IPP Cancelation Bode/Chambers A Policy for Disaster: The Case to Cancel the IPP

Katie Bode & Drew Chambers Vector/ViDA

The present nuclear policy is a recipe for proliferation. It is a policy for disaster. Said Nobel Peace-Prize winner Joseph Rotblat With this in mind, Drew and I today stand resolved: that the United States Federal Government should significantly reform its policy towards Russia. Now often times in debate, its important to interpret the specific words of the provided resolution so that we determine exactly what its asking. The only word we feel is potentially hazy is the word policy, so heres an accurate explanation of policy in the context of the resolution. Dr. Gopal Pokharel, executive director of the Institute of Foreign Affairs , said in 2007 that,
As a matter of fact, when we analyze the dynamics of foreign policy, we should take into account both the aspectstheoretical as well as practical. Concomitantly, the making of foreign policy demands careful scrutiny while understanding its determining factors. A foreign policy can be defined

as a course of action for achieving objectives in foreign relation, as dictated by the ideology of national interest. One of the significant means of the execution of foreign policy

goals is Diplomacy. Diplomacy in the popular sense means "the employment of tact, shrewdness, and the skill in any negotiation or transactions and in the special sense (Quency Wright), it means the art of negotiation in order to achieve the maximum of group objectives with a minimum of costs, within a system of politics in which war is a possibility."1

And as with any foreign policy, our policies and their spending should be responsible, authorized, and in the absolute interest of the United States, so we as the affirmaitve team would urge you to keep these principles in mind as we examine one particular foreign policy, the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program. Background point one is Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention, or IPP, Explained IPP is explained by Matthew Wald as
The Energy Department is subsidizing the institutes under the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention, a program set up in 1994, after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The

program was intended to prevent newly impoverished scientists and their

Gopal Pokharel [PhD in Political Science, Director of the Institute of Foreign Affairs, Professor of Political Science at Tulsa University], Nepalese Foreign Policy in the changed context, October 19th 2007, http://www.telegraphnepal.com/national/2007-09-19/nepalese-foreign-policy-in-thechanged-context
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IPP Cancelation Bode/Chambers institutions from selling expertise to states or terrorist groups that want nuclear weapons.2 In essence, the IPP pays Russian scientists to make sure they stay in Russia and dont move to another nation looking for cash. Our second background point is Funding WMD Work. The Government Accountability Office said in 2007 that, DOE misstates the number of institutes that we included in our fieldwork in Russia and Ukraine. The
correct number is 22. Regarding DOEs comment, our draft report clearly stated that DOE policy does not require IPP project participants reemployed in peaceful activities to cut ties to their home institute. However, more than one [IPP] institute we visited stated that they are still

involved in some weapons-related work, and many institutes remain involved in research and technology development that could be applied to WMD or delivery systems for WMD. We do not believe it is possible for DOE to verify the full extent and intended

purpose of all activities at the institutes where the IPP program is engaged. Moreover, we believe that DOE misrepresents the IPP programs accomplishments by counting individuals who have been reemployed in private sector jobs but also are employed by their institutes and, therefore, may still be involved in weapons-related activities. In our view, the reemployment of former weapons scientists into new long-term, private sector jobsone of the primary metrics DOE uses to measure progress of the IPP programimplies that these individuals have terminated their previous employment at the institutes and are dedicated solely to peaceful commercial activities outside of their institutes.3

So having established that background information, lets look at our first justification, or warrant for why we should change policy, which is Zero Accountability. Our a. point here is Follow the Money. Or rather, dont follow the money would be more appropriate, as the Law Journal Political Science Quarterly point out in 2010,
Yet IPP, too, [has] experienced problems achieving its goals. The continued parochialism of the labs led IPP to difficulties in prioritizing projects and coordinating with other

programs, and to issues with record keeping, funding, goal displacement, and other
Matthew Wald [reporter], U.S.-Backed Russian Institutes Help Iran Build Reactor, published by the New York Times, February 7, 2008, (http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/07/washington/ 07nuke.html) [JS] 3 Gene Aloise [Gene is the Director of the Natural Resources and Environment branch at the Government Accountability Office], Report to the Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOEs Program to Assist Weapons Scientists in Russia and Other Countries Needs to Be Reassessed, published by the Government Accountability Office, December 2007, (GAO-08-189)
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IPP Cancelation Bode/Chambers indicators of accountability. In turn, this situation reinforced persistent security concerns in Russia and fueled worries in the United States that resources intended for
nonproliferation were actually going to Russia's own nuclear weapons programs. As a result
of aggravating these broader political problems in both the United States and Russia, IPP and, by extension, NCI faced increased expectations as well as constraints. As a result, the success of both programs suffered. In contrast to arguments for more lab independence in MPC&A, it was such autonomy that led to problems at IPP.4

