An Enactive Approach to Digital Musical Instrument Design

Newton Armstrong

A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF PRINCETON UNIVERSITY IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

RECOMMENDED FOR ACCEPTANCE BY THE DEPARTMENT OF MUSIC

November 2006

© Copyright by Newton Blaire Armstrong, 2006. All rights reserved.

Table of Contents

Table of Contents ............................................................................ iii Abstract ..........................................................................................v Acknowledgements ......................................................................... vii 1 Introduction............................................................................... 1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 2 The Disconnect .........................................................................2 Flow ........................................................................................6 The Criteria of Embodied Activity ................................................8 The Computer-as-it-comes....................................................... 12

The Interface ............................................................................16 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 Interaction and Indirection....................................................... 16 Representation and Cognitive Steering ...................................... 18 Computationalism ................................................................... 23 Sensing and Acting ................................................................. 32 Functional and Realizational Interfaces ...................................... 41 Conclusion ............................................................................. 49

3

Enaction ....................................................................................51 3.1 3.2 Two Persistent Dualisms .......................................................... 51 Double Embodiment ................................................................ 55
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..... Feely: Usage Examples ............4 3.............................................3 4............. 61 Towards an Enactive Model of Interaction ................ Feely: Software................................................................................. 69 The Discontinuous Unfolding of Skill Acquisition .............. 98 Implementation ...................... Feely: Hardware..................................4 4.100 4....3 3...........2 4................. 82 Conclusion .................. 100 Mr................................3.6 4 Structural Coupling ................................... 155 iv .......................1 4...........152 Bibliography.................................. 148 5 Groundlessness ...................................................................................... 103 Mr............................................ 128 Prospects .................................................5 Kinds of Resistance ......................5 3...................................................................................................................... 116 Mr......

Abstract

Digital musical instruments bring about problems for performance that are different in kind to those brought about by conventional acoustic instruments. In this essay, I argue that one of the most significant of these problems is the way in which conventional computer interfaces preclude embodied modes of interaction. I examine the theoretical and technological foundations of this “disconnect” between performer and instrument, and sketch an outline for the design of embodied or “enactive” digital instruments. My research builds on recent work in human-computer interaction and “soft” artificial intelligence, and is informed by the phenomenology of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, as well as the “enactive cognitive science” of Francisco Varela and others. I examine the ways in which the conventional metaphors of computer science and “hard” artificial intelligence derive from a mechanistic model of human reasoning, and I outline how this model has informed the design of interfaces that inevitably lead to disembodied actional modes. I propose an alternative model of interaction that draws on various threads from the work of Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and the enactive cognitive scientists. The “enactive model of interaction” that I propose is concerned with circular chains of embodied interdependency between performer and instrument, instrumental “resistance” to human action and intentionality, and an integrative approach to the roles of sensing, acting and cognitive process in the incremental acquisition of performative skill.

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The final component of the essay is concerned with issues of implementation. I detail a project in hardware and software that I present as a candidate “enactive digital musical instrument,” I outline some specific usage examples, and I discuss prospects for future work.

vi

Acknowledgements

This paper would have been a much bigger mess were it not for the timely contributions of a number of people. In particular, I have benefited from the very careful readings and insightful criticisms of my advisor, Barbara White, and my first reader, Dan Trueman. Paul Lansky has uttered more wise words than I could count, and he has changed my mind about many things during my time at Princeton (although, as far as I can tell, that was never really his intention). Perry Cook has taught me a great deal about interaction, both in his classes and in the approach to design that he takes in his own projects. He has been an outstanding role model in terms of bridging the gap between theory and practice, and knowing when it’s time to just sit down with a soldering iron. I have also benefited greatly from conversations with other graduate students while at Princeton. In particular, I’d like to thank Ted Coffey, Paul Audi, Mary Noble, Seth Cluett, Scott Smallwood and Ge Wang, each of whom has given me feedback on my work, in the form of both critical readings and more casual conversations about the core topics. I’m also grateful to the other composers in my intake year: Paul Botelho, Stefan Weisman and Miriama Young. Together we represent a diverse group, but there has been a considerable and on-going interest in each other’s work, and this interest has been borne out in tangible forms of support for our respective projects and activities. The history of electronic music performance goes largely without mention in my paper. But the research would not have been possible in the first place were

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I am indebted to all those electronic performers whose work I have engaged.it not for those practitioners. or through personal contact and performance collaborations. from David Tudor to Toshimaru Nakamura. I’m looking forward to rejoining the ranks of the improvising community in a less part-time capacity. but new potentialities of the body. whether through written accounts and recordings. viii . Although my fingers are rusty from typing. who would question the hidden nature of electronic media in order to uncover not just new sounds.

are obsolescent. It says that the functional shape of an instrument is not important as a sculptural object. And as a matter of fact much electronic music leaves the impression that this IS the attitude in which sounds are composed. It says that music is a pure art of sound. for people with ears.1 Introduction Electronics for its own sounds’ sake is a resource that one would be stupid to dismiss. no interrelated functions. That the physical. sensual vision of the playing of it is no longer required. Some New and Old Thoughts After and Before “The Bewitched” 1 . no nerve endings anywhere but the ears. because of its particular virtues and its particular defects. — Harry Partch. even misleading. but with little else— no eyes. but the implication is irrelevant. and that the techniques developed on it.

the question as to whether the computer should be properly considered a musical instrument continues. More often than not.1.1 The Disconnect A wooden wheel placed on the ground is not. a capability that had previously been the reserve of special purpose machines that were for the most part inaccessible to people working outside an institutional framework. the personal computer was becoming fast enough to be used as a realtime synthesizer of sound. In the years since the mid-1990s. there has been a rapid proliferation of new software and input devices designed specifically for musical performance with general purpose computers. But while the widespread availability of the personal computer to the first world middle class has resulted in the medium finding its way into any number of new and diverse musical contexts. the same thing as a wheel bearing a load. for sight. The Phenomenology of Perception The mid-1990s marked a juncture in the short history of computer music. Or. and a burgeoning corpus of new theories. to generate some controversy. more specifically. these controversies revolve around the relationship between the human performer and the performance medium. they revolve around an apparent lack of embodied human presence 2 . — Maurice Merleau-Ponty. A body at rest because no force is being exerted upon it is again for sight not the same thing as a body in which opposing forces are in equilibrium. For the first time. at least in certain quarters. performance practices and musical idioms have emerged in tandem to the new technologies.

brings a unique set of issues and concerns to the problem of musical performance. Defenders of the “near-motionless” school of computer music performance have suggested that complaints such as these arise not because there is something substantive missing from the interaction between performer and performance medium. and that for such an involvement to be tangible to the audience. Those who complain about the current state of computer music performance practice reveal something of their assumptions and expectations as regards musical performance: that the involvement of the performer’s body constitutes a critical dimension of the practice. in real time and real space. considered as a performance medium. and between performer and instrument. between performer and audience. of the sounds they are hearing. and that the attributes of the medium necessitate a break with established instrumental conventions. where the absence of any explicit correlation between motor input and sonic output results in a disassociation of performer from performance medium. what is witnessed is a disconnect. Stuart 2003). In both instances.and involvement in computer music performance practice. it’s necessary that that audience picks up on somatic cues that signal the point of origin. The complainants argue that the performer is either absorbed in near-motionless contemplation of the computer screen—the repertoire of performance gestures not substantively different from those that comprise any routine interaction with a personal computer—or that there is a high degree of arbitrariness to the performer’s actions. the modes of performance that are attendant to those 3 . The argument has it that the computer. but because conventional expectations as regards the constitutive elements of musical performance have not yet caught up to an essentially new performance practice (Cascone 2000.

that is. that computer music performance practice. What distinguishes one side from the other is where that missing something is located: with the performer. the present study is a legitimation of the complaints being uttered against the current state of computer music performance practice. But what can be called into question is the implied corollary to the apologist’s claim that the burden of responsibility lies with the audient.conventions. In certain respects. But more pressingly. It’s been suggested that those who take issue with the apparent lack of human motor involvement in current computer music performance practice reveal a mindset “created by constant immersion in pop media (Cascone 2000: 101-102). is already mature. 4 . In this essay. I’ve found that the performance medium has in all but a few instances managed to maintain a safe distance. Despite investing a number of years in the development of both hardware and software designed specifically for performance. who needs to relearn “active” modes of listening. the “object of performance” is instead transferred to the ears of the audient. as it stands.” On both sides of the argument over the state of computer music performance practice. there is a suggestion that something is missing. and that most of the interesting and significant work in the field remains to be done. then. It’s difficult to defend either position. or “aural performativity (Stuart 2003). assumptions and receptive habits of audiences. or with the audient. and the expectations. I take the opposite position: that computer music performance practice remains both theoretically and technologically under-developed. it is borne out of frustration as a computer music performer. based as they are on speculative assessments of the receptive habits and practices of listeners.” and that the emergence of the new performance paradigm signals a shift away from the locus of the body of the performer.

then the medium deserves to be examined. and significant form of music making. something embedded in the medium itself. 5 . or an ingrained expectation that an explicitly causal relation is witnessed between performance gesture and sonic result. something that necessarily and inevitably brings about a disconnect. in order to determine what can be done to engender the technical conditions from which an embodied performance practice might arise. it seems to me that there is something more fundamental to the issue: that an engaged and embodied mode of performance leads to a more compelling. that is the cause of all this. Rather. dynamic. or “missing dimension.corroborating (from the shaky perspective of first person phenomenal experience) the complaint of the disconnect. I’ve come to believe that there is something intrinsic to the computer. I’m going to suggest that the perceived disconnect. If it turns out that is in fact the case. the audience. and for the social space that they co-construct through the performance ritual. Unlike the apologists for the currently predominant modes of computer music performance practice. for the performer. is not due to a conditioned desire for spectacle. then the medium effectively guarantees that an embodied coupling of human and instrument—a coupling that creates the possibility of engaged and involved experience—never quite takes place. If the attributes of the computer preclude such a mode of performance.” that certain people have been complaining about.

2 The notion of "affordance" was introduced by psychologist James Gibson (Gibson 1977. Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience (Csikszentmihaly 1991). In the Gibsonian sense. Conventional acoustic instruments offer resistance to the body of the performer. As such. and their responses are tightly correlated to the variety of inputs from the performer’s body that are afforded by the mechanism. For a concise summation of the applicability of Csikszentmihaly's ideas to instrumental performance see Burzik's "Go with the flow" (Burzik 2003)." in the sense that I will use the term. De Musica Performers of conventional acoustic instruments often talk of the sense of flow they experience while playing. and the loss of any immediate sense of severance between agent (the performer) and environment (the instrument. the term accounts for the particular 6 . the acoustic space. see Mihaly Csikszentmihaly.2 Flow The matter of music is sound and body motion. and it’s a coupling that happens as a matter of course with acoustic instruments.2 In a sequence of on-going negotiations between performer and 1 For a more complete account of "flow. the social setting. — Aristides. and other providers of context). It’s the kind of absorbing experience that can arise in the directed exchange between an embodied agent and a physical mechanism. 1979). an affordance is an opportunity for action that the environment presents to an embodied agent.1 It’s a way of being that consists in the merging of action and awareness.1.

instrument. But where those writers focus on the shortcomings of the audience." 7 . as well as her intentionality. I’m not specifically interested in appropriating the conventions of acoustic instrumental practice for computer music. Along with those writers who would proclaim the advent of a new computer music performance practice. but because I choose to conceive of the body as a site of possibility and resistance. these negotiations lead to a more fully developed relationship with the instrument.. Performance with a conventional acoustic instrument serves as a useful example of an embodied mode of human activity. or in modeling acoustic instruments in the digital domain. To borrow an example from Andy Clark: ". to a human a chair affords sitting.. and because it seems that the computer has a way of both limiting the body’s possibilities and diminishing its potential for resistance. presents new and unique problems and prospects. and to a heightened sense of embodiment. the performer adapts to what is uncovered in the act of playing. I focus on the shortcomings of current theory and technologies. Over a sustained period of time. I hold that the computer. and of an engaged coupling with a complex physical mechanism. but to a woodpecker it may afford something quite different (Clark 1997:172). considered as a performance medium. But in the context of the present study. and on the body of the performer—not because of the body’s historical coupling to conventional instruments. or flow. physical and perceptual attributes and abilities of the agent. continually developing new forms of embodied knowledge and competence.

of a heightened sense of embodiment. to the experience of playing a conventional acoustic instrument that are pertinent to thinking about the design of digital musical instruments that would allow for embodied modes of performance.There are attributes. these are qualities that I believe are central. that the normative senses of time. to musical performance. then some work needs to be done. are put temporarily on hold. and the social and physical environment in which the ritualised act of performance is embedded. the experience of flow. Traditional though it may seem. in experiential real time and real space. In short. I’ll return to what I take to be the five key criteria of embodied musical performance. 1. the motor system (muscles). the nervous system (including the brain). but directly within the course of action. involves an immediately palpable feeling of active presence in a world that is directly lived and experienced. the five key criteria of 8 . It amounts to a presence and participation in the world. and if it does not presently lend itself to embodied form of interaction. and will remain central. immediate and engaging.3 The Criteria of Embodied Activity Over the course of this essay. then. in which meaning and purpose arise not through abstract contemplation. Such action involves complex and continuous exchanges and interactions between senses. If the computer is going to figure as a musical instrument. The optimal performative experience—this somewhat intangible and elusive notion of flow—could be characterized as a way of being that is so direct. more specifically. or. space and the self.

Embodiment arises contextually. Embodied activity is multimodal. Embodied activity is timely. screwing bolts faster to stay ahead of the work. Chaplin holding these two wrenches. eventually caught up in the machine and ejected onto the factory floor in his hysterical epileptic dance. rushing to catch up. through an agent’s interactions with her environment. This means that it is incumbent on the agent to not disrupt the flow of activity because her capacity for action is too slow. and in her relationship to it. (Sudnow 2001:32-3) 9 . missing one or two along the way. Embodied activity is situated. 2. because the upcoming flow seems to gain speed and he gets frantic. their placements at regular intervals on the belt. The agent must be able to adapt to changes in the environment. A large portion of the agent’s total sensorimotor capabilities are galvanised in performance. Real world activity involves real-time constraints. This involves 3 David Sudnow uses a nice example of untimely behavior in Ways of the Hand: Recall Charlie Chaplin on the assembly line in Modern Times: the conveyor belt continuously carrying a moving collection of nuts and bolts to be tightened. falling behind the time.the particular kind of embodied mode of interaction with digital musical instruments that I hope to uncover through outlining a philosophically informed approach to instrument design. and the agent must be able to meet these constraints in a timely manner. without full prior knowledge of the features of the environment.3 3. or of its structure and dynamics. or because it actually does speed up. Those criteria are: 1.

Borrowing from cognitive scientists Francisco Varela. action and perception.4 That is. with an emphasis on the concurrent utilisation of distinct sensorimotor modalities.e. I will refer to the embodied mode of performative activity I’m outlining here as enactive. That is. the environment is incomplete without the involvement of the agent. The sense of embodiment arises when the agent is required by the task domain. i." But this is potentially misleading. and it presents challenges to the agent that consume a large portion of her attention. I’ll address the concept of enaction in more depth in Chapter 3. 5. living organisms do not emerge into their bodies. between those modalities. and Rosch 1991). The implications of this double sense of embodiment—of its "inner" and "outer" aspects—are explored in Chapter 3. Embodied activity is engaging.. as embodiment is a given for biological systems. optimal embodied experience arises incrementally over a history of sensorimotor performances within a given environment or phenomenal domain. whereas the fact of embodiment is objective. The sense of embodiment is an emergent phenomenon. Thompson.optimising the use of the body’s total available resources for cognition. There is a link between increasing sensorimotor competence within the task domain and the sense of embodiment. Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch (Varela. as well as the potential for mutual interaction. is phenomenal. but for the time being it’s useful 4 This criterion could perhaps have been condensed into the phrase "embodiment is an emergent phenomenon. then. 10 . or cross-coupling. 4. The sense of embodiment.

the “now” of lived experience. This model of cognition. and cognitive systems and structures.” but it also encompasses the emergence and development of knowledge and competence. with its emphasis on bodily involvement in the “bringing forth of a world. 11 . the cognitive dimension of activity.e.. i.”5 provides a template for the performance practice that I hope will emerge from this study. circular. and fully reciprocal process of mutual determination and specification in which subjectivity and the sense of embodiment are in a continuous state of flux. In contrast to orthodox views of mental process that view cognition as the internal mirroring of an objective external world. 5 The expression is borrowed from Varela. of an instantaneous conceptual and corporeal disposition within a given environment. and Rosch 1991). that which is ineluctably the “now. i. Rosch and Thompson's The Embodied Mind (Varela. In the enactive view. it arises through and within an agent’s physical interactions with her environment. This encompasses the dynamics of the experiential present. the enactive perspective takes the repeated sensorimotor interactions between the agent and the environment as the fundamental locus of cognitive development. cognition is fundamentally an embodied phenomenon.” It’s an ongoing. To that extent. plays a determining role in the emergence of cognitive systems and structures.. play a determining role in constituting the “now. in turn. Thompson.e.to emphasize the centrality of the body to the enactive model of cognition.

but its connections to the world around it were weakened.. Clancey 1997. These were precisely the issues suppressed by the computationalist approaches.e. Lynn Andrea Stein has suggested that it was a matter of historical contingency that saw the computationalist approach hold sway in the formative days of computer science: Cybernetics took seriously the idea of a computation embedded in and coupled to its environment. the field as a whole has not been immune to 6 The "prevailing guiding metaphors" of CS and HCI—i. and engaging. The nascent field of computational science was set on a steady path. multimodal. timely. And while the subset of computing devices that is of specific interest to this essay—digital musical instruments—is these days comprised of a vast and diverse array of implementations. (Stein 1999:482) 12 . and routinely preclude modes of interaction that are situated. Stein 1999. dominated by the computational metaphor. 2001. 1997.1. Dourish 1999. cybernetics failed to provide the necessary empowerment for the emerging science of computation and so was lost. The prevailing guiding metaphors of computer science (CS) and human computer interaction (HCI)6 are at odds with the embodied/enactive approach. the epistemological underpinnings of what I have labelled "conventional" CS and HCI—will be outlined in terms of a computationalist ontology in Chapter 2. In the intellectual battles of mid-century. or that lead to a heightened sense of embodiment over a history of interactions. Winograd and Flores 1986) have shown that it is no easy task to design computing devices that would allow for embodied modes of interaction.4 The Computer-as-it-comes A number of authors (Agre 1995.

at around the same time that the first "laptop performers" began to appear. 13 . and I will refer to it under the (intentionally) broad term of “digital musical instruments. This is not to say that all digital musical instruments have failed to realize the potential for embodied modes of interaction. the practitioners seek to extend computing devices. For a diverse range of assessments of laptop performance practice and its reception.” A third current could also be identified.the guiding metaphors of conventional CS and HCI. those instruments that have managed to realize this potential have done so despite the conventional tenets of CS and HCI.”7 and has given rise to a so-called “laptop aesthetic (Jaeger 2003). and would normally be characterized by the “nearmotionless” mode of performance described earlier in the chapter. But rather. The first of these would take the personal computer more or less as it comes (with minimal or zero additions to the standard input devices). through the development and integration of new technologies designed specifically for musical performance. of “extended acoustic instruments.” The second of the two currents is defined precisely through its non-acceptance of the “computer-as-it-comes” as a musical instrument. This is the field of activity to which my own work belongs. 2003. Rather. or even completely reconfigure them. see the articles collected in Contemporary Music Review 22 (4).” in which the computer is used as a signal processing add-on or improvising partner to a conventional 7 The term "laptop music" surfaced in the second half of the 1990s. This practice is often encapsulated under the rubric of “laptop music. It may be useful to distinguish between two main currents in present day computer music performance practice.

research papers and theses on issues in live computer music. This is the computer that “laptop music” adopts wholesale into its performance practice. audio 14 .acoustic instrument. there remains a near total absence of work related specifically to the philosophical foundations of instrument design. the limits and potentialities of the current computational media—i.e. The tendency in digital musical instrument design has been to focus on the pragmatic issues of design: specific sensor and actuator technologies. and that in order to arrive at sustainable designs for enactive instruments. The “computer-as-it-comes” is a term that will appear throughout this essay. What I intend to denote is not so much a specific device (although it could be). and the same computer that those working towards “digital musical instruments” would seek to re-engineer in order to arrive at embodied modes of performance. I believe that the most pressing issues in arriving at designs that allow for embodied forms of musical interaction with computers are philosophical. this area of practice is not of specific relevance to the present study. There has been a great deal of activity in recent years in the development of new digital musical instruments. but rather a general notion of the more or less generic personal computer. But as the presence of the acoustic instrument already invokes the potential for embodied performance. While this has lead to numerous innovations in both the theory and technology of computer music performance. the defining attributes of the computeras-it-comes—need to be examined in philosophical terms. There has also been a steadily growing corpus of scholarly articles.. the technological instantiation of the conventional guiding metaphors of CS and HCI.

