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Fort Monroe, Virginia
A TTNG,-64 350. 05/50(DOCI)(C)(30 Jun 52) 30 June 1952
SUBJECT: Dissemination of Combat Information i •.
,:. j" ') .' -', .: ','; 1 ' , • I i I'
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TO: See distribution .k·. 1 : 1S52 I
r,r'L:V I \
ll •••.•••• •••····.
1. In accor,dance\w'ith SR 525-85-5, Processing of Combat
the inclosed EXTRACTS are forwarded
to Department
of the Army, Army Field For'ce's and the service schools for eval­
and necessary action. ' It may be appropriate, in certain
cases, for these agencies to take actioJi upon a single extracted item;
in others, may be desirable to develop a cross-section of accumu­
lated extracts on a particula:r subject before initiating actiop; and
otten, the extracted item serves ,to reaffirm our doctrinefJ and tech­
,'• .; !
2. Copies are furnished to other military agencies to keep
them informed concerning theater problems from the front line,
through the logistical command.
3. These EXTRACTS are derived from reports which are
SECRET. For the greater convenience of the user"
Office downgrades each extracted item to the lowest classification
cotnpatible with securitY. No effort is made to paraphrase or .delete
any of the extracted remarks, so that none 9f.tJ:1e '
int,ent is lost. ", ' ". "
4. 'Combat information EYTRACTS herein which are appli­
cable to trainin,g at.:.the com,pany-battery level also,appear in Army.
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Extracts from sources
Lt Col, AGe
376 thru 383 Asst Adjutant General
(Over) CN 259Z2

1-.s-o - S'
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3 ACOFS. 0 .. 1a tiA 10 The Quartermaster General
3 ACOFS. G-Z, DA Z Executive for Reserve
15 ACOFS, G-3. DA and ROTC Affairs
. t, ' '
The Adjutant General
Chief Signal Officer
The Surgeon General
Z Chief of Chaplains 4 Chief of Transportation
10 Chief Chemical Officer Comdt
Chief of Engineers"
, . )
Chief of Finance
The Armored School
The Artillery School
Chi,ef of Information
Inspector General
Z ,/
The Infantry School
Army War Col:lege
Z The' Judge Advocate General Z casc
Z Chief of Military History Z Army General School
Z 'Chief. National Guard Z Asst Comdt. The Artillery
Bureau School. Branch
10 Chief of Ordnance 1 ea Pres. AFF Boards
Z The Provost Marshal 1 CO. Arctic Test Branch
, l',,:.:'
Copies furnished:
,70 TAG (10 ea CINC and CG. Major Oversea Command)
, CG's
'z ea Continental Armies
4 Army AA Command,
Z' Military District of
2.' Tactical Air Command '
Chief of Naval Operations. Dept of the Navy
, ,
1 '
,CO. Mountain &: Cold Weather Tng' Command ,,;t,.,
Z Chief, Army Advisory Gp. Air Command and
School. Air University
Comdt of Cadets. US Military Academy
Z Armed Forces Staff College
Z MarinE; ,Corps School
Z USAF Air-Ground Operations School
Z Counter Intelligence Corps School
Z The Provost Marshal General's School
1 Officer in Atlal:l:ti,C: Cent
Attn: Ground Forces Officer
1 Chief. AFF Human tJnjt No 1
',j. ,..
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.7 2 7 19im?P' • iii
@J 8:f4r
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Fort Monroe, Virginia
SOURCE: Command Report - 15th In! Regt
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DATE: February 1<)52 Source No' 376
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. (RESTRICTED) During this period the regiment. con·
tinued to c'onduct VT fire' by Division Artillery over friendly
bunkers along the MLR. This operation was instigated to
create confidence in the occupants of the bunkers regarding
the protection their bunkers would afford them in the evellt
their position was overrun making it necessary to bring.: .
friendly artillery on their position.
, I I." "': :_
,:'(RltST.RICTED),,: I,: The;re:,has been a noticeable lack
of in:the at nightr :F.lTom the
number of rounds expended during contact with the enemy.
'ca'sualties are attlazingly,,low. 'This regiment has and
is continuing to conduct a study of this problem.
... . .
;,',:, ,;?-.. To date it has been determined that: '
a,.: ;ls a tendency for .the rifleman to shoot
over the heads of the enemy•
• •••, ." , " - " J
b. The muzzle blast of the Rifle Cal. 30 MI
the firer"s night vision.
( ,
''c. ,I The 'applicati'oh of'luminous paint on sights
and along the barrel is of some value.,
3. ·tt is recommended that:
... a.. studies. be to , .r
find methods of correcting this deficiency and this information
8'S OV'iil I ISO

'GORts In;;']" ill
b. That a flash hider be provided for the Rifle
Cal.30 MI.
" . c; That this be made a study by the Army Field
Forces Board arid thai 'a CGurs'e ot-instruction in hight firing
be included in the basic training of replacements prior to
'.their arrival in this theater.
SOURCE: Command Report - 5th Regi1l)ental Combat ,Team
DATE: Decen:tber 195.1., Source No 377
," :.. ,*lthough reports' of enemy artilleryf"
for light. shell reports continued to be
turned in with errors in azimuth readings. "f\.special Com­
:pass b.een to each front line unit.
The board is a,piece of soft pine 12" square by 1" in
depth. Four long spikes are put at each corner to stake it
to the ground. A ppotographe'd'disc with highglaze content
iis.'p'laced on the board' with a 'directional north arrow at the
side. A wooden arrow ,is 'placed in the center of the boa:i-'d
:and can be 'made to pivot 'by hand. " .
