TO: unclassified



TO: Approved for public release, distribution unlimited

FROM: Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agencies and their contractors; Administrative/Operational Use; 13 AUG 1966. Other requests shall be referred to Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development [Army], Washington, DC 20310.

31 Aug 1978, Group-4, DoDD 5200.10, per document marking; AGO ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980


The classified or limited status of this repoit applies to each page, unless otherwise marked. Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.


NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a definitely refated government procurement operation, the U. S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever;, and

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may in any way be related thereto.




-n /





erational Reotfor Quarterly Period Eniing 31 July 179.




Ydi~ ihvs~ t'-1 i

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development

Department of the Army
Washington, DO 20310


Significant Unit Activities: j S he Brigade was involved in combat

operations Curing the entire reporting period. Training was conducted concurrently with combat operations during periods wh3n uaits were reof operations. The Brigade conitting 4nd preparing for new phases and administrative moves during the reporting period,
cted three .elements of the Srigade were involved in these moves for a total of

twenty-two days.


each of the Brigades operations is given below.
i~~~. Operatioi, ,VUSIM VI

A, Combat Opera iqns: A summary of the concept and execution of




a. Dates:

I May - 18 May 1966.

, ; b. Mission: Conduct search and destroy operations hear the ; Cambodian Border and astride the II and III Corps boundary in QUAUG LUO and PHUOC LO.IG rovinces to locate and destroy enemy forces and facilities k ' V %A O r. prior to the beginning of the southwest monsoons.
c. Location: QUM'G DUO and PHUOC LONG Provinces.

"4 4
.n o

d. Forces Involved: 327th (1) US: Battalion, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division minus 2d " Infantry. (2) Other: 265th RF Company, elements of 31st Ranger Battalion (ARV), elements of 45th Infantry Regiment (ARV;), CIDG units and RF Scout Company....



1", s . 0A


e. Concept and Execution: SLbwInclosire 1, Gombat ,Olrations After Action Report, Operation AU ITN. 2. Operation COOPSM: (Suspended) The Brigade moved to CVEO 2EO to conduct Operation CcOPER co.mencing 20 May 1966. The operation was suspended and the Brigade assumed the mission as I FFOICIEV reserve. The 2d Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry moved to PLEIKU to back up US Forces engaged west and southwest of Pleiku. 3. Operation HA4TORNE: ...... a. Dates: V V
' ''
. s";-,


, .,,,,I ,;YA


-" ' O C

2 June - 20 June 1966.




-- -FOIZ 0r K0

/..--/z 43*-4.'--.67.




13 August 2.966

Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966

b. iission: Conduct search and destroy operations in the vicinity of DA', TO, TOU 1,101'1, and TAN CH. and assist in the withdrawal of the TU AORONG Regional Force cutpost. c. Location: KONTN Province.

d. Forces involved!
(1) US: Ist Brigade, 101st Airborne Division minus 2d Battalion (Lirborne), 327th Infantry; and 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry, ist Cavalry Division (Airo6bil). (2) Other: 1/42d Infantry iegiment (ARV,), 21st Rangei Battalion (AIRT),. nine CIDG Companies, and one RF company. "e. Concept and rzcution: */Soe Inclaure 2, tombaVOperatons After Action Report, Operation HATOINE

a. Dates: 24 June.:- 15 July 1966.. "

b. Mission: Conduct surveillance of the LAOTiAN/C AM'ODIA/V .orders, block and aabush VC/N"7A infiltration routes, and fix and destroy enemy in zone. c. 'Location: KONWf Province.

d. Forces Involved: (1) US: ist Brigade, 101st Airborne Division minus 2d Batthlion ('Airborne) 327th Infantryr. (2) Ot-her: DAK PEK. e. Concept and Executi6u.' See Inclosul-e 3, Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation BEAU ,EQ.; ,D (1Ac-L. BAIT). 5. Operation JOHN P.UL JOUN'S (Phase I): a. Dates: 21 July - 31 July 1966. GIDG Companies from D TO, MANG EUK and

b. 'Mission: Seize and hold the vital terrain mnd installations in the VU1NG RO Pass (to include LST sites, railroad tunnel, and bridges) along Highway 1 north from VUNG RO Bay to the 2d Korean Marine Brigade area of operation and provide protection for Engineer I-Drk parties in the bay area along the line of oomunidat .ons in the arda of operation. a. Location: PHU YEN Province.

d. Forces Involved: (1) US: Regiment (AR(VN1). lst Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. 2d Korean Marine Brigade, 47th Infantry .' "/

(2) Other:

2d e. Concept and Executiont On 23 July, the" Battalion (Airborne), 502d Infantry conducted an airmobile assault into tha southern

o ;



oration!2 aeport for -. .y OpeatinalAeprt orQuarterly Period
(RCS: CSFO-65)


3lrtu luj,1


portion of the area of operation and seized and dcfended the critical terrain, LST sites, railroad tunnel, and HighwWr 1. Also on 23 July, the ist Battalion (Airbo;-ne), ''th Infantry passed through the 2d ROX Brigade and conducted a ground assault and seized objectives in the northern portion of the area of operation. Both battalions continued to defend the cri.tical terrain and conducted saturation patrolling until 30 July when they were relieved by the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry.

The detailed Combat Operations After Action Report for Operation JOHN PIUL JONES will be submitted with tha next Quarterly Operational Report. 6. The 2d B:.,'Lalion (Airborne), 327th Infautry was detached from the Brigade on operations in the TUY HOA area during most of the reportingperiod. At the beginning of the reporting poriod through 19 June 1966 the 2d B,-ttalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry continued on Operation IMAICRE under the operational control of I Field Force Vietnam. Between 19 June a. d a. July 1966, the 2d Battaion (Airborne), 327th Infantry' came under Lno operational control of the L$t Cavalry Division during Operation NATHAIN HLE. From 2 Jul'; through 11 July 1966, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry was under the oporational control of the Ist Cavalry Division on Operation HEI.Y C0" On !5 July 1966 the Y. 2d Battalion (Airbo'r=O 327th Infantry returned to ths operation control of the Brigade and began preparation for Operation JOHN PAUL JONES. Be Training: Most of 'fe time covered '*y this reporLing period was spent in theconduct of Tactical bperations. However, dturing periods of refitting and prypdratibnfeo nea'.phascs, of operations,. units concentrated training cffbits in those areas which covld be improved on as noted daring previous operations. In addition to the emphasis placed on siall unit tactics, the following training was organized at Brigade level: 1. All now incoming personnel, officers and e:aisted s-en, were processed throrgh 'a replaceuzn detachment at ?HLN RAPG, the Brigade Rear area and Base Camp. Rere they received 6 days of rigorous training in small unit tactics, weapons indoctrination, survival, land navigation, patrolling and physical conditioning. In addition to conbat conditioning individuals and instructing them in "lessons learned" for the individual soldier and small unit, the training served to acclimate personnel to the hot, humid climate of Vietnam. 2. In each area of operation, ranues were quickly established in the Brigade forward base to accommodate firing of small arms, machine guns, grenade launchers and mortars. The ranges were scheduled for use by.the units of the Brigade to allow for the maximu. use of the ranges daring periods when units wore refitting and preparing for new operations. h 3. Helicopter rappelling training was establihcd to increase the proficiency of personnel in the techniques'of rappelling into dense jungle terrain whichdoes not have accessable landing zones. This training was particularly concentrated toward training brigade and battalions reconnaissance elements and Engineer Landig Zohe clearing teams.

4. Driver training was conducted for all units to train driver's
in aircrnft loading techniques f or vehicles. The training was aimed at making drivers more ,proficient in driving vehicles on and off aircraft, in order to provide for smoother loading operations during c.r movements. 5. Flamethrowor teamis from'each Infantry Battalion received proficiency training in the use of the portable flamethrower. The object of the training was to train personnel who could be placed in an "on call" status to be'prepred -to provide flamethrower support to the front line units as requirtd.. As the need for flamethrowers becomes apparent,

the teas can be flown inby helicopter with chareed flambthrowers to





Operational Report for Quarterly Period Endiig 31 July 1966

0CV 7


1o33 Auegst


support a particular requirement. 6.. in June 1-966, the Brigad received forty Winchester, '1oel 70 rifles to be used as snipe: weapons. A,program was established to train selected peisonnel of the Brif~ade in the se of the ieapon and sniper techniques.

7. Training was also c6,nducted for radio telephone operators in ra6io-telghone security and procedures and the vse of the SM.
rom the Arillery in artillery 8. Ifa try perso nel raceived trainin adjustment procedures and techniques, The purpose of the training was to refresh and train officers and non ouossioned officers. 9. By coordination between the Brigade and Special Forces Advisors, a mobile training team was established by the 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery to train CID0 units. Training was provided in urvey, ire direction, service 6f the weap'oi amimniti6n hanuling and observe9 procedures. .2'. A squad leaders coibat reaction course has been esta-lished in the PAN Rh*OG Base Qamip area. The course is one deek in duration and has been established to instruct small unit leacers in the latest combat techniques. C. oves: Tactical and Adninistrative M

1. Numerous tactical and 'ad mnistrat.ve moves were made during the reporting period. Tactical moves wn::'e maeo by both motor vehicle and helicopter. The majority of the adminictrative movement was mad.e by C-130 n reraft. Listed ;elow is a brief description of each'of the administrative moves conducted: a. ,Between 19 and 27 May', the Briade de loyed from 9701 CO to '::"O REO by203 sorties of 0-130 Aircraft. b. Between 29 Nay and 3 June 1966, the Brigade (.-) deplo7ed from O to;DAK TO. A total of'201 srties w6re utilized. On 2 June, the 2d CHEO 3attalion, 502d Infantry displacdd "from PLEK1 io DAW TO by 'CV-2 aircraft and vehicular conoy. c. Between 15 July and .21 Jilly, the Brigade eeployed bo 0-130 aircraft from DAK TO o WY H'A. A total of 182 'sorties were utilized. 2. The maJr problems encountered on the administrative moves were

as 'i~ol&:
'a. . The 'Army was not give, sufficient information regarding -Air orce capabilities to support'adr movement operations. b., 1'Co nniic-ations difficulti es were encountered by the inability, ofthe ArnY and'Air Force Ipersonnel to cormunicate between the departure and arrival air fields. c. There were ihsufficient spare parts and repair facilities -, ,. ya lab-le at the departure 'and arrival airfields to enable minor aircraft repairs. , , d. The USAF mission corgahders faried' diily d urinr particular rnovementa and they woke not, at all tiAas familiar with the aircraft capabilities. D. Operational Areas: See Inclosure V (Opra'ions overlays).








AVBD-Ci'13 August 1966 Operational ieport for Quarter!y Priod Ending 31 July 1966

(R S:


E. Intelligence: 1. Follcwin, is a Ttst of losses inflicted on the en.Lv during the reporting period: PERSO!EL VC KIA (.C) AUSTIN. 17. HAT1C^2VE 102 479 BEAUR'GA'D 18 TOTAL 598

VC KIA (Est) VC KBo(.3c)
VC KBA (Est)


506 52


6O9 57

VC WZA (Est)










Raliers WEAPONS Individual Crew Served

3? 6

88 24

9 0

129 30

2. Intelligence Problem Areas: a. Monitoring of radio and telephone lines uncovered a number of com-nications violations. Corrmand emphasi s has been given to potential problem areas. b.- Ground. fog nd cloud cover had a detrimental effect on the accomplishment of many of the visual reconnaissance, red haze and photo missions. Increased pa :rollinf ha(- to be conducted during this per.iod to obtain the necessary intelligence information. c. In areas where ihe local population was exclusively Montagnard, interpreters were- found to be lackin, in proficiency of the numeroue dialects. Support from the XAMVN and National Police helped overcome th-.s difficulty. d. The S-2 Air has been provided an additional radio to enable direct communications with all visual reconnaissance aircraft. This will facilitate immediate initiation of response to intelligence requirements as

they arise.
F. Personnel: 1. Unit Strength:


a. The Brigade persarnnel strengths at the conclusion of tho period were as follows: Authorized 4,490

Assigned Present for Duty -Not Present for Duty
Base Camp


1,45 .

Tuy Hoa


b. The assigned strength is 122 percent of the authori ,cd strenc'th. The present for duty strength was 101 perdent of the authorized strength. ". personhel. Ofthe noo preseh 'or duty strength, 240 were hospitalized





13 August 1966

Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966



d. The assigned strength figures are extremely inflated. This inflation is also reflected in the not present gor duty figures for the following reasons;. (1) A lar(e number of hospitalized personnel have been transferred to offshore hospitals, (JS, and even discharF:od from the US Aruv withoutnotifidation to the losing unit. (2) The present strength accountaolity system requires assigning personnel (EDCSA) to units prior to their physically joining the unit rather than administratively ca'r:.ing the:n in the pipeline. notificatib (3) EDOSA personnel have been diverted without the subsequent to the losing'unit.

2. Casualties: a. Casualties for the period (1 May - 31 July 1966) were as follows: K':A WIA [[A 157 790 0

b. Total casualtics to date are as follows: KIA WIA MIA 268 1,412 2 The following progras were initiated du'ring

3. Personnel Programs: the reporting period.

a. Officer -darrior of the Week: This program was instituted in order to provide recognition to a lieutenant of one of the combat arms for outstanding le-dership on the battlefield. The "Warrior of the h-ek" spends a twenty-four hour period in the Drigade Command Post as a personal guest of the Comnanding'Genoral. He dines in the General's mess, is billeted in a tent coiplete with bed, shets and mattress, and accompanies the Coriandinr Gcnpral on A daily bulletin notice is trips made co.-ring the twenty-four hotir period. published recogAiz.ing the "Warrior of the Week" and his unit. Also, a letter is wiitten'to the individual's next of kin notifying them of his selection. A similar program has boon initiated for an Enlisted -'arrior of the 4eek. b. Utilization of in-country R&R facilities, During Operation H4dT:RO'ME, seven personnel a day were given the opportunity to utilize the facilities of the 14CV conipound in PLEIKU. Twenty-five men per day were flown to KOI.TMr for an eight hour visit. Currently, fourteen mIen a day are using the facilities offered by the USS Saint Paul, a Navy cruiser which provides naval gunfire support for the Brigade. c. Strong coanmand emphasis was placed on the Brigade Savinr/s Bond program. An immediate goal of 90 percent was reached and an ultimate goal of 100 percent participation is expected.
, d. 'A long range athletic program for the P;'A:' PJG Base Lrea has . been developed. This includes planning for baseball diamonds, football fields, volley ball courts, miniature golf courses, hand ball courts, basketball courts, and horseshoe pits. A new Special Services beach is already in operation.









13 tur:ust 1966


Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966 OSFOR-65)

4. Personnel Planning: The following items vxre planned durin-, the
a. A table of distribution has been organized for the Base Camp at PHP1 ?RZOG whish will insure a nuch more effective utilization and efficient operation o current and proposed facilit es. The reorganizatioa will allow an addition of approximatl:, 250 men to the foxhole strength of the Brigade. b. A Bicigade cooks school has boon established to relieve the critical shortage of cooks in the Britg:ade. Classes are conducted in the base camp area for a pcriod of three weeks and each class has an attondence of twenty personnel. c. Coordination was made with US!,IV to explore the possibility of spreading a planned rotation of 1,200 personnel in December fron 15 November to 30 December. It was further requested that replacements and DEROS personnel be flown directly to NI.Q1 PRA',G or CA!M RANH BAY for the CONS. .

5. Problem 'reas: Administrat'No problem areas encountered 6uring the reporting period included the following:
a. Receipt of orders on personnel evacuated throuoh medical channels are seldom received promptly and many times are not received at all. Close coordinhUon has been m-6e with USARV and the evacuation hospitals. Purging of morning reports for intransit personnel and coordination with the 90th Replacement Battalion has been initiated to drop from the rolls assigned EDCSA personnel who were sub;uquently assig ned elsewhere in the theaber or never arrived. b. A rotational hump axis-ed of approximately forty-five percant of BAigade personnel during the months of June and July. USA XV was appraised of the problem an the rotation was programed from 15 May throu:h. 31. July. c. Shortages of critical MOSts in the areas of cooks, mechanics, medical specialists) A.remen, legal clerks, and surgeons exists. A report was subriitted to USAW on 14 Juno i966 listing critical MOS shortaw.es, and liaison visits have been mide to the USARV G-1 and AG. d. The supply of Bronze Star, ARCO71 and Air Medal certificates has been depleted. This shorta.e is theater wide. 6. Morale: Morale remained "Excello;t" throuphout the period. 0. Logistics: 1. Materiel and Srvices:

a. Supply:
(1) Class I: During the period an adequate supply of "B" rations was received and "A" ration meats were issued in sufficient quantities to supplement most "B" ration meals. However, fresh. fruits, vegetables and bread wore extre mely limited. The following are the Brigade consumption rates of, Class ,I s'%pplies. for the entire reporting.period:

June . July

"6.0 8/T 160.0 SI


-- 7-


C, 04.e j J


13 August 1266

Operational Re ort for Quarterly Period Ending 3. July 1966

(Rcs: cSFru-65)


(2) Class II and IV: The Brigade Support Battalion (Rear) at PHAN 1NO provided the primary source of clothing and TOE equipnent on a call-forvard basis uti izing direct support CV-2 aircraft and on a mission 'asis
aircraft. FSA was the prim~ary sonrce oT barrier materials and dry'call batteries. The followinF, r osmto rates of Class I Vies o h

reporting period:
June 9d.5 S/T

July 30.0 S/T (3) Class III: POL was transported into the operational area by 0-130 and CV-2 aircraft and by surface transportation. torage and distribution of POL was effectcd by utilizing 1,200 gallon tankers, 500 gallon collapsible -itms and I0,O0 gallon ground storage bladders. The following are the POL consumption ratis for the reporting perioe: Ma y

158.5 S/T
289.5 S/T


261.8 9/T

(4) Class V: The Brigade maintained its basic load of ammunition throughout the reporting period.
(a) The following items remained in short supply during the reporting period; hand-held flares, vhite star clusters, green star clusters, white star parachute flares. (b) Brigade ammunition consumption rates for the period: 34.2 SIT June 226.3 S/T July 190.0 S/T t b. Maintenance, The Brikgado initiated daily 'eqlip~mnt stablest? and continued its normal mointenance program. Repair parts shortages existed for e:enerators, vehi.cles ane field ranges, however, the Brigade was capable of performing its mission. The following are the number of jobs received and completed by the Naintenance Company, Support BattaliondurinI the period: Jobs 1,eceived Automotive ,Jobs _^cmpleted 4


Signal En, ineer Instrument Quartermaster

347 547 1,358 291 189 205

275 511 11252 278 168 167


(1) Supplies and euipment were transp.orted to the forward area by C-130 and CV-2 aircraft. During Operations !'TC<RNE and BERF-D 1 somc supplics were transported by land 1ine of corimsanication from PLSIKU. (2) Vehicular transport remains the primary means of transport from USASC, CAM 1W BAY to the Base Camp at PHAN PA'O. Vehicle tranport in the forward areas has been extremely limited due to road condi.tions and enemy activity. However, 595 short haul, 21 ton truck requirements were filled during the reporting period.


AVBD-O SUDBJECT: o /pr 713 August 1966 Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966

(R S: CSF0"5-65)

(3) Air transport was used extensively by the Brigade for movement t<, operational areas 'nd for transporta"ti . of personnel, supplies and equipment to .an from the foi, .ard areas. Some pro, ..cs and delays encountered during the airlift operations could have been prevented had joint Arqy - Air Force planning conferences *been held. Iari.n, the period 518 sortis were flown in support of the Brigade. In addition to USAF support the follwing data represents sorties flown and porsonnel and equipment transported by direct support CV-2 aircraft: May June JulV

73 72

434. S/T of Cargo 73 !/T of Cargo 92 SIT of Carpo

5,O75 Passengers 1,215 Passengers 1,028 Passengers

(4) Throughout the reporting period both Ur-lD and OH-47 helicopters proved extremely effective for aeri,1 rosupply operations. Twro Infantry UH-10 helicopters were placed in direct support of eachwere used Batt.ion for primarily to tactical and logisti al operations. Ci-7 helicopters resupply artillery units. The total tonnape by type of ,supply lifted during the reporting period is as follows:
Cl I Ci V I-later and Misc

June July

.47.70 10.4 5

302.81, 66.88

41.60 5.20

d. Water: Two 600 GPH, water purification units provided water to the Brigade initially. -A 1,500 GPP water purifica.tion unit was added during the quarter providiA continuous, trouble-free water supply for the Brigade. e. Laundry: Initally laundry was a proble-a because a laundry. unit was not taken to the "]I01T CO area during Operation A. S ,TI VI. It was believed that the laundry at PHAT A G could provide adequate servide to the fighting units. This arrangement proved unsatisfactory duo to leatth of processing, lost items, and bad weather vhich prevented aircraft flights to and from the objective area. f. Bath: Bath service was provided to the Brigade by the 148th Quartermaster Company. 2. Medical: a. The sanitation of mess ha.Is, latrine:: and unit areas required comeand emphasis to achieve minimum acceptable standarcs during the first two months of the reporting-period. Hovever, health and hygiene remaine6 excellent considering the operational envirnment. A marked improvement, was noted during

b. Daring .OperationH&THORNE, the Briqade experienced seric -s difficulty in etracting wounded personnel from, montainous and densly cowvred terrain. The two medical evacuation helicopters available to the Brigade proved unsatisfactory aince they were not equipped with a hoist capibility. 'Po ,jir Force CH-43 and Marine CH-46 helicopters weo'o requested to assist in i trncting wounded personel fr6m the battlefield. These helicopters provided iivaluable , service to the Brigade during Operation HAWTHORNE. c. The followlng statistical'data on-significant diseases were the reporting period: ccmpiled ddrihr



. "'



i1 August"1966


Operational Renort for Quzterly Period Ending 31 July 1966

(RcSr CSFCR-65)

Scrub Typhus

June 33




Gastroenteritis 16 O Hepatitis

N-P Problems,
* Amebiasis Shobellosis. Foot Problems Venereal Disease

27 1 0 0 42 ill

Il 0 0 9 3 123

0 0 52 80








Infectiond. -Aletter has been forwarded to I Field Force Vietnam recorlendinE; that shower slippers be .wade available for issue thro'gh normal supply channels. This would assist troops in airing their feet in an attempt to hold down the feot diseases caused by the hot humid climate of Vi-itnam, H. Civil Affairs: 1. The Brigade Civil Affairs/Civic Action Program for the reporting
period was conducted in the following Y&,jor aread:

a. Health 'and anitation: Sick calls were held in six provinces by the MWOA? Medics attached to this Brigade. A tota- of 16,000 persons were treated. b. Public Works" In -May the Engineers repaired 48 kilometers of roni two bridges, three culverts, four school houses and. improved grounds for future buildings. In June, a total of 24 kilometers of road and oue bridge was repaired along with the repair of one culvert. In July, 24 kilometers of road were repaired, two bridges bulilt, one bridge repaired and one culvert repaired. The Market Place in TAN CA1H was leveled and the grounds leasing to the TAN CAPHihu~pital were filled in. c. Transportation: Continuous transportation was provided for laborers in each aIea that laborers were hired.. Transportation was provided for o refugees 'who had lefttheir villages 0to to resettlement stations. d. laborors: Thd Brigade hired a totp of 24,000 laborors during the peribd. Tho largest portioh of the laborers wore hired id P'AR al G. An average of 857 laborers were hired per day. Wageb per vorkor per day varied between 80 VT$ in PHAN RANS, '50 VN$ in DlAK TO and 90 Vj$ in 'UY HOA. e. Agriculture: The Brit'ade Engineer and the Civil Iffairs Team 15 Engineer Officer cordinated and managed the construction of a reservoir at


DAK :Wo.
f. Educatioh . During, the period, an officer from the 2d Battalion, * 327th Infantry taught -English in the TUY HOA High School for a period of 4e .hours.


cg. laims: Twenty-three claims were processed-against the US for litary operations, and three claims were processed for nonlosseb due to r' combat accidonts. A i(tal f 12,OOO-tN$ were paid to Victnamese -ationals.

I -,f

' -

a. .



4-13 Agust 1966 Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July .966
(ROS: CSFOR-65) h. Refugee Extraction:


(1) A total of 532 refugees were extracted from operational areas and returned to GVH control. Emergency medical care and temporary relief assistance were given to many of the refugees. Transportation, to expedite the return of these people to GVN control, was furnished by the Support Battalion and the attached aviation units which flew thirty-seven sorties. (2) During the reporting period two CA tearms, Team 9 anC. Team 15, of the 41st Civil Affcirs Company were attached tolthe Brigade. Team 9 lt Team 15 wad deployed with was placed at thu rear area base camp at PHI P1 N The attachment of these two teams has greatly the Brigade forward olvmento, enhanced the Civil Affairs/Civic Action capabilities of the Brigade. i. Chemical: During Operation HAWTHORNE two offensive chemical strikes were conducted. One strike was conducted usinp the UH-lD to drop These • 7A3 CS filled grenades on dtug-in troops on a ridge line. extreme grenades wer dropped from an altitude of 100 feat; however, there was difficulty in marking: the tarpot area d ue to heavy overcast and rain. ':he secon¢: drop consisted of the delivery of M7A3 CS filled grenades and E158 Canister Cluster CS munitions systems. The drop was held at an altitude of 500 feet 'because of heavy overcast+ The target was a possible supply base, and the strike was exploited by a B-52 raid aboaut one hour following the drop. J. Psychological Warfare: The Brigade considers the Psychological Warfare effort to be an extremely important adjunct to ground tactical operations. We have had up to two teams attached to the Brigade for operations although generally there is only one. Leaflets are delivered primarily by a U-10 aircraft and a C-47 aircraft, both of which are assigned to the 5th Air Command Squadron which is based at PLEIKU. At times organic aircraft have been utilized to drop leaflets or broadcast Psychological Warfare tapes. During the reporting peilod, the Brigade participated in Operations AUSTI. Vi, Ti.Z RNE and BEAUREGARD and is currently participating in Operation JM.11 PAUL JONES. During Operation AUSTIN VI, 755,000 leaflets were dropped and 20 hours of broadcasting time was utilized. During Operation HA;,THOR1 6,600,000 leaflets were dropped and 28 hours of broadcasting time was utilized. On Operation BnAUREDAID 13,592,000 leaflets were dropped and 37 hours of broadcast time was utilized. Operation JOIN PLUL J(,NrS was a week old at the close of the reporting period and at that time 2,142,OOO leaflets had been dropped, anad 10 hours of broadcast time utilized. The majority of the broadcasts were made from drcraft, however, 4 ground mobile speaker teams have been utilized by front line Tnfan y Battalions.






/+7, ,



Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966

13 August 1966


Commanders Observations and Recommendations

Section 2 (C)

Part I Observations (Lessons Learned):
the loyalty and allegiance of the people.

A. General.

In a oounterinsur,-oncy environment it is essential to win In a country with such great


ical instability as exists in Vietnam, our presence, conduct and mothodc of tactical operations must not become a political issue. Otherwise, the government could fall. Our actions must be above reproach so that the communists and Viet Cong have no cauce to exploit unfavorable actions through propaganda. Since we commvand no other forces but our own, it is also ossuntial that we win the respect and adciration of thu military and paramilitary forces in Vietnam. Unlike in other wars, the importance of the individual soldier as an ambassador at large is much greater than ever before, and in guerrilla warfare the cutting edge is the squad and the individual soldier. To this end we have published a brochure (See Inclosure 5), Tips for Diplomats and Warriors. This brochure lists lessons learned and tips for simall unit leaders and individuals in Vietnam. B. Operations. 1. Item As:ni:.nnnt of a co-iman6 and control helicopter in direct Z support of the Infantry Battalion. Discussion: The Vie of a command and control helicopter in the direct support of the nfantry Battalion can provide flixibility to the commander. This helicopter can be used to assist units in pinpointing their location) in guiding units to their objective, and in relaying communications. A helicopter in this role can further be utilized for radical evacuation and resupply missions. Observation: Whon availqble fr;cm supporting airmobile units, a utility helicopter hould be assigned in direct support of the Infamtry Battalion. Item: Daylight movement in dense terrain.

Discussion: It is essential, when moving during daylight hours in dense terrain to deploy on mtually supporting axis in order to preclude enemy ambush and provide a force which'can be made available to encircle the encmy once contact Is m.de. Trails can be utilized for the main element, with patrols out to the front and flanks. The rate of movement of the main body -.st be slower to permit flank units to keep up. Maintaining u flank security in thick Jungle during hours of darkness is almost impossible. Therefore, consideration should be given to establishing a purimeter and arbushing trails at night. t Observation: When moving in dense terrain, forces should be deployed on mutually supporting axis. 3. Item: Employment of weapons in d ense Jerrain.

Discussion: Machine guns shofild be placed well forward in moving columns so that a heavy base of fire can be immediately established with a minimum of maneuver. In many cases the M-16 rifle should be issued in lieu of the M-79 grenade launcher and the H-72 LAW. This should be done where the terrain is so thick it limits the fields of fire to such an extent that it renders the 11-79 and M-72 ineffective. Also, in extremely dense terrain, approximately fifty percent tracer ammunition can enhance the effectiveness of the rifleman by permitting him to observe his fire. Observation: . In.extremely dense Jungle terrain, .(qnsideration should be given t6p,'A6ioying machine guns well forward in moving comums, the

ow A4




~ (RCS: CSFOR-65)


Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966



13' August 1.966

use of approximately fifty percent tracer ammunition, and to replacing the M-79 and M-72 with the 14-16 rifle.

