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MICHAEL RATHJEN

THE CONSTRUCTIVE HILBERT PROGRAM AND THE LIMITS OF MARTIN-L?F TYPE THEORY

1. INTRODUCTION

Hilbert's

program is one of the truly magnificent projects in the philosophy To carry out this program he founded a new discipline of mathematics. of mathematics, called which was to perform the task iiBeweistheorie,\ once of laying to rest all worries about the foundations of mathematics and for all1 by securing mathematics finitist tency. The failure of Hubert's via an absolute reduction proof of consis program on account of

G?del's

results is often gleefully trumpeted. Modern logic, incompleteness are remarkably has shown that modifications of Hubert's program though, can concern different parts of Hubert's two resilient. These modifications

step program2 to validate infinitistic mathematics. The first kind maintains the goal of a finitistic consistency proof. Here, of course, G?del's second incompleteness theorem is of utmost relevance can be shown to be in that only a fragment of infinitistic mathematics consistent. results in mathematical logic have led to the con Fortunately, a substantial chunk of scientifically that this fragment encompasses mathematics 1998; Simpson (cf. Feferman 1988). This work applicable bears on the question of the indispensability of set-theoretic foundations clusion for mathematics. kind of modification gives more leeway to the methods in the consistency in the Such a step is already presaged proof. or work of the Hilbert school. Notably Bernays has called for a broadened a finistic con extended of finitism form 1967). Rather than (cf. Bernays The second allowed sistency proof consistency tistic mathematics fruitfully the objective here proof for a classical is to give a constructive and predicative T in which theory large parts of infini can be developed. In order to undertake such a study

to point to a particular formalization of constructive to P is sufficient P, and then investigate whether predicative reasoning the consistency I shall be concerned of T. The particular framework prove one needs Synthese (2005) 147: 81-120 DOI 10.1007/sl 1229-004-6208-4 ? Springer 2005

82 with was in this paper developed

MICHAEL RATHJEN is an intuitionistic and predicative his developed theory of types which type theory "with the

He by Martin-L?f. motive of clarifying the syntax and semantics of intuitionistic (Martin-L?f 1982). It is intended to be a full scale system to research for formalizing mathematics. in mathe intuitionistic Owing over the last 30 years -the program of reverse mathematics matical logic work have been especially here - one can and Feferman's instrumental to be the system T. It take a certain fragment of second order arithmetic philosophical mathematics" to prove the 's type theory P is strong enough and proving a of T, thereby validating infinitistic mathematics consistency to be feasible. constructive Hilbert program Indeed, the system T alluded to above is so capacious that we do not even know of any result in ordinary that Martin-L?f mathematics in T. Of course, this is a claim regard is not provable only; highly set-theoretic topics in mathematics ing ordinary mathematics are not amenable to a constructive consistency proof, or, more cautiously which do not know how to give constructive consistency proofs for such topics. The main turns out

put, we

type goal of this paper is to find the limits of Martin-L?f A demarcation in determining of the latter is important the ulti theory. mate boundaries of a constructive Hilbert program. The aim is to single out a fragment of second order arithmetic or classical set theory which type theory. of this paper will actually be concerned with some words of ex the limits of Martin-L?f type theory, perhaps exploring from planation are in order. The paper is intended for a variety of audiences and mathematical logic, and not solely aimed at philosophy, mathematics, the small group of researchers who are familiar with all the diverse fields the fields broached here are the areas touched upon in this paper. Among reverse mathe of arithmetic, of proof theory, constructivism, subsystems set theory, Martin-L?f of language matics, type theory, and the philosophy them more accessible. and mathematics, ab initio with the aim of making The cognoscenti, though, should skim over the first couple of sections and 5 and 6. then proceed directly to Sections how the paper is organized: The following adumbrates are introduced and of second order arithmetic fragments various parts of ordinary mathematics formalizing Section 3 surveys different forms of constructivism. mal introduction with relates to the ideas underlying Martin-L?f them to the Dummett-Prawitz meaning-as-use In Section their role 2, for all possible encompasses Since only a quarter formalizations of Martin-L?f

is discussed. 4 provides

Section an infor

type theory and also theory. Section 5 is

concerned

to be consistent

of second order arithmetic which can be shown subsystems to the within Martin-L?f type theory. Section 6 is devoted

HILBERTPROGRAM THE CONSTRUCTIVE limits of Martin-L?f Hilbert matical

83

type theory and thus to the limits of a constructive program based on it. The final section briefly touches on mathe on the higher infinite statements whose proof depends essentially set theory and beyond.

in Zermelo-Fraenkel

2. A

SYSTEMS FOR FORMALIZING MATHEMATICS of Hubert's to finitary more consists by in broadening reduction allowing of the to

natural modification of reduction methods Hilbert

requirement constructive constructive but also absolute

program methods

conception one proves a 'real' statement in a suffi that, whenever guarantee ciently strong classical theory T, say, a fragment of second order arithmetic or set theory, there would be an interpretation to of the proof according

the demand

program for a constructive

The objective generally.3 is not merely the absence

our modified

of inconsistency for which there is an

which

one would true. Moreover, the theorem is constructively like the T to be such as tomake the process of fnormalization of mathematics theory in T almost trivial, in particular T should be sufficiently strong for all This is a very Hilbertian attitude: show once and for all practical purposes. that non-constructive methods do not lead to false constructive non-constructive constructive methods. program that require upon which of a constructive Hilbert conclusions and then proceed happily There are several aspects clarification. a coherent One system on with

is to find some basic of constructive

framework point to a particular The latter task will be addressed

principles is to reasoning may be built. Another for formalizing infinitistic mathematics. in this section. It was already observed

(1938) that classical analysis can be formalized within by Hilbert-Bernays second order arithmetic. Further scrutiny revealed that a small fragment a research program is sufficient. Under the rubric of Reverse Mathematics has been some thirty years ago. The idea is initiated by Harvey Friedman a theorem, one can prove its equivalence to ask whether, to some given re axiomatic with the aim of determining what proof-theoretical system, sources are necessary of mathematics. More for the theorems precisely, the objective tence axioms follows:

Given in order a specific theorem to prove r? r of ordinary mathematics, which set existence axioms are needed

of reverse mathematics in ordinary mathematics.

is to investigate the role of set exis The main question can be stated as

Central mathematics'.

to the above This concept,

is the

reference

to what have

is called a precise

of course,

doesn't

'ordinary definition.

respectively. uncountable topological are not part of ordinary mathematics. is not pivotal for the program. investigations. is second or der arithmetic order arithmetic. WKL^ list of specific subsystems ? are enumerated The systems in ACAo.84 MICHAEL RATHJEN non make we mean main-stream. separable rable Banach and Frechet spaces. This theme is referred to as it has turned out that S(t) often belongs Moreover. De n}-comprehension. dif mathematics geometry.1) are partic a partial realization of the original Hilbert in pursuing ularly interesting Both theories are of the same proof-theoretic program. Second Z2. One over set theory is that it is more amenable at least in my opinion. By contrast. (n{?CA)o arithmetical transfinite recursion and respectively. the However. the which set-theoretic mathematics. there is a weakest tem S(z ) of Z2 such that S(r ) proves r. set exis Tait 1981). be addressed It is well Fraenkel known that mathematics the axiom can be of choice. Very often. The main set existence axioms of RCAo ACAo. though. PRA. countable algebra in the style of van der Waerden the topology of complete and the theory of sepa metric spaces. For their role in Reverse Mathematics. Those parts of theoretic topology on which set-theoretic have a strong bearing will mathematics assumptions in the last section of this paper. comprises ordinary real and complex analysis. by ordinary mathematics Roughly core areas of mathematics i. classical ferential equations. are recursive comprehension. tially depend number theory. rather than set theory. calculus. choice of framework particular For many mathematical natural subsys theorems t . of Z2 dubbed RCAo. The theoriesWKLo andWKL^ (defined in Section 2. the theory of non-separable set vector and general combinatorics. as weak tence axiom of WKLo known is a non-constructive principle . arithmetic and comprehension. spaces. cardinal numbers. increasing strength. possible to turn out to be provably of that theorem will equivalent over a still weaker base theory. formalized The in Zermelo chosen set theory with set existence for studying framework in reverse mathematics. . (1930). is a two-sorted formal system with one sort of variables ranging over natural numbers and the other advantage to proof-theoretic of this framework sort ranging over sets of natural numbers. ATRo. strength as prim a system which to is often considered itive recursive arithmetic. combinatorics. The principal with finitism be co-extensive (cf.e. ATR0 and (nj CA)o. finitions of these systems will be given in the next section. reverse mathematics see Simpson (1999). if a theorem of ordinary mathematics the statement those axioms to a small set existence is proved from the weakest axioms. speaking. countable algebra. no essential use of the concepts and methods of set theory and do not essen on the theory of uncountable In particular. WKLo.