•.\, " To operate the board, all that is nec'essary is to point
the w,ooden arrow in the direction of the sound or flash. '
the numbers 8..t, this point and report them to the CPo
is least one b,oard be ma:de _
available to each company on the front line and that no de­
tailed"or technical explanation be made on the use of
board. A man should be taught three steps in the procedure:
(1) Point the 'ci'rrowin direction of sound or flash. (2) Read
the numbers at' the point and (3) Give the information to
••• ***.* ••
9ce . '5'5 ,
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(CO:NFII)ENTIAL) A total of one thousand"three hundred
(1374) indigenous personnel are employed in
.capa,cities ,witbintbe,regiment. one ,thousand seventy­
seven (1077) of those are members of the Korean ServIce
Corps.' the remaining two hundred ,ninety-seven (297) are
miseel1a.neou. ,personnel·who are p,roc'ured tlirough the Civil
These Korean' perform an invalu­
able s,erviee t,o the' Regiment',by ca,..rying ammuDition. rations
and other supplies to,.front Une .inaccessible' to '
vehicle 1heir utilizatioil I'n 'other areas as KP's,
etc,.. has United States per.Orinel for otper and more
important, tasks.
(CONFIDENTIAL) The most outstanding development in
the field for the month was the expanded use
of listening devices by all line units. The listening device is
composed of a microphone and, r'eceiving set. The microphone
is placed in likely avenues of approach, at a·,range·-greater
than that of the Outpost Line of Res.istance. Mortar concen­
trations are placed on the same spot and fired when sounds
of approaching en'emy are' identified.' The.regiment has ,',
profitedfr'om the use of the device and plans to' initiate train-, '
ing in its use in 'oreier tobetier its warning eaPflbilitie's.
* ••••• *.* •••
• • • ;. < •• :1" f . '
. :n the, past ,there have
been' two instances "in which rounds have exploded in the 4.2
inch,mortar tubes,.' The Heavy Mortar Company developed
a. system' of firing' the p1.ece which afforded maximum,pro­
tection for the crew in the event' of an explosion. system"
incorporates firing by lanyard and a revetment behbldwbich
, .
the crew remains until the round has safely left the tube.
NCLASSIFIED •Sa6lUi' ildPORMA i ib44
J C;ON.IBEf4TIAl!:'"
"cj5N!j6€ 1i$'I'Xl
SOURCE: Command Report - 3d Inf Div
JanuarY' Source No 378
(RESTRICTED) The Division' Light Air Section is in
a composite airseetion with supply, .operations and
housing operating from a common airstrip. The section
functions much the same' as: a company. but does
not have a TlOirE authorization.6verhead personnel re­
quirements are accomplished by airplane mechanics. vehicle
drivers or by special duty In this manner a
separate mess is .maintained to pr'ovide for messing· of .aviation
;personnel. Recommend that a cTIO&E b.e authorized-estab..
lis.bing a Division Aviation Company to include all Army
£unctic>ns of the Division.' '.
SOURCE: Command Report - .9th Infantry ite.gt. '
DATE: January 1952, Sourc,e No 379
(CONFIDENTIAL) The greatest problem continues to
be replacements, both officer and enlisted. In the former
case officers are being received whose training and experi­
ence are at a di:rect variance with the needs of a combat
regini.ent. . It is being made
th8.t, any offic.er wearing "c'rossed rifles" is a qualified 1!)4Z_
cases. however, these officers have had a back­
ground with no experience but instead as personnel
oftjcers. intelligence specialists. TI8rE,etc.
" 'j. .. : ,.
Enlisted are' arriving ,a ,manner.
Recently, arpan a dry cle.aning machine
. • '.' '. . . I , A •
,MOS and another with steam locomotive operator
MOS as·signed. Many men with artillery and other
branch specialities are similarly received. Every effort is
'b-eing made to men reassigned so that the best
ends· of the service are being served not only in utilizing
§2C6!l!, P'S9RP"Ti?
trained manpower but by contributing to good morale by
having men do work they
The replacement is: particularly pr,ess.ing
since Category IV the rotation.program
cause a high rate, on key personnel.
In solving the commissions are
being made as c;')ften as suitable appointees are found. The
9th Infantry IRTe gives a refreshf!r course which helps orient
men who are not familiar with Inf'methods.
SOURCE: C01'llroa,nd Report - Headquarters IX Corps
DATE: JanuarY,195Z Source No 380
: . .
, ',(RESTRICTEDJ There are now in the Corps sector some
15 01",20 of these valuable time-savers designed to meet the
supply tantl-,evacuation"'m!eds of infantry front-line units in
>The model of a. 11 "later ones has been
the 3d 698.: Cons'truction 'on'
this was started as soon as:iJie of Hill 69'8, 'iri t'he
former Z4th Division sectDr-; wai;i It,ts &s1.hgle::' stage.
double-track' -system tramwaYo"po4Ne'ted by a 3/4-ton truck
m4tor. rim attkehed:to tha 'the
driving drum for -the haul '1'he
s'tra"ight-line distance
of the tramway is approximately lS'OO'feet. the 'static load '
cables are 18Z0 feet long, the difference in elevation between
the stations is 910 feet. In one period of 31 days Tramway
698 had hauled 187 tons of ammunition, rations, and other
supplies to ,the top of the hill.' and evacuated Z4 casualties"
During one period it hauled 18 tons and evac'Uated "
four casualties. Through its example the erection
tenance of aerial tramways' has become a primary
of the enginee,rbattalions of divisions attached to the Corps.
