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ENDI 2010 1/50
Japan South Korea aff - ENDI
Japan South Korea aff - ENDI.................................................................................................................................1 1ac – Plan.................................................................................................................................................................3 ***1ac..........................................................................................................................................3 ***1ac.......................................................................................................................................................................3 1ac – Hegemony advantage.....................................................................................................................................4 1ac – Hegemony advantage.....................................................................................................................................5 1ac – Hegemony advantage.....................................................................................................................................6 1ac – Hegemony advantage.....................................................................................................................................7 1ac - Hegemony advantage......................................................................................................................................8 1ac – Hegemony advantage.....................................................................................................................................9 1ac – Hegemony advantage...................................................................................................................................10 1ac – Hegemony advantage....................................................................................................................................11 1ac – Hegemony advantage....................................................................................................................................12 1ac – ROK – Japan relations advantage................................................................................................................13 1ac – ROK – Japan relations advantage................................................................................................................14 1ac – ROK – Japan relations advantage................................................................................................................15 1ac – ROK – Japan relations advantage................................................................................................................16 1ac – ROK – Japan relations advantage.................................................................................................................17 1ac – ROK – Japan relations advantage................................................................................................................18 ***Hegemony advantage generic extensions..............................................................................18 ***Hegemony advantage generic extensions.........................................................................................................18 Bases increase risk of war......................................................................................................................................19 AT: Hegemony good / Deterrence / Appeasement...............................................................................................20 AT: Hegemony good / Deterrence / Appeasement................................................................................................21 Offshore balancing solves......................................................................................................................................22 Offshore balancing solves......................................................................................................................................23 ***Hegemony advantage extensions – North Korea specific......................................................23 ***Hegemony advantage extensions – North Korea specific................................................................................23 Risk of Korean war high........................................................................................................................................24 Risk of Korean war high.........................................................................................................................................25 Solvency – Removing troops key to Chinese support...........................................................................................26 Solvency – Removing troops key to Chinese support............................................................................................27 China key to solve North Korea.............................................................................................................................28 China key to solve North Korea.............................................................................................................................29 US forces in Japan prevent Japanese regional security........................................................................................30 Increasing Japanese defense key to check China...................................................................................................31 Bases prevent Korean reunification.......................................................................................................................32 AT: Withdrawing troops undermines relations.....................................................................................................33 AT: Plan undermines US-ROK alliance.................................................................................................................34 AT: US forces key to regional stability...................................................................................................................35 AT: South Korea key to contain China...................................................................................................................36 AT: US forces deter North Korea...........................................................................................................................37 AT: US forces deter North Korea...........................................................................................................................38 AT: Allied Prolif.....................................................................................................................................................39 ***Relations advantage extensions............................................................................................39 ***Relations advantage extensions.......................................................................................................................39 Japan-South Korea relations low..........................................................................................................................40 Japan-South Korea relations low...........................................................................................................................41 Japan-ROK relations solve the need for US military presence.............................................................................42
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ENDI 2010 2/50
Democracy solves global war.................................................................................................................................43 Relations Key to Stability.......................................................................................................................................44 Relations Key to Stability.......................................................................................................................................45 XT – Myanmar Democracy KT Stability...............................................................................................................46 XT – China Democracy KT Global Democracy......................................................................................................47 2AC China Democracy Impacts – Japan War.......................................................................................................48 2AC China Democracy Impacts – Japan WAr.......................................................................................................49 XT – China Democracy Solves Japan War............................................................................................................50
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ENDI 2010 3/50
1ac – Plan
Plan: The United States federal government should substantially phase out its military presence in Japan and South Korea.
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ENDI 2010 4/50
1ac – Hegemony advantage
Advantage 1: Hegemony Financial collapse makes maintaining hegemony impossible – US withdrawal is inevitable over the long-term Bandow, 10 - senior fellow at the Cato Institute. A former special assistant to President Reagan, he is the author of Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire (Doug,”Bankrupt Empire”, 4/19, http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=23256) The United States government is effectively bankrupt. Washington no longer can afford to micromanage the world. International social engineering is a dubious venture under the best of circumstances. It is folly to attempt while drowning in red ink.
Traditional military threats against America have largely disappeared. There’s no more Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, Maoist China is distant history and Washington is allied with virtually every industrialized state. As Colin Powell famously put it while Chairman of the Joint Chiefs: “I’m running out of enemies. . . . I’m down to Kim Il-Sung and Castro.” However, the United States continues to act as the globe’s 911 number. Unfortunately, a hyperactive foreign policy requires a big military. America accounts for roughly half of global military outlays. In real terms Washington spends more on “defense” today than it during the Cold War, Korean War and Vietnam War. U.S. military expenditures are extraordinary by any measure. My Cato Institute colleagues Chris Preble and Charles Zakaib recently compared American and European military outlays. U.S. expenditures have been trending upward and now approach five percent of GDP. In contrast, European outlays have consistently fallen as a percentage of GDP, to an average of less than two percent. The difference is even starker when comparing per capita GDP military expenditures. The U.S. is around $2,200. Most European states fall well below $1,000. Adding in non-Pentagon defense spending—Homeland Security, Veterans Affairs, and Department of Energy (nuclear weapons)—yields American military outlays of $835.1 billion in 2008, which represented 5.9 percent of GDP and $2,700 per capita. Max Boot of the Council on Foreign Relations worries that the
increased financial obligations (forget unrealistic estimates about cutting the deficit) resulting from health-care legislation will preclude maintaining such oversize expenditures in the future, thereby threatening America’s “global standing.” He asks: Who will “police the sea lanes, stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, combat terrorism, respond to genocide and other unconscionable
human rights violations, and deter rogue states from aggression?” Of course, nobody is threatening to close the sea lanes these days. Washington has found it hard to stop nuclear proliferation without initiating war, yet promiscuous U.S. military intervention creates a powerful incentive for nations to seek nuclear weapons. Armored
divisions and carrier groups aren’t useful in confronting terrorists. Iraq demonstrates how the brutality of war often is more inhumane than the depredations of dictators. And there are lots of other nations capable of deterring rogue states.
The United States should not attempt to do everything even if it could afford to do so. But it can’t. When it comes to the federal Treasury, there’s nothing there. If Uncle Sam was a real person, he would declare bankruptcy.
The current national debt is $12.7 trillion. The Congressional Budget Office figures that current policy—unrealistically assuming no new spending increases—will run up $10 trillion in deficits over the coming decade. But more spending—a lot more spending—is on the way.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac remain as active as ever, underwriting $5.4 trillion worth of mortgages while running up additional losses. The Federal Housing Administration’s portfolio of insured mortgages continues to rise along with defaults. Exposure for Ginnie Mae, which issues guaranteed mortgage-backed securities, also is jumping skyward. The FDIC shut down a record 140 banks last year and is running low on cash. Last year the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation figured its fund was running a $34 billion deficit. Federal pensions are underfunded by $1 trillion. State and local retirement funds are short about $3 trillion. Outlays for the Iraq war will persist decades after the troops return as the government cares for seriously injured military personnel; total expenditures will hit $2 trillion or more. Extending and expanding the war in Afghanistan will further bloat federal outlays. Worst of all, last year the combined Social Security/Medicare unfunded liability was estimated to be $107 trillion. Social Security, originally expected to go negative in 2016, will spend more than it collects this year, and the “trust fund” is an accounting fiction. Medicaid, a joint federal-state program, also is breaking budgets. At their current growth rate, CBO says that by 2050 these three programs alone will consume virtually the entire federal budget.
Uncle Sam’s current net liabilities exceed Americans’ net worth. Yet the debt-to-GDP ratio will continue rising and could
eventually hit World War II levels. Net interest is expected to more than quadruple to $840 billion annually by 2020. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke says: “It’s not something that is ten years away. It affects the markets currently.” In March, Treasury notes commanded a yield of 3.5 basis points higher than those for Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway. Moody’s recently threatened to downgrade federal debt: “Although AAA governments benefit from an unusual degree of balance sheet flexibility, that flexibility is not infinite.” In 2008, Tom Lemmon of Moody’s warned: “The underlying credit rating of the U.S. government faces the risk of downgrading in the next ten years if solutions are not found to our growing Medicare and Social Security unfunded obligations.” This is all without counting a dollar of increased federal spending due to federalizing American medicine. The United States faces a fiscal crisis. If America’s survival was at stake, extraordinary military expenditures would still be justified. But not to protect other nations, especially prosperous and populous states well able to defend themselves. Boot warns: “it will be increasingly hard to be globocop and nanny state at the same time.” America should be neither. The issue is not just money. The Constitution envisions a limited government focused on defending Americans, not transforming the rest of the world. Moreover, if
continues to act as globocop, America’s friends and allies will never have an incentive to do more.
The United States will be a world power for decades. But it can no afford to act as if it is the only power. America must begin the process of becoming a normal nation with a normal foreign policy.
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1ac – Hegemony advantage
Maintaining military commitments risks war – the U.S. could be drawn into nuclear conflicts Layne, 06 (Christopher, professor of government at Texas A & M University, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present, p. 169)
Rather than being instruments of regional pacification, today America's alliances are transmission belts for war that ensure that the U.S. would be embroiled in Eurasian wars. In deciding whether to go war in Eurasia, the United States should not allow its hands to be tied in advance. For example, a non-great power war on the Korean Peninsula-even if nuclear weapons were not involved-would be very costly. The dangers of being entangled in a great power war in Eurasia, of course, are even greater, and could expose the American homeland to nuclear attack. An offshore balancing grand strategy would extricate the United States from the danger of being entrapped in
Eurasian conflicts by its alliance commitments.
the United States and ROK must reconsider their alliance relationship.” From America’s standpoint. however. Tit-for-tat retaliation might spiral out of control. however the current controversy is resolved. including possibly closing the Kaesong industrial park in the North or targeting a North Korean vessel for destruction.aspx?id=23336) Suspicions continue to mount that North Korea torpedoed the Cheonan. the ROK must respond. The tragedy would be no less if the cause was a mine. Triggering a new war was not. That’s the short-term. but could end any chance—admittedly today very slim—of reversing North Korean nuclear development.senior fellow at the Cato Institute. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said last month: “I hope that there is no talk of war. even if small. The ROK nevertheless might be willing to take the risk. and unreasonable demands have mixed with occasional cooperative gestures as Washington and Seoul attempted to dissuade the North from developing nuclear weapons. over the years the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea committed numerous acts of war. Two longer-term issues require attention. Moreover. Beijing’s international reputation would suffer as its policy of aiding the North was fully and dramatically discredited. In recent years the DPRK’s conduct has remained predictably belligerent but constrained: fiery threats. stating that “I wouldn’t necessarily link those directly.” Yet the likelihood that Pyongyang would yield its nuclear weapons while sinking South Korean vessels seems vanishingly small. Now what? The issue is most pressing in Seoul. the ROK would need Washington’s backing and China’s understanding. Then finding the right level of response. he is the author of Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire (Doug. long the senior partner to the Republic of Korea in their military alliance. Even a minimal possibility of a negotiated settlement should be pursued. But even if the DPRK is culpable. That would be an international good. the ROK cannot act decisively.org/Article. most dramatically attempting to assassinate South Korean President Chun Doo-hwan during a visit to Burma and seizing the U. North Korean relations recently have been in a down cycle. Tokyo also would be asked to contribute to the peninsula’s reconstruction. causing North Korea to downgrade economic and diplomatic contacts and even recently confiscate South Korean investments. State Department spokesman Philip Crowley said the Obama administration remained committed to the negotiations despite the sinking. but the latter could be dismissed as an unfortunate occurrence rather than deliberate attack. a South Korean corvette which sank more than a month ago in the Yellow Sea to the west of the Korean peninsula. The Korean War ended in an armistice nearly six decades ago. Finally. however. it makes no sense for its defense decisions to be subject to Washington’s veto. especially if the relationship between America and China grows more contentious.”Taming Pyongyang”. troops near China’s border. the last thing the Obama administration wants is another war.S. Japan’s relations with the North remain stalled over the lack of accounting over the kidnapping of Japanese citizens years ago. America must avoid another war at most any cost. the six-party talks would seem kaput. If a torpedo attack is the most likely cause. intelligence ship Pueblo. avoiding a potentially bloody war on the Korean peninsula while heavily involved in Afghanistan and still tied down in Iraq is far more important than South Korean concerns over justice and credibility.” But even if Seoul won Chinese support for a UN resolution. a military strike would entail a chance of war. diplomatic walk-outs. Why the North would sink a South Korean vessel is a matter of speculation. A former special assistant to President Reagan. War would be a tragic end to decades of hardship and isolation. More critical is the response. The North Korean state likely would disappear. winning Security Council backing would be a useful step. Brinkmanship was the DPRK’s standard diplomatic strategy. leaving a united Korea allied with America and hosting U.S. but at some point the effort simply looks foolish. refused to risk igniting a new conflict. If it chooses the latter. the ROK would have to take bilateral measures. . policy reversals. South Korean officials say the investigation continues as they seek definitive evidence that a torpedo sunk the Cheonan. there is no action or miscalculation that could provoke a response that might lead to conflict. for at least two decades Pyongyang had eschewed military action. of renewed conflict on the peninsula demonstrates that today’s status quo is unsatisfactory for all of the North’s neighbors. would be necessary. No peace treaty was ever signed. First. To do nothing would reward the North and encourage additional irresponsible action. a lot of people in several countries would have to cross their fingers and say some prayers. That certainly would end investment and aid. bilateral differences are only likely to grow. The former would cease to exist. These In any case. but no harm was done.” the South will seek Security Council condemnation of the DPRK. Shots were fired between South and North Korean ships last November near the disputed boundary in the Yellow Sea. What to do? Seoul needs some degree of certainty before acting. but millions of North Koreans likely would die or otherwise suffer along the way. Japan would be less vulnerable to the consequences of war but could be the target of North Korean attempts to strike out. South Korean President Lee Myung-bak has ended the ROK’s “Sunshine Policy. So long as the sinking might have been caused by a mine. Not Washington. Of course. One South Korean diplomat suggested to me that The People’s Republic of China also would be a big loser in any war: refugees would and conflict could spill over the Yalu. The potential consequences are horrifying. likely would prevent negotiations and possibly would entail military retaliation.” which essentially entailed shipping money and tourists north irrespective of the DPRK’s conduct. Conflict was avoided because the United States. http://www.Japan South Korea aff ENDI 2010 6/50 1ac – Hegemony advantage This is specifically true in North Korea – provocations are inevitable as long as the US remains involved and the US will be drawn into conflict Bandow. The result not only would mean a serious and prolonged worsening of bilateral relations and increase in bilateral tensions. 5/3. 10 . Pyongyang has walked out of the long-running Six Party talks and failed in its attempt to engage Washington. North Korea and its people would suffer the most. The potential. Given the South’s level of development. Still. Undoubtedly.nationalinterest. The United States is cooperating in the investigation and reportedly urging the Lee government to wait for proof before acting. Even on the issue of defending against the DPRK their interests differ: Seoul must satiate an angry public desiring vengeance as well as preserve its credibility in confronting the North. Policy makers in both Seoul and Washington are pondering how to respond. Nor does it make any sense for the United States to risk being drawn into a war as a result of acts between other nations. If the sinking was intentional. President Lee Myung-bak has said: “I’m very committed to responding in a firm manner if need be. This is in line with President Lee’s promise “to cooperate with the international community in taking necessary measures when the results are out.
http://www. http://www. On the Korean Peninsula itself. whether nuclear weapons are used in response to nuclear first-use. the DPRK has become a nuclear ‘stalker state’ that seeks to redress past wrongs and use nuclear leverage to force the United States to treat it in a less hostile and more respectful manner. Unlike an individual who stalks. How the great powers. Millions of refugees would flee the affected regions. RMIT University. At worst... such amounts of smoke injected into the stratosphere would cause a huge reduction in the Earth’s protective ozone. and in particular.Japan South Korea aff ENDI 2010 7/50 1ac – Hegemony advantage Expanding North Korean provocations will draw the US into nuclear conflict Hayes. Reactors might also be targeted.org/fora/security/10001HayesHamalGreen.The period of nuclear darkness will cause much greater decrease in grain production than 5% and it will continue for many years. then the United States will have to ask itself whether continued isolation and pressure on the regime is more likely. but the nuclear darkness will cause a deeper drop in temperature than at any time during the last 1000 years. individual warheads equivalent in yield to a range of 6 to 32 Hiroshimas). that is. and the follow-on impacts on the global economy via ecological and food insecurity. or less so. Even a limited nuclear exchange would result in a holocaust of unprecedented proportions.To make matters even worse. of course. causing further mayhem and downwind radiation effects. 06 . could make the present global financial crisis pale by comparison. key population centres are well within short or medium range missiles.25 degrees Celsius for a period of 6-8 years..*Victoria University AND **Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute (Peter and Michael. or merely accident. The Korean nuclear proliferation issue is not just a regional threat but a global one that warrants priority consideration from the international community. Nautilus Institute.org/fora/security/0682Hayes. Like a repeat offender. leading to the resumption of Korean War hostilities. 10 . US efforts to use ‘clear and classical’ deterrent threats to communicate to North Koreans that ‘if they do acquire WMD.3 In Westberg’s view: That is not global winter. But the catastrophe within the region would not be the only outcome. especially the nuclear weapons states respond to such a crisis. radiating ruin left by nuclear next-use. and aftermath chain-reaction affects involving other potential proliferant states. “The Stalker State: North Korean Proliferation and the End of American Nuclear Hegemony” 10/4. and the global nonproliferation regime Hayes and Green. including possible loss-of-control over fissile material or warheads in the chaos of nuclear war.4 These.hundreds of millions of people will die from hunger. and actual use in times of crisis or war.. There could be many unanticipated impacts on regional and global security relationships5. superimposed on a smoking.pdf) The consequences of failing to address the proliferation threat posed by the North Korea developments. Indeed. miscalculation. Pyongyang has a population of over 2 million.html) If as I have suggested.nautilus. 1/5. are serious. The temperature over the continents would decrease substantially more than the global average. New research indicates that even a limited nuclear war in the region would rearrange our global climate far more quickly than global warming. global agriculture. There are no grounds to believe that the DPRK will employ a US or Western conceptual framework of nuclear deterrence and crisis management in developing its own nuclear doctrine and use options. the development of creative and unanticipated ways of using nuclear threats. The direct impacts. Continued rebuffing of Pyongyang’s overtures may lead to more ‘nuclear stalking’ – that is.nautilus. there is the possibility of nuclear attack1. the Way Still Open: Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia”. . A decrease in rainfall over the continents would also follow. are not the only consequences. their weapons will be unusable because any attempt to use them will bring national obliteration’ – as Condoleezza Rice put it in her Foreign Affairs essay in 2000 – serve to incite the DPRK to exploit this very threat as a way to engage the United States. The whole of Japan is likely to come within North Korean missile range. North Korean nuclear use triggers every impact – it destroys the ozone layer.. Westberg draws attention to new studies modelling the effects of even a limited nuclear exchange involving approximately 100 Hiroshima-sized 15 kt bombs2 (by comparison it should be noted that the United States currently deploys warheads in the range 100 to 477 kt. Seoul (close to the North Korean border) 11 million. Melbourne. not only for the Northeast Asian region but for the whole international community. and related political and economic issues. when the risk of nuclear next-use becomes urgent. Currently. to ameliorate stalking behaviours in time of crisis. deployments. and Tokyo over 20 million.The studies indicate that the soot from the fires produced would lead to a decrease in global temperature by 1. the United States has no common language for discussing nuclear weapons with the North Korean military in the context of the insecurities that bind the two sides together at the Demilitarized Zone. and Director. could make or break the global non proliferation and disarmament regimes. “-“The Path Not Taken. San Francisco (Peter. the DPRK is likely to continue to use nuclear threat to stalk the United States until it achieves what it perceives to be a genuine shift in Washington’s attitude. whether by intention. with subsequent nuclear breakout and geopolitical turbulence. the economy. there is no simple way to lock up a state that stalks another with nuclear threat.. with terrible risks of miscalculation and first-use on both sides.Professor of International Relations.
