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Transcript by Federal News Service Washington, D.C.

JOHN HAMRE: Well, you can tell – you know, I always gauge the success of a meeting by the kind of energy in the room, and we’ve got so much energy in the room, it’s hard to control them. It’s got to be you, Eric. At this hour of the day on the Thursday, normally, people’s blood sugar is so low, they’re sleeping rather peacefully through the procession. Not today; it’s going to be great. Welcome. We’re glad you’re all here. This is a great opportunity for us, as we continue the Military Strategy Forum. And I do want to say a special thanks to our friends at Rolls-Royce that are able to make this possible for us to do this, for the Washington policy community. Great pleasure to welcome Eric Olson. This is – I’d just asked him – we’d not met before, although I’ve known him reputationally, and I assume any guy with the name Eric Olson who’s from Seattle had to either be Norwegian or Swedish. And it turns out he’s Cherokee. (Laughter.) I said, okay, so I really kind of blew that wide open. So much for my ethnic stereotyping. I should have known, however, because he’s got the reputation for being tougher than a woodpecker’s lips. And he’s had every command that you can have in the Special Forces, and of course, is now at the top. And it’s a great opportunity for us to have him here. Thank you, Eric. You know, this is an important discussion for us to be having, as a policy community that thinks about national security. I was up on the Hill when the act was created that created program 11. And at the time, it was a Hobbesian choice, because it was a community that was suffering inside a big military establishment that didn’t value it. And then the question was, how do you promote it? You promote it by giving it an independent status and standing, but then it created more structural barriers that we have to work through. And I think that’s the central question, of how do we integrate a force that’s out every day – far more engaged than normal forces, and has been, I think, nonstop – but make it part of the whole? And we’re still working on that. And this is why I’m so anxious to hear Eric’s thoughts this morning, and our panelists, who are going to share further conversation with us. So it’s a wonderful morning. Thank you all for coming. Let me turn it to Ozzie Nelson, who’s going to do this for real and give you a proper introduction. Thanks, Eric. RICHARD “OZZIE” NELSON: Well, welcome, everyone. My name is Rick “Ozzie” Nelson, and I’m the director of the homeland security and counterterrorism program today. I’ll be the moderator for the first part of our event, which will be Adm. Olson’s remarks, and then we’ll allow the admiral to depart, and then we’ll break into the panel, which will be hosted by Jim Miklaszewski. Adm. Olson is the eighth commander of Special Operations Command. His bio is in front of you. I won’t read it to you. After reading his bio, I realized that mine was probably four sizes too big. So now I need to go back and reduce mine. If he can capture his very prestigious

career in such short language, I must be able to capture mine. But basically, he has served in a variety – almost every role – as a special operator, from a staff officer to a peacekeeper to a direct-action individual. And he is obviously well-respected and is the first Navy four-star SEAL in the history of the community. We were just talking about that beforehand. After the admiral gives his remarks, we’ll go ahead and go into some questions for the admiral. I’ll be the moderator, which is, I get the one with the big ruler. They’re questions and answers, not statements and answers, so out of respect for the admiral and his time, please limit your remarks to a question and give the admiral an opportunity to respond to it. And we will have microphones about, too, so you can ask your question with a microphone. But we are truly honored to have Adm. Olson here, and sir, I’ll go ahead and turn it over to you. (Applause.) ADM. ERIC OLSON: Good morning. Thank you, Ozzie. Dr. Hamre, thanks for that kind introduction. I do claim some Cherokee blood, but I also can’t deny my Scandahoovian roots. I am honored to be here with you this morning. Thank you for being here. I relish this opportunity to represent the members of the United States Special Operations Command – all that, that great force does. My remarks today will follow a simple progression. I’ll begin with an overview of the United States Special Operations Command, its functions and its authorities, and then I’ll talk about SOCOM’s role in the current operational environment. And finally, I’ll talk about the future environment and how I see United States Special Operations Command fitting into what the United States and the United States Department of Defense do in the future. At the end of my remarks, I do look forward to an informal question-and-answer period with you. I’ll be especially eager to discuss what United States Special Operations Command is doing with its budget and its acquisition authorities. My purpose this morning is clearly not to market United States Special Operations Command or special operations forces. The people who serve in the operational units are by far the best representatives of the talent and capabilities that this community has to offer. I’m more here to educate. The United States Special Operations Command and its special operations forces are unique within the Department of Defense. Their roles and missions are unique, and we’re unique in how we prepare and present our force to operational commanders around the world who employ them. Much of this is quite nuanced, but I think it’s useful for this audience, especially, to understand it. And I don’t mean to sound professorial in my presentation this morning at all, but I will support any of your requests for college credit when I’m done. (Laughter.) Let me begin with a brief history of how United States Special Operations Command came to be and the basic architecture and functions of the command. Some of you lived through this, but it’s worth a review. This will be a SOCOM 101, of sorts. The Department of Defense activated United States Special Operation Command about 23 years ago. In fact, we’re about

S. Congress mandated that a four-star command be established and demanded that it be a four-star command in order to give it true parity with the other unified combatant commands.S. 2001. This was steady work. supplies or services. who was on his way to take command of Readiness Command. and that it be established to prepare special operations forces to carry out assigned missions and. section 167 of United States Code defines United States Special Operations Command. just as military services write their own doctrine. It is provided separately to the secretary of defense for the purpose of answering those requirements that are peculiar to special operations in nature. on any given day. to plan for and conduct special operations. As a follow-on to the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act. And the headquarters is also responsible for the development of special operations doctrine. 1987.three weeks shy of our 23rd birthday. Gen. United States Special Operations Command does have its own budget authorities and budget responsibilities through major force program – as Dr. Hamre described it – major force program 11 in the Department of Defense budget. Additionally. U. as legislated by an amendment to the National Defense Reauthorization Act of 1986 often known as the Nunn-Cohen amendment or Cohen-Nunn amendment. This is established as a result of law – the unified combatant command was created. training and equipping special operations force and providing forces to support the geographic combatant commanders of the world – Central Command.S. was renominated and reconfirmed as the first commander of United States Special Operations Command en route. depending on who’s secretary of defense at the time. the military departments and certain defense agencies. is responsible for the special operations-peculiar aspects of training and education. kept our operational force employed and deployed about 25 percent of the time – meaning about 25 percent of the force. and responsible for the training and education of special operations skills and knowledge. European Command. relying on the services for service-common aspects of that. if directed by the president or the secretary of defense. Title X. its authorities and its responsibilities. Jim Lindsay. SOCOM’s primary focus was on organizing. So uniquely. Pacific Command and the like – also supported U. Florida. we have our own acquisition authorities so that Special Operations Command can develop and procure – and develop includes research and development activities – and then procure special operationspeculiar equipment. activated at Mac Dill Air Force Base. But Special Operations Command. which uniquely combine certain aspects of the other combatant commands. and the commander of Special Operations Command is the manager and executor of that budget. Before September 11. was outside of the United States in support of operational commanders and U. again. April 16th. ambassadors and their country teams. mostly conducting theater security engagement activities with counterpart forces in several-dozen countries at a . where the commander and the staff of the United States Readiness Command were sort of reflavored as the United States Special Operations Command. ambassadors. The first commander.

In 2004. we receive requests for assistance forces from geographic combatant commanders and make recommendations to the . And then we make recommendations to the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense regarding force and resource allocations to meet global requirements.S. we are clearly in a supporting role and we are a force provider. actions for maximum or optimum effect. would have served in 120 to 140 different countries around the world. We assist policymakers in deciding which potential partner nations the United States military ought to work with. the analogy is that these theater special operations commands are the catcher’s mitts into which United States Special Operations Command pitches our deployed force. And then in 2008. Synchronizing was not a doctrinal term at the time. But note that I said we synchronize planning. SOCOM was assigned as the combatant command responsible for synchronizing the Department of Defense’s planning for global operations against violent extremist organizations and networks. we don’t synchronize operations. These theater special operations commands are. So as to synchronize the United States Special Operations Command receives. with the force heavily engaged in both Afghanistan and Iraq. And in that case. and over the course of a typical year. This is in response to the demands presented by the geographic combatant commanders. carefully. when finally codified as policy. known as a theater special operations command. in conjunction with United States Joint Forces Command. through which they generally exercise their operational command. The geographic combatant commanders each have a subunified special operations command. U. and then through a staffing process. supported by our headquarters at United States Special Operations Command. They then receive and employ the force on behalf of their geographic combatant commander bosses.time. reviews. themselves. or TSOC. Synchronizing needed to be defined. And proponent is another term without a clear definition. who have responsibility for the outcome of the operations. The operations themselves are synchronized by the operational commanders. But SOCOM’s responsibilities in this role are similar to our responsibilities for synchronizing the planning against violent extremist networks. and. And so it was defined through the codification process that assigned United States Special Operations Command that authority. their operational authorities. place and purpose. coordinates and prioritizes Department of Defense plans that support the global campaign against terrorists and their networks. And with baseball season just over the horizon. the secretary of defense and the president expanded the United States Special Operations Command’s responsibilities. in what priority and in what manner. The authorities of proponency are in fact conveyed in whatever mechanism assigns one as a proponent. commanded by one or two-star special operations admirals or generals who work for that geographic combatant commander. United States Special Operations Command was further designated as the Department of Defense proponent for security-force assistance. And it is essentially the responsibility – synchronization is arranging in time.

