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The Presocratics after Heidegger
Edited By David C. Jacobs


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Production by Ruth Fisher Marketing by Nancy Farrell Published by State University of New York Press, Albany © 1999 State University of New York All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission. No part of this book may be stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means including electronic, electrostatic, magnetic tape, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission in writing of the publisher. For information, address the State University of New York Press, State University Plaza, Albany, NY 12246 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The presocratics after Heidegger / edited by David C. Jacobs. p. cm. (SUNY series in contemporary continental philosophy) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-7914-4199-7 (hardcover : alk. paper). ISBN 0-7914-4200-4 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Pre-Socratic philosophers. 2. Heidegger, Martin, 1889-1976. I. Jacobs, David C., 1962- . II. Series. B187.5.P745 1999 182dc21 98-47345 CIP 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1


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In Memoriam

Reiner Schürmann Teacher, Scholar, Thinker


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Acknowledgments Abbreviations Introduction: Heidegger, the History of Being, the Presocratics David C. Jacobs 1 The Destruction of Logic: From Λóyos to Language Jean-François Courtine Translated By Kristin Switala And Rebekah Sterling 2 The Place of the Presocratics in Heidegger's Beiträge zur Philosophie Parvis Emad 3 Keeping Homer's Word: Heidegger And The Epic Of Truth Michael Naas 4 Kalypso: Homeric Concealments After Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida, And Lacan David Farrell Krell 5 Anaximander: A Founding Name in History Michel Serres Translated By Roxanne Lapidus 6 Doubles of Anaximenes John Sallis ix xi 1








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7 What We Didn't See Dennis J. Schmidt 8 The Last, Undelivered Lecture (XII) from Summer Semester 1952 Martin Heidegger Translated By Will Mcneill 9 The Ontological Education of Parmenides David C. Jacobs 10 Heraclitus Studies Hans-Georg Gadamer Translated By Peter Warnek 11 Appearing to Remember Heraclitus Charles E. Scott 12 Heraclitus, Philosopher of the Sign Walter A. Brogan 13 Empedocles and Tragic Thought: Heidegger, Hölderlin, Nietzsche Véronique M. Fóti Contributors Index








295 299


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I gratefully appreciate the permission from Hermann Heidegger and Bouvier Verlag to publish a translation of Martin Heidegger's "Letzte, nicht vorgetragene Vorlesung (XII) aus dem Sommersemester 1952," Hegel-Studien (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag), Band 25 (1990), 23-34; from J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) to publish a translation of Hans-Georg Gadamer's "Heraklit-Studien," in Gesammelte Werke, Band 7 (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1991), 43-82; from the editors at SubStance to publish Michel Serres' "Anaximander: A Founding Name in History,'' SubStance, vols. 71/72 (1993); and from David Smith, ed., The Silverman Lectures (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, forthcoming) to publish Dennis J. Schmidt's "What We Didn't See." Dennis Schmidt, Series Editor of Contemporary Continental Philosophy at SUNY Press, and John Sallis must be acknowledged for their initial and continual support for this collection from its inception. Without them, this project may never have begun and have come to its completion. Also, gratitude goes to the Editors and Staff at SUNY Press for their sponsorship of this book. I express a deep thanks to the authors and the translators for their enthusiastic participation in the development and realization of this collection. Dr. Kristin Switala stands out as my chief source of inspiration; she has offered magnanimous support for this and all of my projects.

Gallen: Erker-Verlag.Document Page xi Abbreviations German Texts of Martin Heidegger BSD Zur Frage nach der Bestimmung der Sache des Denkens (St. and reference information. GA Gesamtausgabe (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann). 1984). 1978). . 1978). GA 1 Frühe Schriften (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. title. 1976). 1966). 1978). GA 21 Logik.these texts are listed below with volume number. 1976). 1981). GA 13 Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. GA 19 Platon: Sophistes (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. GA 4 Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. GA 26 Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. GA 9 Wegmarken (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. 1992). GA 5 Holzwege (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. 1983). EM Einführung in die Metaphysik (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.

GA 54 Parmenides (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. 1982). 2 vols. 1989). GA 45 Grundfragen der Philosophie. 1981). GA 53 Hölderlins Hymne "Der Ister" (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. Endlichkeit. HW Holzwege (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. 1972). 1961). Ausgewahlt "Probleme" der "Logik" (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. 1988).Document Page xii GA 29-30 Die Grundbegriffe der MetaphysikWelt. 1979). GA 55 Heraklit (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. 1984). GA 33 Aristoteles: Metaphysik Θ1-3 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. Einsamkeit (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. 1980). N 1-2 Nietzsche. Zu Platons Höhlengleichnis und Theätet (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. . GA 51 Grundbegriffe (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. GA 65 Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. 1983). GA 40 Einführung in die Metaphysik (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. GA 34 Vom Wesen der Wahrheit. 1983). 1970). (Pfullingen: Günther Neske. 1984). H Heraklit (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. GA 39 Hölderlins Hymnen "Germanien" und "Der Rhein" (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. 1981).

1969). 1978).Document SD Zur Sache des Denkens (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer. 1956). VA Vorträge und Aufsätze (Pfullingen: Günther Neske. SZ Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer. WD Was Heisst Denken? (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer. . 1965). W Wegmarken (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. 1954). US Unterwegs zur Sprache (Pfullingen: Günther Neske. 1961).

William McNeill and Nicholas Walker (Bloomington. 1979). . 1949). trans. trans. David Farrell Krell and Frank A. E. ed. BQ Basic Questions of Philosophy: Selected "Problems" of "Logic. trans. trans. OTB On Time and Being. EB "Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry. Capuzzi (San Francisco: Harper & Row. trans. IN: Indiana University Press. 1994). Ralph Manheim (New Haven: Yale University Press. trans. 1979). 1975). Charles H. 1995). Solitude. BT Being and Time. IN: Indiana University Press. Second Edition. Finitude." trans. trans. IL: Northwestern University Press. HS Heraclitus Seminar. EGT Early Greek Thinking. trans. 1993).. David Farrell Krell (New York: HarperCollins Publishers. Seibert (Evanston. G. OWL On the Way to Language." trans. Aylesworth (Bloomington. David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: Harper & Row. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row.Document Page xiii English Translations of Martin Heidegger's Texts BC Basic Concepts. 1982). FCM Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World. 1959). Douglas Scott. 1996) BW Basic Writings. P. IM An Introduction to Metaphysics.D. 4 vols. IN: Indiana University Press. 1993). NE 1-4 Nietzsche. Hertz (New York: Harper & Row. NY: SUNY Press. in Existence and Being (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company. 1972). Joan Stambaugh (Albany. trans. Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer (Bloomington.

Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper & Row. Language. IN: Indiana University Press. André Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz (Bloomington. trans. Thought. .Document P Parmenides. trans. 1992). 1971). PLT Poetry.

Reginald Lilly (Bloomington. unless otherwise noted. All Presocratic fragments conform to the numbering of this edition of the text. Jean T. . trans. 1951). sixth edition (Berlin: Weidmann. IN: Indiana University Press. and trans. WGM "The Way Back Into the Ground of Metaphysics. 1966).Document Page xiv PR The Principle of Reason. Wieck and J. Diels and Kranz designate testimonial fragments about the Presocratics by other thinkers with the letter A and fragment number. Wilde and William Kluback (Schenectady." in Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Meridian Books. trans. WCT What is Called Thinking?. WP What is Philosophy?. ed. bi-lingual text. 1958). and they indicate the direct citations of the Presocratics with the letter B and fragment number. Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. Glenn Gray (New York: Harper & Row. trans. Fred D. NY: The New College and University Press. 1968). Presocratic Greek Resource DK Hermann Diels and Walther Kranz. 1991).

Heidegger's reading and interpretation of the Presocratics remains open to possibility and is not restrained by the actuality of the current generation's scholarly debate. the works of Heidegger. for those with philosophical training who lack an intimate knowledge of Heidegger's work. Jacobs This collection of essays is devoted to thinking through Heidegger's reading of and relation to the Presocratics. each author was given a topic and plenty of latitude. or both. what we have is a wide array of approaches to Heidegger and the Presocratics. since the attempt is made to explicate Heidegger's engagement with our tradition. for many who already have sufficient knowledge of Heidegger's relation with other philosophical thinkers this introduction will be unnecessary. This collection is meant for those philosophically involved either in Presocratic scholarship. Employing his often cited statement about the activity of phenomenology. 1 . In this way. instead. However. this introduction will prove to be useful. Much criticism of his reading comes from the assumption that Heidegger is ignorant of or merely rejects the previous and current discussions of Presocratic interpretation. the Presocratics David C. there was no attempt in the solicitation of authors to restrict their readings to a set viewpoint.Document Page 1 Introduction Heidegger. Heidegger's innovation in his reading of the Presocratics stems from his awareness of the philological and philosophical debates surrounding how to interpret Presocratic thinkers and from his willingness to carry interpretation beyond the limits of these debates. and they can proceed directly to the articles. For the articles written specifically for this collection. What I propose to do here in this introduction is to lay out Heidegger's approach to the history of philosophy so that an understanding of the Presocratics can be developed from this. Thus. the History of Being.

for Nietzsche. they have another plan in their readings of othersto think. the matter to be thought is precisely that which we are entangled in without our explicit awareness: for Hegel. and we will elucidate Nietzsche's view of the role of history with regard to the will to power and the eternal return. we need to speak briefly of two of his predecessors who shed light on how Heidegger understands the history of philosophy. as we shall witness with Heidegger. presented in his Science of Logic. not merely to sit near by speaking about philosophy but. For both. They both engage in a relationship with the history of philosophy in order to have an impact upon that history. the eternal return of the will to power. the dialectical process of the absolute spirit coming to have self-consciousness. we will propose a few directives on how we can think about the Presocratics and the history of philosophy after we have engaged in Heidegger's thinking. From his early engagement with other philosophical figures within our history to his last works. misunderstands Heidegger's aims and lacks an awareness of the tradition from which he thinks. Finally. we will explain Heidegger's view of thinking within the history of being in light of these two views and his reading of the Presocratics. Both Hegel and Nietzsche approach the history of philosophers not in order to add to the current debate over interpreting the arguments of the philosophers. we will briefly examine Hegel's view of the history of philosophy as it relates to his metaphysical system. by engaging with prior philosophers in order to enter into the philosophical matter at hand. however. but we do return to the "soil" from which all philosophy grows. that is. that they are not primarily concerned with a "correct representation" of prior philosophers but are philosophically engaged in the matter at hand. we do not historically return to the beginning of the history of philosophy in Greece. Heidegger's reading of any thinker or philosopher in the history of philosophy is not for him a place to rehearse all available interpretations and then to criticize a given thinker along with the interpretations themselves.Document Page 2 This criticism. In the second section. rather. In order to understand his project. 2 . We shall see with both of these thinkers. For both Hegel and Nietzsche. what needs to be thought. Heidegger's project is to think in relation to these thinkers and philosophers. to be engaged in it. with these views laid out. In the first section. to philosophize. in the third section.

explaining the context of each. that is. "I maintain that the succession of philosophical systems in history is the same as their succession in the logical derivation of the categories of the idea. and Heidegger is extremely complicated. his stage is essentially connected to all prior stages that have preceded it and have determined it (ILHP. that is.. Hegel interprets the history of philosophy as the same unfolding as his own metaphysical system." Thus. Heidegger states.Document Page 3 Hegel and Nietzsche Although the relationship between Hegel. For this reason. for our purposes here what is significant for all three is a need to have their thinking involved in the matter of the history of philosophy itself. Like all stages in this history except the first. all three attempt to expose the "ground" of the history of philosophizing itself and thereby further what is necessary in this ground. Moreover. 11). there are striking similarities in their approach: all three do not wish to rehearse the current debates surrounding the interpretations of philosophers. all three are not concerned with correct representations of previous philosophers. whereby absolute spirit comes to know itself. 14). and defending how his own philosophical view fits into this history (i. he attempts to think his own philosophy as historical). Hegel writes. illustrating how and why the history of philosophy unfolds the way it does. What is significant for Hegel is that his own philosophical age in the history of the West is the culminating stage where absolute spirit attains self-consciousness. Although the three differ on what the matter of this history is. Hegel reads the history of philosophy to be a progressive development from the first beginning of the Presocratic Greeks to the apex of the Enlightenment. as absolute spirit coming to know itself.e. they attempt to take part in the movement of history itself by philosophizing. Hegel does not separate the history of philosophy and his philosophical and metaphysical views. Hegel's great ingenuity is to detail the philosophers' principles. the dialectical process of beginning can negate the indeterminate idea of being and proceed to the absolute idea. The pure "scientific" and dialectical unfolding of his philosophical view occurs in the specific stages in the history of philosophy. Nietzsche. Because of this. "Hegel is the only Western thinker who has thoughtfully experienced the history of thought" (EGT. Driving the history of philosophy is what all philosophers have attempted to explicate in their philosophical 3 . as presented in his Science of Logic.

Hegel does not hold that there are separate philosophical systems but one single. it grasps itself and all prior stages that have led up to itand it continues until full self-grasping occurs. emphasis added). religiously. artistically. 20. The dialectical development of the philosophical idea in the history of philosophy is similar to its development in the Science of Logic. This falling into time allows for the externalization and for the grasping of itself. its nature is to develop itself (ILHP. culturally. The dialectical process is the methodology that unfolds this development. it must withdraw from its immediacy and become external by permeating the human world. and this advance is the development of its whole mass. The one single idea that remains the center of philosophical systems is what develops in the history of philosophy because. "the spirit has to advance in the consciousness of itself. because of this. "There is one idea. He writes. just as in a living individual one life. 26. the idea itself appears as tainted by the opinions of individual humans). Hegel writes. its concrete totality. in the whole and in all its members. which is externalized and so falls into time" (ILHP. and uniting into a synthesis is at the root of all progressive development in Hegel's philosophical view. differently expressed in the various regions of philosophical activity. and so on (ILHP. it has the urge to develop. The idea or spirit "externalizes" itself in order to be other to itself so that it can come to grasp itself. 5 4 The Greek inception receives a significant place in Hegel's interpretation because it marks the emergence of self-consciousness. philosophically. however. Since it is eternal. The development of the idea in the history of philosophy is of course historical or in time (and. Hegel says.Document Page 4 systemsthe philosophical idea itself. The Greeks free themselves from religious pictorial representations of the divine abso- . it becomes temporal in a world historical moment in order to conceive of itself other than it is. one pulse beats in all its limbs" (ILHP. 67). The main thought or philosophical view of an age permeates all aspects of the age. Thus. 88). This formal process of positing a thesis. 88. or self-actualizing. which in his account concerns the whole history of humanity. 20). contradicting with an antithesis. In each specific age. Although the idea at its beginning is indeterminate and immediate. the content of the idea itself is not essentially affected by time. This grasping progresses because in the subsequent stage the idea or spirit will externalize and grasp itself again but only to come to know itself better in a more explicit way. it is. universal idea that is developing.

II. Hegel philosophizes about the Western philosophical tradition as historical in order to philosophize. which Nietzsche cryptically defines here as "that dark. Hegel philosophizes about the major figures in the history of philosophy not in order to depict their principles and arguments accurately but in order to further the dialectical movement itself. recall certain historical events) and unhistorically (i. it had the elements of universality and necessity (cf.Document Page 5 lute and think on the level of pure thinking. §86). and how it 8 7 6 . how it is to do history. to engage with the philosophical matter at handthe absolute idea.e. 171). for both Nietzsche and Heidegger following Hegel on this point. In viewing his own philosophy as part of the historical and dialectical movement from abstract awareness to the full selfconsciousness of absolute spirit. The health stated here is dependent upon the soil on which it thrives. one must both live historically (i. §1). absolute spirit first "descends into itself" and grasps its inner content and recognizes itself in this content (ILHP. driving power that insatiably thirsts for itself" (UM. In order to use history for the advancement of life. 140. and of a culture (UM. and culture must determine how it is to be historical and unhistorical. forget certain historical events). That is. In other words. This soil which allows the condition of health is life itself. to think then is to be engaged with the history that precedes one's own thinking and is the condition for one's own thinking.. through the Greeks. In the abstract grasping of being by Parmenides. EL. The historical and the unhistorical are necessary for the health of an individual. §3). expressed in "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life.e. This great inception which frees thinking into a pure realm of thought allows the absolute spirit to begin the twenty-five hundred year journey to self-consciousness that unfolds dialectically as the history of the West. philosophy proper begins because pure thinking was first "objective. What remains significant in Hegel's philosophical endeavors for both Nietzsche and Heidegger to follow is that one does philosophy only when one is engaged with the matter at hand. community.. of a people. Nietzsche holds." that is. Each individual. §41). for Hegel. this occurs through the historical/dialectical development of the absolute idea." advance the position that humans need the activity of history not for the truth but for the sake of life and action. Nietzsche's early view of history. The Presocratic Greeks receive distinction because "the starting-point of the Logic is the same as the starting-point of the history of philosophy" (EL. II. As we will see.

9 . The best we can do is to confront our inherited and hereditary nature with our knowledge of it. philosophy. 18).e. Here. he differs from Hegel in that he wants to relate philosophy more intimately to its historical contexts. All Too Human. Nietzsche. Nietzsche's own view becomes a re-thinking of how history must be done in order to aid life itself. Thus. a second nature. In other words. attempts to think and philosophize about philosophy in its historical contexts and dimensions. In this form of history and Nietzsche's philosophizing. II. one forgets all that might be beneficial to life but concentrates on the fact that life is somehow dying from its own past.. §3). §§ 10. One must kill that "nature" in us that is destroying us and replace it with a "nature" that benefits life. to excavate every minute detail of history and express it).Document Page 6 is to thrive. II. In Human. stern discipline combat our inborn heritage and implant in ourselves a new habit. he proclaims. and morality before a tribunal to examine them and finally condemn them (UM. and through a new. §3). "what is needed from now on is historical philosophizing. that is. §3). severing itself away from the historical fever. however. Although Nietzsche lays out different possibilities of how one can do history (i. when we think of how he approaches the history of philosophy later in his thinking. a new instinct. Nietzsche lays out not a new understanding of history but a fuller one in relation to life itself. one ''takes the knife to one's roots" severing oneself from the past in order to live in the future (UM. and he brings current ways of doing history." This new type of philosophy is concerned with the history of the genesis of thought by tracing terms and concepts back to their historical origin and their physiological origin without an attempt to find a pure metaphysical starting place (see HATH. antiquarian. like Hegel. Nietzsche's own approach to history is not to have "a consuming fever of history" (i. II. Nietzsche's re-thinking of the historical practice is itself critical. In the first. in order to let life thrive once again. monumental.. quite significant turn in his thinking. but to remember only what aids life itself. Although this can be done in a variety of ways. Nietzsche writes. so that our first nature withers away (UM.e. we see how his general conception of history becomes an enactment of critical history. and critical).

etc. and eternal. At the heart of his genealogical thinking is the dual role of interpretation and evaluation. it is not merely self-preservation. §2). Nietzsche maintains that the heart of human experience is given over to an artistic enterprise. good. but its views are not and cannot be eternally true. his perspectivism surely falls into a relativism if one still maintains the standard of an absolute. After the ideas of the will to power and the eternal return have been thought and added to his thinking. Humans schematize by subsuming the particulars of experience according to general ideas and concepts. because they are necessary fictions that are life-enhancing. By re-orienting us toward the conditions of our ideas. Thus. but is does express a view that flourishes in his later work." This imposition of regularity and form takes place and must take place in order for the living entity. he shows that philosophies. but the will to powerwhich includes the venting 12 11 10 ." He enacts this replacement with his genealogical thinking which does not attempt to find a pure origin by maintaining a faith in opposite valuesthat is. but rather mixed with their opposites (see BGE. However. his sword. is double-edgedall of humanity has this creative ability to invent by schematizing. the human being. "not 'to know' but to schematizeto impose upon chaos as much regularity and form as our practical needs require. to live. Nietzsche still maintains that our "nature" must be replaced with a second "nature. philosophical thinking and thus all generalizing becomes interpretation that is carried out for one's own life or for the rationalization of a way of life. in pure/impure. Nietzsche continually attempts to disrupt the construction and continuance of these metaphysical dichotomies by tracing the ''eternal" ideas and values back to very "temporal" conditions. his genealogical philosophy becomes more complete. eternal/temporal. and moralities do not have a pure origin and what is maintained within them are not pure. ideas." each performs its task or tasks in the battle against the Platonic and idealistic tradition. On the contrary. Thus. Each living entity interprets according to force that it is in relation to other forces. Nietzsche continually disrupts our tendency to accept such a viewpoint by askingfrom where does the need for this viewpoint come? He writes in his notes.Document Page 7 This turn that takes place in Nietzsche's thought in the late 1870s does not form a philosophy that is distinct from his later genealogy. objective viewpoint. In his later thinking. Nietzsche's experiences his own ideas as "intertwined and interlaced. however. good/evil. What in life is driving one to do this? For Nietzsche.

et passim). Instead of the pure origin of all things from a godhead. Nietzsche strategically places the will to power and the eternal return at the center of this thinking. without beginning. and moralities were attempts to schematize the chaos in order to vent its strength. how each philosopher comes to think from out of a historical context. incorporation. Instead. . without end. Nietzsche's use of the idea. §259). Thus. suppression. a firm. good. ideas. overpowering of what is alien and weaker. One's theories. This venting involves "appropriation.Document Page 8 of one's strength (BGE. it has become innate to believe that there . By introducing the will to power as the driving force of all living things. he thinks the philosophical tradition in its historical conditionsthat is. injury. . metaphysical source. Nietzsche can revaluate the philosophical tradition which attempts to remain pure. and our souls as we attempt to maintain an ideal stateall are not from a pure. . Nietzsche writes: This world: a monster of energy. . the only world we know. The world as we know it. and this tradition cannot own up to its deeds. however. like all of his ideas. but to challenge the idea of a metaphysical origin of all things that has become our "nature"since. §13). is for Nietzsche the will to power transforming itself continually. our values as we revere them. hardness. " (BGE. attempts to battle the traditional drive of philosophy toward another world which thereby devalues this world and life. Nietzsche holds that even though philosophers do attempt to vent their strength and the strength of their way of life upon the world and others. ] This world is the will to powerand nothing besides! And you yourselves are this will to powerand nothing else! (WTP. including human beings. imposition of one's own forms. This world. This idea. and it will eventually transform itself back into its previous shape. . . and eternal. iron magnitude of force that does not grow bigger or smaller. They are part of the world of the will to power. is not expressed to characterize a general law about nature. they are also slandering of life itself because they cannot view the mixture of their pure philosophical actions with the drives that compell them to philosophize. that does not expend itself but only transforms itself [. §1067) 13 Although the eternal return receives psychological interpretations from what is said in The Gay Science (§341) and physical interpretations from his comments in The Will to Power (§§ 1053-67.

This argument may appear to relieve both thinkers of any responsibility for philosophical scholarship. but they remain involved with what propels their own thinking. then. Thus. This does not mean that he attempts an easy way out. they do not attempt comprehensive and correct representations of the other philosophers' views. one must philosophize in relation to others in order to do one's own philosophy. These ideas are presented to "break open" (WTP. In thinking this way. Rather. He lays out another's ideas merely to prompt his own thinking so that he can put forth the strategies needed to battle the tradition. but this ground is not a pure. because he takes on the whole tradition. he is attempting to replace the first "nature" with a "second" that affirms the conditions of its possibilities. However. better stated. In other words. they do this in order to be engaged with the philosophical matter at handfor Hegel. for Nietzsche. metaphysical origin. Both have a philosophical and historical relation to the philosophical tradition. and thereby upholds the historicality of philosophy and thinking. creativity. He re-thinks how philosophy takes place by finding a hidden ground for thinking. In this way. it is only the place from which one person thinks which remains connected to other people. Both Hegel and Nietzsche surely impose their own philosophical viewpoints upon the historical figures they interpret. or. in order to return thinking affirmatively to the historical context by invoking the eternal return of the will to power. Nietzsche employs the will to power and the eternal return as strategies to impede what he calls the "orbit" of philosophical thinking. but the demand for correct representations is based on an a-historical conception of philosophy 14 . forces. Nietzsche's re-thinking of our tradition does not demand that he correctly represent the thinkers before his own time. and so on. Nietzsche's re-thinking of philosophy is an attempt to transform philosophy itself by returning to its historical context. places. in order to advance the development of absolute spirit. drives. battling the chief metaphysical ideas. etc. invention.Document Page 9 must be a pure origin. §1057) the possibilities in our thinking. allows us to re-acquaint ourselves with the conditions for the possibility of thinking at allforces. Nietzsche is not simply escaping the tradition but transforming it by re-thinking what is necessary for the tradition to live. they both maintain that one cannot merely repeat what one has said prior to one's own thinking.

From Nietzsche. Heidegger maintains that a transformation took place in classical Greece that changed the West and that the metaphysical thinking inaugurated there has resulted in nihilism. Heidegger reads the history of philosophy as falling into epochal periods. From Hegel. and philosophical truths is left aside in the "correct representation" of another's thought. What one is doing. linguistic meanings. Heidegger puts forth a preparatory thinking that returns us to metaphysics. This presupposition of the "correct representation'' of earlier thinkers warrants some deeper thought about historical philosophizing and about one's own philosophical and historical purpose in philosophy itself.Document Page 10 which is assumed to be the true way of philosophizing. Nietzsche offers a destructive upheaval severing us from the life-denying past and returning us to an affirmation of the forces of life. thus. both offer a philosophy for the future. For Heidegger. and philosophical truths. One assumes in this case that we can easily extract the philosophical arguments from a prior historical period without losing their historical meaning. the question of history will be how the determination of epoch periods occurs and how human thinking is involved in this determination. This view does not attempt to think the prior view and especially its own view as part of a history. is interpreting from one's own historical position with the priority of its values. In other words. For Nietzsche and Heidegger. the philosopher is merely extricating philosophical bits and pieces from another's thought and then fits these parts into a contemporary schema. Heidegger's History of Being and His Reading of the Presocratics Heidegger draws essential aspects from both Hegel and Nietzsche's philosophical views of history and especially the history of philosophy. The hermeneutical issue of traveling to another historical horizon with different values. one attempts to interpret the predecessor and keep one's own thinking a-historical. but transforms these aspects as he appropriates them for his own thinking. a thoughtful relation to history can transplant us out of this nihilism. where all aspects of the culture are governed by an essential principle. linguistic meanings. when one attempts a "correct representation" one is still imposing one's view upon another as Hegel and Nietzsche do. however. that steps back into metaphysics so that .

how Heidegger approaches philosophers and thinkers within the history of philosophy. philosophical activity should not remain at a safe distance from what is to be thought. what Plato and Aristotle call wonder ( ) By this stepping back. it should not be thought of as outside of history. his concern is to have a philosophical connection with prior philosophers in their thinking in order to think on his own. "Time and Being." Heidegger answers this question: This question comes too late. by accurately depicting the principles and logical arguments. thought in a verbal sense. we raise the question of being anew (see BT and SZ. beings come to show themselves in their presence to human thinking (OTB. can 16 15 . Heidegger reads the history of Western philosophy as the response on the part of the philosopher to heed the call of being. but instead should and must make a thoughtful connection to the matter of philosophy itself. the originary experience that prompts all thinking. Being for Heidegger is the event of this presencing. It derives its binding force from the beginning of the unconcealment of being as something that can be said. to respond to what calls thinking to thinkbeing itself (PLT. Heidegger calls this the dispensation and giving of presencing. Being for Heidegger is not a particular being. but. Heidegger's connection to the history of philosophy is not about duplicating what has been said prior to his own thinking. Just as the will to power is the ground of history but not independent of history. this giving over of beings to thinking. Heidegger's understanding of being is also the ground of and grounded in history. For this character of being has long since been decided without our contribution. 5). how Heidegger develops a relationship with the matter of philosophy. What must be spelled out then is what the matter of philosophy is in the history of being. and how he reads the Presocratics. §1). that is. we are placed into a new relation with what should be thoughtthat is. or the most general being. the highest being. gives over. let alone our merit. and allows for the unconcealment of beings to human thinking. being is the event that dispenses. Why does Heidegger characterize being as presencing? In the 1962 lecture. 246)that is. As is the case for both Hegel and Nietzsche. that is. Thus we are bound to the characterization of being as presencing. 183).Document Page 11 we "enter into a questioning that experiences" (BW. Heidegger heeds both Hegel and Nietzsche's approaches on this point. Thus.

for Heidegger. In other words. but on the other hand the appearing. Heidegger wants to exploit the dual sense of the Greek the appearing or showing of the things that appear. is being itself thought here as the historical event that determines the meaning of beings. the showing of things to us. substance. for Heidegger. In a very basic way. 6-7). What has allowed this basic principle to guide human thinking according to presence. 986b31). How beings appear to human awareness is governed by the historical event that delivers or unconceals beings over to thinking. being lets or allows for presence. Ever since the beginning of Western thinking with the Greeks. Metaphysics. Philosophers respond to how being dispenses beings.e. the appeal or call that occurs in the showing of all beings to thinkingwhat Aristotle calls what appears or shows itself.. The dual aspect of showing has prompted philosophers to distinguish ordinary beings and the highest being (forms. to bring to openness" (OTB.e. philosophers have thought of beings in their presence and their coming to presence (i.Document Page 12 be thought. Thus. their dispensation to human thought) according a basic principle of presence. In philosophical reflection. The response stems from the appeal and releases itself toward that appeal" (OTB. but for Heidegger the understanding of 17 . This appeal or call by being is not some mystical revelation that appears only to asocial thinkers. Aristotle states that Parmenides "was compelled to follow the phenomenon" ( . In explaining how Parmenides came to his statements about being and non-being. but has already occurred in our tradition. "To let presence means: to unconceal. all saying of 'being' and 'is' held in remembrance of the determination of being as presencing which is binding for thinking (OTB. but is . humans in philosophical reflection come to think about what appears to them-beings. What we receive in the appearing of things to our awareness is on the one hand the things as they appear. how beings come to show themselves to the thinking of philosophers.. "to think 'being' means to respond to the appeal of its presencing. 5). their presencing. Thus. 183). characterizing being as the presencing of beings is not Heidegger's interpretation. Heidegger maintains that thinking can get caught up in beings or think about what allows for it is this showing of beings. God). Heidegger writes. i.

From a realist perspective. Although thinkers have thought beings according to presence. Heidegger does not want to split up reality with the temporal and sensible on one side and the atemporal and 18 . Also. 226). Heidegger here falls outside the traditional dichotomy. Heidegger dismisses the interpretation that our consciousness (aiding the absolute spirit) is determining what it means to be for beings. he does not affirm the role of consciousness that is crucial to the idealistthat is. The realist. This showing must be understood as that which determines the meaning of beings presented. The question then is how being is related to history by dispensing or showing beings to human thinking. We will have to spell out below the role of human thinking. The realist merely responds and says that humans did not depict these things as accurately as we do today. what it means to be is unique for each epoch of history. one must think the ontological difference between beings and being (BW. Heidegger reads the history of the West as the history of being where different epochs have expressed a distinct thinking and living. a thinking determined by a thinking of beings. how beings appeared or showed themselves to thinking occurred in their own unique way for different epochs of Western history. and how thinking and beings are connected. however. its relation to being. In Heidegger's thinking. Heidegger does not want to follow the arrogance of the realist who claims that the world is and appears (and has been and has appeared) exactly as it does to this human subject. the beings presented to thinking and the showing of these beings.Document Page 13 the highest being is still onticthat is. view the world correctly and can condemn the entire tradition for viewing it incorrectly. Heidegger sidesteps the arrogance of the realist who believes that we. we might want to say that things just appear as they are and that there is no appearing or showing in itself. In different historical periods. cannot account for the extreme diversity in fundamental interpretations of what it means to be in our history. nor in contrast does he want to follow the idealist who claims that the world is as it is due to this human subjectivity. what it means to be has been thought differently because being has dispensed beings to be in a unique way for each epoch. and the Hegelian idealist would respond by saying that beings appeared differently because of the development of absolute spirit (which our consciousness aids in thinking). that is. in a contemporary setting. The showing of beings cannot be understood according to an understanding of beings.

The sending or showing of beings that being enacts allows for the historical epoch. the actual holding-back of itself in favor of the discernibility of the gift. in Greek. of being with regard to the grounding of beings (OTB. since the unfolding of history and the thoughts about beings are inseparable from the being within history. but rather the fundamental characteristic of sending. but does not show itself separately from this showing or appearing of beings. in which beings appear to human thinking differently according to the sending or showing of being. only the manifestation of beings. what Heidegger calls being.Document Page 14 supersensible on the other. Heidegger writes: To hold back is. both are within history (in this way. while the former affirms only the realm of history). that is. Always attentive to the etymology of words. . For Heidegger. Being for him is not a being outside of time and history determining what it means to be for beings and humans (for this would be being as the highest being). Heidegger writes. there are not two different realmson the contrary. 9). 61). each historical epoch. for it is precisely the withholding that allows for the sending of beings and the sending of history. Heidegger understands history (Geschichte) and destiny (Geschick) in the verbal sense of sending (schicken). "the history of being is the 'Geschick' of being that offers itself to us in withdrawing its essence" (PR. This sending of beings by being itself holds back or withdraws. he is following Nietzsche and not Hegel. the latter still maintains a realm independent of historical movements. show itself as separate from beings. 8). Being in its showing of being withdraws. but it does not. what is presented to human thinking within a historical epoch is sent or offered to it by the epochal event itself. over and above this showing of beings. Heidegger says. in favor of giving or dispensing beings over to thinking (OTB. Being offers itself to us in the showing or dispensing of beings. Hence we speak of the epochs of the destiny of being. Thus. Being dispenses beings to human thinking. Epoch does not mean here a span of time in occurrence. it does not have a self-manifestation. Thus. but being is the dispensing or sending of the event of history itself. How can we understand this withdrawing or holding back of being showing itself in the showing or dispensing of beings? Heidegger attempts to connect the withholding of being in its showing of beings and the history of being. in the way that Heidegger reorients our thinking to an historical period. has the .

and what and how is it? It itself is only whenever we are philosophizing. engage with previous philosophers? We already witnessed that Hegel does this in order to advance the self-consciousness of absolute spirit. the history of being. but his interest lies in determining how their thinking was claimed by being in the dispensation of beings. Humans. Philosophy is philosophizing (FCM. his concern in following Hegel and Nietzsche is not to depict their arguments and main principles (for this would not be philosophizing). Why. and Nietzsche does this to battle the tradition by affirming the historical contexts of philosophy and thinking. however. Heidegger writes: Philosophy demands that we do not look away from it. therefore. and although Heidegger calls attention to an oblivion of being (i. but in order to establish a dialogue with them. to criticize or to accurately present earlier philosophical positions amounts to keeping a distance from the thinking that has occurredor.e.Document Page 15 dispensation of beings because of the withholding of being. There is not a dialectical. How one comes to think is dependent upon how being dispenses beings to thinkingalthough within the context of how being dispenses beings to human thinking there is a fundamental decision humans can make: to think being in its dispensing and showing of beings or to think being according to beings. philosophers have been claimed in their thinking by the dispensation of being and have expressed the fundamental meaning and truth of beings in their writings. 19 . 4). Philosophy itselfwhat do we know of it. For Heidegger. 238). more importantly. For Heidegger. being remains basically unthought in our contemporary epoch) there is not a regressive process as Nietzsche contends. for Heidegger. that is. In Heidegger's reading of previous philosophers and thinkers. Why does Heidegger involve himself with other thinkers? He does this not in order to criticize previous philosophers nor to accurately present and argue about their positions. to think metaphysically. but apprehend it from out of itself. there is a free succession between historical epochs. progressive process occurring in the history of philosophy as Hegel thinks. "comes to language in the words of essential thinkers" (BW. have a significant role to play in the dispensation and showing of beings. because the historical periods are not dependent upon their prior epochs to determine how thinking and living are to occur. What else do different epochs have in common? In each.. to remain distant from one's own possibility of thinking.

he does this in order to think. If philosophers are responding to the dispensation of being. Does this mean then. The concern has to be then what happens to one's own thinking while partaking in such a dialogue. 66-7). that is. i. Many critics have asserted that Heidegger does not portray the philosophers in our tradition with accuracy. he responds to the claim that being itself makes upon his thinking. Heidegger's approach to philosophy and to previous philosophers is to be involved with philosophy. how being dispenses beings to their thinking and how they respond by thinking and writing. Heidegger re-reads a philosopher's main principles in light of how they are a response to being's claim. To answer the question. he wants to be engaged with the matter of philosophy and history itself. that is. then. to philosophize. Heidegger writes in What is Philosophy?: When do we philosophize? Obviously when we enter into a dialogue (Gespräch) with philosophers. This implies that we talk through (durchsprechen) with them that about which they speak (WP. He continues: If we assume that the being of beings addresses itself to philosophers to the extent that they state what beings are. then Heidegger's concern in dialogues is to think how philosophers have been claimed in their thinking by being so that one's own philosophizing thinks how one is claimed in this historical epoch. then our dialogue with philosophers must also be addressed by the being of beings (WP. Following Hegel and Nietzsche.. His concern. what they philosophized about. we might say . Heidegger always stays within the thinking that is first and foremost concerned with thinking what should be thoughtthat is. in order to philosophize himself. however. insofar as they are.e. as critics claim. that Heidegger merely ends up doing his own philosophy when interpreting our tradition? Following Hegel and Nietzsche on this point. 66-9). to think the philosophical matter that demands to be thought. Heidegger enacts dialogues with philosophers in our tradition in order to make a connection with what they spoke. how being presents beings to thinking.Document Page 16 Thus. is to read them as they respond to the claim of being.

86). that is. Heidegger does not want to read philosophers according to the traditional answers to the question of being (i. to depict their systems accurately). 18. 21). What are these "most proper possibilities of inquiry" that can be awakened in our dialogue with previous philosophers and thinkers? Heidegger answers this question in "Moira (Parmenides VIII. so that the claim (under which past. excavating. the problem arises as to how we are to think the question of being regarding its own history in our tradition. and to put forth metaphysical systems. in 1955. SZ.e. 34-41)": Proper inquiry must be a dialogue in which the ways of hearing and points of view of ancient thinking are thought according to their essential origin. Heidegger sees Destruktion as a "loosening of the sclerotic tradition and a dissolving of the concealments" (BT. present. 20). Heidegger understand this re-thinking of our tradition as Destruktion. though he is not primarily concerned with a dialogue with other philosophers. to question. in employing a Destruktion of the obscuring layers that cover . A Destruktion is carried out not to reconnect with our past by returning to it. but dismantling. The Destruktion that occurs does not merely dismantle the tradition but alters our relationship to our tradition.Document Page 17 that he is doing his own thinking. in entering a dialogue with previous philosophers and thinkers. In Being and Time. 70-3). Years later. to make ourselves free for what speaks to us in the tradition as the being of beings (WP. Destruktion means to open our ears. the thinking that is called upon to think. but "to come into full possession of the most proper possibilities of inquiry" (BT. but to raise the question of being itself. that is. Heidegger still thinks of his approach to the tradition according to the idea of a Destruktion of the history of philosophy. what calls them to think. putting to one side the merely historiographical assertions about the history of philosophy. Similar to the dynamic of the dialogue mentioned above. Thus. and future thinkingeach in its own wayall stand) might begin to announce itself (EGT. He writes: Destruktion does not mean destroying.. enabling us to think how metaphysical thinkers come to think.

All the criticisms of Heidegger's questionable interpretations of previous philosophers come down to this question: What does it mean to philosophize and think in our contemporary epoch? This question Heidegger takes seriously and continually thinks through. By not continuing the naive metaphysical labeling of the Presocratics and by not becoming caught up in the current interpretative debates (a continuance of the Platonic and Aristotelian heritage. Heidegger's interpretation of philosophy and thinking is done in order to think. and the predominate view of the Presocratics becomes that they are naive metaphysicians. for Heidegger). What must be kept in mind is that Heidegger does not read these thinkers in order to lay out their principles for inspection. Heidegger's dialogue with the Presocratics is an attempt to think along with them without the Platonic and Aristotelian framework draped over their thinking. Heidegger attempts to be addressed and claimed by what addresses and claims all thinkingbeing in its dispensation and sending of beings and the sending of the contemporary epoch. and it is here that Heidegger's Destruktion comes into full force. and any view not up to this standard is labeled inferior to their great systems. Plato's and especially Aristotle's metaphysical interpretations of their predecessors get handed down in our tradition. In his middle and later thinking. but in order to re-connect with what they thought. and they take on a significant role after this stage. If Heidegger is determined to bring about a dismantling of and hence re-connection with our tradition by having a dialogue with philosophers and thinkers in order to think and be claimed by being. This view takes hold because Plato and Aristotle become the benchmark for metaphysical philosophy. in order to philosophize. 4). the Presocratics here still play a part. the Presocratics are the continual touchstone for his re-thinking of the tradition. In other words. The Presocratic thinkers remain crucial for Heidegger because they are premetaphysicalwhat they think gets covered over in later metaphysical thinking.Document Page 18 over our tradition. To philosophize and think is to think the claim that being makes upon us in the dispensation of beings and the historical sending of our epoch. why does he then have a preoccupation with the Presocratics? Granted that Plato and Aristotle represent the beginning of philosophy and the center of re-thinking for him during the stage of "fundamental ontology" (as manifested in the thematic of Being and Time). he can attempt to dismantle the interpretive layers that . because "philosophy is philosophizing" (FCM.

. to change how we think. and passing away of beings. . The attempt on Heidegger's part is to construct a dialogical relationship with the Presocratics so that he (and we) can come to think that which called them to think and so that we can come to be called by this. his reading of the Presocratics generally centers around Anaximander. Heidegger examines Anaximander's saying in order to see how he thought the coming to presence. The inception is what is sought in their thinking. this is done to affect us.e. They are this. 72-73).Document Page 19 obscure Presocratic thinking and "to open our ears. and other ancient poets. to make ourselves free for what speaks to us in the tradition as the being of beings" (WP. Parmenides. [. and Heraclitus are the only inceptional thinkers. Heidegger underscores for us time and againthis is done "to make ourselves free for what speaks to us in the tradition". Parmenides. Although Heidegger does some exegesis of Pindar. These thinkers are the in-cepted by the in-ception (die vom An-fang Angefangenen). he can view how the Eleatic experienced but did not fully think the duality of (i. he thinks not only the role of λóγος as the gathering and letting lie of the epochal event of being but also . 10-11). Heidegger writes: Anaximander. the presencing of beings) and how thinking and saying are intimately connected in the meaning of being. They are inceptional thinkers (anfängliche Denker) because they think the inception (den Anfang). For Heraclitus. and to think about our own historical context that brings about our own thinking. lingering. they are taken up by it and are gathered into it (P. To what do we open our ears? What is uncovered in the Presocratics? With this Destruktion or dialogue with the Presocratics. however not because they open up Western thought and initiate it. In regards to these three thinkers. ] The inception is that which begins (anfängt) something with these thinkersby laying claim on them in such a way that from them is demanded an extreme retreating before being. what needs to be done here is to express why Heidegger goes to these thinkers for a thoughtful dialogue. Already before them there were thinkers. GA 54. . and Heraclitus. Homer. 7-8. From his reading of Parmenides. Since extensive interpretations of Heidegger's reading of these Presocratic thinkers have been published for decades now. This is not done so that Presocratic scholarship will get to the real Presocratic philosophy.

and how our thinking is historically bound to our epoch. one cannot dismiss the need and urgency when discussing 20 . the truth of being and how we come to think within our historical context. he does this to affect us in our thinkingthat is. However. He offers paths of thought that he has ventured in order to think. 179)." Heidegger performs these readings not to uncover the hidden history of our tradition (although something like this does occur). He constructs his dialogue with the Presocratic thinkers in their first inception so that we can come to be thoughtfully involved in the "other inception" that can occur in the present age. Concluding Questions after Heidegger Heidegger gives us no set methodology that we can follow in our thinking in order to be thinking correctly. After engaging one's thinking within the Heideggerian corpus. Fragment B16). Heidegger attempts a dialogue with the Presocratics. 220) In other words. Heraclitus. What occurs in this other thinking. in this other inception? We experience and think explicitly the truth of how being calls us to think (GA 65. not to add to the scholarship of authors who dispute the "arguments" of their fragments. 179). 39. What Heidegger is preparing in his dialogue with the Presocratics then is a "transition from metaphysics to another thinking (andere Denken)" (WGM. EM. 29). I think that he does present to us two main directives that can be followed up in our own thinking. these paths are not a meta-level narrative (a prolegomena) to direct our future endeavors in philosophical reflection. Their thinking is still fundamentally caught up with beings (GA 65. in order to transform it into the other inception (anderen Anfang)" (IM. ) as what Heidegger reads the extant works of these Presocratic thinkers as they were drawn to think what called or laid claim upon them to think. they do not fully think the inception.Document Page 20 how as unconcealment and concealment govern his thinking of nature ( reveals itself and hides along with this revealment (cf. how we come to think because of the dispensation and showing of beings. Heidegger labels this the ''first inception. in a preliminary way. in order to "retrieve (wieder-holen) the inception of our historical-spiritual existence. Although Heidegger maintains that these Presocratic thinkers experienced the inception and attempted to think it and bring it to language in their writings. but to think what prompted the Greeks to think in this way in the first place.

the suspicion of grand narratives.Document Page 21 philosophy and philosophical figures to philosophize and the need to think about one's own historical context of thinking. why is it that after twenty-five hundred years of philosophical reflection we are still compelled to ponder the why of this activity? This is not a useless. "might not philosophy. do something with us? (IM. the transformation into an information age? What we must determined is not whether Heidegger is correct with this interpretation or that. "higher than actuality stands possibility" (BT. with Heidegger. academic question proposed so that we can turn in continuous reflective circles. SZ. EM. and the traditional philosophical problems so that we can come to think our historical and philosophical matter at hand. the loss of eternal values. Heidegger writes. 12. we should not ask this because we are concerned with what philosophy can do for us. If we take seriously the historical nature of thinking as presented in Heidegger's works. but our own as well. but why we come to philosophize at all. Again. As Nietzsche might ask: How now for us? We must engage with the Presocratics. What is it about our own historical epoch that conditions us to think in the way we do and to have these ontological commitments that we do? Following after Heidegger. if we concern ourselves with it. to think. Heidegger's statement about phenomenology reads. In other words. in order to philosophize. in order to determine and to think about the matter of thoughtnot merely to argue with other scholars about the correct interpretations of the main principles of others. What is it that calls us to think in our own contemporary epoch? Is it the call of being. 38). it is the question that we must face philosophically before all others. the Presocratic fragments. the consequences of practical matters. prompts us to re-think Heidegger's works. and to be historical. 34. then we must come to think not only the historical contexts of previous philosophers. 10). why do we philosophize? Following Heidegger. not merely chronologically but philosophically. it is a question to be asked and answered so that we can determine what it means to be. Notes 1. That is. with our tradition. but he alters them to provide us with that which is thought-provoking. Both of these elements Heidegger shares with Hegel and Nietzsche. .

F. §20. henceforth. the absolute appears as other to consciousness as an absolute content only to be perceived pictorially. 179). Harris (Indianapolis. Hegel. for the purposes of this introduction I will conflate the terms. M. Hegel holds. 1991). IN: Hackett Publishing. Cf. 164). Hegel. Introduction to the Lectures on the History of Philosophy. Modernity. this period did not grasp its philosophical content but presupposes it as givenspecifically. although still abstract. i. This awareness is based on the self-producing absolute. The dialectic plays itself out in each specific stage of philosophy but also in history as a whole. W. W. philosophical freedom occurs when thought rises above mere pictorial representation and "apprehends the idea of the absolute" (ILHP. T. V. This grasping of the essence of all things marks the beginning of pure thinking producing itself. H. this lengthy period of theological philosophy was the "externalization" of the spirit. from religious authorities. S. In Hegel's reading. The Greek beginning of philosophy occurs when the "essence of things comes into consciousness in the form of pure thinking" (ILHP. this text is cited as ILHP with pagination. 5. trans. F. Hegel writes. Suchting. Although Heidegger usually distinguishes between thinkers and philosophers by maintaining that thinkers think and say being as it is and philosophers think being metaphysically (to be defined later). . W. as if philosophically thinking had been out to sea and has finally achieved its destinationthe self-conscious awareness of the conceptual). in this beginning. 3. Hegel's dialectical thinking also presents the entire history of Western philosophy in three main stages. In the second stage. when pure thought occurs the subject produces the object at the same time. henceforth. 22. In this way. or what Hegel calls "Germanic philosophy. 4. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press. G. "this is the Germanic principle. G. however. T. §31). In the last stage. 172). trans. consciousness comes to grasp the absolute and apprehends that it is that which grasps and that which is grasped. This arrival or return occurs when consciousness comes to grasp the spirit again and becomes aware that the subject and object are but the same. The Encyclopaedia Logic. This awareness of the essence of things comes about by grasping the metaphysical principle of all thingswhat Hegel calls the beginning of all things. in Christian theological philosophy the content was given by the Church (EN.. Knox and A. A. Following Greek philosophy is the philosophy of the middle ages which Hegel calls either Roman and Christian philosophy (ILHP. this text is cited as EL with section number. F. the spirit thinks itself and constitutes its being (ILHP. this beginning requires further dialectical development. 175) or Scholasticism (EN.Document Page 22 2. §31). Geraets. Consciousness did not grasp its content because it was not apprehended as posited by itself but externally.e. The three main stages are unfolded dialectically as the self-productive beginning of consciousness grasping the essence of all things.'' begins with Descartes conceptually returning home to the spirit (dramatically depicted when Hegel places the famous "Land Ho!" in Descartes's mouth. 165). this unification of subject and object" (ILHP. 1987).

e. Nietzsche is undermining the drive toward "correct representations" here by equating the historical endeavor with the correct representation of all prior historical events and by equating the unhistorical with forgetting or with the creative interpretation of prior historical events. R. Walter Kaufmann. On the Genealogy of Morals. may be considered first of all as the symptoms of certain bodies. Vol. pp. 12. 14. this text is cited as WTP with section number. §2. however. Friedrich Nietzsche. this text cited as BGE with section number. in words similar to Heidegger's. J. Hegel's project is to interpret what is eternal in each philosophy. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.. Friedrich Nietzsche. §20). §36. 15. R. Cf. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books. 1996). ed. in BQ. he needs to make a recoiling movement (rückläufige Bewegung): he has to grasp the historical justification that resides in such ideas" (HATH. 9. 7. In fact. in Basic Writings of Nietzsche. 1994). Foreword. Nietzsche writes the following about overcoming the metaphysical tradition: "if he [the human who has rejected superstition and religion] is at this level of liberation he now has. with the greatest exertion of mind. The Gay Science. Heidegger's remarks on Plato and Aristotle's understanding of the beginning of philosophizing in wonder. 10. §2. henceforth. The Will to Power. Walter Kaufmann and R. especially answers to the question about the value of existence.J. . Then. 13. 11. All Too Human." in Untimely Meditations. trans. to overcome metaphysics. henceforth. Friedrich Nietzsche. trans. "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life. trans. 133-136. this text is cited as UM with essay and section numbers. §515. Friedrich Nietzsche. 1968). in Basic Writings of Nietzsche. trans. connected to the personal opinion of the philosopher) and not eternal. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Modern Library. One." Friedrich Nietzsche. An "accurate" portrayal of a philosopher's view would include aspects of this philosophy that were merely temporal (i. 1992). henceforth.Document Page 23 6. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. §2. and ed. 8. 1974) Second Preface. trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books. Friedrich Nietzsche. J. henceforth. Beyond Good and Evil. this text is cited as HATH with section number. An example of this is from the Preface for the Second Edition of The Gay Science: "All those bold insanities of metaphysics. §2. he must overlook certain details that do not pertain to the dialectical process itself. This recoiling movement is the movement back into and through metaphysics which enables one to determine its historical contexts and dimensions. in this way. Human. Preface.

that does both actions .Document 16. es gibt. literally as 'it gives'. similar to the phrase 'it rains'. In both. Heidegger interprets the common phrase. there is not literally a being. which we would translate in our colloquial phrase. 'there is'. 'it'.

and the giving that is done is the dispensation of beings. 17. SZ. Thus.Document Page 24 one that gives and one that rainsbecause this is a middle-voice activity. even though it separates itself from ordinary physical objects. imposing on nature or reality a subject-agent model). the most general being. and OTB. 20. Eine freie Folge. §91. "for the 'it' that here 'gives' is being itself. WP. 62-3. 197. which would read as 'the giving gives of itself' or 'the rain rains from itself'. 52. in order to give the metaphysical ground of all beings. etc. Cited by Heidegger." . but since it is determined by beings it pursues the conditions of beings as if these conditions were founded or grounded by a being also. The 'gives' names the essence of being that is giving. He writes. this metaphysical thinking attempts to find the highest being. then. 213). it attempts to think the conditions of beings. This thinking which is determined and directed primarily toward beings brings about metaphysical thinking. "From the First to the Other Inception. 238). in Being and Time (BT. See GA 65. 18. the 'it' that gives is being. as Nietzsche holds. For Heidegger. These odd phrases attempt to express how activities can take place without a subject-agent (and without. metaphysical thinking is still determined by a focus upon beings and not on the showing of beings. granting its truth" (BW.. 19." for Heidegger's distinction and relation between the "first inception" and the "other inception. For Heidegger.

is precisely when Heidegger invents the Presocratics as a radically critical entreaty with regard to the Platonic-Aristotelian inception of metaphysics. This period is primarily aimed at reviving the . The methodphenomenological destructionemployed here tends at first to undo the overlappings and the stratifications of the tradition. or in other words. This question. upon which we want to focus in what follows. as such. and it is marked by Heidegger abandoning his plan of "refounding" (Grundlegung) metaphysics. the heart of the questions initially elaborated by Plato and Aristotle. more difficult to establish precisely: the period where the very idea of an "other beginning. at re-posing anew the question of the sense of being. echoing the Platonic question of The Sophist. do not play any fixed role in the economy of the destruction: it is always Aristotle who constitutes the interlocutor and privileged guide. This corresponds roughly to the courses in the 1930s and 1940s. In this perspective. at a new cost. it is clear that the Presocratic thinkers. taking fundamental ontology as a conducting-wire (fil conducteur). No doubt. it would be useful here to define finally a third period whose chronology is." in its strict correlation with the repetition commemorating the grandeur of the first pre-Platonic and pre-Aristotelian beginning. in order to reach. The second period. as a matter of fact. is put into practice by Heidegger in Sein und Zeit. it is the period of the drafting of an Aristotelesbuch that emerged as Sein und Zeit.Document Page 25 One The Destruction of Logic: From LógoV to Language Jean-François Courtine Translated by Kristin Switala and Rebekah Sterling It is generally agreed that three different periods can be distinguished when one attempts to characterize the relation that Heidegger's thought maintains with Greek philosophy : the first period corresponds essentially to his years at Marburg. gives 4 3 2 1 .

we are already placed before a problem whose solution is reserved for the future. Heidegger himself emphasized the intimate correlation between the question of logic. we can once again distinguish at least three stages: the stage of the works of his youth still marked by the problematic of validity as the first elucidation of being . in 1972. while restoring in them the most rigorous coherence. and above all the habilitation thesis of 1915 (Die Kategorienund Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus): These first works announce already a "Wegbeginn. What is announced is the Seinsfrage under the figure of the problem of categories. the thought experiments of this final period still presuppose the gains of the second great debate with the Greeks before Socrates. capable of integrating the principal stages of a long path of thought. Ein kritisch-positiver Beitrag zur Logik). What we would like to help elucidate is rather the position of the Presocratic moment in the general economy of Heidegger's thought. formulated in this way by Heidegger from 1912.Document Page 26 precedence to a thought more liberally centered on words and their immanent play. In order to do this." We have given this very schematic overview in order to indicate from the outset that our present aim does not at all intend to put forth something like a general assessment of the Heideggerian interpretation of the Presocratics. the question of language under the form of a doctrine of signification. the question of logic or of the "logical" appears at first to furnish a privileged conducting-wire. and what would become the question of language and of its essence. and notably the idea of "tautology. also the dissertation of 1913 (Die Lehre vom Urteil im Psychologismus. and even less to restore the rights of philology against this or that particularly risky exegesis of a fragment of Heraclitus or of Parmenides. "What is logic? With this question. can be considered in fact as one of those principial (principielle) questions. 7 5 6 In this path which leads from logic to language." The question. the question of being. bearing in mind the collations of 1912. on the occasion of the first re-issuing of his Frühe Schriften. In the introduction which he drafted." the beginning [the first clearing] of a stillobstructed road. as we will try to show. even if. insofar as it allows us to follow through the passage from the historicocritical destruction to the shaking or dismantling of the reign of logicthe emergence of a meditation about λóγος opening onto the essence of the word.

which is also a return to the foundation of metaphysics with a view to its overtaking. on this side of Plato and Aristotle. which subsequently will not cease to 13 "degenerate. between a first beginning and an end whose grandeur is placed under the sign of Plato and Aristotle. inside ancient philosophy. In this way. as λóγος . being and of its truth. This step corresponds roughly to the Marburg period and to the elaboration of Sein und Zeit. we can consider that the Presocratic "moment" emerges as such in the internal economy of Heidegger's thought from the moment when. in the horizon of the problem of the world. in the sense of shaking (erschüttern). The third stage is no longer a stage of "destruction. the critical analysis of the enunciative proposition and of its alleged foundation in the Aristotelian doctrine of λóγος. We can clearly see when looking back what makes a system by means of such a "return": the idea of an end of metaphysics by exhausting its initial possibilities." taken as a beginning." a process which essentially consists of returning from the "academic" or "academicized" interpretation of Aristotelian logic to a more original problematic of λóγος intended as a mode of disclosure of. of which the final exam summarized." until its Hegelian summation. a rift is revealed. the "beginning" is in some way split in two and in a sense the Zweideutigkeit emerges. 11 10 9 8 This last stage (the last in any case in which we will be interested ) corresponds to the establishment of a new partition which occurs henceforth.Document Page 27 in judgment. between Plato and Aristotle on one handthe inception of metaphysics conceived as and an earlier thought." Rather." if at least we always mean "destruction" in the sense of phenomenological "deconstruction. its ultimate point being perhaps the 1929-30 course (Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik). which gives his thought its peculiar and vivid rhythm. the abandoning of the project . 12 And it is this "end. the teaching of Plato and Aristotle. the second step is that of the phenomenological "destruction. hereafter. up until then. among others things. In other words." according to the strong image of a gesture consisting of taking something off its hinges (faire sortir des ses gonds)an image that one finds in particular in the Einführung in die Metaphysik. In the present state of the publication of these seminars. in Greek philosophy itself. it is again relatively difficult to mark with precision the exact date of this deliberate return to the Presocratics. by destruction we mean it. which had been affecting. that of the Presocratics. "dismantling'' or "disorientation.

was henceforth becoming hollow from the inside in order to force the appearance of its background. the express repetition of the question of being was aiming at first to rescue the question from the forgetfulness into which it had sunk. with that of Aristotle. If in the perspective of Sein und Zeit. the principal pivoting axis is attached. since for Heidegger it has always been a matter of recovering. Worte ). At the same time. In particular the Summer 1931 course (Aristoteles: Metaphysik Q 1-3) brought about for the first time a significant displacement of the investigation. and in particular the Winter 1925-26 course (Logik. concerning . indeed quite few in number and . in the extraordinarily short sequence that Heidegger always kept in mind. In this large sweeping motion. dedicated this pair time to Plato: Vom Wesen der Wahrheit. everything occurs as if Greek beyond. to a radically new understanding of the forgetting of being. since its first elaboration by Plato and Aristotle.Document Page 28 which found its highest expression in 1929 in the Kantbuchof a refoundation (Grundlegung) of metaphysics. we will be careful not to appeal too much to these two courses which are situated still quite clearly in the continuation of the Marburg courses. no doubt. the teaching of Plato. in particular by means of the ontological. Upon this internal curve which is formed by the Greek moment overallfrom "Anaximander to Aristotle"and of which the central element is certainly the very concept of λóγος in the differentiating multiplicity of its meaning and of its statusit is no doubt necessary to reserve a privileged place for the first courses from the beginning of the 1930s. whose for which it is important at first to recover the force of nomination: constellation delineates the general horizon of an experience not thematized as such nor investigated by the first philosophers.λóγος. would be envisaged as forming the major documents of a bend. And it is very much a matter of "words" (paroles. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit ). turning. premetaphysics. the Greek experience of truth as philosophy itself. or metamorphosis which affects the very notion and. . Zu Platons Höhlengleichis und Theätet. Moreover. still toward the task and the implementation. of which the trace has been conserved for us in the fragmentary words of a few rare thinkers. quite like the course of the following Winter semester (1931-32). soon after. and correlatively the renunciation of the task of fundamental ontology articulated from the (phenomenological) destruction of the history of classical ontology. beyond the 16 15 14 . then.

Document Page 29 academic and traditional sedimentation. from negative judgments of the type: ''this is not that. Vom Wesen der Warheit. . even if this rupture is still awaiting its definitive determination: it would take place in 1935. but neither is it. even though deceitful. it seems to us more illuminating to emphasize in the perspective we are taking hereby following the conducting-wire of the question of logicthe rupture which the Inaugural Lecture has introduced in regard to the perspective of phenomenological destruction. It is in any case a new form of the "destruction" of logic which is at work in the Inaugural Lecture of Freiburg: Was ist Metaphysik? <><><><><><><><><><><><> Let us quickly recall in this perspective the trend of the lecture: nothingness (das Nichts) is what runs counter to anguish in fundamental experience. the access to a Greek experience of the truth as a revealing. appetization (aperite) of the Nothingness in our existence. which 19 18 17 . an extracting from the dissimulation. from negation. It is necessary. In the present absence of the publication of these two courses. . as the experience of the Grundstimmung of anguish is sufficient to attest. must then be considered here as what gives evidence of the continuous and diffuse. at the beginning of the Einführung in die Metaphysik. but that it is on the other hand the negation which is "founded" upon the "not" (the Nicht). which had at first been identified with the inception of metaphysics by Plato and Aristotle. nothing whatsoever. to conclude from this that the "not" could not be produced by the negation (die Verneinung). a yet-to-be-discovered. nor a "state of being" (Seiendes)." The Verneinung. therefore. from a proposition. but it does not allow itself to be spoken of without violating the elementary rules of logic. Why this logical impossibility to talk about nothingness? Because "nothingness" is neither an object (Gegenstand). namely the Summer 1932 course (to appear as volume 35 of the Gesamtausgabe): Der Anfang der abendländischen Philosophie (Anaximander und Parmenides) and the Summer 1933 and Winter 193334 courses (to appear as volume 36/37): Die Grundfrage der Philosophie. for example from language. the negation. it is no longer a matter of some "phenomenon" inferable from something else. . which could well have marked the veritable caesura in the evolution of the Heideggerian interpretation of the Greek beginning.

die überlieferte Auslegung des Denkens"logic. 117)." It is understood that the question which emerges from then on would be expressed soon after as: Was heibt Denken? and that this question would seek to be stated in a form worthy of its appropriately revolutionary stake. the central thesis of the lecture. the traditional interpretation. that is to say at the ground before the decision touching the legitimate sovereignty of "logic" in metaphysics. 20 We recognize. Heidegger would add in a marginal note on his copy: Logik. The very idea of "logic" dissolves in the whirl of a more basic questioning (GA 9. which is of direct interest here to our aims: The question concerning the nothing crosses at the same time the whole of metaphysics. in the Inaugural Lecture a classically Heideggerian gesture: to lead back to the Verhalten and to its multiple ways. received from thought. Das Nichts is der Ursprung der Verneinung.h. that is to say. nich umgekehrt (GA 9.Document Page 30 in turn finds its origin in the being-nothing of nothingness (das Nichten des Nichts). Such an attitude is very much. according to a sense of destruction more and more . 24 It is once more this question of the sovereignty or domination (Herrschaft) of logic which would be examined in the Einführung in die Metaphysik. insofar as it forces us to place ourselves in front of the problem of the origin of negation. against which Carnap. 21 Nothingness is the origin of negation and not the inverse. emphasis added). then the fate of the sovereignty of "logic" within philosophy is thereby decided as well. thus. 23 22 Let us recall further this other formulation of the fundamental thesis of the lecture. in particular. would react. beyond the statement and of every purely theoretical attitude. moreover. 117. d. And its corollary which interests us in the highest degree: If thus the power of the understanding in the field of questions concerning nothing and being is broken.

