An Enactive Approach to Digital Musical Instrument Design

Newton Armstrong



November 2006

© Copyright by Newton Blaire Armstrong, 2006. All rights reserved.

Table of Contents

Table of Contents ............................................................................ iii Abstract ..........................................................................................v Acknowledgements ......................................................................... vii 1 Introduction............................................................................... 1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 2 The Disconnect .........................................................................2 Flow ........................................................................................6 The Criteria of Embodied Activity ................................................8 The Computer-as-it-comes....................................................... 12

The Interface ............................................................................16 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 Interaction and Indirection....................................................... 16 Representation and Cognitive Steering ...................................... 18 Computationalism ................................................................... 23 Sensing and Acting ................................................................. 32 Functional and Realizational Interfaces ...................................... 41 Conclusion ............................................................................. 49


Enaction ....................................................................................51 3.1 3.2 Two Persistent Dualisms .......................................................... 51 Double Embodiment ................................................................ 55

.........3........................ 98 Implementation . 103 Mr.........................................5 3..................................................... 100 Mr.......4 3.................................1 4.................................................................................. 69 The Discontinuous Unfolding of Skill Acquisition ...........................100 4.... 82 Conclusion ...... 61 Towards an Enactive Model of Interaction ........................................................6 4 Structural Coupling ...................................................... 128 Prospects ....... Feely: Usage Examples .............................................................................. 148 5 Groundlessness ...3 4..................... Feely: Hardware......................................................... 116 Mr.........................................152 Bibliography.....................5 Kinds of Resistance ......................................................3 3....2 4..................... Feely: Software......4 4......................... 155 iv ...................


Digital musical instruments bring about problems for performance that are different in kind to those brought about by conventional acoustic instruments. In this essay, I argue that one of the most significant of these problems is the way in which conventional computer interfaces preclude embodied modes of interaction. I examine the theoretical and technological foundations of this “disconnect” between performer and instrument, and sketch an outline for the design of embodied or “enactive” digital instruments. My research builds on recent work in human-computer interaction and “soft” artificial intelligence, and is informed by the phenomenology of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, as well as the “enactive cognitive science” of Francisco Varela and others. I examine the ways in which the conventional metaphors of computer science and “hard” artificial intelligence derive from a mechanistic model of human reasoning, and I outline how this model has informed the design of interfaces that inevitably lead to disembodied actional modes. I propose an alternative model of interaction that draws on various threads from the work of Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and the enactive cognitive scientists. The “enactive model of interaction” that I propose is concerned with circular chains of embodied interdependency between performer and instrument, instrumental “resistance” to human action and intentionality, and an integrative approach to the roles of sensing, acting and cognitive process in the incremental acquisition of performative skill.


The final component of the essay is concerned with issues of implementation. I detail a project in hardware and software that I present as a candidate “enactive digital musical instrument,” I outline some specific usage examples, and I discuss prospects for future work.



This paper would have been a much bigger mess were it not for the timely contributions of a number of people. In particular, I have benefited from the very careful readings and insightful criticisms of my advisor, Barbara White, and my first reader, Dan Trueman. Paul Lansky has uttered more wise words than I could count, and he has changed my mind about many things during my time at Princeton (although, as far as I can tell, that was never really his intention). Perry Cook has taught me a great deal about interaction, both in his classes and in the approach to design that he takes in his own projects. He has been an outstanding role model in terms of bridging the gap between theory and practice, and knowing when it’s time to just sit down with a soldering iron. I have also benefited greatly from conversations with other graduate students while at Princeton. In particular, I’d like to thank Ted Coffey, Paul Audi, Mary Noble, Seth Cluett, Scott Smallwood and Ge Wang, each of whom has given me feedback on my work, in the form of both critical readings and more casual conversations about the core topics. I’m also grateful to the other composers in my intake year: Paul Botelho, Stefan Weisman and Miriama Young. Together we represent a diverse group, but there has been a considerable and on-going interest in each other’s work, and this interest has been borne out in tangible forms of support for our respective projects and activities. The history of electronic music performance goes largely without mention in my paper. But the research would not have been possible in the first place were


whether through written accounts and recordings. Although my fingers are rusty from typing. viii . or through personal contact and performance collaborations. but new potentialities of the body. I’m looking forward to rejoining the ranks of the improvising community in a less part-time not for those practitioners. I am indebted to all those electronic performers whose work I have engaged. who would question the hidden nature of electronic media in order to uncover not just new sounds. from David Tudor to Toshimaru Nakamura.

That the physical. even misleading. no nerve endings anywhere but the ears. And as a matter of fact much electronic music leaves the impression that this IS the attitude in which sounds are composed. but the implication is irrelevant. sensual vision of the playing of it is no longer required. for people with ears. Some New and Old Thoughts After and Before “The Bewitched” 1 . It says that music is a pure art of sound. no interrelated functions. are obsolescent.1 Introduction Electronics for its own sounds’ sake is a resource that one would be stupid to dismiss. because of its particular virtues and its particular defects. — Harry Partch. and that the techniques developed on it. It says that the functional shape of an instrument is not important as a sculptural object. but with little else— no eyes.

the personal computer was becoming fast enough to be used as a realtime synthesizer of sound. these controversies revolve around the relationship between the human performer and the performance medium. performance practices and musical idioms have emerged in tandem to the new technologies. more specifically. and a burgeoning corpus of new theories. A body at rest because no force is being exerted upon it is again for sight not the same thing as a body in which opposing forces are in equilibrium. the same thing as a wheel bearing a load. In the years since the mid-1990s. More often than not. there has been a rapid proliferation of new software and input devices designed specifically for musical performance with general purpose computers. Or. For the first time. at least in certain quarters. the question as to whether the computer should be properly considered a musical instrument continues. they revolve around an apparent lack of embodied human presence 2 . a capability that had previously been the reserve of special purpose machines that were for the most part inaccessible to people working outside an institutional framework. to generate some controversy. — Maurice Merleau-Ponty. for sight.1. But while the widespread availability of the personal computer to the first world middle class has resulted in the medium finding its way into any number of new and diverse musical contexts.1 The Disconnect A wooden wheel placed on the ground is not. The Phenomenology of Perception The mid-1990s marked a juncture in the short history of computer music.

The complainants argue that the performer is either absorbed in near-motionless contemplation of the computer screen—the repertoire of performance gestures not substantively different from those that comprise any routine interaction with a personal computer—or that there is a high degree of arbitrariness to the performer’s actions. but because conventional expectations as regards the constitutive elements of musical performance have not yet caught up to an essentially new performance practice (Cascone 2000. considered as a performance medium. The argument has it that the computer. Those who complain about the current state of computer music performance practice reveal something of their assumptions and expectations as regards musical performance: that the involvement of the performer’s body constitutes a critical dimension of the practice. the modes of performance that are attendant to those 3 . it’s necessary that that audience picks up on somatic cues that signal the point of origin. between performer and audience.and involvement in computer music performance practice. In both instances. and between performer and instrument. what is witnessed is a disconnect. Stuart 2003). and that the attributes of the medium necessitate a break with established instrumental conventions. of the sounds they are hearing. and that for such an involvement to be tangible to the audience. Defenders of the “near-motionless” school of computer music performance have suggested that complaints such as these arise not because there is something substantive missing from the interaction between performer and performance medium. in real time and real space. brings a unique set of issues and concerns to the problem of musical performance. where the absence of any explicit correlation between motor input and sonic output results in a disassociation of performer from performance medium.

or with the audient. who needs to relearn “active” modes of listening. What distinguishes one side from the other is where that missing something is located: with the performer. and the expectations. It’s difficult to defend either position. the “object of performance” is instead transferred to the ears of the audient. that is. as it stands. I’ve found that the performance medium has in all but a few instances managed to maintain a safe distance.” On both sides of the argument over the state of computer music performance practice. assumptions and receptive habits of audiences. it is borne out of frustration as a computer music performer. that computer music performance practice. or “aural performativity (Stuart 2003).conventions. then. In this essay. But more pressingly. I take the opposite position: that computer music performance practice remains both theoretically and technologically under-developed. is already mature. the present study is a legitimation of the complaints being uttered against the current state of computer music performance practice.” and that the emergence of the new performance paradigm signals a shift away from the locus of the body of the performer. 4 . Despite investing a number of years in the development of both hardware and software designed specifically for performance. and that most of the interesting and significant work in the field remains to be done. based as they are on speculative assessments of the receptive habits and practices of listeners. But what can be called into question is the implied corollary to the apologist’s claim that the burden of responsibility lies with the audient. It’s been suggested that those who take issue with the apparent lack of human motor involvement in current computer music performance practice reveal a mindset “created by constant immersion in pop media (Cascone 2000: 101-102). there is a suggestion that something is missing. In certain respects.

I’ve come to believe that there is something intrinsic to the computer. then the medium effectively guarantees that an embodied coupling of human and instrument—a coupling that creates the possibility of engaged and involved experience—never quite takes place. is not due to a conditioned desire for spectacle. If it turns out that is in fact the case. in order to determine what can be done to engender the technical conditions from which an embodied performance practice might arise. 5 . Unlike the apologists for the currently predominant modes of computer music performance practice. something embedded in the medium itself. dynamic. the audience. for the performer. or “missing dimension.” that certain people have been complaining about.corroborating (from the shaky perspective of first person phenomenal experience) the complaint of the disconnect. and significant form of music making. it seems to me that there is something more fundamental to the issue: that an engaged and embodied mode of performance leads to a more compelling. Rather. something that necessarily and inevitably brings about a disconnect. I’m going to suggest that the perceived disconnect. that is the cause of all this. then the medium deserves to be examined. or an ingrained expectation that an explicitly causal relation is witnessed between performance gesture and sonic result. and for the social space that they co-construct through the performance ritual. If the attributes of the computer preclude such a mode of performance.

1. the term accounts for the particular 6 . — Aristides.2 In a sequence of on-going negotiations between performer and 1 For a more complete account of "flow. 2 The notion of "affordance" was introduced by psychologist James Gibson (Gibson 1977. For a concise summation of the applicability of Csikszentmihaly's ideas to instrumental performance see Burzik's "Go with the flow" (Burzik 2003).1 It’s a way of being that consists in the merging of action and awareness. and their responses are tightly correlated to the variety of inputs from the performer’s body that are afforded by the mechanism. the social setting. the acoustic space.2 Flow The matter of music is sound and body motion. Conventional acoustic instruments offer resistance to the body of the performer. Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience (Csikszentmihaly 1991). In the Gibsonian sense. It’s the kind of absorbing experience that can arise in the directed exchange between an embodied agent and a physical mechanism. an affordance is an opportunity for action that the environment presents to an embodied agent. 1979). see Mihaly Csikszentmihaly. As such." in the sense that I will use the term. and the loss of any immediate sense of severance between agent (the performer) and environment (the instrument. and other providers of context). De Musica Performers of conventional acoustic instruments often talk of the sense of flow they experience while playing. and it’s a coupling that happens as a matter of course with acoustic instruments.

I focus on the shortcomings of current theory and technologies. as well as her intentionality. Performance with a conventional acoustic instrument serves as a useful example of an embodied mode of human activity.. considered as a performance medium.. the performer adapts to what is uncovered in the act of playing. and because it seems that the computer has a way of both limiting the body’s possibilities and diminishing its potential for resistance. presents new and unique problems and prospects. and of an engaged coupling with a complex physical mechanism. But in the context of the present study. and to a heightened sense of embodiment. Over a sustained period of time. these negotiations lead to a more fully developed relationship with the instrument.instrument. but because I choose to conceive of the body as a site of possibility and resistance. continually developing new forms of embodied knowledge and competence. to a human a chair affords sitting. physical and perceptual attributes and abilities of the agent. or in modeling acoustic instruments in the digital domain. I’m not specifically interested in appropriating the conventions of acoustic instrumental practice for computer music. Along with those writers who would proclaim the advent of a new computer music performance practice. and on the body of the performer—not because of the body’s historical coupling to conventional instruments. But where those writers focus on the shortcomings of the audience. To borrow an example from Andy Clark: ". but to a woodpecker it may afford something quite different (Clark 1997:172). I hold that the computer." 7 . or flow.

in which meaning and purpose arise not through abstract contemplation. to the experience of playing a conventional acoustic instrument that are pertinent to thinking about the design of digital musical instruments that would allow for embodied modes of performance. then. I’ll return to what I take to be the five key criteria of embodied musical performance. that the normative senses of time. the five key criteria of 8 . Traditional though it may seem. 1. then some work needs to be done. but directly within the course of action. the nervous system (including the brain). and if it does not presently lend itself to embodied form of interaction. If the computer is going to figure as a musical instrument. immediate and engaging. involves an immediately palpable feeling of active presence in a world that is directly lived and experienced. Such action involves complex and continuous exchanges and interactions between senses. in experiential real time and real space. more specifically. In short. to musical performance. these are qualities that I believe are central. or. the experience of flow. and will remain central. and the social and physical environment in which the ritualised act of performance is embedded. The optimal performative experience—this somewhat intangible and elusive notion of flow—could be characterized as a way of being that is so direct.3 The Criteria of Embodied Activity Over the course of this essay. It amounts to a presence and participation in the world. space and the self.There are attributes. are put temporarily on hold. the motor system (muscles). of a heightened sense of embodiment.

This involves 3 David Sudnow uses a nice example of untimely behavior in Ways of the Hand: Recall Charlie Chaplin on the assembly line in Modern Times: the conveyor belt continuously carrying a moving collection of nuts and bolts to be tightened. Embodiment arises contextually. and in her relationship to it. Real world activity involves real-time constraints. because the upcoming flow seems to gain speed and he gets frantic. missing one or two along the way. through an agent’s interactions with her environment. or of its structure and dynamics. eventually caught up in the machine and ejected onto the factory floor in his hysterical epileptic dance. The agent must be able to adapt to changes in the environment. Embodied activity is timely. (Sudnow 2001:32-3) 9 . screwing bolts faster to stay ahead of the work. Chaplin holding these two wrenches. their placements at regular intervals on the belt.the particular kind of embodied mode of interaction with digital musical instruments that I hope to uncover through outlining a philosophically informed approach to instrument design. Embodied activity is multimodal. A large portion of the agent’s total sensorimotor capabilities are galvanised in performance. Those criteria are: 1. falling behind the time. or because it actually does speed up.3 3. Embodied activity is situated. without full prior knowledge of the features of the environment. and the agent must be able to meet these constraints in a timely manner. rushing to catch up. This means that it is incumbent on the agent to not disrupt the flow of activity because her capacity for action is too slow. 2.

The sense of embodiment arises when the agent is required by the task domain. or cross-coupling. The sense of embodiment. That is. Thompson. as well as the potential for mutual interaction. I’ll address the concept of enaction in more depth in Chapter 3. and it presents challenges to the agent that consume a large portion of her attention. between those modalities. as embodiment is a given for biological systems. 10 . action and perception. is phenomenal. and Rosch 1991). the environment is incomplete without the involvement of the agent. whereas the fact of embodiment is objective. living organisms do not emerge into their bodies. then.4 That is. Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch (Varela. I will refer to the embodied mode of performative activity I’m outlining here as enactive. 5.. i. The implications of this double sense of embodiment—of its "inner" and "outer" aspects—are explored in Chapter 3. The sense of embodiment is an emergent phenomenon. 4. Borrowing from cognitive scientists Francisco Varela." But this is potentially misleading. optimal embodied experience arises incrementally over a history of sensorimotor performances within a given environment or phenomenal domain. but for the time being it’s useful 4 This criterion could perhaps have been condensed into the phrase "embodiment is an emergent phenomenon. Embodied activity is engaging. There is a link between increasing sensorimotor competence within the task domain and the sense of embodiment.e. with an emphasis on the concurrent utilisation of distinct sensorimotor modalities.optimising the use of the body’s total available resources for cognition.

In contrast to orthodox views of mental process that view cognition as the internal mirroring of an objective external world. of an instantaneous conceptual and corporeal disposition within a given environment. i. In the enactive view.” It’s an ongoing. play a determining role in constituting the “now. the enactive perspective takes the repeated sensorimotor interactions between the agent and the environment as the fundamental locus of cognitive development.. that which is ineluctably the “now. 11 . in turn.e. 5 The expression is borrowed from Varela. it arises through and within an agent’s physical interactions with her environment. and cognitive systems and structures.e. cognition is fundamentally an embodied phenomenon. To that extent. circular. the “now” of lived experience. Thompson. with its emphasis on bodily involvement in the “bringing forth of a world. and Rosch 1991). This model of cognition..” but it also encompasses the emergence and development of knowledge and competence. the cognitive dimension of activity.”5 provides a template for the performance practice that I hope will emerge from this study. Rosch and Thompson's The Embodied Mind (Varela. and fully reciprocal process of mutual determination and specification in which subjectivity and the sense of embodiment are in a continuous state of flux. This encompasses the dynamics of the experiential present. emphasize the centrality of the body to the enactive model of cognition. plays a determining role in the emergence of cognitive systems and structures.

1997. Lynn Andrea Stein has suggested that it was a matter of historical contingency that saw the computationalist approach hold sway in the formative days of computer science: Cybernetics took seriously the idea of a computation embedded in and coupled to its environment. but its connections to the world around it were weakened.e. and routinely preclude modes of interaction that are situated. Clancey 1997. Winograd and Flores 1986) have shown that it is no easy task to design computing devices that would allow for embodied modes of interaction.. 2001. dominated by the computational metaphor. And while the subset of computing devices that is of specific interest to this essay—digital musical instruments—is these days comprised of a vast and diverse array of implementations.4 The Computer-as-it-comes A number of authors (Agre 1995. Dourish 1999. the epistemological underpinnings of what I have labelled "conventional" CS and HCI—will be outlined in terms of a computationalist ontology in Chapter 2. multimodal. timely. The nascent field of computational science was set on a steady path. The prevailing guiding metaphors of computer science (CS) and human computer interaction (HCI)6 are at odds with the embodied/enactive approach. These were precisely the issues suppressed by the computationalist approaches. (Stein 1999:482) 12 . In the intellectual battles of mid-century. Stein 1999. and engaging. or that lead to a heightened sense of embodiment over a history of interactions. cybernetics failed to provide the necessary empowerment for the emerging science of computation and so was lost. the field as a whole has not been immune to 6 The "prevailing guiding metaphors" of CS and HCI—i.1.

those instruments that have managed to realize this potential have done so despite the conventional tenets of CS and HCI.” A third current could also be identified. It may be useful to distinguish between two main currents in present day computer music performance practice. and would normally be characterized by the “nearmotionless” mode of performance described earlier in the chapter. through the development and integration of new technologies designed specifically for musical performance. The first of these would take the personal computer more or less as it comes (with minimal or zero additions to the standard input devices). This is not to say that all digital musical instruments have failed to realize the potential for embodied modes of interaction. Rather. and I will refer to it under the (intentionally) broad term of “digital musical instruments. This practice is often encapsulated under the rubric of “laptop music.”7 and has given rise to a so-called “laptop aesthetic (Jaeger 2003). 2003. This is the field of activity to which my own work belongs. see the articles collected in Contemporary Music Review 22 (4). For a diverse range of assessments of laptop performance practice and its reception.” The second of the two currents is defined precisely through its non-acceptance of the “computer-as-it-comes” as a musical instrument. the practitioners seek to extend computing devices. But rather.the guiding metaphors of conventional CS and HCI. or even completely reconfigure them.” in which the computer is used as a signal processing add-on or improvising partner to a conventional 7 The term "laptop music" surfaced in the second half of the 1990s. of “extended acoustic instruments. 13 . at around the same time that the first "laptop performers" began to appear.

research papers and theses on issues in live computer music. there remains a near total absence of work related specifically to the philosophical foundations of instrument design. What I intend to denote is not so much a specific device (although it could be).. audio 14 . the limits and potentialities of the current computational media—i. the technological instantiation of the conventional guiding metaphors of CS and HCI. While this has lead to numerous innovations in both the theory and technology of computer music performance. I believe that the most pressing issues in arriving at designs that allow for embodied forms of musical interaction with computers are philosophical. There has been a great deal of activity in recent years in the development of new digital musical instruments.acoustic instrument. the defining attributes of the computeras-it-comes—need to be examined in philosophical terms. This is the computer that “laptop music” adopts wholesale into its performance practice. But as the presence of the acoustic instrument already invokes the potential for embodied performance. There has also been a steadily growing corpus of scholarly articles. and the same computer that those working towards “digital musical instruments” would seek to re-engineer in order to arrive at embodied modes of performance.e. The tendency in digital musical instrument design has been to focus on the pragmatic issues of design: specific sensor and actuator technologies. but rather a general notion of the more or less generic personal computer. and that in order to arrive at sustainable designs for enactive instruments. this area of practice is not of specific relevance to the present study. The “computer-as-it-comes” is a term that will appear throughout this essay.

The personal computer brings with it a sizable repertoire of usage conventions. even though those tenets may (and more often than not will) work against the bringing into being of enactive instruments. and towards arriving at designs that are more fully and properly geared towards the requirements and desires of embodied human actors. of course. behavior and cognition. designers end up drawing on the conventional patterns of use without proper consideration of the implications of those patterns for the end user. But in this essay I focus more on the theoretical and foundational issues of design. Without addressing these issues at some point. there will. If a medium precludes a desired usage— an embodied mode of interaction. 15 . all too regularly. This is the first step towards rethinking and reconfiguring those patterns. mapping strategies. and. and. reflecting world views. for example—and if it does so because of the world models that are embedded in its very mechanism. and models of interaction. there is a greater likelihood that designers will unwittingly fall back on the received tenets of CS and HCI.synthesis methods. be no digital musical instruments of which to speak. While there is a great deal of overlap between the pragmatic and the foundational issues. As I will endeavour to show. in the technological artifacts that result from those designs. that are immanent in designs. Without proper attention to the foundational issues. with a view to providing a conceptual touching stone for the pragmatic stage. then that medium needs to be examined with a philosophical perspective in order to arrive at a better understanding of the ways in which it determines its patterns of use. in turn. and so on. these implications are philosophical in origin. it seems to me that the shift of emphasis is potentially very useful.

Input devices (such as keyboards and mice) capture signals from the user that are mapped. 16 . in the first instance. more than one might believe. is required. it consists in providing an appropriate abstraction of computational data and tasks to the user. through the interface abstraction layer. of musical devices. The interface provides the human with a means of access to the programs running on the computer. Human-computer interface design is therefore concerned with providing the user with a set of usage practices. Traite des Objets Sonore 2. loudspeakers and printers) transmit human-decodable respresentations of the state of the running programs from the computer back to the user. Output devices (such as monitors. — Pierre Schaeffer. Interactions between a human and a computer are conducted through an interface.2 The Interface Musical ideas are prisoners.1 Interaction and Indirection Interaction takes place when signals are passed back and forth between two or more entities. to changes in the state of computer programs. protocols and procedures appropriate to the task domain for which the interface.

in order to accomplish meaningful tasks with computers. and the way in which that task is conceived by the user. considered as an interface. and the task domain is presented to the user in the form of graphical and auditory representations. The physics of computational media consists in the regulated flow of electrons through circuits. including conventional acoustic musical instruments. This sets the medium apart not only from the hammer.One thing that distinguishes the computer from tools such as. then. see Don Ihde's Instrumental Realism (Ihde 1991). in order for significant interactions to take place. is correlated within the user’s cognitive apparatus to the physical act of hammering. the interactional domain needs to be designed. in the distance that the interface imposes between the human and the computer. but from the overwhelming majority of tools that humans use. It follows that interactions with a computer are necessarily indirect. input devices need to 1 The hammer example has figured large in philosophy of technology and media theory since its appearance in Heidegger's Being and Time (Heidegger [1927] 1962) and “The Question Concerning Technology (Heidegger [1949] 1977). Rather. and the human agent does not interact with those circuits in any kind of physically direct manner. 17 . Rather. if ever. Already. we see the “disconnect” between agent and medium. say. But a computer user’s interactions with a computer are rarely. correlated within the cognitive apparatus to the electrical phenomena that constitute the physics of computation. the canonical example of the hammer. its physical operations are abstracted." For an interesting analysis of the role that the hammer has played within these discourses. The hammer.1 is the absence of any direct correlation between the physical domain in which a computational task is carried out.

Ullmer and Ishii 2001. 18 . such as tangible and ubiquitous computing. Greenfield 2006. Norman 1999. ideally to the extent that the user comes to conceive of the task domain directly in the terms of the representations that comprise the interface. 2.2 To a certain extent. — π.be be mapped to tasks and procedures in software. More radical approaches. aggregated metaphorical schema—that are customarily (though somewhat inaccurately) characterized as software. 1994. Weiser 1988. reducing the degree of indirection between agent and medium is also the goal of the present study.e. (printed on a coffee mug) The computer-as-it-comes packages interface abstractions into representational frameworks—i. Users of 2 This is the express goal of so-called "direct manipulation" interface models (see 2.. The overriding goal of conventional human-computer interface design is to reduce the inevitable distance between agent and medium. Weiser and Brown 1996).5 below). But an enactive model of interaction will require an entirely different approach to that taken by conventional HCI.2 Representation and Cognitive Steering Things is what they things. and software data need to be transmitted to the user in the form of representations.o. 1991. would seek to embed computing devices directly (and invisibly) within the user's environment (Dourish 2001.

It’s a suite of bureaucratic abstractions. It’s an unusual transaction that takes place between the designers of computer interfaces and the end users of those interfaces. extrapolated from a real-world task environment that is likely familiar to the user. Models of the world are born out of philosophical systems. However well-formulated or defined those philosophical systems may be. and however conscious a designer may be of the philosophical underpinnings of the decisions made during the course of design. The interface amounts to a model of the world. the user participates in whichever incidental model of the world happens to be implicit to the design. and.personal computers are familiar with the now standard interface metaphors for the routine management and maintenance of their computer systems: files. the transition from design to artifact nonetheless remains loaded with epistemological implications for the end user. desktops. folders. workspaces. trash cans. an encompassing system of metaphors that serves to both guide and regulate the agent’s thoughts and activities through intrinsic correspondences to everyday objects and activities. This is an unavoidable side-effect of indirection. Through the set of interactions made available by whichever incidental pre-packaged representational world. that serves to facilitate bureaucratic work. and the like. despite a great deal of attention within the fields of interaction design and 19 . keeping the play of regulated voltages—the physical agency through which that work is actually accomplished—well out of the user’s immediate zone of awareness.