This is and will continue to be a very collaborative effort. counterterrorism. The national defense strategy also describes the strategic environment for the foreseeable future. civil-military operations. I do need to touch on what special operations activities are. It includes the need to prevent our enemies from acquiring and using weapons of mass destruction. It is bringing together many disparate. It is becoming a more coherent path through which our nation can better work with international friends and partners. but also with USAID. Before I get more into discussion of what SOCOM does in the current operating environment. psychological . There are currently 12 activities that are specifically assigned to United States Special Operations Command. As a global struggle against violent extremist ideology that seeks to overturn or overrun the international state system. It includes the need to work with others to help defuse regional conflicts. Most of them are included in the original legislation that establishes they are defined as core special operations activities insofar as they relate to special operations forces. And securityforce assistance is emerging as a more powerful term. In order to do this. there are tasks that are peculiar to special operations in nature and therefore our responsibility to prepare a force to conduct. This does not give Special Operations Command ownership of any of these activity areas. Treasury and Justice and many others. we will face other threats including a variety of irregular challenges. uncoordinated efforts under a single umbrella. foreign internal defense. or which combination of forces are most appropriate for a particular security-force assistance mission. suggesting that beyond this transnational struggle. So where.Joint Staff regarding which special operations forces. counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. does the United States Special Operations Command fit into United States strategy? The most recent revision of the national defense strategy includes the need to strengthen current alliances and build new partnerships to defeat global terrorism and prevent attacks against us. unconventional warfare. generally. and the need to transform national security institutions to face the challenges of the 21st century. it goes further. but it does mean that within each of these activity areas. primarily with State Department. The United States Special Operation Command’s piece of the defense pie lies primarily in our global responsibilities to provide trained and ready special operations forces to synchronize Department of Defense planning against violent extremist organizations and to serve as Department of Defense’s proponent for security force assistance. our allies and our friends. These 12 tasks – I’ll just read through them briefly – they are direct action. in which we advocate and support department policies in direct coordination with our interagency partners. Success in dealing with these threats will require the orchestration of national and international power over years and decades to come and this will have to be done in an unprecedented way. it is the responsibility of United States Special Operations Command to transcend the boundaries of the geographic combatant commanders. quests by rogue states to acquire nuclear weapons and the rising military powers of other nation-states. which general-purpose forces. security force assistance. although “foreseeable future” is a term that I view as oxymoronic.

I call it truth-telling for a purpose: the truth as a matter of law and as a matter of policy and for the purpose of influencing a foreign audience in a manner that is helpful to mission success and generally and most often for mutually-beneficial purposes. Unconventional warfare really is a doctrinally defined set of activities that essentially is stimulating and supporting insurgents. including those intended to demoralize our enemies. This is often misunderstood as the opposite of conventional warfare – it’s not. primarily mutually beneficial purposes.” So there’s a few obvious ones in there such as direct action and counterterrorism. It may stir up in certain audiences images of mind control or brainwashing. supported by the United States and challenged by an al-Qaida-supported Taliban insurgency. Now that there is a legitimate government in place in Afghanistan. Green Beret A-teams – then supported and stimulated that Northern Alliance force and the other anti-Taliban forces in Afghanistan in an unconventional warfare campaign that ultimately led to the Afghans themselves evicting the Taliban from Kabul. a broadly misunderstood term. we’ve transitioned from unconventional warfare to counterinsurgency as an activity in Afghanistan. This is 750 pages long. if you want me to. The last core activity that I’ll highlight here is psychological operations: again. stimulating and supporting the Taliban in its challenge against the government that they consider to be hostile to them. This counterinsurgency. First is unconventional warfare. where there was a relatively mature but relatively incapable force in opposition to the illegitimate. “other activities as may be specified by the secretary of defense or the president. So these include all actions intended to enable Afghan sovereignty and the protection of the Afghan peoples. is primarily through the conduct of foreign internal defense and security force assistance activities. So one can make the case that al-Qaida is now the unconventional warfare force. again. When there is a government that is considered illegitimate or hostile that is challenged by a force. It’s top secret in classification but in a brief and unclassified manner I . information operations. I’ll get more into that during the question-answer period. So that’s a bit about SOCOM’s roles and missions. It does involve the distribution of information to serve. I’ll get into how we do some of what we do. So unconventional warfare is essentially the flipside of counterinsurgency. These are clearly bread-and-butter activities within the special operations community but there’s also a few that are more nuanced and I’ll just talk about a couple of them because they and your understanding of them are important to our current operations. The Department of Defense campaign strategy against terrorism is contained in Concept Plan 7500. These organizations could be radical Islamic groups. Now. they could be narcoterrorist networks and other non-state actors who threaten the United States.operations. and the catch-all. That was predominantly the Northern Alliance but it was partnered with other forces within Afghanistan and the insertion of a relative handful of 12-man operational detachments – Alpha. counterinsurgency. hostile Taliban government in place at the time. special reconnaissance. then supporting that force is unconventional warfare and this was the case in Afghanistan in the opening weeks of Operation Enduring Freedom. SOCOM has the responsibility to synchronize the planning to defeat violent extremist organizations and networks. as conducted by the United States.

it is the concept of draining the swamp rather than attempting to capture or kill all the alligators. Though stabilizing the environment impacts the enemy in the long term. it’s chaotic. So although the direct and indirect approaches are fairly easy to define in theory. We call them the direct approach and the indirect approach. their organizations and their networks in order to prevent them from harming us in the near term. the indirect approach focuses on shaping and influencing the environment to eliminate local support to or tolerance of terrorists and their activities. consists of those efforts to directly disrupt violent extremist organizations. equipping or otherwise supporting their efforts. It is a guiding plan as it affects other combatant commanders and the military services but it is the supporting plan in the interagency environment for combating violent extremist organizations and it is supported by regional plans crafted by each of the geographic combatant commanders around the world.can tell you that it is the Department of Defense plan. their facilities. It has authority within the Department of Defense. It does provide the framework for two fundamental approaches to defeat our adversaries. it’s kinetic and the effects are almost always nearterm and short-lived. While the direct approach is required to mitigate immediate threats. units and capabilities cannot be categorized as either direct or indirect. the overall effects of the direct approach are not decisive. Some of the activities that they conduct can be categorized as direct or indirect. it includes military support to activities intended to erode the underlying causes. the underlying factors that contribute to terrorist activity in the first place: the basic conditions of economic depression. killing. These operations are conducted almost exclusively by military forces – DOD is in the lead for the United States on the direct approach. The direct approach. interdicting and otherwise destroying terrorists. but only at the time that those activities are occurring and often they occur simultaneously. training. It includes efforts to increase other governments’ willingness or improve their capabilities to remove terrorist sanctuaries from their territories. first approved by Secretary Rumsfeld and then by Secretary Gates so it became the Department of Defense CONPLAN. in which we enable partners to combat violent extremist organizations by contributing to their capabilities through advising. Decisive results come from the indirect approach. they are often difficult to distinguish in practice. This is capturing. So these approaches are independent – they cannot be isolated from each other. The direct approach is a holding action that buys time and space for the indirect approach to achieve its long-term results. It’s urgent. People. religious extremism. it’s necessary. some of whom have clearly expressed their intent to acquire and use them against us. as you would suspect. It also denies access to and use of weapons of mass destruction by violent extremist organizations. . It is a careful balance that is required and often an intertwining. Although the direct approach focuses on isolating the enemy threats and then taking military actions against them. These are terms that are making their way into the common lexicon. crafted by the United States Special Operations Command. They are certainly not mutually exclusive and both are necessary to form the balanced whole. intimidation and more.

