Foreign Policy Analysis (2006) 2, 223–244

The Rift: Explaining Europe’s Divergent Iraq Policies in the Run-Up of the American-Led War on Iraq
JˇRGEN SCHUSTER Eberhard Karls Universita Tu ¨t ¨bingen

HERBERT MAIER Universita Regensburg ¨t
America’s plan to attack Iraq split Europe down the middle. Why did European countries take such different stances toward the Bush administration’s policy? This article examines three different approaches, each rooted in one of international relations (IRs) prominent schools of thought, with regard to their explanatory power in this specific puzzle. Firstly, it shows that public opinion (utilitarian–liberal approach) cannot account for whether a state joined the ‘‘coalition of the willing’’ or not. Secondly, it demonstrates that in Eastern Europe systemic forces of power relations (neorealist approach) are suitable for explaining state behavior, but not in Western Europe. Thirdly, it shows that the ideological orientations of governments (liberal–constructivist approach) were the decisive factor in determining whether a state supported the United States in Western Europe, but not in Eastern Europe. These results offer some interesting insights for the theoretical debate in IRs theory and foreign policy analysis, which are discussed in the final section of the article. In regard to foreign policy analysis, for example, the results of this study propose to ‘‘bring political parties in.’’

America’s Iraq policy split Europe down the middle. After months of ‘‘fighting’’ inside and outside the Security Council, the United States, supported by a ‘‘coalition of the willing,’’ attacked Iraq on March 20, 2003 without having obtained the clear legitimacy they sought. Europe was deeply divided over the question of whether it should support its main ally or ‘‘balance’’ against his Middle East plans. Some European allies like Germany and France vehemently opposed the Bush administration’s policy to disarm Iraq by military means and the accompanying reorganization of the Middle East’s political landscape. Others like Spain and Poland explicitly supported this policy. Why did the European states take such different political positions toward Iraq or, more accurately, toward the United States,
Authors’ note: We thank all the people who helped to improve this article with their critical comments. We are especially grateful to the editors, the anonymous reviewers, the participants at the Graduate Program in International Relations at Eberhard Karls University Tubingen and the following individuals: Verena Andrei, Stephan ¨ Bierling, Thorsten Gobel, Andreas Hasenclever, Carmen Huckel, Reinhard Meier-Walser, Philipp Schuster, and ¨ Christian Strobel.
r 2006 International Studies Association. Published by Blackwell Publishing, 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, and 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK.

224

The Rift

despite them all having been allies of the United States, often for decades, and rarely ever parting with Washington in major international crises in the past? International relations (IRs) theory offers various approaches for the explanation of international politics as well as for the analysis of particular foreign policies. Three paradigms have been dominating the field in recent years: (neo)realism, liberalism, and constructivism (Walt 1998; Rittberger 2001; Snyder 2004).1 As these approaches offer different and competing explanations of foreign policy,2 it seems worthwhile to analyze which one offers the most convincing account of the behavior of European states during the Iraq crisis or to see, indeed, if any of them can provide answers to such a profound and ‘‘real-world’’ question at all. In the following section we derive three hypotheses out of these paradigms. The competing explanatory factors of the study are systemic forces of power relations (a neorealist approach), public opinion (a utilitarian–liberal approach), and ideological orientations of governments (a liberal–constructivist approach).3 The neorealist or power–structural approach regards state behavior as a function of a specific state’s power position in the (relevant) international system. It explains variance in IRs and foreign policy not through differences of the individual units but via different systemic power constellations. The utilitarian–liberal approach and the liberal–constructivist approach reject this Primat der Außenpolitik. Instead, as reductionist approaches, they explain variance in international politics and foreign policy through differences in domestic characteristics, that is, they postulate a Primat der Innenpolitik.4 We tested these hypotheses or the explanatory factor they claim is valid, respectively, on the position of 20 European states toward an American-led Iraq war. As already mentioned, what we hope to explain with these hypotheses is the political position the (European) states took toward an American-led attack on Iraq, that is, if a country (openly) supported the United States endeavor and was part of the ‘‘coalition of the willing’’ or if it rejected the demand for (political) support.5 The reasons why we selected those states listed in Table 1 are manifold. Following Mill’s ‘‘method of difference’’ we confined our cases to a certain class of countries, European democracies, primarily because by doing so we were able to control for a range of possibly different explanations like form of government or, partly at least, cultural differences. Furthermore, Hypothesis 3, the partisan hypothesis, could reasonably only be tested in ‘‘western democracies’’ and it was the behavior of some
1 See note 7 for basic literature on structural realism, page 227 for modern liberalist work, and page 231 for prominent examples of social-constructivist writing. 2 Though it is sometimes disputed to what extent theories of IR, especially neorealism, can be used as or translated into theories of foreign policy, all approaches stress specific factors that can be used to analyze and forecast foreign policy. The claim that ‘‘international politics is not foreign policy’’ and that IRs theory cannot be used to analyze foreign policy is especially maintained by Kenneth N. Waltz (1979:71–72 and 121; 1996). Waltz’s arguments are convincingly refuted by Colin Elman (1996) and James Fearon (1998:289–313). It is quite common for IR scholarsFneorealists are no exceptionFto analyze foreign policy with their IR-toolbox. Waltz himself makes statements and predictions about foreign policy based on his theory (1991:667–670; 1993:45–46 and 61–76). See Rittberger (2001) for a practical demonstration how not just hypothesis, but also theories of foreign policy can be constructed out of IR approaches. 3 The reason why we selected these hypotheses for a closer examination is a twofold one. Firstly, each is derived from one of the currently leading theoretical approaches to IR (see next section). Secondly, those were factors regularly cited as possible reasons for state behavior in media reports and comments before the last Gulf War. 4 Of course, there are constructivist scholars like Alexander Wendt who locate the primary source of state behavior on the systemic level of analysis (Wendt 1992; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Wendt 1999). This strand of constructivist thought is sometimes labeled as sociological institutionalism, whereas what we call liberal constructivism might also be called ideationist liberalism. 5 We used a range of different criteria to establish whether a country supported the United States or not. As the most obvious form of assistance, we regarded direct military participation in the war. Unhesitating and open passive military help also has to be regarded as support as well as troop commitment in the aftermath of the war, especially if this was not subject to the condition of a UN mandate. Furthermore, we especially focused on top official’s speeches, interviews, etc. We also considered a country’s behavior in international organizations like the UN. Finally, we also thought the assessment of other countries to be of importance and therefore regarded the White House’s list(s) of coalition partners as a helpful tool.

JÛRGEN SCHUSTER AND HERBERT MAIER
TABLE 1. Illustration of Power Positions

225

Countryn Belgium Bulgaria Czech Republic Denmark Germany Estonia Francew Great Britainw Greece Hungary Italy Latvia Lithuania Netherlands Poland Portugal Romania Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sum: United Statesw Russiaw

GDP

Military Relative Rank Expenditure Relative Rank Relative Rank GDP (GDP) (ME) ME (ME) Population Population Population 8 16 11 9 1 20 3 2 12 14 4 19 18 6 7 13 10 15 17 5 3,600 1,240 3,000 2,780 32,600 173 38,900 36,500 6,060 1,880 23,700 144 314 7,030 6,690 2,410 2,190 1,010 436 7,560 178,217 281,000 35,000 2.0 0.7 1.7 1.6 18.3 0.1 21.8 20.5 3.4 1.1 13.3 0.1 0.2 3.9 3.8 1.4 1.2 0.6 0.2 4.2 100.0 9 15 10 11 3 19 1 2 8 14 4 20 18 6 7 12 13 16 17 5 10.2 7.9 10.3 5.3 82.6 1.4 59.1 59.4 10.6 10.2 57.6 2.4 3.6 15.8 38.7 10.0 22.5 5.4 1.9 39.4 454.3 273.0 147.0 2.2 1.7 2.3 1.2 18.2 0.3 13.0 13.1 2.3 2.2 12.7 0.5 0.8 3.5 8.5 2.2 5.0 1.2 0.4 8.7 100.0 11 14 10 16 1 20 3 2 9 11 4 18 17 8 6 13 7 15 19 5

251,000 2.9 41,600 0.5 132,000 1.5 172,000 2.0 2,090,000 24.1 11,800 0.1 1,440,000 16.6 1,450,000 16.7 128,000 1.5 111,000 1.3 1,160,000 13.4 15,100 0.2 24,000 0.3 397,000 4.6 324,000 3.7 112,000 1.3 134,000 1.5 56,300 0.6 31,900 0.4 589,000 6.8 8,670,700 100.0 9,260,000 625,000

n Data rounded and for the year of 1999. GDP and military expenditure in million U.S. dollar, population in milllion inhabitants. Relative data only refers to the proportion of the examined countries. w Nuclear powers.

