You are on page 1of 65

1NC: Consult Japan (1/2) 3

1NC: Consult Japan (2/2) 4


Need To Reinvigorate The Alliance 5
Need To Reinvigorate The Alliance 6
Consultation strengthens the Alliance 7
Consultation Generally Good/Strengthens The Alliance 8
AT: Japan will say now 9
AT: Japan will say no 10
AT: Japan will say no 11
Answers To: ?No Crisis ? Consultation Isn?t Needed? 12
Japan wants to be consulted on peacekeeping 13
Japan supports UN peacekeeping 14
Japan supports UN peacekeeping 15
Must Consult Japan on Iraq 16
Must Consult Japan on Iraq 17
Must Consult Japan on Iraq 18
Japan would say ?YES? to greater EU/NATO role in Iraq 19
Answers To: Japan will say ?NO? 20
Japan would say yes to demining 21
Japan would say yes to UN reform 22
Japan leads in Cambodian demining 23
Permutation Answers: Reciprocal/?Genuine? Consultation Key 24
Permutation Answers: ?Pass The Plan, Then Consult? Answers 25
Genuine Consultation is Key to U.S. ? Japan Alliance 26
2NC ? Genuine Consultation is Key to U.S. ? Japan Alliance 27
Consultation key to relations 28
Impacts: Alliance Collapse Causes Rearmament 29
Impacts: Alliance Solves North Korea 30
Impacts: Alliance Solves North Korea 31
Impacts: Alliance Key to U.S. - Russia 32
Impacts: Alliance Collapse = Regional War 33
Impacts: Alliance Key to Taiwan Conflict 34
Impacts: Alliance Key to Taiwan Conflict 35
Impacts: Alliance Key to U.S. Hegemony 36
Impacts: Alliance key to solve terrorism 37
Answers To: Article 9/pacificsm/taboo stops rearm 38
Answers To: Japanese attitudes prevent nuclear rearmament 39
Answers To TMD Disad 40
Answers To: TMD Disad 41
Answers To TMD Disad 42
Answers To China Disad 43
China-Japan DA Answers 44
Sino-U.S. DA Answers 45
Affirmative Consult Answers 46
Affirmative Consult Answers 47
Affirmative Consult Answers 48
Affirmative Consult Answers 49
Affirmative Consult Answers 50
Affirmative Consult Answers 51
U.S.-Japan relations are strong now 52
1AR: China DA Link Extensions 53
1AR: China DA Uniqueness 54
Sino-Japan DA 1AR: Uniqueness Extensions 55
Sino-Japan DA: 1AR: General Extensions 56
Consultation Is Normal Means 1AR 57
Affirmative Answers ? China DA Links 58
Japan will say no to SEAsian peacekeeping 59
Affirmative Answers ? China DA Links 60
1AR Ext: Japan will say no 61
1AR Ext: Japan will say no to increased peacekeeping 62
1AR Ext ? Japan TMD Bad Impact 63
1AR ? AT: Taiwan not linked to U.S. Japan TMD 64
1AR ? Uniqueness Ext. ? TMD not inevitable 65
Japanese Rearmament Answers 66
Japanese Rearmament Answers 67
Japanese Rearmament Answers 68
Japan?s PKO contributions are key to the alliance 69
Japan?s PKO contributions kill the alliance 70
Japan will increase PKO support/involvement now 71
Japanese participation in peacekeeping promotes militarism 72
Japanese participation in peacekeeping promotes militarism 73
Japanese participation in peacekeeping promotes militarism 74

1NC: Consult Japan (1/2)

We offer the following counterplan:

Prior to adoption of the plan, the United States will initiate a process of binding
consultation with Japan and will propose that:

(insert plan)

During consultation, the U.S. will advocate the adoption of this proposal, but will allow
Japan to propose modifications and alternate solutions. The U.S. will adopt and
implement per the results of consultation. Funding and enforcement are provided. We
reserve the right to clarify.

Observation One: Theory


A. Consultation is legitimate. Consultation counterplans are necessary to focus debate
and make the affirmative justify the entirety of the plan. Specific literature, grounding in
the real world of diplomatic policy options, and the clear net benefit warrant the
legitimacy of the counterplan.

B. Affirmative conditionality is illegitimate. The Affirmative is bound to the immediacy,


permanence, and unalterability of the plan established in the 1AC and the cross
examination. If the plan is a conditional moving target it distorts competitive equity in
the aff?s favor by making it impossible to win disad links and counterplan competition.
All severance and intrinsicness permutations should be rejected.

Observation Two: Not topical

The word resolved means ?to make a firm decision.? The counterplan allows for policy
changes to occur.

Observation Three: Competition.

A. Mutually exclusive. The 1AC established the immediate and unconditional


implementation of the plan. Any permutation that solves our net benefit is a severance
permutation and is a voting issue to preserve stable and predictable negative ground
established by the 1AC.

1NC: Consult Japan (2/2)

B. Net Benefits.
1. Prior, genuine consultation is critical to the alliance

Bergsten, Institute for International Economics director, ?01


[Fred, NO MORE BASHING: BUILDING A NEW JAPAN-UNITED STATES
ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP, Takatoshi Ito and Marcus Nolan, eds., 2001, p. 262-3]

Programmatically, making the alliance work is less a matter of bold new initiatives that of
achieving improved consultation between Tokyo and Washington on the whole panoply
of international issues that they face. The Armitage Report contains numerous specific
recommendations along these lines. For example, Washington must accept a greater
political role for Japan and understand that there is a difference between genuine
consultation and mere forewarning. At the same time, Tokyo should be reminded that
global and regional policy initiatives undertaken without prior consultation with
Washington ? such as AMF proposals in 1997, and the FTAs that it has launched
unilaterally in recent years ? are unlikely to succeed. The alternative to making the
alliance work would be for Japan to become an autonomous great power. Under current
circumstances, without significant regional organizations that mediate festering historical
animosities, this would run the risk of destabilizing Asia.!
Its huge costs, to Japan itself and to the United States as well as to regional and global
stability, add strongly to the case for making every effort to restore the Japan-United
States relationship ? including in the economic sphere ? in a modern and normal
direction.

2. Strong alliance solves multiple nuclear flashpoints in Asia

Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State, 2000


[Richard, et al, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/Spelreprts/SR_JAPAN.HTM, The United
States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership, October 11]
Major war in Europe is inconceivable for at least a generation, but the prospects for
conflict in Asia are far from remote. The region features some of the world?s largest and
most modern armies, nuclear-armed major powers, and several nuclear-capable states.
Hostilities that could directly involve the United States in a major conflict could occur at
a moment?s notice on the Korean peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait. The Indian
subcontinent is a major flashpoint. In each area, war has the potential of nuclear
escalation. In addition, lingering turmoil in Indonesia, the world?s fourth-largest nation,
threatens stability in Southeast Asia. The United States is tied to the region by a series of
bilateral security alliances that remain the region?s de facto security architecture. In this
promising but also potentially dangerous setting, the U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship is
more important than ever. With the world?s second-largest economy and a well-equipped
and competent mil!
itary, and as our democratic ally, Japan remains the keystone of the U.S. involvement in
Asia. The U.S.-Japan alliance is central to America?s global security strategy

Need To Reinvigorate The Alliance

POLICY-MAKERS NEED TO PAY MORE ATTENTION TO RE-INVIGORATING


THE ALLIANCE

Kurt M. Campbell is a senior vice president and director of the International Security
Program at CSIS,. THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Fall 2000, p. 25

For all the talk of the U.S.-Japan security alliance as the cornerstone of U.S. strategy in
the Asian and Pacific region, there has not been enough attention by senior U.S.
policymakers, commentators, and elites to understand its complexities or sustain its
importance. Indeed, except for a brief period of strategic reexamination in 1995 -- the so-
called Nye initiative that culminated in the 1996 Clinton-Hashimoto Security Declaration
-- the alliance has, for more than a decade, been managed by mid-level bureaucrats on
both sides of the Pacific. (I must admit here to being one of those mid-level officials,
having worked at the Pentagon between 1995 and 2000 on Asian security matters.)
CONSULTATION STRENGTHENS RELATIONS
Dennis C. Blair and John T. Hanley Jr. Admiral Dennis C. Blair has been the
commander-in-chief of the U.S. Pacific Command since 1998. Dr. John T. Hanley is his
primary strategic adviser in the Asia-Pacific region, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY,
Winter 2001, p. 7
The way ahead in Northeast Asia is to reinvigorate U.S. bilateral alliances with Japan and
South Korea by clarifying their broader strategic purpose and direction. A decade after
the end of the Cold War, U.S. exercises with Japanese self-defense forces need to move
beyond scenarios involving the invasion of Japan. They need to address more directly the
provisions of the defense guidelines and to develop skills to cooperate on the broader
security agenda as Japan accepts a greater role in regional security. U.S. forces in South
Korea and Japan do much more than deter North Korean aggression. They reassure
these countries of the continuing U.S. commitment to our mutual defense treaties. U.S.
forces forward-stationed in these countries anchor U.S. commitments to extended nuclear
deterrence. As reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula and across the Taiwan Strait
progresses, U.S. forward-stationed forces in Japan and South Korea will remain an
essential part of a security !
equilibrium, removing incentives for major strategic realignments or the buildup of
independent military capabilities that would raise tensions and spark arms races in the
region. These forces will also remain the best positioned U.S. forces to work with armed
forces throughout the Asia-Pacific region on shared interests in security and peaceful
development. A concurrent step is to pursue what Stephen Bosworth, U.S. ambassador to
the Republic of Korea, refers to as "enriched bilateralism." Enriched bilateralism
principally involves greater consultation and policy coordination with the nations of the
region regarding the full range of U.S. policies that affect their security interests, going
beyond those that affect only bilateral arrangements. U.S. consultation with security
partners regarding third countries before setting policy and taking action is becoming
more important as security challenges become more regional and interdependent.

Need To Reinvigorate The Alliance


NEED TO PAY NEW ATTENTION TO THE ALLIANCE
Campbell, Senior Vice President and Director of the International Security Program at the
CSIS, THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Fall, 2000, p. 57
The U.S.-Japan political partnership is due for a period of internal reflection and
strategic reinvestment. n1 The alliance that has provided the bedrock for U.S. policy in
Asia and has been a mainstay, preserving peace and stability for nearly half a century,
does not get the attention or recognition it deserves. The security component of the
alliance, after a period of intense activity between 1995 and 1998, has also lost some
momentum. In terms of real strategic oversight on both sides of the Pacific, the alliance
has been on a kind of bureaucratic autopilot for the better part of a decade. There are a
number of reasons for this, not least of which has been the tendency to take the benefits
of the alliance for granted. Yet, there are important changes underway in the Asian-
Pacific security environment that suggest a more activist approach to the alliance is in
order. To revitalize the U.S.-Japan security partnership, the new security dimensions of
Asia -- ranging!
from dramatic diplomatic developments on the Korean peninsula to increasing tensions
across the Taiwan Strait -- demand a more intense and high-level focus for the alliance.
For all the talk of the U.S.-Japan security alliance as the cornerstone of U.S. strategy in
the Asian and Pacific region, there has not been enough attention by senior U.S.
policymakers, commentators, and elites to understand its complexities or sustain its
importance. Indeed, except for a brief period of strategic reexamination in 1995 -- the so-
called Nye initiative that culminated in the 1996 Clinton-Hashimoto Security Declaration
-- the alliance has, for more than a decade, been managed by mid-level bureaucrats on
both sides of the Pacific. (I must admit here to being one of those mid-level officials,
having worked at the Pentagon between 1995 and 2000 on Asian security matters.)
Before making the case for devoting considerably more attention at the highest levels of
our government and society!
to the U.S.-Japan partnership, it is important first to identify the reasons for the previous
lack of focus -- in both political parties and both the legislative and executive branches
of government -- to this crucial security partnership.

U.S.-Japan alliance could crack


Curtis, Columbia political science professor, 2000
[Gerald, NEW PERSPECTIVES ON U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS, p. 35]
It is not so difficult, to imagine scenarios in which friction arises between the United
States and Japan over issues that lie on the security side of the fire wall. The U.S.-Japan
security relationship is sustained by a Japanese belief that the U.S. commitment to
Japanese security is credible, and by and American belief that alliance with Japan serves
vital U.S. national interests. Both these convictions could come under unprecedented
challenge in the coming years.

Consultation strengthens the Alliance


Relations need cooperation to remain stable
Task Force on Foreign Relations for the Prime Minister. ?02
[Nov. 28, Basic Strategies for Japan?s Foreign Policy in the 21st Century,
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/2002/1128tf_e.html]
The United States is the most important country for Japan. How the relationship should
be, however, has up until now avoided redefinition, including the Japan-U.S. security
system which is central to the relationship. Japan must undertake a comprehensive
reexamination of its relationship with the United States focusing on security. The
reexamination exercise would lead to further enhancement of the Japan-U.S. relationship.
If this work is not undertaken, the rifts between the allies will grow from barely tangible
to substantial, and confidence in the alliance among the two nations could be shaken. It is
not unusual that the policy priorities of Japan and the U.S. should be different at times. It
is impossible that the Japan-U.S. relationship will become like the one between the UK
and the U.S. Japan, while upholding objectives common with the U.S, must have its own
axis of coordinates and engage in diplomacy that is complementary to that of the U.S.
Now that the economic ten!
sions are relaxed between the two countries, policy coordination should be pursued.
U.S. Japan alliance needs to be strengthened
Task Force on Foreign Relations for the Prime Minister. ?02
[Nov. 28, Basic Strategies for Japan?s Foreign Policy in the 21st Century,
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/2002/1128tf_e.html]
Factors for instability in the East Asian region include North Korea's nuclear weapons
program and the rapid modernization of the People's Liberation Army in China. The
Japanese alliance with United States, which Japan opted for in the interest of its
sovereignty and independence, may need to be strengthened in the future, and certainly
cannot be expected to weaken.

Consultation Generally Good/Strengthens The Alliance


CONSULTATION IS CRITICAL TO A STRONG ALLIANCE
Jameson, Dean of American Journalists in Japan, ASIA-PACIFIC REVIEW, v. 5(3)
A constructive long-term alliance can hardly be founded upon such fundamental distrust
of an ally. Protecting Japan against itself is as illogical as any part of Japan?s defense
policies. In addition, Washington needs to develop a new willingness to consult Japan
more readily, both to gain approval for American military actions taken from bases in
Japan, as well as to solicit Japan?s ideas and proposals on joint security actions.

U.S. UNILATERAL DECISION-MAKING HURTS THE ALLIANCE


Ted Osius is currently the State Department's regional environmental affairs officer for
Southeast Asia and the Pacific, based in Bangkok, Thailand. From 1998 to 2001, he
served as senior adviser on international affairs to Vice President Al Gore, with a
portfolio encompassing Asia, international economics, and trade issues. Mr. Osius joined
the Department of State in 1989. Starting in 1996, he served as senior political officer in
the U.S. embassy in Hanoi and in 1997 opened the U.S. consulate general in Ho Chi
Minh City, becoming the first American political officer in Saigon in 23 years, THE U.S.-
JAPAN SECURITY ALLIANCE, 2002, http://www.csis.org/pubs/2002_japan.htm
For more than three decades, the multifaceted alliance between the world's two largest
and most technologically advanced economies has deterred aggression and provided the
bedrock for Asian stability. Now, however, the United States and Japan are reexamining
some assumptions underlying their alliance. The Cold War's end revealed new sources of
potential threat, and Japan's national self-confidence has been shaken by a decade of
economic stagnation, a highly fluid political situation, and an inadequate institutional
structure for crisis management and strategy formulation. Japan is trying to redefine its
identity from a nation whose constitution renounces war as a sovereign right to a
"normal" country involved in UN peacekeeping operations and regional military
relationships-a nation likely capable of projecting power beyond its own territory. U.S.
unilateralist tendencies and difficulty in sharing decisionmaking authority with Japan
hamper the alliance's capacity to defend a!
gainst new threats to stability in Asia.

AT: Japan will say now

JAPANESE POLITICIANS WILL AGREE TO U.S. POLICY INITIATIVES IN ORDER


TO MAINTAIN SUPPORT

Kent Calder, is director of the Edwin O. Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies and
Reischauer Professor of East Asian Studies at the School for Advanced International
Studies, Johns Hopkins University, ORBIS, Autumn 2003, p. 65

Similarly, Prime Minister Koizumi, who is especially reliant on public opinion given
intra-party weakness within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, has also found dramatic
U.S.-style foreign policy initiatives attractive in sustaining the support he needs to remain
effective on public-policy issues more generally.

JAPAN WILL FOLLOW US LED INITIATIVES

Masaharu Kohno, Visiting Fellow, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, IN
SEARCH OF PROACTIVE DIPLOMACY, Fall 1999,
http://www.brook.edu/fp/cnaps/papers/1999_kohno.htm
Furthermore, Japan is often criticized for "always following the United States." The fact
is that Japan, as an ally of the United States, shares fundamental values and ideas with the
United States, and as such, its foreign policy naturally moves in a direction similar to that
of the United States. The Japanese decision-making process has been described as an
accumulation of slow actions based on precedents. According to this view, due to general
restraint in its foreign policy decisions and other various considerations, Japan has
refrained from unnecessarily overturning precedents. This reflects a pattern of behavior
that exists throughout the Japanese bureaucracy, but is not necessarily unique to Japan.
JAPAN WILL SAY YES ? THEY ALWAYS DO
THE DAILY YOMIURI (Tokyo) January 23, 2004, p. 4
Now, under Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's leadership, Japan is virtually an
unquestioning partner of the United States. Tokyo has shown full support for Washington
in the most controversial and divisive U.S. foreign policy initiative since the Vietnam
War: the military overthrow of the regime of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.
Koizumi has also signed on to U.S. President George W. Bush's hard-line approach
toward North Korea.

AT: Japan will say no

Japan remains subordinate to the U.S. and will continue to do so


Lincoln, Council on Foreign Relations, 2004
[Edward, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Winter, p.
http://www.twq.com/04winter/docs/04winter_lincoln.pdf]
The United States remains preeminent in the minds of Japanese government officials and
politicians as a strategic ally and economic partner. FTAs to create an Asian bloc that
would trade within itself and be less reliant on U.S. markets are not consistent with
Japanese strategic thinking. This fact, along with the purely domestic politics of
agriculture, explains why the Japanese government has not pursued bilateral or regional
FTAs more vigorously. The Japanese government?s behavior regarding the war on
terrorism and the war in Iraq even more clearly illustrates Japan?s role as U.S.
subordinate. During the Persian Gulf War, the Japanese government was badly
embarrassed by the drawn-out process of acquiescing to Washington?s demands for
financial support for a war whose importance the Japanese simply did not support in
principle or understand. Although the Japanese government eventually voted to provide
$13 billion in assistance, the money came after the war had ended and in!
response to months of arm-twisting by U.S. officials. Not wanting to repeat that
experience, Japanese prime minister Junichiro Koizumi and other Japanese government
officials made a show of verbally supporting the United States quickly and strongly in the
wake of the September 11 attacks. Similarly, Koizumi backed President George W. Bush
often in the run-up to war with Iraq. Koizumi?s only demand was a mild request in
September 2002 for the U.S. president to go to the UN Security Council before invading
Iraq; the Japanese did not join other European nations in demanding a second vote by the
Security Council.

