Economic Policy PaPEr SEriES 2011

EuroPE, G20, and South-South tradE
inSiGhtS from EuroPEan aPProachES to rEGional intEGration in africa
SanouSSi Bilal iSaBEllE ramdoo QuEntin dE roQuEfEuil

© 2011 The German Marshall Fund of the United States. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF). Please direct inquiries to: The German Marshall Fund of the United States 1744 R Street, NW Washington, DC 20009 T 1 202 683 2650 F 1 202 265 1662 E info@gmfus.org This publication can be downloaded for free at http://www.gmfus.org/publications/index.cfm. Limited print copies are also available. To request a copy, send an e-mail to info@gmfus.org. Gmf Paper Series The GMF Paper Series presents research on a variety of transatlantic topics by staff, fellows, and partners of the German Marshall Fund of the United States. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of GMF. Comments from readers are welcome; reply to the mailing address above or by e-mail to info@gmfus.org. about Gmf The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a non-partisan American public policy and grantmaking institution dedicated to promoting better understanding and cooperation between North America and Europe on transatlantic and global issues. GMF does this by supporting individuals and institutions working in the transatlantic sphere, by convening leaders and members of the policy and business communities, by contributing research and analysis on transatlantic topics, and by providing exchange opportunities to foster renewed commitment to the transatlantic relationship. In addition, GMF supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded in 1972 through a gift from Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has seven offices in Europe: Berlin, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, Bucharest, and Warsaw. GMF also has smaller representations in Bratislava, Turin, and Stockholm. about Gmf’s Economic Policy Program The Economic Policy Program is an initiative of GMF dedicated to promoting cooperation between the United States and Europe on domestic and international economic policies as vital instruments of global prosperity, especially for the poor and those affected by shifts in the global economy. The United States and Europe account for more than 40 percent of world economic activity, close to $20 trillion in goods and services on an annual basis. Given the size and importance of this relationship, GMF’s Economic Policy Program seeks to ensure that the benefits of globalization are distributed equitably and fairly. Through in-depth research, targeted grantmaking, strategic convening, and outreach to key policymakers and the media, the program supports transatlantic leadership at the critical nexus of economic policy, trade, development assistance, and management of domestic sectors such as agriculture. On the cover: Man stamping African batik in Volta Region, Ghana. © Tom Schumacher/iStockphoto

Europe, G20, and South-South Trade: Insights from European Approaches to Regional Integration in Africa

Economic Policy Paper Series November 2011

By Sanoussi Bilal, Isabelle Ramdoo, and Quentin de Roquefeuil1

Introduction Background European Engagement in Africa Regional Integration in Africa: Is the EU a Driving Force or a Model? Emerging Players: An Increasing Presence Emerging Players Engagement in Africa and Regional Integration Conclusions: How to Build on European Experiences –The Case for Mutual Learning References Annexes

1 2 3 9 11 14 16 18 20

1

The authors are with the European Centre for Development Policy Management, Maastricht, The Netherlands, and Brussels, Belgium. This is an extensively revised version of a paper written for The German Marshall Fund of the United States – Istanbul Policy Center Workshop on “Promoting Trade and Development in sub-Saharan Africa: Opportunities for Transatlantic Partnership with Emerging Economies at the G20,” Istanbul, May 13, 2011.

1
E

Introduction

urope is widely regarded as the main proponent of regional integration, having followed an impressive integration process itself, in terms of depth, scope, and geographical coverage, since World War II It has very actively supported regional integration initiatives in developing countries, and in particular in Africa, where such initiatives have gained momentum and are considered key priorities Europe has shared its experiences, often acting as a model of integration and has provided political, strategic, and financial support to many regional initiatives in Africa, including through dedicated financial instruments, and endeavors, with significant means, to provide assistance to regional integration initiatives Over the last decade, it has engaged in negotiations on comprehensive free trade agreements (FTAs) with African regional groupings, with a view to foster their integration processes toward the creation of more effective regional markets that would promote equitable and sustainable development However, the EU approach has also encountered its own problems and raised frustrations, and at times resentments, from various African corners At the same time, the international landscape has changed rapidly, with an increasing role of emerging players

such as China, India, and Brazil in Africa The privileged relationship between Africa and Europe has been challenged, calling for Europe to adapt to this new environment What would be the implications for an African regional integration processes? Emerging players have yet to pay greater attention to African regional integration initiatives, which remain marginal in their engagement In Seoul in November 2010, the G20 stressed the importance of concerted actions to support regional integration in developing countries Africa has to lead this process if it is to succeed to its benefit Insights could also usefully be gained from the experience (positive and not) of European engagement in supporting African integration initiatives The aim of this paper is to briefly highlight some of the salient features of the European support to regional integration in Africa and the increasing presence of emerging players in Africa In doing so, it will draw some tentative insights toward a more concerted effort at the G20 in support of African endeavors to foster its regional integration processes

The privileged relationship between Africa and Europe has been challenged, calling for Europe to adapt to this new environment.

Europe, G20, and South-South Trade

1

2
P

Background

olitical and economic regional integration have been a high priority on the African agenda ever since the dawn of the 20th century, when the idea of an economically and politically united Africa was mooted at the first Pan-African Congress in 1900 This gained further momentum at the time of independence some 60 years later Many countries, driven by strong leaders, were deeply committed to constructing endogenous initiatives Some of these were driven by short-term objectives of constructing political cooperation Others were driven by wider visionary goals of creating regional markets that could become integrated economic and political powers in Africa In 1963, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was established, with an increasing number of members over time It was replaced in 2002 by the African Union (AU), which is comprised of 53 countries This dynamism underscored the imperative of deeper regional integration and the necessity for enhanced economic policy harmonization across countries as well as sectoral coordination in areas such as trade, agriculture, management of natural resources, and peace and security Alongside the AU, there exist a number of regional organizations, roughly created around geographical locations with common sub-regional objectives There are fourteen1 regional organizations, eight2 of which are officially recognized by the AU The Abuja
1

Treaty considers these as the building blocks for the pan-African integration process Their role, size, nature, scope, objectives, and coverage vary greatly and progress achieved so far has been significantly different There is no doubt that the profusion of regional organizations across the continent has created a number of challenges, notably due to the overlapping membership, which has caused difficulties for countries belonging to more than one organization to implement regional commitments 3 In stark contrast with the African experience, the European Union (EU) started small as the European Coal and Steel Community, with only six countries Shaped by history and highly motivated by political considerations at the time, the EU has gradually moved toward a common market, a common currency, and, increasingly, though with its own difficulties, toward an emerging coordinated foreign and security policy Due to its solid and positive experience, the EU strongly believes in the merits of regional integration as an important tool for development, and political stability and as vehicle for a smooth integration into global economy Its 50 years of experience in gradually building, deepening, and enlarging its own region speaks for itself 4

3

These are Southern African Development Community (SADC), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Indian Ocean Commission (IOC), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Southern African Customs Union (SACU), East African Community (EAC), Communaute Economique et Monetaire de l’Afrique Centrale (EMAC), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of Great Lakes Countries (CEPGEL), Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS), Union Economic et Monetaire Ouest Afircain (UEMOA), Mano River Union (MRU), and Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD).

