Fort Monroe, Virginia
_._- --- - --­
SUBJECT; Dissemination of Comaat.
TO: Se.e distribution
07 1952
COpy I
1. In accordance with 525-85-5. Processing of Combat Infor­
r.:ation, the at+:ac'.:ed EXTRAC'l.'S are forwarded to Depar+ment of the Army,
ArrJy Field. Forces e.nri thtl' Service Schools for eva.luation and necessary
action. It may be appropriate, in certain cases, for +.hese agencies
+:0 take El,ction t:..po:c. a ita:!:; in others. it may be
desirable to develop a cross-section of accumulated ex+.racts on a
particular subject before inl+ia+:ing action; often, the extracted
item serves to reaffirm our doctrines 3nd +:echniquGs.
2. Copies of Dissemination of Combat Informa.tion prE forwarded,
'''i+.h Departmen+. of the Army approval, to addressees for use
at t,hc headquarters of the installati on or a,ctivi +y concerned to keep
t.hem informed concerning theatre problems from front line through the
logistical command.
3. These are derived fror.! ropor": s which are classified
SECP..ET. For the greater of +he user, thi s Office downgrades
each extrac+:ed item t,he clRssifica+:ion compat.lble with security.
TIo effort is made to paraphrase or dele+.e any portion of extracted
so +hat none of the origir.Lal in,+en+. is lost.
4. Generally, the EXTRAC'l:S which pertai:c. to traininf, appear under
the clasdfication of For combat of training
at t.he Company-Battery level, adcressees are referred +'0 Army
Field Forces TRAIr:lrG BULL3'diJS, which are also published under the
classification of
1 Incl W. lI& MEL.l1ORN
Extract s from sources
Lt Col, AGe'
250 thru 278
AS8t AclJutant General
Bo_... 1_.,.;5:;..;;2 ____
D I BTRlBiJi' 101: :
--1f;!, YlB'"
•• $' e,6tdSrt'f'.
, . ,
sa oe"'; ')N81.i'" .I}lf
Copy No ' Action Addressees
Dopnrtment gf t,he Aw
1- :s ACOFS, Gi
. "'.:
4- 6 ACOFS ,Ga . .' .
7- 21 ACOFS, G.
22- 41 G4
. ' ..
42- 51
52- 51 CQ]'EHGRS
62- 71 COFORD
73- 82 CSIGO
83- 92 COFT
93- 94 Chief of Military History
95-104 ::Qf-iG
105-114 TSG
115-116 TAG
Office. Chief of Army Field Forces
'117' Deputy C=.ief of Staff .
118 . G1
119 G2
. G3( 4)
1:-5l-13Z .. G4
133-137 RD
138 Chemical'
139 Engineer
140 Medical
141 Ordriance
143 Signal
144 'l'ransporta":.ion
145 Adjutant
146 Budget. &Fiscal
147 Chaplain
148 Informs.tion
149 Provost Marshal
Cor.:unali.d£:nt s
150-152 Arr.1Y College
153-154 Command & General Staff College
The Armorr:d School
157-158 The Artillery School
159-160 The Infantry School
161-162 Army Genen,l' School
Asst Comdt, The Arty School. AA&GM Br
Prf' siden+,S
165 AiF :Board no 1
156: lJE' :Board No 2
167 AiF Board :3
168 AFF ::Board lro 4·
169 COt AFF Arctic Test ::Branch
- ,.
-JltR!'" .
• saw)),· )MOIi'"
ATTNG-64 350.05/39 (DOCl) (C)(12 J8b 52)
Subject: Dissemination of Combat Information
Dl : Addressee!f,
170-179 CINC, European Comd
180-189 CG, Trieste US Troops
190-199 CG, US Forces in Austria
200-209 CINC, Far East
210-219 CG, US Army, Alaska
220-229 CG, US .umy. Pacific
230-239 00, US .urny, Caribbean
Qffice. Chief of ArmY Field Forces
240-243 Inspector Secretariat
244-263 G3( 64)
264 J.,G Records
265-274 Extra Copies
275-276 First Army
2?7-278 Second Army
279-280 Third Army
281-282 Fourth Army
283-284 Fifth Army
285-286 Sixth Army
287-290 Army AA Comd, Ent AFB, Colo Springs, Colo
291-292 Supt, USMA. West Point, UY
293-294 CG. TAC, Langley .AFl3
295-296 Chief, Army Advisory Gp, Air Comd &Staff Sch. Air Univ.
Maxwell AFB, Ala.
297-298 Comdt, Marine Corps Sch. Va
299-300 Comdt, USAF Air Ground Soh, Southern Pines, NC
301-302 Comdt, Counter Intelligence Corps Sch, Fort Holabird,
Baltimore 19, Md
303-304 Comdt. The Provost Marshal General's School
". " .. " ",.. . - . . - "59"""" - "til.' ;'" ' . iJ. _
:". ­
{Revised 15 Oct 51)