European allies of the United States that sparked off a debate about the future of transatlantic relations and NATO and the EU.6

Power, Office, or (Ideology-Based) Identities?
The Systemic Level: Power Positions and Power Politics

Hypothesis 1 explains different state behavior through varying material restrictions and opportunities on the systemic level. It does not take into account internal mechanisms and constellations of states. This neorealist or power–structural perspective on the Iraq dispute offers the hypothesis thatFbecause of differences in their power positionFthe ‘‘Great’’ European powers should oppose the United States, whereas the small ones should lean toward supporting the superpower. This thesis can be established via two different, but closely related, lines of argument.

Balance-of-Power Politics Although neorealists sometimes offer rather dissimilar theses about foreign policy behavior, they do share some basic assumptions and conclusions.7 All neorealists see
6 Except for Luxembourg, we compared all those European countries that are a member of both NATO and the EU or can hope to join both clubs until the end of this decade. This leaves all neutral European states out, which seems justifiable as such states generally reject taking sides in military conflicts of third parties. This can be regarded as a sufficient reason to explain why none of these countries actively supported the offensive U.S. policy. 7 For assumptions and core elements of structural neorealist thought, see, for example, Waltz (1979, 1995), Mearsheimer (1995:9–14; 2001:1–54), Elman (1996:18–21), and Baumann et al. (2001:38–42).

226

The Rift

states as unitary and the central actors in an anarchic international system, where no superior authority exists. From a neorealist point of view all states face rather harsh security pressures in such a setting.8 Ultimately they are dependent on selfhelp. The prerequisite to survive is power.9 States therefore act rather similar. They seek power as a means to secure survival (Waltz 1979:79–80). Power enhances a state’s freedom of action, its autonomy, and gives it influence over other states: both of which improve its security. Power and security can be obtained by increasing one’s own military capabilities. An alternative way to defend oneself from the influence of other, maybe stronger, powers is to engage in alliances (Waltz 1979:118–119; Link 2001:107). The central element of structural realism is the concept of structure. According to Kenneth Waltz, a political structure is determined by three characteristics: the ordering principle, the functional properties of the units, and the unit’s power relations (Waltz 1979:ch. 5). As anarchy is seen as a quasi-constant condition in the international world, which does not allow for the functional differentiation of units, the only relevant difference between states is their relative power capabilities. In international politics, the distribution of power is what counts. In order to explain the behavior of individual states, the systemic variable ‘‘distribution of power’’ has to be translated into a unit-level variable. This produces the relative power of a state in a system as the relevant neorealist-independent variable for foreign policy analysis. In neorealist understanding a nation’s foreign policy should be explainable and predictable through identifying its power position (Baumann, Rittberger, and Wagner 2001:42). It is important to note that the main motive that guides the actions of states does not necessarily have to be the whole international system and a state’s power position within the global power structure (Mearsheimer 1990:7). For most states, excluding great and superpowers, who are supposed to have much further reaching interests, the power structure within their ‘‘salient environment’’ (i.e., their neighborhood) is relevant, because ‘‘power and incentives wane with distance from states’ homebase’’ (Mouritzen 1998:4). Neighboring countries and those who are rather close possess a greater potential for influence, because the possibilities of economic and military power projection decline with increasing distance. Therefore, balancing alliance behavior is not foremost aimed at the greatest power, but rather focused on those states that pose the potentially greatest (negative) influence-potential or even threat (Walt 1987:esp. 23–24 and 153–165).10 In terms of security seeking, the aim of a state’s balance politics is to prevent other states from gaining (dominating) influence over it. This is why countries balance in a way that minimizes their (expected) loss in autonomy, or, in other words, that maximizes their (expected) long-term freedom of action (Baumann, Rittberger, and Wagner 2001:46).11 The small European states’ freedom of action and autonomy is most likely constrained by the great European countries, whose freedom of action is again
8 Liberals, Institutionalists, and Constructivists typically do not doubt that the international system is anarchic. But they reject the classical neorealist conclusion that this property inevitably produces a high security pressure, which makes power politics a necessity and genuine cooperation impossible (Wendt 1992; Powell 1994). 9 For short definitions of power and its components see Waltz (1979:131) and Morgenthau (1973). For further discussions of this central but elusive concept, see for example, Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (2001:71–75) and Baldwin (1993:3–25). Because of their importance and their relative ease to measure and compare, we took the following three components of power into account: military power, measured by military expenditure, economic power, measured by GDP, and the size of the population (see Table 1). Thereby, we focus on the ‘‘input dimension’’ of power and follow the neorealist understanding of power as control over resources (Mastanduno 1999:141; Wolf 2004). 10 The geographical proximity is a core element of Walt’s ‘‘Balance-of-Threat-theory,’’ which says that states do note balance against power alone, but against threats. 11 Obviously, in this perspective neorealism is not an evolutionary theory, but a theory of collective rational choice, which makes predictions about specific foreign policy actions possible.

JÛRGEN SCHUSTER AND HERBERT MAIER

227

foremost curtailed by the United States. Thus it can be argued that the great European powers tend to balance, or at least try to balance, against the United States to enhance their own autonomy and influence, while the small European states tend to balance (with the help of the United States) against the powerful European countries for the same reason (Link 2001:134). The same hypothesis can be derived with a slightly different line of argument, which is in principle based on considerations of balance of power, too.

Alliance Dependencies Alliance politics is often explained with reference to conditions of dependence. The argument is that asymmetric dependent allies face an alliance dilemma. On the one hand, they have to fear being dragged into the others’ conflicts, especially those of the leading power. On the other hand, they are afraid of being abandoned by the leading ally. This concern will be greater if a state is dependent on his ‘‘great partner’’ and minor if the alliance leader is in turn (at least indirectly) dependent on the former (Snyder 1984; Kupchan 1988; Bennet, Lepgold, and Unger 1994). For the small European states, a sound relationship with the United States appears much more important than for the powerful countries, because they cannot guarantee their security autonomously. They are much more vulnerable to influences from other, larger countries, as they are too weak without a strong partner. Whereas the powerful states can self-confidently confront the United States because their risk in doing so is simply relatively low, in small states the fear not to anger the superpower should prevail.12 For them it is appropriate to demonstrate their loyalty in order to reassure themselves of further support from the United States and to make clear their own relevance. This, in essence, is the classical balance-of-power argument ‘‘disguised’’ as alliance dependency. Whether argued directly with balance politics or indirectly with alliance dependencies: the neorealist forecast says that the small European states tend to support the American Iraq policy because it is American power that enhances their security and strengthens their autonomous freedom of action by holding in check the power of the bigger European states (Link 2002:41). But which are the small and the Great Powers in Europe? Table 1 illustrates the relative capabilities of the analyzed countries using the indicators of economic strength, military expenditures, and population. Obviously, Germany, the nuclear powers France and Great Britain, but also Italy stand apart. According to the applied indicators, these four countries constitute the group of the great European powers, whereas the 16 remaining countries are considered to be small states (similarly Mearsheimer 1990). The country-specific neorealist forecast is therefore that Germany, France, Great Britain, and Italy should oppose the Unites States’ Iraq ambitions, but the rest should support Washington.
Subsystemic Level: Societal Forces and Ideological Preferences

Whereas the power–structural hypothesis sees the configuration of power resources of unitary states as crucial, Hypotheses 2 and 3 identify domestic configurations as relevant factors determining foreign policy. For (modern) liberals and liberalconstructivists, the international system does not determine states’ preferences and actions. From a domestic politics perspective the sources of foreign policy lie in the material and ideal interests of individuals and groups, the relations between them, and their relative strengths. Domestic actors and structures explain states’ preferences and actions (Moravcsik 1997, 2003). The main foreign policy actor is a
Remember that the small European states’ experience with the United States is very positive. It was the United States that fended off a hegemonic attempt by a European great power three times within one century.
12

228

The Rift

country’s government. Its ‘‘core shared beliefs and interests’’ are said to be ‘‘the primary motivational basis . . . of foreign policy’’ (Hagan 1995:133), especially in very important issue areas like security. Thus Hypothesis 2 examines how significant the domestic interests of governments were. In essence, it postulates that the preferences of society determine the actions of governments. Hypothesis 3 examines whether the ideological stances of governments played a role in determining a country’s position during the Iraq crisis. It claims that the party affiliation of a government, that is, if an administration is left or right orientated, is the decisive factor in determining the position a country took.