This is the first step towards rethinking and reconfiguring those patterns. all too regularly. in the technological artifacts that result from those designs. Without addressing these issues at some point. there is a greater likelihood that designers will unwittingly fall back on the received tenets of CS and HCI. and so on. Without proper attention to the foundational issues. be no digital musical instruments of which to speak. it seems to me that the shift of emphasis is potentially very useful. then that medium needs to be examined with a philosophical perspective in order to arrive at a better understanding of the ways in which it determines its patterns of use. of course.synthesis methods. While there is a great deal of overlap between the pragmatic and the foundational issues. with a view to providing a conceptual touching stone for the pragmatic stage. in turn. The personal computer brings with it a sizable repertoire of usage conventions. As I will endeavour to show. 15 . there will. and. reflecting world views. for example—and if it does so because of the world models that are embedded in its very mechanism. even though those tenets may (and more often than not will) work against the bringing into being of enactive instruments. these implications are philosophical in origin. designers end up drawing on the conventional patterns of use without proper consideration of the implications of those patterns for the end user. behavior and cognition. mapping strategies. and. and towards arriving at designs that are more fully and properly geared towards the requirements and desires of embodied human actors. But in this essay I focus more on the theoretical and foundational issues of design. If a medium precludes a desired usage— an embodied mode of interaction. and models of interaction. that are immanent in designs.

to changes in the state of computer programs. loudspeakers and printers) transmit human-decodable respresentations of the state of the running programs from the computer back to the user.2 The Interface Musical ideas are prisoners. Interactions between a human and a computer are conducted through an interface. Output devices (such as monitors. it consists in providing an appropriate abstraction of computational data and tasks to the user. protocols and procedures appropriate to the task domain for which the interface. in the first instance.1 Interaction and Indirection Interaction takes place when signals are passed back and forth between two or more entities. Input devices (such as keyboards and mice) capture signals from the user that are mapped. of musical devices. more than one might believe. Traite des Objets Sonore 2. The interface provides the human with a means of access to the programs running on the computer. through the interface abstraction layer. Human-computer interface design is therefore concerned with providing the user with a set of usage practices. — Pierre Schaeffer. is required. 16 .

is correlated within the user’s cognitive apparatus to the physical act of hammering. in order to accomplish meaningful tasks with computers. its physical operations are abstracted. correlated within the cognitive apparatus to the electrical phenomena that constitute the physics of computation. say. The physics of computational media consists in the regulated flow of electrons through circuits. in the distance that the interface imposes between the human and the computer. Rather. Rather. we see the “disconnect” between agent and medium. The hammer. if ever. This sets the medium apart not only from the hammer. considered as an interface. but from the overwhelming majority of tools that humans use. 17 . including conventional acoustic musical instruments. in order for significant interactions to take place. and the way in which that task is conceived by the user. and the human agent does not interact with those circuits in any kind of physically direct manner. the canonical example of the hammer. But a computer user’s interactions with a computer are rarely. Already. the interactional domain needs to be designed.1 is the absence of any direct correlation between the physical domain in which a computational task is carried out. It follows that interactions with a computer are necessarily indirect. input devices need to 1 The hammer example has figured large in philosophy of technology and media theory since its appearance in Heidegger's Being and Time (Heidegger [1927] 1962) and “The Question Concerning Technology (Heidegger [1949] 1977). then. and the task domain is presented to the user in the form of graphical and auditory representations. see Don Ihde's Instrumental Realism (Ihde 1991)." For an interesting analysis of the role that the hammer has played within these discourses.One thing that distinguishes the computer from tools such as.

2 To a certain extent. 1991. would seek to embed computing devices directly (and invisibly) within the user's environment (Dourish 2001. such as tangible and ubiquitous computing. Users of 2 This is the express goal of so-called "direct manipulation" interface models (see 2. Greenfield 2006. and software data need to be transmitted to the user in the form of representations. But an enactive model of interaction will require an entirely different approach to that taken by conventional HCI.. 1994.be be mapped to tasks and procedures in software. — π.2 Representation and Cognitive Steering Things is what they things. ideally to the extent that the user comes to conceive of the task domain directly in the terms of the representations that comprise the interface. The overriding goal of conventional human-computer interface design is to reduce the inevitable distance between agent and medium. 2.o. Ullmer and Ishii 2001. reducing the degree of indirection between agent and medium is also the goal of the present study. 18 . aggregated metaphorical schema—that are customarily (though somewhat inaccurately) characterized as software. More radical approaches. (printed on a coffee mug) The computer-as-it-comes packages interface abstractions into representational frameworks—i.5 below). Norman 1999. Weiser 1988.e. Weiser and Brown 1996).

It’s a suite of bureaucratic abstractions. workspaces. extrapolated from a real-world task environment that is likely familiar to the user. keeping the play of regulated voltages—the physical agency through which that work is actually accomplished—well out of the user’s immediate zone of awareness. the transition from design to artifact nonetheless remains loaded with epistemological implications for the end user. an encompassing system of metaphors that serves to both guide and regulate the agent’s thoughts and activities through intrinsic correspondences to everyday objects and activities. and however conscious a designer may be of the philosophical underpinnings of the decisions made during the course of design. and the like. trash cans. folders. It’s an unusual transaction that takes place between the designers of computer interfaces and the end users of those interfaces. However well-formulated or defined those philosophical systems may be. This is an unavoidable side-effect of indirection.personal computers are familiar with the now standard interface metaphors for the routine management and maintenance of their computer systems: files. that serves to facilitate bureaucratic work. desktops. The interface amounts to a model of the world. Through the set of interactions made available by whichever incidental pre-packaged representational world. despite a great deal of attention within the fields of interaction design and 19 . Models of the world are born out of philosophical systems. and. the user participates in whichever incidental model of the world happens to be implicit to the design.

and an even larger number of end users. it orients the user’s cognitive activity. registered in corporeal memory—through repeated performances (Merleau-Ponty [1945] 2004).3 it’s a side-effect that remains beyond the bounds of consideration for a large number of designers. “technology at present is covert philosophy (Agre 1997: 240). then. As Philip Agre has put it. These bodily habits do not so much comprise a catalogue of discrete and distinct states as they do a collection of dispositions and inclinations. the repertoire of meaningful performance actions becomes more or less fixed in bodily habit. This is what Merleau-Ponty defines as an incorporating practice.e. but which at the same time determine the structure and dynamics of those movements. see Heidegger. Critical Theory of Technology (Feenberg 1991).” To the same extent that an interface encapsulates a model of the world. there comes to exist “a durably installed generative principle of regulated improvisations (Bourdieu 1977: 78). a set of implicit assumptions as regards the elements and structure of the task domain begins to solidify. arrangements within which the agent is potentially free to move. “The Question Concerning Technology (Heidegger [1949] 1977). In a similar vein to Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of the habitus. and through a chain of subtle reciprocal influences. Feenberg. it encapsulates a model of 3 In particular. Computation and Human Experience (Agre 1997). and Agre.” As the interface delineates the conceptual milieu to the user. Through repeated performances.technology studies. a process in which actions are literally incorporated—i. 20 ..

there is a high degree of reciprocal determination and specification between perception. that Merleau-Ponty defined as the intentional arc4 (Merleau-Ponty [1945] 2004). to draw a hard 4 In Varela. Thompson. See in particular the book's introduction and opening chapter. In this feedback loop at the heart of the enactive view. at the same time that repetitive dispositions towards action and modes of perceiving are engendered within the agent’s sensorimotor mechanisms. cognition. then it will make little sense. If we accept that these dependencies are real.” This formulation is essentially a latter day reworking of the fully recursive process. action and cognitive process are embedded. “cognitive structures emerge from the recurrent sensorimotor patterns that enable action to be perceptually guided (Varela. Merleau-Ponty’s concept of incorporation is consistent with the enactive model of cognition. encompassing incorporating practices. Or to put it another way.performance. and the contingencies of the environment in which perception. 21 . and Rosch 1991)—the book in which "enactive cognitive science" is first outlined—the authors acknowledge their debt to Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology. when examining an interactional domain with a view to the emergence of cognitive and performative patterns. Thompson. These dual aspects are inextricably intertwined. and Rosch 1991: 172-173). action. In the enactive view. Thompson and Rosch's The Embodied Mind (Varela. and over the history of an agent’s interactions. the systems and structures that play a determining role in the formation of cognitive patterns are in turn determined by the emergent patterns of interactional dynamics. they are mutually reinforcing.

the user adds to these with the installation of new software. and the metaphorical schema that those interfaces encapsulate. but rather as constitutive of that very structure (Hamman 1997: 40). and the user comes to learn. The personal computer arrives from the vendor prepackaged with a vast collection of programmed responses. but also when looking at the consequences of existing designs for performance. We come to see that it is far from transparent to the task domain to which it is applied. the monitor. the more quickly the common notion of the interface as a passive and impartial means to an end begins to break down. These are important concerns not only when arriving at new designs. But it’s how this theory of knowledge and performance is embodied in the interface that is of specific interest to this study. and the potential implications for the thoughts and actions of the people who will interact with them. The affordances of the computer-as-it-comes determine the limits of what is possible within any incidental task domain. or between the mind and the body. without due regard to their contingencies and particularities. It will also make little sense to examine computer interfaces. and accomplishes tasks through the agency of the now standard input and display devices—the keyboard. the mouse. It would seem that the more closely we examine the interface in use. and we begin to understand it “not as an add-on which allows a human to come into relations with an underlying structure. the interface reveals itself as embodying a theory of knowledge and performance.dividing line between action and cognition.” At the same time that the boundaries of the user’s potential repertoire of actions and perceptions are determined by the epistemological underpinnings of the representations that comprise the interface. from one piece of software 22 . and the loudspeakers.

Before heading straight to the drawing board. it’s worth considering what it is. are geared towards routine forms of activity. in 23 . through the agency of software abstractions. The predominant guiding metaphors of human-computer interface design. For complex. and thereby precludes the potential for embodied and enactive modes of interaction. embodied and real-time forms of activity. 2. however. new ways of thinking about design. we are in need of new metaphors. the computer-as-it-comes is a perfectly adequate medium. But I will endeavor to show that it is precisely the models of activity that are embedded in the interface to the computer-as-it-comes that preclude the sense of optimal embodied experience—the sense of flow—that can arise in complex real-time activities such as musical performance with conventional acoustic instruments. particularly over the last fifteen years. It may well be that for the majority of tasks for which personal computers are routinely used. and input and display devices.3 Computationalism While little has been written about the philosophical basis of interaction design with specific regard to digital musical instruments—or even. situated. exactly.to the next. the kinds of behaviors and outcomes that might be expected to come about as a result of her regulated interactions with the medium. and new technologies. with regard to personal computers in general—it’s nonetheless a topic that has received some considerable attention. about the computer-as-it-comes that sways the user into a routine-oriented mode of activity. for that matter.

Brooks (1991). the number of conditions that must be encoded in the agent’s representation of the environment increases in geometric proportion.5 Having accomplished so little of what the pioneers of the field promised in the 1960s.artificial intelligence (AI). AI theorists and practitioners have been forced to critically re-examine the institutionally endorsed models of perception. as well as the various philosophical assumptions on which those foundations are built. This has led to some important questions being raised as regards the traditional foundations of interaction design. symbolic representations of real-world task domains must take into account a huge number of environmental variables if the artificial agent-at-large is to be endowed with even a sub-insect capacity for sensing and locomotion. As the complexity of the agent’s environment increases. 24 . and Agre (1997). it does not take long before the computational load on the artificial agent ensures against its being capable of the rapid real-time responses that we witness in the various creatures that inhabit the real world. the number of environmental variables also increases. the agent has no capacity for responding to features or obstacles that appear in the environment 5 In particular see Haugeland (1985). In turn. As a succession of AI implementations would bear out. Moreover. Given an environment of incrementally increasing complexity. action and reasoning that originally appeared to have such vast potential. Dreyfus (1992). Winograd and Flores (1986).

Scheutz 2002). But even this notion of computation—the originary notion of computer science—is itself already grounded in an older notion. 1936.” Computationalism is the term that I will use. by an engineer. as each new object requires that a new representation be added. The breakaway AI researchers would be arguing. then. 7 The first viable alternative to the symbolic representation approach is outlined in Rodney Brooks' "Intelligence without representation" and "New Approaches to Robotics (Brooks 1991. as since the advent of the Church-Turing thesis (Church 1932. 1991). the mechanistic explanation of the 17th century. Turing 1936) computation has largely been conceived as the algorithmically codifiable manipulation of symbols. They would be arguing against the guiding rubric of computer science. to the agent’s model of the world. conventional AI. Locke and Newton. 6 For an interesting overview of the various problems posed by the symbolic representation approach in AI. that has variously been labeled “mentalism (Agre 1995.unexpectedly. 1997). and socalled “hard” cognitive science. Hobbes.6 It was precisely these kinds of problems that prompted a small faction of AI researchers to question the very principle of symbolic representation." 25 . namely.” and “computationalism (Dietrich 1990. but with Descartes. not only with the accepted wisdom of the field.7 This would be no simple task. Leibniz. see the introduction to Andy Clark's Being There (Clark 1997).” “the computational metaphor (Stein 1999). where those symbols stand in for objects and operations in the world.

If. and has led to what Agre has termed “a dynamic of mutual reinforcement … between the technology of computation and the Cartesian view of human nature. and as the failings of AI would bear out. “symbol manipulation is a disembodied activity (Clark 1997: 4). the way in which we program computers to simulate real-world problems and dynamics. and the successes of computer science can make it rather easy to anthropomorphize the process of computation. therefore. It’s beyond the scope of the present study to enter into what remains a major debate in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science over the mechanistic foundations of thought. to see in the mechanical procedure a simulacrum of human thought. i.At the heart of the computationalist perspective is the presumption that we reason about the world through mechanized procedure. consists in extrapolating data from the world. by and large.” then the computer-as-itcomes—a materialization of the computationalist paradigm—already precludes 26 . and reasoning about the representational domain that those abstractions comprise. as Andy Clark has noted. I will however argue that the tacit acceptance of the computationalist approach will prove to be a stumbling block in the design of computer interfaces for musical performance. through the deductive manipulation of symbols that stand in for objects and operations in the world. the computationalist rubric would have it that computation is synonymous with cognition. This is.e. in much the same way that it has already proven to be a stumbling block in the design of artificial agents.” Essentially. Mental activity. with computational processes inside computers corresponding to thought processes inside minds (Agre 1997: 2). It’s such a view that provided the original impetus of AI research. coding abstractions from that data..

With the current state of knowledge about the workings of the nervous system. (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 29) From this ontological grounding.” setting itself in contradistinction to both the body—which 27 . activities and states. or a “representational bottleneck” (Brooks 1991). for the human agent. such conceptualizations come about as a result of an abstract inner space. is situated above and outside the environmental embedding of the agent’s body. aural and tactile perception. the elements of visual.” It corresponds to a manner of thinking about the world that George Lakoff and Mark Johnson have identified as the container metaphor: We are physical beings. then. an essential dualism at the heart of the computationalist model of cognition. the “mind. the agent performs manipulations on symbolic representations of the task domain in a realm of mental abstraction that is always and necessarily disconnected from the environmental niche in which activity actually takes place. one that sets an “inside” against an “outside. The agent is. bounded and set off from the rest of the world by the surface of our skins. the container metaphor extends to various ways in which we conceptualize time and space. there is no precise way of determining whether this is a matter of a symbolic overload. whether human or artificial. with a bounding surface and an in-out orientation. and we experience the rest of the world as outside us.the possibility of embodied forms of interaction. and events. But it’s a specific variety of dualism. coding abstractions and reasoning about a world that forever remains exterior to cognitive process. In the discourse of computationalism. therefore. actions. In other words. a kind of transcendental controller. Each of us is a container. But what can be seen in the computationalist model of representation is a fundamental objectivism in which the reasoning of the agent. There is.

There is an inevitable delay. “by searching through a space of potential future sequences of events. using one’s world models to simulate the consequences of possible actions (Agre 2002: 132). and these contents form the basis from which plans are constructed. been altered. Implicit to the container metaphor is the assumption that cognition is fundamentally distinct from perceiving and acting. these representations— along with the representations of structure that establish their logical connections. as well as between mind and body. The pertinence of the container metaphor to the present study lies in the strong separation it enforces between agent and environment. between decision and action. these stimuli are converted into representations of the world-as-perceived. in some way or other. and that mind and matter—in the tradition of the Cartesian res cognitans and res extensa—are necessarily separate. then.is viewed as little more than a transducer of sensory experience—and the outside world. It’s precisely because of the schism between thinking and acting that activity is sequential—the agent must form an internal represention of the domain and construct a plan before deciding on appropriate action. and the relationship between agent and world has.” When those plans result in behavior. a kind of propositional calculus—are stored as the contents of the mind. and also in the sequential model of activity that it presumes. And over the iterative chain that would characterize extended activity—a chain of actions following decisions 28 . The “bounding surface” of the mind is traversed by sensory stimuli. the agent reaches the end of the sequence of events that characterizes the “in-out orientation” of the mind. The container metaphor is consistent with the mechanistic explanation.

The great success of the WIMP (window. the user puts things “in” the trash. pointing device) model is due. the workspace is a container for folders. In order to make computers more accessible. dropping. the user comes to encounter the virtual environment in much the same way as the Cartesian subject encounters the world. the interaction paradigm would need to be both immediately intuitive to the broadest possible range of human subjects. “opens” a file or program. double-clicking. it reveals itself to be an instance of the container metaphor. that few people would think to question the kind of user knowledge on which it draws. and applicable across the widest range of known and as-yet-unknown task environments. through an “in-out orientation” to an environment populated by well-defined objects. and so on. to the way in which it galvanizes the user’s knowledge of the world. which are in turn containers for files. etc. But on examination. The representational domain is functionally isomorphic with the Cartesian model of mind. This is a point that I will explore more fully in the next section. and. and so obviously effective. icon.—to accomplish the tasks required by the activity domain. 29 . clicking. this so-called “direct manipulation” style of interaction draws explicitly on the user’s capacity to identify symbolic representations of data (files) and processes (programs). menu. but in terms of the accessibility of computing machinery to non-specialists. by virtue of the interface. The graphical interface paradigm is nowadays so pervasive.following actions—a sequence of such delays punctuates the flow of activity. The transition from textual to graphical modes of interaction with computers brought with it significant implications not only in terms of how humans and computers interact. and—through actions such as dragging. as least in part.

therefore throws up a not inconsiderable 30 . or the sense of flow. however. If. activities in which it would make sense to have an objective cognizance of the contents of the task domain. and to act within it. they bring the user to conceive of the task domain. we can discern that the interface. The objects of the virtual environment provide the locus for interaction. But these are not ordinarily the types of activities in which the agent’s optimal bodily experience. The model of the world as embodied in the interface will effectively lead to its own realization. will bring about the “disconnect” between agent and environment that is implicit to the container metaphor. over a history of interactions. I take no position on the suitability of objectivist forms of representation to everyday or mundane computational tasks. When those representations stand in for the states of a task domain. or for uploading files to a server. By definition. An objectivist model of representational content. in such a way that the focus is directed at changing or manipulating those states. we are considering the suitability of the computer-as-it-comes as a musical instrument that would allow for embodied modes of interaction. All is (most likely) well for the maintenance of a spreadsheet. which would situate the agent’s cognitive activities outside her environment. an enactive model of performance would situate the agent’s cognitive acitivities entirely within her environment. constitute an important matter for consideration. and the world models that those representations embody. have significant bearing on the effective accomplishment of the task at hand.If we consider these encounters with the virtual environment in light of the constitutive role that the interface plays in determining user activity. the kind of representations that serve as the access points to the medium. and the user retains the status of detached controller.

her cognizance of the interface is of the same order of abstraction as the Gibsonian affordance ("this chair affords sitting"). then. and those that would seek to structure the agent’s active involvement within the task domain. even if the form of representation is the physical embodiment of the computing device itself. 2006). tangible interfaces are of a very low order. If.obstacle to arriving at embodied modes of interaction.8 The crucial point.mit.media. it is the difference between those forms of representations that set out to passively encode the state of the task domain. the user of a tangible device manages to put the idea that she is interacting with a computer out of mind. First. For numerous examples of tangible user interface devices see the website of the Tangible Media Group at MIT (http://tangible. But there can be no practicable form of interaction with a computer without an interface. and an interface requires that the computational activity be represented in some form or other. accessed July 25. 31 . however. is the form of representation. 8 This is precisely the representational strategy behind tangible computing. for example. In terms of the magnitude of representational abstraction.edu. More specifically. it’s worth examining in closer detail the costs to performance of unwittingly adopting the objectivist/computationalist model of representation that is ingrained in the methods of conventional CS and HCI. This is a point to which I will return throughout the essay.

for the experience to be that of direct manipulation of the interface contents. disappearance is an indicator of the moment at which the tool user ceases to experience the tool as separate from her body. when it has incorporated it into its ‘world. the container metaphor does not in itself account for how we experience or perceive a disconnect in. And despite the ways in which the WIMP interface regulates the activities of the user. particulary in Being and Time (Heidegger [1927] 1962).4 Sensing and Acting A movement is learned when the body has understood it. Maurice Merleau-Ponty.’ and to move one’s body is to aim at things through it. and indeed situates her in a specific and highly determined relation to the medium.2. In short. musical performance with a laptop computer. A state of immersion in the task for which the tool is required leads to the 32 . The Phenomenology of Perception Although the “disconnect” between agent and environment is intrinsic to the container metaphor as applied to the computationalist model of mind. and for the medium to effectively disappear9 from use. which is made upon it independently of any representation. it’s nonetheless entirely possible for that user to become seemingly immersed in the task environment. for example. 9 Disappearance is an important concept in Heidegger's philosophy of technology. that is. it is to allow oneself to respond to their call.