In the Einführung in die Metaphysik. 25 A formula whose violence echoes that of the preceding year. to an earlier beginning. but in 1935) confirmed: This not only seems to be so. In fact. when Heidegger alluded to the necessity of shaking (ershüttern) logic by opening it up to the question of essence speaking of the word. Heidegger stresses. its directive question.) And in this same course which constitutes the first great evidence of the movement which leads back. even today." whose empire is such that it is allowed to neglect all of the secondary differences and in particular those which would mark something like a progress of logic." this "force" of which he finds the most clear-cut formulation in the Encyclopedia of Hegel (§19): "Logic is the absolute form of truth. For despite Kant and Hegel. The only possible step that remains is to stand on the very ground from which logic rose and to overturn it as the dominant perspective for the interpretation of being. It is so. sealed in its fundamental traits. Heidegger would once again evoke "the power of logic which constantly increases. the great course of 1935 (Einführung in die Metaphysik) which constitutes the clearest testimony to this new interpretation which all at once concerns metaphysics. it is a matter from then on of thwarting a domination. "Logic" is completed. and even more. noch merh als dies. logic has not made a single advance in the essential and initial questions. beyond the Greece of the Platonic-Aristotelian inception of metaphysics. also its background." (Das Logische ist die absolute Form der Wahrheit und. of overthrowing a "sovereignty. it seemed to him. But it is assuredly. and at the same time concerns its necessary overtaking. one step forward since Aristotle. pure truth itself." And Heidegger (not in 1787 either. Heidegger summarizes the group of questions which would henceforth direct him: Wie geschieht das ursprüngliche Auseinandertreten von und λóγος und ? Wie kommt es zum Heraustreten und Auftreten des λóγος ? Wie wird der λóγος (das "Logische") zum Wesen des Denkens? 27 26 . die reine Wahrheit selbst.Document Page 31 resolutely polemical. referring to Kant's famous verdict: "Logic has not made. its Platonic-Aristotelian inception.

dedicated respectively to Parmenides and to Heraclitus. wielding the term "intellectualism" as an insult. Über Logik als Frage nach der Sprache. . perhaps. This implies first that logic must be taken seriously! We renounce the cheap presumption that sees in logic only "red tape" (Formelkram)hollow formulas. This supports the hypothesis that we are formulating here. Logic is for us. the place where humans come into question (die Stätte der Fragwürdikgeit des Menschen). and his reading of Nietzsche. that if the Einführung in 1935 clearly marks a first moment of balance in the new configuration of Greek philosophy. Heidegger begins by evoking the general critique of intellectualism. This last sense of destructionto make logic come off its hinges or. at the price of a radicalization of the critique of logic. which still order the 1940s courses (Winter 1942-1943 and Summers 1943 and 1944).Document Page 32 Wie kommt dieses λóγος als Vernunft und Verstand zur Herrschaft über das Sein im Anfang der griechischen Philosophie? 28 It is in fact these questions. we may nevertheless trace the inquiry back to the beginning of the 1930s and precisely to the Inaugural Lecture of 1929 which this time expressly concerns metaphysics with a view to its overtaking. refer to a new approach concerning the first Greek thinking before Socrates. as we have seen. This approach which clears a path for itself through his reading of Hölderlinabsolutely decisive in this perspectiveundertaken from the Winter of 1934-1935." if at least one wants to actually break it. the essential points of which his last contributions of Vorträge und Aufsätze would take up several years later. he remarks. to dismantle it. through the programmatic declaration: Wir wollen die Logik erschüttern. rigorously formulated from 1935. . for the first time in the Summer 1934 course: Logic-Language. but it is in order to put into effect immediately. . a significant step backwards: It is no use." In the somber context of the epoch. But these great "canonical" moments of exposition. 29 We want to shake logic. . . to shake it until its collapse. what is necessary is first to measure the "Macht der überlieferten Logik. namely. The metaphor here is clearly one of "demolition. according to a gesture familiar to him. well before the 1940s. undertaken in 1936-1937. disorient itself. in view of a meditation concerning the word as a reply to the call of beinghad manifested itself. 30 .

as Heidegger emphasizes again here. ist reiner Nihilismus (EM. was er meint.Document Page 33 With logic what is ultimately put back into question is in fact the determination of the essence of λóγος . the preliminary question is transformed into these underlying questions on the way back to the first beginning: the question of the essence of humans. 18)." What it is necessary then to ask is this henceforth: "Does language constitute a private sector?Preliminary question: What is language's mode of being?" The question of "language's mode of being" refers to the Sprechen. als auch den Aufbauwillen und Glauben zerstört. Er wider-spricht sich selbst. if it is true. weib nicht. Sprechend spricht er so gegen das. while radicalizing. 33 31 32 . which would find its canonical formulation in the course on Nietzsche. Wer vom Nichts redet." Das Reden vom Nichts ist unlogisch. Was sowohl das Denken in seinem Grundgesetz mißachtet. the critique of "logic'' which already underlies the lecture: Wer vom Nichts redet. gegen die "Logik. for example (!) as question of "the essence of language (Sprache) is the fundamental directive question of logic. In this way. the question "who?" and "who are we?" The Einführung in die Metaphysikwhich is everything except an introduction to metaphysics is also the text where the violent identification (metaphysics/Platonism/nihilism) falls into place. . was er tut. The 1935 course in fact opensas everyone knowswith the distinction of two absolutely heterogeneous questions." and by that to the mode of being of humans. to "speaking. the directive question and the fundamental question (Leit. ] Wer das Nichts ernst nimmt. in its classical Leibnizian stamp: Why is there something and not rather nothing? By thus stressing the Zusatz of the Leibnizian question ("and not rather nothing"). that the humans. such as emerge from the differentiated understanding of "the" metaphysical question.und Grundfrage). Er fördert offenkundig den Geist der Verneinung und dient der Zersetzung. stellt sich auf die Seite des Nichtigen. . macht es durch solches Tun zu einem Etwas. the course is directly linked to the finale of the Inaugural Lecture and takes up again. [ . . Ein sich widersprechendes Sagen verstöbt aber gegen die Grundregel vom Sagen (λóγος). and with the accentuation of two contrasted senses of "nothing" or of "nothingness" (Nichts).

what is indicated through the Leibnizian Zusatz is not only simply a "Begleitererscheinung. in referring implicitly no longer to Plato's Sophist." to which we will return. at Carnap. in the 1935 course. henceforth. the essential and original correlation of the question of the state of being and of the question of non-being. The emergence of this configuration marks also the first elaboration. of the question to which Heidegger will apply himself to exploring all its defenders. ob die Logik und ihre Grundregeln überhaupt den maßSstab bei der Frage nach dem Seienden als solchem abgeben können. on the conducting-wire of an inquiry concerning logic. das lediglich die Denkgesetze der herkömmlichen Logik befolgt. but rather what inexorably assesses the radicality of the questioning concerning the state of being in its being. From then on the charge of nihilism made against the "Grundfrage" and its characteristic destruction bears witness to the lack of understanding of the question of being. most likely. 34 The counter-attack here is aimed. still not 36 completed in the Rectorate Address. . henceforth. but to Parmenides' Poem." a closely related phenomenon. pre-Platonic . (EM. Es könnte umgekehrt sein. 35 From this dissociation ("PhilosophieWissenschaft").Document Page 34 To this logical prohibition Heidegger opposes. daß mithin alles Denken. geschweige denn wirklich zu entfalten und einer Antwort entgegenzuführen . nothing or nothingness. Thus. However. it releases a new constellation which remains dominant in the new "appropriation" of the Presocratics: that of ''DichtenDenken. signifying even the most profound Seinsvergessenheit: So rundweg ist nämlich noch gar nicht entschieden. . von sich aus überhaupt die Frage nach dem Seienden auch nur zu verstehen. 19). 39 The central question is. the question: Was heißt Denken? <><><><><><><><><><><><> 38 37 The 1940s were the years of the great courses dedicated to the Presocratics. aiming to recover its original. daß die gesamte uns bekannte und wie ein Himmelgeschenk behandelte Logik in einer ganz bestimmten Antwort auf die Frage nach dem Seienden gründet. von vornherein außerstande ist. it shares as well in a fight against "science" in general.

that it becomes for uswhen a first destinal sending finally lets itself be seized again as suchnecessary. überhaupt denken. the question: Was heißt Denken? What is called thinking? A formula that it is necessary to intend or mean at present as that of a search for what directs thought. ." . as the unity of a "sending" (Geschick).] Richtig denken. henceforth. But what is the Sache. Thought is only truly itself. likewise. to the depth of its essence. when it is no longer anything but a question of thinking? The response at first will seem necessarily "poor" and disappointing. making to it the gift of thought. precisely as that singular state of being (Da-Sein) demanded by an address. traditionally defined as "Lehre vom richtigen Denken" (a study of the rules of thought). We will be careful not. a destinal sending: "'der geschichtliche Mensch'dies meint dasjenige Menschentum. nihilism or the dominant figure of inspection. [. when it responds to what is bestowed or destined to it. It is by this. the Machenschaft. What calls for thought is the "before-being-thought": the Zudenkendes. dem ein Geschick zugedacht ist und zwar als das Zu-denkende. to oppose here the task thus formally definedthought as a commemoration of what offers itself to thinking since the origin of a first beginning never yet truly occurred as suchto the demand to think what is. and logic in its original sense as an opening attentive to the matter in question (the Sache)its requirements. aus der Sache denken. indeed the most necessary: Denken ist not. after Nietzsche. however. . . The Heraclitus course is indeed subtended by a principial opposition between logic. The commemorating thought does not intend in fact to make itself historical in recapitulating by memory (Erinnerung) a past thus ensured of its relief. and then the Gestell.Document Page 35 determination. but it applies itself rather to extricating the fundamental traits from what is and what Heidegger names. ja allerzeit denken lernenist das Nötigste. thus is required by the call. its proper development. 41 40 We see here that this new determination of thinking attuned to the λóγος42 engages nothing less than a new determination of the essence of humans as historical. for what offers itself to thinking. ist not. damit wir dadurch einer wohl noch verborgenen Bestimmung des geschichtlichen Menschen entsprechen. that thinking emerges as a task. That is to say. worthy of a history conceived.

this debate whose stakes would be also or initially to extract the Presocratics from the dialectic logic of the Hegelian relief. certainly not in the sense . a characteristic trait of an Aristotelian self-sufficient and self-pleasing god. what calls to thinking"abstract. but how does it stand with being? One thing is clear in any case." "absolute. and more and more that of the attempt to think being without the state of being. But neither does that signify. it is a question less and less of being of the state of being. (according to the or as objectifying. the attempt which is indicated orthographically from the first courses on Hölderlin by the usage of the archaic term: das Seyn. the question. namely. This structure becomes directive concerning the central question of the Heideggerian meditation which henceforth takes into sight the Presocratic moment. that is. to being as what properly gives to thinking.Document Page 36 Just as in the era of Sein und Zeit. that the task is to think what is." or "intransitive" thinking. emphatically understood here. to think what is meant by thinking. existence. And here to think being is similar to thinking the internal object of thinking. of the νóησις nor in the Hegelian (speculative-dialectical) horizon of a Wissenschaft der Logik." indeed the world as such." What are the consequences of this concerning thought and its object. according to a perspective still phenomeno-logical. we now are permitted to emphasize the import of a structure which lets itself be characterized as a structure of the address (Zu-Struktur). It is necessary ( the origin of the law. even if the debate with Hegel remains in a sense always subjacent in the relation of Heidegger to Greece. or above all and principially in the horizon of λóγος structure of a ) understood as the cornerstone of the reign or empire of "logic. of the command?) to think thought or to think thinking. for Heidegger as the "inventor" of the Presocratics. 45 44 43 Is that to say that thinking. liable to return to some of the thoughts concern- . what calls to thinking? No doubt. or if we must further ) (but what exactly is compelling here? what is "specify"the thinking of thinkers. as a directive structure in the interpretation of understanding. "what is thinking?" when thought no longer lets itself be determined either as representative. likewise. as the Heraclitus course indicates in a particularly striking manner. the esse. its task (Aufgabe)? The "object" of thought is henceforth and unambiguously thinking (cum emphasi). it was possible to extricate a structure of anticipation (the Vorstruktur). gives itself over to being. the "what. or better.

it would be rather more appropriate to speak of logo-logy. Therefore. course. in refusing to repeat for his benefit the Platonic gesture of parricide! 46 It must be that what is there for speaking and thinking that it is. absolutely remarkable in this return to a renewed understanding of λóγος out of the first Greek thinkers is that this understanding is attached exclusively to "words" (Worte) to the detriment of all dialectic discursivity. taking the measure of " . Wittgenstein). 49 48 47 the question of logic is expressly engaged "on the way to language"Unterwegs zur Sprache: if 50 51 logic must be dismantled. it is precisely because it bars access to a renewed understanding of λóγος . We can recognize in fact in that emphatic sense of "Denken"thinking what is to be thought. The destruction of logic in fact always . referring to Novalis. thinking thinking. from now on.Document Page 37 ing existence (Schelling. thinking or. the principal stakes of the destruction of logicradicalized by means of the return upstream to the original words of the first thinkers are to open a new access to language and its proper . losing the phenomenality in its specificity and its regional diversity. For with respect to the emphatic thinking. and it is nothing which is not (Parmenides." As we have already emphasized in fact. "? One can even be tempted to see there something like a that is. at the same time. does it not risk. thinking about "Zudenkendes"as the original principle of what would become soon after. with the later Heidegger. Coleridge. In the critical mode we are nevertheless allowed to ask ourselves in order to know whether and to what extent the Heideggerian meditation.1-2). when it is overcome by the non-dialectical "reflexivity" of Denken. absolutely expressed thinking what is to be thought is. furthermore. Whereas there is not being for being. the "tautological" structure of the ''word. the very dimension of " fatal form of the error of Parmenides to which Heidegger would have yielded. would finally call logology. the misreading of which constitutes perhaps the fundamental trait of the destiny of the West. according to a structure of tautological reflexivity. to which we will return." in the horizon of what Heidegger. Fragment B6. At least since the Summer 1934 Logik essential deployment: the Wesen der Sprache as Sage. What is.

to distinguish. in its parataxic structure. . recommencing (wiederanfangen). were it to be speculative) their whole power of disclosure and of nomination. heißt λóγος : die Sage. within the extraordinary conjunction that is elaborated in the middle of the 1930s. according to the first and unshakable unity of "Sagen""Zeigen" and of the ''Sache"of the very unity which Heidegger would thematize a little later in an exemplary manner in his commentary on the poem of Stefan George: Das Wort (US. it is necessary to try to think together: the new determination of nihilism and of the forgetting of being apprehended henceforth in its destinal dimensions. if not impossible. worin die Dinge nur für den redenden und schreibenden Verkehr verpackt werden. according to its new accentuation. 54 53 It is certainly difficult." and is already what underlies the whole approach of the 1935 course: Wir überspringen . . at first understood as a beginning-again. Im Wort. diesen ganzen Verlauf der Verunstaltung und des Verfalls und suchen die unzerstörte Nennkraft der Sprache und Worte wieder zu erobern.Document Page 38 implies that of grammarphilosophical and propositional. 52 But this new relation to language. 220. in der Sprache werden und sind erst die Dinge (EM. in making itself attentive once more to the "words" (mots) or to words (paroles) resulted from an experiment all at once of "thinking" and of "language. . 237). . What emerges in any case. which the frequentation of the Presocratics opens. the return to the Presocratic beginning. 11). the opening of a new and other beginning. it intends to go back up this side of the syntactic and thus to reach a more original figure of language. denn die Worte und die Sprache sind keine Hülsen. OWL. No doubt. and alone to be able to leave to words (mots) (which are no longer only terms in a proposition. ] Das älteste Wort für das so gedachte Walten des Wortes. according to a more original modality. is the extraordinary historial-destinal (historiale-destinale) "dramatization" of the question of being. . from the first Greek beginning. between the principle motives and the related or secondary motives. [. die zeigend Seiendes in sein es ist erscheinen läßt (US. 140): Das Walten des Wortes blitz auf als die Bedingnis des Dinges zum Ding. 55 in . für das Sagen.

BC. The new thematization of the beginning. deep in the past. 16. 13) Of course. The repetition appeals to our decision and is by that able to open a future anew. from the moment that the latter. BC. envisaged this beginning not as what would be far behind us. remains essentially to come. 58 57 In one sense. it could seem legitimate to compare such a thematic of the beginning to the Husserlian approach aiming at a return. but also in the Summer 1941 course. 15. the call. It is also by thislet us repeatthat the meditation concerning beginning in view of an "other" beginning is still closely linked to the question of language and of thought in language: . since it is defined more in terms of listening. that we find in the Beiträge zur Philosophie. There is in fact a true beginning and a beginning freedom only "where humanity demonstrates decision in its relation to the state of being and to truth" (GA 51. 289). to the proto-foundation (Urstiftung).Document Page 39 the sense of the question: Wie steht es um das Sein? How does it stand with being for us today? Ist das 'Sein' ein bloßes Wort und seine Bedeutung ein Dunst oder das geistige Schicksal des Abendlandes? Fragen: Wie steht es um das Sein?das besagt nichts Geringeres als den Anfang unseres geschichtlichen-geistigen Dasein wieder-holen. an object of an antiquarian curiosity. is inscribed and circumscribed in the history of the truth of being. Heidegger himself emphasizes moreover the decisive dimension of any true beginning: "By beginning. 13). On account of this. never having taken place as such. 56 The necessity of this re-petition of the first beginning emerges. of response to the address. reveals no such voluntative (voluntatif) or voluntaristic trait. just like the Rückgang in den Grund der Metaphysik. in that case. the promise (Zu-spruch). um ihn in den Anderen Anfang zu verwandeln (EM. by way of a figure of erring (Irre). we mean the original decisions which carry and support in advance Western history in its essentiality" (GA 51. but more so as what. the meditation concerning beginning depends in turn on a reflection newly-centered on freedom. it remains to be specified that such an inaugural decision is all but arbitrary or fortuitous: it does not start from nothing. associated with nihilism. beyond the sedimentations and overlayings which debase the original sense and disfigure the initial intention.

with an essential glance into the structure of truth. nor "forget" anything. . . Heidegger expresses himself in the Winter 1937-38 course. The Greeks did not neglect anything at all. . where it is a matter at first of characterizing in its historial import the mutation which is fulfilled with Plato and the resulting subjugation of truth to exactitude. did not pose the question of truth as . . as Heidegger emphasizes a bit later. whether it is true that there it concerns a question not elaborated nor explored thoroughly by the Greeks. . on this side of metaphysics as a unitarily Platonic-Aristotelian determination. . . linked to a determined regime of λóγος. 61 And even if the first thinkers. . makes a system with a double decision. as "logic" and as language.] Dieser Spruch spricht die Grunderfahrung und Grundstellung des antiken Menschen aus. that does not simply authorize us to maintain that they would have neglected it (Versäumnis). more or less contemporary to the Beiträge. The return upstream on this side of Plato." 59 In this way. they unfolded their thought on the ground of "Grund62 . In the Summer 1931 course. the first Greeks are credited. stage by stage.Document Page 40 Was heißt Denken? "Wir stehen vor der Entscheidung zwischen dem Ende und seinem vielleicht noch Jahrhunderte füllenden Auslaufund dem Anderen Anfang. which opens the meditation concerning a new beginning and which by that calls for inquiry about the inaugural words of the Presocratic thinkers. It would be necessary here to want to be able to follow in detail." What awaits our decision is indeed at first the "question" of truth. in der und aus der ein Blick in das Wesen der Wahrheit als Un-verborgenheit des Seienden erwachte. The fragment of Heraclitus (B123) is then assigned a central function: 60 in diesem Spruch des Heraklit ist die Grunderfahrung ausgesprochen. even the Greeks before Socrates. Unverborgenheit. through Heraclitus. the development of Heidegger's position in his attempt to establish the status of truth understood as Unverborgenheit in the horizon or rather as the horizon of Presocratic thought. mit der. It is in any case the experience of the end of metaphysics. [ . Vom Wesen der Wahrheit. relative to the "truth" and to the "word. . mit der allererst und gerade das Philosophieren beginnt.

the essence of language flashed in the light of being. <><><><><><><><><><><><> Howeverand this is the point which here interests us in the highest degreethe first thinkers. after the event. taken absolutely. But the lightning abruptly vanished. die das Anfängliche und Fraglose blieb. . however. transmitted by O. . assuredly deserves . language in its essence. prior to the "discovery" of the Presocratics. . constitutes the true horizon of the meditation opened in the 1930s. The self-explanatory evidence. . are also those who let appear. upon the ground of this non-thematic experience of truth as . That the question of language or better of poetic speech is henceforth intrinsically linked. in its flashing light and its power of nomination. to pose the question of the epochal essence of truth as withdrawal: für die Griechen." and it comes back to us finally. To which it is undoubtedly necessary to add also that the opening of the inquiry in the direction of language allows us to remove the difficulties or the dead-ends which are linked to the problematic of thinking. . and if with this question the question of knowing "who we are ourselves" can finally be decided. Die bliebt im 63 Dasein der Griechen das Mächtigste zugleich und das Verborgenste. . to the radicalization of the destruction of logic and . . 205). we understand how the question of truth is articulated strictly with that of language.Document Page 41 erfahrung" or of "Grundstimmung. (GA 45. we find its most striking indication in the fact that it to the thematic elaboration of truth as is the dialogue with Hölderlin which. 65 64 "[T]hat first illumination of the essence of language as saying disappears immediately into a veiling darkness. Pöggeler. in the Heideggerian meditation. Let us recall here simply these two passages from Vorträge und Aufsätze where the Greek inception of thought and the apprehension of the essence of language are found intimately associated: Once. . . . " If therefore it is to us that it returns historically and historially (historialement) to elaborate the still reserved question of truth. in the beginning of Western thinking.

zuvor schon wie andere Dichter zunächst bekannt. . It is to him that it returns in fact to capture in his speech the signs (Winke) of the gods. it is not because it would permit us to go back up to an entreaty of subjective brilliance. to truth." If poetry is thus assigned a decisive import in the inception of being and the world. stiften die Dichter. in dem Augenblick der ersten äußersten Fragwürdigkeit des Seyns selbst und seiner Wahrheit (Wahrheitsvortrag 1929-1930) wurde Hölderlins Wort. "Germanien" and "Der Rhein. d. or between god and the people. he makes this word enter. the course takes for its conducting-wire the last line of the hymn. his head bare. charged with lightnings in the language of his people .h. zum Geschick.Document Page 42 to be taken seriously and it allows us above all to understand what are the stakes invested at the outset in the interpretation of the Presocratics: Im Augenblick des Abwerfens der letzten Mißdeutungen durch die Metaphysik. "Andenken": Was bleibt aber. A line which Heidegger immediately "ontologizes" in making of the "Dichtung." which becomes henceforth the paradigmatic figure of language. . he stands "under the storms of god . . during the Winter of 1934-1935. Right away. by endeavoring to examine the hymns. and he can thus represent in an exemplary manner human existence as much as it is "ecstatic entreaty. 66 What is this destinal figure worth to the speech of Hölderlin and why was it able to play an absolutely decisive role in the reading of the Presocratics? The first course dedicated to Hölderlin." and exposure all at once to being. 69 67 68 If the meditation concerning poetic speech of Hölderlin plays such a role in the destruction of logic and of the propositional regime . with the beginning of a response. no doubt. to the injunction of the telling: The poet encloses and averts the lightning of the god in the word. the "Stiftung des Seyns. Dasein is nothing else but the exposure to the overpowering nature of Being. . but it is more so because the poet finds himself immediately placed in the position of mediator between the gods and humans." left defenseless and dispossessed of himself." supplies us.

is not a picture of nature. "The Rhein. we are a language-event. . and telling. to be understood at first as a dialogue between gods and humans for which the poet exercises his function of mediator. [. The telling of this poetry is in itself the jubilation of being. ] Only where the word of language happens does being and non-being open up. In a word. is the poetical (Das Gedichtete). [ .Document Page 43 elaborated upon the model of . . . and not a simile either. not only in the superficial sense where it unfolds in time. when it happens that the gods summon us. . that Heidegger thematizes the word as a response . [ . it is on the contrary itself. What is the relation of dialogue to language? In dialogue. there is not here some enunciation which says something about something else. better. We are a happening of language (Sprachgeschehnis)." Heidegger writes in this sense: The first stanza of our poetry. it is at first because the poetic speech does not let itself be interpreted as an expression of the states of the soul." The only "object" of the Dichtung. 71 70 The "Dichtung" finds itself thus performing a quasi-speculative or specular function opposite being: it is in and through poetic speech that it establishes its reign. Through the dialogue humans are in language. . ] This telling is not the covering in words for some meaning hidden behind the surface. is to tell of being.] Our being happens as dialogue. and this happening is properly its being. within the Hölderlinian context." Poetry is to tell. . where one can measure in time its beginning and end. 72 It is no doubt from this understanding of the dialogue. brings us to language. and this happening is temporal. that which asks whether and how we are. but above all because the happening of language is the beginning and the ground of proper historical time to humans. . just as it is said. The Dichten is himself "Sagen in der Art des weisenden Offenbarmachen. . worthy of its essence. and even this poetry. Concerning the hymn. come to the word from what claims it: We are a dialogue. nor any longer as "objectivation. It is still within the framework of the exegesis of Hölderlin that Heidegger redefines in turn the being of humansthey who "live poetically"as a dialogue (Gespräch). . and place us under their summons. the reign of being. language happens.

The gift of the word or better of that "speaking which language speaks through man. asking above all if the Hölderlinian poetic. could well be thus what commands in depth the discovery of the Presocratics: to name. but thought is itself the gift and the acknowledgement or the thanks. must tell and think being: if the authentic thinker is always necessarily identical to that to which he gives himself: then it is important to define in its ground thinking as commemorating or giving thanks (Gedanc. to tell the truth. 73 The Hölderlinian poetic. we may ponder. Wort). Dank). attentive in any case to the mixture (bigarure) of what is always phenomenally specified. without having necessarily to favor that of the agreement taken as essential or destinal: Hölderlin-Heraclitus. the gift which gives to thinking is also precisely the gift of thought: thought is not here a gift in return (a counter-gift in exchange for an initial gift). or better as that response through which the gift is attested as such." 74 If then the thinking and telling. as powerful as it is. dear to Novalis. Germanien. It is always a "gift" which calls to thinking. The concern of language and what is said in and through it is unfolded no doubt in multiple modes. by extending to thought what emerges first in the poetic telling.Document Page 44 or a co-respondence (Entsprechung) to a call or an address (Anspruch). in response to the gift. that is to say. by its insistence upon the "word" (mot. The poetic character (Dichtungscharakter) of thinking remains still veiled. . more playful. Heidegger will repeat in his last great course: Was heißt Denken? However. Meanwhile. is alone in a position to open the ear to the word of the first thinker-poets of Greece. in its dimensions of nomination and its function of commemoration. asking incidentally if the Novalisian logology does not open up the space of play of a less sacred (sacrale) word. to respond to the entreaty of what offers itself to telling and to thinking. then it is also important to reflect telling upon itself. is to call by name. according to the determining figure of tautology or of logology. Heidegger noted in an aphorism.

" 5. put back into question by the different "retractions" which concern in particular the . Cf. "Neure Forschungen über Logik. 159). in particular in "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking" (SD." in GA 1. and by John Sallis. Platon: Sophistes. 1985). 57). in turn and radically. Cf. . 176 sq. 9. 532. 144. Logik. Cf. 188-89. "Where Does Being and Time Begin?. Cf. IM. "Historical critical destruction. 98-118. Von Aristoteles zu Plato. . "A Threshold of Metaphysics." 7. 11. The Question of Language in Heidegger's History of Being. Cf." in Delimitations: Phenomenology and the End of Metaphysics (Bloomington." in Revue de Philosophie Ancienne. 2. 10. Marlène Zarader's study. Cf. are intended to bring us face to face with a possibility of undergoing an experience with language" (OWL." in GA 1. Endlichkeit.Document Page 45 Notes 1.) 6. "Le miroir aux trois reflets. GA 29-30. Unterwegs zur Sprache: "Die folgenden drei Vörtrage. . GA 19. möchten uns vor eine Möglichkeit bringen. EM. in particular the opening of the course on The Sophist. 1986. 1986). well documented by Robert Bernasconi. mit der Sprache eine Erfahrung zu machen" (US. "Vorwort zur ersten Ausgabe der 'Frühen Schriften'. interpretation of 76 sq.). the "debate" with Paul Friedländer.: "Historische-hermeneutische Vorbereitung. 1993). John Sallis." according to the formulation in the 1925-1926 course. Der Grundsatz der Hermeneutik: Vom Hellen ins Dunkle. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit." 8. NJ: Humanities Press. It would be indeed another question to know if the new division operated in the very womb of ancient philosophy. Einsamkeit. dessen Lösung der Zukunft vorbehalten bleibt. Theodore Kisiel. 4. 3. 2 (Atlantic Highlands. 55: "Gleichwohl zeigen sie einen mir damals noch verschlossenen Wegbeginn: in der Gestalt des Kategorienproblems die Seinsfrage. 10 sq. (Translators' note: English translations of Heidegger's German are given when available. "The three lectures . Die Grundbegriffe der MetaphysikWelt. the division with which we will be concerned in what follows is. ch. IN: Indiana University Press. 248 sq." in Delimitations. The Genesis of Being and Time (Berkeley: University of California Press. die Frage nach der Sprache in der Form der Bedeutungslehre. 18: "Was ist Logik? Schon hier stehen wir vor einem Problem. . GA 21.

Einführung in die Metaphysik: "Dieses Heraustreten des λóγος und die Vorbereitung desselben zum Gerichtshof über das Sein geschieht noch . Cf.Document 12.

in view of an other and new beginning. due to the infrequency of the author's use of "mots" we have indicated this by following the translation with this French term in parenthesis in each instance. in Philosophy in the Twentieth Century. 235. 144). ". . Barrett and H. J. Two. . Cf. We shall only master Greek philosophy as the beginning of Western philosophy if we also understand this beginning in the beginning of its end. 14. Aiken (New York: Random House. daß er den anfänglichen Anfang zugleich verdeckte. at least as much as it is declared in the Rektoratsrede. Es bestimmt sogar das Ende derselben. the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle.Document Page 46 innerhalb der griechischen Philosophie. 189). 18. die Philosophie Platons und die des Aristoteles. But this beginning of the end of the great beginning. the thematization of the first great beginning. 179). Translators' note: We have translated both "paroles" and "mots" as "words" throughout the text. Barlow. obzwar verstellte Offenbarkeit des Nichts in unserem Dasein . 13. wenn wir diesen Anfang zugleich in seinem anfänglichen Ende begreifen. D. . Einführung in die Metaphysik: "Die Philosophie der Griechen gelangt zur abendländischen Herrschaft nicht aus ihrem ursprünglichen Anfang. denn erst dieses und nur dieses wurde für die Folgezeit zum 'Anfang' und zwar derart. Recalling these dates is already sufficient to program the study yet to be conducted of the possible intimate connection among the opening of a new relation to Presocratic Greece. . bleibt groß. whose repetition imposes itself upon us today. . attentive to its inaugural words. 16. For the ensuing period it was only this end that became the 'beginning'. . so much so that it concealed the original beginning. GA 21. and Heidegger's political engagement. 1962) 251-270. Aber dieses anfängliche Ende des großen Anfangs. auch wenn wir die Größe ihrer abendländischen Auswirkung noch ganz abrechnen" (EM. "This secession of the λóγος which started λóγος on its way to becoming a court of justice over being occurred in Greek philosophy itself. which in Hegel assumed great and definitive form" (IM. 19." (GA 9. das in Hegel groß und endgültig zur Vollendung gestaltet wird" (EM. Wir bewültigen die griechische Philosophie als den Anfang der abendländischen Philosophie erst dann. [T]he constant and widespread though distorted revelation of the nothing in our existence. W. 15. ." GA 9. Indeed. "ständige und ausgebreitete. sondern aus dem anfänglichen Ende. 17. Cf. 116). remains great even if we totally discount the greatness of its Western consequences" (IM. We will note in this perspective the "genealogy" of the questioning beyond the "physics" established by the exegesis of the allegory of the cave in the "Platons Lehre vom Wahrheit. 104). GA 34. Vol." (BW. 137). "Plato's Doctrine of Truth. eds. "The philosophy of the Greeks conquered the Western world not in its original beginning but in the incipient end." trans. it brought about the end of Greek philosophy.

R. ed. GA 9. 130. when it follows only the thought which 'logic' confines within its forms and rules. 26. "How did the original separation between λóγος and separate and distinct λóγος come to appear on the scene? How did the λóγος (the 'logical') become the essence of thinking? How did this λóγος in the sense of reason and understanding achieve domination over being in the beginning of Greek philosophy?" (IM. Heidegger (semestre verano 1934) en el lagado de Helene Weiss. 24. Unfortunately it is impossible today. 128 sq. 90.h. of which logistics . Why does the lecture put the term in quotation marks? In order to indicate that 'logic' is only one interpretation of the essence of thought. 29. Lecciones de M. precisely that one which rests." 23. also. ed. "Die Verneinung ist aber auch nur eine Weise des nichtenden. 188. Weiss. IM. 117). "Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache. EM. 21. 120: "Die Frage nach dem Nichts durchgreift aber zugleich das Ganze der Metaphysik. French translation in Manifeste du Cercle de Vienne et autres écrits. Der einzig mögliche Schritt ist nur noch der. 1991). ed. Farias (Madrid: MEC." in Heidegger and Modern Philosophy. only one sort of behavior that has been grounded beforehand in the nihilation of the nothing" (BW. 121-122). Nachschrift to Logica by H. auf das Nichten des Nichts vorgängig gegründeten Verhalten" (GA 9.Document Page 47 20. 27. Carnap. as the word indicates. a little later. Logica. 1978). Murray (New Haven: Yale University Press. im Grunde vor die Entscheidung über die rechtmäßige Herrschaft der 'Logik' in der Metaphysik. IM. "[D]ie sich ständig steigernde Machtstellung des Logischen" (GA 40. bilingual edition. 123). 105). Which the resumption echoes. IM. 117. 197). 22." 25. 1931.h. in the 1943 Postface to the lecture (Was ist Metaphysik?). cf. as we know. "Es scheint nicht nur so. GA 40. 118. 2." Erkenntnis II. that is. Cf. GA 40. The mistrust towards 'logic'. 131. to date these "marginalia. GA 9. d. "But negation is also only one way of nihilating. 1985). Denn die Logik hat trotz Kant und Hegel im Wesentlichen und Anfänglichen keinen Schritt mehr getan. "The Overcoming of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language. marking that "logic" (the term is henceforth always used with quotation marks) is only one interpretation of truth: "the barely formulated question makes it necessary now to know whether or if this thought takes place well within the law of its truth. sie (nämlich als die maßgebende Blickbahn der Auslegung des Seins) von ihrem Grund her aus der Angeln zu heben" (GA 40. Es ist so. Antonia Soulez (Paris: Puf. M. on the proof of being reached in Greek thought. come about? How did a 28. 153-179. d. sofern sie uns vor das Problem der Ursprungs der Vereinung zwingt. V..

IM. . The original thought is the echo of the favor of being. Not only is speaking of nothing utterly repellent to thought.'' (GA 9. Cf. 36. He is patently promoting the spirit of negation and serving the cause of disintegration. weil er im Grunde seines Wesens ein Sager. . In speaking of nothing he makes it into a something. EM. .und Neinsager. He who takes the nothing seriously is allying himself with nothingness. In speaking he speaks against what he intended. ." in Heidegger et la phénoménologie (Paris: Vrin. 35. let alone actually unfolding the question and guiding it toward an answer" (IM. 2. To speak of nothing is illogical. It might be the other way around. in Einführung in die Metaphysik: "'Einführung in die Metaphysik' heißt demnach: hineinführen in das Fragen der Grundfrage" (EM. 31. a word which alone gives birth to language as disclosure of the word (parole) in words (mots) . . perhaps in consequence. The response of thought is the origin of the human word (parole). . Heidegger expressly indicates. Courtine. 15). Logica. J. Einführung in die Metaphysik: "Denn Menschsein hießt: ein Sagender sein. 90. in which the only realitythat the state of being islights up and lets itself happen.-F. 118. 308. Der Mensch ist nur deshalb ein Ja. 25). 23). Perhaps the whole body of logic as it is known to us. But discourse that contradicts itself offends against the fundamental rule of discourse (λóγος). the speaker" (IM. 37. altogether. Cf. "Das Nichts bleibt grundsätzlich aller Wissenschaft unzugänglich" (EM. 34. . This echo is the human response to the silent voice of being. 19). 187-205. What disregards the fundamental law of thought and also destroys faith and the will to build is pure nihilism" (IM. "He who speaks of nothing does not know what he is doing. "For to be a man is to speak. it also undermines all culture and all faith. against 'logic'. "For it cannot be decided out of hand whether logic and its fundamental rules can. 19). 25). nothingness remains inaccessible to science" (IM. der Sager ist" (EM. . arises from the knowledge of this thought which finds its source in the proof of the truth of being and not in the consideration of the objectivity of the state of being. 310). "Phénomnénologie et science de l'être. 32. 33. Man says yes and no only because in his profound essence he is a speaker. 1990). . "In principle. 30. is grounded in a very definite answer to the question about beings. all thinking which solely follows the laws of thought prescribed by traditional logic is incapable from the very start of even understanding the question about beings by its own resources.Document Page 48 can be considered today as the natural degeneration. provide a standard for dealing with the question about beings as such. perhaps all the logic that we treat as a gift from heaven. 82). "'Introduction to metaphysics' means accordingly: an introduction to the asking of the fundamental question" (IM. He contradicts himself. 62).

horschsam) auf den λóγος gehört. 189." 40. In this sense. 48. by the interpretation of humans in Greek (Sophoclean) tragedy. 59). Heraclitus. worin ich das Wesen der Sprache suchte." in US.-F. In fact. An abstraction made once again of the Summer 1932 course (to appear): Der Anfang der abendländischen Philosophie (Anaximander und Parmenides).Document Page 49 38. Cf. 189. Cf. . inquiring about the "Seinsweise" proper to the multiplicity of regions or sectors of being. GA 55. 219: "die Frage bleibt. in die ursprüngliche 'Logik' zu gelangen. 185: "Die einfache Absicht dieser Vorlesung geht darauf. That to which Heidegger at first appeared so attentive. Heidegger's translation reads: "Habt ihr nicht bloß mich angehört. is occupied. The address is intended here as happening or proceeding according to a precedence forever unable to be anticipated. 49. . . sonder habt ihr (ihm gehorsam. following the essential connection of the "Rückgang" and the "Überwindung" already well established at the time of the Einführung in die Metaphysik." in Reading Heidegger: Commemorations. the destruction of logic includes the destruction of metaphysics (GA 55. Courtine." 45. 231-32. IN: Indiana University Press. 93: "Im Sommersemester des Jahres 1934 hielt ich eine Vorlesung unter dem Titel: 'Logik'. "Phenomenology and/or Tautology. Es war jedoch eine Besinnung auf den λóγος. We must also note that the Summer 1942 course on Hölderlin. 241-57. John Sallis (Bloomington. dann ist Wissen (das darin besteht). 46. "When you have listened not to me but to the Meaning. wie das Gedachte ist. 43. GA 55. 253 and 257). 243). ed. ob nur als Gegenstand und Objekt . GA 55. 44. 189. Cf. . I offered a lecture series under the title 'Logic'. in which I was trying to find the nature of language'' (OWL. Cf. We must recall that Heidegger himself refers to this course in his "Aus einem Gespräch von der Sprache. 47. 1993). GA 55. Heraklit (Summer semester 1943 and Summer semester 1944). however. according to the multiplicity of its irreducible senses. GA 51. in its central part (63-152). Fragment B50: . Parmenides (Winter semester 1942-1943). GA 55. Der Ister (GA 53). 42. J. the central question of the course on Heraclitus. GA 55. 8). Grundbegriffe (Summer semester 1941). mit dem λóγος das Gleiche sagend zu sagen: Ein ist alles" (GA 55. 41. GA 54." "In the summer semester of 1934. it was a reflection on the λóγος. 39. it is wise within the same Meaning to say: One is All" (EGT. also GA 55.

. . let us skip over this whole process of deformation and decay and attempt to regain the unimpaired strength of words. 14). . for words and language are not wrappings in which things are packed for the commerce of those who write and speak. . 13). in showing. " (EM. ] The oldest word for the rule of the word thus thought. 52. . Cf.] Because the destiny of language is grounded in a nation's relation to . which in Hegel assumed great and definitive form. 11). . intellectual experience of being that they discovered what they had to call 54. 53. 51. lets beings appear in their 'it is"' (OWL. Cf. 189). 232). 155). . . .und Unverhältnis des heutigen Daseins zur Sprache in seiner ganzen Tragweite auszudenken. sondern aus dem anfänglichen Ende. deschalb wird sich uns die Frage nach dem Sein zuinnerst mit der Frage nach der Sprache verschlingen" (EM. . Nur die Lehre des Wortes 'Sein'.Document Page 50 50. is not merely a particular instance of the general exhaustion of language. "And only a very few are capable of thinking through the full implications of this misrelation and unrelation of present-day being-there to language. But the emptiness of the word 'being' . is λóγος: Saying which. sondern umgekehrt: aufgrund einer dichtend-denkenden Grunderfahrung des Seins was erschloß sich ihnen das. sondern verwehrt hat und noch verwehrt" (GA 55. ist nicht ein bloßer Einzelfall der allgemeinen Sprachvernutzung. was sie nennen mußten" (EM. . rather. "The philosophy of the Greeks conquered the Western world not in its original beginning but in the incipient end. dieses Miß. 144). "Wir haben Gründe für die Behauptung. of its forgetting or of its "abandoning": "Auch sind nur die Wenigsten noch imstande. [. "But . sondernder zerstörte Bezug zum Sein als solchem ist der eigentliche Grund für unser gesamtes Mißverhältnis zur Sprache. Einführung in die Metaphysik: "Die Griechen haben nicht erst an den Naturvorgängen erfahren. . also Einführung in die Metaphysik: "Die Philosophie der Griechen gelangt zur abendländischen Herrschaft nicht aus ihrem ursprünglichen Anfang. [. . . das in Hegel groß und endgültig zur Vollendung gestaltet wird. as is also the question of being. . 218). nach dem der λóγος in der abendländischen Geschichte und in der Weltgeschichte überhaupt sein Wesen entfaltet und nicht entfaltet. The problematic of language is itself historially-destinally overdetermined. It is in words and language that things first come into being and are" (IM. but the other way around: it was through a fundamental poetic and " (IM. daß gerade 'die Logik' die Wesensentfaltung des λóγος nicht nur gehemmt. '' (IM.] Weil das Schicksal der Sprache in dem jeweiligen Bezug eines Volkes zum Sein gegründet ist. ist. 39). . "The Greeks did not learn what is through natural phenomena. bildet sich die 'Logik' und ihre Geschichte" (GA 55. the destroyed relation to being as such is the actual reason for the general misrelation to language. for Saying. . . . "Gemäß dem Geschick. "The word's rule springs to light as that which makes the thing be a thing. [.

Doch entsprechend zweideutig wie der Titel 'Seinsfrage' ist die Rede von der 'Seinsvergessenheit" (EM. . in order to transform it into a new beginning" (IM. aber nicht eigens zur Frage machten und nicht ergründeten. Das erste. 108). 124. to repeat. aber das beweist ja nicht. ." what awaits us. sondern ist schärfste und weiteste Auseinandersetzung der Daseinskräfte und der Mächte des Seins. but. daβ die Griechen zwar das Wesen der Wahrheit als Unverborgenheit erfuhren und in Anspruch nahmen und stets bereit hatten. . 12-13. Basic Questions of Philosophy: Selected 'Problems' of 'Logic': "We are standing before the decision between the end (and its running out. . Ein solch innerster Wandel aber ist keine bloβe Ablösung vom Bisherigen.Document Page 51 being. the beginning of our historical-spiritual existence. Dieses bliebt vergessen. . ist der Eingang in die Überwindung der Metaphysik. daβ dieser Wandel nicht geschieht. 56. 51). 15-16. GA 34. Grundbegriffe. 14 62. 39). the question of being will involve us deeply in the question of language" (IM. GA 34. ] To ask 'How does it stand with being?' means nothing less than to recapture. GA 45. 57. ob dieses Geschehnis ein Versäumnis und die Folge einer Unkraft zum Fragen war. an deren Beginn wir stehen. 114-115: "Wir müssen uns deshalb darauf besinnen. Ausgerählt 'Probleme' der 'Logik'. But just as ambiguous as the 'question of being' referred to in the title is what is said about 'forgetfulness of being"' (IM. . [ . daβ wir nicht mit jeder Stunde und jedem Tag in eine völlige neue Geschichte menschlichen Daseins hineinrollen. GA 45.] Die Seinsfrage ist zweideutig. was jetzt und zunächst 'ist'. . ob dieses Geschehnis. 324: "dieser Wandel des Wesens der Wahrheit ist die Umwälzung des ganzen menschlichen Seins." (BQ.dieses aber als das. 37. Das Ausmaß und die Unerbittlichkeit dieser Umwälzung des Seins des Menschen und der Welt vermogen zwar nur wenige heute schon zu ahnen und abzuschätzen." 61. 60. 14). "[D]ie 'Seinsfrage' im Sinne der metaphysischen Frage nach dem Seinenden als solchem frägt gerade nicht thematisch nach dem Sein. GA 51. deren Vollendung zuvor erfahren sein Muβ. . "[T]he 'question of being' in the sense of the metaphysical question regarding beings as such does not inquire thematically into being. In this way of asking. 58. "The beginning is not the past. 18). "Is 'being' a mere word and its meaning a vapor or is it the spiritual destiny of the Western world? [ . 55. Grundfragen der Philosophie. was not ist. oder ob darin gerade die eigentliche Größe des griechischen Denkens besteht und sich . being remains forgotten. which may still take centuries) and another beginning. having decided everything in advance. BC. 59.

Cf. Magurshak and S. was uns und den Künftigen zum Wahren werden und das Wahre sein kann. Martin Heidegger's Path of Thinking. being in question from Husserl or from Descartes (GA 20. 33. Denn was im Anfang der Geschichte der Wesensgründung der Wahrheit geschah. took it up. the term regularly employed by Heidegger. Cf. 68. For Greek Dasein. . 66. . that the Greeks did indeed experience the essence of truth as unconcealedness.' schutzlos preis. NJ: Humanities Press)." 67. 63. . remained the most powerful and at the same time the most hidden" (BQ. 30-31) . 65.und von sich weggegeben. 71 sq." in EGT. but is instead the delimitation of the way we take a stand toward truth and stand in the truth. most extreme questionability of Being itself and of its truth (lecture on truth 1929-30).Document Page 52 vollzieht. . Aber der Blitz verlosch jäh" (VA. 221). "Einmal jedoch.. GA 4. steht fir uns immer vor uns zur Entscheidungals Entscheidung darüber. Heideggers (Stuttgart: Neske. "Logos (Heraclitus. Fragment B 50). 64. 78." "We must therefore reflect on this occurrence. Ibid. . Dasein ist nichts anderes als die Ausgesetztheit in die Übermacht des Seyns" (GA 39. Was this event mere neglect and the result of an incapacity of questioning. . Das Ereignis 1941/1942 as quoted by Otto Pöggeler in Der Denkweg M. . blitzte das Wesen der Sprache im Lichte des Seins auf. 1989. Barber (Atlantic Highlands. or does the genuine greatness of Greek thought consist precisely in this and accomplish itself in it? The decision here is not an attempt to explain and rescue a past incident . "Der Dichter zwingt und bannt die Blitze des Gottes ins Wort und stellt dieses blitzgeladene Wort in die Sprache seines Volkes . . in the moment of the first. became a destiny. . . and always had it available to them. 237). wie wir zur Wahrheit und in der Wahrheit stehen.und Rettungsversuch eines vergangenen Vorgangs . 30 sq. already previously known like that of other poets. . trans. but did not question it explicitly and did not fathom it. also the commentary on "Wie wenn am Feiertage. sondern steht 'unter Gottes Gewittern''mit entblösstem Haupte. 100-101). in return. remained inceptional and unquestionable. "Versäumnnis" is. 176: "In the moment of throwing off the last metaphysical misinterpretations." in Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung. 69. "[F]or the Greeks. Hölderlin's word. 175). 1963). wohl aber die Umgrenzung der Art und Weise. D. §§ 12 and 13). 218. im Beginn des abendländischen Denkens." (VA. that is. For what came to pass at the beginning of the history of the essential foundation of truth always remains for us still to be decideda decision about what for us and for the future can become true and can be true" (BQ. Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitsbegriff. . "Moira (Parmenides VIII)": "jenes erste Aufleuchten der Sprachwesens als Sage alsbald in eine Verhüllung entschwindet. GA 39. . Die Entscheidung hierüber ist nicht der Erklärungs.

. im Geschehen dessen. aber nicht nur in dem äußerlichen Sinne. "Language speaks through the mouth of man" (WCT. . . [ .] Nur wo Sprache geschieht. . wie wir antworten. daß es in der Zeit abläuft. sondern das Sprachgeschehnis ist der Anfang und Grund der eigentlichen geschichtlichen Zeit des Menschen. ] Unser Seyn geschieht als Gespräch. . ist das Walten des Seyns" (GA 39. Das Sagen dieser Dichtung ist in sich der Jubel des Seyns. 328). GA 39. [. . uns zur Sprache bringen. sondern es selbst. kein Vergleich. Wie stehen Gespräch und Sprache zueinander? Im Gespräch geschieht die Sprache. Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens. . "Die erste Strophe unseres Gedichtes und dieses selbst ist keine Naturschilderung. Dauer und Aufhören jeweils zeitlich meßbar ist. Es wird hier überhaupt nicht etwas über etwas anderes gesagt. eröffnen sich Sein und Nichtsein" (GA 39. .Document Page 53 70. GA 13. das die Sprache durch den Menschen spricht" (WHD.] Diese Sagen ist nicht eine Worthülle für einen Sinn und Hintersinn. nach Beginn. . und dieses Geschehen ist zeitlich. 84. . "Sprechen. und dieses Geschehen ist eigentlich ihr Seyn. Das Denken ist die Urdichtung" (GA 5. .] Das Denken ist das ursprüngliche dictare. 87). uns unter ihren Anspruch stellen. so wie es gesagt ist. also "Der Spruch des Anaximander": "Das Denken sagt das Diktat der Wahrheit des Seins. . Wir sindein Sprachgeschehnis. Cf. daß die Götter uns ansprechen. . 74. 31. 255-6). 69-70) 73. [. 72. ob und wie wir sind. 128). [. 71. "Wir sind ein Gespräch.

und es sorget mit Gaben Selber ein Gott für ihn. Jean Beaufret clearly presents this long-held assumption thus: . entstehen. "Brot und Wein" 1 To the extent that Heidegger's works. Thus. Heidegger produces an incomparably large body of work devoted to the early Greek thinkers. they begin with his lecture course of the summer semester 1932. At the risk of oversimplification. First. while Parmenides is the thinker of permanence. kennet und sieht er es nicht. in his published works on Parmenides (19421943) and Heraclitus (1944). it could be said that this body of work accomplishes two closely interrelated goals. Tragen muss er. nun aber nennt er sein Liebstes.Document Page 55 Two The Place of the Presocratics in Heidegger's Beiträge zur Philosophie Parvis Emad So ist der Mensch. Der Anfang der abendländischen Philosophie: Anaximander und Parmenides (The Beginning of Western Philosophy: Anaximander and Parmenides) and end with Heraklit of 1966/67. he totally undoes the assumptionthat for almost two millennia predetermined the understanding of Heraclitus and Parmenidesthat Heraclitus is the thinker of change. Hölderlin. wie Blumen. wenn da ist das Gut. nun müssen dafür Worte. in the span of almost four decades. on the early Greek thinkers after the turn (die Kehre) have been published or are scheduled to appear in the Gesamtausgabe. Nun. zuvor.

Hegel. facing each other in the beginning of thoughta custom which goes back to antiquity. and Nietzsche but not the early Greek thinkers. As I shall try to show. As the first step in this direction we must understand the structure of this major work. this work is firmly grounded in Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis). take place in works dedicated specifically to early Greek thinking. Heidegger opens up a hitherto covered-over and forgotten domain. Kant. I do not want to suggest that Heidegger has a system of thought à la Hegel that beginning with Beiträge zur Philosophie assimilates the whole history of philosophy. 2 A significant consequence of undoing this assumption is the need for a new reading of Plato. . Keeping this proviso in mind while turning to Beiträge zur Philosophie. with his works on these and other early Greek thinkers. at the end of his life and in retrospect. 176). he mentions Leibniz. For it is through this structure that Heidegger enacts a new thinking of being which addresses the aletheiological beginning.) Now. This work is written between 1936-1938 and published posthumously in 1989. it is exactly this omission that points to the place of the early Greek thinkers in Beiträge zur Philosophie. including the fragmented writings of the early Greeks. while I want to suggest that Heidegger's later work is grounded in Beiträge zur Philosophie. I take seriously the words "firmly grounded" because. sword in hand. Heidegger's second major work after Being and Time. we initially find ourselves confronted with a surprising omission: At the juncture where Heidegger programmatically mentions his future lecture courses on the history of philosophy (GA 65. whereas this work of undoing and dismantling the dichotomyHeraclitus as the thinker of change and Parmenides as the thinker of permanenceas well as the opening of the domain of the aletheiological beginning of thinking (if we insist on staying with these two achievements)." ( Heidegger can say: "In a certain way ist in gewisser Weise offenkundig und stets erfahren [GA 1. 438]. Schelling. as we find it already wellestablished in Plato. the domain of the aletheiological beginning of thinking. is manifest and always already experienced. like two gladiators. This opening is of such unparalleled philosophical magnitude that. which Heidegger accomplishes in several works devoted to this philosopher. Secondly.Document Page 56 It is customary to oppose Heraclitus and Parmenides. This thinking is new because. the so-called Presocratics.

Put briefly. I cannot write Being and Time II. It is this move that leads him to the historicality of being itself. 4 3 This move from thinking of being as fundamental ontology to the non-historiographical historicality of being is not an arbitrary one. It is a full and well-rounded response to "the turning-relation-inbeing" (der kehrige Bezug des Seins) which Heidegger experiences the moment he is engaged in the thinking of being. kann ich "Sein und Zeit II'' gar nicht mehr schreiben. Man denkt und redet schon darüber. 1932: People already believe and talk about my writing Being and Time II. der mich irgendwohin führte. dieser Weg aber jetzt nicht mehr begangen und schon verwachsen ist. the path of fundamental ontology. That is okay. thereby unfolding the thinking of being as the thinking of Ereignis. Aber da "Sein und Zeit I" einmal für mich ein Weg war. 5 . daß ich nun "Sein und Zeit II" schreibe. and it is already overgrown. I As early as 1931 and as late as 1932 the plan for writing Beiträge zur Philosophie is already laid out.Document Page 57 unlike the thinking of fundamental ontology. But because Being and Time I was for me once a pathway that led me somewhere and because I can no longer traverse that pathway. the "turning-relation-in-being" is not the result of thinking of fundamental ontology having run its course but is exactly the motivating power that sets this thinking in motion. In other words "turning-relation-in-being" is a turning that precedes the move from the perspective of fundamental ontology to that of the non-historiographical historicality of being. it traverses the pathway of non-historiographical historicality of being (Geschichtlichkeit des Seins). Heidegger in these years realizes the need for moving from fundamental ontology into the path of non-historiographical historicality of being. The external indication of this move is discussed in a letter to Elisabeth Blochmann on September 18. Ich schreibe überhaupt kein Buch. Having gone down the path of thinking of being. Das ist gut so. I do not write a book at all.

The second reason is that this work originates from within a grounding attunement (Grundstimmung) called Verhaltenheit. in which what is to be thought is held back and kept in reserve. It is an awareness of the philosophical magnitude of this move that gives birth to Beiträge zu Philosophie (Vom Ereignis). 4) from the interplay between the guiding question (Leitfrage) of philosophy "what is a being in its being?" ( ) and the root question (Grundfrage). saying is no longer separate from what is said. . 4). here saying does not stand over against what is to be said. that . 3). Rather saying itself is what is to be said. The move from the earlier perspective to the new one takes along and transforms the structure of Dasein as worked out in Being and Time.Document Page 58 The realization that the thinking of the non-historiographical historicality of Dasein's world (die Geschichtlichkeit des Daseins) in Being and Time does not reach the dimension of the nonhistoriographical historicality of being itself is rooted in "the turning-relation-in-being" and constitutes the decisive element in the thinking of being's moving from the path of fundamental ontology into the new path of the thinking of being's historicality. " (das Weiterwinken eines Winkes . . . The third reason is that the thinking that goes on in Beiträge zur Philosophie unabatedly receives "the ongoing enjoining of a beckoning. Heidegger says that Beiträge zur Philosophie is not "a 'work' written according to the hitherto prevailing style" (ein 'Werk' bisherigen Stils) (GA 65. sondern ist dieses selbst als die Wesung des Seyns (GA 65. This grounding attunement holds in reserve the unfolding of "being's in-depth-sway" (die Wesung des Seyns) named Ereignis. hier ist das Sagen nicht im Gegenüber zu dem zu Sagenden. As Heidegger puts it. because the emergence of the transformed structure of Dasein in the new perspective of the thinking of being as Ereignis is of unparalleled importance for determining the place of early Greek thinking in this work. 6 In the language of this work. namely being's in-depth-sway. I shall return to this point taking a brief look at Beiträge zur Philosophie. ) (GA 65. The first reason pertains to the language of this work. There are at least four reasons why Beiträge zur Philosophie is unlike any other major work of philosophy.

stehen je für sich. Instead of chapters Beiträge zur Philosophie is made up of six "joinings" (fügungen). In each of the six joinings [thinking] attempts to say the same about the same. aber nur. . the thinking that goes on in Beiträge zur Philosophie is "not a goal-oriented activity of an individual nor a limited calculation of a community. The Inter-Play (Das Zuspiel). While the Critique of Pure Reason is concerned with determining the condition for the possibility of the objects of experience. Die sechs Fügungen . 4]. stands for itself." (. The Leap (Der Sprung)." "Transcendental Logic. um die wesentliche Einheit eindringlicher zu machen. nicht ein bezwecktes Tun eines Einzelnen und keine beschränkte Berechnung einer Gemeinschaft ist [GA 65. the question of the truth of "being's-in-depth-sway" (Die Wahrheit der Wesung des Seyns). Heidegger takes great care to describe the relationships between the six joinings in view of precisely this regioning: Each of the six joinings .'' and "Reason." In contrast. Here we may think of Kant. beingness of beingsand so follows the terrain of this work does not take up the root question concerning the truth of tradition's preoccupation with "being's-in-depth-sway" as an occurrence that is simultaneous (gleichzeitig) with manifestness of (GA 65." and "Transcendental Dialectic" progressively demonstrate and establish the thesis concerning the a priori elements that determine "Sensibility. . 13. . we find nothing even remotely similar to such a progressive development of a thesis in Beiträge zur Philosophie. The Future Ones (Die Zu-künftigen). . In Kant's Critique of Pure Reason the three main sections called "Transcendental Aesthetic. The six joinings of this work are: The Echo (Der Anklang). 222f. The fourth reason is that Beiträge zur Philosophie is not divided into main sections and chapters by which an author progressively demonstrates and establishes a preconceived thesis. . Each joining names a region in which being sways in depth as Ereignis.) This becomes more clear as we take up the structure of this work. but in each joining in view of an other region wherein being's sway unfolds in its depth as Ereignis and as what names Ereignis. Strictly speaking. and The Last God (Der letzte Gott).Document Page 59 is. aber . The Founding (Die Gründung)." "Understanding. but only so as to make the onefold [that joins them] more penetrating in its depth. In jeder der sechs Fügungen wird über das Selbe je das Selbe zu sagen versucht.). that is.

First. All three are intimately bound to Rede. It is necessary not only to understand that each joining is a region wherein "being's-in-depth-sway" unfolds as Ereignis but also to realize that each joining/region involves the transformed structure of Dasein.h. that is. in the thinking of being within the perspective of fundamental ontology. A mere echo that resounds in the first joining through beings' abandonment by being (Seinsverlassenheit des Seienden). "being's-in-depth-sway" in the sixth "joining" manifests Ereignis as the occurrence that takes place before the passage (Vorbeigang) of the last God. 8182). that is. The truth.Document Page 60 jeweils aus einem anderen Wesensbereich dessen. Da-sein lässt sich nie auf-weisen und beschreiben wie ein Vorhandenes. 7 . It is a gross misunderstanding to render this word as "essential realm. We must also remember that this structure is not a rigid and extant structure. identical process reminiscent of essentia." because the word "essence" resonates in the word ''essential" and misleads thinking into assuming that . Dasein's structure consists of "thrownness" (Geworfenheit). was das Ereignis nennt (GA 65. To understand the transformation that Dasein's structure undergoes when the thinking of being takes the path of being's historicality. And this means according to Being and Time that Dasein is to be obtained in thrown projection. "projection" (Entwurf). and "being-along-with" (Sein-bei). The word Wesensbereich appropriately shows that each joining is a region wherein "being's-in-depthsway" unfolds as Ereignis. we must take seriously the manner in which Beiträge zur Philosophie explicitly acknowledges the inestimable achievement of Being and Time: Da-sein never lets itself be demonstrated and described as something extant. however. Erschlossenheit des Seins. d. we must bear two things in mind. To begin to understand this transformation we must remember that. 231). κοιυóυ and what occurs in each "region" is a self-same. to the deepest unfolding of language. Nur hermeneutisch zu gewinnen. aber nach "Sein und Zeit" im geworfenem Entwurf (GA 65. is that each region/joining manifests "being's-in-depth-sway" as Ereignis in a manner peculiar to that joining. because it is a structure of and for being's disclosure. Dasein is to be obtained only hermeneutically.

e. d. 239)." It is also striking that "projection" is characterized as enactment of "the leap" through which thinking opens up the truth of being. Thus we may ask: leap into what? The response is: leap into ''being's-in-depth-sway" called Ereignis (Wesung des Seyns als Ereignis." projection opens up "being's-in-depth-sway" and keeps it open. i. The phenomenologically significant point concerning projection is that projection shifts into the openness of "being's-in-depth-sway. two things need to be open to each other: "projection" must be open to "being's-in-depth-sway" as Ereignis and "being's-in-depth-sway" as Ereignis must be open to "projection. GA 65. cf.Document Page 61 But Beiträge zur Philosophie does not stop with acknowledging the achievement of Being and Time in uncovering Dasein in thrown projection. projects. It is striking that here "projection" is linked to "the leap." It is this mutual opening that is meant by the phrase "shifting into the open. presents the directives for grasping that transformation.h. dergestalt daß der Werfer des Entwurfs als Geworfener sich erfährt. Beyond this acknowledgementthe second thing to bear in mindthis work also presents directives for understanding the transformation that thrown projection undergoes when the thinking of being takes the path of being's historicality. i." because projection itself is open and receptive to this openness." For.e. 7). By receiving and opening up this "sway. But. Projection is a doing which is from the beginning open to receiving and opening up "being's-in-depth-sway" as Ereignis. The following passage. appropriated by being. experiences itself as thrown into. In its entirety the passage reads: The leap is the enactment of projection of the truth of being in the sense of shifting into the open in such a way that one who throws forth. Were it not for the crucial openness of projection to "being's-in-depth-sway. for the leap to be enacted. when projection occurs as shifting into the open. Der Sprung ist der Vollzug des Entwurfs der Wahrheit des Seyns im Sinne der Einrückung in das Offene. projection does not enter the domain of "being's-in-depthsway" named Ereignis as if "projection" were a doing (Handeln) initially closed off to the openness of this domain and trapped in a closure. er-eignet durch das Seyn (GA 65. which calls for careful attention." .

as the region in which early Greek thinking is at home. By opening. However. The upshot of the second directive is the concomitant transformation of "projection" and "thrownness. as the opening up of "being's-in-depth-sway" (Ereignis). in appropriating Dasein. II Early Greek thinking shines in the joining "The Inter-Play" without becoming thematic in any direct way. "being's-indepth-sway. This directive leads us to the second one. one who enacts the projection in the sense of opening up "being's-in-depth-sway. Pulling together these two directives. in throwing forth in this way. we sum up the transformed structure of Dasein by saying that thrownness means being thrown forth into being's appropriating throw and that projection indicates opening up this throw by the appropriated projection. is bereft of a phenomenological relevanceit is sheer speculation. cannot be enacted unless one who projects this "sway" experiences itself as being thrown into and appropriated by "being's-in-depth-sway" (Ereignis). Keeping this structure constantly in view. It is this transformed structure which upholds and runs throughout the six joinings/regions of Beiträge zur Philosophie. Five directives held within the five sentences that make up the opening section of this joining help us see how . we now turn to the joining named "The Inter-Play" (Das Zuspiel). And there lies the first directive: "Projection" in the perspective of Beiträge zur Philosophie is openness to "being's-in-depth-sway" as Ereignis. Accordingly." Projection. projection would be the juncture where closure to "being's-sway" and openness of this sway come into collision. namely. the "throw" is an appropriating of Dasein. opened up and kept open by the appropriated projection (ereigneter Entwurf). thrownness manifests Dasein as being thrown into "being's-in-depth-sway". "being's-in-depth-sway'' as Ereignis. we arrive at the transformed structure of Dasein." Were this the case. that is. being indicates not only Dasein's thrownness forth into being's appropriating throw (ereignender Zuwurf). projecting." experiences itself as thrown into and thus appropriated by this sway's openness. but also the need of this "throw" to be projected. that is. however. Thus.Document Page 62 projection would indicate the intrusion of a closure into the domain of openness. Collision between closure and openness.

Leitfragenbeantwortung und eigentliche Leitfragenentfaltung. [Moreover]. For the original German may become somewhat more accessible in the light of the readability of its English translation. To proceed with this task. Die Auseinandersetzung der Notwendigkeit des anderen Anfangs aus der ursprünglichen Setzung des ersten Anfangs." The second directive addresses the unavoidable prerequisite for enacting that imperative. Briefly. All the issues involved in differentiating the guiding-question from the root-question. The guiding attunement [in this process] is the joy in questioning the ongoing vibration back and forth of the beginnings. This prerequisite is not based on arguments that support a system of thought. Briefly. that precedes and happens in thinking. Hierzu alles über die Ünterscheidung von Leitfrage und Grundfrage. Given the brevity of the opening section of "The Inter-Play.Document Page 63 early Greek thinking shines forth and is housed in this joining. both in English translation and in the original German. Alle Vorlesungen über "Geschichte" der Philosophie. The first directive for determining the place of the Presocratics in "The Inter-Play" takes on the form of an imperative "to come to terms with an other beginning" as it gets set up in the first beginning. it is necessary that we carefully read the opening section." this reading may be accomplished fairly quickly: Coming to grips with the necessity of an other beginning. Die Leitstimmung: Die Lust der fragenden wechselweisen Übersteigung der Anfänge. Rather this prerequisite is an attunement. the decision on all "ontologies" will be made here. responding to the guiding-question [as distinguished from] the genuine unfolding of this question [as] the passage to the root-question (Being and Time)all belong here. 169). I shall begin by first working out the five directives in the sequence in which they appear in this opening section and then by commenting on them. Die Entscheidung über alle "Ontologien'' (GA 65. Übergang zur Grundfrage ("Sein und Zeit"). this directive is summed up in the phrase "coming to terms with an other beginning. the second . [Likewise] all lecture courses on the "history" of philosophy belong here. as this beginning emerges from out of the setting-up of the first beginning.

holding etc. seizing." Based on this differentiation. an other beginning does not seize Dasein by brute force but reticently. This attunement hints at the "enjoining of a beckoning" that comes from the interplay between the "guiding question" and the "root question." this word conveys the impression that." (The rendition of Anfang as "starting" is misleading because.Document Page 64 directive reminds us that the first directive does not come from a subjective preference but originates from within an attunement that overwhelms thinking prior to its entrapment in subjectivity." The fifth and final directive is closely tied in with the previous one: all "ontologies" will be differentiated (Entscheiden/Scheiden) in accord with the domain opened up by the questions that guide philosophy and in which thinking is grounded." The third directive draws in the transformed structure of projection and is important for finding the place of the aletheiological think- . The fourth directive states that all lecture courses on the history of philosophy belong to the domain opened up by the passage from the "guiding question" to the "root question. in contrast to politically and sociologically familiar modes of seizing.) The second directive points to the transformed structure of Dasein insofar as being's forth-throw is attuned to the joy of questioning the beginnings. the third directive distinguishes two ways of dealing with the ''guiding question": responding to it and unfolding it. The third directive puts forth a differentiation which is of fundamental importance for the thinking that goes on in Beiträge zur Philosophie. aside from the mechanical connotation of this word as in "starting an engine. "thrownness" and "projection"? An other beginning transforms this structure insofar as Dasein is thrown forth into this beginning's throw and opens up this throw by projecting it. we notice that the first three point to the transformed structure of Dasein. This word preserves the "activity" of fangen as taking. in matters pertaining to being (Sein). How does the first directive point to the transformation of Dasein's structure. namely. by way of an "enjoining beckoning. An other beginning (ein anderer Anfang) "seizes" Dasein but. To begin to understand "beginning's forththrow" we draw upon the word Anfang (beginning). the differentiation between "guiding question" and "root question. Considering these directives. Dasein can make a start and thus be in chargewhich is flatly refuted by Dasein's thrownness in being's forth-throw. This distinction is of paramount importance for determining the place of the aletheiological thinking of the Presocratics.

" If the primary outcome of projecting. that is. For the Presocratics name without opening it through thinking-questioning. already open to and thus appropriated by the thinking of The primary outcome of this projection is opening up the subtle interconnection in the first beginning and at the end of the first beginning: "Plato and Aristotle . then it finds its place in an other beginning.. opened up in an appropriated projection. . . When this thinking heeds the "enjoining beckoning" that comes from the . that is. And this means that the aletheiological beginning is ambiguous through and through. "guiding question" The fourth directive immediately follows the differentiation between the "guiding question" and the "root question." While the former guides thinking to a being. "projection" opens up the aletheiological thinking of the Presocratics because "projection" is always . This beginning assigns a without place to the aletheiological thinking of the Presocratics as a thinking that names opening and projecting it. the latter is a question concerned with thinking and opening up itself.e. 121-122). . a being in its name beingness (GA 45.Document Page 65 ing of the early Greeks in Beiträge zur Philosophie. It is this aletheiological thinking that needs to be projected. not only puts in the foreground but also και . opening the interconnection between unconcealment and an unconcealed being. The "guiding question" differentiated from the "root question. then the opening up of the aletheiological beginning is simultaneously the opening up of the question " " that guides the philosophies of Plato and must be carefully Aristotle at the end of the first beginning. that is. This is clearly in keeping with what we discussed earlier about transformation of the structure called "projection." thus hinting at the place that the Presocratics occupy in an other beginning. because ''projection" is never closed off to this openness and trapped in closure. At the same time this thinking is not identical with the -oriented thinking of Plato and Aristotle. As appropriated. always between when they name a being: και the unconcealment." The former question is driven by an irresistible force that for the past two and a 8 . i." It will be recalled that "projection" is not a closure that collides with the openness of being's appropriating forth throw. This ambiguity comes to the fore when the "guiding question" is differentiated from the "root question.

" In original German the title of the fifth section reads: "Die ursprüngliche Zueignung des ersten Anfangs bedeutet das Fußfassen im anderen Anfang. Thus. Thus. This process steadfastly hinders the unfolding of the "guiding question." an unfolding that this work calls Leitfragenentfaltung. Beiträge zur Philosophie calls this process of offering responses to the "guiding question" a Leitfragenbeantwortung. I postpone translat- ." The fifth directive follows from the fourth one. whereas the thinking that goes on in Beiträge zur Philosophie takes seriously the responses to the "guiding question. they all stress the importance of the "enjoining beckoning" which comes from the crossing (Übergang) that spans from the "guiding question" to the "root question. By differentiating the responses to the "guiding question" from its unfolding. The later lecture courses focus on the various responses to the guiding question in their magnitudefor example. by elucidating this title I will show simultaneously the recurrence in this section of the crossing of the "guiding question" toward the "root question" and the emerging of the "enjoining beckoning. this title." By receiving this "beckoning. is an integral part of the text itself." The title of this section is not a heading under which the text of the respective section is subsumed. But this crossing seems to be delayed when the fifth section of "The Inter-Play" explicitly emphasizes the first beginning. we must attend to this section of "The Inter-Play. like all the titles of the two hundred and eighty-one sections of Beiträge zur Philosophie. To see this. Thus the fourth directive is concerned with the magnitude of responses to the "guiding question" and aims at the Leitfragenbeantwortung as the main focus of Heidegger's later lecture courses." this work relegates the task of dealing with these responses to Heidegger's later courses on the history of philosophy and attends only to the unfolding itself of the ''guiding question." aletheiological thinking of the Presocratics begins to cross the domain of the first beginning toward the domain of an other beginning.Document Page 66 half millennia brings forth a series of responses. the fifth directive sets the course for differentiating all ontologies beginning with the aletheiological thinking of the Presocratics. Now. in one way or another." In contrast to my practice so far. Hegel's response is no ordinary event!for the sake of letting the root-unfolding (Wesen as distinguished from Wesung) of metaphysics emerge. Rather. when we gather together these five directives we cannot fail to see that.

I find the possibility for bringing the movement of zu into English in the prefix "en. Now we proceed to translate the title of the fifth section of "The Inter-Play. bedeutet das Fußfassen im anderen Anfang [GA 65." which is also the first sentence of this section: "The original enowning of the first beginning . following this title. for two closely interrelated reasons." that is. translation of the word Zueignung is not an easy task and requires careful preparation. . translation of the word Zueignung must be most appropriate. we may combine "en" and "owning" and render the German Zueignung with "enowning." and since the English prefix "en" captures the movement of bringing something into a certain condition. means taking root in the other beginning.Document Page 67 ing this title into English. bringing something into the condition of owning." the interplay which is under the mandate of the ''enjoining beckoning" that comes from these questions. 171]. First. the former clearly meaning appropriation." (Die ursprüngliche Zueignung des ersten Anfangs. . the fifth section of "The Inter-Play" returns to the "guiding question" in its connection to the "root question. It should be obvious that rendition of Zueignung with "enowning" and its differentiation from Aneignung (appropriation) plays a significant role in understanding the crossing and in noticing the "enjoining beckoning" that guides it.) It is quite important to note that. translating Zueignung with "appropriation" would eliminate the difference between Aneignung and Zueignung." On the other hand. by implication." and once again places in the foreground the crossing of the one toward the other. for it opens the way for understanding the interplay between the "guiding question" and the "root question. For this reason we must read the fifth section: 9 . highlights the "enjoining beckoning" that guides that crossing. we can subsequently look for a word that would convey the sense of Eignung." which according to The Concise Oxford Dictionary. Second. . and. After we accomplish this. What Zueignung says in the title of this section has nothing to do with its ordinary usage such as "dedication. ." as in "dedicating a book to someone. How then to translate the word Zueignung? I propose to take seriously the movement indicated by the prefix zu and look for possibilities that would bring this movement into English. Since German Eignung can readily be rendered with "owning. indicates bringing something into a certain condition.

The phrase "coming to terms with" in the opening section of "The Inter-Play" and the word "enowning" in its fifth section harbor within themselves the passage from the "guiding question" to the "root question. the unfolding of the ''guiding question" as και an unfolding which directly draws in the simultaneously the unfolding of aletheiological thinking of the Presocratics." Moreover. 171). namely "what is the truth of being?" Die ursprüngliche Zueignung des ersten Anfangs (und d. being) toward the root-question. that is. in the way the question plays into the question "What is the truth of being. seiner Geschichte) bedeutet das Fußfassen im anderen Anfang. Recalling the opening section of "The Inter-Play" and reading the first paragraph of its fifth section. that is. its "in-depth-sway" as a question that is covered over by the tradition of metaphysics in the continuity is of its responses to the "guiding question. Finally.Document Page 68 The original enowning of the first beginning (and that means its history) means taking root in an other beginning. the unfolding of the aletheiological thinking of the -oriented thinking of the later Greeks Presocratics along with the reverberation of this thinking in the (Plato and Aristotle) reveal the interplay between the first beginning and an other beginning. this interplay is played under the mandate of the "enjoining beckoning" that is the guide to an other beginning toward which the "guiding question" is already underway. In short. Dieses vollzieht sich im Übergang von der Leitfrage (was ist das Seiende? Frage nach der Seiendheit. the unfolding of the "guiding question. Such root taking gets accomplished in crossing the guiding question (what is a being? as a question concerning beingness. its in- .h. Sein) zur Grundfrage: was ist die Wahrheit des Seyns? (GA 65." The unfolding of the guiding questionwhich is totally different from a critical debate with and an assessment of the traditional responses to this questionreveals the "root question" of the truth of being." This passage or crossing depends entirely on the unfolding of the "guiding question" in accord with the "enjoining beckoning" that is the guide to an other beginning. we can easily see that in both sections Beiträge zur Philosophie is engaged in what this work calls Leitfragenentfaltung. Accordingly the aletheiological thinking of the Presocratics has its place in this crossing.

fails to be an academically viable presentation. since repeating Heidegger does not achieve anything? By preparing such a presentation do we not ignore the "complexity of reading texts" which always amounts to "reinscribing" them? It is my contention that. 176). namely. "what is the truth of being. then it is naive to assume that an ontologically neutral . The fact that Beiträge zur Philosophie neither explicitly includes the aletheiological thinking of the Presocratics in an other beginning nor implicitly excludes this thinking from that beginning supports the view that the aletheiological thinking of the Presocratics occupies a central place in the crossing of the first beginning toward ant other beginning. does not this presentation merely repeat what Heidegger says and. we need to address the relationship between being and language. in so doing. Although it is written in English. we must not lose sight of the fact that.Document Page 69 depth-sway?" For this reason the aletheiological thinking of the Presocratics should be viewed as an integral part of an other beginning even though Beiträge zur Philosophie does not explicitly indicate that this thinking belongs to that beginning. If Beiträge zur Philosophie brings to language a radically unprecedented experience of being. This view is corroborated by the fact that Beiträge zur Philosophie explicitly omits the names of the early Greeks (such as Anaximander. that is. If this is the case." is implicit in the thinking of Beiträge zur Philosophie. III I would like to conclude this presentation with a brief reflection on the language in which it is written. Leitfragenbeantwortung (cf. this language reflects Heidegger's own language. Parmenides and Heraclitus) when "The Inter-Play" indicates the focal points of the future lecture courses that Heidegger plans to give after Beiträge zur Philosophie-lecture courses which will consider responses to the guiding question. GA 65. although "The Inter-Play" does not mention the early Greeks by name. Heidegger after Beiträge zur Philosophie offers a large number of courses on the early Greeks and devotes a number of treatises to them. This fact indicates that the significance of the aletheiological thinking of the Presocratics for the process of unfolding the question that belongs to an other beginning. its in-depth-sway?. in order to deal with these questions. However.