C.. 3x... The Subsystems of Second Order Arithmetic the formal system of second purpose of this section is to introduce so as to be able to delineate order arithmetic and several of its subsystems its constructively Another is to give purpose parts. a defined notion. V. PRA. However. allows for induction only quantifier free formulae. of second-order arithmetic are the defining of 0.Y... Terms relation symbols =. function. Weyl) (cf. (free and bound) and function bound) symbols set variables B..Vx. using A. +. The tree of finite 85 of sequences (1977) proved via model over PRA with respect to as to which parts of mathematics have applications in question Feferman has also been studied intensively science. arithmetic .. precisely justifiable definitions above. in honor of H. over Peano conservative impredicative arithmetic. VX(0 eX -. by Over the years he has developed several systems for formalizing math ematics.b. 1998a. W/r has flexible finite types (over the nat perhaps the most and allows for very natural reconstructions of the real and ural numbers) and functional (as sets) and much of classical complex numbers analysis. -. X. Formulae are built from the prime formulae s = t. t are terms.c. The most The natural variables language number A. Sue stands for the successor are built up as usual. +.x. let ? be the canonical term denot n.. Though. . namely of sets will be considered equality A = BiffVx[xeA The basic axioms axioms in all theories <+ xeB].. PA. (cf. for all primitive function recursive functions but in contrast to symbols Peano arithmetic. streamlined. s < t.. and Sue.z. The system Wf Feferman is 1998b. < and the induction a Wx(x ?X^x + axiom leX)-* Vx(jc e X)). WX and 3X where s.y.HILBERTPROGRAM THE CONSTRUCTIVE K?nig zeros n? asserts that any infinite 's lemma which ones has an infinite path.1. Note that equality in X2 is a relation only on numbers. ?2 of second-order a. Friedman and is conservative theoretic methods that WKLo sentences. and s e A ing . set comprehension is taboo.. of the subsystems basic figuring in reverse mathematics mentioned system we shall be concerned with is primitive recursive which is a theory about the natural numbers which has arithmetic. one accepts the completed InWf infinite set of natural numbers as well as classical logic... Sue.. Wf is 2. <. the constant contains (free 0. b). Z. For neN. e..

... Qx^ip) (resp. Wx(x < s . We classes C which consider e . are called bounded Numerical if they occur in the context quantifiers ? for a term s which does not contain x. and the .. the schema of !F-induction INDF where mulae implies The (p belongs we denote + (p(0)A Vx(<p(x) -> cp{x 1)) -> Vx^(jc). That is. S^-formulae . roughly speaking....) or 3x(x < s A. For each of the basic arithmetical denote by (Ax) the theory consisting the schema of induction IND.. !F. =Vw number" i. ??^-formula. are formulae of the form 3x\ix2 For k > 0. of systems of second order arithmetic is largely owed to schemes. Qxk?). We obtain a similar hierarchy if we allow set quantifica "1" and counting tion by putting a superscript the number of alterations njj!and -formulae (Il| S? . where .86 where x + MICHAEL RATHJEN With regard to a collection consists of the formulae of ?2 formulae 1 stands for Suc(x). idea of reverse mathematics fundamental of a mathematical theorem by classifying strength to establish is needed the existence to of the sets needed comprehension we "reverse" the theorem to derive some sort prove the theorem. Prime{x) = lV? = jt->M 1 is Suc(0).. that if we specify of numbers by a formula cp of a particular type then X the axiom schema of G-comprehension for formula is given by strength comprehension a collection X is a set. which assert. n^-formulae and the numerical alternate in each of the prefixes.. l). Typically. Note that INDAo the induction axiom. set quantifiers.. the formula asserting that "x is a prime < x + Wu < x + \{u-v = is a Ag-formula. VXi3X2 alternate in each of the The of over an arithmetical set quantifiers matrix. are those of the form V*i3x2 while where (p is A[j Qxk?>. The gauging measure is that of the allowable of the <p's. where axiom schema Ax we axioms.. The union quantifiers numerical of all or for all k e N is the class of arithmetical S^-formulae "0" refers to the fact that there are no The superscript U^-formulae. If T is the collection of all ?2 for the schema by IND rather than IND^r.e. to !F. of comprehension scheme. . For instance. prefixes.CA for all formulae The theoretical 3XWu(u e X ?* <p(u)) is to gauge the proof how much (p e G in which X does not occur. this complexity "logical complexity" might be the allowable quantifier depth of cp..) are those formulae are bounded The A^-formulae in which all quantifiers quantifiers. are the formulae 3Z1VZ2 formulae) QX^(p the set quantifiers for arithmetical cp.

Yx). cp in G by G A AC we can formulate the axiom of choice for set R gives rise to a binary relation <R defined by y ^r x := Vx3Y(p(x. Any (y. The xth section of U is defined by Ux Observe a set U is uniquely on account of (..HILBERTPROGRAM THE CONSTRUCTIVE schema Ax. requiring that (p and i? In set theory one has the principle of set induction which says that whenever itself. Y) -> 3YWx(p(x. ? An example for these notations is the theory CA) which contains (n} ? the induction schema.x)eR. cp. A ^-comprehension <pand E?-formula are H?-formulae and ^-formulae. RCA0 is the theory (AC? CA) \ +IND2o. that there sequences with respect to <x to is equivalent Classically WF(^x) Vy We have now [Vm(Vd <x introduced uveY -> ueY) -+ VuueY.CA Wu[(p(u) ^> tf(n)] -> 3XVu(ueX *> <p(u)) is defined by for all n^-formula ??. be a primitive recursive and bijective pairing function.where WF(^x) expresses are no infinite descending i.e. := {y : (x. whereas contains only the induction CA) \ (?j axiom in addition to the comprehension schema for n}-formulae.CA) \ and ATR0 is ACA0 augmented by a schema which asserts that n^-comprehension (or the Turing jump) may . )'s that determined by its sections bijectivity. > :N x N ?> N recursive functions. Aj . the resulting theory by (Ax) \ . that is special form of comprehension is A ?-comprehension. arithmetic induction a property propagates from the elements of any set to the set In the context of second order then all sets have the property. In the framework of these theories one can introduce defined symbols In particular. Using formulae the latter coding. respectively. 87 we denote If we replace the schema of induction by the induction axiom.] for defining the preferred systems the the schemes of reversemathematics. y)eU}. the equivalent of set induction is the schema of transfinite TI for all formulae VX[WF(^X) A -> -+ cp{u)) Vu(Vv <x u(p{v) Vu(p(u)] that <x is well-founded. for all primitive let (. ACA0 denotes the system (?^ .

one which simple esting and does not require the numerical coding of notions from logic. is arithmetically of 2<N which definable from a given dense subcollections each set. Simpson (1988) estimates can be formalized inWKLo of existing mathematics 85% are conservative over PRA with stronger systems which W/r) which The are conservative of over Peano arithmetic. the year G?del's logicians have Incompleteness in been looking for a strictly mathematical example of an incompleteness ismathematically and inter first-order Peano arithmetic. The first such examples were found early in 1977. focus spectrum. were Only found.88 MICHAEL RATHJEN be iterated along any well-ordering. Feferman part Similarly. The mathematically stronger system was defined by Brown (1987) and Brown and Simpson (1986). Brown and Simpson used which over PRA. however. More the additional scheme expresses that. conjectures can be formalized in systems (like of scientifically applicable mathematics that a little bit goes a long way. denotes \. statements metic. WKL<J" of zeros and ones. WKL?" several important theorems of functional is that analysis WKL(J" proves are apparently not provable inWKLo. The axioms Let 2<N denote the set of finite sequences a scheme which amounts are those of WKLo to a strong of plus WKL?" theorem for the Cantor formal version of the Baire category space 2N.2. More How Much of Second Order Arithmetic isNeeded? the foregoing asks which part of second order question precisely out ordinary mathematics. from PA all used of arith techniques from non-standard models later on alternative techniques using proof-theoretic proofs proof theory turned out though results from ordinal-theoretic in providing independence results for theories stronger than to be pivotal . there exists an infinite sequence of zeros and ones which meets over WKLo The advantage of of the given dense subcollections. to prove that is still H2 conservative forcing WKL?" 2. Since 1931. strength beyond Theorems were published. is needed for carrying The program arithmetic as well as Feferman's have amassed of reverse mathematics investigations a large body of detailed results which allows one to draw the conclusion "that at least or or WKL?" respect to n^ that the overwhelming sentences". The most elegant of these due to Paris and Har of the Finite Ramsey Theorem is a strengthening of combinatorial The original proofs of the independence rington (1977). given a sequence of formally. where sulate consistency is rather on the other end of the this section. one is interested in mathematical theorems which encap PRA and Peano arithmetic. The (n}-CA)0 (U\?CA) an extension set existence axiom of WKLo is of RCA0 by weak principal asserts that any infinite tree of finite sequences 's lemma which of K?nig zeros and one has an infinite path.

Predicativism 2. I think. is the most thoroughly worked out system and. Indeed.CA) of bounded 1997).4 (n} Looking CA) + TI 3.) Lorenzen) 1. several different is not a single. up till now no statements of everyday mathematics have been found that require ? more than means available in CA) + TI. After recalling there have been in this section. for graphs proof of the GMT extended version of Kruskal's tree width ? for an upper bound. CA) statements have their origin in certain embed combinatorial independent in the theory of finite graphs. important theorems of graph theory (see Diestel et al. can be discerned: brands of constructivism Russell. It was shown by Friedman \. One of the first facts that has to be taken into account is that 'construc tivism tive mathematics' Indeed. the next section will provide an informal introduction to the ideas underlying Martin-L?f type theory. philosophically ory some history of construc the most convincing candidate. (1987) that the GMT the original Friedman's is not provable in (n{ . The first is a famous dability questions theorem finitely of Kruskal many in ATRo provable that every infinite set of finite trees has only asserting It turned that Kruskal's theorem is not minimal elements. (Brouwer. mutually incompatible. FORMS OF CONSTRUCTIVISM In the foregoing sufficient for the needs section we presented a framework a suitable system for formal of ordinary infinitistic mathematics. Martin-L?f 's the However. so had a considerable mathematical that the metamathematical considerations spin-off. Intuitionism (Poincar?. et al.HILBERTPROGRAM THE CONSTRUCTIVE 89 statement. The stronger theo PA. . clearly defined body of mathematics. used the "gap con theorem with from the proof-theoretic ordinal analysis of dition". Finding presents a more difficult task. 1985). Actually. which was gleaned ? to construct \ and specifically stronger incomplete CA) designed (n} nesses in Peano arithmetic as part of the reverse mathematical program. it has turned out that the system (nj the graph minor suffices for proving theorem. Weyl. Heyting. and even led to a new combinatorial ries referred to are Friedman's system ATRo of arithmetical transfinite ? The recursion and the system (n} \ based on n{-comprehension. Historically izing constructive mathematics some of which are "schools" of constructivism differing at least inmy opinion. An even more striking example of (see Simpson this independence is provided by the graph minor theorem. phenomenon of Robertson is one of the most and Seymour which GMT.