Immersive activity involving the computer-as-it-comes is therefore substantively different to immersive activity involving.g. experiencing the tool as an extension of her body. As a consequence. or between abstract and direct modes of user. To that extent. but it’s that very immersion that determines that the activity is not embodied.. The context of embodiment. this is still a superficial treatment of a very subtle process. say. a conventional acoustic musical instrument. in the midst of activity.. and as such. by definition. provide a guarantee of an embodied mode of interaction. a situated activity. In itself. It would even seem to follow that an immersive activity is. The agent is immersed in the activity. On closer inspection. the environment constituted by iconic abstractions of computational data and tasks.e. i. however. 33 . the environment within which the agent’s sense of embodiment arises. the tool disappears as an object of consciousness. this would not seem to be the case in the specific example of interaction with the computer-as-it-comes. It’s likely that an immersive activity is engaging. the disconnect with the real world is proportional to the amount of attention consumed by the objects that populate the virtual world. is the real world. it fulfills one of the five key criteria of embodied activity that I outlined in Chapter 1.Immersion in the task environment does not. as in the WIMP model—involves situating the agent’s attention and intentions squarely within that virtual world. however. and it would seem that there’s more to the issue than drawing a tidy distinction between the virtual and the real. Immersion in a virtual environment—e.

and the sensorimotor habits and patterns that are engendered by those modes of transmission. i. there is only a single and discrete centre of interaction. and from user back to computer. or. This is where the issues of timeliness and multimodality—another two of the five key criteria of embodied activity—enter the picture. the weight of emphasis on visual forms of representation consumes a large portion of the user’s attention. There are two key facets to the WIMP model that guarantee that interactions with the computer-as-it-comes can never be multimodal: 1. I’ve already discussed the ways in which the core elements of the WIMP model of interaction—the window. and in doing so diminishes the potential for involvement of the other sensory and motor modalities.e. the mouse or text cursor.interaction. more specifically. typing and observing. and 2. at any given moment. These are the two aspects of a mode of interaction—the typical mode of interaction with the computer-as-it-comes—that are experienced by the user as an on-going sequence of pointing. clicking. As the gaze is directed towards an icon of interest to the task. it is the sensory and motor mechanisms that are called into use. the user will come to think and act in terms of the objects that populate a world exterior to cognitive process.. there’s also the how of the container metaphor’s instantiation within the WIMP model. But it’s not simply a matter that because the interactional domain is an instance of the container metaphor. menu and pointing device—play a determining role in the formation of objectivist concepts in the computer user’s cognizance of activity. the hand works in tandem with the eyes to move the mouse cursor towards that icon. icon. When the cursor and icon converge 34 . The key consideration here is the modes for the transmission of signals from computer to user.

on the screen. and the way in which the performer. The single point of interaction that is characteristic of the WIMP model of interaction leads to a mode of activity that is characterized by a sequential chain of discrete user gestures. and no potential for the cross-coupling of distinct input channels. see Fitzmaurice and Buxton's "An empirical evaluation of graspable user interfaces (Fitzmaurice and Buxton 1997). to elicit a response from the on-screen abstraction. 10 For a comparative analysis of "time-multiplexed" (single point) vs.10 With acoustic instrumental performance. and this is where the mode of interaction coincides with the issue of timeliness. There is no concurrency of actions. no possibility of operating at two or more interactional nodes simultaneously. as a function of the ongoing accrual of competence at coordinating the sensorimotor assemblage. where any action can be taken only after the prior action has been completed. it’s not just the concurrent use of multiple sensorimotor modalities that leads to the sense of embodiment. or press keys on the keyboard." 35 . the fingers click on the mouse button. the fewer remain for the agent’s other sensors and actuators. distributed points) interaction scenarios. The immediate cost of the visuocentric approach to the non-visual sensorimotor modalities is self-evident: the more cognitive resources are allocated to vision. it’s the various ways in which these modalities work together and exert influence upon one another. "space- multiplexed" (multiple. is better adapted to meet the real-time constraints of performance. But there is another aspect that is perhaps less obvious. the flow of time is effectively segmented into discrete chunks.

in this specific sense. By “misuse.” I mean a kind of usage that in one way or another does not correspond to the usage scenarios presumed by the WIMP paradigm. 36 . step-by-step. infer. The system of abstractions and representations that typify the WIMP model are not geared to the demands of real time. Agency.” But whatever the designation. might more properly be defined as “embodied agency. The WIMP model of interaction presumes that the user has plans “in mind. building on a model of behavior in which reasoning about representations formed from sense impressions must always take place prior to action. Agency. It may be interesting to consider if there may be potential misuses of the computer-as-it-comes that could lead to embodied interactional modes. on the other hand. let’s assume that the computer-as-it-comes is. That infrastructure presumes a model of reality in which the contents of the world come prior to our behavioral engagement with the world. each step towards accomplishing the plan will simply take as long as it takes to sense.With regard to this notion of timeliness. Rather. and act. it points to a mode of performance that is bluntly precluded by the representational infrastructure of the WIMP paradigm. a sequence that the enactive approach would seek to reverse. until the objective of the task-at-hand is met.” and that these plans are to be executed. As “laptop music” has already figured in the discussion. is indicative of behavior that is adaptive to environmental demands and constraints. where those constraints encompass the necessity of a timely response. in this case. it may be useful to draw a distinction between planning and agency. an off-the-shelf laptop computer.

g. and again I’ll use my pointer finger to click the trackpad button.. For the purposes of this example. My finger will guide the mouse cursor to a point at the top-left region of the screen. and that at each step in that sequence my attention will be directed towards the single point of interaction that the interface affords. The structure of the interface determines that my motions will follow a type-point-click sequence. indicating the point at which the next character in this sequence of discrete characters is anticipated. When I’m done typing. and the number and type of trackpad buttons may also vary. Upon contact. many laptops substitute a trackpoint for a trackpad.The standard input devices of the generic laptop computer are the keyboard and trackpad. A menu will appear. this kind of determination on the part of the interface will preclude embodied modes of interaction. 37 . I’ll use my pointer finger to click the trackpad button. But with different mappings from the 11 These devices vary from one model of laptop computer to the next.” When the cursor is over that word. a mouse cursor will appear on screen. and as I use my third finger to move the cursor over its contents. where prior experience tells me I will find the word “File. inputs at these devices are coordinated by the position of the cursor on the computer screen. each item will be highlighted in turn. My third finger will stop when the menu item “Save” is highlighted.11 According to conventional WIMP practice. I will assume a trackpad with a single trackpad button. e. I’ll move my second finger to the trackpad. As I type these words (at my generic laptop computer). the text cursor blinks at the current text position. As I’ve argued.

it solicits new modes of activity from the user. We see that the keyboard does in fact afford multiple points of interaction. Mappings from trackpad input to software could afford the continuous modification of the sound events thus 38 . then. and that these points might be engaged concurrently. I think. That is. The cursor. We also see that the trackpad affords continuous input with two degrees of freedom. is done away with altogether. Suppose that some piece of sound synthesis software is written. Either way. the computer screen could be entirely dimmed.. an affordance that the blinking text cursor—along with the accumulated usage history of QWERTY technologies— had somehow hidden from view. To minimize unnecessary distractions in performance. Could this amount to an interface that affords embodied modes of interaction? The short answer is.input devices to programs—e.g. an affordance that was not apparent when trackpad usage was bound up with the task of directing the cursor to discrete points on the computer screen. and that it’s written expressly to be used without graphical or textual feedback from the computer screen. Mappings from keyboard events to software could be arbitrarily complex. mappings that would subvert the inherent sequentiality of WIMP—the interface acquires new affordances. or as simple as the mapping from piano keyboard to hammer and string (one sound event per key event). These misuses of the keyboard and trackpad would seem to circumvent the impediments to embodied activity that characterize the WIMP paradigm: singularity and sequentiality. it’s in doing away with the cursor that entirely new interactional possibilities for the keyboard and trackpad become apparent. the interface affords chording. the formation of composite events from distributed points of interaction. perhaps. Interestingly enough.

We may. This is not an insurmountable task. and it’s in the continuity of these modifications that the inherent sequentiality of pointing and clicking would be circumvented. What’s interesting about this example is that we have not changed the physical structure of the interface.e. these new affordances would need to be learned. even. then.. to any regular user of a laptop computer. Of course. to put it out of the way of the hands. especially given that users of general purpose computers 12 The role of bimanual asymmetry in interface design is discussed in 4. we continue to use the same keyboard and trackpad that serve as the input devices in the WIMP model. have the beginnings of an expressive instrument. perhaps. because of the fine granularity of action required of keyboard input. i. is the potential for interaction that the interface affords. of an embodied performance practice. we might turn the base of the laptop at a 30-45° angle to the standard typing position. And they would need to be learned in spite of the activities the laptop has previously afforded in everyday use. chording actions would be performed by the dominant hand. we construct a new model of performance. 39 . What we have changed. At the same time. while continuous modificatory actions at the trackpad would be performed by the nondominant hand.4. The asymmetry of “handedness” would likely determine that. and the example shows that these affordances are immanent to the map from input devices to programs. then.12 To situate the hands in optimal position.triggered by the keyboard. We would almost certainly push the (blank) screen to as flat a position as possible. however. that we substitute a new map for the WIMP map.

I’ve been concerned in this section with outlining the ways in which the standard interaction model of the computer-as-it-comes precludes embodied activity.are. there nonetheless remains some physical property of the interface that would seem to be opposed to the development of an embodied performance practice. One of the hazards of design is the weight of convention on current practice. while the affordances of the interface have been fundamentally altered by new mappings from hardware to software. of the trackpad’s proximity to the keyboard. a force that often goes entirely unnoticed in design practice. to a certain. It seems to me that it’s this very force—and the widespread failure to notice it—that has led 40 . it may simply be an issue of the instrument’s failure to be properly indicative of use (a topic I will discuss in Chapter 4). And this possibility provides enough incentive to turn attention towards the design of special purpose devices. and so on. and while it’s entirely feasible that the performer could develop a timely and multimodal mode of interaction with this new interface. afford embodied modes of interaction. limited degree. Or. But when I suggested that this reconfigured laptop would perhaps afford embodied modes of interaction. under certain circumstance. there seems a reasonable possibility that the instrument will not be engaging over a sustained period of practice. and to leave unanswered the question as to whether this general purpose device might. This may be an issue of the limited potential for resistance in the keyboard’s pushbutton mechanism. of the limited surface area of the trackpad. Whatever the explanation. accustomed to learning new patterns of interaction with each new piece of software. I did so out of a hesitation as regards the physical structure of the interface. of the arrangement of keys not being conducive to chording. That is.

2. a model that inevitably leads to a disembodied mode of interaction.to numerous music softwares that buy unwittingly into the model of interaction that is implicit to the WIMP paradigm.” and “the realization of the constituted objects and subjects in actual technical networks and devices (Feenberg 1999: 202). In doing so. but of a fundamental encounter. — Gilles Deleuze.”13 In terms of the implementation of interfaces. primary and secondary instrumentalization respectively correspond to "essentialist" and "constructivist" orientations of human to medium (Feenberg 1999. these softwares also buy unwittingly into a model of performance that places abstract reasoning prior to action. will need to arrive at an alternative interactional paradigm to that of the computer-as-it-comes. This something is an object. then. 2000).” which respectively consist in “the functional constitution of technical objects and subjects. embodied agent-based model of interaction.5 Functional and Realizational Interfaces Something in the world forces us to think. 41 . not of recognition. the core difference between the primary and the secondary instrumentalization lies in the way that the task 13 In Feenberg's scheme. One of the main objectives of this study is to outline a sketch of one such alternative. An enactive. Difference and Repetition Andrew Feenberg draws a distinction between a “primary” and a “secondary instrumentalization.

The welldesigned functional interface conceals the specific mechanics of the task. on the other hand. still has it uses. as transparently as possible. the correlation between the system of interface metaphors and the system of real-world objects and operations for which those metaphors stand—should.domain is structured. the accomplishment of the task. and. The functional interface (primary instrumentalization) serves a predetermined function. or functionalism. The realizational domain encompasses the contexts of meaning and signification in which human and medium are embedded. in the process. brings with it the possibility of continuously realizing new encounters and uses. Landing an airplane. it is structured around a finite set of interactions which are known in advance of the task’s execution. he is nonetheless careful to point out that the primary instrumentalization.e. for example. realization is a form of play. 42 . In short. of redetermining the relationship between technical objects and their human subjects. be static. the representational correspondence of the interface to the world—i. While Feenberg correlates the secondary instrumentalization with a broadly socialist utopian project. in the interest of maximizing the potential for continued existence. There are a great many task environments in which it makes sense to facilitate. The realizational interface (secondary instrumentalization). and presents the user with possibilities for action that draw on familiar and often rehearsed patterns of experience and use. presents a situation in which human agency is best served by an immutable function-relation between the elements of the interface and the range of possible outcomes that the interface represents. and is conducive to dynamic and indeterminate forms of interaction.

14 This situates the user in an interesting position. the ideal functionalist interface would have the user convinced that it consists of no representations at all. the tool becomes "equipment" at the moment of its disappearance in use. and continues to be constitutive of the structural relation of technical object and human subject. the well-designed functionalist interface is comprised of representations that are immediately familiar to the user. as the task environment obtains its coherence through the system of representations that comprise the interface. That is. 43 . At that moment the task is conflated with the metaphorical domain in which it is represented. it becomes equipment. Functionalism aims to minimize the cognitive load. and instead become the intrinsic elements of the task itself. The cognitive effort is at its optimal minimum when the representations have a directly recognizable corollary in the user’s prior experience of the world. but the medium is still very much present. And while the interface is evidently not at all 14 In Heidegger's terminology. In terms of meeting the various constraints and demands of the task environment. it’s of no use to have the user waste time on the parsing of a complex metaphorical system. To that end. Indeed. and the interface effectively disappears in use. the representations cease to be denotative. She is immersed in what would appear to be the im-mediacy of the task. and it’s of no use to involve her in forms of play. the user comes to conceptualize the task directly in terms of what is represented.Efficiency is key to the functionalist approach. it takes on an artificial transparency through its very leveraging of the user’s experience.

and Hutchins 1986) 15—the model in which the user drags graphical representations of files into graphical representations of folders. and the extent to which the interface disappears from the user’s attention constitutes the key criteria for the success of such approaches. In leveraging the user’s experience of the world. Holland.com/documentation/mac/HIGuidelines/HIGuidelines-2. the interface directs her towards a set of predetermined expectations as regards performance. Norman and Draper 1986). 1999. the functionalist domain does not encompass the contexts of meaning and signification in which human and medium are embedded. the more it seems to be transparent. The idea of leveraging experience in order to minimize the strain that the interface places on the user’s cognitive apparatus is a hallmark of “user-centered design” (Norman 1986. the more effectively it corresponds to the ideal of functionalist efficiency. then. among other things—already has the aim of the usage enterprise built 15 For an implementation guide to the "direct manipulation" model of computer interface design. and is not conducive to dynamic and indeterminate forms of interaction. accessed March 20.html. The model of computer interface design known as “direct manipulation” (Norman. In contradistinction to the domain of realization.apple. Functionalism has become a standard metric in the evaluation of the successes and shortcomings of computer interfaces. It minimizes the cognitive demand and. at the same time.transparent to the task domain. see "The Macintosh Human Interface Guidelines" (http://developer. defines an interactional context in which significance—at least ideally—is invariable. 44 . 2006).

. we are dealing with such a task environment. Where Donald Norman and other key figures in “user-centered design” champion the disappearance of the interface. i. it makes little sense to do so when balancing a computerized bank account or uploading a file to a server.into the blanketing term. i.e. It’s entirely possible that the functionalist approach is optimally effective across a broad range of routine computational task environments. the realizational approach would suggest that the interface offers some form of resistance to the user. In thinking about designing interfaces for musical performance. In much the same way that it makes little sense to employ dynamic and indeterminate forms of interaction when landing an airplane. One of the key aspects of this paradigmatically embodied form of activity is its immediacy.. things work best when the user believes that. and it would seem self-evident that the more the 45 .e. she is in fact working directly with the objects of the task domain. and in which the degree of efficiency with which the task may be accomplished is inversely proportional to the amount of user attention that is consumed by the interface. that the functionalist approach is adopted in task environments where it is not well-suited. in task environments where the task-at-hand is better served by a realizational approach. These are tasks in which the activity is better served by invariable representations. But there is a danger. that it should be irrevocably present. this would seem to be at odds with the notion of flow. At first glance. rather than manipulating symbolic abstractions. That is. with functionalism becoming something of a de facto standard in interaction design.

” The cognitive dimension is central to the process. Hammering may be immediate and immersive. how is that. haptic resistance. exactly how is the potential for realization embedded in the the instrumental interface? Or. or even optimal. energy that is experienced by the musician as sound. the task ceases to present her with cognitive challenges. the musician adapts her bodily dispositions to the ways in which the instrument 46 . such cognitive challenges are not prerequisite to embodied activity. enaction involves the “bringing forth of a world. say. the less im-mediate the activity. It’s at this point that it’s useful to draw a distinction between embodied action and enaction. And it is in this that the hammer is not a realizational interface.medium obtrudes in use. when the agent successfully responds to cognitive challenges. the instrument responds with proportionate energy. For example. weight. the sense of im-mediacy experienced when the agent is immersed in the act of hammering—the sense that the hammer is not a distinct object. a violin is substantively different to a hammer? The short answer is in the way in which the musician’s intentionality is coupled to the instrument’s specific and immanent kinds of resistance. but an extension of the agent’s sensorimotor mechanism—is indicative of that agent’s embodiment in action. Over a sustained period of time. There is a “push and pull” between musician and instrument. As the musician transmits kinetic energy into the mechanism. This raises an obvious question: if performance with conventional acoustic musical instruments is enactive. but it is not necessarily engaging. and it is precisely where enaction and realization coincide. While the sense of embodiment may be enhanced. But once the agent has acquired a sufficient degree of performative competence at hammering. and so on. To return to Francisco Varela’s formulation. and hammering is not enactive.

and ignores the constitutive role that the interface plays in the emergence of intentional and behavioral patterns.. like the violin.e. But this still doesn’t provide a satisfactory explanation of how the potential for realization is somehow embodied in one interface but not another.” But this view does not consider the specific dynamic properties of resistance that are embodied in the interface. functionalism would correspond to a “functional attitude. it presumes a neutrality of the interface to human intentionality. i. she will either abandon the instrument for a medium that offers greater potential for realization. as much as they are determined by the resistance offered by the instrument. it would seem meaningless to talk of functional and realizational interfaces.” and realization would likewise correspond to a “realizational attitude. At one level. offers resistance to the agent. But it’s likely that. An agent could very well set about developing a musical performance practice with a hammer. then. and instead to view the entire process as a matter of the agent’s intentionality. 47 .resists. to the instrument’s dynamical responsiveness. at some point. The hammer. Rather. carefully adapting her bodily dispositions to its dynamic properties of resistance over a period of many years of thoughtful rehearsal. or she will make modifications to the instrument that would better serve that realizational potential. and the cognitive dimension continues to be central to the process of adaptation. It’s important to note that these adaptations. are also determined by the musician’s intentionality. It’s because the musician sets out to realize something—to actively participate in embodied practices of signification—that her adaptation follows a unique trajectory.

artifacts and humans—are constituted through an ongoing process of mutual specification and determination. presents minimal cognitive demands on the agent. the model of musical performance that is of specific interest to the present study is realizational. and at the same time sufficiently coherent.e. and so on. an interface is constituted that comes close to the realizational potential of the real world instrument that it models. A majority of conventional acoustic musical instruments have been constituted in such a way that the dynamic properties of their resistance are sufficiently complex. and for the “bringing forth of a world”—is effectively maximized. and at least partly indeterminate processes of signification. As such. both technical objects and subjects— i. it is advantageous that the hammer.To return to Feenberg’s specification. that they coincide optimally with the musician’s intentionality. and in the carefully considered mapping of the parameters of those synthesis primitives to tactile controllers. fluid. and as such requires the ongoing cognitive involvement of the musician. But the 48 . Approaches to digital musical instrument design that set out to model the dynamics of conventional acoustic instruments by and large circumvent the pitfalls of de facto functionalism. the integration of force feedback within the controller apparatus. it assumes open-ended. In the simulation of the various networks of excitors and resonators that constitute the physical mechanisms of acoustic instruments.. the potential for realization—for embodied forms of signification. In requiring that the musician’s ongoing cognitive involvement is central to the process of adaptation to the instrument’s dynamics. The hammer has been constituted to serve a largely predetermined functional agenda: hammering. considered as interface. Although music has its obvious functional uses in late capitalist society.

The sense of embodiment over a history of interactions within a phenomenal domain emerges at the point where these various constraints intersect. and cognition. timely. As I have attempted to show. the basic idea is nonetheless to arrive at a practice that fully engages the new prospects for performance that are indigenous to computing media. multimodal. In the specific case of musical performance. perception. and cognition.6 Conclusion To reiterate my key criteria from Chapter 1: embodied activity is situated. in a purely enactivist sense. and alternative approaches to design. And while there is much to be learned through analyzing the dynamical properties of conventional instruments. 2. The discourse of functionalism is implicit to the discourse of conventional humancomputer interaction design. of the inseparability of action. This calls for an alternative discourse. this can only be an impediment to arriving at technologies that maximize the potential for realization. This is not just a matter of action. and engaging.main focus of this study is to outline a foundation for the design of digital musical instruments that is more general than the physical modeling of existing instruments. this means interfaces that embody the prospect of enaction. 49 . This is why I have considered it important to distinguish between functional and realizational modes of interaction. perception. but rather a matter of the various and complex dependencies between action. Or.

To arrive at an enactive model of musical interaction. where the locus of interaction is almost invariably unimodal. or embodied cognition. presumes a model of activity that is anything but engaging or challenging to the agent. there is. The WIMP model serves to enforce this separation. and situate the user squarely “outside” the interactional domain. The objectivist foundations of conventional HCI presume a strong separation between user and device. then. the predominant notion of human-computer interaction design. we will need to systematically rethink the world models that are embedded in the interface to the computer-as-it-comes. which would aim to reduce the cognitive load on the agent and make the interface disappear from use. in my view. Further. This will be my task for the remainder of the essay. and at the same time to regulate the actions of the user in such a way that time is discretized into repeating units of sensing and acting.What I have set out to show in this chapter is the various ways in which the computer-as-it-comes is a far from ideal medium in terms of meeting the criteria of embodied activity. 50 . Overcoming the disconnect that the computer-as-it-comes enforces between human and instrument will require elaborating an alternative world model. and then looking at the ways in which such a model could be materialized in an instrument that would necessarily be something other than the-computer-as-it-comes. When all or most of these criteria fail to be met. no possibility for the kind of interactive and circular processes of emergence that are characteristic of enaction.

to draw hard dividing lines between action and cognition. I also suggested that it makes little sense to discuss agent and environment in isolation. But these hard dividing lines persist in our language. our descriptions inevitably land squarely at the boundary between agent and environment. when examining an interactional context with a view to enactive process. and therefore also in any provisional description of the elements and processes of enaction. I suggested that it would make little sense. particularly when attempting to discern the adaptive process that sees a complex set of ever-more refined skills. The Phenomenology of Perception 3.1 Two Persistent Dualisms In Chapter 2.3 Enaction The body is our general medium for having a world. But in any attempt to describe such interactions. And so in the same way that we 51 . dispositions and behaviors emerge over a history of interactions. and instead stressed the inseparability of one from the other. — Maurice Merleau-Ponty. or between body and mind.