.. £52119' SF '" :t I 'filM
it. .tl' I, ) 'I! d·
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(CQNFIDENTIAL) Iti" that an extende'd
track wedge {or tractors. higb .peed, M4'and MS, be designed
,and produced in order ta insure traction during operation on'
frozen : It, i.s further recommended that such
extended.g:oack wedges be included in "Oft Vehicle Material"
in the quantity of 48 per vehicle. ' . '. '
Combat experience had inpi.eated that M4 and M5 high-'
tr.etors do not lbave sufn-de'nt traction on' frozen ground
and to perform their mission as prime'm:overs for towed
A ,field ,expedient. bf welding steel cleats
long. by one inch thick to stabda·rd track
good:,r.esults in the field. 'This expedient; however,
n:takeslarge, demand..,'.on ,both materials and time.' and 'its
SUCces s depends· (1lmost. entirely dpon the skill of the welder.
the cleats' break off with usage.
'.in-·'goocl condition, however. it'has'
2.4 pel" track give good traction even
under jcy It is believed that this number would
be adequate for the ,:xtended wedges recommended.
Report .. 64th Tank Bn (Medium)
DATE: January 1952 Source No 381
", (CONFIDENTlAL) suitable, type track,
be de;;eloj;;ed for winter operations on, ground solidly
to a two or inches,. Exper.ence, ip­
Korea has shown 'that the present track, either steel or rubber,
lacks traction and climb:ing ability, on on frozen
gr'ound, e';en na,'s power t9
type 'M or is
break the surface 'sufficiEH1tly to give the ta'nk the nece'ssary
additional traction anQ also.focus the weight of the tank on
by thi,s ;unit
wllerem every fourth track block IS a deep two-mch cJl.e.vron
block followed by three normal olle-'inc'h chevrori blocks (or
3& F 'x 'W99f'?T
<,'., 'e8tJFI QiiN;P IAL:
nos,,:: i. $it! U 4
normal rubber blocks). Although tests have not as yet been
complicated by track failure, if is foreseen that the combi­
nation tracks being tested may over a period of time lead to
track failure. The combination' of the one two-inch chevron
block followed by the three one'"':inch chevron blocks showed
impJ'oved climbing ability; traction
wa,;a ,still to ,utilize the m.lrimum powet; of
the M46 or A I tank. , , ..
As opposed to. the above the
of normal rubber with tH.e 'two-inch grouser ' '
proved unworthy of further Also, it was n.oted . '
neither the solid two-inch grouser track, the solid one-inch
grouser track. nor the s'olid' t·rack were able to climb
thE! solidly frozen slopes as wen 'as the combination steel
track. it that detailed study
and tests be conducted in the Continental United States
developmentofa tra.ck that will enhance the climb­
iJ,lgability of the future medi.um tank, without t·rack
fQr winter conditions
those in Korea. '
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(RESTRICTED) Action should be taken toward procure­
;me;nt of heatf.7d shelters for tank ma intenance operations
during winter operations. Shelters should be of adequate size
and height to, enable of. the power pack from the tank,
using the wrecker boom, and to allow room for necessary
Although expedients have been used, the re­
s.ulting shelters are and are to some, extent a
safety hazard in high winds. , It ,is believed, t\).at
standards and deadline times during intense cold canbe
ilnprove!l by' proViding shelter, thereby
eiiminating a'nd the all-too-frequent, but neces­
sary, trips to outside warming
oas3"'" Ii#01'1"bN
zSt6fQ1 iDEN i lAc
tiQIIR'TH '? 7 ON

SOURCE: Command Report - 19th In! Regt
DATE: December 1951 Source No 382
(RESTRICTED) Field promotion of wat'rant officers
should be made as simple and effective'as that for commis­
sioning of second lieutenants•
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(RESTRICTED) Though first lieutenants are filling
captain vacancies in combat', promotions have not been forth­
coming because overage of captains, Infantry. in this
theater. Promotions to captain of combat company com­
manders is neces$ry to maintain proper morale and incen­
tive for junior and is the proper reward for deserv­
ing 'commanders. Authority to promote combat company
commanders to captainsregardiess of theater strength,;
braqch'and grade. should be forthcom'ing.
,••••'.. * • * • • •• .
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(CONFIDENTIAL) The device was first
used by us this month. It appears profitable, easy to insta1l
and maintain. Use is recommended for outpost;-positions and
close-in ambushes. Several times we detected enemy move­
ment at ranges up to 200 yards. A Chinese interpreter
greatly increased the value of the .telling us· ,
just what was being' said 'by the enemy detected•. ':,:, i, ,,'.' ;: {.
f ..
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§Kg :r '2'fORi'UtA\

SOURCE: C;.ornmand Report - :ist 'Cay Div .
DATE: .October 1951 Source No 383 I
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t 't· .
It. not my ,purp.ose', within the limitations
. irnpose4 the.cu,rr,ent and the scope of this
report, . a detaile4.dis.cussion, inv.olving·:our bas'ic
qoctrine and ta,ct;ics ... Inste-.d:1prqpose to make some 'general
.comments bas,ed on the experienceis of thi-s di:visicm while
. . ,
. engaged COMMANDqduring the per·iod 8-·Z8
October 1951•. soundness of· doctrine.
it is my. that we sbc;.uld attempt to secure satisfactory
fr,om its application. we do this we are hardly
, in a .position to offer criticism of any, value.. For
. this reason,andqtl;ler:s too n1m1er,ous tomennon" I plan to
discuss only the fundamentals and stress their importance.
