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ABSTRACT Transatlantic relations have been badly strained by the dispute over the US policy on Iraq.The divisions within NATO in February 2003 and subsequent relations between members, however, are a reﬂection of the alliance not having been able to deﬁne an agreed role for itself. Underlying this problem are three deepseated issues that hark back into the cold war era that have yet to be resolved: the role of the US in Europe; Europe’s role in the common defence; and NATO’s role ‘out of area’. The success or failure of NATO’s current efforts to transform itself will impact directly on these three issues and on the future role of the alliance, particularly in the eyes of the US.
The acrimonious political dispute within NATO that erupted into the public domain in early February 2003 exposed serious divisions in the transatlantic alliance over the issue of Iraq. The immediate issue was a push to obtain formal authorisation of advance NATO military planning to help Turkey defend itself in the event of war in Iraq.1 The question of furnishing support to Turkey had been the subject of considerable backroom debate in NATO starting around mid-January. Secretary-general, Lord Robertson, in an effort to break the deadlock in these internal discussions, forced the issue by putting
Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 5.3 © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands, 2004
it before the North Atlantic Council (NAC) before consensus had been reached. On the morning of 11 February the three main dissenting member states France, Germany, and Belgium - broke silence in the NAC and voiced their objections to the plan, thereby vetoing agreement. The immediate crisis spun along for the rest of the week, but Robertson eventually moved the vote into the Defence Planning Committee, which eliminated France from the equation as it is not a member of the alliance’s military structure, and in that forum Belgium ultimately succumbed to pressure to concede to a re-worded agreement. Although NATO was ultimately able to ﬁnesse the issue so that Turkey was provided with the military support deemed necessary, the debacle was an occasion of ‘fear and loathing’ in NATO.2 There was fear that the very public and acrimonious nature of the dispute was a serious blow to the Atlantic alliance. François Heisbourg at the time of the dispute was moved to state, ‘(w)elcome to the end of the Atlantic alliance’,3 while Elizabeth Pond in her initial examination of the crisis published soon afterwards referred to it as ‘the Greek Tragedy of NATO’, a reference to the role of suicide in classical Greek drama.4 Even NATO’s Secretary General, Lord Robertson, a keen and untiring vocal supporter of the alliance, admitted publicly that the dispute had been ‘damaging’, while an unnamed diplomat in alliance headquarters is reported subsequently to have said that it ‘was a near death experience’.5 There was also a degree of loathing within alliance councils that contributed to the political ﬁasco. Pond has cogently argued that there were three key reasons for the debacle in NATO.6 First, is what she termed ‘the arrogance of American power’, by which she means the proclivity of the US, and in particular the current Bush administration, to dictate to its allies rather than convince them, based on the assumption that they not only would but should follow. Second, is what she identiﬁed as ‘the arrogance of weakness’ of certain European states. This, she argued, was manifest in the tendency of France to assert its exceptionalist sense of gloire and grandeur by standing up to the Americans, and by a desire by all of the three dissenting states to demonstrate to their publics that they could say ‘no’ to the hegemon. And ﬁnally, she identiﬁed the personal hostility between George W. Bush and Gerhard Schröder and the growing animosity between the US and France as con420 • Terry Terriff
tributing signiﬁcantly to the hardening of positions and the degree of acrimony that was involved.7 The proximate reasons for this disarray within NATO are well understood to be a spill over from the wider international debate over the wisdom, and indeed legality, of the US efforts to enforce Iraqi compliance with United Nations resolutions regarding weapons of mass destruction, a debate that was largely centred around the UN Security Council. The harm that was caused to NATO, like that to the UN, was ‘collateral damage’ to the US drive to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq, and indeed to the US determination to do whatever it takes to protect itself in the wake of 11 September 2001.8 Nonetheless, this article argues that the dispute within the alliance over Iraq in February 2003 and its political aftermath exposed a number of underlying issues which have been present to a lesser or greater extent for much of NATO’s history. I start by identifying and examining these issues. I next look at what steps NATO agreed to take at its Prague Summit in November 2002 to rectify some of them, and then examine the question of how well these reforms are likely to address the underlying issues and what this may mean for NATO.
Unresolved Fundamental Issues
The imbroglio over Iraq reﬂects a core crisis in the alliance: NATO since the end of the cold war has not been able to deﬁne a clear purpose for itself. Underlying this general failure to carve out a collectively agreed role are three deep-seated issues that hark back into the cold war era and are yet to be satisfactorily resolved. These issues can be broadly identiﬁed as, ﬁrst, the American role in Europe, second, Europe’s role in the common defence, and third, NATO’s role ‘out of area’. For analytical purposes these are examined individually, but in reality they are not entirely separable, for they are entwined and interact in positive and negative ways. Hence, the analysis of these issues starts with the NATO’s role ‘out of area’ and ﬁnishes with the role of the US in Europe.
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NATO’s role ‘out of area’
The question of whether NATO should conduct military operations ‘out of area’ has long been an issue in the alliance. NATO learned very early in its life that ‘out of area’ issues were fraught with divergent interests and perceptions of threat and ideology. This was a point driven home in no uncertain terms in the 1950s when the United States refused to back Britain and France over Suez and France in Algeria. To avoid the problems caused by the divergence between the US as a global power with global interests, France and Britain, among others, as colonial powers (albeit increasingly as former colonial powers) with regional interests, and the small European members with only local or national interests, NATO’s policy on ‘out of area’ issues was studiously not to have one. The emergent position of most European members of the alliance was that NATO’s area of strategic responsibility was conﬁned to the European continent, and they were unwilling to have the alliance used to support US actions outside of Europe. The US, for its part, never strenuously challenged the Europeans’ view, largely out of concern that doing so could fracture the alliance that was central to containing Soviet power in Europe.9 NATO’s policy on ‘out of area’ issues began to change in the 1990s as the Soviet enemy receded and a series of brutal wars erupted in the former Yugoslavia. The alliance’s eventual military intervention in Bosnia in 1995 unequivocally signiﬁed that the it was willing and able to operate ‘out of area’ to address a crisis in an adjacent area that posed a signiﬁcant danger of spilling over to threaten peace and stability in Europe.10 The alliance agreed at the Berlin Summit in 1996 that it should and would be willing to act ‘out of area’ when necessary to forestall or manage crises that carried risks and dangers for Europe. This shift in attitude resulted in distinctions, to use internal NATO terms, between ‘internal’ (the defence of NATO’s borders); ‘adjacent’ (the management of crises contiguous to NATO); and ‘over the horizon’ (or outside of Europe and thus beyond NATO’s purview). The US sought to convince the alliance to accept a much broader, ‘over the horizon’ geographical writ in the autumn of 1998 during the internal debates on the revised Strategic Concept document which was to be agreed at the Washington Summit. But the European allies rejected the American initiative. Thus at the beginning of the 21st century there still remained clear transatlantic divisions within
