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Arms Over the People: What Have the Maoists Achieved in Dandakaranya?
It has hitherto been impossible to assess the approach and activities of the Maoists in the Dandakaranya region in central India. We now have four documents – two authored by senior leaders of the Maoists and two sympathetic accounts – which allow us to evaluate in a limited fashion the work of the Maoists over the past quarter century of operations. The story that comes across is a dismal one. The State earlier did nothing for the adivasis but, considering the time the Maoists have spent in the region, they themselves have achieved little by way of adivasi welfare, be it in wages, education, health or agriculture. This is because the Maoists’ politics of waging guerrilla warfare on the road to seizure of state power has meant that they must focus on using the adivasis for their war.
he Indian state has amassed nearly 1,00,000 paramilitary forces – codenamed Operation Green Hunt – ostensibly to confront an armed rebellion organised by the Communist Party of India (Maoist) in the Dandakaranya forests that stretch across eastern Maharashtra, south Chhattisgarh and western Orissa. There is overwhelming evidence that the Maoist forces at the front line – the militias and the guerrilla army – consist almost entirely of adivasi youth. It is evident – yet systematically overlooked – that any armed operation to flush out the Maoist leadership will have adivasis, armed or unarmed, as the direct target. There are layers and layers of adivasi human shields between the government forces and the Maoist leadership. Further, as the ill-fated and murderous Salwa Judum campaign showed, any attack on adivasis not only results in immense calamity for the adivasis, it, in fact, helps increase Maoist base of support including expansion of guerrilla forces. To understand why even the militias and the guerrillas – not to mention the millions of unarmed adivasis who support them – ought to be viewed as victims requiring protection, we need to understand the real character of how the (upper class) Maoists, driven out from Andhra and Bihar, went about constructing their base of support in Bastar.
were apparently invited by the Maoists to visit their area of operation. There is not a single remark in the two (very) long pieces that question the basic objectives of Maoist strategy. (For records, Roy 2009 did contain some well-tempered critical remarks; they are now totally absent from Roy 2010.) Furthermore, each article is strewn with political remarks of the authors themselves, some of which directly support the basic Maoist goals and practices. Away from the propaganda of the Indian state, then, this study is based on pro-Maoist documents. The Maoist spokesperson Azad (2010) asserts that “the welfare of the masses is the first priority for the Maoist revolutionaries”. The media-savvy Kishenji (Koteshwar Rao) offers to talk to any party that “worked for the common good of people” (Times of India, 18 March) suggesting that the Maoists had devoted themselves to the “common good” of adivasis in Bastar forests. The Maoists had entered these forests for about 25 years before the first of the major attacks by the state began in 2005 and subsequently entrenched themselves therein. So, what have the Maoists accomplished for the adivasis in that quarter of a century?
The ability of an organisation to engage in the welfare of a given population is obviously a function of the influence of that organisation in the concerned area. As the writers report, the Maoists entered the Dandakaranya forests in small groups – two squads (Navlakha 2010), seven squads (Roy 2010) – back in 1980. (The puzzling issue of why they chose Dandakaranya of all places in this vast country will be taken up later.) Having secured the confidence of the local, predominantly adivasi population, they set about organising them so that they can realise their rights – for example, rights of land, forest produce, and the like. Needless to say, vested interests, such as adivasi chiefs in cohort with the local police and forest officials, attempted feeble oppostion initially. There were more determined attempts in 1991 and 1997 that were easily dispelled because a large number of adivasis had benefited from the movement by then: “killing a few of the most notorious landlords” (Roy 2010) did the job. As the remnants of state representatives were
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We now have four important documents in the public domain to study this issue. Two of these are based on recent travels inside the Maoist territory by two public intellectuals from Delhi (Roy 2010; Navlakha 2010); the others are detailed interviews of the general secretary of the Maoist party (Ganapathi 2010) and the Maoist spokesperson (Azad 2010). The last two are Maoist documents by definition. The other two were written after the authors
This is a shorter and revised version of an article that was posted earlier on Outlook.com, Znet, progati.com, and countercurrents.com. Nirmalangshu Mukherji (firstname.lastname@example.org) is at the department of philosophy, Delhi University.
