wrote his Veddnta-naya-bhusana. the teacher of Prakasatman (A. supplementing it with additional Vedantic ideas that had been vall as were all developed after Sankara by the philosophers of his school of 1 thought or explaining Sankara s Bhasya . seems to have written another commentary. He further says in x. Brahma-sutra-bhdsya-vydkhyd Appaya treatise panydsa (called also Nydya-raksd-mani) by Dlksita. in much later times. main lines of and SvayamVacaspati commentary. pupil of Ramacandrarya and pupil s pupil of Mukundasrama. pupil of Visvesvarananda. The tradition probably started from Vidyaranya s Sankara-dig-vijaya.

Vidyaranya also. also 83 on Sankara s summarized by Vidyaranya in a work called Vdrttika-sdra.siddhi-tlkd. and it -was commented on by Vacaspati in his Tattva-samiksa. The Varttika of Suresvara was commented on by at least two commentators. p. and its manuscripts are very scarce the pre sent writer had the good fortune to obtain one. by Sankhapani in his Brahma. The Brahma-siddhi is an important work. But in another passage of the Vivaranaprameya-samgraha (p. 80) (p. 381. Nirnaya-Sagara Press) are in verse. series (p. while there are other references. Many important works however refer to the Brahma-siddhi and its views generally as coming from the author of Brahma-siddhi (Brahma-siddhi-kdra). ought to be considered very reliable. in his Vivarana-prameyasamgraha. 51) a quotation from this Varttika is attributed to Visvarupa. But only the latter two works are available in manu scripts. since two quotations from it in Citsukha s Tattva- and Nydya-kanikd (p. has the author of Brahma-siddhi been referred to as Suresvara. and in all probability it relied on Vidyaranya s testimony that Visvarupa and Suresvara were identi cally the same person. 218) and Citsukha in his Tattva-pradlpikd (p. 6-2 . by the author of a Varttika. 140) and elsewhere. which are in prose. however. 224) he refers to a Vedanta doctrine. Anandagiri in his Sastra-prakasikd and Anandapurna in his Nydya-kalpa-latikd. called the Laghu-samgrahd). but this commentary is a late work. or Brhad-aranyaka Upanisad (which was : Anandapurna in his Brahma-siddhi-vydkhyd-ratna. quotes a passage from Suresvara s Varttika (iv. . so far as it is known to the present writer. as he lived within a hundred years of the death of Mandana whoever Mandana may have been.xi] Mandana. which latter was further commented on by Mahesvara Tlrtha in his commentary. In a commentary on the Pardsara-smrti published in the Bib. A fairly detailed examination of the philosophy of this work will be given in a separate section. There is. The Brahma-siddhi was written in verse and prose. 8). 92. Ind. But in none of these references. and by Citsukha in his Abhiprayaprakasika. such as Tattvapradipikd (p. Suresvara and Visvarupa commentary in verse. Of these the evi dence of Srldhara. little doubt that the Brahma-siddhi was written by pradipikd Mandana or Mandana Misra. attributing it to Visvarupa. attri buting it to the author of the Brahma-siddhi. who belonged to the middle of the tenth century. for both Srldhara in his Nydya- kandall (p. But the work has not yet been published. 140) refer to Mandana as the author of the Brahma-siddhi.

and individual false ex periences of the world have therefore no objective basis. which was in later times so forcefully formulated by Prakasananda. 32).D. it it is Of all passages the most important is that quoted from the Brahma. and the Brahma-siddhi by Mandana. It is said there that according to the author of the Brahma-siddhi it is the individual persons (jlvah. 820). definitely known that the Naiskarmya-siddhi and the Varttika were written by SuresVara.siddhim the Vivarana-prameya-samgraha (p. it is held that according to the author of the Brahma-siddhi both experiences (avidyd 1 mdyd are nothing but false mithyd-pratyaya iti). then Mandana Misra may be regarded as the originator of the Vedantic doctrine of drsti-srsti-vdda. The appearances then are but creations of individual ignorance. their delusive ex periences are similar. Libraries after the above section had been written. or as reflection in may a. 224). corroborates the above surmises. as may well be supposed. About the function mdyd and avidyd copy of the manuscript of the Brahma-siddhi and its commentary was consulted by me in the Adyar and the Govt. nor with the may a. It is. since he lived after Sankara (A. Kuppusvami isastri. I am happy to say. The Brahma-siddhi is expected to be shortly published by Prof. is Brahman the cause of the world (Brahma na jagat-kdranam).84 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. From the few quotations that can be may be traced in the writings of the various writers who refer to 1 possible to come to some fairly decisive conclusions . . but the objective basis of their experience . therefore. If this account is correct. if the views or opinions of the Brahma-siddhi can be compared or contrasted with the views of the Naiskarmyasiddhi or the Varttika. in Prakasatman s Panca-pddikd-vivarana (p. The agreement of individual experiences is due to similarity of illu sions in different persons who are suffering under the delusive effects of the same kinds of ignorance this may thus be compared with the delusive experience of two moons by a number of persons. Neither in itself. and a thorough examination of its contents. Again. astrl in Madras in December 1928. in the plural) who by their own individual ignorance (svdvidyaya) create for themselves on the changeless Brahman the false world-appearance. Sanskrit MSS. Not all persons experience the same world. A separate section has been devoted to the philosophy of A Mandana s Brahma-siddhi. is not the same (samvddas tu bahu-purusdvagata-dvitiya-candravat sddrsydd upapadyate). and I con sulted the tarka-pada of it in proof by the kind courtesy of Prof. The question regarding the identity of these two persons settled. he could not have flourished very much earlier than the middle of the ninth century.

including Suresvara. also. Suresvara and Visvarupa 85 of knowledge as removing doubts he is said to hold the view (as reported in the Nyaya-kandali. for Mandana s views lead to quite different conclusions (parihrtya . 80) it is said that Mandana held that reality . to such a view. are not to be given any consideration. Again.xi] Mandana. 174) says that ignorance (avidya) supported (asraya) in pure consciousness (cin-matrasrita-visayam in his . In the Nyaya-kanikd fests itself in (p. . that ignorance rests with the individuals. in the Laghu-candrikd (p. in commenting on the passage referred to. So dissolution of ignorance means only Brah man. Again. even where from the context of Sankara s Bhasya it may appear as if he was speaking of the individual person (jlvd) as being the support of ajnana. According to Sankara. existence of such a negation as the cessation of ignorance for the monism of Brahman means that there is only one positive entity. p. Kumbakonam edition) Mandana is introduced in the course of a discussion regarding the nature of the dispersion of ignorance and its relation to Brahma-knowledge or Brahmahood. since negation as a separate cate gory has no existence. mentions this point as well as the point concerning avidya-nivrtti in Mandana s view as admission of negation.R. as interpreted by many of his followers. in J. the dissolution of ignorance (avidya-nivrtti) is not a negation. 218) that doubt regarding the validity of what is known is removed by knowledge itself. It has no reference to negations. therefore. as against the views of Mandana. Ramatlrtha Svamin. 112. mani unlimited conceptions of unity or universality whereas differences appear only as a result of limited experience. the negation of duality only means the negation of all positive entities other than Brahman (bhdvddvaitd) The existence of such a negation as the cessation of ignorance does not hurt the monistic creed.A. contrasts the above view of Mandana with that of Suresvara. 1923. and who is reported to have been in agreement with the views of Sarvajnatma Muni. Objections of Mandana. Now many of these views which have been attributed to Mandana are not shared by Suresvara.e. who according to him is referred to by an adjective bahu-sruta in the Samksepa-sdrlraka text. it has to be interpreted in this sense. Muni is Samksepa-sdriraka(n. It does not therefore appear that 1 Mandana Misra and Suresvara were the same Mr Hiriyanna. Sarvajnatma .S. i. ajndnam) and that. Mandana-vdcah taddhy anyathd prasthitam) 1 The commentator of the Samksepa-sariraka. as will appear from what will be said below concerning him. But according to Mandana there is no harm in admitting the . viz.

Anandatman had two disciples. But. our reliance on the author of the Vivarana-prameya-samgraha cannot be considered to be risky and unsafe. a disciple of Padmapada. he could not have identified them in his Sankara-dig-vijaya. and it was at this stage that he was called Suresvara. of Mandana. was not the same person only a we suppose that Mandana was not Mimamsa Vedanta writer of great repute and that his conversion by Sankara meant only that he changed some of his Vedantic views and accepted those of Sankara. who had Citsukha as his taken to be a contemporary of the was the grand teacher ( parama-guru) Anandatman. he could not have written in his Sankara-dig-vijaya r w as (XHI. 5) that Citsukha. if Vidyaranya. the author of the Varttika-sara. in Thus Citsukha may be . that Hiriyanna seems to have removed Now. where he points out that Vidyaranya in his Varttika-sara refers to the author of the Brahma-siddhi as a different authority from the author of the Varttika. But on p. person. unless of the Brahma-siddhi.R. if Vidyaranya. It may therefore be concluded that Mandana. of Vidyaranya. the author of the Brahma-siddhi.86 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. Another consideration also leads one to think that Vidyaranya (the author of the Vivaranaprameya-samgraha) could not have written the Sankara-dig-vijaya.S.knew that Mandana. Now. It may therefore be safely asserted that the author of the Sankara-dig-vijaya was not the author of the Vivarana-prameya-samgraha. had identified who knows them so much about the views might lead one to pause.A. On this theory his Brahma-siddhi was probably written before his conversion to Saiikara s views. but also a . and that the author of the Vidhi-viveka was also the author of the writer. the author as Suresvara. in the Sankara-dig-vijaya. Sukhaprakasa. Now Amalananda had another teacher teacher. Anubhavananda and Sankara nanda. Suresvara. 8) is attributed to Visvarupa Acarya. If this case. So Amalananda may be taken as a contemporary of Vidyaranya. was not the same person as Suresvara. It seems likely that this theory may be correct. 1924. -who lived several centuries after Padmapada. Anubhavananda had as his disciple Amalananda. if this is so. This naturally leads one to suspect that the Vidyaranya who was the author of the Vivarana-prameyasamgraha and the Varttika-sara was not the same Vidyaranya as the author of Sankara-dig-vijaya. viz. Now Mr this difficulty for us by his short note in J. 92 of the Vivarana-prameyasamgraha a passage from the Varttika of Suresvara (iv. and Sankarananda had Vidyaranya as his disciple.

Kumarila or Vyasa. also wrote a commentary on it. and Siddhi. almost the whole of which. Tarka-kanda. is available in the Government Oriental Manuscript Library. Brahma-siddhi with the commentary of San- pusvami available in manuscript. called Tattvas Brahma-siddhi. on this subject no references of value are known to the though that in all present writer other than by the author of the Vivarana-prameya- samgraha. Brahma-kanda.siddhi\ for the passage of the Brahma-siddhi quoted by Vacaspati in his Nydya-kanika is quoted in a manner which suggests that in all probability the author of the Vidhi-viveka was also the author of the Brahma-siddhi. Mandana Mandana Misra khapani is s (A. who had also written a commentary. has not yet been . It may also be concluded probability Visvarupa was the same person as Suresvara. but unfortunately this samiksa. 2 Mandana s other works are Bhdvand-viveka. the author of the Yoga-sutra-bhasya. That Mandana must have been a contemporary of Sankara is evident from the fact that. Kunhan Raja. No. 800). such as Sahara. Vidhi-viveka. .xi] Mandana 87 Brahma.D. so far as is known to the present writer. and makes profuse references to the Upanisad texts. on Mandana text.dtma-khydti. Niyoga-kanda. called Bhdva-suddhi. 3853. and the Sphota-siddhi was commented upon by the son of Bhavadasa. called Tattva-vibhavanti. kanda. asat-khydti. anyathdkhydti and akhydti. Anandapurna also wrote a commentary on the Brahma-siddhi. Through the courtesy of Mahama hopadhyaya Kuppusvami Sastrl the present writer had an oppor tunity of going through the proofs of the Brahma-siddhi and through the courtesy of Mr C. though he quotes some writers who flourished before Sankara. the Honorary Director of the Adyar Library. in the form of verses (karika) and long annotations (vrtti). . Mandana s Vibhrama-viveka is a small work devoted to the dis cussion of the four theories of illusion (khydti). R. he was able also to utilize the manuscript of Sankhapani s commentary 1 The Brahma-siddhi is in four chapters. except some portions at the beginning. Sankara 2 Vacaspati also 1 Citsukha. Vibhrama-viveka and Sphota-siddhi. Of these the Vidhi-viveka was commented upon by Vacaspati Misra in his Nydya-kanikd. Up till now only his Bhdvand-viveka and Vidhi-viveka have been published. the pupil of Jnanottama. called Abhiprdya-prakdsikd. on Vacaspati Misra s Tattva-bindu The commentary on the Sphota-siddhi is called Gopdlika. and Mahamahopadhyaya KupSastrl of Madras is expected soon to bring out a critical edition of this important work. he never refers to any writer after who flourished wrote a commentary.

7. ndndtve tu vivikta-svabhdvayor asamsrstaparaspara-svarupayor asambaddhayoh kldrso drastr-drsya-bhdvah. p. he says that attempts have been be established. (In the press. the self or the subject. For. then it is plainly admitted that objects are not in reality perceived and that there only an appearance of perception. Kuppusvami edition of Brahma. In the Brahma-kdnda chapter Mandana discusses the . changeable intelligence. the only reality further with the same argument. that Mlmamsa view all Vedic texts command or to restrain ourselves is from us to engage in some kind of action certain other kinds of action. In the Brahma-kdnda the most important Vedantic concepts are explained by Mandana according to his own view. that are perceived can best be explained as being things 1 Proceeding illusory creations imposed on self. &quot. This by far the longest chapter of the book. made to bring about this subject. if it is held that the self does not undergo any transformation or change. He first introduces the problem of the subject (drastr) and the object (drsya) and says that it is only by abolishing the apparent duality of subject and object that the fact of experience can be explained.difference&quot. nature of Brahman Tarka-kanda he tries to prove that through perception and that perceive therefore one should not think of interpreting the Upanisad texts on dualistic lines on the ground that perception reveals difference. he tries to refute the that the Upanisad texts are to be interpreted in accordance with the Mlmamsa principle of interpretation. could not change with its varying changes in accordance with its connection with different objects . all then . The fourth chapter. there is only the subject. if there was any real duality of subject and object.object relation through the theory of the operation of an intermediary mind (antahkarand) but whatever may be the nature of this intermediary. that duality could not be bridged over and no relation between the two could if. discovered. the pure un . the Siddhi-kanda. is the shortest: Mandana says here that the Upanisad texts show that the manifold world of appearance does not exist at all and that its apparent existence is due to the avidyd of jiva. drastur eva cid-dtmanah tathd tathd viparindmdd vivartandd vd. it is wrong to think that they have a separate is 1 ekatva evdyam drastr-drsya-bhdvo vakalpate.) . the Niyoga-kdnda.88 The Sankara School of Veddnta in the [CH. on the other hand. we cannot In the third chapter. If objects are not perceived in reality.siddhi. but there is only the appearance of a transformation through its reflection in the antahkarana.

cites tu vibhaktam asamsrstam tayd cetyata iti dur-av agamy am. na. it . But probably the reply of that school would be that. but he thinks that. 2 tathd hi darpana-tala-stham dtmdnam vibhaktam ivdtmanah pratyeti. Prakasatman. 89 Just as the very and independent existence from the same man all sees his own image in the mirror to be different from him and him as an object. citeh suddhatvdd aparindmdd aprati-samkramdc ca. whether one with that or different and could not therefore be called avidya from if it was absolutely non-existent. The fact that Mandana discards this epistemological doctrine shows. : Adyar MS. vyavahara-bljam) such as avidya has it has thus to be admitted that avidya is indescribable or unspeakable (anirvacanlya) 3 . According to Mandana avidya is called may a. be regarded as a criticism of the contemporary inter pretation of Padmapada. 75. He admits that there is an inconsistency in such a view. p. on the one hand. neither existent nor non-existent. may not be out of place to point out in this connection that the theory of Padmapada. drsyd buddhih citi-sannidhei chdyaya vivartata iti ced atha keyam tac chdyatd? a-tad-dtmanah tad-avabhdsah .xi] Mandana self 1 . It p. or false appearance because it is neither a characteristic (sva-bhdva) of Brahman nor different from it. then. 9. . avidya being itself an inconsistent category. they did not admit the reality of objects outside of pure intelligence (cit}. which held that the mind (antahkarand) becomes superimposed on external objects in perception. on the other hand. which was somehow forced into Sahkara s loose epistemological doctrines and worked out as a systematic epistemological theory. 3 Ibid. it. there is no wonder that its relation with jlva should also be incon1 ekantahkarana-samkrdntdv asty eva sambandha iti cet. it would be like the lotus of the sky and would have no practical bearing in experience (na would be real . though they admitted extra-individual reality of objects. If it was the characteristic of anything. It is difficult to conceive how one could admit the existence of external objects outside the pure intelligence (cit) for in that case it would be impossible to relate to exist outside of . It may not be out of place here to point out that Anandabodha s argument in his Nydya-makaranda regarding the unspeakable nature of avidyd which has been treated in a later section of this chapter. as developed later on by Dharmarajadhvarlndra. the two 2 . Jsankhapani in commenting on this discards the view that objects pass through the sense-channels and become superimposed on the antahkaranaoi durbhanam and thereby become related to the pure intelligence of the self and objectified na tu sphatikopame cetasi indriya-prandll-samkrdntdndm arthdndm tatraiva samkrdntena dtma-caitanyena sambaddhdndm tad-drsyatvam ghatisyate. . Ibid. Ibid. was in all probability borrowed from the Samkhya doctrine of cic-chdydpatti in perception. is based on this argument t of Mandana. so the same self appears as the diverse objects outside of it. paramdrthatas ca drsyamdnam drastr-vyatiriktam asti iti durbhanam. According to Mandana avidya belongs to the individual souls (jlva). that he did not admit it to be a right interpretation of $arikara and may. na tarhi paramdrthato dfsyam drsyate.

jlvdsrayd kalpana. p. and this avidyd is . . that the 2 consistent word mdyd implies what is and explainable concept. 11-12. Ibid. 2 anupapadyamdndrthaiva sydt. the jlvas are essentially diversity of jlvas is due to : imagination (kalpana) but this imagination cannot be of Brahman. and the . natural to the jlvas. saruathd sukham asti. and that this cycle is begin ningless and therefore there is no ultimate beginning either of the mdyd . And it is through listening to the Vedantic texts. hi mdyd. since the jlvas themselves are the products of avidyd*. a plunge into cold water is an escape from the painful heat). it had it would be reality been a and not Secondly. pp. that true knowledge dawns and the it was through this avidyd that the jlvas were from Brahman with its destruction they attain Brahmaseparated hood 5 avidyd . avidyaiva hi naisargikl. yathd ghatddi-bhede tad-dkdsam parisuddham paramdkasam eva bhavati. 4 na hi jivesu nisarga-jd vidydsti. dgantukyd vidydydh pravilayah.90 sistent The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. is destroyed . . 1 jlvas themselves are regarded as being the product of imagination Two solutions may be proposed regarding this difficulty. since the . Adyar MS. but he holds that there are . He starts by criticizing the negative definition of happiness as cessation of pain or as a positive mental state qualified by such a negative that there are indeed negative pleasures which are enjoyed as negation of pain (e. since Brahman is devoid of all imagination (tasyd vidydtmanah kalpand-sunyatvdt) . tan-nivrttau brahma-svarupam eva bhavati. iipapadyamdndrthatve yathartha-bhdvdn na mdyd 3 andditvdn netaretardsrayatva-dosah. In defining the nature of commentator raises Brahman as pure bliss Sahkhapani the some very interesting discussions. 10. of the Sahkhapani commentary. 3 This view is held by those who think that jlvas or of the avidyd avidyd is not the material cause of the world these are technically . : called avidyopdddna-bheda-vddins It is through this avidyd that the jlvas suffer the cycle of births and rebirths. it may be said that from avidyd come the jlvas and from the jlvas comes the avidyd. p. 6 duhkha nivrttir ndma na dharmdntaram va tad-visistdtmopalabdhir vd sukham astu. The inconsistency of the relationship of avidyd with the jlvas arises as follows identical with Brahman. meditation. and unexplainable. 5 avidyayaiva tu brahmano jlvo vibhaktah. etc. Ibid. Ibid. jiva vibhdgah.g. firstly. it cannot be the imagination of the jlvas. condition 6 He says cases where pleasures and pains are experienced simultaneously itaretardsrava prasangdt kalpanddhino hi Ibid. 18. Ibid. inconsistent. right thinking.

4 5 atah kdma-nivrtteh prdg-bhdvi sukha-vastu-bhutam estavyam. desires in a sub-conscious or potential bhavisyati) . . in the smelling of a delightful odour of camphor) where cannot . there are many cases it (e. but not at the time of . Again. yet. desires be defined through admitted that positive pleasures are in the first instance experienced and then are desired. even if a thing it is much satisfy is desired. In reply to .23. Ibid. 21. these objections Sankhapani points out that. but that it is a positive concept which has its If negation of existence even before the desires are sublated 4 . Ibid. The theory that pains and pleasures are relative and that without pain there can be no experience of . Again. be denied that we have an experience of positive pleasure 1 Sahkhapani then refutes the theory of pain as unsatisfied desire and happiness as satisfaction or annulment of desires (visayaprdptim vind kdma eva duhkham atah tan-nivrttir eva sukham by holding that positive experiences of happiness are 2 An objection possible even when one has not desired them to this is that experience of pleasures satisfies the natural. man may feel painful heat in the upper part of his body and yet feel the lower part of his body delightfully cool and thus experience pleasure and pain simul and not A taneously (sukha-duhkhe yugapaj janyete). Ibid. but temporarily inactive. does not one so much as a pleasure which comes easily. as happiness. enjoying the pleasurable experience for the desires are not wholly Even at the time of enjoying the satisfaction of most earnest desires one may feel pain. 25. if it is secured after much trouble. certain experiences produce more pleasures in some than in others. then even disinclination to food So it is to be bilious attacks is to be called happiness 5 pleasure and that there can be 1 3 no experience of pain without an Ibid. sahajo P. then one should feel happy before all the pleasurable experience or after the pleasurable experience.g. according to the scriptures there is unmixed pain in Hell. p.xi] Mandana 91 as negation of each other. 20. condition 3 Again. and this is obviously due to the fact that one had more latent desires to be fulfilled than the other. hi rdgah sarva-pumsdm asti sa tu visaya-visesena dvir-bhavati. p. and this shows that pain need not necessarily be relative. So it is to be admitted extinct at that time. p. that pleasure is not a relative concept which owes its origin to the sublation of desires. pp. 2 Ibid. 22. when traces of the desires are wiped out. 27. If pleasure defined as removal of desires.

But among the disciples of Sankara the man who really started the dialectical forms of argument. (ii) first the pre sentation of the positive object and then the presentation of the difference.difference. Against such a view-point Mandana undertakes to prove that istic &quot. 2 This discussion runs from page 44 of the Brahma-siddhi (in the press) to the end of the second chapter. who was second to none in his dialectical powers and who influenced others. (2) that it presents differences from other objects. vyavaccheda-piirvako vidhih. never experienced by perception (pratyaksd) yields He starts by saying that perception three possible alternatives. Brahma-siddhi. Anandajnana. it from other objects 3 positive object and In the third alternative there (i) may again be three other alternatives. yaugapadyam. 8 . Sriharsa. and proper notice has been taken of them in this chapter. Ibid. of the Sankara school. difference. (3) that it both manifests a positive object and distinguishes . are well known. vidhi-purvako vyavacchedah. Anandajnana and Citsukha. 2 .&quot. whether as a quality or character is of things or as an independent entity. if this is so. Ibid. tatra pratyakse trayah kalpdh. (i) that it manifests a positive object. The names of the three great dialecticians. and therefore the Upanisad texts is The argument should not be interpreted in such a way as to annul the reality of &quot.siddhi. Sriharsa. commentaries on some of the Upanisads and the Mandukyakdrika had employed some elements of dialectical criticism. Mandana s great dia found in his refutation of the perception of the Tarka-kanda chapter of his Brahma. : arose as follows the category of difference revealed in perception. its simultaneous presentation of the from others. Anandabodha. viz. the principles of which had long been introduced in well-developed forms by the Buddhists.92 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. Nrsimhasrama and lectical achievement difference (bheda) in was Mandana. vastu-svarupa-siddhih vastv-antarasya vyavacchedah ubhayam vd. 161. n. Citsukha. experience of pleasure is false and consequently the Vedantic view is that the state of emancipation as Brahmahood may well be described as an experience of positive pure bliss 1 Sankara in his commentary on the Brahma-sutra and in his . 1 yadi dnhkhd-bhdvah sukharn sydt tatah sydd evam bhdvdntare tu sukhe duhkhdbhdve ca tathd sydd eva. viz. is all other dialecticians of the Sankara school.&quot. and. (iii) first the presentation of the difference and then the presentation of the positive object 4 If by perception differences distinction . 4 ubhayasminn api traividhyam. the reality of (bheda) difference cannot be denied. p.

both the lotus and the sky are existents. Kdrikd 3. . the objects between which the difference is manifested must first be known.g. The negation involved in the notion of difference can have no bearing without that which is negated or that of which it is negated. e. the lotus of the sky) is to be inter preted as negation of a false relation of its constituents. objects are presented in perception. but conch-shell. Difference of them simultaneously. as also the difference between the two 2 In the case of the discovery of one s own illusion. revealed. unassociated with any pre sentation of difference. It was as &quot. nor both for the positive object must first be difference can be manifested. which can be imagined only as a mental idea 1 If the category of difference distinguishes two objects from one another. it cannot be held that perception.difference&quot.this is not is 1 kutascin nimiltdd buddhau labdha-rupdndm bahir nisedhah kriyatc. first Perception does not reveal merely the difference. then it has to be admitted that the notion not conveyed to us by perception. from other objects. which are positive in themselves (e. . for perception is one unique process of cognition. before any must concern itself in a relation between two positive objects. if it can be proved that only positive . previous knowledge of the object as silver has been negated.g. the cow is different from the horse. nor does it reveal the difference and then the positive object.xij Mandana 93 from other objects are experienced. the incompatibility is due to their relationing. Again. Ibid. or there is no jug here. then it has to be admitted that &quot. only the latter knowledge and this knowledge refers to and negates after the perceptual. or if it manifests both the object and its differences. II. kramah samgacchate yuktyd naika-vijndna-karmanoh na sannihita-jam tac ca tadanydmarsi jay ate. is presented in perception but. The negation of a chimerical entity (e. and in that case the verdict of the Upanisads that reality is one and that no diversity can be real is not contradicted by perceptual experience. after revealing the positive object. and it is such a relation between these two positive entities that is denied). Brahma-siddhi. n. Now of difference is follows the argument.&quot. and both these are positive in their notion. such reveals also its difference . and there are no two moments in it such that it should first reveal the object with which there is present sense-contact and then reveal other objects which are not at that moment in contact with sense. or as denying the objective existence of such entities.g. silver.

na ca tatra eka-jndnasya kramavad-vydpdratdubhaya-rupasya utpatteh.idam 1 &quot. vidhi-purvatd ca niyamena nisedhasyocyate. if the very .satyam jndna-dvayam idam savikalpakam tu nirvikalpakam tayor mula-bhutam tat pratyaksam tatra ca eka-vidhir eva anyavyavaccheda iti bruma iti. In reply to this objection says that things cannot be of the nature of differences in that case all objects would be of the nature of difference. was denied as being the silver for which it was taken. but there are here different cognitive experiences Again. ibid. and thus. since they are both derived from the indeterminate cognition. is also ... potency of the indeterminate cognition of an object that both the positive determinate cognition and its difference from others are Though the positive and the negative are two cognitions. na vidher nisedha-purvakatd nisidhyate. its difference from other objects Mandana firstly. the presented object was perceived as &quot. There is again a view that things are by their very nature different from one another (prakrtyaiva bhinna bhdvah). then these taste properties would also be negated.this before&quot. Kdrikd 3. there is a view (Buddhist) that it is by the power or . but does not therefore follow that a positive . A colour perceived at have its difference 3 . iti siddhi. from others also manifested (eka-vidhir eva anyaAgainst such a view Mandana urges that one positive experience cannot also reveal its differences from all other kinds of possible and impossible objects. but it cannot negate the presence of taste properties at that particular place and time but. ^ankhapani s commentary. suktikd-siddhis tu virodhi-nisedha-purva ucyate. and hence there would be no difference among them secondly. . and when shell. va-vyavahdram . 1 This is concept cannot be preceded by a negative concept therefore not a case where there are two moments in one unique 2 perception. 2 ii. it can well be said that by one positive experience we may also produced. when by perception an object is experienced. it was thus negated there was the perception of the conch There is no negative concept without there first being a it positive concept. grasped by that very act. and. vyavacchedah) a particular time and particular place may negate another colour at that particular place and time. it has to be admitted that perception of a positive entity does not necessarily involve as a result of that very process the negation of all other entities. yet. perception of a colour should negate everything else which is not that colour.94 only that The Sankara School of Veddnta when it [CH. nilasya nirvikalpaka-darsanasya yat sdmarthyam niyataika-kdranatvam tena anddi-vdsand-vasdt pratibhdsitam janitam idam nedam iti vikalpo bhdvdbhd3 pravartayati. as ca sannihitdrtha-sdmdnye nisedho purva-vijfidna-vihite rajatddau vidhi-purva eva. since this is not possible. Ibid. Brahma&quot.

another for their existence (itaretarasraya-prasangai). Mandana has no 95 form. itself.xi] difference&quot. u. these essences should vary in accordance with every object with which a thing may be opposed. the objects themselves would be of the nature of negation . and it has no causal efficiency and it is also not experienced. n. Mandana rejoins that on such a view it would be difficult to of this oppositional relation (apeksa) understand the meaning and function for it does not produce the . no object could be regarded as one. negation. Ibid. and that differences are different. the objects themselves would be difference being essentially of the nature of formless. though an object is produced by its own causes. but not in relation to . vrtti. ndpeksd nama kascid vastu-dharmo yena vastuni vyavasthapyeran. fourthly. In reply to this objection Mandana says that things all which is have been produced by their own causes cannot stand in need of a relation to other entities for their existence. Brahma. object. if differences are regarded as their constituent essences. which is produced by its own causes. if . lation between objects already experienced that difference manifests no. . relationing mental and as such depends on persons who conceive the things. Difference also cannot be regarded as being of the essence of oppositional relation it is only when there is an oppositional re .siddhi. a thing cannot be regarded as both one and many 1 In reply to this the objector says that a thing is of the nature of difference only in relation to others (parapeksam vastuno bheda-svabhavah natmapeksam). In reply to this it may be urged to each and every oppositional term. corresponding that each object has a different specific nature in accordance with the different other objects with which it may be in a relation of opposition but. and so relationing cannot be a constituent of objective things 2 If relationing with other things constituted their essence. na khalu sva-hetu-prdpitodayesu sva-bhdva-vyavasthitesu vastusu sva-bhdva-sthitaye vastvantardpeksd yujyate. 6. for. since difference involves duality or plurality in its concept. except as associated with the other objects (nanapeksa-pratiyoginam bhedah pr ally ate). thirdly. this is so. yet its nature as differences appears in relation to other objects with which it is held in opposition. In reply to this it is urged by the objector that. 2 5. then objects are not produced solely by their own causes. then each thing would depend on others they would depend on one . bhedo vastuno rupam tad-abhava-prasangatah arupena ca bhinnatvam vastuno ndvakalpate.

as ultimate. Again. its own way none the less if for according to so. and there is thus no necessity of illusory admitting the reality of differences in order to explain our notions of in his . of those Relations are internal and are experienced in the minds who perceive and conceive 1 But it is further objected . then on the same ground the existence of differences may also be admitted. If there were no different kinds of things.96 itself. and it is impossible that one and the same thing should serve different purposes. and. Similarly also the notions of long and short . the similarities of effects that to this be how we notice? It does he explain can be according basis of an illusory notion of the sameness of causes so if the Buddhist can explain our experience of similarity . but on the notion of production that which produces is the father and that which is produced is the son. Ibid. There is no . because even the self-same thing can serve diverse purposes the same fire can burn. But this objection is not valid. illuminate and cook. vastu-svabhdvah. to this that concepts like father and son are both relational and obviously externally constitutive. 2 atha nir-anvaya-vindsdndm api kalpand-visaydd abheddt kdryasya tulyatd hanta tarhi bheddd eva kalpand-visaydt kdrydbheda-siddher mudhd kdranabheda-kalpand. . To this Mandana s reply is that these two concepts are not based on relation. depend upon the one occupying greater or less space at the time of measurement and not on relations as constituting their essence. . that the so-called differences may be but fire is differences in name as the burning activity of the same described sometimes burning and sometimes all that as cooking. it would not be possible to explain different kinds of actions. Ibid. the Vedantist may turn explain all appearances of diversity through notions of difference. difference in experience 2 Others again argue that the world must be a world of diversity. In reply to this the objector says that. the Brahman. him all appearances are momentary. But Mandana s reply is . objection to there being a 1 number of limited (avacchinnd) qualities pauruseylm apeksdm na vastv anuvartate. In the Vedanta view it is held the so-called varied kinds of actions appear in one object. and so the objection that varied kinds of actions necessarily imply the existence of difference in the agents which produce them Buddhist is in is not valid. The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. the difficulty in the case of the . if relations are not regarded and if they are derived from different kinds of actions. as the various objects of our experience serve our various purposes. them only on the false on the also appearance of sameness of causes. ato no.

existents&quot. and it is first manifested as indeterminate experience. as apart fromif mutual negation. If. &quot. not realized in experience. D II .it is held by some that difference&quot. however. difference. Brahma-siddhi. so one self-same entity may on the same principle be regarded as the cause of divergent appearances. Such negations. specific negations are implied with reference to determinate entities. can be all definitely {sat) was experienced. for then negations of places would make them empty. This sameness or unity of unity of things as &quot. namely. just as the same fire may have two different kinds of powers or qualities. Again. and since these implied negations can operate only when there are these different entities. difference arises out of the operation of perceptual processes like determinate perception (occurring as the culmination of the perceptual process) for there is no proof whatsoever that . and also pratyekam anubiddhatvdd abhedena mrsd matah bhedo yathd tarangdndm bheddd bhedah kaldvatah. it may be replied. not in the least imply a divergence or difference of entity. depends on these implied negations. consists in the negation of one entity in another. as different from all things in all one another. &quot. As one entity is supposed to possess many divergent powers.xi] Mandana 97 or characters in the self-same thing. that of burning and cooking. Kdrikd 31. it cannot be said that the notion of &quot. milk is different from sesamum because curd is produced from milk and not from sesamum) but divergence of powers is like divergence of qualities. are twofold in their nature.g. is by far the most fundamental of experiences. Again. and this does . then. so the same entity may at different moments both possess and not possess a power. and. cannot be indefinite in their nature. it would be difficult to explain how one could recognize the sameness of things. It is sometimes urged that things are different from one another because of their divergent powers (e. they depend mutually upon one another (itaretarasraya) and cannot therefore hold their own. both unity and difference. n. since the character of these entities. It is a great mystery that the one self-same thing should have such a special efficiency (sdmarthyatisayd) that it can be the basis of innumerable divergent appearances. which later on transforms 1 In this connection itself into various notions of difference the view that things Mandana also takes great pains in refuting things .&quot. Again.

Kdrikd 32. it is not desirable to enter into Siddhi-kanda&amp. which is based on Jnanottama s Candrika.98 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. and it which cannot be known by ordinary experience. it. that he point in his refutation of the category of difference shows that it is inconceivable and dia- lectically monstrous to suppose that the category of difference can be experienced through perception and that it is philosophically more convenient to suppose that there is but one thing which through ignorance yields the various notions of difference than to suppose that there are in reality the infinite agreements of unity and difference just kanda. . Brahma-siddhi. is The to the ignorance (avidya) of the individual souls sort of ultimate reality that is described in the Upanisad due texts is is entirely different from all that as propounding this great truth. Niyoga- Mimamsa view that the Vedantic texts are to be interpreted in accordance with the Mimamsa canon of interpretation. But it is not necessary to enter into these details. as they are experienced in perception 1 In the third chapter of the Brahma-siddhi. It is aranyakopanisad-bhdsya-varttika.gt. works are the Naiskarmya-siddhi and Brhad- The Naiskarmya-siddhi has at commentaries. viz. Suresvara Suresvara least five s chief (A. difficult to determine Jnanottama s date. In the concluding verses of . called the Mandana reiterates the view that the chief import of the Upanisad texts consists in showing that the manifold world of appearance does not exist and that its mani festation (jlva). 800). this commentary the two names Satyabodha and Jnanottama occur and Mr Hiriyanna points out in his introduction to the Naiskarmyasiddhi that these two names also occur in the Sarvajna-pitha of Conjeeveram. as this discussion is not of much philosophical Mandana refutes the importance. ekasyaivdstu mahirnd yan ndneva prakdsate Idghavdn na tu bhinndndm yac cakdsaty abhinnavat. such as the Bhdva-tattva-prakasika by Citsukha.D. the Jaina view that unity and difference are both true in their own respective ways. to which he claims to have belonged as teacher and pupil. This Candrika is thus the earliest commentary on the Naiskarmya-siddhi. that the Upanisads are regarded as the only source from which knowledge of Brahman can be obtained. that Vedic texts imply either a command or a prohibition. But. called the . In the fourth chapter. we see around us. The main consists in this. n.

and all the time one has to perform on all one s obligatory duties. but through long and continuous meditation on the same. is. and so. comparatively recent date. Suresvara states a view attributed to Brahmadatta in the Vidya-$urabhi commentary. if one ceases to perform actions due to desire (kamya-karmd) and prohibited it is which have already accumulated will naturally exhaust themselves in time by yielding fruits. however. Avidya is The first here defined as the non-perception in one s experience of the ultimate oneness of the self: through this rebirths take place. deals with discussions regarding the relation of chapter Vedic duties to the attainment of Vedantic wisdom.xi] Suresvara 99 and according to the list of teachers of that Matha Jnanottama was the fourth from Sankara. the concluding verses are not his. As against this Mlmamsa view Suresvara maintains that emancipation has nothing to do with the performance of actions. if one ceased to perform them. one has to continue to meditate for a long time such ideas of identity. and since no actions. since Citsukha s commentary was based on Jnanottama s commentary Candrika. in the Vedas no injunction in favour of the attainment of right knowledge. the pupil of Uttamamrta. but in serted by someone else. then of course they give no clue to his date except the fact that he must have lived before Citsukha. 7-2 this . Suresvara s Naiskarmya-siddhi is divided into four chapters. that ignorance is not removed merely by the knowledge of the identity of oneself with Brahman. in the way of purifying one s mind. and the destruction of this ignorance which is emancipation (tannaso muktir atmanah). which is of . There the person will naturally be emanci however. since the obligatory duties do not produce any new karma. Performance of Vedic duties may have an indirect and remote bearing. So one should attain emancipation through the performance of the Vedic duties alone. pupil of Dasarathapriya and there is also another commentary. The Mlmamsists think that. called Sdrartha. since. by Ramadatta. So the of right apprehension of the Upanisadic passages on the identity the Brahman and the individual does not immediately produce salvation. Another commentary is the Vidya-surabhi of Jnanamrta. if. then the actions other new karmas accumulate. This would place Jnanottama at a very early date. but it has certainly no direct bearing on the attainment of salvation. as propounded in Vedanta texts. pated from karma. another is the Naiskarmya-siddhivivarana of Akhilatman.

. would be a transgression of one s duties and would naturally produce sins. as won through the proper interpretation of the unity texts of the Upanisads by a 1 The second See also Prof. and that. it is not possible that any duties can be performed at that stage.ioo The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. The Varttika refers to various schools among the adherents of the joint operation of knowledge and of duties (jnana-karma-samuccaya). who thought that reality was a unity in differences. and is there referred to by the commentator Anandajnana as being that of Mandana. when these texts are continually repeated. for the performance of duties implies 1 experience of duality and difference . So knowledge must be combined with the performance of duties (jnana-karma-samuccaya). but. others regarding karma as more im portant. that the conception of reality as based upon two considera being both unity and difference is self-contradictory. Suresvara s refutation of this view is tions. and hence one would not be able to obtain emancipation. it cannot of itself lead to Brahma-knowledge. because. thus giving rise to three different schools of jnanakarma-samuccaya. and that it does not in the least require the per formance of any kind of Vedic duties. Another view which occurs also in the Varttika. state. though true knowledge is also necessary for the realization of truth as unity. is that. which is vehemently opposed by Sankara. viz. and that. even in the emancipated state. duties have to be was performed even in the emancipated being also real. Suresvara also refutes the doctrine of the joint necessity of karma andjndna on the view of those modified dualists. when the oneness is realized through true knowledge and the sense of otherness and differences is removed. Hiriyanna s introduction to his edition of the Nai$karmya-siddhi. therefore. and still others regarding them both as being equally important. chapter of the Naiskarmya-siddhi is devoted to the exposition of the nature of self-realization. like Bhartrprapanca. some regarding jnana as being the more important. Suresvara tries to refute all these views by saying that true knowledge and emancipation are one and the same thing. they produce a knowledge of Brahman as a mysterious effect by just the same kind of process as gives rise to the mysterious effects of sacrificial or other Vedic duties. as the knowledge derived from the Vedantic texts is verbal and conceptual. so that the doctrine of differences as true as that of unity. the differences the necessity of duties cannot be ignored at any stage of progress.

a product of ajnana (nescience or ignorance). All manifestations of duality are due to the dis tracting effects of the antahkarana. however. vanish with the dawn of true self-knowledge of unity. When true knowledge dawns. being itself . due to the imposition of ajnana on which.xil Suresvara 101 all its proper teacher. when all its modifications and appearances shrink within it and it is ex in itself as pure ignorance. Thus it is that the whole of the world-appearance vanishes like the illusory as soon as truth is realized.. etc. the self two and the non-self. It is easy to . the itself into all that is and avidya based not upon individual persons (jlva). its and the manner of its dissolution. This worldappearance appearance is only a product of nescience (ajnana) or false and indescribable illusion on the self. which again in the waking perienced state manifests itself in the whole series of experiences. now the non-self. All the illusory appearances are self. It is this ignorance which. The notion of ego is a changeful and extraneous element. the consciousness remains undisturbed all the same. It is the antahkarana. cannot be regarded as its support or object so the ajnana has for its support and object the pure self or Brahman the ignorance of the self is also in regard to itself. but upon the pure intelligence itself. produces the appearances of individual persons and their subjective and objective experiences. cannot thereby disturb the unper turbed unity of this pure self. and hence outside the element of pure consciousness. This ajnana. and is no real product of any real substance as the Samkhya holds. unlike Vacaspati Misra and Mandana. intellect. according to Suresvara. the self together with all that is objectivity in knowledge vanishes. the pure the cognitive operations. underlying pure Yet this non-self which appears as mind. relation with the self. being connected and is based upon the pure self. is experienced in deep dreamless sleep. It is thus clear that objective. and its objects that suffers all modifications in is not a substantive entity is like the prakrti of the Samkhya . silver in the conch-shell In the third chapter Suresvara discusses the nature of ajnana. or the intellect. since there is no other object regarding which ignorance is the entire field of objective appearance being regarded possible . The experience of the ego and associated experiences of attachment. as mere ignorance. nature of the self that transforms It is the ignorance of the real subjective the intellect and its objects. antipathy. There are entities. for its due merely to ignorance and delusion. as the product of ignorance itself.

Only two works are possible attributed to him. being immediately and intimately related to category the pure intelligence. and since no facts are known that can contradict such a view. then. An objection is raised that. All this false experience. it is not to pronounce any judgment on them. however.this. and the objec tivity of the ego is not apparent. though and that which it is &quot. since the manner of his own salutation to Sahkaracarya confirms this tradition. To Suresvara replies that. viz.102 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. but it enter into these details. universally reputed to be a direct disciple of Sankaracarya. then the ego should have appeared not as a subject. category the and all that is associated with it is experienced as the in reality the ego is itself as much an object as the object. objects themselves. is destroyed Brahman. pleasure. is not useful for our present purposes to Padmapada Padmapada is (A. see that this view of the relation of ajnana to pure intelligence is different from the idealism preached by Mandana. There are many tradi tional stories about him and his relations with Sankaracarya but. in order to give the category of the ego (ahamkdra) is produced formed into the form of the external subjectivity to it. just as in burning wood the fire this category of the ego. in the realization of realized. which is a commentary on . if the ego were as much an extraneous product of ajnana as the so-called external objects. itself appears as the knower. it may safely be assumed that he was a younger contemporary of Sahkaracarya. 820). as associated with appears as subjective experience.). but as an object like this other external or internal objects (e. . pain. the Panca-pddika.D.g. The of the ego. etc. since their truth cannot be attested by reliable evidence. and then through the reflection of the pure intelligence by way of this category of the ego the objective experience. as noticed in the previous section. In the Varttika Suresvara discusses the very same problems in a much more elaborate manner. when the antahkarana or mind is trans objects.&quot. and. when Vedantic texts of unity are In the third chapter of the Naiskarmya-siddhi the central ideas of the other three chapters are recapitulated. to associate objective experiences with particular subjective centres. burns cannot be separated. It is only when the reflected through the ajnana product of the pure intelligence of the ego that the notion of subjectivity applies to it.

1529). z As Mr Telang points out in his introduction to the Mahd-vidya-vidambana. the author of the on the Sdnkara-bhdsya. a pupil of Anandagiri. Anandapurna (A. which is noticed below. . 1904). and Srikrsna also wrote one on the Panca-pddikd-vivarana. the pupil of Gopala SarasvatI and the pupil s pupil of Sivarama. 5 (Nirnaya-Sagara Press. and also wrote a metrical summary of Sankara s Bhdsya and a work abda-nirnaya. called also Vedanta-sara. in which he tried to prove the claims of scriptural testi mony as valid cognition. 1600). 1350).D. Jagannatha was the teacher of Nrsimhasrama. wrote a commentary on the Panca-padikd Nrsimhasrama also wrote a commentary on the Panca-pddikdvivarana. 586 (Chowkhamba). Govindananda must therefore have lived towards the end of the sixteenth century. refers in his Ratna-prabhd commentary commentary on the Sankara-bhdsya. . it seems that Anandapurna lived after Saiikara Misra (A. Vivarana-prameya-samgraha. for Ramananda s teacher Govindananda. wrote his Ratna-prabhd commentary Vivaranopanydsa (a summary of the main theses of the Vivarana) as a commentary on Sankara s Bhdsya\ but this was strictly on the lines of the Panca-pddikd-vivarana^ though it was not a direct SarasvatI. 1 Prakasatman called p. p. is one of the most important of the Vedanta works known to us. called thePanca-padikd-vivarana-prakasikd. who wrote his Vidya-sagari commentary on Sriharsa s Khandana-khanda-khadya and also a commentary on the 2 Mahd-vidyd-vidambana. as is seen from his criticism of his reading of a passage of the Khandana-khanda-khadya. and the Atma-bodha-vydkhydna. Aufrecht refers to another commentary by Amalananda as Panca-pddikd-sdstra-dar.wddhah&quot. pana but this is undoubtedly a mistake for his Sdstra-darpana.xi] Padmapdda s 103 Sankara commentary on the first four sutras of the Brahma-sutra and Sankara s introduction to his commentary known as the adhydsa and the sambhdvand-bhdsya. called also to Anandagiri s commentary as &quot.D 1 200) in his Panca-padika-vivarana 1 The Pancapddikd-vivarana was further commented on by Akhandananda (A. . . Vidyaranya called also wrote a separate monograph. This Panca-padikd. a pupil of Ramananda commentary thereon. Amalananda was a follower of the Vacaspati line and not of the line of Padmapada and Prakasatman.D.D. It was commented on by Prakasatman (A. Govindananda. in which he interpreted the Vedantic doctrines on the lines of the Panca-pddikd-vivarana. Of all these the Vivaranopanydsa of Ramananda SarasvatI was probably the last important work on the Vivarana line. Ramananda may to Jagannathasrama s the Bhdsya-dlpikd. in his Tattva-dlpana.

Govindananda himself his Ratna-prabhd commentary followed the Vivarana line of interpretation. the two powers of knowledge and activity (vijndna-kriyd-sakti-dvaydsraya) and functions as the doer of all it manifests itself as actions all experiences (kartrtva-bhoktrtvaikdIn association with the pure unchangeable light of Brah dhdrah). as interpreted by Prakas atman. It is through the association with this ego that the pure self is falsely regarded as the enjoyer of experiences. kdrana. It is this entity that obstructs the pure and independently self. therefore be placed in the early part of the seventeenth century. deeds (karma) and past impressions of knowledge (purva- read separately. while on the vibratory side of its activity (spanda-saktya). says that prajnd-samskdra) produce the individual persons (jlvatvdpddikd). ksara and akdsa are the terms which are used in older literature as Padmapada synonymous with avidyd. it is called prdna or biomotor functions. The asso its ciation of the ego with the pure dtman. standing as the painted canvas (citra-bhitti) of ignorance (avidyd). nidrd. mahdsupti. has been taken in the first and the second volumes of the present work as the guide to the exposition of the Vedanta. agrahana. tamah. On the question as to whether avidyd has for both support (dsraya) and object (visaya) Brahman Padmapada s own attitude does not seem to be very clear. lay a. is a complex (granthi) which manifests the dual characteristics of activity of the avidyd stuff and the consciousness of the pure self (sambhinnobhaya-rupatvdt). avyakta. avydkrta. p. like the association of the redness of zjapd flower with a crystal. s method of treatment. He only says that avidyd mani fests itself in the individual person (jlva) by obstructing the real nature of the Brahman as pure self-luminosity and that the . 3). and he refers to Prakasatman with great respect as Prakdsdtma-sri-caranaih (Ratna- prabhd.revealing nature of Brahman. manas. sakti. and thus. man it is the complex of these transformations which appears and the enjoyer of as the immediate ego (ahamkdra). Undergoing its peculiar transformations with God as its support. prakrti. But still a few words on Padmapada s philosophy may with advantage be may a. This transformation is called antahkarana. buddhi and the ego or the ego-feeler (aham-pratyayin) on the side of cognitive activity. It is not Padmapada therefore necessary that much should be said in separate sections re garding the Vedantic doctrines of these two great teachers.104 The Sankara School of Veddnta also in [CH.

as meaning that it is this material power of ajndna that is the constitutive or the material cause of the world-appearance.xi] Padmapdda 105 its limitation (avaccheda) through beginningless avidyd the cause of the appearance of infinite individual persons. as a result of that. as will be noticed. &quot. or psychical frame of mind. however. Prakasatman. can lead to the limited expression of the pure consciousness only so far as it is associated with its object. certain changes are produced in it. and it is these changes that constitute the subject-object relation of knowledge (jndturjneya-sambandhah). as a result of the cognitive activity of the ego. and have already been dealt with in the first volume of the present work. and inter preted Sankara s phrase mithya-jnana-nimittah&quot. Padmapada says that. all collected Describing this process. the objects with which that is con cerned become connected with it. viz. In this Prakasatman agrees with the view of Suresvara and his pupil some nice Sarvajnatman. though. Padmapada is also probably the first to attempt an explanation of the process of Vedantic perception which was later on elaborated by Prakasatman and later writers. The perceptual experience of immediacy (aparoksa) of objects means nothing more than the expression of the pure consciousness through the changing states of the antahkarana. But Prakasatman introduces a long discussion. These proofs have been repeatedly given by many other later writers. This is thus one of the fundamental points of difference between the Vivarana line of interpretation and the interpretation of the Vacaspati line. and. Sarvajnatman draws distinctions which are not noticed by Suresvara. trying to prove that is Brahman by Brahman is both the support and the object of avidyd as against the view of Vacaspati Misra that avidyd has the Brahman as its object and the jiva as its support (asraya). elaborates the conception further in his attempts to give proofs in support of the view that avidyd is something positive (bhdva-rupa). and his views were and systematized in the exposition of the Veddntaparibhdsd of Dharmaraja Adhvarmdra in the sixteenth century. The ego thus becomes a perceiver (pramdtf) through its connection . Padmapada draws a distinction between two meanings of false hood (mithya). Theantahkarana. falsehood as simple negation (apahnava-vacand) and falsehood as the unspeakable and indescribable (anirvacanlyatd-vacand). It is probably he who of all the interpreters first described ajndna or avidyd as being of a material nature (jaddtmika) and of the nature of a power (jaddtmika avidyd-sakti).

no immediate knowledge. 475. pp. On this point Prakasatman offers three alternative views. pp. Hence what Padmapada conceived merely as the change of the antahkarana states through the varying relation of the antahkarana with its objects. (2) that that which has maya as its power is the cause. The vada explained in the first doctrines of avaccheda-vada and pratibimbavolume of the present work are also s at least as old as Padmapada to Panca-padika. . the Brahman. Brahman is sarva-jna all (omniscient) in the sense that it manifests all that is associated with it.106 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. elab orates it by supposing that the antahkarana goes out to the objective spatial positions. and he was See volume I.D. Vacaspati Misra (A. viz. and (3) that the Brahman which has maya supported on it is the cause of the world. and both Padmapada and Prakasatman seem bimba-vada). 1 one of these views. Nyaya-varttika.gt. (i) that. Appaya Diksita gives a fairly good Vani summary of these two doctrines in the Parimala. as this is mediated through Knowledge however would mean both mediate and immediate knowledge for it is defined as being there is relations with the reason (lingo) . Vilasa Press. In inference. But gradually more and more attention seems to have been paid to them. since maya is these the ultimate causality rests with dependent thereon. 840). the manifestation of the object (artha-prakasa). the celebrated author of a commentary called Bhamation Sankara s commentary. like two twisted threads in a rope. and assumes the spatial form of the objects perceived. a commentary on Mandana s Brahma-siddhi\ he also commented on the Samkhya-karika. and it is the Brahman that through its maya appears as the world of experience. Vacaspati Misra. is the author of a Tattva-samiksa. . without committing either himself or Vacaspati to any in &quot. maya and Brahman are together the joint cause of the world. the cause of the world. Vidhi-viveka. Prakasatman. These two doctrines were probably present germinal forms as early as the ninth century. 476. however. Srirangam. the theory that the jiva support the reflection theory (pratiis but a reflected image of Brahman 1 . but in Brahman. is interpreted in the definite of this relation as being nothing more than spatial super meaning position of the antahkarana on its objects. On the subject of the causality of Brahman that that Padmapada on which the world-appearance is is says manifested. however. 335~343&amp. with the underlying consciousness.

refers to one Trilocana as being the teacher of Vacaspati. It is 3) however interesting he refers to the author of probability Jayanta) as his teacher (vidyd2 at the end of his Bhdmati commentary that Vacaspati says taru) he wrote that work when the great king Nrga was reigning. says that it is a Vedanta work. Aufrecht. Samkhya and Yoga. and con sequently he can safely be placed in A. i. In his Nydya-suclni- bandhahe gives his date as 898 (vasv-anka-vasu-vatsare). This all king. for in the colophon at the end of the Bhdmati he says that he had already written his Nydya-kanikd. which in all probability has to be understood as of the Vikrama-samvat. 842. p. a commentary on Vacaspati s Tdtparya-tlkd.D. Tattva-samlksd. 87. and the Mitaksara explains it as being the name of the god Karttikeya or Skanda. belong in ing to gods adored with a view to the fruition of one s actions.xi] Vdcaspati Misra 107 the author of a number of other works.siddhi). 4) knowledge (savikalpa) to note that in the Nydya-kanikd (verse the Nydya-mafijari (in . and Vardhamana in his commentary on : it. Nyaya-varttika-tatparya-tlkd. Tattva-bindu. 9). Bhdmati was Vacaspati s last great work. so far as the present writer is aware. Udayana. introductory verse. Nydya-kanikd. which has not been published. it is difficult to give an entirely satisfactory account of the In the absence of Vacaspati s special features of Vacaspati s 1 view of Vedanta. This is however a mistake. Benares. ajndna-timira-samanlm nydya-manjarlm rucirdm prasavitre prabhavitre vidyd-tarave namo gurave. I. and manuscripts of which have become extremely scarce. 294 as a god. Tattva-bindu and other works on Nyaya. But his Bhdmati trilocana-gurunnlta-mdrgdnugamanonmukhaih yathdmdnam yathd-vastu vydkhydtam idam tdrsam. as determinate 1 . Tilakasvamin is referred to in Yajnavalkya. and has nothing to do with Vedanta. Tattva-samlksd. in his Nydya-vdrttika-tdtparya-parisuddhi (p. 1898. which has been understood to refer to his teacher. referring to his work. The last work has not yet been published. But Amala- nanda commenting thereon rightly points out that this word is a compound of the two names Martanda and Tilakasvamin. i. has not yet been histori cally traced. however. as the work deals with the sphota doctrines of sound. con firms this Vacaspati himself also refers to Trilocanaguru. . whom he followed in interpreting the word vyavasdya (Nydya-sutra. called Nyaya-nibandha-prakasa. Vacaspati s Vedantic works are Bhdmati and Tattva-samlksd (on Brahma. In his commentary called Bhdmati he offers salutation to Martanda-tilaka-svamin.

The Bhdmatl commentary on Sankara s Bhasya is a very important one. The most important and earliest of these is the Vedanta-kalpa-taru of Amalananda (A. and were but reflections of his views. Thus he says in his commentary on the Sankara1 Amalananda also wrote another work. As to the method of Vacaspati s faithfully as commentary. towards the end of the seventeenth century. son of Kondaby Laksmmrsimha. keeping himself in the background and direct ing his great knowledge of the subject to the elucidation of the problems which directly arise from the texts and to explaining the allusions and contexts of thoughts. and it had a number of important sub-commentaries. in which. 1913 Srirangam. on which Appaya Diksita (about A. as the Naiyayikas hold. Madras. as Amalananda himself admits in the second verse of the Sdstra-darpana ( Vdcaspati-mati-vimbitam ddarsam prarabhe vimalam) Sri Vani Vilasa Press. Vacaspati defines truth and reality as immediate self-revelation (sva-prakasata) which is never contradicted (abddhitd). reveal any originality of views on the part of Amalananda. however. called Sdstra-darpana. . commentary is a great work. such as the Bhdmatl. . and it is possible to collect from it some of the main features of his views. 1600) 1 . In addition to these there are also largely inspired by the in many cases it differs Vedanta- from and other commentaries on the Bhamatl. wrote another The The Abhoga commentary criticizes is kalpa-taru-parimala. Only the pure self can be said to be in this sense ultimately real. the Bhdmati-vildsa. bhatta and grandson of Rangojl Bhatta. as psychological and as forming the material cause of the mind and the inner psychical nature of man or as the material world outside. and this commentary is called Abhoga. but were based on Vacas pati s interpretation.D. called the Veddnta-kalpa-taru-rnanjari. though it. taking the different topics (adhikaranas) of the Brahma-sutras he tried to give a plain and simple general explanation of the whole topic without entering into much discussion on the interpretations of the different sutras on the topic. 1247-1260). . the Bhdmati-vydkhya by Sriranganatha and another commentary on the Vedanta-kalpa-taru. commentary called Vedanta-kalpa taru-parimala Vedanta-kalpa-taru was also commented on author of the Tarka-dipika. He admits two kinds of ajndna. as the Buddhists hold. He thus definitely rejects the definition of reality as the participation of the class-concept of being. or capacity of doing work (artha-kriyd-kdritva). by Vaidyanatha Payagunda.tilaka.io8 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH.D. These general lectures on the adhikaranas of the Brahma-sutras did not. he always tries to explain the text as he can. objections and ideas of other schools of thought referred to in the text.

and abide there as potential capacities (suksmena sakti-rupena) together with the wrong impressions and psychological tendencies of illusion. their root cause. such as the psychical frame products pralayd) (antahkarand).xi] Vdcaspati Misra i. and says that all appearances originate from Brahman in association with or with the accessory cause (sahakdri-kdrana) of the two avidyds (avidyd-dvitaya-sacivasyd). When the state of mahd-pralaya is at an end. 30. In explaining this passage Amalananda points out that this refers to two avidyds. Though all creation takes place through God s will. In the very adoration hymn of the Bhdmati Vacaspati speaks of avidyd being twofold (avidyddvitaya). 109 the time of the great dissolution (mahaof avidyd. in. being associated with their tendencies and impressions. they assume their particular proper names and forms as of old before the mahd-pralaya. cease to have any functions of their own. at that time merged in the indescribable avidyd. Avidyd thus described resembles very much the prakrti of Yoga. into which all the world-products disappear during a mahd-pralaya together with the fivefold avidyd and their impressions. and then. the immediate and pure self-revelation (sva-prakdsd cit). and it is by such an illusory confusion that these psychical states . Each individual person (jlva) confuses and misapprehends his psychical frame and mental experiences as intelligent in themselves. This statement proves that he believed in avidyd as an objective entity of an indescribable nature (anirvdcyd which all world-products disappear during and out of which they reappear in the end mahd-pralaya become associated with psychological ignorance and wrong pressions which had also disappeared into it at the time of avidyd). one as a beginningless positive entity and the other as the preceding series of beginningless false impressions (anyd purvdpurva-bhrama- samskdrah). but bhdsya. they come out like the limbs of a tortoise or like the rejuvenation during rains of the bodies of frogs lifeless all which have remained inert and the year round. yet God s will is also determined by the conditions of karma and the impressions pro duced by it. There is thus one aspect of avidyd which forms the material stuff of the appearances but the appearances could not have been appearances if they were not illusorily identified with . which at the time of creation become associated with their own proper buddhis. into the and im the mahd-pralaya. moved by the will of God. that at all are not on account of that destroyed they are .

though they . whereby all the world-appearances seem to be manifes tations of reality 1 It is easy to see how this view differs from the view appearances to . and that another false confusion and so on in a beginningless series It is only through such a beginningless series of confusions come in. and it is illusions or confusions.no attain The Sankara School of Veddnta . So each false confusion has for its cause a previous false confusion. the ultimately real and self-revealing Being. Thus on the one hand the avidya operates in the individual person. the one for which the individual person is caused through a beginningless chain of where each succeeding illusory experience responsible. The illusory appearances. [CH. the Brahman is both the support (asrayd) and the object (visayd) of ajiiana. however. The content of the illusory experiences is also derived from the indescribable avidya. and it to is only such uncontradicted self-revelation that can be said to be differs 1 It is in the latter view that Vacaspati Brahma-siddhi he wrote his Tattva-samiksa. cannot be described as being existent or non-existent for. and on the other hand it or pure self-revealing intelligence as its object it obscures and through which it makes its false be expressed. but the pure intelli gence that shines through each individual person (pratyak-cit). Mandana). and that by another and so on. It is not the individual person as such (jlva). as has the (visaya). but is of a transcendental character. since the concept of a person it is confusion which . seem have their individual existences. is explained by a previous illusory mode of experience. from Mandana. as they are. any meaning as appearances for otherwise these appearances could not have been expressed at all. and none of them have that kind of reality which can be said to defy all negation and contradiction. In Vacaspati s view. of the Samksepa-sariraka of Sarvajnatma Muni. thereby giving them a false semblance of reality. on whose . the all its jiva. Brahman which locus or support (dsraya). for in the opinion of the latter. But how does the person itself presupposes the very supposed to make? To this Vacaspati s reply is that the appearance of the personality is due to a previous false confusion. that the later states of confusion are to be explained. which means that the illusion does not belong to the individual person. and that to another previous false confusion (cf. they are always negated by other existences. which is made to appear as real by their association with Brahman. that is both obscured and diversified into a manifold of appearances in a transcendental illusion is a psychological manner.

It is said that his other name was Nityabodhacarya. ii. and. the Brahman. The exact date of neither Suresvara nor Sarvajnatma can be definitely determined. So in spite of the fact that the appearances are made out of avidya. The external objects therefore are already existent outside of the perceiver. the direct at the beginning of his work Samk- sepa-sariraka he offers salutation by the name Devesvara. had they been so. 0. vddino nilddy-dkdrdm vittim abhyupagacchanti kintu anirvacaniyam nlladi). Muni was disciple of Sankara.xi] Sarvajnatma Muni in ultimately real. and they are not of the nature of pure sensations or ideas generated from within. without the aid of such external objects. As soon as this all Brahman is is appearances In the Bhamatl commentary on Sankara s commentary.900). he must have lived either in the seventh century or in the first half of the eighth century. Vacaspati points out that according to the Sankara Vedanta the objects of knowledge are themselves indescribable in their nature (anirvacaniyam nlladi) and not mere mental ideas (na hi brahma- realized. absolutely non-existent like a hare horn. and this identification does not come into conflict with anything else that is known about Sarvajnatma Muni either from the text of his work or from other references to him in general. the word being a synonym of the word sura in Suresvara. to whom a disciple of Suresvaracarya. The identification of Devesvara with Suresvara is made by Rama Tirtha. for the root of their illusory confusion with reality. Kumarila must have lived in the middle of the seventh century. only their nature and stuff are inde scribable and irrational (anirvacyd). the appearances vanish. the Brahman as their underlying ground. they could not have been experienced at all. Sarvajnatma Muni Sarvajnatma (A. they have so far s as any modified existence can be ascribed to them. since Sankara was a contemporary of Kumarila (on the testimony of the Sankara-dig-vijaya). since Bhavabhuti was a pupil of Kumarila. n. since. the commentator on the Samksepa-sariraka. In the . Mr Pandit in his introduction to the Gaudavaho expresses the view that. and it is for this reason that Brahman is to be regarded as the ultimate cause of the world. 28. The unreality of world-appearances consists in the fact that they are negated and contradicted and yet they are not . Our perceptions therefore refer always to such objects as their excitants or producers.

The pure self is directly in the state of dreamless sleep as being of the nature perceived object. very slender. 788. at the end of an act of the Malati-Madhava. This evidence. 226. written in verses It contains. This work. if one can infer this from the fact that Sankara does not make any reference to Kumarila. is of different metres. The arguments of Mr Pandit do not raise any new point for consideration. In his Samksepa-sarlraka he tries to describe the fundamental problems of the Vedanta philosophy. thereby producing the threefold appearances of God (Isvara). is as I have noticed elsewhere. Sarvajnatma Muni was thus probably a younger contemporary of Vacaspati Misra. This ajndna has no independent existence. is probably the only work of his divided into four chapters. 0.D. . 780-820. the supposition that Sarvajnatman lived in A. where. The ajndna. his high pontifical position for a long time. in the second 248. covers its real nature (dcchddya) creates delusory appearances (viksipati).842. it is said that the work was written by a pupil of Kumarila. in the third 365 and in the fourth 63. which that is known to us. should be given up 1 Taking the approximate date of Sankara s death to be about A.ii2 first The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. based as it is only on the testimony of the Sankara-digvijaya. this does not come into conflict with the fact that Vacaspati. and its effects are seen only through the pure self (cid-dtmari) as its ground and its creations are all false. cannot be seriously believed. occupied . Hence there seems to be no reason why the traditionally accepted view that Sankara was born in Samvat 844. or Kali age 3889. probably wrote his earlier work the Nyaya-sucl-nibandha in A. also wrote his commentary on Mandana s Brahma-siddhi who when Suresvara was occupying the pontifical position. 820 and taking into con sideration that Suresvara.D.D. All that can be said is that Kumarila probably lived not long before Sankara. In the first chapter of the work he maintains that pure Brahman is the ultimate cause of everything through the instrumentality (dvdra) of ajndna. in the first chapter 563 verses. the teacher of Sarvajnatman. and 1 See Arya-vidyd-sudhd-kara. volume of the present work Sankara was placed between A. pp. as explained by Sankara. or A. 227. which rests on (asrayd) the pure self and it as its object (visaya). The tradition that Sankara was a contemporary of Kumarila. His theory that Bhavabhuti was a pupil of Kumarila is based on the evidence of two manuscripts. More over.D. 900 may not be very far wrong. soul (jlva) and the operates on and world.

It is its of this similarity translucent character resembles pure Brahman. The intuitive perception of the seers of the Upanisads also confirms the truth of the self as pure bliss and the infinite. It is the above kind of double imposition of the false appearance on the object and of the false object on the false appearance that is known only the false object that appears ia the The inner illusory appearance and the real object lies untouched. there is no is A distinction reality at all. everything being false. becomes associated with the false silver as the &quot. always desires his self as the ultimate object of attainment which he loves above anything else.this silver. (in the case of the false appearance of a piece of conch-shell as silver) the &quot.this&quot. which cannot be regarded as being a means to anything else moreover. viz. element before the perceiver. such is also the pure self. frame (antahkarana) to a certain extent on account of psychical as parasparadhyasa. The illusory impositions on the other hand are limited appearances of the subject and the object which merely contribute to the possibility of false attribution and cannot therefore be real (na vastavam tat).I silvery character or the false appearance of the silver is associated &quot.xi] Sarvojndtma Muni 113 . and happiness without the slightest touch of sorrow and pure bliss can only be defined as that which is the ultimate end and not under any circumstances a means to anything else. drawn here between adhara and adhisthdna. with the &quot. Such an infinite love and such an ultimate end cannot be this limited self.this&quot. since this might lead to the criticism that. as some of the Buddhists contend. while the Brahman as modified by the false ajnana is a false adhara or a false object to which the false appearances directly refer. which is referred to as the agent of our ordinary actions and the sufferer in the daily concerns of life. the ajnana and the Brahman as asso ciated with the ajnana\ but this does not imply that the pure Brahman. But. the element in its &quot. When the Brahman is associated with ajnana there are two false entities. which underlies all these false associations. and the turn.this&quot. there is the fact that everyone of pure bliss . and on account it is often mistaken for the pure self and the pure . is itself also false. before the perceiver is false. of the true object of the conch-shell is not false. Thus in the experience pe-rceive this piece of silver&quot. The pure Brahman that underlies all appearances is the true adhisthana (ground).&quot. All illusory appearances are similarly experienced. though the objectivity of the false silver as the &quot. as the false object.this&quot.

may be contended that there could be no antahkarana without the illusory imposition. yet it is not separately seen.ii4 self is The Sankara School of Veddnta mistaken for the antahkarana. however. it also at its touch under certain circumstances The ajnana. and all that is seen to exist is the unreal silver. the antahkarana is itself the product of a previous imposition. though the world during the time of its ap to be the only existing thing and the Brahman is it. is the pure Brahman. but which has no share in the ultimate cause that underlies them. though it rests on the pure Brahman. and it is the true knowledge exists only for the ignorant. and so it could not itself explain the nature of illusion. any way the material cause of the world. existence and dis solution of the world is Brahman. He definitely denies that Brahman could be proved by any inference to the effect that that which is the cause of the production. melts away. again. but as that which can be independently and is amenable directly felt. according to the testimony of the Upanisads. The reply given to such an objection is that the illusory imposition and its conse quences are beginningless and there is no point of time to which one could assign its beginning. The real ground cause. like butter rupam) in contact with fire. The in its materiality and positive character of ajnana is felt in the world in ourselves as our ignorance. Truth again is defined not as that which to proof. and that of a previous antahkarana. Sarvajnatman strongly holds that Brahman in association and jointly with ajnana cannot be regarded as the material cause of the world. but. Hence. Just as though there is the piece of conch-shell actually existing. in the illusion of the silver in the conch-shell. only through the testimony of the Upanisads that this knowledge can dawn for there is no other means of insight into the nature of . yet. Yet this ajnana has It no and removed when can only be of Brahman dawns. He itself in indulges in long discussions in order to show how the Upanisads . The ajnana is only a secondary means. though the present illusion may be said to have taken its start with the antahkarana. and the ajnana is only the instrument or the means by which ajnana not being it can become the cause of all appearances . since the nature of Brahman can be understood only by the testimony of the scriptures. Brahman. so the real Brahman exists as the is felt pearance not felt to be existent separately from real existence ground. It [CH. is defined as being positive in its nature (bhavaand. and so on without a beginning. without which the transformation of appearances is indeed not possible.

He then tries to show He further clarifies his doctrine of the relation of Brahman to ajnana and points out that the association of ajnana is not with the one pure Brahman. Thus Nrsimhasrama wrote a commentary called Tattva-bodhini. . The Samksepa-sariraka was commented upon by a number of distinguished writers. He also shows how the experiences of waking life may be compared with those of dreams. for appears and is only in connection with this that the ajnana perceived. The second chapter of the book is devoted mainly to the further elucidation of these doctrines. none of whom seem to be very old. but the pure 1 every individual soul . as when one says. In the last chapter he describes the nature of emancipation and the attainment of Brahmahood. ndjndnam advayasamdsrayam istam evam nddvaita-vastu-visayam nisiteksandndm ndnanda-nitya-visaydsrayam istam etat pratyaktva-mdtra-visaydsrayatdnubhuteh. II. say . the ajnana &quot. which is not admitted by the Buddhists. in spite of the doctrine of illusion. In the third chapter Sarvajnatman describes the ways (sadhana) by which one should try to destroy this ajnana and prepare oneself for this result and for the final Brahma knowledge. perceived. In that chapter Sarvajnatma Muni tries to show the difference of the Vedanta view from the Buddhist. It is only Brahman as underlying the individual souls that the ajnana &quot. is not felt. and emancipation means nothing more than the destruction of the ajnana. but with the pure light of Brahman. I do not know what you so it is neither the individual soul nor the pure one which is is Brahman. Samksepa-sdrlraka. that neither perception nor other means of can prove the reality of the world-appearance and criticizes proof the philosophic views of the Samkhya. the Vedanta admits the ultimate reality to be Brahman. Raghavananda another called Vidyamrta-varsini. which shines as the basis and ground of individual souls (pratyaktva) . 211. which difference lies mainly in the fact that. Visvadeva another called Siddhanta-dipa. on which 1 Rama Tlrtha. nor with individual souls. Nyaya and other systems. Purusottama t)lksita wrote another called Subodhini. light as it reveals itself through each and The true light of Brahman is always there. pupil of Krsna Tirtha. When with the dawn of right knowledge it is pure Brahman as one in the light of is realized.xi] Sarvajnatma Muni 115 reality as can lead to a direct and immediate apprehension of Brahman.

also wrote commen taries on all the three works of Anandabodha. since difference cannot be perceived without perceiving both the object and all else from which it differs.D. called Samksepa-sarlrakasara-samgraha. Sarvajnatman the nature of self as pure bliss. Arguing on the fact that even the illusory supposition of an . for perception will naturally 1 Mr Anandabodha Tripathi in his introduction to Anandajnana s date as A. viz. imaginary diversity may Anandabodha tries to refute is is explain all appearances of diversity. Sukha Nyaya-makaranda-tika prakasa also wrote a commentary on the Ny ay a. Nyaya-makaranda. s viev&amp. the teacher of Anandajnana. It cannot be said that first the object is perceived and then the difference. a great name in the school of Sankara Vedanta. mentioning his name. Of these the Nyaya-makaranda was commented his pupil Sukhaprakasa in works called and Nyaya-makaranda-vivecanl. but without . p.n6 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. Having refuted the plurality of subjects in his own way. Nyaya-dipdvali and Pramana-mald. Anandabodha Anandabodha is Yati. . Anandabodha does not pretend to have made any original contribution and says that he collected his materials from other works which existed in his upon by Citsukha and time 2 . He starts his Nyaya-makaranda with the thesis that the apparent difference of different selves is false. 1200. Nyaya-makaranda. He holds that difference (bheda) cannot be perceived by sense-perception. 359. Madhusudana Sarasvati also wrote another commentary. Anubhutisvarupa Acarya (late thir teenth century). the argument of the Samkhya-karika that the diversity of souls and death of some there proved by the fact that with the birth not birth or death of others. since not only do the Upanisads hold this doctrine. s Tarka-samgraha gives Ndnd-nibandha-kusuma-prabhavdvaddtanydydpadesa-makaranda-kadamba esa. based his commentary Anvayartha-prakasika. he turns to the refutation of plurality of objects. of the interpretation of at least three He wrote works on Sankara Vedanta. but it is also intelligible on grounds of reason that the apparent multiplicity of selves can be explained on an imaginary supposition of diversity (kalpanikapurusa-bheda) even though in reality there is but one soul.dip avail.gt. called Nyaya-dipavali-tatparya-tika. He lived probably in the eleventh or the twelfth century 1 He refers to Vacaspati s Tattva-samiksa and criticizes.

again.. etc. being negative in their nature. however.the difference of the jug from the pillar. Whether differ is taken as a subject or a predicate in the form &quot. He points out that the variety and multiplicity of why world-appearance cannot be explained without the assumption of a cause which forms its substance. Since this world-appearance is unreal. and supports the anirva1 In this connection he records his view as to canlya theory of error nescience (avidya) has to be admitted as the cause of worldappearance. when two sensibles are perceived at two different points of time. be said that the perception of any sensible. x. Nor is it possible that. Mlmamsa. on the which the category of difference is realized. pp. all differences. right to hold that all positive entities are of the nature of differences .the jug is different from the pillar. Nydya-makaranda. and there would thus be a vicious infinite. Buddhism. and there no way . the red. it must have for its cause something which is neither real nor 2 unreal. hence. It is not. ch. etc. The negation of the difference of an entity does not mean anything more than the actual position of it. involves with it the per ception of all that is not blue. since such a thing evidently could not be the cause of anything. nor can it of something absolutely non-existent and unreal. the white. 122. discusses the different theories of error held by the Nyaya. basis of Anandabodha then . in which can operate for the comprehension of difference neither can it be held that the comprehension of difference can in any way be regarded as simultaneous with the perception of the sensibles. and the neither-real-nor-unreal entity is avidya come out . p. then to comprehend their differences further differences would be required. It cannot.xi] Anandabodha Yati its 117 is cease with awareness of it object.&quot. . the yellow. say blue.&quot. there could be any way in which their difference could be perceived. 1 2 See the first volume of the present work. cannot be regarded as capable of being perceived as positive sensibles. for this is directly against experience. or &quot. since the cause of world-appearance cannot be either real or unreal. If differences are perceived as positive entities. for in that case the perception of any sensible would involve the perception of all other objects of the world. 485. it cannot come out of a substance that is real. Moreover. for the two sensibles cannot be perceived at one and the same time. in either case there is comprehension of an earlier and ence more primitive difference between the two objects. 123.

Moreover. It is a small work of about twenty-five pages. he justifies the view of its being supported on Brahman. as is well illustrated by the writings . But this to the Buddhists. of the nature of pure consciousness (dtmanah samvid-rupatva). In his Nyaya-dipavali he tries by inference to prove the falsity of the world-appearance on the analogy of the falsity of the illusory silver. the Advaita-siddhi. His method of treatment is more or less the same as the treatment in the Advaitasiddhi of is Madhusudana Sarasvati at a much later period. and secondly. Maha-vidya and the Development of Logical Formalism.n8 He The Sankara School of Veddnta next proceeds to prove the doctrine that the self is [CH. and these were again refuted by Madhusudana s great work. i. being neither negative nor positive. how could one note the difference between one awareness and another. since all relations are of the nature of avidya and there cannot be any omni science without a knowledge of the relations. Brahman can only be regarded as omniscient in its association with avidya. The Naiyayikas had adopted these methods. The Buddhists had taken to the use of the dialectic method was by no means limited also of logical discussions even from the time of Nagarjuna. Vyasatirtha of the Madhva school of Vedanta collected most of the standard Vedanta arguments from Anandabodha and Prakasatman for re futation in his Nydydmrta. between blue and yellow? Referring to avidya.e. there can be no objection to its being regarded as supported on Brahman. The history of this controversy will be dealt with in the third volume of the present work. being indefinable in its nature. This he does. and these refuted in Most of Anandabodha later writers of the their turn in Rama Tirtha s Nyayamrta-tarangini. because avidya. There practically nothing new in his Pramdna-mdld. there is still the unvarying consciousness which continues the same even when there is no object. If there were only the series of awarenesses arising and ceasing and if there were constant and persistent awarenesses abiding all the time. by stating the view that awareness in revealing itself reveals also immediately its objects. by arguing that even though objects of awareness may be varying. borrowed by the s arguments were Vedanta school. and one can recognize here the argu ments of the Nydya-makaranda in a somewhat different form and with a different emphasis. firstly.