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NATO on the question of ‘out of area’, or more particularly, ‘out of region’, operations. The question of whether NATO should operate ‘over the horizon’ was brought to a head by 9/11. NATO, in invoking Article 5 of he treaty in support of the US, was not only honouring the central security guarantee at the heart of the alliance, but in doing so it also was, at least tacitly, signaling that it was prepared to operate outside of the European region in fulﬁlling that guarantee. That NATO would be willing to operate ‘over the horizon’ was ﬁrst ofﬁcially articulated at the ministers’ meeting in Reykjavik in May 2002,11 and conﬁrmed at the Prague Summit in November of that year. The alliance is therefore now, in principle, a European institution with a trans-regional, even a global mandate. The crisis over Iraq, particularly coming so soon after the Prague Summit, has underscored the reality that, while its member states have agreed that the alliance needs to be able to undertake ‘out of region’ operations, the divisions that long underpinned NATO’s hesitancy over such issues still remained. It is well understood that these divisions stem from differences in transatlantic perceptions of what constitutes a threat, and differences in how threats should be addressed.12 One reason why France, Germany and other NATO members were unwilling to back Washington’s Iraq policy was that their estimation of the degree of threat posed by Saddam Hussein and his supposed possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) differed signiﬁcantly from that of the Bush administration. Moreover, they also differed considerably on how that threat should be addressed. France and Germany, among others, argued that the renewed inspections should be given time to work as these would likely constrain and limit the threat posed by Iraq’s possession of WMD. The Bush administration, along with Britain, believed that the threat, especially over the long term, could only be addressed by forcible regime change. Another reason for European concern about Washington’s Iraq policy is that they have different interests at stake in the Middle East and Persian Gulf to those of the United States. They believed (and still do) that those interests could be affected adversely by a war with Iraq.13
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Europe’s role in the common defence
The second issue is the question of the Europeans’ contribution to the common defence. In the days of the cold war this question was present in the perennial transatlantic debates about burden-sharing, with the US repeatedly pushing its European allies to contribute more to NATO’s conventional defence capabilities.14 Through the post-cold war period this issue has been manifest in the growing concern about the very limited military capabilities of the European NATO members. The inadequacies of the Europeans’ capacities was highlighted during NATO’s prosecution of conﬂict with Serbia over Kosovo in 1999, which was an air campaign conducted largely with American capabilities.15 Bluntly put, the European contribution was on the margins. The supposed deﬁciencies of the European (and also the Canadian) militaries is a serious issue for the United States, as it has raised hard questions about the relevance of NATO as a military organisation. NATO at American urging sought to address directly this lack on the part of the Europeans with the agreement on the Defence Capabilities Initiative at the Washington Summit in April 1999. The seriousness with which NATO took this issue is reﬂected in secretary-general Lord Robertson’s subsequent public mantra of ‘capabilities, capabilities, capabilities’. The military forces of NATO’s European members lack ‘stealth’ technologies, advanced real-time reconnaissance/surveillance systems, precision guided munitions and power projection capabilities, among a signiﬁcant range of other assets.16 With the partial exception of British forces, NATO’s militaries do not possess the capabilities needed to ﬁght on the same battleﬁelds as American troops. Equally problematic is that the capabilities gap has fostered a doctrinal gap, as the US adopts new ways of employing force and of waging war that are different from the ways of the Europeans. Washington took away two critical political-military lessons from the Kosovo experience. First, from the US perspective, the need to sustain consensus during the conﬂict meant subjecting the conduct of military operations to political oversight from nineteen states, which it believed to be too constraining.17 And second, Washington believed that the requirement to incorporate the Europeans into operations and mission plans had the effect of degrading mission effectiveness. Moreover, it forced the US to ﬁght in a somewhat different manner than they would have if they had fought alone.18 These ‘lessons’
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are reﬂected in American statements to the effect that ‘the mission determines the coalition, the coalition does not determine mission’. In short, the substantial disparity in military capabilities has led to an American preference for relying on ad hoc ‘coalitions of the willing’ that are prepared to operate under US control, rather than work in the political-military framework of NATO. In NATO it would be constrained by the need to forge consensus despite the fact that the alliance provides no substantive military value-added. Thus, in the wake of 11 September 2001 the United States worked bilaterally to garner contributions from some select states (which grew in number over time). NATO did contribute to the response to the terrorist attacks by sending AWACs to the US, deploying the east Mediterranean ﬂotilla, sending troops into Bosnia, and so on.19 But Washington in effect spurned NATO’s offer to ﬁght with the US in Afghanistan, thereby exposing in a very public way the weakness of the alliance. NATO’s contributions, while certainly not insigniﬁcant, were not central; rather the alliance’s contributions were on the margins of the main US military operations.20 In the case of Iraq, it appears that the Americans saw that NATO could provide necessary support for Turkey. Initial US plans were for the 4th Army Division to use Turkey as a forward base from which to launch an armed incursion into northern Iraq and to have American aircraft ﬂy out of Incirlik to conduct bombing attacks in Iraq. As a consequence, Turkey was legitimately concerned that it would be on the receiving end of Iraqi retaliatory attacks, even if these were ostensibly aimed at American targets on Turkish soil. NATO was a perfect vehicle to provide the equipment and military personnel to improve Turkey’s security from the American point of view. Alliance involvement would have no direct impact on the US military’s capacity to mount and conduct a large invasion of Iraq while sustaining its multitude of other overseas commitments. Moreover, it is likely that the US perceived that an ofﬁcial NATO decision of support for Ankara under the aegis of Article 4 of the treaty would furnish extra political cover for the newly formed Turkish government to agree to let the US use Turkey as a forward base in the face of substantial and vocal domestic public opposition. Thus, much as was the case after September 2001, the Americans were not interested in enlisting NATO to contribute directly, rather it perceived the alliance as only being useful in helping on the margins of the main operation being mobilised against Iraq.