enlarges statements must about this in re root Whatever erate useless new propositions to enlarge the totality. Bishop's Predicativism constructivism constructive MICHAEL RATHJEN (Markov. was taken very seriously by Hermann Weyl: The a field of possibilities root of the trouble lies elsewhere: open into infinity has deepest As Brouwer in themselves. into higher progression He one of arithmetical and Feferman formalisms levels based of the ramified . Y)} holds involves an apparent circle since we know in particular whether F(n. Determining whether N. to a presumed totality a member. The avoidance This principle definitions has also been called the Vicious Circle Principle. mathematics Shanin) took shape in the writings of Poincar? and Russell to the paradoxes. Y)} is impredicative {neN over arbitrary subsets of the natural numbers T' tified variable ranging the set X being defined is one member. (Russell 1908. of which VF ? N F(n. Lorenzen. Russell discerned the common sponse underlying as follows: for the paradoxes we suppose to be the totality on pain which. this is a fallacy. for of propositions. What in? A central tenet is that there is grounded between our understanding of the concept of natural numbers and our un of the set concept. lie outside of that equaly the scope totality gen the totality.90 3. Logicians a foundation of mathematics then proposed using layered classical ramified on the idea of predicativity which ventured The idea of an autonomous hierarchy. such as Wang. 243) In his book Das the real numbers to the initiated a predicative Kontinuum. the quan since it involves ? N F(n. Russian 4. the Fall and Original Sin of set theory. pointed result from it. accepts derstanding Weyl infinite system of natural numbers as a point of departure. for a closed realm of things existing been mistaken out. even if no paradoxes (Weyl 1949. For : VF example. permeate Impredicative set theory in the guise of the separation and Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms as well shall have to settled until the fabric of replacement as the powerset of impredicative axiom. As the French predicativists. of contradiction. Weyl approach chunk of and gave a viable account of a substantial view" "predicative difference is a fundamental that his are the ideas and principles analysis. the completed also accepts in Russell's logic but just works with sets that are of level in other words only with the principle hierarchy. X) holds but that cannot be set definitions X itself is determined. definitions. 224) Thus R?ssel chimes in with An of so-called im anathemizing of an object refers definition impredicative of which the object being defined is itself to be to define a set of natural numbers X as X = Poincar?'s predicative definitions. Sch?tte. It is statements the about totality.

thereby developing implicit in accepting ever higher layers of the ramified hierarchy. have a constructive description. for only on such objects do recursive functions operate. is given to the structure of the continuum. Fur thermore. Then a computer . RA\. Brouwer's intuitionistic augments MP. As in Brouwer's mathematics. to sented in Kreisel (1960) and than taken up by Sch?tte and Feferman therein is determine The notion of autonomy the limits of predicativity. Contrary this school takes the viewpoint that mathematical objects must be concrete. BPq. CT. In as choice sequences and other concepts... The form of constructivism at theorems which a result. WneN[A(n)v--A(n)] with A containing natural number parameters only. the only kind of mathematics form of mathematics. Consideration by the ideal mathematician from N to N is continuous. The rationale for ac MP may be phrased as follows. or equivalently. Mathematics.. we can find a recursive function / which produces m from n. one arrives contradict classical to the of algorithm or recursive function is fundamental to Brouwer. based on condition. which subjectively as "indubitable". Markov thesis. unfolding mental constructions. i. In the performed by the individual is a languageless and solitary activity.. principle. and we also know by in direct arguments that there should be an n such that A{n). or at least as a word in an alphabet. The pivotal consequence functions from the reals to the reals are continuous. concept schools as an integer. in his view. On the other hand. Wn e N A(n. mathematical "constructions accompany originating by the self merely In Brouwerian of the primordial intuition .. mathematics intuitionism. RAa. such of the nature of these sequences as perceived leads one to the conclusion The latter is known that every operation of BPo principle is that all as Brouwer's (for natural numbers). m).. much attention finite proceeding sequences are introduced." (Brouwer 1933).. departure and should perhaps be viewed introspection One takes the structure of natural numbers as a 'boot-strap' as one's point of reflection what is body of and then explores through a process of active a growing this structure. Brouwer regarded intuitionistic mathematics as the only legitimate viz. f(n)).HILBERTPROGRAM THE CONSTRUCTIVE 91 was first pre in an ascending ladder of systems RA0. Suppose A is a predicate of natural cepting numbers which can be decided for each number. Russian of Markov and Shanin. where words main. consists of could be described in free action.. which asserts adopts what he calls Church's we see a quantifier combination that whenever "in e N 3m e N A(n.e.. which may as far as pure logic is concerned he is known as Markov's what logic by as be expressed a -VneN-A(rc) -> 3neNA(rc).

one may assumptions standpoint BC stand for Bishop-style constructivism. Martin-L?f. which trees. as it is in the classical the notion in his set theory CST besides while he uses other primitives as a subsystem of ZF. his (1982) is also intended to be a system for formalizing far deeper in several itionistic mathematics. set theory with his constructive of what conception underlying Bishop's veloped he wanted to Bishop's construc to Cantorian set theory have and Feferman. As an example <0 -> unbounded MICHAEL RATHJEN could and we to search through N for a be programmed should be convinced that itwill eventually of MP to the reals one obtains for an application K(-a in In 1967 Bishop published his Foundations of Constructive Analysis out an informal development of constructive which he carried analysis went substantially further mathematically than anything done before was a confirmed constructivist. his In fact. letting characterize the other Vx x > 0). Moreover. Bishop by work that it could be read as a what was novel about Bishop's However. roughly as follows: philosophies Russian constructivism intuitionism schools. informal semantics called "meaning explanation". is a form logic. Indeed. However. To. in his latter the aim of isolating the principles sets and functions are. conventions can be used in the set theoretical development of of ordinary mathematics too. Not only has he developed which is encapsulated of constructivism philosophical underpinning The for MLTT. 1979). Explicit is suitable and classes 1975.1. as developed The intuitionistic by Martin-L?f theory of types MLTT intu (1975).5 is equivalent to the principle in Section frameworks for constructivism like ZFC tive mathematics as theories relate proposed by Myhill. BI of transfinite induction on well-founded TI defined Several been induction. Brouwerian where BI is bar = BC + MP + CT = BC + BPo + BI. Myhill (1975) de that relate "these principles tion completely case" (1975. which (Feferman ory of operations as well as gener constructive mathematics for representing Bishop-style of structural concepts which alized recursion. The advantage of this is of set. it can be viewed and practise of the set theoretical presentation that the ideas. 347). as well. With classical 2. to be such as tomake the process of formaliza .92 with memory number n such that A(n) find one. constructivists. trivial. as was Brouwer. Martin-L?f probes a formal system MLTT but also a respects. Among the constructivists in the mathematics. direct expression including admit self-application. Bishop works with informal notions piece of classical mathematics which of constructive uses function the fewest and set. Feferman's is a the Mathematics constructive mathematics.

In a first approach. such a view one is however. fulfillment. He explains that the meaning of a pudiates statement is not independent mathematical of our cognitive activity. which may formulation. as a verification. By contrast. and for a mathematical A a method to verify proposition a proof of A. In the case of mathematical statements involving quantifiers cal inference the notion infinite domains.8 In a similar vein. The notion of proposition is a semantic notion. Like Brouwer. 34) goes together that to know with and here be replaced. of the judgement 'A is a explanation 'A is true' you must have knowledge proposition'. the knowledge if you want. notably an awareness is of the distinction Integral between to an understanding of the logical justification the notions The point of view he adopts is that logical operations (constants) operate on propositions whereas the logical laws (rules of inference) operate on judgements. the premises and conclusion of a logi proposition are always judgements. In the order of conceptual priority comes before the notion of proposition of judgement since the assertion A is a proposition is a judgement. Martin-L?f the notion explains as follows: of proposition Returning tion which now to the form of judgement it is this. you must know what counts expectation or realization of it. For this more fundamental. within which the Type theory is a logic free theory of constructions logical notions and constructive reason his I consider can be defined systems of explicit mathematics set theory leave the logical notions unanalyzed. 's theory of types. Per v leads from propositions A and B to a new forming the logical operation A v B.6 type theory philosophically whereas of Martin-L?f laws. solution. of judgement1 and proposition. 'A is a proposition I am using '. (Martin-L?f 1996. over a proposition. a proposition is something that is either true or false. that it is subject related. ranging that the laws of the intuitionisic observed cal Kolmogorov propositional culus become evident upon conceiving variables as ranging propositional over problems or tasks. or intention. It is perhaps not an exaggeration to say that Martin-L?f 's theory gives rise to a full scale philosophy of constructivism. by adopting to postulate a trancendent realm of mathematical compelled objects which determines their meaning and truth value. relative to the knowing subject in Kantian terminology. how to verify A. A is nothing else but to make In keeping with the above meaning the judgement .THE CONSTRUCTIVE HILBERTPROGRAM is a systematic which enables method 93 to the assertions of assigning meaning of MLTT to justify the rules of MLTT him by showing their validity with respect to that semantics. Traditionally. a proposition as a meaningful could be construed statement describing a state of affairs. the semantical explana theoretical by problem. Martin-L?f re such an account as a myth.

