1NC: Consult Japan (1/2) 3 1NC: Consult Japan (2/2) 4 Need To Reinvigorate The Alliance 5 Need To Reinvigorate The Alliance 6 Consultation

strengthens the Alliance 7 Consultation Generally Good/Strengthens The Alliance 8 AT: Japan will say now 9 AT: Japan will say no 10 AT: Japan will say no 11 Answers To: ?No Crisis ? Consultation Isn?t Needed? 12 Japan wants to be consulted on peacekeeping 13 Japan supports UN peacekeeping 14 Japan supports UN peacekeeping 15 Must Consult Japan on Iraq 16 Must Consult Japan on Iraq 17 Must Consult Japan on Iraq 18 Japan would say ?YES? to greater EU/NATO role in Iraq 19 Answers To: Japan will say ?NO? 20 Japan would say yes to demining 21 Japan would say yes to UN reform 22 Japan leads in Cambodian demining 23 Permutation Answers: Reciprocal/?Genuine? Consultation Key 24 Permutation Answers: ?Pass The Plan, Then Consult? Answers 25 Genuine Consultation is Key to U.S. ? Japan Alliance 26 2NC ? Genuine Consultation is Key to U.S. ? Japan Alliance 27 Consultation key to relations 28 Impacts: Alliance Collapse Causes Rearmament 29 Impacts: Alliance Solves North Korea 30 Impacts: Alliance Solves North Korea 31 Impacts: Alliance Key to U.S. - Russia 32 Impacts: Alliance Collapse = Regional War 33 Impacts: Alliance Key to Taiwan Conflict 34 Impacts: Alliance Key to Taiwan Conflict 35 Impacts: Alliance Key to U.S. Hegemony 36 Impacts: Alliance key to solve terrorism 37 Answers To: Article 9/pacificsm/taboo stops rearm 38 Answers To: Japanese attitudes prevent nuclear rearmament 39 Answers To TMD Disad 40 Answers To: TMD Disad 41 Answers To TMD Disad 42 Answers To China Disad 43 China-Japan DA Answers 44 Sino-U.S. DA Answers 45 Affirmative Consult Answers 46 Affirmative Consult Answers 47 Affirmative Consult Answers 48

Affirmative Consult Answers 49 Affirmative Consult Answers 50 Affirmative Consult Answers 51 U.S.-Japan relations are strong now 52 1AR: China DA Link Extensions 53 1AR: China DA Uniqueness 54 Sino-Japan DA 1AR: Uniqueness Extensions 55 Sino-Japan DA: 1AR: General Extensions 56 Consultation Is Normal Means 1AR 57 Affirmative Answers ? China DA Links 58 Japan will say no to SEAsian peacekeeping 59 Affirmative Answers ? China DA Links 60 1AR Ext: Japan will say no 61 1AR Ext: Japan will say no to increased peacekeeping 62 1AR Ext ? Japan TMD Bad Impact 63 1AR ? AT: Taiwan not linked to U.S. Japan TMD 64 1AR ? Uniqueness Ext. ? TMD not inevitable 65 Japanese Rearmament Answers 66 Japanese Rearmament Answers 67 Japanese Rearmament Answers 68 Japan?s PKO contributions are key to the alliance 69 Japan?s PKO contributions kill the alliance 70 Japan will increase PKO support/involvement now 71 Japanese participation in peacekeeping promotes militarism 72 Japanese participation in peacekeeping promotes militarism 73 Japanese participation in peacekeeping promotes militarism 74

1NC: Consult Japan (1/2) We offer the following counterplan: Prior to adoption of the plan, the United States will initiate a process of binding consultation with Japan and will propose that: (insert plan) During consultation, the U.S. will advocate the adoption of this proposal, but will allow Japan to propose modifications and alternate solutions. The U.S. will adopt and implement per the results of consultation. Funding and enforcement are provided. We reserve the right to clarify. Observation One: Theory

A. Consultation is legitimate. Consultation counterplans are necessary to focus debate and make the affirmative justify the entirety of the plan. Specific literature, grounding in the real world of diplomatic policy options, and the clear net benefit warrant the legitimacy of the counterplan. B. Affirmative conditionality is illegitimate. The Affirmative is bound to the immediacy, permanence, and unalterability of the plan established in the 1AC and the cross examination. If the plan is a conditional moving target it distorts competitive equity in the aff?s favor by making it impossible to win disad links and counterplan competition. All severance and intrinsicness permutations should be rejected. Observation Two: Not topical The word resolved means ?to make a firm decision.? The counterplan allows for policy changes to occur. Observation Three: Competition. A. Mutually exclusive. The 1AC established the immediate and unconditional implementation of the plan. Any permutation that solves our net benefit is a severance permutation and is a voting issue to preserve stable and predictable negative ground established by the 1AC. 1NC: Consult Japan (2/2) B. Net Benefits. 1. Prior, genuine consultation is critical to the alliance Bergsten, Institute for International Economics director, ?01 [Fred, NO MORE BASHING: BUILDING A NEW JAPAN-UNITED STATES ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP, Takatoshi Ito and Marcus Nolan, eds., 2001, p. 262-3] Programmatically, making the alliance work is less a matter of bold new initiatives that of achieving improved consultation between Tokyo and Washington on the whole panoply of international issues that they face. The Armitage Report contains numerous specific recommendations along these lines. For example, Washington must accept a greater political role for Japan and understand that there is a difference between genuine consultation and mere forewarning. At the same time, Tokyo should be reminded that global and regional policy initiatives undertaken without prior consultation with Washington ? such as AMF proposals in 1997, and the FTAs that it has launched unilaterally in recent years ? are unlikely to succeed. The alternative to making the alliance work would be for Japan to become an autonomous great power. Under current circumstances, without significant regional organizations that mediate festering historical animosities, this would run the risk of destabilizing Asia.! Its huge costs, to Japan itself and to the United States as well as to regional and global

stability, add strongly to the case for making every effort to restore the Japan-United States relationship ? including in the economic sphere ? in a modern and normal direction. 2. Strong alliance solves multiple nuclear flashpoints in Asia Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State, 2000 [Richard, et al, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/Spelreprts/SR_JAPAN.HTM, The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership, October 11] Major war in Europe is inconceivable for at least a generation, but the prospects for conflict in Asia are far from remote. The region features some of the world?s largest and most modern armies, nuclear-armed major powers, and several nuclear-capable states. Hostilities that could directly involve the United States in a major conflict could occur at a moment?s notice on the Korean peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait. The Indian subcontinent is a major flashpoint. In each area, war has the potential of nuclear escalation. In addition, lingering turmoil in Indonesia, the world?s fourth-largest nation, threatens stability in Southeast Asia. The United States is tied to the region by a series of bilateral security alliances that remain the region?s de facto security architecture. In this promising but also potentially dangerous setting, the U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship is more important than ever. With the world?s second-largest economy and a well-equipped and competent mil! itary, and as our democratic ally, Japan remains the keystone of the U.S. involvement in Asia. The U.S.-Japan alliance is central to America?s global security strategy Need To Reinvigorate The Alliance POLICY-MAKERS NEED TO PAY MORE ATTENTION TO RE-INVIGORATING THE ALLIANCE Kurt M. Campbell is a senior vice president and director of the International Security Program at CSIS,. THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Fall 2000, p. 25 For all the talk of the U.S.-Japan security alliance as the cornerstone of U.S. strategy in the Asian and Pacific region, there has not been enough attention by senior U.S. policymakers, commentators, and elites to understand its complexities or sustain its importance. Indeed, except for a brief period of strategic reexamination in 1995 -- the socalled Nye initiative that culminated in the 1996 Clinton-Hashimoto Security Declaration -- the alliance has, for more than a decade, been managed by mid-level bureaucrats on both sides of the Pacific. (I must admit here to being one of those mid-level officials, having worked at the Pentagon between 1995 and 2000 on Asian security matters.) CONSULTATION STRENGTHENS RELATIONS Dennis C. Blair and John T. Hanley Jr. Admiral Dennis C. Blair has been the commander-in-chief of the U.S. Pacific Command since 1998. Dr. John T. Hanley is his primary strategic adviser in the Asia-Pacific region, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Winter 2001, p. 7

The way ahead in Northeast Asia is to reinvigorate U.S. bilateral alliances with Japan and South Korea by clarifying their broader strategic purpose and direction. A decade after the end of the Cold War, U.S. exercises with Japanese self-defense forces need to move beyond scenarios involving the invasion of Japan. They need to address more directly the provisions of the defense guidelines and to develop skills to cooperate on the broader security agenda as Japan accepts a greater role in regional security. U.S. forces in South Korea and Japan do much more than deter North Korean aggression. They reassure these countries of the continuing U.S. commitment to our mutual defense treaties. U.S. forces forward-stationed in these countries anchor U.S. commitments to extended nuclear deterrence. As reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula and across the Taiwan Strait progresses, U.S. forward-stationed forces in Japan and South Korea will remain an essential part of a security ! equilibrium, removing incentives for major strategic realignments or the buildup of independent military capabilities that would raise tensions and spark arms races in the region. These forces will also remain the best positioned U.S. forces to work with armed forces throughout the Asia-Pacific region on shared interests in security and peaceful development. A concurrent step is to pursue what Stephen Bosworth, U.S. ambassador to the Republic of Korea, refers to as "enriched bilateralism." Enriched bilateralism principally involves greater consultation and policy coordination with the nations of the region regarding the full range of U.S. policies that affect their security interests, going beyond those that affect only bilateral arrangements. U.S. consultation with security partners regarding third countries before setting policy and taking action is becoming more important as security challenges become more regional and interdependent. Need To Reinvigorate The Alliance NEED TO PAY NEW ATTENTION TO THE ALLIANCE Campbell, Senior Vice President and Director of the International Security Program at the CSIS, THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Fall, 2000, p. 57 The U.S.-Japan political partnership is due for a period of internal reflection and strategic reinvestment. n1 The alliance that has provided the bedrock for U.S. policy in Asia and has been a mainstay, preserving peace and stability for nearly half a century, does not get the attention or recognition it deserves. The security component of the alliance, after a period of intense activity between 1995 and 1998, has also lost some momentum. In terms of real strategic oversight on both sides of the Pacific, the alliance has been on a kind of bureaucratic autopilot for the better part of a decade. There are a number of reasons for this, not least of which has been the tendency to take the benefits of the alliance for granted. Yet, there are important changes underway in the AsianPacific security environment that suggest a more activist approach to the alliance is in order. To revitalize the U.S.-Japan security partnership, the new security dimensions of Asia -- ranging! from dramatic diplomatic developments on the Korean peninsula to increasing tensions across the Taiwan Strait -- demand a more intense and high-level focus for the alliance. For all the talk of the U.S.-Japan security alliance as the cornerstone of U.S. strategy in the Asian and Pacific region, there has not been enough attention by senior U.S. policymakers, commentators, and elites to understand its complexities or sustain its

importance. Indeed, except for a brief period of strategic reexamination in 1995 -- the socalled Nye initiative that culminated in the 1996 Clinton-Hashimoto Security Declaration -- the alliance has, for more than a decade, been managed by mid-level bureaucrats on both sides of the Pacific. (I must admit here to being one of those mid-level officials, having worked at the Pentagon between 1995 and 2000 on Asian security matters.) Before making the case for devoting considerably more attention at the highest levels of our government and society! to the U.S.-Japan partnership, it is important first to identify the reasons for the previous lack of focus -- in both political parties and both the legislative and executive branches of government -- to this crucial security partnership. U.S.-Japan alliance could crack Curtis, Columbia political science professor, 2000 [Gerald, NEW PERSPECTIVES ON U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS, p. 35] It is not so difficult, to imagine scenarios in which friction arises between the United States and Japan over issues that lie on the security side of the fire wall. The U.S.-Japan security relationship is sustained by a Japanese belief that the U.S. commitment to Japanese security is credible, and by and American belief that alliance with Japan serves vital U.S. national interests. Both these convictions could come under unprecedented challenge in the coming years.

Consultation strengthens the Alliance Relations need cooperation to remain stable Task Force on Foreign Relations for the Prime Minister. ?02 [Nov. 28, Basic Strategies for Japan?s Foreign Policy in the 21st Century, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/2002/1128tf_e.html] The United States is the most important country for Japan. How the relationship should be, however, has up until now avoided redefinition, including the Japan-U.S. security system which is central to the relationship. Japan must undertake a comprehensive reexamination of its relationship with the United States focusing on security. The reexamination exercise would lead to further enhancement of the Japan-U.S. relationship. If this work is not undertaken, the rifts between the allies will grow from barely tangible to substantial, and confidence in the alliance among the two nations could be shaken. It is not unusual that the policy priorities of Japan and the U.S. should be different at times. It is impossible that the Japan-U.S. relationship will become like the one between the UK and the U.S. Japan, while upholding objectives common with the U.S, must have its own axis of coordinates and engage in diplomacy that is complementary to that of the U.S. Now that the economic ten! sions are relaxed between the two countries, policy coordination should be pursued. U.S. Japan alliance needs to be strengthened Task Force on Foreign Relations for the Prime Minister. ?02 [Nov. 28, Basic Strategies for Japan?s Foreign Policy in the 21st Century, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/2002/1128tf_e.html] Factors for instability in the East Asian region include North Korea's nuclear weapons

program and the rapid modernization of the People's Liberation Army in China. The Japanese alliance with United States, which Japan opted for in the interest of its sovereignty and independence, may need to be strengthened in the future, and certainly cannot be expected to weaken. Consultation Generally Good/Strengthens The Alliance CONSULTATION IS CRITICAL TO A STRONG ALLIANCE Jameson, Dean of American Journalists in Japan, ASIA-PACIFIC REVIEW, v. 5(3) A constructive long-term alliance can hardly be founded upon such fundamental distrust of an ally. Protecting Japan against itself is as illogical as any part of Japan?s defense policies. In addition, Washington needs to develop a new willingness to consult Japan more readily, both to gain approval for American military actions taken from bases in Japan, as well as to solicit Japan?s ideas and proposals on joint security actions. U.S. UNILATERAL DECISION-MAKING HURTS THE ALLIANCE Ted Osius is currently the State Department's regional environmental affairs officer for Southeast Asia and the Pacific, based in Bangkok, Thailand. From 1998 to 2001, he served as senior adviser on international affairs to Vice President Al Gore, with a portfolio encompassing Asia, international economics, and trade issues. Mr. Osius joined the Department of State in 1989. Starting in 1996, he served as senior political officer in the U.S. embassy in Hanoi and in 1997 opened the U.S. consulate general in Ho Chi Minh City, becoming the first American political officer in Saigon in 23 years, THE U.S.JAPAN SECURITY ALLIANCE, 2002, http://www.csis.org/pubs/2002_japan.htm For more than three decades, the multifaceted alliance between the world's two largest and most technologically advanced economies has deterred aggression and provided the bedrock for Asian stability. Now, however, the United States and Japan are reexamining some assumptions underlying their alliance. The Cold War's end revealed new sources of potential threat, and Japan's national self-confidence has been shaken by a decade of economic stagnation, a highly fluid political situation, and an inadequate institutional structure for crisis management and strategy formulation. Japan is trying to redefine its identity from a nation whose constitution renounces war as a sovereign right to a "normal" country involved in UN peacekeeping operations and regional military relationships-a nation likely capable of projecting power beyond its own territory. U.S. unilateralist tendencies and difficulty in sharing decisionmaking authority with Japan hamper the alliance's capacity to defend a! gainst new threats to stability in Asia. AT: Japan will say now JAPANESE POLITICIANS WILL AGREE TO U.S. POLICY INITIATIVES IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN SUPPORT Kent Calder, is director of the Edwin O. Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies and Reischauer Professor of East Asian Studies at the School for Advanced International

Studies, Johns Hopkins University, ORBIS, Autumn 2003, p. 65 Similarly, Prime Minister Koizumi, who is especially reliant on public opinion given intra-party weakness within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, has also found dramatic U.S.-style foreign policy initiatives attractive in sustaining the support he needs to remain effective on public-policy issues more generally. JAPAN WILL FOLLOW US LED INITIATIVES Masaharu Kohno, Visiting Fellow, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, IN SEARCH OF PROACTIVE DIPLOMACY, Fall 1999, http://www.brook.edu/fp/cnaps/papers/1999_kohno.htm Furthermore, Japan is often criticized for "always following the United States." The fact is that Japan, as an ally of the United States, shares fundamental values and ideas with the United States, and as such, its foreign policy naturally moves in a direction similar to that of the United States. The Japanese decision-making process has been described as an accumulation of slow actions based on precedents. According to this view, due to general restraint in its foreign policy decisions and other various considerations, Japan has refrained from unnecessarily overturning precedents. This reflects a pattern of behavior that exists throughout the Japanese bureaucracy, but is not necessarily unique to Japan. JAPAN WILL SAY YES ? THEY ALWAYS DO THE DAILY YOMIURI (Tokyo) January 23, 2004, p. 4 Now, under Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's leadership, Japan is virtually an unquestioning partner of the United States. Tokyo has shown full support for Washington in the most controversial and divisive U.S. foreign policy initiative since the Vietnam War: the military overthrow of the regime of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Koizumi has also signed on to U.S. President George W. Bush's hard-line approach toward North Korea. AT: Japan will say no Japan remains subordinate to the U.S. and will continue to do so Lincoln, Council on Foreign Relations, 2004 [Edward, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Winter, p. http://www.twq.com/04winter/docs/04winter_lincoln.pdf] The United States remains preeminent in the minds of Japanese government officials and politicians as a strategic ally and economic partner. FTAs to create an Asian bloc that would trade within itself and be less reliant on U.S. markets are not consistent with Japanese strategic thinking. This fact, along with the purely domestic politics of agriculture, explains why the Japanese government has not pursued bilateral or regional FTAs more vigorously. The Japanese government?s behavior regarding the war on terrorism and the war in Iraq even more clearly illustrates Japan?s role as U.S. subordinate. During the Persian Gulf War, the Japanese government was badly embarrassed by the drawn-out process of acquiescing to Washington?s demands for financial support for a war whose importance the Japanese simply did not support in principle or understand. Although the Japanese government eventually voted to provide

$13 billion in assistance, the money came after the war had ended and in! response to months of arm-twisting by U.S. officials. Not wanting to repeat that experience, Japanese prime minister Junichiro Koizumi and other Japanese government officials made a show of verbally supporting the United States quickly and strongly in the wake of the September 11 attacks. Similarly, Koizumi backed President George W. Bush often in the run-up to war with Iraq. Koizumi?s only demand was a mild request in September 2002 for the U.S. president to go to the UN Security Council before invading Iraq; the Japanese did not join other European nations in demanding a second vote by the Security Council. Japan will say yes ? especially when the U.S. consults them. Support for Iraq and the war on terror prove strong motive not to deviate from the U.S. Lincoln, Council on Foreign Relations, 2004 [Edward, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Winter, p. http://www.twq.com/04winter/docs/04winter_lincoln.pdf] On one hand, Koizumi?s boldness in supporting the United States in the face of opposition to the war from some 70 percent of the Japanese public appears an exercise of leadership. On the other hand, a closer examination suggests that Koizumi?s behavior reflected a familiar pattern in Japanese foreign policy. The Japanese had three reasons to support Bush, none of which had anything to do with fighting outrageous dictators or bringing a better future to the Middle East. First, the Japanese government wanted to avoid aggravating the U.S. government the way it had during the Gulf War through its slow and grudging support. Second, the real strategic issue for the Japanese government was North Korea, and it expected that support for the war against Iraq would translate into influence with Washington on policy toward North Korea. Whether or not that assumption was correct, it factored into Japanese thinking. Third, Iraq became the most recent opportunity for conservatives in Japan! to press to alter or reinterpret the constitution to permit dispatching soldiers abroad for combat. Thus, in East Asia and on a broader global scale, the Japanese government has continued to act very much as it has ever since the end of the U.S. occupation, as a subordinate power tied to the United States. The U.S. gov- ernment consults the Japanese government, but the reality remains that Japan does not have its own seat at the table of international policymaking. Although Japan criticized the U.S. government and the IMF during the Asian financial crisis, it has not acted on these sentiments to lead its neighbors toward a more independent stance on either international finance or trade. Neither in the Middle East nor in Afghanistan has the Japanese government moved to claim expertise in nation or economy building. Instead, it has ridden the coattails of the U.S. government, avoiding criticism and advancing the causes of domestic conservatives concerning the use of military! force unrelated to the Middle East. AT: Japan will say no Japan will say yes to avoid alienating the U.S.