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US Role in Europe
The ﬁnal issue is the role of America in Europe. There are two aspects to this, one being the ﬁrmness of the US commitment to European security and the other its authoritative voice in NATO. Firstly, the forward deployment of US troops in Europe and the extension of the American nuclear deterrent to protect Europe has been the primary foundation of NATO’s defence efforts. The Europeans have long harboured fears that the US might abandon them. In the period of the cold war the issue of whether and to what degree the security of the United States was coupled to the security of western Europe occasioned iterative, often heated, transatlantic debates, most notably over the nature and practice of the strategy of ﬂexible response.21 In the post-cold war period this issue manifested itself in European concerns about whether the United States, with the Soviet threat gone, would remain militarily engaged in Europe, particularly as Washington drew down substantially American forces from forward deployment on the continent. Moreover, the general reticence of the US to use its military force, particularly ground forces, to address the serial crises in the former Yugoslavia (including Kosovo), raised questions amongst the European allies about whether the US was willing to share equally the risks entailed in protecting Europe. Secondly, the US, due to its substantial military contribution to the common defence and European reliance on this contribution, meant that Washington assumed a dominant or hegemonic position of authority in NATO’s councils. In an alliance based on consensus decision-making, the US was the primes inter pares. When it wanted something strongly enough, it could through consultation and persuasion, even including diplomatic arm twisting, convince the European members to agree. There has long been a general sense that where the US led, the rest of NATO usually followed. Washington’s dominant position within alliance councils has been the source of some tension over the decades, particularly for France which has long argued for more equality for the Europeans in NATO’s political and military decision making. In the 1990s, with the Soviet threat to Europe gone and no other immediate threat apparent and with the slow US withdrawal of some 200,000 personnel from the continent, the European’s dependency on the US was lessened considerably. Nonetheless, the US has continued to be dominant in NATO’s councils, largely resisting efforts (particularly those by France) to institute a greater European role and
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voice within the alliance, leaving European aspirations for a more equal role within the alliance frustrated.22 The uneasy tension between these two aspects has been greatly heightened by American political and military predominance and, post-11 September, the Bush administration’s willingness to employ that power unilaterally to protect America and its interests. On the one hand, the Europeans are concerned that the US will increasingly pull away from Europe unless they are able to convince Washington that they are both politically willing and militarily able to contribute effectively to the management of risks and dangers in the wider global security system as well as those close to home. On the other, there is concern that the US will increasingly use its preponderant military power to act unilaterally in the manner it sees ﬁt without reference to its allies or their interests. The response of the European allies to this dilemma of fear of abandonment and loathing of American behaviour in the lead up to and immediate aftermath of the Iraq war, was as diverse as the members themselves. It occupied a broad spectrum that ranged from France’s position at one end and that of Britain at the other. The view in Paris, one seemingly shared by Germany, was that American power should be constrained by Europe balancing the US. France has long articulated a preference for a multilateral international order because this offers it the greatest diplomatic room for manoeuvre to establish its claim to being a major international player and to achieve to the greatest extent its national interests. French concern about the growth of American power was reﬂected in France’s then foreign minister Hubert Vedrine’s statement in 1998 that the US was a ‘hyperpussaince’. Vedrine was not shy in arguing that France ‘cannot accept . . . a politically unipolar world . . . that is why we are ﬁghting for a multipolar one’. Pierre Lellouche has pointed out that French President Jacques Chirac was an advocate of ‘a multipolar world in which Europe is the counterweight to American political and military power.23 France’s efforts to create a constraining balance to US power ranged from the joint statement in Moscow by Chirac, Schröder and Putin opposing Washington’s policy on Iraq, to attempts to rally the EU to a common European position on the crisis. At the same time, France was mindful that there was a risk that its stance over Iraq could convince the US to pull back from Europe. Hence, while France was engaging in diplomatic jockeying over Iraq in an attempt to
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‘discipline’ American power, it also continued to co-operate with the US on a range of anti-terrorism issues. At the other end of the spectrum was Britain which, while harbouring concerns about an unfettered United States, adopted a different approach. This is epitomised by the ‘special relationship’. The ‘special relationship’ is predicated on the belief that Britain’s interests in the world are best secured by a close, even unquestioning, alignment with its more powerful friend. Additionally, the argument runs, staying close to Washington is the most effective way to inﬂuence American policy. Prime Minister Tony Blair, in an address to Britain’s ambassadors and senior diplomats in January 2003, argued that Britain ‘should remain the closest ally of the US, and as allies inﬂuence them to continue broadening their agenda. The price of inﬂuence is that we do not leave the US to face the tricky issues alone. . . . So when the US confronts these issues, we should be with them’.24 Britain’s policy with respect to Iraq was that it had to stand ‘shoulder to shoulder’ with the United States for better or worse. As a loyal and valued ally it would, in return, gain access to, and arguably inﬂuence on, the inner policy discussions of the Bush administration. Many if not most of the other European allies, including the new ones and those states recently invited to join the alliance, were willing to support politically and materially the US as they saw it as the main provider of their security in Europe.25 Thus, as France (and Germany) sought to balance the US in a belief that ﬁrm political resistance could constrain American power and policy proclivities, Britain and most of the new or putative members of NATO, chose, as one of Blair’s senior advisers put it, to ‘hug them close’.26
NATO’s Transformation Post-Iraq
The agreement of the alliance members to transform NATO at the Prague Summit in November 2002 in principle contribute to alleviating, if not obviating, these fundamental issues. The point of ‘transformation’ is to make NATO more effective in managing the emerging threats posed by transnational terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. It would thereby demonstrate to the Americans the alliance’s continued relevance. There are two key elements to the agreed transformation of the alliance, each
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with a number of linked initiatives. First, the summit formally approved ‘out of region’ NATO missions in principle, a huge step for an alliance that has persistently claimed to be purely defensive and non-interventionist in nature and a guarantor of stability rather than a revolutionary actor. Secondly, the summit approved a US proposal to form an ‘elite’ NATO Reaction Force (NRF) for rapid deployment in Afghanistan-like crises. The ﬁrst active expression of NATO’s new ‘out of region’ mandate was the decision by the alliance following the debacle over support for Turkey to take command of the International Stability and Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul. The alliance’s ﬁrst step into a role in Afghanistan came from German, Dutch and Canadian arguments that NATO should have a supporting role in the command of ISAF, as the alliance could provide resources individual members lacked (especially the Canadians) if they were to sustain their command of the operation. NATO would also furnish a necessary degree of command continuity across the rotation of lead nations. The US, for its part, was keen to have the alliance assume a formal role in Afghanistan and, in spite of initial French reservations that this would result in the US-led military alliance becoming caught in an open-ended mission, the alliance ofﬁcially agreed in April 2003 to assume command of the ISAF operation.27 NATO’s formal assumption of command of ISAF in early August 2003 was soon followed (in October) by a US driven agreement to expand the alliance’s mandate to northern areas of Afghanistan.28 The signiﬁcance of NATO’s shift from a focus on the defence of the Fulda Gap to ensuring security in the Khyber Pass should not be underestimated. NATO’s new willingness to undertake ‘out of region’ missions has opened up a range of new prospective activities for the alliance. A matter of long running debate within the alliance, pushed by the US, has been whether NATO should undertake to contribute formally to the US-led post-war reconstruction efforts in Iraq. NATO very early on agreed to provide informal support for the Polish-led, largely European, force that deployed to Iraq to help provide security and to aid post-war reconstruction efforts. The US, in a seeming reprise of NATO’s path into Afghanistan, has continued to urge NATO to take command of the 9500-member multinational brigade in central Iraq, and even possibly the larger British-led operation in the south.29 At the NATO Istanbul Summit in June 2004, US arguments for a signiﬁcant NATO role in