Prof. . An arc of nuclear instability from Tehran to Tokyo could place U. China.S. (2) states may have politically unreliable or immature command and control systems. Apart from actual use or threat of use. unreliable or immature systems might permit a technical malfunction that caused an unintended launch. thus triggering a mistaken preemption. A pentagonal configuration of nuclear powers in the Pacific basis (Russia. 10 . of Political Science @ Penn State. in geopolitical deterrence and proliferation space. therefore. not excluding preemptive war. and counter-deterrent special operations. defenses. (Stephen. as a deterrent against the outside world’s applying maximal pressure on Pyongyang and as a bargaining chip to extract the economic and political concessions that the DPRK needs if it wishes to avoid giving up its peculiar approach to social engineering. 117-8) Failure to contain proliferation in Pyongyang could spread nuclear fever throughout Asia. the world will not see its nuclear weapons being used against Japan or South Korea or anyone else.Japan South Korea aff ENDI 2010 8/50 1ac . but will rather see this new nuclear arsenal held in reserve (just as the putative Israeli nuclear arsenal has been held in reserve). p. North Korea could exploit the mere existence of an assumed nuclear capability in order to support its coercive diplomacy. Quester has noted: If the Pyongyang regime plays its cards sensibly and well. an eight-sided nuclear arms race in Asia would increase the likelihood of accidental or inadvertent nuclear war. A five-sided nuclear competition in the Pacific would be linked. and the two Koreas – not including the United States.Hegemony advantage This risks nuclear wars throughout Asia Cimbala. and to the emerging nuclear weapons status of Iran. with its own Pacific interests) could put deterrence at risk and create enormous temptation toward nuclear preemption. proliferation strategies into the ash heap of history and call for more drastic military options. Japan. Nuclear Weapons and Cooperative Security in the 21st Century. to the existing nuclear deterrents in India and Pakistan. Japan and South Korea might seek nuclear weapons and missile defenses. In addition. or a deliberate but unauthorized launch by rogue commanders. (3) faulty intelligence and warning systems might cause one side to misinterpret the other’s defensive moves to forestall attack as offensive preparations for attack. especially during a crisis involving a decision for nuclear first strike or retaliation. It would do so because: (1) some of these states already have histories of protracted conflict. As George H.
we will endorse any Japanese attempt to create a nuclear deterrent of its own. .org/pub_display. U. whom it could not so easily intimidate.S. More proliferation may be a troubling outcome. It is sufficient if Washington informs those governments that the United States would not object to their developing nuclear weapons. But offsetting the North's looming illicit advantage may be the best of a bad set of options. “Nuclear Neighbors Might Thwart N. A public opinion poll taken shortly after Pyongyang's nuclear test showed that a majority of respondents believed South Korea should develop a deterrent of its own. the attitude in South Korea is different. those forward-deployed forces are not military assets. In addition. it might have to abandon its current provocative course. If the North had to deal with nuclear neighbors.Japan South Korea aff ENDI 2010 9/50 1ac – Hegemony advantage The plan solves . The mere possibility that South Korea and Japan might do so would come as an unpleasant surprise to both North Korea and China. http://www. Kim's regime might then conclude that keeping the region non-nuclear would be more productive. The prospect of additional nuclear weapons proliferation in northeast Asia obviously is not an ideal outcome.and Beijing -.withdrawing troops will immediately spur Chinese action on North Korea to prevent South Korean or Japanese nuclearization Carpenter.cato. Pyongyang might face the prospect of confronting more prosperous adversaries that could easily build larger and more sophisticated nuclear arsenals than it could hope to do. Japan or South Korea (or both) might well decide to build a nuclear deterrent. democratic countries such as Japan and South Korea do so in self-defense.php?pub_id=6772) Instead of putting a leash on Japan and South Korea. Even if it does not do so. Faced with a dangerous. not when stable. China's is a nuclear Japan. the reality is that if the United States blocks the possible emergence of a northeast Asian nuclear balance.S. nuclear-capable neighbor and a more limited U. 6 . . It's time to share the nightmares. the United States needs to let Seoul and Tokyo know that we intend to withdraw our military forces from South Korea and Japan. 11/11. If our nightmare is a nuclear North Korea. Indeed. Although the Japanese public seems reluctant to go down that path." Even if one does not embrace Krauthammer's approach. Washington Post columnist Charles Krauthammer expresses that thesis starkly: "We should go to the Chinese and tell them plainly that if they do not join us in squeezing North Korea and thus stopping its march to go nuclear.that if the North insists on wielding nuclear weapons. they are nuclear hostages. but it beats that scenario. Moreover. The United States does not need to press Tokyo and Seoul to go nuclear. a nuclear balance of power in the region would likely emerge instead of a North Korean nuclear monopoly. nuclear-armed North Korea.” Chicago Sun Times. . . In an environment with a nuclear-armed North Korea. the real danger arising from proliferation is when repulsive rogue states such as North Korea get such weapons. That would be inappropriate. Korea. it will be stuck with the responsibility of shielding non-nuclear allies from a volatile. The prospect of a nuclear-armed Japan is also the one factor that might galvanize the Chinese to put serious diplomatic and economic pressure on Pyongyang to give up its nuclear ambitions. officials should inform Pyongyang -.vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute (Ted. Washington will urge Tokyo and Seoul to make their own decisions about whether to acquire strategic deterrents. military commitment to the region.
-ROK alliance as well as the strategy for involving China in the North Korean issue. even without Chinese pressure. 5/3. . which would have significantly negative consequences for Beijing. But even if peace survives.S. The incident should impel a serious rethinking of the current U. 10 . given the North’s impending leadership transition and apparent signs of public dissatisfaction.Japan South Korea aff ENDI 2010 10/50 1ac – Hegemony advantage Increasing Chinese involvement in North Korea will create a peaceful solution – it’s the only way to avoid war or North Korean collapse Bandow.aspx?id=23336) Second. Even if the North is blameless.”Taming Pyongyang”. unleashing a flood of refugees. And if Pyongyang is guilty. And if Seoul eschews military retaliation. the United States.senior fellow at the Cato Institute.nationalinterest. he is the author of Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire (Doug. The foreign ministry called the sinking an “unfortunate incident. http://www. And unacceptable. applying substantial political and economic pressure on Pyongyang would risk breaking the bilateral relationship and might spark a violent collapse. South Korea and Japan must develop a unified approach to China built on the sinking of the Cheonan. the risk could not be clearer. Until now the PRC has viewed the status quo as beneficial: the DPRK remains a friendly buffer state. today’s badly misgoverned DPRK might implode of its own accord. the United States and ROK must perennially go hat-in-hand to Beijing to beg for its assistance in dealing with the North. Although few people expect the Koreas to end up at war. In fact. In contrast. the risks of war are obvious and catastrophic. The PRC has said little about the Cheonan incident. As noted earlier. The allied pitch should be simple. active policy designed to both denuclearize the Korean peninsula and promote political and economic reform in the North. a North Korean atomic bomb would not be directed at China. Just one irresponsible act from the unpredictable DPRK could trigger a new devastating conflict. A former special assistant to President Reagan. the risk is real.org/Article. the incident demonstrates that the status quo is dangerous. There is a possibility of violent collapse. a Chinese commitment to take a much more active role might help convince Seoul to choose nonviolent retaliation for the Cheonan’s sinking. the North’s ongoing nuclear program combined with warlike provocations would place increasing pressure on the South and Japan to develop countervailing arsenals.” Beijing’s ambassador in Seoul reaffirmed his nation’s commitment to peace and stability. Beijing should take the lead in forging a new.
the United States and Tokyo engaged in an oft-frustrating dialogue. but the United States does too much. they should pay the cost of and take responsibility for doing so. bases and forces abroad is offensive. since the spectrum of views runs well beyond socialist pacifists and conservative hawks. Wrote Dan Twining of the George Marshall Fund: DPJ members support a trans-Pacific foreign policy role within the alliance. However." the real problem is not that Tokyo does too little. Some Heritage Foundation observed: in keeping with American priorities. Analysts like Harvard's Joseph Nye take the policy for granted. prepared to act against an aggressive hegemonic power should one arise. today's emphasis on military issues may inhibit bilateral cooperation elsewhere. the question will arise: should the United States risk Los Angeles for Tokyo? The increasing unpredictability of North Korean behavior has led to more discussion in Japan about the possibility of developing a countervailing weapon. Some on the Right point out that as Yet South Korea. . . third based on purchasing power parity). worrying only about whether or not it is credible. as Beijing develops its own strategic nuclear deterrent against America. 8/31. the DPJ reaches much further to the left than does the LDP." Indeed. The DPJ's political alliance with the Socialist Party in Japan's upper house will pull its foreign and security policy further to the left — and further away from the broad consensus that has defined the U. Even today. human outflows from failed states. The DPJ intends to change Tokyo's relationship with the U S In what direction will the new government move? Washington should take the lead.php?pub_id=10496) Washington routinely asked Japan to do more militarily.-Japan alliance a to serve as the foundation of Japan's foreign policy." Nevertheless. the DPJ has several reasons to moderate its approach to foreign policy and the alliance." America should not demonstrate resolve in defending allies — Japan as well as South Korea — which should be defending themselves Tokyo is unlikely to allow the United States to use facilities in Japan for American purposes especially to maintain U. Particularly important is the future of so-called extended deterrence. Proposals to revise Article 9 have gone nowhere.S." The 2005 party platform promised to "do away with the dependent relationship in which Japan ultimately has no alternative but to act in accordance with U. and incoming Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama ran towards the center.-Japan alliance for three generations.S. twice the population. when allied states have prospered and the most serious hegemonic threat has disappeared. is why the United States spends so much on the military — roughly half of the global total.S. the greater the need for Japan to augment its forces. before the election. The factional battle over the DJP's approach is likely to be complicated. and provides an irreplaceable staging area should military action be necessary. interests of other nations. the role of U. Washington is in the position to act as an off-shore balancer. terming the U.S. however. ships in the Indian Ocean and Ichiro Ozawa. but only in following America's lead. thereby diminishing the alliance with the United States.S. most notably)." What now with a new government taking control in Tokyo? The DPJ platform calls for a "close and equal Japan-U." since "The forward deployment of a large U. of course. Whatever the Japanese people wish to do. Bruce Klingner of the Other DPJ leaders define a future in which Japan orients itself toward China and pursues Asian economic integration as its external priority. but no more so than the possibility of a confrontation between the United States and nuclear-armed China over the Deterrence can fail. such as pandemics. turning defense responsibilities over to Japan. though spending just one percent of GDP ($47 billion last year) on the military.org/pub_display. which would benefit both countries. cutting host nation support and reducing the U. . Tokyo." Dramatic change has been rare in this consensus-oriented society. nited tates. proclaimed that "it will be the age of Asia. Tokyo cannot demand equality unless it does mor "Neither country is well served by endlessly repeated bromides of the strength of the alliance it becomes increasingly apparent that Japan will not fulfill the security role required to address increasing global security threats.S. allies. Over the last half century Japan has changed far more than has the alliance. and far greater military spending than Pyongyang. military presence causes a realignment of Japanese defense spending while maintaining relations – this facilitates a transition to offshore balancing Bandow. is on par with the leading European states.” National Interest Online.cato. Japan could do much more. South Korea.-Japan relationship accordingly." There is broad support for amending the Status of Forces Agreement.S. North Korea and China. until March party leader.S. http://www. Washington has eleven carrier groups in order to attack other nations. . the less pressure on Tokyo to act militarily. Washington should return to Japan responsibility for its defense.S. Doubling its defense effort — which would still be half of America's burden — with the world's second largest economy would match Chinese military Whether Japan needs to do so is. . The United States and Japan should cooperate on issues ranging from intelligence sharing to emergency base access. And none are relevant to a military alliance. should be the one deterring threats from the North. replacing it with a mature alliance based on independence and equality. Doing the same today. compares to the importance of preserving the nation from attack. The more provocative North Korea in developing and testing both missiles and nuclear weapons. Japan's security dependence is not in America's interest. not to prevent them from attacking America. he is the author of Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire (Doug. alliance Along the way. “Tokyo Drift.S. and several ASEAN nations) as well as friendly powers (India and Indonesia. Protecting war-torn allied states in the aftermath of the greatest conflict of human history made sense. In opposition the party opposed refueling U. In any case. strategic objectives. military force in Japan deters military aggression by North Korea. In Japan the government resisted Washington's entreaties as pacifists and nationalists battled over even modest augmentation of Japan's SDF and limited involvement in international missions Japan has edged towards a more assertive foreign policy. 09 . and in that context it is important for Japan to have its own stance. And — initiate war against China over Taiwan or to otherwise In fact. Kent Calder of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced Studies contends that "top priority.S. to play its role in the region. such as Iran. terrorism. nited tates for With the rise of prosperous and/or populous allied states (Japan.S. Yet Japanese military spending remains anemic and polls suggest that a plurality of Japanese want to cut the SDF budget even further we have "likely seen the high-water mark of Japan's international presence and assertiveness. military presence on Okinawa. does not make sense. America's overwhelming power and geographic isolation give Washington greater flexibility in defending its own security.S. Chief among these challenges is the threat posed by In fact. Why preserve a military relationship created in a very different world? Klingner contended that "the alliance is critical to fulfilling current U. signals Washington's resolve in defending U. It is time to adjust the U. The potential for further proliferation in the region is worrisome. Nye also writes of "a new set of transnational challenges to our vital interests. as well as North Korea's unremitting hostility amid ongoing missile programs. up to Japan. and global warming. to intervene.Japan South Korea aff ENDI 2010 11/50 1ac – Hegemony advantage Reducing U. Even more so.senior fellow at the Cato Institute. oriented to offense rather than defense. A former special assistant to President Reagan. but want Japan to assume a more equal and capable e." None of these. Australia. But ( spending. with forty times the GDP. wishes. active role in response to China's growing economy and more and nuclear . Abraham Denmark of the Center for a New American Security argued: "Despite its provocative statements in the past. but not entangled in daily geopolitical controversies Expecting Tokyo to protect itself doesn't mean severing bilateral security relationships. However. The more persuasive Beijing's so-called peaceful rise. And protecting other nations can lead them to be dangerously irresponsible the U S would be less likely to have to rely on nuclear deterrence Japan if that nation possessed an adequate conventional defense. America's aggressive foreign policy and force structure. primacy.
and both India and Pakistan (which already have nuclear weapons). military power into Eurasia. the United States should be prepared to assist the Europeans. because they carry the risk of entrapping the United States in great power Eurasian wars. Finally. Because future geopolitical conditions might necessitate the reinsertion of U. phased U. and Koreans. and Koreans time to adjust to America's new grand strategy. An orderly.S. U.Japan South Korea aff ENDI 2010 12/50 1ac – Hegemony advantage This is on balance more stabilizing than the status quo Layne. Germany (either as a national nuclear force or as part of an EU nuclear force). On the other hand. and Koreans in building up their independent military capabilities through arms sales and technology transfers. At the same time. the recommended changes in U. The United States should relax its nonproliferation policy and help these states. U. Because of the terrorist threat. because of the complexities and long-term strategic implications of an American shift to an offshore balancing strategy. is leading to a reversion to multipolarity. As part of the change in grand strategy. p. although the United States will not maintain an ongoing forward military presence in Eurasia. which. understandable doubts about the credibility of U.S. efforts to prolong it.S. the adoption of offshore balancing is bound to result in the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Japan. The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present. and to maintain secure command and control over their nuclear arsenals. in turn. Also.S. Japanese. As other states-notably China-rapidly close the gap. Advocates of hegemony claim that it is illusory to think that the United States can retract its military power safely from Eurasia. security guarantees are driving creeping re-nationalization by America's Eurasian allies. it should seek to maintain close military contacts with the Europeans and the Japanese-and develop them with India and Russia-and conduct regular joint exercises. Rather than fostering peace and stability in Eurasia. 189) An offshore balancing grand strategy must be implemented carefully. The answer to this assertion is that the risks and costs of American grand strategy are growing. and in consultation with the Europeans. acquire the technology to build survivable forces. withdrawal will give the Europeans. Japanese. the costs of trying to hold on to hegemony are high and going to become higher. hegemony is fated to end in the next decade or two regardless of U.S. . the United States should maintain a network of basing rights that can be used for this purpose should it become necessary. and the strategy is not likely to work much longer in any event. professor of government at Texas A & M University. In this changing geopolitical context. strategy toward the Gulf and Middle East should be put in place swiftly.S. America's military commitments abroad have become a source of insecurity for the United States. and possibly Korea. Japanese. 06 (Christopher. military power should be retracted from Europe and East Asia gradually.S.
10 (“S Korea PM Calls Japan's Territorial Claim "Foolish". South Korea immediately protested what it sees as the latest display of Japan's territorial ambition. Tokyo also recently approved elementary school textbooks that argue South Korea. (QNA) ." Chung added in his speech carried by the chinese Xinhua news agency today. "illegally occupies" them. April 13 (QNA) . "Damaging sovereignty and self-esteem of a neighboring country to cover up its shameful past is a foolish act." Chung said in a speech commemorating the 91th anniversary of the establishment of the interim government on the Korean peninsula. His remark is the latest in a series of similar denunciations coming after the Japanese government recently reaffirmed its claim to a set of outcroppings lying halfway between the two countries. "The South Korean government will resolutely deal with any provocations against Dokdo. known as Dokdo in South Korea and Takeshima in Japan. summoning a Japanese diplomat and warning negative influences it would have not only on bilateral relations but on Japan's future.Japan South Korea aff ENDI 2010 13/50 1ac – ROK – Japan relations advantage Advantage 2: Japan-South Korean relations Japan-South Korean tensions are inevitable Qatar News Agency. which has maintained an effective control of the islets. by listing them as Japan's territory in its annual foreign policy report. In a similar move that met with much public outcry here.” 4/13. lexis) Seoul.South Korean Prime Minister Chung Un-chan on Tuesday called Japan's renewed territorial claim over a set of disputed islets "foolish". with his barbs directed at Tokyo.
“Japan and South Korea: The New East Asian Core”. market liberalization. these gain traction only because of concerns over China's future strength and not due to any natural formation of international bonds. and cultural power of the two nations is enough to start the process of forming a durable security architecture centered on these two democratic. East Asia. it would further bind the two nations together on security issues. Specifically in China and Myanmar. The Japan-South Korea relationship can also help manage the transition to a peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula. The expansion of democracy in Thailand. the longstanding U. Similarly. That.S. 49:3. targeting aid and expanded relations. stable. is no reason not to capitalize on the improvements already in place. and confidence-building measures. The emergence of such a relationship. however. and perhaps unique. A conscious bilateral policy to work for stability and to spread political and economic norms in the region would naturally attract other states sharing those values. the Japan-South Korea relationship can serve as the nucleus of a liberal bloc in East Asia designed to project a common political front against failing or rogue states. Both Seoul and Tokyo are members of the Asia-Pacific Economic Community and the asean Regional Forum. But no such community of interests currently exists to allow for that type of evolution. free-market state. Their undeniable social and economic advances should be leveraged into a regional role encouraging the spread of the rule of law. . The latter in particular provides the only ministerial-level opportunity for discussing Asian security issues. as another liberal. and conflict resolution to East Asian problems. The unique problem of Sino-Taiwanese relations. of course. intellectual. Mongolia. at the International Institute of Strategic Studies’ 2003 Asian security conference held in Singapore. By rights. and social disparities among its member nations prevent it from forming any type of durable communal identity. military.15 Yet the wide political. The two represent powerful examples of the liberal democratic system. working in cooperation with both the United States and asean. With that will come a clearer recognition of the common interests linking the two states. Auslin ‘5 (Michael. The Broader Face of Security The Japan-South Korea relationship could influence East Asian politics in yet another way. Beijing will have to decide the direction it wants to go.Japan South Korea aff ENDI 2010 14/50 1ac – ROK – Japan relations advantage Consolidating Japan-South Korea relations is key to regional democratization and stability through a multilateral regional order. democratic. Teaches Japanese History – Yale and Dir. Japan and Korea can take the first substantive steps towards recasting the regional security environment. The necessary human and financial capital can come largely from those two countries. and other states offers a historic opportunity for Japan and South Korea to shape the future. the two can identify liberalizing and at-risk nations. seeking to integrate it more fully into a new set of regional norms defined by the success of Japan and Korea. but there is already the political will to start exploring the concept. Precisely the kind of shared interests that mark the Japan-South Korea relationship. free-market states. can lead those two to forming the core of a new security architecture in East Asia in ways that asean and Chinese initiatives are unable to imitate. Project on Japan-U. and creating one in East Asia would mean identifying an enemy and dividing the region into two blocs. preventive diplomacy. Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz that East Asia did not need a nato-type self-defense organization for now. position against Taiwanese independence. Despite limitations on broader initiatives. As for Chinese attempts to recast multilateral organizations. and the potential participation of China. If the Japan-South Korea relationship strengthens and evolves to play a role like the one envisioned here. one-Korea will go a long way toward dispelling the lingering resentments of colonialism and war. and perhaps even with states such as China. China would undoubtedly feel targeted. Although the tcog and other initiatives noted above have already built confidence in the Japan-South Korea relationship. but regional pressure on Myanmar could also be more effective with a push led by Japan and South Korea. ScienceDirect) A roadmap for Tokyo and Seoul's security cooperation exists in their current participation in regional multilateral forums. Not least important. negotiate more favorable loan packages. Summer. and serve as a repository of technical and legal expertise.S. and social progressiveness—in short. the specter of such an agreement has already spurred calls from Beijing for a China-Japan-Korea fta. If the ultimate goal of the area's governments is to create some type of all-inclusive multilateral organization. In particular. it should be part of the Japan-South Korea relationship. In that case.S. must leapfrog the European experience to begin forging a region-wide mechanism. They can adopt the asean Regional Forum's planned three-stage evolution of confidence-building measures. juridical mechanisms. In the same way. was a self-defense organization. Taiwan. Taiwan. Yet the trends discussed in this article affect Taiwan just as much as they affect Japan and South Korea. nato. Indeed. then. and inequalities in production will make a long lead-time necessary for it to be workable. a viable conflict resolution mechanism will take years to build. Negotiating the agreement will be difficult. Tokyo and Seoul's ultimate goal in strengthening their bonds is maintaining peace and stability in Northeast Asia. Cultural exchange organizations such as the Japan and Korea Foundations can provide initial funding. and a clear Japanese commitment to helping produce a liberal. a true Japan-Korea fta would not only be an enormous stimulus toward regional free trade. They can increase the number of academic. The case of North Korea is obvious. and it will be up to the coalition of liberal states in East Asia to make it clear that there is only one path that will benefit all players in the region. a joint program to strengthen civil society in Asia. Orbis. this perhaps is the most attractive way to interact with China. then the course of events in East Asia may make it unavoidable that Taiwan will be seen as a natural partner of the new East Asian core. however. Moreover. and the effective diplomatic isolation of Taiwan due to Chinese pressure make it an extremely sensitive issue. which would have to include strict provisions for transparency. and it is inconceivable in any case that East Asian nations today trust one another enough to create such an organization. is the biggest wildcard in all of this. of course. economic. and artistic exchanges and grassroots programs with those countries. will likely spill over to larger issues of human rights and security. particularly Taiwan and the Philippines. democratic. then-jda chief Ishiba agreed with then-U. The combined economic. and established venues such as the Japan Center for International Exchange (jcie) and the International House of Tokyo offer the infrastructure and expertise for running meaningful exchange programs. Such a move would serve simply to exacerbate tensions and suspicions. Relations.