Lincoln, Council on Foreign Relations, 2004 [Edward, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Winter, p. http://www.twq.com/04winter/docs/04winter_lincoln.pdf] For interests in security and economic access, the key has been to keep the United States and other major players sufficiently satisfied with Japan that they would not end existing relationships. Toward this end, Japan has agreed to pay part of the costs to maintain U.S. bases in Japan and has taken a series of small steps during the past two decades to play a larger role in security matters, such as increasing defense spending and dispatching soldiers for UN peacekeeping operations. Japan won?t say no ? they don?t deviate from the U.S. Inter Press Service, 6 ? 24 - 04 Some critics of Japanese foreign policy say Japan's interests are so closely aligned with U.S. foreign policy that a Japanese seat on the Security Council would be an automatic vote for the United States. Asked to comment on this issue, Kitaoka [Japan's deputy permanent representative to the UN] replied, ''when it comes to core interests of the country, it's very hard for Japan to differ with the United States.We have to be very careful about it.'' Answers To: ?No Crisis ? Consultation Isn?t Needed? CONSULTATION CANNOT WAIT UNTIL CRISES BEGIN Dennis C. Blair has been the commander-in-chief of the U.S. Pacific Command since 1998. Dr. John T. Hanley is his primary strategic adviser in the Asia-Pacific region, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Winter, 2001, p. 7 Security partnerships support U.S. interests in sharing responsibilities for international security and ensuring the international legitimacy of military action. U.S. allies and friends should have confidence that they are full partners, rather than viewing the United States as "the lone superpower," acting without consultation, coordination, and appreciation of their views. Consultation and coordination in the harried pace of events leading to a crisis are not enough. Instead, they must be developed and honed in the course of routine dialogue and exercises. Success requires a habit of cooperation. Japan wants to be consulted on peacekeeping Japan wants to be consulted on PKOs ? without a permanent seat on the Council, they feel left out Toshiro Ozawa, Ambassador of Japan to the United Nations, 6-3-04 [To The Fifth Committee Fifty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly 3 June 2004, http://www.infojapan.org/announce/speech/un2004/un0406.html]

Speaking of Japan, we must point out that the Government of Japan is not blessed with a budgetary mechanism that can easily absorb a more than 60 percent increase of a major budget item. We must also point out that there is criticism within Japan for providing money to PKOs for the benefit of those parties who may or may not be willing to settle their conflicts. This criticism is reinforced by the fact that Japan, not being a Permanent Member of the Security Council,does not participate has often no say in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the long term policies of individual PKOs, despite Japan's obligation to shoulder about one fifth of the related costs. Needless to say, such criticism arises out of Japan's strong commitment to peace on the one hand, and on the other, the frustration regarding the obligations incurred from assessed contributions for peacekeeping budgets. It would be intolerable for the Government of Japan to be left out of discussions espec! ially if those discussions are held without due consideration for facing "the moment of truth" for cases where there is a perceived lack of will to pursue peace.

Japan supports UN peacekeeping Japan supports UN peacekeeping Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ?03 [Diplomatic Bluebook 2003, http://www.infojapan.org/policy/other/bluebook/2003/chap3-a.pdf] In light of these developments, in order to realize the peace, stability and prosperity of the international community, which are essential for securing Japan?s national interest, Japan has made significant contributions in a wide range of areas including nuclear disarmament, contributions toward Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), cooperation in efforts for sustainable development in developing countries and the dissemination and promotion of the concept of human security. Japan expects that the UN will, for example, play a role in the areas of: (1) maintaining international peace and security; (2) universal and fair rule-making that can respond to globalization; and (3) providing sustainable solutions regarding development issues in developing countries. Japan will also continue to actively participate in UN activities and appeal to the UN and its member states. Japan is strongly committed to UN PKOs ? removed all barriers to participation Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ?03 [Diplomatic Bluebook 2003, http://www.infojapan.org/policy/other/bluebook/2003/chap3-a.pdf] Ten years have passed since the enactment of the Law Concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations (International Peace Cooperation Law)3 which enables Japan?s personnel cooperation in international humanitarian relief operations and international election monitoring operations as well as UN PKO. During this time, Japan has participated in many activities, winning much credit of the international community. Furthermore, public understanding within Japan regarding international peace cooperation has deepened. In 2001, a revision to the International Peace Cooperation Law was approved. This revision ?de-froze? such

activities by units of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) as monitoring of disarmament, stationing and patrolling in buffer zones, collection and disposal of abandoned weapons, and expanded the scope of use of weapons,5 thus enabling more wide-ranging and smooth operations. Furthermore, in 2002, Japan?s cooperation to PKO has ente! red a new phase with the dispatch at the largest scale of SDF units in the past for the PKO in Timor-Leste (formerly East Timor).

Japan supports UN peacekeeping Japan is a leader in UN peacekeeping ? they fully support it Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2000 [UN Peacekeeping Operations, http://www.infojapan.org/policy/un/pamph2000/pko.html] Japan, as a responsible member of the international community, has been strenuously working for the maintenance of peace and security. Accordingly, participation in UN peacekeeping operations is today placed as one of Japan's important areas of cooperation for international peace and security. Japan's first substantial participation in a UN peacekeeping operation was in 1989, when 27 electoral observers were dispatched to the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia. Then in 1992, the enactment of the International Peace Cooperation Law enabled Japan to send not only its civilian personnel but also its Self-Defense Forces personnel to UN peacekeeping operations. Based on that law, Japan participated in peacekeeping operations in Angola, Cambodia, Mozambique, El Salvador and East Timor, and since 1996 has been dispatching a Self-Defense Forces contingent to the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), which is deployed on the Golan Heights. Ja! pan's Self-Defense Forces personnel were also sent to assist Rwandan refugees and East Timorese displaced persons as part of international humanitarian relief operations. Japan also cooperated in international election monitoring activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which were conducted by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 1998 and 2000. To date, Japan has also made contributions in kind. For example, Japan provided refugee relief materials such as tents and blankets to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) working for Kosovar refugees and East Timorese displaced persons in 1999. In the same year, Japan also provided the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) with radios for public information purposes in support of the direct ballot in August 1999. In addition to these field activities, Japan takes an active part in discussions in the United Nations to improve the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations. Japan, fo! r example, has been serving as vice-chair for the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, the principal UN forum undertaking a comprehensive review of the questions related to peacekeeping operations. With regard to the issue of the safety of peacekeepers, Japan strongly maintained that necessary measures should be taken for significant improvement, and Japan's initiative resulted in the adoption in 1994 of the "Convention on the Safety of UN and Associated Personnel," which Japan was the second to ratify. Japan has been actively urging other countries which have not yet done so to become a party to the convention. Japan will continue to cooperate with UN peacekeeping activities

not only by participating in actual operations but also by actively engaging in discussions for further improvement of these operations.

Must Consult Japan on Iraq Japan should be consulted about reconstruction Major, former British prime minister, ?03 [John, Ottawa Citizen, 3-27, Lexis] There is a menu of healing actions from which we can choose. We must be generous to post-war Iraq in her travails. We would be wise to consult Arab opinion -- the Arab League and the Gulf Co-operation Council, for example -- about how to reconstitute a free and democratic Iraq. We should discuss our plans with the EU, China and Russia, and seek their active political support. We may, after, all, need them to open up their wallets as well. As we do so, we should not neglect the views of our allies, Australia, Spain and Japan prominent among them. Japan wants the U.S. to consult on Iraq Japan Policy and Politics, 8 ? 26 ? 03 [Factiva] Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi said Thursday there will be no change in Japan's plan to help rebuild Iraq even though the United States has excluded Japan from its latest list of countries contributing to reconstruction work. ''There will be no change in our plan to contribute to providing Iraq with humanitarian and reconstruction assistance,'' the premier told reporters in Prague, when asked to comment on Japan's absence from the list. But he did not elaborate. Washington said Wednesday that 27 countries other than the U.S. are contributing to ongoing operations to help rebuild the war-torn country or keep order there, and that four others have committed to providing troops. But Japan was not among them. ''Japan should play a role which is different from those of other countries,'' Koizumi said, apparently referring to the fact that the war-renouncing Constitution largely limits activities of its Self-Defense Forces (SDF) overseas. Japan will continue to think about i! ts ties with the U.S., its closest ally, and international cooperation, Koizumi said, speaking to reporters on the third and last leg of his European trip which will end Saturday. Consulting Japan on Iraq proves that the U.S. appreciates its support and won?t deprioritize the alliance once relations with others are normalized as a result of the plan Daily Yomiuri, 9 ? 5 ? 03 Today, the Japan-U.S. alliance is said to be in its best shape since Commodore Matthew Perry came to Japan, but this is partly due to luck. For one thing, Japan's value as a U.S. ally was upgraded because France and Germany, traditional U.S. allies, and Russia, a partner that the Untied States had expected to become a new ally, distanced themselves from the Untied States over the latest Iraq war. Another reason for the good state of bilaterial ties is that several U.S. patriots, who served in the administration of U.S. President Ronald Reagan and who know Japan well, are now back in office. They and Shiina forged their friendship during the (Prime Minister Yasuhiro) Nakasone-Reagan

era. One result of this friendship is that although it ended up taking Japan six months to send an Aegis-equipped destroyer to the Indian Ocean to support U.S. forces in the latest Iraq war, the White House warmly praised Japan's prompt dispatch of ordinary destroyers and encouraged Japan to prom! ote further cooperation with the United States. Japan is a key player in Iraq reconstruction Business Times, 9 ? 6 ? 03 Some analysts say that Japan is better placed than the United States to act as a coordinator of Middle Eastern aid to Iraq, and that Japan and Europe might also be better placed to secure economic cooperation with Arab countries in the wake of the invasion of Iraq. Japan is a key player in the Iraq discussions Jiji Press, 9 ? 5 ? 03 [Factiva] Japan and the European Union agreed Friday that the participation of a wide range of countries is necessary in the reconstruction of Iraq, based on a new U.N. resolution. The consensus was reached at talks here between visiting Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi and European External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten. But Patten refrained from commenting on details of a U.S.-proposed draft U.N. resolution that seeks the dispatch of multinational forces to Iraq, saying only that the issue will be discussed at an informal meeting of EU foreign ministers later in the day, according to informed sources. Must Consult Japan on Iraq Japan is critical to U.S. policy success in the Middle East Okamoto, chair of the Japanese prime minister's Task Force on Foreign Relations, ?02 [Yukio, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Spring, Lexis] Recent events have focused international attention on relations between the United States and Islamic countries, which, with a few exceptions, are strained. Some have suggested that Japan can become a potential intermediary between the United States and the Muslim world because of Japan's close relations with Arab governments, Muslim oilproducing states, and the nations of Central Asia; its relatively more flexible stance on human rights policies; and the absence of a strong tie to Israel. Japan can contribute to a U.S.-Islamic dialogue by asserting its view that vast disparities in income and an inconsistent U.S. commitment to human rights are impediments to the U.S. goal of stemming the rise of terrorism in the Islamic world. In recent years, the United States has drifted away from the consensus prevalent in most of the industrialized world that extreme poverty is a primary driver of terrorism and political violence. The United States also needs to explain its reluctance ! to confront the regimes of its friends in the Middle East with the same human rights standards as those applied to Myanmar, China, or Indonesia. Japan is concerned about Iraq oil ? wants to be involved APS Diplomat Recorder, 8 ? 2 ? 03 Mitsubishi agrees with State Oil Marketing Organisation to import 40,000 b/d of Basrah Light crude, equivalent to 7% of the Japanese company's global crude oil trades a day. (This is Japan's first commercial oil deal with Baghdad in 13 years). Mitsubishi Industry

analysts say the deal's significance for Mitsubishi and other Japanese companies outweighs the size of the contract. The deal could open the way for more Japan-Iraq contracts and help Japan in its pursuit of alternative sources of oil, for which it relies heavily on Saudi Arabia, Iran and the UAE. Hajime Furuya, trading companies analyst at UBS investment bank, said: "This transaction by itself has a small impact in business terms but it may have a far greater impact politically and strategically. It may be the signal for Mitsubishi to enter into other businesses in Iraq, such as pipeline or gas-plant construction. It could also open the way for other Japanese companies to go into Iraq". Trading houses Mitsubishi, S! umitomo and Marubeni had substantial dealings with Iraq before the 1990 Gulf War, in infrastructure, construction machinery, energy and pipelines. These and other Japanese trading houses and energy-related companies are studying commercial possibilities in Iraq and are poised to enter negotiations once Japan reinstates long-term export credit insurance to cover their investments in the country. A Sumitomo official said: "Iraq has a lot of business potential so every trading house has to think about how to do business there". Delivery of the Basrah Light to Mitsubishi could begin in late-August and end in December 2003, making a total of 6m barrels, although Mitsubishi said the start date could be postponed to September because of Iraq's unstable security. Japanese companies had feared being pushed out of opportunities in Iraq by US and British businesses. Baghdad owes Japan's public sector about $4.1 bn, according to Paris Club figures, and an estimated $2 bn to private comp! anies. Japan has pledged more than $100m to help in reconstruction. Must Consult Japan on Iraq Japan wants to participate in Iraq Globe and Mail, 9 ? 5 ? 03 [Factiva] Anxious to be a useful ally for Washington, Japan this week joined the U.S., European Union and World Bank in agreeing to set up an international trust fund for reconstruction in Iraq. Japan is a critical player ? they jump started the development fund Kyodo News, 9 ? 4 ? 03 The United States on Thursday welcomed Japan's transfer of more than $98 million in frozen Iraqi assets to the Development Fund for Iraq. "The United States strongly welcomes the government of Japan's actions to fulfill its international requirements under U.N. Security Council resolution 1483," State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said in a statement. "We look forward to other countries following Japan's lead," the statement said. Japan is committed to being an active player in reconstruction Kyodo News, 9 ? 4 ? 03 Japan's commitment to helping rebuild Iraq remains unchanged but Tokyo must study the situation to see what it can offer, top government spokesman Yasuo Fukuda said Thursday. Fukuda's remarks came after the United States began circulating a new draft U.N. resolution on the matter overnight. "What role we can play is a matter to be discussed from now, after research. We would like to make a decision after that research," Fukuda, chief cabinet secretary, said at a news conference. "But our policy to work hard on what our country can do for Iraq's reconstruction is totally unchanged," he said.

Tokyo plans to send a fact-finding team to Iraq as early as this week to find ways to provide humanitarian aid, after its dispatch was postponed due to deteriorating security there. Japan participates in Iraq reconstruction fund negotiations now AP, 9 ? 3 ? 03 Experts from the United States, EU, United Arab Emirates, Japan, the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and the United Nations discussed details of the fund and assessed Iraq's most pressing aid needs at a meeting Wednesday in Brussels. In a joint statement after the talks, all participants "confirmed their commitment to supporting reconstruction in Iraq." Japan would say ?YES? to greater EU/NATO role in Iraq Japan wants greater international support in Iraq ? they would like the plan Xinhua News Agency, 9 ? 5 ? 03 Japan on Friday urged France and Germany to soften their stances on a United Statesproposed resolution aiming at having the UN Security Council (UNSC) authorize a multinational force to help reconstruct Iraq. "Based on the circumstances, we need a framework in which the international community can be united," Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda was quoted by Kyodo News. Answers To: Japan will say ?NO? Japan will say yes if genuinely consulted Kazushi, military security analyst, ?99 [Ogawa, JAPAN QUARTERLY, Spring 1999, p. 14 The most urgent task at the political level is to institutionalize prior consultation on diverse aspects of the operation of the alliance. It is more logical for Japan to start by establishing a system for stating its preference through prior consultation with the United States. Then, and only then, Japan should prepare tools it will need when saying yes: arrangements with the United States for supporting U.S. military operations to the maximum extent possible within the Japanese Constitution, and their enabling legislation. Overall, Japan and the United States are not likely to say no to each other often. However, the two countries can reap great rewards from institutionalization of prior consultation. First, if the United States shows that it solicits Japan?s view before military operations in Asia, Japan?s neighbors would trust Japan more and expect more of it. Japan will say yes ? Good faith consultation ensures that Japan supports the U.S. Kazuya, Osaka University law professor, ?01 [Sakamoto, JAPAN QUARTERLY, April-June, ?Advancing the Japan-U.S. Alliance,? p. 24] The first need is for closer security consultation at several levels, in specific substantive terms, rather than as a mere matter of form. Consultation is a basic prerequisite for cooperation between sovereign states. True cooperation is impossible without consultation. Given the conventional approach to cooperation by goods and people,? however, it is doubtful whether hard-hitting consultations can be conducted with the two sides saying ?yes? or ?no? clearly. The chances are that they will be tempted to follow

their old habits, with one side trying to act freely on its own initiative and the other shirking its responsibilities and avoiding tough decisions. It is welcome that close consultations are under way at the administrative and military levels on the daily execution of the Security Treaty. Since the outcome of such consultations is not always disclosed, however, the Japanese people continue to wonder whether Japan-U.S. security cooperation is truly equal and rec! iprocal. More important, they do not know how top-level government-to-government consultations would be conducted in the event of a real crisis or whether such consultations would successfully resolve the crisis. Reciprocity ensures they say yes Kazuya, Osaka University law professor, ?01 [Sakamoto, JAPAN QUARTERLY, April-June, ?Advancing the Japan-U.S. Alliance,? p. 19] While there can be no doubt about the long-term importance of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, it should be noted that it was concluded half a century ago and revised a decade later, when Japan-U.S. relations were very different from what they are now. Therefore, abiding by the rights and obligations stipulated in the treaty is no guarantee that the Japan-U.S. alliance will remain strong in the 21st century. After all, the Security Treaty is not mutual in the true sense of the word. As it stands, the treaty is unlikely to create a satisfactory ?giver-and-take? relation ship between the two nations. To keep the alliance strong the partners will have to make it truly reciprocal by picking up where the treaty provisions leave off. To that end, security consultation should be conducted more closely. One way to enhance reciprocity would be for Japan to be able to exercise, even if in a limited way, the right to collective self-defense. Japan would say yes to demining Japan supports demining efforts Shinichi Kitaoka, Deputy permanent representative of Japan to the UN, 2004 [May 17, http://www.infojapan.org/announce/speech/un2004/un0405-6.html] Such activities as DDR and demining often play an important role in the area where a peacekeeping mission is deployed. In some cases, peace-building activities have been included in the peacekeeping mandate. Japan, advocating the concept of "consolidation of peace", understands the importance of linkage between peace-building activities and peacekeeping.