Japan will say yes ? especially when the U.S. consults them. Support for Iraq and the war
on terror prove strong motive not to deviate from the U.S.
Lincoln, Council on Foreign Relations, 2004
[Edward, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Winter, p.
http://www.twq.com/04winter/docs/04winter_lincoln.pdf]
On one hand, Koizumi?s boldness in supporting the United States in the face of
opposition to the war from some 70 percent of the Japanese public appears an exercise of
leadership. On the other hand, a closer examination suggests that Koizumi?s behavior
reflected a familiar pattern in Japanese foreign policy. The Japanese had three reasons to
support Bush, none of which had anything to do with fighting outrageous dictators or
bringing a better future to the Middle East. First, the Japanese government wanted to
avoid aggravating the U.S. government the way it had during the Gulf War through its
slow and grudging support. Second, the real strategic issue for the Japanese government
was North Korea, and it expected that support for the war against Iraq would translate
into influence with Washington on policy toward North Korea. Whether or not that
assumption was correct, it factored into Japanese thinking. Third, Iraq became the most
recent opportunity for conservatives in Japan!
to press to alter or reinterpret the constitution to permit dispatching soldiers abroad for
combat. Thus, in East Asia and on a broader global scale, the Japanese government has
continued to act very much as it has ever since the end of the U.S. occupation, as a
subordinate power tied to the United States. The U.S. gov- ernment consults the Japanese
government, but the reality remains that Japan does not have its own seat at the table of
international policymaking. Although Japan criticized the U.S. government and the IMF
during the Asian financial crisis, it has not acted on these sentiments to lead its neighbors
toward a more independent stance on either international finance or trade. Neither in the
Middle East nor in Afghanistan has the Japanese government moved to claim expertise in
nation or economy building. Instead, it has ridden the coattails of the U.S. government,
avoiding criticism and advancing the causes of domestic conservatives concerning the
use of military!
force unrelated to the Middle East.

AT: Japan will say no

Japan will say yes to avoid alienating the U.S.


Lincoln, Council on Foreign Relations, 2004
[Edward, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Winter, p.
http://www.twq.com/04winter/docs/04winter_lincoln.pdf]
For interests in security and economic access, the key has been to keep the United States
and other major players sufficiently satisfied with Japan that they would not end existing
relationships. Toward this end, Japan has agreed to pay part of the costs to maintain U.S.
bases in Japan and has taken a series of small steps during the past two decades to play a
larger role in security matters, such as increasing defense spending and dispatching
soldiers for UN peacekeeping operations.

Japan won?t say no ? they don?t deviate from the U.S.


Inter Press Service, 6 ? 24 - 04
Some critics of Japanese foreign policy say Japan's interests are so closely aligned with
U.S. foreign policy that a Japanese seat on the Security Council would be an automatic
vote for the United States. Asked to comment on this issue, Kitaoka [Japan's deputy
permanent representative to the UN] replied, ''when it comes to core interests of the
country, it's very hard for Japan to differ with the United States.We have to be very
careful about it.''

Answers To: ?No Crisis ? Consultation Isn?t Needed?

CONSULTATION CANNOT WAIT UNTIL CRISES BEGIN

Dennis C. Blair has been the commander-in-chief of the U.S. Pacific Command since
1998. Dr. John T. Hanley is his primary strategic adviser in the Asia-Pacific region,
WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Winter, 2001, p. 7

Security partnerships support U.S. interests in sharing responsibilities for international


security and ensuring the international legitimacy of military action. U.S. allies and
friends should have confidence that they are full partners, rather than viewing the United
States as "the lone superpower," acting without consultation, coordination, and
appreciation of their views. Consultation and coordination in the harried pace of events
leading to a crisis are not enough. Instead, they must be developed and honed in the
course of routine dialogue and exercises. Success requires a habit of cooperation.

Japan wants to be consulted on peacekeeping

Japan wants to be consulted on PKOs ? without a permanent seat on the Council, they
feel left out
Toshiro Ozawa, Ambassador of Japan to the United Nations, 6-3-04
[To The Fifth Committee
Fifty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly
3 June 2004, http://www.infojapan.org/announce/speech/un2004/un0406.html]
Speaking of Japan, we must point out that the Government of Japan is not blessed with a
budgetary mechanism that can easily absorb a more than 60 percent increase of a major
budget item. We must also point out that there is criticism within Japan for providing
money to PKOs for the benefit of those parties who may or may not be willing to settle
their conflicts. This criticism is reinforced by the fact that Japan, not being a Permanent
Member of the Security Council,does not participate has often no say in the decisions of
the Security Council concerning the long term policies of individual PKOs, despite
Japan's obligation to shoulder about one fifth of the related costs. Needless to say, such
criticism arises out of Japan's strong commitment to peace on the one hand, and on the
other, the frustration regarding the obligations incurred from assessed contributions for
peacekeeping budgets. It would be intolerable for the Government of Japan to be left out
of discussions espec!
ially if those discussions are held without due consideration for facing "the moment of
truth" for cases where there is a perceived lack of will to pursue peace.

Japan supports UN peacekeeping

Japan supports UN peacekeeping


Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ?03
[Diplomatic Bluebook 2003,
http://www.infojapan.org/policy/other/bluebook/2003/chap3-a.pdf]
In light of these developments, in order to realize the peace, stability and prosperity of the
international community, which are essential for securing Japan?s national interest, Japan
has made significant contributions in a wide range of areas including nuclear
disarmament, contributions toward Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), cooperation in
efforts for sustainable development in developing countries and the dissemination and
promotion of the concept of human security. Japan expects that the UN will, for example,
play a role in the areas of: (1) maintaining international peace and security; (2) universal
and fair rule-making that can respond to globalization; and (3) providing sustainable
solutions regarding development issues in developing countries. Japan will also continue
to actively participate in UN activities and appeal to the UN and its member states.

Japan is strongly committed to UN PKOs ? removed all barriers to participation


Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ?03
[Diplomatic Bluebook 2003,
http://www.infojapan.org/policy/other/bluebook/2003/chap3-a.pdf]
Ten years have passed since the enactment of the Law Concerning Cooperation for
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations (International Peace
Cooperation Law)3 which enables Japan?s personnel cooperation in international
humanitarian relief operations and international election monitoring operations as well as
UN PKO. During this time, Japan has participated in many activities, winning much
credit of the international community. Furthermore, public understanding within Japan
regarding international peace cooperation has deepened. In 2001, a revision to the
International Peace Cooperation Law was approved. This revision ?de-froze? such
activities by units of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) as monitoring of disarmament,
stationing and patrolling in buffer zones, collection and disposal of abandoned weapons,
and expanded the scope of use of weapons,5 thus enabling more wide-ranging and
smooth operations. Furthermore, in 2002, Japan?s cooperation to PKO has ente!
red a new phase with the dispatch at the largest scale of SDF units in the past for the PKO
in Timor-Leste (formerly East Timor).

Japan supports UN peacekeeping

Japan is a leader in UN peacekeeping ? they fully support it


Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2000
[UN Peacekeeping Operations, http://www.infojapan.org/policy/un/pamph2000/pko.html]
Japan, as a responsible member of the international community, has been strenuously
working for the maintenance of peace and security. Accordingly, participation in UN
peacekeeping operations is today placed as one of Japan's important areas of cooperation
for international peace and security. Japan's first substantial participation in a UN
peacekeeping operation was in 1989, when 27 electoral observers were dispatched to the
United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia. Then in 1992, the
enactment of the International Peace Cooperation Law enabled Japan to send not only its
civilian personnel but also its Self-Defense Forces personnel to UN peacekeeping
operations. Based on that law, Japan participated in peacekeeping operations in Angola,
Cambodia, Mozambique, El Salvador and East Timor, and since 1996 has been
dispatching a Self-Defense Forces contingent to the United Nations Disengagement
Observer Force (UNDOF), which is deployed on the Golan Heights. Ja!
pan's Self-Defense Forces personnel were also sent to assist Rwandan refugees and East
Timorese displaced persons as part of international humanitarian relief operations. Japan
also cooperated in international election monitoring activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
which were conducted by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) in 1998 and 2000. To date, Japan has also made contributions in kind. For
example, Japan provided refugee relief materials such as tents and blankets to the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) working for Kosovar refugees and
East Timorese displaced persons in 1999. In the same year, Japan also provided the
United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) with radios for public information
purposes in support of the direct ballot in August 1999. In addition to these field
activities, Japan takes an active part in discussions in the United Nations to improve the
effectiveness of peacekeeping operations. Japan, fo!
r example, has been serving as vice-chair for the Special Committee on Peacekeeping
Operations, the principal UN forum undertaking a comprehensive review of the questions
related to peacekeeping operations. With regard to the issue of the safety of peacekeepers,
Japan strongly maintained that necessary measures should be taken for significant
improvement, and Japan's initiative resulted in the adoption in 1994 of the "Convention
on the Safety of UN and Associated Personnel," which Japan was the second to ratify.
Japan has been actively urging other countries which have not yet done so to become a
party to the convention. Japan will continue to cooperate with UN peacekeeping activities
not only by participating in actual operations but also by actively engaging in discussions
for further improvement of these operations.

Must Consult Japan on Iraq

Japan should be consulted about reconstruction


Major, former British prime minister, ?03
[John, Ottawa Citizen, 3-27, Lexis]
There is a menu of healing actions from which we can choose. We must be generous to
post-war Iraq in her travails. We would be wise to consult Arab opinion -- the Arab
League and the Gulf Co-operation Council, for example -- about how to reconstitute a
free and democratic Iraq. We should discuss our plans with the EU, China and Russia,
and seek their active political support. We may, after, all, need them to open up their
wallets as well. As we do so, we should not neglect the views of our allies, Australia,
Spain and Japan prominent among them.
Japan wants the U.S. to consult on Iraq
Japan Policy and Politics, 8 ? 26 ? 03 [Factiva]
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi said Thursday there will be no change in Japan's plan
to help rebuild Iraq even though the United States has excluded Japan from its latest list
of countries contributing to reconstruction work. ''There will be no change in our plan to
contribute to providing Iraq with humanitarian and reconstruction assistance,'' the premier
told reporters in Prague, when asked to comment on Japan's absence from the list. But he
did not elaborate. Washington said Wednesday that 27 countries other than the U.S. are
contributing to ongoing operations to help rebuild the war-torn country or keep order
there, and that four others have committed to providing troops. But Japan was not among
them. ''Japan should play a role which is different from those of other countries,''
Koizumi said, apparently referring to the fact that the war-renouncing Constitution
largely limits activities of its Self-Defense Forces (SDF) overseas. Japan will continue to
think about i!
ts ties with the U.S., its closest ally, and international cooperation, Koizumi said,
speaking to reporters on the third and last leg of his European trip which will end
Saturday.
Consulting Japan on Iraq proves that the U.S. appreciates its support and won?t
deprioritize the alliance once relations with others are normalized as a result of the plan
Daily Yomiuri, 9 ? 5 ? 03
Today, the Japan-U.S. alliance is said to be in its best shape since Commodore Matthew
Perry came to Japan, but this is partly due to luck. For one thing, Japan's value as a U.S.
ally was upgraded because France and Germany, traditional U.S. allies, and Russia, a
partner that the Untied States had expected to become a new ally, distanced themselves
from the Untied States over the latest Iraq war. Another reason for the good state of
bilaterial ties is that several U.S. patriots, who served in the administration of U.S.
President Ronald Reagan and who know Japan well, are now back in office. They and
Shiina forged their friendship during the (Prime Minister Yasuhiro) Nakasone-Reagan
era. One result of this friendship is that although it ended up taking Japan six months to
send an Aegis-equipped destroyer to the Indian Ocean to support U.S. forces in the latest
Iraq war, the White House warmly praised Japan's prompt dispatch of ordinary destroyers
and encouraged Japan to prom!
ote further cooperation with the United States.
Japan is a key player in Iraq reconstruction
Business Times, 9 ? 6 ? 03
Some analysts say that Japan is better placed than the United States to act as a
coordinator of Middle Eastern aid to Iraq, and that Japan and Europe might also be better
placed to secure economic cooperation with Arab countries in the wake of the invasion of
Iraq.
Japan is a key player in the Iraq discussions
Jiji Press, 9 ? 5 ? 03 [Factiva]
Japan and the European Union agreed Friday that the participation of a wide range of
countries is necessary in the reconstruction of Iraq, based on a new U.N. resolution. The
consensus was reached at talks here between visiting Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko
Kawaguchi and European External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten. But Patten
refrained from commenting on details of a U.S.-proposed draft U.N. resolution that seeks
the dispatch of multinational forces to Iraq, saying only that the issue will be discussed at
an informal meeting of EU foreign ministers later in the day, according to informed
sources.

Must Consult Japan on Iraq


Japan is critical to U.S. policy success in the Middle East
Okamoto, chair of the Japanese prime minister's Task Force on Foreign Relations, ?02
[Yukio, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Spring, Lexis]
Recent events have focused international attention on relations between the United States
and Islamic countries, which, with a few exceptions, are strained. Some have suggested
that Japan can become a potential intermediary between the United States and the
Muslim world because of Japan's close relations with Arab governments, Muslim oil-
producing states, and the nations of Central Asia; its relatively more flexible stance on
human rights policies; and the absence of a strong tie to Israel. Japan can contribute to a
U.S.-Islamic dialogue by asserting its view that vast disparities in income and an
inconsistent U.S. commitment to human rights are impediments to the U.S. goal of
stemming the rise of terrorism in the Islamic world. In recent years, the United States has
drifted away from the consensus prevalent in most of the industrialized world that
extreme poverty is a primary driver of terrorism and political violence. The United States
also needs to explain its reluctance !
to confront the regimes of its friends in the Middle East with the same human rights
standards as those applied to Myanmar, China, or Indonesia.

Japan is concerned about Iraq oil ? wants to be involved


APS Diplomat Recorder, 8 ? 2 ? 03
Mitsubishi agrees with State Oil Marketing Organisation to import 40,000 b/d of Basrah
Light crude, equivalent to 7% of the Japanese company's global crude oil trades a day.
(This is Japan's first commercial oil deal with Baghdad in 13 years). Mitsubishi Industry
analysts say the deal's significance for Mitsubishi and other Japanese companies
outweighs the size of the contract. The deal could open the way for more Japan-Iraq
contracts and help Japan in its pursuit of alternative sources of oil, for which it relies
heavily on Saudi Arabia, Iran and the UAE. Hajime Furuya, trading companies analyst at
UBS investment bank, said: "This transaction by itself has a small impact in business
terms but it may have a far greater impact politically and strategically. It may be the
signal for Mitsubishi to enter into other businesses in Iraq, such as pipeline or gas-plant
construction. It could also open the way for other Japanese companies to go into Iraq".
Trading houses Mitsubishi, S!
umitomo and Marubeni had substantial dealings with Iraq before the 1990 Gulf War, in
infrastructure, construction machinery, energy and pipelines. These and other Japanese
trading houses and energy-related companies are studying commercial possibilities in
Iraq and are poised to enter negotiations once Japan reinstates long-term export credit
insurance to cover their investments in the country. A Sumitomo official said: "Iraq has a
lot of business potential so every trading house has to think about how to do business
there". Delivery of the Basrah Light to Mitsubishi could begin in late-August and end in
December 2003, making a total of 6m barrels, although Mitsubishi said the start date
could be postponed to September because of Iraq's unstable security. Japanese companies
had feared being pushed out of opportunities in Iraq by US and British businesses.
Baghdad owes Japan's public sector about $4.1 bn, according to Paris Club figures, and
an estimated $2 bn to private comp!
anies. Japan has pledged more than $100m to help in reconstruction.

Must Consult Japan on Iraq


Japan wants to participate in Iraq
Globe and Mail, 9 ? 5 ? 03 [Factiva]
Anxious to be a useful ally for Washington, Japan this week joined the U.S., European
Union and World Bank in agreeing to set up an international trust fund for reconstruction
in Iraq.
Japan is a critical player ? they jump started the development fund
Kyodo News, 9 ? 4 ? 03
The United States on Thursday welcomed Japan's transfer of more than $98 million in
frozen Iraqi assets to the Development Fund for Iraq. "The United States strongly
welcomes the government of Japan's actions to fulfill its international requirements under
U.N. Security Council resolution 1483," State Department spokesman Richard Boucher
said in a statement. "We look forward to other countries following Japan's lead," the
statement said.
Japan is committed to being an active player in reconstruction
Kyodo News, 9 ? 4 ? 03
Japan's commitment to helping rebuild Iraq remains unchanged but Tokyo must study the
situation to see what it can offer, top government spokesman Yasuo Fukuda said
Thursday. Fukuda's remarks came after the United States began circulating a new draft
U.N. resolution on the matter overnight. "What role we can play is a matter to be
discussed from now, after research. We would like to make a decision after that research,"
Fukuda, chief cabinet secretary, said at a news conference. "But our policy to work hard
on what our country can do for Iraq's reconstruction is totally unchanged," he said.
Tokyo plans to send a fact-finding team to Iraq as early as this week to find ways to
provide humanitarian aid, after its dispatch was postponed due to deteriorating security
there.
Japan participates in Iraq reconstruction fund negotiations now
AP, 9 ? 3 ? 03
Experts from the United States, EU, United Arab Emirates, Japan, the World Bank,
International Monetary Fund and the United Nations discussed details of the fund and
assessed Iraq's most pressing aid needs at a meeting Wednesday in Brussels. In a joint
statement after the talks, all participants "confirmed their commitment to supporting
reconstruction in Iraq."

Japan would say ?YES? to greater EU/NATO role in Iraq


Japan wants greater international support in Iraq ? they would like the plan
Xinhua News Agency, 9 ? 5 ? 03
Japan on Friday urged France and Germany to soften their stances on a United States-
proposed resolution aiming at having the UN Security Council (UNSC) authorize a
multinational force to help reconstruct Iraq. "Based on the circumstances, we need a
framework in which the international community can be united," Chief Cabinet Secretary
Yasuo Fukuda was quoted by Kyodo News.

Answers To: Japan will say ?NO?


Japan will say yes if genuinely consulted
Kazushi, military security analyst, ?99
[Ogawa, JAPAN QUARTERLY, Spring 1999, p. 14

The most urgent task at the political level is to institutionalize prior consultation on
diverse aspects of the operation of the alliance. It is more logical for Japan to start by
establishing a system for stating its preference through prior consultation with the United
States. Then, and only then, Japan should prepare tools it will need when saying yes:
arrangements with the United States for supporting U.S. military operations to the
maximum extent possible within the Japanese Constitution, and their enabling legislation.
Overall, Japan and the United States are not likely to say no to each other often.
However, the two countries can reap great rewards from institutionalization of prior
consultation. First, if the United States shows that it solicits Japan?s view before military
operations in Asia, Japan?s neighbors would trust Japan more and expect more of it.
Japan will say yes ? Good faith consultation ensures that Japan supports the U.S.
Kazuya, Osaka University law professor, ?01
[Sakamoto, JAPAN QUARTERLY, April-June, ?Advancing the Japan-U.S. Alliance,? p.
24]

The first need is for closer security consultation at several levels, in specific substantive
terms, rather than as a mere matter of form. Consultation is a basic prerequisite for
cooperation between sovereign states. True cooperation is impossible without
consultation. Given the conventional approach to cooperation by goods and people,?
however, it is doubtful whether hard-hitting consultations can be conducted with the two
sides saying ?yes? or ?no? clearly. The chances are that they will be tempted to follow
their old habits, with one side trying to act freely on its own initiative and the other
shirking its responsibilities and avoiding tough decisions. It is welcome that close
consultations are under way at the administrative and military levels on the daily
execution of the Security Treaty. Since the outcome of such consultations is not always
disclosed, however, the Japanese people continue to wonder whether Japan-U.S. security
cooperation is truly equal and rec!
iprocal. More important, they do not know how top-level government-to-government
consultations would be conducted in the event of a real crisis or whether such
consultations would successfully resolve the crisis.
Reciprocity ensures they say yes
Kazuya, Osaka University law professor, ?01
[Sakamoto, JAPAN QUARTERLY, April-June, ?Advancing the Japan-U.S. Alliance,? p.
19]
While there can be no doubt about the long-term importance of the Japan-U.S. Security
Treaty, it should be noted that it was concluded half a century ago and revised a decade
later, when Japan-U.S. relations were very different from what they are now. Therefore,
abiding by the rights and obligations stipulated in the treaty is no guarantee that the
Japan-U.S. alliance will remain strong in the 21st century. After all, the Security Treaty
is not mutual in the true sense of the word. As it stands, the treaty is unlikely to create a
satisfactory ?giver-and-take? relation ship between the two nations. To keep the alliance
strong the partners will have to make it truly reciprocal by picking up where the treaty
provisions leave off. To that end, security consultation should be conducted more
closely. One way to enhance reciprocity would be for Japan to be able to exercise, even
if in a limited way, the right to collective self-defense.