Fort Monroe, Virginia
'.:' ' .............
. -............ .
-,. -.-
............. , ..
ColIlll1and Report - 38th FA d1
:, t'"
..... ...... ......
. .... ··-.0'. "."
July 1951" Source r;o 250
One of the most ir:!portant items of junior ·officer training in .
Korea is physicll conditioning. None are physically conditioned suf-'
ficiently, upon arrival, to enable them to perform observer
duties without severe physical strain. (RES'IRIClf'ED)
.................,.- .. ,........, .. _. "
Report - 3d Inf D:i.V
•• • ••• , ••• ' • I "' _.. .• • ••.••
May 1951 .. .,',_.. -'.',.
Operations have de..monstrated that the line units .. __. _... ,
have not properly exploited the intelligence and tactical importance
of shell It is believed that this is due, in part at least,
to the shortage of adequately trained personnel and ignorance of
potential value of shell reports.
It is recommended .that the PO parties assigned to infantry rifle
companies be especially trained in the pr'epal"ation of shell reports;
that a schc10l be conducted at Pivi8ion level .for the purpose of in­
structing key non-cons of the rinecompanies in the importance and
PI"eparation of shell :-eports; t1)Clt the courses of instruction at the
infantry service schools in the States put greater emphasis on the
tactical importance of shell and the procedures for obtaining
them. (Jlt'''S'IRICTED)
• ••• '. 0' ••• ,' •••
", "- .
", ........... ,
•••• • • > ••
" ."'- -. '"' . ',. .:..
OCAF.F Form No 73
GVfrQ'R "'$QWt'f'9"
SOURCE: Command Report - 7th Cav Regt
I.:ay 1951 Source No 252 DA'I't!::
1. Combat formations.
2. 3mall unit tactics.
3. Familiarization with 'Weapons otber than their individual arms.
4. Training in camouflage discipline.
5. PhySical conditioning.
Recommend additional trainin;;: in subjects as listed above.
SOURCi: ' . Id1itary Intelligence Section, Staff ( FEC)
DATil:: 27 September 1951 Source Ko 253
The ,Communist Forces have made excellent use of
'!roop camouflage has been so effective that aircraft flying at tree
top level over known troop concentration areas hwe difficulty in
locating these troops. .·,rmored vehicles, trucks and artillery pieces
have also been very successfully camouflaged. They USe all types of
poorly camouflaged dunlIny materiel, while the actual m3teriel, well
camouflaged, has been undetected. The en::mw has 31so attempted to
conceal his river crossing points by camouflage qnd subterfuge.
'Ihis has included moving entire spans out durin?: daylight
hours and moving them back into place for night traffic. (R2S'IRICTED)
SOURCE: Command Report - Ho 8th US Arnw Korea (::!:USll.K)
Sec II: rook 3, 1l.COFS, G2- Part 2
June 1951 Source He,
254 DATS:
Tests were conducted to determine the comparative effectiveness
.. OCAFF Form No ",""
l (.Revised 15 Oct ,
-------------_. ----_. __ .-----­

of all types fragmentgtion grenades known to be employed in Korea.
The following conclusions can be drawn:
a. '!he most >:tand grenades at 5 yards range are thqse
of the US type.
b. The order of effectiveness, gauged by the average number of
perforat-ions at this range, is (1) US, (2) Russ. an a,lcl (3) Korean.
c. None of the stjck grenades tested approached the US types
for fragmentation effect.
d. The maximum effective bursting range is tpn (10) yards.
diminishes rapidly between five (5) and ten (10) yards •
. . (rus'lRICT::.;n)
SOURCS: Cotr.r.l8nd Report - Hq 8th l6 ArTI\V Korea (EU3AK)
Sec II: Supportlllg
DATE: April fuok 21: Source No 255
'!be 5-in-l ration is generally \ll1acceptable for the following
1. Because of their tactical deployment, troops cannot assemble
to eat.
2. Equal distribution of the ration is quite difficult under
combat conditions.
3. Food must frequently be prepared in the mess gear, which is
undesirable because washing facilities are not available to the in- ,
dividual soldier in contact with the enemy.
4. Transportation of the 5-in-l presents a problem since the
individual must carry his own food in comoot.
5. There is a large percentage of waste because of the size of
the food containers.
6. The ration is not palatable when eClten cold. (RE3TR!CT:ill)
7(£ 8J5twtJfi;$
OCAFF Form No 73 s(f"RKY, ('0 '2 PC'"
(Revised 15 Oct 51)