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Iraq were resisted, but the alliance did agree after some internal opposition that it would formally contribute to the training of Iraqi military personnel in Iraq.30 There have also been a number of suggestions that NATO should take on a broader role in the Middle East up to and including the provision of any peacekeeping forces required in the event of a Palestine-Israel peace agreement.31 And Koﬁ Annan, UN secretary-general, observed that ‘NATO’s increasing willingness to “go global” presents important opportunities, in particular for Africa.’32 This range of current and speculative missions suggests that NATO has made a clear break from its past reluctance to address ‘out of area’ issues. It is one thing to claim an extra-regional reach, it another matter to have the expeditionary military capability to exercise it. The NRF is that capability. The purpose of the NRF, according NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, General James Jones, is to ‘give the alliance the military capability to do what it could not do before - insert military forces into a deteriorating situation earlier in a crisis, with more speed, at greater ranges, with more sustainability than ever before’.33 The NRF is supposed to be able to deploy a substantial lead element within ﬁve days and the complete force within 30 days, and to fulﬁll missions that range from evacuations and peacekeeping to counterterrorism and high-intensity combat. When it reaches its projected full operation capability in 2006, it is to consist of some 20,000 to 22,000 personnel from all services. That is, it will be a joint force of integrated land, sea and air elements with the logistics components to support them - the equivalent of a brigade sized combined joint force.34 General Jones, among others, sees the NRF not solely as a necessary means to give NATO a rapid and robust expeditionary military capability, but also as a key lever to redress the issue of the Europeans’ meagre military capabilities.35 Military units assigned to the NRF will be on ready alert for six months, after which they will be rotated out and replaced by other contributed units that are expected to be equipped and trained to ﬁt into the NRF structure. This will push member states to ensure that the units they allocate to the NRF have been furnished with the right modern equipment and training. In a very real sense, the manning of the NRF will force member states, and in particular the smaller ones, to improve signiﬁcantly select elements of their military capability in order to ensure their forces can function at the
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requisite level of military operations. In terms of war-ﬁghting this should ensure, at least in principle, that the NRF forces can ﬁght alongside US forces if need be. The NRF as a lever for developing European military capabilities links directly to the Prague Capabilities Commitment. NATO has jettisoned the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) from the 1999 Washington Summit because only very limited headway had been made in meeting the targets set.36 To redress this failure, NATO at the Prague Summit formed the Prague Capabilities Committee to focus on 12 areas (in four major ‘baskets’) needing improvement. The resultant NATO Defense Transformation Initiative (NDTI) ‘has a narrower focus on new missions and . . . a small, but select number of forces for them.’37 As Thomas Szayna has explained, the logic is that individual member states will take on ‘capabilities tasks’ in advance as one or more of their responsibilities, leading to so-called ‘niche’ responsibilities for even the smallest member. This will be based on each member’s perceived areas of ‘comparative advantage’.38 In linking member’s commitments to the NRF to that member’s NDTI commitments, it is hoped that they will be more willing to make the effort needed to fulﬁll their pledges.
These two initiatives together affect the third issue: the role of the US in Europe. The central question is whether and to what degree they are likely to be successful. First, with respect to out of area operations, the enlargement of NATO’s geographical writ as agreed at Prague is designed, in principle, to address the long outstanding issue of NATO’s policy on ‘out of area’ operations. But in spite of NATO taking on an ever-broadening role in Afghanistan and a smaller one in Iraq, there is little reason to believe that the alliance has resolved the issue. The enlargement of NATO’s writ at Prague appears to be another attempt to save the alliance from irrelevance by giving it new, yet undeﬁned, duties. There has been no discussion let alone a clear policy statement that provides a coherent rationale or set of guidelines to establish when and where NATO is justiﬁed in acting. Nor do post-Prague developments in NATO, such as its acceptance of a role in Afghanistan or even the prospect of at least a
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minor role in Iraq, suggest any clear and reasoned sets of guidelines. It appears simply that this is what the US prefers and this is what other NATO members believe they need to commit to in order to ensure that the US does not walk away from the alliance. Former secretary-general Lord Robertson made clear that NATO must not fail in its ﬁrst ‘out of region’ mission. Robertson, in his last speech to the NATO ambassadors, argued that, ‘Afghanistan will be . . . tough but it has to be a success’, and ‘(f)or that to be guaranteed, the nations will have to wake up to what they have taken on’.39 NATO’s new secretary-general, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, has echoed this, suggesting that NATO’s credibility as a military alliance is at stake.40 The massive expansion of the alliance’s mandate beyond Kabul to the rest of the country requires the commitment of signiﬁcant military resources if NATO is to succeed. As yet, while some progress has been made, the political commitments that NATO has received from its members do not go far enough to meet what is required. And, even then the alliance is ﬁnding it difﬁcult to transform those political commitments into concrete capabilities.41 The reluctance of members to commit resources and capabilities, or to fulﬁll those obligations they have made, reportedly stem from concerns of over-commitment as well as from a general lack of enthusiasm about spending ‘more money by sending equipment and personnel to Afghanistan.’42 Some of NATO’s member states may agree with German defence minister, Peter Struck, when he said, ‘The defense of Germany begins in the Hindu Kush’, but the lack of will by many member states to provide the required military capabilities suggests that the sentiment is not deeply felt.43 The difﬁculties encountered in ﬁelding and operating the Afghanistan mission strongly suggest that NATO may in principle have an ‘out of region’ mandate, but the differences within Europe and across the Atlantic in the assessment of threats and in the perceptions of how to respond remain. Even with respect to the so-called ‘big issues’, such as the proliferation of WMD, differences persist.44 NATO has a trans-regional, even global mandate, and is developing in the NRF the means to fulﬁll it. But there is no real agreement within the alliance about the purpose of that mandate. It is hard to escape the impression that NATO’s members agreed to the ‘out of region’ mandate, in particular Afghanistan and certainly Iraq, largely due to the insistence
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of Washington and with the apprehension that unless they demonstrated the alliance’s relevance the US could effectively abandon Europe to go its own way. Second, with respect to Europe’s military contribution to the common defence, the NRF was proposed by the US in part because, unlike the DCI, Washington believed it provided a much narrower goal which the Europeans should be able to meet. Indeed, the agreement of the defence ministers in June 2003 to the speciﬁcs of the plans to transform NATO apparently made the US military ofﬁcials, normally dismissive of the NATO and its military capabilities, sit up and take notice. The NRF in particular was instrumental in convincing the US that NATO’s member states were serious about seeking to close the capabilities gap by generating a modern, deployable force. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), General Jones, has been very aware of the importance of the NRF, and pressed ahead in developing the new force.45 The NRF, on the announcement of its initial operational capability in October 2003, comprised some 9000 multinational army, naval and airforce personnel which were almost entirely European.46 Signiﬁcantly, the US contributed only some 300 personnel to this initial force and has indicated that, even as the NRF grows to reach its proposed level of some 20,000 to 22,000 personnel, this contribution will not be appreciably increased.47 The lack of a US commitment of signiﬁcant capabilities to the NRF is undoubtedly in part a reﬂection of the fact that the American military currently ﬁnds itself over-stretched. But it also appears in part to reﬂect the fact that Washington sees the development of the NRF as a test of the Europeans’ willingness to provide mobile, deployable, sophisticated capabilities that can ﬁght with the US military even at the basic level of a brigade sized, combined joint force. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that, for the foreseeable future, that the NRF will remain a NATO European force with only a token US presence. More broadly, it is far from obvious that the Europeans will close the military gap, or indeed even improve to the point that the gap is no longer growing. The Europeans were not able to achieve the goals of the 1999 DCI, and there is currently no evidence that European public opinion is willing to accept higher defence spending. As the Economist observed in early 2002, ‘Europeans do not want to give up their butter for guns, not least because they feel there is no threat at present that would justify attempting to close