Japan would say yes to demining

Japan supports demining efforts


Shinichi Kitaoka, Deputy permanent representative of Japan to the UN, 2004
[May 17, http://www.infojapan.org/announce/speech/un2004/un0405-6.html]
Such activities as DDR and demining often play an important role in the area where a
peacekeeping mission is deployed. In some cases, peace-building activities have been
included in the peacekeeping mandate. Japan, advocating the concept of "consolidation of
peace", understands the importance of linkage between peace-building activities and
peacekeeping.

Japan would say yes to UN reform

Japan supports UN PKO reform


Toshiro Ozawa, Ambassador of Japan to the United Nations, 2004
[4 May, http://www.infojapan.org/announce/speech/un2004/un0405.html]
This striking passage is an excerpt from the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace
Operations ("Brahimi report" of 2000). Building upon this report, the United Nations has
engaged in serious discussions on many ideas for effecting reform, and translated
numerous initiatives into action. For its part, Japan has engaged actively in these reform
efforts. Such efforts are beginning to bear fruit. The revival of peacekeeping operations is
of benefit to the entire world, and we welcome this phenomenon.

Japan leads in Cambodian demining

Japan has forged a strong friendship with Cambodia


The Government of Japan, February 2002
[?Japan?s Assistance Policy for Cambodia?, http://www.kh.emb-
japan.go.jp/cooperation/japfc.htm]
Japan's position has been to actively expand its diplomatic efforts to help lead the
international community in support of the restoration of peace in Cambodia. Japan's first
dispatch of PKO personnel in 1992 and its positive contributions to the Consultative
Group meetings for Cambodia are the examples of Japan's efforts in this regard.
Moreover, Japanese citizens' keen interest in supporting Cambodia enables many of
Japan's NGOs play an active role. The Japanese government recognizes the necessity to
further cooperate with these NGOs in order to appropriately respond to the situation. The
Government and the people of Cambodia have expressed their appreciation for Japan's
assistance and as a result have strongly supported Japan's policies in international venues.
On various levels and occasions, close ties of friendship have taken root between Japan
and Cambodia.

General reform in Cambodia is Japan?s mission


The Government of Japan, February 2002
[?Japan?s Assistance Policy for Cambodia?, http://www.kh.emb-
japan.go.jp/cooperation/japfc.htm]
The promotion of reform such as administrative reform, financial and fiscal reform, the
demobilization of the armed forces, natural resources management, and the improvement
of social sector, as well as the strengthening of good governance are all essential in order
for Cambodia to achieve steady economic growth and to fully function as a state. With
this in mind, during then-Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi's visit to Cambodia in January
2000, he affirmed to Prime Minister Hun Sen that Japan would strengthen its technical
cooperation including the dispatch of experts, the acceptance of trainees in Japan and
other forms of support. Prime Minister Obuchi stated that Japan had been extending
support to Cambodia and would extend additional, flexible and prompt assistance,
utilizing various applicable cooperation schemes, in order to further assist with the
country's reforms. Following this statement and regarding the current reform of
Cambodia's legal and judicial system, Japan has !
been providing assistance for the drafting of a civil code and a civil procedure code and is
continuing this assistance for the prompt completion of the drafting of these codes and
there enactment into law. In addition and to complement this, Japan will support the
training of legal personnel through various training programs.
Cambodia is relying on Japan for demining assistance
The Government of Japan, February 2002
[?Japan?s Assistance Policy for Cambodia?, http://www.kh.emb-
japan.go.jp/cooperation/japfc.htm]
The existence of landmines is a great impediment to the reconstruction and development
of Cambodia, and the problems caused by landmines cannot be neglected when Japan
extends the support mentioned above for the improvement of social-economic
infrastructure and agricultural and rural development. Japan has actively been providing
assistance for Cambodia's landmine problems, appreciating its ownership and considering
Cambodia as a pilot country for Japan's assistance on this problem.With respect to
support for demining activities, Japan will offer support to make these activities easier to
be implemented through the development and introduction of more efficient demining
technology. This is in addition to the provision of financial assistance to the UNDP Trust
Fund and the provision of equipment in the bilateral assistance that Japan has made so
far. For landmine victims, in addition to the improvement of health care institutions,
Japan will consider a form of cooperation whe!
re victims can reintegrate back into society following a period of rehabilitation.
Education on landmines and efforts at the community level to solve landmine problems
are also important. It is crucial to actively collaborate with and support NGOs deeply
involved in the rural areas in carrying out their vital demining activities.

Japan is taking an active role in supporting the basic human needs of Cambodia
The Government of Japan, February 200 [?Japan?s Assistance Policy for Cambodia?,
http://www.kh.emb-japan.go.jp/cooperation/japfc.htm] The most important factor for
sustainable economic growth is the improvement of Basic Human Needs (BHN). The
improvement of BHN directly provides benefits to the lives of the poor, and is also
important as it provides a social safety net to deal with the social costs brought by
economic growth. Japan has provided assistance for BHN sectors such as education,
health and medical care, water and sanitation improvement, and other priority sectors for
cooperation. These sectors are very important from the viewpoint of humanitarian
concerns and poverty reduction, and the demand for assistance is still very high.
Moreover, it is anticipated that the number of the so-called socially vulnerable will
increase as Cambodia makes economic progress, and Japan will continue to positively
support the foundation of a social safety net for these people. I!
n the education sector, Japan will continue to provide assistance through grassroots grant
aid for the construction of schools, the absolute number of which is still greatly lacking,
and technical assistance for improving the quality of teachers' capacity and the
administrative capacities of the education authorities. Assistance will particularly focus
on improving science and mathematics education, subjects which are vital for economic
growth and achieving sustainability.

Permutation Answers: Reciprocal/?Genuine? Consultation Key

RECIPROCAL CONSULTATIONS ARE KEY TO RELATIONS


Sakamoto Kazuya, Doctorate in Law from Kyoto University, JAPAN QUARTERLY,
April-May 2001, p. 19

To keep the alliance strong, the partners will have to make it truly reciprocal by picking
up where the treaty provisions leave off. To that end, security consultations should be
conducted more closely.
TREATING JAPAN AS A ?JUNIOR PARTNER? RISKS A BACKLASH
Michael Ohanlon, Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies, Brookings, JAPAN QUARTERLY,
October-December 1997, p. 21
Second, Japan?s apparent position as the ?junior partner? in the alliance is not entirely
healthy. In event of crisis or war, these factors could lead to an American backlash
against a ?freeloading? ally, or to a Japanese backlash against ?domineering? Americans.

Permutation Answers: ?Pass The Plan, Then Consult? Answers


JAPAN WANTS PRIOR CONSULTATION
Blackwell Harris, AMERICA?S ASIAN ALLIANCES, 2000, p. 57

Most Japanese felt that their vast monetary contribution was not appreciated by the
United States. For Japan one of the main lessons was that it should not allow itself to be
placed in a position where the not appreciated by the United States. For Japan one of the
main lessons was that it should not allow itself to be placed in a position where the
United States could drag it into a foreign policy adventure without adequate prior
consultation.

PRIOR CONSULTATION IS NEEDED

Blackwell Harris, AMERICA?S ASIAN ALLIANCES, 2000, p. 57

Consequently, alliance management needs to be flexible, to seek greater substantive


Japanese participation in the consultation process involved, and to recognize the great
sensitivity of actions requiring regional support from allies. Japan is becoming more
regionally oriented: to a degree, it sees itself as increasingly Asian and has carefully
managed its relations with China, in particular. With this increased emphasis on regional
matters, and with regional impacts more important to Japan than global impacts, prior
consultation becomes more crucial.

JAPAN MUST BE GIVEN A VOICE BEFORE DECISIONS ARE MADE

Blackwell Harris, AMERICA?S ASIAN ALLIANCES, 2000p. 28

Enhance bilateral consultations. Differences will inevitably emerge between Japan and
the United States in their approaches to the region. The new administration should ensure
that effective consultation processes are in place that give Japan a voice in alliance policy
before decisions are actually made.
Genuine Consultation is Key to U.S. ? Japan Alliance

Genuine prior consultation is the only way to bolster and maintain the U.S. Japan alliance
Mochizuki, Brookings fellow, ?97
[Mike, ?Relations with the Great Powers,? BROOKINGS REVIEW,
http://www.brookingsinstitution.org/press/review/spring97/powers.htm

As the U.S.-Japan alliance becomes more reciprocal, the United States must genuinely
consult Japan, not merely inform it of decisions already made. Although the two
countries agreed to a prior consultations process when the 1960 bilateral security pact
was signed, this mechanism has never been used. Because support for U.S. military
operations beyond Japan would provoke such intense domestic controversy, Tokyo
appeared to prefer not to be consulted. The Japanese government has applied such strict
criteria for when Washington would have to consult with Tokyo that Washington has
never had to get Japan's formal permission to use bases in Japan for military operations in
Southeast Asia or the Middle East. The result has been, paradoxically, that pacifist Japan
has given the United States freer rein on the use of overseas bases than America's
European allies. Japan's abdication of its right to be consulted has fueled public distrust in
Japan about bilateral defense cooperation. A!
healthier alliance demands prior consultation. As Japan musters the courage and will to
say "yes" to collective defense and security missions, it should also gain the right to say
"no" when it disagrees with U.S. policy. The U.S.-Japan alliance would then evolve
toward something akin to America s strategic relationships with the major West European
allies.

Lack of prior consultation hurts the alliance


Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State, 2000
[Richard, et al, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/Spelreprts/SR_JAPAN.HTM The United
States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership, October 11]

It is imperative to nurture popular support in the United States and Japan to sustain
current cooperation and to open the door to new bilateral endeavors. There should be no
surprises in diplomatic cooperation. Japan often has promoted ideas, such as the Asian
Monetary Fund, without coordinating with Washington. The United States too often has
brought Japan belatedly into its own diplomacy. Both countries suffer when
policymaking-by-afterthought characterizes our relationship. It is past time for the United
States to drop the image of Japanese cooperation in foreign policy as checkbook
diplomacy. Japan must recognize that international leadership involves risk-taking
beyond its traditional donor's role. U.S. policy must consider Japan's goals, even as it
strives to ensure that our agenda is well understood and actively supported by Tokyo.

Binding visible consultation is crucial


Tanaka, Tokyo international relations professor, ?01
[Akihiko, United States-Japan Strategic Dialogue: Beyond the Defense Guidelines,
January 15, http://www.glocomnet.or.jp/okazaki-inst/e2juproje/e2juproje.opening.html]
In the alliance, as Mr. Green said, it is not always about the U.S. telling Japan what to do,
but it is about both the U.S. and Japan nurturing the relationship together. On the U.S.
side, there is something that people in the U.S. have to do to develop the alliance.
Namely, it is not healthy to have a situation where the U.S. will always make the
decisions, and Japan always does what it is told. So I think it is important that we have
consultations in a more visible way at all times between the two countries. It is not
desirable to have external pressure toward Japan regarding domestic political and legal
issues, but I think it is important that the U.S. side, in closely watching discussions of
legal reform in Japan, adopt an encouraging stance toward welcome developments.

2NC ? Genuine Consultation is Key to U.S. ? Japan Alliance


Genuine consultation maintains the alliance and prevents an Asian arms race and war
Manning, Progressive Policy Institute, ?95
[Robert, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Autumn, Lexis]
There is clearly a rich security agenda that requires careful consideration by both
governments and genuine consultation. When viewed in the totality of the relationship,
the U.S.-Japan security alliance holds the potential to be sustained if it is redefined and if
the other components of the relationship, particularly economic relations, can find a new
equilibrium. But can it honestly be said that "if the alliance did not already exist, we
would have to create it now," as Assistant Secretary of Defense Nye recently proclaimed?
n5 Would the U.S. Senate approve a treaty that obligates the United States to extend a
security umbrella over Japan without any reciprocal obligations? Clearly there is a bit of
hyperbole in such a claim. A large array of convergent interests suggest that the security
alliance makes sense for both parties. For Japan, the history of the past century has been
that it has been prosperous and peaceful when in an alliance with a leading maritime
power: Bri!
tain in the first quarter of the century, the United States in the second half. Disaster has
struck when Tokyo has been strategically independent. Moreover, in a very volatile
Northeast Asia, Japan has few alternatives. There is no apparent placement for the United
States as a security partner, and if Japan were to end the alliance and pursue an
independent course it would lead to deep suspicion throughout the Pacific and a
destabilizing arms race (both conventional and nuclear) with Korea and China.

Genuine consultation is key to the alliance


Manning, Progressive Policy Institute, ?95
[Robert, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Autumn, Lexis]
As Japan becomes a more independent actor it will be increasingly important to improve
the U.S.-Japan consultation process so that there is a clear sense of where differences and
convergences lie, what belongs in the bilateral relationship, what is part of regional or
global mechanisms -- and in particular where differences lie that could erode the alliance.

Consultation solves mutual suspicions which threaten the alliance


Smith, Boston international relations professor, ?97
[Sheila, JAPAN QUARTERLY, p. 6, October-December]
The primary goal of the guidelines review is to establish a clear and reliable basis for
crisis management in the Japan-U.S. alliance. The ambiguity that surrounded the
decision-making in the past was in part a factor of the nature of the Cold War
confrontation between the United States and the former Soviet Union, when the overall
aims of U.S. strategy were clear and Japan had a supporting role in the implementation of
that strategy. Today, however, the object, timing and effectiveness of the use of military
force in resolving international disputes are less predictable, and therefore will require
greater coordination and consultation between the United States and Japan than has been
possible in the past. Crisis management, by its very nature, requires quick and coordinate
responses of governments.

Consultation key to relations

Consulting Japan on East Asian regional issues is critical to the durability of relations
Curtis, Columbia political science professor, 2000
[Gerald, NEW PERSPECTIVES ON U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS, p. 37]
The U.S.-Japan alliance has proved enormously valuable to both countries. There are no
compelling reasons for the United States to want to change it fundamentally. While thee
is more vigorous debate in Japan today than at any time since the early 1950s about what
course its foreign and defense policies should take in the future, there is a broad
consensus among both its leadership elite and the public that alliance with the United
States should be maintained as the centerpiece of its foreign policy. The challenge to
U.S. leaders is not to devise policies or employ an antagonistic rhetoric that suggests that
the United States is less committed to sustaining this relationship than is in fact the case.
American national interests will best be served by continuity rather than radical change in
U.S.-Japan relations. A close and positive relationship with Japan is of critical
importance in dealing with a host of regional and global issues. But given the changed
economic and !
political context of U.S.-Japan relations, sustaining and strengthening this relationship
will require innovative thinking and leadership by the president and the senior members
of the administration. More has to be done to involve people with expertise about Japan
when making important dec
isions with respect to East Asia. Greater attention needs to be paid to engaging top
Japanese policymakers in consultations about regional issues. The United States needs to
think strategically about East Asia and place Japan at the center of that strategic thinking.

Consultation crucial to preserving the alliance and shoring up relations


Green, Council on Foreign Relations, 2000
[Michael, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS, Gerald Curtis (Ed.),
p. 262]
The alliance also requires a better management philosophy. In this area, most of the
burden is on the U.S. government, which has not maintained sufficient high-level
coordination with the Japanese side. In the Clinton Administration, Japanese security
issues were managed primarily by deputy assistant secretaries in Washington, while U.S.
security policy issues were managed by vice-ministers and even prime ministers in
Tokyo. This particular asymmetry in the bilateral relationship is simply not sustainable.
The alliance will become less than the sum of its parts unless strategic direction is
consistently set at senior levels of both governments. The U.S.-Japan alliance is based on
broadly shared strategic objectives and a generally complementary division of roles and
missions. But these attributes do not guarantee the continued health of bilateral security
relations. Like a shard that will drown if it does not move forward, the U.S. Japan
alliance requires constant att!
ention, strengthening, and integration.

Impacts: Alliance Collapse Causes Rearmament


Alliance stops Japanese rearmament and regional proliferation
Umbach, German Society for Foreign Affairs fellow, ?99
[Frank, JANE?S INTELLIGENCE REVIEW, http://www.dgap.org/texte/pyonyang2.ht ?
World Get?s Wise.?]
Against this background, Japan and South Korea would only be able to rely upon the
USA?s extended nuclear deterrence umbrella, which has lost some of its former
credibility in the multi-polar post-Cold War security environment. Nonetheless, as long as
the US-Japanese security alliance is maintained ? with its dual functions of constraining
as well as protecting Japan ? the ?nuclear problem? is solved and a ?nuclearisation? of
Japan?s defence policies remains only a theoretical option on the future horizon.
However, should the security alliance collapse, Japan would be surrounded by nuclear
and potentially hostile neighbors (including perhaps a nuclear Korea). If Japan, South
Korea and Taiwan were to feel insecure and isolated, they might be tempted not only to
renounce their former non-nuclear weapon status but also to acquire long-range offensive
maritime and air strike warfare capabilities as a deterrence option and a military
alternative to TMD systems. Conventional, offe!
nsive, precision-strike warfare capabilities ? intended to destroy missile launchers,
storage bases, logistic sites, road or rail transport systems and C3I infrastructure ? are
based on pre-emptive or even preventive strike options. Such drastically enhanced
conventional offensive counterforce postures, however, would be much more
destabilising for the entire region and more dangerous for China itself. In this light, China
should be more concerned about a future security environment where its non-nuclear
neighbours are without TMD capabilities because of the ?near-certainty of war?,
particularly in an escalating crisis.
Weakened alliance ensures quick regional proliferation
New Republic, ?96 [December 23, Expanded Academic]
If the U.S.-Japan alliance holds firm, America can look forward to sharing in the region's
miraculous growth. If it decays, Japan may go nuclear to protect itself from the nuclear
Chinese; South Korea and Taiwan will follow suit; pretty soon the whole region will be
nuclear and nervous. Having pulled off the most remarkable economic advance witnessed
by mankind, Asia could perform its nastiest reversal.
Alliance collapse strengthens Japanese militarism
Nye, Harvard, ?02
[Joseph, THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN POWER, p. 24,
Some politicians have started a movement to revise Article 9 of the country's constitution,
which restrict, Japan's forces to self-defense. If the United States were to drop the alliance
with Japan and follow the advice of those who want us to stay "offshore" and shift our
allegiance back and forth to balance China and Japan, we could produce the sense of
insecurity that might lead Japan to decide it had to develop its own nuclear capacity.
Strong alliance prevents nuclearization
Kas, Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Nonproliferation, ?03
[Yuri, WORLD AFFAIRS, Winter, p. 124)
The importance of the bilateral relationship cannot be overemphasized, particularly since
the role of the U.S.-Japanese security alliance in the post-cold war era has increased. The
"anti-nuclearism" that has been prevalent among the Japanese public and the Liberals
since 1945 makes it politically unwise for the Centrist government--which had been
dominated by the Centrist Liberal Democratic Party until 1993--to opt for nuclearization.
Moreover, the Japanese Self-Defense Force does not have any institutional mechanism or
capability to integrate a nuclear doctrine or forces

Impacts: Alliance Solves North Korea


Strong alliance deters North Korean aggression
Okamoto, chair of the Japanese prime minister's Task Force on Foreign Relations, ?02
[Yukio, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Spring, Lexis]
Despite its years of famine; its evaporating industrial and energy infrastructure; and its
choking, inhumane society, the DPRK government still refuses to retreat to its place on
the ash heap of history. Despite the poverty of the people, the North Korean military
maintains an arsenal of thousands of rocket launchers and pieces of artillery -- some of
which are possibly loaded with chemical and biological warheads -- awaiting the signal
to wipe Seoul off the map. The DPRK's immense stock of weapons includes large
numbers of Nodong missiles capable of striking Japan's western coastal regions and
probably longer-range missiles capable of hitting every major Japanese city. The United
States has two combat aircraft wings in the ROK, in Osan and Kunsan. In addition, some
30,000 U.S. Army troops are stationed near Seoul. Most military experts admit that the
army troops serve a largely symbolic function; if an actual war were to erupt, a massive
North Korean artillery bombardment c!
ould pin down both the U.S. Eighth Army and the ROK armed forces at the incipient
stage. The firepower the USFJ can bring to bear upon the Korean Peninsula within a
matter of hours makes the U.S.-Japan alliance the Damoclean sword hanging over the
DPRK. The DPRK leaders are masters of deception and manipulation, but they know that
launching a military strike against the ROK will expose them to a strong and final
counterstrike from U.S. forces in Japan.
Genuine and binding consultation strengthens the security alliance and checks North
Korean regional aggression
Treverton, Pacific Council on International Policy fellow, ?02
[Gregory, San Diego Union Tribune, December 3, Lexis]
Differences also may emerge in approaches toward North Korea. Despite its own
concerns about North Korea's nuclear development and missiles program, for instance,
Japan will lean toward engaging Pyongyang, come what may. The Bush administration,
which already has named North Korea one of three countries that form an "axis of evil,"
may eventually lean toward a more forceful response. Overall, however, a continued
connection to the United States makes sense for Japan. But it will want a different sort of
alliance. It will want to be consulted -- that hoary diplomatic word -- as an equal. (We
used to joke in the 1970s that the only thing worse than not consulting Japan was . . .
consulting Japan.) It will be less willing to open its checkbook, as it did for the Gulf War
and more recently for the rebuilding of post-Taliban Afghanistan, when the United States
decides policy more or less on its own. It will want to be consulted on a range of issues
from China, to the Korean peni!
nsula, to missile defense. Beyond the bother of consultations that are real -- a kind of
unnatural act for official Washington -- the United States will ultimately face hard
choices about its own role in Asia. A more assertive and sovereignty-conscious Japan is
just one of several reasons why the United States may need to readjust the way it
exercises its considerable military and political weight in Asia. While it is not out of the
question that American troops could remain in Japan and South Korea in the same
numbers a decade hence, it would be rash to bet policy on it. Both Japan's politics and
China's sensitivities might be better served by an American presence that was mostly over
the horizon but still manifestly available given the new instruments of long-range power.
Ultimately, such a move may be the best way to keep contentiousness over security
matters from ripping U.S.-Japan relations asunder.