at least in the United States government. to a large degree. The ultimate effect of this. . That intertwining happens several times a night in several places across Iraq and Afghanistan. As you can imagine. separate the good from the bad. a SEAL platoon. is enabling partners to combat violent extremist organizations themselves so that we can leave and they can control their own destiny. fighting with them. though. Afghan national police. Another example from Afghanistan comes from Special Forces teams living in remote camps. the mass and the money reside within the Department of Defense. It’s quite dangerous and it’s being done every day by special operations troops in their 20s and 30s. mostly conducting unit-to-unit engagements and training events. high technology-enabled tactical skills and the understanding of the operational context of their application. It consumes most of our special operations force that we provide on any given day. These operations involve the special forces A-team. they shoot like us. the Iraqi special operations forces at a very high level – training. eating. wells. We are typically in 75 to 80 countries on any given day. they move like us. pushing from behind. We do many civil affairs operations. a Marine special operations team. There’s a balance between the two that.The military is in the lead on the direct approach. living. this is very sensitive. We normally contract with local people to do the work so everybody wins. planning. it looks like the direct approach. much of the capability. bridges and other development projects as rewards for anti-Taliban activities in these villages. often working in remote places with a relative handful of counterparts and for many of the partner nation units. They look like us. ultimately. and on the indirect approach. It’s not our responsibility to lead the indirect approach but admittedly. during which our forces work with local leaders and USAID whenever and wherever possible to determine which schools need to be painted and where wells ought to be dug or what else will bring value to our presence. has to be carefully executed and this is where you will find the core of special operations: in the balance of effective direct and indirect operations – the combination of high-end. When the counterpart forces fight with us in support. Support in this case comes mostly in the form of schools. Through night-vision video. well apart from any other military force. Air Force combat aviation advisors. Their purpose is to understand the local environment. the United States military is. whether it’s in Baghdad or Anbar or Marja or Farah. A good example of this is what occurs on most days in both Iraq and Afghanistan: training with the Afghan national army. Afghan army commandos. as I said. Our nation’s special operations forces are also at work applying the indirect approach elsewhere around the world. it’s difficult to tell them apart from us. again. It looks very much like the direct approach when they burst into a room in the middle of the night to put the habeas grabus on the bad guys. to conduct these kinds of activities. steep themselves in it and contribute to local security by identifying and supporting the tribal and village leaders who are willing to take action against the Taliban. this is the most prestigious training that they will get all year and it leads to some very important relationships.

S. In recent years. has super-national and national and non-state actors competing for strategic influence and access across the globe.S. The friction produced by the interaction of three dominant factors – these being trans-national crime. There is an increase in demand for natural resources beyond oil that is driving people to move and to compete within their regions or around the globe. It’s a testament to the time and the resources and the efforts that our nation is committed to enhancing their capacity over the last decade. and Colombian hostages. nation-states themselves exerted control over information that equated to a primacy of influence over their populations. U. Building partnerships is key and it requires the fostering of long-term military-to-military relationships and ideally. The significance of that operation is that it was planned. the international complexity. although that model will endure as a model of international order for some time to come. Colombians who had trained with and among United States special operations forces for several years. We don’t pretend that this is an estimate or a forecast – simply a way of thinking about it. Rather. about a year-and-a-half ago. complexity and chaos emerging from this thought model. it culminated in the dramatic rescue of U. these military relationships will survive the temporary vagaries of politics. the strategic environment can no longer be viewed in the pure Westphalian model of nation-states. now. Special Operations Force has been advising and assisting the armed forces of Colombia in their fight against the leftist FARC. led and conducted and by the Colombians themselves. the Colombian armed forces have dealt serious blows to that organization and as you all know. we do need to have an understanding of our current and future operational environments.But the key to success in this balanced approach is persistence. a prioritization of those – which ones are positive that ought to be encouraged? Which ones are negative that ought to be challenged in some way? We see an increasing globalization. special operations forces have been advising and assisting that nation’s armed forces in their successful campaign against radical Islamic insurgents who are linked to al-Qaida in their southern islands. Regional economies and societies and cultures are becoming increasingly intertwined by the growing global networks of communication and finance and trade. the bipolar nature of the strategic environment allowed nation-states to effectively hold global friction points to a manageable level. Until the end of the Cold War. where for over five years. But today. The security environment was actually less complex but national economies were also less intertwined and less interdependent and more importantly. It’s based on trends and connections that we see emerging. The nature of the geostrategic environment is clearly changing. where for over 10 years. United States Special Operations Command headquarters has developed a way of thinking about the future world. violent . The decisive effects of our nation’s persistent engagement with partners around the world can be seen clearly in places like the Republic of the Philippines. In order to best train our people and put the people in the right place at the right time. Even more pronounced are the effects of our nation’s persistent partnership and military engagement in support of Colombian forces.

This is generally a destabilizing factor where it occurs and it is an opportunity for crime and extremism to take root.000 of them are in uniform and except for a couple of thousand at USSOCOM headquarters. Territorial sovereignty can still be defined and defended to a great degree but economic sovereignty. rotarywing aviators in the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment – the Night Stalkers.” As proud as we are of our ability to respond quickly to gunfire when it occurs. natural terrain boundaries and familiar cultural norms. return to historical and enduring affinities of tribal alliances. the force resides primarily within four service components: U. We were at risk in perhaps a half a dozen others. So who actually does this? I’ll talk about that for just a minute. last week. we are at least as proud of our ability to move ahead of the sound of guns in order to prevent that sound ultimately from occurring in places that are at risk. air traffic controllers who can operate independently in remote . we were in direct combat in only two of them: Iraq and Afghanistan.S. largely flying the variance of the venerable C-160 Hercules platform but getting more and more into smaller platforms. But while we were deployed to dozens of countries around the world. The Army Special Forces are the Green Berets. Slightly more than half of the total force is in the Army component and the total force includes many of the forces that you would expect and are aware of. Special operations forces now total over 58. Not surprisingly. the Joint Special Operations Command. Navy Special Warfare Command. Its active-duty civil affairs and active-duty psychological operations practitioners are under the command of Special Operations Command when they are in the United States: Air Force fixed-wing air crews.extremism and significant migration – are driving much of the way the world behaves and these have become dominant global factors.S. The internal controls of nation-states have eroded and sovereignty ain’t what it used to be. United States Special Operations Command forces were present in 79 countries around the world. They may accept substitute governments that provide structure and process within tolerable limits and the legitimate government then becomes less relevant in these places and the non-state actor then gains local dominance.000 – 86 percent – of special operations forces deployed from the United States were deployed into the U.000 people. the Special Operations variant of the Osprey. non-state alternatives are likely to emerge. United States Special Operations Command deliberately leans forward to ensure that proper resources and tools are being applied in these regions. to the tune of about 12. about 10. Individuals may identify less with the state and in some cases. Again.000 people. informational sovereignty and cultural sovereignty are under continuous challenge. Air Force Special Operations Command and Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command and in one subunified joint command. helicopter air crews. Army Special Operations Command. About 52. Central Command area of responsibilities – that’s where the most urgent demand is. We call it “moving ahead of the sound of guns. In areas where governments are not able to wield great influence over their people or support their basic needs. including the tilt-rotor CV-22. Army Rangers and the 75th Ranger Regiment.

There’s a plethora of other disciplines that give the force its capability and its sustainability. We continually stress the need for a few individuals to be thoroughly steeped in other languages and other regions. This is a significant shift from five years ago: We were about one-third in the Reserve component as opposed to the one-fifth that we are now. meaning that they serve in the special operations community for an assignment or two over the course of their careers.E. micro-regional environments in which they work. But we remain underqualified in many key languages and dialects and undereducated in many key areas. At the heart of everything United States Special Operation Command does is the special operations warrior. Our operators average close to 30 years old. Navy SEALs. by T. Lawrence of . These are real people who go forth and conduct the difficult and dangerous missions that this nation asks them to do to solve the complex problems. the subregional. that they maintain the highest levels of warfighting expertise but also that they understand where they are: that they have knowledge of the regional. that finesse trumps mess and that presence without value is perceived as occupation. In special operations forces. The complexity of the operating environment requires that special operations forces be of the highest quality. About half of our force has come in since 9/11 and they are doing what they expected to do. that knowledge trumps doctrine. inspired. It is important to be able to accurately predict the effects of our behavior in the unchanging context of geography. They are about 70 percent married and they are doing what it is they came in to do. But what’s truly special about special operations is the ability to work with and through others in pursuit of mutually beneficial outcomes to unusually complex situations. we believe that substance trumps theatrics. And we in the special operations forces do pride ourselves on being somewhat more qualified with respect to languages and cultures and regional expertise than the broader military forces. There are many times. special operations are thought of as unilateral. This is significantly older than generalpurpose force units. About four-fifths of our force is active duty with about one-fifth in the Guard or Reserves. We continue to expand these programs. Too often. who go through a training program that typically has an attrition rate associated with it and then who earn a MOS – a military occupational specialty – that assigns them to the special operations forces for most of their careers. And fundamental to this effort is our recognition that humans are more important than hardware and that quality is more important than quantity. one-shot deals. high-risk. of course. culture and history of the places we go. combatant-craft crewmen and many submarine operators and Marine Corps raid-and-assault forces and foreign training specialists and then all of the vehicles and airplanes and helicopters and boats and logistics support and intelligence experts and administrative specialists and technicians and instructors and strategists who support that force are within the United States Special Operations Command. About one-third is the SOF careerists – those who volunteer are selected. About two-thirds of our force is non-career special operations forces. of course. We have collectively termed these projects and programs Project Lawrence. pararescue medics in the Air Force. to endure the challenges that make our strategies work. To do this requires an understanding that we simply don’t have. when that is the case.areas.