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such a yawning gap in capability.’48 While some European states, such as France, Norway and Britain, have sought to increase their defence spending, others, such as Germany, are reducing theirs and the rest are struggling to maintain their current levels. The Europeans are left, for the most part, to reconﬁgure and reduce their forces in order to make them more deployable and effective, and to develop niche capabilities (as some states are currently doing). This process is at best very slow, due to legacy systems, the costs of maintaining people in uniform and the expense of upgrading capabilities. All this is compounded by the high expense and inefﬁciencies of national military procurement systems and providers in European states. The central question, then, is not whether the Europeans can close the yawning capabilities gap - as this is at best a very long range hope - rather it is whether they can, over the next three to ﬁve years, make the NRF effective enough to deal with crises without American help. Will success in implementing the NRF signiﬁcantly affect the American view of the value of working under the aegis of NATO? The current propensity of the United States to act unilaterally is unlikely to undergo a substantial reversal. Mark Pollack contends that this tendency is a ‘decades long secular trend’. He argues that the policies of the Bush administration certainly represent an intensiﬁcation of this trend, but that the Clinton presidency often acted in a manner that was unilateral, in spite of its rhetorical commitment to multilateralism.49 As Madeleine Albright used to proclaim, to paraphrase, the US is the world’s ‘indispensable nation’. What this meant in the 1990s, in European terms, was that the US acted only when it wanted to or when it felt it absolutely necessary to do so (as it did in the case of Bosnia) and then it usually dictated the terms of its engagement (as it did in the case of Kosovo). US power at present may be somewhat diffused due to the over-commitment of its military forces, but it is not about to diminish. The US, as long as it perceives itself vulnerable to threats ‘out there’, will continue to act in its own selfinterest, which is to ensure the survival, security and prosperity of the American people. And the United States still feels vulnerable.50 This does not mean that the US will automatically act unilaterally. In the summer of 2004 the Bush administration appeared to be coming round to an understanding that there are limits to American power, and hence that working with allies can be useful and even desirable.51 But many Europeans per434 • Terry Terriff
ceive this apparent lean toward multilateralism as mostly tactical positioning for the US presidential elections in November 2004. Many European policymakers therefore are hoping that the Democrat candidate, John Kerry, wins the electoral race. Kerry has at least stated that he would consult and engage with America’s allies and friends.52 There is a reasonable probability that whoever wins the election, US policy will be more multilateral, certainly more so that it has been over the ﬁrst three years of the Bush administration.53 It is equally probable, however, that if and when the US does consult and persuade NATO members to co-operate, that any such co-operation will be on American terms54 or they will act unilaterally if they must.55 As US secretary of state Colin Powell has framed the issue, ‘(t)ogether if we can, alone if we must’. The US still has little reason to subject itself to the compromises needed to work co-operatively within the structure of NATO if the alliance does not provide any signiﬁcant military added value. Not to put too ﬁne a point on it, continued European military weakness provides signiﬁcant incentive for the US to act unilaterally. And this observation brings up a central conundrum for Europe. The US exhorts NATO’s European states to do more to contribute to the common defence while at the same time arguing that the threats to this common defence are effectively global in nature. If the Europeans do succeed at least in providing and sustaining the NRF to the standard set for the force, the question then is what military role will the global hegemon see Europe and NATO playing in the common security? Clearly one such role the US might see for European NATO is in post-conﬂict reconstruction efforts. This is of course suggested by the US efforts to convince alliance members to undertake missions in Afghanistan and Iraq and its long-standing arguments that Europe take on even more responsibility for the Balkans. It is further underscored by the fact that the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom, which is prosecuting counter-insurgency war against the Taliban, and latterly al-Qaeda, in eastern and southern Afghanistan, remains a separate war-ﬁghting mission from the expanded NATO-led ISAF mission. This particular division of labour can also be observed in the transatlantic negotiations between the EU and the US over control of the operations in Bosnia, with Washington arguing that it wants NATO to retain control over the counter-terrorism ﬁle and the special force of around 500 Italian
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carabinieri, while at the same time keeping under its own control the large American military base in Tuzla.56 The reticence of the US to hand over complete control of Bosnia to the EU, particularly those elements of NATO’s mission most directly related to Washington’s ‘war on terrorism’, is curious. The US has long wanted the Europeans to take full responsibility for the military management of the Balkans so that it can withdraw its own forces there. Another possible role is suggested by the French-led European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) military operation to the Congo earlier in mid-2003. The growing scale of the killing in the eastern Congo raised considerable concern in the UN and in western capitals of a new ‘genocide’ in Africa. The US recognised that something had to be done, with one US diplomat noting that ‘(w)e support a member state that is willing to consider this task quickly’ which was interpreted by some as an implicit nudge to the French to take on the responsibility.57 Similarly, the US proved to be very reluctant to intervene directly in the conﬂict in Liberia in the summer of 2003. Only under considerable public and international pressure, due to the historical ties of the US with Liberia, did the US intervene with a small force, sufﬁcient to defuse the immediate crisis. But it made clear that the force, and the much larger reserve force based on ships off the coast, were not there to stay and that the UN or African states should take on the task of managing the still difﬁcult situation.58 The apparent reluctance, or perhaps lack of interest, of the US in engaging in attempts to rescue failed states in Africa, leaving it to others to respond to these crises, stands in distinct contrast to the fact that US military forces are active in a range of African countries, from Algeria to Djibouti to Kenya, in the hunt for terrorists.59 The distinguishing characteristic is ‘relevance’ to America’s global security agenda. These examples admittedly are a very small data set from which to draw conclusions. Nonetheless, they strongly suggest templates of the roles that the US most likely sees the Europeans and NATO as playing. These are niche roles, ones that are on the edges of what the US sees as its primary security interests or ones that it recognises need to fulﬁlled but which it has little interest in dealing with directly because they do not ﬁt with its main strengths and preferences. What these examples appear to reﬂect is what one ofﬁcial of the Bush administration termed ‘multilateralism à la carte’. That
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is, Washington will choose from the multilateral part of its menu of options when it serves US interests and purposes. The implication is that US foreign and security after the next election, under whatever administration, is likely to be more multilateralist in nature than the muscular unilateralism of the ﬁrst three years of the Bush administration, as it is now widely understood that there are limits even to US military power. But being ‘more’ multilateral is a matter of degree and perception; it is unlikely that a ‘more multilateralist’ US policy will be anything like the robust multilateralism that the Europeans would like, for the US perceives this as being too constraining. In light of the Pentagon’s, and indeed Washington’s, aversion to ﬁghting wars by committee and to making compromises it would rather not make if it is to sustain consensus, it is difﬁcult to escape the impression that greater American multilateralism is likely only to mean that NATO and the Europeans will be pressed to take on roles on the margins of the global interests and policies of the US.