These bodily habits do not so much comprise a catalogue of discrete and distinct states as they do a collection of dispositions and inclinations. “technology at present is covert philosophy (Agre 1997: 240). As Philip Agre has put it.” As the interface delineates the conceptual milieu to the user. This is what Merleau-Ponty defines as an incorporating practice.” To the same extent that an interface encapsulates a model of the world. In a similar vein to Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of the habitus. then. and through a chain of subtle reciprocal influences. see Heidegger. a process in which actions are literally incorporated—i..3 it’s a side-effect that remains beyond the bounds of consideration for a large number of designers. it encapsulates a model of 3 In studies. Critical Theory of Technology (Feenberg 1991). registered in corporeal memory—through repeated performances (Merleau-Ponty [1945] 2004). Through repeated performances. it orients the user’s cognitive activity. arrangements within which the agent is potentially free to move. 20 . Computation and Human Experience (Agre 1997). and Agre. Feenberg. and an even larger number of end users. a set of implicit assumptions as regards the elements and structure of the task domain begins to solidify.e. the repertoire of meaningful performance actions becomes more or less fixed in bodily habit. there comes to exist “a durably installed generative principle of regulated improvisations (Bourdieu 1977: 78). “The Question Concerning Technology (Heidegger [1949] 1977). but which at the same time determine the structure and dynamics of those movements.

performance. action and cognitive process are embedded. when examining an interactional domain with a view to the emergence of cognitive and performative patterns. and over the history of an agent’s interactions. then it will make little sense. Thompson. they are mutually reinforcing. encompassing incorporating practices. action. at the same time that repetitive dispositions towards action and modes of perceiving are engendered within the agent’s sensorimotor mechanisms. In the enactive view. 21 . In this feedback loop at the heart of the enactive view. the systems and structures that play a determining role in the formation of cognitive patterns are in turn determined by the emergent patterns of interactional dynamics. and Rosch 1991: 172-173). and the contingencies of the environment in which perception. Merleau-Ponty’s concept of incorporation is consistent with the enactive model of cognition. If we accept that these dependencies are real. there is a high degree of reciprocal determination and specification between perception. Thompson. to draw a hard 4 In Varela. “cognitive structures emerge from the recurrent sensorimotor patterns that enable action to be perceptually guided (Varela. Thompson and Rosch's The Embodied Mind (Varela. These dual aspects are inextricably intertwined. See in particular the book's introduction and opening chapter. Or to put it another way. cognition. and Rosch 1991)—the book in which "enactive cognitive science" is first outlined—the authors acknowledge their debt to Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology.” This formulation is essentially a latter day reworking of the fully recursive process. that Merleau-Ponty defined as the intentional arc4 (Merleau-Ponty [1945] 2004).

and the metaphorical schema that those interfaces encapsulate. These are important concerns not only when arriving at new designs. But it’s how this theory of knowledge and performance is embodied in the interface that is of specific interest to this study. It will also make little sense to examine computer interfaces. or between the mind and the body. It would seem that the more closely we examine the interface in use.” At the same time that the boundaries of the user’s potential repertoire of actions and perceptions are determined by the epistemological underpinnings of the representations that comprise the interface. from one piece of software 22 . the mouse. We come to see that it is far from transparent to the task domain to which it is applied. the user adds to these with the installation of new software. and the loudspeakers. and the potential implications for the thoughts and actions of the people who will interact with them. and we begin to understand it “not as an add-on which allows a human to come into relations with an underlying structure. The affordances of the computer-as-it-comes determine the limits of what is possible within any incidental task domain. without due regard to their contingencies and particularities. the monitor. and accomplishes tasks through the agency of the now standard input and display devices—the keyboard.dividing line between action and cognition. and the user comes to learn. The personal computer arrives from the vendor prepackaged with a vast collection of programmed responses. the interface reveals itself as embodying a theory of knowledge and performance. the more quickly the common notion of the interface as a passive and impartial means to an end begins to break down. but also when looking at the consequences of existing designs for performance. but rather as constitutive of that very structure (Hamman 1997: 40).

it’s worth considering what it is. through the agency of software abstractions. Before heading straight to the drawing board. But I will endeavor to show that it is precisely the models of activity that are embedded in the interface to the computer-as-it-comes that preclude the sense of optimal embodied experience—the sense of flow—that can arise in complex real-time activities such as musical performance with conventional acoustic instruments. with regard to personal computers in general—it’s nonetheless a topic that has received some considerable attention. for that matter. new ways of thinking about design. we are in need of new metaphors. particularly over the last fifteen years. situated. however. are geared towards routine forms of activity. and thereby precludes the potential for embodied and enactive modes of interaction. about the computer-as-it-comes that sways the user into a routine-oriented mode of activity. It may well be that for the majority of tasks for which personal computers are routinely used. 2. embodied and real-time forms of activity. and input and display devices. and new technologies. the computer-as-it-comes is a perfectly adequate the next. The predominant guiding metaphors of human-computer interface design. exactly. For complex.3 Computationalism While little has been written about the philosophical basis of interaction design with specific regard to digital musical instruments—or even. in 23 . the kinds of behaviors and outcomes that might be expected to come about as a result of her regulated interactions with the medium.

action and reasoning that originally appeared to have such vast potential. Moreover.5 Having accomplished so little of what the pioneers of the field promised in the 1960s. Given an environment of incrementally increasing complexity. as well as the various philosophical assumptions on which those foundations are built. 24 . In turn. AI theorists and practitioners have been forced to critically re-examine the institutionally endorsed models of perception. the number of environmental variables also increases. This has led to some important questions being raised as regards the traditional foundations of interaction design. Brooks (1991). Dreyfus (1992). it does not take long before the computational load on the artificial agent ensures against its being capable of the rapid real-time responses that we witness in the various creatures that inhabit the real world. the agent has no capacity for responding to features or obstacles that appear in the environment 5 In particular see Haugeland (1985). As a succession of AI implementations would bear out. and Agre (1997). the number of conditions that must be encoded in the agent’s representation of the environment increases in geometric proportion. Winograd and Flores (1986). symbolic representations of real-world task domains must take into account a huge number of environmental variables if the artificial agent-at-large is to be endowed with even a sub-insect capacity for sensing and locomotion. As the complexity of the agent’s environment increases.artificial intelligence (AI).

see the introduction to Andy Clark's Being There (Clark 1997). 1997). Hobbes. They would be arguing against the guiding rubric of computer science. 7 The first viable alternative to the symbolic representation approach is outlined in Rodney Brooks' "Intelligence without representation" and "New Approaches to Robotics (Brooks 1991. Turing 1936) computation has largely been conceived as the algorithmically codifiable manipulation of symbols. where those symbols stand in for objects and operations in the world.6 It was precisely these kinds of problems that prompted a small faction of AI researchers to question the very principle of symbolic representation.” Computationalism is the term that I will use. 6 For an interesting overview of the various problems posed by the symbolic representation approach in AI." 25 . the mechanistic explanation of the 17th century. as since the advent of the Church-Turing thesis (Church 1932. as each new object requires that a new representation be added.” “the computational metaphor (Stein 1999). to the agent’s model of the world. not only with the accepted wisdom of the field. and socalled “hard” cognitive science. 1936. Scheutz 2002). Locke and Newton. namely. But even this notion of computation—the originary notion of computer science—is itself already grounded in an older notion.” and “computationalism (Dietrich 1990. but with Descartes. The breakaway AI researchers would be arguing. then. conventional AI. Leibniz.unexpectedly. by an engineer.7 This would be no simple task. 1991). that has variously been labeled “mentalism (Agre 1995.

Mental activity. I will however argue that the tacit acceptance of the computationalist approach will prove to be a stumbling block in the design of computer interfaces for musical performance.e. “symbol manipulation is a disembodied activity (Clark 1997: 4). and has led to what Agre has termed “a dynamic of mutual reinforcement … between the technology of computation and the Cartesian view of human nature. the computationalist rubric would have it that computation is synonymous with cognition. with computational processes inside computers corresponding to thought processes inside minds (Agre 1997: 2). therefore. as Andy Clark has noted. and as the failings of AI would bear out. and the successes of computer science can make it rather easy to anthropomorphize the process of computation. It’s beyond the scope of the present study to enter into what remains a major debate in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science over the mechanistic foundations of thought. by and large. through the deductive manipulation of symbols that stand in for objects and operations in the world. in much the same way that it has already proven to be a stumbling block in the design of artificial agents. This is.” then the computer-as-itcomes—a materialization of the computationalist paradigm—already precludes 26 . If. and reasoning about the representational domain that those abstractions comprise.” Essentially.At the heart of the computationalist perspective is the presumption that we reason about the world through mechanized procedure. coding abstractions from that data. the way in which we program computers to simulate real-world problems and dynamics. to see in the mechanical procedure a simulacrum of human thought. i. consists in extrapolating data from the world. It’s such a view that provided the original impetus of AI research..

then. But it’s a specific variety of dualism. is situated above and outside the environmental embedding of the agent’s body. coding abstractions and reasoning about a world that forever remains exterior to cognitive process. and events. aural and tactile perception. an essential dualism at the heart of the computationalist model of cognition. with a bounding surface and an in-out orientation. the elements of visual. In other words. whether human or artificial.the possibility of embodied forms of interaction. a kind of transcendental controller. and we experience the rest of the world as outside us. There is. therefore. or a “representational bottleneck” (Brooks 1991). there is no precise way of determining whether this is a matter of a symbolic overload. activities and states. Each of us is a container.” setting itself in contradistinction to both the body—which 27 . for the human agent. one that sets an “inside” against an “outside. (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 29) From this ontological grounding. such conceptualizations come about as a result of an abstract inner space. the container metaphor extends to various ways in which we conceptualize time and space. But what can be seen in the computationalist model of representation is a fundamental objectivism in which the reasoning of the agent. the “mind. bounded and set off from the rest of the world by the surface of our skins. actions. the agent performs manipulations on symbolic representations of the task domain in a realm of mental abstraction that is always and necessarily disconnected from the environmental niche in which activity actually takes place. The agent is. With the current state of knowledge about the workings of the nervous system. In the discourse of computationalism.” It corresponds to a manner of thinking about the world that George Lakoff and Mark Johnson have identified as the container metaphor: We are physical beings.

a kind of propositional calculus—are stored as the contents of the mind. and these contents form the basis from which plans are constructed. There is an inevitable delay. The pertinence of the container metaphor to the present study lies in the strong separation it enforces between agent and environment. between decision and action. and the relationship between agent and world has. The “bounding surface” of the mind is traversed by sensory stimuli. “by searching through a space of potential future sequences of viewed as little more than a transducer of sensory experience—and the outside world. then. The container metaphor is consistent with the mechanistic explanation. these stimuli are converted into representations of the world-as-perceived. in some way or other. these representations— along with the representations of structure that establish their logical connections. as well as between mind and body. And over the iterative chain that would characterize extended activity—a chain of actions following decisions 28 . using one’s world models to simulate the consequences of possible actions (Agre 2002: 132). and that mind and matter—in the tradition of the Cartesian res cognitans and res extensa—are necessarily separate. been altered. It’s precisely because of the schism between thinking and acting that activity is sequential—the agent must form an internal represention of the domain and construct a plan before deciding on appropriate action. and also in the sequential model of activity that it presumes.” When those plans result in behavior. the agent reaches the end of the sequence of events that characterizes the “in-out orientation” of the mind. Implicit to the container metaphor is the assumption that cognition is fundamentally distinct from perceiving and acting.

and so obviously effective. but in terms of the accessibility of computing machinery to non-specialists. In order to make computers more accessible. which are in turn containers for files. by virtue of the interface. this so-called “direct manipulation” style of interaction draws explicitly on the user’s capacity to identify symbolic representations of data (files) and processes (programs). icon. and.following actions—a sequence of such delays punctuates the flow of activity. “opens” a file or program. clicking. the user comes to encounter the virtual environment in much the same way as the Cartesian subject encounters the world. The transition from textual to graphical modes of interaction with computers brought with it significant implications not only in terms of how humans and computers interact. double-clicking. through an “in-out orientation” to an environment populated by well-defined objects. The representational domain is functionally isomorphic with the Cartesian model of mind. that few people would think to question the kind of user knowledge on which it draws. dropping. 29 . the interaction paradigm would need to be both immediately intuitive to the broadest possible range of human subjects. and so on. the user puts things “in” the trash.—to accomplish the tasks required by the activity domain. But on examination. and—through actions such as dragging. etc. as least in part. pointing device) model is due. This is a point that I will explore more fully in the next section. menu. to the way in which it galvanizes the user’s knowledge of the world. it reveals itself to be an instance of the container metaphor. The great success of the WIMP (window. the workspace is a container for folders. and applicable across the widest range of known and as-yet-unknown task environments. The graphical interface paradigm is nowadays so pervasive.

they bring the user to conceive of the task domain. The objects of the virtual environment provide the locus for interaction. an enactive model of performance would situate the agent’s cognitive acitivities entirely within her environment. When those representations stand in for the states of a task domain. we can discern that the interface. constitute an important matter for consideration. But these are not ordinarily the types of activities in which the agent’s optimal bodily experience.If we consider these encounters with the virtual environment in light of the constitutive role that the interface plays in determining user activity. I take no position on the suitability of objectivist forms of representation to everyday or mundane computational tasks. activities in which it would make sense to have an objective cognizance of the contents of the task domain. and to act within it. will bring about the “disconnect” between agent and environment that is implicit to the container metaphor. or for uploading files to a server. over a history of interactions. therefore throws up a not inconsiderable 30 . If. All is (most likely) well for the maintenance of a spreadsheet. however. which would situate the agent’s cognitive activities outside her environment. the kind of representations that serve as the access points to the medium. By definition. The model of the world as embodied in the interface will effectively lead to its own realization. and the world models that those representations embody. in such a way that the focus is directed at changing or manipulating those states. or the sense of flow. have significant bearing on the effective accomplishment of the task at hand. we are considering the suitability of the computer-as-it-comes as a musical instrument that would allow for embodied modes of interaction. and the user retains the status of detached controller. An objectivist model of representational content.

media. If.obstacle to arriving at embodied modes of interaction. the user of a tangible device manages to put the idea that she is interacting with a computer out of mind. is the form of representation. For numerous examples of tangible user interface devices see the website of the Tangible Media Group at MIT (http://tangible. First. In terms of the magnitude of representational abstraction. This is a point to which I will return throughout the essay. then. however. 2006). her cognizance of the interface is of the same order of abstraction as the Gibsonian affordance ("this chair affords sitting"). and those that would seek to structure the agent’s active involvement within the task domain. even if the form of representation is the physical embodiment of the computing device itself. More specifically. accessed July 25. and an interface requires that the computational activity be represented in some form or other. 8 This is precisely the representational strategy behind tangible computing. tangible interfaces are of a very low order. it is the difference between those forms of representations that set out to passively encode the state of the task domain. But there can be no practicable form of interaction with a computer without an for example. it’s worth examining in closer detail the costs to performance of unwittingly adopting the objectivist/computationalist model of representation that is ingrained in the methods of conventional CS and HCI.8 The crucial point. 31 .edu.

9 Disappearance is an important concept in Heidegger's philosophy of technology.2. for example. and indeed situates her in a specific and highly determined relation to the medium. it’s nonetheless entirely possible for that user to become seemingly immersed in the task environment.’ and to move one’s body is to aim at things through it. A state of immersion in the task for which the tool is required leads to the 32 . which is made upon it independently of any representation. In short. when it has incorporated it into its ‘world. for the experience to be that of direct manipulation of the interface contents. musical performance with a laptop computer. The Phenomenology of Perception Although the “disconnect” between agent and environment is intrinsic to the container metaphor as applied to the computationalist model of mind. it is to allow oneself to respond to their call. the container metaphor does not in itself account for how we experience or perceive a disconnect in. that is.4 Sensing and Acting A movement is learned when the body has understood it. disappearance is an indicator of the moment at which the tool user ceases to experience the tool as separate from her body. and for the medium to effectively disappear9 from use. Maurice Merleau-Ponty. particulary in Being and Time (Heidegger [1927] 1962). And despite the ways in which the WIMP interface regulates the activities of the user.

experiencing the tool as an extension of her body. but it’s that very immersion that determines that the activity is not embodied. the environment within which the agent’s sense of embodiment arises. As a consequence. it fulfills one of the five key criteria of embodied activity that I outlined in Chapter 1..g.Immersion in the task environment does not. To that extent. the environment constituted by iconic abstractions of computational data and tasks. Immersion in a virtual environment—e. however. this would not seem to be the case in the specific example of interaction with the computer-as-it-comes. It would even seem to follow that an immersive activity is. is the real world. and it would seem that there’s more to the issue than drawing a tidy distinction between the virtual and the real. It’s likely that an immersive activity is engaging. provide a guarantee of an embodied mode of interaction. this is still a superficial treatment of a very subtle process.e. the tool disappears as an object of consciousness. a conventional acoustic musical instrument. a situated activity. by definition. say. On closer inspection. i. as in the WIMP model—involves situating the agent’s attention and intentions squarely within that virtual world. however. The context of embodiment. Immersive activity involving the computer-as-it-comes is therefore substantively different to immersive activity involving. the disconnect with the real world is proportional to the amount of attention consumed by the objects that populate the virtual world. in the midst of activity. In itself. 33 . The agent is immersed in the activity. and as such. or between abstract and direct modes of user..

and 2. menu and pointing device—play a determining role in the formation of objectivist concepts in the computer user’s cognizance of activity. When the cursor and icon converge 34 .. I’ve already discussed the ways in which the core elements of the WIMP model of interaction—the window. the user will come to think and act in terms of the objects that populate a world exterior to cognitive process. There are two key facets to the WIMP model that guarantee that interactions with the computer-as-it-comes can never be multimodal: 1. and in doing so diminishes the potential for involvement of the other sensory and motor modalities. But it’s not simply a matter that because the interactional domain is an instance of the container metaphor.e. or. the mouse or text cursor. typing and observing. the hand works in tandem with the eyes to move the mouse cursor towards that icon. As the gaze is directed towards an icon of interest to the task. at any given moment. clicking. icon. and from user back to computer. there’s also the how of the container metaphor’s instantiation within the WIMP model. This is where the issues of timeliness and multimodality—another two of the five key criteria of embodied activity—enter the picture. the weight of emphasis on visual forms of representation consumes a large portion of the user’s attention. it is the sensory and motor mechanisms that are called into use. The key consideration here is the modes for the transmission of signals from computer to user. more specifically. These are the two aspects of a mode of interaction—the typical mode of interaction with the computer-as-it-comes—that are experienced by the user as an on-going sequence of pointing. there is only a single and discrete centre of interaction.interaction. and the sensorimotor habits and patterns that are engendered by those modes of transmission. i.

"space- multiplexed" (multiple. and this is where the mode of interaction coincides with the issue of timeliness. it’s the various ways in which these modalities work together and exert influence upon one another. no possibility of operating at two or more interactional nodes simultaneously. the fingers click on the mouse button." 35 . and no potential for the cross-coupling of distinct input channels.10 With acoustic instrumental performance. and the way in which the performer. as a function of the ongoing accrual of competence at coordinating the sensorimotor assemblage. There is no concurrency of actions. the fewer remain for the agent’s other sensors and actuators. it’s not just the concurrent use of multiple sensorimotor modalities that leads to the sense of embodiment. or press keys on the keyboard. distributed points) interaction scenarios. The single point of interaction that is characteristic of the WIMP model of interaction leads to a mode of activity that is characterized by a sequential chain of discrete user gestures. the flow of time is effectively segmented into discrete chunks.on the screen. to elicit a response from the on-screen abstraction. 10 For a comparative analysis of "time-multiplexed" (single point) vs. is better adapted to meet the real-time constraints of performance. see Fitzmaurice and Buxton's "An empirical evaluation of graspable user interfaces (Fitzmaurice and Buxton 1997). The immediate cost of the visuocentric approach to the non-visual sensorimotor modalities is self-evident: the more cognitive resources are allocated to vision. But there is another aspect that is perhaps less obvious. where any action can be taken only after the prior action has been completed.

step-by-step. a sequence that the enactive approach would seek to reverse. in this case. until the objective of the task-at-hand is met. By “misuse. Rather. That infrastructure presumes a model of reality in which the contents of the world come prior to our behavioral engagement with the world.” and that these plans are to be executed. Agency. in this specific sense. it points to a mode of performance that is bluntly precluded by the representational infrastructure of the WIMP paradigm.With regard to this notion of timeliness. let’s assume that the computer-as-it-comes is. The system of abstractions and representations that typify the WIMP model are not geared to the demands of real time. 36 .” I mean a kind of usage that in one way or another does not correspond to the usage scenarios presumed by the WIMP paradigm.” But whatever the designation. The WIMP model of interaction presumes that the user has plans “in mind. building on a model of behavior in which reasoning about representations formed from sense impressions must always take place prior to action. is indicative of behavior that is adaptive to environmental demands and constraints. As “laptop music” has already figured in the discussion. Agency. each step towards accomplishing the plan will simply take as long as it takes to sense. might more properly be defined as “embodied agency. infer. an off-the-shelf laptop computer. and act. where those constraints encompass the necessity of a timely response. on the other hand. it may be useful to draw a distinction between planning and agency. It may be interesting to consider if there may be potential misuses of the computer-as-it-comes that could lead to embodied interactional modes.

each item will be highlighted in turn. As I type these words (at my generic laptop computer). this kind of determination on the part of the interface will preclude embodied modes of interaction. I’ll use my pointer finger to click the trackpad button. For the purposes of this example.. and as I use my third finger to move the cursor over its contents. When I’m done typing. My third finger will stop when the menu item “Save” is highlighted. and that at each step in that sequence my attention will be directed towards the single point of interaction that the interface affords. inputs at these devices are coordinated by the position of the cursor on the computer screen. My finger will guide the mouse cursor to a point at the top-left region of the screen. I will assume a trackpad with a single trackpad button.The standard input devices of the generic laptop computer are the keyboard and trackpad. many laptops substitute a trackpoint for a trackpad. The structure of the interface determines that my motions will follow a type-point-click sequence. and again I’ll use my pointer finger to click the trackpad button. I’ll move my second finger to the trackpad.” When the cursor is over that word.g. the text cursor blinks at the current text position. a mouse cursor will appear on screen. e.11 According to conventional WIMP practice. and the number and type of trackpad buttons may also vary. A menu will appear. As I’ve argued. where prior experience tells me I will find the word “File. indicating the point at which the next character in this sequence of discrete characters is anticipated. 37 . Upon contact. But with different mappings from the 11 These devices vary from one model of laptop computer to the next.

is done away with altogether. then. We also see that the trackpad affords continuous input with two degrees of freedom. These misuses of the keyboard and trackpad would seem to circumvent the impediments to embodied activity that characterize the WIMP paradigm: singularity and sequentiality. or as simple as the mapping from piano keyboard to hammer and string (one sound event per key event). We see that the keyboard does in fact afford multiple points of interaction.g. an affordance that was not apparent when trackpad usage was bound up with the task of directing the cursor to discrete points on the computer screen. The cursor. it’s in doing away with the cursor that entirely new interactional possibilities for the keyboard and trackpad become apparent. Suppose that some piece of sound synthesis software is written. and that it’s written expressly to be used without graphical or textual feedback from the computer screen. and that these points might be engaged concurrently.. Could this amount to an interface that affords embodied modes of interaction? The short answer is. the formation of composite events from distributed points of interaction. To minimize unnecessary distractions in performance. Either way.input devices to programs—e. That is. Mappings from keyboard events to software could be arbitrarily complex. Mappings from trackpad input to software could afford the continuous modification of the sound events thus 38 . Interestingly enough. I think. perhaps. an affordance that the blinking text cursor—along with the accumulated usage history of QWERTY technologies— had somehow hidden from view. the interface affords chording. the computer screen could be entirely dimmed. mappings that would subvert the inherent sequentiality of WIMP—the interface acquires new affordances. it solicits new modes of activity from the user.

especially given that users of general purpose computers 12 The role of bimanual asymmetry in interface design is discussed in 4. have the beginnings of an expressive instrument. At the same time. while continuous modificatory actions at the trackpad would be performed by the nondominant hand. is the potential for interaction that the interface affords. i. What’s interesting about this example is that we have not changed the physical structure of the interface.. then. we construct a new model of performance. because of the fine granularity of action required of keyboard input. We would almost certainly push the (blank) screen to as flat a position as possible. we might turn the base of the laptop at a 30-45° angle to the standard typing position. perhaps. of an embodied performance practice. that we substitute a new map for the WIMP map. however. and the example shows that these affordances are immanent to the map from input devices to programs. We may.e. then. these new affordances would need to be learned. to any regular user of a laptop computer. and it’s in the continuity of these modifications that the inherent sequentiality of pointing and clicking would be circumvented. to put it out of the way of the hands. we continue to use the same keyboard and trackpad that serve as the input devices in the WIMP model. Of course.12 To situate the hands in optimal position. even. The asymmetry of “handedness” would likely determine that. 39 .4.triggered by the keyboard. What we have changed. chording actions would be performed by the dominant hand. And they would need to be learned in spite of the activities the laptop has previously afforded in everyday use. This is not an insurmountable task.

and while it’s entirely feasible that the performer could develop a timely and multimodal mode of interaction with this new interface.are. to a certain. limited degree. there nonetheless remains some physical property of the interface that would seem to be opposed to the development of an embodied performance practice. it may simply be an issue of the instrument’s failure to be properly indicative of use (a topic I will discuss in Chapter 4). while the affordances of the interface have been fundamentally altered by new mappings from hardware to software. of the arrangement of keys not being conducive to chording. I’ve been concerned in this section with outlining the ways in which the standard interaction model of the computer-as-it-comes precludes embodied activity. That is. This may be an issue of the limited potential for resistance in the keyboard’s pushbutton mechanism. and to leave unanswered the question as to whether this general purpose device might. accustomed to learning new patterns of interaction with each new piece of software. a force that often goes entirely unnoticed in design practice. One of the hazards of design is the weight of convention on current practice. I did so out of a hesitation as regards the physical structure of the interface. Whatever the explanation. But when I suggested that this reconfigured laptop would perhaps afford embodied modes of interaction. And this possibility provides enough incentive to turn attention towards the design of special purpose devices. of the trackpad’s proximity to the keyboard. and so on. It seems to me that it’s this very force—and the widespread failure to notice it—that has led 40 . under certain circumstance. Or. of the limited surface area of the trackpad. afford embodied modes of interaction. there seems a reasonable possibility that the instrument will not be engaging over a sustained period of practice.