Recent initiatives to harmonize policies and programs among some regional organizations, such as the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Initiative are seen as important steps toward building greater coherence among regional communities. Bilal (2007) and Farrell (2007; 2009).

4

2

These are SADC, COMESA, EAC, IGAD, AMU, ECOWAS, CEN-SAD, and ECCAS.

2

The German Marshall Fund of the United States

3
T

European Engagement in Africa

he EU engages with African countries through a unique mix of aid and trade policies amidst an evolving international context Despite some challenges in implementing and making use of these policies, it must be recognized that the EU has been, and is likely to remain for quite some time at least, the main development partner of Africa That said, the increasing engagement of emerging powers in Africa will surely help reshape the relationship between Africa and the EU, hopefully for the better

The essence of the EU’s vision on regional integration can be found in its 1995 Communication, entitled “European Community support to regional economic integration efforts among developing countries,”5 reinforced on several occasions, as in the 2008 Communication “Regional integration for development in ACP Countries ”6 They outline the way in which the EU’s support encourages to regional integration, notably with its trade policies, through free trade agreements, and through its development policies, with an recent emphasis on aid for trade Because Europe remains Africa’s largest trade partner and donor, it has had some leverage to somehow influence regional integration dynamics in Africa Yet, whether through aid or/and trade, this normative engagement to support integration on the continent has not been without problems Supporting Regional Integration through Aid: Frustrated Ambitions? As a regional entity itself, the EU has perceived the promotion of regional integration as central
5

This commitment is translated in its development agenda by a significant level of funding targeting regional integration support programs, which are mainly delivered at the regional level The EU has traditionally provided development assistance to the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) States through its European Development Fund (EDF), directly to ACP countries, and also to ACP regions, as well as through other sectoral initiatives These include the ACP-EU Water Facility, the ACP-EU Energy Facility, the Africa Peace Facility, and the EU-Africa Infrastructure Fund, among others, which are all aimed at supporting key sectors necessary to complement economic integration Until the 8th EDF (1996-2001), regional programming was agreed between the EU and individual countries belonging to Regional Economic Communities (RECs) Regional funding was often an addition to national activities As emphasized in the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA), the 9th EDF marked a significant turn in the way the EU engaged with RECs by placing a greater emphasis on regional programming as the main instrument to support regional integration A number of RECs7 have become the main partners of the EU to jointly prepare and implement regional programs Table 1 gives a general overview of the breakdown between regional programming and overall EDF funds commitments under the 8th, 9th, and 10th EDF The EDF allocates its funds both at the bilateral level, through National Indicative Programmes and through regional envelopes (Regional Indicative Programmes), whose priorities are defined jointly

The increasing engagement of emerging powers in Africa will surely help reshape the relationship between Africa and the EU, hopefully for the better.

See COM (1995)219: European Community support for regional economic integration efforts among developing countries: Communication from the Commission. See COM(2008)604: Regional integration for development in ACP countries: Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and The Committee of the Regions (2008).

7

6

In Africa, there are four regions supported by EDF. There are 1) Eastern and Southern Africa, comprised of four mandated RECs, namely COMESA, EAC, IOC, and IGAD; 2) the Southern African Development Community (SADC); 3) Central Africa, and 4) West Africa (comprised of two mandated REC, i.e ECOWAS and UEMOA).

Europe, G20, and South-South Trade

3

Table 1: Evolution of EDF commitments Region 8th EDF (1996-2001) Total REI1 219 Subtotal Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) Central Africa Caribbean region Pacific region Total
1

9th EDF (2002-2007) Total 289 253 542 147 64 111 40 904 REI 203 200 403 95 29 89 15 631

10th EDF (2008-2013) Total 645 597 1,242 116 165 165 95 1,783 45 1,341 REI 548 418 966 93 97

East Africa

2

154 143 297 81 60 40 478

West Africa

226 445 121 91 90 35 782

Regional Economic Integration

2

The Commission’s official denomination for this region is “Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean”; in this report, it will be referred to as “East Africa.” Source: European Court of Auditors, 2009

with regional organizations 8 Overall support to regional programs under the 10th EDF amounts to €1 783 billion,9 representing about 8 percent of the total amount for the period 2008-13 This is over twice the funds earmarked for regional integration under the 9th EDF, reflecting the EUACP consensus on the importance of regional integration for development 10

8

The priority areas of EU support to regional integration take place in areas such as building regional markets, connecting regional infrastructure networks, strengthening regional institutions (with particular focus on improving regional governance and cooperation for peace and security), and developing regional policies for sustainable development (and, in the case of the EPAs, adjustment support and broader aid for trade initiatives). European Court of Auditors, 2009.

With its ambitious approach, the EU is the main provider of development assistance at the regional level Besides the Community instruments, EU member states, notably France, the U K , Spain, and Germany, are important contributors of regional support For instance, in East Africa, TradeMark East Africa is a multi-donor, nonprofit company that is supported by EU member states, such as the U K , Denmark, Sweden, Belgium, and the Netherlands It provides support to the Eastern African Community through its Regional East African Integration Programme 2008-13, and it aims at mobilizing $150 million over a five-year period There have been some important milestones achieved, notably through funding of national programs and regional organizations At the national level, a number of sector-specific projects and government programs of regional relevance have been successfully financed At the regional

9

10

See Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Regional Integration for Development in ACP Countries. COM(2008)604 Final. Also see the Commission Staff Working document accompanying the Communication on regional integration for development in ACP countries, SEC(2008)2539.

