Downloaded From OutlineDepot.
Crim Pro I
Downloaded From OutlineDepot.com
Table of Contents
I. Searches and Seizures.........................................................................................5 A. Introduction.................................................................................................5 B. What is a Search?........................................................................................5 1. Open Fields..........................................................................................6 2. Aerial Searches....................................................................................8 3. Thermal Imaging of Homes..................................................................9 4. Searches of Trash...............................................................................10 5. Observation and Monitoring of Public Behavior.................................11 6. Use of Dogs to Sniff for Contraband...................................................12 C. The Requirement for Probable Cause........................................................13 1. Sufficient Belief to Meet the Standard for Probable Cause.................13 2. An Objective or Subjective Standard?................................................15 D. The Warrant Requirement.........................................................................16 1. What Information Must Be Included in the Application for a Warrant?16 2. What Form Must the Warrant Take?...................................................17 3. What are the Requirement in Executing Warrants?............................20 a. How May Police Treat Those Who Are present When a Warrant Is Being Executed?........................................................................................20 b. Do Police have to Knock and Announce?....................................21 c. What if There Are Unforeseen Circumstances or Mistakes While Executing a Warrant?.......................................................................22 E. Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement....................................................23 1. Searches Incident to Arrest................................................................23 2. Searches Made in Hot Pursuit............................................................25 3. Plain View...........................................................................................26 4. The Automobile Exception ................................................................29 a. The Exception and Its Rationale.................................................29 b. Searches of Containers in Automobiles......................................30 c. Searches Incident to Arrest.........................................................31 5. Inventory Searches............................................................................32 6. Border Crossing and Checkpoints......................................................34 7. Checkpoints.......................................................................................35 8. Consent..............................................................................................37 9. Searches on Those on Probation and Parole......................................38 10. Searches When There Are “Special Needs”.....................................40 a. Administrative Searches.............................................................40 b. Drug Testing...............................................................................41 11. Exigent Circumstances.....................................................................44 F. Seizures and Arrests...................................................................................46 1. Is a Warrant Needed for Arrests?.......................................................46 2. When Is a Person Seized?..................................................................46 3. For What Crimes May a Person Be Arrested?.....................................48 G. Stop and Frisk...........................................................................................49 --(Page 2 of 101)--
Downloaded From OutlineDepot.com
The Authority for Police to Stop and Frisk..........................................49 The Distinction Between Stops and Arrests.......................................51 What May Police Do When They Stop an Individual?.........................51 What is Sufficient for Reasonable Suspicion?.....................................52 a. Reasonable Suspicion for Stopping Cars.....................................52 b. Reasonable Suspicion Based on Informants' Tips.......................52 c. Reasonable Suspicion Based on a Person's Trying to Avoid a Police Officer..............................................................................................54 d. Reasonable Suspicion Based on Profiles.....................................55 II. The Exclusionary Rule.......................................................................................55 A. Is the Exclusionary rule a Desirable Remedy?...........................................55 B. The Origins of the Exclusionary Rule.........................................................57 C. Who Can Object to the Introduction of Evidence and Raise the Exclusionary Rule?...............................................................................................................57 D. Exceptions to the Exclusionary Rule.........................................................59 1. Independent Source...........................................................................59 2. Inevitable Discovery...........................................................................60 3. Inadequate Causal Connection – Attenuation of the Taint..................62 4. The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule...........................63 5. Exception for Violations of “Knock and Announce”............................65 6. Exception for Certain Department Violations.....................................66 E. Suppression Hearings................................................................................66 III. Police Interrogation and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination.....................67 A. Due Process and the Requirement for Voluntariness.................................67 1. The Requirement for Voluntariness....................................................67 2. Determining Whether a Confession is Voluntary................................68 a. Burden of Proof...........................................................................68 b. Factors to be Considered............................................................68 3. Is the Voluntariness Test Desirable?...................................................71 4. Coercive Questioning, Torture, and the War on Terrorism..................71 B. Fifth Amendment Limited on In-Custodial Interrogation............................71 1. Miranda v. Arizona and Its Affirmation by the Supreme Court...........71 2. Is Miranda Desirable?.........................................................................74 3. What are the Requirements for Miranda to Apply?............................74 a. When is a Person “In Custody”?.................................................75 b. What is an “Interrogation”?........................................................76 c. What is Required of the Police?...................................................79 4. What are the Consequences of a Violation of Miranda?.....................80 5. What are the Exceptions to Miranda?................................................83 a. Impeachment..............................................................................84 b. Emergencies...............................................................................84 c. Booking Exception......................................................................85 d. Waiver.........................................................................................86 C. The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel and Police Interrogations...........90 1. The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel During Interrogations..........90 2. The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel Is Offense Specific..............92 --(Page 3 of 101)--
1. 2. 3. 4.
...................................94 IV.......................................... Unnecessarily Suggestive Identification Procedures Violate Due Process... Waivers............................com
3. 98 2......................... The Right to Counsel............................................. The Right to Counsel in Lineups.......................................93 4..................98 1. Limits on the Ability of Courts to Find That Identification Procedures Violate Due Process..99
--(Page 4 of 101)--
.......... Due Process Protection for Identification Procedures......... Identification Procedures................. What is Impermissible Police Eliciting of Statements?.............................96 1................ Limits on the Right to Counsel in Identification Procedures...................................................96 2.......................................96 A.......97 B..Downloaded From OutlineDepot.........................................................
I. to introduce evidence of defendant's end of telephone conversations. over defendant's objection. The central requirement of the Fourth Amendment is one of reasonableness. even in an area accessible to the public. amend. Supreme Court reversed. the government was permitted.
What is a Search?
Katz v. supported by oath or affirmation. What a person knowingly exposes to the public. This is a two-part inquiry: first. even in his own home or office. Const. finding that a person in a telephone booth could rely upon the protection of U. not places. amend. shut the door behind him. is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. VerdugoUrquidez. United States. The touchstone of U. 389 US 347 (1967) [Reasonable Expectation of Privacy] Defendant was convicted of transmitting wagering information by telephone in violation of a federal statute. is society willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable? --(Page 5 of 101)--
. One who occupied a telephone booth. The Fourth Amendment protects people. houses.
B. Const. which was overheard by FBI agents who had attached an electronic listening and recording device to the outside of the public telephone booth where he had placed his calls. shall not be violated. At the trial. but upon probable cause. MacArthur. Illinois v. But what he seeks to preserve as private.S. may be constitutionally protected.S. Searches and Seizures
The Fourth Amendment states: the right of the people to be secure in their persons. IV. and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. has the individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged search? Second. and paid the toll that permitted him to place a call was entitled to assume that the words he uttered into the mouthpiece would not be broadcast to the world. The Fourth Amendment only applies within the United States. IV analysis is whether a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy. and no warrants shall issue. and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. papers.
Nor are the open fields "effects" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. amend. the test of legitimacy is not whether the individual chooses to conceal assertedly "private" activity. United States. IV. the court affirmed the validity of the open fields doctrine. the United States Supreme Court has given weight to such factors as the intention of the Framers of the Fourth Amendment. the uses to which the individual has put a location.
--(Page 6 of 101)--
. Const. amend. but instead whether the government's intrusion infringes upon the personal and societal values protected by U. investigated and discovered a marijuana field a mile from petitioner's home that was surrounded by "no trespass" signs. the lower court held that petitioner's rights under U. IV had not been violated. Noting that the U. Const. In assessing the degree to which a search infringes upon individual privacy. the officers' actions in entering such open fields without a warrant or probable cause did not violate the Constitution." No single factor determines whether an individual legitimately may claim under the Fourth Amendment that a place should be free of government intrusion not authorized by warrant. amend. Because the court found that there was no reasonable or legitimate expectation of privacy in open fields. amend.
As to this second inquiry under Katz.
1. The distinction between the latter and the house is as old as the common law.S. but only those expectations that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable. papers. The special protection accorded by the U. Applying the open fields doctrine.S. The Fourth Amendment does not protect the merely subjective expectation of privacy.
Oliver v. Because privacy for outdoor activities conducted in fields only extended to the area immediately surrounding the home. and the societal understanding that certain areas deserve the most scrupulous protection from government invasion. Const. houses. IV to the people in their persons. and effects is not extended to the open fields.S. the court affirmed the introduction of the evidence in petitioner's case and reversed the suppression of evidence in respondent's case. IV protection against unreasonable searches did not extend to intrusions into open fields. 466 US 170 (1984) Petitioner was arrested and indicted after police officers.S Const. without a warrant and without probable cause.
On appeal. 480 US 294 (1987) Drug enforcement agents began investigating defendant after he purchased large quantities of chemicals used to manufacture illegal drugs. As a practical matter these lands usually are accessible to the public and the police in ways that a home. the agents arrested defendant. The agents watched defendant place the chemicals in a barn on his ranch and observed a laboratory. the Court since the enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic. United States v. An individual may not legitimately demand privacy for activities conducted out of doors in fields. The barn was 50 yards from the fence surrounding the house and 60 yards from the house itself. There is no societal interest in protecting the privacy of those activities. that occur in open fields.These factors are equally relevant to determining whether the government's intrusion upon open fields without a warrant or probable cause violates reasonable expectations of privacy and is therefore a search proscribed by the Amendment. open fields do not provide the setting for those intimate activities that the Amendment is intended to shelter from government interference or surveillance. This rule is true to the conception of the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment. or commercial structure would not be. The Amendment reflects the recognition of the Framers that certain enclaves should be free from arbitrary government interference. such as the cultivation of crops. After obtaining a warrant. except in the area immediately surrounding the home. an office.
--(Page 7 of 101)--
. Agents then made a warrantless entry on the property to confirm their suspicions. Agents also knew that the barn was not being used for intimate activities of the home. Defendant was convicted of drug-related offenses. The appellate court reversed defendant's conviction finding that the evidence should have been suppressed because it was seized pursuant to the unlawful warrantless entry. For example. It is not generally true that fences or "No Trespassing" signs effectively bar the public from viewing open fields in rural areas. In contrast. the court held that the barn lay outside the curtilage of the ranch house. The barn did not lie within the area surrounding the house that was enclosed by a fence. Dunn. The appellate court also found that the barn was within the protective ambit of the Fourth Amendment because it was within the curtilage of the residence.
California v. Defendant's expectation that his yard was protected from observation was unreasonable and not an expectation that society was prepared to honor. The curtilage concept originated at common law to extend to the area immediately surrounding a dwelling house the same protection under the law of burglary as was afforded the house itself. however. Ciraolo. The distinction between a person's house and open fields is as old as the common law. What a person knowingly exposes to the public. papers. houses. the nature of the uses to which the area is put. and effects did not extend to the open fields. Nor does the mere fact that an individual has taken measures to restrict some views of his activities preclude an officer's observations from a public vantage point where he has a right to be and which renders the activities clearly visible. this did not bar police observation. 476 US 207 (1986) Warrantless aerial observation of individual's fenced-in backyard held not to violate Fourth Amendment.
2. whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home. That the area is within the curtilage does not itself bar all police observation. Nor did the mere fact that defendant had erected a 10-foot fence around his yard preclude an officer's observations from a public vantage point where he had a right to be and which rendered activities clearly visible. 4th amendment protection of the home has never been extended to require law enforcement officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home on public thoroughfares. The concept plays a part. Although defendant's yard was within the curtilage of his home. The Fourth Amendment's protection accorded persons. --(Page 8 of 101)--
. The Court stated that Fourth Amendment protection of the home had never been extended to require law enforcement officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home on public thoroughfares. Curtilage questions should be resolved with particular reference to four factors: the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home. even in his own home or office. in interpreting the reach of the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment has never been extended to require law enforcement officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home on public thoroughfares. and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by. is not a subject of 4th amendment protection.
but whether it was in the public airways at an altitude at which members of the public traveled with sufficient regularity that the accused's expectation of privacy from aerial observation was reasonable. 476 US 227 (1986) The taking of aerial photographs of an industrial plant complex from navigable airspace is not a search prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.
Dow Chemical v. Plurality White The accused could not reasonably have expected that his greenhouse was protected from public or official observation from a helicopter which was not violating the law or Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations by flying over the greenhouse at an altitude of 400 feet. United States. Brennan. The property surveyed was within the curtilage of defendant's home and. 488 US 445 (1989) The police flew over a greenhouse located on defendant's property in a helicopter at 400 feet. what was growing in the greenhouse was subject to viewing from the air. 533 US 27 (2001)
--(Page 9 of 101)--
. Florida v.
3. Dissent Was a "search" for which a warrant was required under the Fourth Amendment. Defendant could not reasonably have expected the contents of his greenhouse to be immune from examination by an officer seated in an aircraft flying in navigable airspace at an altitude of 500 feet where such private and commercial flight at that altitude was routine. looked into the greenhouse and saw marijuana. Riley. United States. The police then obtained a search warrant for the greenhouse and seized the marijuana. Although defendant no doubt intended and expected that his greenhouse would not be open to public inspection and took precautions to protect against ground-level observation. O'Connor The relevant inquiry was not whether the helicopter was where it had a right to be under FAA regulations.
Thermal Imaging of Homes
Kyllo v. because the sides and roof of his greenhouse were left partially open. therefore. because public aerial observation from that altitude of the accused's curtilage was not so commonplace that the accused's expectation of privacy in his backyard could be considered unreasonable. subject to search without a warrant.
rather than any "through-the-wall" surveillance. Based on the thermal-imaging information.
Searches of Trash
California v. Where the government uses a device that is not in general public use. 486 US 35 (1988) The arrestees claimed that they had exhibited an expectation of privacy in the trash that was searched by the police because it was in opaque bags on the street for collection at a fixed time and there was little likelihood that it would be inspected by anyone. that constitutes a search.S. the surveillance is a "search" and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant. snoops. and other members of the public. police obtained a search warrant for the residence. Brennan. When the police obtain by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area. IV only if the respondents manifest a subjective expectation of privacy in their garbage that society accepts as objectively reasonable. could have no reasonable expectation of privacy in any inculpatory items that they discarded.
--(Page 10 of 101)--
. The police had aimed a thermal-imaging device at petitioner's residence after a police detective suspected that petitioner was growing marijuana. Greenwood. children. Those who have deposited garbage in an area particularly suited for public inspection and. at least where the technology in question is not in general public use. public consumption. dissent Was nothing more than drawing inferences from "off-the-wall" surveillance. for the express purpose of having strangers take it. The warrantless search and seizure of garbage bags left at the curb outside a house violates U. to explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion. amend. It is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of a public street are readily accessible to animals. Dissent Scrutiny of another's trash is contrary to accepted notions of civilized behavior. Stevens. the agent's conduct did not amount to a search and was perfectly reasonable. in a manner of speaking.
4. This assures preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted. Const. scavengers.
A person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another. 468 US 705 (1984) Government agents. The Court held that there was neither a search nor a seizure within the contemplation of the Fourth Amendment. It travels public thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in plain view. which amounted principally to the following of an automobile on public streets and highways. nor to movements of objects such as the drum of chloroform outside the cabin in the open fields. Karo. 460 US 276 (1983) The issue was whether governmental surveillance conducted by means of the beeper. Knotts. No expectation of privacy extended to the visual observation of defendant's automobile arriving on his premises after leaving a public highway. United States v. The monitoring of a beeper in a private residence. Moreover. Monitoring of the beeper led to a search of a residence. A warrant was not required for the placement of the beeper in the can because the can was owned by the government. 401 US 745 (1971)
--(Page 11 of 101)--
. One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is transportation and it seldom serves as one's residence or as the repository of personal effects. which yielded illegal drugs. violated defendant's 4th amendment rights.5. and it was switched with a can owned by a government informant. The Court found that nothing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as science and technology afforded them in this case.
Observation and Monitoring of Public Behavior
United States v. White. the Court ruled that the transfer of the can from the informant to respondents was not a search or seizure because the transfer did not invade respondents' privacy. United States v. violates the Fourth Amendment rights of those who have a justifiable interest in the privacy of the residence. A car has little capacity for escaping public scrutiny. acting without a warrant. placed a beeper in a can of ether. a location not open to visual surveillance.
For constitutional purposes. Schultz Smith v Maryland.
6. The Court also ruled that even if petitioner did harbor some subjective expectation that the phone numbers he dialed would remain private. 442 US 735 (1979) After the victim of a robbery began receiving phone calls from the person who claimed to be the robber. either simultaneously records them with electronic equipment which he is carrying on his person. this expectation was not one that society was prepared to recognize as "reasonable. a suspect. The Court found that petitioner did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy regarding the numbers he dialed on his phone because those numbers were automatically turned over to a third party." Thus. the Court concluded that installation of the pen register was not a "search" and no warrant was required.
Concededly a police agent who conceals his police connections may write down for official use his conversations with a defendant and testify concerning them. California Bankers Assn v. without a warrant. Congressional Change: statute requires a court order for use of a pen register. the police installed a pen register. After the police discovered that petitioner had called the victim. they charged him with robbery. 462 US 696 (1983) [Airport]
--(Page 12 of 101)--
. Patriot Act: AG can use pen register on authority of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court when not concerning a US citizen or for terrorism investigations. was dialing.
Use of Dogs to Sniff for Contraband
United States v. Place. No reasonable expectation of privacy in bank records. at the central telephone system in order to determine the identity of the numbers that petitioner. or carries radio equipment which simultaneously transmits the conversations either to recording equipment located elsewhere or to other agents monitoring the transmitting frequency. without a warrant authorizing his encounters with the defendant and without otherwise violating the latter's 4th amendment rights. no different result is required if the agent instead of immediately reporting and transcribing his conversations with defendant. the phone company.
which was located in a public place. Caballes. The use of a well-trained narcotics-detection dog--one that does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden from public view--during a lawful traffic stop. to a trained canine -.
1. despite the fact that the sniff tells the authorities something about the contents of the luggage. It does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden from public view. for example. as does. the manner in which information is obtained through this investigative technique is much less intrusive than a typical search.
The Requirement for Probable Cause
Carroll v. does not require opening the luggage. A dog sniff conducted during a concededly lawful traffic stop that reveals no information other than the location of a substance that no individual has any right to possess does not violate the Fourth Amendment.
A "canine sniff" by a well-trained narcotics detection dog. A seizure that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket to a driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that mission. however.
C. Thus. Exposure of respondent's luggage. generally does not implicate legitimate privacy interests. Moreover. Sufficient Belief to Meet the Standard for Probable Cause
Aguilar-Spinelli two part test Required: Was the informant credible – was it likely that he or she was tellling the truth? --(Page 13 of 101)--
. Illinois v. This limited disclosure also ensures that the owner of the property is not subjected to the embarrassment and inconvenience entailed in less discriminate and more intrusive investigative methods. the information obtained is limited. an officer's rummaging through the contents of the luggage. 543 US 405 (2005) A seizure that is lawful at its inception can violate the Fourth Amendment if its manner of execution unreasonably infringes interests protected by the United States Constitution. a contraband item. Thus. the sniff discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics.did not constitute a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 267 US 132 (1978) Probable cause is met if the facts and circumstances before the officer are such as to warrant a man of prudence and caution in believing that the offense has been committed. United States.
by a strong showing as to the other. While an effort to fix some general." according to its usual acceptation.turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts -.not readily. it is clear that only the probability. Finely tuned standards such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence.the informant's "veracity" or "reliability" and his "basis of knowledge. practical question whether there is "probable cause" to believe that contraband or evidence is located in a particular place." and "basis of knowledge" are all highly relevant in determining the value of his report. It imports a seizure made under circumstances which warrant suspicion.