5 Functional and Realizational Interfaces Something in the world forces us to think. the core difference between the primary and the secondary instrumentalization lies in the way that the task 13 In Feenberg's scheme. 41 .to numerous music softwares that buy unwittingly into the model of interaction that is implicit to the WIMP paradigm. This something is an object. a model that inevitably leads to a disembodied mode of interaction.”13 In terms of the implementation of interfaces. One of the main objectives of this study is to outline a sketch of one such alternative. will need to arrive at an alternative interactional paradigm to that of the computer-as-it-comes. An enactive. not of recognition. then. primary and secondary instrumentalization respectively correspond to "essentialist" and "constructivist" orientations of human to medium (Feenberg 1999. 2000).” which respectively consist in “the functional constitution of technical objects and subjects. embodied agent-based model of interaction. In doing so. Difference and Repetition Andrew Feenberg draws a distinction between a “primary” and a “secondary instrumentalization. but of a fundamental encounter. — Gilles Deleuze.” and “the realization of the constituted objects and subjects in actual technical networks and devices (Feenberg 1999: 202). these softwares also buy unwittingly into a model of performance that places abstract reasoning prior to action. 2.

as transparently as possible. the accomplishment of the task. There are a great many task environments in which it makes sense to facilitate. the representational correspondence of the interface to the world—i. for example. in the interest of maximizing the potential for continued existence.e. While Feenberg correlates the secondary instrumentalization with a broadly socialist utopian project. be static. and is conducive to dynamic and indeterminate forms of interaction. and. brings with it the possibility of continuously realizing new encounters and uses. or functionalism. of redetermining the relationship between technical objects and their human subjects. realization is a form of play. it is structured around a finite set of interactions which are known in advance of the task’s execution. he is nonetheless careful to point out that the primary instrumentalization. in the process. and presents the user with possibilities for action that draw on familiar and often rehearsed patterns of experience and use. Landing an airplane. The realizational domain encompasses the contexts of meaning and signification in which human and medium are embedded. The realizational interface (secondary instrumentalization). 42 . presents a situation in which human agency is best served by an immutable function-relation between the elements of the interface and the range of possible outcomes that the interface represents.domain is structured. In short. the correlation between the system of interface metaphors and the system of real-world objects and operations for which those metaphors stand—should. The welldesigned functional interface conceals the specific mechanics of the task. on the other hand. still has it uses. The functional interface (primary instrumentalization) serves a predetermined function.

and continues to be constitutive of the structural relation of technical object and human subject. and instead become the intrinsic elements of the task itself. That is. the tool becomes "equipment" at the moment of its disappearance in use. 43 .Efficiency is key to the functionalist approach. She is immersed in what would appear to be the im-mediacy of the task. it’s of no use to have the user waste time on the parsing of a complex metaphorical system. The cognitive effort is at its optimal minimum when the representations have a directly recognizable corollary in the user’s prior experience of the world. and the interface effectively disappears in use. but the medium is still very much present. it takes on an artificial transparency through its very leveraging of the user’s experience. the ideal functionalist interface would have the user convinced that it consists of no representations at all. In terms of meeting the various constraints and demands of the task environment. the user comes to conceptualize the task directly in terms of what is represented. Functionalism aims to minimize the cognitive load. Indeed. And while the interface is evidently not at all 14 In Heidegger's terminology. To that end. the representations cease to be denotative. and it’s of no use to involve her in forms of play. At that moment the task is conflated with the metaphorical domain in which it is represented. as the task environment obtains its coherence through the system of representations that comprise the interface. the well-designed functionalist interface is comprised of representations that are immediately familiar to the user.14 This situates the user in an interesting position. it becomes equipment.

the functionalist domain does not encompass the contexts of meaning and signification in which human and medium are embedded. the interface directs her towards a set of predetermined expectations as regards performance. 1999. It minimizes the cognitive demand and. 44 . The model of computer interface design known as “direct manipulation” (Norman. among other things—already has the aim of the usage enterprise built 15 For an implementation guide to the "direct manipulation" model of computer interface design. at the same time. Holland. then. Functionalism has become a standard metric in the evaluation of the successes and shortcomings of computer interfaces. In contradistinction to the domain of realization. and is not conducive to dynamic and indeterminate forms of interaction. accessed March 20.transparent to the task defines an interactional context in which significance—at least ideally—is invariable. and Hutchins 1986) 15—the model in which the user drags graphical representations of files into graphical representations of The idea of leveraging experience in order to minimize the strain that the interface places on the user’s cognitive apparatus is a hallmark of “user-centered design” (Norman 1986. In leveraging the user’s experience of the world. see "The Macintosh Human Interface Guidelines" (http://developer. the more effectively it corresponds to the ideal of functionalist efficiency.html. and the extent to which the interface disappears from the user’s attention constitutes the key criteria for the success of such approaches. the more it seems to be transparent. 2006). Norman and Draper 1986).

that it should be irrevocably present. It’s entirely possible that the functionalist approach is optimally effective across a broad range of routine computational task environments.e. this would seem to be at odds with the notion of flow. i. we are dealing with such a task environment. In thinking about designing interfaces for musical performance. One of the key aspects of this paradigmatically embodied form of activity is its immediacy.e. and it would seem self-evident that the more the 45 . it makes little sense to do so when balancing a computerized bank account or uploading a file to a server.. i. and in which the degree of efficiency with which the task may be accomplished is inversely proportional to the amount of user attention that is consumed by the interface. That is. in task environments where the task-at-hand is better served by a realizational approach. Where Donald Norman and other key figures in “user-centered design” champion the disappearance of the interface. At first glance. the realizational approach would suggest that the interface offers some form of resistance to the user.into the blanketing term. These are tasks in which the activity is better served by invariable representations. with functionalism becoming something of a de facto standard in interaction design. she is in fact working directly with the objects of the task domain. that the functionalist approach is adopted in task environments where it is not well-suited.. rather than manipulating symbolic abstractions. things work best when the user believes that. In much the same way that it makes little sense to employ dynamic and indeterminate forms of interaction when landing an airplane. But there is a danger.

medium obtrudes in use. the sense of im-mediacy experienced when the agent is immersed in the act of hammering—the sense that the hammer is not a distinct object. haptic resistance. or even optimal. As the musician transmits kinetic energy into the mechanism. Over a sustained period of time. the task ceases to present her with cognitive challenges. energy that is experienced by the musician as sound. It’s at this point that it’s useful to draw a distinction between embodied action and enaction. For example. the musician adapts her bodily dispositions to the ways in which the instrument 46 . and it is precisely where enaction and realization coincide. There is a “push and pull” between musician and instrument. weight.” The cognitive dimension is central to the process. But once the agent has acquired a sufficient degree of performative competence at hammering. exactly how is the potential for realization embedded in the the instrumental interface? Or. say. but an extension of the agent’s sensorimotor mechanism—is indicative of that agent’s embodiment in action. and hammering is not enactive. but it is not necessarily engaging. This raises an obvious question: if performance with conventional acoustic musical instruments is enactive. how is that. enaction involves the “bringing forth of a world. the instrument responds with proportionate energy. And it is in this that the hammer is not a realizational interface. when the agent successfully responds to cognitive challenges. While the sense of embodiment may be enhanced. a violin is substantively different to a hammer? The short answer is in the way in which the musician’s intentionality is coupled to the instrument’s specific and immanent kinds of resistance. To return to Francisco Varela’s formulation. Hammering may be immediate and immersive. such cognitive challenges are not prerequisite to embodied activity. and so on. the less im-mediate the activity.

At one level. it would seem meaningless to talk of functional and realizational interfaces. But this still doesn’t provide a satisfactory explanation of how the potential for realization is somehow embodied in one interface but not another.resists. and ignores the constitutive role that the interface plays in the emergence of intentional and behavioral patterns. An agent could very well set about developing a musical performance practice with a hammer. 47 . to the instrument’s dynamical responsiveness. It’s important to note that these adaptations. functionalism would correspond to a “functional attitude.” But this view does not consider the specific dynamic properties of resistance that are embodied in the interface.. at some point. Rather. and instead to view the entire process as a matter of the agent’s intentionality. and the cognitive dimension continues to be central to the process of adaptation.e. But it’s likely that. as much as they are determined by the resistance offered by the instrument. like the violin. then. i. she will either abandon the instrument for a medium that offers greater potential for realization. or she will make modifications to the instrument that would better serve that realizational potential.” and realization would likewise correspond to a “realizational attitude. offers resistance to the agent. carefully adapting her bodily dispositions to its dynamic properties of resistance over a period of many years of thoughtful rehearsal. It’s because the musician sets out to realize something—to actively participate in embodied practices of signification—that her adaptation follows a unique trajectory. it presumes a neutrality of the interface to human intentionality. are also determined by the musician’s intentionality. The hammer.

that they coincide optimally with the musician’s intentionality. fluid. and in the carefully considered mapping of the parameters of those synthesis primitives to tactile controllers. the model of musical performance that is of specific interest to the present study is realizational. the potential for realization—for embodied forms of signification. and at the same time sufficiently coherent. and so on. the integration of force feedback within the controller apparatus.To return to Feenberg’s specification. artifacts and humans—are constituted through an ongoing process of mutual specification and determination. As such. In the simulation of the various networks of excitors and resonators that constitute the physical mechanisms of acoustic instruments. both technical objects and subjects— i. Although music has its obvious functional uses in late capitalist society. A majority of conventional acoustic musical instruments have been constituted in such a way that the dynamic properties of their resistance are sufficiently complex. and at least partly indeterminate processes of signification. But the 48 .. Approaches to digital musical instrument design that set out to model the dynamics of conventional acoustic instruments by and large circumvent the pitfalls of de facto functionalism. it assumes open-ended. and as such requires the ongoing cognitive involvement of the musician. considered as interface. The hammer has been constituted to serve a largely predetermined functional agenda: hammering. and for the “bringing forth of a world”—is effectively maximized. presents minimal cognitive demands on the agent. In requiring that the musician’s ongoing cognitive involvement is central to the process of adaptation to the instrument’s dynamics. an interface is constituted that comes close to the realizational potential of the real world instrument that it models.e. it is advantageous that the hammer.

This calls for an alternative discourse. and cognition. the basic idea is nonetheless to arrive at a practice that fully engages the new prospects for performance that are indigenous to computing media. This is not just a matter of action. In the specific case of musical performance. of the inseparability of action. The sense of embodiment over a history of interactions within a phenomenal domain emerges at the point where these various constraints intersect. And while there is much to be learned through analyzing the dynamical properties of conventional instruments. perception. multimodal.main focus of this study is to outline a foundation for the design of digital musical instruments that is more general than the physical modeling of existing instruments. perception.6 Conclusion To reiterate my key criteria from Chapter 1: embodied activity is situated. and engaging. this can only be an impediment to arriving at technologies that maximize the potential for realization. This is why I have considered it important to distinguish between functional and realizational modes of interaction. The discourse of functionalism is implicit to the discourse of conventional humancomputer interaction design. timely. this means interfaces that embody the prospect of enaction. in a purely enactivist sense. and cognition. 49 . and alternative approaches to design. As I have attempted to show. 2. but rather a matter of the various and complex dependencies between action. Or.

which would aim to reduce the cognitive load on the agent and make the interface disappear from use. we will need to systematically rethink the world models that are embedded in the interface to the computer-as-it-comes. there is. or embodied cognition. When all or most of these criteria fail to be met. The objectivist foundations of conventional HCI presume a strong separation between user and device. no possibility for the kind of interactive and circular processes of emergence that are characteristic of enaction. 50 .What I have set out to show in this chapter is the various ways in which the computer-as-it-comes is a far from ideal medium in terms of meeting the criteria of embodied activity. presumes a model of activity that is anything but engaging or challenging to the agent. the predominant notion of human-computer interaction design. then. and then looking at the ways in which such a model could be materialized in an instrument that would necessarily be something other than the-computer-as-it-comes. where the locus of interaction is almost invariably unimodal. Further. The WIMP model serves to enforce this separation. This will be my task for the remainder of the essay. Overcoming the disconnect that the computer-as-it-comes enforces between human and instrument will require elaborating an alternative world model. and at the same time to regulate the actions of the user in such a way that time is discretized into repeating units of sensing and acting. and situate the user squarely “outside” the interactional domain. in my view. To arrive at an enactive model of musical interaction.

and therefore also in any provisional description of the elements and processes of enaction. when examining an interactional context with a view to enactive process. But in any attempt to describe such interactions. our descriptions inevitably land squarely at the boundary between agent and environment. But these hard dividing lines persist in our language. dispositions and behaviors emerge over a history of interactions. and instead stressed the inseparability of one from the other.1 Two Persistent Dualisms In Chapter 2. I also suggested that it makes little sense to discuss agent and environment in isolation. — Maurice Merleau-Ponty. or between body and mind. The Phenomenology of Perception 3. I suggested that it would make little sense. to draw hard dividing lines between action and cognition. And so in the same way that we 51 .3 Enaction The body is our general medium for having a world. particularly when attempting to discern the adaptive process that sees a complex set of ever-more refined skills.

Enaction involves a temporality in which relations are constantly in flux. much less defend. it does not necessarily follow that “direct experience”—however that may be defined—does not factor among those varieties of human experience for which we may or may not already have an adequate terminology. any notion of “direct experience. As long as the body is opposed to both mind and world. It is a variety of experience that comes prior to description. In other words. and Rosch 1991: 116). But while philosophical language may be geared in such a way that describing experience necessarily involves dualist.” Disconnection would seem to be the order of the day. The specific variety of experience that I’ve set out to describe—this paradigmatically embodied. it’s difficult to describe. resides in the “nowness” of the experiential present. will ultimately lead us back to a primary disconnect. then. and in which new systems and structures continuously emerge and disappear in the midst of interactional unfolding. it involves “the processual transformation of the past into the future through the intermediary of transitional forms that in themselves have no permanent substance (Varela.insert a hard dividing line between body and mind. Or rather. permeated as it is by the inherent dualisms of Western philosophical and scientific discourse. it would seem that our language. and which are therefore not at all easy to define in dualist. Thompson. abstract and objectivist terms.” The directness of experience. we tacitly delineate a neat separation between body and world. and prior to any clear 52 . and between body and world. abstract and objectivist terms. This presents a problem. it will lead us to two disconnects: between mind and body. immersive and engaged experience—is fundamentally about activities that are always in a state of becoming. On the face of it.

determination of the subject, or of those objects and opportunities for action that make up that (transitional) subject’s environment. In attempting to define “direct experience,” then, we encounter a paradox. Direct experience implies a provisional and temporary state of being that is always and necessarily resistant to ontological reduction. I would even go so far as to say that the “nowness” of the lived present is that which makes direct experience, by definition, preontological. But as soon as we attempt to describe the systems and structures of direct experience, we introduce ontological categories. It’s in this that we see the intrinsic paradox of the description: there can be no notion of that which is direct without casting experience in abstract terms. This is likely to be the source of some confusion. And given that one of the primary motivations behind the present study is to outline a philosophical foundation for design, it will not help if the key philosophical concepts are poorly defined or potentially misleading. Fortunately, questions such as these are not without precedent; there is a branch of philosophy that has dealt systematically with direct experience, and it has done so within the context of a well-defined dualist discourse. In the transcendental phenomenology of Husserl,1 the existential phenomenology of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, and in the latter day


Although Husserl does not figure very significantly in this study, I mention him

because he is acknowledged as the founding figure of European phenomenology, and had a direct influence on the thinking of both Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty.


reworking of both European and Buddhist phenomenology2 in enactive cognitive science and so-called postphenomenology,3 the apparent paradox of a dualistic description of unreflective behaviour is dealt with comprehensively. Phenomenology, in its various manifestations, is a vast and complex field, and it’s beyond the scope of this essay to cover any of its myriad branches of inquiry in any significant manner. However, there are two key concepts, from two quite different moments in the phenomenological tradition, which are particularly useful to the model of interaction that I am attempting to describe. Double embodiment and structural coupling—both of which terms already point to a fundamental dualism prior to their elaboration—respectively address the mind/body and body/world problems in direct experience. In outlining them here, I hope to clear up any confusion as to how the dualism that resides in any description of embodied action is substantively different from the disembodied dualism that lies at the heart of the computationalist perspective. This should bring us to a point where, after having established a disconnect in our descriptions, we come to see how that disconnect ceases to exist in the flux of


The philosophy of Nagarjuna, for example, and of the Madhyamika tradition in

Buddhist thought, figures significantly in Varela, Rosch and Thompson's outline of "codependent arising," and its implications for subjectivity (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991).

Postphenomenology is a term introduced by, and most often associated with,

philosopher Don Ihde (Ihde 1983, 1990, 1991, 1993, 2002).


embodied action, and in the experiential merging of self and world. I should note that I am not attempting to construct a new theory of the mind/body problem here, or even to weigh into the debate. Rather, the objective is pragmatic: to outline some core theoretical issues with a view to opening up a space for new digital musical instrument design scenarios.


Double Embodiment

As long as the body is defined in terms of existence in-itself, it functions uniformly like a mechanism, and as long as the mind is defined in terms of pure existence for-itself, it knows only objects arrayed before it. — Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception

In his analysis of tool use in Being and Time (Heidegger [1927] 1962), Heidegger draws a famous distinction between the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand. The ready-to-hand indicates an essentially pragmatic relation between user and tool. It is when the tool disappears, i.e., when it has the status of equipment, that the user engages the task environment via the ready-to-hand. The relation, then, is not about a human subject and an “object” of perception. Rather, it is about that object’s “withdrawal” into the experiential unity of the actional context:
The peculiarity of what is proximally ready-to-hand is that, it must, as it were, withdraw in order to be ready-to-hand quite authentically. That with which our


” only “if it breaks or slips from grasp or mars the wood. in Heidegger’s more often used term.everyday dealings proximally dwell is not the tools themselves.” Prior to the technological breakdown. the hammer is invisibly folded into the continuum of direct experience. or.” It’s only when this flow of activity is disturbed by some kind of technological breakdown that the apparently seamless continuity between user and tool is broken. On the contrary. was undertaken: 56 .. that with which we concern ourselves primarily is the work. (Heidegger [1927] 1962: 102) The hammer appears as an object of consciousness. The moment of its acquiring the status of object coincides with a disturbance to the accomplishment of the purpose for which the activity. then. or if there is a nail to be driven and the hammer cannot be found (Winograd and Flores 1986: 36). The human is caught up in what Hubert Dreyfus has called “absorbed coping (Dreyfus 1993: 27). but rather disappears into the purposefulness of action. the presence-at-hand of the ready-to-hand makes itself known in a new way as the Being of that which lies before us and calls for our attending to it.e. it acquires “hammerness. With this obstinacy. in the first instance. In the moment of breaking down the tool becomes un-ready-to-hand. i. and enables us to see the obstinacy of that with which we must concern ourselves in the first instance before we do anything else. present-at-hand: Anything which is un-ready-to-hand … is disturbing to us. (Heidegger [1927] 1962: 99) The ready-to-hand implies an engaged and embodied flow of activity. It has no objectness in itself.

(Heidegger [1927] 1962: 105) Hubert Dreyfus recasts Heidegger’s distinction between the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand in psychological terms." biological and phenomenological. There is a back-andforth in experience. and Rosch 1991). 57 . Thompson. or a double embodiment. who in turn base their coinage on Merleau-Ponty's notion of embodiment: We hold with Merleau-Ponty that Western scientific culture requires that we see our bodies both as physical structures and as lived. between direct and abstract modes of engaging the world. Thompson and Rosch's The Embodied Mind (Varela.When an assignment has been disturbed—when something is unusable for some purpose—then the assignment becomes explicit. we continuously circulate back and forth between them. That both modes are experienced by the same body points to a fundamental duality of embodied experience. direct.4 4 I borrow the term "double embodiment" from Varela.” That is. experiential structures—in short. Merleau-Ponty recognized that we cannot understand this circulation without a detailed investigation of its fundamental axis. Instead. These two sides of embodiment are obviously not opposed. He suggests that it is only when purposeful activity is disturbed that “a conscious subject with self-referential mental states directed toward determinate objects with properties gradually emerges (Dreyfus 1991: 71). and to reflect on the context in which action and intention is embedded. as both "outer" and "inner. then. immediate experience is supplanted by abstract and reflective experience when the tool user is necessitated by a breakdown to perceive the tool in abstract terms.

the body must necessarily “contain” cognition. Further. for example—the experience of disembodiment is quite literally embodied by the reflective subject. (Varela. the embodiment of knowledge. This seemingly paradoxical state of affairs is captured in Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the “practical cogito (Merleau-Ponty [1945] 2004).” an idea that. Thompson. dismiss the reflective state of disembodied reason. abstract reflection would seem to be more or less identical in function to the disembodied reasoning of the computationalist model of cognition that I outlined in Chapter 2. First. Rather.At first glance. There are two critical points here in arriving at a fairly subtle. distinction. It does not. To the extent that abstract reflection forms part of lived experience—at the moment of a technological breakdown. the computationalist model of cognition does not account for unreflective experience. and experience. According to the computationalist perspective. such a state of affairs arises only when the flow of unreflective activity is interrupted. satisfy the criteria of embodied activity that I laid out in Chapter 1. it would seem contradictory to speak of abstract reflection as a subset of embodied experience. for example. in a namely. Second. then. and reasoning about potential courses of action. by locating cognitive process entirely within the mechanisms of the body as lived. all activity is mediated by internal representations of the task domain. cognition. With double embodiment. and inherently paradoxical. An enactive model of cognition does not. it encompasses it within the lived experience of the doubly embodied agent at large in the world. and Rosch 1991:xv-xvi) 58 .

then. but the contradiction disappears…if we operate in time. through what Varela et al. Thompson. indeed. and if we manage to understand time as the measure of being. encompasses both reflective and unreflective experience. we continuously circulate back and forth between them (Varela.single turn of phrase. and Rosch 1991: xv).” But the moment in which the agent becomes subjectively conscious of her body. For Merleau-Ponty. hand in hand. and Rosch 1991: xvi). as for Heidegger. it is through this circulating back and forth. as long as we operate within being. actional and cognitive skills develop. “These two sides of embodiment are obviously not opposed. Instead. then: it “encompasses both the body as a lived. is only ever 59 . with the substitution of practical understanding for abstract understanding.” that perceptual.” Indeed.” The crucial factor in addressing the apparent contradiction between direct action and abstract reflection is to situate both within the context of the unfolding of activity and cognitive skill in a temporal context: There is. And in the unfolding of being that conforms to the enactive model of cognition. and Rosch 1991). have termed “a fundamental circularity (Varela. Enaction does admit a mind/body dualism. a contradiction. and with the placement of an “I can” prior to the “I think (Merleau-Ponty [1945] 2004: 137). the phenomenological project is in the first instance concerned with reversing the Cartesian axiom. (Merleau-Ponty [1945] 2004: 330) Embodied being. encompasses both direct action and abstract reflection. Thompson. Thompson. experiential structure and the body as the context or milieu of cognitive mechanisms (Varela. and of her body’s objective relations to the objects arrayed before it.

it keeps the user in a state of disconnection from the tool. Hamman 1997. and is our natural way of galvanizing tools and working within our everyday environments— is missing from the conventional interactional paradigms with the computer-as-itcomes. 1999). At the moment that activity resumes. the body recedes into the background. multimodal. and its objects withdraw into the immediacy of the task. What I have endeavored to show here is that this disconnect is a factor in experience. timely. As I argued in Chapter 2. they also place emphasis on non-real-time music production (composition). But that form of direct experience that Heidegger termed the ready-to-hand—a notion that is more or less synonymous with the notion of embodied activity that I outlined in Chapter 1. It does not allow for a motility that is situated. and so when turning to design. it should not be discounted. 60 . the computer-as-it-comes precludes embodied forms of activity. In short. attention should be 5 Winograd and Flores present an extensive analysis of the conventional metaphors of computer science in relation to a Heideggerean ontology in Understanding Computers and Cognition (Winograd and Flores 1986). I suggest. rather. that with a view to designing enactive instruments. a disconnect that is reinforced by the symbolic representationalist underpinnings of conventional computer interfaces.5 While some authors have suggested that we should explicitly factor the Heideggerean breakdown into our music interface models (Di Scipio 1997.transitory. engaging. rather than the processes of real-time music production (performance) with which I am specifically concerned.

but from a world which the subject itself projects. 3.3 Structural Coupling The world is inseparable from the subject. but from a subject which is nothing but a project of the world. for example. to the incremental adaptive process of learning to play a conventional acoustic instrument.5) I outline this adaptive process in detail with specific reference to the role of breakdowns. 61 . The world 6 Later in the chapter (3. The Phenomenology of Perception Although I’ve already suggested that double embodiment and structural coupling address. then.directed at maximizing the potential for fully engaged and direct experience. respectively.6 My focus. we can expect that breakdowns will happen in the course of everyday practice. and the subject is inseparable from the world. but rather at engineering the potential for the desired kind of breakdowns. — Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Such breakdowns are essential. In terms of the technical implementation. when turning to issues of design. the measure will be resistance. or with any other tool. As with the hammer. mind/body and body/world dualisms. will not be directed at engineering breakdowns. it would be more accurate to say that both double embodiment and structural coupling address the mind/body/world continuum with an emphasis on different processes.

The process is captured neatly in Maturana and Varela’s definition of an autopoietic machine: An autopoietic machine is a machine organized (defined as a unity) as a network of processes of production (transformation and destruction) of components that 62 . the concept of structural coupling was applied to evolutionary biology. and in the emergence of performative and cognitive patterns and competencies. as the organism and the environment exchange matter and energy. it addressed the circular and reciprocal nature of these interactions. In much the same way. It presented an analysis of the interactions between an organism and its environment (where the environment may include other organisms). the emphasis in structural coupling is on the circular processes of causation and specification that pertain between the agent and the environment. But where the emphasis in double embodiment is on the oscillatory nature of mental engagement in an interactional context..obviously figures in the double embodiment analysis: it is the context in which action is embedded. More specifically. 1987). and hence the structure of their interactions. with a view to their mutual adaptation and coevolution. In early formulations (Maturana and Varela 1980. More specifically. The coupling between organism and environment is “structural” because. the mind figures in structural coupling: it is the locus of cognitive emergence over a history of interactions between body and world. it enforces a separation—in order to demonstrate the inseparability of one from the other in the unfolding of a coextensive interactional milieu. structural coupling draws a dividing line between body and world in description and schematization—i. their respective structures.e. are changed as a function of the exchange.