.F Cpo 'tf1'Ht'tr
Report - 2d Division
l,ay 1951 SOURC,: ;ro 256
It was observed on nwnerous occasions till t frontline co;:unanders
[-,,8sita ted to call for close !lrtillerJ'
It is import"lnt that constant att:,mtion be directed to the
eliminntion of faultyrange estimation tech'iiques. Tney
spell, the 5iif1'e!'ence b8tween an victory ,qnd d costly defeat.
, , '
Comm:md Report -2d Inf'Vi", - 1'.ppendix D
" ,-
,:,ource _::> DATE:
1:-19 CARHL1.GE
, ' "The ,firepower and maneuverability of the £,1:-19 Lotor Carriage
wi th twi.n 40-mm guns make it highly desirabl e for the tJrpe: of war­
far·e -f-ough.t ' in-, :tW:s" theatre." -The' ,i.,i-Ie ..110 tor .Carr iage' witil' 'quadt'\lple '
mounted .50 caliber machine guns has been issueq as a substitute item.
i-Iowever, the adv3.l1:"tciges ,of i. e. the fUll track, the added
projectile, make it more
in"oombat th:ln the "M-16 halftrack motor carriagA.
.., ' .. ' '" ".. " , -, . ' ,,,

, SOURC3: E8port - I ,US t?orp.s.
DA'B: \lay 1951
Additions were rna}"" in all the fror::t was initially
covered withf·Qrtii'ication,;. lack of3.dequqte planning in the
[placing of mine fi'31ds ";:'1.3 nvir,lent when. it vms found that ref,erence
points of some mine fields w<':re in th:') midst of miGe fields.
This presented a hazard to the unit "'chich mi:;ht later be required
..... -
d '81it."
cLJitJAih, 'MU»:ua j _

to rf'lTlOVe the mine fields_ The solution to the problem such cases
was advance planning of fields by the Dilfision
and the interested Infantry commander. The engineer company which
is to lay the mine field should be made fully a1Nare of t:1e locations
of proposed mine fields before laying the first fields, so that
refer8nce points can be est:Iblished "'811 c1e,qr of 5i selected
for other fields and so tMt. tr.can be reached 'It any
time. ,
Command Report - 3d Inf Div
;\l:1rch 1951, Source No 2,59
Searchlif,hts are used advantageously in illurni,nating patrol··
objectives while letting p.itro1s move about in the Shadows. They
,pr0vide suffic'ient,' illumination for artillery adjustments. They
have an adverse effect on ehGllrj' morale and tend to keep him in his
foxhole. Using direct illumination, they will blind the and
aid in repulSinG a night 'atta·ck·. (RF..5TRICTED)
Comm.and Report - 2d ingr C fu
July 1951' Source No 200
Practically all the replacements received during V-lis period .' ....
were those who' w,:;re new to thel.!'r.I.Y but had received both infantry
and engineer basic trAining. This has proved to be good initial
training for this, theatre. (R-::JTRI,c;r .::;D)
SOURCZ: .Command Report·.. 64th Medium Tai1k 1)1
DATE: 1951 30urce No. 261
It is recommended that each tank company be assigned five
6 ,A
ff$1t''tr ",m1M1 ft9+'
frequencies for the operation of seR 508-528 series radios.
platoon would t;,en have its ovrn ch.mnel and each comp.qny crdnnel
"muld be cleared of sixteen stations. (Rf<.:JTRICP -.Jj)

Oil cooler fan failures still continued to be ti18 lU8jor' It
During th,OJ period I to da te, t:1er.::o has b8en totr11 of
fifty-one (51) such failures. (CONFID:<:NTLti.)
Command R.eport - .tiq 8t:l US '\rlT('f Korea (EUSAK)
Sec II: Supp Doc, Bk 7: Armor
April 1951 Source No 262
Thnks were used in tht:: 'Islleys, but had difficul ty negoti"l ting
the many obstacles and. in eleV3.tingtheir guns high enough to fire at
the tops of the ridges. (COl'JFID;:NTIAL)
Communication between the tanks and the infantr=-' h1S been satis­
factory when the SCR 300 was used in the command tank on the infantry
frequency, or when a tank liaison party with a 500 series radio was
attached to thp infantry conunand column. The telephone on the reAr
of the tank is uns"ltisfactory. It is very difficult to get it out of
the spring-loaded box in which it is housed, especially if dirt, mud,
or ice have gotten into the springs. cord on the telephone is so
s'lort that the infantrymen the phone cannot take"') cover, but
ust stand up or run (J,lon? after the tank. The housing should be
changed to eliminate mCivin;; parts, and should be moved down the tank
;1ull so the inf':1ntrym:m can reach it from the prone position. rt
should be to provido cover from rain and snow. The cord
should ba longer so the infantryman can get back in his hole or in
he ditch after he gets phone. 1be head set should be re-designed
to make it more''"!'ug-·ed, $0 wneI;l the infantryman releases it tbe
tant:er can pull it back to the tank without damage.
... ",.",.
.DltTY 'NwlMCTtCar
.(Revised 15 Oct ... J
------------------- ---.. --,
.!l..I1ITN\TION 01
Recommend Ordnance study of eliminating
company ch,mnel for, supply and eV-'lcuntion of the regimental
-uank companies' 'armorEd vheicles. (R$OOCTiD)
SOURC,S: pormnand Report - 6th _t In
D.:> Ti: 'lpril 19.51 Source No 263
of disabled jecame a major problem during
vhe month due to the shortage of adequate to"Ting equipment. It has
peen found that due to their lack of power, the LI-J2 recovery vehicles
'1ith r3dia1 engines are iriadequate for tqwing !ii-46 tanks. '1.'1:1e M...32
r-ecovery vehicles librd engines perform admirably.
30URC?: pommand ... 187th A.'.:>n RCT ... '))£ Parachute :>:aintenance Detachment
, , i!Jay 19.51 Source No 264'
IN T-7 1L:..m P,,-RACi-iLiTIS
In the inspection of 1'-7 m"lin parachutes it MS been fourid that
hQles, poor, and various malfu.'lctions exist in the
ew allotmont of this type parachute received at this station. All
of this type are in the process of unpacked and
nspected. (CONFID:1>JT.J:AL)
SOURCS: Ik>mmand Report - 44th Const in
pril 1951 Source No 265
It is recommended that hydraulic jacks 0 f up to 40 ton capacity
Je included in T/O&',£ to facilitate con::ltruction. (lU:>TlUCTm)
OCAFF Form No 73