Should a global financial shock cause China to lose its export markets. but it is not inconceivable. not a fragile one. over time. aims to create an Asian region where its authoritarian ruling groups are unchallenged. Good relations between Beijing and Taipei would increase exchanges of students. apex. Chinese analysts fear that as economic stagnation. who largely control the security and propaganda apparatuses. one-party. especially if Taiwan and Singapore were both admirable democratic alternatives. Sci. My own hunch. China is not likely to democratize in any immediate future. . Can the world afford not to treat China as the superpower it is? The CCP imagines a chaotic and war-prone world disorder of American-led democracy-promotion being replaced by a beneficent Chinese world order of authoritarian growth with stability. ALTHOUGH WE may be seeing through a glass darkly to try to locate forces of regime instability or democratization in China. instability might threaten the regime. Resultant stagnation would create a regime crisis. what is clear is how to analyze the forces at work that will decide whether it is more or less likely that China will democratize. The West would be seen as a fount of evil. For Confucian China. Too much economic inequality is a huge obstacle blocking a democratic transition. in any foreseeable future. although the CCP’s foreign policy works against the spread of democracy. The future is contingent on unknowable factors. it is possible to imagine politically conscious Chinese seeking to ride a wave of regional democratization. Such meanderings of the mind should not be confused with confident predictions about a democratic outcome. a technocratic. Starting in the 1990s. pushing. For the CCP is trying to solve its governance problems. affordable housing. an authoritarian superpower that has the economic clout to back and bail out authoritarian regimes around the globe. political stability. This requires improving economic relations with Taiwan. Region is decisive. the forces of polarization will be reversed. unless globalization so reduces distance that the two sides of the Pacific seem no further apart than the English Channel did in the eighteenth century. That is. – U. Pol. minimally corrupt. Japan is out of touch in imagining a superior Japan leading China into an East Asian Community. rural. nipping them in the bud. to a democratic opening in Mexico—because. identified. sixty million laid-off former State Owned Enterprise (SOE) workers—turning against the regime. “Asia will determine the fate of democracy. families. among other things. An exception is democratic Taiwan. Democratic Taiwan. . too. But an adaptable and resilient CCP regime that continues to deliver rapid economic growth is not going to be abandoned by rising classes worried about vengeance by the losers in a polarized society. and vengeful against economic winners. Such a neofascist ruling coalition might turn to military adventures or close China’s doors in order to appeal to nativists—in ways. household agriculture and physical mobility in China make it likely that Kuznets curve factors. professional. “Singapore . however. in contrast. administrative state. Authoritarian China. and thereby create a counterforce that might find democracy attractive. Core areas of industrialization are beginning to hollow out. of course. Perhaps there will turn out to be truth to the analogy of a feudal-like CCP-type system rooted in Russian czarist feudal institutions with the repressed labor relations of plantation slavery and its aftermath. The regime’s economic reformers. The rising urban middle classes prefer to be defended by the authoritarian state rather than risk their status and fortunes in a democratic vote. Wisconsin. Anxious analysts worry about the entrenchment of greedy local interests that resist the many adaptations required for the continuing rapid growth that wins legitimacy and stability for the regime. could come to seem to Chinese victims of a repressive. market. Still. and Bangladesh. imagining itself as a moral global pole leading humanity in a better direction. in which the economic gap narrows after an initial widening as a country develops. in part. comprehended in terms of the strength and weakness of its diverse and conflicting elements. corruption. China has no similarly large and attractive democratic neighbor. in the late 1980s in East Asia (the Philippines. http://www. This consensus hypothesis. One key is Indonesia. and debt delegitimated Mexico’s presidential populism. Prof. Chinese household agriculture is very different from the world of the landed elites that emerged out of slave-plantation Latin America. Democracypromoter Larry Diamond concludes in his recent book The Spirit of Democracy that democracy is in trouble across the world because of the rise of China. flexible. but also. after 1974– 1975 in Southern Europe.org/article/?article=1318) THESE CCP antidemocratic policies are significant. a full exploration of democratic possibilities should look into all the wild-card factors. My own reading of this interaction is that is a superpower probing. tourists. wealth. we must then ask about the political possibilities inherent in the way economic forces create new social groups that interact with the different interests of state institutions. As Haleb’s Black Swan suggests. There is no other long-lasting basis for trustful cooperation with the government in Beijing than to accept the regime’s legitimacy. Ever less charismatic and weaker presidents in China will lack the clout to defeat the vested interests who will act much as landed elites acted in the days of the ancien régime to block the changes required for economic growth. Mexico had a one-term president for six years who chose his successor. Pakistan. but that a far more likely outcome is either continuity. there are democratic tendencies that result from the move from collective farming to household agriculture and from the rise of property rights. evolutionary change toward a dominant-party populist presidentialism imagining itself as becoming more like authoritarian Singapore. that democratic transitions are more likely where economic polarization is limited. But East Asian economic growth seems to me to be of a different order than Latin America’s. and arbitrary political system to be China’s better future. could be portrayed as having sold the nation’s better future to Western imperialism if Chinese lost their jobs because of an economic virus spreading from New York and London to Shanghai. China has a president who serves two five-year terms and chooses his successor at the close of the first. neofascist hardliners might implement policies that would alienate many people in China and in Asia. The CCP intends for authoritarian China to establish itself as a global pole. It is a resilient regime. therefore. head off dangers to the regime. If Indonesia were to succeed. that would lose China the sources of continuing high growth. It is possible to imagine the losers from China’s continuing rapid growth—for example.” Joined by ever richer and more influential petro powers leveraging the enormous wealth of Sovereign Investment Funds. There are political forces in Jakarta that oppose Beijing’s efforts in Southeast Asia to roll back the advance of democracy. and a secure pension system. with Japan showing China the way in everything from environmentalism to shared high standards of living. All students of democratic transitions agree that great economic inequality makes ruling groups resistant to a democratization that they believe would put their ill-gotten gains at risk. is that anxiety about Latin Americanization in China is an indicator that the regime remains preemptive. in a post–Lee Kuan Yew era. could help make democracy seem a natural regional alternative to politically conscious Chinese. Beijing has portrayed Taiwan as a trouble-making polity and a chaotic society. imagined as an undeserving and traitorous upper stratum. China interact.” at least in the foreseeable future. would then democratize. Democratization tends to occur regionally—for example. Mexico uniquely abutted the United States and wished to benefit from greater access to the U. The democracies might be able to promote an end to systemic abuses of human rights in China. China will similarly experience it as a threatening American arrogance for the U. could foreshadow a resilient form of capitalistauthoritarianism by China. leading there to a wave of military coups. The alternatives seem too costly. Vietnam. low levels of corruption. minimally cruel. is well on the way to defeating the global forces of democracy. government to assume that an incredibly successful China. where the majority is imagined as poor. in the 1980s. Robinson’s Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. and Taiwan). The CCP regime. and after November 1989 in Eastern and Central Europe. and then both the people and the ruling groups might choose a transition to a more chauvinistic and militarist order that would renounce China’s global openness as a betrayal of the nation’s essence.S. joined by its authoritarian friends. an albatross to further growth. The internal Chinese analysis of a future crisis brought on by Latin Americanization should be treated seriously. that. Dissent. by evolving into a Singapore-type authoritarianism. China’s growth patterns have polarized the division of wealth such that China may soon surpass Brazil as the most unequal (but stable) major country in the world. a new middle class. needs to be saved by American missionaries of democracy. And then.dissentmagazine. and leader of an Asian community. were also to democratize. China’s successes in that direction make it hard to imagine Asia. That is. becoming defined by a democratic ethos that makes authoritarian China seem the odd nation out. and elsewhere in Asia. If Singapore. and if nations in South Asia. China is the core. There may be far less of a challenge to China from democracy than there is a challenge to democracy from China. and entrepreneurs across the Taiwan Strait.” which delivers “booming development.Japan South Korea aff ENDI 2010 15/50 1ac – ROK – Japan relations advantage That’s key to reverse a global authoritarian tide and preserve global democracy. and of the state. This is a real possibility in our age of transportation and communication revolutions. To be sure. opponents of the government would not back a move to democracy. so the same could happen with China. it is clear that much depends on how the post-Mao right-authoritarian populist system relates to social contradictions. would be militantly against any opening to democracy. as occurred in Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s. But such imaginings rest too much on long-term speculations about concatenating factors leading to distant futures. enough wild cards are in play that China’s democratization is not impossible. however. but Americans will not be heard in Chinese ruling circles unless they abandon a democratization agenda in which change for the better in China presupposes ending the leadership role of the CCP. . is formalized in a rational-choice model in Daron Acemoglu and James A. in which regional institutions are inoculated against democratization. a world leader in IT. greedy. The danger is dubbed Latin Americanization. Friedman ‘9 (Edward. as at one with the interests of CCP ruling groups. literacy.S. “China: A Threat to or Threatened by Democracy?” Winter. subsequently in Latin America. China is combining rapid industrialization with a climb into postmodern service and high-technology-based growth in which industrial workers can seem a dying breed. Appeasement is the price of long-term good relations. or a transition in a more chauvinistic and militaristic direction. there are some ways in which regional forces could yet initiate a regional democratization. CCP ruling groups imagine foreign democracy-promotion as a threat to China’s—and the world’s—better future. corrupt. will operate in China in the future. Although regional factors make all this unlikely. First. that is. and pulling the world in its authoritarian direction. In sum. An analyst should try to understand how the forces of region. Still. democracy is not impossible. however. and responsive to threats and will. and so on—as Seymour Martin Lipset long ago argued. In addition. But the basic interests of China’s economic modernizers are to move as quickly as possible into advanced technology and Information Technology (IT). HAVING EXAMINED regional forces. South Korea. The CCP is moving toward presidential succession rules similar to what Mexico institutionalized in its earlier era of a one-party dominant presidential populism. of groups and interests fostered by the economic moment globally and at home. History suggests that left nationalists within the regime.
We incorrectly see Myanmar as a ''democracy transition'' problem. Only the army will do well with more international isolation. Senior Fellow – Hoover Institution. long denied access to foreign aid. that the country was opening up too fast. appears increasingly endangered. the story of Myanmar's last 20 years has been one of a pro-democracy movement held down by repression. But the generals see it as a civil war finally coming to an end with the collapse of the communist insurgency in 1989 and the cease-fire agreements. and openness. 9-29.carnegie. NYT. “Don’t Force Democracy in Burma”. the near conclusion of the war is the very beginning of a long state-building exercise (on their terms). and his Revolutionary Council sealed off the country. And what of sanctions? In 1962. . banning almost all external trade and investment. L/N) For many on the outside. a new generation of army officers. Nuclear. expelling ethnic Indian communities and shutting the door to all tourism. while shunning meaningful democratic change. rather than a time to hand over power to the politicians they distrust. accountability. might soon face more dire conditions. Ne Win.and therefore incredibly complex.html) This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. and biological weapons continue to proliferate. leave behind the rhetoric and look for practical measures based on a better understanding of the country's past. As the Security Council takes up Myanmar for the very first time. the global ecosystem. rather than acting as pressure for more basic political change.org//sub/pubs/deadly/dia95_01. democratic ones. In this context. with a tough military machine and a society brutalized from generations of war. hoping to attract tourism and foreign investment for the first time in decades. chemical. wanted an end to the country's international isolation and allowed market-oriented economic reforms. Far from it. with its provisions for legality. popular sovereignty. Myint-U ‘6 (Thant. more like Afghanistan or the war-torn societies of sub-Saharan Africa -. Myanmar democracy is key to stability. Only liberal democracy can bring long-term stability to a country as ethnically and culturally diverse as Myanmar. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous. Gen. kicking out foreign aid programs. The cease-fires could still unravel. “Promoting Democracy in the 1990s”. between the army and 17 of its remaining battlefield opponents. For the generals. The question is how to go from here to there. Myanmar is also a country emerging only cautiously from more than 30 years of self-imposed isolation. Western sanctions and boycotts have strengthened the hand of those who oppose even these tentative measures. The very source of life on Earth. Some believed the market-oriented reforms were going too far. in the late 1980's and early 1990's. December. This is all not to say that Myanmar shouldn't be a democracy. it would be good to be mindful of Burmese history. nationalizing businesses. in the early 1990's. http://www. the military's chief. Author of “The River of Lost Footsteps: Histories of Burma”.Japan South Korea aff ENDI 2010 16/50 1ac – ROK – Japan relations advantage Democracy solves extinction. But this was a hesitant move. And then. sort of a Velvet Revolution gone wrong. state structures (other than the armed forces) are nearly nonexistent and millions of poor people. Diamond ’95 (Larry. The result was disaster for an already impoverished economy. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy. But it actually represents a postconflict challenge.
No analogy is perfect. St. L/N) It wasn't the sort of statement that sets the blood racing: "We have more or less reached agreement with regard to the political parameters and the guiding principles for the settlement of the boundary dispute.it won't actually be called an alliance . The last thing we want is China and India jostling for advantage in this theatre. other countries might have to accept the risk that a "containment" policy entails. she told Prime Minister Manmohan Singh that it is now America's policy to "help India become a major world power in the 21st century. If China were hell. and it did not even end well last time. where the existing uncertainties led to a brief border war between the two Asian giants in 1962. but they are seen in Beijing essentially as domestic issues having to do with the country's historic territorial integrity.on military co-operation in Asia. John’s Telegram. we are playing with nuclear weapons. 4-17. More negotiations There will have to be further talks before India and China actually start demarcating their long Himalayan frontier. for a census has not been conducted for decades). perhaps less (nobody knows. but this one feels pretty convincing. “Wedged between a rock and a hard place”. they will drive China into a needless military confrontation with its neighbours and destroy the fragile hope of reconciliation between India and Pakistan. and Nixon's rapprochement with China gave the Russians something else to worry about by completing their encirclement. for Myanmar's restive ethnic minorities live mostly along the country's borders with its neighbours. And not a moment too soon. and in most cases they were withdrawn again after making their point. America is playing the role of Britain and France." The biggest American bribe on the table is the recent announcement that India would be allowed to buy the next generation of advanced combat aircraft from the U. is good news for those who hope that their children or grandchildren will not die in the Third World War.K. It is the period before 1914. who got together to "contain" it. the two countries can reach an understanding .S. and certainly will not make America or anybody else safer now . China's occupation of Tibet and its claim to Taiwan are both contentious issues. China. China may increase weapons Except that the U. The various border quarrels that led to brief outbreaks of shooting 30 or 40 years ago with the Soviet Union. China's forces never pushed past the specific territories they claimed. That persuaded the Germans that they were encircled . when the traditional great powers who were facing a future of relative decline. and want to draw India into a military alliance against it. including the military implications of that statement. Now.bent on conquering the planet." But Indian National Security Adviser M. and they imagine that they are replaying the Nixon-Kissinger strategy of 30 years ago. Independent Journalist. once Russia. were to collapse precipitously. China has not been expansionist. If India falls for their blandishments. in any case. America's great strategic adversary was the Soviet Union. It has become urgent because the Bush administration is trying to lure India into an alliance with the United States that would implicitly define China as the enemy.a free-trade area would help.Japan South Korea aff ENDI 2010 17/50 1ac – ROK – Japan relations advantage Myanmar collapse causes India-China war and massive instability. strategy of encircling China is more likely to convince Beijing that it must build up its military power in order to protect itself. This is not an unlikely possibility. If the central authority. President George W. We have seen this movie before. Other inducements will be deployed in coming months. had been drawn into an alliance with the western great powers. The good news out of New Delhi last week is that the Indian government seems not to be falling for the neo-conservative strategy. Britain and France. the country could descend into civil war.S. which would give it definitive air superiority over China (and Pakistan) in a single bound. Senior Writer. but the territories at issue were not large or important. one might add. “India and China: avoiding the past”. They do not constitute proof of a more general Chinese expansionism . China is being cast in the role of Germany. The impact is nuclear world war III. however incompetent and dumb. and India gets to play Russia.which would be. The neoconservatives in the Bush administration have a high opinion of their own strategic abilities.as indeed they were.' said Mr Yeo. Straits Times ‘7 (Janadas Devan. There is a lot of work still to be done on Sino-Indian relations. When U. And that led to the First World War.. Nobody was actually to blame for the First World War. 10-26. Russia. when we were only playing with machine-guns and trenches. More things also need to happen if China and India are to avoid confrontation as both countries take their place in the front rank of the great powers over the next generation . 'The last thing we want is a Yugoslavia or an Iraqi situation at our doorstep. Germany's rapid industrial growth after unification in 1870 triggered the old balance-of-power reflex in the existing top dogs. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited New Delhi last month. India and Vietnam were driven by genuine boundary disputes and prickly Chinese nationalism. the neo. sought to contain the rapid growth of German industrial power by making an alliance with the other rising power. Narayanan's announcement on April 10 during Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's four-day visit to India. Even under the current communist regime. with the Burmese constituting no more than 60 per cent of the population. not towards it old paradigm that no longer served the true interests of the great powers even 100 years ago. Britain and France.S. given that it is a multi-ethnic country. pretty pointless in the current era of the global economy.but this is definitely a step in the right direction. This time around.S. Bush visits India later this year. and a mutual security pact wouldn't hurt either . India and Thailand will probably get drawn into the ensuing maelstrom. Dyer ‘5 (Gwynne.conservatives see China as the emerging strategic rival. Then. the other rising industrial power. but at least the trend is away from confrontation. but it isn't. L/N) Prevent Myanmar from breaking apart. Behind the times The master strategists in Washington are trapped in an ." and the State Department briefer emphasized that Washington "understands fully the implications. and the White House hopes that by the time U. The right analogy for what is happening now is not Nixon's China policy of the early 1970s.
celebrating Tokyo’s claim. and provide responsible leadership in East Asia. Cooperation over truly important issues. financial as well as political. before backing down under pressure. The voyage takes several hours and the unpredictable waves often prevent anyone from landing. since its allies are well able to defend themselves. it was one of the few unifying features of a peninsula divided by the US and Soviet Union in 1945. as it constructs a nuclear arsenal. except in Korea. these countries demanded that Tokyo eschew even the ability to defend itself. There is perhaps even greater cause to work together to promote their mutual security. Roh Moo-hyun. (A similar controversy enveloped the Library of Congress. 80. The two leading democratic. These feelings were understandable. added its angry voice. the visitors typically stay only 20 minutes. longterm cooperation between Japan and South Korea by forcing regional security cooperation Bandow. Japan’s wartime leaders all died long ago. and sent Prime Minister Han Seung-soo to the islands. The US disarmed Japan and imposed a "peace constitution. In contrast. Escaping disputes like the South Korean-Japanese quarrel over who owns 33 worthless bits of rock a world away from America would be an added benefit of disengagement. but you wouldn’t know it from relations between South Korea and Japan. most of whom had come from the North. Seoul cheerfully subsidizes North Korea. China’s influence is growing. Moreover. canceled a scheduled meeting between the two countries’ foreign ministers. but both send naval patrols into the surrounding waters.Japan South Korea aff ENDI 2010 18/50 1ac – ROK – Japan relations advantage The plan solves – it creates sustainable. sought to rally the ROK against "the Japanese ambition for territorial aggression. the Philippines a third world state. and to cooperate with each other in doing so.000 South Koreans have made the trek so far this year. After the Chinese Revolution. Kim’s successor. Economic ties are strong and the two are important trading partners. Imperial Japan gained dominant influence in the peninsular kingdom in the late 1800s and formally annexed Korea as a colony in 1910. a testament to the frivolous petulance which sometimes captures the popular psyche of the Republic of Korea. That policy no longer serves US security interests. Indeed. Tokyo’s policies were characteristically brutal: Korean culture was suppressed. However. he is the author and editor of several books (Doug. he encouraged more positive bilateral ties after he was elected ROK president in 1997. The competing claims are tied up with Tokyo’s military victory over Russia and – the cause of the issue’s emotional sensitivity in Korea – Japan’s subsequent takeover of the Korean peninsula. The two countries set the issue aside when they normalized relations in 1965. http://original. South Korea installed a small police garrison in the 1950s to stake its claim and rejected Tokyo’s offer to bring the issue to the International Court of Justice. has taken a back seat to immature political posturing. such as Singapore." temporarily recalled its ambassador from Japan. but controversy flared in 2005 when the government of Shimane prefecture in Japan declared Takeshima Day. It’s time for Tokyo and especially Seoul to behave like serious members of the international community rather than spoiled teenagers. Even when the sea cooperates. an official in the ruling Grand National Party. Besides." He was right. capitalist powers in East Asia – both close US allies – have been blustering over the status of 33 barren but contested blocks of rock. Relations between South Korea and Japan have improved in recent years. Anti-Japanese taunts became a useful political tactic for political elites in the ROK and elsewhere. Not every South Korean gets a chance to guard the easternmost territory of our nation. and while Beijing has been assertive rather than aggressive so far. but American policymakers soon reconsidered. the more practical consequence of the controversy is to poison relations between the two countries. the controversy over the Takeshima (Japanese name)/Dokdo (Korean name) Islands (or Liancourt Rocks in the West) has pushed relations backwards. Alas. which planned on listing the islets as Liancourt Rocks. strong throughout most of the region. the White House ordered the Board to reverse itself. The militaristic imperial order. It’s no wonder that anti-Japanese feeling. Seoul called it "an intolerable act. an octopus fisherman and his wife. attempted to use anti-Japanese feeling to bolster his fading popularity. of Pyongyang by many ethnic Koreans living in Japan. During abortive negotiations between the two states. Indeed. Secure beneath America’s protective umbrella. ***Hegemony advantage generic extensions . During World War II the Japanese took Koreans as "comfort women" for Japanese soldiers on break from conquering East Asia and the Pacific. was especially intense in Korea. attempting to maintain Washington’s military hegemony along China’s border is unsustainable. 08 . North Korea remains an unpredictable and hostile force. the horrifying brutality and criminality of the North Korean government eroded the support. at which more than a thousand convicted war criminals are interred. a police conscript stationed on the islands. neither feels much pressure to do so as long as Washington provides both security guarantees and military garrisons. one official observed: "We would be better off if we just blow up the islands." Twenty-four-year-old Kim Eun-taek. but President Lee Myun-bak. In July the Japanese Ministry of Education issued a new manual for teachers and textbook publishers asserting Tokyo’s rightful ownership. This irresponsible behavior is made possible by Washington’s continued defense of both nations.antiwar. South Korea says it may construct a marine science research station and village on the rocks next year. faced with the threat of popular protests during President George W. Hong Joon-pyo. I never liked the Japanese. while lobbying America to maintain its troop presence – and treating Japan as a potential threat. advocated improving relations." It seems inconceivable that either nation would ever use military force to advance its claim. Korean names were outlawed. America occupied both the ROK and Japan at the end of World War II. Japan was America’s only potential powerful friend in Asia during the Cold War’s early years. elected last December. Bush’s planned visit to Seoul in early August." which technically outlaws any military. North Korea. the Republic of Korea an economic and political wreck. as Beijing grows wealthier and more influential. Japan didn’t help matters. both South Korea and Japan would be more secure if they acted in tandem on geopolitical issues. which has largely ignored the issue (the islands are much closer to the South). The US was drawn into the controversy. The advantages of cooperation between Japan and South Korea are obvious. America’s allies were marginal: Australia and New Zealand small and distant. Moreover. such as denuclearizing North Korea and channeling Chinese ambitions in a positive direction. With the end of the Cold War the case for continued American military domination of East Asia disappeared. South Korean citizens demonstrated. which calls them the East Sea. Dissident Kim Dae-jung took refuge in Japan decades ago." The ROK predictably protested and. A former special assistant to President Reagan. Just two Koreans.) In August Seoul arranged an international press delegation to Dokdo/Takeshima to build public support. Nevertheless. and Korean labor was conscripted. live permanently on the assorted outcroppings – 56 acres in all – but every day hundreds of South Koreans visit. especially with the status of dictator "Dear Leader" Kim Jong-il in question. died along with them. (The surrounding waters are commonly known as the Sea of Japan. Still.” 9/20. noted Defense Minister Lee Sang-hee. but the statute of limitations has run out. The US should say no more. Tokyo’s neighbors applauded. “Time to Tell Irresponsible Allies No Thanks. devastated by Tokyo’s defeat. with assorted politicians periodically sounding off on the alleged benefits of colonialism in Korea and visiting the Yasukuni Shrine. but left the issue unresolved. Even most of the "grunts" are dead. The South even conducted military exercises nearby – to prepare for any Japanese provocation. Washington faced two large communist rivals in East Asia. spoke for many of his countrymen when he told the New York Times: "I feel immensely proud.com/doug-bandow/2008/09/19/time-to-tell-irresponsible-allies-no-thanks/ Six decades have passed since World War II ended.Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute. The US Board on Geographic Names changed its listing of the islands from South Korean to "undesignated sovereignty.