In the wake of the Defence Ministers’ Meeting in Brussels in early June 2003 at which the recommendations for the transformation of the alliance were agreed, the then secretary-general, Lord Robertson, enthused that ‘(t)his is a new NATO. A NATO transformed in [the] Prague Summit.’60 The NATO that exists today is certainly different from the one that existed when the Berlin Wall came down in 1989, particularly if the Prague initiatives are successfully implemented. Moreover, more than a year on from Lord Robertson’s claim, the strains in transatlantic ties that resulted from the serious disagreements over Iraq appear to have eased somewhat and the alliance itself has made considerable progress in implementing critical decisions taken at the Prague Summit. In spite of Robertson’s claims that this is a new NATO - as well as the alliance’s own efforts - its future as an effective military organisation is highly contingent. Transatlantic relations in the summer of 2004 were improved, but serious tensions nonetheless still existed. Underlying current tensions are three fundamental issues that have long troubled the alliance. One is the question of NATO’s role outside of Europe. Although NATO has ﬁrmly embraced the
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concept of conducting operations outside of Europe, there is as yet no clear agreement about what guidelines the alliance should follow in regards to operations in other theatres. The long-standing differences between Europe and the US on their respective assessments of the degree of threat posed by external risks and dangers, and over the how such risks and dangers should be approached, remain. The second issue is that of the disparity in power between the US and Europe. The wide gap in capabilities has led Washington to believe that, given its perception that European military assets have only a marginal utility, to engage in operations under the aegis of NATO is not worth the constraints that the alliance’s commitment to consensus imposes. There is little real prospect that Europe will be able to close the gap, broadly conceived, for at least ten years if at all. Thus much will ride on how successful the Europeans are in creating and supporting an effective NRF that meets the standards currently set for it. As General Jones noted, ‘(if) the NATO Response Force works, NATO will be transformed. If it doesn’t work, we’ve got major difﬁculties.’61 The NRF if successfully implemented will provide the alliance with an effective crisis management tool, but overall it will still be a comparatively small force capable only of limited military operations, particularly at the high end of war-ﬁghting, unless it is working with US military forces. Success or failure in resolving these ﬁrst two problems will affect directly the third issue: the US role in Europe. In particular, they will inﬂuence the way the Americans sees NATO. There is no reason to believe that the US will ever be willing to give up its role as primes inter pares within the alliance; hence the question is whether it might be willing in time to share some leadership responsibility if it sees its NATO partners as politically willing and militarily effective allies. Another critical question for NATO is what sort of roles will a more multilateralist-inclined US see it playing. The comparatively limited nature of the NRF, the most probable viable European capability, suggests that Washington would likely see NATO as being tasked to conduct select crisis response operations that it perceives as impacting only marginally, if at all, on US interests and security. Or. Alternatively, the NATO role might be in those crises that Washington is not enthusiastic about dealing with due to its disinclination to engage in humanitarian emergencies, nationbuilding or peacekeeping.
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The degree to which the alliance succeeds will determine how the US sees NATO. It is difﬁcult to see the transatlantic differences over ‘out of area’, or ‘out of region’, missions ever being fully resolved due to the differences in interests that exist between the US as a global power and the Europeans as either regional or local powers. Moreover, the distinctive approaches that both sides bring to questions of how to confront particular external threats and dangers will remain, sometimes convergent, often divergent. These differences will likely continue to be addressed and debated on a case-by-case basis. Therefore it will be critical for NATO to create sufﬁcient effective capabilities, primarily through the NRF, to convince the US that the alliance has military value. Today there appears to be two very general possible futures for NATO based on the failure or success of its effort to transform. If the Europeans fail even at generating and sustaining the NRF, the US is likely increasingly to see NATO as having little real military utility. Such a general outcome does not mean that NATO will vanish, that ‘the death of NATO’ is nigh. The US has a clear interest in sustaining NATO, if only to ensure both peace and stability in Europe and the maintenance of America’s hegemonic position there. The difference will be that the US, rather than being an intimate, active member of NATO, could well pull back from Europe to become an off-shore balancer, unwilling to work under the auspices of the alliance. NATO in this general future would become increasingly more political than military in nature. It would become, as some detractors put it, a political talking shop. If NATO succeeds in its transformation effort and provides at least a modicum of usable and effective military capability through the NRF, Europe must be concerned about the degree to which it will be subject to the political and strategic global agenda of the US. The European allies may well face an America that presses them, either through NATO, or even the ESDP, to take on those military missions too trivial to excite Washington’s interest, whether these be managing security problems in Europe, peacekeeping and nation-building from the Balkans to the Middle East to Afghanistan, or humanitarian or crisis response missions in Africa. NATO in this future would be little more in military terms than an auxiliary to US forces. For an alliance that sees itself ﬁrst and foremost as a military organisation, neither of these futures will be welcomed. Fear and loathing in NATO indeed.
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The basis of the request was Article 4 of the Washington Treaty which states that NATO’s members will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any member country is threatened. See NATO: Basic Texts, The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington D.C., 4 April 1949, at http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm#FN1.
The author acknowledges Hunter S. Thompson for the phrase ‘fear and loathing’. See Thompson, Fear and Loathing in Las Vegas: A Savage Journey into the Heart of the American Dream (New York: Warner Books, 1971) and Fear and Loathing on the Campaign Trail ’72 (New York: Warner Books, 1973).
Quoted in: Michael J. Glennon ‘Why the security council failed’, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2003 at: http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20030501faessay11217/michaelj-glennon/why-the-security-council-failed.html?mode=print (14/06/03).
See Elizabeth Pond, ‘The Greek tragedy of NATO’, Internationale Politik, (Transatlantic Edition), 1(1), Spring 2003. Quoted in Jim Mannion, ‘NATO agrees sweeping reforms, but cracks remain after Iraq’, Agence France Presse, 12 June 2003, at http://web.lexis-nexis.com/executive/ document?_m=d885dc18f377266d90d5fded3957fd23&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkSl&_md5= 6231c35ac37cf3dfb75b3f77c37e82d7&cont=1. Elizabeth Pond, in her book on NATO after the Iraq crisis also refers to the dispute as a ‘near death experience’. See Elizabeth Pond, Friendly Fire: The Near Death of the Transatlantic Alliance (Washington DC: Brookings Institute, 2003).
See Pond, ‘The Greek tragedy of NATO’. The degree of US disdain for its ‘weak-kneed’ allies was reﬂected in Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s statement regarding ‘Old versus New Europe’, among others, and the general comments emanating out of the US such as ‘cheese eating surrender monkeys’, ‘axis of weasels’, and ‘chorus of cowards’.
For two accounts of the events leading up and then following the dispute within NATO, see Pond, Friendly Fire; and Philip Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, Allies at War: America, Europe and the Crisis over Iraq (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004).
For an overview of the ‘out of area’ issue during the cold war period, see Elizabeth D. Sherwood, Allies in Crisis: Meeting Global Challenges to Western Security (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 1990).