of mathematical be related truth has arguments in Subsection 4. ended framework in that one may always add new types and rules provid to a meaning which validates them.1. are the following: for rules meaning explanations use of the propositions-as-types 1. type universes. b are equal elements of type A (abbr.3. A type). V. a particular powerful way of going beyond an existing for point T of MLTT malization is by reflection about T. a ? There b :A). When (?>. we make a judgement. The language with which we will be concerned a full scale system which accounts one does in for essentially everything formal The mathematics. A. His 4. a is an element of type A (abbr. This is formally mirrored of universes by the introduction features of MLTT Distinctive into MLTT. follows. a :A).e. features will A First Glimpse 's formal be addressed one by one in what to represent logic the use of inductive These 4. 2. a. The fundamental notions of type theory are introduced in the four forms of judgement: 1. procedures. 3) logical operations we hold a proposition to be true.94 The most notion will forceful MICHAEL RATHJEN criticism of the idea of a knowledge transcendent been put forward by Dummett. v. Moreover. 3. This for deriving ments is essential language has a system of rules for deriving judge involve rules in contrast to the standard formal systems which The distinction between propositions and judge propositions. A ? B). for Martin-L?f. of Type Theory Martin-L?f ments. MARTIN-L?F'S When we talk about Martin-L?f THEORY OF TYPES than just a type theory we refer to more as the meaning for the rules form an essential system explanations here is ingredient of it. taken in conjunction with Prawitz's reduction systems and to G?del's Dial?ctica MLTT is an open system. --. What we combine of the by means and hold true are propositions. A and B are equal types (abbr. the full paradigm are obtained and expressiveness strength through data types and reflection. In ing they are amenable explanation of fact. duction origins of this system can be traced to the natural de of Gentzen. A is a type (abbr. 4. is a qualitative distinction between of a type arbitrary elements and canonical elements of a type. i. A type A is defined by stating what .

b) = (a'. b of A are equal if. equality. elements. judgements since we the other hand. b') : A x B of A ?> B is an expression which (in (?x)t(x) a function given by a term t(x) such that t(a). of the Cartesian where a product type A x B is a pair. By contrast. regards "2 + 2" as a program.b): Ax B (a.HILBERTPROGRAM THE CONSTRUCTIVE we what have to do in order need to construct to be satisfied a canonical element 95 of the type and to be elements program arbitrary to equal the same conditions for such canonical or equal. Equality between canonical elements of and transitive. (-^-introduction) [x :A] t(x) : (?x)t(x) :A ^ B [x : A] = t(x) s(x) : B (?x)t(x) = (Ax)s(x) :A -? #' B . and can : A and b : A.b). which allow of the form t : A for non-canonical t. viz. canonical elements of A. Martin-L?f the expression. But obviously 2+ 2 : the given rules. an arbitrary element of type A is a method which when executed yields a canonical element of type A. called elimination rules. is an element of B for each a : A. Two a and b evaluate elements a. However. shall need further rules. For each type there are type should be reflexive. the judgement N is not derivable via N-introduction. 2+ 2 is not obtainable from its evaluated Therefore one before we to derive form (in his theories) itwill be the canonical element SSSSO. The pertaining rules are: a: -A b :B a = a' :A b= V :B (x-introduction) A canonical element (a. the result formally) denotes a for x. which gives instructions In for its own evaluation. we will neglect all rules dealing with For ease of presentation The type of natural number is introduced by the following rules: (N-formation) (N-introduction) The introduction N type -0 a :N Sa elements :N :N of N are generated. On of type N as well. rules state how canonical of type N. These are best illustrated by means of a concrete example. A-> B (ILt :A)B(x) A+ B (Ex : A)B(x). In the natural of substituting deduction takes the forms calculus. formation rules for that type and introduction rules to construct canonical elements of that type. 2 + 2 should be regarded can evaluate it to a canonical element as an element rules let us study some further forms of stating any elimination called canonical elements henceforth. symmetric. types and their canonical Ax B A canonical be written element as (a. when executed.

we are allowed sign of the major to the introduction 'means' according rule for this sign".4 below) elimination us study the much simpler case of the type A ? B. c= d a) a :B a = :A (^ -elimination) : A ?> B b :A App(c. (Ax)t(x) The a canonical elements of A + B are of the forms / (a) and j (b). above).96 where inference. Then we can Suppose A is a type and B(a) : A)B whose are of the form form a new type (Hx canonical elements where t(a) is an element of B for each a : A. As the whose defining equations express the elimination let rules for N are rather involved (but see Section 4. A ?> B has the using special constructors. Referring dividing logical rules into introduction the harmony between the logical constants. there are no other ways is expanding here on Gentzen's to form ideas of to and elimination rules. b) with a : A and ? : 5(a). constructor A + B has the constructors / and j. The elimination rules for a type A are. as it were. Martin-L?f rules. a) ? App(d. respectively. and so forth. notion of a constructor. b) :B . viz. Gentzen these (1935) explains two kinds of rules as follows: "an introduction rule gives. A. given rules for the type. of when making an inference by an elimination pressed somewhat as follows: ' to 'use only what the principal rule. Here the rules are:9 c : A -> B App(c. and recursion rules for structural induction rules for an arbitrary type requires formal rendering of elimination a new constant. then (Ex : A)B(x) is a type whose are pairs (a. premiss In the case amount The of to familiar the type of natural numbers N the elimination rules over N. The dual of the introduction rules for obtaining canonical elements of a type are its elimination rules. a " in question while "an elimination rule is only definition of the constant a consequence the corresponding introduction which may be ex rule. They amount to are generated by exactly the means saying that all canonical elements of A laid down canonical in the introduction elements. where : A and b : B. canonical There is a certain pattern for forming canonical in all the elements in canonical above cases. If B(a) is a type for each a elements : A. MICHAEL RATHJEN [x : A] indicates an assumption which the gets discharged by is a type for each a : A. Associated with each type will be a selector (dual to the as an implicitly defined constant. Each element form is built from its components N has the constructors 0 and S. natural consequences of its introduction rules. as it were.

The point of view to be adhered on propositions are types and that logical operations is that propositions So far we have avoided correspond to the appropriate type forming operations in line with the of the interpretation (BHK-interpretation) Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov each proposition is of the logical constants. the meaning of the selector App To explain suppose c : A ?> B and a canonical a : A. B which is executed ? a for x leads to t (a) : B. constructive procedure It seems that the notion of constructive procedure used here must be taken as a primitive logical notion.a) c: c= A-* a :A = t(a) : B B x) : A ?> B (Ax)App(c. The table below gives a dictionary for translating operations Logical into type theory. Then App(c.HILBERTPROGRAM THE CONSTRUCTIVE 97 [x: A] t(x) : B App((Ax)t(x). It turns out that the first glimpse of type theory to given above suffices for that task.2. is a method element of for obtaining a) c is a method which yields a canonical as follows. whereby constructive meaning identified with the type of its proofs. notion Type-theoretic type element of A notion proposition proof of A A is true A has an element AA? AD B Ax B A-> B AvB (VxgA)B(x) (3xeA)B(x) Note defined that the treatment A+B (ILc : A)B(x) (Ex : A)B(x) in MLTT to strictly adheres should range only over already Brouwer's dictum sets/types of quantifiers that quantified variables A.10 For example the constructive mean in saying that a proof of A D B is a ing of an implication A D B consists that transforms each proof of A into a proof of B. 5. 77i? Proposition-as-Types Interpretation be treated are to the question how standard logical operations in type theory. . Substituting element (2x)i (x) of A we finally arrive at a canonical element of B. t(a) through evaluating 4. Thus.

The in objects and constructions inferences and mathematical constructions between terrelationship logical connects together logic and mathematics.3.b). Prawitz (1977) has expanded that a theory of meaning ideas who suggested formulated in terms of proofs or rules also ought to take note of Gentzen's funda the rules from it. of B or j (b). The inductive nature of the canonical proofs can be made more explicit by the following table: a canonical proof of has the form where a is a proof of A A A B (?. where t(a) is a proof of B{a) whenever a is an element of A (3xe A)B(x) (a. b). a deficiency overcomes it seems that MLTT of the which is due to the latter's rather narrow focus semantics on logical reasoning. logic retreats into the background and mathematical occupy center stage. Logic gets intertwined with . 1977) has brought Inspired by ideas of Wittgenstein. where b is a proof (VxeA)#(x) (Ax)t(x). On an understanding On the other Dummett-Prawitz of certain is closely of the meaning of the logical oper a brief account of their to intersperse be instructive and illuminating for the one hand this might hand. forward philosophical arguments against a platonistic theory of meaning. where a is an element of B(a) of A and b is a proof 4. 'smeaning aspects of Martin-L?f explanations.98 MICHAEL RATHJEN as types. The Dummett-Prawitz Meaning-as-Use Theory and MLTT Dummett (1973. In mathematics. the elements of a proposition In rendering propositions are to as proofs and thus its canonical be understood elements could be termed canonical proofs. to a rejection of classical amounting logic in favour of intuitionistic logic. on Dummett's mental In order for such a rejection to be conclusive. where a is a proof of A a is a proof of A. and b is a proof of B A d B (Ax)t(x). or duality obtains between insight that a correspondence for asserting a sentence and the rules for drawing consequences In many aspects the Dummett-Prawitz theory of meaning-as-use related toMartin-L?f 's understanding it useful ators and thus I consider theory here. where t (a) is a proof of B whenever Av B i (a).