4. Item: Utilization of helicopter'units in support of the
battalion. Discussion: When helicopter companies are placed in direct support of an Inantry Battalion, grCeator rosponsivonass and effectiveness can be realized b, consistantly employing the same helicopter unit with a particular battalion. This permits the helicopter and Infantry units to become more familiar with each othors 'prsonnel and methods of operation. Observation: Every effort should be tade to have the same helicopter unit con-istat) : support the same Infantry unit. 5. item: Attachment of : nineor larning zone clearing teams. Discussion: In many cas;s, when opcrating in dense terrain,, natural landing zones are not available. 'The assignment of snall engineer teams to the Infantry Battl3c'a, for use in cutting or improving .landing z.nes, will permit the use of helicopters for resupply and medicnl evacuation which might otherwise not be possible. Observation: When operating in dense terrain, sm-ll Engineer

laading zone dlearing teas should be attached to each Infantry Battalion.


zploitation of B-52 strikes.

Discuss- on: .When B-52 strikas are to be conducted, they must diate exploitation of the target area following the be scheduled to permi strike. This enables our forces to catch the enemy off guard when he is still dazed by the strike and pri,-r to his being able to evacuate his equipment and wounded. In dense jungle, it b6co'=s difficult to 6eploy uni's during the hours of darkness. Therefore, consideration should be given to scheduling the B-52 strikes 6uring, dayliht hours. Observation: B-52 strikes should be scheduled to permit exloitation of the target aroa by friendly forces imediately following the strike.



Engagement of newly infiltral d NVA units.

Discussion: Newly infiltrated NVA units ongaged at the border are extremely vulnerable ito attack. They have just finished a long Journey that left then physically an6 psycholcgically unprepared for combat. They are inexperienced and not knowinf, the terrain are forced to use existing road and trail networks. This makes them easily detected and subject to ambush. Observation: NVA units should' be engaged by friendly forces

as soon as possib -- feJr 8. Item:

oy have infiltrated into RVN.

New Lightweight Howitzer M-102 continues to prosent problm.

in tht: maintanenco areas. The following defects have been noted during the past oporations: Broken sight miunt, broken bearing on variable recoil cam roller, broken bearing bracket, binding elevation mechanism, cracked base plates and broken platform stakes. Eergency EIR's have been .submitted on. • these items. to be corrected a!-r4p

Observations The defects noted on the 14-102 howitzer need s possible.






O '* (A *," 13 August 1 66 Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966



9. item: M-79 Cannister .1ound.

DiscussionL The convojtional 11-79 round was found to have limited value in oxtreaely thick bamboo jungles. si.nce the round could not penetrate the undorf rcwth- 110 X157611P can.ais,... - and for the M-79 grenade launcher, however, proved to be hit hly effective in penetratin: the bamboo. The shot pattern at 100 yrds provides an extroeollr high number of first-round Rills. The use of this round tote~her ith the 6 0ma mrtar was effective in discouragitgC "huguin-1" toclniquvs by the enemy. Observation: The XM1576NP cannister round is effective for use in dense jung.le torrain and its issue to units in Vietnam should be



Continuous tactical air and artIllerv support.

Discmssion: The continuous ano si, 1ltaneous empleymont of artillery and tactical air support of the same target area has buon a problem. A possiole solution to this problem is to place a UFF (kN/Vi:C-24) radio in the artillcr'r XDC and to have an artillery FO accompany the FA0 or train the FAC in FO procedures. Th . FO would be equioped with an A~1/°RC-25 radio. This would provide .ontinuous c:mmunications between the artillery FSC, ALO, FAC's and fighter pilots and thus,:pornit direct coordination. Obs.rvition: Continuous conraications b:twccn the artillery and Air Force is necessary to effect cc,-tinuois and simultaneous artillery and Tactical Air support
of the sanmc .. tarea.


Item : Use of cratering charges.

Discussion: Cratering charges are more effective than TNT or C-4 for the destruction of tunnels, fortifications and caches. Although cratering charges are awkward and not easily transportable by fcotmobile elements, the charge is very stable and cau easily be delivered to :the area by eploying free-fall techniquies froma hcverii* helicopter. Observation: Crateri.g,, charges are more effective than T'YT or C-4 for the dostrti&oi-of tunnels, fortifications and caches. 12. Item: Flamcthrowers.

Discussion: Flanothrowers have been found to be too cumbers e to be carried by elmaents maneuvering by foot in dense jungle terrain. The 18 flamethrowers authorizodthe three battalions of the Brigade have be.en turned into the Brigade Base Camp, and three flani-ethrowers have bcor issued to the Support Battalion (Forward) for use on call by the battalions. This pooling of infraqently used assets conserves mr.teriel, -reduces maintenance and reduebs unit impedimenta. Flamethrowers should be flown into the ebbs. jcctivo area as required. Support Battalion, with the assistance of the 20th Chemical Detachment, has been given the responsibility for maintaining three portable flancthrowers in.a ready, charged state to be issued to.tho using unit on short notice. Observation: -Flamethrower teams with charegd flamcthrowers should be on call to e flcm by helicopter into forward areas requiring their use. 3' Item: with a winch capa&bit Inadequacy of current helicopter winch systems. iMany missions require the, use of helicopters " 'Yhe hoist on the UII-lD m6d-evacneeds to be modified



COA1 1



B -J. ', '. 13 August 1966 Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966 (R CS: CSFOR-65 )

to increase its reliability. The hoist of tht CH-47 is adequate but to siow frr personnel evacuation. The hoist of the Marine Corps CH-h6 is adequate. Howevor, we believe the AF H11-43 is the best ncans available. Air Force and [karine helicopters can be used if available but only on a mission basis. Consideration should be eivun t r. providing the Brigade two HH-43 hcliccpters until the UH-ID has been modified to provide for reliable extraction. Observation: Helicopter winch syste'Ss for the CH-47 and UH-ID sha. id be improvea to provide a more relr6ble and faster hoist capability.


calnb 14. e

:,Use of CH-47 "piggy-back" loads.T

Discussion: Airlifting of "piggy-back" sling loads. This m copters can be exp-:'t-th~ rouah the use of artillery units br CH-47 helltechnique reduces tbe tiu-.ie and number of sorties required. Observation: 'Piggy-back" loading should be used when dis-

placing artillery units by-CH-47 helicopter. 15.
Item: Reporting of nine field lccations.


Discust: jn: During the month of July 1966, elements of the Brigade encountered three u r,,ked and unreportced mine fields which had apparently been emplaced by firnedC3 izrces. A total of seven lives were lost in these naine fields and more than oix platoon days of effort were.required to identify mark the limits of the fields or to destroy the mines. Observation: It is imperative that all mine.ficlds known to any element of fr:-drTyif.y6"rces be reported through proper channels, C. Intelligence: 1. Item: Use of IPd teams and interpreters at battalion level.

Discussiont The use of IPW teams at battalion level to interrogate P(I-Is can po,_evaluable information which would otherwise not have been available for some time. Also, the use of interpreters down to company level can be uscful in obtaining information from P9d's and the local populace. Observation: When available, IKt personnel and interpreters should be provided down tothe battalion level. 2. Item: Reliabilityr of sources of intelli.ence information.

Discussion: Operations during this period reconfirmed the-fact that the best intelligence information is received from friendly units on the ground. The infornation gained from ralliers, agents; local civilians and visual reconnaissance has been found to be extremely sketchy nd unrelible.. Observation: Friendly units on the ground provide the mosti' "* reliable intelligence sources. .'*


3. Item: Lack of adequate communications by Viet Cong.
Discussion: , The apparent lack of adequate Viet Cong ceomnications has enabletoeB-gado to. engage many small elements without the Viet Cong being able o alert other enemy forces in the area. Eragemonts with those small groups of NVA soldiers enabled capturing prisoners and documonts from which valuable information-was obtained. Fro these documents it was often possibl6 to rapidly dotornine the encmy's strength and disposition.








AVBD-"' ' 13 August 1966 SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966



Observation: The Viat Con[: lack of commnications often permits r tb enCagoment of one enemy element without pernItting other Viet .Cong forces in the area to be alerted; 4," It ; North Vietnamese ap covera-e.

Discussion: Frequently captives can read their wmn maps but are unfamiliar with oursand unable to road them. Bettor information can be teams and the front line battalions have obtained fron ceptives if the IF,,! North Vietnamose . ps of the operational area. , e Observation: *i:orth Vietnamese map covero,of the operational area should be pr (cd to '7d teams and front line battalions.

5. Itcm:

Necessity for oap turing, prisoners of war.

Discussion: During Operation HUTUOE, prisoners ware not captured until late in the opration. Individual soldiers must be impressed with the importance ol capturing prisoners. They are often inclind to be too quick on the trigger. Observation: Individual soldiers must be impressed with the importance of capturinCg PO,-.,s. 6. Cong capture. Discussion: The taedirtu deployment of IM teams to the place where Viet Cong ha.ve boon captured, enhances the timeliness of the information gained and ne-atos the possibility of false or misleading information being obtained by untrained interrogators When possible, IN teams should be sent to the Observation: location where the PMYd'eTave been captured. 7. Item: Conversion bf the track mounted 1,500 GPH Erdalator water purificatio-t to an airmobile ite,. Discussion: Co A, 326th Ehgr Bn irrived in Vietnam with two erc.alator water purification sets. Those items had 600 GPH trailer n0lct been well used before arrival in country and began to have mintenance troubles immcdiately. A single 600 GPH sot mst be run almost continuously in order to supply the 1st Brija(e with water. This continuous operation compounded the mainteaancc problems. USRV reco,ni-ed the unsatisfactory performance of the 600 GPH sets -and issued turo new 1,500 GPH sets to replace then. The truck mounted 1,500 OPi sets cre too high to fit in any aircraft other thh the c-124. to the Ist ]Br3a..(e in Vietnam. This negated the usefulness 6f these ites Observation: A visual inspection of the l,'O0 Og set revealed purification equipment is attachied to ihe frame of g that the van cent' inthe the- track with ten bolts, five on each of the main frame meeoors. The only other connection to the track body was a gas lkne from ,the fuel tank to the *ace' he--.,er within the van. Because the heater is not needed in Vietnam, this , jind was permanently disconnected. By loosening the bolts, tho van can be -lifted by two forklifts onto pallets and into J-130 di roraft. •The 27. ton truck generator 10., with thu van dismounted ,nC the 3/4 ton trailer containing the O make one C-130 load. The van body takes one-half of another load. Upon arrival, the van can again be placed onto the truck. This disassemblyz:ljoacing, and reassembly has leon accomplished t-rice without mishap or undue efort. 71)e 1,50ooGPH ordalator water purification set has provided thc 1st Brigar'e water ithout -interruption since it has been in the forward area. The capacity 1imot.w Item: Imediate deploynont of IPW teams to points of Viet








3 August 1966

perational Report (RCS: CSFOR1-05) for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966


is groat enough so that tho equipment operates loss than half of the time and adeqv.ate time is available for prevontativo maintenance. 8. Item: I$aintainance of contact with the eneray The MVP is an intollinonce collection agency


and by virtue of the nturo of its operations is often subjected to e-mmy contact. Since tho enuv r contact is of duch a positive intelligen ce nature, it has been found n cossary to have an imaei te action force available in conjunction with all L11P operations. Thu force neced only be of sufficient size to maintain contoct with the enemy until an adequate size fore is employed. This force, of platoon or company size would be deployed in proximity to the LRR? so it can move to cnga:o when the LRRP observes an e nev.y forco. Obseivation: Reconnaissance elements should often be backed s which can maintain contact with t he enery until up by i-,-m.diate aioa larger forco can be deployed in the area. D. Logistics: I Itema: Use of native supply bearers.

Discussion: In extremely dense terrain, carrring of excess aminition and eq pent7 an extremuly hinder the maneuverability and effectiveness of the individual soldier. Natives can be employed and utilized in carrying food an supplies from landinU zones to clandestine base areas. Small units can be resupplied from these locations. Observation: When possible, native supply bearers should be utilized in dense SRa-o "errain sa our troops can travel lightly and be in better phsical condition to fi? ht when tha enemy is encountered.

caliber .45 143a S,:G or cIiber .30 Carbine, and provisions must be made for
lhaving such ammniticn immediately available for resupply. CIDG personnel d so prefer to be given fish ,and rice, their noral (iet, rather than C-rations. Observation: The resupply of armunition anC food for CIDG units should be handlod through Special Forces Advisoro and not by direct resupply by the Brigado S.4. 3. Item: Necessity for a joir.t Arry - Air Force planning conference prior to amajor eeployenmt by aircraft. Discussion: During past operations, there has been a lack of infor.m.tion provided to the frmy regarding, the c:paeilitius of the Air Force to support air movaient operations. AWditional difficulties were encountered by the ".nability of either the Army or Air Force to cornqnicate directly between the departure and arrival airfields. The assignment of a senior mission with the deploying unit to coorinate the movement would commander to rein further enhance the operation. Observation: A joint planning conference should be held between the Ar-W and Air Force prior to the unit deploying by air. E. Psychological 'larfareb IU. Iteia: Location of Psychological Warfare unit.



Most CIDG personnel are armed with either the

Discussion: Psychological 'Wrfare atrcraft should be attached to and operate from the Bride. Stationing these aircraftjat air strips,





13 August 1966 1. ' Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966





other than the Brigadets reduces the floxibi11-4y and rospoinsiveoss of the Psy War effort. Observation: locationi 2. Item: Assignment of Psy War personnel to the Brigade, Psy Uar aircraft should operate from the Brigade

Discussion: To conduct an effective Psy Jar program in the Brigade, it is imporativo that a school trained officer, preferably a captain, be assigned to the S-3 Section as the Brigade Psychological Warfare Officer. Obseur-ation: to the Brigade. Part II Rcomn-ndations: A. That Poy War aircraft be attached and remain in the Brigade area during opeoations. Action Taen: Ist Brigade, 101st 21 June 1966, Subject: Psychological 7Tarfare, attachnont. e be piroviecd with B. Tht the anC a small Psy Jar detachment .:rf'arc Officur and delivering: leaflets. Airborne Division letter dated to I FFORCIEV, requested this ont school trained Psycholorical capable of printing, packaging A school trained Psy ',dr officer should be assigned

Action Taken: Request was forwarxed to I F7,C0 V by ist Prigade, 101st Airbornev o -- .WX (S), 6406A dated 23 June 1966, Subject: Psychological Operations Posture; C. That a senior USIY mission commander be assigned for airlifts and that a joint Army - Air Force planning converence be held prior to any air moveiaent. Action Ttk en: mission throuah chann. A letter is being prepared onthis subject for sub-

D. Tnh.t a fourth maneuver battalion be provided to thie ist Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. Action Taken: T..fX (S), this liqs, 8-081A, Subject: Fourth Maneuver B,-ttalion Separate )rigadc, to I FF.0"V gubmitted the rocoi.rendation that
action be t-ken to that end as soon as u'raticable an gave advantaes to Such

a concept. E. That Department of IArm,% approval be given to, the flTOE ton the Ist Brigade 101st Airborne Division. Approval has been received to date only by LSLUV and USA2Pf. Action Taken: 1st Brigade,. '101st Airborne Division letter, Subject: -to.lst Brigade,, 101st Airborne Division, to Commnding' Rocommendbd A1ugment General, USIV., dated 'I ilovember 1965.
be approved.

F, That the emplcyment of native supply bearers on combat operations .

ActionTakent. Recommendation forwarded by TIX, this Hqsi,Sbbje t: Formation of VSC to USIRV, dated 19 May 1966, and letter, this flqs; Subject: Formation of Vietnamese Servioe, Corps, to I FF(OCEV, dated 26 June 1966.



. Q. °"(*

1 ,





13 August 1966 Operational Report for Quarterly Report Ending 31 July 1966. (RCS: CSFc-65)

0, That the 1,500 GPI! truck nounted erdalator, FSHI-4610-649-8386, be redesigned to be air transportable by 0-130 aircraft. Action Taken: A letter recommending this action is being prepared for forwarding through USXRV to the Army Materiel Commind.



Brigadier Oeneral' USA Comimandirg Inclosures Combat Oper tions After Action Report, Operation AUSTIN 2 - Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation H,19THOMIE 3 - Combat Operations After Action Report) Operabion BFEAREARD (EAOLE BAIT)

5 - Tips for Diplomats and Warriors
Distribution: Z_=.CO,2.FZO~CEV, ?o 962L&0,J1?G .' Asst CofS Yo Forcn ovelcpment, DA 'N C VDARMA, AFO 965:), IV ~ 3 - COt US~a," PO 96307, ATv: AVc-Dw ----------ton DO 20310 (thru channels)

4 -'Operations





Inolosure 4 (Opere.tiolns Overl. ys) to, Operational 11eport for um'terey Period Ending 31 July 1966 The Tabs to thiLs inclosure provide overlays for each of the Brigades operational areas during the reportinq period as follows: Operation AUSTIN VI - See Tab A Operation FAI,,MM :OP Operation 1. A . - See Tab B

See Tab 0

Operation 3O1I PAUL

OIES - See Tab D




~. Tab A to~ lnckii&l

(Operation~ AUSTMI VI) to operati-ns Ovorlays


33. sokles: 1:50oO

*Tab D to Incolosuro

L~(Cporation HILITUOflME)

to Operatiohs Ovorlays






Soales 1:250,000/



2ab 0 to Ini.losur 4- (Operation BEAURtWkLD) to Operations Overlays







D to IXnlosure q (Operation JOIIl PAUL JORS) to Operations Over1ays












5 June 1966

Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation AUSTIN (RCS:

NACV J3-32)


d6mmanding General
I Field Force Vietnam

APO US Forces 96240 TOs i Comanding"General US Military Assistance Command Vietnam ATTN: J343 APO US Forces 96243


(U) Name of Operation:

Operation AUSTIN. 12 April to 18 May 1966.

2. (U) Date of Operation: 3. 4. (U) Location:


LONG Provinces.
(U) Command Headquprters: Ist Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.

5. (U) Reporting Officer: Brigadier General Willard Pearson, Commanding General, Ist Brigade 1 Olst Airborne Division.

6. (C) Task Organization:
a. Shown below is the task organization of the Brigade during Operation AUSTIN 2 (PHAN THIET Area). This organization remained relatively unchanged throughout the entire operation, with the exception of GVN Military and para-military forcer who were attached and/or un-er operational coordination of the 1st Bde during various phaseoc of the operation. The GVN units are listed

in paragraph b below. TF 2/502 2/502 Inf 02/320 Arty 3d Flat (-) A/326 Engr Tm 3d RRU TF 1/327 1./327 Inf A2/320 Arty
•Tm 3d RRU

Bde Troops 2/320 Arty (-) B1/30 Arty A2/17 Cav (effective 23 Apr 66) A/326 Emgr Element Spt BnHHC, Ist Bdo, 101st Abn Div
MP Plat

1st Plat(-), A/326 Eng

20-Cml Det 181 MT- Det


HE- I, 245 Psy Ops Co.: Bde Avn Sec...

Infantry Division (ARVN) provided security be mutual agreement with CG, ist


During AUSTIN 2 the 442d RF Company and 23d Recon Company, 23d



•Q-J 9" -.





June 1966

Combat Operation After Action Report, Operation AUSTIN (RCS:

MACV J3-32)
Bde for the ?HAN THIET irfield como-lex by conductin : S&D operations in adjacent areas. PF units from the *icxal *'? training cc.- ter assisted in provtding airfield security. Coordination with the 44th Infantry Regiment (A,0N) provided security for A/326 Engr to repair, clear, and open National Route 1 from FIRN THIET to SONG MAO during phase II. CIDO units from LUONG SON CIDG canp accompanied each Bde Inf Bn on operations during phase II. Local RF units were used as blocking forces and additional combat power. During AUSTIN 6 the 285th RF Company was attached to the lst Bde. Early coordination was established vith MkCV Adv Tm 32 (OHLI NGHIA - QUANG DUC Province' and MWCV Adv Tm 94 (UDS B-34) (SONG BE - PHOUC LONG Province). Montagnard scouts, porters and guide , a III Corps Ranger Company from the 31st Ranger Bn, CIDO units, and elements of the 45th Infantry Regiment (ARVN) were attached and/or worked In conjunction with 1st Bde during all phases. i:iti :' NHON CO Airfield security was provided by an RF scout company and upon theiL' departure# by a CODO company with sublasequent relief during phases II and III by a battalion from the 45th Infaniry

Regiment (ARVN).
c. A2/17th Cay rejoined the Briuade (w)after release from TF 2/327 (TUY HOA - Operation FILLMORE) on 23 April 1966 for use in Operation AUSTIN 6 commencing I May 1966. A2/17th Cay did not participate in AUSTIN 2. d. On 11 May 1966 TF2/503Inf.was attached tb the Drigade. This TF' consisted of 2d Battalion (Abn), 5O3 hf, .2 tBtry, 2d Battalion ,(Abn). 3 319th Itillery. A Co, 82d Aviation Battalion from B3N HOA was in direct support of TF 2/503. :i 7. (C) Supporting Forces: a. 2/320th Artillery (Abn): Employed in a direct support role'i

b. B1/30th Artiflerys
during the operatioh.

Provided general support (reinforcing) fi es
trovidd helicoptoer for 1O ccmpenw Ose

10th Aviation Battalions

or larger assaults throughout the operation. "n addition, the unit flew di resupply missions and provided armed helicopter support. d. A Company, 82d Aviation Battalion: helilift for TF 2/503 bIf. Provided direct support

e. 7th Fleet, US Navy: The USS Canberra and USS Higbee provided naval gunfire support during Operation AUSTIN 2. "w !-,82 tactical air miesions for 218 f. 7th Air Division, sorties. Results of the above miss, . .sinclude 61 VC KBA, 61 structures destroyed, 36 structures damaged, 1 secondary explosion, 1 bunker destroyed,

3 bunkers damaged, 3 caves destroyed, 3 wells destroyed. In all cases, tactical air support was immediately responsive to requests.
g. Strategic Air Command. USAF: in support of Operation AUSTIN 6.


Flew 1 3-52 mission for 3 sorties

h. 498th Medical Detachment (Airmobile): Provided continuous,and efficient medical evacuation for the Brigade throughout the operation. 8 (U) Intelligence Inclosure 2, Intelligence.

9. (U) Mission: Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam directed that the1st Brigade, .1 irborne Division initially'conduct sea*rch and destroy operations astride the II and III Corps boundary in tho'PH I THIET area subsequently in the NHON CO areas to locate and destroy enemy forces and facilities.



__, de-n



StBJECTt 10.


J/q' 1966 une


MACV J3-32) Combat Operation After Action Report, Operation AUSTIN (RCS: J
(C) Concept of Opefttic.,: Coration AUSTIN consisted of two

operations, AUSTIN 2 an, ASTIN 6 a. Operation AUSTIN 2: This operation was conducted in two phases. See Inclosure 3 (Operations Overlay, Operation AUSTIN 2). (1) 1hase I (12 April to 18 April 1966): This phase consisted of the initial search and destroy operations by 2/502 Inf and 1/327 Inf, astride the II and III Corps boundary northwest of PHAW THILT. (2) Phaso I (18 April - 25 jpril 1966): This phase consisted of Hunter Killer operations northeast of A; THIET by 2/502 Inf and 1/327 Inf and in conjunction with the 44th Inf Regt (ARVN), opening National Route 1 from PIMN THILT to SONG MAO.
bt Operation AUSTIN 6: This operation was conducted in three.


See Inclosure 4 (Operations Overlay, Operation AUSTIN 6),

(1) destroy (1 y - by 2/502 Inf This vicinity of the initial" search andPhase 1: operations 10 May 1966). inithe phase consisted of BU 11RNG RF outpost to spoil a suspected NVA attack in that area. This phase also involved the committment of 1/327 Int southeast of the BU PRANG RF outpost astride two main infiltration routes from Cambodia. All operations wore conducted in conjunction with the 45th Infantry Regiment (ARVN) conducting a search and destroy operation to the southwest of NHON CO. (2) Phase I, (6 May - 14 * 1966). This phase consisted of search and destroy operations in the vicinity'of 2U GOK Wt.? Airfield by 2/50,2 Inf, 1/327 Inf and 2/503 Inf. While 2/502 Thf entered the B3U GI, MA? area on 6 May, 1/327 Inf remained in the vicinity southeast of BU PRANG, subsequently joining the BU GIA MW campaign on 10 May 1966(3) Phase III (14 W ,, 18 May). This phase exploitation of a B-52 strike northwest of BU 01K VUL? by the 2/503 Inf. 1/327 Inf and 3d En, 45th Regt, conducted Search operation in their respective areas southeast of BU GIA W.1, phases effected a link-up. 11. (C) Executions a. AUSTIN 2s consisted of the 2/502 Inf and and Destroy and in the final

(1) The Brigade (-) began deployment by air and sea from the TUY HOA area .nto the HAN THIET area on 8 April 1966. The last elements closed PHAN THIET on 16 April 1966. A total of 237 C-130 sorties were flown and 3 barges used. 2/502 :; ,•(2) Phase 'r On,11 ,- 12.April 1966, small recon elpments from Inand the Brigade Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol were covertly inf troduced at dusk by-helicopters into $rea BULL RUN.. The mission of these elements was- to develop hard intelligence of the ar -a and secure landing zones in preparation for the Bn (-) assaults the following day. On 13.April 1966, TF 2/502 Inr condicted a'heliborne assault on multiple LZfs in Area SUtL RUN. The scheme of maneuver invozved 9no bompany blocking across, the valley in the eastern portion of Area BULL RUN with one company sweeping southeast along the stream and river bed areas. The thirda the western portion- of Area BULL RUN, east company conducted,and sweep fromblocking along the valley into the force. Following a link!-up of all forces on 16 April 1966, TY 2/502 Inf reorieoed to the southwest and conducted a two day sweep- operation generally parplll to the II and II Cprps boundary. Following the completion of this swecp, i8I,April 1966, TF 2/502 Wt was extracted by helicopter back to "PHAN THILT;Artioeld. Concurrent with operations in. Area BULL RUN, 2/327 W bdtiated ....
ii i'













operations in Lrea SUMTI.. I*Nvpkthu,,is werp, introduced into 1t11o area at dusk en Ii April 1966 aecompan-.&d by platoon si 2u units wibch acted as i3.eiat reaction f ordes e3mal t recon teans continued -to bo **ntroauccd into Area ohIeR untl), by 16 April 1966; tic total force conji.4:ed was apiroximately oercinforcc t. i'iflo company. Th.. Bn (-) remained at ?HMN Ti1ILT Airfield as Driada. ii . 1 FT'ORC.SV rcserv-. Vigorous saturation p,.trolling continued throughout krea SUMrER until 18 Aril 1966 when all for~d~s were extracted by heli copteor back to OLIAN TH'I1T Airfield. During this pL-riod -a Vietnamese RF Cnny,231 Itecon Co, and selected PF units provided security for the 2HAN TI:;T Airfield conpleX. (3). Phase-Ii:,, Based on ,iptelgence that-a VC base area was located ',Inthe mountainous area northeast of 211 THMtf plans were form.ulatcd to commit forces in that area. On 18 April 1966, 2/320 Art (-) moved by CV-2 aircraft into the LUONG SON CIG cz, -Id D1jO,,4rty. mqvod by, 0 130. aircraft. into SONG -jjO Airfield to conducf a .t.,tical -motor march into ,the LUO'IG Q CIDG -camp. . :At dusk-cna:9 lpilil -1966, recon elem ents from Z/59?* .i~g. ana.2/34 ~Inf-wore' introduced into Areas PIIRTHER LEWARD by helicopter.. Cocurn rvith theo rqcon .bl-lecnt assaults, the -23d, YietnamsieeJunk Fleet conducted a*,, "T-g.~ amiphiojo.us:aszaqlt along thq coastlihe. *On.?2 feint jAprl 1966, 2/ 02'nf and l/327* Ing 6onduced heliborne assaul:ts on rm.ltiplo LZiss in *ra-an-tR *and .L0.AA1D respectively.. Elements froRbho LUONG SONG CIDO camp accopxai. both battalions cting as, guides. .aild intc4'prote s.. .Concurrentiy:.two b'dtt-ons of ,thc:Whhtfr.Inf 1Regt (III VN.-).;initi~ated1 op~retaops..gn.ral ly parali OG~i. o~cdt '!l te--Ntional 1RotI L 'Art~a COYOTZ. -, o~ir RoInP ani *and-bcupicdblocking positions ~1C~Y-ppc,Z ,tqeal ,pospsiblq VC routos through that, ait. ddit,*onal2i. thro\ ooppani s-werec helilifted .into operationala'ea.to donduct swes h,/O .and' 1/3f7' Inf'to: the 'boith-the


training cadre anfd battalion coordinators *ith RF comyxinics sweeping :6o ' hb south and east; 1/327 inf swept soutir. .hilo the RT units swept to the northwhetfo tiseln swa L thus si~ne confiJdenoQ in the local GVN forces nw whie fro teline a e ra ns4in %2 rt ce~nig the ;prscnce of large VO forces in the, :.rea. Following, s~arch and _strcy operaticiis to the south, 2/502 Ing 'and 1/327 InC wer.a extractad by h(,li.:,).,tcr to x9HiaN THIT Airfield. ll1 units closed by 25 April 1966 tc~rminatinZ; Operation AUSTIN 2. b. AUSTIN 6: (1) the N11011Narea CO were flown. A.1l (2) The Brigade began deployment from,the'?H10N THIZT' area to by C"130 aircraft on 25 April 1966. A total, of 172 sorties units bad closed NHON CO by 2 M~ay 1966. P'hase 1; On 30 April 1966 roc6n clcmbonts of 2/502 Ing and

Ing were introduced into Areas JACKSON and SHERMAN. On 1 may 1966, *1/327 2/502 3Inf conducted a helibc'rne as. -,u! nto Area JjiCK8ON to spoil a suspected R1L. attack on the. DY! iRANO iF'ou tj? ." _2 -Y~ ebhdu td sere h andt, destroy rf .ions. in, ijeas. JQYSON.-until 6 May 1966 with coiitad'., i1/27, * ~~~.:i.. .'u~~a -aemtted on .1 My 1966 by helicopter into xaS.M~ard w: * ,' f~iltration roptes from Cambodia. 1/327 -Thf.conducted search and dcestroy orat.onz i.n Area MHEMO4A, ti18May 1966 with niegative contact. .Security' of th& NEON CO, Airfied was coordinated wihadpr'l by a, tI-S ga' scout company a~nd, upon thoir relief, by h,.1oeal CI.Pd company. i~ll onerations were conducted in coordination viith- theo 45th .Infantry .Regiment' (ARM~)"~ :scarch and.,destroy o~eriktioxi to: thp,,southwe f TlibllI.cO.* Ist
'; -

* (.-Phase If.' Acting or. reliable intellenoo rep)orts that a VO -buildup was takingi.placd in- the *BU. GIL. M~t? rea,- -2/502 .InC wa-s, com-aitted en 6 May: 1$66 ,,y,heaicoptcr in,the. ii~nii, of -3U GIA WP Airf ield andI init:. Ati .sqz.Mkp c~mc d*.jtroy opera ions, in that area.' , Ais 'the'. in~ollig ncb situation developed it was dcjded 'to- commidt'1/3.27 Inf ii tile arda'to

AVAD-C SJ BJECT: Combat Operations Af ter '.c iion Rport, Opera ;ion AUSTIN (RCS: MLCV J3-32)

/,.-, /-

5 juno 1966

reinforce 2/502 Inf. Three days were required to complete the heliborna movement duo to inclement weather. 1/327 Inf completed movement on 10 May 1966
and initiated search and destroy operations southeast of BU GIA IP. On 8 May 1966, in order to release A2/17 Cav and one rifle company for committment to

reinforce 2/502 InC and 1327 Inf, one battalion from the 45th Rogt (ARV11)
was provided for security of the NHON CO Airfield and Brigade CP complex.