Structural coupling is a key component of the enactivist model of cognition. then.produce the components which: (i) through their interactions and transformations continuously regenerate and realize the network of processes (relations) that produced them. by the agent. a continuous realization of “the network of processes. i. Rosch and Thompson’s formulation. or enacted. Thompson. connect the embodied agent to the environment within the course of action. traverses the divide between agent and environment. there is an increasing regularization of structure. (Varela. and such that those exchanges strengthen the conditions for continued interaction. The fully developed notion of structural coupling. emphasizes the 63 . and Rosch 1991: 206) The world that is brought forth. In Varela. it is the very mechanism by which cognitive properties emerge: Question 1: What is cognition? Answer: Enaction: A history of structural coupling that brings forth a world. in turn.e. and (ii) constitute it (the machine) as a concrete unity in the space in which they (the components) exist by specifying the topological domain of its realization as such a network. (Maturana and Varela 1980: 78-79) Over a history of exchanges between organism and environment.” such that both organism and environment are more viably adapted to productive exchange.. In contrast to the computationalist subject— who reasons about an external world in an internal domain of symbolic representation—the enactive subject actively realizes the world through the connection of the nervous system to the sensory and motor surfaces which.

and this is where the “hard dividing line” that we may draw between them must necessarily be qualified. The dividing line is rather more pliable. 64 . Physical constraints also exist within the environment. In other words. The contingencies and specificities of the agent’s embodiment form one such constraint.inseparability of agent and environment in embodied cognition. but at the same time locates the points at which agent and environment intersect. a quality that is tidily encapsulated in a schematization by Hillel Chiel and Randall Beer (Figure 3. structural coupling implies physical constraints and feedback. There is a certain push and pull of physical forces between agent and environment that constitutes a critical aspect of their structural coupling. This push and pull between agent and environment has a dynamic contour. and these forces act upon the agent’s body within the course of activity. and offers an explanation as to how repetitive contacts at these points of intersection can lead to incrementally more complex states of functioning on the part of the cognitive system.1). and it is a constraint that is in an ongoing state of transformation as the agent acquires and develops motor skills. or finds herself in new or changing environments with new or changing actional priorities. and so play a critical role in the emergence of embodied practices and habits.

the dividing lines between body and environment. but they are not rigid. The “body” consists of sensory inputs and motor outputs. 65 . which is connected to the sensorimotor surface through the same dynamical “push-pull” patterns that connect the body to the environment.Figure 3. and the environment are each rich. the body (sensorimotor surfaces). There is. In Chiel and Beer’s diagram. and between nervous system and body. are clearly distinct. the body. complicated. which in turn is embedded within the environment. The push and pull between each of the components in the interactional domain is indicated by projecting triangular regions. and vice versa.1. and contains the nervous system. It’s clear that a “push” on one side of the body-environment divide results in a proportionate “pull” on the other. The nervous system. a fluid complementarity between environment. highly structured dynamical systems. Chiel and Bier’s commentary: The nervous system (NS) is embedded within a body. then. Interactions between the nervous system. which are coupled to one another. and the environment (from Chiel and Beer (1997)). and adaptive behavior emerges from the interactions of all three systems.

and vice versa. from one interaction to the next. Although it doesn’t form an explicit part of Varela and Maturana’s original formulation. they form a nonautonomous dynamical system (Beer 1996.body. the dynamical systems approach provides a potentially useful way of both understanding and schematizing structural coupling. These kinds of exchanges may be more or less stable in terms of the impact of environmental dynamics on agent dynamics. We would then see the projecting triangular regions extend and contract in regular (though not necessarily periodic) oscillatory patterns. or even random behavior. To capture the properly dynamical nature of this complementarity. depending on the potential complexity of balancing the intentionality of the agent with the environmental contingencies. may exhibit linear. of which Chiel and Beer’s diagram provides an instantaneous snapshot. the diagram would need to be animated. and nervous system. Beer has suggested that when embodied agent and environment are coupled through interaction. What we see is a transfer function—a map—from agent to environment and back again. nonlinear. that. And they may demand more or less of the agent’s cognitive resources. Thelen 1994). and these motions would provide a view of the continuous balancing of energies between agent and environment as the play of physically constrained action unfolds over time. I will return to this point in my outline of implementational models in Chapter 4. It’s a perspective that has also been adopted by a handful of cognitive scientists as an explanatory mechanism for the emergence of cognitive structures through interactional dynamics (Hutchins 1995. 66 . 1997).

The agent does not feel herself to be separate from the world in which she is acting but. This lands us. the agent. as soon as we’ve drawn the dividing line between agent and environment. it’s precisely the point at which the mechanics of the agentenvironment connection need to be described. Although we can delineate the boundary between agent and environment in an abstract diagram of their interactional milieu. their bounding surfaces. But what distinguishes the enactive model from the computationalist model is the formation of a larger unity between agent and world through dynamical processes of embodied interaction and adaptation. i. rather. 67 . back within the computationalist model of rationally guided action. and to understand their respective behaviors as self-contained properties of autonomous systems. rather than being lived through a world of abstract inner contemplation. and by a form of experience that. The danger with the analytic part of this formulation is that. Therefore.e. more or less. the world. On one side.There are two fundamental and seemingly contradictory points to viewing interactions between an embodied agent and its environment as a process of structural coupling: 1. to locate the points at which agent and environment intersect. such a diagram will not capture the experiential aspect of embodied interaction. to emphasize the inseparability of agent and environment. and 2. on the other. by the “push and pull” between coupled physical systems. is lived directly at the points where the sensorimotor system coincides with the environment in which it is embedded. These processes are characterized by crossings of the divide. it’s rather easy to view them in isolation. We will see a disconnect in schematizations of both the computationalist and the enactive models of action.

of an organismic continuity between agent and environment. and the fifth--embodiment is an emergent phenomenon-would come for free. Structural coupling between performer and instrument will. perceptual and actional abilities constitute the teleological dimension of structural coupling. be key to the model of enactive musical performance that I am proposing.” but rather constitutes “a system of possible actions. the first four criteria of embodied activity would form a structurally coupled system. The “bringing forth of a world. amounts to the moment at which the original severance. and vice versa. and an essential criterion in design. 7 To be more precise. As Thelen and Smith point out (Thelen 1994). structural coupling implies enaction. a virtual body with its phenomenal ‘place’ defined by its task and situation (Merleau-Ponty [1945] 2004: 250). The body is not “as it in fact is.7 To this extent (and in keeping with Varela.” I would argue that. as a matter of definition. therefore. ceases to factor in the agent’s intimately folded into its dynamics and processes. 68 . a structurally coupled system is inevitably formed. the emergence of cognitive. or disconnect. Thompson and Rosch’s formulation). when the five criteria of embodied activity (Chapter 1) are met. as a thing in objective space.” that is.

To that end. It’s the dynamics of the various models of interaction between human and computer that form the key concern.e. There is a basic model of human-computer interaction (figure 3. In turn. with the intention of holding this model in view when shifting the focus to implementation.. the computer transmits output signals representing the state of its programs which are perceived by the human. then. But before turning to issues of the design and implementation of enactive digital musical instruments. it may prove useful to outline the various models of interaction that I’ve discussed to this point in the form of diagrams. the interface).4 Towards an Enactive Model of Interaction The key theoretical components of the essay have now been presented.3. with a view to distinguishing their various implications for the development of human cognition and action. but remain both general and nonspecific in terms of hardware and software implementation details (i.2) that can be taken to hold for all subsequent models. 69 . The leap from theory to implementation is almost always a shaky endeavor. and the models that I present here may serve as a provisional and necessarily speculative bridging of the gap between theory and praxis. The human performs actions at the inputs to the computer which cause changes to the state of the computer’s programs. is to arrive at a candidate model of enactive interaction. The underlying rationale. the diagrams focus specifically on human-computer interaction.

8 it can also be assumed 8 To say that the basic mechanics is unchanging is not to say that the interfaces will be identical. and M represents the map from the human’s motor activities to the state of the computer’s input devices. The basic model of the human-computer interaction loop. But there is nothing to link perception to action.HUMAN PERCEPTION COMPUTER OUTPUT S PROGRAMS ACTION M INPUT Figure 3. the input and output devices constitute the interface to the programs running on the computer. In fact. the usefulness of the model lies solely in specifying the basic mechanics of human-computer interaction. the model does not account for it. That is. The basic mechanics can be taken to mean the maps from output to perception. however. and as these mechanics can be assumed to be unchanging for all subsequent models. The basic model is. although a cognitive dimension is implied. Together. 70 .2. and therefore demonstrates intentionality. incomplete. The human perceives and acts. S represents the map from the state of the computer’s output devices to the human’s sensory inputs.

3. this means the map between perception and action. HUMAN PERCEPTION COMPUTER OUTPUT S REASONING PROGRAMS ACTION M INPUT Figure 3.3). and these dynamics will in turn carry different sets of implications for cognition. Human actions follow after inner reasoning about sensory inputs. Different interfaces will result in different map dynamics. The basic model extended to include the model of human activity in conventional HCI. we need only insert human reasoning between perceiving and acting (figure 3. For present purposes. and a and from action to input. 71 . To make the step from the basic model to the conventional model of humancomputer interaction. perception and action. resulting in a sequential chain of actions.that the subsequent models will be distinguished solely by cognitive considerations.

There is therefore an inevitable time delay between perception and action. 9 In the spirit of mechanistic philosophy. and it’s interesting to note the upside-down symmetry on either side of the human/computer divide.” 72 .segmentation of the flow of time (see Chapter 2.” “Programs.” “Reasoning.” and “Output.” and “Action.3. either the mouse or the keyboard). at least according to the minimal criteria I set down for embodied activity in Chapter 1. and output devices are ordinarily visuocentric and geared to a single focal display point (the cursor). Although they are not detailed in figure 3. it can be assumed that the input and output devices of conventional HCI serve to reinforce the computationalist ontology from which conventional HCI derives.” We now have a schematization of the Cartesian subject in the midst of interaction. the duration of which is simply as long as it takes to perform the necessary mental computations. To this extent. we have what I have termed “the computer-as-it-comes.9 The conventional model presumes that the human reasons about her interactions with the computer in an inner world of mental abstraction. This model is paradigmatic of what I have termed “the computer-as-it-comes.” respectively as “Input.” It can effectively be guaranteed that interactions with the computer-as-it-comes will be disembodied. we could even relabel “Perception.4). input devices are ordinarily monomodal and geared to a single focal point of motor activity (from one moment to the next. When these factors combine in the form of a device.

In Chapter 2. 73 . I have added a further cognitive dimension to the human side of the computer-as-it-comes model. perceptual and actional patterns. the immediate concern lies with the implications of the interface for the emergence of cognitive.4). I drew a distinction between functional and realizational interfaces.” within the course of action.” This knowledge can be considered offline with regard to activity. knowledge is “accessed. It can also be assumed that there are no real-time constraints on the accessing of this knowledge. In schematizing the respective interactional paradigms of the functional and realizational interfaces.” rather than “constituted. it’s an abstract quantity that exists prior to interactions with the computer. The distinction rests on the manner in which the interface elicits particular varieties of action and thought from the human user. in user experience. That is. while the computer side has remained unchanged. then. and while it directly informs the ways in which the human subject perceives and reasons. and that this aspect reinforces the sense. the added dimension is labelled “Knowledge. In the diagram of the functional model of interaction (figure 3. While the terminology places explicit emphasis on the interface and how it is constituted. that the knowledge being galvanized is offline.

5).. The functional interface is deterministic.4. and this knowledge is galvanized to guide perception and reasoning. it is not advantageous to activities that are dynamic or nondeterministic by nature. Through leveraging existing user knowledge. While the approach has a great many advantages for routine activities with computers. 74 . leading to appropriate action. The human-computer interaction loop with the functional interface (see 2.e. and the interface is designed to lead to the accomplishment of this goal while placing minimal cognitive demands on the human. The human’s knowledge is leveraged by the abstractions that comprise the computer’s interface. i. the goal of the taskat-hand is known in advance.HUMAN KNOWLEDGE COMPUTER PERCEPTION S OUTPUT REASONING PROGRAMS ACTION M INPUT Figure 3. I noted in Chapter 2 that functionalism is something of a standard in conventional interaction design. the task domain and its end goals are made as transparent as possible. and thereby minimizing the cognitive load.

it is dynamic in realizational interactions.” and “Realization” and “Reasoning.” 75 . “Knowledge” is relabelled “Realization. Because the term “knowledge” implies a fixed state of knowing. The realizational interface is nondeterministic.” are now bidirectional.e. Whereas human knowledge can be considered static in functional interactions.” and the links between “Realization” and “Perception.. it brings with it a continuing potential for new encounters and uses.In figure 3.5). it is substituted in the diagram by the more dynamic and fluid “realization. HUMAN REALIZATION COMPUTER PERCEPTION S OUTPUT REASONING PROGRAMS ACTION M INPUT Figure 3. and human knowledge continues to expand over a history of interactions. The human-computer interaction loop with the realizational interface (see 2.5. The key difference between the realizational and the functional interface lies in the cognitive demands they place on the human.5. i.

on the other hand. According to the criteria of embodied activity. The realizational interface. reasoning and action are collapsed. I have defined embodied activity as a state of being that consists in a merging of action and awareness. the model represents a disembodied mode of interaction. It’s precisely this corpus of “knowns” on which the functional interface draws. the boundaries between perception.The term “knowledge” implies a static corpus of known facts. a reasoning stage still intervenes between the perceiving and acting stages. an important step has been taken towards the enactive model.” In figure 3. and the continuity between perceiving and acting is indicated by the label “Perceptually Guided Action. there is a seamless continuity between perceiving and acting. and thus opens the possibility for the on-going generation of new meanings and modes of thought.6. By introducing resistance to the interface—a resistance that requires the human to fully engage in the activity—the shift is effected from a static and deterministic model of activity to one that is dynamic and nondeterministic. it still requires that the human commit continuous and significant cognitive resources to the task. then. deliberately prompting her to new modes of thinking about the task domain. That is to say. experienced as flow.” 76 . In figure 3.5. Nonetheless. offers resistance to the user. While realization is offline to the activity. Hence the substitution of the more dynamic and fluid term “realization.

and that this has proven a major stumbling block in arriving at designs for digital musical instruments that allow for embodied modes of interaction.” or. and the sense of disconnect between human and computer ceases to factor in experience. in the rubric that I’ve used throughout the essay. there is a merging of action and awareness. “absorbed coping. The perceiving/reasoning/acting sequence has been collapsed into a fully integrated model of activity. labelled here as “Perceptually Guided Action. and it can be assumed that the experience of “oneness” involves the loss of any sense of disconnect with the computer. As with 77 . or in Hubert Dreyfus’ paraphrase. I’ve argued that such a mode of activity is precluded by the computer-as-it-comes.” This corresponds to the flow of embodied activity (see 1. embodied action.2).6. and to Heidegger’s ready-to-hand (see 3. This is the first of the schematizations in which the human is represented as a unity. The model of activity corresponds to Heidegger’s ready-to-hand. Perception and action constitute a unity. Embodied Interaction.HUMAN S PERCEPTUALLY GUIDED ACTION COMPUTER OUTPUT PROGRAMS M INPUT Figure 3.2).

Indeed. “Realization” is connected to “Perceptually Guided Action” through a bidirectional path (figure 3. Cognitive realization is. That is. unreflective mode of behavior. prerequisite to enaction. the distinguishing aspect of the ready-to-hand is that it is an unconscious. Enaction implies an embodied model of interaction with 78 . then. however. that while the sense of embodiment may be optimal when cognitive challenges are placed upon the human agent.2). To make the step from embodied action to enaction. Human and computer are structurally coupled systems (see 3.7. there is no explicit focus on conscious mechanisms.the standard model of human-computer interaction (figure 3.3). Enaction. such challenges are not prerequisite to embodiment. In Chapter 2. I suggested that what distinguishes embodied action from enaction is the realizational dimension.7). HUMAN REALIZATION COMPUTER S PERCEPTUALLY GUIDED ACTION OUTPUT PROGRAMS M INPUT Figure 3.

And in both instances. the interface is 10 There are continuing disagreements among cognitive scientists and philosophers of mind as to whether "inner representations" play a part in direct experience.e. “representational and non-representational intentionality (Preston 1988). cognition is an embodied phenomenon. But where the realizational interface solicits a mode of activity that is disembodied and offline. Another way to view this is as the difference between. deliberately causing a reappraisal of the representations that comprise the interface.a view to cognitive and actional realization. through reciprocal patterns of determination.10 That is. If we were to stick with the idea that humans are 79 . In the enactivist view. an activity that necessarily involves reasoning. Although I take no position in the debate.” Where the realizational interface is concerned with engineering a representational breakdown—i. It arises through physical interactions. realization is tightly correlated to the resistance that the interface offers to the human user. the enactive interface solicits time-constrained improvised responses that are embodied and online. in Elizabeth Preston’s terminology. and in turn shapes the trajectory of future interactions. and is therefore disembodied and offline—the enactive interface is concerned with soliciting new responses without recourse to inner representations. There’s a symmetry between the enactive model and that of the realizational interface (figure 3. and to the cognitive challenges this resistance presents. as this makes it easier to distinguish between direct and abstract experience.5): both include a realizational dimension that is tied. for the purposes of the present study I assume that inner representations play no part in direct experience. to perception and action.

stemming from forces that are directly registered through the body. we do not relate to an object in terms of its objectness. in real time and real space. that is.. in keeping with Merleau-Ponty’s theory of “double embodiment. realization is an incremental process of cognitive regularization and awareness. 80 . "a deictic ontology .” that performance practice. it’s important to note that while the enactive model of interaction represents an idealized “way of being” in the performative moment. and human activity is embodied and online. can be defined only in indexical and functional terms. but I will reiterate here. Before turning to design. and at the same time determining the emergent contour of the body’s unfolding patterns and trajectories. it does not represent the sum total of the performance practice.7). In the enactive model. Rather. then.. Deictic representations were discussed in Chapter 2. then we could potentially draw the distinction between abstract and direct experience in terms of objective and deictic intentionality.encountered directly rather than abstractly. in addition to the enactive model of interaction (figure 3. social position. And it is because the object is so directly folded into the actional midst that we encounter it directly rather than abstractly. but in terms of the role it plays in our activities. however. According to Philip Agre. in relations to an agent's spatial location. The enactive model of interaction represents the ideal performative outcome of the class of digital musical instruments that I am setting out to define and describe in this study. then. would also at various moments involve embodied action storing the contents of their environment as inner representations at all times. or current and typical goals or projects (Agre 1997: 242)." With deictic intentionality.

and the human performer would routinely cross the lines that distinguish one modality from the next. That the same human is able to divide the instantaneous allocation of cognitive resources into representational and nonrepresentational subcomponents is nothing extraordinary for a practiced.6). particularly as. In everyday embodied practices. At the same time. it’s likely that the act of playing proceeds without a great deal of reflective thought. it cannot be assumed that the instrument will provide endless novelty to the performer. i. There will be “breakdowns.5). At such moments—again. and offline realization (figure 3. and becomes readyto-hand. she becomes more finely adapted to the instrumental dynamics. which shift awareness to the “objectness” of the instrument. however. multi-tasking. We see then a coincidence of the present-at-hand and the ready-to-hand. in the midst of embodied activity. a violinist breaks a string in the middle of performance. drawing the focus of her attention to the objectness of the instrument. it’s not unusual for these experiential modalities to be engaged simultaneously. It is also something that happens as a matter of course in the 81 . it will be encountered through a representational intentionality. The instrument will become present-at-hand.” particularly in the learning stage.(figure 3. doubly embodied performer. she continues playing on the remaining three strings. For example. as the intentionality of the performer is divided across different components of the same instrument. Each of these modalities would constitute different ways of engaging the same instrument. Additionally. over the course of practice. With the greater portion of available cognitive resources allocated to the instrumental breakdown..e. to borrow terminology from Heidegger—the instrument effectively disappears from use.

3. embodied action. In the broadest sense of the term. 82 . the other modalities—embodied action and offline realization—will invariably follow.8). human intentionality is fundamentally concerned with the body’s manner of relating to objects in the course of purposive activity. action and cognitive unfolding within the circumscribed interactional domain of instrumental practice. In the particular case of what I have termed enactive digital musical instruments. The practical implication for instrument design. In using the umbrella term “intentionality. and offline realization models into a single integrated model. it can be assumed that if the instrumental implementation engenders suitable conditions for the enactive model of interaction. and therefore need not factor in design. it encompasses both representational and nonrepresentational intentional modes. then.5 The Discontinuous Unfolding of Skill Acquisition In Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology.” then. then. is that the enactive model is the only one that need be kept in view. we can condense the enactive.” The model encompasses the interdependencies between perception. which I have termed “enactive performance practice (figure 3.development of any form of embodied practice.

The instrumental reactions are perceived by the human. as they are registered in the body. Her bodily actions are transduced by the instrument and lead to a reaction. I represents the map from human intentionality to the instrument.8. but we get closer to 83 . and cognitive abilities emerge over time through the continuous and embodied circular interactions between them. modulate her intentionality. and of the dynamics of the bodyinstrument interactions. exemplifying an intentionality. While the enactive performance practice model is too general to be useful in design. Enactive performance practice. it does serve to encapsulate all the key facets of the interaction paradigm I’ve set out to describe. Human body and instrument are unities. The process could be schematized as a bidirectional exchange. and these perceptions. As these cognitive abilities develop. and thus her ongoing reactions and bodily dispositions.COGNITION R Time HUMAN BODY INSTRUMENT I Figure 3. while R represents the map from the instrument’s reactions back to the human. The human acts purposefully through her body. there is an incremental regularization of the performative patterns of the body.

as the body continues to adapt to the dynamics of the interactional domain. however.the flux of the performance experience if the interactions are viewed as circular and continuous. it's beyond the scope of this study to factor them into consideration.11 Enactive performance practice as I’ve outlined it here is consistent with Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the intentional arc (see Chapter 2). as it implies a continuity in the acquisition of perceptual. this is solely for the purposes of clarity. At the same time. the model does not accurately reflect the ways in which the modes of bodily relation to an instrument are transformed over the course of cognitive 11 In this essay. realized at the connections between the nervous system. of course. a continuity that is also implied in the unbroken trajectory of cognitive unfolding in figure 3. and the environment. actional and cognitive skills. the sensorimotor surfaces. It should be kept in mind that cognition is an embodied phenomenon. etc. this doesn’t present a problem. As long as enactive performance practice—and also the intentional arc—can be said to encompass representational and nonrepresentational modes. 84 . the environment may include any manner of physical spaces. The “arc” metaphor is interesting. Over time. cognitive abilities continue to develop. The cognitive dimension is not independent of these interactions. the environment can be taken to comprise the instrument.8. While such features of the environment will inevitably play a part in the emergence and formation of performer intentionality. humans. In real practice. but rather is folded into them through realization. other animals. Although cognition and the body are indicated as distinct entities in figure 3. and an idealized physical space in which the instrument's outputs might be optimally perceived by the human performer.8.

i. Hubert Dreyfus’ “The Current Relevance of Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Embodiment (Dreyfus 1996).” and illustrates his argument with two examples: learning to drive a car. it’s worth considering the ways in which human bodily ways of being are transformed within the process of acquiring a specific skill. I will borrow from Dreyfus’ decomposition of the intentional arc into five distinct stages.” and David Sudnow’s Ways of the Hand (Sudnow 2001).” and “Expertise”—where each stage is characterized by specific bodily ways of relating to the task environment in question.” “Advanced beginner. but will illustrate the argument with an 12 The numbering system in citations of Dreyfus' article refer to the paragraph number of the online text. Dreyfus sets out in his article to “lay out more fully than Merleau-Ponty does. 85 . Before moving on to issues of implementation. it does not account for the intrinsically discontinuous back-andforth between the present-at-hand and the ready-to-hand that characterizes the acquisition of skill. such as learning to play a musical instrument. then. This is an especially important point when considering the acquisition of realizational skills. Dreyfus assumes “the case of an adult acquiring a skill by instruction (Dreyfus 1996:6). In the discussion that follows.e.”12 He does this by dividing the temporal unfolding of skill acquisition into five distinct stages—“Novice.” “Competence.” “Proficient. and learning to play chess. I’ll do this by drawing out some correspondences between two texts.unfolding. how our relation to the world is transformed as we acquire a skill (Dreyfus 1996:6).

example that is more immediately pertinent to the present study: learning to improvise with a musical instrument. (Sudnow 2001:12) The proper “place” of the chords was determined by the specific configuration of piano keys that the hand would need to engage. playing a chord’s tones in nicely distributed ways. Sudnow’s Ways of the Hand—a detailed first person “production account” of the gradual acquisition of skill as a jazz pianist—is in this regard an ideal candidate. the features of the task environment were chords. Dreyfus’ “Novice” stage begins with the reduction of the task environment into explicit representations of the elements of which the environment is composed: Normally. (Dreyfus 1996:7) That the features of the environment are “context-free” implies that the focus of activity is directed towards connecting the body to the instrument—i. and the proper alignments were the voicing of those chords: In early lessons with my new teacher the topic was chord construction. establishing a “grip”—in the proper place and with the proper alignments. the instruction process begins with the instructor decomposing the task environment into context-free features which the beginner can recognize without benefit of experience in the task domain. time-constrained performance. like a computer following a program. but without any explicit regard as to how these alignments will eventually fold into the context of embodied.. It’s interesting to note the 86 . The beginner is then given rules for determining actions on the basis of these features.e. or voicing. For Sudnow.

then—the initial “context-free” feature of the environment—is itself decomposed into individual features. I’d let it go. the “Advanced beginner” stage is characterized by the emergence of a degree of contextual recognition: As the novice gains experience actually coping with real situations. Instructional maxims now can refer to these new situational aspects. getting a good grasp. As Sudnow notes. I had to take up the chord again in terms of its constitution. Each note of the chord is mentally associated with an individual finger before the hand gains a hold on the chord as a whole. groping to put each finger into a good spot. (Sudnow 2001:12) The mode of engagement here is clearly that of the present-at-hand. having gained a hold on the chord.“substantial initial awkwardness” that Sudnow describes in the complex of lookings and graspings that characterize this stage: I would find a particular chord. and. “lots of searching and looking are first required (Sudnow 2001:12). as well as to the 87 . The chord. the student learns to recognize them. And this decomposition demands an on-going coordination between an abstract mental image of the task at hand and the accomplishment of the task.” In Dreyfus’ taxonomy. perspicuous examples of meaningful additional aspects of the situation. find the individual notes again. he begins to note. or an instructor points out. recognized on the basis of experience. arranging the individual fingers a bit to find a way for the hand to feel comfortable. After seeing a sufficient number of examples. build it up from the scratch of its broken parts. then look back to the keyboard—only to find the visual and manual hold hadn’t yet been well established.

