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• There are many types of games, board games, card games, video games, field games (e.g. football), etc. • W focus on games where: We f h – There are 2 or more players. – There is some choice of action where strategy matters. gy – The game has one or more outcomes, e.g., someone wins, someone loses. – Th outcome depends on the strategies chosen by all players; The t d d th t t i h b ll l there is strategic interaction. • What does this rule out? – Games of pure chance, e.g., bingo, slot machines. (Strategies don't matter). – Games without strategic interaction between players, e.g., players e g Solitaire.

**Why Do Economists Study Games?
**

• Games are a convenient way in which to model strategic interactions among economic agents. • Many economic issues involve strategic y g interaction.

– Behavior in imperfectly competitive markets, e.g. Coca-Cola versus Pepsi. – Behavior in auctions, e.g. when to bid in , g dynamic internet auctions. – Behavior in economic negotiations, e.g. trade. g g

• Game theory is not limited to Economics.

Three Elements of a Game: 1. A description of the consequences (payoffs) f each player for every ( ff ) for h l f possible profile of strategy choices of all players. 1 The players – how many players are there? – d does nature/chance play a role? t / h l l ? 2. A complete description of the strategies of each player h l 3. players .

“prisoners” 1. – In strategic/normal form game depiction. followed by professor 2 payoff.Illustration: The Prisoner’s Dilemma Game Dil G • Two players. Confess – Payoff consequences quantified in prison years (negative numbers): fewer years (less negative payoffs) =greater satisfaction. Confess – Prisoner 2: Don't Confess. 2. . – Prisoner 1: Don't Confess. Prisoner i / lf d i i i 1 payoff first. • Each has two strategies. • Each is questioned by detectives separately and without communication.

-5 5 5 . -1 .Prisoners Prisoners’ Dilemma Game in “Normal” or “Strategic” Form Prisoner 2’s Strategies Pi 2’ St t i Don't Confess Don't Prisoner 1’s Confess Strategies g Confess -1. 0 . 15 0 -15 Confess -15. -5. 0.

Dilbert Illustration http://www.gametheory.net/media/Dilbert.wmv .

How to play games using the p yg g comlabgames software. . • You are randomly matched with one other player. • Click the client play tab. Enter the address provided on the board in the server box. Then click the Login button. • Enter any user name (password is optional). • Double click on comlabgames desktop icon. • Start playing the game when roles are assigned. • Choose a row or column strategies depending on your role as player 1 or player 2.

Computer Comp ter Screen View Vie .

Results Screen View Number of times each outcome has been realized realized. .

she does not know what Prisoner 1 has chosen. .-15 Confess This line represents a constraint on the information that Prisoner 2 has available.-5 Confess -15.0 . Don't Confess 0. Pi h h Prisoner 2 Confess -5. While Prisoner 2 moves second.Prisoners' Dilemma Game in “Extensive” Form Extensive Prisoner 1 Don't Confess Prisoner 2 Don't Confess -1. Prisoner 2 payoff. Payoffs are: Prisoner 1 payoff.-1 .

. Player 2 also does d due to th i f ti t Pl l d not know Player 1’s moves. and d t the information set.Computer Screen View Player 1 (up left) moves without knowing Player 2’s moves.

one team wins and the other loses. . – M More generally. Don't Confess in Prisoners' Dilemma. in football. If a win = +1 and a loss =-1. e. if players’ interests are not always in direct conflict so that there conflict. the sum is zero. • For example when both players choose Don t example.g.Prisoners Prisoners' Dilemma is an example of a Non-Zero Sum Game • A zero-sum game is one in which the players' interests are in direct conflict. are opportunities for both to gain. the sum at stake can be a constant. ll h k b • A game is non-zero/non-constant sum..

• Settle a divorce amicably or hire a lawyer? • Immediately merge left when signs indicate the right lane ahead is closed or continue driving in right lane up to the merge point? • Full price menu or value price menu? • Can you think of other applications? .The Prisoners' Dilemma is applicable to many other situations. situations • Nuclear arms races.

Non-Binding.075. £100. £0 .youtube. £50.150 Steal £100. £0 £0. Pregame Communication or “Cheap i i h Talk”: should/does it matter in the PD? http://www.com/watch?v=p3Uos2fzIJ0 Split Split £50.150.075 Steal £0.Labels or “Framing”.

