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Crim Pro I
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Table of Contents
I. Searches and Seizures.........................................................................................5 A. Introduction.................................................................................................5 B. What is a Search?........................................................................................5 1. Open Fields..........................................................................................6 2. Aerial Searches....................................................................................8 3. Thermal Imaging of Homes..................................................................9 4. Searches of Trash...............................................................................10 5. Observation and Monitoring of Public Behavior.................................11 6. Use of Dogs to Sniff for Contraband...................................................12 C. The Requirement for Probable Cause........................................................13 1. Sufficient Belief to Meet the Standard for Probable Cause.................13 2. An Objective or Subjective Standard?................................................15 D. The Warrant Requirement.........................................................................16 1. What Information Must Be Included in the Application for a Warrant?16 2. What Form Must the Warrant Take?...................................................17 3. What are the Requirement in Executing Warrants?............................20 a. How May Police Treat Those Who Are present When a Warrant Is Being Executed?........................................................................................20 b. Do Police have to Knock and Announce?....................................21 c. What if There Are Unforeseen Circumstances or Mistakes While Executing a Warrant?.......................................................................22 E. Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement....................................................23 1. Searches Incident to Arrest................................................................23 2. Searches Made in Hot Pursuit............................................................25 3. Plain View...........................................................................................26 4. The Automobile Exception ................................................................29 a. The Exception and Its Rationale.................................................29 b. Searches of Containers in Automobiles......................................30 c. Searches Incident to Arrest.........................................................31 5. Inventory Searches............................................................................32 6. Border Crossing and Checkpoints......................................................34 7. Checkpoints.......................................................................................35 8. Consent..............................................................................................37 9. Searches on Those on Probation and Parole......................................38 10. Searches When There Are “Special Needs”.....................................40 a. Administrative Searches.............................................................40 b. Drug Testing...............................................................................41 11. Exigent Circumstances.....................................................................44 F. Seizures and Arrests...................................................................................46 1. Is a Warrant Needed for Arrests?.......................................................46 2. When Is a Person Seized?..................................................................46 3. For What Crimes May a Person Be Arrested?.....................................48 G. Stop and Frisk...........................................................................................49 --(Page 2 of 101)--
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The Authority for Police to Stop and Frisk..........................................49 The Distinction Between Stops and Arrests.......................................51 What May Police Do When They Stop an Individual?.........................51 What is Sufficient for Reasonable Suspicion?.....................................52 a. Reasonable Suspicion for Stopping Cars.....................................52 b. Reasonable Suspicion Based on Informants' Tips.......................52 c. Reasonable Suspicion Based on a Person's Trying to Avoid a Police Officer..............................................................................................54 d. Reasonable Suspicion Based on Profiles.....................................55 II. The Exclusionary Rule.......................................................................................55 A. Is the Exclusionary rule a Desirable Remedy?...........................................55 B. The Origins of the Exclusionary Rule.........................................................57 C. Who Can Object to the Introduction of Evidence and Raise the Exclusionary Rule?...............................................................................................................57 D. Exceptions to the Exclusionary Rule.........................................................59 1. Independent Source...........................................................................59 2. Inevitable Discovery...........................................................................60 3. Inadequate Causal Connection – Attenuation of the Taint..................62 4. The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule...........................63 5. Exception for Violations of “Knock and Announce”............................65 6. Exception for Certain Department Violations.....................................66 E. Suppression Hearings................................................................................66 III. Police Interrogation and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination.....................67 A. Due Process and the Requirement for Voluntariness.................................67 1. The Requirement for Voluntariness....................................................67 2. Determining Whether a Confession is Voluntary................................68 a. Burden of Proof...........................................................................68 b. Factors to be Considered............................................................68 3. Is the Voluntariness Test Desirable?...................................................71 4. Coercive Questioning, Torture, and the War on Terrorism..................71 B. Fifth Amendment Limited on In-Custodial Interrogation............................71 1. Miranda v. Arizona and Its Affirmation by the Supreme Court...........71 2. Is Miranda Desirable?.........................................................................74 3. What are the Requirements for Miranda to Apply?............................74 a. When is a Person “In Custody”?.................................................75 b. What is an “Interrogation”?........................................................76 c. What is Required of the Police?...................................................79 4. What are the Consequences of a Violation of Miranda?.....................80 5. What are the Exceptions to Miranda?................................................83 a. Impeachment..............................................................................84 b. Emergencies...............................................................................84 c. Booking Exception......................................................................85 d. Waiver.........................................................................................86 C. The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel and Police Interrogations...........90 1. The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel During Interrogations..........90 2. The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel Is Offense Specific..............92 --(Page 3 of 101)--
1. 2. 3. 4.
.......... Limits on the Right to Counsel in Identification Procedures....99 --(Page 4 of 101)-- ................................................................... The Right to Counsel......96 1.......Downloaded From OutlineDepot................................com 3......... What is Impermissible Police Eliciting of Statements?. Waivers....... Unnecessarily Suggestive Identification Procedures Violate Due Process............................................................93 4..............97 B............98 1........... Due Process Protection for Identification Procedures............................................96 2..........................................96 A......................................... Limits on the Ability of Courts to Find That Identification Procedures Violate Due Process............................................ 98 2............................ Identification Procedures.................................. The Right to Counsel in Lineups..94 IV.
shall not be violated. amend. and paid the toll that permitted him to place a call was entitled to assume that the words he uttered into the mouthpiece would not be broadcast to the world. Searches and Seizures A. IV. MacArthur. even in an area accessible to the public. houses. But what he seeks to preserve as private. has the individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged search? Second. VerdugoUrquidez. is society willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable? --(Page 5 of 101)-- . amend. Supreme Court reversed.S. over defendant's objection. Introduction The Fourth Amendment states: the right of the people to be secure in their persons. At the trial. finding that a person in a telephone booth could rely upon the protection of U. B. supported by oath or affirmation. may be constitutionally protected. This is a two-part inquiry: first. not places. The central requirement of the Fourth Amendment is one of reasonableness. and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. to introduce evidence of defendant's end of telephone conversations. 389 US 347 (1967) [Reasonable Expectation of Privacy] Defendant was convicted of transmitting wagering information by telephone in violation of a federal statute. papers. shut the door behind him. and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Const. Illinois v. the government was permitted. Const. What is a Search? Katz v. The Fourth Amendment only applies within the United States.S. and no warrants shall issue. IV analysis is whether a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.I. What a person knowingly exposes to the public. United States. even in his own home or office. The Fourth Amendment protects people. but upon probable cause. is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. One who occupied a telephone booth. The touchstone of U. which was overheard by FBI agents who had attached an electronic listening and recording device to the outside of the public telephone booth where he had placed his calls.
amend. amend. IV had not been violated. but only those expectations that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable. Because the court found that there was no reasonable or legitimate expectation of privacy in open fields. Const. Open Fields Oliver v. the court affirmed the validity of the open fields doctrine. --(Page 6 of 101)-- . 1. investigated and discovered a marijuana field a mile from petitioner's home that was surrounded by "no trespass" signs. and the societal understanding that certain areas deserve the most scrupulous protection from government invasion. IV to the people in their persons. IV. United States. The distinction between the latter and the house is as old as the common law. The Fourth Amendment does not protect the merely subjective expectation of privacy. amend. the test of legitimacy is not whether the individual chooses to conceal assertedly "private" activity. but instead whether the government's intrusion infringes upon the personal and societal values protected by U.S." No single factor determines whether an individual legitimately may claim under the Fourth Amendment that a place should be free of government intrusion not authorized by warrant. The special protection accorded by the U. papers.S. Because privacy for outdoor activities conducted in fields only extended to the area immediately surrounding the home. IV protection against unreasonable searches did not extend to intrusions into open fields.S. Const. houses. As to this second inquiry under Katz. the lower court held that petitioner's rights under U. Const.S Const. 466 US 170 (1984) Petitioner was arrested and indicted after police officers. Noting that the U. the court affirmed the introduction of the evidence in petitioner's case and reversed the suppression of evidence in respondent's case. In assessing the degree to which a search infringes upon individual privacy. without a warrant and without probable cause. the United States Supreme Court has given weight to such factors as the intention of the Framers of the Fourth Amendment. amend. Applying the open fields doctrine. the uses to which the individual has put a location. Nor are the open fields "effects" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. and effects is not extended to the open fields. the officers' actions in entering such open fields without a warrant or probable cause did not violate the Constitution.