we do have to embrace disciplines and knowledge outside of traditional military fields. We need to find ways to bring this into our world. One-third of the master’s degrees that enlisted into the United States Army last year enlisted through the MAVNI program. One example of this is an initiative currently primarily within the Army. The concepts behind balancing direct and indirect approaches and what amounts to – or what some describe as a global counterinsurgency effort – are not new to how we conduct irregular warfare in many ways. 4. This is an initiative known as MAVNI. Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest. It is one that we continue to support and consider ourselves primary – to be of primary benefit to us. not green card holders – but visa holders who are in the United States for a period of two years are eligible to enlist in the United States Army.Arabia. And under this program visa holders – not citizens. recruitment is equally important. And as important as retention is to maintaining our investment in people. We hire the best people we can for the jobs that we assign them to do. But the response has been tremendous. It was supported strongly by the secretary of the Army.000 people have filled out the form that indicates an interest in enlisting in the Army. These initiatives include an exploration of innovative options to permit specialization without sacrificing promotion opportunities or retention.000 of these indicated an interest in serving in or in support of Special Operations forces. A hundred and 72 are under orders to the Special Operations community. We do recognize that nonmilitary and nongovernment sectors of American society as well contain specific areas of expertise that are essential to progress in the military campaigns in this new normal. All of them speak English as a second or third or fourth language. 81 have already reported for duty. So if I sound excited about this. Over 800 have now enlisted in the United States Army. A number of visa holders in the United States are communicating with each other about the advantages and disadvantages of enlisting in the United States military. This is intended to produce individual regional expertise in a way that simply doesn’t exist now so that we can gain and sustain a credible persistent approach in these regions. And this is back to more . Eighty-two percent of them have at least an associate’s degree. There is a vibrant blog on this. who is an imperfect model but one who does convey a sense of the value of local expertise. It was stimulated by a request by Special Operations Command. It was approved by the secretary of defense in November of 2008 and it was implemented just over a year ago in February 2009. The Cold War was the aberration. And 14. From anthropologists to X-ray technicians. And this is a cultural challenge within our own military. I am. We do seek the right people for the right jobs.

salt. Yet these two in combination give rise to an endless series of maneuvers. Admiral. Yet in combination they produce more hues than can ever be seen. Pure military skill will not be enough. for those very. We’ll start over here with the microphone. “In battle there are not more than two methods of attack: the direct and the indirect.) MR. white and black. Who can exhaust the possibilities of their combination?” And that is the business and the beauty of special operations forces. by subversion and by force of arms. Thank you very much. sweet and bitter. With that. red. paramilitary and civil action must be blended to produce success. And when you hear that encapsulated in such a form. So if you could. our officers and men must understand and combine the political. yellow. “The enemy uses economic and political warfare. those of us that follow the community know under your leadership has been instrumental in trying to get the force ahead of the sounds of gunfire. Yet combinations of them yield more flavors than can ever be tasted. Please state your name and where you’re from and then. I will say upfront that I won’t provide any meaningful detail on specific operations that are being conducted under a geographic combatant commander’s authority. most technologyenabled man-hunting and thing-hunting operations are conducted by special operations forces. On the highest end. directaction activities will always remain urgent and necessary. please ask a concise question. The direct and indirect lead unto each other in turn. it just reminds us of the range of areas of locations and the range of missions that the special operations community is involved in on a daily basis. It is like moving in a circle: You never come to an end. of course. please raise your hand and one of our individuals will get you. we’ll go ahead and get right to questions. but I am happy to talk about just about anything else you would like to address. . acrid. “To win this struggle. So we appreciate your vision in that area. it’s absolutely remarkable. A full spectrum of military. The balance and intertwining of direct and indirect are key. And so now I’ll quote Sun Tzu: “There are not more than five primary colors: blue. I am ready for your questions. And.” I’m quoting President John F.traditional forms of warfare. again. There are not more than five cardinal tastes: sour. NELSON: Well. special warfare being the community that ultimately evolved into the joint special operations community that I now serve. thank you. While the ability to conduct high-end. Kennedy in his forward to a 1962 United States Army manual on special warfare. economic and civil actions with skilled military efforts in the execution of this mission. very insightful comments. We acknowledge that it is the indirect actions that will have the most decisive and enduring the effects. propaganda and naked military aggression in an endless combination to oppose a free choice of government and suppress the rights of the individual by terror. (Applause. I’ll quote: “Pure military skill is not enough.

This was not by itself much of a change. The force is really in pretty good shape. the force is in pretty good shape. OLSON: This has been our consideration for a long period of time. the outcome of the work that they are doing. NELSON: The next question in the back. OLSON: Yeah. ADM. Their families are proving to be quite supportive. McChrystal’s operational control. MR. Admiral? Q: Good morning. There is not enough – you know. Our retention rate is higher than it has ever been. And if he’s got a nationwide fight to undertake I certainly support his – certainly respect that role. Special Operations force. So thanks for asking it. It has proven more resilient than we had anticipated. I support the shift of operational control of the special operations forces that were shifted to Gen. Julian Barnes with the L.A. I am quite careful to state that our ability to absorb growth is limited to the 3 to 5 percent range because of our internal structures and our need to not lose our soul in the process of growth.Q: Admiral. Green and I’m not surprised that your question is about the people. And what did you think of that move? And why was that an important move to make? ADM. sustainability attrition and so forth? And what are your concerns with regard to the long-term sustainability of the U. in the gray. Times. I am in favor of unity of command and unity of effort as military concepts. Kevin. . Your force has been engaged in very high OPTEMPO operations for almost nine years. McChrystal and the regional commanders in ISAF. Why – the special operations forces in Afghanistan were recently put under the direct control of Gen. we ought to provide him all of the tools and authority that he needs to carry out his very difficult mission. He was already the commander who was approving the concepts of operations for the employment of special operations forces in that environment. He already had in our terminology tactical control over the force. In fact I think that they are personally rewarded by what they see to be the benefits. McChrystal and I spoke about that before he deployed a year ago.S. Gen. by the normal metrics that we use. What is the state of readiness? What is the state of morale. thanks. Admiral. McChrystal primarily responsible and accountable for the outcome in Afghanistan. we are growing our Special Forces and our SEALs and our Marine Corps special operations teams and our Air Force aviators all at an unprecedented rate. we cannot do enough to support them but I think for now. recruiting is pretty good. But he gained an additional measure of authority to re-mission the force and re-locate the force by gaining operational control of it. In fact. I used to work for Adm. As long as we are holding Gen.

As you know. And so supporting them will become – is a continued mission of the rest of the force. as I described earlier. Are we on pace for that drawdown? And how seriously are the special operations forces there preparing for a possible resurgence in violence at the conclusion of this election process? In Kandahar lots of emphasis is being put on shaping the operations.000 troops in Iraq by the end of August. Tim. Tell us what role the special ops are playing in shaping? ADM. Shaping operations involve a wide variety of activities. NELSON: Adm. Tim Davidson (sp). go to the range with them. Odierno is that the special operations forces will be sustained at about their current level. Still. Yeah. OLSON: Your first question is clearly one for the CENTCOM commander regarding the drawdown in Iraq. I’m not one who believes that we can keep doing what we’re doing indefinitely. Q: Hi. All indications including my conversations with Gen. Q: Hi. the technologies associated with finding and tracking with precision. With the blue suit right in front there. MR. go through a final exercise with them. NELSON: Let’s go try this side of the room. I don’t think I have anything unique to share on that. finding people is very important. we can absorb the growth and apply it in the correct ways on the battlefield. So virtually 100 percent of special operations activities are in support of Afghan partners. And so finding things. There is the high-tech enabled man-hunting/thinghunting flavor of special operations. The way that special operations partners is with the Afghan commandos is an assigned team will train with the Afghan commandos in a schoolhouse environment. thank you for that question. I’ve got to warn you both: My questions are about the CENTCOM region. thanks. we generally are working in small units in more remote places getting a sense for the context of the places that we’re working so that our behavior there will have more predictable effects. Thank you. But there are two flavors of special operations activities. Green. What I’ll tell you is that the special operations forces are not experiencing a drawdown in Iraq. Petraeus and Gen.But. Special operations roles are. Justin Fishel with FOX News. the goal is to get to 50. MR. one question per customer. And that’s a slightly different flavor of the way that special operations does its shaping activities. Could you just briefly discuss your highest-priority technology needs for the command? ADM. Admiral. given that rate. graduate them and then move out to their assigned operational areas with them in order to sustain that partnership in a very meaningful way. And no cheating. .) We have many. We are very closely partnered with Afghan forces. OLSON: Yeah. Let’s go with the brown suit right here in the front. (Laughter. but we’re not seeing signs of breakage in the force yet.