Influence of Public Opinion One central argument of utilitarian–liberal approaches is that, in democracies at least, societal interests shape the behavior of governments and therefore of states, because rational politicians adapt to the interests of society in order to assure reelection and stay in power. To put it rather simplistically but vividly, representative government acts as a ‘‘transmission belt’’ that translates individual and group interests into public policy (Moravcsik 1997:518).13 In such a conception of public policy, public opinion, elites’ attitudes, and positions of interests groups are decisive factors for political action. This study focuses on public opinion and asks to what extent it can explain the behavior of European states during the Iraq crisis. Hypothesis 2 assumes that the general public has a distinct and measurable impact on the foreign policy behavior of countries. The core statement of this ‘‘bottom-up’’ approach is that ‘‘[i]n sum, leaders follow masses’’ (Risse-Kappen 1991:480). Whereas it was nearly consensus for several decades that mass public opinion plays only a very minor role in foreign policy, if any, this interpretation has been considerably challenged over the last 20 years. A growing number of studies reached the conclusion that ‘‘mass public opinion matter[s]’’ (Risse-Kappen 1991:510, emphasis in the original).14 The thesis that mass public opinion has an effect on policy should be especially true if a broad public is activated (Powlick and Katz 1998). This was surely the case with the Iraq question, which was hotly debated around Europe. Furthermore, the hypothesis exists that the influence of mass public opinion grows as more, especially issue specific, survey data become available to politicians (Holsti 1996:195). Therefore we operationalized the influence of society, its beliefs, interests, and actors through the concept of mass public opinion.15 We applied two criteria to measure public opinion. Firstly, we considered the results of surveys. Secondly, we analyzed the extent of public protests. However, some problems with the case-specific formulation of the hypothesis that mass public opinion determines a government’s Iraq policy should be discussed. First of all, second-hand survey data had to be used. There were some crosscountry surveys available, but in order to get a broader picture it was essential to use country-specific surveys as well. Therefore, and because of changes over time, it seems reasonable to allow for a rather wide tolerance. Furthermore, especially if
13 Clearly, this argument is based on the concept of political actors as rational utility maximizers as it is formulated in classical economic theory of politics and pluralist theory of democracy. From that perspective the aspiration of politicians to ‘‘attain the income, prestige, and power which come from being in office’’ (Downs 1957:28) finally acts as the mechanism that makes society’s preferences those of governments. 14 For overviews of the debate about the effect of public opinion on foreign policy see Russett (1990:87–110), Holsti (1992), and Shapiro and Jacobs (2000:223–245). 15 This operationalization of societal attitudes also results from the nature of the examined problem. The influence of private interest groups etc. should be rather low in the analyzed situation compared with situations with distributional effects, because ‘‘in the case of broader political and security issues, powerful domestic actors do not frame policy decisions as they do on domestic matters’’ (Banchoff 1993:12). Furthermore, the influence that private interest groups can exert in politicized issues seems to be largely dependent on the support of mass public opinion (Risse-Kappen 1991:510–511).

JÛRGEN SCHUSTER AND HERBERT MAIER
H 2a prediction: country does not support the U.S. ‘neutral range’ prediction: country supports the U.S.

229

share of population against attack

0.6

0.5 mass protests against an Iraq-war

0.4

H 2b

prediction: country does not support the U.S.

prediction: country supports the U.S.

FIG. 1. Decision rule for the societal hypothesis.

measurement difficulties are considered, it is rather unlikely that a government will follow public opinion if there is no clear or a changing majority. Thus, it was deemed necessary to specify an ‘‘undetermined’’ or ‘‘neutral’’ range, which we defined as instances where between 40% and 60% of the people were against or for an Iraq invasion in the weeks and months before the beginning of the war. Only if more than 60% persistently opposed an attack would it be expected that the government followed in its policy. It is clearly a weakness when for a particular value range of an independent variable no meaningful prediction can be formulated. Thus, we formulated Hypothesis 2 in a second version, which argues that only if public opinion is clearly against an invasion, that is, if more than 60% oppose such an action, a country will take a corresponding stance. If opposition is below that threshold, Hypothesis 2b predicts that a country supports the United States.16 As mentioned above, besides survey data, we employed a second criterion to determine the public’s attitude. As an indicator of salience we considered to what extent people took to the street to express their opinion. If there were mass demonstrations against an Iraq war, it can be argued that there was clear public pressure on the government, even if the general public mood was in the ‘‘neutral’’ range. Consequently, under such circumstances a government should have taken an opposing stance against the United States as well, according to the societal hypothesis.17 As describing all possible constellations and predictions of Hypothesis 2a and 2b would be too long winded for this paper, Figure 1 shows the possible values and the accompanying forecasts of these hypotheses. The dotted arrows show when and how mass protests altered the classification compared with survey data.

Do Parties Matter? The third or partisan hypothesis suggests that the ideological background of a government, which is expressed in its party affiliation, has a major influence on foreign policy. Governments formed by left-of-center parties or at least dominated by leftist parties are expected to oppose America’s Iraq policy. Governments
16 This argument needs at least one further auxiliary assumption. For example, it can be argued that, for diplomatic reasons, a country tends to support a friendly nation, because it seeks to avoid conflict not only on the domestic level, but also on the international level. Only if domestic opposition is obvious, a government should withdraw from its predisposed supporting stance. See Bennet et al. (1994). In the strict sense, this argument leaves the subsystemic level and employs a third-image argument. 17 This argument rests on the consideration that even with unclear survey data, a significant part of the population is highly mobilized if hundreds of thousands of people take to the street. A very strong issue-specific activation suggests that the relevant issue has a significant impact on the overall valuation of a government or party. Thus, this issue should be relevant for the voting decisions of an important part of society.

230

The Rift

formed by or dominated by right-of-center parties are supposed to back the United States. Obviously, this hypothesis implies a very different conception of political actors. They are not primarily regarded as utility maximizers, who derive utility only from being in office. On the contrary, this hypothesis models political actors as mainly policy oriented. It assumes that their first and foremost concern is to shape their countries’ policy according to their political beliefs or ideology. According to the ‘‘partisan theory’’ (Hibbs 1992), political actors are, with limits of course, able to do this. Partisan theory suggests that the partisan composition of a government is a major determinant of policy outputs and outcomes as well. Party ideologies are thought to be relevant for public policy (Hibbs 1977; Schmidt 1996; Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen 1997; Boix 1998). Regularly policy preferences are operationalized through the left–right scheme. We followed this scheme and grouped all major parties and all governments in either the right category or the left one. Social-democratic, socialist, communist, green and social-liberal parties were counted as left parties. The category of right parties consists of conservative, liberal and liberal-conservative, Christian-democratic, and center-parties.18 We applied two criteria for that classification. The first criterion was the way a party sees itself, which is expressed in which international party organization a party is a (associate) member.19 Secondly, the political science literature about European parties and their ideological orientation and media reports were used to classify the parties.20 The hypothesis that leftist parties, and therefore governments dominated by leftist parties, should oppose the Iraq policy of the Bush administration rests on three considerations. Firstly, it can be argued that ideological kinship plays a role in international coalition-building processes, which implies that right-orientated governments tend to support a conservative U.S. administration.21 Secondly, the political left tends to value peace and nonmilitary conflict resolution higher, especially when there is no ‘‘clear’’ humanitarian cause for an intervention.22 Thirdly, antiAmerican sentiment seems to be stronger within the European left than the (moderate) right. Although the partisan hypothesis is widely examined, discussed, and usually affirmed in Comparative Politics and Comparative Economics, it is neglected in Comparative Foreign Policy Analysis and IRs. Studies that explicitly examine whether the ‘‘color’’ of a state’s government makes a difference for its external behavior in comparative perspective are very rare, even though disagreements between parties over foreign policy issues are quite common and often as fiercely debated as those about domestic issues.23 This neglect of party politics in the analysis of foreign policy and IRs is particularly noteworthy, because the ‘‘partisan theory’’ lies at the center of democratic legitimation. It is also remarkable because, with the ‘‘constructivist turn’’ (Checkel
18 A complete list of the 116 examined parties and their classification can be downloaded at http://www.uniregensburg.de/Fakultaeten/phil_Fak_III/Politikwissenschaft/html/herbert_maier_downloads.html. 19 Member lists are provided by all major international party organizations. See www.europeangreens.org, www.eldr.org, www.evppe.org, www.pes.org, www.liberal-international.org, and www.socialistinternational.org. 20 Besides country-specific articles about party systems that cannot all be listed here, we mainly used Ismayr (2002, 2003) and Bugajski (2002), which provide a good overview of European party systems. 21 The assumption behind this argument is that ideological kinship involves a similar belief system or set of normative political attitudes, which leads to a similar assessment of problems and a similar policy, respectively. 22 The dimensions ‘‘peace’’ and ‘‘military’’ are important indicators for classifying parties on the left–right continuum (Budge and Klingemann 2001). 23 Of course, some studies on foreign policy analyze the role of political parties, but mostly those are countryspecific studies (see, for example, Banchoff 1993; Verbeek 2003). Comparative studies are rare. Exceptions are, for example, Zurn (1993), Kittel, Rittberger, and Schimmelfennig (1995), Kaarbo (1996), and Therien and Noel (2000). ¨ Therien and Noel provide a short overview of the spare literature about the impact of political parties on foreign policy as well.