The b. point is Iranian Nuclearization. Due to the lack of spending accountability and project oversight, we can see from the U.S. Committee on Energy and Commerce that,
We have just learned that the Department of Energys (DOE) highly touted

nonproliferation program [the IPP], intended to keep Soviet-era scientists from migrating to rogue states following the collapse of the Soviet Union, has been funding Russian research institutes working on nuclear projects in Iran. In 2006,

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told Congress that the United States faces no greater challenge from a single country than from Iran. 5

This brings us to c. Russia Rearming. The last, and also a very important impact to the detrimental lack of following where our funds are spent is that our IPP project teams have contributed to the rejuvinating of Russias weapons complex, as said Dr. Sharon Weiner in 2010,
The pursuit of organizational interest eventually also led the U.S. labs to run into problems with domestic politics in the United States. Early cooperative threat initiatives with Russia were plagued by a persistent disagreement in the United States as to whether such efforts furthered U.S. national security or simply provided charity to a former enemy. Within Congress, some members

remained fearful that U.S. funding would inadvertently further Russia's own military programs. The U.S. labs, however, acted to reinforce these fears in two ways. First, sloppy record keeping meant that often the labs could not prove that IPP and NCI funding was not channeled into Russian nuclear weapons improvements. Second, in an effort to justify their programs despite the lack of job creation, the labs gradually began to shift their focus from nonproliferation to transparency. Transparency, however,
Sharon K. Weiner [B.A., Northeast Missouri State University; B.S., Northeast Missouri State University; M.A., University of Lancaster (UK); Ph.D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology; assistant professor in the School of International Service at American University], Organizational Interest, Nuclear Weapons Scientists, and Nonproliferation, published in the Journal: Political Science Quarterly, 2009-2010, (Vol. 124, No. 4; pp. 655-679) [Brackets added for clarification]
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U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce [Signed by representatives from all states], John D. Dingell [Chairman; Committee on Energy and Commerce], Bart Stupak [Chairman; Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations], Letter to Samuel W. Bodman (U.S. DOE Secretary) concerning IPP and Iran, February 6th 2008, http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/Press_110/110-ltr.020608.Bodman.NonProliferation.pdf
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suggests a more permanent engagement with Russia that, in turn, reinforces persistent

domestic political fears about helping Russia re-arm.6 The article goes on to say that the most significant issues were security concerns, accountability, coordination, and,
These problems got their start in one piece of good news: despite concerns about the spread of weapons knowledge, there was no evidence of significant proliferation from the former Soviet Union. Few weapons workers emigrated and most of those went to the United States, Europe, or Israel. However, as the urgency and danger of proliferation diminished, domestic political concerns in both Russia and the United States increasingly sought to question and limit cooperation. In this environment, the self-interested behavior of the U.S. labs acted to reinforce rather than assuage these concerns. The most significant issues were security concerns in Russia, accountability in the United States, coordination between U.S. programs, and U.S. fears that money aimed at

nonproliferation was actually helping Russia rejuvenate its own weapons complex. As explained below, the organizational interests of the U.S. labs amplified each of these issues, causing them to become stumbling blocks to further U.S.-Russian cooperation.7 Finally we have d. State Secrets Spilled.

The characteristics of scientist programs in Russia gives room for the risk of accidently letting loose top-secret information on the matters at hand such as weapons and security issues. And this card from Retired US Army Brigadier General Kevin Ryan, who is also the executive director for research at the Belfer Center, generally indicts the nature of scientist engagement programs in Russia of which the IPP is one, and General Ryan said in 2011 that, Retired US Army Brig. Gen. Kevin Ryan, executive director for research at the Belfer Center, said that both Russia's Federal Security Service and the FBI have long worried that Russian and US weapons scientists working together on peaceful projects might inadvertently spill state secrets. "That's the risk for everybody, but they consider it a higher risk than we do," Ryan said.8

Sharon K. Weiner [B.A., Northeast Missouri State University; B.S., Northeast Missouri State University; M.A., University of Lancaster (UK); Ph.D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology; assistant professor in the School of International Service at American University], Organizational Interest, Nuclear Weapons Scientists, and Nonproliferation, published in the Journal: Political Science Quarterly, 2009-2010, (Vol. 124, No. 4; pp. 655-679)
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Ibid

China Daily, Russia abandons $1B Western aid to weapons, April 20th 2011, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2011-04/20/content_12363674.htm