Defendant was convicted of drug-related offenses. In contrast. Agents also knew that the barn was not being used for intimate activities of the home. The appellate court also found that the barn was within the protective ambit of the Fourth Amendment because it was within the curtilage of the residence. the court held that the barn lay outside the curtilage of the ranch house.These factors are equally relevant to determining whether the government's intrusion upon open fields without a warrant or probable cause violates reasonable expectations of privacy and is therefore a search proscribed by the Amendment. the Court since the enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic. United States v. open fields do not provide the setting for those intimate activities that the Amendment is intended to shelter from government interference or surveillance. For example. The barn did not lie within the area surrounding the house that was enclosed by a fence. The appellate court reversed defendant's conviction finding that the evidence should have been suppressed because it was seized pursuant to the unlawful warrantless entry. It is not generally true that fences or "No Trespassing" signs effectively bar the public from viewing open fields in rural areas. After obtaining a warrant. or commercial structure would not be. As a practical matter these lands usually are accessible to the public and the police in ways that a home. 480 US 294 (1987) Drug enforcement agents began investigating defendant after he purchased large quantities of chemicals used to manufacture illegal drugs. such as the cultivation of crops. --(Page 7 of 101)-- . There is no societal interest in protecting the privacy of those activities. The Amendment reflects the recognition of the Framers that certain enclaves should be free from arbitrary government interference. An individual may not legitimately demand privacy for activities conducted out of doors in fields. This rule is true to the conception of the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment. On appeal. except in the area immediately surrounding the home. The agents watched defendant place the chemicals in a barn on his ranch and observed a laboratory. the agents arrested defendant. Dunn. an office. Agents then made a warrantless entry on the property to confirm their suspicions. that occur in open fields. The barn was 50 yards from the fence surrounding the house and 60 yards from the house itself.
Although defendant's yard was within the curtilage of his home. Ciraolo. even in his own home or office. The Court stated that Fourth Amendment protection of the home had never been extended to require law enforcement officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home on public thoroughfares. Nor did the mere fact that defendant had erected a 10-foot fence around his yard preclude an officer's observations from a public vantage point where he had a right to be and which rendered activities clearly visible. --(Page 8 of 101)-- . this did not bar police observation. is not a subject of 4th amendment protection. What a person knowingly exposes to the public. The Fourth Amendment's protection accorded persons. houses. The Fourth Amendment has never been extended to require law enforcement officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home on public thoroughfares. however. Nor does the mere fact that an individual has taken measures to restrict some views of his activities preclude an officer's observations from a public vantage point where he has a right to be and which renders the activities clearly visible. and effects did not extend to the open fields. Defendant's expectation that his yard was protected from observation was unreasonable and not an expectation that society was prepared to honor. Aerial Searches California v. 476 US 207 (1986) Warrantless aerial observation of individual's fenced-in backyard held not to violate Fourth Amendment. the nature of the uses to which the area is put. 2. Curtilage questions should be resolved with particular reference to four factors: the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home. in interpreting the reach of the Fourth Amendment. 4th amendment protection of the home has never been extended to require law enforcement officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home on public thoroughfares. The distinction between a person's house and open fields is as old as the common law. That the area is within the curtilage does not itself bar all police observation. and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by. whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home. papers. The concept plays a part. The curtilage concept originated at common law to extend to the area immediately surrounding a dwelling house the same protection under the law of burglary as was afforded the house itself.
Plurality White The accused could not reasonably have expected that his greenhouse was protected from public or official observation from a helicopter which was not violating the law or Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations by flying over the greenhouse at an altitude of 400 feet. Dissent Was a "search" for which a warrant was required under the Fourth Amendment. O'Connor The relevant inquiry was not whether the helicopter was where it had a right to be under FAA regulations. Thermal Imaging of Homes Kyllo v. subject to search without a warrant. The property surveyed was within the curtilage of defendant's home and. 3. United States. what was growing in the greenhouse was subject to viewing from the air. but whether it was in the public airways at an altitude at which members of the public traveled with sufficient regularity that the accused's expectation of privacy from aerial observation was reasonable. The police then obtained a search warrant for the greenhouse and seized the marijuana. Although defendant no doubt intended and expected that his greenhouse would not be open to public inspection and took precautions to protect against ground-level observation. Defendant could not reasonably have expected the contents of his greenhouse to be immune from examination by an officer seated in an aircraft flying in navigable airspace at an altitude of 500 feet where such private and commercial flight at that altitude was routine. 476 US 227 (1986) The taking of aerial photographs of an industrial plant complex from navigable airspace is not a search prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. 533 US 27 (2001) --(Page 9 of 101)-- . looked into the greenhouse and saw marijuana. Dow Chemical v. because the sides and roof of his greenhouse were left partially open. 488 US 445 (1989) The police flew over a greenhouse located on defendant's property in a helicopter at 400 feet. because public aerial observation from that altitude of the accused's curtilage was not so commonplace that the accused's expectation of privacy in his backyard could be considered unreasonable. Riley. Florida v. therefore. Brennan. United States.
The police had aimed a thermal-imaging device at petitioner's residence after a police detective suspected that petitioner was growing marijuana. This assures preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted. scavengers. amend. Based on the thermal-imaging information.S. could have no reasonable expectation of privacy in any inculpatory items that they discarded. and other members of the public. Where the government uses a device that is not in general public use. Brennan. that constitutes a search. Greenwood. --(Page 10 of 101)-- . IV only if the respondents manifest a subjective expectation of privacy in their garbage that society accepts as objectively reasonable. dissent Was nothing more than drawing inferences from "off-the-wall" surveillance. Searches of Trash California v. for the express purpose of having strangers take it. police obtained a search warrant for the residence. the surveillance is a "search" and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant. Stevens. to explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion. Const. 4. Those who have deposited garbage in an area particularly suited for public inspection and. When the police obtain by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area. the agent's conduct did not amount to a search and was perfectly reasonable. The warrantless search and seizure of garbage bags left at the curb outside a house violates U. rather than any "through-the-wall" surveillance. 486 US 35 (1988) The arrestees claimed that they had exhibited an expectation of privacy in the trash that was searched by the police because it was in opaque bags on the street for collection at a fixed time and there was little likelihood that it would be inspected by anyone. at least where the technology in question is not in general public use. in a manner of speaking. public consumption. Dissent Scrutiny of another's trash is contrary to accepted notions of civilized behavior. children. snoops. It is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of a public street are readily accessible to animals.
5. A warrant was not required for the placement of the beeper in the can because the can was owned by the government. It travels public thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in plain view. acting without a warrant. the Court ruled that the transfer of the can from the informant to respondents was not a search or seizure because the transfer did not invade respondents' privacy. The Court held that there was neither a search nor a seizure within the contemplation of the Fourth Amendment. violated defendant's 4th amendment rights. and it was switched with a can owned by a government informant. Monitoring of the beeper led to a search of a residence. No expectation of privacy extended to the visual observation of defendant's automobile arriving on his premises after leaving a public highway. United States v. 468 US 705 (1984) Government agents. which amounted principally to the following of an automobile on public streets and highways. Moreover. Observation and Monitoring of Public Behavior United States v. which yielded illegal drugs. nor to movements of objects such as the drum of chloroform outside the cabin in the open fields. White. A person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another. violates the Fourth Amendment rights of those who have a justifiable interest in the privacy of the residence. The Court found that nothing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as science and technology afforded them in this case. A car has little capacity for escaping public scrutiny. One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is transportation and it seldom serves as one's residence or as the repository of personal effects. The monitoring of a beeper in a private residence. Knotts. 460 US 276 (1983) The issue was whether governmental surveillance conducted by means of the beeper. a location not open to visual surveillance. placed a beeper in a can of ether. 401 US 745 (1971) --(Page 11 of 101)-- . Karo. United States v.
" Thus. The Court found that petitioner did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy regarding the numbers he dialed on his phone because those numbers were automatically turned over to a third party. at the central telephone system in order to determine the identity of the numbers that petitioner. the Court concluded that installation of the pen register was not a "search" and no warrant was required. California Bankers Assn v. no different result is required if the agent instead of immediately reporting and transcribing his conversations with defendant. Congressional Change: statute requires a court order for use of a pen register. a suspect. For constitutional purposes. The Court also ruled that even if petitioner did harbor some subjective expectation that the phone numbers he dialed would remain private. Use of Dogs to Sniff for Contraband United States v. the phone company. or carries radio equipment which simultaneously transmits the conversations either to recording equipment located elsewhere or to other agents monitoring the transmitting frequency. this expectation was not one that society was prepared to recognize as "reasonable. Concededly a police agent who conceals his police connections may write down for official use his conversations with a defendant and testify concerning them. without a warrant. After the police discovered that petitioner had called the victim. 6. was dialing. Schultz Smith v Maryland. 462 US 696 (1983) [Airport] --(Page 12 of 101)-- . Place. the police installed a pen register. without a warrant authorizing his encounters with the defendant and without otherwise violating the latter's 4th amendment rights. No reasonable expectation of privacy in bank records. either simultaneously records them with electronic equipment which he is carrying on his person. they charged him with robbery. 442 US 735 (1979) After the victim of a robbery began receiving phone calls from the person who claimed to be the robber. Patriot Act: AG can use pen register on authority of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court when not concerning a US citizen or for terrorism investigations.