As long as the body is opposed to both mind and world. and which are therefore not at all easy to define in dualist. Enaction involves a temporality in which relations are constantly in flux. much less defend. Or rather. This presents a problem. immersive and engaged experience—is fundamentally about activities that are always in a state of becoming. then. any notion of “direct experience. It is a variety of experience that comes prior to description. The specific variety of experience that I’ve set out to describe—this paradigmatically embodied.insert a hard dividing line between body and mind. Thompson. On the face of it. and in which new systems and structures continuously emerge and disappear in the midst of interactional unfolding. permeated as it is by the inherent dualisms of Western philosophical and scientific discourse. and Rosch 1991: 116). it does not necessarily follow that “direct experience”—however that may be defined—does not factor among those varieties of human experience for which we may or may not already have an adequate terminology.” Disconnection would seem to be the order of the day. and between body and world. will ultimately lead us back to a primary disconnect. and prior to any clear 52 . resides in the “nowness” of the experiential present. we tacitly delineate a neat separation between body and world. it’s difficult to describe. it would seem that our language. abstract and objectivist terms. it will lead us to two disconnects: between mind and body. But while philosophical language may be geared in such a way that describing experience necessarily involves dualist. In other words. abstract and objectivist terms.” The directness of experience. it involves “the processual transformation of the past into the future through the intermediary of transitional forms that in themselves have no permanent substance (Varela.

determination of the subject, or of those objects and opportunities for action that make up that (transitional) subject’s environment. In attempting to define “direct experience,” then, we encounter a paradox. Direct experience implies a provisional and temporary state of being that is always and necessarily resistant to ontological reduction. I would even go so far as to say that the “nowness” of the lived present is that which makes direct experience, by definition, preontological. But as soon as we attempt to describe the systems and structures of direct experience, we introduce ontological categories. It’s in this that we see the intrinsic paradox of the description: there can be no notion of that which is direct without casting experience in abstract terms. This is likely to be the source of some confusion. And given that one of the primary motivations behind the present study is to outline a philosophical foundation for design, it will not help if the key philosophical concepts are poorly defined or potentially misleading. Fortunately, questions such as these are not without precedent; there is a branch of philosophy that has dealt systematically with direct experience, and it has done so within the context of a well-defined dualist discourse. In the transcendental phenomenology of Husserl,1 the existential phenomenology of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, and in the latter day

1

Although Husserl does not figure very significantly in this study, I mention him

because he is acknowledged as the founding figure of European phenomenology, and had a direct influence on the thinking of both Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty.

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reworking of both European and Buddhist phenomenology2 in enactive cognitive science and so-called postphenomenology,3 the apparent paradox of a dualistic description of unreflective behaviour is dealt with comprehensively. Phenomenology, in its various manifestations, is a vast and complex field, and it’s beyond the scope of this essay to cover any of its myriad branches of inquiry in any significant manner. However, there are two key concepts, from two quite different moments in the phenomenological tradition, which are particularly useful to the model of interaction that I am attempting to describe. Double embodiment and structural coupling—both of which terms already point to a fundamental dualism prior to their elaboration—respectively address the mind/body and body/world problems in direct experience. In outlining them here, I hope to clear up any confusion as to how the dualism that resides in any description of embodied action is substantively different from the disembodied dualism that lies at the heart of the computationalist perspective. This should bring us to a point where, after having established a disconnect in our descriptions, we come to see how that disconnect ceases to exist in the flux of

2

The philosophy of Nagarjuna, for example, and of the Madhyamika tradition in

Buddhist thought, figures significantly in Varela, Rosch and Thompson's outline of "codependent arising," and its implications for subjectivity (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991).
3

Postphenomenology is a term introduced by, and most often associated with,

philosopher Don Ihde (Ihde 1983, 1990, 1991, 1993, 2002).

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embodied action, and in the experiential merging of self and world. I should note that I am not attempting to construct a new theory of the mind/body problem here, or even to weigh into the debate. Rather, the objective is pragmatic: to outline some core theoretical issues with a view to opening up a space for new digital musical instrument design scenarios.

3.2

Double Embodiment

As long as the body is defined in terms of existence in-itself, it functions uniformly like a mechanism, and as long as the mind is defined in terms of pure existence for-itself, it knows only objects arrayed before it. — Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception

In his analysis of tool use in Being and Time (Heidegger [1927] 1962), Heidegger draws a famous distinction between the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand. The ready-to-hand indicates an essentially pragmatic relation between user and tool. It is when the tool disappears, i.e., when it has the status of equipment, that the user engages the task environment via the ready-to-hand. The relation, then, is not about a human subject and an “object” of perception. Rather, it is about that object’s “withdrawal” into the experiential unity of the actional context:
The peculiarity of what is proximally ready-to-hand is that, it must, as it were, withdraw in order to be ready-to-hand quite authentically. That with which our

55

.everyday dealings proximally dwell is not the tools themselves. was undertaken: 56 . In the moment of breaking down the tool becomes un-ready-to-hand.” only “if it breaks or slips from grasp or mars the wood. and enables us to see the obstinacy of that with which we must concern ourselves in the first instance before we do anything else. it acquires “hammerness.e.” It’s only when this flow of activity is disturbed by some kind of technological breakdown that the apparently seamless continuity between user and tool is broken. present-at-hand: Anything which is un-ready-to-hand … is disturbing to us.” Prior to the technological breakdown. (Heidegger [1927] 1962: 102) The hammer appears as an object of consciousness. On the contrary. (Heidegger [1927] 1962: 99) The ready-to-hand implies an engaged and embodied flow of activity. but rather disappears into the purposefulness of action. i. or. With this obstinacy. It has no objectness in itself. the hammer is invisibly folded into the continuum of direct experience. in the first instance. in Heidegger’s more often used term. The human is caught up in what Hubert Dreyfus has called “absorbed coping (Dreyfus 1993: 27). The moment of its acquiring the status of object coincides with a disturbance to the accomplishment of the purpose for which the activity. then. that with which we concern ourselves primarily is the work. the presence-at-hand of the ready-to-hand makes itself known in a new way as the Being of that which lies before us and calls for our attending to it. or if there is a nail to be driven and the hammer cannot be found (Winograd and Flores 1986: 36).

immediate experience is supplanted by abstract and reflective experience when the tool user is necessitated by a breakdown to perceive the tool in abstract terms.4 4 I borrow the term "double embodiment" from Varela. Merleau-Ponty recognized that we cannot understand this circulation without a detailed investigation of its fundamental axis. He suggests that it is only when purposeful activity is disturbed that “a conscious subject with self-referential mental states directed toward determinate objects with properties gradually emerges (Dreyfus 1991: 71)." biological and phenomenological.” That is. direct. or a double embodiment. we continuously circulate back and forth between them. between direct and abstract modes of engaging the world. experiential structures—in short. These two sides of embodiment are obviously not opposed. as both "outer" and "inner. Thompson. then. There is a back-andforth in experience.When an assignment has been disturbed—when something is unusable for some purpose—then the assignment becomes explicit. Instead. and to reflect on the context in which action and intention is embedded. who in turn base their coinage on Merleau-Ponty's notion of embodiment: We hold with Merleau-Ponty that Western scientific culture requires that we see our bodies both as physical structures and as lived. and Rosch 1991). That both modes are experienced by the same body points to a fundamental duality of embodied experience. 57 . Thompson and Rosch's The Embodied Mind (Varela. (Heidegger [1927] 1962: 105) Hubert Dreyfus recasts Heidegger’s distinction between the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand in psychological terms.

in a namely.At first glance. such a state of affairs arises only when the flow of unreflective activity is interrupted. Rather. It does not. the embodiment of knowledge. To the extent that abstract reflection forms part of lived experience—at the moment of a technological breakdown. dismiss the reflective state of disembodied reason. First. abstract reflection would seem to be more or less identical in function to the disembodied reasoning of the computationalist model of cognition that I outlined in Chapter 2. for example—the experience of disembodiment is quite literally embodied by the reflective subject. cognition. According to the computationalist perspective. the computationalist model of cognition does not account for unreflective experience. and experience. (Varela. Second. There are two critical points here in arriving at a fairly subtle. and Rosch 1991:xv-xvi) 58 . This seemingly paradoxical state of affairs is captured in Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the “practical cogito (Merleau-Ponty [1945] 2004). Further. it would seem contradictory to speak of abstract reflection as a subset of embodied experience.” an idea that. for example. and inherently paradoxical. by locating cognitive process entirely within the mechanisms of the body as lived. and reasoning about potential courses of action. satisfy the criteria of embodied activity that I laid out in Chapter 1. Thompson. the body must necessarily “contain” cognition. then. it encompasses it within the lived experience of the doubly embodied agent at large in the world. An enactive model of cognition does not. distinction. With double embodiment. all activity is mediated by internal representations of the task domain.

” that perceptual.” Indeed. And in the unfolding of being that conforms to the enactive model of cognition. and if we manage to understand time as the measure of being. the phenomenological project is in the first instance concerned with reversing the Cartesian axiom. encompasses both direct action and abstract reflection. as long as we operate within being.single turn of phrase. Enaction does admit a mind/body dualism. For Merleau-Ponty. and Rosch 1991: xvi). Thompson. as for Heidegger. encompasses both reflective and unreflective experience. and Rosch 1991: xv).” The crucial factor in addressing the apparent contradiction between direct action and abstract reflection is to situate both within the context of the unfolding of activity and cognitive skill in a temporal context: There is. through what Varela et al. “These two sides of embodiment are obviously not opposed. is only ever 59 . then: it “encompasses both the body as a lived. we continuously circulate back and forth between them (Varela. and of her body’s objective relations to the objects arrayed before it. hand in hand. and Rosch 1991). and with the placement of an “I can” prior to the “I think (Merleau-Ponty [1945] 2004: 137). Thompson. experiential structure and the body as the context or milieu of cognitive mechanisms (Varela. Thompson. it is through this circulating back and forth. but the contradiction disappears…if we operate in time. indeed. have termed “a fundamental circularity (Varela. actional and cognitive skills develop. then.” But the moment in which the agent becomes subjectively conscious of her body. (Merleau-Ponty [1945] 2004: 330) Embodied being. a contradiction. Instead. with the substitution of practical understanding for abstract understanding.

I suggest. the computer-as-it-comes precludes embodied forms of activity. timely. 60 . the body recedes into the background. they also place emphasis on non-real-time music production (composition). and is our natural way of galvanizing tools and working within our everyday environments— is missing from the conventional interactional paradigms with the computer-as-itcomes. rather than the processes of real-time music production (performance) with which I am specifically concerned. engaging. As I argued in Chapter 2.transitory. It does not allow for a motility that is situated.5 While some authors have suggested that we should explicitly factor the Heideggerean breakdown into our music interface models (Di Scipio 1997. rather. 1999). What I have endeavored to show here is that this disconnect is a factor in experience. it should not be discounted. But that form of direct experience that Heidegger termed the ready-to-hand—a notion that is more or less synonymous with the notion of embodied activity that I outlined in Chapter 1. attention should be 5 Winograd and Flores present an extensive analysis of the conventional metaphors of computer science in relation to a Heideggerean ontology in Understanding Computers and Cognition (Winograd and Flores 1986). and so when turning to design. Hamman 1997. At the moment that activity resumes. multimodal. that with a view to designing enactive instruments. a disconnect that is reinforced by the symbolic representationalist underpinnings of conventional computer interfaces. and its objects withdraw into the immediacy of the task. it keeps the user in a state of disconnection from the tool. In short.

but from a subject which is nothing but a project of the world. The world 6 Later in the chapter (3. respectively. As with the hammer.5) I outline this adaptive process in detail with specific reference to the role of breakdowns. to the incremental adaptive process of learning to play a conventional acoustic instrument. it would be more accurate to say that both double embodiment and structural coupling address the mind/body/world continuum with an emphasis on different processes.6 My focus. for example. The Phenomenology of Perception Although I’ve already suggested that double embodiment and structural coupling address. but from a world which the subject itself projects. In terms of the technical implementation. will not be directed at engineering breakdowns. but rather at engineering the potential for the desired kind of breakdowns. Such breakdowns are essential. 3.3 Structural Coupling The world is inseparable from the subject. and the subject is inseparable from the world. when turning to issues of design. the measure will be resistance. 61 . we can expect that breakdowns will happen in the course of everyday practice. or with any other tool.directed at maximizing the potential for fully engaged and direct experience. then. — Maurice Merleau-Ponty. mind/body and body/world dualisms.

1987).e. The coupling between organism and environment is “structural” because. it enforces a separation—in order to demonstrate the inseparability of one from the other in the unfolding of a coextensive interactional milieu. their respective structures.. structural coupling draws a dividing line between body and world in description and schematization—i.obviously figures in the double embodiment analysis: it is the context in which action is embedded. the concept of structural coupling was applied to evolutionary biology. More specifically. with a view to their mutual adaptation and coevolution. as the organism and the environment exchange matter and energy. it addressed the circular and reciprocal nature of these interactions. It presented an analysis of the interactions between an organism and its environment (where the environment may include other organisms). and hence the structure of their interactions. and in the emergence of performative and cognitive patterns and competencies. the mind figures in structural coupling: it is the locus of cognitive emergence over a history of interactions between body and world. the emphasis in structural coupling is on the circular processes of causation and specification that pertain between the agent and the environment. But where the emphasis in double embodiment is on the oscillatory nature of mental engagement in an interactional context. In much the same way. More specifically. In early formulations (Maturana and Varela 1980. are changed as a function of the exchange. The process is captured neatly in Maturana and Varela’s definition of an autopoietic machine: An autopoietic machine is a machine organized (defined as a unity) as a network of processes of production (transformation and destruction) of components that 62 .

(Maturana and Varela 1980: 78-79) Over a history of exchanges between organism and environment. by the agent. in turn. and Rosch 1991: 206) The world that is brought forth. connect the embodied agent to the environment within the course of action. a continuous realization of “the network of processes. Thompson. Structural coupling is a key component of the enactivist model of cognition. Rosch and Thompson’s formulation. The fully developed notion of structural coupling. and such that those exchanges strengthen the conditions for continued interaction. there is an increasing regularization of structure.produce the components which: (i) through their interactions and transformations continuously regenerate and realize the network of processes (relations) that produced them. (Varela.. emphasizes the 63 . and (ii) constitute it (the machine) as a concrete unity in the space in which they (the components) exist by specifying the topological domain of its realization as such a network.” such that both organism and environment are more viably adapted to productive exchange. In contrast to the computationalist subject— who reasons about an external world in an internal domain of symbolic representation—the enactive subject actively realizes the world through the connection of the nervous system to the sensory and motor surfaces which. or enacted. it is the very mechanism by which cognitive properties emerge: Question 1: What is cognition? Answer: Enaction: A history of structural coupling that brings forth a world.e. traverses the divide between agent and environment. i. then. In Varela.

This push and pull between agent and environment has a dynamic contour. and these forces act upon the agent’s body within the course of activity. and it is a constraint that is in an ongoing state of transformation as the agent acquires and develops motor skills. structural coupling implies physical constraints and feedback. There is a certain push and pull of physical forces between agent and environment that constitutes a critical aspect of their structural coupling. The contingencies and specificities of the agent’s embodiment form one such constraint. The dividing line is rather more pliable. 64 .1). and this is where the “hard dividing line” that we may draw between them must necessarily be qualified. or finds herself in new or changing environments with new or changing actional priorities. Physical constraints also exist within the environment. a quality that is tidily encapsulated in a schematization by Hillel Chiel and Randall Beer (Figure 3. and offers an explanation as to how repetitive contacts at these points of intersection can lead to incrementally more complex states of functioning on the part of the cognitive system.inseparability of agent and environment in embodied cognition. In other words. but at the same time locates the points at which agent and environment intersect. and so play a critical role in the emergence of embodied practices and habits.

1. complicated. There is. and contains the nervous system. The push and pull between each of the components in the interactional domain is indicated by projecting triangular regions. then. but they are not rigid. the dividing lines between body and environment. the body (sensorimotor surfaces). Chiel and Bier’s commentary: The nervous system (NS) is embedded within a body. highly structured dynamical systems. It’s clear that a “push” on one side of the body-environment divide results in a proportionate “pull” on the other. the body. and adaptive behavior emerges from the interactions of all three systems. The nervous system. In Chiel and Beer’s diagram. Interactions between the nervous system. are clearly distinct.Figure 3. and the environment (from Chiel and Beer (1997)). which is connected to the sensorimotor surface through the same dynamical “push-pull” patterns that connect the body to the environment. 65 . and between nervous system and body. which in turn is embedded within the environment. The “body” consists of sensory inputs and motor outputs. which are coupled to one another. a fluid complementarity between environment. and vice versa. and the environment are each rich.

It’s a perspective that has also been adopted by a handful of cognitive scientists as an explanatory mechanism for the emergence of cognitive structures through interactional dynamics (Hutchins 1995. Thelen 1994). that. I will return to this point in my outline of implementational models in Chapter 4. nonlinear. And they may demand more or less of the agent’s cognitive resources. What we see is a transfer function—a map—from agent to environment and back again. Although it doesn’t form an explicit part of Varela and Maturana’s original formulation. from one interaction to the next.body. the diagram would need to be animated. We would then see the projecting triangular regions extend and contract in regular (though not necessarily periodic) oscillatory patterns. they form a nonautonomous dynamical system (Beer 1996. Beer has suggested that when embodied agent and environment are coupled through interaction. the dynamical systems approach provides a potentially useful way of both understanding and schematizing structural coupling. or even random behavior. of which Chiel and Beer’s diagram provides an instantaneous snapshot. 66 . and these motions would provide a view of the continuous balancing of energies between agent and environment as the play of physically constrained action unfolds over time. To capture the properly dynamical nature of this complementarity. may exhibit linear. and vice versa. 1997). depending on the potential complexity of balancing the intentionality of the agent with the environmental contingencies. These kinds of exchanges may be more or less stable in terms of the impact of environmental dynamics on agent dynamics. and nervous system.

rather. This lands us. such a diagram will not capture the experiential aspect of embodied interaction. and by a form of experience that. the world. We will see a disconnect in schematizations of both the computationalist and the enactive models of action. on the other. and 2. more or less.e.There are two fundamental and seemingly contradictory points to viewing interactions between an embodied agent and its environment as a process of structural coupling: 1. is lived directly at the points where the sensorimotor system coincides with the environment in which it is embedded. as soon as we’ve drawn the dividing line between agent and environment. i. to locate the points at which agent and environment intersect. it’s precisely the point at which the mechanics of the agentenvironment connection need to be described. and to understand their respective behaviors as self-contained properties of autonomous systems. But what distinguishes the enactive model from the computationalist model is the formation of a larger unity between agent and world through dynamical processes of embodied interaction and adaptation. it’s rather easy to view them in isolation. On one side. by the “push and pull” between coupled physical systems. The danger with the analytic part of this formulation is that. 67 . These processes are characterized by crossings of the divide. Although we can delineate the boundary between agent and environment in an abstract diagram of their interactional milieu. rather than being lived through a world of abstract inner contemplation. their bounding surfaces. The agent does not feel herself to be separate from the world in which she is acting but. Therefore. the agent. to emphasize the inseparability of agent and environment. back within the computationalist model of rationally guided action.

ceases to factor in the agent’s experience. therefore. structural coupling implies enaction. when the five criteria of embodied activity (Chapter 1) are met. or disconnect.” I would argue that. and vice versa. Structural coupling between performer and instrument will.” but rather constitutes “a system of possible actions. be key to the model of enactive musical performance that I am proposing.7 To this extent (and in keeping with Varela. as a matter of definition. The “bringing forth of a world. The body is not “as it in fact is. as a thing in objective space. of an organismic continuity between agent and environment. and the fifth--embodiment is an emergent phenomenon-would come for free. a structurally coupled system is inevitably formed.” that is. the emergence of cognitive. amounts to the moment at which the original severance. As Thelen and Smith point out (Thelen 1994). 7 To be more precise. perceptual and actional abilities constitute the teleological dimension of structural coupling. Thompson and Rosch’s formulation). the first four criteria of embodied activity would form a structurally coupled system. 68 . a virtual body with its phenomenal ‘place’ defined by its task and situation (Merleau-Ponty [1945] 2004: 250).is intimately folded into its dynamics and processes. and an essential criterion in design.

But before turning to issues of the design and implementation of enactive digital musical instruments. the interface).e. The human performs actions at the inputs to the computer which cause changes to the state of the computer’s programs. is to arrive at a candidate model of enactive interaction. and the models that I present here may serve as a provisional and necessarily speculative bridging of the gap between theory and praxis. the computer transmits output signals representing the state of its programs which are perceived by the human. with the intention of holding this model in view when shifting the focus to implementation. It’s the dynamics of the various models of interaction between human and computer that form the key concern. then.3. it may prove useful to outline the various models of interaction that I’ve discussed to this point in the form of diagrams. In turn.4 Towards an Enactive Model of Interaction The key theoretical components of the essay have now been presented. There is a basic model of human-computer interaction (figure 3. but remain both general and nonspecific in terms of hardware and software implementation details (i. To that end. The underlying rationale. The leap from theory to implementation is almost always a shaky endeavor. with a view to distinguishing their various implications for the development of human cognition and action..2) that can be taken to hold for all subsequent models. 69 . the diagrams focus specifically on human-computer interaction.