4

The German Marshall Fund of the United States

level, the EDF has helped support regional integration, notably through the implementation of regional trade policy agendas, infrastructure development, management of natural resources, development of information and communication technologies, and peace and security (See Annex 1) Although the EU’s support to regional integration has made significant in-roads in Africa and has proved relevant to the needs of RECs and countries, working regionally has also proved to be quite challenging The first set of problems encountered relates to the specific characteristics of African regional integration Overlapping membership between RECs results in a complex web of weak and duplicating mandates and conflicting programs, often leading to difficulties in pursuing coordinated and coherent policy formulation It often leads to costly competition for power and financial resources, inconsistencies in policy formulation and implementation, unnecessary duplications of functions and efforts, fragmentation of markets, and restriction in growth potential of regions, which consequently reduce the ability of RECs to pursue coherent and effective integration programs Additionally, regional programs often lack welldefined policy objectives that were not sufficiently aligned with national priorities, therefore resulting in low level of transposition of regional commitments at the national level and insufficient national/regional coordination This is in part due to the fact that some countries do not always give a high priority to regional integration as a policy objective due to other pressing needs identified at the national level Furthermore, limited overall capacity constraints of RECs reduced their ability to demonstrate clear and strong leadership, to develop bankable projects, and to implement commitments 11
11

A second, related set of problem relates to the EU’s approach to regional integration So far, despite some encouraging efforts in aligning its own regional cooperation strategy to the RECs’ own priorities, there seems to be a lack of complementarity between the EU’s strategy and its member states’ individual country cooperation strategy Furthermore, despite the relevance of regional projects and increased support to provide institutional building, there seem to be insufficient links between regional priorities and national activities Regional and national projects have often been conducted on two independent tracks Monitoring by the European Commission and RECs as well as implementation of regional projects have often proved slow and complex 12 Thirdly, there are difficulties in working through the guiding principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action at the regional level Indeed, in many cases, ownership of regional strategies remains insufficient although regional programs are jointly defined RECs often find it difficult to drive regional initiatives, in part due to weak institutional and technical capacity, but also because they lack sufficient political legitimacy and the mandate to do so Alignment with the EU’s strategies also proved challenging in areas where priority projects are not clearly defined and where bankable projects are not available Finally, despite a number of laudable initiatives, donors’ coordination, including among Europeans (Commission and EU member states) has often proved difficult, with the exception of support to infrastructure corridors 13

Although the EU’s support to regional integration has made significant in-roads in Africa...working regionally has also proved to be quite challenging.

12

See European Court of Auditors (2009). See Mackie et al. (2010).

See Mackie et al. (2010).

13

Europe, G20, and South-South Trade

5

Promoting Regional Integration through Trade Policy: Good Intentions but Ambiguous Impact? The EU’s support to regional integration is at the cornerstone of the EU’s development and external cooperation policy It dates back to the late 1960s and the Yaoundé II Convention, when the thenEuropean Economic Community (EEC) and the group of ACP countries established that the regional organizations of signatory states could be beneficiaries of Community aid and could be extended the same trade preferences Since then, EU support to the ACP countries has been structured through the successive Conventions and Agreement 14 Trade was, under Lomé preferences, conducted on a unilateral preferential basis However, this was deemed to be incompatible with the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and therefore were replaced on January 1, 2008 by reciprocal trade arrangements, the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPAs), and, for those ACP countries unwilling or unable to conclude an EPA, by the EU generalized system of preferences (GSP) available to all developing countries While the EPAs have to ensure compatibility with WTO rules, their main stated objective is to foster sustainable development through gains from trade but also to reinforce endogenous regional integration processes in the ACP This lies at the heart of the decision to negotiate reciprocal trade agreements on a regional basis It is expected that, by building on larger regional markets, EPAs would facilitate the integration of the ACP in the world economy, provide economies of scale, stimulate investment, and contribute to lock in the necessary trade reforms Interestingly, signing agreements on a regional basis is also seen as a way of ensuring regional integration The EU, in that logic, would serve as an external guarantor of regional integration
Yaoundé (1963-75), Lomé I-IVbis (1975 – 2000) Conventions and the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (2000-2020).
14

In the same vein, EPAs were expected to benefit from deeper integration within the regions; by creating dynamic and stronger markets, regions would conclude more comprehensive agreements with the EU and would in turn be able to provide stronger bases, as “building blocks,” to the AU process of continental integration Not much of this, however, has actually happened four years after the first EPAs were signed or initialed Despite all good will, there is a common perception, largely illustrated by the failure of many to conclude the EPAs, that there is insufficient coherence between the EPA agenda and the regional integration processes in Africa The EPAs are meant to support the endogenous regional integration agenda of the ACP, as arguably is the case in the Caribbean But in Africa and the Pacific, EPAs have often been perceived as an EU attempt to drive and sometimes pre-empt the regional agenda Besides, conflicting liberalization schedules under the EPA in some cases threaten to disrupt existing regional integration Countries have often not been able to align their national interests at the regional level, leading to diverging national positions on EPAs in the same region (in terms of scope, depth, coverage, and timing of the agreement, as well as of willingness to conclude an EPA) As a result, some countries broke out of the region by ultimately concluding individual interim EPAs in 2007 in order to preserve their preferential market access to the EU It follows that countries within the same region currently fall under different trade preferences with the EU: while some have concluded interim EPAs, others are now divided into standard GSP countries (for non-LDCs) and Everything But Arms beneficiaries (for LDCs) So far, instead of consolidating regional processes, the EPA process has added an additional layer

6

The German Marshall Fund of the United States

of complexity to the already intricate picture of regional integration in Africa 15 The EPA regional groupings have not yet matched the contours of the formally recognized regional organizations to which they belong, except for the EAC 16 In addition, some regional sub-groupings17 were more fully integrated than the broader EPA configurations Furthermore, African countries have been put in the difficult position of having to speak with one voice within their regional grouping during their negotiations with the EU Political will to safeguard regional integration has often been insufficient This is most apparent in the decision to opt for bilateral interim agreements (the so-called Interim EPAs) The idea of such agreements was to safeguard market access to the EU with bilateral agreements in those regions where regional solutions were not possible at the time This bilateral approach, adopted by the EU and some ACP counterparts, while being pragmatic, is clearly at odds with the goal of reinforcing regional integration Indeed, should this situation last, regional cooperation and the dynamic of further integration would be interrupted: customs unions will be unable to apply the same common external tariff, new border controls will be required, heterogeneous rules of origin might thwart production integration, and political tensions would rise across the region Thus, despite an ambitious agenda for promoting regional integration through bilateral trade policy,
15 16

the EPAs have in many cases exacerbated the tensions and incoherencies of African regional integration processes The ongoing EU experience with promoting regionalism on the continent through bilateral agreements highlights the tensions that exist between bilateral trade policy and endogenous regional integration processes Bilateral negotiations, especially when taking place between such asymmetric partners, can drive a wedge between the members of an economic region and undermine the process that was supposed to be supported in the first place Thus, despite the best of intentions from the European Union and the Commission, the dynamics of trade negotiations, with their constant tug and pull, have sometimes proved to be a strain on regional integration This seems to be one of the important lessons of the EPA process, and It is should undoubtedly be taken on board by other partners that might seek to encourage regional integration through bilateral trade policy The EU also works increasingly at the continental level, with the African Union through the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES), which was signed in 2007 This is in itself highly symbolic and telling of the EU’s overall enthusiasm for promoting regional solutions to development challenges More specifically, the JAES includes a specific partnership focusing on Trade, Regional Integration, and Infrastructure (TRII), thus directly supporting regional integration Despite the good initiative, the JAES and the TRII partnership are often confronted by the EU’s fragmented cooperation instruments and trade regimes, which makes coordination a challenge It has so far remained at a too technocratic level, with little political and strategic impetus related to key practical regional integration challenges It has also been mainly de-linked from politically sensitive areas, such as the EPAs, and been unable to strengthen tentative AU initiatives such as the