Japan would say yes to UN reform Japan supports UN PKO reform Toshiro Ozawa, Ambassador of Japan to the United Nations, 2004 [4 May, http://www.infojapan.org/announce/speech/un2004/un0405.html] This striking passage is an excerpt from the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace

Operations ("Brahimi report" of 2000). Building upon this report, the United Nations has engaged in serious discussions on many ideas for effecting reform, and translated numerous initiatives into action. For its part, Japan has engaged actively in these reform efforts. Such efforts are beginning to bear fruit. The revival of peacekeeping operations is of benefit to the entire world, and we welcome this phenomenon.

Japan leads in Cambodian demining Japan has forged a strong friendship with Cambodia The Government of Japan, February 2002 [?Japan?s Assistance Policy for Cambodia?, http://www.kh.embjapan.go.jp/cooperation/japfc.htm] Japan's position has been to actively expand its diplomatic efforts to help lead the international community in support of the restoration of peace in Cambodia. Japan's first dispatch of PKO personnel in 1992 and its positive contributions to the Consultative Group meetings for Cambodia are the examples of Japan's efforts in this regard. Moreover, Japanese citizens' keen interest in supporting Cambodia enables many of Japan's NGOs play an active role. The Japanese government recognizes the necessity to further cooperate with these NGOs in order to appropriately respond to the situation. The Government and the people of Cambodia have expressed their appreciation for Japan's assistance and as a result have strongly supported Japan's policies in international venues. On various levels and occasions, close ties of friendship have taken root between Japan and Cambodia. General reform in Cambodia is Japan?s mission The Government of Japan, February 2002 [?Japan?s Assistance Policy for Cambodia?, http://www.kh.embjapan.go.jp/cooperation/japfc.htm] The promotion of reform such as administrative reform, financial and fiscal reform, the demobilization of the armed forces, natural resources management, and the improvement of social sector, as well as the strengthening of good governance are all essential in order for Cambodia to achieve steady economic growth and to fully function as a state. With this in mind, during then-Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi's visit to Cambodia in January 2000, he affirmed to Prime Minister Hun Sen that Japan would strengthen its technical cooperation including the dispatch of experts, the acceptance of trainees in Japan and other forms of support. Prime Minister Obuchi stated that Japan had been extending support to Cambodia and would extend additional, flexible and prompt assistance, utilizing various applicable cooperation schemes, in order to further assist with the country's reforms. Following this statement and regarding the current reform of Cambodia's legal and judicial system, Japan has ! been providing assistance for the drafting of a civil code and a civil procedure code and is continuing this assistance for the prompt completion of the drafting of these codes and there enactment into law. In addition and to complement this, Japan will support the training of legal personnel through various training programs.

Cambodia is relying on Japan for demining assistance The Government of Japan, February 2002 [?Japan?s Assistance Policy for Cambodia?, http://www.kh.embjapan.go.jp/cooperation/japfc.htm] The existence of landmines is a great impediment to the reconstruction and development of Cambodia, and the problems caused by landmines cannot be neglected when Japan extends the support mentioned above for the improvement of social-economic infrastructure and agricultural and rural development. Japan has actively been providing assistance for Cambodia's landmine problems, appreciating its ownership and considering Cambodia as a pilot country for Japan's assistance on this problem.With respect to support for demining activities, Japan will offer support to make these activities easier to be implemented through the development and introduction of more efficient demining technology. This is in addition to the provision of financial assistance to the UNDP Trust Fund and the provision of equipment in the bilateral assistance that Japan has made so far. For landmine victims, in addition to the improvement of health care institutions, Japan will consider a form of cooperation whe! re victims can reintegrate back into society following a period of rehabilitation. Education on landmines and efforts at the community level to solve landmine problems are also important. It is crucial to actively collaborate with and support NGOs deeply involved in the rural areas in carrying out their vital demining activities. Japan is taking an active role in supporting the basic human needs of Cambodia The Government of Japan, February 200 [?Japan?s Assistance Policy for Cambodia?, http://www.kh.emb-japan.go.jp/cooperation/japfc.htm] The most important factor for sustainable economic growth is the improvement of Basic Human Needs (BHN). The improvement of BHN directly provides benefits to the lives of the poor, and is also important as it provides a social safety net to deal with the social costs brought by economic growth. Japan has provided assistance for BHN sectors such as education, health and medical care, water and sanitation improvement, and other priority sectors for cooperation. These sectors are very important from the viewpoint of humanitarian concerns and poverty reduction, and the demand for assistance is still very high. Moreover, it is anticipated that the number of the so-called socially vulnerable will increase as Cambodia makes economic progress, and Japan will continue to positively support the foundation of a social safety net for these people. I! n the education sector, Japan will continue to provide assistance through grassroots grant aid for the construction of schools, the absolute number of which is still greatly lacking, and technical assistance for improving the quality of teachers' capacity and the administrative capacities of the education authorities. Assistance will particularly focus on improving science and mathematics education, subjects which are vital for economic growth and achieving sustainability. Permutation Answers: Reciprocal/?Genuine? Consultation Key RECIPROCAL CONSULTATIONS ARE KEY TO RELATIONS

Sakamoto Kazuya, Doctorate in Law from Kyoto University, JAPAN QUARTERLY, April-May 2001, p. 19 To keep the alliance strong, the partners will have to make it truly reciprocal by picking up where the treaty provisions leave off. To that end, security consultations should be conducted more closely. TREATING JAPAN AS A ?JUNIOR PARTNER? RISKS A BACKLASH Michael Ohanlon, Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies, Brookings, JAPAN QUARTERLY, October-December 1997, p. 21 Second, Japan?s apparent position as the ?junior partner? in the alliance is not entirely healthy. In event of crisis or war, these factors could lead to an American backlash against a ?freeloading? ally, or to a Japanese backlash against ?domineering? Americans.

Permutation Answers: ?Pass The Plan, Then Consult? Answers JAPAN WANTS PRIOR CONSULTATION Blackwell Harris, AMERICA?S ASIAN ALLIANCES, 2000, p. 57 Most Japanese felt that their vast monetary contribution was not appreciated by the United States. For Japan one of the main lessons was that it should not allow itself to be placed in a position where the not appreciated by the United States. For Japan one of the main lessons was that it should not allow itself to be placed in a position where the United States could drag it into a foreign policy adventure without adequate prior consultation. PRIOR CONSULTATION IS NEEDED Blackwell Harris, AMERICA?S ASIAN ALLIANCES, 2000, p. 57 Consequently, alliance management needs to be flexible, to seek greater substantive Japanese participation in the consultation process involved, and to recognize the great sensitivity of actions requiring regional support from allies. Japan is becoming more regionally oriented: to a degree, it sees itself as increasingly Asian and has carefully managed its relations with China, in particular. With this increased emphasis on regional matters, and with regional impacts more important to Japan than global impacts, prior consultation becomes more crucial. JAPAN MUST BE GIVEN A VOICE BEFORE DECISIONS ARE MADE Blackwell Harris, AMERICA?S ASIAN ALLIANCES, 2000p. 28 Enhance bilateral consultations. Differences will inevitably emerge between Japan and the United States in their approaches to the region. The new administration should ensure that effective consultation processes are in place that give Japan a voice in alliance policy before decisions are actually made.

Genuine Consultation is Key to U.S. ? Japan Alliance Genuine prior consultation is the only way to bolster and maintain the U.S. Japan alliance Mochizuki, Brookings fellow, ?97 [Mike, ?Relations with the Great Powers,? BROOKINGS REVIEW, http://www.brookingsinstitution.org/press/review/spring97/powers.htm As the U.S.-Japan alliance becomes more reciprocal, the United States must genuinely consult Japan, not merely inform it of decisions already made. Although the two countries agreed to a prior consultations process when the 1960 bilateral security pact was signed, this mechanism has never been used. Because support for U.S. military operations beyond Japan would provoke such intense domestic controversy, Tokyo appeared to prefer not to be consulted. The Japanese government has applied such strict criteria for when Washington would have to consult with Tokyo that Washington has never had to get Japan's formal permission to use bases in Japan for military operations in Southeast Asia or the Middle East. The result has been, paradoxically, that pacifist Japan has given the United States freer rein on the use of overseas bases than America's European allies. Japan's abdication of its right to be consulted has fueled public distrust in Japan about bilateral defense cooperation. A! healthier alliance demands prior consultation. As Japan musters the courage and will to say "yes" to collective defense and security missions, it should also gain the right to say "no" when it disagrees with U.S. policy. The U.S.-Japan alliance would then evolve toward something akin to America s strategic relationships with the major West European allies. Lack of prior consultation hurts the alliance Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State, 2000 [Richard, et al, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/Spelreprts/SR_JAPAN.HTM The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership, October 11] It is imperative to nurture popular support in the United States and Japan to sustain current cooperation and to open the door to new bilateral endeavors. There should be no surprises in diplomatic cooperation. Japan often has promoted ideas, such as the Asian Monetary Fund, without coordinating with Washington. The United States too often has brought Japan belatedly into its own diplomacy. Both countries suffer when policymaking-by-afterthought characterizes our relationship. It is past time for the United States to drop the image of Japanese cooperation in foreign policy as checkbook diplomacy. Japan must recognize that international leadership involves risk-taking beyond its traditional donor's role. U.S. policy must consider Japan's goals, even as it strives to ensure that our agenda is well understood and actively supported by Tokyo. Binding visible consultation is crucial Tanaka, Tokyo international relations professor, ?01

[Akihiko, United States-Japan Strategic Dialogue: Beyond the Defense Guidelines, January 15, http://www.glocomnet.or.jp/okazaki-inst/e2juproje/e2juproje.opening.html] In the alliance, as Mr. Green said, it is not always about the U.S. telling Japan what to do, but it is about both the U.S. and Japan nurturing the relationship together. On the U.S. side, there is something that people in the U.S. have to do to develop the alliance. Namely, it is not healthy to have a situation where the U.S. will always make the decisions, and Japan always does what it is told. So I think it is important that we have consultations in a more visible way at all times between the two countries. It is not desirable to have external pressure toward Japan regarding domestic political and legal issues, but I think it is important that the U.S. side, in closely watching discussions of legal reform in Japan, adopt an encouraging stance toward welcome developments. 2NC ? Genuine Consultation is Key to U.S. ? Japan Alliance Genuine consultation maintains the alliance and prevents an Asian arms race and war Manning, Progressive Policy Institute, ?95 [Robert, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Autumn, Lexis] There is clearly a rich security agenda that requires careful consideration by both governments and genuine consultation. When viewed in the totality of the relationship, the U.S.-Japan security alliance holds the potential to be sustained if it is redefined and if the other components of the relationship, particularly economic relations, can find a new equilibrium. But can it honestly be said that "if the alliance did not already exist, we would have to create it now," as Assistant Secretary of Defense Nye recently proclaimed? n5 Would the U.S. Senate approve a treaty that obligates the United States to extend a security umbrella over Japan without any reciprocal obligations? Clearly there is a bit of hyperbole in such a claim. A large array of convergent interests suggest that the security alliance makes sense for both parties. For Japan, the history of the past century has been that it has been prosperous and peaceful when in an alliance with a leading maritime power: Bri! tain in the first quarter of the century, the United States in the second half. Disaster has struck when Tokyo has been strategically independent. Moreover, in a very volatile Northeast Asia, Japan has few alternatives. There is no apparent placement for the United States as a security partner, and if Japan were to end the alliance and pursue an independent course it would lead to deep suspicion throughout the Pacific and a destabilizing arms race (both conventional and nuclear) with Korea and China. Genuine consultation is key to the alliance Manning, Progressive Policy Institute, ?95 [Robert, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Autumn, Lexis] As Japan becomes a more independent actor it will be increasingly important to improve the U.S.-Japan consultation process so that there is a clear sense of where differences and convergences lie, what belongs in the bilateral relationship, what is part of regional or global mechanisms -- and in particular where differences lie that could erode the alliance. Consultation solves mutual suspicions which threaten the alliance Smith, Boston international relations professor, ?97 [Sheila, JAPAN QUARTERLY, p. 6, October-December]

The primary goal of the guidelines review is to establish a clear and reliable basis for crisis management in the Japan-U.S. alliance. The ambiguity that surrounded the decision-making in the past was in part a factor of the nature of the Cold War confrontation between the United States and the former Soviet Union, when the overall aims of U.S. strategy were clear and Japan had a supporting role in the implementation of that strategy. Today, however, the object, timing and effectiveness of the use of military force in resolving international disputes are less predictable, and therefore will require greater coordination and consultation between the United States and Japan than has been possible in the past. Crisis management, by its very nature, requires quick and coordinate responses of governments. Consultation key to relations Consulting Japan on East Asian regional issues is critical to the durability of relations Curtis, Columbia political science professor, 2000 [Gerald, NEW PERSPECTIVES ON U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS, p. 37] The U.S.-Japan alliance has proved enormously valuable to both countries. There are no compelling reasons for the United States to want to change it fundamentally. While thee is more vigorous debate in Japan today than at any time since the early 1950s about what course its foreign and defense policies should take in the future, there is a broad consensus among both its leadership elite and the public that alliance with the United States should be maintained as the centerpiece of its foreign policy. The challenge to U.S. leaders is not to devise policies or employ an antagonistic rhetoric that suggests that the United States is less committed to sustaining this relationship than is in fact the case. American national interests will best be served by continuity rather than radical change in U.S.-Japan relations. A close and positive relationship with Japan is of critical importance in dealing with a host of regional and global issues. But given the changed economic and ! political context of U.S.-Japan relations, sustaining and strengthening this relationship will require innovative thinking and leadership by the president and the senior members of the administration. More has to be done to involve people with expertise about Japan when making important dec isions with respect to East Asia. Greater attention needs to be paid to engaging top Japanese policymakers in consultations about regional issues. The United States needs to think strategically about East Asia and place Japan at the center of that strategic thinking.

Consultation crucial to preserving the alliance and shoring up relations Green, Council on Foreign Relations, 2000 [Michael, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS, Gerald Curtis (Ed.), p. 262] The alliance also requires a better management philosophy. In this area, most of the burden is on the U.S. government, which has not maintained sufficient high-level coordination with the Japanese side. In the Clinton Administration, Japanese security

issues were managed primarily by deputy assistant secretaries in Washington, while U.S. security policy issues were managed by vice-ministers and even prime ministers in Tokyo. This particular asymmetry in the bilateral relationship is simply not sustainable. The alliance will become less than the sum of its parts unless strategic direction is consistently set at senior levels of both governments. The U.S.-Japan alliance is based on broadly shared strategic objectives and a generally complementary division of roles and missions. But these attributes do not guarantee the continued health of bilateral security relations. Like a shard that will drown if it does not move forward, the U.S. Japan alliance requires constant att! ention, strengthening, and integration.

Impacts: Alliance Collapse Causes Rearmament Alliance stops Japanese rearmament and regional proliferation Umbach, German Society for Foreign Affairs fellow, ?99 [Frank, JANE?S INTELLIGENCE REVIEW, http://www.dgap.org/texte/pyonyang2.ht ? World Get?s Wise.?] Against this background, Japan and South Korea would only be able to rely upon the USA?s extended nuclear deterrence umbrella, which has lost some of its former credibility in the multi-polar post-Cold War security environment. Nonetheless, as long as the US-Japanese security alliance is maintained ? with its dual functions of constraining as well as protecting Japan ? the ?nuclear problem? is solved and a ?nuclearisation? of Japan?s defence policies remains only a theoretical option on the future horizon. However, should the security alliance collapse, Japan would be surrounded by nuclear and potentially hostile neighbors (including perhaps a nuclear Korea). If Japan, South Korea and Taiwan were to feel insecure and isolated, they might be tempted not only to renounce their former non-nuclear weapon status but also to acquire long-range offensive maritime and air strike warfare capabilities as a deterrence option and a military alternative to TMD systems. Conventional, offe! nsive, precision-strike warfare capabilities ? intended to destroy missile launchers, storage bases, logistic sites, road or rail transport systems and C3I infrastructure ? are based on pre-emptive or even preventive strike options. Such drastically enhanced conventional offensive counterforce postures, however, would be much more destabilising for the entire region and more dangerous for China itself. In this light, China should be more concerned about a future security environment where its non-nuclear neighbours are without TMD capabilities because of the ?near-certainty of war?, particularly in an escalating crisis. Weakened alliance ensures quick regional proliferation New Republic, ?96 [December 23, Expanded Academic] If the U.S.-Japan alliance holds firm, America can look forward to sharing in the region's miraculous growth. If it decays, Japan may go nuclear to protect itself from the nuclear Chinese; South Korea and Taiwan will follow suit; pretty soon the whole region will be nuclear and nervous. Having pulled off the most remarkable economic advance witnessed by mankind, Asia could perform its nastiest reversal. Alliance collapse strengthens Japanese militarism

Nye, Harvard, ?02 [Joseph, THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN POWER, p. 24, Some politicians have started a movement to revise Article 9 of the country's constitution, which restrict, Japan's forces to self-defense. If the United States were to drop the alliance with Japan and follow the advice of those who want us to stay "offshore" and shift our allegiance back and forth to balance China and Japan, we could produce the sense of insecurity that might lead Japan to decide it had to develop its own nuclear capacity. Strong alliance prevents nuclearization Kas, Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Nonproliferation, ?03 [Yuri, WORLD AFFAIRS, Winter, p. 124) The importance of the bilateral relationship cannot be overemphasized, particularly since the role of the U.S.-Japanese security alliance in the post-cold war era has increased. The "anti-nuclearism" that has been prevalent among the Japanese public and the Liberals since 1945 makes it politically unwise for the Centrist government--which had been dominated by the Centrist Liberal Democratic Party until 1993--to opt for nuclearization. Moreover, the Japanese Self-Defense Force does not have any institutional mechanism or capability to integrate a nuclear doctrine or forces