The basic model of the human-computer interaction loop. In fact. That is. The basic mechanics can be taken to mean the maps from output to perception. the usefulness of the model lies solely in specifying the basic mechanics of human-computer interaction. Together. and therefore demonstrates intentionality. The basic model is. The human perceives and acts. although a cognitive dimension is implied. the model does not account for it. and M represents the map from the human’s motor activities to the state of the computer’s input devices. the input and output devices constitute the interface to the programs running on the computer. however.HUMAN PERCEPTION COMPUTER OUTPUT S PROGRAMS ACTION M INPUT Figure 3. incomplete. But there is nothing to link perception to action.8 it can also be assumed 8 To say that the basic mechanics is unchanging is not to say that the interfaces will be identical. 70 . S represents the map from the state of the computer’s output devices to the human’s sensory inputs.2. and as these mechanics can be assumed to be unchanging for all subsequent models.

and these dynamics will in turn carry different sets of implications for cognition. Different interfaces will result in different map dynamics. and a and from action to input.3). For present purposes.that the subsequent models will be distinguished solely by cognitive considerations. The basic model extended to include the model of human activity in conventional HCI. To make the step from the basic model to the conventional model of humancomputer interaction.3. this means the map between perception and action. perception and action. Human actions follow after inner reasoning about sensory inputs. we need only insert human reasoning between perceiving and acting (figure 3. HUMAN PERCEPTION COMPUTER OUTPUT S REASONING PROGRAMS ACTION M INPUT Figure 3. resulting in a sequential chain of actions. 71 .

and output devices are ordinarily visuocentric and geared to a single focal display point (the cursor).” It can effectively be guaranteed that interactions with the computer-as-it-comes will be disembodied.4).9 The conventional model presumes that the human reasons about her interactions with the computer in an inner world of mental abstraction.” We now have a schematization of the Cartesian subject in the midst of interaction. There is therefore an inevitable time delay between perception and action. the duration of which is simply as long as it takes to perform the necessary mental computations.” 72 . either the mouse or the keyboard). To this extent. Although they are not detailed in figure 3. 9 In the spirit of mechanistic philosophy.” “Reasoning.” and “Output. at least according to the minimal criteria I set down for embodied activity in Chapter 1. we have what I have termed “the computer-as-it-comes.” “Programs.” respectively as “Input. it can be assumed that the input and output devices of conventional HCI serve to reinforce the computationalist ontology from which conventional HCI derives. input devices are ordinarily monomodal and geared to a single focal point of motor activity (from one moment to the next. we could even relabel “Perception.” and “Action. This model is paradigmatic of what I have termed “the computer-as-it-comes. and it’s interesting to note the upside-down symmetry on either side of the human/computer divide. When these factors combine in the form of a device.segmentation of the flow of time (see Chapter 2.3.

While the terminology places explicit emphasis on the interface and how it is constituted. while the computer side has remained unchanged. that the knowledge being galvanized is offline. it’s an abstract quantity that exists prior to interactions with the computer.” This knowledge can be considered offline with regard to activity. the immediate concern lies with the implications of the interface for the emergence of cognitive. The distinction rests on the manner in which the interface elicits particular varieties of action and thought from the human user. in user experience. the added dimension is labelled “Knowledge.” rather than “constituted. I have added a further cognitive dimension to the human side of the computer-as-it-comes model.” within the course of action. In the diagram of the functional model of interaction (figure 3. and while it directly informs the ways in which the human subject perceives and reasons. I drew a distinction between functional and realizational interfaces. In schematizing the respective interactional paradigms of the functional and realizational interfaces. It can also be assumed that there are no real-time constraints on the accessing of this knowledge. knowledge is “accessed. then. perceptual and actional patterns.4). and that this aspect reinforces the sense.In Chapter 2. 73 . That is.

. The human’s knowledge is leveraged by the abstractions that comprise the computer’s interface. the task domain and its end goals are made as transparent as possible. i. and thereby minimizing the cognitive load. it is not advantageous to activities that are dynamic or nondeterministic by nature.HUMAN KNOWLEDGE COMPUTER PERCEPTION S OUTPUT REASONING PROGRAMS ACTION M INPUT Figure 3. 74 . The human-computer interaction loop with the functional interface (see 2. The functional interface is deterministic. the goal of the taskat-hand is known in advance. and this knowledge is galvanized to guide perception and reasoning. While the approach has a great many advantages for routine activities with computers.e.4. leading to appropriate action.5). Through leveraging existing user knowledge. I noted in Chapter 2 that functionalism is something of a standard in conventional interaction design. and the interface is designed to lead to the accomplishment of this goal while placing minimal cognitive demands on the human.

i.e.5). it is substituted in the diagram by the more dynamic and fluid “realization.” and “Realization” and “Reasoning. Because the term “knowledge” implies a fixed state of knowing.5. The human-computer interaction loop with the realizational interface (see 2.. Whereas human knowledge can be considered static in functional interactions. “Knowledge” is relabelled “Realization.In figure 3. The key difference between the realizational and the functional interface lies in the cognitive demands they place on the human.” are now bidirectional. it brings with it a continuing potential for new encounters and uses.5. it is dynamic in realizational interactions.” and the links between “Realization” and “Perception.” 75 . and human knowledge continues to expand over a history of interactions. The realizational interface is nondeterministic. HUMAN REALIZATION COMPUTER PERCEPTION S OUTPUT REASONING PROGRAMS ACTION M INPUT Figure 3.

the boundaries between perception.” 76 . I have defined embodied activity as a state of being that consists in a merging of action and awareness.The term “knowledge” implies a static corpus of known facts. By introducing resistance to the interface—a resistance that requires the human to fully engage in the activity—the shift is effected from a static and deterministic model of activity to one that is dynamic and nondeterministic. According to the criteria of embodied activity.” In figure 3. reasoning and action are collapsed. then. and the continuity between perceiving and acting is indicated by the label “Perceptually Guided Action. While realization is offline to the activity. the model represents a disembodied mode of interaction. Hence the substitution of the more dynamic and fluid term “realization. there is a seamless continuity between perceiving and acting. and thus opens the possibility for the on-going generation of new meanings and modes of thought. In figure 3. a reasoning stage still intervenes between the perceiving and acting stages. That is to say.6. offers resistance to the user. Nonetheless. The realizational interface. It’s precisely this corpus of “knowns” on which the functional interface draws. it still requires that the human commit continuous and significant cognitive resources to the task. an important step has been taken towards the enactive model. deliberately prompting her to new modes of thinking about the task domain.5. experienced as flow. on the other hand.

Perception and action constitute a unity. or in Hubert Dreyfus’ paraphrase. labelled here as “Perceptually Guided Action.2). The model of activity corresponds to Heidegger’s ready-to-hand.” This corresponds to the flow of embodied activity (see 1.HUMAN S PERCEPTUALLY GUIDED ACTION COMPUTER OUTPUT PROGRAMS M INPUT Figure 3. and the sense of disconnect between human and computer ceases to factor in experience. The perceiving/reasoning/acting sequence has been collapsed into a fully integrated model of activity. and that this has proven a major stumbling block in arriving at designs for digital musical instruments that allow for embodied modes of interaction. embodied action. and to Heidegger’s ready-to-hand (see 3.2).” or. and it can be assumed that the experience of “oneness” involves the loss of any sense of disconnect with the computer. This is the first of the schematizations in which the human is represented as a unity. there is a merging of action and awareness. I’ve argued that such a mode of activity is precluded by the computer-as-it-comes. As with 77 . “absorbed coping. Embodied Interaction.6. in the rubric that I’ve used throughout the essay.

3). unreflective mode of behavior. Enaction. “Realization” is connected to “Perceptually Guided Action” through a bidirectional path (figure 3. prerequisite to enaction.7). In Chapter 2. however. I suggested that what distinguishes embodied action from enaction is the realizational dimension. Cognitive realization is. Human and computer are structurally coupled systems (see 3. HUMAN REALIZATION COMPUTER S PERCEPTUALLY GUIDED ACTION OUTPUT PROGRAMS M INPUT Figure 3. such challenges are not prerequisite to embodiment. Enaction implies an embodied model of interaction with 78 . the distinguishing aspect of the ready-to-hand is that it is an unconscious.7. That is. there is no explicit focus on conscious mechanisms.2). that while the sense of embodiment may be optimal when cognitive challenges are placed upon the human agent.the standard model of human-computer interaction (figure 3. then. To make the step from embodied action to enaction. Indeed.

5): both include a realizational dimension that is tied. and in turn shapes the trajectory of future interactions. If we were to stick with the idea that humans are 79 . Another way to view this is as the difference between. But where the realizational interface solicits a mode of activity that is disembodied and offline. and to the cognitive challenges this resistance presents. the enactive interface solicits time-constrained improvised responses that are embodied and online. to perception and action. And in both instances. Although I take no position in the debate. for the purposes of the present study I assume that inner representations play no part in direct experience. in Elizabeth Preston’s terminology. In the enactivist view. as this makes it easier to distinguish between direct and abstract experience. There’s a symmetry between the enactive model and that of the realizational interface (figure 3. realization is tightly correlated to the resistance that the interface offers to the human user.a view to cognitive and actional realization. It arises through physical interactions. cognition is an embodied phenomenon.e. through reciprocal patterns of determination. “representational and non-representational intentionality (Preston 1988).” Where the realizational interface is concerned with engineering a representational breakdown—i. deliberately causing a reappraisal of the representations that comprise the interface.10 That is. an activity that necessarily involves reasoning. the interface is 10 There are continuing disagreements among cognitive scientists and philosophers of mind as to whether "inner representations" play a part in direct experience. and is therefore disembodied and offline—the enactive interface is concerned with soliciting new responses without recourse to inner representations.

but in terms of the role it plays in our activities. in real time and real space. In the enactive model. in relations to an agent's spatial location. can be defined only in indexical and functional terms. it’s important to note that while the enactive model of interaction represents an idealized “way of being” in the performative moment. then. The enactive model of interaction represents the ideal performative outcome of the class of digital musical instruments that I am setting out to define and describe in this study.7). And it is because the object is so directly folded into the actional midst that we encounter it directly rather than abstractly. Deictic representations were discussed in Chapter 2." With deictic intentionality. in addition to the enactive model of interaction (figure 3. or current and typical goals or projects (Agre 1997: 242). Before turning to design. however. then we could potentially draw the distinction between abstract and direct experience in terms of objective and deictic intentionality. social position. Rather. would also at various moments involve embodied action storing the contents of their environment as inner representations at all times. then. and at the same time determining the emergent contour of the body’s unfolding patterns and trajectories. that is. and human activity is embodied and online.. but I will reiterate here.. realization is an incremental process of cognitive regularization and awareness. 80 . in keeping with Merleau-Ponty’s theory of “double embodiment. it does not represent the sum total of the performance practice. "a deictic ontology . According to Philip Agre. we do not relate to an object in terms of its objectness. stemming from forces that are directly registered through the body.” that performance practice.encountered directly rather than abstractly.

a violinist breaks a string in the middle of performance. in the midst of embodied activity. We see then a coincidence of the present-at-hand and the ready-to-hand. to borrow terminology from Heidegger—the instrument effectively disappears from use. Additionally. it will be encountered through a representational intentionality. particularly as. and the human performer would routinely cross the lines that distinguish one modality from the next.(figure 3. she becomes more finely adapted to the instrumental dynamics.5). doubly embodied performer.” particularly in the learning stage.. In everyday embodied practices. it’s likely that the act of playing proceeds without a great deal of reflective thought.6). At such moments—again. For example. Each of these modalities would constitute different ways of engaging the same instrument. multi-tasking. With the greater portion of available cognitive resources allocated to the instrumental breakdown. That the same human is able to divide the instantaneous allocation of cognitive resources into representational and nonrepresentational subcomponents is nothing extraordinary for a practiced.e. and offline realization (figure 3. over the course of practice. she continues playing on the remaining three strings. drawing the focus of her attention to the objectness of the instrument. it’s not unusual for these experiential modalities to be engaged simultaneously. There will be “breakdowns. which shift awareness to the “objectness” of the instrument. and becomes readyto-hand. however. It is also something that happens as a matter of course in the 81 . The instrument will become present-at-hand. At the same time. i. it cannot be assumed that the instrument will provide endless novelty to the performer. as the intentionality of the performer is divided across different components of the same instrument.

it can be assumed that if the instrumental implementation engenders suitable conditions for the enactive model of interaction. The practical implication for instrument design. and offline realization models into a single integrated model. we can condense the enactive. In using the umbrella term “intentionality.development of any form of embodied practice. it encompasses both representational and nonrepresentational intentional modes. then. then. the other modalities—embodied action and offline realization—will invariably follow. and therefore need not factor in design. human intentionality is fundamentally concerned with the body’s manner of relating to objects in the course of purposive activity. 82 .5 The Discontinuous Unfolding of Skill Acquisition In Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology. action and cognitive unfolding within the circumscribed interactional domain of instrumental practice. In the broadest sense of the term. is that the enactive model is the only one that need be kept in view. In the particular case of what I have termed enactive digital musical instruments.” then.” The model encompasses the interdependencies between perception. which I have termed “enactive performance practice (figure 3.8). 3. embodied action.

and of the dynamics of the bodyinstrument interactions. The instrumental reactions are perceived by the human.8. As these cognitive abilities develop. and thus her ongoing reactions and bodily dispositions. The human acts purposefully through her body. but we get closer to 83 . exemplifying an intentionality.COGNITION R Time HUMAN BODY INSTRUMENT I Figure 3. Human body and instrument are unities. as they are registered in the body. and cognitive abilities emerge over time through the continuous and embodied circular interactions between them. there is an incremental regularization of the performative patterns of the body. The process could be schematized as a bidirectional exchange. while R represents the map from the instrument’s reactions back to the human. it does serve to encapsulate all the key facets of the interaction paradigm I’ve set out to describe. Her bodily actions are transduced by the instrument and lead to a reaction. Enactive performance practice. and these perceptions. I represents the map from human intentionality to the instrument. While the enactive performance practice model is too general to be useful in design. modulate her intentionality.

Over time. this doesn’t present a problem.11 Enactive performance practice as I’ve outlined it here is consistent with Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the intentional arc (see Chapter 2). humans. As long as enactive performance practice—and also the intentional arc—can be said to encompass representational and nonrepresentational modes. however. other animals. this is solely for the purposes of clarity. The “arc” metaphor is interesting. the environment may include any manner of physical spaces. It should be kept in mind that cognition is an embodied phenomenon. realized at the connections between the nervous system. and the environment. 84 . In real practice. actional and cognitive skills. and an idealized physical space in which the instrument's outputs might be optimally perceived by the human performer. etc. the sensorimotor surfaces. but rather is folded into them through realization. While such features of the environment will inevitably play a part in the emergence and formation of performer intentionality. of course. Although cognition and the body are indicated as distinct entities in figure 3. The cognitive dimension is not independent of these interactions. the environment can be taken to comprise the instrument. as the body continues to adapt to the dynamics of the interactional domain.8. a continuity that is also implied in the unbroken trajectory of cognitive unfolding in figure 3.the flux of the performance experience if the interactions are viewed as circular and continuous. At the same time. as it implies a continuity in the acquisition of perceptual. cognitive abilities continue to develop.8. the model does not accurately reflect the ways in which the modes of bodily relation to an instrument are transformed over the course of cognitive 11 In this essay. it's beyond the scope of this study to factor them into consideration.

Before moving on to issues of implementation. i. such as learning to play a musical instrument.e. I will borrow from Dreyfus’ decomposition of the intentional arc into five distinct stages. Hubert Dreyfus’ “The Current Relevance of Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Embodiment (Dreyfus 1996).”12 He does this by dividing the temporal unfolding of skill acquisition into five distinct stages—“Novice. Dreyfus assumes “the case of an adult acquiring a skill by instruction (Dreyfus 1996:6).” “Proficient. but will illustrate the argument with an 12 The numbering system in citations of Dreyfus' article refer to the paragraph number of the online text.” and “Expertise”—where each stage is characterized by specific bodily ways of relating to the task environment in question.” “Advanced beginner. In the discussion that follows. it’s worth considering the ways in which human bodily ways of being are transformed within the process of acquiring a specific skill. then. 85 . and learning to play chess.” “Competence. Dreyfus sets out in his article to “lay out more fully than Merleau-Ponty does. how our relation to the world is transformed as we acquire a skill (Dreyfus 1996:6). I’ll do this by drawing out some correspondences between two texts. This is an especially important point when considering the acquisition of realizational skills. it does not account for the intrinsically discontinuous back-andforth between the present-at-hand and the ready-to-hand that characterizes the acquisition of skill.” and David Sudnow’s Ways of the Hand (Sudnow 2001).” and illustrates his argument with two examples: learning to drive a car.unfolding.

It’s interesting to note the 86 . Sudnow’s Ways of the Hand—a detailed first person “production account” of the gradual acquisition of skill as a jazz pianist—is in this regard an ideal candidate. Dreyfus’ “Novice” stage begins with the reduction of the task environment into explicit representations of the elements of which the environment is composed: Normally. like a computer following a program.. playing a chord’s tones in nicely distributed ways. The beginner is then given rules for determining actions on the basis of these features. (Dreyfus 1996:7) That the features of the environment are “context-free” implies that the focus of activity is directed towards connecting the body to the instrument—i. but without any explicit regard as to how these alignments will eventually fold into the context of embodied.example that is more immediately pertinent to the present study: learning to improvise with a musical instrument. or voicing. time-constrained performance. (Sudnow 2001:12) The proper “place” of the chords was determined by the specific configuration of piano keys that the hand would need to engage.e. and the proper alignments were the voicing of those chords: In early lessons with my new teacher the topic was chord construction. For Sudnow. the features of the task environment were chords. the instruction process begins with the instructor decomposing the task environment into context-free features which the beginner can recognize without benefit of experience in the task domain. establishing a “grip”—in the proper place and with the proper alignments.

having gained a hold on the chord. the “Advanced beginner” stage is characterized by the emergence of a degree of contextual recognition: As the novice gains experience actually coping with real situations. The chord. As Sudnow notes.” In Dreyfus’ taxonomy. “lots of searching and looking are first required (Sudnow 2001:12). And this decomposition demands an on-going coordination between an abstract mental image of the task at hand and the accomplishment of the task. arranging the individual fingers a bit to find a way for the hand to feel comfortable. or an instructor points out. (Sudnow 2001:12) The mode of engagement here is clearly that of the present-at-hand. build it up from the scratch of its broken parts. perspicuous examples of meaningful additional aspects of the situation. getting a good grasp. I had to take up the chord again in terms of its constitution. Instructional maxims now can refer to these new situational aspects. then—the initial “context-free” feature of the environment—is itself decomposed into individual features. he begins to note.“substantial initial awkwardness” that Sudnow describes in the complex of lookings and graspings that characterize this stage: I would find a particular chord. and. the student learns to recognize them. as well as to the 87 . I’d let it go. groping to put each finger into a good spot. recognized on the basis of experience. After seeing a sufficient number of examples. find the individual notes again. then look back to the keyboard—only to find the visual and manual hold hadn’t yet been well established. Each note of the chord is mentally associated with an individual finger before the hand gains a hold on the chord as a whole.

integrated motion of the hands: As my hands began to form constellations. where the stage as a whole is characterized by a gradually increasing capacity for dealing with the 88 . or both) nor timely (in the sense that the transition from one place and alignment to a next must satisfy timing constraints in the broader context of a performance). or that it might be solicited by some other pressing constraint in the environment.e. that such gestalts remain limited to isolated and non-time-pressured events. Dreyfus’ designation for the third stage of skill acquistion—“Competence”—is potentially misleading. then. remains offline. The perceptual recognition of places and alignments is beginning to occur at a higher level of scale. seeing not its note-for-noteness but its configuration against the broader visual field of the terrain. but as a single. however. the scope of my looking correspondingly grasped the chord as a whole. It would perhaps be more accurate to say that competence emerges towards the end of the third stage. (Dreyfus 1996:10) The “situational aspects” here point to an initial emergence of gestalts. of the tendency to regard coordinated actions—such as the playing of a chord—not as the combined motions of individual figures. The context that the performer is beginning to glimpse.objectively defined non-situational features recognizable by the novice. i. but this recognition is neither situated (in the sense that one place and alignment might lead to a next place and alignment. (Sudnow 2001:13) It’s important to note. It is at the next stage of skill acquisition that such factors enter the equation.

its online aspects—leads to a sense of frustration. (Dreyfus 1996:13) Interestingly enough.e. It was going on all around me. for I was up there trying to do this jazz I’d practiced nearly all day. The beginning of the third stage is marked. Between the chordchanging beat of my left hand at more or less regular intervals according to the chart. situated in the midst of these surrounding affairs. and the student might wonder how anybody ever masters the skill. I was in the midst of a music the way a lost newcomer finds himself suddenly in the midst of a Mexico City traffic circle. (Sudnow 2001:33) 89 . by anything but a sense of performative competence. performance becomes nerve-wracking and exhausting. there were friends I’d invited to join me. At this point. since a sense of what is important in any particular situation is missing. with no humor in the situation. the disparity between the level of skill accomplished thus far and a newly gained understanding of the larger context of performance—i.. i. for situated and timely musical utterances. however.online aspects of performance. and the rather more smoothly managed and securely pulsing background of the bass player and drummer. and the musicians I’d begun to know. Sudnow’s first public performance took place at precisely this stage in his development. there obtained the most alienative relations. It’s worth quoting his account in full: The music wasn’t mine. the melodic movements of the right. I was on a bucking bronco of my own body’s doings. the number of potentially relevant elements of a real-world situation that the learner is able to recognize becomes overwhelming.e. Rather. This frustration is borne specifically of the body’s inability to adequately respond to the seemingly overwhelming online demands of performance: With more experience.

in fact. Dreyfus notes that the performer normally responds to the newly discovered enormity of the task at hand by adopting a “hierarchical perspective. many differing from each other in subtle.The gap between motor intentionality and motor ability led to a music that “was literally out of hand (Sudnow 2001:35). as well as sequences comprised of the individual 90 . ways.” In short. the components of the “Competence” stage are rather more contextbound: The competent performer thus seeks new rules and reasoning procedures to decide upon a plan or perspective. (Dreyfus 1996:15) For Sudnow. therefore. Competent performers. The problem is that there are a vast number of different situations that the learner may encounter. But unlike the concrete components of activity that constitute the “context-free” features of the “Novice” stage. But these rules are not as easily come by as the rules given beginners in texts and lectures. nuanced. more situations than can be named or precisely defined so no one can prepare for the learner a list of what to do in each possible situation.” and by deciding upon a route that “determines which elements of the situation are to be treated as important and which ones can be ignored (Dreyfus 1996:14). the task is again reduced to individual components.” It also led to Sudnow shying away from further public performances for a period of several years. There are. the plan was to work towards a “melodic intentionality” by extending in practice his acquired embodied knowledge of isolated chords to patterned sequences of chords. have to decide for themselves what plan to choose without being sure that it will be appropriate in the particular situation.