where use is to be taken in a very broad sense in the sense all its aspects. a meaning would therefore be of as a social enterprise understood in and exchange results with each in a primordial way. all we learn is how i. sentences. Thesis of a math holds that the meaning in the (abstract) its truth conditions by of us. we it therefore are trained seems as establishing the truth of sentences. appears to be very detached practice... not by trans to use expressions . is actually taught.3. what it is Dummett argues be recognizable fully manifest covering that two expressions which are always used in the same way The main lines of support for Dummett's the same meaning. Such no importance for mathematics can cooperate which many people other". His tenet is that the meaning of a sentence must be by in its use.THE CONSTRUCTIVE HILBERT PROGRAM 99 mathematical and it appears that its role therein and operations. This view. ". The points. Use exhaustively determines meaning ought to have thesis are the 1. in the art of proving mathematical of this transcendence serves of to the elucidation that the invocation as an ?berbau which fails to add anything merely to know a mathematical statement. it seems that what look back at the way that mathematics we learn is not to establish in a transcendent of sentences truth-conditions world And but rather what is to be counted that is to say. (Prawitz 1977. existing independently be developed along part of mathematics The Meaning-as-Use classical/platonist statement is determined ematical realm of mathematical mathematician objects from mathematical If we however. When lation we learn a language into another language.1.. special I shall not undertake any detailed analysis of all the facets of of Below to a rough sketch and Prawitz's Dummett's arguments and confine myself of the main 4. cannot be separated from mathematical Indeed. constructions. it is to assume that part of the meaning of This part of the meaning would then be irrelevant when the statement was used in communication. has that meaning has to be observable: to be communicable to assume that there and that communication in the ingredient in the use made is some meaning of a sentence which cannot become manifest cannot be communicated.e. following: cannot be separated from use and must that meaning us. not only ' can swork demonstrate that a coherent theory of meaning does Martin-L?f objects the lines of Dummett-Prawitz but also for a rich and elaborate can be construed as that logical operators cases of more general mathematical operations. 14) 2.

Molecular that use determines meaning does not rule out the possibility The principle with re that the meaning of a single statement can only be understood as a whole. Thus the only way of acquiring of a sentence and learning its use. Therefore the meaning observing cannot transcend its total use. if other expressions the meaning of a statement cannot regress. Dummett in the philosophy and observational meaning determined sentences. An extreme holistic view gard to the framework of language the "that nothing less than the total use of the language determines sentence" of an individual 1977. Knowledge it in terms of of Socrates by explicitly strated in the manner defining of which is already known. endowed with a as of the former is understood the meaning in isolation whereas of science. On such a view.3.100 MICHAEL RATHJEN of a sentence in such a language correctly. of the meaning of a sentence A can only manifest plicit knowledge itself in the ability to use it or to respond to its use by others in a certain consist such knowledge is by way. In short: We know the meaning of A if observable we know under what conditions A may be correctly asserted. the above views on the meaning Specialized amount to agreeing with in of a sentence the intuitionists that meaning to be understood in terms of proofs. example of a restricted form of holism of course. it (Prawitz meaning to develop a meaning is not possible of theory which explains the meaning or even to adhere to a sentences in terms of their constituent parts single claims milder which form of holism where are amenable to other one singles to such a molecular sentences out a privileged class of sentences and which meaning explanation their deductive by relationships with the drastic form of holism on the grounds that rejects situations by us through use in particular meaning must be recognizable and 'total use of language' blatantly escapes recognizability. has somehow mathematics Versus Holistic Views on Meaning 4. The latter are. must therefore consists in can sometimes be demon of the meaning of an expression 3. Here by their role in deducing and refuting privileged observational Hubert's the privileged program. in mathematics A prominent is. 7). The grasp of the meaning our ability to use it correctly. However.2. the meaning of explicit verbalizable and thus knowledge solely knowledge Im of meaning must ultimately be traced back to implicit knowledge. are called standpoint one distinguishes between theoretical sentences. by and large. sentences then gives meaning this class. there is not to be an infinite to the case of mathematics. where underlying Partial holism is also a common 'real sentences'. .

In the case of a conditional A D B a direct proof consists of a construction / which when fed a direct proof of A returns a direct proof of B. p. taking an example the notion from Prawitz A(n) v B(n) it would B(n). Meaning-as-Use and the BHK-Interpretation The meaning-as-use thesis asserts that the meaning of a statement is de termined by the conditions under which it may be correctly asserted.g. However. is obtained proofs of a proposition rules for the pertaining of a proposition A A B from a direct proof pa of A and a direct proof pB of B.yeN)F(x. Even from an intuitionistic are perfectly cannot be ob point of view there legitimate proofs which tained in this direct way..m) for large numbers n. Under for asserting is to know proof the proposition-as-types view. an intuitionistic to obtain that (1977.3. To give an example. molecular semantical view in that the proofs of a complex proposition explained the notion to give a proof by what it means The BHK-interpretation mentioned of A or what A. of the are in terms of proof conditions for its components. For instance. To distinguish of proof supported by the BHK-interpretation from others. proof is too restrictive. "we may assert even intuitionistically a proof of A(n) or for some numeral n without knowing be sufficient. Thus a sentence from its atomic components generated logical operations. Following of Frege. pB) type. to a mathematical statement A. the canonical are precisely the ones generated by the introduction a direct proof (pA. The condition A. 4. A first attempt at a meaning theory for mathematical {MT\) To know statements A could be framed as follows: for assert of the meaning of A is to know A the conditions a canonical ing A. Thus from a direct it is not necessary that such a direct . 21). Or. repudiates a molecular sees the meaning view. if we know a proof of A(0) v B(0) and a point proof of view but it is sufficient that we know a procedure proof be of a direct proof of (VxgN)([A(x) v B(x)] -> [A(x + 1) v B(x + 1)])". he as being determined the way it is built up from its con by an individual (having is which meaning immediate meaning) via carries parts. let us call them canonical proof s or direct proofs. e.3. and maintains a sentence stituent 101 all kinds of holistic meaning theories however. in arithmetic we frequently infer a statement F(n. its meaning could be explained Turning counts as a proof of above provides a precise rendering what counts as a proof of amathematical It also adheres to proposition.THE CONSTRUCTIVE HILBERTPROGRAM Dummett. m from a proof of the universal statement (VxeN)(V. y) by instantiation.

In a sense. of A or know a procedure proof that we know the rules for drawing moreover. taking concept of meaning To know for asserting A is that we either know a canonical for obtaining such a proof. in that they flow naturally to A seem to occupy a privileged position ing rules. Nonetheless.3. remedied by saying: (MT2) To know As MICHAEL RATHJEN a result. conse the exact nature of the rules for drawing specify of inferring further from A. Thus. view. the ability only comprises in the commitments made by asserting it. there is an important strand of ideas originating with Gentzen. The condition proof for asserting A is that we either know a canonical for obtaining of A or know a procedure such a proof. Prawitz embraces the this idea is developed as developed in (M3) as the most desirable candidate but the caveat that "in order for such a meaning theory to appear it seems that one has to argue for the unique position of the ing A. consequences from A. the problems met with can be (MT\) the meaning of A is to know the conditions for assert ing A. 4. He therefore a harmony the that in a theory of meaning should obtain between suggests a sentence and the rules for drawing consequences from rules for asserting which manifests itself sentence to the molecular in addition it. theory of running through Dummett's elimination rules are rules for inferring consequences Gentzen's meaning.102 actually constructed. from a sentence elimination of the following (MT3) and run parallel rules into account we form: the meaning of A is to know the conditions for assert to the introduction arrive at an enriched rules.4. Hence. The condition . the full grasp of the meaning of a statement not a proof of itwhen one is presented to recognize to draw consequences to us but also our capacity from it. there are many ways quences the elimination rules pertain sentences from a given one. Such a view seems to prevail elimination from the corresponding (M3) doesn't inMLTT notion also enters reasonable. where of meaning at full scale. and. On the Harmony between the Rules for Making Assertions and Drawing Consequences in (MT2) may be somewhat Dummett points out that the view expressed an important aspect of the use of an assertive immature in that it neglects In the case of mathematics.

Therein characteristics: 1.. The s constructivism. they serve merely if we wished. 33). the elimination on them...g.. with dispensed From the fact that we have discarded are it. e.HILBERTPROGRAM THE CONSTRUCTIVE elimination rules" 103 that what distin 1977. of the elimination the question of the position To my mind one views propositions in a wider context where best discussed and in addition interpretation These so-called section. The latter clearly cor are pivotal in determining the as e. Negation that something holds stating this would exact: because Or to be more elements. Thus Inductive Data far I have Types addressed a small of MLTT which is fragment an inductive data type is concept of only sufficient central G?del for developing logic. the natural mathematical types rules elements formal strength whereas proof-theoretic in theories of considerable proof-theoretic roborates meaning numbers. I. to Martin-L?f It was very succinctly stated by text for an invited lecture which he delivered in in a handwritten he described constructive mathematics by the following two 1933. They tools for performing mathematical operations to prove assertions about all the elements of the type by struc tural induction and at the same time allow one to define functions on the of theoretic research systems to in-depths proof the type by structural recursion.g. must not be applied to propositions 2. the view of that elimination involving statements 4. He conjectures (Prawitz rules from other possible candidates might be that the elimination guishes in some sense the strongest rules for drawing consequences constitute they from an assertion. The totalities (as we application for which of we the notion can give "all" a finite can. tives of general (i. give existence propositions. Owing it is known of elimination rules in that the omission featuring inductive types gives rise to theories of weak rules results the inclusion of elimination strength.e. for the totality of all properties integer and as we cannot.4. it follows that we left with or "any" is to be restricted to those infinite for generating all their elements procedure of forming the next greater integers by the process for all Nega in our are to have meaning propositions) an example do but. e. existence propositions system only in the sense that we have found not state it explicitly. for the totality of of integers).g.e. for the sake of brevity. In the case of inductive in the next sub types will be discussed rules amount data types. as an abbreviation and could be entirely of existence only and the rules logical for proving the notion concerning essentially one method . enable to the central one takes to the type forming operations pertaining also mathematically types important inductive data rules is as types to the BHK into account.