JÛRGEN SCHUSTER AND HERBERT MAIER
Theoretical Background Structural realism (neorealism) Utilitarian liberalism Level of Actor analysis Thirdimage Secondimage State Actor’s basic interest Survival, security Actor’s Preference Maximizing autonomy and influence Independent variable Hypothesis

231

Power position Weak states support U.S., strong oppose. Societal preference (public opinion) States, whose public is against an Iraq-war, oppose an attack. Left governments oppose the U.S.’s Iraqpolicy, right governments support the U.S.

Government (Re-)election Determined by to attain (exogenous) office societal preference

SecondLiberal constructivism image (idealist liberalism)

Government, Convert party elites partisan identity into public policy

Assumption: Left Party is stronger affiliation of peace-orientated government and more skeptical against (conservative) U.S.-policy.

FIG. 2. Overview of the examined hypotheses.

1998) in IRs, a new (or renewed) emphasis has been put on ideational factors like beliefs, norms, ideas, and culture (Goldstein and Keohane 1993; Klotz 1995; Finnemore 1996a; Katzenstein 1996; Wendt 1999; Boekle, Rittberger, and Wagner 2001).24 In principle, nothing speaks against locating the ‘‘intersubjectively shared, value-based expectations of appropriate behaviour’’ (Boekle, Rittberger, and Wagner 2001:106), which constructivists claim to guide actors’ behavior at the level of political parties or party ideologies, respectively. If parties and governments took a distinguishable position according to their ideological background, then they did so because they differently interpreted or constructed the situation, as they had different identities or normative visions about appropriate political behavior. The next section presents the empirical answers to the question of whether it were international power structures, public opinion, or party ideologies that had the dominant impact on the Iraq policy of European states in the months before the war. Before this presentation, Figure 2 gives a short overview of the three hypotheses derived above.

Results
In this section the results of the hypotheses tests on the 20 European countries listed above will be presented. The dichotomous values of the variables were derived with the help of case studies, which examined the behavior of each country from summer 2002 until summer 2003.25 Table A1, which can be found in the appendix, summarizes those values for each country. Tables A2–A5 summarizes the performance of the hypotheses tested, with Tables A3–A5 providing some simple statistics as well.
Hypothesis 1: Small States and Great Powers

Out of 16 small states only three did not declare themselves part of the ‘‘coalition of the willing’’ and did not lend their political, sometimes even military, support to the
24 25

We use the term constructivism in the sense of ‘‘soft’’ or ‘‘thin’’ constructivism (Carlsnaes 2002; Palan 2000). For those case studies and their sources, see Schuster (2004).

232

The Rift

United States, namely Belgium, Greece, and Slovenia, with Slovenia being rather unsure for quite a long time. Together with Belgium, France and Germany, the two leading continental powers, fiercely opposed the United States. But the other two Great Powers, Great Britain and Italy, supported the United States. With a ‘‘hit rate’’ of 75%, the power-structural hypothesis scored rather high as Tables A2 and A3 show (see appendix). Several further points are also noteworthy. In several cases Hypothesis 1 is the only hypothesis that offers a correct forecast. All those casesFEstonia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and RomaniaFare former communist countries in Middle-Eastern Europe. And the only ex-communist country that did not align itself with the United States was Slovenia, although for several months it seemed as if Slovenia would declare itself part of the ‘‘coalition of the willing.’’ Obviously, in the eastern parts of Europe the powerstructural hypothesis scored well. Not so much in Western Europe, where its forecast and actual behavior fit in 6 out of 10 cases and where alternative accounts attain a better record.
Hypothesis 2: The Sceptical People

In all but a few European countries, the public’s attitude toward an Iraq intervention was clearly hostile against an invasion (see Tables A2 and A4 in the appendix). European societies generally were very skeptical against the United States Iraq policy. In no country was there a clear and permanent majority for a military solution of the Iraq crisis. On the contrary, in most countries a clear majority rejected an attack, even if supported by a further United Nations Security Council Resolution. Nearly everywhere, sending own troops to Iraq was regarded as anathema by large majorities. In some states, however, public opinion was rather undetermined. Public opinion about the right Iraq policy was unclear in Bulgaria, Denmark, Poland, and Romania before the war, where nearly half of the population expressed consent to America’s Iraq policy and wanted their governments to support the United States. Opinion polls showed similar figures for Great Britain, but contrary to the four countries listed above, Britain saw substantial public unrest as hundred of thousands took to the streets to protest against an imminent attack and their own government’s support of such a move. Germany, Italy, and Spain, to name just the most striking examples, saw massive public protests as well. In those countries, but also in France, Greece, and so forth, opinion polls showed a crystal clear picture with up to 90% rejecting an invasion and support of an intervention. Despite this sometimes massive public resistance, governments generally did not follow public opinion. In fact, the forecast of the societal hypothesis was correct in only 31% (Hypothesis 2a) and 45% (Hypothesis 2b) of the cases, respectively. Additionally, there were no cases in which public opinion served as the only explanation for the relevant country’s political position. Although there are clear signs that some governments that supported the United States, like those of Spain, Italy, Hungary, or the Czech Republic, became more cautious with mounting public opposition and, for example, backed away from once offered active military support, no country that stood in the camp of the ‘‘coalition of the willing’’ altered its pro-American position and shirked from its political support. As just indicated, public pressure seems to have influenced governments in their decisions about the use of their own military forces.26 Although the dependent variable of this study is the political stance a country took, it seemed worthwhile to analyze how well the societal hypothesis would have fared, if the dependent variable had been altered into ‘‘active military participation in an Iraq intervention.’’ Clearly, a forecast about military participation of European countries in an Iraq war based on the public’s stance would have scored very well with a ‘‘hitrate’’ of nearly
26

Chan and Safran (2006) and Schuster (2004) provide a more detailed discussion of this issue.

JÛRGEN SCHUSTER AND HERBERT MAIER

233

90%. As there is further evidence from the case studies that some governments really backed away from military support and constrained their support for the United States at the political level in the face of public opposition, it can be argued that the public’s will is generally mighty enough to hinder the use of military force, but it seems not to be influential enough to determine key political foreign policy positions.
Hypothesis 3: Party PoliticsFThe Left Versus the Right?

The result of the partisan hypothesis is somewhat ambivalent, but very interesting (see again Tables A2 and A5 in the appendix). In 12 out of 20 cases a state took the position expected by the partisan hypothesis. Overall, this result is not very impressive, but a closer look reveals some interesting details. Whereas in Middle Eastern Europe the partisan hypothesis correctly predicted only 4 out of 10 cases, it was wrong in only two West European Countries: in Britain and France. However, in both countries there was clear case evidence that the parties of the right were more supportive toward the United States than those on the left. France, by the way, was the only country with a right-of-center leadership that opposed the United States’ Iraq policy. And Britain’s labor government was the only leftist West European government which supported the United States. In contrast, six out of seven left-of-center governments in Eastern Europe positioned their country in the ‘‘coalition of the willing.’’ In this part of Europe, the ideological orientation of a government, measured in the categories of left-of-center and right-of-center, obviously has no explanatory power for a country’s position during the Iraq crisis. In Western Europe though, the party affiliation of a government seems to be a good indicator of how a country behaved during the Iraq crisis, as Table A2 and especially the low value of the Fisher–Yates test on statistical independence show (see Table A5). The hypothesis that leftist parties tended to object to the U.S.-led invasion, whereas the political right supported this action, gets further support from a more detailed analysis of the positions of individual parties. Table 2 summarizes the results of this analysis, which examined the stance of 116 European parties or their leadership, respectively. It shows a significant relationship between the ideological orientation of parties and their stances during the months before the Iraq war. This relationship is weaker in Eastern European countries than in Western European ones, but is nevertheless significant. Still, the main point is that there exists a clear difference between Eastern and Western Europe.
TABLE 2. Summary of European Political Parties’ Positions Percentage Fisher–Yates Rate Test on Statistical K Coefficient Independence (Normed) f (Via w2) Difference All parties Western European partiesw Eastern European partiesn All opposition parties Western European opposition partiesw Eastern European opposition partiesn All governmental partiesw Western European governmental partiesw Eastern European governmental parties
Passed exact Fisher–Yeates test at a ¼ 0.05. Passed exact Fisher–Yeates test at a ¼ 0.01. N ¼ 116.
n