There is practically no reference to this 1 . such as Raghunatha.D. 1260).D. pp. Chowkhamba 2 edition. etc. evam sarvd mahavidyds tacchdyd vdnye prayogdh khandanlyd hi.xi] Mahd-vidya and Development of Logical Formalism 119 of Vatsyayana. Mathuranatha Bhattacarya and Gadadhara Bhattacarya. . 1 gandhe gandhantara-prasanjika na ca yuktir asti tadastitve va kd no hdnih tasyd apy asmdbhih khandanlyatvdt. viz. p. Gaekwad s Oriental Series. It is generally believed that such methods of overstrained logical formalism were first started by Gangesa Upadhyaya steadily truth seems to be that this of Mithila early in the thirteenth century. Sankara himself had utilized this method in the refutation of sophy. of inference. though these writers largely adopted the dialectic methods of Nagarjuna s arguments. Jagadisa and others. 486-491. p. Also Vehkata s Nydya-parisuddhi. 1450) and others probably some time in the eleventh century. R. One notable instance of it is the formu lation of the maha-vidya modes of syllogism by Kularka Pandita in the eleventh century. Citsukha Acarya s Tattva-pradlpikd p. Jagadisa Bhattacarya. Vaisesika and other systems of Indian philo But. in their discussions on the nature of kevalanvayi types (A. But the method of logical formalism was growing among certain writers from as early as the tenth and eleventh centuries. i iSy) References to this syllogism are found in the writings of Citsukha Acarya called also Vyasasrama (A. and Tattva-muktd-kaldpa with Sarvdrtha-siddhi.D. 13. also p. 304 (Benares. 2 The maha-vidya syllogisms were started (A. Mr M. 1369).D. 1220). there seems to be little attempt on their part to develop the purely formal side of Nagarjuna s logical arguments. 125. The commentator Pratyagrupa-bhagavan mentions Kularka Pandita by name. Amalananda.D. Buddhistic. maha-vidya syllogism earlier than Srlharsa (A. t . etc. Vacaspati. Venkata (A. Amalananda s Veddnta-kalpa-taru. . 126. Udayana and others. Jaina.D. 304. 22. 485. Uddyotakara. sarvdsv eva mahdvidydsu. Sesa Sarngadhara Anandajnana (A. and they continued to be referred to or refuted by writers till the fifteenth century. Telang has collected all the above references to mahd-vidyd in his introduction to the Mahd-vidyd-vidambana. ^riharsa s Khandana-khanda-khddya. Baroda. 1247). . 273-276. 1 1 8 1 .. 478. 1920. pp. 1895). the attempt to formulate definitions with the strictest formal rigour and to offer criticisms with that over emphasis of formalism and scholasticism which attained their cul mination in the writings of later Nyaya writers such as Raghunatha Siromani. Anandaj Sana s Tarka-samgraha. though it is curious to notice that they were not mentioned by Gangesa or any of his followers. p. athavd ayam ghatah etadghatdnyatve sati vedyatvdnadhikarandnya-paddrhatvdt patavad ity-ddimahdvidyd-prayogair apt vedyatva-siddhir apy uhanlyd.

Mahd-vidyd modes were special modes of syllogism. and refuted from the eleventh century It is well Kumarila to the sixteenth century. Recently two different com mentaries have been discovered on mahd-vidyd^ by Purusottamavana and Purnaprajna. flourished in the eleventh century. such as Bhatta and his followers. they would have other kinds of application for the proving or disproving and doctrines. while the followers of the Nyaya and Vaisesika. . called also Yaugacaryas. But the kevaldn probandum and vayi form of inference which is admitted by the Naiyayikas applies to those cases where the probandum is so universal that there is no case where it is absent. Telang s introduction to the Mahd-vidyd-vidambana. regarded sound as non-eternal (anityd).The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. the founder of mahd-vidyd syllogisms. Assuming that Kularka Pandita. Venkata in his Nydya-parisuddhi refers to the Mahd-vidyd. Not only does Vadindra refer arguments of previous writers in support of mahd-vidyd and it in his Mahd-vidyd-vidambana. In all probability mahd-vidyd syllogisms were first started by Kularka Pandita in his Dasa-sloki-mahd-vidyd-sutra containing sixteen different types of definitions for sixteen different types of mahd-vidyd syllogisms. If these also modes of syllogism could be regarded as valid. but Bhuvanasundara Suri also in his commentary on the Mahd-vidyd-vidambana refers to other critics of mahd-vidyd. Ordinarily concomitance (vydpti) con sists in the existence of the reason (hetu) in association with the its non-existence in all places where the probandum is absent (sddhydbhdvavad-avrttitvam). it may well be suggested that many other writers had written on this subject before Vadindra refuted them in the first quarter of the thirteenth century. and Srinivasa in his commentary Nydya-sdra on the Nydya-pari suddhi describes them as works which deal with roundabout to the in refutation of 1 This shows that for four or five syllogisms (vakrdnumdna) centuries mahd-vidyd syllogisms were in certain quarters supported . believed in the doctrine of the known eternity of sounds. R. that the great Mimamsa writers. the Mdna-manohara and the Pramdna-manjarl. invented prob ably by Kularka Pandita for refuting the Mimamsa arguments of the eternity of sounds and proving the non-eternity of sounds. The special feature of the mahd- of other theories vidyd syllogisms consisted in their attempt to prove a thesis by the kevaldnvayi method. and consequently it cannot have a reason (hetu) whose concomitance with it can be determined by 1 See M.

other possible alternatives being ruled out. Thus in the proposition. a typical mahdof knowability relations of all dissociated from the and non -eternal qualities of all other objects excepting . (meyatva) as such the eternal may be understood by following Thus it is said that by reason self.nonsubject in that eternity &quot. vayini vydpake pravartamdno hetnh) exists in a . &quot. a reason which in a subject (paksa) without failure (proposition i) proves (sddhayati). namely.g. by virtue of the fact. it was not easy to criticize them by pointing out defects or lapses of concomitance of the reason and the probandum. as no negative instances are available in their case. In order to make it possible that a kevalanvayi form of syllogism should be applicable for affirming the non-eternity of sound. which is generally sought to be the direct method of agreement and difference (pro position 3).to proved by the subject &quot. In other words. that such an unfailing existence of that probandum in that probandum inseparably abiding way is only possible under one supposition (pro position 2). the affirmation of another probandum in another subject (e.sound&quot. both the pro bandum and the reason are so universal that there is no case where cases existence in cases by negative instances. It is this indirect approach of inference that has been by their concomitance can be tested of maha-vidya styled roundabout syllogism. This vidyd syllogism. Maha-vidya were forms of kevalanvayi inference of this type. the affirmation of the probandum &quot. that. visesam vddy-abhimatam sadhayati) is proved by the necessary impli cation of the existence of a particular probandum in a particular subject (z^paksevydpaka-pratltya-paryavasdna-baldt). affirmed by the existence of hetu in the subject on kevalanvayi lines (i kevaldn. Kularka tried to formulate propositions in sixteen different ways so that on kevalanvayi lines such an affirmation might be made about a subject that by virtue of it the non-eternity of sound should follow necessarily as the only consequence. they being kevalanvayi forms of syllogism.).xi] its its Mahd-vidyd and Development of Logical Formalism non-existence in all all 1 21 where the probandum is absent and where the probandum is present. and syllogisms there were sixteen different varieties of it which had this advantage associated with them. Thus maha-vidya has been defined as that method of syllogism by which a specific probandum which it is desired to prove by the joint method of agreement and difference (3 anvaya-vyatireki-sddhya- the critics .This is describable or nameable (idam abhidheyani) because it is knowable (prameyatvat)&quot.

as they are all formed on the same principle with slight variations. Vadindra in his Mahd-vidyd-vidambana refuted these types of syllogism as false. such a non-eternal relation of the self to sound may be their mutual difference or their mutual negation (anyonydbhdva) Now. and the consequence is that it is left only with some kind of non-eternal quality in relation with sound.&quot. and in the concluding verse of his work refers to Yoglsvara as his preceptor. since all other non-eternal . The above epithets of Harakinkara. y . &quot. for the self indirect is sound is itself This incontestably and roundabout method of syllogism is known as mahavidyd. may have to other eternal objects. was Mahadeva. then. relations that the self may have to it and all other eternal relations that other non-eternal objects. refers to him by the name Mahadeva. Vadlndra s real name. have already been taken out of consideration by the qualifying phrase. related to a non-eternal entity (dtmd sabdetardnitya-nitya. viz. then this viz. etc. Vadindra styles himself in the colophon at the end of the first chapter of as eternal.i22 The Sankara School of Veddnta is [CH. if the self. in the absence of any negative instances. if it has a non-eternal quality in relation to sound. known Mahd-vidyd-vidambana Hara-kinkara-nyay deary a-paramapandita-bhatta-vddindra. non-eternal. as this was left out of consideration in the qualifying adjunct. that can be so only under one supposition. and all other such relations that it may have to all eternal and non-eternal objects jointly. and it is not known that any one else tried to revive them by refuting Vadlndra s criticisms. that sound is non-eternal. his &quot. has such a non-eternal quality incontestably or relation to sound. But. then this can only be under one supposition. Mr Telang points out in his introduction to the Mahd-vidydvidambana that his pupil Bhatta Raghava in his commentary on Bhasarvajna s Nydya-sdra called Nydya-sdra-vicdra. is in relation to sound. sound. which did not take sound within also its purview. which is admitted to be eternal. the in separable and unfailing non-eternal quality that the self may have. but. nyay deary a. except sound. Since many relations are on the Nyaya view treated as qualities. do not show however what his real name was. yavrttitvdnadhikarandnitya-vrtti-dharmavdn meyatvdd ghatavat) Now by the qualifying adjunct of self the self is dissociated from all qualities that it shares with all other eternal and non-eternal objects excepting sound. It is needless to multiply examples to illustrate all the sixteen types of propositions of maha-vidya syllogism.

. 1400). . Vadlndra s Maha-vidya-vidambana has two commentaries. Bhatta Raghava says that name of Vadlndra s father was Saranga. since he was a pupil of Vadlndra. Bhatta Raghava gives his own date in the Saka era The sentence however is liable to two dif ferent constructions. on a Maha-vidya-dasasloki-vivarana by an unknown author. viz. In addition to these Bhuvanasundara Suri also wrote a small work called the Laghu-maha-vidyd-vidam- bana and a commentary. first chapter he gives an exposition of the maha-vidya syllogisms the second and third chapters are devoted to the refutation of these syllo gisms.D.D. 1210-1247. A. one called Maha-vidya-vidambana-vyakhyana. mahd-vidya. It is difficult to prove that any as follows : particular quality should exist everywhere and that there should not be any instance or case where it does not occur.D.xi] Maha-vidyd and Development of Logical Formalism 123 and the rest of the epithets were his titles. hetu there would be great scope for fallacies of self-contradiction (sva-vydghdta) and fallacies of illicit distribution of the middle term (anaikdntikatva) and the like. viz. 1252 and 1352. Mr Telang suggests that we A. by Bhuvanasundara Suri (A. 975-1025). Telang Vadlndra. Mr Telang points out that such a date would agree with the view that he was a religious counsellor of King Srlsimha. 1225. But.D.D. judging from the fact that Vadlndra was a religious coun sellor of King Srisimha (also called Siiighana) who reigned in Devagiri A. who refers to his Maha-vidya-vidambana. The main points of Vadlndra s criticisms may briefly be stated He says that it is not possible that there should be a reason (hetu) which has no negative instances (kevaldnvayiproper hetor eva nirvaktum asakyatvat). 984) and Sivaditya Misra also refers to two other works of that he must have written other works in refutation of Vadlndra s Maha-vidya-vidambana consists of three chapters. and that in all probability he lived before Venkata (A. He also shows how all these fallacies apply to all the mahd-vidyd syllogisms invented by Kularka Pandita.D.D. called Vyakhyana-dipika. the . should take A. 1267-1369). 1252 to be the date of Bhatta Raghava and. by Anandapurna (A. D. Rasa-sara and Kandda-sutra-nibandha. Vadlndra refers to Udayana (A. and argues from allusions contained in Vadlndra s Maha-vidya-vidambana Mr (A. and the other. In the .D. one may deduct about 27 years from his date and fix Vadlndra s date as . In the third chapter he shows that not only is it not possible to have kevaldnvayi but that even in arguments on the basis of such kevaldnvayi hetus. giving us two different dates. 1600). Maha-vidya-vivarana-tippana.

But the school of abstract and dry formalism may be said to have properly begun with Kularka Pandita. of this new Citsukha of about A. ninth and tenth centuries one notices a steady development on this side in the works of prominent Nyaya writers such as Vatsyayana. which is so essential for the development of true philo- . the great writers school of logic (navya-nydya). 1220 (of whom Vadlndra was a contem porary). which may be regarded as a new on turning point after vydpti. Aryadeva and others in the third and the fourth centuries and their later successors in the fifth.124 The Sankara School oj Vedanta [CH. who with the subtleties of his acute mind by the introduction new concepts of avacchedakata. our present purposes to enter into any elaborate discussion of Vadlndra. and to have been carried on in the works of a number of other writers. or the authors of the Mdna-manohara and Pramdna-manjarl in the latter part of the eleventh century. but had already come into fashion a few centuries before him. It will thus be seen that the fashion of emphasizing the em ployment of logical formalism as a method in philosophy was inherited by the Naiyayikas and Vedantists alike from Buddhists like Nagarjuna. Vacaspati Misra and Udayana and Vedantic authors such as the great master Sankaracarya. sixth and seventh centuries. This work was further carried extremely elaborately by his later successors. Raghunatha Siromani. for the present digression on logical maha-vidyd syllogisms is introduced here only to show that It is needless for were not first introduced by Sriharsa.D. Jagadisa Bhattacarya.D.D. Vacaspati Misra and Anandabodha Yati. Gadadhara Bhattacarya and others. On the Vedanta side this formalism was carried on by Sriharsa (A. though Sriharsa was undoubtedly the most prominent of those who sought to apply these scholastic methods in philosophy. Uddyotakara. scholastic logicisms until we come it enlivened of the to Gaiigesa of the early thirteenth century. 1 187). But during the eighth. 1 260 and through a number of minor writers until we come to Nrsimhasrama and Madhusudana Sarasvati of the seventeenth century. Anandaj nana or Anandagiri of about A. who began to direct their entire attention to a perfecting of their definitions and discussions on strict lines of formal accuracy and preciseness to the utter neglect of the collection of new data. new experiences or the investigation of new problems or new lines of enquiry. It may be surmised that formal criticisms of Sriharsa were probably largely responsible for a new awakening in the Naiyayikas.

Benares. Parallel to this a new force was gradually growing during these centuries in the writings of Ramanuja and his followers. and in the succeeding centuries the followers of Madhva. began Sankara school) very strongly. But. Criticisms became for the most part nothing more than Nyaya and Vaisesika definitions. Laksanavall and therefore must have flourished after him. Mimamsists and Naiyayikas were based largely on the analysis of experience from the Vedantic standpoint and its general approach to philosophy. A history of this controversy will be given in the third and fourth volumes of the present work.D. Udayana. and points of view Vedanta Dialectic of Snharsa (A. 1900. when once they started perfecting the purely logical appliances and began to employ them successfully in debates. p. the great Vaisnava writer. the great logician Garigesa of Mithila refers to Srlharsa and refutes his tarkdmbardnka(go6)pramitesv atltesu sakdntatah varsesudayanas cakre subodhdm laksandvallm. Srlharsa flourished probably during the middle of the twelfth century A. Thus in the growth of system of thought tenth and eleventh at its the history of the dialectic of logical formalism in the Vedanta it is found that during the eighth. Laksanavall.xi] Veddnta Dialectic of Snharsa 125 sophy. with utter creations in philosophy. . 72. it became essential for all Vedantists also to master the ways of this new formalism neglect of new for the defence of their old views. But in the twelfth and the thirteenth centuries the controversy was largely with the Nyaya and Vaisesika and dominated by considerations of logical formalism above every criticisms of thing else. Surendralal Gosvamin s edition. though the Vaisnavas brought in many new con to criticize the Vedantists (of the It is siderations formalism in philosophy. the method of logical never lost its high place in dialectic discussions. 1150). as is evident from the colophon of his Srlharsa often refutes the definitions of Udayana. ninth. But the method of logical formalism had attained such an importance by this time that. Again.D. centuries the element of formalism was lowest and the controversies of the Vedanta with the Buddhists. the great Nyaya writer. lived towards the end of the tenth century. found therefore that from the thirteenth or fourteenth century the Vedantic attack was largely directed against the followers of Ramanuja and Madhva. 1 .

who was dethroned in A. varnana. in which he attempts to refute all defini tions of the Nyaya system intended to justify the reality of the categories of experience and tries to show that the world and all world-experiences are purely phenomenal and have no reality behind them. Prakdsa by Vardhamana. At least one refutation of it was attempted by the Naiyayikas. 1195.D. Kharidana-mandana by Paramananda. Vidyd-sdgarl by Vidyasagara. Sthairya-vicarana.e. Gaudorvisa-kula-prasasti. as is evidenced by the work of a later Vacaspati (A. and cannot be associated with Jayacandra. Vijayaprasasti. e. lived before that date. 1914. Chandah-prasasti. Khandana-mandana by Bhavanatha. i. he wrote a work eulogizing the race of the kings of Gauda leads one to suspect that he may have been one of the five Brahmans invited by Adisura of Bengal from Kanauj in the early part of the eleventh century. Several commentaries have been written on this celebrated work by various people. Vidydbharanl by Vidyabharana. such as Arnava- the King of . and also Isvarabhisandhi and Pancanallya kavya 2 The fact that . Khandana-khanda-khddya. p. 1200.g.the sweets of refutation&quot. Khandana-kuthdra by Gokulanatha Upadhyaya. between the tenth and twelfth centuries At the end of his book he refers to himself as honoured by Kanauj (Kanyakubjesvard). i.126 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH.). 1350) from Bengal. of these however are available. Benares.e. Khandana-tlkd by Padmanabha Pandita. Didhiti by Raghunatha Siromani. King of Kasi or . Ananda-vardhana by Sankara Misra. H95 1 the end of the several chapters many works of his. and before Garigesa. views. . Khandana-mahd-tarka by Caritrasimha. Khandana-khandana by Pragalbha Misra. Srlharsa at the end of this work speaks of having purposely made it ex tremely knotty here and there. called Khandanoddhdra. which holds that commentary on the Khandana-khanda-hhddya. Srlharsa must have Accordingly Srlharsa was after Udayana A. Siva-sakti-siddhi. consciousness 3 1 His polemic in his Anandapurna Benares. who was dethroned about king may In his poetical work Naisadha-carita he mentions at A.D. called Khandana-phakkika. since Gahgesa lived in A.D. sraddhdrdddha-guruh slathikrta-drdha-granthih samdsddayat tv etat-tarkarasormmi-majjana sukhe$v dsanjanam sajjanah. 1341. Sisya-hitaisinl by Padmanabha.D. so that no one could understand its difficulties easily except when explained by the teacher. $rl-darpana by ^ubhaiikara. explains Kanyakubjesvara as Kaslraja. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Book Depot. Thus he says grantha-granthir iha kvacit kvacid api nydsi prayatndn mayd 3 : z None prdjiiammanya-mand hathena pathitlmdsmin khalah khelatu. The only reality is the self-luminous Brahman of pure is against the Nyaya.D. Sriharsa s most important philo sophical contribution was the Khandana-khanda-khadya (lit. and. &quot. in which case Srlharsa would have to be placed at that time. Nava-sahasanka-carita. It is probable that this be Jayacandra of Kanauj.

nihilists are interested in the refutation of all definitions and therefore his dialectic . though his chief polemic is against the Nyaya. and the as such. . Chowkhamba Sanskrit Book Depot. since his criticisms are almost wholly of a destructive nature like those of Nagarjuna. yet. it necessarily follows that there can be no definitions. or. no less effectively against any other system. (sad-asadbhyam vilaksanam) and is unreal This indefinableness is in the nature of all things in the world and all experiences (meya. p. and no amount of in genuity or scholarship can succeed in defining the nature of that which has no definable nature or existence. Benares. 1914. not even excepting cognitions (vijnand) while the Vedanta makes an excep tion of cognitions and holds that all the world. : buddhyd vivicyamdndndm svabhdvo ndvadhdryate ato nirabhilapyds te nissvabhdvds ca desitdh. etc. and Srlharsa s prove that all that is known is indefinable and unreal. Otani University Press. that ho definitions of the phenomenal world are possible Naiyayika. if no and that the world of phenomena and 1 all our so-called experiences and says: Sriharsa himself admits the similarity of his criticisms to those of Nagarjuna tathd hi yadi darsanesu sunya-vdddnirvacanlya-paksayor dsrayanam tada tdvad amudm nir-bddhaiva sarva-pathlnatd&quot. from which he quotes the following verse &quot. they could be used. being only of a phenomenal nature and having only a relative existence based on practical modes of acceptance. in other words. with modifications.xi] Veddnta Dialectic of Sriharsa is 127 whatever known is has a well-defined real existence. Khandana-khandakhddya. The difference of the Vedanta from the idealistic Buddhists consists in this. z By the idealistic Buddhists Srlhars? here means the idealism of the Lankdvatdra. would be valid against all views and definitions of other systems 1 He starts with the proposition that none of our awarenesses ever stand in need of being further known or are capable of being the objects of any further act of knowledge. Sriharsa undertakes to show all definitions of things or categories put forward by the writers are absolutely hollow and faulty even according to Nyaya the canons of logical discussions and definitions accepted by the that definition can stand or be supported. 2 svabhavanugaminyam anirvacaniyata). and. 287. But. is indefinable either as existent or non-existent . 229-230. 1923. Those who criticize with the object of establishing positive definitions would object only to certain definitions or views of other schools but both Sriharsa . that the latter hold that everything is unreal and indefinable. customs and to main point conventions. pp. excepting knowledge or awareness. Lankdvatdra-sutra.

however. unless the opponents are successful in defending their own positions against the attacks of the Vedanta. This. since. then the such realization is right knowledge (prama) is is a right idea. this right idea is to be regarded as valid proof. however. it is regarded by the Vedantist as true and hence the Vedantist may be called upon to prove that the way in which or the means of proof through which he came to have his idea was true. if the idea were not realized. so that the Vedantic argu ments in refuting their position would be effective. For Sriharsa does not believe in of the world proved. and so. Regarding the proof that may be demanded of the ultimate oneness Sriharsa says that the very demand proves that the idea of ultimate oneness already exists. one cannot legitimately ask the Vedantist to adduce any proofs to demonstrate what is false. says that the arguments of Sriharsa are open to the same objection and are not true. If anyone. out what is true resorting to the reality of his arguments and enters into them without any assumption of their reality or unreality. So the Vedantist can say that the unreality It is useless for . whatever may have produced it. and these further employment of the pramanas and so on until we have vicious infinite regress. and the that employment of the pramanas would require further arguments. . though the Naiyayika considers it false. if it is admitted that the idea of absolute oneness question arises whether or error (aprama). however. the Vedantist would readily deny for. this would mean that the opponents reject their own canons. It can be contended it is not possible to argue without first admitting the reality of the arguments. If it realized (pratlta).128 of it The Sankara School of Veddnta are indefinable. It may be urged that. any one to attempt to find arguments for the arguments can by be proved to be false even by the canons on which they are based. So the manifold world of our experience is indefinable. the very arguments accordance with the canons of the opponents to destroy their definitions be regarded as false. Now. no one could think of asking for a proof of it. and the one Brahman is absolutely and ultimately real. the Vedanta point of view is not refuted. in employed If. even though the idea of the absolute oneness may . then. is [CH. then that would only establish his own contention. If such an idea is false. But such reality cannot be established without first employing the pramanas or valid means of proof. is here interested only in destroying the definitions The Vedanta and positions of the opponents.

xi] Vedanta Dialectic of Srlharsa right.many. inferences by themselves cannot stand alone or contradict the non-duality taught in the Upanisads. present. Perception applies to the experience of the immediate present and is therefore not competent to contradict the universal proposition of the oneness of all things.revelation of knowledge also fails to show its difference from all objects of the world. or difference as being of the nature of the objects which are differenced if that were the case. as a result of our pro gressive and better knowledge of things. There may be a fire on a hill but yet. may better here be dropped. If perception cannot prove anything. Leaving aside the discussion of the propriety of such demands on the part of the opponents. as Sriharsa says. from ourselves. is not contradicted by any other. the Vedantist says that the Upanisadic texts demonstrate the truth of the ultimate oneness of reality. The ultimate oneness of all things. taught in the Upanisad texts. even though the idea of the fire may itself be right. moment and therefore cannot apply to all things of the past. an inference is false. in their essence or in their totality. then the false and erroneous perception of silver would also at once manifest its difference from the object (the conch-shell) on which the false silver is imposed. stronger. Again. The main stress seems to rest on the idea that the immediate differences between the things perceived do not in the least suggest or imply that they. In our world of phenomenal experience our minds are always im pressed with the concept of difference . be considered as one identical reality (as is asserted in the Upanisads).&quot. as taught by the Upanisads. if one infers may the existence of such afire from fog appearing as smoke. of the perceived objects from all other things is not revealed in the nature objects of the perceived objects themselves as svariipa-bheda. could not ultimately. as asserted in the Vedic texts. In this way Srlharsa tried to prove that the purport of non-duality. cannot be said to be negatived by our perceptual experience of For our perception deals with individual things of the &quot. again. then such . The difference. yet the 129 be way in which one happened to come by this idea be wrong. but Srlharsa says that the . but the differences among the objects The self. proof. in our perception of the things of experience we do not realize the differences of the perceptual themselves. being of a verbal nature. and future and establish the fact of their all being different from one another. Most of these arguments.

It may also be pointed out that the concept table&quot. say a book. Words to ideas relating &quot.&quot. But a &quot. as being the thing. r &quot.&quot.. &quot. There is no meaning in speaking of &quot. of difference is entirely extraneous to the concept of things as they are understood or perceived. &quot. then this will in variably include as &quot. would be necessary to find out some way of establishing a relation between &quot.difference&quot.&quot. Again.the from. and the things that differ.difference&quot. such a nature cannot be in need of being determined by other things.difference&quot. If it lies involved within the essential nature of all things that differ. If anyone says that a book is identical with &quot.difference&quot. ences can only be be the nature of a thing.the quality of being distin guished would have no meaning or locus standi. and that another.the quality of being distinguished &quot.the table&quot. unless the table w ere also taken with it.difference&quot. also within the essence of the book. Firstly. the concept of difference can hardly be defined. difference may here be described as being &quot. &quot. One thing. then difference would be identical with the nature of the things from the things that differ. The joint notion of the book and the table is different . The notion of &quot. then the table has to enter into the nature of the book.difference&quot. we mean its difference from table. mere existence of an idea does not prove can give things. is itself different from the notion of the book and the table.book&quot. when such differ determined by a reference to other things. is supposed to be of the nature of things.to be dis complex quality be distinguished which necessarily means tinguished from. If difference were different it then should have a vicious endless may be He says that &quot. but &quot.13 The Sankara School of Veddnta its [CH. If by &quot. and this might require another connection. and so we that differ. even to absolutely non-existing &quot. for there cannot be any difference without referring to the things from which there is difference. So on this view also the table and all other things which could be distinguished from the book are involved in the very essence of all things a conclusion which contradicts the very concept of difference.difference&quot. which is of the nature of the things which series. &quot. from a table.to &quot. &quot.the distinguished from a table&quot. If is realized as being different from a table the nature of the quality of being &quot. looked upon from a number differ must involve them all in one. rise reality. whether jointly or separately. is a constituent of the &quot. of possible points of view. and that would mean the identity of the table and the book.

since the class-concepts of the book and the table. the book). this &quot.otherness&quot. if the book with the table was absolutely chimerical. these class-concepts no such special characteristic (dharmd) by virtue of which one could be denied of the other or they could be distinguished from each other. It is therefore wrong to think that things are of the nature of difference. even though the notion of difference may in some sense be said to lead to our apprehension of individual things. is interpreted as &quot.mental or &quot. not having 9-2 .&quot. For under standing the nature of a book understand previously its not necessary that one should difference from a table. Moreover. since the Naiyayika.g.xi] Veddnta Dialectic of Sriharsa &quot. again.otherness&quot. wherein difference negation&quot. against whom Srlharsa s arguments are directed. or negation as otherness. he does not invariably because of such a resemblance to a cow think the animal to be a wild cow. such a denial of identity would be absolutely meaning cannot. means the denial of one class-concept in respect of another (e. s It horn. be suggested that this mental negation. So. In the absence of such distinguishing qualities they may be regarded as identical but in that case the denial of one class-concept (say of the table) would : involve the denial of the class-concept of the thing itself (e. When one says that the book is other than the table.g. even though the notion of differ ence may be admitted to be responsible for our apprehension of the different individual things. like the hare less. does not admit that class-con cepts possess any distinguishing qualities. (say book from the table) is explained as being the negation of the identity of one with the other. Sriharsa here raises the objection that. when he so con siders an animal as a wild cow. 131 from the notion that the book differs from the it is table. an apprehension of an individual . The mental decision regarding an animal as a cow or a wild cow takes place immediately without any direct participation of the cause which produced it. the apprehension of such individual things does not carry with it the idea that it is on account of such difference that the individual things are perceived. (anyonyabhdva). In another view. It is through similarity or resemblance between two things say be tween a wild cow (gavaya) and the domestic cow (go) that a man can recognize an animal as a wild cow but yet. that of book on the table) for there is in . thing does not involve as a constituent any notion of difference. what is meant is that identity of the book with of the the table is identity of the denied.

. further. it may be asked whether these distinguishing characters are themselves different from the objects which possess them or not. are identical. any distinguishing qualities.132 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. If they are different. makes these earlier terms of difference un necessary It 1 . Again. and hence all opposite characters in the backward identical. If. and so there would be no way of distinguishing one thing to see therefore that there special case re as otherness (anyonyabhavd). cannot. since in the series the earlier series If terms of difference can only be established by the establishment of the later terms of difference. and so on. then the characters will be identical. and. book from is no way of making a table. p. whereas the object is finite and limited in time. therefore. It is easy then also it may be asked whether the opposite characters have further opposite characters to distinguish them from one another. if these are supposed to stop anywhere. one may again ask concerning the opposing characters which lead to this difference and then again about other opposing characters of these. Again. 1914. Benares. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Book Depot. they came all at once. 206. would be identical. and so there is a vicious infinite. they could not arrive in less than infinite time. there would be such a disorderly medley of these infinite differences that there would be no way of determining their respective substrates and their orderly successive dependence on one another. then the final characters at that stage. if difference garding negation is regarded as the possession of opposite characters (vaidharmya). dvitlya-bhedddi-prayojanasya trtlya-bhedddinaiva siddheh so pi vyarthah sydt. And. again. the forward movement in search of the later terms of difference. we 1 perceive seeming differences in all Sriharsa does not deny that things. through mental denial both the book and the table would be devoid of the class-concepts of book and table. If these infinite differences were to hold good. Vidyd-sdgart on Khandanakhanda-khddya. from another. in support of the earlier terms of difference. would be meaningless and all things would be on the contrary it is admitted at the very first stage that opposite or differing characters have no differing characters to distinguish them from one another. and these again others. but he denies their prathama-bheddsvlkdra-prayojanasya bheda-vyavahdrdder dvitlya-bheddd eva siddheh prathama-bhedo vyarthah sydd eva. not having any further opposite characters to distinguish them. be said that our perception of differences has any such intrinsic validity that it can contradict the ultimate unity taught in the Upanisad texts.

Nor can correspondence of the cognition with its object (yatharthanubhavah prama) be regarded as a proper definition of right cognition. man s . Such correspondence can be defined as meaning either that which represents the reality of the object itself or similarity to the object. Khandana-khanda-khddya. 2 E. since. though the awareness may be right. and so there is a circle of relativity which defies all attempts at giving an inde pendent definition of any of these things. p. Our world of experience consists of knower. as they involve the fallacy of argument in a circle (cakrakd). pdramdrthikam sattvam. through unerring instruments.xi] Application of Dialectic to Different Categories 133 ultimate validity. or makes from faulty data or by fallacious methods. he first urges that such a definition is faulty. them to be due to avidyd or The chief method of Srlharsa s dialectic depends upon the assumption that the reality of the things that one defines depends upon the unimpeachable character of the definitions. since he considers nescience alone 1 . and hence there is no way in which the real nature of things can be demonstrated or defined. avidyd-vidyamdnatvam tu tadtyam isyata eva. is a case of chance guesses which may sometimes be right without being produced by unerring instruments of senses. again. it cannot be called right cognition 2 It is urged that cognition. direct apprehension of the real nature of things. knowledge can only be by a reference to the knower. however. as the possessor of knowledge. if one accidentally guesses rightly certain things hidden under a cover and not perceived. the known. but all definitions are faulty. must be produced a right inference . can be understood understood only by a reference to knowledge and the knower. Application of the Dialectic to the Different Categories and Concepts.g. when a man rightly guesses the number of shells closed in another hand. It is mainly this rela tivity that in specific forms baffles all attempts at definition of all categories. or when one makes a false inference of fire on a hill from a fog looking like smoke from a distance and there is fire on the hill by chance his judgment may be right though his inference may be false. 214. Sriharsa takes for his criticism the definitions of right Assuming the definition of right cognition to be the first cognition. The real nature of 1 na vayam bhedasya sarvathaivdsattvam abhyupagacchdmah. in order to be valid. here. kirn ndma no. known and knowledge if a knower is defined .

p. cognition. whereas they 2 But that belong to awareness as being qualities which it reveals . when we are considering the correspondence of the nature of the object and the nature charac is concerned. 2 arthasya hi yathd samavdydd rupam visesanlbhavati tathd visayabhdvdj jndnasydpi tad-visesanam bhavaty eva. Vidyd-sdgarl on Khandana. Sriharsa says that the word 1 dvau ghatau suklav ityatra rupa-samkhyddi-samavdyitvam na jndnasya gunatvdd atah prakdsamdna-rupena artha-sddrsyam jndnasya ndsti asti ca tasya jndnasya tatra ghatayoh pramdtvam.134 The Sankara School of Veddnta is [CH. p.before me&quot. Referring to Udayana paricchitti. Again. has also to be rejected as false. . then it . nor white. If this is has to be admitted as being a right admitted to be a right cognition. may be terized by the awareness of the is with the object object. but the neither two. and so correspondence of awareness may rather be defined as similarity of the former If this similarity is means that the awareness must have such a character as possessed by the object (jnana- visayikrtena rupena sadrsyani). due to obstructive circum stances. since the refers to the character. If entire correspondence not assured. entire correspondence of thought and object be urged. there may be an awareness is awareness . only the nature of cognition disputed as to right or wrong. was meaningless to define right cognition as true correspondence might as well have been defined as mere cognition. an object with the object to the latter. for qualities that belong to the object cannot belong to the awareness of two white hard marbles. then partial it correspondence But. would not hold good of &quot. in the perception me the silver&quot. whereas it is admitted by the Naiyayikathat. nor hard 1 It may be urged that the correspondence consists in this. If. 398. belong to the object as qualities possessed by it. entire correspondence is considered indispensable. all our affirmations regarding the objects to which the characters are supposed to belong would be false. form or appearance correspondence always of the thing. if above can hardly be considered satisfactory. the awareness of &quot. then cognition of an object with imperfect or partial correspondence. then the like the correctness of the partial correspondence has to be ignored. since all cognition would have some object to which it referred and so far as that only was concerned all cognitions would be valid. Khandana. however. then this is clearly impossible. or s definition of right cognition as samyak proper discernment. 399. indeterminable.before in the case of illusory perception of silver in a conch-shell. so far as reference to an object all cognitions are valid. that the whiteness etc.

If.&quot. But even in this case it would be difficult to define . for. if any kind of distinguishing feature would do. entire. Arguing against the definition of right cognition hension which is as &quot. If all the particular distinguishing features are insisted on. Srlharsa says that &quot.not incorrect&quot.not defective&quot. again. then it may well be pointed out that it is impossible to discover any feature of any cognition of which one can be positively certain that it is not wrong. and there is no way of determining this. then the definition is useless. (avyabhicdri anubhavah).appre not incorrect or not defective&quot. or &quot. If right discernment means the discern ment of an object with its special distinguishing features. since the nature of the special distinguishing features which would establish its validity cannot be established by any definition of which contradicts a same objection would be impossible to make any them all. cannot mean that the cognition must exist only at the time when the object exists. if it is samyak means &quot. the perceiver seems to perceive the distinguishing marks of silver in the conch-shell. this again is unintelligible. The certitude of a cogni previous wrong cognition would often be right knowledge. and no one but omniscient being could perceive a thing with all its characters. as in the case of the true perception of silver. then in the case of the false perception of silver in the conch-shell the distinguishing feature of being before the eyes is also possessed by the conch-shell. and it definition which would include tion liable to the as the wrong cognition itself. which often refers . for even in wrong cognition. whereas in the case of the false perception of silver in the conch-shell no such distinguishing features are observed. A dreamer confuses all sorts of characters and appearances and conceives them all to be right. the essential nature of the distinguishing features for. Application of Dialectic to Different Categories &quot. the dis tinguishing features be described as being those characteristics without the perception of \vhich there can be no certain knowledge and the perception of which ensures right cognition. 135 samyak visible (proper) is meaningless . since impossible to see all the an invisible constituent parts of a thing.xi] &quot. The whole point lies in the difficulty of judging whether the distinguishing marks observed are real or not. for then inferential cognition. say of conch-shell as silver. and properties or qualities. then there will be endless distinguishing features. It may be urged that in the case of right perception the object is perceived with its special distinguishing features.

then this would apply even to those cases where one object is wrongly perceived as another.&quot. if the view that an awareness and its object are one and the same be accepted. right cognition which with its defined as a cognition the incompatibility of object is not realized by any other cognition. the definition of right cognition would have been very easy. there had been any way of defining faultless cognition. since cognition is so different in nature from the object that it is . If if it is a faultless later cognition. is not sufficient to &quot. white Moreover. then also there are difficulties in the may for way. repeated successively through a number of moments and found to be in agreement with its object through all the successive moments right. For even a wrong cognition some time be not contradicted by any other cognition.136 to past The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. Neither can it mean that the cognition coexists in space with its objects nor can it mean that the right cognition is similar to its object in all respects. for even the wrong is other hand. then it is very difficult to and there may be a false cognition of causal effi- . On the there right cognition is properly defined. urged that the contradiction must be by then it may be pointed out that. would also have to be admitted as is because in this case the previous cognition If.an apprehension which is not incompatible (avisamvadi) with the object known. which it is perceived. the vision of the conch-shell by the normal eye as may be contradicted by the later vision by the jaundiced eye as yellow. not possible that there should be any case in which it would be similar thereto in all respects. certified by the cognition of the succeeding moments. in speaking of faulty or wrong cognition. Arguing against the Buddhist definition of right cognition as &quot. unless no meaning cognition of a snake might cause fear and even death. If right cognition is defined as a cognition which has causal efficiency. then a wrong cognition. that in fact is not a proper definition. would be false. And. Sriharsa tries to refute the definition in all the possible senses of incompatibility of cognition with object which determines wrong knowledge. until it is contradicted. distinguish right knowledge from wrong cognition. If it is urged that the causal efficiency must be exercised by the object in the same form in ascertain this. is again. and future things. If the definition is supposed to restrict right cognition to cognition which its is cognition as being in agreement with cognized by another object. and hence the word avyabhicarl&quot.

instrumentality&quot. After showing that it is impossible to define right cognition (prama) Sriharsa tries to show that it is impossible to define the If it is at . as a separate agent. It would be a long Srlharsa attempts to show tale to go into all the details of this discussion as set forth by it is Sriharsa. and the notion that the thing may be attained as it is perceived may be present even in the case of the wrong perception is of silver in the conch-shell. idea of instruments (karana} or their operative action (vyapara) as involved in the idea of instruments of cognition (pramdnd). and shows that none of these meanings can be satisfactorily 1 justified . since the fact of the production 1 Among many other definitions by Uddyotakara &quot. . since it is uncontradicted at least at the time when the illusion is produced. since it is way Dharmaklrti difficult to s definition of right is cognition as enabling one to attain the object (artha-prapakatvd) determine which object can be actually attained and which not. and for our present purposes enough to know that Srlharsa refuted the concept of &quot.karana&quot. since it is difficult to determine its separate existence. Khandana. urged that a right cognition is that which is not contradicted any time.xi] Application of Dialectic to Different Categories . in which case even the wrong perception of silver in the conch-shell would be a right cognition. 137 ciency also hence it would be very difficult to ascertain the nature of right cognition on the basis of causal efficiency. In refuting the definition of perception he introduces a long discussion showing the uselessness of defining perception as an instrument of right knowledge. Perception as cognition is defined in the Nyaya which . arises it is with its object but through the contact of a particular sense impossible to know whether any cognition has originated from sense-contact. Srlharsa points out again that in a similar also unintelligible. then cognition it be asked whether the absence of contradiction is at the may time of perception only. that instrumentality as an agent cannot be separately conceived as having an independent existence.&quot.yadvan as given Sriharsa also refutes the definition of karana eva karoti tat karanam. then we are not in a position to assert the Tightness of any cognition for it is impossible to be certain that any par ticular cognition will never at any time be contradicted. If right defined as cognition which is not contradicted. 506. p. both as popularly conceived or as conceived in Sanskrit grammar. or instru ment. He also discusses a number of alternative meanings which could be attributed to the concept of &quot.

He points out that the definition of perception by Aksapada as an uncontradicted cognition arising out of sense-contact with the object is unintelligible. of knowledge from sense-contact cannot itself be directly perceived or known by any other means. in order that this quality may be cognized. unless the much in contact with the sense as is the object. and. It is also impossible to say whether any experience will for ever remain uncontradicted. if at any stage of the infinite regress it is supposed that no further attribute is necessary.138 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. and hence faultlessness cannot be known previously tain and independently. then. the specifi cation of the object in the case of each perception would make it particular. offers a refutation of the definition of perception in a much more condensed form. which is as objects. since the faultlessness can be known only if there is no contradiction. Again. Sriharsa supposes that. it would be difficult to formulate a definition of perception in such a way that it would imply only the revelation of the external object and not the self. then this involves the omission of the preced ing determining attributes. if perception reveals some specific quality of the object as its per manent attribute. and so there would be an infinite regress. mostly by pointing out verbal faults in the formulation of the definitions. and this would defeat the purposes of definition. If this prehensible. Sriharsa urges specific object with hand with the external ments that. a commentator on Sriharsa s Khandanakhanda-khadya. Since in perception the senses are in contact on the one hand with the self and on the other by a series of argu which the sense is in contact is mentioned in each case. this again is produced by unintelligible. How can we know that a cognition would not be contradicted? It cannot be known from a knowledge of the faultlessness of the collocating cir cumstances. until the possibility of the perception immediateness be explained as a cognition the instrumentality of the sense-organs. for the instrumentality of sense-organs is incom is also negatived. which can only apply to universal concepts. there ought to be another attribute. Sriharsa takes a number of alternative definitions of perceptions and tries to refute them all more or less in the same way. Citsukha Acarya. Nor can it again be urged that right cognition is that which can . and the collocating circumstances would con many elements which are unperceivable. and this would presuppose another attribute. Arguing against a possible definition of perception as immediateness.

I pass on to his criticism of the nature of concomitance (vyapti). and its other slightly modified varieties. p. e. A thing qualities as knowable only such. vydpti cannot be established unless the invariable concomitance of all the individuals involved in a class be known. Sriharsa argues in refutation of such an interpretation that. produce an effort on the part of the perceiver (pravrtti-samarthya) for even an illusory knowledge can produce an effort on the part of the perceiver who is deceived by it. smoke) which always concomitant with the major term (sddhya. then by a mental contact with the class-concept knowable we might know all individual knowables and thus be omniscient as &quot. . fire). 1915. the cognitions. e. Passing over the more the mountain) of a reason or probans (linga. fire). would involve the knowledge of 1 such specific qualities for the drsyate hi mani-prabhdydm mani-buddhyd pravartamdnasya mani-prdpteh pravrtti-sdmarthyam na cdvyabhicdritvam.g. which is at the root of the notion of inference. is major term (sadhya. if all individual smoke may be known in such a way by a mental contact with class-con cepts. may affirm of all all individuals of a class without actually is experiencing the invariable concomitance of cases.xi] Application of Dialectic to Different Categories 139 . The Naiyayika holds that the mind by a sort of mental contact with class-concepts or universals.g. &quot. which is impossible.smoke&quot. It is urged that the universal relationship of invariable concomitance required in. and yet there is no reason to deny the validity of see the lustre of a . Mere achievement of the result is no test for the Tightness of the cognition for a man may . the individuals. or as invariable concomitance of the probans with the probandum or the e. yet it cannot be doubted that his apprehension of the ray of the gem as the gem was erroneous 1 In the case of the perception of stars and planets there is no chance of any actual attainment of those objects. well. It in this way that.g. gem and think it to be a gem and really get the gem. Tattva-pradlpikd. 218. e. and therefore is as an individual with its specific to all know a thing as a knowable . NirnayaSagara Press.g. called samanyapratyasatti. when perceiving smoke on a distant hill. or less verbal arguments of Srlharsa in refutation of the definitions of inference (anumand) as linga-paramarsa or the realization of the presence in the minor term (paksa. Bombay. perceiving smoke and fire in a large number of one understands the invariable concomitance of smoke with fire by experiencing a sort of mental contact with the class-concept &quot.

g. if invariable concomitance between smoke and fire be denied. and hence the things may remain wholly unknown in their diversity of characters and may yet be known so far as they are merely knowable. and &quot. then there would be no possibility of mistakes in the observation of such concomitance. yet absence of earth and also the absence of &quot. knowledge cut.knowable. It may be urged that knowability is one single character. But such mistakes are committed and corrected by later experience.possibility of being cut&quot.knowable&quot.. But it is as difficult to ascertain such uni versal absence as it is to ascertain universal concomitance.&quot. e.earth&quot. &quot.possibility of being If it is urged that concomitance cannot be determined by a single instance of the absence of one tallying with the absence of the other. and that things may be otherwise completely and may yet be one so far as knowability is concerned.&quot. tarka or eliminatory consideration in judging of possi cannot be considered as establishing invariable concomi tance. Again. assuming for the sake of argument that it is possible have a mental contact with class-concepts through individuals. [CH. would involve all knowables and so even the diversity of characters different would be involved within the meaning of the term &quot. To this Sriharsa answers that the class-concept &quot. if this invariable concomitance be defined as avindbhava. such a definition is faulty. can the invariable concomitance itself be observed? If our senses could by themselves observe such relations of concomitance. and such an assumption would lead to a vicious mutual interdepend bilities Now The great logician Udayana objects to this and says that. there is also the absence of the other. . for all arguments are based on invariable concomitance. then also it may be said that it is not possible to determine such an impossibility either by senseor by any other means. the reason or the probans. if this concomitance be defined as the impossibility of the presence of the middle term. it must be proved that universally in all instances of the absence of the one. class-concept knowable would involve all individuals which have a specific knowable character. where the major term or the probandum is also absent. the fire. the smoke. which means that when one is absent the other is also absent.140 The Sankara School of Veddnta &quot. Again. then ence. Thus there is no real concomitance be tween is in dkdsa there &quot. for it may apply to those cases where there is no real invariable concomitance. Again.g. e. and there is no way in which one to how can account for the mistake in the sense-judgment.

and. if in spite of that one begins to doubt whether on any particular day when he is hungry he should take food or not. namely. and such doubts would make inference is impossible. If such an exaggerated doubt be considered illegitimate. made manifest.invariable concomi . so long as there is doubt. that it is possible that there may be a case in which the concomitance may be found wrong. then life would be impossible 1 Sriharsa. this can only be when the invalidity of the inference has been . which is impossible.xi] Application of Dialectic to Different Categories 141 there are strong arguments (tarka) against such a denial (badhakas tarkah) y with fire. and so there may always room for the supposition that any particular smoke not be caused by fire. there is no obstruction in the way of inference. namely. Doubts which make our daily life compatible impossible are is illegitimate. tance&quot. p. Khandana-khanda-khddya. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Book Depot. as a natural relation (svabhavikah &quot. if you entertain the doubt. 7. sambandhah) . 693. It may be that there are smokes which are not caused by fire. and the admission of this would involve the admission of inference. . then the possibility of such a doubt (sanka) must be supported by inference. vydghdto yadi sankdsti na cec chankd tatastardm vydghdtdvadhir dsankd tarkah sankdvadhih kutah. in which he says that. Kusumdnjalt. inference is invalid if there is no doubt. . Hence the argument of possibilities (tarka) can never remove doubts 2 Sriharsa also objects to the definition of &quot. that smoke is due to some cause other than fire. and until such invalidity is found there will always be doubts. Every day one finds that food appeases hunger. Udayana had however contended that.natural relation&quot. He rejects the term 1 and says that invariable concomitance sankd ced anumdsty eva na cec chankd tatastardm vydghdtdvadhir dsankd tarkah sankdvadhir matah. How can one be sure that all smokes are caused by fire ? There may be differences in these two classes of fire which remain unnoticed by us. 1912. replies to this contention by twisting the words of Udayana s own karika. Benares. Doubts can be enter tained only so long as such entertainment of doubts with practical life. that. if smoke is not regarded as concomitant then smoke would either exist without any cause or not exist at all. But Sriharsa says that there is room for an alternative proposition which Udayana misses. however. with regard to a future case. ill.

implication and testimony. Srlharsa says cannot be defined as negation of anything. hence not a negation of is a mere form of speech. all.non-being&quot. Without entering into the details of Sriharsa s argument it may be pointed out that it rests very largely on his contention that conditionality of relations can not be determined without knowledge of the nature of invariable concomitance and also that invariable concomitance cannot be determined without a previous determination of the conditionality of relations. we note to Sriharsa s refutation of the Nyaya categories.142 The Sankara School of Veddnta justifiable in [CH. &quot.being&quot. Again. each existing thing being unique in quality. exists.g.non-being&quot. are not of much importance from a philosophical point of view. not all earthen objects can be so scratched. in &quot. all that is earthen can be scratched with an iron needle. there is is no common Again. as &quot. and both being and anything. that to the category of non-being (abhava). Nor again can non-being be defined as that which opposes being . since. &quot. is as much a negation of &quot. such as existence or being..being&quot. Negation non-being may be expressed in a negative form. both non-being and being may stand as grammatical nominatives of the verb itself. (ii) produced by the nature of the related (sambandhi-svabhava-janya).being&quot.&quot. would not be any of its possible meanings. Turning now much right speak of being as existing as of non-being as existing . which possessed by them &quot. He says that being cannot be defined as being existent in itself.there is no jug . such as on the nature of the related (sambandhi-svabhava(i) depending srita).&quot. &quot. Sriharsa s brief refutation of analogy. e. &quot. Though in some cases earthen objects may be scratched with an iron needle. for being may as well be interpreted as a negation of non-being as non-being of cannot be defined as that which Turning it being (bhdvabhdvayor dvayor apt paraspara-pratiksepatmakatvai). that he begins with the refutation of being or positivity (bhavatva). He further refutes the defini tion of invariable concomitance as a relation not depending upon conditional circumstances (upadhi). as also his refutation of the definitions of the different fallacies of inference. as these would be too wide and would apply even to those things which are not invariable concomitants. of is &quot.g. (iii) not different from the nature constituting the relatedness. &quot. we can with as &quot. for not all non-being is opposed to all being (e. and need not be detailed here. since non-being is also existent in itself.

which is sought to be defined. even qualities. what of qualities? meant by defining substance as the support (asraya) Since qualities may subsist in the class-concept of quality (gunatva). and yet one specifies colours by numbers. the class-concept of quality ought to be regarded as substance according to the definition. It may be urged that a is substance is that in which the qualities inhere. and it is again on the strength of the definition of quality that such appearances are to be rejected as false.g. respect of which the jug is denied) if non-being opposes some existent things. . for qualities belong according to definition only to . such as colours. as one. 143 on the the absence of jug does not oppose the ground in . Moreover. of yellowness in a white conch-shell and the real appearance of whiteness in the conch-shell? Unless the falsity of the appearance of yellow in the conch-shell is realized. then the appearance of the so-called substances as being endowed with qualities may also be regarded as equally erroneous. Furthermore. mixed or primary and colour is regarded as quality). &quot. and colour also is counted as a quality. two or many colours. Sriharsa says that even qualities appear to have numeral and other qualities (e.g. Again. being en dowed with numeral qualities. the Nyaya definition of quality as that which has a genus and is devoid of qualities is unintelligible for the defini tion involves the concept of quality. of a colour being deep or light. number counted as a quality. It is only by holding to this appearance of qualities endowed with .xi] Application of Dialectic to Different Categories ground&quot. If colours are known as qualities in consideration of other reasons. substance cannot be defined as the inhering or the material cause (samavayi-karana). there can be no difference between the one case and the other. or is many colours. have numeral qualities for we speak of one. then that does not differentiate negation for there .? But what would be the meaning here of the particle How would one dis tinguish the false appearance. numeral qualities that the definition of quality can be made to stand. are many which are opposed to one another (e. If it is urged that this is a mistake. In refuting the Nyaya definition of substance (dravya) as that is the support of qualities. to a jaundiced eye. since it is not possible to know which is the inhering cause and which is not for . Again. we speak of two which or three colours. two. existent things the horse and the bull). then these. could not for that very reason be called qualities .in&quot. as pointed out above.

&quot. cause is defined as the antecedence of that which is other than the notcause. if it is urged that. which is always an intervening factor between the cause and the effect. then its meaning is unintelligible. for the notion of something being a container or (adhard) is dependent on the notion of the concept of and that concept again depends on the notion of a &quot. So there would not be a single instance that the Naiyayika could point to as an example of quality. container. again. dence can be ascribed only to the causal operation. but these. then operation even the cause of the cause would have to be regarded as one with it the cause and therefore cause. He also deals with the impossibility of defining the nature of the subject-object relation (visaya-visayi-bhava) of knowledge.in&quot. then the accessory circumstances and common and abiding conditions. In refuting the definition of cause Sriharsa says that cause cannot be defined as immediate antecedence for immediate antece . are also to be regarded as operation. the causal be not regarded as a separate and independent factor. The container cannot be supposed to be an inhering cause. &quot. endowed with the quality of separateness. The meaning of relation as or &quot. space. and there is no other notion which can explain either of the concepts independently. But.operation&quot. is not at all clear. it cannot be regarded as being one with the cause. since the cause of the cause is not an operation.g. would be unexplainable. which impossible.g.144 substances. the cause) cannot be considered as a factor which stands between (cause) and that which follows it (effect). or &quot. the causal operation) belongs to a thing (e. . Further. The Sankara School of Veddnta Even the numerals themselves are [CH. If.herein. &quot. for in that case such examples as &quot. If the opponent should define it as that factor without which the cause cannot produce the effect. Sriharsa points out that. if relation is to be conceived as something subsisting in a thing. one may well ask the opponent to define the meaning of operation. If. Speaking of relations. produced by the cause for it is the meaning of the concept still to be explained and defined.herein&quot. such as the natural laws. and so forth. not &quot. without which an effect is cannot be produced.there is a grape in this vessel&quot.in&quot. being philosophically important. are omitted here. cannot be qualified as being . then this again would be faulty for one cannot understand itself of cause that has . He then takes a number of possible meanings which can be given to the notion of a container. on the theory that what (e.the absence of horns in a hare&quot.

which quality can be directly perceived by us as existing in things. and other hand. would be impossible to conceive of the production of it would not be possible for anyone to know which particular cause would produce a particular effect. Thus we may perceive the stick of the potter s wheel to be the cause of the particular jugs produced by it. yet regarded as the cause of sound. and vice-versa. If. On the then it individual things. in variable antecedence be understood to mean unconditional ante cedence. however. this would not explain the causality of space. cause is defined as invariable antecedence. Moreover. it is not possible to perceive by the senses that an individual thing is the cause of a number of individual effects for . 145 is the not-cause &quot. If. be regarded as the cause of the disease on account of their in colour. Moreover. variable antecedence. of the definition without understanding what the nature of cause. space. until these individual effects are actually produced it is not possible to perceive them. if mere invariable antecedents be regarded as then the invariably preceding symptoms of a disease are to cause. causality cannot be regarded as a specific character or quality belonging to certain things. being a per manent substance. then two coexistent entities such as the taste and the colour of an earthen pot which is being burnt must mutually be the cause of the colour and the taste of the burnt earthen pot for neither does the colour condition taste. again. If causality existed only with reference to things in general. If.xi] Application of Dialectic to Different Categories &quot. cause is defined which is present when the effect is present and absent when the effect is absent. Again. nor does the taste condition . or of all the various ways in which Srlharsa sought to refute them in his . It is not necessary for our present purposes to enter into all the different possible concepts of cause which Srlharsa seeks to refute: the above examination is expected to give a fairly comprehensive idea of the refutation of the category of cause. since perception involves sense-contact as its necessary condition. is always present as a not-cause of anything. methods of Sriharsa s Nor is it possible within the limited range of the present work to give a full account of all the different alternative defences of the various categories accepted in Nyaya philosophy. again. but it is not possible to perceive causality as a general quality of a stick or of any other thing. is and as that which is never known to be absent. then permanent substances such as space are to be regarded as the sole causes of effects.

were mainly occupied in inventing suitable and phrases by which they could define their way that the undesirable applications and issues of their definitions. for example. Khandana-khanda-khadya. The chief defect of Sriharsa s criticisms is that they often tend to grow into verbal sophisms. in his treatment of relations he only tries to refute the definitions of relation as container and contained. In one sense. If these criticisms had mainly been directed towards the defects of Nyaya thought. as pointed out by the criticisms of their opponents. like Gahgesa. as inherence. It how these refutations of the verbal definitions of the is easy Nyaya spirit of the Naiyayikas into re-stating their definitions with proper qualificatory phrases and adjuncts. though of his criticisms. . however. the and some of his followers had done a great later disservice to the development of thinkers. But in many cases his omissions become very glaring. qualificatory adjuncts categories in such a Raghunatha and others. and lay greater stress on the faults of expression of the opponent s definitions and do not do him to see the justice of liberally dealing with his general ideas. Another defect of Srlharsa s criticisms is that he mainly limits himself to criticizing the definitions of Nyaya categories and does not deal so fully with the general ideas involved in such categories ought. as has already pointed out.146 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. It exhaustive treatment of the problems involved in the discussion. that he has only a destructive point of view been and is . in all fairness to Srlharsa to be said he took the Nyaya definitions as the main objective that. characteristic feature of his refutation is. I have therefore attempted to give here only some specimens of the more important parts of his dialectical argument. could be avoided. later writers would not have been forced to take the course of developing verbal ex pressions at the expense of philosophical profundity and acuteness. and as subject. Thus. yet in dealing with the various alternative varia tions and points of view of such definitions he often gives an of thought. therefore.object relation of cognitions. the older Nyaya later Nyaya thought for. by which they avoided the loopholes left in their former definitions for the roused the defensive attack of Srlharsa criticisms of Srlharsa and other critics. unlike Nyaya writers. Srlharsa may therefore be said to be the first great writer who is responsible indirectly for the growth of verbalism in later Nyaya thought. and leaves out many other varieties of relation which might well have been dealt with Another .

gives us a very acute Citsukha. Suresvara. and even those definitions which he refuted could be bettered and improved by using suitable qualificatory phrases. To show that particular definitions are wrong is not to show that the things defined are wrong. Vallabha a (Lllavatl). Sriharsa did not and could not show that the ways of definition which he attempted to refute were the only ways of defining the different categories. on which the study of the present section is based. Uddyotakara. a particular concept has to be analysed on the basis of its own occurrences. But incapacity to define or describe anything in some particular way cannot mean that the thing is false. in his Tattva-pradlpikd. in whatever way one might try to define. but the refutation of the particular way of presentation of the concept does not mean that the concept itself is impossible.D. Kumarila.xi] Citsukha s Interpretations of Veddnta Concepts 147 not prepared to undertake the responsibility of denning any position from his own point of view. He did not attempt to show that the concepts involved in the categories were fraught with such contradictions that. Kularka Pandita and ridhara . they are all false. Sivaditya. In order to show the latter. Instead of that he turned his attention to the actual formal definitions which had been put forward by the and sometimes by Prabhakara and tried to show that these Nyaya definitions were faulty. Citsukha (about A. commented on by Pratyagbha- gavan 1 (A.D. 1220). but he not only furnishes. being indescribable. He delights in showing that none of the world-appearances can be defined in any way. one could not escape from those inner contradictions. a concise refutation of the Nyaya categories. and that thus. a pupil of Gaudesvara Acarya. Citsukha s Interpretations of the Concepts of Sarikara Vedanta. In this work he quotes Udayana. no doubt. Padmapada. which were inherent in the very nature of the concepts themselves. like Sriharsa. a commentator on Sriharsa. It is. They could probably be defined in other and better ways. called also Jnanottama. true that the refutation of certain definitions involves the refutation of the concepts involved in those definitions. Salikanatha. wrote commentary on Anandabodha Bhattarakacarya s Nydya-makaranda and also on Sriharsa s Khandana-khanda-khddya and an independent work called Tattvapradlpikd or Cit-sukhl. had all Sriharsa s powers of acute dialectical thought. but also. and the inconsistencies involved in such an analysis have to be shown. 1400) in his 1 Nayana-prasadini .

reve lation or self-illumination (sva-prakdsa). the relation of inherence (samavaya). doubt. while the former was an ascetic and a preceptor of the King of Gauda. memory. etc. in variable concomitance (vydpti). Vivaranaa commentary on the Pramana mold of Anandabodha. the ideas (sarva-pratyaydndm yathd thatvam). called Abhiprdya-prakdsikd.revelation (sva-prakaa) the nature of self as consciousness 9 (dtmanah samvid-rupatva).the nature of ignorance as darkness. the smallest of the book. specific particulars (visesd). . analogy (upamdna). the nature of nature of nescience (avidya). causality.revelation or self-illumiIn addition to these he also wrote a commentary on the (Nydya-kandati) . His pupil Sukhaprakasa wrote a work on the topics of the Brahma-sutra. com Brahma-siddhi. he deals with the possibility of the realization of Brahman and the nature of release through knowledge. which is much smaller than the first two. He is not only a protector of the Advaita doctrine of the Vedanta. a of s Sankara.148 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. called the Naiskarmya-siddhi-tlkd or the Bhdva-tattva-prakdsikd. and an index to the adhikaranas of the Brahma-sutra. Visnu-purdna-tlkd. Citsukha deals with the interpretation of the Vedanta concepts of self. called Nydya-sudhd and Jndnasiddhi. His teacher Jnanottama wrote two works on Vedanta. perception. measure. he deals with the nature of the ultimate state of emancipation. classconcepts. called Adhikarana-manjarl. misra). namely the concept of self. In the third chapter. for the latter was a householder (as he styles himself with a householder s title. mentary on Mandana siddhdnta-prakdsako vyutp&dakai ca. action. In the second chapter he refutes the falsity (mithyatva). . Citsukha starts with a formal definition of the most funda mental concept of the Vedanta. analysis and interpretation of some of the most important concepts of Sankara Vedanta. Sad-darsana-samgraha-vrtti Adhikarana-sangati (a work explaining the inter-relation of the topics of the Brahma-sutra) and a com mentary on the Naiskarmya-stddhi. as Citsukha describes him in his colophon to his Tattva-pradlpikd. etc. the all nature of the truth of Nyaya categories of difference. illusion. inference. In the first chapter cepts . Brahma-sutra-bhdsya tdtparya-dlpikd. time. but he seems to have been a different person from the Jnanottama who wrote a commentary on Suresvara s Naiskarmya-siddhi. non-being. Both Padmapada and Prakasatman in the Panca-pddikd and Panca-pddikd-vivarana had distinguished the self from the ego as self. implication. called Adhikarana-ratna-mdld 1 Thus Pandita Harinatha arma in his Sanskrit introduction to the Tattvapradlpikd or Cit-sukhl speaks of this work as advaita-siddhdnta-raksako py advaitay . existence of the reason in the minor term (paksa-dharmata) reason (hetu). called Bhdsya-bhdva-prakdsikd. induction (vyapti-graha). He is also said to have written the Brahmastuti. being. quality. and an inhabitant of the village of Mangala in the Cola country. the nature of illusions. space. duality. but also an interpreter of the Vedantic con 1 The work is written in four chapters. separateness. In the fourth chapter.

52. p. (samvid) self-revealing and that its self-revelation is not due to 1 It is on account of this natural any other self. being directly and illusorily imposed upon the self-revealing conscious become experienced. p. and by a mind-object contact the mind is transformed into the form of the object. 2 tasmdd anubhavah sajdtiya-prakdsdntara-nirapeksah prakdsamdna eva visaye prakdsddi-vyavahdra-nimittam bhavitum arhati avyavadhdnena visaye prakdsd- di-vyavahdra-nimittatvdt. forms or states. But. feelings. it is called experience (anubhava) and. and thereby the one consciousness. 149 nation (svayam-prakdsd) is Thus Prakasatman says that consciousness .revealing cause self-revelation of consciousness that . 3 tasmdt cit-svabhdva evdtmd tena tena prameya-bhedena upadhlyamdno nubhavdbhidhdnlyakam labhate avivaksitopddhir dtmddi-sabdaih. are different mental constituents. which was apparently split up into two forms as the object-consciousness which appeared as material objects and the subject-consciousness which appeared as the Citsukha defines it as cognizer. etc. emotions. is again restored to its unity by the super-imposition of the subjective form on the objective form. It may be objected that desires. which. . These subjective states are not cognized in the same way as external objects. 4 avedyatve saty aparoksa-vyavahdra-yogyatvam svayam-prakdsa-laksanam* Ctt-sukhl. it is called the self or atman appears in connection . 9. etc. ness. According to Vedanta epistemology these subjective experiences of will. and the object-form is revealed in consciousness as a jug or a book. the first to give a formal definition of the nature of this self- revelation. for the object of cognition has a separate objective existence. But in the case of our experience of our will or our feelings these have no existence separate from our own mind and hence are not cognized in the same way as external objects are cognized. Panca-pddikd- vivarana.xi] Citsukhcfs Interpretations of Veddnta Concepts . and hence the definition might as well apply to them. though it is not an object of any cognition or any cognizing activity (avedyatve pi)*. Panca-pddikd. also are not objects of any cognition and yet are entitled to be regarded as immediate. that which is entitled to be called immediate (aparoksa-vyavahdra-yogya). p. its objects also appear as self2 revealing Padmapada also says the same thing. IQ. 1 therefore since the samvedanam tu svayam-prakdsa eva na prakdsdntara-hetuh. . Ibid. when it is 3 But Citsukha was probably by itself. this consciousness with other objects and manifests them. when he states that the self is of the nature of pure self-revealing consciousness when .

then that also might require another process. though they appear as immediate.revealing consciousness. In the field of ordinary experience the perceived world-objects are found to be entitled to be called immediate no less than the self-revealing conscious ness. and. and it is only because they are objects of cognition that they can be distinguished from the self. the epithet &quot. or. and hence they also cannot be said to be entitled to be called immediate. But in the true sense even external objects are but illusory impositions on the self. they are not entitled to be called immediate.revealing consciousness.revealing consciousness. the epithet avedyatva successfully distinguishes self-revealing consciousness from all cognitions of external objects which are entitled to be called im mediate and are to be excluded from the range of self-revealing con sciousness only by being objects of cognition.revealing is proved by the very fact of the experience itself. . The main argument in favour of the admission of the category of independent self-revealing consciousness is that. and hence the phrase avedyatve (not being an of cognition) is unnecessary as a special distinguishing object feature of the self. .revealing consciousness is admitted. avedyatve pi ndparoksa-vyavahdra-yogyatd tesdm. Nirnaya-Sagara Press. since in all our ordinary stages of experience the only in the last experience of world-objects is immediate. and so there would be an unending series. 1915. and that another. unless an in dependent self. there would be a vicious series in the process preceding the rise of any cog nition for. they have no proper experience of these states . if the pure experience of self-revealing consciousness has to be further subjected to another process before it can be understood.150 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. Moreover. yogyata. for no one doubts his own ex perience or stands in need of any further corroboration or con firmation as to whether he experienced or not. Bombay. p. It may be objected 1 siddheh. To such an objection Citsukha is s reply is that the experience of external objects stage of world-dissolution and Brahmahood found non-immediate and illusory. they So. adhyastatayaiva tesam Cit-sukhi. in other words. diate &quot.imme called immediate. 10. There is therefore no meaning in trying to distinguish the self- revealing consciousness as one which is not an object of cognition for on the Vedanta theory there is nothing which is entitled to be . that the pure experience is self.is therefore also unnecessary. is possible only through a process of are not entitled to be called immediate 1 illusory imposition.

rupatva). This is. of course. 2 vidito ghata ity atra tu vitteh. it the awareness that is is the cognized object that is known and not cognized. p. since neither the senses nor the external objects can of themselves produce the self. when one perceives a jug. if knowledge were not admitted as self-revealing. that the pure self-revealing con sciousness shows itself only on the occasion of a mental state but its difference from other cognitive states lies in the fact that it has no form or object. since this view had been maintained in the Upanisads and repeated by Sankara. p. 18. next point that Citsukha urges is that the self is of the nature of pure self.revealing consciousness may become further cognized. yet it stands on a different footing from the objects . for the self always stands directly and 1 ghata-jndnodaya-samaye manasi kriyd tato vibhdgas tatah purva-samyoga-vindsas tata uttara-samyogotpattis tato jridndntaram iti aneka-ksana-vilambena utpadyamdnasya jndnasya aparoksatayd pnrva-jndna-grdhakatvdnupapatteh. Citsukha s reply to that this is that. known by illuminated by it. and in such a case the self. which could not have stayed through so many moments 1 Again. said to be directly . though it may be focussed by a mental state.revealing consciousness (dtmanah samvld- The no new contribution by Citsukha. the whole world would be blind and there would be no self -revelation. Cit- sukhl. Prakasatman and others. Padmapada. anuvyavasdyena ghatasyaiva viditatvam avaslyate na . but with the Buddhistic. Ibid.xi] Citsukha 9 s Interpretations of Vedanta Concepts 151 it is well known that we may be aware of our awareness of anything (anu-vyavasaya). then a cessation of that activity. then a further starting of new activity and then the knowledge that I know the jug. 2 If the previous aware awareness. then this would amount to an admission of the possibility of the self being the self (svasydpi svena vedyatvdpdtdf) a theory which would accord not with the Vedanta idealism. When one knows that he knows a book or a jug. or rather I know that I know the jug and hence such a cognition cannot be and immediately cognizing the first awareness. and hence. there can be no awareness of . but only of the cognized object ness could be made the object of subsequent awareness. and therefore the self is also of the nature of knowledge. No one like doubts about his own self . Citsukha says that. no doubt. knowledge. 17. the self also is immediately revealed or experienced without itself being the object of any cognizing activity or cognition. It is true.revelation of knowledge. there is the mental activity.

Self and knowledge being identical. Citsukha says that it cannot be held that the subject. for in the illusory perception of silver there is the false perception of silver without any actual sense-contact with silver. . since the idea of subject-object relation is itself obscure and unexplainas to the impossibility of properly explaining the subject-object re\ation(visaya-visayi-bhava) in knowledge. pratiyogitvam atyantdbhdvam prati mrsdtmatd. pointing out that a whole. 39. Nor can such a relationship be explained on a pragmatic basis by a re according to ference to actual physical practical action with reference to objects that we know or the internal volitions or emotions associated with our knowledge of things. since. . For what may be the nature of such a change? If it be described as jnatata. there is no relation between the two save that of identity (jnandtmanoh sambandhasyaiva abhavat) Citsukha defines falsity (mithyatvd) as the non-existence of a 1 He shows this by thing in that which is considered to be its cause . a work composed much later than the Cit-sukhi. then there w ould be no fixed law knowledge in r which such qualities should be produced. how can such a character be by my that that the at the present moment generated as a positive quality an object which has now ceased to exist? If such a quality can be produced even in past objects.152 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. and. falsity of the world-appearance is that it is impossible that there should be any relation between the self -revealing consciousness. reference to A subject-object relation (visaya-visayi-bhava) cannot explain it. pp. vimatah patah etat-tantu-nisthdtyantdbhdva-pratiyogl avayavitvdt patdntaravat Cit-sukhi. the parts of which it it is does not exist anywhere. it cannot be in the parts 2 Another argument adduced by Citsukha for the a . For in picking up a piece of silver that we see in front of us we may quite unknowingly be drawing with it the dross contained in the silver. immediately self. 2 amsinah svdmsa-gdtyantdbhdvasya pratiyoginah amsitvdd itardmslva. . if it does not exist even there. Some . or the character of being known. It is. p. anywhere and is false. and the objects which are cognized (drsya). must exist in made. being a whole. however. and hence the fact of the physical sarvesdm apt bhdvdndm dsrayatvena sammate Cit-sukhi. the knower (drk). Knowledge cannot be said to arise through sense-contact..object relation means able. . of these definitions of falsity are collected in Madhusudana s Advaitasiddhi. Arguing knowledge produces some change in the object (visaya) and knower produces such a change. 40. evident that if it is to exist whole cannot exist in the parts.revealed. 41.

well be considered subject and the subject. So. yet it is called only positive because of the fact that it is not negative 2 Ignorance or nescience is described as a positive state and not a mere negation of know .object relation of know ledge cannot be defined as a mere physical action following cognition The internal mental states of volition and the emotions associated . If. . and hence the subject. it is urged that objectivity consists in the fact that whatever is known appears in conscious ness. 2 bhdvdbhdva-vilaksanasya ajnanasya abhdva-vilaksanatva-mdtrena bhdvatvoIbid. etc. object. light. . &quot.xi] Citsukha s Interpretations of Veddnta Concepts 153 drawing of the dross cannot on that ground alone make it an object of my knowledge. then even the senses. p. however.. 58. he will be disappointed. the senses. the object cannot be contained in it.&quot. with knowledge belong to the knower and have nothing to do with the object of knowledge. the light knowledge may as well defined as that to and other accessories which help the rise of be regarded as objects. . for. 3 vigltam Deva-datta-nistha-pramdna-jndnam Devadatta-nistha-pramdbhdvdtiriktdnddernivarttakam pramdnatvdd Yajnadattddigata-pramdna-jndnavad ity anumdnam. positivity as well as of negativity. Here there is the right knowledge of the fact that 1 anddi-bhdva-rupam yad-vijndnena villyate tad ajndnam iti prdjnd-laksanam sampracaksate andditve sati bhdva-rupam vijndna-nirdsyam ajndnam iti laksanam iha vivaksitam. Citsukha follows the traditional view of nescience (ajndnd) as a positive entity without beginning which disappears with the rise of true knowledge 1 Nescience is different from the conception of . If objectivity be defined as that which can induce know ledge. p. pacdrdt. all that helps the rise of knowledge. ledge said that the rise of right knowledge of any object in a person destroys the positive entity of ignorance with reference to that object and that this ignorance is something . Cit-sukhi. Object cannot be which knowledge owes its particular form for. It cannot be a mere undefined relatedness for in that case the object may as object is contained in it . what does this appearing in consciousness mean ? It cannot mean that consciousness is the container and the consciousness being internal and the object external. 57. and so it is different from what one would understand by negation of 3 . right Citsukha says that the positive character of ignorance knowledge becomes apparent when we say that We do not know whether what you say is true. the question arises. may as well be regarded as objects. knowledge being identical with its form. in whatever way one may try to conceive the nature of the subject-object relation. Ibid.

the saksin. p. According to Prabhakara. p. 59. there is ignorance (ajnana). The opposite view is that of Prabhakara. Whatever is known is true. as qualified by such an ignorance. falsehood is due to omissions of knowledge and failure in noting differences. and the conch-shell is thus regarded as silver. This false asso ciation is failure to note that not due to an active operation of the mind. which fails to note the actual want of association between two things which are falsely associated as one. . 60. and hence things which are distinct and different are falsely associated as one. Such an is not experienced through sense-contact or but directly by the self.sarvam vastu jndtatayd ajndtatayd vd sdksi-caitanyasya visayah. All things are the known also objects of the inner unmoved intuitive consciousness either as or as unknown 2 Our reference to deep dreamless sleep as .revealing consciousness sense-processes.154 The Sankara School of Veddnta is . but is it is not known whether what said is valid 1 Here is also there which not the same a positive knowledge of ignorance of fact. On account of such a failure things which are distinct are not observed as distinct. Ibid. Just before the rise of right knowledge about an object ignorance. however. According to this theory all illusion consists of a false association or a false relationing of two things which are not presented in experience as related. is what said is known. but merely to a failure to note certain distinctions presented in experience. Citsukha objects to this view and urges that such an explanation tvadukte rthe pramdna-jndnam mama nusti ity asya visista-visaya-jndnasya pramdtvdt. 2 asman-mate ajndnasya sdksi-siddhataydpramdndbodhyatvdt. Cit-sukhl. as mere absence of knowledge. the false is never presented in experience. and the object. 1 . nor is the false experience due to an arbitrary positive activity of wrong construction of the mind. is experienced as being unknown. that the false is never One presented in experience and that falsehood consists in the wrong construction imposed upon experience by the mind. of the chief tenets of Vedanta epistemology lies in the supposition that a presentation of the false is a fact of experience. But here there is no false presentation in experience. a state in which we did not know anything (na kimcid-avedisam) is referred to as a positive experience of ignorance in the dream less state. [CH. pramdna-jndnodaydtprdk-kdlc ajridnam tad-visesito rthah sdksi-siddhah ajiidta ity anuvdda gocarah . . the great Mimamsa authority. but to a no such association was actually presented in experience (asamsargagraha).

Therefore the false presentation. On the analogy of our false experience of the everchanging flame of a lamp as the same identical one all cases of true recognition might no less be regarded as false. But what the nature of the presentation that forms the object (alambana) of false perception? It cannot be regarded as absolutely non-existent (asai). since that which is abso lutely non-existent cannot be the object of even a false perception. constitutes the indefinable nature (anirvacanlyata) of 1 all illusions 2 . Take the pro are false apprehensions and false presentations&quot. Thus of conch-shell as silver it in the case of the illusory perception is the conch-shell that appears as a is piece of silver. 2 pratyekam sad asattvdbhydm vicdra-padavlm na yad gdhate tad anirvdcyam dhur veddnta-vedinah. since it is quite reasonable to suppose that false knowledge is produced by defective senses which oppose the rise of true knowledge and positively induce that a false appearance 1 . position. then here is a false proposition. p. and moreover it cannot through such a perception (e. then it would be hard to find out any true proposition or true experience. If the falsity of all propositions be said to be due to a failure to note differences. the tendency of a man to pick up the piece of silver. was no was only the conch-shell that appeared though it serves all the of a perceptual object. and therefore all inferences would be doubtful.g. 79. There could be no case in which one could assure himself that he was dealing w ith a real association and 7 not a failure to apprehend the absence of association (asamsargagrahd). Ibid. the falsehood of which is not due to a failure to note differences. 66. Citsukha therefore contends that it is too much to expect all cases of false knowledge can be explained as being due to mere non-apprehension of difference. and it is precisely this character that silver in the past it as silver. if it is admitted to be false. then Prabhakara s There is contention false. All cases of real and true association could be explained as being due to a failure to note differences.xi] Citsukha s Interpretations of Veddnta Concepts all 155 can never explain cases of false apprehension.. . Cit-sukhl. cannot be described either as purposes existent or as non-existent. if this proposition is admitted to be correct. and one says that there is no silver at the present time and there . tathd dosdndm api yathdrtha-jndna-pratibandhakatvam ayathdrtha-jndnajanakatvam ca kirn na sydt. p. which is but a false per ception of a piece of conch-shell) induce a practical movement on the part of the perceiver. Neither can it be regarded as existent for the later experience contradicts the previous false perception.