[. This continue as in the second case. y))) :C(Sa) RN(Sa.] and so we may applied system process on the method of complete induction in its definitions as well as its proofs. getting a y)) is explained : N. y)e(x. the preceding (x. substitute a for x and of C(c) In the element C(0). Rn(^? d. (x. by reach the value 0. we get a canonical y)). The elimination (N-ehmination) c:N - [x :N. y)) (namely. canonical as follows: first execute c. correspondingly. d. Executing is in C(Sa) the first case. Otherwise. d. is also a canonical but. y : C(x)] d :C(0) e(x. y)e(x. which yields a canonical = 0 : N in this case.. y : C{x)] e(x. 51) The paradigm of an inductive data type is that of the type of natural num to the principles rules for N correspond of induction bers.104 general of our MICHAEL RATHJEN induction say that our to the generating is based exclusively namely. a function on all canonical the recursion elements tells one how to define principle of the type by recursion on their build rules explain how non-canonical elements ments up. d: C(0) [x :A. complete propositions. until we eventually explanation of the above (N-equality I) elimination rule also explains the equality rules. (x. by / which. d. d. elements. (x. which is either 0 or Sa for some a element the first case. y)) a :N . y)e(x. y)) :C(c) d: C(0) Rn(c. In of N. (x. continue by executing d. y : C(x)] e(x. value) for y in e(x. : C(0). RN(a. (x. elimination are formed via the selector.d.y)e(x. y) :C(Sx) = e(a.y) :C(Sx) RN(c. y)e(x.y) :C(Sx) C(c) RN(0. and the equation rules explain how the selector to the type N elements. it. the right premiss. (G?del 1995. Likewise. since c / / = second case. element as to get e(a. The elimination nation over N. y)e(x. y)e(x. for an arbitrary inductive type A the elimi rules encapsulate the principles of structural induction and recursion over A.. The selector pertaining operates on the canonical rules is the following: is R^.(x. More formally. d.y))=d: (N-equality II) [x :N. The induction principle for A tells one how to prove properties for of a type by induction on the build-up of its canonical all elements ele and recursion and. y) so Rn(<z.

of objects as the smallest collection satisfying set theory the inductively In classical defined closure that satisfy of all collections the intersection an explicit definition is thoroughly impredicative over all collections. essary at some point to make use of some impredicative are accounted is certainly the way that inductive definitions for in classical set theory. then (ao) (oil) (On) is in 0. then so is the successor (a) 2. if a is in 0. ai. such as classical to represent .. An inductive definition often involves the characterization certain of a collection conditions. defined using quantification that if one wants to make as set is usually obtained Such the closure conditions.HILBERTPROGRAM THE CONSTRUCTIVE An 105 inMartin-L?f type theory example of an inductive definition built over a family of types.. The taken as a constructive infinitary is the W-type inductive generation proceeds by the following introduction rules: 0: -O a: & a' :0 f :N^ sup(/) 0 :O as formation of well-founded trees The last two clauses may be depicted as follows: 1. is a sequence of ordinals in 0. A special case of the latter is trees over N which may be ordinals or well-founded the type of Brouwer version of the second number class of ordinals. if ao. But there is something unsatisfying about this conclusion. in that the collection It would seem therefore is sense of infinitary inductive definitions it is nec This definitions. Many can be intuitively in their own inductive definitions understood directly terms and impredicative them within a particular definitions frame are only required in order set theory..

e. It gives the conceptions which have governed our constructions " which roughly speaking says whatever we rise to a reflection principle " are used to doing with types can be done inside a universe (Martin-L?f of the existing 1975. which the step of recognizing have been introduced hitherto and perform that of meaning informal semantics aware of is an attempt to become 'introspection' in the past. to Martin-L?f's (Ue-formation) Ue : type a :Ue Te(fl) : type (Ue-introduction) a :Ue a+b b :Uc :Ue ? :Ue Te(N) = N a :Ue ?(a. are not that different from inductive seem that type universes It might data as opposed to inductive data types their elements types.106 4. of the type there is a declaration. in those for IT.5. Each time an element of Ue is generated type forming operation function Te. II and their rules.. is defined decoding function this simultaneously to occur negatively in its introduction rules as. e.g. this leads to an extension of type theory in that the type forming capacities formalization of G be come enshrined in a type universe Ue mirroring G.g. then this gives rise to they are valid according This act of explanation. allowed . moreover. +. are not simply defined by a positive inductive definition. The elements and Te(*) or G?del numbers of types generated from N via the of type Ue are codes + and IT. the introduction the universes Type encapsulate as follows. and.. On the formal level. role may be explained informal notion of reflection whose a particular formalization the course of developing of type theory. 83). [x :Te (a)] t(x) :Ue (Ax)t(x)) :Ue a :UG b :UG Tc(a+b) = Te(a) + TG(b) Tc(U(a. However. of the decoding by means for which it stands. G consists of the type forming the rules: operations N. say G. They incorporate function defined the extra feature of being equipped with a type-valued on them. The Reflection via Universes MICHAEL RATHJEN of Martin-L?f in type theory is particularly manifest openendedness of so-called universes. If. During the type theorist may look back over the rules for types. x :Ue [x :Te (a)] a :Ue t(x) :Ue = (Ux : (Ax)t(x))) Te(a))Te(t(x)) are defined by a simultaneous induction.

Palmgren sequence at extensions of type theory with more powerful axioms. denoted MLF. e. externally indexed tower of universes considered (1975. The type-theoretic formalization of the (1998). the introduction to their dual.. this idea has been developed (1998) who by Palmgren level of abstraction as elements of arbitrary finite levels.HILBERTPROGRAM THE CONSTRUCTIVE As in the case of inductive 107 universes give rise the elements of Ue rules for type data types. Martin-L?f of Reflection It is the nature The which first level reflect of reflection is encapsulated type forming accepted previously an infinite.. been taken in Rathjen and Palmgren a formal type theory MLQ. Aiming Martin-L?f then suggested finding axioms for a universe V which itself is closed under the universe operator. 1984) g . gives rise to types having codes for such which may be called universes of type two. When S(F) applied to a family of sets.. the elimination entail that rules... e. all of which are closed under the same standard Uo gUi The next natural step was to imple of set forming operations. universe constructions stronger Essentially require new ideas and their seems to be limited by creativity in Rathjen potential only.6.g.g. in gaining into how type forming operations insight the introduction in a One can. Such a system. In more generality. which are exactly generated by the forms of type that Ue is reflecting. I have stated a conjecture about the proof-theoretic (2000) strength of universe constructions based on higher types which predicts that they can introduced type universes A further . Such a operations introduces (1998) which step has. ensemble ment a universe operator into type theory which takes a family of sets and constructs a universe while above it. was presented operator inRathjen (2000). is closed under F. After consists was referred one can go to a new level of abstraction which the superuniverse are obtained. are a universe M and a uni Central toMLQ verse of codes for type constructors Q which are defined simultaneously. codes for types operations. G Un G . However. internalize of new universe operators : Fam -> Fam formal system of type theory wherein each operator F from families of types to families of types gives rise to a new universe : Fam ?> Fam. produces structors. where the universe pertinent rules is due to Palmgren to as a superuniverse for intuitionistic type theory. S(F) a universe in addition to the standard set con above it which. 1993).11 4.. inHigher Order Universes to aim at higher degrees in universes containing introspection. Such a universe operator was formalized by Palmgren logical framework working with an infinite on a domain-theoretic of the interpretation of universes (cf.

the inconsistency definitions atively type TTM. hence inductive whenever X eye that ismonotone. The between TTM a new construction and the systems above is that TTM introduces 's in Martin-L?f which is not foreshadowed principle difference for Setzer's is witnessed by the fact that models original papers. More precisely. ju is a recursively Mahlo Another constructive type theory has been important step in advancing of a Mahlo universe in type taken by Setzer who gave a formalization set Zermelo-Fraenkel theory (cf. The set inductively is the smallest such a set exists. i. universes L?f type theory in longer required rules for elimination yield to respond and that such rules may be rather alien to the idea of a universe. theory an important step for expanding the realm of Martin-L?f type theory. Constructive set can the existence of aMahlo with an axiom asserting theory conjoined be as has been shown in Rathjen in TTM Setzer's (2003b). Palmgren's inconsistency proof presents usual defined elimination rules for universes are tailored for monotone inductive definitions proof that the usual Palmgren's an inconsistency when applied to TTM prompted Martin rules that universes need not be equipped with elimination that the inductively and thus spring from the crucial property is the least fixed point of the corresponding operator. with elimination shows it to be incompatible a paradigm shift to a new Martin-L?f sense. 6) and. The 1978) though. Hinman theory of inductive definitions point of view of the classical no surprise. set A is derived from a mapping given <S>:pow(A) -> pow(A) A. <D(X) ? 0(F) denotes the class of all subsets of A. a least fixed not possess view on non-monotone set is obtained is that the inductively the corresponding applying previous stages along way. TTM means of a type are no the elements that the rules for forming to be monotonie. to the monotonicity of d> the pertinent point. KPM was de segments L^ of the constructible hierarchy L. type (or set) over a inductive definition in set theory a monotone To be more precise. From the (cf.108 always be mimicked to formalize MICHAEL RATHJEN in a classical set theory called KPM.e. where signed ordinal (cf. interpreted It provides is stronger than those based on higher type universes. Due operator is non-monotone arises.. by In a rules for the universe. O00. Setzer 2000). dubbed TTM. This inductive definition Mahlo universe are generated by a non-monotonic (see an observation due to Palmgren which Section furthermore. Rathjen 1991). operator to what in this the ordinals until no new objects are generated -> pow(A) : pow(A) is an arbitrary mapping if <D in stages by iter at has been generated . however. set Z such that ?(Z) ? In the case of Setzer's and does The classical defined Z.Herepow(A) defined by O.