(Sudnow 2001:13) It’s important to note. seeing not its note-for-noteness but its configuration against the broader visual field of the terrain. of the tendency to regard coordinated actions—such as the playing of a chord—not as the combined motions of individual figures. (Dreyfus 1996:10) The “situational aspects” here point to an initial emergence of gestalts. It is at the next stage of skill acquisition that such factors enter the equation. The context that the performer is beginning to glimpse. the scope of my looking correspondingly grasped the chord as a whole. but as a single. remains offline. or both) nor timely (in the sense that the transition from one place and alignment to a next must satisfy timing constraints in the broader context of a performance). It would perhaps be more accurate to say that competence emerges towards the end of the third stage. that such gestalts remain limited to isolated and non-time-pressured events. or that it might be solicited by some other pressing constraint in the environment.objectively defined non-situational features recognizable by the novice. Dreyfus’ designation for the third stage of skill acquistion—“Competence”—is potentially misleading. but this recognition is neither situated (in the sense that one place and alignment might lead to a next place and alignment. then.e. where the stage as a whole is characterized by a gradually increasing capacity for dealing with the 88 . The perceptual recognition of places and alignments is beginning to occur at a higher level of scale. i. however. integrated motion of the hands: As my hands began to form constellations. aspects of performance. Between the chordchanging beat of my left hand at more or less regular intervals according to the chart. The beginning of the third stage is marked. (Sudnow 2001:33) 89 . At this point. i.. the disparity between the level of skill accomplished thus far and a newly gained understanding of the larger context of performance—i. Sudnow’s first public performance took place at precisely this stage in his development. since a sense of what is important in any particular situation is missing.e. and the musicians I’d begun to know. for situated and timely musical utterances. by anything but a sense of performative competence. with no humor in the situation. the number of potentially relevant elements of a real-world situation that the learner is able to recognize becomes overwhelming. I was on a bucking bronco of my own body’s doings. It’s worth quoting his account in full: The music wasn’t mine. for I was up there trying to do this jazz I’d practiced nearly all day. situated in the midst of these surrounding affairs. It was going on all around me. there were friends I’d invited to join me. and the rather more smoothly managed and securely pulsing background of the bass player and drummer. (Dreyfus 1996:13) Interestingly enough. performance becomes nerve-wracking and exhausting. there obtained the most alienative relations.e. This frustration is borne specifically of the body’s inability to adequately respond to the seemingly overwhelming online demands of performance: With more experience. I was in the midst of a music the way a lost newcomer finds himself suddenly in the midst of a Mexico City traffic circle. and the student might wonder how anybody ever masters the skill. the melodic movements of the right. its online aspects—leads to a sense of frustration. Rather.

as well as sequences comprised of the individual 90 . ways. (Dreyfus 1996:15) For Sudnow. therefore. have to decide for themselves what plan to choose without being sure that it will be appropriate in the particular situation.” In short. more situations than can be named or precisely defined so no one can prepare for the learner a list of what to do in each possible situation. Dreyfus notes that the performer normally responds to the newly discovered enormity of the task at hand by adopting a “hierarchical perspective.The gap between motor intentionality and motor ability led to a music that “was literally out of hand (Sudnow 2001:35). But unlike the concrete components of activity that constitute the “context-free” features of the “Novice” stage. The problem is that there are a vast number of different situations that the learner may encounter. Competent performers. nuanced.” and by deciding upon a route that “determines which elements of the situation are to be treated as important and which ones can be ignored (Dreyfus 1996:14). many differing from each other in subtle. the components of the “Competence” stage are rather more contextbound: The competent performer thus seeks new rules and reasoning procedures to decide upon a plan or perspective.” It also led to Sudnow shying away from further public performances for a period of several years. the task is again reduced to individual components. There are. the plan was to work towards a “melodic intentionality” by extending in practice his acquired embodied knowledge of isolated chords to patterned sequences of chords. in fact. But these rules are not as easily come by as the rules given beginners in texts and lectures.

was dependent in my experience upon the acquisition of facilities that made it possible. (Sudnow 2001:43) And in due course. It’s precisley in this emerging capacity to form fully articulated phrases that the performer achieves a degree of competence. this plan was decided upon without input from his teacher. Though not yet a native speaker of 91 .” doing hosts of calculating and guidance operations of this sort in the course of play.. As the abilities of my hand developed. rather than appearing solely at the level of the event: A small sequence of notes was played. gestalts began to emerge at the level of the sequence.. The simplest sorts of melody-making entailed a note-to-note intentionality that had been extraordinarily deemphasized by virtue of the isolated ways in which I’d been learning. I had left dormant whatever skills for melodic construction I may have had. Motivated so predominantly toward the rapid course. (Sudnow 2001:43) The emergence of these gestalts is more or less equivalent to what Sudnow describes as “the emergence of a melodic intentionality”: . an express aiming for sounds. then a next followed. this was a largely conceptual process.” then “diminished on the third and a repeat for the next. I found myself for the first time coming into position to begin to do such melodic work with respect to these courses. and for some time. and it wasn’t as though in my prior work I had been trying and failing to make coherent note-to-note melodies. Not coincidentally. or guidance from “texts and lectures”: At first. I’d think: “major triad on the second note of the scale. now again.notes that those chords contain. frustrated in my attempts to reproduce recorded passages.

and that. the performer’s theory of the skill. Action becomes easier and less stressful as the learner simply sees what needs to be achieved rather than deciding.. it is embodied by the experiencing subject. by a calculative procedure. there is also an increase in the ratio of ready-to-hand to present-at-hand modes of engagement: As the brain of the performer acquires the ability to discriminate between a variety of situations entered into with concern and involvement. plans are intuitively evoked and certain aspects stand out as important without the learner standing back and choosing those plans or deciding to adopt that perspective. responses are either strengthened or inhibited. which of several 92 . as the result of both positive and negative experiences.the language. (Dreyfus 1996:20) These “situational discriminations” of “intuitive behavior” point explicitly to the mode of “absorbed coping” that is definitive of the ready-to-hand. there is nonetheless a fledgling facility for forming coherent sentences. With an increase in embodied skill. as represented by rules and principles will gradually be replaced by situational discriminations accompanied by associated responses. Dreyfus’ chracterization of the “Proficient” stage is particularly interesting in terms of the Heideggerean opposition between the present-at-hand and the ready-to-hand: Suppose that events are experienced with involvement as the learner practices his skill. And it’s precisely in the ready-to-hand that “experience is assimilated”. then. and only if. experience is assimilated in this atheoretical way and intuitive behavior replaces reasoned responses.e. Proficiency seems to develop if. Should this happen. i.

Or. the occurrence of breakdowns is directly related to the number and type of skills the performer has not managed to assimilate: 93 . as.possible alternatives should be selected. the present-athand. (Dreyfus 1996:21) The “Proficient” stage is. the catalyst that effects the shift from a ready-to-hand to a present-at-hand mode of perceiving the task environment. There is less doubt that what one is trying to accomplish is appropriate when the goal is simply obvious rather than the winner of a complex competition. and essence of the experience was tasted with a “this is it” feeling. than it would be undermined. the bicycle seemed to do the riding by itself.e. still comprised of a generous quota of moments characterized by a mode of “detached evaluation”. In fact. the very first attempt to sustain an easeful management undercuts it. keep failing.. the bicycle seems to go off on its own. (Sudnow 2001:76) What we see is the paradigmatic Heideggerean “breakdown”. You struggle to stay balanced. Yet there’s no question but that the hang of it was glimpsed. then several revolutions of the pedals occur. when one first gets the knack of a complex skill like riding a bicycle or skiing. And it’s interesting to note the way in which this can directly conflict with “intuitive behavior”: No sooner did I try to latch onto a piece of good-sounding jazz that would seem just to come out in the midst of my improvisations. like a revelation. since doubt comes only with detached evaluation of performance. at the moment of involved intuitive response there can be no doubt. however. you try to keep it up. i. and it disintegrates. more specifically. The occurrence of such breakdowns is directly related to the number and type of skills the performer has managed to assimilate in the course of interactions with the environment up to the moment in question.

themes starting to achieve some cogent management. To decide. sayings now being attempted. What distinguishes the “Proficient” stage from the “Expertise” stage. 94 . the solicitation of self-conscious thought. and the catalyst of “stammerings and stutterings”—becomes increasingly seldom. must still decide what to do. But at the same time. from the level of the individual phrase or sentence to the level of. is the continuity of the discourse. he falls back on detached. (Sudnow 2001:56) It’s these “connectives”—“a way of making the best of things continuously (Sudnow 2001:59)”—that gradually fall into place over the course of sustained practice. With this falling into place. (Dreyfus 1996:22) What distinguishes the “Proficient” stage from the “Competent” stage is a shift to a yet higher level of articulational scale. Sudnow also uses a linguistic analogy: From a virtual hodgepodge of phonemes and approximate paralinguistics. For this reason.e. connectives yet to become integrally part of the process. rule-based determination of actions. seeing the goal and the important features of the situation. perhaps. A continuity that—in the case of proficiency—is rendered discontinuous by the intrusion of breakdowns. however. and with the embodiment of ever more refined responses to the dynamical contingencies of the environment. the proficient performer. a sentence structure was slowly taking form. That is. the occurrence of breakdowns—i. courses of action were being sustained that faded and disintegrated into stammerings and stutterings. a discussion or argument.The proficient performer simply has not yet had enough experience with the wide variety of possible responses to each of the situations he or she can now discriminate to have rendered the best response automatic.

(Dreyfus 1996:25) More specifically. he suggests that discriminating ability and a continuity of response are necessarily linked criteria of expertise: With enough experience with a variety of situations. have enabled the expert performer to respond to the same conditions from which those breakdowns emerged in a timely and unselfconscious manner. single action. all seen from the same perspective but requiring different tactical decisions. each of which share the same decision. the perfomer is immersed in the activity.I’ve already suggested that a capacity for continuous intuitive interactional response to environmental dynamics is definitive of what Dreyfus describes as the “Expertise” stage. (Dreyfus 1996:25) The lessons learned from breakdowns during the “Proficient” stage. and the “I think” is supplanted by an “I can”: 95 . Actions are perceptually guided. then. This allows the immediate intuitive response to each situation which is characteristic of expertise. the proficient performer gradually decomposes this class of situations into subclasses. But Dreyfus also points to a greater refinement to these responses than there is to the variety of responses that are typical during the “Proficient” stage: The expert not only knows what needs to be achieved. but also knows how to achieve the goal. based on mature and practiced situational discrimination. or tactic. A more subtle and refined discrimination ability is what distinguishes the expert from the proficient performer. with further discrimination among situations all seen as similar with respect to plan or perspective distinguishing those situations requiring one action from those demanding another.

though my fingers went to places to which I didn’t feel I’d specifically taken them.9. the performer embodies perceptual. in a little strip of play that’d go by before I got a good look at it. (Sudnow 2001:78) At this point in the discontinuous unfolding of skill acquisition. it may be worth revising the diagram of figure 3. there also emerges a parallel refinement of articulational fluency: I could hear it. seemingly because of something I was doing. In light of the apparent discontinuities of skill acquisition. Certain right notes played in certain right ways appeared just to get done. pacings. in fact for the very first time. I could hear a bit of that language being well spoken. In figure 3. in suitable performance circumstances. a saying particularly said in all of its detail: its pitches. durations. enable the experience of flow. the temporal dimension is segmented into discrete blocks corresponding to Dreyfus’ five stages of skill acquisition. 96 . accentings—a saying said just so. (Sudnow 2001:76) With the refinement of dispositional abilities.I’d see a stretch of melody suddenly appear. intensities. in which cognitive unfolding is indicated as continuous over time. actional and cognitive capacities that. unlike others I’d seen.8. could recognize that I’d done a saying in that language.

motor and perceptual skills. I represents the map from human intentionality to the instrument. Advanced beginner 3. “Skill” replaces “Cognition” in this diagram. Expertise SKILL R Time HUMAN BODY INSTRUMENT I Figure 3. 97 .1. Competence 4. A more accurate model yet might indicate the changing nature of human body/instrument relations over each of the five stages of skill acquisition. as well as the capacity for coordination among the three components in both reflective and unreflective behavior. encompassing the discontinuous unfolding of skill acquisition.9. “Skill” is indicative of cognitive. where “skill” can be said to encompass cognitive. while R represents the map from the instrument’s reactions back to the human. motor and perceptual skills. It is also indicative of the developing capacity for coordination between all three. the diagram of the continuous and circular human/instrument interaction loop is sufficiently general to be applicable at each of the stages. Proficient 5. but as it stands. A detailed view of enactive performance practice. Novice 2.

Sudnow’s account in Ways of the Hand is representative of what I have termed an enactive performance practice. But there is nothing particularly extraordinary about the way in which his skills were acquired. Given an able body (and therefore an innate capacity for perception, action and cognition), an intentionality (e.g. to become an improvising jazz pianist, to produce coherent sequences of notes, etc.), and a sufficiently responsive instrument (e.g. a piano), any human subject might follow an analagous course. In Sudnow’s case, these three prerequisites to enactive performance practice came for free. But my argument has been that in the case of performance with digital musical instruments, something fundamental is missing; i.e. a sufficiently responsive instrument. A sufficient responsiveness is synonymous with what I have referred to as resistance. And it’s precisely the kind of resistance that an instrument affords to the intentioned, embodied agent that will determine whether or not that instrument has the kind of immanent potential that would lead to an enactive performance practice. Kinds of instrumental resistance, then, will be a major focus when the discussion turns to issues of implementation in Chapter 4.



I began this chapter with a discussion of the inevitable paradox in any description of direct experience. The model of enactive performance practice—an attempt at such a description—brings the discussion squarely back to this fundamental, instinctive, and largely unreflective way in which humans, through the agency of


their bodies, relate to the world. This raises the question: if unreflective behavior is so fundamental to human experience, why go to the trouble of detailing so many of its particularities? Why not let that which will happen as a matter of course, happen as a matter of course? Both Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty viewed their work as opposed to the mechanistic underpinnings of canonical Western philosophy. In their respective analyses of mundane, everyday, unreflective activity, there is an agenda to replace the Cartesian model of subjectivity with that of the embodied agent at large in the world. I suggested, earlier in the chapter, that a reversal of the Cartesian axiom constitutes the first concern of the phenomenological project. The mechanistic and the phenomenological discourses, then, are fundamentally at odds. And to the extent that technical discourse continues to hinge on the discourse of mechanistic philosophy, it also continues to be resistant to phenomenology. My concern, then, has been with outlining a model of human experience and activity that serves as an alternative to the model routinely adopted by technical designers, i.e. that of the perpetually disembodied Cartesian subject. If it is in fact possible to design and build digital musical instruments that allow for enactive processes to be realized, then we will have done nothing other than arrive right back at the most fundamental form of human agency.





Kinds of Resistance

There are two key assumptions that underlie the enactive model of interaction: 1. that human activity and behavior has rich, structured dynamics, and 2. that the kinds of resistance that objects offer to humans in the course of activity are key to the on-going dynamical structuring of interactional patterns. In the previous chapter, I was concerned with describing the interactional patterns of an enactive performance practice with a view to the implications of those patterns for cognition. Focus was directed at the dynamics of human activity and behavior. In this chapter, focus is directed at the kinds of resistance that a candidate digital musical instrument might offer to a human performer in the midst of performative activity. The underlying concern, then, shifts from theory to implementation. I have suggested previously in the essay that conventional acoustic instruments, because of the resistance they offer to the performer, serve as useful examples of technical objects that embody the potential for enaction. But in the huge diversity of mechanisms that we see across the range of acoustic

instruments, there is a proportionate diversity in kinds of resistance. The physical feedback to the performer that arises in the encounter between bow and string, for example, is of a different kind to that which comes of the projection of breath into a length of tubing. We can assume, then, that in much the same way that the contingencies of human embodiment play a determining role in the dynamical emergence of performative patterns, so too do the contingencies of instrumental embodiment. This makes the task of arriving at a universal template for the design of enactive musical instruments a profoundly complex, if not obviously impractical undertaking. In the various models of interaction that I schematized in the previous chapter, the maps from human motor function to computer input devices, and from computer output devices to human sensory input, are non-specific in terms of the particular sensorimotor mechanisms that are activated in the course of interaction—the models are intended to be as general and universal as possible. But as soon as we move from interaction diagrams to real world implementations, a higher degree of specificity is required. If, for example, a candidate model for an enactive digital musical instrument were to remain general, there would need to be an account of the myriad ways in which human energy might be transduced as signals at the computer inputs. In the context of the present study, rather than attempting to compile a comprehensive catalogue of implementational possibilities, I will focus on one particular real world implementation: a digital musical instrument that also happens to represent my first serious attempt at engaging the essay’s key theoretical issues in the form of an actual device. This device, as with any musical instrument, offers unique kinds

It is at the level of hardware. I nonetheless hope to make it apparent that in maintaining a loose coupling between hardware and software components. which 102 . In the pages that follow. and I will stick with that model here. In persisting with the standard division between hardware and software. i. the potential for reusing those components is increased. This is the model I employed in the interaction diagrams of Chapter 3. that the greater portion of attention would be directed towards input and output devices. when the core concern is how the candidate instrument is resistant to the human performer. programs and output devices. While I shall be discussing just one specific implementation. I will.e. direct a significant amount of attention to issues of software. digital instruments constitute a special class of musical devices: their sonic behavior is not immanent in their material embodiment. while hardware certainly constitutes more than a passing concern. I hope also to demonstrate the utility of keeping the two layers separate in the design process. therefore. But as I pointed out in Chapter 1. The final component of the study sets out. This is particularly true of software components. Standard human-computer interaction models partition the computer into three distinct layers: input devices. It would seem likely. the dynamical behavior and resistance of the instrument is to a large degree encapsulated in its programs. hardware. then. with a view to the various ways in which its indigenous and particular kinds of resistance may or may not lend themselves to the development of an enactive performance practice. but rather.of resistance to the performer. must be programmed. that the performer actually physically engages the instrument. to detail the instrument’s implementational specifics. So.. after all.

And to the extent that the framework continues to evolve across distinct implementations. such as a new hardware framework.1). 4.2 Mr. Feely represents my first attempt at the implementation of an enactive digital musical instrument (figure 4.1 In that case. Feely: Hardware Overview A device that goes under the name of Mr. where hardware and software may in a certain variety of cases be inextricable. 1 For an interesting counter example to this approach. see Cook (2004). any one particular software framework brings with it a certain modest degree of generality.may at any time in the future need to be integrated into different implementational contexts. 103 . we may also see the beginnings of—if not a universal approach to the design of enactive digital instruments—one that is at least suitably general and robust.

Feely. 104 .Figure 4. Mr.1.

Rather. Kartadinata notes that total integration is not ubiquitous among conventional acoustic instruments—e. that is. “Encompassing” is used here in its most literal sense: all of the components of which the instrument is comprised—the input devices. One of the design goals was to create a silent instrument with no moving parts inside the enclosure. the operating system resides on flash memory.Mr. with patches applied for low latency audio throughput and for granting scheduling priority to real-time audio threads. Integration and Instrumentality Sukandar Kartadinata has used the term “integrated electronic instruments” to denote a class of devices characterized by an encompassing approach to their material realization (Kartadinata 2003). and the internal circuitry—are encompassed within a single physical entity. running the Linux 2. the output devices. MIDI A/D and D/A boards. Feely’s computational nucleus resides on a miniature x86 compatible motherboard. the bow is a distinct physical entity from the body of the violin—but “total integration” is not really the point of an integrated approach. For that reason. emphasis is placed on the coherence of the instrument.. and a specific motherboard/chipset combination was chosen because of its capacity for fanless operation.” 105 .g. how the material embodiment affords a performative encounter with a unity. and power conversion modules are located in the same enclosure as the motherboard. Eight channel audio A/D and D/A hardware. This is in sharp contrast to the sprawl of individual devices and cables that characterizes “the often lab-like stage setups built around general purpose computers (Kartadinata 2003:180).6 kernel.

106 . both of which figured in my approach to design.2 shows Mr. It may appear redundant to suggest that an instrument should be instrumental. but it seemed to me a useful way of distinguishing the project from those in which the instrument comprises a general purpose. Figure 4. that the instrument should have the feel of a musical instrument.Integration and coherence of the instrumental embodiment were important factors in the design of Mr. and both of which factor in the perceived coherence of the instrument to the performer: 1. Feely in the playing position. and 2. but designed to rest in the lap of the performer. From the outset. Because of the instrument’s weight. I had in mind that it was of critical importance that the instrument should have an instrumentality. that the instrument in its material embodiment should be indicative of a specific purpose. it is secured on a stand. This is suggestive of two different interpretations. Feely. off-theshelf computer (with or without an attendant array of peripheral input devices).

Feely in the playing position. proportional to the amplitude of the human’s motor energy output. The sense of the instrument’s physically “being there” is. as weight is transferred from the upper body to the thighs. Mr. In the act of playing. The control surface is situated at the performer’s centre of gravity. the contact with the instrumental body is intensified by hand actions at the control surface.Figure 4. and it is angled (with respect to the performer) in 107 .2. But there is another aspect to this “being there.” and this is tied in with the way in which the instrument is indicative of its use. then. This aspect of the design is tied in—in the most literal sense—with the aim that the instrument should feel like a musical instrument. The playing position ensures that there is constant physical contact between performer and instrument.

then. is that the interface is devoid of representational abstractions. makes itself more than readily apparent. and that it therefore need not accommodate the multiple representational paradigms required of a multiplicity of possible usages. The control surface is partitioned into distinct regions (figure 4. is equivalent to the “considerable difference between using the real world as a metaphor for interaction and using it as a medium for interaction (Dourish 2001:101). An important aspect.” Three classes of input device are used on Mr. Feely’s control surface: knobs. The way in which Mr. and occupies the focal ground in the field of vision.” but—to paraphrase Michael Hamman—that it is “so very there” that the opportunity for action. This means that the instrument is intended to be nothing but a musical instrument. buttons and joysticks. for physically engaging the controls. of the instrument’s instrumentality. which are distinguished by the points in the audio synthesis system 108 .such a way that it presents itself optimally to the hands.” I avoided any graphical representations of the sound or its generating mechanisms at the interface. then. Feely is a special purpose device. Control Surface Unlike the computer-as-it-comes—a general purpose device—Mr. Feely’s interface is different to that of the computer-as-it-comes. giving preference to the performer’s perceptions of the sound itself. In keeping with Rodney Brooks’ dictum that “the world is its own best model (Brooks 1991). and the cross-coupling of these perceptions with the tactile and visual engagement of the instrument and its input devices.3). It’s not just that the instrument is “there.

worth noting the control surface’s basic partitioning scheme in this section. Mr. I will detail the specific functional behaviors and mapping strategies used to connect the input devices to the audio system in 4. however.3. It is. Although this unavoidably touches on software issues.3. Feely: Control surface partitioning scheme. the functional layout of the panel is a hardware concern. Display & Patch Control Joysticks Variants Mute Buttons Global Power Volume On/Off Channel Section Global Section Figure which they are linked. 109 .

or by synthesis network topologies. The Channel Section is partitioned into five discrete channels of three knobs and one button each. 110 . and three knobs combined with three buttons. These joysticks are considered freely assignable to any and multiple input points in the discrete synthesis channels or the global processing network. The Global Section is divided into two subsections.” “Joysticks. which respectively comprise nine knobs.3. and in certain cases to points in the five discrete channels. by mapping functions. all other buttons will be in their off state. These variants may differ by synthesis parameter settings. The Joystick Section is comprised of two x-y joysticks. one of which springs back to its centre position when not in use. These controllers are mapped to a global audio processing network. the functions of the other three sections are self-explanatory.Of the eight distinct regions that comprise the control surface.” “Global Section. These buttons are used to switch between pre-stored variants in the synthesis network.” “Mute Buttons. The Display and Patch Control section is described under Visual Display below.” and “Power On/Off” in figure 4. The Variants Section is comprised of six backlit buttons.” and “Variants” in figure 4. four would ordinarily be utilized only between periods of performative activity: those labelled “Display & Patch Control.” “Global Volume. The four remaining control surface regions—labelled “Channel Section. Signals from each of the five discrete synthesis channels are passed as inputs to this processing network. When one of these buttons is toggled on. there are respectively mapped to five discrete audio synthesis networks in the software system.3—indicate the areas in which activity is focused during performance.

the user quickly adapts to the relationship between a cluster of controls and clusterings of associated behavioral patterns at the instrument’s output. Firstly. is not required to store a catalogue of controller functions and mappings in conscious memory. The emphasis is placed on motor memory as opposed to the conscious storing of data. and the underlying software system is designed in such a way that motor memory should be transferable and adaptable across varying audio subsystem implementations.With all these individual input devices and multiple mapping systems. The performer. This means that motor patterns do not need to be relearned from scratch from one patch to the next. The physical layout of the control surface. The layout of the control panel is designed to facilitate this learning process. The control surface is still. reinforces the relationship between specific functional regions and specific functional behaviors to both the visual and tactile senses. And if the performer is required to store such data in conscious memory. across varying implementations of the underlying audio synthesis networks—the patterning of the instrument’s behavior remains relatively constant. sufficiently 111 . from a base set of functional correspondences. in itself. Secondly. by employing a static functional structure across different patches—that is. how things work in practice. properly or sufficiently indicative of its use. then. it would seem that the performer has rather a lot to remember during performance. then the instrument is not. across even radically divergent implementations of the sound generating subsystem. however. This is not. but rather learns through performing. as a whole. in fact they should be optimally adaptable. then. by partitioning the control surface into functional regions.

g. program exceptions. therefore. not only with a view to minimizing the cognitive demands of visual attention. however. or so great that. it would remain beyond grasp. make any demands on the performer’s attention. It proved useful. which is used to navigate a patch bank between performances. electronic 112 . CPU overload. It does not. to integrate a character display with the control surface.complex and multifaceted as to offer resistance to learning. it may be directed to the guidance of motor activities. and to monitor data in the case of “breakdowns” (e. even after a significant amount of practice. This is something that I tried to avoid in the design of Mr. The display is not intended to be used during performance. I discussed the cost to the nonvisual senses of the visuocentric approach to interaction as typified by the computer-as-it-comes. memory errors. Audio Display An important aspect of the “feel” of many conventional acoustic instruments is the haptic feedback to the performer from the instrument’s vibrating body as it radiates sonic energy.). except as a notification mechanism in the case of such a breakdown. Feely. It was my aim that the degree of resistance should be neither so minimal that the interface would become quickly transparent to motor memory and activity. but with a view to rendering the interface as free of abstraction as possible. and to the extent that vision is required for the performance task. etc. Visual Display In chapter 2. Unlike conventional acoustic instruments.

because of its size and weight. Feely. to a lesser extent. the radiation of vibrational energy can be felt through the feet and. and resulted in the choice of a combined amplifier/loudspeaker system that. and the type and number of reflective and absorbtive material in proximity to the loudspeaker. its frequency and loudness. in deciding upon an amplifier/loudspeaker system. by careful positioning of the amplifier/loudspeaker in performance. The perceptual localisation of the origin of the sound is an important indicator of the 113 . that the loudspeaker should have a wide radiation pattern. Except in the case that the amplifier/loudspeaker system is built into the instrumental body. that the amplifier be powerful enough for the instrument to be used without further amplification (e. in the case of the great majority of acoustic instruments. could not practically be integrated with the body of the instrument. is the instrument’s body—is as close as is practical to the body of the instrument. The effect varies with the character of the sound. the torso. the type of floor surface. This speaker placement has one other advantage: the location of the point source of the sound—which. system). electronic instruments are lacking in the haptic vibrational feedback that is characteristic of their acoustic counterparts. it’s possible to go a certain way towards the “feel” of a conventional instrument. By placing the amplifier/loudspeaker on the floor.A. Nonetheless.g. This issue was taken into consideration in the design of Mr. as close as is practical to the body of the instrument. This limited the options among available technologies. it was outweighed by other constraints: 1. and 2.instruments require the use of amplifiers and loudspeakers in order to propagate sound in space. through a P. but unfortunately.