Impacts: Alliance Solves North Korea


North Korea risks proliferation, millions of deaths and nuclear war ? only close
cooperation solves.
Hirsh, former Newsweek editor, ?03
[Michael, January 13, Newsweek, Factiva]
Let's face it: the very reason the Bush administration wants to attack Iraq and not North
Korea is because it can: it knows Iraq is less dangerous. Kim, in effect, holds South
Korea, Japan and tens of thousands of U.S. troops hostage; in a matter of hours, he can
cause casualties "on a scale we have not seen since World War II," says a U.S. military
official in Seoul. With nearly 1.2 million troops under arms, 70 percent of them forward-
deployed, Kim Jong Il can order a crushing blitz southward much as his father did to start
the 1950-53 Korean War. Not only does he almost certainly have a few nuclear bombs
ready--most experts agree Saddam is some five years away from one--he possesses
chemical weapons sufficient to kill millions. Kim's long-term threat is even scarier. The
biggest danger to American lives for decades to come will be proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction and missiles that could fall into the hands of terrorists. On this score
North Korea is far more !
of a menace. And as Rumsfeld has said, North Korea is "the world's biggest proliferator
of ballistic missiles." Missile exports are thought to make up half of Pyongyang's annual
$1 billion in exports; much of this technology goes to terror-generating nations in the
Middle East. Kim also could build as many as 100 nuclear weapons by 2009, notes one
CIA analysis. Then there is the threat of a destabilized Asia--the likeliest place for
America to be drawn into a major war decades hence. Bush officials privately concede
that North Korea appears only steps away from declaring itself a nuclear power. That in
turn could provoke South Korea, already questioning America as an ally, to go nuclear,
which could make Japan rethink its nonnuclear posture. Nothing is likelier to make China
rush into an arms race--it is now only slowly building up its forces--than a nuclear-armed
Japan. And long after Saddam is in his grave, China will be Washington's biggest future
strategic headache. Sad!
dam, by contrast, is something of a spent force in the Muslim world.

Ext: Japan is key to solve North Korea


Japan is key to stable relations with North Korea
Hwang, Heritage Foudnation, April 26th 2004
[Balbina Y., ?A New Security Agenda for the U.S. Japan Alliance?
http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bg1749.cfm, downloaded on
7/14/04]
North Korea's shocking admission to kidnapping Japanese citizens and refusal to allow
their families to return to Japan, pursuit of clandestine nuclear programs in flagrant
violation of international agreements and treaties, withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, and proliferation of missiles6 constitute a threat to peace and
stability in the region and are intended to undermine America's bilateral alliances in the
region.Thus, any peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue will require
Japan's strong support and cooperation in the six-party talks with North Korea. Prime
Minister Koizumi made clear his intention to forge a new relationship with North Korea
when he visited Pyongyang in September 2002. While North Korea dashed hopes of an
immediate turnaround in bilateral relations by mishandling the issue of kidnapped
Japanese citizens, Japan will likely play a key role in any future breakthrough in easing
diplomatic tensions with Pyongyang.

Impacts: Alliance Key to U.S. - Russia


Strong alliance is key to U.S. Russian relations and Russian democratic transition
Okamoto, chair of the Japanese prime minister's Task Force on Foreign Relations, ?02
[Yukio, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Spring, Lexis]
In military terms, the U.S.-Japan alliance's struggle with Russia is dramatically reduced.
Now the allies will need to work together to bring Russia into the circle of advanced,
industrialized democratic states. Despite the Putin administration's current apparently
pro-Western policies, Russia will need many decades to extinguish its long-standing
profound mistrust of the United States. NATO's repeated rejections of Russian requests to
be considered a candidate for membership, coupled with that body's relentless expansion
toward Russia's borders, has led Russian leaders to express an aspiration to become a
greater power in the Pacific. Although Russia's continuing refusal to return the Northern
Territories to Japan and the lack of a peace treaty ending World War II clouds Japanese
sentiment toward Russia, Japan remains the key for Russia's entry into the Pacific. In this
context, Japan has a role to play as a less threatening representative of the West and as an
example of n!
on -- Euro-U.S. democratic tradition. Putin's personal attachment to Japan may also make
the relationship between Japan and Russia an important conduit of communication
between the West and Moscow in the years to come.
U.S. Russian relations are critical to Russian political and economic stability ?
cooperation prevents multiple scenarios for global conflict
Rumer and Sokolsky, Institute for National Strategic Studies senior research fellows, ?02
[Eugene and Nikolai, STRATEGIC FORUM, #192, May,
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF192/sf192.htm

Even a cursory examination of the alternatives should make clear why investing in a
stable and positive relationship with Russia is in the national interest. We must not take
Russia's pragmatism and ability to act in its self-interest for granted. We need to look no
further than the record of Russia adrift throughout the 1990s for proof. Russia may have
achieved a substantial degree of stability since the nadir of 1998 when its currency
collapsed and its leadership became mired in a succession of crises and corruption
scandals. However, this achievement and Russia's constructive stance in the international
arena should not be considered irreversible. Russia's ability to act in its self-interest will
not always translate into compliance with U.S. interests. But dealing with a responsible
and coherent leadership presiding over a stable and secure Russia is preferable to coping
with an erratic Russia. In the short and medium term, U.S. efforts to combat proliferation
and terror!
ism would face much tougher odds without Russian cooperation. Despite Russia's
diminished stature in the international arena, its cooperative approach to U.S.-Russian
relations since September 11 has had a positive, soothing impact on trans-Atlantic
relations, making it possible for the United States in turn to focus its diplomatic and
political energies where they have been needed most. The record of the 1990s offers an
important lesson: a weak Russia is in the interest of no one. The ability of Russia to put
its own house in order--from securing its nuclear weapons to pumping oil and gas to
global markets--is an important element of U.S. national and international security. The
danger to U.S. interests is not from a potential challenger to President Putin, who might
shy away from a good personal relationship with his American counterpart, but from
Russia failing to consolidate its political and economic accomplishments of the last few
years. In the long run, U.S. interests!
would be well served by a cooperative relationship with Russia, as envisioned by
President Bush. Russia is by no measure likely to regain its global superpower status.
However, as a regional power, it could be a useful collaborator with the United States--
from helping to balance China to supplying energy to key markets to exercising restraint
in critical areas of conventional and WMD proliferation. Thus, shaping positive and
collaborative long-term Russian attitudes is an important U.S. objective.

Impacts: Alliance Collapse = Regional War


Alliance collapse triggers regional war
Okamoto, chair of the Japanese prime minister's Task Force on Foreign Relations, ?02
[Yukio, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Spring, Lexis]
Fifty years have passed since Japan and the United States signed the original security
treaty and more than 40 years have passed since the current 1960 treaty came into force.
Neither Japan nor the United States has a desire to alter the treaty obligations, much less
abrogate the alliance. Nevertheless, exploring potential alternatives to the alliance is
worthwhile, if only to illuminate why it is likely to survive. For Japan, treaty abrogation
would result in a security vacuum that could be filled in only one of three ways. The first
is armed neutrality, which would mean the development of a Japan ready to repel any
threat, including the region's existing and incipient nuclear forces. The second is to
establish a regional collective security arrangement. This option would require that the
major powers in Asia accept a reduction of their troop strengths down to Japanese levels
and accept a common political culture -- democracy. Neither of these conditions is likely
to be met!
for decades. The third option, the one outlined in the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, is for
Japan's security to be the responsibility of a permanent UN military force, ready to
deploy at a moment's notice to preserve peace and stability in the region. Such a force, of
course, does not yet exist. None of the three possible replacements for the Japan-U.S.
alliance is realistic. The alternatives also seem certain to increase the likelihood of war in
the region, not decrease it -- the only reason that Japan would want to leave the U.S.-
Japan alliance. An overview of aftereffects on the United States of an abrogation of the
alliance runs along similar lines. In the absence of a robust, UN-based security system,
relations between the giant countries of Asia would become uncertain and competitive --
too precarious a situation for the United States and the world. The United States would
lose access to the facilities on which it relies for power projection in the region. Much
more imp!
ortantly, it would also lose a friend -- a wealthy, mature, and loyal friend. Given the
magnitude of the danger that an end of the alliance would pose to both Japan and the
United States, both sides will likely want to maintain their security relationship for many
years to come. A completely new world would have to emerge for Japan and the United
States to no longer need each other. Despite frictions over trade, supposed Japanese
passivity, purported U.S. arrogance, and the myriad overwrought "threats to the alliance,"
the truth is that this military alliance between two democratic states is well-nigh
unbreakable -- because there are no acceptable alternatives.

Impacts: Alliance Key to Taiwan Conflict


Alliance is key to a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue ? prevents war with China
Okamoto, chair of the Japanese prime minister's Task Force on Foreign Relations, ?02
[Yukio, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Spring, Lexis]
Opinion is divided about the rise of China as a political, economic, and military power.
Some view China's admission into the World Trade Organization, the emergence of a
civil society in the country, and the decline of the Communist Party's revolutionary
ideology as hints of a bright future in which China will seek peaceful coexistence with
the rest of the world while its political and human rights practices slowly evolve toward
global norms. Others see echoes of the rise of the great imperial powers in the nineteenth
century and foresee a fearful global struggle against a vengeful, recidivist Chinese state.
Recent events, including the Chinese government's quiet support of the U.S. war on
terrorism and the absence of criticism of Japan's 2001 dispatch of the SDF, tend to
support the first, more optimistic view. Regardless of whether China's development takes
the bright path or the fearful one, however, reason for concern exists on one issue: the
resolution of the status of!
Taiwan. Chinese citizens from all walks of life have an attachment to the reunification of
Taiwan and the mainland that transcends reason. The U.S.-Japan alliance represents a
significant hope for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan problem. Both Japan and the
United States have clearly stated that they oppose reunification by force. When China
conducted provocative missile tests in the waters around Taiwan in 1996, the United
States sent two aircraft carrier groups into nearby waters as a sign of its disapproval of
China's belligerent act. Japan seconded the U.S. action, raising in Chinese minds the
possibility that Japan might offer logistical and other support to its ally in the event of
hostilities. Even though intervention is only a possibility, a strong and close tie between
Japanese and U.S. security interests guarantees that the Chinese leadership cannot afford
to miscalculate the consequences of an unprovoked attack on Taiwan. The alliance backs
up Japan's basic st!
ance that the two sides need to come to a negotiated solution.

Impacts: Alliance Key to Taiwan Conflict

Taiwan conflict escalates into a global nuclear war ? ending civilization

Straits Times, 2000 [June, 25, No one gains in war over Taiwan]

THE DOOMSDAY SCENARIO - THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait


war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to
conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale
war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and
near and -horror of horrors -raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already
told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics
support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In
the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent,
Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration
may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing
world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political
landscape. The balance of!
power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia,
hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could
enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war?
According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which
fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using
nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The
Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its
implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted
with two choices in Korea -truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of
nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before
the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China
50 years later, short of using n!
uclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that
can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear
option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a
review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan
Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a
gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that
although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from
the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons
mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen
Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of
civilisation. There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear
Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivab!
le, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else. Gen
Ridgeway recalled that the biggest mistake the US made during the Korean War was to
assess Chinese actions according to the American way of thinking. "Just when everyone
believed that no sensible commander would march south of the Yalu, the Chinese troops
suddenly appeared," he recalled. (The Yalu is the river which borders China and North
Korea, and the crossing of the river marked China's entry into the war against the
Americans). "I feel uneasy if now somebody were to tell me that they bet China would
not do this or that," he said in a recent interview given to the Chinese press.

Impacts: Alliance Key to U.S. Hegemony


Relations are critical to U.S. hegemony and power projection
Kazushi, military security analyst, ?99
[Ogawa, JAPAN QUARTERLY, Spring 1999, p. 19-20. (DRGOC/D496)]
First, the United States cannot maintain global preponderance with Japan. Second, in
military terms, the alliance with Japan is the most symmetric of America?s alliances. The
first point is obvious from Japan?s unique role as America?s power projection platform.
U.S. military bases in all other allied countries are forward bases for responding to
specific regional threats. For instance, bases in the Republic of Korea (South Korea) are
for deterring ? and failing that ? fighting ? a war on the peninsula by deploying forces in
response to military threats from North Korea. The immense bases in NATO Europe are
also for meeting regional threats, as were those in the Philippines. In contrast, U.S. bases
in Japan provide the bulk of support for the Seventh Fleet and III Marine Expeditionary
Force, whose area of responsibility stretches from Hawaii to the Cape of Good Hope ?
one half of the world! Such a power projection platform is vital for America?s
maintenance of a position fro!
m which it can claim global leadership
U.S. hegemony prevents nuclear war
Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND, 1995 (THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Spring 1995, p.
online)
Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to
preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On
balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable
not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises
leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be
more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the
rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively
with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional
hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would
help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the
world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a
global nuclear exchange. U.S!
. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a
multipolar balance of power system.

Impacts: Alliance key to solve terrorism

Close cooperation between Japan and the US can thwart emerging global threats
Hwang, writer for the Backgrounder, April 26th 2004
[Balbina Y., ?A New Security Agenda for the U.S. Japan Alliance?
http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bg1749.cfm, downloaded on
7/14/04]
The U.S.-Japan alliance was created in the aftermath of World War II and became the
anchor for building stability and prosperity in Northeast Asia during the Cold War. The
current security environment, however, is dramatically different. Some Cold War threats
such as North Korea persist, while new threats from non-state actors, including terrorists,
have emerged. Continued close cooperation between the United States and Japan could
prove critical to defeating these threats.

Answers To: Article 9/pacificsm/taboo stops rearm


Article 9 and Pacificism don?t stop rearmament
AUSTRALIAN FINANCIAL REVIEW, April 7, 2003, p. 16.
One of Japan's most impressive young politicians, Taro Kono, says support for
constitutional reform is growing. "People are getting more realistic," he says. "Not many
people still believe that if you don't have armed forces, no one is going to attack you. I
don't think anyone believes it after [September 11, 2001] or the North Korean missile
shootings. I think parliament is getting ready even to do constitutional reform. We are
getting close to the two-thirds majority." US embassy officials tactfully say it's a domestic
matter. But Washington clearly supports change. A report in October 2000, from a
bipartisan working group on US-Japan relations, concluded that Japan's prohibition
against collective self-defence was "a constraint on alliance co-operation". "Lifting this
prohibition would allow for closer and more efficient security co-operation," it said.
Numerous indicators prove checks on rearmament don?t matter
Wall, Cambridge Center for International Studies, ?03
[David, JAPAN TIMES, February 2, 2003, p. online.
Recently we have seen Japanese gun boats sink a North Korean vessel on the high seas
and sail to support United States-led forces in wars against Afghanistan and Iraq. Article
9 of the Japanese Constitution, which is supposed to outlaw such practices, has been
effectively jettisoned. We have heard calls for Japan to develop nuclear weapons, and we
have heard calls for the Japanese air force to carry out preemptive strikes against nuclear
installations in North Korea. What we have not heard is Koizumi taking any principled
stand against any of this. What we are hearing instead is calls for Japan to become more
assertive on security issues, for example in the recently published report, "New Era, New
Vision." This report was prepared for the prime minister by a task force led by Yukio
Okamoto, an adviser on foreign relations to the Japanese Cabinet.
Taboo weakening now
Kas, Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Nonproliferation, ?03
[Yuri, WORLD AFFAIRS, Winter, p. 124)
Japan's "nuclear taboo" since 1945 seems to be weakening, partly because of a generation
change. Debate over military and nuclear issues is not taboo anymore, and the Japanese
have finally started to talk about "security," which has increased Japan's Centrists'
pragmatism on national security. This cultural factor should not be underestimated. Until
the early 1990s, Japan was the only developed state where few courses on security
studies were taught at higher education institutions. Therefore, it has been difficult for the
Japanese-both the public and policy makers-to grasp a basic knowledge of nuclear
weapons and nuclear strategy, which is common in other developed states. Even today
Japanese state universities do not offer a course on security studies.
Nuclear taboo has weakened
NEWSWEEK, May 5, 2003, p. 32.
For Beijing, the damage Pyongyang is doing to its strategic backyard is probably the
most compelling reason to ratchet up the pressure. "If this goes badly," says David
Shambaugh, a professor of Chinese politics at George Washington University, "not only
do they get a nuclear North Korea, but possibly a nuclear Japan, South Korea and
Taiwan." Chinese officials are keenly aware that Japanese policymakers have begun to
shed their "nuclear allergy" in the months since Pyongyang acknowledged its uranium-
based weapons program. Although personally opposed to a nuclear option, Diet member
Ichita Yamamoto says, "We should start by seriously considering a capacity to attack
missile bases in North Korea.

Answers To: Japanese attitudes prevent nuclear rearmament


Attitudes toward nuclear weapons could change quickly
Walker, CSIS Japan chair, ?02
[Elliot, JAPAN TIMES, August 5, 2002, p. online.

But opinions can change, can't they? Such must be the rationale for questioning Japan's
nonnuclear policy. Japan's democratic system will keep in check any nuclear militarism -
for now. But Japan's security environment is changing, and so is Japanese military policy.