Recursive For definiteness are in the following let this mean is contained in T. Furthermore. All amodicum to contain that the system PRA of Primitive either directly or by translation. DEFINIITION and ?2.1. <?-equivalent. if T\ <o T2 and T2 <o T\. rules can be found by viewing non-monotone elimination inductive types as being equipped with a W-type which provides the (or well-ordering) stages of its inductive generation. a 0? :=0((j Q?) u y ^ ?<a ?<a where a ranges over the ordinals.0) -> Proofs(/(*). if there exists a primitive to T2. correct type-theoretic elimination have yet to be found. I agree with Setzer (2000. then say that T\ is proof-theoretically recursive T2. Furthermore. 157) that the rules for non-monotone type universes I'd like to conjecture that the "correct" 5. WHICH FRAGMENTS OF SECOND ORDER ARITHMETIC ARE SECURED BY MLTT? The central will notions be used strength a brief account assumed and proof-theoretic of proof-theoretic reducibility I shall insert below. O should contain ^-reducible function / ?x of the equations of the language of PRA. so that in the statement of proof-theoretically reducible in the process of reduction it we say that T\ is simply to T2 (written T\ < T2) and T\ and T2 are theorems . of them. Let Tu T2 be a pair of theories with languages and let O be a (primitive collection recursive) respectively.HILBERTPROGRAM 109 THE CONSTRUCTIVE then the the set-theoretic given by definition of the set inductively defined by <I>is O00 := (J<Da. T\ =0 T\ and T2 are said to be proof-theoretically 72. written </>)]. The appropriate class Q> is revealed self. formulae closed We T\ <o 5. common to both languages. written such that (1) PRA hV^GOVx [Proofs (jc. For the readers convenience theories T considered Arithmetic of arithmetic.

et al. stronger the reducing (X^-AC) can be proven consistent inMLTT.110 MICHAEL RATHJEN = (written T\ T2). More precisely. A /?-model let T be the is absolute.12 Well. the help of one type universe strength as (E^-AC). the strongest result of its kind. For the important class of than the mere consistency statements one obtains a conservativity result. However. of (X^-AQ+TI is provable inMartin the following the part of the intuitionists/constructivists.2 is by no means (1996) introduces .3 (Rathjen 2003a. than (S2-AC) ory J?ger and Pohlers bar induction in terms of an (1982) gave an ordinal analysis (E^-AC) plus the pertaining ordinal representa ordinal representation system. respectively. The consistency s 1984 type theory. when T\ = T2. The paper a theory of second order arithmetic which by Rathjen is based on \ but in addition has axioms stating that there exist (E^-AC) is a model with respect to which many /^-models of (E^-AC). Utilizing tion system the following result was obtained independently by Rathjen (2003a) and Setzer (1998): THEOREM L?f 5. 1981) showed that the intuitionistic Buchholz (see tree classes.2. is of the same ID1 inductive 60-iterated (0). With proof-theoretic one can interpret in type theory thereby the WMype reflecting ID'<6o(0) a considerably to type theory. the representation system used in the analysis of (L^j-AQ+TI yields more of the latter system. Proof-theoretic of < Alterna strength in the late 1970s theory undertaken Pohlers and Sieg investigations by Buchholz. objection of consistency the significance could be raised against proofs: even if it that the classical demonstrated had been constructively theory T cannot On lead to mutually results. Setzer 1998) The soundness of the negative arithmetic fragment of (X^-AQ+TI inMartin is provable Every n!j inMartin-L?f's statement (1984) type theory. proof-theoretically equivalent we shall say that T\ and T2 have the same proof-theoretic tively. n^ THEOREM 5. in provable (S^-AQ+TI has a proof L?f 's (1984) type theory. the notion of well-foundedness statement is the scheme asserting that every true \ plus theory (I^-AC) n^ Theorem 5. the theorems of T would neverthe contradictory sense and their investigation therefore an idle without less be propositions it turns out that the constructive well-ordering proof of pastime.

to apply reflection to any particular formalization it is possible of MLTT. fundamental question.HILBERTPROGRAM THE CONSTRUCTIVE reflected in a y?-model of (E^-AC). Thus from the point of view of justifying ical practice in a Hilbertian the existing formalizations way we have consistent mathemat of MLTT are already powerful enough. it doesn't is equiconsistent of ZFC and argue thatMLTT exhausts and furthermore with TM since drawing such an exact limit toMLTT appears to entail that from within Martin-L?f this limit could be approached type theory and a foundational therefore be overcome.15 of T. a hypothetical realm by adopting. This thought experiment one to delineate the type bounds for the realm which never be leaving. Theorem and soundness the consistency n^ 6. It is. that the type from Rathjen (1996). An intellectual in difficulty should then allow theorist will this project is to become aware of the conceptions which govern pursuing all possible of aMartin-L?f theorist. This it is still of great interest is a somewhat ambiguous toMartin-L?f 's outlook that though. of course. The same proof-theoretic and T have the 5. Notwithstanding to ponder where the limits of MLTT lie. Consequently. More undertaking seem to be possible to single out a particular fragment TM over. to transcend the type theorists it appears to be possible Nonetheless. THE LIMITS OF MARTIN-L?F TYPE THEORY Above seen that ordinary mathematics is demonstrably relative toMLTT. as it were. more precisely. it should enable the Can torian set theorist to draw a line in his set-theoretic world beyond which the type theorist will never be able to reach. A first and rather coarse type thinking of Martin-L?f reflection suggests three basic principles type theory. . Martin-L?f and thus obtain a stronger system. elements of a particular type it is disallowed In declaring what are the tomake reference to all types. (AO) (Predicativism) The realm of types is built in stages (by the idealized type theorist). type theory as cannot be captured by a formal system. It also follows proves theory MLQ It follows 111 from Rathjen (1996). It is not a completed totality.15 that the type theory MLF strength. orem 5. how a canonical of element (Al) A type A is defined by describing A is formed as well as the conditions two canonical under which elements of A are equal. 'eagles' point of view as in an advanced position on all pos set theory and reflect from such classical sible moves the type theorist can ever perform. or.

The elements of type A are then con to be represented the elements of O00. and (A2) are liable to different readings and perhaps are in need I consider it more fruitful though. has the consequence that (A2) hereditarily will be lost by considering all types to be surjective images of nothing an encoding that with such subsets of N. yields A can be emulated by an inductive definition O over the natural every type numbers together with a decoding function D. O00. consists of the elements types. Firstly. of N.112 (A2) The canonical MICHAEL RATHJEN of a type must be namable. is of the allowable of classifying To find such . where O :pow(N) -> pow(N) is a (class) function set inductively from the class of all subsets defined to pow(N). proceeds (cf. a <D? :=<D([J^) ?<a U (JO^. I shall not impose the restriction by on operators. Thus the type A will be by identified with the set : x G <D??}. In investigate let us adopt a classical Cantorian point of view and analyze the following. that is to say. In combination (Al). to of further rumination. Setzer 2000) features a type which type theory TTM a monotone operator.A common way and decoding operators inductive definitions by their syntactic complexity. a rigorous formal model of these principles within set theory. But ?<a monotonicity consists in describing A further step in delineating MLTT <I> functions Da. ?<a where sidered a ranges over the ordinals. as a word in a for a symbolic representation. The := <D?? (Jo?. pow(N). Principles (AO). (Al). in addition to countably many basic sym language whose alphabet. {D(x) The vast majority of inductively defined types of MLTT monotone operators13 O whose iterations satisfy Oa = i>( since Setzer's not generated is given by |J <D^). on this basis. introduced of previously bols. By G?del numbering. Here elements they must allow "previously" refers back to the stages of (AO). the foregoing types are to be interpreted principles as sets. has the set-theoretic definition by O.

These formulas may contain previously further sets as parameters. The same persistency = V. respectively. type-valued the validity should not nullify this fact. X e M. the collection They are exactly formulas generated from the atomic and negated atomic formulas by closing off under A.8). Though as a delineation fragment. KP. to saying that terms amounts the foregoing in set-theoretic Framing ? t e O(X) the truth of formulas describing and D(t) b. v. gm) h then (P. universe. this method of generation of elements should also obey a the method Furthermore.e. of inductive definitions for generating types inMLTT on as known -> pow(N) for generating (A3) Every inductive definition O : pow(N) the elements of a type A inMLTT and its pertinent decoding func tion are definable by set-theoretic E-formulas. It a small fragment of ZF. Kripke-Platek T. i. A. bounded quantifiers (Wxea). remain And to be in the time a new element is a type of codes of types which comes endowed with a function D (like in the case of type universes). then decoding = B with x : A of equations between types of the form D(x) true under expansions of the universe of types. in the guise of on the ubiquitous Kripke-Platek set theory. Gp) |= t G O(X)14 should obtain as well. one thus is led to impose restrictions the preceding.1.HILBERTPROGRAM THE CONSTRUCTIVE 113 a syntactic bound it is in order to recall that the type theorists develop their universe of types in stages. (3xea) and unbounded existential 3x (cf. Introducing a new type A consists in describing a method its elements. Taking into account that the type for generating is always in a state of expansion it becomes clear that theoretic universe for of A is formed by the method of generation can only refer to types that have been built up hitherto. property should hold for formulas of the form 'D(x) are can be characterized The formulas which by the latter property technical sets of sets of set-theoretic in set theory as the E-formulas. In ought to be persistent under adding more sets to a set-theoretic remain more that whenever M and P are transitive language this means t G <D(X). M ? P and (M. types. is based set theory is a truly remarkable . the method and yield t : A in the expanded universe if A should as well. Barwise 1975. where these sets correspond to defined To avoid misunderstandings. such that t. I'd like to emphasize that (A3) is not meant to say that every such E inductive definition gives rise to a type acceptable inMLTT. allows This (A3) is intended only us to draw a limit for MLTT of an upper bound. quantification In view of the complexity follows. subsystem of ZF. form: If at a certain stage an object condition of the following persistency as an element of A then an expansion t is recognized of the type-theoretic each universe should applicable same vein.