june 19, 2010
JS).000 leaves or 100 bamboo culms in a day.000. Roy (2010) is led to believe that the party’s authority “now ranged across 60. a adivasi has to cut. In general terms. and three to five area JSs go on to constitute a division.000 members. ploughing was unheard of until 10 years ago. The documents do not state how many contractors operate in the Dandakaranya area. the Maoists were able to build up a substantial organisational base both in terms of participartion of people and coverage of area. From 2001 onwards. things seem to have proceeded smoothly till about 2005. The contractors are allowed to collect up to 5. Dandakaranya Adivasi Kisan Majdoor Sangh (DAKMS).00. The Maoists were also able to eliminate traditional social evils such as free first day labour for tilling the land of the village chief. ‘We need people who know about seeds. Krantikari Adivasi Mahila Samity (KAMS). currently has nearly 1. honey and other forest produce that generate “royalties” for the party. but due to the adivasi traditions. a adivasi has to collect and bundle nearly 2. But the mere surpassing of highly exploitative wages announced by a particular state government to satisfy the greed of private contractors does not by itself qualify as an “alternative development model” that others allegedly preach but the “Maoists have been practising for last 30 years among millions of Indians” (Navlakha 2010).000 bags. Chetna Natya Manch. I must emphasise that these are Maoist numbers as told to the visiting intellectuals. The other side of this problematic picture is that. These measures explain why the adivasis feel indebted to the Maoists. The Maoists also organised the adivasis to construct some harvesting structures such as ponds and wells. None of this sounds anything more than routine. Roy (2010) writes: “Only 2% of the land is irrigated. ‘We need urgent help in the agriculture department’. To earn about Rs 30.00. Fourteen to fifteen such JSs make up an area JS. much of adivasi livelihood in the concerned area depends on collection of forest produce such as tendu leaves and bamboo culms. I do not think that it is physically possible to collect nearly 2. Comrade Vinod says. has over 10. such a contractor makes about Rs 55.000 square kilometres of forest. the wages sketched above signal “huge achievements for adivasi people” (Roy 2010). These figures are roughly corroborated by Kobad Ghandy (2008) who reported that daily wages have been raised three to four times from Rs 10 some years ago. In a “highwage” state like Kerala – perhaps one model the Maoists would wish to compete with – wages under the rural employment guarantee scheme range up to Rs 150 a day (Utsa Patnaik. The task was relatively easy since.’” Why is Comrade Vinod asking for these absolutely basic things now? What have the Maoists been doing for close to three decades? Health and Education A more concrete picture of the food situation emerges when we look at the health sector. the adivasis in Bastar “make just enough to stay alive until the next season” (Roy 2010). that these wages – negotiated by the Maoists with private contractors – are higher than those announced by the Chhattisgarh government.000 bags per season per contractor. hybrid seeds and chemical pesticides are edging their way in (Gadchiroli is in adjacent Maharashtra). etc. Roy (2010) reports that. and millions of people”. permaculture. Dandakaranya has been directly administered by Revolutionary People’s Committees (Janatanam Sarkars. Even then it is undeniable that the Maoists have impressive support of adivasis in a large area. The women front. I suggested the preceding figures basically Economic & Political Weekly EPW to match Ghandy’s estimates. at a conservative estimate. it is said that the tendu leaf business itself runs into hundreds of crores of rupees. and encouraged the nomadic adivasis to learn proper cultivation techniques. A similar story obtains for bamboo culms. and their yields. it is evident that these wages are much. organic pesticides. The peasantworker front.000 members. Even if absolute comparisons are difficult. gender. among other items. caste. It is well known that adivasis occupy the bottom of economic ladder. 2010 vol xlv no 25 17 .000 acres of forest land which they had been cultivating “illegally” in any case for generations.00.000 tendu leaves per day! No doubt this is a substantial increase from a meagre 3 paise per bundle in 1981 (Roy 2010). personal communication). and huge profits for contractors.000 members. There is an attempt to introduce multicrop and shifting cultivation.00. So. There is no mention of even a sngle health centre initiated by the Maoists in june 19. without furnishing data. There are 10 divisions in Dandakaranya. according to Navlakha (2010) – currently fetches one rupee. What have the Maoists done with these resources? Wages and Agriculture Consider the issue of wages. Given their atrocious exploitation in the past by the State and private operators. Similarly. The documents report. the Maoists themselves collect