JI PPf"csfiw
SOrJRC,S: Command Report - 62d ''npr Const fu
:ipril 1951 Source No 266
The 62d "hgineer Construction B3.ttalion had been assigned to
tne speedy construction of a low level \"dJ bridJe. T!1is project
was (3) days of schedule, due lar';ely to an
innovation in the use of bearing plates. Jurnin;" holes in I-beam
flanges to correspond 7d,th Irloles in bearing pl.1tes proved too
slow for the operation, as iDlllediate co;npletion of tho pro.iect was
n"cessary to the support of Army advance. Ii
plan to USe double bearing plates and wdd the I-beam to the top
plate ""reatly increased th::; speed with which the assi€,'1lmpnt was com­
pleted.An entire forty-two-foot (42
) b,W could nO"VI
be asscr;J.blcd
with diaphragm (held in place by chain hoists), permitting the
of uiap;U'agm :mel benring plates and the placL.'1.g of crossties
without referenc= to the center line. The entire unit could be
';ockeyed to the center with pinch bars. (RESTRICT;]))
.:lOURCS: Cor.un·and Report - 24th Ini Div -
February 1951 Ho 261
OFFI OF 'illS COI,JJ:i.:umn;:} G 2l\r';f(u,
rx.\cs 400. 8 Febru::lry 1951
suroSCT: Logistic dupport
'ill: (Addressee delated)
1. '!he iQ'm;y sytem of logistic support and :;v'l.inten,3.nce is
premised on the following:
a. Divisional service, m'1intenance, supply and other logistic
functions are performed in close support of the combat element.
b. Ar1f\y service, !H'lintenance, supply ::-md other logistic
functions in direct sup-nort of Divisions and Corps units are performed
from positions :is close as possible in rear ofdivisional service
OCAFF Form Nc \
(Revised 15 Oct !>1)
'.' , •.•••••••• ,#- ••• ­

c. Impetus trom the rear.
2•. The effectiveness of _the system. has been reduced very C(?n- .
siderablyby two practices which have become prevalent in recent
. . a. 'Stationing of divisiOn service elements as fa.r as. 175 .
es from regiments,thus making the rendering of proper divisional
sUPPW"t and maintenance difficult to impossible. Tnis
ractice fUrther renders direct logistic support and maintenance
effectual by forcing Army support units to move to locations in
ear of distant divisional' elements.
b.' Jtrpa'ssmg of Ord field depot companies by going direct
base depots to -scrounge" spare parts, major assembles and other;.:
xpendable items. This practice leads to hoarding. and -false" .. -.
hortages and has rendered ineffective the supply of Ord through
ormal' distribution channels. .
),;. '!he Arriw system is sound and battle-proven. It can and will
e made to work in this command. Recommtndatians for remedial action
th regard to weaknesses in logistic support and main­
eriance can not be' properly ID'lde by me until our own errors are
rreoted. .
4-.' The following policies are announcech
' .. a. : 'All elements of diviSions Rear CPt's) .
e . located 'in zone' forward of rear boundaries Unless. _ •. '.'
pecifically' to located elseyrhere by this headquar..
•. . b. . channel;s of l"esupply. and. be
trictly adhered to (see ZUSAK SO,P for Adm, 25 Oct 50 w/changes) •.
. ',.; "
lsi E. MOore
lRYltNT Z. lY.oo&...: . .
. , "
biajor General, uni.ted States ArD\r•.
, .. " ................ ...... . ,
....... _.,.,,'
OCAFF Form No 73
1$ <Xt:,sl:)
Command Report - 7th Inf
June 1951 Source No 268
It is recommended that. 'tIhoM"'tl.e lessens learned, tactical
applications used, as well .s: innovations resorted to
in pursuing the J<orean 'Val" be carefully appraised in the light of
probable future enemy capabilities and the unllsual nature of current
operations. In most ways the war in Korea is an anachronism. The
common use of human be'3rers, the lonlt and arduous mountain climbing
nmneuvers the stripping down of units in order to negotiate
difficult terrain is the result, not necessarily of the terrain,
but primarily because of the paucity of troops. '!he force neces­
sary to allow for a offensive of envelopment and destruction
is not available. There i5, and been, ample terrain of a suitable
nature, and enen:w situations capa]:)le ot being exploited by an armored­
infantry deep penetration and encu-element; followed by a mop-up by
infantry units oper.:lting .qgainst isolated units in mountainous terrain.
li,a11iY times in the last 11ve (5) mon ths there ha ve been opportuni ties
to encircle and crush enemy units from the size of a regiment to a
corps. The lack of sufficient troops has forced the UN forces ,to
attack frontally and slowly and maintain a defensive attitude even
during the conduct of the a ttack. This \Val" is in every respect a
"Poor t S "1'[3.1". It
Therefore, any recommendations based on the current Korean
campaigns with regard to basic chRnges in ,'ind/or tactics should
be scrutinized primarily in the light of the future, rather than with
respect to the present or P'lst campaigns in Korea. It is a tribute
to the baSic organization of the infantry regiment that the present
structure has been flexible enough to meet the r€"..quiremoots of the
Karp-an (S?;C[{ET)
it T-kINE PLA. 'lOON
Tne present AT...Mine Platoon hClS proved to be v3rsntile, dependable
and flexible. Its primary use has been to augment, or many times to
replace, engineRr troops at the regimental level. The regimental
defense against arr.lOred attack ·could be grea tly iniproved if the
AT-t'·ine Platoon rod an ,3ctiva, as well as passive, mAans of antitank
defense. If the l05-rrnn R('!coilless Rifle mounted the 1/4 ton truck