Impacts: Alliance Solves North Korea Strong alliance deters North Korean aggression Okamoto, chair of the Japanese prime minister's Task Force on Foreign Relations, ?02 [Yukio, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Spring, Lexis] Despite its years of famine; its evaporating industrial and energy infrastructure; and its choking, inhumane society, the DPRK government still refuses to retreat to its place on the ash heap of history. Despite the poverty of the people, the North Korean military maintains an arsenal of thousands of rocket launchers and pieces of artillery -- some of which are possibly loaded with chemical and biological warheads -- awaiting the signal to wipe Seoul off the map. The DPRK's immense stock of weapons includes large numbers of Nodong missiles capable of striking Japan's western coastal regions and probably longer-range missiles capable of hitting every major Japanese city. The United States has two combat aircraft wings in the ROK, in Osan and Kunsan. In addition, some 30,000 U.S. Army troops are stationed near Seoul. Most military experts admit that the army troops serve a largely symbolic function; if an actual war were to erupt, a massive North Korean artillery bombardment c! ould pin down both the U.S. Eighth Army and the ROK armed forces at the incipient stage. The firepower the USFJ can bring to bear upon the Korean Peninsula within a matter of hours makes the U.S.-Japan alliance the Damoclean sword hanging over the DPRK. The DPRK leaders are masters of deception and manipulation, but they know that launching a military strike against the ROK will expose them to a strong and final counterstrike from U.S. forces in Japan. Genuine and binding consultation strengthens the security alliance and checks North Korean regional aggression Treverton, Pacific Council on International Policy fellow, ?02 [Gregory, San Diego Union Tribune, December 3, Lexis]

Differences also may emerge in approaches toward North Korea. Despite its own concerns about North Korea's nuclear development and missiles program, for instance, Japan will lean toward engaging Pyongyang, come what may. The Bush administration, which already has named North Korea one of three countries that form an "axis of evil," may eventually lean toward a more forceful response. Overall, however, a continued connection to the United States makes sense for Japan. But it will want a different sort of alliance. It will want to be consulted -- that hoary diplomatic word -- as an equal. (We used to joke in the 1970s that the only thing worse than not consulting Japan was . . . consulting Japan.) It will be less willing to open its checkbook, as it did for the Gulf War and more recently for the rebuilding of post-Taliban Afghanistan, when the United States decides policy more or less on its own. It will want to be consulted on a range of issues from China, to the Korean peni! nsula, to missile defense. Beyond the bother of consultations that are real -- a kind of unnatural act for official Washington -- the United States will ultimately face hard choices about its own role in Asia. A more assertive and sovereignty-conscious Japan is just one of several reasons why the United States may need to readjust the way it exercises its considerable military and political weight in Asia. While it is not out of the question that American troops could remain in Japan and South Korea in the same numbers a decade hence, it would be rash to bet policy on it. Both Japan's politics and China's sensitivities might be better served by an American presence that was mostly over the horizon but still manifestly available given the new instruments of long-range power. Ultimately, such a move may be the best way to keep contentiousness over security matters from ripping U.S.-Japan relations asunder. Impacts: Alliance Solves North Korea North Korea risks proliferation, millions of deaths and nuclear war ? only close cooperation solves. Hirsh, former Newsweek editor, ?03 [Michael, January 13, Newsweek, Factiva] Let's face it: the very reason the Bush administration wants to attack Iraq and not North Korea is because it can: it knows Iraq is less dangerous. Kim, in effect, holds South Korea, Japan and tens of thousands of U.S. troops hostage; in a matter of hours, he can cause casualties "on a scale we have not seen since World War II," says a U.S. military official in Seoul. With nearly 1.2 million troops under arms, 70 percent of them forwarddeployed, Kim Jong Il can order a crushing blitz southward much as his father did to start the 1950-53 Korean War. Not only does he almost certainly have a few nuclear bombs ready--most experts agree Saddam is some five years away from one--he possesses chemical weapons sufficient to kill millions. Kim's long-term threat is even scarier. The biggest danger to American lives for decades to come will be proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles that could fall into the hands of terrorists. On this score North Korea is far more ! of a menace. And as Rumsfeld has said, North Korea is "the world's biggest proliferator of ballistic missiles." Missile exports are thought to make up half of Pyongyang's annual $1 billion in exports; much of this technology goes to terror-generating nations in the Middle East. Kim also could build as many as 100 nuclear weapons by 2009, notes one CIA analysis. Then there is the threat of a destabilized Asia--the likeliest place for

America to be drawn into a major war decades hence. Bush officials privately concede that North Korea appears only steps away from declaring itself a nuclear power. That in turn could provoke South Korea, already questioning America as an ally, to go nuclear, which could make Japan rethink its nonnuclear posture. Nothing is likelier to make China rush into an arms race--it is now only slowly building up its forces--than a nuclear-armed Japan. And long after Saddam is in his grave, China will be Washington's biggest future strategic headache. Sad! dam, by contrast, is something of a spent force in the Muslim world. Ext: Japan is key to solve North Korea Japan is key to stable relations with North Korea Hwang, Heritage Foudnation, April 26th 2004 [Balbina Y., ?A New Security Agenda for the U.S. Japan Alliance? http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bg1749.cfm, downloaded on 7/14/04] North Korea's shocking admission to kidnapping Japanese citizens and refusal to allow their families to return to Japan, pursuit of clandestine nuclear programs in flagrant violation of international agreements and treaties, withdrawal from the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty, and proliferation of missiles6 constitute a threat to peace and stability in the region and are intended to undermine America's bilateral alliances in the region.Thus, any peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue will require Japan's strong support and cooperation in the six-party talks with North Korea. Prime Minister Koizumi made clear his intention to forge a new relationship with North Korea when he visited Pyongyang in September 2002. While North Korea dashed hopes of an immediate turnaround in bilateral relations by mishandling the issue of kidnapped Japanese citizens, Japan will likely play a key role in any future breakthrough in easing diplomatic tensions with Pyongyang. Impacts: Alliance Key to U.S. - Russia Strong alliance is key to U.S. Russian relations and Russian democratic transition Okamoto, chair of the Japanese prime minister's Task Force on Foreign Relations, ?02 [Yukio, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Spring, Lexis] In military terms, the U.S.-Japan alliance's struggle with Russia is dramatically reduced. Now the allies will need to work together to bring Russia into the circle of advanced, industrialized democratic states. Despite the Putin administration's current apparently pro-Western policies, Russia will need many decades to extinguish its long-standing profound mistrust of the United States. NATO's repeated rejections of Russian requests to be considered a candidate for membership, coupled with that body's relentless expansion toward Russia's borders, has led Russian leaders to express an aspiration to become a greater power in the Pacific. Although Russia's continuing refusal to return the Northern Territories to Japan and the lack of a peace treaty ending World War II clouds Japanese sentiment toward Russia, Japan remains the key for Russia's entry into the Pacific. In this context, Japan has a role to play as a less threatening representative of the West and as an example of n! on -- Euro-U.S. democratic tradition. Putin's personal attachment to Japan may also make the relationship between Japan and Russia an important conduit of communication

between the West and Moscow in the years to come. U.S. Russian relations are critical to Russian political and economic stability ? cooperation prevents multiple scenarios for global conflict Rumer and Sokolsky, Institute for National Strategic Studies senior research fellows, ?02 [Eugene and Nikolai, STRATEGIC FORUM, #192, May, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF192/sf192.htm Even a cursory examination of the alternatives should make clear why investing in a stable and positive relationship with Russia is in the national interest. We must not take Russia's pragmatism and ability to act in its self-interest for granted. We need to look no further than the record of Russia adrift throughout the 1990s for proof. Russia may have achieved a substantial degree of stability since the nadir of 1998 when its currency collapsed and its leadership became mired in a succession of crises and corruption scandals. However, this achievement and Russia's constructive stance in the international arena should not be considered irreversible. Russia's ability to act in its self-interest will not always translate into compliance with U.S. interests. But dealing with a responsible and coherent leadership presiding over a stable and secure Russia is preferable to coping with an erratic Russia. In the short and medium term, U.S. efforts to combat proliferation and terror! ism would face much tougher odds without Russian cooperation. Despite Russia's diminished stature in the international arena, its cooperative approach to U.S.-Russian relations since September 11 has had a positive, soothing impact on trans-Atlantic relations, making it possible for the United States in turn to focus its diplomatic and political energies where they have been needed most. The record of the 1990s offers an important lesson: a weak Russia is in the interest of no one. The ability of Russia to put its own house in order--from securing its nuclear weapons to pumping oil and gas to global markets--is an important element of U.S. national and international security. The danger to U.S. interests is not from a potential challenger to President Putin, who might shy away from a good personal relationship with his American counterpart, but from Russia failing to consolidate its political and economic accomplishments of the last few years. In the long run, U.S. interests! would be well served by a cooperative relationship with Russia, as envisioned by President Bush. Russia is by no measure likely to regain its global superpower status. However, as a regional power, it could be a useful collaborator with the United States-from helping to balance China to supplying energy to key markets to exercising restraint in critical areas of conventional and WMD proliferation. Thus, shaping positive and collaborative long-term Russian attitudes is an important U.S. objective. Impacts: Alliance Collapse = Regional War Alliance collapse triggers regional war Okamoto, chair of the Japanese prime minister's Task Force on Foreign Relations, ?02 [Yukio, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Spring, Lexis] Fifty years have passed since Japan and the United States signed the original security treaty and more than 40 years have passed since the current 1960 treaty came into force. Neither Japan nor the United States has a desire to alter the treaty obligations, much less abrogate the alliance. Nevertheless, exploring potential alternatives to the alliance is

worthwhile, if only to illuminate why it is likely to survive. For Japan, treaty abrogation would result in a security vacuum that could be filled in only one of three ways. The first is armed neutrality, which would mean the development of a Japan ready to repel any threat, including the region's existing and incipient nuclear forces. The second is to establish a regional collective security arrangement. This option would require that the major powers in Asia accept a reduction of their troop strengths down to Japanese levels and accept a common political culture -- democracy. Neither of these conditions is likely to be met! for decades. The third option, the one outlined in the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, is for Japan's security to be the responsibility of a permanent UN military force, ready to deploy at a moment's notice to preserve peace and stability in the region. Such a force, of course, does not yet exist. None of the three possible replacements for the Japan-U.S. alliance is realistic. The alternatives also seem certain to increase the likelihood of war in the region, not decrease it -- the only reason that Japan would want to leave the U.S.Japan alliance. An overview of aftereffects on the United States of an abrogation of the alliance runs along similar lines. In the absence of a robust, UN-based security system, relations between the giant countries of Asia would become uncertain and competitive -too precarious a situation for the United States and the world. The United States would lose access to the facilities on which it relies for power projection in the region. Much more imp! ortantly, it would also lose a friend -- a wealthy, mature, and loyal friend. Given the magnitude of the danger that an end of the alliance would pose to both Japan and the United States, both sides will likely want to maintain their security relationship for many years to come. A completely new world would have to emerge for Japan and the United States to no longer need each other. Despite frictions over trade, supposed Japanese passivity, purported U.S. arrogance, and the myriad overwrought "threats to the alliance," the truth is that this military alliance between two democratic states is well-nigh unbreakable -- because there are no acceptable alternatives. Impacts: Alliance Key to Taiwan Conflict Alliance is key to a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue ? prevents war with China Okamoto, chair of the Japanese prime minister's Task Force on Foreign Relations, ?02 [Yukio, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Spring, Lexis] Opinion is divided about the rise of China as a political, economic, and military power. Some view China's admission into the World Trade Organization, the emergence of a civil society in the country, and the decline of the Communist Party's revolutionary ideology as hints of a bright future in which China will seek peaceful coexistence with the rest of the world while its political and human rights practices slowly evolve toward global norms. Others see echoes of the rise of the great imperial powers in the nineteenth century and foresee a fearful global struggle against a vengeful, recidivist Chinese state. Recent events, including the Chinese government's quiet support of the U.S. war on terrorism and the absence of criticism of Japan's 2001 dispatch of the SDF, tend to support the first, more optimistic view. Regardless of whether China's development takes the bright path or the fearful one, however, reason for concern exists on one issue: the resolution of the status of!

Taiwan. Chinese citizens from all walks of life have an attachment to the reunification of Taiwan and the mainland that transcends reason. The U.S.-Japan alliance represents a significant hope for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan problem. Both Japan and the United States have clearly stated that they oppose reunification by force. When China conducted provocative missile tests in the waters around Taiwan in 1996, the United States sent two aircraft carrier groups into nearby waters as a sign of its disapproval of China's belligerent act. Japan seconded the U.S. action, raising in Chinese minds the possibility that Japan might offer logistical and other support to its ally in the event of hostilities. Even though intervention is only a possibility, a strong and close tie between Japanese and U.S. security interests guarantees that the Chinese leadership cannot afford to miscalculate the consequences of an unprovoked attack on Taiwan. The alliance backs up Japan's basic st! ance that the two sides need to come to a negotiated solution.

Impacts: Alliance Key to Taiwan Conflict Taiwan conflict escalates into a global nuclear war ? ending civilization Straits Times, 2000 [June, 25, No one gains in war over Taiwan] THE DOOMSDAY SCENARIO - THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -horror of horrors -raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of! power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using n!

uclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation. There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivab! le, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else. Gen Ridgeway recalled that the biggest mistake the US made during the Korean War was to assess Chinese actions according to the American way of thinking. "Just when everyone believed that no sensible commander would march south of the Yalu, the Chinese troops suddenly appeared," he recalled. (The Yalu is the river which borders China and North Korea, and the crossing of the river marked China's entry into the war against the Americans). "I feel uneasy if now somebody were to tell me that they bet China would not do this or that," he said in a recent interview given to the Chinese press. Impacts: Alliance Key to U.S. Hegemony Relations are critical to U.S. hegemony and power projection Kazushi, military security analyst, ?99 [Ogawa, JAPAN QUARTERLY, Spring 1999, p. 19-20. (DRGOC/D496)] First, the United States cannot maintain global preponderance with Japan. Second, in military terms, the alliance with Japan is the most symmetric of America?s alliances. The first point is obvious from Japan?s unique role as America?s power projection platform. U.S. military bases in all other allied countries are forward bases for responding to specific regional threats. For instance, bases in the Republic of Korea (South Korea) are for deterring ? and failing that ? fighting ? a war on the peninsula by deploying forces in response to military threats from North Korea. The immense bases in NATO Europe are also for meeting regional threats, as were those in the Philippines. In contrast, U.S. bases in Japan provide the bulk of support for the Seventh Fleet and III Marine Expeditionary Force, whose area of responsibility stretches from Hawaii to the Cape of Good Hope ? one half of the world! Such a power projection platform is vital for America?s maintenance of a position fro! m which it can claim global leadership U.S. hegemony prevents nuclear war Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND, 1995 (THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Spring 1995, p. online) Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises

leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S! . leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.

Impacts: Alliance key to solve terrorism Close cooperation between Japan and the US can thwart emerging global threats Hwang, writer for the Backgrounder, April 26th 2004 [Balbina Y., ?A New Security Agenda for the U.S. Japan Alliance? http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bg1749.cfm, downloaded on 7/14/04] The U.S.-Japan alliance was created in the aftermath of World War II and became the anchor for building stability and prosperity in Northeast Asia during the Cold War. The current security environment, however, is dramatically different. Some Cold War threats such as North Korea persist, while new threats from non-state actors, including terrorists, have emerged. Continued close cooperation between the United States and Japan could prove critical to defeating these threats. Answers To: Article 9/pacificsm/taboo stops rearm Article 9 and Pacificism don?t stop rearmament AUSTRALIAN FINANCIAL REVIEW, April 7, 2003, p. 16. One of Japan's most impressive young politicians, Taro Kono, says support for constitutional reform is growing. "People are getting more realistic," he says. "Not many people still believe that if you don't have armed forces, no one is going to attack you. I don't think anyone believes it after [September 11, 2001] or the North Korean missile shootings. I think parliament is getting ready even to do constitutional reform. We are getting close to the two-thirds majority." US embassy officials tactfully say it's a domestic matter. But Washington clearly supports change. A report in October 2000, from a bipartisan working group on US-Japan relations, concluded that Japan's prohibition against collective self-defence was "a constraint on alliance co-operation". "Lifting this prohibition would allow for closer and more efficient security co-operation," it said. Numerous indicators prove checks on rearmament don?t matter Wall, Cambridge Center for International Studies, ?03 [David, JAPAN TIMES, February 2, 2003, p. online. Recently we have seen Japanese gun boats sink a North Korean vessel on the high seas

and sail to support United States-led forces in wars against Afghanistan and Iraq. Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, which is supposed to outlaw such practices, has been effectively jettisoned. We have heard calls for Japan to develop nuclear weapons, and we have heard calls for the Japanese air force to carry out preemptive strikes against nuclear installations in North Korea. What we have not heard is Koizumi taking any principled stand against any of this. What we are hearing instead is calls for Japan to become more assertive on security issues, for example in the recently published report, "New Era, New Vision." This report was prepared for the prime minister by a task force led by Yukio Okamoto, an adviser on foreign relations to the Japanese Cabinet. Taboo weakening now Kas, Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Nonproliferation, ?03 [Yuri, WORLD AFFAIRS, Winter, p. 124) Japan's "nuclear taboo" since 1945 seems to be weakening, partly because of a generation change. Debate over military and nuclear issues is not taboo anymore, and the Japanese have finally started to talk about "security," which has increased Japan's Centrists' pragmatism on national security. This cultural factor should not be underestimated. Until the early 1990s, Japan was the only developed state where few courses on security studies were taught at higher education institutions. Therefore, it has been difficult for the Japanese-both the public and policy makers-to grasp a basic knowledge of nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy, which is common in other developed states. Even today Japanese state universities do not offer a course on security studies. Nuclear taboo has weakened NEWSWEEK, May 5, 2003, p. 32. For Beijing, the damage Pyongyang is doing to its strategic backyard is probably the most compelling reason to ratchet up the pressure. "If this goes badly," says David Shambaugh, a professor of Chinese politics at George Washington University, "not only do they get a nuclear North Korea, but possibly a nuclear Japan, South Korea and Taiwan." Chinese officials are keenly aware that Japanese policymakers have begun to shed their "nuclear allergy" in the months since Pyongyang acknowledged its uraniumbased weapons program. Although personally opposed to a nuclear option, Diet member Ichita Yamamoto says, "We should start by seriously considering a capacity to attack missile bases in North Korea. Answers To: Japanese attitudes prevent nuclear rearmament Attitudes toward nuclear weapons could change quickly Walker, CSIS Japan chair, ?02 [Elliot, JAPAN TIMES, August 5, 2002, p. online. But opinions can change, can't they? Such must be the rationale for questioning Japan's nonnuclear policy. Japan's democratic system will keep in check any nuclear militarism for now. But Japan's security environment is changing, and so is Japanese military policy. Political conditions could change ? triggers rearmament AUSTRALIAN FINANCIAL REVIEW, ?03 [April 7, 2003, p. 16. Nuclear weapons are still taboo, though the constraints are political rather than

constitutional or technical. In March 1959, then prime minister Nobusuke Kishi told parliament that while Japan had no intention of acquiring nuclear weapons, "speaking in terms of legal interpretation of the constitution, there is nothing to prevent the maintaining of the minimum amount of nuclear weapons for self-defence". Nor is there a technical obstacle. One nuclear expert recently told the AFR Japan had 70 tonnes of plutonium in storage. North Korea is considered to be a nuclear power because authorities cannot account for between 6 and 8 kilograms of plutonium. The same expert said that, if the political environment changed, Japan could produce a crude nuclear weapon in three or four days.