Rs 120 per bag of tendu leaves from the contractors (each bag contains 1. collect and bundle 100 bamboo culms to earn Rs 35 a day. This means that for a big contractor with 5. Even the cultural front. thousands of villages. much lower than the minimum wages enforced across the nation. The actual figures are likely to be much less. For agricultural labour. as recorded in a given JS. the party makes about Rs 6. Personally. minimum wages typically vary between Rs 60 and Rs 80 a day in the rest of the country. having negotiated what I consider to be merely subsistence wages for the adivasis. Navlakha (2010) presents some details about the grain and vegetable items cultivated.COMMENTARY driven out of the area. the wage for a bundle of 20 bamboo culms has been raised from 10 paise in 1981 to Rs 7 now. During this period. A bundle of 50 tendu leaves – 70. then. On a seasonal basis. Each JS is elected by a cluster of three to five villages whose combined population can range from 500 to 5. the impoverished adivasis never knew anything better. In Gadchiroli on the other hand. As for agriculture. It is difficult to compare wages on an absolute scale since they vary widely with respect to nature of work.000 bundles). In Abujhmad. There is some mention of using tractors and buffaloes for ploughing in some areas in recent times. “there was a class society here. in general. It is difficult to form a picture of the extent of these efforts and their role in improving the quality of life of the adivasis. unlike plains the Mukhia/Manjis exploitation did not appear sharp” (Navlakha 2010). the Maoists did encourage the adivasis to grab about 3.000. as Navlakha (2010) was told. tamarind. location. has nearly 90.000 per season.
severe ear and tooth infections and primary amenorrhea – malnutrition during puberty causing a woman’s menstrual cycle to disappear. we do not know the extent of these efforts. a large number of these impoverished schools have either been occupied by the security forces or blown up by the Maoists to prevent the security forces from doing so. Any index on quality of life certainly brings out what the Indian state has done to its people. For example. There is no evidence that the Maoists even contemplated them. The basic goal was to “build a standing army. The documents suggest the following story. due to their historical isolation and exploitation from the outsiders. the education act. Roy (2010) reports a doctor she met – a doctor was visiting that area after many years. they could have dominated scores of gram sabhas and panchayats in the Bastar area. Words like “famine” and “sub-Saharan condition” are frequently used in the documents under study (Navlakha 2010. Dandakaranya offered a variety of advantages. the doctor said. there is malaria. or never appear in the first place. But the area at issue concerns essentially the Maoists “with a history of more than two decades where the party has been able to create an alternative structure. tractors. It was a vast densely forested area spanning across several provinces such that people can cross state boundaries through the forest itself. to pursue these democratic goals. Similar efforts could have been directed at other forest produce and agricultural land. as the general secretary Ganpathi told his visitors (Ganapathi 2010). agriculture. Classes last for 90 minutes for each subject with four subjects taught in a day. there is also a mention of some evening schools operating in some areas. “There are no clinics in this forest apart from one or two in Gadchiroli. and the ability to draw rural credit from local banks. As with the almost complete absence of health centres. Dandakaranya was virtually a “blank slate” on which the Maoists decided to inscribe Charu Majumdar’s – and. Azad 2010). apparently. Also. have a haemoglobin count between five and six (when the standard for Indian women is 11). these people’s organisations could have made full use of national rural employment guarantee scheme. as noted. The doctor said that most of the people he has seen including those in the guerrilla army. and other schemes of the state. The words are of course polemically directed at the State. torchlights to CDs to teach history and science. Navlakha (2010) reports that lately the JSs have initiated a scheme of “barefoot doctors” in which some adivasis are trained to apply some medicines (distinguished by their colour) for afflictions such as malaria. the right to information. as noted. Young children are suffering from Protein Energy Malnutrition Grade II. the Maoists enjoyed unprecedented advantages. with the funds so available: schools. No doctors. colleges. Alternative Model Insofar as adivasi welfare is concerned. depending upon how tense the situation is in a particular area. The state had only a rudimentary presence in some areas. After considerable setbacks to their armed struggle in Andhra. vol xlv no 25 EPW Economic & Political Weekly Again we do not know the extent of these efforts. tapeworm. Kanhai Chatterji’s – “vision”. and