I’d think: “major triad on the second note of the scale. then a next followed. and for some time. was dependent in my experience upon the acquisition of facilities that made it possible. I found myself for the first time coming into position to begin to do such melodic work with respect to these courses.. an express aiming for sounds. Motivated so predominantly toward the rapid course. this plan was decided upon without input from his teacher.. (Sudnow 2001:43) And in due course. As the abilities of my hand developed. and it wasn’t as though in my prior work I had been trying and failing to make coherent note-to-note melodies. The simplest sorts of melody-making entailed a note-to-note intentionality that had been extraordinarily deemphasized by virtue of the isolated ways in which I’d been learning. rather than appearing solely at the level of the event: A small sequence of notes was played. It’s precisley in this emerging capacity to form fully articulated phrases that the performer achieves a degree of competence. this was a largely conceptual process. frustrated in my attempts to reproduce recorded passages.notes that those chords contain. Not coincidentally.” doing hosts of calculating and guidance operations of this sort in the course of play. (Sudnow 2001:43) The emergence of these gestalts is more or less equivalent to what Sudnow describes as “the emergence of a melodic intentionality”: . I had left dormant whatever skills for melodic construction I may have had. or guidance from “texts and lectures”: At first. now again.” then “diminished on the third and a repeat for the next. gestalts began to emerge at the level of the sequence. Though not yet a native speaker of 91 .

as represented by rules and principles will gradually be replaced by situational discriminations accompanied by associated responses. which of several 92 . and that. it is embodied by the experiencing subject.e. by a calculative procedure. Should this happen. responses are either strengthened or inhibited. (Dreyfus 1996:20) These “situational discriminations” of “intuitive behavior” point explicitly to the mode of “absorbed coping” that is definitive of the ready-to-hand. and only if. then.the language. Dreyfus’ chracterization of the “Proficient” stage is particularly interesting in terms of the Heideggerean opposition between the present-at-hand and the ready-to-hand: Suppose that events are experienced with involvement as the learner practices his skill. experience is assimilated in this atheoretical way and intuitive behavior replaces reasoned responses. With an increase in embodied skill. there is nonetheless a fledgling facility for forming coherent sentences. And it’s precisely in the ready-to-hand that “experience is assimilated”. Proficiency seems to develop if. i. Action becomes easier and less stressful as the learner simply sees what needs to be achieved rather than deciding.. plans are intuitively evoked and certain aspects stand out as important without the learner standing back and choosing those plans or deciding to adopt that perspective. the performer’s theory of the skill. there is also an increase in the ratio of ready-to-hand to present-at-hand modes of engagement: As the brain of the performer acquires the ability to discriminate between a variety of situations entered into with concern and involvement. as the result of both positive and negative experiences.

the present-athand. than it would be undermined. like a revelation.e. There is less doubt that what one is trying to accomplish is appropriate when the goal is simply obvious rather than the winner of a complex competition. the bicycle seemed to do the riding by itself. then several revolutions of the pedals occur. more specifically. i. at the moment of involved intuitive response there can be no doubt. as. when one first gets the knack of a complex skill like riding a bicycle or skiing..possible alternatives should be selected. keep failing. since doubt comes only with detached evaluation of performance. you try to keep it up. In fact. Yet there’s no question but that the hang of it was glimpsed. and it disintegrates. the occurrence of breakdowns is directly related to the number and type of skills the performer has not managed to assimilate: 93 . Or. the catalyst that effects the shift from a ready-to-hand to a present-at-hand mode of perceiving the task environment. however. still comprised of a generous quota of moments characterized by a mode of “detached evaluation”. the bicycle seems to go off on its own. and essence of the experience was tasted with a “this is it” feeling. (Dreyfus 1996:21) The “Proficient” stage is. (Sudnow 2001:76) What we see is the paradigmatic Heideggerean “breakdown”. You struggle to stay balanced. the very first attempt to sustain an easeful management undercuts it. The occurrence of such breakdowns is directly related to the number and type of skills the performer has managed to assimilate in the course of interactions with the environment up to the moment in question. And it’s interesting to note the way in which this can directly conflict with “intuitive behavior”: No sooner did I try to latch onto a piece of good-sounding jazz that would seem just to come out in the midst of my improvisations.

and with the embodiment of ever more refined responses to the dynamical contingencies of the environment.The proficient performer simply has not yet had enough experience with the wide variety of possible responses to each of the situations he or she can now discriminate to have rendered the best response automatic. connectives yet to become integrally part of the process. 94 . a sentence structure was slowly taking form. he falls back on detached. is the continuity of the discourse. With this falling into place. a discussion or argument. (Dreyfus 1996:22) What distinguishes the “Proficient” stage from the “Competent” stage is a shift to a yet higher level of articulational scale. (Sudnow 2001:56) It’s these “connectives”—“a way of making the best of things continuously (Sudnow 2001:59)”—that gradually fall into place over the course of sustained practice. the proficient performer. however. and the catalyst of “stammerings and stutterings”—becomes increasingly seldom. perhaps. What distinguishes the “Proficient” stage from the “Expertise” stage. For this reason. courses of action were being sustained that faded and disintegrated into stammerings and stutterings. the occurrence of breakdowns—i. To decide. the solicitation of self-conscious thought. from the level of the individual phrase or sentence to the level of. But at the same time.e. sayings now being attempted. Sudnow also uses a linguistic analogy: From a virtual hodgepodge of phonemes and approximate paralinguistics. rule-based determination of actions. seeing the goal and the important features of the situation. A continuity that—in the case of proficiency—is rendered discontinuous by the intrusion of breakdowns. themes starting to achieve some cogent management. That is. must still decide what to do.

or tactic. each of which share the same decision. (Dreyfus 1996:25) More specifically. single action. A more subtle and refined discrimination ability is what distinguishes the expert from the proficient performer. he suggests that discriminating ability and a continuity of response are necessarily linked criteria of expertise: With enough experience with a variety of situations. with further discrimination among situations all seen as similar with respect to plan or perspective distinguishing those situations requiring one action from those demanding another. have enabled the expert performer to respond to the same conditions from which those breakdowns emerged in a timely and unselfconscious manner. But Dreyfus also points to a greater refinement to these responses than there is to the variety of responses that are typical during the “Proficient” stage: The expert not only knows what needs to be achieved. Actions are perceptually guided. then. (Dreyfus 1996:25) The lessons learned from breakdowns during the “Proficient” stage.I’ve already suggested that a capacity for continuous intuitive interactional response to environmental dynamics is definitive of what Dreyfus describes as the “Expertise” stage. This allows the immediate intuitive response to each situation which is characteristic of expertise. the proficient performer gradually decomposes this class of situations into subclasses. based on mature and practiced situational discrimination. the perfomer is immersed in the activity. all seen from the same perspective but requiring different tactical decisions. and the “I think” is supplanted by an “I can”: 95 . but also knows how to achieve the goal.

In light of the apparent discontinuities of skill acquisition.8.I’d see a stretch of melody suddenly appear. in which cognitive unfolding is indicated as continuous over time. the performer embodies perceptual. pacings. accentings—a saying said just so.9. it may be worth revising the diagram of figure 3. though my fingers went to places to which I didn’t feel I’d specifically taken them. 96 . could recognize that I’d done a saying in that language. in a little strip of play that’d go by before I got a good look at it. durations. I could hear a bit of that language being well spoken. unlike others I’d seen. in fact for the very first time. enable the experience of flow. a saying particularly said in all of its detail: its pitches. (Sudnow 2001:76) With the refinement of dispositional abilities. there also emerges a parallel refinement of articulational fluency: I could hear it. seemingly because of something I was doing. intensities. In figure 3. actional and cognitive capacities that. Certain right notes played in certain right ways appeared just to get done. (Sudnow 2001:78) At this point in the discontinuous unfolding of skill acquisition. in suitable performance circumstances. the temporal dimension is segmented into discrete blocks corresponding to Dreyfus’ five stages of skill acquisition.

as well as the capacity for coordination among the three components in both reflective and unreflective behavior. Expertise SKILL R Time HUMAN BODY INSTRUMENT I Figure 3.1. motor and perceptual skills. “Skill” replaces “Cognition” in this diagram. “Skill” is indicative of cognitive. It is also indicative of the developing capacity for coordination between all three. A more accurate model yet might indicate the changing nature of human body/instrument relations over each of the five stages of skill acquisition. 97 . Competence 4. where “skill” can be said to encompass cognitive. Proficient 5. A detailed view of enactive performance practice. motor and perceptual skills. Novice 2.9. I represents the map from human intentionality to the instrument. the diagram of the continuous and circular human/instrument interaction loop is sufficiently general to be applicable at each of the stages. but as it stands. while R represents the map from the instrument’s reactions back to the human. Advanced beginner 3. encompassing the discontinuous unfolding of skill acquisition.

Sudnow’s account in Ways of the Hand is representative of what I have termed an enactive performance practice. But there is nothing particularly extraordinary about the way in which his skills were acquired. Given an able body (and therefore an innate capacity for perception, action and cognition), an intentionality (e.g. to become an improvising jazz pianist, to produce coherent sequences of notes, etc.), and a sufficiently responsive instrument (e.g. a piano), any human subject might follow an analagous course. In Sudnow’s case, these three prerequisites to enactive performance practice came for free. But my argument has been that in the case of performance with digital musical instruments, something fundamental is missing; i.e. a sufficiently responsive instrument. A sufficient responsiveness is synonymous with what I have referred to as resistance. And it’s precisely the kind of resistance that an instrument affords to the intentioned, embodied agent that will determine whether or not that instrument has the kind of immanent potential that would lead to an enactive performance practice. Kinds of instrumental resistance, then, will be a major focus when the discussion turns to issues of implementation in Chapter 4.

3.6

Conclusion

I began this chapter with a discussion of the inevitable paradox in any description of direct experience. The model of enactive performance practice—an attempt at such a description—brings the discussion squarely back to this fundamental, instinctive, and largely unreflective way in which humans, through the agency of

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their bodies, relate to the world. This raises the question: if unreflective behavior is so fundamental to human experience, why go to the trouble of detailing so many of its particularities? Why not let that which will happen as a matter of course, happen as a matter of course? Both Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty viewed their work as opposed to the mechanistic underpinnings of canonical Western philosophy. In their respective analyses of mundane, everyday, unreflective activity, there is an agenda to replace the Cartesian model of subjectivity with that of the embodied agent at large in the world. I suggested, earlier in the chapter, that a reversal of the Cartesian axiom constitutes the first concern of the phenomenological project. The mechanistic and the phenomenological discourses, then, are fundamentally at odds. And to the extent that technical discourse continues to hinge on the discourse of mechanistic philosophy, it also continues to be resistant to phenomenology. My concern, then, has been with outlining a model of human experience and activity that serves as an alternative to the model routinely adopted by technical designers, i.e. that of the perpetually disembodied Cartesian subject. If it is in fact possible to design and build digital musical instruments that allow for enactive processes to be realized, then we will have done nothing other than arrive right back at the most fundamental form of human agency.

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4

Implementation

4.1

Kinds of Resistance

There are two key assumptions that underlie the enactive model of interaction: 1. that human activity and behavior has rich, structured dynamics, and 2. that the kinds of resistance that objects offer to humans in the course of activity are key to the on-going dynamical structuring of interactional patterns. In the previous chapter, I was concerned with describing the interactional patterns of an enactive performance practice with a view to the implications of those patterns for cognition. Focus was directed at the dynamics of human activity and behavior. In this chapter, focus is directed at the kinds of resistance that a candidate digital musical instrument might offer to a human performer in the midst of performative activity. The underlying concern, then, shifts from theory to implementation. I have suggested previously in the essay that conventional acoustic instruments, because of the resistance they offer to the performer, serve as useful examples of technical objects that embody the potential for enaction. But in the huge diversity of mechanisms that we see across the range of acoustic
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instruments, there is a proportionate diversity in kinds of resistance. The physical feedback to the performer that arises in the encounter between bow and string, for example, is of a different kind to that which comes of the projection of breath into a length of tubing. We can assume, then, that in much the same way that the contingencies of human embodiment play a determining role in the dynamical emergence of performative patterns, so too do the contingencies of instrumental embodiment. This makes the task of arriving at a universal template for the design of enactive musical instruments a profoundly complex, if not obviously impractical undertaking. In the various models of interaction that I schematized in the previous chapter, the maps from human motor function to computer input devices, and from computer output devices to human sensory input, are non-specific in terms of the particular sensorimotor mechanisms that are activated in the course of interaction—the models are intended to be as general and universal as possible. But as soon as we move from interaction diagrams to real world implementations, a higher degree of specificity is required. If, for example, a candidate model for an enactive digital musical instrument were to remain general, there would need to be an account of the myriad ways in which human energy might be transduced as signals at the computer inputs. In the context of the present study, rather than attempting to compile a comprehensive catalogue of implementational possibilities, I will focus on one particular real world implementation: a digital musical instrument that also happens to represent my first serious attempt at engaging the essay’s key theoretical issues in the form of an actual device. This device, as with any musical instrument, offers unique kinds
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but rather. when the core concern is how the candidate instrument is resistant to the human performer. The final component of the study sets out. after all.e. i. that the greater portion of attention would be directed towards input and output devices. This is particularly true of software components. While I shall be discussing just one specific implementation. that the performer actually physically engages the instrument. which 102 . It is at the level of hardware. This is the model I employed in the interaction diagrams of Chapter 3. But as I pointed out in Chapter 1. It would seem likely. Standard human-computer interaction models partition the computer into three distinct layers: input devices. I hope also to demonstrate the utility of keeping the two layers separate in the design process. hardware. In the pages that follow. So. and I will stick with that model here.. digital instruments constitute a special class of musical devices: their sonic behavior is not immanent in their material embodiment. In persisting with the standard division between hardware and software. I nonetheless hope to make it apparent that in maintaining a loose coupling between hardware and software components. therefore. must be programmed. the potential for reusing those components is increased. direct a significant amount of attention to issues of software. then. while hardware certainly constitutes more than a passing concern.of resistance to the performer. programs and output devices. I will. with a view to the various ways in which its indigenous and particular kinds of resistance may or may not lend themselves to the development of an enactive performance practice. to detail the instrument’s implementational specifics. the dynamical behavior and resistance of the instrument is to a large degree encapsulated in its programs.

any one particular software framework brings with it a certain modest degree of generality. we may also see the beginnings of—if not a universal approach to the design of enactive digital instruments—one that is at least suitably general and robust. see Cook (2004). Feely represents my first attempt at the implementation of an enactive digital musical instrument (figure 4. 103 .1).1 In that case. And to the extent that the framework continues to evolve across distinct implementations. 1 For an interesting counter example to this approach. 4.2 Mr. where hardware and software may in a certain variety of cases be inextricable. such as a new hardware framework.may at any time in the future need to be integrated into different implementational contexts. Feely: Hardware Overview A device that goes under the name of Mr.

1. Feely. 104 . Mr.Figure 4.

and power conversion modules are located in the same enclosure as the motherboard. This is in sharp contrast to the sprawl of individual devices and cables that characterizes “the often lab-like stage setups built around general purpose computers (Kartadinata 2003:180). One of the design goals was to create a silent instrument with no moving parts inside the enclosure. emphasis is placed on the coherence of the instrument. and the internal circuitry—are encompassed within a single physical entity.. the bow is a distinct physical entity from the body of the violin—but “total integration” is not really the point of an integrated approach. that is. and a specific motherboard/chipset combination was chosen because of its capacity for fanless operation. “Encompassing” is used here in its most literal sense: all of the components of which the instrument is comprised—the input devices. running the Linux 2. with patches applied for low latency audio throughput and for granting scheduling priority to real-time audio threads. Feely’s computational nucleus resides on a miniature x86 compatible motherboard. how the material embodiment affords a performative encounter with a unity. MIDI A/D and D/A boards.g. For that reason.” 105 .Mr. Kartadinata notes that total integration is not ubiquitous among conventional acoustic instruments—e.6 kernel. Eight channel audio A/D and D/A hardware. the operating system resides on flash memory. the output devices. Rather. Integration and Instrumentality Sukandar Kartadinata has used the term “integrated electronic instruments” to denote a class of devices characterized by an encompassing approach to their material realization (Kartadinata 2003).

that the instrument in its material embodiment should be indicative of a specific purpose. Because of the instrument’s weight. off-theshelf computer (with or without an attendant array of peripheral input devices). From the outset. Figure 4. This is suggestive of two different interpretations. Feely. and 2. that the instrument should have the feel of a musical instrument.2 shows Mr. 106 .Integration and coherence of the instrumental embodiment were important factors in the design of Mr. it is secured on a stand. Feely in the playing position. I had in mind that it was of critical importance that the instrument should have an instrumentality. but it seemed to me a useful way of distinguishing the project from those in which the instrument comprises a general purpose. and both of which factor in the perceived coherence of the instrument to the performer: 1. It may appear redundant to suggest that an instrument should be instrumental. but designed to rest in the lap of the performer. both of which figured in my approach to design.

This aspect of the design is tied in—in the most literal sense—with the aim that the instrument should feel like a musical instrument. In the act of playing. Feely in the playing position. proportional to the amplitude of the human’s motor energy output. The control surface is situated at the performer’s centre of gravity. and it is angled (with respect to the performer) in 107 . Mr.” and this is tied in with the way in which the instrument is indicative of its use. The sense of the instrument’s physically “being there” is. The playing position ensures that there is constant physical contact between performer and instrument. then. But there is another aspect to this “being there.2.Figure 4. the contact with the instrumental body is intensified by hand actions at the control surface. as weight is transferred from the upper body to the thighs.

Feely’s control surface: knobs.such a way that it presents itself optimally to the hands. An important aspect. is equivalent to the “considerable difference between using the real world as a metaphor for interaction and using it as a medium for interaction (Dourish 2001:101). In keeping with Rodney Brooks’ dictum that “the world is its own best model (Brooks 1991). buttons and joysticks.” but—to paraphrase Michael Hamman—that it is “so very there” that the opportunity for action. It’s not just that the instrument is “there. giving preference to the performer’s perceptions of the sound itself. This means that the instrument is intended to be nothing but a musical instrument. Feely’s interface is different to that of the computer-as-it-comes.” Three classes of input device are used on Mr. The way in which Mr. Feely is a special purpose device. for physically engaging the controls.” I avoided any graphical representations of the sound or its generating mechanisms at the interface. of the instrument’s instrumentality.3). The control surface is partitioned into distinct regions (figure 4. makes itself more than readily apparent. then. and occupies the focal ground in the field of vision. which are distinguished by the points in the audio synthesis system 108 . then. and the cross-coupling of these perceptions with the tactile and visual engagement of the instrument and its input devices. and that it therefore need not accommodate the multiple representational paradigms required of a multiplicity of possible usages. is that the interface is devoid of representational abstractions. Control Surface Unlike the computer-as-it-comes—a general purpose device—Mr.

Mr.to which they are linked. the functional layout of the panel is a hardware concern. It is. 109 .3.3. worth noting the control surface’s basic partitioning scheme in this section. Display & Patch Control Joysticks Variants Mute Buttons Global Power Volume On/Off Channel Section Global Section Figure 4. Although this unavoidably touches on software issues. Feely: Control surface partitioning scheme. I will detail the specific functional behaviors and mapping strategies used to connect the input devices to the audio system in 4. however.

” and “Power On/Off” in figure 4. The Display and Patch Control section is described under Visual Display below. or by synthesis network topologies. and three knobs combined with three buttons.3.” “Mute Buttons. These controllers are mapped to a global audio processing network. The four remaining control surface regions—labelled “Channel Section. Signals from each of the five discrete synthesis channels are passed as inputs to this processing network. These joysticks are considered freely assignable to any and multiple input points in the discrete synthesis channels or the global processing network. and in certain cases to points in the five discrete channels.” “Joysticks.” and “Variants” in figure 4.” “Global Volume. all other buttons will be in their off state. The Channel Section is partitioned into five discrete channels of three knobs and one button each. The Joystick Section is comprised of two x-y joysticks. 110 .” “Global Section.Of the eight distinct regions that comprise the control surface. These buttons are used to switch between pre-stored variants in the synthesis network. The Variants Section is comprised of six backlit buttons. by mapping functions.3—indicate the areas in which activity is focused during performance. one of which springs back to its centre position when not in use. which respectively comprise nine knobs. The Global Section is divided into two subsections. When one of these buttons is toggled on. the functions of the other three sections are self-explanatory. four would ordinarily be utilized only between periods of performative activity: those labelled “Display & Patch Control. there are respectively mapped to five discrete audio synthesis networks in the software system. These variants may differ by synthesis parameter settings.

by employing a static functional structure across different patches—that is. but rather learns through performing. The layout of the control panel is designed to facilitate this learning process. and the underlying software system is designed in such a way that motor memory should be transferable and adaptable across varying audio subsystem implementations. then. in fact they should be optimally adaptable. in itself. properly or sufficiently indicative of its use. The control surface is still. how things work in practice. the user quickly adapts to the relationship between a cluster of controls and clusterings of associated behavioral patterns at the instrument’s output. This is not. reinforces the relationship between specific functional regions and specific functional behaviors to both the visual and tactile senses. The physical layout of the control surface. Secondly. This means that motor patterns do not need to be relearned from scratch from one patch to the next. it would seem that the performer has rather a lot to remember during performance. then the instrument is not.With all these individual input devices and multiple mapping systems. across even radically divergent implementations of the sound generating subsystem. is not required to store a catalogue of controller functions and mappings in conscious memory. Firstly. across varying implementations of the underlying audio synthesis networks—the patterning of the instrument’s behavior remains relatively constant. The performer. The emphasis is placed on motor memory as opposed to the conscious storing of data. from a base set of functional correspondences. as a whole. And if the performer is required to store such data in conscious memory. however. then. by partitioning the control surface into functional regions. sufficiently 111 .

therefore. program exceptions. etc. not only with a view to minimizing the cognitive demands of visual attention. and to the extent that vision is required for the performance task. it would remain beyond grasp. This is something that I tried to avoid in the design of Mr.g. and to monitor data in the case of “breakdowns” (e. Audio Display An important aspect of the “feel” of many conventional acoustic instruments is the haptic feedback to the performer from the instrument’s vibrating body as it radiates sonic energy. but with a view to rendering the interface as free of abstraction as possible. I discussed the cost to the nonvisual senses of the visuocentric approach to interaction as typified by the computer-as-it-comes. Visual Display In chapter 2. memory errors. It proved useful. make any demands on the performer’s attention. Unlike conventional acoustic instruments. It does not. which is used to navigate a patch bank between performances. electronic 112 . to integrate a character display with the control surface. except as a notification mechanism in the case of such a breakdown. or so great that. however.). even after a significant amount of practice. It was my aim that the degree of resistance should be neither so minimal that the interface would become quickly transparent to motor memory and activity.complex and multifaceted as to offer resistance to learning. CPU overload. Feely. The display is not intended to be used during performance. it may be directed to the guidance of motor activities.