Despite the best of intentions from the European Union and the Commission, the dynamics of trade negotiations, with their constant tug and pull, have sometimes proved to be a strain on regional integration.

See Bilal and Braun-Munzinger, 2010; Bilal and Stevens, 2009.

The EAC decision to negotiate an EPA as a bloc was made as early as 2002, but, this was not finalized until late 2007 when the region initialed an interim EPA with the EU. Until then, the region negotiated within the ESA configuration. In the current state of play, the EAC is the only coherent regional configuration to have initialed an interim EPA in Africa. Notably the UEMOA within ECOWAS, EAC within ESA, and SACU within SADC.

17

Europe, G20, and South-South Trade

7

controversial Minimum Integration Programme The TRII partnership, as most other pillars of the JAES, has lacked ownership and political drive from the countries and regions concerned, which de facto lowers the ambitions of EU support delivered at the Pan African level to regional integration 18

18

See Bossuyt and Sherriff (2010) and ECDPM (2010).

8

The German Marshall Fund of the United States

4
I

Regional Integration in Africa: Is the EU a Driving Force or a Model?
more difficult to implement deeper economic integration commitments, probably due to varying of national priorities, with political considerations often dominating economic concerns 20 Finally, several African regional organizations have not followed a traditional Balassa-type21 sequencing in their integration process: monetary integration has often preceded economic integration, largely due to historical reasons Furthermore, many observers have noted that some regional organizations have had a tendency to engage in deeper regional integration agendas, which did not necessarily correspond to their true (i e revealed) national or even regional interests Either rhetoric has been ahead of real political will, or economic, social, historical, political, and geo-strategic conditions have not been conducive to the implementation of ambitious integration agenda In other words, grand integration designs à la the European way did not match the economic and political reality of the regions concerned As a result, all regional integration initiatives in Africa suffer, to varying degrees, from a significant implementation problem, with regional decisions often poorly transposed at the national level and serious delays in their ambitious integration agenda Some key features of regional integration processes seem to have been overlooked, notably that different levels and scope of integration can be pursued depending on the specific characteristics and political ambitious of a region, as well as on the capacity of the region (including at the institutional level) to effectively pursue the integration agenda This “fallacy of transposition” due to the “nonreplicability” of the European experience, which does not fit developing countries, has

n many African circles, the experience of the EU is widely perceived as not just an example, but also as a model for regional economic integration 19 Indeed, many African regional integration initiatives have sourced their inspiration in the EU experience, be it in terms of policy agenda or of institutional set up A case in point is the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU/UEMOA) In order to assess the EU’s impact on regional integration in Africa, it is therefore necessary not only to assess the active policy of the EU in this respect, but to acknowledge that the European experience has been important and visible enough to attract, by itself, the attention that made it de facto a model of regional integration for many, and an incentive to attempt to pursue similar paths While many regional organizations have followed an EU-type of approach by adopting economic integration objectives and institutional designs that resemble, at least in their form, some of the features of the EU model, it is obvious that it takes more than just institutions to achieve integration and policy objectives It is important however, to highlight some fundamental differences between the EU and African models First, Africa has 54 countries, with 1 billion people — twice EU’s population and number of countries Secondly, Europe in the 1950s and the African continent today have very different starting points, in terms of level of economic development, infrastructure, human and capital stocks, governance of public institutions, political leadership, and checks and balances, to name but a few Thirdly, despite strong historical and political origins, the EU’s regionalization process has largely been driven by an economic “functional” agenda African regional organizations seem to find it
19

All regional integration initiatives in Africa suffer, to varying degrees, from a significant implementation problem.

20

See Bilal,(2005, 2007), Farrel (2007, 2009), and Murray (2008, 2009).

See Draper (2010, 2011). Balassa (1961).

21

Europe, G20, and South-South Trade

9

dominated the institutional and policy development of many regions, notably, but not only, in Africa As the EU experience shows, regional integration is deeply political and quite complex to implement, in particular when it comes to calling for greater commitments that entail giving up some national sovereignty toward larger supranational institutions While the EU has largely succeeded in its economic integration, although

not without difficulties, most African countries have been reluctant to delegate some of their national sovereignty and have de facto relied on a mainly intergovernmental model of integration This resistance has also contributed to putting the institutional design and policy agenda of some of the regional groupings at odds with the effective implementation of their integration programs

10

The German Marshall Fund of the United States

5
T

Emerging Players: An Increasing Presence
Trade Relationship The growing importance of South-South trade with regards to Africa is well documented (see figure 1) China’s trade with the continent in particular has experienced spectacular growth; the annual growth rate of Sino-African trade averaged 33 5 percent between 2000 and 2008 23 Fuels and minerals accounted for the bulk of Africa’s exports to most trading partners in 2009 While the EU is still by far the most important trading partner, China, India, and Brazil, have substantially increased their share of trade with the continent China’s top five imports were essentially concentrated in natural resources, while India’s second largest imports were in inorganic chemicals and precious metals, and Brazil imported fertilizers

he EU is a traditional partner of Africa, but this special relationship is losing some of its dominance This, directly or indirectly, has some impact on regional integration in Africa While the EU remains the most significant provider of aid and trading partner, with increasing intensity Africa is engaging, both in political and economic terms, with a number of emerging economies 22 South-South cooperation and partnerships are not a new phenomenon, but they are gaining in importance China, and to a lesser extent Brazil and India, are leading this trend in Africa, although the size of their engagement has not yet reached the EU’s level This section outlines the size and nature of the emerging players’ interactions with Africa, and goes on to assess the impacts of this trend on regional integration in Africa and draw some parallels and lessons from the EU’s experience

The annual growth rate of Sino-African trade averaged 33.5 percent between 2000 and 2008.