Moreover. a contraband item. 267 US 132 (1978) Probable cause is met if the facts and circumstances before the officer are such as to warrant a man of prudence and caution in believing that the offense has been committed. does not require opening the luggage. however. A dog sniff conducted during a concededly lawful traffic stop that reveals no information other than the location of a substance that no individual has any right to possess does not violate the Fourth Amendment. the information obtained is limited. which was located in a public place. an officer's rummaging through the contents of the luggage. 1. Sufficient Belief to Meet the Standard for Probable Cause Aguilar-Spinelli two part test Required: Was the informant credible – was it likely that he or she was tellling the truth? --(Page 13 of 101)-- . The Requirement for Probable Cause Carroll v.did not constitute a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. the manner in which information is obtained through this investigative technique is much less intrusive than a typical search. A seizure that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket to a driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that mission. despite the fact that the sniff tells the authorities something about the contents of the luggage. United States. Illinois v. Thus. generally does not implicate legitimate privacy interests. A "canine sniff" by a well-trained narcotics detection dog. as does. the sniff discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics. 543 US 405 (2005) A seizure that is lawful at its inception can violate the Fourth Amendment if its manner of execution unreasonably infringes interests protected by the United States Constitution. Caballes. to a trained canine -. C. Thus. Exposure of respondent's luggage. for example. This limited disclosure also ensures that the owner of the property is not subjected to the embarrassment and inconvenience entailed in less discriminate and more intrusive investigative methods. It does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden from public view. The use of a well-trained narcotics-detection dog--one that does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden from public view--during a lawful traffic stop.
by a strong showing as to the other. One simple rule will not cover every situation. Instead. Informants' tips doubtless come in many shapes and sizes from many different types of persons. and not a prima facie showing. It imports a seizure made under circumstances which warrant suspicion. reduced to a neat set of legal rules. Finely tuned standards such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence. in determining the overall reliability of a tip. Rather. Gates. 540 US 366 (2003) --(Page 14 of 101)-- . 462 US 213 (1983) An informant's "veracity. however. of criminal activity is the standard of probable cause. it is clear that only the probability.turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts -. numerically precise degree of certainty corresponding to "probable cause" may not be helpful. or by some other indicia of reliability. Probable cause is a fluid concept -. may vary greatly in their value and reliability. have no place in the magistrate's decision.the informant's "veracity" or "reliability" and his "basis of knowledge. or even usefully. should not be understood as entirely separate and independent requirements to be rigidly exacted in every case. Was it likely that the informant had knowledge? Replaced by Gates totality test Illinois v. Maryland v. The quanta of proof appropriate in ordinary judicial proceedings are inapplicable to the decision to issue a warrant. These elements." There are persuasive arguments against according these two elements such independent status. While an effort to fix some general. practical question whether there is "probable cause" to believe that contraband or evidence is located in a particular place. The term "probable cause. useful in formal trials." and "basis of knowledge" are all highly relevant in determining the value of his report. they are better understood as relevant considerations in the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis that traditionally has guided probable-cause determinations: a deficiency in one may be compensated for.not readily. Informants' tips. they should be understood simply as closely intertwined issues that may usefully illuminate the commonsense. The "two-pronged test" directs analysis into two largely independent channels -. like all other clues and evidence coming to a policeman on the scene. Rigid legal rules are ill-suited to an area of such diversity. Pringle." "reliability." according to its usual acceptation. means less than evidence which would justify condemnation.
In addition to the driver and a back set passenger, defendant was a front seat passenger in a vehicle which was stopped for speeding. Upon a consensual search, a significant amount of cash was found in the glove compartment of the vehicle and drugs were discovered between the back-seat armrest and the back seat. Although defendant subsequently admitted that the drugs and cash were his, none of the vehicle occupants admitted to ownership of the drugs at the time of the search, and all three occupants were arrested. It was an entirely reasonable inference that any or all three of the occupants had knowledge of, and exercised dominion and control over, the drugs, and thus a reasonable officer could conclude that there was probable cause to believe defendant committed the crime of possession of drugs, either solely or jointly. It was also reasonable for the officer to infer a common enterprise among the three occupants, in view of the likelihood of drug dealing in which an innocent party was unlikely to be involved. The probable-cause standard is a practical, nontechnical conception that deals with the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. The substance of all the definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt, and the belief of guilt must be particularized with respect to the person to be searched or seized. The term "probable cause," according to its usual acceptation, means less than evidence which would justify condemnation. It imports a seizure made under circumstances which warrant suspicion. To determine whether an officer had probable cause to arrest an individual, a court examines the events leading up to the arrest, and then decides whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to probable cause.
An Objective or Subjective Standard?
Whren v. United States, 517 US 806 (1996)
--(Page 15 of 101)--
Plainclothes vice-squad officers were patrolling "high drug area" in an unmarked car. An officer who had observed traffic violations approached a vehicle that was occupied by defendants. When the officer approached defendant driver's car window, he observed two large plastic bags of what appeared to be crack cocaine in defendant passenger's hands. Defendants were arrested and illegal drugs were retrieved from the vehicle. On appeal, defendants accepted that the officer had probable cause to believe the traffic code was violated, but argued that the test for traffic stops should have been whether a police officer, who acted reasonably, would have made stop for the given reason. An automobile stop is thus subject to the constitutional imperative that it not be "unreasonable" under the circumstances. As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred. The constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops does not depend on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved. Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis. Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 US 146 (2004) An arresting officer's state of mind (except for the facts that he knows) is irrelevant to the existence of probable cause. That is to say, his subjective reason for making the arrest need not be the criminal offense as to which the known facts provide probable cause. The fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.
The Warrant Requirement
The 4th Amendment provides that: “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched. And the persons or things to be seized.”
1. What Information Must Be Included in the Application for a Warrant?
Must be supported by oath or affirmation, Particularly describing the place to be searched, The persons or things to be seized. The warrant will specify the time period for its execution. Must be issued by a neutral and detached magistrate. --(Page 16 of 101)--
What Form Must the Warrant Take?
Andresen v. Maryland, 427 US 463 (1976) Petitioner, as the closing attorney, was convicted of false pretenses for defrauding a purchaser of property. Investigators obtained a search warrant to search petitioner's offices for evidence of the crime. The court also rejected petitioner's argument that the searches were unreasonable because they were based on general warrants. The warrants referred only to the crime of false pretenses and were sufficiently specific. State search warrants issued for searches of the business offices of an individual suspected of having committed the state crime of false pretenses in connection with his real estate activities involving a certain "Lot 13T" are not rendered fatally general by the addition, in each warrant, to the exhaustive list of particularly described documents, of the phrase "together with other fruits, instrumentalities and evidence of crime at this [time] unknown," where the quoted phrase was not a separate sentence, but appeared in each warrant at the end of a sentence containing a lengthy list of specified and particular items to be seized, all pertaining to "Lot 13T," so that in context the term "crime" in the warrants referred only to the crime of false pretenses with respect to the sale of such lot. General warrants, which pose the problem not of intrusion per se, but of a general, exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings, are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, which addresses the problem posed by a general warrant by requiring a particular description of the things to be seized; such requirement makes general searches impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another, leaving nothing to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant as to what is to be taken. A specific list of documents to be seized that is contained in state search warrants issued for searches of the business offices of an individual suspected of having committed the state crime of false pretenses in connection with his real estate activities regarding a certain subdivision does not constitute an impermissible "general" warrant, where the investigation was one of a complex real estate scheme whose existence could be proved only by piecing together many bits of evidence; the complexity of an illegal scheme may not be used as a shield to avoid detection when the state has demonstrated probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and probable cause to believe that evidence of this crime is in the suspect's possession.
--(Page 17 of 101)--
The fact that the application adequately described the things to be seized did not save the warrant from its facial invalidity because the warrant did not incorporate other documents by reference and neither the affidavit nor the application accompanied the warrant. and such documents are properly admitted into evidence in the individual's state prosecution for the crime of false pretenses (a crime for which the state must prove intent to defraud beyond a reasonable doubt). The warrant was plainly invalid as it provided no description of the type of evidence sought. and evidence of crime at the time unknown. does not violate the rule that when police seize mere evidence probable cause must be examined in terms of cause to believe that the evidence sought will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction. and if so. The magistrate's authorization of the search did not render it constitutional because the warrant's obvious deficiency required the court to consider the search warrantless and presumptively unreasonable. --(Page 18 of 101)-- . whether the federal agent was entitled to qualified immunity. Groh v. a warrantless search was presumptively unconstitutional. The seizure of documents pertaining to a lot other than "Lot 13T" by trained special investigators during searches of an individual's business offices pursuant to state warrants. relying on an affidavit that particularly described the items in question. given that a magistrate. The federal agent was not entitled to qualified immunity because no reasonable officer could have believed that a warrant that plainly did not comply with the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirements was valid nor been unaware of the basic rule that. absent consent or exigency. based upon the individual's misrepresentations concerning Lot 13T to the purchaser of such lot. Ramirez. 540 US 551 (2004) The issues were whether the search violated the Fourth Amendment. which warrants listed specified items pertaining to Lot 13T to be seized together with other fruits. instrumentalities. found probable cause to conduct the search. where the trained special investigators reasonably could have believed that the evidence specifically dealing with another lot could be used to show the individual's intent with respect to the Lot 13T transaction.