During the early morning hours of 11 May 1966 2/502 Inf began receiving
sniper fire while conducting search and destroy operations west of BU GIA MAP. This contact developed into a battc! wit. two company NVA force. Elements of 2/502 inf and A2/17 Cay s'rounded this force, directed artillery and Tac Air into the area and was able to decimate ant entire NVA Battalion, as confirmed

by body'count and later P04 interogalici., Two batteries of 2/320 Artillery "ired 2,000 rounds in support of 2502 Inf during the engagement. On 11 May 1966, TF 2/503 was attached to the Brigade Pid moved by C-130 aircraft to SONG BE Airfield. Deploying by helicopter to LZts north of SONG BE, TF
2/503 initiated search and destroy operations to the north and linked up with 2/502 Inf on 13 May 1966 west of BU GIA MAP.

(4) Phase III:

At 141OOOH May 1966, a B-52 strike was con-

ducted northwest of BU GIA MAP in Area SAND. 2/502 Inf and 2/503 Inf conducted search and destroy operations in this area to exploit the strike. Relatively light contact was experienced by both forces throughout the exploitation. On 17 May 1966, 2/503 Inf was extracted by helicopter to SONG BE and subsequently moved by 0-130 aircraft to BEIN HOA. 2/502 Inf moved by helicopter to BU GA MAP Airfield and was extracted by CV-2 aircraft to NHON CO on 17 May 1966. Concurrent vith the B-52 exploitation, 1/327 Inf continues search and destroy operations southwest of BU GIA M?, seizing a VO Provincial Hqs, Hospital and POw can.p. One company from the 31st Ranger Battalion (IIl Corps) provided security for three 155rm howitzers from B1/30 Arty, supporting elements of the 45th Infantry Regiment (ARVN) in operations in Area TORCH southwest of BU GIA MAP. On'15 may 1966 a link-up was effected with elements of the 3d Bn, h5th )-)f Regt (RVNI), sweeping north from National Route 1ho Following the link-up, 1/327 Inf was extracted by helicopter to NHON CO Airfield on 18 May 1966. 12. (C) Results:

A, The 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, succeeded in its mission to tind, fix, and destroy Viet Cong forces and facilities in the ?HAN THIET and NHON CO areas, b. AUSTM 2. (1) Personnel losses: The following losses were inflicted on the enemy during Operation

16 VC 1aA (BC)

5 VO KA (ARMY) 5 70C KXI (EST)
16 vC KDA (EST) (uAF) 25 VCS
3 VCG (mcl 2 WIf. (2) Weapons captured;




o, 5 June 1966 Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation AUSTIN (RCS: ft.CV J3-32)
Nomenclature (a) United States Manufactured S'otgun, 12 go;age Rifle, US, ,1903 .Oal 30.06 Carbine, US MI, Cal .30 SIM,
1, Cal


QUiAntity 1 1 1 1 1 1 1


SMG, Thompson Cal .45 (b) German Manufactured Rifle, Mauser 98, Cal 7.92 (c) French Manufactured Rifle, MAS 1936 Cal 7.5,m

(3) Food
Rice destroyed Rice evacuated 13 4;ons 2 tons 2 tons noted) Structures Structures damaged Adminjzrative camn (100 persons) Bunkers Bunkers damaged Caves Wells (5) Body to weapons ratio: ASTI 6. The following losses (1) Persormel losses: 101 VC KIA (BC) 103 VC KIA (EST) 2.7 to 1. 61 36 1 1 3 3 3



Potatoes destroyed

(4) Camps or Buildings destroyed (unless

re "..flicted on the enemy during Operation

45 K13A (EST) (USAF)
6 VCG (Includes 3 WIA) 6

0 A


0 A), -n 7*11 5 June 1966 Combat Operat.ons After Action Report, Ope -ation AUSTIN (ROS,

MACV J3-32)
(2) Weapons captured: Nomenclature (a) United States Manufactured Carbine US M-l, cal .30 (b) (c)



German Manufactured Rifle Mauser 96, cal 7.92mm French Manufactured SMG, Mi949 9rm I 1

(d) Chinese Commuitst Manufactured LMO type 56 (Soviet RPD) AT rocket launcher type 56 (Soviet RPG-2) 1953 copy of Soviet 7.62mm rifle 111918/30 (sniper rifle) Carbine type 56 (Soviet SKS) 7. 6 2mm Carbine type 52 (Soviet M1944) "7.62mm

3 3 1 12

WAt rifl., ty,,o 56 (Soviet '.K-47)


Unknown m(e) maufactured Unknoim (Destroyed)
(3) AmmuniLtion i 8!xun mortar 60mm mortar 5?7mm RR 124 rds


141 rds
101 rds 24 rds

4Omm for RPG-2

.45 cal
, 6ml (4)

300 rds 2,000 rds 2.3 to 1.

Body to weapons ratio:

(C) Admnistrative Matters:


Personnel and Administration:

Inclosure 1 (Personnel and

b. Logistics. Inclosure 5 'Logistics).




7 z/Z

I s


Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation AUSTIN (R^S: MACV J3-32)

5tO 1966 June

1.11. (C) Special Equipment and Technique.s: a. In the PH!AN THIET area, water resupply was most difficult. There were no streams and low LZts existed for resupply by helicopter. Resupply of water in 5 gallon cans was accomplished, but extraction of Qmpty cans was difficult and time consuming. Collapsible canvas water bags which, when empty could be folded ana carried, proved to be the best solution. b. By cutting trails in the Jungle until an established trail was intersected, elements were able to avoid established VC early warning oatposts. c, Ground elements must be positioned in nutually supporting positions due to loss of helicoptpr support to move reserves during periods of inclement weather. d. Native bearers can be effectively utilized to resupply units in clandestine bases. The bearors'and supplies can be moved to an LZ some distance from the clandestine base by helicopters; guides from the unit then can escort the native bearers to the clandestine base and back. e. Due to the thick Jungle terrain encountered in the NHON CO area, several new employment techniques for weapons were developed. (1) Because of the difficulty in mannevering, machine guns were placed well forward in colums so that a heavy base of fire would immediately be available when contact was made. (2) The M-79 and the M-72 (LAW) proved relatively ineffective in the thick jungle. The terrain precluded good fields of fire. As a result few M-72's were used and additional M-16 rifles substituted. (3) Following the initial successes gained by experiments with tracer ammo the Infantry Battalions utilized tracer ammo in a 50 - 50 ratio. This technique proved extremely effective, particularly in the dense junglefiring at a fleeing, elusive enemy. f. Moving through dense terrain in daylight on mutually supporting axes is essential to preclude enemy ambush and to provide an imrodiately available encircling force once contact with the enemy is made. Trails must be utilized for movement of the main body, with recon patrols well out to the front. Flanking units must be kept out at least 400 - 500 meters, with plans for flanking on encircling any enemy force engaged. The rate of the main body must be slowed to permit the flank units to stay parallel to or leading the main body. Night movement through thick jungle mailitaining flank security proved almost -.mpossible. Therefore, the t,-,ails were amnbushed at night and a perimeter was establish ed. f. Effective utilization of artillery fire contributed significantly to the very favorable kill ratio obtained. Several techniques used in the employment of artillery were as follows:
Jungle. Fire was initially placed well to the rear of the enemy's position and adjusted onto the posl.ticn. This preveiteed the enemy from breaking contact rnd held him down in position while we deployed forces around his flanks and rear. (2) The -NVA made maxim.:- use of wire for communications when set up in ambush- or. defensive positions. A rapid and -heavy volume of artillery fire disrupted their communications.


frtilleny was employed as soon as contact was made in the



dt, JECT:

5June 1966

Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation AUSTIN (RCS:.

MACV J3-32) (3) Artillery fire was "rolled" in front of the pursuing torce in 100 meter increments in order to disrupt enemy delaying actions. (4) Smoke rounds were used extensively to pinpoint locations in the dense junglei g. The use of 124 teams at.Bn level to interogate POW's provided valuable information that otherwise would not have been available for some time. Also, the use of interpreters at company level proved to be of great help in obtaining information, both from !"OWts and local population.. h. Assignment of a C&C helicopter in direct support of each Infa'try Battalion proved' quite efeetive. The battalions use" this helicopter for liaison, commnication relay with subordinate units, assisting units to pinpoint their locations, guiding units to terrain objectives, and locating


potuntial LZ's.

i. During this operation, as in idarny past operations, maximum use was made of ARVN forces as security for the artillery batteries. This 7-eased US forces from the security mission and added to our combat cap.oility. j. When conditions permitted, an airmobile company wis placed in direct support of each infantry battalion, and the same company habitually supported'a specific battalion. This , . angement was rutually advantageous. It resulted in increased responsiveness, andenhanced the effectiveness of
aviation support.

k. Operating across Corps Boundaries with the Base and Hqs in one Corps ara and the tactical operation in another seemed to enhance the security promise. of the operation and decreased the likelihood of premature com.1. Use of recon elements to secure LZ's for the assaulting battalions increased our element of surprise. m. All weather close air support provided by the use of "Sky Spot", has definite value.5 18 "Sky Spot" sorties were flown during Operation AUSTIN 6. All were preplanned missions. Evaluation of these missions indicated relatively good coverage and accuracy. The largest circular error was approximately 300 meters from the 1rescribed target with some ordnance within 10 meters. The accuracy of "'Sk.j Spot" is primarily dependent on accurate 8 digit target coordinates. ,With the difficulties of identifying exact positions from the ground in dense jungle, aer'al or artillery confirmation of coordinates must be maie before requesting "Sky Spot".
' n, The technique of publishing and distributing a cover plan to

the actual operation proved highly effective and seemed to increase the element of surprise. In connection with this cover plan, artillery fires were used to prepare fake LZ's,with helicopters conducting feint assaults in the iareas mentioned in the cover plan. In addition, increased aerial recort,naissance was conducted in these areas.

o.- One significant aspect of Operation AUSTIN was the active integration of all available forces to,-d .ceed RF/PF, CDG and ARVN units. ThiAs include to instill greatly increased our combat power a greater ddgree of
confidence in the GVK forces. At the close of AUSTIN 2 thd US Sector Advisor

to BIMH THUAN Province noted, "The people really got a boost by the presence of 'the Brigade in the province. Statistics given to me by the Province Chief show forty-ohe ralliers, true VC, returnpd:-to GV ranks, and three hundred and sixty-one men, women, and children formerly under the VC yoke have retuied to government control. To me this is significant and quite meaningful."


AVAD-C i.3JECT: 15.


Juno 1966

Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation AUSTIN (RCS: MOV J3-32) (C) Commander's Analyslsi

a. Suitable techniques must be developed to permit simultaneous employment of close air support and artillery. When the artillery cease fire is given there is usually a lull while the FAC identifies and marks the target. This lull has been used by the enemy to police his dead, wounded and equipment from the battlefield. Likewise, there is usually a 1ull follow., ing an air strike before artillery can again be brought to bear. b. Employment of the starlight device is limited in dense underbrush. The thick underbrush prevents long range observation. c. The wear out period of juhgle boots and fatigues in jungle .. "rain was more rapid than anticipated or previously experienced. d. All enemy base camps and other installations were found near the intprsection of trails and streams. Search of water sheds should be among %-he top priorities when seeking enemy installations. e. All enemy movement was along well defined trails. Ambushing the ,als, particularly at night resulted in several VC KIA, prisoners weapons, ard documents captured. f. Enemy ambush positions were gen.rlly located along high ground adjacent to trails. g. Ene.y automatic weapons positions generally covered the long axis of approach, e.g. the trails. h. Enemy forces were vulnerable to encirclenent anid made little or no use of flank security when engaged.

4 special personalized leaflets were prepared, (See inclosures 10 - 13for

i. The support of the 245th Psy Ops qompany was inadequate. Although

examples), delivery time was too slow on all except one. Also, the 5th Air Commando Squadron provided inadequate aircraft support for Psy War operationL. Psy War aircraft were grounded in NHA TRANG and elsewhere due to weather. while planes were flying in the operational area. J. A B-52 strike was conducted at 140100H May 1966 along the Cambodian border. Because of the dense jungle, units could not deploy until daylight. Several more hours were required to traverse the 3 KM Buffer Zone. When units reached the strike area TL, .Joundnumerous footprints in a bomb -ater indicating that the NVA had tim" to evacuats before pursuit could be li-itated. B-52 strivos must be scheduled to permit immediate exploitation, preferably at first light. k. The new .LghtweightHovitzer continues to present problems. The following are defects that occured during the operation: Broken sight mount. Broken bearing cm variable recoil cam roller. Broken terra tire bearing bracket. Fogged siChts. Turned sight rocticles. Binding elevation mechanism. Cracked base plates. Broken platfom stakes. 1. During clearing operations in bariboo forests, chain saws are of little value. Vines become easily entangled in the saws and the bamboo 10







5 June 1966
Combat Operations After Action Report, Opration AUSTIN (RCS:

MACV J3-32> splinters cause many lacerations among the workers. m. Package petroleum products should be issued in quarts. 55 gal drums are too larga to allow for efficient distribution to units. n. The hoist for aero-medical evacuation is invaluable in jungle acas; however, the present hoist needs modification to increase its reliability.
' o. Newly infiltrated IVA units engaged at the border were extremely

vulnerable to attacks for the folT intC easonst (1) They had just finished a long and harrowing journey that -:ft them physically and psychologically unprepared for combat. (2) They were inexperienced in combat.

(3) Not knowing the terrain, they were forced to use existing ..ad and trail networks, especially when guides were not available and thus urld be easily detected by LRRP type patrols and later ambushed. (4) Hany units infiltrate without their heavy weapons or all of their individual weapons. 16. (C) Recommendations:

a. That commando marking kits (balloons with 02 capsules) or hand held smoke flares be issued to uni.ts to assist in marking location in jungle terrain with thick canopy. b. That the Psychological Warfare capabilicy be incre.sed by increasing the size and capability oe the supporting detachment. The following
are considered essential:

(1) More and better broadcasting capability. (2) Increased photo reproduction capability. (3) Greater printing capability. c. That sufficient Psy War aircraft be attached or remain in the Brigade area during an operati on. d. Present methods of destroying large quantities of captured rice ,ton'.!nuo to be inadequate aid time consuming. A quick and efficient means of lestroying large quantities of rice is needed. e. Many tines individuals were forced to sleep on leech infested terrain. Consideration should be given to issuing a lightweight jungle hammock. f. During the monsoon season when resupply may be delayed due to inclement weather, Infantry Battalions are forced to carry additional ammunition. In this connection, a lightweight plastic, disposable magazine for the Ssoldie'. M.-16 is needed to reduce the weight carried by the individual g. That the hoist for aero-medical evacuation be modified to increase its reliability.



Coz bat Operations After Action Report, Operation AUSTIN (RCS:
MACV J3-32)

h. That the This will greatly increase their be issued during navigational beacon. direct support Aviation Battalion capability the portable adverse weather conditions and at night. i. That two U-6 aircraft be assigned to the Brigade to handle minor resupply and administrative missions so that the Brigade's 0-1 aircraft can be used solely for operational reconnaissance and surveillance.


Brigadier Genural, USA Commanding Inelosures: 1 - Personnel and Administration 2 - Intelligence w/2 Inw1s 3 - Operations Overlay, Operation AUSTIN 2 4.- Operations. Overlay, Operation AUSTIN 6 5 - Logistics w/2 1zj1s'.
6 - Commnictions

7 8 9 10


Civil Affairs Psychological Warfare Artillery w/2 Incls 12 Ecamples of personalized leaflets

Distribution: 1 - Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Dept of the Army, Washington D.C. 20310 1 - CG, USIRPAC (ATTN: GPOP-MH) 1 - CC, MCV (ATTN: MAC J343) 1 - CG MACV (ATTN: MhC J)
1 - CC


2 - CG USARV I - CO USARV (ATTN: AVO Historical Division) 2 - CO, 101st Abn Div, Ft Campbell, Ky' 1 - DCO


S 1 -sX
1 -32 10 -3,s34 i1-SS


- io 1 -10





Inclosure I (Personnel and Admi-istration) to After Action Report, Operation AUSTIN

a. The Brigade personnel strengths at the AUSTIN were as follows: Authorized Augmented Assigned Joined - Not Assigned Present for Duty Not Present for Duty Aix-head Base Camp (Phan Rang) Tuy Hoa 5062 6008 183 5143 582 2462 1402 1279

nclusion of Operation

b, The assigned strength was 124% of the augmented authorized strength; the present for duty strength was 107% of the augmnted authorized strength. c. Of the riot present for duty strength, 362 were hospitalized personnel. Because of casualties, ETS losses, and the number of personnel remaining in a hospitalized status, rifle company present for duty strengths were reduced during the operation. d. ,The Brigade now has 21 ARVN NCO interpreters and 3 LNO's assigned. 2. (C) Casualties: a. Casualties for Operation AUSTIN 2 were as follows:


WIA 15


b. Casualties for Operation AUSTIN 6 were as follows:




3. (U) ,roarams:
a. The Brigade continued to operate a Forward.Personnel Services Canter of AG, .Postal, and Finance representatives and scheduled periodic :isits to units of JAG and Red Cross representatives. With one battalion at Tuy Hoa, an increasing number of replacements at Phan Rang, and the Brigade -) at Phan Thiet, it became necessary to temporarily augment administrative personnel in order to meet all necessary personnel services requirements. b. The newly arrived Red Cross Recreatins Unit formulated its program of services to the Brigade and established a temporary office at th6 Base Camp. The unit initiated visits to troopers at Tuy Hea and Phan Thiet. Response was excellent. A recreation center is also being constructed at the Base Camp. c. the Brigade One Special at the Phan To take advantage of the excellent beach facilities at Phan Thiet, established a swimming beach co-located with the shower point. Service entertainmont group provided a variety show performance Thiet airstrip.

d. In order to expedibe award of the Purple Heart to members of the Brigade -who are wcinded in action btt not evacuated, the Drigade requested authority to award the Prple Heart. 1. (U) 9_ ," Morale during the operation remained "excellent.

. .

Inclosure 2 (In1elligencs) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation AUSTIN 1. (0) OPRATION AUSTIN 2:


a. Weather: The weather in the PHAN Z{IET area vas under the influence of the transition from the ME to SW monsoon seasons. There was relatively little rairfall and drought conditions generally prevailed in the coastal plain. Cloud cover and severe :-.nds occurred infrequently. In general the weather had no effect on friendly operations, except that the shortag. of water adversely affactod both VO and friend1l movecnt.. b. Terrain:

(1) -The terrain in.the area of operations was'characterized by extensive rice paddies in the LA NGA River valley, and mountainous terrain to the east of PILAd THIET. Cross country movement was restricted to trails and stream beds in the mountains and jungle. (2) The mountain area northwest of PHibN TkiIET provided cover and concealment and limited fields of fire. In the area to the east, the heavy jungle provided good concealment and fair cover, while observation and fields of fire we :c s,-vrely limited. Terrain generally favored small xuit guerrilla tactics.

(3) The principal avenues of approach were Route 1 to the LVorth and South and the unnumbered route I to I4JONG DN. Secondary avenues of approach were along branches of the KAO'ET River from the SW and the LA NGA River from the West and North.
c. EneZy Situation: to be locattd as follows: Initially Viet Cong units were believed

(1) The 186 Main Force battalion reported by a rallier North and West of PHAN THIET in the DANG ;GIA VC base area. (2) The 602 Provincial Battalion and the companies of the 603 Provincil Battalion located North and East of PIMN THI!1D in the LE HONG PHONG VC base area. (a) Unconfirmed reports indicated that the 48th VC RegiLient was located north of :''1 TMET.

(4) Thr'ee beparate local force companies, 12 guerrilla platoons and an estimated 1,000 local guerrillas were scattered throughout the area of interest. Aggregate VC strength was estimated at 4,300 personnel. (5) The DONG GIA Base area, North and West of PIUN THIET was believed to contain the B.300 VC Province Headquarters, a medical facility and two VC PO1 camps. The area was aiso believed to be a storaga area for rice, salt, and weapons.
The LE HONG PHONG VC be , area, North an& Fast of P'AN TH'IET was believed to contain threu VC district headquarters, rice storage and food production ateae d. Results:

(1) Order of Battle
, (a) As a result of a sweep operationn tw D6ng ia,B.se &rea, one unidentified VO platoon was' contacted and two popular force prisoners of the VO-were liberted. :No significant cmnps or .documents

were found.


Inclosure 2 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation AUSTIN (b) A sweep directed against LE HONG PiONG resulted one contact with an n,.identified platoon. The cal, ure of one prisoner from Company 486, 602nd Battalici and the discovery of a VC Political headquarters. The myth that the DANG GIA and LE HONG PHONG areas (o) wore major VC base areas was disspelled. There were numerous intications that tey werc used by the local VC, but not on the scale that was believed prior to our entry into the area.

(d) VC units and their locations for Operation "AUSTIN
211 are as follows:

UNIT 48th Regiment



EVALUATION Unconfirmed


186 1F Battalion
602 Battalion

AN 7940 ZT 1334
BN 100300 BN 100300

Mar 4 Apr


320 120

486 co 487 Cc

BN 100300



488 Co
603 Battalion 440 Co 450 c 400 HIQ Section
460 Company

BN 100300 BN 010480
BN 220330 AN 955165 ZT 180340

100 1

489 Co

115 110


490 Company 430 Platoon Guerrilla Units:

BN 520480 AN 825190

ZS 220970

60 75


ZT 254046'
BN i0518 BIT 10020 BillN 075185



""24 Ift

14 243 36




" "



ZT 230180 ZT 270030 AN 830190 BN 050330 BN 016230 AN 930170

" "

" "



17 27 36 16 26 20

AN 940200 " " THUAN HOK AN 950150 " " HONG HAI Part time guerrillas, scattered (2) VC personnel a.a z~aipment losses:' 12b of this After Action Report. e. Significant VC Engagements and Losses:

1,000 See paragraph

(1) 121445 Apr at ZT 234358 12 YC were engaged by Recon 2/502 resulting in the release of two PF that were prisoners of. the VC. PF stated that contact permitted 56 other prisoners to escape. (2) 121555 Apr at ZT 098286 approx 25 VC engaged LRRP Team #1 resulting in 5 VO KIA (BC) before team was extracted. " (3) 211000 Apr at BN 020318 a VO was captured by B/2/502. VC stated he was a member of the 486th Company. (4) 211100 Apr the 2/502 found what appeared to be a VO Admin area, possibly an induction center, based on the number of alplicdtions to join the National Fiont for the Liberation of SVN found. 2-2.




Inclosure 2 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report,

Operation AUSTIN f. Lessons Learneds Our operations again proved that the best intelligeme is that gained by units on the ground. The DMIG IA and
LE HONG IPHONG Base areas (especially the latter) had been built up into

maj;ior base areas on information gathered from agents, ralliers, local '..!.lians and visual reconnaissance. This information proved to be
ex remely sketchy and unreliable when checked against the actual grouni.





Inclosure 2 (Intelligence)- to Combat Operations After Aotion Report, Operation AUSTIN 2. (C) Oeration AUSTIN 6:

a. Terrain: The area of operations consisted of mountainous terrain rising to heights of 900 motors. About 75 pereont of the terrain wao covered with jungle, which included a canopy as high as 100 feet and . k.& underbrush. The plateau area around flu Prong was relatively open. Ob~prvation and fields of fire were fair to excellent and cover and concoaiment vaie from poor to good. Extremely hcavy 6-rowths of bamboo w-ere encountered around Bu Gia Map where observation and fields of fire 'ere poor, and cover and concealment varied from good to excellent. ibri=,ry avenues of approach were 10o 14 from the North and South, the unnumbered East-West road along the Cambodian border, and the Song Be River from the West. Theo terrain favored enemy ifiltration operations by peoviding concealment from aerial observation, ard restricted our operations because of the lack of landing zones# especially in the Bu Gia Map area. b6 Weather: May was the beginning of the Southwest monsoon and there was an increase in cloudiness and precipitation. Jigh wlialu

occurred infrequently, but rain and low cloud conditions usually began each afternoon at 1500 hours and last"4i until 1000 hours-the following
morning. The weather severely lir-i't, our aerial activity and restricted visibility during morning hours when ground fog was prevalent. These weather conditions favored the enemy by concealing his. activity and movement from our aerial observation.

o. Prior to Operation AUSTIN 6, little was known about enemy activity in northern Phouc Long and western Quang Duo xovinces. The following information was available at the beginning of the operations folowng (1) Major VC infilvration routes crossed the I/ill Corps
boundary and the Cambodian border in this area.

tt t (2) AJVC captain captured near Song Be in April stated that the 602-608 NVA infiltration groups were near Bu Gia Map.
(3) A VC provincial headquarters (B6) was believed to be located near the II/Ill Corps boundary southwest of Bu Gia Map. d. During the operation, the intelligence situation developed rapidly. Because this development was so unique in its scope and timeliness, detailed description of aevelopment is Includod in Icl 1 (Development o. Intelligence in the Bu Gia Map Area) to Inclosuro 2 (Intelligence). e. Results:

(1) Order of Battle: As a result of Operation AUSTIN 6, the following major units were identified by POV's, doutrents and ID

cardas (a) Infiltration group. 141st NVA Regiment alias 14th Regiment alias 304th

This regiment was identified in Pleiku province in April 1966 -and was reported by POW's to be moving to War Zone 1). POW's and naps taken in the Bu -Gia Map area further irdicated that the 141st was moving to War-Zone D.

delaying action against the advance elements of the 2/502 If and A/2/17

2 The 3rd Battalion, 141st NVA Regiment fought a

Cay on 10 and 11 May in the vicinity of YU 2634. This action rendered the 3rd Battalion ineffective as-a fighting forcei Total results of this engagement were: 69 VC XIA (BC), 74 VC KIA (est), three LMG's and nine individual weaponR captured. 2-4


_ __ _




!nalosure 2 (Intelligonco) to Combat Operations After Actioh Report, Opc.ration AUSTIN n It is believed that tie 141st '(egiment with .rew

northwest into Cambodia on or about 11 VYV. A The 141st Regiment is believed to consist of three infantry battalions (numbered 1, 2, and 3) and specialized supporting companies. The 3rd Battalion, 141st Regiment is composed of three rifle companies (numbered 11, 12, and 13) and a heavy weapons comany. Weapons of the battalion include four 60rm mortars per company and light rachineguns. The heavy weapons conpany has three 82rm mortars and heavy rachineguns. The regimental commander is Lt Col Trac and the 3rd Bat.. tlion Commander is Captain Than.