12/15. they might support them.pdf Bases Increase the Likelihood of War The US maintains an unprecedented infrastructure of more than 700 US foreign military bases.org/i/pdf-files/Gerson-Forum-Military-Bases. Japan could do far more to protect itself and its region.ipb. attempting to run the world. Seoul is friends with all of its neighbors. The second ranking economic power on earth. the US invasion of Panama. http://original. Again.senior fellow at the Cato Institute. Most South Koreans no longer fear Pyongyang. But the vast majority of Americans. even the North’s former allies. But what normal person would support spending billions of dollars to raise and maintain overseas thousands of troops to guard South Korea? Then there’s Japan. Jan-Feb. 7 . probably would be much less enthused if they thought about it. “Embarrassed to Explain US Foreign Policy”. America’s policy-making elite naturally offers a multitude of arguments to maintain the same military commitment more than a half century after the end of the Korean War.S. In recent years such bases have been essential to the US wars against Iraq. But alliances and bases can act as transmission belts of war at a time when we should be building firebreaks to war. Beyond such major commitments. Bases increase the likelihood of war Gerson.S. in fact. To the extent that they believed that such facilities advanced American security. A former special assistant to President Reagan. .Director of Programs at the American Friends Service Committee (Joseph. Its neighbors prefer that Washington do the job. 7 . American elites rather like the idea of the U. they have been lavishing subsidies and aid on North Korea for years.antiwar.” Peacework Magazine. http://www. Beijing and Moscow. into regional conflicts Bandow.Japan South Korea aff ENDI 2010 19/50 Bases increase risk of war These alliance guarantees will operate as transmission belts for war – drawing the U. who have to pay the bill. the 1998 war against Serbia. Washington has dribbled bases and forces around the world. and the current wars within Colombia and the Philippines. The 200-plus US military bases and installations in Japan and South Korea increase the likelihood of future US wars against North Korea and China.com/doug-bandow/2007/12/14/embarrassed-to-explain-us-foreign-policy/) Similarly misguided is America’s continuing defense of South Korea. “Ten Reasons to Withdraw all US Foreign Military Bases. It’s a policy of which Americans are largely ignorant. The South has upwards of 40 times the GDP and twice the population of North Korea. he is the author of Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire (Doug. but so what? That doesn’t make the policy in America’s interest.
In 2004. But it was effective in communicating to the United States and ROK leaders that the DPRK would not accept nuclear threat and would field a conventional deterrent to offset American nuclear superiority while it began to develop a nuclear option. during full-blown. they became committed actual nuclear armament to strengthen their "stalker" strategy and to force the United States to adjust its policy of malign neglect under President Bush Jr. especially economically. Of course. reveal the effects of North Korean nuclearization and the lack of an American vision for regional order based on Global Abolition-the new doctrinal framework introduced by President Obama for international relations without depending on nuclear threat. Unlike the other states in the region. 12/17/09 . In 2004. In my view. it has not blocked North Korea's nuclear breakout since the end of the Cold War. and finally explicitly and on display. if ever. then ambiguously. military exercises. it has not escaped the notice of allied security leaders that a pipsqueak state has effectively stalemated the nuclear hegemon in the domain in which it purports to wield unique power capacities. but only severely damaging to US forces in-theater and would have barely affected the United States itself. “Extended Nuclear Deterrence: Global Abolition and Korea. all the nuclear weapons states are responsible for the parlous state of the NPT-IAEA system. in 2006. Rather. Consequently.html) END = Extended Nuclear Deterrence In 1978. but instead. the DPRK and the United States have spent two decades in a slow motion confrontation over North Korea's nuclear proliferation activity. possibly even pre-emptively. the DPRK decided to break out of the static game of positional political and military warfare in the late seventies. they still could not stop a North Korean conventional military sledge-hammer falling on Seoul and allied US-Korean forces. As part of a global reversal of the 1958 deployment in 1991. But in the case of the DPRK. the United States as a direct antagonist and primary player in the Peninsula is by far the state held most accountable for these dismal outcomes. while politically marginalized. for decades. Thus. the immediate prospect of nuclear annihilation. rhetorical threats. requiring as it would survivable retaliatory nuclear forces that it could not obtain. The North Koreans used nuclear threat. As they state now: Our strengthening of the nuclear deterrent is an irrefutable exercise of our independent right and sovereignty for the defense of our dignity. testing each other's intentions."  As a result of nearly two decades of slow motion nuclear wrestling with the DPRK culminating in 2009 in the latter's second.was inconsistent with environmental data collected from the Yongbyon facility. This reduction in ambiguity as to North Korean intentions was matched by increasing clarity as to their weapons capacity in the first (fizzle) and second (successful) nuclear tests. US nuclear hegemony based on END in East Asia has begun to unravel due to the havoc wrought by the North Korean nuclear breakout on the NPT-IAEA system as a whole. Taiwan. The weaponization of North Korean fissile material and the testing of longer range (albeit still unreliable) delivery systems now makes nuclear next-use in Korea a conceivable contingency during a war. The latter is the bit that most Americans find incredible given the nature of the North Korean polity. and the safety of the nation against the nuclear threat of the United States. The problem is that while this approach worked--albeit at the risk of real nuclear war--for the entire Cold War. this time successful. and the outright declaration that the DPRK had achieved nuclear weapons status. or even one aimed at strategic deterrence-that was a game in which the DPRK knew from the outset that it could not hope to ever match the United States. and perhaps even to enlist the United States as a security partner. Until 1989. 2. President Bush Sr. Conversely. and. they began to refer to nuclear weapons not as "nukes. the DPRK outright refused to adhere to international norms related to the NPT and IAEA safeguards system. by the United States. the DPRK sought to use its nuclear threat as a compellence strategy. Henceforth. Until 2004. system. and by its direct challenge to US hegemony in its alliance relationships. San Francisco (Peter. and the continuing reliance on nuclear weapons as the basis for US alliances in the region. an unstable standoff and continuous confrontation took place at the DMZ where the two sides projected lethal threats at each other in the most direct and provocative ways-most unmistakably in the August 1976 near-war over the poplar trees. creating confidence and then rapidly demolishing it. Thus. however.Professor of International Relations. Given the asymmetric cost of containing the DPRK nuclear threat by nuclear threat projection to the United States versus the cost to the DPRK. . and US withdrawal became part of the drama that unfolded around the DPRK nuclear breakout that surfaced publicly in 1992 when the IAEA discovered that the DPRK's nuclear declaration. at least in its own eyes. the DPRK had faced for decades direct American nuclear threat and the full array of forward deployed weapons and delivery systems. by its rejection of the authority of the UNSC as enforcer of the NPT-IAEA system. to bring the US-Korean War to an end with a peace treaty. Nonetheless. in an idiosyncratic form of North Korean nuclear nationalism. to their "massive deterrent" and then explicitly "nuclear deterrent" and finally. in the event that nuclear weapons were used. the nearly complete withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Korea that began in 1976 under President Carter was reversed due to a conservative backlash. and Director. as the leading edge of its political engagement of the United States aimed at forcing it to change its policies towards the DPRK. and Korea remained implicated in the provision of END to Japan by the United States. the DPRK was not part of the international community (in contrast. its alien values. Since 2008. the North Koreans had relied primarily on the leverage gained from nuclear proliferation threat in the future. and raises the possibility of unconventional delivery of DPRK nuclear devices to the United States itself-thereby forcing the United States to pay far more attention to this otherwise puny and impoverished adversary. The Korean People's Army in the North sought to reduce its vulnerability to American nuclear threat by adopting a forward-deployed offensive posture so that. was highly integrated into the global market system and also was covered by the US nuclear umbrella). Nautilus Institute. Alarm bells only began to ring about its independent nuclear weapons potential in the mid-eighties. North Korea's Nuclear Vulnerability The challenge to END in East Asia came from North Korea. nuclear test.org/fora/security/09096Hayes. RMIT University. Moreover. Such an attack would have been suicidal to both Koreas. to change its policies of containment and sanctions that kept the DPRK isolated from the world. Melbourne. near-war crises on the DMZ. The inability and unwillingness of the United States to halt or reverse North Korean nuclear breakout to the point where the DPRK can at least partly neutralize the United States' "unique" nuclear weapons capacities are obvious to the leadership of all states in the region. linked nuclear weapons with the person of the great leader and his strategy. and the antithetical economic systems-North Korea being rather like the Borg fictional cybernetic organisms in the popular American science fiction series Star Trek it seems inconceivable that it could seriously wish to become a security partner of the United States. the North Koreans shifted gears with a loud crash heard by those who study its public pronouncements to its own population-often far more accurate and direct than they are usually given credit for by American analysts who read primarily the propaganda aimed at external audiences. Policy Forum Online 09-096A http://www. at first in ways highly opaque.nautilus. to attempt to make the United States accept the legitimacy and sovereignty of the North Korean state and leadership. Recent discussions of the need to "shore up" extended deterrence in the US-Japan security alliance. such a partnership is exactly what the North Koreans had in mind until 2004.Japan South Korea aff ENDI 2010 20/50 AT: Hegemony good / Deterrence / Appeasement Current US alliance guarantees aren’t credible – North Korea will inevitably challenge it and US hegemony will collapse Hayes. the very ones that underlay the Cold War alliance system created by John Foster Dulles half a century ago. culminating in an agile DPRK nuclear weapons strategy a decade later intended to project nuclear threat right back up the American barrel aimed at Pyongyang. US intelligence estimates at the time show a remarkable laxity in relation to DPRK nuclear weapons motivations at this time. the reflexive reversion to END by Obama's appointees shows the shallowness of the Global Abolition policy current.” 12/17. This was not primarily a defensive strategy. thereby reinforcing extended nuclear deterrence to Japan and Korea and even reintroducing nuclear weapons into Korea itself. The DPRK thereby called the American bluff in the most serious challenge to American nuclear hegemony in the entire post Cold War period. Surprisingly. but always managing the risks at each stage of the DPRK breakout to preserve the possibility of reversing the latest gain of the DPRK's incremental nuclearization and weaponization. the credibility of US END has fallen to an all-time low. The big question today is whether they can be persuaded to return to that position. the credibility of US END with allies in this region was tied up directly with the United States' ability to stop and reverse (not merely contain by deterrence) the DPRK's acquisition of nuclear weapons and use of nuclear threat to compel the United States and others to negotiate with it-what I term the DPRK's "stalker strategy. as a spoiler state for cooperative security institution building in the region. withdrew US nuclear weapons from the ROK." an abstract noun. test and deploy for many decades.
selective engagers overstate the effect of U. rather. America's major allies have sufficient military strength to deter any potential aggressors. especially if it expands eastward. Department of Political Science at MIT. selective engagers point to the costs of others' great power wars and the relative ease of preventing them. the only sure path to ruin is to step in the middle of a faraway fight. But NATO. Although distant great power wars are bad for America. and Russians would still have to worry about China. International Security.Japan South Korea aff ENDI 2010 21/50 AT: Hegemony good / Deterrence / Appeasement US Withdrawal Doesn’t Cause conflict—the only risk of great power war is if the u. so spirals should not be acute. redirect its economy toward the military. The neighbors' attempts to eliminate the vulnerability give them fleeting offensive capabilities and tempt them to launch preventive war. strategic depth. with 44 percent of the world's GDP. These analysts fear that American military retrenchment would increase the risk of great power war. selective engagement will ensure that when a future great power war erupts. After an American withdrawal. frighten their neighbors. Second. according to these analysts. may worry Russia. and continued engagement will not reliably prevent it. military presence as a positive force for great power peace. 1997.S. Some advocates of selective engagement point to the past fifty years as evidence that America's forward military presence reduces the chance of war. With or without a forward U. even for those countries that manage to stay out of the fighting. it exacerbates the risk. military were to withdraw from Europe. its ever-trusted ally. The expanse of Siberia gives Russia. In fact. which stands between it and Japan. is sucked in through its overseas commitments Eugene Gholz and Harvey Sapolsky. These threats can be managed without U. Furthermore. Spirals happen when states. The more NATO frightens Russia. China has a long land border with Russia. The Cold War's great power peace. South Korea benefits from mountainous terrain which would channel an attacking force from the north. because any country's attempt to achieve security will give it an offensive capability against its neighbors. In sum. Japan and Taiwan are islands. the United States will be in the thick of things. and the longest period of European great power peace ensued. no other region in which great powers interact offers more defensive advantage than East Asia. the more likely it is that Russia will turn dangerously nationalist. The risk of spirals is great when offense is easier than defense. controlling more than 21 percent of the world's GDP. The danger of spirals leading to war in East Asia is remote. seeking security. First. Europe's strongest advocate for NATO expansion. The prospect for spirals is greater in Europe. . is blessed with inherent defensive advantages. Offense is difficult in East Asia. In today's world. because it would be German rather than American troops standing guard on the new borders. is to remain engaged in Europe and East Asia. but continued U. the Europeans would still need to keep an eye on Russia. the Japanese. Koreans. disengagement will not cause great power war. is far more threatening. p. Selective engagers overstate America's effect on the likelihood of future great power wars. The selective engagers' strategy is wrong for two reasons. selective engagers overstate the costs of distant wars and seriously understate the costs and risks of their strategies. But if the U. was over determined. In some circumstances. Twice in this century the United States has pulled out of Europe.S. A West European military union. however. Overseas deployments require a large force structure. presence. European and Asian powers had a common foe which encouraged them to cooperate. engagement may actually increase the likelihood of conflict. Even worse. There is little reason to believe that withdrawal from Europe or Asia would lead to deterrence failures. which makes them very difficult to invade. But Asia. throughout the Cold War. even Germany. assistance. A great power war today would be a calamity.s. as discussed earlier.S. Then America chose to stay engaged. but enjoys the protection of the East China Sea. and the challenge will encourage European and Asian regional cooperation. might become less enthusiastic.S. engagement does not reduce that danger. Nuclear weapons brought a powerful restraining influence. and try to re-absorb its old buffer states. The best way to prevent great power war. v21 n4. Conflict is far more likely to erupt from a sequence described in the spiral model. 30-32 Several prominent analysts favor a policy of selective engagement.S. and both times great power war followed.
the United States would intervene with its own forces only when regional powers are unable to uphold the balance of power on their own. it merely needs to ensure that they do not fall under the control of a hostile great power and especially not under the control of a so-called peer competitor. professor of international affairs at Harvard. worth fighting and dying for). offshore balancing is not isolationist. 05 (Stephen. It husbands the power upon which this primacy rests and minimizes the fear that this power provokes. and the Persian Gulf. (By limiting military commitments overseas. Offshore balancing further recognizes that the United States does not need to control these areas directly.) The United States would still be prepared to use force when it was directly threatened—as it was when the Taliban allowed al Qaeda a safe haven in Afghanistan—and would be prepared to help other governments deal with terrorists that also threaten the United States. and would thus make it less likely that the United States would have to intervene in far-flung places where it is not welcome. a strategy of offshore balancing would make it less likely that the United States would face the hatred of radicals like bin Laden. Offshore balancing assumes that only a few areas of the globe are of strategic importance to the United States (that is. Over time. But it would no longer keep large numbers of troops overseas solely for the purpose of “maintaining stability. Equally important. But it is not a passive strategy and does not preclude using the full range of America’s power to advance its core interests. it reduces the danger of being drawn into unnecessary conflicts and encourages other states to do more for us. Specifically. . Most importantly. Offshore balancing is the ideal grand strategy for an era of American primacy. The United States would still be actively engaged around the world. Offshore balancing does not preclude using power for humanitarian ends—to halt or prevent genocide or mass murder—but the United States would do so only when it was confident it could prevent these horrors at an acceptable cost. By setting clear priorities and emphasizing reliance on regional allies. industrialized Asia. Under this strategy. In this strategy. http://bostonreview.Japan South Korea aff ENDI 2010 22/50 Offshore balancing solves Offshore balancing historically solves—their disads assume isolationism. not our alternative Walt. To prevent rival great powers from doing this. through multilateral institutions such as the United Nations and the WTO and through close ties with specific regional allies.net/BR30. Boston Review.html) The final option is offshore balancing.1/walt. however. offshore balancing prefers to rely primarily on local actors to uphold the regional balance of power.” and it would not try to use American military power to impose democracy on other countries or disarm potential proliferators. it takes advantage of America’s favorable geopolitical position and exploits the tendency for regional powers to worry more about each other than about the United States. Feb/March. the vital areas are the regions where there are substantial concentrations of power and wealth or critical natural resources: Europe. “In the National Interest: A new grand strategy for American foreign policy”. which has been America’s traditional grand strategy. an offshore-balancing strategy would make it easier for the United States to intervene in cases of mass murder or genocide. the United States deploys its power abroad only when there are direct threats to vital American interests.
offshore balancing would take advantage of the unique geostrategic advantages that allow the United States to benefit from multipolarity. rather than arising from any direct threat to the United States itself. the United States would reap security advantages from a reversion to multipolarity. If the United States adopted an offshore balancing strategy. the United States would increase its relative power against both China and Japan by letting them compete and balance against. and it is to America’s advantage to shift this responsibility to others. the United States is far less vulnerable to the effects of "instability" than are the major powers of Eurasia. the United States might need to intervene to thwart the emergence of a hegemonic challenger. The strategy of preponderance. Visiting Associate Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School.83 In contrast. Domestic economic revitalization and a neomercantilist international economic policy would be integral components of the strategy. offshore balancing would rest on the assumption that America’s overall strategic position would be enhanced by devolving to others the responsibility for their own defense. exercise a free hand strategically. however (notwithstanding U. Third. or time. For the United States.85 When an offshore balancer shifts to others the dangers entailed by “going first. The strategy of preponderance commits the United States to alliance relationships that run counter to geostrategic logic: it imposes the greatest burden (in terms of danger and cost) on the alliance partner (the United States) whose security is least at risk. An offshore balancing strategy would reverse this pattern of alliance relations.4’ Because of its insularity. complaints about burdensharing inequities). Hence an offshore balancing strategy would not rule out the possibility that. and great powers do not bandwagon. It is often unclear which of potential multiple rivals poses the most salient threat. thereby forcing others to assume the risks and costs of antihegemonic balancing.S. 06 (Christopher. it might be too uncomfortable psychologically for the United States to live in a world dominated by another power.s.88 Multipolarity challenges strategists because a state can be threatened by more than a single adversary.S. control over the international system—including control over U. First. however. Christopher Layne.their evidence assumes a complete collapse of the u. for example. deterrence could be weakened and the nuclear revolution (which bolsters insularity) could be partially offset.S. also would seek to maximize U. and contain. There is no inherent reason that the United States should be compelled to bear the high costs of providing security for other states. each other. whether measured in terms of capabilities. The United States is far removed from powerful rivals and shielded from them both by geography and its own hard power. As an offshore balancer. a Eurasian hegemon might be able to use its power diplomatically to coerce the United States. Some analysts predict that the RMA will result in greatly enhanced conventional war-fighting capabilities. and it could-and should-insulate itself from possible future Eurasian great power wars. Washington has decided that it is preferable strategically for the United States to defend Germany and Japan rather than for Germany and Japan to defend themselves. Japan and Western Europe.86 The United States would be the primary beneficiary of these rivalries between (among) the other great powers in the emerging multipolar system. the risk of conflict and the possible exposure of the American homeland to attack. security competitions almost certainly would occur in East Asia and Europe.82 A good strategy. long have possessed the economic and technological capabilities to defend themselves. An offshore balancing strategy would be grounded on the assumption that relative economic power matters. however.S. the United States confronts this dilemma of multiple rivals. Three reasons explain why the possibility of intervention cannot be foreclosed completely. Noninsular states’ constant worry about possible threats from nearby neighbors is a factor that historically has increased the relative power position of insular states. In East Asia.Japan South Korea aff ENDI 2010 23/50 Offshore balancing solves offshore balancing solves their impacts -. “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing” International Security. hedges against unknown (and unknowable) future contingencies.S. relative power by capitalizing on its geostrategically privileged position. As an offshore balancer. In contrast. Offshore balancing is the classic grand strategic response of an insular great power facing two (or more) potential peer competitors in the same region. traditional concerns about the military effects of capability and resource distributions among states again could become salient. and avoid being automatically engulfed in Eurasian conflicts because of its alliance commitments. interests. affies—would have adverse geopolitical consequences. an offshore balancing strategy would be based on the assumptions that in a multipolar world other states will balance against potential hegemons. if so. derive directly from the overseas commitments mandated by hegemony's allencompassing definition of U.89 Offshore balancing solves the risk of the US being drawn into future great power wars Layne. Great powers that stand on the sidelines while their peers engage in security competitions and conflict invariably gain in relative power. Consequently. America’s core security probably would be unthreatened. as the balancer of last resort.87 Offshore balancing thus would be a more sophisticated power-maximizing strategy than preponderance: the United States would be able to enhance its relative power without having to confront rivals directly. other states have the incentive to balance against geographically proximate rivals. The strategy of preponderance is based in part on the assumption that the United States must prevent the rise of a hegemonic challenger because other states either will not or will not do so effectively. The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present. ***Hegemony advantage extensions – North Korea specific . Even if a Eurasian hegemon were to appear.S. The strategy. intentions. p. has actively discouraged them from doing so because American policymakers fear any diminution of U. 169) By devolving full responsibility for their defense to U. The fear that a future Eurasian hegemon would command sufficient resources to imperil the United States is a strategic artifact of the prenuclear era. where China and Japan are emerging great powers. the military-technological backdrop to international politics may change in the future because of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Second. as an insular great power. In that case.” it can reasonably hope that it may never have to become involved. professor of government at Texas A & M University. Summer 1997 In the early-twenty-first-century multipolar system the risk that a Eurasian hegemon will emerge is slight. the United States can stand aloof from others’ security competitions and engage in “bystanding” and “buck-passing” behavior. allies. In a multipolar world the United States could be confident that effective balancing ultimately would occur because to ensure their survival.