Thus. says something about the objects of the search. most United States Courts of Appeals hold that a court may construe a warrant with reference to a supporting application or affidavit if the warrant uses appropriate words of incorporation. 547 US 90 (2006) An anticipatory warrant is a warrant based upon an affidavit showing probable cause that at some future time (but not presently) certain evidence of crime will be located at a specified place. United States v. not in the supporting documents. Indeed. but the contents of that document are neither known to the person whose home is being searched nor available for her inspection. The Fourth Amendment by its terms requires particularity in the warrant. Because the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion stands at the very core of the Fourth Amendment. Thomas Dissent The search did not violate the Fourth Amendment. because. The Fourth Amendment does not forbid a warrant from cross-referencing other documents. a warrantless entry to search for weapons or contraband is unconstitutional even when a felony has been committed and there is probable cause to believe that incriminating evidence will be found within. Most anticipatory warrants subject their execution to some condition precedent other than the mere passage of time--a socalled "triggering condition. Grubbs. and if the supporting document accompanies the warrant. despite the defective warrant." --(Page 19 of 101)-- . absent exigent circumstances. the search was not unreasonable. And for good reason: The presence of a search warrant serves a high function and that high function is not necessarily vindicated when some other document. judicial precedent firmly establishes the basic principle of Fourth Amendment law that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable. somewhere. The fact that a warrant application adequately describes the things to be seized does not save the warrant from its facial invalidity.
that where the anticipatory warrant places a condition (other than the mere passage of time) upon its execution. Moreover. the first of these determinations goes not merely to what will probably be found if the condition is met. 544 US 93 (2005) The individual's detention during the search of the premises was plainly permissible because a warrant existed to search a particular residence and the individual was an occupant of that residence at the time of the search. and thus that a proper object of seizure will be on the described premises. How May Police Treat Those Who Are present When a Warrant Is Being Executed? Muehler v. Mena. It should be noted. The two to three hour detention in handcuffs was not unreasonable given that the case involved the detention of four people by two officers during a search of a gang house for dangerous weapons. evidence of a crime. an anticipatory warrant could be issued for every house in the country. 3. The officers' use of handcuffs to effectuate the detention was reasonable where the warrant authorized a search for weapons and a wanted gang member resided on the premises. or a fugitive will be on the described premises (3) when the warrant is executed. Thus. (If that were the extent of the probability determination. They require the magistrate to determine (1) that it is now probable that (2) contraband. What are the Requirement in Executing Warrants? a. the need to detain multiple occupants of the premises made the use of handcuffs all the more reasonable. authorizing search and seizure if contraband should be delivered--though for any single location there is no likelihood that contraband will be delivered.) Rather. Anticipatory warrants are no different in principle from ordinary warrants. however. --(Page 20 of 101)-- . The officers' questioning of the individual about her immigration status was not an independent Fourth Amendment violation because mere police questioning was not a seizure. the use of handcuffs minimized the inherent safety risk involved in the search. the probability determination for a conditioned anticipatory warrant looks also to the likelihood that the condition will occur.
Do Police have to Knock and Announce? Wilson v. b. Although a search or seizure of a dwelling might be constitutionally defective if police officers enter without prior announcement. and (3) facilitating the orderly completion of the search. and remanded the case to determine whether the unannounced entry was reasonable under the circumstances. there are three legitimate law enforcement interests that provide substantial justification for detaining an occupant: (1) preventing flight in the event that incriminating evidence is found. 520 US 385 (1997) --(Page 21 of 101)-- . Richards v. Officers executing a search warrant for contraband have the authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted. The detention of an occupant is surely less intrusive than the search itself and the presence of a warrant assures that a neutral magistrate has determined that probable cause exists to search the home. Such detentions are appropriate because the character of the additional intrusion caused by detention is slight and because the justifications for detention are substantial. (2) minimizing the risk of harm to the officers. Supreme Court held that the common-law knock and announce principle formed a part of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry and a search or seizure of a dwelling might be constitutionally defective if police officers entered without prior announcement. law enforcement interests may also establish the reasonableness of an unannounced entry. 514 US 927 (1995) Defendant was convicted of delivery and possession of drugs after police officers. Against this incremental intrusion. as detainees' self-interest may induce them to open locked doors or locked containers to avoid the use of force. in executing a search warrant. Wisconsin. Arkansas. entered through an unlocked screen door without first knocking or announcing their presence.
or had a duty to discover and to disclose. petitioner sought to exclude evidence on the ground that the officers had failed to knock-and-announce. The validity of the warrant was assessed on the basis of the information that the officers disclosed. However. but the police should be required to make it whenever the reasonableness of a "no-knock" entry is challenged. --(Page 22 of 101)-- . but found that the blanket exception to the knock-and-announce requirement for felony drug investigations was unconstitutional. Before the officers executing the warrant became aware that they were in a separate apartment occupied by defendant. to the issuing magistrate. for example. 480 US 79 (1987) The evidence had been seized in a search conducted pursuant a warrant that specified a location of "the premises known as 2036 Park Avenue third floor apartment." The police reasonably believed that there was only one apartment on the premises described in the warrant. they had discovered the contraband that provided the basis for defendant's conviction. Garrison. Police executed a search warrant for petitioner's hotel room seeking evidence of the felonious crime of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance They did not knock and announce prior to their entry and drugs were seized. The question presented to the Court was whether the seizure of the contraband was prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. would be dangerous or futile. under the particular circumstances. This showing is not high. The court affirmed the judgment against petitioner because it found the officers' decision not to knock-and-announce was reasonable under the circumstances of this case. In order to justify a "no-knock" entry. The officers' execution of the warrant reasonably included the entire third floor. there were two apartments on the third floor. c. What if There Are Unforeseen Circumstances or Mistakes While Executing a Warrant? Maryland v. or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by. the police must have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence. and their conduct was consistent with a reasonable effort to ascertain and identify the place intended to be searched within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. At trial. allowing the destruction of evidence. The Court held that the warrant was valid when it was issued and the manner in which it was executed was reasonable.
Valid warrants will issue to search the innocent. Officers executing search warrants on occasion enter a house when residents are engaged in private activity. since the officers' failure to realize the overbreadth of the warrant was objectively understandable and reasonable. When officers execute a valid warrant and act in a reasonable manner to protect themselves from harm. and the resulting frustration. although they were not the same race as the suspects being sought under the warrant. Supreme Court held that the execution of the properly issued warrant by the deputies was not unreasonable. satisfying the Fourth Amendment. Further. and since they discontinued the search as soon as they discovered their mistake. 127 S. The U. Regardless of the difference in race. E. and humiliation may be real. in order to insure that no weapons were concealed in the bedding or elsewhere. Los Angeles County v. 395 US 752 (1969) --(Page 23 of 101)-- . however. The warrant was executed in a reasonable manner. California. embarrassment.S. and innocent people unfortunately bear the cost. and the deputies were justified in ordering the residents from the bed. Rettele. Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement Searches Incident to Arrest Chimel v. and refusing to allow them to dress for a brief period. The Fourth Amendment allows warrants to issue on probable cause.Ct. 1989 (2007) The residents recently purchased the home and asserted that. one of the suspects was reported to be armed. when the residents were ordered from their bed the deputies had no way of knowing whether the suspects were elsewhere in the home. a standard well short of absolute certainty. the deputies ordered the residents to get out of their bed and remain unclothed until the deputies determined that the suspects were not present. the Fourth Amendment is not violated. 1.
police arrested him. may be made only under the authority of a search warrant. When petitioner returned from work. They looked through the entire house and had petitioner's wife open drawers and physically remove contents of the drawers so they could view items. in the absence of well-recognized exceptions. and the arrest itself frustrated. When an arrest is made. among other things." It found that there was no justification for searching any room other than that in which the arrest occurred. Police came to petitioner's home with an arrest warrant to arrest him for an alleged burglary. Police then asked for permission to "look around. for searching through all the desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas in that room itself. In addition. the court held that the search was "unreasonable. But there must be something more in the way of necessity than merely a lawful arrest. it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape." Even though petitioner objected. Police seized a number of coins and medals. Reversing the appeals court's affirmance of conviction. it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. It grows out of the inherent necessities of the situation at the time of the arrest. 414 US 218 (1973) --(Page 24 of 101)-- . Such searches. Robertson. A search or seizure without a warrant as an incident to a lawful arrest has always been considered to be a strictly limited right. for that matter. that respondent State later used to convict petitioner of burglary. United States v. There is no justification for routinely searching any room other than that in which an arrest occurs or. the officer's safety might well be endangered. and the court overturned the conviction. the officers conducted a search. Extending the search to the entire house was not proper. Even searching through desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas of the room where the arrest occurred was not appropriate. Otherwise.