± epment.°


250A NVA Regiment alias Bae Son (North Mountain)

1 This regiment is believed to be composed of Battalions numbered 603 through 605 and specialized conpanies designated 0-13 through C-19. 2 A prisoner taken from the 608th Battalion indicated that four of the separate companies of the Bac Son Regiment arc

in this battalion:

C-13 (Infantry),

C-16(ortar and Heavy Machinegun). moved north into Combodia.

0-14 (Engineer), C-15 (Signal), and He stated that the battalion had

3 This regiment is believed to have infiltrated by battalion toward Bu Nard (YU 0919) from the Bu Gia Map area on 18-30 April. . (e) Infiltration Group 609:
1 Identification cards of the 609A and 609D battalion size infiltration groups were recovered from several VC MOs. These cavds indicated the presence of an NVA Regiment using 609 as its infiltration number.

2 Prisoners consistently reported the presence of three regiments (16th, 141st, and 250A) in the area. Compositions of the 141st avd 250A regiments :s dsorained above do not include elements of the 609th infiltration g:- g. The 609th infiltration group may also be known as the 16th Regiment. (d) VC B6 (Phouc Long Province) Headquarters

Y. 1/327 Inf overran the VC Province Headquarters via YIJ 4424 on 16 May.,T
Mates, personnel and weapons rosters for the five district companies,

.2 Captured documents included :intelligence astir

after action reports, reports on the US buildup, captured ARVN documents, and large amounts of VC propaganda. during Operation AUSTIN 6. (2) VC personnel and equipment losses: this After Action Report. f. Intellie;unce Analysio, Lessons Learned: () Analysis:
(e) log iq l st qj Y units and their locations

See para 12c-



Inclosure 2 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation AUSTIN (a) The Bu Gia lap area was a major VC supply base and rest station as imdicated by the capture of 80 tons rice and large amounts of mortar and 1R ancrnition. (b) The presence of three NVA Regiments indice.tes the possibility of a VC division size unit opcrating in this area. Two of the regiments (141st and Bac Son) were reported to be infiltrating towards War Zone D. (c) As indicated by POW's, units infiltrating into South Vietnam have low morale because of home sickness and hardships endured during infiltration. POW's indicate that they are receiving about five months basic training before starting infiltration, and some newly drafted NVA soldiers are only fifteen years old. h s eThe malaric rate of infiltration groups is as high as 90 percent with an average five.peroent death rate. Desertion is high in infiltration units. One POW reported that twenty percent of his company had deserted during infiltration. (e) POW's reported that heavy weapons are issued upon arrival in South Vietnam. (f) VC B6 (Phouo Long) Province infrastructure was significantly damaged with the capture of the Provirie Headquarters complex and the many records of the headquarters. (2) Lessons Learneds

(a) The apparent lack of adequate VC coMunica-ions enabled us to engage many smal enemy elements without. alerting other enemy forces in the area. Engaemeats with these small groups of INVA soldiers enabled us to take prisoners and capture documente from vhich we were able to rapidly determine the enemy's strenth and disposition. (b) Extremc:,y accurate informaticn provided by a VC rallier-combined with Red Haze, Special Agent Reports, ane' our knowledge of the infiltration routes, wore the intelligence factors which enabled us to locate and overrun a major VC base. (o) In areas such as Bu Gia Map, where friendly forces have not challenged the VC for a log ,period, the VO tend to become as nonchalant about seeur r as we do in our safe areas* It was this false sense-of security, and our clandestine entry into the area that made the surprise of our attack so complete.

2 Inclosures: 1 - Development of Inteoiigenoe in the Bu Gia Map Area
- VC Units and Locations, Operation AUSTIN 6





Inol 1 - (Development of Intelligence in the

Bu Gia Map Area) to Inclosure

2 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation AUSTIN

1. 4 May - 01-E on a VR mission received fire off the south end of Bu Gia Map Airfield. 2. 041240 May - Bde aerial observer received fire at YU 338365.

3. 061600 May B/2/502 capti:ted an ammunition cache at YU 344372 consisting of 100 rds 57mm HR, 68 rds 60mm Illum, 24 rds 60mm HE, 63 rds 8lom Illum, 8 rdd 81mm RE, approx 300 rda .45 aaT, and, approx .2000 rds .223 cal (M-16). Two fresh sigas (ballpoint ink on cardboard) indicated the ammunition had switched from control of enemy province headquarters to Militar* Region VI headquarters, and that the 840th I9 Battalion had illegally drawn two rde of 57mm RH ammunition. One sign stated that units must coordinate with Military Region VI Hqs before drawing additional ammunition from the cache.
4. 061635 May C/2/502*captured 1 NVA soldier with pack at YU 336365.

a. filtration Bn,ehe prisoner stated rno Son (North Mountain) Regiment. TVA-inwhich is in the Boo war a rifleman in the 608th His unit rested near Bu Gia Map one month (via YU 311339), and departed to movo north across the Cambodian border on 3 May. b. He stated the 608th"Battalion has' 300 mn organized into four companies. The battalion has two 81mm mortars r.th twenty =:s of ammunition each, two heavy machineguns with 400 rds per gun, AK-47's with 100 rds each, and SKS's with 50 rds each. the general health condition of the unit is poor. The 608th has never supplied replacements
to other units.


Sbujeot's knowledge of elements of the 608th Bn: (1) En HQs s

Bn XO Plat Off

Duong Nhan


13th Compan4.

CO X0 let Plat Ldr
2nd, "
" "

l/Lt Cam lo/,t




2/Lt Mac MI/Sgt Quang, CWO Nguyen Dhu Done
There are three

Subject was a member of this company.

platoons with three squads of.nino men. Ahe e is*no weapons squad;. RAch squad has four or five A-47's o04AK-50's. Company strength is
about 60 of 100,authorized. The ur._ has never been in battle. Three men have deserted, three died of malaria and 34 were left behind because

of malaria.

(3) 14th

Company (conbatugineers),
Capt Cau -



-also purify water for medical purposes. They have shovels, pic'.u, and kniva. aend Ate armd with AK-471s, 11K-50'., and 31's. Each platoon has a ligvt PG. There are 30 men in each platoon. Pour or five men of this unit have died" of malaria.
* C2 " 2-A.;1

Mission is to prepare roads and act as infantry.


Incl 1 -(Development

of Intelligence in .the Bu Gia Map Area) t Inclosure

2 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation AUSTIN

(4) 15th Company (Combat Communications): There are three platoons in the company. Company equipment includes three telephones and two HT-I radios. Ten personnel carry approximately one RL-159 (equivalent) of wire (two IMs per man). Weapons of the company are

AK-47's, SKS's and two K-44 Russian 7.62mm Mosin-Nagant carbines.

(5) 16th Company (Heavy Weapons):
CO li/Lt Man

The company has three 30 man platoons, two 82m mortars with 10 rds of ammunition each, and two 12.7mm heay machinegans. d. Subject heard other personnel mention that the 603rd _..filtration Battalion movod south. e. On 5 May he observed 60 rice porters moving along the road

at YU 311339, headed towards Bu Gia Map.
Subject was carrying a notebook with hospital records, supply f. records, and rice receipts. He stated he did not own the notebook but that he had picked it up as he left the company camp to use as cigarette papar. (He did not chaxge his explanation throughout interrogation). (1) The hospittl records indicate an important enemy hospital is near Bu Gia Map. They listed 200 sick personnel froa the 603rd, 604th, 605th, and 608th NVA irnift-n..on battalions who were treated by the hospital during April 1966. (2) The supply records indicate that there is a supply base near Bu Gia Map which is subordinate to Military Region VI Hqs.

(3) The rice receipts indicated that units which drew rice at Bu Gia Map during the month of April were the 603rd, 604th, 605th,
and 608th NVA infiltration battalins, the 840th MF VC battalion, and the


C13, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18 companies (suspected separate NVA companies).
5. 061930 May B/2/502 discovered an abandoned VC camp with seven huts capable of housing Z0 personnel at YU 349345.
6. 070645 May B/2/502 engaged 5 VC vic YU 353367. VC KIA (BC), 1 VCC, 1 MAT 49 captured. Results: 2

a. The VCC was an ammunition bearer in the C-7 mortar company (NVA). The company has 110 men. Five men died of malaria during infiltration. The unit h's not been issued its full comrlement of weapons. It has no mortars, and there arc only 20 AK-47's end ten French MAT 49 Thd remainder of the personnel carry grenades. submachineguns. b. The prisoner left his company on 7 May with four other personnel with instructions to pick up ammunition at the airfield. After capture he led elements of B/2/502 to a-caqp at YU 381358 consisting of eight huts which appeared to have been evacuated two days previously. He stated his company had been resting at the camp for two months to recoup from the long trip and many cases of ialaria. c. The subject said everyone in his unit hat malaria to some when captured). About 15/ were degree, (he was suffering froz..a serious cases and cannot walk. 'ik:.. company has never been engaged, r is vory low, and the men are sick and afraid of fighting. d. The -company was supplied rice, They -went to B-i to draw supplies. 2-Asauce, -and salt by 13-1.


Ici 1 -(Development of Intelligence in the Bu Gia Mp Area) to Inclosure
1% ' 2 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report, AUSTIN Operation 31:


070950 May

-/2/502 discr ered three tons of rice buried at YU 361YW59.

071020 lMaY B/2/502 discovered a'VO camp with four huts which
VC withdrew SE.

appeared to have been abandoned three or four weeks at It 3513484

9. 071450 May A/2/502 engaged fifteen VC at YU 316367.

10. 071546 May B/2/502 engaged one sniper at YU 375353. Results, one VO KIA (BC), captured one unidentified bolt action weapon.
11. 080725 May A/2/502 engaged five VC at YU 307354. one VC KIA (BC), two packs and one'nK-47 c~ptured. Results:

a. A set of North Vietnamese i:100,000 maps classified SECHET covering the oastal area from the Delta north to Nha Trang and of War Zone D (vic Ben Cat) were found with the body. b. The dead man cariied ;n ID card indicating he was a member of the 304A YnIA .Attalion, c. Two VG" and one returnee in the PLEIKU-KNTUM area in the month of April indicated the 304th Infiltration Group is the 141st Regt

of the 312th NVAL Diision.

The infiltwation group includes four

,battalion size groups:

304 A, B, C, and D.

T'hose personnel stated

that the infiltration group was infiltrating .outh to War Zone D. The 304A infiltration group is the 2nd Bn, 141;L .1.gt and has 500 men. The CO is Capt Cha Thanh Vinh.
12. 080901 May A/326 Engr discovered one ton ,C polished rice at YU

338376. 13.

080930 May A,'2/502 engaged a sniper, at YU 3. 3358.
one unidentified bc.t action weapon c apureda.



VC IaA (BC),

081500 May A/2/502 discovered a hut with two tons of oats at

YU 318339.

automatic weapons at YU 299335, results: captured. 16. 17.

O8louiO May A/2/502 engaged an 'unknown number of VC with many

one VO IIA" (BC), one AK-47

081855 ,&Y A/2/502 engaged a sniper at YU 299388. 081950 May Reconnaissance Pictoon 2/502 smrounded a snail VO
Results: two VC CIA (BC), captured one unidentified

i,:Ce at YU 299388.

bolt action weapon, one RPG-2 rocket launcher, and twelve packs containing 24 rockets and documents. a. The two deal men carried ID cards of the 304D infiltration Bn.

b. Documents were weapons rosters, passwords ard countersigps, and personnel rosters from B-3 platoon, U/I company, 304D battalion.

The platoon has- a strength of 25 man of khom seven are AWOL. The platoon is an-,d w-ith eight AK-47's, and six SKS carbines. Squads in the platoon
are~nunbered A7, 8, and 9.

18. 1%
VO 'i

090t15 May A/2/502 found one RPGT2 rocket launcher at YU 299388. 090720' May A/2/502 enga 6ne VO at YU 299388. Results: one two
(BF1I The dead rancrried an ID card of the 304D battalion.


. o 4n May B/2/502 engaged two VC at YU 384306. Result.: (B and an one 13 oarbine captured.

24?17.4 A.




of Intelligence in the Bu Oia Mal Area) to Inclosuro

2 (Intelligenco) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation AUJSTIN

VC KIk (BO), captur


one A-47.
reported a 100 ton

9 MY an inforer at .luang Duo Sector Eqt

rice storage area vio 383858.

Aerial !photography shows tents just across the Cambodian border in the same arna at YU 383595 (3), YU 379592 (3), and YU 380586 (2). 23. 9 MaY received report from Pouc Long sector Hqs that a rallier from VC*.ilitary 0510 stated as follows: a. b. YU 440238. o. VC Provincial committee base vic YU 455262. Army medical base vic YU 455252, and a military base vie 300 barrels of rice stored vie YU 455270.

d. A large rice cachb was moved from Bu Gia Map to vie YU 350290. e.

liters of rice is stored at YU 285065. 4M) at this location.

Milk, fish juice, su.r, local cigarettes, salt, ard 5200

There are also five houses (6M X

f. The cadre of the VC military committee have announced that they will attempt to have an operation in Phouc Long ?.rovince very soon. *24. 091915 May sector agent reports a POW camp with one US prisoner between YLJ 222273 and YU 228281.

25. 26.

100715 May A/2/502 engaged one VC at YU '277348.



VC IA (BC), captured one ChiCom carbine.

100930 Nay A/2/502 engaged ore VC moving east on a trail at YU
Results," one VC XIA (BC), captured one A-47. Results: one

27. 101015 May A/2/502 engaged five VC at YUT 274348. VC IA (BC), one VCC, capturad two AK-47's. a.

VCC was a master sergeant in the 2nd Squad, lst Pit, 2nd Co,

3rd Bn, 141st Regt. He was manring a guard post in front of his company when captured.
b. The prisoner stated that four compb.itc- wexe dug-in in an ambush position with indirect fire support forty -inutes walk west of the point of capture, and that three more companies wcze located one and one-

half hours walk west on the same trail*

o. He located his Bn CP at a clearing between YU 233353 and YU 222361, and the 141st Regt CP vie YU 1838. It is the general policy that each Bn is sepolated by a one hour march, and the regimental-CP is a four hour march to the rea-. d. Once a week members of his company received supplies from a supply point one half a day's march away. e. The prionor stated there are three companies in each Bnp, ,nd three Bns in the 141st Regt. There are 120 men in his company. The unit is now short 20 men because of malaria and desertion. Each company is ar-d -th one, 82mm mortar, three 60.m mortar;. The mortars were isau'Ad in h flu ia Map area. Each squad has a light MG, A-47's B

and EF.3' s. The company has an adequate food supply, is sometimes short of aimniti6h, and always ahort of clothing.



fnol 1

-(Development of Intelligence in the Bu Gia Map Area) to Inclosure 2 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation AUSTIN

f. Unit morale is low. All men are draftees and are homesick. The prisoner was Ircifted in April 1965.

28. 101258 May B/2/502 observed four VC at YU 315308. dropped packs end fled northwest ona trail.
size enemy base oamp at YU 270334. day.

The VC

29. 101325 May Reconnaissance platoon 2/502 discoyered a bat telion
It had been occupied within the past

30. 101445 May Reconnaissance platoon 2/502 engaged company to The bodies battalion size unit at YU 278345. Results 18 VC IA (BO).
were stripped by the enemy. 31. 101445 May A/2/502 engaged VC briefly at YT 260353. three VC KIA (BC), captured threeAK-47's. 32. 101610 May B/2/502 engaged VC sniper at YU 319322. one VC KIA (BO), captured one US osbine. Results, RIesults:

33. 101740 May C/2/502 captured one VCC with n vie YU 279348.

OG-2 rocket launcher

a. The prisoner was a meiber of ClI Co (stated it was known as 104 during infiltration). He did not seem to know his Bn and Regt designations (mentioned 2nd Zn, 3rd Bno 3rd Aset, 341st Rogt and 041 Regt during interrogation). Us believedhis 13n CP was located vi YU 275335. b. He says tkpt there are only 30 men in his company - during infiltration 20 men deserted and 0Q dip4d,of malaiia .' Unit morale. is low beoaus( men are homesick. o. His corzany had set an ambush vie YU 310339& His unit became scattered when everyone ren at the sbund of gunphots. He was cap-

tured wandering by hizef.
d. months ago. ftbJeot wKs 15 years old, and ws dreSd into the aTmy five

34. 35. 36.

101825 May A/l/327 found a company miss bivoueo at YU 370310.

102015 MaY A/l/327 disoovered am=uuaition oao'he at YU 349377.
notax ammtlmition.

The cache contained 49 rds 60m and 53 rds Sla

102035 May./i/427

amnuw 1,,.s t4gge;

ly three to 1foW VC at

YU 377317. 37. 111045 May A/2/502 was fired upon.1W twvo snpers at YU 261348. 111050 May A/2/502 engaged reinforced VC platoon at YU 261349.


The engagement continued through the afternoon. Vaemy force increased during the battle to an-estimated two companies. The onemy was dug in and communications wive had been laid in the position. The enemy force was enveloped by A/2/17 Car from its tear. Airetriks a and 1500 rds of artillery were called, upon the enemy trapped between our forces. At 1600 the enemy broke contact ant withdrew northwest (probably along a

trail vie YU 255245, YU 240355, YU 210370 YU 180390).

iA (0c), 59 VC KIA (eat), 15-VC IbA (est),.oaptured three-MG and nine iWdividual w~apons.

Besults' 51 VC

-9 01 XVi 1/3?7 diaocvercd1 three tons of vice at YU 353367. 1 c
40. 111340 May A/1/327 diioovored two VC bodies in black pajamas and pi:cos of two destrcyod weapons at 'YU 347403. Th.s was an apparent result of our 1W fires.



t +,--

InI 1 -(Development of Intelligence in the Bu Gia Map Area) to Inclosure
2 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation AUSTIN 41. 111540 May A/1/327 engaged five VC at YU 355365. and were -ra&'. ,uto a'woodlina.; 42. Two VC fell:

111540 May /327 discovered a Montagnard village (50 personnel)

and 75.tons of rice at YU 363350. The ri6e wi.l be evacuated and the Montagnards have also requested ext;aotion.

43. 11 Unr captured documents Andloate the enery has drawn large quantities of foodstuffs vie Phouc Tinh.
44. 121300 May Reconnaissance Platoon 1/327 discovered three tons I

rioe in three hbuses at (U372366. 45. 121300 May A//327 discovered two company or larger bivouacs, one on each side of the river vicinity Yd 37988. Six hundred pounds
of rice was found in one bivouac. . 46. 121300 May A/2/502 engaged eight V from a range of 20 meters at YU 250354.- Our unit was surprised, because the enemy personnel wore US type unifoms wit1; fatigue .type caps. After the engagement one pistol belt and pack overed -4th blood w s capt~ired (one V KIA (est)). 47. 12143O14ay aerial observer reported bunkers and trench netork

at YU 243353. 48. 1220)0 May Long knge hec, iAis.ance Patrol was unable to infiltrate by helicopter at YU 17333irbeocaise of heavy AW fire. 49. 12 YU*243j26. Xa 2/502 veported 1 VP;KIA kBO Trw air or artillery at 50. 51. 122255 May 2/503 discovered 1000 pounds of vice at YU 280285. 12 My aerial bbservatiou.ieport: YU.12400, 3 boats in brush,

YU 218411, 4 boats in:biush; YU 245448, 4 boats in brush. 52. 131015 May A2/502 discovered VC base camp at YU 238368. The camp includes 15 huts and a 40-50 man hospital. Although no medical
supplies or documents were recovered, it was apparent that surgery had been performed in the hospital. The camp had beer bean abandonad in the past two days.

53. 131100 ay 1/327 reported-seven-Moitagnards dame to their CP at Du Gia Mip airfield, The Montagnards stated: thay they had been held prisoner last night 'ut had esoa,:d. They stated -there are many VC four hours march away, but couli not give a direction. 54. 131620 May Drigade Aeri&l S) at YU 2124b6. Oservear received ground Lire (Mi &

55. 132115 May Bde radio relay at YU 184608 received greande and SA probe. 56. 13 May Visual

Il1connaiapsoo Reports
Stock pen wtbtwo w'nter buffalo.

YU 380592 YU 383596 YU 343568
YU 275474

ple 1 house - 3 .. ran. 1 house - 1 man. Camouflaged house.,
People tending fish traps.

YU 2'2406 YO 213394 YU 216392

Two 3-' rafts, four 15' rafts, one 12' boat, received pound fre (SA and AW). Vivo people on trail, ran into woods. Seven people in clearing, ran.,

Incl 1- (Development of Intelligence in the Bu Gia Map Area) to Inclosure 2 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation AUSTIN

57. 1410005 May A/2/17 Cay discover43 VC KLA (BC) at YU 361359. Bodies were three or four days old. 58. 141030 May LRRP Team 1 discovered three tons of rice at YU 1772899. 141230 May A/2/502 engaged 15 VC at YU 194362.
a. ID cards taken from the bodlesi



4 VC

KIA (BC), captured 2 AX-47's. 2 cards from Dean (Bn) 609A. 2 cards from Dean (Bn) 609D.


Followi-ag documents wore captured:

(1) Communist party ID and passport for Trinh Ban De, ?FC, 24th Co, 308th Division. (2) Rice receipts: from 14th Regt and 141st Regt. one from 609th unit (Regt?) and one

(3) Receipt from unidentified unit for one pair Russian binoculars,. one compass and 2 " map sheets.

5, 61 7, and.8i

Personnel and woa1:=o3 rosters. for squads Alt 2, 3, 4,
Platoon 'size uniz :2 is composed of A5, 6, 71 arA 8.

xoturn address of B2 is 3158A, C2, H20. (5) Song books for Liberation Army.
60. 141300 May A/2/502 captured 1 VC WIA at YU a237354. a. b. guns. Captive was a PFC, 13th Co, 3rd Bn, 141st Regt. The 3rd Bn has four companies: 11th, 12th, 13bh, and an

Artillery Company armed with three 82mm mortars, and tkree heavy machineThe battalion has no ammunition for the mortars. c. Captive stated the 14th Regt is the code designation for the 141st Regt. He located the 2nd an, 141st Regt at Bu Dop (YU 0030) and the lst Bn and 141st Regt Hqs vie YU 2546. His regiment was supposed to proeed to Ong Cu DS-9. d. The captive's CO told him there were two other regiments in. the area: the 16th !.gt vie YU 2341, and the Bac Son (North Mountain) Regt, unlocated. e. Captive stated his company left IMN with 124 men, but only 40 men were in an ambush position during an engagement with the 2/502

on 10 May.

(50% of the company has malaria).

The prisoner was wourded

in this engagement and states that his company and the llth Company were severely mauled. The engagemient with the 2/502 on 11 May rendered the 12th Company ineffective.

/ 61. 141315 May 2/502 reported many footprints across a B-52 crater vie LU 195360. 62. 141445 May A/2/502 reported hearing what seemed to be troops
Artillery was fired

digging in vie YU 192375.

negative results.

63. 141715 May-A/i/321 discovered a trail lined onboth sides with newly emplaoed puji -stakes at YU 453286.

64. 141750 May -Reconnaissance platoon 1/327 discovered a VC- cmp at YU 448318. It appeared to have been deserted for slme-time. 2-A-7




- (Development of Intelligence in the Bu Gia Map Area) to Inclosure h.1 2 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After. Action Report, Operation AUSTIN


AiI P 74 A-,


141810 May A'2/502 discovered a large base camp .ith 60-70

hiiti at YU 192378. 66. 141830 May C/2/502 discovered a VC base camp at YU 225360.

67. 151030 May C/1/327 engaged 5-6 VC at YU 420257, discovered slightly prepared position, carbine magazine, weapon stock, documents, black clothing, trails leading SE and cocmmunioations wire leading to a camp at YU 421254. Many trails lead SE from the area. 68. 151220 May C/l/327 engaged 5-6 VC at YU 426254.

69. 151330 May B/1/327 disoover. extensive, recently ubed trail complex at YU 445250. 70. 151348 May 2/503 discovered VC waystation at YU 255294. Freshly prepared food was on tables, rmd documents dated 31 April were found. 'e main route from the way station is on an azimuth of 2250. RIA (BC), oapturnd one Mauser 98. Discovered several buildings and tables inthe area. 72. 151430 May 1/327 discovered large complex of trails and buildings vio YU 431245.
71. 151415 May B/I/327 engaged 12-VC at YU 444253. Results, 1 VC

73. 151453 May Aerial Observer discovered bridge at YU 163338.
74. 151525 May A/1/327 engaged three VC with AW vicinity YU 468274. Est 1 VC WIA. Three VC appeared to be wearing j.ngle fatigues. Documents captured at the location included letter to the CO of K58 POW camp: "Special attention will be given one US POW and 2 VN POWs". The letter was dated 11 May and further warned the camp CO to be ready to move in five minutes (included some information of our operations in tfe area.) 75. 160155 May 1/327 CP at YU 366310 received" two rds SA fire. 76. 160725 May A/l/327 captured one VC WIA with Mo.in-Nagnt 44 rifle at YU 480258.
secrity The platoon had tn othei His (%6). section, .assignad responsibilityamedsecurity of VC Pistolsmn for with .45 cal province b. He said the 141st Regt was on the C.%mbodian border and two other U/I VC/NVA regiments and five local force companies are in Phouc Long Province. One ocmpany was assigned to each district, shd one each to K-58 and K-6 District HQs. K-58 is vic YU 480258 Iere subject was captured, and K-6 is 8-10 Km to the east. camp until 15 May. The prisoner's name was McLean (or something similar). He wore camouflagcd fatigues and a green beret. He was captured in the battle of Bu Dang, in 1964. He has no wounds and is in good health. a. Captive was a warrant officer, the Plt Ldr of the 0-317

c. Captive stated an American prisoner was kept at K-58 POW

The US prisoner has been taken to K-59 District.

77. 161045 May B/I/327 observed 13 VC moving NE vie YU 450258. 78. 161230 May 2/503 found a voltage meter, made in the People's Republic of China, on trail at YU 204359.79. 161500 May G/1/327 discovered a hospitdi,.with medcal supplies and one bivilian radio at YU 440239.
2 • -4S


1bl 1 -(,eOvelopment of Intelligence in the Bu Gia Hap Area) to Inclosure 2 (Inteligence) to Combat Oparations Aftor Action Riport Operation AUSIN 80. 161523 Iay B/1/327 discovcred an abandoned village at YU 455235. 'el. 161930 lily D/l/327 fou u, a iqs area vie YU 440244.


The unit found one messhall (35 man c.,paeity), one dis,ensary (6 beds), one permanent barracks, several small huts, several ho~nkers, urder oonstruotion(apparently for future C?), 15 chickens,

15 ri's 7.62w, 30 rds cal .30' 4 stick grenedes, one 57mm 1i. z'i, packages oe£ 1r. and small quantity of pills and morthiolate. e b. documents inCic*.te this was a VC Provinoe Hqs, with related installations. o. ooc'eunts also in.ic,-te that an .mericen, Captein Clayton, Holland, A/D Team 94, has been in. area. The M1OV 'ea. (uS6Y) at the Song Be atettod, that Capt Holland had been killed and a Sp/4 HO Clain haaL been captured. 82. 16 'RiyVisual Reconnaissanoe: ran at YU 263334. eight personnel with weapons

83. 170840 1hv 10th Avn Dn reported M aircraft receive( one hit at YU 241018. 84. 170905 May D/l/327 fourd dooupnt, 100 rin 7.62= end 14 ammunition drum at YU 4402414 85.: 170915 aircraft receive?, oe at ZU 000308. Hay l!,th Avn n-reported UdL 86. 170910 lay CV-2 receivod tree lUts at YU 9423. iter with a alf hit

87. 171000 Ilay B/1/327 fowun a portable ype written message at YU 440242. 88. 17 MAY Visual ReoonnaIusence,

YU 484395 - ) huts with possible trenches. .YU 485396 - Trenches in oollins.

YU 397221 -, people moving east
on trail. 9. Special Agent Reports during the operationt. 262-E .26 apr , 27Apr it 5 a'y
10 a~y 11 My S

LOCATIO' 1Y425258 YU 435257 Y1 380575 YU 424290 1 306458, YU 421279 " 410412 TU 46335s ~ YU 4386384.... YU 40032.6 YU560995 560047




Re.'iHaze Reports- sding tne -operation:


; .---


2.4-9" 2-A-9.


do v/Id.#L




Inal 1 - (Deve1op ent of Intelligonoo in the Bu Gia Hap Area) to Inclosre2 (Intelligenoe) to Combt O crmtni : Aftor Action ilepotp Operation AIbTIN D_. ,,iIo N - LOC.,oN YU 495313 YU 475321 , -YU 490280
YU 454300

- 32 031200-M45 16 17
" 15 34 60

051900 May
" "


YU 3539

YU 3636 YU 246302

122130 May It

16 .3 3

YU 253170 YU 256170 YU 258170
YU 370351


YU 375345

,, .18 1 1

2 28 2 20 8

YU 340160 Y 343163 YU 308200 YU 354176f1"'' YU 357169 YU 328181 YI 381135 YU 378130

1 4

1 5

YU 381129 YLT 381127 YU 385094 YU 393494




, -,











'[;1 2



Units and Locations'- uperation AUSTIN 6) to Inclosure 2


(Intelligence) to Cc.mbat 0,eratiuns Aftor Action Report Operation ALUSTIN


Units ilentii!d by all sources during Operation .USTIN 6. a. Units i(dentified or mentioned by ±rW's an1 ralliers.