Was it likely that the informant had knowledge? Replaced by Gates totality test Illinois v. Instead. like all other clues and evidence coming to a policeman on the scene. and not a prima facie showing. reduced to a neat set of legal rules. 462 US 213 (1983) An informant's "veracity. The quanta of proof appropriate in ordinary judicial proceedings are inapplicable to the decision to issue a warrant. they should be understood simply as closely intertwined issues that may usefully illuminate the commonsense. Gates. or by some other indicia of reliability. have no place in the magistrate's decision." There are persuasive arguments against according these two elements such independent status. numerically precise degree of certainty corresponding to "probable cause" may not be helpful. One simple rule will not cover every situation. or even usefully. These elements. Informants' tips doubtless come in many shapes and sizes from many different types of persons. The term "probable cause. 540 US 366 (2003)
--(Page 14 of 101)--
. should not be understood as entirely separate and independent requirements to be rigidly exacted in every case. means less than evidence which would justify condemnation. Rather. Pringle." "reliability. of criminal activity is the standard of probable cause. Probable cause is a fluid concept -. may vary greatly in their value and reliability. they are better understood as relevant considerations in the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis that traditionally has guided probable-cause determinations: a deficiency in one may be compensated for. Rigid legal rules are ill-suited to an area of such diversity. useful in formal trials. however. Maryland v. The "two-pronged test" directs analysis into two largely independent channels -. in determining the overall reliability of a tip. Informants' tips.
In addition to the driver and a back set passenger, defendant was a front seat passenger in a vehicle which was stopped for speeding. Upon a consensual search, a significant amount of cash was found in the glove compartment of the vehicle and drugs were discovered between the back-seat armrest and the back seat. Although defendant subsequently admitted that the drugs and cash were his, none of the vehicle occupants admitted to ownership of the drugs at the time of the search, and all three occupants were arrested. It was an entirely reasonable inference that any or all three of the occupants had knowledge of, and exercised dominion and control over, the drugs, and thus a reasonable officer could conclude that there was probable cause to believe defendant committed the crime of possession of drugs, either solely or jointly. It was also reasonable for the officer to infer a common enterprise among the three occupants, in view of the likelihood of drug dealing in which an innocent party was unlikely to be involved. The probable-cause standard is a practical, nontechnical conception that deals with the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. The substance of all the definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt, and the belief of guilt must be particularized with respect to the person to be searched or seized. The term "probable cause," according to its usual acceptation, means less than evidence which would justify condemnation. It imports a seizure made under circumstances which warrant suspicion. To determine whether an officer had probable cause to arrest an individual, a court examines the events leading up to the arrest, and then decides whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to probable cause.
An Objective or Subjective Standard?
Whren v. United States, 517 US 806 (1996)
--(Page 15 of 101)--
Plainclothes vice-squad officers were patrolling "high drug area" in an unmarked car. An officer who had observed traffic violations approached a vehicle that was occupied by defendants. When the officer approached defendant driver's car window, he observed two large plastic bags of what appeared to be crack cocaine in defendant passenger's hands. Defendants were arrested and illegal drugs were retrieved from the vehicle. On appeal, defendants accepted that the officer had probable cause to believe the traffic code was violated, but argued that the test for traffic stops should have been whether a police officer, who acted reasonably, would have made stop for the given reason. An automobile stop is thus subject to the constitutional imperative that it not be "unreasonable" under the circumstances. As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred. The constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops does not depend on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved. Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis. Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 US 146 (2004) An arresting officer's state of mind (except for the facts that he knows) is irrelevant to the existence of probable cause. That is to say, his subjective reason for making the arrest need not be the criminal offense as to which the known facts provide probable cause. The fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.
The Warrant Requirement
The 4th Amendment provides that: “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched. And the persons or things to be seized.”
1. What Information Must Be Included in the Application for a Warrant?
Must be supported by oath or affirmation, Particularly describing the place to be searched, The persons or things to be seized. The warrant will specify the time period for its execution. Must be issued by a neutral and detached magistrate. --(Page 16 of 101)--
What Form Must the Warrant Take?
Andresen v. Maryland, 427 US 463 (1976) Petitioner, as the closing attorney, was convicted of false pretenses for defrauding a purchaser of property. Investigators obtained a search warrant to search petitioner's offices for evidence of the crime. The court also rejected petitioner's argument that the searches were unreasonable because they were based on general warrants. The warrants referred only to the crime of false pretenses and were sufficiently specific. State search warrants issued for searches of the business offices of an individual suspected of having committed the state crime of false pretenses in connection with his real estate activities involving a certain "Lot 13T" are not rendered fatally general by the addition, in each warrant, to the exhaustive list of particularly described documents, of the phrase "together with other fruits, instrumentalities and evidence of crime at this [time] unknown," where the quoted phrase was not a separate sentence, but appeared in each warrant at the end of a sentence containing a lengthy list of specified and particular items to be seized, all pertaining to "Lot 13T," so that in context the term "crime" in the warrants referred only to the crime of false pretenses with respect to the sale of such lot. General warrants, which pose the problem not of intrusion per se, but of a general, exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings, are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, which addresses the problem posed by a general warrant by requiring a particular description of the things to be seized; such requirement makes general searches impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another, leaving nothing to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant as to what is to be taken. A specific list of documents to be seized that is contained in state search warrants issued for searches of the business offices of an individual suspected of having committed the state crime of false pretenses in connection with his real estate activities regarding a certain subdivision does not constitute an impermissible "general" warrant, where the investigation was one of a complex real estate scheme whose existence could be proved only by piecing together many bits of evidence; the complexity of an illegal scheme may not be used as a shield to avoid detection when the state has demonstrated probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and probable cause to believe that evidence of this crime is in the suspect's possession.
--(Page 17 of 101)--
found probable cause to conduct the search. whether the federal agent was entitled to qualified immunity. and such documents are properly admitted into evidence in the individual's state prosecution for the crime of false pretenses (a crime for which the state must prove intent to defraud beyond a reasonable doubt). Ramirez.
--(Page 18 of 101)--
. The magistrate's authorization of the search did not render it constitutional because the warrant's obvious deficiency required the court to consider the search warrantless and presumptively unreasonable. a warrantless search was presumptively unconstitutional. relying on an affidavit that particularly described the items in question. The fact that the application adequately described the things to be seized did not save the warrant from its facial invalidity because the warrant did not incorporate other documents by reference and neither the affidavit nor the application accompanied the warrant.
The seizure of documents pertaining to a lot other than "Lot 13T" by trained special investigators during searches of an individual's business offices pursuant to state warrants. based upon the individual's misrepresentations concerning Lot 13T to the purchaser of such lot. and if so. The federal agent was not entitled to qualified immunity because no reasonable officer could have believed that a warrant that plainly did not comply with the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirements was valid nor been unaware of the basic rule that. Groh v. instrumentalities. The warrant was plainly invalid as it provided no description of the type of evidence sought. absent consent or exigency. and evidence of crime at the time unknown. 540 US 551 (2004) The issues were whether the search violated the Fourth Amendment. which warrants listed specified items pertaining to Lot 13T to be seized together with other fruits. where the trained special investigators reasonably could have believed that the evidence specifically dealing with another lot could be used to show the individual's intent with respect to the Lot 13T transaction. given that a magistrate. does not violate the rule that when police seize mere evidence probable cause must be examined in terms of cause to believe that the evidence sought will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction.
Thomas Dissent The search did not violate the Fourth Amendment. the search was not unreasonable. United States v. because. despite the defective warrant. And for good reason: The presence of a search warrant serves a high function and that high function is not necessarily vindicated when some other document. and if the supporting document accompanies the warrant. Most anticipatory warrants subject their execution to some condition precedent other than the mere passage of time--a socalled "triggering condition. somewhere. Indeed. 547 US 90 (2006) An anticipatory warrant is a warrant based upon an affidavit showing probable cause that at some future time (but not presently) certain evidence of crime will be located at a specified place.
The fact that a warrant application adequately describes the things to be seized does not save the warrant from its facial invalidity. The Fourth Amendment does not forbid a warrant from cross-referencing other documents. Grubbs. Thus. judicial precedent firmly establishes the basic principle of Fourth Amendment law that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable. not in the supporting documents. The Fourth Amendment by its terms requires particularity in the warrant. most United States Courts of Appeals hold that a court may construe a warrant with reference to a supporting application or affidavit if the warrant uses appropriate words of incorporation."
--(Page 19 of 101)--
. a warrantless entry to search for weapons or contraband is unconstitutional even when a felony has been committed and there is probable cause to believe that incriminating evidence will be found within. says something about the objects of the search. Because the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion stands at the very core of the Fourth Amendment. absent exigent circumstances. but the contents of that document are neither known to the person whose home is being searched nor available for her inspection.
3. the probability determination for a conditioned anticipatory warrant looks also to the likelihood that the condition will occur. 544 US 93 (2005) The individual's detention during the search of the premises was plainly permissible because a warrant existed to search a particular residence and the individual was an occupant of that residence at the time of the search. authorizing search and seizure if contraband should be delivered--though for any single location there is no likelihood that contraband will be delivered. the need to detain multiple occupants of the premises made the use of handcuffs all the more reasonable. How May Police Treat Those Who Are present When a Warrant Is Being Executed? Muehler v. The officers' questioning of the individual about her immigration status was not an independent Fourth Amendment violation because mere police questioning was not a seizure. the use of handcuffs minimized the inherent safety risk involved in the search. Thus. and thus that a proper object of seizure will be on the described premises. It should be noted. The two to three hour detention in handcuffs was not unreasonable given that the case involved the detention of four people by two officers during a search of a gang house for dangerous weapons.
--(Page 20 of 101)--
. Mena. Anticipatory warrants are no different in principle from ordinary warrants. or a fugitive will be on the described premises (3) when the warrant is executed. Moreover.
What are the Requirement in Executing Warrants?
a.) Rather. the first of these determinations goes not merely to what will probably be found if the condition is met. (If that were the extent of the probability determination. The officers' use of handcuffs to effectuate the detention was reasonable where the warrant authorized a search for weapons and a wanted gang member resided on the premises. an anticipatory warrant could be issued for every house in the country. however. that where the anticipatory warrant places a condition (other than the mere passage of time) upon its execution. They require the magistrate to determine (1) that it is now probable that (2) contraband. evidence of a crime.
The detention of an occupant is surely less intrusive than the search itself and the presence of a warrant assures that a neutral magistrate has determined that probable cause exists to search the home. Wisconsin. and (3) facilitating the orderly completion of the search. Against this incremental intrusion. in executing a search warrant. Supreme Court held that the common-law knock and announce principle formed a part of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry and a search or seizure of a dwelling might be constitutionally defective if police officers entered without prior announcement. law enforcement interests may also establish the reasonableness of an unannounced entry. Officers executing a search warrant for contraband have the authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted. there are three legitimate law enforcement interests that provide substantial justification for detaining an occupant: (1) preventing flight in the event that incriminating evidence is found. Although a search or seizure of a dwelling might be constitutionally defective if police officers enter without prior announcement. Richards v. entered through an unlocked screen door without first knocking or announcing their presence. Arkansas. Do Police have to Knock and Announce? Wilson v. as detainees' self-interest may induce them to open locked doors or locked containers to avoid the use of force. 514 US 927 (1995) Defendant was convicted of delivery and possession of drugs after police officers. Such detentions are appropriate because the character of the additional intrusion caused by detention is slight and because the justifications for detention are substantial. and remanded the case to determine whether the unannounced entry was reasonable under the circumstances. 520 US 385 (1997)
--(Page 21 of 101)--
. (2) minimizing the risk of harm to the officers. b.
there were two apartments on the third floor. This showing is not high. What if There Are Unforeseen Circumstances or Mistakes While Executing a Warrant? Maryland v. but found that the blanket exception to the knock-and-announce requirement for felony drug investigations was unconstitutional. In order to justify a "no-knock" entry. and their conduct was consistent with a reasonable effort to ascertain and identify the place intended to be searched within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. However." The police reasonably believed that there was only one apartment on the premises described in the warrant.
--(Page 22 of 101)--
. but the police should be required to make it whenever the reasonableness of a "no-knock" entry is challenged. allowing the destruction of evidence. under the particular circumstances. The question presented to the Court was whether the seizure of the contraband was prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. The officers' execution of the warrant reasonably included the entire third floor. The Court held that the warrant was valid when it was issued and the manner in which it was executed was reasonable. Garrison. Before the officers executing the warrant became aware that they were in a separate apartment occupied by defendant. At trial. c. The validity of the warrant was assessed on the basis of the information that the officers disclosed. petitioner sought to exclude evidence on the ground that the officers had failed to knock-and-announce. or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by. they had discovered the contraband that provided the basis for defendant's conviction. or had a duty to discover and to disclose. for example. would be dangerous or futile. The court affirmed the judgment against petitioner because it found the officers' decision not to knock-and-announce was reasonable under the circumstances of this case. to the issuing magistrate. 480 US 79 (1987) The evidence had been seized in a search conducted pursuant a warrant that specified a location of "the premises known as 2036 Park Avenue third floor apartment. the police must have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence. Police executed a search warrant for petitioner's hotel room seeking evidence of the felonious crime of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance They did not knock and announce prior to their entry and drugs were seized.
Further. and innocent people unfortunately bear the cost. Supreme Court held that the execution of the properly issued warrant by the deputies was not unreasonable. Officers executing search warrants on occasion enter a house when residents are engaged in private activity. although they were not the same race as the suspects being sought under the warrant. Valid warrants will issue to search the innocent. 1989 (2007) The residents recently purchased the home and asserted that. California. 1.
E. however. satisfying the Fourth Amendment. and humiliation may be real. The Fourth Amendment allows warrants to issue on probable cause.
The warrant was executed in a reasonable manner. one of the suspects was reported to be armed. and the deputies were justified in ordering the residents from the bed. Los Angeles County v. Rettele.
Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement Searches Incident to Arrest
Chimel v. 395 US 752 (1969)
--(Page 23 of 101)--
.S. 127 S. Regardless of the difference in race.Ct. embarrassment. the deputies ordered the residents to get out of their bed and remain unclothed until the deputies determined that the suspects were not present. and refusing to allow them to dress for a brief period. in order to insure that no weapons were concealed in the bedding or elsewhere. the Fourth Amendment is not violated. since the officers' failure to realize the overbreadth of the warrant was objectively understandable and reasonable. and since they discontinued the search as soon as they discovered their mistake. when the residents were ordered from their bed the deputies had no way of knowing whether the suspects were elsewhere in the home. When officers execute a valid warrant and act in a reasonable manner to protect themselves from harm. and the resulting frustration. The U. a standard well short of absolute certainty.
may be made only under the authority of a search warrant. When petitioner returned from work. among other things. Otherwise. Robertson. police arrested him. It grows out of the inherent necessities of the situation at the time of the arrest. Police then asked for permission to "look around." It found that there was no justification for searching any room other than that in which the arrest occurred. for that matter. Police seized a number of coins and medals. There is no justification for routinely searching any room other than that in which an arrest occurs or. Extending the search to the entire house was not proper. in the absence of well-recognized exceptions. Even searching through desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas of the room where the arrest occurred was not appropriate. the court held that the search was "unreasonable." Even though petitioner objected. United States v. the officer's safety might well be endangered.
Police came to petitioner's home with an arrest warrant to arrest him for an alleged burglary. Such searches. and the court overturned the conviction. 414 US 218 (1973)
--(Page 24 of 101)--
. Reversing the appeals court's affirmance of conviction. When an arrest is made. They looked through the entire house and had petitioner's wife open drawers and physically remove contents of the drawers so they could view items. it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. A search or seizure without a warrant as an incident to a lawful arrest has always been considered to be a strictly limited right. it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. and the arrest itself frustrated. But there must be something more in the way of necessity than merely a lawful arrest. In addition. that respondent State later used to convict petitioner of burglary. for searching through all the desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas in that room itself. the officers conducted a search.
The threat to safety from issuing a traffic citation was significantly less than in the case of a custodial arrest. a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification. A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the 4th amendment. It is intended to vindicate society's interest in having its laws obeyed.S. The officer then searched defendant and felt an object under defendant's coat. It is the fact of the lawful arrest. as authorized by Iowa law. The Court reversed the appellate court's decision and found the search permissible. though far from inconsiderable. The authority to search the person incident to a lawful custodial arrest. The officer felt there was something in the package that was not cigarettes. constitutes a brief. does not depend on what a court may later decide was the probability in a particular arrest situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon the person of the suspect. whether or not trial or conviction ultimately follows.
Searches Made in Hot Pursuit
Warden v. Const. The protective search for weapons. 387 US 294 (1967) --(Page 25 of 101)--
Defendant was pulled over by a police officer. The officer had probable cause to arrest defendant for driving after his license had been revoked. An arrest is the initial stage of a criminal prosecution. which establishes the authority to search. There was no need to discover and preserve evidence because once defendant was stopped and issued a citation all the evidence necessary to prosecute had been obtained. The officer opened the package and found what was later determined to be heroin. IV. and the interests each is designed to serve are likewise quite different. and we hold that in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of U. while based upon the need to disarm and to discover evidence. as authorized by Iowa law--held to violate Federal Constitution's Fourth Amendment. by police officer who issued speeding citation--rather than making arrest. Knowles v. amend. Hayden.
2. on the other hand. The officer reached into the coat and pulled out a cigarette package. intrusion upon the sanctity of the person. that intrusion being lawful. Iowa. An arrest is a wholly different kind of intrusion upon individual freedom from a limited search for weapons. but is also a reasonable search under that amendment. 525 US 113 (1998) Full search of automobile. and it is inevitably accompanied by future interference with the individual's freedom of movement.
403 US 443 (1971)
--(Page 26 of 101)--
. he knew that the robber was armed and he did not know that some weapons had been found at the time he opened the machine. which was too substantial. be as broad as may reasonably be necessary to prevent the dangers that the suspect at large in the house may resist or escape. or for his weapons. in the absence of a specific question to that effect. within a house into which he had run only minutes before the police arrived. Even if it is assumed that exigent circumstances made lawful a search without warrant only for one suspected of armed robbery. cannot be accorded controlling weight. even when it was accomplished under statutory authority and when probable cause was present. as where the police were informed that an armed robbery had taken place. New Hampshire. at the least. although according to his testimony he was searching for the man or the money. they acted reasonably when they entered the house and began to search for a man of the description they had been given and for weapons which he had used in the robbery or might use against them. armed. The exigencies of a situation may make imperative a warrantless entry into premises and a subsequent search.
3. nor the search for him without warrant. must. Payton v. The Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to delay in the course of an investigation if to do so would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others. absent exigent circumstances.
Coolidge v. it cannot be said that the officer who found the suspect's clothing in a washing machine was not searching for weapons. his failure to state explicitly that he was searching for weapons. The permissible scope of search for a suspected felon. The Court held that to be arrested in the home involved not only the invasion attendant to all arrests. where.
Neither the entry without warrant to search for a robber. but also an invasion of the sanctity of the home. and that the suspect had entered the house less than 5 minutes before they reached it. is invalid where the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative. 445 US 573 (1980) The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibited the police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home in order to make a routine felony arrest. New York.