But it is a very important need for us. Q: Hi. Navy.So that includes a full range of what’s generally known as ISR: intelligence. I’m wondering if you can talk about any specific concerns that will have to be addressed among special forces if that ban is lifted and also if you have a personal opinion that you could express. So this is more – this is less technology development than technology awareness and technology sharing. great. Everybody who comes into special operations forces has already served in one manner or another in the Army. In the back in the black – the woman with the black shirt? Q: Anne Flaherty with the Associated Press. I don’t mean just unmanned airborne platforms.) ADM. generally. reconnaissance capabilities. of counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction obviously gets into some very sensitive areas. . I don’t think there are any special concerns with special operations forces. NELSON: Okay. “Don’t ask. And another important technology for us is for us to be able to – they are technologies that allow us to be fully interoperable with partners around the world. MR. precursors. our business in counterproliferation has to do with locating and interdicting the movement of weapons. airborne/maritime. Air Force or Marine Corps. So that’s a very important technology for us. ADM. don’t tell” is a hot topic right now. locate and render safe WMD. NELSON: We have a question in the middle of the room. This is a wide variety of manned/unmanned. But what I can say here is that. the gentleman right here in the brown – green shirt. Tony Capaccio with Bloomberg News. OLSON: All right. if you will. chemicals and other contributors to a WMD capability. ground/human censors associated with all of that discipline. devices. the services do that. I don’t manage the people themselves. Sometimes we will pursue what doesn’t appear to be the most advanced technology. OLSON: The special operations niche. And we accept those people and follow the laws and policies regarding all military people and monitor the management of people by authority. What capabilities have you grown since then to meet that mandate and are they directed primarily against al-Qaida-type organizations or state actors like Iran and North Korea. So I’d say there is no particular issue with respect to special operations forces. The 2006 QDR called for a greater capability for SOF to detect. but it’s the most useful technology in the environments in which we work. MR. (Laughter. Next question? No – (laughter). surveillance. One of the corollaries you never talk about is this counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Pentagon is looking at it.

We are finding a lot of common ground. We hosted a conference in Tampa a couple of years ago and had 82 nations show up. MR. OLSON: Yeah. Our relationships with other nations are quite good. MR. Q: Admiral. If we’d give you a round of applause.) ADM. it’d be great. (Off-side conversation. last question. I was just – the day before yesterday at the Pacific area special operations conference. everyone if you could remain seated while the admiral and his party depart. (Applause. Thank you for your candid remarks. oh. I think we’re pretty good shape internationally with special operations forces. We’ll go ahead and go to the gentleman in the back with the blue jacket. One of them is jointness and another one is special operations. bring together training and technologies within the NATO special operations environment. MR. which had 19 special operations – 19 countries represented in their special operations community. well. The dialogue is robust. There is an emergence in. This is in fact an operational command within the NATO construct that will.) MR. Admiral. How confident are you about the relationship that your guys have with the special forces from other NATO countries – not just thinking of Britain. a dozen or so countries around the world of a Special Operations Command counterpart of some sort. in an unprecedented way.It also includes. NELSON: Okay. OLSON: Thank you. it’s – there are a few military concepts that seem to be catching on around the world. the ability to handle. (Off-side conversation. What we’re seeing specifically that’s playing out now is a transition of the NATO special operations coordination center into a NATO special operations headquarters. if everybody could please get back – return to your seats – and we’ll get the second half started and we’ll get you out of here on time at 11:00. but other ones too? ADM. NELSON: So if the panelists could join us up here. to render safe those things that are interdicted. And of course we embody both. to a degree. NELSON: Okay. But.) . it’s Mike Levins (sp) from the Times of London. it’s an honor and a privilege to have you here. My view of all this is quite optimistic. Thank you. NELSON: Okay. So that is what we do and we’ve grown in both capability and capacity somewhat since the last QDR in those areas.

And now.S. vice president for special programs in the intelligence. I’m sorry.S. And before I begin with the introduction. relating back to that experience I had with the special operations forces and the Iraqis and the admiral’s emphasis on the nonconventional warfare. . And we all know very well. Olson said – particularly about the way special operations operate and train the individual armed services in other countries and he alluded. We have comments first from the individuals. I just wanted to follow up on something that Adm. special operations forces and Iraqi commandos for a week in the fall of 2003. And we went out on several nighttime missions. please return to your seats. would know how to do this. I can’t believe that we lost half the people. And this is the first time – because we hear so often – that the local force – we’re hearing it now again. those Iraqi commandos had the kind of confidence and even bravado that one did not see in the rest of the Iraqi forces at the time or for some time to come. : (Inaudible. I appreciate it. only about six. And next to Michele is Kenneth Rapuano. in fact. when our editors got a hold of the videotape and watched these operations – partially in the dark as you can well understand. And I think that is one of the unsung missions of special operations forces that just doesn’t get emphasized enough. JIM MIKLASZEWSKI: Okay – (audio break) – there we go. the asymmetrical warfare. they’re not. in Afghanistan – the Afghan forces are in the lead when in fact. Rick “Ozzie” Nelson. What is the immediate and long-term future for Special Operations and how can that be achieved in the timeframe necessary to deal with the emerging threats of today? MR. You’d think I. MIKLASZEWSKI: Oh. Ozzie. I had the opportunity to embed with U. I’ll introduce the panel from left to right. thank you for listening.MR. That was just a personal note. And if you haven’t seen her working paper from December on special operations forces. So just to follow up again too on what Adm. Thank you. Olson had to say to open up the questioning – again. director of advanced systems and policy analysis at MITRE Corporation. I’ll turn it over to you to kick us off. We have Michele Malvesti. commandos and the Iraqi commandos. We’re not as important as Adm. He’s a former deputy assistant to the president and deputy homeland security adviser. Thank you very much. Olson. to the Iraqi commandos. Jim. I recommend it highly and you should look forward to a much larger work on special operations forces coming up in the next month or so. some with night vision lenses – they did. She’s a former senior director for Combating Terrorism Strategy at the National Security Council in the Bush administration. security and technology at Science Applications International Corp. have a difficult time differentiating between the U. CNAS. But we’ll go ahead and get started. seven months after the initial invasion and before the capture of Saddam Hussein. of all people. even at that early stage. in most cases. NELSON: Okay. But in dealing with these commandos. particularly.) MR. Special operations forces clearly appears to be a growth industry. And I can tell you.

And there are potential downsides to any growth. efforts to rescue hostages. It’s also in their volume of work and it’s also in their level of achievement. some of them are internal. the senior leadership must continue to manage and guard against any potential downsides with respect to this growth. First. It’s in manpower. as the direct approach – almost exclusively with.) MICHELE MALVESTI: Hi. There are many impediments which we could go into. And this growth I’ve defined in five different ways. I think they’re facing three key challenges that I’d like to point out today – some of them are external. But they need to seize this moment. I think for many individuals at the senior policymaking level. many of which we heard Adm. takedowns. I’m Michele Malvesti. the first challenge – SOF have become persistent war fighters operating across the globe. specifically. . three key challenges for SOF. We heard the admiral talk a little bit about that. The second key challenge I’d like to highlight with regard to special operations is that SOF have experienced significant growth since 9/11. It’s in their overall capacity by virtue of their expanded force structure. in preventing threats and challenges that flow from today’s geostrategic landscape. I think SOF’s core qualities and mission areas. kind of.(Off-side conversation. good morning. And they tend to remain unaware of the SOF warrior-diplomat role or that indirect approach that the admiral is talking about and the unique. you know. And I think growth is in many ways very positive but growth can also come at a cost. perhaps. And I think that the SOCOM. And so common the SOF senior leadership really must better equip policymakers with knowledge of how their engagement skills work and how they can be better leveraged in support of a full range of foreign policy challenges. And they need to seize this moment to facilitate their continued development and evolution as well as to help fulfill their value to the nation. particularly in working with relevant populations. In many ways. outside theaters of combat. the snatch-and-grab missions. One area is that many policymakers at all levels of government lack an understanding of the full range of SOF capabilities. It’s in budget. SOF really face obstacles to expanding their global access and presence in support of national security and foreign policy objectives. culturally attuned capabilities that special operations forces bring to bear. But the national security apparatus broadly continues to struggle with how best to apply force in general and SOF. they tend to equate special operations with what the admiral described. SOF really have been experiencing their most extensive and transformative use in the modern era over the past nine years. other kinetic-type operations. And this really is a missed opportunity – not just for SOF. not just for policymakers but quite frankly for the nation in confronting key national security challenges. provide policymakers strategic flexibility in destructing but more importantly. Olson discuss. essentially over the past decade. I’d like to just point out. Let me just highlight one. SOF really are enjoying a well-earned renaissance period. as we can certainly glean from the admiral’s statements.