l 0.5769 0.7647 0.0000 0.4000 0.3333 0.4167 0.0714 0.8000 0.0000

w

0.0000 0.0000 0.0245 0.0000 0.0018 0.0171 0.0004 0.0001 0.2689

0.7265 0.9100 0.4164 0.7715 0.8473 0.6125 0.6346 0.9023 0.3093

0.5988 0.8406 0.3081 0.6509 0.7483 0.4805 0.5021 0.8286 0.2241

60.28 81.58 29.31 59.87 60.00 48.48 45.03 82.86 15.93

w

234

The Rift

The partisan hypothesis clearly holds for oppositional parties, both in Eastern and Western Europe. For governmental parties, however, only in Western Europe does a strong and significant relationship between the ideological orientations of parties and their positions regarding an Iraq intervention exist. Eastern European parties in government mostly did not act as expected according to their ideological background. Obviously, it did not really matter in former communist states if a country had a left-of-center or right-of-center government. It did make a significant difference in Western Europe though. The observation that an overall relationship between parties’ ideologies and positions toward America’s Iraq policy exists, as it is clearly visible in the opposition parties’ stances, has an apparent implication. In the western part of Europe ideological preferences generally transformed into foreign policy. In the eastern part, those ideological attitudes were superimposed by other forces and consequently had no effect. The results described so far can be further validated by a short significance test. With a simple binomial test, we examined whether the results of the hypotheses were just accidental, that is, could just as well have been achieved through simple guessing or by tossing a coin; or if the knowledge of a state’s power position, the party affiliation of its government, or the public’s attitude significantly enhanced the chances to predict correctly if a country was part of the ‘‘coalition of the willing’’ or not. The results of this test, which formally reads H1: pi40.5 (H0: pi  0.5), with pi being the proportion of correctly predicted cases, are presented in Table 3. Cleary, this test confirms the results described above. Knowledge of public opinion could not really help to forecast a European country’s political position on an American-led Iraq intervention. A forecast about military support for the United States, though, would have been rather reliable and clearly not accidental if based on the public sentiment about such a policy. The same is true for the powerstructural hypothesis, especially in Eastern Europe, and the partisan hypothesis in Western Europe. In these cases it is highly unlikely that the observed proportion of congruence between prediction and actual behavior could have been achieved through random guessing.
Power in the East–Ideology in the West?

One major result of this study so far has been that the explanatory power of the partisan and the power structural hypotheses differ sharply in the western and the eastern part of Europe. The partisan hypothesis offers a convincing account for the

TABLE 3. Test of Results’ Superiority Against Guessing Right Hypothesis Hypothesis Hypothesis Hypothesis Hypothesis Hypothesis Hypothesis Hypothesis Hypothesis
n

Wrong 5 4 1 11 11 2 8 2 6

Proportional Right 0.75 0.60 0.90 0.31 0.45 0.89 0.60 0.80 0.40

Proportional Wrong 0.25 0.40 0.10 0.69 0.55 0.11 0.40 0.20 0.60

N 20 10 10 16 20 19 20 10 10

P(x  r)w 0.0207 0.3770 0.0107 0.9616 0.7483 0.0004 0.2517 0.0547 0.8281

1n 1 (West) 1 (East)n 2 (a) 2 (b) 2 (Military)n 3 3 (West)n 3 (East)

15 6 9 5 9 17 12 8 4

Significant at a ¼ 0.1. Probability that a ‘‘success rate’’ at least as good as the actual rate would have been achieved by pure guessing, with r being the number of correctly predicted cases by each hypothesis.
w

JÛRGEN SCHUSTER AND HERBERT MAIER

235

behavior of West European governments, but cannot explain the positions of their eastern counterparts. The power-structural hypothesis is well placed to account for the supportive behavior of nearly all Eastern European countries, but the power position of a country seems to be a rather inadequate indicator of behavior in Western Europe. But what can account for the different explanatory power of the power structural and the partisan hypothesis in different regions of Europe? Why had there been obviously dissimilar motivational sources of foreign policy? Apparently, an intervening variable had to be at work. Two rivalry explanations seem plausible: one that stresses cultural factors and one that is located at the systemic level and stresses differences in the security environment or its perception, respectively. The second explanation seems more convincing. We argue that the dissimilar security situation is the prevailing reason, that is, the intervening variable, why systemic forces operated in Eastern Europe but not in Western Europe and made Eastern European countries support the United States regardless of domestic configurations. After all, it is plausible that a country which faces tougher security pressures and more negative influence scenarios from its neighbors is more likely to look for a strong partner to provide shelter and security. As long as the small European states are, or perceive themselves as, dependent on the United States for security, they are likely to strive for a close and untroubled relationship with the United States. Of course, this is true for all small states in Europe. But the argument is that Eastern European states live in a worse, or perceive a worse, security environment, which makes power political considerations prevalent and pushes domestic motives aside. A possible decline in the relationship with the United States seems much graver for those states under the assumption of a declining marginal utility of security. Without dwelling on details, it can be argued that a worse objective security situation can be established through the higher political instability in neighboring regions and through the potentially dominating influence of Russia, from which those states just ‘‘escaped.’’ In the end, it has no consequences at all for the observation that domestic constellations did not influence the security policy of the former communist states, but had generally a decisive weight in Western Europe if the security situation is just perceived or objectively determinable. Nonetheless, there is an argument that speaks against the predominance of alternative, that is, cultural explanations like the argument that the Eastern European countries are all former communist countries which had just been freed by the United States and because of this are more willing to engage in the liberation of subjugated countries. If these interpretations were the most convincing, then there should have been no significant difference in the behavior of governmental and oppositional parties as cultural and perceptional factors should have the same effect on a party, regardless of whether it is in opposition or if it governs. The oppositional parties in Eastern Europe therefore generally should not have acted according to the partisan hypothesis. However, they did (see Table 2). The fact that the Eastern European parties in government, but not the oppositional parties, generally took a pro-American stance regardless of their political background supports the interpretation that there exists an objectively more precarious security situation in Eastern Europe, according to which those governments were forced to act. But there is also evidence that cultural and/or perceptional factors played at least a minor role because, as Table 2 also shows, the relationship between ideological background and political stance in the Iraq issue is clearly weaker in Eastern European countries than in Western European ones. The essence of the empirical results of this study can be summarized as follows. Domestic constellations, or more precisely, the ideological background of governments, generally decided if a country was part of the ‘‘coalition of the willing’’ in

236

The Rift

Western Europe. In Eastern Europe, though, domestic constellations did not play a role. There, states predominantly acted according to structural forces at the systemic level.

Implications for IRs Theory
This last section focuses on two implications of our empirical study for the theoretical debate in IRs and foreign policy analysis. We argue that (1) neorealist theory would benefit from acknowledging the possibility of varying security pressure independent of a state’s power position, and (2) political parties should receive greater attention in the analysis of foreign policy. The obvious dependency of the explanatory power of the structural approach on the security environment a state faces implies that, in security issues, too, the scope of the neorealist theory is more limited than claimed by its advocates. Power considerations only seem to govern foreign policy if a country’s security position is fragile or is perceived as fragile. Where threats are small, neorealist accounts score poorly. This leads to the thesis that neorealist theory is not a very suitable model to account for foreign policy in regions like Western Europe, where national policy is, at least to a certain degree, transformed by institutional arrangements, etc., and where no significant external threat to autonomy can be perceived. The worst-case assumption of structural realism seems not to describe correctly the actual calculation of political actors in those ‘‘safe regions.’’ There, considerations of power typically seem to be superimposed by domestic factors. Neorealist approaches could enhance their plausibility and applicability, especially in the field of alliance and balance politics if they employed a state’s security position as the explanatory variable (or at least explicitly recognized the security environment as an intervening variable) instead of the power position. The security position can be understood as consisting of the power position and further components which, independently of power relations have an effect on the security of a country. Instead of being a function of its power position, the foreign policy of a country should be understood as a function of its security position. In such a model, the security position increases both with an increasing power position and with a better power-independent security position. If the power position of a country is very weak because of its own minor capabilities and/or the system’s power structure, then its security position is solely determined by powerindependent factors. If the security environment is very fragile and threatening, then the security and autonomy of a country is largely, or even totally, dependent on its power position (and those of its allies). Under the common neorealist premise that states derive utility from security and under the assumption of a declining marginal rate of utility from security, states will strive less for power, and balance of power politics will determine policy less, the better its security position is, because a marginal change in security has comparably little impact on a state’s utility under the condition of high security. Following from this, and from the variability of security independent of power, power and balance politics will not play a major role if the security position is good, even if the distribution of power would suggest such policies. Especially if a good security position is mainly a result of power-independent factors, states are supposed to be relatively relaxed about a marginal change in their power position. However, if a state’s security position is bad, we expect it to be much more sensitive to changes in relative power and to act much more according to power and alliance motives.27
27 This view is very similar to Stephen Walt’s ‘‘Balance of Threat’’ theory and partly derived from it as the informed reader surely is aware of (Walt 1987; for a similar argument see Brooks 1997). Stronger than Walt’s theory, though, it emphasizes the importance of the ‘‘absolute’’ level of security, instead of relative differences in threats from different states. However, the similarity is clearly strong, as the power-independent security position can be