Sequential Move Games • Games where players choose actions simultaneously are simultaneous move games. recognizing that your opponent is doing the same. • Many strategic situations involve both sequential and simultaneous moves. – Must anticipate what your opponent will do right now. • Games where players choose actions in a particular sequence are sequential move games. now – Many sequential move games have deadlines/ time limits on moves. Sealed-Bid Auctions. . – Examples: Prisoners' Dilemma.Simultaneous v. – Must look ahead in order to know what action to choose now. i l – Examples: Chess. Bargaining/Negotiations.

the amount at stake is tripled ( p (=12).6 If sender sends d d (invests) 4.The Investment Game is a Sequential Move Game Sender S d Don't Send 4.0 Keep 0. ) The investment game is depicted in “extensive” form .12 Send Receiver Return 6.

Computer Screen View p • You are either the sender or the receiver. If you are the receiver. . wait for the sender's decision.

opportunities for cooperative behavior may arise. • Advise: If you plan to pursue an aggressive strategy. another – Example . game. think i . – Indefinitely versus finitely repeated g y y p games – Reputational concerns matter. – Players likely to not know much about one another. ask yourself whether you are in a one-shot or in a repeated game If a repeated game thi k again.One-Shot versus Repeated Games p • One-shot: play of the game occurs once. game.tipping on your vacation • Repeated: play of the game is repeated with the same players.

Strategies will depend on whether the game is one-shot or repeated. Return • • • How do strategies change when the game is repeated? . left behind when you go on vacation.Strategies g • • A strategy must be a “comprehensive plan of action”. that specifies the actions you want taken in every situation which could conceivably arise during your absence absence. a decision rule or set of instructions about which actions a player should take It is the equivalent of a memo. Confess – Investment Game: • Sender: Don't Send. Examples of one-shot strategies one shot – Prisoners' Dilemma: Don't Confess. Send • Receiver: Keep.

if you are the sender: Initially play Send. then play Don't confess in the next round. then play Confess in the next round. Play Send as long as the receiver plays Return If the receiver plays Keep. Return. If your opponent plays Don't confess. the sequential nature of the relationship allows for the adoption of strategies that are contingent on the p g g actions chosen in previous plays of the game.Repeated Game Strategies p g • In repeated games. – In the investment game. If your opponent plays Confess. never play Send again. This is known as the "grim trigger" strategy. • Example trigger strategies – In prisoners' dilemma: Initially play Don't confess. . This is known as the "tit for tat" strategy. • Most contingent strategies are of the type known as "trigger" strategies.

For outcome example. . • Otherwise the game is one of imperfect Otherwise. the l I th t di t t th sender and receiver might be differentially informed about the investment outcome.g. but the sender may not y p . the receiver may know that the amount invested is always tripled. information –E Example: In the repeated investment game. in Chess.Information • Players have perfect information if they know exactly what has happened every time a decision needs to be made. y be aware of this fact. e.

People treat expected payoffs the same as certain payoffs (they are risk neutral). that all players know that all players know that all players know X and so on on. – We can relax this assumption to capture risk averse behavior..Assumptions Game Theorists Make Payoffs are known and fixed. . ff The rules of the game are common knowledge: – Each player knows the set of players.. ad infinitum. strategies and payoffs from all possible combinations of strategies: call this information “X.. l b h i ll – They understand and seek to maximize their own payoffs. – E Example: a risk neutral person is indifferent between $25 for certain or l ik l i i diff b f i a 25% chance of earning $100 and a 75% chance of earning 0. that all players know that all players know X.” – Common knowledge means that each player knows that all players know X. – They are flawless in calculating which actions will maximize their payoffs. All players behave rationally..

what side of the road to drive on).g. While it rules out completely surprising actions/outcomes from a strategic setting (e. Examples of statements that may be regarded as common knowlege: Everyone knows that everyone knows that: 1) there are four seasons. 3) The average annual catch of fish by Philippine fishermen exceeds 2 million metric tons.Common Knowledge? Common knowledge can be a strong assumption. the events of 9/11/01). but is necessary for analysis of a game.. however small. 3) right from left (e. 2) Henry the VIII’s fifth wife was Catherine Howard ) y (beheaded after two years of marriage). most settings can be reformulated i i ( h f 9/11/01) i b f l d as ones where all possible outcomes have some probability of occurrence. (e g Examples of things that are not common knowledge: 1) The capital of Botswana is Gaborone.g. . 2) there are seven days in a week.

• Thus in equilibrium no one has an incentive to change Thus. each player is playing the strategy that is a "best response" to the strategies of the other players. equilibrium. it ti h l l h th ti Sometimes equilibrium will involve changing action choices (known as a mixed strategy equilibrium). that is the strategy that yields the highest payoff given the strategies of the other players. his strategy given the strategy choices of all others. – A situation where players always choose the same action. qu b u s ot: • Equilibrium is not: – The best possible outcome.Equilibrium • The interaction of all (rational) players' strategies results in an outcome that we call "equilibrium." q • In equilibrium. . Equilibrium in the one-shot prisoners' dilemma is for both players to confess.

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