. Now! Now words for that must come forth like flowers. F. (Frankfurt am Main. Hölderlin. NOTES 1.-W.Document Page 70 language stands ready to function as a vehicle for bringing that new experience of being into language. §5. This means that a presentation such as the one attempted here takes its bearing from the relationship of being to language for the purpose of bringing to language the new experience of being that gives birth to Beiträge zur Philosophie. von (endnote continued on next page) . wie Blumen. The upshot of the insight into the relationship of being and language is that there is no such thing as an extant ontologically neutral language. 2 (Stuttgart: Verlag W. Heidegger on Heraclitus: A New Reading (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press. von Herrmann. entstehen. 2. 2nd ed. 8. and thus to gain access to the resources of language that correspond to those "faces. the objection that such a presentation merely repeats Heidegger cannot be sustained because this objection is based on the assumption that there is already a consensus as to what this philosopher thinks. nun müssen dafür Worte. 1986). 7. "Heraclitus and Parmenides." in Kenneth Maly and Parvis Emad.-W. 3. 70. 1955). "Brot und Wein. Kohlhammer. eds. As the German language bends and twists in order to correspond to the new experience of being that sustains Beiträge zur Philosophie. showing as it does that this assumption is far from being true. 2. Hölderlin saw the strains through which language undergoes when it gets exposed to a new experience of being: Nun. Also. is itself an attempt to take a look at those hidden "faces" of the experience of being that are turned toward us. Hence. Heideggers Philosophie der Kunst. Perhaps better than anyone else. Bd. F. Cf. so should English abandon the illusion of having in its treasury an ontologically neutral language for translating the language of this work. Jean Beaufret." in Sämtliche Werke. Klostermann Verlag." Why did the thinking of being in the perspective of fundamental ontology take more than two decades in order to recognize the impassability of that perspective? The epigram to this essay responds to this question. Such a presentation. 1994).

55f. ed. (Frankfurt am Main. Klostermann Verlag.-W. 1995). 2nd ed. 1995). 1989). 147-73. Essays in Honor of William J. 1982). Babich.-W. Martin Heidegger-Elisabeth Blochmann Briefwechsel. 70f. The Path of Archaic Thinking: Unfolding the Work of John Sallis (Albany: SUNY Press. 1994). see Martin Heidegger. 67f. 8. Klostermann Verlag. From Phenomenology to Thought. In Grundfragen der Philosophie: Ausgewählte "Probleme" der "Logik" (GA 45). Considering this fact it is unwarranted to suggest that Heidegger fails "to demonstrate a certain solidarity between the Platonic dialogues and the writings of the early Greek thinkers. Wege ins Ereignis: Zu Heideggers "Beiträge zur Philosophie". (Frankfurt am Main. Richardson (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers. von Herrmann. On this point. seventh ed. 1985). 5. 55f. B. Errancy and Desire.. see F. Wege ins Ereignis: Zu Heideggers "Beiträge zur Philosophie" (Frankfurt am Main. 262. 4. 92-114." in Kenneth Maly. Medard Boss. a lecture course text written at the same time as Beiträge zur Philosophie. Heidegger renders explicit the interconnection between in early Greek thinking and . 7. 54. John Sallis. J. 30f. von Herrmann mentioned in note 3 above. For works related to this discussion. Subjekt und Dasein: Interpretationen zu "Sein und Zeit". The lesson we learn from reading this lecture (GA 45) is that Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit belongs to the broader context of the thinking that goes on in Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis). Zollikoner Seminare. 6." Cf. . 9. von Herrmann.Document Page 71 Herrmann.. "A Wonder that One Could Never Aspire to Surpass. Sykes (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1918-1969 (Marbach am Neckar: Deutsche Schillergesellschaft. and works by F.." in Babette E..-W. ed. ed." and ''being-along-with" to Rede.. 316. see F.. 331f. On the relation of "thrownness." "projection. 1987). Klostermann Verlag. ed. The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English. I have discussed this point at great length in my essay "Heidegger I Heidegger II and Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)..

one might echo him and say in an exaggerated way that nonetheless bears upon the truth that in it the very fate of the West hangs in the balance (HW. 318. P. on the the disclosiveness. After slaying Pandarus with his spear. . this enfolding into subterranean concealment. For the Romans. speaks of this exemplary scene of salvation. darkness and light. 33). Although Heidegger himself never. The scene occurs in Book 5 of The Iliad as the Achaean warrior Diomedes and his charioteer Sthenelus confront the Trojan Aeneas and his ally Pandarus. causing him to fall upon his knees and lean "upon the earth. Indeed.308-10). . With this fall. ).Document Page 73 Three Keeping Homer's Word: Heidegger and the Epic of Truth 1 Michael Naas For the Greeks. to my knowledge. Even the earth receives its essence from this same realm. on a surface of concealment and disclosure. contrary. of the supraterranean (the span of heaven. Diomedes strikes Aeneas in the hip with an enormous stone. The earth is the in-between. any more than birth is. death is not a "biological" process. but that of the entire civilization we . EGT. this eclipse of light and eyes. 88. The Wraith of Aeneas Where on earth to begin an analysis of Heidegger's reading of Homer but in the in-between of Homer's earth. 5. Birth and death take their essence from the realm of disclosiveness and concealment. mortals and the gods. the appearance of Aeneas beneath the light of day would seem to have come to an end. not only his appearance. 60). falling and salvation.. namely between the concealment of the subterranean and the luminosity. (GA 54." as "dark night enfolded his eyes ( )" (I.

allowing him to live. Diomedes leaps upon Aeneas to finish him off. .Document Page 74 know Aeneas was destined to found. And now would the king of men. the round shields and fluttering targets (I. About her dear son she flung her white arms. even his mother. who quickly spirits her away to her own mother Dione. been quick to mark. thought on the basis of concealment. With Aphrodite gone. 5. the civilization that Heidegger often characterized as having brought the Greek world itself to a certain fall. One concealment is thus played off another to save Aeneas: as Aeneas swoons on the battlefield and is enfolded into the dark night that almost always coincides with death. thus. saved by Greek gods. Aeneas. . But as she is bearing Aeneas away. There Leto and the archer Artemis healed him in the great sanctuary. The Roman world is. but Apollo of ) in the likeness of Aeneas' self and in armor like to his. (I. Aphrodite enfolds and shelters him in her garment and Apollo carries him away while dissembling his appearance. as Heidegger claims. to appear another dayeven if elsewhere. . of being enfolded into the darkness of the underworld. Aphrodite. and glorified him. have perished. but the gods do not turn away from him: Aeneas then did Apollo set apart from the throng in sacred Pergamus where was his temple builded.445-53). unable to of appear beneath the light of day. that conceived him to Anchises. the silver bow fashioned a wraith ( and over the wraith the Trojans and goodly Achaeans smote the bull's-hide bucklers about one another's breasts. And yet this dark night concealing Aeneas from light and life is suddenly lifted. and before him she spread a fold of her bright garment to be a shelter against missiles .311-16). causing her to call out for help to her brother Ares. . the fact that Apollo saves Aeneas by fashioning an himwhile Homer uses a word for this dissembling appearance that will come to be identified in Plato with what is opposed . Aphrodite is herself wounded in the wrist by Diomedes. had not the daughter of Zeus. There is much to comment upon in this exemplary scene: the fact that death is. 5.

while betraying. falling and salvation. his engagement with him is surely not as insistent or developed as is his engagement with other early Greek figures such as Heraclitus. In the end. The questions posed here about language. in the end. the truth of Homer's word is being concealed by those who would take it elsewhere (to Athens. While this catalogue of the references to and uses of Homer will be by no means complete. Whenever Homer is invoked or cited in the interest of some controversy or struggle (for example in that between Heidegger and Friedländer). for while Heidegger often refers to Homer. But for the moment. philosophy and what comes before or after philosophy. both the letter and the spirit of Homer's word. Heidegger tries to remain true 2 .Document Page 75 to truth. one can never be sure of him that is being fought over. I hope it to be somewhat representative. whenever the figure of Homer arises in Heidegger's work. to Aristotle and Plato. is that all these questions and responses will revolve around Heidegger's reading of Homer. will be familiar to those who work on Heidegger. 599a). what kind of authority is being claimed when Homer is evoked. but also. I would like simply to use this scene as an emblem to illustrate that. is always at stake. but the concealment and revelation. a figure who has received relatively little attention in Heidegger scholarship. the relationship between concealment and revelation. in Homer. Parmenides. with what is "easy to produce without knowledge of the truth ( )" (Republic. the falling and salvation. I will claim that. perhaps. in some sense. lost in being saved. or Sophocles. and the answers I propose will no doubt be just as familiar. Covering the Field: An Homeric Catalogue I shall begin by trying to give some indication of how Heidegger uses Homer throughout his work. of Homer. then. to Homer himself. to Rome) or whether the truth of this word consists in its being concealedto the Romans. about the relationship between philosophy and poetry. The only originality or usefulness I hope to claim for this analysis. whether Homer is being lost or whether it is Homer or an saved. whether Homer functions in Heidegger's corpus as a sort of sign or indication or whether the language of Homer signals the need to rethink the very nature of signs and indications. falling and salvation. whether. And not only concealment and revelation.

this interest in Homer. for Heidegger. closer than anyone else. In fact. 4 3 Through the poetry of Homer. Homer is of interest to Heidegger simply because he is the first." In this departure language was being. to the origin of the Greek language and perhaps to language itself. Socrates asks near the beginning of The Cratylus. IM. Such an origin has. since the beginning." inaccessible. or treat it precisely as a mere beginning. to a thinking that would wish to fix. the Greeks would have experienced the mystery of the origin of language that coincided with their departure . Language is the primordial poetry in which a people speaks being. I will not. First. been sought since the beginning of Western philosophy. beginning with the most obvious if perhaps the most deceptive. be trying to discredit or verify the truth of Heidegger's reading or interpretation of Homer but will be trying to think along with Heidegger what first gives or promises this truth. He writes in An Introduction to Metaphysics just before referring to Homer: "In connection with the question of the essence of language.Document Page 76 to what is never present but is nonetheless always 'promised' in it. therefore. of course. to use a Heideggerian vocabulary. then. And yet the origin is not. the question of its origin has arisen time and time again" (GA 40. analyze. The origin of language is not some event in man's existence but coincides with his very "departure into being. 180. been summoned to bear witness to it. a mere chronological beginning. therefore. it might thus be thought. a few indications or pointers. the first poet of the West. I will argue that Heidegger tries to keep Homer to his word in order to help us heed a certain notion of 'truth' that remains concealed and indeed must remain concealed even at the very origin of Western poetry. thus. and Homer has. So it is not simply because he is the oldest that Homer turns out to be so close to the origin. The Greeks created (geschaffen) and experienced (erfahren) this poetry through Homer (GA 40. 180. Conversely. "the origin of language is in essence mysterious. IM. 171). "am I wrong in imagining that I have found a clue to )?" (393b) Heidegger Homer's opinion about the correctness of names ( would seem to share this interest in origins and. 171-72). embodied in the word: poetry. the great poetry by which a people enters into history initiates the molding of its language.

133. The language of Homer gives access to an origin of language. making him into an indicator of both the past and the future. in all its many variants and derivations it means as much as laying" (WD. for "As early as Homer. While Homer appears to be. Heidegger speaks of "the great poetry by which a people enters into history. Pindar. that is. particular words used by Homer might be investigated so as to reveal their relation to this mystery of man's departure into language and being. but this origin must remain essentially mysterious. but." Heidegger claims. original meaning of But this reading of Homer as an indicator and preserver of past meaning becomes complicated when the eventual concealment of this meaning is also to be found in him. But besides. for Heidegger. sign of the poetic richness and polysemy of Homer's language. is not one addition to a linguistic meaning "as early among others. he is mentioned in What is Called Thinking? along with Sappho." just as a certain understanding of will threaten to restrict it to the correspondence between words and things. In What is Called Thinking?. however. 68). already on the way to metaphysics.108 ''as an example of the as to 'gather' "(GA 40. Because "the language of Homer is. the word ( as ) signifies telling a tale. 204)." This poetry is not the beginning of some literary tradition with which a people might identify so as then to enter into history but is itself the very bringing of a people into history.Document Page 77 into being. Heidegger seems to suggest that the "originary meaning" of a word such may be concealed to some extent even in its earliest uses. 170. to put it in a single phrase. then. since early times and over a wide area. IM. for example. Heidegger cites The Odyssey 24. WCT. not only for Homer but for an entire people. It does this. in Homer would thus seem to mean telling a tale in addition to laying or gathering. we are closer to the mystery of the origin of language and so to the mystery of man's departure into being. "a mixture of different dialects which preserve the earlier form of the language" (GA 40. IM. 72. and . Thus. the poet of the Greeks par excellence. to language. In Homer. In the passage cited above. in An Introduction to Metaphysics. This could simply be read as a . 124). their departure into a language in which being could be spoken. thereby suggesting that Homer is. as we will see later with the addition of a meaning related to telling a tale and reporting. Indeed such an addition will threaten to restrict as Homer. and reporting. of the transition between one experience of language and another.

and not simply cited or mentioned once or twice. Each historical people has such a poetry. in both Early Greek Thinking and Parmenides. But poetry is not. Virgil. or Parmenides. Homer helps Heidegger demonstrate the distance between our metaphysical thinking and the poetry of the early Greeks. 29-30). 114. EGT. EB. a people becomes historical only through such poetry. But. that is. In the 1966-1967 Heraclitus Seminar of Heidegger and Fink. The non-metaphysical language of Homer thus provides a way of countering the metaphysical language of Plato and Aristotle. 61). our language. It is surely no coincidence that Homer is used throughout. and Hölderlin as poets in whom "the essence of poetry is realized" (GA 4. HS. in ''The Anaximander Fragment" Heidegger says that " and become conceptual terms with Plato and Aristotle and their schools. as ways of luminous rising and decline" (HW. Goethe. Homer thus interests Heidegger because of his proximity to the origin of language and because the essence of poetry and the relationship of the Greeks to their own language is realized in his work. Rather." Homer is mentioned along with Sophocles. Homer will thus interest Heidegger not only because he is closer to an origin but because he may help us see how far we are from it. indeed. This no doubt stems in part from the fact that comparisons are often most effective when the things being compared are not too different or 6 5 . Heidegger uses Homer very rarely to this end. In the essay. 103. By returning to the pre-philosophical poetry of Homer or Sophocles. Therefore. Homer is more often used as a means of entering a pre-metaphysical thinker such as Anaximander. Heidegger says in that "it is important for us that there is no theoretical response to a remark of Fink concerning conceptual determination of time as time with Homer and Hesiod.Document Page 78 Sophocles as having brought to language something essentially different from literature (WD. Heidegger is able to illuminate the distance between this poetry and later philosophical or metaphysical thought. for example. 33. WCT. it also speaks differently from the still older poetry of Homer" (WD. Heidegger writes: "Parmenides' language is the language of a thinking. 134). WCT. it is that thinking itself. Shakespeare. "Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry. Heraclitus. 314-15. both speak of time only out of experience" (GA 15. for Heidegger. Similarly. to a certain extent. and within it. 154. But and are old words which even Homer knows" and "are to be thought from . Dante. 186). interestingly. 270). the same as thinking even though one may be used to help illuminate the other.

poet. speaks everywhere throughout the language . we sometimes have to proceed by means of an earlier thinker or. it is necessary that we avail ourselves of an opportunity which in terms of its subject matter. But in order to understand the essence of a later thought. the above comparison between Homer's understanding of time and Plato's yields little more than a general observation about how one is conceptual and the other is not. the thinker of being. 55). heed the earlier thought concealed within it. 31-32). In Homer we perceive such an opportunity (HW. as Heidegger says. This is important because in these . its time. the thinker of becoming. . aside from the Anaximander fragment. 340-41. For example. and Heraclitus. Through this reading of Homer. we must. "who knew all that is. 316.Document Page 79 distant. says Heidegger. a guideline which would translate (über-setzt) us there? Because the word in question . is to be. what comes to the fore in their language? Where is there. in order to understand or cross-over to a thinker. and Heraclitus. . and the realm to which it belongs. With this Heidegger begins a long commentary on five lines from the first book of The Iliad where Homer speaks of the seer Calchas. and the "original words and " used by Homer. Parmenides. 341. EGT. EGT. Anaximander's thought will help us avoid simply repeating the easy opposition between Parmenides. "in our recollecting we latecomers must first have thought about the Anaximander fragment in order to proceed to the thought of Parmenides and Heraclitus" (HW. "Every thinker is dependentupon the address of Being" (HW. EGT. But Heidegger also claims that. Heidegger is able to oppose the "conceptual terms" and which "appear as rootless participial endings" in Plato and Aristotle. 55). and which from every point of view precedes the pronouncements of thinking. This is not an attempt to understand a thinker by means of his influences. indeed. . or once was ( πρó ). And yet how are we to avoid this if Anaximander's thought is itself understood in terms of this same opposition? Heidegger answers by taking us even further back: When the Greeks say ." Heidegger proceeds to interpret these words in terms of a coming into and a withdrawal from unconcealment and not as three modes of a universal concept of presence. lies outside philosophy. for.

" is now no longer obtuse. 38). 317. but whose concepts are nonetheless determined by. which nevertheless bears on the truth. . Homer thus allows us to think what is thoughtlessly uttered by philosophers who have forgotten. the ontological difference itself lies concealed (HW. . such references are often inscribed within a sort of narrative . The word by which we . "being. 32-33). 323. EGT. The Case of the Fall While Heidegger refers to Homer either to illuminate early Greek thinking or to mark the distance between it and later metaphysical thought. that the fate of the West . Whither have Homer's words translated (über-gesetzt) us? To . 36-37). assuming that the (das Geschick des Abend-Landes) hangs on the translation of the word translation (Übersetzung) consists in crossing over (Übersetzung) to the truth of what comes to language in (HW. EGT. . 33). concealed by a series of transformations and translations in and of the West. and translate the Greek word itself hastily employed ciphers for arbitrary and vague notions about some indeterminate universal (HW. EGT. "In Homer's language is not a conceptual philosophical term but a thoughtful and thoughtfully uttered word" (HW. The result of this commentary on Homer is not simply a corrective of the usual way of interpreting or representing what is present in terms of a universal concept of presence but. no longer are "to be. a transformation or translation of our very relationship to being. The stakes of understanding or translating these original words could thus not be higher: We might assert in an exaggerated way." as the translation of . the ontological difference.Document Page 80 participial endings "the distinction between 'to be' and 'a being' lies concealed"that is. Heidegger claims. 318. 322. EGT. The language of Homer would thus allow us to cross-over or to be translated to an understanding or experience of language that will have been concealed by later philosophical thought.

. .'' But "the Romans later translated . . . . "Much has been written about this fall of the Greek into or through the Latin and so all I wish to do here is simply highlight the role Homer plays in it. evideri means to become visible. 16). For the Romans. In an attempt to in Heraclitus Fragment B16. evidence for this transformation or fall from the self-showing of beings to the human perception of them can be found almost everywhere in later Greek and. to recall to modern man a concealed way of thinking concealment and a forgotten way of thinking forgetting. . is to be understood as "shining of one's own accord. According to Heidegger. according to Heidegger. and languagein the work of Heidegger. 'it is not to all that the gods appear both see the young woman before them but only Odysseus "apprehends the presencing of the goddess. At issue is almost always the way certain fundamental terms are thought or translated. While the fall or degeneration is most poignantly marked by the Latin translation of Greek terms. one might say. on the contrary. and modern epochs we witness what appears to be a progressive fall of the Homeric/Presocratic way of thinking. whether they are thought in terms of an essential self-showing or self-presencing or whether they are thought in reference to human speech and perception. especially. truth. . Heidegger turns to the famous passage rethink the nature of wherein Odysseus covers his head in the presence of . From Plato and Aristotle to the Roman.161) in which Athene appears as a young woman to Odysseus and his son Telemachus though only Odysseus can see that she is Athene. The opening epigraph from Heidegger's 1942-1943 lecture course on Parmenides already introduced us to this disjunction: "For the Greeks. In his "Aletheia" essay. that is. medieval. The analysis is surely amongst the most memorable in the Heideggerian corpus relating to Homer. " Odysseus and his son Telemachus for as "the poet says. Evidence is then thought in terms of human beings as those do the seeing" (BSD." "a characteristic pertaining to things themselves in their presencing. To illustrate this. . indeed even in the way evidence itself is thought. 7 One could cite numerous examples of this narrativethis epic of being. Heidegger recalls a passage from The Odyssey (16. . Heidegger analyzes a passage from The Odyssey in order.Document Page 81 concerning what might be called 'the fall of early Greek thought'. for example. Roman evidentia. evidence for it can already be found in the conceptual language of Plato and Aristotle. ." Such presencing.

linear narrative according to which the Homeric as "unconcealment" (Unverborgenheit) would have been and Presocratic understanding of concealed and forgotten by later thought. that our forgetting is the result not of "the superficiality of our contemporary way of life" but of "the essence of oblivion itself" (VA. 254. To think the transformation of the Greek world into the Roman or the modern simply in terms of a fall. ''has forgotten the essence of forgetting. Heidegger begins his seeming retraction by reiterating his oft-repeated claim that translated as "truth" understood cannot be 8 . human realm and resituating them in an essential concealment from within the things themselves." Heidegger wants us to hear instead "'he remained concealed'as the one who was shedding tears" (VA. 106). 256." We have forgotten that forgetting and concealment belong not to us but to the essence of beings themselves. On the basis of this reading. as meaning not 'I forget' (the usual rendering). especially since it concerns a reading of Plato more than of Homer. By removing concealment and forgetting from the subjective." where Heidegger seems to recant or at least recast the simple. for it would be to forget that concealing and forgetting do not simply befall the Greek world from without but lie at the very heart of the Greek experience of beings. This text. Heidegger is able to recall something that we have forgotten: modern man. written in 1964 and published in German in 1969. EGT. Heidegger is able to reinterpret the verb . Such would appear to be one of the conclusions of "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking. EGT. EGT. he says. but as "I amwith respect to my relation to something usually unconcealedconcealed from myself" (VA. It is not my intention here to retrace this complex debate between Heidegger and Friedländer. in terms of the degeneration or forgetting of the Greek world. would thus appear to betray more than explain that fall. 108). 108). but it will be important to underscore some of its central arguments in order to continue to analyze the role Homer plays in Heidegger's work.Document Page 82 the Phaeacians as he listens to the minstrel Demodocus sing of the woes of the Achaeans. would appear to be a response to Paul Friedländer's critique of Heidegger's translation of as "unconcealment" and an admission that the narrative of the fall of Greek thought is not as straightforward as first thought. Whereas the key verb in this passage is usually understood and translated as the "transitive 'he concealed'. 256. then.


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as the "correspondence of knowledge with beings" or else as the "certainty of the knowledge of Being." These latter determinations of truth must instead be thought on the basis of , of unconcealment thought as clearing. " , unconcealment thought as the clearing of presence, is not yet truth." thus first grants the possibility of truth as adaequatio or certitudo. The unconcealment that is It might thus seem that appeared as unconcealment in Homer and the Presocratics but was then itself concealed by later conceptions of truth as correctness or correspondence or certainty. But Heidegger in 1964 seems to admit that did not mean unconcealment even for the early Greeksindeed, not even for Homer:
The natural concept of truth does not mean unconcealment, not in the philosophy of the Greeks either. is already used by Homer only in the verba It is often and justifiably pointed out that the word dicendi, in statements, thus in the sense of correctness and reliability, not in the sense of unconcealment. But this reference means only that neither the poets nor everyday linguistic usage, nor even philosophy, see themselves confronted with the task of asking how truth, that is, the correctness of statements, is granted only in the element of the clearing of presence (SD, 77; BW, 447).

What then about the transformation of "truth" from Homer and the Presocratics to Plato and Aristotle? Heidegger says flatly that "the assertion about the essential transformation of truth, that is, from unconcealment to correctness," is "untenable." Since " , as clearing of presence and presentation in thinking and saying, immediately comes under the perspective of and adaequatio," there never was a time when it simply meant or was revealed as unconcealment. Heidegger then asks:
Does this happen by chance? Does it happen only as a consequence of the carelessness of human , belongs to , not thinking? Or does it happen because self-concealing, concealment, as a mere addition, not as a shadow to light, but rather as the heart of ? (SD, 78; BW, 448)

While these comments of 1964 would seem to bring to a definite close the case for a transformation or 'fall' of Homeric-Presocratic


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into metaphysical truth as correspondence or correctness, they would seem to be definitive proof of a transformation and perhaps even a fall of Heidegger's own thought, a final admission on Heidegger's in "the sense of 'unconcealment' seems to have evanesced part that, in David Krell's words, even before Homer sang." Heidegger would seem to have been swayed not only by Friedländer's from , that is, his etymological derivation based on the critique of his derivation of alpha-privative, but, more importantly, by his claim that "from an early Greek period we have, it seems, only a single case in which was understood as " and that in this single case from Hesiod what is at issue is not the concealedness of beings but the "correctness of perception." While Heidegger could argue that his enterprise is not first and foremost philological and that etymology has little to do with the task of thinking, the fact that not a single example can be found in the early Greeks of as the unconcealedness of beings and not as the correctness of perception cannot simply be ignored. Moreover, says Friedländer, "in Homer, and , with a single exception, always occur connected with, and dependent on, verbs of assertion." Heidegger's rendering of as unconcealment would thus either have to be abandoned or else his reliance upon Homer for thinking it completely foregone. Since as unconcealment is what would first give every example of truth as correspondence in Homer or Parmenides or Plato or Aristotle, no example could ever be given for it. Homer and Plato would be, so to speak, on the same side. While the thesis of a fall from the Greek to the Roman might still be maintained, Heidegger's reconciliation with Friedländer would signal the end of any real internecine conflict between the Greeks concerning the meaning of this pivotal word. But was such a reconciliation really necessary? Or better, was it really the case? Balancing the Two Sides Though the debate between Heidegger and Friedländer is much too complicated to enter into fully here, a couple of points concerning the matrix of words , , , etc., in Homer might be raised in order to help resituate what Friedländer himself calls the "single exception" to the rule that, "in Homer, and . . . always occur connected with, and dependent on, verbs
11 10 9


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of assertion." Put briefly, whenever words associated with 'truth' or 'falsity' are found in Homer, it is almost always in the context not only of concealment and unconcealment but of the concealment and unconcealment of two narrative possibilities. The opposition in Homer is not so much between the true and the false as between the tale within one's breast and the tale without, between two possible narratives or fates. While one might wish to assimilate one of these tales or fates to what one knows or thinks to be true and the other to what can be fashioned to correspond or not to this, we miss a number of important details in rushing to such an equivalence. Indeed we miss the fact that , , , , etc., are almost always to be found in a narrative context where certain things are revealed or concealed to certain characters in the narrative and not to others and where this difference becomes part of the narrative for the audience. In other words, the event of concealment or unconcealment is almost always revealed as a concealment or unconcealment and the narrative revolves around this difference. In the two passages from The Odyssey cited by Heidegger above, what is important is not just concealment and unconcealment but the differences established in the narrative between them: while Odysseus sees the self-presencing of the goddess Athene, Telemachus does not, and we the audience see this difference; while the Phaeacians do not see Odysseus who has become concealed as the one shedding tears, Alcinous, the king of the Phaeacians, does see him, and we the audience see this. In both cases what is revealed is the very event of concealment (to Telemachus or the Phaeacians) or unconcealment (to Odysseus or Alcinous). By focusing solely on the question of truth or falsity, on the correspondence between speech and fact, we fail to notice the role that the various relations between the characters in The Iliad and The Odyssey play in the unconcealment or concealment of the tale within, the appropriateness of this unconcealment or concealment, the relationship between not speech and thought but speech and action, and, finally, the narrative mise en scène of this concealment or unconcealment. In Homer, a character is revealed to others within the narrative and to the audience without by means of their particular relationship to concealment and unconcealment. When, for example, Eumaeus in The Odyssey tells the disguised Odysseus how vagabonds and wanderers seeking entertainment come to '), and are not minded to speak the truth ( Ithaca and "lie ( )"


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about Odysseus, what he emphasizes is just as much the character of those who tell these untruths as the fact that they are untruths (O, 14.122-27). The vagabond dissembles in order to receive entertainment; indeed the role of the vagabond is determined or revealed through his relationship to dissemblance, through his tendency to conceal the tale within by means of another without. While vagabonds conceal the truth or conceal the tale within their breast, the good or wise man usually does not. Athene encourages Telemachus in the beginning of The Odyssey to approach Nestor to learn the whereabouts of his father, saying, "do thou beseech him thyself that he may tell thee the very truth ( ). A lie ( ) will he not utter, for he is wise ( ) indeed" (O, 3.19-20). It is clearly less a question here of Nestor lying than of him holding back or not revealing what he knows. Nestor will reveal what he knows about Odysseus to Telemachus because he is , that is, not because he is honest but because of his capacity for appropriate and judicious speech. Just before the chariot race during the funeral games for Patroclus, Achilles sets as an umpire the "godlike Phoenix, his father's follower, that he might mark the running and tell the truth ( ) thereof" (I, 23.359-61), Phoenix being chosen not so much because he will tell the truth but because he will reveal or make known what has happened in an appropriate and reliable way (see I, 24.406-408). Revealing or concealing the tale within one's breast places one along a hierarchy of 'virtue' that runs from robbers and vagabondsoften associated with the perfidity of women up to wise men, counsellors, prophets, minstrels, kings, and the gods. One thus conceals or reveals the tale within, within one's breast, depending upon who one is, who one is talking to, and the circumstances of the exchange. Indeed, it is usually inappropriate to conceal something from a family member,
17 18 16 14 15 13 12


someone one serves, or from a comrade. When asked by Telemachus to tell him how he returned to Ithaca, Odysseus says, "Then verily, my child, I will tell thee all the truth ( )" (O, 16.226). Telling the truth is thus not simply the result but the very performance, the establishing or the maintenance, of a social relation. The story of Odysseus' return is nothing other than the story of his various concealments and unconcealments; but the narrative of The Odyssey is the putting on the scene, the revelation, of these various events of concealment and unconcealment. When Odysseus arrives in


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Ithaca and encounters Athene disguised as a young shepherd, he considers expressing his joy in having returned home, but, not absolutely certain to whom he is speaking (O, 13.312), he decides instead to ), but dissemble and to say that he is from Crete: "he spoke not the truth ( checked the word ere it was uttered, ever revolving in his breast thoughts of great cunning" (O, 13.25355). This capacity for concealment, for concealing the tale within at just the right moment by weaving another without, is what constitutes Odysseus's very identity. As the narrator says of Odysseus just before he reveals himself to Penelope, he made "the many falsehoods of his tale seem like the truth ( ). . ." (O, 19.203). The difference between identities, between different narrative possibilities, lies at the heart of The Iliad as well. When Achilles is threatened with being overcome by the River Scamander, he blames his own mother Thetis for having "beguiled [him] with false words ( ), saying that beneath the wall of the mail-clad Trojans [he] should perish by the swift missiles of Apollo" (I, 21.273-78). The fact that these deceptive words were uttered by Achilles's own mother is emphasized as much as the fact that they were deceptive and false. But more importantly, Achilles suggests that his own mother did not simply utter something that turned out to be false but told him a tale, reserved or promised him a fate, that will not be fulfilled. Such a promise, as John Austin has shown, is not simply a statement concerning some future action that turns out to be true or false but a speech act or performance with in Homer as merely a question of falsity is thus to miss the role certain effects. To treat what is speech acts such as promises and oaths play in the epic narrative. Adapting Simone Weil's famous phrase, one could say that The Iliad isabove allthe poem of illocutionary force. In Book 19 we are told the story of how Hera beguiled or deceived of the Argives rather than Zeus's son Heracles. Hera pressured Zeus to swear this by accusing him of uttering a false promise, that is, of abusing the formula or conventions of the promise or oath by saying something but not fulfilling or bringing it about: "But with crafty mind the queenly Hera spake unto him: 'Thou wilt play the cheat, ). Nay, come, and not bring thy word to fulfillment ( Olympian, swear me now a mighty oath that in very truth


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that man shall be lord. . . " (I, 19.106-109). Hera thus gets Zeus to make explicit the speech act that was implicit in the voicing of his wishes. The false promise, unlike the false statement, necessarily engages human trust and brings one into an ethical order. When the Trojans break their sworn truce with the Achaeans, Agamemnon encourages his ); nay, they that were troops by reminding them that "father Zeus will be no helper of lies ( the first to work violence in defiance of their oaths, their tender flesh of a surety shall vultures devour. . . " (I, 4.235-37). Antenor too predicts disaster for his fellow Trojans after they have broken the oaths of faith if they do not return Helen and the treasure Paris brought back from Sparta: "Now do we fight after proving false to our oaths of faith ( ), wherefore have I no hope that aught will issue to our profit, if we do not thus" (I, 7.351-53). What characterizes the false promise or oath is just as much the telling, the speakingand all the rites associated with itas what is told or spoken. While a lie may have certain (perlocutionary) effects, a false of Aeneas, the promise in and of itself, as a speech act, engages certain effects. Not unlike the false promise is not simply that which is at one or several removes from the truth but that which engages human activity by making a possibility appear that will not be fully realized. , etc., are used in Homer in the context of But whether concealing or revealing the tale within one's breast or in the context of false promises and oaths, what is significant is not only that one thing is revealed rather than another but that this revelation, this tension between concealment and unconcealment, is itself revealed or staged. This is seen most clearly when deliberation is itself represented in the Homeric narrative. For example, when in Book 10 of The Iliad the Achaeans wait anxiously for the return of Diomedes and Odysseus from the night raid on the Trojans, Nestor debates whether to reveal or conceal his thoughts concerning the ominous signs that he is the first to hear:
My friends, leaders and rulers of the Argives, shall I be wrong ( )? Nay, my heart bids me speak ( horses strikes upon my ears (I, 10.533-35; I, 10.534 = O, 4.140). ), or speak the truth ( ). The sound of swift-footed

Since Diomedes and Odysseus left on foot, Nestor fears the worst when he hears horses approaching the Achaean camp and so deliberates

205. In neither case is it a question of lying or speaking the truth. one promising or presaging good and the other one evil. 21. 19 There thus always appear to be two tales. 212. but nowfor myself I heard the voice of the goddess and looked upon her faceI will go forth. 4. 21. cf.342). Priam says that if anyone else. one concealed within and one revealed without. to an interpretation that is often staged as an interpretation and that often in fact changes the course of what is interpreted. they are always open to interpretation (see I. for the audience. 20 Two tales are thus always competing for human attention and trust. one a revelation of divine desires or of fate and the other one not. This line is repeated in The Odyssey when Helen is the first to see in Telemachus his likeness to Odysseus and so debates whether or not to reveal her thoughts (O. a false thing might we deem it ( ). Because they are always revealed in speech as possibilities of what might be fulfilled or revealed.140-41). "Nay.404-405. but of concealing or revealing what one is thinking. my spirit bids me tell it" (O. When Odysseus is looking for allies to help slay the suitors he debates whether to reveal his identity and intentions to Eumaeus and the neatherd but then concludes. The fact that the word once again that it is less a question of the correspondence between speech and fact than of a revelation in speech of what will be against the backdrop of what was expected to be. 4. of these revelations. their structure is more akin to a promise. The audience is made privy not only to the revelations of Nestor and Helen but to the very process. 9.115-16). it is thus more a promise or an oath than a statement. even as it shall be ( )" (O. But what is perhaps more significant here is that two narrative possibilitiesto conceal or to revealare being staged. When Hera tries to persuade Priam not to risk going to ransom Hector's body. nor of saying something that turns out to be true or false. he reveals to them that he has returned with a plan to slay the suitors: "to you will I tell the truth ( ). is used here in the context of the future seems to indicate O. were to have bidden this.Document Page 89 whether to reveal or conceal his thoughts. revealed.635-37). the very coming to light. 5. And after testing them a moment. what one is saying to oneself (see I. 18.194). and turn away therefrom the more. Whereas we might wish to identify the desires of the gods and fate with a truth that will eventually be revealed. whether a seer or priest. neither shall .

or at least to narrative (pace Friedländer). so would I have it (I." But if we look at the wider context of this line and read it in relation to the other uses of . it was doubted in antiquity whether Homer could have said it" and then moves on"So much for Homer.220-26). The line occurs near the middle of the epic. that she may win a meagre wage for her children. we might be able to reestablish some relation both to unconcealedness (pace Heidegger) and to speech. it is not a question of the one truth being opposed to all that is false but of two tales competing for the attention of the characters and/or the audience. two tales competing for the light of narrative. as Friedländer himself admits. but this authority is not absolute. does not seem to be related to speech but would instead describe the "honest or reliable" character of a spinning woman. . The word could still be false. the evenness of the spinning woman's scales being is used compared to the evenness of the battle as maintained by Zeus. The authority of the source thus prevails. for not even the gods know or can control fate. as a careful ( ) woman that laboureth with her hands at spinning. And if it be my fate to lie dead by the ships of the brazen-coated Achaeans. 12. But the word for scales throughout The Iliad in the context of Zeus' determination of the fates . holdeth the balance and raiseth the weight and the wool in either scale ( ). another tale could still be told. Hopefully.Document Page 90 her word be vain. these comments will put us in a better position to reread the famous passage from The Iliad wherein ..432-37). even so [the Trojans] could not put the Achaeans to rout. until Zeus vouchsafed the glory of victory to Hector. (I. 24. must always be revealed and interpreted (see I. the signs of their promises. at a decisive turning-point in the narrative. Friedländer mentions this exception. Two tales are thus always either implicitly or explicitly being opposed in Homer. 2. making them equal. 21 The simile seems quite clear and straightforward.348-53). but they held their ground. and the signs of the gods. as the rout of the Achaeans that was promised by Zeus to Thetis for her son Achilles is about to be fulfilled. points out that since "this meaning of the word occurs only in this passage. in Homer. etc. so evenly was strained their war and battle.

the fulfillment of one promise and not another. It is almost as if Zeus' scales were an externalization of deliberation. whose eyes will once again see the light of day and whose will be enfolded into darkness. reliably. the event of revelation itself unconcealed. . in essence. and the scales eventually tip in one direction rather than another. A careful reading of this entire debate would thus probably do well to maintain a balance between the two accountsjust so long as sufficient attention is paid to the event of revelation in the balance. has convincingly argued that Heidegger ends up conceding the etymological and philological evidence to in his thinking. first voiced in 1954 and subsequently revised. who has retraced the debate and taken into account Friedländer's three revisions of his critique as well as Heidegger's various responses to them. In this simile. 22. so as to Friedländer "not in order to abandon the fundamental place of maintain it the more strongly. as if his scales were a way of determining one narrative possibility rather than another. or appropriately balanced her scales and has not favored one side over the other.Document Page 91 of men. . a sharpening of the difference between 22 . of the deliberation we see Nestor or Odysseus undergo as they decide whether to reveal or conceal. the debate between Heidegger and Friedländer is not so much decided as reconfigured.69-70. With this simile. but. . cf. two possible fates. would modify not only the spinning woman's reliability but the precarious moment that immediately precedes the revelation of one tale or fate rather than another. . In Book 8. Zeus "lifted on high his golden scales ( ) and set therein two fates of grievous death ." What thus looks like and has been read as a "straightforward retraction. for example. Robert Bernasconi. the determination of who will live and who will die. and down sank the day of doom of the Achaeans" (I. 8. Zeus weighs two possible scenarios. 72.)." says Bernasconi. The Fall of the Case Though it may seem that Heidegger in 1964 finally ceded to Friedländer's objections. the scales tip not so much in one direction or another as toward the very event of their balancing and their fall.209 ff. The spinning woman might thus be described as insofar as she has judiciously. is. the revelation of fates would itself be revealed.

the concealment within that is itself already in Homer. BW2. already with the early Greeks occurs predominantly in connection with and . 23 Although it may seem that Heidegger came to see only in 1964 that there was no "essential transformation of truth" from unconcealment to correctness. occurs already at the beginningthat we are to 'remember' as un-concealment. It is through this concealment or forgettingwhich. the clearing of a self-concealing sheltering" (SD. . the unconcealment of the concealing-sheltering of language. but because the essence of word and legend is grounded in the essence of truth . what was unsaid before metaphysics. the concealment of concealed when it is reduced to the relationship between things and words. or after metaphysics. he had been aware for quite some time that is connected to or under the sway of speech. already in the already in Homer Parmenides course some twenty years earlier. . occurs already in Homer "connected" and belongs to it. he had noted: .Document Page 92 ''historical scholarship" and what Heidegger calls "remembrance. of returning to Homer in order to recover an understanding of that was thought and revealed in him but then lost or forgotten after but of 'remembering' at the end of metaphysics. 448). that the Greek word for "true." It is not a question." that already in Homer "the possibility to think as was blocked. 102. therefore. Indeed." The fact that was connected from the very beginning to speech proves only that "language perhaps also resides under the sway of unconcealment. It is at the end of metaphysics that we must heed not what was present in Homer and then lost but the concealment that was at work . . with the word and the legendary word." above all with "speech" (GA 54. It is not because the truth is character of language as "expression" but in the essence of often also enunciated. . 69). P. we now see. 24 It appears that was already experienced by Homerand already understood early on by Heideggeras the unconcealment of a concealment. not as "the mere clearing of presence" but or 'hear the echoes' of as "the clearing of presence concealing itself. . that is. 78. But the ground for this "fact" does not reside in the . .

language is thought differently. The essential unity in the Greek understanding of truth from Homer to Plato means. in order to focus on what is given or unconcealedtruth as correctness. on the contrary. the opening scene can no longer take place between Homer and Plato. in Plato. if there is an essential unity from Homer to Aristotle." But in Hölderlin. Indeed in the 1969 seminar in Le Thor Heidegger seems to suggest that there is indeed a transformation in the understanding of the essence of language from the beginning of metaphysics to the end but that this transformation is less a fall than a salvation. indeed a Heideggerian narrative of the Greek fall 25 If there is . It is in this hidden comprehension that Homeric poetry moves (GA 15. Both Homer and Plato. and to state is to manifest something as something. as the strife between concealment and unconcealment. . one sees the deeply nonpoetic nature of the Greek comprehension of language" (GA 15. 336). or else already at the beginning. with Homer. "Since . Perhaps the Greek gods were right to save Aeneas. the forgetting of them. that is. Heidegger emphasizes. allowing us now to see just how unpoetic the Greeks really were. then it is difficult to see how or why Homer and the Presocratics would have any privilege in helping us to cross-over to another thinking.Document Page 93 But if there is no transformation in the nature of truth. in the Romans. The fall of the Greek into the . that either all of them are saved from the fall or. more poetically. While the narrative of the fall of the Greek world and language into the Roman can still be maintained. In Greek. does not begin within the Greeks. to name is to call out (Rufen). to name always already means to state (Aussagen). but either after Roman. that is. to put it boldly. an understanding of saying as stating that "hinders the understanding of the essence of poetry. both poetry and philosophy. There is indeed a unity in the understanding of language from Homer to Aristotle. that all of them are subject to it. The Aristotelian analysis of language achieves in a certain sense the most originary comprehension of language as it already governed Homer's poetry (as epic poetry). for Hölderlin. 336). more likely. as unconcealment. would turn away from what first gives truth. a movement toward rather than away from the essence of poetry. Heidegger here draws all the Greeks together between the two names Homer and Aristotle.

This second salvation occurs as Achilles and Aeneasthese two epic heroes. in order to return to Homer or to a naming that precedes metaphysics. While concealedness and unconcealedness might have been put on the scene by the Greeks. these two heroes of the Greek and Roman epicscome "into the space between the two hosts" to fight each other man to man. according to Heidegger. but as a telling or narrative that would be part of this fate. hoping. Suffice it to say that once again "the fate of the West" would hang in the balancenot as a fact that would then be recounted. And since such an echoing could never be the object of a straightforward narrative. the end of the circuit of representation and of the representation of this circuit. but all of a sudden the action is suspended. they hurl their respective spears at one another: the shield of Achilles pierces that of Aeneas but misses Aeneas himself. 1-2. that would. the beginning again and again turns out to be precisely a gift to an epoch" (GA 54. P. Heidegger writes in Parmenides: "Because it does not reside back in a past but lies in advance of what is to come. retrospectively determine the fate that is being told. for this unrepresentable relationship to be echoed within or at the limits of philosophy. the modern. the very nature of a fall would need to be rethought. one that would have to be told by beginning at the end. it would have been necessary to wait until the end of the circuit of philosophy. Aeneas is saved once again by the Greek gods. After Aeneas recounts their respective lineages. Aeneas then picks up a huge stone.Document Page 94 into the Roman. we are to assumewe who can still hear the echoes of Book 5to do to Achilles what Diomedes earlier did to him. Five books from the end of The Iliad. an for the Achaeans to fight over. will eventually come to take over and command the Greek world. saved this time specifically because of his lineage. it would not have been thought through by them. Such a counter-story cannot be told here. then the above would perhaps be the beginning of the counter-narrative. 1). in a sense. The poet intervenes to tell 27 26 . While the unity of concealedness and unconcealedness would be named and experienced by the early Greeks.. etc. the lineage that. with Nietzsche and Hölderlin. the medieval. The Seed of Aeneas of him being set up by Apollo Five books into The Iliad Aeneas is saved by Greek gods.

not necessarily for good: For the Romans. though. And so perish not without seed ( Poseidon "shed a mist over the eyes of Achilles. . All quotations from Homer are The Iliad and The Odyssey. As Diomedes says in The Iliad when choosing Odysseus to accompany him on the night raid of the Trojan camp. settlement. completely foreign to the Greek and (GA 54." drew his spear out of Aeneas' shield and set it at his feet. MA: Harvard University Press. whose superior knowledge of the Heideggerian corpus was of inestimable help in tracking down and interpreting references to Homer. ready now to be transplanted. T. . for Heidegger. the land as distinct from the sea. My deep thanks to Will McNeill. P.341). and installation are possible from those places where they are impossible. his lineage preserved. another thousand-year journey. . who immediately recognizes this to be the work of the gods: "a great marvel ( ) is this that mine eyes behold" (I. land of settlement as realm of command. in the Loeb Classical Library. Murray (Cambridge. this distinction differentiates that upon which construction. his seed protected. And so a tale is saved and not lost. lifted high off the ground he is brought back down to earth on the edge of the fray. his salvation. 20. 1984). A.302-305). one last time. In the Roman terra can be heard an imperial accent. tellus.Document Page 95 us that Aeneas would have hit Achilles with the stone and Achilles would have slain him in return had not Poseidon seen this and intervened: "for it is ordained unto him to escape. promised and revealed. Terra becomes territorium. . the earth. 60). He then lifted Aeneas up and ''swung him on high from off the ground. trans. 88-89. Notes 1. "When two go together.325-27). another fate. The founder of Rome is thus saved one last time by Greek gods. is the dry land. it was the one chosen to help who inevitably ended up discerning first and best." bringing him to the "verge )" of the battle where he warns him not to face Achilles again since only he can slay him (I. He then scatters the "wondrous mist" from the eyes of Achilles. brought back down to an earth that will never be the same because of him. one discerneth before the other. "And as in The Iliad. that the race of Dardanus ) and be seen no more ( )" (I. on the contrary. because of his fall. Aeneas is saved once again. 20. terra. ( 20.

4. Plato. I think. N. and advancing. for while Odysseus sees his in Hades. . without asking about the domain in . Again in Early Greek Thinking Heidegger asks. 131. there is Heracles. whose case most resembles that of Aeneas. One could no doubt reread the entire text by following the movement of these references. .93 is more complex than he lets on. 184). See Heidegger's own comments on 19.796. 195.] Zα-signifies the pure letting-rise within appearing. 88. 116). gazing upon. 202. EGT. . and all their ways. For sleep and death signify not a total concealment but a concealment from everyday modes of concealment and disclosure. 127. What is revealed in dreams conceals the disclosure of wakefulness (see O. it seems to me. . 32. Tom Davis in an unpublished paper has a fascinating discussion of this passage in The Odyssey. Will McNeill's translation. 128-29. 11. "How must we understand our word 'life.Document Page 96 2.83. Finally. The verb means rising into the light. 6. 3. 23. a tendency to regard the true as correctness of assertion or correspondence of statement and fact.351-57. My thanks to Tom Davis for this reference. 23. sadness of mourning. 108. 24. 824. 34. 73. The result of this analysis is the insight that the early Greeks thought lifeor way that is totally foreign to our own zoological or biological sense. I. Krell concludes: "There is instead an essential continuity in the history of 'truth'. 4546. 8. 'to live. 128. in a 265-66. 23. 602. . 189." Davis concludes from this that "while Heidegger is right to think a subjective active voice is ." misplaced in translating Davis thus rereads the scene in terms of a "complex interplay of atunements" that is.103-4). Fowler (Loeb Classical Library. 22. 20. Heidegger makes a similar statement in his Hölderlins Hymnen "Germanien" und "Der Rhein" (GA 39. . 5. 188. 11. 69.' if we accept it for a faithful translation of ? [. while what is revealed in Hades conceals or dissembles what is disclosed to the living (see O.14. 31. 7.93 to bring to our attention that Alcinous does notice this unnamed stranger's . 835). Homer is cited in no less than a dozen different places in this latter volume (GA 54. and this means to see the light of the sun"' (VA. While agreeing in essence with Heidegger's reading. the word does not signify that which is without truth but that which is revealed within the concealment of sleep or death. 425-34).602-603). where the others present do not. the middle-voiced event at 8. quite in line withand more completely developed thanwhat is said below concerning the necessity of in Homer in terms of the narrative mise en scène of the concealment or always reading unconcealment. 136). P. Davis strengthens. 475-76. this reading by paying close attention to the fact that "Homer stages the entire scene at 8. 35. H. 213-18. 59-60. it is said that Heracles "himself ( ) among the immortal gods takes his in Platon: Sophistes (GA joy in the feast" (O. 9. trans. 190-91. breaking in upon. 1977). 102-103. Homer says. 4. In Homer. Cratylus.

Interestingly. 13. 222. While the passage seems quite straightforward in opposing the truth within to the false tale without. 14. although he is a vagabond in ). When asked by Penelope what he had learned about Odysseus during his trip. 22..58-59). where Odysseus must stress that. 7. 11. As Priam prepares to ransom the body of Hector.226 when asked by Odysseus to name the servants who had betrayed Odysseus' house (O. 17. See Alcinous' description of him at O. A lie will he not utter.Document Page 97 which words and things so wondrously converge. truth ( . The nurse Eurycleia repeats line 16. 7. Plato I: An Introduction.295-97). Friedländer. See I. . 10. 11. robbers of lambs and kids from your own shame . ." in Daimon Life (Bloomington: Indiana University Press.108. "I will tell thee all the ). the tale Odysseus proceeds to tell is one of deceit that itself involves deceit. Paul Friedländer. Plato I: An Introduction. 3. 6." Indeed.420. Nestor himself repeats the words spoken of him later in the same book when he counsels Telemachus to go to Menelaus: "do thou beseech him.363-68. see also I. Odysseus throughout The Odyssey at once need. 223. 1992). he makes up the tale of a Phoenician who gave him "lying counsel ( )" so as to sell him into slavery (O. 17. mother. 386). 11. cf. he does not tell his mother that he had in fact just seen his father in Eumaeus' hut. . Telemachus says: )" (O. . 1958). . see David Krell's "Where Deathless Horses Weep.507).261-62). See O." in NE 1. But "Then verily. false of tongue ( folk" (I. Nestor says in The Iliad that although Diomedes is young.296. 18. . for he is wise ( ) indeed" (O. 16. 251. The word is used almost exclusively to describe not necessarily truthful but appropriate speech. he has told Alcinous "the truth ( defines and defies the role of the vagabond. 24. nimble of foot . a speech that usually comes with age and is regarded as a form of distinction. Odysseus responds. 9.327-28). he calls his remaining sons "these things of ). he "givest prudent ) to the princes of the Argives" for he "speakest according to right ( counsel ( )" (I. 100-136. 15. where Anteia "made a tale of lies ( )" for Proteus concerning Bellerophon. For a beautiful analysis of Heidegger's conception of the animal in light of Homer's treatment of the horses of Achilles who mourn for Patroclus in The Iliad. as thou biddest me" (O. the entire scene is one of secrecy and concealment. I will tell thee all the truth ( while Telemachus accurately recounts his visits to Nestor and Menelaus.160 ff.382-83. Hans Meyerhoff (New York: Pantheon. 12. When asked by Achilles in Hades how his son is faring. 14. 122). trans.

6. a concealment of the open. Plato I: An Introduction. At O. See Heidegger's "Hegel und die Griechen" (GA 9. Finally. Robert Bernasconi. ed. 20. Telemachus says. 25. At O.489). IN: Indiana University Press. For an excellent discussion of Heidegger's interpretation of in Plato.254-57. Interestingly. where the dangers of misrepresentation appear inherent not only to the interpretation but to the very transmittance of the messages of the gods. for with every unconcealment comes a concealment of what first gives unconcealment. Interpretation is thus never simply correct or incorrect as measured against the truth of what is or will be. For Homer. Eumaeus tells Telemachus 'all the truth' about the vagabond against the backdrop of what the audience knows and Eumaeus suspects to be the truth about him.14-15. Odysseus says. See also I. 16. John Sallis (Bloomington. 255. then. What is thus emphasized here is the concordance between the tale Odysseus knows and could himself sing and the one Demodocus has just sung." in Reading Heidegger.361-66 and 386-89. 443). 8. 22. 1985). all the while concealing from Eumaeus his knowledge of the stranger's identity and plans." 266). 80-82). interpretation is never neutral. "Phenomenology and/or Tautology. see Adriaan I. see O. 20. Peperzak's "Heidegger and Plato's Idea of the Good. Nestor reveals to Telemachus what happened to Agamemnon in light of what could or would have happened had Menelaus been there to prevent it. "that the word philosophers who pronounced it" (Peperzak. 21. When listening to the minstrel Demodocus sing in the palace of the Phaeacians. a wresting from unconcealment and a bringing into the open that engages human activity and brings about certain (often tragic) effects. Bernasconi. 2.159. 24. and . a making present of one narrative possibility or scenario rather than another. 258-85. "Heidegger seems to suggest." Heidegger and Plato's Idea of the Good." trans. 223. that is. Friedländer. just a few lines after this citation. At O." as Adriaan Peperzak puts it. that he will not conceal what is on his mind concerning the disguised Odysseus. in Reading Heidegger.Document Page 98 19. The Question of Language in Heidegger's History of Being (New Jersey: Humanities Press. 24. "for well and truly ( ) dost thou sing of the fate of the Achaeans" (O. 23. Part of this translation comes from Jean-François Courtine. in effect. where what is revealed is not only the difference between the tall tale Odysseus tells about himself and the one Eumaeus has himself constructed but also the difference between these tales and what the audience knows to be the case. 15. The Question of Language in Heidegger's History of Being. Heidegger speaks of the difference between is wiser than the 26. 1993). The false or baneful dream sent to Agamemnon by Zeus in Book 2 of The Iliad might be read in this way (see I. rather. . 14.61-64. It is. 3. 17. Jeffrey S. Librett. 21.

. 72 ff. 1995). John Sallis writes in Echoes (Bloomington: Indiana University Press. a voice which thus echoes in philosophy and in the nonphilosophy in which philosophy is completed and dissolved. .Document Page 99 27. 229 ff. as well as Kenneth Maly's "Reading and Thinking: Heidegger and the Hinting Greeks. 36. "In the regress to the clearing there sounds the echo not only of philosophy but also of another. ." See also his Double Truth (Albany: State University of New York Press. 1990)." in Reading Heidegger. an older voice .

on the basis of provocations from Nietzsche. I. all of them in response to the Heideggerian thought of concealment. Veils." and (4) care as heart and doom." Derrida invokes the Greek 2 1 . Yet what do the spurs. Heidegger. the verge or spindle of the loom. In fact.. spars. Derrida. Derrida. We find it in The Iliad (e. and masts of a ship have to do with sails and veils? The relationship between spars and is not only the verge of sails in the Homeric text is quite intimate. As a whole. and the further figure of "veils. For these two goddesses serve as the poles of the concealed tension that pervades Odysseus's adventures." in both cases the French voiles. between Kirke and Kalypso. senses that remind us also of battle.Document Page 101 Four Kalypso: Homeric Concealments after Nietzsche. the covert goddesses of Homer's Odyssey. the words are cognate: 3 . Perhaps the most fitting devotion to these goddesses would be to trace apparitions of concealment and concealing (Verborgenheit. and Verges In a note at the outset of "Plato's Pharmacy. during moments of respite from the blood and gore of emerge. (2) daimons and drugs. and verges. are clustered about the following themes: (1) sails. There Derrida invokes the classic Quintillian metonymy of "sails" for ships. just as Helen and Briseis serve to spark the events of The Iliad. Verbergen) in Homer. veils. 491). Heidegger. Sails. (3) Kalypso "herself" as concealment "itself.g. and Lacan David Farrell Krell These notes on The Iliad and The Odyssey. 6. and Lacan. the notes shuttle between the isles of Aiaia and Ogygiathat is. Yet it is only in The Odyssey that the other senses of pages in Derrida's Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles.

11. or the main support beam of the sailor's home? When Odysseus is engaged in his first interview with Penelope after his homecomingor rather. in the course of his homecoming. Odysseus sets sail for Hades. "loading mast and sail onto the trusty ships. after the year spent on Aiaia with Kirke. 402). 1. it therefore does Especially when one is working in the Ionian dialect. . 351. Heidegger. gliding over existence like a Mittelwesen. and Lacanare those on which shimmering sails. Derrida. 578). "raise the mast of pine ( )" (O. Setting up the mast is essential to setting and sail.Document Page 102 the loom. 24. 51. 506. 7. 139. dreaming of its cognate. the mast to which Odysseus is securely fastened in order to resist the seductions of sirensong. stovepipe and potbelly stove? Is not the ship's mast a king of roofbeam. Here are some of the passages where spurs and sails appear together: Telemachos's companions prepare ) into the air . no veil. no sail. it is also the mast of the ship. and no seabreeze. the mightiest mast would be the most useless member of the ship. Yet if there were no sail. 3 and 12. appears as . who sings and weaves veils divine when she is not turning sailors into swine (O. span it. the "large loom" of clever Penelope. 2. to make stand. 12. What does Nietzsche say in section 60 of The Gay Science? He pictures the sailing ship drifting like a butterfly or a ghost. 357. . the . a daimonthe spurring spar. 10. his father does the same after the interview with Proteus. No spur. cf. cognate nevertheless make sense of the winds. Yet the in Homer's textafter Nietzsche. Shimmering sails flutter like white veils against the dark mast and the brazen blue of the sky. or writes. The parataxis of suggests the derivation most strongly. which is not yet . 19. 110." (4. 316). . "Es sind die Frauen . 15. to erect. as the sorceress-goddess commands: "Raise your mast and hoist shining sails ( )" (10. that's it. chimney and mantlepiece. If is the spar. 129). or the "grand ambrosial loom" of Kirke.are brailed. and hoist the shining sails ( to set sail. 311. 21. Are they notas Melville (in both Moby-Dick and "My Chimney and I") would affirmhearth and home to mariners. if the mast thrusts upward into the sky. 424-26). 222. where not seem far-fetched to wonder whether and have something to do with Hestia and the hearth. 14. that would be it!" 4 We know that comes from . Nietzsche says. the mast that is later that interest us most shattered by a gust of Zeus's stormwind (O. who weaves by day and unravels by night.

. and blood streamed over the lever. It is no longer a leverage he needs. So what is that enormous doing in Polyphemus's cave? He plans to use it as a shepherd's crook after it has dried." Odysseus 307): "Here the flawless hearth of Odysseus ( will arrive when the moon wanes but then stands again in the sky ( ). 304) to which I draw near. . The emphatic 6 . . . while I braced myself upwards and turned it. Daimons and Drugs Who is the daimon who breathes courage into Odysseus and his crew in Polyphemus's cave? Who or what does the word address? Who are these middling creatures. no philology. 19. a lever. after daimon wine has worked its worst on Polyphemus and he is vomiting up chunks of the men he has devoured. . and the holy. life itself is a daimon. Could it . who know nothing of ships and commerce. . related in his view to anxiety. with all the lunar attributes of Hestia? And does not be she before the mast: Heidegger. 375. 322. which was like iron tempered in the juices of his eye" (9. and perhaps never completedisguising himself as the old Cretan beggar. but we can be sure that it was his best. it will give Nobody all the of the hearth to a glowing red. mortals and immortals? Heidegger refers to the daimonic as das Übermächtige. and 381-94). Masts are foreign to the Cyclops. . However. even though it is the size of the mast of a twenty-oared freighter. Odysseus sharpens one end of it and heats it in the fire but a µοχλóς. "Then a daimon inspired us with courage. the nothing. Nobody neglects to say which foot he put forward when he braced himself. . the right or the left. . My companions grasped the lever toward its sharpened front and plunged it right in his eye.Document Page 103 complete. who always knows how to get leverageat least when he is among men. in his book on care. . a note on leverage. . like one who drills the planks of a ship. these Mittelwesen who mediate between earth and sky. say that even when the moon is at the full it remainsat least on its dark sideforever in concealment? 5 A final note on the mighty verge of ship and loom. In Heidegger's view. Some will say that this is fantasy. Odysseus . 332. but one must wonder whether Homer entertained the connection. he says (O.

word that Heidegger (in "Aletheia" and in the Heraclitus lecture course of 1943) omits. He also mentions the special mode of revealing/concealing that constitutes animal life: "But animality does belong to in a special sense." Yet in the end he seems determined to reserve the never-setting clearing of being for human beings and the gods. paradoxically. as it is when Odysseus's crew slaughter the Oxen of the Sun. The rising of animals into the open remains closed and sealed in itself in a strangely captivating way. And when Eumaeus. even if a being well-nourished pertains to humans as well as to other animals. doubly. the fatness of the animals is a measure of the hybris and impending nemesis of the suitors.word appears in Phoenix's address to the wrathful Achilles. the faithful sowherd." is the root of ζáω. very. would make much of this: it is as though Heidegger does not pay sufficient heed to the earth (and the hearth) as the site of enjoyment. 530). . Human beings are particularly well nourished at feasts. the lore and love of life. and. Curiously. the "anyone'' of apparently excluding those "anythings" that happen to be animals. Another ζα. No doubt Phoenix's speech does seem closer to The Odyssey than to the rest of The Iliad. in effect. whatever his sense of usufruct in "The Anaximander Fragment" Heidegger does mention the fires of sacrifice that sear the flesh of animals. ζαwords are rare. Heidegger himself is captivated by such weeping. a bizarre omission in the context of za-ology. is : O. . "well-nourished. as numberless succulent pigs and well-nourished (I.Document Page 104 prefix ζá. it is also at feasts where they sometimes weep in secret. unveils) how "someone" can be. Whereas daimons are everywhere in Homer's texts. in that song which many scholars have taken to be a later addition to the Ur-Iliad. finds he must eternally offer up the best-nourished pigs to the suitors. 223: cf. 4. 19). Some. thoroughly. cognate with . 14. Proteus guards his herd of well-nourished seals. ontologically must bein the troubling and troubled world that is the world of care. following Levinas. 7. The one that crops up again and again. 7 and it reflects daimonic power. where they eat sumptuously. none of which thrive on ambrosia and nectar. 14. "throughout. (O.450-1). steers wend their bloody way to the gods in sacrifice. For it shows (reveals." is the very ζα. As we shall see in some detail in the next section. and perhaps closer still to Hesiod and even to Aeschylus. ''Ατε the with it appeals to 10 9 8 .

Yet I wonder whether the god-swollen river is not the "earlier" appearance. 525). and the need to relent. Vanishing how? as those who are entseelt.word appears in the lines Apollo addresses to Poseidon. Heidegger constantly tries to confine the daimonic and deific to the theater of theory. as the German says. 21. flourishing to the full. one may be temptedagain for Nietzschean genealogical reasonsto compare the two riverbank slaughters. repent." which in the late 1880s Nietzsche consistently invokes under the figure of Circe the sorceress. the 13 12 11 . deprived of heart. . Homer need not play second fiddle to the Bible: Achilles's revenge against Agamemnon for the latter's "rape'' of Briseis (it is the concealed Briside. as all the gods do battle at the river Xanthes. hardening the zeta and delta to the theta of -. who are as wretched as the leaves on the trees. flourishing at first ( ). 326). And what is ? We shall come to that. old Phoenix says: "Thus we heard tell of earlier heroes. and reconcile. Odysseus's revenge against Antinoos and the other suitors. recant. It is precisely here that many critics envisage "the triumph of morality" over the heroic sense of destiny. Twice the warriors confront the turbulent waters of a "Zeus-swollen river. to which I shall now return. (After reading Derrida's Schibboleth. not Helen. Burgeoning. if ). vast ( In the course of his plea to Achilles. That is too !) An undertaking for these notes. is contrasted sharply by dwindling and vanishing. enjoying the fruits of the earth. There are two more daimonic usages to record. but perhaps proto-ζα. who sparks the immediate events of the Ilias epic). 21. "mortals. the more vital and powerful epiphany. whom Odysseus will have hanged by a single rope. In his lecture courses. who. 263. Another ζα. 464-66). but also against the servantgirls who consort with them. . those who are deprived of . theory in the sense of theater. In the great tale of vengeance that is Western "morality. precisely here that a Nietzschean genealogical reading of The Iliad would have to do its work.Document Page 105 . vanishing ( )" (I. the gods being die Hereinblickenden.words proper. ) "Why should I do battle for the sake of mere mortals!" exclaims the sun god. 9. let themselves be reconciled by gifts perchance they had raged in anger ( and words" (I. if only briefly. at the end. not to mention the revenge of one god or goddess against another. 17. not ζα. and the vengeance of Zeus Pater upon all. but then." (I.

appears a surprising number of times in the vocative. and life? Doubtless by way of Demeter? who inspires courage in Odysseus. and well versed in all tricks and turns. 7. the more self-concealing and self-withdrawingpresencing of the . He is as metamorphic as Proteus. ''Oh." . 561. 1. ingenious. Helen cries. 3. he cries. as one personage addresses The word another. We would say he is a clever devil. below in the next section)." But to return to that (O. 48. 163. has been clinging to Zeus's knee. 190 and 200). ) earth. and is not the somewhere between Zeus. Oh.399). the wheat rich fields. 3. 24. 521). 1. 223 and 379. Priam does the same to Hekuba when she tries to dissuade him from recovering Hektor's body: "Oh. " you certainly have nothing to complain aboutand this is all your fault!" (O. 48-49). certainly as clever as Penelope's . dismal of fortune. Hera has not overlooked the significance of the fact that Thetis. Paris having been helicoptered off the battlefield by the goddess of love at the moment when Menelaos is about to throttle him. 194). Listige. you blind one. you always know what I'm doing. he cries. Yet he is also the man of misfortune. writes the German translator. in the second instance. " . the this not the generously giving ( daimon. 202. " . All these emphatic apostrophes. always in a state of agitation or irritation. you cunning one!" The cunning one is the uncanny one. and 281). "You fool!" Odysseus addresses the Greeks in such fashion when they show signs of weakness: "Are you out of your minds?" (I. the daimon of transformations. "Oh. see the discussion of Heraclitus B16. 168. O du Verblendeter. the mother of Achilles. 21. 6. you guilty one. When brother Hektor catches Paris nestled comfortably in bed. miserable woman!" (I. why do you try to seduce me . ex14 . 326. the Homeric refrain." or "Oh. When she confronts him with it and accuses him of conspiring with Thetis against her Achaeans.Document Page 106 more frightful and uncannythat is. 22. Athena complains to Father Zeus at the outset of The Odyssey: "But my heart is torn by Odysseus. cf. . Odysseus is cunning.(O. so?" (O." inasmuch as Verblendung is elsewhere used to translate the effects of ''Ατε Or. 2. the one who manages to bring to the fore what ought to have remained concealed. you cruel one. One of the hero's epithets is "clever. mighty of mind. nothing can be concealed from you ( )" (I. 1. 115. the nourishing earth: is daimonic? Finally. When Aphrodite tries to seduce Helen back to the bed of Paris.

goblins. or shared suffering. 856-69). Well might he equal a daimon. mocks Odysseus . What do all these daimonic vocatives imply? Vexation in the face of a superior power. 336-40. astonishment in the face of a stranger. uncompromising woman. including all the reasons for his concealed tears. Nor should we forget the (good) daimon that breathes courage into Odysseus and his crew as they plunge the lever into Polyphemus's eye . and cruelty. Reunited at last in mutual recognition. "Eat. the whole story (264). he retorts. Bist du ein Unhold? "Are you a demon? What the hell kind of woman are you? "Who the devil do you think you are?" (O. The Odyssey yields fewer such vocatives. He has already addressed him as a "frightful stranger." presumably in strength. uncanny stranger" (O." thus granting victory to one people or the other (I. and cobolds to which Jane Ellen Harrison refers under the name keres. desperation in the face of a stubborn. It is as though the apostrophized daimon refers to those ancient sprites. danger. The model warrior Diomedes is said to be "equal to a daimon. 438 and 459). Each addresses the other with . bacilli. then as the dire demon. 71). 14. Hektor hopes to engage with Ajax "until a said of Achilles during the daimon pulls us apart. 291-92). 15 The itself enters on the Homeric scene either genie or beneficent powermore often the former than the latter. fear in the face of concealment. . And when Penelope hesitates before in disguise. Wicked woman!" (O. 23. accusation in the face of the guilty one or the fool. awaiting the definitive sign. The same will be of Book 20 (447). first as the helpful divinity. this Diomedes. they exchange strong words. as Penelope demands to hear his story. but this time teasingly. When Melantho. or perhaps simply a courageous one. suggest the overpowering power of the uncannythe power that shows something that ought to have remained in concealment. one of the pair (Odysseus) repeats the attack.Document Page 107 claimed at moments of extreme vexation. cunning. 5." (361). leader of the lubricious servant girls. Here are a small handful of daimonic epiphanies. who wounds both the goddess of love and the god of war in battle (884. 166 and 174). 19. 443). 7. Odysseus. but also in outward appearance (I. Eumaeus encourages Odysseus-incognito as follows: .

tempting them like a siren to betray themselves. and craftily procrastinate (O. "Yet I. it is (as one might expect) a daimon who is said to possess the hero and make him sulk. cunning Kalypso the fame of his Trojans" (O. 19. . tapping it and calling out the names of the Greek heroes in the voices of their respective wives. was led by some sort of daimon to be her fireside friend ( ). 386). Even the powerful goddess. "You mournful old man ( ). and the misfortunes that a daimon would invariably send (O. In Phoenix's moralizing appeal to Achilles. 134-35). 9. . 2. 21. there not 16 Is . It is ) to sit at that large surely a good daimon who ''inspires" Penelope (µοι . 166). 146-47). 201). "You came. if only a divinity would bring him back." Soon the daimon will conduct us as well to Kalypso's hearth. herself. Telemachos replies that if he were to do so he would have two things to fear. 4. der Herd. For the moment. a refrain later taken up by Philoitios. 274-75). Odysseus. needs a daimon to call mortal men to her side. 3. in order to weave. Later still. it is surely a wicked daimon who drives Helen to the Trojan Horse and has her circle about it. the sowherd encourages him to tell the truth by saying. Odysseus tells Alkinoos. Neither man nor god mixes with her. 9. Philoitios warns one of the suitors that a daimon should steal him away before Odysseus's return (O. not the vengeance on which Achilles' heart is set: "Do not let a daimon drive you to it. it was a divinity who brought you here to me ( )" (O. ravel. and guilt and retribution are the order of the day. 381). The gods themselves often relent. 17. 18." . After Odysseus-incognito has spun out his little epic of lies to Eumaeus. 243. Nestor in Pylos recounts the parting of the ways between his and (O." However laconic Menelaos's account of the matter may seem. my friend" (I. Now for the demons. "because a daimon commanded you. 600-601). poor wretch. 138-39). recall Heidegger's fascination with the hearth. When Antinoos encourages Telemachos to send his mother to her father's house in preparation for another marriage. Odysseus's loyal cowherd (O. hoping in that way to enhance θεóς . Achilles is told. 14." says her aggrieved husband. his father. Later he cries the same to the surly goatherd who has just given the "old man" (= Odysseus-incognito) a good swift kick: "If only Odysseus were here. especially in his lectures on Hölderlin's hymn.Document Page 108 (O. Der Ister. Odysseus's ships: "For I saw that a daimon planned ill for us.

the . or apportioning. as Odysseus puts his father Laertes to the test. 16. 149-50). spinning out the last of his epic fables. daimonically cryptic and calyptic. an evil spirit enchants me. cannot trust his senses: "No. distributing. When the Northwind . 10. and all enjoyed the meal they deserved ( )" . 24. 194-95). 306). 12. 64). I recorded Liddell-Scott's surmise that the word is related to . 295). 256. Occasionally. not my father. was es an Unheil gibtein Unhold schickt es in Eile (O. 19. Sometimes that evil appears in the form of a nightmare: (O. 24. as at a meal. dividing up. we may take it that an Unhold is the ugly potency. In Daimon Life. 587). Meanwhile. Telemachos. an Unhold who drinks up the pool in which parched Tantalos is made to stand (O. dazed by the reappearance of his father. I tried to trace the probable origins of the word . 201). as in the phrase. 87). Odysseus. Yet there is always the view from the other side: one man's evil genie is another man's guardian angel. . an Unhold who puts words of mutiny of Eurylochos's mouth (even though the German translation calls this daimon eine Gottheit: O. 19. That evil spirit was Pallas Athena. paratactic refrain nonetheless resonates as Denn alles. about the hearth and heart of any homethe uncanny unhomelike? Has not Odysseus been tasting this for months and years among the goddesses and witches of the isles? 17 It is an Unhold who drives Odysseus back to Aiolia (O. the word appears in parataxis with as the evil he sends. 11. "Yet a daimon (ein Penelope is visited by daimonic cares as well: Unhold) brought me immeasurable mourning" (O. 19. where his sowherd dwelled" (O. a "recalcitrant daimon." . stirs up the sea. If the word hold in German refers to the fair and the gracious. Finally. 20." ein Unhold berückt mich.Document Page 109 something powerfully concealed. "And after they had finished the work and prepared the meal ( ) they feasted ( ). the unpropitious power that ought to have remained in concealment but came to the fore. you are not (O. 512). is surely to blame (O. 18. When the defunct suitor Amphimedon informs Agamemnon in Hades how he got therein that remarkable second visit to the World of the Dead that opens the final song of The Odysseyhe tells how Odysseus found Eumaeus the sowherd: "And then there was this evil spirit κακòς ) who led Odysseus far out into the fields. we again hear the refrain. 129). Aber es trieb mich ein Unhold (O.