Answers To TMD Disad Not unique ? Missile Defense coop is a done deal Business Week, ?03 [July 14, Lexis] Also in June, the government approved a plan to produce with the Pentagon a Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3) surface-to-air guided missile air-defense system. That could lead to a sea-based missile system designed to deter an attack from North Korea, says Masashi Nishihara, an international relations professor at Japan's National Defense Academy. Japan fears an assault from Pyongyang, which may be more likely to strike at Tokyo than at South Korea in any face-off with the U.S. Japan could even be readying to remove the greatest taboo of them all. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party has released a national security analysis that suggests Japan consider revising its war-renouncing Constitution, which was essentially written by U.S. occupiers. No impact - TMD not destabilizing ? China won?t be threatened Inside the Pentagon, 8 ? 17 ? 03 [Factiva] U.S. missile defense plans would not necessarily destabilize Asia if the United States handles the issue carefully and takes steps to avoid alienating China, according to a study released last week by the Atlantic Council of the United States. The nonpartisan Washington-based research institute believes well-developed missile defenses in Asia may prevent instability, though such a policy would require Washington to continue discussing plans in public and consulting closely with key states. Most missile defense systems under development will not be ready for several years, giving U.S. policymakers time to consider various options, according to the report's authors, who include former under secretaries of defense Walter Slocombe and Jacques Gansler as well, as retired Air Force Gen. Michael Carns and C. Richard Nelson, director of the Atlantic Council's program on international security, China decided some time ago how to cope with U.S. plans for a missile defense system in ! East Asia, according to the report. "The long lead times for developing and deploying missile defenses, combined with the transparency of programs and regular briefings abroad by U.S. officials, suggest that deployment of missile defenses need not be destabilizing," the report states. "Most of the systems currently in research and development will probably not be ready for fielding for several years and, even when they are deployed, China should be confident that they do not pose a threat to its deterrent capabilities."

China realizes it?s a done deal ? they also don?t perceive Japan TMD as a threat ? Taiwan is key and the counterplan doesn?t make TMD deployment in Taiwan more likely Greeen, Council on Foreign Relations, ?01 [United States-Japan Strategic Dialogue: Beyond the Defense Guidelines , January 15, Michael, http://www.glocomnet.or.jp/okazaki-inst/e2juproje/e2juproje1.tmd.html] Another reason is, I think, that the Chinese side has realized that the U.S. and Japan are going to move forward incrementally with missile defense, regardless of Chinese criticisms at this point. There are other reasons such as cost and feasibility for why we might not do it, but I think the Chinese side realizes their complaints will not stop us from moving forward. What we heard in Beijing--in a frank dialogue with Chinese counterparts--was very little about U.S.-Japan TMD. Now what they're worried about is U.S.-Taiwan TMD, which is what frightens them because of the political implications. Alliance reassures China by checking Japan Cossa, Pacific Forum president, ?97 [Frank, U.S.-JAPAN BILATERAL DYNAMICS, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books%20%201997/Strength%20Through%20Cooperation%201997/stcch10.html] The U.S.-Japan alliance plays another crucial role in Korean security today and after reunification by providing Korea with a certain (although varying) degree of confidence that Japan will not become the future threat. Anti-Japanese sentiments are already proving to be a unifying force in Sino-ROK relations and could have significant ramifications on the postreunification security framework for Northeast Asia. The de facto three-way relationship among the United States, Japan, and the ROK has, as one of its few unifying factors, the common bond provided by the long-standing alliances between the United States and each of the two former bitter rivals. ROK-Japan cooperation is important to long-term stability in Asia and, more immediately, appears crucial to the success of the U.S.-initiated Agreed Framework and the Korean Peninsula Economic Development Organization (KEDO) efforts to denuclearize North Korea. Answers To: TMD Disad Turn - Japanese TMD checks North Korean Threat O?Hanlon, Brookings, ?01 [United States-Japan Strategic Dialogue: Beyond the Defense Guidelines , January 15, Michael, http://www.glocomnet.or.jp/okazaki-inst/e2juproje/e2juproje1.tmd.html] However, there is still a military confrontation on the peninsula that has not been mitigated, that has not been reduced in any meaningful way by the process of dente. So I am trying to sound like an optimist, but a cautious one who believes that the best way to approach North Korea is with carrots and sticks -- or carrots and deterrence. Since the early 1990s, North Korea has acquired an arsenal of perhaps 100 Nodong missiles that are capable of reaching Japan. Right now the alliance has no way to deal with that capability. In theory, North Korea could try to use those missiles, either directly in an attack against Japan, or to put psychological pressure on Tokyo during a crisis. So I think we should use more carrots, and in the case of TMD, perhaps a little more deterrence as well, with Pyongyang. North Korea risks proliferation, millions of deaths and nuclear war ? only close

cooperation solves. Hirsh, former Newsweek editor, ?03 [Michael, January 13, Newsweek, Factiva] Let's face it: the very reason the Bush administration wants to attack Iraq and not North Korea is because it can: it knows Iraq is less dangerous. Kim, in effect, holds South Korea, Japan and tens of thousands of U.S. troops hostage; in a matter of hours, he can cause casualties "on a scale we have not seen since World War II," says a U.S. military official in Seoul. With nearly 1.2 million troops under arms, 70 percent of them forwarddeployed, Kim Jong Il can order a crushing blitz southward much as his father did to start the 1950-53 Korean War. Not only does he almost certainly have a few nuclear bombs ready--most experts agree Saddam is some five years away from one--he possesses chemical weapons sufficient to kill millions. Kim's long-term threat is even scarier. The biggest danger to American lives for decades to come will be proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles that could fall into the hands of terrorists. On this score North Korea is far more ! of a menace. And as Rumsfeld has said, North Korea is "the world's biggest proliferator of ballistic missiles." Missile exports are thought to make up half of Pyongyang's annual $1 billion in exports; much of this technology goes to terror-generating nations in the Middle East. Kim also could build as many as 100 nuclear weapons by 2009, notes one CIA analysis. Then there is the threat of a destabilized Asia--the likeliest place for America to be drawn into a major war decades hence. Bush officials privately concede that North Korea appears only steps away from declaring itself a nuclear power. That in turn could provoke South Korea, already questioning America as an ally, to go nuclear, which could make Japan rethink its nonnuclear posture. Nothing is likelier to make China rush into an arms race--it is now only slowly building up its forces--than a nuclear-armed Japan. And long after Saddam is in his grave, China will be Washington's biggest future strategic headache. Sad! dam, by contrast, is something of a spent force in the Muslim world. Not Unique ? Japan is deploying missile defense now Berkofsky, European Institute for Asian Studies, 9 ? 12 ? 03 [Alan, ASIA TIMES, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/EI12Dh01.html] Japan should be able to shoot down North Korean missiles on its own. This is the most recent announcement from Japan's Defense Agency, and it is already causing the usual controversy in Japan and protests from its neighbors in East Asia. Last month the 2003 edition of Japan's White Paper for Defense urged the country's policymakers finally to give the green light for missile defense in order to be prepared to deal with "unpredictable threats, such as ballistic missile and terrorist attacks". The Defense Agency followed up on the White Paper and is requesting 200 billion yen (US$1.7 billion) for fiscal 2004 and 2005 to buy US Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3) anti-missile systems as well as US SM-3s (Standard Missile 3). he SM-3s, to be deployed on Aegis destroyers, are designed to intercept incoming missiles from outer space, and the PAC-3 system, deployed at four ground-to-air missile units, are set to shoot down missiles before they hit the ground. Answers To TMD Disad Missile defenses reduce the risks of nuclear conflict in several ways

Utgoff, Institute for Defense Analysis, ?02 [Victor, SURVIVAL, Summer, p. 92-3] Missile defences for the states that take may have to protect others from aggression backed with nuclear weapons are also important for other indirect purposes. First, by largely suppressing the effectiveness of a prospective aggressor's nuclear-armed missiles, defences could ruin his confidence that potential protectors would see intervention as too risky and allow his aggression to succeed. Thus, defences would largely restore the degree of effective deterrence of aggression that had existed before the prospective aggressor had acquired its missiles and nuclear weapons. Second, missile defences are also important for drawing together and maintaining coalitions to confront nuclear-armed aggressors. Unless reasonably strong defences can be provided, states other than the US and those immediately and directly threatened by the aggressor might not be willing to join." But the legitimacy provided by broad coalitions for the kinds of actions that might prove necessary in confron! ting nuclear-armed aggressors could be especially important. In particular, if nuclear retaliation were to prove necessary, the US should not be seen as having acted unilaterally. Third, if a nuclear-armed state did launch a nuclear attack, US and allied missile defences could save significantly more lives than one might at first think. While reducing losses suffered by the US and its allies is the most important and direct purpose of the defences, these reductions could also justify a less destructive retaliation. More specifically, every US or allied citizen saved by the defence could mean that one of the aggressor's citizens is saved as well. Fourth, missile defences could substantially alleviate the pressures for quick action by the US and its allies. For example, by sharply reducing the potential damage an opponent's missiles might cause, defences could allow protectors to take a 'wait and see' approach to any initial aggression, rather than risk starting a war by a pre! emptive attack against the opponent's weapons. Avoiding unnecessary preemptive attacks would be especially important if destruction of the opponent's weapons were to impose high risks on people in surrounding areas. Similarly, by reducing the damage wreaked by an aggressor's initial attack, effective missile defences could give decision-makers more scope to delay retaliation. Delay would allow more careful consideration of how to respond, including closer consultation with allies and others involved. This would be important in obtaining a broad legitimisation of US actions. Of course, the US might not want to exploit this possibility in any given case, perhaps seeing very prompt retaliation as most likely to suppress the further use of nuclear weapons in the situation at hand. Effective defences could also largely suppress any final lashing-out by the attacker if he were faced with total defeat. This, of course, would make it easier for the US and its coalition partners to ! pursue the attacker's total defeat. Better yet, if the prospective protectors had missile defences, a nuclear-armed state could no longer assume that its opponents could not afford to drive it to the point where it had nothing left to lose. With total defeat a more credible prospect, such aggression should be better deterred. Note that in all but the first of the foregoing arguments, the effect of missile defences is to increase the freedom of action of the US and its allies. Defences would permit less destructive or less immediate retaliation, make it less risky to forgo or, alternatively, to carry out preemptive attacks, and would reduce the risks and potential costs of imposing total defeat on an aggressor. In

some circumstances, the US and its allies might see no advantage in such increased freedom of action. But the enhancements to this freedom come bundled together, and on balance, seem well worth having. In general, increased freedom of action for the protectors shoul! d translate into less promising options for aggression. Defences are also important for the morale of the states that would be expected to defend against aggression backed by nuclear weapons. If the need to confront such aggression arises, the US and its coalition partners would feel entitled to the added assurance that such defences would provide. Facing aggression without such defences, in the knowledge that they could have been provided, could create a certain resentment at having to run unnecessary risks. Answers To China Disad Turn ? China wants a strong alliance ? it?s the best check on Japan Johnson, Harvard government professor, ?03 [Alastair Iain, International Security, Spring, Lexis] As for the U.S.-Japan alliance, Chinese attitudes are exceedingly complex. Since the announcement of guidelines for revising the U.S.-Japan security treaty in 1996 to specify more clearly the Japanese role in support of U.S. military operations in the region, Chinese leaders have been increasingly worried about the possibility that this alliance could become a tool for defending a permanently separated or even a formally independent Taiwan. 9 Many Chinese analysts believe, however, that a Japan within a bilateral alliance with the United States is still better than a Japan outside of such constraints as long as this alliance is not used to provide military cover for an independent Taiwan. More evidence? Cossa, Pacific Forum president, ?97 [Frank, U.S.-JAPAN BILATERAL DYNAMICS, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books%20%201997/Strength%20Through%20Cooperation%201997/stcch10.html] The U.S.-Japan alliance plays another crucial role in Korean security today and after reunification by providing Korea with a certain (although varying) degree of confidence that Japan will not become the future threat. Anti-Japanese sentiments are already proving to be a unifying force in Sino-ROK relations and could have significant ramifications on the postreunification security framework for Northeast Asia. The de facto three-way relationship among the United States, Japan, and the ROK has, as one of its few unifying factors, the common bond provided by the long-standing alliances between the United States and each of the two former bitter rivals. ROK-Japan cooperation is important to long-term stability in Asia and, more immediately, appears crucial to the success of the U.S.-initiated Agreed Framework and the Korean Peninsula Economic Development Organization (KEDO) efforts to denuclearize North Korea. ECONOMIC TIES PREVENT SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT Robert Sutter is a professor of Asian studies at Georgetown University's School of

Foreign Service, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Autumn, 2002, p. 37 The most important of these factors is that both the Japanese and Chinese governments are domestically focused on the economic development of their countries. They believe that economic development requires a prolonged, peaceful, and cooperative relationship with their Asian neighbors, notably one another. China depends heavily on Japan for economic assistance, for technology and investment, and as a market for Chinese goods. Japan is increasingly dependent on China as a market, a source of imports, and an offshore manufacturing base. NO RISK OF A SERIOUS SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT Robert Sutter is a professor of Asian studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Autumn, 2002, p. 37 Fortunately, China's and Japan's recent policy and behavior in Asia show little sign of becoming seriously divisive for the foreseeable future. Neither Beijing nor Tokyo appears to give primary attention to offsetting the influence of the other in seeking their respective regional goals; they are focused on more general priorities and concerns. Although Sino-Japanese differences may flare from time to time over issues grounded in the two countries' changing power and influence in Asian and world affairs, the differences are bounded within confines that help to avoid serious disruption and to preserve regional stability and prosperity. China-Japan DA Answers TURN: SINO-JAPANESE ENTENTE THREATENS U.S. HEGEMONY Robert Sutter is a professor of Asian studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Autumn, 2002, p. 37 Realistically, the probability is low that a Sino-Japanese entente may emerge that would seriously complicate the existing U.S. security architecture in Asia or possibly challenge the leading U.S. economic role in the region Sino-U.S. DA Answers CHINA DOES NOT SUPPORT A BREAK-DOWN IN U.S.-JAPANESE RELATIONS Robert Manning, Senior Fellow at the Progressive Policy Institute, THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Winter 1994, p. 45 The PRC has no desire to see a breakdown in the U.S.-Japan security relationship that would result in a withdrawal of U.S. forward-deployed forces and its nuclear umbrella, a fully independent Japan, and probable risk for China-Japan economic cooperation. This sequence of events would almost certainly produce a new arms race, one compounded by the North Korean nuclear threat, which at the G-7 summit of July 1993 led Tokyo to publicly not rule out the unthinkable: becoming a nuclear power. This was not a new Japanese position. Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi in 1957 had previously stated,

"Depending on future developments in nuclear weaponry I do not think that the Constitution bans nuclear weapons if they are of a defensive character." This view was reaffirmed in Japan's 1970 White Paper on Defense.

Affirmative Consult Answers Japan will say no [insert evidence specific to your aff] Japan has a track record of saying no Schwenninger, World Policy Institute, ?95 [Sherle, WORLD POLICY JOURNAL, Summer, Expanded Academic] A second explanation has to do with the long buildup of resentment against the United States caused by an endless stream of American demands over the last two decades. This has helped produce a new generation of leaders, both among the reform politicians and the bureaucrats, that is more resistant to American concerns. In particular, key bureaucrats in the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Japan blame American pressure in the 1985-86 period for the buildup of the asset bubble that still plagues the Japanese economy, especially the banking sector, which has been hurt by falling stock and property prices from their earlier inflated levels. "Never again" has become the guiding philosophy of the members of this group - a slogan that has unfortunately blinded them to Japan's own self-interest. Hence Tokyo's resistance to Washington's calls for an easier monetary policy. TURN ? Relations lead to TMD which causes nuclear war A. Japan may endorse a TMD, but public opinion is critical Saunders, CNS East Asia Nonproliferation Program director, ?03 [Phillip, Theater Missile Defense and Northeast Asian Security, http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_3b.html] Japanese deployment of an advanced TMD system is not a fait accompli, however. Decisions on development and deployment are tied to a variety of political and technical variables including: changing threat perceptions (especially regarding North Korea); cost; effectiveness of the technology; legal and constitutional issues related to bilateral cooperation with the United States; and the impact on Sino-Japanese relations and global arms control affairs. Japan has not yet had a serious public debate about TMD, and its ultimate decision on deployment remains unclear. Problems have arisen in the development of TMD that call into doubt the participation of U.S. allies in East Asia. A principal concern is TMD's military effectiveness. Studies of the Patriot system during the Gulf War show that it was minimally effective at best. The Patriot's difficulty in defeating comparatively unsophisticated Iraqi Scud missiles raises questions about the likely effectiveness of upgraded Patriot! systems. In addition, Theater High Altitude Area Defense system (THAAD) tests to date have not performed up to expectations. After a series of initial test failures, THAAD recently demonstrated the capability to successfully intercept a test missile, but questions remain about its overall effectiveness and reliability. Consequently, Japan and Taiwan remain hesitant to fully endorse TMD. B. Prior consultation boosts Japanese support for TMD, overcomes public opposition to collective security