,Operations in October .. aa always, revealed our weak­
nes,ses.; ,I hope to cSr,ndldly cover most .of these.' How •. v:er,
, of this discussion, if complete. would be innu­
merable., Consequently,I have selected. only the .moreim­
portant and broader topics for review in this report•
.'1. Attacks..,
'!'. ..,' ..
. w,e night and dayfor,a protracted period
detail, attack and plans for' ' .
, supporto( At the cqnc1usion of the
'phase, it is that nolhing, has :been,overlooked.
·¢.Onsideri.ng readvon "D" Day and "HJI Hour,. we
we find. ·our '.'steam" '
stUI a long way from the objective. The plans are perfect,
, support our supplies more than adequate.
Wherein does the fault It-e·? Often,., tar too often. in my
'we .advantage superiority of fire­
,f!specially: our organic. weapons.. depending instead
'.on artiliery the load.. ,.oRGANIC WEAPONS,
ONE OF., ·'J;'aEM,.M¥S'r BE EMPLOYED. :1"0 THE
,MAfC1MV¥. ",;
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. ','. Too often we make the mistake of not using all avail­
., able ,troops., If a company is se'nt .out to take an ..
the entire company should be used. Every weapon should be
iI s ttl a:a
.'1'[\j' 'ttl,TEo; Li
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UNCU\SS\f\ED 10·
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placed in operation at time 01' another the attack.
Every trick. scheme. device of the human mind should be
resorted to: and incorporated ·into the ;p.lan.I·l'egret that we
don't always.,do Acomp;my one ends up
the This is wrons.: ,DON'T A BOY
TC?, I?O A MAN'.S. JQBJ By 40ing we ,have faUed to apply ..
the ba,s.ic·of pri,.r;1ciples: Maximum.employment of
the force. fire and maneuver.. .. ' ',' •
. .... . ." '. . . ,
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.,. ': freque"Uy find it necessar,y to com­
mit of their cons,equently unable to: another
group either wonpos.it\onto 0011,-'
tinue the a ore•. the· unit, PI;'. the ()bjeetive., '. This
..a .. .. w.l1ich is , I).eoes"sitated
by local we .. ;.: .,',
maintain ready reserves in close proximity to attacking
{Qrc'es. Whenever possible, this practice must be avoided
and a reserve unit made available.
} '.', .
.We stU,1 fail to exploit and take of weaknesses
in ,the enemy',s Plans must be flexible' to .extent
we,cap e'Cplpit at all times and with, tl\e least possible
98lay.whenever sttuation p.rmits.,· ,.,,',
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9reater C; oll,sideration must be given to. the nigptattack.
sold;,ers to attacks., during
. .... ,
ness.",Offic:ers aDd, :NCO··s must lear.n to .control unit.s at
. . -. :
nig:ht. phasets probably. our weakest." yet could, be .our:
strongest, Many 8;n opportunity to exploit has been;lost, ,', '
because, of follow-up initial $ucces·ses. witp
Ilight: attacks...... ,This. w.e must.learn thor.oughly and
rapidly. and battalioll. commanders should alwavs.;
be ready to by ni.ght attacks, a reserve company
by .stoPpil?-i ·one the in day!
if n.ecessary, to reorganization,and ,:();n
. . . ,­
. ,Aft.,. 'an objective,
we tOo often stop there and relax.. WE MUST LEARN_T.o.
OR THE ATTACK. This is an old 'critie{sm of
American troops, and despite repeated emphasis on the sub­
ject in our se.rvice schools and training, we nevertheless
' ..
EE6dili i i litl ca:a:
,.. ,.,.....
CONF 'DEN i 1*.
· ,
fail to properly organize a position. The results are inevi­
table: our forces are immediately counterattacked and
valuable ground is lost. In my opinion, few subjects need
in our training.' .
. , :'\
, .'.. If 'it is to be held, immediate preparation and' organiza­
tfon of strong defensive positions is 'absolutely essential upon
S'Edzing an objective. Consolidation'and' organization df a
position can ri-ever be ovel'-empbasized and because of our
'failures to follow through,weare repeatedly shoved off hills
by an enemY'who is aware of this weakness, who prepares
for this moment with'rapid counterattacks. If the supporting
'weapons and artinery'fiies are properly used -- artillery
concentration laid on avenues o(approach and a,ssembly areas,
organicwea'poris 'u&edto'keep t'hi enemy at a distattce... -thEm
the assaulting units can usually hold untU reinforcements
'Another important item to be emphasized in training
'is assault fire. ,If a unit has" as an objective a hilt OJ' piece
lc,f terrain, then the best way ,to take'it is to get'-on'top;of it -­
a.nd' fast! To this end we employ our rrubdmum supporting
'fires; however, in the 'fi'nat'assault (the·taS't'r'ough'fc)rty or
:'tifty:yai'ds when we mask our supportmg 1t is 'the attack­
ing unitt!i own assault fire which must }(eep the' enemy down
untit we can close with 'him. Unle-ss 'our TROOPS MOVE
"FAST, AND FIRE WHEN THEY MOVE, rio objective will be
taken'without great' c'ost in ..
Our soldiers, one and all. have a tendency to 'stop'
moving when they fire a weapon. This failing must be· over­
come.' Infantry soldiers must be taught the advantage of
assaulting' a position by firing while rapidly moving•. Train­
ing in: loading and'firing: while moving', must be emphasized
, and' practiced. '
, ­
2. . Attack of a 'Fortified 'Position.