such action would risk a retaliatory spiral. the South’s defense minister now says a mine or torpedo might have been involved. Tensions on the Korean peninsula have risen after President Lee ended the ROK’s “Sunshine Policy”—which essentially provided bountiful subsidies irrespective of Pyongyang’s behavior. respond to Beijing’s insistence that the DPRK rejoin the Six-Party Talks or something else? South Korea should propose its own high level visit to the PRC. 4/6. he is the author of Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire (Doug. Seoul might feel the need to respond with force.org/Article. Even under the best of circumstances there is no certainty about what is likely to occur in North Korea. However. Beijing is happier with the status quo than with risking North Korea’s economic stability or the two nations’ political relationship. has attempted to dampen speculation by announcing his intention to “look into the case in a calm manner. where the factions are unclear. . as he apparently desires. including that of China. the status quo is inherently unstable. Beijing has pushed the DPRK to negotiate and backed limited United Nations sanctions.Japan South Korea aff ENDI 2010 24/50 Risk of Korean war high Risk of war in Korea is high Bandow. http://www. No one wants to play out that scenario to its ugly conclusion. 10 . Apparently North Korean leader Kim Jong-il is planning to visit China. military coup or messy succession fight. the prospect of conflict had dramatically diminished over the last couple of decades. A former special assistant to President Reagan.” But the possibility that Pyongyang committed a flagrant and bloody act of war has sent tremors through the ROK. it’s impossible to ignore the possibility of an implosion. different family members could reach for power. Speculation is rife about the reason: to request more food aid. But the ROK should press further. Even if the DPRK was not involved in the sinking. prevents the North from engaging in armed instances of brinkmanship. involving not only varying factions but different family members. Despite China’s preference for avoiding controversy. The Republic of Korea’s president. After his government downplayed the likelihood of North Korean involvement. Diplomatic talks would be halted. Lee Myung-bak. Although the DPRK’s governing structures so far have proven surprisingly resilient. If North Korea continues to develop nuclear weapons.nationalinterest. After intermittently engaging in bloody terrorist and military provocations. Where it would end no one could say. Nevertheless. its actions could trigger two equally explosive responses: a military attack by the United States or decisions by South Korea and Japan to build nuclear weapons in response. Thankfully. Now we are no longer sure. both to protect its international reputation and prevent a domestic political upheaval. and the military might become the final arbiter. changing the PRC’s policy requires convincing Beijing to assess its interest differently. Such an outcome would be in no one’s interest.senior fellow at the Cato Institute. the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea seemed to have largely abandoned direct attacks on South Korea and the United States. At base. Washington doesn’t like that judgment. Politics in Pyongyang resembles succession in the Ottoman court. And with Pyongyang in the midst of a leadership transition of undetermined length. So far the People’s Republic of China has taken a largely hands-off attitude towards the North. Even if justified. only prudence. The foreign ministers of both nations met in Beijing in mid-March and issued a standard call for resumption of the Six-Party Talks. But the PRC has refused to support a potentially economy-wrecking embargo or end its own food and energy subsidies to North Korea. The Yellow Sea incident reemphasizes the fact that North Korean irresponsibility could lead to war. the threat of war seemingly remained low. backed by the United States. Seoul could ill afford not to react strongly. Doing nothing is worse than attempting to force a change in the North’s nuclear policies or ruling elites. There are several reasons for China’s stance.”An Unstable Rogue”. A weaker Kim Jong-il is less able to impose his will on the military or hand over power to his youngest son. the possibility of violence occurring in the North and spilling outward seems real. not principle. Moreover. The Yellow Sea incident could help. All economic aid to and investment in the North would end. Prospects for reconvening the Six-Party Talks would disappear. promote investment in the North.aspx?id=23144) In late March an explosion sunk a South Korean warship in the Yellow Sea. A torpedo would mean a North Korean submarine actively targeted Seoul’s aging corvette.
But cash-strapped Washington has no appetite. Much the same goes for Japan.guardian. "The Korean war was extraordinarily costly. the Cheonan. have risen significantly following South Korea's decision to punish the North for the March sinking of its naval corvette. And once shooting starts. which is backing South Korea at the UN security council. Today's South Korean announcement that it is planning joint anti-submarine exercises with the US provides one obvious possible flashpoint. may quickly be drawn into any new skirmishing. killing 46 sailors.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/may/24/china-faces-toughchoices-korea) The risk of renewed.co. 5/24 . all-out warfare on the Korean peninsula is rated low by most western and Chinese analysts. Both sides have much to lose if violence ratchets up. President Lee Myung-bak's move to resume psy-ops (psychological warfare operations) along the demilitarised zone. mayhem may ensue. http://www. more trouble is likely. But the chances of escalating armed clashes. Seoul says a North Korean torpedo destroyed the Cheonan. and scant capacity. planned or otherwise. "This latest violence is as unlikely as previous incidents to lead to renewal of general fighting." The US. it can be hard to stop. Simon. Barack Obama has directed the US military to be ready "to deter future aggression" and is demanding the North admit responsibility and apologise.an assistant editor of the Guardian and a foreign affairs columnist (5/24/10. for more war. " China faces touch choices over Korea ". with the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq unfinished.Japan South Korea aff ENDI 2010 25/50 Risk of Korean war high The risk of Korean war is high – small disputes could escalate Tisdale. If its vengeful navy were to encounter another of Kim Jong-il's submarines. but any use would result in instant devastating retaliation. And if the South makes good its vow to intercept North Korean commercial shipping. North Korea now has at least a primitive nuclear weapon." said author Arthur Cyr in the China Post. and neither side has ever tried to renew such hostilities. The Guardian. . with 29.000 troops based in the South. has already led Pyongyang to threaten to shoot up the border. including broadcast propaganda messages targeted at North Korean troops.
upiasia. The Korean peninsula is also seen as a predetermined battlefield if war breaks out between China. The U.S. troops from the region.com/Security/2009/10/13/us_bases_are_obstacle_to_korean_reunification/1193/) The United States believes that if the North collapsed. Many believe that the South Korean government is a puppet of the United States.S.S. http://www. as the three nations could avoid hitting each other’s territories. protecting North Korea means keeping the United States and its allies from encroaching on its border. China would rather maintain the status quo than accept a reunified Korea under South Korean administration. . military presence. But both Koreas would have to face the brunt of a full-scale war. U.S. But in order to get the Chinese to endorse the plan. the Koreas have provided a buffer zone for more than half a century since the end of the Korean War. China’s growing economic and military clout has increased the necessity for a military presence in South Korea. Even a unified Korea might not want the U. China might be forced to accept a reunified Korea if it wants to maintain an international image as a peace-promoting country.S. unless it gets some kind of security guarantee without losing the strategic balance in the region. This would have its challenges. Besides. bases are obstacle to Korean reunification. The question is. 10/13. China would have to back reunification to demonstrate that it is a responsible player in regional cooperation. China will do its best to stabilize North Korea and rebuild its political structure in line with Chinese interests.S. whose economy is touted to race ahead of that of the United States. as that would leave a strategic vacuum. as the Japanese fear reprisals from the Chinese for atrocities committed during World War II. “U. and might increase the chances of military confrontation. allowing the new Korea to handle its own security. as reunification would make the objective of providing deterrence against the North redundant. China would probably ask for a U. Also. troop withdrawal as a precondition to the reunification of the two Korea’s under a liberal and democratic government. Japan and the United States. For China. as it would be difficult to explain why it was required if the North Korean threat no longer exists. Stationing troops in Korea after reunification would only reinforce this belief. Since the end of the Korean War the United States has maintained a large military contingent in South Korea to deter an invasion attempt by the North. the United States would have to give up its strategic military bases in South Korea and order a complete withdrawal of U. military.S. withdrawal would be ideal. troops is a prerequisite to genuine Chinese support for Korean reunification Van Nguyen.S. The complete withdrawal of all U. Australia. However. His articles have been published in OpEdnews. military bases in South Korea could pose the greatest obstacle to a peaceful reunification of the Koreas. The United States may not withdraw its troops.S.S. This would create a deep rift within the Koreas and threaten to derail the reunification process. an alternative would be to allow China to set up bases in the northern part of Korea. the United States and Japan. there is little incentive for it to allow reunification to take place unchallenged.freelance writer based in Sydney. Although complete U. However. will the United States pull out all its troops in order to allow the peaceful reunification of the Koreas? The United States has been dreading a scenario in which its military bases in South Korea could come under threat. 9 . military bases and personnel from the Korean peninsula should follow after a timetable has been set.” UPI Asia.Japan South Korea aff ENDI 2010 26/50 Solvency – Removing troops key to Chinese support Removing U. Therefore. military base in a united Korea would only strain ties with China. Asia Times Online and Foreign Policy Journal (Peter. military presence keeps China’s ambitions in check and in the bargain offers Japan some security.S. But regardless of the implications and consequences. which would escalate the conflict and make it difficult for all parties to disengage for fear of losing face. however. the United States will hesitate to remove its bases. Both Koreas have been constantly eyed by foreigners due to their geostrategic value in Northeast Asia. A U. similar to Kyrgyzstan allowing Russia and China to set up bases to ease their concerns over the U. For China. millions of North Koreans have a deeply embedded resentment against the United States and are highly suspicious of its geopolitical moves in the region. This would leave the warring states relatively untouched. It would risk losing influence over Korea to China.
Some conservatives including pundit Charles Krauthammer have been arguing that nothing would concentrate Beijing’s mind more than the prospect of a nuclear-armed Japan.com/dispatch/southkorea/090527/time-encourage-japan-and-south-korea-go-nuclear?page=0. A former special assistant to President Reagan. Bradley K. or its designated successor. Irrespective of the state of bilateral U. “at that point. The State Department can issue statements "strongly discouraging" Japan from seeking nukes. the potential of military conflict on the peninsula and attacks on Japan have caused greater interest in Japan for adopting a more aggressive foreign policy backed by a larger military. looking credible causes Chinese action.” They don’t have to actually go nuclear. the Wall Street Journal. We must hope that the Yellow Sea sinking was a tragedy rather than a provocation. http://www. We may not even need Japan to actually go nuclear. . given the strains in the U. 4/6. We already have a history of accepting new nuclear states when those countries are our allies and it is in our strategic interests (Israel and India come to mind as prominent examples). Dealing with North Korea provides the PRC with an opportunity to demonstrate the strength of its commitment to peace and stability. Japanese moves towards proliferation force Chinese sanctions on North Korea --. The new government in Tokyo is committed to improving Japan’s relationship with Beijing.causes Kim to back down.” American Spectator Blog. Martin.1. The country that could do the most to reduce the chance of conflict is China. finally be forced to enter into genuine leveraged buyout negotiations. http://spectator. Philip Klein. said in an e-mail that he agreed with all of Straub’s points but wondered whether Japanese nuclear armament was the “one strategic threat” that might outweigh what he said China now considers the primary threat: a “catastrophic collapse” of North Korea. 5/27/2009. but then stymie any efforts to impose sanctions on them through the U. that notion is being examined more widely. the incident should remind everyone that the Korean peninsula remains a military tinderbox.S. which has been propping up the North Korean economy. too. The two nations’ economic ties continue to expand. The American Spectator's Washington correspondent. Charles Krauthammer the best argument for this joins the list of those advocating that the U.nationalinterest. Japan. Chris Nelson. now might not seem to be the best time to engage China. should challenge China over the issue. 30-year veteran Asia correspondent for organizations including Newsweek. It would only take one accident or mistake to trigger full-scale war. Moreover. “Opinion: Time to encourage Japan and South Korea to go nuclear?” Global Post.N.globalpost. Pressing Pyongyang more strongly would provide evidence of the PRC’s commitment to play a more constructive regional role. http://www.Japan South Korea aff ENDI 2010 27/50 Solvency – Removing troops key to Chinese support The risk of Japanese rearm will mobilize China to pressure North Korea Bandow. the PRC will have to be persuaded to change course.-China relations. The PRC opposes this new course. in turn prompting Japan to sound serious” about developing nuclear deterrents. With the latest test.org/blog/2006/10/20/nuclear-japan. We don't have to actively help Japan obtain nuclear weapons. whose influential Washingtonbased daily Nelson Report looks at policy issues affecting Asia. the Baltimore Sun. as long as it looks realistic enough that they are going nuclear to twist China's arm.aspx?id=23144) Admittedly.-PRC relationship. influence: that is unlikely to happen so long as South Korea feels threatened by the North and uncertain about China’s willingness to develop a more equal relationship between the two Koreas. As part of that dialogue. The South also has a critical role to play in engaging China.senior fellow at the Cato Institute.S. Beijing increasingly expects political influence commensurate with its growing economic strength. to become concerned enough about the fallout from Kim’s nuclear adventurism to join in truly effective sanctions. GlobalPost's North Korea columnist. resolving the multiple problems of North Korea would be the most effective way to quiet Japanese geopolitical fears. To me approach is that it is the only surefire way to pressure China into using its leverage against North Korea. “at which point might the Kim regime. Asia Times and. But even if the former.S. most recently. “Nuclear Japan. might Beijing actually risk sanctions to bring down the Kim regime. we can just engage in the same diplomatic doublespeak that China does with regard to North Korea. But Beijing also desires to expand its political role while diminishing U. In his Washington Post column today. Tokyo should point to the dangers posed by North Korean misbehavior to surrounding nations. he is the author of Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire (Doug.” Nelson suggested. A different view is that what is really needed is for China. If South Korea “sounded serious.S. Bloomberg News. 10 . 10/20/2006. and that point only. spilling chaos across their shared border.”An Unstable Rogue”. Beijing is unlikely to reconsider its policy unless it believes doing so is in its interest. However. let Japan go nuclear.org/Article.
At the same time. and recently gained Kim's agreement to expanded co-operation in talks in Beijing.guardian. food aid program. It is virtually impossible for outsiders to be confident that they understand the inner workings of North Korean decision-making. Syria. or actively hostile. What implications does this economic story have for the development of sanctions in response to North Korea’s nuclear activities? The first relates to the question of the regime’s intentions. the North could collapse into a failed state located right at China’s doorstep. however." North Korea totally dependent on China --. “Economic Shifts Critical for North Korea Sanctions. North Korea has also sought out other partners who do not pose sanction risks. and trade.eastwestcenter. 6/12/2009. not the US.co. As a result. But as the North Korean leadership understands very well. In addition. and professor at UC San Diego’s Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies.an assistant editor of the Guardian and a foreign affairs columnist (5/24/10. recognises this fact. North Korea has in fact become more economically open. Clinton is urgently pressing Chinese leaders to rein in their rogue neighbour.Japan South Korea aff ENDI 2010 28/50 China key to solve North Korea China is vital to solving North Korean conflict Tisdale. However. Trade with Europe stagnated following the onset of the nuclear crisis. The US secretary of state. Neither carrot nor stick has worked. http://www. the Chinese leadership faces its own risks in pushing North Korea to the edge. as a result. Hillary Clinton. The North Korean economy is indeed becoming more open. If the North Korean leadership had been pursuing a reformist path since the onset of the crisis however gradually . "The North Koreans will be more easily dissuaded from further attacks if they don't get cover from China. A second. China has become even more central to any effective sanctions effort. However the political geography of North Korea’s trade has shifted quite fundamentally. or with whom North Korea’s nuclear and missile interests are aligned .most notably Iran. Another implication has to do with the political geography of North Korea’s external economic relations.it would have constituted an important signal that the country was open to economic inducements. "It is absolutely critical to Korea and the US that China send that signal. while the problem has grown steadily worse. Simon. The Guardian. the willingness to terminate the U. An unintended consequence of the crisis has been to push North Korea into a closer economic relationship with China and other trading partners that show little interest in political quid-pro-quos." Michael Green of the Centre for International Studies told the New York Times. Put differently. Senior Fellow at both the East-West Center and the Peterson Institute for International Economics.” East West Center. provides food and fuel.org/newscenter/east-west-wire/economic-shifts-critical-for-north-korea-sanctions/. http://www. and. observation is that despite the recent anti-reformist turn and the constraints of the second nuclear crisis. towards economic engagement. . if pressed too hard. and potentially Egypt. the government’s behavior with respect to Kaesong and the ongoing meddling in the border trade shows a regime that is either indifferent. including further escalatory moves on North Korea’s part or the prospect that. Trade with Japan has virtually collapsed as Tokyo moved toward a virtual embargo.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/may/24/china-faces-toughchoices-korea) The unpalatable truth is Washington has failed utterly to resolve the North Korean conundrum over a period of decades. The North’s very high level of dependence on China raises little doubt that Beijing could exercise influence on Pyongyang if it chose to do so. In Beijing for this week's US-China strategic dialogue. investment and particularly aid from South Korea fell sharply following the inauguration of Lee Myung-bak.S. the evidence on this score is not comforting. but the leadership remains highly ambivalent about this development. let alone sanctions. 5/24 . but it is nonetheless important to ask whether military and diplomatic signals are aligned with other developments in the North Korean political economy. If any one country has sufficient leverage to prevent escalation of the current crisis and open the path to a solution. has shown little interest in economic carrots. To the contrary. " China faces touch choices over Korea ". and apparently contradictory. It is its biggest trading partner. Marcus Noland and Stephan Haggard. Beijing is the North's only serious ally. North Korea appears to have rearranged its external economic relations to reduce the risk that traditional sanctions would work. the North’s dependence on China for trade has grown dramatically. it is China.Chinese sanctions would change North Korean behavior. far outstripping trade with other partners.
FORCES KOREA STILL NEEDED ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA?. alliance for maintaining regional stability.61 North Korea reluctantly accepted the ambiguous statement about the light water reactor and “China made clear it was prepared to blame the U. replacing the U. more Asian countries are depending on China instead of the United States for economic growth. The exercise started in Russia and concluded in China under a scenario of the two countries responding in order to stabilize a fictional country within the region. “Japan.S.”62 Although both South Korea and China stated that North Korea must stop their nuclear weapons program. their positions during the Six-Party Talks presents a challenge for the U.ml/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA448328&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc. both militarily and economically. China. The exercise gave China an opportunity to observe some of Russia’s weaponry that China will probably purchase. efforts to isolate and coerce North Korea.S. in the six-party talks”59 or that “the ROK no longer supports U.66 China’s economic and military growth.S.65 China’s improved position in Northeast Asia. “South Korean Unification Minister Chung Dong Young has proclaimed that the North is entitled to a nuclear program”63 and the Chinese delegation for the November 2005 fifth round of the Six-Party Talks stated that the DPRK has a right to retain nuclear capability for their civilian nuclear energy program.”60 The purpose of the Six-Party talks is to establish a forum for the United States. North Korea.S. to accept the September 19 th Agreement that included ambiguous language on the light water reactor and allows North Korea to retain a civilian nuclear program.”56 China’s economic growth coupled with its growth in military ground forces is making China a major player in the Northeast Asia region and a growing influence throughout the Asia-Pacific region.S.pdf A second concern involves how China fits into the international politics and influence within the Northeast Asian region. representatives. USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT paper (Wayne. were adamant about ceasing all nuclear operations to include nuclear operations for civilian nuclear energy programs until North Korea has fully dismantled its nuclear weapons program. . China’s influence in international politics can possibly be best seen during the September 2005 fourth round of the Six-Party Talks when they urged the DPRK and the U. however.S.64 The U. along with China’s support for North and South Korea cooperation.S.S. for failure of the talks if it did not also accept the statement. 6 – US Army Colonel. improved China-Russia relations. China has undergone a major economic transformation by ascending from a financially bankrupt country to a major trading center of goods in the AsiaPacific region. and Russia to discuss and talk through the issues concerning the DPRK nuclear weapons program. South Korea.” 3/15. http://www. “IS U. policy toward North Korea.S.Japan South Korea aff ENDI 2010 29/50 China key to solve North Korea US policy towards North Korea can’t succeed – China will inevitably undermine the status quo Stevens. Taiwan. can be viewed by other countries in the region as a viable alternative to a U. warrant considering China as a potential threat to the U.S.dtic. For example.S.58 Some political science observers argue that “the ROK is closer to China than the U. because of China’s growing military power more Asian countries have started to adjust their realignments with China. Countries in the region may seek to improve their foreign relations with China after taking into consideration that Russia and China conducted a joint military exercise called “Peace Mission 2005” in August 2005. In fact. South Korea.57 Also. but rather cooperates with China to undermine U. Japan. and Singapore already export more to China and send more investment capital to China than they do to the United States.