Mochizuki, Brookings, ?97 [Mike, BROOKINGS REVIEW, 3/22, http://www.brookingsinstitution.org/dybdocroot/press/review/spring97/powers.htm] As the U.S.-Japan alliance becomes more reciprocal, the United States must genuinely consult Japan, not merely inform it of decisions already made. Although the two countries agreed to a prior consultations process when the 1960 bilateral security pact was signed, this mechanism has never been used. Because support for U.S. military operations beyond Japan would provoke such intense domestic controversy, Tokyo appeared to prefer not to be consulted. The Japanese government has applied such strict criteria for when Washington would have to consult with Tokyo that Washington has never had to get Japan's formal permission to use bases in Japan for military operations in Southeast Asia or the Middle East. The result has been, paradoxically, that pacifist Japan has given the United States freer rein on the use of overseas bases than America's European allies. Japan's abdication of its right to be consulted has fueled public distrust in Japan about bilateral defense cooperation. A! healthier alliance demands prior consultation. As Japan musters the courage and will to say "yes" to collective defense and security missions, it should also gain the right to say "no" when it disagrees with U.S. policy. The U.S.-Japan alliance would then evolve toward something akin to America s strategic relationships with the major West European allies. Affirmative Consult Answers C. Japanese TMD angers China, causes a regional arms race, and a preemptive attack on Taiwan Bergsten, Institute for International Economics, ?01 [Fred, NO MORE BASHING: BUILDING A NEW JAPAN-UNITED STATES ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP, Takatoshu Ito and Marcus Nolan, Eds., 229-230] Enhanced cooperation between Japan and the United States has not been welcomed by either Pyongyang or Beijing. The Chinese criticized both the 1996 United-States Japan Joint Security Declaration and the 1997 Security Guidelines revision, and have objected vociferously to bilateral cooperation on TMD and the possibility of cooperation on NMD. The Chinese believe that these missile defense schemes are aimed at them. They see TMD as fostering Taiwanese independence by rendering ineffective their ballistic missile threat against the island, and NMD as negating their nuclear forces and promoting US hegemony and Japanese remilitarization. Their likely response is to accelerate the modernization and deployment of their nuclear-armed missiles (to preserve their deterrent against these presumably imperfectly effective systems), while exploring the possibility of developing their own antimissile system, possibly in collaboration with Russia. In the extreme case, China might attem! pt preemptive military action against Taiwan before the deployment of an extended deterrence-enhancing US NMD system. Of course, the impact of TMD and NMD on security affairs in Northeast Asia is ambiguous, owing to the uncertainties about the effectiveness of the technologies and the reactions of the state actors. Japanese analysts understand that the missile defense programs potentially enhance Japanese credibility of US extended deterrence. At the same time, the deployment of missile defenses could spark a regional arms race. As one commentary put it, Japan at present ?is like a poker

player who keeps anteing up and waiting to see the next card before deciding to stay in the game or fold. D. Taiwan conflict escalates into a global nuclear war - ending civilization Straits Times, 2000 [June, 25, No one gains in war over Taiwan] THE DOOMSDAY SCENARIO -THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -horror of horrors -raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of powe! r in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase: Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear wea! pons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilization. There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Annaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be! ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else. Gen Ridgeway recalled that the biggest mistake the US made during the Korean War was to assess Chinese actions according to the American way of thinking. "Just when everyone believed that no sensible commander would march south of the Yalu, the Chinese troops suddenly appeared, " he recalled. (The Yalu is the river which borders China and North

Korea, and the crossing of the river marked China's entry into the war against the Americans). "I feel uneasy if now somebody were to tell me that they bet China would not do this or that," he said in a recent interview given to the Chinese press. Affirmative Consult Answers CONSULTATIONS FAIL BECAUSE ALLIES FIND OUT IN ADVANCE AND THINK WE ARE PRESSURING THEM INTO IT Muskie Newsom, Georgetown Associate Dean, THE CONGRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY, 1986, p. 102 In general, before an administration can talk with allies meaningfully, it must obtain the concurrence of the executive departments involved and the Congress. This leads in many cases to publish revelations of and administration?s intentions before the allies are ever consulted. The allies feel they are being presented with a fait accompli rather than being asked for their views prior to a decision. TURN: BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS UNDERMINE MULTILATERAL APPROACHES TO SECURITY Raymond Vernon, Harvard Business Professor, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Summer 1990, p. 57 Bilateral relations between Japan and the United States promise to remain critical for both countries in the foreseeable future. On economic issues, however, the bilateral approach inescapably will continue to generate interactions of a destructive kind. What may prevent such developments from turning into more active hostility is that neither country can inflict great harm upon the other without imposing great costs upon itself in the process. Likewise, there are few bilateral issues that do not intimately affect third countries as well. As a result, most of the disputes that arise between Japan and the United States involve issues in which third countries have a legitimate interest, suggesting the desirability of shifting to multilateral settings wherever the choice exists. In the case of Japan and the United States, however, the reasons for avoiding bilateral efforts to resolve large problems or disputes are strengthened greatly by the basic incompatibilities in th! e decision-making processes of the two governments. As a result, when the United States and Japan engage in two-way conversations, it appears that they cannot hear each other. Inadequate as existing multilateral institutions may be for the development of policy and the settlement of disputes, therefore, they are measurably superior to the bilateral channels of Japanese-U.S. relations. Japan already shows small signs of recognizing this critical point, and it is time for the United States to recognize it, as well. Affirmative Consult Answers TURN: CHINA A. IN THE STATUS QUO, THE U.S. IS BALANCING RELATIONS WITH JAPAN AND CHINA

Robert Sutter is a professor of Asi an studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Autumn, 2002, p. 37 Considering other external forces, no government with an interest in Asian affairs would benefit from greater Sino-Japanese friction, including the United States. The Bush administration has been careful to balance its strong pro-Japan slant by reaffirming its continued interest in closer, mutually beneficial relations with China, designed in part to sustain regional peace and stability. B. U.S.-JAPAN MILITARY COOPERATION SCARES CHINA Robert Sutter is a professor of Asian studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Autumn, 2002, p. 37 On the other side, long-standing Chinese concerns about Japan's impressive military capabilities have increased since 1996 as a result of U.S.-Japanese agreements broadening Japan's strategic role in Asia to include recent Japanese naval deployments in the Indian Ocean. Recent plans for a Japanese-U.S.-Australian strategic dialogue have elicited repeated expressions of concern from China. Affirmative Consult Answers TURN: SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICTS A. NOTHING WILL THREATEN SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS IN THE STATUS QUO Robert Sutter is a professor of Asian studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Autumn, 2002, p. 37 Little appears to be on the horizon that will substantially change the recent balance between friction and cooperation in Sino-Japanese relations in a way that would pose serious challenges for U.S. leadership in Asia or U.S. interest in regional stability and development. The shock of the September 11 attacks on the United States along with the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan had the effect of somewhat reducing China's relative influence in Asia while providing Japan an opportunity to expand its role in South and Central Asia. Policy changes after the presidential elections in South Korea late this year could upset the delicate equilibrium on the peninsula, though few see viable alternatives to some continued South Korean engagement with the North. The Chinese leadership transition in 2002 -- 2003 is not expected to result in significant changes in policy toward Asia, as Beijing strives to maintain a calm external environment and focuses. B. IMPROVING U.S.-JAPAN TIES WILL ENCOURAGE JAPAN TO ADOPT A COMPETITIVE STANCE TOWARD CHINA

Robert Sutter is a professor of Asian studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Autumn, 2002, p. 37 Regional military pressures, stemming from such developments as the rise of China's military power or North Korea's military posture, may lead Japan to strengthen its ties with the United States. These pressures also may lead Japan to consider a more competitive stance toward China. C. SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT CAUSES WAR IN ASIA Richard Samuels, Ford International Relations Professor, MIT, THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCES: PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE, pp. 6-7 The same forces that lead China and Japan into an adversarial relationship in the first place might well push them to the brink of war. From a U.S. perspective, this would be disastrous, for several reasons: -War between two of America?s largest trading partners would be devastating to the U.S. economy -U.S. involvement would be difficult to avoid in a war between a former ally and a former enemy -War between a nuclear power and a threshold nuclear power would push the envelope in new and disconcerting ways -War between the two would be another) humanitarian disaster -Nuclearization in Japan would press both Koreas to do the same, and perhaps pressure other Asian nations to follow suite.Even if China and Japan did not go to war, a Cold War between the two great powers could impose high costs on the region, and indeed the globe, if the last simmering conflict between two giants on the world scene has taught us anything. At a minimum, the remarkable (and hard-earned) domestic politics stability in Japan would further unravel, creating even greater uncertainties for its foreign policy and its evolving role as provider of global public goods. Affirmative Consult Answers TURN: TURN: EXPECTATIONS OF DEFERENCE TOWARD THE U.S. INCREASE JAPANESE NATIONALISM Kent Calder, is director of the Edwin O. Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies and Reischauer Professor of East Asian Studies at the School for Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, ORBIS, Autumn 2003, p. 65 Clearly there are powerful winds, both foreign and domestic, blowing in the direction of a more assertive, nationalistic Japanese foreign policy, particularly within Asia. Japan has financial resources that many Asians, especially in infrastructure-poor Northeast Asia, see as critical to their own long-term development, while many younger Japanese chafe at established patterns of diplomatic deference toward the United States. NO UNIQUE COUNTERPLAN ADVANTAGE: THE U.S. WILL CONSULT JAPAN IN THE FUTURE

CHRISTOPHER A. LAFLEUR, SPECIAL ENVOY, ASIA, June 26, 2003, p. online We are still at a preliminary stage in our discussions, but we have reviewed our overall strategic interests and reconfirmed that we share a broad range of common values and shared interests. The Japanese have indicated they will take these discussions into account as their own defense plans are updated. For our part, we have apprised our Japanese counterparts of our ongoing review of future force structure and assured Japan that we would be consulting with them closely before we reach any final conclusions. CONSULTATION IS NORMAL MEANS: THE U.S. CONSULTS WITH JAPAN NOW CHRISTOPHER A. LAFLEUR, SPECIAL ENVOY, ASIA, June 26, 2003, p. online We are working to enhance our alliances and friendships in East Asia by ensuring that our linchpin ally, Japan, continues to play a leading role in both regional and global affairs, based on our common interests, common values, and close defense and diplomatic cooperation. We reaffirmed those common values and interests with Japan in the meeting of the Security Consultative Committee -- commonly referred to as the "2+2" ? in December 2002. The "2+2" Joint Statement is testimony to our shared views on threats of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, Iraq, North Korea, regional security issues, China's role in regional stability and prosperity, missile defense and defense planning. I note that the level of Japan's participation in Operation Enduring Freedom has been unprecedented and, for Japan, path-breaking.

U.S.-Japan relations are strong now U.S.-Japan relations remain strong Glosserman, CSIS, 2004 [Brad, COMPARATIVE CONNECTIONS, July, http://csis.org/pacfor/ccejournal.html] Relations between the United States and Japan were very good this quarter, even though a number of events threatened to derail the solid ties between the two governments. A hostage crisis in Iraq and the discovery of an alleged al-Qaeda network in Japan brought home to Japanese the reality of the war on terror. No longer could they disassociate themselves from events half a world away. By the end of the quarter, both governments could point to their relationship as an example of how an alliance is supposed to work; Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro could finally make the case that his close relationship with President Bush paid tangible dividends. Not only was his strategy vindicated, but he could point to an outcome on a key policy that a majority of Japanese could support. North Korea ensures cooperative relations Cossa, CSIS, 2003 [Frank, COMPARATIVE CONNECTIONS, Oct/Dec,

http://csis.org/pacfor/cc/0304Qoverview.html] If the North Korean nuclear crisis has served to divide Washington and Seoul, it has had the opposite effect as far as Washington's relations with Tokyo are concerned. Tokyo has consistently taken a hard line on dealing with the North, not just because Japan sits within range of North Korea's growing missile force (which many fear could be fitted with nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads), but also because of the emotionally charged abductee issue. The North Korea nuclear issue has allowed Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro to move forward with his support and participation in Washington's missile defense program - Tokyo announced this quarter that it would proceed with the development and deployment of missile defense, a significant step beyond its precious commitment to conduct joint research - and has also increased security awareness in Japan to the extent that many are now more willing to see Japan take a more active role in regional security affairs, much to Washing! ton's (and Koizumi's personal) satisfaction. More often than not, the two have also collaborated at the TCOG to strengthen Seoul's resolve. The US has never had a closer ally than Japan Hilton, Author of Japan today April 6th 04 [Henry, Japan-U.S. relations enter new phasehttp://www.japantoday.com/e/?content=comment&id=574] Yet again Japan's solution was to acknowledge its weaknesses and work desperately to regain a position of greater importance in international society. This time the strategy worked brilliantly. Japanese governments from the occupation years on have rarely budged from professing to work closely with the United States. President George Bush has reason indeed to claim that the United States has "no closer ally" ? at least historically and in this particular region. Bush likes the new Koizumi Cabinet- Boosts relations Tatsumi, Research Associate, Center for Strategic and International Studies 9/26/03 [Yuki, Koizumi's Reelection and Its Implications for U.S.-Japan Relations http://www.glocom.org/debates/20031002_tatsumi_koizumi/index.html Downloaded 7/15/04] The Bush administration has a favorable view of the new Koizumi cabinet. It certainly welcomes the retention of Foreign Minister Kawaguchi and JDA chief Ishiba, as both are considered reliable counterparts as the two countries tackle issues such as North Korea, Iraq, and missile defense. The selection of Shoichi Nakagawa (a member of rachi giren) to head the Ministry of Economic, Trade and Industry, a lead agency for export control, is also an indication that the Koizumi government will maintain a firm stance vis-a-vis North Korea. Overall, it is certain that in the foreign and security policy arena, close cooperation between the two countries will continue. 1AR: China DA Link Extensions CHINA IS TRYING TO WOO JAPAN AWAY FROM CLOSE ALIGNMENT WITH

THE U.S. Robert Sutter is a professor of Asian studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Autumn, 2002, p. 37 Given the Chinese focus on dealing with the more important concern posed by the United States, one result that works against Sino-Japanese rivalry is that Chinese officials have at times sought to avoid disputes with Japan. In fact, they have tried to woo Japan away from close alignment with the United States and toward positions more favorable to China. 1AR: China DA Uniqueness CHINA IS WORKING COOPERATIVELY WITH ASIAN COUNTRIES NOW Robert Sutter is a professor of Asian studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Autumn, 2002, p. 37 Concurrently, Chinese leaders sought to establish "partnerships" or "strategic partnerships" with most of the powers along China's periphery, notably in Southeast Asia, where Japan loomed large in the 1980s and 1990s but pulled back after the Asian economic crisis of 1997 -- 1998, and on the Korean Peninsula. They emphasized putting aside differences and seeking common ground. Chinese political and military leaders, including Vice President Hu Jintao and other leaders expected to take leadership positions at the Chinese party congress in the fall of 2002, also began actively meeting visitors from Asia and traveling throughout the region. These officials seem prepared to adhere to the current Chinese approach to the Asian region. They are likely to remain focused primarily on the many domestic challenges posed by economic, social, and political issues. Regarding regional organizations, Chinese officials were instrumental in the establishment in 2000 of the Shanghai Cooperatio! n Organization, which also includes Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan; and they have worked assiduously to improve China's relations with ASEAN, proposing an ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement. China also worked closely with Japan, South Korea, and ASEAN in the so-called ASEAN Plus Three dialogue that emerged around the time of the Asian economic crisis. Despite assessments that Chinese activism has recently increased because of perceptions of U.S. containment around China's periphery, rivalry with Japan, or other similar concerns, the motives of the People's Republic of China (PRC) seem more multifaceted and long-term. The multitude of new endeavors, in fact, appears to assist several of the following important Chinese objectives: * Securing China's foreign policy environment at a time when the PRC regime is focused on sustaining economic development and political stability.

* Promoting economic exchange that assists China's internal economic development. * Reassuring Asian neighbors through increased contact about how China will use its rising power and influence. * Boosting China's regional and international power and influence and helping to secure a multipolar world order -- Chinese leaders seem more confident of China's power and influence but they also remain wary of U.S.-led or other regional efforts to work against China. Sino-Japan DA 1AR: Uniqueness Extensions SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS IMPROVING Robert Sutter is a professor of Asian studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Autumn, 2002, p. 37 In addition to advances in relations with Southeast Asia and Korea, China's relations with other powers around its periphery, with the possible exception of Japan, have improved. One must consider other factors as well, however, for this development. Sino-Japan DA: 1AR: General Extensions CHINA AND JAPAN ARE BALANCED ON A DANGEROUS EDGE OF RIVALRY Benjamin Self is a senior associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Winter 2002, p. 77 China and Japan are balanced on a razor's edge between closer cooperation and dangerous rivalry. In September 2002, the two countries celebrated the thirtieth anniversary of the sudden normalization of their bilateral relations. Normalization was the first pillar, followed by the Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1978, as friendship became the mantra of leaders on both sides. If current trends continue, peace is likely to hold, but friendship may no longer be tenable. TRADE WILL NOT SUSTAIN SINO-JAPANESE TIES Benjamin Self is a senior associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Winter 2002, p. 77 Economic interdependence has long been expected to solve problems in Sino-Japanese relations. Although the profit motive provides an incentive for businesses to pressure their governments to settle differences, rapidly growing trade relations produce their own set of problems. Just as Japan's in-roads into the Chinese market in the mid-1980s provoked public backlash, with Chinese students dubbing the lack of balance in trade "Japan's second invasion," China's growing presence in Japan has more recently

generated angry complaints and friction. n5 Differential growth rates raise concerns about the relative benefits of trade, especially when associated with shifts in industrial production. The Japanese fear that the competition caused by cheap labor in China will hollow out Japan's industrial core. Japanese investment continues to flow into China, and many businesses have shifted their production from Japan or even from Southeast Asia to China. Some Japanese firms move to China! because they feel they have no choice, given the tremendous cost differential, yet find themselves discriminated against in China, mitigating the advantages of cheap labor. Trade officials and diplomats are hoping that China's entry into the World Trade Organization will provide an effective mechanism for resolving or even preventing such problems, but significant difficulties remain. In the past, China has voiced frustration over the slow pace of investment and technology transfer by Japan to China, but Chinese officials and businesspeople seem to recognize that bilateral economic relations with Japan are currently about as good as they can get, given the dire state of the Japanese economy, and have stopped complaining. Beijing fears that Tokyo might slow the pace of foreign direct investment and limit the official developmental assistance Japan provides. Rather than demand more, China is looking to protect what it has now, insisting on maintaining unfettered access to Jap! an's market. In addition, China wants the flow of official developmental assistance to continue to help it cope with the huge challenge of modernizing the hinterland. Japan, on the other hand, wants a better deal. Most analysts agree that China needs continued high levels of economic growth to manage the social costs of the tremendously challenging transition in the state-owned and agricultural sectors of the country. The gap between winners and losers is widening; rising unemployment threatens social stability while those working in factories fall behind the entrepreneurs and growing middle class. Pensions are minuscule, and the social safety net is not worth mentioning. Implementation of the one-child policy in 1979 has resulted in fewer young workers to care for elder, retired generations. China will be the first nation to become gray before it becomes rich. China's ability to monitor its citizens -- once a powerful tool of the Communist Party -- is withering away. The em! barrassment of the Falun Gong's mobilizing activities against the government (such as large-scale demonstrations and disruption of the broadcast of government television) are dangerous, in part, because they reveal how feeble state control has become. For now, most Chinese recognize that they are much better off with a government than without one so they tolerate party rule, but true popular support for the government is lacking. Should the global economy fall into recession in 2003, sustaining the growth rate of 7 -- 8 percent required for social stability would become nearly impossible for the Chinese government. What measures might China's rulers take to preserve their power in the face of such challenges? Needless to say, the potential for jingoistic posturing and reliance on traditional xenophobia and anti-Japanese sentiment are definite possibilities. Economic issues often provide common interests in bilateral relations so that both nations can work cooperatively to th! eir mutual benefit. Gains from trade are real, and increases in Chinese productivity can mean a better life and greater purchasing power for the population. But there are dangerous aspects as well. The greater concern is that good times will come to an end and the Chinese will experience great disappointment -- great enough to anger them into

searching for a scapegoat. If the Chinese people find that scapegoat just next door, with a little help from a regime desperate to retain the little power it has left, the current problems affecting the Sino-Japanese relationship could become explosive. Trade friction could escalate, disputes over intellectual property rights could erupt, and competitive devaluation of currencies could disrupt economic stability. Consultation Is Normal Means 1AR CONSULTATION ON THE DEFENSE ALLIANCE NOW VOICE OF AMERICA NEWS April 29, 2003, p. online The Japanese delegation is in Washington for consultations on the U-S - Japan defense alliance. The group is meeting with officials at the State Department and Defense Department as well as Asia defense specialists to review the status of the security alliance in light of new threats posed by international terrorism and countries like North Korea that have weapons of mass destruction. (Signed) THE U.S. HAS BEEN CONSULTING JAPAN FOR YEARS INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, August 1, 2001, p. 6. The United States and Australia plan to expand their alliance consultations to include Japan and South Korea, but Australian officials sought Tuesday to reassure Beijing that the move was not directed against China. Affirmative Answers ? China DA Links Strengthening U.S.-Japan relations freaks out China, causing an arms race and regional instability Arase, Pomona political scientist, ?99 [David, http://www.nichibei.org/je/arase99.html, Four Paradoxes in US-Japan Security Cooperation] An attempt to improve regional stability channeled through strengthened bilateral consultations may have dangerous unintended consequences. In the bilaterally managed strategic triangle of Tokyo, Washington, and Beijing, each actor cannot observe the tone and substance of what the other two are discussing behind closed doors. Even though this information is of critical importance to each actor's security, it can only be guessed at. Thus, there is ample scope for suspicion, uncertainty, and misperception regarding the others' intentions. With uncertain information about these intentions it will seem only prudent for each actor to plan for worst case scenarios. As Japan regards the ups and downs of Sino-US relations, it may see a dilemma. On the one hand, on his visit to China last year, President Clinton exhibited behaviors that sacrificed Japan's status to cultivate a so-called strategic partnership with China. If Japan fears the US and China will continue to reach bilatera!