"Thus the father slept quietly on Mount Gargaron in the arms of his wife. or "girdle of However. In the face of the overpowering power of the δαιµóνιον." Ganz von Liebe benommen und Schlaf.430-31. a second derivation is tempting. (O. 119). human existence is invaded by a kind of animal seriousnesswhat the Germans call tierischer Ernst. 14. obedient to necessity ( Achilles' own immortal horses warn him of his lota god and a mortal will bring him to submission: (I. as Heidegger's word for animal behaviorbut also for the singular effect of anxiety on a Dasein that is about to become appropriate. A more stunning example is the stone that Ajax sends crashing against Hektor's chest: "The dark of night veiled his eyes ( : we )" (439). of course. with Zeus alone the occasional exception. benumbed by love and slumber. Achilles )" (I. 19. garbed in Aphrodite's enchantment. as so often in the Homeric epics: (I. The word benommen will strike any za-ologist. of all people. ) sent this pest to disturb our meal (δαιτóς)?" (O. A lizard sunning itself on a rock and a Dasein shocked out of its quotidian complacency are both benommen. 7. Antinoos. . cf. 446). and the blow still dazed his senses (θυµóν ) and Patroklos's death deals just such a blow to Achilles. will soon come to such veilings). When he makes peace with Agamemnon. 535). as a source of the daimonic is the power of A more relevant "Homeric" reason for considering sleep. 417)." . . invoked just now. Hera. 18." something he knows through and through. as Sein und Zeit relates. Benommenheit is perhaps best considered a word for daimonic impact.433). (I. for meat is something Eumaeus "had seen. the compelled ( ) him" (I. 14. There was something distinctly noble in Eumaeus's demeanor "as he rose to distribute the meat. 148 and 203). Somewhere between mourning ( raging vengeance (χóλος). 2. brings the two words together when he complains about the "old man's" presence at the feast of the suitors: "What evil spirit (Welcher Unhold. 233 ff. something even of the seer or the one who allots destinies. 14. "Let the heart in our breasts be tamed. The same word. Achilles remembers that even Herakles could not flee his fate: "Rather.Document Page 110 (I. 19. rears its daimonic head in The Odyssey." brings Zeus to love and sleep. Nestor recounts Agamemnon's ignominious fate: "But then a .). as though clairvoyant. 66). says. 17. 0.

(I. contemplating the death of the suitors and their women. Odysseus. (I. later he threatens Hera with fists. He asks the hooting and jeering suitors not to join in the fracas. These coups of a dual alongside the plague ( coinage dominate Derrida's reflections on Geschlecht. to withhold their ). 8.. an unpublished and unfinished third manuscript measures these strokes of mortal sexuality in Heidegger's Trakl essay. It is as though the poetic line in Homer is delimited (as Charles Olson says it ought to be) by the breath. The word is again associated with "blows" when Odysseus prepares to face. 18. 397). Its place in the poetic line is virtually always at the very end of the linenot." whines the Bum. the Universal ). ). (O. One final note on as far as I can see.. and submissions. there are dozens upon dozens of blows that fall in The Iliad and The Odyssey that I have not recorded here. and there is invariably a catch in the breath. 20. a caesura. . 3. beats his breast in anger." (O. for metrical reasons (dozens of other words would fill the rhythmic bill). see I. espying on the battlefield the hero he has cuckolded. It perhaps also has to do with what Heidegger calls the double Schlag of sexualitythe initial inexplicable dispersion of Dasein into at least two sexes. 4. blows ( The daimonic thus has to do with both allotments and damaging disclosureswith sendings. blows. 31. 17). Iros-Airos. for the prize of a blood sausage: "Now I shall have to submit to blows ( old man. Patroklos's death is due to both the blow delivered by Apollo and the lances hurled by Euphorbos and Hektor. in every invocation of the daimon. of course. 455). and. three parts of which have been published. ) of discord. where Paris. in a boxing match. 269)." . when Athena and Hera rebel against Zeus in order to help the Achaeans. 54). with a lightning-bolt. 19 18 . 13). 3. For some Homeric uses of . The word is once again brought into the proximity of gods and mortals in a sententious remark by Menelaos: "It is painful for a god to have to submit ( ) to a mortal man" (O. (O. "was struck down in his innermost heart. he threatens to blast their chariot (I. 816). and between them. 15.Document Page 111 sending of the gods ( ) took him to perdition. 16. but presumably because of its uncanny semantic power. so that he does not suffer defeat at the hands of them all (57: . deliveries. the promise of a gentler twofold.

cf. 246). this submission to external compulsion? Who will taste the flavor of these tears of his? These matters are concealed. ). Hermes comes to Ogygia she recognizes him straightaway: "She knew him as soon as she saw him. 246. She and Hermes alike feed on ambrosia and nectar in her dining hall. Yet Hermes. And when she poses a question to )" (5. by her who did the willing. 29: ). Kalypso is also called a nymph (5. 57 et passim. I told him many times I would make him ageless and deathless all his days.'' she chides them. 96). Book 5. Odysseus calls her a powerful and uncanny goddess. altogether deathless. 30. When daimon? Surely not. Ogygia seems to herand to usas remote as possible from Olympus. Indeed. for the gods. the Olympians are particularly hard when a goddess elects a mortal for her (122). 79-80). 7. but the nymph was opposed" (154). you gods. however much Odysseus weeps during the daylight hours. are not unknown to each other ( )" (5. as we heard. I nurtured him ( : cf. concealment itself." goddess who abjures the gods. 14. discussed above)." she complains. 180. if one can say so. They are. he replies. and ends with Odysseus burying himself under dry leaves on the Phaeacian shores (where Nausicaa will find him). Precisely how unwilling is the hero? Where are the eyes that will plumb this unwillingness.Document Page 112 Kalypso's Concealments Is Kalypsowho. Kalypso. the god who comes to you ( when Hermes communicates Zeus's will to her. cf. Odysseus being the lover she has nursed for seven years ("I won him over to love. To be sure. "whose life flows on like water. goddess. A lover. 218)." 135-36. which begins with Dawn rising from the arms of her lover Tithonos in order to show herself and bring light to immortals and human beings alike. needs a mediating daimon to call mortal men to her sideherself a mere (O. 9. concealing himself as one conceals coals under . "You gods. more jealous than all the rest. "He was compelled to do so. "You question me. 85. cf. goddess divine (78. "You are hardhearted." (154-55). 149: ): "Homecoming! was his cry. Kalypso suddenly dissociates herself from the gods. which is that she send Odysseus on his way. seven years of nights. he spends his nights in her spacious grotto. Who is Kalypso? What are her effects? Hers is perhaps the most perfect of songsThe Odyssey. unwilling.

855)." Veils with what? In the first place. is the with parergonal veils: "Never has love so veiled my senses. dismantled like Lemuel Pitkin. fading words. : "And I shall veil. he tells of the two who got away: the sons of . dazed by Ajax's rock: . "a black cloud of horror wrapped him round" (I." (I. in the bolder days of Troy. Thus Aphrodite plucks Paris from Menelaos's vengeful grip. 315). 438-9). As the tiresome Nestorsurely the prototype of Shakespeare's Poloniusrecounts his exploits back in the olden days when men were men. stripped of his armor. 16. 14. "the Ugliest Man. Once Paris is ensconced in his chambers. 3. The impact is immediate." plaint of Paris. 2. these being the song's final. and are the hero's eyelids in sleep." "I"? Who am "I''? "She that veils. silverveiled Helen comes to him. "wrapped in veils of mist. with night and death. 488: ) in order to preserve the seed of fire ( . "Black night veiled his eyes" (I. and "darkness veils his eyes. veils her hero's beloved lids in sleep. whom Poseidon snatched from the battlefield ( . 490). 22. everything that veils your shame. presumed lost: 24. Earlier I mentioned Hektor. Others are less lucky. 752). 18. Kalypso. (491) is Odysseus himself." (I. There on the shore. When Andromache sees Hektor dragged across the plain outside 20 ." Aktor. 263). v. and "veiled in his deathly demise. 519). 14. Odysseus threatens Thersites. 11. "Apollo has killed me. cf." (I.Document Page 113 heaps of ashes (5. 381)." in the following way: "Watch I don't rip every shred of clothing from your body. Laertes' grief over his son Odysseus. "concealing him in a heavy mist. (487) is the glowing seed of fire. Each time a god or goddess wants to rescue a favorite from an especially parlous situation on the battlefront. and it too has to do (442)." (I. he or she veils him in a cloud and snatches him from the melee. accompanied by Aphrodite. and cruel fate!" cries Patroklos. his flies from the gaping wound. as perhaps later on the Sandymount Strand of Joyce's "Nausicaa." Athena (494). News of Patroklos's death has almost the same effect on Achilles: . The Trojan prince Hyperenor is lanced. In earlier days. I.

Hera now goes to fetch Aphrodite's a smaller version of the girdle. 4. 20. and night drops down from the sky" (O. Yet also including the mortals. (There are numerous examples of as concealment and oblivion in Homer's poemsI. 314-15). however. Cloud-gatherer Zeus unleashes a hurricane after the Oxen of the Sun have been slaughtered. concealing. 185). as will be showings. Zeus eclipsed that becloud the mind ( is Zeus benumbed. and 10. she collapses: "Gloomy night veiled her and covered her eyes. 97 and 102. 9. perfumes that permeate heaven and earth. veils are parerga. as it were. 210.) Heidegger relates how Odysseus conceals himself as he weeps at Alkinoos's courtTelemachos did precisely the same at the court of Menelaos (4. 12. 9. including Zeus.. 22. Sails never simply cover or cleave to the mast. there is no need to report on them here. 114-16)by pulling a purple cloth over his eyes. 65). Such clouds of mist sometimes conceal more than a single warrior. and lascivious whispers ) even of the wisest ones" (216-17). (I. 14. they do not cover themthey hide them in order better to show them." (I. pearl earrings. Veiling themselves with veils. and they often conceal not in order to protect but to offer a foretaste of doom. 466. . and. Whether . cf. a veil shining like the sun. . "of love. is one word for another. ." Heidegger is occupied with concealment ostensibly reveals nothing about . unguents immortal. goddesses cover their faces. O. the well-versed Odysseus. Yet his most trenchant example of In "Aletheia. 21. The final touch is a veil. Both do a great deal of revealing work in The Odyssey. 623). 91 and 151. and golden brooches: Hera is on her familiar way to seduce her consort again. her loveliest robes. As if that were not enough. immortals as well as mortal to submission ( men" (198-9). Veilings of the second order. "In foggy mist he veils land and sea ( . and etc. The Lakedaimonian women are "beautifully veiled. those featuring Kalypso of Ogygia and Kirke of Aiaia. 19. "Give me now the forces of love and longing ( ). 537. . O. 86).. ). especially in Books 5 evil.Document Page 114 the city walls. And yet there are also very different sorts of veilings. . by which you bring all shades of the daimon!). among them. 21 An ambrosial bath. they are supplemental or (O. No." Penelope when she goes down to meet the hated suitors (18. longing. Aphrodite undoes her girdle of enchantment.

. 152. 558. . 2. 24. . in all the forms of hair. 5. "Athena takes Achilles by the it. but also because. cf. . in "The Phases of the Moon. cf. 3. 1. Odysseus prays to Athena." (O. to bring light to the immortals ( ) . 33 and 35. 5. This is precisely the phrase Odysseus uses when Kirke tells him that there is one more diversion on his homeward routehe must go to hell. Helios is one of . Odysseus's moment comes on the last leg of his journey homeward. 20. 10. while remaining invisible to all the others. especially in the form of (I. When. 2. "and concealing his magnificent face. 198). however. she hears and heeds him. is the invocation of Dawn: "Now. but also in the vain endeavor to conceal himself. Perhaps the most familiar of such revelations. 9. ." (I.. of day is to be born. as Hera says. that the sun might finally set ( )" (O. Zeus 13. to repeat. presumably out of shame. There is even a moment when it seems the sun of life will never set." (O. )." and as she does so she reveals herself . However. 539-40). where daylight never penetrates (O. If one searches for the antithesis of concealing. to him alone. 329). inasmuch as King Alkinoos recognizes Odysseus's concealment for the selfshowing it is. Sometimes the light goes out: when Menelaos learns of his brother's murder he sinks into the dust and weeps: "I didn't have the heart to go on living. her fingers all roses . "the light of day.13). Vain. 1. 24. (I.. 85). "Helios rose . 12. 1). when Dawn ). 6. 497-98). and 17." (8. Prosopokalypsis. 4. ." which we will take up once again in a moment." To see the light Heidegger's favorite figures. cf. but does not show herself: (O. one finds it precisely where Heidegger found that grace the Homeric epics." discussed by Heidegger in "Aletheia. to live. . after he has been to Hades. That is one of the themes of Heraclitus's "never-setting sun.Document Page 115 porphyry being the color of death and mourning." recalls William Butler Yeats. 29-30. to go on seeing the light of day. as Priam tells Achilles: 120). partly because she fears Poseion. 131). sunward ( ). years later. during that last long day at Alkinoos's court: "Again and again Adysseus turned his head . 2). namely. "Gods are recalcitrant when they appear in person.'' (O. showed herself (sich zeigte: "Dawn found him as soon as she shone ( ) on strand and sea" (I.

The next morning. 324). 12. which is hollow at the base of his throat. 383 and 385). as when Penelope. always anachronistic nostalgia for something other than domesticity. as it is for Iros Airos. as when Hektor inadvertently allows himself to shine through ( ) his armor. 192)." . "Large. regardless of what we will have heard concerning the hero's "unwillingness": "Once again they betake themselves to her spacious grotto. To espy a Cyclops against the sky ) in high mountains" (O. Or so the story goes. Kalypso's island would charm a godHermes. who stops to contemplate it in astonishment on his way to end the seven years of Odysseus's confinement. to veils and concealings. when Dawn shows herself ( ). For Odysseus did go off to war. and on to Aiaiathe poles of the Odyssean itinerary on the way to IthakaOgygia and Aiaia being names for the uncanny homecoming that transpires in secret prior to the homecoming proper. cloaked in glittering (O.(O. 20. Sometimes self-showing is deadly. Zeus commands him to shine on gods and mortals rather than shades: (O. . for something that elsewhere the Briside and Helen inspired./Joyously in a corer of the cave they huddle in love. and broad shoulders appeared ( )'' (O. for example. Back to Ogygia. when the "old man" disrobes for the boxing match: ). 22. 9. 160 and 165). 5. apparently without undue constraint.Document Page 116 does not wish the sun to set. And on his way home he was waylaid. And sometimes it is deadly for another. did abandon Penelope and their son. More often than not. The light of day is not the only thing that surges upward in radiance. at the supersternal notch (I. the Universal Bum. 64). veils. 67-68). well-formed thighs showed themselves ( 18. a self-showing has to veil itself. names for the always antecedent. shows herself to the despicable suitors. And sometimes selfis like seeing "a wooded crag towering ( showing is descensional. 227). then. On that last night (or were there four or five nights attached to the four or five days during which Odysseus builds his raft?) Odysseus confines himself again to Kalypso's grotto. however. as when Poseidon shakes the earth until it threatens to gape and expose ( ) the hateful domain of Hades to mortals and gods (I. Back. 18. Ogygia and Aiaia are namesor criesof desire and adventure. at least not forever: when Helios threatens to go to hell and shine on the dead ( ) unless those who poached his herd are punished.

ties the immortal around his breast. reveal (Heidegger would insist) the mysterious dimension of every showing. returns the immortal veil to its aqueous domain. Odysseus at long last finds refuge. It is a matter of engaging in a thoughtful dialogue with Heraclitus. as Odysseus nears Phaeacia. and with Ino's help struggles ashore. B16: . A black (353). Under old leaves . he conceals his seed of fire. For two days and nights he swims through the storm-tossed brine. Goddess has contrived yet another trap for him.Document Page 117 Kalypso veils herself ( ) from head to toe (230-32). commands him to abandon both raft and clothing. wine. Odysseus is dragged down by the rich robes given him in parting by Kalypso (321). calyptic concealments. if they agree to show themselves to our reading. She even inspires its with wind. land and seaand Tossed overboard. The raft's is smashed by a sudden gust of wind. Heidegger's entire effort in "Aletheia" is designed to frustrate all oppositional or dialectical thinking when it comes to revealing/concealing. When after a struggle he regains his raft. the Shining Goddess ( . She shows Odysseus the trees for his raft. There are so many surprises in this essaylet us look at a few of them. of trying to approach Fragment . Then she dives back into the seaas the recollection of Kalypso that she is. the father whom a wicked daimon has struck down with illness (396-67). and hurtles headlong into the sea. . and when the raft is finished she outfits it with food. concealments that somehow show themselves. he tears off Kalypso's himatia. Odysseus wonders whether the Shining wave envelopes her. or what is left of it. He shies from no paradoxon or oxymoron when it is a matter of such thinking. She gives him now an ambrosial veil ( ) to wear about his chest until he reaches shore. On the eighteenth day at sea. one might say). He welcomes the eventual calm the way children welcome the recovery of their father (394: ). and to swim for it. the goddess of shimmering . Ino. and when Athena sends sleep These cryptic. and water. Poseidon veils fluttering reappears. but after one more blast of wind from Poseidon. Perhaps yet another (421) will send a monstrous fish to make a meal of him? In the mouth of a river. as it were. (Must not Nietzsche have loved this image of shiningthe welcome recovery of a stricken father!) Yet no safe exit onto the shore shows itself (410: ).

The Lethe that flows through all Aletheiathat is the mystery. this saying means: "As the one who leads one's life. does not mean the transitive "he concealed." The German translation by Voss over into the comes closer to what the Greek says." Concealment here defines the way in which a human being should be present among others. in the Phaeacian king's palace. on the other hand. covered his head each time at the minstrel Demodocus's song. without the others noticing it. 83 ff. and thus hidden from those present. The German. inasmuch as the critics tell us that human beings mattered little to rather than a . how can one hide oneself?" Concealment in the face of what never goes into concealmentthat is the question. somewhat surprisingly. earlier in his career he often . a who rather than a what." tears from all the other guests)." but "he remained concealed''as the one who was shedding tears. it always involves a Heidegger insists that the who is a question of human beings and gods. and so should we. remain concealed (therein). By the manner of its saying.Document Page 118 "In the face of that which never sets. whether happy or sad. thus revealing who he is to all who have eyes to weep or ears to hear." Thought from a Greek perspective. ohne daß alle anderen es merkten (Then he shed tears. we translate: "[A]lsdann vergoß er Tränen. At the end of the essay Heidegger. without all the others noticing it). Consistent with the wept. Odysseus weeping. 8.) tells how Odysseus. "Remaining concealed" is the key word in the Greek. I therefore cite "Aletheia" at length: Homer (Odyssey. called it the realm of the daimonic. as "Live in Correspondingly. since it carries the important verb German formulation: "Allen übrigen Gästen verbarg er die stürzende Träne (He concealed his flowing . neither Hegel nor Nietzsche nor Platobut Odysseus. the Greek announces that concealingand therefore at the same time remaining uncon- . however. Verse 93 runs: spirit of our own language. Odysseus concealing himself as he weeps and sighs. we translate the well-known Epicurean admonition hiding. Heidegger's first who is neither Heraclitus nor Clement of Alexandria (who cites Heraclitus in his Paidagogos). says: he wept. Heidegger goes to some length to set the scene for Odysseus's concealed revelation. And.

for us. selfmanifesting. in its undisturbed harmony. a few verses before the one we have cited. what governs the Greek experience is a concealment surrounding the one in tears. lying-before. Homer says (86): . One need not begin with a seemingly capricious etymology in order to experience how universally the presencing of what is present comes to language only in shining." Voss in fact leaves the key word untranslated: . Nor does the poet say: Odysseus concealed himself as one weeping. Homer does not say: Odysseus concealed his tears. We must ponder this matter ever more strenuously. Accordingly. on the basis of remaining concealed. would be unthinkable within Greek existence and language if remaining concealed/remaining unconcealed did not hold sway as that which really has no need to bring itself expressly to language. But doesn't this quite clearly mean the same as: he hid himself before the Phaeacians out of a sense of shame (aus . he says: Odysseus remained concealed. a concealment that isolates him from the others. even at the risk of becoming diffuse and fastidious. that Plato's interpretation of presencing as accidental. bringing-itself-before. To be sure. as awe (Scheu). Odysseus shied away (scheute sich)as one shedding tears before the Phaeacians. Voss translates: (Odysseus covered his head) "daß die Phäaken nicht die tränenden Wimpern erblickten (so that the Phaeacians could not see his wet lashes).Document Page 119 cealedexercises a commanding preeminence over every other way in which what is present comes to presence. On the contrary. and in assuming an outward appearance. In keeping with idiomatic German. Rather. All this. the Greek experience in the case of Odysseus does not proceed from the premise that the guests present are represented as subjects who in their subjective behavior fail to apprehend the weeping Odysseus as an object of their perception. The fundamental trait of presencing itself is determined by remaining concealed and unconcealed. since this language itself arises from it. A lack of sufficient insight into this remains either arbitrary or matter will mean. granted Scheu)? Or must we also think that we are striving to get closer to its essence as the . arising.

Can his invisible tearsbut also his audible sighstouch us? Homer seems to give adequate grounds for those tears. It is a reserved remaining-concealed before the closeness of what is present. he gathered up his courage and spoke. Can one also imagine Odysseus weeping over less heroic and less homelike matters? Can one imagine him weeping in memory of seven years of nights? Seven years of awe-inspiring nights? Can one imagine him echoing the sobs of a goddessKalypso. For a long time the mortal said nothing. this poetic vision of Odysseus weeping beneath his cloak makes clear how the poet feels the governance of presencinga meaning of being which. though still unthought. It is the sheltering of what is present within the intangible nearness of what in each case remains in comingthat coming which is an increasing self-veiling. Odysseus weeps in mourning and in nostalgia. sometimes sad. must be thought in the light of remaining concealed. sometimes happy. or Demodocus's. let us sit at the feet of the weeping Odysseus. We know that Odysseus wept also on the isle of Ogygia. during the days that he sat on the shore gazing toward Ithaka. 22 At the risk of becoming diffuse and fastidious. has already become destiny. The polytropic hero is weeping because the words of a song. "How could a goddess be so unhappy?" Kalypso replied. "You are a goddess. have touched him. . Awe corresponds to it. Finally. and he implores the goddess to send him home. for example? Perhaps he sat at her feet. as we now sit at his. Perhaps he kissed them on the night she hid her face upon her raised knees and wept. Presencing is luminous self-concealing. or Homer's." Odysseus said quietly. He deplores the bloodshed. and all the elevated matters related to it. shed over the memories of the graves of so many heroes during ten long years of war.Document Page 120 Greeks experienced it? Then "to shy away" would mean to be safeguarded and to remain concealed in restraint (im Verhoffen). Typically Greek. and her need to obey them left her without a sense of who she was. For Hermes had come that very day with orders. in keeping to oneself (im an-sich-Halten). Thus awe.

That is what takes place in the occurrence to which we . . even if she submerges again and again under the waves of his fantasies concerning her. which received the streams of her tears. say nothing. was too beautiful and too shy for words? In any event. "If I were divine. who will be lost at sea rather than in the balm of your body the unguent of your thighs the honey of your breasts. even if she is overdetermined. For I must head homeeven if I no longer know who I am ." will not go down in oblivion. you who forgot yourself in order to remember me. He no longer dared to speak. At the same time.Document Page 121 "For seven years' of nights I have tasted the divinity of your loins and trembled before your daimonic beauty. when you are concealed from me. but even more I will weep for me. What is it to remember someone? What is it to forget or to have to forget? Heidegger suggests the following: says: I amwith respect to my relation to something otherwise unconcealedconcealed from myself. because of this concealing." Kalypso raised her head slowly and looked long. but thought to himself I will weep for you. . What is present subsides into concealment in such a way that I. for its own part. remain concealed from myself as the one from whom what is present withdraws. Or did Odysseus also weep because Nausicaa. into the mortal's eyes. feel nothing but the numbness of his heart and limbs. you who have granted me your bed and your body. is thereby concealedeven as I am concealed from myself in relation to it. I will weep for you. who like Kalypso had rescued him. this very concealing is itself thereby concealed. yes. would I need you to tell me of my divinity? And how could a goddess be so unhappy?" Again she lowered her head to her knees. because tears belonged to gods and goddesses now. beloved goddess. . Odysseus could see nothing. Odysseus is someone who weeps in memory of someone who will not "set. but listen to me. The unconcealed. Never again would he show himself weeping. had to shy from weeping. He could not even weep. I am a mortal. for this much I know: you are a goddess. looked longingly.

something does not simply slip away from us. When we forget. indeed. Forgetting itself slips into a concealing. so that none of it would be lost. and I worshiped her. 23 I amwith respect to my relation to someone who is otherwise unconcealedconcealed from myself. as thought I were a bee. this much is made . Even as she concealed her weeping from me. Now I do not know who I am.Document Page 122 refer when we say: I have forgotten (something). hidden behind cascades of tears. He was able to tell her of his wife and son without betraying them or hurting her. I remain concealed. so my own weeping is concealed from me. Precisely when she shows herself. Thus they also identify the concealment in which a the middle voice. Fidelity suddenlyin the sudden passage of seven yearsredoubled its demands on him. which was all they ever cared about or for. One of the oddest moments of Jacques Lacan's "Signification of the Phallus" comes when he introduces or "shame" into his . We do not know who we are. the basic trait of presencing and absencing themselves. For seven years they showed one another everything mortal. gave me rosewater to drink. except as those who are concealed from themselves and from one another. I felt a change coming over me. I too am swallowed up in the occlusion. as well as in the experience of the forgetting of remaining-concealed. does not signify one form of human behavior among sufficiently clear: many others. How now am I to be faithful to her? She cupped her hands under my joy. Now she says she does not know who she is. Concealed nothing but what had to remain concealed. concealed nothing from one another. along with our relation to what is forgotten. my world occludes. as a basic and predominant Both in the way the Greek employs verb. to remain concealed. speaking in . but identifies the basic trait of ever stance we take toward what is present or absentif not. and indeed in such a way that we ourselves. She began to feed me flowers. . intensify it: human being founders by reference to its relation to the thing that is withdrawn in concealment. The Greeks. everything immortal. therefore. fall into concealment.

reticence. For. 25 From here it is not far to Lacan's identification of the cock-of-the-walk. the famboyant phallus. virile display itself appears as feminine. One might say that this signifier is chosen as what stands out as most easily seized upon in the real of sexual copulation. as the oxymoron of turgidity and flow suggests. and can only be always on the verge of appearing: All these propositions merely veil over the fact that the phallus can play its role only as veiled. as in itself the sign of the latency with which everything signifiable is struck as soon as it is raised (aufgehoben) to the function of the signifier. and also as the most symbolic in the literal (typographical) sense of the term. and restraintto an always frustrated expectation (Verhoffen)? Was he trying to contemplate a self-concealing remaining-concealed before the closeness of what is present? Was Lacan himself. that is. The phallus is the signifier of this Aufhebung itself which it inaugurates (initiates) by its own (Scham. strikes the signified. in the human being. has the strange consequence that. 24 Yet the verge's upsurgence into appearance is a far more cryptic affair. branding it as the bastard offspring of its signifying concatenation." 26 Was Lacan trying to think a certain fidelity to shying-away. For the phallus is an affair of calypsis. One might also say that by virtue of its turgidity it is the image of the vital flow as it is transmitted in generation. at the hands of this demon. the phallic verge rises as the apparentthe appearingin and for itself: The phallus is the privileged signifier of that mark where the share of the logos is wedded to the advent of desire. since it is the equivalent in that relation of the (logical) copula. because of the Verdrängung (repression) inherent in the phallic mark of desire. This is why the demon of exactly at the moment when the phallus is unveiled (cf. to awe. shame) in the ancient mysteries rises up disappearance. the famous painting of the Villa of Pompei). as an essentially feminine figure: "The fact that femininity takes refuge in this mask. It then becomes the bar which.Document Page 123 argument. as a translator . initially.

261). murmured to Odysseus My life consists of endless textures of the blackness of darkness. disappear behind his cloak or porphyry in order to weep the tears of his own blindness and helplessness.Document Page 124 of Heidegger's "Logos. 515 and 741). . 4. does it also hide to love? Is this the "hovering intimacy of revealing and concealing" of which Heidegger speaks? love story. and soul-destroying drugs. Was Odysseus now for the first time in his life blinded by the light of remaining-concealed? Did he. but he did degenerate to vice." (I. her brow motionless on her knees." 28 A word. about Homer's pharmacy. ." shying away from the intangible nearness of what remains in comingthat coming which is an increasing self-veilingwhich he named desire? And are we certain that in either Homer or Heidegger desire plays no role in the concealments of being? Kalypso. 191 and 218. (O. he did not die from it. 401 and 900. doctors apply "alleviative herbs. not even after years. In one of the aphorisms of Beyond Good and Evil. 11. Nietzsche betrays one of the most open secrets of philosophy in the West: "Christianity gave Eros poison to drink: to be sure. not even after years' of years. an awe-filled story of mourning and care? Care as Heart ( ) and Doom ( ) 27 Is the history of being yet another Kirke's veilingsfor we too shall sail now from Ogygia to Aiaiaare somewhat different from Kalypso's. the Mistress of Poisons. Later. mild anodynes. An unfortunate side-effect of these drugs is that the users become swine as well. at the dawn of our tradition. it is a warp and woof without relief or rescue. months later. 10. in The Odyssey. it is far more often a matter of deadly poisons. . Kirke's are induced by horrid drugs. (O. 5. After extracting the bronze and or iron from the heroes' wounds. 1. then. in his view is less involved in the raptures of sexuality than in the resentful prohibitions enforced by morality. which will cause Odysseus's men to forget their homeland. Recall once again Nietzsche's designation of Western morality as Circe. before the desire that suddenly had nowhere to hide? In all self-showing loves to hide (Heraclitus B123). 236).

213)." . who apparently words for both sides (330-31). it will help." (O. savage beasts that have been enchanted by her and (O. 220-21). All these drugs are brought to her by a . They greet Odysseus's men cheerfully with administered terrible poisons. for example. is the mistress of such formidable . Helen. woman of daimonic skill. Helen. (Homer's text often places the adjective before the pharmaka. 29 . . she welcomes the men. and showed me how it had come to be. it induces a kind of euphoria as it causes its userlike the patient given morphine or Valium or Darvon before surgery"to forget everything bad. a woman by the fascinating name of Kirke's palace is surrounded by wolves and lions. wagging tailsit must have been the same euphoric drug that Helen administered to Telemachos. a beloved son or a brother murdered by the sword (close enough to Menelaos's case) right before one's eyes. wily. as though it were a prepositional label. or. and well versed in the that works as an laboratory. 329). 10. ''where the fertile fields ( ) produce masses of drugs. . how it had grown. 4. carried to her from Egypt. ." a antidepressant.Document Page 125 (2. massive . skillful.) Yet sometimes it is hard to tell whether a given Mittel is a Heilmittel. and plucked an herb from the ground. a Gift. the noble mixed with the deleterious. (222-30). the blossom white as milk: Moly the gods call it. and an anticholeric. shimmering god. then administers the poison that induces oblivion and piggery." says Hermes. Kirke . On his way to the rescue. "Take this poison. Into Telemachos's wine she slips "a measure of enchantment. if "duplicitous" is too unsympathetic a word (and it is). daughter of Zeus. 255)at her spins and sings withinis she a goddess or a woman. Gave it to me. Odysseus meets Hermes. Feigning hospitality. let us say that she is παλυτρóπη. Helen proffers in a mixing bowl. inducing an oblivion that banishes tears even in the face of the death of a mother or a father (close enough to Telemachos's case). or a Gegengift. The root was black. brandishing the most renowned of all the noble pharmaka in Western letters: Thus spoke the silvery. is as duplicitous a pharmacist as she is lover. the crew wonders (228.

"Sheathe your sword. though not in that of the narration). All the crew reunited now. the restored sailors are taller and handsomer than they were before their Schweinerei. shades of not long for this life. there to take further instruction from the blind androgynous seer. furtively. By now it is Odysseus who has forgotten the homeland. preserves her strong medicine. Odysseus feasts in the palace of Kirke. Book 10 ends with a rhetorical water. she of the serpentine coils of hair. Perhaps the sailors. Whatever pacific oath she may swear. of whom Hermes has often spoken. of course. Kirke drives the "swine" out of stall. as he will follow those of Kalypso. sprinkles each one with yet another pharmakon." or "Poldy" and "Mol(l)y. As Odysseus and his men go down to the ship in order to embark. Kirke Polypharmaka./She had vanished" (573). "but only raise high the mast and hoist your sails. "and come to bed. she replies that he must set sail for the House of Hades and the frightful Persephone." she says.'' dich nicht. through all the phases of the moon. for over a year. the uncanny goddess with the voice of a human being (136: ) has vanished like a wisp of smoke or a rivulet of : "Softly. he follows her instructions. Remarkably. (For. Kirke tells him not to concern himself about how to get there: Sorge . day after day. lamenting all the way their impending voyage to the ends ofand underthe earth. The sorceress goddess knows that the man who now confronts her must be the molyfied Odysseus. Tiresias. 449): "Who could cast an eye on a god who does not wish to be seen. When be by Hermetic Odysseus begs release from her." The goddess herself. week after week. (505-506). will jestingly name them "Odysseus" and "Kirke. Kirke disappears. as Kirke goes to rejoin Kalypso. a god who wends every which way?" That sounds so much like Heraclitus B16 that it seems almost as if Heraclitus were paraphrasing Homer. thinking of Homer's god- . a white ram and a black ewe. she too of beautiful coils and human audition (12. and however fortified the hero may .Document Page 126 No man every allowed Kirke's poison to penetrate "the barrier of the teeth" and resisted enchantment. When Odysseus asks for a guide thither. With her rhabdos (this too she shares with Hermes). She has left behind two sheep for itself. and it is his crew who must remind him of it. Kirke retains her power to entrance. where we can trust one another. question. the Ithacans to take on board. Ogygia comes after Aiaia in the chronology of initiation and homecoming." After she has sworn an oath not to unman him.

I cannot take up questions of υóστος here. love is a kind of obsession to possess. In the sixth of his "Tautenburg Sketches for Lou. Penelope as the sunlit heart and erected hearth of the home. Heidegger. When did Kirke decide not be be seen? When did she begin to wend every which way? Did Odysseus ever see her? And can we not pose the same questions with regard to Kalypso? Is her medicine weaker than Kirke's? Or is Kalypso"I shall conceal. Derrida." Nietzsche writes: "Love. and also after Joyce) as Odysseus's heroic overcoming of the shadowy erotic figures of Kalypso and Kirke. Figures of remaining concealed. Who can descry a goddess or a woman who remains concealed? Is Odysseus any less concealed to Kalypso? How could one conceal oneself before a sun that never sets. even after the famous "recognition" scene(s). not to mention the tears of a goddess. Perhaps Telemachos's encounter with Helen would be the pendant in Books 1-4 to the tale I have in mind. sung in the fifth and tenth books of The Odyssey. so that there would actually be something lunar about his sun that never sets. even when the revelation is at hand. it would be by focusing on the figures of Odysseus-in-disguise and Penelope-veiled: figures of concealment both to one another and to us.Document Page 127 desses. which shines upon all lovers. to be sure. inspiring our awe as she wends every which way? If Kalypso and Kirke. I shall remain concealed"as potent a figure of mystery and every bit as fertile as Kirke when it comes to shying away. and Lacan." He offers no explanation of either the godhead or the suffering. If I were to take them up. that is. love is adoration of a suffering and veiled godhead. perhaps the relation of the "adventures" (Books 5-7) to the "homecoming" (Books 1324) has to be rethought. as the two points at which the tension of his bow is polesthe two most keenly felt. is something altogether different than it is for women. For most men. for the other kind of men. unless that sun. It seems to me that The Odyssey can no longer be read (at least after Nietzsche. yet it is here that the acerbic misogynist reveals himself most unforgettably. for men. It is certainly not an overcoming of erotic concealment for the sake of a transparent Penelope. serve as the axes or of Odysseus's adventures. Such a traditional reading insults the cunning of Penelope and the cares of Odysseus. dances with the dark side of the moon? 30 .

Now they all know it is the man himself. thereof one should sing or write. just look at youI will give a parcel of land on the far side of Ithaka. too shy to look her in the face." The women all look closely at him. Penelope steals upon him. I know it's kinky. she swings slowly at the hip. not girls. He calls Eumaeus the sowherd to him. "There are too many suitors. How many different ways to prepare bean curd do you know?" He then calls the lubricious servant girls to him. he looks west and quietly weeps.Document Page 128 Whereof one cannot speak. She looks at him with a smirk. but you may prefer it to mass murder. Odysseus continues: "To each of you who can lure a suitor or two awayand I know you can." The women depart. Telemachos wants them all hanged. as Odysseus sits on the wall of his palace parapet. He addresses the leader of the women. She lays her left hand on his shoulder. "These suitors are killing too many of our pigs. their ropes in hand. Imagine Odysseus arriving home. one should sing or write at the risk of discharging the sacred can(n)ons of literature. Or merely too hip. toward her left. she silences them with a look. Their leader Melantho is very fresh. watching the sun rise orange over the frosted olive leaves and purple figs. Melantho is close enough to Odysseus to smell him. No. She remembers. Silently. They do their work. one eyebrow raised high. he squeezes it between shoulder and wet cheek." . Always in search of the better story. you know. One morning. When some of the other women start to snigger. The far side of the island is soon swarming with clever little Ithakans. Here is a piece of rope. plotting against the suitors as before. then back again. on her bare feet. but unstringing his bow forever. I've only got one wife. in case you want to bind your suitor to the bedpost. But Odysseus is cutting the rope carefully into even lengths and unraveling the strands. "You miss her?" "Them. Odysseus is holding a piece of rope that his boy has given him. women.

O.). but cf. 9. 526. "Do you know. It is.Document Page 129 She says nothing for a long moment. For could be Kummer as various senses of this strange word. Sorge. and Homer into Woody Allen. and that even in Manhattan murder doesn't always seem the sensible way to solve problems among lovers. Sorge dich nicht. I. bekünmert. Don't worry. where it means failing to administer Sorge und Pflege. I know. much as Herz. Yet I must record a final note on care. merely a series of phonemic accidents. even if Kalypso hides and Kirke reassures me. used in the familiar senses of "to concern oneself with. the gods themselves are sorglos. to take In addition to words related to care of" (I. 187). Already I will have tried my readers' patience beyond the breaking point. 20. Glenn Gray's wonderful English. There is and cura. 130 and 24. 21. unless perhaps you are a writer of plays and fictions. Sorge dich nicht. 306). 17. apparently quite close in meaning to : cf. 352. While mortals are . 342) and ." Sorge. The negative of the latter word appears to mean "without cares. It is to . She lets him weep to an end before she speaks. don't take it to heart. that trouble me now. 23." If such a retelling of the Homeric tale seems to turn Ithaka into Manhattan. 319. have no care. Maybe I do. there are the words ( . 1. and the Germanic kar bears no etymological no established etymological link between and that Heidegger directs our search for the ancient relation to cura. 523. 305. You think I have a cold heart. at least in J." sanssouci. Yet anyone who has read Heidegger in English since the early 1960s responds to the sound of "care. especially . How close are ? How close are we to the heart. Heidegger explicitly relates the word Sorge to cura. 492. and to doom. see also O. and no one should pay them any mind. sufferings or troubles (O. 1. etc. there is nothing to reply except that Manhattan too is an island. is all about taking-to-heart. not even in Was heißt in Augustine's vocabulary. Yet it is . Telemachos calls me the Iron Lady. I'm thinking of a long voyage. And even then there are other ways. 24. 6. or the precursors of Sorge. I've been thinking about taking a trip myself. I don't know. or of what in the early 1920s he was calling Bekümmerung. ? we here to 31 . but as far as I know he never mentions Denken? which. Don't object: I know that's what you think. (I. It could take years. O.

18. in the case . onto the scales. in mid-line. Which at least sounds like the simple Latin word cur. inasmuch as even Herakles could not flee his when compelled him (I. the Trojans. cf. 22. and doom: kur. . 115-19).Document Page 130 Of the many words that one may translate as "heart. the word is . 247). with the anticipated outcome (cf. often translated as ) have not "in our hearts"). and . oppressed by cares (19. and as a synonym of . 535). Apollo's words to Poseidon at I. 8. : I. One wonders if it is related to the ancient Sumerian word for the underworld. and portrayed as a formidable figure on Achilles' Ilias. However. 21. both as collective fate and as the allotment of individual destinies. It is also the oppressive care of mortality itself and "as such. Why? At one point in is addressed as a goddess or daimon. 18. is not only the heart and the concerns of the heart. O. Which is to say. those now of Hektor and Achilles. Strife. cf. 21. you can testify to it. the Phaeacians' hearty reception of Odysseus. By far the most common appearance of is as a pendant to . both spelling death. the "Ugliest Man. 280. Once again Zeus tosses two lots onto the scales. however). the abyss." if one may say so. the of the Achaeans causes the scale to sink to the earth. at O. like the word which is not the case with any of the other heart-words. Zeus tosses two lots. (19. Odysseus's heart. one representing of mortals. and Penelope's anxious heart." has upbraided Agamemnon. 10. 365). At the moment in question. Some examples of : Hektor's courageous heart (I. particularly notable. appears almost always at the end of a line of verse. Uproar. Dominating one of the two cities of mortals. 344)." or simply . "purple death and mighty destiny. 32 The overwhelming sense one has when reading both Homeric poems is that and are the selfsame. . are ." . Parallel with the phrase . however. It too. Achilles proclaims himself ready to receive his own now that Hektor's fate is set. 18. After Thersites . 12. the other the Achaeans. all you whom the keres of death ( swept away" (I. 301-302). Soon. ).. 70). and Odysseus. 516-17: . 497). "murderous Ker" (I. while the lot of the Trojans climbs to high heaven. the dispensation of death. shield. 464-66. the scales will shift.. brooding on the suitors' end (O. the city at war. 45. (I. Menelaos's loss of heart (cited above. Odysseus appeals to the prediction by Kalchas the seer of eventual victory over the Achaeans: "For we held it well in memory ( . 2.

the thought for which Apollo struck him in the back. The sense of as allotted destiny. 157. 17. O. Odyssee by Anton Weiher (Munich. 127 and 414). cf. suffer all the concealments of love? And are not the concealments of love bound up with desire and the possibility of death? Notes 1. Book XXIV. 22. "murder and annihilation" (I. 17. prior to that. 17. care as heart and doom? Are these the goddesses Schelling dreams of in The Ages of the World when he concedes that the eternal mirrorplay of Father and Son must yield to the less predictable playand the wrathof the goddess? Indeed. shifting unpredictably between singular and plural. is simply this: "No one can elude death and the keres" (O. 12. 387). . even No one? No one except. 33 . 17. The last god is eucalyptic.g. 547. in this way so reminiscent of the . in Beiträge zur Philosophie. 24. who occasionally usurps the prerogative of the in order to manipulate lots? Or do the immortals inevitably join the mortals in loving and in mourning? This was Hölderlin's lightning-bolt thought. 19. In what follows I refer to the Greek/German texts published by the Heimeran Verlag. the immortals who initiate us into our mortality? Are they the gods Heidegger means when he so readily couples human beings and divinities? Are not Kalypso and Kirke goddesses to whom something like care may be attributed. 155. this is clearly the "black ker" that Penelope wishes on Antinoos: O. there is in Heidegger's view a kind of signaling. surely. or . thinks of "the last god" he is pursuing that Hölderlinian thought: as the last god vanishes. 5.Document Page 131 (I. lines 130-131. 14. 130-31. or. 2. in the plural (O. .: I. 352. 24. a kind of greeting in going. Ilias translated by Hans Rupé (Munich. The god comes to presence precisely as an absenting. can the gods themselves elude Zeus Pater. 82. designating the words as I or O. I cite them by Book (or "Song") and line. the immortals? However. 500). we find Are Kalypso and Kirke the last goddesses. O. And it may be that when Heidegger. 714. 34 . e. more rarely. 1974). meaning Iliad. O. 3. must not God the Father alter his sex and his life in multiple ways before he learns how to beget and bear a child? Must he not. 558). 1961). 18. as furtively as Kirke. 6.

). See the Studienausgabe of Freud's works (Frankfurt am Main: S.d. 12. in EGT. W. Schibboleth: Pour Paul Celan (Paris: Galilée. Lunar Voices: Of Tragedy. 1982). see the discussion in Krell. 1995). See Heidegger. 657). This is the definition proffered by F. VA. 3: 424. and accepted by Freud. translated by Alphonso Lingis as Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press. 274. Note also her translation of the than as a more personalized type of deity (Prolegomena. 2. Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion (Cleveland: World Publishing as "potency" rather Company. 44-56. 1972). See Jacques Derrida. "Here. 1.)" 7. Totalité et infini: Essai sur l'extériorité (Paris: Livre de Poche. Poetry. translated by Barbara Johnson as Dissemination (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. edited by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari. 14. chap. and is translated by D. 1980). 27-42. See Nietzsche's works in the Kritische Studienausgabe (KSA). ) . Daimon Life. Fischer. SZ. See the lecture course on Heraclitus in Heraklit. 73n. 116. V. 338-39. GA 54. see Emmanuel Lévinas. Schelling. J. and Thought (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Éperons: Les styles de Nietzsche (Paris: Flammarion. 4. 9. 1978). 5. 9. at I. n. GA 26. 11. See Jane Ellen Harrison. Parmenides. Meridian Books. 1966). xx. "Introduction to Za-ology" (Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Seinsverständnis und . but in fact throughout. inasmuch as Ilias is all about wrath ( and revenge (χóλος). Martin Heidegger. 1981). On enjoyment. 211: "(Zu bedenken bleiben: Sein und . 3. 587. "Aletheia" appears in VA. Sein qua Grund! Sein und NichtsAngst. Fiction. in EGT. See Krell. 257-82. 65n. 13. La dissémination (Paris: Seuil. in EGT. in 15 volumes (Berlin and Munich: de Gruyter and Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag. 127-51.Document Page 132 2. Capuzzi. See again that remarkable note on Streuung (dissemination) in Heidegger's Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz. 10. see also Krell. "Das Unheimliche" appears at 4: 241-74. HW. Krell and F. 8. 1969). 147-82. 1986). F. 430-605. 15. 53. as the essential definition of the uncanny. Martin Heidegger. 122-142. 301-305. 243. GA 55. See Jacques Derrida. 1992). 624. 6. 102-23. See Jacques Derrida. Daimon Life: Heidegger and Life-Philosophy." that is.

Document 16. which serves as a . 134-143. Hölderlins Hymne "Der Ister". the oven out back. See Heidegger. GA 53. I will say nothing here of the kitchen stove.

edited by Juliet Mitchell and Jacqueline Rose (London: Macmillan Press. not the Paris of plato (sic) and Socrates in Derrida's Post Card. in 21." Glotta 42 (1964). 1989). 1993). Merentitis. 395-451. Feminine Sexuality. 52 ff." in Kleine Schriften. "Envois". 148 ff. with English translations as follows: the first appears in Research in Phenomenology. 264-65. "Der Schleier der Penelope. ed. La carte postale de Socrate à Freud et au-délá (Paris: Aubier-Flammarion. Wolfgang Bauer. writing. The fourth. 163-218. 1960. 1987). "Die schreckliche Kalypso. Dirlmeier. 85. See also Krell. 106-108. R. 1948. Harder. and Lunar Voices. VA. allow me to refer readers to chap. Again. R. 25. has appeared in Commemorations: Reading Heidegger: Commemorations.. 3 of Krell." Symposium R. for example: R. 82. 1987). Nickel. 1987). and the Human Body (Albany: State University of New York Press. Leavey Jr. De l'esprit: Heidegger et la question (Paris: Galilé. 18. The plaint of Paris? Not Matthew Paris. Heidegger. Jacques Lacan and the École Freudienne. the second." Gymnasium 66 (1959) 74 ff. 26. 1967.. 23. 4.. 161-96. 41 ff. John Sallis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. which Alfred Heubeck calls "masterful" and "decisive. Karl Reinhardt (familiar to readers of Heidegger). See Derrida. although there too it is fundamentally a matter of what goes on behind the philosopher's backto wit. ed.. J. 1997). 19. Heidegger. above all. 1983). Leavey Jr. There is a vast literature on these veilssee. 1983. Marg. chap. translation modified. Lacan. W. F. VA. 8. On the uncanny-unhomelike. 137 ff. 1987). EGT. Feminine Sexuality. "Die Sprache im Gedicht. Sühnel. 20 ff. translated by John P. John Sallis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Dyer. "Odysseus und Kalypso.. Feminine Sexuality. ed.'' Philologicus 116 (1972). Daimon Life.. Archeticture: Ecstasies of Space. appears in Deconstruction and Philosophy: The Texts of Jacques Derrida. "The Use of Homer. 50. see the Introduction to Daimon Life. 29 ff.Document Page 133 corrective to the nostalgia of all hearths. Lacan. Athens. translated by Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 8. 17. Berline. "Vermutungen zur Herkunft der Kirke und Kalypso. 1980). 151-55. "Die Abenteuer der Odyssee. See Derrida. EGT. 261-64. "Der Swang der Kalypso: Odyssee V. 20. Müchen. 108-109.. and. chap. US." Festschrift für K. 24. two of the four "Geschlecht" papers are published in Psyché: Inventions de l'autre (Paris: Galilée. Haakh. The third "Geschlecht" is not yet published." 22. R." Von Werken und Formen. translated by Alan Bass as The Post Card (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. translated by John P. 1972. translation modified. H. in Heidegger.. 65-83. See the essay on Trakl. Time. . 82.

VA. .Document 27. EGT. 114. 272. translation modified.

N. Liddell-Scott does not speculate on an etymological connection between these two morphologically identical words. instinct with a new spirit. Berlin. 29. the Erotes.Document Page 134 28. The Keres. WCT. "Beobachtungen zur KirkeEpisode in der Odyssee. F.. Bussolino... but the Keres developed mainly on the dark side. 127 ff. so that matters of the heart are not altogether excluded from her purview.. KSA. H. doom is feminine in gender.. "The Planktai and Moly: Divine Naming and Knowing in Homer. In essence as in art-form. Liddell-Scott lists "A" and "B" forms of the verb . See Heidegger. Wildhaber. 168. they went downwards. Here too. dissertation. meaning a carpenter's axe. Lesky." Wiener Studien 63 (1948). 1946). lifewards" (631). part VII. Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis). C." Revue des Études Anciennes 63 (1961)." Gymnasium 66 (1959). 22 ff. "Kirke und die Schweine. "Das Gift der Kirke. Segal. Lee. W. WD." Rivista di Studi Classici 10 (1962). "Circean Temptations: Homer. fructifying or deathbringing. on these questions. 191 ff. 31. Freiert." and that while the heart is neutral. Finally. no." Ph. it has already been seen. Philipp. Kirke und Odysseus: Überlieferung und Deutung von Homer bis Calderon. Clay. "Ulysse et Circé: Notes sur le chant X de l'Odyssée. related to .. The words therefore cannot be appears to be a contraction of conflated. 10: 37. there are many things to read: P. 32. 264 ff. R.D. with regard to moly. Yet she does argue that Eros himself is a form of ker. 253 ff. GA 65.. J. University of Minnesota. and Others. 419 ff. ''Aia (Kirke)." Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association 99 (1968). Ovid. 213 ff. J. 1951. Hirvonen. Beck. Schelling. "The Motifs of Confrontation with Women in Homer's Odyssey. 30. O. 10-53. "La lingua di Omero in rapporto alla psicologia femminile." Glotta 39 (1960-1961). to be sick at heart or anxious in the "B" sense. makes no explicit reference to the ker of the heart. 1968. Helsinki. KSA. Touchefeu-Meynier. even if the semantic link seems compellinghow could one not be sick at heart or full of anxiety in the face of harm or destructive power? Jane Ellen Harrison's long and detailed exposition in Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion concerning the keres or sprites. K. those tiny winged creatures who generally mean mischief. deathwards. 5: 102. She writes: "Eros is but a specialized form of the Ker. ." Festschrift Meuli. to pound or rub to pieces. see D.. B. the Erotes are Keres of life. went upwards. William K. Vergil. and like the Keres take the form of winged Eidola. Matriarchal Survivals and Certain Trends in Homer's Female Characters. . ed. See part one of Heidegger. nor can they be convincingly linked etymologically. are little winged bacilli. Paetz." Hermes 100 (1972). Manfred Schröter (Munich: Biederstein Verlag und Leibniz Verlag." Philologicus 109 (1965). Keres and Erotes are near akin. 1972. 1 ff. 1970. 34. Note that the circumflex (usually) becomes an acute in the shift from "heart" to "doom" and "lot. J. A. "Homeric 33. P. G. Die Weltalter Fragmente: In der Urfassungen von 1811 und 1813. 509 ff. to harm or destroy in the "A" sense.

doxographers claim that Anaximander was the first to have the audacity to inscribe the inhabited world in a similar schematic form. will be born." but a certain other infinite nature. where what we would call a map appears below a text chiselled in cuneiform characters. the origin. insisted that water was the basic element. according to the summons of Time.Document Page 135 Five Anaximander: A Founding Name in History Michel Serres Translated by Roxanne Lapidus In his Commentary on Aristotle's Physics. . and that it is neither water nor any other of the so-called "elements. or unique principle of all things. . generation. is born. all was born." as he says in somewhat poetical terms. he wrote. . Simplicius cites Anaximander. whose thought flowered in the same years as Anaximander's. From Justice on Earth to the World Local Elements Thales. The British Museum houses a Babylonian tablet from the third millennium. for beings. in it destruction also takes place. Now. after Theophrastus's The Opinions of the Physicists. according to what must be. it is "that from which there is. for beings render justice and reparation to one another. From it. . from which are born all the heavens and the worlds within them. Fragment A2: Anaximander . said that the principlethat is to say the essenceof beings is the infinite . from their mutual injustice.

considered the four elementswater. spark or clod. so that the entire earth. Heraclitus opted for fire. it is simultaneously disappearing beneath the waves. Others. the water must somehow recede. as in the beginning and now. One could say that as this island earth is being born from the waters. encompassed by it or immersed in ittorrential. like the Nile. Now if from the ocean. débâcle. the water in rivers sometimes flows from one to the other. Later. this fragile island surrounded by the ring of ocean. as do the Black Sea. all things come from it and no doubt return to it. Surrounding. it also reigns in the middle of inhabited lands. Generalization of Conflicts Now then. here is the Mediterranean. as large as one wishesdrop. even later. at the heart and traversing the land. caveins. Both maps show the round. fire and earthto be the root of all. propagandistic. the Danube and the Guadalquivir flow into this watery matrix. even unto the outer limits. from which come all things. On Anaximander's map. What power will force it into retreat? . What Thales announces about genesis over time. while the Greek map already aims at the entire universe. precisely. like Anaximenes. Overflowing rivers. schematize in space: water dominates. overflowingawaits. that air was the origin of all things. whose source is fed by the aquatic ring and empties into the central lake. in the central position. In order for something else to remain after separating itself from the water. in their unity and their diversity. suspended. The Babylonian map is political. determinable and local.Document Page 136 The local and the global separate these two original maps: the one exalts the preponderant excellence of its own country by placing its city and river. the Tigris and the Persian Gulf. while the other schematizes the world in its entiretyat least as it was known by the experts of the time. a destiny of shipwreck. water laps at the surrounding land. ethnocentric. streaming. the Euphrates. In all of these theories the principle is reduced to something concrete. if our origins are in water. the Sea of Azov and the Red Sea. floods. the Caspian. is water. air. Ionian physics later claimed. the two maps. like Empedocles. bubble. In opposition to Thales. ring-like form of the immense ocean surrounding the globe.

drown or extinguish this spark-world. the second too incandescent. Whether by drowning or the Big Bang. Likewise. together or alone. then the question of origins and guiding principles is taken care of. reciprocal or mixed laws of Hate and Friendship. Water flows only from the aquatic. or internal battles? The Agrigentian physicist foresaw. or immediately afterwards. and rapidly uninhabitable. and this so quickly that time itself would disappear. the fanatical dialectic or the natural contract among Empedocles's four elements. an accord. the concert. or the world might dissolve in the soft injustice of muddy sinkholes. redundancy. and water. for their respective impudence and injustice? Nothing new can appear under the reign of a single. Can the empire of water or of fire make reparations to the air. even before being born. or to the earth itself. overwhelming. only matter can spring from the four material bodies. would have the power to suffocate. water and air. The first world is too wet. with its flaming risk of explosion under the scarlet iniquity of torches. Who has ever seen a pyre or an inferno extinguish itself of its own accord. For everyone understands that water must not dominate. either case would mean total destructionswift. Will it be a despotic empire. compressed to the point of nothingness. the inextinguishable war. in answer to this dramatic question. The in Sum If all things under the heavens and in the multiple worlds within them deal justly with and make reparation to each other for their mutual imperialism. air fire. the dreary repetition of one . nor must fire dominate. alliance or vengeance. In every case identicalness. earth.Document Page 137 Likewise. a union. the world would perish amidst an open war among the four elements. both in danger of flooding or combustion. a federation. under the irresistible injustice that makes one element dominate. for example. solitary element. except when the flames have consumed everything combustible? Earth. equitably. persevere and grow. the variegated bouquet. From this springs the composite. fire is lit only from conflagrations. the world is in danger of perishing rapidly in or by flames. immediate. rightly. if the underlying principle is fire.

or inversely. Its raison d'êtrewhich makes it existblocks all other beings in order to appear. There are no territories without boundaries. so free and fertile that everything finite or definite will spring from it. hazy unities troubling the edges of neighboring fluids. Anaximander removes the boundaries of that place to which all the forest's trails lead. just as with genesis. without borders there is no "there"islands are bounded by water. lapping at their shores. makes beings lose plurality. Its exasperated abstraction disguises (in order to repeat) the ancient nocturnal myth of the golden bough. airy turbulences. neither living being nor word. Local and Generalized Revisited When fire transforms the solid earth into liquid water. the sinister Place de Grève. Therefore. requires a definition in order to exist.Document Page 138 element. By its very being. Is every underlying principle deduced from prosecution? Undefined. this entrenched spot. the paths of the forest lead to this funerary crypt. must be neither a being nor a place. entrenched. pyres or infernos are furnaces of flames vibrating with gusts of wind. and only gives this place up to his own killer. lakes or bodies of water fluctuate in the often porous enclosures of their banks. the basic principle must not acknowledge any border. the entrenched being forbids the unexpected. seas and oceans are expanses of water surrounded by the fractal jaggedness of their shores. and then into fluid air. Thus the indefinite or the infinite opens up. in that space. Anaximander's theory of origins and of the underlying principle can be deduced from what he says about justice and vengeance. To avoid injustice. in the name of justice. temporality is blotted out. Now this place. when cold or the absence of heat makes them . in which a restless spirit armed with a saber takes its place in the foliage of a tree by killing. Nothing new. through the same power that enables it to occupy its own exclusive place. to spread the reign of injustice and violence. Thus the philosophy of the entrenched being is concerned with violent occupation and expulsion. the spirit glides over the waters. has any further chance of appearing. this locality that is invaded or defended.

what is it that this infinite cannot be? Neither water nor air no fire nor earth. water or air. each of the underlying principles chosen with unparalleled profundity by Thales or Anaximenes. It is the two original conditions or the two primordial oceans of geometric thoughtthe underlying space-time at the origin of mathematics. existing before the immensity of space.Document Page 139 move in the opposite direction in the same cycle of evaporation and condensation. underlying numbers or infinite time. since the latter did not come until later. This unbounded. beyond the senses. it would be bounded by a definition. local and global. . since it is unbounded. with each perceptible change comes an intermediate state where the substrata. nor some element of matterthus neither elemental nor material. without fold. Neither here nor there. Immaterial." or the first conception of the philosophy of mixtures? Or the impossibility of designating what came first. thus absent. indefinite. in Sum To express it negatively. Was philosophy as such being born? . Anaximander seems to have changed physics. contraction or closure. predating topological beginningsfirst of all is the abstract. as an intermediary. Is this already the space of "phases. freed of any limits. that is. no sense can apprehend it. It's almost as though it didn't exist. It cannot be seen or smelled. or who prevails? The . This is the . and therefore present everywhere. a border or a perimeter. touched or heard. qualitatively or topologically deployed. and the origin of physics. By eliminating water. explaining changes . There is no discernible boundary between these fundamental and original states to which the Ionian colleagues (rightly) attribute everything that exists in the universe. but above all a limitless openness. and. rather than abandoning it. and without our being able to say that he ventured into metaphysics. In any case. it is not there. infinite principle thus designates not only an immense and limitless space or time (in quantitative or metric terms). indifferently or indefinitely. because if it were. can call itself either gaseous or liquid. one or the other. absent.

as a possible basis for physics. he encountered abstraction itself. In general. while time immediately disappears in the stubbornness or stagnation of redundancy. which is described by the accusative case. Prosecution and the law thus precede the physical object. a same cause or thing vitrifies space and freezes time. armed violence or temporary truce. Notice with what rigor the grammatical object. As an abstraction. What can always be falsified. So we must move from the principle (either abstract or drawn by Anaximander from beyond the material elements). against which the defense and counter-attack will be made. the conditions for all abstract knowledge appear even before the topology of openings or the geometry of pure and limitless space. Thus it harks back to the law. the complement of our actions in general and of transitive verbs. rightly or wrongly. . violently called into question? Before phenomenology can say that the object appears. Thus the thing is first of all this causethe reason for the accusation that attacks and conquers or for the excuse. or what we later would have called a pretopography. grammar has subpoenaed it to appear. But above all. Thus Anaximander marks forevermore the explanation of the world by the most formal thought possiblemathematics. was mathematics born from a need for justice? For an equation expresses a contract of equivalence. accuses? Can it be declared any more clearly that the object has its origin in the cause.Document Page 140 What knowledge did he encounter? A pre-geometry. is designated by a case whose name. this or that idea or enterprise. it perpetuates its takeover. In spreading its influence. It generates physics. before either of these. by the integral of negations? Abstraction. From the Campus to the Praetorium Local Elements No matter whether water or fire winsyou or I or some empire. towards what has been said about justice and vengeance. no matter what component of the worldthe sole victor paints space in his color. A designated domain wins and maintains its sway.

these modern philosophers all revive the fear of Hellenic polytheism that Anaximander. cut the throats of virgins so that the sun would come up. Heidegger describes in topological terms (open and closed localities) what Hegel affirmed in dynamic schemas of other and samethe latter occupying the interior of the place. which is the beginning of exclusion or war. where vengeance will never end. But the reign of sameness must be suspended. do they continue the sacrifices whose rituals allow them to attach traditional time to themselves. birth. plunged in the night like those legendary Europeans fascinated by the shades of the golden bough. the Aztecs too believed that dawn could not come without this abominable forfeit. or do they decide to invent a new kind of time? . It's said that the Aztecs. The . Spring and its flower of youth. do they perpetuate revenge or stop it. which was a new one because of him. do all the world's beings make war or peace. time and history flow with sacrificial blood. The necessity for the continuation of time justifies not only death as such. Like Bergson. Thales and the Ionian physicists overcame. time only advances through negative machinationsas these regressive atrocities express. the forces of genesis and disappearance. in gallantly abstract terms! These philosophies can be reduced to a legitimation of putting people to death. it is a matter of wiping out the reigning being. to bring relief. Anaximander speaks of this universal injustice. Autumn and the serene light of great age.Document Page 141 Generalization of Conflicts Time cannot advance unless repetition of the same thing ceases. of the eternal return of vengeance with its unfailingly mournful consequences. Following this seeming edict. In these paganisms. fecundity and destructive agony can all carry out their activities. Kill. in Sum At the dawn of this era. either the others. When separated from the victorious and global extension of this or that being. Issuing from that split so very close to the entrenched being. atop their pyramids. who only reigns because he murdered the one whose place he took. together. or else the single other takes over. but also so-called legal murders. evolution. form an orchestral mixture. In so doing. the former remaining outside its boundaries.

no matter what language we speakdo we know any more fundamental actions than those designated by these tria verba? At the dawn of our era.Document Page 142 According to Anaximander. makes its summons before the tribunal where these judgments are rendered. and. founded on its own power. in the first letters of the first alphabetical code. the offspring of the limitless . of the law. the creation. Using these as recognized or unrecognized objects of exchange. a royal entrenched being? Can we imagine a more beautiful. nor without beginning a new time. whose origins lie here. by opening its despotic limits. in which they are immersed. addico. I summon. the first written word saysor writesin Greek. certain beings claim or render justice and reparation among themselves. would announce in the language of ancient Roman law. for their reciprocal injustice. Which one? In court. Issuing from the infinite. I give. the three primordial verbs of justice: do. like these beings. novel clemency than that of a thought that abandons its own law. himself a temporal being. the verbs to say and to give. Revisited Do we understand the effort toward the infinite made by this man whose name appropriately designates ) in a fortified enclosure ( )the potentate of an area with closed the title of king ( bordersthat is. This is what Anaximander. dico. at the opening of a case. but it summons itself. on the balance-sheet underlying the law. Local and Individual. But no one can conceive the origin without producing it. Anaximander inaugurates the era from which our history begins. Thus in the Greek dawn. We as talkative. pronounced in archaic Latin. along with the substantive form of summons. I say. time. the proto-praetor. of language and of philosophy. economic animals brought together by legal and social contracts. proclaims itself the son. says in terms that the unimaginative doxographers call poetic (but without acknowledging its truth)meaning productive or performative. everything depends on the summons of timebut before what tribunal? Not only does a new time come through the channels of justice. the praetor or person who inaugurates the session. discovered at the same time and in the same place. These are the first performative acts or words of exchange.

I give: I say that I abdicate. since time itself begins with this renunciation of Anaximander. the renunciation. is this what we should call time itself. since he renounces the dismal repetition of the force of "me"? Do science. the abandonment. immersed in a time that subpoenas his place. thought. I summon"? Beyond saying them. And since then. civilization and history begin with the dismissal. judge or praetoris this what we should henceforth call Anaximander. I give. do we authentically do anything else? There lies the beginning of history. says and summons to justice? This is the origin. . dico abdico. Because by virtue of his name he is the entrenched being par excellence. which is inaugural in its perpetual present and which. gives. I say. or someone who abandons all? Do we understand that he thereby opens up a new era. immediately after his abdication. of itself. render and give. Magistrate. the detachment of a king? Thus the spoken word hinges on a single letter: do.Document Page 143 .I give. do. can we imagine a local power that imposes restraint upon itself. by his common name? Or rather. he lets time summon his own place to the bar. And since only the latter demonstrates an order. have we ever repeateddesperately and without always understanding themany other words than "I say. and yet thinks the opposite of his title and name. I abdicate: I say that I give. he lets it speak. a being that no longer perseveres in its own being. the anonymous Anaximander melts into the infinity of thingsinto space and time. Finally. I abdicate.

as it were. 341c). which was written more than six centuries after the original passage and which set the passage in a context quite remote from that of early Greek thought. To say nothing of Plato. to what later will be gathered under the name passage then concludes with utter directness: "Ponder each thing in the way by which it is manifest. What it enjoins is not any particular observation or action but rather the very stance constitutive of thinking as such. Referring to manifestness to sight. even force or violence. The relevant passage was preserved and transmitted as a quotation in a text by Sextus Empiricus. expanding the translation of . to the the tongue as well as other partsthat is. that the young Heidegger. In this perspective it is little wonder. consider by all means how each thing is manifest. It begins: ''But come.Document Page 145 Six Doubles of Anaximenes John Sallis In Empedocles' On Nature a decisive injunction came to be openly declared. to observe. of what would come to be called philosophy. determining things by the very look ( ) they present. as each is itself manifest. to hearing. contrivance. in a The injunction is that things in their manifestness be considered by all means ( sense that does not exclude the use of artfulness. Thus it is no mere passive beholding that is enjoined but a pondering that would." One could show how this injunction is in force throughout what can be recovered of Empedocles' thought. to look closely at. could discover in Greek thinking an orientation to the self-manifestation of phenomena that proved even more originary than that accomplished 2 1 . entice things into the open and surprise them in their very moment of manifestness. the passage enjoins him to consider each thing in its manifestnessthat is. guided by Aristotle. to ponder thoughtfully each thing in its way of being manifest. of the decisiveness with which his thought is bound to (Letter 7. then. that is. )." Addressed to Empedocles' pupil Pausanias.

serious difficulties in substantiating the claim. The doxographical testimony to this connection serves to confirm the unmistakably audible echoes of Anaximander's thought in what the tradition has preserved of the words and thought of Anaximenes. in particular? For in certain respects. but the moment in which the beginning is articulated and gathered up as something sustaining. one has no choice but to rely on a few passages from much later authors that summarize his thought. Thus. even the culmination.C. Anaximenes' thought as transmitted through these reports and summaries is cast for the most part in an Aristotelian language and conceptuality that almost certainly could not have been proper to it originally. in the city of Miletus? What about Anaximenes. the moment of the of philosophy. of that initial moment not the simple beginning. writing retrospectively of his early engagement with the Greeks. these summaries in turn relying in most cases on still earlier reports. Only one short fragment has any claim to reproducing the words of Anaximenes himself." thus concluding that "what phenomenological investigations rediscovered as the supporting attitude of thinking proves to be the fundamental trait (Grundzug) of Greek thinking. For interpreting his basic thought.Document Page 146 through the phenomenological turn to the things themselves. Is it possible to discern in what remains accessible of the thought of Anaximenes a trace of the demand to consider by all means how each thing is manifest? Of Anaximenes' life and activities virtually nothing is known aside from his having been a pupil and/or companion of Anaximander. Consequently. Theophrastus. as commentators have noted. and even in this case there are. does not ascribe such orientation only to Aristotle but extends it to "Greek thinking as a whole. especially those by Aristotle's pupil. any effort to gain access to his thought must system4 . especially in the view of the ancients." 3 What about this extension? Is the bond to the things themselves in their manifestness decisively operative in Greek thinking as a whole? Does the force of the Empedoclean injunction extend back even to the beginning of Greek thought? Can a trace of it be discerned even in that remote beginning that is supposed to have been accomplished in the sixth century B. Not that much remains: there is perhaps less than in the case of any other early Greek thinker accorded comparable significance in the ancient tradition. Yet Heidegger. his thought represents the genuine achievement. of course.