IPP Cancelation Bode/Chambers The question we have to be asking ourselves, is why is our money intended to stop the production and spread of nuclear materials going against this very principle by supporting pro-nuclear programs in two individual countries? The U.S. should not be spending one dollar on these actions, let alone tens of millions, at the cost of violating and shattering the very notion that threat reduction is based upon. Our next justification is Improper Hiring. The important a. point here is Inexperienced Scientists, and this point says that the IPP is hiring scientists without experience in weapons or past involvement with the USSR. Gene Aloise, with the Government Accountability Office, said in 2007 that,
DOE has overstated the number of WMD scientists receiving DOE support and the number of longterm, private sector jobs created. First, according to our analysis of 97 IPP projects involving about 6,450 scientists for whom we had complete payment information,

more than half of the scientists paid by the program never claimed to have WMD experience. Furthermore, according to officials at 10 nuclear and biological institutes in Russia, IPP program funds help them attract, recruit, and retain younger scientists and contribute to the continued operation of their facilities. This is contrary to the original intent of the program, which was to reduce the proliferation risk posed by Soviet-era

weapons scientists. For example, about 972 of the scientists paid for work on these 97 projects were born in 1970 or later, making them too young to have contributed to Soviet-era WMD efforts. Second, although DOE asserts that through April 2007, the IPP program had helped create 2,790 long-term, private sector jobs in Russia and other countries, we were unable to substantiate the existence of many of these jobs in our review of the projects DOE considers to be commercial successes. DOE relies on good- faith reporting and does not independently verify employment data it receives. Finally, DOE officials stated that the IPP program metrics are not sufficient to judge the programs progress in reducing proliferation risks. However, DOE has not updated its metrics or set priorities for the program on the basis of a country-by-country and institute-by-institute evaluation of proliferation risks.9

The b. point is Unathorized Action. Robert Robinson, also with the GAO, said in 2008 that,
Our analysis of the programs operations provide further support, we believe, for the need for fundamental program reassessment. Over half of the scientists being funded at the 97 projects we reviewed did not claim any

Gene Aloise [Gene is the Director of the Natural Resources and Environment branch at the Government Accountability Office], Report to the Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOEs Program to Assist Weapons Scientists in Russia and Other Countries Needs to Be Reassessed, published by the Government Accountability Office, December 2007, (GAO-08-189)
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weapon-related experience in the documentation we reviewed . Instead of being used to support

former Soviet-era weapons scientists, the authorized design of the program, funding is now being used to attract, recruit and retain younger scientists that were too young to have had this experience. In this way, we may actually be helping sustain the
continued operation of institute activities or, at a minimum, help the institutes develop technical capabilities that we ultimately may have to compete against. Ultimately, and importantly, DOE has not updated its metrics to judge the extent to which the program is actually reducing proliferation risk, and this is where we want to make sure the energy is concentrated here today, or adjust priorities so that funds can be targeted to the areas of highest need. 10

Not only is hiring inexperienced scientists unauthorized, it also increases the proliferation threat by educating previously uneducated scientists about weapons, as seen in c. Risk Raised. Dr. Weiner said in 2010,
Regardless of the value of transparency, it requires more long-term engagement with current Russian defense institutes. Therefore, if the United States works with scientists inside the weapons complex, then U.S. programs, by definition, will pay the salaries of defense

workers, help supply equipment that can be diverted to military uses, and contribute to the production of weapons-relevant knowledge. For these reasons, a shift from
nonproliferation to transparency contradicts the assumptions on which cooperative threat reduction is premised and threatens to destabilize the fragile domestic political balance in the United States that enables cooperative work with Russia.11

When a program seeks to justify its existence and prolong its life long-after the original purposes have been fulfilled, the only outcome is negative as clearly exemplified in the case of the IPP program. The IPP must be addressed and we offer the solution in our plan of action. Our only mandate is to: cancel the Russian leg of the IPP program.

Robert A. Robinson [Robert is the Government Accountability Office Managing Director of Natural Resources and Environment; in this hearing, Mr Robinson was substituting for Gene Aloise, who was being treated for medical problems], COMBATING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGYS INITIATIVES FOR PROLIFERATION PREVENTION (IPP) PROGRAM HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS: FIRST SESSION, published by the United States Government Printing Office, January 23, 2008, (Serial No. 11082) Emphasis added
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Sharon K. Weiner [B.A., Northeast Missouri State University; B.S., Northeast Missouri State University; M.A., University of Lancaster (UK); Ph.D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology; assistant professor in the School of International Service at American University], Organizational Interest, Nuclear Weapons Scientists, and Nonproliferation, published in the Journal: Political Science Quarterly, 2009-2010, (Vol. 124, No. 4; pp. 655-679)
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IPP Cancelation Bode/Chambers Its time to finish a program that shoud have been finished long ago. Its time to finish the IPP.