I think SOCOM and the senior leadership. Michele for saving me from my embarrassment and – MS. such as foreign internal defense. if PSYOP are not viewed equally integral to counterterrorism as direct action is. And I think that in a pre-9/11 world. for example. when they continue to think through and define what the core mission areas are for SOF. if Civil Affairs. hostage takings. One of the points on the evolution – I do just want to point out because it relates particularly to what the admiral spoke about where SOF. counterterrorism with direct action. you know. But I think that they need to continue to look to the future and how they can continue to evolve as a unified force. I think. Thank you. in our pre-9/11 concepts of combating terrorism. then they are likely to be further deprived of resources. they need to think through them in ways that will fully maximize all units. high-end role of resolving particular incidents. And so those are just three. speaking about the volume of work. MALVESTI: No – . all commands and all skill sets within the special operations community. the SOF community really is in a well earned renaissance period. In SOF. for example. such as information ops and PSYOPS that really are critical to one of the nation’s foremost national security challenges. their innovative mindset – which really are hallmarks of special operations – or anything that potentially diverts them from maintaining readiness for those missions that only special operations can conduct. such as civil affairs operations. it could include greater demands on SOF that could take a toll on SOF’s unconventional thinking. And the third challenge I’d like to point out – we heard the admiral talk about the list of 12 core activities as they relate to special operations. you know. I think it will continue to discriminate them and help SOF to be able to go where others cannot go and do what others cannot do in places where military mass and might and brawn really do not lend themselves but SOF’s skills – in that individual as the unit of action – really is very appropriate. that may have been much more appropriate or applicable – tended to think of counterterrorism for special operations in a much more. MIKLASZEWSKI: Thank you. I think there has been a tendency to equate. if FID. reactive. key challenges for SOF.This could include. But combating terrorism in a post-9/11 world is really much more expansive. I think. And if those activities. MR. you thereby exclude other key activities. the community itself – as well as their key advocates – should guard against viewing counterterrorism in a way that privileges only direct action as the embodiment of counterterrorism operations because when you do that. still continue to retain a lot of innovation and imagination in their mindset is really looking at the individual as the unit of action and I think that this is a key discriminator for special operations. particular crises – hijackings. given only perfunctory attention or not performed or employed to maximum effect.

two subcomponents of them. which is getting the right people. . very challenging. government community writ large when it comes to our operations in theater and looking into the future and that’s really balancing these critical values between the primary missions of the SOF community. what is the fundamental premise of SOF. So how do you ensure that those pictures that you’re streaming from a Predator and other assets are informed by the specific knowledge of that ODA team that’s operating in that area and understands the personalities and the activities? That would be one issue. very. growing variety of assets to provide us pictures and understanding of what’s going on at least visually and we are looking to now mate that with the human features. The SOF has to take. really. So I would address. It’s very intuitive and people accept it and are very in favor of it but in the doing is very complex. these direct action capabilities are still essential to what we’re doing – not only in theater.) And Kenneth. but I think it’s still fundamental to the effectiveness of both sides of the coin. Very distinctly different missions – that being the direct and indirect mission – yet they are intertwined in a very fundamental way. a little bit more controversial. And. One would be the technology piece – we’ve seen a phenomenal evolution of capability when it comes to ISR. difficult challenge. in the right places to do the right jobs. (Laughter. you know. So we developed the special capabilities. there’s a Moore’s law challenge in the sense of our capability to collect information is dramatically outstripping our capacity to analyze and apply it. And I think that there are both technological and human approaches to addressing that. intelligence surveillance applications. And that’s something that’s facing the broader military community and the special operations community as well. as well as a very integrated approach to applying them within a special operations community. KENNETH RAPUANO: Hi. The other is. But by the same token.S. the more kinetic. So we have now full-motion video. I think. lowdensity assets that we simply can’t afford to spread throughout the entire conventional military system. One. Olson really put his finger on one of the biggest challenges that is facing both the special operations community and the broader U. essentially. but to prevent threats from manifesting in the United States as well. I’m Ken Rapuano. getting those most dangerous alligators in the swamp to facilitate our ability to go out and drain the swamp. I think that Adm. We’ve transitioned to much more of an emphasis on counterinsurgency warfare. essentially. MIKLASZEWSKI: – appearing to at least answer part of my question. we’ve got a whole variety. perhaps. please. What a lot of people in the military community call high-value. And it’s navigating that exchange and balance that is proving to be. We started out with the fairly highly kinetic-centric approach to our operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan.MR. This is a very rich area so I’m going to try to restrain my remarks to a couple of key observations.

operational transition and management of the force. for better or for worse. Some of the ways this is going to happen. So with that. for many reasons that I think obvious to this audience. in terms of unifying all those elements of intelligence – human. which is the F3AE cycle. clearly. that’s the “find. that’s very satisfying for many people. And so. to a situation now where there are such tight restrictions on detainee operations and interrogation operations that many in the military community. filled with transnational threats. If many of you aren’t familiar with that. I mean. are very. On the other hand. feel that we’ve dramatically undermined our capability to get visibility into the intentions and operations of the adversary. based on the lack of training and oversight that resulted in abuses like Abu Ghraib. their plans and capabilities. significant increase in kill operations. for the force to kind of redefine itself and set itself up for future success. MIKLASZWESKI: Ozzie? MR. executes geographically and SOCOM is a functional command. finish. to better understand the networks. both within the military operational community and the broader intelligence community. for SOF really to take advantage of this position it’s in now. as well as the intelligence community. But it’s an area to be sensitive to and be educated on. In baseball. exploit. as well. In think-tank world. the human intelligence piece of what has most been associated with our direct mission. as much as that may or may not be a good way to operate in today’s transnational world. are going to execute geographically. That would be – this would be an issue that many would say is just outside the pay grade of SOCOM and the military. where it has a lot of clout and has been very. analyze. it’s important to obviously talk about the ongoing operations.” And that’s a process that was really pioneered by the special operations community. So my comments will be slightly shorter and I’m going to look towards the future of SOF here.S. I get to fill all the gaps that were not already talked about. it’s something that they have to deal with. On the operational transition.And that’s the interrogation and the exploitation. So all of the departments and agencies. And you’ve seen a coincident reduction of capture operations and a commensurate. MR. government. I’m going to bucket mine similar to what Michele did. very serious restrictions on our ability to exploit human intelligence. when we’re executing geographically. What we’ve seen. and that they can . batting third is kind of prestigious. And I broke those categories down into three: strategic integration. roll them up and then continue the cycle. NELSON: Great. and in fact. very effective. The pendulum has swung. So on the one hand. The U. material exploitation – and then follow up action into a single operating authority. as Michele said. And that’s going to require some very difficult questions to be asked and some assumptions to be challenged. I’ll leave it at that and we can follow up on the discussion. too. that is the case. we are losing capability. And SOCOM has to figure out a better way – the special operations forces have to figure out a better way – to leverage that construct. but there’s really an opportunity. it needs to take the next step in how it’s going to operate outside of the Title 10 battle areas. so you are able to rapidly capitalize on information associated with terrorist networks. thank you. fix.

On the other hand. is their integration into the interagency. and DOD is very – likes to encourage others to give up their responsibilities and authorities. And that’s something that they need to consider. it’s very difficult to say no. In this environment. They need to do a better job. in my opinion. one. For the management of the force piece. with actual operators – people that understand the special operations community. folks have touched upon the fact. We’ve had a very long debate in the last years. that is not something that we can do in a periodic or episodic fashion.S. Olson said. you know. or those inbeds.S. I always joke that DOD interagency was always a view of. we’ll get the rest of the government to do what we want. Because they have some core tasks that nobody else in the U. They have they have to balance this need between being high-tech and low-tech simultaneously. A lot of times those LNO billets. The level of understanding requires you to be embedded in that country over a long period of time. That’s not interagency coordination in a true sense. It’s. to develop the relations. in IA. We’re very. government is relied upon to do and when those . have a larger presence in some of the other areas. And the presence in those departments and agencies can’t be under the premise that we’re going to get those departments and agencies to do what we want them to do. are individuals that don’t have a lot of background in SOF and that’s something they need to revisit. to establish the culture – to establish the presence. particularly the military. government. And one of the things they’re going to have to consider when they do that is. how can we be the supportive force? And then they need to fill those billets. And that persistent presence is something that SOF is going to have to work with the rest of the interagency on to establish. the SOF forces have led the U. so they can focus on their core tasks. And I think they need to do a little better job of saying that. If SOF forces are going to get this cultural experience and this language. You know. and get integrated. how can we help you? As Adm. I think it’s very. about whether – who should be in control of those military forces inside a foreign country and whether the chief of mission should have any authority over that. is the role of SOF inside the missions – chief of missions – inside the embassy teams.improve upon. but sometimes we’re hesitant – DOD’s hesitant to give up their authorities and responsibilities. SOF takes a lot of pride in being the ones that can solve any problems and take on any mission. You know. in which they show up to conduct a small exercise and then depart. they’re not taking full advantage of that and I think that they could do that further – fill up the IA billets outside of the intelligence community. those individuals. But what they need to do – I think SOF again. very important. of integrating into the interagency. along those same lines. Also. On one hand. needs to do – take an opportunity to do a little better job of saying no. is it going to be appropriate at any time in the future for those forces to fall under chief of mission authorities. Obviously. it’s low-tech relationships that are developed with the high technology that allows them to have a strategic effect with tactical actions. interagency integration. and this is probably the most critical aspect.