that intrusion being lawful. There was no need to discover and preserve evidence because once defendant was stopped and issued a citation all the evidence necessary to prosecute had been obtained. though far from inconsiderable. It is intended to vindicate society's interest in having its laws obeyed. and we hold that in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of U. by police officer who issued speeding citation--rather than making arrest.S. The officer felt there was something in the package that was not cigarettes. while based upon the need to disarm and to discover evidence. The officer then searched defendant and felt an object under defendant's coat. 2. The Court reversed the appellate court's decision and found the search permissible. The officer reached into the coat and pulled out a cigarette package. 525 US 113 (1998) Full search of automobile. The officer had probable cause to arrest defendant for driving after his license had been revoked. intrusion upon the sanctity of the person. The threat to safety from issuing a traffic citation was significantly less than in the case of a custodial arrest. on the other hand. An arrest is a wholly different kind of intrusion upon individual freedom from a limited search for weapons. Knowles v. amend. as authorized by Iowa law. does not depend on what a court may later decide was the probability in a particular arrest situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon the person of the suspect. Hayden. An arrest is the initial stage of a criminal prosecution. and the interests each is designed to serve are likewise quite different. It is the fact of the lawful arrest. as authorized by Iowa law--held to violate Federal Constitution's Fourth Amendment. and it is inevitably accompanied by future interference with the individual's freedom of movement. The authority to search the person incident to a lawful custodial arrest. but is also a reasonable search under that amendment. The officer opened the package and found what was later determined to be heroin. which establishes the authority to search. A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the 4th amendment. a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification. Searches Made in Hot Pursuit Warden v. whether or not trial or conviction ultimately follows. 387 US 294 (1967) --(Page 25 of 101)-- . Defendant was pulled over by a police officer. IV. Const. constitutes a brief. The protective search for weapons. Iowa.
his failure to state explicitly that he was searching for weapons. armed. The Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to delay in the course of an investigation if to do so would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others. 403 US 443 (1971) --(Page 26 of 101)-- . New York. New Hampshire. Payton v. is invalid where the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative. where. at the least. 445 US 573 (1980) The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibited the police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home in order to make a routine felony arrest. although according to his testimony he was searching for the man or the money. in the absence of a specific question to that effect. even when it was accomplished under statutory authority and when probable cause was present. or for his weapons. he knew that the robber was armed and he did not know that some weapons had been found at the time he opened the machine. Even if it is assumed that exigent circumstances made lawful a search without warrant only for one suspected of armed robbery. absent exigent circumstances. be as broad as may reasonably be necessary to prevent the dangers that the suspect at large in the house may resist or escape. but also an invasion of the sanctity of the home. it cannot be said that the officer who found the suspect's clothing in a washing machine was not searching for weapons. cannot be accorded controlling weight. Plain View Coolidge v. and that the suspect had entered the house less than 5 minutes before they reached it. The exigencies of a situation may make imperative a warrantless entry into premises and a subsequent search. The Court held that to be arrested in the home involved not only the invasion attendant to all arrests. they acted reasonably when they entered the house and began to search for a man of the description they had been given and for weapons which he had used in the robbery or might use against them. 3. as where the police were informed that an armed robbery had taken place. must. Neither the entry without warrant to search for a robber. The permissible scope of search for a suspected felon. which was too substantial. within a house into which he had run only minutes before the police arrived. nor the search for him without warrant.
Finally. but also to believe that the weapons and handguns had been used in the crime he was investigating. and the items searched for were not contraband. The Supreme Court affirmed. The search did not come within the automobile exception to the warrant requirement because the automobile was regularly parked in the driveway and was not fleeing. --(Page 27 of 101)-- . And an object that comes into view during a search incident to arrest that is appropriately limited in scope under existing law may be seized without a warrant. Horton v. petitioner sought certiorari. California. The search was authorized by the warrant. the police may seize evidence in plain view without a warrant. not only to obtain a warrant to search for the stolen property. it was not a necessary condition. the Court found that the car was not an instrumentality of the crime that could be seized in plain view because the police knew in advance of the car's location and had ample opportunity to obtain a valid warrant. the seizure is also legitimate. it was immediately apparent to the police officer that they constituted incriminating evidence. Finally. The Court rejected the contention that the search of the automobile was incident to a valid arrest because petitioner was arrested in his house and the car was outside some distance away. Under certain circumstances. Two additional conditions must be satisfied to justify the warrantless seizure. The officer had probable cause. though inadvertence was a characteristic of most legitimate plain view seizures. but by one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. the plain view doctrine has been applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused. When the weapons were discovered. Where the initial intrusion that brings the police within plain view of such an article is supported. After an appellate court affirmed the conviction. but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. so that the items seized from petitioner's home were discovered during a lawful search authorized by a valid warrant. The scope of the search was not enlarged in the slightest by the omission of any reference to the weapons in the warrant. and the seizure was authorized by the plain view doctrine. The Court concluded that. 496 US 128 (1990) Petitioner was convicted of the armed robbery of the treasurer of a coin club following denial of his motion to suppress weapons seized by police from his residence. not by a warrant. Thus the police may inadvertently come across evidence while in hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect.
two sets of expensive stereo equipment were noticed by one of the officers. Such a search was not "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment because it was not sustainable under the "plain view" doctrine. If. but he or she must also have a lawful right of access to the object itself. they may seize it without a warrant.i. First. 480 US 321 (1987) When law enforcement officers entered defendant's apartment under exigent circumstances after a bullet was fired into the apartment below. not only must the item be in plain view. during a stop and frisk. Hicks. Dickerson. not only must the officer be lawfully located in a place from which the object can be plainly seen. The officer's moving of the equipment constituted a "search" separate and apart from the search for the shooter. if its incriminating character is immediately apparent.the plain-view doctrine cannot justify its seizure. Under the plain-view doctrine. 508 US 366 (1993) Respondent was arrested and charged with possession of a controlled substance after a police officer. He thought these anomalous in the context of the squalor of the apartment. and moved some of the components in order to read and record their serial numbers. Minnesota v. The court stated that the state supreme court was correct in holding that the police officer in this case overstepped the bounds of the "strictly circumscribed" search for weapons allowed under Terry. sliding. if its incriminating character is not immediately apparent -. Arizona v. e. however. The state supreme court affirmed the state court of appeals' decision reversing the trial court. and otherwise manipulating the contents of respondent's pocket which the officer already knew contained no weapon. if police are lawfully in a position from which they view an object. the officer determined that the lump was contraband only after squeezing. the police lack probable cause to believe that an object in plain view is contraband without conducting some further search of the object -. Second. Respondent proceeded to trial and was found guilty. and if the officers have a lawful right of access to the object. The state supreme court found that based on the record before it.. retrieved a lump of cocaine from respondent's pocket. The state supreme court held that the stop and the frisk of respondent was valid under Terry. but that the seizure of the cocaine was unconstitutional. and weapons that was the lawful objective of his entry. --(Page 28 of 101)-- . The trial court denied respondent's motion to suppress the cocaine. its incriminating character must also be immediately apparent. victims. Probable cause is required in order to invoke the "plain view" doctrine. The court affirmed.
if not actually moving. which was parked on a public lot. The Exception and Its Rationale California v. law enforcement officials observed defendant and a youth enter the mobile home. the vehicle is obviously readily mobile by the turn of an ignition key. Chambers v. there is a reduced expectation of privacy stemming from its use as a licensed motor vehicle subject to a range of police regulation inapplicable to a fixed dwelling. 471 US 386 (1985) After receiving information that the exchange of marijuana for sex was taking place at defendant's motor home. the ready mobility of the automobile justifies a lesser degree of protection of those interests. holding that defendant's motor home clearly fell within the vehicle exception to the warrant requirement because it was readily mobile and was situated in a way or place that objectively indicated that it was being used as a vehicle. Maroney. one agent entered the motor home and observed marijuana. Besides the element of mobility. The mobility of automobiles creates circumstances of such exigency that. Carney. When a vehicle is being used on the highways. Without a warrant or consent. Defendant was convicted for possession of marijuana for sale. as a practical necessity. rigorous enforcement of the warrant requirement is impossible. The United States Supreme Court reversed. The youth later stated that he received marijuana in exchange for sexual contacts with defendant. First. less rigorous warrant requirements govern because the expectation of privacy with respect to one's automobile is significantly less than that relating to one's home or office. --(Page 29 of 101)-- . Second. 399 US 42 (1970) Automobiles and other conveyances may be searched without a warrant in circumstances that would not justify the search without a warrant of a house or an office.temporary or otherwise -. or if it is readily capable of such use and is found stationary in a place not regularly used for residential purposes -.the two justifications for the vehicle exception come into play. provided that there is probable cause to believe that the car contains articles that the officers are entitled to seize.4. The Automobile Exception a. The privacy interests in an automobile are constitutionally protected. however.