'. 1
. ..
The' execution: of 'Operation COMMANDO found us faced
with the problem of reducing the heaviest fortified positions
:yetencountered in the Korean 'campaign. This should have
presented no :'great problem, but it did. We reacted as if it
were a completely new and untouched-on phase of offensive
wiloda.re., ay our, failure to use the, vast Clmount of experience
,.1 1
ze8f4P' IeEPJT I A Is:.
I NT LOeb,
dl,lring the last war -- especially in the quite similar
campaigns. and even during the over one year of­
this war _. :we lost much valuable time and many lives•.
Doctrines and suggested tactics on the ATTACK OF A
FORTIFIED POSITION should no longer be treated as a
specialty field. It should receive consideration in each and
every offensive tactical training problem. Every answer.
to even a hypothetical problem, should envision the reduction
of mutually supporting bunkers. No longer should we think
of certain weapons such as.the flame demolitions
of various types, etc; as being the exclusive property of
specially .trained assault squads whose only mission is to
reduce one bunker which delays the advance of the regular
rifle elements. It is important that each objective be con­
sidered another Siegfried Line· and the basically sound
doctrine applied in each time and train­
ing and rehearsals prior to an attack but. it is time that we
take. Once we have stopped the:attaek long enough to
permit the enemy. to build bunker typer such
a,s those we have re.cently then the technique
mU$t be rehearsed over and over to insures'U¢ces's in. our
3. W.ithdrawal.
It has been proved by costly experience that night with­
dra,walsare disastrous.- yet our commanders still attempt
the.m. . Certainly an intelligent ·commander always considers
the pc;»ssibility of a by planning the routes, desig-'
nating a covering force •. etc. Due consideration should be
given to tbe sometimes illusory emergency which- requires
such a move and. if well thought out,· the position is usually
not untenable as fir&-t thought to be. By staying on position
we can usually avert a catastrophe and at the ;same time bold
hard won terrain.· Naturally. this discussion, :is based on
the premise that the force is on position with adequate strength
to ..4efend· or delay untildayligh't. ::.;,'
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eLCDRi i ;
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.p aUII; IW6Aih: is::·
eeNfJl5EN i tAL

Our·'troops must be instilled With'the spi,'tit.- confidence,
and determination·to hold.." If f'orced to;withdraw. ·to dQ so·
only on order and under control- in;·planned phases.
The final decision will normally: rest with the local com­
mander. and' should only be made after carefully estimating
the situation.
--".. 1
.. ,: • ','.
During.these operations we had excellent artillery s·up­
port but 'I-must admit that' our commanders 'do not knaw how
to use. it to. obtain maximum results. In my opinion we r.ely
on artillery' to bridge the gap between small arms fire', with­
out properly using the organic infantry weapons to full ad­
vant;ilge. Thi-s, gap is too wide for such wasteful useo!
artiUery .!Ven under ideal conditions where the infantry follows
well plaeed: accurate' rolling fire. Minimum safety clearance
in the ,Kor,ean hills prevents close- in support that is possible
on fiattel"' or rolling terrain. Since the movement of a Uhit
up a steep slope' is slow; continuous fir-e must be laid on the
objective after the artillery has moved from the forward to
the reverse slope or higher up the slope. Once our infantry
is within assaulting range, artillery ·sbould then 'be shifted
to avenues of approach and reverse slopes. to prevent· enemy
r.emfo.rcements and counterattack. Instead,' lOur men'will
order fire lifted, . then start the assault up a long' steep
slope. When we do this, the enemy has sufficient time to
recover and emerge from the well prepared positions on
rever.se slopes. ready to enlage our troops. ·Thus'un£or·tu­
nately we'are caught at the worst moment when we are· tired
from the long climb and assault and we have lost the shock
effect of artillery.
Our people must·be·forcibly shown the valae of ·well .
employed a.rtillery fire.· I feel tbat this' can best be accom­
plished by training infantry behihd- t'ol1in.g fire at the minimum
safety elearancewithinfantry weapons firing at the· objective
simultaneously. In our practice problems there is always a
lifting"ef.,f{re before the infantry starts either moving or
This' gives an erroneous impression wbichunfortu.
nately is: carried ,over: into eomba/tt•.
' .. the forwar.9:. in noposi­
tion to adjust fire, yet artillery is needed. What can be done
in such a case? For one solution, the battalion liaison
officer Jrom an OP should'be able to assist. Any number
of· method, 'can
be worked out'to keep continuous fire on an
Artillery should 'seldom be fired by map coordinate
unless nD other' means exist.' This is an unsatisfactory
method and is not accurate;t.it cannot ,be adjusted to give
effective close support to the infantry in this type terrain.
The succes s' of Operation COMMANDO was greatly
affected by use of direct fire ISS-mm', 8-inch guns and tank
weapons. We shoUld bever hesitate to move 'these weapons
up into the bills within range for DIRECT FIRE against
bunker,s •
. ' .i'. ,All high velocity· direct fire weapons are effective' pro­
v;ided they can be positioned. ' Future operations against'
defensive positions should include.' from the ve-ry start', these
weapons, which should move as close dftbe infantry as is
practicable. .
Massing 'of artillery fires is sometimes overlooked.
It :llVly.be.. the best plan to concentrate Z/3 or 3/4 of all avail­
able support ona battalion objective until 'it is
We can do this, without 'materially affecting the
other infantry units -that are reorganizing'and
making'preparations for the continuation of the attack.;
The importantpomt W',hich I wish to etnpbcisize here is:
USED ARTILLERY, FIRE.' It is never to be substituted for
more accurate'mortar fire',"nor can it ever be used in place'
of organic infantry weapons. It is the combination of all
these weapons, organic and supporting, which makes for a
successful operation.