OCAFF Form No··-'
Jib! "[saspee [fOr.
(Revised 15 Oct ;".,)
------------------- ---,­
sueE 12M J F ' ....
utilizing i1Z:iT or "3quash-head" amllluni tion proves to be an acceptable
antit3.nk weapon, the inclu.sion of nine (9) to twelve (12) of such
weapons organic to thelT-111ine Platoon is recommended. This would
require only twelve (12) additional men (driver-loaders), since the
balance of the platoon could perform a dU.'ll nission. It is felt that
the additional 'MJrkload on Service Company l'aintenance Section can
be .:lbsor;Jed inside thepres·:mt T/O&E structure.
It is thRt b . ., made of the practicality of
introducing eight (8) ll-55 (quadruple-munted Cal .50 mounted
ton trucks into the Infantry Regiment. Tnese weapons are capable
of being fired either from the bed of th3 truck or from ground mounts.
On the offEilns i ve thes;3 "Vr::;apons could be uSt'ld truck-mounted for close
ground support or for antiaircraft protection of motor colurrms, CP's
or supply installations. On the defense or a static situation
they could be ground mounted for the same purposes and the trucks
could qe used other than for primary purpose. The ton truck
is a rugged and mount for the quad-fifvJ and elimin3tes
the and trafficability problems inherent in the M-16
vehicle. The additional firepower and particularly the antiaircraft
potential of this weapon would make it a valuable organic addition
to the Infantry Regiment.
COfJIrand Report - I Corps Transportation Report
April 1951 Source No. 269
Corps should never have less than four (4) truck companies in
support. Even though there are periods of little utiliz3tion,
vrucks must be "on tap" for tactical oper::itions. Four (4) truck
mits consti tute a minimum. (RESTRIcrED)
-.::W«,WM' .
OCAFF Form No 73
"$ _.1'· ,·ssq .\tirt
. (,Revised 15 Oct 51)

'------------------- ---- ---- --­
,SE& ""',....
W55tW'(r ,,'ftc" 9 7'
SOURCE: Com..-nand Report - 15th FA fu - 2d L"lf Div
D,l.m: kay 1951 Scurce No 270
'nle Tlo should be jmplemented to furnish one (1) ;,4ir observer
for each organic aircraft authorized by the FOI"lTard observers
Bra being directt3oto, thi,sjoLJ they are Urgently n')eded to meet
the. requiremmtsof troops, on ,the gz-ound. (R.1.:>"'1'RICT'.ill) , .
Conmflc,rReport.:-;':' 'Hq:oatfiUS ,<irnv Korea
. . Sec II:
" "'Bo'ok 5,"ACOF3'GL!, Part 3
Source No. 271
. .. '
1. Experience with truck operation in 0111 corps areas in the
last two (2) months! has; that ,mQte\.'Centralized control of all
phases of truck ;operation, in_ forward ,areas is necessary if most'
efficient and rna.ximumavailability of vehicles is to
be realized. "
.-, "
2. The present practice 'o'f, puttingtransporta tion units or ,'in
some cases, 'a givan nUr:lber of :trucks ,in direct suppor t . of an 'organi­
z.3.tion nas the following results: "
a. ,A ,lacko! flexibility - there often periods 6f time
when the unit supported, does not need :ill th!3 'trucks, yet-the:: are'
not available' for. other use. " '
b. ,on days when the unit has he:lVY cornmittments,-they have
"l tendEncy to "ram" the trucks - without rt-]gard to proper operating
pr.a'ct'ice"imd good :Ilr3intenance policies.
c. ,4" great d.::aJ. of IfdeadhE!':!.ding" in one direction results,
I'l.l though cargo may be ,1vailable and could be offered and hauled if
there wore centr-'llized centrol. This applies· p:1rticularly tooaok
ho.uling of drums and brass.
d. "'hEn, a heavy, W1expectad, de need for' a large'"