These factors contribute to the potential for an encounter with the instrument that is engaging (one of the five criteria of embodied activity from Chapter 1). both for the performer. fellow performers. that the hardware interface to Mr. then. Feely avoids the interface model of the computer-as-it-comes. and the audience. and encompasses multiple distributed points of interaction. Firstly. it may be useful to recap on the key aspects of the hardware implementation. it also avoids the associated costs of that model for interaction. the instrumental interface affords distributed motor activities without the burden of representational abstractions. At the same time. then. Feely offers resistance to the performer without having paid due attention to software. and for the emergence of an enactive performance practice. motocentric rather than visuocentric. and to point to some implications for embodiment. representation-hungry. Whereas the computer-as-it-comes would situate the user’s attention in a world of metaphorical abstraction and would provide no guarantee of 114 . and sequential (as opposed to parallel) mode of interaction that is idiosyncratic to the computer-as-it-comes. Summary It would be premature to evaluate the ways in which Mr. singular (as opposed to distributed). The interface is. the instrument is integrated and instrumental.instrument’s phenomenal presence. Secondly. This stands in contrast to the visuocentric. This means that the performer engages an instrument that has a functional coherence to its material embodiment as well as a tangible physical presence in performance. Nonetheless.

Feely affords embodied modes of interaction.4). 115 .e. This brings the discussion around to the implementation of the instrument’s sonic behavior in software. When the focus is shifted from the instantaneous aspects of embodied activity to embodiment as an emergent phenomenon.e. to the emergence of an enactive performance practice—the instrument will be required to offer resistance to the performer through the medium of sound. specifically. vision). Such issues are tied in with the instrument’s behavior. These factors again correspond to certain of the five criteria of embodiment.meeting timing constraints (see 2. and timely. i. But to get from interaction to realization—i. Feely situates the user’s attention directly within the activity. Mr. hearing. we touch on issues of adaptation and cognition. and—because of the distributed and multiply parallel nature of the performative mode—offers a reasonable chance that the real-time constraints of musical performance might be met. Mr.. encourages the parallel distribution of the activity across distinct sensorimotor modalities (touch and proprioception. multimodal. and the unique dynamical patterning of thought and activity that comes of that resistance. As a piece of hardware. with the resistance that it offers to the performer. that embodied activity be situated..

116 . it is mature and offers a rich set of built-in features. SuperCollider Server Architecture The SuperCollider audio synthesis engine passes signals between nodes on a server. Feely’s software system is written in the SuperCollider programming language.3 Mr. much of the task of programming has involved the incremental development of a framework—an integrated library of extensions to the language—that augments the base audio synthesis architecture with modules that allow for complex dynamical mappings between system entities. The implementational possibilities of these extensions to the language will comprise the main focus of this and the next section. primitives.4). where those nodes represent instances of user-defined synthesis and processing functions. and 3. it will be useful to describe the base architecture on which the framework is built.audiosynth. As the main focus of my work has been directed at the creation of a system that would allow for dynamical behaviors.4. First. however. it is easily extensible with user-defined modules. A sample signal flow diagram would look familiar to anybody who has worked with modular synthesis systems (figure 4. it is object-oriented.2 The language was chosen for three main reasons: 1. and plug-ins. Feely: Software Overview Mr. 2. 2

4. The values of a parameter slot may be set by sending messages to the node to which the slot belongs.NODES SIGNALS SOUND Figure 4. or by mapping the parameter slot to the output of a bus (figure 4. SLOTS MESSAGE BUS Figure 4. a node that represents an oscillator function may contain slots for frequency. Writing values to a node’s parameter slots by 1. and 2. For example.5. phase and amplitude parameters. 117 . sending a message.5). A node on the synthesis server may contain parameter slots. SuperCollider synthesis server: Signal flow. mapping the slot to the output of a bus.

Bus 2 taps an output signal from a node in the second channel and maps it to a parameter slot of a node in the first channel.6).A bus is a virtual placeholder for a signal.6. from which the signal could be rerouted as an audio signal input to any other node. to tap an output signal from any node in the synthesis network and route it to a bus. or mapped to a parameter slot belonging to any other node (figure 4. Bus 1 taps an output signal from a node in the first channel and routes it to the audio input of a node in the second channel. Signal routing between parallel synthesis networks using busses. BUS 1 1 2 BUS 2 Figure 4. SuperCollider’s bussing architecture allows for the flexible routing of signals within the synthesis network. This flexibility is exploited and extended in the 118 . It’s possible. for example.

a function that is applied to the signal such that the signal’s characteristics are transformed between output at the source component and input at the receiver component. the functional transformation of the signal takes place between the bus and the signal’s destination. As I noted in the previous section. In Mr. and rerouted from that bus to any other point in the network. 119 . any signal within the audio synthesis network may be routed to a bus. The behavior of the instrument as a whole is in large part determined by these functions and their various mappings and routings within the audio synthesis network. Feely’s mapping framework. The mapping layer allows for the flexibility to route the signal at a single bus to multiple destinations with multiple functional mappings (figure 4. and for defining functional mappings between them. A functional mapping can be taken to mean the transfer function from the output of one component to the input of another. Feely is primarily concerned with providing a flexible and intuitive mechanism for routing signals between components of the audio synthesis network. That is. Mapping Framework The mapping framework that I have developed for Mr. The mapping framework consists of a hierarchical library of such functions encapsulated within discrete software objects. Feely’s mapping framework. This is an example of a “one-to-many (Wanderley 2001)” mapping model. The objects that perform these transformations comprise the mapping layer.7).extensions to the language that form the basis of Mr.

8). y and z) between the bus and their respective parameter slot destinations. or 120 . BUS 1 x BUS 2 y Figure 4. The mapping framework also allows for the “cross-coupling (Hunt. and Paradis 2003)” of bus signals.7 The signal at a bus is split into three signals. The transformed signals are summed. These signals are routed to three different parameter slots.8. or “many-to-one (Wanderley 2001)” mappings (figure 4. Wanderley. The signals at two busses are subject to functional transformations (x and y).Mapping Layer x BUS y z Figure 4. effecting a one-to-many mapping. Each signal is subject to a functional transformation (those transformations denoted here as x. The software objects that perform these transformations comprise the mapping layer.

For example.” resulting in a mapping from multiple signal sources to a single parameter slot. The output of the dependent function y is then mapped to a parameter slot in an audio synthesis network component.9.“cross-coupled. the mapping framework allows for what I have termed “functionparameter” mappings. This is a 121 . where that argument is set at a parameter slot. Additionally. where the output of one functional mapping may be mapped into a parameter slot in another (figure 4. the signal at BUS 2 is multiplied by the scaled signal at BUS 1.9 might scale the output of the signal at BUS 1 into the range [1. function x in figure 4. The signals at two busses are subject to functional transformations (x and y). The output of function y is mapped to a parameter slot in an audio synthesis network component. When the output of x is mapped into the parameter slot that corresponds to the multiplicand argument of y. BUS 1 x BUS 2 y Figure 4.10]. Function y might multiply the output value of the signal at BUS 2 by the value of an argument. The output of function x is mapped into a parameter slot in function y.9).

While all busses in the audio synthesis system are instances of a single class of bus. the scope of a bus corresponds to the function of the input device as defined by the partitioning of Mr. Mr. but it makes clear the kinds of complex interdependencies between system components that “function-parameter” mappings allow. Feely’s hardware controls are connected to the audio synthesis network through busses (figure 4. they are nonetheless classified as having either local or global scope. Feely’s control surface into functional regions. All busses that are placeholders for signals routed from audio signals have global scope. Analog signals are read by an analog-to-digital converter (ADC) and written to a bus in the audio synthesis network. 122 . are accorded either local or global scope. In this scheme. x ADC BUS y z Figure 4.10. however. The map from hardware to software.simple example. Busses that are placeholders for signal arriving from Mr.10). depending on the particular input device to which they are connected. and can be routed to any point in the synthesis network. The signal at the bus may be treated as though it were any other signal. and therefore have identical implementations. Feely’s hardware controls.

1 and 2.1 L1.3 2 L2. 1 L1. The output of these audio synthesis channels is summed and sent to a global processing network. are connected to busses that have local scope within each of the five discrete audio synthesis network channels. Busses L1. Feely’s control panel.. while Global Section controllers are connected to busses that have global scope (figure 4. they may only be routed to the corresponding audio synthesis network channels.3 GLOBAL G1 G2 Figure 4. Their scope is local.1-3 and L2.2 L2. i. for example.Channel Section controllers.11).2 L1. Local and global scope of busses.1-3 are connected to Channel Section controllers on Mr.1 L2.11.e. 123 .

nonetheless.e. between the mapping scheme of figure 4. then. appear to be relatively flat.11 and that of a linear summing mixer is that the bussing architecture in the figure shows the possibility of a flexible routing of controls signals to individual parameter slots in the various mixer channels. signals are treated as equivalent whether their origins are external or internal to the system. i. they may be routed to the global processing network. and therefore represent the points at which human action and internal mechanism coincide. as a transparency to the source of signals within the system effectively blurs the implementational boundary between human and instrumental behaviors. The scope of these busses is global. Busses have a special status in the mapping framework. They are placeholders for signals that originate both outside and inside the audio synthesis network. however. It was a deliberate design choice to accord busses this dual role. The dynamical behavior of the system as a whole would. is encapsulated in the structure and behavior of a single integrated signal flow network. or to any of the discrete audio synthesis channels.. That is to say. To this point. Consider a system. The only difference. The “push-and-pull” of dynamical forces that is key to the instrument’s resistance.Global busses G1 and G2 are connected to Global Section controllers on Mr. for example. Feely’s control panel. and this equivalency of signals implies that all signal flow networks are formed at the same level of structure. where the outputs from 124 . the simple mapping schemes I have illustrated have not demonstrated models of dynamical behavior.

GLOBAL A1 A2 1 2 x y Figure 4. The output of channel 1. Global busses A1 and A2 serve as placeholders for the output signals of channels 1 and 2 .12). is used to regulate the internal behavior of channel 2. These signals are transformed by functions. after underdoing functional transformation. Discrete audio synthesis networks are coupled to form an interacting composite network. 125 .two discrete audio synthesis networks are routed to global busses. and then back to parameter slots within the discrete networks (figure 4.12. and vice versa. and the continuous outputs of those functions are routed to parameter slots in the discrete channels. x and y.

scale it to an effective range and map the resulting signal to the slot. could be used to regulate one another’s behavior.In this example. rather than being summed (as in figure 4.e. scale the audio signal to an effective range. indicated in figure 4. These functions might encapsulate any number of behaviors. its topology—creates a coupling between the two discrete audio synthesis networks.12 as x and y. The way in which the bussed signals act as regulatory mechanisms in the respective synthesis networks is defined by the mapping functions. behavioral patterns are determined in part by signals that originate outside the network. This presents an interesting design 126 . and vice versa. map the audio signal unaltered into the parameter slot. internal behavior is nonautonomous. the possibility for nonlinear dynamical behaviors in the composite (coupled) system. i. they now form coupled nonautonomous systems. They might. Any of these choices would create the possibility for complex behavioral dependencies between the two synthesis networks. the composite network (comprised of the two interacting subnetworks) could be said to be autonomous. and exhibits behavior.. From the perspective of a human observer. then. for example. and at the same time.12. where they had previously formed uncoupled autonomous systems. The output signals from the two channels.e. as it operates.. track the signal’s frequency or amplitude characteristics. Summary From the perspective of either of the discrete networks in figure 4.11). however. The structure of the network—i. and so on. the output of channel 1 is routed back to a parameter slot in channel 2. without human intervention.

the instrument responds and resists with proportionately rich and varied sonic behavior. And these interdependencies are key to the “push-and-pull” dynamics that define the instrument’s kinds of resistance.12. call for calibration of the system—a “tuning” of the system’s dynamical responsiveness—when human action enters the equation. however.problem: we want the instrument to have rich. It does. this model forms the basis of the first usage example I will outline in the next section. but at the same time. embodies the potential for dynamical behavior when coupled to a human performer. the mapping framework allows for the creation of complex interdependencies between system components. This does not rule out the kind of model encapsulated in figure 4. In fact. we want those dynamics to emerge in the coupling of the instrument to a human performer. i. rather than exhibiting autonomous dynamical behavior. the kind of system that is more compelling with a view to enactive performance practice would be one that.e. So. such that when there is a “push-and-pull” of physical forces at the hardware layer.. In summary. structured dynamics. then. although we could engineer a system that exhibits dynamical behavior without human involvement. 127 . I’ll take up this issue by outlining two specific usage examples. But the question remains as to how one might go about calibrating the system in such a way that it requires human action.

1. then. 128 . through the addition of two local busses. As in figure 4. to different modes of embodied activity.12.13 departs from that of figure 4. At the present writing. the first model is in an early stage of development.4. however. Feely in use.13 illustrates an extension of the interacting composite network of figure 4. while the second is relatively mature. because they point to different kinds of resistance. The two usage examples are interesting. Example 1: Pushing the envelope Figure 4. more specifically. Or.4 Mr.12. because their differences illustrate the ways in which diverse implementations might highlight distinct facets of a single basic concern: enactive performance practice. The example in figure 4. Feely: Usage Examples Overview In this section I outline two examples of Mr. in such a way that the two discrete audio synthesis networks regulate one another’s behavior in a manner determined by the output of the functions x and y. L1. and vice versa.12. I have chosen these specific examples because of their differences. the output of channel 1 is mapped via a global bus to a parameter slot in channel 2. and to different realizational potentialities.1 and L2.

1 and L2.1 A1 A2 a x b y Figure 4. these busses are mapped to parameter slots of mapping functions that are internal to the system.1 2 L2.1 and L2.1 are placeholders for signals from Mr. Functional covariance. and the output of function b serves as a continuous input to function y. i. Rather than being mapped to parameter slots in the nodes that comprise the synthesis network. they 129 . These signals are mapped to parameter slots of mapping functions internal to the composite audio synthesis network. or argument.1 provide the effective point of access to the system for human action. where the output of function a serves as a continuous input.. to function x. The local busses L1.GLOBAL 1 L1. Feely’s Channel Section. Local busses L1.13.e. This is an instance of “functionparameter” mapping.

1—the busses that are shown in figure 4. and is covariant with human action.13 represent just a partial view of the entire system. then. The functional mappings from the local busses L1. but in all instances map into continuous ranges as suitable to the synthesis parameter in question. In the “pushing the envelope” model. corresponding to the five channels of three knobs that comprise Mr. Feely that goes under the working title “pushing the envelope.13 are mapped to various parameter nodes in the respective discrete audio synthesis networks. Feely’s Channel Section. the functions x and y (figure 4.13—are key to the dynamical responsiveness of this particular network. The way in which the output signals of the coupled channels regulate one another’s behavior.1 and L2. The two busses per channel that are not shown in figure 4.represent “function-parameter” mappings. is largely determined by the functional mapping from the local busses to the parameter nodes of the global busses.” The mappings illustrated in figure 4. which utilizes five discrete audio synthesis networks and assigns three local busses to each network. These mappings vary across different implementations of the basic system.xn) 130 . It’s their role that I will focus on here.13) represent composite functions: amplitude followers (on the signals at A2 and A1 respectively) modulated by the output of a logistic mapping function: xn+1 = µxn(1 . This network of mappings forms the basis of a performance scenario I’ve developed for Mr.

The mapping functions x and y. The effective ranges of a and b are scaled to a dynamically rich range in µ (between 2. effecting a coupling between the two channels. the corresponding knobs in Mr. a range that encompasses the discontinuous transition from flat to chaotic dynamics through successive period doublings). the greater the amplitude of the resulting signal. that the more “active” the activity. and is entirely unstable when µ is greater than 3. Feely’s Channel Section— that are connected to the bus.9 and 3.13) represent the variable µ in the logistic mapping function. As the outputs of a and b are effectively plugged into µ.2 respectively.e. the dynamical contour of the outputs of x and y are directly proportional to the rate of performer activity. then.87. essentially.1 and L1. This means. which results in the system as a whole having response 131 . The parameter slots in the mapping functions x and y (figure 4. It represents a simple nonlinear system. The logistic mapping function is interesting because the trajectory of its orbit varies with different values of the variable µ. already embody the potential for complex dynamical behavior. 1]).The outputs of x and y are connected as level controls at the output stage of channels 1 and 2 respectively. The functions a and b in figure 4. The amplitude of this function’s output will vary proportionately with the rate of performer activity at the hardware controls—i. where the dynamical contour of the modulated signals derived from A2 and A1 may be more or less chaotic or “flat” depending on the assignment of a constant value to µ.87 (assuming values of x in the range [-1.13 represent the slope (rate of change) of the signals at busses L1. the response of which becomes increasingly chaotic when the value of µ is greater than 3. This creates for a potentially very interesting mapping.

it requires a considerable investment of performative energy. the system doesn’t just require the performer. because of the way the system is calibrated—specifically the “tuning” of the logistic map variable µ in relation to the rate of change of motor activity—it requires a performer.14. In practice. i.characteristics that vary dynamically with the “push-and-pull” of human motor actions. an increase in the rate of left-right knob “twiddling” with respect to time (figure 4. the response of the system is dynamically flat. the “pushing the envelope” model has certain interesting implications for performance.e. For example. Secondly. Thirdly.14) will result in a proportionate increase in the “degree of chaos” in the outputs of functions x and y. Left-right knob manipulation with respect to time. without performer action.. Firstly. TIME Figure 4. the system requires considerable physical effort on the part of the performer to elicit dynamically rich responses from the software system. the behavior of the system as a whole is far from 132 . To that extent.

and particularly on the way that dynamical changes propagate through the composite network. at the same time that they continue to be more closely aligned to certain expectations. The complexity of the system’s dynamical responsiveness is effectively guaranteed by the interdependencies of the five discrete audio synthesis networks. there are parallels in the dynamics of the “pushing the envelope” network to the dynamics of many conventional acoustic instruments. and these patterns are yielding varieties of sonic responsiveness that. Nonetheless. as encapsulated in the functional mappings from outputs in one channel to parameter nodes in another. also continue to yield new and often surprising dynamical contours. Example 2: Surfing the fractal wave (at the end of history) In certain respects.transparent at first use. I’ve found that it’s not possible to get an overall conceptual grasp on its range of behavior. In my experience thus far with this system. The key implication of these interdependencies is that performative actions directed toward a single channel of controls will have consequences beyond the scope of the discrete audio synthesis network to which those controls are connected. certain recurrent patterns of motor activity have begun to emerge. That is to say. although the performer may place the focus of activity at any one moment within a specific channel—and the human anatomical constraint of two-handedness tends to determine this kind of pattern in performance—the effects of that activity will nonetheless be felt throughout the composite network comprised of all five channels. 133 . and in fact demands significant experimentation before certain consistent patterns and responses begin to reveal themselves.

the system’s dynamical responsiveness is proportionate to the amplitude of that energy. then. Hence the distinction between “surfing” and “pushing” analogies. The model I outline in this section—“surfing the fractal wave (at the end of history)”3—embodies an altogether different kind of resistance and affords an altogether different variety of motor activity. i. Patterns of motor activity in “surfing the fractal wave” are designed around the asymmetry of “handedness” (Guiard 1987). 134 . has very little to do with McKenna's original intention. in the “surfing the fractal wave” model.html).When there is no input of human energy. things are already in motion in the instrumental mechanism.” And when human energy is transmitted to the system. Where performance with conventional acoustic instruments ordinarily requires a “pushing” of kinetic energy into the instrumental mechanism in order to set things in motion. The mode of performance. dominant and non-dominant 3 The name is borrowed from the title of a 1997 Terence McKenna lecture (http://www. the instrument’s response is “flat. My appropriation.. then. for example. a particular way in which the model requires the performer: it requires a “pushing”—a directed expenditure of kinetic energy—to actualize the dynamic potential that is immanent to the network. There is. is more concerned with giving dynamical shape and contour to these motions. an “absorbed coping” that is about the timely navigation of energy flows in the environment. rather than the directed transmission of energy flows that originate in the body.abrupt.

For example. The “surfing the fractal wave” model heads in this direction. (Kabbash.15 represents a partial view of the “surfing the fractal wave” network model. The left hand sets the frame of reference for action of the right. Figure 4. advocate the design of humancomputer interfaces that exploit the habitual ways in which humans tend to use their hands in skillful activity. Kabbash et al. 3. the left hand grips the paper. 135 . while the right hand holds the brush and does the fine strokes onto the canvas. 2. then the right starts to write with the pen. in hammering a nail. the left hand holds the nail while the right does the hammering. For example. a tendency that is self-reinforcing across a wide range of activities and over repeated performances. Buxton and Sellen describe three characteristic ways in which the two hands are asymmetrically dependent in select everyday tasks: 1. The sequence of motion is left then right. For example the left hand brings the painter’s palette in and out of range. Buxton. and Sellen 1994:418) Each of these examples could be viewed as aspects of a single embodied tendency. Kabbash. but they cooperate in the accomplishment of the larger task that those sub-tasks comprise.hands are afforded independent sub-tasks. The granularity of action of the left hand is coarser than that of the right.

The x and y outputs of a joystick with global scope (JSX. Feely’s Channel Section.1 C2. Some feedback networks. The sequencer sends a stream of timed triggers to parameters in each of five discrete audio synthesis networks (for clarity. only two are shown).3 Audio Network 2 C2. Knob manipulations are in most instances performed by the right hand. JSY) are mapped to parameter slots of a chaotic sequencer function (SEQ). Local busses (C1. These controls “filter” the results of the mapping from the sequencer stream to each of the discrete audio synthesis networks. Joystick manipulations are always performed by the left hand. “Surfing the fractal wave” network model.3 Audio Network Figure 4.1-3) read signals from the knobs in Mr.1-3 and C2.2 C2. mapping functions and audio synthesis network schemata have been omitted for clarity.LH GLOBAL JSX a SEQ JSY b RH 1 C1. 136 .1 C1.2 C1.15.

where certain gestural patterns emerge in response to the dynamical properties of the “function-parameter” mappings of the global busses JSX and JSY (placeholders for continuous signals from the x and y axes of the joystick. the pads of the left hand fingers tend to “ride” the joystick.4 The sequencer is calibrated in such a way that its output is more or less stable when the values of the mapping functions a and b are close to the centre of their effective ranges. In practice this means that when the joystick is in its centre position (the resting position for a “spring-back” style joystick). respectively) into the output of a chaotic sequencer (SEQ).The diagram divides the network space into left hand and right hand regions. 4 The "chaotic" sequencer function is not technically chaotic (in mathematical terms). with a regular and stable amplitude pattern (figure 4.16.16). at a medium tempo. 137 . In performance. the sequencer clock outputs a steady stream of pulses. The designation can be taken to be qualitative. Time Figure 4. Sequencer pulse stream when the joystick is in centre (“resting”) position.

17. the degree of pulse “nestedness. this single variable determines two aspects of the sequencer’s behavior: 1. then—corresponding to a left-to-right movement across the joystick’s x axis—results in an increase in the pulse stream’s frequency and amplitude (figure 4. In short. An increase in the signal at JSX. The parameter slot to which the mapping function b is connected represents a chaotic variable in the sequencer function.17). Sequencer pulse stream when there is a left-to-right movement across the joystick’s x axis. the probability that successive values read from an internal finite state machine are mapped to the amplitude of the pulse stream. The parameter slot to which a is mapped represents a multiplication argument for the sequencer’s clock frequency and base amplitude. Time R JSX L SEQ Figure 4.The mapping functions a and b determine. however. An increase in the value of both of these parameters (corresponding to a bottom-to138 .” and 2. that deviations in the x and y axes of the joystick result in more complex behaviors in the pulse stream.