and found marijuana. and the privacy interests in a car's trunk or glove compartment may be no less than those in a movable container. Rather. search the passenger compartment of that automobile. The scope of a warrantless search of an automobile is not defined by the nature of the container in which the contraband is secreted. he may. the occupants are alerted. The same probable cause to believe that a container held drugs allowed the police to arrest the person transporting the container and search it. opened the trunk. Searches of Containers in Automobiles California v. Hence an immediate search is constitutionally permissible. 500 US 565 (1991) Defendant placed a bag in the trunk of a car. The police could search containers found in an automobile without a warrant if their search was supported by probable cause. The Court held that the Fourth Amendment did not require the police to obtain a warrant to open the sack in a movable vehicle simply because they lacked probable cause to search the entire car. Acevedo. --(Page 30 of 101)-- . it is defined by the object of the search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be found. A search warrant is unnecessary where there is probable cause to search an automobile stopped on the highway. It follows from this conclusion that the police may also examine the contents of any containers found within the passenger compartment. Police officers stopped him. When a policeman makes a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile. and the car's contents may never be found again if a warrant must be obtained. the car is movable. The Fourth Amendment did not compel separate treatment for an automobile search that extended only to a container within the vehicle. Probable cause to believe that a container placed in the trunk of a taxi contains contraband or evidence does not justify a search of the entire cab. The police had probable cause to believe that the paper bag in the car's trunk contained marijuana and probable cause allowed a warrantless search of the paper bag. The expectation of privacy in one's vehicle is equal to one's expectation of privacy in a container. as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest. b. A warrantless search of an automobile can include a search of a container or package found inside the car when such a search is supported by probable cause.
were justifiably seized because of the exigencies of the situation. Thus. He therefore required the occupants to get out of the vehicle and proceeded to search them. When a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile. 129 S. amend. He opened the envelope and found that it contained marihuana. amend. since the justification for the search is not that the arrestee has no privacy interest in the container. bags. the search did not violate the safeguards of U.Ct. for if the passenger compartment is within reach of the arrestee. police officers searched his car and discovered cocaine in the pocket of a jacket on the backseat. the trial court denied his motion to suppress the items seized in the search of the vehicle. Arizona v. The Court determined that the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement did not justify the search because --(Page 31 of 101)-- . be searched whether it is open or closed. he may.S. search the passenger compartment of that automobile. and locked in the back of a patrol car. It thus includes closed or open glove compartments. handcuffed. Belton. Const. The items seized in the warrantless search of the vehicle's passenger compartment. of course. the officer smelled marihuana smoke and saw an envelope on the car's floor that was marked with a name for marihuana. XIV. He also searched defendant's jacket in the vehicle and found cocaine. In defendant's subsequent drug prosecution. incident to defendant's lawful custodial arrest. IV and U. as well as luggage. 1710 (2009) After respondent was arrested for driving with a suspended license. but that the lawful custodial arrest justifies the infringement of any privacy interest the arrestee may have.S. consoles. 453 US 454 (1991) [Replaced by Gant] Defendant was a passenger in an automobile that sped by a police officer at a fast rate. clothing. as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest. Searches Incident to Arrest New York v. Gant. Upon stopping the car. The police may also examine the contents of any containers found within the passenger compartment. Const. The court's holding encompasses only the interior of the passenger compartment of an automobile and does not encompass the trunk. boxes. or other receptacles located anywhere within the passenger compartment. and the like.c. "Container" denotes any object capable of holding another object. so also will containers in it be within his reach. Such a container may.
Also. Police may search incident to arrest only the space within an arrestee's "immediate control. Circumstances unique to the automobile context justify a search incident to arrest when it is reasonable to believe that evidence of the offense of arrest might be found in the vehicle. all of whom had been handcuffed and secured in separate patrol cars before the officers searched respondent's car. While an arrestee's status as a recent occupant may turn on his temporal or spatial relationship to the car at the time of the arrest and search. Opperman. an offense for which police could not expect to find evidence in the passenger compartment of his car. 541 US 615 (2004) Police are allowed to search the passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to a lawful custodial arrest of both occupants and recent occupants. the doctrine of stare decisis did not require adherence to a broad reading of Belton. 428 US 364 (1976) --(Page 32 of 101)-- ." meaning the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. Thornton v. Accordingly. and (2) police could not reasonably have believed that evidence of the offense for which respondent was arrested might have been found in the car since he was arrested for driving with a suspended license. the safety and evidentiary interests that supported the search in Belton simply were not present in the instant case. The safety and evidentiary justifications underlying Chimel's reaching-distance rule determine Belton's scope. Belton does not authorize a vehicle search incident to a recent occupant's arrest after the arrestee has been secured and cannot access the interior of the vehicle. it certainly does not turn on whether he was inside or outside the car at the moment that the officer first initiated contact with him The authority for the vehicle search was not limited to arrests of persons actually occupying vehicles at the time of initial contacts with officers. 5. Inventory Searches South Dakota v. United States.(1) police could not reasonably have believed that respondent could have accessed his car at the time of the search since the five officers outnumbered the three arrestees. since the same interests in the safety of the officer and preservation of evidence applied to both occupants and recent occupants of a vehicle.
S. Narcotics were found in the bag and defendant was subsequently charged with violating the state's controlled substances statute. local police departments generally follow a routine practice of securing and inventorying the automobiles' contents. he removed cigarettes from the shoulder bag he was carrying and then placed it on the counter in the station. Specifically. The court reasoned that the owner.S. Police frequently attempt to determine whether a vehicle has been stolen and thereafter abandoned. IV. the judgment was reversed and remanded on the basis that the police were indisputably engaged in a caretaking search and such was not unreasonable. As part of a routine booking procedure. In such circumstances. The court concluded that in following standard police procedures the conduct of the police was not unreasonable under U. a majority of the Court held that the search was not invalid under the Fourth Amendment. On certiorari. the search was not unreasonable. Const. The practice has been viewed as essential to respond to incidents of theft or vandalism. IV when they conducted a routine inventory search of an automobile lawfully impounded by police. the state trial court suppressed the drugs and that judgment was affirmed on appeal. When vehicles are impounded. the Court held that because the search was conducted as a part of a routine administrative procedure that was incident to defendant's arrest and incarceration. The procedures developed in response to three distinct needs: the protection of the owner's property while it remains in police custody. Const. and the protection of the police from potential danger. 462 US 640 (1983) Defendant was arrested for disturbing the peace. an officer emptied and inventoried the contents of the bag. The court held that there was no suggestion whatever that the standard procedure was a pretext concealing an investigatory police motive. Further. the inventory itself was prompted by the presence in plain view of a number of valuables inside the car. On appeal. The Court reasoned that such --(Page 33 of 101)-- . Illinois v. State appealed the judgment that held that local police violated U. amend. having left his car illegally parked for an extended period and thus subject to impoundment. When he arrived at the police station. contending that the search and seizure was not unreasonable. was not present to make other arrangements for the safekeeping of his belongings. the police could search any container in defendant's possession. On defendant's motion. amend. Lafayette. the protection of the police against claims or disputes over lost or stolen property.
and reassemble a vehicle's fuel tank. as opposed to a more "intrusive" search of a person.S. The Court contrasted the level of intrusion at a checkpoint stop with that of a roving patrol and also cited the relatively low expectation of privacy in an automobile. had no place in border searches of vehicles. The Supreme Court found that complex balancing tests to determine what was a "routine" search of a vehicle. The Court held that the operation of fixed checkpoints need not be authorized in advance by warrant. Searches made at the border. 428 US 543 (1976) The Court granted certiorari in consolidated cases arising from prosecutions for illegal transportation of aliens. The United States' authority to conduct suspicionless inspections at the border included the authority to remove. United States v. are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border. in order to resolve a conflict among the lower courts regarding the constitutionality of the United States use of permanent checkpoints away from borders. while the intrusion on U. The Court affirmed one respondent's conviction and reversed and remanded the remaining cases with directions to affirm the conviction of another respondent. disassemble. and stops and questioning could be made in the absence of any individualized suspicion at reasonably located checkpoints. IV interests was limited. 541 US 149 (2004) The appellate court held that the Fourth Amendment forbade the fuel tank search absent reasonable suspicion. pursuant to the longstanding right of the sovereign to protect itself by stopping and examining persons and property crossing into the United States. Requiring reasonable suspicion would be impractical because the flow of traffic was too heavy to allow a particularized study enabling a given car to be identified as a possible carrier of illegal aliens. Searches made at the border were reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occurred at the border. Border Crossing and Checkpoints United States v. amend.a search was supported by the State's interest in safeguarding defendant and his property as well avoiding possible claims of theft by the police. Flores-Montano. Ramsey. The United States' interest in preventing the entry of unwanted persons and effects is at its zenith at the international border. The Court employed a balancing test and said that the need to make routine checkpoint stops was great. Martinez-Fuerte. 431 US 606 (1977) --(Page 34 of 101)-- . United States v. Const. 6.