. It is therefore desirable to pass on to his dialectic criticism of the Nyaya categories. Citsukha s general approach to such refu tations is same kinds also slightly different from that of Sriharsa. and his refutations of the Nyaya categories were not intended so much to show that they were inexplicable or indefinable show that they were false appearances. months. For. quickness and dura cannot by themselves indicate the nature of time as it is in It itself. however. 321. Nirnaya-Sagara Press. Bombay. 1915. and that the pure revealing Brahman was the only reality and truth. since there is nothing new in them and they have already been described in chapter x of volume I of this work. such an agency. which brings about the con nection of solar vibrations with worldly things. p. succession and simultaneity. Moreover. it cannot be said that the notions of before and after have Again. unlike Sriharsa. They may be regarded as the imtarani-parispanda-visesdndm yuva-sthavira-sarlrddi-pindesu mdsddi-vicitrabuddhi-janana-dv arena tad-upahitesu paratvdparatvddi-buddhi-janakatvam na ca fair asambaddhdndm tatra buddhi-janakatvam. is called time 1 To . (This is Vallabha s view of time. Citsukha says that time cannot perceived either by the visual sense or by the tactual sense. though the arguments of Citsukha are in many cases new and different from those given by Sriharsa. It will suffice. this Citsukha replies that. can it be apprehended by the mind (manas). making them appear as young or old only through some other agency such as days. since the self itself can be regarded as the cause of the manifestation of time in events and things in it is accordance with the varying conditions of their appearance. since the solar vibrations can only be human bodies and worldly things. and the it would be tedious to follow the refutation of of categories by two different writers. to unnecessary suppose the existence of a new category called time. by Pratyak-svarupa1 bhagavat. time as their material cause. associated with may be urged that. as to self- be in refuting time (kala).156 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. The notions of tion. tasya ca kdla iti samjnd. for the validity of these notions is challenged by the Vedantist. as the mind only operates in association with the external senses.. nor Thus. It is unnecessary to deal with the other doctrines of Vedanta which Citsukha describes. before and after. etc. it cannot be inferred.) Nayana-prasddirii commentary on Cit-sukht. to give only a few of these criticisms. na ca sdksdt sambandho raviparispanddndm pindair asti atah tat-sambandhakatayd kascid astadravya-vilaksano dravya-visesah smkartavyah. as they mostly refer to the refutation of such kinds of categories as are discussed in Srlharsa s great work Khandana- khanda-khadya. since there are no perceptual data. Citsukha dealt with the principal propositions of the Vedanta.

if the wholes are different from the parts. that the atoms are therefore regarded as the last state. if they are partly in the parts. It . peats Sankara s refutation of the concept of wholes and parts. relativity (apeksa-buddhi). many particles may make gross appearances possible even without combining. and. and. given that sense of relativity. the concept of contact (samyogd) also inexplicable. it is not indispensable that atoms should combine to form bigger particles or make grosser appearances possible for. contended equally be regarded as the that. In refuting the atomic theory of the Vaisesikas Citsukha says is that there no ground for admitting the Vaisesika atoms. then the same may apply to the atoms as well. would be difficult to if they are not maintain that the wholes were . they have parts and cannot therefore be considered as indivisible. . Citsukha then re . then there would be many such wholes. saying that. if they are in the parts. From considerations of some data be discarded for relative space cannot be perceived by the senses or inferred for want of data of ex perience. made of parts. If these be admitted on the ground that all things are to be conceived as being divisible into smaller and smaller parts. visibility of the trasarenus could not be put forward as a reason why they could not be regarded as indivisible Moreover. It is therefore unnecessary admit the existence of relative space as a separate category. since these are visible. then the same difficulty of wholes is and parts would appear. then the specks of dust that are seen in the windows when the sun is shining (called irasarenus) If it is may last stage of divisible size. if the atoms were partless . they must be either wholly or partly in them if they are wholly in the parts. the mind can in association with our experience of bodily movements form the notion of to relative space. how could they be admitted to combine to produce the grosser material forms? Again. . it may be said in reply that. then they must be in the parts or they it would not be there in the parts. Again.xi] Citsukha s Interpretations of Vedanta Concepts 157 pressions produced by a greater or lesser quantity of solar vibra tions. since the Nyaya writers admit that the atoms can be perceived by the yogins. like threads in a sheet. If it is urged that one to atoms are must stop somewhere. Both time and relative space originate from a sense of relative space (dik) has to . since its apprehension can be explained on the basis of our known data of experience. There is therefore no necessity to admit time as a separate category. or in each part the whole would be found. and are uniform in size and not further divisible.

then contact (samyoga) would include even the relation of inherence. and there are no two separate things which can be related. etc. such as that which exists between a piece of cloth and the threads. until one knows the meaning of the concept of contact. and even the pos session of an article by purchase would have to be included as contact. 300. since in the case of partless entities the relation of contact cannot connect the parts. as separate numbers. are actually produced. the relation between substance and quality would not be a relation. Moreover. It relation to be cannot be objected that &quot. three. If it is defined as the coming together of two things which are unrelated. were valid. p. Citsukha refutes the concept of separation (vibhaga) on the same lines and passes over to the refutation of number. If it is defined as a relation which is produced in time and is transitory (anityah sambandhah janyatva-visesito va). since what we per ceive is but the one thing. but are imaginatively pro duced by mental oscillation and association from the experience of single objects. We simply deal with the notions of two. then there are two terms here also. tathdbhutdyd eva buddher dvitvddi-vyavahdra-janakatvopapattau dvitvddy-utpddakatva-kalpand-vaiyarthydt.158 The Sankara School of Vedanta [CH. If the objector means that the relation must be between two terms. three and the like. the article possessed and the possessor. There is therefore no necessity of thinking that the numbers.not in contact. These numbers therefore do not exist separately and independently. three. of mental association 1 . as two. is not a relation. .&quot. etc. etc. na. then cases of beginningless contact would not be included. as they have no parts. one cannot under . Citsukha urges that there is no necessity of admitting the existence of two. and then by a sense of oscillation and mutual reference (apeksa-buddhi) we associate them together and form the notions of two. two.possession&quot.. if the objection . since a such must be between two things for. stand the meaning of the phrase &quot. then again it would be wrong. etc. cannot be defined as the coming together of any two things which are not in contact (apraptayoh prdptih samyogah) for. three. if contact is defined as relation which does not connect two things in their entirety (avyapya-vrttitva-visesito). since this relation of possession is also produced in time. Nayana-prasddinl. namely. three. since quality and substance exist together. on the strength of our powers 1 dropita-dvitva-tritvddi-visesitaikatva-samuccaydlamband buddhir dvitvddijaniketi cet.

then. Even if one admits the class-concept. then there would be a number of classconcepts. if each class-concept of cow were spread out over all the individual cows. If one admits a class-concept. just as one individual had certain peculiarities in perceiving one individual animal we have and in perceiving other individual animals also individuals which entitled it to be called a cow. and there would be no necessity of admitting a separate class-concept. then there would be no necessity of admitting the class-concept of cow. identity. For it would then be an individual characteristic. it is difficult to see how it can be conceived to be related to the individuals. If each class-concept of cow were wholly existent in each of the individual cows. and. If it is The question is what exactly is meant by class-concept. and. unless all the individual cows were . things the class-concept of cow exists only in the existing all cows. one has to show what constitutes the essentials of it in each case. there is^ ata. and if it is If all held that would be a medley of all would be everywhere. we have the same notion of cow. Again. one has to point out some trait or quality as that which indicates the class-concept. said that. then it may be replied that this does not necessarily imply the admission of a separate class-concept of cow. What constitutes the essentials of the concept of cow? It is difficult to formulate one universal charac teristic of cows. and this mutual dependence would make the definition of either of them impossible. inherence or any other kind of relation existing anywhere. It cannot be a relation of contact. so the other had their peculiarities which entitled them to be called cows. there class-concepts together. class-concepts existed everywhere. if one such characteristic could be found. We see reflections of the moon in different places and call each of them the moon. for.xi] Citsukhcfs Interpretations of Veddnta Concepts 159 Citsukha then refutes the notion of class-concept (jatt) on the ground that it cannot be proved either by perception or by in ference. when the notion of a cow. so as to be partly here and partly there. then those essentials would be a sufficient justification for knowing a cow as cow and a horse as horse: what then is the good of admitting a class-concept? Again. even if a class-concept be ad mitted. then how does it jump to a new cow when it is born? Nor has the class-concept any parts. and one would recognize it as a cow everywhere. if such essentials have to be found in each case. Then again one could not get at this trait or quality independently of the class-concept or at the class-concept independently of it.

as which are all however regarded being causes for the production of the shoots of plants. then the same to stand as an objection against the soul (which argument ought is an all-pervasive entity) being regarded on the Nyaya view as the common. such as earth. may be present . The cause cannot be defined as that which being there the effect follows. abiding and cause of the production of pleasure and pain. If this antecedence be further qualified as that which is present in all cases of the presence of the effect and absent in all cases of the absence of the effect. water. etc. and it is again kindled when he returns &quot.. water. since the shoots cannot be produced from seeds without the help of other co-operating factors. one could not have the notion of any concept. such a definition would not apply to those cases where by the joint a number operation of co-operating entities the effect is produced.160 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH.unconditionally (ananyatha-siddha) a qualifying condition of antecedence. If it be argued that the ass is present only because of the presence of other conditioning factors. again. even then the ass and the common abiding elements such as space. earth. then also the washerman s ass may be considered to satisfy the conditions of such an antecedence with reference to the in the fire washerman s house with his ass. etc. there is Furthermore. unless the cause can be properly defined. among of co-operating circumstances. If &quot. like an ass. but this would not justify anybody calling an irrelevant thing a cause. air. the same may be said of seeds. many . class- brought together. for then a seed cannot be regarded as the cause of the shoot of the plant. to his is house with his further added as ass). ether and the like may be regarded as causes of the fire. the effect follows for an irrelevant thing. and on the back of which the washerman be regarded carries his clothes might washerman as a thing antecedent to the smoky fire kindled in the s house and thus as a cause of fire. If objection be raised against the possibility of ether (akasa) being regarded as the cause of smoke on the ground of its being a all-pervasive element. Cause. house (when the washerman is away from the the fire in the washerman s house is also absent. Citsukha says that cause cannot be denned as mere antecedence (purva-kala-bhavitva) for then the ass which is always found in the house of a washerman . Moreover. cannot be defined as that which being present in the midst of the co-operating factors or even accessories (sahakari). light. Speaking of the refutation of cause (karana).

a cause cannot collocation be defined as a collocation of things. A cause cannot far &quot. for the Nyaya holds that there are eternal substances such as atoms. such a by the plurality of causes (fire may be produced by rubbing two pieces of wood. would be non-existent. and which not being there there is no effect (sati bhdvo saty abhava eva) for . souls. In refuting the conception of substance (dravya) Citsukha says that a substance can be defined only as being that in which the qualities inhere.cause. what does this collocation of causes mean? It cannot mean occurrence in the same time or place. Moreover. different from the causes. such differences do not necessarily imply is maxim invalidated : that the different effects belong to different classes for the differ ences might well be due to various attendant circumstances. since it has not so been possible to define what is meant by &quot. being causeless. then things. etc. the individuals being there. as the conception of effect always depends upon the notion of cause. Again. and the supposition of a collocation of causes as producing the effects would be uncalled-for. or by a lens). since and a substance is believed quality at the DII moment even qualities are seen to have qualities by the Naiyayikas to be without any of its origination. they themselves would be cannot be said that. which have no cause. it is impossible to know it by observation. But. The phrase collocation of causes will therefore be meaningless. by striking hard against a flint. If the former be accepted. Nor can a cause be defined as that which being there the effect follows. . since such a may well be one of irrelevant things.xi] Citsukha s Interpretations of Veddnta Concepts 161 no way of defining the co-operating conditions. or identical with them. such a definition cannot JI . there being no sameness of time and place for time and place any cause.. it may be asked whether a collocation of causes (samagrl) be something &quot. be defined as a collocation of different causes. which is absurd. Since cause cannot be defined. If the latter alternative alternative would follow from individual be accepted. Even when differences are noticeable. Again. then. even if there were any such difference. not admitted. for.&quot. It may be urged that there are differences in each kind of fire produced by the different agencies to which it may be replied that. since the individuals are the causes of the col location. there is always the colloca tion and so always the effect. then effects causes as well. neither can effect (karya) be it respectively. if the existence of cause be without satisfactorily defined. Again.

atiteh katham ndtivydptih. there will be a vicious infinite. since the qualities of number and separateness cannot be said to have any further qualities. Ibid. Ibid. For in the first case a substance. again. is itself is associated with the class-concept of substance. properly distinguish or define a substance. and in the latter case it would be difficult to find anything that cannot be called a substance. . 178. cannot exist in a negation 1 It may again be asked whether the absence of the negation of qualities refers to the negation of a in either case number it is of qualities or the negation of all qualities . tannirupanam susakam. p. Substances. it may be said in reply that the charge of vicious infinite cannot be made. as a quality. for where is the substance which lacks all qualities? The fact also remains that even such a roundabout definition cannot distin guish a substance from a quality. p. a definition would make us regard even negation (abhava) . If a substance be defined in a roundabout way as that in which there is no presence of the absolute negation of possessing qualities (gunavattvatyantdbhdvanadhikaranata) then also it may be objected that such . 4 Ibid. them all 4 . 176.1 62 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. There Prasastapada defines guna as that which inheres in a substance. 179. iti anugata-pratyayah pramdnam iti cenna suvarnamupalabhya mrttikdm-upalabhyamdnasya laukikasya tad evedam dravyam iti pratyayd-bhdvdt parlk$akdndm cdnugata-pratyaye vipratipatteh. if qualities are admitted to have further qualities. wrong. since the absence of the negation of qualities. asminnapi vakra-laksane gunddisu apt samkhyd-prthaktva-gunayoh pr. p. would not be called a substance. being itself a negation. 1 without any quality karanam svasya svasminnavrtteh 2 tatraiva atyantdbhave tivydpteh. sopi hi gunavattvdtyantdbhdvas tasyddhiCit-sukht. 177. therefore it cannot be admitted that in the sub stances one finds any characteristic which remains the same in . have nothing in common by virtue of which they could be regarded as coming under the 3 Gold and mud and trees are all class-concept of substances as substances. but there is nothing common in them regarded by virtue of which one can think that gold is the same as mud or tree. 3 jatim abhyupagacchatd tajjdti-vyanjakam kimcid-avasyam abhyupeyam na ca . for even qualities have the numerical qualities and the qualities of separateness 2 If it is argued that. dravyam dravyam . p. Referring to qualities (guna). which contains only some qualities and does not possess others. Citsukha deals with the definition of guna in the Vaisesika-bhasya of Prasastapada.

how he was not equal to the task and remained content with criti cizing the definitions given by the Naiylyikas. quality cannot involve the phrase &quot. The class-concept of quality. and in that sense (except for a tendency to find faults of a purely verbal nature in Nyaya defini tions) Sriharsa s method was it an application of to the actual definitions of the a continuation of Nagarjuna s. as given by the Nyaya. which supposed that all that was It aimed at refuting these definitions in order to prove that the natures of all things are indefinable. Prasastapdda-bhdsya. and Nyaya. and so the phrase &quot. n. is meaningless. Nyaya. Benares. 94. In some cases. again. p. Nagarjuna s main attempt thesis is that all things are relative and hence indefinable in 1 sarvesdm gunatvdbhisambandho dravydsntatvam rupddindm gundndm nirgunatvam niskriyatvam. That it is easy to pick holes in all definitions was taught long ago by Nagarjuna. though Sriharsa and Citsukha carried out an ever. from whatever point of view one at the question. The Vizianagram Sanskrit Series. But the definition of a . elaborate show scheme of a critique of the different categories in order to that the definitions of these categories. Hence. as their existence and nature are all involved in may a. can be determined only when the general character of qualities is known and the nature of class-concepts also is determined. who to refute Nagarjuna s conclusions. Sriharsa was a protest against the realistic definitions of the knowable was also definable. properly its difference from motion is not known. The only reality is Brahman. it is may look impossible to define qualities.which has no motion&quot. n.without a quality&quot.xij Dialectic of Nagdrjuna and Vedanta Dialectic 1 163 and which has no motion (niskrtya) . It will appear from what has been adduced that Citsukha and enters into detail concerning most concepts of particular categories tries to show their intrinsic impossibility. Sankara himself had started it in his refutation of the Nyaya and other systems in his commentary on the Veddnta-sutras. for quality is still to be defined. But the most important part of Nagarjuna s method was de made no liberately ignored by Sriharsa and his followers. Again. . But it may be well to point out here that.Vaisesika. are impossible. It is needless now to multiply examples of such refutation by Citsukha. yet neither of them can be regarded as the originator of the application of the dialectic method in the Vedanta.Vaisesika. unless the guna is defined. The The Dialectic of dialectic of Nagarjuna and the Vedanta Dialectic. 1895.

and. Published by the of Sciences of the U.S. Academy .164 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. while Bhavaviveka sought to estab to show that for the true . At this time the Yogacara school of Mahayana monism developed in the north. During the Gupta empire.S.. The school of Bhavya was called Madhyamika-Sautrantika on account of his supplementing Nagarjuna s arguments with special argu ments of his own. who wrote a separate work on the same subject in 400 verses. of Valabhl in Surat. but incomprehensible as well.D. a Ceylonese by birth.R. and the aim of this school was knowledge of the one consciousness (vijnana) all logical arguments were futile. they cannot be said to possess any essences of their own. Asahga and Vasubandhu flourished. in the fifth century A. In the sixth century A. For about two centuries after this the doctrines of Nagarjuna lay dormant. but also that it is ever produced in any one of the above ways. the master commentator on Nagar)una sMadhyamika-karikd. lish his idealistic monism by logical arguments. Nagarjuna was followed by Aryadeva. since all logic is futile and inconsistent. Leningrad. In taking up his refutation of the various categories of being Nagarjuna begins with the examination of causation.D. since their essences are not only indefinable and indescribable. All logical arguments showed only their own inconsistency 1 It seems very probable that Srlharsa was inspired by these Yogacara authors. of Orissa. 1927. It was this Madhyamika scheme of Candraklrti that finally was utilized in Tibet and Mongolia for the realization of idealistic monism.D the relativist philosophy of Nagarjuna again flourished in the hands of Buddhapalita. does not refer to them. Buddha palita sought to prove that the apprehension and realization of the idealistic monism cannot be made by any logical argument. 66-67. and of Bhavya. and their relativist allies from Nagarjuna to Bhavya. But Nagarjuna denies not only that anything is ever produced. or Bhavaviveka. pp. and Candraklrti. themselves. and so there is no way of discovering their essences. Causation is regarded as being from the inner changes of some permanent or abiding production stuff or through the conglomeration (samagrl) of several factors or through some factors operating upon an unchangeable and abiding stuff. Buddhapalita holds that things cannot arise in the non-Buddhistic systems of philosophy 1 The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana. as is evidenced by the fact that Buddhaghosa of the fourth century A. s supported Buddhapalita scheme as against the Candraklrti finally scheme of Bhava viveka and tried to prove the futility of all logical arguments.

says that the refutation of Buddhapalita should have been supplemented with reasons and examples and that his refutation would imply the undesirable thesis that. reality or unreality of . there will be an infinite regress. If I did (really) cognize some (separate) things. however. Upon the basis of these things perceived or (inferred). p. 36. sarvasya janma ca bhavet khalu sarvatas ca tulyam paratvam akhile janake pi yasmdt.xi] Dialectic of Ndgdrjuna and Vedanta Dialectic if 165 of themselves. is free to find fault with other views. are Buddhapalita. can commit mistakes just for the sake (of proving) But I have none. But Candraklrti objects to this criticism of Bhavaviveka and says that the burden of proof cause and effect lies in establishing the identity of with the opponents. they already existing. anything or in the combination of reality and unreality 1 This was exactly the point of view that was taken by Sriharsa. Therefore there was no way in which the Vedanta view could be attacked. 16. and that again. criticizing . Ibid. Sriharsa says that the Vedantists have no view of their own regarding the things of the world and the various cate gories involved in them. Therefore I cannot be assailed on such a basis 2 sad asat sad~asac ceti yasya pakso na vidyate updlambhas cirendpi tasya vaktum na sakyate. Mddhyamika-vrtti. then things would eternally continue to be produced. and. the Samkhyists. Nagarjuna writes in his Vigraha-vydvartani thus : When I I have these (of my own to prove). if things are not produced of themselves. if that which is existent has to be produced again. . . I could then make an affirmation or a denial . It is unnecessary to give any new it is argument to refute the Samkhya sat-kdrya-vada view enough to point out the inconsistency of the Samkhya view. its business is finished. I cannot be accused (of being inconsistent). who hold that view. they must be produced by other factors. and. there is no in their being produced if things that are existing are regarded as capable of being produced again. when once this is done and the inconsistencies of other positions are pointed out. since it does not believe in the . There is no meaning in the production of what already exists. anyat pratltya yadi ndma paro bhavisyat jdyeta tarhi bahulah sikhino ndhakdrah p. The Vedanta. But these (separate) things do not exist for me. meaning since. Bhavaviveka. Thus Aryadeva says that the Madhyamika view has no thesis of its own which it seeks to establish. for it has no view of its own to establish.

e. they quarrel with it also themselves. So. then any number of counterassertions may be made for which no proof need be shown and.g. But. they cannot be required in . if proofs are not required in one case. Things are not produced by any conglomeration of foreign for. but not in adducing any new arguments or any new counter. Since there is no thesis. the Madhyamika has nothing to Mddhyamika-vrtti. the other. to which the author is indebted for the translation and some of the materials of the last two paragraphs. . . and. it cannot be produced by a combination of them both. See also Stcherbatsky s The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana. if their affirma the to offer new arguments or tions contain any thesis. dark ness from light 1 And. the Madhyamikas must give some proofs. if the thesis that all existents are unproved&quot. and this would involve a further specification of the nature of such proofs and a specification of the number of valid proofs admitted by them.theses. since the Madhyamikas have no theses of their own. The Madhyamika answer such an objection. So one could with equal validity assert that all existents are real and are produced from causes. Again. whatever a view may be. not possible for new examples in Madhyamikas since they have no view of their own to support.1 66 The Sankara School of Veddnta Candrakirti thus emphasizes the fact that it is [CH. it must be established by proper proof. any cause (ahetutah). The Buddhist logicians try to controvert this view by pointing out that. 36. criticizing any view. So of criticism consists only in finding fault with all theses. as formulated by Candrakirti. In an argument one can only follow the principles that one admits no one can be defeated by arguments carried on on the basis of principles admitted only by his opponents. were it so. is a mere assertion without any proof to support it. They cannot even prove their own affirmations. is that the Madhyamika has no thesis of his own and so the question whether his thesis is supported by valid proof or not is as meaningless as to the question regarding the smallness or the greatness of a mule s horn. and in replying to the counter-charges so far as inconsistencies can be found in the the Madhyamika scheme opponents theses and methods. in order to prove the thesis that all existents are unproduced. whatever they may be. 1 . the world could not have sprung into being without factors or causes . p. if a thing cannot be produced out of itself or out of others. there would be no law of such production and anything might come from any other thing.

of a thing is what it is in itself Candrakirti holds that. but only such as would appeal to their hearers.thing in itself&quot. There quite competent to deal with is a phenomenal reality and order which is true for the man in the street and on which all our linguistic and other usages are based. Candrakirti . should he hold the proposition that all existents are (sarve bhava anutpannah)? To this the Madhyamika such propositions appear as definite views only to ordinary people. not accept the realistic conceptions of the is Nyaya school. restricts it to the unique thing and thinks that all associations of quality in itself (sva-laksand) and relations are ex traneous to perceptions and should be included under imagination or inference. and their relations are also conceived as real. The proper attitude for the wise is always to remain silent. This however does violence to our ordinary experience and yet serves no better purpose for the definition of perception . since relations are also per Dinnaga was as much a relative concept as the relational things that are popularly perceived as true that being so. it is meaningless to define perception as being only the thing in itself. They impart instruction only from a unproduced replies that popular point of view to those who want to listen to them. as given by Dinnaga so. Dinnaga. Their arguments are not their own or those which they believe to be right. if the Madhyamika has no thesis of his own. thus does not think that any good can be done by criticizing the realistic logic of the Naiyayikas. While Dinnaga urges that . not to the wise. and . If that is why not from the transcendental point of view. things are relational as well. the Nyaya logic is them and give an account of them. In the phenomenal view things are ad mitted to be as they are perceived. who on the one hand accepted the view-point of popular experience and regarded on the other all things as having a real objective existence. The &quot. But it may well be asked why.xi] Dialectic of Ndgdrjuna and Vedanta Dialectic 167 say regarding the nature of valid proofs (pramand) or their number. It is interesting to refer to the discussion of Candrakirti with Dinnaga regarding the nature of sense-percep tions. so far as popular perceptions or conceptions go. It is not out of place here to mention that the Madhyamika school wishes to keep the phenomenal and the real or the transcen dental views wide apart. Phenomenally substances exist as well as their qualities. (sva-laksana) ceived to be true. which fit in with the popular experience? This reminds us of the attitude of the Vedantists. since. in defining perception.

The main principle which Nagarjuna employs in refuting the idea of causation or production in various ways is that. it cannot be the cause of 1 anything else . That which has no essence in itself cannot be caused by anything else. it regarded it as somehow existing by itself and invented a theory of perception by which it could be considered as being manifested by coming in illusorily imposed on it. if a thing exists. 1 If it is urged that going 1. Nagarjuna similarly examines the concepts of going and coming and says that the action of going is not to be found in the space traversed. it cannot be produced. and this relation must mean that it was in some way existent in them. as the Vedanta was unable interpretations of experience and to give the manifold world-appearance a footing in reality. as the Naiyayikas used to think. The Vedanta there fore could not agree with their definitions. and. namely. that the self-luminous Brahman was the only reality and that it was through it that everything else was manifested. cannot produce the effect. and apart from the space traversed and not traversed there cannot be any action of going. if it does not exist. But. having no essence in itself. Production of anything out of some foreign or extraneous causes implies that it is related to them. 90. who had no view-points of their own to support. since the effect is not per ceived in those causal conditions. hand considered them on this point and unreal from the transcendental point of view of ultimate reality. it cannot be produced at all. and. Continuing the discussion on the nature of causation. and. . The attempts of Srlharsa to refute the realistic definitions of the Nyaya were intended to show that the definitions of the Nyaya could not be regarded as absolute and true. p. is 6. could leave the field of experience absolutely undisturbed and allow the realistic defini tions of the Nyaya to explain the popular experience in any way they liked. while the Madhyamikas. if it is already existent in them. Nagarjuna and Candrakirti hold that collocations of causal conditions touch with Brahman and being which are different from the effect . the Vedanta had a thesis of its own. its production becomes useless. as is held by the Hinayana Buddhists for. it cannot be produced out of them.1 68 The Sankara School of Veddnta as false [CH. The attitude of the Vedantists seems to have been directly inspired by that of the Madhyamikas. neither in the space Mddhyamika-vrtti. nor is it to be found in that which is not traversed. Nyaya But.

how can going be associated all? with the goer at Again. pea is from another pea.goes&quot. So there is here for any kind of passage no reality in going. unless some space is gone over. can be so called? by virtue of association with which a and. &quot. but in the person who continues to go. in the proposition is &quot. and that is what separate &quot. or becoming. and. (sthiti). then even without going one could be called a goer. (gantd gacchati) there satisfied by the verb only one action of going. It is as one may see in a mirror the pea beautiful face of a woman and feel attracted by it and run after was her. If going is in the goer alone. &quot. and if there is no goer without going. there cannot be a goer. if there are two actions. there are the shoots. . being already at rest. Again. it cannot be asso ciated with the space traversed.going&quot. which is impossible. since going is in him in whom there is the effort of going. if there is no going without the goer . &quot. the shoots neither are seeds nor are different from them. if the action of going is to be associated with the person who goes. exists. for who is at rest? The goer cannot be at rest. being A in another yet no pea becomes another pea. for.. there cannot be any beginning. cannot be the agent of another action of being at rest. there cannot be a goer. state of shoots (ankura). Going&quot. and the refutation of going&quot. . image of a woman s face may Just as the essenceless rouse attachment in fools. If the goer and going be regarded as then there would be neither verb nor agent. must exist. then there must be two actions and not one and.the goer is goes&quot. the seeds there. it &quot. implies that there are also two agents. since no one can be a goer unless he goes he who is not a goer. &quot. It may be urged that the movement of going is associated with the goer and that therefore going belongs to the goer but. that .re maining at rest&quot. If seeds passed into the &quot.xi] Dialectic of Ndgdrjuna and Veddnta Dialectic 169 traversed nor in the space untraversed. though the face never passed into the mirror and there no human face reflected in the reflected image. stands identical. For. A pea is neither nor different from it. since there are no two actions of going. the movement of going cannot even be begun. One action cannot be connected with both. then they would be seeds and not shoots. If both the goer and the space traversed have to be associated with going.going&quot. yet. there is no beginning and when there cannot be urged that no motion of going. then this again cannot be right. implies the refutation of all kinds of passage (niskarsand) as well. when is the motion of going.goer&quot. there there is Again. since its opposite.

nor are they interested to give a scientific reconstruction of our They are agreed in discarding the validity of as such. that the concepts which he criticized were shown by him to have been intrinsically based and constructed on notions which had no essential nature of their own. so are world-appearances the causes of our delusion and attach ment. and so on. But from what has been said it may be possible to compare or contrast Nagarjuna s dialectic with that of Sriharsa. ultimate reality of Brahman. own. however. and that again through the former or through another. but were understood only No concept revealed any intrinsic nature of and one could understand a concept only through another. its psychological experience. The oppositions shown are therefore . The entire world-appearance would thus be based on relative conceptions and be false. it does not appear that he ever properly tried to apply his own dialectic to his thesis and attempted to show that the definition of Brahman could stand the test of the criticism of his own dialectic. It is Nagarjuna needless to multiply examples and describe elaborately s method of applying his dialectic to the refutation of the various Buddhistic and other categories. But. and do not treat the concepts in a concrete manner and are not based on the testimony of our in relation to others. But. Nagarjuna mainly attacked the accepted Buddhistic categories and some other relevant categories which were directly connected with them.1 70 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. But. agreed in the view that there was no theory of the recon struction of world-appearance which could be supported as valid. while Nagarjuna had no thesis of world-experience his own to uphold. From the fact that the Nyaya could not define its categories he rushed to the conclusion that they were intrinsically indefinable and that therefore the world-appearance which was measured and scanned in terms of those categories was also false. But the entire efforts of Sriharsa were directed to showing that the definitions of the Nyaya were faulty and that there was no way in which the Nyaya could define its categories also properly. Nagarjuna s methods differ considerably from those of Sriharsa in this. Sriharsa sought to establish the validity and world-experience. Neither Nagarjuna nor Sriharsa is interested to give any rational explanation of the world-process. while Sriharsa attacked only the definitions of the Nyaya. Nagarjuna s criticisms are. however. largely of an a priori nature. Both Nagarjuna and Sriharsa were.

600). the Buddhist Dinnaga (A. 100). a follower of the Lokayata school. was very great. had taken to critical and ways of discussion. 100). 300). 760) and Kamalaslla Doctrine.D. the grammarian-philosopher Bhartrhari (A.D. It some of such as Srlharsa. the Mimamsist Kumarila Bhatta (A. the rhetorician Bhamaha (A. based on the dialectical methods of Nagarjuna.D. The criticism of the different schools of Indian thought. but many dialectical other Buddhist writers. Sriharsa altogether different plan of approach. Buddhist Sarighabhadra Vasubandhu (A. as contained in Santaraksita s Tattva-samgraha with Kamalaslla s commentary Panjika. the Buddhist Dharmakirti (A. the Samkhyist Isvarakrsna (A. 400). the (A. the (A. 200).D. Dharmatrata (A. . Citsukha and others. mentally more convincing and more direct than the elaborate roundabout logical subtleties of Srlharsa s dialectic. has also been pointed out that not only Nagarjuna and Candra kirti. 150).D. show wonderful powers following an of regarded as and finesse.D. 300). Ghosaka yana (A.D.D.D.D. while the frequent verbalism of discredit to his whole venture. logical subtlety s criticisms. though the total effect can hardly be an advance from the strictly philosophical point of view.D. Buddhadeva (A. A. Santaraksita lived in the first half of the eighth century and Kamalaslla was probably refuted the views his junior contemporary. 350). the Naiyayika Vatsyathe Mimamsist Sabarasv^min (A.D.D. 300). the Samkhyist Vindhyasvamin (A. But as a rule they are based on the fundamentally relative nature of as the criticisms of Srlharsa our experience.D. (A. (a) Criticisms of the Sdmkhya Parindma Vedanta In tracing the history of the dialectical ways of thinking in the it has been pointed out in the previous sections that the influence of Nagarjuna and Candrakirti on Sankara and his followers..D. They are never half so elaborate but at the same time they are funda . the Jaina Acaryasuri Samkhyist Mathara Acarya (A.xi] Dialectical criticisms of Santaraksita and Kamalaslla 171 very often of an abstract nature and occasionally degenerate into verbalism. many of his criticisms is a Dialectical criticisms of Santaraksita (A. 350). Buddhapalita and Candrakirti. 650). the Naiyayika Uddyotakara (A. 500). 650).D.D. 640).D. They of Kambalasvatara. the Buddhist Vasumitra (A. 478). as forerunners of Vedanta Dialectics. It cannot be denied that.D. 390). 680).D. is a remarkable instance of this.

In criticizing the Samkhya views they say that. were in all probability greatly in this fluenced. 700). then the occurrence of new qualities one to hold the view that the causal substance is undergoing transformations (parinama). 700).D. for. are collected from Dr B. does not take responsibility for them. etc. 700). the causal scheme of the Samkhya. 700). be identical with the cause.D. then the causal and the effect states should abide together in the later product. 700). and a new state If that a previous state is arrested it is urged that causal trans cannot entitle if they are. why should they be produced from the pradhanat If they are identical. the Naiyayika Aviddhakarna (A. it may be asked whether such qualities are different from the causal sub stance or not.D. Bhavivikta (A.D. the Buddhist Yugasena (A. which is impossible. which also reveals the nature of the critical thinking that prevailed among the Buddhists before Sankara and by which Sankara and his followers. Ahrika (A. and that is avowedly not available here. the evolutes. for this would only mean is produced. since he cannot spare the room for proper discussions. Again.172 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. 1 These dates The . 700). which means identity in diversity. The ordinary way of determining causality is invariable antecedence. then the first part of the argument would reappear. Prasastamati (A. yet. if curds. If the changing qualities and the causal substance are identical.D.D. the Jaina Subhagupta (A.D.D. 700). the pradhana. by Santaraksita and Kamalaslla yet some of the important points of these criticisms may be noted in order to show the nature and importance of work. the very arguments that are given in favour of the sat-karya-vada (existence of the effect in the cause) could be turned against it. if it changes. Sumati (A.D. then there is nothing that remains as a permanent it cause . The idea of parinama. 1 . then the evolutes themselves might be regarded as cause or the pradhana as effect. formation means the assumption of new qualities. 700) It is all a complete analysis of not possible here. of course. and the Mlmamsist Uveyaka (A. if the effects. already exist samgraha. Sankarasvamin (A. though he thinks that many of these dates are generally approximately correct. the Jaina Patrasvamin (A. Thus. if it is urged that any entity changes into diverse forms.Bhattacharya s foreword to the Tattvapresent author. Citsukha or Anandajnana.D. to enter into the criticisms of the different philosophers . 700). like Sriharsa. is also inadmissible. 700). If does not change. it may be asked whether the nature of the causal entity also changes or does not change.

then it is admitted that the to effects are actually non-existent in the cause. since according to the sat-karya-vada theory causal productions are impossible. some new characteristic or some knowledge some obscuration to the comprehension. however. if it is different. then there is production of what was non-existent. In it may again be asked whether this new character (svabhavatisayd) that is generated by the application of the premises is different from the decisive conclusion itself or identical with no meaning in its admissible between introduction. are also inadmissible. but were produced by the application of arguments. is If it is urged that. are already existent. Again.xi] Dialectical criticisms of Sdntaraksita and Kamalasila 173 in the nature of the milk. nothing ought to be capable of being definitely asserted. since any attempt to introduce a relation between it. brought about by the causal operation. this would mean that what was non-existent could be produced. admit in the cause some specific character istic. the Samkhyist may be asked to define application what he means by such manifestation (abhivyakti). is actualized. then produced from it? If there is it what is the meaning of their being no idea of production. In the light of the above criticisms. and that the causal operations which actualize the effects produce some specific determinations in the cause. being effects. Again. and thus the sat-karya-vada cisive conclusions. in consequence of which the effect. though the decisive conclusion (niscaya) tative premises. it is theory fails. which was non-existent before. according to Samkhya. the application of all Samkhya arguments might be regarded as futile. yet the already existent before the application of it argumen may be regarded as being manifested by the of those premises. If it is identical. since all arguments are intended to arrive at decisive conclusions but de of either buddhi. that only particular kinds of effects are produced from particular kinds of causes. on account of the absence of which the effects remained in the potential state in the and we have cause. there is no idea of causality. is urged that the effects are potentially and causal operations only actualize them. If existent in the cause. the arguments of Samkhya in favour of sat-karya-vada. since according to the sat-karya-vada theory doubts and errors are always existent as a modification manas or caitanya. contended that decisive conclusions were not existent before. If. there is . which would be against the sat-karya-vada theory. . This manifes tation may mean either or the withdrawal of the first alternative. no relation is these two.

according to the law of different kinds of causal forces (karana-sakti-pratiniyamai). is mental. so here also. As the Satkaryavadins think that out of the same three gunas different kinds of effects may be pro duced according to causal collocations. divested from all associations of a 2 previous and a succeeding point of time The meaning of a-satkarya-vada is that an entity called the effect is seen immediately a. . of the thing that is being produced. It cannot mean the rise of the knowledge about that particular object for the manifestation of which the premises are applied.existent. for certainly there is no such non-existent entity which comes into 1 Production in reality means nothing more than the charac being teristic of the moment only. that know ledge is already there. according to the sat-karya-vada theory.sat-karya-vada. it is of the varying capacities of the causal forces that the various effects of the causes are produced. if there is any false knowledge. two unrelated would launch us into a vicious infinite (anavastha). Tattva-samgraha-panjikd. it could not be destroyed. 33. and therefore there could be no emancipation. Thus the argument that that which is non existent has false no form (nairupya) and therefore cannot be produced is for the operation of production represents itself the character . The law of causal forces is thus ultimately funda misnomer. Again. . and therefore all persons should always remain emancipated.sat-karya-vada. Again. in reality. that also must be ever. Ibid. yet a few words maybe said in reply to the Samkhya refuta tion of a. kintu kdlpaniko yam vyavahdro yad asad ntpadyata iti ydvat. different kinds of non-existing effects come into being. Santaraksita and Kamalasila then urge that. 2 vastundm purvdpara-koti-sunya-ksana-mdtrdvasthdyl svabhdva eva utpddah ity ucyate. As a matter of fact. it cannot mean the removal of the obscuration of knowledge. for. be on account thus solely due to the diverse nature of the causal forces that produce them. and therefore there ought to be no bondage.174 The Sankara School of Veddnta entities [CH. however. for true knowledge is ever-existent. though the above refutation of the sat-karya-vada ought naturally to prove the a-satkarya-vdda (the production of that which did not exist before) doctrine. the whole of the teachings of Samkhya philosophy directed to the rise of true knowledge ought to be false. It meaningless to hold that the limitation of causal forces is to is found in the pre-existence of effects for. 1 na hy asan-ndma kincid asti yad utpattim dviset. The name a . if there is obscuration. for. The production of various effects is . p.

Refuting the other Samkhya doctrines. but from different lumps. then the existence of the effect in the cause is naturally denied for it is the exist in the . it is held that even pleasurable objects may appear painful to someone. it would have been perceived it is therefore said that the effect did not exist before. so all objects are produced from one prakrti\ but is many and limited this also is a fallacious argument. Santaraksita and Kamalasila point out that. if an effect (e. this cannot lead us to infer that there is one such cause as the prakrti of the Samkhyists. since all earthen things are not out of one lump of earth. this.xi] Dialectical criticisms of Santaraksita and Kamalasila 175 after a particular causal operation. there is no reason for garded admitting one eternal prakrti as the source of them all. then from the fact that the world of objects be pleasurable or painful. however.g. but this should not be interpreted to mean that the Buddhists believed in the non-existing existence of the effect. then the fact that the same objects may appear pleasurable to some and painful to would be unexplainable. It is sometimes held that. though it may be inferred that the world of effects must have its causes. as all earthen things are produced from one earth. since only conscious states can be regarded as pleasurable or painful. if objective material things were themselves pleasurable or painful.g. . before this second moment. curd) is said to exist in the cause (e. There is no sense at all in describing material things as of the nature of pleasure or pain. which suddenly came into being after the causal operadon. form of potency of the effect that exists in the cause and not the effect itself. it cannot do so in the actual form of the effect. milk). being made up and non-eternal one ought to suppose that the cause of the objects also should be many. however. the Samkhyists believe that all sensible things are of the nature of pleasure and pain. Again. If. produced Thus. moment of the causal operation. if and it it certainly did not exist first did exist at the . on account of his particular state of mind or bad destiny. limited and noneternal. then the objects them others selves cannot as if objects are re of three gunas. If it is said to a special capacity or potency (sakti). If causes are similar to effects. Again. since then milk would have tasted as curd. since. is obviously im possible. Again.

etc. There exist therefore only loose and discrete sense. etc. for trees. There are no objects which can be perceived by the two senses. that it is wrong to make any assertion from the former to the latter. The argument that. Criticism of Isvara. so trees. there is no proof that it is one identical object that is perceived by the eye as well as touched. which men fancy themselves to be perceiving. are different. If two colour sensibles. etc. must also have been made by that there one intelligent creator inference cannot be made from mere . is wrong.176 The Sankara School of Veddnta (b) [CH. . To this Santaraksita and Kamalaslla reply that we perceive only the different kinds of visual and tactile sensibles and that there are no further shaped wholes or so-called objects. etc. say the yellow and blue. since a state of arrest breaks up into a state of natural phenomena. data. seen in the day. The argument that. since jugs. since a causal similarity of any description there must be a law of unconditional and invariable connection (pratibandha). What exist therefore are not wholes having colour and tactile characters. then still more different are the colour sensibles and the tactile ones. there must be an motion or production in all intelligent creator.. an intelligent creator. that we touched in the night when we did not see it. is faulty.. and it is meaning same object or whole which has both characteristics. but only discrete elements of colour and tactile sense-data the combining of them into wholes is due only to false imagination. The general Buddhist arguments the existence of any eternal entity will also apply against against the existence of any eternal God. different kinds of entities less to say that it is the colour and tactile from tactile sense. existence of There being thus no shaped wholes. It is meaningless to think that the visual sensibles and tactile sensibles go together to form one whole object. the supposition of the God as shaper and organizer is inadmissible. of the chief arguments of the Naiyayika theists in favour of the existence of God is based on the fact that the specific forms One and shapes of the different objects in the world cannot be explained except on the supposition of an intelligent organizer or shaper. are made by an intelligent potter. they are wrong for colour sensibles or sense-data are entirely . are so different in nature from jugs. When people say that it is the same coloured object. The fact that there are the effects cannot lead to the inference is mere and organizer.data.

then also be asked whether at the time of productive activity (sarga) may the activity of dissolution or of maintenance (sthiti) may also be as accessory causes it expected to be operated. prakrti and Isvara being eternal causes. one would expect to have simultaneous pro duction of all effects. If it is urged that. the old objection of simultaneous production Moreover. hills. or whether at the time of dissolution. though all kinds of forces are existent in prakrti. Again. because God only creates when He wishes. for here also. If it is urged that the three gunas behave The arguments urged in refutation of prakrti also apply against the with reference to God s operation. since God s will is regarded Him and one. if it is urged that the above argument does not hold. His will cannot be transitory. may be granted that all Again. He ought not to depend on accessory assistance. yet it is only those that become operative that take effect. even if for argu diverse natural objects and phenomena. He being the creator of all such accessory circumstances. if opponents themselves. and that another. of the production of any particular phenomenon all other pheno mena are not produced.xi] Dialectical criticisms of Sdntaraksita is and Kamalasila 177 for there no state of arrest in nature . all things in the world things are happening in succession. they could not render any assistance in His creation. if He and His will be always present. etc. through the operation of a causal agent. and this would introduce a third factor. and yet at the moment as eternal holds good. then everything would have sprung into being all at once. since God is eternal and since His will depends only on Him and Him alone. Now. for. then it may be replied that. by the arguments of the are momentary. causality of Isvara and prakrti. He must have another being to guide His operations. while others are inoperative. such as trees. there might be productive operation as well. thus the joint causality of purnsa DII 2 . and there would thus be a vicious infinite. Again. then God also must be operating at intervals and. at intervals. Therefore there is argument in favour of the existence of one omniscient creator.. presuppose intelligent creators. then those phenomena cannot be regarded as being caused by s natural objects. no and Isvara would which admits the joint Patanjala-Samkhya. If God had been the creator. it may be objected that some other kind of cause has to be admitted for making some powers of prakrti operative. and that another. there is no argu ment for supposing that one intelligent creator is the cause of all ment sake it God or by His will.

If He created the world out of mere playful instincts. then there is no reason to suppose that He would be able to do it at intervals. are not like material objects. (c) Refutation of the Soul Theory. then there would be simultaneous production. He would have created and destroyed the world simultaneously. it may then be pointed out that the analogy of spider s webs is false. If He derived much enjoyment from His productive and destructive play. the world would not have been so full of misery. then these playful instincts would be superior to Him. as it were. He would not have destroyed the world had He been so kind if He created and destroyed the world in accordance with the good or bad deeds. it may readily be objected that a being who creates such a great universe without any intelligent purpose would indeed be very unintelligent. just as spiders. Again.. They hold that no thought or knowledge requires any further knower for its illumina tion. . then.178 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. then He would not be independent. He would not have allowed Himself to be influenced by the consequences of bad deeds in producing misery in the world. since the spider does not naturally produce webs. the view that God produces the world through kindness is also false for. God. so God also may be producing the world gradually and not all at once. Again. which would . and its activities are determined by such motives. however. If it is urged that the world was produced naturally by His own existence. If He is not capable of creating and de stroying the world simultaneously. if it had been so. is objected to by Santaraksita and Kamalaslla. Again. etc. If it is urged that creation flows from God unconsciously. If it is objected that. is also easily refuted. and prakrti . had it been so. if He were able. feelings. though they naturally go on producing webs. that our thoughts must have a knower and that our desires and feelings must have some entity in which they may inhere and that this entity is soul and that it is the existence of this one soul that explains the fact of the unity of all our conscious states as the experience of one individual. Had He been independent. there being before creation no beings. there would be a vicious infinite. God could not feel kindness to non existent beings. The Nyaya view of the soul. is One who can have only one uniform motive. yet do not produce them all at once. desires. but only through greed for eating insects.

On the other hand. It to senses is cannot be said that . that it cannot be conceived related to it. is regarded as one eternal consciousness. but this is false. The so-called unity of consciousness is due to a false unifying imagination of the momentary ones as one. soul theory of the ( d) Nyaya and Refutation of the Mlmamsa Theory of the Self.xi] Dialectical criticisms of Sdntaraksita and Kamalaslla 179 require a receptacle in which they might be placed. as all material objects are soulless. then know or the knowing faculty (buddhi) ought also to be regarded ledge as one and eternal. The sense of ego cannot be said to refer to . since. It is sometimes argued that the existence is proved by the fact that a man is living only so long as his vital currents are connected with the soul. it refers sometimes to our body (as when I say. deaf its &quot. yet it passed through various changing phases of other feeling and volitional states. &quot. and that he dies when they are disconnected from it. reference to body or manent and direct realization of its only indirect for no other per nature is found in experience. It is fulfilling knowledge in its aspect of ego that is often described as the self. That the self was of the nature of pure consciousness was proved by the fact that it perceives itself to be knower in the past and in the present. I am I am white &quot. To this Santaraksita and Kamalaslla reply that. though there is no objective entity corresponding to it. the self. So the existence of the self is proved by the fact of self-consciousness. &quot. the same kinds of the soul unless the existence of soul be proved. however. as it is supposed to be. and sometimes to intellectual states. though the nature of the self as pure consciousness was eternal and unchangeable. there would not have been such diversity of opinion about its existence. etc. for the sense of ego is not eternal. also often arise in succession and cannot therefore be regarded as inhering in a permanent self. say that the self is directly perceived in experience if it had not been. but seemingly Kumarila does not if the self similarly .).. the supposition of its con nection with vital currents as determining life is untenable. desires. Some. so also are human body beings. The con clusion is that.). sometimes to the senses (as when I say. Feelings. It is also well known that different entities may be regarded as combined on account of their of functions. The supposed Thus eternal soul is so different from the how one there is can help the other or even be hardly any argument in favour of the Vaisesika. Kumarila believed that.

then such a cognizing faculty cannot be regarded as eternal and one. fact that there The objective entities. just as a mirror. when there are no objects? Moreover the Mlmamsist does not think that the cognizing faculty assumes the forms of the objects cognized. though it has always a capacity of burning. if they are entirely different from . Again. so the selves are eternally conscious and yet operate only in connection with their specific bodies and grasp the various kinds of sense-data. it. Again. then their changes would imply the change of the self. since there is really no reflection in the mirror itself. fire is also false. If the knowing faculty be regarded as eternal and one. since there fire that is constant the analogy of the reflecting also false. yet only reflects when the objects are presented . the self is regarded as one and eternal. the buddhi cannot be compared to a mirror as an apparatus for producing illusory images. for then some other if buddhi would be necessary for perceiving illusory images. The analogy of . If the knowing faculty is to be re garded as eternal owing to an experience of continuity of conscious ness. then how can one explain the variety of cognitions? If it is urged that the variety of cognitions is due to the assumption by the cognizing faculty of various forms of objects. then sound-cognition would be the same is is as colour-cognition. how are the varying states of cognition. one can see a reflection in a mirror at a particular angle. though the knowing faculty is one. etc. taste-cognition. and again. to be explained? If it is urged that. consider buddhi to be such. yet burns only when combustible substances are put in it) it only passes through various kinds of perception according as various kinds of objects are presented to it or.180 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. then it cannot pass through the varying feeling and volitional states. If the to change of cognitions is due to the changing operations of the senses and the sense-objects. though it has always the power of reflecting. If these states are not entirely different from the self. such as colour-cognition. but believes that cognition reveals the objects in the objective world and the cognizing faculty has itself no forms may be cognitions without a corresponding real objective presentation proves that our cogni tions are subjective and self-revealed and that they do not reveal (nirdkdrd buddhih). then how can one explain the experience of the variety of cognitions in hallucinations. If it is urged that the knowing faculty has always the power of revealing all things. and all cognitions are forged from them(selves).. the mirror therefore is only an apparatus for producing an illusory not one mirror cognition. yet (just as a fire.

be considered to be their enjoy er. tion. If one eternal ness that illusorily appears as objects.. then they would be identical with the nature of the self. and if buddhi be different from purusa. apart from the individual cognitions of colour. again. the nature of purusa cannot be affected by the varying states of pleasure and pain. and that. no eternal. but only one eternal consciousness. It is also wrong to suppose that the sense of may arise. Again. etc. The Upanisadic thinkers hold that all one eternal conscious and that there is in reality no perceiver and perceived. the of the self it is pointed out that the self as pure consciousness. one and Samkhya regards eternal. and. then there cannot be a distinction knowledge and right knowledge. (e) Refutation of the Samkhya View of the Self. then it cannot be regarded as an enjoyer. trates all its activities for the (/) The Refutation of the Upanisad View of it is the Self. then with their change the purusa also undergoes a change. the purusa cannot if the prakrti concen enjoyment of the purusa. Against this view it is urged by Santaraksita and Kamalasila that. It has in reality no specific object to refer to as the self. if the pleasurable states may be pointed out in objection could be submerged in the nature of the self in identity with itself. unchangeable consciousness is experienced. consciousness of false is the one reality. all belong to buddhi and the purusa only enjoys the reflections in the buddhi. if 181 the how should their change self affect the self? it these states all belong to the is and pleasurable state submerged urged that it is when the in the nature of the common self. bondage and emancipa There being only one reality. it self-consciousness refers to a really existing entity corresponding to it. and if they are different. is that the painful state that. and Kamalasila Again. why should the purusa suffer for what is done by the buddhit If. etc.xi] Dialectical criticisms of Sdntaraksita self. if it could be affected. If it is held that enjoyment. it ought not to be able to enjoy diverse Against the Samkhya view kinds of experiences. taste.. . it may well be objected that if the reflections in the buddhi are identical with purusa. there is no right knowledge which need be attained. as such. It may therefore be safely asserted that the existence of the self is not proved by the evidence of self-consciousness. if all actions and deeds belong to buddhi. it would itself be changeable. how can it be regarded as unconscious? Again.

a technical term. then the premise that whatever is produced is necessarily destructible would be Naiyayika view. The for their destruction condition or cause than the fact of their being produced. or in other words they are momentary. The Vatsiputriyas also similarly divide existing entities into momentary (e. etc. is false. as produced (krtaka) and unproduced (a-krtakd). is technically called ksana. p. is therefore inadmissible. or causes other than the fact of their being produced. and only positive entities depend on other conditions or causes for their production. and they hold that those which are produced are destructible. earth. It has also been stated above that destruc tion is pure negation and has therefore no characteristics which have to be generated by any positive set of causes or conditions 1 1 The word ksanika. . sound. however. and whatever has this quality is called ksanika (utpdddnantara-vindsi-svabhdvo vastunah ksana ucyate. after production.). ideas. Moreover. because at the expiry of the moment nothing remains which can be characterized as momentary. The objection of Uddyotakara that what only stays for a moment of time (ksana) It cannot be called ksanika. but the very causes that lead to the production of an entity lead also to its destruction the next moment.1 82 The Sankara School of Veddnta (g) [CH. ksana therefore does not mean time- moment.&quot. Destructibility being a necessary is characteristic of productibility. which grammatically distinguishes the possessor of the momentary character from the momentary character itself. The character in an entity of dying immediately . means the character of dying immediately after being produced. Santaraksita and Kamalaslla point out that the Naiyayikas divide existing entities into two classes. etc. flame. Destruction. Tattva-samgraha.momentary. being nega tion.g. since the destructibility of momentary things does not de pend on any cause excepting the fact that they are produced for. is due only to verbal license. that produced entities on other conditions. is. no entity separate from the momentary character. then they must be destroyed the moment they are produced. If pro depend duced entities do not depend for their destruction on any other false. therefore. There is. On this point Santaraksita and Kamalaslla urge that whatever is produced is momen tary. sa yasydsti sa ksanika hi. had the destructibility of such entities depended on conditions . Refutation of the Theory of the Persistence of Existing Entities. destruction cannot need the inter ference of any causes. sky. destruction. according to ^antaraksita. and the use of the term ksanika. 142). Destruction therefore not generated by any separate causal apparatus. is not produced by any conditions or causes like a positive entity.g. which is translated as &quot.) and non-momentary (e. is not a positive entity and is absolutely contentless. being negation.

Entities that persist cannot serve any purpose and therefore cannot have any existence. then it would be impossible to define the nature of such association for an association may be either of . identity or of productivity (tadatmya and tad-utpatti)y&nd neither of them is possible in the present case. for this special modification. they are momentary. being of the nature of an additional assistance (upakara). since the special modification recognized as being different from the persisting entity and is acknowledged by assumption to be produced by the accessories. then that can be either in succession or simultaneously. if it is identical. They urge that entities can only serve a purpose. If this special modification be regarded as being neither of the nature of an o o additional assistance (upakdra) nor of the nature of an essence . the complete cause being there. If an ought to come for. and not the persisting entity. In order to if prove their thesis they enter into the following argument. the be there. such association cannot be regarded as being of the nature of samavaya. and there is no reason why the effects should happen in succession but it is well known in experience that effects happen only in succession and not simultaneously. the special modification may be either identical with or different from the nature of the persisting entity. If. cannot be regarded as being of the nature of inseparable inherence (samavaya). then. effects must also .xi] Dialectical criticisms of Sdntaraksita and Kamalaslla 183 Kumalaslla and Santaraksita urge that existence (sattva) can be affirmed only of those entities which are capable of serving a purpose (artha-kriya-samartha). it is the element of this special modification that is to be regarded as the that the effect cause of the effect. If it is again urged is due to the association of the special modification with the persisting entity. If any purpose is to be served. for. is Again. however. ducing a special modification (atisayadhand) of the persisting cause or by independent working in consonance with the productive action of the persisting entity? In the first alternative. and both these alternatives are impossible. and no middle alternative is existing entity persists in time. since the effect follows in consequence of the special modification of the accessories. then one may well enquire as to the nature of the assistance given by the successive accessories to the persisting entity in the production of the effect is it by pro . it is objected that even a persisting entity can perform about simultaneously. then all its effects possible. actions in succession owing to its association with successive acces sories (kraminah sahakarinati).

Santaraksita and Kamalasila reply that in their view the accessories behave in two ways. as independent co-operation (ekarthakriyd-kdrita) and. in one moment. They are all being produced and determined by the respective causes and conditions in a beginningless series. ground and as persisting. common verbal usage to be . may well be asked whether the causal nature of the persisting entity is the same together with the totality of the accessories as it is without them? In the former case. For the fact of persistence The cannot be perceived by the senses and must be regarded as due to false imagination. secondly. Regarding the objection of Bhadanta Yogasena. identical with the persisting entity. where a flame is known to and produced anew. accessories sisting entity can Thus in the first moment the different accessory-units are only independently co-operant. All recognition is due to the operation of memory. then anything in the world could be regarded as being in the samavdya is relation with anything else. then how can a cognition in the past comprehend an different. regarded as being associated with the persisting entity in a relation of samavaya. yet none of their operations are irrelevant. the would also be persistent. In the latter case. the effects may be regarded as being of a joint nature. since. persistent is invalid for it is well known that even in ordinary per in recognition are not really the same. as mutual help (parasparopakdritd). that the same difficulties would arise in the assumption of entities as momentary. then it is entity of the present time? If they are held to be acknowledged that the entities perceived as the same ment The objector s argu since things pass by the same name. which is almost universally recognized as invalid for purposes of right knowledge. In the other alternative.184 The Sankara School of Veddnta and if it is still [CH. if the entity now perceived be the same as the entity perceived at a previous time. firstly. ception. in which it maintained that the persisting entity awaits only the independent it working of the accessories. In this view. On this point it may be argued that in recognition. in the production of the effect of the third moment. they must be that. though each entity operates independently. objection against the momentariness of all things on the that things are perceived and recognized to be the same. and therefore mutually determining one another. is not a valid one. it is still said in be destroyed every moment. . their mutual actions cannot help one another. the per no longer be regarded as persisting. but in the second moment.

it cannot be producing it again and again. It must therefore be admitted that the causal the cause is . The cause however perishes in the second moment. man may generate other without being superintended by any permanent conscious this agent.. when not destroyed. would the phenomenon of bondage and of emancipation again. then the theory of karma would fail. if it did. that duced. again. without being superintended by any conscious agent. apply to a non-permanent being? In reply to this Santaraksita and Kamalasila say that. once the cause has produced the effect.&quot. To this the reply of Santaraksita is that in the second moment the effect is produced in dependence on the undestroyed causal efficiency of the first causal moment.this happening. can it be understood that a momen tary cause which does not abide till the rise of the effect should produce the same? Again. for how can it be understood that the deeds be performed by one. so the inner states of a states. that is pro all through ignorance that a man cannot discern that subsequent states are determined by the natural forces of the It is preceding ones and thinks of himself as performing this or that action or as striving for emancipation. (h) Refutation of Criticisms of the Non-permanency of Entities. Thus all existing things must be regarded momentary. and then again at the third stage attain a new constitution by further accretion of new nutritive elements. if objects are momentary. just as a seed by means of its invariable power produces the shoots. How. if things are momentary. so that the effect is produced by the causal efficiency of the first moment. &quot. The true nature of things cannot be determined by the illusory experience of ignorant people. happens&quot. the formula (dharma-samketa) for all production is.xi] Dialectical criticisms of Santaraksita and Kamalasila 185 as the same flame. for. there would be a vicious infinite. as there would be no permanent perceiver who would identify the present and the past as being one. being produced. It is sometimes objected that the parts of a seed attain a due by assimilating nutritive elements at the second stage. and that therefore it cannot constitution be held that the parts of the seed are entirely destroyed at the second stage. It is objected by the Naiyayikas and others that. and the fruits reaped by another? How. how can they be perceived by the eye? The phenomena of recognition would also be inexplicable.

and the momentariness or permanence of objects has 4 nothing to do with their determination There are in reality no agent and no enjoy er. states by the previous ones. is invalid. then the fact. in the Buddhist view.1 86 The Sankara School of Veddnta . for ideas may be considered to have forms akin to the objects. it cannot be modified (vasana) by deeds (karma). 1 The efficiency of the cause ceases immediately after production view that the effect is produced simultaneously with the cause (saha- bhutam kdryam) the effect before it is itself is it is . admitted to be able to generate the effect so can the cause be also admitted to be able to produce the effect. If is the causal operation independently by itself. that a thing is smelled after it is seen may also lead one to infer that colour is the cause of smell. Invariable antecedence is the only qualification to be of the of cause 2 . produced for then the effect also has to be . It must also be remembered that the Buddhists do not regard mere antecedence as the definition of cause. 180. and there would be a vicious infinite. The objection that. acknowledged same nature as the cause but at the same moment it can have no scope for its efficiency. no difficulty need be experienced in perception. In either case the ideas are produced by their causes. is invalid. p. vijndna-vddin . . There is no necessity also for admitting a causal operation (vyapara). 3 na hi vayam dnantarya-mdtram kdrya-kdrana-bhdvddhigati-nibandhanam . 4 Santaraksita and Kamalaslla are Buddhists who style themselves nirdkdra. for the Buddhists have no objection to regarding colour as an accessory cause of smell. and necessary ante cedence if Again. The objection of Uddyotakara.yasyaivdnantaram yad bhavati tat tasya kdranam isyate. for. or to be formless. . this modification 1 The Vaibhasikas are spoken of by ^antaraksita as holding the view that the effect is produced at the third moment. In this view the effect is produced by the destroyed cause. since the cause cannot produce itself produced again. the objects are admitted to be momentary. unreasonable. but only the series of passing mental pheno mena. [CH. Ibid. then that would require another opera that another. p. and effect. but revealing the objects. 2 idam eva hi kdryasya kdrandpeksd yat tad-anantara-bhdvitvam. if the mind is momentary. Tattvasamgraha. 177. as separate and distinct from the cause. it cannot produce after . but invariable 3 . If a causal operation has to be admitted for connecting the cause with the tion. Thus the cause and effect cannot be produced simultaneously. Causality consists in the determination of the succeeding . that. if antecedence be ad mitted to be alone the determinant of causality.

that memory is possible. they hold that. it is specific experience. they think that bondage means nothing more than the production of painful states due to ignorance (avidya) and other mental causes. but they do not admit its existence as an . eternal and single entity. also goes which has of wholes already (avayavi). such particularly modified mental states are generated as may be said to contain seeds of memory. Again. atoms also stand garded as substantive wholes made up of and not easy to prove the existence of separate and independent time and space entities. as different from characters and qualities. and that liberation also means nothing more than purity of the mental states due to cessation of ignorance (i) through right knowledge. is no ground that no cause of atoms is known for thinking that they are causeless. substance. thus. quality (guna). causes The Buddhists to their like other facts of refuted. Again. There is again no permanent perceiver who remembers and recognizes of conscious states. for spatial and temporal determinations may well be explained as mental modifications due. water. is never perceived. can be produced in eternal entities.xi] Dialectical criticisms of Sant or aksita and Kamalaslla 187 (vdsana) means nothing more than the production of a new mental state of a modified nature. The refutation been effected. relation of inherence (samavaya). and the conno refutation tation and denotation of words (sabddrtha). the atoms being always the same in nature. it is only when in a particular series a particular on account of the strength of perception. Santaraksita and Kamalaslla attempt to refute the categories of substance (dravyd) with its subdivisions. of course accept the existence of manas as an instrument separate from the sense-organs. refutation of substances implies the refutation . The of gunas. may since no Speaking against the eternity of atoms. The Buddhists also do not consider that there is one person who suffers bondage and is liberated. no conditions special excellence or collocations of any kind can produce any change in the nature of the atoms. action (karma). air and so the four which are ordinarily re substances earth. . This briefly be set out here. generality. or class concepts (sdmanyd). specific pecu liarities (visesa). all objects should be at all. The mere fact or not produced from them either at once. Refutation of the Nydya Vaisesika Categories. fire. against the acceptance of substantive wholes.

yet it is wrong to assume the existence of eternal class-nature existing constantly in all the changing and diverse individual members of a class. again. which are supposed to be dependent on substances. to analyse the sense-data as substances having qualities and motion as different categories in hering in them. For. If things are admitted to be persistent or eternal. though the perception of class-natures may be supposed to be due to some cause. cooking&quot. a cook called a cook even when .. There is. The per ception of numbers also ought to be regarded as due to mental modifications associated with particular cognitions. howsoever we may try to explain it. for action. it is difficult to see how one thing can remain constantly the same. cooking in the cook. then also may be objected that. There is no reason for holding that numbers should stand as separate qualities. by virtue of which the class-nature is of cook admissible. In a similar manner Santaraksita and Kamalasila proceed with the refutation of the other Nyaya qualities. involving as it does successive separation of parts and association of contact-points. which is impossible. though all the individual members in which it is supposed to exist are constantly which is changing. since the operation of is cooking is different in each case. they hold that. Regarding the refutation of class-concepts the main drift of Buddhist argument is that. then action cannot be attributed to them. If things by nature. in their view. The main principle involved in the refutation of gunas and karmas consists in the fact that the gunas and karmas are regarded by the Buddhists as being identical with the particular sense-data are at rest cognized. If class-natures are said to inhere owing to specific it qualities. all things are admitted to be momentary. It is wrong. Moreover. no meaning in acknowledging colours. If the sub stances do not exist. in which relation the gunas are supposed to exist in substances. that is also the supposed to be inhering in it. as different from the atoms in which they are supposed to exist. then they will be in motion while they are perceived to be at rest. implies many moments for its execution.1 88 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. as also the motion which it is supposed to execute. etc. then also movement cannot be explained. If things are admitted to be always moving. Whatever quality may be the substance.g. if Proceeding with the refutation of action (karma). there cannot be any vibratory movement in them. there no one character is &quot. e. there can also be no relation of inherence.

This shows that the . yet their own specific anu-hrasva parimana would not pass on to the catur-anukas.xi] Dialectic of is Sankara and Anandajndna 189 he not cooking. can be justified on the impure analogy of even the critics of the Vedanta. the Buddhist objects mainly to the admission of a permanent samavaya relation. if yogins can perceive the ultimate specific ferent held qualities as dif from one another. thinking person to Considerations like these should lead any deny the existence of eternal class-natures. which anukas made out are possessed of their own measure. The Vaisesikas hold that in the production of the dvy-anuka (containing two atoms) from the paramanu (single atom) and of the catur-anuka (containing four atoms) from the dvy-anuka. it is Regarding the refutation of specific qualities (visesa) that. Regarding the refutation of samavaya. uncaused by the parimana of the dvy-anukas. as the Naiyayikas suppose. as if the one (e. which are peculiar to paramanu and dvydifferent in nature of the anuka respectively. or relation of inherence. they might equally perceive the atoms to be different from one another. supposition that the relation of inherence. It is a false cloth in the thread. ii 11-17. which are of the anu-hrasva parimana. though all the qualities of dvy-anukas would pass on to the caturof their combination. yet the to specific parimdndalya measure of the paramanus does not pass the dvy-anukas. Thus. though all other qualities of paramanus pass over to dvy-anukas produced by their combination. if the atoms cannot be perceived as different except through some other properties. excepting the specific measures of parimdndalya (specific atomic measure) and anu-hrasva (specific measure of the dyads). such as that of the is ever felt to be. all other qualities of the paramanu and the dvy-anuka are transferred to the dvy-anuka and catur-anuka respectively. n.g. His first thesis is that the production of an effect from the cause. then the same may be required of the specific properties themselves. the Vaisesikas. the cloth) in the other (threads). was existing Dialectic of Sankara and Anandajfiana. It is well known that Sankaracarya in his commentary on the Brahma-sutra. So also. as in the case of the production world from pure Brahman. though all the individuals in which this relation may be supposed to exist should be changing or perishing. the mahat parimana. criticizes the atomic theory of the Vaisesikas. viz.

being unconscious at that time. since the atoms are partless. and so the anu-hrdsva measure of the dvy-anukas may produce an altogether different measure in their product. because. the pure Brahman. cannot them selves make any effort. there cannot be any combination of atoms. If the relation of contact requires a further it with the objects in contact. and that another. it cannot be objected that the analogy of dissimilarity of qualities a moment without (guna) cannot be cited in support of the dissimilarity of substances. More combine over. there is no reason why. At that moment.190 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. if to unite two s Sahkara different objects the relation of samavdya is needed. Again. remain for qualities. then samavdya. the impure world) from an altogether different cause. but that it naturally did not pass on to it. the dvy-anukas. Sankara s second thesis is that the Vaisesika view that atoms is wrong. and since the contact of atoms cannot be effected without effort. If it is urged that the measure of the paramdnu cannot pass on to the dvy-anuka only because its passage is rendered im possible by the taking possession of it by an opposite quality (the anu-hrasva parimdnd) then a similar reply may be given in the case . it follows. since. upheld by third point is that the relation of samavdya the Vaisesikas cannot be admitted . since before creation there is no one who can make an effort. and since combination implies contact and contact implies parts which come in contact. of the difference between the world and Brahman. Vaisesikas believe that the pdrimdndalya measure (parimdnd) of the paramdnus may produce an altogether different measure in their product. relation of is samavdya no reason why samavdya should not require some other to connect relation . for want of the effort needed for such a contact. it is impossible to account for the activity without which the contact of the atoms would also be impossible. according to the Vaisesika theory. to object to in the production of an altogether different effect (viz. and that another. all products Moreover. So the atoms cannot combine. there and so on ad infinitum. and since the selves. the catur-anukas viz. when the was produced. not that the passing of the pdrimdndalya measure is opposed by the other parimdna. the mahat parimdna. the pdrimdndalya measure should not dvy-anuka pass on to it. for. since the pdrimdndalya measure did not pass on to it as did the other qualities. On this analogy it may be contended that the Vaisesikas have nothing . would require another samavdya to connect itself with them. being itself different from them.

seldom indulges in logical dialectic like the above. eternality and that therefore the atoms must be it eternal for. It cannot. if inseparableness means inseparableness of char acter or sameness of character. Again. just as other objects having qualities are made up of simpler entities. Again. or inseparable and yet the whiteness of the cloth is not regarded as abiding in the threads. even though implies the existence of eternality. and. product a piece of cloth then the threads and the cloth cannot be . etc. from substance. the fact that the cause of the destruction of the atoms is not known does not imply that they of the ways of destruction does not imply eternality.. regarded as having the same space. not right to suppose that. then creation would be impossible. they are to be regarded as ayuta-siddha. Sankara. it does not imply that the atoms should be eternal. and yet it is asserted by the Vaisesikas that their relation one of samavaya. depend on substance its for their existence or manifesta quality do not appear to be as different substance appears black or white. A separableness (ayuta-siddhatva) from it. Again. then quality cannot be regarded . since the atoms possess the qualities of colour. since the cause exists it cannot be regarded as inseparable from the is cause. they must be the product of some simpler causes. yet. If . moreover. inseparableness means inseparableness of time. Again.xi] Dialectic of Sankara and Anandajnana 191 in its turn. and this implies that the qualities are at bottom identical with the substance (dravyatmakata gunasya). since there is such an eternal thing as Brahman. since we have the idea of nonthis it is eternality. then the two horns of a bull. since they are inseparable in their nature. But even here he does not so much criticize the definitions of the Vaisesikas as point out the general logical and metaphysical confusions that . must imply . then there can be no dissolution (pralayd). Again. as being different prior to the effect. and there are only a few rare instances in which he attacks his opponents from a purely logical point of view. the Vaisesikas are wrong in speaking of six different categories and yet hold that all the five other are eternal. however. Moreover. if they are always disintegrating. when threads constitute as their . being cause and effect. if the atoms are regarded as always operative and combining. This inseparableness can not be inseparableness of space for. be urged that the dependence of other categories on substance consists in their inas A substance and two substances. for mere ignorance categories tion. which exist at the same time. should also be regarded as inseparable and.

and makes some positive and important statements. Anubhutisvarupacarya wrote five works. but it denies the power of perception and inference to give us right knowledge. Anubhutisvarupacarya and Suddhananda. was probably a native of Gujarat and lived in the middle of the thirteenth century. who is different from the other Suddhananda. subtleties to power of his dialectical demolish the cherished principles of pure logic as formulated by the Nyaya logicians. about the Vedanta doctrine itself. called Nibandha. samgraha The importance of the Vaisesika was gradually increasing. also called Anandagiri. but it is a criticism which aims at destroying the possibility of logical or perceptual knowledge as a whole. He was a pupil of two teachers. criticizes not only Nyaya categories of logic. of which Suresvaracarya was the first teacher. viz. and refutation of the Vaisesika dualistic writers was supposed that a would also imply a refutation of the from Vaisesika and metaphysics. (i) a grammatical work called Sarasvata-prakriyd. on Anandabodha s Pramana-mala. called Nyaya-makaranda-samgraha. It is not a criticism of certain doctrines in support of others. and it supposes that it achieves its purpose by proving that the Nyaya modes of definition of perception Citsukha the s and inference are faulty and attempts are more positive. too. (3) a commentary on AnandabodhaYati sNyaya-makaranda. Mr their chief support who draw Tripathi points out in his introduction to Anandajnana s Tarkasamgraha that Anandajnana was a spiritual head of the Dvaraka monastery of Sankara. Nothing is known about his other teacher. on Anandabodha s Nyaya-dipavali. for he self -contradictory. the teacher of Svayamprakasa of the . (2) a commentary on Sankara s commentary on Gaudapada s Mandukya-karika. Suddhananda. but also the categories of Vaisesika metaphysics. and (5) another commentary. It is [CH. called Candrika. as it was more and more adopted by Vaisnava realistic writers. gradually it such as Madhva and his followers. physics Anandajnana. It does not touch any specific metaphysical views. Anandajnana s Tarkais another important work of negative criticism of the Vaisesika categories and in that sense a continuation on a more elaborate scale of Citsukha s criticisms of the Vaisesika categories.192 result The Sankara School of Veddnta from some of the important Vaisesika theories. easy to note the difference of a criticism like this of Srlharsa in his from the criticism where he uses all the Khandana-khanda-khadya. (4) a commentary.