The scope of the search was not enlarged in the slightest by the omission of any reference to the weapons in the warrant. and the seizure was authorized by the plain view doctrine. not only to obtain a warrant to search for the stolen property. Finally. 496 US 128 (1990) Petitioner was convicted of the armed robbery of the treasurer of a coin club following denial of his motion to suppress weapons seized by police from his residence. The search was authorized by the warrant. The search did not come within the automobile exception to the warrant requirement because the automobile was regularly parked in the driveway and was not fleeing. so that the items seized from petitioner's home were discovered during a lawful search authorized by a valid warrant. Where the initial intrusion that brings the police within plain view of such an article is supported. not by a warrant. California. the seizure is also legitimate. but also to believe that the weapons and handguns had been used in the crime he was investigating. Thus the police may inadvertently come across evidence while in hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect. the plain view doctrine has been applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused. After an appellate court affirmed the conviction. Finally. Under certain circumstances. When the weapons were discovered. And an object that comes into view during a search incident to arrest that is appropriately limited in scope under existing law may be seized without a warrant. it was immediately apparent to the police officer that they constituted incriminating evidence. the police may seize evidence in plain view without a warrant. it was not a necessary condition. and the items searched for were not contraband. Horton v. Two additional conditions must be satisfied to justify the warrantless seizure. though inadvertence was a characteristic of most legitimate plain view seizures. The officer had probable cause. The Court concluded that.
--(Page 27 of 101)--
. but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.
The Court rejected the contention that the search of the automobile was incident to a valid arrest because petitioner was arrested in his house and the car was outside some distance away. petitioner sought certiorari. The Supreme Court affirmed. but by one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. the Court found that the car was not an instrumentality of the crime that could be seized in plain view because the police knew in advance of the car's location and had ample opportunity to obtain a valid warrant.
The trial court denied respondent's motion to suppress the cocaine. and moved some of the components in order to read and record their serial numbers. Such a search was not "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment because it was not sustainable under the "plain view" doctrine.
First. Hicks. Dickerson. The state supreme court affirmed the state court of appeals' decision reversing the trial court. If. The state supreme court held that the stop and the frisk of respondent was valid under Terry. and if the officers have a lawful right of access to the object. and weapons that was the lawful objective of his entry. Probable cause is required in order to invoke the "plain view" doctrine. two sets of expensive stereo equipment were noticed by one of the officers. sliding. its incriminating character must also be immediately apparent. 480 US 321 (1987) When law enforcement officers entered defendant's apartment under exigent circumstances after a bullet was fired into the apartment below. not only must the officer be lawfully located in a place from which the object can be plainly seen. Arizona v. Under the plain-view doctrine. if police are lawfully in a position from which they view an object. Minnesota v. the officer determined that the lump was contraband only after squeezing. but that the seizure of the cocaine was unconstitutional.i. --(Page 28 of 101)--
. The court affirmed. during a stop and frisk. however. The court stated that the state supreme court was correct in holding that the police officer in this case overstepped the bounds of the "strictly circumscribed" search for weapons allowed under Terry. not only must the item be in plain view. retrieved a lump of cocaine from respondent's pocket. The state supreme court found that based on the record before it. they may seize it without a warrant. 508 US 366 (1993) Respondent was arrested and charged with possession of a controlled substance after a police officer.the plain-view doctrine cannot justify its seizure.. if its incriminating character is immediately apparent. e. victims. but he or she must also have a lawful right of access to the object itself. if its incriminating character is not immediately apparent -. He thought these anomalous in the context of the squalor of the apartment. The officer's moving of the equipment constituted a "search" separate and apart from the search for the shooter. Respondent proceeded to trial and was found guilty. and otherwise manipulating the contents of respondent's pocket which the officer already knew contained no weapon. the police lack probable cause to believe that an object in plain view is contraband without conducting some further search of the object -. Second.
holding that defendant's motor home clearly fell within the vehicle exception to the warrant requirement because it was readily mobile and was situated in a way or place that objectively indicated that it was being used as a vehicle. When a vehicle is being used on the highways. 399 US 42 (1970) Automobiles and other conveyances may be searched without a warrant in circumstances that would not justify the search without a warrant of a house or an office. if not actually moving.
The Automobile Exception
a. or if it is readily capable of such use and is found stationary in a place not regularly used for residential purposes -. which was parked on a public lot. law enforcement officials observed defendant and a youth enter the mobile home. there is a reduced expectation of privacy stemming from its use as a licensed motor vehicle subject to a range of police regulation inapplicable to a fixed dwelling. The youth later stated that he received marijuana in exchange for sexual contacts with defendant. The Exception and Its Rationale California v. The mobility of automobiles creates circumstances of such exigency that. Carney. however. The privacy interests in an automobile are constitutionally protected. one agent entered the motor home and observed marijuana. Without a warrant or consent. rigorous enforcement of the warrant requirement is impossible. Defendant was convicted for possession of marijuana for sale. as a practical necessity. The United States Supreme Court reversed. Chambers v. the vehicle is obviously readily mobile by the turn of an ignition key.4. the ready mobility of the automobile justifies a lesser degree of protection of those interests. First. Second.temporary or otherwise -.
--(Page 29 of 101)--
. 471 US 386 (1985) After receiving information that the exchange of marijuana for sex was taking place at defendant's motor home. less rigorous warrant requirements govern because the expectation of privacy with respect to one's automobile is significantly less than that relating to one's home or office. provided that there is probable cause to believe that the car contains articles that the officers are entitled to seize. Maroney. Besides the element of mobility.the two justifications for the vehicle exception come into play.
and found marijuana. and the privacy interests in a car's trunk or glove compartment may be no less than those in a movable container. A search warrant is unnecessary where there is probable cause to search an automobile stopped on the highway. The police could search containers found in an automobile without a warrant if their search was supported by probable cause. the occupants are alerted. Police officers stopped him. Probable cause to believe that a container placed in the trunk of a taxi contains contraband or evidence does not justify a search of the entire cab. b. The expectation of privacy in one's vehicle is equal to one's expectation of privacy in a container. The police had probable cause to believe that the paper bag in the car's trunk contained marijuana and probable cause allowed a warrantless search of the paper bag. The same probable cause to believe that a container held drugs allowed the police to arrest the person transporting the container and search it. opened the trunk. 500 US 565 (1991) Defendant placed a bag in the trunk of a car. as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest. he may. The scope of a warrantless search of an automobile is not defined by the nature of the container in which the contraband is secreted. and the car's contents may never be found again if a warrant must be obtained. The Court held that the Fourth Amendment did not require the police to obtain a warrant to open the sack in a movable vehicle simply because they lacked probable cause to search the entire car. it is defined by the object of the search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be found. Rather. Searches of Containers in Automobiles California v. When a policeman makes a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile. the car is movable. Acevedo.
--(Page 30 of 101)--
. search the passenger compartment of that automobile. Hence an immediate search is constitutionally permissible. The Fourth Amendment did not compel separate treatment for an automobile search that extended only to a container within the vehicle. A warrantless search of an automobile can include a search of a container or package found inside the car when such a search is supported by probable cause. It follows from this conclusion that the police may also examine the contents of any containers found within the passenger compartment.
as well as luggage. Arizona v. He opened the envelope and found that it contained marihuana. be searched whether it is open or closed. search the passenger compartment of that automobile. he may. Const. It thus includes closed or open glove compartments.S. In defendant's subsequent drug prosecution. Belton. The Court determined that the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement did not justify the search because
--(Page 31 of 101)--
. 453 US 454 (1991) [Replaced by Gant] Defendant was a passenger in an automobile that sped by a police officer at a fast rate.Ct. The court's holding encompasses only the interior of the passenger compartment of an automobile and does not encompass the trunk. Thus. The items seized in the warrantless search of the vehicle's passenger compartment. were justifiably seized because of the exigencies of the situation. He also searched defendant's jacket in the vehicle and found cocaine. handcuffed. consoles. and locked in the back of a patrol car. the trial court denied his motion to suppress the items seized in the search of the vehicle. 129 S. as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest. He therefore required the occupants to get out of the vehicle and proceeded to search them. Gant. Such a container may. for if the passenger compartment is within reach of the arrestee. of course. When a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile. amend. boxes. clothing. IV and U. but that the lawful custodial arrest justifies the infringement of any privacy interest the arrestee may have. amend. so also will containers in it be within his reach. Upon stopping the car. The police may also examine the contents of any containers found within the passenger compartment. 1710 (2009) After respondent was arrested for driving with a suspended license. XIV. the search did not violate the safeguards of U. Const. since the justification for the search is not that the arrestee has no privacy interest in the container.S. Searches Incident to Arrest New York v.c. bags. "Container" denotes any object capable of holding another object. police officers searched his car and discovered cocaine in the pocket of a jacket on the backseat. or other receptacles located anywhere within the passenger compartment. incident to defendant's lawful custodial arrest. and the like. the officer smelled marihuana smoke and saw an envelope on the car's floor that was marked with a name for marihuana.
Thornton v.(1) police could not reasonably have believed that respondent could have accessed his car at the time of the search since the five officers outnumbered the three arrestees. Accordingly. 428 US 364 (1976)
--(Page 32 of 101)--
. Circumstances unique to the automobile context justify a search incident to arrest when it is reasonable to believe that evidence of the offense of arrest might be found in the vehicle. an offense for which police could not expect to find evidence in the passenger compartment of his car. all of whom had been handcuffed and secured in separate patrol cars before the officers searched respondent's car. United States. Belton does not authorize a vehicle search incident to a recent occupant's arrest after the arrestee has been secured and cannot access the interior of the vehicle. it certainly does not turn on whether he was inside or outside the car at the moment that the officer first initiated contact with him The authority for the vehicle search was not limited to arrests of persons actually occupying vehicles at the time of initial contacts with officers. Opperman. since the same interests in the safety of the officer and preservation of evidence applied to both occupants and recent occupants of a vehicle. and (2) police could not reasonably have believed that evidence of the offense for which respondent was arrested might have been found in the car since he was arrested for driving with a suspended license. Also. Police may search incident to arrest only the space within an arrestee's "immediate control. 541 US 615 (2004) Police are allowed to search the passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to a lawful custodial arrest of both occupants and recent occupants.
South Dakota v. While an arrestee's status as a recent occupant may turn on his temporal or spatial relationship to the car at the time of the arrest and search. The safety and evidentiary justifications underlying Chimel's reaching-distance rule determine Belton's scope." meaning the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. the doctrine of stare decisis did not require adherence to a broad reading of Belton. the safety and evidentiary interests that supported the search in Belton simply were not present in the instant case.
was not present to make other arrangements for the safekeeping of his belongings. The court held that there was no suggestion whatever that the standard procedure was a pretext concealing an investigatory police motive. Specifically.S. On defendant's motion. On appeal. IV when they conducted a routine inventory search of an automobile lawfully impounded by police. State appealed the judgment that held that local police violated U. the judgment was reversed and remanded on the basis that the police were indisputably engaged in a caretaking search and such was not unreasonable. the Court held that because the search was conducted as a part of a routine administrative procedure that was incident to defendant's arrest and incarceration. and the protection of the police from potential danger. he removed cigarettes from the shoulder bag he was carrying and then placed it on the counter in the station. The procedures developed in response to three distinct needs: the protection of the owner's property while it remains in police custody. The court concluded that in following standard police procedures the conduct of the police was not unreasonable under U. amend. Further. amend. Lafayette. having left his car illegally parked for an extended period and thus subject to impoundment. contending that the search and seizure was not unreasonable. The Court reasoned that such --(Page 33 of 101)--
. On certiorari. In such circumstances. the state trial court suppressed the drugs and that judgment was affirmed on appeal. Const. 462 US 640 (1983) Defendant was arrested for disturbing the peace. The practice has been viewed as essential to respond to incidents of theft or vandalism. a majority of the Court held that the search was not invalid under the Fourth Amendment. Police frequently attempt to determine whether a vehicle has been stolen and thereafter abandoned. the search was not unreasonable. Narcotics were found in the bag and defendant was subsequently charged with violating the state's controlled substances statute. the police could search any container in defendant's possession. Illinois v. IV. When he arrived at the police station. local police departments generally follow a routine practice of securing and inventorying the automobiles' contents. As part of a routine booking procedure. The court reasoned that the owner. the inventory itself was prompted by the presence in plain view of a number of valuables inside the car. Const. When vehicles are impounded.S. the protection of the police against claims or disputes over lost or stolen property. an officer emptied and inventoried the contents of the bag.
IV interests was limited. and reassemble a vehicle's fuel tank. 541 US 149 (2004) The appellate court held that the Fourth Amendment forbade the fuel tank search absent reasonable suspicion. Searches made at the border were reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occurred at the border. The Court affirmed one respondent's conviction and reversed and remanded the remaining cases with directions to affirm the conviction of another respondent. disassemble. The United States' interest in preventing the entry of unwanted persons and effects is at its zenith at the international border.S. The United States' authority to conduct suspicionless inspections at the border included the authority to remove. Ramsey. had no place in border searches of vehicles. The Court held that the operation of fixed checkpoints need not be authorized in advance by warrant. Searches made at the border. The Court contrasted the level of intrusion at a checkpoint stop with that of a roving patrol and also cited the relatively low expectation of privacy in an automobile. Martinez-Fuerte. while the intrusion on U. are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border. Const. Flores-Montano. in order to resolve a conflict among the lower courts regarding the constitutionality of the United States use of permanent checkpoints away from borders. United States v. pursuant to the longstanding right of the sovereign to protect itself by stopping and examining persons and property crossing into the United States.a search was supported by the State's interest in safeguarding defendant and his property as well avoiding possible claims of theft by the police. amend.
Border Crossing and Checkpoints
United States v. and stops and questioning could be made in the absence of any individualized suspicion at reasonably located checkpoints. United States v.
6. Requiring reasonable suspicion would be impractical because the flow of traffic was too heavy to allow a particularized study enabling a given car to be identified as a possible carrier of illegal aliens. 431 US 606 (1977)
--(Page 34 of 101)--
. The Court employed a balancing test and said that the need to make routine checkpoint stops was great. The Supreme Court found that complex balancing tests to determine what was a "routine" search of a vehicle. 428 US 543 (1976) The Court granted certiorari in consolidated cases arising from prosecutions for illegal transportation of aliens. as opposed to a more "intrusive" search of a person.
S. the court reversed the judgment. 482 authorized the search of letters. and was not based upon the existence of "exigent circumstances.C. The court reversed the appellate court and upheld defendant's conviction.
7. Inspectors sought a search warrant after several hours.The court held that the standard to be applied at the border was a reasonable suspicion. Key evidence against them was obtained when a customs officer searched international mail intended for respondents. the length of time defendant was detained was reasonable.
Defendants were convicted of possession of narcotics. became suspicious of a number of similar looking letters originating from Thailand that contained more than letter paper. 473 US 531 (1985) Defendant entered the United States at an airport. The court held that the 482 "reasonable cause" standard was less stringent than the Fourth Amendment "probable cause" standard. The court held that a border search was an exception to the warrant requirement. based on experience. 496 US 444 (1990)
--(Page 35 of 101)--
. Under the reasonable suspicion standard." United States v. Defendant was given the opportunity to undergo an x-ray. Holding that 19 U. and was satisfied where the officer. and that the "reasonable cause" standard of 482 satisfied the Fourth Amendment. Sitz.S. Based on the facts of this case. officials at the border must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person of alimentary canal smuggling. Montoya-Hernandez. Inspectors detained defendant for at least 16 hours before defendant passed balloons filled with cocaine from her alimentary canal. Customs inspectors detained Defendant upon her arrival based upon a suspicion that she was smuggling drugs.
Michigan Dept of State Police v.
the police stopped a predetermined number of vehicles. the checkpoints were generally effective. and the subjective intrusion on individual liberties was not substantial. The three prong test for determining the constitutionality of a sobriety checkpoint plan involved balancing the state's interest in preventing accidents caused by drunk drivers. However. challenged the constitutionality. amend. the stops could only be justified by some quantum of individualized suspicion. City of Indianapolis v. an officer advised the driver that he or she was being stopped at a drug checkpoint and asked the driver to produce a license and registration. all licensed drivers. On review the court found that a three prong test was appropriate. and respondents. the court held that such stops were reasonable considering the increasing number of alcohol-related deaths and mutilation on the nation's roads. Respondents argued that the analysis had to proceed from a basis of probable cause or reasonable suspicion. and the level of intrusion on an individual's privacy caused by the checkpoints.S. balancing the state's grave and legitimate interest in curbing drunk driving. The State program was consistent with the Fourth Amendment and the balance of the State's interest in preventing drunken driving and the degree of intrusion upon individual motorists who were briefly stopped weighed in favor of the State program. IV because the primary purpose of the narcotics checkpoint program was to uncover evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.
--(Page 36 of 101)--
. The checkpoints violated U. and there must be some governmental need beyond the normal need before a balancing analysis was appropriate. the effectiveness of sobriety checkpoints in achieving that goal. The court found that a seizure occurred when a vehicle was stopped at a sobriety checkpoint. Const. Edmond.
Petitioners set up programs for sobriety checkpoints. The officer looked for signs of impairment and conducted an open-view examination of the vehicle from the outside. Pursuant to written directives. Because the authorities pursued primarily general crime control purposes at the checkpoints. 531 US 32 (2000) Petitioner city operated vehicle checkpoints to interdict unlawful drugs. A narcotics-detection dog walked around the outside of each stopped vehicle. At each checkpoint location.
Schneckloth v. which the Court adhered to. The traditional definition of voluntariness. his lack of education or his low intelligence. the lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights. the court must consider the nature of the interests threatened and their connection to the particular law enforcement practices at issue. The court of appeals vacated an order that denied the petition for habeas corpus relief on grounds that there was insufficient proof that respondent knew that he had a right to refuse to give his consent to the search.
8. Drayton. the court assesses the totality of all the surrounding circumstances--both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation. and the use of physical punishment such as the deprivation of food or sleep. Bustamonte. The Court disagreed that proof of knowledge of the right to refuse consent was a necessary prerequisite to demonstrating "voluntary" consent. 412 US 218 (1973) Respondent was brought to trial on a charge of possessing a check with intent to defraud. The traditional definition of "voluntariness" does not require proof of knowledge of a right to refuse as the sine qua non of an effective consent to a search. Some of the factors taken into account include the youth of the accused. Rather. In determining whether a defendant's will was over-borne in a particular case. United States v. the Court held that individual consent could only be ascertained by analyzing all of the circumstances. the length of detention. The United States Supreme Court is particularly reluctant to recognize exceptions to the general rule of individualized suspicion where governmental authorities primarily pursue their general crime control ends. Respondent moved to suppress the introduction of certain material as evidence against him on the ground that the material had been acquired through a warrantless search and seizure that were unconstitutional. 536 US 194 (2002)
--(Page 37 of 101)--
. In determining whether individualized suspicion is required to accompany a seizure. the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning. did not require proof of knowledge of a right to refuse as the sine qua non of an effective consent to a search.
quiet voice. That the questioning took place on a bus did not on its own transform it into an illegal seizure. Georgia v.
Searches on Those on Probation and Parole
United States v. Further evidence of drug use was seized after obtaining a search warrant.
The United States Supreme Court held that the police did not seize the defendants when they boarded the bus and began questioning passengers. and spoke to them one by one in a polite. without more. gave police no better claim to reasonableness in entering than they would have had in the absence of any consent at all. Defendant was indicted for possession of cocaine. however. Since a co-tenant wishing to open the door to a third party has no recognized authority in law or social practice to prevail over a present and objecting co-tenant. The fact that the officers were not in uniform or visibly armed had little weight. his disputed invitation.
9. without more. 534 US 112 (2001)
--(Page 38 of 101)--
. Knights. Although the officer did not inform the defendants of their right to refuse the search. her disputed invitation. readily gave consent to search and led an officer to defendant's bedroom where a section of a drinking straw with a powdery residue was found. 547 US 103 (2006) Police were called to a home for a domestic dispute. Randolph. they left the aisle free so that passengers could exit. The officer asked the defendants first if they objected to a search. The officers did not brandish weapons or make any intimidating movements. When asked for permission to search the house. Defendant's wife told the police officers that defendant was a cocaine user and that there was evidence of such in the house. defendant unequivocally refused. gives a police officer no better claim to reasonableness in entering than the officer would have in the absence of any consent at all. The Court held that since the wife had no recognized authority in law or social practice to prevail over her husband. Even after arresting one defendant. The officers gave the passengers no reason to believe that they were required to answer questions. Nothing the officer said would have suggested to a reasonable person that he was barred from leaving or terminating the encounter. he did request permission to search. the officer addressed the second defendant politely and gave no indication that he was required to answer questions or consent to a search. His wife. The totality of the circumstances indicated that the consent was voluntary.