education? With a large number of villages under their control. cholera and elephantitis.” Notice that most of the severe conditions are caused by acute malnutrition – especially in women and children – suggesting what the “alternative model” of agriculture and other efforts at Maoist “development” has done to the people of Dandakaranya. The rare schools that exist are all provided for by the State. cooperatives devoted to forest produce such as tendu leaf could have competed – with massive popular support – for the tenders floated by the state each year. No medicines. the JSs under the Maoists have initiated a mobile school programme. later. The basic idea. This way the system of greedy contractors would have been eliminated from the scene and the entire profits – after paying “Kerala”-type wages – would have remained with the adivasis. adivasi traditions have been compelled to acquire some degree of militancy to defend themselves. it is seriously questionable if the Maoists entered the forests of Dandakaranya three decades ago with adivasi welfare in mind at all. the documents do not provide any evidence for any new and regular school for the adivasi children in the vast area. tube wells. There is extensive tuberculosis caused by more than two years of chronic anaemia. There are between 25 and 30 students and three teachers. Dandakaranya was to be that base. Again. adivasi societies have less sharp class structure. buffaloes. 2010 . safe source of drinking water. Add to this the state funding that would have been allocated to these panchayats. In this light. and those first squads were sent in to reconnoitre the area and begin the process of building guerrilla zones” (Roy 2010). Why not? Primacy of Warfare A disturbing answer begins to emerge when we look at what else the Maoists have done in the area during the same period. while it was almost totally absent in others. as noted. osteoporosis. However. could the Maoists have done better on wages. In time. Apart from this. beyond these rather primitive and grossly inadequate efforts. is that “it is important to guard against getting bogged down in legalism and economism and forget that masses have to be prepared for seizure of power”. technical institutes. Finally. The mobile schools are in nature of camps where children attend schools for anywhere between 15 and 30 days. Under the auspices of these adivasi-controlled panchayats. In Dandakaranya.COMMENTARY that vast area. the three most dreaded illnesses. the documents do not explain why the Maoists failed to introduce thousands of regular schools in the 10 divisions under their control during at least two decades of non-tense situation. health. they could have formed hundreds of democratically-constituted cooperatives to administer the livelihood of adivasis. One can only imagine what good could have been done for the adivasis 18 june 19. this method reduced infant mortality by 50% (Ghandy 2008). the forest rights act. Lately. They have begun to employ certain teaching aids from globe. irrigation canals from rivers. “It’s an epidemic here. virtually uncontested” (Navlakha 2010). health centres. like in Biafra”. the Maoists decided to enter these forests way back in 1980. not just the adivasis. All we are told repeatedly is that people have been advised to drink boiled water. In any case. By now. for which it would need a base.
vehicles such as hundreds of motorcycles. the best of the fighters from the militias are incorporated into more professional guerrilla squads whose members sport combat uniform and carry “serious” weapons such as Insas rifles. pistols. Presuming that most members are famine-stricken adivasis themselves. however. it is clear why the system of greedy and rich contractors is allowed to cheat the adivasis all the way because they basically fund the war against the State for seizure of power. Allocation of Funds The documents do not explain sufficiently where the money for this elaborate military structure comes from. including royalties. approach.) About half of the income comes from allocation by the JS. technical experts. 2010 vol xlv no 25 19 . confiscation of the wealth and the income sources of the enemy. Ultimately. the astronomical money needed for that purpose must be controlled directly by the party itself. The income side showed about Rs 11 lakh. it does not directly mention the “royalties” – the real money. landmark tree or rock formation throughout the forest areas. self-loading rifles. the task of constructing guerrilla bases started in earnest in 2001. The writers report that there are about 50. So. the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA) was formally consituted. home-made pistols to genuine rifles and rocket launchers (10% of the used stock is distributed from the central army headquaters to the militias each year). It is reasonable to expect that the income of a given RPC is primarily meant for development work in the concerned area. comb. mortars and rocket launchers. gunpowder. The squads from Andhra started organising village