Defendant was given the opportunity to undergo an x-ray. Key evidence against them was obtained when a customs officer searched international mail intended for respondents.S. the court reversed the judgment. Montoya-Hernandez. Sitz. and that the "reasonable cause" standard of 482 satisfied the Fourth Amendment. Customs inspectors detained Defendant upon her arrival based upon a suspicion that she was smuggling drugs. and was not based upon the existence of "exigent circumstances. and was satisfied where the officer. officials at the border must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person of alimentary canal smuggling. the length of time defendant was detained was reasonable. became suspicious of a number of similar looking letters originating from Thailand that contained more than letter paper.S. Under the reasonable suspicion standard. Holding that 19 U.C. Inspectors detained defendant for at least 16 hours before defendant passed balloons filled with cocaine from her alimentary canal. 7. 496 US 444 (1990) --(Page 35 of 101)-- . Inspectors sought a search warrant after several hours. based on experience. The court held that a border search was an exception to the warrant requirement. Checkpoints Michigan Dept of State Police v. 482 authorized the search of letters." United States v.The court held that the standard to be applied at the border was a reasonable suspicion. The court reversed the appellate court and upheld defendant's conviction. Based on the facts of this case. Defendants were convicted of possession of narcotics. 473 US 531 (1985) Defendant entered the United States at an airport. The court held that the 482 "reasonable cause" standard was less stringent than the Fourth Amendment "probable cause" standard.
and the level of intrusion on an individual's privacy caused by the checkpoints. and there must be some governmental need beyond the normal need before a balancing analysis was appropriate. the court held that such stops were reasonable considering the increasing number of alcohol-related deaths and mutilation on the nation's roads. However. balancing the state's grave and legitimate interest in curbing drunk driving. 531 US 32 (2000) Petitioner city operated vehicle checkpoints to interdict unlawful drugs. Edmond. The officer looked for signs of impairment and conducted an open-view examination of the vehicle from the outside. Respondents argued that the analysis had to proceed from a basis of probable cause or reasonable suspicion. --(Page 36 of 101)-- . the stops could only be justified by some quantum of individualized suspicion. challenged the constitutionality. Const. A narcotics-detection dog walked around the outside of each stopped vehicle. The three prong test for determining the constitutionality of a sobriety checkpoint plan involved balancing the state's interest in preventing accidents caused by drunk drivers. IV because the primary purpose of the narcotics checkpoint program was to uncover evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing. amend. and respondents. the checkpoints were generally effective. all licensed drivers. Petitioners set up programs for sobriety checkpoints. On review the court found that a three prong test was appropriate. The State program was consistent with the Fourth Amendment and the balance of the State's interest in preventing drunken driving and the degree of intrusion upon individual motorists who were briefly stopped weighed in favor of the State program. Because the authorities pursued primarily general crime control purposes at the checkpoints. The court found that a seizure occurred when a vehicle was stopped at a sobriety checkpoint. At each checkpoint location.S. Pursuant to written directives. an officer advised the driver that he or she was being stopped at a drug checkpoint and asked the driver to produce a license and registration. City of Indianapolis v. the effectiveness of sobriety checkpoints in achieving that goal. The checkpoints violated U. the police stopped a predetermined number of vehicles. and the subjective intrusion on individual liberties was not substantial.
the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning. United States v. The Court disagreed that proof of knowledge of the right to refuse consent was a necessary prerequisite to demonstrating "voluntary" consent. 8. Rather. and the use of physical punishment such as the deprivation of food or sleep. Bustamonte. the court must consider the nature of the interests threatened and their connection to the particular law enforcement practices at issue. 412 US 218 (1973) Respondent was brought to trial on a charge of possessing a check with intent to defraud. which the Court adhered to. 536 US 194 (2002) --(Page 37 of 101)-- . the court assesses the totality of all the surrounding circumstances--both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation. Respondent moved to suppress the introduction of certain material as evidence against him on the ground that the material had been acquired through a warrantless search and seizure that were unconstitutional. In determining whether individualized suspicion is required to accompany a seizure. In determining whether a defendant's will was over-borne in a particular case. the lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights. The court of appeals vacated an order that denied the petition for habeas corpus relief on grounds that there was insufficient proof that respondent knew that he had a right to refuse to give his consent to the search. Some of the factors taken into account include the youth of the accused. The traditional definition of voluntariness. The traditional definition of "voluntariness" does not require proof of knowledge of a right to refuse as the sine qua non of an effective consent to a search. Consent Schneckloth v. Drayton. The United States Supreme Court is particularly reluctant to recognize exceptions to the general rule of individualized suspicion where governmental authorities primarily pursue their general crime control ends. the length of detention. his lack of education or his low intelligence. the Court held that individual consent could only be ascertained by analyzing all of the circumstances. did not require proof of knowledge of a right to refuse as the sine qua non of an effective consent to a search.
Nothing the officer said would have suggested to a reasonable person that he was barred from leaving or terminating the encounter. 9. they left the aisle free so that passengers could exit. When asked for permission to search the house. 547 US 103 (2006) Police were called to a home for a domestic dispute. 534 US 112 (2001) --(Page 38 of 101)-- . Further evidence of drug use was seized after obtaining a search warrant. Although the officer did not inform the defendants of their right to refuse the search. defendant unequivocally refused. Defendant's wife told the police officers that defendant was a cocaine user and that there was evidence of such in the house. Georgia v. Knights. His wife. he did request permission to search. gave police no better claim to reasonableness in entering than they would have had in the absence of any consent at all. gives a police officer no better claim to reasonableness in entering than the officer would have in the absence of any consent at all. however. quiet voice. and spoke to them one by one in a polite. his disputed invitation. That the questioning took place on a bus did not on its own transform it into an illegal seizure. Defendant was indicted for possession of cocaine. The United States Supreme Court held that the police did not seize the defendants when they boarded the bus and began questioning passengers. readily gave consent to search and led an officer to defendant's bedroom where a section of a drinking straw with a powdery residue was found. The officers did not brandish weapons or make any intimidating movements. without more. The fact that the officers were not in uniform or visibly armed had little weight. Even after arresting one defendant. without more. Randolph. the officer addressed the second defendant politely and gave no indication that he was required to answer questions or consent to a search. The Court held that since the wife had no recognized authority in law or social practice to prevail over her husband. The officer asked the defendants first if they objected to a search. Since a co-tenant wishing to open the door to a third party has no recognized authority in law or social practice to prevail over a present and objecting co-tenant. her disputed invitation. Searches on Those on Probation and Parole United States v. The officers gave the passengers no reason to believe that they were required to answer questions. The totality of the circumstances indicated that the consent was voluntary.
and with only reasonable grounds (not probable cause) to believe that contraband is present. or plea of guilty. 2193 (2006) The officer recognized the inmate as a parolee and.S. California. because parole is more akin to imprisonment than probation is to imprisonment. a state is willing to extend parole only because it is able to condition it upon compliance with certain requirements. --(Page 39 of 101)-- . was reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. a court granting probation may impose reasonable conditions that deprive the offender of some freedoms enjoyed by law-abiding citizens. In most cases. Parolees are on the continuum of state-imposed punishments. Inherent in the very nature of probation is that probationers do not enjoy the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled. The court found that the search was reasonable under the general Fourth Amendment approach of examining the totality of the circumstances. 126 S. like incarceration. the officer searched the inmate The U. Samson v. Parole is an established variation on imprisonment of convicted criminals . . Probation diminishes a probationer's reasonable expectation of privacy -. . even though the officer did not suspect the inmate of any criminal activity. Thus. is a form of criminal sanction imposed by a court upon an offender after verdict.so that a probation officer may. Acceptance of a clear and unambiguous search condition of parole significantly diminishes a parolee's reasonable expectation of privacy. Probation is one point on a continuum of possible punishments ranging from solitary confinement in a maximum-security facility to a few hours of mandatory community service. supported by reasonable suspicion and authorized by a condition of probation. search a probationer's home without a warrant. however. that the suspicionless search was a reasonable condition of parole which advanced state interests and parole conditions severely diminished the inmate's expectation of privacy while on parole. . On this continuum. consistent with the Fourth Amendment. before the completion of sentence. on the condition that the prisoner abides by certain rules during the balance of the sentence. Ct. the court held that the warrantless search of defendant. The court found that defendant's status as a probationer subject to a search condition diminished his reasonable expectation of privacy. Just as other punishments for criminal convictions curtail an offender's freedoms. with the probation search condition being a salient circumstance. finding. Probation. The essence of parole is release from prison. Supreme Court held. parolees have fewer expectations of privacy than probationers.