Olson’s terminology. And please – I’ve been asked to say this – please state your question in the form of a question and not some kind of personal mission statement. your comment about policymakers and. the military information support teams. So any questions? Yes. Clearly. And then. Michele talked about this a lot – the strategic integration. given the fact that we’re in a decade. they need to be successful. or some considerations to the train-and-equip mission. as you know. who’ve had the opportunity to work with civil affairs. I’m not recommending that that should take place. but maybe not quite as what you said. Because. I think they have a unique position. the MISTs – but not all policymakers. or for oversight.tasks come to bear. Because I would have thought that. you know. So I won’t go into any more of that. MALVESTI: Sure. . If you would. MIKLASZEWSKI: Okay. particularly at the policymaker’s level. And then also with their growth. a lot of the SOF growth has not been in operators. their level of understanding and knowledge of SOF and SOF capabilities. as before. of ongoing operations where SOF had been heavily involved. But I’ll go ahead and leave it short and turn it back over to Jim. ma’am. please. I think policymakers – a lot of individuals serving in country teams. And we can get into some questions. almost. I think she’s absolutely right about SOF not being appropriately integrated into the national decision-making process. there’s not a civilian career path for those that are involved in the SOF communities. I was interested to hear. again. And they need to focus on that. It’s going to have to happen. SOF is the – SOCOM is the only entity that has a train-and-equip function but doesn’t have a standing service to support it. And I think that there’s going to be a need for them to develop a career path for individuals that are SOF enablers. given the operational experience. And I also think along the lines of civilian career opportunities. It has been in support forces and in enablers and in the civilian personnel. Q: Sharon Pickup. maybe not the opposite. I do think that an assistant secretary in OSD is probably not the level of support that they need to ensure that SOF is properly integrated into national security decision-making and that something we may want to consider is elevating the status of that billet. And those individuals are going to become even more important in the future. who are working in countries with the embassies. there’s a lot more interaction with the capabilities. or need to be done. SOF supporters. MR. So I’m just curious if you could expand on your comments because I would have thought that you would have said that there would have been a greater understanding. And I’m talking at the very senior levels. to use Adm. I think my comments – and I apologize if I was not as nuanced as I should have been – were geared more towards the indirect side of the house. GAO. Michele. if you could identify yourself. lastly. But I also think there needs to be some changes. please. because they can take tactical actions that have strategic effects. when you have an ongoing operation for almost a decade. MS. now.

And it takes more time and effort to get that understanding. dealing with special operations. That’s what I meant. NELSON: Well. MR.If you look at the broad span of policymakers. I know they have the authority. the direct action side. commando side of the House – in terms of highly kinetic. you know – we were talking about comments about the ASD SO/LIC? Q: Your opening. to help shape and stabilize an environment. Many of the very high. Q: They have that. high senior policylevel meetings. I’m talking about outside of the declared war zones. The longer-term. I apologize if I talk too quickly sometimes. What I said is – what I was trying to articulate is that. at very senior levels. beyond Title 10. MR. decisions to apply SOF outside of declared theatres of combat dealt more with that. And I just don’t think that the senior-level policymakers. to then allow for the dedicated. And of course. more nuanced set of capabilities necessary to address more of the fundamental causes. MR. how to properly and fully leverage and utilize the full range of the culturally attuned. versus symptoms – it’s just more complex. follow-on use of development aid and assistance. I didn’t mean beyond a Title 10. for example. But I don’t think that collectively we have thought through. and this is for Ozzie. Q: Tim Davis. So what exactly – . I’m sorry. MR. they don’t have the opportunity to work very directly with the culturally attuned warrior-diplomat side of the house for SOF. particular when it’s addressing what are considered potentially imminent threats. NELSON: No. NELSON: Oh. Q: I understand where you’re going with that. you said. get a tremendous amount of attention. and not the other side of the house. kind of. Iraq and Afghanistan. who are dealing with very specific. for example. Could you please expand on your remarks that you need something beyond a Title 10 authority for SOF? You kind of threw me out on that one. but they’re operating. to say that there’s just a natural tendency to look for near-term results the more senior you get in government. diplomat side of SOF: for example. in 88 countries. And so policymakers may have a better sense of that skill set for the special operations community. It’s a large elephant. RAPUANO: I would just quickly add to that. across all departments and agencies. high-end time-sensitive issues as they relate to SOF are really only becoming very familiar with one part and one skill-set inside SOF. certainly over the course of the five years that I sat at the White House. There are many hands on it. but how they operate in those authorities is what I’m talking about. I don’t understand that. high-end operations.

RAPUANO: Congratulations. a more established presence. direct-action oriented. RAPUANO: I would say that that really gets to the heart of the tension. Don’t criticize us because the mission has changed and that’s what we were doing. in many cases. but for those of you who know Kimberly Dozier as CBS correspondent. Kim. So that’s what I was trying to capture there. conventional forces. where do you get the intel to get OBL? So where do you all come down on that? MR. but who’s doing what to whom. Flynn has been working on. Gets you the background on all the Taliban and al-Qaida activists throughout Afghanistan. within not only the U. but what’s the collection plan? And I think that’s something that Gen. that was the mission then. between white SOF. that may not be the area where you’re getting the most return on investment from very unique and specialized assets. but then NATO and ISAF. Q: Thanks. it’s going to require a long-term presence in those embassies. Gen. in a more collaborative fashion. which also published Michele’s recent report. Something that’s not based – a lot of those relations and those operations and those countries are based on mil-to-mil exercises that are scheduled and that’s the extent of it. once you collect that. There’s also a question of.S. where is it fused? How is it analyzed and disseminated? They’re challenges that they’re dealing with. There’s a lot of collection apparatus out there and you need to think about where do you apply what level of asset to collect what type of intelligence or information? You know. such as they could reach there – and that he needed more COIN-centric information. Flynn. if you want to develop the relationships. He wanted to know the price of fuel in the marketplace. MR. in terms of better integrating collection amongst all these disparate units. And he talked about how he needed to shake up the way the military gathered intelligence in Afghanistan because it had been too CT. What I’m suggesting is if you want to have the culture of expertise. not only in terms of the roles and responsibility when it comes to all the different functional areas of intelligence. NELSON: It’s how they’re operating in their company – in those countries. Because there are only so many resources and then. you know. military. It is important information to support the longer-term COIN . black SOF. And so I’ll ask an intel question. Mike Flynn. saying. Q: Thank you. Maj. well. recently came out with a controversial report published by CNS. well. I’m arguing for a more persistent presence in those countries. Pakistan. she has just recently taken a new position in terms of the chief intelligence correspondent for Associated Press. Q: Thank you very much.MR. So I would argue that he’s making a very important point. RAPUANO: And I don’t mean to embarrass you. Now. he’s gotten a lot of grousing from operators since then. if you switch all your resources to getting the kind of information he’s asking for. Last Thursday – MR.

That’s where we join. I don’t think that – it’s not necessarily unique to SOF. Are those fusion centers the appropriate locus for that collection. RAPUANO: Well. right now – pony up the kind of commitment and cash necessary to grow special operations? Is that possible in the near-time future and what’s going to be required? MS. again. in my view. or shouldn’t be done at the expense. growth is good. primarily within two declared theatres of combat – the limited numbers and percentage of SOF who are operating across the world is very restricted. You. McChrystal coming on board as the commander and the increased emphasis on COIN. that’s where we’re gathering and sharing all this intel already. if I could. But always. my experience is we just don’t have enough of these guys. So it’s a question of governance and a question of integration and coordination. isn’t that was the fusion centers were supposed to be all about? So why create a parallel system? MR. You. Ozzie. that we have the fusion centers. though. which was about fusing intelligence collection amongst all these various elements in the field. MALVESTI: I think. But the focus was on the HVT mission there. Michele. can any administration – this one in particular. I think the military as a whole has yet to think through how best to incentivize a career path that keeps individuals in countries long enough to sustain long-term partnerships. I did an active-duty tour serving Gen. relationships beyond just TDYing . Olson talking about persistence. Again. If you’re combining both the HVT mission with the broader COIN mission in terms of collection. Afghanistan and Colombia and I’m just wondering. or are you going to do it in another fashion? Q: Excuse me. are talking about a renaissance and all the additional requirements. RAPUANO: Are you talking about the targeting fusion centers? Which – fusion center’s a very popular concept today and – Q: That’s what operators on the ground say to me. And we’re looking at a growing threat in terms of asymmetrical warfare. this was prior to Gen. Now. again. again. I’d like to go back to my original question. I think the admiral has said 74 countries around the world. McChrystal and working with Gen.operations. Part of this. Well. growth to do what? And if you currently have 86 percent of the force in CENTCOM in direct support of – you know. I’ve watched them work in Iraq. Why does Flynn want to create a parallel universe of intel outside of the fusion centers? Why not just add in? MR. that was – one of my responsibilities was setting up the targeting fusion centers. first of all. Flynn from the end of ’06 into ’07. Q: I would follow up. We’ve heard from Adm. but it shouldn’t – it can’t be done. but then it does get to a capacity question. you’ve dramatically expanded your requirement and then you need to think through. is not having the persistent presence and engagement. You know. of intel and information supporting more direct action for more imminent threats. In fact. my experience may be a little dated at this point. mentioned persistence.