18. The increase in the signal at JSY results in a greater 139 .top movement in the joystick’s y axis) results in an increase in the system’s entropy.18 adds a bottom-to-top movement in the joystick’s y axis to the left-to-right movement in the x axis illustrated in figure 4. and a bottom-to-top movement across the y axis. where pulse “nestedness” implies a greater likelihood of frequency multiplication from one pulse to the next (and therefore a greater likelihood of extra pulses being “nested” into the pulse stream). Sequencer pulse stream when there is a left-to-right movement across the joystick’s x axis. The output of the pulse stream shows the trajectory towards a higher “degree of chaos” over time. Figure 4. Time R JSX L T JSY B SEQ Figure 4.17. and where the irregularly patterned output of the internal finite state machine incrementally encroaches on the otherwise linear behavior of the amplitude mapping in the mapping function a (corresponding to the left-to-right movement across the joystick’s x axis).

18 would indicate). The perceptual guiding of left-hand actions in “surfing the fractal wave” is more integrated than figure 4.18 would suggest. the transitions between then. but there are certain 140 . and a greater likelihood of irregularities in amplitude patterns. Each of the five synthesis networks implements a resonator function. the performer guides the left-hand through singular trajectories across a two-dimensional space. where the pulses that are mapped into each of network serve as excitors. But these motor patterns constitute only one part of the coordinated left hand/right hand movements that amount to “surfing the fractal wave. While each of these networks encapsulates different dynamical responses.likelihood of “nestedness” in the pulse stream. While the joystick operates across two degrees of freedom—the x and y axes—the performer does not break the activity down into separate movements in two dimensions (as figure 4. there are strong symmetries between their behaviors. The output of the chaotic sequencer is mapped to parameters in each of the five discrete audio synthesis networks. and for the shift from greater-to-lesser and lesser-to-greater degrees of event density with respect to time.” And while it’s useful to break the activity down into left and right hand sub-tasks. Rather. These resonators embody different resonance models (with different dynamical responses). And it’s in these motions that a “feel” develops for the sequencer’s stable and chaotic regions. there can be no complete picture without considering how these sub-tasks coordinate and cooperate. and between the kinds of responses that right hand actions might elicit from each of the networks.

The symmetry holds at the level of hardware.” “Resonance”) are assigned to corresponding busses across each channel.” “Width. where rows of knobs in Mr.4. and “Resonance” corresponds to busses C1-5.1 C1.perceptual constants from one network to the next.3. “Width” corresponds to busses C1-5. Percepts (“Gate.5 Figure 4. “Gate” corresponds to busses C1-5. That is.3 Audio Network C2. where each of those percepts corresponds to the same bus number assignment in each channel.2.2 C1.2 C2.19 shows the mapping from local busses to two of the five discrete audio synthesis channels. This has the 141 . High level “percepts” are symmetrical across each of the five channels.3 Audio Network 3. Feely’s Channel Section correspond to rows of busses in the diagram.1. Perceptual symmetries in the functional mapping from busses to the audio networks across distinct channels. 1 Pulse Stream GATE WIDTH RESONANCE 2 C1. Figure 4.19.1 C2.

all pulses are passed when the gate’s value is one.e. It is tied in specifically to parameter nodes in the resonator that change the resonator’s dynamical responsiveness. these “percepts” require a symmetry in terms of the effect of functional mappings into each of the discrete audio synthesis networks if their particular perceptual qualities are to be discerned and distinguished.. and each pulse in the stream has a 0. then. Feely’s Control Section. and the ways in which the filters that 142 . Of course. The implementation of the “Width” mechanism varies slightly from one channel to the next. where no pulses are passed to the resonator system when the gate’s value is zero. whereas these events will take on longer durations (correlating to the perception of having a greater temporal width) as the resonator’s “elasticity” is slackened.e. their bandwidths. i.5. a tighter “elasticity” (implemented as a shorter impulse response in the delay lines in the resonator’s filterbank) will result in shorter output events. It acts.effect of similar classes of response being elicited from corresponding knobs in each of the five channels of Mr. The “Resonance” mechanism is the most varied in terms of implementation across the five channels. The “Gate” mechanism is functionally identical across all five channels: turning the corresponding knob from left to right has the effect of allowing a greater number of pulses to pass through a gated input to each resonator. i.5 probability of passing when the gate’s value is 0. the resonant frequencies. as an event filter on the pulse stream. but its effect is symmetrical: turning the corresponding knob from left to right has the effect of “loosening the elasticity” of each resonator.

comprise the resonator’s internal filterbank interact. The sequence of motion is left then right. as it unfolds. the respective actions form a continuous interplay of complementary motions—as opposed to a sequence of isolated events—and the transference from left-handed to right-handed motions takes place at a much finer granularity of temporal scale. left hand movements give contour to the dynamical unfolding of the pulse stream. But unlike Kabbash et al. 143 . is the frame of reference for the “picking” and “shaping” of discrete events that characterizes right hand actions.” there is a correspondence to each of the three characteristic behaviors of bimanual asymmetric action that Kabbash et al. In the breakdown of right hand and left hand tasks in “surfing the fractal wave. then the right starts to write with the pen”). 2. point out.’s corresponding example (“the left hand grips the paper. The pulse stream. Across all five channels. The left hand sets the frame of reference for action of the right. This follows from the first point: the right hand modifies the event stream only after the left hand has given the stream its dynamical contour. while the right hand acts as an event filter on the stream. turning the “Resonance” knob from left to right tends to shift the dynamical response of the resonator increasingly towards distortion. In the “surfing the fractal wave” model. It’s worth addressing each point in turn: 1. and a modifier of the dynamical properties of the events that emerge from pulses hitting the resonator functions. self-oscillation and nonlinear behavior.

’s corresponding example: “the left hand brings the painter’s palette in and out of range. leaving the little finger to move the joystick through the two dimensional plane while the thumb and pointer finger turn the knobs. left hand activities do not seem to require any conscious attention. turning. In “surfing the fractal wave” the left hand is designated to control the joystick. while the right hand holds the brush and does the fine strokes onto the canvas. and the engineering of the interface around habitual 144 . Feely’s Channel Section. That the dominant hand should be at the centre of attention in the midst of bimanual action is not a point that Kabbash et al. and they do not require grasping.” The two key aspects to the model of activity in “surfing the fractal wave” are the “surfing” aspect. while the right hand activities demand on-going and focused attention. and finely detailed turnings and twiddlings of those knobs. The granularity of action of the left hand is coarser than that of the right. discuss. But even this action is of a coarser granularity than the actions designated to the right hand.3. actions that involve a constant “hopping” between the fifteen knobs that comprise the Channel Section. or other finger motions that are performed at a fine granularity of scale. These joystick manipulations do not require the hand to reposition itself across discrete points on the control surface. such as Kabbash et al. my left hand will often span the distance from the joystick to the top row of knobs in Mr. It’s interesting to note that in the act of playing. I’ve found that in playing with the model. but it seems that my experience of this phenomenon with “surfing the fractal wave” might also apply to other activities.

then. where the desired outcome of the function is known in advance of its execution. in which events are initiated when the performer transmits kinetic energy to the instrumental mechanism. I’ve had a better capacity to deal with the system’s unfolding in a timely manner. but in the coordination of the hands with respect to timing constraints.embodied patterns of “handedness. It’s been interesting to note that. Summary The conventional metaphors of computer science tend to regard computation as an inherently sequential process. And these events can go by very fast. the “surfing the fractal wave” model is built around a persistent stream of events. and in the elaboration of larger scale events. This is at odds with the enactive model of interaction. and as my hands have become both better coordinated and more individually dexterous. more specifically. and this in turn has led to a higher level of detail and nuance in both the shaping of individual sounds at the event level. such as phrases and gestures. Motor patterns. emerge not only in the interdependencies between the two hands. and 145 . In contrast to the “pushing the envelope” model. the entangling of these aspects in the midst of performance—that give the model its idiosyncratic kind of resistance. as a function from input to output comprised of a series of discrete and causally related steps. over the period of time that I’ve worked with this model.” It’s these aspects—or. where activity takes place across a network of interacting components. That is. and where the behavior of those components. This seems to me indicative of the coevolution of sensory. motor and cognitive competencies that is definitive of enaction.

An enactive digital musical instrument. The examples I’ve outlined in this section point. i. will depend on a fundamentally different view of computation to that of conventional computer science. The system allows for human action to be folded into the dynamical processes of interacting network components.e. computation would be viewed as a process in which “the pieces of the model are persistent entities coupled together by their ongoing interactive behavior (Stein 1999:483). to a kind of physical model. a matter of design. And the “right” kinds of resistances—at least with a view to structural coupling. Rather than falling back on the “computation-as-calculation” model. realization and enaction—will be those that are neither so transparent to human action that they demand little thought or effort..” This model of “computation-as-interaction” underlies the design of Mr. in that they embody networks of dynamical 146 .therefore of the network as a whole. the focus of my work is directed more towards the development of instrumental behaviors that are indigenous to computing media. Structural coupling is not. however. then. the kinds of resistance that the instrument affords to the human remains a matter of how the infrastructure is utilized. is adaptive and emergent with respect to the ongoing push-and-pull of interactional dynamics. while the software system provides the required technical infrastructure. or so ungraspable that they forever remain beyond motor and cognitive capability. and to that extent it also allows for a structural coupling of performer and instrument. however. a given property of the system. I suggested in chapter 2 that while there is much to be learned from the physical modeling of conventional acoustic instruments. Feely’s software system.

The design of these systems. Rather.. the performer will continue to realize new practices. I’m suggesting that it’s through this shift that we see the potential arise for what I have called an “indigenous” computer music. i. leaving the designer free to experiment with any manner of sound-producing and processing components. or on differential equations that describe well known physical systems. In the approach I’ve taken. If the balance between these two poles is apposite. I’ve found that the “right” kinds of resistances. But in contrast to physical models of conventional instruments. So.e. 147 . design choices as to “kinds of resistance”—i. takes a middle course between normative and speculative modes of interactivity. classes of behavior—are effectively decoupled from audio synthesis implementations. and new ways of encountering the instrument. however. while the components of the audio synthesis network certainly continue to play a critical role in the instrument’s behavior. over a sustained period of time..e. the models are not based on data from real world measurements. then. continue to be those that are resonant with phenomenal experience and past practices of embodiment. the focus of development is shifted to the mapping framework. they are evolved interactively through experimentation with various mapping and calibration schemes. this means that the simulated physics of resistance will be—in some way or other—functionally related to physical descriptions of real world behavior. the virtual physics of these systems is speculative.dependencies in which human action is resisted by forces that are immanent to the software network. between that which is familiar and that which is other to every day phenomenal experience. Essentially. then the kinds of resistance that the systems afford will be sufficiently rich in dynamical potential that.

would lie with the way in which models might be generated from a consistent but open-ended application of principles that emerge from the interaction between philosophical and technical problematics. as both designer and performer. At first glance. I can’t say for certain how one would go about putting 148 . It also seems that at a certain point. and that there are a great many implementational possibilities yet to be uncovered. in both design and performance. In my work with Mr. this may appear to contradict my observation at the beginning of this chapter that the task of arriving at a universal template for the design of enactive instruments may be ultimately impracticable. rather. these “uncoverings” will necessarily require the development of patterns. Rather than persistently hopping back and forth between philosophical and technical discourses. This would be a kind of meta-design. Feely.4. At this point in my work. For design. it seems I’m still just scratching at the surface of these matters. that are of a higher order than those I’ve outlined to this point. this will likely be a matter of evolving a body of general principles that might be employed such that design knowledge can be added to incrementally.5 Prospects The two usage examples I’ve outlined in this chapter demonstrate just a small number of possible approaches to engineering the kinds of resistance that digital musical instruments might store in potentia. But the issue I’m raising here is more directly concerned with arriving at general principles that operate at a higher level of abstraction than purely implementational concerns. The concern. there would exist an evolving metric for balancing the constraints of one against the other in an integrated framework.

such a framework together. though. Multitasking must necessarily involve some degree of compatibility between the actional patterns that comprise the sub-tasks. it may also lead to a heightened sense of flow—of performative embodiment. Again. how these models might be interleaved in the context of the same performance. As I’ve been careful to make clear. and therefore afford very different varieties of human action. see Alexander ([1964] 1997). there is a higher order of multitasking that could potentially encompass both models simultaneously. And while the two usage examples I outlined in the previous section might involve a certain degree of multitasking in and of themselves. it would seem that they are in fact so different in playing technique as to be incompatible. the two usage examples I’ve outlined in this chapter embody very different kinds of resistance. then. In designing for multitasking. the issue comes back to design.5 and it seems to me a potentially very productive avenue of investigation. The development of higher order patterns in performance is also a matter of balancing opposing constraints. it may prove useful to have in store some metric of actional distance between the kinds of 5 For example. At the same time that this may eventually lead to more complex and diverse sonic utterances. But problems such as these are not without precedent in the history of design. It’s interesting to consider. This kind of multitasking is part and parcel of expert musicianship. In considering the merging of the two models into a single integrated model. 149 .

the more I’m able to isolate certain quirks and glitches in the system. Its appearance or suppression in performance becomes a 6 For example. the more I play with the “surfing the fractal wave” model. But again.7 These kinds of discoveries constitute an important aspect of the learning process. and this element is accounted for in the contingencies of environmental dynamics. at least to this point. There is a stochastic element in enactive process. then. This has certainly been the case with conventional acoustic instruments—and is perhaps definitive of so-called “extended” techniques—and there’s no reason to assume that the situation should be any different for digital musical instruments. It’s been interesting for me to note that. see Wild. It's also interesting to note that.6 With or without these higher order design methods. The balancing of these constraints may prove to be difficult. The glitch. the products of design will invariably afford opportunities for action that were at no point factored into the design process. is simply folded into the enactive model of interaction. the "pushing the envelope" 7 model has yielded no such interesting anomalies. such approaches are not without precedent in design. but because in certain cases they can lead to entirely new avenues of investigation—avenues that would have remained closed had the system been insulated from random environmental inputs in the first instance. Johnson and Johnson (2004). 150 .motor activities that different models afford. not just because they can be assimilated into the accumulating motor and sonic vocabulary.

Either choice will lead to the appropriate refinement of actional dispositions. 151 .matter for human intentionality.

not as a form.5 Groundlessness Whatever comes into being dependent on another Is not identical to that thing. — Barbara McClintock 152 . — Gilles Deleuze. but as a complex relation between differential velocities. each living individuality. between deceleration and acceleration of particles. Nor is it different from it. or a development of form. Mūlamadhyamakakārikā XVIII:10 The important thing is to understand life. Therefore it is neither nonexistent in time nor permanent. Spinoza: Practical Philosophy The main thing is that you forget yourself. — Nagarjuna.

” that enactive theory necessarily implies a “groundless” or “selfless” self—i.” and so on. a self with “no permanent substance. Thompson. and Rosch 1991:116).The structure of our language typically leads us to characterizations of interaction that focus on one side or the other of the interactional loop. the unavoidable products of a subject/object syntax. linkages. and perception is geared towards abstract contemplation of the objectness of things in the world. But despite the inevitable linguistic constraints. It’s precisely because enactive process concerns “the processual transformation of the past into the future through the intermediary of transitional forms that in themselves have no permanent substance (Varela.e. I’ve sought to describe the inherent circularity of the continuous interactional unfolding that is definitive of enactive process. “Humans use technologies. active and embodied participation in the dynamical unfolding of real time and space—and it’s the same non-self that vanishes the moment that attention is turned inward. of course. and my writing in this essay has not been immune to the lopsided characterizations of interaction that such products embody.. One of the more radical outcomes of Varela. and the dynamic momentum of the emergent system that arises in the relations and linkages between heterogeneous elements. These are. Rosch and Thompson’s outline of an enactive cognitive science is the model of subjectivity that necessarily follows from enactive process. but with relations.” a “subjectless subjectivity (Deleuze and Guattari 1987). heterogeneity. a process that is not concerned with subjects and objects. 153 .” This is the non-self that appears in the experience of flow—in an unselfconscious.” “technologies determine humans.

an equipment is a tool that presents itself to human perception and intentionality as something-in-order-to.. it’s directed towards designing something-in-order-to-not-besome-thing. and which at the same time would serve as the measure of the instrument’s resistance. Or. a potential which would lead to an incremental unfolding of relationality.” In Heidegger’s terminology. I have not dealt with the epistemological or ontological implications of an enactive approach to design in any significant manner. we are designing something-in-order-to-perform-music. While the statement is obviously true. if the performative way of being that it brings about is concerned with the unfolding of relations rather than the ordering of things—then I would say that the implementation in question has utility. But to my mind (however that may now be defined). computers have a significant potential. It would be easy enough to arrive at the conclusion that. it’s precisely these implications that are most critical when thinking about design..e. I’ve invoked Heidegger’s use of the term “equipment. 154 . or when implementing implementations. At various points throughout the essay.e. That is. An enactive approach to digital musical instrument design would necessarily account for the realizational potential of the instrument. a conclusion. is directed towards designing an encounter. I think. then.In this essay. and that the epistemological and ontological qualities that it embodies necessarily imply an ethics. The concern for design. it is not. it affords a particular utility. In this respect. i. If an implementation might afford the potential to undermine essentialist ways of being—i. in designing a digital musical instrument.

Computational theories of interaction and agency. pp. Roy and F. 1999.-M.1-52. Agre and S. 1996. [1964] 1997. ———. 1997. J. Rosenschein..-S. Computation and human experience. Naturalizing 155 . 1992. ed. CA: International Computer Music Association.” In B. M. T.” In P. An introduction to cybernetics. Cambridge. “The practical logic of computer work. pp. Notes on the synthesis of form.” In Proceedings of the 2001 International Computer Music Conference. “Sensorimotor transformations in the worlds of frogs and robots. Rosenschein. 2001.Bibliography Agre. Bahn. J. Arbib. P. ed.44-51. Anderson.” Informatica 19 (4):527-535. R. Ashby. UK: Cambridge University Press.53-79. 2005. Varela. R.130-142. Bailey. MA: MIT Press. and J. ———. Petitot. Computational theories of interaction and agency. MA: MIT Press. New York: Da Capo Press. Agre and S. 2002. ———. Design for a brain: The origin of adaptive behaviour. pp. W. Hahn. Cambridge. C. Cambridge. “Physicality and feedback: A focus on the body in the performance of electronic music. Barbaras. Pachoud. Liaw. [1956] 1965. Trueman. “Dynamic networks of sonic interactions: An interview with Agostino Di Scipio. Cambridge. “Computational research on interaction and agency. MA: MIT Press. 1995. D. pp. Alexander. ed. Improvisation: Its nature and practice in music. “The movement of the living as the originary foundation of perceptual intentionality. and D. 1996. [1952] 1960. Cambridge. San Francisco. C. “Computation and embodied agency.” In P.” Computer Music Journal 29 (3):11-28.. MA: Harvard University Press.” In Computationalism: New directions. ———. London: William Clowes and Sons. New York: John Wiley & Sons. C.

1979. Inc. Mind and nature: A necessary unity. Computational theories of interaction and agency. New York: Bantam Books. trans. ———.” In P. “New approaches to robotics. 1990. ———. 2005. Stanford. 2004. R. 1990. B. R. Trends in gestural control of music. Sync or swarm: Improvising music in a complex age. G. “A dynamical systems perspective on agent-environment interaction. Cambridge.525-538. 1993.” Artificial Life 10:309-326. 1980. “Herbert Brün: Project sawdust.” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4 (3):91-99. U. 1991. New York: Continuum. CA: Academic Press Professional.K. San Diego. MA: Harvard University Press. R. Outline of a theory of practice. Borgo.: Polity.41-70. G. Intelligence as adaptive behavior: an experiment in computational neuroethology. “Intelligence without representation. Cambridge. “Physical interfaces in the electronic arts: Interaction theory and interfacing techniques for real-time performance. 1997. pp. pp. Adamson. T. ———. Bongers. New York: Columbia University Press. ———. 1996. pp. Blum. MA: MIT Press.: Cambridge University Press. Paris: IRCAM. “Autopoiesis and cognition in the game of life. CA: Stanford University Press. 1991. trans.” In M. Cambridge. Battier. “Dynamical approaches to cognitive science. 2000.K. ———. ed. Bateson. “The dynamics of adaptive behavior: A research program. 1991.phenomenology: Issues in contemporary phenomenology and cognitive science. Toronto. Brooks. D. The field of cultural production: Essays on art and literature. Nice. Beer. Agre and S. Bourdieu. P. Cambridge. D. ———. Rosenschein. 156 .” Computer Music Journal 3 (1):6-7.” Artificial Intelligence 47:139-159.” Robotics and Autonomous Systems 20:257-289. U. ed.173-216. Wanderley and M. Raymond and M. ———. 1977. Language and symbolic power. 2000. ———. The logic of practice.” Science 253 (5025):1227-1232.

2002. “To listen and to see: Making and using electronic instruments.-M. 1986. Capra. pp. 1996. MA: MIT Press. Naturalizing phenomenology: Issues in contemporary phenomenology and cognitive science. MA: Harvard University Press.3-10. Chabot.” Computer Music Journal 24 (4):12-18. Pachoud.” Parachute (107):56. “The aesthetics of failure: ‘Post-digital’ tendencies in contemporary computer music. sequence. H. 1999. “Plus ça change: Journeys. Bruner. Toward a practice of autonomous systems: Proceedings of the first European conference on artificial life. 1987. “Artificial life and real robots. J. 1969. “There’s more to interaction than meets the eye: Some issues in manual input. Cascone. ———. 2003. Stanford. system: Three levels of reception in the performance of laptop music. “Infraudibles.” Contemporary Music Review 22 (4):101-104. X. ———. W.” Leonardo Music Journal 11:43-49. Draper. A. Buxton. “Grain. Casati. ———.” In F. New York: John Wiley and Sons. Cambridge. 1966-2000. Bourgine. K.———. Brün. Varela and P. ———. NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. pp. Roy and F. Cambridge.” In B. Burzik.” Leonardo Music Journal 3:11-16.counterfeiting aura in the age of infinite reproduction.” In D.372384. 2001. instruments and networks. CA: Stanford University Press. J. Cambridge. ed. R. Norman and S. pp.” Contemporary Music Review 22 (4):1-2. “Formal structures in the phenomenology of motion. Actual minds. 1994. “Introduction. New York: Anchor Books. 1991. Von Foerster and J. “Go with the flow. “Laptop music . 2003. ed. Hillsdale. User centered system design: New perspectives on human-computer interaction. Music by computer. Petitot. 2000. MA: Harvard University Press. Beauchamp.” The Strad:714-718. 2003. The web of life: A new scientific understanding of living systems. W. 157 . 1992. Casserley. J. possible worlds. L. Varela.319-337. ed.” In H. F. ed. Acts of meaning.

Situated cognition: On human knowledge and computer representations. body and environment. “A manifold interface for a high dimensional control space. and D. N. D. second series 33:346-366. Clarke. “A set of postulates for the foundation of logic. 1995. 1997. 1997. Cambdrige. Chiel. 1998. J. ———. W. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ed. “The limitations of mapping as a structural descriptive in electronic instruments. “Generative music and laptop performance. A. Upper Saddle River. J. I. A.385-392. Choi. ———. 1995. Cambridge. 158 . H. Natural-born cyborgs: Minds. “An unsolvable problem of elementary number theory. Clancey.” Philosophical Perspectives 9:89-104. U. 1997.” Annals of Mathematics. pp.: Cambridge University Press. ———. A..” Contemporary Music Review 9:207-220. “The brain has a body: adaptive behavior emerges from interactions of nervous system. 1936. Proceedings of the 2002 New Interfaces for Musical Expression Conference. and R. Clark. Chalmers. Beer. “Generativity. “A component model of gestural primitive throughput. F.. 1932. 1993.” Contemporary Music Review 22 (4):67-79.” Trends in Neurosciences 20 (12):553-557. Collins. 2002.” Analysis 58 (1):7-19. Being there: Putting brain. Clark.” In Proceedings of the 1995 International Computer Music Conference. 2003. 2003. San Francisco. body and world together again. “The extended mind. CA: International Computer Music Association. 1997. mimesis and the human body in music performance.Chadabe. and the future of human intelligence. MA: MIT Press. Electric sound: The past and promise of electronic music. Brazil.” In E. NJ: Prentice Hall. technologies.” In Proceedings of the 2003 New Interfaces for Musical Expression Conference.197-201.” American Journal of Mathematics 58:345-363. ———. pp.201-204. pp.K. E. 2003. “Moving minds: Situating content in the service of real-time success. ———. Church.

” Journal of New Music Research 33 (3):315-320.” In Proceedings of the 2001 New Interfaces for Musical Expression Conference. 2001. CA: University of California Press. P. B. 1983. ed. H. CA: International Computer Music Association. Damasio. San Francisco. 1987. trans. Deleuze. Bergsonism. New York: Putnam. A thousand plateaus: Capitalism and schizophrenia. New York: Zone Books. Cook. San Francisco: City Lights. Joughin. Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and schizophrenia. M. and E. ———. R. 1991. Difference and repetition. Bourgine. Guattari. A. Csikszentmihaly.202-208. P. The practice of everyday life. 1991.. trans. Deleuze. New York: Zone Books. Tomlinson and B. and F. ———.88-95. trans. Flow: The psychology of optimal experience. 2004. Habberjam. 1994. G. “Principles for designing computer music controllers. 1984. MA: MIT Press. Cambridge. R. New York: Harper Perennial.” In Proceedings of the 1994 International Computer Music Conference. 1992. [1968] 1994. New York: Columbia University Press. “Remutualizing the musical instrument: Co-design of synthesis algorithms and controllers. E. A. 1990. Cull. 1994. ———.Cook. “The circularity of living systems: The movement and direction of behavior. pp. Dedieu. Di Scipio. ———. R. P. M. 2000. trans. Mazer. Hurley. “Formal processes of timbre composition: Challenging the dualistic paradigm of computer music. Massumi. reason and the human brain. Berkeley.” In F. “An approach to sensorimotor relevance. M. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.. Spinoza: Practical philosophy. Descartes’ error: Emotion. Patton. 1988. J. G. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Expressionism in philosophy: Spinoza. pp. trans. De Certeau. Toward a practice of autonomous systems: Proceedings of the first European conference on artificial life. Varela and P. 159 .” Journal of Applied Systems Studies 1 (1):51-65.

louisiana. What computers still can’t do: A critique of artificial reason. 1992.” Social Research 60 (1):17-38. MA: MIT Press. 1996. ———. ———. Cambridge. ———. Music. S.” In E. “Ecological modeling of textural sound events by iterated nonlinear functions. Dreyfus. London: Routledge. 2000. “Heidegger’s critique of the Husserl/Searle account of intentionality. E.pdf. 1990.spring/dreyfus. Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy (4). A. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing. MA: MIT Press. pp.ics. The current relevance of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of embodiment. “From essentialism to constructivism: Philosophy of technology at the crossroads. ed. 1993. Light and D. Division I’. Electronic Media and Culture. Emmerson. 2000. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. ———. 2001. Sound ideas: music. 1997. Oxford: Oxford University Press. machines. “’Losing touch?’: The human performer and electronics. Cambridge. Embodied interaction: Exploring the foundations of a new approach to HCI. Feenberg. 2005. 1999. Being-in-the-world: A commentary on Heidegger’s ‘Being and Time. A.———. Cambrdige.294-315. Transforming technology. MA: MIT Press. Where the action is: Foundations of embodied interaction.1996. ———. Evens. 1991. Higgs. Technology and the good life? Chicago: University of Chicago Press. http://ejap.194-216. ———. ———. “Interpreting music technology: From Heidegger to subversive rationalization.html. 160 .edu/~jpd/publications/misc/embodied. Critical theory of technology. P.” Social Epistemology 4 (135-154). Dietrich. http://www.” In S. pp.” In Proceedings of the 2000 Colloquium on Musical Informatics. H. 2002. 2000. Dourish.33-36.spring. Questioning technology. 1991.” Sonus 18 (1):63-80. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. A. pp. Emmerson. and experience. ed. “Computationalism.uci. Strong.