JÛRGEN SCHUSTER AND HERBERT MAIER

237

Our results imply the thesis of a smaller scope of the power-structural neorealist approach. In our model the concept of the power-independent security position leaves room for changes in a state’s security position regardless of changes in its power position. In contrast to that, neorealists generally see security that is not based on power as constant (and small), because they operate with worst-case scenarios.28 According to the results of this study, we expect the power position to be a useful indicator for foreign policy analysis only if the nonpower components of security are in a ‘‘bad condition.’’ Determining in more detail and across a wider range of issues and cases what generally constitutes the power-independent security situation should be a promising field of future research, offering the opportunity of theoretical advancements by connecting insights from different paradigms.29 Various arguments about what constitutes a state’s security situation besides its power position can be found in institutionalist, liberal, and constructivist thinking. These approaches have in common that they do not work with worst-case assumptions and allow for a variation of the power-independent security situation. With varying emphasis these approaches argue, for example, that information, international institutions (Keohane 1993, 2002), the form of government (Russett 1993; Oneal and Russett 1999; Russett and Oneal 2001; Lipson 2003), or national cultures (Kier 1995; Katzenstein 1996; Hudson 1997), norms (Kratochwil 1989; Onuf 1989; Finnemore 1996b) and ideas (Goldstein and Keohane 1993) have a changing effect on policy, because such factors are supposed to offset the constancy of anarchy (Wendt 1992). The second major implication, or rather claim, of our study is: ‘‘Bring parties in!’’ Surprisingly enough, political parties and their differing ideological orientations have been neglected in the theoretical study of IRs and foreign policy. However, they offer a promising field of research, especially for the study of foreign policy formulation in parliamentary systems. This study suggests that it is sensible to analyze the effects that governments’ party affiliations have on foreign policy in more detail, and from a comparative perspective. In countries that do not face significant external threats, this domestic factor seems to have an underestimated influence on foreign policy. As indicated above,23 there are just a handful of scholarly publications discussing this topic seriously and in a comparative perspective. Textbooks on IRs and foreign policy are mostly ignorant on the role of political parties and their ideological preferences. Whenever political parties are mentioned, two things are remarkable: they are either touched on in a footnote or a small paragraph or they are discussed generally in the context of government structure. Indeed, there is a strand in the literature discussing the effects of different government and cabinet structures, and also of different party systems, on foreign policy at some length.30 Although these are important contributions that provide remarkable insights, it seems to us thatFmuch like at the international levelFsuch analyses of governmental structures, which ignore the political aims, orientations, and ideologies of their subjects, risk overestimating structural conditions while disregarding the agency of the
understood as the sum of all threats from other states. Further neorealist works that offer some similar aspects, that challenge the constant effects of anarchy from a neorealist perspective, and that influenced our model are, for example, Grieco (1995) and Schweller and Priess (1997). 28 (Neo)realists, especially neoclassical realists, frequently argue that the power position of a country does not necessarily entail the expected policy. They maintain that domestic factors hinder states to react ‘‘correctly’’ according to the structure of the international system (Waltz 1979:71). See further and on neoclassical realism generally Schweller (1997, 2003) and Rose (1998). However, for the model just described domestic factors are not just intervening variables, which lead to suboptimal policy. It provides a (systemic) boundary condition, under which circumstances foreign policy is led by power structures. 29 Especially in foreign policy analysis, there are trends that endorse the combination of different approaches and accept eclecticism in theory building (Neack, Hey, and Haney 1995:2; Hill 2003:30; Neack 2003). 30 See, for example, Kaarbo (1996, 2001), Ireland and Gartner (2001), Sprecher and DeRouen (2005), or Chan and Safran (2006).

238

The Rift

actors. We think this limitation on structure at the domestic level misses opportunities of more actor-focused explanations that take the ideological orientations of important players, visible in party affiliations, into account. It might have been justified to neglect governments’ party affiliations in times of high security pressures that threatened the survival of Western democracies. But to ignore the ideological orientations of parties and governments today means to ignore an important determinant of foreign policy. At least in Western Europe, it appears not erroneous to care about governments’ ideologies, as Morgenthau once claimed (Morgenthau 1973:5), but necessary.

Appendix
Tables A1–A5
TABLE A1. Values of Variables Power Position Weak Weak Weak Weak Weak Strong Strong Strong Weak Weak Strong Weak Weak Weak Weak Weak Weak Weak Weak Weak Governments’ Ideological Orientationn Left Right Left Right Left Right Left Left Left Left Right Right Left Right Left Right Left Right Left Right PO on Military Participation Oppositional Oppositional Oppositional Neutral Oppositional Oppositional Oppositional Oppositional Oppositional Oppositional Oppositional Oppositional Oppositional Oppositional Oppositional Oppositional Oppositional Oppositional Oppositional Oppositional

Country Belgium (W) Bulgaria (E) Czeh Republic (E) Denmark (W) Estonia (E) France (W) Germany (W) Great Britain (W) Greece (W) Hungary (E) Italy (W) Latvia (E) Lithuania (E) Netherlands (W) Poland (E) Portugal (W) Romania (E) Slovakia (E) Slovenia (E) Spain (W)

Political Stance Oppositional Supportive Supportive Supportive Supportive Oppositional Oppositional Supportive Oppositional Supportive Supportive Supportive Supportive Supportive Supportive Supportive Supportive Supportive Oppositional Supportive

Public Opinion (PO) Oppositional Neutral Oppositional Neutral Oppositional Oppositional Oppositional Oppositional Oppositional Oppositional Oppositional Oppositional Oppositional Oppositional Neutral Oppositional Neutral Oppositional Oppositional Oppositional

n Where both left and right of center parties were part of a government this government was classified according to the dominating party of parties.

TABLE A2. ResultFOverview

Country

Power-structural Hypothesis

Partisan Hypothesis

Societal Hypothesis (a)

Societal Hypothesis (b)

Societal Hypothesis (Military)

JÛRGEN SCHUSTER AND HERBERT MAIER

Belgium (W) Bulgaria (E) Czech Republic (E) Denmark (W) Estonia (E) France (W) Germany (W) Great Britain (W) Greece (W) Hungary (E) Italy (W) Latvia (E) Lithuania (E) Netherlands (W) Poland (E) Portugal (W) Romania (E) Slovakia (E) Slovenia (E) Spain (E) Sum ‘‘confirmed’’ Sum ‘‘not confirmed’’ No. of valid cases Proportion of confirmed cases

Not confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Not confirmed Not confirmedn Confirmed Not confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Not confirmedn Confirmed 15 (W:6, E:9) 5 (W:4, E:1) 20 (W:10, E:10) 0.75 (W:06, E:0.9)

Confirmed Confirmed Not confirmedw Confirmed Not confirmed Not confirmedw Confirmed Not confirmedw Confirmed Not confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Not confirmed Confirmed Not confirmed Confirmed Not confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed 12 (W:8, E:4) 8 (W:2, E:6) 20 (W:10, E:10) 0.6 (W:0.8, E:0.4)

Confirmed Fz Not confirmed Fz Not confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Not confirmed Confirmed Not confirmed Not confirmed Not confirmed Not confirmed Not confirmed Fz Not confirmed Fz Not confirmed Confirmed Not confirmed 5 (W:4, E:1) 11 (W:5, E:6) 16 (W:9, E:7) 0.3 (W:0.44, E:0.14)

Confirmed Confirmed Not confirmed Confirmed Not confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Not confirmed Confirmed Not confirmed Not confirmed Not confirmed Not confirmed Not confirmed Confirmed Not confirmed Confirmed Not confirmed Confirmed Not confirmed 9 (W:5, E:4) 11 (W:5, E:6) 20 (W:10, E:10) 0.45 (W:0.5, E:0.4)

Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Fz Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Not confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Not confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed 17 2 19 0.89

n

w

But some evidence that a county’s behavior was influenced by the desire not to anger the United States. But a clear difference in the stances of left and right parties, with the left being less willing to support the United States than parties of the right. z Observed values of surveys are predominantly in the ‘‘neutral’’ range and no massive public protests. Therefore no clear prognosis is possible.