. Panclkarana-vivarana. and Tarka-samgraha have already been printed. Taittinya-bhdsya-tippana.xi] Dialectic of Sankara and Anandajndna 193 seventeenth century. not been available to the present writer. . Kathopanisad-bhdsya- tikd)Mundaka-bhdsya-vydkhydna. In the first chapter. Taittirlya-bhdsya-vdrttika-tikd bhdsya-vdrttika-tlkd. and its diverse forms. with a commentary called Tattva-candrikd bhdsya-tlkd (called also Nydya-nirnaya). by Rama Tirtha. existence (sattva). has. Tripuri-prakarana-tika. The Tarka-samgraha and Tattvdloka. Chdndogya-bhdsya-tlkd. he starts with a refutation of the concepts of duality. author of the Tattva-dipana. non-existence. But some of works. 1 See DII Mr Tripathi s introduction to his edition of the Tarka-samgraha. The Tarka- samgraha is devoted almost wholly to a detailed refutation of the Vaisesika philosophy. .&quot. author of the Advaita-makaranda-tlka. The book is divided into three chapters. such as Upadesa-sdhasn-vivrti. Vdkya-vrtti-tlkd Atma-jndnopadesa-tikd Svarupa-nirnaya-tikd . 13 Baroda. as he refers to him as srlmad-dnandasaildhva-pancdsyam satatam bhaje in the fourth verse of his Tattvadlpana. Of these his Isdvdsya-bhdsya-tippana. Anandagiri wrote a large number of works. a commentary on Prakasatman s Panca-pddikd-vwarana. in which he refutes the doctrines of many other philosophers. 1917. positivity (bhdva) and negativity (abhdvd). the most distinguished of Anandagiri s was pupils One of Akhandananda. Sdstra-prakdsikd Brhad-dranyakaSdrirakaBrhad-dranyaka-bhdsya-tikd. fifteenth a pupil of Jagannathasrama (latter part of the century). un fortunately. dealing with the criticism of substances (dravya).Janardana. as atoms (paramdnu) and molecules (dvyanuka) and its grosser forms and their modified states . Gitd-bhdsya-vivecana. . Anandojnana then passes on to a refutation of the definition of substance and its division into nine kinds (according to the Vaisesika philosophy). which was probably the his name only when he was a householder) seem to be two independent works 1 Of these the manuscript of of Anandagiri . It will thus be seen that almost all his works are but commentaries on Sankara s commentaries and other works. Kenopanisadbhdsya-tippana. the second work. . Vdkya-vivarana-vydkhyd. still Tattvdloka (attributed to &quot. his other .Mdndukya-Gaudapddiya-bhdsyavydkhyd. earth. Paddrtha-tattva-nirjiaya-vivarana and remain to be printed. which are mostly commentaries. He then criticizes the first substance. including Bhaskara s parindma doctrines. reality (tattva).

disputations examples and wranglings. it is found that none of those ways can be affirmed of it or.194 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. space. Thus Anandajnana says that an . alternative left . vice. is that the illusory imposition is The only indescribable in its nature 1 This indescribability (anirvacyatvd) means that. discussions. memory. classify or define the world of appearances they have failed. 135. that it is indescribable 1 pdrisesydd anirvdcyam dropyam upagamyatdm sattvddindm prakdrdndm prdg-ukta-nydya-bddhandt. In the third chapter he refutes the notion of action. fire. pleasure. con comitance (vyapti). and continues to criticize the other substances such as water. Neither can it be regarded as absolutely non-existent (atyantasat) for. separateness (prthaktva). p. air. the nature of knowledge. will. (drstanta). . illusion and dreams. (upamand). self (atmari) and manas. to which reference has by already been made when Anandabodha s views were under dis cussion. measure (parimand). in other words. taste (rasa). it would not have appeared as immediately perceived (aparoksa-pratiti-virodhat) nor can it be . The thesis designed to be proved in all these refutations is the same as that of Srlharsa or Citsukha. analogy pain. . viz. separation (vibhagd). reason (hetu). contact (samyogd). testimony of the scriptures (agamd). that in whatsoever manner the Vaisesikas have attempted to divide. etc. In the second chapter he goes on to the criticism of qualities (gund). virtue. fallacies (hetv abhasa). The conclusion at which he arrives after this long series of criticisms sions in his and refutations reminds us of Anandabodha s conclu Nyaya-makaranda. senses and sense-objects. the nature of right knowledge and its means (pramana and prama). akdsa. it cannot be existent any where else. inference (anumand). time. in which ever way one may try to describe it. on which a commentary was written his teacher Anubhutisvarupa Acarya. antipathy (dvesd). heaviness. touch (spar so). class-concept or universality (jati). since it is non-existent in the sub stratum (adhisthand) of its appearance. liquidity (dravatvd). perception (pratyaksa). the effects of heat on the transformations of objects through mole cular or atomic changes (pllu-paka and pithara-pakd). as bodies. such as colour (rupa). regarded as existent and non-existent in the same object. had it been so. illusory imposition cannot be regarded as existent (sat) for. and the theory of creation and dissolution. smell (gandha). effort (prayatnd). number (sankhya). Tarka-samgraha. the relation of inherence (samavayd) and different kinds of negation.

as it were. Ibid.samastasyaiva bhedabhdnasydpdramdrthikasyaikajndna-sdmarthydd eva sambhavdn ndjfidna-bhede hetur asti. the self. one ajnana that is responsible for appearances of the dream state as well as of the waking state. pp. . 4 ekas tdvad dtrnd dvayor api dvayoh sampratipanno sti. since they are all in describable in their nature. p. as it were. yena yena prakdrena paro nirvaktum icchati tena tendtmand yogas tad-anirvdcyatd matd. how is the phenomenon of self-consciousness or self. Thus there is the one Brahman and there is one beginningless. indescribable ajnana in connection which is the cause of all the infinitely diverse appearances through which the former appears impure and suffers bondage. . which the material stuff of the all (the knower. 137. tasmdd rupyddi-kdryasydnirvdcyatvdt tad-updddnam apt adhisthdndjndnam upddeyam. which is the material out of which all appearances take their form. 2 . their cause the nescience of the substratum 2 . Ibid. the means of knowledge. 137. pp. It is the one ajnana which produces all kinds of diversity by its diversity of functions or modes of opera tion. is associated with Brahman is . since all for their cause and since that which appearances is not a real thing cannot have a real thing as its material cause (na ca avastuno vastu upadanam upapadyate). and again appears liberated. 136. If there is only one reality. This one ajnana then can explain the infinite kinds of appearances. and there is not the slightest necessity of admitting a of appearances. 138. 195 in each and every one must have something of those Now. which through one ajnana appears in all diverse forms of appearances. tasya svdjndndd eva avivdda-siddhdd ekasmdd atiriktam sarvam pratibhdti. . He then asserts that this nescience (ajnana). for Brahman could not be regarded as omniscient or the knower of all (sarva-jna) without its association with ajnana. number of ajnanas in order to explain the diversity or the plurality The many selves are thus but appearances pro duced by this one ajnana in association with Brahman 4 It is the . and that it does not in any way infect the one true self with any kind of activity. 138. the Brahman. Ibid. the objects and their relations) 3 Everything else that appears the one reality. Tarka-samgraha. is the product of except this ajnana. 13-2 .recognition to be explained? To this difficulty Anandajnana s reply is that both the perceiving and the perceived self are but false appearances in the antahkarana (an ajnana product). p.xi] Dialectic of Sankara and Anandajndna ways 1 . 139. through the with it. 3 pramdnatah sarvajnatve pi pramdtrtvasya pramdna-prameya-sambandhasya cdjndna-sambandham antarendsiddheh tasmin ajndnavattvam avasyam dsrayitavyam anyathd sarvajnatvdyogdt. and. must also be of that nature.

and that the author of the 1 work p.D. Govt.D. (A. MSS. 1200). srama editions A. In view of the above it may be suggested that Anandajfiana is following the same line of interpretation of the relation of ajnana to Brahman which was upheld by Vacaspati and Anandabodha. Tarka-samgraha.D. through the kind courtesy of the Librarian. however. No. 38. and not to the author s personal name 2 This work has been referred to by Anandajfiana. Kasmiraka Sadananda Mahesvara 1650). which the present writer commentary had an opportunity of going through from a copy in the Adyar colophon of the work Library. Library. the thirteenth century (Mundaka. Vadindra. Mr Tripathi collects the names of some of these writers. 27. 1547). p. paramdrthato na bandho na muktir iti sakarydjiidna-nivrttyupalaksitam paripurnam dtma-tattvam eva parama-purusdrtha-rupam sidhyati. MS. Madras. Ramananda SarasvatI. Mr T. . of . does not anywhere in the work reveal his own name and the references which can be found in other works are all to its name as Prakatar or to the author of the Prakatartha (prakatdrtha-kdra). Philosophy of the Prakatartha-vivarana (A. Krsnananda (A. Vadivagisvara. : . Sesa Sarngadhara. I. tatra ca anddy anirvdcyam ekam ajndnam anantabheda-pratibhdna-niddnam. 1650) and others. 2 The colophon of the work runs as follows jndtvdpi yasya bahu-kdlam acintanena vydkhydtum aksamatayd paritdpi cetah tasyopatdpa-harandya mayeha bhdsye prarabhyate vivaranam prakatdrtham etat. R. 1918 and 1917).veddnta-vdkyottha-tattva-sdksdtkdra-pardkrta-sakdrydjndnam muktam iva bhdti. 23.196 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. Anandawell be supposed may lived in the latter half of the twelfth y Kena it Advitlyam dtma-tattvam. p. Chintamani. Anandajnana s position as an interpreter of Sankara s philosophy is evident from the number of able commentaries which he wrote on the commentaries of Sankara and also from the references made to him by later writers. The author.D. The Prakatartha-vivarana (as the writer himself calls it in the prarabhyate vivaranam prakatdrtham etat) Saiikara s is an important commentary still in manuscript on on the Brahma-sutra. 32. who is intending to bring out an edition. 1 realization of the Vedantic truth of the real nature of the self In fact there is neither bondage nor emancipation. Tirtha (A. as Prajnanananda. Madras. 141.D. tatas cdnekdrtha-kalusitam dtma-tattvam baddham ivdnubhuyamdnam.

MS. thus be a mental transformation which can excite the its Veddnta-kaumudl. and he ultimately holds the view that the mind is a substance with a preponderance of sattva. and it is by the reflection of the pure consciousness in the infinite parts of this Brahma that there arise the infinite of individual souls through the veiling and creating functions of the maya. 99. He certainly preceded Ramadvaya. the author of the Vedanta-kaumudi. it cannot be known as it is: still it may well be regarded as the positive cause of all illusions 2 The well. 3 MS. being helped by the moral destiny (adrstadi-sahakrtam). 12. which has an illuminating nature. But. . but . Prakatartha MS. p. is defined in the Prakatartha as its illumination without the cognition of own idea (sva-samvinself- The self is to be regarded as such a supposition the revelation of the self revealing would be inexplicable 3 The author of the Prakatartha then criticizes the Kumarila view of cognition as being a subjective act. arrives at the place where or manas the objects stand like a long ray of light and comes in contact with it.xi] Philosophy of the Prakatdrtha-vivarana 197 century. has been largely influenced in many of his conceptions by the 1 argument of this work The author of the latter holds that the indefinable maya in is matra-sambandhini) association with pure consciousness (cinthe mother of all existence (bhuta-prakrti). the Bhaskara view of knowledge as merely a particular kind of activity of the self. Maya or ajnana is not negation. who not only refers to the Prakatartha. but a positive material cause. from the fact of a particular awareness. known Vedantic term svaprakasa nairapeksena sphuranam). and that it is this manas which. Through the reflection of pure consciousness in maya is produced Isvara (God). and this leads to defined. . as also the Nyaya-Vaisesika and Prabhakara views of knowledge as an illumination of the object inhering in the subject (atma-samavayl visaya-prakaso jnanam) and . dvaranatvdt prakdsa-heyatvdd vd tamovat-svarupena pramdna-yogyatve py abhdva-vydvrtti-bhrama-kdranatvddi-dharma-visistasya prdmdnikatvam na viru2 dhyate. and then as a result thereof pure consciousness is reflected upon the object. transcript copy. and by a transformation of Him there arises the creator Brahma. dtmd sva-prakdsas tato nyatha nupapadyamdnatve sati prakdsamdnatvdn naya evam na sa evam yathd kumbhah. just as the earth is of the jug (ajndnam nabhava upadanatvan mrdvat). Perceptual cognition. p. inferable for without . being of the nature of veiling number (avaranatvai) and being destructible through right knowledge (prakasa-heyatvaf). 1 would cognition.

lingddi-samvid-vyavadhdna-pratibandhdt. . Vimuktatman Vimuktatman. that it is often extremely difficult to follow properly the meaning of the discussions. na tu samvid-vyanjakam MS. and the manuscript from the Adyar Library. 72). the teacher of Citsukha. Avyayatman Bhagavat Pujyapada. for the manas there. may a and ajnana as conditioning Isvara andjiva. Cochin State. which is a transcript copy of a manuscript of the Naduvil Matham. and which has been available to the present writer. For reasons stated else where Jnanottama could not have flourished later than the latter is He half of the thirteenth century. It was commented upon by Jfianottama. but only such a transformation of the manas that a rise of the idea about the object may not be obstructed 2 The author of the Prakatartha accepted the distinction between . Vimuktatman wrote also another work. The work has not yet been published. and is devoted in a very large in part to discussions relating to the analysis of illusions in the Vedanta school and in the other schools of philosophy. a thirteenth century. p.198 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. 54. 1 MS. the Naiskarmya-siddhi by Suresvara. however. disciple of (A. the transformation of manas takes place without any actual touch with the objects and there is . 1200). called Pramana-vrtti-nirnaya. The work is divided into eight chapters. . to which he refers in his (MS. is prevented therefore no from being in contact with the object that is inferred. is very fragmentary Ista-siddhi many parts. so much so. direct excitation revealing the object . p. being in direct touch with the reason or the linga. later wrote his Ista-siddhi probably not than the early years of the quoted and referred to by Madhusudana in his Advaita-siddhi and by Ramadvaya in his Veddnta-kaumudl of the fourteenth century. There is here not an operation by which the knowledge of the object can be directly revealed. such as the Brahma-siddhi by Mandana. easy to see how Dharmarajadhvarindra elaborated his Vedantic theory of perception and inference with these and other data worked out by his pre It is decessors. 54- upalabdha-sambandhdrtha kdrena parinatam mano ndvabhdsa-vydvrttt-mdtraphalam. This work is to be regarded as one of the four traditional Siddhis.D. revelation of an object (manah-parinamahsamvid-vyanjakojnanam) 1 In the case of inference. and this commentary is called Istasiddhi-vyakhya or Ista-siddhi-vivarana. p.

except pure The atoms are often regarded as beginningless.difference&quot. The difference between consciousness and other objects (anubhuti). . reply to this objection involves a consideration regarding the nature of difference. If No A were of the nature of the entities that differed. though the perceiver may not be cognized. There cannot logically be any difference between the perceiving principle (drk) and the perceived (drsya)\ for the former is unperceived (adrsyatvai) . 1 But this view also is not correct. and therefore the notion of difference can be realized difference ought to be manifested. p. that. etc. Thus he starts the discussion regarding the nature of the ultimate reality as pure intuitive consciousness Nothing can be beginningless and eternal.xi] Vimuktdtman Ista-siddhi 199 the the by Vimuktatman Hitherto and Madhusudana. since they have colours and other sense-properties. but. and it is only the intuitive consciousness that can be said to be so. as an entity different from the difference difference should not be dependent 1 tasmat kathancit bhinno jnandntara-gamyo rupa-rasddivad bhedo bhyupeyah. though this difference is generally accepted. perceived entity. while the latter can be described as the &quot. Advaita-siddhi by Naiskarmya-siddhi and the Advaita-siddhi have been published . But it may be argued that. they are like other objects of nature. yet he is self-luminous. Only that can be indivisible which is partless and beginningless. The Brahma-siddhi is expected be published soon in Madras but as yet the present writer is not aware of any venture regarding this important work. to only the . between a perceived and an un for all difference relates two cognized entities. The difference has thus to be regarded as a characteristic (dharma) different from the nature of the differing entities and cognized by a distinct knowing process like colours. Ista-siddhi Adyar MS. as without them no combination of atoms would be possible. since it is difficult to admit &quot. by incognizable.this&quot. consciousness. 5. or the object. tastes. is this. in which he offers his adoration to that birthless. dialectical reasoning shows that the two are not intrinsically different. infinite intuitive consciousness of the nature of selfjoy which is the canvas on which the illusory world-appearance has been painted. and they have parts also. the former is clearly not such. The work begins with the interpretation of a salutation made the author. But. then on a reference to another (na svarupa-drstih prati-yogy-apeksa).

the selfluminous perceiving power is always present. either as the essence of the perceiving self or as its characteristics. Thus the perceiving self and the perceived (drk and drsyd) cannot be differentiated from each other. or mutual so. as it is itself of the nature of So the notion of the negation of the perceiving self cannot be anything but illusion. but the perceiving self is of the very nature of perception. Moreover. however. proves that difference is it is not a characteristic of the perceiving it self. and it is impossible that it could be negated a condition without which neither difference nor negation could be possible. then that very fact .200 The Sankara School of Veddnta . the admission of mutual negation as a separate entity. or mutual negation which has the perceiver as one of its alternating poles. difference or &quot. p. since they are both perception. negation is defined as the non-perception of a perceivable thing. Admitting for the sake of argument that the perceiving self could be negated. arises that. then the infinite limitations and differences that are characteristic of the perceived would also be character istic of the perceiver and there are the further objections to such a supposition that it is against all ordinary usage and experience.difference. such a difference would involve another dif known. Therefore. . a reference to another. It may be argued that the two are identical. and that another and that another. 6. between the perceiver and the perceived can be cognized for it is impossible that there should be any other cognition by which this &quot. how could there be any knowledge of such a negation? for without the self there could be no perception. could be perceived 1 Moreover. If this admitted to be self-luminous. which is a condition for all notions of mutual negation. Again. . . and as there is no other way in which this difference can be conceived. cannot be established. [CH. difference or mutual negation&quot. it is difficult to imagine how negation &quot. . evam ca sati na drg-drsyayor bhedo drastum sakyah ndpy anyonydbhdvah na hi drsah svayam drsteh prati-yogy-apeksa-drsty-antara-drsyam rupdntaram svam samasti svayam drstitva-hdndt MS. would not await &quot. if it is admitted that such a difference is cognized. if the perceiving self and the perceived were identical. This being difference&quot. we should have an infinite regress and the same objection applies to differing entities for ference by which it is . and its non-perception would be impossible. it is clear that there is no difference between the perceiving self and its characteristics. then &quot.&quot. The difficulty.

revealed . but not so the . secondly. is not illuminated. firstly. 25. and Vimuktatman tries to show that this alternative is also impossible and that the perceiver and the 1 abhede saha-bhdndyogdd dvayor hi saha-bhdnam na ekasyaiva drk saha bhdtlti bhavatdpy ucyate. and. the perceiver is always self-revealing. as pure awareness. each momentary and and. then it would not be awareness. ndpi drsyenaiva drsyam saha drg-drsyayoh saha bhdnam ucyate atas tayor bhedo bhdty eva. and so the perceiver. as two are experienced and not one. for. 2 tasmdt sarva-vyavahdra-lopa-prasangdn na bhedo drg-drsyaoh. jug or a book. MS. the latter is always self-revealed. 201 is experienced simultaneously (sahopalambha-niyamat) but the reply that.xi] Vimuktdtman . for in the very experience of the two In spite of such obvious their difference is also manifested 1 contradiction of experience one could not venture to affirm the 2 The maxim of identity of the perceiver and the perceived of the perceiver and the perceived because of simultaneous identity . perceived. and the perceived is never self-luminous.svarupam cet tadd bhdndn na samvido bhdnam. na hi drsaiva bhdtlti kintu p. There is another alternative. that particular content would always have stood self-revealed 3 particular cognition (e. cannot be identified with its object 4 It has already been pointed like a . atah samvedyasya ghatasukhddeh samvidas cdbheda-gandho pi na pramdnavdn. that they may be both identical and different (which is the bhedabheda view of Bhaskara and Ramanuja and others). perception cannot be regarded as true for. and. viz.D. regarded as identical. thirdly. and now it is shown that they cannot be regarded as identical. There is thus plainly no simultaneity of the perceiver and the is illuminated in con perceived. out that the perceiver and the perceived cannot be regarded as different. 4 asamvedyaiva samvit samvedyam cdsamvid eva. are not illuminated. Ibid. and. had it been so. the other objects B. the perceiver is never a cognized object. C. There is thus an intrinsic difference between awareness and the object. but a mere object. p. so no consciousness can be regarded as being always qualified by a particular objective content. cannot be re vealed without the perceiver. p. yadi sarmndah sdpi bhdty eva samvid-bhdndt samvedy a. When a perceived object sciousness. cannot be the object of any other cog nition. when the perceived object A B A but the consciousness (samvid) is always self-illuminated. Moreover. as such. they cannot be . 3 . etc. Ibid. 27. kirn vidyud-visesitatd ndma samvidah svarupam uta samvedyasya. awareness of blue) is self. if any particular awareness could be the object of any other awareness. 31. Ibid. is illuminated.perceived&quot. though the &quot.g.

if again the forms are identical with the entity. and. what then is its status? The perceiver is indeed the same as pure perception and pure bliss.202 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. then also the question arises whether their forms as perceiver and perceived are identical with the form in which they are identical with Brahman and no one is aware of any form of the perceiver and the perceived other than their forms . perceived cannot be regarded as being both identical and different. it cannot also be identical with other forms for then these different forms would not be different from one another. if it is neither identical nor different nor both identical with the manifold world and different. if they are both one and identical with Brahman. one distinguish the entity (rupin) from the forms (rupd) ? In the third alternative the question arises whether the entity is identical with one particular form of it and different from other forms. and these again other two forms in which they are identical and different. and we should have infinite regress In the : and the same kind of infinite regress would appear in the relation between the entity and its forms. If the manifold world is neither different nor identical nor both different and identical with the perceiver. the manifold world must necessarily be unsubstantial (avastu) for. then also the question it is objected that two whether these forms are one. there would be no difference between them. Moreover. it might have been related in one of the above three . For these and similar reasons it is impossible to hold that the perceiver and the perceived are different as such and yet one and identical as Brahman. as such. and. In the first alternative the forms would not be different in the second they would not be one with the entity. how can entity should have arises . . yet they may be regarded as Brahman. The upholder of the bhedabheda view is supposed to say that. or whether it is both identical with the same form and different. different or both identical with that entity and different. and so on. and these other two forms. and therefore it it difference they have any If again is form cannot be admitted that in spite of their in which they are one and identical. quite possible that an identical different forms. If it is argued that their identity with Brahman urged is in another form. as such. . though the perceiver and the perceived cannot. if it had any substantiality. But in reply to this it may be one in their nature as that. if any part of the entity be identical with any par ticular form. first case each form would have two forms. be regarded as identical.

so the pure consciousness also is related to this world2 appearance. 1 . But. 2 yatha citrasya bhittih sdkdt nopdddnam ndpi sahajam citram tasydh ndpyavasthdntaram mrda iva ghatddih ndpi gundntardgamah dmrasyeva raktatddih na cdsydh janmddis citrdt prdg Qrdham ca bhdvdt. Since the manifold world is not a substance. It is thus regarded as a power of ignorance (avidya-sakti) which is the material cause of all a jug the painting. Ibid. then both our common experience and our practical dealing with this world would be contradicted. none of the above objections would be applicable to this view. and. Just as a canvas is neither the material of the picture painted on it nor a constituent of the picture. which are not regarded nor not- as unreal because of their nature as neither substance substance. and since the ways of objections effects of mayd canot be regarded either as substantial or as un substantial. but because they are contradicted in experience. which is but a painting of mayd on it Maya is unspeakable and indescribable (amrvacamya). yady api bhittim vind citram na bhdti tathdpi na sd citram vind bhdti ity evam-ddy-anubhiitir bhitti-jagac-citrayor yojyam. To this Vimuktatman s reply is that. so Brahma-knowledge. like the redness in ripe mangoes. the facts of experience may also be justified 1 As an instance of such an appearance which is neither vastu (substance) nor . its admission cannot disturb the monistic view. one may refer to dream-appearances. but as involving the characters of both being and non-being. But. whereas the painting would not be there without the canvas. 73. which is itself a product of ignorance and its processes. or as a change of quality. if 203 it is unsubstantial. since the world is admitted to be made up of mayd (mayd-nirmitatvdbhyupagamdt).xi] Vimuktdtman relation. avastu. p. 64. and just as the canvas was there before is it would remain even if the painting were washed away. not as different from both being and non-being. But it may again be objected that. p. and just as . destroys the self-same ignorance from which it was produced and its processes and at last itself subsides and leaves the Brahman to prapancasya vastutvdbhdvdn nddvaita-hanih avastutvdbhdvdc capratyaksddyaprdmdnyarn apy-ukta-do$dbhdvdt. then none of the above would apply. objects of perception otherwise called matter (sarva-jadopdddnabhutd). MS. since it is not unsubstantial. and just as the picture cannot be regarded as being a modification of the canvas in the same way as a modification of clay. just as fire springing from bamboos may burn up the same bamboos even to their very roots. if the world were unsubstantial.

called Vedanta-kaumudi. nants of ajnana. wrote an important work. also ceases of itself. just as the digging of a well means the removal of . in which he discussed in a polemical way many Vedantic problems while dealing with the subject matter of Sankara s commentary on the first four topics of the Brahma-sutra.D. all earth that was obstructing the omnipresent akasa or space the pramanas have thus no function of manifesting the self-luminous consciousness. emancipation. . and the reconciliation of the pluralistic experience of practical life with the monistic doctrine of the Vedanta but. 143. involving within it not only all phenomena. ajnana or avidya. Vimuktatman does not consider avidya to be merely subjective. but regards it as being both subjective and objective. as the essential features of these theories of illusion and their criticisms have contain . which do not involve any new point of view in Vedantic inter pretation. as there are not . already been dealt with in the tenth chapter of the first volume. such as the nature of bondage. The functions of the pramanas. p. Ramadvaya. but all their mutual relations and also the relation with which it is supposed to be related to the pure consciousness. which consist only mere processes of ignorance. The work has not yet been published. after which Brahma-knowledge as conceptual knowledge. here any strikingly new modes of approach. these out in the present work. in four chapters. it is not desirable to enter into these fresh criticisms of Vimuktatman. own radiance 1 .204 shine in are all The Sankara School of Veddnta its [CH. He also deals with some of the principal Vedantic topics of discussion. p. may be left Ramadvaya (A. These beyond many new and important points but. in the removal of obstructions veiling the illumination of the selfluminous consciousness. 1300). a pupil of Advayasrama. This cessation of ajnana is as unspeakable as ajnana itself. 2 Ibid. 137. and more particularly to the criticism of anyathakhyati. and only remove the veiling ajnana 2 So Brahma-knowledge also means the removal of the last rem . being the last vestige of ajnana. Unlike Mandana. Vimuktatman devotes a large part of his work to the criticism of the different kinds of theories of illusion (khyati). but at least one manuscript of it is available in the Government 1 MS. which is in reality all relations.

19. he repeats his very phrases with a slight elaboration 1 Just as the cloudless . so the pure consciousness. pp. in Ramadvaya refers here to the daharadhikarana of Ankara s commentary on the Brahma-sutra.D. author of the Ista-siddhij has been placed by the present author in the early half many noted of the thirteenth century. presumably to I. but . but approvingly. which is the underlying reality of all objects. 36 and 47. Vimuktatman. which regard individual souls as real (apare tu vddinah paramdrthikam eva jaivam rupam iti manyante asmadlyds ca kecit). It is this consciousness that forms the real ground of all that is known. none of whom are than the thirteenth century. Ramadvaya always refers to him by his he also . transcript copy. Just as a spark of fire cannot manifest itself as fire if there are no fuels as its condition. where ^ankara refers to the supposed distinction between the individual soul (jlvd) and Brahman. 3. Vedanta-kaumudl-vydkhyana^ a manuscript of the first chapter of which has been available to the present writer in the library of the Calcutta Asiatic Society. later Ramadvaya in the course of his discussions refers to authors on Nyaya and Vedanta. 14) refers to Janardana. The date of the writing of the copy of the Vedanta-kaumudl-vyakhyana is given by the copyist Sesanrsimha as A. cannot illuminate them if there are not the proper conditions to help 1 2 it in its work 2 . p.xi] Rdmddvaya : 205 Oriental Manuscript Library. Such a view militates against the correct understanding of . as if his views were largely guided in his Vedanta-kaumudl-vyakhyana (MS. Madras this through the kindness of the Curator the present author had the opportunity of utilizing. 1512. In the enunciation of the Vedantic theory of perception and inference Ramadvaya seems to have been very much under the influence of the views of the author of the Prakatartha for. See Veddnta-kaumudi. . which is Anandajfiana s name as a householder. Ramadvaya called also wrote a commentary on his Vedanta-kaumudl. both outside and inside the circle of Upanisadic interpreters. so the pure consciousness veils itself with the indefinable avidya and appears in diverse limited forms. sky covers itself with clouds and assumes various forms. Here ^ahkara says that his commentary is directed towards the regulation of those views. These are probably the only manuscripts of this work known till now. though he does not refer to his name in this connection. Janardana lived in the middle of the thirteenth century it seems therefore probable that Ramadvaya lived in the first half of the fourteenth century. Such a conditioning factor is found MS. It is therefore certain that the work cannot have been written later than the fifteenth century.

and. are joined together in the same cognition as &quot. having taken place in the same process (vrtti) there. 36. (prama).does by such a process remove its veil of avidya. as the vrtti becomes superimposed on the object. which The Sankara School of Veddnta is [CH. 8 . there is also the objective fact subjective of an illumination of the object (evam vrtti-vyanjakam apt taptd- antahkarana (antahkarana-caitanyayor and iron in the heated iron. illusorily identified with the aikyddhydsat). and the object also being in contact with it is mani in by the same process. 2 Veddnta. of the stuff of pure sattva: on the occasion of sense-object contact this manas. In reality it is the underlying consciousness that manifests the vrtti transformation of the antahkarana but. This passage seems to be borrowed directly from the Prakatdrtha. the eternal unchangeable and upholding consciousness. as sydpi its other effect. transformed into the form of the process (vrtti) of right knowledge by me&quot. by manifesting also manifests the object. p. just as an illusory snake shows itself as a piece of rope. cattanyam). and thus apart from the illumination as awareness. the self as the only reality which through avidya manifests itself as individual souls and with its removal reveals itself in its real nature in right knowledge as paramesvara.this object is known fested (vrtter ubhayasamlagnatvdc ca tad-abhivyakta-caitanyatathdtvena mayedam viditam iti samslesa-pratyayah). appears as the cognizer (vrtti-laksana-pramdsraydntahkarandvacchinnas tat-pramdtetyapi vyapadisyate) 2 The object also attains a new status in being manifested and is thus known as . the object (karma. Ibid. the consciousness limited by the antahkarana. (though its limited condition as individual soul this avidya formed its own body). as long ray reaching to the object itself or limited by the antahkarana (antahkarandvacchinnam conditioned . But it may well be that both the Veddntakaumudl and the Prakatdrtha borrowed it from the Panca-pddikd-vivarana.kdrakdbhivyaktam ca tat prakdsdtmand phalavyapadesa-bhdk). as may be inferred from their verbal agreement.kaumudi. as it is . p. it is also the vrtti it yah-pinda-nydyena tad-ekatdm ivdptam vrttivad-visaya-prdkatydt- mand sampadyate) 3 The moments in the cognitive process in perception according to Ramadvaya may thus be described. 37- MS. The . The two manifestations of the subject and the object. transcript copy. appears as many through avidya. and. being propelled by the moral destiny (adrstddi-ksubdham). like a magician. Paramesvara. transforms itself into the form of a 1 The pure consciousness. is the one reality which. There is no consciousness other than this (eka eva parames varah kutastha-nityo vijndna-dhdtur avidyayd- mdyayd mdydvivad anekadhd vibhdvyate ndnyo vijndna-dhdtur 1 asti).206 manas. like fire identified with the vrtti transformation of the antahkarana.

separate from the brightening up of consciousness at the first moment of the vrtti transformation. as limited by the antahkarana as trans formed into the vrtti.. From the point of view of (the defined as the non-distinction (abheda) of the pramana-caitanya from the visaya-caitanya through spatial supercognition it is imposition of the vrtti on the object. both being regarded as two distinct phases. the antahkarana or mind vrtti. as soon as there is a transfor mation of the antahkarana into a vrtti. This latter view. Perception from the point of view of the object (visaya-gata-pratyaksatva) is defined as the non. and.distinction of the object from the pramatr-caitanya or the perceiver. but serves as a transparent transmitter of the light of consciousness to up and overcomes The the object on which the vrtti is superimposed.this object is known by me&quot. viz. the pramana-caitanya same consciousness conditioned by the vrtti of the antahkarana). and the visaya-caitanya (the same consciousness conditioned by the object). Now. since the vrtti joins up the subjective brightening up of consciousness and the objective illumination of the object. and the known as that which has been objectively illuminated. of the same perceptual revelation.object contact offers an occasion for the moral destiny (adrsta) to stir up the antahkarana. which is consciousness conditioned by the antahkarana. the pramatr-caitanya (the con sciousness conditioned by the antahkarana). the definition of perception from the point of view of the object as the non-distinction of the object from the consciousness as limited by antahkarana (ghatdder antahkarandvacchinna-caitanydbhedah). and. and. and out of this cognition it is possible to differentiate the knower as the underlying consciousness. the consciousness brightens vrtti The pure for the moment the veil that was covering it.xi] Rdmddvaya 207 sense. In the Vedanta-paribhasa we hear of three consciousnesses (caitanya). the object has an objective manifestation. as it were. as a result thereof. cognitional and objective. these two are joined up (samslesa-pratyaya) and this results in the cognition &quot. as a result thereof. According to this perception (pratyaksa) can be characterized either from the point of view of cognition (jnanagata-pratyaksatva) or from the point of view of the object. is transformed into a particular state called consciousness underlying the antahkaranawas lying dormant and veiled. thus no longer veils the underlying consciousness. is open to the serious objection that really the non-distinction of the object (or the consciousness conditioned .

For the passage of the Vivarana to which reference is made here expounds an entirely different view 3 .&quot. then in perceiving an object. 1902. That other traditional Vedantic inter preters entirely disagreed with the view of Dharmaraja Adhvarlndra is also evident from the account of the analysis of the perceptual process given by Ramadvaya. perception there was non-distinction of the subject. that has the subject and the object at its two poles and thus unites the subject and the object in the complex subjectthis is known by me. as has just been pointed out. forced to define visaya-gata-pratyaksatva as non-distinction of the object from the subject. Bombay.208 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. Benares.&quot. son of Ramakrsna Adhvarin.g. Thus Akhandananda in his Tattva-dipana commentary explains the word samvid as samvic-chabdena indriydrtha-samprayoga-ja-jndnasya vivaksitatvdt. a book. or the vrtti. Dharmaraja Adhvarlndra himself raises an objection against his interpretation. that it might t t be urged. 1911. I am the book. &quot. and not I perceive the book &quot. Benares. 194. Venkatesvara Press. that it is the illuminated cognitive process. and by the antahkarana and not with the That this is so is also perceiver (antahkaranavacchinna-caitanya). but with the vrtti that the object is united. Ramadvaya says. The object is thus predicate form illuminated by the vrtti and it is not directly with the subject. y 2 Ibid. p. Tasmdd avyavadhdnena samvid-upddhitaydparoksatd visayasya. . admitted by Dharmaraja Adhvarlndra. 4 It should be noted here that samvid means cognitional idea or senseknowledge and not the perceiver (antahkaranavacchinna-caitanya). 50. Pancapddikd-vivarana. 75. as the author of the Sikhdmani says. if in object from the one should feel in reply to 1 &quot. bhdsd p. e. p. antahkaranavacchinna-caitanya) but with the cognition (pramana-caitanya or vrtti-caitanya)\ for the cognition or the vrtti intervenes between the object and the perceiver. such an objection he says that in the perceptual process yad vd yogyatve sati visaya-caitanydbhinna-pramdna-caitanya-visayatvam ghatdder visayasya pratyaksatvam tathdpi visayasydparoksatvam samvidabheddt iti vivarane tatra tatra ca sdmpraddyikaih pramdtrabhedasyaiva visayaikhd-mani on Veddnta-paripratyaksa-laksanatvendbhidhdndd evam uktam. 3 Tattva-dipana. 1892. in his Sikha-mani commentary on the Vedanta-paribhasa 1 But he tries to justify Dharmaraja Adhvarlndra by pointing out that he was the object is in immediate contact with the vrtti . It its says there that the perceptibility of the object consists in directly and immediately qualifying the cognitional state or sense-knowledge (samvid)^. since this view was taken in Prakasatman s Vivarana and also in other traditional works on Vedanta 2 This however seems to be an error. . .

The samvid-upddhitd aparoksatd visayasya is revealed in perception only as an object of awareness. p. . Panca-pddikd-vivarana. 1 &quot. 1891. that. 50). Veddnta-paribhasa. from the Buddhist idealism (vijndna-vada) consists in this. . The views of the Vedanta-kaumudi.xi] Rdmddvaya 209 there is only a non-distinction between the consciousness underlying the object and the consciousness underlying the perceiver. as the antahkarana is transformed into by superimposition on objects. Benares. there is also a direct and immediate connection between them. did not accord any independent status to objects as outside the ideas or percepts. object whereas the awareness and the subject reveal themselves directly and immediately and not as an object of any further intuition or inference (prameyam karmatvena aparoksam pramdtr-pramiti punar aparokse eva kevalam na karmatayd)*. while the Buddhists This is . The development of the whole theory of perception may be attributed to the Panca-pddikdvivarana. 3 Panca-pddikd. since all the essential points of the perceptual theory can be traced in that work. p. it is illuminated by the underlying consciousness and that through the spatial contact with the objects the veil of the objects is removed by these antah karana transformations there are thus two illuminations. The difference of the Vedantic view of perception. 77. since they are only a reflection of the ex position of the subject in Padmapada s Panca-pddikd and Prakasatman s Panca-pddikd-vivarana. that. 17. 50. undoubtedly so. does not imply the assertion of a relation of identity resulting in the notion I am the book&quot. cannot be regarded as original in any sense. the Vedanta accepted the independent mani festation of the objects in perception in the external world 2 There is thus a distinction between visional percept and the object but . 76. and this non-distinction. p. however. but it is hardly an answer to the objection that has been raised. DII 14 1 . and it is this immediate relationship of the object to its awareness that constitutes the perceptivity of the object (avyavadhdnena Vivarana. Thus it holds that all the world objects are veiled states by avidyd. . 2 na ca vijndndbheddd eva dparoksyam avabhdsate bahistvasydpi rajatdder dparoksydt. pp. being non-relational. namely . It is true that the object and the subject are both but impositions of avidyd on one distinctionless pure con sciousness but that fact can hardly be taken as an explanation of the various modes of experiences of the complex world of subjectobject experience. as expounded in the Panca-pddikd-vivarana.

antahkarana modification (or &quot. 3 ydvanti jndndni tdvanti sva-tantrdni para-tantrdni vd ajndndni tato na dosah. and this is illuminated by the consciousness underlying the antahkarana resulting in the perception of the knower as distinguished from the illumination of object to which the operation of the vrtti is directed in spatial superimposition the difference between the subject and the object in perception is thus due to the difference in the mode or the condition of the vrtti with reference to the subject and the This is exactly the interpretation of the Vedanta-kaumudl. 43. Benares. . and to Vedanta-paribhasa and pure consciousness) the question that.e. and that each cognitive illumination removes only one 3 But this ajnana corresponding to the illumination of one object also is not an original contribution of Ramadvaya. 256-259. are largely different therefrom and are in all probability inexact.I the subject) and the consciousness underlying the vrtti). Praka- satman s reply is that. individual objects (consciousness limited by specific avidya materials constituting the objects) through the vrtti it can result only in revelation of a particular subject and a particular object .210 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. if there were unity of the consciousness underlying the object and the consciousness underlying the antah . pp. and not in the revelation of all subjects and all objects 2 This has been elaborated into the view that there is an infinite number of ajfiana-veils. MS.&quot. and it is only the latter form that could be expected from the unity of the three consciousnesses). and explain the duality in perception (e. karana (i. not am the book. since it was . p. 70.g. Veddnta-kaumudi. . I perceive the book. of the antahkarana transformations (called vrtti in the Vedanta- kaumudi. object and it has been pointed out above that the explanations of the Vedanta-paribhasa. 2 etat pramdtr-caitanydbhinnatayaiva abhivyaktam tad visaya-caitanyam na pramdtr-antara-caitanydbhedena abhivyaktam ato na sarvesdm avabhdsyatvam. As this unity is effected between individual subjects (consciousness limited by specific antahkaranas) and 1 . since the antahkarana is one with its vrtti y attributed to the antahkarana as its the vrtti operation is rightly agent. there would be nothing to &quot.&quot. p. 1902. 71. copy. Panca-pddikd-vivarana. p. and Tattva-dipana. also 1 propounded by his predecessor Anandajnana in his Tarka- See Panca-pddikd-vivarana. since the unity of the object-consciousness with the antahkarana-consciousness (subject) is effected through the modification or the vrtti of the antahkarana and.

27. Veddnta-paribhdsd. 211 samgraha and by others The upshot of the whole discussion is that on the occasion of a cognitive operation of the mind both the mind and the cognitive operation become enlivened and illuminated by the indwelling pure consciousness as subject-consciousness and awareness. 46). p. theory is that there is an infinite number of the ajndna-veih as soon the vrtti-object contact. but an active transformation of a real sattva stuff. as the Nyaya holds. as the perception of the object continues in time. copy. pp. . and thus there is very quick succession of veils and their removals. tathd sarvdny apt atisaighrydt tu jndna-bhedavad dvarandntaram na laksyate. 2 atah sdvayava-sattvdtmakam antahkaranam eva anudbhuta-rupa-sparsam adrsyam asprsyam ca visaydkdrena parinamate.xi] 1 Rdmddvaya . and through contact with this cognitive operation the object also becomes revealed not as a mere content of awareness. the mind (antahkarana) 2 Since in the continuous perception of the same object we have only a rapid succession of cognitive acts. 26. The cognitive operation before its contact with the object is a mere undifferentiated awareness. having only an objective reference and devoid of all specifications of sense characters. the veil is removed and the object is illu minated the next moment there is again an ajndna-veil covering the object. which later on assumes the sense characteristics in accordance with the object with which it comes in contact. and again illumination of the object. 191 1). nor is the illumination of the object to be regarded mere form of awareness without there being a corresponding as a objective entity (visayabhivyaktir nama vijnane tad-akarollekhamatram na bahir-anga-rupasya vijnanabhivyaptih). that the cognitive operation is not an abstract idea. each . The . MS. modification or transformation of the self which may be inferred from the fact of the enlightenment of the object (jndtata). but there is one unchanged continuous vrtti and not different vrttis removing different ajnanas (kin ca siddhdnte dhdrdvdhika-buddhi-sthale na jndnd-bhedah kintu ydvdd ghata-sphuranam tdvad ghatdkdrdntahkarana-vrttir ekaiva na tu ndnd vrtteh sva-virodhi-vrtty-utpatti1 . Veddnta-kaumudl. and again there is the vrtti-ob^ect contact. however. Cognition of objects is thus not a mere quality of the self as knower. p. nor is there any immediate contact of the self with the object (the contact being only through the cognitive operation) the cognition is also not to be regarded as unperceived movement. copy. This view of the Veddnta-kaumudi is different from the view of the Veddnta-paribhdsd which holds that in the case of continuous perception of the same object there are not different successive awarenesses. 14-2 . It must be noted. as Kumarila held. Bombay. as there is t paryantam sthdyitvdbhyupagamdt. 42. Veddnta-kaumitdi.anus arena vijndndntaram visay avaranabhangenaiva sva-kdryam karoti.as is held by the Buddhist subjective idealists. MS. but as an objective fact shining forth in the external world. On account of the rapidity of this succession it is not possible to notice it (vrtti-vijnanasya sdvayavatvdc ca hrdsa-dasdydm dipa-jvdidyd iva tamo ntaram mohdntaram dvaritum visayam pravartate tato pi kramamdnam ksandntare sdmagry.

Ramadvaya defines right knowledge (prama) as experience which does not wrongly represent its object (yathdrthanubhavah prama). p. tatra smrti-vydvrttam Veddnta-paribhdsd. 2 Ibid. it only as a mode s Ramadvaya of cognitive process. yet in the former case the definition of truth becomes more subjective than in the latter case for want of wrong representation refers to an objective correspondence and objective certainty. Veddnta. . seems to point only to a verbal difference from Ramadvaya s definition but it may really mean very much more than a verbal difference. . and what is regarded as the present time is that in which the successive timemoments have been fused together into one concrete duration it : is this concrete duration. which is in reality but a fusion of mo mentary cognitive acts and awarenesses. Such a definition of truth becomes very relative. though want of contradiction (Dharmaraja Adhvarindra s condition) and want of wrong repre sentation (Ramadvaya s condition) may mean the same thing. For. perception of time is but the perception of the succession of cognitive acts. 16. An awareness may wrongly represent an object. kdldpeksayd krama-sambhavdt. . that is designated as the 1 According to Ramadvaya the definition of per present time ception would not therefore include the present time as a separate element over and above the object as a separate datum of per ception for his view denies time as an objective entity and regards . since its limits are . and he defines the instru ment of right knowledge as that which leads to it 2 Verbally this definition is entirely different from that of Dharmaraja Adhvarlndra. MS. na caitdvatd jndna-yaugapadydpattih suksmano. . 20. 3 pramdtvam anadhigatdbddhitdrtha-vi$aya-jndnatvam. illumination. na ca suksma-kdlopddhindm apratltih kdryakramenaiva unnlyamdnatvdt. .212 dispelling The Sankara School of Veddnta an [CH. not fixed by correspondence with 1 its object. definition of right knowledge is also different from that of Dharmaraja Adhvarlndra. with whom the two conditions of prama or right knowledge are that it should not be acquaintance with what was already known 3 The latter (anadhigata) and that it should be uncontradicted condition. there intellectual darkness enfolding the object before its is no separate perception of time as an entity standing apart from the objects. . pp. Considering the fact kdlah pratyaksa-gocarah . . however. copy. p.stambhddir eva prdg-abhdva-nivrtti-pradhvamsdnutpatti-rupo vartamdnah tad-avacchinah kdlo pi vartamdnah sa ca tathdvidho neka-jndna-sddhdrana eva.kaumudi. 20-22. but yet may not be found contradicted in the personal history of one or even many observers.

2 . we shall have to exclude much that is perceive things that if we universally acknowledged as right knowledge. There is therefore no justification for introducing anadhigatatva as a condition of perception. Ramadvaya says that in inference the inferred object does not form a datum and there is no direct and immediate contact of the antahkarana with the inferred object (e. for all practical purposes it had a real existence. it often happens that this and makes recognition cases of right we perceived before. regarding the existence of fire) which is called inference 2 . knowledge. and.g. we deny that these are possible. fire). 1 ajndta-jndpanam pramdnam iti tad asdram. Turning to the difference between perception and inference.g. they are impositions and appearances which have as their ultimate ground one changeless consciousness.kaumudt.g. Ibid. MS. viz.xi] Rdmddvaya 213 that the Vedanta speaks of a real spatial super-imposition of the modification of the antahkarana (which is its cognitive operation) on the object.kaumudl is in all probability indebted. copy. One of the earliest explanations of the Vedantic view of inference occurs in the Prakatdrtha-vivarana. p. a Vedanta definition of truth might well be expected to be realistic and not subjectivistic or relativistic. so as to justify the validity of the consciousness as right knowledge at every moment.found faulty because of the fact Vedanta all dual experience of the world was false. though it was ultimately so. however realistic these cognitive relations to objects may be. p. and Ramadvaya refers to the Ista-siddhi to justify his view on this point. . 18. for. 47. The definition of pramd by Ramadvaya as an awareness which does not give a wrong representation (yatharthanubhava) of objects could not be. to which the Vedanta. that a pramd must always be that which acquaints us with what is unknown before (anadhigata) 1 Ramadvaya definitely repudiates such a suggestion He says that that according to the . Also it cannot be conceived how in the case of the continuous perception of an object there can be new qualities accruing to the object. smoke). As to the other point. nor can it be said that the sense-organs after producing the right knowledge of an object (which lasts for some time and is not momentary) may cease to operate until a new awareness is produced. The idealism of the Vedanta rests content in the view that. In inference the antahkarana is in touch only with the reason or the linga (e. Vedanta. and through this there arises (lingadibala-labdhdkdrollekha-mdtrend) an idea in the mind (e.

validity (svatah-prdmdnya) is defined as the acceptance by the underlying sdksi consciousness of this validity in accordance with the exact modes of the awareness (of which the validity is affirmed). Ibid. pp. vol. Pancadasl. viz. in absence of any defects 1 Ramadvaya. 336. 2 sati ydvat-svdsraya-grdhaka-sdmagn-grdhyatvam svdsrayo vrttitad-grdhakam sdksi-jiidnam tendpi vrtti-jndne grhyamdne tad-gata- prdmdnyam apt grhyate. however. being produced by the actual data of that cognition. Veddnta. is a popular compendium in verse. each cognition is . It may well be remembered that Dharmaraja Adhvarindra defines validity (prdmdnyd) of knowledge as an aware ness that characterizes an object as it is (tadvati tat-prakdrakajnanatvam). though the objects are revealed outside. 61. and in accordance with the exact objective con ditions of the awareness. 3 A History of Indian Philosophy. copy. Veddnta-paribhdsd. pp. jnaptdvapijndna-jndpaka-sdmagn-mdtra-jndpyatvam svatastvam. of any defects or distorting elements may invalidate any cognition but. . On the subject of the self-validity of knowledge (svatah- prdmdnya) Ramadvaya does not. p. I. Vidyaranya (A. MS. in which Madhava elaborates the latter s arguments in his own way. while self. MS. 1 Both these works attained great celebrity on account of . 1922. p. 4 prdkatyena yuktasydpi tasya na sarvair viditatvam sva-prakdsam apt prdkatyam kasyacid evddrsta-yogdt sphurati na gunatve jndnasya kathancid artha-yogah samastlti. Vivarana-prameyasamgraha and Pancadasi\ and also Jlvan-mukti-viveka. Of these the former is an independent study of Prakasatman s Panca-pddikdvivarana. 1350). so long as such defects are not known. closely follows Rumania it s view of the self. and that. 68. include the absence of defects (dosdbhdvd) in the definition of svatah-prdmdnya.validity of knowledge and defines is as that which. 372-375. 52. copy. .D. does not contain any element which derived from other sources 2 Later knowledge of the presence . that they may be perceived by us . by Rumania and In this connection Ramadvaya points out that our cognitions are entirely internal phenomena and are not in touch with objects. dosdbhdve jndnam. pp. His other work.214 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. like Dharmarajadhvarmdra. 67. In addition to the Sarva-darsana-samgraha Madhava wrote two works on the Sankara Vedanta system. Veddnta. 337. merit and 4 demerit. yet it is through our own internal conditions.kaumudi. Cambridge. vijndna-sdmagrl-janyatve sati yat tad-anya-janyatvam tad-abhdvasyaiva svatastvokty-angikdrdt. valid of itself for reasons similar to those held 3 already discussed .kaumudi.

Maya all things is the that appears identified with being is the maya as the power of Brahman regulates all relation and existence or being of order of the universe. we could not have found any enjoy ment in sense-objects. i. brother of Sayana. where the white canvas stands for the pure Brahman. Pancadasi. and it is described as that power by which can be produced the manifold world-appearance.xi ] Vidyaranya and same 215 their clear to be the forcible style and diction. 38. and part. This self is pure bliss. is. All objects of the world are thus but a complex of Brahman and maya. their inter-relations and interactions 3 He compares the world-appearance to a painting. Vidyaranya is reputed as Madhava. . however. all qualities of things. The all Brahman. . He was a pupil of Sankarananda. Bharati Tirtha. who had written some works of minor importance on the Upanisads 1 Vidyaranya in his Pancadasi repeats the Vivarana view of the Vedanta. the white paste for the inner controller (antaryamiri). This power (sakti). 3 saktir asty aisvari kdcit sarva-vastu-niydmikd. It should therefore be regarded as ultimately real. . the dark colour for the dispenser of the crude elements (sutratmari) and the coloration for 1 Bharatltlrtha and his teacher Vidyatirtha also were teachers of Vidyaranya. the great Vedic commentator. that. and it is only in association with a part It cannot of Brahman that it transforms itself into the various elements and their modifications. Maya is the cause of this obscuration. It is self- luminous and neither is rises nor sets 2 . there is no moment when there is no . Vidyaranya thus seems to have had three teachers. be regarded either as absolutely real or as unreal. for even in dreamless sleep there must be some consciousness. 40. Calcutta. 7. cic-chdydvesa tah . ill. 2 nodeti ndstamety ekd samvid esd svayam-prabhd. consciousness. saktis cetaneva vibhdti sd. Ibid. because loved by us as our own selves. associated only with a part of Brahman and not with the whole of it. Vidya Tirtha and Sankarananda. 1907. Basumati edition. The light of consciousness is thus itself ever present without any change or flickering of any kind. If the nature nothing of self had been unobscured. whether in our awakened state or in our dreams or in our dreamless condition. In association with the intelligence of Brahman this behaves as an intelligent power which is responsible for the orderliness of . as is evident from the later remembrance of the ex perience of the dreamless state. It is only because the self is largely obscured so to us that much we do not rest content with self-realization and crave for other pleasures from sense-objects.

the dispenser of the concrete elemental world (viraf). Vrttiprabhdkara by Niscaladasa Svamin. attributes that chapter to Bharati Tlrtha.se Bhdratltirtha-vacanam. being reflected through the mayd. popular and attractive way.D. which has generally been of self-realization 1 . however. Vedanta-tattvaviveka. . the substance of which has already been utilized in section 17 of chapter x. p. Advaita-vada. is The chief and important feature of Vidyaranya s Pancadasi the continual repetition of the well-established Vedantic prin ciples in a clear. suchasAdvaita-dipika. assumes the diverse forms and characters. Niscaladasa Svamin points out in his Vrtti-prabhdkara that Vidyaranya was author of the first ten chapters of the Pancadasi and Bharati Tlrtha of the other five. called Vivaranopanydsa. It is traditionally believed that the Panca dasi was written jointly by Vidyaranya and Bharati Tlrtha. but. followed as the main guide in the account of Vedanta given in this and the preceding chapter. which is very helpful to those who wish to initiate their minds inro the Vedantic ways His Vivarana-prameya-samgraha is a more scholarly work. and this fits in with the other tradition that the first six chapters were written by Vidyaranya and the other nine by Bharati tlrtha. Nrsimhasrama Muni (AT Nrsimhasrama Muni (A. Vacarambhana. is an ethical treatise.Advaita-panca-ratna Advaita-bodha-dipika. in the beginning of his commentary on the seventh chapter. . and all the figures that are manifested thereon are the living beings and other objects of the world. as it is of the nature of an elaboration of the ideas contained in Panca-padika-vivarana. Vidyaranya then goes on to describe the usual topics of the Vedanta. which have already been dealt maya with. volume i of the present work. Ramakrsna. Tdtparya-bodhinl by Ramakrsna and another commentary by Sadananda. 1500) was a pupil of Girvanendra Sarasvati and Jagannathasrama and teacher of Narayanasrama. and there being but few ideas which can be considered as an original contribution of Vidyaranya to the development of Vedantic thought. The false appearance of individual selves of subjectivity consciousness a product of is due to the false identification with the underlying pure Brahman. which is referred to by Appaya Dlksita in his Siddhdnta-lesa. 2 He also wrote another work on the Vivarana. and commentaries on the Samksepa-sariraka and Pancay 1 There are four commentaries on the Pancadasi: Tattva-bodhini. He wrote many works. covering more or less the same ground as the Naiskarmya-siddhi of Suresvara. no separate account of its con tents need be given here 2 The Jivan-mukti-viveka.216 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. who wrote a commentary on his Bheda-dhikkara. 68 Vivaranopanya. It is Brahman that. Bheda-dhikkara.

anddy updddnatve sati jndna-nivartyam ajndnam. He considers the self to be bliss itself (sukha-rupa) and does not admit that there is any difference between the self and bliss (sa cdtmd sukhdn na bhidyate)*. but it does not seem that he introduced any new ideas into the Vedanta. . Nrsimhasrama was very well reputed among his con temporaries. vol xxv. as described in the tenth chapter in the first volume of this work 3 . So also. p. May 1 903 This work has two important commentaries. 43. called Tattva-bodhinl zndPanca-padika-vivaranaprakasika. cannot show by logical arguments or by a reference to experience that subjectivity or egoism (ahamkara. In explaining the nature of the perceptual process he gives us the same sort of account as is given by his pupil Dharmaraja Adhvarindra in his Vedanta-paribhasa. which is of fundamental im portance for the Vedanta thesis. but silver cannot be the same as being or existence 1 . Ibid. 1 Vedanta-tattva-viveka. nikhila-prapancopdddnabrahma-gocaram eva ajndnam. p. antahkarana-vrttyd ghatdvacchinnam caitanyam upadhtyate tadd antahkarandvacchinna-ghatdvacchinna-caitanyayor vastuta ekatve py upddhibheddd bhinnayor abhedopddhi-sambandhena aikydd bhavaty abheda ity antahkarandvacchinna-caitanyasya visaydbhinna-tad-adhisthdna-caitanyasydbheda-siddhy3 2 yada artham 4 5 vrtter nirgamanam vdcyam. . viz. . 29. His definition of ajndna is the same as that of Citsukha.xi] Nrsimhasrama Muni 217 padika-vivar ana. because the two are also the So entirely different and cannot be identified. that it is a beginningless constitutive cause. the silver appears to be existent and real (sat). p. He defines the falsehood of world-appearance as its non-existence in the locus in which it appears (pratipannopadhav abhdva-pratiyogitva) When a piece of conch-shell appears to be silver. Vedanta-tattva-viveka. . p 1 2 The Pandit. which is removable by true knowledge 5 There . Tattva-viveka-dipana. its apparent identification with these is thus appearance of subjectivity or egoistic characters in the self-luminous self is false. p. . 15. 22. when we take the worldappearance as existent. He is more interested in emphasizing the fact of the identity of Brahman with the self and the illusory character of the world-appearance than in investigating the nature and con stitution of mayd and the way in which it can be regarded as the material stuff of world-appearance. and one called Tattvaviveka-dlpana-vydkhyd by Bhattoji. Nrsimhasrama. the world-appearance cannot be identical with being or existence 2 necessarily false . is thus practically . Ibid. and he relies on the texts of the Upanisads to prove this point. however. viz. which he also calls antah- karana or mind) is different from self. (na tdvad rajata-svarupam sat). Ibid.

differ no new ence &quot.D. It is sometimes said that he had two different religious views at two Saiva and the Vedanta.2i8 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. as attempted by Sankara and others. lived probably in the middle of the sixteenth century. attaining this right wisdom of oneness (advaita-vasana) arises only through the grace of Siva. 1550). and it is for this reason that Vyasa in his Brahma-sutra tried to establish the superiority of the qualified Brahman Siva as interpreted by Srlkanthacarya. in his attempts to refute &quot. he was only a good compiler and not an original thinker. was anticipated by his great Appaya Diksita 1 Appaya Diksita (A. yet the desire for cannot be certain different periods of his for . He was a great scholar. and he studied Logic (tarka) with Yajnesvara Makhlndra. He was also called Appayya Diksita and Avadhani Yajva. On the side of dialectical arguments. . See colophon to Appaya Diksita s commentary on the Nydya-siddhdnta-manjarl of Janaklnatha. in spite of his scholarship. life. But of this one he was such an all-round scholar that the fact that he wrote a Saiva commentary and a Vedantic commentary need not lead to the supposition that he changed his faith. who lived early in that century. though the right interpretation of the Brahma-sutra is the monistic interpre tation. line of argument in his presentation of the Vedanta.) 1 . and on many occasions where he had opportunities of (or Makhlndra simply Raja giving original views he contents himself with the views of others. and wrote a large number of works on to subjects. There is. In the beginning of his commentary Sivarka-mani-dlpika on Srikantha s Saiva commentary to the Brahma-sutra he says that. well-read in many branches of Sanskrit learning. For. however. and he was somehow able to reconcile in his mind the Saiva doctrine of qualified Brahman (saguna-brahma) as Siva with the Sankara doctrine of unqualified pure Brahman. who is said have been famous for his scholarship from the Himalayas to the south point of India the name of his father was Rangaraja many : Makhlndra). This shows that even while writing his commentary on Srikantha s Saiva-bhasya he had not lost respect for the monistic interpretations of Sankara. nothing very noteworthy in his Vedantic doctrines. It is possible. as he refers to Nrsimhasrama Muni. called Nydyasiddhdnta-manjari-vydkhydna (M S . (bheda) in his Bheda-dhikkara he predecessors Sriharsa and Citsukha. His grandfather was Acarya Diksita.

Bhattoj! Diksita must there Diksita. Inscriptions. vol. in his commentary on the Atmdrpana-stava. in the second chapter. 1626 to settle certain disputes between the Saivas and the Vaisnavas. a brief summary of the doctrines of Madhva. Kalahasti-sarana-Sivananda Yoglndra. A. indicated by his own statement in the Tantrasiddhdnta-dipikd by the latter author. a a work on .D. the very year when years. called Naya-manjari. vide Hultzsch. 1566 to 1575. S. grammar. vol. It is said that Appaya Diksita wrote about four works. decisive conclusions in accordance with the views of Sahkaracarya) muktavali. that his sympathies with the monistic Vedanta. He says in his Sivdrka-mani-dlpikd that he lived in the reign of King Cinnabomma (whose land-grant inscriptions date from Sadasiva. . in the third chapter the decisive conclusions from the point of view of Srikantha s commentary called Naya-manimdld and in the fourth chapter. Vydkarana-vada-naksatra-mdla. called Nyaya-muktdvali. He had for his pupil Bhattoji introduction to the Siva-lilarnava. as pointed out by Mahamahopadhyaya Kuppusvami Sastri in his Sanskrit Since he lived seventy-two he must have died some time in 1626. Tattva- work on Vedanta. maharaja of Vijayanagara. deepened with age. In the Oriental Historical Manuscripts catalogued by Taylor.D. which at the beginning were only lukewarm. as is fore have been a junior contemporary of Appaya Diksita. gives the date of Appaya Dlksita s birth as Kali age 4654. as is also evidenced by his other statement in his Tattva-kaustubha work at the request of King Keladl-Venkatendra. the doctrines of Ramanuja. n. Purvottara-mimdmsd-vdda-naksatra-mdld (containing various separate topics of discussion in Mimamsa and 1 See Mahamahopadhyaya Kuppusvami Sastri s introduction to the Siva- Itlarnava. called Naya-mayukha-mdlikd.D. i).xi] Appaya Diksita 219 however. who reigned from 1604 to 1626 (vide Hultzsch s second volume that he wrote this of Reports on Sanskrit Manuscripts)^. under whose orders he wrote the Sivarkamani-dlpikd commentary on Srikantha s commentary. Srirangam. 1554. he came to the Pandya country. Some of hundred them maybe mentioned here Advaita-nirnaya. : Catur-mata-sdra-samgraha (containing in the first chapter.I. His grandson Nllakantha Diksita says in his iva-lilarnava that Appaya Diksita lived to the good old age of seventy-two. or A. 1911. it is related that at the request of the Pandya king Tirumalai Nayaka he came to the Pandya country in A.

a short work on the threefold mean . Rdmdyana-tdtparya-nirnaya\ Rdmdyana-tdtparya-samgraha . . etc. which in the hands of the later followers of Sankara gradually thickened into a positive stuff through the evolution or transformation of which all the phenomena of world- appearance could be explained.awork on . Vrtti-vdrttika. a . . Ramacandra Yajvan (Gudhartha-prakdsd). a com mentary on Srlkantha s Saiva-bhdsya on the Brahma-sutra\ Sivalamkdrd). commentary . . a collection of the views of different philosophers of the monistic school of Sankara on some of the most important points of the Vedanta. . meaning of the texts of the Upanisads Rdmdnuja-mata-khandana . Dharma-mimdmsdVidhi-rasdparibhdsd Ndma-samgraha-mdlikd Vidhi-rasdyana yanopajivani. 1550 1600). . rhetoric Jayolldsa-nidhi. . commentary on Vacaspati s Bhdmati commentary. . a commentary on Sankara s Sivdnanda-lahari\ Sivdrcana-candrikd Sivotkarsa-can. a short Mimamsa work. . a commentary on Amalananda a s Veddnta-kalpa^taru. Vedanta) Nydya-raksd-mani.220 . Siddhanta- lesa-samgraha. drikd Sivotkarsa-manjari Saiva-kalpa-druma Siddhdnta-ratndhara\ Madhva-mukha-bhanga. . . karndmrta Siva-tattva-viveka Siva-purdna-tamasatva-khandana Sivddvaita-nirnaya Sivdnanda-lahari-candrikd. without any attempt at harmonizing them or showing a his own preference by reasoned arguments. The Vedantists held that this may a. Sivdrka-mani-dlpikd. Prakasananda It (A. Visvanatha Tirtha. Veddnta-kalpa-taruparimala. Rd- mdyana-bhdrata-sdra-samgraha Rdmdyana-sdra Rdmdyana-sdrasamgraha\ Rdmdyana-sdra-stava\ Mimdmsddhikar ana-maid Upakrama-pardkrama. ings of words Kuvalaydnanda.D. a commentary on the Bhdgavata-purdna commentary on Venkata s Yddavdon the Prabodha-candrodaya ndtaka. . a Yddavdbhyudaya-tikd. an attempt to show that Madhva s interpretation of the Brahma-sutra is not in accordance with the . Dharmaya Diksita and others. . The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. a work on rhetoric on which no less than ten commentaries have been written Citra-mimdmsd. a commentary on the Brahma-sutra following the monistic lines of Sankara. and comprising by Acyutakrsnananda Tirtha (Krsna- number of commentaries Gangadharendra SarasvatI (Siddhanta-bindu-sikara). has been pointed out that the Vedanta doctrine of monism as preached by Sankara could not shake off its apparent duality in association with may a. bhyudaya . .

since the variety and multiplicity of world-appearance cannot be explained by the pure changeless Brahman. indescribable. unchangeable Brahman. an indefinable stuff. But when one considers that may a is regarded as positive and as the stuff of the transformations of world-appearance. the maya. and hence the charge of duality would be false. again. The central doctrine of Prakasananda has already been briefly described in chapter x. Prakasananda was probably the first who tried to explain Vedanta from a purely sensationalistic view-point of idealism and denied the objective existence of any stuff. Almost all the followers of Sankara had. however. which is itself the out come of nescience. indefinable. cannot be called a cause of the world for causality based upon the false notion of duality. and his analysis of the nature of perceptual cognition has already been referred to in a preceding section of the present chapter. the scope of the Vedanta (karya-karana-vadasya vedanta-bahirbhutatvat). since there is nothing else but Brahman. was unspeakable. When in reply to the question.what is the cause of . be called a cause. &quot. section 15.xi] Prakasananda it 221 its though adhered to Brahman and spread magical creations thereon. is (avidya). The theory of cause and effect thus lies outside . The existence of objects is nothing more than their perception (drsti). Nescience . under the circumstances. he says that the attribution of causality to Brahman cannot be regarded as strictly correct for ordinarily causality implies the dual relation of cause and effect. may a was unreal and illusory. Speaking on the subject of the causality of Brahman. changeable and unthinkable and was thus entirely different from the selfrevealing. of volume I of the present work. it is hardly intelligible how it can be kept out of consideration as having no kind of existence at all. The positive character of may a as being the stuff of all world-appearance has to be given up. The charge of dualism against such a system of philosophy could be dodged by the teachers of Vedanta only by holding that. been inter preting their master s views in such a way that the positive exist ence of an objective world with its infinite varieties as the ground of perceptual presentation was never denied. The whole course of the development of Vedanta doctrine in the hands of these Vedanta teachers began to crystallize compactly in the view that. it cannot. since Brahman was the ultimate reality. has necessarily to be admitted as the ground of this world. if the strictly monistic doctrine is to be consistently kept.

is not by any means a new contribution of Prakasananda. Thus it would be wrong to argue that. and hence it would be a dual principle existing side 1 by side with Brahman True knowledge is opposed to false knowledge . bddhatvena visayitvam iti ndtmdsraya ity arthah tathd ca nddvaita-ksatih. following the realization of the underlying ground. want of the cause.222 the world?&quot. The nature of this nescience cannot. therefore. that the appearance which was illusorily imposed on it did not exist. Compare also Bhdmatl on Adhydsa-bhdsya. the false appearance absolutely vanishes.all in another form this negation. for here. It will be futile for any one to try to understand it as it is in itself. and positive. is be proved by any of the pramanas for . as Prakasatman holds in the Vivarana\ for such a definition would not apply. 108. This all else excepting Brahman has thus two forms in one . 1890. defines it as the conviction. it is not anywhere. since this negation remains after the realization of Brahman. Nescience is that which else. and it is this conviction that is technically called bddha. it would not itself be negated. and this latter form thus is itself contradicted and its else itself being in an illusory negated by former form. and it will not be anywhere.&quot. Thus Citsukha writes the same thing in his Tattva-dlpikd (also called Pratyak-tatt- . Prakasananda. ndstltiniscayasya asti rupadvatatra adhyas^ amdnatvena rupena sva-visayatvam. that the sur mised appearance was elsewhere and not on the ground on which it was imposed. The its self with the immediately presented destruction of nescience cannot mean cessation together with its products. p. Nescience is proved by one s own consciousness so it is useless to ask how nescience is proved. imposition. Yet it is destroyed cannot be known except through something to : when the identity of the Brahman is realized. the respondent simply wants to obviate the knowledge) awkward silence. The Sankara School of Veddnta it [CH. is cluded within except Brahman. by its relation and it is inexplicable in itself. The indefinability of nescience is its negation on the ground on which it negation of appears (pratipannopddhau nisedha-pratiyogitvam). The Pandit. is said that nescience (ajnana literally. This view is different from the anyatha-khyati view. See his commentary on the Siddhdnta-muktdvali. in such a way 1 Brahmany adhyasyamdnam sarvam kdlatraye yam ekam bddhdtmakam aparam adhyasyamdnatvam. when the underlying ground is imme diately intuited. yet beginningless something else. form it is negation and &quot. whether taken simply or jointly. This idea. however. Nana Diksita seems to have borrowed his whole argument from the Bhdmatl. and it is impossible to perceive darkness by light. and it is felt that it was not there. it is like darkness and the pramanas or the valid ways of cognition are like light. however.

i. So Prakasananda holds that the self Prakasananda . which are themselves but illusory products. thus means the absence entire absence of all of the negation of bliss (an-dnanda-vyavrtti-mdtram dnandatvam) 2 He differs also from the view of Prakasatman that dnanda. because it is the ground of the appearance of blissfulness. but that endowed with bliss is called blissful (visistasyaiva dnanda. raises the question regarding the beholder of the &quot. Moreover. Prakasatman holds that blissfulness is is the object the self on which the character of imposed. p. What people consider of value and desire is not the blissfulness. is called blissful. p. The Pandit.xi] Prakasananda 223 that. means the substance which appears that as blissful. And. the is latter is dispelled altogether. and it would therefore be as right to call the self blissful as to call it painful. . sometimes raised be must vanish when true knowledge dawns. or bliss. .&quot. since it it is we really desire. when the former dawns. according to Sarvajnatma Muni. An then the person who has realized Brahma knowledge will cease to have a bodily existence for bodily existence is based on illusion and all illusion objection that. . 174. pp. Bliss. which is the same as pratipannopddhau nisedha-pratiyogitvam. 39. 2 3 Samksepa-sdrtraka. Siddhdnta-muktdvali. Compare also Veddnta-paribhdd. In later times Madhusudana freely used this definition in his Advaita-siddhi. he may all the same lead any one to the true path. The Pandit. there will be no competent Vedanta teacher. I. The self is called blissful. 1 kalpito pyupadestd sydd yathd-sdstram samddiset na cdvinigamo doso vidydvattvena nirnaydt. if this so. since the self appears not only as blissful. 1 may lead any one to the right path replies that. if this is so. just as the Vedas. as follows: pratiyogitvam atyantdbhdvam prati mrsdtmatd. 215. cannot be called blissful because blissfulness is is illusorily which happens to be the ground on imposed. which in itself is which it is dissociated from blissfulness. 160. naturally of a blissful character. 1890. 219 and 220. the subject of the nature of the self as pure bliss (dnanda) he differs from Sarvajnatma Muni s view that what is meant by On the statement that the self is is of the nature of pure bliss is that there sorrows or negation of bliss in the self. not the object of blissfulness. but also as pain ful. To this Prakasananda though the Vedanta teacher may be himself an illusory production. sarvesam api bhdvdndm dsrayatvena sammate va-pradipika) p. mithydtvam ca svdsrayatvendbhimata-ydvannisthdtyantdbhdva-pratiyogitvam. paddrthatvdi)* If blissfulness is not a natural character of the it self. Prakasananda holds that this view is not correct. even . but that which is blissful. 1890.

Since the self and its cognition are identical and since there is nothing else but this self. 420. In the colophon of his work he says that the essence of the Vedanta as bdldn prati vivarto yam brahmanah sakalam jagat avivarttitam dnandam dsthitdh krtinah sadd. So vivarta really means oneness with the substance. .224 The Sankara School of Veddnta it [CH. and with others who conception of developed a it more realistic may a transformation but . stance.pray ojana- taya) monism would be fictitious anything existed apart from self. that our ideas have no objective substratum to which they correspond. Ibid. it is indefinable (anirvacanlyd) though common people would always think of it as being real with the texts of the Vedas. 2 one and only ultimate reality. but. strictly speaking. this experienced duality and says that is Brahman who has experience of duality. and both of them would land us in into all its impossible consequences. The vivarta view holds that the effect has no reality apart from the underlying ground or substance. developing probably on the lines of Mandana. if an attempt is non-entity made to interpret it logically. 326. like . tried for the first time to give a consistent presentation of the Vedanta from the most thorough-going idealistic point of view. that there is no kind of objectivity that can be attributed to the world. yet there is no actual modification or transformation (parinamd) of Brahman experiences. was he who. If one looks at may a in accordance will appear to be an absolutely the hare s horn. The Pandit. In this view he has often to self is the fight with Sarvajfiatma Muni. Prakasatman. and that there is no causation or creation of the world. p. 1890. and it virtually denies all else that may appear to be growing out of this one sub The false perception of world-appearance thus consists in the appearance of all kinds of characters in Brahman. that the (vastavi) . p. though Brahman alone exists. there is no meaning in saying that the Vedanta admits the vivarta view of causation for. . there 1 is . which is absolutely characterless (nisprakarikayah saprakarakatvena bhavah). Prakasananda thus preaches the extreme view of the Vedanta. no causation If at all (vivartasya bala-vyutpatti. may a (tuccha). then the Vedantic disturbed. tucchdnirvacanlyd ca vdstavi cety asau tridhd jneyd mdyd tribhir bodhaih srauta-yauktika-laukikaih. since such a view would be open to the ob jections brought against the alternative assumptions of the whole of Brahman or a part of it. that may a is absolutely non-existent.

Kamalajanayana and Vaglsa Gosvamin. The Pandit. s most important work. who w as r and teacher of Purusottama a pupil of Visvesvara Saras Sarasvatl. in all probability first half of the sixteenth century. Bengal. 428. Krsna-kutuhala nataka.tikd^ Bhdgavata -purdna-prathama sloka vydkhyd. .manddkini. D ii 15 . and this shows though thoroughgoing Vedantist. Brhat-tlkdy and Laghu-candrikd.stuti. Madhusudana s father is said to have been Pramodapurandara Acarya. 1890.tikd Ananda . yacchisya-sisya-sandoha-vyaptd bhdrata-bhumayah vande tarn yatibhir vandyam Prakdsdnandam tsvaram. Sarasvatl. he was religiously attached to tantra forms of worship. Advaita-siddhy-upanydsa. since Bhattacarya is a Bengali surname and since his favourite pupil was a Bengali. Advaita . 488. a Manoramd Mahd-laksmi-paddhati and that. at a time when different countries of India had become pervaded . such as tantra-rdja-tikd. Siddhanta-muktavali. 3 p. Tdrd-bhakti-tarangini. 2 by the disciples and disciples of the disciples of Prakasananda Madhusudana Sarasvatl Madhusudana vatl (A. called Siddhanta-pradipika. 4 The Advaita-siddhi has three commentaries. flourished in the .bodha . Advaita-manjari. he also must have been a Bengali. Samksepa-sdriraka- sdra-samgraha. tries to refute Siddhdnta-tattva-bindu. - - bhakti. however. Bhagavad-gltd gudhdrtha dipikd BhagavadVeda . in His which he the objections raised in Vyasatlrtha Nyayamrtcfi vedanta-sdra-sarvasvam ajneyam adhundtanaih asesena mayoktam tat purusottama-yatnatah. p. His pupil Purusottama Sarasvatl in his commentary on the Siddhdnta-bindu-tlkd refers to Balabhadra Bhattacarya as a favourite pupil of his. is Hari-lild-vydkhyd. Some of the important details of Madhusudana s philosophical dialectics will be taken up in the treatment of the philosophy of Madhva and his followers in the third volume of the present work in connection with Madhusudana s discussions with Vyasatlrtha. by Brahmananda Sarasvatl. .xi] Madhusudana Sarasvatl 225 preached by him is unknown to his contemporaries and that it was he who first thoroughly expounded this doctrine of philo 1 Prakasananda wrote many other works in addition to his sophy . It is also pointed out that in a family genealogy (Kula-panjikd) of Kotalipara of Faridpur.raksana Atma . Ramajna Pandeya in his edition of Madhusudana s Veddnta-kalpa-latika suggests that he was a Bengali by birth.ratna . Ibid. and Pandeya argues that.Prasthana-bheda Bhakti-sdmdnya-nirupana . his Advaita-siddhi. . Sn-vidya-paddhati.rasdyana Sdndilya-sutra-tikd.Sdstra-siddhdnta-lesa-tikd. Yadavananda Nyayacarya. who had four sons ^rlnatha Cudamani. His chief works are Veddnta-kalpa-latikd. . Advaita-siddhi. Nana Diksita wrote a commentary on the Muktavall.D.

and so forth. as it only repeats some of the important arguments of the bigger work Advaita-siddhi and It is tries to refute the view of dualists like the followers of Madhva. though he was such a confirmed in constant controversy.9 and 10 of the tenth chapter of the present work. The Advaita-ratna-raksana may therefore be regarded as a much later work. and this shows that the Vedanta-kalpa-latika was written prior to all these works. was monist in his philosophy. duality cannot be proved by any means of proof. already dealt with in the tenth chapter and also in the section Vedantic Cosmology of the present volume. p.8. or devotion. His Advaita-ratna-raksana deals with such subjects &quot. with whom Madhusudana unnecessary. Ramajna Pandeya \ points out in his introduction to the Vedanta-kalpa-latika that the Advaita-siddhi contains a reference to his Gita-nibandhana the Gita-nibandhana and the Srimad-bhagavata-tika contain refer ences to his Bhakti-rasayana. It is. he was a theist in his religion and followed the path of bhakti. as is evidenced by his numerous works promulgating the bhakti creed. There is nothing particularly new in the Vedanta-kalpalatika that deserves special mention as a contribution to Vedantic refers to the Advaita-siddhi and thought. against the monistic Vedanta of Sankara and his followers. 7. There is practically nothing new in the work. See also Mahimnah-stotra-tlka. excepting that he gives a con nected account of the perceptual process. p. however. &quot. Madhusudana s Siddhanta-bindu does not contain anything of importance. for our present purposes to enter into any of the details of this work. as the validity of the Upanisads: the Upanisads do not admit duality. indeterminate know valid ledge does not admit duality. therefore. . and the Bhakti-rasayana refers to the Vedanta-kalpa-latika . and Siddhanta-bindu in his Advaita537 (Nirnaya-Sagara edition). 5. Madhusudana s Vedanta-kalpa-latika was written earlier than his Advaita-siddhi and his commentary on the Mahimnah stotra 1 . have nothing to do with the philosophy of the Vedanta. perception does not prove the reality of duality. which is the subjectmatter of Advaita-siddhi. however. More will be utilized in the third volume in connection with the controversy between Vyasatirtha and Madhusudana. 1 The special feature of the work consists in the frequent He refers to the Vedanta-kalpa-latika siddhi. the duality involved in mutual negation is false . with which we are concerned in the present chapter. Materials from this book have already been utilized in sections 6.226 The Sankara School of Veddnta [CH. interesting to note that. These works.

as the Naiyayikas of the substantial nature of the senses. ceases in emancipation to have any contact withpurusa. This is an evident misrepresenta tion of the Samkhya. next introduces a discussion of the nature of self-knowledge. an existent entity. like other in connection with pure consciousness.xi] Madhusudana Sarasvatl 227 summaries of doctrines of other systems of Indian philosophy and contrasts them with important Vedanta views. for with the Samkhya the destruction of sorrow in emancipation means that the buddhi. He then treats of the destruction of nescience. makes its appearance He the Upanisadic propositions of identity. Manas is said to pervade the whole of the body and not to be atomic. The first problem discussed is the nature of emancipation (moksd) and the brief ways of is realizing it: Madhusudana attempts to prove that it only the Vedantic concept of salvation that can appeal to men. there is no inconsistency in having emancipation from sorrow. all other views being unsatisfactory and invalid. which. since the thinks that what is existent cannot be destroyed. He concludes the work with a discussion Thus the mind-organ is said be made up of five elements. and hence. Samkhya view of salvation he says that. for example. and then. even though sorrow may not be destroyed. however. since Brahma knowledge can be attained only through things. to Finally. a product of prakrti Samkhya which is the source of all sorrow. But it does not seem in refuting the that he does proper justice to other views. hold. It is unnecessary for our present purposes. and holds that it is the self freed from nescience that should be regarded as the real nature of emancipation. sorrow. to multiply examples of misrepresentation by Madhusudana of the views of other systems of thought in regard to the same problem. cannot be destroyed. Madhusudana returns again to the problem of emancipation. so there cannot be being any emancipation from sorrow. Thus. whereas other senses are regarded as being constituted of one element only. anvitdbhidhana-vada and the like. he passes over to the dis cussion of import of propositions and the doctrines of abhihitan- vaya-vada. In the course of the discussions he describes negation (abhavd) also as being made up of the stuff of nescience. 15-2 .

the son of Agnivesya. which contains twenty-three thousand seven included devoid of the general characteristics throughout occupied with discussions of hundred and thirty-four verses (ignoring possible differences in different manuscripts or editions) and is thus very much larger than the Srimad-bhagavad-gita. that its claim to treatment immediately after Sankara seems to me to be particularly strong. A heavenly damsel (apsarah). Moreover. is so much like the view of Sankara and of Vijnanavada Buddhism. The Yoga-vasistha-Ramayana may be it is among the pur anas. To illustrate this idea he narrates a story in which Karunya. and which it is never tired of reiterating. This extensive philosophical poem. as to was not more fitted for the attainment of his highest than follow ing a course of self-abnegation and desirelessness (tyaga-matrd). is a unique work. On hearing this question of Karunya Agnivesya told him that he could answer his question only by narrating a story. having returned from the teacher s house after the completion of his studies. resembling the Vedantic doctrines as interpreted by Sahkara. but of the puranas and is Vedantic problems of a radically monistic type. The work begins with a story.CHAPTER THE XII THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE YOGA-VASISTHA philosophical elements in the various Puranas will be taken in a later volume. certain Brahmin went to the A hermitage of the sage Agastya and asked him whether knowledge or work was the direct cause of salvation (moksa-sddhana). so a man can attain the highest (paramam padam) only through knowledge and work. after hearing which he might decide as he chose. When he was asked for the reason of said that he was perplexed over the question action of a man in he whether the accordance with scriptural injunction was or this attitude of his. Agastya replied that. sitting on one of the peaks of the . remained silent and did no work. the various inter pretations of the Vedanta-siitra which will follow are so much opposed to Sankara s views as to make it hard to find a suitable place for a treatment like that of the Yoga-vasistha unless it is taken up immediately after the chapter dealing with Sahkara. Suruci by name. as a bird flies with its two wings. The philosophical view with which it is concerned.