What could be less attached. in this very supposition. precisely. still stops short of gathering under the name what will later be assumed to be thus gathered and hence opposed to ? What can it have meant for Anaximenes to say something like: everything comes from air? Presumably Anaximenes was setting forth air as the source or origin from which all things somehow come forth into their presence. his thought proper. as in the case of Anaximenes. less attentive. to things in their manifestness than such seemingly empty theorizing? And yet. Anaximenes is supposed to have theorized that everything comes from air. What remains of Anaximenes' thought are only those phantoms of it set moving along diverse lines in later texts. But how. in and through the flight of these doubles.Document Page 147 atically deconstruct these sources in such a way as to inhibit the otherwise natural tendency to read back into the earlier thought later conceptualities that first became possible on the basis of the earlier thought and of what came directly in its train. their manifestness. is one to understand without merely assuming for it the sense that was later to be explicitly determined for it by Aristotle? Is it at all certain what is to be understood by air ( )? Is it indeed even certain that is to be translated by air? What would be the sense of translation in this case. But in this case can one seriously suppose that a bond to things in their manifestness could have been operative? After all. most notably. in the way that later reports as well as present-day commentaries formulate it. the distinction between compass of a thought that. there is much that calls for suspicion and must indeed be suspended if there is to be hope of genuine access to Anaximenes' thought. is the sense of to be determined prior to. What is one to understand by theorize in the thought of one who preceded (and contributed to the that came to be accomplished in the work of possibility of ) the determination of the sense of Plato and Aristotle? How. one can catch a glimpse of what one would call Anaximenes himself. considering that the Anaximenean can be identified neither with air in the sense determined by modern physics (as a mixture of gases) nor with the element ( ) that comes to be designated by this name in Aristotle? In Homer and frequently refers to what one would need to translate as mist or Hesiod . The question is whether. independently and ? How is it to be determined within the of.


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haze. For example, in The Theogony, one finds the expression (119); clearly the reference is not to the openness and transparency of what might be called air but to the darkness or mist refers to the so-called lower air, that which occurs that obscures vision in the underworld. Often , the shining upper between earth and sky, up to and including the clouds, in distinction from the part, which is sometimes depicted also as fiery. Thus, a passage in The Iliad declares that "the fir-tree reached through to the " (14:288). The semantic link of to what would be called breath and wind forms the basis for the links that Anaximenes' thought seeks to forge between these; it is by no means assured that these links would remain unaffected even by the most discreet translation. Thus, in the case of Anaximenes especially, one will need to forgo translating certain basic words of his thought, on pain of translating the thought itself into something alien. Or rather, echoing Heidegger, one will need in these cases to translate Anaximenes back into Greek. Even the report that Aristotle gives of the basic thought of Anaximenes stops short of declaring him to have theorized that everything comes from air. What Aristotle says rather is that Anaximenes posited as the of the other simple bodies (Metaphysics, A3, 984a5; DK, A4). Thus, Anaximenes' but that the other simple bodies ( , in basic thought is not that everything comes from particular, is mentioned, presumably to mark the difference from Thales) come from it. Nothing at all is said of how all other bodies, those compounded from simple bodies, come to be.
6 5

But how is one to understand this coming from that is such as to warrant naming the ? be in order that it be capable of constituting the ? Or rathersince the what ( ) What must be in order to be the ? Must it already orients the question to later Greek thoughthow much of all else that can be said simply to be? be at all in order to be the One of the reports that most advances these questions comes from Theophrastus by way of Simplicius (DK, A5). Marking the link with Anaximander, the report declares that for Anaximenes, too, the ) is one and unlimited ( ). There can be little underlying nature ( doubt but that the reference to the underlying naturethis very formulationrepresents precisely an Aristotelian reinscription of the sense in which the other simple bodies are said to come from the one : within the conceptuality of about to be named


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Aristotle's treatise on , the word names that which underlies and endures throughout a process of change, that from which, in precisely this Aristotelian sense, things that come to be (something) may be said to come. If this sense is suspended, what remains is merely the declaration that that from which things come forth is one and is unlimited ( ). To say that it is , thus echoing Anaximander, is to say that it has no , no limit or extremity at which it would end or from which it could have begun. If, as most of the reports (although not this one) attest, that from which things come forth is to be called beginning (to isolate onebut only oneof the component senses of ), then it will be a beginning that itself has no beginning.

The report continues by marking a point that differentiates Anaximenes from Anaximander: Anaximenes does not consider the unlimited one (from which every-thing simple comes forth) to be indeterminate ( ) but rather takes it to be determinate and indeed identifies it as . The word overlaps semantically with : both bespeak the privation of a certain limit, of an and a , respectively. It is not, in general, self-evident how these two kinds of limits (and their respective privations) are to be differentiated, but in the present case the continuation of the or, as the text says literally: having been delimited ( passage specifies that having an from )means being delimited in such a way as to have an identity, so as in this case to be identifiable, in particular, as . On the other hand, to say that this one (from which everything ) is is to say that there will be no limit or simple comes forth and which is delimited as would not be. Wherever anything is (using wherever to boundary beyond which or before which . In other denote togetheror indifferentlywhat will be distinguished as place and time) there is also words, wherever anything is, such as fire or stone, there will be, not one, but two: fire or stone and . Except perhaps where there is simply , there will always be a double. One might venture to say even that Anaximenes' basic thought is that of the doubling of being. The remainder of the report from Simplicius is addressed precisely to this doubling. In saying that , it is imperative to stess the moment of unity: it is not as wherever anything else is there is also though other things merely have somewhere alongside them, but rather in the very unity of each thing (as it is delimited in its identity) there


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is also . Or, to turn the identity around: in everything else there is both and something different from , a doubling within the identity. Thus, the report from Simplicius says that is ). This differentiation is said to be effected differentiated in its being ( becomes firewhile also remaining , that is, it is by rarity and density. By becoming rarer, differentiated from itself, becomes the double: . By becoming denser, more compact, becomes wind, then cloud, then water, then earth, then stoneswhile also remaining in each case . In the phrase found in a parallel report from Hippolytus (DK, A7), appears different, shows itself as different, is differently manifest ( ). In his basic thought of as (which is explicit in the report from Hippolytus), Anaximenes is considering precisely these different manifestations and seeking to think what must also be with every such manifestation.

Both the reports name what are counted as simple bodies (in the Aristotelian formulation), namely, fire, wind, cloud, water, earth, and stones. Both then extend the discourse beyond these: the rest (that is, all beings other than the simple ones) come forth from these. The two reports thus outline what one might call the full range of diverse manifestations. Most remarkably, however, the report from Hippolytus indicates that there is a discontinuity in this range, is most equable ( ), it is indeed a kind of zero-point of nonmanifestation: whenever not manifest ( ) to sight. It comes to be manifest only when it is differentiated in its being, only when it appears different from itself. As long as it remains simply identical with itself (most equable: ), it does not show itself. In other words, never shows itself as itself but only in connection with the manifestation of something different from it. Only when doubling commences is there manifestation. , to . It is hardly necessary to stress Both reports link doubling, that is, what is called the risk one would incur by merely translating , without further ado, as movement or motion. The report from Hippolytus ascribes preeminently to , and one could, following Boeder's proposal, take to be most capable of precisely because of its lack of any limit that would set a limit to its . Nonetheless, it remains highly problematic what could designate in the present case. What kind of movementtaking the word in the broadest and most open sensecould


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be ascribed to , understood as the one, unlimited from which all things come forth into their manifestness but which itself never becomes manifest as itself? Is its "movement" to be reduced to a complex of movements of invisible material particles by which it could become rarer or denser? Or does its have to do with the very "movement" of manifestation in which things come forth so as, unlike , to be manifest to sight? Everything depends on how the doubling is understood, on how it is that each thing manifest as fire, . How is with such things, especially considering wind, cloud, water, earth, or stone is also that it remains nonmanifest as such? Another report, this one from Aetius (DK, A10), bears on this , the report says that such a declaration must question. Commenting on the ascription of divinity to be taken as identifying "the powers that pervade the elements or bodies ( )." But what kind of power is ? What is it a power for? empower, enable? Is it not the power for precisely that of which it is the What does this namely, for the coming forth of things into their manifestness? Is it not the empowering in which things come to presence? Is not the very openness, invisibility, and transparency the of what is called precisely what makes it possible for things to come forth in their manifestness? Is that grants the open place of manifestation? Is it not precisely as such an open place that it not is with all things? And to the extent that the semantics of the word inclines also toward the Homericalso bespeaks the obscuring that doubles all Hesiodic mist or haze, might one not suppose that manifestation, that shadows it? In this case it would come as no surprise that, in the only passage that can be taken to present the words of Anaximenes himself, there is a coupling of the soul and the cosmos: "As our soul, being , holds us together, so do and enclose the whole cosmos" (DK, B2). For then Anaximenes would be saying: as empowers the coming of things into their manifestness, so does it, as soul, gather each of us and draw us to that manifestation in such a way that we are gifted with the power of as the one, apprehending what comes to presence. Thus it would be that in his basic thought of unlimited, invisible Anaximenes would have thought precisely that by which one can come to consider by all means how each thing is manifest.


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Notes 1. Against the Logicians, I, 125. This text is commonly cited (e.g., by DK) as Adversus Mathematicos, VII. 2. In DK, this passage occurs as Fragment B3, 1. 9-12. Further references are indicated by DK followed by fragment number. 3. Martin Heidegger, "Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie," SD, 87. This text dates from 1963. 4. Burnet is insistent on this point: "It is not easy for us to realise that, in the eyes of his contemporaries, and for long after, Anaximenes was a much more important figure than Anaximander. And yet the fact is certain. We shall see that Pythagoras, though he followed Anaximander in his account of the heavenly bodies, was far more indebeted to Anaximenes for his general theory of the world. We shall see further that when, at a later date, science revived once more in Ionia, it was 'the philosophy of Anaximenes' to which it attached itself. Anaxagoras adopted many of his most characteristic views, and so did the Atomists. Diogenes of Apollonia went back to the central doctrin of Anaximenes, and made Air the primary substance." Cf. John Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy (New York: Meridian Books, 1957), 78f. For Hegel, too, Anaximenes represents the completion of Milesian thought, its highest moment: "In place of the undetermined matter of Anaximander, he again posits a definite natural element (the absolute in a real form)but instead of the water of Thales, that form is air." Cf. G. W. F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie I, vol. 18 of Werke (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1971), 214. Focusing on the fragment in which Anaximenes connects air with (which Hegel translates as Geist), Hegel characterizes him as having also marked "the transition of the philosophy of nature into the philosophy of consciusness, or the surrender of the objective form of principle." Ibid. 5. See also G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), 10; and Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, 74. 6. See Heribert Boeder, Grund und Gegenwart als Fragziel der Früh-Griechischen Philosophie (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), 45f. 7. This is explicit in Aristotle's discussion of the (Physics Γ 4, 203b7). 8. For all these names, perhaps most notably for reservation proposed above in regard to . 9. Boeder, Grund und Gegenwart, 47. 10. Though not without considerable difficulty. See Kirk and Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers, 158f. as an :

, one would need to exercise the same caution and


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Seven What We Didn't See
Dennis J. Schmidt
"Je stärker ich in die eigene Arbeit komme, um so sicherer werde ich jedesmal in den großen Anfang bei den Griechen zurückgezwungen." Heidegger to Blochmann, 19 Nov. 1932

Among the most striking aspects of Heidegger's efforts to engage the Presocratics is his tendency to turn to the enigmatic fragments we have from their writings in order to address some of the most pressing and painful questions of the contemporary world. One of the arguments that I want to make in this essay is that the apparent absence in Heidegger's work of any effort to speak to the exigencies of contemporary life, or to bring his concerns to bear upon questions of justice and ethical life, begins to disappear once one understands his fascination with early Greek thought in its proper context. Through his engagement with early Greek texts, Heidegger begins to develop the elements of what might be called a non-metaphysical sense of ethicality. The ethical vocabulary and framework to which we have become acclimated are clearly lacking here, but it is precisely this framework (which Heidegger designates as "humanism") that has so vividly demonstrated its failure. Admittedly, then, the ethical sensibility toward which Heidegger is groping in his treatment of the early Greek is strange and does not conform to traditional expectations. Heidegger does not formulate an ethics that is determined by the relation between human beings or between humans and a god. But then it is these expectations that most of all are being called into question.

schema. but not the only. As Heidegger never fails to point out. at least insofar one agrees with Heidegger that the decisive element of the West is its metaphysical ground. there is an as yet unthought element in these textsan element which possesses what Hölderlin called an "oriental vitality. They are the presentation of what remains outside of the West and yet belongs very much to the origins of the West. Not in the first instance cosmologies. Consequently.Document Page 154 This means of course that one needs to approach his texts on early Greek thoughthere I am including "literary" works along with what is typically designated as "philosophic" since the works in question stand before the division between literature and philosophyby recognizing that rather than regarding Presocratic texts as relics of a bygone era. but still somewhat legitimate. concretization of the long evolution of Platonic thought. Heidegger analyzed contemporary life as the epiphenomenon of a peculiarly metaphysical fundament the roots of which he found in Plato. in a controversial parenthetical remark found in the published version of Introduction to Metaphysics. For Heidegger. Heidegger looks to them as fundamentally distinctive and as somehow apart from the conceptual economies and rationalities that define contemporary thought and that collude with the crises of our age. but politologies." As foreign." But modern technology is simply the most extreme and most visible. this strange residue of alterity from our own beginnings. these texts promise the real possibility of an immanent critique of Western culture since they exhibit a decidedly non-Western element. a potential fragmentarily inscribed in a range of early Greek texts. Heidegger even proposes that the Nazi movement needs to be interpreted in light of the "encounter of planetary technology and contemporary human being. Indeed. Beginning with the Introduction to Metaphysics. form of the elaboration of the destiny of metaphysics. and perhaps final. and yet at the roots of the West. The overcoming of metaphysics is the task of creatively repeating the still unthought potential of the origins of the West. this appeal of the Presocratics for Heidegger is easy to understand according to a very over-simplified. this element. Since Presocratic thought does not submit 3 2 . Heidegger refers to modern technology as the most recent. then. these texts belong very much to a future. has an emancipatory potential. As is well known. Here one sees the relation between Heidegger's interest in the Presocratics and his attempt to develop an open arena for a radical critique of Western culture. to a promise as yet unredeemed.

<><><><><><><><><><><><> Nietzsche. as for Heidegger. But it is important to note that these texts are not alone in the promise they hold. is whether a philosopher can address the issue of justice today. "Origin of the Art Work. in his efforts to find a language and manner of thinking that does not belong. calculus. an economy of exchanges. One reads the Introduction to Metaphysics." and even the notorious "Rectoral Address" and one finds . A calculus that has culminated today in the field that is known as ''applied" ethics. contemporary philosophical narratives of justice are merely interpretations that hide the fact that there is no justice as such. something apart from the framework hitherto established by philosophy. the riddle of shared life in time. who Heidegger called "the last philosopher of justice" and who was also captivated by early Greek texts. His claim is that the tradition of philosophical reflections on justice that start with Plato inevitably resemble shopkeepers scales. That is why Heidegger's interpretations of Presocratic texts need to be understood as part and parcel of his critique of the contemporary world. yet concentrated. above all. Or is it the case that truly creative responses to the enigmas of ethical life. he argues that. it takes the form of a calculus. to the rationalities and grammars of the onto-technological traditions of metaphysics. is finally an elaborate form of double bookkeeping in which the units of measure are calibrated according to "the good" only to mask the truth that justice. or what is called justice. however loosely and critically. technological. especially the relation of ethics and technique. Poetic and early Greek texts share the same promise for Heidegger: both operate outside of the orbit of the concept and its specific. is really nothing but a calculus of power. it is not surprising that Heidegger turns to them. when justice is thought under the sign of the concept. Hence. gesture of wrapping the German Reichstag? 5 4 So it is not a sign of oblivion to the times that this turn to the Presocratics plays such a prominent role in the turbulent times of the early 1930's. So the real question for Nietzsche.Document Page 155 itself to the strictures of the idea and the economies of metaphysics. In other words. was among the first to raise serious questions about the general form of Western philosophical discourses on justice and ethical life. What we find in philosophy. are to be handed over to the province of art and actions such as the simple. Nietzsche contends.

It is. at a time in which the catastrophe of recent German history could no longer be evaded. then." An urgency pervades Heidegger's attempts to take up these texts. but the standards pertaining to the needs of these times of crisis. There Heidegger suggests." a text written just a few months before the text on Anaximander. and when his own personal crises almost led to a collapse. contrary to every expectation and to the disbelief of many. whose poetic work Heidegger finds holding 7 6 . especially to early Greek texts. is not new and does not begin with Heidegger. But it is not only during these years that the Presocratics so powerfully animate his philosophical imagination. and especially to the text on Anaximander that I want to address. that his thought has always been concerned with the ethical. After the war. So. Heidegger is not simply laboring as the custodian of another time. Hölderlin. But my contention is that this promise of an "original ethics" is first substantially answered in Heidegger's treatment of Anaximander. Heidegger argues that we need to break with conceptions of ethicality and justice that are wedded to images of "the human" and "humanism'' if ethical life is to be renewed. Heidegger chooses to devote himself to a powerful meditation on Anaximander's fragment on the relation of time and justice as a way of seeking out a new manner of reflecting upon what must be done today. but is searching for a new mode of address to these times.Document Page 156 crucial decisions in these texts being made with reference to Presocratic texts. <><><><><><><><><><><><> It should be acknowledged at the outset that the attraction to Greece. then we need to understand the grounds of ethical life as greater than that which we. as human beings. not the standards of philology that serve as the best measure for Heidegger's achievements in these texts. There the argument is explicit: if justice is to be understood as something other than a calculative technique. that which the Greeks called presses into our existence. In the "Letter on Humanism. in turning to these early Greek texts. to the crises of time which these times signal: "But herein these years. define and can understand. During those years Heraclitus and Sophocles seem to play a special role in Heidegger's thought. Key words drawn from form an axis along which Heidegger's own early Greek texts work moves forward.

only over time and the completion of the destiny of the Greek metaphysical origins of philosophy could such matters become visible. because in a very real sense Heidegger's point was never thematized in those early Greek texts. One pivotal illustration of such a point is found in a seemingly passing remark that Heidegger makes in his text on "Anaximander's Saying." In what seems to be an aside. <><><><><><><><><><><><> But what one might learn from Heidegger about justice is not a simple recapitulation of early Greek thoughtno thoughtful elaboration of the relation of justice to time could pretend to immunize itself against the specificities of the times. The peculiarity to which I am referring is the tendency. What Heidegger tries to make clear in his interpretations of Greek texts is just what this experience and knowing refer to. Heidegger calls attention to a peculiar feature of the early Greek literary imagination which helps illuminate his own central insight into the character of justice as he formulates it through an engagement with Anaximander's philosophical experience. namely. for Heidegger. and why it is that this experience solicits thinking today. Here then it is possible to say something about the possibility of justice without submitting that discourse to the rule of metaphysical-conceptual assumptions. suggesting that our relation to Greece is like the heliotropism of flowers that need to turn and face the sun. the necessity perhaps. the promise that in these texts one finds the promise of a nonmetaphysical determination of justice. of the Greek poetic imagination to regard those who possess wisdom in matters of justice as blind.Document Page 157 a promise akin to that held by early Greek texts. I have already suggested the general form of an answer to this question. That is why I would argue that the text on Anaximander. which speaks most directly to this possibility of a justice that resists calculation. even more than the author of Hyperion. already felt the imperative of turning to Greek literature so strongly that he described it in a beautiful image drawn from nature. Furthermore. My argument is that . Rather. This attraction is not a matter of some sort of nostalgia for a bygone era but represents something more substantive. some sort of knowing that emerged out of that experience. However. stands as something of a summit among Heidegger's texts on the Presocratics. it is important to recognize that the Greece to which we are indexed is not a geo-political designation. it is the name for some sort of experience.

as "Ungerechtigkeit" in German. Heidegger's discussion will quickly shift away from any . a word that is typically rendered as "injustice" in English. without fanfare. obviously. Heidegger suggests that the possibility of translation is at issue here. the topic of which is the relation of justice and time. not the oldest text by any orthodox calendar. The almost invisible passage to what I want to call attention shows up when Heidegger turns to what he calls the "oldest" text of the West." At the outset of his interpretation of these words." <><><><><><><><><><><><> The centerpiece of Heidegger's attentions in his reading of Anaximander is Anaximander's word . that language might remain the hidden bond in the question of the relation of time and justice spoken in this fragment. These general comments will help set the context for my special concern with the question of why Theophrastus is compelled to characterize these words as "rather poetical. to answer this question one ultimately needs to understand the sense of time formulated by the words themselves. yet. there is the very important question of how this text merits this designation. haunt all that follows. 'according to necessity.Document Page 158 a more extended reflection upon the image of blindness in Greek literature than Heidegger himself provides supplies a means for eliciting a sense of precisely what he comes to say about justice today on the basis of his interpretation of Anaximander. The orthodox English translation of Anaximander's fragment is well known: "and the source of the coming into being of things is also that which destruction happens. It is. and the question of translation. Rather. This move is decisive concern with the privative form of the word and come instead to speak of and not unproblematic since it signals a shift from a discourse on injustice to . words which are from Theophrastus and which read "as he describes it in these rather poetical terms. for they must pay penalty and retribution to each other for their injustice according to the ordinance of time'. But the special point that I want to develop first appears in the words that follow Anaximander's text. the very brief fragment from Anaximander. That suggestion. a Greek text." I will return to the significance of this passage after some general comments about Heidegger's interpretation of Anaximander's text. It is important to note that. namely.

In the end. that is philosophy. Odysseus sees the ghost of his mother. It is also the word that Homer uses as the answer to one of Odysseus' most broken"destined" by hearted entreaties in The Odyssey: Odysseus has descended into the land of the dead. He had been gone a long time and had not known of her death. a discourse on justice might not be possible. Such a distinction might indeed be the distinction that separates Socrates and Plato. suggests that the revelation of such knowledge is ." If Heidegger refuses to translate the word and speak of "Gerechtigkeit" or "justice. of mortality. A discourse about injustice might be possible. between justice and injustice. I will forgo indications of how pervasive this word is in Heideggerespecially from 1935-1946culminating in the Nietzsche volumes where Heidegger even ." Instead I will simply say in anticipation that argues that "the knowledge of becomes the word naming that wider horizon. where there is no light. that region of ethicality which is not defined by the human. We find the word. But it might be precisely this shift that needs to be called into question and may not be one that can be accomplished. and before leaving the underworld of shadows. Such a shift presumes a certain symmetry. in writing of the fantastic adventure in which truth beyond the capture of time is revealed. already in Parmenides who. Teiresias. and may be precisely the move into metaphysics.Document Page 159 one of justice itself. . to which Heidegger refers us in the "Letter of Humanism. some translation or perhaps simple negation. Clearly this word is one of the elemental words concerning ethicality at work in the Greek philosophical imagination. His mother answers simply that such is the here. in order to speak with the blind prophet. and the untranslatable possibility that it names. it might just be the case that a non-metaphysical discourse on ethicality might need to rest content with the critique of injustice and abandon the dream of a theory of justice. a necessity which we need respect. He said that he ached to hold her one more time and did not understand why that was not possible. There is a certain intractable need indicated 8 . that captures Heidegger's But it is this word imagination of justice and becomes the axis along which the question of a non-metaphysical determination of justice begins to be reformulated." it is because he wants to remind us that what is names here is a field wider than that which has yet been contained by those words. Clearly more is at stake in the question of its possible translation that the task of simply finding an equivalent term. for instance.

It is the name for the rightness. namely. that Kalchas. If we understand such "seeing into the future" to refer to a sort of prophecy for which there are no surprises. At a decisive point in his anlaysis Heidegger enlists a passage from Homer. he proposes the German word "Fug. It is Heidegger who has argued that the poetical is a manner of thinking with an integrity independent of the philosophical or conceptual such that what is said poetically has a necessity of its own and so cannot be said otherwise. To that end. it needs attention with respect to the poetical character in which it is presented. and in an effort to comprehend their situation and to find a remedy. that these are poetical terms in which Anaximander is thinking about this necessity of . he suggest "joint" and explains that proposed translation by referring us to Hamlet and the phrase we find there saying that "time is out of joint. Such a view would lead to a rather silly expression of justice as requiring a calculation of the future. is the . and." In other ." When Heidegger discusses this passage he notes that this seeing into the future. is when matters are as they should be. Heidegger cites a passage from the beginning of The Iliad. For nine days the Greeks had suffered a plague. more precisely. <><><><><><><><><><><><> This is the point at which I must finally return to Theophrastus's passing comment on Anaximander's fragment. Here what Heidegger does not say is of central importance. then such a remark clearly does not illuminate the at all. riddle of But this reference to the future as the concern of the ethical needs further attention. Achilles summons Kalchas. Of course this does not mean: for justice to be had. the word traditionally translated as "justice. the lawful necessity. for things to be in thread that joins time and joint. the one who is called to end the sufferings of the Greeks. the one who sees into the 9 . this glimpse down the route of lawful necessity which is equally the time of my death." is taken more as a name for the rightness that words. we must know the outcome of the present. but to make a point that is most appropriately made in an image.Document Page 160 When Heidegger finally wagers a translation of this word. the joint. namely. one who "sees into the future. not to dramatize an idea that could be made otherwise. the appropriateness." When Derrida risks a translation of this translation.

One could continue offering 11 10 . even though both of them have written powerfully about it. One could refer to Thamyris. to whom Plato refers in The Phaedrus. but what is clear is that all the ancient legends that surround him find his blindness to be an element in his knowledge. one could refer to the poet Demodokeos who was given the gift of song by the muse who took his eyes. In a culture that equated light and life. it is irrelevant whether or not there was a blind Homer. a veil he removes upon uttering those words). That is even the case with his name: Οµηρος means "hostage" which was a synonym for the blind who needed to be led by a guide. but nonetheless ironically. a culture of light. In the final analysis. suggesting that he was cleverer than Homer since Stesichorus knew how to recover the loss of his eyes: he simply wrote the linesdecisive in The Phaedrus"This story is not true" (it's a line that Socrates repeats with a veil on his head. To that end. blindness was the ultimate form of human suffering. This relation of blindness and poetic insight is so basic to the Greek sensibility and such a relationship is so essential that it was necessary for the Greeks to understand their preeminent poet. is blind and it is precisely his blindness that is what we need to understand since it enables him to see what we do not see. In Greece. covering his eyes. ) But for now my point is to indicate the extent to which blindness attaches itself to the Greek poetic imagination that thinks the riddle of . most of all because the stories of the way he became blindno matter which story one tellsintroduce the crucial dimension of desire into the issue of the poetic. Homer. for instance. as blind. As is well known. and so it is no accident that blind Teiresias is the only one who can see in the underworld of the deadthat has always been his elementand in one respect it is this symbolic relation with death that is the source of his insight about the destiny of the living. blindness came to stand as the most visible image for the human condition as suffered. the blind poet who is the hero of the tragedy by Sophocles that we have lost. (As an aside let me simply say that the experiences of Teiresias are especially important for a fuller treatment of this thematic. it is unclear whether there was in fact "a" Homer. Or one could refer to Stesichorus. The relation of the blind to the λóγος is more acute. We. blindness bore a resemblance to death. Consequently. do not find the blindness of a Milton or a Borges essential to their poetic character.Document Page 161 future. What is relevant is that the Greek imagination required the blindness of such a poet of ethical life.

entering the eyes that brings a warmth that nourishes the wings of the soul. What makes Oedipus' blindness especially interesting is that. but to a moral condition. The Greek words blend appearing on stage newly blinded." 12 But. who was given insight simultaneously with his blindness. seeing is too painful. passages such as the one in The Phaedrus where he speaks of "the stream of beauty. Plato is decisive since one finds in Plato a number of passages about eyes. who blinds himself because. Only after he has "said the unspeakable" does he begin to see what he did not see beforewhen he had eyes. that in those instances where the origin of a blindness is explained. for instance. Here." we come to understand that in the poetic imagination such blindness refers not to a physical condition. yet difficult. recommending to his children "one wordlove. was memorialized for his watchful service by having his eyes set in peacock tails). To provide such a context it would be necessary to range from philosophical presuppositions about the relation of sight to knowledge to mythological images about eyes (ranging from the Cyclops Odysseus blinds. instead of trying to tackle such a wide theme. Oedipus is called " blindness. One goes blind because one knows too much. suffering. but chose blindly.Document Page 162 such illustrations. It is in Oedipus at Colonus that Sophocles charts the moral growth of Oedipus. it would also be necessary to situate such characterizations of blind poets with respect to the enormous significance of the seeing eyes in Greek literature in general and Greek philosophy in particular." It is a remarkable death scene. witnessing and human life in the most compact manner: . unlike Teiresias. of course. the knowledge Oedipus won through blindness comes only comes gradually. affir14 13 . With his entry into blindness. once he sees. one bathed in light and expressive of the most tender. after his murder. let me try to focus upon what we should be able to see in the case of perhaps the most celebrated image of blindness in Greek tragedy. who enters a blind beggar led by his daughter Antigone and dies in the most marvelous manner. to the Gorgon. the all-seeing guard with a hundred eyes and who. it is typically a punishment for trespassing the limits of human knowledge. Were one to properly discuss the nature of poetic blindness. the sight of which means death. At the moment of "by the chorus. when Hölderlin suggests that Oedipus has "an eye too many perhaps. up to Argus. I am referring of course to Oedipus. but to do so only confirms the general point to be made: namely.

We must give what we do not haveif there is . for instance. which he proposes as a key word in the non-metaphysical ethical sensibility expressed in the Greek poetic imagination. to render difficult any understanding of this wordand of the last word that Oedipus utters before his deathHeidegger argues that this word of affirmation." ''esteem. we gradually come to realize that it is we who do not see. affirmation is the core thought of that fragment. But. to be the fittingness of While I want to say more about this sense of affirmation to which we are now referred. one of the words that Kant uses to characterize what we feel before the sublime. does not name a human trait." 15 Its ethicality is inseparable from its own imperfection. We watch as Teiresias sees into the future. but we still do not understand. if we read reflectively at all. But it must be understood to be an exceedingly difficult expression of love. Heidegger's interpretation of the Anaximander fragment comes very close to suggesting that such pure. and it is also the German translation for Augustine's word "diligis").Document Page 163 mation." and even "love" (it is. By this point it should be clear that what makes discussing images of blindness encountered in such poetic texts so problematic is that. Heidegger eventually comes to translate it as "Schätzen"a word that means something like "honor. yet flawed. It is the future . which is the word by which Anaximander names what can be given fittingly. Heidegger focuses upon the word commonly translated as "retribution" or "penalty. and one that should not necessarily be characterized as the perfect achievement of reconciliation such as is found in Hegel's claim that after the catastrophe "the wounds of spirit heal and leave no scars behind. there remains one more point that must be said about the specific character of blindness that is crucial for an understanding of such affirmation. It is not in our control." Struggling to understand that word. Oedipus' parting word of affirmation needs to be heard as the summit of the tragedy generally and the point at which the poetic expression of the knowledge of finds its most pristine expression. It is almost a serene moment in this trilogy of tragedies otherwise bursting with catastrophe. Set so clearly apart from the turmoils of tragedies. it is not first of all "ours" even if it is what we need to learn if justice is to be. In proposing that Anaximander's text is . But there is a clue to be found in understanding that such seers look into the future. which is expressive of an affirmation beyond calculation.

Most of all. as that which we are facing. and make whole what has been smashed. which literally means "behind" or "hinter. but to which we are blind. The Greek word but to the future. The angel would like to stay. they are united in their mutually deep commitment to the idea that we are bound to the mysteries of futuritymysteries that the Greeks thought under the notion of destinyand that it is out of that mystery that the riddle of shared life in time is to be thought. The first is a common image rooted in the Greek language. while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. today. Here let me suggest that two further images might help us sort out this dilemma. a sense of the future quite distinct from any conception of the future as that for which we plan and calculate. it has got caught in his wings with such violence that the angel can no longer close them. defining our . and both concern our relation to the future. The storm is what we call progress. This storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back is turned. This is how one pictures the angel of history. the point that I believe one can find powerfully presented by Heidegger. like to think of the future as that which is in front of us. Whereas we. his wings are spread. is far closer to Heidegger's view of the relation of history and justice than is commonly acknowledged. "Theses on the Philosophy of History." refers to not the past blind spot. Where we perceive a chain of events. But a storm is blowing from Paradise. It is. he sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet. But the point that such images highlight.Document Page 164 that holds our destiny and the necessity that governs it. not the past. in Greece the image of the future is of that which is behind us. his mouth is open." where he writes the following: A Klee painting named "Angelus Novus" shows an angel looking as though he is about to move away from something he is fixedly contemplating. the second comes from Walter Benjamin. is that the future is another . His eyes are staring. His face is turned towards the past. Benjamin's sense of the inexorable in history. awaken the dead. We find a similar sense of our situatedness in time in Benjamin's text. and of the messianic arrival of justice. however. 17 16 The image here is powerful and disquieting in the way that it situates us in relation to a future that finds it possessing great force.

Let me suggest further that the sort of original ethics one finds in Heidegger is. In the end. as Nietzsche argues. as that which cannot be outwitted. It is precisely this which safeguards freedom. ultimately very non-Western. as Derrida argues. Original ethics begins when freedom is revealed as consisting in this risk of both the demonic and the divine. a time apart from the calculations of the present. it becomes the exposure of the aporia of the ethical that. like the Greeks. has an ethical import." and apart from the economics of discursive practices.Document Page 165 time. cannot be calculated. As the alterity of time itself. Heidegger . in time. in taking up the texts in which Heidegger turns to early Greek works. He returns us to a knowledge that formed the abyssal grounds of Greek tragedy. "infinitely distributes itself"that indexes us to what cannot be seen and cannot be told. Now. that those who do not understand the force of destiny must go blind in order to see. as that which holds for me the end of time in my death. to what I didn't see. Most important to realize is that Heidegger has sought to remove the question of ethics away from every sense that ethical life is a matter of someting calculableit is. namely. to my mind. especially the work we find on the Presocratics. Heidegger. it is necessary that I begin to move toward my conclusion to try to draw some of the threads of my remarks together. Most of all I want to say something more pointed about my contention that. knew that destiny arose as the future. and that is one of the reasons that one finds such incredulous responses to efforts to enlist Heidegger in discussions of ethical life and to propose that his work. as strange even beyond the projections of the imagination. each of us is finally confronted with the question of what we expect from an ethics. my relation to the future. Such a sense of the ethical begins and ends simultaneously. a radical freedom which must be acknowledged as beyond calculation. we find a truly innovative avenue for elaborating questions directed to the possibility of justice today. however. He resists such a notion vigorously because it is precisely an awareness of the incalculable as such that first opens the promise of something like the ethical. It is clear that Heidegger is working to redirect such questions and so undermines some of the assumptions that we might make about what would constitute and answer to the questions posed by our ethical being. is an ethical relation. "beyond good and evil. But of course Heidegger knows all too well that freedom preserved leaves us open to the monstrous as well as the divine.

as Deleuze has noted. 18 . But there is something that can be said here. and moves up through Spinoza (for whom. It is. that one can only And here what needs to be said is that it is. and that it is out of the knowledge that I am wedded to what I cannot know. and Sophocles. ethical affirmation. Anaximander. it is all a matter of struggling with all one's might to extend the borders of what is known.Document Page 166 knows that I am bound to something greater than me. And one must understand what Odysseus learns in Hades: that in giving such affirmation of what is other than ourselves we must not wait for a reciprocal gift. It is an affirmation like that which Oedipus found before his death. In the end. but a gift. If I were a poet perhaps I could say it properly. this experience of limits. is not symmetrical." In the end. However. But it is equally a matter of knowing how to cope with our blindness. in a tradition of thinkers of the ethical. and that we can at least know and understand that to which we are bound as greater than that which we define (so that the "ethical" realm must include what we confusedly call animals and nature). especially insofar as it is garnered out of a reading of early Greek texts. that there are ineluctable limits that blind our speculative abilities. of pure generosity. But it is too easy. with what we didn't. of fittingness. of mortal life. as Homer says. I am trying to situate Heidegger's ethical thought. there one should pass by. the love what one does not see. It would be misleading to suggest that the end of Heidegger's reflections on ethical life arrive at something like the emotion we call love. nonetheless. In saying this. and of exercising a vigorous critique of inequities on the basis of what we do understand. it does seem clear that he attempts to show us that we are bound to what we cannot calculate. the texture of . perfectly without reason and so all I can do is allude to its saying. and far too misleading to speak of love at this point. All of these efforts somehow call for an affirmation of what we cannot see. I have already indicated that there is a powerful sense of affirmation struggling to be expressed in Heidegger. that I can find ethical experience. what we don't see. who refers to the divinity of the "yes." and through Nietzsche who writes that "where one cannot love. one that begins with Homer. "ethical joy is the correlate of speculative affirmation" ) through Hegel. something that I cannot understand.

Document Page 167 We didn't see the seven mountains ahead of us. The world broke up into unimaginable forms. We didn't see the mountains ahead and so we didn't sense the upheavals to come. upheavals that were in fact already in our midst. that struggles are never truly concluded. beauty to be incarnated. We were unprepared for an era twisted out of natural proportions. We didn't see the chaos growing. This is a story for all of us who never see the seven mountains of our secret destiny. always calling us. and that life can always be used to create more light. and his reading of early Greek texts generally." 20 . and when its advancing waves found us we were unprepared for its feverish narratives and wild manifestations. and is not. in the first instance. In turning to Heidegger's work on the Presocratics. joys to be rediscovered. saying that once thinking begins to poetize with respect to the riddle of being. dreams to be realized. it is then. We didn't see how they are always ahead. It is a creative and philosophically imaginative confrontation with these texts. Taken as a whole. and especially his texts on Greek tragedy. and only the circling spirits of the age saw what was happening with any clarity. waiting to burst into flames. it "brings what is to be thought into nearness with the earliest of what has been thought. that sometimes we have to redream our lives. But they formulate only a beginning. I believe. an effort to remedy inappropriate scholarship on the part of the classicists. who never see that beyond the chaos there can always be a new sunlight. promises made before birth to be fulfilled. important to understand that they form a whole cloth and that they need to be read in tandem with Heidegger's work on poetic texts. Heidegger concludes his text on Anaximander by acknowledging this. these texts do drive at something like an ethical sensibility. 19 My argument has been that Heidegger's reading of Anaximander. and love embodied. This is the song of a circling spirit. unprepared when our road began to speak in the bizarre languages of violence and transformations. We didn't notice how they hinted that nothing is ever finished. always reminding us that there are more things to be done. is best interpreted as an effort to formulate the contours of a non-metaphysical sense of ethical life.

8. is a reference to Christo's project of covering the Reichstag with a shimmering fabric. 251b. 15. Oedipus at Colonus. Plato. K. 40:1 (Spring 1996). "what is art?". line 1612. 11. ed. . Storck (Marbach am Neckar: Deutsche Schillergesellschaft. trans. One might think the logic of the alterity with reference to Hölderlin's celebrated Böhlendorf letter. It is this portion of The Odyssey that Plato seems to be explicitly re-writing in the "Myth of Er" in Book 10 of The Republic. 188-196. line 1283. ed. 12. Oedipus Tyrannus. Phänomenologie des Geistes (Hamburg: Meiner. W. Kamuf (New York: Routledge. 9.Document Page 168 Notes 1. 1989). 1990). 1960). Sophocles. 1995). 187. W. F. 3. trans." Philosophy Today. The Greek Myths (New York: Penguin Books. See Jacques Derrida. Wright (Albany: SUNY Press. Also. Hegel. G. The Experiences of Tiresias: The Feminine and the Greek Man. 23. 55. EM. 10 April 1932. Specters of Marx. Phaedrus. 211-226. That act. Phaedrus. 5. 243a. 98. Martin HeideggerElisabeth Blochmann: Briefwechsel 1918-1969. On this point see Robert Graves. lines 248ff. See The Odyssey. That is the section of The Republic in which Plato speaks to "what awaits the dead. 4. 14. 10. Martin HeideggerElisabeth Blochmann: Briefwechsel 1918-1969. 2. 49. Here see my "Poetry and the Political. 6. of course. Nicole Loraux. 1952). vol. 7. Book 11." in Festivals of Interpretation: Essays on Hans-Georg Gadamer's Work. It also stimulated a number of responses to the question. provoked a remarkably lively and intelligent debate about the nature of the parliament. the history of that building (especially its role in Nazi times) and its suitability for the parliament of a re-unified Germany. 13. Sophocles. P. Paula Wissing (Princeton: Princeton University Press. Plato. On this see my "Lyrical and Ethical Subjects: On the Ordeal of the Foreign and Enigma of One's Own. 470. This. Joachim W." and the section in which the discussion of justice reaches a summit. 1994). 152. during two summer weeks in 1995.

1969). 17. ed. 343. Ben Okri. . Norton. trans. 18. Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken Books. 257-258. HW. Hannah Arendt.Document Page 169 16." 9. 1988). Songs of Enchantment (New York: Doubleday. Spinoza: Practical Philosophy. 1993). 20. 19. 3. in Illuminations. Walter Benjamin. See Bernard Knox's discussion of this word in his Backing into the Future: The Classical Tradition and Its Renewal (New York: W. trans. "Theses on the History of Philosophy. Gilles Deleuze. 1994). W. 29. Robert Hurley (San Francisco: City Lights Books.

however.Document Page 171 Eight The Last. and that this is reflected in the translation. Band 25 (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag. Although included in the original handwritten manuscript. The English reader should note that the German textin particular the introductionhas a somewhat stilted style. this lecture was not delivered as part of the course. 1990). which appears in Early Greek Thinking (New York: Harper Collins. 1984). and facilitate cross-reference to the German text." by Frank A. read the text of lecture XII as part of a subsequent "Colloquium on Dialectic. Undelivered Lecture (XII) from Summer Semester 1952 Martin Heidegger Translated by Will McNeill Translator's Introduction The following text presents for the first time a translation of the final lecture prepared by Heidegger for the second part of his 1951-1952 course Was heißt Denken? (What is Called Thinking?). Heidegger did. The published version of the course likewise omits the final lecture. but also because it represents an early version of the essay that appeared in revised form under the title "Moira" in Vorträge und Aufsätze. WILL MCNEILL DEPAUL UNIVERSITY . apparently because there was insufficient time at the end of the summer semester. Capuzzi. The numbers in square brackets indicate the original manuscript pagination." which took place in Muggenbrunn on 15 September 1952. Both the protocol of the "Colloquium" and the lecture are published in Hegel-Studien. The text of the lecture is significant not only because it belongs to the original manuscript of Was heißt Denken?. In preparing this translation I have had reference to the translation of "Moira.

Nicht nämlich ohne das Seiende." since destiny has bound this to be whole and immovable too. What is said in these words concerning the relationship between Being"? [24] and . in which it is what is said. something that we find before us like many other things. will you find thinkingnor was there nor is there nor will be there anything else outside of or besides that which is in "being. It is valid also for voyaging across the sea. zu sein. wirst du finden das Denkennicht war nämlich oder ist oder wird sein Anderes außer neben dem "Seiend. unbewegbar auch. Undelivered Lecture (XII) from Summer Semester 1952. is thinking as is also therefore what is thought. For not without beings.34ff. "Dasselbe aber ist Denken als auch weswegen ist Gedachtes. Thinking thus proves to be identical to Being. Fragment B8." nachdem dies doch Geschick fesselte ganz. According to this perspective. The integral is a kind of sum-total arrived at by a process of adding together. One perspective regards thinking as something that is. Such a being. "thinking and So far as I can see. however. like all of its kind. We scarcely require any philosophy in order to arrive at this conclusion. thinking is identical in kind to beings." Parmenides. What it says is valid not only for thinking as something we find before us. in dem es Gesagtes ist. must accordingly be counted as belonging among other beings and as included among or "integrated" into these beings. The sum total of beings is called Being. for . the various interpretations that have become customary all maintain one of the following three perspectives.Document Page 172 The Last." "The same. each of which also finds some support in the text.

classifying among beings all that is. one that rests on the fundamental Cartesian position and reads: esse = percipi: "Being is identical with being represented. In order to facilitate our understanding. which posits beings as objects of representation. Or more accurately. the issue seems to be the relation of knowing to actual reality. Within such philosophy. For what the philosophers busied themselves with in their first attempts at philosophy. It is a proposition of Berkeley's. Being is identical with thinking insofar as the objectivity of objects is "constituted" in representational consciousness. a theory that has become the authoritative fundamental trait of that questioning which modern philosophy pursues.Document Page 173 building houses. one seeks some assistance. one of the manifold beings of which each one speaks of thinking as also being one of the many sometimes is and sometimes is not. There can be no doubt that the modern proposition esse = percipi has its basis in the statement of Parmenides. In the light of these determinations. thus being fundamentally both at once: present and absent. Since. One wonders why Parmenides explicitly draws such a conclusion precisely with regard to thinking. for all human activity. Modern philosophy has established a theory of knowledge that has passed through doubt. whenever one considers the issue in this way. we find a proposition that provides an illuminating pointer for interpreting the statement of Parmenides." By bringing this together with Parmenides' assertions. one no longer wonders about it anymore. [25] Another. these assertions first attain the perspective of a distinct philosophical questioning. in the relationship between thinking and Being. more thoughtful approach at least finds "statements that are difficult to understand" at this point in the text. namely. Parmenides' statement proves to be an as yet unrefined and early form of the modern doctrine concerning the essence of knowledge. loses the character of a genuine task of thinking as philosophy progresses. irrespective of whatever historiographically ascertainable dependencies we have in . And it would scarcely be worth while our considering this interpretation of the relation between Being and thinkingan interpretation that "amasses" and represents beings as the mass aggregate that is Beingwere it not for the fact that it gives us the occasion to expressly point out that Parmenides nowhere explicitly . why he bothers to specifically ground it by adding the commonplace remark that apart from beings and besides beings as a whole there are no beings. one finds in the philosophy of modernity whatever assistance is needed.

an interpretation of this early Greek statement in terms of the perspective of modern thinking is erroneous from the outset. and not the reverse. Earlier thinking is thereby inevitably drawn into this later dialogue. this proposition is neither an assertion about "thinking" nor an assertion about "Being. transposed into its field of hearing and perspective. namely the Platonic way." whereas the early Greek proposition asserts something about "thinking. in the manner of "spirit. A formulation of the modern names proposition fully corresponding to this would have to read: percipi = esse. According to this doctrine. but is an assertion about how both belong to the realm of the nonsensible." The statement that thinking is identical with Being means: both are in essence non. do not belong to . They can be apprehended only in . this divergence can already be seen from the manner in which the propositions speak. in keeping with the principle of the fundamental Cartesian proposition: ens = ens verum. and thus robbed. the "ideas.Document Page 174 view. On both occasions. Being does not belong among the essence. Being is. Thus. And yet it remains an attempt to appropriate Greek thought. to percipi. Parmenides first and attributes it to . Here. Yet the way in which the modern proposition historically belongs together with this early Greek proposition entails an essential divergence in their meanings. Each of these three interpretations imports and attributes later ways of questioning to early Greek thinking." nor even an assertion about the essence of their belonging together as divergent. In the neoplatonic interpretation of the Parmenidean saying." For this reason. Finally. in Parmenidean statement say. ancient philosophy itself already attempted to lend weight to the Parmenidean statement in its own way. as Plotinus would have the the realm of the sensible. If we are attentive. [27] Nevertheless. [26] The modern proposition asserts something about ''Being. however. an attempt that gets played out in manifold forms. The modern proposition by contrast attributes the esse.and supra-sensible." which constitute the "being" ("seiend") in all beings (Seienden). but is . of the freedom of its own telling. which is named first. Presumably all later thinking that attempts to bring itself into a thoughtful dialogue with early thinking must speak from its own perspective and thus shatter the silence of the earlier thinking. this does not of itself necessarily entail its . the guiding perspective is taken from the Socratic-Platonic doctrine concerning the Being of beings (das Sein des Seienden). as it were. verum = certum.

Every attempt in this regard will therefore direct its attention toward the obscure parts of the text that are worthy of question. Everything depends on whether the dialogue initiated by this later thinking opens itself freely from the outset. In grammatical terms. and constantly.34ff. unfold into its own worthiness in its very questionability. This twofold respect may be named in the turns of phrase "Being of beings" and "beings in their . must not exhaust itself in simply seeking to note the inexplicit presuppositions underlying the earlier thinking. Such inquiry.Document Page 175 being recast into later thinking. by way of such dialogue. come thoughtfully to language. among which we could also classify thinking as being something. a thoughtful dialogue remains altogether absent. Yet nor does mean in the sense of "Being [taken] by itself'' (des "Seins für sich").) speaks of the Parmenides is by no means referring to beings in themselves as a whole. Such closing oneself off occurs whenever later thinking fails to embark on an inquiry into that perspective of hearing and seeing which is appropriate to the earlier thinking. as well as their essential provenance. rather than immediately taking up residence solely at those places that bear the appearance of being comprehensible. by contrast. or whether it closes itself off from such earlier thinking and covers it over with the opinions belonging to later schools of thought. What must be noted above all else is that the more detailed text in which the statement of Parmenides is . content themselves more or less with merely noting and enumerating the obscure places in the text. Unless such meditation occurs. however. the and. the early thinking can. of course. [28] with regard to the issue at stake. The following remarks. but does not of itself bring this about. as though it were a matter of merely delimiting the specifically nonsensible is spoken as a participal essence of Being from beings in themselves. The inquiring must become an explicit pronouncement in which the perspectives of seeing and hearing. so as to let itself be addressed in an authoritative manner by the earlier thinking. Such an undertaking can prepare for a translation to occur. 1. is thought in a twofold respect. By the "beings" ("Seienden") thus named. the dialogue is over before it has begun. Alternatively. handed down to us (Fragment B8. for in the latter instance.

At the beginning of Western thinking. Here we must ward forgottenness. this twofold as such has already fallen away. The essence of forgottenness. pointing more penetratingly into what is worthy of questioning. the respect in which this belonging of thinking to Being must be heeded. 2. on the other hand." At the beginning of Western thinking. the twofold comes to be coined in diverse ways. be prematurely interpreted as identity. . beings" comes to receive the historical coining of its essence in each case. The is that." That. which for its part demands and at the same time along with it . Yet such belonging must not. because thinking from then on moves within this twofold in such a way that the latter gives no occasion for thought. is the . It looks as though the twofold has faded away into the inessential.Document Page 176 Being. not even where. letting-lie-before. is precisely "Being" in the sense of ''Being of . . and the name accorded to it. The is that due to which there presences whatever has been "taken into heed. in accordance with the way in which the "Being of . thinking presumably belongs to Being. This widely invoked "Being itself" as distinct from beings. however. states more clearly. from out of as concealment. announces itself in as forgottenness from the off any premature views." Thinking [29] is neither needed by "beings in themselves. Fragment B8. and calls them on the way . for with this falling away the twofold falls into . though indeterminate conception of "forgetting. . however." Rather the reverse is the case: We must enquire concerning the essence of forgottenness. that is." Yet such naming is far removed from thinking this twofold (Zwiefalt) itself as such. beings. . The appearance thus arises that this Being of beings is merely "identical" with beings as a whole. Yet this falling away is not nothing. and as such is that which most is (das Seiendste). however. According to Fragment B3 (earlier B5). or even from raising it to something worthy of question. the Being of beings. what is nevertheless all-important is ) by sighting it in an appropriate catching sight of what is named by "Being" ( manner. ." nor necessitated by "Being [taken] by itself. Thinking to itself. however. in noting that we are not to interpret perspective of a commonplace.

The and its are in each and every case something said. This thinking subsequently brings beings forth to appear explicitly as . the appearing of that which is present in presencing. to let appear. remains indigenous to . is a . That which has been taken into heed is always already gathered as something lying before us. remain something that is kept silent. determines the essence of saying experienced in a Greek way. Such however. 3. before this. and thus constantly. Beings (as) being (Das Seiende (als) seiend). beings ( an ambiguity that can be readily overheard. not subsequently or arbitrarily. and on occasion even must. namely the letting-lie-before of that which is present in its presencing. Wherein does the distinction between the two consist? Why does Parmenides characterize the and as in Fragment B8? This word is translated correctly in lexical terms as "something spoken. In there lies: to name in praise. letting-lie-before. [30] is. which is. however. Taking into heed unfolds and preserves this gathering. nevertheless. Yet everything that is spoken is. as . not explicitly pronounced. ( ) and are the Same. but essentially.Document Page 177 itself is singularly due to this twofold. As belonging together in this way. for example. to call forth before us. in a way that does not yet appear to appear in the ambiguity of the . whence the "phases" of the moon. from out of which the metaphysically coined essence of Western-European of thinking henceforth unfolds. . needs the jointure and . is necessarily something spoken. what is said can also. Consequently the too." Yet to what does this speaking refer which is here named by ? Does speaking here merely mean the utterance ( ) of the meaning of a word or and statement ( )? Is speaking here merely the "phonetic" as distinct from the "semantic"? Not at all. the appearing of the stars and of the moon in its alternating shapes. though not identical. Not everything said. In this way thinking belongs together with this twofold. . something said. from the outset. ens qua ens). Speaking. is of the same. What kind of belonging together is this? In accordance with the jointure of which we have elucidated (Fragment B6).

belongs. We can find it only wherever it Parmenides is concerned with saying to where indigenously belongs. rather than representing that which is "spoken" as that which has been uttered in the sensible. Yet not apart from "beings" can you find Parmenides does say: . . Why? Because as . Linguistic expression forces and pushes and carries the meaning of what can be saida meaning that cannot be represented in the sensibleinto the sensible realm of discursive utterance and written inscription. but think self-showing and appearing in the first instance in terms of what prevails as that which reveals itself before any distinguishing between the sensible and the nonsensible. As something that has been uttered. gathered together with the . Where do we find ? Only wherever it shows itself. taking into heed has come forth to appear "in beings. to which there also belongs whatever pertains to the soul? Were we other to reflect upon as an experience in the soul or to attempt to find it within the field of the "facts of consciousness. Thus comes to appear in what is spoken. we think it in a Greek way as that which has appeared. Only as does the come forth to appear in the and is thus: . How are we to understand this? [31] We can succeed in understanding it only if. Certainly. whatever is spoken is something that can be perceived in the realm of the sensible. and in what way is something that has appeared? It is this as . and only as that gathers itself of its own accord and in a singular manner in the direction of the which thus gathers does it prevail in the manner that it prevails." then we would never be able to bring into view in Parmenides' sense. This ) to that which emerges demands that we precisely do not restrict appearing and self-showing ( in the field of whatever can be perceived in the sensible. In this regard. We find it only . His questioning asks solely about the relation of to ." Does this mean that can be found before us among the . Parmenides says: .Document Page 178 essence as : letting that which is present lie before in its presencing. in the realm of beings. And it can show itself only wherever it has come to appear? Where. Yet does Parmenides here speak of an intended nonsensible meaning that then comes to appear in the sensible through the sound of a word? By no means.

for does not . . and thus it pays heed to the presencing of what is present. belongs to . in taking into heed the . this relation is in accordance with . it is that with which belongs together: the in its twofold. as the way in which is drawn into the . the presencing of that which is present. namely as . does not take that which is present into heed as that which is present. therenamely "in" this twofold itself and in it alone in play and therefore comes forth to appear (thought participially).Document Page 179 The is something that has appeared. due to what is that? Presencing ( which the prevails. It takes into heed. The itself prevails in the twofold of "beings being" ("Seiendes seiend"). that is. to be determined in terms of Being. due to the twofold of listens to because. and does so even when the twofold is not specifically named. and to what extent. the being of beings (das Seiend des Seienden)." shows itself only as . What does this all mean? It calls upon us to think that. saying and that which it says is. The relation of to rests in the fact that.34) related back? Due to what does that which has been taken into heed prevail? Due to nothing other than that which. that is. presencing and that which is present. but appeared . is the Same ( ) as is taking into heed. always asking: . in what way are these. later named the as taking into heed the in the itself. what is that which is present in respect of its presencing? In what way is Being in regard to beings. needs a taking into heed. and how is Being to be thought? 4. among those that can be (those that are actual "in themselves"). And ). nor even given thought as such. nonsensible "Being [taken] by itself. Subsequent thinking says: . as beings. wherever presencing in the sense of is presencing of that which is present appears. [32] To what is the (B8. nor in the realm of that is taken up and taken on by . Wherever that which is present shows itself in its presencing. This. of its own accord. apprehend just any arbitrary thing. and that means: neither among those beings that are perceptible in the realm of the sensible.

Parmenides does not interrogate the essence of than does any other Greek thinker. [33] . however. in keeping with which our fundamental relation to the presencing of what is present comes to be . . where coming-forth-before is appropriated (sich ereignet): arrival before us into unconcealment and forth from out of concealment. Thought in a Greek manner. Saying is at home in the twofold of Being and beings. Yet presumably they all including essential provenance of their successors.. Language is insofar as unconcealment. This "light" already . His thoughtful telling speaks from out of a listening Who or what is to her address. is appropriated. this means something other than the assurance that what Parmenides pronounces is entirely correct and not false. as knowing determined as seeing. ? Parmenides names her. "On Truth and Lie in the Extramoral Sense"-think everywhere under the umbrella and protection of in the sense of the unconcealment of that which is present in its presencing. Language prevails in its essence where appearing prevails. as and . He no more asks concerning the And yet. The fact that speaks in the thinker's and the likewise veiled essence saying means rather that the concealed essence of the twofold in the of language accompany thinking onto the path that everywhere remains a three-way path. and most lately Nietzsche in his unpublished essay from 1873. as a remote as is a remote as is a discussion of the distinction between meditation on the possible way in which the twofold essentially belongs together with the essence of language. because the house of the twofold is-the house. having been built from the essence of language? Yet wherein does the essence of language reside? We said that saying is letting-lie-before and lettingappear. i. .e. The visibility presupposes granted by lets presencing arise as presencing as "outward look" ( ) and "aspect" ( ). To what extent? Parmenides gives no answer. we latecomers may conjecture and must ask: Is saying at home in the twofold of Being and beings because of the house of Being (which always means: of the Being of beings). it belongs to the twofold of the . This occurs even where the relationship of human beings to what is present is explained with the aid of the lumen naturale.Document Page 180 conjoining with . because of him the question is remote. With respect to this remoteness. and was first ignited historically in and through .

inasmuch as this essence unfolds into the twofold of the . and technological) representation. but rather always merely presupposes it. does Parmenides bring to the fore something apparently self-evident. whose essential provenance remains veiled. logical.34ff) think the belonging of each time this belonging is emphatically placed at the beginning of the sentences. At such a moment. metrical-poetic. the and must in each case be regarded as the emphatic predicate of a as its "subject.e. namely that fact that "apart from beings" no beings can ever be found anywhere? Manifestly he does so only because gives rise to the appearance that it maintains itself alongside that which "is . and do so in such a way that Both fragments (B3 and B8.. the customary question of origin falls by the way. [34] to ." Only in the step back of a thinking that sentence that grammatically speaking has is no longer Greek and that no longer thinks in an ontological or metaphiscal way at all can and must even be read as the "subject" of such a sentence. precisely with respect to the belonging together of with . since it itself arrives from out of something more concealed. the essence of language withdraws for a vocation that gives thought to something other than those forms of language that appear and offer themselves to metaphysical (i. just as every question concerning the origin "of language" in general must already have brought the essence of language and the nature of its essential domain into the clear. however. Within the same veiling. grammatical.Document Page 181 a determination that still comes to the fore most emphatically in the modern form of the essence of truth as certainty. then names the as yet unthought . even though never in itself shelters the essential its part "needs" the provenance of the (Fragment B6). In keeping with the Greek text. a twofold which for essence of . The Augustinian and medieval theory of light is left in a complete vacuum with respect to the matter at issueto say nothing of its Platonic heritageif it is not thought back in the direction of . Yet why. The theological explanation of the provenance of truth and language from God as first cause can never clarify the essence of what is supposed to be caused in this way. 5. biological or sociological.

is drawn into and retained in the twofold of the . something that appears. Yet the jointure is able to keep itself removed in this way only insofar as the is a and as such is something "spoken. the "history of Being" is never a sequence of occurrences that "Being [taken] by itself. arriving or departing. Nothing that concerns the presencing of that which presences. however. In accordance with this twofold. for it is that which. the always ). Only that which is not given up is truly given as a gift whose destining is bestowed the possibilities of its unfolding. cannot be fragmented. and certainly not the jointure of and is outside of the twofold or alongside the . Accordingly. insofar as takes this twofold into heed and. The and sets free the . however. twofold of beings and Being. Parmenides says (B8. a destiny which. coming forth or passing away." that is. By contrast to whatever is moved in the manner of what is present or absent. For the and let that which is present lie before in its presencing. Presencing is a singular and unifying One that prevails as an entirety. keeps this twofold as such in the realm of that which is concealed. The destiny of "Being" ( ) is the destining of the twofold." In which case.): Destiny has bound the . itself first receives the pledge that grants its [essential prevailing?]. namely into the twofold. in remaining steadfast. from out of such taking." as set off from beings. Yet from where does appear. presencing gathers that which presences in its presencing and absencing. passes .Document Page 182 present. this appearance is not a mere appearance. if not from the twofold itself. itself lets remains "without movement" ( is the dispensation into the whatever is present be steadfast in its presencing and absencing.36ff. Such dispensation bestows the destining that is the twofold within which whatever is present appears in presencing. the presencing in its appearing. Precisely inasmuch [35] as it gives that which is present to be free in its presencing. and in so doing jointure of in a certain manner keeps itself removed from that which is present. and they lie over and against such presencing. and above all is never first pieced together from whatever is present or absent in any particular instance.

nor even thought in terms of the twofold as something ultimate. nor can it be represented in terms of presencing. one can always insist with complete legitimacy that the difference which sustains all ontology has long been familiar to Western philosophy.Document Page 183 throughas though that history simply opened up. namely that which is present and presencing. namely logic. for a new form of historiography. and that these thereby lay claim upon thinking as representation. For the authoritative path that thinking in its beginnings first has to traverse leads above all to its taking into heed the presencing of that which presences. It is so emphatically familiar that no occasion is sought or found to ever give thought to the essential provenance of this distinction as a distinctionand in so doing to become thoughtful with regard to thinking hitherto. It is all too easily overheard. The growing endeavors to "transform" the existing doctrine of thinking. With this destiny. and it does so precisely through the fact that only that which has become twofold is revealed. withheld in its essence. The "history of Being" is the destiny of the in which there occurs the destining of the twofold in the event of appropriation. into logistics. And the destiny itself? It can neither be explained in terms of that which is present. stands only at its tentative beginning. [37] shows itself ( The that lets as "Ev lie before that one can all too easily lose sight comes to language in such an unquestioned manner . With respect to this distinction. the increasing calculative attempts to resituate language in general in the realm of logistical technology. the will to secure all saying (speaking on the radio) and writing as the production of ready-made literatureall these point to the fact that the consummation of metaphysics. this twofold of that which presences and presencing. that which presences comes into unconcealment as that which is present. more profound insights into the history of metaphysics as it has hitherto been thought. that which precedes and that which comes after with regard to its emergence: the a priori and a posteriori. which itself thrives from giving no thought to the twofold with respect to its essential provenance. [36] For this twofold itself remains concealed in this destiny. ). presencing. The twofold that is represented by way of and these terms that belong to it appears in the form of the distinction between the . announces its worthiness to be questioned already in the early period of Western thinking. so as to name that wherein it. Nonetheless.

calls upon us to let lie before and to take into heed: that which is present in its presencing (Anwesendes anwesend). In the following the gathering of this call. which cannot be traveled. From its being guided into paying suitable heed to the three-way path there speaks the gathering of that call which. and the third. Such a demand appears in an odd light when we meditate on the fact that the essence of mortals is called into a heedfulness of the gathering of that call which points them toward that which is to be thought. This unity of the three-way path determines the manner in which early thinking sets out. however. The unending nature of the dialogue. but is the sign of a fullness of that which is worthy of thought. something kept open for thoughtful remembrance. . but because what is said itself remains worthy of questioning. This three-way path is determined in its unity from out of the first. expects only assurance and appeasement from thinking is demanding the self-annihilation of thinking. too. WesternEuropean thinking catches sight of the presencing of that which is present in those coinages of its appearing in accordance with which the fundamental positions of metaphysics are determined. The dialogue with Parmenides will never come to an end. on the other hand. is not a deficiency. not only because there remains much that is obscure in the fragments of his "poem" that have been passed on to us. calling through the twofold. runs its course within what is worthy of questioning. For it is the path that it is only in its unity with the remaining two paths: the second. which cannot be circumvented. which provides the authoritative measure for the way in which thinking properly proceeds.Document Page 184 of the extent to which this path. Whoever.

Parmenides' goddess says to her young student. In his thinking. Parmenides' pronouncement about the relationship between being and thinking stands as his pinnacle achievement. Even with this novel reading of opened up by Heidegger and others. much still deserves careful attention in his thought. since this relationship is the center of Parmenides' thinking. we will examine what is said by Parmenides about the relationship between being and thinking. then a simple question arises: How are we to make sense of the fact that the Poem is an instruction that attempts to bring thought to being if being and thought always already belong together? We can think through this aporetic character of Parmenides' thought if we consider three things: first. Focusing on this education on how to instructing a youth on how to think . if being and thinking belong together and are together in some sort of presence.Document Page 185 Nine The Ontological Education of Parmenides David C. for there I will return again" 1 . "it is common to me from where I will begin. However. His Poem can be characterized as a depiction of a goddess and mortal opinions. we will re-think the relationship between . Jacobs In the history of philosophical reflection. and. being and thinking with the portrayal of the dispensation of At the Center: The Belonging Together of Being and Thinking In Fragment B5. we will lay out the ontological education that Parmenides portrays as occurring between the goddess and the youth. second. which we will hold here. links being and thinking in their relationship as a belonging together and not as an identity. much still remains enigmatic about the relationship between being and thinkingand. we can see how the instruction moves or turns the youth's thought to think in its think presence with thought. third.

we could not easily exclude an idealistic reading. By doing so. this fragment cannot be easily placed within the Poem by philologists for two reasons: (1) there is no obvious connection to other fragments contextually or grammatically. We can place ourselves directly within the problem of if we are cautious and make only preliminary remarks about the occurrence of this phrase in the Poem. this fragment indicates the central problem of Parmenides' thought. we read a sense of from identity. an equation that allows for the priority of thinking in idealism. Here. the waking and the sleeping. In Fragment B88. This beginning and the return revolve around that is pronounced in the Poem. These remarks will remain few until we have thought through both participants in their relationship. If his Poem is about the thinking of thinking together in some way. thereby. Parmenides' thinking begins and returns to this center. In Fragment B3. which links being and how to think being. Enigmatic and somewhat homeless within the Poem. they merely connect the two by identity (and. they force their assumptions into this equation). the phrase means a belonging together and definitely not an identity. but what is made quite explicit is that being and thinking are linked by .1-2). is at the center of the matter at hand. its meaning is certainly different In Heraclitus. Thus. With Fragment B3 alone.Document Page 186 (B5. however. then . with this precedent in Heraclitus. a center that allows for the announcement on . and the young and the old are . interpreters follow and continue an idealistic tradition that equates being and thinking. he states that the living and the dead. Similar to Fragment B5. Parmenides links and by . 4 3 . and (2) the fragment seems to characterize Parmenides' thinking as a whole. that will be instructive here. can also be read in Parmenides as determining the relationship between being and thinking as a belonging together. that links both being and thinking is pronounced twice in This center (or centering) of Parmenides' Poem. Fragment B3 reads: 2 Since many already assume what and are prior to their reading of Parmenides.

34-41). and to pull (B1. the use of in Fragment B8 gives us a deeper glimpse into the relationship between being and thinking. This overemphasis portrays the urgency to . Fragment B1 (the Proem) presents an allegorical description of what is to occur to the youth's thought.2). It is on account of that there is any thought ( ) at all. The use of here again indicates the relationship between being and thinking.Document Page 187 When it comes to the difficult lacuna in the final step of the ontological education (B8. However. belonging together. The Ontological Education: The Turning of Thought Even though thinking is on account of . 8). to lead (B1. the text and or in Fragment B8 does not warrant any idealism. "on account of. to escort (B1. the Poem begins from the side of . it is on account of . Fragment B8. thinking comes to be on account of . It is how we can . 5 that is. We will shortly see that together by the belonging together is based on presence and that the Poem attempts to determine how thinking is to come to being in their belonging together. In the first nine lines of the Proem. By running ahead to the center of the Poem. 3. the identity between can be shown to a mere presupposition held prior to any reading. It displays how a youth is brought to the house of the goddess guided by the maidens and carried by a chariot. . 4). Even in this pronouncement that in order for a thought to occur for gives priority to . What has to be emphasized is the transporting of the youth. second. Moreover. that a thought comes to be.2. more is exhibited here than in Fragment B3.34 reads: This ''wherefore" ( preliminarily think about ." "because of") names .5). the following verbs are used: to carry (B1. to bring (B1. Thus. we can note two significant characterizations of the relationship between being and thinking: first. In this line in B8. being and thinking belong together and are linked and.2.1. and are held to be . we see that . 5).