126 S. that the suspicionless search was a reasonable condition of parole which advanced state interests and parole conditions severely diminished the inmate's expectation of privacy while on parole. On this continuum. is a form of criminal sanction imposed by a court upon an offender after verdict. --(Page 39 of 101)--
. even though the officer did not suspect the inmate of any criminal activity. consistent with the Fourth Amendment. a state is willing to extend parole only because it is able to condition it upon compliance with certain requirements. search a probationer's home without a warrant. the officer searched the inmate The U. was reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Probation. In most cases. . . Inherent in the very nature of probation is that probationers do not enjoy the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled. like incarceration. a court granting probation may impose reasonable conditions that deprive the offender of some freedoms enjoyed by law-abiding citizens. . Acceptance of a clear and unambiguous search condition of parole significantly diminishes a parolee's reasonable expectation of privacy.S. the court held that the warrantless search of defendant. Supreme Court held. Just as other punishments for criminal convictions curtail an offender's freedoms. Ct. parolees have fewer expectations of privacy than probationers. The essence of parole is release from prison. Probation is one point on a continuum of possible punishments ranging from solitary confinement in a maximum-security facility to a few hours of mandatory community service. with the probation search condition being a salient circumstance. The court found that defendant's status as a probationer subject to a search condition diminished his reasonable expectation of privacy. Parolees are on the continuum of state-imposed punishments.
The court found that the search was reasonable under the general Fourth Amendment approach of examining the totality of the circumstances. Probation diminishes a probationer's reasonable expectation of privacy -. on the condition that the prisoner abides by certain rules during the balance of the sentence. Thus. supported by reasonable suspicion and authorized by a condition of probation. and with only reasonable grounds (not probable cause) to believe that contraband is present. 2193 (2006) The officer recognized the inmate as a parolee and. or plea of guilty. California. Samson v. Parole is an established variation on imprisonment of convicted criminals .so that a probation officer may. before the completion of sentence. however. finding. because parole is more akin to imprisonment than probation is to imprisonment.
Administrative Searches Camara v. not individualized suspicion. Searches When There Are “Special Needs”
a. but they will not necessarily depend upon specific knowledge of the condition of the particular dwelling. He claimed the warrantless search requested by the building inspectors violated his Fourth Amendment rights.
10. or the condition of the entire area. may be based upon the passage of time. it is obvious that probable cause to issue a warrant to inspect must exist if reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling. The Court held that probable cause would still be required for issuance of a warrant for an administrative search. Such standards.. the Supreme Court also recognizes that the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion. the nature of the building (e. The occupant denied entrance to building inspectors on three separate occasions. Supreme Court jurisprudence recognizes that to accommodate public and private interests some quantum of individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure. while U. each time demanding that they first obtain a warrant. but the standard was lower than for issuance of a warrant in criminal cases. The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness. Thus. Having concluded that the area inspection is a reasonable search of private property within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 387 US 523 (1967) A city ordinance gave city building inspectors the right to enter any building at reasonable times in furtherance of their code enforcement duties. The standard would be met by a reasonableness showing. in light of the reasonable goals of code enforcement. which will vary with the municipal program being enforced.S. The Court held that the administrative search was not peripheral to the occupant's Fourth Amendment interests because a criminal prosecution could and did result from his refusal to submit. He was prosecuted under another ordinance that made it a crime to refuse to comply with the inspectors' requests. San Francisco.
--(Page 40 of 101)--
. g. a multifamily apartment house).
there is no compelling urgency to inspect at a particular time or on a particular day. New York v. a similar expectation in an individual's home. Similarly. On grant of certiorari. but not entry by force. the high incidence of motor vehicle theft rendered such inspections essential and amounted to a substantial state interest and hence the State was allowed to address the major social problem of car theft by the implementation of an administrative scheme. 482 US 691 (1987) Police officers searched respondent vehicle dismantler's junkyard pursuant to N. as a practical matter and in light of the Fourth Amendment's requirement that a warrant specify the property to be searched. Moreover. In the course of their search. Thus. the requirement of a warrant procedure does not suggest any change in what seems to be the prevailing local policy. In light of the regulatory framework governing his business and the history of regulation of related industries. it seems likely that warrants should normally be sought only after entry is refused unless there has been a citizen complaint or there is other satisfactory reason for securing immediate entry. An expectation of privacy in commercial premises is different from. which . in most situations. most citizens allow inspections of their property without a warrant. and indeed less than. officers discovered stolen vehicles and parts in respondent's junkyard.Y Veh. 515 US 646 (1995)
--(Page 41 of 101)--
. Acton. of authorizing entry. & Traf. required junkyard owners to maintain records for routine spontaneous inspections by police officers and state agents. the Court reversed the appellate court's judgment upon a finding that vehicle dismantlers were part of a closely regulated industry that carried a reduced expectation of privacy thereby lessening the application of Fourth Amendment warrant and probable cause requirements. Drug Testing
b. Law 415(a)(5).
Vernonia School v.
In the case of most routine area inspections. Burger. This expectation is particularly attenuated in commercial property employed in closely regulated industries. In addition. an operator of a junkyard engaging in vehicle dismantling has a reduced expectation of privacy in this closely regulated business. to inspect.
" they voluntarily subject themselves to a degree of regulation even higher than that imposed on students generally. Particularly with regard to medical examinations and procedures. . for which the student's parents had to sign consent forms. a seventh grade student and his parents. Respondents. therefore. 536 US 822 (2002) The students contended that the board's drug testing policy was unconstitutional since the board failed to identify a special need for testing students who participate in extracurricular activities." students who voluntarily participate in school athletics have reason to expect intrusions upon normal rights and privileges. Also. Students were not entitled to full Fourth Amendment protections where the state's interest in preventing drug addiction among students was compelling and student athletes had a decreased expectation of privacy. and to be vaccinated against various diseases. Earls. There is an element of "communal undress" inherent in athletic participation. Board of Ed of Pottawatomie County v. However. including privacy Collecting the samples for urinalysis intrudes upon an excretory function traditionally shielded by great privacy. There is an additional respect in which school athletes have a reduced expectation of privacy. Somewhat like adults who choose to participate in a "closely regulated industry. public school children are routinely required to submit to various physical examinations. For their own good and that of their classmates.
--(Page 42 of 101)--
Petitioner school district required student athletes to submit to drug testing. the degree of intrusion depends upon the manner in which production of the urine sample is monitored. the urinalysis and accompanying disclosure requirements were not significant invasions of privacy. refused to sign the testing consent forms and filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from enforcement of the policy on the grounds that it violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. By choosing to "go out for the team. students within the school environment have a lesser expectation of privacy than members of the population generally Legitimate privacy expectations are even less with regard to student athletes. and the policy neither addressed a proven problem nor required a showing of individualized suspicion of drug use.
amend. and given the extensive involvement of law enforcement officials at every stage of the policy. the drug testing policy was a reasonably effective means of addressing the board's concerns about preventing drug use in the board's schools in the face of the evidence of increased drug use at the schools. City of Charleston.Ct. and the board's method of obtaining urine samples and maintaining test results was minimally intrusive on the students' limited privacy interest. The board's general regulation of extracurricular activities diminished the expectation of privacy among students. Further.
The policy did not constitute an unreasonable search because it reasonably served the board's important interest in detecting and preventing drug use among its students. hospital staff members tested pregnant patients for drug abuse and reported positive tests to the police. Const. Redding. 532 US 67 (2001) A state hospital implemented a policy setting forth procedures to be followed by hospital staff to identify pregnant patients suspected of drug abuse.S. 2633 (2009)
--(Page 43 of 101)--
. Safford School District v. U. 129 S. which was to use the threat of arrest and prosecution in order to force women into treatment." Therefore. Pursuant to the policy. the case simply did not fit within the closely guarded category of "special needs. Ferguson v. and suspicionless searches necessarily applied to the policy. warrantless. Given the primary purpose of the program. IV's general prohibition against nonconsensual.
466 US 740 (1984)
--(Page 44 of 101)--
. The meaning of such a search. The student claimed that extending the search at the principal's behest to the point of making her pull out her underwear was constitutionally unreasonable. The scope will be permissible. or sale of any drug on school grounds. This suspicion was enough to justify a search of the student's backpack and outer clothing. Another student's statement that forbidden prescription and over-thecounter drugs came from the student was sufficiently plausible to warrant suspicion that the student was involved in pill distribution. O. What was missing from the suspected facts that pointed to the student was any indication of danger to the students from the power of the drugs or their quantity.
11. The T. that is. the principal. Wisconsin. concern to limit a school search to reasonable scope requires the support of reasonable suspicion of danger or of resort to underwear for hiding evidence of wrongdoing before a search can reasonably make the quantum leap from outer clothes and backpacks to exposure of intimate parts. In the context of a school search. The principal knew beforehand that the pills were common pain relievers. and the nurse were protected from liability through qualified immunity. possession. the Supreme Court held that the strip search of the student was unreasonable and a violation of the Fourth Amendment. and the degradation its subject may reasonably feel. Exigent Circumstances
Welsh v. The school's policies strictly prohibited the nonmedical use. L. Because there was reason to question the clarity with which the right was established. the rule of reasonableness states that the search as actually conducted be reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place. when it is not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction. the assistant. Thus. and any reason to suppose that the student was carrying pills in her underwear. place a search that intrusive in a category of its own demanding its own specific suspicions.
Moreover. with some difficulty. they heard shouting from inside. an altercation taking place in the kitchen of the home. The court also held that the officers had an objectively reasonable basis for believing both that the injured adult might need help and that the violence in the kitchen was just beginning. Const. the burden is on the government to demonstrate exigent circumstances that overcome the presumption of unreasonableness that attaches to all warrantless home entries.Ct. four adults were attempting. that presumption of unreasonableness is difficult to rebut. although no exigency is created simply because there is probable cause to believe that a serious crime has been committed. swung a fist and struck one of the adults in the face.
Before agents of the government may invade the sanctity of the home. A common-sense approach is required by the U. According to the testimony of one of the officers. to restrain a juvenile. IV prohibition on "unreasonable searches and seizures. The juvenile eventually broke free." and an important factor to be considered when determining whether any exigency exists is the gravity of the underlying offense for which the arrest is being made.m. Nothing required them to wait until someone was "unconscious" or "semi-conscious" or worse before entering.S. and proceeded down the driveway to investigate. Upon arriving at the house. 1943 (2006) At about 3 a. Stuart. application of the exigentcircumstances exception in the context of a home entry should rarely be sanctioned when there is probable cause to believe that only a minor offense has been committed. When the government's interest is only to arrest for a minor offense. through a screen door and windows. and the government usually should be allowed to make such arrests only with a warrant issued upon probable cause by a neutral and detached magistrate. and saw. they observed two juveniles drinking beer in the backyard. amend. four police officers responded to a call regarding a loud party at a residence. There. 126 S. The court held that it did not matter whether the officers entered the kitchen to arrest defendants and gather evidence against them or to assist the injured and prevent further violence. The officer testified that he observed the victim of the blow spitting blood into a nearby sink. Brigham City v.
--(Page 45 of 101)--
.. They entered the backyard.
Moreover. IV. as the government acted upon information from a reliable informant that defendant possessed stolen cards Because there is a strong presumption of constitutionality due to an Act of Congress. viewed objectively. The Court first ruled that defendant's arrest did not violate the Fourth Amendment because (1) it was based upon probable cause. Mendenhall. A police officer may arrest without warrant one believed by the officer upon reasonable cause to have been guilty of a felony
2. One exigency obviating the requirement of a warrant is the need to assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury. regardless of the individual officer's state of mind. the United States Supreme Court reversed. The officer's subjective motivation is irrelevant. amend. 1.S. 423 US 411 (1976) Defendant's conviction for possession of stolen mail was reversed when the appellate court determined that the warrantless arrest of defendant violated his Fourth Amendment rights and that the postarrest search of defendant's car was coerced. justify the action. Const. law enforcement officers may enter a home without a warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury. On certiorari.
Seizures and Arrests Is a Warrant Needed for Arrests?
United States v.
When Is a Person Seized?
United States v." obviously the Court should be reluctant to decide that a search thus authorized by Congress was unreasonable and that the Act was therefore unconstitutional. The relevant prior decisions are uniformly to the contrary. 446 US 544 (1980)
--(Page 46 of 101)--
. especially when it turns on what is "reasonable.
F. An action is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. U. Accordingly. as long as the circumstances. Watson. The need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency. there is nothing in the Court's prior cases indicating that under the Fourth Amendment a warrant is required to make a valid arrest for a felony.
The passenger is seized as well and so may challenge the constitutionality of the stop. 536 US 194 (2002) If a reasonable person would feel free to terminate the encounter. 2400 (2007) When a police officer makes a traffic stop. his freedom of movement is restrained. The court held that the totality of the evidence was adequate to support the district court's findings that defendant voluntarily consented to accompany the officers and that defendant consented to the search of her person freely and voluntarily. holding that defendant's consent to the search of her person had not been voluntarily given. the driver of the car is seized within the meaning of the 4th Amendment. Brendlin v. The court held that defendant was not seized when she was approached by the federal agents who asked to see her ticket and identification. United States v. Only when such restraint is imposed is there any foundation whatever for invoking constitutional safeguards. --(Page 47 of 101)--
. in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident. the court reversed the judgment of the lower appellate court. a reasonable person would have believed that she was not free to leave. 127 S. A person has been seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendmentonly if. or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled. Defendant was convicted of possessing heroin with intent to distribute after the district court denied her motion to suppress the introduction of the heroin at trial. Drayton. even where the person did not attempt to leave. As long as the person to whom questions are put remains free to disregard the questions and walk away. a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave. California. would be the threatening presence of several officers. A person is seized only when. even though defendant was not expressly told that she was free to decline to cooperate with their inquiry. then he or she has not been seized. On appeal. in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident. The court held that a person had been seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if. the display of a weapon by an officer. The reasonable person test is objective and presupposes an innocent person. The lower appellate court reversed. Ct. by means of physical force or a show of authority. there has been no intrusion upon that person's liberty or privacy as would under the Constitution require some particularized and objective justification. Examples of circumstances that might indicate a seizure. some physical touching of the person of the citizen.
therefore. a seizure did not occur when the subject had not yielded.
For What Crimes May a Person Be Arrested?
Atwater v. and he was untouched at the time he discarded the cocaine. The common law may have made an attempted seizure unlawful in certain circumstances. but it made many things unlawful. Virginia v.
3. Neither usage nor common-law tradition makes an attempted seizure a seizure. very few of which were elevated to constitutional proscriptions. 499 US 621 (1991) The court granted certiorari on the issue of whether defendant had been seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment at the time he dropped the cocaine when he saw an officer running towards him. The Court found that the test for a show of authority was an objective one and that defendant was not seized until he was tackled. Moore. The court rejected petitioners' argument that peace officers' authority to make warrantless arrests for misdemeanors was restricted at common law to instances of breach of the peace. The cocaine abandoned while defendant was running was not the fruit of a seizure and not excludable. Petitioners sued respondents.Ct. California v. 1598 (2008)
--(Page 48 of 101)--
. Respondent officer had probable cause to believe that petitioner arrestee had committed a crime in his presence. The court determined that the Fourth Amendment does not limit police officers' authority to arrest without warrant for minor criminal offenses. 532 US 318 (2001) Respondent officer arrested petitioner arrestee for seatbelt violations and placed her in jail until she was released on bond. respondent officer was authorized to make a custodial arrest without balancing costs and benefits or determining whether or not the arrest was in some sense necessary. The Court held that with respect to a show of authority regarding the application of physical force. Hodari. 128 S. Defendant's case did not involve the application of any physical force. alleging a Fourth Amendment violation. The court also rejected petitioners' argument for a modern arrest rule. City of Lago Vista.
but it also chose not to attach to violations of its arrest rules the potent remedies that federal courts had applied to Fourth Amendment violations. Because the arrest was constitutional. A search subsequent to arrest revealed he was carrying crack cocaine.
The Authority for Police to Stop and Frisk
Terry v. But if a person is stopped. Linking Fourth Amendment protections to state law would have meant losing a bright-line constitutional standard as well as causing those protection to vary from place to place and from time to time. the search incident to the arrest was also constitutional. Ohio. Code Ann. they arrested him for the misdemeanor even though under Va.
1. Defendant was stopped by police officers who suspected he was driving with a suspended license. the police can do a search incident to the arrest. there can be a frisk only if there is a reasonable suspicion that the person has a weapon that might endanger the police. 19. The Court noted that its decisions counseled against changing the calculus that the arrest was constitutionally reasonable because there was probable cause to believe defendant committed the minor crime in the officer's presence. but for a stop there only has to be reasonable suspicion. Virginia chose to protect individual privacy and dignity more than the Fourth Amendment required. 392 US 1 (1968)
--(Page 49 of 101)--
G. After they confirmed his license was suspended. The Court had treated additional protections exclusively as matters of state law. there must be probable cause. If a person is arrested. they should have only issued him a summons.
Stop and Frisk
For an arrest.
There must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer. that petitioner and his companions were about to commit a daytime robbery. and it is not to be undertaken lightly. Const. where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual." but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.S. based upon his experience."arrests" in traditional terminology. amend. he has "seized" that person. The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed. The court ruled that despite the fact that the arresting police officer lacked probable cause to arrest petitioner at the time he made the "stop and frisk" warrantless intrusion upon petitioner that produced the weapon at issue. When an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others. of petitioner's overcoat. and his belief that petitioner was presently armed." or pat-down. not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or "hunch. And in determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such circumstances. On certiorari the court affirmed petitioner's conviction. It is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person. which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment. due weight must be given. under U. it would appear to be clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the power to take necessary measures to determine whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical harm. IV. and that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress. IV: the officer had a reasonable suspicion. regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime. The Fourth Amendment governs "seizures" of the person which do not eventuate in a trip to the station house and prosecution for crime -. --(Page 50 of 101)--
. the court ruled that the search of the outer clothing of petitioner and his companions was properly limited in time and scope in order for him to determine the presence of weapons and to neutralize the danger posed. the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger. Furthermore.S. Petitioner sought review of his conviction for carrying a concealed weapon. Whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away. the search satisfied the conditions of U. amend. Const. dangerous. contending that the weapon seized from him was obtained through an illegal search. and posed a threat to him and to others justified both the officer's "stop" of petitioner and the "frisk.
Stat. and the State's requirement of a response did not contravene the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment. rationale.
3. constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure. Rev. In the ordinary course a police officer is free to ask a person for identification without implicating the Fourth Amendment. 542 US 177 (2004) A police officer responded to a call reporting that a man assaulted a woman.
--(Page 51 of 101)--
. 171. Interrogation relating to one's identity or a request for identification by the police does not. Taking a person to the police station for fingerprinting is an arrest and must be based upon probable cause. an officer may not arrest a suspect for failure to identify himself if the request for identification is not reasonably related to the circumstances justifying the stop. Questions concerning a suspect's identity are a routine and accepted part of many Terry stops.