See, for example, Ivo H. Daalder, Getting to Dayton: The Making of America’s Bosnia Policy (Washington DC: Brookings Institute, 2000); and Giovanna Bono, NATO’s ‘Peace-Enforcement’ Tasks and ‘Policy Communities’: 1009-1999 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003).
NATO Press Releases, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Final
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Communiqué, 14-15 May, 2002 Press Release M-NAC- 1(2002)59 at: http:// www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-059e.htm.
Undoubtedly the most well known explication of these differences is Robert Kagan’s argument, which he pithily summed up as ‘The US is from Mars, Europe is from Venus’. See Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (New York: Knopf, 2003).
A third point of contention was that the other NATO members differed considerably from the Bush administration in their estimation of necessity to address the Israel-Palestine problem as a central component of addressing the issue of peace and stability in the Middle East.
See, for example, Phil Williams, US Troops in Europe (London: Macmillan, 1985). The US contribution is claimed to have been some 70% of the ﬂights and 80% of the bombs dropped. For a detailed analysis of the extent of the gap in capabilities see David S. Yost, ‘The US-European capabilities gap and the prospects for ESDP’, in Jolyon Howorth and John T. S. Keeler, Defending Europe: The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy (London: Palgrave, 2003), pp. 81-106.
The then SACEUR General Wesley Clark has argued that Washington caused more problems than did the Europe capitals, suggesting that this US concern is something of a myth. See Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo and the Future of Conﬂict (New York: Public Affairs, 2001).
Interviews with US department of defense ofﬁcials, April 2000. For a thorough analysis of what NATO did contribute, see Tom Lansford, All for One: Terrorism, NATO and the United States (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002). As one NATO ambassador noted, ‘(w)e felt marginalised if not irrelevant. Robertson really expected the US not only to be grateful, but also to take up the article 5 offer.’ Further, as a military ofﬁcial observed, ‘Robertson’s response to September 11 was a real error of judgment. . . . It damaged Nato.’ Quoted in Judy Dempsey, ‘Robertson struggles to rescue Nato’ FT.com, 12 February 12 2003, at: http://news.ft.com/servlet/ ContentServer?pagename=FT.com/StoryFT/FullStory&c=StoryFT&cid=104249178547 9&p=1012571727159.
See, for example, Ivo Daalder, The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response: NATO Strategy and Theater Nuclear Forces since 1967 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991). For an analysis of the US perspective on the viability of extending its nuclear deterrent to cover Europe, see Terry Terriff, The Nixon Administration and the Making of US Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca NY: Cornell Studies in Security Affairs, 1995).
See, for example, Michael Brenner and Guillaume Parmentier, Reconcilable Differences: US-French Relations in the New Era (Washington DC: Brookings Institute, 2002), especially pp. 38-68. A particular instance of this US resistance was the dispute over a The Atlantic Alliance After the Crisis over Iraq • 441
European assuming command of Allied Force Southern Europe in 1997. See Ronald Tiersky, ‘French gamesmanship and the future of the alliance: the case of Allied Forces Southern Europe’, in Lawrence R. Chalmer and Jonathan W. Pierce (eds.), NATO 1997: Year of Change (Washington DC: National Defense University Publications, 1998), Tiersky chapter at: http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books%20-201998/ NATO%201997%20Sept%2098/natoch2.html.
Quoted in: Michael J. Glennon ‘Why the Security Council Failed’, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2003 at: http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20030501faessay11217/michaelj-glennon/why-the-security-council-failed.html?mode=print (14/06/03).
Quoted in Peter Riddell, Hug Them Close: Blair, Clinton, Bush and ‘Special Relationship’ (London: Politico, 2003) p. 15. Indeed, the dispute within NATO over furnishing support to Turkey under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty reinforced the belief of new alliance members, and those states invited to join the alliance in 2004, that they could not rely on other European states, particularly France and Germany, for their security and that only the US would be willing to provide this. Interviews with Delegation Ofﬁcials, NATO Headquarters, July 2003.
On British policy, particularly with respect to Iraq, see Riddell, Hug Them Close. Daniel Dombey and Hugh Williamson, ‘Nato to command Afghan mission’, FT.com, 16 April 2003, at http://news.ft.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=FT.com/ StoryFT/FullStory&c=StoryFT&cid=1048313837986&p=1012571727102.
‘UN Council Approves a Broader Afghan Mission’, NYTimes.com, 14 October 2003, at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/14/international/asia/14AFGH.html?pagewanted=print&position.
See Elaine Sciolino, ‘Drifting NATO ﬁnds new purpose with Afghanistan and Iraq’, NYTimes.com, 23 February 2004, at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/23/international/europe/23NATO.html?pagewanted=print&position=; and ‘NATO Chief Says Iraq Role Depends on Baghdad, U.N.’, NYTimes.com, 4 March 2004, at http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/international/international-iraq-nato.html?pagewanted=print&position=.
See, for example, Reuters, ‘NATO Settles Dispute Over Training Iraqi Forces’, New York Times, 26 June 2004, at http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/politics/politicsiraq-nato.html?pagewanted=print&position=; and Daniel Dombey, ‘Paris holds out over Nato training’, FT.Com, 29 July 2004, at http://news.ft.com/servlet/Content Server?pagename=FT.com/StoryFT/FullStory&c=StoryFT&cid=1087374059706&p= 1012571727166.
See, for example, Paul Ames, ‘NATO eyes role in Mideast peace efforts’, Yahoo! News. 11 June 2003, at http://news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story2&cid=518&u= /ap/20030604/ap_on_re_eu/nato_3&printer=1.
442 • Terry Terriff
Quoted in ‘Annan sees NATO African role’, The Mercury, 9 March 2004, at http://www.themercury.news.com.au/printpage/0,5942,8913923,00.html. Quoted in Paul Amex, ‘Special force inaugurated: NATO unit can deploy quickly’, Calgary Herald, 16 October 2003, at http://web.lexis-nexis.com/executive/ document?_m=63e5708ac582863ac6f1d7fdb34f5457&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkSl&_md5= 41694d5076d0608a7c0d376868c85a85&cont=1 (06/02/2004).
The two other main elements are, ﬁrst, effecting change in the alliance’s command structure to make it leaner and more efﬁcient with the emphasis on ensuring that it is capable of generating and supporting expeditionary operations; and second, the establishment of Transformation Command, which is to work on developing new doctrines and concepts for alliance forces.
Interviews with SHAPE ofﬁcials, July 2003. DCI identiﬁed some 58 speciﬁc areas where military capabilities needed upgrading that were designed to improve mobility and deployability, sustainability, effective engagement, survivability, and interoperable communications. ‘NATO’s Defence Capabilities Initiative’, NATO Fact Sheets, at http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/ 2000/nato-dci.htm.
Jeffrey Simon, ‘NATO at a crossroads: can it cope with post-September 11th and enlargement challenges?’, unpublished paper, Institute For Security Studies, National Defense University, p. 3.
Testimony by Thomas Szayna (RAND Corporation) before the Committee on NATO Enlargement of the US House of Representatives’ Committee on International Relations, Sub-Committee on Europe, 17 April 2002.