to it might be interesting an equivalent of T which is couched in terms of characterization give of second order arithmetic. V T has an axiom is a Ei <\ asserting in a transitive set which (written M elementary V). called ITT. we have to alter KP slightly. assume that ITT introduces a new type A by operations in this way: . without between book by Barwise To describe the foundation an G-least scheme site of quantifiers. The transitive models unbounded the axioms of KP is T. subsystems the question of the type theorist's limit. Then T formulas (?>(x. in T. that the boundaries satisfies M elaborating Before <\V. Further. Among scheme which says that every non-empty definable class has the foundation element.e. KP arises from ZF by omitting to bounded formulas. has a certain repertoire of type forming opera to a collection G set of E-definable tions.1.y) with KPr +Wx3M(xeM The following 6. KP has been a major see the branches of logic (for more information many of KP are called admissible 1975). further where M on this question. Let KPr result from KP by restricting In addition universe to KPr. set is contained of the set-theoretic M <\V stand for the scheme VaeM for all bounded is the theory [3x(p(x. is definable pow(N) then <D?? g M. a great deal of set theory requires only the considerably the power set axioms of this subsystem. The argument may run the types that may ever be constructed Types are interpreted as sets. I shall now argue on the Resuming of MLTT. by a E formula is provable -> V.114 MICHAEL RATHJEN weaker than ZF. At a certain stage the idealized type theorist. To be more that every substructure precise. theorem A M<iV). say G. a)\ all free variables exhibited. i. to put itmore pictorially. it contains all basis of T that every set M <\ V is a model inMLTT.a) -> 3x GM<f(x. and collection axiom and restricting that separation is formulas interaction sets. theorist can ever develop can be emulated of the type theorist world are to be drawn inside M. let to sets. THEOREM with The parameters If <t> : pow(N) inM and M <\ a Martin-L?f above theorem supports the claim that everything type in T or. The operations correspond on sets.

y) and S(u. <Ddefines a by letting <S>(X) and for every X?N there exists function since the <DM are E definable M <i V such that X e M. v) iff (M. the generation of the elements of is closed under G set. Y g pow(N) n M.e. there are E-formulas y/(x. pow(N) on M whenever M <\V. Theorem 6. PD leads to a quence set theory. THE HIGHER At INFINITE AND NEW AXIOMS in order to point out that there the end of this article it is. ThVX cN3FO(X) = Y. diagonalization set existence axioms considered are of the power set operation are determined and Friedman's in modern so-called set theory go way be large cardinal axioms that require D. Martin's Borel The possess a winning PD. i. Gm) 1=?(u. v) whenever X.According H M and a de H M -? pow(N) A gives rise to an operator (?>M '. Thus T proves that O is a E-definable operator. are parts of mathematics which are permeated by set theory and thus are not capable of a constructive the structure consistency proof. one can deduce Employing O00 is E definable too. Thus any such M reasoning as developed to (A3). v GM. <S>M = Y to say. as that <D?? is a set. Perhaps. are definable asserts that all games which in the language of Z2 have a is that PD is a conse strategy.1. one can infer that <?}??eM and thus = A = {D(u) : u G <D??} {DM(u) : u e O^} g M for every M -q V. Moreover. In particular of sets of reals is affected by set-theoretic axioms. Now define O :pow(N) -> pow(N) = <3>M(X). These yond Zermelo-Fraenkel that certain infinite games played imply on sets of reals always .. that is definable and DM are uniformly Moreover.HILBERTPROGRAM THE CONSTRUCTIVE 115 utilizing G. u. and M <\ V. where X e M and M <\ V. Inductively we may assume that any set M with M <\ V is a model of /TT's up to this point. v) such that (?>M(X) iff (M. Y) and DM{u. projective determinacy. function DM which are both E-definable coding on all M <\ V. Examples of results iterations many uncountably theorem that all Borel games theorem. most notably. strategy. 7. ?m) \= ^(X. perhaps. The relation to large cardinals winning of infinitely many Woodin of the existence cardinals.

Steel's line of argument was that the descriptive is a reason why mathematicians should adopt nating from large cardinals recent held that his most these large cardinal axioms. i. and suggesting several inaccuracies bringing improve ments. Harvey Friedman reasons for relation theory (BT).e. maintained 2000). An enlarging of the by the idea of proof implied instead of reduction therefore of theory was tofinitist methods suggested: be of a constructive character. BT is concerned with the sets and their images under multivar?ate between functions.. every projective of Baire. the question: Does (see Feferman and John Steel. The ASL 2000 et al. relationship What is most striking about Friedman's results in BT is that they encapsu the proof-theoretic late strength of certain large cardinals. The need for a modified Hilbert program has clearly been recognized by Gentzen (1936) and Bernays (1967): It thus became apparent and of reasoning of proof it was to classical is not the only alternative that the "finite Standpunkt" ways is not necessarily theory. die Grundlagenfragen 2 The first step being and main step consists aus der Welt zu schaffen ".116 very satisfying structure MICHAEL RATHJEN sets of reals in that under PD theory for projective set A of reals is Lebesgue has the property measurable. system T. then A has a perfect subset (see Woodin 1994). principles that mathematics set theory ema in ZFC. The einfUrallemal the whole to formalize of mathematics of T. Harvey Friedman not already provable needs new axioms. to my attention. methods reasoning us to deal with more . and if A is uncountable. Notwithstanding that we hold differing views on the foundations our discussions of mathematics. allowing only that the arguments required general forms of inferences. of the paper atMonk Fryston Hall (while in a cream tea) were most enjoyable. for the core of mathematics adopting new axioms as BT has consequences are hard to dismiss. Only the future can tell whether BT is ever going to play a role in the dealings of everyday mathematics. in a formal second 3 Such a shift from the original program is implicit inHilbert-Bernays' acceptance des bisherigen of Gentzen's methodischen consistency proof for PA under Standpunktes in proving the consistency (1938) apparent the heading "?berschreitung der Beweistheorie". Roughly which speaking. Two of the panelists. indulging I wish to thank John Derrick Notes ". provides called Boolean strong discovery.. annual meeting also saw a panel mathematics need new axioms? discussion devoted to ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS for reading an earlier version of this paper.

: 1933. Vol. 496-504. and types discovered by the formal the analogy propositions Curry and Feys (1958) and further developed by Howard (1969). Graph New York-Berlin-Heidelberg. Urteil was is closely related The word "judgement" In his transcendental which forms part of logic in Kant's central notion logic. speedy publication 7 to the German the word "Urteil". Theory. far deeper of constructive s with Martin-L?f in this area without familiarity work should be done any case no further we anticipate with pleasure whose work. thesis.D. of Analysis. Springer-Verlag. such a decision has of universes. used the German word breaks Aufgabe.: P. 355). Hilbert. up the rules which we rules.: New E. North-Holland. 1958. there of are certain mathematical This statements topic will be whose the in the con last briefly strength large sistency section. philosophy. stands for the elementhood relation restricted to sets inM. p. While some recent unpublished the complexity work of Martin-L?f. Springer-Verlag. and Subsystems Berlin. theory may References Barwise. Berlin... Willen. and Free of Constructive Encyclopedia of Constructive David. Foundations J. Press. York. Combinatory Curry. call His and elimination elimination the equation was rules. 1987. Diestel. Iterated Definitions Amsterdam. Springer-Verlag. Macmillan pp. Feferman. University 'Which Set Existence of Pure Axioms are Needed Annals 1967. J. metic. Feys: Logic. Pohlers. PA. Park. Theorem?'. K. Inductive 1981. elimination elements operates on explain explain 10 On and equality are formed the canonical between elements. of Philosophy. D. Vol. Berlin. 5 to as bar induction. and R. via collectively respectively. 123-144. the selector. 'Functional Arith Pennsylvania the Separable Buchholz.HILBERTPROGRAM 117 THE CONSTRUCTIVE 4 However. H.. TI is often referred This is the reason why the principle 6 I have become Since completing this paper this view was shared by Myhill: Incidentally. D. S. B. Sieg: W. New York. Brown. Analysis. 3.: 1985. R. L. Bishop.: Ph. Martin-L?f any additional to keep that it is natural the view the type U^ open to reflect expressed not to incorporate forms of type that can arise in the future and therefore In my view is a mere convenience lest one rules for universes. rules rules requires proof touched upon Martin-L?f into actually two groups dubbed how how non-canonical the selector level. K. I. ? mathematics. Springer-Verlag. (Myhill 1975. Kant arrives at his categories by discerning the various forms He 9 of judgements. Admissible M. Beeson. 9 177-193. (Dutch). Brouwer. Bernays. Foundations 1967. . McGraw-Hill. Brown. inconsistent theory elimination to specify forms be forced different 2 This is reminiscent of Russell's can be 14 Gm true but that every axiom of a consistent 13O is said to be monotone ifX ? Y implies O(X) ? O(T). 'Weten. Martin-L?f's ization as a definitive its general system makes extremely unlikely formal adoption In it pushes its analysis than we do.: 1975. E. to Prove W and W. .: 1997. with of familiar cardinals. and Applied Logic 31. Simpson: Hahn-Banach 1986. and S. Sets and Structures. of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Euclides Spreken' in Weak of Second Order Analysis Subsystems State University.. Mathematics. bon mot that not in an everything be false.

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