It’s time to reconsider both Tokyo’s and Washington’s regional roles. Washington has more than enough on its military plate elsewhere in the world. ground forces in Japan and the larger mutual defense treaty between the two nations has disappeared. However. but World War II is over. A good place to start in cutting international installations would be Okinawa. Promiscuous intervention in today’s world inflates the power of Washington policy makers but harms the interests of U. East Asia might not look so friendly in coming decades. however.” Many analysts nevertheless want the United States to attempt to maintain its unnatural dominance. Tokyo remains heavily dependent on Washington for its security. it cannot easily reject Washington’s request for bases. 10 . the long-running Burmese guerrilla war in that nation’s east. 5/12. the strength of the U. Washington is risking the lives and wasting the money of the American people to defend other populous and prosperous states. Both Japan and India could play a much larger role in preserving regional security. defend Japan from what? Today Tokyo faces few obvious security threats.aspx?id=23390) the necessity of both U. Rather than expect its allies to defend themselves and promote regional stability. Rather than a unilateral promise by the United States to defend Japan. If the Japanese people want a minimal (or no) military. even among its old allies —hasn’t been there lately. The mind boggles. he is the author of Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire (Doug. Thus the U. “Japan Can Defend Itself”. Washington policy makers long have enjoyed America’s quasi-imperial role. Okinawan residents must do more than demand fairness. But U. Making fewer promises to intervene would allow the United States to reduce the number of military personnel and overseas bases. A former special assistant to President Reagan. with an expected $1. a flare-up of secessionist sentiment in Indonesia.” For years the most obvious target of the American forces was North Korea." He added that "It has become clear from our negotiations with the Americans that we cannot ask them to relocate the base to too far-flung a location. a stronger Japanese military—which already possesses potent capabilities—would be a far better mechanism for encouraging responsible Chinese development. In any case. An expansive American role made sense during the Cold War in the aftermath of World War II. alliance as a deterrent force. citizens. given the horrors of World War II. or border skirmishes between Cambodia and Thailand? It hard to imagine any reason for Washington to jump into any local conflict. Their feelings are understandable. so far the North has proved to be surprisingly resilient. violent opposition to Fiji’s military dictator. reliance on Okinawa. insisting that Tokyo fulfill its past promises." Apparently his government intends to move some facilities elsewhere on Okinawa as well as to the small island of Tokunoshima. more accurately. Checking China is next on the potential Okinawa mission list. North Korea’s uncertain future and China’s ongoing growth should give the Japanese people pause for concern. assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific security affairs in the Bush administration. the United States can no longer afford to protect countries which are able to protect themselves. the primary problem is Japan. the most fundamental duty of any national government is defense. no one expects the United States to launch a ground invasion of the People’s Republic of China irrespective of the future course of events.S. intransigence over Okinawa has badly roiled the bilateral relationship. U. a Japan that appears to almost intentionally ignore the increasingly complex and dangerous neighborhood in which it is located. we must ask Okinawa to bear some of that burden. Richard Lawless. so the Marines might wait a long time to undertake this mission.6 trillion deficit this year alone.org/Article.” The party later moderated its program. The threat of piracy has even caused Tokyo to open its first overseas military facility in the African state of Djibouti.S. Responsibility for protecting To coin a phrase. Lieutenant General Keith Stalder. The then opposition Democratic Party of Japan promised to “do away with the dependent relationship in which Japan ultimately has no alternative but to act in accordance with U. . Today’s “Self-Defense Force” is a widely accepted verbal evasion of a clear constitutional provision. defending and defeating potential adversaries. Washington should close Futenma—as a start to refashioning the alliance with Japan.Japan South Korea aff ENDI 2010 30/50 US forces in Japan prevent Japanese regional security US presence in Japan prevents Japan from developing a regional military role Bandow. troops be sent to resolve. that is their right. Washington is entitled to request—or. it’s time for a change.” However. . It’s time for Washington to deliver. Nevertheless. Should U.S. They must advocate defense independence. With Tokyo retreating from its commitment to chart a more independent course. the relationship should become one of equals working together on issues of mutual interest. The Obama administration responded badly.S. Raymond Greene. So long as Tokyo requests American military protection. .” Nevertheless. and . Japan’s activities remain minimal compared to its stake in East Asia’s stability. it is up to the United States to reorder the relationship. America’s consul general in Okinawa.” Afterwards he visited Okinawa and indicated that he planned to renege on his government’s earlier promises: “we must maintain the Japan-U. Tokyo’s neighbors remain uneasy in varying degrees about the prospect of a more active Japan. the MEF wouldn’t be very useful in any conflict. Thus. There’s also the kitchen sink argument: the Marines are to maintain regional “stability.S. And Tokyo cannot easily say no. Both Okinawans and Americans deserve justice. with the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) expected to reinforce the Republic of Korea in the event of war. Michael Schuman argued in Time: “Anyone who thinks the balance of power in Asia is not changing—and with it. Before the demonstration Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama said that “It must never happen that we accept the existing plan. For this reason. claimed: “observers perceive a Japan that is seemingly content to marginalize itself. both domestic pacifism and regional opposition have discouraged reconsideration of Japan’s military role. say.” Pentagon officials draw expanding circles around Okinawa to illustrate potential areas of operation. However. so long as Japan goes hat-in-hand to the United States for protection. America’s presumption should be noninvolvement rather than intervention in other nations’ wars. A revived Japanese empire is about as likely as a revived Mongol empire. they want America to contain a wealthier and more influential Beijing.S. More recently some Americans have talked about deploying the MEF to seize Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons in the event of a North Korean collapse. wishes. But they should not expect other nations to fill the defense gap. calling for a “close and equal Japan-U. Washington’s willingness to continue defending an increasingly wealthy Japan made a rethink unnecessary. However. However. America’s post-Cold War dominance is coming to an end. Rather than accommodate a more powerful China. http://nationalinterest. Japan should become that of Japan.” True enough.S. Moreover. citizens are paying for and dying in Washington’s quasi-imperial wars.S. Yet the ROK is both financially and manpower rich. said the island deployment is “the perfect model” for the alliance’s objectives of “deterring. Many Japanese citizens are equally opposed to a larger Japanese military and more expansive foreign policy. including Japan. insist on—bases that serve its interests. Alas. Who should protect Japan? Japan. Only reluctantly did Washington indicate a willingness to consider alternatives—after imposing seemingly impossible conditions. The other important question is. national efforts from Japan and its neighbors. American forces and personnel are expected to be at perpetual risk guaranteeing the interests of other states. Still.S. Thus. only the Japanese can assess the threats which concern them rather than Washington. many Japanese see little cause for an enlarged Japanese military. the Marine Corps Pacific commander. But even a more flexible basing policy would not be enough.. Article 9 of which prohibits the use of force and even creation of a military.senior fellow at the Cato Institute. Thus. That world disappeared two decades ago.S. says: “Asia is going though a period of historic strategic change in the balance of power. Nevertheless. the government promised to reconsider a previous agreement to relocate the Marines Corps Air Station at Futenma elsewhere on Okinawa. called “peace constitution” on Japan. they want Washington to keep its friends dependent. And only the Japanese can decide how best to respond to any perceived threats. Fears of a more dangerous North Korea and a more assertive People’s Republic of China have recently increased support in Japan for a more robust security stance. American officials soon realized that Washington could use military assistance. The United States imposed the soWhatever the justifications of this arrangement during the Cold War. Moreover. The majority of residents want to send the base elsewhere. which is why East Asian security and stability require greater Regional defense also warrants improved multilateral cooperation—something which should minimize concerns over an increased Japanese role. alliance.
though. the intensity of the opposition to Japan becoming a normal great power and playing a more serious security role is waning. the response to that prospect ranges from receptive to enthusiastic. If China does not succumb to internal weaknesses (which are not trivial). . The wariness about Japan as a more active military player is strongest in such countries as the Philippines and South Korea. but the attitude in those countries about the desirability of Japan and India adopting more active security roles is not unique. The alternative to Japan and India (and possibly other actors.cato.php?pub_id=11665) Yet some distrust of Japanese intentions lingers. Washington should embrace a similar view. The emergence of a multipolar power system in East Asia is the best outcome both for the United States and China's neighbors. and the latter still bears severe emotional scars from Tokyo's heavyhanded behavior as Korea's colonial master. The former endured a brutal occupation during World War II. such as Indonesia and Vietnam) becoming strategic counterweights to a rising China ought to be worrisome. A vacuum that China would be well-positioned to fill. 4/7. Even in those countries.Japan South Korea aff ENDI 2010 31/50 Increasing Japanese defense key to check China Increasing the Japanese regional defense role is vital to checking Chinese hegemony Carpenter. That emerging realism is encouraging. Given America's gradually waning hegemony. It is gratifying that nations in the region seem to be reaching that conclusion. a failure by other major countries to step up and be significant security players would lead to a troubling power vacuum in the region. gradually displacing the United States. it will almost certainly be the most prominent power in East Asia in the coming decades. And in the rest of the region. But there is a big difference between being the leading power and being a hegemon. Australia and New Zealand may be a little ahead of the curve in that process. 10 – vice president for defense and foreign policy at the Cato Institute (Ted. “Tokyo Rising”. both in the United States and portions of East Asia. The latter is a result that Americans cannot welcome. http://www.org/pub_display.
55 North Korea has used the Declaration as a mechanism to express their concerns with South Korea for continuing to allow U. work to resolve common elements pertaining to reunification. The DPRK always appears to dangle the unification issue in front of the ROK as a way to achieve some specific objective. The South Korean people are more concerned over issues affecting reunification cooperation and coordination than the possibility of war with North Korea. http://www. social. promote economic. and environmental cooperation. North Korea. . “IS U.ml/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA448328&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc. settle problems with separated families and long-term prisoners. The political relationship between the two Koreas has come a long way since 1950.dtic. FORCES KOREA STILL NEEDED ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA?.54 The accord focused on: Resolving the country’s reunification independently. strategically and masterfully the North Korean regime has managed to negatively impact the U. the sensitivity of any issue affecting that priority can easily cause the ROK to over react. 6 – US Army Colonel.” 3/15. USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT paper (Wayne. public health sports.S.S.pdf) First. and maintain continued dialogue to ensure the implementation of the Declaration. A sympathetic ear by the South Korean people of North Korea’s allegations and the potential for damaging the unification plan can easily fuel anti-Americanism on the peninsula. In 1992 the political relationship grew further with the two Koreas agreeing to a non-aggressive reconciliation and exchange program between the two countries.53 The two Koreas’ political relationships advanced to a new level when South Korean President Kim Dae-jung and North Korean leader Kim Jong il signed the “North – South Joint Declaration” on 15 June 2000 in Pyongyang.S. – ROK Alliance. invasion of the North to overthrow the regime. Since the ROK Government views unification as the country’s number one priority and national interest. forces to remain in the ROK and to express the DPRK’s alleged fear of a U.Japan South Korea aff ENDI 2010 32/50 Bases prevent Korean reunification North Korea uses the issue of US forces to prevent reunification Stevens.S. cultural.
html) There is a broader lesson here: as the world’s only superpower. The United States would not withdraw from world affairs under this strategy. Instead of bending over backward to persuade the rest of the world that the United States is 100-percent reliable.net/BR30. and with a clear strategy for doing so. http://bostonreview.1/walt. they’ll make concessions to win it Walt. and it would still retain potent power-projection capabilities. American leaders should be encouraging other states to bend over backward to keep the United States as an ally. they would be willing to do much more to make sure that we would. professor of international affairs at Harvard. .Japan South Korea aff ENDI 2010 33/50 AT: Withdrawing troops undermines relations Offshore balancing increases cooperation with allies—if they have doubts about US support. Other states are more likely to do this if they believe that American support is conditional on their cooperation. 05 (Stephen. Playing hard-to-get simply means intervening only when overt aggression occurs and America’s vital interests are directly threatened—and intervening with the clear intention of coming home quickly. Feb/March. To reiterate: offshore balancing is not isolationist. If other states were not entirely sure that the United States would come to their aid if asked. It also has the luxury of being able to do so. “In the National Interest: A new grand strategy for American foreign policy”. Boston Review. America’s Asian and Persian Gulf allies illustrate this dynamic perfectly: whenever they begin to fear that the American role might decline. the United States has an incentive to play hard-to-get. they leap to offer Washington new facilities and access agreements and go to greater lengths to conform their foreign policy to ours.
the U.S.S. Cooperation on missile defense would be one such step. commitment to the alliance will continue as the U.Japan South Korea aff ENDI 2010 34/50 AT: Plan undermines US-ROK alliance Substantially reducing troops won’t undermine the alliance – the U. Imagine the imposition of sanctions.senior fellow at the Cato Institute.S.106 Strategically. There is much the United States and ROK can do in the coming years to cooperate to encourage South Korean and regional security. The USFK’s reach back capability to Pacific Command and its commitment to the Mutual Defense Treaty plays a key role in assisting the ROK in deterring aggression from external attack and providing stability within the Northeast Asia region.107 The U. but will also expect South Korea to shoulder greater responsibilities in order to contribute more to the stability of the Northeast Asia region. . and can the United States accommodate itself to a more influential China? Is the ROK willing to risk its survival as a prosperous and independent nation by getting in between those two powers? This is why the relationship between the United States and South Korea must change. 6 – US Army Colonel.S. will remain watchful and alert towards the dangers of North Korea. Fall. A myriad of issues. should American support be needed to thwart a serious hegemonic threat beyond the capacity of friendly regional states to contain. America’s fight in the Global War on Terror and the realignment between countries such as China and South Korea or possibly China and Russia. enhances its missile defense capabilities and increases fire power. such as seizure of illicit North Korean weapons shipments.ROK Alliance is clearly going through some strenuous times and challenges. According to the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America. makes a reduction of U. the reductions will also aid in alleviating some of the anti-American tensions on the peninsula by reducing the American footprint and providing the U.108 Michael O’Hanlon testified before the House Armed Services Committee that the South Korean forces are at least as strong as North Korea. .S. policy.ROK Alliance over the decades primarily centered around defending the ROK and deterring the DPRK aggression in order to maintain peace on the peninsula.S.S.104 United States Forces Korea is still needed on the peninsula. Other dangers also await the South if it continues to tie itself to American defense policy. Although the strategic defense objectives of the U. enforcement of a blockade or military strikes on the North--conducted by American forces located beyond South Korea's borders and acting outside of South Korea's borders over the objections of the ROK. or allies and friends.dtic. to reconsider the usefulness and efficiency of U. . The SPI talks should focus on refashioning the relationship to fit today's dramatically new security environment.S.S.109 President Roh may have been a little over optimistic in his assessment of ROK forces. they should begin with the presumption that Seoul will begin taking over responsibility for its own defense.” 3/15. President Roh said in his speech to Korean Air Force Academy graduates that the ROK has military power that no one can challenge and sufficient capabilities to defend itself. and the pending desire for reunification of the two Koreas. Arrangements also should be made for emergency base access.S. A strong U. for that matter). military forces permanently stationed in South Korea. FORCES KOREA STILL NEEDED ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA?.105 The U. will take preemptive acts as necessary to eliminate threats to the U. Can Beijing peacefully assert itself on the East Asian and global stage. 5 . must work with the ROK to develop their defense capabilities and set the conditions for Seoul to become more self-reliant in providing for the security of their nation and in assuming wartime operational control of their forces. Scaling down troop commitments doesn’t preclude defense cooperation Bandow. Another would be joint naval training and maneuvers to prepare for future contingencies.pdf Conclusion The U.S.S. lexis) Seoul cannot escape being tied to U. A former special assistant to President Reagan. “IS U. The National Interest. Reduction of U. USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT paper (Wayne. even if it tries to disassociate itself from Washington. most notably 9/11 are causing the U. “Seoul Searching”. troops on the peninsula should not be viewed as a diminishing commitment to the alliance. with a forward deployed basing to fight the GWOT and respond to emergencies within Northeast Asia and possibly throughout Asia-Pacific. he is the author of Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire (Doug.103 The National Security Strategy goes further in saying that the U. force structure changes are warranted due to global security issues and the impact of non-state actors and terrorist groups. will increase efforts to build up South Korean forces to compensate Stevens. http://www. plans to invest $11 billion in equipment and weapon systems for USFK troops. Rather than maintaining a formal commitment to defend the South from North Korea (or China. North Korea is unlikely to distinguish the positions of the two members of the Mutual Defense Pact and is likely to view the South as an appropriate target of retaliation.S.S. Most important. Washington should pursue more limited forms of defense cooperation advantageous to both sides.ml/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA448328&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc. troops in Korea a wise decision. but South Korea certainly has a remarkable military force that has the capability to enable South Korea to move toward and become a power balancer within the Northeast Asia region. The most important future international relationship may well be that between the United States and China.S.S.S.
Piracy is a major problem. “Seoul Searching”.S. ethnic divisions and other parochial squabbles. or whether the Air Force is preparing to bomb opium fields in Burma. The region is no longer the focus of global hegemonic competition. as opposed to widespread conflict. 11/11. are vigorously re-imagining the rationale for retaining U. ethnic. However. military intervention--nor is it clear why the Mutual Defense Pact between Seoul and Washington is required. The National Interest.S. meanwhile. Fall. 5 .senior fellow at the Cato Institute. U. Advocates of a permanent U. Some South Koreans do so as well: Kim Sung-ban of the Institute on Foreign Affairs and National Security argues that "Even in the absence of a military threat from North Korea". 5 .aspx?id=20218) Other advocates of the alliance make the “dual use” argument. none has significant and growing differences with other major powers. seems to be threatening to break out. preventing terrorism or drug trafficking Bandow. economic. nationalistic and religious division in Indonesia. No general East Asian conflict. The greatest threats to regional stability come from within weak if not outright failed states: insurgency and corruption in the Philippines. is best combated by accurate intelligence and special forces. http://www. it is not likely to intervene in inter-communal strife in the Moluccas or independence demands in Aceh or Irian Jaya. Only if nations throughout East Asia essentially collapsed--an unlikely event in the extreme--would there be substantial harm to America and other countries.senior fellow at the Cato Institute. . ground forces based in Korea cannot patrol the Malacca Strait. Troops in South Korea are irrelevant to regional stability. Most of these problems are not susceptible to solution via U. lexis) In response. The National Interest. Nor is it clear how unexplained "instability". is not worth today’s one-sided alliance. “Seoul Searching”. Japan and Indonesia--cannot deploy more ships and other assets to cope with this threat. All of the major regional powers benefit from peace.-ROK alliance is irrelevant to regional stability Bandow. how stationing troops in Korea helps to combat the spread of aids. however.S. whatever that means in practice (invading Burma or preventing the dissolution of Indonesia?). Washington refused to use force against Indonesia over East Timor. 8 . not thousands of conventional forces configured to repel a land assault. piracy.S. Advocates also fall back on a familiar litany of transnational threats such as terrorism. some supporters of America's position in South Korea suggest using forces stationed there to intervene in local conflicts and civil wars. A former special assistant to President Reagan. democratic protests and ethnic conflict in Burma. Fall.nationalinterest. the alliance should be revamped "to focus on promoting stability in Northeast Asia. Terrorism. forces on the Korean Peninsula. other than a possible China-Taiwan confrontation. a commitment to defend "stability" in East Asia implies a willingness to intervene in a score of local conflicts revolving around border disputes. The U. A former special assistant to President Reagan. interests. A former special assistant to President Reagan. such as providing a small troop contingent to a safe sector of Iraq (which Seoul plans on withdrawing by year’s end). would harm the global economy and thus U.S. that American forces stationed on the Korean peninsula are useful for purposes other than defending South Korea." Yet it is difficult to spin a scenario involving real war between real countries. But an army division and assorted other forces have little useful role in promoting regional stability. Australia. “Seoul Searching”.senior fellow at the Cato Institute. Of course.S. And minimal ROK support for other U.S. drug trafficking and infectious diseases to justify the continued existence of the alliance. he is the author of Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire (Doug. however. objectives. occupation talk grandly of preserving regional stability and preparing for regional contingencies. he is the author of Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire (Doug.org/Article. he is the author of Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire (Doug. Singapore. but not only is there no reason that the regional powers--including South Korea. lexis) Some alliance advocates.Japan South Korea aff ENDI 2010 35/50 AT: US forces key to regional stability US defense presence in South Korea is useless for regional stability Bandow. One wonders.
nationalinterest. 8 .S. To join the United States against China would turn Seoul into an implacable enemy of its permanent neighbor. one that possesses a long memory and almost certainly will eventually become the region's dominant power. A former special assistant to President Reagan.Japan South Korea aff ENDI 2010 36/50 AT: South Korea key to contain China The ROK won’t help contain China Bandow. The most obvious casus belli between the United States and China is Taiwan. http://www. The only problem with this strategy is that virtually no one in South Korea will sign up. against China Bandow. especially involving a conflict between China and Taiwan.S. also view the ROK as a member of an incipient anti-China coalition to contain Beijing. “Seoul Searching”. 11/11. he is the author of Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire (Doug. A former special assistant to President Reagan. What would the ROK do? No official decision has been taken.S.senior fellow at the Cato Institute. "Korea will certainly wish to avoid being drawn into" a Sino-American conflict over Taiwan. South Korea will never support the U.aspx?id=20218) Most American analysts. This is why Korean analysts Woosang Kim and Taeho Kim have argued." . Fall. The National Interest. at least. 5 .senior fellow at the Cato Institute. and China could well make untenable the proposition that both countries can jointly cooperate to resolve a plateful of concrete policy issues and longer-term questions on the peninsula.org/Article. lexis) Japan's stance has raised expectations regarding South Korea. bases in the South would be an equally obvious and easy target should Washington and Beijing start shooting at one another. but news reports suggest substantial opposition within the government to expanding the alliance's reach. Who in South Korea wants to make his country a permanent enemy of the incipient superpower next door. The Korea Herald editorialized on March 11 that unlike Japan. he is the author of Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire (Doug. irrespective of Washington's policies. "China's growing influence over and interdependence with South Korea amid the continuing rivalry between the U. Forget the historic ties and present economic relationship between the PRC and ROK. let alone do so to save Taipei? Especially since U. “Seoul Searching”.