The Distinction Between Stops and Arrests
If a person is detained for sustained interrogation. that is an arrest. Defendant was convicted for obstructing the officer in carrying out his duties under Nev. the request for identification. Court of Nevada. Under these principles. the request for identification was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the Terry stop. But there is no hard and fast limit. If an investigative stop continues indefinitely. The officer found defendant standing outside a parked truck with a woman inside the truck. Sixth Judicial Dist. a "stop and identify" statute that required defendant only to disclose his name. at some point it can no longer be justified as an investigative stop.2. The officer arrested defendant. The ability to briefly stop a suspect. What May Police Do When They Stop an Individual?
Hiibel v. and practical demands of the Terry stop. by itself. A Terry stop must be justified at its inception and reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the initial stop. Also. Asking questions is an essential part of police investigations. or check identification in the absence of probable cause promotes the strong government interest in solving crimes and bringing offenders to justice.123. because the request for identity had an immediate relation to the purpose. The United States Supreme Court determined that the Terry stop. The officer asked for defendant's identification 11 times and was refused each time. ask questions.
White. This process allows officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that might well elude an untrained person. regardless of whether the facts taken in isolation appeared innocent. Reviewing courts making reasonable-suspicion determinations involving investigatory stops must look at the totality of the circumstances of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing. 534 US 266 (2002) Defendant. Reasonable Suspicion for Stopping Cars United States v. the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause.4.
--(Page 52 of 101)--
. that suppression of the drug evidence was not required. The United States Supreme Court held. evaluated in isolation. It was reasonable for the agent to make commonsense inferences from his observations and his experience that defendant was attempting to avoid the checkpoint. was stopped by an agent on an unpaved and rarely traveled road near the United States border which was commonly used by smugglers to avoid a border patrol checkpoint. Although an officer's reliance on a mere hunch is insufficient to justify a stop. since the totality of the circumstances warranted the stop for further investigation of defendant's vehicle. The appellate court found that certain of the suspicious circumstances. however. The agent determined that the unusual behavior of the occupants justified an investigatory stop. Arvizu. Reasonable Suspicion Based on Informants' Tips Alabama v. 496 US 325 (1990)
b. traveling with a woman and children in a minivan. and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard. rather than taking his family on a recreational outing.
What is Sufficient for Reasonable Suspicion?
a. during which the agent discovered a substantial amount of drugs. were susceptible to innocent explanations and thus insufficient to support a finding of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the investigatory stop.
When the officers stopped respondent. Reasonable suspicion. Const. 529 US 266 (2000)
--(Page 53 of 101)--
. that must be taken into account when evaluating whether there is reasonable suspicion. IV.. is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability. are considered in the totality of the circumstances. but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause. noting that a "totality of circumstances" approach was used to determine whether an informant's tip established probable cause or the reasonable suspicion required by an officer to make a Terry stop. like probable cause. did not violate U. the United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded. J. amend. The level of suspicion required for a Terry stop was less demanding than that required for probable cause. quantity and quality. If a tip has a relatively low degree of reliability.S. Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause.L.
The State sought review of a judgment holding that officers did not have the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an investigatory stop of respondent's car based on an anonymous tip and that marijuana and cocaine seized were fruits of respondent's unconstitutional detention. Florida v. On appeal. When significant aspects of the informant's predictions were verified. there was reason to believe that the informant was honest and wellinformed. The investigative stop. more information will be required to establish the requisite quantum of suspicion than would be required if the tip were more reliable. therefore. the anonymous tip had been sufficiently corroborated to furnish reasonable suspicion that respondent was engaged in criminal activity. Both factors. and reasonable suspicion could arise from information less reliable than that required to show probable cause. the whole picture.
approaches an individual. the individual has a right to ignore the police and go about his business. The court held that an anonymous tip that a person was carrying a gun was. And any refusal to cooperate. without reasonable suspicion or probable cause. the court declined to modify the Terry standard to license a "firearm exception" since it roved too far from the court's established reliability analysis. Finally. The Court found that the determination of reasonable suspicion had to be based on commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior. Illinois v. IV. and conducted a protective pat-down search for weapons. and that headlong flight was the consummate act of evasion. Wardlow. Two of the officers caught up with him. amend. and that officers were justified in suspecting that defendant was involved in criminal activity based on his presence in an area of heavy narcotics trafficking and his unprovoked flight upon noticing the police. The Court found that nervous. the accurate description of respondent's appearance was not enough since the reasonable suspicion at issue required that the tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality.S. Reasonable Suspicion Based on a Person's Trying to Avoid a Police Officer. does not furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed for a detention or seizure. Const. Defendant was arrested when officers discovered a . The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress. but the appellate court reversed. Respondent was searched after an anonymous caller reported to the police that a young black male standing at a particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun. not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person. When an officer. The state supreme court agreed. The tip pointing to respondent lacked the moderate indicia of reliability necessary because the call provided no predictive information to enable the police to test the informant's knowledge or credibility. without more. c. 38-caliber handgun. evasive behavior was a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. 528 US 119 (2000) Defendant fled upon seeing police officers patrolling an area known for heavy narcotics trafficking. Further. --(Page 54 of 101)--
. without more. concluding that sudden flight in a high crime area did not create a reasonable suspicion justifying a Terry stop. The court affirmed a judgment holding that a Terry "stop and frisk" search of respondent based only on an anonymous tip was invalid under U. insufficient to justify a police officer's stop and frisk of that person.
Unprovoked flight is simply not a mere refusal to cooperate. The Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court and remanded the case. d. Because the standard for reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop was less than for probable cause.
A. by its very nature. Reasonable Suspicion Based on Profiles United States v. it is just the opposite. is not going about one's business. 126 S. In addition. Allowing officers confronted with such flight to stop the fugitive and investigate further is quite consistent with the individual's right to go about his business or to stay put and remain silent in the face of police questioning.Ct.
The Exclusionary Rule
Is the Exclusionary rule a Desirable Remedy?
Hudson v. but the fact that these factors may be set forth in a "profile" does not somehow detract from their evidentiary significance as seen by a trained agent. although each of defendant's actions by itself might have been innocent. Flight. 490 US 1 (1989) Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents in Honolulu learned that defendant had paid cash for his $ 2. the totality of all the circumstances together with all of defendant's actions were sufficient for DEA agents to have a reasonable suspicion that defendant was committing a drug crime. Michigan. Sokolow. a drug source. 2159 (2006)
--(Page 55 of 101)--
. A court sitting to determine the existence of reasonable suspicion must require the agent to articulate the factors leading to that conclusion. the Court determined that the DEA agents were justified in making the stop.100 airline tickets to spend a short time in Miami. They stopped him when he returned to Honolulu and discovered cocaine in his luggage.
II. in fact. defendant appeared nervous and was travelling under a false name.
Whether the exclusionary sanction is appropriately imposed in a particular case is an issue separate from the question whether the Fourth Amendment rights of the party seeking to invoke the rule were violated by police conduct. What the knock-and-announce rule has never protected is one's interest in preventing the government from seeing or taking evidence described in a warrant. and has repeatedly emphasized that the rule's "costly toll" upon truthseeking and law enforcement objectives presents a high obstacle for those urging its application. The exclusionary rule generates "substantial social costs. because its officers have violated the law must bear some relation to the purposes which the law is to serve. not the Supreme Court's first impulse. The Supreme Court has rejected "indiscriminate application" of the rule and has held it to be applicable only where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served--that is. The Supreme Court has therefore been cautious against expanding it. of course. Suppression of evidence has always been the United States Supreme Court's last resort. granting establishment of the primary illegality. The United States Supreme Court has never held that evidence is "fruit of the poisonous tree" simply because it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police. the Supreme Court declined to hold that all evidence is "fruit of the poisonous tree" simply because it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police." The United States Supreme Court has treated identification of a Fourth Amendment violation as synonymous with application of the exclusionary rule to evidence secured incident to that violation. Attenuation can occur. Subsequent case law has rejected this reflexive application of the exclusionary rule. where its deterrence benefits outweigh its "substantial social costs. Rather. or causation in the logical sense alone." which sometimes include setting the guilty free and the dangerous at large. but-for cause. The penalties visited upon the Government. the exclusionary rule is inapplicable. the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint. Attenuation also occurs when. and in turn upon the public. even given a direct causal connection. the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained. Rather. Even in the early days of the exclusionary rule. when the causal connection is remote.
--(Page 56 of 101)--
. can be too attenuated to justify exclusion. the more apt question in such a case is whether. Where the interests that were violated have nothing to do with the seizure of evidence.
C. the exclusionary rule. Mapp v. rather than on the concept of standing. 439 US 128 (1978) The Court affirmed petitioners' convictions for armed robbery because their motion to suppress a sawed-off rifle and shells seized by the police during the search of a vehicle in which petitioners were passengers was properly denied. Who Can Object to the Introduction of Evidence and Raise the Exclusionary Rule?
Rakas v. Ohio. as necessary to ensure such rights. the Court expressed that the preferred analysis for determining the scope of constitutional rights protected by the exclusionary rule focused on the substantive question of whether petitioners had their own rights infringed by the police's search and seizure. 232 US 383 (1914) In review of defendant's contention that the warrantless seizure of his private correspondence violated his Fourth Amendment rights.
--(Page 57 of 101)--
. as previously decided. intended for the protection of the people against such unauthorized action. Denying shortcuts to only one of two cooperating law enforcement agencies tends naturally to breed legitimate suspicion of "working arrangements" whose results are equally tainted. the Court held: 1) that the letters in question were taken from defendant's house by an official of the United States acting under color of his office in direct violation of the constitutional rights of defendant The Fourth Amendment is intended to secure the citizen in person and property against unlawful invasion of the sanctity of his home by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction. 367 US 643 (1961) It was apparent that the materials introduced into evidence in the prosecution of defendant were seized during an illegal search of defendant's residence in violation of the Fourth Amendment.B. Illinois. which prohibited the introduction into evidence of material seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Court held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment extended to the States the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures. This protection is equally extended to the action of the government and officers of the law acting under it.
The Origins of the Exclusionary Rule
Weeks v. To sanction such proceedings would be to affirm by judicial decision a manifest neglect if not an open defiance of the prohibitions of the Constitution. likewise applied to the State's prosecution of state crimes. Noting that the inquiry was essentially the same. United States. And.
like the trunk of an automobile. IV protected only those places in which petitioners themselves had a reasonable expectation of privacy. Minnesota v. and second. the Court found that petitioners' rights were not violated where they had no legitimate expectation of privacy in areas of a car in which they claimed no property or possessory interest. the search as violative of the Fourth Amendment. Without holding that a property interest was required. the Court determined that the appropriate measure of rights was no longer guided solely by whether petitioners were legitimately on the premises that the police searched.S. whether the proponent is asserting his own legal rights and interests rather than basing his claim for relief upon the rights of third parties. since the search did not violate any of their rights. Carter. amend. 525 US 83 (1998)
--(Page 58 of 101)--
. Criminal defendants who assert neither a property nor a possessory interest in an automobile in which they were passengers at the time of a police search which encompassed the glove compartment and an area under the seat.S. and who do not assert an interest in a rifle and shells which were seized. through a motion to suppress the evidence at their state court trial. amend. and. The issue of standing involves two inquiries: first. the defendants' claim would also fail in an analogous situation in a dwelling place.
Further. these are areas in which a passenger qua passenger would not normally have such expectation. IV depends not upon a property right in the invaded place but upon whether the person who claims the protection of the amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place. Capacity to claim the protection of U. the fact that they were legitimately on the premises in the sense that they were in the car with the permission of its owner not being determinative of whether they had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the particular areas of the automobile searched. Const. cannot challenge. Using this analysis. whether the proponent of a particular legal right has alleged injury in fact. since no showing of any legitimate expectation of privacy in the glove compartment or area under the seat of the car was made. the Court decided that U. Const. furthermore.
amend. IV legitimate expectation of privacy claim. but one who is merely present with the consent of the householder may not. and the car. Const. In order to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment.S. one of them recognized defendant. 2400 (2007) After officers stopped a car to check its registration without reason to believe it was being operated unlawfully. Ultimately. In addition. Upon verifying that defendant was a parole violator. An overnight guest in a home may claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment.Ct. The Court held that the relevant question was to ask whether a reasonable person in defendant's position after the car was stopped would have believed himself free to terminate the encounter between the police and himself. and respondents were arrested and charged with conspiracy to commit a controlled substance crime. and that his expectation is reasonable. The Court thought that in such circumstances any reasonable passenger would have understood the police officers to be exercising control to the point that no one in the car was free to depart without police permission. 1. but one who was merely present with the consent of the householder could not. the officers formally arrested him and searched him. either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society. Const. a warrant was issued. holding that an overnight guest in a home could claim the protection of U. Based on that observation. Brendlin v. 487 US 533 (1988) --(Page 59 of 101)--
. amend. finding.. i.e. The court reversed and remanded.
D.S. the state supreme court determined that respondents had standing to assert a U. California. The officer observed respondents bagging cocaine in the apartment.
A police officer looked through a window blind in a lessee's apartment based on an informant's tip. Respondents made a motion to suppress the evidence. a passenger in the car. contending that the officer's observation was an unreasonable search.
Exceptions to the Exclusionary Rule Independent Source
Murray v.S. United States. one that has a source outside of the Fourth Amendment. a defendant must demonstrate that he personally has an expectation of privacy in the place searched. The State conceded that the police had no adequate justification to pull the car over. 127 S. Const. IV purposes than residential property. the driver. amend. methamphetamine paraphernalia. property used for commercial purposes was treated differently for U. IV. among other things.
an unlawful search. it did not explicitly find that the agents would have sought a warrant if they had not earlier entered the premises. or as a consequence of. or as a consequence of. while the government should not profit from its illegal activity. even without a violation of the Fourth Amendment. exclusion of such evidence would put the police in a worse position than they would have been in absent any error or violation. Williams. Petitioners contended that the independent source doctrine only applied to evidence obtained for the first time during an independent and lawful search. lawful seizure is genuinely independent of an earlier. the exclusionary rule does not apply and the evidence is admissible. The Court held that. which may well be difficult to establish where the seized goods are kept in the police's possession.
2. there is no reason why the independent source doctrine should not apply. although the district court found that the agents did not reveal their warrantless entry to the magistrate. The independent source doctrine does not rest upon a metaphysical analysis. 467 US 431 (1984)
--(Page 60 of 101)--
. When the challenged evidence has an independent source.
If the police can demonstrate that they inevitably would have discovered the evidence. tainted one. Invoking the exclusionary rule in such circumstances would have put the police in a worse position than they would have been if no violation had occurred. but later obtained independently from activities untainted by the initial illegality. So long as a later. if later obtained independently from activities untainted by the initial illegality. but upon the policy that. Petitioners' motions to suppress were based on claims that evidence was seized illegally because agents did not inform the magistrate about a prior warrantless entry to the premises where bales of marijuana were eventually seized. The independent source doctrine applies also to evidence initially discovered during. Nix v. The Court rejected that argument and adopted the Government's view that the doctrine also applied to evidence initially discovered during. an unlawful search. neither should it be placed in a worse position than it would otherwise have occupied. The Court remanded the cases for further findings as to whether the information upon which the warrant was based amounted to an independent source.
the evidence is admissible. If the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that unlawfully obtained evidence ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means. the societal costs of the exclusionary rule far outweigh any possible benefits to deterrence that a good-faith requirement might produce. should have been excluded because the evidence was the product of unlawful questioning by the police. which allows the admission of unlawfully obtained evidence that ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.also lessen the likelihood that the ultimate or inevitable discovery exception will promote police misconduct. if the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means. He successfully challenged the conviction on the ground that evidence of his incriminating statements. which led the police to the victim's body. the prosecution need not prove the absence of bad faith in obtaining the evidence. but that it included no such "good faith" requirement. It concluded that the record supported the finding that the victim's body would inevitably have been discovered. However. no such evidence was admitted.including the possibility of departmental discipline and civil liability -. the evidence should be received. Respondent was found guilty of first-degree murder. Significant disincentives to obtaining evidence illegally -. even had the incriminating statements not been elicited from respondent. At his second trial. Under the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule. The Court held that there was an inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule. In these circumstances. When an officer is aware that the evidence will inevitably be discovered. and reversed the appellate court decision.
--(Page 61 of 101)--
. but the trial court admitted evidence of the body's location and condition on the theory that the body would have been discovered in any event. Cases implementing the exclusionary rule begin with the premise that the challenged evidence is in some sense the product of illegal governmental activity. he will try to avoid engaging in any questionable practice. there will be little to gain from taking any dubious "shortcuts" to obtain the evidence. In that situation.
but it would not be sufficient fully to protect the Fourth. Conversely. and the exclusion of a confession made without them. do not alone sufficiently deter a Fourth Amendment violation. Exclusion of a confession made without Miranda warnings might be regarded as necessary to effectuate the Fifth Amendment. the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint. were sufficient to purge the taint of the illegal arrest. Illinois. The question whether a confession is the product of a free will must be answered on the facts of each case. along with other factors. the Court examined the record in light of those factors and concluded that petitioner's statements were inadmissible. Miranda warnings. petitioner gave inculpatory statements after he was read his constitutional rights. the Court held that the Miranda warnings could neither automatically nor by themselves protect an accused's Fourth Amendment rights. the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. might permit the admission of such evidence. particularly. The Court held the trial court had to examine factors such as the temporal proximity of the arrest to the confession. the more apt question in such a case is whether. and that Miranda warnings. However. and. granting establishment of the primary illegality. the intervening circumstances. though. making admissible that which would normally be excluded. The statements were admitted at trial on the basis that the Miranda warnings. On certiorari. the Court held.3. Whether a confession was freely given or improperly coerced. 422 US 590 (1975) Following an illegal arrest. Rather. The Court also held that the exclusionary rule did not automatically proscribe the use of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons. No single fact is dispositive
--(Page 62 of 101)--
. Inadequate Causal Connection – Attenuation of the Taint
The exclusionary rule applies if there is a substantial causal connection between the illegal police behavior and the evidence. if the link between the illegal police act and the evidence is attenuated. by themselves. The court need not hold that all evidence is "fruit of the poisonous tree" simply because it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police. Brown v. then the evidence is admissible. had to be determined on a case by case basis.
to be sure. And the burden of showing admissibility rests. particularly. Kentucky. (b) he was detained in a relatively "congenial" atmosphere. the exclusionary rule does not bar the state's use of a statement made by the defendant outside of his home. But they are not the only factor to be considered. on the prosecution. 448 US 98 (1980) The statements made by the defendant concerning his ownership of the controlled substances were admissible at trial even assuming that he was being illegally detained by police in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments at the time he made the statements. but rather of the defendant's exercise of free will in view of the fact that (a) he received Miranda warnings only minutes before making the incriminating statements. (c) the admissions were a spontaneous reaction to the discovery of the drugs. Rawlings v. and (e) the defendant did not claim that his admissions were anything other than voluntary New York v. and. The purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct are all relevant. The temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession.