” In E. Want. cognition and computerized sound. A. J. pp.. G. “The aesthetics of interactive computer music.” Communications of the ACM 43 (9):75-80. ed. 1983. Goudeseune. T. Gallagher. G. Hamman. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gillespie. M. 1979. J. CA: New Riders Press. Fodor. and W. “Haptics. A. and R. pp. ———. Perceiving. 2001. E. Cook. Bransford. New York: Houghton-Mifflin. Gibson. O’modhrain. M.” Computer Music Journal 25 (1):21-33. ed.261-276. 161 . MA: MIT Press. Urbana-Champaign. 2000. ed. E. Computation. Garnett. Shaw and J. and knowing: Toward an ecological psychology. Cambridge. MA: MIT Press. Giunti. Hillsdale. Everyware: The dawning age of ubiquitous computing.37-43. Composing with parameters for synthetic instruments. Berkeley.” In R. 1999. 1987. University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Davenport. “Embodied user interfaces for really direct manipulation. Proceedings of the 2002 New Interfaces for Musical Expression Conference.247-260.. C.43-50. Gunther. 1997.Fishkin. “Cutaneous grooves: Composing for the sense of touch. 2003. E. ———. IL. “Interaction as composition: Toward the paralogical in computer music. MA: MIT Press. Greenfield. G. Music. Cambridge. “An empirical evaluation of graspable user interfaces: towards specialized. 2001. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1999. ed. Buxton.. The modularity of mind. 2006. S.” In P.” In Proceedings of the 1997 SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems. Guiard. A. “Asymmetric division of labor in human skilled bimanual action: The kinematic chain as a model. B. B. Cambridge. space-multiplexed input. 2002. cognition and computerized sound. “Haptics in manipulation. “The theory of affordances. 1997. Fitzmaurice. Brazil. pp. Harrison. acting. Gujar. The ecological approach to visual perception. J. Music. and S.” In P. Y. K. 1997. Cook. NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.” Sonus 18 (1):26-44. How the body shapes the mind. pp. dynamics and cognition.” Journal of Motor Behavior 19 (4):486-517. Moran. 1977.

” Perspectives of New Music 40 (1):92-120.” In. 2002. biology and chemistry. ed. and the composition of music interaction.159-174. Macquarrie and E. literature and informatics. signification. evolution. 1985.3-35. How we became posthuman: Virtual bodies in cybernetics. Athens: World Scientific Engineering Society. “From technical to technological: Interpreting technology through composition. Haraway. M.” In The question concerning technology and other essays. 2000. “Structure as performance: Cognitive musicology and the objectification of procedure. 1988. ———. ———. trans. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Scheutz. K. Basic problems of phenomenology. ed. business and economics. Cambridge. 2002. pp. interactive emergence. Tabor. [1949] 1977. Heidegger. Westport: Greenwood Press. H. Robinson. New York: Harper and Row. trans. London: SCM Press. Otto Laske: Navigating new musical horizons. 162 . ———. “Authentic intentionality. interpretation. Artificial intelligence: The very idea. “Priming computer-assisted music composition through design of human/computer interaction. composition.shout. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Haugeland.pdf.” In M. ———. N.” Journal of New Music Research 28 (2):90-104. Mastorakis. “A cyborg manifesto: Science.” In J. 1999. 1999. ed. Being and time. “The question concerning technology. 2000. http://www.” In Proceedings of the 2000 Coloquium on Musical Informatics. pp. MA: MIT Press.” In N. J. The technical as aesthetic: Technology. 2002. Mathematics and computers in modern science: Acoustics and music. Catching ourselves in the act: Situated activity. pp. 1996. and human thought. J. D. 1999. MA: MIT Press. and socialist-feminism in the late ywentieth century. Cambridge. MA: MIT Press. A. Cambridge. Hendriks-Jansen. New York: Routledge.149-181. technology.———. ———. ———. ———. “From technical to technological: The imperative of technology in experimental music composition. “From symbol to semiotic: Representation. Hofstadter. ———. Hayles. [1927] 1962. Computationalism: new directions.

and R. D. Albany. MA: Perseus Book. Proffitt. and M. Cambridge. R.209-212. ———. Emergence: From chaos to order. Technology and the lifeworld: From garden to earth. “Towards a model for instrumental mapping in expert musical interaction. A. ———. Hutchins.” Journal of New Music Research 25 (3):212-230. Cambridge. D. Hunt. 1990. Cambridge.03. Existential technics. Cognition in the wild.html. J. Hidden order: How adaptation builds complexity. E. ———. Rosenschein. Bloomington. IN: Indiana University Press. 2003. IN: Indiana University Press. “The importance of parameter mapping in electronic instrument design. 1995. pp. control. H. ed. Cambridge. NY: State University of New York Press.honing. http://smt. Adorno. Philosophy of technology: An introduction. “Analysis of adaptation and environment. J.1.9. ———. ———. “Formalization of computer music interaction through a semiotic approach.367-396. W. pp. Some comments on the relation between music and motion. MA: MIT Press. Pausch. pp.. 1991. and T. and artificial intelligence. ———. 1997. 2003. Instrumental realism: The interface between philosophy of science and philosophy of technology. Adaptation in natural and artificial systems: An introductory analysis with applications to biology. San Francisco. Honing. M. 1993.” In Proceedings of the 2000 International Computer Music Conference. 1992. Wanderley. 1996. 2000. 1995.” Journal of New Music Research 32 (4):429-440.03. MA: Perseus Books. Hunt.1/mto. Music Theory Online (1). Holland. New York: Paragon House.Hinckley. 163 . Meaning in musical gesture. Trends in gestural control of music. and N. 2000. I. 1983. 1996. 1972. K. 1998.. F.” In Proceedings of the 1997 SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems. Horkheimer. Paradis. Dialectic of enlightenment.9. trans. Wanderley. Patten. Cumming. CA: International Computer Music Association.” In P. MA: MIT Press.. Bloomington.. M. A. Iazzetta. M. New York: Continuum. Kirk. Ihde. Computational theories of interaction and agency. Horswill. Kassell. Cambridge. MA: MIT Press.ucsb. “Cooperative bimanual action.27-34. Agre and S.

” In W. ———. S. “Integrality and separability of input devices. Sibert. Cambridge.” Computer Music Journal 7 (7):43-55. “FMOL: Toward user-friendly. imagination. Jackendoff. sophisticated new musical instruments. and reason. The body in the mind: The bodily basis of meaning. S. P. “The (anti-)laptop aesthetic. embodiment. L. MA: MIT Press. A.417-423. Jacob. pp. 1987. S. B.” Computer Music Journal 26 (3):23-39. and A. The origins of order: Self-organization and selection in evolution. Krefeld.” Contemporary Music Review 22 (4). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.. ed. efficient and learnable instruments.. Cambridge. and coordination dynamics. 2003. MA: MIT Press. Sellen. Mullen.” In Proceedings of the 1994 SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems. Jordà. “The Hand in the web: An interview with Michel Waisvisz. T. 1994. 2003. S. M. D. “The embodiment of intentionality. V. 2003. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1993.” ACM Transactions on Computer-Human Interaction (1):3-26. Jordan. Consciousness and the computational mind. Karmiloff-Smith. Johnson.” Journal of New Music Research 31 (1):1-10. 2002. pp. “The gluiph: A nucleus for integrated instruments. Bodies in technology. “Interactive music systems for everyone: Exploring visual feedback as a way for creating more intuitive.” In Proceedings of the 2003 New Interfaces for Musical Expression Conference. Buxton. pp. 164 . MA: MIT Press. Dynamical systems approach to cognition: concepts and empirical paradigms based on selforganization. Kauffman. ———. 1987. Kabbash. 1992. 2002.180-183. 1994. Cambridge. 2002. and M. “Improvising with computers: A personal survey (1989-2001). Tschacher. 2003. 1990. Jaeger. Beyond modularity: A developmental perspective on cognitive science.” In Proceedings of the 2003 Stockholm Music Acoustics Conference. “Two handed input in a compound task.201-228. Kartadinata. R. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. R.———. Mcfarlane.

1986. 1968. P. “What is means to be ‘situated’. Leppert. A. Lingis. and M. Toward a practice of autonomous systems: Proceedings of the first European conference on artificial life. Lakoff. MA: MIT Press. E. Johnson. Hendriks. We have never been modern. 1991.” Interface (20):235-269. New York: Basic Books. 1993. C. Lidov. Boston: New Science Library.48-57. trans. Latour. pp. Morrison. L. Lansky. The tree of knowledge: The biological roots of human understanding. E. R. ed.Lakoff.” Perspectives of New Music 28 (2):102-110. The phenomenology of perception. “A view from the bus: When machines make music.” Cybernetics and Systems 29:751-777. ———. G. ———. representation. and R. Maturana. H. 1987. B. Dordrecht. 1980. 1980. Chicago: University of Chicago Press... Bourgine. New York: Basic Books.483-514. 1990. “Toward an epistemology of composition. Smith.. The society of mind. Holland: D. and A. Varela. Evanston. [1945] 2004. Laske. M. CA: University of California Press. G.” In P. Beskin. 165 . 1999. trans. The sight of sound: Music. 1992. Minsky. M. Metaphors we live by. P. Merleau-Ponty. Loren. Agre and S.. Computational theories of interaction and agency. D. Maes. M. ———. Reidel Publishing Company.” In F. Where mathematics comes from: How the embodied mind brings mathematics into being. ed. Lyons. Núñez. Cambridge. Varela and P. J.. Cambridge. J. IL: Northwestern University Press. and F. Philosophy in the flesh: The embodied mind and its challenge to western thought.” Semiotica 1 (3):69-97. New York: Simon and Schuster. Dietrich. MA: MIT Press. London: Routledge. Rosenschein. pp. “Learning behavior networks from experience. 2000. C. “Exploiting patterns of interaction to achieve reactive bahvior. R. “Mind and body in music. O. 1987. 1993. 1996. 1998. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf. and the history of the body. and J. Berkeley. Autopoiesis and cognition: The realization of the living. The visible and the invisible. D.

1999. and S. 1999. 1974. A. Naturalizing phenomenology: Issues in 166 . Hillsdale. Pachoud. A. 2002. NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. “Human bodies. Action in perception. Cambridge.Mulder. 1986. O’day. Norman.-M. Norman and S. Hillsdale. 1999. Nardi. The design of everyday things.286335. and V. MA: MIT Press. User centered system design: New perspectives on human-computer interaction. New York: Basic Books. D.. 2002. 1996. 1999.” In B.. NJ: Prentice Hall. B. MA: MIT Press. and E.” Leonardo Music Journal 12:11-14. “Interactive gesture music performance interface. Ostertag. Draper. Cambridge. K. 2004. The invisible computer: Why good products can fail. Nardi. D.” In D. MA: MIT Press. London: Guildhall Music and Drama Annual. ed. Mumma. 2002. NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. ———. pp. New York: American Audio Engineering Society. ———. Hutchins. “Affordances. 1967.” Paper read at Proceedings of the 2002 New Interfaces for Musical Expression Conference.” In. “’Leibhaftigkeit’ and representational theories of perception. J. NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. “Live electronic music. Norman and S. ———. ———. “Cognitive engineering. eds. computer music. E. B. Draper. Appleton and R. ———. L. Noë. ed. “Direct manipulation interfaces. University of York. “Notes on cybersonics: Artificial intelligence in live musical performance. Cambridge. 1986. Norman. Petitot.” In J. 1974. D. Context and consciousness: Activity theory and human-computer interaction. ed.” In D. Roy and F.” Interactions 6 (3):38-43. MA: MIT Press. conventions and design. Norman. The Development and Practice of Electronic Music. J. D. ed. Hillsdale. Information ecologies: Using technology with heart.” In Proceedings of the 33rd National Convention of the American Audio Engineering Society. Ng. B. Radical user interfaces for real-time musical control. Draper. Perera. Englewood Cliffs. the personal computer is so complex. C. Pacherie. Holland. G. Cambridge.. “Creative aspects of live electronic music technology. 1986. and information appliances are the solution. J. Varela. 1999.

Pask. ed. Fourth European conference on artificial life. Toward a practice of autonomous systems: Proceedings of the first European conference on artificial life. “Distributed adaptive control: A paradigm for designing autonomous agents. “Current trends in electronic music interfaces. Ph. Perkis. CA: Stanford University Press. Heidegger. 1997. Paradiso. An approach to cybernetics. Naturalizing phenomenology: Issues in contemporary phenomenology and cognitive science. ———. Pachoud. ed. Norton. ed. Varela. Stanford. 167 . “Bringing digital music to life.” IEEE Spectrum 34 (12):18-30. G.contemporary phenomenology and cognitive science. Philosophy. B. Verschure.” In P. 1962. “Epistemic autonomy in models of living systems. 1995. Representational and non-representational intentionality: Husserl. E. 1992.21-30. Preston. and S. New York: W. J..-M. No sound is innocent. 1996. Varela. E.” Computer Music Journal 20 (2):28-32. Micro man: Computers and the evolution of consciousness. Petitot. “Heidegger and artificial intelligence.. CA: Stanford University Press. Prem.-M. Stanford. MA: MIT Press.” In F. and F. New York. and artificial intelligence.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1):43-69. Naturalizing phenomenology: Issues in contemporary phenomenology and cognitive science. W. S. Curran. 1988.196-219.. Pinker. J. pp. Essex: Copula. NY: Harper. Matching Tye. Roy.” In B. E. J.. J. Pask. Pfeifer. “Beyond the gap: An introduction to naturalizing phenomenology. 1993. B. 1999. ed. New York: Macmillan.-M. T. CA: Stanford University Press. Roy and F. “The teleological dimension of perceptual and motor intentionality. Pachoud. A. 1997.2-9. Prévost.” In B. Petitot. 1997. “Electronic music: New ways to play. J. Harvey.D. Cambridge.1-80. pp. Pachoud. Roy and F. 1999. Bourgine. Stanford. pp. 1982. pp. and P. ———. Varela and P. J. F. Boston University. J. R. How the mind works. Boston. Pachoud. G.” Journal of New Music Research 32 (4):345-349. Varela. Petitot. pp. Husbands and I. 2003.148-160.

257-259. and L. Petitot. ed. 168 .-M. 1985. Sapir. Scheutz. pp. CA: International Computer Music Association. Computational theories of interaction and agency. ———. 1999. 2002. S. Machine musicianship. ———. 1994. pp. pp. Kaelbling. representation and symbol. W. S. 1989. “Using contemporary technology in live performance: The dilemma of the performer. Agre and S. M. MA: MIT Press.541-596. U. CA: International Computer Music Association. ed. T..1-21.” In B. R. J.The next generation. CA: William Kaufmann Inc. “Saving intentional phenomena: Intentionality.” Journal of New Music Research 32 (3):239-242. Cambridge. Roads. L. Rowe. “Gestural control of digital audio environments. pp.” In Computationalism: New directions. Pachoud. ed. MA: MIT Press. Proceedings of the 1992 International Computer Music Conference. Roy and F. C. “Some remarks on musical instrument design at STEIM. 2002. J. “A situated view of representation and control. Varela. Rosenschein. Los Altos. 1996.-M.” In Proceedings of the 1989 International Computer Music Conference. Naturalizing phenomenology: Issues in contemporary phenomenology and cognitive science. “Effort and expression. Pfeiffer. pp. “The matter of music is sound and body-motion. CA: Stanford University Press. 2003. Rosenschein.111-147.” Contemporary Music Review 22 (4):11-22.Reddell. A. Riethmüller. Cambridge. MA: MIT Press. CA: Stanford University Press. P. pp.” Contemporary Music Review 6 (1):3-17. Cambridge. 1992.” In P. J. Materialities of communication. J.” In H.” In. Cambridge. MA: MIT Press. Roy. 2001. A. “Laptopia: The spatial poetics of networked laptop performance. 1993. “Active music representations. Stanford. Interactive music systems: Machine listening and composing. Ryan. ———. Schloss. San Francisco.148-156. 2003. ed. Gombrecht and K. “Improvisation with George Lewis.” Journal of New Music Research 31 (2):119-129.414-416. “Computationalism . Stanford. San Francisco. 1991.” In A. Strange.

———.” In J.” In M. Cambridge. Cambridge. Suchman. Sudnow. 1998. 1999. Urbana. Simon. The mathematical theory of communication. B.55-83. J. Smith. Smyth. D. IL: University of Illinois Press. pp. Cambridge. 1992. 1987.” Computer Music Journal 16 (3). “The object of performance: Aural performativity in contemporary laptop music. CA: Stanford University Press.” In. and J. Smith. Sheets-Johnstone.” Paper read at Proceedings of the 2002 New Interfaces for Musical Expression Conference. J. Scheutz. “Musical motion and performance: Theoretical and empirical perspectives. 1999. ———. Cambridge.” Computer Science Education 8 (2):118-129. Smith. 2000. C. 2001.” Cybernetics and Systems 30 (6):473-507. pp. C. On the origin of objects. 2002. Roy and F. Stein. 1996. MA: MIT Press. Pachoud. MA: MIT Press. “What we’ve swept under the rug: Radically rethinking CS1. Ways of the hand: A rewritten account. “The foundations of computing. Petitot. H. “Plans and situated actions: The problem of human-machine communication. The sciences of the artificial. Stuart. ed. A.83-110. “Intentionality naturalized?” In B. 1995. ed. Cambridge. Musicking: The meanings of performing and listening. “Challenging the computational metaphor: Implications for how we think. 2001.-M. Varela. 2002. Naturalizing phenomenology: Issues in contemporary phenomenology and cognitive science. Rink. ed.. 1998. L. Philadelphia: John Benjamins. W. T. Shove. pp. “An alternative to a standard taxonomy for electronics and computer instruments. Hanover.Shannon. NH: Wesleyan University Press. 1949. The primacy of movement. M. D. P. Stanford. L.” Contemporary Music Review 22 (4):59-65. 2003. Small. L.K. C. Cambridge. C. U. MA: MIT Press. Computationalism: New directions. MA: MIT Press. “Creating sustained tones with the cicada’s rapid sequential buckling mechanism. UK: Cambridge University Press.23-58. Spiegel. 169 . A.: Cambridge University Press.

and P. Temprado. E. M.Tanaka. Dynamical systems approach to cognition: Concepts and empirical paradigms based on self-organization. pp. A dynamic systems approach to the development of cognition and action. J. 2002. N. Noë. 1994. Thelen. Stanford. Port and T. Trueman. Naturalizing phenomenology: Issues in contemporary phenomenology and cognitive science. Princeton. “Perceptual completion: A case study in phenomenology and cognitive science. P. Body and world Cambridge. Reinventing the violin. ed.17-44. 2003. Knapp. “Multimodal interaction in music using the electromyogram and relative position sensing. C. B.” In Proceedings of the 2000 170 .93-132.-M. 1999. Ph. pp. and L. D. Cambridge. A. J. Pachoud. “Grounded in the world: Developmental origins of the embodied mind. ———. CA: Stanford University Press. “Time scale dynamics and the development of an embodied cognition. Bahn. 2003. ed. Todes. Roy and F. pp. Tschacher. MA: MIT Press.. ———. 1999. Mind as motion: Explorations in the dynamics of cognition. Varela.69-99. Pessoa. 1995. pp. 2000. 1992. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Company. pp. “Motion in music: A neurobiological perspective.” In B. Cambridge. MA: MIT Press. Cook.. J. Van Gelder. NJ. S.” In E. “The dynamics of dynamics: A model of musical expression.” Journal of New Music Research 31 (2):119-129. ed.” In R. ed. “Alternative voices for electronic sound: Spherical speakers and sensor-speaker arrays (SenSAs). Petitot. MA: MIT Press. 2000. ———.” In W. Dynamical systems approach to cognition: Concepts and empirical paradigms based on self-organization. Trueman. Music.. MA: MIT Press. Brazil. J. “Cognition in action: The interplay of attention and bimanual coordination dynamics. D.” Music Perception 17 (1):115-126.161-195.” Journal of the Acoustical Society of America 91 (6):3540-3550. embodiment and coordination dynamics. embodiment. “BoSSA: The deconstructed violin reconstructed. ———. Princeton University.43-48. Tschacher. 1999. and coordination dynamics. E.. Cambridge.D. and R. Todd. Proceedings of the 2002 New Interfaces for Musical Expression Conference. 2001. ed.” In W. Thompson. A.

” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21:615-628.. pp. Human-computer interaction in the new millenium. Ogilvy. Amsterdam: Elsevier (North Holland). ed. Wanderley. The second self: Computers and the human spirit. New York: Simon and Schuster. B. T. Varela.248-251.” Contemporary Music Review 22 (4):81-92. 2004. Albany. “Computing machinery and intelligence. Van Gelder. Carroll. CA: Stanford University Press. Revisioning Philosophy. 1936. New York: North Holland. and R. with an application to the Entscheidungsproblem.International Computer Music Conference. 1950.. “Making it concrete: Before. and P. Van Nort. “The specious present: A neurophenomenology of time consciousness. San Francisco. S. 2003. M. 1984. ed.” Journal of New Music Research 19 (3):245-255. 2001. Depalle. NY: State University of New York Press. T.579601.” In J. ———.” In M. 1998. F.. ed. pp. 1979. “Emerging frameworks for tangible user interfaces. Turkle. “Designing musical cyberinstruments with body and soul in mind. Pachoud. Principles of biological autonomy. “The resonance of the cubicle: Laptop performance in post-digital musics. D. Petitot. pp. Turner. Series 2 42:230-265.” In B. Turing. pp.36-48. Stanford. 2000. Ishii.” In Proceedings of the 2004 New Interfaces for Musical Expression Conference. ———. pp. “On computable numbers. 1980.” Mind LIX (236):433-460. A. T. CA: International Computer Music Association. Ungvary. Autopoiesis: A theory of living organization.” Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society. ———. Varela. M. ———. Addison-Wesley. Ullmer.266-314. J. during and after breakdowns. M.” In J. Vertegaal. 171 . “Describing the logic of the living: The adequacy and limitations of the idea of autopoiesis. pp. ed. Roy and F. 1999. Naturalizing phenomenology: Issues in contemporary phenomenology and cognitive science.97-109. and H. “On the choice of mappings based on geometric properties. Zeleny. J.87-91.-M. 1992. “The dynamical hypothesis in cognitive science.

Varela. Varela and P. Thompson. 172 . Von Neumann. M. Verplank. 2001. Varela.” In F. M. 2003. University Paris 6. J. P. Thompson.” Copmuter Music Journal 29 (2):23-39. “The connection between AI and biology in the study of behavior.421-428. D. B. Cambridge. Bourgine... W.. Wessel. 1988. F. Webb. Smithers.. and M.” Scientific American 265 (3):94104. Cambridge. and T. pp. “Interconnected musical networks: Toward a theoretical framework. “The world is not a desktop. CA: Xerox PARC. 1958. ed.” In Proceedings of the 2001 New Interfaces for Musical Expression Conference. Wright. G. ———. Performer-instrument interaction: applications to gestural control of sound synthesis. 2001. Rosch. Toward a practice of autonomous systems: Proceedings of the first European conference on artificial life. Wanderley. “A course on controllers. “Why interaction is more important than algorithms. New Haven. 1994. Whitelaw. and E. The embodied mind: Cognitive science and human experience. F. M. and E. Palo Alto. and S. The computer and the brain. 1992. 1996. CA: Xerox PARC. MA: MIT Press. 1997. Weinberg. 2005. 2001. Paris. M. “Problems and prospects for intimate musical control of computers. MA: MIT Press. 1991. 2001. 1991. Weiser. Palo Alto.. Ubiquitous computing #1 and #2. The coming age of calm technology.” Interactions 1 (1):7-8. E. Brown. CT: Yale University Press. “Radical embodiment: Neural dynamics and consciousness.” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 5 (10):418-425. Wegner. ———.” Communications of the ACM 40 (5):80-91. Weiser.” Contemporary Music Review 22 (4):93-100. “Sound particles and microsonic materialism.” In Proceedings of the 2001 New Interfaces for Musical Expression Conference. “The computer for the twenty-first century.

ed. T. Winkler. pp. N.218-226. Stanford. U. Wilden. and F. “Body and performance.Wiener. A. P. and H. MA: MIT Press.. System and structure: Essays in communication and exchange. T. Johnson. Cybernetics.” In Proceedings of the 3rd International Workshop on Task Models and Diagrams for User Interface Design. London: Tavistock Publications. P. 1977. 1986. Zumthor. Understanding computers and cognition: A new foundation for design. San Francsico.” In H. “Towards a composite modelling approach for multitasking. Flores.17-24.261-264. Wild. “Making motion musical: Gesture mapping strategies for interactive computer music.. Cambridge. CA: Stanford University Press. L. Prague: ACM International Conference Proceeding Series. pp. 1995. Winograd. Johnson. pp. Norwood. CA: International Computer Music Association.” In Proceedings of the 1994 International Computer Music Conference. Pfeiffer. control and communication in the animal and the machine. NJ: Ablex Publishing. 1961. P. 2004. 1994. 173 . Gombrecht and K. Or.

Sign up to vote on this title
UsefulNot useful