l understandings at Japan's expense, Japan will feel less secure and will act accordingly. On the other hand, if the United States and China are on the brink of conflict, Japan will also feel less secure and will have an incentive to compensate with greater defensive sufficiency. As for China, it may fear that the updated US-Japan alliance is directed against itself. Moreover, despite US and Japanese assurances to the contrary, it cannot know for sure to what extent China figured into US-Japan discussions. In security affairs it is only natural to be highly risk-averse; it would be only rational for China to develop enough military capability to deter this potential source of threat. As Japan and the United States perceive and respond to a growing Chinese military posture, a vicious circle of escalating threat and countermeasures by each side may take root. To mitigate these risks it would be better to reduce the bias toward threat inflation introduced by the present heavy r! eliance on bilateral consultations. This is not to say bilateral treaties or understandings are themselves bad or need to be replaced, but discussions about them need not be exclusively bilateral. Multilateral discussions can be helpful in giving actors more accurate perceptions of others' intentions. Assuming these intentions are peaceful, the pressures to arm and plan for worst case scenarios may be reduced. In trying to improve all-around relations among Washington, Tokyo, and Beijing, it might be beneficial to have substantive triangular discussions where presently there are none. STRONG U.S.-JAPANESE TIES SCARE CHINA Zbigniew Brzezinski, famous geostrategist, former diplomat, John?s Hopkins & CSIS, THE CHOICE: GLOBAL DOMINATION OR GLOBAL LEADERSHIP, 2004, p. 112 The Chinese analysis went on to argue that "The international security issue has become increasingly diversified, traditional security factors and non-traditional ones have become intertwined, and the harm caused by the non-traditional security problems such as terrorism and drug trafficking is becoming more serious:' Reflecting a more doctrinal perspective, the PLA organ warned that the above notwithstanding, the United States is increasingly inclined to give its alliances, notably NATO and the defense treaty with Japan, an offensive capability that should be of concern to China. It was the JapaneseAmerican connection, needless to add, that most worried the strategists in Beijing. Japan will say no to SEAsian peacekeeping Southeast Asian peacekeeping is key to check China threat ? Japan will say no because its vital to their national security Self, Stimson Center associate, ?03 [Benjamin, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Winter, http://www.twq.com/03winter/docs/03winter_self.pdf] JDA officials tend to see the rivalry with China in broader geographic terms as well. Japan?s effort to engage in peacekeeping operations in Southeast Asia?especially its current operation in East Timor?is part of a plan to fill the strategic vacuum in the region and prevent China from exercising increased influence. Affirmative Answers ? China DA Links

CHINA FEARS JAPANESE POWER ASSERTION Bhubhindar Singh is an Associate Research Fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore., CONTEMPORARY SOUTHEAST ASIA, April 2002 v24 i1 p82(24) To China, Japan has not issued a satisfactory apology for its wartime aggression, which, to the Chinese, raises the possibility of Japan reverting to its old ways. The Chinese believe that such a Japan would likely be more independent of the United States and generally more assertive internationally. (77) The situation is accentuated by the inability of the Japanese to come to terms with the "history issue". Japan's neighbours have repeatedly expressed doubts about Tokyo's intentions because of issues that hint at Japan's return to a militaristic past, such as the textbook controversy, the Japanese refuting facts about the Nanjing Massacre, (78) and occasional statements by Japanese officials that challenge the defensive nature of Japan's military capabilities. (79 INCREASING JAPAN?S INFLUENCE DECREASES CHINA?S INFLUENCE Bhubhindar Singh is an Associate Research Fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore., CONTEMPORARY SOUTHEAST ASIA April 2002 v24 i1 p82(24) An increasingly normalized Japan would probably lead to a proportionate increase in Tokyo's political influence in the Asia-Pacific region. This would directly challenge China's emerging influence in the region, leading to competition for regional influence between the two Asian giants. The Chinese are further disturbed at the emerging influence of Japan because of the strong presence of the United States in East Asia. As a result of the U.S.-Japan security alliance, which signifies the strong links between Washington and Tokyo, the balance of power in East Asia is tilted against Beijing.

1AR Ext: Japan will say no Japan has a history of saying NO to U.S. policies Schwenninger, World Policy Institute, ?95 [Sherle, WORLD POLICY JOURNAL, Summer, Expanded Academic] As indicated above, in the 1986-91 period, Japan did make some modest progress toward more domestic-led growth, as its current-account surplus fell as a percentage of GNP. But its current-account surplus has since risen to even higher levels - upward of 3.2 percent of GDP - and now Japan no longer seems as willing to accommodate more American demands. From a Japan that would always say "yes," we now have a Japan that not only can say "no," but indeed frequently does so. In 1994, Japan flatly rejected the Clinton administration's efforts to establish numerical goals for imports in the Japanese market and for the reduction of Japan's growing current-account deficit (although these issues are resurfacing within Japan itself). Moreover, unlike in the 1985-86 period, it has resisted American efforts to force it to adopt an easier monetary policy (in spite of the fact that Japan has high real interest rates that are choking its economy and contributing to the high yen). As evidenc! e of Japan's new assertiveness, it has taken the offensive, arguing more vigorously than in the past that America's trade problems lie in the United States.

1AR Ext: Japan will say no to increased peacekeeping Japan will say no ? they oppose increased funding for peace keeping Toshiro Ozawa, Ambassador of Japan to the United Nations, 2004 [4 May, http://www.infojapan.org/announce/speech/un2004/un0405.html] Ironically, however, the continuing creation and deployment of peacekeeping operations on an unprecedented scale is beginning to cast a grim shadow over this revival. In his press conference on 2 April, the President of the Security Council said that there is a possibility that the total budget for peacekeeping operations this year could rise to 4.5 billion dollars, an amount unprecedented in history. Under such circumstances, Japan would be expected to shoulder approximately 900 million dollars of this burden. This is an enormous figure, surpassing Japan's current annual bilateral Official Development Assistance (ODA) to the African countries. It may be true that there is no price-tag on peace, but it is also true that Member States' resources are not unlimited. Should not Member States face up to the fact that increased budgets for peacekeeping do consume resources that might otherwise flow into such areas as development and poverty alleviation? Should not Member States as! k whether it makes sense for peacekeeping operations to carry out such tasks as development and human rights, tasks which other international organizations are better equipped to undertake? Japan is of the view that we Member States must give more serious thoughts on whether continuation of current practices is truly beneficial for the international community as a whole. Japan will say no ? they oppose anything that increases peacekeeping costs Inter Press Service, 6 ? 24 - 04 A key issue of concern to Japan is the rapid rise in the U.N. budget for peacekeeping operations. Japan already contributes about 20 percent of those costs, far more than any country. Last month, U.N. officials announced that next year's budget will rise to 4.6 billion dollars, a 60 percent increase from the year before. That has alarmed the Japanese government, which says it will be forced to cut its offshore development aid to meet the increased peacekeeping operations costs. Japan's U.N. ambassador, Toshiro Ozawa, outlined those concerned in a Jun. 3 speech to the General Assembly. ''We must point out that the Government of Japan is not blessed with a budgetary mechanism that can easily absorb a more than 60 percent increase of a major budget item,'' he said. Ozawa added that Japanese criticism of the U.N. peacekeeping budgets ''is reinforced by the fact that Japan, not being a Permanent Member of the Security Council, has often no say in the decisions of the Security ! Council concerning the long-term policies of individual PKOs (peacekeeping operations), despite Japan's obligation to shoulder about one fifth of the related costs.'' Japan will say no ? the oppose open ended PKOs ? there has to be a clear exit strategy before they?ll support it TOSHIRO OZAWA AMBASSADOR OF JAPAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS, 2004

[29 March, http://www.infojapan.org/announce/speech/un2004/un0403-8.html] A large-scale PKO was set up in Liberia last year. This year, another major PKO is being initiated in Cote d'Ivoire, and in the horizon, new missions are expected in Burundi, Haiti and Sudan. Having reiterated the importance of the PKOs and the Japanese government's position to cooperate with these PKOs, we have to be insistent on some points in order to be accountable to the Japanese taxpayers who bear about 20% of the total PKO budget; when creating a new mission, full account of the necessity of the mission, the appropriateness of the plans and the exit strategy for each case must be put forward. And, after the missions are established, periodic reviews must be made in order to ensure that the activities of each mission are implemented both effectively and efficiently including through further cost reductions by enhancing synergy of the regional missions. We also wish to point out that the size of a mission must be reduced step-by-step in line with the gradual fulfillment! of its mandate. 1AR Ext ? Japan TMD Bad Impact TMD deployment destabilizes East Asia for multiple reasons ? multiple sources of conflict Wang Qun, Director of China's Department of Arms Control and Disarmament, 2000 [September 28, 2000, TMD and US-China-Japan Cooperation, http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/asia/napsnet092800.html] The TMD joint development by the United States and Japan is, in fact, not a stabilizing factor in promotion of East Asian security, but rather a destabilizing factor, affecting regional and even global security with multi- fold implications. Firstly, the sophisticated TMD systems, especially NTW currently under the joint development by the United States and Japan, given its inherent strategic capability, once deployed in East Asia, will undoubtedly serve as an indispensable link within US NMD. Under such circumstances, the above TMD systems will have the same severe negative impacts as those of NMD on both global and regional security. Secondly, the sophisticated TMD systems under joint development by the US and Japan, if deployed, will contribute to wrecking the existing security landscape in East Asia. This will undoubtedly tip the current tenuous strategic balance in East Asia. Moreover, given the "revolutionary" nature of such sophisticated military systems, other countr! ies will have to come up with corresponding adjustments to their own military strategies. As a result, a spiral arms race in the region may be triggered. Thirdly, the sophisticated TMD systems currently under joint development by the US and Japan, if deployed in East Asia, will drastically enhance the overall offensive-defensive capability of the USJapan military alliance, far exceeding the level they maintained during the cold war era, as such sophisticated systems, given their strategic capability, can help push the US NMD to the very forefront in East Asia, and enable the United States to greatly enhance its capability of military involvement in regional security issues as a result of its rapid military penetration and projection, thus constituting a direct threat to surrounding countries in the region. Fourthly, TMD joint development by the United States and Japan will help Japan pick up its pace in its endeavor to embark on the course of remilitarization. Japan's def!

ense budget currently ranks only the second in the world,(2) with overwhelming ground, naval and air forces. In September 1997, Japan and the United States signed their amended Defense Cooperation Guidelines.(3) In May 1999, the Japanese Diet reviewed and subsequently endorsed the bill concerning "situation in the areas surrounding Japan", which expand its defense area to "areas surrounding Japan". Moreover, some politicians in Japan have, from time to time, called for changes in Japan's military strategy, i.e. from a strategy of "defense confined to its own territory and coastal waters" to a "preemptive" one.(4) And some even went so far as to call for amendments to Japan's Peace Constitution.(5) So, US-Japan cooperation on TMD can only contribute the resurgence of Japan's militarism. Fifthly, TMD joint development by the United States and Japan will give rise to mounting misgivings and mistrust among the major powers in the region, especially China and Russia, and subseque! ntly erode the basis of their cooperation in the regional context, thus making it difficult to foster a sound and enabling security environment in the region. Sixthly, the US-Japan cooperation on TMD will not be conducive to relaxing the tensions on the Korean Peninsular, in particular the resolution of the Korean nuclear and missile crises. The emerging positive developments, from another perspective, point to the very fact that the excuses employed by the US and Japan to develop TMD in East Asia is untenable. If they are bent on their own way and continue to pursue TMD, it will affect the momentum being gained in the wake of the recent rapprochement between DPRK and ROK. As a result, any resolution to the above crisis will remain elusive. Seventhly, the US-Japan cooperation on TMD will not help prevent the proliferation of missiles; on the contrary, such cooperation can only multiply the risk of the proliferation of missile technologies and render MTCR ineffective, given t! hat technologies for both offensive missiles and missile defenses are mutually convertible, and many technologies for missile defenses can be used and adapted to develop and improve the technologies for offensive missiles. In fact, many TMD systems, even in the case of such a low-tier TMD as PAC-III, are subject to the control of the MTCR as Category II items. So, US- Japan cooperation on TMD is, in fact, very much at odds with the non- proliferation purpose the United States has advocated. Lastly, the deployment of sophisticated TMD systems in East Asia will constitute a direct grave threat to China's national security interest. According to the information made available by the US side, NTW, for instance, is an upper-tier TMD system inherently capable of intercepting ICBMs even in the ascent/boost phase.(6) The NTW system, given its velocity, is capable of penetrating 800 to 1000 km inside China, thus directly threatening the safety of China's coastal provinces. The Chines! e have naturally registered their grave concerns and strong opposition. 1AR ? AT: Taiwan not linked to U.S. Japan TMD China fears U.S.-Japan TMD will extend to Taiwan Wang Qun, Director of China's Department of Arms Control and Disarmament, 2000 [September 28, 2000, TMD and US-China-Japan Cooperation, http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/asia/napsnet092800.html] TMD relating to Taiwan represents a special concern to China, as it involves not only China's sovereignty but its national security interests as well. Our concerns on this score are actually two-fold. One is the American factor, i.e. the direct provision by the US to

Taiwan of TMD systems, equipment, technologies, services or other assistance. Another is mainly the Japanese factor, i.e. the potential incorporation of Taiwan into the US-Japan TMD protection umbrella. Neither scenario is acceptable to China, because both scenarios constitute not only an act of interference in China's internal affairs on the part of the US and Japan, but also a major shift in the latter's policy towards China. Given the nature of TMD systems, especially with the involvement of early warning information, the provision of assistance to Taiwan, particularly in a case of Taiwan contingency, is virtually tantamount to restoring "something" in a nature of a quasi- military alliance between the US and! Taiwan. This will give rise to serious political and military consequences. So, if the US and Japan are to provide Taiwan with TMD, no matter in what form, or to incorporate Taiwan into their TMD protection umbrella, it will not only shake the basis of China's relations with the US and Japan with destructive impacts, but also inject new destabilizing factors into the regional security environment. 1AR ? Uniqueness Ext. ? TMD not inevitable TMD is backburnered now Berkofsky, European Institute for Asian Studies, 9 ? 12 ? 03 [Alan, ASIA TIMES, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/EI12Dh01.html] Axel Berkofsky, PhD, is a research fellow and policy analyst for the European Institute for Asian Studies. The military's cheers are premature, claims the Japan Times in a recent editorial maintaining that the original joint US-Japan research on the feasibility of the regional theater missile defense (TMD) system has to "yet to produce a conclusion". Unless the Defense Agency knows more than the Japanese public, the most recent call to buy US missile-defense hardware off the shelf instead does indeed suggest that TMD has been put on the back burner for the time being. Japanese Rearmament Answers NO THREAT FROM A JAPANESE MILITARY BUILD-UP TO TAIWAN Zbigniew Brzezinski, famous geostrategist, former diplomat, John?s Hopkins & CSIS, THE CHOICE: GLOBAL DOMINATION OR GLOBAL LEADERSHIP, 2004, p. 115-6 It would be a mistake, however, for U.S. decision-makers to infer that a similarly significant Taiwanese military buil4UP would likewise have a positive effect. Unless altogether detached from the United States, a gradually more powerful Japan is unlikely to exploit its increasing military prowess to directly challenge any vital Chinese interest. That is not the case with Taiwan. There is a greater risk that the separatist political forces in Taiwan would be tempted to use any major upgrading of Taiwan's military capability as an opportunity to declare their island's formal independence from China. No Chinese government, not even a highly authoritarian one, could then remain passive, especially in view of the increased role of nationalism in the Chinese mass consciousness. Chinese popular fury could then trigger a regionally destabilizing Sino-American military clash.