--(Page 63 of 101)--
. The voluntariness of the statement is a threshold requirement. (d) the conduct of the police did not rise to the level of conscious or flagrant misconduct requiring exclusion of the defendant's statements. 495 US 14 (1990) Where the police have probable cause to arrest a suspect. Harris. such statements not being the product of the illegal detention.The Miranda warnings are an important factor. The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule
United States v. The presence of intervening circumstances. Leon. in determining whether the confession is obtained by exploitation of an illegal arrest. 468 US 897 (1984) This case presented the question whether the exclusionary rule should be modified so as to allow the use of evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause. of course. even though the statement is taken after a warrantless arrest made after nonconsensual entry in the suspect's home.
so long as the circumstances of its issuance are not "entirely unreasonable. "Grounding the modification in objective reasonableness. that institutional incentive will be lost. the Court's "reasonable mistake" exception to the exclusionary rule will tend to put a premium on police ignorance of the law. Where the officer's conduct is objectively reasonable. The rule thus operates as a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect. however. however. for it is painfully apparent that the officer is acting as a reasonable officer would and should act in similar circumstances. The good-faith exception will encourage police to provide only the bare minimum of information in future warrant applications. We emphasize that the standard of reasonableness we adopt is an objective one. The threat of exclusion cannot be expected significantly to deter them. The Fourth Amendment contains no provision expressly precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation of its commands. Suppression remains an appropriate remedy if the magistrate or judge in issuing a warrant was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth. Excluding the evidence can in no way affect his future conduct unless it is to make him less willing to do his duty. Many objections to a good-faith exception assume that the exception will turn on the subjective good faith of individual officers. rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved. retains the value of the exclusionary rule as an incentive for the law enforcement profession as a whole to conduct themselves in accord with the Fourth Amendment. as neutral judicial officers. Dissent:
--(Page 64 of 101)--
." all police conduct pursuant to that warrant will be protected from further judicial review. Dissent: After today's decisions. they have no stake in the outcome of particular criminal prosecutions. excluding the evidence will not further the ends of the exclusionary rule in any appreciable way. and the use of fruits of a past unlawful search or seizure works no new Fourth Amendment wrong. Judges and magistrates are not adjuncts to the law enforcement team. Indeed. The police will now know that if they can secure a warrant. Stevens. The wrong condemned by the Fourth Amendment is "fully accomplished" by the unlawful search or seizure itself. and the exclusionary rule is neither intended nor able to cure the invasion of the defendant's rights which he has already suffered." Brennan.
468 US 981 (1984) After police questioned defendant regarding a murder. The police drafted an affidavit to support an application for an arrest warrant and search warrant of defendant's home. On these questions. arguendo. references to controlled substances were not deleted from form that constituted the application. Police made changes to form. a search of private property without proper consent is unreasonable unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant. however. Ct. 2159 (2006)
--(Page 65 of 101)--
. Massachusetts v.
Any Fourth Amendment case may present two separate questions: whether the search was conducted pursuant to a warrant issued in accordance with the second Clause. We cannot intelligibly assume. The exclusionary rule should not be applied when the officer conducting the search acted in objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate that subsequently is determined to be invalid. The uniformly applied rule is that a search conducted pursuant to a warrant that fails to conform to the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment is unconstitutional. under our cases it has never been "reasonable" for the police to rely on the mere fact that a warrant has issued. that a search was constitutionally unreasonable but that the seized evidence is admissible because the same search was reasonable. whether it was nevertheless "reasonable" within the meaning of the first. if not. Police could not find proper warrant application and used one from another district that was for controlled substance. they examined a car defendant had borrowed. the constitutional text requires that we speak with one voice. the police have always known that if they fail to supply the magistrate with sufficient information. 126 S. That rule is in keeping with the well-established principle that except in certain carefully defined classes of cases. Law enforcement officers have long been on notice that despite the magistrate's decision a warrant will be invalidated if the officers did not provide sufficient facts to enable the magistrate to evaluate the existence of probable cause responsibly and independently. and the judge told the police the warrant was sufficient authority to carry out the search. Michigan. and. the warrant will be held invalid and its fruits excluded. Thus. Sheppard.
5. Exception for Violations of “Knock and Announce”
Hudson v. The warrant form and affidavit were reviewed by a judge.
That negligent error was not enough. Viewed from this perspective.
6. Assuming that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred when defendant was arrested on the recalled arrest warrant. The value of deterrence depends upon the strength of the incentive to commit the forbidden act. the exclusionary rule is inapplicable. It does not follow that the Fourth Amendment requires adoption of every proposal that might deter police misconduct. Deleware. they were not so objectively culpable as to require exclusion. police conduct had to be sufficiently deliberate such that exclusion could meaningfully deter it. There must be allegations of deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth.” Generally these occur before trial and many jurisdictions bar a defendant from raising exclusionary rule arguments later unless there is good cause for failure to do so at the suppression hearing. It was far removed from the core concerns that led to the exclusionary rule's adoption. Franks v.Ct. a presumption of validity with respect to the affidavit supporting the search warrant. In this case. Where the interests that were violated have nothing to do with the seizure of evidence. --(Page 66 of 101)--
E. To mandate an evidentiary hearing. of course. 129 S. not reckless or deliberate. the challenger's attack must be more than conclusory and must be supported by more than a mere desire to cross-examine.
The primary mechanism for raising the exclusionary rule is via a “suppression hearing. and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence was worth the price paid by the justice system. United States.
Exception for Certain Department Violations
Herring v. 695 (2009) The lower court concluded that the error in failing to update the computer database to reflect the recall of the arrest warrant was negligent. the exclusionary rule did not apply as the error that occurred arose from nonrecurring and attenuated negligence. the miscommunications were not routine or widespread. What the knock-and-announce rule has never protected is one's interest in preventing the government from seeing or taking evidence described in a warrant. 438 US 154 (1978) There is. by itself to require the extreme sanction of exclusion under the Fourth Amendment. deterrence of knock-and-announce violations is not worth a lot. and those allegations must be accompanied by an offer of proof. To trigger the exclusionary rule.
But the presumption upon which weight is given to such evidence. United States. in the courts of the United States. for the law cannot measure the force of the influence used. voluntary confession of guilt is among the most effectual proofs in the law. a deliberate. 168 US 532 (1897) In criminal trials.III. Due Process and the Requirement for Voluntariness 1. Police Interrogation and the Privilege Against SelfIncrimination
A. People of Territory of Utah. held out by one in authority. Mississippi. in order to be admissible. which. nor by the exertion of any improper influence. the issue is controlled by that portion of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. or because of a threat or promise by or in the presence of such person. in reference to the charge. deprives him of that freedom of will or self-control essential to make his confession voluntary within the meaning of the law. must not be extracted by any sort of threats or violence. and constitutes the strongest evidence against the party making it that can be given of the facts stated in such confession. namely. or decide upon its effect upon the mind of the prisoner. that one who is innocent will not imperil his safety or prejudice his interests by an untrue statement. however slight. ceases when the confession appears to have been made either in consequence of inducements of a temporal nature.
The Requirement for Voluntariness
Hopt v. must be free and voluntary: that is. nor obtained by any direct or implied promises. commanding that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. A confession can never be received in evidence where the prisoner has been influenced by any threat or promise. 110 US 574 (1884) While from the very nature of such evidence it must be subjected to careful scrutiny and received with great caution. Bram v. Brown v.
--(Page 67 of 101)--
. 297 US 278 (1936) Defendants testified during their trial for murder that their confessions were false and had been procured by physical torture. touching the charge preferred. wherever a question arises whether a confession is incompetent because not voluntary. operating upon the fears or hopes of the accused." A confession. and therefore excludes the declaration if any degree of influence has been exerted.
A state may not permit an accused to be hurried to conviction under mob domination. A state may not deny to the accused the aid of counsel.
--(Page 68 of 101)--
. and (3) offered to protect the individual from his fellow inmates. But the freedom of a state in establishing its policy is the freedom of constitutional government and is limited by the requirement of due process of law. Fulminante. contrive a conviction through the pretense of a trial which in truth is but used as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty through a deliberate deception of court and jury by the presentation of testimony known to be perjured. The Court must find voluntariness by the “totality of the circumstances. where the whole proceeding is but a mask. food water. The state may abolish trial by jury.
2. The Use of Force and Threats of Force Arizona v. 499 US 279 (1991) Eventually. unless in so doing it offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental. it is more likely to be deemed involuntary. and/or access to a restroom. after the informant had (1) become friends with the individual. It may dispense with indictment by a grand jury and substitute complaint or information. A state is free to regulate the procedure of its courts in accordance with its own conceptions of policy. Burden of Proof Burden of Proof that a confession is voluntary is on the prosecution. through the action of its officers. the individual confessed to the murder to a fellow inmate who was a paid informant for the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Factors to be Considered Length of the Interrogation and Deprivation of Basic Bodily Function If an interrogation when on over a long period of time. Nor may a state.” b.
Determining Whether a Confession is Voluntary
a. especially where a suspect has been denied sleep. (2) said that he--the informant--knew that the individual was starting to get some "tough treatment" from other inmates because of a rumor that the individual was suspected of the murder. without supplying corrective process.
The Court held that the confession was coerced and that the state failed to meet its burden of establishing. The use of Bruno. but began in early evening. Psychological Pressure Tactics Spano v. beyond a reasonable doubt. The admissions of a defendant come from the actor himself. There was a credible threat of physical violence to defendant unless he confessed. and one that is not supported by any testimony of Fulminante. he had stipulated that "at no time did the defendant indicate he was in fear of other inmates nor did he ever seek Mr. The decision of the Supreme Court of Arizona rests on an assumption that is squarely contrary to this stipulation. Rehnquist Dissent Indeed. he could be protected. Bruno's was the one face visible to petitioner in which he could put some trust.'" Sarivola's testimony that he told Fulminante that "if [he] would tell the truth. that the admission of the confession was harmless error. a credible threat is sufficient. the most knowledgeable and unimpeachable source of information about his past conduct. and the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition. A confession is like no other evidence. characterized in this Court by counsel for the State as a "childhood friend" of petitioner's. Sarivola's 'protection.
--(Page 69 of 101)--
. is another factor which deserves mention in the totality of the situation. 360 US 315 (1959) Petitioner was questioned for virtually eight straight hours before he confessed. and did not bear fruition until the not-too-early morning. Certainly. confessions have profound impact on the jury." adds little if anything to the substance of the parties' stipulation. There was a bond of friendship between them going back a decade into adolescence. Coercion can be mental as well as physical. Nor was the questioning conducted during normal business hours. New York. continued into the night. The defendant's own confession is probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted against him. with his only respite being a transfer to an arena presumably considered more appropriate by the police for the task at hand. so much so that the courts may justifiably doubt its ability to put them out of mind even if told to do so. A finding of coercion need not depend upon actual violence by a government agent.
After another police officer arrived. Connelly. defendant was again advised of his rights. Lying to the suspect by telling him that his accomplice had already confessed is OK. 394 US 731 (1969) Age. and that there was no friend or adviser to whom she might turn. Dennis. and Mental Condition Colorado v. Defendant was then held in custody and proceeded to confess to a child's murder. The next day. and no reason not to believe that the police had ample power to carry out their threats. The officer immediately advised him of his Miranda rights and defendant said that he understood the rights. Coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not "voluntary" within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Defendant approached a police officer and. Absent police conduct causally related to the confession. 372 US 528 (1963) Oral confession made by defendant only after the police had told her that state financial aid of her infant children would be cut off. Illinois. without any prompting. The psychiatrist who had evaluated the man testified that the man was experiencing "command hallucinations. and she had no previous experience with the criminal law.
We conclude that petitioner's will was overborne by official pressure. Level of Education. Fraizer v. defendant stated for the first time that voices had told him to confess. fatigue and sympathy falsely aroused." It also appeared that these threats were made while she was encircled in her apartment by three police officers and a twice convicted felon who had purportedly "set her up". Leyra v. after considering all the facts in their post-indictment setting. 347 US 556 (1954) An officer acting as a friend to a suspect and expressing sympathy for his or her plight is not deception requiring suppression of a confession. confessed to a murder. Deception Lynumn v. there is simply no basis for concluding that any state actor has deprived a criminal defendant of due process of law." and that this psychotic condition had motivated his confession but had not impaired his ability to understand his Miranda rights. Cupp. and her children taken from her. 479 US 157 (1986) Majority: Rehnquist. if she did not "cooperate. Dissent: Brennan
--(Page 70 of 101)--
and the War on Terrorism
The Military Commission Act of 2006 Provides for military commissions to try non-citizens accused of terrorism and prohibits the admissibility of statements gained through torture. Judges inherently have great discretion under a “totality of the circumstances” test.
--(Page 71 of 101)--
. To hold otherwise allows the State to imprison and possibly to execute a mentally ill defendant based solely upon an inherently unreliable confession. I would require the trial court to make such a finding on remand. Miranda v. before admitting the confession of a mentally ill person into evidence. who question suspects literally every day. whether exculpatory or inculpatory. Arizona. "custodial interrogation" is questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. Critics argue that police. . on the basis of evidence extrinsic to the confession itself. Marshall: The prosecution may not use statements.
B. stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against selfincrimination.
Is the Voluntariness Test Desirable?
Reliability is no the only concern." Minimum standards of due process should require that the trial court find substantial indicia of reliability.
A true commitment to fundamental fairness requires that the inquiry be "not whether the conduct of state officers in obtaining the confession is shocking. but whether the confession was 'free and voluntary'. . need more instructions than a voluntariness test can provide. certain police techniques are repugnant and override free will and thus are not to be tolerated. Arizona and Its Affirmation by the Supreme Court
Miranda v. . Torture. Fifth Amendment Limited on In-Custodial Interrogation 1. Coercive Questioning. 384 US 436 (1966) Majority.
by trading on his insecurity about himself or his surroundings. a confession is involuntary where it is obtained by a law enforcement officer by way of incommunicado interrogation. trick. The aura of confidence in his guilt undermines his will to resist. If an individual held for interrogation by a law enforcement officer indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking. knowingly. Dissent: White The new rules are not designed to guard against police brutality or other unmistakably banned forms of coercion. provided the waiver is made voluntarily. are employed. The Fifth Amendment. that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him. either retained or appointed. there can be no questioning. is this: To be alone with the subject is essential to prevent distraction and to deprive him of any outside support. Those who use third-degree tactics and deny them in court are equally able and destined to lie as skillfully about warnings and waivers. He merely confirms the preconceived story the police seek to have him describe. in clear and unequivocal terms. The aim in short is toward "voluntariness" in a utopian sense. at times relentless questioning. and ultimately to discourage any confession at all. or to view it from a different angle. for example. or cajole him out of exercising his constitutional rights. the interrogator must "patiently maneuver himself or his quarry into a position from which the desired objective may be attained. that he has a right to remain silent. The police then persuade. however. in an environment created for no purpose other than to subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner. the thrust of the new rules is to negate all pressures. and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney. Rather. has never been thought to forbid all pressure to incriminate one's self in the situations --(Page 72 of 101)--
." 23 When normal procedures fail to produce the needed result. the police may resort to deceptive stratagems such as giving false legal advice. Patience and persistence. A defendant may waive effectuation of his rights to remain silent and to be assisted by counsel at a custodial police interrogation. As a constitutional prerequisite to any questioning. and intelligently. Police Interrogation. It is important to keep the subject off balance. in essence. voluntariness with a vengeance. Even though not involuntary in traditional terms. an individual held for interrogation by a law enforcement officer must be warned. To obtain a confession. to reinforce the nervous or ignorant suspect.
3501 prescribes -. however. Martinez. We hold that Miranda.
covered by it. viz.. being a constitutional decision of this Court. until 3501 is repealed. we held that certain warnings must be given before a suspect's statement made during custodial interrogation could be admitted in evidence. in denial of a discharge in bankruptcy. compelled confessions. and in numerous other adverse consequences. but also that Justices whose votes are needed to compose today's majority are on record as believing that a violation of Miranda is not a violation of the Constitution. United States.S.C. inasmuch as 3501 excludes from trial precisely what the Constitution excludes from trial. in refusal of a military commission. it has been held that failure to incriminate one's self can result in denial of removal of one's case from state to federal court. may not be in effect overruled by an Act of Congress. In Miranda v. O'Connor and Scalia
--(Page 73 of 101)--
.the use at trial of a voluntary confession. The reason the statement does not appear is not only (and perhaps not so much) that it would be absurd. On the contrary. Chavez v. and we decline to overrule Miranda ourselves. 3501. Dissent: Scalia and Thomas One will search today's opinion in vain. even when a Miranda warning or its equivalent has failed to be given -.S.C. which in essence laid down a rule that the admissibility of such statements should turn only on whether or not they were voluntarily made. In the wake of that decision. Congress enacted 18 U. 530 US 428 (2000) miranda rule has a constitutional basis. Arizona.Rehnquist. We therefore hold that Miranda and its progeny in this Court govern the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation in both state and federal courts. and. I dissent from today's decision. for a statement (surely simple enough to make) that what 18 U. will continue to apply it in all cases where there has been a sustainable finding that the defendant's confession was voluntary. The Court's unspoken assumption that any pressure violates the privilege is not supported by the precedents and it has failed to show why the Fifth Amendment prohibits that relatively mild pressure the Due Process Clause permits. 538 US 760 (2003) Plurality Thomas. Dickerson v.violates the Constitution.
The privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment is a fundamental trial right of criminal defendants. but said that money damages are not necessary to enforce Miranda. A third criticism of Miranda is based on constitutional interpretation and the role of the judiciary. A second criticism is the opposite: Miranda prevents police from gaining confessions and it allows guilty people to go free. Kennedy: A constitutional right is traduced the moment torture or its close equivalent are brought to bear.” It provides clear guidance to police: Administer the simple warnings and follow the procedures and there is a presumption that any confession is admissible. What are the Requirements for Miranda to Apply?
Three questions arise in applying Miranda: When is a person “in custody”? What is interrogation? What police actions are sufficient to meet the requirements of Miranda? --(Page 74 of 101)--
Is Miranda Desirable?
Three Criticisms: It does not succeed in curing the inherently coercive nature of incustodial interrogation. the interrogation of respondent was the functional equivalent of an attempt to obtain an involuntary confession from a prisoner by torturous methods. Although conduct by law enforcement officials prior to trial may ultimately impair that right.”
3. Kenney and Ginsburg Stevens : As a matter of fact. Defenses of Miranda: “Miranda's empirically detectable net damage to law enforcement is zero. a constitutional violation occurs only at trial Souter and Breyer Disagreed .
2. Dissent:. Miranda has significant effect in increasing professional behavior by police officers and enhancing the public's awareness of constitutional rights. Ginsburg: I would hold that the Self-Incrimination Clause applies at the time and place police use severe compulsion to extract a statement from a suspect. the exclusionary rile is sufficient.
" Oregon v. thus Miranda was not applicable. Mathiason. At the very least. after being told by the police that they thought he was involved in a burglary and that his fingerprints had been found at the scene.a. Alvarado. The Miranda opinion declared that the warnings were required when the person being interrogated was "in custody at the station or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. When is a Person “In Custody”? Orozco v. where there are often impartial observers to guard against intimidation or trickery." Plainly the respondent could have so believed. According to the officer's testimony. our Miranda holding should not apply. he was seated at a desk. the questioning takes place in a coercive environment." But the opinion iterated and reiterated the absolute necessity for officers interrogating people "in custody" to give the described warnings. he was told that he was free to go. 394 US 324 (1969) The State has argued here that since petitioner was interrogated on his own bed. petitioner was under arrest and not free to leave when he was questioned in his bedroom in the early hours of the morning. Yarborough v. Texas. 429 US 492 (1977) The Court found that because defendant had come voluntarily to the station. and because he did in fact go at the conclusion of a 30 minute interview. Dissent. 541 US 652 (2004) --(Page 75 of 101)--
. Custodial interrogation means questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. if respondent entertained an objectively reasonable belief that he was not free to leave during the questioning. in familiar surroundings. Marshall: It is true that respondent was not formally placed under arrest. It is true that the Court did say in Miranda that "compulsion to speak in the isolated setting of the police station may well be greater than in courts or other official investigations. but surely formalities alone cannot control. no Miranda violation occurred. even in the absence of any formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement. A noncustodial situation is not converted into one in which Miranda applies simply because a reviewing court concludes that. The Court found that no custody was proven. then he was "deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way.