.6-7). blind. contact between the mortal youth and the goddess is made.. Thus. we will bring our attention to the divine figures in the ontological education as a whole. our concern is the goddess' words that follow: It is fitting that you will learn ( ) all things. in which there is no true trust (B1. The path that he will eventually follow is described by his divine instructor as "far away from the trodden path of humans" (B1. this allegory holds as the image for what is to come in the education: the youth is to learn how to think properly according to the divine. you ) has sent you forth to travel this path (for indeed it is far away are welcome. The allegory in Fragment B1 suggests how the youth must be forcibly removed and carried away from the "thinking" of mortals.Document Page 188 drag the youth away from his mortal thinking and to a proper .e. The project of the Poem centers on this learning. teaching him how to think and how to think about mortal opinions). the Poem begins by explaining how the youth is plucked out of the realm of mortals (i. mortal "thinking" or opinions) and placed onto a path that leads to the house of the goddess.e. and dazed" (B6. She takes the youth by the hand and says: Youth in the company of immortal charioteers. and this learning is hinged upon the relationship between being and thinking.24-28). since no ill fate ( from the trodden path of humans). both the untrembling heart of well-rounded truth and the opinions of mortals. however. Now.27). removed from mortal thinking and brought to think At the house of goddess. We note in passing that and have this early role in the education. Immediately after the Poem. his thinking will be properly. but right and justice ( ) have sent you (B1. Reading the Proem as an allegorical overture for the rest of the Poem suggests the analogous relationship between mortal realm/ divine realm and mortal thinking/ ontological thinking.28-30). With the youth being forcibly removed from the mortal realm and carried to the divine realm. and we can see from the extant fragments that the instruc- . a way of "thinking'' that is "carried deaf. later. the goddess begins to educate the youth on the truth (i. you reaching my house are carried by the horses.

as completely present with thought. the goddess says.. this path is concerned with the thinking that is turned by ("is not") (B2. will move toward and in this movement he will begin to think properly. that is.e. are for thinking.Document Page 189 tion on the opinions of mortals is separated from the ontological instruction explicitly by the goddess at B8. excluding Cornford's Fragment ). or what I call the ontological education. These paths of inquiry. we will only think through the education of . i. is turned by . is pointed out to be a path ( from . His thought can think differently by following one of these paths. or literally no turning = + ) which is wholly unlearnable. by following the signs in By explaining each of these stages.. the only paths ( ) of . One cannot follow .3-4). from the end of B8 through Fragment B19.5). In the instruction on . how his thought is turned in its attention.53 through the remaining fragments (i. Thus. the instruction to look upon being(s) as present to thought in Fragment B4 3. becomes central. for it follows truth ( ). has three primary stages: 1. the education of the mortal opinions is executed from B8. "come. B2. the youth's thought. we can come to think the relationship between being and thinking in Parmenides' thought. this path is concerned with the thinking that is turned by ("is") (B2. The second path. the proper path for thinking. The improper 8 . First Stage.7-8). In Fragment B2. the thinking of Fragment B8 properly. as the goddess tells the youth.50-52. short-cut. the goddess begins the education of by directing the thinking of the youth. I will tell you and pay heed having heard the story. Although the education of the opinions of mortals is crucial for the overall education. the separation of and ("is" and "is not") in Fragment B2 7 6 2. which follows . How the this second path because mortals cannot recognize or indicate non-being ( youth is to think. a path directed toward its inquiry there are for thinking" (B2.1-2). The first path is the path ( goal) of persuasion. The youth's learning of the truth. she says.e. which was just removed from mortal opinion.

10 9 From a parallel usage. is crucial. which separates these two paths. here. thus. This mortal way of thinking constitutes a third possible path for thinking. or it is apotropic since in its turning toward non-being it is turning away from turn toward . The mortals are uncritical ( ). for without it the youth would continue to think like a mortal. we can read . we ask: How will play this role maidens. the mortals are "carried deaf. Their thought then thinks being and non-being the same and at other times not the same. dazed. think of this third path as backward turning ( thought in its activity is palintropic. blind. The objective then of the education is to follow the first path.7-9). Hence. where no turning ( . thus indicating that both Although Parmenides relabels the first path and the third path as a proceed directly to their goal. by whom both being and non-being have been thought the same and not the same. [in] uncritical clans. In the second path. to think properly and in the end to think We can ask here: Since we are concerned (on the side of in the belonging together with ) with determining how thought will come to . turning now to being and after to non-being. we can ) or as a turning back and forth. horses. Parmenides here makes a decisive indication in language by which we can characterize the three paths. their thought follows this third path which conflates the two. thought is atropic since it does not made. This . on this path. and chariot played in carrying the youth to the goddess? How will of bringing thought to ? Philological evidence has been given of a use of in Homer's works that supports a "vector" or "conveyer" sense of . and even later to both between and has not been as belonging together in some way. is turned by . one is "guided by the twisted thoughts" of the mortals. because the ) takes place. which is wholly unlearnable. Because of this reading. . Here. the path ( ) of all things is backward turning ( )" (B6.Document Page 190 path. by following truth and by having thought turned by in order itself. thought is protropic for it turns toward . the goal of the third path is both being and non-being. how will function as the transporter or turning of thought to ? We have already noted that the Proem functions as an allegory for the perform the roles that the education of the youth. In the first path. for they have not executed the between the first two paths.

only clarifies Parmenides' concern with presence. 12 11 . One cannot see absent beings. but both are "filled in" in the transportation of thought toward its goal. Thought in its proper functioning thinks beings as present with thought. Thus. to turn away from completely or to go back and forth between being and nonbeing. This evidence allows us to hold that the education which starts transports or turns thought toward ." "along side") that functions as that which tells us how the belonging together of being and thinking is. following the path of or the path of mortals. which will send or turn his thought to in order to think properly. in seeing. what one sees must be in the presence of one's vision." which has a visual emphasis. To look upon beings otherwise allows for thought. namely. that is. As we will see. beings that are with away) should be thought as thought. . Thinking in relation to beings is proper only when one "views" beings as present with thought. the goddess has placed the youth on the path of . Here. In Fragment B4. Thinking proper now can be thought as a thinking that can only think beings as present with thought.Document Page 191 Parmenides' as beginning with no subject or predicate content. thought can come to think and thereby belong with being. It is precisely the meaning of presence here that allows us to understand how we must think about thinking and being(s) in Parmenides' Poem. This command by the goddess links thinking and the visual by subordinating the former to a particular aspect of the latter. and it is here in the place of presence that being and thinking properly belong. "look upon beings which are nonetheless absent as firmly present beings with thought" (B4. One must look upon or consider beings. The next line of B4 appears to give justification for the first line regarding absent and present beings in relation to thought. It is the παρ (''with. which one normally holds as absent from thought. . ). by performing the between with and . as firmly present with thought. The command (look upon . it is in the relationship of thinking as present with thought that will enact the final stage of proper thinking. this "is" is determined by presence. the goddess says.1). In this way. (beings that are (beings that are with or present)that is. That is. Second Stage. This stage of the ontological education is the instruction on how to "view" being(s) in a very general sense. Parmenides's central positioning of presence in relation to thought is made explicit. it reads.

in the instruction to think .. and they disallow thought to turn back and forth between being and nonbeing. absent beings and present beings). for this of to occur.6. cf. This final stage occurs by order to think following certain signs ( . must be present not only with thought but entirely with itself for proper thinking to occur. In this stage of the ontological education. thought is completely turned toward in properly. B8. Moreover. If one were to think Second. here. Both of these latter options involve thinking as not present with thought and hence are improper. then it cannot cut off or void between entities to demarcate different beings. B8. one must think as not holding together.3). In order to think as generated and destructible. for this would be allowing νóος to cut off parts . Third Stage. and this is excluded due to Parmenides' priority given to presence. one must venture thought down the path away from or the path that goes back and forth 16 15 14 13 .. In order to think properly. The third stage prompts thought to think in this manner. However. Since thinking properly is thinking as present with thought.23). our thought must be directed or turned toward in order to think it entirely. we must think as present with thought. B8. In order to think this void. There is no possibility to think a space itself. Hence. as entirely present with thought. a lack of (i. they prohibit thought to turn away from and toward nonforbid νóος to think being.Document Page 192 "because it [thought. one would need to involve non-being with . νóος will not cut off from holding fast to (B4. However. so that one could think that came from non-being or that will go into non-being. First. thought here is turned away from by thinking it as ungenerated and indestructible.2) that prompt four "turnings" to take place. one must think as ungenerated and indestructible (B8. Thus.e. to think the lack of something is tantamount to thinking it as not with thought. If the proper function of νóος is to think beings as present with from holding fast to .e. as holding together ( . all-that-is must be shown to be present with thought in order for us to think it at all. is the elimination of thinking as a plurality which is stated in the first line of the fragment (i. a void) would need to be thought in order to separate from . that is. All of these signs improperly. and thought must attend to all of . Implicit.2). these possibilities and is turned toward thought is turned toward in its presence with thought.

the change from place to place. all of properly.. However.Document Page 193 between being and non-being. Implicit here is the Greek ).e. as holding together with itself.32). Since is holding together. that is. since the would have to think will move is not (i. For movement. it lacks nothing. it occupies the only place. The youth's thought is taught to think as completely 18 . is not and cannot be thought properly as present there into which with thought). Parmenides here is exploiting the dual sense of . as having more here and less there. Since there is sense of place ( . it would be complete with no lacks at all or not be. as complete or as not incomplete (B8. Parmenides writes that "if it were lacking it would lack everything" (B8. to occur. the youth's education is complete in from our thought. the thought of the youth is brought to be with a proper relationship with .33). and a being resides in a place.e. the goddess states that genesis and perishing have been driven off (B8. Thus. one must think is thought in regards to having a lack. that is. movement and change. one would need to think non-being as part of . Third. one must think moving from here to there. one's thought is 17 as immobile ( . Since the first "sign" has eliminated change (i.26). or as changing from this to that. in order to have Within the ontological education. The completeness of Fourth. A place is occupied by something. B8. This completeness turns our as entirely present with our thought. it is impossible to think that will move into this void.. as birth and death). By thinking as immobile [ thought is turned toward . one as having the possibility to be here and then later there. being and thinking come to belong with each other in the complete presence of being with thought.27-28). Viewing the belonging together of being and thinking from within the side of shows that must come to in some way in order to belong with it properly. Since is thought of as holding is and together completely with itself. The goddess instructs that "abiding the same and in the same. Not one aspect of is absent thought finally to think is present with our thought. Thus.29-30). it only ] lies by itself and abides firmly there in this way" (B8. By thinking turned toward . In order to think as mobile. we must think it as complete. The thinking of according to these "signs" turns thought regards to thinking toward as complete in order to think all of as present with thought.

but that the education itself provides for a movement of thinking toward being or a turning of thought toward being to think being in its presence. this involves attempting to think what is unthought in another philosopher's thinking. that being and thinking belong together. in Parmenides' Poem. the inception of Parmenides' thinking or the inception of our own thinking. We could certainly delve also into how Nietzsche pushed this historical or genealogical aspect of philosophizing further. However. We have already observed. but our concern is how. even if this comes at the price of turning it against itself. However. thinking about our philosophical history takes on a whole new approach and emphasis. What lies dormant in our dialogue with Parmenides is a "thinking that is awake to the inception" (EGT. Interpretative claims do not maintain the importance they once had. 19 What we want to do in this last section of this essay is to probe back into the center of Parmenides' Poem and awaken what lies dormant there or what remains unthought. not mere presuppositions but nascent thoughts or even the alterity of thinking that brought about the philosopher's thinking from its inception. An ambiguity presents itself: If there . we emphasize that the belonging together of being and thinking is grounded on the priority of presence in Parmenides' thinking.Document Page 194 present with thought. that is. Deleuze and Guattari articulate this new manner of philosophizing about philosophy and the consequences of such activity: Even the history of philosophy is completely without interest if it does not undertake to awaken a dormant concept and to play it again on a new stage. Returning to the Center: The Dispensation of Being Since Hegel's philosophical interpretation of the history of philosophy as a history. in Heidegger's thought. the youth's thought and thinking come into the belonging together with and hence are . Although in different terminology. philosophy has had to come to grips with viewing its activities as historical. In this way. 86). When reading another thinker the thinking that takes place within the dialogue between philosophers becomes the signature of what has occurred.

the supposed progenitor of the excluded middle surely would have more logical sense than to posit a contradiction.Document Page 195 is in the reality of no movement and being and thinking belong together. but a nonetheless has sent the youth traveling to the goddess.26-28). We must highlight the role that these divine figures have later in the final stage of the ontological education. but right and justice ( ) have sent you (B1. However. providing the divine justification of why . Thus. and . another reading must be more plausible. but first we should look at how Parmenides explicitly describes this giving of to thinking. 20 No ill . We could easily say that the entire Poem is about the giving of to thinking. first pronounced in the Proem. In the final stage in of the ontological education. since no ill has sent you forth to travel this path (for indeed it is far away from the trodden path of humans). In regard to how the youth must think as ungenerated and indestructible. We will however concentrate on and because of the limited role of in Fragment B8. We will think through this enigma by re-thinking what Parmenides says about the dispensation of . and our concern will shift to how was given to Parmenides' thinking. 21 and are indicated in language as significant as they are shown to participate in the "shackling" of . the role of is crucial. we already cited the greeting from the goddess to the youth: You are welcome. These three have sent him to the goddess to come to think (and mortal opinions). and these same three are articulated as having a significant role in dispensing . From the Proem. come to have significant roles in the giving or dispensation of to thinking. if they must always already be present with each other? Many commentators have just boldly decided that Parmenides contradicts himself. where the youth is having his thought completely turned toward order to think it as completely present with his thought. We must stress the ontological roles of these divine figures and their early function in the Proem where both have part in sending the youth toward the goddess. and this is combined by her enunciation that and have sent him. the goddess says. how is it that thought comes to thinkor is moved and turned to thinkbeing.

here has the significant role in that it is she who is in is. and (and. she holds ( ) together in her shackles. from and in its state of being. but upon his arrival is presented as completely immobile. Just as gives the divine justification for the first two signs in the final stage of the ontological education (i. the maidens escorting the youth to the goddess must persuade to open the gateway to the path of the goddess (B1. appearance is in the lacuna regarding and in the last step of the final stage of the . has a function at the start of the journey to the goddess' house.15-21). We receive. Near We have already noticed that reappears and has a significant function. we can say that the reason that the youth determines that must think as ungenerated/indestructible and as holding together (i. "neither genesis nor destruction has allowed. since ontological education. First. thought in its activity in coming or turning toward Before we think through this dual role of . the manner in which and the manner in which is given to thinking. As an allegorical overture. her the end of the ontological education.e. but she holds it [ ] fast" (B8. not yet thinking fully and completely but the turning of one's thoughtful attention toward .e. and he must think in this way. How are these very different connected? has the older sense of "way" or "course" as in the functioning of nature. Second. In fact. ) are said to have sent the youth traveling to the goddess. The role of in Fragment B8 is to disallow genesis and destruction by holding in her shackles. It is she who determines how is and is to be thought here. appears twice in the Proem.1315). we first turn to the role(s) of .Document Page 196 one must think this way. in my reading. this opening is the directing of thought toward for the first time. the first two signs of B8) is because maintains to be in this manner. "for nothing other is or will be besides shackled it to be whole and immobile ( )" (B8. relaxing her shackles. The goddess says.36-38). The youth allegorically travels to to think it properly. It is this that charge of how is holding together. Parmenides.. We receive here the divine justification for thinking as whole and immobile. thinking as ungenerated/ 22 . Thus.. roles of but in this context in Parmenides has the sense of the manner in which thought comes to must appear to the youth's thoughtthat is.

Nothing else is or will be besides . and the dispensation of Significant. That is. luck. and (and ) send the youth toward the goddess for his education on how to think . and function by dispensing in its presence with thought so that it can be Both thought in its presence. The signs prompt thought to think as fully present with thought by thought coming to think or follow in thinking the signs. this strange paradox of immobility and movement? Because presents itself in its presence with thought and Parmenides articulates this presentation. Why. then. provides the justification of the last two. Only if is figures render how whole and immobile can thought come to think it in its presence with thought. Thus. As mentioned. but also how then presents itself or to thinking by using the is presented. The older this to the manner in which thought comes to sense of also aids us in our reading. is the coupling of sending the youth or thought to to thinking in this particular manner based on presence. then. Thus. they give over to thought so thought can function properly by thinking in its presence. Both divine is to be thought in fact. Parmenides brings to language the dispensation of movement toward it and by presenting the goddesses as participating in bringing the youth to . From the verb ("to receive one's portion"). Parmenides articulates how gives itself to thinking by presenting thought traveling to . Both and fate). since shackled it to be whole and immobile. surely is fate but is so because one's share has been given over to one. honor.Document Page 197 indestructible and holding together). 24 23 . has determined how these signs will function in their presenting of to thinking. or what Heidegger would call the presencing of what is present. how and what is to be. but what remains significant and unthought are their roles in the dispensation of how is to appear to thought. In our context. has been determined by to be in this way. has the older meaning of "way" or "course" and we connected and how is given to thought. but its presence with characteristic of thought. the main is not the signs as many commentators have thought. booty. The signs then present in its presence with thought. dispenses as whole and immobile so that thought can think it in its presence with thought. still has this sense of giving over to others what is their share (their share of land.

Parmenides brings to language how thinking comes to think and how being presents itself to be. then. according to but also how has disclosed itself to Heidegger. "Moira. or to think being as presence." "to seize. our reading of Parmenides' ontological education is merely the opening up of a space to think through the enigma at the center of his thought. 7-8). "to capture. thinking itself is seized (genommen) by the claim of being (BW. P. . 8). occurs when one thinks dispensation of as presence and the fact that one must come to think in its presence. 264). Heidegger is emphasizing the root verb latent in Anfang: fangen. much more deserves to be thought. articulates this seizure of thinking by being in bringing to language how thought must be wrenched far away from the trodden path of humans (B1. was to articulate how is given to his thinking as presence. is that he not only attempts to think thinking (GA 54. because what is said there continually deserves more thought" (EGT. Indeed. Much more remains to be thought. what makes Parmenides an inceptional thinker along with Anaximander and Heraclitus. and proper thinking of thought. 100-1). One must question the role of the signs in Fragment B8. Given the thinking for Parmenides. 11. Thinking. is how thinking was seized by being to think being in its presence with thought. through the movement of thought toward being and through the dispensation of . and as Heidegger says. Here. Parmenides. the coming to think. Parmenides' accomplishment. How do . Parmenides brings to language how thinking comes to think by depicting thought in its travel or turning toward in order to have the proper belonging together based on presence." with "the dialogue with Parmenides never comes to an end . then. What Parmenides enunciates. 10. However. the belonging in its presence with together of being and thinking. then." In Heidegger's thinking. and he must think in its presence. Conclusion: What Deserves More Thought Heidegger ends his essay. Thinking occurs on account of the dispensation of as presence. Heidegger writes. proper in its presence with thought itself. we can end with a few questions that can prompt further inquiries. "these thinkers are in-cepted by the in-ception (vom Anfang Angefangenen)" (GA 54.27). 25 In his Poem. P.Document Page 198 presents itself as presence to Parmenides.

Document Page 199 the signs function in dispensing to thinking? We have viewed the signs as turning thought toward . M. vol. for it is not outside produced is a thought." Canadian Journal of Philosophy. but how in the end are they itself in its dispensation to thinking? If they can be thought as . David Gallop's translation. 87. NJ: Humanities Press. Hegel. H. 1987). Frommanns. and by T. then how is his instruction on connected to her ? Is his . 627. Robinson. not Fragment B3: "Thinking produces itself and what is ) with its being. 17 (Stuttgart: Fr. All translations of Parmenides' Poem are my own from the Greek in DK.1-2). In the end. Reading as a belonging together has also been pointed out by Heidegger in EGT. W. where to be wise is to listen to the and then to say ( ) one is all? has in the Poem in the dispensation of and how in One must consider the role that its dispensation is a historical event. most do not follow Hegel's overall view. F. When is given to thinking as presence. Simson (Atlantic Highlands. 1. 312). vol. thinking is thus identical (identisch for of beingthis great affirmation" (G. cf. Cf. identity pronounced by . 4. 1. S. similar to Heraclitus's in Fragment B50. "Parmenides on Ascertainment of the Real. Lectures on the History of Philosophy. how do they reveal and thereby conceal in its dispensation? in relation to how one is to speak ( ) of One must examine the role of the goddess' . Also. Although most commentators repeat the idealistic presupposition of the . vol. Parmenides of Elea: Fragments (Toronto: University of Toronto Press. based on Fragment B8. 1983). Notes 1. 1959).34. the proper saying of by mortals. Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie. Does her disclose to the thinking of the youth? If so. our dialogue with Parmenides revolves again and again in the belonging together of the beginning and the end of thinking. in Sämtliche Werke. 3. Haldane and F. we find that Absolute Spirit is this being which is coming to think/know itself. how is this constitutive of the center of philosophical thinking in the West? These questions merely continue since the task of thinking does not come to an end. which is hidden within the beginning. Hegel's words. no. E. 2. 253. for "it is common to me from where I will begin. trans. 4 (June 1975). vol. for there I will return again" (B5.

Dissertation. See Alexander P. cf. 1970)." The Monist. Robinson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press. eds.D. vol. and "Some Alternatives in Interpreting Parmendies." Classical Review. 5. We are reading the infinitive should not be read as "to be thought. 45-60. not large. Ph. 49 (1935). I translate his thoughts. 1 (January 1979). .9). 7. 1993. "Determinacy and Indeterminacy. 1987)." ch. in mid-sea. possibly. 9. 55-56. What Mourelatos argues for in Homer's use is that the subject and the predicate of these verb uses have been suppressed and the use of transports "thought" toward the filling in of the subject and predicate. in the height of modernity with Hegel. 82). Canadian Journal of Philosophy. T. and in "Learning to Think To Eon in Parmenides' Poem. for Heraclitus. The Route of Parmenides (New Haven: Yale University Press. Two of the examples from Homer that Mourelatos supplies are: Now there is a certain island. 10. We must note the reversal: in early Greek thought. priest of Hephaestus. KingFarlow. "A New Fragment of Parmenides. . vol. Vanderbilt University. Also. .844). in Heraclitus: Fragments.D. no. Villanova University. in the way he constructs 11. rocky. Shiner and J. being is dependent upon thinking (see Heidegger. vol. . March 1992. 122-123. I have discussed the education of the opinions of mortals in "Parmenides' Two Accounts of Mortal Contrariety and the Distinction between Being and Non-being.Document Page 200 4. as final. M. R. Mourelatos. 2 (1976). In these contraries. Supplemental. D. Parmenides uses here not or . see Robinson's essay in note 1. B88. Cornford." presented at the Metaphysical Society of America. EGT. (O. DK. Maiden Star. their belonging together also has as the added sense of changing into one anothera meaning that Parmenides does not have with the belonging together of and . It is that thinks. blameless. 62. maintains as an apparatus separate from thinking. See F. but can think improperly. 3-14. Heraclitus. 5. . Mourelatos. which means that the paths are there "for thinking" and 8. to emphasize the mortals' confusion. trans. 4 ("The Naming and Thinking of To Eon as Contraries"). 6." See Alexander P. midway between Ithaca and rugged Samos. Thus." in New Essays on Plato and the Pre-Socratics. Being and Non-Being in the Fragments of Parmenides. thinking is dependent upon being. note 26. and ed. Now there was among the Trojans one Dares. as "thought" and as "thinking" because Parmenides. M. bountiful. My concern with this philological evidence is that transports toward . I think that Parmenides is maintaining thought as an apparatus separate from proper thinking. 4. (I.

("toward") and tendere ("to stretch. and these (opening wide) made from the doors a wide chasm. They just might be arguments or protoheld that these "signs" are arguments for the qualities of arguments. The maidens coaxing her with soft words. especially those within the Anglo-American tradition. Parmenides discusses the completeness of as holding together at B8. revolving in their sockets of the brazen door posts fastened together with bolts and bins. trans. 83.6-21. as immobile at B8. In the above citation and in the following words: There are the gates of both the paths of the night and day. holds the keys of exchange of these. Parmenides discusses thinking 17. Although maintaining is mentioned. and the aetherial gates are filled with mighty doors. Tomlinson and G. 14. we are taking thinking as an attending which is the stretching toward as it comes to be present with it and to take heed of it. Parmenides discusses the thinking of 18. Significant here is the imagery that maintains as allowing the entourage through to the divine realm. at once. Most commentators on Parmenides. and a lintel and a threshold of stone holds them apart. Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press." "to extend. and ." "to look after. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. cunningly persuaded her so that she would push back the bolted bar for them swiftly from the gates." "to tend to") and has the sense of "to stretch toward." Its base comes from the Greek .22-25." and "to turn one's attention to. 15. 19. The goddess says. is twice mentioned in the Proem. the maidens guided the chariot and horses straight through them (Bl. 1994). which as an allegory for the education would be the turning toward to think it properly. Thinking can be further understood as ''to attend" with its multiple meanings of "to be present with. It shows precisely that thought and hence thinking are subordinate to being. much-avenging." and "to take heed of.11-21). 16. it is another divine figure that seems to have the responsibility of . 13.26-31.32-33 and at B8. that thought and thinking do not determine what is. "for strong . but what deserves to be thought is how they turn thought toward . "to stretch by force.Document Page 201 12." The Latin attendere can help us in understanding thinking here. that is. This line eliminates an idealistic reading of Parmenides' thought. Parmenides discusses the problems of generation and destruction at B8. at B8. H. have .42-49. 21. What Is Philosophy?." With these many meanings in place." "to take heed of. It is from at. 20.

NJ: Humanities Press. Edmund Berry writes that it is now generally recognized that ("to receive one's portion"). 25.30-32). . when the youth's thought is entirely turned toward has a complete hold over his thinking. education of mortal opinions attests to this. for the transition into the its full presence with thought. came to mean "fate" but thought in the sense of receiving one's lot or share in life (Edmund Grindlay Berry. it appears that is the ruling . From Religion to Philosophy (Atlantic Highlands. "The History and Development of the Concept of THEIA MOIRA and THEIA TUCHE Down to and Including Plato" (Ph. she comments that the opinion of mortals will now not ever overtake him (B8. 172-174. which fences it about. Also. 1940). when the youth reaches the goddess' house to receive his education. M. factor in relation to 22. Dissertation. Cornford. Both references show that Parmenides did bring to language the seizure by and in this way his thinking belonged to in its dispensation to thinking as presence. That is.61). and any incorrect teaching he now hears will not affect him.Document Page 202 necessity ( ) holds it fast in the chains of a limit. See F. This contact between the youth and the goddess allegorically presents the "contact" between the belonging together and he thinks it in of being and thinking. 23. Two instances of the depiction of the seizure of thinking in Parmenides's Poem are: In the Proem. and spoke these words . 1980). Parmenides writes. ." (B1. . "the goddess readily received me hospitably and took my right hand with her hand. As the goddess stops her about truth. Wherefore it is not right ( ) for being to be incomplete" (B8. Thus. His thinking has been seized or taken in on how to think properly. 1-2). University of Chicago. . which is from the verb 24.22-23). This hospitable contact between the mortal and the divine allegorically names the goddess' friendly and pedagogical hold upon the youth in his ontological education. if we take "whole" and "complete" to have the same meaning which is justified in the Poem.D.

It is the continual effect of the rise of modern science. the concept of method was taken as constitutive for what is to be called science. that dominates all our habits of thought. Socrates is supposed to have said that what he understood of them he found to be excellent. and then I shall enter into the hermeneutical problems that can often be of a philological sort. To be sure. He remains "The Obscure. Men such as Hegel. Yet it strikes me that two points have not been considered adequately: the way in which Plato takes up Heraclitus and the style employed by Heraclitus in the formation of his statements. one finds sentence-like propositions that were already renown in antiquity for their obscurity and profundity. He trusted that this was the case with the many others that he did not understand. Moreover. Countless philological commentaries have been carried out. it would take a Delian divera master diverto retrieve this treasure from the depths and to bring it to light. there is still another enormous difficulty continually leading us astray in all philosophical understanding of Greek thought. [44] Connected with this is the fact that modern philosophy . Henceforth." There is no reliable basic orientation that permits grasping this radiant figure standing between morality and metaphysics. What was true for antiquity seems no less true today.Document Page 203 Ten Heraclitus Studies Hans-Georg Gadamer Translated by Peter Warnek Heraclitus remains a continual challenge for every thinker. and this difficulty is also the case when it comes to Heraclitus. and Heidegger met this challenge in fundamentally different ways. What we have of Heraclitus is limited to citations made by later authors who begin with Plato and stretch throughout the entire later antiquity. I shall offer an account of the philosophical importance connected with every interpretation of Heraclitus. 1 Yet. Nietzsche. the pioneering act of which was Galilean physics.

accompanied the victory march of modern science. to be sure. doubts that arise from the most divergent perspectives. It has since become an unavoidable task to think through again and again the central philosophical problem of self-consciousness. Even Husserl's ambitious attempt to achieve philosophy actually as an exact science for the first time remains planted in this soil. from out of the principal of selfconsciousness. this aggressive posture of modern science over and against the nature that surrounds us. programmatically developed the derivation of all justification of truth. . upon the fact that the "I think" must be able to accompany all my representations. such as in historicism. There the "cogito ergo sum" was distinguished as the indubitable reality of the one who thinks and doubts and as the most sure and unshakable fundament of all certainty. the primacy of self-consciousness over and against "consciousness of something'' became the stigma of modern thought. This was. As a rule. Our century is determined by this in the most profound way. the concept of subjectivity has been elevated to a position of centrality. Subjectivity. It began with Nietzsche." This culminated in the radical shaking of naive self-certainty and led to doubts concerning the assertions of self-consciousness. all grounding of validity in general. Doubts concerning the certainty of self-consciousness have since then taken hold of modern thought and have kept it uneasy. above all Fichte. not yet a philosophy of reflection in the full sense of the word. which is grounded in the concept of subjectivity and which newly defines the meaning of objectivity in terms of this subjectivity. However.Document Page 204 established its philosophical self-grounding upon the concept of self-consciousness. Those who followed Kant. since Kant took up this Cartesian designation of the "res cogitans" in the critical demonstration of his transcendental philosophy and grounded the justification of the concepts of the understanding upon the synthesis of apperception. With regard to Descartes's meditation on doubt. one turns to Descartes's famous meditation on doubt for the revolution that is instigated with the development of the modern natural sciences. and it is from this soil that the bold thought experiments of Heidegger and Wittgenstein sought to free themselves. in the critique of ideology or in psychoanalysis. German Idealism had indeed at that time conceived of something that was well suited to philosophically characterizing the new place of the humanity in the world. the psychologist in Nietzsche set forth the injunction: "a more fundamental doubt is needed. as transcendental philosophy. In this way.

one finds oneself referred back to the historical dimension which leads from Descartes to Augustine. it is the fact that the Greeks had in their possession neither an expression for the subject or subjectivity nor an expression for consciousness and the concept of the I. to the place of the human in the world. Heraclitus enjoys a special fame. better still. If something can truly come to the aid of our modern concern with the riddle of self-consciousness. namely. and from Augustine to Plato. the reflexivity of self-consciousness possesses secondary importance. Heraclitus's thinking exerts an utterly peculiar attraction upon the .Document Page 205 With regard to this question we can be guided by the phenomenological evidence which Franz Brentano first reproduced but which by no means was missed by Aristotle. The primacy of self-consciousness can hold only if one attributes an absolute priority to the ideal of certainty. In order to free oneself from this most modern perspective. by no means did they assertand this includes Aristotlethe central position of self-consciousness. Inasmuch as they surely did after all take into regard the wonder of thinking itself. it has in no way the function of grounding or securing human knowledge. which is always consciousness of something. nor only to the use that was already of his name by Plato. or whether his thinking does not instead point in another direction. The structure of selfhood points to other contexts than the "fundamentum inconcussum" by which self-consciousness maintains itself against all skepticism. which. who said at the end of the entire movement of thought of Western metaphysics that there was not a single proposition of Heraclitus that he was not able to take up into his logic. or. [45] Over and against the intentionality of consciousness. The question arises whether one may view Heraclitus at all from the point of view of this problem of self-consciousness. has made up the essence of modern natural science. neither in his "anthropology" (De Anima. only to his presence in Hegel. He owes this not only to the aphoristic obscurity that we have already mentioned. nor. I would like to show now that it must be followed back further still. to the ideal of a methodological confirmation of the validity and reality of mathematical construction. since Galileo. from Plato to Heraclitus. Even though the god of Aristotelian ontotheology is indeed the highest being (as the "primum movens" and as constant self-presence). finally. Γ) nor even in the grounding of his "first philosophy" upon the self-thinking nous.

he furthered his own thinking through his references to Heraclitus. can be granted in advance to our most ancient witnessand this is Plato. One must continually be asking oneself: How is it possible to uncover or strip away the prior understanding that has been transmitted to us through the authors who offer these citations? By what means can we arrive at a historically appropriate yet philosophically expressive understanding of Heraclitus and his statements? A certain priority. he is still our most ancient witness. how they can be misused. appropriated it for their own purposes. and how their meaning can be covered over to the point of indecipherability." carved into a piece of bark above the entrance a strange and deeply troubling statement. at the same time. The speculative tension of his thinking leads him repeatedly to the most extremely sharpened formulations. I believe. Meanwhile. His writings are the very first philosophical texts that we possess in their entirety. quotations or collections of quotations from later writers who were still familiar with Heraclitus's "book" but who. we cannot allow ourselves to become entangled straight off with naive determinations of what such sentences might mean. admittedly. of course. as modern researchers educated in historical critique. The particular fascination that Heraclitus engenders does not ultimately have to do with the paradoxical and dialectical structure of such statements. However. One can puzzle over the meaning of this sentence. we know all to well what citations are. Everything earlier is fragmentary. there is the lightning bolt that suddenly erupts and is then extinguished. an obvious paradox. They are all like the statement on the eternal flowing river into which one can never step into again as the sameand from out of which the souls rise as vapors (Fragment B12). Investigation into Heraclitus presents therefore a special hermeneutic task.Document Page 206 radical extremism of Nietzsche and upon Heidegger's insight into the end and the beginning of metaphysics. what can be done with citations. Now. 2 . Plato. Anyone who visited Heidegger's hut up in the Black Forest even once saw the Heraclitean statement. that is. We have to concentrate upon the particular conditions of the tradition which grant us access to the texts we are reading as fragmented pieces. did this as well. "Lightning steers all things. but the dominant interpretation until now which sees the lightning as an attribute of the all-governing godhead fails to take heed of the paradox in Heraclitus which certainly must not be ignored. Instead of the calm hand [46] that guides the ship through the waves.

it is said that. One . and of world-periods of dissolution and reconstitution into unity. It belongs to the elegance of writing that. the simultaneity of self-dispersion and selfunification. together. Plato has the Eleatic stranger invoke a statement of Heraclitus. one does not introduce a literal citation. For someone familiar with the manner of Plato. however. Plato designates all previous thinkers. as is the case with most Greek citations. the matter suddenly seems completely different.Document Page 207 The Platonic dialogues yield a peculiarly ambiguous and conflicting picture of Heraclitus. Heraclitus is brought forward as the originator and symbol of a view of the world which knows . precursor to Plato's own thought of the If we attend to the other references to Heraclitus in Plato's work. "Ionic muses" means here without doubt Heraclitus. In a famous passage in The Sophist. Heraclitus is caricatured here into a type that does not necessarily correspond to what Plato himself saw in Heraclitusor even what Heraclitus actually said and intended. as had the doctrinal poems of Empedocles in the eyes of Plato. 187a). as the . against this. in that they had not taught only the alternation of multiplicity and unity. taught only the one as true being. The Ionic and Sicilian muses. The exact formulation of the statement is uncertain. but rather builds it into one's own movement of thought. as Heracliteans (Theaetetus." but which instead sees all things nothing of the abiding sameness of the essence of things. This is attributed here to Heraclitus: the one and the many do not alternate but rather.). some taught the many as true being. This statement is found one other time in Plato and is there cited by the physician Eryximachus (Symposium. Of these Ionic muses who speak through Heraclitus. it is then said that they had thought more precisely than the Sicilian muses. as much as possible. In this context. 152e). In a well known elaboration in The Theaetetus. to which we must turn for the origin of all our acquired familiarity with Presocratic doctrines (Sophist. 242c ff. from Homer to Protagoras (with the single exception of Parmenides). On the one hand. The more precise thesis is the simultaneity of the one and the many. the " in change and in flux. are the whole truth of being. with regard to Plato's predecessors. It is amazing what Plato summarizes here as Heraclitean. while others. Heraclitus here stands for merely a kind of counter-type. hold it to be more clever to weave the one and the many together. What is offered under his name [47] is in Plato's view intended to emphasize the one exception to what the great Eleatic represents.

He gives an abundance of extreme oppositions. like Eryximachus. is corroborated through countless variations on the same point. The example of the river is the best one to introduce here. The statement legitimated by Plato (Sophist. etc. So he continues in The Symposium." And similarly: "The barely drink that is not stirred separates. what is decisive is the simultaneity (cf. Symposium. On the unity as the finally emerging result ( ). is an example for the unity of opposites of which Heraclitus speaks in countless ways: war and peace. Translated. In the end the river. and he maintains that all of them are one. since it invokes the unity of the course of the river and the restlessness of its flowing." This is a most paradoxical dialectical formulation. into such statements. other without transition. The question is how we are to bring together the Heraclitism of the things being constantly in flux and the tense dialectical unity which is compressed. Heraclitus is fond of giving examples for such paradoxes. his ." Heraclitus has illustrated his own genuine wisdom. Here is the river into which all things in constant change flow. it is "like the harmony of bow and lyre. too. The same phrase which is found in The Sophist (242e) is placed in the mouth of the physician Eryximachus in The Symposium (187a). Let us proceed from the phenomena that Heraclitus had in view. hunger and satiety. moreover. The passage in The Sophist shows unambiguously that Plato himself understood quite well that Heraclitus did not. gods and humans. this means: "The one that in itself places itself over and against itself always joins together with itself. because [48] his lack of understanding for the speculative unity of that which is opposed is caricatured in the manner in which the physician directs a haughty critique at Heraclitus. 187a. 242e). To this corresponds: runs: (Symposium. it is the same river. as it were. we the contrary. mean . However. in many such examples. mortal and immortal. 187bl). Fragments B51 and B8). Fragment B8: have here a secure starting-point which. Thus. In all these examples. This is significant. It is distin5 4 3 . The mysterious problem that shows itself behind all these oppositions becomes manifest: what is the same shows itself as an . cf. what appears is what the Greeks called change.Document Page 208 of the major challenges Greek texts place upon us is to hazard where a citation actually begins and to what extent it is being fitted into the current movement of thought.

That appears to be Heraclitus's profound meaning. Aristotle tells us. In this text. Hegel ante diem. and this is precisely the concern that modernity especially takes upon itself. I believe. This seems to me to follow indirectly from the manner in which the Eleatic thematic is set aside in The Theaetetus. Theaetetus first learns what knowledge is: not immediate evidence. for this reason. there is not only the intriguing intimation that Eleatic thinking and The Sophist in particular are being referred to. However." The ironic artificiality with which the Heracliteans are inspired Plato's thinking of the " introduced in The Theaetetus suggests that Plato first of all built up the opposing notion of this universal . no longer as before. 6 . This appears. [49] the essence of knowledge would remain uninvestigated" as if to say that knowledge would be comprehensible only without Eleatic thought. The structure of self-consciousness appears to is indeed thought as a world principle. However. Clearly.Document Page 209 guished by its abrupt suddeness. it can again present itself in a different way. In the next moment. This insight into the unreliability of all things. which is indeed also already at the basis of Eleatic thought. in Aristotle. speaks much more clearly: "because without that for which our conversation is underway. And. as is well known. to proliferate his thought of the "genuine" Heracliteans. perhaps in Cratylus or in other flux. however. this is indeed the very lesson that Theaetetus must draw from the dialogue with Socrates. He is the main source for our knowledge concerning the Presocratics in general. the Eleatic stranger takes over the conversation on the next day. things do not look good for Heraclitus. The reason given for Socrates leaving aside the teaching of Parmenides. In this dialogue concerning the sophists. without a doubt. in my opinion. . Also. he had already encountered such a doctrine. to take a completely different of these appears direction: ''The souls too rise from the vapors" (Fragment B12)and still the unfathomable (Fragment B45). in order. be implicit hereand the How does this fit with the rest of the tradition? This is decisively determined by Aristotle. The fundamental experience of thinking here appears to be that of the essential unreliability of everything which shows itself first one way and then otherwise. would Heraclitus himself also have had to learn this? This process theory that Socrates in The Theaetetus develops from out of the doctrine of the flux has its strongest support in the statement of Heraclitus concerning the continually renewed waters that flow through the same streams. but rather .

The world is not in need of any Atlas to carry it. Thus. even if he himself obviously does not take this polemical assertion completely seriously.) [50] What we know of Heraclitus does not fit in especially well with this. However. the principle of contradiction. cf. Greek cosmology was developed as the basic truth of the cosmogonies of the most ancient thinkers.. It maintains itself and holds itself in order. in his eyes. G3. that some assert that Heraclitus did not hold the basic principle of all knowledge. This has yet to be considered carefully. by means of calculation and the doctrine of proportions. physics) is extraordinarily difficult to connect with Heraclitus. is not so much the joining of the all according to counting and proportions as it is the constitution of the being of "nature" ( ). always lighting in the same way? At this point. No limits can prevent the all-consuming-fire from devouring everything.e. not only earth and fire are artfully kept distinct from each other but also. It does not lend itself to a proper accord with the other "elements.Document Page 210 apparently on account of Heraclitus's paradoxical formulations. how can fire have such a clear shape and boundary. water and fire (Timaeus. cosmogonies which originally were religious but which gradually gained support through disciplined observation. he seems to be in a great predicament. moves and orders itself. by means of air.). The sun. 31b ff. 99b-c. that is. When Anaximander. This much at least is relayed to us by the doxography (DK 12 All). a self-movement from out of itself: the insight into the nature of the all teaches that it maintains itself. This could come as no recommendation in the eyes of Aristotle. . More weight must be given to the fact that his own main concern (i. which he sees confirmed in his review of the Presocratics and which he asserts against the Pythagoreanism of Plato. The guiding perspective of Aristotle. Anaximander comes upon the idea of the holes or openings in the great vault of the heavens through which the concealed raging fire shines for us as a peaceful luminescence. 1005b24). is supposed to have explained the role of the heavenly body and its shape." Plato's Timaeus offers us a portrayal of how in the ordering of the universe. to be valid (Metaphysics. one of the greatest Ionic researchers prior to Heraclitus. That beings at bottom are fire is a position not especially well-suited to gaining an understanding of either the stable order of the world totality or an account of its emergence. the moon (in case one does not know that its light is only borrowed). that in itself it is in balance. (This is also the case in The Phaedo. and the stars are indeed fire.

but in a context mentions an interpretation of fire as "the warm itself" ( that is not only extremely playful and which also does not at all fit into a cosmogonical perspective. Fragment B16).Document Page 211 Now. but not especially renowned for its cosmological progressiveness. the cosmological problem of fire remains difficult. did Heraclitus present a cosmology at all? We have reasons to doubt this. Plato ) within fire. However. cl) is instead alluding to Heraclitus's image of the sun which constantly ignites anew ( Fragment B6). as a constitutive part. who still knew Heraclitus's text. Diodotos. 24. hearkens back to Heraclitus. There is something significant about the fact that the origin of life depends on warmth. When nature was discussed. this was meant only as deal with nature but with the " a way to give illustrative examples. or possibly the sun which never sets ( . The allusion to the sun of Heraclitus in The Republic (VI. However. In fact. Simplicius (Physics. The Cratylus (413b4. The evidence for this is not exactly favorable. there is certainly another way to think the mysterious essence of fire as a cosmic principle. nothing. and this is to think its presence in everything that is warm." the state. we take this from a stoic in the Ciceronian period. in my opinion. [51] Even if we assume that fire is in everything warm and thereby everything living. 498a) also documents that this Heraclitean teaching was indeed known. One has to ask oneself whether this really was just a moralistic stoic reinterpretationas in without doubt suggested by the alleged 10 9 8 7 . has not been taken seriously enough. It is in fact not easy to see how one might build up a cosmology on the basis of the original phenomenon of fire. In other passages in Plato's work. However. in The Cratylus (413c3). One only has to think of the doxography on Anaximander in order to illustrate this (DK 12 A30). in any case. To begin with. Aristotle is really at a loss with this problem. he maintained that the text did not at all . It seems that the impact of Aristotle and Theophrastus was so powerful that the Presocratics in general were all seen as cosmologists. there is an ancient tradition which. 1 ff. Aristotle hardly mentions Heraclitus in his introductions to The Physics and The Metaphysics.) brings forth a pure construct which seems to have its origin in Theophrastus and which has a good understanding of its own awkwardness. It does not easily let itself be taken as an element. a material interpretation of fire as an element of things is not thereby given. where fire and warmth appear as almost the same. which we might if we perhaps relied on Plato. that is.

Likewise. for example. when the tradition not only offers no help but actually promotes errancy? It is not only the agenda of the meta-physician Aristotle that takes us in this direction. there is a whole host of indications advising us to take seriously what the stoic said. this was to be conceived of as the fire of hell. However. until it turns to cinders. does the Heraclitean statement.Document Page 212 title (A More Accurate Compass for the Course of Life )or whether there is not some truth to it." "to grasp. Hippolytus also also means first of all "to cut. One has to ask oneself whether Heraclitus was a rival of the Ionic cosmologists at all or whether he did not instead work as one of their criticsin the way that Parmenides. Thus. the moralistic exposition of the alleged cosmologists through the later stoics and Church fathers also imports something foreign. always meaning ''to put under arrest" but at first simply means "to take hold of. There is. to differentiate. [52] How is one supposed to decide such a question." For the Church fathers. actually say that everything will go up in fire? It is Fragment B66: ." This is indeed 14 . one understands the two Greek verbs as "to condemn" and as "to take hold of" or "to put under arrest. Semantic details point in this same direction. again and again a bitter criticism of political naiveté and the superficial sensibility of the people of his own land. to which all of this seems to be traceable. We also have other sentences which belong entirely to the dimension of the moral and political. too. separate. we find in any case a large number of overt and provocative political and moral statements. the conflagration of the world becomes the judgment of the world. If we review the bulk of the citations of Heraclitus. They were able to impute that Heraclitus already knew something about this. All is is a far cry from consumed in the heat of the fire. What is the correct translation? As a rule. the theologians. 13 12 11 Thus. in this manner. However." The sentence could therefore very likely mean that fire separates everything. However. The word " " is in Greek usage primarily "practical rationality" and thus does not really mean the theoretical use of reason. With the Christian aware that the stoics had taught the conflagration of the world. without doubt had brought about a critique." These are words that are indeed known as legal expressions and to this extent fit the image of the last judgment. This was the manner in which they took the fire doctrine. They were also . the world "conflagration. namely. to enthusiastically cites this sentence.

" in the sense given in The Cratylus." In fact. there is. It is of course only a hypothesis which can present no self-reliant evidence. too. by following the path of a morphologically determined . the right (the ) is replenished. is linked to the just (the .Document Page 213 what fire is.) interprets "being. in addition to Anaxagorian . However. In my opinion. Still. in the midst of this uncertainty inherited from the tradition. The structure of unambiguous sentences which can belong only to Heraclitus can be established because they resemble each other as if they were members of the same family. even where something is being imitated. after all. Thus. through the fire which is all pervasive.). lets everything else appear as being ( . This is not to claim that we could distinguish with certainty the imitations or reinterpretations from the genuine words of Heraclitus in each individual case. Moreover. has no original image which might provide a standard for what is similar. There fire is named. Family resemblance. through its relative to the extent that this swiftest and finest ( velocity. then the imitation offers instruction. who knows? That the sentence had primarily the sense which has been outlined hereand at most only allowed the latent "moralistic" meaning to resonate slightlythis must still be weighed carefully. (Wittgenstein's metaphor considered family resemblance in this way in his critique of nominalist prejudices. And if this is so. the play in The Cratylus best reflects the manner in which.) It thus speaks in no way against the guiding thought of a morphological inquirythat is. the sentence in Heraclitus that is summoned up for the could have had a completely different meaning than the one that as a rule is laid upon it. as "the warm itself'' within fire (413c3) which permeates all appearances and which ). as it were. with materiality. how we might proceed further. For example. it can place all things into the burning embers. "becomes fire. such that the stones themselves (the coals) become fiery as they glow in the blazea beautiful and vivid example of the way the earth. there is only one method of access: the morphological. 412d5). [53] This is in fact "Heraclitean. above and all in the play upon etymology in The Cratylus (412d ff. 16 15 Let us ask ourselves. a good bit of supporting evidence for this sentence and its interpretation. 412d7)just as the theory of movement in The Theaetetus (156c ff. the magma of the volcano is a good illustration of this. the structure of thought that is imitated may not be completely unrecognizable. that it can produce no strict criterion." At any rate. too.

That is surely the reason why Heraclitus particularly loves wordplay. 21 20 19 18 17 It has been shown by a number of researchers. Accordingly. . concentrated. its work is death. as it were. Things are presented. although it is handed down to us expressly as Heraclitean by a most reliable source. that other methodological techniques have this same orientationfor example. where the play on words occurs in the unison between "common" ( ) and "with reason" . Thus. on the basis of the citations in Aristotle and the wordplays of Pausanias and Eryximachus in The Symposiumand considering the precedent set by Hesiod and with a view toward the (Works and Days. it can be reconstructed by means of morphology. Reason is not only common to all. This seems to me to be a genuine Heraclitean sentence. Within the word. for which reason the later critics of style claimed that he was melancholic and that he always said his sentences only halfway. the list of Hippolytus citations. but rather everything that is common rests on reason. It allows him to capture his own truth in the utterance of the word and to stir up.Document Page 214 reduction. by Hermann Fraenkel in particular. Wordplay relies upon a sudden shift in sense and understanding from an orientation that has already been established toward one that is a completely different one. The result reads as follows: "The father is the son of himself. the parable." This ) and the bow ( ).)Heraclitus made similar word-plays with ''loving strife" to which Aristotle appears to be alluding. one of the artistic methods that plays a dominant role in Heraclitus corresponds to this paradoxical style: word-play. [54] There is a well-known example for this in Heraclitus: "The name of the bow is life. Something else would be for us unrecognizable. he makes himself into a father. 20 ff. I suspect. However. thoughtless usage of language. in Hippolytus in a way that is so strange to what is Christian Trinitarian that one takes it to be a mere falsification. in the terse style of a paradox. whereby something is said. the leveled off. the paradoxical sentence. paradoxically." This means to say: When the father produces a son. however. relies upon the unison of the word "bios" for both life ( there is already the unity of opposites. I have reclaimed a fragment that up until now has been lacking from the collections. Another example that plays with words in this way in order to enhance the truth that is concealed within them is Fragment B114. here we have Heraclitus. This is nevertheless something instructive for us as a reasonable guiding principle: where things proceed concisely.

Document Page 215 proportion. for example: "I have sought myself. as it describes the great cyclical movement of the elements. valuable for the interpretation. Thus. I shall begin with a well-known sentence that offers the occasion to display the difficulty that inheres in the preconceptions operating in the citations. Already in antiquity this was understood variously in terms of the perspective of the Aristotelian [55] determined cosmology. and from there to earth. its ascent to the one and the true. Here we read. And. it is the living attunement to transcendence. these directions are also completely different from those of the doctrinal books rooted in the AristotelianTheophrastian tradition. moreover. In this way. The sentence that I have in mind is one of the most simple sentences that one can think: "The way up and the way down is one and the same" (or. This is for Plotinus the way up and the way down that Heraclitus is supposed to have meant. It thus becomes necessary to open up the paradoxical insights of Heraclitus through morphology. and also the non-symmetrical analogy. that determines the horizontal understanding of the author. One becomes thoroughly convinced of this when one reads how Plotinus especially praises Heraclitus for this. which descends into the body. The sentence comes to us from Plotinus (and others). Only later reappropriations developed cosmological interpretations. the statements in Heraclitus to which Plotinus appeals in this way still have something in them that seduces us. This platonist of the era of the Caesars is one for whom the new dimensions of inwardness have opened up. One saw here a portrayal of the cycle of the elements. the mood or sensibility of the early Christian centuries. 24 23 22 . For us this sounds like an early intimation of Christian inwardness. but had found everything himself. it is obvious that his understanding of the book of Heraclitus with which he was still familiar strikes out in directions that are completely different from the ones that we may assume for Heraclitus himself." For the biography of antiquity this meant he had no teacher. from below to above and from above below. and with the soul's return. Yet the text found in Plotinus and elsewhere does not point to this context. Certainly. today no one would follow this interpretation of the sentence of Heraclitus. "the way there and back is one and the same"). into our true selves. because Heraclitus has taught us to inquire into our souls. moreover. he takes the statement to be concerned with the soul. and this is. from the fire of the heavens to water and to air. In Plotinus. Nevertheless. if not the reverse.

on the way hither. in a similar fashion. these "anima naturaliter christiana. also harbors a kind of identity in the opposition itself. appears short). On the contrary. recognized what is truly beautiful and thus pointed toward the Christian future. indeed. This does not have to preclude that in this sentence concerning the way up and the way down still other morally nuanced is usages are not supposed to be heard. the riddle of being conscious (i. in the flame that consumes itself and is extinguished. at the heart of the shrine of Silenus.Document Page 216 as it is to be heard for the first time in Socratic questioning. the usage Plotinus makes of the sentence shows how little one is obliged to apply the sentence cosmologically. Everywhere he sees the wonder of life. Heraclitus sees through the obviousness of differences and oppositions and discovers everywhere the one. in the sudden change from fire to water. In my opinion. but which. it is a simple example of how something that is one and the same can look completely different. in the movement which commences from out of itself and ceases by itself. being awake) and the mystery of death. We have inherited a whole collection of sentences bearing the name of Heraclitus which demonstrate. it is certainly more correct to recognize in it an utterly simple observation. this hearkens to Socrates and Plato. so deep is its ground. no matter how far one advances. or that precisely this was the proper intent. And yet here one should also be suspicious of this powerful resonance with our own history of the soul. the same path which seems long. whatever is addressed in this sentence (''the way up and the way down is one and the same").. In any case." who. how something can change its aspect utterly. [56] There is manifest a correspondence between the structure of the thought and the formal structure of such sentences. Heraclitus is sayingagainst the basic experience of something being distinguished and opposed from and to something elsethat we should see that what might present itself in this way. his one. seems so difficult and. he discovers in all the same riddle. during the ascent. during the descent. He attends to this in such diverse phenomena as in the flow of things." Again. upon return. even opposed. the justification for our simplistic 26 25 . It is the same path which. However.e. Evidently. so easy (or. as differentiated. Or even when we read: "The limits of the soul cannot be measured. In any case. from sleep to waking. What must be shown is that this is one of the points by which Plato takes up and by which he took over the heritage of Heraclitean thought in a positive manner.

31 30 29 28 27 The significance of the neuter that appears here as "the wise" is very diverse. Fragment B41). By a stroke of good fortune. adding color to the adjacent words. The possession of the neuter represents one of the ingenious advantages of the Greek language for the abstractness of thinking. Taken by itself. This text was most certainly intended to be read to an audience. over and against which humans remain always without comprehension. In this always. or "that is the insight" ( . namely. "This . It is not exactly differentiation. we have before us a problem of interpretation. I take this to be the authentic and original principle that seems to be variously repeated in his book." How does such laying out in truth look? The reader of the book sees it. this is the utterly predictable and pedantic excuse of school teachers. and yet in the context of hearing this sentence such a category comes to life again. : "it does and does not want to be called by the name Zeus" (Fragment B32). "one is the wise. What others take as different. Heraclitus describes his project in the following manner: . One must recall that Aristotle was a lecturer (even if he also read aloud naturally). this is a true case of what the grammarians call . or does it always remain without comprehension? Presumably. but perceiving the one in all that is differentiated: that is the Heraclitean message. is in fact truly one and the same." is also hiding somehow in Fragment B50. in the way Hesiod takes day and night. Our formula." Aristotle wonders where the "always" belongs. the one who heeds the hears it.Document Page 217 understanding of the sentence can be found by proceeding in a way that Heraclitus himself establishes and in fact at the very beginning of his writing. Yet I am addressing this much discussed [57] and overly paradoxical sentence here in order to put a paradox into relief which seems to me to have not been properly considered and which supposedly presents a kind of guideline for the entire interpretation. Heraclitus promises "to lay everything out as it is. It can be extended in different ways according to this formula. which always is. Contemporary philologists are also divided on this point. The speaker was thus able to express himself in such a way that the word ''always" could offer light on both sides. like an announcement in the style of an encompassing . Heraclitean teaching is continually formulated in this way: . this beginning has been reliably handed down to us. This sounds completely conventional. that with regard to the first sentence of the writing of Heraclitus. Aristotle remarks. .

Heraclitus claims much more. who use "das Göttliche" or "das Rettende" in their poetry. there is at its beginning a genuine Heraclitean comparison which gives an initial indication of what Heraclitus wants to say on the whole. it is a presence of being that proceeds from such a neuter. just as they forget what they do while asleep. This is how Heraclitus evidently meant his . [59] That is what is distinctive about what we do in sleep. Here. The actions of dreams are incon- . We are acquainted with a similar use of the neuter from German poetry. Fragment B108). "Das Unheimliche. in my opinion. a truth which speaks from out of all things. in this manner. We bring into our lived actuality nothing from the dream experiences that we have undergone. Nevertheless. yet which no one wants to take as true. At any rate. a presence that fills the entire expanse. does not announce that the author has a teaching that is better than the teachings of others. above all since Goethe and Hölderlin. 34 33 32 I want to insist that the Proem tells us nothing about the content of the doctrine. it is not so rigorously observed that these "viewpoints" ( ) of mortals always appear in the plural and not at all in the Platonic singular. The announcement instead ought . the hermeneutic task of understanding the introductory sentence should not." or whatever it is. When something like this is encountered in poetry. is the fullest presence. we forget. Unfortunately. without thereby naming a particular and determinate being." 36 35 This means evidently that they learn nothing from the abundance of their experiences. Heraclitus is as radical as is Parmenides when the goddess he introduces speaks of the opinions of mortals (Fragments B1. Over and against [58] the appearance of everything ( changing differences.Document Page 218 Reinhardt and Snell have taught us to see this well. be interpreted in advance in terms of the doctrine that is to come later. moreover. When we awaken. This teaching is supposed to be better than the viewpoints of all humans as such. again. Yet this announcement steadfastly to awaken an expectation and it relies upon the style of the interrupts the expectation in the most paradoxical manner. "the wise" is not in such a way that it is next to many others-it is "separate" from ." like "das Rettende. Also." "das Göttliche. there remains the opposition between the one knower and the many who do not know: "It remains hidden from humans what they do while awake.'' or "das Heilige. The Proem. Instead.30 and B6). it is not to be understood as a particular being. it is that which authentically is. It should be clear finally that this is not a reference to his colleagues.

the beginning of the book offers guidance. behind the most everyday experience. turns upon itself. Fragment B75 names those who on account of their dreaming are sleeping." In this way. at the same time. This teaching leads to insight and. not only in order to grasp the poetizing of the Heraclitean sentence. while the sleeping turn away each into his own. However. The dream is for Heraclitus the symbol of the universal lack of the word understanding. as when is used for "world"). It is a true paradox here that announces itself as the teaching of Heraclitus. once awakened to the wakefulness of the day. it is an assertion that. it is not a matter of the extent to which dreams were understood in antiquity in terms of their foreboding.Document Page 219 sequential. "they are the same as the inexperienced despite all experience. A sentence like the following belongs here: "For the wakeful there is only one and one common world. but it belongs at the same time to the content of Heraclitus's teaching. One can wake someone from sleep. The parable of waking and sleeping not only provides an example. a worker: a builder of an entire private world). of continuing to play the game of the dream. nor does one integrate it into one's experience. Fragment B73 expresses this directly: "One should not act and speak like those who sleep. This is what is meant in the introductory sentence. (that is. The metaphor in this violent introductory sentence is suspenseful enough. there is more to it. Their experiences have no consequences." the wise. Hence. teaches the chasm that yawns between the one truth and the incapacity for learning of those entangled in the manifold of human fancy and dreams. That humans undergo experiences without becoming wise means that they live like dreamers. The provocation of the first sentence rests upon this." In this sense. We thus confront this parable repeatedly (even if perhaps not always in Heraclitean wording. 40 39 38 37 . What is constantly in view is the humans who [60] while awake behave as if they were asleep. at the same time. Heraclitus sees with a cold and clear vision that dreaming is not being awake. but also in order to seek the "one. Neither is one capable. And thus it literally means: . The incomprehension that humans have over and against the truth is not to be posited simply as an unalterable fact." This formulation is admittedly so banal that one might well have to assume with Kirk and here Marcus Aurelius is only articulating the moral quintessence of the concluding sentence of Fragment B1. so to speak.

it reads surprisingly and provocatively: "Death is what we see while awake (and not life). In the first clause. The Heraclitean use of this manner of thinking has. analogies. within which dream images are encountered. its own character. however. because I am looking in the same direction." The subtlety of this surprising proportion lies in the fact that the end part of the proportion reads and not . 43 42 41 The family resemblance of Heraclitean sentences calls for a very careful rhythmic analysis of what has been handed down to us. At times. Precisely. We can observe how Heraclitus does not simply construe such proportions and comparisons. along with its apparent wakefulness.Document Page 220 Repeatedly one finds a proposition formed between waking and sleeping on one side and living and being dead on the other side. Death and sleep form the two basic terms. The sentence could have read simply: (or. Instead. the word "life" would be an acceptable way to proceed. That comparisons. in Charles Kahn's commentary. In this regard. What is provocative about the sentence is its surprising beginning. but rather loves to embellish his sentences in a paradoxical manner such that they take on a provocative and paranetic sharpness. and proportions were an archaic way of thought has been shown above all by Hermann Fraenkel. and what we see as slumberers is sleep. The precision of this finely chiseled sentence thus becomes unmistakable. It is due perhaps to the ancient style of making a citation in which one at the same time explicates." The entire state of being asleep. 44 . I would like to pose the question to Kahn's analysis of the tonal structure of Fragment B25 whether in the end ("they attain") is not dispensable. I already find very fine observations. The undeniable word play speaks for itself and demands consideration. we do not read in Fragment B21. Thus. the correspondence of which speaks for itself. "sleep" and not "dream. is thereby attributed to those who are sleeping as what they see. )." What is seen in wakefulness is itself attributed as a whole. a correspondence between sleep and dream images on the one side and being awake and the waking world (or life) on the other side. as we might expect. in the best formed [61] Heraclitean sentences I believe I recognize a true family resemblance. Thus. I would like to go still further and produce through emendation and condensation the original Heraclitean sentence from out of sentences that are not well formed. not to life and vitality but instead to being dead. and there one finds ''death.

taking what is opposed as separate beings. summer and winter. 46 45 In this same way. like day and night. The introductory sentence discussed above is to be included here. youth and old agebut instead. and this is the listen.Document Page 221 Conversely. just as this happens in Fragment B1 with "always": [ ] . as well as some others. Indeed. This is the paradox: he wants "to open up the to which it is proper to confrontation (auseinandersetzen)" of this being-one. the necessary dissolution of one thing into another. or like Fragment . why entirely separated form its object should Heraclitus have followed the ambiguous gravitation of words only in his introductory sentence and not also have taken advantage elsewhere of their duplicitous reference? Even here the would be heard doubled. appears to me to be conclusive. the fragment that I reconstructed. it is in fact established through the . . dream and sleep stand for the confusion that lies in the inability to discern one and the same essence in everything different that we encounter. When the multiplicity is announced in itthe "words and deeds" as they are encountered by allone must keep in view precisely the one that alone is the true. He not only means what everyone knowsthe sequence of things. instead of recognizing the true unity. In Fragment B21. It is from this style that I discern placing the and the in opposition. Fragment B20 reveals basic determinations of this kind with and . above and beyond this. like the mixed drink that would separate if one did not stir it (Fragment B125). Also. However. The sentence shows all humans to be in error in the same way. Heraclitus does not weary of teaching in countless variations the inseparability of opposites that signifies unity. it is clear that the may not be contrasting . In this last case I wonder whether the bond that is formed through the basic determinations in such a long sentence would not be more effective if one were to take things further by with . The tension of these Ionic muses consists expressly in the fact that it is the same that holds itself together in its separation from itself (Fragment B51). he means that kind of being-in-each-other that Plato [62] emphasizes in the passage in The Sophist from which we took our point of departure. one feels assured that one has the correct wording when a sentence reveals unmistakable basic terms as is the case in Fragment B21 in the correspondence between and ("death" and "sleep").

of which he speaks in The Physics (187a14). he doctrine as a case of passes Heraclitus over. it becomes completely clear how this is to be understood: the high and low note must both be there if there is to be harmony. In any event. This becomes apparent in a passage in The Physics (A4. one could gather the examples together without the simultaneity that belongs to the speculative unity of temporal succession. since the Platonic appears in the series. In all these cases. the barley drink. 989a13). this could not be unified with the Heraclitean text. harmony as such. passage in The Sophist (242b) one might have expected it. a unity based on mere temporal succession or on the mere suddenness of transition is no longer the issue.Document Page 222 B10 with its ("to be in accordto be out of accord").) that mentions. if what one has in mind is the suddenness of transition. Likewise. Apparently. and as it well could be behind the deepened doctrine of opposites that the goddess reveals to Parmenides. Heraclitus is not named when Aristotle substitutes what is between fire and air. or Fragment B8 with its ("striving againstassisting"). A whole series of unmistakably Heraclitean fragments supports this: the image of the river. Instead of classifying Heraclitus's fire and fitting this into the principle of his doctrine of elements here. the harmony in the relation between bow and lyre. 187a20 ff. with what is between air and water. and yet it also clearly intends the at-once. only Empedocles and Anaxagorasand precisely through the similar differentiation between "periodically" and "once only"as among those who take up the one and the many at the same is discussed with Heraclitus being mentioned. if one takes seriously the Platonic contrast between the Heraclitean Ionic muses and the Sicilian muses of Empedocles. in The Metaphysics (A8. And it is the same with the consonance and dissonance that is secured through the 49 . Aristotle in fact nowhere has a speculative understanding of the contradictory assertions of Heraclitus. one can understand the only as the logical inseparability of the whole and parts. In Aristotle. although given the reliance on the time. 48 47 One must in any case judge things this way. [63] How do the stronger conceptual assertions look now? Fragment B10 does indeed lead toward a prior separation. Here. in his eyes. The separation into opposites therefore is not the result of a process of as Aristotle maintains that it is in Anaximander (DK 12 A16). Likewise. with the exception of Anaximander.

therefore. To be sure. In contrast. the one must be understood in the Platonic sense. In the case of day and night. where Hippolytus expressly introduces oppositions. And yet. as in Fragment B67. I think. firmly grounds the "out of all one" in the sense 50 If one examines the announcement of the string of citations in Hippolytus. This demonstrates that it was there already beforehand. my analysis of the father-son paradox cited above has strengthened the expressive power of the string of citations. Heraclitus wants at bottom to assert the same for all that is. And this is the reason he names the one "distinct from all. That holds for the continuation of Fragment B67. the reading of which is uncertain enough. where the different aspects of the god or of fire come to be through the admixture of different incense. nevertheless. what is changes its aspect utterly and the opposite emerges. The separation into opposites. every change in Heraclitus's eyes implies an at-once. All the same. on the succession that is nevertheless described as sudden transformation ( ). testifies generally to the unitary essence of things and their true being. on the whole. Fragment B51. without doubt lays the emphasis on change. it becomes possible to question whether in some cases they illustrate genuine speculative unity." The opposites that are explicitly named are clearly given under the particular perspective that they seem to exclude each other completely. however. this is confirmed by the polemic with Hesiod in Fragment B57. the opposition between lack and satiety appears to offer especially clear . 54 53 52 51 This seems to me to hold for the cosmology of Fragment B31. death ( ) and its opposition to life is confirmed by Fragment B76. Regardless. which we will take up shortly. they allow themselves to be recognized as one and the same. other assertions seem to express only change as such and not the speculative unity inherent in change. which refers back to Fragment B62. one must come to the insight that the other is always already there. This. They do not exist without each other. Fragment B88. Among the oppositions of which Fragment B67 speaks. Nonetheless "the god" here also stands for the one. In this way. ). All at once. Likewise. whether it is the case that they follow each other necessarily or whether they directly [64] harmonize and form the unity of a melodic joining. The best indication of this is precisely that the opposite breaks forth suddenly and immediately.Document Page 223 analogy of harmony ( in which Plato speaks of it. Thus. the being one of the different.

Independently of all cosmological applications and interpretations. admittedly among the oppositions. One actually is young. In this way. and this does not only mean that one feels rejuvenated. Whoever falls or sinks into sleep appears to be completely other and is yet the same as the one seen in wakefulness. Waking and sleep. the oppositional pairs are to be understood simply according to the model of waking and sleep (Fragment B88). both are in it. One can suddenly be young. insofar as "old" and ''young" are things that are very relative. It is without doubt significant that this opposition does not occur here in Heraclitus as something special. one can suddenly appear old. The greatest difficulty in the evidence that supports our interpretation is presented by the opposition between life and death. The opposition between war and peace is just as illuminating. The outbreak of war is a full transformation of all things. This extraordinary place of death still makes its presence known.Document Page 224 evidence. we also confront the dialectical play of "young and old" in the series of relations. we also confront in Fragment B88 the "lively and dead" and moreover "young and old. In Plato's Parmenides (141a f. that it is the same thing that is at once one and another. The one is the total non-being of the other. Only the aspect of the being changes. What is so astounding about the opposition between being awake and asleep is just the suddenness with which the entire condition becomes another. but rather in a long series of similar oppositional pairs. moreover.. Now. In this way." What is reciprocal change to mean here? "Young and old" can perhaps be explained to a certain extent as the exchange of perspectives. Even if death in its complete irrevocability and incomprehensible terror is no longer understood in light of the redeeming act of the sacrificial suffering of the crucifixion through Jesus and as a whole the Christian message is no longer faithfully accepted. the Platonic formula would prove to quite right.). it still is not so easy . we all know this experience. too. 152a f. This is a reminder that the role of death and the corresponding understanding of it within the horizon of Christian culture to which we belong [65] is a completely unusual and extraordinary one. The allure of food presupposes hunger and appetite and disappears with surprising suddenness when one is sated. Likewise. even today when the religious background of the modern world has paled considerably and the Easter faith in the overcoming of death through resurrection occupies the general consciousness of culture less and less. belong in this group.

as depicted by the Homeric epic. Even the representation of Hades remains an answer to the incomprehensible riddle of death. of course. Our own preconceptions are so deeply entrenched that they obstruct our understanding of other cultures and historical worlds. or in other forms of belief in the soul or in immortality. This certainly holds also for native Greek religion. native Greek religion. At bottom all religions are answers to the riddle of death. . we have to remain conscious of our own preconceptions. And even today we are moved still by the breathtaking sorrow of Greek burial paintings. in his Phaedo. the drama of the gods that Aeschylus brought to the stage with his novel interpretation of the myth of Prometheus shows that death is a kind of question of life for humanity. whether this answer if found in the cult of death or in the cult of foreknowledge. In the case of Heraclitus.Document Page 225 to be sufficiently conscious of the particular role death plays in our European culture and its vital history. obtrudes directly upon our own preconceptions and to this extent leads us astray. even the reunification with them. with its representation of Hades and the isle of the blessed has in mind the lasting presence of the departed [66] and. for example in the representation of Hades and the river of forgetting which cuts the living off from the dead. And similarly. On the other hand. Plato himself. tell precisely how the overcoming of death comes to failure. To be sure. Once only has to consider the distortion of the Vedanta carried out by the Kantian Schopenhauer. However. even when we guard ourselves against making premature identifications. one must try to become conscious of one's own preconceptions. too. where we meet up with completely foreign cultural horizons and traditions. Some myths associated with the name Orpheus and Eurydice or in a certain sense also with the figure of Büsser's Sisyphus appear to lessen the irrevocability of death. Human concern has everywhere ascribed great importance to the experience of death. Greater difficulties do arise. speaks of the child in man. One can look at this as a classic example of what I have called in the context of the problem of hermeneutics "the consciousness of the history of effect" (wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewußtsein). this is difficult enough. In order to arrive at a better understanding. since the influence of late antiquity and early Christianity upon the Heraclitean tradition. And this is true even as one looks to the testimony of Heraclitus. primarily through Hippolytus and Clement. these myths. in the Nekyia. whose anxiety before death can never be totally calmed.