Feely. in deciding upon an amplifier/loudspeaker system. By placing the amplifier/loudspeaker on the floor. and the type and number of reflective and absorbtive material in proximity to the loudspeaker. and resulted in the choice of a combined amplifier/loudspeaker system that. as close as is practical to the body of the instrument. through a P. could not practically be integrated with the body of the instrument. electronic instruments are lacking in the haptic vibrational feedback that is characteristic of their acoustic counterparts. the radiation of vibrational energy can be felt through the feet and.A. is the instrument’s body—is as close as is practical to the body of the instrument. to a lesser extent. because of its size and weight. system). by careful positioning of the amplifier/loudspeaker in performance. that the amplifier be powerful enough for the instrument to be used without further amplification (e. Except in the case that the amplifier/loudspeaker system is built into the instrumental body.g. Nonetheless. in the case of the great majority of acoustic instruments. that the loudspeaker should have a wide radiation pattern. This issue was taken into consideration in the design of Mr. it was outweighed by other constraints: 1. but unfortunately. the type of floor surface. This limited the options among available technologies. The perceptual localisation of the origin of the sound is an important indicator of the 113 . it’s possible to go a certain way towards the “feel” of a conventional instrument.instruments require the use of amplifiers and loudspeakers in order to propagate sound in space. The effect varies with the character of the sound. and 2. This speaker placement has one other advantage: the location of the point source of the sound—which. the torso. its frequency and loudness.

then. Nonetheless. These factors contribute to the potential for an encounter with the instrument that is engaging (one of the five criteria of embodied activity from Chapter 1). This means that the performer engages an instrument that has a functional coherence to its material embodiment as well as a tangible physical presence in performance. and encompasses multiple distributed points of interaction. Feely offers resistance to the performer without having paid due attention to software. fellow performers. Whereas the computer-as-it-comes would situate the user’s attention in a world of metaphorical abstraction and would provide no guarantee of 114 . Summary It would be premature to evaluate the ways in which Mr. singular (as opposed to distributed). and sequential (as opposed to parallel) mode of interaction that is idiosyncratic to the computer-as-it-comes. it may be useful to recap on the key aspects of the hardware implementation. both for the performer. then. motocentric rather than visuocentric. and the audience. that the hardware interface to Mr. and for the emergence of an enactive performance practice. and to point to some implications for embodiment.instrument’s phenomenal presence. At the same time. This stands in contrast to the visuocentric. Feely avoids the interface model of the computer-as-it-comes. The interface is. Firstly. it also avoids the associated costs of that model for interaction. the instrument is integrated and instrumental. the instrumental interface affords distributed motor activities without the burden of representational abstractions. representation-hungry. Secondly.

we touch on issues of adaptation and cognition. and timely. encourages the parallel distribution of the activity across distinct sensorimotor modalities (touch and proprioception.e..e. Feely situates the user’s attention directly within the activity.4). Mr. But to get from interaction to realization—i. Mr. As a piece of hardware. and—because of the distributed and multiply parallel nature of the performative mode—offers a reasonable chance that the real-time constraints of musical performance might be met. multimodal. Feely affords embodied modes of interaction. 115 . hearing. specifically. that embodied activity be situated. and the unique dynamical patterning of thought and activity that comes of that resistance. When the focus is shifted from the instantaneous aspects of embodied activity to embodiment as an emergent phenomenon. to the emergence of an enactive performance practice—the instrument will be required to offer resistance to the performer through the medium of sound. This brings the discussion around to the implementation of the instrument’s sonic behavior in software. These factors again correspond to certain of the five criteria of embodiment.. with the resistance that it offers to the performer. i.meeting timing constraints (see 2. vision). Such issues are tied in with the instrument’s behavior.

however.audiosynth. it is mature and offers a rich set of built-in features.com.4). it is object-oriented. As the main focus of my work has been directed at the creation of a system that would allow for dynamical behaviors. it is easily extensible with user-defined modules.4.2 The language was chosen for three main reasons: 1. 116 . it will be useful to describe the base architecture on which the framework is built. 2 http://www. where those nodes represent instances of user-defined synthesis and processing functions. 2. primitives. SuperCollider Server Architecture The SuperCollider audio synthesis engine passes signals between nodes on a server. Feely: Software Overview Mr. A sample signal flow diagram would look familiar to anybody who has worked with modular synthesis systems (figure 4. much of the task of programming has involved the incremental development of a framework—an integrated library of extensions to the language—that augments the base audio synthesis architecture with modules that allow for complex dynamical mappings between system entities. First. and 3. The implementational possibilities of these extensions to the language will comprise the main focus of this and the next section.3 Mr. and plug-ins. Feely’s software system is written in the SuperCollider programming language.

Writing values to a node’s parameter slots by 1. A node on the synthesis server may contain parameter slots. or by mapping the parameter slot to the output of a bus (figure 4. SuperCollider synthesis server: Signal flow. sending a message.5). a node that represents an oscillator function may contain slots for frequency. For example. 117 .4.NODES SIGNALS SOUND Figure 4. mapping the slot to the output of a bus. The values of a parameter slot may be set by sending messages to the node to which the slot belongs. and 2.5. phase and amplitude parameters. SLOTS MESSAGE BUS Figure 4.

6. BUS 1 1 2 BUS 2 Figure 4. for example. to tap an output signal from any node in the synthesis network and route it to a bus. Bus 1 taps an output signal from a node in the first channel and routes it to the audio input of a node in the second channel. It’s possible. Bus 2 taps an output signal from a node in the second channel and maps it to a parameter slot of a node in the first channel.6). SuperCollider’s bussing architecture allows for the flexible routing of signals within the synthesis network. Signal routing between parallel synthesis networks using busses.A bus is a virtual placeholder for a signal. This flexibility is exploited and extended in the 118 . from which the signal could be rerouted as an audio signal input to any other node. or mapped to a parameter slot belonging to any other node (figure 4.

any signal within the audio synthesis network may be routed to a bus.extensions to the language that form the basis of Mr. As I noted in the previous section. 119 . Feely is primarily concerned with providing a flexible and intuitive mechanism for routing signals between components of the audio synthesis network. The behavior of the instrument as a whole is in large part determined by these functions and their various mappings and routings within the audio synthesis network. The objects that perform these transformations comprise the mapping layer. the functional transformation of the signal takes place between the bus and the signal’s destination. The mapping framework consists of a hierarchical library of such functions encapsulated within discrete software objects. Mapping Framework The mapping framework that I have developed for Mr. A functional mapping can be taken to mean the transfer function from the output of one component to the input of another. The mapping layer allows for the flexibility to route the signal at a single bus to multiple destinations with multiple functional mappings (figure 4.7). Feely’s mapping framework. and for defining functional mappings between them. a function that is applied to the signal such that the signal’s characteristics are transformed between output at the source component and input at the receiver component. In Mr. That is. This is an example of a “one-to-many (Wanderley 2001)” mapping model. Feely’s mapping framework. and rerouted from that bus to any other point in the network.

and Paradis 2003)” of bus signals. These signals are routed to three different parameter slots. effecting a one-to-many mapping. or “many-to-one (Wanderley 2001)” mappings (figure 4.8. Each signal is subject to a functional transformation (those transformations denoted here as x. Wanderley. BUS 1 x BUS 2 y Figure 4. or 120 .7 The signal at a bus is split into three signals. The transformed signals are summed. The signals at two busses are subject to functional transformations (x and y). The software objects that perform these transformations comprise the mapping layer. The mapping framework also allows for the “cross-coupling (Hunt.8).Mapping Layer x BUS y z Figure 4. y and z) between the bus and their respective parameter slot destinations.

The output of function y is mapped to a parameter slot in an audio synthesis network component. Additionally. the mapping framework allows for what I have termed “functionparameter” mappings. where the output of one functional mapping may be mapped into a parameter slot in another (figure 4. For example. The output of the dependent function y is then mapped to a parameter slot in an audio synthesis network component. function x in figure 4.“cross-coupled. BUS 1 x BUS 2 y Figure 4. where that argument is set at a parameter slot.” resulting in a mapping from multiple signal sources to a single parameter slot. the signal at BUS 2 is multiplied by the scaled signal at BUS 1.9).10]. The signals at two busses are subject to functional transformations (x and y). This is a 121 . The output of function x is mapped into a parameter slot in function y.9. Function y might multiply the output value of the signal at BUS 2 by the value of an argument.9 might scale the output of the signal at BUS 1 into the range [1. When the output of x is mapped into the parameter slot that corresponds to the multiplicand argument of y.

While all busses in the audio synthesis system are instances of a single class of bus. All busses that are placeholders for signals routed from audio signals have global scope.simple example. are accorded either local or global scope. and can be routed to any point in the synthesis network. Feely’s hardware controls. they are nonetheless classified as having either local or global scope. Feely’s hardware controls are connected to the audio synthesis network through busses (figure 4. and therefore have identical implementations. x ADC BUS y z Figure 4. the scope of a bus corresponds to the function of the input device as defined by the partitioning of Mr. Feely’s control surface into functional regions. The signal at the bus may be treated as though it were any other signal. Mr. 122 .10. depending on the particular input device to which they are connected. Analog signals are read by an analog-to-digital converter (ADC) and written to a bus in the audio synthesis network. but it makes clear the kinds of complex interdependencies between system components that “function-parameter” mappings allow. Busses that are placeholders for signal arriving from Mr.10). however. In this scheme. The map from hardware to software.

1 L1. Local and global scope of busses.e.2 L1. for example. Their scope is local. i.3 2 L2..1-3 are connected to Channel Section controllers on Mr.3 GLOBAL G1 G2 Figure 4. The output of these audio synthesis channels is summed and sent to a global processing network. Feely’s control panel.2 L2.1-3 and L2.11. 123 . they may only be routed to the corresponding audio synthesis network channels.11). are connected to busses that have local scope within each of the five discrete audio synthesis network channels.1 L1.Channel Section controllers. Busses L1. while Global Section controllers are connected to busses that have global scope (figure 4.1 L2. 1 and 2.

e. The only difference. Feely’s control panel.Global busses G1 and G2 are connected to Global Section controllers on Mr. then. Consider a system. and therefore represent the points at which human action and internal mechanism coincide. Busses have a special status in the mapping framework. they may be routed to the global processing network.11 and that of a linear summing mixer is that the bussing architecture in the figure shows the possibility of a flexible routing of controls signals to individual parameter slots in the various mixer channels. i.. the simple mapping schemes I have illustrated have not demonstrated models of dynamical behavior. between the mapping scheme of figure 4. They are placeholders for signals that originate both outside and inside the audio synthesis network. The scope of these busses is global. appear to be relatively flat. is encapsulated in the structure and behavior of a single integrated signal flow network. nonetheless. The dynamical behavior of the system as a whole would. To this point. It was a deliberate design choice to accord busses this dual role. however. That is to say. signals are treated as equivalent whether their origins are external or internal to the system. where the outputs from 124 . and this equivalency of signals implies that all signal flow networks are formed at the same level of structure. The “push-and-pull” of dynamical forces that is key to the instrument’s resistance. for example. or to any of the discrete audio synthesis channels. as a transparency to the source of signals within the system effectively blurs the implementational boundary between human and instrumental behaviors.

These signals are transformed by functions. and vice versa. x and y.12). and the continuous outputs of those functions are routed to parameter slots in the discrete channels.two discrete audio synthesis networks are routed to global busses. Discrete audio synthesis networks are coupled to form an interacting composite network.12. 125 . and then back to parameter slots within the discrete networks (figure 4. Global busses A1 and A2 serve as placeholders for the output signals of channels 1 and 2 . after underdoing functional transformation. The output of channel 1. is used to regulate the internal behavior of channel 2. GLOBAL A1 A2 1 2 x y Figure 4.

i.e. rather than being summed (as in figure 4. the composite network (comprised of the two interacting subnetworks) could be said to be autonomous. They might.e. scale it to an effective range and map the resulting signal to the slot. the output of channel 1 is routed back to a parameter slot in channel 2. This presents an interesting design 126 .11). and so on.. as it operates. they now form coupled nonautonomous systems. map the audio signal unaltered into the parameter slot. From the perspective of a human observer. could be used to regulate one another’s behavior. Summary From the perspective of either of the discrete networks in figure 4. where they had previously formed uncoupled autonomous systems. indicated in figure 4.In this example. These functions might encapsulate any number of behaviors.12 as x and y. and vice versa. internal behavior is nonautonomous. for example. Any of these choices would create the possibility for complex behavioral dependencies between the two synthesis networks. scale the audio signal to an effective range. The way in which the bussed signals act as regulatory mechanisms in the respective synthesis networks is defined by the mapping functions. without human intervention. and at the same time. behavioral patterns are determined in part by signals that originate outside the network. track the signal’s frequency or amplitude characteristics. the possibility for nonlinear dynamical behaviors in the composite (coupled) system. The output signals from the two channels.12. The structure of the network—i. and exhibits behavior. then.. however. its topology—creates a coupling between the two discrete audio synthesis networks.

such that when there is a “push-and-pull” of physical forces at the hardware layer. In summary. structured dynamics. rather than exhibiting autonomous dynamical behavior. embodies the potential for dynamical behavior when coupled to a human performer. but at the same time.e. 127 . the kind of system that is more compelling with a view to enactive performance practice would be one that. I’ll take up this issue by outlining two specific usage examples.problem: we want the instrument to have rich. And these interdependencies are key to the “push-and-pull” dynamics that define the instrument’s kinds of resistance. call for calibration of the system—a “tuning” of the system’s dynamical responsiveness—when human action enters the equation. This does not rule out the kind of model encapsulated in figure 4. we want those dynamics to emerge in the coupling of the instrument to a human performer. the instrument responds and resists with proportionately rich and varied sonic behavior. the mapping framework allows for the creation of complex interdependencies between system components. In fact. It does.. this model forms the basis of the first usage example I will outline in the next section. i. So.12. then. But the question remains as to how one might go about calibrating the system in such a way that it requires human action. although we could engineer a system that exhibits dynamical behavior without human involvement. however.

to different modes of embodied activity. the first model is in an early stage of development. while the second is relatively mature.12.13 departs from that of figure 4.13 illustrates an extension of the interacting composite network of figure 4.4 Mr. then. Feely: Usage Examples Overview In this section I outline two examples of Mr. The two usage examples are interesting. At the present writing. Feely in use. and vice versa. the output of channel 1 is mapped via a global bus to a parameter slot in channel 2. As in figure 4. through the addition of two local busses. The example in figure 4. because their differences illustrate the ways in which diverse implementations might highlight distinct facets of a single basic concern: enactive performance practice. because they point to different kinds of resistance. Or. I have chosen these specific examples because of their differences. L1. more specifically. however. Example 1: Pushing the envelope Figure 4. 128 .4.12. and to different realizational potentialities.1 and L2. in such a way that the two discrete audio synthesis networks regulate one another’s behavior in a manner determined by the output of the functions x and y.1.12.

1 and L2. and the output of function b serves as a continuous input to function y. Functional covariance. to function x.1 are placeholders for signals from Mr. This is an instance of “functionparameter” mapping.1 and L2.. or argument.e. Rather than being mapped to parameter slots in the nodes that comprise the synthesis network. these busses are mapped to parameter slots of mapping functions that are internal to the system.GLOBAL 1 L1. they 129 . The local busses L1. These signals are mapped to parameter slots of mapping functions internal to the composite audio synthesis network.1 A1 A2 a x b y Figure 4.1 2 L2. where the output of function a serves as a continuous input. i.1 provide the effective point of access to the system for human action. Local busses L1.13. Feely’s Channel Section.

then. This network of mappings forms the basis of a performance scenario I’ve developed for Mr. the functions x and y (figure 4. Feely’s Channel Section. The functional mappings from the local busses L1. The two busses per channel that are not shown in figure 4. and is covariant with human action. is largely determined by the functional mapping from the local busses to the parameter nodes of the global busses. corresponding to the five channels of three knobs that comprise Mr. which utilizes five discrete audio synthesis networks and assigns three local busses to each network. These mappings vary across different implementations of the basic system. Feely that goes under the working title “pushing the envelope.13) represent composite functions: amplitude followers (on the signals at A2 and A1 respectively) modulated by the output of a logistic mapping function: xn+1 = µxn(1 . In the “pushing the envelope” model.1 and L2. It’s their role that I will focus on here.13 are mapped to various parameter nodes in the respective discrete audio synthesis networks.xn) 130 .13—are key to the dynamical responsiveness of this particular network.13 represent just a partial view of the entire system. The way in which the output signals of the coupled channels regulate one another’s behavior. but in all instances map into continuous ranges as suitable to the synthesis parameter in question.1—the busses that are shown in figure 4.represent “function-parameter” mappings.” The mappings illustrated in figure 4.

effecting a coupling between the two channels. the corresponding knobs in Mr. then. and is entirely unstable when µ is greater than 3. The mapping functions x and y.87 (assuming values of x in the range [-1. This creates for a potentially very interesting mapping. which results in the system as a whole having response 131 .The outputs of x and y are connected as level controls at the output stage of channels 1 and 2 respectively. where the dynamical contour of the modulated signals derived from A2 and A1 may be more or less chaotic or “flat” depending on the assignment of a constant value to µ. that the more “active” the activity. already embody the potential for complex dynamical behavior. The logistic mapping function is interesting because the trajectory of its orbit varies with different values of the variable µ.2 respectively. The parameter slots in the mapping functions x and y (figure 4. The functions a and b in figure 4. essentially.13 represent the slope (rate of change) of the signals at busses L1. It represents a simple nonlinear system. The effective ranges of a and b are scaled to a dynamically rich range in µ (between 2. a range that encompasses the discontinuous transition from flat to chaotic dynamics through successive period doublings).9 and 3.e. the response of which becomes increasingly chaotic when the value of µ is greater than 3. This means.13) represent the variable µ in the logistic mapping function. the greater the amplitude of the resulting signal. Feely’s Channel Section— that are connected to the bus. The amplitude of this function’s output will vary proportionately with the rate of performer activity at the hardware controls—i. 1]).87. As the outputs of a and b are effectively plugged into µ. the dynamical contour of the outputs of x and y are directly proportional to the rate of performer activity.1 and L1.

Thirdly. For example.14. the system doesn’t just require the performer. To that extent. In practice. the response of the system is dynamically flat.characteristics that vary dynamically with the “push-and-pull” of human motor actions. Left-right knob manipulation with respect to time.e. the “pushing the envelope” model has certain interesting implications for performance.14) will result in a proportionate increase in the “degree of chaos” in the outputs of functions x and y. because of the way the system is calibrated—specifically the “tuning” of the logistic map variable µ in relation to the rate of change of motor activity—it requires a performer. the system requires considerable physical effort on the part of the performer to elicit dynamically rich responses from the software system. i. Secondly. TIME Figure 4. without performer action. Firstly.. it requires a considerable investment of performative energy. the behavior of the system as a whole is far from 132 . an increase in the rate of left-right knob “twiddling” with respect to time (figure 4.

although the performer may place the focus of activity at any one moment within a specific channel—and the human anatomical constraint of two-handedness tends to determine this kind of pattern in performance—the effects of that activity will nonetheless be felt throughout the composite network comprised of all five channels. certain recurrent patterns of motor activity have begun to emerge. there are parallels in the dynamics of the “pushing the envelope” network to the dynamics of many conventional acoustic instruments. Example 2: Surfing the fractal wave (at the end of history) In certain respects. Nonetheless. That is to say. I’ve found that it’s not possible to get an overall conceptual grasp on its range of behavior. as encapsulated in the functional mappings from outputs in one channel to parameter nodes in another. 133 . and these patterns are yielding varieties of sonic responsiveness that. and particularly on the way that dynamical changes propagate through the composite network. also continue to yield new and often surprising dynamical contours. The complexity of the system’s dynamical responsiveness is effectively guaranteed by the interdependencies of the five discrete audio synthesis networks.transparent at first use. In my experience thus far with this system. The key implication of these interdependencies is that performative actions directed toward a single channel of controls will have consequences beyond the scope of the discrete audio synthesis network to which those controls are connected. at the same time that they continue to be more closely aligned to certain expectations. and in fact demands significant experimentation before certain consistent patterns and responses begin to reveal themselves.

is more concerned with giving dynamical shape and contour to these motions. a particular way in which the model requires the performer: it requires a “pushing”—a directed expenditure of kinetic energy—to actualize the dynamic potential that is immanent to the network. rather than the directed transmission of energy flows that originate in the body. the instrument’s response is “flat. has very little to do with McKenna's original intention. then. 134 . dominant and non-dominant 3 The name is borrowed from the title of a 1997 Terence McKenna lecture (http://www.html). things are already in motion in the instrumental mechanism. The mode of performance.org/LOGOS/tm970423. an “absorbed coping” that is about the timely navigation of energy flows in the environment.” And when human energy is transmitted to the system.e. There is. My appropriation. in the “surfing the fractal wave” model. Patterns of motor activity in “surfing the fractal wave” are designed around the asymmetry of “handedness” (Guiard 1987).When there is no input of human energy.abrupt. then. for example. Where performance with conventional acoustic instruments ordinarily requires a “pushing” of kinetic energy into the instrumental mechanism in order to set things in motion. however. Hence the distinction between “surfing” and “pushing” analogies. i. the system’s dynamical responsiveness is proportionate to the amplitude of that energy. The model I outline in this section—“surfing the fractal wave (at the end of history)”3—embodies an altogether different kind of resistance and affords an altogether different variety of motor activity..

the left hand grips the paper. For example. Buxton. in hammering a nail. Figure 4. a tendency that is self-reinforcing across a wide range of activities and over repeated performances. 135 . The sequence of motion is left then right. Kabbash. and Sellen 1994:418) Each of these examples could be viewed as aspects of a single embodied tendency.hands are afforded independent sub-tasks. The granularity of action of the left hand is coarser than that of the right. The left hand sets the frame of reference for action of the right. For example.15 represents a partial view of the “surfing the fractal wave” network model. 3. The “surfing the fractal wave” model heads in this direction. advocate the design of humancomputer interfaces that exploit the habitual ways in which humans tend to use their hands in skillful activity. (Kabbash. For example the left hand brings the painter’s palette in and out of range. then the right starts to write with the pen. Buxton and Sellen describe three characteristic ways in which the two hands are asymmetrically dependent in select everyday tasks: 1. but they cooperate in the accomplishment of the larger task that those sub-tasks comprise. 2. Kabbash et al. while the right hand holds the brush and does the fine strokes onto the canvas. the left hand holds the nail while the right does the hammering.