5. ' Training.
, ,', I
, ' ": ;
The subject ,of trat-ning beUig' s'Oclosely relate4 'to. the"
deficiencies herein bef:brre. 'discusseS and'since"most of our
ills can, be by realistietratning in the fundamentals.
I W:0uld 1ike.. .of
Sf't';§? r::- n;rr ?I '? 9' rr I
"",.., .....·,t: . ," .. '\ "'" '.. ' .' t
not receiving suffiieient emphasis in our
'.'. . 1 ! '. :,' ti"·. ,"0 ••
trai,nmg centers.. , c'
• .. • j '.. .. ' • I,. .'
: t. . ."!' .',,' 'f .:..... .! 't • ., .. : • ' . '.
Our men must bave more UNIT: TMINING before reach-
a combat It they
been trabling centers, t.hey have
• ' c" • ,.1. " ',' . _
\ not,:- - or pos,s only once or twiCe,:,- - engaged in a, tactical
problem ,under ,the leader,ship of an NCO who leads and directs
them under" silnuiated 'battlefield conaitions where they actually
,apply the principles, of fire and movetnent as a fighting team.
• , ' , 'c,,' " c ' ,
,this trainirtg left as
the ,of a division' in corrtbat, while '?ther
less im'portant subjects are covered over and over in training
centers. Np subject can possibly be as important to the com­
.' .... .. , ,
,:. • ' ," " ",;', c ;,,' , '
'1;rQPps need this trai.ning in basic tactics under
.' ..... ..t . . I ',. •.•• • •
of an or NCO :Who engages in the
their :Ieadet and. not as' a supervisor' who
Ciitiques action oia acting
In this division problems,of platoon and company size
z:un iiveammunition at every available opportunity,
but nevu' have the time required to out confident,
well-trafued soldiers.' ' . " ' , '
Another, and perhaps more critical problem
urgent need to afford our officers, of 'all grades', more'time
and, practice in the actual command of troops. It is too often
the case, the background of the line officer
to'find that bad little'or no command
duty for many years. 'If fortunate, he bas recent
bt:anch service training in my view too much
ls type, of Pteparation for
for with When inv'olved the
leader, mU,st KNOW from actual practical field experience
often isn't re!l1embered until too late!
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.: .. t' , • ; .' ., '.
: ' ....... ·t ...·.l • ' • ;"!fit " ,.," • F;. • I
Toproperiy consider doctrines of defense In view of
experi-ence and--conditions- which have and do influence our


actiobs in Korea I before going im'o 'a 'generalized' '
""description. we should cover these problems not for the
,purpose of excusing our actions and justifying our adoption
'of unorthodox methods,. but so that the ,l'ead,er will }:)e cogni­
zant f:4 them. " " ,',., , '
••" < ••
in mind that of a' division
, .'" • •• 4 ,,' " • '
. sector is in our present
. Some of the fador.'sleading' to tl)is, are: ,','
. . '.:. . ..,; .
t • .•f.:! ., .'" " • F "
a. Thew-iath of this cjivbion.sector _t is over
Z6.000 yards: at times a companyfron[has Z.,.O,OO
" _'... f' .• ' ..' -.. •• I" --4 ... ->­
, yards.. ",
.' , . . . ­
, , ','. (,'. ',.' ,
b. No regimental tank compa:nie!$ a:.:e, have
been assigned to this division. '.,
c. Depth
to the defensive position, because of wide
{'tontages and limited troop strength. is obtained by
:i mentary
In the final analysis there simply have not enough
avai1a1:>le to cover the ground. If you consider ,these
fa'ctors, you possibly will why C)ur 'commanders
, adcSpted what they'- thought were' justified to,
.. ;. t-' • '" • • ';. . -'..... '. "
meet the requirements. realizing that our doctrines are '
flexible and that the principles still apply under conditions
in Korea.

I think it best to briefly evolution' of'
fense sulce the ot the K,Qreall as it ", "
concerns tlie company .. - 'the inference being that if all com­
. I;l8.nies pt:0perly organize so the division defeJ'lse is, ..
" " , ' , ',.,
. " ,'" r;
',\ Early with our ,
the of. coordinated,! ,:sqPP9rting
'was impossible. '
were not
fronts and sectors of responsibility elther a tie-in.
physica1ly or by fire. Units were' adopt the "
perimeter system, as the only means of defending the key
;terram in their assigned sectors. This system
<t. . . ;.:.. . '•• ' I.
'Worked; the'accomplishments are clear in the recprd.. ,
.... , .. ", ...... ', " ....... ".'
!kCWiI i JJ4P6AiilA:: s _
Yet we developed nothing new and, even then. never were all
important in any given sector occupied.
' .... ' 'I
As the number, of our units increased and conditions
, '
generally improved in our favor we atill, to an extent. con­
tinlled to prepare our defensive positions as the troops on the
Naktong did. True. the sector decreased and if we had con­
tinued to defend key .terrain features as they of the
did., ,no reason for complaint would available. But instead
of, occupying all of the key features. in a sector, unitc:;om­
manders started to a180 decrease the. area of occupation by
forming close knit company perimeters on possibly one or two
featur.e.s .. , :Even when defending -on line. instead of sending
or smaller units, .... - as they did previ9u,sly -- t9
occupy and. organize a piece of ground. the tendency.J?y the
company was to pull the elem,ents of ,the company
closer together until all surrounded him on the of
a circular position. Close-by features worthy of defending
wer.e. ignored. great gaps -- impossible to cover by fire -­
continued to exist between COMpanies. permittipg the e.nemy
to at will around our positions and attack from any point.