14th tegt 16th alias 141st alias 304 lteg
Bao Son iRcgt 608th. Bn &%o Aegt Son CoMpanies 13, 14, 15, 16 1 608 Bn Biac Son iRegt 0-7 Mortar Company (Saamte) 3rd 13n 141st : e# C-11 Co 3rd n 141st Regt C-12 C " "t 11
C-13 Ca



C-510 P'iuoc Long, Military H. G-317 1'iuoo Long 'Province HQ Secuiltvr Aat K-6, I-58, K-59 ! .uc Log Dist HP, Phuoc Long Distriot Coe 270, 272, 515, 31 6 i 317
A-207 Ihuoo Long Dist Hq

b. Units identified by ID cards: 609 A 16th Regt? 609 D 304 A 304 D 14th nka 141st Iegt
O. Units i-Ientifiea

6o3 i n
60 4 Bn 6 604 Bn

by c. .'umentst

B~ o k 5 05 Dn Dnc Sonska 250OA

608 Bn 0-13 C-14 C-17 0-18 609 Unit (16th Regt?) 14th Unit ala 141st itegt aka 304


Bao Son Separate Companies


33-2 Plat Believed B-2 Plat

tV. be subordinate to e'huoa Long-Province

K-58 .wist Hq Phuoc Long C270 Ca
C271 Co Dist Companies Auoc Long .rgvince 0277 Co 840 VJ Bn - quan 2Juo H 500 unidentified unit. 2. Final Bno y Disposition

141st Regt NVA 250A - Bac Son 609 - 16th Regt
608 Bn 250k Rlegt

Camb ,*.±a YU 0919
Unlooated Cambodia


2000 1000
2000 400

.11 Nay ,Unconf Prob / O AP: XConf 1 May Unconf Poss
_14 May. . Unconf. Prob

840 Bn aka 120 186 Bn ,

Unlocatea, liem Duc- Dist


-- Conf

-- .-.







o------Oporation AUSTIN 6) to Inclosure 2


*-InclZ.'-(VC Units nwi Locations


(Intolligence) to Combat OpJation UNIT 145 (EW) Bk 81st Bn C-24 Co 0-70 Co 0-75 Co C-280 C-7 LCATION Kicn liuo I ist Khiom Duo Dist YU 8272 'Dao Lap Dist Khiem uo Dist IMen Duo Dist YU 318358

action Ro.=ort 01p.rtion AUSTIN DATE EVALUATION Cbnf Unconr Prob Conf " of II Unconf Prob

STRENGTH 130 350 140 60

y 27 I.. . 5 May




r, f

L 1._2---2 'gi 'VJ

h i
Inclosure 5 (Logistics) to After Action Report, Cperation AUSTIN L' (C)mGANIZATION FOR' SPP(' T' a. Support Battaliont (1) Headquarters Datachment: This section provided the command and control of Support Battalion (Forwcrd). It was-organized into ommrad, operations, cor-municaticns, and movements control sections.
(2) Supply Detachmenti This section was responsib:1e f ortfia receipt, storage, and issue of all classes of supply. It also provided a 1.-'igger s. ction and an Explosive Ordnance Disposal Team. (3) Maintenance Detachment: This section provided a repair capability for small arms, artillery, engineer, automotive, signal and .qvartermasterequipment. It *;s organized into a 'shop office, and a . eccaey and contact team. (M) deical Cwmpany,,-):, A,, clearing' station was established with a twenty bed capacity, a surgical section, a holding section, erergency treatment section, a dental section, and a graves registration section. b. Supporting Forces: (1) Forward Support Detachment, IFIA TRANG Support Commandt Coanded Icy Capb Donnelly. This unit provided the cnmmand and control of the supporting logistics area, and coordinated activities of the supporting units. This headquarters Was 1xtremely cobperative and responsive .throughout the opera3iQ , )j'J,(.9 ,

"' '"

(2) 10th Aviation Battalion:
•tactical and logistical operations.

To airmobile companies supported

(3) 135th Aviation Comapany: Provided CV-2 aircraft to transport supplies, repair parts, and personnel to and fran the forward area. Aircraft sorties allccated were not suffiesnt to support the logistict.

plan on all occasions.
(4) CH-s7 helicopter support was provided by l47th Aviation Company (Airmobile Medium) and Ist Cay Div (Airmobilo).

(5) 198th Aviation Company: Provided medical air evacuation 1
'throughout tlie operation.




Forward Supprt Detacipient, NHA MANG SuppQ't Command
This provided an efficient operation

and Support Battalion were collocat 1. ani reduced handling of supplies.

(1) Class I- "B" and "0 ration-meals were consumed during th oporation. Supplements to the "B" ration, consisting f fresh meat ad ,. broad., were issued periodically and in lessor quantities than desired. Fresh fruit and vegetables were in short supply. -Afive "day.otock level of "C" rations was maintain-d by the, NHA TrUI.G Forward Support Detachment and Support Battalion supply point., There *re 213 short tons of "B" rations and 34 short tons of "C" rations issued. Only a small pcrtibn of the required condiments were received. Sundry ites arrived late and in inadequate quantity.



' "

provided Clas6 II & IV items. 5I short tons were issued. A large quantity of barriop riatria 'was issued. Boots. ahd clothing were received in sufficient, qu.ities.to m edt the Brigade requirements..




(Rear), PHAN RAG,





5 (Logistics) to £.tr Action Report, Oporation AUSTIN

(3) Class III: The MA TRAG Forwnard Support Detachment. provided all tyros of Class III items in sufficient quantities. 155 short tons of POL were issued during t!.e *cration, to include 21,962 gallons of o S, 6,255 -allons DIESEL, a.d 19,31 gallo, s LVGAS.
Cl) V: The Brigade entered the operation with its basic Cass ( load. The Forward Support Detachment, NBJA TMAG Support Cominnd, maintained a three day stock level; until during Opeiation AUSTIN 6, when weather conditions delayed rosupp2y of Class V to the point where only 2600 rounds of artillery axnmuLntion were.ayailable. This necessitated calling for a tactical emorgency resupply of arti.lary ammunition. In view of this, the stockago objective was incroaaed to fcur days. During 0peration AUSTIN 6 the 'a mo depot at CM 11I 1 BaY shipped Rocket, LAW, 66124, Lot No.,LS-18-1 to the Mi>( CO area. This lot had, previous to shipment, boen'suspended from issue except for emurgeoncy cnbat use. No other lot w;s mad..available. An insufficient amount of yellow smoke grenades and signal illuminating ' ground star clusters and Darachutes were not available for issue. Support Battalion authenticated transportation orders and the Forward Support "Dteachmont, MHA TVANG Support Cotmand received, stored, and issued all amunition.

(5) Water: Company A, 326th Engineer Battalion operated a water point at 2.01,4 CO and MIN flIET using one 600 GPH MLdalator.
b. 14aintenance: The Support Battalion maintenare detachment received 41 automotive, 124 signal, 68 armament, 10 instrument, 25 quartermaster, and 20 engineer job orders. All but 4 automotive, 16 signal, 2 ar.m-. ament, and 6 engineer jobs were completed. Mo shortage of spare parts for generators still exista. 9 BIR's were submitted on the Starlight Scope. (1) Ground Transportation: Battalion were used on 161 missions. (2) Air Transporttior 'Rhe 2 1/2 Ton Trucks of-Support

(a) Fixed Wing: CV-2 aircraft supporting the Brigade flw 612 sorties for a total of 5,075 PAX and 434 short tons of cargo. (b) Rotary Wing: (HFlicopter resupply) I. Both UH-ID and, CH-7 heliccters were used to*

supply cormmitted forces- The wse of the ;.4-47 .reduced the time required for resupply from that required by the Mh +D and released UH-lD's for support

of tactical oporations.




2 Use of slings and nets was a particularly effectW7e method of resupply, reducing aircraft ground time for lcading and off-loading. (c) Army aircraft lifted a total of 370 short tons of supplics in the forward area. Attached.at 11osstaes one and two 4:Yd the daily aor~iI ro supply tonnago by class of supply during Operations AUSTIN 2 and c.

Other Scrvices: (I) (2)

Graves Registration was provided by 3h8th Quartermaster Bath: 148th Quartermaster Company provided a bath unit

"in the PHAN rMMT and DEW CO area. (3) Laundry: A laundry unit was not taken into the ONH0 CO area f or two ieasons: First, the Brirado. was travelling light and secondly it was believed that the laundry at RBAN RANG could supply adequate service. Unfortunately this -)roved to be unsatisfactory. Laundry took too long to proess) pieces wero missing wh.n r-t.2-nd and bad weather prohibited timely ls from WiT RAW to the cbju. .ve area.

Inclosure 5 (Lo.listiw.j) to After Action Repoit, Operation AUSTIN 3. (0) L :AL:

a. Thno sanitation of mess halls, latrines and unit areas was good. Health and hygiene were at a high level. Two medevac heli.copters wore available; one was equipped,,aith winch, which proved invaluable in extracting, wounded from the jungle. Dup'to operating great distances froa clearing facilities one medevac ship was stationed in the area of operations, the other medevac ship remained at the cloaring company. b. Patients Treateds


, , (2) KIA
" 3) Non-Battle Injury







(4) Disease (5) (6) Returned to duty Evacuated to hospital

235 (7Malaria) 357 (17 Halaria) 201 96 9 305 320 93 18 431

(7) .Remain in holding (8) Total patients treated o.

The hospitalized personnel arc categorized by wounds as follc.. : AUSTIN 2 (1) Head 3 0 0 6 0 1 2 4 7 AUSTIN 6

(2) Chest (3) Abdann

(4) Upper extremities (5) Lower extremities

4. (U) stR,'MY,
a. Supply operations were simplified by collocating the Forward Support Detachient, MIA TRiNG Support Command and Brigade Support Battalion. Ccmnon supply points were used for Class I and Class V. The Forward Support Dotachront did not prLovide Class II and IV supply; Class III was issued in bulk to Support Battalion. b. The &i.iade made extensive use of the CH-47 helicopter for resupply. It provided a substantial increase in carring capacity and therefore a reduction in time required for aerial resupply. c. Water supply in the PHAIN THIET area presented a majr problem.Of the two 600 GPH 4rdalators assigned to the Brigade, one was turned in for maintenance and the other one operated at a maximum capacity o 250 GPH.' The Bigade also used a water treatment plant at the PHAN flIET Airlield, but had to tranaport rain water 7 M4 through the city and was delayed at tI :i lyyepolitia.1. demonstrations.




Inelostwe 5 (Logistics) to Af tar Action Report, Operation AUSTIN



(0) COITLUSi S:.

a. Collocating the organic supply detachment (Support Battalion) and the .ck-up support unit (R,d Spt Dot, IX, TRJATG Spt Coed) is an effLiciont method of providing support to the Brigade when operating separately and away frcm established support areas. The workload is shared by both units and excess handling is eliminated. b. Supply of forward units il greatly facilitated by having an adequate nunber of helicopters in direct support; in this case two a-iobio ccmpannes (UH-ID) and three OH-hlgls. resupply. c, Slings and nets provide the best and most rapid means of aerial

- d. .. aundry service should be provided in the vicinity of the rigade Trains. -Shipment of laundry by air caused considerab2e problems in handling, and control of laundry and increased airlift requirements.

2 Incl I - Air Resupply Data - Operation AUSTIN 2 2 - AiL' Resupply Data - Operation AUSTIN 6






.to •

2) Snclosure. 1 (Air Rosu1.rly Data - Operatinn aS"STIMNto Inolbsuxo 5 (Lo.istios) Roport Oe ration 4'USTIW After £A.tion




14 Apr 17 Apr 18 Apr

8,600 2,550


3,800 7,500

2.52 2.90 3.75

950 150 Il450


0.07 0.72


23 Apr 24 Apr
25 Apr




14.27 27.29











Incloesre I






Tholosure 2 ( dr ResrnijApy D-

to "Ite kc~icon Report, Opetationm

~ (j~eratiofi

kustxzn 6) to Xznclasurc

5 (Loclstioa)




2 bay
3 May












5 May
6 ay











8 May

9 Hay
10 Ilay 11 Nay

15,275 2,825

7.60 1.40

43,500 133,000

21.75 66.50





12 May 13 Nlay 14 )lay 1 lay






0.1 0.b7

7,205 11175


3,60 5.58


1,980 9,220

0.99 4.6o

16 May



90 00
L-64,700 232,15




Iralosure 2



Inclosuro 6 (Communications) to After Action ieport, Operation AUSTII 1; (C) Background:The Ist Brigade HC Commucation Platoon and the 1st FASOP, B Company 501st Signal Battalion, had iahe isiohV of:,ploviding internal communications in support.of.Brigade tactical operati6nThese two pla. tons installed, maintained and operat2d the communications facilities in the Brigade Comman, ,Post& These included the Brigade Communications and Message Center, F1 and AM not control stations, and Brigade switchboard wire system. They also installed and maintained voice'circuits to subordinate organizations,



2. (C) Operatonsi (AUSTIN 2)
.a s VI" Section - Equipment operated by 4!st Signal ,Battalion gavo ,.he Rrigade access to Typhoon and Strike itear, ,while our own MZC-68 gavethe 2/320 Artillexy a common user circuit to Strike Switeh and a hot line to the FSCC. b, Co-mmunications Center Section.- Operated on line TT with Typhoon.and provided motor and air messenger service to all units* a. Switchboard and Wire Section - The Brigade Switchboard consist-. ed of one S13-86 Switchboard, providing a total of 60 common user circuits. An average of over 700 calls were made per 24 hour period. Twenty-five miles of wire WD-l/TT were laid for Operation AUSTIN 2, d, FMl Radio Scction -The primary moan of communications with subordinate units was F4 radio. Most of the traffic was passed over the Brigade Operations IntelliGence Net. The Brigade Command Not was rarely used. An automatic retransmission station for the Operations Intelligence Net and a manual relay station for the Administration Logistics/.Net were located on Hill 872 and 2.302. 2. 2i? adio Section - iRATT communications were installed between 2/327 Infantry Battalion, Brigade Command Post and Phan tang Base Camp. This not was used primarily for classified.service messages. A radio .tam;' from the 54th Signal Battalioh was provided ini direct support with an AN/ G0:C-46 (Ai),and Ke-2 '(SSB);. :'The ta radio gave the Brigade entrance into Command Not B, a secure directed.11ATT Not controlled by I FFV. The Wf-2 provid'd a phone patch into the TyphocnSwit6hboardp allowing an alternate

means into the long line trunks.
f. Maintenance Section - The maintenance section provided 2nd echelon maintenance suppart for signal items. and generators. The major maintenance problem during this operation was .teletype equipment. Generators were fairly stable. Generally the time delay experienced on items . evacuated for repair and returned through Phan RWang Base Camp has increased. The Rod -Ball Express System has improved- 100,per cent.

3. (C) Opration





a. VHF Section - An IC-73 from 54th Signal Battalion provided the Dri.ado with communications to Typhoon and Strie ,iar. •An 1MC-68 was -et up at the MACV Compound at Ghia Nhia giving us a hot line and common user circuit with MACV and a comnon user circuit to the Aviation Company in that

b. Communications Center Section - Operated on line TT with Typhoon and provided motor and aii messenger service to all units. c. Switchboard and Wire Section - The Brigade Switchboard consisted of one 8B-86 with two TA 207 prbviding a total of 60 commcn user circuits with an average of 500 calls made per 24 hour poriod. The wire section laid 30 miles of WD-i Wire, ticine in tho,.Infantry rtillery and Support Battalions)

along with separate-Coanis, to the Strike Switchboard..

',A' '"":"' -6-1




Inclosure 6 (Comnunications) to After Action iloport, Operation AUSTIN d. 1FI, Radio Section - The primary means of communication with subordinate units was 1I7I radio. Mst of the traffic was passed over the Brigade Operations Intelligence Not. The .Brigade Comman.nder's Net was used as an Operations Intelligence Not during the lattur part of AUSTIN 6. 1V326 Engineer, 2/503rd Infantry, 17rd Airborne Brigade, : ,CV Advisors an.'. let Brigade 101st Airborne Division. TOO operated in this not. An automatic retransmission station for the Operations Intelligence Not and a manual relay station for the 4,dnii, strction Logistics and subsequcntly the Brigade Command Net was located first at. Du Prang Outpost, and then

v.n Son, De Mountaii.
e. A11 Udio Section - RJTT communications wore installed between 2/32:7 Infantry Battalion, BrigaCe Command Post end Phan !lng Base Camp. "om the 54th Signal Battalion was provided in direct support with an AN/

This not was used primarily for classified service messages. A radio team

G.,C-26 (AM) and KwI-2 (SSB). The AM radio gave the Brigade entrance into Command Net A, a secure directed 3ATT Net controlled by I FFV. The AN/0RC26 was later replaced with an AN/01C-46 because of equipment failure, The KIIMM-2 provided a phone patch into the Typhoon Switchboard, allcwine an altornate means into the long line trunks. f. Maiitonace Section - The maintenabce section provided 2nd echo-... ion maintenance support for signal items and genorators. The major matntonanco problem during this operation was toletype equipment. Oonerally the time delay experienced on items evacuated for repair and returned through Phan "RanG Base Camp has increased. The Rled Ball Express System has improved 100 per cont. . 4& Lessons Learned.


The PE-75/AF 0encratoii ruipdros oil changes every 20 hours.

Fifty weight oil should be used a a), times.

b, A4 Radios providing ITT (0iC-46 or 26 and VSc-I) should be. in
mch oloser proximity to the Brigade Communication Center than was the case in this operation. In any case this distance should not exceed l00.moters. a. Personnel, particularly supervisors, should be billeted with or adjacent to their equipment for ronscc of control. d. Teletype. equipment outages can be attributed to the age factor

of the teletypes an.d constant operation.for the past year.
e Switchboard S13-86 is proving to be an unreliable switchboard. A new SB-86 was installed upon arrival at Nhon Co. After ton days of operation the new switchboard had started to malfunction. f. Inclement weather (severe rains and lightning) seemed' to have an adverse effect initially cn the retransmission station, The utmost care must be exercised to protect components and to keep them as dry as possible,








- - ---










A/ J ewZA

Inclosure 7 (Civic Action) to After Action Report, Operation AUSTIN Civic Action: 1. Health and Sanitations at Sick calls and medical treatment were conducted in the hamlets surrounding Nhon Co. A total of 560 patients were treated by Brigade medical persorel. b. Tooth brushes were distributed in two villages and classes conducted on their use. 2. Construction: Land clearing and road building in the Ihon Co area not only benefited the organization of the Brigade Headquarters but was designed to assist in the preparation for the establishment of a relocation village for refugees. ?reparation was made for the rehabilition of the school house used by Brigade Headquarters. 3. Commerce and Industry: Sixty-six porters were hired to transport materials for the operational battalions. Local business establishments were encouraged resulting in the aidition of seven nzw buildings housing various businesses. Thonr, wore planned to provide trade for the resettlement villages -zpvn the Brigade's departure.

4. Community Relations:
'iALtainod with Province, DiStrict, and vila. Close contact was lage officials in order to. maintain price control to preclude problem areas. Distribution of soap, clothes, food and milk was made to some of the poorer hamlets in the area. b. On 2 May 1966 the village of Eu Tong was moved to Gia Nghia. Movemont included 31 personnel, 1 hospital complete, 30 tons of rice and household goods.

5. Other Areas of Operationt Civil Affairs Teams #9 and #15, Ust Civil Affairs Company, continued operations in the Phan Rang and Tuy Hoa areas



Inclosure 8 (Psycho.ogical Warfare) to A..er Action Report, Operation AUSTIN


1. (C) Psychc..ogical Objetives: -sychological warfare activities were oriented and directed mainly to enemy units in each bperational area, although selected leaflets and broadcasts were designed to izorm the indigenous population (CF AUSTIN 6) of the Brigade's 'objectives*. 2. (0) Psychological Warfare .



(1) Leaflets. A total of 293,000 leaflets of the type shown were dropped on the dates indicated below Date 19 April Method USAF U1O Number 40,00o' Type Safe Conduct Passes

20 April 21 April'

USAF U10 USAF1O 0" "

10,000 19,006, 40,000

Chieu Hoi Safe Conduct Passes -.Eag).e Strike Chiu Hoi Safe Conduct Passes Chicu Strike Eagle Hoi Dcmoralization Chieu Hoi• 'Chieii Hoi

22 April USAF U1O



19,000 j 25,000 "0,0 P" 0 0' 1 20,000

23 April " USAF UIO 24 April USAF U10



(2) Loudspeaker. A total of 17 hours ofiloudspeaker appeals were flown by U U10 Psy War aircraft on 22 April and 24 April, using ground "units 0A? as control stations to insurd that the broadcasts were being flown at the proper altitude for maximum audibility. (3) Stumary. Loudspeaker and leaflet' appeals were general in nature with no specifis appeal to any particular enemy unit .-- ethnic group.



a. Leaflets. A total of 885,000 leaflets of the type indicated were dropped on the dates shown. Date30 April Method USAF UIO Number 4O0oo 20,000 Type Chieu Hoi Safe Conduct Passes

1 May
2 May 3 MaY


20,000 20,000 20,000 20,000

Chieu Hoi
Safe Conduct Passes Chieu Hoi Safe Conduct Passes Cieu Hoi.

5 May



Chieu Hoi
Safe Conduct Passes 100 e Strike .,..F "Safe Conduct Passes






Inclosure 8 (Psychological Warfare) to After Action Report, Oporation AUSTIIlI Bde, 101st Abn Div , .9 May




.20,000 20,000

Eagle Strike Chieu Hoi

1o May
11 May


20,000 30,000 20,000

Direct Appeal (608th Bn) (CF hi,1 12)
Safe Conduct Passes Direct ppeal (608th Bn) Demoralization Eagle Strike

'12 Hay



3C,000 25,000
30,000 30,000 25,000 25,000 20,000 40,000 60,000 20,000 20,000 20,000

Direct Appeal (608th Bn) Demoralization Direct Appeal (608th Bn) Direct Appeal (141st ReGt) (C? Incl 13) B-52 RP.st Strike Safe Conduct Passes Direct Appeal (3/141st) (OF Inal 11) Direct Appeal (3/141st) Safe Conduct Passes Eagle Strike

14 May


16 May


(2) Loudspeaker. A total of 5 hours aid 45 minutes of loudspeaker appeals were flown by USAF U1O Pay War aircraft oh 30 April, 3 May, 10 May, 11

May, 12 May and 16 May. The theme of all appeals was Chieu Hoi. On 10 May an
on-the-spot appeal was taped with a captured NVA soldier and flown the same day. (3) Summnxy Four personalized leaflets and one personalized taped oroadcast were directed against enemy units and other indigenous as~nhel in the operational area. As the 1st Brigade did not remain in the area for an xtended period of time, the true effectiveness and ultimate impact of the appealswas not ,known as, of the closing date of Operation AUSTIN.

.. .






4!4 ~ 4
4 4


. . . . . ...



(Artillery) to After Action Report, Operation AUSTIN k

1. (C) BACKGROUND: The 2d Howitzer Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery provided direct support to the 1st Brigade throughout Operation AUSTIN. B Battery, ist Battalion, 30th Artillery (155m Howitzers) was under operational control of the Brigade. P, (C) OPERATIONS, a. was The Batteries of 2d Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery occupied a

tc'tal of 19 positions in support of the Brigade during the operation.


, road, UH-ID helicopter, CV-2 fircraft, C-123 aircraft, 0-130 aircraft and H-47 helicopters. b. Missions fired and ammunition expended. (1) Total number of missions fired: (2) Total number of rounds expended: 726. 4083. 67., Operation AUSTIN 2;

(3) Total number of registrations conducted: (4) (5) Total number of H&I tr'. ets fired: 649.

Total number of rounds expended on H&: 4 - snipers or ,s i.c

3400. " 1 - well destroyed.

(6) Surveillance: c.

Missions fired and ammunition expended - Operation AUSTIN 6: . (I) (2) Total number of missions fired: Total number of rounds expended: 1126. 7754.



'(4) (5)

Total number of registrations conducted:
Total number of H&I targets fired: 896. Total number of rounds expended on He: Surveillance20 VC KIA (BC)





2 snipers and A/W silenced -ZIMlosu1=ee, I - Positions Occupied by Artillery in Operation AUSTIN 2.



Positions Occupied by Artillery in Operation AUSTIN 6.





. . ..



Inclosure 1 (Poaitions Occupied by Attillery in'Opration At'STrA 2) to Ilnc6sure 9 (:rtillery) to After Action Report) Operation AUST14 Operation AUSTIN 2 "A"It/2/320 (P Apr 66) 12599.44 Az of OL Az of Fire

-4 26. m

38028.09 2103.M

Oriet Aug
HV"/2/320 (20 Apr 66)


12462.79 Az of OL Az of Fire Orient Ang 12357.70


38024.43 1572.79 4@00.0 t( 3972.7A

27. 2m


27 3

(20 Apr 66)

Az to OL -1345.7 "Az of Fire - 4000.MA Orient ling - 3745.79 1654.4o Az t6 OL - 34498.27
- 584o,.7



'Az of Fire
Orient Ang B (2/320) (13 Apr 66) 79226,61 Az to OL

264.07A 55.1m,

A 06602624 2296,59

Lz of Fire C (2/320)
(12 Apr 66) A (2/320) (13 Apr 66) B (1/30) (13 Apr 66)

000 0

Orient Ang - h696.51 79106463 - 06572.a3 Az to OL - 0313.59 Az of Fire - 10.0 Orient Ang - 2713.59 78985.10 - 06606.14 Az to OL - 53h1.34 Az of Fire 4'.O Orient Ang - 13.9 73001.62 Az to eL Az of Fire Orient Ang 79194.04 An to OL As of Fire


B (1/30) (3.4 Apr 66)

-14246.o5 - 488o.8U - 580.A - 540.88 - 06771.34 - 3712.3" - 3742.39
- 5h2.3p


B (2/320) (14 Apr 66)



:Tnclovare 2 (Positions Occupied by Artillery in Operation AUSTIN 6) to .Inclosure 9
(Azrtillory) to After Action Report, Operation AUSTfl Positions OcupLd B Coordinates Date



27 Apr 66 294.pr 66 29 Apr 66
30 Apr 66

B/.1/30 (-)
B 3 Section B1/30




30 Apr 66

C C A 3 Sections B/1/30 YU496576 YU337364 YU33736 5 YU805253

1 may 6 6
1 May 6 6 6 May 66 i0 May 66 12 May 66

3 Sections B/1/30


13 May 66
13 May 66

B1/30 (-)
•OU337364 A A C 3 Sections B1/30 B130 (-) §


14 may 66
16 May 66
66 66

YU508241 U995254 iU797250 YU806252 Chec Reo

17 May 18 May


18 May 66 18 May 66



1 00

N %




i-; N











i~f $,AiUf i






My comrads in the 608th: Comrads yen, Dong, and Phan I was sick and abandoned by my unit. I was left without food or adequate clothingp I was left to die. The Americans found me and gave me food, shelter, clothing, and medicine to cure me of my sickness. 'They have treated ne well in all recpects. I urge -l. of you, my cor,"des, tz! cose this useless .V:*-,ht th:t" cvn only 1oato 0 dihn,. . C, > : ^o .. .'on , nnd lov, , ns, nel in an urfivked zrxlc. :e0fro it ,I- to;. ].ba, = 1 3,; to the allied forces. Come to the main h!ii.y'"ih ;' r •-. ,; -.n yoir

itw.pon oveor your r4:, shoulder mrnnlo do., ,. ";'t y over your head; Come to the nearest alli:d foroes.

shirt Slxvo

You will be given fo.d, shelter, clothing, ..nd medicine. Rally now.

/oigcd/ Vi Vai Ty 3rd Pl.itoon, 13th Co., .608th Battalion Used with Operation Austin VI Job No. 56-8-245N







VI S'AO ? Vsao aguMi

ntr6c Vi 4

qu~uig d~c. -Auh c6 thN song m d'em b~li gi a 4'jhh, Bin d'ng ruon?.noi y~m I 'ang dang cin b~n tay' rh *chic cha anh t~i mien bic Thay vi 'dtuc $ong de'.giu~p d6 th6n I .nganh di C~hk thf, thm ,kh6ag mo di, bao nH au dim' ya t tien cha. anh. Tnrv6c khi Cic b,%n cu*ag chj u Chun& so phf'n~xay,' hiyr!'uy, nght vI quay, tr& v'e V,6i chaih phu* v%' I vc hungh d5ng mil h.. Bin g cich c~i L'o, su~n deo bin-Val Ii1,mi truecyu6n g da . M~y dan nai ~C I~rnz V dng minh d6ng giln nh'at,gia io lin kh~l d'alu VI viy I1km hi. t~ gbpdah i rn Cie ban ;'ues~ ~ i phuzcng 'd 4': 9

I 4i din va' cet tong rvng rim tich

thanh ni an tre' tU61 ch', ip'fo bac

Sf. 10- 24SN










t kou 0


-4 I


'\~(7\~' ~








y1 frg




'$4 _____________________________________________________________________




~'1 w

2 .4. ~




Bol.-lang bol &6 talm anib n ilm. Linb kiang saia-doaan parachute 101 iin nr au ni im rig~a Linahkla~ e - aaau lah brul tam Iah lang bol ng & 'tai anib vtgt-minh sin btyhling do phl tam Iah ho dang gar boa lagar phai, tus ma-bol he; ma bol he chenjoh cigl-hiu bol Ian&ggeh clu sinu bo4 he, hi ii.bol he I ang bol &"O.S kra cing * ma- boa Ivgar mai vi~t-mnh, may dO nha, hiti geh ma ai phan-clu kal he,ier Phan coh-hliu nhi u-dian, lah . mir, koi fim, at-da, ma ropu , nr,6. I arvg ph ai ai m. nau chb bol. I an; bol ma nhi-hi u, bol geh sonam ailm ralau aiim.