but the American people no longer should be responsible for South Korea’s defense. U.they provide the primary driver for the nuclear program Bandow. whatever the prognosis for the ongoing denuclearization talks. not reinforced. offers no justification for the alliance. China. a vast technological edge.S. maintained a large troop presence in the DPRK. some two decades ago. The likelihood of either Moscow or Beijing backing North Korea in any new war is somewhere between infinitesimal and zero.S. Washington retains an overwhelming deterrent capability. the misnamed mutual defense treaty—in practice. The ROK now does more business with Beijing than with America. whose large-scale intervention had saved North Korea from defeat. irascible and authoritarian Syngman Rhee was an embarrassment to the United States. albeit a shrinking one. not the United States. Seoul’s military budget approaches the DPRK’s entire GDP. Seoul would have been overwhelmed in any resumption of hostilities. but Washington felt it had little choice but to support him as well as the military dictators who followed. At least Park Chung-hee was an economic liberalizer. support. South Korea has been capable of protecting itself for decades. he is the author of Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire (Doug. It makes no sense for the United States to maintain a defense guarantee for—or troop deployments in—the ROK. Pyongyang as yet has no means of reaching the American homeland. a North Korean nuclear weapon would be a problem for the South and the rest of the region.-ROK alliance arguably had a role to play. and the ROK economy took off before the South finally transitioned to democracy.Japan South Korea aff ENDI 2010 37/50 AT: US forces deter North Korea U. Washington’s promise to defend the South goes back to 1953 and the unsatisfying end of the Korean War. Seoul has spent the last decade subsidizing the North. both recognized Seoul as the cold war concluded. http://www. the ROK long ago raced past the North in every measure of national power. the Republic of Korea (ROK) had not yet become a global powerhouse and the extraordinary weakness of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) was not yet obvious. Providing aid to and investing in one’s enemy is a curious strategy for dealing with a supposed security threat. “Seoul Searching”. Without wartime U. The aged. If the ROK actually fears the North. The fighting concluded with an armistice. The rest of East Asia would unreservedly stand behind South Korea. Today. including promoting Asian security. In sum. absent America’s defense commitment. they offer a justification for the DPRK to build a nuclear arsenal. Russia and China. They will be nuclear hostages if the North creates a deliverable weapon. the Eisenhower administration accepted a stalemate near the preinvasion border.aspx?id=20218) Strengthening the alliance might have made sense three decades ago. Without post-war U. or his likely successors.nationalinterest. Moreover. the South doesn’t need America to defend it.org/Article. South Korea is a helpless international dependent no longer. The U. The ROK and the United States should remain friends and cooperate in pursuing common goals. 8 . The cold war still raged. . and far more allies and friends. but no peace treaty. are suicidal. it should have redirected some of the aid money to its military budget.S. Rather than gain the victory Americans had grown to expect. The North’s nuclear program. The South ranks among the world’s top-dozen economies and is the third most important geopolitical player in East Asia. 11/11. the North’s one-time military allies.S. support. forces don’t deter North Korea. the ROK government would have been swept from the peninsula. First. the defense guarantee runs only from Washington to Seoul—is an expensive anachronism. And yet. upwards of forty times the GDP. South Korea has twice the population.S.senior fellow at the Cato Institute. Also. Nowhere else on earth would Washington have so many military personnel at such risk. forces based in the peninsula do not constrain Pyongyang. A former special assistant to President Reagan. Although the South Korean economic miracle was underway. however. and even if it were capable of doing so. Second. there is no evidence that Kim Jong-il. It should be terminated. To the contrary.
lexis) The Bush Administration also seems to think that South Korea is better prepared to stand on its own. the United States would gain nothing by maintaining an Army division and other units in the South. To the contrary.Japan South Korea aff ENDI 2010 38/50 AT: US forces deter North Korea U. The National Interest.-Korea alliance could get Korea unwillingly dragged into a regional conflict." . editorialized: "We must not let down our guard to the possibility [that] changes in the role of U. 5 . The newly inaugurated Security Policy Initiative (SPI) talks. expected to run bimonthly over the coming year. he is the author of Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire (Doug.S. director of policy planning for the State Department. Fall. "the South Koreans are appropriately increasingly taking the lead in their own defense" and will be "assuming some missions and some responsibilities as we adjust our relationship going forward. a liberal daily newspaper." Mitchell Reiss. Moving U. As Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld explained after meeting with South Korean Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-ung. "how the Korea-U." But many Koreans worry that what Washington has in mind is the evolution of the alliance from a defense pact to a Korean blank check that will support any U. as the official statement after the first meeting explained. will study. alliance should be transformed to prepare for a future in which security conditions on the Korean peninsula. occur. such as improved inter-Korean ties. Last fall Hankyoreh. acknowledges that "some of the assumptions that underpinned the alliance in 1953 are being re-examined. America's force presence exacerbates the problem by creating thousands of American nuclear hostages within range of Pyongyang's weapons.S. Whether Washington ended up holding a nuclear umbrella over the ROK or encouraging South Korea to create its own nuclear deterrent." Dealing with a nuclear North Korea would be more complicated but would not be aided by conventional troop deployments. troops in Korea or a changed U.senior fellow at the Cato Institute.S. military action in the region. “Seoul Searching”.S.S. A former special assistant to President Reagan.S. conventional forces play no role in deterring North Korean nuclear weapons Bandow. forces south--essentially dismantling the fabled tripwire of fifty years--and cutting the American garrison by one-third suggest that Washington no longer believes its military presence to be central to the ROK's security.
despite the North's rhetoric. professor at South Korea's Hanshin University. Nuclear hedging has not been implemented as a coherent national strategy. Finally. “The North Korean nuclear test: The South Korean reaction. are unlikely to support the transfer of nuclear materials for military purposes. nuclear umbrella isn't enough to keep Seoul safe. So I am hopeful that such popular support for peace will lead to a practical process of denuclearization and disarmament on the Korean Peninsula. ***Relations advantage extensions . Instead. The country's most important investors seemed to dismiss the idea of a war between the North and South as unlikely. A few statements from domestic civil society organizations did request that North Korea stop its nuclear program. they have made many political statements this week. As for Seoul's intellectual elite. Others want to discuss what options the South Korean government should take if the country's leaders decide the U. as many professors at the country's major universities want him to apologize for prosecuting Roh and to support the basic rights of expression that make the South a democracy. polling shows that public preferences against nuclearization are stable.org/webedition/features/the-north-korean-nuclear-test-the-south-korean-reaction. Politically. Neither will South Korea Kiho Yi. the South Korean people seem opposed to such actions. The evidence suggests that support for such a policy among domestic organizations cannot be assumed. But back to the domestic response in South Korea. other than the two hours immediately following the test. Evidence also suggests that Japanese military planners believe that the costs of independent nuclearization outweigh any security benefits. Director of the Nautilus Institute at Seoul. Like the South Korean public. http://www. these statements involve Lee Myung-bak. a hollowing out of the U.S. and sustained political will and organizational cooperation would be required to independently develop a robust nuclear deterrent. 67 percent of everyday South Koreans said that Seoul needs to find a peaceful way in which to solve the North Korean nuclear crisis. Nevertheless. but none of them involve North Korea.4.” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Japan's energy bureaucrats. But again. the South Korean stock market remained pretty much unaffected by Pyongyang's actions last week. According to a recent poll done by Mono Research. “Why Japan Will Not Go Nuclear (Yet).S. for example. suggesting that Japanese public opinion is likely to remain a significant constraint on policy change even in the absence of Japan's bilateral alliance with the United States. Spring 2007. only 25 percent answered that South Korea should take a strong stand against North Korean military provocations. the response has been more heated. deterrent is unlikely to automatically translate into the inclusion of a nuclear deterrent within Japan's force structure.” International Security 31. given the repercussions for the civilian nuclear energy program.thebulletin.Japan South Korea aff ENDI 2010 39/50 AT: Allied Prolif Japan won’t actually go nuclear Llewelyn Hughes. Some members of the South Korean Parliament have seriously raised the idea of Seoul pursuing its own nuclear capability. 6/5/2009. worked as the secretary general of the Korea Peace Forum from 2003 to 2006. but that was about it in terms of public outcry. Doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Project Muse.
even while substantively it seemed fairly clear that they continued to have very different opinions about territorial and historical disputes. setting the stage for 2010 – the 100th “anniversary” of Japan’s annexation of Korea. says students should be given a deeper understanding of territorial issues. “China.. Relations between Tokyo and its neighbors have been strained. L/N) Apart from their shared desire for a denuclearized Korean peninsula. AP. However. Japan and South Korea are key trading partners. China. http://csis. AP Worldstream. released Friday as a guide for high school history teachers. The new Hatoyama government quickly began to show more attention to its relations with its East Asian neighbors and hinted at a small change in priorities with respect to North Korea. L/N) South Korea said Friday its relations with Japan could suffer because of a newly published teaching manual that asserts Japanese claims over a group of islets under Seoul's control.Japan South Korea aff ENDI 2010 40/50 Japan-South Korea relations low Relations stable but not solidified. USC and Ji-Young. 12 – 25 (“SKorea-Japan territorial dispute flares anew”. 10 – 10 (Elaine Kuirtenbach. based on Japan's fair claim to certain geographic regions. Kang and Lee ’10 (David. Georgetown U. by comments and acts by Hatoyama's conservative predecessors that were seen as glorifying Japan's wartime past. Japan. which Seoul says is effectively reiterating Japan's claims. however." . South Korea and Japan said mostly all the right things. It does not specifically mention the disputed islets. which lie about halfway between the two countries and are known as Dokdo in Korean and Takeshima in Japanese. no real movement or dramatic changes came about during the quarter.pdf) Relations between Japan and the two Koreas were relatively uneventful in the final quarter of 2009. But it references a middle school teaching manual that directly names them. “Japan-Korea Relations: Small Signs of Progress?” Jan. SKorea discuss North Korea nukes”. Teaching disputes are straining relations now.org/files/publication/0904qjapan_korea. Ties are strained now. The new manual. South Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman Moon Tae-young said the new manual "could cause negative effect on developing future-oriented relations between South Korea and Japan by infusing wrong territorial perceptions into Japan's future generations.
When Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda attended Lee's inauguration ceremony on Feb. Relations between Seoul and Tokyo have often been marred by disputes over history and territory. 25. but could not assuage public opinion when historical issues were disputed and eventually hardened diplomatic stances toward Japan. Yonhap ‘8 (“Lee meets top delegates from four superpowers”. No long-term constructive ties. Lee said he did not want to ask Japan to apologize nor express remorse over the two countries' shared history. South Korea's new administration has shown enthusiasm for rebuilding ties with Japan. South Korean President Lee Myung Bak mentioned Japan ties in his speech on March 1. Japanese prime ministers' visits to Yasukuni Shrine and descriptions in Japanese history textbooks. 3-13. Roh Moo-hyun. he adopted a more confrontational stance toward Japan in the wake of a series of incidents. including the Shimane prefectural government's passage of an ordinance establishing a Takeshima Day and former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's visit to Yasukuni Shrine. Daily Yomiuri ‘8 (“Tokyo. Ties remain tense. bilateral visits by national leaders came to a halt. At a press conference in January before taking office. "South Korea and Japan should pragmatically build a future-oriented relationship. Delegations from Japan's ruling and opposition parties have visited South Korea since the year started. in part a legacy of Japan's colonial rule of Korea from 1910-45. Seoul both duty-bound to mend ties”. 2-26. L/N) Japanese and South Korean leaders began one-on-one shuttle diplomacy in July 2004. indicating Tokyo's desire to improve ties with Seoul. but the exchanges stopped a year later due to South Korea's anger over then Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's repeated visits to the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo. Most South Korean presidents in the past strongly urged future-oriented relations with Japan at their inaugurations." Lee said in the speech. . the anniversary of the 1919 uprising against Japanese colonial rule of the Korean Peninsula. As a result. the two leaders met and agreed to resume regular visits to each other's nation. Though Roh launched his administration with a similar attitude of trying to shelve such contentious issues. emphasizing the bilateral relationship should be future-oriented.Japan South Korea aff ENDI 2010 41/50 Japan-South Korea relations low Relations are trapped in a vicious cycle. L/N) Since its launch last month. The phrase was to reconfirm his intention to begin mending ties with Japan that were soured over so-called historical issues during the administration of his predecessor. Japan and South Korea have repeated a vicious cycle in which ties have deteriorated in the latter half of each South Korean president's term as a result of these disputes. Past South Korean administrations had placed importance on ties with Japan. which venerates Japan's war criminals. But a set of three disputes rooted in history between the two countries has surfaced repeatedly--over territorial claims on the Takeshima islets (known as Dokdo in South Korea).
A good portion of this article examines the structure of Japan-South Korea security relations.. without attempting to replace the security structure. JSTOR) This article argues that Japan and South Korea have reached adolescence in their security relationship. A lack of formalization of the security relationship. – George Washington U. Specifically.S. and even minimize the level of immediate resources that the United States needs to devote to Northeast Asian stability. but Japan-South Korea security rela. meaning that even with some political issues remaining unresolved.east Asia might contribute to a decline in the need for American security commitments. Sci. Both defense-official exchanges and the scheduling of a search-and-rescue (SAR) exercise resumed quickly in early 2002." And it leaves the puzzle of whether stability in North. which has implications for the idea of a "virtual alliance. Sept-Oct. commitments to the region.tary-to-military relations between the air forces and the navies. One implication of this new level in relations is that Japan and South Korea are now better able to handle basic security for themselves. 43:5. even if their chief security partner-the United States-is engaged else. interest in low-level security cooperation is solid. as well as shared responsibilities created by overlapping ex. . with room to grow. Grad Student Pol. leaves both American al. I argue that regional economic dynamics has been a strong incentive for these developments. Asian Survey. A subtle but long-term nuance here is that Japan and South Korea are assuming some of the region's basic security chores. The bilateral relationship may bolster vigilance over North Korea.tions are by no means a substitute for U. this study looks at the development of mili. however. “Japan and South Korea: Security Relations Reach Adolescence”. far more than the ominous threat posed by North Korea. By analyzing the relationship in "political-military" and "military-military" terms. the study sorts out various issues to demonstrate that the goals of coordinating responses to low-intensity crises and maintaining regional stability underpin Tokyo and Seoul's shared security interest. Analysis of present Japan-South Korea relations shows that security cooperation is limited and tightly focused. are driving security cooperation. after being suspended in mid-2001 owing to a flap over historical issues. The study finds that a surge in maritime traffic. Manosevitz ‘3 (Jason.monic stability the United States has labored for in the region.lies with considerable policy flexibility and some strategic ambiguity.clusive economic zones (EEZs) designated under the auspices of the 1994 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Today's state of affairs derives from an incremental introduction of military organizations into the security relationship during the 1990s. The rebound in security relations testifies to the durability of and increasing desire for limited cooperation. It is in this sense that their efforts support the non-hege.where.Japan South Korea aff ENDI 2010 42/50 Japan-ROK relations solve the need for US military presence Consolidation of Japan-SK alliance resolves the need for US military support and security guarantees.
and one for which there is little systematic evidence. One interesting piece of Russett's research should help to point him away from his doubts that democracies are more peaceful in general. The citizens and officials of democracies recognize that other states. In other cases. one of the Arab belligerents. but he also meant the "diminution of the likelihood of large-scale conflict between states.and perforce of nuclear peace -. however governed. was a reluctant party to the fight. during the Cold War. often have aimed at conquest or subjugation." 2 Kennan's view was strongly influenced by the policy of "unconditional surrender" pursued in World War II. were slow to anger." The so-called revisionist historians argued that America bore an equal or larger share of responsibility for the conflict. it entails a spirit of compromise and self-restraint. such as Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982 to root out an enemy sworn to its destruction or Turkey's invasion of Cyprus to rebuff a power-grab by Greek nationalists. and continued to hold their prizes as Europe democratized. The European powers conquered most of Africa and Asia. such as Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. there were often motives other than aggrandizement. the pacific inclination of democracies." 9 If it is the ethos that makes democratic states more peaceful toward each other. as in the case of England against Finland. England did accede to the pressure of its Soviet ally to declare war against Finland which was allied with Germany.democratically constituted states Russett cites his own and other statistical explorations which show that while democracies rarely fight one another they often fight against others. Russett says that those who claim democracies are in general more peaceful "would have us believe that the United States was regularly on the defensive. more peaceful than are authoritarian or other non. but the struggle as a whole was driven one-sidedly. But the latter question is all important. Saddam Hussein's decision to swallow Kuwait was probably encouraged by the inference he must have taken from the statements and actions of American officials that Washington would offer no forceful resistance. for example. we must ask not only who started a war but why. In recent years a burgeoning literature has discussed the peacefulness of democracies. however tiny. the American policy was "containment. Russett aimed to explain why democracies are more peaceful toward one another. democracy is the willingness to resolve civil disputes without recourse to violence. primarily its concern for the well-being of American nationals and its desire to remove a chip. and it was abandoned after World War II. when America invaded Grenada. democracies nominally went to war against democracies when they were dragged into conflicts by authoritarian allies. Thus. "structural/institutional model"). The trouble with such studies. Hitler was emboldened by his notorious contempt for the flabbiness of the democracies. and the invaders were greeted with joy by the Grenadan citizenry. but he was pointing to two down-to-earth historical observations: that democracies are more peaceful than other kinds of government and that the world is growing more democratic. So in the Cold War. A victim can sometimes turn the tables on an aggressor. Lebanon did little fighting and soon sued for peace. or rather to forecast.Japan South Korea aff ENDI 2010 43/50 Democracy solves global war Democracy key to global nuclear peace. policy). it is easier to determine whether a conflict has occurred between two states than whose fault it was. Washington was impelled by self-interest more than altruism. Buchanan have both instanced democratic England's declaration of war against democratic Finland during World War II. like a spigot . after much procrastination. would not that ethos also make them more peaceful in general? Russett implies that the answer is no. His statistical assessments led him to conclude that: "almost always the cultural/normative model shows a consistent effect on conflict occurrence and war. it opposed the war but went along with its larger confreres when they opted to attack. Francis Fukuyama argued that democracy's extension was leading to "the end of history. For example. but once aroused "a democracy … fights in anger … to the bitter end. He reasoned that "citizens … will have a great hesitation in … calling down on themselves all the miseries of Democracy is not just a mechanism. Even so. America treated Japan and that part of Germany that it occupied with extraordinary generosity. Democracies are not only slow to anger but also quick to compromise. the United States may have initiated some skirmishes (although in fact it rarely did). But the declaration was purely formal: no fighting ensued between England and Finland. 5 neutrality and to support France. Democracies. Neither point has gone unchallenged. He aimed to explain why democracies are more peaceful toward each other. was also democratic within the confines of its peculiar confessional division of power. But subsequent experience. But this is too pat." he wrote. One hypothesized that the cause lay in the mechanics of democratic decision-making (the war. Muravchik ‘1 (Josh. North Korea's of South Korea. In contrast. “Democracy and Nuclear Peace”. http://www." 1 Fukuyama's phrase was intentionally provocative. but there are several cases where dictators have done so. because to his mind a critical element in the peaceful behavior of democracies toward other democracies is their anticipation of a conciliatory attitude by their counterpart. he constructed two models. Nations that embrace this ethos in the conduct of their domestic affairs are naturally more predisposed to embrace it in their dealings with other nations. But America had no designs upon Grenada." he says. The political scientist Bruce Russett offers a different challenge to the notion that democracies are more peaceful. such examples abound. America pulled out. The structural/institutional model sometimes provides a significant relationship but often does not. however. the wars launched by dictators. Immanuel Kant was the first to observe. "We would have been able to avoid many … difficulties if the democratic process had developed normally in our country. North Korea almost surely discounted the likelihood of an American military response to its Page 2 invasion of the South after Secretary of State Dean Acheson publicly defined America's defense perimeter to exclude the Korean peninsula (a declaration which merely confirmed existing U.putting have challenged this proposition. and subsequent book. In particular we should consider what in Catholic Just War doctrine is called "right intention. To do this. None would dispute that Napoleon was responsible for the Napoleonic wars or Hitler for World War II in Europe. democracies have turned to war in the face of provocation. Indeed. Democracies may often go to war against dictatorships because the dictators see them as prey or underestimate their resolve.is the spread of democracy. In 1990. Since then. In a famous article. from the Soviet game board. Germany might have behaved more cautiously in the summer of 1914 had it realized that England would fight to vindicate Belgian … is a much more controversial proposition than 'merely' that democracies are peaceful in their dealings with each other. Only a few decades ago. "That democracies are in general. July. he turned the Soviet Union away from its historic course. but after a time their victims seized the offensive. But Mikhail Gorbachev made nonsense of their theories when. 7 To render judgment about the relative peacefulness of states or systems. the academic Paul Gottfried and the columnist-turned-politician Patrick J. the other that it lay in the democratic ethos (the "cultural/normative model"). The Cold War ended almost instantly--as he no doubt knew it would." 3 Some of those who find enthusiasm for democracy off. Within the councils of the Arab League. in the case of Lebanon against Israel. but their challenges have only served as empirical tests that have confirmed its robustness. Lebanon. rarely on the offensive. Indeed the proposition that democracies do not go to war with one another has been described by one political scientist as being "as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations. The big exception to this rule is colonialism. have legitimate interests. Later. 4 In fact. even tongue-in-cheek. No doubt many of the instances of democracies at war that enter into the statistical calculations of researchers like Russett stem from the colonial era. To reduce the data to a form that is quantitatively measurable. and they are disposed to try to accommodate those interests except when the other party's behavior seems threatening or outrageous. such as the negotiated settlements America sought in Korea and Vietnam proved him wrong. but that does not make the victim equally bellicose. To be sure. is that they rarely examine the question of who started or caused a war. the Soviet Union's of Hungary and Afghanistan.pdf) The greatest impetus for world peace -. Resident Schoalr – AEI. After organizing an election. Notwithstanding the insistence on unconditional surrender.npecweb. he said. The strongest exception I can think of is the war between the nascent state of Israel and the Arabs in 1948. There is a deeper explanation." By this he meant the conclusion of man's quest for the right social order. The Soviet policy was "class warfare". in dealing with all kinds of states. however." which means roughly: what did they hope to get out of it? In the few cases in recent times in which wars were initiated by democracies. At bottom. Surely this is an exception that proves the rule. Israel was an embryonic democracy and Lebanon.org/Syllabus/Muravchik." 8 But this valid insight is incomplete. The attitude of live-and-let-live cannot be turned on and off . Peace theory has robust support." 6 But that is not quite right: the word "regularly" distorts the issue. But colonialism was a legacy of Europe's pre-democratic times.S. in the name of glasnost and perestroika. as distinguished an observer of international relations as George Kennan made a claim quite contrary to the first of these assertions. And to forgive. I know of no case where a democracy has initiated warfare without significant provocation or for reasons of sheer aggrandizement.
replacing Yasuo Fukuda. South Korea and the U. an item mentioned by the press statement. In this sense. Mr. North Korea's nuclear development is the most serious diplomatic issue Japan and South Korea face. troops from South Korea by the end of this year." said Lee. "I wish South Korea and Japan would further improve their neighborhood relations following the election of Aso as the new Japanese prime minister. In his first overseas trip since taking office in February. In discussions focused on bilateral economic ties. It is hoped that they will facilitate bilateral cooperation in tackling international issues. 9-25. Roh's conciliatory attitude toward North Korea and policy of distancing his country from both Japan and the United States also cooled South Korea's relationship with Japan and the U. Lee also agreed to double the maximum annual number of youths participating in the bilateral working holiday system to 7. South Korea and China will also hold a meeting in Japan this year to bolster cooperation on pressing issues in Northeast Asia. The EPA faces strong opposition in both Japan and South Korea. pushing the second round of joint history studies by scholars from both countries. Japan." Lee said in the message. Roh were in office.S. President Lee then came to Japan. was elected as Japan's new prime minister at the Diet on Wednesday. In their meeting. In his talks in Camp David. and he and Prime Minister Fukuda agreed that their countries plus the U. Given how close Japan and South Korea are geographically and the need for bilateral cooperation to improve regional stability. and President Roh's harsh attitude toward the so-called historical issues and the territorial issue over Takeshima (Dokdo in Korean). to bring about denuclearization of North Korea and normalization of the North's relationship with Japan and the U.S. The chilly ties were partly caused by then-Prime Minister Koizumi's repeated visits to Yasukuni Shrine. Fukuda agreed to deepen bilateral cooperation between Japan and South Korea. "Bilateral relations must be developed in a future-oriented direction and with history in mind. President George W. it was decided that Japan and South Korea would closely cooperate and participate in efforts to create a post-Kyoto Protocol framework to fight global warming in and after 2013. Mr. and increase the figure to 10. but despite expected difficulties in the EPA talks.200 from each side in 2009. This meaningful approach will accelerate grassroots exchanges between the two countries and deepen mutual understanding. Mr. still need to minimize differences in their perception of the threat posed by the North's nuclear programs. Fukuda and Mr. Japan's war shrine.S. frequent meetings between Japanese and South Korean leaders are indispensable. After the meeting. Japan and South Korea. however. is important. Japan Times ‘8 (“Warming up Tokyo-Seoul ties”. Lee first went to the United States to hold talks with U.000 by 2012. Aso." it should not hinder bilateral efforts oriented toward the future. where he and Mr. the presidential retreat. Since China serves as the chair of the six-party talks. the two leaders agreed on the necessity of the North making a complete and accurate declaration of its nuclear programs. L/N) President Lee Myung-bak on Wednesday sent a congratulatory message to Japan's new Prime Minister Taro Aso. Relations are still cool.500 U. Fukuda and Mr. But the Japanese government and people should not use his statement as an excuse to disregard South Korea's perception of history. Bush. the two leaders agreed to open working-level talks in June to resume negotiations for signing an economic partnership agreement. Lee's visit to Japan and Mr.S. Mr.S. L/N) Although Japan and South Korea need to carefully manage their relationship. Lee avoided substantive discussions on bilateral historical issues. Maintaining positive ties is vital to regional stability. Lee said that although the South Koreans cannot forget "past history. Fukuda's reciprocal trip to South Korea in the latter half of this year will help to reinvigorate bilateral dialogue. In addition. Yonhap ‘8 (“Lee sends congratulatory message to new Japanese leader”. the president of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party.S. it was agreed that experts from both countries will launch joint research programs on international politics and economics. Mr. and trilateral cooperation among Japan. In particular. President Lee also offered to cooperate in solving the issue of North Korea's abduction of Japanese citizens. should exchange opinions and expand cooperation on a wide range of international issues.Japan South Korea aff ENDI 2010 44/50 Relations Key to Stability Relations key to Northeast Asian stability. . Furthermore. 4-24. Koizumi and Mr. Bush agreed to scrap plans that would have withdrawn 3. Mr. it is reasonable for Tokyo and Seoul to seek closer cooperation with Beijing in resolving the North Korean nuclear problem. saying that future-oriented development of relations between South Korea and Japan is essential to prosperity and stability in Northeast Asia. That will be essential to the stability and prosperity of Northeast Asia. Lee and Mr. Mr. the joint press statement shows that both countries are determined to warm up a relationship that grew cool when Mr.