And you know. I think that if you’re going to have more growth. we currently only have 6 percent in PACOM. MR. This concentration over such a long period of time. And my impression. how does SOF balance that? MS. it’s growth. currently. I’m not sure that more growth is necessary. you know. could have been done by the general-purpose forces. within CENTCOM and again. . then. you know. And the other issue was growth. concentrated en masse. so it’s again. across the globe. another 2 percent in SOUTHCOM and less than 1 percent in the NORTHCOM AOR. where they can take out their actions militarily. so that they can do exactly what you said. before they come to some kind of power. to get ahead of the sound of the guns. MALVESTI: Part of it is also what the requirements currently are – the military requirements are – in terms of the geographic combatant commanders and where they are. across Iraq and Afghanistan. necessarily. obviously. I think I actually have the statistics here. MALVESTI: Yeah. it’s one of the reasons why. I don’t think SOF needs more temporary presence. you know. MR. is: It is the objective of SOF to head off the extremists before they get a foothold. I think. 2 percent in EUCOM. in Iraq and Afghanistan. MIKLASZEWSKI: Well. And I think that SOF needs to regain some of that ground as far as their uniqueness and their specialty. If you have 86 percent in CENTCOM. again. you know. is coming at a cost in terms of engagement elsewhere. really comes at a cost for the engagement and the culturally attuned capabilities that SOF can bring to bear elsewhere. It’s just. And because SOF is so good at what they do. we have to distinguish between the operators – you know. and just like the admiral said. so many of these threats – extremist threats – have been popping up in other countries. there is a tendency by the operational commanders to want to use them in some of these missions. very small percentages of SOF operating around the world. at least. MIKLASZEWSKI: Well. where SOF is not located. I think. I mean. growth – but growth to do what and to be where? MR. And I think that this mass concentration within one. but not just growth to have more. Jim – so they can employ themselves better in other fronts. NELSON: No.individuals. I’ll let Iraq – I mean. 4 percent in AFRICOM. though. Because there were a lot of missions that I saw firsthand in Iraq and Afghanistan that I felt. I think they need more persistent presence. so to speak. but as we’ve seen recently. very. I agree with Michele. worldwide presence and engagement has been a touchstone for SOF for many years. But you do have. MS. individuals. absolutely. I’ll let Ozzie and Ken speak to that as well. I think it’s a great question. and then support infrastructure. SOF has to say no more often. you know. the actual trigger-pullers themselves.

But by the same token. I’m not sure that even individuals outside of SOF know what that actually means. You’ve got to make some hard choices. versus all of these developing and growing counterinsurgency capabilities and awareness within the conventional force? And then. I’m sorry. Detail is very. they’re very. MR. . MIKLASZEWSKI: Okay. we’re growing COIN capabilities throughout the conventional military force. that you are in COIN. MR. Q: Hi. quite frankly. If you look even at the 2010 QDR. We’re never going to be able to grow SOF to address all of our concerns throughout the world when it comes to insurgency and extremism. everywhere. Detail is very. it easily could be termed irregular warfare – a new term of the day. finally. I’m not sure if so many people always talk about SOF-like. When we were talking about the better utilization of SOF forces and maximizing their use. as Ozzie mentioned. I think special operations has become all things to all people. so it does come back to governance and coordination. which goes back to my earlier comments about the importance of developing a cadre of nonoperators – nontrigger-pullers – that understands the SOF community in those global support functions. they are very focused in terms of the lion’s share of the resources to CENTCOM theater of operations. essentially. They have a worldwide mission. direct mission set. It’s just not going to be possible and we need to accept that and prioritize. Because it’s much more focused and you get much higher return on investment in the sense of. we’re growing SOF. the SOF community is struggling because they do have such a worldwide presence. you don’t need to apply this fertilization resource.Because as you have this global presence – and SOF is a global force – it’s almost going to be as important. but when you look at what the resource requirements are for counterinsurgency operations. or are they resisting your opinion on that? MS. Oh. you’ve got to have a better prioritization process. And I think that when it comes to mission prioritization. very large. Yet on the other hand. I would say that the general – and I’m certainly not – I have no expertise on the general-purpose forces per se – you’re right. John Gruen. Lockheed-Martin. the SOF enablers and the services picking up some of that slack. you see general-purpose forces taking on or being assigned to develop competencies in areas that. And I think that’s why heretofore you’d seen a prioritization of the high-value. very long on logistics. Where are you going to get the best return on the more specialized assets within SOF. We simply cannot do everything. And you can’t do everything. were once almost the sole province of SOF. everywhere. You need someone familiar with the special operations community. very long on ISR and all those capabilities and assets. Making general-purpose forces more SOF-like – do you see the services taking that on board. And I think that we’re going to have to do that. And you don’t need a special operator to conduct those kinds of activities. MALVESTI: I’ll answer part of the question and then I’ll let somebody else take a different stance on it. RAPUANO: I would just add to both sets of comments that it really does come down to specialization in the sense of.

Rather than think of it in terms of. MR. you have seen a closing of the gap with conventional forces. now. in terms of targets of interest. specialized training. to remain innovative in how they’re going to approach mission sets. This will help them retain innovation and imagination. certainly one of them is tacking and tracking. it gets back to this Moore’s Law challenge. MIKLASZEWSKI: Please. Paul Dennem (sp). And in certain of those areas. their proficiency – their technical proficiencies – are starting to slowly close the gap between SOF. kind of direct-action type capabilities.Also. very intense. Q: Hi. So it really does get back to. What do you think are the top two or three gaps that the warfighter needs to address in terms of C4ISR? If you could fix two or three things. I think it’s important to shed work in operations of marginal value – but. you know. by orders of magnitude. It may be good for SOF. you know. let’s start divesting of particular missions – I mean. has improved substantially. both for indirect and direct action – you know. a little competition’s always good. I think that’s a good thing. more data with the employment and deployment of more and more of these assets. competition’s good. just by virtue of nine years on a battlefield. The other is. Now. And we see it growing. RAPUANO: I would just add to that. some of those exceed what our tier-one SOF forces had 10. The combat experience level and training. in the sense of. four things be? MR. But I would say. to the standard infantry platoon in the Marine Corps or the Army. MR. individuals starting to take on particular areas. you know. perhaps. you know. 15 years ago. in my view. So the capability of the conventional force has increased dramatically. They’re going to need to focus at those areas and those locations. you know. whether or not – how far away the general-purpose forces are from developing true core competency in SOF-like missions – I think they’re probably a long way off. When you look at the enablers that are available. They’re still – you don’t have the same maturity and experience when you compare the average special-operations operator to the standard infantryman. where we feel the combination of the greatest threat and likely return on investment from the investment of those assets. particularly when you get into the counterinsurgency realm. we are collecting. I mean. the experience and maturity of their force. traditionally. but you do have a significant closing of the gap. has been very significant technical capabilities and enablers. in the field as well as in the operations center – what would those top three. And I think if it helps SOF to be imaginative. at least for the types of missions that we’re working on in theater. Because the counterinsurgency mission is never-ending and it’s worldwide. And it’s the ability to digest it and apply it that is just a . I think the big discriminator for SOF. with those populations. RAPUANO: Well. So that’s something that the SOF community is never going to be able to address all of. to see. how are you going to apply the differentiated value of the special-operations community to give you the best return on that investment and then leverage the conventional force to start filling that gap? Because the gap also reflects a significant expansion of mission.

You’re collecting more information on patterns and individuals and potential TTPs. E-5 in the field. MR. we have Special Operations Command data. but if you’re not applying. but there is a saturation point where he cannot absorb it. you can give a lot of technology to that E3. I think. throughout that system. so you can’t even do a legitimate search in a data mine until you get that together. I still am completely perplexed why we. (Applause. And then just tagging and tracking the unmanned. it is – it’s the data. Ken is exactly right about that. you know. So how do you get the information of most relevance in the hands of the operators who need to apply it? Because what we’re doing. (END) . ultimately. but not necessarily better capability. in the sense of. is significant as well. whole-of-government set of players that are involved – if you’re using it and applying it where it matters most. They can’t digest it. is we’re drowning the operators in information and they can’t handle it. MIKLASZEWSKI: Okay. unmanned aerial sensors still remain huge. I would – number one is. as well as the processes to better discriminate and filter the information that we apply to the warfighters. But then.) Thank you very much. It’s also the ability to integrate the systems. And we’re got to be developing both the technology. unmanned UAVs. So those are probably all the three top priorities from my perspective. And it’s not an easy challenge And it does get that human element. And it’s not just the ability to mine the data. I mean. we have intelligence community data. the human knowledge that we’re gaining through our presence – both from the special-ops community as well as the conventional forces – and then all the other. So you’re seeing patterns. or we have NATO data. We appreciate it. I mean. as a nation. And they’re not – assistants aren’t even physically talking to each other. unattended sensors. in effect.tremendous challenge. have been unable to product the number that we need to cover the battlefield. you know. I think Ken’s exactly right. NELSON: Yeah. all this data – in terms of ISR in particular – it’s the significance of the information. You know. MR. You know. we’re developing tremendously better capacity. we still have – we can’t even get the data in the same data space.