militias from the very beginning. and food). one-third of the guerrilla forces of the erstwhile People’s War Group were transferred to Dandakaranya from Telangana in Andhra back in 1988 after some support from the adivasi population had been secured. That is the goal.000 members of militias and 10. bows and arrows. Now that we have some idea of where the money from the taxes. well-concealed factories and workshops for manufacture. toothpaste. and 0. Does it mean that some of the other income. Later in the essay.000 from taxes on contractors. electronic and other devices for triggering IEDS.COMMENTARY The first task was to create enough guerrilla zones. and taxes collected in the guerrilla zones and base areas. and are now moving towards battalion formation” (Navlakha 2010). so. although the income includes about Rs 3. and the second was to secure guerrilla bases in the guerrilla zones so created.000 in PLGA. those plans would have driven the system of private contractors out of Dandakaranya resulting into a massive loss of revenue for the party. The adivasis are essentially cannon-fodder in this elaborate military strategy. The current plan is to “intensify and expand guerilla war” (Ganapathi 2010).9% for education. It is important to note that “defence” means providing just the kits for the militias and PLGA (three pair of uniforms. Navlakha (2010) reports on the budget for 2009 of one area RPC (recall that there are about 50 area RPCs in Dandakaranya). Is that where rest of the money including the “royalties” go? The answer is likely to be in the positive since even most of the development money is diverted to military preparations. Militias consist of 20 to 30 young people armed with anything from bows and arrows. about 12% for agriculture. 9% for health. repair and refitting of weapons. and so on. Navlakha (2010) does report. To ensure that these bases are not “easily penetrable or accessible”. the source of money: party membership fee. Navlakha (2010) informs us that “revenue accruing from looting of bank or confiscation of wealth are far less” than the money collected from royalties on forest produce such as tendu leaf. In December 2001. hand grenades and other forms of explosives. and in this shape 10-12 spots were concentrated upon to form the guerrilla bases. Apparently. laptop computers. By now. levy and the contributions of the people. muzzle loaders. The RPC budget does not pay for the weapons and related military needs. is partly distributed by the divisional RPCs to area RPCs? Or. some carry light machine guns. It turns out though that over 50% of the (meagre) income is allocated to “defence”. oil. some have been removed from the corpses of security personnel after ambushes. Except for the supply of human power – young men and women – to the militias and PLGA (we return). does it mean that most of the real money remains with the party itself for military work? An indirect evidence for the latter conclusion emerges when we look at the expenditure side of the budget. The preceding perspective also explains why the Maoists never even contemplated alternative and genuine development plans based on panchayats. Navlakha (2010) explains the distinction: “Guerilla zone is a fluid area” but the guerrilla bases “are not easily penetrable or accessible”. (Navlakha (2010) makes a distinction in the accounts between taxes/levies. It is unclear if the total amount of these seizures explain almost battalion level weaponry. solar-charged batteries. the PLGA has “moved from platoons to companies. revolvers. all of this requires an elaborate structure of informers. For another. it is really the royalties/levies from forest produce and taxes on contractors and companies that constitute the bulk of the funds. washing soap. lookouts. it is unclear what it means. and “contributions from people” basically go.60. royalties. those plans would have raised the condition of the adivasis from mere subsistence to the threshold of decent living. It is interesting that. Two or three spots were selected for guerrilla bases in each division. To pursue it. Once guerrilla zones expanded and covered much of the area. in general terms. Abujmaad forms the central guerrilla base. and royalties. “we have to develop guerilla war into mobile war and guerilla army into a regular army” (ibid). party membership fees are not likely to amount to much. Some weapons and related ammunition have been seized/stolen from police stations and armouries. Needless to say. technical equipment for secure wireless communication. Having tasted decent living by their own cooperative june 19. the adivasis are nowhere in the picture. cooperatives. which are imposed on all. a complex Economic & Political Weekly EPW system of landmines and IEDs punctuate every road. AK-series rifles. It is anybody’s guess how much money is so collected and how it is divided between military work and “mass work”. etc. An apparently disjointed bit of information throws some light on the issue. Their basic task is to “guard” a group of villages. soap.