truck concentr3ti6n occurs, e. g.- a large troopmov8J.,oot, it is ver'J
difficult to collect the vIJhicles "l.nd control their movem8nt, dis-
Pt). tch and oper,3, tion.
e. Truck oper::ttion is from those who ::ire trained
to handle it and oftf'..Il put in inexperienced h;mds, or people not
pI'operly staffed to handle it.
f.Operations being split up into snaIl units, truck
dal'ldlines are not spread over a wide area, but ,1re often concentrated.
g. Normal ch::nnels of comm!'l.nd and adr.ninistration are broken
3. Several solutions are possib18:
a. Put all vehicles under :u-rr\)7" control 'lna give sJPport
missions, either continuing or temporary a.s needf-;d.
b. Lea';e units in direct support, but only :It Corps level,
a voiding -':lny breakdovms beyond battlllion, all support lower than
corps level to be by miSSion.
c. 'Use of tr'1nsportation coordinator, machinery for 'Which
alreA.dy exists, by proper use of 3Slst 'rr1nsportqtion Highway Trms­
port Group.
4. llecommend th;:)t Transportation OffiCer be requested
to submit a study on truck operation as outlim::1 herein, I'd. th his
recoPlIllertdations. (R.8STRICTED) ,
Col1U!l3nd 'i.eport - 42Sth Tr"lnsport'ltion Traffic R8gulating Gp SOURCE:
Source No 272
A bucket type conveyor Should be bull t by "hgineers to speed up
discharge of COl'll from barges. At present, cO"l.1 is discharged from
ship to barge by ship's g8ar, and removed from b'1rges by laborers
wearing nAIf frames. This results in up barges on coal
OCAFF Form No 73
. (Revised IS Oct 51)


! COfJIIland Report - I US Corps
June 1951 Source No 273
. .
During the month of June a Corps Investigation. dection 1'!;:;S "
organized, consisting of two (2) military police invGstigators from
Police Comp.::lny, to prelirilL.'1flI"'J invG3tigations
of crimes eoIhmitted in the I Corps '!his section VT3.S set up
... bec.:ause on ·the ·CID··.. ··
theY,were un.qble to dispatch a team of Agents imrilediately due to the
overlo:-ld of on h':md, and in so!;:e instances witnesses disappeared
and c!vidence '1T'1S missL.'1g due" to llI}3voidable Under the present
setup, as sooh as a crirr.e is reported to the mili t.3.ry polic8 or
Provost '" 8.I'shal·, team'-iss-en'b out "'to' mcrke" an' ir:1medi.1tE:l' .
investigation, and if sufficient leads, vritnesses and suspects are
located to 5ho1
;, the ,probability that the fllleged offense was conunitted
and by whoin, case is 't':lI"ned over to the CID. \"i'hen. investigation
the offenseisQfa minor n"ture or committed through
n egl with no criminril intent, 3 report of the p:-eliminary in­
is sent to the cOmrrk1.nding officer of the offender. The
two (2) enlist?;d mEn "l:ho constitute the I Corps IJ.:PIteam are both
trC!ined ihyestigat0rs, arid in the one week in June in which they were
organized ·the:,r successfull:;.'" solved several crirrim.l cases that would
very likely not have been prior to the setting up of the LPI
team. It is· believed that a team of traL.'1ed investig1tors should "De
incorporat?d in the T/O&E of the Provost l.:arshal Sections or' e'lch di­
vision and corps operating in the field, to make preliminary investi­
gation artd take some of the 'lTorkload .off the CID•. (lti:STRICTED)
Command Report - jd i'iAA !{; Ih
l:arch 1951,
Source No. 274
1. Recommend that power. for M-h5 turret on M-16 mount be taken
from vehicular pOYler supply.· Since vehicle opor3tes on 12 volt
Systetl, poy,cr could be taken frorn vchicul,11' o3.ttery to b:lse turret.
Slip rings in base of turret could b8 used to· ... t power to
master of turret. This would eliminate the Power Charger,
SE'ea wStStstt'9-'
Briggs .'md Str:t tton, presently mount od o,n the re3.r of t."1o turrdt
'1nd 3.110"J! room for four (4) addi tiOl13.1 chasts of amr.lUni tion. For
<luxiliary povr::;r in C'"lS3S vahicle is in st<1tic po"i tion, a PE-210
could bo used to provide power to storage battery.
2. Recornr.lend th'!t a m:mual system of oper'l.tion be! designed for
firing, traversing, and elevJting the guns of th8 M-45 turrGt when
el3ctric'l1 power is off. '!he present shortage of solenoids in this
has pointed out the need for some typo of rn.nual firing,
cspeci'llly in ground support r(lles.
Cormnnd Report - 2d Inf Div SOUReE:
July 1951 Source No. 275 DATE:
With the rect)I?unitmcnt of th3 2d Division to:m 1.ctiv,') sector on
16 July 1951, ele to'lr.lS "!T:Jre sont out to ,nch regiment in order that
on-th-spot might be 8ffectod. R::sul ts,.'1S of this date,
indicAte that this is '1 r..ore effective way of utilizing ele personnel
within the Division. This rrnrks a ch3.nge in the detnchr.l8l1ts opor'l­
tion1.l policy in3smuch as during tho past months these te'1r:ls
h'1d bGon ,b::!sed'1t detC1chment headqu::trters '3.nd sent ()lit to the regi­
ments on
When ,the 2d Division moved back into the K:msas Line in the
l1iddle of July, 111 1mi ts were Vl1'-1.rned to ch"ck their areas carefully
for nines. There were, nev.;rthcl3ss, heavy c'lsu3.1 ties caused by
friendly mini';s which h3.d not baen plotted when SO'Nll, or reported to
the relieving units v;hen the 2d Division took over. It is 8xtremely
inportant th1t units planting mine fields them in patterns and
det'lilcd and 3ccur2te maps of their loc'ltions. In '1ddition
to those prcc1.utions, the fields should ba proPerly m1rked. lUI of
these lre, basic prcc.1utions but they h'lvO not been followed
in tho Kor·::nn Thcat.",r. r[;;my booby tr'lps p11ced by individu,1ls ncar
theirf'oxho1es were not d"o·1ctiv'lted when units lw,r0 moved and these,
too, were the basic ·for m'l.ny unnecess1ry c1su,llties.
:JltRli _
OCAFF Form No 73
, •• 7;59' "sPCr"trQl'
(Revised 15 Oct 51)