The x and y outputs of a joystick with global scope (JSX. Joystick manipulations are always performed by the left hand.3 Audio Network 2 C2. mapping functions and audio synthesis network schemata have been omitted for clarity.3 Audio Network Figure 4. Some feedback networks.2 C1. JSY) are mapped to parameter slots of a chaotic sequencer function (SEQ). Local busses (C1. The sequencer sends a stream of timed triggers to parameters in each of five discrete audio synthesis networks (for clarity.1-3 and C2. “Surfing the fractal wave” network model.2 C2. only two are shown). These controls “filter” the results of the mapping from the sequencer stream to each of the discrete audio synthesis networks.15.1-3) read signals from the knobs in Mr.1 C1.1 C2. Feely’s Channel Section. Knob manipulations are in most instances performed by the right hand. 136 .LH GLOBAL JSX a SEQ JSY b RH 1 C1.

respectively) into the output of a chaotic sequencer (SEQ). 4 The "chaotic" sequencer function is not technically chaotic (in mathematical terms). Sequencer pulse stream when the joystick is in centre (“resting”) position. the pads of the left hand fingers tend to “ride” the joystick. at a medium tempo. the sequencer clock outputs a steady stream of pulses.16). with a regular and stable amplitude pattern (figure 4. Time Figure 4. where certain gestural patterns emerge in response to the dynamical properties of the “function-parameter” mappings of the global busses JSX and JSY (placeholders for continuous signals from the x and y axes of the joystick.4 The sequencer is calibrated in such a way that its output is more or less stable when the values of the mapping functions a and b are close to the centre of their effective ranges.The diagram divides the network space into left hand and right hand regions. The designation can be taken to be qualitative. 137 . In practice this means that when the joystick is in its centre position (the resting position for a “spring-back” style joystick). In performance.16.

An increase in the signal at JSX.17. the probability that successive values read from an internal finite state machine are mapped to the amplitude of the pulse stream. however. this single variable determines two aspects of the sequencer’s behavior: 1. that deviations in the x and y axes of the joystick result in more complex behaviors in the pulse stream. In short.17). Time R JSX L SEQ Figure 4. Sequencer pulse stream when there is a left-to-right movement across the joystick’s x axis. The parameter slot to which the mapping function b is connected represents a chaotic variable in the sequencer function. The parameter slot to which a is mapped represents a multiplication argument for the sequencer’s clock frequency and base amplitude.” and 2. then—corresponding to a left-to-right movement across the joystick’s x axis—results in an increase in the pulse stream’s frequency and amplitude (figure 4.The mapping functions a and b determine. An increase in the value of both of these parameters (corresponding to a bottom-to138 . the degree of pulse “nestedness.

18.top movement in the joystick’s y axis) results in an increase in the system’s entropy. where pulse “nestedness” implies a greater likelihood of frequency multiplication from one pulse to the next (and therefore a greater likelihood of extra pulses being “nested” into the pulse stream).17. The increase in the signal at JSY results in a greater 139 . Time R JSX L T JSY B SEQ Figure 4. Sequencer pulse stream when there is a left-to-right movement across the joystick’s x axis.18 adds a bottom-to-top movement in the joystick’s y axis to the left-to-right movement in the x axis illustrated in figure 4. Figure 4. and a bottom-to-top movement across the y axis. and where the irregularly patterned output of the internal finite state machine incrementally encroaches on the otherwise linear behavior of the amplitude mapping in the mapping function a (corresponding to the left-to-right movement across the joystick’s x axis). The output of the pulse stream shows the trajectory towards a higher “degree of chaos” over time.

the performer guides the left-hand through singular trajectories across a two-dimensional space. there are strong symmetries between their behaviors. Each of the five synthesis networks implements a resonator function. The output of the chaotic sequencer is mapped to parameters in each of the five discrete audio synthesis networks.likelihood of “nestedness” in the pulse stream. where the pulses that are mapped into each of network serve as excitors.18 would suggest.” And while it’s useful to break the activity down into left and right hand sub-tasks. These resonators embody different resonance models (with different dynamical responses). And it’s in these motions that a “feel” develops for the sequencer’s stable and chaotic regions. While each of these networks encapsulates different dynamical responses. The perceptual guiding of left-hand actions in “surfing the fractal wave” is more integrated than figure 4. and between the kinds of responses that right hand actions might elicit from each of the networks. Rather. but there are certain 140 . While the joystick operates across two degrees of freedom—the x and y axes—the performer does not break the activity down into separate movements in two dimensions (as figure 4.18 would indicate). and a greater likelihood of irregularities in amplitude patterns. there can be no complete picture without considering how these sub-tasks coordinate and cooperate. But these motor patterns constitute only one part of the coordinated left hand/right hand movements that amount to “surfing the fractal wave. the transitions between then. and for the shift from greater-to-lesser and lesser-to-greater degrees of event density with respect to time.

The symmetry holds at the level of hardware. where each of those percepts corresponds to the same bus number assignment in each channel. Percepts (“Gate.3 Audio Network C2.perceptual constants from one network to the next.” “Resonance”) are assigned to corresponding busses across each channel.” “Width.2 C2. High level “percepts” are symmetrical across each of the five channels. “Width” corresponds to busses C1-5. This has the 141 .5 Figure 4. where rows of knobs in Mr.2 C1.2. Figure 4. That is. Feely’s Channel Section correspond to rows of busses in the diagram.4.1 C1.1.3. 1 Pulse Stream GATE WIDTH RESONANCE 2 C1. Perceptual symmetries in the functional mapping from busses to the audio networks across distinct channels.1 C2. “Gate” corresponds to busses C1-5. and “Resonance” corresponds to busses C1-5.19.3 Audio Network 3.19 shows the mapping from local busses to two of the five discrete audio synthesis channels.

It is tied in specifically to parameter nodes in the resonator that change the resonator’s dynamical responsiveness. a tighter “elasticity” (implemented as a shorter impulse response in the delay lines in the resonator’s filterbank) will result in shorter output events. but its effect is symmetrical: turning the corresponding knob from left to right has the effect of “loosening the elasticity” of each resonator. all pulses are passed when the gate’s value is one. The “Gate” mechanism is functionally identical across all five channels: turning the corresponding knob from left to right has the effect of allowing a greater number of pulses to pass through a gated input to each resonator.5.e. i. the resonant frequencies. The “Resonance” mechanism is the most varied in terms of implementation across the five channels. where no pulses are passed to the resonator system when the gate’s value is zero. these “percepts” require a symmetry in terms of the effect of functional mappings into each of the discrete audio synthesis networks if their particular perceptual qualities are to be discerned and distinguished. Feely’s Control Section.e. then. Of course.. It acts. and the ways in which the filters that 142 . whereas these events will take on longer durations (correlating to the perception of having a greater temporal width) as the resonator’s “elasticity” is slackened. as an event filter on the pulse stream. and each pulse in the stream has a 0.effect of similar classes of response being elicited from corresponding knobs in each of the five channels of Mr. their bandwidths. i.5 probability of passing when the gate’s value is 0. The implementation of the “Width” mechanism varies slightly from one channel to the next.

the respective actions form a continuous interplay of complementary motions—as opposed to a sequence of isolated events—and the transference from left-handed to right-handed motions takes place at a much finer granularity of temporal scale. left hand movements give contour to the dynamical unfolding of the pulse stream. 2. In the “surfing the fractal wave” model. In the breakdown of right hand and left hand tasks in “surfing the fractal wave. It’s worth addressing each point in turn: 1.” there is a correspondence to each of the three characteristic behaviors of bimanual asymmetric action that Kabbash et al.comprise the resonator’s internal filterbank interact.’s corresponding example (“the left hand grips the paper. Across all five channels. and a modifier of the dynamical properties of the events that emerge from pulses hitting the resonator functions. The left hand sets the frame of reference for action of the right. as it unfolds. This follows from the first point: the right hand modifies the event stream only after the left hand has given the stream its dynamical contour. then the right starts to write with the pen”). self-oscillation and nonlinear behavior. But unlike Kabbash et al. The pulse stream. The sequence of motion is left then right. is the frame of reference for the “picking” and “shaping” of discrete events that characterizes right hand actions. turning the “Resonance” knob from left to right tends to shift the dynamical response of the resonator increasingly towards distortion. point out. 143 . while the right hand acts as an event filter on the stream.

It’s interesting to note that in the act of playing. turning. actions that involve a constant “hopping” between the fifteen knobs that comprise the Channel Section.3. That the dominant hand should be at the centre of attention in the midst of bimanual action is not a point that Kabbash et al. These joystick manipulations do not require the hand to reposition itself across discrete points on the control surface. or other finger motions that are performed at a fine granularity of scale. while the right hand holds the brush and does the fine strokes onto the canvas. and the engineering of the interface around habitual 144 . left hand activities do not seem to require any conscious attention. and they do not require grasping. such as Kabbash et al. and finely detailed turnings and twiddlings of those knobs. discuss. Feely’s Channel Section. but it seems that my experience of this phenomenon with “surfing the fractal wave” might also apply to other activities. In “surfing the fractal wave” the left hand is designated to control the joystick. The granularity of action of the left hand is coarser than that of the right. while the right hand activities demand on-going and focused attention. leaving the little finger to move the joystick through the two dimensional plane while the thumb and pointer finger turn the knobs. But even this action is of a coarser granularity than the actions designated to the right hand.” The two key aspects to the model of activity in “surfing the fractal wave” are the “surfing” aspect. I’ve found that in playing with the model. my left hand will often span the distance from the joystick to the top row of knobs in Mr.’s corresponding example: “the left hand brings the painter’s palette in and out of range.

and this in turn has led to a higher level of detail and nuance in both the shaping of individual sounds at the event level. and in the elaboration of larger scale events. in which events are initiated when the performer transmits kinetic energy to the instrumental mechanism. such as phrases and gestures. but in the coordination of the hands with respect to timing constraints. motor and cognitive competencies that is definitive of enaction. It’s been interesting to note that. And these events can go by very fast. Summary The conventional metaphors of computer science tend to regard computation as an inherently sequential process. This seems to me indicative of the coevolution of sensory. In contrast to the “pushing the envelope” model. the “surfing the fractal wave” model is built around a persistent stream of events. That is. emerge not only in the interdependencies between the two hands. then. and where the behavior of those components. Motor patterns. where the desired outcome of the function is known in advance of its execution. and 145 . and as my hands have become both better coordinated and more individually dexterous. the entangling of these aspects in the midst of performance—that give the model its idiosyncratic kind of resistance. where activity takes place across a network of interacting components. more specifically.” It’s these aspects—or. This is at odds with the enactive model of interaction. as a function from input to output comprised of a series of discrete and causally related steps. over the period of time that I’ve worked with this model. I’ve had a better capacity to deal with the system’s unfolding in a timely manner.embodied patterns of “handedness.

therefore of the network as a whole. then. while the software system provides the required technical infrastructure. or so ungraspable that they forever remain beyond motor and cognitive capability. computation would be viewed as a process in which “the pieces of the model are persistent entities coupled together by their ongoing interactive behavior (Stein 1999:483).. is adaptive and emergent with respect to the ongoing push-and-pull of interactional dynamics. a given property of the system. and to that extent it also allows for a structural coupling of performer and instrument.” This model of “computation-as-interaction” underlies the design of Mr. the focus of my work is directed more towards the development of instrumental behaviors that are indigenous to computing media. realization and enaction—will be those that are neither so transparent to human action that they demand little thought or effort. Structural coupling is not. however. Rather than falling back on the “computation-as-calculation” model. i. The system allows for human action to be folded into the dynamical processes of interacting network components. in that they embody networks of dynamical 146 . the kinds of resistance that the instrument affords to the human remains a matter of how the infrastructure is utilized. a matter of design. The examples I’ve outlined in this section point. An enactive digital musical instrument. however. Feely’s software system.e. I suggested in chapter 2 that while there is much to be learned from the physical modeling of conventional acoustic instruments. And the “right” kinds of resistances—at least with a view to structural coupling. will depend on a fundamentally different view of computation to that of conventional computer science. to a kind of physical model.

between that which is familiar and that which is other to every day phenomenal experience. If the balance between these two poles is apposite.. then. Rather. I’ve found that the “right” kinds of resistances. or on differential equations that describe well known physical systems.e. design choices as to “kinds of resistance”—i. the models are not based on data from real world measurements. this means that the simulated physics of resistance will be—in some way or other—functionally related to physical descriptions of real world behavior.dependencies in which human action is resisted by forces that are immanent to the software network. i. continue to be those that are resonant with phenomenal experience and past practices of embodiment. the focus of development is shifted to the mapping framework. and new ways of encountering the instrument. classes of behavior—are effectively decoupled from audio synthesis implementations.. then the kinds of resistance that the systems afford will be sufficiently rich in dynamical potential that. The design of these systems. So. leaving the designer free to experiment with any manner of sound-producing and processing components. they are evolved interactively through experimentation with various mapping and calibration schemes. But in contrast to physical models of conventional instruments. however. over a sustained period of time. 147 . the virtual physics of these systems is speculative. Essentially. the performer will continue to realize new practices. I’m suggesting that it’s through this shift that we see the potential arise for what I have called an “indigenous” computer music. while the components of the audio synthesis network certainly continue to play a critical role in the instrument’s behavior.e. takes a middle course between normative and speculative modes of interactivity. In the approach I’ve taken.

and that there are a great many implementational possibilities yet to be uncovered. these “uncoverings” will necessarily require the development of patterns. In my work with Mr. Feely. It also seems that at a certain point. Rather than persistently hopping back and forth between philosophical and technical discourses. would lie with the way in which models might be generated from a consistent but open-ended application of principles that emerge from the interaction between philosophical and technical problematics. it seems I’m still just scratching at the surface of these matters. this will likely be a matter of evolving a body of general principles that might be employed such that design knowledge can be added to incrementally. this may appear to contradict my observation at the beginning of this chapter that the task of arriving at a universal template for the design of enactive instruments may be ultimately impracticable.5 Prospects The two usage examples I’ve outlined in this chapter demonstrate just a small number of possible approaches to engineering the kinds of resistance that digital musical instruments might store in potentia. At first glance.4. that are of a higher order than those I’ve outlined to this point. I can’t say for certain how one would go about putting 148 . At this point in my work. But the issue I’m raising here is more directly concerned with arriving at general principles that operate at a higher level of abstraction than purely implementational concerns. The concern. rather. This would be a kind of meta-design. For design. as both designer and performer. in both design and performance. there would exist an evolving metric for balancing the constraints of one against the other in an integrated framework.

the two usage examples I’ve outlined in this chapter embody very different kinds of resistance. The development of higher order patterns in performance is also a matter of balancing opposing constraints. This kind of multitasking is part and parcel of expert musicianship. there is a higher order of multitasking that could potentially encompass both models simultaneously. it would seem that they are in fact so different in playing technique as to be incompatible. see Alexander ([1964] 1997). 149 .5 and it seems to me a potentially very productive avenue of investigation. In considering the merging of the two models into a single integrated model. But problems such as these are not without precedent in the history of design. Again. though. how these models might be interleaved in the context of the same performance. In designing for multitasking. then. the issue comes back to design. it may prove useful to have in store some metric of actional distance between the kinds of 5 For example. At the same time that this may eventually lead to more complex and diverse sonic utterances. And while the two usage examples I outlined in the previous section might involve a certain degree of multitasking in and of themselves. and therefore afford very different varieties of human action. it may also lead to a heightened sense of flow—of performative embodiment. As I’ve been careful to make clear. Multitasking must necessarily involve some degree of compatibility between the actional patterns that comprise the sub-tasks.such a framework together. It’s interesting to consider.

It's also interesting to note that. such approaches are not without precedent in design. the more I play with the “surfing the fractal wave” model. at least to this point. Johnson and Johnson (2004). and this element is accounted for in the contingencies of environmental dynamics. It’s been interesting for me to note that. the more I’m able to isolate certain quirks and glitches in the system. see Wild. then. The glitch. There is a stochastic element in enactive process. the "pushing the envelope" 7 model has yielded no such interesting anomalies. 150 . not just because they can be assimilated into the accumulating motor and sonic vocabulary.7 These kinds of discoveries constitute an important aspect of the learning process.6 With or without these higher order design methods. The balancing of these constraints may prove to be difficult. but because in certain cases they can lead to entirely new avenues of investigation—avenues that would have remained closed had the system been insulated from random environmental inputs in the first instance. But again. the products of design will invariably afford opportunities for action that were at no point factored into the design process. This has certainly been the case with conventional acoustic instruments—and is perhaps definitive of so-called “extended” techniques—and there’s no reason to assume that the situation should be any different for digital musical instruments. Its appearance or suppression in performance becomes a 6 For example. is simply folded into the enactive model of interaction.motor activities that different models afford.

Either choice will lead to the appropriate refinement of actional dispositions. 151 .matter for human intentionality.

or a development of form. — Barbara McClintock 152 . Mūlamadhyamakakārikā XVIII:10 The important thing is to understand life.5 Groundlessness Whatever comes into being dependent on another Is not identical to that thing. Therefore it is neither nonexistent in time nor permanent. Spinoza: Practical Philosophy The main thing is that you forget yourself. not as a form. but as a complex relation between differential velocities. between deceleration and acceleration of particles. — Nagarjuna. each living individuality. — Gilles Deleuze. Nor is it different from it.

” This is the non-self that appears in the experience of flow—in an unselfconscious. These are. and perception is geared towards abstract contemplation of the objectness of things in the world. but with relations. the unavoidable products of a subject/object syntax. a process that is not concerned with subjects and objects. linkages. Thompson.. and Rosch 1991:116). active and embodied participation in the dynamical unfolding of real time and space—and it’s the same non-self that vanishes the moment that attention is turned inward. a self with “no permanent substance.” that enactive theory necessarily implies a “groundless” or “selfless” self—i. I’ve sought to describe the inherent circularity of the continuous interactional unfolding that is definitive of enactive process. of course. One of the more radical outcomes of Varela. 153 .The structure of our language typically leads us to characterizations of interaction that focus on one side or the other of the interactional loop. Rosch and Thompson’s outline of an enactive cognitive science is the model of subjectivity that necessarily follows from enactive process.e. and the dynamic momentum of the emergent system that arises in the relations and linkages between heterogeneous elements. and my writing in this essay has not been immune to the lopsided characterizations of interaction that such products embody. But despite the inevitable linguistic constraints.” and so on. “Humans use technologies. heterogeneity. It’s precisely because enactive process concerns “the processual transformation of the past into the future through the intermediary of transitional forms that in themselves have no permanent substance (Varela.” a “subjectless subjectivity (Deleuze and Guattari 1987).” “technologies determine humans.

i.e. a conclusion. While the statement is obviously true. is directed towards designing an encounter... computers have a significant potential. it’s directed towards designing something-in-order-to-not-besome-thing. The concern for design. It would be easy enough to arrive at the conclusion that.In this essay. in designing a digital musical instrument. An enactive approach to digital musical instrument design would necessarily account for the realizational potential of the instrument. At various points throughout the essay. 154 . and which at the same time would serve as the measure of the instrument’s resistance. I think. I’ve invoked Heidegger’s use of the term “equipment. Or. we are designing something-in-order-to-perform-music. In this respect. That is. it affords a particular utility. If an implementation might afford the potential to undermine essentialist ways of being—i. I have not dealt with the epistemological or ontological implications of an enactive approach to design in any significant manner. an equipment is a tool that presents itself to human perception and intentionality as something-in-order-to.e. or when implementing implementations. and that the epistemological and ontological qualities that it embodies necessarily imply an ethics.” In Heidegger’s terminology. then. if the performative way of being that it brings about is concerned with the unfolding of relations rather than the ordering of things—then I would say that the implementation in question has utility. it’s precisely these implications that are most critical when thinking about design. a potential which would lead to an incremental unfolding of relationality. it is not. But to my mind (however that may now be defined).

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