Brahma told him to apply and went himself to him (Valmiki). On hearing this the king had refused to go to heaven. he was answered. being pleased. and during their stay there they were subject to mutual jealousy on account of the inequality of their enjoyments. when he had finished the story of Rama the work properly known as Ramayana and taught it to Bhara dvaja. this was done. She asked him where he was going. and asked him not to cease working until he finished describing the entire character of Rama. when this was reported to Indra. xn] Introduction of the Theme 229 Himalayas. and he. people enjoyed superior. he was very much surprised and he asked the messenger to carry the king to Valmiki s hermitage and king. medium or inferior: when they had exhausted their merits by enjoyment. wished to confer a boon on him. once saw a messenger of Indra flying through the sky. and that he had had to go to him on duty and was returning from him. Bharadvaja in reply said that he would like to receive such instructions as would to Valmiki enable people to escape from sorrow. medium and inferior pleasures according as their merits were superior. was performing a course of asceticism (tapas). Bharadvaja also asked Valmiki to describe how Rama and his wife. brother and followers behaved in this sorrowful and dangerous world and lived in sorrowless tranquillity. they were reborn again on earth. the king asked Valmiki how he might attain moksa. having given his kingdom to his son and having become free from all passions. by listening to which people will be saved from the dangers of the world. Aristanemi make Valmiki acquainted with the king s refusal to enjoy the fruits of heaven and request him to give him proper instructions for the attainment of right knowledge. When Brahma disappeared from the hermitage after giving this instruction.CH. In reply he said that a certain by name. accompanied by Bharadvaja. but while doing so he was asked by the king to describe the advantages and defects of heaven. The messenger replied that he was asked by Indra to take a welldecorated chariot and bring the king in it to heaven. on hearing which he would make up his mind whether he would like to go there or not. leading to emancipation (moksa). Bharadvaja recited it once to Brahma (the god). and. The damsel wanted to know in detail what happened there between the messenger and the king. and Valmiki in reply wished to narrate the dialogue of When Vasistha and Rama (Vasistha-rama-samvada) on the subject. . Valmiki said that. In heaven.

much later than would be implied by the claim that the work was written by the author of the Ramayana. and this mind itself appears to be non . When Agasty a finished narrating Brahmin Sutiksna felt himself enlightened. on hearing all this from his father Agnivesya. At this time the sage Visvamitra of his sorrow. and the damsel was also pleased and dismissed the heavenly messenger. and since work and passivity mean the same. In answer to the above question Valmiki replied that Rama. as is generally supposed. in. it was his clear duty to follow the customary duties of life the story. existent. When Valmiki narrated this dialogue of Vasistha and Rama. went out on his travels to see the various places of pilgrimage and hermitages. 50: atha tarn atimdtra-vihvaldm sakrpdkdsabhavd sarasvatl sapharim hrada-sosa-vihvaldm prathamd vrstir ivdnvakampata.parasparam asanginah).230 The Philosophy of the Yoga-vdsistha [CH. be almost unhesitatingly assumed that the author borrowed it from Kalidasa.. however.. s Rama Rama said in reply that a new enquiry had come all into his mind and had made him averse from enjoyments. Karunya. and Visvamitra asked him the cause of his dejection. . 16. since he realized the philosophical truth. It contains a sloka which may be noted as almost identical with a verse of Kalidasa s Kumdra-sambhavd1 It may. and it is this answer which forms the content of the book. There is at least one point which may be considered as a very clear indication of later date. Everything is like a mirage. in my opinion. people are born to die and they die to be born again. became very much concerned about Rama s sadness and asked Vasistha if he knew what might be the cause of it. dejected mental state at this time created much anxiety. They are collected and associated together only by our mental imagination (manah-kalpanaya) The world of enjoyment is created by the mind (manah). Everything is impermanent (asthira) in this world. On his return. Vasistha then explained the nature of the world-appearance. also visited the city of Ayodhya to invite Rama to kill the demons. the . There is no happi ness in this world. felt as if he realized the ultimate truth and thought that. All existent things are unconnected (bhavdh. after finishing his studies. Rama s father. and it is true. he looked very sad every day and would not tell anyone the cause King Das*aratha. 1 Yoga-vdsistha. king Aristanemi found himself enlightened. that Kalidasa .

the choice of words is exceedingly pleasing to the ear. the writings of Gaudapada and Sahkara. and they often produce the effect of interesting us more by their poetical value than by the extremely idealistic thought which they are intended to convey. I am therefore inclined to think that the author cation of idealistic of the Yoga-vasistha was probably a contemporary of Gaudapada or Sarikara. 800 or a century anterior to them. The author of the Yoga-vasistha. Of these commentaries I am par ticularly indebted to the Tdtparya-prakdsa of Anandabodhendra. But the writer seems to have been endowed with ex traordinary poetical gifts. Several commen taries have been written on it. It is known also by the names of Arsa-Rdmdyana. and it was also summarized in verse by some writers whose works also had com mentaries written upon them. Utpatti. The Yoga-vasistha is throughout a philosophical work. Jndna-vdsistha. the views of the Yoga-vasistha so much resemble those of the idealistic school of Buddhists. Upasama and Nirvana. viz. Vdsistha-Rdmdyana or Vdsistha. Vairagya. It may also be assumed that the interval between Kalidasa s time and that of the author of the Yoga-vasistha had been long enough to establish Kalidasa s reputation as a poet. called Vdsistha-Rdmdyana-candrikd. There is another fact which deserves consideration in this con nection. Sthiti. namely. The Yoga-vasistha had a number of commentaries. that the whole work seems to be a Brahmanic modifi Buddhism. wrote the Tdtparya-prakdsa. The work contains six books. about A. pupil of Gangadharendra Sarasvati of the nineteenth century.xn] The Yoga-vasistha Literature 231 lived in the fifth century A. Ramadeva and Sadananda also wrote two commentaries on . One other important instance can be given of such a tendency to assimilate Buddhistic idealism and modify it on Brahmanic lines. in the form of popular lectures. agreement neither of them refers Again. and Sankara In spite of the fact that the views of the Yoga-vasistha s interpretation of Vedanta have important points of to the other. son of Narahari. flourished at least some time after Kalidasa. whoever he may have been. Mumuksu-vyavahara.D. MahdRdmdyana. or prakaranas. Thus Advayaranya. Anandabodhendra Sarasvati. Gangadha rendra also is said to have written a commentary of the same name. and the same idea is often repeated again and again in various kinds of expressions and poetical imagery. wrote a commentary on it.D. Almost every verse is full of the finest poetical imagery.

Rdmdy ana in the Proceedings of the Madras Oriental Conference of 1924 says that the Moksopdya-sdra. The Yoga-vdsistha-sdra also had two commentaries by Purnananda and Mahidhara. For. . was written by an Abhinanda who is not to be confused with Gauda Abhinanda. Yoga-vdsistha-sdra-samgraha and Vdsistha-sdra or Vdsistha-sdra- the work. like dreams in deep sleep (susupti). and in addition to these there called Yoga-vdsistha-tdtparya-samgraha. Yoga-vdsistha-slokdh and Yoga-vdsistha-samksepa by Gauda Abhinanda of the ninth century. At the time of each dissolution the entire universe of appearance is destroyed. The names of some of its summaries are Brhad-yoga-vdsistha. if it was existent. by Mummadideva.Laghu-jndna-vdsistha. pupil of Advaitananda. What is left is deep and static (stimita-gambhira) neither light nor dark ness. is another commentary. Incidentally this also refutes his view that the Yogavdsistha is to be placed between the tenth and the twelfth centuries. indescribable and unmanifested (andkhyam anabhivyaktam). the Pada-candrikd. was written by Madhava Sarasvatl. and it is the main thesis of this work that it does not exist. The date of the Yoga-vdsistha may thus be regarded as being the seventh or the eighth century.232 The Philosophy of the Yoga-vdsistha [CH. But he misses the fact that Gauda Abhinanda had also written another summary of it. but a somehow existent entity. This entity manifests itself as another (svayam any a ivollasan) and through this dynamic aspect it appears as the ever-active mind (manas) like moving ripples from the motionless ocean. . called Candrikd. . for. The Ultimate The third Entity. and another commentary. Yoga-vdsistha-sdra or Jnana-sdra. ceptible universe (drsya). book of the Yoga-vdsistha deals with origination All bondage (bandhd) is due to the existence of the per (utpatti). Mr Sivaprasad Bhattacarya in an article on the Yoga-vdsistha. called Yoga-vdsisthasamksepa. The Yoga-vdsistha-samksepa of Gauda Abhinanda had a commentary by Atmasukha. which is another name for the Yoga-vdsistha-sdra. and another called Samsdratarani. gudhdrthd by Ramananda Tirtha. the Yoga-vdsistha must have been written at least in the eighth century. But in reality whatever appears as the diver sified universe is altogether non-existent. if a summary of it was written by Gauda Abhinanda of the ninth century.

in spite of its appearance. sarvesdm bhuta-jatdndm samsdra-vyavahdrindm prathamo sau pratispandas citta-dehah svatodayah asmdt purvdt pratispanddd ananyaitat-svarupim iyam pravisrtd srstih spanda-srstir ivdnildt. rdmdsya manaso rupam na kimcid api drsyate ndma-rndtr dd rte vyomno yathd siinya-jaddkrteh. remains always in itself and does not really suffer any transforma tions or modifications. having no actual reality. though this manas itself is merely a hypothetical starting-point. in. 3. it is merely a 3 name. The Muni held that what appears dreamland or due to the imagination of manas. 233 all. mere nothingness . by whose mental creations everything springs forth in appearance. there is emancipation (moksa). That anything has come out of merely like the production of and existence are like momentary imaginations. Gradually. which. though these dreams and manas are merely the same and a mirage stream. Out of the first movement of this entity arises ego (svata). just as one cannot separate liquidity from water or movement from air. Manas is thus nothing but the hypothetical entity from which all the dreams of appearance pro ceed. . has no proper form. and appears does not exist at all it is all mere mental creations. in. there springs forth the entire world- appearance. like fairyland (yathd samkalpa-nagaram yaihd gandharva-pattanam). and. For the manas is not different from the dreams of appearance and cannot be separated from them. Whatever appears and seems to have existence is nothing but manas. could not cease under any circumstances It does not exist at The ultimate indefinite and indescribable entity. The ultimate entity or imagining (samkalpa-purusd)^ before us is is a mere entity of pure conceiving . essenceless mental creations of the ultimate entity. All characteristics of forms 1 Yoga-vdsistha. it is like the vacuity it is does not exist outside or subjec surrounding us everywhere. or pure intelligence (paro bodhah). It is only by the realization whatever else false that this world-appearance has no possibility of existence that the notion of ourselves as knowers ceases. which is pure extinction (nirvdna-matra). There is nothing in essence except that ultimate entity. 15. 3. It tively inside us. 38. This manas. by a series of movements (spanda) like waves in the air. though the false appearance may continue as such. 14. 111.4. is in reality no thing but the ultimate entity. proceeding out of the substanceless.xn] it The Ultimate Entity 1 . however.

impossible to distinguish between them tamas are thus but synonyms for the citta. III. the Vedantins call &quot. 7. and 6 which. like the water of the mirage or the son of a barren woman.234 it The Philosophy of the Yoga-vdsistha 1 . the idealistic Buddhists call &quot.&quot. in. The state of emancipation is the cessation of this and it is no perceiver. There is in reality . same concept 2 It is the perceiver that appears as the perceived. world 5 . neither statical being nor becoming (na bhdvo bhavanam na ca). mala. Avidyd. nameable (kimapy avyapadesatma) and neither being nor nonbeing nor being-non-being. 69. The ultimate entity is thus neither existent nor non-existent and is both statical and dynamical (spandaspandatmakd) 1 it is indescribable and un. 22. and in which described as that essencelessness (sunya) which does lies the ground and being of the essenceless world-appearance (yasmin sunyam jagat sthitam). III. 9. 49. in spite of all creations. no vacuity (sunya). no spirit or conscious ness. y that the Samkhyists call purusa. is essenceless The illusory world. pervading the inner and the outer &quot. nihilists idea&quot. appearance has to be considered as absolutely non-existent. called drsti-srsti-vdda. 46. 9. &quot. 70. 4. 3 6 in. no matter. III. III. 16. bandha. It is of the nature of pure pure annihilation and cessation. samsrti.Brahman. perceived or perceptions. purne purnatn prasarati sdnte sdntam vyavasthitam vyomany evoditam vyoma brahmani brahma tisthati na drsyam asti sad-rupam na drastd na ca darsanam na sunyam na jadam no etc chdntam evedam atatam. but pure cessation or pure negation. but the perceptions that appear as the perceiver and the perceived. 59. . It is not appear to be so. On Vedanta lines it is very similar to Prakasananda s interpretation of the Vedanta in later times.pure (vijnana-matra) and the essencelessness (sunya)^. 6-7. 4 7 ndsa-rupo vindsdtmd. 5. 5. in. which can probably be traced at least as far back as Gaudapada or Mandana. and this is what we mean 3 by Brahman Its nature is that of pure cessation (santa) and it is this world-appearance. is . manas. The similarity of the philosophy of the Yoga-vdsistha to the idealistic philosophy of the Lankdvatarasutra is so definite and deep that the subject does not require any elaborate discussion and the readers are referred to the philosophy of the Lankdvatdra in the first volume of the present work. [CH. Prakasatman refers to the Yoga-vdsistha as one of his main authorities. 2 5 4.

235 The world as such never existed in the past. any has 1 real sense . Ghana has been paraphrased in the Tdtparyaprakdsa as accretion (upacaya). somehow to But yet there is the appearance. tatas tarn ghanatdm jdtam ghana-spanda-kramdn manah. is of the ultimate being. and corresponding to each ghana there was a semi-statical creation. comparison of numerous passages like these shows that each mental creation is the result of a creative thought-movement called bhdvand. manah sampadyate lolam kaland-kalanonmukham kalayantl manah saktir ddau bhdvayati ksandt. move ments is said to be ghana. which is akin to thought. and desires to flow out of itself as a pure essence of creative . in no sense and is nothing but the seeming appearances of the self-conscious move ment (sva-samvedana-matrakani) network of being existing. . is produced a state which can be described as a self. bandhyd-putra-vyoma-bane yathd na stah kaddcana jagad-ddy akhilam drsyam tathd ndsti kaddcana na cotpannam na ca dhvarnsi yat kilddau na vidyate utpattih kldrsl tasya ndsa-sabdasya 2 kd kathd. At this stage it forgets. dkdsa-bhdvandmacchdm sabda-blja-rasonmukhlm . as it were. The order of moments leading to the manifestation of the world- appearance can be described in this way: At first there is some thing like a self-reflecting thought in the ultimate entity. 4. n. It is only this entity that can be called conscious intelligence becomes more and more concrete (cit). of the nature of pure cessation (santa). iv. The first objectivity is akasa. 5. The ultimate entity is. and following each ghana there was a spanda (ghana-spanda-kramdt) . All the non-existent. of course. . moment arise the ego (ahamta) real. on a further movement. which at this moment is like the akasa is and the ego and which the seed (bljd) its of all the conceivings air 2 . manifested as (kald). its subject-objectless ultimate state.thinking entity. nor exists now. Thus.samvedana) other conditions of soul (jiva) arise out of it. as described above. and its genesis be accounted for. producing some indescribable objectivity which gives rise to an egohood. and has only an appearance of Thought (samvit). and each successive A movement in the chain of a succession of developing creative . This creation At this is. or concrete. 17. which is clear pure intelligence. nor will exist hereafter so it has no production or destruction in . however. of thought (bhavana). formulates by movement Again. pure vacuity. 44. 16. As the thought-activity (ghana. in which everything may be reflected. Bhdvdna is the same as spanda as the result of each thought-movement. movement and time (bhavana-matra-sara).xn] Origination Origination. there was thought-accretion (ghana). ill.

is through which the soul thinks that is it only the conscious subject and as such different from the object . hearing and taste. Manas. It is by the all-powerful so conceptual activity of Brahman that there arises the appearance of many centres of subjective thought. following the dkasa moment and from it as a more concrete state (ghanlbhuya). Through its desire. These are all.236 The Philosophy of the Yoga-vdsistha [CH. 12. &quot. smell. however. All it is this conceiving activity that appears as existent does so only as a result of the conceptual I shall see. sentences self-conscious thought 1 The stages then are. the appearance of the two hollows of the eye. and as such have no reality apart from their being as mere appearance. though pure consciousness manifested its in essence. according to this theory. Since their nature is purely conceptual (vikalpd). with and valid means of proof. In reality. . is in an un- state. Then comes the illusory notion of subjectivity. there comes activity of thought. Gradually the of the other tan-matras of sparsa. There is no single soul. which has no other reality than the fact that they are conceptions of the their words. which. they cannot be real at any time. however. and similarly in the case of touch. comes forth the sound-potential (kha-tan-matrd). This moment naturally leads to the state of the subjective ego. ideal creations. and from them the entire objective world. rasa andgandha conceivings follow.&quot. there first arises an objectivity (cetyatva) through of self-directed it self-consciousness the objectivity inherent in (satas cetyamsa-cetanai)\ next arises the soul. which conceives actively (buddhitvakalanam) and which leads to the objective con ceptions of the different tan-matras and the world-appearance. This sound-potential is the root of the production of all the Vedas. is nothing but that function of pure consciousness through which it posits out of itself an object of itself. far less an infinite number of them. the jivas have no other existence than the con ceptualizing activity which produces their appearance. Here the pure conscious part may be called the spiritual 1 III. (cetyaika-parata-vasat). There is no materiality or form: these are nothing but the self-flashings of thought (citta-camatkara). Brahman. as the souls (jivas). that in the state of equilibrium (sama) of the ultimate indescribable entity called the . tejas. where there is objective consciousness only through the touch or connection of objectivity (cetya-samyoga-cetanat) instead of the self-directed consciousness of objectivity inherent in itself.

yathd karma ca kartd ca parydyeneha samgatau karmand kriyate kartd kartrd karma pranlyate in. but. as this state is determined by the activity of the previous state. irrelevant to enquire into the possibility of some other cause of the ultimate cause. most important question. cid-bkdgo trdjado bhdgo jddyam atra hi cetyatd. bljdnkurddivan-nydyo loka-vedokta eva sah. Brahmanah kdranam . and no ultimate if priority can be affirmed of any one of But. it may be said that the karma generates the kartd. and this would mean cito 2 yac cetya-kalanam tan-manastvam uddhrtam ill. the root desire (vdsand) through which a man is born also makes him suffer or enjoy in accordance with it. and this objectivity takes its first start with the rise of egohood (ahamta). Manas and the Categories . spring forth together. otherwise called the karma. 91. 54. 18. 19. 95. kirn sydd iti vaktitm na yujyate iv. 22. The active states of manas are again determined by their preceding moments and may in their turn be considered as determining the succeeding moments. the kartd by its activity again produces karma. As in the case of the seed coming from the tree and the tree coming from the seed. Manas and the Categories. succeeding state. so that karma and kartd are mutually determinative. it When any particular state determines any maybe considered as an agent. 7. Karma in this view is nothing but the activity of the manas. Karma. how the original disturbed and how the present development of the equilibrium creation has come about. though it appears to per ceive something other than itself (svam evdnyatayd drstva). the answer given in the conceptual But to the is Yoga-vasistha is that it is by pure accident (kdkatdllya-yogena) that such a course of events took place. 15.xn] Karma. 37. in. if kartd and karma . iv. the Brahman 3 . then the responsibility of karma ceases. then a particular birth ought not to be de termined by the karma of previous birth. the cycle proceeds on from kartd to karma and from karma to kartd. them 4 this is so. svabhdvo nirvisesatvdt para vaktum na yujyate. or kartd\ but. 237 1 In its objectivity part and its objectivity aspect the material part also the cit perceives nothing but itself. 96. It is indeed disappointing that such a wonderful creation of world-appearance should have 2 It is considered ultimately to depend on accident for its origin . namely. 20.

so even the body. man s enjoyment and sorrow did not depend on his karma. and the actions which follow are indeed very diverse. kalpand. prayatna. namely. first but only different moments. or activity. the soul and the body associated with it are supposed to be manifested. Manas means that activity which induces being subsists between being and non-being and through non-being: it is essentially dynamic in its nature and passes by the name of manas. The seed of karma is to be sought in the manas (karma-bljam manah-spanda). citta. It is by the activity of manas that the subject-objectless pure consciousness assumes the form of a self-conscious ego. so movement and activity cannot be separated from manas. is in reality nothing but the manas and its activity. Thus the moment is of self-conscious activity leading in different directions manas. there is called . indriya. however. In answer to such a question. activity of Manas thus consists of this constantly positing activity (ekdnta-kalanah). be separated from fire or blackness from collyrium. Karma and manas are in one sense the same. vidyd. raised by Ramacandra. Manas. It is the synthetic (kriya) function (tad-anusandhatte) of manas that is called the functioning of the conative senses. as it is by the movement of manas that all effects take place. stages or aspects. Manas is essentially of the nature of karma. in reality. Vasistha says that karma is due not to dtman. as a result thereof. It is the mental movement which constitutes karma. If one ceases. and. external karma. When first the category of manas rises into being from Brahman. by which all actions are performed. the other also necessarily ceases. after such oscillating movement. may a and kriyd are different only in name. buddhi. and it is for this reason that karma is nothing but manas. smrti. and the cessation of activity means the destruction of manas (karma-nose mano-ndsah) 1 As heat cannot . but to manas. They do not same concept. which is associated with physical. When. current only because they lay stress the same active functioning. In this world the movement generated by action (kriyd-spandd) is called karma. and. ahamkdra. samsrti. vdsand. the These different names are on the different aspects of mean different entities. and the bodies with all their associated sufferings or enjoyments are produced. prakrti. and they create confusion by these varied names . karma.238 that The Philosophy of the Yoga-vdsistha [CH. they signify the active functioning of manas or citta. karma also begins from that moment.

anything previously seen or unseen. In the realization that there is such a thing as self-knowledge. but its main purpose lies in the attempt to create a firm conviction on the part of its readers. by One repeating the same idea in various ways by means of stories and elaborate descriptions often abounding in the richest poetical imagery of undeniably high aesthetic value. citta and buddhi^ 1 . 96. When the true knowledge is forgotten and the impressions of the false world-appearance gain ground. I.xu] Karma Manas and . as &quot. and that there is also such a thing as the false and illusory world-appearance. subdued form. 34. as being we have what is called memory (smrti). it is called buddhi. As self. pearance which goes by the various called illusion (mayo) 1 Thus it is the same ap names of jiva. Kalidasa. When the citta turns itself to previously experienced. When of the past and the anticipations of the future. it desires anything. we have what are called the impure states (mala). leaving its self-contained state. the Categories 239 the position of either of the alternatives. it is As the and as . . it is called karma. 1 in. Jlva ity ucyate loke mana ity api kathyate cittant ity ucyate saiva buddhir ity ucyate tatha.the thus. we have what is called right knowledge (vidyd). When. III. When there is reflective thought associated with the memory citta. as if certain attractions or repulsions to certain things were really experienced. ahamkara. dominating all other inclinations. called the origin (prakrti).&quot. we have kalpana. 17-31. The functions of the five kinds of cognition please us and are called the senses (indriya) all world-appearance has its origin and ground in the highest it is . When by the false notions of associations of body and soul there is the feeling of a concrete individual as it is called &quot. we have the root inclinations (vasana). hardly inferior to that of the greatest Sanskrit poet.&quot. called existent nor non-existent. of the peculiarities of this work is that it is not a philo sophical treatise of the ordinary type. 96. When certain impressions are produced in a very subtle. it is called the activity is taken in its actual form as motion or action towards any point. true state can neither be it gives rise to all kinds of appearance. manas.

But the question arises. . yet it seems to posit itself as its other. whereas generally thought to have no permanent basis. The World-Appearance. existing outside of us. The seer never transforms himself into objectivity. All objective appearance is thus nothing but identically the same as the Brahman. Brahman remains shut up within itself. Yoga-vasistha is never tired of repeating that this world is hare s horn. The self-alienation by which the pure consciousness constructs the dream conception is such that. 46. But. It is by accident that certain dream series correspond with certain other dream series 1 But in reality they are all empty dream con structions of one manas. change less and unchangeable. yet such a change is not real. can the order of the world-appearance be explained ? The natural answer to such a question in this system is that the seeming correspondence and agreement depend upon the similarity of the imaginary products in certain spheres. though there is this change into manas and through it the production of the world-appearance. But. . associated with the latter is 1 melanam apisvaklya-parakiya-svapndndrn daivdt kvacit samvddavat svdntahkalpandlmakam eva. It is by becoming like a The manas that Brahman transforms itself into thought-activity and thus produces the seeming changeful appearances. and all that appears has simply no existence. IV. time. It is by the dream desires that physical objects gradually come to be considered as persistent objects . or a lotus in the sky. But Brahman in itself cannot have anything else (brahma-tattve nyata nasti). though during the continuance of the dreams they appear to be real. but illusory for during all the time when this change makes its appearance and seems to stay. The state of Brahman is higher than the state of manas. Yoga-vdsistha-tdtparya-prakdsa. how. and also upon accident. if the worldappearance is nothing but the illusory creative conception of manas. . permanent convictions (sthira-pratyayd). that the former is considered by us as . 18. they are all the while nothing but mere dream conceptions. Any experience which persists. action and substance (desa-kala-kriya-dravyaih) The difference between the ordinary waking state and the dream state consists in this. but remains simply identical with himself in all ap pearances of objectivity.240 The Philosophy of the Yoga-vdsistha [CH. and as diversified by space. whether it be dream or not. a forest in the sky. though it always remains identical with itself.

and body heat (tejas). somehow that to difference between be permanent and therefore real. very much It is the manas that is both the and the perceived universe (visva-rupata) 3 perceiver (purusa) itself like fire.xn] The World. we have experiences of the dream state. and on account of this all sorts of knowledge arise. The vital principle remains still in itself. ii. action or speech. it appears to itself as that concept. . 19. as the oil remains in the sesamum (taila-samvid yatha When the vital principle (jiva-dhatu) is disturbed. . momentary. . just as an iron ball 2 tile) . action and speech. are relatively persistent. 12. whereas. they lose their validity as representing permanent objects. or deep sleep state. and our faith in them becomes shaken. and the illusion of world-appearance inherent in it is manifested as coming from outside through the various sense apertures. if even our waking conceptions come to be regarded as changeful. There is is within us a principle of pure consciousness. 23. The susupta. 2 IV. IV. vitality (vlrya). in a potential state without any external manifestation. In the active condition. There is thus no dream states and waking states except this. we did not consider them to be false for during that time those dream experiences appeared . Whenever the manas strongly identifies itself with any of its concepts. which also the vital principle (jiva-dhatu). and it is then that the latter are contra dicted and therefore regarded as false. It is only with the coming of the waking state that there is a break of the dream experiences. 19. If the dream experiences persisted in time and the waking experiences were. when the body is associated with manas.Appearance 241 comes to be regarded as permanent. continuous and per while the former are changeful and impermanent the 1 latter manent (asthira) (sthira). But so long as the dream experiences lasted in the dream state. This being of a steady and fixed character is called the waking state (jagrat). the vital principle moves through the body. is that in which the body is not disturbed by the movement of the manas. in fire becomes jdgrat-svapna-dasd-bhedo na sthirdsthirate vind samah sadaiva sarvatra samasto nubhavo nayoh svapno pi svapna-samaye sthairydjjdgrattvam rcchati ast hairy at jdgrad evdste svapnas tddrsa-bodhatah. then the waking state would be considered as a dream and the dream experiences would be considered as ordinary experiences in the dream state.

one may attain emancipation. and that this is the only way of salvation. of the Samkhya consider manas to be pure con have also explained their doctrines in other de they tails. Nature of Agency (Kartrtva) and the World Creation. or deeds requiring strenuous exercise of will-power. Thus each system of thought thinks too much of its own false methods of salvation (svair eva niyama-bhramaih). if he understands that the world-appearance is nothing but his own illusion. The followers of The followers . sweet or bitter. as those of the Yoga discipline. 2 yohyantara-sthdydh manovrtter niscayah upddeyatd-pratyayo vdsandbhidhdiv. . provided there is complete self-control and cessation of all sense desires. 38. 21. springing from the tradi tional wrong notions. 56.242 The Philosophy of the Yoga-vdsistha [CH. and such appearances arise only through the habitual creations of the mind. There is nothing intrinsically pleasurable or painful. 2. But the truth underlying all these concep tions is that manas is the root of all creations. natatkartrtva-sabdenocyate. he begins to perceive things in that particular manner during that particular time 1 . nant and instinctive desires and inclinations (vasanabhidhdnah) 2 The inner movement of feeling in the person towards the enjoyment of experiences takes place in accordance with these fixed desires or inclinations leading him to specific forms of enjoyment. na tad asti na yat satyam na tad asti na yan mrsd. The Vijnanavadins (Idealistic Buddhists) think that. and they think that emancipation cannot be attained by any way other than that which the Samkhya suggests. When one believes and thinks with strong faith in any particular manner. All enjoy thus a natural consequence of our nature and character as active agents. of the nature of domi . Since all active agency (kartrtva) consists in the ment 1 is na jneneha paddrthesu rupam ekam udiryate drdha-bhdvanayd ceto yad yathd bhdvayaty alam tat tat-phalam tad-dkdram tdvat-kdlarn prapasyati. so it is in the grasp of will and resolution. 57. Illusion of Whenever we ascribe agency (kartrtva) to any person in respect of deeds producing pleasure or pain. sciousness the Vedanta also consider that emancipation is attained if one understands that all this world is Brahman and if there is self-control and cessation of desires together with this knowledge. IV. cold or hot. and an internal determination of the mind. we do it wrongly for agency consists .

the world-appearance has sprung forth from Brahman. there is no sorrow in this world-appearance nor such quality which is different from Brahman. in Brahman existence. and there is the movement without any is done by manas is done. But those who have no vasana cannot be said to have the nature of active agents or of enjoying anything. if everything has proceeded from Brahman. that to a person who has a perfect realization of the nature of the world-appearance. Their minds are no doubt always active and they are active all the time. but Brahman a existence at mere conceptual creation from the Brahman and having no all. unity. as being be similar in nature thereto. may lead to all sorts of mischief. If. and what is not done by it is not done. and therefore all powers (saktayah) are seen . On this account instruction in the identity of the Brahman and the world-appearance should never be given to 1 6-2 . but. root desires (vasana). as they have no vasana. The latter that all power of action and all mental modifications appear. and is thus possible only for those who do not know the truth and have their minds full of the root inclinations. they are not attached to fruit. and through the (karma). it is is mentioned. it ought to is sorrowless. All action or active agency is thus associated with root inclinations (vdsana). and is upheld in manas. Only in the any eyes of a person difference who has not the complete realization does this between the world-appearance and Brahman seem to be so great. attachment. naturally expected to be similar thereto in substance. (cit) it out of pure consciousness or mind. Every thing is but a mental creation and has no other existence.xn] Nature of Agency and Illusion of World Creation 243 inner effort of will. Ultimately. and the mere notion of the identity of Brahman and the universe. has evolved or Brahman. and not the body the world has appeared from the mind (citta or manas). duality and multi plicity all proceed from Brahman. as has already been citta. the enjoyment following such an inner exercise of will is nothing but the feeling modifications of the mind follow ing the lead of the active exercise of the will. is of the essence of manas. without its complete realization. so it is the manas that is the active agent. how is this to be explained? To such a question the answer is. while the world-appearance is full of sorrow. therefore. Whatever . the Brahman? When anything comes out of any other thing. how is it that the world-appearance happens to be so different from its source. But. everything comes from Brahman for that is the source of all powers. non-existence.

At the very first the outflow of this manas energy in the direction of a conceptual creation means an accumulation of energy in manas. again. yet to cycle take their start. so is . and all sorts of wonderful sights are shown. and a cloth becomes a jug. modifies manas by its accretion. result is . of manas thus modified is the creation of air. and so on. At the next stage there is a combination of this statical state of energy with the next outflow of energy. IV. . and that.244 The Philosophy of the Yoga-vdsistha [CH. no destruction whatsoever 2 . 41. and that leads to again the formation of the stabilized energy of the third order. as a result of this creative outflow of energy. creation the creative from manas that creation and destruction from cycle At the beginning of each so-called of manas energy is roused. 39. ndtra kascit kartd na bhoktd na vindsam eti. is thus through the interaction of the actualized energy of thought with the active forms of the energy of thought. and this outflow . called ghana. anyone whose mind has not been properly purified by the essential virtues of self-control and disinclination to worldly pleasures 1 As in magic (indrajala). The outflow of this second order. and so on. 39. the entire world-appearance produced out of the imagination of the mind. There is no active agent (kartr) (bhoktr) of the pleasures and sorrows of the world. which is a sort of statical aspect of the dynamical energy (spandd). there is an accretion of energy in manas at this moment there is another outflow (spandd) or movement on the part of manas. though none of these appearances have the slightest essence of their own. as modified by the accretion of energy of the previous state. which join together. a jug becomes a cloth. and the movement the stabilized accretion of energy of the second order this followed by another outflow of energy. and there is a third outflow of energy of the manas as modified by the previous accretion. Thus it is said that the first movement of manas manifests itself as the akasa creation. non-existent things are produced and existent things are destroyed. This process of the modification of energy by the outflow of the manas modified at each stage by the accretion of the outflow of energy at each of the preceding states is called ddau sama dama-prdyair gunaih sisyam visodhayet pascal sarvam idam brahma suddhas tvam iti bodhayet. at each successive outflow from is The course of thought-creation creative the supreme fund of potential energy. 23. and no one enjoyer and there is Though it is the ultimate state all is the indescribable Brahman or cit. IV.

and afterwards that of the ahamkara and buddhi. then the vayu tan-matra from the akasa tan-matra plus the outflow of energy. wait for the future. He is full of bliss and happiness. and thus of the subtle body (pury-astaka) thereafter the cosmic body of Brahman is formed and developed in accordance with the root desire (vasana) inherent in manas. we have the subtle body of eight constituents (five tan-matras. agent (tyakta-kartrtva-vibhramah). He internally renounces all actions. though he remains altogether unaffected by them internally. this Emancipation (mukti) in system can be attained in the is is lifetime of a person or after his death. nor remain in the present. as if he were in a state of deep sleep (susuptavai) He is self-contained and thinks as if nothing existed. he has not the delusion of being himself an active . then. grief.xi i] The Stage of 1 . The jlvan-mukta state which the saint has ceased to have any desires (apagataisanah). even though he may be perceiving all things with his external eye and using his limbs in all directions. ahamkara. the ahamkara and the buddhi. he is asleep. The Stage of the Saint (Jivan-mukta). called the pury-astaka of Brahma. 1 He has no antipathy. But all this is pure mental creation. He does not that in . after the tan-matra. He may be doing all kinds of actions externally. tan-matra. the Saint all 245 ghana-spanda-krama The creation of the so-called tan-mdtras (subtle states) of akasa. in the former case it called sa-deha-muktatd. he is awake and. Thus here we have first the akasa . vayu. though he may be doing all kinds of things. though awake. and so also are all the scriptures. nor remember the past. and so on. and does not desire anything for himself. or outbursts of pleasure. Then. emotions. and hence unreal. QT jlvan-muktatd. Though sleeping. from the akasa tan-matra plus the vayu tan-matra plus the outflow of energy of the third order. He has always an inward eye. tejas tan-matra. gods and goddesses and all else that passes as real. and therefore appears to ordinary eyes to be an ordinary happy man but in reality. He is quite neutral to all who iv. From this develops the body of Brahma. ap and ksiti takes place in this order. 13-30- . buddhi and the root manas). tejas. and from the creative imagination of Brahma we have the grosser materials and all the rest of the world-appearance. 44.

he may still continue to have the illusion of world-appearance. (2) as. or indifferent. goes so the body. he says that knowledge destroys only those actions which have not already begun to yield their fruits. though 2 Of the Upanisads internally he may remain unaffected by it . Jivan-mukti. do him in his or well . when a man through some eye-disease sees two moons instead of one. meaning 1 2 % ?7 Sankara * s Sanraka-bhdsya or the Brahma-sutra. is serious with an old man. is considered by Sankara also as a possible state. sympathetic with the sorrows of a suffering man. even when the saint is firmly convinced of the unreality of the world-appearance. 15. and so it is not possible for anyone to escape from their effects. He is not interested in his own virtuous He all deeds. and. those actions which have already begun to yield fruits cannot be destroyed by true knowledge. being firm in his convictions. good or bad. may continue to exist for some time even after the rise of knowledge. vi. he can play like a child and can 1 sympathize with the sorrows of sufferers . enjoyments. In explaining such a condition Sankara gives two analogies: (i) as a potter s wheel on revolving when the vessel that it was forming is completed. i. bad. sins. he he shows sympathetic interest in each person plays with a child. or emancipation while living. on the basis of Chandogya. though he does not seem to have used the term in his works. though unaffected in every way within himself. 2. so. But it appears that this indifference on the part make him an exclusive and unnatural man. an enjoyable companion to a young man. which was necessary till the attainment of true know ledge. mentions the word jlvanthose saints who live till their fruit-yielding mukta. Thus. . has a true philosophic knowledge of the essence and nature of phenomena. which seems to have drawn its inspiration from the Yoga-vdsistha. only the later Muktika Upanisad. iv. 14. good. he continues to do so even when he is convinced that there are not two moons but one. He is wise and pleasant and loving to all with whom he comes in contact. in bondage or emancipation. he can take part in the enjoyment of others. own way. for.246 The Philosophy of ill the Yoga-vdsistha [CH. he remains all neutral to from the descriptions of a saint does not kinds of happenings. 19. and it has to be admitted that until the effects of the actions even after the dawning of true knowledge the body remains which have already begun to yield fruits are exhausted by enjoyment or suffering.

enjoyment of others and when when with philosophers sopher as gay as a child sufferings of others he can be with children. The Srlmad-bhagadoes not deny such qualities to a saint. is for pleasure. 55-58. appearance mixes with The Thus we to question whether a saint is effects of his own deeds was also raised in above the tyranny of the Buddhist quarters. n. and is absolutely devoid of all likes and dislikes. Gita. Like a tortoise within its shell. fear or anger. also n. is yet not absolutely cut off from us for. though it or old men. and it is said that no one can attain nirvana without enjoying the 1 2 Muktika Upanisad. whereas the Yoga-vasistha.xn] The Stage of the Saint . which gives a summary of it in its own way But it seems as if the conception of the saint in the Yoga-vasistha . the idea seems to be pretty old. 247 actions (prarabdha-karma) are exhausted 1 But. though absolutely unaffected by all pleasures and sufferings. but is not cut off from society and can seemingly take The part in everything without losing his mental balance in any way. is find in the Katha-vatthu that a discussion raised as whether a saint can be killed before his proper time of death. and seems to lay stress on the aspect of the passivity and neutral character of the saint. The saint in the Yoga-vasistha not only performs his all own actions in an unattached manner. contented in himself. no attachment. He is absolutely unattached to anything. vi. but what one misses the taking of a full and proper interest in life along others. and as serious as any philo vad-gita. 33. that here the saint. though he has no . The conception of sthita-prajna in the Srimad-bhagavad-glta reminds us of the of steady state of a jlvan-mukta saint. 42. by virtue and vice. 76. though the word is not mentioned. I. lays equal stress on both these special features of a saint. though the saint is internally absolutely unaffected by all that he may do. . of course. interest in his own good. as we have already said. 3 Yoga-vasistha. always recommends even the unattached is saint to join in there with all all kinds of good actions. 35. but to the sorrows and joys of others. he draws himself away from the sense2 This conception of the Srimad-bhagavad-glta is referred to objects 3 in the Yoga-vasistha. 52-58. A sthita-prajna (man wisdom) has no desires. Srlmad-bhagavad-gita. he can show enjoyment sympathy with the in the . yet does not mention them either. has not perturbed by sorrow nor longs is but has this advantage over the other. .

2. he could not escape suffering the effect of his misdeeds. . about A. 508. and hence there is no possibility of knowledge. they were as small as grains of rice . and so emancipation during the period while the body remains is not possible 3 The point is noticed by Vatsyayana in a discussion on Nyaya-sutra. p. Thus. antipathy. Nydya-manjari. 304. tad evam navdndm dtma-gundndm nirrnfdocchedo pavargah tad evedam uktam bhavati tad-atyanta-viyogo pavargah. iv. virtue. 43. who said that this was due to the crime of parricide. pain. knowledge. 450). [CH. W. accumulated intentional deeds 1 is Dhamma-pada commentary Burlingame. vice and rooted instincts). vol. yasmdt sarva-duhkha-bljam sarva-duhkhdyatanam cdpavarge vichidyate tasmdt sarvena duhkhena vimuktih apavargo no nirbijam nirdyatanam ca duhkham utpadyate. n. then the is Kathd-vatthu. the body. 2. and these were explained by Buddha. objects through the senses and denies it by declaring that in emancipation (apavarga) the soul is dissociated from the body and all the senses. even though he had attained sainthood (arhattva) in that life. story is told in the (the date of which. and that with the extinction of all knowledge there is also ulti mate and absolute destruction of pain 4 The Vaisesika holds the same view on the subject. W. and it is easy to see that this cannot happen except after death. iv. . Thus Sriharsa says that. Burlingame. occurs only when the the nine kinds of qualities (will. not all agreed re garding the possibility of the jivan-mukta state.248 fruits of The Philosophy of the Yoga-vdsistha . when through . there soul is absolutely dissociated from all cannot be emancipation. p. where he raises the question of the possibility of knowledge of external . Vatsyayana on Nydya-sutra. The different Indian systems are. 42-45. which were on the point of bearing fruit 2 This would naturally imply the view that sainthood does not necessarily mean destruction of in pieces was torn by thieves. right 1 knowledge (par amariha-darsand] all merit ceases.D. according to the Nyaya. The same legend repeated in the introduction to Jdtaka 522. how the great saint Moggallana A and his bones were pounded until such a miserable death of such a great saint naturally raised doubts among his disciples. according to E. xvn. 2. effort. pleasure. however. 2 Buddhist Legends by E. apavarga^ or emancipation. which Moggallana had committed in some previous birth. but that even after the attainment of sainthood the body may continue to exist for the suffering of the effects of such actions as are on the point of bearing fruit. Unless such a dissociation actually occurs.

desists injunctions. p. Prasastapdda1 bhdsyby p. exhausts in the end all the potencies of his karmas (nihsesa-karmdsayd) and attains 3 emancipation This view. 157. is absolute and ultimate non-production pation. exhausts by enjoyment and good and bad fruits of previous actions. The Samkhya-kdrika. according to this view. are able to ripen for bearing fruit. 2 dtyantikas tu dehocchedo nihsesa-dharmddharma-pariksaya-nibandhano moksa iti. the body may still continue to remain simply by the inertia. when no further karma is accumulating but it does not call this state moksa during life. p. p. however. 3 Ibid. suffering the . like the extinction of fire by the burning up of all the fuel and such an eternal non. 283. Thus Salikanatha. there is absolute cessation of the production of body. Nydya-kandalt. 282. and when in consequence none of the karmas of undetermined fruition (aniyata-vipdka). etc. being averse to worldly sorrows and all pleasures which are mixed with traces of sorrow. of body. tranquillity. when true knowledge is attained (samyagjndnadhigama). in explaining the Prabhakara view in his Prakarana-pancika. 156. he who. of the old avidya\ just as even after the potter has ceased to operate the potter s wheel may continue to move as a yathd dagdhendhanasydnalasyopasamah punar anutpdda evam punah sarirdnutpddo moksah. . however.. and the present body having been body destroyed by the exhaustive enjoyment of the fruits of merit and demerit. . self-restraint and absolute sex-control. no doubt has reference to a very advanced state in this life. accumu lated through beginningless time. which produce and the senses. says that . and there being no further production of any new body the by reason of the destruction of all the seeds of karma.xn] The Stage of the Saint 249 soul. attains true and is equipped with the moral qualities of passionless knowledge. not possible to exhaust by enjoyment or suffering the fruits of all the karmas accumulated since beginningless time. works for emanci difficulty is raised that it is from committing the actions prohibited by Vedic which produce sins. for moksa. 1 emancipation means the absolute and ultimate destruction of the 2 The body. holds that. being devoid of the seeds of merit and demerit. Prakarana-pancika. production of body is called moksa (emancipation) Prabhakara seems to hold a similar view. due to the total exhaustion of merit and demerit . as it were. Prasastapada also writes: tadd nirodhdt nirbljasydtmanah sarlrddi-nivrttih punah sarirddy-anutpattau dagdhendhandnalavad upasamo moksa iti.

the roots of which have already 1 Sdrnkhya-kdrikd. i. but is . raises the threefold conception of manda-viveka . for its . as oarikara The Tattva-kaumudl here essays to base its remarks did in his bhd$ya on the Brahma-sutra. The Tattva-vibhakara of Vamsidhara Misra. may. the roots in the world of sub conscious impressions being destroyed. and begins to re-live the nature of his own self and to discriminate himself as being entirely different from his psychosis (sattvd) but. IV.250 The Philosophy of the Yoga-vasistha it [CH. . The general impressions of cognition (jnana-samskara) however. 3 Ibid. result of the momentum which 1 . ill. yet.I &quot.. and viveka-nispatti (finished discrimination) 3 The stage of mandaviveka is that in which the enquirer has not attained the desired discrimination of the difference between prakrti andpurusa. 8. 2. in commenting on Vacaspati s Tattvakaumudl. these occasional ordinary cognitive states cannot produce further new impressions. But this is an asamprajnata state. more particularly the Pravacana-bhasya. asmuch as the roots of the old impressions have already been instincts. such as do not know&quot. on Chdndogya. A man who nears the state of emancipation ceases to have doubts about the nature of the self.&quot. has acquired (cakra-bhramivad dhrta-sarirah) in the The word jivan-mukta sutra. Compare Yoga-vdsistha: ghand na vdsand yasya punarjanana-varjitd. and the occasional appear ance of ordinary cognitive states being but remnants produced of citta. The by some of the old impressions. 14. in. in know. there &quot. viveka-nispatti. endeavouring to attain it the madhya-viveka stage is the state of the jivan-mukta. is not used either in the Karika or Tattva-kaumudl or in the Tattva-vibhakara.support.e. 78.&quot. n. vi. and therefore there cannot in this stage be any reflection of pleasure or sorrow (due to the fructifying karma prarabdha-karmd) on the purusa.I &quot. state in which there is no subject-object knowledge. 67.mine. 68 . and also ^rlmad-bhagavad-gitd. is an asamprajnata . 77. 2 Sdmkhya-sutra. 37. uses the term and justifies it on the same grounds as does Vacaspati 2 The Samkhya-sutra.&quot. The Yoga also agrees with the general conclusion of the Samkhya on the subject. madhya-viveka (middle discrimination). am. emerge other ordinary cognitive states. quotes Mundaka Upanisad. remain until the final destruction y point here is that. The Samkhyahowever. The last stage. as a result of the persistence of some decayed roots of old impressions and . 77-83. (feeble discrimination). a state in which there is still subject-object knowledge and a full conscious discrimination. in the intervals of the flow of true discrimi native knowledge.I burnt. &quot. 2.

they cannot. Medhatithi. Pancadasi. therefore.xn] The Stage of the Saint 251 been burnt. Yoga-sutra. with the nature and characteristics . with the final object for which jivanmukti is sought and in the fifth. 2 . Kahola-brahmana. Maitreyi-brahmana. intense 1 Disinclination to passions and desires (virakti) is. and in such a state the sage. though living (jlvann eva). Bhagavata. Bodhayana. produce any further impressions and thus cannot be a cause of bondage to the saint. Jabala-brahmana. Sarirabrdhmana. n. in the second. Antarydmi- brdhmana. Suta-samhita. Sankara-bhasya. to him. etc. Visnu-purana. iv. So my identification of the Vidyaranya of the Pancadasi with the writer of Jlvan-mukti-viveka in the first volume (p. Taittiriya-brdhmana. such as Brhadaranyaka Upanisad. Vydsa-bhdsya. Yoga-sutra and Vydsa-bhasya. which he called Jlvan-mukti-viveka 2 It is divided into five chapters. as quotations from the chapter Brahmdnanda of the Pancadasi are found in it (chap. The work is more a textual compilation from various sources than an acute philosophical work examining the subject on its own merits. Chowkhamba edition). The next stage is. . pp. Parasara. according (tivrd) and very intense (tivratara). Naiskarmya-siddhi. Gita. when the citta returns back to 1 prakrti. 419) of the present work seems to be erroneous. of course. and there is only discriminative knowledge. with the destruction of manas (mano-nasd) in the fourth. Among later writers Vidyaranya wrote on this subject a treatise . Panca-padika. the state of absolute emancipation (kaivalyd). Brahma-sutra. This Vidyaranya seems to be later than the Vidyaranya who wrote the Pancadasl. becomes emancipated (vimukta). Visvarupa Acarya. 196. With the advance of this state the sage ceases to have inclinations even towards his processes of concentration. though he refers to relevant passages in several other works. these occasional ordinary cognitive states are like passing shadows which have no basis anywhere. never to find the purusa again . 29-32. Kausitaki. Brhaspati-smrti. and have virtually renounced the world. of two kinds. Brahma-upanisad. this state of samadhi is called dharma-megha. The writer seems to have derived his main inspiration from the Yoga-vasistha. Gauda-pada-karika. of those saints who have attained jivan-mukti by wisdom and right knowledge (vidvat-samnyasd). the works of Yama. 195. In the first he deals with the authorities who support jivan-mukti . Katha-valli. though living. with the nature of the destruction of instinctive root inclinations (vasana)\ in the third. At this stage all the roots of ignorance and other afflictions become absolutely destroyed.

holds that on account of steady right knowledge even the seeming appearance of passions and attachment cannot do any harm to ajivan-mukta. Vidyaranya follows the view of the Yoga-vdsistha. . who killed Sakalya by cursing and yet did not suffer on that account. . since such a person is fixed and steady in his Brahma knowledge. Thus he gives the example of Yajiiavalkya. though he supports it by other scriptural quotations. if he desires emancipa parama-hamsa. however. and its power of overruling the limitations and bondage of past karmas. pp. Vidyaranya. If the ascetic has is 1 tion. the already a jivan-mukta. in this is that in which the person does not desire anything whereas very intense virakti is that in which the person ceases to have any desires for all future lives 1 Vidyaranya takes Intense virakti life. it is called vividisd-samnydsa (renunciation for thirst of knowledge). z It is pointed out by Vidyaranya that the Arunikopanisad describes the conduct and character of vividisd-samnydsa. but a mere appearance (dbhdsa) of it 3 . Paurusa is defined in the Yoga-vdsistha as mental and physical exertions made in properly advised ways (sddhupadistaordinary desires he is called hamsa. great pains to prove. 1 1 When a man renounces the world for the attainment of right knowledge. as distinguished from vidvat-samnyasa (renunciation of the wise) in the case of those who have already attained right knowledge. On the subject of bodiless emancipation (videha-mukti) also he refers to passages from the Yoga-vdsistha. 20-24). rooted in instinctive passions. one loin-cloth and to repeat the Aranyakas and the Upanisads only. he called . 183-186. of the special features of the Yoga-vdsistha is the special emphasis that it lays upon free-will and its immense possi bilities. cessation of all instinctive root desires (vdsana-ksaya). by reference to various scriptural texts. because he was of right knowledge (tattva-jndnd) . The course of their conduct is described in the Pardsara-smrti. firm in his knowledge of the unreality of the world. 2 As regards the nature though one might develop into the other of jivan-mukti. . Jivan-mukti is the direct result of the dawning and the destruction of manas (mano-ndsd). 3 Jlvan-mukti-viveka. in which one is asked to have a staff. Energy One of Free-will (Paurusa).)ust as the bite of a snake whose fangs have been drawn cannot do him any harm. and the Parama-hamsopanisat describes the conduct and character of vidvat-samnyasa in which no such repetition of the Upaniads is held necessary. Jivan-mukti-viveka. . i.252 The Philosophy of the Yoga-vdsistha [CH. I. The latter kind of samnyasa is with reference to those who are jlvan-mukta. that there are these two distinct classes of renunciation (sonny asiri). This makes the difference between the final stages of the two kinds of renunciation (Jivan-mukti-viveka. So his anger was not real anger.

of course. always a limit beyond which human endeavours are not possible. and the can be overcome by the present paurusa*. Not only so. since mere random endeavours or endeavours on a wrong line cannot the be expected to produce good results 5 If one exerts his will and directs his efforts in the proper way. Ibid. The idea that one being led in a particular way by the influence of past karmas has to be shaken off from the mind for the efforts of the past life are certainly not stronger than the visible efforts of the moment. ii. of the past life their respective strength. he is bound to be successful. sa ca sac-chdstra-sat-sanga-sad-dcdrair nijam phalam daddtlti svabhdvo yam anyathd ndrtha-siddhaye.xn] Energy of Free-will 1 . and one or the other gains ground according to kinds. yo yam artham prdrthayate tad-artham cehate kramdt avasyam sa tarn dpnoti na ced ardhdn nivartate. * 4. 17. II. n. n. is led to many Whenever is a great effort is made or a great energy exerted. 5. All efforts have indeed to be made in accordance with the direction of the scriptures (sastrd). if he does not turn back in midway 2 Paurusa is of two . but the endeavours of any individual may be in conflict with the opposing endeavours of other persons. and any part of the daiva which becomes weaker than the efforts of the present life sddhupadista-mdrgena yan mano. There is. Yoga-vdsistha. : in this life. The karma past paurusa of past life and the karma of this life are thus always in conflict with each other. 3 Ibid. 12. there victory. 4. since only such actions can succeed anything and works accordingly in the proper way. 7. depends upon the relative strength of the two. by cultivating company of good friends. and by adhering to right conduct. 5. which would have evil results. (praktand) and of this life (aihika). Ibid. . 25. and there fore it is necessary that proper economy of endeavours should be observed by following the directions of the scriptures. The whole question. ii. 253 If a person desires margena). standing as a separate force it has a continuity with the power of other actions performed . 4.nga-vicestitam tat paurusam tat saphalam any ad unmatta-ce$titam. he is certain to attain it. . 5. the power so that it is possible by superior exertions to destroy of the actions of previous lives. There is nothing like destiny (daiva). whether the daiva of the past life or the paurusa of this life will win. this life is can conquer the effect of past deeds. u. and of these two also that which is stronger wins 4 By strong and firm resolution and effort of will the endeavours of . Ibid.

and that . and to exert oneself to his utmost to attain the supreme end of life. of the legs and corresponding muscles that one can walk. properly speaking. when directed with the and proper advisers or teachers. that. Properly speaking. and the nature of efforts being essentially vibratory (spanda}. and it cannot be used by any of the senses. come that daiva exists. Yoga-vdsiftha. insensible. that becomes like an animal at the mercy of destiny or God. standing on its own account. and. It is only he who thinks that destiny must lead him on. in a contrary direction is naturally annulled. even if it is admitted aid of the sastra is daiva a mere fiction . but it even goes to the extreme of denying daiva and calling it The a mere fiction. which may take him to heaven or to life is hell. The object of all endeavours and efforts in this to destroy the power of the so-called destiny. is no daiva. Visible efforts are all tangible and open to immediate perception. and consequently does not strive properly to overcome the evil destiny. and it is only by the effort nothing is effected is . then daiva is never seen anywhere. how can this supposed formless (amurta) entity in contact with it? It is only fools who conceive the sdstrato gurutas caiva svatas ceti tri-siddhayah sarvatra purusdrthasya na daivasya kaJdcana. Yoga-vasistha not only holds that paurusa can conquer and annul daiva. What passes as no one has ever experienced it. n. does not exist at all. there . Thus it is said that endeavours and efforts manifest themselves as the movement of thought (samvit-spanda). and there is also a corresponding enjoyment or suffering. which is only imagined and can never be proved. . n. So everything is effected by personal efforts.254 The Philosophy of the Yoga-vdsistha [CH. 7.the movement of manas (manah-spanda) and the movement of the senses (aindriyd) Thought movement is followed by movement of the psychosis or cetas\ . so-called daiva. By all the pramanas at our disposal it is found that nothing but the firm exercise of will and effort achieves its end. that there by pure daiva it is only by the effort of eating the satisfaction of hunger. the body moves accordingly. or exercised in accordance with the sastra or with the directions of a teacher 1 It is for all of us to exert ourselves for good and to withdraw our rninds from evil. . and wherever any achievement is possible it is always by continual strenuous effort of will. or daiva. it is only by the effort of the vocal organs that speech is effected. one can never expect such move ment from the formless. If this view is true.

and manas being the same as the agent or the person (purusa) so daiva does not exist as an entity separate from the purusa. and there would Man is thus a free source . Vasana and karma are. is by essence a free source of active meaningless to say that he could be determined by anything but himself. and what does it mean after all? In answer to this Vasistha says that. The instinctive root inclinations (vasana) of a prior state become transformed into karma. who are learned and wise. the question arises. tion in a particular way. which is a mere name. 9. and what else that entity. 8. u. A man works in accordance with his vasana and by vasana gets what he wants. and vasana being the same as manas. if it is held that any other entity could determine him. There are always in manas two distinct groups of vdsanas. and are ruined. At the all time of taking any step people have a particular idea. There is no daiva. operating towards the good and towards the evil. when any endeavour (paurusa) comes to fruition or is baffled. and they are all merely synonyms for the same indescribable entity (durniscaya). Whatever the manas strives to do is done by itself. . and depend on it. a mere consolatory word. ordinary people as being and the whole thing is referred to by due to daiva. always attain their . 16. and it is our clear duty to rouse the former against the latter. what other thing would de by the former. did it come to be accepted. since man energy. whereas those are heroes. n.xn] Energy of Free-will 255 who existence of daiva. Daiva is but another name for the karmas performed with strong desire for fruit. Ibid. so that the latter may be overcome and dominated . prdjnds tu paurusdrthena mudhaih prakalpitam daivam tat-pards te ksayam gatdh padam uttamatdm gatdh. and asks how. Yoga-vdsistha. if it did not exist. karma thus being the same as vasana. it is thus be an endless vicious regression 2 termine that entity. therefore. a particular resolution there may be success or failure as the result of opera . it is mere vacuity. 29. But. 1 highest by their free-will and endeavour Rama points out to Vasistha in u. and a good or a bad result is gained. anyas tvdm cetayati cet tarn cetayati ko parah ka imam cctayet tasmdd anavasthd na vdstavl. and it can neither help nor obstruct anyone in any way. which is the same as being done by daiva. 9 that daiva is fairly well accepted amongst people. people speak of it as being daiva. more or less like the potential and actual states of the same entity.

roused by the vibration of prana. while shut to state. and in order to stop the course necessary that the cause of knowledge should When the citta remains awake to the inner sense. which are said to be like its two seeds. 20-27. things are conceived to be one s own the body. activity.256 The Philosophy of the Yoga-vdsistha [CH. The cessation of the vibration of prana means cessation of all cognitive functions. 91. . then there is no manifestation of mind. 14. then there appears the mind the vibration of the prana (prdna-spanda) that manifests itself through the citta and causes the world-appearance out of nothing. v. and its processes and the cognitive functions do not operate 2 It is . there is a very intimate relation . of activity. But when the prana lies dormant in the hollow of the veins (sird-sarani-kotare). prdna-spanda. 91. I have translated sira as veins. full of its thought processes (samvedanamaya). As a result of the vibration of prana. One of these is the vibration (parispandd) of prana. As a top spins round in the yard when struck. and that which appears to be limiting his activity is but one side of him. . v. its The mind (citta). Yoga-vdsistha. it be first attacked. the senses. states (vrtti). we have the citta the yogins control prana highest through prdndydma (breath-regulation) and meditation (dhydna). all For the cessation of between vdsand and such that vdsand is created and stimulated into prdna-spanda. 3 Yoga-vdsistha. and prdna-spanda is set in motion through vdsand. the ego and the like we have what is 1 2 in accordance with proper instructions 3 Again. is extraneous cognitive activities. which he can overcome by rousing up his virtuous side. and the other. is manifested. though I am not properly authorized to do it. the cognitive function is set in motion like a top (vita). For the difference between veins and arteries does not seem to have been known. When by strong ideation and without any proper delibera tion of the past and the present. so. This view of purusa-kdra and karma seems to be rather unique in Indian literature. strong and deep-rooted desires and inclinations which construct (drdha-bhdvand) 1 When the prana vibrates and is on the point of passing through the nerves (nddl-samsparsanodyata). knowledge of knowledge. does so for which naturally transforms itself into two reasons. Prana and its Control.

vi. The two are connected with each other in there the relation of seed and shoot (bijankuravai) from prana-spanda is vasana. (sndyu) as fastening materials and cemented with blood. 2 tri-prakdra-mahd-sthunam.xn] called vasana. ida andpingala. Yoga-vdsistha. The object . tightly fitted with the tendons by pillars of three . since both the vasana and the prana-spanda are the ground and cause of the manifestations of cttta. the trunk. Prana and its Control 257 Those who have not the proper wisdom always believe in the representations of the ideations of vasana without any hesitation and consider them to be true. of knowledge cessation of inherent in the knowledge itself. 66 and 67. The mental outgoing tendency of the pranas from the cavity of the heart is called recaka. find in the Yoga-vasistha that it is said to be vibratory activity (spanda-sakti) situated in the upper part of the body. samvidam viddhi samvedyam bijam dhlratayd vind na sambhavati samvedyam taila-hlnas tilo yathd na bahir ndntare kimcit samvedyam vidyate prthak. is supposed to instruct Vasistha in vi. It is supposed to be supported kinds 2 provided with nine doors (seven aper tures in the head and two below). in There is a natural pranayama going on in the body waking states as well as in sleep. 14. v. and the legs. The interval between the cessation of one effort of apana and the rise of the effort of prana is the stage of kumbhaka. Bhusunda. pitta (bile) and kapha (phlegm) vdta-pitta-kapha-laksana-tri-prakdrd mahdntah sthiind vistambha-kdsthdni yasya. 91. and. and the drawing in of the pranas (dvadasanguli) by the apana activity is called pur oka. There is also a machine (yantrd) of bone and flesh (asihi-mamsa-mayd) in the shape of three double lotuses (padma-yugma-traya) having pipes attached to them running both upwards and downwards and with their petals closing upon oneanother(anyonya-milat-komala-saddala). I am myself inclined to take the three kinds of pillars as referring to the bony structure of three parts of the body the skull. lying passive and unmanifested (nimllite). while apana is the vibratory activity in the lower part As a description of prana we of the body. He compares the body to a house with the ego (ahamkara) as the householder. The commentator DII 17 . and so with the 1 knowledge the object of knowledge also ceases is . fat. 24 on the subject of prana. flesh and On the two sides of it there are the two nadis.When it is slowly samulam nasyatah ksipram mula-ccheddd iva drumah.24. and from vasana there is prana-spanda. the cessation of one promptly leads to the cessation of the other. the venerable old crow who was enjoying an excep tionally long life. explains the three kinds of pillars as referring to the three primal entities of Indian medicine vdyu (air).

78 it is said that citta and movement are in reality one and the same. and the apdna for inhalation (puraka). or lungs. As water enters through the crevices of the earth. passing upwards and etc.258 filled The Philosophy of with air. the opera tion of the tactual sense. It is probable that the discovery of the respiratory functions of the lungs was made by a school of thought different from that of the medical school. is differently named as apdna etc. but none of their functions and modes of operation are at all mentioned. In the Yoga-vdsistha in. 25. digesting of food and the power of speech 1 The prana current of air stands through its power that there is the movement . Pupphusa. the Yoga-vdsistha [CH. one by Yoga. the petals move. so that. vi_. on account of its diverse functions and works. . if the vibratory activity of the body be made to cease. Thus through spanda-nirodha we have prdna-nirodha and through prdna-nirodha activity. and between the two operations is called kumbhaka consequently. is differently named as prdna. In v. of the prana. are mentioned only by name in Susruta-samhitd. the air. and vice-versa. ^ different places. the thoughtactivity will automatically cease.^i^vayu ^ is said to be nothing but a vibratory entity (spandateyat sa tad vdyuh). It is this prana air which. 1 whole 2 Ibid. They go out. 24. body the prana is associated with air currents. and by the movement of the petals Thus increased. so air (vdta) moves in the body through the nddls and is called prana. return. But all the functions for exhalation (recaka) the moment of respite . and the other by right knowledge. the air is called prana: it is of the eyes. and are therefore altogether inseparable. i^. snow and . consisting of the cessation of mental states. as well as the upholding of the body. like the its whiteness. It is in the threefold machinery of the lotus of the heart (hrt-padma-yantra-tritaye) that all the prana forces operate and spread forth upwards and downwards like the rays from the moon s disc. Located in the heart. breathing through the nose. are ultimately due to the movement of citta 2 Though in its movement in the . It is curious to note in this connection that in the literature of the Ayur-veda there is probably no passage where there is such a clear description of the respiratory process. Yoga-vasif}ha. the air increases. and these two act and react wehzvespanda-nirodha. if the prana and apdna can be made to cease there is an unbroken continuity of kumbhaka. There are two ways of destroying the citta. repulse and draw and circulate. and consequently with the destruction of one the other is also destroyed. vi. downwards through apdna samdna. 61-74. still it is in reality nothing but the vibratory activity proceeding out of the thought- upon each other.

or the practice of not taking breath and maintaining kumbhaka. Kausitaki. prana as consciousness. 78.&quot. Brhaddranyaka. of which five are usually enumerated. v. &quot. again. 5. .breathing forth. 14. 21 etc. &quot. except the hatha-yoga process of arresting the inner air passage by the tongue. there dawns all of a sudden the right knowledge and . or through exhaustive ex halation. prana as strength. like spokes of a wheel. Aitareya. properly denoting breath. 4. prana. 8. prana connected with vc. 8. 6.expiration. 2. n. From the movement of prana there movement of citta. or through fixed habits of long But is the . says. 15. 11. in its remote sense. i. but some sort of biomotor force. 14. n. 5.breath&quot. prana connected with dtman. prana as the result of food. 2. the function of the five vdyus.yu. II. the consequent cessation of prana activities 2 Professor Macdonell. of water. viz. 1-9. inhalation associated with meditation. ibid. apana. vi. prana as the most important function of life. writing on prana in the Vedic Index. ill. even is when opposed to apana. But. Chdndogya. 5.&quot. or through stopping the inner respiratory passage by 1 or. 12. 5. vi. 4. 25. n. But its proper sense beyond question &quot. Relation of prana to other functions.prana. the general meaning of the word in the Upanisads is not air current. vydna. In the narrow sense prana denotes one of the vital airs. VI. 3 Difference between prana and vdyu. Thus it holds that through concen trating one s mind on one subject. 4 the ndsikya prana. cannot be determined. 7. Yoga-vdsisiha. vol. when all are mentioned. The exact sense of each of these breaths. The word prana has sometimes merely the general sense of breath. uddna and samdna. in. 3-5. energy or 3 It would be tedious to vitality often causing these air currents refer to the large number of relevant Upanisad texts and to try . as everything else connected with prana. and vague significance in Vedic literature.&quot. I. vi. to ascertain after suitable discussion their exact significance in each tdlu-mula-gatdm yatndj jihvaydkramya ghantikdm urdhva-randhra-gate prdne prdna-spando nirudhyate. v. though in a few cases the word may have been used for &quot. important to notice in this connection that most of the forms of prdnaydma as herein described.xn] Prana and it is its Control 259 identical with citta. otherwise known as khecarl-mudrd. and from that there is knowledge (samvid) As regards the control of the movement of prana. 17-2 . . 4. 2 commentary on the above. Maitn. Distinction of ndsikya and mukhya prana. are the same as described in the sutras of Patanjali and the bhdsya of Vyasa and this fact has also been pointed out by the commentator Anandabodhendra Bhiksu in his It is . II. the Yoga-vasistha advises several alternatives. ii. II. prana as force running through the susumnd nerve. prana as life. 6. is a term of wide . through attaching the tip of the tongue to the uvula concentration of the mind or thoughts on the point between the two brows.

I refer to the Veddnta-sutra of Badarayana. as accepted by the highest Hindu authorities. having transformed itself into a itself vdyu-mdtram&quot. It is that by the functioning of which the existence of the soul in the body. and the possible. equally explicit on the point. which may be supposed to be the earliest research into the doctrines discussed the Vedanta-sutra. says that it is neither air current (vdyu) nor action (kriyd). like prime minister (rdja-mantrivaj jlvasya sarvdrtha-karanatvena upakarana-bhuto na svatantrah) Prana is not an instrument like the senses. The human body formation of itself may be ksiti. 6. but. it may be supposed that vdyu (air) is prana but it is not so. v. . 4. it is stated . Thus has been considered as different from air and action (in the Upanisads). 4.260 case. 9 (na vdyu-kriye prthag upadesdi). when all the senses leave the body the prana continues to operate. It is regarded as a modification or trans not vdyu. Sankara s own state &quot. differentiates group of five that is called vdyu prana . i. Sahkara says that pr ana is not as in dependent asjtva (soul). nor simply air. i. i. Sankara. passage which identifies vdyu with intended to prove that it is the nature of vdyu that has prana transformed itself into the entity known as prana (just as the senses in is Mundaka. as Vacaspati says. as the Samkhya supposes for it is regarded as different from the . are The five vdyus are the five functionings of this vital . it is vdyu into the body. In explaining the nature of prana in n. vdyur evdyam adhydtmam dpannah panca-vyuho visesdtmandvatisthamdnah prdno ment t( is ndma bhanyate na tattvdntaram ndpi which. I. since in Chdndogya. . iv. commenting on this. it is a particular evolutionary product of the category of vdyu. vydna. speaking of what may be the nature of prana. that they are different. which Amalananda explains in his Veddnta-kalpataru as vdyoh parindma-rupa-kdrya-visesah. 19. but performs everything on its behalf. or life (jlva-sthiti). Brhad-dranyaka. He says. 3. 3.3. passage of the jiva out of the body. earth). since prana in the Upanisads. 12 and a .samdna). n. Brhad-dranyaka. The Philosophy of the Yoga-vdsistha is [CH. as is said in Chdndogya. or death (jivotkrdnti). says that from such passages as yah prdnah sa esa vdyuh panca vidhah prdno pdno vydna uddnah samdnah (what is prana is idyu and it is fivefold. uddna.vdyu-bheda&quot. 4. Again. which operate only in relation to particular objects for. 1. 1 8. n. The best way to proceed therefore to refer to the earliest traditional meaning of the word.e.e. is not alto gether a different category. 10-12. 7. prana apdna. in. it is not the action of the senses.

subtle&quot. Vacaspati. imagination (vikalpa). I propose now to turn to the . The Samkhya-Yoga differs from the Vedanta in rejecting the view that the prdna is in any sense an evolutionary product of the 1 Vidvan-mano-ranjanl. Tlrtha. says that prdna fivefold functionings. 4. though it must be states of the remembered that upholding of the it still other functions over and above the and the senses (na kevalam sarirendriyabody it has dhdranam asya kdryam. n.xn] Prdna and its Control 261 illusion. but that it is not so is evident from the fact that the substance of the prdna is not air (etat . says that it is an evolutionary product of the essence ofvdyu and the other bhutas. Bombay. Vacaspati. Govindananda. commenting on the above passage of the Vedantasdra. There are in the Veddnta-sutra which may lead us to think that the five vdyus may mean air currents.atomic&quot.. though pervading the whole body. is In Vedanta-sutra. but it is not in any sense the external air Rama which performs certain physiological functions in the body (tathd mukhya-prdno pi vdyor bdhyasya sutrdtmakasya vikdro na sdrira1 madhye nabhovad vrtti-ldbha-mdtrena avasthito bdhya-vdyur eva) Having proved that in Vedanta prdna or any of the five vdyus means biomotor force and not air current. n. which is explained 4. With reference to the prdna to the motor organs or faculties of speech. and the prdnas are called kriyatmaka. n. in commenting upon Veddnta-sutra. 4. n. p. just as the fivefold mental states of right knowledge. sleep and memory are the different mind. principle. Samkhya-Yoga. described as being atomic (anu). prdnddi-pancakam dkdsddi-gata-rajo.). says that it is the cause which upholds the body and the senses (dehendriya-vidharana-kdranam prdnah). or consisting of activity. in commenting on Veddnta-sutra.msebhyo militebhya utpadyate) and the rajas element is said to be produced from the five bhutas. Vacaspati in explaining it &quot. n. ibid. 4. on account of its pervading the whole body by says that it is its called (upacaryate) and character (duradhigamatd). 105. This seems to be something like biomotor or life force. 19). 1916. (siiksma). 13. Sahkara says that their vibratory activity is derived from prdna relation of some passages (vdg-ddisuparispanda-ldbhasyaprdndyattatvam. 9. Jacob s edition. by Sahkara as &quot. . only in a derivative figurative sense only on account of its inaccessible or indefinable and it is a vibratory activity which upholds the process of life has no other direct operation than that (parispanda-rupa- prdnandnukulatvdd avdntara-vydpdrdbhdvdt). etc.

to. 9. holds that it is the external air which Gaudapada s bhdsya on the Samkhya-kdrika. in n. referring to Sdmkhya-kdrikd. which is called buddhi is What with reference to to its its intellective power and prdna with reference power as activity. and Vacaspati says that the five vdyus are their life. then. ill. we find that the five vdyus are spoken of as the common func tioning of buddhi. It is true. 4. 3 See the Tattva-muktd-kaldpa. 29. 1 1). 39. It thus the entity which moves and not mere motion that is called 2 prdna Ramanuja agrees with Sankara in holding that prdna is is . it is biomotor force and no air current. 10. 1-15. This means that the three. The so-called five vdyus are the different functionings of the mahat-tattva (sdmdnya-kdrya-sddhdranam yat kdranam mahat-tattvam tasyaiva vrtti-bheddhprdndpdnddayah see . 4. . n. 4. . Thus in this view also prdna is ahamkdra and manas. Vydsa-bhdsya. which is evolved from prakrti. nature of vdyu. 29 compares the action of prdna to the movement of birds enclosed in a cage which moves the cage: compare ^ahkara s reference to Veddnta-sutra. . 31.262 The Philosophy of the Yoga-vdsistha [CH. n. In support of this view the Sdmkhya-pravacana-bhdsya. says that on Vedanta-sutra. and also Rdmdnuja-bhdsya and Srutaprakdsikd. But it should be noted that this modification of air is such a modification as can only be known by Yoga methods 3 not air (vdyu). The 1 Vaisesika. of external air are also called prdna but that is because in inspira tion and expiration the function of prdna is active or it vibrates. ahamkdra and manas. but a transformation of the nature of air. in their own way. 4. 9. are each energizing. however. n. n. it is Thus Vijnanabhiksu 4. Bhiksu s Yogavarttika. 2 Rdmdnuja-bhdsya on Veddnta-sutra. 8. he says that pr ana is neither air nor the upward or downward air current (mukhya-prdno na vdyuh ndpi sdrirasya urdhv-ddho-vgamana-laksand vdyu-kriya). Vacaspati s Tattva-vaisdradl. Again. and the joint operation of these energies that is called the fivefold prdna which upholds the body. that sometimes inspiration and expiration . n. according to Samkhya-Yoga? It is mahat-tattva. Vijndndmrta-bhdsya. n. Again. prdna. 53-55. buddhi. The special feature of this view is that this biomotor force is in essence a mental energy consisting of the specific functionings of buddhi. 4. prdna in his Vijndndmrta-bhdsya is called vdyu because self-active like the latter (svatah kriydvattvena ubhayoh prdnavdyvoh sdjdtydt). ahamkdra and manas 1 It is due to the evolutionary activity of antahkarana. and Nagesa s Chdyd-vydkhyd thereon may be referred no doubt.

and as fulfilling the same kinds of is a sort of driving . . Prana itself In the Yoga-vasistha. the five vayus are controlled 5 The Saiva authorities also agree with the view that prana is identical with cognitive activity. and by upholding the keenness of the senses and the dhatus holds together the heat. 4 Yoga-vdsistha.m. 13. 138. the movement of the senses. and prana is definitely spoken of by him as force movement and that it is (kutila-vdhinl prana-saktitif 1 2 . in. and there is nothing to suggest that he meant air currents 3 The long description of Caraka (i. . Bhdva-prakdsa. and so by the control of the is. we have already seen above. in. and that only its actions as body are manifested (avyakto vyakta-karmd ca). nothing but the movement of the intellect as ahamkara*. 47. it is in itself avyakta (unmanifested operating in the is or unknowable). Thus the Bhdvavayu describes vayu as follows: It takes quickly the dosas. 13) and it has no other reality than vibration. 78. 1914. Sen s edition. 43. p. prana or defined as that entity which vibrates (spandate yat sa tad vayu vayuh. By its move ment it produces all energy. Susruta holds that in all its operations. is dry. which passes through the nadls (nerves) and maintains all the body mind . com posed of rajo-guna. and he refers to Bhatta Kallata as also holding the same view. 14. Calcutta. Prana is essentially of the nature of vibration (spanda). Ibid. as again. prakasa dhatus and the malas from one place to another.xn] Prana and its Control 263 according to its place in the body performs various physiological functions 1 The medical authorities also support the view that . 6 iva-sutra-vimars int. light and moving. as will be noticed in the next chapter. 48. It is not only a physical force regulating the physiological functions of the body. and mind is but a form of prana energy. but is also the mover and controller of the mind feeling and willing. senses and the mind 2 Vahata in his Astanga-samgraha also regards vayu as the one cause of all body movements. p. Trichur. Sivopadhyaya in his Vivrti on the 3 Nydya-kandali of S~rldhara. seems to suggest that he considered the vayu as the constructive and destructive force of the universe. 5 pp. Vaha^a s Astanga-samgraha and the commentary by Indu. as knowing. 44. functions inside the body as well. 12). v. Thus Ksemaraja says the cognitive force which passes in the form of prana through the nadis. regi lates inspiration and expiration and generates all movement and action. 212. and upholding power. is subtle. cold.

is to cease Vijnana-bhairava and Vivrti. Desire means the imaginations of the mind. mind Stages of Progress. and also Dinakarl and Rdmarudrl on the Siddhanta-muktavall on Bha$d-parichcheda. and the 1 Bhatta Ananda in his Vijnana-bhairava itself does the same . 120.let this happen to me. such as &quot. 48. Of these the first three stages are called the The seventh stage the last transcen waking state (jdgrat). Vijnana-bhairava also describes prdna as force (sakti). saint is in a state of pure knowledge and is bliss (suddha-samvit-mayd- nanda-rupa). vi. The senses are like its young. The proper way to stop this sort of imagining in this 1 by sheer force of will from hoping or desiring and for this one has to forget his memory. p. the an unconscious state called the turya. 2 3 Yoga-vasistha. and this is also called sankalpa.&quot. the fifth stage sixth stage is 3 stage is called the turydtita Desire (iccha) is at the root of . See the Nyaya-kandall of Sridhara. called the dreamless (susupta) state. it is a state which is more like that of is deep dreamless sleep (susupta-sadrsa-sthiti). It is like a mad elephant rushing through our system and trying to destroy it. It has been already said that the study of philosophy and association with saintly characters are the principal means with which a beginner has to set out on his toil for the attainment of salvation. and the seventh all our troubles. The sixth stage is that in which the saint is in a state of pure bliss . Vijndna-kaumudi describes prdna as a functioning of the (citta-vrtti). dental state (turydtlta). 44. . It can only be conquered by the close application of patience (dhairya). stage is the stage of critical thinking (vicdrand) the that of the mental practice of dissociation from all passions. In the first stage (prathamd bhumika) the enquirer has to increase his wisdom by study and association with saintly persons. which cannot be experienced by any saint while he is living. p. and the instinctive root inclinations (vdsand) are like its flow of ichor. etc.264 The Philosophy of the Yoga-vdsistha [CH. for manner. in which the may be said to be half-asleep and half-awake (ardha-suptaprabuddha). This stage saint that of the jivan-mukta. verse 67. The second third is through a right understanding of the nature of truth the world-ap pearance shows itself to be false the fifth stage is that in which the . (asanga-bhdvand)\ the fourth stage (vildpani) is that in which . the fourth stage is called the is dream state (svapna).