A ordinary traffic stop is not “in custody” for the purposes of Miranda.. must be determined based on a how a reasonable person in a suspect's situation would perceive his circumstances. 446 US 291 (1980) – not an interrogation. given those circumstances. and second." First. detention of a motorist pursuant to a traffic stop is presumptively temporary and brief Second. The initial determination of custody. would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave. circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop are not such that the motorist feels completely at the mercy of the police. for purposes of requiring a pre-interrogation advisement of rights. Once the scene is set and the players' lines and actions are reconstructed. not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned. regardless of the nature or severity of the offense of which he is suspected or for which he was arrested.
Rhode Island v. Two features of an ordinary traffic stop mitigate the danger that a person questioned will be induced "to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely. Courts must examine all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation and determine how a reasonable person in the position of the individual being questioned would gauge the breadth of his or her freedom of action.
Custody. exception bc its there to prevent interrogations…. Innis. Two discrete inquiries are essential to the determination of custody. a court must apply an objective test to resolve the ultimate inquiry: whether there was a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest. depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation. for purposes of requiring a pre-interrogation advisement of rights. McCarthy. Berkemer v. 468 US 420 (1984) A person subjected to custodial interrogation is entitled to the benefit of the procedural safeguards enunciated in Miranda. for purposes of requiring a pre-interrogation advisement of rights: first. I is more analogous to a Terry Stop. What is an “Interrogation”?
b. what were the circumstances surrounding the interrogation.
--(Page 76 of 101)--
overhearing the conversation. should be considered interrogation. as well as those that are designed to do so. Majority said that the conversation was not such that the police should have know it would elicit an incriminating response. By prohibiting only those relatively few statements or actions that a police officer should know are likely to elicit an incriminating response. Marshall. to understand how this objective standard as applied to the facts before us can rationally lead to the conclusion that there was no interrogation. The term "interrogation" under Miranda refers not only to express questioning. The suspect. Stevens. told the officers to turn the car around so that he could show them where a shotgun was located. A practice that the police should know is reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response from a suspect thus amounts to interrogation. 481 US 520 (1987)
--(Page 77 of 101)--
. but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. rather than the intent of the police. Dissent: Statements that appear to call for a response from the suspect. the Court today accords a suspect considerably less protection. the definition of interrogation can extend only to words or actions on the part of police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. But. Dissent: I am utterly at a loss. two of the patrolmen conversed with each other concerning the possibility that one of the handicapped children from the nearby school might find a weapon with shells and get hurt. The Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent.
While the police car was proceeding to its destination. Arizona v. Mauro. The latter portion of this definition focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect. because the police surely cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable results of their words or actions. however.
the coercive atmosphere is lacking.
It held that although the officers knew that incriminating statements might be made if defendant spoke with his wife. The sixth amendment applies in a case by case basis. It thus held that the officers' actions in allowing defendant to speak with his wife and taping the conversation were not the functional equivalent of an interrogation under Miranda that violated defendant's previously expressed wish to not be questioned further without a lawyer present. The State alleged that the statements were voluntary and not coerced. that a police officer would accompany her. The essential ingredients of a "police-dominated atmosphere" and compulsion are not present when an incarcerated person speaks freely to someone that he believes to be a fellow inmate. the Federal Constitution's Sixth Amendment prevents the government from interfering with an accused's right to counsel. psychological ploys. Perkins. Dissent This Court reverses. Miranda warnings are not required when a suspect is unaware that he is speaking to a law enforcement officer and gives a voluntary statement. they failed to give respondent any advance warning that Mrs. Coercion is determined from the perspective of the suspect. or direct questioning. that the police employed a powerful psychological ploy. and that Miranda warnings were not required when an undercover agent was asking questions that could elicit an incriminating response. however. respondent would not have freely chosen to speak with her. As the transcript of the conversation reveals. their decision to allow the conversation involved no coercion or psychological ploy designed to elicit an incriminating response. Dissent:
--(Page 78 of 101)--
. When a suspect considers himself in the company of cellmates and not officers." The record indicates. Illnois v. finding that no interrogation occurred because Mauro "was not subjected to compelling influences. Mauro was coming to talk to him. 496 US 292 (1990) The prisoner claimed that the statements were properly excluded because he had not been given Miranda warnings by the undercover agent. After charges have been filed. or that their conversation would be recorded. Marshall.
The appellate court held that the respondent was not properly advised of his right to counsel during the interrogation. neither would cause the suspect to "think that the listeners have official power over him. 453 US 355 (1981) The respondent a minor was arrested for murder. If Miranda now requires a police officer to issue warnings only in those situations in which the suspect might feel compelled "to speak by the fear of reprisal for remaining silent or in the hope of more lenient treatment should he confess. The officer advised the respondent of his Miranda rights. the respondent was again advised of his rights. Eagan. After the respondent's parent's arrived. At this time the respondent gave a statement. The Court found that the respondent was informed of his right to have a lawyer present prior to and during interrogation and that he could have one appointed if could not afford one. The respondent declined to talk. with each man offering his views on different topics. and the informant were not equal participants in a freeranging discussion. Although such abhorrent tricks would play on a suspect's need to confide in a trusted adviser."
c. Perkins. What is Required of the Police? California v. which was used at his trial. 492 US 195 (1989) “appoint an attorney for you without costs”
--(Page 79 of 101)--
This interaction was not a "conversation". The courts do not require a verbatim recital of the words of the Miranda opinion but rather examine the warnings given to determine if the reference to the right to appointed counsel is linked with some future point in time after the police interrogation. No talismanic incantation is required to satisfy Miranda strictures."presumably it allows custodial interrogation by an undercover officer posing as a member of the clergy or a suspect's defense attorney. Duckworth v. Rather. the officer. it was an interrogation: Perkins was subjected to express questioning likely to evoke an incriminating response. The Court held that the appellate court erred because it was clear that the respondent's Miranda rights were fully conveyed. Prysock. The warnings required and the waiver necessary in the absence of a fully effective equivalent are the prerequisites to the admissibility of any statement made by a defendant. The Court held that the rigidity of Miranda did not extend to the precise formulation of the warnings given.
but that one would be appointed if and when he went to court. Under Miranda. second statement chose to speak. as here. Marshall: The majority reaches this result by seriously mischaracterizing that decision. What are the Consequences of a Violation of Miranda?
Majority view: Miranda rule is a constitutionally based rule. to ask when he will obtain counsel. The Court finally held that defendant's waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights after being arrested was done voluntarily and with full understanding of his rights. after receiving Miranda warnings. Dissent.
--(Page 80 of 101)--
. If there is a violation of Miranda.
4.. the Court held that the initial warnings given to the prisoner touched all of the bases required by Miranda. Majority: balance the cost against accomplishing purpose of the rule: 1st statement involuntary. Miranda did not require that attorneys be producible on call. then suppress statement in the government’s case in chief. and that an attorney would be appointed for him if he could not afford one. value of its clarity. The Court also held that a suspect who had once responded to unwarned yet noncoercive questioning was not thereby disabled from waiving his rights and confessing after he had been given the Miranda warnings. it leads the suspect to believe that a lawyer will not be provided until some indeterminate time in the future after questioning. Oregon v. Miranda is a profilactic rle to protect 5th amendment and stop coerced confessions. The "if and when you go to court" advice simply anticipated that question. Elstad. instead. The Court held that the defendant's statements. A warning qualified by an "if and when you go to court" caveat does nothing of the kind. but only that the suspect be informed. following waiver of Miranda. It would be relatively commonplace for a suspect. 470 US 298 (1985) 1st statement “yes I was thereburglary” violated Miranda. made in his own living room and in the presence of his mother before being taken to the police station. were not the subject of police coercion. a police warning must "clearly inform" a suspect taken into custody "that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. that he had the right to an attorney before and during questioning. The police also added that they could not provide the prisoner with a lawyer.
Missouri v. in the individual case. I: even if the warning is otherwise calid have they creted an enviorment that the secondary statement is not a voluntary waiver of Miranda rights. the finder of fact must examine the surrounding circumstances and the entire course of police conduct with respect to the suspect in evaluating the voluntariness of his statements. and the change in identity of the interrogators all bear on whether that coercion has carried over into the second confession. Souter. It may be triggered even in the absence of a Fifth Amendment violation. was voluntary. Miranda's preventive medicine provides a remedy even to a defendant who has suffered no identifiable constitutional harm. however. Failure to administer Miranda warnings creates a presumption of compulsion. Ginsburg. The fact that a suspect chooses to speak after being informed of his rights is highly probative. the change in place of interrogations. administered for almost 20 years by most courts with no untoward results. This is an interrogation.
The Miranda exclusionary rule. though technically in violation of Miranda. As in any such inquiry. Consequently. the time that passes between confessions. Dissent The correct approach. The relevant inquiry is whether. Thus. When a prior statement is actually coerced. There is no warrant for presuming coercive effect where the suspect's initial inculpatory statement. the second statement was also voluntarily made. Seibert. serves the Fifth Amendment and sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself. Briar (principle) Concurring opinion. unwarned statements that are otherwise voluntary within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment must nevertheless be excluded from evidence under Miranda. 542 US 600 (2004) Plurality opinion. in fact.
--(Page 81 of 101)--
. is to presume that an admission or confession obtained in violation of Miranda taints a subsequent confession unless the prosecution can show that the taint is so attenuated as to justify admission of the subsequent confession. The Fifth Amendment prohibits use by the prosecution in its case in chief only of compelled testimony. Stevens.
police arrested defendant for the death of the teenager but refrained from giving her Miranda warnings. The threshold issue when interrogators question first and warn later is thus whether it would be reasonable to find that in these circumstances the warnings could function "effectively" as Miranda requires. Just as no talismanic incantation is required to satisfy Miranda's strictures. Employing a procedure called "question-first" interrogation. Because the facts did not reasonably support a conclusion that the warnings given could have served their purpose. a mentally ill teenager died during a scheme to conceal defendant's neglect of the son. the postwarning statements also were inadmissible.
--(Page 82 of 101)--
. there is no practical justification for accepting the formal warnings as compliance with Miranda. The trial court suppressed the prewarning statement but admitted the postwarning recitation. Supreme Court held that the question-first tactic effectively threatened to thwart Miranda's purpose of reducing the risk that a coerced confession would be admitted. it would be absurd to think that mere recitation of the litany suffices to satisfy Miranda in every conceivable circumstance. Could the warnings effectively advise the suspect that he had a real choice about giving an admissible statement at that juncture? Could they reasonably convey that he could choose to stop talking even if he had talked earlier? For unless the warnings could place a suspect who has just been interrogated in a position to make such an informed choice. After defendant's bedridden son's death. The inquiry is simply whether the warnings reasonably convey to a suspect his rights as required by Miranda. Twenty minutes after eliciting a confession. Strategists dedicated to draining the substance out of Miranda could not accomplish by training what the Court had previously held Congress could not do by statute. unwarned and inadmissible segment. or for treating the second stage of interrogation as distinct from the first. police Mirandized defendant and requestioned her.
if no. the subsequent statement is inadmissible for want of adequate Miranda warnings. if at all. (fruits – subsequent statements are not the fruits) The core protection afforded by the Self-Incrimination Clause.
--(Page 83 of 101)--
5. United States v. the admissibility of any subsequent statement should turn in these circumstances solely on whether it is knowingly and voluntarily made. at that point. clarity is served if the later confession is approached by asking whether in the circumstances the Miranda warnings given could reasonably be found effective. unwarned sequence of questioning.
simple failure to administer Miranda warnings. If yes. amend. Though Miranda requires that the unwarned admission must be suppressed. 542 US 630 (2004): exclusionary rule balancing. Police do not violate a suspect's constitutional rights (or the Miranda rule) by negligent or even deliberate failures to provide the suspect with the full panoply of warnings prescribed by Miranda. In a sequential confession case. or if the suspect waived his or her rights under Miranda. A suspect who has once responded to unwarned yet uncoercive questioning is not thereby disabled from waiving his rights and confessing after he has been given the requisite Miranda warnings. because the earlier and later statements are realistically seen as parts of a single.S. U. if the statements were made at the time of booking the suspect in response to routine questions by the police. Potential violations occur. a court can take up the standard issues of voluntary waiver and voluntary statement. Can use shotgun into evidence. Patane. unaccompanied by any actual coercion or other circumstances calculated to undermine the suspect's ability to exercise his free will does not so taint the investigatory process that a subsequent voluntary and informed waiver is ineffective for some indeterminate period. V. The Clause cannot be violated by the introduction of nontestimonial evidence obtained as a result of voluntary statements. If the statements were obtained in an emergency situation. And.
What are the Exceptions to Miranda?
There are 4 major exceptions: If the statements are used for impeachment purposes. the exclusion of unwarned statements is a complete and sufficient remedy for any perceived Miranda violation. is a prohibition on compelling a criminal defendant to testify against himself at trial. only upon the admission of unwarned statements into evidence at trial.
the State made no effort to use the statements in its case in chief. defendant was questioned regarding specified statements defendant made to the police immediately following his arrest. and the appellate court affirmed defendant's conviction. Impeachment Harris v.. and the state sought to impeach defendant with his statements. and that the court's decision in the instant case went far toward undoing much of the progress made in conforming police methods to the Constitution. joined by Douglas and Marshall. the court held that Miranda did not prevent the state from using defendant's statement to the police to confront defendant with prior inconsistent utterances. New York. 401 US 222 (1971) – nothing prevents the use of the statement for impeachment. Brennan. provided of course that the trustworthiness of the evidence satisfies legal standards. Defendant was subsequently convicted of selling heroin to an undercover police officer. More important to get the statement
b. Thus.. conceding that the statements were inadmissible under Miranda. Emergencies New York v.
--(Page 84 of 101)--
. Quarles.a. It does not follow from Miranda that evidence inadmissible against an accused in the prosecution's case in chief is barred for all purposes. dissenting stated that it was monstrous that courts should aid lawbreaking police officers. The statements partially contradicted defendant's direct testimony. Miranda bars the prosecution from making its case with statements of an accused made while in custody prior to having or effectively waiving counsel. During cross-examination at his trial. On appeal. the court concluded that defendant's credibility was appropriately impeached by use of his earlier conflicting statements. J. 467 US 649 (1984) – public safety exception. JJ. However.
A police officer pursued respondent suspect in a supermarket after a woman identified him as the man who raped her. The officer frisked respondent and discovered that he was wearing an empty shoulder holster. After handcuffing respondent, the officer asked him where the gun was. Respondent said, "the gun is over there." After the officer retrieved the loaded gun, he placed respondent under arrest and read him his Miranda rights. In the subsequent prosecution of respondent for criminal possession of a weapon, the judge excluded the statement and the gun because the officer had not given respondent his Miranda warnings before asking him where the gun was located. The Court held that there was a "public safety" exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be given before a suspect's answers could be admitted into evidence, and that the availability of that exception did not depend upon the motivation of the individual officers involved. The public safety exception will not be difficult for police officers to apply because in each case it will be circumscribed by the exigency which justifies it. Police officers can and will distinguish almost instinctively between questions necessary to secure their own safety or the safety of the public and questions designed solely to elicit testimonial evidence from a suspect. O'Connor, J., concurring in part in the judgment and dissenting in part, filed a separate opinion stating that Miranda required suppression of the incriminating statement but not the gun itself. Marshall, J., joined by Brennan and Stevens, JJ., dissented on the ground that the interrogation violated the Fifth Amendment prohibition of coerced self-incriminating statements. c. Booking Exception Pennslyvania v. Muniz, 496 US 582 (1990) – information during booking; will be inevitably given to police in booking process
--(Page 85 of 101)--
Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol. Defendant argued that portions of a videotape should have been suppressed because he had not been given his Miranda warnings. The state appellate court agreed and vacated defendant's conviction, holding that when the physical nature of the tests began to yield testimonial and communicative statements, the protection afforded by Miranda was invoked. The Court found that the Miranda requirement afforded protection against self-incrimination to persons under custodial interrogation. The Court distinguished between testimonial and real or physical evidence when invoking the privilege. The Court held that a field sobriety test or taking a blood sample constituted real or physical evidence; whereas requiring defendant to respond to specific questions was testimonial. The Court distinguished questions from defendant while he was informed about the properties of a breathalyzer test from utterances made in response to personal questions from the police officer, such as the date of defendant's sixth birthday. The Court held that comments made by defendant while submitting to a test should not have been suppressed. Although the test does not delineate the ways in which a person might be made a witness against himself, the court has long held that the privilege does not protect a suspect from being compelled by the state to produce real or physical evidence. Rather, the privilege protects an accused only from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the state with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature. In order to be testimonial, an accused's communication must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion or disclose information. Only then is a person compelled to be a witness against himself. d. Waiver North Carolina v. Butler, 441 US 369 (1979)
--(Page 86 of 101)--
Defendant was convicted of kidnapping, armed robbery, and felonious assault. In reversing the convictions, the state court found that defendant's incriminating statements had been admitted in violation of Miranda requirements because defendant had refused to waive in writing his right to have counsel present and there had not been a specific oral waiver. On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court held that the state court erred in its reading of Miranda. The Court noted, pursuant to Miranda, that an accused's express statement could constitute a waiver, and that the accused's silence alone after the applicable warnings could not do so. However, the Court did not hold that an accused's express statement was indispensable to a finding of waiver. Thus, the Court held that a court could find an intelligent and understanding rejection of counsel in situations where an accused did not expressly state as much. The question of waiver had to be determined on the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case, including the background, experience, and conduct of defendant. If an interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that a defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel. An express statement that an individual is willing to make a statement and does not want an attorney followed closely by a statement could constitute a waiver. But, a valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of the accused after warnings are given or simply from the fact that a confession was in fact eventually obtained. Moran v. Burbine, 475 US 412 (1986) Respondent confessed to and was convicted of the murder of a young woman. Respondent later challenged his conviction, claiming his confessions should have been suppressed because the police deceived him by failing to inform him that a public defender had called to speak with him while he was in custody, but prior to arraignment On review, the Court found that respondent at no time requested an attorney, and events occurring outside the presence of respondent and entirely unknown to him had no bearing on his capacity to comprehend and knowingly waive his rights. The Court held that once a person knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights, the waiver was valid as a matter of law. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 US 96 (1975)
--(Page 87 of 101)--
but detectives from the same police department returned the next day and again interrogated petitioner. where there was no finding that he understood his right to counsel and intelligently and knowingly relinquished it. The Court concluded that when the questioning was for different crimes.
Defendant was arrested in connection with the investigation of robberies. Minnick v Mississippi. Defendant was thereafter questioned at another police station about a homicide and confessed to the murder. petitioner requested an attorney. by a different police officer. and (3) having requested counsel. 498 US 146 (1990)
--(Page 88 of 101)--
. 451 US 477 (1981) After he was arrested and read his Miranda rights. and the police. petitioner was not subject to further interrogation until counsel had been made available to him. but was a right that had to be scrupulously honored by the police. where petitioner had asserted his right to counsel and his right to remain silent." Edwards v. The admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends under Miranda on whether his "right to cut of questioning" was "scrupulously honored. Arizona. after an extended period without questioning. the request to remain silent had been scrupulously honored. The right to remain silent encompassed within the Miranda rights was not a right to permanently remain silent. The Supreme Court held that (1) the use of petitioner's confession against him violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Petitioner confessed to the crimes during the second interrogation. returned and secured a confession. defendant stated that he did not want to talk about the robberies. After being advised of his rights. unless petitioner himself initiated further communication with the police. The police officers ceased questioning. without furnishing him with counsel. in a different station. (2) petitioner did not validly waive his right to counsel.