Japan South Korea aff ENDI 2010 45/50 Relations Key to Stability Key to East Asian stability. Japanese Foreign Ministry officials said. South Korea. It should encourage the strengthening of relations between and among its varied allied partners. their first since Fukuda officially took office Wednesday. Relations between Japan and South Korea have been deteriorating due to Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's repeated visits to Yasukuni Shrine. For example.org/Research/HomelandSecurity/bg1607. The professor called on Japan to demonstrate leadership in the matter. Pasicolan and Hwang ‘2 (Paolo and Balbina. and Australia. Nikkei Weekly ‘5 (“Experts debate forging community in Northeast Asia”. Japan and South Korea should be encouraged to cooperate with each other. Rather. Asian Studies Center – Heritage Foundation. But he also indicated the importance of the two countries building future-oriented relations. "I am convinced that further developing friendly and cooperative relations between Japan and South Korea will lead to the stability and prosperity of East Asia and the rest of the world. solves asymmetric threats. Solves stability. L/N) Ahn also said that cooperation between Japan and South Korea. “The Vital Role of Alliances in the Global War on Terrorism”. Aso said he will strive to help improve bilateral relations. which is regarded as a symbol of Japan's past militarism by its Asian neighbors such as South Korea and China. both of which have nurtured democratic civil societies. asked for South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun's cooperation on pressing North Korea to resolve its past abductions of Japanese nationals. 11-1. including those regarding Yasukuni Shrine. 10-24. in a telephone conversation on Friday. and Australia and South Korea. L/N) Ra pointed out that there are "weighty" history issues lying between South Korea and Japan. Nevertheless. L/N) Japan's new Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda. better two-way ties”. In the 15-minute phone call.S. the premier said. the two leaders agreed to closely cooperate in furthering "future-oriented" bilateral ties and both expressed hopes to meet at the East Asia Summit slated for late November in Singapore. 9-12. a war-related Tokyo shrine that honors Japanese Class-A war criminals among the war dead. JEN ‘7 (Japan Economic Newswire. Such a networked system is the only reliable weapon with which the United States and its allies can successfully deter or do battle with the asymmetric threats of the future. over which bilateral FTA negotiations have become deadlocked. Korean abductions.cfm) Strengthen relations among U. as should Japan and Australia. 9-28. Jiji Press Ticker Service ‘5 (“ROK Envoy Pins Hopes on Aso-Ban Meeting”.heritage. In reply. The future of stability and prosperity in Asia will continue to depend on the structure of alliances that exists between the United States and key players in the region. It is necessary for Japan and South Korea to have friendly ties for the stability of East Asia. “Fukuda seeks Roh's help on N. would be crucial to promote the stability and prosperity of the Northeast Asian region. . alliance partners. Japan-ROK relations key to stability. the United States should not rely solely on its formal bilateral relationships. such as Japan. Policy Analysts. Backgrounder #1607. Relations key to East Asian stability. it should work to broaden this network by pursuing a hub-and-spokes system of alliances. saying Tokyo can take the first step in this direction by offering concessions on the farm product trade issue. http://www." Fukuda was quoted as telling Roh.
strongly supported the Secretary-General's positive interventions in Myanmar. but also with the international community at large. 10-8. Council President LESLIE KOJO CHRISTIAN ( Ghana). and rejected as well the arbitrary detention of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and other opposition leaders. Deeply Concerned over Rights Violations. as the situation had deteriorated over the last year. He said the increase in the number of internally displaced persons was creating a situation of instability that could affect the region. There was an urgent need to promote dialogue in order to seek political solutions that would lead to a democratic transition and national reconciliation. Members Call for End to Repression. Gambari's recent visit to the country underscored the continuing importance of the special envoy's role as a vital link. . The special envoy's contribution in that regard was of the utmost importance. the restraints on human freedom and the detention of peaceful demonstrators. Peru condemned the repression of peaceful demonstrations. Immediate Release of Political Prisoners”. speaking in his national capacity. not only between the Government and people of Myanmar. He said recent events in Myanmar had introduced a new dynamicin the political situation. Mr. The country's long-term peace and stability would depend on the fulfilment of the legitimate aspirations of the people for democracy and a better quality of life. M2 Presswire ‘7 (“United Nations: Speed Up Myanmar Reconciliation Process. Countries in the region had an important role to play in that regard.Japan South Korea aff ENDI 2010 46/50 XT – Myanmar Democracy KT Stability Democracy and human rights protection is key to Myanmar stability. L/N) JORGE VOTO-BERNALES ( Peru) said he was concerned at the violations of human rights and the serious humanitarian crisis. Urges Secretary-General As His Special Adviser Briefs Security Council On Recent Visit.
Japan South Korea aff ENDI 2010 47/50 XT – China Democracy KT Global Democracy Chinese democracy determines global democracy. Prof.-China relations are each an important concern in itself. – Marquette University. p. in “What if China Doesn’t Democratize? Implications for War and Peace”. 5) The prospects for democracy in China and U. it would be important first because China itself represents a large portion of humanity. Sci.S. McCormick. McCormick ’00 (Barrett. . both through its active participation in multilateral forums (as described in Samuel Kim's contribution to this volume) and through bilateral support for dictatorships like Burma's present government. but since China is an increasingly important and influential country in world affairs. China already has a significant impact on the diffusion of democracy. Ed. Edward Friedman and Barrett L. China's continuous antidemocracy diplomacy would have a significant impact on the diffusion of human rights and democracy throughout the world. If antidemocratic tendencies remain entrenched in Beijing. Pol. this kind of diplomacy will doubtless intensify. If China were to decisively reject democracy.
So I believe it is with China and Japan. . at least momentarily. there were no such plans. toward the east. ever occurred. Early in 1972.2 The dynamics of these dangerous forces lie deep inside China's authoritarian nationalism. Kent Calder. this is a lie Beijing has successfully kept burning and fomenting in China hate for Japan. . Charles W. "China may become a superpower . embassy in Japan will be attacked by ten Chinese guided missiles. tensions." Most directly worrisome as a cause of war. Only the trust. China currently is already more than a nation. absolute evil. from Napoleon's invasion of Germany to Hitler's invasion of France. Entering the twenty-first century. Consequently at stake include initial efforts at democratization in Russia allowing. control the `wild horse' of Japan?" 9 China was especially worried that the United States. reduce the hates and angers that provided the tinder that could be ignited into war by unfortunate incidents and domestically needed maneuvers. It should start with a boycott of Japanese goods!" "Some say don't forget June 4 [the crushing of the 1989 democracy movement]. claiming. making for a momentary Tokyo-Beijing entente. 1996 24 that must inevitably have strong concerns. Japan would go nuclear and have its military take over for the American military in Southeast Asia. 25 so unfounded concerns about and against a democratic Japan inflame nationalist passions and war potential even for reformers in post-Mao China 26 The Chinese people continually remind themselves of their suffering at the hands of Japanese aggressors. As French and Poles both decided to treat the post-Nazi German democracy as not responsible for Nazi crimes." In China. Mistrust." Actually. former Japanese "the most serious issues Japan may confront in the future may well be those related to China. Chinese patriotism is dangerously out of touch with core Japanese political realities. Hawkins Chair Prof. It wants to control the region. "Under the name of `mutual defense.. "Can the U. Beijing again launched massive campaigns against Japan. that is. reported that "China's leaders have always said they would go to war to prevent the permanent division of China. and desires for vengeance suffused the . A 1984 book noted that. "The issue of Taiwan for Japan is similar to that of Calais in relations between France and England.S. But obviously China's first getting it wrong and then later abandoning Leninism have changed little in Beijing's attitude toward Tokyo. Which is more dangerous?" "Let me predict that in thirty years the U. treaty not only provides for Japan's unlimited arms expansion and accelerated nuclear armament but also its dispatch of troops to foreign lands. "The political relationship between Beijing and Tokyo reached an all-time low during 1969 and 1970 when the Chinese assailed the revival of Japanese militarism. . Nonetheless. . In the section on "Sino-Japanese Relations" in his 1997 study of Asia 's Deadly Triangle.. That deadly anger pervades Chinese society." Hanoi leader Pham Van Dong told Mao in November 1968 that Vietnamese "were very much afraid that Japan would . participate in the Vietnam war. toward the east!" Except for the era from 1972 to 1982. an end to Cold War tensions. so Beijing naturally worried about Japanese revanchism." 23 Aware of China's vision of its future and its willingness to use force." 5 Obviously the charges were untrue. For maritime nations. are required for genuine China-Japan reconciliation. Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai asked. "The United States Government and the Yoshida government are conspiring to rearm Japan." 4 Leninist ideology had imperialism as expansionist and impoverishing.-Japan Society in Seattle on March 12..S. transparency. not informing the Chinese people about the actual attitudes of Japan's people in Japan's antiwar constitutional democracy in opposing nuclear weapons or resisting military involvement in the Cold War. Beijing's hostility to Tokyo could facilitate a war in the twenty-first century. ." 3 As Moscow worried after World War II about German revanchism. Japan is treated as inherently evil. Sci. or anything close. the entire modern era. and to drive Japan once again onto the path of aggression. France and Germany were regularly at war with each other. State Department for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Freeman Jr. a senior adviser to the U. Ed. even cosmopolitan Chinese intellectuals tend to see Japan as dynamized by right-wing super patriots. they are vital lifelines of support. Even during the May 1999 Chinese riots sparked by the murderous NATO bombing of China's embassy in Belgrade. to enslave the Japanese people.. and flashpoints for war. relationship . a cultural force that has influenced her neighbors throughout history. There should be no doubt that what the two Axis powers did to people they conquered was evil. with a proud 5. and swear that it shall never be allowed to happen again. it is a civilization. China's foreign minister in 1958 denounced the U. No such thing. many angry Chinese still focused on Japan. If you can't remember September 18 [1931 Japanese invasion]. Ruling groups in China. . This is why a continued American presence in the Pacific is necessary.' the United States could despatch Throughout. and.." "China should take care of Japan first. They now believe that they are likely to have to do so.. "The Americans are the enemy of the Chinese Communist Party. so Chinese will have to change their view of democratic Japan if peace is to prevail. McCormick. declared on August 15. It can shape regional politics. or Gibraltar during the Napoleonic wars. A vicious spiral has been unleashed. As Soviet Russian reformer Khrushchev's government was legitimated by the Great Patriotic War against Nazi Germany and made opposition to purported military revanchism in an actually democratic and antiwar Germany central to Moscow's expansionism in East Europe. 1958 the New China News Agency announced that Japan's arms expansion plans took "nuclear armament as the core" and Japanese troops to China's Taiwan and to any place in the West Pacific. Neighboring countries are aware of a `big China' and Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa told the U. A former top U. "the other newly industrializing countries of Asia along with Japan would not feel comfortable being influenced heavily by China.S. Analogous transitions which illuminate what is readily create security dilemmas because defensive efforts by Tokyo are taken in Beijing to be threats that must be met in a tit-for-tat way..-Japan security treaty. 1951. the problem has been intensified by post-Mao reform. Prior to Germany's democratization. 99-105) If China does not democratize. for the first twenty years of the People's Republic. after talking with leaders in Beijing. post World War II German-French reconciliation after Germany democratized. hate. however. over time. But China kept drumming up fear of and hate toward Japan made Japan the "arsenal for Southeast Asia. supposedly from 1874-1945.First Century Forum." 10 During a visit to North Korea in spring 1970. might encourage its Japanese allies to station their forces on the island. Edward Friedman and Barrett L." 6 Actually. official.S. "nationalistic impulses haven't been entirely fulfilled.Japan South Korea aff ENDI 2010 48/50 2AC China Democracy Impacts – Japan War Chinese democracy solves Sino-Japan war Friedman ’00 (Edward. that is. and cooperation facilitated by democratization could. The Japanese are the enemy of the Chinese people." "Where will the Chinese people find their living space in the future? In the ocean! We need to move toward the east. more clearly. Mao took as China's adversary "aggression on the part of Japan or any other state that may collaborate in any way with Japan.S. in “What if China Doesn’t Democratize? Implications for War and Peace. Actions premised on such worst case readings . China's foreign minister."8 Just prior to a brief and transient 1972—82 era of good relations. continually revved up indignation toward an alleged revival of Japanese militarism. the security treaty that Prime Minister Kishi renegotiated in 1960 was again erroneously denounced by China in 1960: "This . On December 7." 7 Obviously.' "" Vietnam's Communist Party Chief Le Duan agreed with Zhou in 1971 that "Japan has a plan for Southeast Asia. or the issue of Iceland or the Azores during World War II. while withdrawing its own troops from Taiwan. This large change may be impossible unless China democratizes. a move toward genuine reconciliation.S. a special moment when Mao Zedong's policy line of allying with any nation possible against a threatening Soviet Union dominated Chinese politics. "Zhou [Enlai] argued vigorously that 'Japanese militarism has revived and has become a dangerous force of aggression in Asia. and getting past the passions of early democratization. were China's military actions aimed against Taiwan. the Japanese prime minister found."22 That shaping influence includes the use of force. interpreting virtually every Japanese gesture as if Japanese militarism might soon be on the march all over Asia. then you are not a true Chinese. Pol. In the original Valentine's Day 1950 military treaty with Stalin. when Nixon and Kissinger discussed removing the American military from Taiwan. – University of Wisconsin." Indeed. peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region in the twenty-first century require a major change in Beijing-Tokyo relations.. as a government and people which are unrepentant for World War II atrocities in China. China views Japan as tomorrow's military threat.000 year history." "Right! China should take care of the Japanese devils first. claiming that the result of President Nixon's Guam doctrine of no longer having America fighting ground wars on the continent of Asia would be that Japan would replace America in Asia. Japan has been treated by the People's Republic of China as a real or potential enemy. China's armed forces have begun a decade-long effort to acquire the capabilities and do the planning required to have a serious chance of overwhelming Taiwan's formidable defenses. When Kishi Nobuske became Japan's prime minister. p. Democratization. Web postings included." 12 [He Continues…] As Benito Lim put it in September 1996 in Beijing at the Twenty. . foresees arms races.
That soon led into a disastrous war. And this time with nuclear weapons as part of the equation. Indeed.org/2005/2005l/2005lrxl. Prof.Japan South Korea aff ENDI 2010 49/50 2AC China Democracy Impacts – Japan WAr That goes nuclear Lim ‘5 (Robyn. But are they learning the right lessons? If not.html) For example.icasinc. Currently. As noted. it will be a familiar story of greed. “Geostrategic Trends in Asia”. 1-6. recent visits by senior Japanese army officers to the Russian Far East would have any old geopolitiker sniffing the breeze. hubris and miscalculation leading to war. the history of Whales 3: Elephants 0 stands as a warning of the difficulties that China faces in managing its "peaceful" rise. the hubris on display in Beijing may lead Russia and Japan to sink their differences in order to align against a "rising" China that threatens them both. Wanting too much too soon. the precedent having been set in the period from 1907 to 1916. . those advising Deng's successors are said to be studying this history. It is all starting to look redolent of what happened in Germany early last century when an arrogant and foolish young Kaiser sacked that great helmsman Bismarck. http://www. IR – Nanzan U. in Japan. It would not be the first time Russia and Japan have resolved their differences. the Kaiser soon provoked the formation of the very coalition of the flanking powers (France and Russia) that Bismarck had laboured so hard to prevent.
p. Chinese are not taught that China's neighbors have historic grievances toward an unwelcome Chinese hegemony. American policymakers. Chinese specialists in Japanese history could add to the public debate large facts which Beijing's authoritarian censors suppress. Friedman ’00 (Edward. China's military might should not be exaggerated. Ed. Hawkins Chair Prof. Sci. A democratic debate in China might somewhat puncture virtually genetic notions of Japanese evil. Hawkins Chair Prof. As in its 1999 view of war in Yugoslavia which brackets Kosovo victims of Serbian policy. places where China already is bullying neighbors is also a mistake. will have to face up to the real dangers that lie within resurgent Chinese antiJapanese. – University of Wisconsin. Democratization in China would cool anti-Japanese sentiment. Only Chinese can do that. Pol. – University of Wisconsin. p. in “What if China Doesn’t Democratize? Implications for War and Peace. viewing the rest of the world as below itself. 113) Were China a democracy. Ed.Japan South Korea aff ENDI 2010 50/50 XT – China Democracy Solves Japan War Chinese democratization is key to reducing the risk of war with Japan. But that enlightened Germany policy that meant to enrich Germany's Communist neighbors and help them appreciate the virtues of peaceful cooperation (engagement) did not prevent the crushing of Solidarity in Poland in 1980 or block an intensification of a second Cold War in the 1970s caused by Brezhnev's militarism. Friedman ’00 (Edward. Demagogues in Washington or Beijing could easily derail it. in “What if China Doesn’t Democratize? Implications for War and Peace. – University of Wisconsin. . when Chinese commanders claimed 7 million killed and that the plains were turned red?" And should China apologize for any of the subsequent Chinese attacks on the Vietnamese state over the next four centuries. "Japan tried to maintain diplomatic relations with China on an equal basis. 37 Japanese do not imagine themselves as eternal aggressors against China. It is worth recalling the tensions in Europe in the early 1980s as Pershing missiles were deployed to match Soviet Russia's SS-20 missiles." 38 That is. if they wish to preserve peace and prosperity. Sci. Through much of Japanese history. Hawkins Chair Prof. its anti-Japan passion might be cooled by the complexities of openness and transparency. in “What if China Doesn’t Democratize? Implications for War and Peace. "Should Vietnam demand that China apologize and face history for the Ming [dynasty] invasion of Dai Viet in the fifteenth century. 109) To be sure. Edward Friedman and Barrett L. Only with a democratization of China by Chinese can Chinese develop the critical self-understanding that can facilitate a reimagining of Japan. Friedman ’00 (Edward. and an aggrieved China as the eternal victim. Pol. Were China a democracy. 124) Both Tokyo and Washington should be committed to full engagement with Beijing. Sci. But. McCormick. McCormick. Only Chinese democratization allows the conditions of stable peaceful Sino-Japanese relations. never recognized Japan or any other nation under heaven as an equal. Pol. there could be voices in a debate calling attention to millennia of Chinese wars of incorporation and expansion. Ed. p. McCormick. China. In a democracy. Illusions protect war-prone forces. to an equivalent of NATO member Germany's 1969 Ostpolitik. What should reparations be? 32 It might be possible in a Chinese democracy to get the viewpoints of China's anxious neighbors into China's policy debate. much of Japanese history is an attempt to end subordination to China. thereby creating a peace-oriented foundation for genuine China-Japan reconciliation. however. Yet outsiders cannot change China. Edward Friedman and Barrett L. Sinocentric chauvinism. supporters of China-Japan reconciliation as more important than demands for endless Japanese apologies could ask. Engagement with vigilance has to be a long-term commitment despite nasty bumps along the way. The road to peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region will not be smooth. as one Japanese analyst noted. Edward Friedman and Barrett L. ignoring the regional facts. Chinese purity. Beijing sees no neighbors or minorities as victims of China. Growth will not by itself reverse the nasty chauvinistic dynamics pulsating in China.
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