99. is Existence of citta 1 described as the state of universal negation (sarvdpahnava). I. are psychological. . Yoga-vasistha. the eternal state when every else has ceased 2 In this state citta is destroyed. vi. can somehow be grasped but the seventh is absolutely transcendental the sixth state . or the realization of the distinction of prakrti and purusa 3 . it does not seem any one to one correspondence of the prajna states of the Yoga-vasistha with those of Patanjali. chapter 125. 126. though it is characterized as bodhdtmaka (identical with consciousness). memory continues such hopes and desires cannot be The last stage. 37. 3 z Ibid. Siva. fifth state that It is only the . describes this state not as being. Ibid. 99. i also ibid. and its destruction bliss the destruction . showing the stages of the disintegration of citta before its final destruction or citta-vimukti* Here also the . 126. is pain. This last state is indeed absolutely indescribable (avyapadesya). The Yoga-vasistha. and thus. Cambridge. the ultimate state . the first containing four The and the second three. of all relations and differentiations of subject and object. however. vi. The seven stages of prajna are there divided into two parts. A . and indescribable. when all movement has ceased (aspanda) . vi. vi. 126. which. Yoga-vasistha. But. The Yoga-vasistha occasionally mentions the name Yoga as denoting the highest state and defines it as the ultimate state of unconsciousness (avedanam that there 5 vidur yogam) or as the cessation of the poisonous effects of desire In the first half of the sixth book. being . History of 6 Icchd-visa-vikarasya viyogamyoga-ndmakam. it seems.xn] so long as Stages of Progress 265 stopped. ending with vildpanl. vol. p. one has no knowledge in this state. all thoughts and imaginations have ceased. apart from this. but as a state of unconsciousness unthinkable and indescribable. whereas the last three stages represent the advance of the evolution of citta towards its final is disruption. 273. is a state of un consciousness (avedanam) 1 Yoga is also defined as the ultimate and state of unconsciousness (avedana). 4 See my Indian Philosophy. first four stages. 71-72. division of the progressive process into seven stages naturally reminds one of the seven stages of prajna (wisdom) in Patanjali s Yoga-sutra and Vydsa-bhdsya. and one is thing reduced to the ultimate entity of consciousness. vi. though it is variously de free scribed as the state of Brahman. 1922. Of these the four are psychological and the three are ontological. 126. manifests is itself as being of the nature of ananda one of unconsciousness.essentially one of bliss.

For the limitations of time and space do not hold for thought. there are seven progressive stages. 2. cirdj-jdgrat-sthita. is the ultimate state aimed at 1 Karma. The commentator in trying to explain this says that it is not impossible for everything . karma therefore means nothing short of abandonment of 2 Cessation of karma thought-activity or the process of knowledge thus means the annihilation of knowledge. is present everywhere in the spirit. vi. the unconscious. 50. but it is due to this activity that the ego and all other objects of thought come into of ment being. according to the Yoga-vdsistha . 9. time is in thought reversible. Yoga-vdsistha. 26. 4 Ibid. sarvesdm karmandm evarn vedanam bljant uttamam svarupam cetayitvdntas tatah spandah pravartate. which is often described as a stage of pure bliss. jdgrat-svapna and kslna-jagaraka Svapna-jdgara (dream-awake) persons are those . so that our exist ence at a time future to theirs does not necessarily prevent their having an experience of us in dreams. the kevala-jdgaras are those such beings pass who are born in this life for the first time. jdgrat-sthita. 15. The third class. are those without sleeping can by mere imagination continue to con all ceive sorts of activities and existences. activity manifesting itself as subject-object knowledge. so it is dream persons of their dream experience. As who in some past state of existence realized in dream experience all our present states of being and worked as dream persons (svapnanara). When 1 This turlydtlta stage should not be confused with the sixth stage of susupti. should minds in their vasana forms (tad-antah-karane vdsandtmand sthitdh)*. stone-like knowledgeless state . The stirring of karma or activity of thought is without any cause. 2. 3 Ibid. as be present in their except in thought. As both past and present have no existence possible that we.266 of citta The Philosophy of the Yoga-vdsistha [CH. 5 Ibid. final who emancipation. Tdtparya-prakdsa. and may ultimately .is nothing but thought- by cessation of knowledge . and as elements in thought 5 everything exists everywhere (sarvam sarvatra vidyate) By dreams these persons may experience changes of life and even attain to . Abandon . The second class. kevalavasanas. the sankalpa-jdgaras. the goal of all our endeavours should be the destruction of 3 all knowledge. so there are also seven kinds of beings according to the weakness or strength of their There are svapna-jagara. attain emancipation. . in. a state of neither pain nor nor any intermediate state a state as feelingless as that pleasure of the stone (pdsdnavat-samam). ghana-jdgrat-sthita. vi. 1 6. sankalpa-jdgara. n.

pride (mada). but on the contrary emphatically says that. 190.. Yoga-vasts fha.xn] Methods of Right Conduct . just as 1 jndnasya jneyatdpattir bandha tasyaiva jneyatd-sdntir ity abhidhlyate moka ity abhidhlyate. be accepted for the achievement of the highest end. 267 through more than one life. and jealousy (matsarya). and de ^ liverance (moksd) is realized when knowledge is absolutely and ultimately dissociated from all objects and remains in its tran scendent purity. Good men are defined in the Yoga-vasistha as follows dese yam sujana-prdyd lokdh sddhum pracaksate sa visiftah sa sddhuh sydt tarn prayatnena samsrayet. . for which he must read the right sort of scriptures (sac-chastra) and associate with good men 3 He should somehow continue his living and abandon even the slightest desire of enjoyment (bhogagandham parity ajei). think that the two cannot jointly be taken up. Bondage (bandha). ignorance (tamah). the per . may be born as trees. antipathy (dvesa). ablutions or the like for the realiza ordinary tion of our highest ends. formance of religious observances leads only to pride and vanity and does not produce any good. the Yogavasistha does not. having neither an object nor a subject 1 . On the question whether knowledge or work. 6. followed by 2 So long as the mind right apprehension of the nature of reality is not chastened by the clearing out of all evil passions. they are called cira-jagaras Such beings. anger the (krodha). The essential duty of an enquirer consists in energetic exertion for the achievement of the highest end. 9. which can only be achieved by the control of attachment (rdga). 8 m. according to the Yoga-vasistha remains so long as our knowledge has an object associated with it. 6. Yoga-vasistha does not enjoin severe asceticism or the kinds of religious gifts. Methods The of Right Conduct. etc. in. : Ibid. sva-pauru$a-prayatnena vivekena vikdsind sa devo jndyate rdma na tapah-sndna-karmabhih. and finally. n. those that have reached the turya state of deliverance are called ksina-jagaraka./mzmz or karma. Those of such beings suffering rebirth who by study and good association attain right knowledge are called jdgrat-svapna-sthita . and should continue critical thinking (vicar a). is to . i. Ibid. vi. on account of their sins. like Sankara. in which case they are called ghana-jagaras. 20.

one has to try for these three together and for this one has to control one s desires on one hand and practise breath-control (prana-nirodhena) on the other.8. v. identical state same them can be . The main features of Sankara s idealism consist in the doctrine that the self-manifested subject-objectless intelligence forms the ultimate and unchangeable substance of both the mind (antahkarana) and the external world.268 a bird flies The Philosophy of the Yoga-vdsistha [CH. But. which are the very substance and root of the citta. and these two would thus jointly co-operate steadily towards the final goal. This point therefore needs some discussion. v. 1. . nevertheless. such . such as the external forms of objects and the diverse mutation is mental states. Whatever there is of change and outside of this Intelligence. 93. all his endeavours should be directed towards the uprooting of instinctive root inclinations (vasana). but this progress. so large a number of questions dealt with in the Yoga-vdsistha occur that one does not readily imagine that there may be any difference between this idealism and that of Sankara. 92. different kind of indescribable existence from Brahman 1 but still 3 they are Yoga-vasi$tha. etc. . These are mutable and have therefore a . the destruction of the vasands and the destruction of the citta all mean the so that none of and are interdependent on one another. 2 Ibid. changes are found associated with this reality or Brahman. attained without the other. Yoga-vasistha.7. provided it is steady.. Sankara Vedanta and Buddhist Vijnanavada. which is also the Reality. with its two wings. aban doning the desire for enjoyment. To as the Jivan-mukti-viveka. Such an advancement is naturally slow. I. so an enquirer can reach his goal the joint operation of knowledge and work 1 through The main object of the enquirer being the destruction of citta. Ibid. The realization of the truth (tattva-jnana). is to be preferred to any violent efforts to hasten (hatha) the result 2 Great stress is also laid on the necessity of self-criticism as a means of loosening the bonds of desire and the false illusions of world-appearance and realizing the dissocia tion from attachment (asanga)*. So. a superficial reader the idealism of the Yoga-vasistha may appear to be identical with the Vedanta as interpreted by Sankara and in some of the later Vedanta works of the Sankara school. .

269 somehow Sankara s idealism does essentially of a positive nature not allow him to deny the existence of external objects as apart from perceiving minds. The Buddhists there are made entities are invariably perceived simultaneously to argue as follows When two they are identical : . who Thus he severely criticizes the views of the Buddhist refuse to believe in the existence of external objects from the thoughts which seem to represent them. indispensable for estab lishing connection with the so-called external world. is unneces it is asked how. diversity of percepts. chapter x. esse estpercipi. says that external objects are directly perceived in ceptions. 1922. 2 Kasyacid eva jndna-ksanasya sa tddrsah sdmarthydtisayo vdsand-parindmah. Some of these arguments are of great philosophical interest and remind one of similar arguments put forth by a contemporary British as apart Neo-realist in refutation of Idealism. as apart from their being perceived. Bhdmatl. held that there is no object for the percepts excepting the sensations. the answer is that such diversity may be due to the force of vasanas or the special capacity of the sary. 28. shows that for the appearance of ideas the operation of the sense-organs. that can be refuted by pointing to the fact that the inde pendent existence of the objects of perception. See the account of gahkara Vedanta in my A History of Indian Philosophy. special distinctive capacities may also be considered as possessing which would account for the diversity of percepts generated by those cognition moments. in relating the above argument of the Buddhist idealist. or that the existence of anything consists in its being perceived. now knowledge and objects are perceived simultaneously. Sankara. In dreams it is these diverse cognition moments which produce diversity of of the mental order moments percepts. if there are no external objects. and its their existence during dreams. . the successive . Cambridge. n. if it is all our per and how then can they be denied? In answer to this. when the sense-organs are uni versally agreed to be inoperative. can the diversity of percepts be explained. If 2 If the so-called particular moment associated with the cognition external objects are said to possess different special capacities which would account for the&quot. since the vol. Our ideas have nothing in the external world to which they correspond. u. and he does not adhere to the doctrine of idealists. therefore the objects are identical with their percepts.xn] Buddhist and Vedanta Idealism 1 . 1 I. can be known from the perception itself.

This is universally felt and acknow ledged. The but the object remains the same 1 above argument of Sankara against Buddhist idealism conclusively proves that he admitted the independent existence of objects.e. 129-139. even while trying to refute it. All objects have only perceptual existence (prdtltlkaBoth Prakasananda and the Yoga-vdsistha deny the sattvd). but also holds that they exist in the same form in tually to the admission that our 1 which they are known. Siddhanta-muktdvah.270 The Philosophy of the Yoga-vdsistha [CH. perceiving of an object is not the object itself. while Sankara not only admits their existence. A. External objects had an existence different from and inde pendent of the existence of the diversity of our ideas or percepts. and this amounts vir knowing an object does not add vol. later exposition of Vedanta by Prakas ananda. how can such a difference be denied? its You may two cases see a jug or varies. since he says that what is inner perception appears as if it exists outside of us. Apart from ideas or percepts there is no physical or external world having a separate or independent existence. externally. See The Pandit. seems to derive its inspiration from the Yoga-vdsistha in its exposition of Vedanta on lines similar to the idealism of the Yoga-vdsistha. 2. and the Buddhist idealist. by denying the as Veda. i-siddhdnta-muktdvali. it is always felt that the perception of the blue is different from the blue which is perceived. n. . remember it : the mental operation in these . the inner mental world of thoughts and ideas and the external world of objects. xi. 28. known existence of objects not perceived (ajndta-sattvdnabhyupagama) 2 Prakasananda disputes the ordinarily accepted view that cognition . existence of objects when they are not perceived. pp. which did not owe their existence to anybody s knowing them. there is no independent external existence of objects apart from their perception. for objects for him exist only so long as they are perceived. For according to the Yoga-vdsistha it is only ideas that have some sort of existence. 2 arikara s bhasya on the Brahma-sutra. refutes such a doctrine. the blue stands forth as the object of perception and the two can never be identical. But the idealism of the Yoga-vdsistha is more like the doctrine of the Buddhist idealists than the idealism of Sankara. If externality as it such never existed. i. how could there be an appearance of in consciousness? When and all experiences testify to this difference between knowledge object. of objects arises out of the contact of senses with objects. Esse est per dpi is the doctrine of the Yoga-vdsistha while Sankara most emphatically . admits it in a way. new series.

though The relation of the is real. But this inner and lectic of its immanent movement does not seem to have any dia own. which is the ultimate truth. the Brahman. and the characterless which forms its absolute is never revealed in experience. indefinite and indescribable. but the appearances. namely the category of the indefinite. but to accident or chance (kakataliyd). Whatever forms and characters there are in our experience. ch. operation for its productions can be given the imaginary shapes of ideas and objects. to this may a in maya\ the real is the unchangeable. is itself tion of this inner activity of the characterless spirit. The however holds that formless and characterless truth. which have nothing but a mere perceptual existence. The world is only unreal in that special sense. . that he held that the Brahman is the immanent self within us. as it is to reality Sankara. what is changeful. and no definite formula of the method of its . x. are due not to a definite order. by virtue of which it can reveal all the diverse forms The relation between the appearances and the not external.xn] Buddhist and Veddnta Idealism 271 known anything to it or modify it to any extent. 1 See my A History of Indian Philosophy vol. Sankara is Sankara Vedanta therefore as indefinite as the not in a position to tell us. except that it becomes to us through knowledge. is therefore unreal. This is in a way realism. Another important defect of the system is that it does not either criticize entity knowledge or admit its validity. I. . . have an indescribable and indefinite nature which 1 Sankara Vedanta takes it for granted passes by the name of mayo that that alone is real which is unchangeable. Such a conception is indeed very barren. and it is here that the system of the Yoga-vasistha is particularly defective. which is in nothing but a subject-objectless pure consciousness. The idealism of Sankara s Vedanta consists in this. may a belongs to a category different from affirmation and negation. even though they may not be perceived. but how the forms and characters changeful become associated with it or what is their origin or what is their essence. internal as well as external. Things are what they are. This ultimate entity is associated with an energy of movement. whatever may be. are produced by the opera of appearances. which are but the unreal and illusory manifestations of the reality. it is this characterless entity or void (sunyd)\ but. which transcends all changeful experience and is also ultimate reality underlying all objects perceived outside of us in the external world. it entity is Yoga-vasistha the ultimate is it said to be the Brahman. cit. it is positive.

however. no such attempt is made in the Yogaappearances vdsistha. or exertion of free-will and energy. On the practical side it lays great stress on paurusa. reminds us very strongly of what this system owes to Vijnanavada Buddhism. While there are thus unmistakable influences of Vijnanavada and Gaudapada on the Yoga-vdsistha. which strongly reminds us of the Vaisesika view of mukti. but are both indispensable for each and every right-minded enquirer. these important contributions of the system are never re ferred to either for the descriptive interpretation of the system or for its refutation. But.XII With Sankara the case is different for he holds that this absolute Brahman is also the self which is present in every experience and is is immediate and self. where it is left to chance. holds that knowledge (jnana) and karma maybe combined together. and of karma as meaning only thought. Its state of mukti (emanci pation) is therefore described. It is curious that in the Sanskrit account of Vijnanavada by Hindu writers. as we have already seen above. pure vijndna and void (sunya). the seventh stage. Its doctrine of esse est per dpi and that no experiences have any objective validity outside of themselves. it emphatically denies daiva as having the power of weakening paurusa or even it exerting a superior dominating force. distinction of prakrti and purusa. differently described by various systems as Brahman. so clearly shows. gives us a new view it As against Sankara. But the absolute of the Yoga-vdsistha characterless and beyond experience. such as Vacaspati and others. but a state of characterlessness and vacuity almost. be more fully discussed in my treatment of Saiva philosophy. It denounces external religious observances without the right spiritual exertions as being worse than useless. while in truth it is nothing but a characterless entity. as pdsdnavat or like a stone. as its doctrine ofspanda. This point will. In several places in the work it is said that this ultimate state is tion. and that they are not for two different classes of people.272 The Philosophy of the Yoga-vdsistha . while an important Vijnanavada work its like the Lankdvatdra-sutra tries to various categories the origin of the various explain through in knowledge. asso ciation with good men and self-criticism. .revealed. like the Brahmahood of the Vedanta.activity. The principal practical means for the achievement of the highest end of the Yoga-vdsistha are the study of philosophical scripture. The state of final emancipa is not a stage of bliss. it seems to have developed in close association with the Saiva. or immanent activity. that there are no external objects to which they correspond and that all are but forms of knowledge. [CH.

&quot. Their speculations regarding embryology. who are aware of the great importance of Hatha Yoga or Tantra physiology or anatomy in relation to some of the Yoga practices of those schools will no doubt be interested to know for purposes of comparison or con medical schools on kindred points of interest. 213-217. i. What upanga Atharva-Veda and means in this connection cannot easily be satisfactorily explained. many other interesting ethical instructions and reveals a view of life which differs considerably literature contains. The Atharva-Veda contains six thousand verses and about &quot. The from that found in works on philosophy further.000 verses in one thousand chapters and was composed by Brahma before he created all beings (Susruta. i. says that an upanga is a smaller anga (part) angam eva alpatvad uparigam. I. it treats of many other interesting details which throw a flood of light on the scholastic methods of Indian thinkers. Those. trast the speculations of the Ayur-veda and the Atharva-Veda. Dalhana (A. noo) in explaining the word in his exactly Nibandha-samgraha.D. was directly and intimately connected with the Samkhya and logical speculations Vaisesika physics and was probably the origin of the 1 subsequently codified in the Nyaya-sutras . heredity and other such points of general enquiry are likely to prove interesting even to a student of pure philosophy. again. 1 The system of Samkhya philosophy taught in Caraka-samhita. 5). iv. Thus. Susruta says that Ayur-veda (the science of of the life) is an upanga originally consisted of 100. has already been described in the first volume of the present work. D ii 18 . . moreover.samhita.CHAPTER XIII SPECULATIONS IN THE MEDICAL SCHOOLS IT may be urged that the speculations of the thinkers of the medical schools do not deserve to be recorded in a History of Indian Philosophy. the toes or the palms of the hands are called upanga. while hands and legs are regarded as angas. But the force of such an objection will lose much in strength if it is remembered that medicine was the most important of all the physical sciences which were cultivated in ancient India. pp.

24.GandharvaandArtha-sastra. but as an upaveda of the Atharva-Veda?. mentions five vedas. n. which . 10. If the Ayur-veda originally contained 100. 33. 9. Yajus.000 verses. 1 . This passage seems to be at variance with Caraka. and so there were always plenty of people who knew about life.6. 30. the elder. 10. Asura-veda. Caraka distinguishes Ayur-veda as a distinct Veda. when we hear of its being produced. as Dalhana explains it. superior to the other Vedas because it gives us life. 16. Brahma veddngam astdngam dyur-vedam abhdsata. says that there was never a time when life did not exist or when intelligent people did not exist. i. and Nilakantha. i. whether they be of world or of another 2 Vagbhata. could not * 4 . Itihdsa-veda and Purdnaveda. Brahma-vaivarta-purdna.8. viz. however. 1. Sarpa-veda. while Caraka. 6 supposes that diseases broke out at a certain point of time. The Mahd-bhdrata. which occurs in the Worterbuch in connection with the word dyur-veda. Ayur-veda. For. 1. far from being a small appendage. speaks of upaveda.onnection. Brahma-vaivarta. for it supposes that diseases also existed always. it is only with reference to it its first systematized comprehension or instruction that ginning may be said to have a be which is is Again. speaks of Ayur-veda not as an upanga. it cannot be called an upanga of the Atharva-Veda if upanga is to mean a small appendage. in discussing the nature of Ayur-veda. Gopatha-Brdhmana. Pisdca-veda. The science of life has always been in existence. Is it an addition by the reviser Drdhabala? 2 Caraka. it can only be with reference to a beginning of the comprehension of thinker or the initiation of a its y principles by some original new course of instruction at the hands of a gifted teacher. i. 3 Astdnga-samgraha. Caraka. i. 1 in all its 5 eight parts . but there was always a continuity of the science of life. which . and there have always been people who understood it in their own way. ex plaining this. 42 and Ayur-veda-dlpikd of Cakrapani on it. it was more than ten times as extensive as the Atharva. This quotation. but Ayur-veda is not mentioned in this . i. says that there are four upavedas. a later purana says that after creating the Rk. one thousand prose lines. probably in the sense of upaveda. all other enjoyments or benefits. Sama and Atharva Brahma created the Ayur-veda as the fifth his Worterbuch to the effect that t Veda 4 Roth has a quotation in Brahma taught Ayur-veda. i. Caraka. n. Dhanur- the basis of this veda. i. Ayur-veda was not produced at any time out of nothing. I. i.274 Speculations in the Medical Schools [CH. was a vedanga.Veda. and there were always medicines which acted on the human body according to the principles which we find enumerated in the Ayur-veda.

and them together in the popular commenting upon Kausika-siitra. as modified and supplemented by later revisers. as an upaveda of the Atharva-Veda as an independent . i. 8-2 . and was associated with the Atharva. . was Ayur-veda entitled to great respect. tatra dhdrasamutthdndm vaisamya dyurvedam cakdra adhaj-ma-samutthdndm tu sdstramidam ucyate. and the Atharvan practices for the latter 1 Caraka himself counts penance (prdyas-cittd) as a name of medicine (bhesajd) and Cakrapani. incantations and charms. Jyotis and Nirukta. and those produced by sins and transgressions. the latter was associated with it as its literary accessory. and thus prdyas-citta is synonymous with bhesaja 2 But what is this Ayur-veda? We now possess only the treatises of Caraka and Susruta. which contained 100. 25. 25. It should be noted that vedanga is generally used to mean the six angas. But Susruta tells us that Brahma had originally produced the Ayur-veda. viz. 2. 1 dvi-prakdrd vyddhayah dhdra-nimittd asubhanimittds ceti. vi. kinds of diseases . however. the holier of the two. 1 Caraka. and the other by medicines. . says that as prdyas-citta removes the diseases produced by sins. in diseases. and then. the one principally by What Susruta understands by calling Ayur-veda an updnga of the Atharva-Veda is probably nothing more than this. later on divided it into eight subjects. Chandas. We upaveda.xm] Ayur-veda and the Atharva-Veda 275 thus find that Ayur-veda was regarded by some as a Veda superior to the other Vedas and respected by their followers as a fifth Veda. that the nature of this asso ciation consisted in the fact that both of them dealt with the curing of diseases and the attainment of long life . Kalpa. Darila s 2 comment on Kausika-sutra. 2. Both the Atharva-Veda and Ayur-veda dealt with the curing of linked this generally the former being mind. Vydkarana. as an updnga of the Atharva-Veda and lastly as a vedanga. gives us a hint as to what have been the points of contact and of difference between may Ayur-veda and the Atharva-Veda. and. ibid. finding the people weak in intelligence and short-lived. The Ayur-veda was made for curing the former. so medicines (bhesajd) also remove diseases. Thus he says that there are two those that are produced by unwholesome diet. All that can be understood from these conflicting references is that traditionally believed that there was a Veda known as which was almost co-existent with the other Vedas. be verified owing to some omission in the reference. on account of its religious value. Darila Bhatta. in commenting on this. It seems. 3 and Ayur-veda-dlpikd.000 verses spread over one thousand chapters. Siksd.Veda it was in a special way.

treatment of diseases of the head (salakya). and Krsnatreya is alluded to as being the founder of medical science (cikitsitam)* One of the earliest systematic mentions of medicines unmixed with incantations and charms is to be found in the Mahd-vagga of the Vinaya-Pitaka. It is curious. the processes of counteracting the influences of evil spirits (bhuta-vidya). We hear of compendiums of medicine as early &quot. and the three constituents (dhdtu). Mahd-vagga. 86.vidyd is counted as one of the eight tantras of Ayur-veda. is 54 (55). The work statement of in which the kinds of studies were not differentiated seems to be fairly trustworthy. vi. that nowhere in the PratUakhyas or the Vedas does the name Ayur-veda occur. 342. Astariga Ayur-veda is. XH. or a veddnga also points to its existence in some state during the period when the Vedic literature is was being composed. 2. where the Buddha is prescribing medicines for his disciples 5 These medicines are of a simple nature. surgeon. 21. an upaveda. 15. mentioned by Bloomfield in The Atharvap. vdyu (wind).V. though Upanisads different branches of study are mentioned in the former 3 The .11. 87. 4 Mahd-bhdrata. however. 5 Vinaya-Pitaka. named Akasagotto. 11. The fact that Ayur- veda called an updnga. as the 2 . antidotes to poisons (agadatantra). who made surgical operations (sattha- kammd) on we 1 (bhagandard). as we find it in the Susruta-samhitd or elsewhere. i. Krsnatreya is referred to in Caraka-samhitd.25. . 210. i. 5-9. however. 3 itihdsa-purdnam Rg-vedam bhagavo dhyemi Yajur-vedam sdma-vedam dtharvanas caturtham pancamam veddndm vedam pitryam rdsim daivam nidhim vdkovdkyam ekdyanam deva vidydm brahma-vidydm bhuta-vidydm k$attra-vidydm naksatra-vidydm sarpa-deva-jana-vidydm. 129. says that Krsnatreya and Atreya are two authorities who are different from Atreya Punarvasu. mentioned in the Mahd-bhdrata. commenting on this. treatment of ordinary diseases (kdya-cikitsa). Chdndogya.Prdtijakhya. 10. Speculations in the Medical Schools [CH. . are also mentioned there is reference to a theory that by these three the body is sustained and that by their decay the body decays (etaih kslnais ca kstyate). but they bear undeniable marks of methodical arrangement. In RockhilPs Life of the Buddha hear of Jivaka as having studied medicine in the Taxila Univerfistula Susruta-samhitd. 2 R. We are also told there of a . surgery (salya). Veda and Gopatha-Brdhmana. Of these bhuta. i. XH.276 viz. pitta (bile) and slesman (mucus). &quot. treatment of child diseases (kaumara-bhrtya). vil. 1-14. 16. The name of the medical work mentioned Subhesaja. vi. the science of rejuvenating the body (rasdyand) and the science of acquiring sex-strength (vdjlkarana) 1 Susruta that Ayur-veda was originally a great later subdivisions of its eight different . the great teacher of the Caraka-samhitd. . and Cakrapani.

equal to thousands of medicines . etc. be lost. The early works now available to us. Gurv-ajnd-ldbhdnantaram etat-tantra-karanam. that such a literature existed. strength. i also Caraka-samhita. 3. viz. the Atharva-Veda 277 That even at the time of the Atharva-Veda there were hundreds of physicians and an elaborate pharmacopoeia. the constancy of the qualities of medical herbs. and Susrutasamhitd. The opposite of this the asukham dyuh. &quot. also alludes to the existence of a beginningless traditional continuity of Ayur-veda. &quot. 3 . which developed in later times.. uses the word life. under which term he includes life. were all in an undifferentiated condition. hita (good) and akita (bad).&quot. it came ultimately to Ayur-veda in the general sense of science of Life is divided by Caraka into four kinds. 2 . 9. duhkha (unhappy). which has been variously described as a fifth Veda or an upaveda. 4 Cakrapani quotes the Agnivesa-samhita in his Ayur-veda-dlpika. vitality. I. Sukham dyuh is a life which is not affected by bodily or mental &quot. satarn hy asya bhisajah sahasram uta vlrudhah. was a tantra. is indicated by a mantra therein which and speaks of their powers as being employed by thousands of medical 2 Thus it can hardly be denied that the practice of practitioners medicine was in full swing even at the time of the Atharva-Veda and. diet. is endowed with of all and is full is sorts of vigour. treating diseases with drugs. sukha (happy). is Hitam dyuh all who is always willing to do good to life of a person never steals others beings. therefore. What then was the Ayur. Atharva-veda. I. p. i. the Caraka-samhita. Caraka. in which the different branches. though we have no other proofs in support of the view that there existed a literature on the treatment of diseases. . Even Agnivesa s work the that are (Agnivesa-samhitd) which Caraka revised and which was available at the time of Cakrapani. 52. n. when he alludes definitely to such a literature. 177-185. that the systematized works of Agnivesa and others superseded it and that. known by the name of Ayur-veda.xm] sity Ayur-veda and under Atreya 1 . 1 truthful. are both known as tantras*. diseases. and their effects on human body and the intelligent enquirer. vi. viz. Cakrapani s Ayur-vedadlpikd. energy. is the property. veda. The Caraka-samhita extols the virtues of amulets. yet we have no evidence which can lead us to disbelieve Susruta. however. activity enjoyments and successes. i. 65. self-controlled. as a consequence. 3. self-restrained Life of the and works Rockhill s Buddha. if not a literature distinctly separate from the tantras now available to us 4 ? It seems probable.

2 i. what is its connection We find in the Caraka-samhita that a physician should particularly be attached (bhaktir adesya) to the Atharva-Veda.. &quot. but there are with Veda. that the . 3 nakhena. 40 and I. with careful consideration. I. that by which life is known or examined. Caraka-samhita. 20. In I. 20-23 : hitdhitam sukham duhkham ay us tasya hitdhitam mdnam ca tac ca yatroktam ayur-vedah sa ucyate. 30. does not transgress the moral injunc tions. in commenting on this. Susruta himself remarks that. i. while he considers the number of bones in the human body to be three hundred. penances offerings (bait). But. 14. 5. 20 the derivation of Ayur-veda is given as dyur vedayati iti ayur-vedah. i. (niyama). . vations dyur asmin vidyate anena vd dyur vindatity ayur-vedah. . This is further corroborated by a com parison of the system of bones found in the Caraka-samhita with that of the Atharva-Veda. auspicious diseases (cikitsa) by advising the propitiatory . regard to the description of bones some very important points in 1 Caraka. salya-tantre tu triny eva iatani. Viewed in the light of Cakrapani s interpretation. takes to virtue and to enjoyment with equal zeal. The AtharvaVeda. Susruta-samhitd.&quot. Susruta. 30.Speculations in the Medical Schools [CH. or that by which life is attained. deals with different kinds of subjects. The object of the science of life is to teach what is conducive to all these four kinds of life and also to determine the length of such revered this a life 1 . The Atharva-Veda deals with the treatment of rites (svastyayana) oblations (mangata-homa). since it is advised that physicians should be attached tothe Atharva&quot. if Ayur-veda means with the Atharva-Veda^ science of life. 6. 7.e. Atharva-Veda becomes Ayur-veda (Atharva-vedasya dyurvedatvam uktam bhavati).samhitd. i. honours persons. Trlni sasthdni satdny asthndm saha danta- Caraka. iv. the adherents of the Vedas hold them to be three hun dred and sixty and this is exactly the number counted by Caraka 3 The Atharva-Veda does not count the bones. says that. no doubt. 18. and so Ayurveda is to be considered as being only a part of the Atharva-Veda (Atharva-vedaikadesa eva ayur-vedah). purificatory rites (pray as-citta). it seems that the school of medical teaching to which Caraka belonged was most intimately connected with the Atharva-Veda. The opposite of this is called ahita.e. fasting (upavdsd) and in cantations (mantra) 2 Cakrapani. Trlni sasasthdny asthi-satdni veda-vddino bhdsante. is charitable and does what is beneficial to world and to the other. Susruta suggests two alternative deri i. i. it comes to this. m. that which instructs us about life. 30.

veda-vadino in Susruta-samhita. and by characterizing fact that they 1 itself as an upanga of the Atharva-Veda*. namely. The source of the last three was probably the first (Ydjnavalkya-Dharma-sdstra). pp. thus remarks: really . It may be added term pratistha for the base of the long bones obviously agrees with the Charakiyan term adhisthana and widely differs from the Susrutiyan kiirca 1 The Satapatha-brahmana.&quot.A important circumstance differs is that the Atharvic system shares with the Charakiyan one of the most striking points in which the latter from the system of Susruta. The Ydjnavalkya-Dharma-sdstra. pp. See also Satapatha-brdhmana. 360 bones. r according to all orthodox estimates derive their validity from the Vedas. &quot. however. developed from the Atharva. Jayanta argues that the validity of the Vedas depends on the have been composed by an absolutely trustworthy A. the assumption of a central facial bone in the structure of the skull.3. as has been suggested by Dr Hoernle in his Studies in the Medicine of Ancient India. as Dr Hoernle has pointed out. 40-46. 5. with both the schools to which Caraka and Susruta respectively 2 The word belonged. 4. in the sense that it was a supplementary work having the same scope as the Atharva-Veda. x. which is . 3 The word upanga may have been used. the Susrutasamhita developed. counts. 9-14.xin] Ayur-veda and the Aiharva-Veda 279 which the school to which Caraka belonged was in agreement with the Atharva-Veda and not with Susruta. 3 and 4. 12. 2 : . This does not preclude the possibility of there being it Atharva-Veda. be viewed together with the identification by the latter of Ayur-Veda with not unreasonable to suppose that the by Caraka. 2. as Caraka did . in. If this agreement of the Vedic ideas with those of the Atreya school of medicine. 6. as represented an Ayur-veda of another school. however. shows an acquaintance that the Atharvic . 2. the legal literature and the purdnas. to which Sus ruta refers and from which.D. Ibid. through the teachings of a series of teachers. which. xn. 5. viu. as represented by Caraka. 113. Dr Hoernle. 4. But none of these non-medical recensions are of an early date probably they are not earlier than the third or the fourth century A. but is literally true in the sense that it gives us the view which shared by Caraka with the Atharva-V eda the Satapatha-brahmana. 2. Visnu-dharmottara and Agni-Purdna also enumerate the bones of the human body in agreement with Caraka as 360. Rudolf Hoernle s Studies in the Medicine of Ancient India. may be Atreya school. F. who has carefully discussed the whole question. Visnu-smrti. This literature probably tried to win the respect of the people by associating itself with the Atharva-Veda. 7 and 10. 18 does not mean the fol lowers of Ayur-veda as distinguished from the Vedas. also xu. as Dalhana interprets it. p. 105-106.Veda.

According to this interpretation the Atharva-Veda is entitled to be included within Yajus. See also Nyaya-manjan. Jayanta in reply says that the validity of Ayur- veda due persons and is . are of such an infinite variety that it would be it to the fact of its absolutely impossible for any one man to know them by employing the experimental methods of agreement and difference. 250-261. The Atharva-Veda is referred to in the GopathaBrdhmana. which can be taken only on trust on their authority. the earliest Rg-Vedic hymns. i. 10 speaks of four Vedas again rcahsdmdniyajumsi. and this explains the references to the three Vedas. hymns is are curative (bhesaja).&quot. 16 as Brahma. in the history 1 Some of the sacred texts speak of four Vedas and some of three Vedas. person (dpta). Sayana sese Yajuh-sabdah&quot. It is only because the medical authorities are almost omniscient in their knowledge of things that they can display such superhuman knowledge regarding diseases and their cures. But it may be argued that the validity of Ayur-veda is not because its it has for its author trustworthy persons.&quot.280 Speculations in the Medical Schools [CH. Gopatha-brdhmana. in.&quot. n. Brh. The fourth Veda. and two different reasons are adduced. yad bhesajam tad amr tarn. asya mahato bhutasya nihsvasitam etad rg-vedoyajur-vedah sdma-vedo tharvdnYam rsay as trayt-vtdo viduh girasah. being composed by trustworthy can be also verified by experience. e. the validity of which is due to the fact that it has been composed by trust worthy persons (dpta). 1. and whatever is curative is immortal. y ad amr tarn tad pp. As an analogy he refers to Ayur-veda.i. .4. known as the Atharva-Veda or the Brahma1 Veda. and says that all the refers to the Mimdmsd-sutra. it is said that the Atharva-Veda was produced by the ascetic penances of Brahman secondly it is suggested in the Gopatha-Brahmdna that all Atharvanic &quot. &quot.u. 11. Brahma. their combinations and applications. . and whatever Ye tharvdnas tad bhesajam. is immortal Brahman &quot. His attempts at refuting the view that medical discoveries may have been carried on by the applica tions of the experimental methods of agreement and difference and then accumulated through long ages are very weak and need not be considered here. That the medical instructions of the Ayurveda are regarded as valid is due to the fact that they are the instructions of trustworthy persons (yato yatrdptavddatram tatra prdmdnyam iti vydptir grhyate). but because instructions can be verified by experience (nanvdyur-vedddau prdmdnyam pratyaksddi-samvdddt pratipannam ndpta-prdmdnydt). for never. . p. n. 4.g. 37 other Vedas which are neither Rk nor Sama are Yajus (SSyana s Upodghdta to the Atharva-Veda. deals mainly with curatives and charms There is no reason to suppose that the composition of this Veda was later than even . probably. Taittiriya-brdhmana.26 speaks of three Vedas. 1895). &quot. Firstly. He argues also that the very large number of medicines.Veda. 4. Bombay edition.

cursing an enemy. The purposes which vanic charms were supposed to fulfil the Athar were numerous. that the Atharva-Veda was compiled in its present form some new hymns were incorporated with it. as Sayana points out in the introduction to his commentary. Amulets are used almost as freely as they were three or four thousand years ago. and the latter with offensive rites for molesting an enemy (abhi- carikd]. The hold of the Atharvanic charms on the mind of the people was prob ably very strong. when the Rg-Vedic sacrifices have become extremely is rare. The Rg-Veda itself may be regarded in a large measure as a special development of such magic rites. and ac cordingly the Grhya-sutras draw largely from them. alleviating sufferings. It may there fore be presumed that a good number of Atharvanic hymns were current when most of the Rg-Vedic hymns were not yet composed. however. By the time. The Atharva-Veda. These practices were mostly for the alleviation of the troubles of an ordinary householder. the Tantric charms of comparatively later times. since they had occasion to use them in all their daily concerns. and the royal priests had to be versed in the Atharvanic practices. also called terrible (ghora). very large part of the income of the priestly class is derived from the performance of auspicious rites (svastyayand). Even now. the use of Atharvanic charms and of their descendants. very common amongst all classes of Hindus. was indispensable to kings for warding off their enemies and securing many other advantages. The oldest name of the Atharva-Veda is Atharvangirasah. promoting of welfare (paustika) and the curatives (bhesajani).xin] of India Ayur-veda and the Atharva-Veda 281 was there any time when people did not take to charms and incantations for curing diseases or repelling calamities and injuring enemies. A and oblations (homo) for curing chronic and serious illnesses. These may . and this generally suggested a twofold division of it into hymns attributed to Atharvan and others attributed to Aiigiras the former dealt with the holy . (santa). and snake-charms and charms for dog-bite and others are still things which the medical people find it difficult to combat. purificatory penances (prayascitta). Faith in the mysterious powers of occult rites and charms forms an essential feature of the popular Hindu mind and it oftentimes takes the place of religion in the ordinary Hindu household. securing a male issue to the family. and the like. the philosophic character of which does not tally with the outlook of the majority of the hymns. winning a law-suit.

or string into the fields enemy army.282 Speculations in the Medical Schools briefly [CH. different kinds of Fever. know ledge of future success or failure. providing antidotes against all kinds of poisons. such as the bhuta. cursing. riches. food grains. chariots. strengthening cows. neck and inflammation of the neck. arranging women s sons. tongue. securing rain. stopping the flow of blood from wounds caused by injuries from life. winning and stopping brawls. white leprosy. bringing about various household properties. preventing epileptic fits and possession by the different species of evil spirits. letting loose a bull (as a part of the general rites sraddhd). and Diabetes. agriculture. cities. killing enemies. procuring prosperity. Brahma-raksasa. securing large gambling. winning a battle. appeasing a king s anger. making a new-built house auspicious. stopping inauspicious marks in women. etc. heart diseases. performing in debates rivers flow according to one s auspicious rites for a new house. encouraging and where the enemy army may be moving. charming all instruments of war music. acquisition of villages. of cattle. weapons. eyes. warding off the evil effects of a rites for Brahmin s curse. performing the rites of the harvesting month of Agrahayana (the middle of November to the middle of December). nose. Dropsy. children. be summed up in accordance with the Kausika-sutra as follows: quickening of intelligence. off all kinds of frightening the elephants of enemies. elephants. frightening and ruining the protecting one s own army. Pthisis. securing curatives for various otherwise incurable diseases produced by the sins of past curing all diseases generally. throwing a charmed snare. accomplishment of the virtues of a Brahmacarin (religious student). making wish. Cholera. and thunder. stopping too much rain . performing the coronation ceremony. fortresses and kingdoms. Fever. pisdca. knowing the future result of a battle. warding weapons. removing the sins of prohibited . curing vata. winning back a lost city demolished by the enemy. the conditions of bulls. Jaundice. expiating sins. supplying curatives for the diseases of the head. ascending a chariot for winning a battle. winning the minds of generals and chief persons. winning in the welfare of cattle and horses. etc. production of unanimity (aikamatya) and contentment among the people. wives.. securing gains in trade. ears. securing easy delivery and the welfare of securing the foetus securing prosperity. stupefying. sword. pitta and slesman.. amulets for promoting welfare. horses. curing worms in cows and horses.

Naksatra-kalpa. are actually Parisistas. of the sun and moon. These were Paippalada. such as rain of dust. The Saunaare available. Naksatra. performing aus picious rites. Vaitana. 3 tatra Sakalyena samhitd-mantranam santika-paustikadisu karmasu viniyogavidhanat samhita-vidhir nama Kausikam sutram. paying off debts. The three kalpas. also The Kausika-sutra is known as Samhita-vidhi and Samhita-kalpa. performing the ceremonies at birth. Jajala. marriage. and Caranavaidya. Of these the Kausika-sutra probably the and most important. kiya recension is what is now available in print. etc. Kausika. At present the evidence we possess is limited to that supplied by the Kausika-sutra. Manda. raksasas. 2 kalpa and Santi-kalpa these are also known is as the five kalpas earliest . . Of these only the Paippalada and Saunakiya recensions different recensions. counteracting the molesting influence of the charms of an enemy. or sakhas. securing long life. viz. 283 acceptance of gifts and prohibited priestly services preventing bad dreams. naming... Ahgirasa and Santi. the appearance of comets. tad eva itarair upajivyatvat. removing the evil effects of unlucky stars under whose influence an infant may have been born. the wearing of holy thread. The Saunakiya school has the Gopatha-brahmana as its Brahmana and five sutra works. Saunaklya. Angirasa. . (panca-kalpa) . removing the evils of bad omens.xin] Ayur-veda and the Atharva-Veda . molesting an enemy. warding off calamities due to the disturbance of nature. Brahmavada. the appearance and of yaksas. The Paippalada recension exists only in a single un 1 It published Tubingen manuscript first discovered by Roth has been edited in facsimile and partly also in print. Tanda. Devadarsa. per forming funeral rites. etc. No manuscript of the Angirasa-kalpa seems to be available. tonsure. the readings of which differed more or less from one another. Whether all these functions were discovered when first the Atharvanic verses were composed is more than can be definitely ascertained.. earthquakes. Upodhghata of Sayana to the Atharva-Veda. Ac cording to the Indian tradition accepted by Sayana the compila tion of the Atharva-Veda was current in nine different collections. etc. eclipses The above long list of advantages which can be secured by the performance of Atharvanic rites gives us a picture of the time when these Atharvanic charms were used. but from the brief notice of Sayana it appears to 1 2 Der Atharvaveda in Kashmir by Roth. p. 25. blood. Jalada. since all the other four depend upon it 3 The Naksatra-kalpa and Santi-kalpa are more or less of an astro logical character.

The suggestion. Hoernle suggests that by parsni Susruta meant the os calcis. contained in the word Carana-vaidya. which probably formed the old Ayur-veda of the Atreya-Caraka school. p. . kurca 2 bones. that portion of it which can be superficially seen and felt.&quot. and sought their help. or one in each leg. and the two bones form one circular bone (valaydsthi} of one gitlpha for each leg. the word Caraka (literally. is referred to. in the dual number. 4 II. valaya prob &quot. III. and that the sufferers on hearing of the arrival of such 1 persons approached them. The existence of the Carana-vaidya (wandering medical sakha reveals to us the particular sdkhd of the Atharva-Veda. in this connection is also hardly correct. according as the constituent pieces. much of what Hoernle has said on the point loses its value and becomes hyper critical. pp. The Vaitdna-sutra dealt with some sacrificial and ritualistic details. On my interpretation Susruta . (5 saldkds and the one bone to which they are attached) 2 bones.circular. Is it likely that 1 Caraka also counts one parsni for each foot. 91-96). Susruta. v. 128) remarks on the fact. Gulpha means the distal processes of the two bones of the leg. that is. If this is accepted. who identified the Atharva-Veda with Ayur-veda. heels (parsni. which Dalhana explains as tola 6 bones. also Hoernle. supposing that he spoke gitlpha of two kurcas and two gulphas in the same leg. 2 are particularly important in this connection. 33 and x. it is possible that the interpretation is that there are two bones in one cluster (kurcd} in each leg. There are two gulphas. Susruta probably knew the real nature of it as a cluster (kurcd) for in Sdrira-sthdna vi he speaks of the astragalus as kurca-siras. has tala-kurca-gulpha-samsritdni dasa. but he counts the parsni separately. 19. Let us 2 first start with the anatomical features of the Atharva-Veda The bones counted are as follows: i. See Hoernle s comment on Susruta s division. and. The Kausika-sutra was commented on by Darila. Hoernle misinterpreted Dalhana.ornament&quot. Bhadra and Rudra. there are four gulphas. 5. that Caraka means the backward and downward projections of the os calcis. or the one whole valaydsthi. The main interest of the present chapter is in that part of the Atharva-Veda which deals with curative instructions. It is curious that Vagbhata I makes a strange confusion by attributing one parsni to each hand \ 3 (Astdnga-samgraha. have been a manual for molesting one s enemies (abhicdra-karma). pointed out a number of incon sistencies and suggested a different reading of the Susruta text. Kesava. in the two feet) 3 2. 82. His translation of valaya as &quot. Hoernle. pp. known as the malleoli. The same maybe the case with the Atharva-Veda. Bones in the Atharva-Veda and Ayur-veda. and probably did not think that it was a member of the tarsal cluster (kurcd}. Following Dalhana. . or head of the cluster. ankle-bones (gulphau in the dual number) 4 . Hoernle (Studies in the Medicine of Ancient India. 102-104. 81. is interesting practitioners) . and for this the Kausika-sutra has to be taken as the principal guide.&quot. that the medical practitioners of those days went about from place to place. As counted by Caraka and also by Susruta. ably means &quot. and is popularly known as the heel.284 Speculations in the Medical Schools [CH. a wanderer) had anything to do with the itinerant character of Caraka s profession as a medical practitioner? 2 Hymns II.

of the hands and feet) 2 5. and from this point of view the counting of ilium and ischium as one bone is justifiable. All these four kinds of network exist in the two joints of the hands and feet. and the pubis. bhaga to the bhagdsthi. Susruta. Caraka seems to count it as one bone. kurca. the two malleoli bones and the two gulpha bones. 7 Caraka speaks of two bones in the pelvic cavity. while the latter counts the sacrum and coccyx as one bone forming part of the vertebral column. In addition to these a separate bhagdsthi is counted by Caraka. the kurca. the breast bones . Susruta collects them under tala. 6 The tibia and the fibula in the leg. 8 Caraka. ischium. . become fused together as one bone in adult life. The ilium and ischium. (3) sndyu. 5 in the dual) 4 7.e. the shanks (jdnunoh sandhi) 6 7 (janghe in the dual) . Susruta and Vagbhata I describe this organ rightly as consisting of two bones. Nitamba corresponds to the two sroni-phalaka of Caraka. 25. bhaga. 285 3. (2) sird. The Atharva-Veda justly describes the figure made bv them as being a fourfold frame having its ends closely connected together (catustayam yujyate samhitdntam) The corresponding two bones of the fore-arm (aratni) radius and ulna are correctly counted by Caraka. viz. vi. however. (4) bones (mdmsa-sird-sndyv-asthi-jdldni). the actual number. 4 Hoernle remarks that in the Atharva-Veda asthlvat and jdnu are synony mous. Curiously enough. Caraka calls it uru-nalaka. the in Susruta astragalus. Kurca means a network of (i) flesh (mdmsa). and this analogy suits the construction of the elbow pan. 2. counts five bones four in the guda. 9. upon bhagdsthi. He probably considered (as Hoernle suggests) the sacrum and coccyx to be one bone which formed a part of the vertebral column By bhagdsthi he probably meant the pubic bone. sthdna. The os calcis would be the pdrsni. seems clearly to enumerate them separately. 8 10. the os innominatum on both sides. not in the ordinary list of bones in Sdrtra. Susruta s main difference from Caraka is this. . Caraka. but the text. guda to the coccyx and trika to the triangular bone sacrum. the lower part. the knee-joints 8. though they are two bones in the body of an infant. probably for the knee-cap (patella) and the elbow pan (kapdlikd). Vagbhata takes trika and guda as one bone. the knee-caps (asthivantau . x. 2. describes it (the cross bone which binds together trie haunch bones in front). : . 5 This seems to be different from asthlvat (patella). the portion joined to the other innominate bone. and there is no passage to show that he knew of more. 2 Caraka counts these metacarpal and metatarsal bones (pdni-pdda-saldkd) as twenty. that. 3 Caraka uses the term pdni-pdda-saldkddhisthdna. digits (angulayah in the plural number) 4. Susruta does not refer to them in the bone-list. base (pratistha)*\6. for Cakrapani. the pelvic cavity (sronl in the dual) . however. whereas their actual number is fifty-six only. 1 Both Caraka and Susruta count sixty of these phalanges (pdni-pdddnguli) . the thigh bones (uru in the dual) n.xni] Bones in the Atharva-Veda and Ayur-veda 1 . The bdhu is not enumerated in this connection. His combined tala-kurca-gulpha includes all the bones of the hand and foot excluding the anguli bones (phalanges). Yajnavalkya. Caraka uses the terms jdnu and kapdlikd. Bhela. Kapdlikd means a small shallow basin.siras. Modern anatomists think that each os innominatum is composed of three different bones: ilium. -. a special term used by him. i. the upper portion. but at the time of counting the marma in ibid. commenting abhimukham kati-sandhdna-kdrakam tiryag-asthi&quot. but separates it from the vertebral column. and Susruta. Susruta and Vagbhata I count it correctly as one bone in each leg. nitamba and one in the trika. 19. the former considers them as two bones and as separate from the vertebral column. metacarpal and metatarsal bones (ucchlankhau in the dual number. knew of only two bones as forming the kurca. as&quot. . Susruta uses the term kurpara (elbow pan). or pubic bone. v. The asthlvat is probably the patella bone.

* Kaphoda probably means scapula or shoulder-blade. even if they are counted. exteriorly to the thoracic vertebrae and interiorly to the costal cartilages -jatru). for in reality there are only two bones. &quot.e. But the eighth. and describes it as triangular (trika-sambaddhe) and this term has been erroneously interpreted as grlvdyd amsa-dvayasya ca yah samyogas sa trikah by Dalhana The junction of the collar-bone with the neck cannot be called trika. aksaka (collar-bone) and amsa. Hoernle s fancied restoration of the ten of Susruta does not appear to be proved. and not 72. This word amsa seems to be a wrong reading. There are.e. twenty-four ribs. however. as Hoernle points out. In medical works it means the cartilaginous portion of the neck. 2 (uras) . So. since the two lowest have no tubercles. the total number ought to be 68 bones. there are twenty-four bones in the pdrsva (ribs). 27.&quot. adds the sternum and the eighth costal cartilage on either side to Caraka s fourteen bones. . however. but it is yet counted as a bone by the Indian anatomists. as we read in the Satapatha-brahmana: tasmdd imd ubhayatra parsavo baddhdh kikasdsu ca jatrusu&quot. owing to a misinter pretation of the anatomical terms sandhi and amsa. Caraka calls it &quot.&quot. This gives us the total number of fourteen which Caraka counts. It is again not a bone. and this can hardly be accounted for. There are altogether ten costal cartilages on either side of the sternum.e. and two bronchi. there are altogether seven bones on either side of the sternum. it was made to mean clavicle. 3 Pdrsvayos catur-vimsatih pdrsvayos tdvanti caiva sthdlakdni tdvanti caiva sthdlakdrbuddni. and hence is applied either to the neck generally or to the sterno-clavicular articulation at the base of the neck (Susruta). Indian anatomists counted cartilages as new bones (taruna asthi). . larynx. eighth. which included these three. books as synonymous with windpipe or neck generally. According to modern anatomists there are.g. Caraka uses the word amsa-phalaka. Hoernle supposes that Yajna valkya s number was the real reading in Susruta. 1 Caraka counts fourteen bones in the breast. Susruta speaks of there being thirty-six ribs on either side. The sthdlakas and arbudas cannot properly be counted as separate bones. (the ribs are fastened at either end. viz. The sternum was not counted by Caraka separately.jatru&quot. but. 5 Caraka counts fifteen bones in the neck. vi. &quot. v. but his argument is hardly i. counts seventeen. that. ninth and tenth cartilages are attached to the seventh. 1 2 the windpipe (grlvah in the plural) -. yet he distinctly names amsa-phalaka in drira. It is only as late as the sixth or seventh century A. He probably counted the transverse processes &quot. Yajnavalkya. But could it not mean the acromion process of the scapula? Though Susruta omits the shoulder-blade in the counting of bones in Sdrlra. convincing. A rib consists of a shaft at the point of junction of these two parts there is a tubercle which and a head articulates with the transverse process of corresponding vertebrae. the backbone (prstlh . See Hoernle s Studies in the Medicine of Ancient India. no doubt. Caraka uses two other terms. the breast (stanau in the dual) 3 514. and probably this tubercle is arbuda. ninth and tenth cartilages are considered as a single bone. but a cartilage. e. the scapula and the collar-bone. (for this term is aksakasamjne). Hoernle says that originally the word denoted cartilaginous portions of the neck and breast (the windpipe and the costal cartilages). 2 The windpipe is composed of four parts. and Susruta kanthaHoernle has successfully shown that the -word jatru was used in medical nddt.13. &quot. trachea. i.&quot. p. 168. as Hoernle points out. i. only seven. Susruta and Vagbhata I curiously count eight bones in the breast. if the seventh. twentyfour sthdlakas (sockets). the shoulder-blade (kaphodau in the dual) 4 515. the shoulder-bones (skandhan in the plural) 5 16. the windpipe (Caraka). . With him this was the result of the continuation of the costal cartilages attached to one another without a break.286 1 . and twenty-four sthdlakdrbudas (tubercles).D. Speculations in the Medical Schools [CH.

thirty bones. 27. the body. with Susruta we have twelve thoracic vertebrae. 5 Sankha is the term denoting the temples. The word klkasa (A. and got the number fourteen. which. Both the frontal and occipital are really each composed of two bones. (laldta)\ 19. . The joint of each of the anal bones. According to Caraka. viz. so he counted the sockets of the teeth (dantolukhala) and the hard palate (talusaka). in the Atharva-Veda and Ayur-veda 2 (amsau in the dual) . and the two transverse processes.V. and he thus gets the number six. thus leaving a remainder of four bones. 2) means the thoracic portion of the spine. This is the acetabulum. the lower jaw only is counted as a separate bone (ekam hanv-asthi). 287 18. . section of this chapter. 3 Laldta is probably the two superciliary ridges at the eye-brow and kakdstkd the lower portion. i. however. Susruta divides the frontal. one single bone. 2) means the whole of the spinal column. 33. as was done by Susruta. Susruta has three. samudgdh). comprising the body of the superior maxillary together with the molar and nasal bones. the two nasal. The brain-case consists of eight bones. Each bone consists of four parts. He adds to this the sacrum and the coccyx as one pelvic bone. twelve transverses. to which he added the vertebrae as constituting Susruta counts nine bones. z Both Caraka and Susruta call this aksaka and count it correctly as two bones. six lumbar vertebrae. In Caraka the body and the spinous process of the twelve thoracic vertebrae make the number twenty-four. in which the head of the femur. together with the other six. Susruta s counting of the upper hanu did not include the palatine process so he also counts the tdlu (ekam tdluni). Susruta considers the body and the spinous process as one and the two transverse processes as two thus for the four bones of Caraka. 1 Caraka counts forty. and Caraka counts them all as four bones. made the total number nine. Caraka counts the two molar (ganda-kuta). the five lumbar vertebrae (body + spine + two transverses) make twenty. the pile of the jaw (hanu-citya)* 21 the cranium with temples (kapalamf.e. the central facial . Of these the temporal bones have already been counted as sankha.three bones in the vertebral column (prstha-gatdsthi). the pubic bone and the hip bone (nitambd) is also described by him as a samudga. Caraka did not count the upper jaw. the in the plural) 1 17. counts the upper and the lower jaws as two bones (hanvor dve). n. (they are called aksaka because they are like two beams the fastening-pegs of the junction of the neck. Sdrira.bones). or cotyloid cavity. Though the author has often differed from Dr Hoernle. Though actually each of these bones consists of two bones. .xm] brow Bones . is lodged (Susruta. the spinous process.V. yet he is highly in debted to his scholarly explanations and criticisms in writing out this particular . amsa-pltha-guda-bhaga-nitambesu &quot. Susruta further speaks of amsa-puha (the glenoid cavity into which the head of the humerus is inserted) as a samudga (casket) bone. v. 33. The seventh bone contains spinous and transverse processes and was probably therefore counted by him as three bones. parietal and occipital bones into two halves and considers them as separate bones. . and the two attachments are counted as two bones (dve hanu-mula-bandhane) Susruta. Of these two are inside and hence not open to view from outside. &quot. they are so fused together that they may be considered as one. thus making the number forty-five. So there are only six bones which are externally visible. anukya (A. n. Caraka counts four cranial bones (catvdri sirah-kapdldni) and Susruta six (sirasi sat). the collar-bones bone (kakatika)*\ 20. while the actual number is only twenty-six. &quot. which become fused in later life. Cakrapani describes it as aksa-vivaksakau jatru-sandheh falakau&quot. and the two superciliary ridges at the eye-brows as forming one continuous bone 4 (ekdsthi ndsikd-ganda-kuta-laldtam). and udara the abdominal portion. of which both Caraka and Susruta count two.

&quot.. it is always used in the plural (nitya-bahu-vacandntd). was probably considered as another pittddhdra. But. in commenting on this. since Caraka considers its importance in connection with hiccough. who places it on the same side of the heart as the liver. drngadhara. 34) he speaks of kloma as one of the organs connected with hiccough (hrdayam kloma kantham ca tdlukam ca samdsritd mrdvl sd ksudra-hikveti nrndm sddhyd praklrtita).gall&quot. is quite useless for identification. kloma must mean with him the one organ of the two lungs. 45. Macdonell considers it to be &quot. the spleen (plihan). and S*ankara. (Vimdna. where water is borne or secreted. The Bhdva-prakdsa describes it as the root of the veins. &quot. the 1 Caraka counts kloma as an organ near the heart. I. however. i. is evidently erroneous. n. which latter. The two matsnda in this explanation would probably be the gall bladder and the pancreas. Weber thinks that it may mean (Indische Studien. Vagbhata and other authorities use the word in the singular. however. Br. the lungs (kloma) 1 . 500). Susruta speaks of pupphusa as being on the left side and kloma as being on the right. Sayana describes it as etat-samjnakdt tat-sambandhdt mdrnsa-pinda-visesdt&quot. since he does not mention pupphusa (lungs Mahd-vyutpatti. v. as all the authorities use the word in the singular. This. We have no proofs through which we could assert that the writer the Atharva-Veda verse knew the number of the different bones Organs in the which he refers but it does not seem possible that the references made to bones could have been possible without a careful study of the human skeleton. 10). . on account of its secretions. 206). In another place (Cikitsa. v. The Atharva-Veda. commentary of ^aiikara) is against the verdict of Susruta. the gall-bladder (haliksna) 2 the kidneys (matsnabhyamf the liver (yaknd).matsndbhydm ubhaya-pdrsva- sambandhdbhydm vrkydbhydm tat-samlpa-stha-pittddhdra-pdtrdbhydm. however. then matsnd would mean the two sacs of pitta (bile) near the kidneys. vol. Whether this was done by some crude forms of dissection or by a study of the skeletons of dead bodies in a state of decay is more than can be decided. Susruta. That kloma was an organ which formed a member of the system of respiratory organs is further proved by its being often associated with the other organs of the neighbourhood. 13. of to Atharva-Veda and Ayur-veda. i. says that. . such as the throat (kantha) and the root of the palate (tdlu-mula). . Since the two lungs vary in size.(gudabhyah). Vagbhata I follows Susruta. and. 100). p. literature. This. Caraka. 3 Sayana paraphrases matsndbhydm as vrkydbhydm.Jihvd-tdlv-ostha-kantha-kloma-sosam drstvd&quot. If this explanation is accepted. but he does not count pupphusa. whatever that may be. . . . it is quite possible that Susruta called the left lung pupphusa and the right one kloma. tilam) 2 &quot. (antrebhyah). but in Brhad-dranyaka. the word kloma is used in the plural number. Many of the organs are also mentioned. such as the heart (hrdaya). describes it as a gland of watery secretions near the liver (jala-vdhi-sird-miilam trsnd-tchddanakam &quot. Thus Caraka says. His description of it as being located on the left of the heart (yakrc ca klomdnas ca hrdayasyddhastdd daksinottarau mdmsa-khandau.288 Speculations in the Medical Schools [CH. the rectum and the portion above i\. Cakrapani describes it as pipdsd-sthdna (seat of thirst). Sayana gives an alternative explanation: &quot. the stomach and the smaller intestine . . i. xvn. Caraka s reading is vukka. though it is one organ. This word does not occur in the medical (Vedic Index. udakavahdndm srotasdm tdlu-mulam kloma ca. .some particular intestine&quot. .

&quot. 3 is offset apparent by the occurrence of the same words in vn.e. general sense of internal canals arteries in the modern sense of the terms. &quot. of the lower part. 33). 3. showing how vague were the ideas held with regard to such 4 But this is not correct. 17 is a charm for stopping the flow of blood from an injury or too much hemorrhage of women. i. x. is regarded as the place where the urine collects (A. like Sayana. etc. Most of the organs of a cow are mentioned. &quot. the veins (snavabhyah) and the arteries 2 (dhamanibhyah) Thus we see that almost all the important organs . as Sayana says). 3 subjects which suggests a knowledge of the distinction between veins and . 15.V. i. 6). x. the abdomen (udard). This verse runs as follows: (Sayana says thou sira ) remain (i. says that &quot. (veins?) wearing red garment (or the receptacles of blood) of woman which verse.2.&quot. Vasti. i it is said.V. 17. &quot.&quot. or bladder.V. &quot. 9. explained as sthavirantrci).Thou it is a prayer to dhamanis. the pericardium (puntat) and the bronchial tubes (saha-kanthikd). Along with the organs of human beings mentioned above two other organs are mentioned. so 1 bahu-cchidran mala-pdtrdt&quot. (the vessel Pldsiis paraphrased by Sayana as of the excreta with many holes). and the epithet lohita-vdsasah as either wearing red garment or red. yakrt sdvttrah. . reported in the later Atreya-Caraka school or the Susruta school were known to the composers of the Atharvanic hymns 3 . &quot.Those hiras .The distinction between veins and arteries in i. such as is not found in vn. n. or the receptacle of blood (rudhirasya nivdsa-bhutak} &quot. matsne evdsyasvattham ca pdtram audumbaram ca pittarn naiyagrodham antrdni sthdlyah gudd updsaydni sycna-pdtre plihdsandl ndbhih kumbho vanisthuh pldsih sdtdtrnnd tad yat sd bahudhd vitrnnd bhavati tasmdt pldsir bahudhd vikrltah. . 5 daughters without a brother are constantly flowing should remain dispirited. the colon (plasi) 1 the umbilicus (nabhi). &quot.xm] Organs in the Atharva-Veda and Ayur-veda by Sayana . 289 larger intestine (vanisthu. 2. The Satapatha-brdhmana. klomd vdrunah. i. vagina. viz. and says. so thou &quot. 9. in explaining the next . for there is nothing in I. thou of the upper part remain. 5 Sayana paraphrases hird as sira and describes it as a canal (nddl} for carrying blood (rajo-vahana-nddyah}. xn. 17. Diseases and medicine: Vedic. 3 enumerates all these organs as being sacred to certain gods and sacrificial instruments hrdayatn evdsyaindrah puroddsah. 35. cease from letting out blood. the marrow (majjabhyah). These holes are probably the orifices of the glands inside the colon (mala-pdtra). 4 Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics. whether the Atharva-Veda people knew the difference between the sira and the dhamani.V.&quot. 17. 2 Sayana says that sndva means here the smaller sir as and dhamani the thicker ones (the arteries) suksmdh sirdh sndva-sabdena ncyante dhamani-sabdena sthuluh (A. A. 9 shows that probably dissection of animals was also practised. 35. The sukta i. &quot. so thou of the middle part. 3 A.&quot. In i 17. A handful of street-dust was to be thrown on the injured part and the hymn was to be uttered. &quot. 2 with the more Boiling raises the point meaning entrails.

But s interpretation is thousand. antrebhyo vinirgatasya mutrasya mutrdsaya-prdpti-sddhane pdrsva-dvayaity ucyete. Susani. 3 6 we hear of two nadis called gavlnyau for carrying the urine from the kidneys to the bladder 3 The gods of the eight quarters and other gods are in the nowhere that the distinction . &quot. 17 is that here sir as the thicker nadis round the ovary for keeping are said to be a latter. hundred and dhamanis if a thousand.These in the middle were formerly (letting out blood) among a hundred dhamanis and thousands of hiras (and after that) all the other (nddls) were playing with (others which have ceased from letting out blood) 2 / Hymn VII. But. 7) eight dhamanis called manya are mentioned. together with the god of de 4 livery (Susa). The third verse says. on which strangury depends. Sayana here says that dhamanis are the important nadis in the heart (hrdaya-gatdndm pradhdnanddlndm). 17. so thou the big dhamani hiras and dhamanis are mentioned. the dhamanis still appear as the bigger channels and the siras as the finer ones. is mentioned in A. In A. . in explaining this verse. anena prayogena nivrtta-rudhira-srdvd avatisthatdm) 2 Here both the dhamani and the hird are enumerated. 12. is also invoked. i. 4 Another goddess of delivery. i. Sayana s Bhdsya. In one passage sthe 3 nddyau gavlnyau (A. The only point of difference between this verse and those of i. 5 two nddls called gavlnikd are referred to and are described by Sayana as being the two nddls on the two sides of the vagina controlling delivery (gavlnike yoneh pdrsva-vartinyau nirgamana-pratibandhike nddyau Sayana). The Prasna Upanisad. vi. whereas this verse dhamanis as performing the same function.V. is a hundred and thus almost agrees with refers to .&quot. [CH. . 16 (satam caikd ca hrdayasya nddyah). 6 also speaks of a hundred nddls .290 Speculations in the Medical Schools 1 &quot. says that the hiras are fine nadis inside the ovary (garbha- dhdrandrtham antar-avasthitdh suksmdyd nddyah) and the dhamanis it steady (garbhasayasya avastambhikd bdhyd sthuld yd nddyah). Nodi seems to have been the general name of channels. I close with a stone the apertures of a hundred hiras and a thousand dhamanis. 4. in. produced the foetus and. In the third verse both the small. and hiras or siras are branch nddls (sirdndm sdkhd-nddlndni) The number of dhamanis. The the number of nddls in the heart given in the Katha Upanisad. A nddl called sikatdvatl. Say ana. woman who is an enemy. and Sayana says that they are near the neck. n. Sayana also freely para phrases dhamani as sird (mahl mahatl sthulatard dhamanih sird tisthdd it tisthaty eva. whereas in the siras the dhamanis were said to be a hundred and the a accepted. In I. of which there are thousands of branches. as here given. Say ana Aiharva-Veda is there any passage which suggests between veins and arteries in the modern sense of the terms was known at the time.V. 35 is for stopping the issue of a &quot.V. facilitated birth by loosening the bonds of the womb 1 said to have . previous verse referred to sir as as letting out blood. . ii.



in the

Atharva-Veda and Ayur-veda


The termjarayu is used in the sense of placenta, which is said to have no intimate connection with the flesh and marrow, so that
it falls


it is

eaten by the dogs and the body








to a first aid to delivery in ex

panding the sides of the vagina and pressing the two gavinikd nadis 1 The snavas (tendons) are also mentioned along with dhamanis, and Sayana explains them as finer sir as (suksmdh sir ah

sndva-sabdena ucyante) The division of dhamanis, siras and snavas thus seems to have been based on their relative fineness: the

called siras

thicker channels (nadis) were called dhamanis, the finer ones were and the still finer ones snavas. Their general functions
less the

were considered more or

same, though these probably

differed according to the place in the body where they were situated and the organs with which they were associated. It


to have been recognized that there was a general flow of the liquid elements of the body. This probably corresponds to the notion of srotas, as we get it in the Caraka-samhita, and which will be dealt with later on. Thus A.V. x. 2. says, "who stored in him


floods turned in



moving diverse and formed

to flow

in rivers, quick (tivra), rosy (arund), red (lohini), and copper dark (tamra-dhumra), running all ways in a man upward and down

elements in the body.

This clearly refers to the diverse currents of various liquid The semen, again, is conceived as the thread of life which is being spun out 2 The intimate relation between the heart and the brain seems to have been dimly apprehended. Thus it is said, "together with his needle hath Atharvan sewn his head The theory of the vayus, which we find in all later and heart 3 literature, is alluded to, and the prana, apdna, vydna and samdna are mentioned 4 It is however difficult to guess what these prdna, apdna, etc. exactly meant. In another passage of the AtharvaVeda we hear of nine prdnas (nava prdndn navabhih sammimite), and in another seven prdnas are mentioned 5 In another passage



1 2

vi te bhinadmi vi

yonim vi gavinike. A.V.




asmin reto nyadadhdt tantur dtayatdm iti (Who put the semen in him, saying, Let the thread of life be spun out? A.V. x. 2. 17). 3 Murdhdnam asya samslvydtharvd hrdayam ca yat (A.V. x. 2. 26). See
also Griffith s translations.


Ko asmin prdnam

avayat ko apdnam vydnam u samdnam asmin ko deve dhi

sisrdya puruse (Who has woven prdna, apdna, vydna and samdna into him and which deity is controlling him? A.V. x. 2. 13). 6 Sapta prdndn astau manyas (or majjnas) tarns te vrscdmi brahmand (A.V. n.
12. 7).




2. 3. 3

refers to seven prdnas, sapta vai 19-2


Speculations in the Medical Schools



hear of a lotus with nine gates (nava-dvaram) and covered

with the three gunas 1



a very familiar


in later

Sanskrit literature, as referring to the nine doors of the senses, and the comparison of the heart with a lotus is also very common. But one of the most interesting points about the passage is that

seems to be a direct reference to the gima theory, which re ceived its elaborate exposition at the hands of the later Samkhya

As is probably the earliest reference to that theory. stated above, the real functions of the prdna, etc. were not properly understood prdna was considered as vital power or

we have


and it was believed to be beyond injury and fear. It was as immortal as the earth and the sky, the day and the night, the sun and the moon, the Brahmanas and the Ksattriyas, truth and false 2 A prayer is made to prdna and hood, the past and the future for protection from death (prdnapanau mrtyor ma pdtam apdna svahaf. In A. V. in. 6. 8 manas and citta are separately mentioned and Sayana explains manas as meaning antahkarana, or inner organ, and citta as a particular state of the manas (mano-vrtti4 Here also the heart is the seat of conscious visesena), as thought O Mitra and Varuna, ness. Thus in a prayer in in. 26. 6 it is said, take away the thinking power (citta) from the heart (hrt) of this woman and, making her incapable of judgment, bring her under my control 5 The eyas with which we are familiar in later medical works of Caraka and others is mentioned in A.V. n. 18, where


slrsanydh prdndh. Again a reference to the seven senses is found in A.V. x. 2. 6: kah sapia khdni vitatarda sirsani. In A.V. XV. 15. 16. 17 seven kinds of prdna, apdna and vydna are described. These seem to serve cosmic functions. The

seven prdnas are agni, dditya, candramdh, pavamdna, dpah, pasavah and prajdh. The seven apdnas are paurnamdsi, astakd, amdvdsyd, sraddhd, dlksd, yajna and daksind. The seven kinds of vydna are bhumi, antariksam, dyauh, naksatrdni, rtavah, drtavdh and samvatsardh.

pundarikam nava-dvdram tribhir gunebtiir dvrtam tasrnin y ad yaks am dtmanvat tad vai Brahma-vido viduh. (Those who know Brahman know that being to be the self which resides in the lotus flower of nine gates covered by the three gunas. A.V. x. 8. 43.) The nddts tdd, pingald and susumnd, which figure so much in the later Tantric works, do not appear in the Atharva-Veda. No reference to prdndydma appears in the Atharva-Veda. A.V. n. 15. 3 Ibid. n. 1 6. i. Prdna and apdna are asked in another passage to enter a man as bulls enter a cow-shed. Sayana calls prdna, apdna sariras-dhdraka (A.V. in. n. 5). They are also asked not to leave the body, but to bear the limbs



old age (HI. n. 6).

Manas and

citta are also separately


The word


thinking (cittinah

counted in A.V. ill. 6. 8. sometimes used to mean men of the same ways of Sayana. A.V. Hi. 13. 5). sarndna-citta-yuktdh


Practice of Medicine in the
described as being ojas and




asked to give ojas to the


Practice of Medicine in the Atharva-Veda.

As we have said above, there is evidence to show that even at the time of the Atharva-Veda the practice of pure medicine by professional medical men had already been going on. Thus the
9. 3, as explained by Sayana, says that there were hundreds of medical practitioners (satam hy asya bhisajah) and thousands of herbs (sahasram uta virudhah), but what can be done by these can

verse n.

verse 2

be effected by binding an amulet with the particular charm of this Again (n. 9. 5), the Atharvan who binds the amulet is

described as the best of all good doctors (subhisaktamd). In vi. 68. 2 Prajapati, who appears in the Atreya-Caraka school as the original teacher of Ayur-veda and who learnt the science from Brahma, is

asked to treat (with medicine) a boy for the attainment of long 3 In the Kausika-siitra a disease is called Itngi, i.e. that w hich

has the symptoms


and medicine (bhaisajyd)

as that


destroys (upatdpa). Darila remarks that this upatapa-karma refers not only to the disease, but also to the symptoms, i.e. a 4 In bhaisajya is that which destroys the disease and its symptoms

few medicines are mentioned, such as jangida (xix. 34 and 35), gulgulu (xix. 38), kustha (xix. 39) and sata-vara (xix. 36), and these are all to be used as amulets for pro tection not only from certain diseases, but also from the witchcraft (krtya) of enemies. The effect of these herbs was of the same miraculous nature as that of mere charms or incantations. They did not operate in the manner in which the medicines prescribed
the Atharva-Veda

only a

Ojo sy ojo me ddh svdhd (A.V. n. xvm. i). Sayana, in explaining ojah, sanra-sthiti-kdranam astamo dhatuh." He quotes a passage as being spoken by the teachers (dcdryaih): ksetrajnasya tad ojas tu kevaldsraya isyate yathd snehah pradlpasya yathdbhram asani-tvisah" (Just as the lamp depends on the oil and the lightning on the clouds so the ojah depends on the kshetra-jna




(self) alone).

Satam yd bhesajdni te sahasram samgatdni ca srestham dsrdva-bhesajam vasistham roga-ndsanam. (Oh sick person you may have applied hundreds or thousands of medicinal herbs but this charm is the best specific for stopping hemorrhage. A.V. vi. 45. 2.) Here also, as in n. 9. 3, the utterance of the charm is considered to be more efficacious than the application of other herbs and medicines. Water was often applied for washing the sores (vi. 57. 2). 3 Cikitsatu Prajdpatir dtrghdyutvdya caksase (\i. 68. 2). 4 Darila s comment on the Kausika-sutra, 25. 2.