.. ..


SOURC.E: Command RGPort - 2d Inf iv
Source No. 276
DATE: July 1951
. All 7S-rmn recoilless rines snd' .So calibre machine guns in the
8th Infantry Regiment wer(l f6rmedin battery and supported. the ...... '; .. oJ,.
$s8ul ting echelons. "Heavy Mortar Company, 9th InfantrY Regime.n:t
as attached to Heavy Mortar Compa:riy, 38th Infantry Regiment and
gether formed a twenty (20) guri battery :in 'support of this 9peration.
k Company; 2Jd' Infant!jT,. fired' direct· and indirect fire
. n· the 38th Inf;mtry sector to assist in th:e attack.· (REs'lRICTED)'
DATE: Source No. 277
.: _ c
Form No
-·.. _,'".;:."'_-'"
. Training should 8oph9size. the inportance of well dug-in positiona.
tis reasonably c8rtainthat this battalion would hllve suffered
umerous casualties' had it not been so well dug-in while under hOf?tUe
'ounterbattery fke. . (RESTRICTED) .' .
Oper'ati"on-'of in Korea,
oints out a requirement for strengthening the mouritmg of the rear
hock absorbers on 1/4 ton vehicles. The welds between the upper
J...;ltes and the frameshave:O'ften failed. (RESTRICTED)
Overall experience. ih light artillery 'units in Korea demonstrates
he a4vi"sa:bUi ty ;of including Camster TIS as part o:fthe basfc'
mmuniti'onloadof each lOS-rom ho'wi tzer section for· employment against
nfUtrating ground troops at close range. Ten (10) rounds per piece
uld be sufficient.­ (CONFIDMIAL)
* * ... * * 4' * * * *
----------------- --._._------- .--­
... SEtTEfi' ..
¢ Gee. . A •• ad>
4 ... I iJ. 1:1'.... _
Some means of night air observation should be provided in order
to locate enemy artillery mortars. In the rugged terrain encountered
in Korea,.. gr01.¥ld observation and location by flashes of <'nmny glIDS
is often very difficult due to intervening ridges. l-Ielicopters
operating above friendly front lines might provide a solution to
this problem. Orientation could be accomplished by properly emplaced
searchlights or other visual beacons. (RESTRICfED)
lUI high explosive projectiles lOS-mIll should be issued 'with
nose plugs, supplementary :1nd charges not be ready fuzed. The reasons
for this are as follows:
1. }Janufacture, asso!'1bly, :md riJsupply problems are
greatly rninir:dzed by h'3.ving a cornmon HE projectile unfuzed.
stocks in dunps, ASP's 3.nd "ven within batteries can be acco;nplished
more re.:tdil;y by using a co;:;mon unfuzed projectile"md bulk issue
of. fUZes.
2. d degree of safety is .3.ttained when Ik1.ndling un­
fuzed projectiles as compared -vrith handling the fuzed rounds.
3. Experience indicates thQt service of the piece is not slowed
dovm by tqe USe of unfuzed projectiles' and in some actually
a cCGlerated. In f.lB.ny instances difficulty has been encot1."ltered in
removing fuzes which have been set-punched in place in order to
install a different type. No such difficulty has been observed in
removing nose plugs fro!" projactiles.
4. During the Kore8.n op,-;ra tiuns vast quantities of time fuzed
sholls h:we been used as point detonating when stocks of PD fuzed
shell had been expendod. This dOGS not appeD.r to an economical
practice and could be avoided. Tim8 adjustments h3ve been very in­
requent and a small stock of tim<3 could be c3.rried on hand in
the event they- were required.
S. In some instances of units relieving other units j,n place
nd taking OiT?r ammunition on ha.nd in howj.tzer pOSitions, ammunition
.'3.S been rep9.cked in the wrong CGntain3rs and the narkings on the
acking as to tJ-pe fuze did not coincidG with the actual fuze con­
ain3d therein, causing erroneous '3.mmu..."li tion reporting and consequEn t
ddition'll labor in making physical inventori8s.
OCAFF Form No 73
ozeen" 0" tiJi "f'CM 7
(Revised 15 Oct 51)