Sine:e the bad practices have and so
long accepted as theory of defense. we must go back to the,
fundamentals of our basically ·sound defensive doctrines. rhe
defense of key terrain in any unit sector must be stressed
whether H. is a squad. platoon. company or larger unit. No
longer can the close companionship of des,ire to
s.tay together in a tight perimeter - - influence
zatioD" of sectors;.of responsibility. We must
them that it is not to o;rgani:zr,e a co,rnpa,ny with. a
physical tie- in between platoons or even squads, in some cases:;
that gaps will exist .to permit us to prepare artillery and
morta,r .concentratiOlls. to cover the area by AWfire .from ,
more than one,position. which eliminates the need for occupa­
tion and cr,eate. impact areas close-in. Our
taught that no army·can cover every q( ground
in its area of responsibility.
. We must analyzatiop. befQ..re
lay.ing out a hasty defens.ive •. A must
walk the terra:i.. Planning a company defense 'po;sition from
a map is easy phrsical energy. but is impracticable.

Our officers study the terrain while walking o:v:er it.
unit in mind, before making a
decision. BY,kn,owmg the of unit. weapons
in possession ofbis men, the condition of his troops • .:.
physical, mental, state of training -- the commander is able
to plan his defense as he walks. You canlt position a.utomatic
..' .
weapons from a map; you can't locate the dea.d space in front
of positions. The se,lection' qf alternate and primary
for automatic must be made on the ground
.type of emplacement. a:nd its exact 10,cation can only be. deter·
mined by looking the terJ'ai,n.
: >' Preparation of connecting. at
prima,ry and alternate AW positions, .tpust routiI;1e
even in If.time
tions must be prepared with treJ;lChe$ .and
overhead c·over. .
, , "
Upon occupying the position, the .companyand
supply routes must be .selected;. a J"econ if
to determine the feasibility of using a certain Not
;always will. the route over unit 11l;o.v;ed in
be the best for moving supplies ."'''::.,.a, route ,may..
one .less arduous cUmbing terrain, a more
route the position. .:, ','
• • ; I
Avenues of ,enemy must b.e., our d:e,...
fenses planned to conform .with ..
of gOM tactical principles. These -..v:enues
'be· interdicted ·by slJpportlng ;fires and entrp.nce
to our position. '
". .,
,., < ,',
Communicat,ion in every. fQrm must
wire. radio, whi6tles. Prearrangeq
be SOP 'cor;npa.DY,and taught to
minute they join·a co,mpaJlY.: between,
battalion headquarters' P'lll$t, be pla.nned. We must
.. without it. " ','i.', . '
" ; . ; .
Routes of withdrawal convenient for aii to a
.company assembly area and thispoint,to;.the new posi­
tion are a part of every plan. .1, , :J
.J 46
.s liil blii f
'P"freplans mustbeprepitred as !foon' after'o'Ccupation
"a,S 'pOs'Sible t' 'anddurin'g'daylight.' Every man in the company
\, should know 'concentrationsal'ld be able to call '
lor them.' :. ,
Little need be said about the perimeter type of defensive
position. Cenerally our: lroopshave been successful in setting
, up -this ;arid have beett able' to withstaridheavy enemy'
Same principles tn and 'preparmg'8. '
, line defense are usually applicabie - 'terrain must be
'occupied. Sometimes it is best to e10setight and oc'cuPY only
, the dominating terrain features. This, "o'f course; depends
on the size 01 the unit. But, usually itl the' case' 'of a company, ,
"the deieD$e should lie' and 'tight as 'terrain 'never allows
us the freedom of organization 'that we like. Our plans must
confOrm With the terraizi.
,. ."
" '
7. Logistics.
; when attacking. a unit faces many numerous and difficult
supply problems, but all have been studied and in most cases
a reme'd'Ydeveloped. Stili we"a;re 'uWa'bleto keep the supplies
'moving by the' 'conveyor belt th4:! units until
can be built. ' At the attack,
supply'is usually accomplished by hand made
up o{indigenous labor who CarTy-CrOm a rear 'suPPly base.
. 1')1is' is not completely' satisfactory. however." Even thoti"gh at
. tiznes are able' to'truck supplies to the biseof a position,
'bnd 'carrying'is still the only rrleans of getting 'it to the top.
By the use of M3q
s. 'if available for 'this purpose. many supply
problems could very likely be leesened by decreasing the hand
'carrying distance. In many instances M39' s can traverse steep
slopes 'and even thbugh not'able to 'reach :the' top of i1 hill,' can
reach a p6sition dose to the unit: Often: timeS· tanks too are
to reach the tops of some hilts to support the' infantry.
Thfs' being possible, supplies 'f6r 'the infantrY'should be'1oaded
'for the ascent. ,;' .