Figure 1: Shares of emerging and traditional partners in Africa’s trade (in percentage)

Notes: TPs – traditional partners; EPs – emerging partners. Source: Figure 6.3, OECD (2011). http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932403572

22

See Bilal and Rampa (2011) and the references therein.

23 FOCAC, China-Africa Trade and Economic Relationship Annual Report 2010.

Europe, G20, and South-South Trade

11

In terms of trade policy, in 2008, India became the first developing country to provide duty-free quota-free market access to 49 LDCs, following commitments taken at the 5th WTO Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong in 2005 Duty-free treatment covered 85 percent of tariffs lines while some additional 9 percent of tariff lines were granted preferential access, with up to a 20 percent margin of preference Some key products of interest to Africa were excluded however, such as tea, coffee, some vegetables, fruits and nuts, iron and steel, and refined copper, amongst others Similarly, China provides duty-free quota-free access to 33 LDCs (30 of which are in Africa) for some 4,762 products since July 1, 2010 This accounts for 60 percent of all taxable items and 98 2 percent of the total volume of LDC exports to China Brazil announced in 2010 that it would provide dutyfree treatment to 80 percent of all tariff lines from LDCs, which would gradually be extended to 100 percent 24 While one cannot yet assess the impact of the breadth and the depth of such preferences to LDCs, these commitments demonstrate the willingness of emerging powers to increasingly engage with them Currently, trade preferences are unilateral and conducted on a bilateral basis; they are highly concentrated in some specific sectors, in particular fuels and minerals, with no forthcoming sight of engaging into reciprocal FTAs This de facto restrains their ability to promote regional integration through traditional trade agreements If African RECs seek to negotiate trade agreements with emerging players, lessons learnt from the difficult EPA would be useful to some extent They would need to ensure effective ownership, both at national and regional levels, and engage in negotiations with emerging partners also on
24

the basis of their regional integration agenda It is important to mention that South-South FTAs would not have to be subjected to the strict WTO conditions for reciprocal liberalization under GATT Article XXIV, but could benefit from the flexible framework of the Enabling Clause However, African countries that have signed an EPA with the EU would have to bear in mind that any tariff concessions given to emerging economies that are not covered in EPAs might have to be extended to the EU, by virtue of the Most Favored Nation (MFN) clause in the EPA, should this clause not be modified This could potentially affect the prospect and content of future FTAs between African countries and their emerging partners Investment Flows Africa attracts significant foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows from emerging economies While developed countries still remain the largest providers of FDI, China is the leading investor from emerging economies in Africa, with an FDI stock of US$9 332 billion in Africa in 2009 25 Although there is some degree of heterogeneity in FDI flows from emerging economies, in general, investment flows in Africa have largely been shaped by interests in specific sectors and in specific countries A large share of India’s FDI for instance is directed toward Mauritius, mainly in information and communications technology, manufacturing, tourism, and financial services Brazil has essentially focused on energy, mining, infrastructure, and agriculture As seen in Figures 2 and 3, China’s investment is highly concentrated in a few countries, with a strong focus on natural resources and infrastructure-related projects, as well as manufacturing industries Stateowned companies have carried out much of the investments in natural resources and infrastructure
25

Source: http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news10_e/ devel_18mar10_e.htm

MOFCOM, 2009 statistical bulletin of China’s outward Foreign Direct Investment

12

The German Marshall Fund of the United States

Figure 2: China’s FDI stocks in Africa

Source: Information Office of the State Council (2010)

development, while private companies have engaged in manufacturing and services Development Finance

Chinese annual development assistance is targeted to Africa 27 In 2007, this amounted to US$616 million (compared to $462 in 2006) If concession loans were included, Chinese development assistance would have amounted to $1 6 billion in 2007 28 Much of the development assistance is channeled to infrastructure development This is often perceived as highly linked to its commercial interests in natural resources due to the fact that these are concentrated in resource rich countries and to the fact that infrastructure is often “packaged,” with natural resources used as collateral 29 India’s development assistance, though smaller in scale, is similar to that of China Much of it is directed to infrastructure projects and agricultural sectors India also tends to focus on trade-related issues, linked to its own interests in Africa, and often targets mineral rich countries

According to official figures, 45.7 percent of Chinese annual development assistance is targeted to Africa.

Similar to trade and investment, development finance from large emerging economies Figure 3: Composition of China’s FDI in Africa has increased significantly over the past decade, despite its relatively small share compared to OECD DAC countries Here again, the level and type of financing is highly heterogeneous, ranging from concessional/interest-free loans and lines of credits to grants Other common forms of aid include technical assistance, debt cancellation, capacity building, resource support, and scholarships China has become a major provider of capital flows (concessional or not) to developing countries According to the Financial Times, the China Development Bank and the China Export-Import Source: Information Office of the State Council (2010) Bank provided more loans to developing countries in 2009 and 2010 than the World 27 China’s Foreign Aid, Information Office of the State Council of The Bank 26 According to official figures, 45 7 percent of
People’s Republic of China. See Kragelund (2010). For more details, see IMF (2011).
28 26

See Financial Times, “China’s lending hits new heights,” 17 January 2011.

29

Europe, G20, and South-South Trade

13

6
M

Emerging Players Engagement in Africa and Regional Integration
regional communities in Africa, and influence the way development cooperation funds are channeled to and operationalized in the RECs These three points are taken up in turn As evidenced by recent high-level official visits in ECOWAS, SADC, and the EAC, Chinese leaders are increasingly seeking to engage with regional economic communities and financing “regionwide” infrastructure initiatives As recently as June 2011, for example, Chinese leaders from China Council for The Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT), the China-Africa Joint Chamber of Commerce, the Export-Import Bank of China, and the China Development Bank and China-Africa Development Fund (CADFund) are reported to have discussed “fast tracking” the financing of various infrastructure projects in ECOWAS, notably the Trans-West African Highway Network 30 The visit is noteworthy because of its explicitly “regional” outlook; meetings with regional organization officials to discuss funding for regional projects China has also recently nominated its ambassador in Zambia as the Chinese Permanent Representative to COMESA,31 and has promised to develop greater cooperation with SADC 32 During the Second Africa-India Forum Summit 2011, India also reaffirmed its commitment to strengthen its partnership with the AU as well as the RECs 33 Formal SouthSouth cooperation on regional integration is in its infancy, but if the trend is confirmed, it is growing
30