Speculations in the Medical Schools


in the ordinary medical literature acted, but in a supernatural way. In most of the hymns which appear as pure charms the Kausika-

sutra directs the application of various medicines either internally or as amulets. The praise of Atharvan as physician par excellence

and of the charms as being superior to all other medicines pre scribed by other physicians seems to indicate a period when most of these Atharvanic charms were used as a system of treatment

which was competing with the practice of ordinary physicians with the medicinal herbs. The period of the Kausika-sutra was probably one when the value of the medicinal herbs was being more and more realized and they were being administered along with the usual Atharvanic charms. This was probably a stage of recon ciliation between the drug system and the charm system. The


jangida, kustha, etc.,

dedicated to the praise of certain herbs, such as show that the ordinary medical virtues of

herbs were being interpreted on the miraculous lines in which the charms operated. On the other hand, the drug school also came

under the influence of the Atharva-Veda and came to regard


as the source of their earliest authority. Even the later medical literature could not altogether free itself from a faith in the

powers of medicine and non-medical manner. Thus supernatural operating Caraka, vi. i 39 directs that the herbs should be plucked according to the proper rites (yatha-vidhi) and Cakrapani explains this by saying that the worship of gods and other auspicious rites have to be performed (mangala-devatarcanddi-purvakam)\ in vi. i. 77 a
efficacy of

charms and

in the miraculous




of herbs


advised, which, along with



had the power of making a person invisible to all beings bhutanam bhavati) miraculous powers are ascribed to the (adrsyo fruit amalaka (Emblic Myrobalan), such as that, if a man lives among cows for a year, drinking nothing but milk, in perfect sensecontrol and continence and meditating the holy gayatrl verse, and if at the end of the year on a proper lunar day in the month of Pausa (January), Magha (February), or Phalguna (March), after fasting for three days, he should enter an amalaka garden and, climbing upon a tree full of big fruits, should hold them and repeat (japan) the name of Brahman till the amalaka attains im

mortalizing virtues, then, for that moment, immortality resides in the amalaka and, if he should eat those amalakas then the goddess
; y

Sri, the incarnation of the

Vedas, appears in person to him (svayam


Practice of Medicine in the


is if

cdsyopatisthanti srlr vedavdkya-rupinl, vi. 3. 6). In vi. i. 80 it said that the rasdyana medicines not only procure long life, but,

they are taken in accordance with proper attains the immortal Brahman. Again in

rites (yatha-vidhi), a


word prayascitta (purificatory penance) is considered to have the same meaning as ausadha or bhesaja. The word bhesaja in the Atharva-Veda meant a charm or an amulet which could remove diseases and
vi. i. 3



symptoms, and though



medical literature the

more commonly used to denote herbs and minerals, either simple or compounded, the older meaning was not aban doned 1 The system of simple herbs or minerals, which existed independently of the Atharva-Veda, became thus intimately con nected with the system of charm specifics of the Atharva-Veda whatever antagonism may have before existed between the two systems vanished, and Ayur-veda came to be treated as a part of




Prajapati and Indra, the mythical physicians of the Atharva-Veda, came to be regarded in the Atreya-Caraka school as the earliest teachers of Ayur-veda 3
. .

the Atharva-Veda 2

Bloomfield arranges the contents of the Atharva-Veda in fourteen classes: i. Charms to cure diseases and possession by





Prayers for long


Imprecations against demons, 1 The A.V. terms are bhesajam (remedy), bhesaji (the herbs), and bhesajih (waters). The term bhaisajya appears only in the Kausika and other sutras and
Brahmanas. Bloomfield says that the existence of such charms and practices guaranteed moreover at least as early as the Indo- Iranian (Aryan) period by the stems baesaza and baesazya (manthra baesaza and baesazya; haoma baesazya), and by the pre-eminent position of water and plants in all prayers for health and long life. Adalbert Kuhn has pointed out some interesting and striking re semblances between Teutonic and Vedic medical charms, especially in connection with cures for worms and fractures. These may perhaps be mere anthropological coincidences, due to the similar mental endowment of the two peoples. But it is no less likely that some of these folk-notions had crystallized in prehistoric times, and that these parallels reflect the continuation of a crude Indo-European folk lore that had survived among the Teutons and Hindus. See Bloomfield s The Atharva-Veda and Gopatha-Brdhmana, p. 58, and Kuhn s Zeitschrift fur vergleichende Sprachforschung, xm. pp. 49-74 and 113-157. 2 The Atharva-Veda itself speaks (xix. 34. 7) of herbs which were current in ancient times and medicines which were new, and praises the herb jangida as being better than them all na tv a pure a osadhayo na tvd taranti yd navdh. 3 A.V. vi. 68. 2 Cikitsatu prajdpatir dJrghdyutvdya caksase; ibid. xix. 35. i Indrasya ndma grhnanto rsayah jangidam dadan (The rsis gave jangida, uttering the name of Indra). This line probably suggested the story in the Caraka-samhitd, that Indra first instructed the rsts in Ayur-veda. See ibid. xi. vm. 23 yan mdtali rathakrltam amrtam veda bhesajam tad indro apsu prdvesayat tad dpo datta bhesajam. The immortalizing medicine which Matali (the charioteer of Indra) bought by selling the chariot was thrown into the waters by Indra, the master of the chariot. Rivers, give us back that medicine!


and health (dyusydni) and enemies (dbhicdri-




Speculations in the Medical Schools


kdni and krtyd-pratiharandni)\
(stri-karmani); 5.



to secure

pertaining to women harmony, influence in the

assembly, and the like (saumanasydni)\ 6. Charms pertaining to royalty (rdja-karmdni) 7. Prayers and imprecations in the interest of Brahmins; 8. Charms to secure property and freedom from
in expiation of sin and defilement and theosophic hymns 1 1 Ritual Cosmogonic (prayascittdni) istic and general hymns; 12. The books dealing with individual themes (books 13-18); 13. The twentieth book; 14. The kuntdpa 1 hymns of these we have here to deal briefly with 1,2,3,4 anc 9, more or less in the order in which they appear in the Atharva-Veda. A.V. i. 2 is a charm against fever (jvara), diarrhoea (atlsdra),

danger (paustikdni)









diabetes (atimutra), glandular sores (nddi-vrand)\ a string made of munja grass is to be tied, the mud from a field or ant-hill is to be

be applied and the holes of the anus and penis and the mouth of the sore are to be aerated with a leather bladder and the charm is to be chanted. The disease dsrdva, mentioned in this hymn, is explained by Sayana as meaning diabetes 2 1.3 is a charm against stoppage of urine and stool (mutrdtisara)
clarified butter is to


Along with a chanting of the hymn the be made to drink either earth from a rat s hole patient (musika-mrttika), a putikd plant, curd, or saw-dust from old wood, or he is to ride an elephant or a horse, or to throw an arrow a fine

iron needle

be passed through the urinal canal. This is probably the earliest stage of what developed in later times as



charms for driving away evil when a man is possessed by them, spirits, ydtudhdnas and kimldins, 10 is a charm for dropsy (jalodara): a jugful of water con i. taining grass, etc. is to be sprinkled over the body of the patient, i. ii is a charm for securing easy delivery. I. 12 is a charm for all diseases arising from disturbance of vdta, pitta and slesman Headfat, honey and clarified butter or oil have to be drunk. disease (sirsakti) and cough (kdsa) are specially mentioned, i. 17

the vasti-kriyd 3


7 and


8 are

Bloomfield s The Atharva-Veda and Gopatha-Brdhmana, p. 57. Bloomfield says that dsrdva means atlsdra or diarrhoea (ibid. p. 59). The same physical applications for the same diseases are directed in A.V. n. 3. Asrdva denotes any disease which is associated with any kind of diseased ejection. Thus in II. 3. 2 Sayana says that dsrdva means atlsdrdtimutra-nddi-vranddayah. 3 Pra te bhinadmi mehanam vartram vesantyd iva evd te mUtram mucyatdm bahir bdl iti sarvakam (I open your urinal path like a canal through which the waters rush. So may the urine come out with a whizzing sound A.V. i. 3. 7). AH the verses of the hymn ask the urine to come out with a whizzing sound.




Practice of Medicine in the

women. In




for stopping blood

from an injury of the veins or

arteries or for stopping too

much hemorrhage


case of injuries a handful of street-dust is to be thrown on the 1 I. 22 place of injury or a bandage is to be tied with sticky mud is a charm heart-disease and jaundice hairs of a red cow against
are to be

drunk with water and a piece of a red cow s skin is to be tied as an amulet. It is prayed that the red colour of the sun and the red cow may come to the patient s body and the yellow

colour due to jaundice may go to birds of yellow colour. I. 23, which mentions kilasa or kustha (white leprosy) of the bone, flesh and skin and the disease by which hairs are turned grey (palita), 2 is a charm The white parts are to be rubbed with against these an ointment made of cow-dung, bhrnga-raja, haridra indravaruni and nilika until they appear red. The black medicines applied are asked to turn the white parts black. I. 25 is a charm against takman, or fever the patient has to be sprinkled with the water in which a red-hot iron axe has been immersed. The descrip tion shows that it was of the malarial type; it came with cold (sltd) and a burning sensation (sod). Three types of this fever are described: that which came the next day (anyedyuh), the second day (ubhayedyuh) or the third day (trtiyaka) 3 It was also
. ,

associated with yello\v, probably because it produced jaundice, n. 9 and 10 are charms against hereditary (ksetriya) diseases,
4 leprosy, dyspepsia, etc. Amulets ofarjuna wood, barley, sesamum and its flower had also to be tied when the charm was uttered 5

against various diseases due to worms. The priest, when uttering this charm, should hold street-dust in his left hand and press it with his right hand and throw it on the patient. There

n. 31




and invisible worms some of them are called algandu and others saluna\ they are generated in the intestines, head and
are visible

12 is also a charm for the same purpose. 135-137 is also a charm for strengthening the roots of the hair. Kakamdci with bhrnga-raja has to be drunk. Namah sltaya takmane namo ruraya socise krnomi yo anyedyur ubhayedyur abhyeti trtlyakdya namo astu takmane. See also A.V. vn. 123. 10, where the third-day fever, fourth-day fever and



irregular fevers are referred to.

The word ksetriya has been irregularly derived in Panini s rule, v. 2. 92 Commentaries like the Kdsika and the Pada(k$etriyac parak?etre cikitsyaK). manjarl suggest one of its meanings to be "curable in the body of another

(janmdntara-sarlre cikitsyah), that is, incurable. I, however, prefer the "hereditary," as given by Sayana in his commentary on A.V. II. 10. I, as being more fitting and reasonable. 5 Yakfman is also counted as a ksetriya disease (n. 10. 6).



Speculations in the Medical Schools


they go about through the body by diverse ways and cannot be killed even with various kinds of herbs. They sometimes reside
in the hills

and animals, and they enter into our system through sores in the body and through various kinds of food and drink 1 n. 33 is a charm for removing yaksman from all parts of the body. m. 7. i is a charm for removing all hereditary (ksetrlya) diseases the horn of a deer is to be used as an amulet, m. n is a charm against phthisis (raja-yaksmari)


in herbs



particularly when it is generated by too much sex-indulgence the 2 iv. 4 is a charm for attaining virilitypatient is to eat rotten fish

the roots of the kapittha tree boiled in milk are to be drunk when the charm is uttered, iv. 6 and 7 are charms against vegetable poisoning the essence of the krmuka tree is to be drunk, v. 4 is a

charm against fever (takmari) and phthisis the patient is to take the herb kustha with butter when the charm is uttered 3 v. n is a charm against fever 4 v. 23 is a charm against worms the patient 5 is given the vi. 15 is a charm juice of the twenty kinds of roots
; ,


for eye-diseases leaves fried in


the patient has to take various kinds of vegetable 6 vi. 20 is a oil, particularly the mustard plant


against bilious fever (susmino jvarasyd)


it is

said to


a great burning sensation, delirium and jaundice, vi. 21 is a charm for increasing the hair the hair is to be sprinkled with a decoction
vi. 23 is a charm against heart-disease, dropsy and jaundice, vi. 25 is a charm for inflammation of the glands of the neck (ganda-mala) 1 vi. 85 is a charm against consumption 8 vi. 105 for cough and (rajay-aksmari)\ vi. 90 for colic pain (Z/a)

of various herbs,





31. 5.



vn. 78

have adopted Sayana s interpretation. also a charm for inflammation of the neck (ganda-mala) and

phthisis (yaksma).

Kustha was believed to be good for the head and the eyes (v. 4. 10). Gandhara Mahavrsa, Munjavan, and particularly Balhika (Balkh), were regarded as the home of fever; so also the country of Ahga and Magadha. It was accompanied by cold (sita) and shivering (rurah). It was often attended with cough (kdsd) and consumption (valdsa). It attacked sometimes on the third or fourth day, in summer or in autumn (saradd), or continued all through the year. 5 This is one of the few cases where a large number of roots were com pounded together and used as medicine along with the charms.


Some of the other plants are alasdld, sildnjdld, nlldgalasdld. Also vn. 78, where apacit appears as a name for the inflammation of the neck (gala-gandd) Three different types of the disease are described. Apacit is at first harmless, but when it grows, it continues more to secrete its discharges,


on the joints. These boils grow on the neck, the back, the thigh-joint and the anus. See further vi. 83, where conch-shell is to be rubbed and applied, vin. 83 is also a charm for it. Blood had to be sucked off the inflamed parts by a leech or an iguana (grha-godhika)
like boils


A piece

of iron


to be tied as an amulet.

xii i]

Practice of Medicine in the



other such diseases due to phlegm (slesma)\ vi. 109 for diseases of the rheumatic type (vdta-vyddhi1 ). vi. 127 is a charm for abscess (vidradha), phlegmatic diseases (valasa) and erysipelatous inflam

mation (visarpa). Various kinds of visarpa in different parts of the body are referred to. Heart-disease and phthisis are also men
tioned 2

There are

(A.V. vin. 5. 7), diseases such as fever, head-disease, etc. Several diseases are men tioned in ix. 1 8 first the diseases of the head, sirsakti, sirsamaya,

hundred kinds of death (mrtyu) which are explained by Sayana as meaning
said to be a

karna-sula and visalpaka, by which secretions of bad smell come out from the ear and the mouth, then fever proceeding from head
troubles with shivering and cracking sensations in the limbs. Takman, the dreaded autumnal fever, is so described. Then comes

consumption then come valasa, kdhdbdha of the abdomen, diseases of kloma, the abdomen, navel and heart, diseases of the spine, the

ribs, the eyes, the intestines, the visalpa, vidradha,


(vdtikdra), alaji and diseases of the leg, knee, pelvis, veins and head. Boiling, in his article on diseases and medicine (Vedic) in the

Encyclopaedia ofReligion and Ethics, makes the following remark con To be noted however cerning the theory of the origin of diseases.


the fact that the

Hindu theory

of the constitution of the


of three elements, bile, phlegm and wind, does not appear in early Atharvan texts. Vdti-krta-nasanl of vi. 44. 3 cannot be urged as

means, not destructive of (diseases) pro duced by the wind in the body (vdti-krta-ndsanl) but destructive of that which has been made into wind. Evidently, from its asso ciation with diarrhoea, it refers to wind in the intestines." This does not seem to me to be correct. The phrase which Boiling quotes is indeed of doubtful meaning Sayana takes it as being composed of two words, vdtl (healer by aeration) and krta-ndsanl (destroyer of evil deeds which brought about the disease). But, however that may be, there are other passages on the subject, which Boiling seems to have missed. Thus in I. 12. 3 diseases are divided into three classes, viz. those produced by water, by wind, and those which are dry yo abhrajd vdtajd yas ca s usmah 3 The phlegm of the later medical writers was also considered watery, and the word
proof to the contrary, as



1 Pippali is also to be taken along with the utterance of the charm. It is regarded as the medicine for all attacked by the diseases of the wind (vdttkrtasya bhesajlrri). It is also said to cure madness (ksiptasya bhesajlrri). 2 Clpudru is a medicine for valasa. Clpudrur abhicaksanam (vi. 127. 2).



also vatlkdrasya (ix. 13. 20).


Speculations in the Medical Schools


abhraja probably suggests the, origin of the theory of phlegm, as being one of the upholders and destroyers of the body. The

word vataja means, very

plainly, diseases

produced by wind, and

the pitta, or bile, which in later medical literature is regarded as a form of fire, is very well described here as susma, or dry. Again in vi. 109 we have pippall as vdtl-krtasya bhesajlm. The context

shows that the diseases which are referred to as being curable by pippali are those which are considered as being produced by wind in later literature; for "madness" (ksiptd) is mentioned as a sus" to vatl-krta disease. The word susma comes from the root dry up, and in slightly modified forms is used to mean a "drying and In one place at least up," "burning," "strength,"


used to describe the extremely burning sensation of delirious bilious fever, which is said to be burning like fire 1 My own conclusion therefore is that at least some Atharvanic people had
it is

thought of a threefold classification of all diseases, viz. those pro duced by wind, those by water, and those by fire, or those which
are dry and burning. This corresponds to the later classification of all diseases as being due to the three dosas, wind (vayu\ phlegm

(kapha or slesmd) and bile (pitta). Apart from the ordinary diseases, many were the cases of possession by demons and evil spirits, of

which we have quite a

large number. Some of the prominent ones are Yatudhana, Kimidin, Pis aca, Pisact, Amiva, Dvayavin, Raksah,











Durnama, Sunama, Kuksila, Kusula, Kakubha, Srima, Araya, Karuma, Khalaja, Sakadhumaja, Urunda, Matmata, Kumbhamuska,
etc. 2

Sdyaka, Nagnaka, Tangalva, Pavinasa, Gandharva, Brahmagraha, Some of the diseases with their troublous symptoms were (poetically) personified, and diseases which often went to
gether were described as being related as brothers and sisters. Diseases due to worms were well known, in the case of both men


vi. 20. 4. For other references where the word susma occurs in more or modified forms see i. 12. 3, ill. 9. 3, iv. 4. 3, iv. 4. 4, v. 2. 4, v. 20. 2, vi. 65. I,

VI. 73- 2, IX.

tion of

passage contains a good descrip spirits which fought with evil ones and favoured men, such as Piriga, who preserved the babe at birth and chased the amorous Gandharvas as wind chases cloud, vm. 6. 19, 25 says that sometimes the higher gods are also found to bring diseases. Thus Takman was the son of Varuna (vi. 96. 2) and he produced dropsy (i. 10. 1-4, II. 10. I,


I. 10, 20, IX. 4. 22, etc. 28. 35, n. 9, n. 14, vm. 6.




of these beings.

There were some good


16. 7, etc.).

Parjanya (rain-god) produced diarrhoea, and Agni produced


headache and cough.


Practice of Medicine in the



There were also the diseases due to sorcery, which a very important part as an offensive measure in Vedic played India. Many of the diseases were also known to be hereditary
and of

From the names of the diseases mentioned above it be found that most of the diseases noted by Caraka existed will in the Vedic age. The view-point from which the Vedic people looked at diseases

seems to have always distinguished the different diseases from their symptoms. Thus the fever was that which produced shivering, cold, burning sensation, and the like, i.e. the diagnosis was mainly symptomatic. In addition to the charms and amulets, and the herbs which were to be internally taken, water was considered to possess great medical and life-giving properties. There are many 1 hymns which praise these qualities of water The medicinal pro of herbs were often regarded as being due to water, which perties formed their essence. Charms for snake poisons and herbs which were considered to be their antidotes were in use. Scanty references to diseases and their cures are found sparsely scattered in other Rg- Vedic texts and Brahmanas. But nothing in these 2 appears to indicate any advance on the Atharva-Veda in medical knowledge. Apart from these curatives there w ere also the already mentioned charms, amulets and medicines for securing long life and increasing virility, corresponding to the Rasayana and the Vaji-karana chapters of Caraka and other medical works. We


cannot leave this section without pointing to the fact that, though

most diseases and many remedies were known, nothing

in the


of nidana, or causes of diseases, is specified. The fact that there existed a threefold classification of diseases, viz. abhraja, vataja and susma, should not be interpreted to mean that the Vedic people

had any knowledge of the disturbance of these elements operating as nidanas as they were understood in later medical literature. The three important causes of diseases were evil deeds, the sorcery of enemies, and possession by evil spirits or the anger of certain gods.
is immortality and medicine in See also I. 5. 6, 33, n, 3, in. 7. 5, iv. 33, vi. 24. 92, vi. 24. 2, etc. For a brief survey of these Rg- Vedic and other texts see Boiling s article "Disease and Medicine (Vedic) in Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics.

apsu antar amrtam apsu bhesajam (There


4. 4).


Speculations in the Medical Schools


The Foetus and the

Subtle Body.

A human



five elements, ether, air, fire,

regarded by Caraka as a modification of the water and earth, and it is also the

seat of consciousness (cetand)

The semen

itself is


of the

four elements, air, fire, water and earth; ether is not a constituent of it, but becomes connected with it as soon as it issues forth,
since akasa or antariksa (ether) is all-pervading. The semen that is ejected and passes into the ovary is constituted of equal parts of
air, fire,



for akasa itself

water and earth; the ether becomes mixed with it in the is omnipresent and has no movement of

the semen is the product of six kinds of fluids (rasa). But the foetus cannot be produced simply by the union of the semen of the father and the blood (sonita) of the mother. Such a union can produce the foetus only when the atman with its subtle body, constituted of air, fire, water and earth, and manas (mind the organ involved in all perception and thought), be comes connected with it by means of its karma. The four

own 2

elements constituting the subtle body of the atman, being the general causes of all productions, do not contribute to the essential
3 The elements that contribute to bodily features of the child the general features are, (i) the mother s part the blood, (2) the father s part the semen, (3) the karma of each individual; the

by the assimilated food-juice of the mother need is determined by the karma traits are determined by the state of mind of the individual in its previous birth. Thus, if the previous state of life was that of a god, the mind of the child
part played

not be counted separately, as it of the individual. The mental


garbhas tu khalu antariksa vayv-agni-toya-bhumi-vikdras cetanddkithdnaiv. 4. 6.

bhutah. Caraka,

vdyv-agni-bhumy-ab-guna-pddavat tat $adbhyorasebhyahprabhdvas ca tasya. Caraka, iv. 2. 4. dkdsam tu yady-api sukre pdnca-bhautike sti tathdpi na puru$asarlrdn nirgatya garbhdsayam gacchati, kintu bhuta-catustayam eva kriydvad ydti dkdsam tu vydpakam eva tatrdgatena sukrena sambaddham bhavati. Cakrapani s Ayur-veda-dtpikd, iv. 2.4. Susruta however considers sukra (semen) as possessing the qualities of soma, and drtava (blood) as possessing the qualities of fire. He says, however, that particles of the other bhutas (earth, air and ether, as Dalhana enumerates them) are separately associated with them (saumyam sukram drtavam dgneyam itaresdm apy atra bhutdndm sdnnidhyam asty anund visesena parasparopakdrdt pardnugrahdt paraspardnupravesdc ca Susruta, in. 3. i), and they mutually co-operate together for the production of the foetus. 3 ydni tv dtmani suksmdni bhutdni dtivdhika-rfipdni tdni sarva-sddhdranatvena avisea-sddrsya-kdrandmti neha boddhavydni. Cakrapani s Ayur-veda-dtpikd, iv. 2. 23-27.

. iv. ill. Susruta 1 6) says that the very subtle eternal conscious principles are manifested (abhivyajyate) when the blood and semen are in union (parama-suksmas cetanavantah sasvata lohita-retasah sannipdtesv abhivyajyante). 3. viz. whereas. tathdpi yadaivdtivdhikam suksma-bhiita-rupa- sarlram prdpnutah. Caraka. etc. But later on (111. however. water and earth. karmdt-makatvdn na tu tasya drsydm divyam vind darsanam asti rupam. air. rajas. when it comes into connection with the combined semen and blood of the father and mother.&quot. 2.) called &quot. it. in explaining this. 1 When a man dies. composed of the four elements. . veloping foetus are agni. Susruta (l. 2. the term purusa is applied to the unity of five elements and the self (sarlri). 4 . the foetus begins to develop 2 . is This bhutatmd i. Anukam prdktandvyavahitd deha-jdtis tena yathanukam iv. 27.3. and then. sattva. panca-mahdbhuta-sarlri-samavdyah purusa ity ucyate. 2. tadaiva te sarlram janayatah.xin] will it The Foetus and the Subtle Body 303 be pure and vigorous. 2. is the heat-power which the fivefold functionings of digestion (pdcaka).36. Cakrapani. the faculty of vision itself in 1 manifests Tesdm vlsesdd balavanti ydni bhavanti mat d-pitr -karma-jdni tdni vyavasyet sadrsatva-lingam satvam yathanukam api vyavasyet. and this is the object of medical treatment. i. iti yo deva-sarlrdd avyavadhdnendgatya bhavati sa deva-satvo bhdvati. soma. in a subtle state and manas. brightening of the skin (bhrajaka). Medical treatment is of this karma-purusa and his body (sa esa karma-purusah cikitsddhikrtah Susruta. fire. yady api sukra-rajasl kdrane. 3 Caraka. bhutais caturbhih sahitah su-suksmair mano-javo deham upaiti dehdt 23-27. from the previous body of a dying being 3 . 4. Cakrapani. the five senses. The semen and blood can. ndnyadd. the subtle body together with the soul presiding over by Susruta karma-purusa. (In this science. in. tamas. and the bhutatmd all these contribute to the life of the foetus and are also called the pranas 4 (life) . if it was that of an animal. for there it is said that the soul comes into contact with the combined semen and blood along with its subtle elemental body (bhutdtmana) In another passage a somewhat different statement is found (SuSruta. together will be impure and dull . operate as causes of the production of the body only when they come into connection with the subtle body transferred (in. i 21) again says. iv. 16). tasmin kriyd so dhisthdnam.e. i. iv. with his subtle body. passes invisibly into a particular womb on account of its karma. Here it is said that the materials of the de . 3). his soul. says that the agni (fire) spoken of here Dalhana.4) tn ^ s statement is modified in such a way as to agree with Caraka s account.

The first passage seemed to indicate that life was manifested as a result of the union of semen and y blood with . except on the supposi tion that Susruta s work underwent three different revisions at three different times. as the latter is. in explaining this. 36. says that this doctrine of a subtle body (ativahika sarlra) is described in the agama. comes in touch with it the . iv. udana. sattva. . etc. . vayu represents that which operates as the fivefold life-functionings of prana. . 2. The reason for these three views in the three successive chapters cannot be satisfactorily explained. etc. chyle. says. samana. and of the sense of taste. such as chyle. These three powers are more or less of a hypothetical nature. The third passage introduces. such as mucus. absorbing within them a number of functionings and body-consti tuents. Indu.. in samkhya-darsana-rupad ativahika-sarirdt). His further explanations of the nature of applications of the jiva show that he looked up Patanjali s Yoja-sutras for the . blood. n. (alocaka). in addition to these. may suitably be compared with the Samkhya view. details of avidyd. Astdnga-samgraha. . which is a product of their combined evolution. 2. tainted. and the place of semenblood is taken up by the three root-powers of agni. and tamas. with the 1 afflictions (klesa) of attachment. Vagbhata the elder says that the moment semen and the blood are united. and the other klesas... is the root-power of all watery elements. its the second passage considered the connection of the soul subtle body (bhutatma) necessary for evolving the semen- blood into life.. Cakrapani him explaining Caraka-samhita. rajas. The five senses contribute to life by their cognitive functionings. etc.304 Speculations in the Medical Schools [CH. semen. Dalhana says further that sattva rajas and tamas refer to manas. coloration of the blood. the intellectual operations and the heat operations involved in the formation and work of the the soma different constituent elements (dhatu). and vyana. apdna. being moved by manas (mano-javend). and by agama the Samkhya dgama is to be understood (tena dgamdd eva self.mano-javena jivendbhisamsrstam prdpta-samyogam garbhdsayam suklam upaydti. . the life principle (jiva). etc. as referred to in the medical works. The doctrine of a subtle body. the five senses.bijdtmand garbha-kdrana-mahd-bhutasvabhdvena suksma-svarupaih manas -sahacdribhis tanmdtrdkhyair mahd-bhutair anugatam stri-ksetra-prdptyd karma-vasdd drtavena misrl bhutam anvaksam misribhdva-hlna-kdlam eva. and vayu.&quot. the mind-organ. The Samkhya-karika 39 speaks of a subtle body (suksma deha) and the body inherited from 1 gate pur cine rajasi nave vasthite iuddhe garbhasydsaye marge ca bljdtmand suklam avikrtam avikrtena vdyund preritam anyais ca mahd-bhutair anugatam drtavena abhimurchitam anvaksam eva rdgddi-klesa-vasdnuvartind sva-karmacoditena mano-javenajlvendbhisamsrstamgarbhdsayam upaydti. &quot.

The necessity of admitting a subtle body is said to lie in the fact that the buddhi. and the subtle body is this sup 1 In the Samkhya-pravacana-bhasya. it becomes itself associated with these. since the Yoga view can explain the situation without the hypothesis of any such body. V. which bears the impress of virtue. how can it connect itself with a subtle body at the time of death ? If this is to be done through another body. leave any body at . with the ment ahamkara and the senses. just as a little flame . Samkhya-tattva-kaumudt. smaller 3 Vacaspati. The citta is all-pervading. 3 mdtram ghata-prdsdda-pradlpa-kalpam sankoca-vikdsi cittam sanra-parimdndkdraity apare pratipanndh. If it is argued that the citta is connected with such a subtle a subtle body from beginningless time. so in the interval between one death and another birth the buddhi. and that yet it pervades the whole body. and other intellectual defects and accomplishments. 103. But. 103. 41. says that in the Samkhya view the citta is such that it cannot. . says (mind). 39. vice. On mahat. Vydsa-bhdsya on Patanjali s Yoga-sutras. simply by contraction and expansion. just as a cloth obtains fragrance through its connection with campak flowers of sweet odour. 40. ahamkara. Sdmkhya-pravacana-bhdya t 2 . require a supporting body. like the rays of a lamp in a jug or in a palace. death and occupy another body without intermediate relationship with a subtle body (ativahika-sarira). iv.xm] The Foetus and the Subtle Body 305 the parents. etc. in explaining the Yoga view as expounded by Vyasa. cannot exist without a supporting body. v. DII . then the reply is that such body has never been perceived by anyone (na khalu etad . and at each birth it receives a new body and at each death it leaves it. tathaiva lingayathd dipasya sarva-grha-vydpitve pi kalikd-kdratvam dehasya deha-vydpitve py angustha-parimdnatvam. 1 . if the citta cannot itself leave a body and occupy another. in rays that according to it the citta Samkhya view. 10. and hence it suffers successive rebirths. till the buddhi becomes dissociated from it by the attain of true discriminative knowledge. pervades refuting the 2 The Vyasa-bhasya. contracts and dilates according as the body that it occupies is bigger or a whole room by its . then we are led to a vicious infinite. it is said that this port subtle body is like a little tapering thing no bigger than a thumb. adhyaksa-gocaram) nor can it be regarded as indispensably neces sary through inference. The suksma continues to exist till salvation is attained. the eleven senses and the account of its association with the buddhi. and that through another. It is constituted of five tan-matras.

a subtle body (ativakikatvarn tasya na The Vaisesika also declines to believe in the existence of a subtle body. since the mind . Vizianagram Sanskrit series. the requires a body to disintegrated by the heat in the womb into the state of and atoms of new qualities. and it im body. Vacaspati says that purusa is not a physical thing and hence it cannot be drawn out of the body. there enters into it the mind (antahkarana). in which Yama draws out the purusa also denies the existence of a subtle The soul. Heat is the main agent responsible for all disintegration and re-combination foetus is involved in the process of the formation of the foetus. According to this view the subtle body and the mind have nothing to do with the formation and development of the foetus. through the unseen power (adrsta). 103. The development of the foetus is thus described by Sridhara in his Nyaya-ka ndali 2 After the union of the father s semen and the mother s blood there is set up in the atoms consti &quot. in. says that the thumb-like purusa referred to in Mahd-bhdrata. The Nyaya does not seem to have considered this as an portant question. Reference is made to Mahd-bharata. according to the 1 Vacaspati s Tattva-vaisaradi. . Thus there is no necessity of admitting mrsydmahe) 1 . 17. and the Mahabhdrata passage quoted above. Thus the manifestations of the all-pervading citta of a soul cease to appear in its dying body and become operative in a new body that is born. support it (na tu sukra-sonitavasthayam sarirasrayatvan manasah). conglomerate together to form a new body. food-juice. 10. 17. which Yama drew from the body of Satyavan. through the successive formation of . The Sdmkhya-pravacana-bhdsya. IV. is all-pervading. p. Small quantities of food-juice of the mother go to nourish it.&quot. : tuting them a change through the heat of the womb. has the size of the subtle body (linga-dehd) 2 Nydya-kandali. It must therefore be interpreted in a remote sense as referring to the cessation ity of manifestation of citta in the dying body (na cdsya niskarsah sambhavati. v. 296. dyads and triads.306 Speculations in the Medical Schools a separate citta. etc. which could not have entered in the semen-blood stage. in. the body of the foetus develops and. aupacdriko vydkhyeyas tathd ca cites cittasya ca tatra tatra vrtty-abhdva eva niskarsdrthah). and assigns to it no place in the development of the foetus. 33. angustha-matram purusam niscakarsa yamo baldt. such that their old colour. together with those of the atoms. [CH. and each soul is associated with itself Each citta connects with a particular body by virtue of the fact that its manifes tations (vrtti) are seen in that body. . when such a body is formed. 1895. 296. become destroyed and new similar qualities are produced and in this way. form. Nyaya. Then.

. In the Vaisesika also the all-pervading dtman comes into touch with the foetus through the manas\ but the difference is this. that here the manas is an operative factor causing the development of the foetus. 469). if at the time of the union of the semen and blood the soul comes in touch and a woman with it is 1 5 through the mind. effect of the iv. nor by time. The foetus is thus produced of itself. nor by god.xin] The Foetus and the Subtle Body 307 of the size of a thumb. to be explained 1 In rebirth it is only the all-pervading soul which becomes away . connected with a particular body (ya eva dehantara-samgamo sya. tarn eva taj-jndh-para-lokam dhuh) 2 . . . has. The view that the foetus is the result of the joint six dhdtus reminds us of a similar expression in Caraka. Ibid. 560-61. vdydt kdyasyotpattir bhavati). p. That which consolidates (samslesa) the body is called earth (prthivi-dhatu)\ which digests the food and drink of the body is called fire that which produces inhalation and exhalation is called air (vdyu-dhdtu) that which produces the pores of the body is called ether (antah-sausiryam) (dkasa-dhatu) that by which that (tejo-dhatu) . 3 4 6 Mddhyamika-vrtti (Bibliotheca Buddhica). ovary and blood. \ knowledge produced combination of them all of is is called the vijndna. which operate together when they are in . pp. of the six constituents (sanndm dhdtundm samavdydt). p. p. 3 . nor by one cause. combination with the sixth dhdtu. . Ibid. Caraka gives there a summary of the discussions amongst various sages on the subject of the causes of the formation and development of the foetus where there is a union between a man with effective semen : with no defect of organ. nor by both itself and another. but by the combination of the mother s and the father s parts at the 4 proper season The combination of father s and mother s parts gives us the five dhdtus. 473. nor by nature. 567. whereas there the manas goes to the foetus when through the influence of body-heat it has already de veloped into a body. . the vijndna. not by another. nor by no cause. according to Nyaya. It is by the that a body is produced (sarvesdm satna- The seed of vijndna produces the name and form (ndma-rupdnkura) by combination with germ many other diverse causes. Candrakirti gives us an account of the Buddhist view from the Sdlt-stamba-sutra 3 The foetus is produced by the combination . tasmdn na hrt-pundanke ydvad-avasthdnam dtmanah ata eva angusthaiti mdtram purusarn niscakarsa baldd yama avagantavyam (Jayanta 2 Vydsa-vacanam evam-param s Nydya-manjarl. then the foetus begins to develop When taken care of by proper nourishment etc then at the right time it .dhdtu.

Ibid. is not true that the sattva issuing forth from one body itself remembered the events with another. So none of the above is causes can be regarded as valid. if the foetus is the product of a number of combined causes. did it produce itself after being born or without being born ? In both cases it is ^impossible for it to . for. asks what. for. the proper hygienic care of the parents bodies (sdtmya) and the food-juice. places and with defective powers. it connects to food-juice. in opposing the above statement of Atreya. 3. 20. 3. 3 n. neti bhagavdn Atreyah sarvebhya ebhyo bhdvebhyah samuditebhyo garbho Ibid. Moreover. Bharadvaja. iv. in spite of the union of the parents. 3. Again. 1 Caraka-samhitd. it often happens that they remain childless. if it were so. where it is said that just as a medical again repeated room (kutdgdram vartuldkdram grhamjaintdka-sveda-pratipdditam Cakrapani) is made up of various kinds of things. and not by any one of them separately This idea is in iv. bhinirvartate. for there are many who have these. or just as a chariot is made up of a collection of its various parts. which is an intermediate vehicle serving to connect the soul with a former body when it leaves and the one (aupapdduka) 1 Bharadvaja said that none of these causes can be considered as valid. . but have no children. 3. is 2 produced. and the whole development is [CH. To this Atreya replied that it by the combined effect of all the above elements that a child . if would not have cared itself. 20. and there is also operant with these the sattva or manas. if it did. to the due com bined effect of all the bhdvdndm). then all people would have got children. the self had the power of producing to take birth in undesirable as sometimes happens. we should all have of our past life.308 the child is Speculations in the Medical Schools born. The elements mentioned above (samudaydd esdm foetus is born of elements from the mother father. for. iv. and there are many who have not these. the self cannot pro duce the self. so is the foetus made up of the combination of various entities which con tribute to the formation of the embryo and its development (ndndvidhdndm garbha-kdrdndm bhdvdndm samudaydd abhinirvartate) z The idea of such a combined effect of causes as leading to the production of a perfect whole seems to have a peculiar Buddhistic ring about it. but have children. produce it itself. If it was due Again. 3._ 2 iv. the self. proper hygienic habits cannot be regarded as the cause.

sweat and vegetables. again. those . 23. then it cannot know anything when it has no senses. etc. so. when the disease or defect of the father so deep-rooted as to have affected (upatdpd) the germ part of any particular organ in the seed. unless it be so Each of our limbs semen. and of a madman mad? Moreover. unaffected. then it has to be admitted that the soul can have knowledge only when there are senses and is devoid of it when there are no senses is . it cannot be the cause of the body-movements or of any of its other activities and consequently cannot be called the soul. but. elements assemble in a particular body. To this Atreya replies that there are four kinds of beings. assume depend upon the form of the body where they assemble. by the organ of taste the different tastes. If the soul perceives the jnatvam ajnatvam ca sa-vikaras catma) of sense through the activity of the senses. 21. IV. 2 Ibid.but liable to change (yatra caitad ubhayam sambhavati 1 . by the ear sounds. for Caraka-samhitd. and for that reason the child does not inherit the qualities of the father. 22.xm] is The Foetus and the Subtle Body 309 the definite order in which they co-operate together to produce the various parts (katham ay am sandhlyate)} Again. when it is unconscious. and feels by the skin the different sensations of touch. if it is argued that the self perceives by the eye colours. silver. iv. 3. 3. atman. why is not the son of a stupid person stupid. etc. assume the form of any mould in which they are poured. and. It is therefore simple nonsense to say that the soul perceives colours. born from ovaries. how is it that a child born of a woman is a human child and not that of any other animal? If. . by the smell odours. if the defect or is so superficial that his semen remains then the disease or defect is not inherited by the son. he alone is disease of the father responsible for the goodness or badness of his sense-organs 1 . The child does not owe sense-organs to his parents. man is born out of man. bad or chronic as and organs had to have affected his their germs in the semen is of the father. lead. of a blind man blind. and. eggs. Just as gold. then the child produced out of the semen is born defective in that limb. by its senses. copper. the foetus takes that par But a man is not infected with the defect or disease of his father. such as per objects ceiving and the like. in that case the soul is not un- changeable. when the foetus-producing ticular form. Beings in each class exist in an innumerable diversity of forms 2 The forms that the foetus-producing elements (garbha-kard bhdvdh) viz.

by our dream-knowledge when the senses lie inoperative Atreya further says that. 31. this knowledge which the self always . in commenting on this. The presence due to his own destiny or the fruits karma (daiva). we cannot have any know ledge of the external world. iv. The self (atman) is conscious only The self is never without the sattva it or the mind-organ. these are born from his of own self is or absence of the sense-organs is (atma-janindriyani). 3 The word kdrya-jndnam in Caraka-samhitd. Here the soul is the knower by virtue of its constant association with manas. iv. says that our knowledge of the external world is due to the operation of the sense-organs in association with the mind-organ. Ibid. is well illustrated 4 . 3. iv. one can have knowledge even without the activity of the senses 5 The self is things . The knowledge that the self has when it has no sense-organs operating in association with the mind has no object (nirvisaya) in other words. 2 has is 4 formless. 27. seems to be somewhat new. But in the Nyaya-Vaisesika view the soul is not always in contact with manas and is not always conscious. 3. intelligence and bliss. is also re pletely strained of all in the self. or mind-organ. nor the unity of being. but the internal organ of mind is always associated with the self: so the knowledge which is due to this mind-organ is ever present in the self (yat tu kevala-mano-janyam dtma-jndnam. 6 . are required can be performed unless these are present. It seems that both sattva and manas are used to denote the mind-organ. 25. For the self is neither pure intelligence. like that of the Vedanta. If these sense-organs do not exist. In this. 3. tasmdj jna-svabhdva eva nirindriyo py atmd (Cakrapani s Caraka-tdtparya-tikd. we are nearer to the Nyaya-Vaisesika view. 3. na hy-asattvah kaddcid atmd sattva-visesdc copalabhyate jndna-visesah. and through there is always some kind of consciousness in the self 2 . This view of Caraka. definite law that the sons of idiots or idiots or men with defective senses should necessarily be born be otherwise defective 1 when the sense-organs exist. has been explained by Cakrapani as kdrya-pravrtti-janaka-bdhya-visaya-jndnam. 28-29). 1 The manas in that view is atomic. tad bhavaty eva sarvada).310 Speculations in the Medical Schools [CH. when the senses are com restrained and the manas. as interpreted by Cakrapani. 3. The self. as the agent. however. like the thus of itself purusa of the Samkhya-yoga. and concentrated the knower and the agent. iv. The view that the Caraka-samhitd. Ibid. cannot without the sense-organs have any knowledge of the external world leading to practical work no practical action for which several accessories . Cakrapani. a potter who knows how to make a jug cannot succeed in making it unless he has the organs with which to make it 3 The fact that the self has consciousness even when the senses do not operate . vindplndriyaih samddhi-baldd eva yasmdt sarvajno bhavati. iv. So there no . 26.

in.xin] The Foetus and the Subtle Body 311 soul has always a formless consciousness has undoubtedly a Vedantic or Samkhyaic tinge. 1 Those who perform good deeds go to the prana. On the subject of the existence of subtle bodies we have already quoted the views of different Indian schools of philosophy for the purpose of suggesting comparisons or contrasts with the views of Caraka. when they exhaust their good deeds . but the other details evidently separate this view from the accepted interpretations of these schools. The theory of the soul. 2 m. In the kingdom of the moon they had watery bodies (candra-mandale yad their am-mayam available in that sariram upabhogartham arabdham) for the enjoyment kingdom and. however. with which are also associated the five vayus. and again discharged as semen into the wombs of their wives and are reborn again. and even body of plants. they neither enjoy must be made between the condition of those who are endowed with plant-bodies as a punish ment for their misdeeds and those who pass through the plantbodies merely as stations on their way to rebirth. smoke and cloud and then are showered on the ground with air. 1-7. i. . as interpreted by Sankara. go to the kingdom of the moon and afterwards practically exhaust the whole of their fund of virtue and consequently cannot stay there any longer. and those who commit sins suffer in the 2 kingdom of Yama and then are again born in this world Those who. when they are absorbed into the A difference in the case of the latter there 1 is neither enjoyment nor sorrow. apana. they get a body which is like akasa and are thus driven by the air and come into association with smoke and cloud. through enjoyment and can no longer hold that body. i. At this stage. region of the moon. In the case of the former the plant life is a life of enjoyment and sorrow. of 3ankara on the Brahma-sutra. According to the Vedanta. as a reward of their good deeds. the rains and absorbed by the plants and again taken into the systems of persons who eat them. as here indicated comes as a digression and will have to be discussed more adequately later on. 13. The Bhasya Ibid. begin . downward journey to this earth. whereas pleasure nor suffer pain. They pass through dkasa. Before concluding this section reference must be made to the Vedanta views with regard to the nature of subtle bodies. the subtle body is constituted of five particles of the elements of matter (bhuta-suksmaih). etc.

from the marrow the the second night after the union of semen and blood the foetus is of the form of a round lump called kalala. and earth (and not any other order) at the time of its entrance into the womb 2 . salt (lavand). in four months the abdomen. there is a descrip tion of foetal development. in three months the feet. twins are produced. from mdmsa comes fat (medas). 4. By an excess of semen over blood a male child is produced. acid (amid). sweet (madhurd). in the fifth month the spine appears.312 Speculations in the Medical Schools [CH. that which is hot (usna) is heat-light (tejah). Even when the plant-bodies are chewed and powdered the souls residing in them as stations of passage do not suffer pain. hrdayangamdsti. nose. the different elements of matter in conjunction with the subtle body are associated with the self. In the ninth month. that which is vacuous is dkdsa. in the sixth month the mouth. the issue becomes either blind or lame or dwarf. water. and it is flesh (mdmsa). bitter (tiktd). when the two are equal a hermaphrodite is produced. Its main points of interest may thus be summarized the hard parts of the body are earth. Cakrapani. Bhdsya of 3ankara. for they are only in contact with these plant-bodies (candra-mandalaskhalitdnam vrlhy adi-samslesa-matram tad-bhavah) 1 We thus see that it is only the Samkhya and the Vedanta that . while according to the Samkhya it is the tan-matras which constitute the subtle body. agree to the existence of a subtle body and are thus in accord with the view of Caraka. when the foetus is well developed sndyu bones (asthi). after a fortnight it assumes the form of a spheroid. Caraka-samhitd. The body is further said to depend on six tastes (fad-dsraya). If the minds of the parents are disturbed (vydkulita-mdnasaK). says that there is no special reason why the order of acceptance of gross elements should be from subtler to grosser it has to be admitted only on the evidence of the scriptures ayam ca bhuta-grahana-krama dgama-siddha eva ndtra yuktis tathd-vidhd 2 . blood (sonita) and From the six kinds of rasa comes the sonita. at the eighth night it is of the form of a vesicle called budbuda. heels and the pelvic portions appear. When air somehow enters and divides the semen into two. from it the tendons (sndyu). 8. in two months the head appears. the date of which is unknown. they have the appearance of a little lump of mucus (kheta-bhutd) with all its When limbs undifferentiated and undeveloped 1 to such an extent that they may as well be said in. from the bones the marrow (majja). semen (sukrd). commenting on this. 3 In the Garbha Upanisad. . Foetal Development 3 . light. by the excess of blood a female child is produced. pinda. But Caraka is more in agreement with the Vedanta in the sense that. the liquid parts are water. in the eighth month it becomes fully developed. i. iv. also ill. 22-27. By . hot (katu) and pungent : made up of seven dhdtus of chyle (rasa). that which moves about is vdyu. i. 25. associated successively with akasa in y air. eyes and ears develop in the seventh month the foetus becomes endowed with life (jivena samyukto bhavati). from sonita comes mdmsa. from the (kasdyd). The soul in one atomic moment becomes heat. it is the fine particles of the gross elements of matter that constitute the subtle bodies in the case both of the Vedanta and of Caraka.

and resolves that. i. Foetal Development exist. on account of its previous karma.ndrigebhyah sukram utpadyate kintu sukra-rupatayaiva vyajyate. in. commenting on this. According to Susruta the ejected semen enters into the female organ (yonim abhiprapadyate) and comes into (garbhasaya) after 5 association therewith the menstrual product At that very moment. iv. the vital spots (marman) as being 107. sukha-laksana-vydydmajosma-villnam vidrutam anildc cyutam&quot. the female organ here means the uterus. thinks that the cause of discharge of semen is joy (harsa)*.e. 7. the tissues (sndyu) as 109. the joints as 180. and the joy which causes the discharge and the entrance of the semen into the uterus 4 Thus he says that. form after a particular operation (Susruta. iv. it bad deeds and repents bones as being four. the sirds. in. by the jnanagni one performs good and bad deeds. but it exists as it is and is only mani says. the semen constituent or the seed. &quot. as 700. 1915. being ejected by the it is . the place of the fested in a visible 6 foetus. This Upanisad counts the cranial with all its organs. generated rouses the vayu. Dalhana. As Dalhana interprets this. darsandgni and jnanagni. thus Dalhana says. in.&quot. 3. 3 13 Susruta remarks that the two main con are respectively made up of the watery element of the moon (saumyd) and the fiery element also associated (agneya) the other elements in atomic particles are semen and blood.xm] not to exist as to stituents of the body. and these mutually help one another and co-operate 1 Susruta further goes on together for the formation of the body to say that at the union of female and male the heat (tejah) all .yones tritlydvartdvasthita-garbhasayydm pratipadyate. remembers its previous birth and knows its good and that. thus becomes associated with the material characteristics of sattva. 4). . i. The uterus is probably considered here as the third chamber. A body is called sarira. by the darsandgni forms and colours are perceived. 4. Nirnaya-Sagara edition. be comes combined with the menstrual product (drtava) in the uterus it has entrance thereinto through the proper channel (ucitena patha). the semen is not pro duced from the different parts of the body. says that &quot. viz. 3. with them. the preceding two being probably the vulva and the vagina. But as soon as the child is born it comes into connection with Vaisnava vdyu and forgets all its previous births and resolutions. 4. . and Susruta-samhitd. 4 Cakrapani.&quot. the semen enters into the third chamber of the female organ. or veins. and through the coming together of heat and air the semen is discharged 2 Caraka. The kosthdgni digests all kinds of food and drink.e. 3. but remains in all parts of the body. it will follow the Samkhya-yoga discipline. produced from the body. 3. self as joy (harsa-bhutenatmanodiritas cadhisthitas ca). it is suffering the pains of the life of a foetus. Ibid. the the bones as 300. the soul with its subtle body comes into association with it and . 1 2 marrow places as 500. the kosthdgni. if it can once come out. however. &quot. 3 Caraka-samhitd. commenting on Caraka-samhitd. 4. because three fires reside in it (sr ay ante). The semen is not . 7. having come out of the man s body.

1 . the material constituents of the body having undergone a chemical change (abhiprapacyamdnd) due to the action of cold. 1 Sattva-karano guna-grahandya pravartate Caraka-samhita. iv. . it is elliptical (peti). In the fourth definite month the differentiation . yet the view adopted here ignores the difference between qualities and substances. ibid. . demonic (asura). If it is the foetus of a male child. The word guna is used in all these passages in the sense of material entity or bhuta. the foetus has a jelly-like form (kalala) in the second month. referring to the question of the association of the soul with the material elements. it is spherical (pinda) if it is of a female child. Though guna means a quality and gunin a substance. says that the self (atmari) is inactive activity is however attributed to the soul on account of the operative mind-organ which is asso ciated with it. phrodite. This.314 Speculations in the Medical Schools [CH. is described here only as an organ of the 2 month. much more fests a desire for the objects of the senses. and other rajas and tamas. inactivity of the soul. Caraka. 3 On the meanings of the words pest and arbuda there is a difference of opinion between Dalhana and Gayl. 2 Dalhana explains kalala as singhdna-prakhyam. seems to be a compromise on the karana) . and godly (deva). . In the third month five special eminences are seen. characteristics. which holds the soul to be absolutely inactive but the text of the Caraka-samhita does not here say anything on the . if it is of a herma In the first . however. 8. and guna. Thus Gayi says that pest means quadrangular (catur-asra) and arbuda means the form of the bud of a silk cotton tree (sdlmalimukuldkdrairi) .). Cakrapani rightly points out that guna here means material elements which possess qualities gunavanti bhiitdni. since the heart is the special seat of consciousness so from the fourth month the foetus mani of the limbs is . for Caraka describes the soul as active (pravartate) as agent (kartf) and as universal performer (visva- karmari). and well manifested and owing to the manifestation of the heart of the foetus the entity of con sciousness becomes also manifested. and the sattva soul (sattva-karana). in the sixth intelligence begins to develop in the seventh the division and differentiation of . it is like the half of a solid sphere (arbudaf. heat and air (sltosmanilaih) the foetus becomes hard (ghana). the ordinary word for quality. in commenting on the above passage. as also the slight differentiation of limbs. In the fifth month the consciousness becomes more awakened. says that this is due to the operation of the soul acting through the mind-organ (sattva- Cakrapani. stands here for substance (gurja-guninor abhedopacdrdt Cakrapani. part of Cakrapani with the views of the traditional Samkhya philosophy. 4.

so the human body is also made up of five elements 3 . kloma. in. and the upperandthe its lower rectum from the mother. heart. In ibid. 14. ness power of movement the disposition of the constituent elements (dhatu-vyuhand) and bodily efforts. mdtur ojo garbham gacchatlti yad ucyate. 4. subtleness of structure (sauksmya) and porosity (virekd) from vayu (air) are formed the sensation of touch. in the fifth it gets more flesh and blood. the organ of touch. liver. cold. fat. in the third . smell. tad-garbhauja eva mdtr-sambaddham son mdtroja iti vyapadisyate. elements from which they have grown 2 As the whole world is made up of five elements (bhuta). in the sixth there is greater develop ment of strength and colour. In the fourth month the foetus becomes hard. the vital element (eyas) still remains unsettled. 12. but. in the eighth. Caraka-samhitd. the vital fluid passes from the mother to the foetus. beard. and so. it returns to the mother Cakrapani. kidneys. foetus being not yet perfectly developed. nails. veins and semen from the father. and hair. 2 it is said that the foetus gets its skin. 3. Caraka. The parts of the body which are thus formed from different material elements grow and develop with the accession of those . navel. 13). in describing the part played by different material elements in the formation of the body. spleen. 4. teeth. steadiness and hard ness. organ of smell. and in the eighth month there is a constant exchange of vital power (ojas) between the mother and the foetus. stomach. 24. flesh. heaviness. vision. . due to the accretion of material elements. rough . lightness (laghava). Cakrapani. however this may be. the larger intestines. . 4. blood. Caraka maintains that the senses and all other limbs of the body which grow7 before birth make their 4 appearance simultaneously in the third month When. iv. month. it is certain that the development of all these organs is really due to the assimilation of the five elements of matter. . says that from the element akasa are formed sound. iv. smoothness and watery characteristics.xm] Foetal Development 315 limbs become complete. 3. 4. etc. the sensation of taste and the taste-organ.. evani ayam loka-sammitah purusah ydvanto hi loke bhdva-viseds tdvantah purnse. since the latter cannot retain 5 it. So the development of the human foetus is. from fire. commenting on this. . from water. there grow in the heart feelings and desires. heat. the organ of hearing. The says that such an exchange 1 is only possible because the foetus Susruta-samhita. digestion. it becomes short-lived 1 . from earth. vision. softness. the organ of . but. bladder. if a child is born at this time. bones. the sense-organs grow. ydvantah puruse tdvanto loke (Caraka-samhitd iv. colon. 3 . iv. IV. 4 5 Ibid. 30. in the seventh it becomes complete with all its limbs. like the develop ment of all other things in the world.

Thus. 6. she could not live. . because the whole body grows from there. according to Marici (as reported by Caraka) it is not possible to say which part of the body develops first. in. because according to Krtavirya (as reported in Susruta) this is the seat of consciousness (cetana) and of buddhi and manas . mother. because it is the seat of the senses according to Kankayana. and the foetus. the physician of Balhlka. 3. appears first. and according to Parasara (as reported in Susruta). though on account of their fineness and more or less undifferentiated character such develop ment may not be properly noticed. as with the parts of a growing bamboo-shoot or a mango fruit(garbhasyasuksmatvan nopalabhyante vamsankuravat ciita-phalavac ca) 1 Just as the juicy parts and the stone. undeveloped. 21. serves also as the mother s vital power (ojas) for other wise. 32 and Caraka-samhita. since this is the place where food is stored. According to Bhadra Saunaka (as re ported by Caraka) the smaller intestine and the larger intestine since this is the seat of air (marutadhiBadisa (as reported by Caraka) the hands sthdnatvdt) according to and feet come out first. Two different schools of quarrelling authorities are referred to by Caraka There and Susruta. being associated with the . because these are the principal organs. navel comes according to Bhadrakapya (as reported by Caraka) the first. if the ojas went out altogether from the mother. . because it cannot be seen by anyone (paroksatvdd acintyani) according to Subhuti Gautama (as reported by Susruta) the middle part of the . they are the main roots of all efforts (tan-miilatvdc cestdydh) ac cording to Vaideha Janaka (as reported by Caraka) the senses appear first. for they are the seats of understanding (buddhy-adhis. according to Kumarasiras and Saunaka the head appears first. because (pakvdsayd) appear . since the development of other parts of the body is dependent on it (tan-nibaddhatvdt sarva-gdtrasambhavasyd) according to Dhanvantari (as reported by both Caraka and Susruta) all the parts of the body begin to develop together (yugapat sarvangdbhinirvrtti). are all found clearly developed and differentiated when it . and according to Markandeya (as reported by Susruta). is a good deal of divergence of opinion as regards the order of the appearance of the different limbs of the foetus. first. and Krtavirya the heart . iv. which are undifferentiated in a green mango at its early stages. thdna). 1 Susruta-samhitd.316 is still Speculations in the Medical Schools [CH. body (madhya-sarira) appears first.

. and the fat of pure flesh only is called vapd. which exists in the the purlsa-dhard.the third. v). is . however. Foetal Development so. called the medo-dhard. Sdrtra. mdmsa-dhard. semen (sukra) (kapha). flesh A (mdmsa). rohinl. such as chyle (rasa). is found the first . seven different layers of skin (kala] are successively produced like the creamy layers (santanika) formed in milk The first layer. the sixth and the seventh are the pitta-dhard and the sukra-dhard. of the flesh are found. is called avabhasinl\ the second. 2 The fat inside the smaller bones is called medas. bile (pitta) and excreta (purlsa) have also to be counted as dhdtus. though on account of their fineness of structure when the all its and growth they cannot then be distinguished. which exists in the intestine (pakvdsayd) and separates the excreta. The the fourth kala fifth is the slesma-dhard. blood (rakta). their existence is inferred from the places allotted to them. one-eighth. or fat. sveta\ the fourth. This is said to hold good only paddy in those places of the body which are fleshy. dhdtu (from the root dhd. Susruta says that. lohita. called tdmrd\ the fifth. one-eighteenth of a paddy seed (dhdnyd) in thickness. one-twelfth of a paddy seed. to hold) is that which supports or sustains the body. the veins. . the rakta-dhard. known as the mdmsa-dhard. or marrow. the seventh. of the size of a seed. Referring to the early process of the growth of the foetus. there is also found in the abdomen and is between the smaller bones 2 joints . the sixth. These kalds. 3 17 human foetus is even in the early stages of undifferentiated parts are already developing development. there pari passu. one-sixteenth of a paddy seed. and the kalds are supposed to divide the layer of one dhdtu from another and are covered with lymph and tissues (sndyu) 1 In . or roughly one inch. fat (medas). Sus*ruta thinks that the liver 1 and spleen are produced from The kala is *vati$thate defined by Vrddha-Vagbhata as yas tu dhdtv dsaydntaresu kledo yathdsvam upmabhir vipakvah sndyu~sle$ma-jardyu-cchannah kdstha iva sdro dhdtu-sdra-se?ol patvdt kald-samjnah (Astdnga-samgraha. Apart from these seven kolas of skin there are also seven kalds between the different dhdtus. marrow and the last vital fluid (ojas). tissues. of the size of two paddy seeds. whereas that inside the larger ones is called majjd. in the second. . one-fifth. blood inside the flesh the fat which is in the third. fact that the different dhdtus must have separate the kala. etc. vedini. Lymph (majja). as the semen and blood undergo chemical changes through heat. All these seven layers of skin come to about six paddy seeds.xin] is ripe. bone (asthi). are not visible.

and on the right side the liver and the kloma (right lung?). starting from here. which is the centre of the dhamanis through which flows the current of life (prdna-vahd). blood. defect of any particular limb at birth is due to some defect in that part of one or more of the operating causes through the influence of which that particular limb was A produced. in the potential form. The changes of pleasure unchanged and pain or such other characteristics as are considered to be due already inherent in them. 4. and unduka (a gland in the colon?) from the dirt of blood (sonita-kitta-prabhava}. pupphusa (lungs) from the froth of blood. HI. Garaka-samhitd. the heart remains contracted. Susruta-samhita. of organs The cause of foetal development is not a question or limbs which were absolutely non-existent: they already existed. nir-vikarah paras tv dtmd sarva-bhutandm nirvisesa-sattva-sarirayos tu visedd vise$opalabdhih. or to the body 2 Cakrapani. 4. to the soul are really due either to sattva or manas. The air. blood and flesh. . The joint causes did not produce something absolutely new. 57. as the essence of lymph. 2 1 . At the bile. The foetus grows through the chyle of the mother and 1 through the inflation of the body of the foetus by air of the body is the heating centre (jyotih-sthdnd) and the . from the essential part of flesh. best parts (prasada) of blood and lymph are acted upon by and vdyu works in association therewith by this process the entrails. lymph and fat the testicles. From the essential part of blood and fat the kidneys (vrkka) are produced.318 Speculations in the Medical Schools [CH. It must be borne in mind that a foetus is the product of several causes operating jointly. Underneath the heart on the left side there are the spleen and the pupphusa. 34. . being associated with heat. The time of sleep. but their joint operation helped to actualize all that was Of all the joint causes the self remains in all changes of the body. enters the flesh and changes the currents. iv. blood. rectum and bladder are produced. continues to inflate the body. says that the fact that a soul may . and this is particularly the place of consciousness. and by the oily part of fat the vdyu produces the veins (sir a) and tissues (sndyu). the tongue is produced. and from the essence of blood and lymph the heart. The navel air. commenting on this. in the causes operating jointly. and. when the heating process goes on in the abdomen. the muscles (pesi) are differentiated. when it is covered with slesman having a super also abundance of tamas.

iv. It has to be noted that. Caraka. 4. or morbid elements. one or more dhatus may be in excess or deficient either in partial ten dencies or in entirety (akdrtsnyena prakrtyd ca). due to the excessive preponderance of rajas or tamas. Cakrapani s comment on Caraka-samhitd. These. which in themselves which are but the characteristics of mind (sattva-rajas-tamah-prabalatasattva&amp. and it works properly so long as these elements are in 2 proper proportions (sama-yoga-vdhin) in the body The modifica . since the normal measure or prdkrta-mana of dhatus is said to be that which exists when there is no trouble or affection. or elements. iv. pitta and slesman. as Cakrapani explains. That amount of excess or deficiency which does not produce trouble or affection of the body is called the normal measure of the dhatus (prdkrta-mdna) 9 It is indeed obvious that such a definition of prdkrta-mana and dhdtu-vaisamya involves a vicious circle. 6. and by that of the second body two the mind becomes affected. Caraka-samhita. however. are in reality due to virtue and vice. are counted both as constituents (dhatus) and as dosas. l rupa-vikdraja-manojanya-dharmddharma-janydny eva) There are three kinds of morbid elements (dosa) of the body. vdta. explains sama as meaning ucita-pramana (proper quantity). 4. viz.gt. Cakrapani s commentary. When one or more of the dhatus fall off or exceed the proper quantity (dhdtu-vaisamya). will be dealt with more fully later on. Cakrapani. and two morbid elements which affect . 6. Dhdtus are those elements which uphold the body. The tions of the five elements which co-operate together to uphold the body are called dhatus. and tamas. pitta and kapha. vdyu. 4. the mind (sattva). rajas first three the Growth and Disease. 2 1 . 3 etad eva dhdtundm prdkrta-mdnam yad avikdra-kdri. viz. By the disorder of the becomes diseased. in commenting on the word sama-yogavdhin. and dhdtu-vaisamya is that which exists when there is trouble . three elements. not every kind of excess or deficiency of dhatus produces dhdtu-vaisamya. iv. or disturbance of the equilibrium of the dhatus it is only when such deficiency : or excess produces affections of the body that it is called dhdtu-vaisamya. The body is the con glomeration (samudaya) of the modification of five bhutas.xin] take its Growth and Disease 319 liable to is birth as this or that animal does not imply that the soul is change (paramdtma-vikdrd na bhavanti) for such a change .

Caraka-samhitd. hear. Slight variations of the entitle us to call them instances of dhatu-vaisamya unless there is vikara or symptoms of it externally expressed. the climatic charac teristics of heat and cold. the pitta existing in its own proper measure body and there is is somehow carried by vayu to a part consequently a local excess. 1 Not to see. Diseases are caused through the excessive. I. the touching of too much cold or heat or too much bathing or massage are examples of atiyoga. dhdtu-samya its 2 (dhdtu-sdmya-kriyd coktd tantrasydsya prayojanam) man wishes to keep his health at If a normally healthy normal he has to take things of different tastes. and the prakrta-mana of dhatus is the same as health. wrongful administration of sense. and a course of behaviour. I. 44. 53. much eating. The sole aim of Ayur-veda is to advise diet. if healthy person may who has lost the equilibrium of his dhatus of Ayur-veda is they are properly followed. as when. medicines. and the misuse of intelligence 3 Thus . and level. when . and things having a different composition decrease it (sdmdnyam ekatva-karam health of a is visesas tu prthaktva-krt) 1 The normal but another name for his dhdtu-samya a man said to be unhealthy. there cannot be any vaisamya. i. i. or to be in a state of dhatu-vaisamya. symptoms due proportion of dhatu do not of disease (vikara) are seen. 52. deficient. Ibid. the sight of objects with powerful light. so that there may not be an excess of any particular kind of substance in the body.320 Speculations in the Medical Schools [CH. When the dhatus are in their normal measure. the trouble or affection of the body has thus to be defined in terms of dhatu-vaisamya. The daily course of a healthy man ought to be such that the equilibrium of dhatus may be properly maintained. the hearing of loud sounds like the roaring of thunder. in the body. except of a local nature. i. for example. The only escape from this charge is that dhatu-vaisamya and disease are synonymous. taste or 2 Ibid. Things having the same sort of composition as a particular bodily dhatu increase it. smell. or excessive too association with sense-objects. man is . i. such that. kdla-buddhlndriydrthdndm yogo mithyd na cdti ca dvaydsraydndm vyddhlndm tri-vidho hetu-samgrahah. the smelling of very strong odours. a normally maintain the balance of his dhatus and a man may regain it. Whatever leads to the increase of any particular dhatu automatically leads of the also to the decrease of other dhatus which are opposed to it. .objects. The aim thus to advise men how to secure .

Cakrapani says that this includes sinful deeds which illness and unhappiness. the real cause of the illness is primarily produced. buddhy-aparddhasyaiva indri- ydrthdtiyogddi-hetutvdt. . ayoga and mithya-yoga of the effort of speech. may still The 1 z principle of growth I. is at the root of all excessive.&quot. i. would be examples of the improper use (mithya-yoga) of the visual sense. i. ta-grtsma-varsdh. and decay is involved in the maxim Caraka-samhitd.objects 4 for. which illness is efficient only after a certain lapse of time. 37. im and body. become be regarded in some sense as the cause through which the adharma is matured and becomes productive. ayoga and 3 But the misuse of intelligence. . adharma or its root cause. or are performed to an excessive degree. sdrlra-mdnasika-vdcanika-karma-mithyd-yo- vikdrdndm kriya- Three seasons only are mentioned. unnatural manner. Thus Cakrapani. cold or rains to an excessive degree or to a very deficient degree or in a very irregular or . however. n. 1 3 ltosma-varsa-laksandh punar heman&quot. by the sins (adharma) associated with those deeds. which in their combination are so opposed as to be unhealthy. 53. . hideous. at all. or to see frightful. or not performed in an undesirable or unhealthy intelligence (prajnaparadha) When a particular season manifests its special characteristics of heat. or 321 deficient association with sense- objects. is an example of the improper use of the tongue. prajnaparadha kala. this. deficient or under prajnaparadha. prajnaparadha. To see objects very near the eye. or mithya-yoga of time (kala) . be examples of mithya-yoga of the nose to eat together different kinds of things. n. all activities of speech. we have what are called atiyoga. To hear grating and unpleasant sounds would be examples of the improper use of the ear to smell bad and nauseating odours would . 40. says. Ibid. i. mind and body (vdn-manah-sarlra-pravrttiY But these are all due to the misuse of . commenting on Ibid. Ibid. i. when they performed manner. When certain sinful deeds are performed by prajnaparadha. mind . wrongful association with sense. unpleasant and disturbing sights. are to be considered respectively as examples of atiyoga. to be exposed to sudden heat and cold are examples of the 1 proper use of touch Similarly. at a very great distance. it is all misuse of intelligence and is therefore included . ii. or time.xm] touch at all Growth and Disease would be ayoga. and. 39. when proper things are not taken at the proper time or proper things are not done at the proper time. 42. produce genaivd-dharmotpdddvdntara-vydpdrenaivddharma-janydndrn mdnatvdt.

bones by cartilages. it becomes assimilated into the body. flesh increases by the intake of flesh. i. i. so the whole chyle is transformed into blood. 4 Ibid.e. proper age of growth. but also to substances having largely similar qualities. Cakrapani explains dma-garbha as anda. also iv 6. and unhealthy food. increases it to a certain extent. The assimila tion of food is effected by heat which digests. ii. so does blood by taking blood. fat which makes the food smooth. some say that. 2 3 Caraka-samhita. Ibid. semen by semen and a foetus by eggs not only to the same kind of substances as taken in ciple applies . food which has qualities opposed to the natural qualities of the body. and time which helps the process of digestion 4 As any particular food is digested and changed. 10. 6. is transformed into blood. 9 and particularly iv. fat by fat. 6. and of this As regards the method whole milk is transformation. Some say that the chyle the blood into flesh. just as the seminal fluid may be increased by taking milk and butter (samdna-guna-bhuyisthdndm anyaprakrtlndm apy-dhdra- vikdrdndm upayogah) 3 The ordinary conditions of growth always hold good. iv. Therasa (chyle) produced as a result of the digestive process. 14 and 15. water which softens. the above example. there are two different views summed up by Cakrapani 28. has a disintegrating influence on the body. . 43 and 44. proper diet and absence of those circumstances that retard growth. articles that the different constituents of the body grow when of food having similar constituents are taken. . having the same colour and smell as blood. iv. namely. As regards the growth of the body through the essence of the food-juice. The hard parts of the food form the hard parts of the body and the liquid parts form the liquid parts such as blood and the like. another part of the rasa. 3). goes to blood and increases it. marrow 2 But the prin by marrow. Here the whole circulait. just as the changed into curd.322 Speculations in the Medical Schools [CH. . air which collects together all things for the action of heat. . iv. etc. 6. and another part similarly goes to flesh and increases with reference to 1 its and the same process takes place increasing fat. nature. 6. coming into association with rasa as the body-constituent (dhdtu-rupa-rasa). I. Ibid. while others say that this transformation is somewhat like the circula tion in irrigation (kedari-kulyd-nydya). 10. and so forth. (i. and that they decay when articles of food having opposite qualities are taken (evam eva sarva-dhdtu-gundndm sdmdnya-yogdd vrddhir vipar1 y ayadd hrdsah) Thus.

but on the second theory. and so on. and increases it. the nourishment of flesh later than that of blood. Elsewhere (ibid. milk through its special quality (prabhdvd) can be immediately associated with the seminal fluid and there by increase also 1 (keddrl-kulya) it But Cakrapani remarks that the earlier theory as good as the later one. 14 and 15. that part of it which nourishes the blood goes directly into that. etc. as is said in Susruta. if it had to follow the lengthy process of passing through the circulatory systems. vi. so the time that a particular food takes for getting itself transformed into semen or into any other dhdtu depends upon the nature of the food and the powers of digestion. mdmsam itydder ayam arthah yad raktam jay ate. it takes a month for the transformation of ordinary articles of food into semen. through different channels from the very first stage. For on that view might be held that by milk its special quality (prabhdvd) it . (khale kapota-nydya) so not all the digested food-juice passes through the channel of the rasa-dhatu but different parts of it pass . marrow and semen 1 But others think that. . 15. khale-kapota-pakse tu vrsyotpanno rasah prabhdvdc chlghram eva sukrena sambaddhah san tat-pustim karotiti yuktam (Cakrapani on Caraka-samhitd. But there is generally this time limitation. kslrddayas ca sadya eva vrsyd drsyante. it could not do its part so quickly. vi. called dhdtu-rasa and posaka-rasa. Thus the circulatory system is different from the very beginning and yet the nourish ment of blood takes place later than that of rasa. the unabsorbed part passes into blood. according to some authorities. The upholders rasa-pusti-kdldd uttara-kdlam of the last view maintain that the other theory cannot properly explain how a nourishing diet (vrsya). vrsya-prayogasya raktddi-rupdpatti-kramendticirena sukram bhavatiti. 15. changed into semen in six days and nights.). But Caraka does not favour any time limitation and urges that. 28. See Cakrapani s comment on Caraka-samhita. that the part which nourishes the blood enters into it only when the part which nourishes rasa-dhatu has been absorbed in it. 3). 2 is are two kinds of rasa. just as in a farm-house pigeons of different descriptions sit together . just as the movement of a wheel depends upon the energy spent on it. and all that. and so on (rasdd raktam tato . 2 parindma-pakse. 32) it is said that those articles of food which stimulate semen (vrsyd) are. so again the part which enters into flesh can only do so when the part which nourishes blood has been absorbed in it. and what is unabsorbed there passes into flesh and so on to the other higher constituents of bones. That part of it which nourishes rasa enters into the channel of its circulation. There . can immediately increase the seminal fluid.xm] Growth and Disease 323 tion begins by the entrance of the entire chyle into the constituent rasa (rasa-dhatu^ in passing through some part remains in the rasa . I. such as milk. whereas in the ordinary course.

Nor can it be said that according to the first theory every case of impurity of rasa (rasa-dusti) is also a case of impurity of blood (rakta. So the part that goes to form blood may be pure. vi. thus both theories are equally strong. and there is also a flow of this seminal fluid through the body by way of its own ducts. vi. which is called marrow. again. siras are (vasa) again. from fat bones. 15. a quotation from Bhoja. or body-constituents. from which it is ultimately liberated through its 2 proper channel 1 . passed quickly through the various stages and became associated with the seminal fluid. By the rousing of desires and sex joy and by the heat of the sex act the semen oozes out and collects in the testes. are hard. . and the pores are filled in by fat. from bones marrow. from flesh fat. The blood. though produced from flesh and fat. In Caraka-samhita. or rasa. for not the whole of rasa is transformed into blood. 15 . and is called fat (medas). becomes steady and white. 22-29. and nothing can be said in favour of either. and from says in vi. being worked upon by vayu and heat.324 Speculations in the Medical Schools [CH. ovarial blood and the seven layers of skin that from rasa is also produced milk. 14 and 15. Ojas 2 Cakrapani on Caraka-samhita. heat and air and therefore. milk ovarial blood. and from flesh are produced fat and the six layers of skin. is counted as an upa-dhatu. but only a part of it. the thick tissues or ligaments (kandara) and produced from blood. the rasa part may be impure. The two theories above referred to deal with the supposed ways in which such transformations occur. Just as water percolates through the pores of a new earthen jug. 15. In addition to the seven dhatus. spoken of above there are ten upa-dhatus. 15. semen is produced. again. from rakta flesh. but still 14 and 15. The bones are a conglomeration of earth. the semen percolates through the pores of the bones. 15. vi. The chyle. They are made porous by vayu running through them. it is said that from rasa there is rakta (blood).dusti). from marrow semen. as is argued. becomes tinged with red by the heat of bile. which are counted by Bhoja as 1 Caraka sirfij s?iayu. and from fat (medas) are produced the five tissues. Caraka-sarnhitd. From the oily parts of marrow.

4 (medas) sweat that of flesh bile (pitta) and that of fat This view of vayu. and the impurities which are left out and cannot be assimilated into the body as its constituents are called kitta or mala. but. do not pollute or weaken the body or produce diseases. and thus instead of weakening the body So even malas called they serve to sustain it. 3. when they are in their proper measure. vi. and they are therefore called dosa. must. Thus in the pores of the body are formed many undesirable bodily growths which seek egress some qualities of the The body . those which the mala. and there are other entities which. when 1 2 Caraka-samhita. 30. mouth and of the holes of the hairs of the body. pitta and kapha and It all other malas. pitta and kapha. 6. they become digested by heat. beard. I. From this kitta are produced sweat. But the theory of wasteproducts is that. the hair. nails. however. they serve to sustain the body and perform important functions. 17. slesman and the dirt of ear.. Pitta and Kapha. like the other \Vaste-products of the body. constituents of the body. existing in the body. . so long as they do not ex ceed their proper measure. hair of the 3 body. are dhatus. the vayu (air). Others which go towards the sustenance and the growth of the body are called prasada 1 But vayu. urine. Ibid. the prasada. tend to weaken or destroy it. that of rasa is phlegm (kapha). yarn anuvartayatah 3 28. iv. be noted that the vayu. 3). are often turned into pus. 15. etc. . vayu. 4 Ibid. etc. exposed food is in the stomach to the internal fire of the digestive organs.xin] Vayu. so long as they remain in their proper measure (svamana). pitta (bile) and kapha (phlegm or lymph) may become less or more than their normal measure (prakuptta). like vayu. of morbidities of the body. eye. Pitta and Kapha Vayu. pitta. waste-products (kitta). 28. pitta and kapha seems to indicate that these are secretions. or body-constituents. i. or sweat. such as blood. these are all called malas. nose. urine. excreta. purify the body. 325 make the system are briefly of two kinds. and those which sustain and foul. The essential part of the digested the chyle (rasa). pitta and kapha are primarily responsible for all kinds . The impurity of food is excreta and urine. Both the mala-dhatus and the prasadadhatus in their proper measure co-operate together in sustaining the body 2 When various kinds of healthy food and drink are . evam rasa-malau sva-pramdndvasthitav dirayasya sama-dhdtor dhdtu-sdm(ibid.

This due proportion. It is when there is excess or deficiency of one or more of them that they oppose in various ways the general process of that working of the system and are to be regarded as dosas or polluting agents. the As has already been body is composed of certain constituents. pitta and kapha. Radhamalla. refers to Caraka-samhttd. tongue. These are (i) the watery secretions from tongue. but of all these vayu. its health and disease.326 Speculations in the Medical Schools [CH. two or all three of them. (7) the eruptions which come out in youth. 29-30. and beards. There are various waste-products of the body. Thus 1 arrigadhara (iv. 5) counts seven visible waste-products which are different from the three malas referred to here as vayu. eyes and cheeks. teeth. and hence the deficiency or excess of waste-products is regarded as the cause of all dhatu-vaisamya. they pollute the body and may ultimately break it. So long as the waste-products are not in deficiency or excess. 15. (6) the glossy appearance of the face. (5) the dirt of the eyes. (4) the nails. however. depend on the proper absorption of food and drink in such a way that each of the dhatus may have its due share and that only. pitta and kapha are regarded as being fundamentally the most important entities. said. . in support of the above passage of are chidra-malas or impurities of the openings. It is also necessary that there should be a due functioning of the causes of waste or accretion. vi. (3) the dirt of ears. however. such as rasa and rakta. can be absorbed 1 The working manner conducive to the preservation of the proper of the constituents with reference to themselves and proportion the entire system. what quently certain waste-products are left is it that sustains the system or breaks it? It has already been noticed that the due proportion of the dhatus is what constitutes the health of the body. But of all waste-products vdyu. . we take. must. as is easy to see. they exceed the proper limit or become less than their proper measure. neither less nor more. Most of the malas . Deficiency or excess of waste-products is there in a fore an invariable concomitant of all disturbances of the balance of dhatus. that into the system. in commenting on this. they are the agents which constitute the main working of the system and may them selves be therefore regarded as dhatus. being at the root of all growth and decay of the body. armpits and penis. pitta and kapha are regarded as the three most important. and they sustain the work of the body by their mutual co-operation in proper measure. The food and drink which we take go to nourish the different dhatus. and destroy it by the disturbance of balance due to the rise or fall of one. (2) the colouring pitta. Not all the food and drink and conse question arises. arngadhara.