.., iGlWIi*
t S'
sdT',' 1 It, Hi.Bt .;


6. "\.r:1Dunition status reports be si!:':plified by separating
the fuze froD the shell. (CONF.rDENTLu.)
The 8:iplC3c8;ient theenmy of fiat tr'! j ector::.' 1 rtill er"J on
hiGh. r idr,es hill tops has proven to be :1 thorn in our side.
'!hose posit.ions qre veI'"'j" difficult to hit and when our fires f,et
close to the; enerly. piece he Ell'lrely ,'rithdr'rr;rs W8'1pons -3.n.l personnel
into a previously prFlp'lred cave or du'S-out (,';hich is usuall;;- very
cleverly canoufla3ed) until our fire is lifted.
Our recent of qr:bushes has pro\Ten to be
effective. B8.sed on intelligence repo>:'ts, day tiIile registrations
h8.vebeen made on points ?mer·e night "lctivity by thi:1 enEI1y.has been
observed. On signal fron patrols or other raeans, fire has
been placed on these and in one instance tv:o (2) of four (4)
trucks operating over one of these points were destroyed and
numerous Cl'lsual ties were inflicted on eneli\Y personnel and animals.
COIJra:md Report ... 2d viv L:.rty
Source No. 278
resourceful ener.,ywho l:lakes excellent USe of the favorable
terrain ;for his pieces has r:Jr3de; oo"4J1te;rbattery an extremely
difficul t nission. The units of Division have had only
fair success but are redoubling their efforts to get better results.
.. , .
or,. OCAFF Form No
. (Reyise,d

Lack of radar €wipment continues to hamper the effectiveness
of the countermortar prograo. Under present conditions a mortar
j;;ust be seen or its flash observed before neutraliz.3tion or destruc­
tion ca.n be effected.
The use of surveyed ground observation posts, nanned on a
(24) hour baSiS, has enabled the artillery to locate
Hany ener:lY weapons. '!his observlltion has also proved valuable in
other reported information. (RZSTRICTED)
Aerial photo and visual r,lethods of co un termor tar and countep,.
battery have been only partially effective. Sound ranging has
[been unsuccessful in the mountains due to echoes and lack of surveyed
Radar would help ir:!measurably. The Division :.rtillery has
the personnel, but does not the quipl'lent. (CONPID:iNTI,AL)
That counterr.!ortar radar equipment ba obtained for the light
battalions of this division. (CONFIDT!NTL.L)
'!ha t much greater 8J::phasis be placed on the submission of timely
shell reports and other enemy information qy battalion
in intelligence traininr, programs. (RESTRICT'JID)
im a,Yanuni tion linit2.tion of fifteen (15) rounds per day or two
forty (240) rounds per battalion per day, placed on the
Division ,irtillery 'luring July, proved too restrictive. Such
1m allowance does not afford proper protection of infantry patrols,
not a.llo'lf! for proper count'8rb'lttery fires, and generally re­
tricts the Division to a passive defense. (RlSTRICTBD)
, **********
OCAFF Form No 73
9ltZUJJ ; . "M I. mi. $:OiS
, 15 Oct 51) . :.;-;'
------------------- ._-- -- ....­
-... ..
S2CU;;; hi' tJJI'.JfbN
Despite the five (5) weeks of training, it required approxi­
mately ten (10) days of combat to enable the units to reach a high
degree of efficiency. This was particularly noticable in the units
which had rotated the majority of their experienced persorme1 to
the zone of the interior, leaving ;:l minimum of battle experienced
personnel on hand.
. OCAFF Form No 7- .. " ...
."Tn 'MfP?;' 7
(.Revised 15 Oct 5i I

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