ost of the trade, investment, and development finance flows of emerging players in Africa are channeled at the national level, although some continent-wide forums for diplomatic dialogue have been set up There has been little engagement so far with regional organizations to support regional integration processes Diplomatic forums have however been created: China launched a tri-annual Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), which is largely a diplomatic initiative framed along collective consultation, dialogue, and cooperation with Africa Details of the implementation remain largely at the bilateral level Similarly, the AfricaIndia Forum, launched in 2008, is a platform that considers modalities to strengthen collaboration and cooperation in politics, economic matters, energy, and security Together with African states, the African Union, as well as the chairpersons of the eight RECs recognized by the AU, also participate in discussions, which remain largely political and diplomatic Although it aims to adopt a framework to reinforce regional cooperation in a wide range of fields, so far, most of the support is conducted through bilateral channels with individual African countries Finally, the AfricaSouth America Forum also provides a platform for discussion to strengthen coordination between the member states of the Union of South American Nations and African countries This does not mean, however, that emerging players have no impact on regional integration in Africa Very recently, some of these new players, notably China, have shown some degree of willingness to engage at the regional level This could usefully complement the current trend that has privileged bilateral implementation and continent-wide diplomatic talks Second, massive investment in infrastructure is de facto having an impact on regional integration Third, emerging players might provide a new blueprint for the development of

Joint ECOWAS Delegation, Chinese Officials to Meet On Integration Projects Support, ECOWAS Press Release No.113/2011, 20 June 2011. http://news.ecowas.int/presseshow. php?nb=103&lang=en&annee=2011 COMESA Press Release, 28 June 2011. www.comesa.int/lang-en/ component/content/article/715-chinese-ambassador-presentscredentials

31

32 “China vows closer bonds with SADC,” Gov.cn, 4 June 2011. www. gov.cn/english/2011-06/04/content_1877648.htm 33 See paragraph 27 of the Second Africa-India Forum Summit 2011 Addis Ababa Declaration, www.au.int/en/summit/sites/default/ files/Addis percent20Declar-1.pdf

14

The German Marshall Fund of the United States

The lessons outlined in the first part of the paper, regarding the difficulties of working with and through African RECs in terms of weak capacity, overlapping memberships, and poor national/ regional coordination, could no doubt be shared by the EU with emerging players, if their engagement with RECs is to increase Secondly, the massive financial flows channeled to infrastructure are de facto having an impact in regional integration by enhancing regional infrastructure and connectivity This is perhaps most true of their massive investments and concessional loans in infrastructure, which could go a long way in improving regional infrastructure and promoting regional trade 34 Indeed, poor regional infrastructure has repeatedly been highlighted as a major impediment to regional integration The same goes for India’s investment in services and information and communication technology, which could also have repercussions on regional trade by reducing the costs of doing business Maximising the impact of these new investments in infrastructure depends on how they are coordinated at the national and regional level and how these are aligned with RECs’ own regional strategies The recent visits of Chinese leaders to African RECs are, in this respect, a positive sign, although it has to be stressed that even infrastructure investment at the national level could and should often be conceived in a region-wide infrastructure strategy if its impact on regional integration is to be maximised Thirdly, and especially true of China, the rise of emerging players in Africa is accompanied by a shift in the conceptions and notions of how development cooperation works and how it ought to work, as well as of how growth and development is achieved and sustained They are therefore indirectly impacting the development
34

model around which African regional integration is designed, but also the way development cooperation is channeled to Africa 35 Although the European Union remains the prime “model” in the field of the “institutional engineering” of regional integration, the RECs are increasingly looking East for new ideas and models to emulate 36 Brazil also offers a new development model to increase agriculture production and innovation in Africa, which is likely to gain prominence in the context of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP)37 and its regional dimension Different modalities on aid delivery, and especially infrastructure, are also having different impacts on regional integration, and on the development agenda in general 38 This should be seen as an opportunity for Africa to draw from each partner’s comparative advantage and to strengthen ownership of its development and integration agenda

Maximising the impact of new investments in infrastructure depends on how they are coordinated at the national and regional level.

35 36

See Bilal and Rampa (2011).

See “ECOWAS to emulate Chinese development model,” ECOWAS Press Release No.105/2011, 21 June 2011. http://news.ecowas. int/presseshow.php?nb=105&lang=en&annee=2011
37

Recent examples include the Africa-Brazil Innovation Marketplace, www.africa-brazil.org See Jacobs, (2011) and Bilal and Rampa (2011).

38

See Shiere and Rugamba (2011).

Europe, G20, and South-South Trade

15

7
T

Conclusions: How to Build on European Experiences – The Case for Mutual Learning
to be learnt from the EU’s success, it is clear that regional integration in Africa will follow its own pace, driven by specific economic and political interests endogenous to the regions concerned While many in Africa are quite severe and critical about the EU’s role and effectiveness, it is important for Africa to also engage with the new comers and ensure that the emerging economies, as well as any future initiative by new global decision-making bodies such as the G20, significantly contribute to the regional integration agenda of the continent So far, relationships with new global players such as China have been largely bilateral, with sporadic political and diplomatic talks at the continental level that have not translated yet into sustained support to the African regional agenda African regional integration would certainly benefit from a structured dialogue and coherent strategic engagements on regional integration issues with all partners African regional institutions should be supported in their efforts to develop regional engagement strategies designed to ensure that all international partnerships and cooperation are promoted on the basis of, and can contribute to, African objectives and endogenous plans Learning from the experience of Africa-EU relations, and in particular European approaches to regional integration in Africa, would be a solid first step in this direction, so that future international engagements and initiatives are not perceived as externally driven and led but are rooted in the political, economic, and institutional realities of African countries A stronger engagement at the regional level from African partners should not be done at the detriment of bilateral or multilateral agenda for development Regional support is no substitute for national, continental, or global action But the regional dimension has often been the weak, if not

he European Commission has been keen to share its experiences in regional integration The EU also has an ambitious agenda on regional integration, encompassing trade policies (with the negotiation of comprehensive FTAs with regional groupings), development instruments, and political partnerships and strategies The EU’s approach and experience thus provides a wealth of information and lessons for other international partners willing to support regional integration processes by developing countries There are insights from both the successes and weaknesses of the European approach Indeed, EU efforts to foster, support, and push for regional integration on the African continent has not always been successful, and also led to mixed results The trade policy part of this commitment has often generated tensions and frustrations in Africa, as shown by the current deadlock in the EPA negotiations and the possible implications that this state of affairs could have on the regional integration agenda in Africa Though European development support for regional integration has been welcome in Africa, questions remain as to how effective it has been Coordination and complementarity among European and other donors has often been insufficient, the articulation between national and regional initiatives too loose, and the coherence across sectors, between aid categories and among types of financial flows (loans, grants, FDI) often lacking Besides, excessive donors’ dependence, capacity constraints, institutional weaknesses, and insufficient political leadership at the regional level have hampered many regional integration processes in Africa As to whether the EU’s model of integration has served African regional integration, experience has shown that the wide disparity in incentives, levels of commitments, or the specificities of the African continent has made it difficult to mimic the EU model While there are certainly interesting lessons