"Christ is my life and death my gain." In this way. exchange from death to life ( when from out of the argumentation of The Phaedo it is to be concluded that the souls of the dead not . as the text states. just how is one to understand that this follows from the 55 . Plato gives an indication of this. The Orphean and Pythagorean belief in the transmigration of the souls and the reincarnation of the souls of the dead into new lifeless beings might make a kind of reciprocal exchange between death and life intelligible. It is difficult for the modern reader to understand that from out of the general cycle of natural life one is able to infer the balance between death and life. Nothing like this lies hidden in the belief in Hades. although the text has been handed down to us intact. This boundary has been described by Novalis in his "Hymns to the Night. The peculiarity of the Christian religion consists in the fact that it does not lessen but rather completely accepts the terror of death in its faith in the resurrection as the salvation from death through the sacrificial suffering of Jesus. between dying and rebirth as such. Even in The Phaedo. in the end. the pre-Christian world and thus the Greek world as a whole is separated from Christianity by an insurmountable boundary. The rhythm of natural life appears to be simply inappropriate to the life history of human being. In the end. To infer this is so absurd that modern philology has crossed out this additional determination as inauthentic. there is something astonishing in this for us." One also becomes aware of the foreignness of the Christian religious experience of death when one reads the first proof for the immortality of the soul that Plato in The Phaedo (70d ff. However. as is the case with other religions. something else is at issue: the sudden transformation from death to life is coordinated with the sudden change from life to death. 71e). One has to understand the Greek cult of death on the whole as a kind of holding fast to life. Although this may have been promised to the initiates of such a cult. 72e) but rather.Document Page 226 However.) puts into the mouth of Socrates. this depends exclusively upon the question of whether the one who is newly incarnated in this way gains remembrance of his prior life. However. in such religious movements in late Greece no less than in Homer there was no actual corresponding counterpart to the overcoming of death in the sense that is posited by Christian faith in the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. [67] that the good who have died will only continue to exist ( have a better existence than the bad (72e). when Cebes only hesitantly concedes the . in Heraclitus.

too. recalling an important little scene in the Platonic Phaedo is helpful. there is not. in particular in the conversation between Socrates and the two Pythagoreans. the issue can have nothing to do with the transmigration of the soul.. a determinate being. The thought of Heraclitus is therefore much more radical. the early oppositional thinking of the Ionics and the Pythagoreans was not conceptually aware of this at all.).Document Page 227 rhythm of natural life? Here it is easier to grasp that The Phaedo continues with a further proof by means of which the periodicy of natural processes is fitted into the well-known Socratic argument of . However. 70d ff. this is later named . that this something sense than when one says of some such thing. whereas in Plato the realm of the Greek soul common to both natural life and thinking being becomes recognizable. This truly presupposes the pure thought. that maintains itself as inalterable even in its transformed modes of appearance and in its changed residence in the body or in Hades. a soul. Socrates takes this opportunity also to make clear to his friend Cebes that. here. At this point. of its being an idea. opposition as such. 26d) he explicitly introduces the third kind. On the contrary. when in The Philebus (23d. . At 103a ff. The unknown person recalls that the transition from one to another. In Heraclitus. It means that the opposites are distinguished from that in which they appear. In Aristotle. an anonymous person interrupts the Socratic argumentation which has introduced the exclusion of the opposition between life and death to prove the immortality of the soulan obvious clue receiving thereby extraordinary emphasis. What is decisive is to make clear that this has nothing to do with Heraclitus. the entire mediated horizon of the transmigration of the soul continues to echo. was asserted at an earlier point in the dialogue (namely. one might consider here how in Plato. a moves from an opposite toward another. For him. Plato illustrates this later as the inadequacy of the earlier thinkers. that of the measured (in addition to that of the measure). In any case. of opposites into each other. for example the soul. as it appears to be in Plato. when one thinks the opposites as such and has them in view in terms of their oppositional exclusion. Heraclitus with his bold oppositional pairs aims entirely at the paradox of sudden change. the thought of opposites has here another . The soul in the first argument is indeed something completely different from the soul that recalls itself. one wonders how this proof is to supplement the first.

the one wise. I am thus coming to the conclusion that here one ought not make reference to certain modes of representation. nor even the representations relayed through Homer and Hesiod or the hero-cult or the mystery-religion correspond to the true intention of Heraclitus. as the true. It is the suddenness with which the aspect of things is altered. Plato is able to take up Heraclitus. The thought is much more radical. the true divine. in the one. and in the one he finds opposition. in fire the flame. the true ( ). This is most evident in the opposition between life and death. Neither the Aristotelian analysis of the movedness (Bewegtheit) of nature. However. Thus. Correspondingly. Not a determinate being. the issue is the paradox of sudden change and thereby the unity of being. the soul is to be found in everything that lives. in of the soul. 56 . go over into each other and are one. one ought to attempt once again to follow the program of the Proem and to discern in familiar experiences the unrecognized truth. One has to interpret the entire teaching with regard to this point. the wise alone." that could mean that their being first emerges through our death. as the unchangeable behind the altering aspect. which makes itself manifest in the sudden exchange between death and life. What is at issue in the thesis of identity is something else. What is life and what is death? What is the genesis of life and the dissolution of life? That is the riddle upon which Heraclitus meditates. which means that the immortals do not emerge for us as what they are as long as the security and certainty of life holds us back. If in Fragment B62 the issue is that the gods "live our death. Death itself is like an abrupt change in the appearance of being. For him. Plato will portray the great Parmenides the leading the flustered young Socrates into the bold games that the one is in all things and that also the ideas. Their being articulates itself as what it is with respect to our finality (and certainly not because they stand by as spectators as Fink suggests ). It is the mystery of the nature of being itself. Every attenuation of opposition between death and life stands in contradiction to the overall tenor of the teaching of opposition. He seeks in all oppositions the one. once again the truth would be that through their exchange both aspects prove their nullity and confirm the one. the oppositonal ideas themselves. one could understand that in living we die their death. In this way.Document Page 228 [68] Recalling Plato can help us to surmise Heraclitus's proper question.

They do not deserve credibility. Since there can be surprise. Similarly. for humans it is repulsive and deadly" (Fragment B61). Fragment B24). "change rests" or "always to be challenged and pressured by the same is tiresome" should be detached from all dissatisfactory mythical applications of the kind proposed by Plotinus. Fragments B24. "when one does not hope. Only those who hope can meet up with the unhoped for. One example of something known to all is the . the meaning of which is indisputable.Document Page 229 In this way. for example: "The ass prefers chaff to gold" (Fragment B9). He is elevating of the one who has fallen in war. B25. one also will not find what is unhoped for. or a mystery-wisdom which would be closed off to those who are uninitiated but which Heraclitus would have in common with all the initiated. These all are negative counterparts to the identity of the different. behaves like an ape" (Fragment B83). the meaning is precisely that humans after their death are present otherwise. compared to the god. the identity of numerous assertions concerning the changing aspect of things comes to light. as exemplary and as transfigured. and B27 can also be interpreted in a similar fashion. "in the field of honor" ( like one suddenly transformed. there can be fulfillment. known to all. He himself says explicitly: . elevated. This would have been for him at most an example of the suddenness of such a change that is taken from the cult. Fragment B18 seems to express the same experience from out of the human world." It is because of hope that what enters presents itself as completely otherwise than one was able to anticipate. Or: "The most beautiful ape is ugly compared to the race of humans" (Fragment B82). [69] Thus. Even statements such as Fragments B84a and B84b. They hardly indicate any sort of particular Heraclitean teaching concerning the dead and their future fate. yet which none discern in its true significance. what is being dealt with here is also something lying there in the open. This is Heraclitus's insight and has nothing to do with any partaking of the cult of the hero. precisely because it was unforeseeable and appeared out of reach. 59 58 57 . All honor him. Rather. and in their difference they allow the identical to be discerned. in a way that would have been thought impossible during the time of life. Or: "Seawater is for fish drinkable and necessary for their life. a secret intimation of unforeseen experiences in the beyond cannot be the meaning of Fragment B27. Or: ''The wisest of humans. and all see him otherwise. Rather.

the father of all things. do not aim at the transformation of the dead. The immortals are also in this way a particularization and do not exist without mortals (Fragment B62).Document Page 230 That such an interpretation gets at the meaning of the Heraclitean sentences is at the very least confirmed also by Fragment B53. so does the power of the gods emerge in the failure of humans." This is supposed to say that their nobility consists in that in their life they actually follow what according to Heraclitus is the one true (das Eine Wahre)." Impotence and power of the human emerge from this. and "Eris. Thus. in Heraclitus it can be said that: "Dike. and their barrenness in their own affluence. It looks rather as if Heraclitus in bold enlightenment thought. are one (I prefer to read community of right and community of strife encompass all things. Fragment B80 states that war is in fact common to all. "it proves some to be gods. anticipating Plato. Fragment B29 seems to me also to confirm this: "The noble choose the one instead of all others. and however much the resonance of conventional religious representations may nonetheless play a role herethe attempt fails which until now has met with general acceptance. B25. As war makes manifest the power and impotence of humans. others humans. the one in the multiplicity of appearances. the true god. However much these interpretations may remain individually questionable. to make Heraclitus into a logical interpreter 62 61 60 . that is." strife. War. like Fragments B24. does not only lie at the basis of the most extreme oppositions but it itself unleashes the alteration of aspect." what is ). It is possibly all the more paradoxical that the immortality acquired by those who have fallen comes to them through death! At this point. This again means that what is already implicit in each thing does make itself apparent. It is behind the different in which things seem to show common to all discord. from which one can withdraw and which befalls all in the same measure. the genuine themselves. From one side it emerges [70] that they are cowardly slaves. from the others that they are truly free. and perhaps even B27. What is common to all is in truth one and the same. By immortals Heraclitus evidently does not mean the god of Fragment B67. The apportioned the same to all. The continuation that is indeed produced correctly by Diels goes along with this. Thus. I would like to pose the general question of whether all the sentences concerning fame and immortality. There what is addressed is war. places the traditional world of the gods in a reciprocal relationship with the world of human experience.

This new science too. For it is not special knowledge which is The meteorological process is as thematized but rather the new way of seeing the world. that Heraclitus may not at all be seen as one who continues the Ionian cosmogony and leads this cosmogony into cosmology. and one has to ask whether such processes of the becoming of the world cannot continually and everywhere begin anew. This does not at all mean abandoning our basic principle. we must now ask ourselves how Heraclitus criticizes in its entirety the new enlightenment which was being promoted by the Milesians. to think plain as day to all observation. He is not claiming to introduce new knowledge from all over but rather to bring to light the truth that is concealed in all that is evident and otherwise familiar. In this regard. as a consequence. but also by the Pythagoreans and men like Xenophon. and so it was thought at bottom in a manner intelligible for every thinking consciousness. [71] It fails because Heraclitus demands the thinking of the one and expects thereby wisdom not from the initiated but from all humans. however. Indeed. how is all of this to be reconciled with the cosmology of fire? With regard to this question one not only has to keep in view Heraclitus's style and Plato's characterization of Heraclitus but one must also take into account the polemical references made to the Milesian teaching. However. therefore. The later theory of corpuscles and then finally the atomists thought in this way. This follows from the introductory . must be subordinated to a certain kind of enlightenment. his intention does not seem to be to enter into competition with the great researchers and discoverers of Miletus. And yet it looks here as though the matter takes a peculiar turn. I mean. and how he thereby inserts his own insights. like the question concerning the beginning.Document Page 231 of the wisdom of the mysteries on account of his mystical tone. When Heraclitus appeals to the cosmogonical knowledge of his Ionic neighbors. One has to ask oneself to what extent the demythologizing of the mythical world picture and the reception of the cosmogonical schema make such questions unavoidable. If we have thus far followed the general guidance of the Proem and not assumed anything that everyday human experience is not supposed to teach and in truth does not teach. the claim to paradoxical enlightenment which the Proem puts forward has been constantly related to the comportment of humans as a whole. he frequently makes overly naive observations or applications that can mean only that the reference to cosmological matters is for him of secondary importance.

cannot be encouraging. However. something else sounds first part more like a positive reference to the Ionic teaching of immediately Heraclitean. it reminds one of the admonishing assertion concerning the unreason of human beings. which inspired Heraclitus's vision of the world. If we now turn to the continued text of Clement. fire. already for this reason we shall not get far with the interpretation of the fire-cosmology as a "cosmology. As if the Ionians with their cosmogony would have taught anything other than precisely thisthat no god and no human has established the order of the world. And yet it is just as little to be doubted that Heraclitus presupposes in any case the measuredness of all events and only wants to interpret this same measuredness anew. I do not think that one can see here a reference back to Ionic cosmogony as has been newly attempted. who. like dreamers. the measure or continually brings forth the measure anew. This seems to me to be the meaning of the riddle that is offered in Fragment B30. is imposed upon what is eternally living. This measure is portrayed here as the self-igniting and extinguishing of firea strange contrast between measured order and what is explosively abrupt. connects immedi63 . To this extent the issue is not to resolve the presumed cosmology in terms of mere symbolism. and that is the emphasis that this order is the same for all (or by all). What otherwise holds from out of itself the great balance of the world vision of Anaximander. Fragment B31. that is. What is at issue is to discover in Heraclitus a new answer to the experience of the being of the whole. There is Fragment B30 which appears to be unproblematically united with the entire early tradition of cosmological thought. or even with the [72] teaching of the elements introduced by Empedocles and elaborated by Plato and Aristotle. the always restless fire. Heraclitus's sentence sounds in its . Fragment B89). Thus. it is apparent that ignition and extinguishing symbolize precisely what is sudden. each forms his own world (cf. what holds. What is essential in this sentence is evidently that the expectation for a unchanging order of the world is to be attributed precisely to the most turbulent of all the elements. If this part of the text is genuine." The tortured attempts of the later doxographers to reconcile the Heraclitean sentences handed down to us with the cosmological schema. What is at issue is a few cosmological sentences whose form is utterly paradoxical. In this way. one can hardly doubt that the subsequent sentence.Document Page 232 sentence that plays with the paradox of a truth that is visible to all yet everywhere mistaken.

fire presents the universal structure of all being. However. The earthly sea approaches the heavenly fire as its extreme counterpart. Fire.")." This is stated as fire is compared with gold. "undergoes change. Fragment B30) evidently belongs together with inflaming and The "always alive" ( extinguishing. Hence. i. . as the suggests. air. This has to form the guiding thread of the interpretation.. when it is mingled with incense" (Fragment B67). and it nonetheless is oneas is all life. This is precisely its liveliness. he appears to me to be right that here the most extreme opposite to fire. And similar to Fragment B88: all things change like fire. The emphasis is continually placed upon the one. the phrase bears the same unmistakable tone of the paradox which the first sentence made evident as paradox. Fire. Certainly.e. light. it already becomes clear that fire is not a visible element but rather. in which all oppositions pay penalties and compensation for their prevailing. and warmth at a distance (which perhaps already approach and play into the difference between the sensible and the spiritual) from the above sentence. is missing. The changeable is itself the one. inflames according to measure and is extinguished according to measureas is the case also for the life rhythm of waking and sleep. what is continually changing over and against all constancy. too. on the contrary. Then. precisely that which was essential to the Ionic cosmic wisdom and provided its intuitive ground (in Thales and Anaximenes). In this way. the sea. that is the true and the wise. the connection with the preceding sentence remains Greek expression decisive. too. or relatively and the sudden change of the aspects. the turning points of the course taken by the sun could also fit in here. is named as its other. the continuation must be understood from that point: What happens in igniting and extinguishing? Kahn remarks correctly that in what follows the atmosphere. striking out like a flame and collapsing in being extinguished. whether these are now the opposites and their transformation into each other. Even if one keeps all later distinctions between fire. however. Likewise.Document Page 233 ately to our sentence ("fire's transformations . It thus has nothing to do with the fully harmonious Ionic [73] event of equalization. Fragment B90 explains this best: "All is exchangeable with fire and fire with all. . insofar as all changethe seasonal shifting of the sun alsoand all reversal have something sudden about them. All things are the eruption of restless fire. behind all the presumed differences. that is. 66 65 64 . .

The continuation handed down to us fits in with this unproblematically.Document Page 234 I believe the cosmological testimony concerning the transformations. The difference between day and night. Only when one decides to interpret the fragment in this manner. too. [74] that fire lies at the bottom of all that undergoes transformationlike the sun. the evaporation. There are bright and dark clouds over land and sea. When a brooding heat lies on the land. And in the further process. When Clement wants to interpret this reconstruction as must establish that nothing in the text speaks of this. From out of the bright clouds. Perhaps. it is only stated that fire provides the ground. if we here believe in a lacuna in the text because Clement says: . the initiation of the transformations with the sea ( ) appears to me to be understandable only if one does not see in it a first transformation of fire into water but rather simply an assertion about the beginning as it was made by Ionic cosmology. it is not being said that the sea becomes half earth and half hot wind but rather that with the drying out of the land ("half-way. is supposed to be explainable through this process. does it first become possible to understand the continuation. fire itself precisely does not appear as a phase. . Is one to suppose that Clement actually found in the text that. in the end. if a hot wind is whipping up. Here." The issue is not whether fire is. all things again become fire? However. doxography tells us fantastic things. That is an experience with which all of us are familiar. what is meant here is not "turning points" but actually "transformations. Clearly. or that half of fire becomes wind. is explained most easily in this way. one as it was in the beginning. even the solar eclipse. The clarification Clement makes by appending is to this extent not really so false. This is all downright opaque. Evidently. The text says only that in the end the sea once again floods over all things." so to speak) the hot wind begins. that in the end the sea once again swallows up all things. it stays cooler by the sea. the source of Diogenes did not find here clear rep67 . Thus. basins of fire of the stars fill themselves. but rather the reverse. he no longer cited this due to an oversight? We trust the words of the church fathers too readily. The only thing in the text of Heraclitus handed down to us that could point in this direction would be the . not that fire changes into earth and so comes out half earth. then. The interpolations made by Clement take this to be the and god! Thus. I think. after this. the .

It is certainly a difficult question as to how the cosmic aspect of the doctrine of fire even if it is understood metaphoricallyis connected to the Heraclitean assertions concerning the soul. moreover. It is also to be remarked that the basic testimony of the doctrine of the which is flux is cited only by Eusebius because of the reference to the (Fragment B12)." Clement was evidently not able to appeal to anything in the text for his interpretationotherwise he would have done so. If we now consider how during this period is almost a catchword for the liquid. [75] The intuition that lies at the bottom of the entire text is most easily described through Simplicius's (the active) a kind of general answer of the Aristotelian physics to the concept of the Ionians. In any case. Therefore. This is expressed in the text handed down to us with provocative emphasis. the unresting ( . Both the emergence of fire and the extinguishing of fire are. It is encountered both in the never-resting fire and in the never-resting primordial sea. From this. is quite understandable." from here. The stoic interpretation that brings together the doctrine of the flux with that of the soul. Not the transformations of water (Thales) or air (Anaximenes) but rather the transformations of fire is what is described here. appears to me to be an excessively unreliable source. That the emergence of land seems like "death. Thus. Where 68 . the flowing. it seems to me that Heraclitus with his doctrine of fire asked questions that went beneath the Ionic cosmogony. Over and against the never-resting life of the ocean. there is still one last step to take.Document Page 235 resentations. here I would also prefer to start with those texts in which direct observations are expressed that allow Heraclitus's doctrine of fire of its own accord to be connected unambiguously with the "psychical. the fluid. "ontologically" considered. It appears rather that for these tiresome constructions the only actual basis was the . Clement says)." One result. equally riddlesome. on the basis of its own doctrine of the pneuma. This issue is rather the genuine riddle of thought that fire implies. the entire teaching of the flux is thereby connected without coercion. that has nothing to do with the supposed world conflagration. that is. of how something comes to be from out of something else. The first thing that can be indicated about it is eternal movedness. the secure land is something dead. the " . of our skepticism against the cosmological schema of doxography was that fire for Heraclitus should not so much explain and describe the experience of the world.

He speaks of the which is greater in death than it is in sleep. The tradition from Clement gives nonetheless a sharp clue. admittedly. with which he contrasts the "taut Ionic muses" with the "Sicilian. Heraclitus recognized this as the one in all oppositionsthe unity of the tension [76] in what is opposed. To place fire as one much seek here an explanation as he discerns the whole mystery of the element next to the "other" elements is an utterly absurd paradox. Not how the one transitions into another but rather that it is also the other without transitionthis is the "one wisdom" of Heraclitus." Is ("when he sleeps") supposed to have been attached by Heraclitus as a solution for those who are poor at solving riddles? The style of the polarities would be perfect without this attachment and the 70 . speak here of a play on words. It is the liveliness itself that makes itself manifest as never resting self-movement. Plato's unambiguous assertion confirms this. when the eyes are extinguished. then one understands easily: "living he touches the dead. If one takes this as one's starting-point." If one holds the igniting candle just a little off to the side. 69 The spatial expression for such transitionless otherness is touching together ( )the key word in the profound Fragment B26: "The human kindles a light in the night." This describes at the same time the structural law of those sentences that we would like to attribute to Heraclitus on the basis of their family resemblance.'' The question is." The sentence poses a number of riddles. "to kindle" and "to touch. is not used transitively. even if in general the middle voice. as is also the case with the (Fragment B88). Awake he touches the sleeping. The genuine riddle of being is not how the same order of the whole maintains itself in the exchange of what transpires but that this being in change itself takes place. it does not light. in Plato's Parmenides (156d) Without transition. suddenly like lightning. Anyone who has ever lit candles on a Christmas tree knows that there prevails a close semantic relationship between the two meanings of . awake he touches the sleeping. the riddlesome has a meaning that does not find a proper place in the Eleatic antitheses.Document Page 236 does it come form and where does it go? The extinguishing may indeed visibly die awayin embers and ashesbut where does it come from? What is this sudden enflaming? I think that Heraclitus does not so . Alive he touches the dead. to what extent these two meanings play into each otherso much so that one cannot even . "To ignite" means "to touch.

.Document Page 237 solutiontaking its departure from the last wordwould be easy enough. In general. either conscious or not. is this all that is meant. but also not even worthy of Heraclitus." although this is a final change. from Christian faith. to use a concept that one does not yet find in Platoeven though in everyday Greek language it is completely ordinary. This also holds for the beginning of the "sleep of death. Accordingly. he has in view the resurrection out of the promise of Christianity. )? Certainly. so that the clause either to be understood with a stoic meaning or as having been forced into a Christian context by . what does the first clause of the fragment want to say ( human "mastery" over fire and the ability to produce light is one of the most ancient experiences of humanity. so that all is fire. in something that everyone at all times wise ( can observe without thinking anything of it ( ). in a way that is riddlesome. a correspondence of nature's extinguishing and igniting with sleep and awakening. he must have modified somewhat the authentic is sentence of Heraclitus that he cites. and we do say of one who is fast asleep that he sleeps "like the dead. one understands. It is also certain that igniting or setting something on fire remains something close to a miracle. The phenomena that Heraclitus is considering are ''total" opposites of this kind that show themselves to be one precisely through the suddenness of the change [77] from one into the other." that is. There is no transition between sleep and being awake. evidently. Waking and sleep. He comprehends the one ) of death and life in being awake and in sleep. . like one who is dead. the very one who is "alive. One also understands the lighting of the candles or the oil lamp to confirm the sameness of what is burning and what can burn. However. death and life and the "art" of the use of fire? Clement cites the whole thing for the sake of the awakening and the waking. life and death touch each other immediately. The one who is awake and the one who sleeps is one and the same. not there. the epigrammatically shortened text not only does not seem to me to sound Heraclitean. as for example when speaking of the weather (as is "Umschlag" in German). he is present otherwise. Waking is a . Either one is "here" or not "here. This is recorded in the myth of Prometheus. the Yet." There is something mysterious in the suddenness of the change. To this end. This allows the Christian author Clement with the insertion of the ." When he sleeps. . when the one who falls asleep is "gone" all at once.

but instead seethis is what we all do when "the human" awakens! What is actually peculiar to "the human" is not dreaming but the upsurge of this inner light that we call thinking or consciousness. The extinguished eyesif this actually occurs in the sentence of Heraclitusnecessarily give the night a metaphorical meaning. Heraclitus does often oppose the world of dreams and madness to the common world of the [78] day and of reason." . if it is the case that the addition must actually be maintainedand it points nonetheless to the "igniting" by means of its semantic contrast with "to become extinguished"it must make a particular point. as . As if we have mastered our dream life in many interpreters do with regard to the the same way that we have mastered the fire that we light! And then the emphatic "himself" would be unintelligible! To be sure." This does not fit the situation of one sleeping. at this point we receive unanticipated support for thinking together what ignites self-movement and the "soul. If one assumes that here what is meant is not the light of the dream but rather the brightness that we call "consciousness" (and this is indeed actual like abrupt awakening from out of sleep. waking and sleep. thanks to the light that we kindle.Document Page 238 to recognize in (one who is "well disposed") not only a kind of semantic testimony to the ("deliberation. how did Heraclitus himself connect the sequel. It also seems to me to be misguided to relate this general assertion about ''the human" to dream life. even if Pythagoras and the as the way of salvation out of the cycle of births may have already been playing a way of role there. the analogy between life and death. Whether the phrase is now actually Heraclitean or added as an aid to a solution by a good puzzler of the Heraclitean riddleit makes the point. 72 71 Thus." Besinnung) but also directly a kind of semantic testimony to possession of the faith in the resurrection. then the Heraclitean first gains its full expressive power: oneself. However. The night in which we do not dream. a coming "to !). The Socratic-Platonic resonances are unmistakable. the string of assertions made here by Heraclitus about the "soul" force us to see in more than the living thing that departs with the last draw of breath. Yet." Whatever in early Greek thought might have been. to the first clause? That "the human being" itself kindles a light in the night already points to a very particular use of fire: "the production of light.

When it is encountered. Consider Fragment B46: . [79] However. The self emerges from this as the preferred object of mad self-certainty. some of these exhortations barely seem to match the morphological criteria for genuine Heraclitean style which I take as my starting point. it is acknowledged that one must dislodge the from the context of a theory of knowledge in which it seems to appear here. acquired in In this way. On the contrary. lies in every human. One assertion about has to give back to the word the original moral sense that has nothing to do with Plato's . water and death are so peculiarly entangled. at the same time." Today. One could call it an illness. And yet these assertions. Does Heraclitus then actually want to make Thus. Fragment 643). Phaedrus. blind optimism. is this not perhaps due more often to the trivializing citations? I offer an example in which the deterioration through such trivializing is carried out in two steps.Document Page 239 the that flames up when one comes "to oneself" (with some sleepers this takes awhile!) is not isolation but the way towards taking part in the common day and the common world." and mad selfin Homer of certainty. in which fire and soul. "he called belief epileptic collapse (Fallsucht) and seeing he called deception. Admittedly. To rob or otherwise harm one who has collapsed would be nothing less than a sacred violation. 244c) is not original (cf. the whole of the Heraclitean teaching is connected to the profundity of these analogies and proportions. Euripides. when he compares it to "technical" expression for epilepsy. I think that Heraclitus wants to say something important here. blind selfindulgence. ? More precisely. The moment of piety and forbearance also pertains to the opinion that all humans have of themselves. if one considers the by now heartless fun of epilepsy. Through 73 . is to be understood as self-veneration. It is and in and is also lacking in madness. A moment of madness. the sacred illness. There is no need in my opinion to prove that the epistemological use of the word in Plato (Phaedo. the ''sacred illness" of epileptic collapse has much more the sense that pious devotion and forbearance for the afflicted is called for. one should not place too much weight upon the "collapse" as such. break through these entanglements and thereby take on a provocative character and exhort to insight. 92a. the pragmatic meaning (to foresee) suggests an understanding of as "madness.


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self-critique and reason, with the aid of the reason common to all to go beyond such illness, one can be led to a proper and healthy sense of self-esteem. Nonetheless, this "illness"to the extent that it is onerequires a certain forbearance or indulgence. No one can go on without regard for oneself (even a modest one). Joseph Conrad in Lord Jim has described the life tragedy of a young man who suffers with guilt the complete loss of this regard for oneself. The paradoxical sentence is certainly not meant as a call to have forbearance before illusions about oneself. However, Heraclitus sees the power of illusions which everyone [80] has with regard to oneselfjust as he correctly sees that human fate is not decided through the divine guidance of a " " but in the way one leads one's life ("ethos"); this is also said in Fragment B119; . Should not both the disaster of madness and the injunction of forbearance have been emphasized in Heraclitus? They could be emphasized here: . . . (Fragment B43 and attached to Fragment B46). Perhaps, it is so. Like so much else this would certainly be in accord with the profound vision of Heraclitus, the sage of the soul. His style of thought is unmistakably more akin to the fullness and sharpness of the gnomic aphoristic wisdom that to Ionic science. The critical confrontation with the latter, which comes to expression in the doctrine of fire, gives rise to amazing assertions about the " " and its " ." That the of the soul "increases itself" has to be seen, in my opinion, together with all the assertions that distinguish the one hidden unity behind opposites as the "one wise." One may not presuppose here, in a manner that is post-Cartesian, the ''substantial" division between the outer and the inner. One must take note of the simplest observation, that is "life" and that the living, in contrast to everything, is a whole that increases therefore because something is added to it; it augments, develops, moves, and in the end seeks "itself." This "itself" that in all "change" hides one and the same thing places Heraclitus in opposition to the Miletian thought of opposites. The self-igniting of the fire, the self-moving of the living, the coming to itself of the waking and the self-thinking of thought are manifestations of the one that always is. The mysterious "itself" is what holds for the entire profundity of Heraclitus. In an inimitable fashion, he holds the singular middle voice that has been lost in the reflexivity of self-consciousness in the thought of modernity: It is ignit74


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ing"for itself." Or is it becoming inflamed "by itself" like the wood in the fireplace? To not know this is not to know what is "alone wise." From here, one can understand how the Platonic question concerning the one and the many can find itself in the "taut" muses of Ionia. Heraclitus's vision encompassesas it seemslife, consciousness and being. It was precisely this task of thinking together what is thus separated that Plato saw placed before him. The Phaedo vividly tells this story that begins with the natural principle of the "soul" that life cannot be without the cycle of circular movement. Nature therefore continually renews life in rhythmic return such that there is no death for it. However, that is only one aspect of life and soul. There [81] is also the life for whom death is something, because the human is something other than simply a link in the chain of the life that roles on rhythimically. Life has memory, such that it becomes more in "experience"; it increases "itself" in traversing the cyclic course of life. This is the thought enacted in The Phaedo. Socrates shows his friends how the principle of life and this other principle of ''thought" " are one and in this way inseparable as becoming and being. (Anaxagoras did not and " know to unify these.) The same insight inhabits the myth in The Phaedrus of the ascent of the soul and its downfall. Hereas Plato stylizes and inspires his Socratesa true master of poetic discourse and speculative irony makes his is young friend who thoughtlessly followed rhetorical virtuosity conscious of the fact that something other than the calculus of gain and pleasure that is presented in the artful speech of Lysis. But before the flow of mythic imagination proceeds to run its overwhelming course, Socrates proposes something like a proof: "All soul is immortal"; "all this is soul concerns itself with what is without soul." Note here that suddenly the "soul" becomes the principle of self-movement! The story that is then told reports that this principle that reigns throughout all that is and through which the heavens obtain their order also has its place in the soul of the individual and indeed in the unity of "loving" and "learning." To the extent that "learning" is the remembrance of the true, " ," everyone participates in the true. This is evidently the great insight that Plato points to here, which he calls at this point (245c4). Self-movement is a true wonder. Whereas otherwise all movement occurs by virtue of something and is in movement only so long as it is moved, the living, that is, what has soul, is in movement by its own impetus and is in movement as


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long as it is alive. That is evident on its own. This evidence is strong enough to derive from it yet another proof for the immortality of the soul. The world, this great ordered structure of astral and earthly movements, cannot at all be connected with the thought of a state of rest. From this Socrates concludes: Therefore that which is the cause of such self-movement, the soul, must also always exist. It looks as though Plato fulfills here the expectation that can be fulfilled "only by a wise man," as it is that moves on its own and not stated in The Charmides (196a), namely, to show that there is a by virtue of something else. He would thereby show himself to be the Delian diver who from out of the dark depths brought something precious to light. In this way, Plato interprets the being of the human within the great bounds of cosmic events, in which " in mythical metaphors. Aristotle sought to he unifies both aspects of self-movement and " complete this unification in the development of his concepts ( , ). And Hegel, the great Aristotelian of modernity, follows him. However, is Heidegger not right when, questioning back, he discovers a Heraclitus that is behind metaphysics, yet in whom everything still plays itself out? At the same time, could he not also have found in Plato's dialectic the continuation of this play of thought? Notes 1. The numbers indicated for the Heraclitus citations in the text follow the numbering in Diels/Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (Berlin: August Raabe, 1897), cited DK. Yet this should be continually compared to I. Bywater, Heracliti Ephesii Reliquiae (Oxford: Clarendon, 1877) and Charles H. Kahn, The Art and Thought of Heraclitus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979). 2. Fragment B64: 3. The stoics called this adaptation 4. Fragment B125: 5. Plato (Cratylus, 402a): B12): 6. Theaetetus, 184a3 ff.: . 7. For example, Phaedo, 103d ff.; Philebus, 29b f. 8. He says (in Physics, 203, 24-25 Diels): [ . ] . .
77 76

. . . . And with obvious emphasis, Heraclitus (Fragment .... , ,


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. Neither the Aristotelian concept of the the "active" ( ). 9. For example, Philebus, 29c, or Timaeus, 79d. 10. DK 22A1: . . . ( ) ( ) . 11. DK 22 Al: .

nor the Empedoclean concept of the elements matches

12. Werner Jaeger has made a persuasive case that, in contrast to Parmenides, the Greek word that and but rather and . See Die Heraclitus uses for "thinking" is not Theologie der frühen griechischen Denker (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1953), 121 ff., including the attached note. See The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1947), 103. 13. Charles Kahn (The Art and Thought of Heraclitus, 21), in the meantime, does just this, as I note. I am in complete accord that this does not mean that Heraclitus would be conceivable without Ionic cosmology. It is present and remains in view, but in such a way that the critique of the is directed at it. 14. This is what is meant in Empedocles (DK 31 B62): unusual use of , it is a citation of Heraclitus! . If this is supposed to be an

15. At this point Bywater cites Aetna, v. 536: quod si quis lapidis miratur fusile robur, cogitet obscuri verissima dicta libelli, Heraclitti, tui, nihil insuperablile ab igni, omnia quo rerum naturae semina iacta. 16. Cf. Cratylus, 412d ff. and 413b ff. ( . ) the sequence:

17. Cf. my study, "Vom Anfang bei Heraklit," in Gesammelte Werke, Band 6, in Griechische Philosophie II (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1985), 236 ff. 18. Fragment B48: 19. Fragment B114: .... 20. Nicomachean Ethics, Θ1, 1155b4; Eudemian Ethics, H1, 1235a25. 21. Nicomachean Ethics, Θ1, 1155b6: . 22. Fragment B60: . . Cf. Heraclitus Fragment B80: . . . . ,


23. Cf. Bywater, Heracliti Ephesii Reliquiae, 28. Thus, Clement also understands Fragment B31 in this way. Concerning this, see my discussion below. 24. Fragment B101: 25. Fragment B45: . .


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26. Symposium, 221d-222a: Alcibiades likens Socrates to a statue of Silenus which must be opened, and in the center of which one finds images of the gods. 27. Cf. my study, "Hegel und Heraklit," in Gesammelte Werke, Band 7, Plato im Dialog (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1991), 32-42. 28. Fragment Bl: ....

29. It seems to me not to be possible, as has been maintained many times, to connect the "always" only ). Such a possibility is ruled out if one to the λóγος, in the sense of the λóγος " that is true" ( behind the unitary and monolithic λóγος. Aristotle does well to considers the position of this leave things undecided where nothing necessitates a decision. That he takes it as a problem at all seems to illustrate the transition to a primary approach to reading that is interested in punctuation as an aide in understanding. However, the truth is that the punctuation is actually less important than the persistently bivalent tone in the psalming lecture. Kahn has a similar position, except that I do not understand the as "forever true," but rather as "ever-present'' (and thereby "true")"present" yet "ignored." What Kahn has shown us in his radical study on the meanings of "being" not only applies to Heraclitus, but it also shows what cannot be detached from this: "present" and "true," said from the λóγος are one, ) remains mistaken. even if it always ( 30. Cf. Fragment B41: Fragment B32: 31. Fragment B50: 32. Cf. my study, "Sokrates' Frömmigkeit des Nichtwissens," In Plato im Dialog, 85. 33. A. Mourelatos would like to avoid the triviality in this text by understanding the as the pregnant "holding together" that is actually the wisdom of Heraclitus. (A. Mourelatos, "Heraclitus, Parmenides, and the Naive Metaphysics of Things," in Exegesis and Argument: Studies in Greek Philosophy Presented to Gregory Vlastos, eds. E. N. Lee, A. P. D. Mourelatos, and R. M. Rorty (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1973), 38, note 60. In my view, the fact that we are dealing here with the first sentence of the book speaks against this. This announcement is not yet the doctrine. As the announcement of something that attains its actual fulfillment in an entirely different way, the conventional character of these sentences, on the contrary, appear to me to be highly paradoxical. I will attempt to demonstrate this. 34. Concerning this passage, cf. my study, in Plato in Dialog, 24 ff. 35. Fragment Bl: . . . .

Document Page 245 36. : . 1005b23 ff. 39. Γ3. 258 ff. S. Kirk.. 46. 37. Θ1. where one expects and finds . 48. 99. Die Geschichte der Philosophie vor Sokrates (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. Heraclitus: The Cosmic Fragments (Cambridge: University Press. 41. see Reinhardt. Fragment B20: . .. 43. The subtlety of the parallel and lies in its variation: despite their being awake humans live in between permanent oblivion ( ). Bröcker has rightly separated here the stoic addition from the Heraclitean sentence cited by Marcus Aurelius. 45. 1012a24ff. 1235a25. Eudemian Ethics..) The sentence is emphatically symmetrical. Fragment B89: . 1155b4. 1955).. G.. 35 ff. Concerning the extinguishing of the . Kahn. Hermes (1942).. Fragment B75: .. In my opinion. . (Kahn also adopts this. Karl Reinhardt's interpretation. 38. The Art and Thought of Heraclitus. just as they forget afterwards ( ) their dreams (what they did while asleep) and leave them unattended ( ). 231 ff. The same variation is met in Fragment B21. but in my opinion he seeks it in the wrong place (The Art and Thought of Heraclitus. 213). 1954).. The Art and expects that the preceding Thought of Heraclitus. H1. . Fragment B21: .. 44. Kahn does indeed sense the asymmetry of the Heraclitean sentence. Wege und Formen (Munich: Beck. 44 ff.: Likewise G7. which he takes from Hölscher. This has been discussed above. Fragment B73: . H. One will be illustrated. 1965). Fraenkel. 40.. This is shown clearly at Metaphysics. 47. a complete span of time. I also cannot follow Bollack here because he neglects the clear evidence that it is the forgetting of dreams that is being alluded to. 42. I do not find convincing. Nicomachean Ethics. 4.

De Mundo.Aristotle.Document 49. Fragment B10 (= Pseudo . 5. 396b20 f. .): . (or ) .

This is what the ignorant ( 63.1. . Cf. He also correctly hears in this a reference to the sentence that opens the whole text. Fragment B62: . 53. winter and summer. Fragment B18: 60. 187-200. Kahn has shown quite nicely how Heraclitus goes beyond the statements on war of Homer and Archilochus (The Art and Thought of Heraclitus. 98. see the discussion above.. 158 ff.. 55.Document Page 246 50. H. Christopher Smith (New Haven: Yale University Press. 61. war and peace. . Band 6.): . . 15-16. satiation and hunger. German text was originally published in Gesammelte Werke... HS. Fragment B53: . Fragment B67 (cont..8. Fragment B31: . .. but instead the issue is the way conflict comes into play as the ) continually miss.6. Enneads. P. 57. For an interpretation. 205). 21-38. day and night. 58. "The Proofs of Immortality in Plato's Phaedo. Cf. Here. Fragment B88: . my study. Fragment B51: . ." in Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical Studies on Plato. 64. trans. common (ξυνóν).. as it is in Anaximander. 56. 54. . Fragment B67: . 51. I do not find here a reference to the sentence of Anaximander. However. Fragment B80: . Fragment B27: 59. familiar to us only by chance." 52. IV. it is not a matter of Dike appearing as violent punishment. . Fragment B30: . 1980). "The god is 62. Martin Heidegger and Eugen Fink.

221 ff. Hölscher moves in the same direction in his basic interpretation. 104. See note 8. 230. 67. then again. Euripides Fragment 270: . See also. Clement. 139 ff. Damasc. not literally enoughwhen he completely dissociates . 69. 116128. 245c5: .). Band 6. Band 7. 75. V.) word 74. cf. ed. Sacra par. 322 ff. a sense which is indispensible in the opening clause. 66. 14. of course. Testimonianze e Imitazioni (Florence: La nuova Italia. Cf. my study. Cf. is also no actual evidence. 24b6. Kahn. Also. my study.. Fragment B116: . Uvo the literal sense of "to touch" from Hölscher. 693e (cf. Phaedrus. Sstromateis.. Mondolfo/Tarán.. 68.. does not prove the usage of the δóκησις. Thus. the word is found in Fragment B131 understood in a manner that is to be expected here: ( ) moreover. "Vorgestalten der Reflexion. (And Corpus Hippocrates. 1968). Littré. in Gesammelte Werke. Anfängliches Fragen (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. elsewhere it is attested to as "old": Joh.Document Page 247 65. IX. Fragment B90: . Fragment B26: 71. Fragment B115: . 70. Eraclito. . for example. The Art and Thought of Heraclitus. in the most genuine gnomic style." in Plato im Dialog. "Der platonische Parmenides und seine Nachwirkung. as in Heraclitus Fragment B17 . This." in Gesammelte Werke. 73. 4: . 72. but in my opinion still takes the "physics of the soul" too literallyand yet. Concerning this. 76. 156-160. 1972).

To do this he also refers to Heraclitus: De Anima. . Heraclitus is also being invoked ( ). A2. However. 405a25-28: . at 405a5.Document 77.

by Origen. Scott "The Hidden Unity of Being and Appearance. our range of reference. . people's explicit appropriations of Greek thought and practice. Thomas. by many who are within our canon of knowledge and by others whose names are lost to our surveys of western philosophers. their dissents. That civilization appears originary for our ways of thinking as well as for what we think is most profound and problematic. As we think and perceive we are also the heirs of those who copied texts. in our practices and values. our limits and abilities of sensibility. Proclus. Greek thought. of the fires that burned them. live through us in lineages of active as well as tacit memory. who "corrected" and preserved them. Maimonides. of the mold and air that consumed and desiccated them. Vico. all of Greek culture. omissions. Greek civilization and its appropriations by our forbearers appear in inchoate and tacit dimensions of our . in our thinking we are the heirs of the destroyers of the texts.. and inaccuracies as well as their creative use of Greek texts directly formed our own structures of recognition. In our thought and knowledge we are their heirs. our memories. and Hegel. . In our lineage." They provide direction for us. Augustine. This "influence" is multiplied by our post-Greek forbearers who themselves gave form and substance to our present ways of knowing and living. appear in our culture with degrees of vividness and obscurity as though "we" were living memories of "Greece." Heidegger. An Introduction To Metaphysics The Appearance of "Greece" The questions of memory and knowledge are evoked by the subject of this volume as well as by the topic of this essay. and.Document Page 249 Eleven Appearing to Remember Heraclitus Charles E. limits.

"Greece" appears. These descents play active roles in both our present experience and our interpretations of what remains of Greek civilization. and multiple other descents. in mediated texts." We know that we belong to "Greece" in knowing that its being is lost in its appearance. Greek civilization is not immediate to us in our inchoate experiences of appearance and reality. multiplied. divinity. We know that the being of "Greece" comes to us and is lost to us in the appearances of our Greek heritage. nothing purely Greek. we are inclined to think again of Greece and of its originary importance for us. We know that as heirs we are able to err. when we turn our attention to them. We know that "Greece" appears to us in forms of recognition. The involuntary memory of the Greeks that inhabits our language and thought as well as our ways of life is not the immediacy of Greek civilization. . a difference that is articulated in the "reality" of past events as distinct from their appearance in memory and narration. diluted and transformed. We know that nothing Greek is present to us as simple Greek presence. in awarenesses and blindnesses that are not of Greek lives or of Greek thought. One such tacit dimension is found in our sense of the difference between appearance and reality. or change. as aspects of our values. In them we are also of Hebraic lineages. and mentation as we read the Greek texts or as we imagine ourselves in their languages and festivals. of tragedy. in our experiences and in our approaches to it. displaced and transferred. I turn first to Nietzsche's account of the sublime dimension of dionysian memory. disciplines. truth. Gothic. We find in these experiences. Roman.Document Page 250 thought and experience as well as in the explicit traditions that trace their identities in the lineages of Plato or Aristotle. whether tacitly or explicitly. The dilutions and fragmentations of Greek thought and life appear. We also know that these opening observations about the appearance and being of Greek thought are thoroughly indebted to "Greece. Many of us find ourselves inclined to think further in the impact of this association of loss and presence. of Celtic. In its appearance. Germanic. Sublime Memory As I approach Heidegger's encounter with Heraclitus' truth. The "reality" of "Greece" appears to be lost in our memory of "Greece" by means of the operative sense of the difference between appearance and reality.

Both conscious and unconscious. In the early festivals. In such an event. closer to dying than to individuation. they moved in an immediacy of life. although "it'' is without an image to preserve it. and intelligent direction. both those who danced and sang dithyrambically and those who were outside of the orchestrathe place of dance and were. Standing out from oneselfecstasisoccurs in an event of disjoining and falling apart. language." were involved without the protection of conscious distance or judgment. being-coming-apart. "that" which "Dionysus" signifies becomes vivid. It is rather an occurrence in which "something" excessive to identity and individuation is manifest and in which the individual experiences loss of autonomy and control. As individuals are performed and presented in their singularity and in the erosion of their singularity. without the mediation of self-consciousness. the experience of dionysian oblivion is transferred to a staged scene. They were immediately engaged. Their passions and movements arose from the loss of themselves. In The Birth of Tragedy.Document Page 251 This dimension of memory is not based on literal truth or accuracy. Nietzsche elaborates this kind of experience by reference to "primitive" participation in dionysian festivals. A similar immediacy. suffering without a sense of justice. As sublime. an experience opens out to "something" beyond identity. feeling with identity without identity or identification. un-distanced from bodies. standing out from themselves in the passions of commonly losing their selves. those who participate by seeing and hearing undergo the "drama" and its music with an immediacy of participatory 1 . both with and without orientation. without hope or defining memory. Their dionysian spirituality was determinate indetermination. "observers. For the unorder of Fateits dismemberment of personal and social standingis removed from dances of oblivion to a scenic play that is filled with images of identity. They were united in the movements and sounds of disjoining from everything individual and familiar to them. enveloped the occurrence of performances of tragedy. in a dismembering of the structures in which one consciously exists and knows himself or herself. The immediacy here is one of interrupted dramatic order. Nietzsche says. they found sameness in loss and in life other to identity. of the undoing of character. In the immediacy of both. In the context of dionysian experience. honor. and the oblivious music and movement of the earlier festival is transferred by the disordered music and cries of the chorus to an enacted narrative. reputation. the sublime occurs in the loss of identity. But in this event. in modern.

In the tragedy. the enacted images give participation in an ecstatic loss of individuation by means of individualized images that. even the coming of such vivid images has a dionysian aspect just as naming and preserving imagelessness by such an image as "Dionysus" has an apollonian aspect. "I" see it or hear it or feel it without intending it. according to Heidegger. dreamless sleep. "something" said in the occurrence that exceeds what the images explicitly articulate and what the images "really" are. In contrast to what I call to memory by imaginative and conscious action. "Something" comes to image without explanation or voluntary effort. It is an immediate memory in tragic happening. for example. These images come with immediate vividness. It is also not the same as its retention. Vivid memory in this context may be described as dreamlike. In its occurrence it is not like an object that I find. Heraclitus' Memory According to Heidegger Heraclitus. They no longer find themselves as observing citizens. "says" the self-concealing of . Our emphasis falls on re-membering in both the images and their vivid presentation the occurrences of ecstatic dismemberment that open to no image or identity. remember dionysian dismemberment and its ecstatic release of conscious singularity. It is a memory that happens as the images bring with them an indeterminate beginning and end that is pervasive of their "reality" or appearances.Document Page 252 inclusion. A vivid memory occurs to me. it is held or kept only in its loss and remains. but rather lose themselvesdisidentify themselvesin the drama's occurrence. It marks a loss of autonomous activity. It interrupts the state to which it occurs. a vivid memory is like the coming of a dream. In its coming it displaces a person's personal stance and active selfconsciousness. we find an instance of memory in the coming of images. in the oblivion that the arrival of images carries. at its artistic finest. which coming to pass of thought: as presents itself in the . with dithyrambic music. Hence. In Nietzsche's account of dionysian memory in classical Greek tragedy. They do not shudder in a sense of distance. They re-mind one of the sublime limit of identity and formation. They are in the play's life as though they were enmeshed and shuddering in a vivid dream.

We now notice that. and Heraclitus' thought remembers in its own occurrence the intimacy of self-revealing and self-concealing. opens what shines to an appearance" (EGT. Memory is imbedded in both the occurrences and the structures of language. is not lost in the interest of completion. The concealing of the coming to presence of things is given a strange vividness. . conceals itself in its self-presentation. Heraclitus is both obscure and lucid in not overlooking this concealing-appearing at-onceness in the shining of things. as he thinks. The emphasis also falls on the happening of experiences and thought more than on what is experienced and thought. we shall consider the function of the middle voice to sayto voicethe occurrence of presencing and concealing. "Obscure lucidity" names what happens in his thinking as he thinks things in their concealing-appearing occurrence. On Heidegger's account. Lighting bestows the shining. . Heidegger writes: "Heraclitus is called 'the Obscure. Through the middle voice 2 . explanation.' But he is the Lucid for he says the lighting whose shining he attempts to call forth into the light of thinking.Document Page 253 names the coming to presence of things. in Heidegger's reading. conceptual structure. . knowledge. That means that Heraclitus "thinks" a concealing dimension of things in their appearing by a reserve. perception of problems. 103). Memorial transfer seems to occur in the coming and going of images. experience. "something" as unsubject to image and identity as "the dionysian" in Nietzsche's account of tragedy is found in the occurrence of Heraclitus' thought. Itthe concealingis not forgotten. But "coming to appear" not occur only as the shining or appearing of things. Heraclitus is most clear because he or coming to life or coming to gives thought to a hiddenness and obscurity in the presencingthe pass or coming to appearof things. recognition of things. In order to follow this interpretive claim by Heidegger. thought. I emphasized in the previous sections that non-voluntary memory can happen in the coming of images as well as in the occurrences of language. and order of importance and insignificance. Heraclitus' lucidity is found in his bringing to language the process of does coming to appear (not simply giving expression to what appears). and perception. His "lucidity" occurs in an obscurity that. a refusal to give disclosive presence dominance in his thought. or something approximate to what we might call clarity. It also "hides" or fails to appear or happens as other to its own appearing.

we shall find a different memory of the appearance of being from the memories that we are accustomed to identifying. Coming to appear also means coming to pass. The word not only means "to forget. Heidegger says that in forgetting. as I bring the word to bear in the context of Heidegger's discussion of Heraclitus. This is close to the strange dionysian insight that "what'' does not and cannot be an image of any kind happens as un-imageable. Or we could say that concealing occurs as concealing (itself). a process for the expression of which the middle voice is especially suited. This awkward languageawkward to us given our sense of proper claritymeans that what we ordinarily call the essence of things occurs as the coming to appear of things. we shall also find a different way of thinking what we usually call the distinction between appearance and reality. The essence of life is self-showing and selfconcealing in the coming to pass of things. Memory. the forgottenthe con3 . according to Heraclitus. The "dimension" of appearing that conceals (itself) and does not appear happens as not appearing. This happening. is both (self)-showing and (self)-concealing. as distinct from appearing. Heidegger takes a further step. In this process. The occurrence of "essence" is neither an activity on the part of a subject nor the consequence or recipient of an action. It is self-enactment. We will find concealment in the to presenceof thought. the self-concealing/self-showing Wesen (essence or coming to pass) of appearing. These different memories are imbedded in the thought of being and appearance and in the language in which we think and say being and appearance. the grammatical expression of which was the middle voice in Sanskrit and Greek. means not forgetting. Concealing occurs in excess to appearing. .Document Page 254 function of language. in Heraclitus' thought. nonmiddle voice sense of "remaining concealed": "what" remains concealed occurs (we would say. as with image but at once as other to image. that is. we will find the performative expression of the thought and occurrence of concealingsomething like a remembering of concealingthat exceeds the expressive capacity of active the coming and passive formations and the images of presence. Perhaps our memory of the selfenactment of appearing/not appearing as the essence of what appears depends on recall of an intransitive middle voice meaning that is embedded in reflexive constructions. it means the "essential" happening of life." It has also a Consider the middle voice verb. reflexively occurs) as self-concealed. as "the Greeks" experienced it.

The word Wesen. is determined by the happening of coming-to-appear-withdrawing-fromappearing. In this intransitive middle voice. We could say that concealing conceals in accompaniment with appearing. concealment happens as concealing (something like the occurrence of Hades or. Something like self-concealment and forgetting is thus "remembered" in the self-enactment of concealing that accompanies or "belongs to" appearances. 108). by being or non-being. 108). we could say that we have a distinction between the self-enactment of appearing and something other to appearing that of itself "enacts" concealment. we thus find expression of something other to appearance that "occurs" (i. we could assume that Heraclitus finds in appearing/concealing a strangeness of life that considerably exceeds the intelligence of distinctions and "clear" appearance. Rather than coming to appear. the self-enactment of their occurrence.. by identity or chaos. It is not subject to appearance. as Heidegger is using it in this context.Document Page 255 cealedhappens in concealment. From one way of looking at it. the one who exists in and with the appearing-concealing of things is not removed from concealment but lives in the occurrence of self-concealment. Further. Persephone). although it occurs with appearance. Heraclitus finds in the appearing of things "something" quite other to appearance. the sense of the word. I occur in self-concealment as I appear with the appearing/concealing occurrence of things. at times. We might contend as well that the middle voice can "say" the Wesen of things. Wesen. Although we could not call this other to appearance "reality'' or "being" in the post-platonic senses of these words. It does not appear as concealment. so concealment withdrawal from the appearing of ." As the dionysian appears in withdrawal from images in relation to which "it" is other. Rather it "is" a self-enactment of concealing. according to Heraclitus. It is inherent in it to withdraw itself and to founder in the wake of its own concealment" (EGT. : A middle voice verb that says. has a middle voice sense of self-enactment that is not determined primarily by formation or deformation.e. the coming to pass) of oblivion itself. A concealment and forgetfulness of the appearing of the "self" accompanies the appearing "self. Heidegger is showing by this turn in his discussion that. "what takes place in such indifference comes from the Wesen (the essence. "I amwith respect to something usually concealedconcealed from myself" (EGT. self-conceals) with appearance.

"Forgetting itself slips into a concealing. And. An individual exists in the withdrawal of appearance as well as in the disclosiveness of appearance. This withdrawal is like forgetting. the issue is the self-enactment of . absurdly. I am self-concealed beyond presence and remembrance. It is also a matter of losing touch with both what one experiences and the experience of presence as such. High reputation.Document Page 256 whatever is manifest. justice. Even now. and both self-remembrance and self-forgetfulness occur in the withdrawal and disclosiveness of appearance. It (identity) is a selfenactment of withdrawal from identity. fall into . 108-109). The Greeks. or good. remembering my forgetting. speaking in the middle voice. It is not only a matter of knowing that all things are passing away as they come to be. intensify it: they also identify the concealment into which man falls by reference to its relation to what is withdrawn from him by concealment" (EGT. Happeninglifeis not found in presencing alone but in depresencing as well. And we have seen that for Heraclitus such "memory" is not the same as focused recollection. That is. and excellent character are not only as they appear. Identity as such carries its own loss. Its "essence" is in a "process" of withdrawal and removal from appearance. Thus concealment. We are the self-enactment of such darkness in our occurrence as alert and enlightened. the (EGT. believable. The thought is that cannot be appropriately remembered and thought if concealment in its own self-enactment is not remembered. They do not give appearance to a steady presence-for-goodness. "I remain concealed" in my best appearance and knowledge. therefore. but also of appearing itself could lead to hopelessness in the sense that one knows that nothing is simply as it appears. 109). and indeed in such a way that we ourselves. A thorough incompleteness of not only what appears. but is the occurrence of self-forgetting in the very of thought and . the arising and coming to be (appear) of all things. Nothing is simply true. To remember is to forget. to forget is to remember. that the disaster of not being present accompanies the marvel of being present. Nothing simply is. honor. Nothing is simply alive. along with our relation to what is forgotten. Life as coming to manifest presence is at once a compound forgetfulness of no appearing whatsoever. In relation to what do I remain concealed? Heidegger says that Heraclitus' preoccupation is not with concealment but with that in relation to which concealment happens: the never-setting.

hiding hides (itself). And in that "phusical" happening concealment occurs with the process of appearing as other to the process of appearing. the shining life of coming-to-presence is made obscureunlucidand unremembered. So in Heraclitus' preoccupation with the never-settingthe always arisinghe is also attentive to concealing which never occurs as arising or appearing. in Heraclitus' thought. but which nonetheless belongs to arising and appearing. rise to thoughtful and expressed life." as "being inclined to": the arising of things into appearance gives favor to the self-concealing of that very event.Document Page 257 language. and obscure preoccupation with the never-setting. This coming-to-appearwithdrawing-from-appearing is the event or essencetheWesen-of life. forgetfulness of selfappears. . In his thinking. Hence. 113-114). They are of each other. self-concealing does not mean the disaster of nothing at all. One emphasis in this memory is on concealment is remembered as the thought of unpresence in presencing. Heraclitus says that " " Heidegger interprets these words to mean. It means self-concealment. for Heraclitus. grounding presence. the on-going of the arising. never-setting of the "process" of coming to appear. In thought and language things appear. and in that sense they are one in difference. according to Heidegger. selfappearing and self-concealing ''west": they eventuate in mutuality. gives favor to its own withdrawal from appearing. The implication is that when presence dominates and organizes a process of thinkingwhen the forgetfulness of self-concealing is forgotten the event of coming to presence is also forgotten in the structures and appearances to which the event gives rise. This claim is not exactly the claim that Nietzsche makes for tragedythat tragedy provides a sublime. life-affirming occurrence of the dionysian. It means the always. the dark and threatening obscurity of self-concealing means the neversetting of the coming of appearances. "rising (out of self-concealing) bestows favor on self-concealing" (EGT. It means emergence of appearance. In the "metaphysical comfort" of an image of complete. He thinks of as "giving favor to. In the appearing of things. incomplete. He remembers that forgetting and concealing pervade and intimately border remembering and appearing. and his thought is thus in (a middle voiced) remembrance of concealment and its enigmatic. : A middle voice word that means. But it is a similar claim in the sense that.

Heidegger. and awareness that happens in appearance and presentation but is not in the form of representations or re-cognitions. however." In Heidegger's reading of Heraclitus' Fragment B16. memory in the sense of one's undergoing the emergence of vivid images or events in which something pastno longer presentcomes again with renewed. The presentational occurrence is not one of images of past events but the coming again of appearing with self-concealing: againnever-settingin the withdrawal of appearances. one's knowing how something in the past happened or knowing that fire burs when touched." or "to bestow attention upon. Vivid memory suggests the nonvoluntary emergences of images and events that are compelling in their power to bring one into their domain of meaning and experience. which we have considered in the context of the middle voice. disciplines of recovery. stresses thought and language rather than images. and methods for cultivating retention. the elements of again and of attention occur in Heraclitus' thought as distinct from occurring as an object of his thought. We shall consider further the second and third kinds of memory.Document Page 258 Heidegger's Appearing to Remember Heraclitus Underlying this discussion is a distinction among: memory that comes with practice or habit or effort. for example. often in the forms of association. presence. if different. Yet these elements also have the vividness of something coming to mind without intentional or subjective action or habitual retention. and memory in the sense of bearing in mind the occurrence that is taking place and passing away. The third kind of memory. The re of remembering appears to have a middle voice sense of happening without an active constitution of concepts or objects. Its awareness in Heraclitus' thought seems to belong to its occurrence and to show itself in the movement and language of his thought. suggests awareness in an event of the occurrence of appearing and not appearing. It shares a kinship with the apollonian occurrence of the coming of a dream in the occurrence of images. The rethe . Memory in the form of knowing suggests intentional action. The again seems to happen in the conjunction of self-showing and self-concealing. The prefix re suggests again or anew. and with the darkness that it interrupts and paradoxically carries with it. Remember means "to come or to bring to mind again. They suggest a certain displacement of the individual's intentionally constituted identity and boundaries." "to keep in mind. habitual retention.

Document Page 259 againis "minded" in the way in which Heraclitus' thought comes to presence. These thoughts and voices are recoverable in their obscurity. academic life. But only if what the thought that forgets them loses the power . Self-showing and self-concealing are not identical. We can hear them again. mindful. disciplined intelligence. a difference in Heraclitus' voice begins to emerge that is other to Heidegger's ordinary. But the words in their own thoughtfulness provide a certain vividness of presentation that is not like an interpreter's projections when one listens to them in their own extraordinary voice. by giving favor to the otherness of Heraclitus' words. Heraclitus appears differently in relation to the voices that Heidegger is accustomed to hearing and articulating in his ordinary. But he also finds that the enactment of Heraclitus' words and thought calls him out from his operative. then. by looking again and again. aware in the continuing loss and return of appearance is to remember. What can we say. Heidegger is clear that he has no adequate access to Heraclitus' intentions or to his "representational range" (EGT. and are "favored" ( ) in the way in which his thought arises and comes to language. Their lack of identity. in our engagement with them. 120). I believe that Heidegger is advocating processes that dismantle our operative certainties in order to allow considerable differences in thought and voice to ariseto appearand to return us. while they nevertheless belong together in the arising of thought and language. To be alert. scholarly good sense and places in question the grounds of his certainty. Such a dialogue would seem to provide a space of exchange in which the fragments say (again) the essence (Wesen) of their words and thoughts. Remembering happens in the appearing/disappearing of what is thought and said. to thoughts and voices in our heritage that are forgottenobscuredin the way our heritage carries them. He knows that he cannot "prove" the correctness of his hearing and that he cannot abstract himself from his own life-situation. Remembering happens in this instance as an alert event of the coming to pass of appearances. The middle voice sense of "happening again" suggests undergoing a continuous boundary in the arising of thought. of Heidegger's remembering Heraclitus' thought? He believes that by entering into "a thoughtful dialogue" with the fragments that they may say far more than they can directly articulate. By calling into question his own philosophical training. suggests continuous loss and return of the emergence of appearance.

That thinking and speaking occur in the listening. something coming to pass in the dialogue and yet not fully retainable by reportage and repetition? It would seem so. showed him far more than what they seemed to be. in the mentation of Heidegger's engagement. Is this vivid appearing exactly. Is this process of remembering and forgetting the same (of the same Wesen) as the one that Heidegger finds taking place in Fragment B16? Again. And the "recovery" does not occur in the techniques of certainty and discovery that define a large segment of our disciplines and knowledge. It would seem that Heidegger's remembering Heraclitus occurs in the appearing of Heraclitus' words and thought in a dialogue of questioning uncertainty. In a sense. and methods that helped Heidegger along his way. established knowledge. Rather.Document Page 260 whereby they are silenced. If that is so. really Heraclitus' voice? Who could know? Is it an appearance that is at once emerging and slipping away. and we recall him in his presence only in the loss of his presence. He certainly engages in active remembrances. The rethe againhappens in the vividness of the different thinking and language that speak themselves in the dialogue's middle voice aspect. assumptions. and gave rise in their strangeness to his thought. He also uses all of the ordinary philosophical. He appears vividly in the oblivion of his pastness. let thinking appear as continuing engagement with what appears and is withdrawn in our heritage. our remembering occurs in the uncertainty and questions that come with dialogical presentations. and of self-showing and self-concealing in their middle voices. then the dialogue and its minding of remembering and forgetting. we have to favor ( ) what is perhaps forgotten in our honest. This favoring probably will not result in newly established certainty. Like other appearances that distracted him. it would seem so. empirically. How are we to consider this kind of remembering in Heidegger's thought? The againthe re. But they are in the service of a process that lets them fall into question under the impact of something that is vivid in its occurrence and that does not fit the rubrics. engages (again) the thinking of Heraclitus. and philological resources that serve his purposes. so Heraclitus appears in question in Heidegger's encounter with the fragment and gives rise to thought that is (perhaps) like . scholarly. the anewof his mentation takes the form of a searcha listening forwhat he cannot actively call to memory by associations among the concepts and images that he knows. But it might well give rise to thinking.

it gives the space. 2. for example. The following discussion of this word is a reading of EGT. . 103). 3. The English version. The word suggests both elevation and excess." A lintel is something that spans an opening to carry a superstructure. The word has the overtone of both reaching a limit and opening out at a limit beyond the limit. Notes 1. translates sagt as "tells of" (EGT. In Heidegger's use of sagen. sublime. dionysian occurrences are elaborated by the intransitive verbal sense of sublime in a context of chemistry: to come to pass from solid to vapor state and condense back again to solid. 108 ff. to convert something inferior to something of higher worth. suggestions found also in the German erhaben and das Erhabene.Document Page 261 his in its determinant indeterminacy and in its passion less to know than to let what appears continue to appear in remembrance of its enlightened darkness. The word can also mean. Sublime literally means "(coming) up to below the lintel. as distinct to sprechen or erzählen. in Early Greek Thinking. In the context of Nietzsche's The Birth of Tragedy. for a threshold. the word suggests immediacy of expression rather than narration or report.

This task itself raises hermeneutical questions with regard to any strategy for reading the fragments. The very words attributed to Heraclitus are already encoded for us by Plato and Aristotle who often preserve a saying of Heraclitus as a point of contrast to their own philosophical positions. All-important to such endeavors is the choice of which fragment to put first. This fact not only creates complications for our attempt to read Heraclitus as an early Greek thinker. Most of the fragments are given to us already enmeshed in the later metaphysical tradition. an originary premetaphysical philosopher. but it also bypasses the opportunity to consider the disruptive effect of these sayings and their removal on the texts from which they are sundered.Document Page 263 Twelve Heraclitus. for from this often follows a certain prioritizing of other fragments according to an advance conviction as to what Heraclitus most wants to emphasize. Interpreters give themselves the task of weaving a narrative exposition to justify the coherence of interpretative decisions. Brogan The Problem of Reading and Interpreting Heraclitus Any interpretation of Heraclitus faces extraordinary difficulties that arise due to the very character of fragmentary writing and its peculiar relationship to narrative exposition. Thus the task of creating a text of Heraclitus such as the one put together by Diels and Kranz requires that these sayings be torn away from the foreign (often Platonic or Aristotelian) contexts in which they are embedded. Philosopher of the Sign Walter A. Most commentators attempt to gather and link together the fragments according to a certain overall understanding of what Heraclitean philosophy stands for. especially in that many commentators aspire to an exposition of Heraclitus that finds him to be a philosopher of difference. The attempt to cover over the fragmentary character of Heraclitus's thought by organizing his sayings in 2 1 .

I argue that what is most radical in the thought of Heraclitus will be missed if we merely view his thinking as an inversion of typical philosophical priorities. to think unity within multiplicity.Document Page 264 a systematic fashion would seem counterproductive to a reading of Heraclitus that holds him to be a philosopher of strife and discord. It is a problem that inhabits every philosophy which. The problem of language and expository writing is not only a difficulty that arises due to the historical accident that only partial texts of Heraclitus remain extant. This posture of listening offsets the tendency to impose oneself upon the texts. It tries to let the fragments speak for ) and backstretching ( . But Heraclitus himself suggests the path to follow to avoid arbitrary impositions of order. namely. disruptive style as providing a Λóγος befitting the matter to be thought. Rather. and thus is able. attempts to address the notion of difference. the fragmentary character of the sayings of Heraclitus should not be too readily ignored or covered over by commentary. The difficulty of thinking identity and difference together in this way further corroborates our initial concern about the problem of interpreting fragmentary writing. So many of his fragments call for a listening to the sayings themselves and being guided by the matter for thought uncovered in the fragments. too. it is important to appreciate the positive contribution of his fragmentary. or about opposition instead of harmony. It does so while at the same time attempting to deconstruct a one-sided reading of Heraclitus that organizes the fragments in such a way as to contrast Heraclitus's philosophy of becoming with Parmenides's philosophy of being. I. This reading also depends on a decision to trace a connecting link and narrative thread through several fragments. Heraclitus is not simply to be admired as one who talks about becoming instead of being. Fragment themselves and follows the labyrinthine ( 4 3 . From this perspective. Heraclitus is the one who thinks being as becoming and who recognizes that essence is change. In this essay. am employing a narrative style and weaving together Heraclitean sayings in an attempt to demonstrate a certain thesis. that Heraclitean thought posits at the beginning a twofold Λóγος and a double movement. The preponderance of evidence indicates that Heraclitus is not merely the philosopher of flux. like that of Heraclitus. in response to Parmenides. or about change instead of permanence. Inasmuch as Heraclitus is a thinker of difference and change and strife.

The criteria for selection must be appropriate to the matter and the fragmentary style of writing under consideration. neither can they speak. The interpretation of this fragment as speaking of a peculiar signature that exceeds the dichotomization of revealing and concealing and speaks in a kind of middle-voice of what neither can be (fully) revealed nor can be entirely hidden is warranted by other fragments such as Fragment B54: "The hidden harmony [that does not appear] is stronger 7 6 . The opposition of revealing and concealing plays at the center of the Heraclitean cosmos. the opposition between what shows itself and what does not. not after.Document Page 265 B51) circuit of Heraclitus's difficult thought. but one would do so by listening to the fragments themselves and." The divine language of the sign. 5 This strategy of listening stretches back and forth in appreciation of the tension in the thought of Heraclitus. allowing to be disclosed what was hidden in the discourse of Heraclitus. that is." Nevertheless. Is this listening-reporting approach appropriate to the insight that all unconcealment remains in relationship to concealment and vice versa? Is there a more appropriate strategy and language that would not seemingly destroy Heraclitus by privileging unconcealment over concealment? At the heart of things in Heraclitus's thought is the unity of veiling and unveiling. where he calls such a way of speaking divine: "The Lord whose oracle is in Delphi neither speaks ( ) nor conceals ( ) but gives a sign ( ). we remain suspicious of any strategy that would listen in order to take the obscurity of Heraclitus and try to expose and clarify it. In this case. non-metaphysically understood. The Heraclitean commitment to a language that remains faithful to the double movement of revealing and concealing is evident in Fragment B93. and brings forth what it points out and represents. but a peculiar sign in that it comes before. would seem to locate a way in which the transitional language of difference can be expressed. Heraclitus tries to think the accord and. guided by the sayings. it discovers harmony in this tension (Fragment B51). Like the relationship of the bow to the lyre. as we remain suspicious also of the apparent aim of making present and available the true meaning of Heraclitus's words. the task would still be to select and gather the fragments into a certain way of laying out the thought. This is of course in keeping with the recommendation of Heraclitus himself who warns in Fragment B19: "Not knowing how to listen. One might call such an originary speaking a signing.