Political conditions could change ? triggers rearmament


AUSTRALIAN FINANCIAL REVIEW, ?03 [April 7, 2003, p. 16.

Nuclear weapons are still taboo, though the constraints are political rather than
constitutional or technical. In March 1959, then prime minister Nobusuke Kishi told
parliament that while Japan had no intention of acquiring nuclear weapons, "speaking in
terms of legal interpretation of the constitution, there is nothing to prevent the
maintaining of the minimum amount of nuclear weapons for self-defence". Nor is there a
technical obstacle. One nuclear expert recently told the AFR Japan had 70 tonnes of
plutonium in storage. North Korea is considered to be a nuclear power because
authorities cannot account for between 6 and 8 kilograms of plutonium. The same expert
said that, if the political environment changed, Japan could produce a crude nuclear
weapon in three or four days.

Answers To TMD Disad

Not unique ? Missile Defense coop is a done deal


Business Week, ?03 [July 14, Lexis]
Also in June, the government approved a plan to produce with the Pentagon a Patriot
Advanced Capability (PAC-3) surface-to-air guided missile air-defense system. That
could lead to a sea-based missile system designed to deter an attack from North Korea,
says Masashi Nishihara, an international relations professor at Japan's National Defense
Academy. Japan fears an assault from Pyongyang, which may be more likely to strike at
Tokyo than at South Korea in any face-off with the U.S. Japan could even be readying to
remove the greatest taboo of them all. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party has released a
national security analysis that suggests Japan consider revising its war-renouncing
Constitution, which was essentially written by U.S. occupiers.
No impact - TMD not destabilizing ? China won?t be threatened
Inside the Pentagon, 8 ? 17 ? 03 [Factiva]
U.S. missile defense plans would not necessarily destabilize Asia if the United States
handles the issue carefully and takes steps to avoid alienating China, according to a study
released last week by the Atlantic Council of the United States. The nonpartisan
Washington-based research institute believes well-developed missile defenses in Asia
may prevent instability, though such a policy would require Washington to continue
discussing plans in public and consulting closely with key states. Most missile defense
systems under development will not be ready for several years, giving U.S. policymakers
time to consider various options, according to the report's authors, who include former
under secretaries of defense Walter Slocombe and Jacques Gansler as well, as retired Air
Force Gen. Michael Carns and C. Richard Nelson, director of the Atlantic Council's
program on international security, China decided some time ago how to cope with U.S.
plans for a missile defense system in !
East Asia, according to the report. "The long lead times for developing and deploying
missile defenses, combined with the transparency of programs and regular briefings
abroad by U.S. officials, suggest that deployment of missile defenses need not be
destabilizing," the report states. "Most of the systems currently in research and
development will probably not be ready for fielding for several years and, even when
they are deployed, China should be confident that they do not pose a threat to its deterrent
capabilities."
China realizes it?s a done deal ? they also don?t perceive Japan TMD as a threat ? Taiwan
is key and the counterplan doesn?t make TMD deployment in Taiwan more likely
Greeen, Council on Foreign Relations, ?01
[United States-Japan Strategic Dialogue: Beyond the Defense Guidelines , January 15,
Michael, http://www.glocomnet.or.jp/okazaki-inst/e2juproje/e2juproje1.tmd.html]
Another reason is, I think, that the Chinese side has realized that the U.S. and Japan are
going to move forward incrementally with missile defense, regardless of Chinese
criticisms at this point. There are other reasons such as cost and feasibility for why we
might not do it, but I think the Chinese side realizes their complaints will not stop us from
moving forward. What we heard in Beijing--in a frank dialogue with Chinese
counterparts--was very little about U.S.-Japan TMD. Now what they're worried about is
U.S.-Taiwan TMD, which is what frightens them because of the political implications.
Alliance reassures China by checking Japan
Cossa, Pacific Forum president, ?97
[Frank, U.S.-JAPAN BILATERAL DYNAMICS,
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books%20-
%201997/Strength%20Through%20Cooperation%201997/stcch10.html]
The U.S.-Japan alliance plays another crucial role in Korean security today and after
reunification by providing Korea with a certain (although varying) degree of confidence
that Japan will not become the future threat. Anti-Japanese sentiments are already
proving to be a unifying force in Sino-ROK relations and could have significant
ramifications on the postreunification security framework for Northeast Asia. The de
facto three-way relationship among the United States, Japan, and the ROK has, as one of
its few unifying factors, the common bond provided by the long-standing alliances
between the United States and each of the two former bitter rivals. ROK-Japan
cooperation is important to long-term stability in Asia and, more immediately, appears
crucial to the success of the U.S.-initiated Agreed Framework and the Korean Peninsula
Economic Development Organization (KEDO) efforts to denuclearize North Korea.

Answers To: TMD Disad


Turn - Japanese TMD checks North Korean Threat
O?Hanlon, Brookings, ?01
[United States-Japan Strategic Dialogue: Beyond the Defense Guidelines , January 15,
Michael, http://www.glocomnet.or.jp/okazaki-inst/e2juproje/e2juproje1.tmd.html]
However, there is still a military confrontation on the peninsula that has not been
mitigated, that has not been reduced in any meaningful way by the process of dente. So I
am trying to sound like an optimist, but a cautious one who believes that the best way to
approach North Korea is with carrots and sticks -- or carrots and deterrence. Since the
early 1990s, North Korea has acquired an arsenal of perhaps 100 Nodong missiles that
are capable of reaching Japan. Right now the alliance has no way to deal with that
capability. In theory, North Korea could try to use those missiles, either directly in an
attack against Japan, or to put psychological pressure on Tokyo during a crisis. So I think
we should use more carrots, and in the case of TMD, perhaps a little more deterrence as
well, with Pyongyang.
North Korea risks proliferation, millions of deaths and nuclear war ? only close
cooperation solves.
Hirsh, former Newsweek editor, ?03
[Michael, January 13, Newsweek, Factiva]
Let's face it: the very reason the Bush administration wants to attack Iraq and not North
Korea is because it can: it knows Iraq is less dangerous. Kim, in effect, holds South
Korea, Japan and tens of thousands of U.S. troops hostage; in a matter of hours, he can
cause casualties "on a scale we have not seen since World War II," says a U.S. military
official in Seoul. With nearly 1.2 million troops under arms, 70 percent of them forward-
deployed, Kim Jong Il can order a crushing blitz southward much as his father did to start
the 1950-53 Korean War. Not only does he almost certainly have a few nuclear bombs
ready--most experts agree Saddam is some five years away from one--he possesses
chemical weapons sufficient to kill millions. Kim's long-term threat is even scarier. The
biggest danger to American lives for decades to come will be proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction and missiles that could fall into the hands of terrorists. On this score
North Korea is far more !
of a menace. And as Rumsfeld has said, North Korea is "the world's biggest proliferator
of ballistic missiles." Missile exports are thought to make up half of Pyongyang's annual
$1 billion in exports; much of this technology goes to terror-generating nations in the
Middle East. Kim also could build as many as 100 nuclear weapons by 2009, notes one
CIA analysis. Then there is the threat of a destabilized Asia--the likeliest place for
America to be drawn into a major war decades hence. Bush officials privately concede
that North Korea appears only steps away from declaring itself a nuclear power. That in
turn could provoke South Korea, already questioning America as an ally, to go nuclear,
which could make Japan rethink its nonnuclear posture. Nothing is likelier to make China
rush into an arms race--it is now only slowly building up its forces--than a nuclear-armed
Japan. And long after Saddam is in his grave, China will be Washington's biggest future
strategic headache. Sad!
dam, by contrast, is something of a spent force in the Muslim world.

Not Unique ? Japan is deploying missile defense now


Berkofsky, European Institute for Asian Studies, 9 ? 12 ? 03
[Alan, ASIA TIMES, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/EI12Dh01.html]
Japan should be able to shoot down North Korean missiles on its own. This is the most
recent announcement from Japan's Defense Agency, and it is already causing the usual
controversy in Japan and protests from its neighbors in East Asia. Last month the 2003
edition of Japan's White Paper for Defense urged the country's policymakers finally to
give the green light for missile defense in order to be prepared to deal with "unpredictable
threats, such as ballistic missile and terrorist attacks". The Defense Agency followed up
on the White Paper and is requesting 200 billion yen (US$1.7 billion) for fiscal 2004 and
2005 to buy US Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3) anti-missile systems as well as US
SM-3s (Standard Missile 3). he SM-3s, to be deployed on Aegis destroyers, are designed
to intercept incoming missiles from outer space, and the PAC-3 system, deployed at four
ground-to-air missile units, are set to shoot down missiles before they hit the ground.

Answers To TMD Disad


Missile defenses reduce the risks of nuclear conflict in several ways
Utgoff, Institute for Defense Analysis, ?02
[Victor, SURVIVAL, Summer, p. 92-3]
Missile defences for the states that take may have to protect others from aggression
backed with nuclear weapons are also important for other indirect purposes. First, by
largely suppressing the effectiveness of a prospective aggressor's nuclear-armed missiles,
defences could ruin his confidence that potential protectors would see intervention as too
risky and allow his aggression to succeed. Thus, defences would largely restore the
degree of effective deterrence of aggression that had existed before the prospective
aggressor had acquired its missiles and nuclear weapons. Second, missile defences are
also important for drawing together and maintaining coalitions to confront nuclear-armed
aggressors. Unless reasonably strong defences can be provided, states other than the US
and those immediately and directly threatened by the aggressor might not be willing to
join." But the legitimacy provided by broad coalitions for the kinds of actions that might
prove necessary in confron!
ting nuclear-armed aggressors could be especially important. In particular, if nuclear
retaliation were to prove necessary, the US should not be seen as having acted
unilaterally. Third, if a nuclear-armed state did launch a nuclear attack, US and allied
missile defences could save significantly more lives than one might at first think. While
reducing losses suffered by the US and its allies is the most important and direct purpose
of the defences, these reductions could also justify a less destructive retaliation. More
specifically, every US or allied citizen saved by the defence could mean that one of the
aggressor's citizens is saved as well. Fourth, missile defences could substantially alleviate
the pressures for quick action by the US and its allies. For example, by sharply reducing
the potential damage an opponent's missiles might cause, defences could allow protectors
to take a 'wait and see' approach to any initial aggression, rather than risk starting a war
by a pre!
emptive attack against the opponent's weapons. Avoiding unnecessary preemptive attacks
would be especially important if destruction of the opponent's weapons were to impose
high risks on people in surrounding areas. Similarly, by reducing the damage wreaked by
an aggressor's initial attack, effective missile defences could give decision-makers more
scope to delay retaliation. Delay would allow more careful consideration of how to
respond, including closer consultation with allies and others involved. This would be
important in obtaining a broad legitimisation of US actions. Of course, the US might not
want to exploit this possibility in any given case, perhaps seeing very prompt retaliation
as most likely to suppress the further use of nuclear weapons in the situation at hand.
Effective defences could also largely suppress any final lashing-out by the attacker if he
were faced with total defeat. This, of course, would make it easier for the US and its
coalition partners to !
pursue the attacker's total defeat. Better yet, if the prospective protectors had missile
defences, a nuclear-armed state could no longer assume that its opponents could not
afford to drive it to the point where it had nothing left to lose. With total defeat a more
credible prospect, such aggression should be better deterred. Note that in all but the first
of the foregoing arguments, the effect of missile defences is to increase the freedom of
action of the US and its allies. Defences would permit less destructive or less immediate
retaliation, make it less risky to forgo or, alternatively, to carry out preemptive attacks,
and would reduce the risks and potential costs of imposing total defeat on an aggressor. In
some circumstances, the US and its allies might see no advantage in such increased
freedom of action. But the enhancements to this freedom come bundled together, and on
balance, seem well worth having. In general, increased freedom of action for the
protectors shoul!
d translate into less promising options for aggression. Defences are also important for the
morale of the states that would be expected to defend against aggression backed by
nuclear weapons. If the need to confront such aggression arises, the US and its coalition
partners would feel entitled to the added assurance that such defences would provide.
Facing aggression without such defences, in the knowledge that they could have been
provided, could create a certain resentment at having to run unnecessary risks.

Answers To China Disad

Turn ? China wants a strong alliance ? it?s the best check on Japan
Johnson, Harvard government professor, ?03
[Alastair Iain, International Security, Spring, Lexis]
As for the U.S.-Japan alliance, Chinese attitudes are exceedingly complex. Since the
announcement of guidelines for revising the U.S.-Japan security treaty in 1996 to specify
more clearly the Japanese role in support of U.S. military operations in the region,
Chinese leaders have been increasingly worried about the possibility that this alliance
could become a tool for defending a permanently separated or even a formally
independent Taiwan. 9 Many Chinese analysts believe, however, that a Japan within a
bilateral alliance with the United States is still better than a Japan outside of such
constraints as long as this alliance is not used to provide military cover for an
independent Taiwan.
More evidence?
Cossa, Pacific Forum president, ?97
[Frank, U.S.-JAPAN BILATERAL DYNAMICS,
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books%20-
%201997/Strength%20Through%20Cooperation%201997/stcch10.html]
The U.S.-Japan alliance plays another crucial role in Korean security today and after
reunification by providing Korea with a certain (although varying) degree of confidence
that Japan will not become the future threat. Anti-Japanese sentiments are already
proving to be a unifying force in Sino-ROK relations and could have significant
ramifications on the postreunification security framework for Northeast Asia. The de
facto three-way relationship among the United States, Japan, and the ROK has, as one of
its few unifying factors, the common bond provided by the long-standing alliances
between the United States and each of the two former bitter rivals. ROK-Japan
cooperation is important to long-term stability in Asia and, more immediately, appears
crucial to the success of the U.S.-initiated Agreed Framework and the Korean Peninsula
Economic Development Organization (KEDO) efforts to denuclearize North Korea.

ECONOMIC TIES PREVENT SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT

Robert Sutter is a professor of Asian studies at Georgetown University's School of


Foreign Service, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Autumn, 2002, p. 37

The most important of these factors is that both the Japanese and Chinese governments
are domestically focused on the economic development of their countries. They believe
that economic development requires a prolonged, peaceful, and cooperative relationship
with their Asian neighbors, notably one another. China depends heavily on Japan for
economic assistance, for technology and investment, and as a market for Chinese goods.
Japan is increasingly dependent on China as a market, a source of imports, and an
offshore manufacturing base.

NO RISK OF A SERIOUS SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT

Robert Sutter is a professor of Asian studies at Georgetown University's School of


Foreign Service, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Autumn, 2002, p. 37

Fortunately, China's and Japan's recent policy and behavior in Asia show little sign of
becoming seriously divisive for the foreseeable future. Neither Beijing nor Tokyo appears
to give primary attention to offsetting the influence of the other in seeking their
respective regional goals; they are focused on more general priorities and concerns.
Although Sino-Japanese differences may flare from time to time over issues grounded in
the two countries' changing power and influence in Asian and world affairs, the
differences are bounded within confines that help to avoid serious disruption and to
preserve regional stability and prosperity.

China-Japan DA Answers

TURN: SINO-JAPANESE ENTENTE THREATENS U.S. HEGEMONY

Robert Sutter is a professor of Asian studies at Georgetown University's School of


Foreign Service, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Autumn, 2002, p. 37

Realistically, the probability is low that a Sino-Japanese entente may emerge that would
seriously complicate the existing U.S. security architecture in Asia or possibly challenge
the leading U.S. economic role in the region

Sino-U.S. DA Answers
CHINA DOES NOT SUPPORT A BREAK-DOWN IN U.S.-JAPANESE RELATIONS
Robert Manning, Senior Fellow at the Progressive Policy Institute, THE WASHINGTON
QUARTERLY, Winter 1994, p. 45
The PRC has no desire to see a breakdown in the U.S.-Japan security relationship that
would result in a withdrawal of U.S. forward-deployed forces and its nuclear umbrella, a
fully independent Japan, and probable risk for China-Japan economic cooperation. This
sequence of events would almost certainly produce a new arms race, one compounded by
the North Korean nuclear threat, which at the G-7 summit of July 1993 led Tokyo to
publicly not rule out the unthinkable: becoming a nuclear power. This was not a new
Japanese position. Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi in 1957 had previously stated,
"Depending on future developments in nuclear weaponry I do not think that the
Constitution bans nuclear weapons if they are of a defensive character." This view was
reaffirmed in Japan's 1970 White Paper on Defense.

Affirmative Consult Answers


Japan will say no [insert evidence specific to your aff]
Japan has a track record of saying no
Schwenninger, World Policy Institute, ?95
[Sherle, WORLD POLICY JOURNAL, Summer, Expanded Academic]
A second explanation has to do with the long buildup of resentment against the United
States caused by an endless stream of American demands over the last two decades. This
has helped produce a new generation of leaders, both among the reform politicians and
the bureaucrats, that is more resistant to American concerns. In particular, key
bureaucrats in the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Japan blame American pressure in
the 1985-86 period for the buildup of the asset bubble that still plagues the Japanese
economy, especially the banking sector, which has been hurt by falling stock and property
prices from their earlier inflated levels. "Never again" has become the guiding philosophy
of the members of this group - a slogan that has unfortunately blinded them to Japan's
own self-interest. Hence Tokyo's resistance to Washington's calls for an easier monetary
policy.
TURN ? Relations lead to TMD which causes nuclear war
A. Japan may endorse a TMD, but public opinion is critical
Saunders, CNS East Asia Nonproliferation Program director, ?03
[Phillip, Theater Missile Defense and Northeast Asian Security,
http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_3b.html]
Japanese deployment of an advanced TMD system is not a fait accompli, however.
Decisions on development and deployment are tied to a variety of political and technical
variables including: changing threat perceptions (especially regarding North Korea); cost;
effectiveness of the technology; legal and constitutional issues related to bilateral
cooperation with the United States; and the impact on Sino-Japanese relations and global
arms control affairs. Japan has not yet had a serious public debate about TMD, and its
ultimate decision on deployment remains unclear. Problems have arisen in the
development of TMD that call into doubt the participation of U.S. allies in East Asia. A
principal concern is TMD's military effectiveness. Studies of the Patriot system during
the Gulf War show that it was minimally effective at best. The Patriot's difficulty in
defeating comparatively unsophisticated Iraqi Scud missiles raises questions about the
likely effectiveness of upgraded Patriot!
systems. In addition, Theater High Altitude Area Defense system (THAAD) tests to date
have not performed up to expectations. After a series of initial test failures, THAAD
recently demonstrated the capability to successfully intercept a test missile, but questions
remain about its overall effectiveness and reliability. Consequently, Japan and Taiwan
remain hesitant to fully endorse TMD.
B. Prior consultation boosts Japanese support for TMD, overcomes public opposition to
collective security
Mochizuki, Brookings, ?97
[Mike, BROOKINGS REVIEW, 3/22,
http://www.brookingsinstitution.org/dybdocroot/press/review/spring97/powers.htm]
As the U.S.-Japan alliance becomes more reciprocal, the United States must genuinely
consult Japan, not merely inform it of decisions already made. Although the two
countries agreed to a prior consultations process when the 1960 bilateral security pact
was signed, this mechanism has never been used. Because support for U.S. military
operations beyond Japan would provoke such intense domestic controversy, Tokyo
appeared to prefer not to be consulted. The Japanese government has applied such strict
criteria for when Washington would have to consult with Tokyo that Washington has
never had to get Japan's formal permission to use bases in Japan for military operations in
Southeast Asia or the Middle East. The result has been, paradoxically, that pacifist Japan
has given the United States freer rein on the use of overseas bases than America's
European allies. Japan's abdication of its right to be consulted has fueled public distrust in
Japan about bilateral defense cooperation. A!
healthier alliance demands prior consultation. As Japan musters the courage and will to
say "yes" to collective defense and security missions, it should also gain the right to say
"no" when it disagrees with U.S. policy. The U.S.-Japan alliance would then evolve
toward something akin to America s strategic relationships with the major West European
allies.