16

The German Marshall Fund of the United States

missing link, to international cooperation with Africa Building on the Seoul Development Consensus for Shared Growth of November 2010, which called for priority actions to support regional integration,39 the G20 should provide the strategic momentum for a greater international push to support regional integration initiatives and for more concerted efforts among major partners of Africa, both traditional and emerging players, in line with African regional objectives and leadership In this context, sharing of experiences and insights on regional integration support would be a key first component where the G20 could play a catalytic role The EU could provide such impetus to do so, and could gain valuable insights itself to adjust its dedicated approach to support regional integration in Africa

39 www.g20.org/Documents2010/11/seoulsummit_annexes.pdf On global or regional systemic issues, the G20 has notably adopted the following principle: “Prioritize actions that tackle global or regional systemic issues such as regional integration where the G20 can help to catalyze action by drawing attention to key challenges and calling on international institutions, such as MDBs, to respond. Focus on systemic issues where there is a need for collective and coordinated action, including through South-South and triangular cooperation, to create synergies for maximum development impact.”

Europe, G20, and South-South Trade

17

8

References

Balassa, B (1961), “Toward a Theory of Economic Integration,” Kyklos, 14 (1), 1–17 Bilal, S (2005), “Can The EU be a Model of Regional Integration? Risks and Challenges for Developing Countries,” Paper presented at the CODESRIA - Globalisation Studies Network (GSN) Second International Conference on “Globalisation: Overcoming Exclusion, Strengthening Inclusion,” Dakar, Senegal, 29-31 August 2005 www ecdpm org/bilal Bilal S (2007) Is the EU a Model of Regional Integration? Risks and Challenges ECDPM www ecdpm org/bilal Bilal, S (2010), “Regional Integration, EPAs and the Trade & Development Agenda: Africa-EU relations reconsidered,” in EARN, Beyond Development Aid: EU-Africa Political Dialogue on Global Issues of Common Concern, Lisbon: European Africa Policy Research Network www ecdpm org/ Web_ECDPM/Web/Content/Download nsf/0/3 58F5704237DD73FC12577D800277D3F/$FILE/ Beyond percent20Development percent20Aid percent20Final pdf Bilal, S and C Braun-Munzinger (2010), “EPA Negotiations and Regional Integration in Africa: Building or Stumbling Blocks?” Trapca, Trade Policy Review, Volume 3, 82 – 107 www ecdpm org/bilal Bilal, S and F Rampa (2011), “Emerging economies in Africa and the development effectiveness debate ” ECDPM Discussion Paper 107 www ecdpm org/dp107 Bossuyt, Jean and Andrew Sherriff (2010), “What next for the Joint Africa-EU Strategy? Perspectives on revitalising an innovative framework - A Scoping Paper” ECDPM Discussion Paper 94, Maastricht: European Centre for Development Policy Management www ecdpm org/dp94

Draper, P (2011), “Rethinking the (European) Foundations of Sub-Saharan African Regional Economic Integration,” Trade Negotiations Insights, vol 10, no 4, June www acp-eu-trade org/tni Draper, P (2010) “Rethinking the (European) Foundations of African Economic Integration: A Political Economy Essay,” OECD Development Centre Working Paper, 293 EARN (2010), Beyond Development Aid: EUAfrica Political Dialogue on Global Issues of Common Concern, Lisbon: European Africa Policy Research Network www ecdpm org/ Web_ECDPM/Web/Content/Download nsf/0/3 58F5704237DD73FC12577D800277D3F/$FILE/ Beyond percent20Development percent20Aid percent20Final pdf European Commission (2008), Communication on Regional Integration for Development in ACP countries, COM(2008) 604 final/2, 6 October 2008, http://ec europa eu/development/icenter/ repository/Communication_on_Regional_ Integration_COM-2008-604_en pdf European Commission (2002), Trade and Development: Assisting Developing Countries to Benefit from Trade, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, COM(2002) 513 final, 18 September European Commission (1995), European Community Support for Regional Economic Integration Efforts among Developing Countries, Communication from the Commission, COM (95) 219, http://europa eu int/comm/development/ body/legislation/recueil/en/en13/en131 htm European Court of Auditors (2009), Effectiveness of EDF support for Regional Economic Integration in East Africa and West Africa, Special Report No 18/2009 http://eca europa eu/portal/pls/portal/ docs/1/3664622 PDF

18

The German Marshall Fund of the United States

Farrell, M (2009) “EU policy toward other regions: policy learning in the external promotion of regional integration,” Journal of European Public Policy, 16: 8, 1165 -1184 Farrel, M (2007), “From EU Model to External Policy? Promoting Regional Integration in the Rest of the World,” in Meunier, S and K McNamara eds , The State of the European Union, vol 8, Oxford University Press Jacobs, Berts (2011) “European programs and Chinese projects: a modality clash on sustainable infrastructure development in Africa,” paper presented at the 4th European Conference on African Studies, Uppsala IMF (2011), “New Growth Drivers for Low-Income Countries: The role of BRICs,” mimeo http://www imf org/external/np/pp/eng/2011/011211 pdf Kragelund P (2010), “The potential role of nontraditional donors’ aid in Africa,” ICTSD Issue Paper No 12, Geneva: International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development http://ictsd org/downloads/2011/03/the-potential-role-of-nontraditional-donorse28099-aid-in-africa pdf Mackie, J , S Bilal, I Ramdoo, H Hohmeister, and T Luckho (2010): Joining Up Africa: Support to Regional Integration ECDPM Discussion Paper 99 www ecdpm org/dp99 Murray, P (2009), “Model Europe? Reflections on the EU as a model of regional integration,” in Della Posta, P , M Uvalic and A Verdun eds , Globalization, Development and Integration, Basingstoke, Palgrave, pp 273-286 Murray, P (2008), “Regional Power Europe? The place of the EU in comparative regional integration Analysis,” in Kösler, A and M Zimmek eds , Elements of Regional Integration: A Multidimensional Approach, Baden-Baden,