Much can be done to improve our present flame thrower
'if its use' Resupply is
sucn'a problem that it can never 'be used:' a:s: the efflcfent weapon
that 'it 'is and'to'meet our needs. Thedevetboprnent ot a simpler
f,; ! [;, 1 . . ( , ­
:zfSS!'F '
" . '" -.. '" '.fl •• , ...
an't a
refueling system wheJreby fuel tanks can be refilled close to
using units' position!! ::should, receive top ,prioT.ity. 1\ lighter
weight.. burning perio<Land greater range flame
thrQweT is, ne.ededfor mountain operations•
. """- \,",
The positioning of tanks on hill tops with the infantry
our. logistic problems but it is an overwhelming
favor of using M39personnel carriers for
supply.. Once a tank is poSitioned on a hill, suitably dug in
and with adequate targets, it should be left there as constant
movement for. r.esupply unnecessarily increases maintenance
problems. '
The of using mules should not be overlooked;
in faet. a study and experiment may prove its possibility
especially for defensive materials, such as:
wire (concertina), piekets, mines, pioneer tools, etc." These
are the items .that, are needed almost as 'as
atnll'l1mition by assaulting unit preJ)Uingl.mr a eOUl')te.r .
1)hey,will usually,be.available if .the logistic plans
as to include the movernen.t Qfa su,pply train a ,
behind the atta.cking; ec:helon..
4 J ,\ .,,; .:.! ";
8. Cotnl1)unic4t.tions.·. ." .
". I .
: .i. ',1;)jer.ation COMMANDO once again brought to light many
glaring deficiencies in our employment of signal communication.
The tendency on tbe·part of unit commanders and subordinate
leaders to rely almost on radio. and VHF media
of, commwncatiC)ns,resulted in over",: burdcningtl)"se. chalU,lels
of. communication. Also, w:tlen these electrical through
mechanical inoperable. cOJPn:l,unjcation with and
control of·units was lost. In addition, many targets of oppor­
tunity, particularly those observed just after elements
have taken tbeu- objective, not under
artillery and mortar :fire.th'l,ls allowing the ,enemy to assemble
fC)r.ces l"apidly; and , .
. . '
It is imperative that the commander utilize every means
of COmmunication at his disposal. Land lines must be laid as
rapidly.as pos,ible .tQ:fo:rward positions, and wire m1,lst closely
follow ech.elon. . Adequate usage was not made of
is :an e"eellentmeansof
that can be very effectively at night.
• •• \.". - • ; • -Ii. " . "., ...
• •
In regard to security, it must never be forgotten that
the enemy possesses many of our type radios and has at
time jammed our channels. It is also entirely possible that
some of our moves were blunted becaus. the enemy possessed
prior knowledge of the particular move. To take full advan­
tage of our excellent signal equipment, thorough training of
operators, expert maintenance, and uninterrupted resupply
of batteries and spare parts, are essential througbout all
echelons right to the smallest units.
9. Tactical Air Support.

Air strikes should seldom be used against an objective
when forward observer adjusted artillery and mortar fire is
being placed and the infantry is positioned ready to move
under cover of this fire. By placing an air strike on such
a positlon, much time is lost in lifting artillery and again
getting fire the objective after the strike.. At the same
time the momentum of· the attack is lost and the accurate
. . . .
pinpoint 4. Z, 8l... mm fire is sacrificed for less accurate
area coverage. In addition adjacent units, ,ttacking, lose
their supporting fire while aircraft is in the area.
This same aircraft can be 'used much more effectively
.. by just beyond the objective, without iifting the
supporting fire, to interdict asseinbly and build'-Jlp
t6 prevent enemy reinforcement.. ' 100- to Z50-Pound bombs
equipped with VT fuzes should be used.
Prior preparation of defensive positions should include
a softening up by air power using 500- and 1000-pound bombs.
However, against heavily fortified positions and bunkert,
, . this should before the attacking'troops start the
attack. Fo.r as previously stated, artillery fire should seldom
be lifted once the infantry has started moving. To soften up
the hea.yi1y defended hills with lattger Personnel bunkers
and weaPons the heavy (lOOO-pound) bombs must be used.
. . . ." \. f A '-"
. napalm and 'rockets areto'an effective
but thcdr effeC:tiveness is greater against troops in open
trenches.. Are8::,9apalm bombing is difficult and costly in air­
. craft aga#ist the positions.' It is probable that
." "1lUt air.craftcould be'more effectively em­
'., \ <.' .
ployed 'aga1nst other targets in support of the ground operation.
., • o.a, _.••...... ....
• •
.. ..... .,... ,- .
su . I ! Ii" ORidATION •

An attempt. in the foregoing ha:s' been -made to- cover the
probleaur..enceuntered,JIftd some 'of, the methods we have learned
from 'expe,iencehe"er, -are•. bowever•. innumerable
important' subjects,' la. ;menticmed in the il'ltroduction. fa dis - .
cus.ion of·_icb should be included but bave not been;for reasCIB
of time a;nd .
There are many tb;iilg. that we can do to improve the
efficiel'lcy of our operation.. . For certain. we can improve
the leadership qualities of our company grade officers and I
know of no better way than by proper training. Our communi:'
cation sy'stem needs constant improvement; also I cal'l't over­
emphasize the importance of accurate. timely casualty re·
porting and the passing on of imormation to the next higber
Most of .the problems encountered are old ones; everyone
is aware' of the f supposedly common errors that .
officers bave always made. We must emphasize
the fundamentals ill a program wbich is filled with small unit
tactics. i Other les. important subjects can be covered con-'
currently. Our soldiers must be made to realize that the
mistakes made by to apply fundamental doctrines cost
us· lives and loss of valuable time.. I am convinced that our
doetrines are sound 'and battle proven - - it is in our applieation
of th.s. doctrines· or rather in our failure to apply them to the
situation that we have failed. -. .
_ ) . " t ','
) ..
:: • .i."
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" ... "UNCLASSlffED !!
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