239

240

The Rift
TABLE A3. ResultsFHypothesis 1 Country Row Total

Small H1: all countriesn Support Yes No Column total H1: Western European Countriesw Support Yes No Column total H1: Eastern European Countriesz Support Yes No Column total

Large

13 81% 3 19% 16 80%

2 50% 2 50% 4 20%

15 75% 5 25% 20 100%

4 67% 2 33% 6 60%

2 50% 2 50% 4 40%

6 60% 4 40% 10 100%

9 90% 1 10% 10 100%

0 F 0 F 0 0%

9 90% 1 10% 10 100%

n Percentage rate difference 31%; w2 1,667; f (via w2) ¼ Cramer’s index 0.289; K-coefficient (normed) 0.392; Fisher– Yates Test on statistical independence 0.249. w Percentage rate difference 17%; w2 0,278; f (via w2) ¼ Cramer’s index 0.167; K-coefficient (normed) 0,232; FisherYates Test on statistical independence 0.548. z Percentage rate difference #DIV/0!; w2 #DIV/0!; f (via w2) ¼ Cramer’s index #DIV/0!; K-coefficient (normed) #DIV/0!; Fisher–Yates Test on statistical independence 1.000.

References
ALESINA, ALBERTO, NOURIEL ROUBINI, AND GERALD COHEN. (1997) Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. BALDWIN, DAVID A. (1993) Neoliberalism, Neorealism and World Politics. In Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, edited by David A. Baldwin. New York: Columbia University Press. BANCHOFF, THOMAS F. (1993) The Party Politics of Foreign Policy: Germany and European Institutions, 1949– 1992. Ann Arbor: UMI, Princeton University, Ph.D. Dissertation. BAUMANN, RAINER, VOLKER RITTBERGER, AND WOLFGANG WAGNER. (2001) Neorealist Foreign Policy Theory. In German Foreign Policy Since Unification: Theories and Case Studies, edited by Volker. Rittberger. Manchester: Manchester University Press. BENNET, ANDREW, JOSEPH LEPGOLD, AND DANNY UNGER. (1994) Burden-Sharing in the Persian Gulf War. International Organization 48:39–75. BOEKLE, HENNING, VOLKER RITTBERGER, AND WOLFGANG WAGNER. (2001) Constructivist Foreign Policy Theory. In German Foreign Policy since Unification: Theories and Case Studies, edited by Volker. Rittberger. Manchester: Manchester University Press. BOIX, CHARLES. (1998) Political Parties, Growth and Equality: Conservative and Social Democratic Strategies in the World Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. BROOKS, STEPHEN G. (1997) Dueling Realisms. International Organization 51:445–477. BUDGE, IAN, AND HANS-DIETER KLINGEMANN. (2001) Finally! Comparative Over-time Mapping of Party Policy Movement. In Mapping Policy Preferences: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments

JÛRGEN SCHUSTER AND HERBERT MAIER
TABLE A4. ResultsFHypothesis 2 Public Opinion Pro Hypothesis 2a: All countries (Political) Support Yes No Column total Hypothesis 2b: All countriesw (Political) Support Yes No Column total H2c: (Military) All countriesz Direct Military Support Yes No Column total
n

241

Contra

Row Total

0 F 0 F 0 0%

11 69% 5 31% 16 100%

11 69% 5 31% 16 100%

4 100% 0 0% 4 20%

11 69% 5 31% 16 80%

15 75% 5 25% 20 100%

0 F 0 F 0 0%

2 !1% 17 89% 19 100%

2 !1% 17 89% 19 100%

n Percentage rate difference #DIV/0!; w2 #DIV/0!; f (via w2) ¼ Cramer’s index #DIV/0!; K-coefficient (normed) #DIV/0!; Fisher–Yates Test on statistical independence 1.000. w Percentage rate difference 31%; w2 1,667; f (via w2) ¼ Cramer’s index 0.289; K-coefficient (normed) 0,392; Fisher– Yates Test on statistical independence 0.282. z Percentage rate difference #DIV/0!; w2 #DIV/0!; f (via w2) ¼ Cramer’s index #DIV/0!; K-coefficient (normed) #DIV/0!; Fisher–Yates Test on statistical independence 1.000.

1945–1998, edited by Ian Budge, Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Andrea Volkens, Judith Bara and Eric Tanenbaum. Oxford: Oxford University Press. BUGAJSKI, JANUSZ. (2002) Political Parties of Eastern Europe: A Guide to Politics in the Post-Communist Era. Armonk: Sharpe. CARLSNAES, WALTER. (2002) Foreign policy. In Handbook of International Relations, edited by Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons. London: Sage. CHAN, STEVE, AND WILLIAM SAFRAN. (2006) Public Opinion as a Constraint against War: Democracies Responses to Operation Iraqi Freedom. Foreign Policy Analysis 2:137–156. CHECKEL, JEFFREY T. (1998) The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory. World Politics 50:324–348. DOUGHERTY, JAMES E., AND ROBERT L. PFALTZGRAFF. (2001) Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey. 5th edition. New York: Longman. DOWNS, ANTHONY. (1957) An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy. New York: Harper & Row. ELMAN, COLIN. (1996) Horses for Courses: Why not Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy? Security Studies 6:7–53. FEARON, JAMES. (1998) Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and Theories of International Relations. Annual Review of Political Science 1:289–313. FINNEMORE, MARTHA. (1996a) National Interest in International Society. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. FINNEMORE, MARTHA. (1996b) Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology’s Institutionalism. International Organization 50:325–347. FINNEMORE, MARTHA, AND KATHRYN SIKKINK. (1998) International Norms and Political Change. International Organization 52:887–917. GOLDSTEIN, JUDITH, AND ROBERT O. KEOHANE, EDs. (1993) Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

242

The Rift
TABLE A5. ResultsFHypothesis 3 Governments Political Orientation Row Total

Right Hypothesis 3: All countriesn Support Yes

Left

8 89% No 1 11% Column total 9 45% Hypothesis 3: Western European countriesw Support Yes 5 83% No 1 17% Column total 6 60% Hypothesis 3: Eastern European countriesz Support Yes 3 100% No 0 0% Column total 3 30%

7 64% 4 36% 11 55%

15 75% 5 25% 20 100%

1 25% 3 75% 4 40%

6 60% 4 40% 10 100%

6 86% 1 14% 7 70%

9 90% 1 10% 10 100%

n Percentage rate difference 25%; w2 1,684; f (via w2) ¼ Cramer’s index 0.290; K-coefficient (normed) 0,394; Fisher– Yates Test on statistical independence 0.221. w Percentage rate difference 58%; w2 3,403; f (via w2) ¼ Cramer’s index 0.583; K-coefficient (normed) 0,713; Fisher– Yates Test on statistical independence 0.119. z Percentage rate difference 14%; w2 0,476; f (via w2) ¼ Cramer’s index 0.218; K-coefficient (normed) 0,302; Fisher– Yates Test on statistical independence 0.700.

GRIECO, JOSEPH M. (1995) Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism. In Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge, edited by Charles W. Kegley. New York: St. Martin’s Press. HAGAN, JOE D. (1995) Domestic Political Explanations in the Analysis of Foreign Policy. In Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in its Second Generation, edited by Laura Neack, Jeanne A. K. Hey and Patrick J. Haney. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall. HIBBS, DOUGLAS A. (1977) Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy. American Political Science Review 71:1467–1487. HIBBS, DOUGLAS A. (1992) Partisan Theory After Fifteen Years. European Journal of Political Economy 8:361–373. HILL, CHRISTPPHER. (2003) The Changing politics of Foreign Policy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. HOLSTI, OLE R. (1992) Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond–Lippmann Consensus. International Studies Quarterly 36:439–466. HOLSTI, OLE R. (1996) Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. HUDSON, VALERIE., ED. (1997) Culture and Foreign Policy. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. IRELAND, MICHAEL J., AND SCOTT SIGMUND GARTNER. (2001) Time to Fight: Government and Conflict Initiation in Parliamentary Systems. Journal of Conflict Resolution 45:547–568. ISMAYR, WOLFGANG., ED. (2002) Die politischen Systeme Osteuropas (The Political Systems of Eastern Europe). Opladen: Leske þ Budrich.