NOMOS, Schriften des Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung, pp 57-71 OECD (2011), African Economic Outlook 2011: Africa and its emerging partners, OECD, African Development Bank, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), United Nations Programme Development http://www africaneconomicoutlook org/en/ Schiere, R and A Rugamba (2011) “Chinese Infrastructure Investments and African Integration,” African Development Bank Group Working Paper no.127, Tunis http://www afdb org/ fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/ WPS percent20No percent20127 percent20Chinese percent20Infrastructure percent20Investments percent20 pdf UNECA (2008), Assessing Regional Integration in Africa 2008: Toward Monetary and Financial Integration in Africa, Addis Ababa: United Nations Economic Commission for Africa www uneca org/ aria UNECA (2006), Assessing Regional Integration in Africa II: Rationalizing Regional Economic Communities, Addis Ababa: United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and African Union www uneca org/aria

Europe, G20, and South-South Trade

19

Annexes

Annex 1 Support to African Regional Organizations through the 10th EDF Central Africa, Eastern Africa and Indian Ocean (ESA-IO), West Africa, and Southern Africa receive funds from the 10th EDF with the overall objectives to reduce poverty, promote economic growth, and favor peace and security In the Central Africa Region, €165 million has been committed, of which €15 million allocated to CEPGL (Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries) The three areas of intervention include trade and economic integration and EPA accompanying measures (€97 million), management of renewable natural resources (€30 million), and political integration (€15 million) In the ESA-IO Region, €645 million has been committed, of which 85 percent are attributed to deepening regional economic integration through the implementation of the customs union and EPA and regional sector policies such as trade related infrastructure and food security; 10 percent to furthering political integration/ cooperation

agenda, through measures to assist the region to deal with conflict prevention and to promote good governance; and 5 percent to other programs that are related to the strategies of the ROs, including capacity building, support to the IRCC and involvement of nonstate actors In West Africa, €597 million has been committed to assist the region in deepening regional integration and improving competitiveness and EPAs; improving good governance and regional stability and other programs such as environment and support to nonstate actors Finally, in Southern Africa, €116 million has been committed, of which 80 percent for regional economic integration to support SADC economic integration and trade policies, including investment promotion, regional infrastructure, and food security; 15 percent for regional political cooperation, to support capacity building in the context of regional governance and implementation of JAES in the area of peace and security; and 5 percent for nonfocal areas

20

The German Marshall Fund of the United States

Annex 2 Top 10 Africa’s Exports to Key Trading Partners Top 10 export products to EU, US$million   Mineral fuels, oils, distillation products, etc Pearls, precious stones, metals, coins, etc Electrical, electronic equipment Cocoa and cocoa preparations Articles of apparel, accessories, not knit or crochet Ores, slag, and ash Machinery, nuclear reactors, boilers, etc Iron and steel Edible fruit, nuts, peel of citrus fruit, melons Vehicles other than railway, tramway Articles of apparel, accessories, knit or crochet All products 2007 8 91 4 99 2 93 5 66 3 38 3 97 3 60 2 18 2 30 3 06 2008 8 37 5 51 3 63 5 92 3 98 4 40 4 20 2 47 2 33 2 82 2009 81 20 5 01 4 61 5 91 4 95 2 51 2 55 1 64 2 37 1 87 2 57 87 99 133 71

158 89 211 38 139 91 Top 10 Africa’s exports to China, US$million

  Mineral fuels, oils, etc Ores, slag, and ash Copper etc Wood and art wood, wood charcoal Iron and steel Other base metals Oil seed, oleagic fruits, etc Inorganic chemicals, precious metal compound Cotton Pearls, precious stones, metals All products

2007 39 70 5 30 0 90 0 91 0 61 0 36 0 11 0 03 0 21 0 33 49 90

2008 28 90 5 52 1 00 0 78 0 99 0 25 0 31 0 13 0 23 0 34 40 10

2009 41 30 8 50 2 97 1 13 0 99 0 55 0 38 0 37 0 32 0 32 59 12

Europe, G20, and South-South Trade

21

Top 10 Africa’s exports to India, US$million   Mineral fuels, oils etc Inorganic chemicals, precious metal compound Edible fruit, nuts, peel of citrus fruit Iron and steel Salt, sulphur, earth, stone, lime, and cement Ores, slag, and ash Wood and art of wood, wood charcoal Fertilizers Pearls, precious stones, metals, etc Edible vegetables and roots and tubers All products 2007 10 30 0 94 0 24 0 25 0 13 0 12 0 15 0 07 0 13 0 08 13 29 Top 10 Africa’s exports to Brazil, US$million   Mineral fuels, oils etc Fertilizers Salt, sulphur, earth, stone, lime and cement etc Iron and steel Machinery, boilers, etc Inorganic chemicals, precious metal compound etc Organic chemicals Aluminum etc Cocoa and cocoa prep Electrical, electronic equip All products
Source: ITC TradeMap

2008 13 87 2 52 0 48 0 47 0 28 0 52 0 17 0 26 0 18 0 07 19 82

2009 12 74 1 19 0 44 0 30 0 29 0 21 0 19 0 15 0 13 0 12 16 62

2007 12 00 0 70 0 20 0 20 0 10 0 30 0 10 0 02 0 08 0 01 14 10

2008 6 60 0 30 0 08 0 05 0 10 0 07 0 06 0 01 0 09 0 01 7 70

2009 9 60 0 60 0 10 0 10 0 10 0 01 0 09 0 08 0 05 0 05 11 30

22

The German Marshall Fund of the United States

Annex 3 Top Recipients of Chinese Investment Rank 1 2 3 4 5 Top recipients of Chinese FDI, 2003-2009, ($Millions) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 South South Africa Nigeria (24) Sudan (147) Sudan (91) Algeria (99) Africa (454) (4,808) Mauritius Zambia Nigeria Zambia Nigeria (46) Algeria (85) (10) (87) (390) (214) South Africa South Africa Algeria Nigeria (53) Nigeria (68) Nigeria (163) (9) (18) (146) South Africa Zambia Madagascar Zambia (6) Guinea (14) Sudan (51) (47) (119) (61) South Mali (5) Benin (14) Guinea Niger (111) Algeria (42) Africa (41) 2003 2009 Algeria (229) Congo DR (227) Nigeria (172) Egypt (134) Zambia (112)

Major Chinese Investment Activity in Africa, August 2010 – February 2011

Source: Beijing Axis, 2011

Europe, G20, and South-South Trade

23

Offices
Washington • Berlin • Paris • Brussels Belgrade • Ankara • Bucharest • Warsaw

www.gmfus.org

Sign up to vote on this title
UsefulNot useful