Quoted in, ‘Dutchman takes NATO helm as alliance faces key tests’, Yahoo! News, 4 January, 2004, at http://news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story2&cid=1511&u= /afp/20040104/wl_afp/nato_chief_040104034905&printer=1.
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, speech on the 40th Munich Conference on Security Policy, 7 February 2004, at http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?menu_ 2004=&menu_konferenzen=&sprache=en&id=127&.
See, for example, Judy Dempsey, ‘Nato has no time to lose in Afghanistan’, FT.com, 2 December 2003, at http://news.ft.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename= FT.com/StoryFT/FullStory&cid=1069493659428&p=1016649827938; Judy Dempsey, ‘Nato needs more tools for the job in Afghanistan’, FT.com, 27 February 2004, at http://news.ft.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=FT.com/StoryFT/FullStory&c =StoryFT&cid=1077690740504&p=1012571727166; and Reuters, ‘Karzai Calls on Stretched NATO for Election Back - Up’, NYTimes.com, 10 March 2004, at http:// www.nytimes.com/reuters/international/international-nato-afghanistan-karzai.html? pagewanted=print&position=.
Judy Dempsey, ‘Nato must prove itself in Afghanistan’, FT.com, 17 February 2004, The Atlantic Alliance After the Crisis over Iraq • 443
at http://news.ft.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=FT.com/StoryFT/ FullStory&cid=1075982606988&p=1016649827938.
Quoted in Pond, Friendly Fire, p. 36. See Terry Terriff, ‘“A train collision in the making”: the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and transatlantic relations,’ Journal of Transatlantic Studies, forthcoming Spring 2005.
Interviews with ofﬁcials, Ofﬁce of the SACEUR, SHAPE, July 2003. Spain at present is the biggest contributor to the prototype force with 2,200, plus ships, aircraft and helicopters, followed by France, with 1,700, and Germany at 1,100.
Interviews with NATO and SHAPE ofﬁcials, July 2003. Special Report, ‘America and Europe: Who Needs Whom?’ The Economist, 9 March 2002. Mark A. Pollack, ‘Unilateral American, multilateral Europe?’, in John Peterson and Mark A. Pollack (eds.), Europe, America, Bush: Transatlantic Relations in the Twenty First Century (London: Routledge, 2003) pp. 115-27.
It is striking that in the initial months of the 2004 US presidential campaign the dominant issue, rather than being the economy or other domestic issues as is the norm, is about which party can better provide security and peace of mind for the American public.
For a good overview of the steps both sides of the Atlantic to start mending transatlantic ties, see Elizabeth Pond, ‘Lurching back together’, International Politik (International Edition) 5(1), 2004, at: http://www.dgap.org/english/tip/tip0401/ pond.htm.
On Kerry’s foreign policy, see Perry Bacon Jr., Lisa Beyer, and Karen Tumulty, ‘Interview: John Kerry’, Time Online Edition, 7 March 2004, at http://www.time.com/ time/covers/1101040315/ninterview.html; also, Karen Gibbs, ‘Does Kerry have a better idea?’, Time Online Edition, 7 March 2004, at http://www.time.com/time/covers/1101040315/nkerry.html; and Deborah McGregor ‘Bush and Kerry hasten to set out their policy stores’, FT.com, 5 March 2004, at http://news.ft.com/servlet/ ContentServer?pagename=FT.com/StoryFT/FullStory&c=StoryFT&cid=107838154656 1&p=1012571727162.
For an argument to this effect, see Gerald Baker, ‘A new US foreign policy?’, FT.com, 11 March 2004, at http://news.ft.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=FT.com/ StoryFT/FullStory&c=StoryFT&cid=1078381706999&p=1012571727102.
Indeed, for many European policymakers the 2004 US presidential campaign was a case of ‘fear and loathing on the campaign trail’. If Kerry were elected he would almost certainly ask the European allies for more direct help in Iraq, and if they declined the request of a ‘multilateralist’ president they would risk inﬂicting fur-
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ther, even permanent, harm to already damaged transatlantic relations. Alternatively, if Bush, a president they much disliked, were to win, they at least would be able to say ‘no’ without inﬂicting further harm. The reference is to, Thompson, Fear and Loathing on the Campaign Trail ’72.
Even Kerry said that, if he were elected president, he would act unilaterally if need be, up to and including engaging in pre-emptive war, to protect the US. See footnote 52 on Kerry’s statements of his views of US foreign policy.
The US also argued that NATO should retain control of the issues of war criminals. See, Judy Dempsey, ‘US and Europe vie for control of Bosnia force’, FT.com, 8 March 2004, at http://news.ft.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=FT.com/ StoryFT/FullStory&c=StoryFT&cid=1078381608815&p=1012571727102.
Quoted Felicity Barringer, ‘UN council may request foreign force for Congo’, NYTimes.com, 13 May 2003, at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/13/international/africa/13CONG.html?pagewanted=print&position=. See also, Reuters, ‘France Considering Rapid Reaction Force for Congo’, NYTimes.com, 12 May, 2003, at http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/international/international-congo-democraticun.html?pagewanted=print&position=. France took on the task and transformed the venture into an ofﬁcial ESDP mission that was successful in fulﬁlling its limited mandate. Reportedly, the US was interested in a French-led ‘coalition of the willing’ and was irritated when France turned the undertaking into an ofﬁcial ESDP one. Personal communication.
See, for example, Linda Feldman, ‘Is US inching toward intervention?’, Christian Science Monitor, 7 July 2003, at http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0707/p01s03usfp.htm. Indeed, the US Marines who were put ashore were convinced that their stay would be very brief and so failed to take anti-malarial prophylactics (due to potential side affects), resulting in a signiﬁcant number of them contracting malaria. See Associated Press, ‘Navy Is Investigating Post-Liberia Malaria’, NYTimes.com, 10 September 2003, at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/10/international/ africa/10MALA.html?pagewanted=print&position= (10/09/2003).
See, for example, Jim Lobe, ‘Pentagon’s “footprint” growing in Africa’, Foreign Policy In Focus (Silver City, NM & Washington DC: 12 May 2003), at http:// www.fpif.org/commentary/2003/0305africa_body.html; and Craig S. Smith, ‘US Training African Forces to Uproot Terrorists’, NYTimes.com, 11 May 2004, at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/11/international/africa/11AFRI.html?hp=&page wanted=print&position= .
US Department of State, ‘Lord Robertson signals “a New NATO, a NATO transformed”’, International Information Programs, 12 June 2003, at http://usinfo.state. gov/topical/pol/nato/03061204.htm.
Quoted US department of defense, ‘Jones discusses changing troop “footprint” The Atlantic Alliance After the Crisis over Iraq • 445
in Europe’, Federal Department and Agency Documents, 10 October 2003 at http://web.lexis-nexis.com/executive/document?_m=3e8c0f9a3842b8dd9570b2ad720 ebebc&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkSl&_md5=50024c6dc5365cfdcdd58247af766d98&cont=1 (06/02/2004).
446 • Terry Terriff
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