S6.6- 24SN (Mv)




THE EiLE PROTECT THE GOOD., This man you see in the picture is a soldier from the 101st Airboxne Division (Screaming Eagle). '"-i man of the screaming Eagle have thc mission of freeing all good • le from Viet Gong control. These Soldiers will fight to gunrantee safty for all the Villagers. Come to them, and they will t*e your family to an area were they can iork togathor for thenmelfs. Your family will not have to worry about bainq forces to work for the
Viat Cong. Each family will receive material to build their own house, land the Ea-Ii for cropn, chickens and cors.o k4t and seed protect

you. /md. your family will have happiness.

M 'XLVL: 13-5--66




-T9 "7:)





















" ,',*
.*. ..-







10 9 APRIL








/ (I


, 2-502 1-327


SN - 20

2s, 0,.


'i.' Ko










....--" -"""--.i'-





c oL
C2 kl$0






i(US) 44 NF (AR N)































_ _ _ _ _'-














2-50 2 a2,7










_ __ __ _ _




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HEADQUARTERS IST BRIGL 1, M0IST AIRKOM'E DIVISION APO San Franoisco 96347 AVBD-A SUBJECT: 12 August 1'966 Combat Operations After Action Rport, Opcration WWTHORITE (ROS: M0AV



Oorrwcnding General I Field Force Victnam APO US Forces 96240 Comanding Gonorl US alitary Assistance 0ormand Viotnan ATTN: J343 APO US Forces 96243



1. Lotto this hn.dquirtors, subject as above, datcd 22 July 196G, is changod as follows: Remove pages one and two of in cosuro I and replace with attached pages one and two. 2. After the above action has boon comploted this letter will be filed in front of basic publication.


1 Thc!: as


Distribution: I - Assistant Chief of Staff for Force D-volopmont, Dept of the Arr TWashington DC 20310 1 - OG, USIRPAC (ATTI: GROP-M) I - OG, H1AOV (ATTU: IMC J343) I - OG, MOAV (ATTN: MAC J2) 2- CG, USARV I - CG, USAIRV (ATTil: AVC Historical Division) 2- CG, IFRCEV 2 - OG, 101st Abn Div, t Coboll, KY 1 - CG 1S DOO 1 - XO


1- 10
1- Sig











Inclosure 1 (contd)


(2) The present strength accountability system requiren assigning personnel (E3DCSA) to units prior to their physicallv joining the unit rather than administratively carrying them in the "ineline".


EDCSA personndl ha'.- been diverted without the subsequent

notification to the losing unit. (C) Casualties: a.
T Casualties .for Operation HAI IT.-CRITE were as follows:

.UNIT 1/327
. 2/502"




q. 7. .


, ,

,' .



A/326 A 2/17

1 o.

6 2 ,

spt Bn



b. Total casualties to date are as follows: KiA ' WIA , MIA ..... 3.

1206 ,2

(C) Personnel Management:

a. A total of 291 replacements were received in the Bripade during this period. Breakout of wach'personnel to the maneuver battalions vere as

follows: •,"

1/327 2/502"





b.: Losses of critical personnol were closely monitored and 30 3crsonnel with critical HOS were assigned as follms:

Plat.Ldrs Sgts

1 I1O


Doctors .



commurications piersonnel, and legal clerk.



Incl.osurd 1 (Personrel and Lli~ni-..--ticn) to *iftar Action lcnorts, Operation
1, (0) a. Unit -Strenozths: 3egirnnin; or One.-oti on Fhl"t1orne. of Operat- on.


(1) The Irisade -iersmorl stron.-ths at the $)ardnnIn W"TI'MIT, -ere as f ollo-s: 4'utl'orized Assi ned -.Joine6.-not Acsipmod. Present for D.uty

116 9312 2318 1573

1!ot Present for Duty A'ir Iead Strength ~3ase Camp,

(2) )assignd The stremgh -aurs isas elce resent nthe 1 io ,ftert srnt-1m for


trerifaed.stoh luty"re strc.2use: ronr'e 33 ,ee onitansferd


(3) S

the nii15r ot'fr

d;sjthi.e s


or A No












P', s er olos


DIVISION 12 August 1968

Comba~t Opora'tions Afto r5.-32) Comn,tnding GcnoraQ I Fiold Forco Victn.m APO US Forcos 96240 Corma~nding Gonoral1

tlion Roport, Opoation HANITHORIM, (ROS: MANV




. Lttox' this hoc dqunrtors, subjoet c~s above,. dc~tcd 22 July 1963, is chnngod as fo~llows: Remova pagco ono nnd two of~ in c)osura 1 :nd roplace with att"chod pages ono and two. 2. Af bar tho abo~vo action has bocn complot'~d this lottor ifl bo Mild in front of basic pub] jction, IOR VE C012,AIUDER:

I Icl: as


Distribution: 1Assistant Chicf of Stz,.ff for Force Developent, Dopt of the aT.V W.ashington DO 20310 1 - OG, IJS1RPAC (ATTU:. GROP-M.I 1 - CG, 110V (ATTII: IIAC J343) I - CG, 1,10V (ATN: MACl J2) 2 - CG, USIV 1 - OG, USAlRV (A'TTIq AVO Historical Division) 2 - CG, IP~rm EV 2 - CG, 101st Abn Div, Ft Ccunboll, Ky 1- CO

10.. S3 1 - S4 1 - Big 1- 10 1FSE



Inclosure 1 (contd) (2) The present strength accountability system recuires assigning personnel (1.4DCSA) to units prior to their physically joining the unit rather than administratively carrying thw in the "pinelinel'. (3) EDSA personn6l have been diverted without the subsequent notification to the losing unit. 2. (C) Casualties: a. Casualties for Operation HA-'TIVORNE were as follows:




2/320. A/326 , A 2/17 Spt Bn


6 2 I
2 ",

1 0 0


b. Total casitalties to d,.to ":'as follows: KIu WLI 230



3. (b) Personnel Management: a. A total of 291 replacements were received in the Briqade during this period. Breakout' of suoh Dersonnel to the raneuver battalions vcre as follows1/27 2 502 2/320

118 22

b. Losses of critical personnel ,ere closely monitored and 30 personnel with critical IIOS.ver6 assi~ned as follows: Plat'Ldrs Plat Sgtc Doctors Med Ops Asts Medics 11 10 2 2 5

c. Emergency ieouisitions' for continuing critical lIOS'short ,-ce-ore submitted for E-7 platoon sergeants, cooks, medical specialists, mechanics, communications personnel, and legal clerks.











Inolosurt- 1 (T'ersonrel and u.dninistr-tic ) to t.Xtcr Action eyn6r'tb, Operation I.(0) Unit',tren~ths:
Segirnin.% of Cmct~~


(1 ) The 3rigade nersovro1 strawlths at the ,eginnin, oC Operati.on TVUT~"re as f o3lo%'m: -e Aut)horized ,Issi~ied Joine.d not A*3igned Present for DJuty iVot Present for Duty Air Nead Strength 3ase Camp, Tuxy ',*oa 4h90 58/hO 116

472 2398 1793



(2) The assigned streprth -as 130 . oZ the aut' orized strength; the present for duty streng0' -as 11 9" of the nut)'ori~ed strerr~th.

(3) Of the nct present. for dutir streng~th, 339 ,ere bos'nitaJlized
personnel. b' Conclusion o1^ Cmr!%ion I'-IT"CIIV.P2.

(1 ) The Iriade -ersonnel strengrths a~t the conclusior. of Cneration i-ore as follmrs: Authorized 4490 Aasitned Z5 5749 Joined rot Assi,'ied 115 !rre sent for ')Utv 4703 'lot Present, for ' ty 931 Air Vend Strength 2431

Tuy i1oa


(2) The assigned wa3 128'1 of the aut!-orized strengtb; t1.e n'resent for duty stronitt1 vas 10O551 of the authorized strength. (3) -ersonrel.. c. Mhe ttassi~gned 5tren ts, fi~uros are extremely inflated. inflnt.on is also re'lected in the "lnot )present for dutyvt becrmse: This Cf t!,e not --resent foi- dutv otrcn4th, /.^,I -ere 6 it).o

(1) A 1-.r,e nw.-ber ofP 1;os)it.^lived n'ersonre3 Nave '~sen transferred to or:f-sho-e !,osiilals, WINU, dnd/or over dischsar,,ed Croni the US r-r 1'10itu notificeation to the losing, unit.


DEPARTIMMN OF TIM AMY H M-DQUA-,T1rM 1ST BRIWOA)S 1015T AIB23U DIVISION AVBD-A Sn-JEOT: AP ,m:onic 64 12 August 1966 Combat Operations A±tor Action Roport, Oporation ITHORNTE (RCS: 14ACV J3-32)


Ceranding General I Field Forcc Victnan APO US Forces 96240 Ceonending General ATN: q343 APO US Forces 96243


this headquartors, subject n's eab-jve, dated 22 July 1063,


Aftor tho' abovo action hns boon completod this lattor will be


WILLAMP.GOVE I (ATl::2d 3343) C

DATistrCHitorcation:on I G, A bn DATV, Cc34e3) IMO




Inclosure I (contd)


(2) The present stro .;h tcountability system reauires assigning personnel (EDC) to units prior to their physicallv joining the unit rather than administratively carrying them in the "pineline". (3) EDCSA personn6J have been diverted without the subsequent notification to the losing unit. 2. (C) Casualties: a. Casualties for Operation HA.TFCRINE were as follows:


16 4 1

71 24 6

2/320 A/326

A 2/17

0 47

1 241

b. Total casualties to date are as follows: KIA WIA MIA 3. 230 1206 2

(C) Personnel Ianagebment:

a. A total of 291 replacements were received in the Briade during this period. Breakout of such personnel to the rianeuver battalions were as follows: 1/327 2/502 2/320 108 118 22

b. Losses of critical personnel were closely monitored and 30 Dersonnel with critical MOS were assigned as follows: Plat'Ldrs Plat Sgts Doctors Med Ops Assts Medics 11 10 2 2 5

c. Emergenuy reouisitions'for continuing critical MOS sh.rt .(e vere submitted for E-7 platoon and legal clerks. medical specialists, mechanics, communications personnel, sergeants, cooks,




(~eronr'3 an Thcosu~


1Ifter .tjon
stn)~ h

x016rtj, 0rtion



e' rand


UnitI'rifgd ofine .,to a. -aor 1!resent' ast

1 b90 1 'vhre I 5252-

Fot "resent for 'Duty Air !'mad Strongt 3ase Camr Tay ',*oa

239" 179,3


t m's 13015 or tbe aut ori~cd strength(2) TheC Assigned strergth of the autl'oriled strereyt),. liT9 the present for duty strengti- -as strength, 339 i"ere hos-ita~ized (3) Of the nct present for dutv parsonne1l.S

b. Concus.o



at the (I1) The 'rigade *'ersonnel stregths ollovrs:419 as C -v'~:~~~ere Joined not Assilned ;resent for Nty Ilot Present for Wby Air Vend Strenh SaseO Ck'IP Tu~y Vtoa 115 4703 931 2431 1527 755

of Certixr,

tbhe aut'orfted stren (thb tile -resent (2) The assirned -1-s 128", or autlorized streng.th. for dluty stron--tl- vas 05~ of the -a're 6sW se rsent f or dutv ctrength, I1.1 c' -rt (3) C^ t "nersonre-., This JiUprCC are extre7',cj7 inf2Atcd. a. The tIassignmed" stren-,2"no't liresent for duty"' bectnisethe inflation isalso'mi"lecbed in -.ersonre3) have ',cen transrerred -W,1tA'u (1) A 3pr,",e nv'rber ofP !;osnitn~lizei even disobarqod cron the 17) r'And/or to of"'-sho-e l osnitals, CC-1S, notification, to the losing27 unit.


5rAI C051-)




TS J-i,


DIVISION 12 August 1966

Oombat Operations After Action Roport, Operation HATHOPME (ROS: M.CV



Oo-vninding General I Field Force Vietnam APO US Forces 96240 Commanding Generol US Nlitery Assistance Command Vietnam ATTN: J345 APO US Forces 96243


1. Letter this hc-dqurters, subjoct as above, dated 22 July 1966, is changcd as follows: Remove pc.gos one and two of inclosuro 1 and roplace with att.chod pags one ad two. 2. After the abovo action hao bocn completed this lot'or filed in front of basic ublication. FOR THE COINUTIER: ill bo

1 Incl: as Distribution: I - Assistant Chief of Stnff for Force Dwvolopmont, Dopt of the Imy Wa shington DO 20310 1 - CG, USARPAC (ATTN- GROP-IQ:) 1 - CG, IfACV (ATTII: iH&C J343) 1 - CG, 11CV (ATTN: MAC J2) 2 - OG, USARV I - OG, USARV (ATT;r AVG Historical Division) 2 - OG, IF0RCEV 2 - CG, 101st Abn Div, Ft Counboll, Ky 1 - CG I - DCO WILLIA E. GPDVES9 2d Lt, AGO Asst AG

1-xO 1
I - S2 10 - S3


I. !-'...

1 -S4 1- $5
I -10 1 -Sig

' A












Inclosure I (contd) (2) The present strength accountability system reauires assigning personnel ()DCSA) to units prior to their ph sically1 6oining the unit rather than administrative:y carrying them in the" "pineline (3) EDOSA personn61 have been diverted without the subsequent notification to the losing unit. 2. (C) Casualties: a. Casualties for Operation HMAMTFRNE were as follows: UNIT 1/327 2/502 2/320 A/326 KIA 25 16 4 1 W,, 137 71 24 6

A 2/17






b. Total casualties to date are as follows: KIA WIll IA 3. 230 1206 2

(C) Personnel Management:

a. A total of 291 replacements were received in the Brigade during this period. Breakout of such personnel to the maneuver battalions were as follows 1/327 2/502 2/320 108 118 22

personnelb. Losses of critical personnel were closely monitored and 30 with critical lIOS were assigned as follows: Plat drs Plat Sgts Doctors Med Ops Assts Medics 11 10 2 2 5

c. Emergency reouisiticns'for continuing critical M0S"shortage w re submitted for E-7 platoon sergeants, cooks, medical specialists, mechanics, communications personnel, and legal clerks.




ccMF/ D)E/V.T/AIInclosurd I (Personre3 and Adidnstr~ttcqi) to After Action leports, Operation if (C) Unit Strenpths: a. V'WU-re 'e 3eginnin.j of C'o~ti on ki-thorne. (1 ) The Irigade iersomrol stranwths at the ber~nnirn, of Operation as follo-'s: 4uthorizcd ".sit~ed Joined,* not Assigned Pre~sent for ,uty ~ tIresent for uty " Air !lead Strength Base Cami Tuy 1Poa 49 581t0 116 5252 7 239% 1793


(2) -the assigned- strength i.,as 130' of the autl'tri~edi strengt; the present for duty strengt!- -a 11 9' of thp nut1'ori~ed streniT.
(3) Of the nct present for dutv' strength, 339 iere hosnItalized personnel.

ersniel-toao: )igae (1 Th Authorized A.ssivnec Joined not Assi-ped Present for Duty Pesent for rAxty Fr Air Vendi Strength 3ase C&Ip TUY 'oa 4490 57)49 115

at the conclusion of C'er.ntion

93 2431 1527 755

(2) The assigned i,-e 1281' of the autlorized strength; tlhe rresent for duty stron.3th va 1055, of the authorized strength.. (3) nersonnel.. a. The "assigned" strenfgt. figurcs are extrenoayj inf2Ated. inflntlon is also rei~lected in the "riot 'presert for duty"l bci'use: Tbis Of the not nresent, for duty ctren*gth, h1 -aere 1-os-ita)1zad

)ersonnlel N'ave tmen trAnsferr'ed *(1 ) A IPr,, nrirber ot ios-,itnlized -. to of-sho. e osnibals, CU'US, dnd/or oven discharzed Cron the US trl '4itlont notifiation to the losing unit.


// rl

DEPARTI.NT OF THE A HEADQUARTERS IST BRIOADE fOIST AI10', DIVISION APO Scn Brancisoo 96347 AVBD-A SUBJEOT: 12 August 1968 Combat Oporctions After Action Roport, Oportion llWTHORPdT (RCS: MACV



Cor ,,nding Gonoral I Field Force Victnnm APO US Forcos 96240 Conmianding GonorJl US klitary Assistnco Comrand Viotnm ATTN: J343 AFO US Forcos 96243


1. Lottor this hc-dquartors, subjoct -,s bovo, datod 22 July 1966, is changod .sfollows: Romovo pagcs onc and two of inclosuro 1 and roplaco with attachecd pcgos ono and two. 2. Aftor tho abovo action has boon complotod this lottor will bo filcd in front of basic publication. TOR THE COMM&IDER:

1 Incl: as

2d Lt, AGO Asst AG

Distribution: I - Assistant Chief of Staff for 2 orco Dovolopmontp Dopt of tho Amy Washington DC 20310 I- CG, USARPAC (ATT: GROP-MH) 1 - CG, MOV (ATTI: HAO J343) I - OG, NOV (ATTN: MAC J2) 2 - CG, USATV I - CG, USARV (ATTII; AVC Historical Division) 2- CG, IFTORCEV 2 - CG, 101st Abn Div, Ft Camboll, Ky 1 - CG 1 - DCO 1- - XO S1O


I -


10. S5 I - S4 1- $5 1 - 10
1 - Sig










Inclosure I (contd) (2) The present strength accountability system reuires assigning personnel (3DCSA) to units prior to their physiallv joining the urit rather than administratively carrying them in the "pineline". (3) 1vDCSA personn6l have been diverted without the subsequent notification to the losing unit. 2.(C) Casualties: a. Casualties for Operation HANTTFORIM were as follows:

1/327 2/502 2/320 A/326

25 16 4 1

137 71 24 6

A 2/17
Spt Bn



b. Total casualties to date are as follows: KIA WIA MIA 3. (C-). 230 1206 2

Personnel Management:

a. A total of 291 replacements were received in the Brignade during this period. Breakout of such personnel to the raneuver battalions were as follows: 1/327 2/502 108 118 22


b. Losses of critical per nel were closely monitored and 30 -mrsonnel with critical HOS were assigned as follows: Plat Ldrs Plat Sgts Doctors Med Ops Assts Medics 11 10 2 2 5

c. Emergency reouisitions"for continuing critical YOS"shortage w re submitted for E-7 platoon sergeants, cooks, medical specialists, mechanics, communications personnel, and legal clerks.












9eginning of 0&'t .coticn 1;A'-t1horne.

(1) The 3rigade 'iersonrol strcn-,t1s at the be i nnin.7 of' Operation WT0111 as f ol~lo-': vere 1-ut),orized I ssined Joined' not A *sipned Present for D)uty I ot 1Vre sent for 'Jut-y Air Nead Strongth 3ase Carvp Thy IVoa threet(2) parsormel. b. FN~ Conclusion of Qrnkinn 107V11 111t~) 581,0 lit 5252 472 2398 1703 1061

The Assigned stremgth -as 13a,' of the auti orized strori~h; (3), Of the nct prosen-t for dutv strength, 3 9 -ere bos'nitalized

(1) The 1rigade -ersonnel strow.,ths at the conclusion of C'nern'ti.on vereas follov"s:


Assigned Joined not AIssi 7,ned. Present for DJuty 'ot Present for ')uty Air Vead Strength '3ase Cavip Thy IFoa

4490 5749 115 4703 931 2431 1527 75 5

(2) The assigned 's128" of the autlorized strength; tl'e -resent for duty strongth vas 105.5 'of the authorized strength. (3) ?ersonrel., e. The "assigned" strenT.: figuros are extrenely inflated. inflation is also' re.Plected in the "not' nresert for duty" lbocerse : This Cf t!,,e niob -resent fox- duty ctroeth, 1.11 --aere !-os-Nit.lized

(1) A lpAr,'e nm':ber o? lios-Atnlized tiersonre3 Nave 17^en transferred to ofl-sho~e 1osni~als, CC"U, dnd/or oven dischar~iod C'ron the IM,tr-'-v "'it-ont notification to the losing unit.

CcAJF1?PEA rb'/i9,

DEPARTI-NT Or TIHE Af MY HEADQUARTERS. 1ST BRIGADE~ 101ST A1RfOR NE DIVISION AFO San Francisco 96347 AVBD-A SUBJOT: 313-32) 3.2 Au"Ust 196 Combat Opcroations Aftor Action Rjport, Opo:rntion HAWITHORNE (,VS: MtUCV


Oorwon-nding Gcnoca I Ficid Forco Victn.on AM1 US Forcos 96240 Commarnding GonoroJ. US 1d1litary Asoistanco .Command, Vi.otnam. ATTN: 3343 APO US Forcos 96243


1. Lottor this hc- dquoirto~o, is chnngcd as follows:

.- ooct rns X ocbovo, dc~cd 22 July 1966,

Rcmovo, pagos ono and two of inclosuro 1 and roplaco with attach-ed pcagos ono and two. 2. After tho above action haa boon complotod this lotter wil. be filcd in front of basic publication. FOR M1 COMITIDER:

IIncl: as


1 - Assistant Chicf of Stnff for Feoco Decvolopmont, Dopt of the Ixmy Washington DC 20310 1 - CG, USLRPAC (AT- GROP-ME) 1 - CG, ~IMOV (ATTN: 11AC J.343) I - CG, IMOV (ATTN: 14AC J2) 2 - CG, USILRV ' 1 - G, USARV (ATTI!; AVC Historical Division) 2 -CG, I 1 IIEV 2 - CG, 101st .Abn Div, Ft Csmboll, Ky


3.-S2 10 - 53


1 - S5 I1-PS0 1- Sig

1. (0) a. !A" 'Uje.-re Unit 5trengths: Seginnin., of Cle-Lion "I1'-o-Irnc. (I ) The 3r a s fo12 c'.s: '4utborized


Inc3 osurd I (Personn~el and, Administr',tin'n) to Af tor Action lenoi'ts, Operation

ide-ersonrdl strongths nt the beginninT of Operation 14190

oine not Assipned Present for !Juty F'ot "'resent for %utyr Akir Nead Strength 3ase Camp ~ Tuv~o


116 5252 472 239e 17 93 1061

(2) The assigned strength 1.ins 130'.1 of the autt'orined stront'-; the nxresent. for duty strength -no 11T.~ of the Aut),oriqed strerlgth.

porsonnel. b.

Of the nct -present for dutiy strength, 339 -ere hos'nita~ized

Conciusion of Oporn~ion I~V.~

(1) The 3ricgade -ersonnel stremaths at the conclusion of C',erntion raere as follov~s:Q Authorized Assim9ed Joined not ?,sdfii 'd Fresent for D~uty 'lot Present for %,uty Air Veacl tent 3ase Camp Thyr Yea 4)490 5treng9 4703 931 2431 1527 755


(2) The assigned v"s 1281 of the aut'-orized strength; the nresent for duty strongtl- v.as 105r,of the authorized streigth. personrel.

* (3) Of th-e not nresent for dutv strenngth, 1-21 -*ere !wi.04zi

c. The "assifoed" strengiV figures are extrenelv inflated. infla~tion. is also reiflected in the "not ',resent for diuty" becnise:

()A 2Pr,,,e nrber oZ Ioan4 tilivec' :-%ersonneJ. Nave Ijeen transferred to off-shore Yoon'itals, CCV1*US, dnd/or zven dischar'ea; fromi the U3 trr-v --iti-it notification to the losing unit,



DIVISION1" 12 August ±968

Combnt Oporations Aftor Action R,;portp Opoiatiozi IIAW-TIORflE (M~.S: MACV


Coirm~nding Gonerc-l I Fiold Forco Victnaa APO US Forccs 96240 Cornanding Gonoral US Mitary Assistanco Coruand Viotnam ATTII: 33543 APO US Foroos 96243 jctcs n abovo, dcated 22 July 1966,


1. Lattor this hondqiw.rto-s, is changed as follows:

Ramovo pagos ono and two of in dosura 1 and rcoplaco with catt,.ch-;d

pagos ono and two.
2. Aftcr tho' abavo 4ction has bocn complotod this lattor irill bo filod in front of basic publication. 17OR THE COMINfDER:





Asst AGI

Distribution: 1 - Assistant Chief of Staff for FPorco Dwvclopmont, Dept of tho Arnty W.-shington DC 20310 1 - OG, USARPAC (A*2TU,: CR0 P-MI) 1 - CG, MACV (ATTI?: HAG J343) 1 - CC, 1ACV (ATTN: XAC J2) 2 - CG, USARV 1 - CC, USARV (AMTT; AVG Historical Division) 2 -CG, IM0REV 2 CG, 101st Von Div., Ft Ccuboll, Ky I1- CG

I -OO 12
XS2 10.,S3 1- S4 I1-S5 I -10


Inclosure I (contd)
(2) The present strength accountability rstem reauiies assigning personnel (i7DCSA) to units prior to theii physically joining the unit rather than administratively carrying them in the "pineline". (3) EDCSA.personn6l have been diverted without the subsequent notification to the losing unit. 2. (C) Casualties:
a. Casualties for Oneration HV'TFORNE were as follows: UNIT KIA IA

1/327 2/502

25 16
4 1
0 0

137 71

A 2/17 Spt Bn

2 1



re as follows:

Total casualties to dnto KLI 230





(C) Personnel Management:

a. A total of 291 replacements were received in the Brigade during this period. Breakout of such oersonnel to the aneuver battalions vere as follows:

2/502 2/320

118 22

b. Losses of critical personnel were closely monitored and 30 personnel vith critical MOS were assigned as follos: Plat'Idrs Plat Spts Doctors Med Ops Assts Medics 11 10 2 2 5

a. Emergency reouisitions'for continuing critical MOS"shortage ,.vre sergeants, cooks, submitted for E-7 platoon and legal plerks. medical specialists, mechanics, comunications personnel,













lnclo=u6 1 (Versonrel and Adm'inistrvtim')

to Aftor Action leports, Opereation


(0)Unit Strentoths:
a. eginning, of Cle,.tion lzmit)1orne.

(I ) The )ri.gade ,ersc-,- ,)I s-trensti's at ti-e be-I nninj of Operati.on 're WWUMM -e~f~as foJllo-,': Autr'orized 'XeSsi M-4 d JToined,' not Assigned Present Tor '"hity "'otaPresent for Duty Air "lead Strength .3ase Carn, p1793 Tuy !Toa 4h90 581,0 116 5252 472 2398 1061

(2) The assigned strerngt: .,as 1301. or the aut'-ori~ed strnth; the present for duty strengt' -as 11 9" of the ant],orig~ed strer, th.

(3) Of the nct present for duty' strength, 339 i'ere hos'vttalized
porsonnel. b. Concl.usion of Nor-irc on I'7~~

(1) The 3rigade "ersonnel strom-,the at the conclusion of C'nor.'.tion FAIV."?3 as follow*s ere Authorizedl Assigned Joined not Assi~ned Yresent for Duty 'ot Present for "iuty Air I:ead Strength S3ase Camp Tuy !17oa

4490 5749 115 4703 931 2431 15P7 755

(2) The assigned -._s j28'; oF the aut'-orimd strengths; the -Nresent for duty stron,#!- vas 105,1% of the auth~orized strenpth.

" ersonrel.

Cf t,,'e not vresent for duty strenath, 1.21 -'ere I"os-itn)izad

c. The "~assig~ned" stren-011 figures -ire extremely inflated. Ir.,'ltWt.on is also reflected in the 1 nrot nresent for dIuty" bec:%nse?

(1 JA)p~r'e nr. ber of 1;osnitrlized -nersonnel )'ave been transferred ) to off-shof-e 1osnc'als, CC"US, 4nd/or even dischmried rrom the U." t-r ,w4tl'ont notification to the losing unit.