" is also the speaker of signs. coming forth into the open ( ) never gives itself over to be revealed. but always comes forth in a movement of returning into hiddenness. that we bring.Document Page 266 than the visible. It is necessary to think this originary doubling in order to see that ambiguity. a transformation." The aporia of thinking about being. Heraclitus speaks of the everliving fire ( ). the fire that lights up what appears by flaming up and dying out with measure. Fire is the clarity that conceals itself in shadows. the Λóγος of communication possible. In Fragment B30. Remembering that Heraclitus. emerging. never abandons its friendship with the dark and hidden sources of revelation. is at the heart of things. the difficulty and impossibility of understanding in regard to such matters. they are like the deaf. fundamentally unable to be communicated itself and within Λóγος as such a because it is a sharing that cannot be shared. It is intrinsic to the matter in question. that which in its essence means revealing. the harmony of pays heed to the shattering force out of which it has come forth. we can postulate that ambiguity. In imparting itself and giving attends to the secret that is held in reserve and yet makes expression to its being. as a name for cosmic order." and Fragment B123: " (the emerging) loves to hide. present yet absent. we leave behind. never abandons its relationship to the underworld and the night. unlike the utterly exposed products of human fabrication. then Heraclitus is saying something peculiar: emerging. So. But to see this hidden power in the visible requires a doubling of vision beyond what is ordinarily seen. What we saw and grasped (the visible). 10 . but what we did not see and grasp. But this hidden intensity loves to withdraw and hide its raging force so as to allow what is to stand in its light. the bright flame that preserves the shadow of the night. intensity and transformation are the . If we understand as etymologically related to light ( ) and appearance ( )." And in Fragment B56: "People are deceived over the recognition of visible things." That is. Thus in Fragment B34: "Not understanding. is not only due to human error and lack of focus. a hidden intensity. 9 8 It is this double character of being as withdrawing and revealing that makes human knowledge so elusive and difficult. appearing. lighting are also intrinsically related to concealing. the secret that is signed but erased. . There is within tendency towards and need for concealment. who is called the "Obscure.


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The Double Logos of Listening and Speaking Fragment B1 says that when we in our ordinary activities use words and do things, there is no heeding of the of the things with which we are dealing. But it is nevertheless on the basis of this "nature" that such words and deeds are possible. Thus, to most people, what they are doing remains hidden to them. They do not see or comprehend the Λóγος. This special Λóγος guides and governs the ordinary words and deeds of people, but they speak and act under its guidance without being aware of its guiding force. So all human Λóγος and activity depends on this other Λóγος, and human awareness, perception, and involvement with things, stem from this association with the Λóγος. It is this disposition to listen and to speak in a way in which one's words are not merely full of oneself but in communication with what is other than oneself that Heraclitus refers to in Fragment B112 where : Healthful thinking is the greatest virtue." he names it Heraclitus defines this other-directed virtue as "speaking the truth, that is, bringing forth ( ) puts together Λóγος, , and . For according to nature by listening." are the same. It is not only a matter of recognizing that our Heraclitus, originary Λóγος and peculiar way of being is made possible by this other than human Λóγος. Heraclitus also says that all Λóγοςthey are what they are in relation to Λóγος. How is it coming into being, all beings are that, according to Fragment B1, when we are led from the multiplicity of ordinary speaking to the singular Λóγος, we discover the whole of what is? The movement from the multiple to the singular paradoxically opens up again the question of the manifold. Fragment B2 says: "It is necessary to follow what is common (ξυνóς). But although the Λóγος is common, the many live as though they had a private understanding." When Heraclitus announces that the hidden Λóγος is common, does he mean that all particular beings belong to it? Is it the whole of ? Λóγος would then mean the community of all things, their being-together as a beings, the and Λóγος, Heraclitus is not thinking out of the whole, the totality. In thinking the unity of division of human being and nature or human being and spirit. And yet his complaint is that this split in has already occurred. Thus Heraclitus calls us back from the splitting apart of Λóγος and Fragment B50: "Attuning yourself not to my Λóγος, but to Λóγος, it is wise to say the same, that is, to ." So what is required is say


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a kind of listening, a turning away from one kind of listening to attend to another. There are a number of other fragments where Heraclitus mentions this need to listen. In Fragment B19, for example, Heraclitus complains that people do not know how to listen and to speak. So many of the fragments speak of listening, we might do well to entitle Heraclitus the philosopher of sound who recalls for us the /λογóς , to the light that ringing of being. Human speaking requires listening and attending to the is common to all and that unifies all beings. Thus Heraclitus points out that many people try their hand at acting and using words, but unlike these false attempts to speak truly, when he does this, he distinguishes things according to and determines how they have their being on the basis of . Thus the common λογóς is not separable from what is and is available to be seen and/or heard, even by the masses. The point is not that they need turn away to another, separate realm. Rather, it is a matter of getting beyond the narrow logic of self-expression to a logic of listening that is open to being as such and able to reveal what is in this light. In Fragment B34, when Heraclitus says that people are like the deaf, he does not mean that it is essentially impossible for them to hear. Deaf people are by nature hearers. And in Fragment B72, he says of λογóς : ''Though most close, yet we are separate from it; though encountered daily, it is most strange." Heraclitus often plays with this theme of nearness and farness. Perhaps there is a problem with too much familiarity that blocks us from what is essential for thinking. Overfamiliarity makes what is revealed obscured in its essence, taken for granted and forgotten. Thus in Fragment B73, Heraclitus says we are related to things as if asleep and thus know nothing of them. And in Fragment B89, Heraclitus says that those awake see the one ordered cosmos common to all, while those asleep turn away to their own. In Heraclitus, then, there is a call for a kind of reawakening, a recollection of the hidden, common λογóς, a recollection that attends to the oneness . Elsewhere Heraclitus calls this oneness a self-differentiating harmony. of the many, the That is, he hears a polemic harmony in this λογóς and at the heart of what it reveals. The Polemic Nature of the Common Logos Aristotle tells the story of Heraclitus warming his bottom by the hearth when a disgruntled admirer expressed his disappointment at the


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thinker's engagement in such a mundane activity. Heraclitus is reputed to have said, "Here too the gods dwell." No doubt this story reminds us of Heraclitus's predilection for fire. Plutarch reports that ) to be an exchange of fire (Fragment B90). On the basis of this and a Heraclitus held the all ( host of other fragments, Heraclitus is rightfully considered the first thinker to see instability at the heart of things. He is the philosopher for whom the all is change, in the sense of exchange and immediate transition, an exchange that is more primordial than the polarities that undergo change. Fire is for Heraclitus the elementary force that says how the one/all occurs, as strife and conflagration. In Fragment B80, Heraclitus says: "One should know that πóλεµος is common and is and everything occurs by way of strife (being in tension with) and necessity ( ). The λóγος that in other fragments is identified with the common is here called πóλεµος. Every gathering is . a gleaning, selecting, and struggling into expression. The common λóγος is here also called opens up in advance the space in which beings are in their separateness. Thus the that "steers all things" is also spoken of in Fragment B53: "Πóλεµος is both king and father of all; some it reveals as gods, others as humans; some it makes free, others slaves." Gathering is separating. λóγος is πóλεµος . Here πóλεµος is a word for Zeus, Zeus who allows beings to appear as they are, in their place and limit. )." In Fragment B64, this is made explicit: ''Zeus's lightening bolt steers all things ( Heraclitus's understanding of the λóγος that is other than his own as a disruptive, conflictual λóγος indicates how he thinks the relationship of the two kinds of λóγος. Heraclitus calls for a listening to λóγος that turns away from λóγος in the everyday sense. Nevertheless there is no evidence to support the claim that Heraclitus is a dualist. What is required of us is to be able to think the λóγος in such a way as to recognize how it is both different from and the same as ordinary λóγος. In Fragment B72, Heraclitus says of λóγος: although most close, we are separate from it; and while encountered daily, it is most strange. The unusual double status of Heraclitean λóγος leads us to call Heraclitus the philosopher of the sign, that is, a philosopher of language who understands language ambiguously as both saying and not saying, so that in the saying we are to hear also what is not said, or hidden from the saying. Such an approach to λóγος, such an ability to double the λóγος, is especially necessary for one , since " loves to hide itself." Heraclitus's philosophy who would interpret and speak of calls


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for a λóγος that gives heed to , a joining of and λóγος and . The sameness of λóγος and , of course, cannot be appreciated within a framework that divides the subject and object. In trying to give expression to this peculiar λóγος, we recognize an element of nonsubjectivity, a disowning of the proper λóγος that I would call my own. Heraclitean λóγος tries to speak in a voice that is non-appropriative and that gives resonance to what does not come from itself. It is the difficulty of this language that has led to the frustration of the tradition over the obscurity of Heraclitus's philosophy. : The Kinship of Heraclitus and Parmenides This effort in Heraclitus to understand the sameness of λóγος and

, of thinking and being leads to

accusations that he is a philosopher of darkness. Yet, for Parmenides, this same effort brings him accolades for the clarity of his logic and the brilliance of his light. This disparity in the reception by the tradition of these two thinkers may not, however, be accidental. Parmenides prohibits the thinker from gazing into the dark and impossible place wherein the difference emerges. This prohibition against confusing being and non-being, as well as the one and the many, cannot be found in the thought of Heraclitus. In fact, his own thinking arises out of the limits of Parmenides's thought. The contribution of Parmenides was to make it possible for us to secure the one and to think identity. Heraclitus transgresses the limits of Parmenidean thought, not in order to go beyond it and to further bifurcate the matter for thought. What interests Heraclitus is the disjunction and prohibition upon which the one is established. What he discovers is that this disjunction and its contradictory strife both initiates and , he does so while belongs to the one. Although Heraclitus addresses the unity of λóγος and have already split apart (Fragment B1). In this sense, Heraclitus recognizing that λóγος and accepts the wisdom of Parmenides who says the realm of the one and that of the many are bifurcated. But for Heraclitus, this λóγος of separation goes astray and cannot be properly understood apart from a . The wisdom to say is achieved by way λóγος that speaks about this difference of a recovery from a sleepful condition where we have forgotten how to listen and how to speak , that is, according to what is common to all. according to


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We might agree for this reason with several contemporary scholars who argue that Heraclitus philosophizes after and in response to Parmenides. Heraclitus agrees with Parmenides that the task of philosophy is to follow the divine path and to think the one, but holds that this oneness is hidden and not readily available. Moreover, Parmenides was wrong, according to Heraclitus, in bifurcating the path of the one and that of the many. The path of becoming already discloses the path of being, even though most do not pay heed to it. The one is not other than the many. The one is the many. This contradictory , is unity you missed, because you did not see that the λóγος that is common, the λóγος that is war, πóλεµος. Discord lies at the heart of what is. The singular path of what is is doubled. In fact, its singularity is only first achieved and disclosed in this doubling. Thus, it is not accidental that the unity of what is gets missed and covered over in our ordinary ways of dealing with what is. The unity is itself this granting of difference, of disunity. So Heraclitus is speaking to Parmenides when he says in is and everything occurs by Fragment B80: "One should know that πóλεµος is common and way of strife and necessity." Heraclitus thinks Parmenidean necessity as strife. The bifurcated paths of the one and the many come together in this thought of strife and the elementary transformative power of fire that Heraclitus names πóλεµος . One might imagine Parmenides's confusion when Heraclitus insists that pure being, that which is in harmony, differentiates itself and is in and of itself divisive, as Heraclitus says in Fragment B51. Parmenides might become troubled and counter that in that case the two paths, the path of being and that of becoming, would be the same. And Heraclitus would respond that indeed "the way up and the way down are the same" (Fragment B60). In certain fragments, Heraclitus clearly establishes his kinship with Parmenides. For example, in ), we must base our strength on what is Fragment B114, he says, "If we speak with intelligence ( common to all. . . [and be] nourished by the one, which is divine." And in Fragment B40, we find: "learning many things does not teach one to possess intelligence ( )." Then there is Fragment B114: "If we speak with , we must base our strength on that which is common to all ( ).'' Yet in Fragment B35, Heraclitus says, "Those who love wisdom [philosophers of the one] must be inquirers into the many." Parmenides would appear to be refuted in this statement. Despite all the emphasis on the one, Heraclitus in the end seems to remain the


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philosopher of becoming. Combining Fragments B56 and B55, Heraclitus says: "Although people are deceived over the recognition of visible things, I honor most what can be seen and heard and experienced." So we can surmise that by belonging to the λóγος, we are not drawn away from what we ordinarily do. After all, Heraclitus spends his time by the hearth and playing with children and taking mud baths. Perhaps we can reconcile the many indications that Heraclitus is a philosopher of becoming and change and multiplicity with the contrary evidence we have gathered that his essential thought is of being and oneness, if we were to discover that for Heraclitus these two domains are not irreconcilable. Opposition and difference are at the heart of unity. Unless we attend to the unifying one in this sense, then we will not truly be lovers of the visible. So in Fragment B72, he says, "Although we are constantly dealing with the λóγος, we are drawn apart from it and therefore what we daily encounter remains separate from us." Thus, it is a question of hearing the voice of the divine as always already at work in the midst of the things with which we deal. Heraclitus does say in Fragment B108 that "what is wise [the saying of the same] is set apart from all things," but it is set apart as common to all. This is the genuine basis for our ability to see, hear, and speak about things. In order to engage in these human activities authentically, we need to stand in the midst of things in such a way as to listen to the unity that is a πóλεµος, a setting apart. When we do, he says in Fragment B112, we have the wisdom to speak the , paying heed to it. truth and act according to The Problem of Naming the One All: Heraclitus and Hesiod Several of Heraclitus's fragments make evident that his philosophical position is hostile to the philosophical project of Hesiod, the genealogical project of naming what is. One might perhaps be tempted to object to this claim. After all, is there not some kinship between Heraclitus and Hesiod in that Hesiod tells a story of the violent event that instituted the hierarchical order of Zeus and Heraclitus tells the story of war and strife at the heart of being? But then perhaps Heraclitus would respond that we have misunderstood him. Πóλεµος is an orginary strife, a difference that comes before the splitting apart of things into

Heraclitus does not think according to the bifurcated logic of identity and difference. oneness seems to reestablish what we have already argued is not present in the thought of Heraclitus. . and even though the Even though divine oracle or λóγος never entirely reveals nor conceals itself. its sudden occurrences which happen as extraordinary bursts of lightning that suddenly flash on the scene and penetrate the obscurity that harbors the λóγος and makes it difficult to see. dualism. Namely. "but not at the same time. day and night are one. Heraclitus complains. but that. To listen to the λóγος requires an attunement to the intrinsic concealment that characterizes the λóγος an attentiveness to its traces. we can surmise that Heraclitus is not faulting Hesiod for holding apart day and night and recognizing the regulation that allows each its stay in turn and never permits them to cross paths. Heraclitus does not add the proviso. that is. There is. Heraclitus only argues that a viable understanding of this difference and opposition must realize that true difference presupposes oneness and vice versa. . of course. In the genealogy of the gods. this hidden λóγος is. rather he requires a logic of both . to think Heraclitean difference requires the abandonment of dualistic thinking that would bifurcate the one and the many. Heraclitus would no doubt see the face of Parmenides over his shoulder and immediately insist that the original difference does not belong to a realm other than that which is differentiated. There is something insufficient and inadequate about the name Zeus and all names that would attempt to make apparent what is always more than anything that appears. Fragment B18 says. On the basis of what we have said so far. In other words. albeit recovered. It is not that Heraclitus is unaware of the separation of day and night. and. he rather envisions it as instituted and the result of a titanic struggle for power and domination.Document Page 273 different beings." loves to hide and to reveal itself by way of concealing itself. Day and night are both the same and not the same. and so forth. but signifies its presencing in the mark or trace of the word it gives. Hesiod does not think the difference as original. despite this separation. "Hesiod did not understand that day and night are one" (Fragment B57). "If . its appeal to an original. "a more powerful harmony than the one that appears" (Fragment B54). Unlike Aristotle. a difficulty in this Heraclitean notion of original difference. Heraclitus says. Thus. This is at least how I take Heraclitus's reservations about giving the name of Zeus to the polemic fire that steers all things.

The debate between Heidegger and Fink as to whether to begin the interpretation with the λóγος fragment or the fire fragment is an example of the importance of this decision. Confer Martin Heidegger. S. Fragment B 16). Their commentary is so evasive that it is often difficult to find the actual sayings of Heraclitus. even though the purpose of the text is to provide an annotated version of Heraclitus with English translation. H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1987). since there is no trail leading to it and no path. J. Reinhardt has led to a false argues that Plato's famous ascription to Heraclitus of the saying representation of the doctrine of Heraclitus. fragmentary language of ambiguity. See also Maurice Blanchot. the foreshadowing. which does not advocate a boundless flux. H." in EGT. Kirk. place or receptacle. 152ff. 169ff. Martin Heidegger's reading of Heraclitus is guilty of this tendency to emphasize the gathering together of all of Heraclitus's thought into a clearing. Parmenides (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann Verlag. Either/Or. one will not find it out. The Writing of the Disaster.Document Page 274 one does not expect the unexpected. The warring oneness that Heraclitus discovers by listening to the other λóγος shows that Heraclitus is not a dualist who merely prefers difference to identity and flux to permanence. Heraclitus is a philosopher of the sign. the discovery of Heraclitus is that there is unity at the heart of difference. "Logos (Heraclitus. Volume I. but to the matter about which he thinks. 3. See Martin Heidegger and Eugen Fink. Ann Smock (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. and M. HS. Perhaps the worst example of such an offence is the text of G. Schofield. See Karl Reinhardt. 5. Notes 1. despite the extraordinary contribution that his distinction between truth . Fragment B 50)" and "Aletheia (Heraclitus. The Presocratic Philosophers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Plato's Timaeus might perhaps be read in part as a meditation on the primordial flux of Heraclitus. trans. 1986). would seem to support his thesis. Raven. 1977). Rather. 2. V. original thoughts. trans. 6. The obscurity attributed to his thought belongs not to his own love of darkness. but because they are listening to the hidden harmony." Thus. and E. For a discussion of fragmentary writing that offers a positive philosophical account see Soren Kierkegaard. not because they are remnants of more complete. The etymological connection between this word for the flow and the word . E. 1983). 4. The fragments of Heraclitus themselves inhabit the character of the sign.

provides a compelling reading along these lines. It is noteworthy that already with Aristotle the written tradition had become sufficiently pronounced that it was necessary to assign the production of a book-like manuscript to eminent thinkers." Also see Karl Reinhardt. EM. 10 (1994). 7. "Heraclitus Studies. He says that Hölderlin hesitates to call nature the holy awakening of the light which shines only when it is concealed and thus protects what the light shines upon. from whom we inherit the fragments. 1979). beginning with Aristotle. 1982). Confer also Martin Heidegger. See also his essay. 3-9. 8. 75ff. Parmenides. "Heraclitus Studies. GA 55. " Studies. 13. according to the names of the authors. there can only be a clearing in relationship to the surrounding darkness. 12. and it may well be that the aphoristic quality of his sayings is part of their original character. The Presocratic Philosophers (New York: Routledge. 58. 201ff. See Martin Heidegger. vol. 9. I am indebted to Charles Scott for pointing out the force of the middle voice in Presocratic and Catastrophe: Heidegger's 'Anaximander Fragment'. It is likely that Heraclitus still belonged to the oral tradition of his times. 1407b16)." in this volume. Hans-Georg Gadamer's essay. For an influential account of the affinity of the thought of Heraclitus to that of Parmenides. For Heidegger. "Appearing to Remember Heraclitus. Heraclitus is the thinker of Lichtung. Nevertheless. As in the Black Forest. HS. and I think that what I don't understand is good toobut it would take a Delian diver to get to the bottom of it. Parmenides." in this volume. 10. Confer Charles Kahn. The Art and Thought of Heraclitus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. the choice of this fragment as the first is not entirely arbitrary. . see Karl Reinhardt. Diels and Kranz organize the fragments alphabetically.Document Page 275 as correctness and truth as unconcealment had made to an understanding of difference in Heraclitus. See Martin Heidegger and Eugen Fink. 11. See Gadamer's essay. Aristotle says that this saying came at the beginning of Heraclitus's book (Rhetoric." Heidegger philosophy in his essay. Diogenes Laertius reports that Socrates read Heraclitus and said: "What I understand is good. the clearing. It is perhaps for this reason that Heidegger considers the poet most akin to Heraclitus to be Hölderlin." See Jonathan Barnes. 127-42. Heraklit.

The interrelation is extraordinarily complex and has not been adequately addressed in the philosophical literature. The present essay sets itself the task of exploring. as interlinking modernity with ancient Greece. The question of tragedy. Hölderlin's understanding of tragedy. Fóti As a "working hypothesis. responds to it. but I also wish to suggest that. in The Death of Empedocles.Document Page 277 Thirteen Empedocles and Tragic Thought: Heidegger. it is tied up with the key concerns of his thought. indissociable from his dialogue with Hölderlin. Far from being a peripheral or specialized issue that surfaces here and there in his work. Nietzsche Véronique M. moreover. in this context. He certainly was aware of the complex interconnections that constrained his meditation on the work of art to engage with the theory of tragedy as developed in late eighteenth.and nineteenth-century German thought. together with its import for Heidegger through the mediacy of Nietzsche. particularly as developed in his fragmentary The Death of Empedocles. Hölderlin. since Nietzsche himselfas Kommerell noticed and as Beissner has pointed outresponds to Hölderlin's theory of tragedy." Michel Haar proposes that Heidegger's analysis of the work of art in terms of an essential strife between "earth" and "world'' responds to and explicates the conflictual complementarity of the Apollinian and Dionysian art energies in Nietzsche's Birth of Tragedy. I second this hypothesis. in a preparatory manner. but also his guiding effort to accomplish a retrieval in difference of ancient Greece. Heidegger's engagement with Nietzsche is. so that not only Heidegger's analysis of art and artworks. is as such indissociable from the entire problematic of the relationship of ancient Greece to Western modernity (Hölderlin's Hesperia). 4 3 2 1 .

Transgression: Hölderlin's Empedocles The central concern of Hölderlin's Empedocles texts is with the transgressive moment of excess in the relationship of art (and. each takes on the essential traits of the other. so to speak. the poetic form most suited to this concern. whereas nature is divinized by art. this ideal has become marked by sorrow and solitude. becomes the poetic task of purifying excess. for him. for Aristotle. which was masked rather than resolved in "pure life. 7 6 5 . of the human being) to nature. Only through strife can nature and art reveal the extremity of their antagonism. that." In the intimacy of their mutual challenge and provocation. The figure of Empedocles (gleaned from Diogenes Laertius) as philosopher. The very title of one of Empedocles's two philosophical poems. To temper and contain this intensity. offer a "bolder simile" of the poetic insights and render them communicable. through an inner kinship. and as a spiritual and political innovator.Document Page 278 Consummation. for Hölderlin. who privileges drama as accomplishing a mature balance between subjectivity and objectivity. form-giving energy." art drawing sustenance from nature. the poet must cast it into the alienation. in that it echoes the question of the that is. for." quasi-Dionysian aspect. it is formed only by feeling and cannot defend itself against an intellectual challenge. nature must show itself in its "aorgic. he embodies it in the figures of Diotima in Hyperion. however. discriminative. and of Panthea in Empedocles I and II. discerns the achievement of this pure interrelation in certain aspects of Greek civilization. The limitation of a "pure life" of human beings within nature is. For it to become knowable. aorgic nature "concentrates" and particularizes itself. Καθαρµóι (Purifications) may here be significant (although it was probably affixed by posterity). is emblematic of Hölderlin's own poetic passion and intellectual aspirations. Hölderlin recognizes a form of "pure life" in which nature and art contrast ''harmoniously. of foreign characters and remote events which nonetheless. while also protecting them against the transience and dissipation that afflict whatever remains tied to the self." its separative. poet. the very work of tragedya work that. he understands the tragic ode as the vehicle of the greatest intensity or "inwardness" carried to the brink of nefas. Hölderlin. for all its beauty. however. Tragedy is. together with his legendary self-chosen death in the fire of Mount Aetna. unlike Hegel. more generally. In Panthea. and art (together with the human sphere which it characterizes) in its "organicism. like Schiller.

sprung from "highest antagonism. for that very reason. 9 Such relinquishment of individuality constitutes. . must become. it is evanescent and almost illusory. . so that the unifying moment dissolves again. with more sober differentiation. be set forth more generally. as reconciliation appears to be there. with respect to the impressions of the organic. The fruit of this dialectics of centering and eccentricity. however. like a phantom. for Hölderlin. The moment of reconciliation. and more clearly. a tragic destiny and an essential sacrifice 10 that may historically be called . too intimate (or too inward. since the divine no longer appears sensuously. and tears itself away from its own center.Document Page 279 whereas organic singularity generalizes itself. for the organic. innig). [and] with respect to the impressions of the aorgic. its generality only a product of the highest strife. and the organic acts again upon this moment in its own manner. the aorgically engendered individuality contained in the moment becomes again. does not lead on toward further syntheses on the path toward absolute realization. passing over into the former. as such. for the forces that brought it into being must immediately disintegrate it: [T]he individuality of this moment is only a product of the highest strife. an object of mere quiet contemplationcan now. 8 The process of dissolution is. more aorgic. and the aorgic in its [manner]. . oriented toward the aorgic. veers toward infinity. the organic. together with the inwardness (Innigkeit) of the past moment. must be deterred by the evanescent moment." is an exalted moment of "highest reconciliation" which Hölderlin ranks among the most meaningful experiences that human beings can attain to. [and] since the felicitous deception of the union ceases to the precise degree to which it was too intimate and too singular. the two extremesof which one. while the aorgic. and a "more beautiful" reconciliation is finally attained through the aorgic relinquishment of sovereign individuality and a sober consciousness of finitude: Since now the union is no longer in something singular [in which it was]. the organically engendered generality contained in the moment becomes again more particular.

unlike Hegel's. in general." In keeping with the dialectical schema just outlined. denied to him the realization of his poetic and intellectual gifts in their proper sphere. becomes actually that wherein the destiny of his time in its entirety appears to resolve itself. the very intimacy and mutual fascination of the contestants in the extremity of their strife engenders a fleeting semblance of reconciliation which becomes manifest." What it demanded of him. a firm foothold in a singular individual. in its entirety. a vessel for the containment of the infinite within the finite hybristically transgresses the measures of finitude. the exigency of Empedocles's time. and as a merging of subjectivity with the unconscious and "disorganic" powers of nature. errors. for its resolution. returns to and affirms a finitude that repudiates sublation. while he agrees. since "that which unites must perish. was "a sacrifice. The challenge for the poet is to give concrete particularity to Empedocles's transgression. in which the powerful antagonism of art and nature strove to gain. and this it can only do by expressing itself as to some determinate point or case. and. both marked by "the violent opposition of art to nature. for Hölderlin. realized by a single individual. In Hölderlin's view.Document Page 280 for to purify a union that is too intimate and in advance of its time. in "restraint and purity. he places particular emphasis on the "untimely" aspects of the character of the protagonists. in advance of the historical process (the complex interactions of what is "ownmost" to a people with what is alien to them) that could have led up to it. On such concreteness. with Hegel as well as Heidegger. The notion of . everything necessarily depends. This seeming fusion of opposites in an individual consciousness is both unstable and hybristic and must therefore be tragically undone. which links nobility and transgression. wherein the human being. Hölderlin's dialectical thought. because it appeared too visibly and sensuously. understands tragic destiny as provoked by essential historical tensions. as an alienation of his analytical and creative powers from his subjectivity. Hölderlin remarks. in the person of Empedocles. Empedocles is. An individual who makes himself. is here reinterpreted in terms of an all-embracing vision. in an exemplary sense a man of his time and native country. in this respect. as one so gifted." 12 11 The con- . rather than by the flaws. so to speak. in terms of which the world appeared before his eyes. and without differential articulation. or frailty of the protagonists." Hölderlin." although no such resolution can in fact be "visible and individual.

the focus shifts to Empedocles's relationship to his people: he is now a Promethean figure who loves mortals excessively and who. in that language is. an arrogant Barbarian. In the second version. the Egyptian priest Manes. while conversely he seeks to concentrate the aorgic powers of nature within his finite individuality and to announce his mastery over nature. and I alone Was god. the very element of finitude.. who alone is ennobled by self-chosen death. capitulates to their limited understanding and proclaims himself the vivifier. for him. This Christ-like "new savior" is born . I learned it to the end. is so transported by the joy of his union with the elemental and vital powers of nature that he proclaims himself a god. but. denying his finitude. In the first version (which is the lengthiest and most complete). taking advantage of their credulity and debasing nature's dignity and enigma.. as philosopher and sage. it is appropriate. I knew it. In the third version. how could it still for me Be holy as before? The gods had now become Servile to me. after all. The crux of the drama is now his conversation with his former teacher. and giver of soul." greater than Manes himself. The two aspects of his transgression are intimately conjoined: Sacred Nature! Virginal one who flees from the coarse sense! I have despised you and set up myself alone As master. for Hölderlin. which has been betrayed. 13 The fact that the transgression is contained in a mere word is puzzling to Empedocles's disciple Pausanias. Empedocles. so I proclaimed in insolent pride.Document Page 281 crete understanding of the transgression is indeed the issue on which the three versions differ most markedly. Empedocles searchingly accuses himself of having (in his excessive selfidentification with nature) not loved human beings "humanly" enough. unifier. thereby inviting the inhumanity of his banishment. The life of Nature. in symbolically bringing them heaven's living fire. who has come to ask him whether he is "the single one.

and perhaps his or her love of the people is not "human" enough. he describes himself as one whom the spirit has chosen. the single one's. And close together they live again. s/he discloses that which is limited and must perish in its highest beauty. Rather than claiming to be the destined savior (who would. but as a marker of epochal as well as more ordinary limits. He derails. by the heroes of the Greek tragic stage). His own happiness. be related to the heroic and tragic figures of antiquity). Hölderlin suggests. The poet is no savior and no reformer. he repudiates a self-identification with the messianic figure as a temptation and provocation to raging excess (Zorn) that disturbs the sacred calm of his impending death. the last life. as such. however. so that through him the "swan song. he remains a poet. he himself. so that through a pure hand For the pure one may come to pass what is necessary. Human beings and gods he reconciles. and the holy Spirit of life may not remain fettered. even in his silence (he has not told Manes everything). which for him is too happy. and." His selfdescription emphasizes that. the passionate impulse of Greek antiquity to contain its natal fiery element in a lucid articulation foreign to it reaches its highest and hybristic moment (a pinnacle only approximated. as before. And gives what he possessed back to the element That glorified him. the idol of his time Breaks. from his dying land. and lovingly He gathers what is mortal to his breast. the son May not be greater than his parents. chastened. when he has appeared. a beauty indissociable from mortality and finitude. And gentle grows in him the world's strife. receives The rays of heaven calmly. in the extremity of "wild antagonism. 14 Although Empedocles acknowledges that Manes knows him. the new savior." he is the healer and purifier: The single one. may resound. The inevitable destruction of such a figure is gripping because of the nobility and beauty of the reconciliation of the aorgic . Forgotten on his account. In the Hölderlinian figure of Empedocles. And so that.Document Page 282 out of the antagonism of "light and night".

Hera. which are in unstable resolution at certain phases of the cosmic cycle. scientific. but it also opens up the possibility of a reconciliation which is more sober and differential. Not only the Empedocles texts. Finally.Document Page 283 and organic elements attained as the dying image or swan song of Greek culture. or B110). or the whirling elemental particles of consummate Strife) allows for the genesis of a phenomenal world." articulate an order that is at once temporal and elemental. Empedocles's "cosmic cycle" outlined in his poem. These must be respected and considered in their own right as well as in terms of Hölderlin's relationship to the French Revolution. and that is reflected in 17 16 15 . insofar as unification amidst differentiation (rather than the undifferentiated sphere that is "blameless Love's" consummate achievement. but also the earlier Hyperion and the later fragmentary and cryptic "Annotations" to Sophoclean drama express "republican" and emancipatory political ideals. for Hölderlin's guiding preoccupation is not the politics of the day but the deflection of dialectics and essential history toward finitude. B134. Aidoneus. but they do not offer a master key to the texts. The pantheism and panpsychism suggested by certain Empedoclean fragments (such as B133. and Nestis that he gives to the four "roots" or elements. ''On ) set forth in Nature. What is now precluded is the effort to contain the infinite within the finite. an important consequence of the priority of the finite is to understand every moment of dialectical synthesis in relation to social and political concerns. and religious doctrines. For Hölderlin. have profound resonances in Hölderlin's thoughtresonances that reverberate beyond the fragmentary tragedy." as well as his doctrine of the fall and redemption of spirits ( "Purifications. Empedocles in the Perspectives of Hölderlin and Nietzsche Although Hölderlin draws inspiration at least as much from Empedocles's legendary biography as from his philosophical. the infinite retreats as the inconspicuous opening for finite configurations. and perhaps also by the divine names of Zeus. the three versions of the tragedy and its "Ground" reveal a deep engagement with certain aspects of Empedocles's thought. Of key importance for Hölderlin is the Empedoclean opposition of the cosmic principles of Love (the quasi-organic power of unification) and Strife (the quasi-aorgic power of differentiation leading to dissolution).

As is evident. the place of the mediating powers "of light. by its central chiasm. a fecundation which it transmits by burying it in the earth of Occidental consciousness. especially in the first version. the entire structure of tragedy has disappeared. is situated at the chiasmatic juncture. as for Manes. with Empedocles. and there is consumed. from which it distances itself in order to acquire a culture of its own.Document Page 284 Hölderlin's schema of the relationship between Oriental Greek antiquity (linked to the element of fire) and Occidental modernity (linked to the element of earth). 18 For Marquet. a like destiny is "forbidden fruit") to go forth fearlessly." its nature. into a trans-historical schema designated by the serene figure of infinity. This schema is lucidly outlined by JeanFrançois Marquet: Greek consciousness is born from out of the Oriental (or Asian) blaze of Ether. but to the resorption of Empedocles's individual destiny. of beauty. Ancient Greece. drawn in a proto-Nietzschean manner). In his dialogue with Pausanias. it returns. and Empedocles rejoices in his destiny. aware that "everything returns" (es kehret alles wieder). in which the order of time "concentrated" itself. Hölderlin here foreshadows (in a text that was significant to Nietzsche) Nietzsche's thought of the Eternal Return. this historical schema is represented by the figure of in finite interconnection. like Semele. Hölderlin's inability to complete the tragedy may not be due. advising Pausanias (for whom." 19 This place of juncture is not truly a locus of tragedy. . but in the end returns to itself by giving it a definite form. of love. which differs from the figure of Empedocles's bi-polar cosmic cycle. The Greek as well as the Hesperian consciousness are each constrained to act against its own "element. and that whatever will come to pass is already accomplished. to its fiery source. . as Prignitz thinks. Hölderlin's Empedocles of the third version voices this new understanding: 21 20 . All action is in the past. to his main character's weakening position in relation to his priestly opponents (who are. but not without having received. on Marquet's interpretation. In Hölderlin's third version of The Death of Empedocles. At the end of this cultural process. in an ecstatic state. its god as yet unknown to it. The latter is at first disoriented (or rendered eccentric) by this foreign content.

24 23 The thought of Empedocles nevertheless haunts Nietzsche. but ultimately by a simultaneity of ecstasy and terror. the Dionysian energy also expresses itself in a quasi-Empedoclean reconciliation and universal harmonization: The festivals of Dionysos not only confirm the alliance between man and man. the separative energy of Empedoclean Strife is doubly refined. breaks asunder. not only by the collapse of individuation and social structure. he initiates the privilegingconsummated by Heideggerof Anaximander. "The Dionysian World View" and "The Birth of Tragic Thought. As Gadamer points out. Heraclitus. 22 Unlike Hölderlin. And everywhere. for which the notes are preparatory." reveal both an Empedoclean and a Hölderlinian inspiration. who symbolizes Empedoclean Love. and Parmenides as the unsurpassable beginning of Western thought.Document Page 285 Whatever a single thing is. for the Dionysian and Apollinian creative energies. Love does not die in its bud. as presented in The Birth of Tragedy. in free joy. The pure Dionysian impulse. in tension with this Hölderlinian aspect. the most ferocious animals approach ready for peace: the flower-garlanded chariot of Dionysos is drawn by panthers and tigers. treating him generally as a liminal figure. linked to licentious Asiatic nature cults and characterized. as well as in keeping with the plastic energy of art as the creation of radiant semblance (schöner Schein): . Nevertheless. Life's lofty tree dispenses itself. sobriety. and measure. in keeping with Hölderlin's organic principle governing lucid articulation. but Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks. 26 25 In the Apollinian impulse. breaks off at the very point where the discussion must turn to Empedocles. Freely earth proffers its gifts. bears more evidently the traits of Hölderlin's aorgic principle than the features of Aphrodite. His notes and fragments of 1872 mention Empedocles now and then in his dual aspect of rhetor and compassionate reformer. and in the 1870 lectures. Nietzsche is strangely reticent concerning Empedocles. they also reconcile man and nature. symbolized by orgiastic transport and intoxication (which Dionysian art does not indulge in but rather "plays" with).

nor does he return to Empedocles's elaboration of a philosophy of "nature" ( ). how30 . that wisdom and calm of the sculptor god. combined sensitivity with analytical reason. 27 Although Apollo is the artist-god. Dionysos is in every sense hostis. This is not to say that his thought remains at the level of the Hölderlinian "pure life" as the harmonious interrelation of art and nature. but rather. The subversive energy of the Dionysian impulse cannot ultimately be contained by beautiful illusion. that freedom from wild impulses. Nietzsche observes. lies the reason for modernity's profound nostalgia for ancient Greece. must not be lacking in Apollo's naturethat measured limitation. but rather that. It took the form of the Olympian pantheon and of the Homeric epics. Nietzsche does not restage the Hölderlinian opposition of art to nature. challenging the Homeric-Apollinian ideals of measure and beauty. lest it act in a pathological manner. which glorified life "in the bright solar light of such divinities" with a passion that turned even laments into songs of praisepraise for a life lived in solar clarity but upon which mortals have no lasting hold. his Apollinian and Dionysian impulses are art energies that surge out of nature. the crucial relationship is no longer that of art to nature. However. The initial achievement of the Hellenic genius was. Excess now reveals itself as truth. he rejects it perhaps more resolutely than does Hölderlin. in mythical terms. echoing Hölderlin's geohistory. traces to Oriental sources) instigated a conflict between truth and beauty since.Document Page 286 The god of beautiful semblance must at the same time be the god of true cognition. The initial incursion of the Dionysian impulse into pre-Homeric Greek culture (an incursion which Nietzsche. nature's hidden truth was revealed "with terrifying clarity" to a people who. through the Dionysian cults. to the Apollinian healing of the dismembered Dionysos. Here. 29 28 Nietzsche himself refuses to subscribe to this nostalgia that he takes to comprise the "noblest" as well as the "most vulgar" representation. the potentially inimical stranger powerful enough to bring down the hospitable house. The Greeks. for Nietzsche. in an unprecedented manner. the delicate limit which the dream-image must not overstep. a of the Dionysian impulse through Apollinian clarity linked. Rather. where semblance does not merely delude. but deceives. but of art to truth. for him (as for Hegel).

but rather was achieved. Heidegger points out that. Hölderlin had already grasped this polarity "in a deeper and nobler manner. 31 Law. for him. Releasement A crucial text for an explication of and reflection on Heidegger's engagement with Nietzsche in "The Origin of the Work of Art. The issue of nihilism forms the horizon over against which the questions of the philosophical import of tragedy. while Nietzsche can lay claim to originality in tracing and interpreting the Dionysian/Apollinian polarity in Greek thought (notwithstanding the influence of Jacob Burckhardt). A key concern of these lectures." as Heidegger calls it). must. but rather as foreshadowing the figure of the tragic hero as artist-philosopher and bringer of transvaluation (a figure already anticipated. focused on the Nietzschean problematic of the will to power. be considered. without rebirth in Occidental modernity. " of Attic drama with its transgressive Nietzsche's response to Hölderlin involves his view that the higher reconciliation of opposed energies is . by Anaximander). is the first volume of his Nietzsche lectures of 1936-1940. rather than the Hölderlinian. mediation of Greek thought." Since Heidegger traces its Hölderlinian articulation solely to the poet's letter to Böhlendorff of 4 December 1801 (which contrasts the "holy pathos" of the Greeks and the "Junonian sobriety" of Hesperia). in Greek tragedy." and with the Nietzschean. By a strange elision. which awaits its not still withheld by history. and of the interrelation of Hölderlin. Nietzsche. and. is to interpret and carry forward Nietzsche's questioning of art as a counterforce to the historical momentum of nihilism. He does not draw Empedocles as a figure of Promethean or sacrificial transgression. the Empedoclean inspiration that interlinks the two thinkers has vanished from sight. one is left with the impression of a fundamentally 33 32 .Document Page 287 ever." or his quite un-Hölderlinian preoccupation with the body as a field of forces (his "physiology. for Heidegger. Fracture. he asserts confidently that Nietzsche (who had no access to the letter) "could have known nothing" of Hölderlin's precedence. notwithstanding Nietzsche's acknowledged situation at the extreme limit of ''metaphysics. responded to this challenge by creating "the higher moments of sublimity and ridicule. of excess and rage (Zorn). and the thought of Empedocles.

The shift. Like Nietzsche. artistic creation and appreciation. and the primordiality of law. or that. to go toward each other in contrariety. though subtle (and still indebted to Hölderlin's poetic language) veers from a concern for differentiation to a concern for reconciliation and integration. Heidegger can say that form. Nietzsche no longer pits the Dionysian energy of transport or intoxication (Rausch) against Apollinian sobriety. it is linked to a preoccupation with counteracting the discrediting of sensuous complexity that goes hand in hand with nihilism. and with equal necessity under one yoke . This continuity. that sovereignty that allows for the native originality of chaos. in Heidegger's formulation. Their polarity no longer disrupts the Nietzschean circle interlinking transport with beauty. The figure of the yokean artefact. art is actual in its essential plenitude. 36 34 35 The tropology of chaos and law bound under one yoke has superseded that of trait and rent (Riss) that both dissevers and holds together earth and world. for Nietzsche.Document Page 288 unbroken continuity between Hölderlin and Nietzsche. along with Heidegger's own position. where great style is. In the Nietzsche lectures. however. grounds the possibility of transport.. a (it is prominent in the first choral ode of Sophocles's product and perhaps even symbol of Antigone which extols human mastery over nature )is one that calls attention to a forceful imposition of will.. Heidegger insightfully points out that. but rather considers both these energies to be essential moments of transport for the self-assertion of power in its fullness. in its finitude. Heidegger emphasizes the 37 . On this basis. subsequent to The Birth of Tragedy. or perhaps a shared "unsaid" to be retrieved and consummated by Heidegger. needs to be called into question. there is great style.. Where the free disposition over this law is the self-forming law of coming to pass. and specifically in The Twilight of Idols. and such questioning can he partly focused on the tragic persona of Empedocles." Excess is spontaneouslyif paradoxicallyreconciled with autonomous law. transport is "the brightest victory of form. passion (Lust) and lifea circle that becomes Heidegger's own interpretive structure.. or again. chaos and law submit to the same yoke: The fundamental condition [for the classical configuration]. is the equiprimordial freedom for the most extreme opposites.

Hölderlinian . self-absolutizing law that. Heidegger's law yoked to chaos is not the univocal." Hölderlin's Empedocles of the third version. then Hölderlin. folds back upon the radical simplicity of the belonging together of man and being. . remarks in the face of death: 41 . which enable art to transmute limitation into strength. . and that it gives ascendancy to the retractive pull of mortality over any integrative force. Hölderlin repudiates it as part and parcel of a destructive "passion for death" (Todeslust). mindful of his own mortality. but rather. as Michel Haar remarks perceptively. as opening up the possibility of loving finite or mortal beings "humanly.'' Hölderlin's understanding of art. To be sure. and specifically of poetry (Dichtung. whether facilitated by transport and ecstasy. is eccentric. for him. inscribed in a tragic spirit." Hölderlin's ruptures or caesurae are not. more than Heidegger. bound up with . or by technology and art. emerges as the thinker of tragedy. in acts of homage. Pausanias. in that it bypasses any preoccupation .Document Page 289 creative and transformative or poietic character of art which is. according to Schürmann. such as the "firm letter" and the caesura. However." but is perhaps more akin to the necessary and integrative violence that springs from natality. according to Haar. in the end. as well as of the disseverance of his destiny from that of his close disciple. as an affirmation Neither Heidegger nor Nietzsche recognizes the force of Hölderlin's tragic of the measures and limits of finitude through a relentless purification of the finite being's aspiration to an exalted vantage point. stresses the markers of finitude. however. Hölderlin. [and] thus of Technology." 40 39 38 it does not allow mortality and finitude to assert their insurpassable heterogeneity. yields "hegemonic phantasms. Whereas Nietzsche understands transport as the very force of life. with technology and its If one agrees with Schürmann that what tragedy brings to the fore is "the counterpull between natality and mortality" within the fracture or discordance that is being. since it is integrative and is ultimately consummated in the "event of appropriation" (Ereignis) that. marks the limit at which "the History of Being. by contrast. . For Heidegger. it institutes a genuinely tragic recognition of what Schürmann calls "ultimate double binds. does not seek to marginalize or discredit what it purifies. although he does not attempt to think its transcendental conditions in being as such. but in a spirit of serenity. in the wider sense). . . even a "principle of anarchy" (Reiner Schürmann's term) could not "sustain its subversive force without the support of the epoch.

ultimately dissolves the structure of tragedy into serenity. and brightly Life." It is. Heidegger affirms an integrative . blossoms above it. rather than attentiveness to finite beings in their singularity and sensuous complexity. a path that is more properly that of the thinker of manifestation (being) than the poet's path of attentiveness to the singular in its unique presenting. the being of beings. 42 It is nevertheless significant that. constitutes the main antidote to nihilism. within the order of time. the justice or law at issue is not severe and univocal. whom he characterizes as standing "in the envisagement of what presences in its unconcealedness. as is the law of Aeschylean and Sophoclean tragedy. or law which fits the finite being (in the manner of Fug) into an articulation or topology justice. by the justice ( ) of their relinquishment of power to others in respectful care (Ruch).Document Page 290 Heaviness falls. Heidegger here locates the tragic within the very releasement which. Rather than stressing fracture and singularization. in a free yet essen- . but first address in thought its essentiality (Wesensart). which at one stroke has lighted the concealment of what absences as what absences. essentially tragic: 43 Anaximander's experience of Presumably we approach the essence of the tragic when we do not explain it psychologically or aesthetically. however. He rejoins him." beings in their being remains. They belong together. a law that leads on to releasement. however. for Heidegger. Heidegger ultimately rejoins Hölderlin not only in his engagement with but also in his surpassing of the structure of tragedy. perdurance. the ethereal. in that we think . rather. as they situate themselves within the limited "while" of their presenting. 44 The "injustice" ( ) of beings in their presenting is their insistence on claiming intrinsic reality. as does Hölderlin. For him. Though it is integrative. which mandates the escalation and final self-undoing of the protagonist's initial hybristic blindness or "tragic denial. of presenting. to heed this binding and unbinding justice or law. it must be assuaged. the inaugural Greek thinker is Anaximander. for Hölderlin. for Heidegger. and privilege over others. by a different path. The intimate conjunction of these two paths shows the belonging together of poet and thinker. and falls.

the "Frankfurter Plan" probably dates from 1787. and Judgment. rather than in keeping with Heidegger's own quasimessianic and sometimes apocalyptic paradigms.. See Martin Heidegger." HW. L'Herne: Hölderlin (Paris: Editions de l'Herne. According to Christoph Prignitz carefully worked out chronology in his Hölderlins ''Empedokles" (Hamburg: Helmut Buske Verlag. but Heidegger does not. 15 vols. Speculation." in Sämtliche Werke.: Klostermann. and Friedrich Beissner. Heidegger: The Work of the 30s (tentative title. 2. Both writers point out Nietzsche's citations from and allusions to Hölderlin's Empedocles texts. together with the "Frankfurter Plan" and the "Grund zum Empedokles. and section I in . 69-152.Document Page 291 tial complementarity. trans. 233-237... Geist und Buchstabe der Dichtung. see Nachgelassene Fragmente. For an English translation of the "Grund zum Empedokles. see the articles in the section. 9-156. la tragédie. and III). 4. 1988). 13. SUNY Press. "Erläuterungen. "The Origin of 'The Origin of the Work of Art'. in Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe (henceforth KSA). 7-68. 108. trans. forthcoming). The two key texts are Heidegger's Einführung in die Metaphysik. Sophoclean tragedy. M. the "Ground for Empedocles" from August or September 1799. 4. Vol. and Friedrich Nietzsche. 153-169. 112-126. eds. in a paper scheduled to appear in James Risser. Michel Haar. For a discussion of the versions and chronology of Heidegger's text. 1993). Courtine. 1869-1874. to my knowledge. fourth ed. Notes 1. together with Hölderlin's commentaries on his own Sophocles translations. to be referred to as Empedocles I. see Jacques Taminiaux. ed. vol. II. Both of these texts address. 1946-1957). The Song of the Earth: Heidegger and the Grounds for the History of Being. "La Grèce. For Kommerell's and Beissner's comments. ed. (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. 1985). ed. and ed. and the third version was abandoned in 1800. For Nietzsche's outline sketch of a Hölderlin-inspired Empedocles-drama of his own. in part. 50-61. 348." SA 4. Der Tod des Empedokles (three fragmentary versions. 1989). 1956).-F. Colli and M. 345. trans. comment on Hölderlin's Empedocles texts." in J. I discuss Heidegger's treatment of Sophoclean tragedy." see Thomas Pfau. 1993). Die Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik. followed by A. and his lecture course on Hölderlins Hymne "Der Ister". Michael Gendre (Albany: SUNY Press. Friedrich Hölderlin: Essays and Letters on Theory (Albany: SUNY Press. ed. (Frankfurt a. 3. the first and second versions from the following two years. "Grosse Stuttgarter Ausgabe" (henceforth SA).. Friedrich Hölderlin.. F. Beck." in Poetics. Reginald Lilly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press. G. 332. Montinari (Berlin: de Gruyter. KSA 7. For recent philosophically oriented scholarship on Hölderlin's theory of tragedy. "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes. GA 53. 3-168. see Max Kommerell. Beissner. I. 1980-1988).

Systema intellectuale huius mundi [1680]). 1908). The Pre-Socratics: A Collection of Critical Essays." As to the relation between the philosophical and religious aspects of Empedocles's thought.. Nussbaum's The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Stobaeus. 12. see Charles Kahn. 265-272. "Grund zum Empedokles. vol. 15." The latter term. Heidegger takes over the notion of the essential sacrifice in "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes" ("The Origin of the Work of Art"). Pfau. but none." 4th ed. "Grund zum Empedokles. unfortunately. 54. clarification. SA 4. does not convey Hölderlin's sense. ed. I have rendered geläutert as "chastened" but the translation does not capture the connotation of purification. of Hölderlin. Mourelatos. 7. 9. Friedrich Hölderlin. Translations from the three versions of the tragedy (not included by Pfau) are my own." in Alexander P. 14 (Stuttgatt-Bad Cannstatt: Friedrich Fromann Verlag.: Roter Stern. "Grund zum Empedokles. vol. Hermann Glockner. Pfau translates Hölderlin's Opfer sometimes as "sacrifice" and sometimes as "victim. "Anmerkungen zum Ödipus." 156f. Vorlesungen über die Aesthetik. Friedrich Hölderlin. Martha C. Poesis Philosophica [1573]." SA 4. besides Diogenes Laertius. Friedrich Hölderlin. 20. 149-52. Werke. 16. Pfau. in my view. 14. 1982). vols.: Insel Verlag. Pfau. 5. F.M. Concerning the sources available to and probably used by Hölderlin (which include. SA 4.." SA 5. . ed.. 11. Jenseits des Idealismus: Hölderlins Letzte Homburger Jahre (1804-1806) (Bonn: Bouvier. Sattler. or refinement by fire. "Grund zum Empedokles. Samtliche Werke. 1993). 1965)." 161.. 54. 1986) includes some discussion of Hegel. 60." 154. 13.M. 101-16. E. "Jubiläumsausgabe." 154.. 50-52. G. Hölderlin. 10 and 11. See "Grund zum Empedokles. Pfau. and certain Aristotelian texts. eds. 195-202. D. W. "Religion and Philosophy in Empedocles' Doctrine of the Soul. 10.Document Page 292 Christoph Jamme and Otto Pöggeler. but the rather cryptic meaning he gives it is not necessarily Hölderlin's. Mares speaking. 1: "Hölderlins Quellen. see Uvo Hölscher. 2. "Frankfurter Ausgabe" (Frankfurt a. Hyperion. Pfau. Friedrich Hölderlin. D. 136. ed. Empedokles und Hölderlin (Frankfurt a. Hegel. I have consulted Pfau's translation of the "Ground for Empedocles" but have not followed it closely." and "Anmerkungen zur Antigonä. 479544. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 8. Friedrich Hölderlin. 2nd ed. See Hölderlin. and Ralph Cudworth. 6. 1964). Henricus Stepharus. ch. Plutarch.

" 22. and "Die Geburt des tragischen Gedankens. vol. Prignitz. Solmsen ascribes cosmogony to Strife and zoogony to Lovean interpretation that appears untenable. trans. F Nietzsche. E. F." appears in R. . 25.C.-F Marquet. and A. 550-562. §4. 127 (punctuation added). Furley." 31. In Greek. D. I accept and presuppose the understanding of Empedocles's "cosmic cycle" as bipolar rather than quadripolar (and involving an inverted world). "Structure de la mythologie hölderlinienne. SA 4. 133. 1987 [1962]). KSA I. Mourelatos's updated bibliography lists sources since Long's article." 361." in The Pre-Socratics. eds. Stanley (Albany: SUNY Press. Long. following J.Document Page 293 17. Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks. Solmsen's "Love and Strife in Empedocles' Cosmogony. F." KSA I. 21. 2. U." KSA I. 221-64. Die Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen. Bollack. I follow Nietzsche's Greek and Latin play on hostis. Studies in Presocratic Philosophy (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press. Jon W. Marquet. ." in Heidegger's Ways. 352-369 (my translation). "The History of Philosophy. KSA I. 581-599. Nietzsche. KSA I. A. 153-80 (158)." in L'Herne: Hölderlin. Solmsen. 27. 23. A. 1994). meaning 30. "Structure de la mythologie hölderlinienne. trans. KSA I. 800-72. 26. 28. 24. 554. Long. 555. notwithstanding the merits of his basic position. See A. hostis is "stranger and enemy. 20." and hostia is "sacrificial victim. 29. See Nietzsche's discussion of Anaximander in Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks. Hans-Georg Gadamer. the term played on is simply "whosever (whatsoever) s/he (it) may be. "Die dionysische Weltanschauung. KSA I. "Empedocles' Cosmic Cycle in the 'Sixties. Allen and D. 19. Marianne Cowan (Washington. 553-557.: Regnery Gateway." whereas hospes is "guest-friend." but in Latin. SA 4. 397-425.. §1. Hölscher. Hölderlins "Empedokles. Compare The Birth of Tragedy. 561. J. 1975). 18.

N 1. . 34. N 1. 124. 117.Document 32. 33. 124. N 1.

The Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal. The Song of the Earth. 14:2-15:1 (1991). 151. SA 4. 40." HW. 1982). "Ultimate Double Binds. . Techne (Atlantic Highlands. 1992). Haar. 44. 141. "Der Spruch des Anaximander. 157. Sophia. For further discussion. Heidegger. 42. Heidegger and the Political. 296-343 (320). 3. see my Heidegger and the Poets: Poiesis. 132.. 39. Heidegger's interpretation of Sophocles." M. Jacobs. Brainard. The Song of the Earth. vols. HW. Haar's reference is to Reiner Schürmann's Le principe d'anarchie: Heidegger et la question de l'agir (Paris: Seuil. eds. see also. 38. 36. and R.Document Page 294 35. 37. 43." is focused entirely on this ode. the essay dates from 1946. 5. note 6. Lee. 330. 213-36. 4. in Einführung in die Metaphysik as well as in Hölderlins Hymne "Der Ister. Reiner Schürmann. ch. N 1. Haar. D. N 1. NJ: Humanities Press. 41.

He is the co-editor of Heidegger on Heraclitus: A New Reading. He is the author of Heidegger and the "Phenomenology" of Values and many essays on Heidegger and phenomenology. His research often centers on the interface of Greek philosophy with Contemporary Continental thinking. He is presently working on a book for SUNY Press on Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle. is the author of many articles on Ancient Greek philosophy and Contemporary Continental philosophy.Document Page 295 Contributors Walter A. Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" (GA 25). With Peter Warnek. and Extase de la raison: Essais sur Schelling. Brogan. Parvis Emad is Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at DePaul University and co-editor of Heidegger Studies. He is currently translating (with Kenneth Maly) Heidegger's Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (GA 65). Heidegger et la phénoménologie. Metaphysics Theta 1-3: On the Essence and Actuality of Force (GA 33). about which . He has also published several French translations of works by Heidegger and by Schelling. He is the author of Suarez er le système de la métaphysique. a journal he is currently editing from the University of WisconsinLa Crosse. and Heinrich Wiegand Petzet's Encounters and Dialogues with Martin Heidegger 1929-1976. Jean-François Courtine is Professor at the École normale supérieure and the University of Paris-X and Director of the Husserl Archives in Paris. he co-translated Heidegger's Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (GA 32). he co-translated Heidegger's Aristotle. Professor of Philosophy at Villanova University.

Gesamtausgabe. Poetry and History. and Nietzsche's philosophy. questioning the metaphysical issues involved in technology. Augustine. and Husserl. Baden. In 1923. Painting. he began teaching at the University of Marburg. Literature and Philosophy in Dialogue. Techne and has edited MerleauPonty: Difference. Materiality. Heidegger's Ways. Aristotle. in 1927. he resigned his Rectorship in the following year. He received his Doctorate in Philosophy under Schneider and Rickert. Heidegger had continually published essays. the problem of modern science and technology. he became Husserl's assistant at the University of Freiburg. from his early years onward. contemporary European philosophy. Heidegger's lecture courses. Hegel.Document Page 296 he has recently contributed an article to The Encyclopedia of Philosophy Supplement. and formulating the contemporary task of thinking. In 1928. exploring our philosophical relation to the tradition of philosophy. he became Professor of Philosophy at the University of Freiburg. he studied for the priesthood at the Albert-Ludwig University in Freiburg. In 1919. and On Education. Descartes. From the publication of his first work. She does research on phenomenology and existentialism. in 1889. the history of philosophy. Prior to his philosophical studies. Fóti is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Pennsylvania State University. Véronique M. rethinking the modern period. Kant. under the rule of the National Socialist Party (which Heidegger joined in that year). She has authored Heidegger and the Poets: Poiesis. and Heidegger. . Aquinas. Reason in the Age of Science. and he died in 1976. Being and Time. he was propelled into philosophical celebrity. The Relevance of the Beautiful. Philosophical Apprenticeships. he taught courses on the Presocratics. Hans-Georg Gadamer is Professor Emeritus at Heidelberg Universität and is the author of Truth and Method. and essays are now being published in his multi-volume. Plato. In addition to his teaching. With Heidegger's background in phenomenology he taught phenomenological interpretations of classical philosophy. He continued teaching courses on classical philosophy and now included extended readings of Hölderlin's poetry. which he later abandoned. He became Rector of this university in 1933. Martin Heidegger was born in Messkirch. Hegel's Dialectic. raising the question of being in a variety of philosophical ways. Sophia. seminars.

Stone. and Delimitations: Phenomenology and the End of Metaphysics. and Intimations of Mortality: Time. Lunar Voices: Of Tragedy. and more recently his work examines the role of the human body in the history of philosophy. Sensuality. John Sallis is Liberal Arts Professor of Philosophy at Pennsylvania State University. Fiction. 1993). Of Memory. Truth. He co-edited "Heidegger and the Political" (Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal. He is the author of numerous books. Dennis J. His research centers on ancient Greek philosophy and nineteenth and twentieth-century continental thought. most recently. and Writing: On the Verge. Schmidt is Professor of Philosophy at Villanova University and serves as editor of the Series of Continental Philosophy at SUNY Press. SpacingsOf Reason and Imagination. Nietzsche and Son of Spirit.Document Page 297 David C. His books include Infectious Nietzsche. He has also written essays on art. Echoes: After Heidegger. and Thought. He has written on Parmenides. Postponements: Woman. Jacobs is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga. He is editor and translator of a wide range of books and articles in German and French thought and letters and the author of two novels. including. 1991). and post-Kantian continental philosophy. the translator of Bloch's Natural Law and Human Dignity. and editor of Hermeneutics and the Poetic Motion. Michael Naas is Associate Professor of Philosophy at DePaul University in Chicago. Reminiscence. He has written numerous articles on Ancient Greek literature and philosophy and on contemporary French thought. literary criticism. Poetry. 1995) and is the co-translator of Jacques Derrida's The Other Heading (Indiana University Press. David Farrell Krell is Professor of Philosophy at DePaul University in Chicago. He is the author of Turning: From Persuasion to Philosophy (Humanities Press. as well as Jean-François Lyotard's Hyphen: The Judeo-Christian Connection (Humanities Press. Nietzsche. Double Truth. and Heidegger. He is the author of The Ubiquity of the Finite and On Germans and Other Greeks (forthcoming). and Finitude in Heidegger's Thinking of Being. Daimon Life: Heidegger and LifePhilosophy. 1992) and Memoirs of the Blind (University of Chicago Press. forthcoming). . ancient philosophy. and Death in Nietzsche. Crossings: Nietzsche and the Space of Tragedy.

Rome: A Book of Foundations. Les Cinq Sens. natural conceptual frameworks. Atlas. the origin of the natural sciences. He has written on classical philosophy. and has authored nearly thirty books.Document Page 298 Charles E. was elected to the Académie Française in 1990. . Scott is Edwin Erle Sparks Professor of Philosophy at Pennsylvania State University. and chaos within scientific investigation. and a book of interviews with Bruno Latour. the indeterminancies. the relation between the sciences and the humanities. Angels: A Modern Myth. Culture and Time. Hermes I through Hermes V. The Natural Contract. Michel Serres is Professor of the History of Science at the University of Paris-I (Sorbonne) and Professor of French at Stanford University. and power. and the relationship between science. His recent books are The Question of Ethics and On the Advantages and Disadvantages of Ethics and Politics. Conversations on Science. His books include Le Système de Leibniz et Ses Modèles Mathématiques. order. information.

148. 83. 135-143. 232. 136. 214. 228. 210. 227. 139. 198. 145-152. 222. 158. 87 . 285. 11 Attunement (Grundstimmung). 12. 255. 275 n. 65. 290 Anaximenes. 277 Apollinian impulse. 62 Aristotle. 27. 18. 212. 257 Archilochus. 93. 181. 273. 249 Austin. 205. 209. 78. 211. 147. 167. 222. 150. 28. 268. 163. 31. 69 Anaxagoras. 5 Aeschylus. 146. 242. 205. 210. 160. 19. 232. John. 75. 235 Apollinian art. 11. 246 n. 3. 151 Air. 81. St. 156. 84.. 56 Aletheilogical thinking. 58 Augustine. 78. 149. 148. 286 Appearing. 147 Aletheilogical beginning. 146. 25. 145. 250. 290 Aetius. 40. 28. 166. 285.Document Page 299 Index A Absolute spirit. 211. 149. 163. 104. 135. 79. 217. 222 Anaximander.

11. 235. Franz. 5 Church fathers. Henri. Rudolf. 153 Boeder. 141 Berkeley. 118. Heribert. 163. Walter. 277. 232. 168 n. 57. 34 Cartesian. John. 2 Benjamin. 214 Christo. 91 Berry. 55 Beissner. 24 Blindness. 291 n. Jacob. 208 Christian Trinitarian. 212 Clement of Alexandria. 4 C Care. 164 Bergson. Friedrich.Document B Beaufret. 45 n. Elisabeth. Jean. 287 Burnet. 162. 237 . George. 158. 166 Blochmann. 202 n. Edmund. Robert. 205 Burckhardt. 150 Brentano. 173 Change. 173 Bernasconi. 161. 152 n. 225. 234. 124-131 Carnap. 236.

58. 94. 78 Dasein. 240 Cratylus. Tom. 75. 64 Davis. 101. 82. 96 n. 112. Joseph. Gilles. 265 Conrad. 8 Deleuze. 255. 209 D Dante. 166. 86. 257. 61. 176.Document Concealment and concealing. 194 . 74. 63.

10. 27. 252 Dispensation of being. 165 Descartes. 277 Dionysian impulse. 14. 11 Difference. 206 Dialogue. 111. 3-5. 5. Rene. 275 n. 222. 161 Derrida. 211 Diogenes. 286 Dionysian memory. 263. 194-198 Double binds. Jacques. 209 Empedocles. 136-137. 127. 102. 204. 289 Doubling of being. 278 Dionysian/Apollinian polarity. 32 Destruction of logic. 20. 160. 285. 205 Destiny. 251. 277-294 . 243 n. 230. 275 n. 17. 234. Hermann. 19. 182 Destruction (Destruktion). 287 Dionysian art. 17. 37 Dialectic. 250. 22 n. 264 Diodotos. 145-146.Document Page 300 Demodokeos. 105. 43 Diels. 19. 149 E Eleatic thought.

82. Hermann. 155-156. 78. 220 Fichte. 60. 14 Friedländer. 45 n. 204 Fink. 67 Ereignis. 64-69 Forgetting. Sigmund. 228. 7 . 205 Genealogical philosophy. 63 Eternal return. 274 n. 160. 11. 235 F Family resemblance. 8. 132 n. 164 G Gadamer. 90-91 Fundamental ontology. 166-167 Eusebius. Eugene. G. 222 231. 2 Fire doctrine and cosmology of fire.Document Enowning (Zueignung). 82 Fraenkel. 9. Hans-Georg. 263 Freud. Paul. 232 First beginning. 75. 220 Fragmentary writing. 84. J. 61.. 57-58 Future. 214. 284 Ethics. 285 Galileo. 163.

207. 2-4. 44. 78. 249261. 2. 4. Glenn. 131. 203. 115. 36. 147.. 134 n. 3. Jane Ellen. 150. 156. 31. 55-56. 190. 126. 78. 166. 213. 19. 22 n. 246 n. 263-275. 159-161. 277. 58. 9 History and historicality of being. 223. 204 Goethe. 182. 278. 186. 32 Hegel. 277. 218 Gray. 104. 43-44. 194 Guiding question. 78. 66. 280. 147-148. 73-99. 35. 156. Edmund. 141. J. 117-118. 217. 42. 81. 204 . 40. 136. 57. 78-79. 286 Heraclitus. 199 n. 152 n. 272-274 Hippolytus. 101-134. 249. 10. 10-20. 205. 214. 285 Hesiod. 39. G. 5. 183 Hölderlin. 194. 62 Husserl. 203-247. 61. 168 n. Friedrich. 129 Greek civilization. 19.Document German Idealism. W. 200 n. 225 Historical and unhistorical. 228. 94. 55. 198. 278-291 Homer. 289 Harrison. 108. 249. 4 Guattari. 218. 242. 154. 6 Historicality of philosophy. 75. 64-69 H Haar. 5 Historical philosophizing. Michel. 250 Greek inception of history. 166. Felix. 209. F. 223.

12 Joyce. Werner. 155. 19 Injustice. James. 157-160 . 264 Inceptional thinkers. 127 Justice. 158-159. 140. 243 n. 290 J Jaeger.Document I Identity.

96 L Lacan. 37 M Maimonides. 11 Krell. 122-123. 1 . 31. 219 Marquet. 290 Leibniz. G. 104 Liddell-Scott. 134 n. 33. 244 n. Charles. 246 n. 263. 151 Marcus Aurelius. 102. 60. 43. 233. 147. 291 n. 245 n. 34 Levinas. 145. 204 Kirk. 62 Kant. 127 Language. Emmanuel. 288. 219 Klee. 243 n. G. 25-53. W. 58. 93. 164 Kommerell.. 29-34. 32 Logic. S. 284 McNeill. 264 Law. 249 Manifestation and manifestness. 59. Jean-François. David Farrell. Immanuel. 29. Jacques. 277. Paul. 220. 2 Kranz. Max. 13.Document Page 301 K Kahn. Walther. 95 n. William. 84. 109. 275 n..

8. 256. 127. 253. 283-291 Nihilism. 174 Nietzsche. 124. 14. 260 Morphological. 35. 203. 44 O Olson. 102 Memory. Friedrich. 213 Mourelatos. 1. 258. 287 Nothingness. 35. 187-194 Origen. 277. 76. 78 Original ethics. 33 Novalis. 23 n. 80 Ontological education. 256. 244 n. 249. 200 n. 165-166. 154 Negation. Alexander. Hermann. 156. 2. 253. Charles. 117-118. 23 n. 204. 180. 250. 257. 249 Origin of language. 10. 111 Ontological difference. 222 N Nazi movement. 251. 155. 105. 5. 30. 64-69 . 259. 252. 254. 29 Neoplatonic. 165 Other beginning. 207.Document Melville. 159. 102. 261 n. 258 Middle voice. 33 Muses. 206. 255. 257. 257.

162. 264. 154 P Parmenides. 19. 34. 174. 270-273. Otto. 224. 229 Poetry (Dictung). 181. 147. 56. 55. 74. 28. 185-202. 208. 27. 218. 211.Document Overcoming metaphysics. 37. presence. 145 Philosophy and poetry. 77 Plato. 225. 179. 79. 83. 155. 207. 42. 249 Protagoras. 118. 241. 5. 17. 12. 236. 221. 78. 206. Karl. 159. 218. 38 R Reinhardt. 18. 214. 161. 227. 245 n. 205. 281 Practical rationality. 239. 56. 11. 228. 84. Christoph. 84. 34. 79. 291 n. relation between. 75. 250 Plotinus. 174. 145. 284. 237. 216. 41 Powers of nature. 81. 172-184. 216. 210. 11. 78. 209. 222. 93. 75. 159. 203. 183 Prignitz. 19. 211 Presencing. 215. 4 . 209. 207 Q Question of being. 226. 154. 40. 3 n. 285 Pausanias. 2 Proclus. 75 Pindar. 65. 228. 182. 232. 78 Pöggeler. 25.

77 Schelling. 64-69 S Sallis. 14 . 75 Roman law.Document Revealing and revelation. W.. 45 n. 142 Root question. John. 8 Sappho. J. 11. F. 71 n. 132 n.

275 n. 35 Separation into opposites. 150. 241. 17 Sophocles. F. 238. 289. 148. 218 Socrates. 161 Subjectivity. 226. Benedict De. 161. 162. 145 Shakespeare. Reiner. 228. 283. 235 Snell. 209. 81. 76. 204 Self-showing. 75. 135. 223 Sextus Empiricus. 159. Charles. 241 Spinoza. 204 T . 149. 14. 227. 26. 78. 166 Stesichorus. 203. 255 Self-consciousness. 278 Schopenhauer. 235. 32. Bruno. 225 Schürmann. 78. 275 n. William. 289 Scott. 166. 254 Sending (Geschick). 7 Self-concealing. 254. 156. 293 n. 290 Soul. 75 Simplicius. 113 Signs. Arthur.Document Page 302 Schiller. 216. 10 Solmsen.

252 Tragic destiny. 135. St. 160. 280 Transcendental philosophy. relation between. 92. 97 Twofold of being and beings. 158.. 172-184. 175. Simone. 135. 136. 7-9. 93. 87 Western culture. 83. 183 U Unconcealment. 148. 146. 235 Theophrastus. 249 Virgil. 185-187 Thomas. 154 Will to power. 176. 182. 86. 147 Thinking and being. 251. 217 . 211 Theorize. 80 Truth. 78 W Weil.Document Thales. 158 Tragedy. 139. 94 V Vico. 204 Translation. 141. 82. 249 Time. 84. 287 Wise.

43-44 X Xenophon. Ludwig. 231 . 37-38.Document Wittgenstein. 204. 213 Words.

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