Affirmative Consult Answers


C. Japanese TMD angers China, causes a regional arms race, and a preemptive attack on
Taiwan
Bergsten, Institute for International Economics, ?01
[Fred, NO MORE BASHING: BUILDING A NEW JAPAN-UNITED STATES
ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP, Takatoshu Ito and Marcus Nolan, Eds., 229-230]
Enhanced cooperation between Japan and the United States has not been welcomed by
either Pyongyang or Beijing. The Chinese criticized both the 1996 United-States Japan
Joint Security Declaration and the 1997 Security Guidelines revision, and have objected
vociferously to bilateral cooperation on TMD and the possibility of cooperation on
NMD. The Chinese believe that these missile defense schemes are aimed at them. They
see TMD as fostering Taiwanese independence by rendering ineffective their ballistic
missile threat against the island, and NMD as negating their nuclear forces and promoting
US hegemony and Japanese remilitarization. Their likely response is to accelerate the
modernization and deployment of their nuclear-armed missiles (to preserve their deterrent
against these presumably imperfectly effective systems), while exploring the possibility
of developing their own antimissile system, possibly in collaboration with Russia. In the
extreme case, China might attem!
pt preemptive military action against Taiwan before the deployment of an extended
deterrence-enhancing US NMD system. Of course, the impact of TMD and NMD on
security affairs in Northeast Asia is ambiguous, owing to the uncertainties about the
effectiveness of the technologies and the reactions of the state actors. Japanese analysts
understand that the missile defense programs potentially enhance Japanese credibility of
US extended deterrence. At the same time, the deployment of missile defenses could
spark a regional arms race. As one commentary put it, Japan at present ?is like a poker
player who keeps anteing up and waiting to see the next card before deciding to stay in
the game or fold.

D. Taiwan conflict escalates into a global nuclear war - ending civilization


Straits Times, 2000 [June, 25, No one gains in war over Taiwan]
THE DOOMSDAY SCENARIO -THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait
war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to
conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale
war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and
near and -horror of horrors -raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told
the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics
support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In
the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent,
Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration
may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing
world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political
landscape. The balance of powe!
r in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities
between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new
and dangerous phase: Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to
General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against
the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons
against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a
personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications
on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two
choices in Korea -truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear
weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the
latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50
years later, short of using nuclear wea!
pons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy
major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A
Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its
"non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang,
president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the
Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the
government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to
drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the
country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said
that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilization. There would
be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Annaggedon over Taiwan
might seem inconceivable, it cannot be!
ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else. Gen Ridgeway
recalled that the biggest mistake the US made during the Korean War was to assess
Chinese actions according to the American way of thinking. "Just when everyone
believed that no sensible commander would march south of the Yalu, the Chinese troops
suddenly appeared, " he recalled. (The Yalu is the river which borders China and North
Korea, and the crossing of the river marked China's entry into the war against the
Americans). "I feel uneasy if now somebody were to tell me that they bet China would
not do this or that," he said in a recent interview given to the Chinese press.

Affirmative Consult Answers


CONSULTATIONS FAIL BECAUSE ALLIES FIND OUT IN ADVANCE AND THINK
WE ARE PRESSURING THEM INTO IT
Muskie Newsom, Georgetown Associate Dean, THE CONGRESS AND FOREIGN
POLICY, 1986, p. 102
In general, before an administration can talk with allies meaningfully, it must obtain the
concurrence of the executive departments involved and the Congress. This leads in many
cases to publish revelations of and administration?s intentions before the allies are ever
consulted. The allies feel they are being presented with a fait accompli rather than being
asked for their views prior to a decision.
TURN: BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS UNDERMINE MULTILATERAL
APPROACHES TO SECURITY

Raymond Vernon, Harvard Business Professor, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Summer


1990, p. 57

Bilateral relations between Japan and the United States promise to remain critical for
both countries in the foreseeable future. On economic issues, however, the bilateral
approach inescapably will continue to generate interactions of a destructive kind. What
may prevent such developments from turning into more active hostility is that neither
country can inflict great harm upon the other without imposing great costs upon itself in
the process. Likewise, there are few bilateral issues that do not intimately affect third
countries as well. As a result, most of the disputes that arise between Japan and the
United States involve issues in which third countries have a legitimate interest,
suggesting the desirability of shifting to multilateral settings wherever the choice exists.
In the case of Japan and the United States, however, the reasons for avoiding bilateral
efforts to resolve large problems or disputes are strengthened greatly by the basic
incompatibilities in th!
e decision-making processes of the two governments. As a result, when the United States
and Japan engage in two-way conversations, it appears that they cannot hear each other.
Inadequate as existing multilateral institutions may be for the development of policy and
the settlement of disputes, therefore, they are measurably superior to the bilateral
channels of Japanese-U.S. relations. Japan already shows small signs of recognizing this
critical point, and it is time for the United States to recognize it, as well.

Affirmative Consult Answers

TURN: CHINA

A. IN THE STATUS QUO, THE U.S. IS BALANCING RELATIONS WITH JAPAN


AND CHINA
Robert Sutter is a professor of Asi
an studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service, WASHINGTON
QUARTERLY, Autumn, 2002, p. 37

Considering other external forces, no government with an interest in Asian affairs would
benefit from greater Sino-Japanese friction, including the United States. The Bush
administration has been careful to balance its strong pro-Japan slant by reaffirming its
continued interest in closer, mutually beneficial relations with China, designed in part to
sustain regional peace and stability.

B. U.S.-JAPAN MILITARY COOPERATION SCARES CHINA

Robert Sutter is a professor of Asian studies at Georgetown University's School of


Foreign Service, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Autumn, 2002, p. 37

On the other side, long-standing Chinese concerns about Japan's impressive military
capabilities have increased since 1996 as a result of U.S.-Japanese agreements
broadening Japan's strategic role in Asia to include recent Japanese naval deployments in
the Indian Ocean. Recent plans for a Japanese-U.S.-Australian strategic dialogue have
elicited repeated expressions of concern from China.

Affirmative Consult Answers

TURN: SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICTS

A. NOTHING WILL THREATEN SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS IN THE STATUS


QUO

Robert Sutter is a professor of Asian studies at Georgetown University's School of


Foreign Service, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Autumn, 2002, p. 37

Little appears to be on the horizon that will substantially change the recent balance
between friction and cooperation in Sino-Japanese relations in a way that would pose
serious challenges for U.S. leadership in Asia or U.S. interest in regional stability and
development. The shock of the September 11 attacks on the United States along with the
U.S.-led war in Afghanistan had the effect of somewhat reducing China's relative
influence in Asia while providing Japan an opportunity to expand its role in South and
Central Asia. Policy changes after the presidential elections in South Korea late this year
could upset the delicate equilibrium on the peninsula, though few see viable alternatives
to some continued South Korean engagement with the North. The Chinese leadership
transition in 2002 -- 2003 is not expected to result in significant changes in policy toward
Asia, as Beijing strives to maintain a calm external environment and focuses.

B. IMPROVING U.S.-JAPAN TIES WILL ENCOURAGE JAPAN TO ADOPT A


COMPETITIVE STANCE TOWARD CHINA
Robert Sutter is a professor of Asian studies at Georgetown University's School of
Foreign Service, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Autumn, 2002, p. 37
Regional military pressures, stemming from such developments as the rise of China's
military power or North Korea's military posture, may lead Japan to strengthen its ties
with the United States. These pressures also may lead Japan to consider a more
competitive stance toward China.

C. SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT CAUSES WAR IN ASIA


Richard Samuels, Ford International Relations Professor, MIT, THE U.S.-JAPAN
ALLIANCES: PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE, pp. 6-7
The same forces that lead China and Japan into an adversarial relationship in the first
place might well push them to the brink of war. From a U.S. perspective, this would be
disastrous, for several reasons:
-War between two of America?s largest trading partners would be devastating to the U.S.
economy
-U.S. involvement would be difficult to avoid in a war between a former ally and a
former enemy
-War between a nuclear power and a threshold nuclear power would push the envelope in
new and disconcerting ways
-War between the two would be another) humanitarian disaster
-Nuclearization in Japan would press both Koreas to do the same, and perhaps pressure
other Asian nations to follow suite.Even if China and Japan did not go to war, a Cold War
between the two great powers could impose high costs on the region, and indeed the
globe, if the last simmering conflict between two giants on the world scene has taught us
anything. At a minimum, the remarkable (and hard-earned) domestic politics stability in
Japan would further unravel, creating even greater uncertainties for its foreign policy and
its evolving role as provider of global public goods.

Affirmative Consult Answers

TURN: TURN: EXPECTATIONS OF DEFERENCE TOWARD THE U.S. INCREASE


JAPANESE NATIONALISM

Kent Calder, is director of the Edwin O. Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies and
Reischauer Professor of East Asian Studies at the School for Advanced International
Studies, Johns Hopkins University, ORBIS, Autumn 2003, p. 65

Clearly there are powerful winds, both foreign and domestic, blowing in the direction of a
more assertive, nationalistic Japanese foreign policy, particularly within Asia. Japan has
financial resources that many Asians, especially in infrastructure-poor Northeast Asia, see
as critical to their own long-term development, while many younger Japanese chafe at
established patterns of diplomatic deference toward the United States.

NO UNIQUE COUNTERPLAN ADVANTAGE: THE U.S. WILL CONSULT JAPAN


IN THE FUTURE
CHRISTOPHER A. LAFLEUR, SPECIAL ENVOY, ASIA, June 26, 2003, p. online

We are still at a preliminary stage in our discussions, but we have reviewed our overall
strategic interests and reconfirmed that we share a broad range of common values and
shared interests. The Japanese have indicated they will take these discussions into
account as their own defense plans are updated. For our part, we have apprised our
Japanese counterparts of our ongoing review of future force structure and assured Japan
that we would be consulting with them closely before we reach any final conclusions.

CONSULTATION IS NORMAL MEANS: THE U.S. CONSULTS WITH JAPAN NOW

CHRISTOPHER A. LAFLEUR, SPECIAL ENVOY, ASIA, June 26, 2003, p. online

We are working to enhance our alliances and friendships in East Asia by ensuring that our
linchpin ally, Japan, continues to play a leading role in both regional and global affairs,
based on our common interests, common values, and close defense and diplomatic
cooperation. We reaffirmed those common values and interests with Japan in the meeting
of the Security Consultative Committee -- commonly referred to as the "2+2" ? in
December 2002. The "2+2" Joint Statement is testimony to our shared views on threats of
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, Iraq, North Korea,
regional security issues, China's role in regional stability and prosperity, missile defense
and defense planning. I note that the level of Japan's participation in Operation Enduring
Freedom has been unprecedented and, for Japan, path-breaking.

U.S.-Japan relations are strong now

U.S.-Japan relations remain strong


Glosserman, CSIS, 2004
[Brad, COMPARATIVE CONNECTIONS, July, http://csis.org/pacfor/ccejournal.html]
Relations between the United States and Japan were very good this quarter, even though a
number of events threatened to derail the solid ties between the two governments. A
hostage crisis in Iraq and the discovery of an alleged al-Qaeda network in Japan brought
home to Japanese the reality of the war on terror. No longer could they disassociate
themselves from events half a world away. By the end of the quarter, both governments
could point to their relationship as an example of how an alliance is supposed to work;
Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro could finally make the case that his close relationship
with President Bush paid tangible dividends. Not only was his strategy vindicated, but he
could point to an outcome on a key policy that a majority of Japanese could support.

North Korea ensures cooperative relations


Cossa, CSIS, 2003
[Frank, COMPARATIVE CONNECTIONS, Oct/Dec,
http://csis.org/pacfor/cc/0304Qoverview.html]
If the North Korean nuclear crisis has served to divide Washington and Seoul, it has had
the opposite effect as far as Washington's relations with Tokyo are concerned. Tokyo has
consistently taken a hard line on dealing with the North, not just because Japan sits within
range of North Korea's growing missile force (which many fear could be fitted with
nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads), but also because of the emotionally charged
abductee issue. The North Korea nuclear issue has allowed Prime Minister Koizumi
Junichiro to move forward with his support and participation in Washington's missile
defense program - Tokyo announced this quarter that it would proceed with the
development and deployment of missile defense, a significant step beyond its precious
commitment to conduct joint research - and has also increased security awareness in
Japan to the extent that many are now more willing to see Japan take a more active role in
regional security affairs, much to Washing!
ton's (and Koizumi's personal) satisfaction. More often than not, the two have also
collaborated at the TCOG to strengthen Seoul's resolve.

The US has never had a closer ally than Japan


Hilton, Author of Japan today April 6th 04
[Henry, Japan-U.S. relations enter new
phasehttp://www.japantoday.com/e/?content=comment&id=574]

Yet again Japan's solution was to acknowledge its weaknesses and work desperately to
regain a position of greater importance in international society. This time the strategy
worked brilliantly. Japanese governments from the occupation years on have rarely
budged from professing to work closely with the United States. President George Bush
has reason indeed to claim that the United States has "no closer ally" ? at least historically
and in this particular region.

Bush likes the new Koizumi Cabinet- Boosts relations


Tatsumi, Research Associate, Center for Strategic and International Studies 9/26/03
[Yuki, Koizumi's Reelection and Its Implications for U.S.-Japan Relations
http://www.glocom.org/debates/20031002_tatsumi_koizumi/index.html Downloaded
7/15/04]
The Bush administration has a favorable view of the new Koizumi cabinet. It certainly
welcomes the retention of Foreign Minister Kawaguchi and JDA chief Ishiba, as both are
considered reliable counterparts as the two countries tackle issues such as North Korea,
Iraq, and missile defense. The selection of Shoichi Nakagawa (a member of rachi giren)
to head the Ministry of Economic, Trade and Industry, a lead agency for export control, is
also an indication that the Koizumi government will maintain a firm stance vis-a-vis
North Korea. Overall, it is certain that in the foreign and security policy arena, close
cooperation between the two countries will continue.

1AR: China DA Link Extensions

CHINA IS TRYING TO WOO JAPAN AWAY FROM CLOSE ALIGNMENT WITH


THE U.S.

Robert Sutter is a professor of Asian studies at Georgetown University's School of


Foreign Service, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Autumn, 2002, p. 37

Given the Chinese focus on dealing with the more important concern posed by the United
States, one result that works against Sino-Japanese rivalry is that Chinese officials have at
times sought to avoid disputes with Japan. In fact, they have tried to woo Japan away
from close alignment with the United States and toward positions more favorable to
China.

1AR: China DA Uniqueness

CHINA IS WORKING COOPERATIVELY WITH ASIAN COUNTRIES NOW

Robert Sutter is a professor of Asian studies at Georgetown University's School of


Foreign Service, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Autumn, 2002, p. 37

Concurrently, Chinese leaders sought to establish "partnerships" or "strategic


partnerships" with most of the powers along China's periphery, notably in Southeast Asia,
where Japan loomed large in the 1980s and 1990s but pulled back after the Asian
economic crisis of 1997 -- 1998, and on the Korean Peninsula. They emphasized putting
aside differences and seeking common ground. Chinese political and military leaders,
including Vice President Hu Jintao and other leaders expected to take leadership positions
at the Chinese party congress in the fall of 2002, also began actively meeting visitors
from Asia and traveling throughout the region. These officials seem prepared to adhere to
the current Chinese approach to the Asian region. They are likely to remain focused
primarily on the many domestic challenges posed by economic, social, and political
issues. Regarding regional organizations, Chinese officials were instrumental in the
establishment in 2000 of the Shanghai Cooperatio!
n Organization, which also includes Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and
Uzbekistan; and they have worked assiduously to improve China's relations with
ASEAN, proposing an ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement. China also worked closely
with Japan, South Korea, and ASEAN in the so-called ASEAN Plus Three dialogue that
emerged around the time of the Asian economic crisis. Despite assessments that Chinese
activism has recently increased because of perceptions of U.S. containment around
China's periphery, rivalry with Japan, or other similar concerns, the motives of the
People's Republic of China (PRC) seem more multifaceted and long-term. The multitude
of new endeavors, in fact, appears to assist several of the following important Chinese
objectives:

* Securing China's foreign policy environment at a time when the PRC regime is focused
on sustaining economic development and political stability.
* Promoting economic exchange that assists China's internal economic development.

* Reassuring Asian neighbors through increased contact about how China will use its
rising power and influence.

* Boosting China's regional and international power and influence and helping to secure a
multipolar world order -- Chinese leaders seem more confident of China's power and
influence but they also remain wary of U.S.-led or other regional efforts to work against
China.

Sino-Japan DA 1AR: Uniqueness Extensions

SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS IMPROVING

Robert Sutter is a professor of Asian studies at Georgetown University's School of


Foreign Service, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Autumn, 2002, p. 37

In addition to advances in relations with Southeast Asia and Korea, China's relations with
other powers around its periphery, with the possible exception of Japan, have improved.
One must consider other factors as well, however, for this development.

Sino-Japan DA: 1AR: General Extensions

CHINA AND JAPAN ARE BALANCED ON A DANGEROUS EDGE OF RIVALRY

Benjamin Self is a senior associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center, WASHINGTON


QUARTERLY, Winter 2002, p. 77

China and Japan are balanced on a razor's edge between closer cooperation and
dangerous rivalry. In September 2002, the two countries celebrated the thirtieth
anniversary of the sudden normalization of their bilateral relations. Normalization was
the first pillar, followed by the Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1978, as friendship
became the mantra of leaders on both sides. If current trends continue, peace is likely to
hold, but friendship may no longer be tenable.

TRADE WILL NOT SUSTAIN SINO-JAPANESE TIES

Benjamin Self is a senior associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center, WASHINGTON


QUARTERLY, Winter 2002, p. 77

Economic interdependence has long been expected to solve problems in Sino-Japanese


relations. Although the profit motive provides an incentive for businesses to pressure
their governments to settle differences, rapidly growing trade relations produce their own
set of problems. Just as Japan's in-roads into the Chinese market in the mid-1980s
provoked public backlash, with Chinese students dubbing the lack of balance in trade
"Japan's second invasion," China's growing presence in Japan has more recently
generated angry complaints and friction. n5 Differential growth rates raise concerns about
the relative benefits of trade, especially when associated with shifts in industrial
production. The Japanese fear that the competition caused by cheap labor in China will
hollow out Japan's industrial core. Japanese investment continues to flow into China, and
many businesses have shifted their production from Japan or even from Southeast Asia to
China. Some Japanese firms move to China!
because they feel they have no choice, given the tremendous cost differential, yet find
themselves discriminated against in China, mitigating the advantages of cheap labor.
Trade officials and diplomats are hoping that China's entry into the World Trade
Organization will provide an effective mechanism for resolving or even preventing such
problems, but significant difficulties remain. In the past, China has voiced frustration
over the slow pace of investment and technology transfer by Japan to China, but Chinese
officials and businesspeople seem to recognize that bilateral economic relations with
Japan are currently about as good as they can get, given the dire state of the Japanese
economy, and have stopped complaining. Beijing fears that Tokyo might slow the pace of
foreign direct investment and limit the official developmental assistance Japan provides.
Rather than demand more, China is looking to protect what it has now, insisting on
maintaining unfettered access to Jap!
an's market. In addition, China wants the flow of official developmental assistance to
continue to help it cope with the huge challenge of modernizing the hinterland. Japan, on
the other hand, wants a better deal. Most analysts agree that China needs continued high
levels of economic growth to manage the social costs of the tremendously challenging
transition in the state-owned and agricultural sectors of the country. The gap between
winners and losers is widening; rising unemployment threatens social stability while
those working in factories fall behind the entrepreneurs and growing middle class.
Pensions are minuscule, and the social safety net is not worth mentioning.
Implementation of the one-child policy in 1979 has resulted in fewer young workers to
care for elder, retired generations. China will be the first nation to become gray before it
becomes rich. China's ability to monitor its citizens -- once a powerful tool of the
Communist Party -- is withering away. The em!
barrassment of the Falun Gong's mobilizing activities against the government (such as
large-scale demonstrations and disruption of the broadcast of government television) are
dangerous, in part, because they reveal how feeble state control has become. For now,
most Chinese recognize that they are much better off with a government than without one
so they tolerate party rule, but true popular support for the government is lacking. Should
the global economy fall into recession in 2003, sustaining the growth rate of 7 -- 8
percent required for social stability would become nearly impossible for the Chinese
government. What measures might China's rulers take to preserve their power in the face
of such challenges? Needless to say, the potential for jingoistic posturing and reliance on
traditional xenophobia and anti-Japanese sentiment are definite possibilities. Economic
issues often provide common interests in bilateral relations so that both nations can work
cooperatively to th!
eir mutual benefit. Gains from trade are real, and increases in Chinese productivity can
mean a better life and greater purchasing power for the population. But there are
dangerous aspects as well. The greater concern is that good times will come to an end and
the Chinese will experience great disappointment -- great enough to anger them into
searching for a scapegoat. If the Chinese people find that scapegoat just next door, with a
little help from a regime desperate to retain the little power it has left, the current
problems affecting the Sino-Japanese relationship could become explosive. Trade friction
could escalate, disputes over intellectual property rights could erupt, and competitive
devaluation of currencies could disrupt economic stability.