Thus he says that vdyu sustains the body. ejective forces (vega-pravartana) pitta helps . Caraka-samhitd. IV. 3 Cakrapani on Caraka-samhitd. Just as it is necessary that religious duties (dharma). it is not a mala proper but a mala-dhdtu (nirbddha-kardn malddinprasdmde samcaks3 In another passage of Car oka (i. i. excreta. colour and health of the body. Caraka-samhitd. however. vayu pitta and slesman. exhalation (ucchvasa). Vagbhata. I have sometimes translated mala as &quot. it is said that out of the digested food and drink . pitta and kapha are known as dosa. inasmuch as they sustain the body as y much as the other dhatus.In one sense you have all spoken correctly but none of your judgments are absolutely true. when they are disturbed. But. I.&quot.&quot. vdta. : 1 . when they are in their natural state of equilibrium.waste-products. mental and bodily movement the body by (cestd). a mala is in such proportions that it does not produce any disease. they produce opposite results and ultimately There is break the whole balance of the system and destroy it 1 . and these may be called mala when they are in such . which has been mahe) referred to above. 3). When. 17. and naturally this may cause confusion. vdyu. (artha) and desires (kama) should all be equally attended to. summer and rains all go in a definite order. do. dhdtu and mala and speaks of them as being the roots of the body. contribute to the efficiency of all the sense-organs. urine.e. and sometimes as &quot. The term mala has reference to the production of diseases 2 Kitta means waste-products or secretions. however. 12. and endow a man with long life. I. 6. etc. &quot. 8 vdyuh pittam kapho dosa dhatavas ca mala matdh. dhdtu and mala. iv. rasa or rakta. 3). wealth . 28.polluting agents or impurities&quot. These malas are also dhdtus. 4 Also evam rasa-malau sva-pramdndvasthitav dsrayasya sama-dhdtor dhdtusdmyam anuvartayatah (Caraka-samhitd. the strength. Compare Sdrrigadhara. 28. one important point to which the notice of the reader should par ticularly be drawn. inspiration (nihsvdsa). so all the three. there are produced rasa and kitta (secretion) called mala (tatrdhdraprasdddkhya-rasah kittam ca maldkhyam abhinirvartate) and out of . contributing energy (utsdha). 13. 2 tatra mala-bhutds teye sarlrasya bddhakardh syuh. or just as the three seasons of winter. pitta and slesman or kapha. so long as they are in their proper proportions and balance (te sarva eva dhdtavo maldkhydh prasdddkhyds ca)*. proportions as to cause diseases. this kitta is produced sweat. takes a different view of this subject. He separates the dosa.xm] VdyUy Pitta and Kapha 327 Atreya says in answer to Kapyavaca s remarks in the learned dis cussions of the assembly of the sages.

courage (saury d). 3 Astdnga-samgraha. the child is said to possess the special features of one is accordingly called vata-prakrti. power of holding the 1 body. tajjdn ity -up ac arena tan dhur ghrta-ddhavat rasddisthesu dosesu vyddhayas sarnbhavanti ye. dhdtu-posdya prasdda-labhyam eva (ibid. the supporting burden (dharana) of the bones (asthi). ?nala 3 . is a joint product of dosa. dhdtu and that the emphasizes one important characteristic of the dosas when he says dynamic which sets the dhatus in motion (dosebhya eva is dhdtundm pravrttih) chemical derived from them 4 . power of understanding (dhi). Indu. softness of the body. oiliness. but dosa-vaisamya. It is pointed . and slesman. of the chyle (rasa) are to the Owing predominance of one or other of the dosas from the earliest period. digestive function. the function of sight. of males said that the excreta has the denies that the malas of dhatus could be the cause of disease. and the equilibrium of dosas or or other of the dosas and dosa-samya is health. imagination (medha). puts it as sarlram ca dosa(i. by steadiness. i. He further definitely it is .e. Vagbhata further says that disease is not prakrti dhatu-vaisamya. the 1 disturbance of dosas . heat. The functions of the seven dhatus. I. a metaphorical statement The . is the disturbance of dosas. pittaor slesma-prakrti. pitta and kapha by calling the latter dosa (polluting agents) and the former dusya (the constituents which are polluted). I. body. the commentator on the Astanga-samgraha. by serving to unite the joints. and. etc. on this view. the contribution of vitality (jlvand). He thus tries to explain away this view (that of Caraka as referred to 2 above) as being aupacarika. smoothness. tathd ca rasasya vahana-pdka-sneha-kdthinyddi dosa- 5 Ayur-veda is closely associated with the Samkhya and Nyaya-Vaisesika. the production of oiliness (sneha). etc. according to him.). activities.328 Speculations in the Medical Schools [CH. which alone deal with some sort of physics in Indian philosophy. and the circulation hardness. i. the filling up of bone cavities (purana or majja) and productivity (garbhotpdda of sukra) of the . as dosas are entities independent of the dhatus. while urine ejects the surplus water and sweat holds it back The elder Vagbhata distinguishes the dhatus from vayu. derived from the dosas. when the foetus begins to develop. are said to be the giving of satisfaction through the proper functioning of the senses (prlnana or rasa). Indu. may not necessarily mean the dis turbance of dhatus 5 Astanga-hrdaya. A disease. however. the commentator on the Astanga-samgraha. dhdtu-mala-samuddyah 4 i). In another passage the elder Vagbhata says u. 1-5. beginning with rasa.

so the three dosas also co-operate together. pitta and kapha and holds that the body out by Narasimha Kaviraja (a writer from the south) in his Vivarana-siddhantacintdmani (the only manuscript of which is in possession of the present writer) that according to Samkhya it is the dosa transforming itself from a state of equilibrium to a state of unbalanced preponderance of any of them that is be called a disease (vaisamya-sdmydvasthd-bhinndvasthd-visesavad dosatvam rogatvam). p. the dhatus. pitta with sattva and kapha with tamas*. guna-dvitayam api kaphejndtavyam sattvatamo-bahuld dpa (Dalhana on Susruta. so all diseases are but modifications of the three dosas. Dalhana identifies vayu with rajas. Vivarana-siddhdnta-cintdmani. however. 1 Astdnga-samgraha. I. &quot. he explained away as being metaphorical (aupacarikl) the expressed views of Caraka that the dhalu-malas are the dosas. Here also the same tendency is seen. ucyate. Thus he says. The Naiyayikas. That Caraka sometimes describes a disease as being dhdtu-vaisamya is to be explained as due to the fact that. So a disease is different from its symptoms or effects. I. in spite of the mutual opposition that exists among themselves. Narasimha further holds that. they are themselves also called diseases in a remote sense (yat tu Carakena dhatu-vaisamyasya rogatvam uktam tat tesdm tathdvidha-duhkha-kartrtvdd aupacdrikam.&quot. on the one hand. . or. On the other hand.As the three gunas co-operate together . the In the Sutra-sthana Susruta mentions blood (sonita) as having same status as vayu. for the production of the world in all its diversity. 22. In the treatment of the bone system the present writer agrees with Dr Hoernle that Vagbhata always attempted to bring about a reconciliation between Caraka and Susruta by explaining away the unadjustable views of one or the other. He further follows the Uttara-tantra in holding that the three dosas are the three gunas (bhinna dosas trayo gunah). he tacitly accepts the diseases as separate substances. since to dhdtu-vaisamyas produce diseases. 9). 3). Yady evam tat katham kapha-prakrtike pumsi sattva-gunopapannatd pathitd. so all the different diseases 1 The elder Vagbhata uses also in nothing but the three dosas another place the simile of the three gunas with reference to the three dosas. in spite of natural opposition. 66. hold that disease is a separate entity or substance. Thus. for the pro duction of the diverse diseases 2 . he followed the statements of the Uttara-tantra that the three dosas. rajo-bhuyistho mdrutah. (ibid. rajo hi pravartakam sarva-bhdvdndm pittam sattvotkatam laghu-prakdsakatvdt. drambhakam virodhe pi mitho yad yad guna-trayam visvasya drstam yugapad vyddher dosa-trayam tathd 3 21). Pitta and Kapha manifold universe is 329 nothing but a modification of the gunas. as the Vdyu. excreta and urine sustain a man s body. which is produced by dosa. since Caraka speaks of diseases as being fiery (agneya) and aerial (vayavya).rajo-yuktam vdity eke kaphas tamo-bahulah.guru-prd- varandtmakatvdd ity dhur bhisajah. billows and foam are seen which are in are reality the same as the ocean. MS. but which is not itself a dosa (dravyatve sati dosa-bhinna-dosa-janyatvam rogatvam).xni] that. as in the ocean waves. Uttara-tantra.

1. on the other. to connect together. Susruta s work being principally a treatise on surgery. articles to Susruta. : . the formation of the body (deha-sambhava-hetavah) The vata. in its function in the eyes it is called &quot. kapha and sonita in health and disease. Dalhana remarks that in co and kapha are concomitant causes. Pitta has all the qualities of fire. pitta from tap. body. between the stomach and the smaller intestines (tatra-stham evd). and after etad dhi salya-tantram. and it cooks all food and drink and separates the chyle on the one hand. 5. to move. pitta and slesman as the causes of . to heat. The Siitra-sthana of Susruta com pares kapha. Dalhana. are like three pillars co-operates with vata. etc. Susruta also uses the word dosa to mean pus (puya) (i. as is found in the supplementary book. articles of food with fiery qualities serve to increase it.colouring&quot.3 and 4. and blood also same work. in commenting on this. 2 Susruta further derives vata operation with semen and blood from the root va. It is hot. ditsyesu &quot. when it increases. ). its author holds that blood with all its impurities 1 plays an important part in producing disturbances in all wounds Susruta further speaks of vdta. says that. in function in the liver and spleen. possesses bad smell. urine. liquid 1 and blue or yellow. depends on food and drink as well as on the various combinations of vayu. it is called &quot. and slesman from slis. commenting on this. according is situated between the stomach (amasaya) and the smaller intestines (pakvdsaya). working . writes sahakdritayd deha-janakd abhipretdfy&quot. In discussing the nature of pitta. as supplying the colouring matter of blood. in its function of giving a glossy appearance to the skin it is called bhrajaka.33 Speculations in the Medical Schools [CH. (ranjakd). in its function it in the heart serves intellectual purposes (sadhaka). when it diminishes. pitta. pitta and vayu with the moon (soma). Dalhana. and the excreta. pitta them in the which support the body. called the Uttara-tantra. he says that pitta is the fire in the body and there is no other fire buf pitta in the body.21. and. pitta and kapha. situated in the lower. 2 sukrartavadi Susruta. of food with cooling properties serve to diminish it.perceiving. salya-tantre ca vraneh pradhdna-bhutah vrane ca madhye raktasya prddhdnyam iti sonitopdddnam (ibid. and so. by its own power (atma-saktya) it works in other pitta centres of the body and by its heating work (agni-karmd) sets up the proper activities at those places. the sun (surya) and air (anild) but not with the three gunas. middle and upper parts of the . iz). its In its function of cooking it is called pacaka.&quot. or locaka. Pitta. Being situated in the above place.

the tongue. or it may mean such unassimilated products. if it is interpreted as dhatu-mala. I. pitta and kapha are regarded as being produced from kitta. which absorb the substantial part of the food-juice and throw off some of its impurities into the unabsorbed material.. as chyle. 8-16. does not seem to refer to is this secretive aspect. Coming to ilesman. 3) . or the part of it unassimilated as blood. and they break up the body when they are in undue What exactly kitta means is difficult to determine. the throat. the dry (susma) and the wet (abhraja) 2 In the Caraka-samhitd vat a. vi. but he seems to have grasped the essential physiological activity of the body as being of the nature of digestive operation and the distribution of the heat and the products of digestion. etc. water and have been well before his mind. They are thus regarded here as being of the nature of internal waste-products of unassimilated food-juice at the different stages of its assimilation. and so forth. together with the secretions from the respective dhatus. agner ivdsya . air. or impurities of dhdtus. Susruta says that the stomach is its natural place. which is counted as dosa by Susruta. that in the AiharvaVeda mention is found of three kinds of diseases. or of the nature Susruta. considered to be secretive. I. . the head and in all the joints of the body. being watery. such as the heart. Being in dmasaya. which otherwise would have destroyed the whole body by its ex cessive heat. 4). These secretions and waste-products form the source of most of the con structive and destructive forces of the body. which have important physiological functions to perform for the preservation of the process of the growth of the body. essence or substance of waste-product. . however. n. is regarded as being the liver and the spleen 1 I have noticed above. The watery character of kapha and the fiery character of pitta are not ignored but their . 1 2 seems to and the analogy of cooking. . when they are in due proportions. dahata eti susminah (ibid. the airy (vataja). Ye abhraja vataja yas ca susmo (Atharva. flesh.Veda. 12. It mean merely the part of the food-juice unassimilated as chyle. or secretions. Susruta also seems to Susruta-samhitd. it works in the other centres of slesman. again. this at least is what kitta ought to mean. The place of vdyu is the pelvic regions and the rectum (sroni-guda-samsraya) the main place of the blood. it flows downwards and neutralizes the bile-heat. as requiring fire. may proportions.xni] Vdyu y Pitta and Kapha 331 passing through unhealthy digestive actions tastes sour. 20.

however. the is is mind from is desirable. though described as neither hot nor cold according to the Vaisesika philosophy. always fond of taking a middle course in his endeavour to reconcile the different attempts to grasp the prin ciples under discussion. the food-juice taking the place of earth and the other three principles being fire (pitta).e.5S. yet. . holds that they are comparable to the three gunas. light (laghu). Vagbhata. cold (slta). i.i. dhatus and dhatu-malas are quite different entities. have leant more towards the view of the physiological operations of the body as being due to elemental activities.332 Speculations in the Medical Schools [CH. collects together 1 Caraka-samhitd. daruna is mentioned. however. In the Uttara-tantra and by Vagbhata the Samkhya analogy of the gunas seems to have had a very distracting influence. he further thinks that dosas. all the carrier of the stimulation of sense-objects. though opposed to one another. The supple mentary Uttara-tantra. water (slesmari) and air (vdta). in place of cala. thinks that they are the three gunas. scattering everything else in different directions (visadd) and 1 It is neutralized in the body by those things which rough (khara) . moving (cold). Of course. 12. these writers explain away the difficulty by a vague reference to the Samkhya gunas. they also co-operate together. water and air is are here regarded as being transformations not explained by Susruta. samana and apana and is the generator of diverse kinds of efforts it is the force which controls (niyanta) . The person who seems to have had the most definite conception of the dosas was Caraka. instead of trying to find out the true physiological position of the dosas. udana. Cakrapani.in commenting on this. and. In the healthy constructive process the vayu is said to perform physiological functions as follows: it sustains the machinery of the fests itself as body (tantra-yantra-dharah). and. 12.i. The reason why the prin ciples of the body of fire. suksma is not mentioned. but that is on account of its association with the heat of pitta (yoga-vahitvai). because. Cakrapani says that daruna means the same as cala. and.it mani prana. but he is unable to give any definite idea as to what these dosas are. In the Vata-kala-kaliya chapter (i. 4). says that. In the same chapter (i. subtle (suksma). six qualities of vdta are mentioned. that which makes holes. Let us now return to Caraka. 7) vayu vayu is is qualified as susira-kara. since it is found to increase by cold and decrease by heat. when connected with pitta it is found to be hot. By him vayu is described as being dry (ruksa). it is regarded as cold. because diseases are but modifications of the dosas. have opposite qualities. undesirables and directs (praneta) it to all that the cause of the employment of the sense-organs.

It is interesting to note how Vayorvida describes the cosmic functions of air as the upholding of the earth. 1 In the same discussion Marici considers fire to be contained in the pitta and productive of all good and bad qualities. courage and fear. as also of the corresponding sense-organs. makes the mind sad. happiness and life. and arrests the functions of all sorts of troubles. energy and idleness. the pranas. the flow of rivers. the healer of morbidities. and ignorance. the uniform motion of the planets and stars. ignorance. etc. Kapya maintains that soma. . i.xin] Vdyu. and in short. leanness. etc. Pitta and Kapha 333 the dhatus of the body. When weakens the strength. n and 12. etc. the shaping of flowers and fruits. the framer of the shape of the foetus. causing the burning of fire. It seems fairly certain that the theory of vata. the showering of rains. it brings about pratyaya-bhuta). harmonizes the functions of the body as one whole. 12. the production of the power of seeds to produce shoots.. fatness. the air for the digestive fire. the operating agent for all kinds of circulation. water and fire as being world-principles of con struction the different vayus were known as early as the AtharvaVeda. the production of clouds. identical with the continuity of life (ayuso nuvrttiit is in undue proportions. digestion and indigestion. and vdyu is regarded in many of the Upanisads as the prin ciple of life.. 12. the growing up of crops. etc. is the cause of touch and sounds. fire (dahand) and water (toya) as the fundamental con : body. the formation of the seasons. vision and blindness. the root of joy and mental energy. 2 knowledge These discussions seem to indicate that before Atreya s treatise was written attempts were made to explain the physiological func tions of the body in health and disease by referring them to the operation of one operative principle. pitta and kapha is a later development of the view which regarded air (pavana). delirium. Thus Susruta refers to this view 2 7 Caraka-samhitd. joy. anger. causes malformations of the foetus. contained in slesman. The Chdndogya Upanisad speaks of earth. colour. 8. such as firmness and looseness of the virility and impotence. the ejecter of extraneous dirts. Ibid. i. the formation of the strata of minerals. is the mover of speech. stitutive principles of the 1 body. produces diseases and all emotions of fear. the shooting out of plants. produces all good and bad qualities. according as it is in equilibrium or is disturbed. weakens the functions of the sense-organs. grief. is.

80. the constitutional condition of the dosas remains the same. or slesma-prakrti. All medicines are applied for attaining this end. they emphasized the necessity of ad mitting one or more inherent dynamic principles for the develop ment and decay of the body. the three constitutive elements being and water 1 The advance of the medical schools of thought . This explains how vata. . Susruta. but in more or less diverse ways and in diverse systems. Again. over these speculations and over others which consider the body to be a product of one bhuta or of many bhutas is to be sought in this. 4. pitta-prakrti and slesma. whereas vdtala and pittala persons are always of indifferent . pitta and slesmari). and quantitative predominance is the same as vikdra. When a vdtala person takes things which increase vdta.&quot. his vdta increases at once. . What they mean by vdta-prakrti is that vdta is quantitatively predominant (ddhikya-bhdvdt sd dosa-prakrtir ucyate). So in the case of a pittala person pitta increases rapidly when articles which increase pitta are taken. the newly collected dosa produces morbidity on the lines on which the predominating dosa of his constitution is working but this newly collected dosa does not augment the corresponding original dosa. the terms vdta-prakrti. fire Some say that the constitution (prakrti) of the human elemental (bhautiki). pitta-prakrti. with equal vayu. pitta. body is air. as has already been mentioned. 4. [CH. The original dosa is never increased. when is of that dosa which . 80 : Speculations in the Medical Schools &quot. prakrtim iha nardndm bhautikim kecid dhuh pavana-dahana-toyaih kirtitds tds tu tisrah. pittala. whatever may be the predominance of a dosa due to any disease. Since all men take various kinds of diet (visamdhdropayogitvdt) they must be either vdtaprakrti. The dosas which are constitutional always remain as the health. and so with regard to slesman (Caraka-samhitd. Thus a vata-prakrti person does not become slesma-prakrti or pitta-prakrti. in. 6. 2 ill. there is a disease with the predominance predominant in man s constitution from his birth. so the proper terms are vdtala. and viceversa. Caraka refers to a view that there are none who may be regarded as sama-vdta-pitta-slesman (or having equal vdta. pittala and slesmala 2 Men of the slesmala type are generally healthy. etc. that. pitta and kapha are regarded both as dhdtu and as dosa as prakrti and as vikrti. and there cannot be any doubt that such a state exists. that from the time of the formation of the foetus the vata. Against this Caraka says that sama-vdtapitta-slesman is the same thing as health or freedom from disease (aroga).334 in in. these do not increase in him as rapidly as vdta does. Later on. pitta and kapha are working. but when he takes things which increase pitta or slesman. and. Thus Caraka says. prakrti are incorrect for prakrti means health. mala and kapha (sama-pittdnilay kaphd) or different degrees of predominance of them as vatala. 14-18). besides allowing the material causes (upadana) of the body to be the dhatus.

acidity. 21. possible for them to grow simultaneously violent in a In the six seasons of rains (varsa). in this connection to say that. there is no further disease. If the dosas can be removed or neutralized at this stage. summer 3 vdta. and it 2 It is not out of place grows weaker when the opposite is the case . vrddhih prakopah). though the total quantity of dosa may not be in excess. . 17. in the harvesting season (hemanta) there lowering of pitta there is collection and of collection slesman. in the . He says that a disease may be caused by a dosa which is not in excess of the constant constitutional quantity (prakrti-mdna) by virtue of the fact that it may be carried from one part of the body to another and thereby may produce a local accretion or excess. 17. late autumn (hemanta). i. says that sancaya of dosas means aggre gation or accumulation in general (dehe tirupdvrddhis cayah) prakopa of dosas means that the accumulated dosas are spread through the system (vilayana-rupd 3 . in the Thus. and vayu there is respectively. The stage of cay a is the first stage of operation in the growth and prevention of diseases. Ibid. 17. slesman . 1 Caraka says that in the normal . tutional (prakrti) dosa is that a dosa grows strong in a system in which a corresponding dosa is constitutionally predominant. autumn of in the rains (varsa) (sarai) there is dis is turbance of pitta. in com menting on Susruta-samhitd. I. pitta or kapha. The external signs of the cay a of vdta are fullness of the . and it is system. The . 1. spring (vasanta) and summer (grisma] there is an alternate collection (cay a). winter (slta). 62). Dalhana. The usual indication of the disturbance (prakopa) of vayu is disorders of the stomach of pitta. 38-41 ksaye (i.7. The prakopa of blood (sonitd) is always due to the prakopa of vdta. for example. palpitation (hrdayotkledd). 45) is often referred to in support of the view that the new accretions of dosas affect the prakrti-dosas But Cakrapani explains it differently. state the heat of The passage prakrti-stham yadd pittam mdrutah slesmanah Ibid. 112. autumn (sarat). . . thirst and burning of kapha. and there is no interchange between these later collections of dosas or their deficiency and the con stitutional constant parts of the dosas known as prakrti 1 The only sense (as Cakrapani says) in which a dosa is related to a consti . etc. The later accretion of the dosas or their deficiency has a separate course of action in producing diseases. stomach and want of motions of pitta yellowish appearance and reduction of heat (mandosnata) of kapha heaviness of the limbs and feeling of laziness. they do not always neutralize one another. In all cases of cay a there is a feeling of aversion to causes which increase the particular dosa of which there has been cay a (caya-kdrana-vidvesas ca). though the dosas are mutually op posed to one another. aversion to food. 18. collection of pitta.xm] Vayu. This is the second stage of the progress of diseases. disturbance (prakopa) and lowering down (prasama) of the three dosas pitta. and so forth Contrasting the in the normal (prakrti) and abnormal functions of the dosas (vikrti) states. See also Cakrapani s comments on these. Pitta and Kapha 335 constant part engaged in their physiological operations. 2 samdndm hi prakrtim prdpya dosah pravrddha-balo bhavati. asamdndm tu prdpya tathd balavdn na sydt (Cakrapani on Caraka-samhitd. I. .

20. but in the abnormal state pitta produces is the dirt of the many diseases . When a large quantity of water accumulates at any place. blood and the stomach. 18-32). forty of pitta and twenty of slesman various affections of vdta. the joints. e. vdyu. slesman system and the cause of many troubles. The places (sthdndni) at which the affections of vdta. The fourth stage is when the purva-rupa is seen. e.g.g. standing as symbols of a number of symptoms without any real existence? In such an interpretation reality would belong to the symptoms. is the cause of all motor activities. and the agents of morbidity. At this stage there is something like a fermentation of the dosas (paryusita-kinvodaka-pista-samavdya ivd). it is to be considered that there is disturbance of vdyu wherever there is another set of symptoms. pitta and kapha. This is moved about by vdyu. There are eighty affections of 1 But in each of these vdta. sometimes two conjointly. pitta. little. pitta or kapha. of which the last is the most important. it moves a movement is like prakopa. so the dosas also flow. n. i. or the dosas. sometimes alone. pitta and kapha are mostly found are thus described by Caraka of vdta the bladder. But a question may arise as to what may con sistently with this view be considered to be the nature of vdyu. spreads itself in the natural place of another dosa. head. and vdyu is the source of all activities and the life of all living beings . there is disturbance of pitta. like water from the clouds (doso vikdram nabhasi meghavat tatra varsatt). Thus Caraka in i. pitta occasions digestion. 12-23 describes certain symptoms as leading to a diagnosis of the disease as being due to the disturbance of vata. waist and the bones of the leg. there the symptoms of diseases are showered down. 39). in froths and foams. The difference between prakopa and prasdra is thus described by Dalhana: just as when butter is first stirred up. the remedy of the latter will remove the former (vdyoh pitta-sthdnagatasya pittavat pratlkdrah). When one dosa. pitta and slesman the special features . 20. this slight . 1 Caraka-samhitd. and vdta also produces many diseases and ultimately death. of which the chest is the most important. of pitta sweat. which though inanimate. or in whatever part the fer mented dosas spread. In the whole body. would only be convenient symbols for collecting certain groups of these symptoms under one name. Are they only hypothetical entities. as it were. 38. in the half of it. and sometimes all together. third stage is called prasdra. it breaks the embankment and flows down and joins on its way with other streams and flows on all sides . stomach and fat. neck. and the fifth stage is the stage of rupa or vyddhi (disease) (ibid. when it is continuously and violently stirred to flow out. of slesman the chest. but the smaller intestine : (pakvdsaya) is its particular place of affection.336 Speculations in the Medical Schools [CH. and so . but. rectum. it may then be called prasdra (Susruta-samhitd. slesman is strength and vitality. i. 21. Wherever there is one particular set of symptoms. and characteristics of the corresponding dosas are found.

The nature and the functions of the dosas do not depend in the least on their visibility or invisibility. there are many passages which describe pitta and kapha as entities having a particular colour and material consistency. stimita-guru-slta-vijjaldcchah (slesman is smooth. cold. sweet. be noted that the translation I have given of some of these . Pitta and Kapha 337 But there are serious objections against such an inter pretation.lean. sharp and liquid. 7. the causes were also considered as having those qualities from which those of the effects were derived. and is acid and pungent and bitter ibid. &quot. So. tries to divide the dosas into two classes. . ibid.xin] forth. ekam punar vdta-pitta-slesmandm (ibid. as we have shown above. Mahamahopadhyaya Kaviraj Gananatha Sen. e. words cannot be regarded as satisfactory for in the translation I could only give one sense of a word. ill. 9-11. moving. These passages could not be satisfactorily explained upon the above interpretation. coarse and scattering 8. as it is of little value from the medical point of view it also does not help us to understand the real nature of the dosas.&quot. and possesses bad odour. ill. But it also means &quot. which in the original Sanskrit has been used in a variety of senses which the word has. Thus.5). 14. or (of a voice) &quot. from the diverse qualities of our bodies attribution of a certain is The due considered as effects. of Calcutta. pleasing. 8. slesma hi snigdha-slaksna-mrdu-madhura-sdra-sdndra-mandaas those 1 The which regard vata. there are many passages where these dosas are described as secretions and waste-products. having only a methodological value as being no more than convenient symbols for a collective 1 grasp of different symptoms . lean and small. and secretory character of these dosas is amply indicated by such passages pitta and slesman as requiring some space in the stomach for digesting the food materials. Vayu. substantial.&quot.g. moist and transparent ibid. 3). There is no English synonym which would have so many senses.broken. cold.having insomnia. Moreover. dosas number of specific qualities to the to a belief that the qualities of effects are due to the qualities of causes. pittam usnam tiksnam dravam visram amlam katukam ca (pitta is hot. But though such a distinction can doubtless be made. It must. pp. 7).&quot. which in their normal proportions sustain and build the body and in undue proportions produce diseases and may ultimately break up the system. however. but hypothetical.slim. 6). &quot. heavy. invisible (suksmd) and visible (sthuld) Siddhdnta-niddna. For. 7. Caraka says that on account of the qualities of rauksya the bodies of those having congenital vata tendency are rough. for example. 8. it has not been so distinguished in the medical literature. nor can the visible dosa be regarded as always the &quot. manifold. vdtas tu ruksa-laghu-cala-bahu-slghra-sita-parusa-visadah (vata is rough. compact. I have translated ruksa as rough.&quot. inert. in. DII 22 . and so forth. product of the invisible one. quick. and this would be impossible upon the interpretation that they are not real entities. 2. light. Thus. 14. and it is also said that there are particular places in the body where they collect. in connection with the description of the qualities of vata. in. benumbed. soft. 14.&quot. 7.

laghu. The nature of the disturbance of a dosa is determined by the nature of the dis of its turbance of the qualities involved (amsdmsa-vikalpa) 1 The natural inference from such a theory is that. its component entities are in certain definite proportions both with regard to themselves and to tatra 10. &quot. Thus vdyu is said to possess the qualities of ruksa. or sita. qualities of a to excess. Hence it is the business of the physician not only to discover which dosa has run to excess. leaving others undisturbed. Cakrapani. On view a dosa appears to be a particular kind of secretion which a mixture of a qualities. n). : dosdndm amsdmsa-vikalpoyathd 6. kaddcil laghv-ams ah. or so may sita and ruksa. of one s body were considered as being due to one or the other of the body-building agents. and so would be all his efforts. The dosa or dosas which become prominently disturbed in a system are called anubandhya. and so forth. i . and so forth. in commenting on this. II. i. and the dosa or dosas which at the time of diseases are not primarily disturbed are called anubandha. etc.4. it is possible that a dosa in state of disturbance will remain a dosa. eating. . these characteristics of the through remote similarity referred to them. the movements of a man with congenital vata tendency would be light and quick. speech.e. and yet have some qualities increased and others decreased. sita. weak. it is called sannipdta. cala. since the entities having this or that quality are but component parts of a dosa. leaving others intact. but also to examine which qualities of which dosa have run to excess. on account of the quality of lightness of vdyu. says vateprakupite pikadacidvdtasya s ltdmso balavdn bhavati. kaddcid rjlksdmsah kaddcil laghu-ruksdmsah&quot.338 Speculations in the Medical Schools [CH. number of different secretions having different but which operate together on the same lines. the voices of such people are rough. body were There is another point to be noted in connection with the enumeration of the qualities of the dosas. and they cannot sleep well (jagarukd)\ again. slow and broken. HI.. grating. and when two are so disturbed it is called samsarga (ibid. It is easy to see that the resemblance of the qualities of vdyu to the qualities of the body is remote yet. The disturbance of a dosa does not necessarily mean that all its qualities have been exhibited it is possible that one or more of the . The its qualities of dosas are variable. ruksa and laghu. since the special features and characteristics . When a particular dosa is in a healthy order. a dosa - this is cannot be regarded as a whole homogeneous in all its parts. 1 Caraka-samhitd. bahu. When three of the dosas are jointly disturbed. and it is possible that in any particular case the sita quality may in full strength dosa may run run to excess. sighra.

the names of diseases are intended to be mere collective appellations of a . I. secretions Vdyu. . for both follow the order of human karma.. This psycho-physical &quot. of course. run parallel to each other. The opera mind and the operations of the body. pitta and kapha are found to perform not only physical operations. The whole system of Caraka s treatment depends upon the ascer tainment of the nature of these affections. various kinds. vayu. on taking into consideration the com parative strengths of the different components of a dosa and the relative strengths of the other components of other dosas and the relative strengths and proportions of each of the dosas amongst themselves. It may be remembered all in this connection that dhatu-vaisamya or abhighata (bodily in a fall and the like) is foolish action (prajnajuries through accidents. pitta and kapha seems to be a sort of psycho-physical parallelism. though to they correspond each other closely. It will also increase or decrease. as performed by and kapha on the materials of the dhdtus. body corresponding to mind. A be easily seen that. the number of combinations is innumerable. ndma-jndnam tu vyavahdra-mdtra-prayojandrtham (Cakrapani on Caraka- samhitd. Again vata. and both corresponding to karma. paradha).xin] the total dosa. says: satvam ca sariram&quot. while others may remain in the normal dosa state. but neither of them is determined by the other. some of the component undue proportions. Caraka. 53). and the diseases proceeding from such combinations are also innumerable. (the mind corresponds to the body and the body to the mind). the quantity of the whole dosa such as kapha or pitta may should therefore be regarded as a name for a collection of secre tions rather than one secretion of a homogeneous character. Pitta and Kapha But. What is meant by attributing intellectual functions to vayu. rasa. in sariram apt satvam anuvidhlyate trying to formulate it. 1 yad vdtdrabdhatvddi-jndnam eva kdranam rogdndm cikitsdydm upakdri. mind corresponding to body. number of affections of a particular type 1 One further point which ought to be noted with regard to the constructive and destructive operations of vayu. rakta. 339 when it is may increase in disturbed. 18. pitta s tions of the etc. parallelism is suggested throughout Caraka s system. pitta and kapha is that they are independent agents which work in unison with a man karma and also in unison with a man s mind. but also intellectual operations of the ultimate cause of But all intellectual operations belong properly to mind.

It is said in ibid. considers the brain to be the centre of the manas^ a view which is. almost unique in the field of Sanskrit 1 The (i. as I shall point out later on. because. ascended to heaven&quot. 9. 9. vm. hrdaya 2 on&quot. 3 as sirsakti. called mastulunga in Caraka-samhitd. Head and Heart 1 .i. Harvard siro-majjd. In vm. 9.e. 26). 80). who. as in the passage quoted by Cakrapani in vm. vm. 16. his forehead. having sewed together his head (murdhdnam) and also his heart. &quot. 9. though the currents of sensation and pass through other parts of the body as well. however.34 Speculations in the Medical Schools [CH.&quot. and of these the three most important are the head. The word sometimes. 8). The brain. artha. According to Caraka and Drdhabala all the senses are particularly life The connected with the head. hrdi murdhni ca vastau ca nrndm prdndh pratisthitdh. passage from Caraka. 101 . different names of the heart in Caraka-samhitd are mahat. vi. Cakrapani. 9. The pranas.brain 3 Head-disease is also mentioned in the Atharva. (Whitney s translation. 17. Atharvan.V. 9. used in the sense of head. his hindhead (kakdtika). having gathered a gathering in man s jaw. and all the senses are said to depend (sritdh) on the head 2 The difference . Cakrapani. Bhela. so far as I know.Veda. &quot.head. quoted above shows that at least Drdhabala considered the head to be the centre of the senses and all sense currents and life currents. 12. X. all the senses are hurt. when there is an injury to the head.4. in commenting upon this passage. 2. out of the oriental series. 2. they are also injured. 6 the word sirsa is used in the sense of &quot. vm. The most vital centres of the body are the head. yet they are particularly connected with the head (sirasi visesena prabaddhdni). says that. between head (sirsa) and brain (mastiska) was known as early as the Atharva-Veda. Thus in A. 12).Which was that god who (produced) his brain.&quot. explains it as sritd iva sritdh. 8 (them) forth. i.) 4 head&quot. because. 80 of Caraka-samhitd. as has also been explained by Cakrapani 4 . who is as old as Caraka. . 26. and in verses 8 and 26 of the same hymn the word mastiska is used in the sense of &quot. as well as the prdnas. but the heart is regarded as the vital centre of the pranas. Mastiskam is mastifka . x. i. 30. 4 it is distinctly said that all the senses and the currents of senses and prdna are dependent on the head as the rays of the sun are dependent on the sun sirasi indriydni indriya-prdna-vahdni ca srotdmsi suryam iva gabhastayah samsritdni. the heart and the pelvis. though rarely.e. Also in vm. aloft from the brain the purifying one sent &quot. 3). Cakrapani. the heart and the pelvis (vasti). the is used in the same chapter in the sense of brain9. i that there are one hundred and seven vital centres (marma). as if they depended (i.V. 80 mastiske stdngulam pattam. when the head is hurt. (A. matter is word mastiska matter (vm. the vital currents. (ibid. who first his skull. as well as of the manas.

&quot. which. and thence proceeds the choice of action. and this leads In another passage. The manas knows the citta. the heart is affected. The citta is also the cause of all motor functions and such that those who are possessed of good cittas follow a good course and those who are possessed of bad cittas follow a bad course. as a result of this. and.&quot. and from the affections of the heart the understanding (buddhi) is affected. Bhela says that there is a special kind of alocaka to madness 2 r . feelings and judgments. w hile describing the different functions of pitta. Buddhi. Bhela s chapter on Unmdda-cikitsitam. seat between the head and the palate tastes sense-objects (visayan indriyanam) and the knows all the which come near it (rasadikan samlpa-sthdri). by bringing about the contact of manas with the soul. which its is 341 all the highest of it senses (sarvendriya-parani). has (siras-talv-antara-gatam). Bhela says that the dosas in the brain affect the manas. causes cognition and. activities. 149. produces the discriminative visual knowledge by which 1 different objects are comprehended by the eye. . so far as can be s meagre statements. or understanding. made out from Bhela all cause of and the heart was regarded as its seat. then comes the understanding. the citta y is situated in the heart. Of these manas is entirely different from citta and. The siras-talv-antara-gatam sarvendriya-param manah tatra-stham tad dhi karanam sarva-buddhindm cittam hrdayavisayan indriyanam rasadikan samsritam kriydndm cetardsdm ca cittam sarvasya karanam. citta and buddhi. mdnasam dusayanty dsu tatas cittam vipadyate citte vydpadam dpanne buddhir ndsam niyacchati tatas tu buddhi-vydpattau kdrydkdryam na budhyate evam pravartate vyddhir unmddo ndma ddrunah. (buddhi). Buddhi was probably the determinate understanding and judgment which was but a function of the citta. transmitting it to the citta. urdhvam prakupitd dosdh . . Head and Heart He says that manas.xi n] literature. 149. pitta called the caksur-vaisesika. p. The original cause of manas and the energy of all the senses and the cause of all feelings and judgments Being situated there. Ibid. siras-tdlv-antare sthitdh. . The citta was regarded as the cause of all activities. Calcutta University edition. deciding what is worth doing and what is not. it is regarded as the cognitions and as having its seat in the brain. is the understanding of certain actions as 1 good (subha) and certain others as bad (asubha) * It seems plain that Bhela distinguishes between manas. p.

. the vital fluid ojas. excludes navel and flesh and includes the temples (sankhd) in their place. integrates them with other similar known facts (pratyudaharati). however. called the romdvarta. is the supreme superintendent (adhipati). which. below the eyes. Ibid. But in all prob ability the word is used here in a general way to denote the vital parts. . . 3 * madhye sird-sannipdtah srrigd- Caraka-samhitd. judgmental state. IV. semen. It is difficult to determine what is exactly meant by prdna here.seats of prdna are said to be the head. bladder. 1 ~ Bhela s chapter on &quot. rectum. and. upper part of it (mastakdbhyantaroparisthdt sird-sandhi-sannipdta) and this place. Caraka considers the heart (hrdaya) to be the only seat of consciousness 3 The. there are the nerves called the apdnga. navel. would produce deafness on both sides of the nasal aperture inside the nasal organ there are two nerves called phana. All these cognitive nerves meet in the brain . 19. Purusa-niscaya&quot. p. 6. passing at the centre of the eyebrow (srngdtaka)* He further says that the nerves are attached to the brain inside the skull on the . and. In I. and importance concerning doubt that he knew that particular nerves in the head were connected with particular sense functions. 9. associates the data (dharayati). being there. . would destroy the sensation of smell at the back of the eyebrows. 4 and 5 Caraka says that the whole body with heart. hrdayam cetanddhisthdnam ekam. ghrdna-srotraksi-jihvd-santarpanlndrn sirdndrn takdni. Thus he says in in. 30. 28 that there are two nerves (sird) lower down the ears on their back. however. restraint of thoughts (dhdrand) 1 Susruta does not state anything of but there seems to be little . wills for future realization. 7. which. 8. is different. after producing our knowledge in conceptual and judg mental forms. throat. 3 Caraka. and it is produced by a kind of dlocaka pitta called the buddhi-vaisesika. nose and taste are situated in the head. 6. called vidhurd. remembers the past. blood and flesh 4 In i. holds together the subtle forms emanating from the self (susuksman arthdn dtma-krtdn). which is special situated at the point between the eyebrows. if cut. It cannot be decided whether he took this in any deeper sense or whether he means simply that the sense-organs of ear. generates instructive actions. Caraka says that the head is the place for the senses.342 Speculations in the Medical Schools [CH. Susruta-samhitd. if cut. and is the force which operates in meditation (dhydnd) . would produce blindness. if cut. in. 81. eyes. 28. which.

are all supported &quot. but in the sense that the heart in the sense that they the place depend on the is heart for their proper functioning. where these reside. Cakrapani says that the mention of param ojas here proves that Caraka be lieved in another. The dhamams of the heart contain half a handful of aparam ojas. Caraka holds that the manas and the soul reside in the heart and so also do cognition. aparam ojas. however. In the Apasmara-mdana (n. 3). since the heart is affected by strong thoughts. manas and the objects thought (cintya). but does not nourish it.of (samsrita) by the heart. if the heart bursts. It is for this reason that. which is the cause of all knowledge of sense-objects and the upholder (dharin) of the are supported system. as the eighth dhatu. if the heart is well. pleasure and pain. not. Ojas ought not to be regarded as the eighth dhatu. the trunk. See also ibid. m. 8. I. 30. I. Just as rafters by pillars. however. for it only supports (dhdrayati) the body. 17. 2 1 . they also work well. and he holds that. if a man is struck in the heart. Ojas. is supported by pillars and It is plain. collectively called sad-anga. Ojas is. i) also speaks of the heart as being the space where Caraka-samhitd. and the head. 2 The heart It is also the place of the supreme vitality (param ojas) . and. regarded in the Atharva-Veda. The self. and in the disease known as prameha (urinary disease) it is this ojas that is wasted. however. knowledge (vijndna). But Cakrapani does not seem to agree with this view of Caraka. while that of param ojas is only eight drops of a white-red and slightly yellowish liquid in the heart. the senses. 30. body cannot when all is well with the heart. 9) and also of the currents of mental activity (11. whereas with the slightest waste of the param ojas a man cannot live. 4) Caraka speaks of the 7. 5. 6. he swoons away. 17.xm] Head and Heart 343 the four extremities. pleasure and pain. 5. heart as being the supreme place of the inner self (antar-atmanah srestham ayatanam). they also go wrong. 74 and 75 and Cakrapani s comment on the same. just as a house rafters 1 . is sometimes used also in the sense of rasa (Caraka-samhitd I. resides in the heart. the mind and the soul actually reside in the heart and so do pleasure and pain. if the heart is wrong. Cakrapani s commentary). It may not be out of place here to point out that the Taittirlya Upanisad(i. he dies. but even with waste of this ojas a man may live. The total quantity of aparam ojas in the body is half a handful (ardhdnjali-parimdna). n. is also regarded as the place where all consciousness is concen trated (tatra caitanya-samgrahah). the sense-objects. Caraka says that the heart is the centre of the prdna currents (prana-vahanam srotasam hrdayam rnulam. 6. the self. it is well with all the rest. so are they all supported by the heart. as Cakrapani explains. that the is subsist in the heart. What meant is that.

and they are said to carry white. 6. 4 Brh. 17. i. says that the nadls or siras . 16. 6. says that these various colours are due to the various combinations of vata. or channels Sankara. those which carry blood are red. Mund. prdna and antahkarand) of the subtle body. 18. : . i the hirds are i. described as being of red garments (lohita-vdsasah). 17. in explaining Brh. 1870. . which Sayana explains as lohitasya rudhirasya nivdsa-bhutd hi (the abode of blood) and paraphrases as rajo-vahana-nddyah. 3 satam hirdh sahasram dhamanlr uta. there controls the external senses. Chdnd. iv. In many other 1 Upanisads the heart is the centre of many nadis. of two different kinds of channels in the body. . resides. the state of deep sleep The The names Circulatory and the Nervous System. sira (also hira} and dhamani. vii. vii. emanate from the heart and spread over the whole body (purltat) 2 The buddhi resides in the heart and from called hita. elements (five bhutas. Sayana explains hira as garbha-dhdrandrtham antar-avasthitdh suksmd nddyah and dhamani as garbhdsayasya avastambhikd sthuld nddyah. i. 272. ten senses. Anandagiri. 17. quotes a passage from Susruta which is substantially the same as Susruta-samhitd.344 Speculations in the Medical Schools [CH. in commenting on the same. superintends state of (susupti). vi. Atharva-Veda. 36. 8 and 9. at the time of hearing in the awakened state the buddhi passes through these nadls to the ear it. 6 and 7. 20. i. manomaya purusa. 3 the Atharva-Veda speaks of hundreds of dhamanls and thousands of hirds. 21. ii Prasna. from dhamani. 20. 2 and 3. n. blue. 3. iv. y which are developed out of the food-juice and are number. iv. vm. also seems to distinguish hira.e. pitta and He states that the seventeen slesman which the nadls carry 4 . in. with ^aiikara s commentary. But Sahkara takes it here to mean the whole body. we have the awakening. therefore. Thus. 3. seem to have been distinguished at a period as early as the Atharva-Vedcfi. In I. the mind-person. those which carry pitta are blue. iv. and those which carry slesman are white arundh sira vdta-vahd nlldh pitta-vahdh sirdh asrg-vahds tu rohinyo gauryah slesma-vahdh sirdh. n. in. 2 The word purltat means principally the covering of the heart. abide 1 See Brh. Maitrl. i. n. and from there expands the auditory organ and When the buddhi thus expands. which is the support of all instinctive desires. commenting on this. to show that those sirds which carry vata are rosy (arund). 7. The Brhad-aranyaka Upanisad de scribes the hitd nadls of the heart as being as fine as a thousandth part of a hair.000 in . yellow and green liquids Sankara. 6. It seems. Katha. 19. Bibliotheca Indica. Atharva-Veda. for example. 2. 2. 4. iv. 2. 19. In i. vi. when it contracts. 2. that the larger ducts were called dhamanis. Kaus. 19.

2. which is split. is described in the Rg-Veda (vin. which goes towards the head. n. i) as This word may &quot. i. vi . . 3 J 3 would read nalani. 173. or hollow reed.} with Nada. the nadis are connected with the heart. and many of these are extremely there is a flow of 2 . by penetrating into the finest nadis. : . fine. See also Wackernagel.produced in the rains. 34. I. Maiin. I. 2 Sayana. In Brhad-aranyaka. p. 105. like spokes in a wheel.&quot. In another place it relation with nadl 3 etymological varsika. was known as early Upanisad.&quot. vi. being explained by him in one passage (i. or . 2. quotes the following verse: madhya-sthdydh susumndydh parva-pancaka-sambhavdh sdkhopasdkhatdm prdptdh sird laksa-traydt par am ardha-laksam iti prdhuh sanrdrtha-vicdrakdh. serves to surrounded by a network of nadis.V. The nada. iv. how ever. See also Katha. 8 the word nadika is used . in these nadis. vi. All that can be understood from these passages is that they are some kind of ducts. 183 et seq. 138.xin] The Circulatory and the Nervous System 345 there . 4.\ Vedische Studien. of which one goes towards the head 1 In Mund. 69. I. 8. Chandogya. vin. vin. 6 speaks of 101 nadis proceeding from the heart. Here Caland and Henry. being have some said that . and over which the waters go. 17. 6 and 7. 3 it is said that is the finest essence of food-juice inside the cavity of the heart it is this essence which. . p. 433 &quot. is women break nada with stones and make mats out of them 4 The word nadl is also used in the Atharva-Veda in the sense of &quot. Prasna.Nada is found in several passages of the Rg-Veda (i. 32.&quot. says that in the heart there are one hundred nadis and in each of these are twenty-two hundred branches and the vyana vayu moves through these. 33) as growing in ponds and in the Atharva-Veda (iv. n. vi. 6. 3. 2 1 to as the show that the Chdndogya 1 . v. through which support the body. 6 it is said that. The Maitrl Upanisad mentions the susumna nadl proceeding upwards to the head. : In the Atharva-Veda. 717 et seq. 18. as a reed boat. This passage is sometimes referred to in later literature susumna nadl. 8). 3. Urdhva-gd nadl susumndkhyd prdna-samcdrini. the nadis are described as ducts over the through which the seminal fluid flows ye te nddyau deva-krte yayos tisthati vrsnyam te te bhinadmi(l break with a stone upon a stone those two ducts of yours 5 testes. 19. being about the thousandth part of a hair in breadth. It is identified by Pischel (Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenldndischen Gesellschaft 35. through which blood and other secretions flow. 179. From the heart it rushes upwards through the extremely fine hita nadis which are rooted in the heart. in. i. 16. etc. It is . x. 4) but its sense is still obscure. 138. 4 yathd nadam kasipune striyo bhindanty asniand (Atharva-Veda. None of these passages tell us any prana thing definite about the nadis. 2. 3 Macdonell makes the following remarks in his Vedic Index. L Agnistoma. 4. in his commentary on A.ducts 5 In Atharva-Veda. Altindische Gramnmtik. n. vol. 2. 32.

Dhamani. by which all people live and without which they all die. 390. which nourish the body are secreted (sravanaf) out of these. 24). . 1 &quot. when the heart is formed. It is the essence by which the foetus is formed. Vedic Index. &quot. Caraka plainly regards dhamanls.reed&quot. These carry through out the body the ojas. it is the essence of the body and the seat of the pranas. 7. I have already referred to the use of the word hira in the Atharva2 Veda\ the word is also used in the Rg-Veda The above references show that nadls. n. life also ceases to exist. nadyah). reed. in Caraka and with a vol. the rivers are said to be dhamanls (ya dhamanayas to. etc. 2 tvam vrtram dsaydnam sirdsu maho vajrena sisvapah. x. In vi. &quot. I shall now come to Caraka: it will be found that there was not much advance towards a proper understanding of the significance of their distinction and (sabda) &quot. n. The word sir a is spelt with a palatal dental in the Vedas. siras (or hiras) and dhamanls were all ducts in the body. 8) and in a citation appearing in the Nirukta (vi. through which your semen flows). and Sayana paraphrases dhamani here as nadi. and which goes to the heart at a later stage. These ducts are called dhamanls.V. 90. The in the in Caraka and with a short word dhamani is spelt with a long &quot. 19. they are called srotas. 6 the word sndva means fine siras (suksmah-sirah) and dhamam the larger ducts (dhamani-sabdena sthuldh).i&quot. in. 5 one hundred dhamanls are said to surround the body of a person suffering from colic or gout (sula). 121. 15 In testes. and so also the interspace of the quarters of the sky (yasya catasrah made by God over your two pradiso nddyah}. In Chandogya. . R. and Sankara paraphrases dhamani as sir a. to denote the speech organ (vak). The word dhamam is used in Rg-Veda. u. . i. because they are filled with chyle from outside. I. because the chyle.V. whereas the dhamanls were the larger ducts. 2.s&quot. when it is lost. 33.pipe 1 and by Macdonell as explanations are to be accepted. p. n.&quot. appears to denote pipe in a passage of the Rg-Veda (n. the hollows of the seas are described as nadls (samudro yasya nddyah). then in A. and 1 6. but sometimes the nadls or siras had also the special sense of finer channels. and it has therefore been differently spelt in this chapter in different contexts. ii. siras and srotas (secretory currents) as ducts and thinks that different names are applied to them on account of their different functions. 8 and is paraphrased by Sayana as sound If Sayana s or &quot. functions. He says that the roots of the ten dhamanls are in the heart.&quot. and they are called sir a. Atharva-Veda.i&quot.346 Speculations in the Medical Schools [CH.

urine. for the flow of prana. bony marrow. 5. food-juice.3. . because they go (saranat sir ah) to the different parts of the body 1 The ten dhamanis spread out in manifold branches throughout the body. 7). takes the srotas as being the apertures through which the dhatus and other waste-products flow 4 In whatever way it may be looked at. santy eva. however. ahankdra. in commenting on this passage (Caraka-samhitd. tadvad atindriydndm punah sattvddindm kevalam cetandvac charlram ayana-b^ntam adhisthdna-bhutam ca&quot. 5. ill. na ca srotas chidra-pathena gamanam vind tad-uttarottara-dhdtutvena parinamati. according to Caraka. fat. semen. blood. flow through the body and all the channels (sarva-srotamsi ayana-bhutani) For the supply of materials for the suprasensual elements of the body. The 2 heart sir ah. says. pitta and kapha may be said to go about through all the srotas. .xm] The Circulatory and the Nervous System 347 . vata. the srotas is. etc. flesh. excreta and sweat. The coming together of rasa with blood at a different part of the body cannot take place without a path of trans mission. they must be considered as having some material spatial existence. In the Caraka-samhita srotas means properly the path through which the successive evolutionary products of the bodyconstituents (dhatus) or other kinds of secretion run and accumu late together with elements of their own types 2 Cakrapani explains it thus The transformation into blood takes place in connection . Cakrapani s comment on ibid. etc. bhutam adhisthdna-bhutam ca&quot. water. can all be carried in currents. is the root of all Caraka-samhita. . dhmdndd dhamanyah sravandt srotdmsi saranat n. buddhi and ahankdra may be atlndriya. nothing but . such as manas. buddhi. So the transformation of dhatus takes place through the function of this path of transmission. no doubt. Garigadhara s Jalpa-kalpa-taru on ibid. the duct of the dhamanis. 4 dhdra-parindma-raso hi srotasdm chidra-rupam panthdnam vind gantum na saknoti. I. Ibid. of the living 1 body serves as a channel 5 . in. : with chyle (rasa). 5 Gangadhara. Vayu. So for each kind of product there is a separate srotas. These manas. called srotas. however. Caraka opposes the view of those who think that the body is nothing but a collection of srotas. though there are. etc. 3 Dosdndm tu sarva-sarlra-caratvena yathd-sthfda-sroto bhidhdne pi sarvavdtddtndm apipradhdna bhutd dhamanyah srotamsy eva gamandrtham vaksyante 30. for the simple reason that the substances which pass through these srotas and the parts of the body where they are attached are certainly different from the srotas themselves.mana dtmd srotra-sparsana-nayana-rasan aghrdna-buddhy-ahankdrddindm kevalam cetandvat sajivam sarlra-sroto yana&quot. . special channels for each of the three 3 Gangadhara. but they are not on that account non-physical. There are several passages in Caraka where we hear of mano-vaha currents (currents carrying manas} if manas. There are separate srotas materials. .. pitta and slesman. . &quot. the whole .

dhamani. in accordance with the suggestions found in theAtharvaVeda. prdna channels. and the fat and pores of hairs. From these signs therefore one can infer that the prdna channels have been affected. 2 The synonyms for srotas given by Caraka are sird. vomiting and the like. Cakrapani explains it (kloma) as hrdaya-stham pipdsd-sthdnam. though the dhamanis and sir as were regarded by Caraka as having the same functions. and the seat of thirst is in the heart (kloma) 1 When these are affected. of the chyle (rasa) currents. 3 There is one passage of Drdhabala (Caraka-samhitd. 13. rasa-vdhinl. are the sources of fat channels fat bone channels the bones and joints. It is reasonable to suppose. says that dhamanis and srotas are different on account of their being different in number and of their having different functions and different appearances. dsaya and niketa. where it is said that hundred dhamanis and seven hundred sir as. It is well known that a distinction between siras and dhamanis is drawn by Susruta. of . and it is attended with sound and pain. dhamanis have become contracted (sankoca). palate. The liver and spleen are the source of blood currents. of urine channels. and this Caraka-samhitd. and. 5. Gaiigadhara. in spite of the fact that here the sir as and dhamanis are regarded as synonymous. the testes and penis. 23) which seems to draw a distinction it is between sirds symptom of a disease. said that the sirds have and dhamanis for there. however. in. 29. mdrga. [CH. the tongue. nddi. but indigestion. there is either too respiration the palate. and Gahgadhara as the point of conjunction between the throat and the heart (kanthorasoh sandhill). that. the may be very slow or very quick. 7. and the ten dhamanis are the paths. . in commenting on this passage. The source of water channels is affected. the bladder. dried up. and there is great thirst. VI.956.348 Speculations in the Medical Schools i. samvrtdsamvrtdni (open at the root. The tendons and skin are the sources of flesh currents. 10. panthd. their It is number is differently there are two counted in iv. 1 but Caraka positively denies any such distinction . of perspiration channels and pelvis. of the excreta 2 channels. when these are affected. and the finer endings of these are counted as 29. the pubic and the iliac regions. of semen channels. The kidneys . general moves through the channels of the prdna vdyu\ for vayu in all parts of the body. the intestines and the rectum. sthdna. to note that. curious. lips. . but closed at the end). . The heart is the source. to which I shall presently refer. as a expanded (dydma) and the .e. The stomach is the source of all currents carrying food. there is no desire for food. When these are much or too little respiration. of marrow channels. sarira-chidra. the former were larger than the latter 3 sir as. throat and kloma become .

that they have sometimes been regarded as perform . When blood passes through them. etc. 5. the principal siras are torty in number. ill. . food. 3 Susruta-samhita.. The srotas carry prdna. saying that they are different in appearance. blood. fineness (sauksmydt). and they allow the mind and senses to operate in their own ways and serve also to fulfil other functions of moving rapidly (prasyandana) . when vayu works in them. When pitta flows through the siras. 3. 9. blood. Dalhana. flesh and fat proximity. whereas the dhamanls that carry sense-im pressions of sound. white and red. 3. The dhamanls are more like sensory nerves. and also because of the fact that they have been referred to in similar terms by older authorities. 349 Gangadhara is accepted by his commentator Cakrapani also unable to point out any passage in Car oka to prove his opinion or to state more explicitly what is the difference of functions and appearances between the dhamanls and siras. they appear shining. The siras permit us to contract or expand our limbs or perform other motor functions. similar functions. without acknowledgment. etc. in. in. Cakracommentary on Caraka. have no distinctive colour. 1 pani 2 s na ca Carake Susruta iva dhamani-sira-srotasam bhedo vivaksitah. slesman. the principal dhamanls twenty-four and the principal srotas twenty-two in number. 4 ing the same work. 9. etc. pitta. Vayu. since they carry sensations of sound. are the s view that siras. they become coloured and filled also with the different dhatus and produce the sense-cognition of touch. pitta. and it is very surprising that he should not know the difference of views on this point between Caraka and Susruta and should try to support Caraka by a quotation from Susruta on the very point on which they materially differ. 4 Ibid. 3 It is on account of their close water. When slesman passes through them. and the srotas have the same colour as the dhatus which flow through them. in explaining this.xi 1 1] is The Circulatory and the Nervous System 1 . increase digestive fire and health. taste and smell (sabda-rupa-rasagandha-vahatvddikam dhamanlndm). srotas and dharmanls same and opposes it. blue. colour. 8-17. create desire for food. says that the siras carry vdta. in. Dalhana on ibid. In fact Gangadhara s remarks are directly borrowed from Susruta. and are rosy. 7. they give an oily appearance to the body. number and functions. though their functions are really different . Susruta refers to Caraka Again. 3. firmness of joints and strength. slesman and blood any one of these may flow through any and every sira*.. chyle.

as soon as it is digested by the food-juice throughout action of heat. The apertures of some dhamanis by which the food-juice is circulated through the body are as fine as lotus fibres. excreta. etc. pitta. marga.g. and others grosser sir ah 2 . of all these ducts that their functions are sometimes confused. and are thirty in number. in explaining is this. The carrying of vdta. when a bundle of grass the burning of each separate blade of grass cannot be burning. says that. the same two dhamanis these dhamanis that the that carry the semen in men. rupa. these there are altogether ten for carrying vdta. as distin guished from speech two for going to sleep. and it is . shoulders. etc. dkdslydvakdsdndm dehe ndmdni dehindm srotdmsi mdrgdh kham dhamanyah. two for carrying milk in women. which is designated as the seat digestion. branch out. It is by body on the upper side of the navel (e. start The dhamanis from the navel .35 Speculations in the Medical Schools [CH. kapha. . . 10. as the apertures of lotus stalks. semen. Sarlra. 7 and 8 see also Dalhana s commentary on it. urine. as. is the common these dhamanis. so the sir as dhamanis and srotas are situated so close to one another that it is very difficult .) held fast to the lower quality of all part. ten to the lower part and four crosswise (tiryag-gdh). there are two for Of the organ of speech. The dhamanis connected with of rasa (rasa-sthana) 2 1 Thus Dalhana remarks . srotas. Susruta. menstrual blood. They eject vdta. there are eight for carrying sabda. and work. two for making noise (ghosa). K. perceived on account of their contiguity. two for each. rasa and gandha. sonita. are divided into three classes. ird. etc. two for each. apertures. kha and dhamanl are the general names used to denote the canals or ducts of the body 1 It is on account of the similarity of action to observe their separate functions . pitta. the pittas ay a carry the the body. by supplying it to the upper circulatory dhamanis and through them to the heart. Ibid. is sides. ix. chest. downwards. sonita and rasa. Thus some dhamanis have very fine apertures. Dalhana. two for being awake two for bearing tears. ten proceed to the upper part of the body. and nourish the body with the assimilable products of . and some grosser than them. yathd svabhdvatah khdni mrndlesu bisesu ca dhamanlndm tathd khdni raso yair upaclyate. back. Those ten which go to the upper part of the body. Those dhamanis which branch out downwards are thirty in number. hands. Ten dhamanis : carry vata. They are connected with the place of pitta (pittds aya) draw downwards the materials not fit for being ab sorbed.

which. when hurt. mano py ekam eva. . see also Dalhana s commentary on it. and it is these which regulate women. called apanga. Susruta also speaks in this connection of a place inside 1 2 Susruta. and penis are held together. Below the eyebrows on the two sides of the eye there are the two dhamanis. watery sprinklings. as connected by manas. produce blindness there are also two other dhamanis.) pancdbhibhiitds tv atha panca-krtvah pancendriyam pancasu bhdvayanti pancendriyam pancasu bhdvayitvd pancatvam dydnti vindsa-kdle. also produce of smell. ix. in. rectum. as associated with the subtle body. two for its ejection. the effective principles (vlrya) of oil. urine. vi.&quot.ix. which. (It is through these dhamanis.xm] The Circulatory and the Nervous System 351 kapha and rasa\ two. two are for the production of semen (sukrapradur-bhava). the menstrual flow in the case of . There is the cognizer (mantr) and the manas organ the dhamanl which is con . in. nected with manas on one side and the dhamanis which carry the different sense-impressions on the other make the sense-data 3 cognized by the self . two are connected with the bladder for ejecting urine. 7 and 8 . Dalhana. arrest the sensation of the ear there are two dhamanis. various sensory and motor dhamanis Down below the back called vidhura. connected with the larger intestines. u. through which perspiration goes out and which nourish the body with rasa. m. . 9. Dalhana. receives the pleasurable and painful impressions of touch. says: fair eva mano. tena manasd yaiva dhamanl sabdddi-vahdsu dhamanlsv abhiprapannd saiva dhamanl sva-dharmam grdhayati mantdram ndnyeti. &quot. 2 The dhamanis direct the five painful sense-impressions of touch senses to the five sense-objects for their cognition. 28. two. that the self. produce deafness. IX. etc. in commenting on the above. which. eject the excreta there are eight others which carry perspiration. when hurt. enter the body after being acted on by bhrajaka (heat of the skin) 1 It is again these which carry the pleasurable and .nugataih sukhdsukha-rupam sparsam karmdtmd grhnlte. and through these waist. are spread all over the body. says: mantd hi sarlre eka eva. : blindness. which go crosswise (tiryag-gah). It is by these dhamanis that the intestines. Each of the other four dhamanis. two dhamanis called phana which. drira. innumerable as they are. two carry water. excreta. has hundreds and thousands of branches. when hurt.&quot. above the eyebrows and below them. when inside the two nostrils there are the injured. like so many windows their mouths are at the holes of the hairs. called dvarta. &quot. The are further named in Susruta. carry the food-juice. Susruta. bladder . connected with the intestines. oint ments. in commenting on this passage of Susruta. which.

drlra. The srotas are again described by Susruta as being ducts. They start from the navel and branch out number. water. In describing the siras (700 in number) Susruta says that these are like so many canals by which the body is watered and by the contraction and expansion of which the movements of the body are rendered possible. which are also but special kinds of sndyus. and these have also holes within them (susirdh). semen and menstrual blood. at least to some extent. and the same is the case with those which circulate pitta. ten for pitta. which is regarded as one bone from the bottom of the back to the root of na hi vdtam sirdh kdscin na pittam kevalam tathd slesmdnam vd vahanty eta atah sarvavahdh smrtdh. Susruta. flesh. be noted though some siras are regarded as mainly circulating vdyu or pitta or kapha. 16. sndyu and bones which are particularly the seats of prdna: when persons are hurt in these places. . in. The siras of vdta circu like so many lation again branch out into 175 siras. and these. as the adhipati superintendent. other than sird and dhamanl. all. which start from the cavity of the heart and spread out 2 through the body These srotas carry the currents of prdna. fibres of leaves. nerve system of the Tantras. food. But it should that.352 Speculations in the Medical Schools [CH. When vdta is properly circulated through the siras. fat. circulate There are 900 sndyus. they may either lose their lives or suffer various kinds of deformity. Sus ruta also mentions five hundred muscles. The Nervous System The of the Tantras. the skull on the upper part of the brain. The principal siras are forty in of these ten are for the circulation of vdta. We have thus altogether 700 siras. blood. as well as the kandards. 13: muldt khdd antaram dehe prasrtam tv abhivdhi yat srotas tad iti vijneyam sird-dhamanl-varjitam. it struction becomes possible for us to move our limbs without ob and to exercise our intellectual functions. ix. The mannas are vital spots in flesh. is entirely different from that of the medical systems of Caraka and Susruta. sir a. where all the sir as have met together. ten for kapha and ten for rakta (blood). Susruta. however. It starts with the conception of the spinal column (meru-danda). 2 vii. just as the several pieces of planks are held together in a boat. excreta. urine. serve to bind the joints of the body. kapha and rakta. juice. yet they 1 all three .

tad-bdhye tu tayor madhye susumnd vahnisamyuta This however is against the view of the Sat-cakra-nirupana. z Nddtis derived by Purnananda Yati in his commentary on the Sat-cakra-nirupana. 226. idd and pingald are both inside the spine. branching on the left. judging from the fact that it is said to originate in the sacrum. On thepingald. which takes . &quot. Mahamahopadhyaya Gananatha Sen makes a . but this is entirely against the accepted view. where it gets joined with the citrim nddi and enters into the cerebral region. susumnd. . If susumnd is the central nerve of the spinal cord. and are seventy. where it joins with the plexus of a thousand nerves called brahma-cakra (cerebrum in the vault of the skull) and is divided at the level of the larynx (kanthd) into anterior and posterior parts between the two eyebrows (djnd-cakrd) and the cavity in the brain (brahma-randhrd) respectively.two thousand in number. vajra and citrim . the end of the vertebral column. hasti-jihvd. 35. According to the Nigama-tattvasdra-tantra. and they proceed upwards to the highest cerebral nerve-plexus. and between it and the susumna are the pusd. susumnd to be inside the passage of the spine. The sankhini (the auricular branch or the cervical plexus on the left) goes parallel to the susumna. as a passage or duct (nada gatau iti dhdtor nadyate gamyate naydpadavyd iti nddi).&quot. stretching from the left eye to the left foot.xin] The Nervous System of the Tantras 353 the neck. 227). stretching from below the corner of the right eye to the abdomen. the lumbar nerves. . which encases within it the vajra nddi. to go. Rele thinks that this susumnd nddi is nothing but the spinal cord. sankhini. . Seal thinks that susumnd is the central passage or channel of the spinal cord and not a separate nddi (The Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus. the auricular branch or the cervical plexus. which is again in reality made up of three 1 All nadis start from the root at nadis. This inner passage 1 But according to the Tanira-cuddmani susumnd is not inside the spinal column but outside it. stretching from the corner of the left eye to the left leg. which has within it a fine aperture running all through it. and that again encases within it the citrim nddi. which is the fine 2 aperture running through the spinal cord . pp. Thus it says. Mr Rele in his The Mysterious Kundalinl (pp. but takes a turn in the region of the neck and passes on to sarasvati left ear-holes in another branch it passes through the inner side of the region of the forehead. 219. from which it goes upwards to the base of the skull. then on its extreme right side is the idd. . In the passage inside this spinal column there is a nerve (nddi). called susumnd. and then parallel to it towards the susumnd are the gdndhdrl. The place of the root of these nadis (kdnda) is an inch above the anus and an inch below the root of the penis. Dr Sir B. called kdnda. from the root nad. 3 6) thinks that it is anddl which is situated centrally and passes through the spinal column (meru-dandd) but. kuhu (the pubic also the visvodara. N. nerve on the left) and the extreme left of it is and varana (the sacral nerve). The susumna the root of the . pasyantl. nddi is a sort of duct inside the spine. DII 23 . called sahasrdra.

i and Yogi-ydjnavalkya-samhitd. Yogi-ydjna valkya. St. In Yoga and Tantra literature the term nddl generally supersedes the term sird of the medical literature. St. nddl is also called further duct or nddl within the citrinl 1 brahma-nddl. The three. viz. distinctly does 2 The Rele wrong to call it the vagus nerve. including vajrd and citrinl}. including susumnd and counting susumnd as one nddl (i. however. because the channel of the susumnd the brahma-nddl. and it is . Jndna-samkalinl. as idd nddl on the left side of the susumnd outside the Mr spine goes upwards to the nasal region. regards the nddls as originating from the nerve-plexus in the very serious mistake in his Pratyaksa-sdrlraka when he thinks that the nddls are to be regarded as being without apertures (nlrandhra). of another nddl. while the Tantra school. for there is no The susumnd thus in all . But. . Other accounts of these nddls hold that the idd proceeds from the right testicle and the pingald from the left testicle and passes on to the left and the right form (dhanur-dkdre). The susumnd . as it were (triveni). 18. the name Srlkanada in his Nddl-vijndna counts the number of nddls as thirty-five millions.354 within the Speculations in the Medical Schools citrinl [CH.. and. Purnananda s commentary on Satcakra-nirupana. . and pingald follows a corresponding course on the right side. etc. susumnd is sometimes but kundalinl itself cannot be called a nerve. called alambusd. are also described as being like the moon and the sun respectively. though the total number of nddls is regarded as being seventy-two thousand. . however. and susumnd as fire 3 In addition to these nddls the Yogi-ydjnavalkya mentions of the susumnd in a bent meet at the root of the penis. making the number of the important nddls fourteen. as represented works Sat-cakra-nirupana. is the passage through which this energy flows from the lower part of the trunk to the . They are certainly not so regarded in the Ayur-veda or in the Sat-cakra-nirupana and its commentaries. Kundalinl is a name for supreme bodily energy. All the nddls are connected with the susumnd. whence it becomes connected with the aperture of the sankhinl (sankhinl-ndlam dlambyd) and passes to the cerebral region.e. Hatha-yoga-pradipikd. a Susumndyai kundalinyai. which is thus regarded as the junction of the three rivers. idd (compared to Yamuna) and pingald (compared to Sarasvati). probability stands for our spinal cord. The two nddls idd and pingald. 2. 64. called kundalinl regions of the nerve-plexus of the brain. of susumnd (compared to the river Ganga). p. is said to take a turn and get connected with the sankhinl in the inside region of the forehead. 1 Sabda-brahma-rupdydh kundalinydh parama-siva-sannidhi-gamana-patha rupa-citrinl-nddy-antargata-sunya-bhdga iti. 3 Sat-cakra-nirupana. iv. .

in the heart. Of these the first is adhara-cakra. as manifested in its move ment of a downward pressure of the apdna vdyu and an upward pressure of the pr ana vdyu. This plexus is situated between the penis and the anus. Vijnanabhiksu says in his Yoga-varttika that one branch of the susumna goes upwards from here. Next is the cardiac plexus (anahata-cakra or visuddhacakra). however. and while Caraka regards them as originating from the heart. going upwards. There is a form. of twelve branches. Next comes the lalana-cakra. generally translated as sacro-coccygeal plexus. which is the nddi for carrying the functions of manas and is called mano-vaha nddi. and which carry the sense-qualities of colour. the mind-organ. that exhalation and inhalation are made possible and life functions operate. Next is the laryngeal and pharyngeal plexus. There are again seven hundred nadls with fine apertures. odour. spiral in its by the potential mother-energy. Next to this is the ajna-cakra between the eyebrows. the sacral plexus. It is in touch with the mouth of the susumna. This spiral and coiled fibre is called kula-kundalini . Next comes the svadhisthanacakra. therefore. taste. and there are eight elevations on it. Srikanada. opposite the uvula.xm] The Nervous System of the Tantras 355 lying between the root of the penis and the anus. in the region of the navel. like a fine bud with an aperture at its mouth. near the root of the penis. Srikanada regards from the region of the navel (nabhi-kandd) and downwards and sideways from there. and the seat of for it is manas. In the centre of the plexus there is an elevation called svayambhulinga. fine thread-like fibre. It seems. which carry food-juice by which the body is nourished. within which is the manas-cakra. that it is through this nddi that connection is established 23-2 . Of these again there are twenty-four which are more prominent. at the junction of the spinal cord and the medulla oblongata. Next comes the lumbar plexus (mani-pura-cakra). called the bhdrati-sthdna. * The most important is its feature of the Tantra school of anatomy the theory of nerve-plexuses (cakra). compromises with the Tantra school by holding that of as originating them these thirty-five millions there are seventy-two thousand nadls which may be regarded as gross and are also called dhamanis. the centre of all sense-knowledge and dream-knowledge. attached to the aperture of the svayambhu-linga on one side and the mouth of the susumna on the other. the Jndna-samkalinl tantra calls it jndna-nddi. touch and sound (pancendriya-gundvaha).

is the sahasrara-cakra. 14 and 15. But. but. since the nerve-plexuses are all outside the spinal aperture. would not have been possible. as these are effected by the automatic functions of prana 1 Above the djnd-cakra comes the soma-cakra. judging from a wide comparison of the it seems pretty certain that it is the kundall sakti or the kundall energy which is carried upwards. as the kundalinl is a mysterious power. supposing that these nerve-plexuses represent the corre sponding places of the cakras inside the spinal cord. that the nadis are themselves capable of producing tactile impressions for. The of Yoga consists in rousing the potential energy located in process the adhara-cakra. then eating and drinking. and finally. If the kundall energy is inexhaustible in its nature. I have ventured to refer to the cakras as such. This kundalinl is described as a fine fibre like a lightning flash (tadid iva vilasat tantu-rupa-svarupa). pp. which raises the question whether this is actually a physical nerve or merely a potential energy that is to be carried upwards to the upper cere brum in the sahasrdra-cakra\ and it cannot. as raised in Sir John loses its point. carrying it upwards through the aperture of the citrinl or the brahma-nadl. Sankara MiSra argues in his commentary on the Vaisesika-sutras. But it must be borne in mind that. there or the sahasrdra. and also because it has become customary to refer to the cakras as plexuses. .356 Speculations in the Medical Schools soul. v. How far the cakras s Serpent Power pp. and bringing it to the brahma-randhra cerebrum. the whole discussion as to whether the texts. 222-225. residing in the brain. had it not been so. as associated with their corresponding feelings. 301-320. be yet satis factorily explained. I think. so also are the cakras the mysterious centres in the path of the ascent of the A nerve-physical interpretation of them as nervekundalinl. if the kundalinl is to pass through the aperture of the citrinl nddl and at the same time pass through the cakraS) the cakras or the lotuses (padmd) must be inside the spinal cord. residing in the manas-cakra. Seal s Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus. The chief interest of the present section only to show that the Tantra See Dr Sir B. discussion on these subjects will be found in the treatment of Tantra philosophy in a 1 A later volume of is this work. the seat of the soul. . [CH. more detailed plexuses would be very unfaithful to the texts. can themselves be called nerve. in the upper between the . in the middle of the cerebrum. But. plexuses is very doubtful. and the manas. N. ddhdra-cakra rises or is depleted or not or whether the kundalinl herself her eject. 2.

xin] The Theory of Rasas and is their Chemistry 357 entirely different in its conception from the Ayur-veda which has been the subject of our present enquiry. chedaniya and neutral (sddhdrana). sweet (madhura). Another fact of importance also emerges from these considera tions. Purnaksa held that there were three rasas. hot (katu). anatomy Caraka s own part refers to the heart as the central seat of the soul. Varyovida held that there were six rasas. Sakunteya. Varyovida. attended by Atreya. or rasa. namely. their specific properties as light or heavy (gund). on account of the diversity of substances in which they are located (dsraya). though in Drdhabala s supplementary part of the Siddhi-sthdna the head is associated with sensory consciousness. salt (lavana). distasteful and harmful. 26 of Caraka we hear of a great meeting of sages in the Caitraratha Forest. cold (slta). nutritive (upasamanlya) and denutritive (chedaniya). sweet and good. was that which could be perceived by the organ of the tongue and it was one. In I. hot (usna). Bhadrakapya held that taste. bitter (tiktd). alkaline (ksdra). that of water. and held that there were eight pungent (kasdya) and rasas. anatomy. fiery. smooth (snigdha) and dry (ruksa). the physician of Balkh. Kumarasiras held that there were five rasas. watery. But the Tantra school points to the upper cerebrum as the seat of the soul and regards the spinal cord and its lower end as being of supreme importance for the vital functions of the body. earthy. viz. unmanifested (avyakta). Sakunteya held that there were two rasas. Nimi held that there were seven rasas. Kankayana held that the rasas were of infinite variety and could not be counted. their action in developing or reducing the consti tuents of the body (karma) and their diversity as apparent to the organ of taste. light (laghu). heavy (guru). theory of Rasas or tastes plays an important part in Ayur-veda in the selection of medicines and diet and in diagnosing diseases and arranging their cures. the Vaideha king Nimi. Bhadrakapya. Hiranyaksa held that there were four rasas. upasamaniya. . Badisa added one more to these. for the purpose of discussing questions of food and tastes. Purnaksa Maudgalya. Badisa and Kankayana. sweet and harmful. that. Atreya Punarvasu held that there are six rasas only. Kumarasiras Bharadvaja. Hiranyaksa Kausika. airy and ethereal (antariksd). The Theory The of Rasas and their Chemistry. sour (amid). distasteful and good. viz.

place in which the substance is grown (desd)\ (5) the time at of heaviness. It is well known that by composition wholly new properties may be generated in the product. The seats of rasas are the essences of the five elements (panca-mahd-bhuta-vikdrdh) modified in accordance with five conditions. produced (kdla) moisture and dryness belong to the things to which cold. Again. . which is lighter than rice.saline&quot. the feeble rasa may be regarded as unmanifested or. any substance. when a substance has two rasas.hot and pungent&quot. bitter (tiktd) and astringent (kasdyd). The view that there is an infinite number of rasas is untenable for. (avyaktd) could be given. (i) specific nature of the substance (prakrti) (2) as acted upon by heat or other agents (vikrti) (3) association with other things (vicara) (4) the . that 1 Thus mudga (a sort of kidney-bean). sweet (madhurd). has the rasas of astringent and sweet and is yet light by nature. but that is no reason why we should say that water has a separate taste called &quot. the rasas belong. this may be con sidered as unmanifested. as it is made up of more than one rasa and affects more than one sense-organ for it has at least two important rasas (of &quot. of a syrup. Vikrti is best exemplified in the case of fried paddy. lightness. acid (amid). which is a bhuta-vikdra. . which 1 The gunas separate rasa. . is no such separate rasa which can be called unmanifested (avyaktd). though it may be urged that the same rasa may occur differently in different to There . Pleasantness (svddu) or unpleasantness (asvadu) of taste depends on liking or disliking. Its actions are sedative (upasamand) and denutritive (chedand). when in a compound of different rasas. though one would expect it to be heavy on account of its rasas of astringent and sweet.) and it affects not only the organ of taste. say. one dominant and the other extremely feeble.unmanifested&quot. Medicinal herbs vary in their properties in accordance with the time of plucking. . hot and pungent (katu). would only go to show that there are various grades of forms of each particular rasa and not prove that with each variety of a particular rasa the rasa itself is wholly different. objects. . warm. but certainly there is no rasa to which the name &quot.unmanife