JAPAN WILL NOT DIRECT ANY INCREASE IN MILITARY CAPABILITIES AT CHINA Zbigniew Brzezinski, famous geostrategist, former diplomat, John?s Hopkins & CSIS, THE CHOICE: GLOBAL DOMINATION OR GLOBAL LEADERSHIP, 2004, p. 115-6 The Japanese themselves show considerable sensitivity to Chinese concerns and are likely to maintain a low profile even while steadily enhancing their military capabilities. That enhancement defenseless in the event of some unexpected U.S. disengagement, and not by a national passion for independent military power. On balance, the Japanese goal is more to have a fail-safe option than to plot a sudden breakout. It is, in fact, to the great credit of the Japanese people and its political elite that democratic values and a strong anti-militarist ethic have become deeply engrained in their outlook. The ongoing debates in Japan regarding the scale and geostrategic scope of the country's military programs, and the continued public support for strict constitutional limits on Japanese military engagement abroad, all reflect a rational and responsible view of Japan's international role. In brief, the Japan of today-a genuine constitutional democracy-is a good global citizen." Japanese Rearmament Answers JAPAN MAY REJECT PACIFISM, BUT IT DOES NOT EMBRACE MILITARISM Zbigniew Brzezinski, famous geostrategist, former diplomat, John?s Hopkins & CSIS, THE CHOICE: GLOBAL DOMINATION OR GLOBAL LEADERSHIP, 2004, p. 117) To be sure, voices have been raised in Japan in favor of a more assertive international posture, especially in the wake of 9/11. But aside from a strident minority without much popular support, the mainstream case for a more active Japanese posture tends to emphasize Japan's obligation as the world's number two economic power to shoulder its commensurate share of responsibility for global security. By and large, this posture does not involve calls for an altogether independent military status that would de-link Japan from the United States. There may be a growing inclination to reject internationalist pacifism, but that does not signify a desire to embrace nationalist militarism. The views expressed after 9/11 by the chairman of the Japanese Upper House Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense are typical. He noted that "a simple pacifist concept that military power is evil has existed in postwar Japan as a result of the nations tragic experiences in World War II. T! his idea became exaggerated and developed into the so-called one-country pacifism, and we must do some soul-searching about that." He then went on to argue that "Japan should become capable of serving a role in responding to new threats in the post-Cold War era as a responsible member of the international community. Next, we must establish a system to protect our lives, property, and land from traditional threats (such as armed attacks by other countries... .Finally, we must make adjustments to legal frameworks for smooth functioning of the Japan-US alliance, which is indispensable to maintaining the overall

military balance in East Asia." PACIFISM IS STILL STRONG IN JAPAN ASIAN AFFAIRS: AN AMERICAN REVIEW, Summer 2003 v30 i2 p132(10) Given those attitudinal changes, one might expect that Japan's political-military "normalization" would have proceeded apace. In fact, however, this process has been gradual, hesitant, and contested. Pacifism, although on the defensive, is far from a spent force. Japanese pacifists, moreover, can count on foreign (particularly Chinese and Korean) support for their dubious contention that moves toward assuming greater international military responsibilities feed, and are fed by, the revival of militarism and ultranationalism. Other influential groups with different foreign policy agendas also oppose movement toward defense normality and closer strategic cooperation with the United States. "Mercantilists" fret over the possible impairment of Japan's access to vital overseas markets and sources of raw materials; "multilateralists" prefer a focus on the United Nations and regional multilateral initiatives; "Asianists" are worried about the impact of defense normalization on Japa! n's efforts to forge cooperative relations with China and the rest of Asia. And "Gaullists," although by no means averse to a larger and more active Japanese military role, criticize any move that smacks of subordination to the United States. (2) Perhaps the most fundamental obstacle to change other than the continuing appeal of pacifism, however, is the complacency of the Japanese people as reflected in their attachment to a relatively comfortable status quo and their reluctance to assume the burdens of engagement in international power politics. Japanese Rearmament Answers JAPAN DOESN?T HAVE THE ECONOMIC RESOURCES NEEDED FOR FULL REMILITARIZATION ASIAN AFFAIRS: AN AMERICAN REVIEW, Summer 2003 v30 i2 p132(10) The reorientation of Japan's national security priorities has been complicated by its prolonged economic slump and soaring government debt, which have limited defense spending and focused attention inward on domestic reform. By the same token, however, those developments have also generated pressure to cut Official Development Assistance--a mainstay of "comprehensive security"--which many critics see as increasingly unreliable in maintaining the goodwill of key countries such as China. The declining efficacy of Japan's economics-first approach to national security has arguably boosted the appeal of political-military normalization. Contrary to earlier expectations, moreover, the breakdown of the Cold War-era hegemony of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and of the left-right axis of Japanese party politics has not given rise to bolder and more effective political leadership. Indeed, the exigencies of building and maintaining coalition governments have, if anything, reinforc! ed pressures for compromise and consensus.

NO CHANGE IN JAPAN?S CONSTITUTION FOR 5-10 YEARS ASIAN AFFAIRS: AN AMERICAN REVIEW, Summer 2003 v30 i2 p132(10) Some are deterred by the risk of stirring up a divisive national debate. Others fear adverse Chinese and Korean reactions. Still others are sincerely committed to pacifist ideals or see those ideals as adding a moral dimension to the pursuit of economic objectives. Perhaps most important, few regard constitutional change as an urgent national priority, as is reflected in the leisurely pace of the Diet's consideration of constitutional revision--it is expected to take five to ten years.

Japan?s PKO contributions are key to the alliance Japanese participation in UN peacekeeping is crucial to maintaining the health of the alliance Hughes, Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at Warwick, 2004 [Christopher, JAPAN?S SECURITY AGENDA, p. 204] Japan has been motivated to support UN concepts of security due to principles of internationalism and its desire to uphold the status quo of the current interstate security system. Japan?s role in PKOs should not be separated from the importance of upholding the bilateral security relationship with the United States. In certain ways multilateral UN PKOs have been used as stalking horses to advance bilateral cooperation with the United States. Expanded UN participation is the lynchpin to sustaining US-Japanese bilateral relations Hughes, Centre for the Study of Globalization and Regionalisation at Warwick, 2004 [Christopher and Akiki Fukushima, in BEYOND BILATERALISM, Ellis Krauss and T. J. Pempel, Eds., p. 84] Indeed, it is apparent that in the post-Cold War period, as in the Cold War period, for Japanese policymakers one of the principal functions of the United Nations is to provide multilateral legitimization for the incremental expansion of U.S.-Japan bilateral security activities that are seen not to impose unmanageable risks of entrapment. The role of the United Nations as a ?stalking horse? for recent developments in the expansion of alliance cooperation can be seen in a number of ways. The revised NDPO and the revised Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, although designed to facilitate bilateral cooperation, again both draw on the United Nations for their legitimacy. Japan?s participation in PKO has been seen by some as a means to enable SDF dispatch to accomplish the goal that was not possible at the time of the first Gulf War of removing restrictions on the overseas dispatch of the SDF on an individual selfdefense basis and then of preparing the domestic and ! international conditions for SDF dispatch on other missions that are non-UN-centered, including support for U.S. forces in East Asia.. Japan?s role in the war on terrorism has

been a partial realization of this goal, and the clearest demonstration that UN multilateralism can be manipulated as the justification for bilateral objectives. Peackeeping operations provide cover for U.S.-Japan missile defense cooperation Hughes, Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at Warwick, 2004 [Christopher, JAPAN?S SECURITY AGENDA, p. 204-5] Japan?s role in PKOs has also been used to justify other changes in alliance arrangements. U.S. Japan cooperation on BMD has been justified on the basis that a seamobile system could be used to provide air defense for U.S. forces engaged in UN operations against states with missile capabilities in the Persian Gulf, as in the 1991 Gulf War. Japan?s PKO contributions kill the alliance Participation in UN peacekeeping will undermine the alliance and trigger militarization Hughes, Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at Warwick, 2004 [Christopher, JAPAN?S SECURITY AGENDA, p. 205] Japan?s involvement in PKOs and the war on terror may strengthen the bilateral security relationship with the United States but may also pull its security policy in other directions. Japanese policymakers do not perceive their UN-centered activities as yet a realization of the type of dependence on the UN for security as envisaged in the BPND; for the foreseeable future they will continue to focus on the U.S.-Japan security treaty. Japan?s role in PKOs does, though, provide an alternative vision based on UN multilateralism. In addition, the war on terror has raised the intriguing prospect of collective security. Japans designed the ATSML by shifting the emphasis from article 9 to the preamble of the constitution. In this case, article 9 is no longer providing a guide for what Japan should do to contribute to international security and how it should do it, but merely how it should do it in terms of restrictions on the use of force, while the legitimization for what Japan! should do is now provided by the preamble. Japan is potentially realizing Ozawa?s concept of collective security, which would allow Japan to engage in any type of military activity including peace enforcement and full combat duties in international coalitions given UN authority. Arguably, the Japanese government inadvertently arrived at collective security operations because if would distract Japan from its U.S. commitments. Still, if Japan were to choose collective security, UN-centered activities, it would lessen its dependence on the United States, allowing it to employ a wider range of military power and to achieve the status of ?normal? military state. Consultation is critical to sustaining cooperative multilateral efforts Krauss, UC San Diego international relations professor, 2004 [Ellis and T.J. Pempel, in BEYOND BILATERALISM, Krauss and Pempel, Eds., p. 316] Both governments now also have enhanced opportunities and incentives to increase the density and intensity of their cooperative and consultation efforts. The stakes in doing so are higher than ever in the new multilateral context, because failure to do so can result in publicly embarrassing and costly outcomes. The United States learned this in the EVSL

negotiations, Japan learned it in its precipitous proposal for the AMF. Given that Japan and the United States are typically key pivot points around which multilateral regional organizations revolve, little progress will occur unless they cooperate; each, as Krauss has pointed out in Chapter 12, can veto the other?s unilateral moves in such forums. Japan will increase PKO support/involvement now Japan will continue to expand PKO involvement Hughes, Centre for the Study of Globalization and Regionalisation at Warwick, 2004 [Christopher and Akiki Fukushima, in BEYOND BILATERALISM, Ellis Krauss and T. J. Pempel, Eds., p. 83] Japan?s strong interest in a UNSC permanent seat means that it will continue to deepen cooperation with UN-centered multilateral security activities. It is likely, however, to be ultracautious in expanding cooperation with the United Nations through the utilization of collective self-defense or collective security options. Japanese exercise of collective selfdefense, given the realities of U.S. leadership in international coalitions, is likely, even under the sanction of the United Nations, to compound the risks of entrapment. Japanese exercise of collective security could accentuate the risks of entrapment, and more likely abandonment, especially if Japan is more beholden to the demands of the United Nations than to its U.S. ally. Instead, the most likely path of Japan?s UN-centered multilateral activities is to continue to explore the current incremental path of expanding cooperation in PKO and in the types of measures contained in thee ATSML and in similar legal fram! eworks in the future. This offers Japan the ability to make an active multilateral contribution to international security via the United Nations that is at times distinct from the function of the U.S.-Japan alliance, but also to maintain the bilateral alliance as the principal foundation of its security policy. Japan wants to expand UN PKO participation Hughes, Centre for the Study of Globalization and Regionalisation at Warwick, 2004 [Christopher and Akiki Fukushima, in BEYOND BILATERALISM, Ellis Krauss and T. J. Pempel, Eds., p. 82] Japan?s other conceivable multilateral security option is to explore enhance UN-centered frameworks. Japan has shown an inclination to expand UN cooperation in a number of ways. It has been able to expand cooperation with the UN incrementally by keeping in place current constitutional prohibitions and utilizing the principle of individual selfdefense. As already observed, this has enabled it to take on important UN PKOs and to exploit UN resolutions to expand the range of Japan?s cooperation in the war on terrorism since 2001.

Japanese participation in peacekeeping promotes militarism JAPANESE INVOLVEMENT IN PKOS PERCEIVED AS A RETURN TO

MILITARISM Michael E. O?Hanlon, Senior Fellow, Brookings Institute, Expanding Global Military Capacity for Humanitarian Intervention, 2003, p. 94 (HARVUN2287) In other Asian countries, many would oppose such a Japanese security policy out of fear of latent Japanese militarism. Within Japan, that worry exists too. But the alternative force structure outlined below would involve far two few troops to threaten countries such as China, Korea, the Philippines, or Vietnam. Yet the new capabilities would be quite substantial when measured against the demands of global humanitarian, peacekeeping and peace-enforcing missions. JAPANESE PARTICIPATION IN UN PKOS THREATENS ITS COMMITMENT TO ANTI-MILITARISM Hugo Dobson, Lecturer in International Relations of Japan, University of Sheffield, Japan and United Nations Peacekeeping, 2003, p. 4 (HARVUN2292) Japan is one of the few nations to have renounced its right to belligerency and the maintenance of armed forces with an explicit statement in its Peace Constitution of 1947. Despite traditional, Western interpretations of anti-militarism based on Christian ethics, Japan has demonstrated a long-standing commitment to anti-militarism rooted in Japanese society and its experience of the A-bomb attacks on Hiroshima and Nagaskai, the firebombing of Tokyo, and the reaction to the colonization of East Asia by the Japanese Imperial Army. With a societal, not religious, basis for this stance (no Western, Christian country, except for Costa Rica, has ever renounced violence as a state policy so explicitly), Japan is undeniably worthy of attention to ascertain how this seemingly unorthodox position emerged and whether it is sustainable in the post-Cold War world. This assertion is supported by the efforts of policy-making agents throughout the postwar period to challenge this tradition! al foreign policy stance in an attempt to transform Japan into a ?normal? nation with the ability to exercise the military option. Thus, as a result and in contradiction to its antimilitarist declarations, the Japanese government has come to create and expand the SDF in addition to hosting and supporting US bases. As will be seen in this book, during the 1990s Japan?s contribution to peacekeeping became one of the issues through which this battle was fought out. JAPANESE PARTICIPATION IN PKOS USED TO CHALLENGE ITS ANTIMILITARISM Hugo Dobson, Lecturer in International Relations of Japan, University of Sheffield, Japan and United Nations Peacekeeping, 2003, p. 4-5 (HARVUN2293) As Japan is one of the only states in the world to renounce its right of belligerency in constitutional terms, and its right of collective self-defense, as an interpretation of the Constitution, what Japan can and cannot do within peacekeeping, and the relevance this has for Japan?s broader security stance is highly relevant. In a comparable fashion to Japan, Finland has suffered from restrictions to its military posture resulting from its action in the Second World War. However, it has carved out a role for itself as one of the

world?s leading peacekeepers. Similarly, participation in PKOs has been used by certain elements in Japanese society and government as the justifying factor for overcoming traditional restrictions and establishing a new military role for Japan. For a time in the 1990s, participation in PKOs appeared to be the issue that was the trigger for a wider reconsideration of Japan?s position in, and contribution to, the international community. Japanese participation in peacekeeping promotes militarism JAPANESE INVOLVEMENT IN PKOS THREATENS ANTI-MILITARIST NORM?SIGNALS RETURN TO IMPERIALIST AMBITIONS Hugo Dobson, Lecturer in International Relations of Japan, University of Sheffield, Japan and United Nations Peacekeeping, 2003, p. 37 (HARVUN2297) In this light, Japan ought not to contribute to PKOs as it would be the thin end of the militarist wedge. One Japanese scholar, Watanabe Osamu, has interpreted Japan?s recent activity in PKOs (as well as its official development assistance contributions) as a step in the development of Japanese neo-imperialism. Watanabe argues that the strength of the domestic anti-militarism in Japan against the overseas dispatch of the SDF created one of the strongest set of ?shackles? (ashikase) against the growth of Japanese neo-imperialism. Moreover, the adoption of the International Peace Cooperation Law (more commonly known as, and hereafter, the PKO Law) in June 1992 is regarded as an important first step in the progression of Japanese militarization, the incremental revision of the Peace Constitution of the attainment of a permanent seat on the UNSC. Under the name of ? international contribution? the Japanese government is seen to be implementing a neoimperialist policy in line wit! h the bilateral relationship with the US, to which we now turn. INCREASING JAPANESE COMMITMENT TO UN PKOS IS DIMINISHING ITS ANTI-MILITARIST NORM Hugo Dobson, Lecturer in International Relations of Japan, University of Sheffield, Japan and United Nations Peacekeeping, 2003, p. 159 (HARVUN2301) The domestic norm of anti-militarism, with its strong social origins rooted in the experience of Second World War, is well understood in Japanese society. With a strong traditions going back to the prewar period that challenged Japan?s military enterprise in East Asia, though to the A-bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the firebombing of Tokyo, anti-militarist tendencies have been clearly expressed in opinion polls throughout this period. The specific frames instrumentalized to promote this norm include respect for the Constitution and Article 9, abandonment of the US-Japan Security Treaty and curtailment of the role (if not the very existence) of the SDF. Thus, during the Second Gulf War, the traditional anti-militarist attitudes of Japanese civil society were still largely intact, both reflected in and supported by the political stance of the SDPJ since shortly after the Second World War. So, if this domestic norm and its restrictive nature is widely recognized and comp! rehended, why has its specificity been classified in Table 7.1 as ?Medium: falling?? Simply put, this is due to the emerging norm of the UN and its peacekeeping as ?

Medium: rising,? and I would suggest that the norms of UN internationalism and peacekeeping are rising at the expense of the domestic norm of anti-militarism. JAPANESE INVOLVEMENT WITH UN MISSIONS THREATENS ITS DOMESTIC ANTI-MILITARISM NORM Hugo Dobson, Lecturer in International Relations of Japan, University of Sheffield, Japan and United Nations Peacekeeping, 2003, p. 160 (HARVUN2302) Any contribution that could be justified under the UN Charter could also be justified under the Japanese Constitution because of their common origins. It is necessary to understand how deeply anti-militarist roots have been put down in postwar Japan society and, as a result, the extent to which the Japanese government has had to use stealth and incrementalism in responding to both international and domestic norms. There has been a clash of international and domestic norms in Japan for the past half-century over the role of the UN in relation to domestic anti-militarism and the dominant normative influence of US bilateralism ? a clash seen throughout the empirical chapters. Japanese participation in peacekeeping promotes militarism JAPANESE GOVERNMENT USES UN AS COVER FOR ITS EFFORTS TO WEAKEN THE ANTI-MILITARIST NORM Hugo Dobson, Lecturer in International Relations of Japan, University of Sheffield, Japan and United Nations Peacekeeping, 2003, p. 160 (HARVUN2303) Thus, during the Diet debates concerning the passage of the PKO Law and in dealing with the neighboring states in East Asia, Japanese politicians and bureaucrats stressed that the contributions of personnel would take place within the framework of the UN. This policy was realized with the first dispatch of SDF troops on the UNTAC mission where the terms of the UN?s mandate and the maintenance of a cease-fire were repeatedly referred to ? a trend that has continued in attempts (successful and unsuccessful) to revise the PKO Law. In this way, the LDP leadership, eager to expand Japan?s contribution to international society, and in particularly the UN with one eye on a UNSC permanent seat, was able to weaken traditionally stringent recognized norm of anti-militarism by combining it with the resonant norm of UN internationalism and its peacekeeping activities. The norms of UN internationalism and peacekeeping display aspects of an anti-militarist nature but recognize the use of ! force in achieving the goal of peace. In this way, the LDP leadership could proceed in its goal of making Japan a ?normal? state that exercises military power and still overcome the anti-militarist ?allergy?. For these reasons, the anti-militarist norm is regarded as not having necessarily weakened but having mutated to permit a level of force acceptable to the Japanese government and society of the day and as long as it is mandated by the international community.