and most of these have been part of the armed forces for several years. and that can only come from private operators. “they trail the PLGA squads. then of course everything gets postponed. achieve better wages. health centres. which able-bodied adivasi child can resist the temptation of assured food. The Hindu. welfrare measures cannot even be properly undertaken since you need money for arming guerrillas. etc. Hindi and English. in fact. G (2010): “Days and Nights in the Heartland of Rebellion”. because the war-like situation in which they have had to function leaves them little space to concentrate on health. when the State attacks and the economic lives of adivasis are further disrupted. What is the Maoists’ own record with respect to children? Roy (2010) describes. Navlakha (2010) also reports that. A (2009): “Mr Chidambaram’s War”.com Ghandy. could have started from the beginning. Taking advantage of the historical neglect and exploitation of the adivasis by the State – the “root cause” – the Maoist leadership ensured the support of hapless adivasis with token welfare measures while directing most of the attention secretly to construct guerrilla bases. BBC South Asia. Roy. Gandhi Nagar Adyar.htm The last date for the submission of applications is 12. If establishing guerrilla zones was the priority. who has now risen to be a commander of a PLGA platoon. these specialised schools. etc (Navlakha 2010). Basic Communist Training School). the bigger the “people’s army” of starving children. host select groups of 25-30 children in the age group of 12-15. Comrade Madhav. While the general adivasi child has no school to go to.mids. most importantly.com (An abridged version appeared in Economic & Political Weekly. extortions etc. Once they pass out. a young girl. write to us or refer our website: http://www. then. better struggle for wages. 23 September. this – as with other horrors – might well be true. The mobile schools mentioned earlier are not meant to provide education to adivasi children in general. of the people in the militias and PLGA are aged between the mid-teens to early 20s. Recruiting children for warfare seems to be an established practice in the Maoist scheme of things. References Azad (2010): “Interview with the Spokesperson of CPI (Maoist)”.79. clothes. CPI (Maoist)”. One of the leaflets. 14 February. Kamla. joined the Maoists at the age of nine in Warangal in Andhra Pradesh (Roy 2010). maths. they lured a large number of adivasi children with assurances of food and clothing. – (2010): “Walking with the Comrades”. etc. clothes. health. These children receive intensive training for six months in a curriculum consisting of basic concepts of Marxism Leninism and Maoism. social science. no opportunities in hand. sanhati. personal needs will be fulfilled and your families would be helped by the Janatam Sarkar”. among others. peer company.in Applications are invited for four ICSSR Fellowships for Ph. agricultural improvement. by Jan Myrdal and Gautam Navlakha. directed at “unemployed boys and girls of Bastar”. May). These children have now grown into formidable militia and guerrilla forces. Outlook Magazine. We can only guess about her age when she joined the armed forces. Roy’s narrative and the accompanying photographs furnish the distinct impression that most. sanhati. The entire thing is carefully organised. etc. with stars in their eyes.D. the adivasis cannot be allowed to prosper beyond subsistence because it will interfere with the plans for seizure of power. Outlook Magazine.2010 20 june 19. as noted. For further details and application. if armed struggle from the beginning had not been a priority. and the ability to roam the forests with a rifle slung on shoulders? Naturally. Roy’s motherly instinct wells up as she prepares to sleep in the forest amidst hundreds of armed guerrillas: “I’m surrounded by these strange.COMMENTARY enterprise. in Social Sciences (Economics/Sociology/History/Political Science/Anthropology). Ganapathi (2010): “Interview with General Secretary. In the process. different types of weapons.ac. would the adivasis continue to clutch on to the Maoists. With no schools to go to. 2010 vol xlv no 25 EPW Economic & Political Weekly . Given the character of the State. education. education. II Main Road. Navlakha. The more the repression by the State. Chennai 600 020 Telephone: 24412589/24412295 Email: roby@mids. enrolment for militia and PLGA increases sharply. as with any regular army. called Young Communist Mobile School (or. as with scores of movements around the country. says “you will not get any salary but food. Twenty-five years is a long time to set up schools.ac.7. computers. But if adivasi welfare was the first priority (as Azad and Kishenji claim as cited). K (2008): “Interview with Suvojit Bagchi”. 14 April. and with sub-Saharan conditions prevailing in their families. The basic picture is abundantly clear from Maoist documents themselves. like groupies of a rock band” (Roy 2010). beautiful children with their curious arsenal”. recruitment drives are conducted with meetings and leaflets. It may be argued that one should not assess the impact of the Maoists’ work in Dandakaranya in terms of their contribution to the socio-economic welfare of the adivasis. would they allow their young people anymore to join the militias and PLGA to die violent deaths at a young age? In sum. This is not an isolated example. 21 March. 9 November. MADRAS INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPMENT STUDIES No. if not all.in/phd2010. Children for War The Maoists complain that the State uses “school children as SPOs (special police officers) and as police informers” (Azad 2010). who is 17 and is already a hardcore member of the PLGA with a revolver on her hips and a rifle slung on her shoulder.
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