DEPRM-atIUT U THlE AR1Nt HZEADQURTERS IST BRIGADE 101ST AIMO~RIE DIVISIONT APO Sen Francisco 96347 AVBD-A SUBJECT: 12 August 196S Combat Oprations After Action Roport, Oporation HAWITHORNE (R~CS: IIACV J3-32)


Corvaanding Gcncrej. I Field Forco Vietnam, APO US Forces 96240 Cormanding General 'S lilitary Asaistenco Comand Vietnen ATTN: J343 APO US Forcos 96243


1. Letter this ho'.dquirtors, subject as above, dated 22 July 1966, is chnnged as follows: Remove pegos one end two of in closure I end rcplaco with attached pages one and two. 2,' After th .rb-ovo uetion hac. beon completod this letter w-ill bo filed in front of basic publication. MOR TH CMbfl1A1DER:

1 Imel: ,is


Distribution: I - Assistent Chief of Staff for Forco Development, DepOt of tho JArar Wshington DC 20310 1 CG, USIPAC (ATTIT: GR0PIT 1I CG, UACV (ATTHN: 1.10 J343) I - C, KACV (ATTLN: RAC 32) 2 - G, USARV I - C, USARV (ATTiT: LVC Historical Division) 2 - CC, Im.0RCEV 2 - CG, 101st Abn Div, Ft Ccuboll, Ky 1 - CG 1 - DCO 1 - X0 1 - 51 1 - S2


I - S4

1 - S5






Inclosure 1 (contd)
(2) The present strength accountability system requires assigning personnel (!DCSA) to units prior to their phsically 6oining the unit rather than administratively c,rrying them in the "pineline".

(3) EDC&A perzonndl have been diverted without the subsequent notification to the losing unit.
2. (C) Casualties: a. Casualties f,r Operation HAIITt:RIS were as follows:

UN'IT 1/327
2/502 2/320

1KIAL 25

IN 137
71 2L.


0 0

2 1

A 2/17 Spt Bn



b. Total cas':a..ties to date are as follows:
KIA W'L liA 230 1206 2

3. (C) Personne Management:
a. A total of 291) replacements were received in the Bris?4do during

this period.

Breakout of ich
1/.327 108

personnel to the

aneuver battalions

ere as


u. Losses of



ritical personnel were closely monitored and 30

personnel with critica: -10S were assigned as follows: Platt Ih'r Plat Sgts Doctors Med Ops A-sts Medics 11 10 2 2



c. Emergency eouisitions -- continuing critical OS'shortage ,tre submitted for Z-Tnlaton sergeants, cooks, medical specialists, mechanics, and personn,, -legal








.. . .

. ,, ~









Irelosurd 1 (Personnel and Adnnistr?.tion) to Af.ter Action Reports, Operation 1. (0) a. Unit Strenoths:. .j Beginning of One='ation "-, orne.

(I) The Irigado 'ersonral strengths at the be innin, of Operation I.TGOnI , i-ere as follo,.s: Authorized ' ssi.ned, Joined not Assigned Present for :*uty 1,Tot "Present for Duty Air ]lead Strength &-se Camp Tuy Ioa , 40O 58&0 116 5252 472 2398 1793

(2) The assigned strength ,as 130 of the aut'.orized strength; the present for duty strength ns 119" of the autI'ori .ed strength. ! (3) Of the nct present for duty strength, 339 vere hosnitalized personnel. b. H?' Ti O, Conc3usion oC Opromi.on I'" P^

(1) "The 3rigade n'ersonnel strengths at the! conclusion of Oneration .'Tvere follo.s: . as

.Authorized 4490 Assigned 5749 Joined not Assignad 115 Present for Duty' h703 Yot Present for futy 931 Air ITend Strength 2431 '3aso Camp 1527 Tuy I:oa 755 (2) The assigned as 1285 of the authorized strength; the nresent for dutT strsnsite 1055 of the ss autotorized strength . (3) personnel.

Of the not -,resent for duty strength, ,I1 .ere !.osnitntzad S This

inflation is also rei'lected in the "not )resent f6r duty" bectnuse:

The "assi ned"l stren-t L figures are extrenea7 inflated.

( ) 3,rpe nu,;ber 6? bosnitnlized -ersonnel have been transrerred to of2-shoe . osnitals, C01"US, nd/or even diseharlyed Cron the US I'ry .-. Lt1'out notification to the losing unit.



O I 0d



C 6o



DEPAR .,NT OF THE AMff HEADQUARTERS IST BRIGADE fOIST AIP'3OR E DIVISION APO Gan Fracisco '96347 12 August 1966 Combat Operations After Action Report, Opcration RX-1THORIM (RCS: IICV



Cov, nding General I Ficld Force Victn,-m APO US Forces 96240 Commanding Generl US Military Assistancc Cormiand Viotnsa ATTIT: J343 APO US Forces 96243


1. Letter this ho-dqunrtors, subject cs zboeo, dated 22 July 1966, is changcd as follows: Remove p .gcs one and two of inclosuro I and replacc with attached pa.go$ Oond two. 2. After the above action has bon completod this letter will be filod in front of basic publication. R TH COMANDER:

I Incl: s 2d Lt, AGO Asat AG

Distribution: 1 - Assistant Chief of St,-ff for Force Dvolopmont, Dopt of tho 'A=q Unshinoton DO 20310 I- CG, USIPAC (ATTh GROP-MH) 1- OG, IMOV (ATTl: IHAC 3343) I - CG, 10V (ATTN: AO 32) 2 - CG, USRV


CG, USARV (ATTiM: AVC Historical Division)

2 - OG, IFM0ICEV 2 - CG, 101st Abn Div, Pt Ccmboll , Ky I - CC


10 - S3 1 - S5


1- S5 1-0Sig I - 10 -


__ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _



Inclosure I (contd)


(2) The present strength accountability system reouires assigning personnel (EDCSA) to units prior to their physically Joining the unit rather than administratively carrying them in the "pineline". (3) EDCSA personnel hc notification to the losing unit. 2. (0) Casualties: a. Casualties for Operation H%,TVORb were as follows: ,een diverted without the subsaquent

1/327 2/502 2/320 A/326

25 16

137 71 2L 6


A 2/17
Spt Bn







'b. Total casualties to date are as follows: YIA WIA lIlA 3. 230 1206 2

(C) Personnel Management:

a, A total of 291 replacements were received in the Bripgade during this period. Breakout of such oersonnel to the maneuver battalions were as follows: 1/,.27 2/320

108 118 22

b. Losses of critical personnel were closely monitored and 30 Dersonnel with critical lIOS were assigned as follows: Plat' Ldrs Plat Sgts Doctors Med Ops Assts Medics11 10 2 2


c. Emergency reouisitions for continuing critical MOS shortage vl're submitted for E-7 platoon sergeants, cooks, medical specialists, mechanics, , communications personnel- and-legal clerks.,



Inelosur6 I (T'ersenrel and Adrlnistrt~tion) to ALtcr Action le2,orts, Operation 1. (C) Unit Strenpths: a. ITYGO1U Begirnnin3 or One,.,ti on Fai-thorne.

(1) 'The lrignde 'ersao.Tol strcn-,tIc -it the be i~nninm of Operation "ere as fo3.]o-~s: AutIlorized .,ssigned Joined not Aosigned PFresent Zor Dutyr IVot 'Present for D2uty Air !Ilead Strength 3ase Carl', Thy. IVoa 4h90 58AO 116 472 2398 1793 1061


(2), The assigned strength i-as 13(y,, of the aut',oried strcongth; the-present for duty strengb!, -.as 11 9"of the nut'ori7.-ed strenrgth. personnel. b.


Of the nct present for dutv strength, 339 ,'ere hoan'ita~ized

Conc~usion or' (prakion ITO''. S (1), The 3riwide -'ersonnal strengths at the conclusion of Cnern-tion -vaTO~ follmi*s: 're as Authorized !'ssigmed Joined n~ot AIssi~ed -rresent for Duty V!ot 2resent for 'juty Air V:end Strength SJase Cam~p Tuy IFoa 4490 5749 115 4703 931 2431 1527


'(2) for duty stron:gt

The. assigned -'6d'!128V "' 1: autl-orized strengtb; the rnresent vas 105,'Iof the'aut' --..zed stren, th. Of0 the not nresent for duty* strength, &P1 '-ere I'os-itnlivad This


c. The "assign~ed" strenagth figures are extreneIy infhted. inflation is also rellec~ed in the "not 'nresent for duty"l bewnise:

(1 ) A 1ar-e nv.'pber of' bos-itlized tiersorel hive ',ecn transrerred to off-shor-e -osnitals, CUIUS, 4nd/or even dischnrood Croni the US trry vitl-out notification to the losing unit.

C0AJf/t Eftr/77 A

COA//<12Q ) T~/

SUTJECT: Combat Oporcations Aftor Action Roport, Opcratiori HAITHORM (RCS: MACV 3-32)


Conrmnding Goncra'J I Ficid Forco Victnan~ APO US Forcos 96240 TO ornanding Gonoro'. US 1ilitary AssistancocCormna AWN: J34% APO US Forces 96243




Lctter this ho, dquartors, sibjoct %s cabovo, drtod 22 Tuly 1966, is chinged as f'ollows: Romovo, pages one and tim of in closuro 1 and roplacc u-Ith attachetd pages ono and two. 2. After th6 dbovc 4ction ha-c boon complotod this lottor iril be filod in front of basic publication. M~R Tifl CC1-121DER:

I Inci: *as


Distribution: 1I Assistant Chiof of Staff for lerco Dwolopmopt, Dept of the xqr Wshington DO 2031.0 I. GG, USL.RPAC (Af.'1611; CROPMM) 1. - CG, 110OV (ATT11: II:0 J343) 1 - OG, 1,10V (ATTN: I4AC J2) 2 - CG, USAD.V 1 - CGj USAIRV (ATTT AVO Historical Division) 2 - CC, IFF0ROEV 2 - CC, .101st Abn Div, Ftb Ccubll., Ky 1-O 1S 1-2 10 - 3 1 - 34 I -S5 1-10 I I Sig





Inclosure 1 (contz)
(2) ..ersonnel (13DCSA) Thriun.its irior to their -• .Lity system the unit rather to, resent strength ac W.sicallv Joining recuires assigning 6 ahn administrative'Sy carrying them in the "tpioeline".

(3) EDCSA personn6l notification to 'Ae losing unit. have been diverted without the subsequent

2.(c) a.

tJatsualties: Casalties for Operation HVTITORNE were as follows:

1/?27 2/;02

25 16 4 1

137 71 24, 6

A 2/17

Spt Bn TOTAL b.


1 241

Tcal casualties to date are as follows:

IV, 3.

230. 1206

(C) Tersonnel Management:

a. A total of 291 replace-er s were received in the Briqade during this period. Breakout of such persc reel to. the ;ianeuver battalions were as follows: 1/327 2/502 108 118



b. Losses of critical personnel were closely monitored and 30 nersonnel imith critical HOS were assigned as follows: -Plat Ldrs Plat Sgts Doctors Med Ops Assts Medics 11 10 2 2


c. Emergency reouisitions for continuing critical M0S"shortage w re submitted for E-7 platoon sergeants, cooks, medical specialists, mechanics, communications ersonnel, and legal clerks.



Incl.osurC- 1 (IPersonrel and Adradis.t -,,t-1. (0) a. Unit )tren-pths~

to '..tcr Action Tlenorts, Operation

3eginnin.3 of Cne-.'oti on IW"thorne.

(I1) The 3rigade '-nersonr'ol strongths at the beV.nnin', of Operation J!"'TI'MUr.l '*ere as i'ollo-~s: Autlhorized ssi-ned Joinet; not A sipned Present Zor -*uty "6t P're sent for Nty Air !lead Strength
B9ase Cann~

4~ 5A0L0

5252. 472

Tuy 1!oa

1793 1061

(2) -,he Pssigned. strerngth -as 1305' of t~p. aut 1 'orized strongth; the present for duty strangt!-,-'as 119"' of the aijt],orized strenfgth. (3) porsonnel. b. Coliclusion or'N~rMaton C1.

Of'the not nrosent ftr dutiy strength, 339 -ere hos'ditalized

(I..The 3rigade ',r'sfirfea strnti as follqsto~tsa veTc?~~re Authorized Assignpe d A Joined not Assi',,nd 'Present for D2uty I!ot Yresent for Quty Air Vend Strength 0ase Ck'IP ~ Thy roa

atte he ocnso

-rVo fC:r~ 4 o

41490 57h9 -115 4703 931 2431 1527 755

(2) The as3igned vas 128")of the autl-orized strengtb; t~'e -~resent for dluty etron gtl- vat; 1O55 of the aut),orized strength. :wrnonrel.

(3Y. Of the not 'iresent for dutv strength, I.P.1 -.ere !'os-itrklizad

c. Via RlassignedI strengthi figures are extrenely inflated. inflation is also-rellected in the "tnot nrnesent for 'luty1 bec'use:

(1) A IP.rve nvrber o.:' );ositnlived- tersonrel, bave ',een transferred to orf-sho' e 1-osnilals, 'CUS, dnd/or oven diecharqed frrn the U.3 t'rrv -4t1'out notificption~to the losing unit.





CoN PJ0 e-N -T I At,


10 Auut 1966


Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation BEAUREGARD (EAGLE BAIT) (R"S: MACV J3-32).


Commanding . naral ..
I Field Force Vietnam APO US Forces- 962h0


,Comranding General US Military Assistance Command Vietnam ATTI: J343 APO US Forces 96243

1. 2. 3.

(U) (U)' (U) '() (U)

Name of Operation: -Operation M"EAURBGJD (EAGLE BAIT). Dates ofOperatioin:' 24,June through 1 July' 1966. Locatiog: KO'NT111 Province. Ist Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.


Co;,and,'Headquqrtersi Reporting. Officer:


Brigadier General Willard Pearson', Com-

manding General, ist Brigade, iOlst Airborne Division. 6. (U) Task Organization:
a. The task--organization of the..Brigade at the initiation of

Operation BEAUREGA ) (EAGLE BAIT) was as shown below.
remained relatively unchanged throughout the operation. TF 1/327 Bde Troops

This organiatioh

1/327 Inf
TF 2/502
12 Tm20

A 2/320 Arty 1. Tm, A 36 Engr

1C(A 2/17 Cav A 326 Engr(-) MP Plat
1/101 Avn Sec C6 m Det HE M2, Det Psy 181. MI 245

2/502 Inf326 Engr I.Z Tmi A 2/320 Arty B 1/30 Arty (OPCON) spt Bn()

O1s Co

3 RR11

b. During the operation, three CIDO companies operated with the Brigade through mutual coordination with the Commanding General. Two

TO) CIDG companies (DAKC with USSr Tm A .2144 worked with TF 1/327 and TF
2/502 respectively. Also, one CIDO company (!MNG BUK) with USSF Tn A

243 worked with the Brigade troops. .These units and, one Regional Forces c6ppany served'as naneuver -elements, protected iadio relaSy sit.es ' protected artillery batteries, protected Brigad" base camp and screened


of attacking 'units.' Also CIDG elements (DAK PEK) with USSF Tm A


I ..... .... . ..



lo Au
Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation BEAUREGARD (EAGLE BAIT) (RCS: MACV J3-32)

1st 1966

242 screened the LA'OTIM/RVN border and D:'( POKO River north of the
Brigade area of operation. Long range reconnaissance Apache Patrols were also employed to obtain information of enemy locations. c. TF 2/327 Inf remained detached from the Ist Brigade and was attached to the 1st Cay Div (Airmobile) in TP HOA on Operations YATHAN HALE and HIMY CLAY. 7e (C) Supporting Forces: a, 2/320 Arty: Employed in a direct support role.

b. B 1/3') Arty (OPO,): Provided general support (reinforcing) fires during the operation. c. lOth Army Aviation Bn: Provided two light airmobilo companies plus six UN-lD and four UH-lB aircraft in general support. In additionj two operational CH-47 aircraft wore provided from the Ist Cay Div. d. 129th and 183d Avn Co's: aircraft in direct support. e, 245th Psy Ops Co: in general support. War Ops. support. g. 299th Engr Bn (Combat): Provided one company in general Provided a total of four 0-1

Pvovided two loudspeaker and leaflet teams Provided airlift support for Psy

f. 5th Air Commwando Squadron:

h. 7th USAF:. Flew ten Tactical Air missions totalling twentyfive sorties. Of these missions, nine were preplanned and one was immediate. The iymvdiate strike was requested through the Air Force Direct Air Request Net and the response time from the initiation of the request until time-over-target was twenty minutes. The results of these missions included 5 VC KBA(BC), 21 VO KBA (EST), 3 structures destroyed and 19 structures damaged. i. 498th Med Det (Airmobile): Provided continuous medical, evacuation for the Brigade throughout the operation. J. 2!ACV and USSF Adv Teams, 24th Special Tactical Zone (ARVN)

provided liaison and coordiiation with ARVN, RF, PF and-CIDG foreos in the area of operation., 8. (U) Intelligence: See Inclosure 2, Intelligence.

9. (0) Mission: Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam directed the ist Brigaae, 1O tAirborne Division to conduct surveillance of the LOTIIA'/Ct30DIAN;/RN borders; block and ambush VC/NVA infiltration routes; and fix and destroy enemy in zone. 10. (0) Concept of peration: Initially, the concept of the operafion was to screen the area east of the D..K POKO River and to employ deception measures to bait the enemy from suspected hiding places into terrain favorable to friendly forces. Following the first seven days of the operation, the concept was to move west and conduct surveillance, blocking and ambush operations between the DK POK0 River and the L.UOT.*N Border. Later in the operation, the Brigade conducted search and destroy operations to exploit intelligence indications and contacts nade with the enemy by reconnaissance forces. 2



.l i- A; 4,.;

----- A


AV3D-C1I 0

-7 /P >Vr/
,!ACV J3-32)

"Augu#s 1966

Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation DEAUREG.'D

11. (0) Execution: On reconniaissance elements and (EXfLE CIDG began irth the Mff-tration of 24 June, Operation BfAUREG'. attached B.dT) forces to the east of the DJK POiCe River. (See Inclosure 3A, Opertion Schematic, Period. 24-30 June). These forces screened all known and suspoctod enemy infiltration routes. In addition, one rifle company was moved into each of the battalion areas of operation as an immediate action forco cabable of exploiting any major enemy contact. All possible measures wore taken to deccive the enemy as to the prosence of friendly forcas and to entice him to disclose his presence. Aerial reconnaissance and resupply to the forward elements were severely restricted. Because of little contact, reconnaissance elements and battalion reaction forcas moved west of the DA( POKO River on 1 July. (See Incloeure 3B, Operation Schematic, Period 1-7 July). The 1/327 Inf (-) moved by helicopter to conduct surveillance, the 2/502 blocking and ambush operations in the north, while elements Cof Inf infiltrated on foot to screen infiltration routes in the south. On companies 5 July, wThen reliable intelligence sources indicated that two -';W. were moving toward tha LACTIMI Border, the Brigade i-:mediately reacted by placing two rifle companies lof the 1/327 Inf, one platoon of 1A2/17 Cav and a battery of 2/320 Arty into blocking positions along the D iKROLOMG and DAK BLOC Valleys. On 7 July, the 2/502 Inf (-) made an airmobile assault on Objective M-1 to conduct search and destroy operations in exploitation of a contact mde by the Brigade reconnaissance elements with the onemnr. (See Inclosure 30, Operation Schematic, Period 7-11 July). The 2/502 Inf suffered four killd and six wounded from nines located in the vicinity of one of the landing zones near DIX SUT. Engineer mine clearing tears were r.apidly lifted into the area and worked diligently in.marking the mine field and destroying a portion of the mines. Having raccived onl one minor enemy contact in the DW(. ROLORG and DIXK BLOC Valleys, the 1/327 Inf (-) conducted an nirmobile assault to Objective PETE, east of the 2/502 Inf (-). Both battalons converged on the suspected enemy from opposito directions. Folloning the link-up between the two ,battalions on 11 Jly, the 1/327 Inf (-) continued its search and .destroy operations to the south. The 2/502 Inf (-) conducted an airnobile assault to the east on Objective ?RINCE and swept south to Objective LOD. (See Inclosure 3D, Operation Schematic, Period 11-15 July). When intelliednce reports indicated an enery build-up along the- Ci24BODILN Border,olements of the 1/327 Inf rapidly executed an airmobile assault to Objective KNIGHT and established a blocking position there. Having made no significant enemy contact, all units returned to D.X TO II Airfield -on 11 July and 15 July in preparation for deplo. ant to 4 TUY HOA.


(C) Results:

a. The 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division accomplished its mission of conducting surveillance of the LAOTIIT, C, ODIN and RM borders;
blocking and ambushing VCA/VA infiltration routes; and fixing and-destroying the eno, in the zone. b. The following losses were inflicted on the enemy during the .ralliers. In addition,ninoe individual and crew served weapons were captured and large quantities of rice and barley were destroyed. the operation were as follows: '" "' 39 WIA. ,c. "riandly losses during. 6 KA,


18 V(KIA (BC), 5 V3 KDA (BC), 21.VC.KPd

(BST), 17 V6S and



(C) Adminiitrative Matters: aA Personel and Administration:

Son Inclosure 1, Personnel and

Administration. b. Logistics: See Inclosure 4, Logistics.


IV 1Y &oiFIA,9


10 August 1966 Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation BEAUREGAMD (EAGL BAIT) (RCS: NAOV J3-32. (C) Special Equipment and Techniques:
a. Deception Techniques: H~ad additional helicopters been


available to the Brigade, &,ception missions wold have been flown to areas in which operaticns wore not ocing conducted. Such techniqles might have been effectivc in deceiving the enemy. ammunition under the howitzers in an Artillery displacc-ment saves time and minimizes the time a helicopter requires on the ground. " minimum of four CH-47 helicopters must be provided for displacement of the Lrtillery to insure rasponsivoness where it appears that najor 'enemy
forces will be encountered. c campaiGn Psychologieal Warfare: The complete saturation of a


OH-h7 1

,,,t_,gy-backl, Loads:

The technique of sling loading

target is nc-t the answer to a successful psychological wirfarn

To be most effective, the leaflet program mist be introduced

into an area where strong tactical pressure has boon applied. A four to six week psy-chological warfare campaign is considered to be the time frame
required to produce lucrativc results.

15. (C) Cormander's Analysis:
a. Lessons Learned: (1) The importance of having interpreters available who are familiar with the local dialect was reconfirmed. OIDG personnel familiar with the local language were effective in obtaining valuable intelligence information from the natives. This information could notIe obtained by the intelligence personnelwithoat the"interpreters'

assistance. The need for qualified, interpreters will continue to be ani important requirement.
(2) The effects were felt during the operation,of the times approaching monsoon season At then aircraft and helicopter

support was inoperative eue to inclement weather. However, there were no periods in excess of five hours which precluded the use of helicopters. (3) The individual soldier must be impressed with the fact that although there are cascs of isolated mines, the detonation of a single mine may well indicate a mine field.

(4) Ii dense jungle terrain, where few natural heliccpter landing zones exist, small Engineer clearing teams must habitually be provided to each battalion. These teams can build or improve landing zones for use by helicopters conducting medical evacu.tion, resupply and troop lifts. (5) The use of allied and indigenous forces are a valuable asset which will conserve or augmnt the forces available to a US unit comander. In this operation, Apache reconnaissance forces were invaluable as an extension of or resources.
b. Highliphts of Operation: (1) Throughout the period, CIDG units worked in mutual
cooperation with the Brigade. The CIDG personnel enjoyed workinEg irith US troops and pprformod in an enthusiastic manner. The troops of the

Brigade ained additional confidence in the local CIDG units. The cooperation and performance of duty of the CI)G and their USSF Advisors in KO,,1T.. Province xas the best and most profcssion-X that this Brigade has experienced in the past six months.


__ _


_ _

_ _ _













Combat Operzt ions After Action Report, Operation 3EUREOARD (EAGLE BAIT) (-CS: 4ACV J3-32)

10 August 1966

(2) T.ice during the operation, mine fields were located by our forces. Upon locatint a rine field the tactical forces stayed clear of the area, and mi-e sweeping eloments from the Engineers were immediately deployed with a small security force. The mine fields were marked and/or destroyed depending upon the extensiveness of the mine field network.
(3) Although no significant contact was made during the operation, it is believed that the techniques of deception and employment utilized would have been extremely sucdessful if there had been greater numbers of enemy forces in the area. 16. (C) Recommendations:

a. That a minimum of four CH-47 helicopters be provided to the Briga.de when supporting Artillery must be moved by an vir LOC. b. That the use of Artillery Mobile Training Teams be considered by other US tactical units as a means to improve Artillery techniques of Vietnamese units and to foster a better understanding and relationship between US and Vietnamese forces. c. That steps be taken by higher headquarters to rigidly enforce the proper reporting and recording of mine fields as prescribed in current doctrine. d. That organic and supprting logistical agencies continue to collocate in futvro operations.e. That Irovisions be made for medevac helicopters with a ;aore effective hoist capability to support the Brigade during futu re operations.

WILLARD PEARSON Br. ien-r -eeral, Cormanding Inclosures 1 - Personnel and Admiistratin 2 - Intelligence 3 - Operations Schematics 4 -.Logistics.




Communications Civil Affairs Psy War Artillery






flistribiL I - Aosistantb Ohief 0: StayC for Force Development, Dept of the Ar Ilablaingbon DO 20,310 1
2I CG; 14POY 'ATT)!h CG, UOV ATTIN: W0 J343) nil,0 J'21

2 -G, USPrf 21 OG; U3S2W (~T 75V 2 ;- orl; IV 2

L:IC '!istoriceJ. D-l.ision)

Oampbell, OG, 101st Abn Div, N't

I- S2




I S4



1..Sig MEFT.

Inclosure 1 (Personnel and Administration) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation B!EAUREGARD 1. (C) UNIT STREOGTHS: a. Beginning of Operation BAURMGAMD. (1) The Brigade nersonnel strengths at the beginning of oeration MhURSQARD wore as follows: Authorized Assigned Joined not Assigned Present for Duty Not Present for Duty Air Head Strength Base Camp

Io90 5677 93 4500 1177 2324 1597

Tuy Hoa


(2) The assigned strength was 1261 of authorized strongth,.the Twesent for duty strength vas 100% of the authorized strength. (3) Of the not nresent for duty strength, 121"-ere hospitalized'nersonnel b. Conclusion of Operation Sr!dUREGA.RD. (1) The Brigade personnel strengths at the conclusion of Operation WUREGAfRD were as fqllows: Authorized Assigned' Joined not Asign d Present for Duty Not Present for Duty Air Head Strength Base Camp 1.90 5558 186 4269 1289 2475 1300

Thy H6a


(2) The assigned strength was 12/L of the authorizea strength; the present for duty strength was 95% of the authorized strength. (3) Of the not present for duty strength, 341 were hosnitalized personnel.

2. (C) Casualties:
a. Casualties for Otoration MEAUREVID wore as. follows:


UNIT 1/327



" 13








COA/cP vi7-,4 4J
_ _ _ __ _ _ __ _ _


Inclosure 1 (Personnel and dminist r-tion) ' -Go.bat Operations Pfter Aotion rleport, Operation DiMAUPJ-M!MD (AGl, BAIT) b. Total Casualties to date are as follows: KIA WIA 1I1A 236 12145 2


3. (C) Personnel Services:
a. Utilization o±' in - country rest and recupcration ficilities on a 2A hour basis, During tis oneration, 7 )ersonnel a day ,ef'o given the o,)portunitv to utilize the facilities of the MCV cmnound in Plieku. In addition, 25 men a day -ere flown to Kontum for an 8 hour visit. b. AG, Finance, SqA, and AmericAn Red Cross Representatives visited the forward area and nrovided assistance.



Inclosure 2 (Intelligence) to Combat Operation BEAUI ElGAD (F2GiW. IT) 1. Terrain:

perations After Action Report,

a. Terrain was mountainous, covered with dbnse foliage. The ridges wore high with the ravine sides steep. Bamboo and broad leaf tropical pJnts dominated the lower "-egions with evergreens showing at higher elevations. b. Observtion and fields of fire were limited by dense undergrowth and the rugged terrain; however, cover and concealment were enhanced by the sone factors. Highway 14 is the principal north iouth route of approach, while the bridge (ZB 016218) andby pass ite (YB 948682). between Dak To and Dak Sut are keys to' the logistics to the area. c. Vehicular moveent was restricted to the main avenue and a few smaller roads. Generally vehicular overland movement is impossible due to the terrain. Foot movement is slow and difficult. 2. Woather:



a. The weather was dominated by thd southwest monsoon with the cloud conditions and rain being as expected. Visibility was sharply reduced during the early morning, late afternoon and evening hours due to dew ceilings and ground fog conditions. Visual air reconnaissance was impossible at times because ' obscuring of the ground by fog. Scattered thundershowers were frequent, causing hazardous flying conditions over some areas. These thundershowers g~ncrally shifted within an hour or two, incroasin- visibility and bettering conditions. A particularly violent streams to rise sharply for two to three' thundorshowar would cause sall hours within a small area. Best times for visibility were genally between 1000 hours and 1530 hours. b. Winds were gbnerally irost' to east and cE negligible to moderate intensity.- Heavy winds were not experienced. c. The temperature was 'cdol ith variations from 730 F - 750 F at night to'830 F - 850 F during the day. Humidity was generally high. 3. At the beginning of Operation EAUREGAMD the following information was available concurning enemy activity. a. Tralls used for infiltration from Cambodia and Laos crossed the operational area. b. Total strength in Kontum was believed to include 3800 NVA personnel,eight to ton local guerrilla comp.%anies with a strength of 560 personnel and 2100 militia. c. The 630th NVA Division was believes ,t ohavf"been located in the ' Chu Prong Base Area (SW Pleika-)"&id coudt avc'en deployed to the X~ntum area as a reinforcement. The 403rd, 407th and 409th 'Main Force battalions wore also available for reinforcement fzom Binh Dinh province., d. area. Indications show that the 12.7mm At. ,IG was being imployed in the

G., Extensive fortifications in the area indicated a war zone typ. complex that took a g-eat deal of time to prepare (eat more the 6 months). 'f. The 4th Bn, 24th NVA Regt was believed to be withdrawing to a rest area in the .vicinity of Dak Sut (YB 9352), along Highway #14. 'The 5th Battalion was withdrawing to an unknown rest area..' • g. Xnteriogation reports indicate a mission of the 4th Battalion, 24th IVA" Regiment was to attack Dak To and then Tan Canh during monsoon season.