Consultation Is Normal Means 1AR

CONSULTATION ON THE DEFENSE ALLIANCE NOW

VOICE OF AMERICA NEWS April 29, 2003, p. online

The Japanese delegation is in Washington for consultations on the U-S - Japan defense
alliance. The group is meeting with officials at the State Department and Defense
Department as well as Asia defense specialists to review the status of the security
alliance in light of new threats posed by international terrorism and countries like North
Korea that have weapons of mass destruction. (Signed)

THE U.S. HAS BEEN CONSULTING JAPAN FOR YEARS

INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, August 1, 2001, p. 6.

The United States and Australia plan to expand their alliance consultations to include
Japan and South Korea, but Australian officials sought Tuesday to reassure Beijing that
the move was not directed against China.

Affirmative Answers ? China DA Links


Strengthening U.S.-Japan relations freaks out China, causing an arms race and regional
instability
Arase, Pomona political scientist, ?99
[David, http://www.nichibei.org/je/arase99.html, Four Paradoxes in
US-Japan Security Cooperation]
An attempt to improve regional stability channeled through strengthened bilateral
consultations may have dangerous unintended consequences. In the bilaterally managed
strategic triangle of Tokyo, Washington, and Beijing, each actor cannot observe the tone
and substance of what the other two are discussing behind closed doors. Even though this
information is of critical importance to each actor's security, it can only be guessed at.
Thus, there is ample scope for suspicion, uncertainty, and misperception regarding the
others' intentions. With uncertain information about these intentions it will seem only
prudent for each actor to plan for worst case scenarios. As Japan regards the ups and
downs of Sino-US relations, it may see a dilemma. On the one hand, on his visit to China
last year, President Clinton exhibited behaviors that sacrificed Japan's status to cultivate a
so-called strategic partnership with China. If Japan fears the US and China will continue
to reach bilatera!
l understandings at Japan's expense, Japan will feel less secure and will act accordingly.
On the other hand, if the United States and China are on the brink of conflict, Japan will
also feel less secure and will have an incentive to compensate with greater defensive
sufficiency. As for China, it may fear that the updated US-Japan alliance is directed
against itself. Moreover, despite US and Japanese assurances to the contrary, it cannot
know for sure to what extent China figured into US-Japan discussions. In security affairs
it is only natural to be highly risk-averse; it would be only rational for China to develop
enough military capability to deter this potential source of threat. As Japan and the United
States perceive and respond to a growing Chinese military posture, a vicious circle of
escalating threat and countermeasures by each side may take root. To mitigate these risks
it would be better to reduce the bias toward threat inflation introduced by the present
heavy r!
eliance on bilateral consultations. This is not to say bilateral treaties or understandings are
themselves bad or need to be replaced, but discussions about them need not be
exclusively bilateral. Multilateral discussions can be helpful in giving actors more
accurate perceptions of others' intentions. Assuming these intentions are peaceful, the
pressures to arm and plan for worst case scenarios may be reduced. In trying to improve
all-around relations among Washington, Tokyo, and Beijing, it might be beneficial to
have substantive triangular discussions where presently there are none.

STRONG U.S.-JAPANESE TIES SCARE CHINA


Zbigniew Brzezinski, famous geostrategist, former diplomat, John?s Hopkins & CSIS,
THE CHOICE: GLOBAL DOMINATION OR GLOBAL LEADERSHIP, 2004, p. 112
The Chinese analysis went on to argue that "The international security issue has become
increasingly diversified, traditional security factors and non-traditional ones have become
intertwined, and the harm caused by the non-traditional security problems such as
terrorism and drug trafficking is becoming more serious:' Reflecting a more doctrinal
perspective, the PLA organ warned that the above notwithstanding, the United States is
increasingly inclined to give its alliances, notably NATO and the defense treaty with
Japan, an offensive capability that should be of concern to China. It was the Japanese-
American connection, needless to add, that most worried the strategists in Beijing.

Japan will say no to SEAsian peacekeeping

Southeast Asian peacekeeping is key to check China threat ? Japan will say no because its
vital to their national security
Self, Stimson Center associate, ?03
[Benjamin, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Winter,
http://www.twq.com/03winter/docs/03winter_self.pdf]
JDA officials tend to see the rivalry with China in broader geographic terms as well.
Japan?s effort to engage in peacekeeping operations in Southeast Asia?especially its
current operation in East Timor?is part of a plan to fill the strategic vacuum in the region
and prevent China from exercising increased influence.

Affirmative Answers ? China DA Links


CHINA FEARS JAPANESE POWER ASSERTION
Bhubhindar Singh is an Associate Research Fellow at the Institute of Defence and
Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore., CONTEMPORARY
SOUTHEAST ASIA, April 2002 v24 i1 p82(24)
To China, Japan has not issued a satisfactory apology for its wartime aggression, which,
to the Chinese, raises the possibility of Japan reverting to its old ways. The Chinese
believe that such a Japan would likely be more independent of the United States and
generally more assertive internationally. (77) The situation is accentuated by the inability
of the Japanese to come to terms with the "history issue". Japan's neighbours have
repeatedly expressed doubts about Tokyo's intentions because of issues that hint at
Japan's return to a militaristic past, such as the textbook controversy, the Japanese
refuting facts about the Nanjing Massacre, (78) and occasional statements by Japanese
officials that challenge the defensive nature of Japan's military capabilities. (79
INCREASING JAPAN?S INFLUENCE DECREASES CHINA?S INFLUENCE
Bhubhindar Singh is an Associate Research Fellow at the Institute of Defence and
Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore., CONTEMPORARY
SOUTHEAST ASIA April 2002 v24 i1 p82(24)
An increasingly normalized Japan would probably lead to a proportionate increase in
Tokyo's political influence in the Asia-Pacific region. This would directly challenge
China's emerging influence in the region, leading to competition for regional influence
between the two Asian giants. The Chinese are further disturbed at the emerging
influence of Japan because of the strong presence of the United States in East Asia. As a
result of the U.S.-Japan security alliance, which signifies the strong links between
Washington and Tokyo, the balance of power in East Asia is tilted against Beijing.

1AR Ext: Japan will say no


Japan has a history of saying NO to U.S. policies
Schwenninger, World Policy Institute, ?95
[Sherle, WORLD POLICY JOURNAL, Summer, Expanded Academic]
As indicated above, in the 1986-91 period, Japan did make some modest progress toward
more domestic-led growth, as its current-account surplus fell as a percentage of GNP. But
its current-account surplus has since risen to even higher levels - upward of 3.2 percent of
GDP - and now Japan no longer seems as willing to accommodate more American
demands. From a Japan that would always say "yes," we now have a Japan that not only
can say "no," but indeed frequently does so. In 1994, Japan flatly rejected the Clinton
administration's efforts to establish numerical goals for imports in the Japanese market
and for the reduction of Japan's growing current-account deficit (although these issues are
resurfacing within Japan itself). Moreover, unlike in the 1985-86 period, it has resisted
American efforts to force it to adopt an easier monetary policy (in spite of the fact that
Japan has high real interest rates that are choking its economy and contributing to the
high yen). As evidenc!
e of Japan's new assertiveness, it has taken the offensive, arguing more vigorously than in
the past that America's trade problems lie in the United States.
1AR Ext: Japan will say no to increased peacekeeping

Japan will say no ? they oppose increased funding for peace keeping
Toshiro Ozawa, Ambassador of Japan to the United Nations, 2004
[4 May, http://www.infojapan.org/announce/speech/un2004/un0405.html]
Ironically, however, the continuing creation and deployment of peacekeeping operations
on an unprecedented scale is beginning to cast a grim shadow over this revival. In his
press conference on 2 April, the President of the Security Council said that there is a
possibility that the total budget for peacekeeping operations this year could rise to 4.5
billion dollars, an amount unprecedented in history. Under such circumstances, Japan
would be expected to shoulder approximately 900 million dollars of this burden. This is
an enormous figure, surpassing Japan's current annual bilateral Official Development
Assistance (ODA) to the African countries. It may be true that there is no price-tag on
peace, but it is also true that Member States' resources are not unlimited. Should not
Member States face up to the fact that increased budgets for peacekeeping do consume
resources that might otherwise flow into such areas as development and poverty
alleviation? Should not Member States as!
k whether it makes sense for peacekeeping operations to carry out such tasks as
development and human rights, tasks which other international organizations are better
equipped to undertake? Japan is of the view that we Member States must give more
serious thoughts on whether continuation of current practices is truly beneficial for the
international community as a whole.

Japan will say no ? they oppose anything that increases peacekeeping costs
Inter Press Service, 6 ? 24 - 04
A key issue of concern to Japan is the rapid rise in the U.N. budget for peacekeeping
operations. Japan already contributes about 20 percent of those costs, far more than any
country. Last month, U.N. officials announced that next year's budget will rise to 4.6
billion dollars, a 60 percent increase from the year before. That has alarmed the Japanese
government, which says it will be forced to cut its offshore development aid to meet the
increased peacekeeping operations costs. Japan's U.N. ambassador, Toshiro Ozawa,
outlined those concerned in a Jun. 3 speech to the General Assembly. ''We must point out
that the Government of Japan is not blessed with a budgetary mechanism that can easily
absorb a more than 60 percent increase of a major budget item,'' he said. Ozawa added
that Japanese criticism of the U.N. peacekeeping budgets ''is reinforced by the fact that
Japan, not being a Permanent Member of the Security Council, has often no say in the
decisions of the Security !
Council concerning the long-term policies of individual PKOs (peacekeeping operations),
despite Japan's obligation to shoulder about one fifth of the related costs.''

Japan will say no ? the oppose open ended PKOs ? there has to be a clear exit strategy
before they?ll support it
TOSHIRO OZAWA
AMBASSADOR OF JAPAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS, 2004
[29 March, http://www.infojapan.org/announce/speech/un2004/un0403-8.html]
A large-scale PKO was set up in Liberia last year. This year, another major PKO is being
initiated in Cote d'Ivoire, and in the horizon, new missions are expected in Burundi, Haiti
and Sudan. Having reiterated the importance of the PKOs and the Japanese government's
position to cooperate with these PKOs, we have to be insistent on some points in order to
be accountable to the Japanese taxpayers who bear about 20% of the total PKO budget;
when creating a new mission, full account of the necessity of the mission, the
appropriateness of the plans and the exit strategy for each case must be put forward. And,
after the missions are established, periodic reviews must be made in order to ensure that
the activities of each mission are implemented both effectively and efficiently including
through further cost reductions by enhancing synergy of the regional missions. We also
wish to point out that the size of a mission must be reduced step-by-step in line with the
gradual fulfillment!
of its mandate.

1AR Ext ? Japan TMD Bad Impact


TMD deployment destabilizes East Asia for multiple reasons ? multiple sources of
conflict
Wang Qun, Director of China's Department of Arms Control and Disarmament, 2000
[September 28, 2000, TMD and US-China-Japan Cooperation,
http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/asia/napsnet092800.html]
The TMD joint development by the United States and Japan is, in fact, not a stabilizing
factor in promotion of East Asian security, but rather a destabilizing factor, affecting
regional and even global security with multi- fold implications. Firstly, the sophisticated
TMD systems, especially NTW currently under the joint development by the United
States and Japan, given its inherent strategic capability, once deployed in East Asia, will
undoubtedly serve as an indispensable link within US NMD. Under such circumstances,
the above TMD systems will have the same severe negative impacts as those of NMD on
both global and regional security. Secondly, the sophisticated TMD systems under joint
development by the US and Japan, if deployed, will contribute to wrecking the existing
security landscape in East Asia. This will undoubtedly tip the current tenuous strategic
balance in East Asia. Moreover, given the "revolutionary" nature of such sophisticated
military systems, other countr!
ies will have to come up with corresponding adjustments to their own military strategies.
As a result, a spiral arms race in the region may be triggered. Thirdly, the sophisticated
TMD systems currently under joint development by the US and Japan, if deployed in
East Asia, will drastically enhance the overall offensive-defensive capability of the US-
Japan military alliance, far exceeding the level they maintained during the cold war era,
as such sophisticated systems, given their strategic capability, can help push the US NMD
to the very forefront in East Asia, and enable the United States to greatly enhance its
capability of military involvement in regional security issues as a result of its rapid
military penetration and projection, thus constituting a direct threat to surrounding
countries in the region. Fourthly, TMD joint development by the United States and Japan
will help Japan pick up its pace in its endeavor to embark on the course of re-
militarization. Japan's def!
ense budget currently ranks only the second in the world,(2) with overwhelming ground,
naval and air forces. In September 1997, Japan and the United States signed their
amended Defense Cooperation Guidelines.(3) In May 1999, the Japanese Diet reviewed
and subsequently endorsed the bill concerning "situation in the areas surrounding Japan",
which expand its defense area to "areas surrounding Japan". Moreover, some politicians
in Japan have, from time to time, called for changes in Japan's military strategy, i.e. from
a strategy of "defense confined to its own territory and coastal waters" to a "preemptive"
one.(4) And some even went so far as to call for amendments to Japan's Peace
Constitution.(5) So, US-Japan cooperation on TMD can only contribute the resurgence of
Japan's militarism. Fifthly, TMD joint development by the United States and Japan will
give rise to mounting misgivings and mistrust among the major powers in the region,
especially China and Russia, and subseque!
ntly erode the basis of their cooperation in the regional context, thus making it difficult to
foster a sound and enabling security environment in the region. Sixthly, the US-Japan
cooperation on TMD will not be conducive to relaxing the tensions on the Korean
Peninsular, in particular the resolution of the Korean nuclear and missile crises. The
emerging positive developments, from another perspective, point to the very fact that the
excuses employed by the US and Japan to develop TMD in East Asia is untenable. If they
are bent on their own way and continue to pursue TMD, it will affect the momentum
being gained in the wake of the recent rapprochement between DPRK and ROK. As a
result, any resolution to the above crisis will remain elusive. Seventhly, the US-Japan
cooperation on TMD will not help prevent the proliferation of missiles; on the contrary,
such cooperation can only multiply the risk of the proliferation of missile technologies
and render MTCR ineffective, given t!
hat technologies for both offensive missiles and missile defenses are mutually
convertible, and many technologies for missile defenses can be used and adapted to
develop and improve the technologies for offensive missiles. In fact, many TMD systems,
even in the case of such a low-tier TMD as PAC-III, are subject to the control of the
MTCR as Category II items. So, US- Japan cooperation on TMD is, in fact, very much at
odds with the non- proliferation purpose the United States has advocated. Lastly, the
deployment of sophisticated TMD systems in East Asia will constitute a direct grave
threat to China's national security interest. According to the information made available
by the US side, NTW, for instance, is an upper-tier TMD system inherently capable of
intercepting ICBMs even in the ascent/boost phase.(6) The NTW system, given its
velocity, is capable of penetrating 800 to 1000 km inside China, thus directly threatening
the safety of China's coastal provinces. The Chines!
e have naturally registered their grave concerns and strong opposition.

1AR ? AT: Taiwan not linked to U.S. Japan TMD


China fears U.S.-Japan TMD will extend to Taiwan
Wang Qun, Director of China's Department of Arms Control and Disarmament, 2000
[September 28, 2000, TMD and US-China-Japan Cooperation,
http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/asia/napsnet092800.html]
TMD relating to Taiwan represents a special concern to China, as it involves not only
China's sovereignty but its national security interests as well. Our concerns on this score
are actually two-fold. One is the American factor, i.e. the direct provision by the US to
Taiwan of TMD systems, equipment, technologies, services or other assistance. Another
is mainly the Japanese factor, i.e. the potential incorporation of Taiwan into the US-Japan
TMD protection umbrella. Neither scenario is acceptable to China, because both
scenarios constitute not only an act of interference in China's internal affairs on the part
of the US and Japan, but also a major shift in the latter's policy towards China. Given the
nature of TMD systems, especially with the involvement of early warning information,
the provision of assistance to Taiwan, particularly in a case of Taiwan contingency, is
virtually tantamount to restoring "something" in a nature of a quasi- military alliance
between the US and!
Taiwan. This will give rise to serious political and military consequences. So, if the US
and Japan are to provide Taiwan with TMD, no matter in what form, or to incorporate
Taiwan into their TMD protection umbrella, it will not only shake the basis of China's
relations with the US and Japan with destructive impacts, but also inject new
destabilizing factors into the regional security environment.

1AR ? Uniqueness Ext. ? TMD not inevitable

TMD is backburnered now


Berkofsky, European Institute for Asian Studies, 9 ? 12 ? 03
[Alan, ASIA TIMES, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/EI12Dh01.html]
Axel Berkofsky, PhD, is a research fellow and policy analyst for the European Institute
for Asian Studies. The military's cheers are premature, claims the Japan Times in a recent
editorial maintaining that the original joint US-Japan research on the feasibility of the
regional theater missile defense (TMD) system has to "yet to produce a conclusion".
Unless the Defense Agency knows more than the Japanese public, the most recent call to
buy US missile-defense hardware off the shelf instead does indeed suggest that TMD has
been put on the back burner for the time being.

Japanese Rearmament Answers

NO THREAT FROM A JAPANESE MILITARY BUILD-UP TO TAIWAN

Zbigniew Brzezinski, famous geostrategist, former diplomat, John?s Hopkins & CSIS,
THE CHOICE: GLOBAL DOMINATION OR GLOBAL LEADERSHIP, 2004, p. 115-6

It would be a mistake, however, for U.S. decision-makers to infer that a similarly


significant Taiwanese military buil4UP would likewise have a positive effect. Unless
altogether detached from the United States, a gradually more powerful Japan is unlikely
to exploit its increasing military prowess to directly challenge any vital Chinese interest.
That is not the case with Taiwan. There is a greater risk that the separatist political forces
in Taiwan would be tempted to use any major upgrading of Taiwan's military capability
as an opportunity to declare their island's formal independence from China. No Chinese
government, not even a highly authoritarian one, could then remain passive, especially in
view of the increased role of nationalism in the Chinese mass consciousness. Chinese
popular fury could then trigger a regionally destabilizing Sino-American military clash.
JAPAN WILL NOT DIRECT ANY INCREASE IN MILITARY CAPABILITIES AT
CHINA

Zbigniew Brzezinski, famous geostrategist, former diplomat, John?s Hopkins & CSIS,
THE CHOICE: GLOBAL DOMINATION OR GLOBAL LEADERSHIP, 2004, p. 115-6

The Japanese themselves show considerable sensitivity to Chinese concerns and are
likely to maintain a low profile even while steadily enhancing their military capabilities.
That enhancement defenseless in the event of some unexpected U.S. disengagement, and
not by a national passion for independent military power. On balance, the Japanese goal
is more to have a fail-safe option than to plot a sudden breakout. It is, in fact, to the great
credit of the Japanese people and its political elite that democratic values and a strong
anti-militarist ethic have become deeply engrained in their outlook. The ongoing debates
in Japan regarding the scale and geostrategic scope of the country's military programs,
and the continued public support for strict constitutional limits on Japanese military
engagement abroad, all reflect a rational and responsible view of Japan's international
role. In brief, the Japan of today-a genuine constitutional democracy-is a good global
citizen."