The prisoner resisted. The prisoner was convicted. When counsel was requested. The presence of counsel would be the adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the Fifth Amendment privilege. The state court denied the prisoner's application finding that since counsel was made available to the prisoner. interrogation must cease. The prisoner was arrested and requested an attorney. The prisoner and his friend escaped from a county jail and broke into a mobile home. On appeal. The rule ensures that any statement made in subsequent interrogation is not the result of coercive pressures. and implements the protections of Miranda in practical and straight-forward terms. and officials may not reinitiate interrogation without counsel present. Edwards conserves judicial resources which would otherwise be expended in making difficult determinations of voluntariness. A single consultation with an attorney does not remove the suspect from persistent attempts by officials to persuade him to waive his rights. Authorities may not initiate questioning of the accused in counsel's absence. the interrogation of the prisoner had to cease. Federal Bureau of Investigation agents and the local police made persistent attempts to persuade the prisoner to waive his rights. When counsel is requested. The prisoner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief alleging that his statements were taken in violation of his right to counsel under the Fifth Amendment. Preserving the integrity of an accused's choice to communicate with police only through counsel is the essence of Edwards and its progeny. His presence would insure that statements made in the government-established atmosphere are not the product of compulsion. Two of the residents of such home were killed. or from the coercive pressures that accompany custody and that may increase as custody is prolonged. his Fifth Amendment right to counsel was satisfied. the court found that that the prisoner's Fifth Amendment protection was not terminated or suspended by consultation with counsel. but eventually submitted to interviews without his attorney present. Officials could not reinitiate interrogation without the presence of the prisoner's attorney. The prisoner spoke with his attorney. whether or not the accused has consulted with his attorney. Edwards is designed to prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights.
--(Page 89 of 101)--
The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel and Police Interrogations 1. holding that defendant's mention of a lawyer during interrogation was not a request for counsel and that the agents properly determined that defendant was not invoking his right to counsel. The military judge at general court-martial denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained during the interview. suspect in murder. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. but then saying he did not want a lawyer. he must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney. United States. After the interview was under way. which he voluntarily waived. Although a suspect need not speak with the discrimination of an Oxford don. Davis v. 377 US 201 (1964)
--(Page 90 of 101)--
. The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel During Interrogations
The need for counsel to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege comprehends not merely a right to consult with counsel prior to questioning. was interviewed by the Naval Investigative Service. The NavyMarine Corps Court of Military Review and the United States Court of Military Appeals affirmed. A statement either is such an assertion of the right to counsel or it is not. indicating at first he might want a lawyer. If the statement fails to meet the requisite level of clarity. holding that equivocal requests or comments regarding an attorney did not require questioning officers to stop interrogation so that counsel could be present and that questioning could continue unless a suspect actually requested an attorney. United States. The suspect must unambiguously request counsel.
C. and was given the military equivalent of Miranda warnings. defendant made comments. the officers are not required to stop questioning the suspect. but also to have counsel present during any questioning if the defendant so desires. 512 US 452 (1994) Defendant. Questioning continued.
by means of which a federal agent listened to the conversation. joined by Clark and Harlan. J. were not admissible at his trial. In an opinion by Stewart. 430 US 387 (1977)
--(Page 91 of 101)--
. JJ. the defendant held a conversation in the absence of his counsel with one of his codefendants while sitting in the latter's automobile. Williams. elicited by government agents after he had been indicted and in the absence of his counsel. and was released on bail. defendants are as much entitled to such aid of counsel during that period as at the trial itself. unaware that the codefendant. At the defendant's trial in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. pleaded not guilty. expressing the views of six members of the Court. had allowed the installation of a radio transmitter under the front seat of the automobile. the Supreme Court of the United States reversed. dissented on the ground that the pretrial statements of a defendant in criminal proceedings should be admissible in evidence if voluntarily made and not coerced.. testified to incriminating statements made by the defendant during the conversation.
The defendant. from and after the finding of an indictment.. it was held that under the Sixth Amendment's guaranty of the defendant's right to assistance of counsel. co-operating with government agents. over the defendant's objection. During the period of the proceedings from the time of their arraignment until the beginning of their trial. J. Any secret interrogation of a defendant. Brewer v. contravenes the basic dictates of fairness in the conduct of criminal causes and the fundamental rights of persons charged with crime. after being indicted with other persons for violating the federal narcotics laws. and the trial resulted in the defendant's conviction. While free on bail. without the protection afforded by the presence of counsel. the federal agent. the defendant's incriminating statements.. and that the absence of counsel should be only one of several factors considered in judging voluntariness. retained a lawyer. On certiorari. White.
The prosecution. Texas v. In the car. and that respondent was the only one who knew where the body was. Cobb. The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel Is Offense Specific
A key distinction between the fifth Amendment right to counsel and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is that the latter is offense specific. has the weighty obligation to show that the waiver was knowingly and intelligently made. he has a right to legal representation when the government interrogates him. Respondent eventually led the officers to the body. and that he should not talk to the officers until consulting with the attorney. as judicial proceedings had been initiated against him before the start of the car ride. The officers gave respondent Miranda warnings. After respondent's arraignment. Respondent did not waive his right to counsel because he consistently relied upon the advice of counsel in dealing with the authorities. respondent expressed no willingness to be interrogated. and the officer deliberately set out to elicit information from him when he was entitled to the assistance of counsel. During the trip. one officer discussed how expected snow might make recovery of the body and a Christian burial impossible. knowingly and intelligently waive his right to have counsel present at an interrogation after counsel has been appointed. Respondent was arrested for the abduction of a missing girl. another attorney similarly advised respondent. 532 US 162 (2001)
--(Page 92 of 101)--
. An accused can voluntarily. that the officers would not interrogate him. The Court held that respondent was entitled to a new trial because he was deprived of the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel. however. Once adversary proceedings have commenced against an individual.
2. His attorney advised him that police officers would be transporting him to another city.
but denied knowledge of the missing residents. indictment. preliminary hearing. whether by way of formal charge. The Court affirmed holding that respondents' confessions. Since the two offenses required different elements of proof. obtained from a police-initiated custodial interrogation.
Waiver of the 6th Amendment right to counsel must be a knowing and intelligent waiver. under Miranda to refuse any police questioning concerning uncharged offenses. and that under such circumstances. Jackson. Respondent thus had no right to the presence of his previously appointed counsel during the interrogation concerning the murder charge. the right to counsel was offense specific. and prosecution was not initiated on the murder offense at the time of the interrogation.
--(Page 93 of 101)--
3. and their confessions were admitted into evidence at their respective trials. they were separate offenses. that is. for it does not attach until a prosecution is commenced. at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings. violated respondents' right to counsel. Const. or arraignment. The United States Supreme Court held that. respondents were separately arraigned and at that time each requested appointment of counsel. respondents were interrogated after each was advised of his Miranda rights. The U. after respondents requested appointment of counsel at their arraignments but before respondents consulted with counsel. Respondent argued that his right to assistance of counsel was violated since the permission of respondent's appointed counsel was not obtained prior to interrogation. VI right to counsel is offense specific. amend. respondents confessed to their crimes. and the confession resulting from that interrogation was admissible. Even though the right to counsel under the Federal Constitution's Sixth Amendment does not attach to uncharged offenses. While in police custody. Respondent confessed to burglary of a residence. After appointment of counsel for the burglary offense. any waiver of the right to counsel for the police interrogation was invalid. information. 475 US 625 (1986) Overruled by Montejo In two unrelated murder cases. respondent was subsequently advised of his rights and confessed to murdering the residents. suspects retain the ability. regardless of whether the murder charge was closely related factually to the burglary offense. During the interrogations. It cannot be invoked once for all future prosecutions.S. Michigan v. and before respondents were able to consult with counsel.
any waiver of the defendant's right to counsel for that police-initiated interrogation is invalid.the Court presumes that the defendant requests the lawyer's services at every critical stage of the prosecution. once such a defendant has invoked his right to have counsel present. at an arraignment or similar proceeding. Doubts must be resolved in favor of protecting the constitutional claim.
The State has the burden of establishing a valid waiver of Sixth Amendment rights. And under Minnick's prophylactic protection of the Edwards right. This settled approach to questions of waiver requires the Court to give a broad. and punishing those who violate the law. What is Impermissible Police Eliciting of Statements?
The use of prison informant is an area where the 5th and 6th Amendments differ. of his right to counsel. whether or not the accused has consulted with his attorney. any suspect subject to custodial interrogation has the right to have a lawyer present if he so requests. Statements obtained in violation of the 6th amendment may be used for impeachment purposes.
4. If police initiate interrogation after a defendant's assertion. rather than a narrow. 487 US 285 (1988) Defendant's waiver of his right to counsel under the Fifth Amendment pursuant to Miranda was also sufficient for a waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. no subsequent interrogation may take place until counsel is present. Patterson v. interrogation must stop. 129 S. Under Edwards' prophylactic protection of the Miranda right. United States v. The 5th does not apply because there is not an interrogation. 2079 (2009) The Court held that the marginal benefits of Jackson (the number of confessions obtained coercively that were suppressed by its bright-line rule and would otherwise have been admitted) were dwarfed by its substantial costs (hindering society's compelling interest in finding.Ct. Henry. 447 US 264 (1980)
--(Page 94 of 101)--
. convicting. Montejo v.) Defendant was given an opportunity to contend his letter should have been suppressed under Edwards. Louisana. Illinois. interpretation to a defendant's request for counsel -. Under Miranda's prophylactic protection of the right against compelled self-incrimination. and to be advised of that right.
had agreed to act as a police informant. (2) the informant obeyed these instructions. the Court held that the government's specific mention of defendant to the undercover informant. The Court held that defendant's statements to a government informant should not have been admitted at trial because by intentionally creating a situation likely to induce the defendant to make incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel. and (3) the accused's statements were spontaneous and unsolicited. Finding that (1) the police had instructed the informant to ask no questions but merely to listen to what the accused might say." Kuhlman v. The accused made incriminating statements which the informant reported. Further. he had "some conversations with Mr. Nichols was not a passive listener. The Court held that defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached at the time he made the statements. constituted the type of affirmative steps to secure incriminating information from defendant outside the presence of his counsel prohibited by the Sixth Amendment. the government had violated defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. on grounds that admission of the confession violated his Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel. Prior to the accused's trial in a New York state court. the trial judge denied the motion. rather. U. 8 Yet according to his own testimony. Henry" while he was in jail and Henry's incriminatory statements were "the product of this conversation. The Government argues that the federal agents instructed Nichols not to question Henry about the robbery. 477 US 436 (1986) An accused. Const. Wilson.
--(Page 95 of 101)--
. amend. VI does not forbid admission in evidence of an accused's statements to a jailhouse informant who was placed in close proximity but made no effort to stimulate conversations about the crime charged.S. unknown to the accused. he moved to suppress the jail cell statements as obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. who denied any involvement in an armed robbery in which a person was killed. was nevertheless arraigned and confined in a jail cell together with another prisoner who. an paid undercover informant. who was paid on a contingency fee basis. after defendant was indicted and while he was in custody.
Defendant challenged the admission at trial of incriminating statements made by defendant to his cellmate.
either through prior arrangement or voluntarily.
A. there can be little doubt that the post-indictment lineup is a critical stage of the prosecution at which an accused is as much entitled to the aid of counsel as at the trial itself. not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material. the defendant must demonstrate that the police and their informant took some action.the state obtains incriminating statements from the accused after the right to counsel has attached. and when presence of counsel itself can often avert prejudice and assure a meaningful confrontation at trial. Evidence had to be presented as to whether the in-court identifications were based on observations or the lineup. Const. but the court of appeals reversed his conviction and ordered a new trial. Wade.
The Right to Counsel in Lineups
United States v. which may not be capable of reconstruction at trial. the Court could not determine whether the courtroom identifications should be excluded. VI is not violated whenever -.S.
IV. reported his incriminating statements to the police. Rather. Respondent was convicted. The post-indictment lineup was a critical stage of the proceedings. excluding the courtroom identifications. until a hearing could determine whether the in-court identifications had independent origins.by luck or happenstance -. At trial. The Court remanded the action to the court of appeals to enter a new judgment vacating respondent's conviction. intentional or not. in a pretrial lineup. --(Page 96 of 101)--
. When it appears that there is grave potential for prejudice. No 5th Amendment problem: The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him. that was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks. the employees pointed to respondent when asked to identify the robber. 388 US 218 (1967) The employees of a robbed bank identified respondent in a lineup that had been conducted without counsel being present.
The Right to Counsel 1. a defendant does not make out a violation of that right simply by showing that an informant. amend. Based on the record. so respondent was entitled to have his attorney present. The court of appeals concluded that the lineup violated respondent's Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel. beyond merely listening. Since U.
Kirby. even though counsel was not present. A person's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel attaches only at or after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against him. VI. Limits on the Right to Counsel in Identification Procedures
Illinois v. and witnesses identified defendant. the Court refused to extend the right to an identification that took place before the commencement of any prosecution whatever. The State is therefore not entitled to an opportunity to show that that testimony had an independent source.
The Sixth Amendment guaranty of the assistance of counsel applies to "critical" stages of the proceedings. 388 US 263 (1967) Defendant was indicted for robbery and murder and was appointed counsel. This is not to say that a defendant in a criminal case has a constitutional right to counsel only at the trial itself. This issue was remanded because the record was inadequate for the Court to determine whether the incourt identifications had an independent source. a lineup was conducted without notice to defendant's counsel. The lineup was illegal because it violated defendant's right to counsel under U. 406 US 682 (1972) Although the Sixth Amendment right to counsel existed at a postindictment pretrial lineup. Because defendant was identified before he was arrested on the robbery charge." Wong Sun. The right attaches at the time of arraignment. The United States Supreme Court vacated the conviction.S.
2. The incourt identifications were inadmissible without evidence that they had an independent source. Const. the pre-indictment identification was admissible. That testimony is the direct result of the illegal lineup "come at by exploitation of [the primary] illegality. and it exists also at the time of a preliminary hearing. Subsequently.
--(Page 97 of 101)--
. Gilbert v. amend. and the Supreme Court of California affirmed the conviction. Only a per se exclusionary rule as to such testimony can be an effective sanction to assure that law enforcement authorities will respect the accused's constitutional right to the presence of his counsel at the critical lineup. Witnesses' testimony that they identified defendant at the lineup was inadmissible because it was the direct result of the illegal lineup. Defendant was convicted. California.
Ash. that marks the commencement of the "criminal prosecutions" to which alone the explicit guarantees of the Sixth Amendment are applicable. 394 US 440 (1969)
--(Page 98 of 101)--
. California. at trial some witnesses identified respondent. Unnecessarily Suggestive Identification Procedures Violate Due Process
The practice of showing suspects singly to persons for the purpose of identification. or advisor to. and immersed in the intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal law.
B. Counsel has continued to act as a spokesman for. Foster v. namely. the right of the accused to have counsel acting as his assistant. petitioner government used a photographic display to determine whether witnesses would be able to make in-court identifications of respondent. therefore. a claimed violation of due process of law in the conduct of a confrontation depends on the totality of the circumstances. However. The appellate court held that admitting the photographs into evidence constituted the introduction of a post-indictment identification. The accused's right to the "Assistance of Counsel" has meant just that. Respondent was convicted. 413 US 300 (1973) Prior to trial of respondent accused. United States v. and only then that the adverse positions of government and defendant have solidified. but one was unable to make any selection. amend.
The initiation of judicial criminal proceedings is far from a mere formalism. It is this point. Some witnesses selected his picture. the accused. It is the starting point of the United States' whole system of adversary criminal justice. It is then that a defendant finds himself faced with the prosecutorial forces of organized society. For it is only then that the government has committed itself to prosecute. Throughout this expansion of the counsel guarantee to trial-like confrontations. and not as part of a lineup. Const. has been widely condemned. The Court held that U. VI did not grant the right to counsel at photographic displays conducted by respondent for the purpose of allowing a witness to attempt an identification of the offender. Due Process Protection for Identification Procedures 1.S. the function of the lawyer has remained essentially the same as his function at trial.
Each case in which an identification by photograph is made must be considered on its own facts. After defendant was arrested for armed robbery. although he "thought" that defendant was one. and defendant was convicted. Convictions based on eyewitness identification at trial following a pretrial identification by photograph will be set aside on the ground of misidentification only --(Page 99 of 101)--
. The police brought defendant into a room so that the witness could speak to him. The witness could not positively identify defendant as one of the robbers.” The Court has rejected due process challenges to suggestive identification procedures if it concludes that there are sufficient indications of reliability. Before the trial the bank employees who had witnessed the robbery identified photographs of the petitioners as representing the robbers.
2. the witness was still uncertain whether defendant was the robber. The Court granted certiorari to determine if the police lineup had violated defendant's constitutional rights. United States. The Court held that the lineup had to be judged by the totality of the circumstances. the Court concluded that the procedure so undermined the reliability of the eyewitness identification that it violated defendant's right to due process. however. The Supreme Court has been willing to allow convictions baseed on suggestive identifications if the witness has an “independent source for the identification. Limits on the Ability of Courts to Find That Identification Procedures Violate Due Process
Foster is the only case in which the Supreme Court has found that an identification procedure violates due process. One petitioner's testimony at his unsuccessful pretrial motion for suppression of certain evidence was admitted against him at the trial. and the District Court denied the petitioners' request for production of the photographs which had been shown to the witnesses before the trial. Even after the one-on-one confrontation. he identified defendant in court. Simmons v. and during the trial such employees also identified the petitioners as the robbers. two lineups were held. 390 US 377 (1968) Two petitioners were convicted in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois for the armed robbery of a federally insured savings and loan association. The Court found that defendant's lineup presented a compelling example of unfair lineup procedures because the suggestive elements in the identification procedure made it all but inevitable that the witness would identify defendant whether or not he was in fact the robber. In reversing defendant's conviction and remanding the case.
the accuracy of his prior description of the criminal. or more lenient. whenever it has been obtained through unnecessarily suggested confrontation procedures. the accuracy of the witness' prior description of the criminal. without regard to reliability. and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation. 409 US 188 (1972) Following a jury trial in a Tennessee state court. the level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation. The victim had spent considerable time with her assailant. and testified at the trial that she had "no doubt" about her identification of the accused and that there was something about his face "I don't think I could ever forget. The evidence against him included testimony concerning his identification by the rape victim at a pretrial police station showup. the accused was convicted of rape. 432 US 98 (1977) Respondent. The Court reasoned that the factors that had to be considered included the opportunity of the witness to view respondent at the time of the crime. proposed a per se rule of exclusion that he claimed was dictated by the demands of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process. focuses on the procedures employed and requires exclusion of the out-of-court identification evidence. and the time between the crime and the confrontation. the witness' degree of attention. the witness' degree of attention. Against these factors was weighed the corrupting effect of the suggestive identification itself. Neil v. Biggers. had given the police a description of him. approach is --(Page 100 of 101)--
. The Court adopted the totality of the circumstances test and concluded that the criteria applicable in determining the admissibility of evidence offered by the prosecution concerning an identification were satisfactorily met and complied with in respondent's case. The courts of appeals appear to develop at least two approaches to out-of-court identification evidence. under all the circumstances of respondent's case. there was very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. The Court determined that it could not say that. The first. Brathwaite.
if the photographic identification procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification." The factors to be considered in evaluating the likelihood of misidentification include the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime. on a claim for habeas relief. The second. the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation. Manson v. or per se approach.
serves to limit the societal costs imposed by a sanction that excludes relevant evidence from consideration and evaluation by the trier of fact. Its adherents feel that the per se approach is not mandated by the Due Process Clause.S. in contrast to the other. Const. despite the suggestive aspect.
--(Page 101 of 101)--
. U. XIV. the out-of-court identification possesses certain features of reliability.one that continues to rely on the totality of the circumstances. This second approach. amend. It permits the admission of the confrontation evidence if.