JÛRGEN SCHUSTER AND HERBERT MAIER

243

ISMAYR, WOLFGANG., ED. (2003) Die politischen Systeme Westeuropas (The Political Systems of Western Europe). 3rd edition. Opladen: Leske þ Budrich. KAARBO, JULIET. (1996) Power and Influence in Foreign Policy Decision Making: The Role of Junior Coalition Partners in German and Israeli Foreign Policy. International Studies Quarterly 40:501– 530. KAARBO, JULIET. (2001) Domestic Politics and International Negotiations: The Effects of State Structures and Policymaking Processes. International Interactions 27:169–205. KATZENSTEIN, PETER., ED. (1996) The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics. New York: Columbia University Press. KEOHANE, ROBERT O. (1993) Institutionalist Theory and the Realist Challenge After the Cold War. In Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, edited by David A. Baldwin. New York: Columbia University Press. KEOHANE, ROBERT O. (2002) Institutional Theory in International Relations. In Realism and Institutionalism in International Studies, edited by Michael Brecher and Frank P. Harvey. Ann Arbor: University of British Columbia Press. KIER, ELIZABETH. (1995) Culture and Military Doctrine: France Between the Wars. International Security 19:65–93. KITTEL, GABRIELE, VOLKER RITTBERGER, AND FRANK SCHIMMELFENNIG. (1995) Between Loyalty and Exit: Explaining the Foreign Policies of Industrialized Countries in the UNESCO Crisis (1978– 87). T ubinger Arbeitspapiere zur Internationalen Politik und Friedensforschung 24, T ubingen. ¨ ¨ KLOTZ, AUDIE. (1995) Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. KRATOCHWIL, FRIEDRICH V. (1989) Rules, Norms and Decisions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. KUPCHAN, CHARLES A. (1988) NATO and the Persian Gulf: Examining Intra-Alliance Behavior. International Organization 42:317–346. LINK, WERNER. (2001) Die Neuordnung der Weltpolitik: Grundprobleme globaler Politik an der Schwelle zum 21. Jahrhundert (The Realignment of World Politics: Challenges of Global Policy at the Beginning of the 21st Century). 3rd edition. Munich: C.H. Beck. LINK, WERNER. (2002) Hegemonie und Gleichgewicht der Macht (Hegemony and Balance of Power). In Internationale Politik im 21. Jahrhundert, edited by Mir A. Ferdowsi. Munich: Fink. LIPSON, CHARLES. (2003) Reliable Partners. How Democracies Have Made a Separate Peace. Princeton: Princeton University Press. MASTANDUNO, MICHAEL. (1999) Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy After the Cold War. In Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies After the Cold War, edited by Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno. New York: Columbia University Press. MEARSHEIMER, JOHN J. (1990) Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War. International Security 15:5–56. MEARSHEIMER, JOHN J. (1995) The False Promise of International Institutions. International Security 19:5–49. MEARSHEIMER, JOHN J. (2001) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: Norton. MORAVCSIK, ANDREW. (1997) Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics. International Organization 51:513–553. MORAVCSIK, ANDREW. (2003) Liberal International Relations Theory: A Scientific Assessment. In Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field, edited by Colin Elman and Miriam F. Elman. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. MORGENTHAU, HANS. (1973) Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace. 5th edition. New York: Knopf. MOURITZEN, HANS. (1998) Focus and Axioms. In Bordering Russia: Theory and Prospects for Europe’s Baltic Rim, edited by Hans Mouritzen. Aldershot: Ashgate. NEACK, LAURA. (2003) The New Foreign Policy: U.S. and Comparative Foreign Policy in the 21st Century. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. NEACK, LAURA, JEANNE A. K. HEY, AND PATRICK J. HANEY. (1995) Generational Change in Foreign Policy Analysis. In Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in its Second Generation, edited by Laura Neack, Jeanne A. K. Hey and Patrick J. Haney. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall. ONEAL, JOHN R., AND BRUCE M. RUSSETT. (1999) The Kantian Peace: The Pacific Benefits of Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885–1992. World Politics 52:1–37. ONUF, NICOLAS. (1989) World of Our Making. Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations. Columbia: Columbia University Press. PALAN, RONEN. (2000) A World of Their Making: An Evaluation of the Constructivist Critique in International Relations. Review of International Studies 26:575–598.

244

The Rift

POWELL, ROBERT. (1994) Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist–Neoliberal Debate. International Organization 48:313–344. POWLICK, PHILIP J., AND ANDREW Z. KATZ. (1998) Defining the American Public Opinion/Foreign Policy Nexus. Mershon International Studies Review 42:29–61. RISSE-KAPPEN, THOMAS. (1991) Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies. World Politics 43:479–512. RITTBERGER, VOLKER., ED. (2001) German Foreign Policy Since Unification: Theories and Case Studies. Manchester: Manchester University Press. ROSE, GIDEON. (1998) Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy. World Politics 51:144–172. RUSSETT, BRUCE M. (1990) Controlling the Sword: The Democratic Governance of National Security. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. RUSSETT, BRUCE M. (1993) Grasping the Democratic Peace. Principles for a Post-Cold War World. Princeton: Princeton University Press. RUSSETT, BRUCE, AND JOHN R. ONEAL. (2001) Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations. New York: W. W. Norton. SCHMIDT, MANFRED G. (1996) When Parties Matter: A Review of the Possibilities and Limits of Partisan Influence on Public Policy. European Journal of Political Research 30:155–183. SCHUSTER, JuRGEN. (2004) Das ‘alte’ und das ‘neue’ Europa: Die Reaktionen der europ a ¨ischen La ¨nder auf die ¨ amerikanische Irak-Politik (‘Old’ and ‘New’ Europe: The European States’ Reactions towards the American Policy against Iraq). Munster: Lit-Verlag. ¨ SCHWELLER, RANDALL L. (1997) New Realist Research on Alliances: Refining, not Refuting, Waltz’s Balancing Proposition. American Political Science Review 91:927–930. SCHWELLER, RANDALL L. (2003) The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism. In Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field, edited by Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman. Cambridge, U.K.: MIT Press. SCHWELLER, RANDALL L., AND DAVID PRIESS. (1997) A Tale of Two Realisms: Expanding the Institutions Debate. Mershon International Studies Review 41:1–32. SHAPIRO, ROBERT Y., AND LAWRENCE R. JACOBS. (2000) Who Leads and Who Follows? U.S. Presidents, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy. In Decision-Making in a Glass House: Mass Media, Public Opinion, and American and European Foreign Policy in the 21st Century, edited by Brigitte L. Nacos, Robert Y. Shapiro and Pierangelo Isernia. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. SNYDER, GLENN H. (1984) The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics. World Politics 36:461–495. SPRECHER, CHRISTOPHER, AND KARL DEROUEN JR. (2005) The Domestic Determinants of Foreign Policy Behavior in Middle Eastern Enduring Rivals, 1948–1998. Foreign Policy Analysis 1:121–141. SYNDER, JACK. (2004) One World, Rival Theories. Foreign Policy 145:53–62. THERIEN, JEAN PHILIPPE, AND ALAIN NOEL. (2000) Political Parties and Foreign Aid. American Political Science Review 94:151–162. VERBEEK, BERTJAN. (2003) Decision-Making in Great Britain During the Suez Crisis: Small Groups and a Persistent Leader. Aldershot: Ashgate. WALT, STEPHEN M. (1987) The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. WALT, STEPHEN M. (1998) International Relations: One World, Many Theories. Foreign Policy 110:29–47. WALTZ, KENNETH N. (1979) Theory of International Politics. New York: McGraw-Hill. WALTZ, KENNETH N. (1991) America as a Model for the World? A Foreign Policy Perspective. Political Science and Politics 24:667–670. WALTZ, KENNETH N. (1993) The Emerging Structure of International Politics. International Security 18:44–79. WALTZ, KENNETH N. (1995) Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory. In Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge, edited by Charles W. Kegley. New York: St. Martin’s Press. WALTZ, KENNETH N. (1996) International Politics is not Foreign Policy. Security Studies 6:52–55. WENDT, ALEXANDER. (1992) Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics. International Organization 46:391–425. WENDT, ALEXANDER. (1999) Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. WOLF, KLAUS DIETER. (2004) Von der Bipolaritat zur Unipolaritat? Der Mythos vom zweiten Am¨ ¨ erikanischen Jahrhundert (From Bipolarity to Unipolarity? The Myths of a Second American Century). In Weltpolitik Heute (World Politics Today), edited by Volker Rittberger. Baden-Baden: Nomos. ZuRN, MICHAEL. (1993) Bringing the Second Image (Back): About the Domestic Sources of Regime ¨ Formation. In Regime Theory and International Relations, edited by Volker. Rittberger. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Sign up to vote on this title
UsefulNot useful