Japanese Rearmament Answers

JAPAN MAY REJECT PACIFISM, BUT IT DOES NOT EMBRACE MILITARISM

Zbigniew Brzezinski, famous geostrategist, former diplomat, John?s Hopkins & CSIS,
THE CHOICE: GLOBAL DOMINATION OR GLOBAL LEADERSHIP, 2004, p. 117)

To be sure, voices have been raised in Japan in favor of a more assertive international
posture, especially in the wake of 9/11. But aside from a strident minority without much
popular support, the mainstream case for a more active Japanese posture tends to
emphasize Japan's obligation as the world's number two economic power to shoulder its
commensurate share of responsibility for global security. By and large, this posture does
not involve calls for an altogether independent military status that would de-link Japan
from the United States. There may be a growing inclination to reject internationalist
pacifism, but that does not signify a desire to embrace nationalist militarism. The views
expressed after 9/11 by the chairman of the Japanese Upper House Standing Committee
on Foreign Affairs and Defense are typical. He noted that "a simple pacifist concept that
military power is evil has existed in postwar Japan as a result of the nations tragic
experiences in World War II. T!
his idea became exaggerated and developed into the so-called one-country pacifism, and
we must do some soul-searching about that." He then went on to argue that "Japan should
become capable of serving a role in responding to new threats in the post-Cold War era as
a responsible member of the international community. Next, we must establish a system
to protect our lives, property, and land from traditional threats (such as armed attacks by
other countries... .Finally, we must make adjustments to legal frameworks for smooth
functioning of the Japan-US alliance, which is indispensable to maintaining the overall
military balance in East Asia."

PACIFISM IS STILL STRONG IN JAPAN

ASIAN AFFAIRS: AN AMERICAN REVIEW, Summer 2003 v30 i2 p132(10)

Given those attitudinal changes, one might expect that Japan's political-military
"normalization" would have proceeded apace. In fact, however, this process has been
gradual, hesitant, and contested. Pacifism, although on the defensive, is far from a spent
force. Japanese pacifists, moreover, can count on foreign (particularly Chinese and
Korean) support for their dubious contention that moves toward assuming greater
international military responsibilities feed, and are fed by, the revival of militarism and
ultranationalism. Other influential groups with different foreign policy agendas also
oppose movement toward defense normality and closer strategic cooperation with the
United States. "Mercantilists" fret over the possible impairment of Japan's access to vital
overseas markets and sources of raw materials; "multilateralists" prefer a focus on the
United Nations and regional multilateral initiatives; "Asianists" are worried about the
impact of defense normalization on Japa!
n's efforts to forge cooperative relations with China and the rest of Asia. And "Gaullists,"
although by no means averse to a larger and more active Japanese military role, criticize
any move that smacks of subordination to the United States. (2) Perhaps the most
fundamental obstacle to change other than the continuing appeal of pacifism, however, is
the complacency of the Japanese people as reflected in their attachment to a relatively
comfortable status quo and their reluctance to assume the burdens of engagement in
international power politics.

Japanese Rearmament Answers

JAPAN DOESN?T HAVE THE ECONOMIC RESOURCES NEEDED FOR FULL RE-
MILITARIZATION

ASIAN AFFAIRS: AN AMERICAN REVIEW, Summer 2003 v30 i2 p132(10)

The reorientation of Japan's national security priorities has been complicated by its
prolonged economic slump and soaring government debt, which have limited defense
spending and focused attention inward on domestic reform. By the same token, however,
those developments have also generated pressure to cut Official Development
Assistance--a mainstay of "comprehensive security"--which many critics see as
increasingly unreliable in maintaining the goodwill of key countries such as China. The
declining efficacy of Japan's economics-first approach to national security has arguably
boosted the appeal of political-military normalization. Contrary to earlier expectations,
moreover, the breakdown of the Cold War-era hegemony of the Liberal Democratic Party
(LDP) and of the left-right axis of Japanese party politics has not given rise to bolder and
more effective political leadership. Indeed, the exigencies of building and maintaining
coalition governments have, if anything, reinforc!
ed pressures for compromise and consensus.
NO CHANGE IN JAPAN?S CONSTITUTION FOR 5-10 YEARS

ASIAN AFFAIRS: AN AMERICAN REVIEW, Summer 2003 v30 i2 p132(10)

Some are deterred by the risk of stirring up a divisive national debate. Others fear adverse
Chinese and Korean reactions. Still others are sincerely committed to pacifist ideals or
see those ideals as adding a moral dimension to the pursuit of economic objectives.
Perhaps most important, few regard constitutional change as an urgent national priority,
as is reflected in the leisurely pace of the Diet's consideration of constitutional revision--it
is expected to take five to ten years.

Japan?s PKO contributions are key to the alliance

Japanese participation in UN peacekeeping is crucial to maintaining the health of the


alliance
Hughes, Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at Warwick, 2004
[Christopher, JAPAN?S SECURITY AGENDA, p. 204]
Japan has been motivated to support UN concepts of security due to principles of
internationalism and its desire to uphold the status quo of the current interstate security
system. Japan?s role in PKOs should not be separated from the importance of upholding
the bilateral security relationship with the United States. In certain ways multilateral UN
PKOs have been used as stalking horses to advance bilateral cooperation with the United
States.

Expanded UN participation is the lynchpin to sustaining US-Japanese bilateral relations


Hughes, Centre for the Study of Globalization and Regionalisation at Warwick, 2004
[Christopher and Akiki Fukushima, in BEYOND BILATERALISM, Ellis Krauss and T.
J. Pempel, Eds., p. 84]
Indeed, it is apparent that in the post-Cold War period, as in the Cold War period, for
Japanese policymakers one of the principal functions of the United Nations is to provide
multilateral legitimization for the incremental expansion of U.S.-Japan bilateral security
activities that are seen not to impose unmanageable risks of entrapment. The role of the
United Nations as a ?stalking horse? for recent developments in the expansion of alliance
cooperation can be seen in a number of ways. The revised NDPO and the revised
Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, although designed to facilitate bilateral
cooperation, again both draw on the United Nations for their legitimacy. Japan?s
participation in PKO has been seen by some as a means to enable SDF dispatch to
accomplish the goal that was not possible at the time of the first Gulf War of removing
restrictions on the overseas dispatch of the SDF on an individual selfdefense basis and
then of preparing the domestic and !
international conditions for SDF dispatch on other missions that are non-UN-centered,
including support for U.S. forces in East Asia.. Japan?s role in the war on terrorism has
been a partial realization of this goal, and the clearest demonstration that UN
multilateralism can be manipulated as the justification for bilateral objectives.

Peackeeping operations provide cover for U.S.-Japan missile defense cooperation


Hughes, Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at Warwick, 2004
[Christopher, JAPAN?S SECURITY AGENDA, p. 204-5]
Japan?s role in PKOs has also been used to justify other changes in alliance
arrangements. U.S. Japan cooperation on BMD has been justified on the basis that a sea-
mobile system could be used to provide air defense for U.S. forces engaged in UN
operations against states with missile capabilities in the Persian Gulf, as in the 1991 Gulf
War.

Japan?s PKO contributions kill the alliance

Participation in UN peacekeeping will undermine the alliance and trigger militarization


Hughes, Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at Warwick, 2004
[Christopher, JAPAN?S SECURITY AGENDA, p. 205]
Japan?s involvement in PKOs and the war on terror may strengthen the bilateral security
relationship with the United States but may also pull its security policy in other
directions. Japanese policymakers do not perceive their UN-centered activities as yet a
realization of the type of dependence on the UN for security as envisaged in the BPND;
for the foreseeable future they will continue to focus on the U.S.-Japan security treaty.
Japan?s role in PKOs does, though, provide an alternative vision based on UN
multilateralism. In addition, the war on terror has raised the intriguing prospect of
collective security. Japans designed the ATSML by shifting the emphasis from article 9
to the preamble of the constitution. In this case, article 9 is no longer providing a guide
for what Japan should do to contribute to international security and how it should do it,
but merely how it should do it in terms of restrictions on the use of force, while the
legitimization for what Japan!
should do is now provided by the preamble. Japan is potentially realizing Ozawa?s
concept of collective security, which would allow Japan to engage in any type of military
activity including peace enforcement and full combat duties in international coalitions
given UN authority. Arguably, the Japanese government inadvertently arrived at
collective security operations because if would distract Japan from its U.S.
commitments. Still, if Japan were to choose collective security, UN-centered activities, it
would lessen its dependence on the United States, allowing it to employ a wider range of
military power and to achieve the status of ?normal? military state.

Consultation is critical to sustaining cooperative multilateral efforts


Krauss, UC San Diego international relations professor, 2004
[Ellis and T.J. Pempel, in BEYOND BILATERALISM, Krauss and Pempel, Eds., p. 316]
Both governments now also have enhanced opportunities and incentives to increase the
density and intensity of their cooperative and consultation efforts. The stakes in doing so
are higher than ever in the new multilateral context, because failure to do so can result in
publicly embarrassing and costly outcomes. The United States learned this in the EVSL
negotiations, Japan learned it in its precipitous proposal for the AMF. Given that Japan
and the United States are typically key pivot points around which multilateral regional
organizations revolve, little progress will occur unless they cooperate; each, as Krauss
has pointed out in Chapter 12, can veto the other?s unilateral moves in such forums.

Japan will increase PKO support/involvement now

Japan will continue to expand PKO involvement


Hughes, Centre for the Study of Globalization and Regionalisation at Warwick, 2004
[Christopher and Akiki Fukushima, in BEYOND BILATERALISM, Ellis Krauss and T.
J. Pempel, Eds., p. 83]
Japan?s strong interest in a UNSC permanent seat means that it will continue to deepen
cooperation with UN-centered multilateral security activities. It is likely, however, to be
ultracautious in expanding cooperation with the United Nations through the utilization of
collective self-defense or collective security options. Japanese exercise of collective self-
defense, given the realities of U.S. leadership in international coalitions, is likely, even
under the sanction of the United Nations, to compound the risks of entrapment. Japanese
exercise of collective security could accentuate the risks of entrapment, and more likely
abandonment, especially if Japan is more beholden to the demands of the United Nations
than to its U.S. ally. Instead, the most likely path of Japan?s UN-centered multilateral
activities is to continue to explore the current incremental path of expanding cooperation
in PKO and in the types of measures contained in thee ATSML and in similar legal fram!
eworks in the future. This offers Japan the ability to make an active multilateral
contribution to international security via the United Nations that is at times distinct from
the function of the U.S.-Japan alliance, but also to maintain the bilateral alliance as the
principal foundation of its security policy.

Japan wants to expand UN PKO participation


Hughes, Centre for the Study of Globalization and Regionalisation at Warwick, 2004
[Christopher and Akiki Fukushima, in BEYOND BILATERALISM, Ellis Krauss and T.
J. Pempel, Eds., p. 82]
Japan?s other conceivable multilateral security option is to explore enhance UN-centered
frameworks. Japan has shown an inclination to expand UN cooperation in a number of
ways. It has been able to expand cooperation with the UN incrementally by keeping in
place current constitutional prohibitions and utilizing the principle of individual self-
defense. As already observed, this has enabled it to take on important UN PKOs and to
exploit UN resolutions to expand the range of Japan?s cooperation in the war on
terrorism since 2001.

Japanese participation in peacekeeping promotes militarism

JAPANESE INVOLVEMENT IN PKOS PERCEIVED AS A RETURN TO


MILITARISM

Michael E. O?Hanlon, Senior Fellow, Brookings Institute, Expanding Global Military


Capacity for Humanitarian Intervention, 2003, p. 94 (HARVUN2287)
In other Asian countries, many would oppose such a Japanese security policy out of fear
of latent Japanese militarism. Within Japan, that worry exists too. But the alternative
force structure outlined below would involve far two few troops to threaten countries
such as China, Korea, the Philippines, or Vietnam. Yet the new capabilities would be
quite substantial when measured against the demands of global humanitarian,
peacekeeping and peace-enforcing missions.

JAPANESE PARTICIPATION IN UN PKOS THREATENS ITS COMMITMENT TO


ANTI-MILITARISM

Hugo Dobson, Lecturer in International Relations of Japan, University of Sheffield, Japan


and United Nations Peacekeeping, 2003, p. 4 (HARVUN2292)
Japan is one of the few nations to have renounced its right to belligerency and the
maintenance of armed forces with an explicit statement in its Peace Constitution of 1947.
Despite traditional, Western interpretations of anti-militarism based on Christian ethics,
Japan has demonstrated a long-standing commitment to anti-militarism rooted in
Japanese society and its experience of the A-bomb attacks on Hiroshima and Nagaskai,
the firebombing of Tokyo, and the reaction to the colonization of East Asia by the
Japanese Imperial Army. With a societal, not religious, basis for this stance (no Western,
Christian country, except for Costa Rica, has ever renounced violence as a state policy so
explicitly), Japan is undeniably worthy of attention to ascertain how this seemingly
unorthodox position emerged and whether it is sustainable in the post-Cold War world.
This assertion is supported by the efforts of policy-making agents throughout the postwar
period to challenge this tradition!
al foreign policy stance in an attempt to transform Japan into a ?normal? nation with the
ability to exercise the military option. Thus, as a result and in contradiction to its anti-
militarist declarations, the Japanese government has come to create and expand the SDF
in addition to hosting and supporting US bases. As will be seen in this book, during the
1990s Japan?s contribution to peacekeeping became one of the issues through which this
battle was fought out.

JAPANESE PARTICIPATION IN PKOS USED TO CHALLENGE ITS ANTI-


MILITARISM

Hugo Dobson, Lecturer in International Relations of Japan, University of Sheffield, Japan


and United Nations Peacekeeping, 2003, p. 4-5 (HARVUN2293)
As Japan is one of the only states in the world to renounce its right of belligerency in
constitutional terms, and its right of collective self-defense, as an interpretation of the
Constitution, what Japan can and cannot do within peacekeeping, and the relevance this
has for Japan?s broader security stance is highly relevant. In a comparable fashion to
Japan, Finland has suffered from restrictions to its military posture resulting from its
action in the Second World War. However, it has carved out a role for itself as one of the
world?s leading peacekeepers. Similarly, participation in PKOs has been used by certain
elements in Japanese society and government as the justifying factor for overcoming
traditional restrictions and establishing a new military role for Japan. For a time in the
1990s, participation in PKOs appeared to be the issue that was the trigger for a wider
reconsideration of Japan?s position in, and contribution to, the international community.

Japanese participation in peacekeeping promotes militarism


JAPANESE INVOLVEMENT IN PKOS THREATENS ANTI-MILITARIST
NORM?SIGNALS RETURN TO IMPERIALIST AMBITIONS

Hugo Dobson, Lecturer in International Relations of Japan, University of Sheffield, Japan


and United Nations Peacekeeping, 2003, p. 37 (HARVUN2297)
In this light, Japan ought not to contribute to PKOs as it would be the thin end of the
militarist wedge. One Japanese scholar, Watanabe Osamu, has interpreted Japan?s recent
activity in PKOs (as well as its official development assistance contributions) as a step in
the development of Japanese neo-imperialism. Watanabe argues that the strength of the
domestic anti-militarism in Japan against the overseas dispatch of the SDF created one of
the strongest set of ?shackles? (ashikase) against the growth of Japanese neo-imperialism.
Moreover, the adoption of the International Peace Cooperation Law (more commonly
known as, and hereafter, the PKO Law) in June 1992 is regarded as an important first
step in the progression of Japanese militarization, the incremental revision of the Peace
Constitution of the attainment of a permanent seat on the UNSC. Under the name of ?
international contribution? the Japanese government is seen to be implementing a neo-
imperialist policy in line wit!
h the bilateral relationship with the US, to which we now turn.

INCREASING JAPANESE COMMITMENT TO UN PKOS IS DIMINISHING ITS


ANTI-MILITARIST NORM

Hugo Dobson, Lecturer in International Relations of Japan, University of Sheffield, Japan


and United Nations Peacekeeping, 2003, p. 159 (HARVUN2301)
The domestic norm of anti-militarism, with its strong social origins rooted in the
experience of Second World War, is well understood in Japanese society. With a strong
traditions going back to the prewar period that challenged Japan?s military enterprise in
East Asia, though to the A-bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the firebombing of
Tokyo, anti-militarist tendencies have been clearly expressed in opinion polls throughout
this period. The specific frames instrumentalized to promote this norm include respect for
the Constitution and Article 9, abandonment of the US-Japan Security Treaty and
curtailment of the role (if not the very existence) of the SDF. Thus, during the Second
Gulf War, the traditional anti-militarist attitudes of Japanese civil society were still
largely intact, both reflected in and supported by the political stance of the SDPJ since
shortly after the Second World War. So, if this domestic norm and its restrictive nature is
widely recognized and comp!
rehended, why has its specificity been classified in Table 7.1 as ?Medium: falling??
Simply put, this is due to the emerging norm of the UN and its peacekeeping as ?
Medium: rising,? and I would suggest that the norms of UN internationalism and
peacekeeping are rising at the expense of the domestic norm of anti-militarism.

JAPANESE INVOLVEMENT WITH UN MISSIONS THREATENS ITS DOMESTIC


ANTI-MILITARISM NORM

Hugo Dobson, Lecturer in International Relations of Japan, University of Sheffield, Japan


and United Nations Peacekeeping, 2003, p. 160 (HARVUN2302)
Any contribution that could be justified under the UN Charter could also be justified
under the Japanese Constitution because of their common origins. It is necessary to
understand how deeply anti-militarist roots have been put down in postwar Japan society
and, as a result, the extent to which the Japanese government has had to use stealth and
incrementalism in responding to both international and domestic norms. There has been a
clash of international and domestic norms in Japan for the past half-century over the role
of the UN in relation to domestic anti-militarism and the dominant normative influence of
US bilateralism ? a clash seen throughout the empirical chapters.

Japanese participation in peacekeeping promotes militarism


JAPANESE GOVERNMENT USES UN AS COVER FOR ITS EFFORTS TO
WEAKEN THE ANTI-MILITARIST NORM

Hugo Dobson, Lecturer in International Relations of Japan, University of Sheffield, Japan


and United Nations Peacekeeping, 2003, p. 160 (HARVUN2303)
Thus, during the Diet debates concerning the passage of the PKO Law and in dealing
with the neighboring states in East Asia, Japanese politicians and bureaucrats stressed
that the contributions of personnel would take place within the framework of the UN.
This policy was realized with the first dispatch of SDF troops on the UNTAC mission
where the terms of the UN?s mandate and the maintenance of a cease-fire were
repeatedly referred to ? a trend that has continued in attempts (successful and
unsuccessful) to revise the PKO Law. In this way, the LDP leadership, eager to expand
Japan?s contribution to international society, and in particularly the UN with one eye on a
UNSC permanent seat, was able to weaken traditionally stringent recognized norm of
anti-militarism by combining it with the resonant norm of UN internationalism and its
peacekeeping activities. The norms of UN internationalism and peacekeeping display
aspects of an anti-militarist nature but recognize the use of !
force in achieving the goal of peace. In this way, the LDP leadership could proceed in its
goal of making Japan a ?normal? state that exercises military power and still overcome
the anti-militarist ?allergy?. For these reasons, the anti-militarist norm is regarded as not
having necessarily weakened but having mutated to permit a level of force acceptable to
the Japanese government and society of the day and as long as it is mandated by the
international community.