."'" /

• Inclosuro 2 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation BEAU.EGARD (RAGLE BAIT) h. Interrogation repo)ts place thu last resupply to the 4th Battalion at I June for ammunition and 31 May for food. 4. (C) During the operation, the intelligence situation was doveloped


a. Inf'rmation obtained from VOS produced only data such as the status of Hamlet or Village populace. Nanes of VO syipathizers were recgded. VOS did not have lmowledge of NIVA units or any other Order of Battle information. b. Visual Reconnaissance: VR was flown an average of 9.5 observer hours per day for the past operation and revea)od fortifications, heavy trail activity md several radio antennas. VR confirmed soverUJ. SPARs and chock6d Red Haze activity within the Bde TAOR. A total of 6 photo missions and 2 Red Faze missions were requested and flown in support of the operation. VR A/C found many A" weapons, and A/C received 2 .50 caliber hits on one occassion. C(ORDINTES YB 992195 DESCRTPTION Circular clarings in bamboo thickets near Bdo Base area. RESULTS/ACTION SPAR rptd VC unit in area. Furthor ground check revealed diggings in clearing were friendly. Fired 01-D rockets, results unknown. Arty fired, wpn meod to now loation, fired arty again, results unknown. Rp .to S-2. Rod Haze revealed heavy use of trail at night. Rpt to S-2. Rpt to s-2. Arty adjusted and 75% of fortifications destroyed., Rpt ro oy.

B 778420 . YB 901451 & YB 89450

ast-like object in field, poss radio antonna. A/C found .50 cal AA MG, and drew fire witrccors. Weapon fired at mny M in area. Poss rice storage area, I/G entrance w/boards rupporting entrance. Well used t)ail running into jungle, showing sitnAs of recent heavy use. 20 foxholes w/overhead cover, 50-70 anti-holicoptor stakev in rice paddies VC trenches and foxholes on ridge line. 75 new foxholes in defensive pore-

1B 9M5
YB 9625 to YB 796258 YB 902537 ZB 135564 to ZB 143558 ZB 016552 ZB 040513 23 073475

15 new foxholeop camouflaged, with Rpt to S-2. fields of fira cleared in undergrowth# AS 820400 Area shows signs of heavy activity Rpt to S4 mar huts, cultivations and well used trails. YB 868943 Large number of oe-phants, appear Rpt to S-2. wild, but may be pack elephantq . Note: VPi listed above does not inclvde all nissiona, but is merely a listing of ort significant siahtings.


c. The I ,g 'Rango econnaissancr. Platoon was utilized oxtensively for the detection of enemy locatie-s, movements, and/or supporting activities.
(W 1 July - The LERP reported mortar fire vie ZB 083444 and noted heavy recent ttail activity moving to the north out of general area ZU 0940.


3 July


The TIP disovored a wa et (ZB 065396) lost by a

member of the 2/502. The wallet had been lost curing a battle with the 4th Bn, 24th t"A olgt at a point favther east. Conclusion: The 4th Bn

24th RVA Reg$ withdrew through ZB 065396 and su.Uo.quently north. 2-2
C~ 6-IJ-7








Action Report,

Inclosure 2 (Intelligence) to ombt .perat~ion~s Aft


6 July - The LRIAP recivod small arms and automatic weapons

fire frora YB 983562, YB 983569, YB 993573, YB 996563 and YB


(5) (6)

7 July - Tho LIV? contactod 'asma.l VC element at YB 957517.
10 July - The LRR sighted 17 VC moving SE at YB 764269.

1 July - Tho IA1P contacted an estimated VC platoon at

YB 762270. d. Through coordination with Special Forces, Apache teams were made available as an additioxvl reconnaissanco means. e. Ljison with the 42nd ARVN Regt. CIDG companies in our AO, and 24th STZ Headqui.rtors ",oro complementary intelligence sources. f. The location of large quantities of rice and barley were utilized as indications of VC activity in the area: WCTIN YB YB YB YB YB YB YB YB YB 920430 923,404 912445 957435 951318 920411 950560 918424 960567 955564 QUkNTITY AIM TypE (TONS) 2- (rice)' " 1 3 " (barley) (rico) 1 "
" "


12 3/4 i0*


S. Results." a. Initial Order of Battle:

(1) Prior; tho following is a listing of known units in this area of operations: 200th Arty Bn 407th WF Bn 13th AA Bn 24th NVA Rogt (2) PM4, ralliors and suspects: no worthwhile information bas been obtained during this period from the interrogation reports. (6) Total Strength: 4,360 to in6lude VC and RVA personel.

(4) Initial Enem .Disposition:
UNIT 200th Arty Bn 4Oth F Bn !3th AL Bn 24th NVA Regt LOCATIOT YB 9363 BR 1685 Unlmown Dak To Tou Morong ST-ENGTH DATE 200 200 Unk "I000 19 Tun a M Confirmed " Nono Approximate

b. Order of Battje Summary:, DiwIng recent operation no new or additional information has been compiled, constituting no change to tho present Order of Battle.



Inclosure 2 (Intelligence) to CombziB perations After Action Report, Operation BEAUREGAflD (F_ GLE BAIT)
6. (C) Intelligence Analysis, Lessons Learned:




(1) Because of the losses sffered during Operation EAWTHOMRN, the e~ements of the 24th NVA Regt appeared to be avoiding further contact with US forces. (2) Local enemy forces continue to operate as a dotorrioZ foce in those areas where food supplies exist. Although incapable of sustained defensive operations, their presence is sufficient to make CIDO and ARVII surveillc-nc,) difficL 11. not unfeasiblo. (3) The terrai.n in -ha operational area is cf such a nature tbat both V0 an..' NV7A " in:Uh contle to ha.ve rolativo f-reedom of movemfnt 1.l as long as their oporatiohs are conducted at the individual and small unit !evel., (41 Much of the support of the local polmlace has been lost as indicated by the- high refugee rate at the end of Operation BEAURlIRD* b. Lessons Loarnod: The LRRP is an intolligenc6 collection agenV and by virtuo o.f the nature of its operations is often subjected to ene; contact. Since onaiy cofttact is of such a positiv intollience natu3e it has been decried necessary to have a reaction force available in ca- 8 junction with all IMRP operations. The force necd only be of sufficient size to maintp.Lu contact with an enemy force (e.g. - platoon) until a adequate sizo force is mustered for employment.


(C) x2evxulk

a. The brigade was successful in deploying units in those areas onsidered to be occupied by the enemy. However, Operation BRAUREQID) was oharaotoriled by a distinct lack of siglticeant contact due to the pusposeful evasive tactics of those NVA units in the AO. b. The following to a breakout of the enamy weapons and material losses during Oporatio= BEAUREG .. (EGLE BAIT) n (1) Weapons Captured:

NME IA~ 'AK-47 6
7. 2=nr Mosin Nagant ,3

C= ImhOx HA)1UFATtMf 2 ChiCom.

7.62mm FfSH, Model 1953 22 gauge Stevens

1 i. 1Us


ChiCom US.

.45 cal Thompson 5!D
30 cal carbine,L




7.6m. (sher) 7.62mm (long) .45 caliber
12 gauge shotgun

257 59 27


Pood: !OMCIATURE R' Rice Barley QUANTITY 28J. Tons 3 " ons


l 'i ll ij t


l l








iniclasure 3A (Operation Schenatic., Period 24 30 June) to Combat Operations After Acti.on Report, Operation BEAUREZ -ID(EAGLE BAIT)

scag LAOS

1 C












Irloe3 (&pration Salongitia, P'1oe 1 7 .0-7) Operation.% After Action Report, Operaion IkJi1)-WAGD

tn, .

i z,



















Operations After Aotion Rep,

~ ~V~~dL.4 ~'


'e.' 1 ILU.Y) to Gomba.t Oprtration MUMMARD (YAtMITT)


8 0


9 0_








/30 0%04








S Openitions Aftii,, Aotion flopoet,




5 3tuy) to (r.2bo±

(E At T), (rAri(*AtnnA? T





so so 00 1



Iclosure 4 (Logistics) to Combat'Operntions After Action Report
Oper,.tion BEAUREGARD (Eagle Bait) (5) Water: Company A, 326th Engineer Battalion operated.a water point at TAN CANH using a 1500 GPH Erdalator which provided excellent service throughout the operation. b. Maintenance: The Support Battalion Mdintenance Detachment received 37 automotive, 80 signal, 70 armsnent, 20 instrument, 63 ouartermaster and 47 engineer job orders. c. Surf-ce Transportation: 212 - 2 1/2 ton truck transportation reouests were filled during the operation. d. Air Transport. 'tion:

(1) Fixed Wing:' CV-2 aircraft supijorting the Brigade flew 38 sorties for a total 1P 553 passengers and 26.1 short tons of cargo. 12 - C130 sorties were flcri So-, 72 p-rsengers and 25.75 short tons of cargo. (2) Rotaryr Wing: Both CH-47 and UH-lD continued to prove invaluable in aerial resupnly operations of committed forces. Two UH-1Dts were placed in direct support of each Infantry Battalion and provided extremely efficient tactical and administrative support to the comniittbd units. (3) Army aircraft lifted a total of 58.52 short tons of supplies into the forward area. Attached at Appendix 1 is the daily aerial resupply tonnage by class of supply during Operation BEAURMGARD (Eagle Bait). e. Other Services: (1) Gravas Registration was provided by 148th Quartermaster Company, and elements of USRSC, QUI NHON. (2) Bath: l4Wth Quartermaster Company provided excellent service throughout the operation.




a. There were no major problems encountered iu the areas of field sanitation and personal hygiene. Engineer LZ clearing teams and a single medevac helicopter wi-.out winch, proved adeauate for the relatively small. number of casualties generated by the operation. b: Patients Treated:

(1) WiA (2) Non-Battle Injury

42 75". 189
Total Treated 306



c. d. e.

RetUrned to di#y Evacuated to hospital Remaining in holding

23.0 0

Z. Hospitalized personnel (Battle Injtiries) 'categoized by wovurds
are as follows: .(l) "

Head '


(2) Chva

2 4

(3) Upper extremities
A .


Inclosure 4 (Logistics) to Combat Operations After Action Report Operation B4%U}UXOAWJ (Eagle Bait) 1. (C) OANIZAT!UN F01 SUPPOihT: a. Support Battalion:

(1) Headquarters Detachment: Provided comaand and control for Support Battalion (Forward). The Petachunent was organized into command, operations, communications 'and movement control sections. (2) Supply Detachment: Was responsible for receipting, storage and issue of all classes of supply and provided a parachute rigger section, (3) Maintenance Detachment: Provided repair capability for small arms, artillery, engineer and autcmotive items. The detachment was organized into a shop office and a recovery/contact te i:..

(4) Medical Company: Provided Brigade level medical service, It was organized into a company headauarters section, a surgical section, a holding section, a medical evacuation section, an emergency treatment section, and a dental section.
b. Sun.orting Forces: (1) FSA, USASG, QUI NHON (TF Stinson) supported 1st Bde 131st Abn Div. FSA w-s collocated with Supplv Detachment, Supoort Ba.ttalion. It was responsible for receiving and stocking Class I, III and V and for issue of Class III to aviation units. (2) 10th Ayiation Battalion: 1'roVi.ded 2 light ainnobile comoni'os, pls 6 UH-ID and 4 UH-1B aircraft to support tactical and logistical operations. (3) CH-47 helicopter su.,j-ort was provided by 147th Aviation Company (Airmclile ,edi=m) .nd 1st Cay Div (Airmobile). (4) 498th Aviation Company: throughout the operation. 2. M'TIfIIEL AND SEIULqS: a. Supply: Provided Medical Aeroevacuation

(1) Class I: A total of 184 short tons of "B" rations and 62 tons of Meals, Combtl, Individual, Type "C" were issued during the operation. 'An adequate supply of "B" rntions was received and "All ration meats were issued in sufficient ouantities to supolement all but 5 "B" r.%tion meals. However, 'fresh vegetables and bread issues were extremely limited. (2) Class II and IV: Class II and IV supolies were shipped from the Brigade Support Battalion in PHAN RANG ond QUI NHON and CAM RANH BAY Area Supoort Commands. However, jungle fatigues and boots were in

short supply throughout the operation.
(3) Class III: 211 short tons of Class III and I1ia were issued during the operation (excluding JP-), to include 39,500 gallons of 4-OJAS, 9,500 gallons of DIESEL, Pnd 15,900 of AVL;AS (115/145). Suporting aviation units used 204,250 gallons of JP-h (592 short tons). 4 oper.tion. (4) Class V: X49 short tons of Class V were issued during the The following items rimainad in short sup'ply during the onor-tioi,. (a) Hard-Huld Flares

(b) White Star Cluster (c) Greun Star Cluster (d) White St.r Parachute Fl.res




Inclosure 4 (Logistics) to Combat Ope ations After Action Report Operation. BMUR'CGARD (Eagle Bait)

(4) Lower extremities
(5) Abdomen





4. (U)s~x
a. Spply operztions continued to be simplified by collocating the FSk, USASC. QU7I 1i,14 and the Brigade Support Battalion. Comaon Supply and V. Support Battalion, lst Brigade, Points were used for Cl.ss I1 101st Airborne Divioion provided Class II and IV supply. b, Helicnpter Hoist: Operations in mountaincus and/or heavily . un n a to neccnvitate fitting medevac helicopters with a forested terrai winch capabil i-ty"


(U) cO.


a. Duplication of effort is reduced by olocating tie FarvarSupport Area with thh orgunic Forward Support Elewent. b. Med,-w.' heliopers iauiped t;ith winch capabilitr are a necessity when operating in mountainous and/or heavily forested terrain.





_ _

(Appendix 1) to Inclosure 4 (L zistics) to Combat Operations After Action

Report, Operatoni rM.TAIJ&lAfl CLMP) 1 PC..t 1: "





June .......


25 June
26 June 27 June

....... .........

28 June 29 J,,,e 30 Jine



.... ......... .. ..


2 July
2 July 3 JLly

lCO 110




4 July
5 July 6 July 7 July


.11. .25 4.50 2:20 .80 .50 1.15 -

lO 50 500 7500 32,500 32,500 17,500 800 -




9000 4400 1600 1000 2303 ..... ...... .

.25 3.75 16.25 16.25 8.75 .40

1000 2900 1000 1500

.50 1.45 .50 .75

8 July
9 July

10 July
11 July 12 July


L1. , July



15 July










Inclosure 5 (Communications) to Combat Operations ,ftur

.ction R-port, Operation

I. (u)
The Isr.oi Id-H,] veers and Headquarters Company Communications Platoon amd the Ist FM? bad the joint mission of continuing the communications support of the BDrigadc Ho:1douart.rs as initially established for Operatioln HAIHORNE. 2. (C) to

a, VHF Soa!-'ior, .. Not conf.ted. b.. C m ,,r.cations Center Section
and socl.re tJ :c _ce ":, .FFCI7. c; o -

Provided motor messenger service

c. wire in .

terinet.ng, 7

. ,, - A t7o-..'o..ion ,.chboard was operated a:so ' , .; , Au', i-. nsalled increased the in tha 00N ?.) arc, i


d. F P d M. i " Tro i ' .. z.A i>. operational traffic. i., Spliistt-r"g the 7.'v) .1 1 ca... f fciw peak periods. A FM role? sico \:t :., ted vnrsaur,ission. 'i: n..' z a.tomation clr9 e, n Brigade Hnadquarto

P. 'I

C' C n ,uod to provide maintenance support for rtrs Ccmpany and dttac,: nts. to. , 'nt'--a -. Igixe ITT net between

f. X P,. ",i DM TO. "'HATX" "A

3. (0)

C,'rpx: ,


into the Corps area sy- ,'m

- 51th Si.gncl t,...n provided VHF circuits ,,cure iTT to FFOR(EV, and operate a Single Side

Band Phone Patch ot D

"OK"N,! 1XI1G, and HA TANG.

Probe .Areas:

a. Persoi.nel shortages - Shortapes in ski]3led MOSt s.are becoming critical, especially 32?, 72B2P and 72134P, affecting communication center operations and repair capability. b. Equipment shortages - 12 3TJ AC generators were requisitioned on

"02" priority in oveber 1965 as a replacement for the PE-75 generators, which have proved unreliab.o, Only ona has been received.
c. TT-4 tei'ntypevriters continue to be a critical maintenance problem. Insufficient floats at', avoM)lable to maintain a continously operational machine. d. T195 TransmiLtters continue to be a cr tical maintenance problem. Insxfficient maintonance floats ara available to maintain a continously operational net or system, even though all AM Radios are consolidated under Brigade control., e. IN communications between the Brigade and Battalion TAC Command Posts were not reliable. This can be improved by the use of ground-mounted AN/VRC-46, radio sets and Remote Control Unit AW/GRC-39, and'training of RTO's. f. Several units layed wire through the Brigade Command Post area using unsatisfactory wire laying techniques. Units should review F1 24-20 with changes. g. Telephone subscribers often did not use directly numbers. Asking for partiep by name conititues a security violation in bome cases, and in all cases delaying the operation of the switchboard. Directories arm avaibla from Strike 10.




Inclosm-.o 6 (Civil. Af±'c-Ar)
1. (C)

to Combc.t Opcrationa Aftor Action ' loport,p

"7- eci::octoo'. m inlyt, 't 's:;iiting tho Civil. .f.?rira civic tLctio- -o.170~ UK1 TO District C!-ief in h~is o:Zorts to rocor.-i3p- Vic missions -.s~siViod
to Inim as p.to-' the. nml~utionrxy Dovolo~ment P,-orn. ;,oornso the ,3r3i*,-Ao r,,&I±o in the no crxa,. thnt it hal boon in :'=oNOpr.%tioa )flisofr .M:1:0=, ,:qpini-)ra6nirxino tho0 Civil ocrlior p:?r;rcjas cosianad to loaon tho' friction botsoon thi3 Dlrig.Ae ,ne. tho poopo of the -r-2. (C) In -n effort, to nmort tha '6volut, on o-' Dole.ost Pro":rzi o'3J activo of tho, W7~ TO District; this Prign?.o 'orl-od coosOZ -dth the Sub-Soctor .4visor, C,-.pt D'-).u,", :!-Yd the U9VID rp-O-oft-tiv4' IL- Szr..6?. :. list o.;,-1oioots, in or-d~r or pr'iority, wa.s drv-n %r) Zd%~s time, mon, =0nd oqtdmpont booc-o trniL,.blo the projects wroo umdortdma:c -nd conpbotod. Sono of those mprojocts m'ro:

)m-irg, Oporcation 22JtX'(:P

'Tigdo Is

Crcndng cmnd i.mproving t aO Ccntr.-. 11txrhot 2).cmo in V.
, and5. n bridr rop~dr, 24 s. ro,-,d 3 bridiros.



a. d. o.

CM Grcdin!! rouM for a now s61,ool in D,.C! Cutti.ng :tia,-or Dist~tot uso.

Plo.-rin tho 3m-th±cJon~ tho side of 11-oito 0haoNs e


ti f. Wa Oand W.7 C-IT.

'a".' initu'o to tho Schools in or


Inclosut'o 7 (Psy llcz) to Conb..t Oporc.tions Lptor Lotion ..03ot Oporcttion

K(U) Psv~looiorJ. ObjootV.va: To prormoto cotivo civilcz supp6rt, to inclmoo cotion oonornt -ith :'Mrl in sirv~ort of tho flrigcolsrniassi, to domorcliizo tho onm, MA )*.omoto z~lcr r ot.n'noos.
2. (U) Psyoho..orioc1. 7noS Usod: v.. b.e o. 3. DomorcJlit'.o !rVA -nd VC crndro.

to (~T/2Jlt

od !Torooa.

Chiorn !oio

(C) Tcragot Lucdioncoo:


24th floginont.

b. Viot Cong Crfro.

Spo:or hoL-s. S. .ot -

43 1hours

o. d.

S,ooic3. 7 eJ.ia

v.ta oftoo.:

3 63 3

0. Spocir2. ta-pos Forlwod.

5. (a

ossons Loc_no-.2

Thcvt tho offCoct?_xonoss of :%. tcati.cI. 7sy '!mr oc'xgn 0do"Ond on tho uso o.7 r5.itcry Zoroo in tho oporabion3 croc. l'4litmxy pro;ssuwo is nocowzy to insiro rosponso in tho t.-wiot c.1xIionco. b. Thrt compioto sa~turation of a targot idth lo.-Sots is onl~y t p*rttk2 solution fZo: rn of 70otivo ,sy irr eccp. It must be tho combinod~ offort of locMlots cnd teati~n. uross,.'xo.

a.. boon nmoo.

conclusions: Thtrt tho rosuW.ts of tho Psy 11ar oVfort in 0Oorntion 1ru.hvo boon noro offrootivo if strong n iit~lz,* contcot hv.A

J~'.rxx imrM

lob. The lonCg rongo Trortlts o-9 tho Psy_"Tci of:ort otmulot bo dotorminod, but it %tsboon tho rxilo in tho pr.st th- t tho full of ,o ts lli's '7,x oonpcign. tc2~o /+-6 oh ctr.

I 12e

Tnolostuxo 8 (trtilory) to Comba't Opom.tions Lftor Lotion Ronort,

1. (C) Ilassions: W. D.r tt,^ion, (tirbo-no), 320th Arti)J.oi-.r DS of Ist Drigc^Ao, 101st Airborno Division. IT' 3ttory, Ist ,tJon(To~iod) 31 30th I rtillory roinl'orcoo rM ".ct!itzor DTtt,-lion (A±rborno), 320th Artilloiy.
2.(0) ao1.tion: 24P/ 30 AJu1o: P.12. Imit'] uro' plc 0. on stcndby alJort. Units continuoP to mrtitcin oqti-pont. 4 aorvico M~cwtieo wa~s conducto. on 26 - 27 Jiuno to foz1irwizo tho Forvcerd Obsorvor.s end I M4.cson OZ.Picors ith tho :--robloms of Azrtillory c.jastw~nt in jtmg31o. c.. 1 - 5 July: I July I.//20ti Lrty c2'sXrcc. .-t 10 0 hrs :Lom Z.t'.227 to 771045316 to !jqpport scr-oo-nin-- zision o thio !/77t In t.D/3Ot*. Arty- bog,-n dis,~.coin to :3V,523c9 rt l3)0I hrs to suniort ocrooning missiofi of~ 2/502cA 1*ifn'tr. Doth units closod cnt 1VO0 hrs. ))%wing t'-Is por.oc, tio bc.ttorios o^ tho 2/320th !.rty -'oro clibrcetoc. During this poricd -,n,: worm'a Ziroe. t 101 tc-xr7-ots oxpondinr, 402. roud. On 051.430 ',Ixn Jul 61, 3-/2/320t% rt di!;pl.,.od to Y386041,5 in sumport ofP the, 1/327th Inrn~.Unit closod -. 2()/+5 hArsa t b. 7. - 15 JTuly: tLt 070C 5 iirs July 6,,, I/.12/320th Arty dis-i.cood to Zfl962521. to surpport 2/5021. Infc.,it:'y. Unit o..1ood at 1.745 !Irs. On s Jly W2/ -atArt c -4sp3.eto 1"3043553 in su-.%"ort of V7i~ infentry. Unit clo-iod at 1745 'o..s On 1.2 JuLy 3/l/?Oth ' ty edis- -cod to M01)32-.0 if sm:,ort o 7 2/5')2 Infentiy. Il ol-awn.ts clonod bm.ok to basuo oc.Vi; D,,7 TO, cI of' 1745r hs 16 July 66. 3. (0) SuyrLy cmd .Lhiistrcation: *'Toro ,-oro eoqmuto UI!-V'sx to Iproido tho roq L4-oe. rosuppAy cf tho bcUtc1on dwin,. tha oporation.

4. (C) Problom .Lroeas:
c~ isnlw~omont by tue (2) C:~4 'H.M~i ory bc.ttorios abo cisl-.od by~uti)Izin!! only t'-o C~-7 boothis plxoos ocil~nito 1iwitcationo on timoly six ,port o.7 tho infr',nt:y -aid dolays toinitiction. oZ ground op~rations b-y s iorto2 olononts * Dovandont on distcneo of dis1:onotllr tho o trc-os -From six to nino hours. Dtwminvft'his porioc. t-0o br-.ttuoz7 is oiporeating in t-o positions -rith WinAitm su-pport. Lditionn2.1y tho socitity foroo -Vor Iio b;-.ttory:- is dividoe, rmd in some inst.tmoos tiro forcos -AIIl bo romviA:od, ono to soovo the fcnrd posit,*on -Md ono to row~in in tho prosont positbion until disploome nt is omloto. b. Po~itioninp-w o.'tldio Mole.- The D-ctm.2ion, Aumng thd 1-.ttor phcso.o.f the oporcation, oxporionood diff'iouty in comtuiioting irith f!or,!.-"d bcttorios booruigo of tho loction of' tho Brigndo radio 5. (C) Corr-onto:

a' Tho b,tt,%Iion for tho first time disp1Inod utilizing thi "pi~'-e~o" ystem. r 31inging mmstntion um-lor tho hoi.tzors vr2.urnb2o timo-is smxod ciid the3 tineo on the rome.. by tho c77-1+716 is minmiso',. The bt'.tt 71an hzns the onp.bility o:? novin'w nino houritzors b3, igry-bnoh", .c=d by 5 Lkgust "ill ho aq -. lo ^f movin --. hositsor, b in thsmnuor. b. Pm 13%T va~s plwoe in sunorlt o:7 the .o Spocil-. leoos C.iwmt dm'i~g t~,) oporeation. Tho 1~jTT nrovidod'instruotion in :*ir r5otion ~pod''es,6ro- diifl. on the 105m, hovitora, w-4ntonlmse prooodtwo, ce tho orro, !i.ndl in, -h?, ot prooduros o-* cm1t5.on. A.Wton!%!1y, ' 2±~it~mnntecno is orformo&'on tho :*i-tirs ced -iro diroot5.ol fo~a W,~ rocorda 'Toro providod to the crtiAllory olonont of the or.inp.






8A2~oj to Co

)-zE , -~.ttions lftar Lotion Raort,

o. Qno OIDG connt~ iTCO )rovidod v.3 J./2/32.t Airt-,. This Coroa pjravo alocur~to 'i N of."ioiont -n,,. v'2.ng m-nno-.?.

~ soctrity :Corco for

vn- oro-, its rAssion

OL Tho Qi-/ .& posit-.onod a~t ZJD013?.13 ror the0 ontlr~o Dorioel 0, tho oporcation. Tho :,ovt~ctor &! ro"-onsibil'ity lu ,c.o B'igcdo T'otionr1. Oporrat-ions Contor and tho &cj h cnt 1,0 3.cootcr pr-69 vith soconda-y ase-bion-, bai c m tho J-Ur.ing b,-.ttar5.os. a-o 2-4 Tvno to 15 Zu: th' .ikj nonl-oporc.tion'. Tor 5.2 -oiws. 0poc.ti.nc;, poriods :?or the rc o roni 1810 lwa to 0600 '.,=s, adil; thlis boi.-G, tho naos- Thyopriod o-" zo::t,.r rmttrzi-s. C. (U) Iloeormiondction: A1 vnlznwri o-? ^%our (4+) 0!-47 's bq plc-ood in smr or. o:7 tho battcioin dairin.,: futuro ai~obilo oporcntions.


0.o Poqlitions Occinicd -.-. ,'-T-,mtioa ;ci)nidod) to d Ino).ornx-oI (2. Inclo~uro 8 (Lriti.1o.') to Coleba± 0pcc:tons Lftcr ltet5.ol Pon-ort, 0por'.t5~on fl1y:~)(Conti'dY

24 Anlo - IJuly

0~523 Condulctod:PoII~
2 TLLv - 5 July



6 TiL%, - 7 Jv2y .Oll.0: T)OW123 Cne -tatoe: 0
a 'Tar -

POSIT1OI: Zfl023ple Conducmtod: 15 T-1 2. Prep 3 DefComo1

3" T3


-im's Firod:

4P 364 Nn HWT 20 'IF


-Sa-voyod-.1 batro:Is sl -~ ICv-wnlcomo otoc

Incomwi~o 1 ( 24 rt. o
Cout Tv,-.i 'I,

1c rcPs~ft.

8to 'etin iT :,, Lou-Pl

LM-uAion :=ondod) to

To~r Gon 0 r polcdod: 6497 11M


24JLyZ -






*2OSITIMZ7OT 3Z. Condatod: 1 Ccibrr.tion
8 Ju0y - 9 July




POSXTaiOU: 171424,0, Conduotod: .12 Ma. 8 Dof Gono


Msns lfrei:

43. 227 1~



Svo Prcatio

30 22











2200 2 12

~ ~

27 Svo Praotioeu s

3. t/rd



M ,

















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