Thus. Searches When There Are “Special Needs” a. The standard would be met by a reasonableness showing. each time demanding that they first obtain a warrant. Administrative Searches Camara v. Supreme Court jurisprudence recognizes that to accommodate public and private interests some quantum of individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure. it is obvious that probable cause to issue a warrant to inspect must exist if reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling. Such standards. San Francisco. may be based upon the passage of time. g. 10. not individualized suspicion. --(Page 40 of 101)-- . while U. a multifamily apartment house). the nature of the building (e. the Supreme Court also recognizes that the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion. Having concluded that the area inspection is a reasonable search of private property within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. which will vary with the municipal program being enforced. but they will not necessarily depend upon specific knowledge of the condition of the particular dwelling. The Court held that the administrative search was not peripheral to the occupant's Fourth Amendment interests because a criminal prosecution could and did result from his refusal to submit. The occupant denied entrance to building inspectors on three separate occasions. in light of the reasonable goals of code enforcement. 387 US 523 (1967) A city ordinance gave city building inspectors the right to enter any building at reasonable times in furtherance of their code enforcement duties. or the condition of the entire area. but the standard was lower than for issuance of a warrant in criminal cases. The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness. The Court held that probable cause would still be required for issuance of a warrant for an administrative search.S. He claimed the warrantless search requested by the building inspectors violated his Fourth Amendment rights.. He was prosecuted under another ordinance that made it a crime to refuse to comply with the inspectors' requests.
515 US 646 (1995) --(Page 41 of 101)-- . On grant of certiorari. most citizens allow inspections of their property without a warrant. & Traf. New York v. the Court reversed the appellate court's judgment upon a finding that vehicle dismantlers were part of a closely regulated industry that carried a reduced expectation of privacy thereby lessening the application of Fourth Amendment warrant and probable cause requirements.Y Veh. required junkyard owners to maintain records for routine spontaneous inspections by police officers and state agents. In light of the regulatory framework governing his business and the history of regulation of related industries. a similar expectation in an individual's home. but not entry by force. Vernonia School v. in most situations. of authorizing entry. Burger. Thus. and indeed less than. In addition. In the course of their search. In the case of most routine area inspections. it seems likely that warrants should normally be sought only after entry is refused unless there has been a citizen complaint or there is other satisfactory reason for securing immediate entry. there is no compelling urgency to inspect at a particular time or on a particular day. An expectation of privacy in commercial premises is different from. to inspect. Similarly. 482 US 691 (1987) Police officers searched respondent vehicle dismantler's junkyard pursuant to N. This expectation is particularly attenuated in commercial property employed in closely regulated industries. an operator of a junkyard engaging in vehicle dismantling has a reduced expectation of privacy in this closely regulated business. Law 415(a)(5). as a practical matter and in light of the Fourth Amendment's requirement that a warrant specify the property to be searched. officers discovered stolen vehicles and parts in respondent's junkyard. Moreover. Acton. which . Drug Testing b. the requirement of a warrant procedure does not suggest any change in what seems to be the prevailing local policy. the high incidence of motor vehicle theft rendered such inspections essential and amounted to a substantial state interest and hence the State was allowed to address the major social problem of car theft by the implementation of an administrative scheme.
including privacy Collecting the samples for urinalysis intrudes upon an excretory function traditionally shielded by great privacy. Respondents." they voluntarily subject themselves to a degree of regulation even higher than that imposed on students generally. Students were not entitled to full Fourth Amendment protections where the state's interest in preventing drug addiction among students was compelling and student athletes had a decreased expectation of privacy. By choosing to "go out for the team. and the policy neither addressed a proven problem nor required a showing of individualized suspicion of drug use. a seventh grade student and his parents. refused to sign the testing consent forms and filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from enforcement of the policy on the grounds that it violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Somewhat like adults who choose to participate in a "closely regulated industry. Particularly with regard to medical examinations and procedures. public school children are routinely required to submit to various physical examinations. the urinalysis and accompanying disclosure requirements were not significant invasions of privacy. and to be vaccinated against various diseases. Earls. Also. There is an element of "communal undress" inherent in athletic participation. However." students who voluntarily participate in school athletics have reason to expect intrusions upon normal rights and privileges. 536 US 822 (2002) The students contended that the board's drug testing policy was unconstitutional since the board failed to identify a special need for testing students who participate in extracurricular activities. therefore. --(Page 42 of 101)-- . Petitioner school district required student athletes to submit to drug testing. for which the student's parents had to sign consent forms. the degree of intrusion depends upon the manner in which production of the urine sample is monitored. students within the school environment have a lesser expectation of privacy than members of the population generally Legitimate privacy expectations are even less with regard to student athletes. For their own good and that of their classmates. . There is an additional respect in which school athletes have a reduced expectation of privacy. Board of Ed of Pottawatomie County v.
Pursuant to the policy. the case simply did not fit within the closely guarded category of "special needs. which was to use the threat of arrest and prosecution in order to force women into treatment. The policy did not constitute an unreasonable search because it reasonably served the board's important interest in detecting and preventing drug use among its students." Therefore. warrantless. and the board's method of obtaining urine samples and maintaining test results was minimally intrusive on the students' limited privacy interest. hospital staff members tested pregnant patients for drug abuse and reported positive tests to the police. 129 S. the drug testing policy was a reasonably effective means of addressing the board's concerns about preventing drug use in the board's schools in the face of the evidence of increased drug use at the schools. Redding. Const. U. Further. and given the extensive involvement of law enforcement officials at every stage of the policy. and suspicionless searches necessarily applied to the policy.Ct. Safford School District v. Given the primary purpose of the program. City of Charleston. amend. The board's general regulation of extracurricular activities diminished the expectation of privacy among students.S. 2633 (2009) --(Page 43 of 101)-- . 532 US 67 (2001) A state hospital implemented a policy setting forth procedures to be followed by hospital staff to identify pregnant patients suspected of drug abuse. Ferguson v. IV's general prohibition against nonconsensual.
the principal. Because there was reason to question the clarity with which the right was established. when it is not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction. O. concern to limit a school search to reasonable scope requires the support of reasonable suspicion of danger or of resort to underwear for hiding evidence of wrongdoing before a search can reasonably make the quantum leap from outer clothes and backpacks to exposure of intimate parts. place a search that intrusive in a category of its own demanding its own specific suspicions. What was missing from the suspected facts that pointed to the student was any indication of danger to the students from the power of the drugs or their quantity. The T. and the nurse were protected from liability through qualified immunity. The school's policies strictly prohibited the nonmedical use. Another student's statement that forbidden prescription and over-thecounter drugs came from the student was sufficiently plausible to warrant suspicion that the student was involved in pill distribution. and the degradation its subject may reasonably feel. or sale of any drug on school grounds. the rule of reasonableness states that the search as actually conducted be reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place. In the context of a school search. Thus. the Supreme Court held that the strip search of the student was unreasonable and a violation of the Fourth Amendment. This suspicion was enough to justify a search of the student's backpack and outer clothing. 11. The meaning of such a search. The scope will be permissible. the assistant. The student claimed that extending the search at the principal's behest to the point of making her pull out her underwear was constitutionally unreasonable. 466 US 740 (1984) --(Page 44 of 101)-- . possession. L. Wisconsin. that is. The principal knew beforehand that the pills were common pain relievers. Exigent Circumstances Welsh v. and any reason to suppose that the student was carrying pills in her underwear.
and the government usually should be allowed to make such arrests only with a warrant issued upon probable cause by a neutral and detached magistrate. four adults were attempting. the burden is on the government to demonstrate exigent circumstances that overcome the presumption of unreasonableness that attaches to all warrantless home entries. They entered the backyard. Stuart.. Brigham City v. that presumption of unreasonableness is difficult to rebut. Const. --(Page 45 of 101)-- . There. an altercation taking place in the kitchen of the home. to restrain a juvenile. application of the exigentcircumstances exception in the context of a home entry should rarely be sanctioned when there is probable cause to believe that only a minor offense has been committed. through a screen door and windows. The court also held that the officers had an objectively reasonable basis for believing both that the injured adult might need help and that the violence in the kitchen was just beginning. Upon arriving at the house. Nothing required them to wait until someone was "unconscious" or "semi-conscious" or worse before entering. The court held that it did not matter whether the officers entered the kitchen to arrest defendants and gather evidence against them or to assist the injured and prevent further violence. 1943 (2006) At about 3 a. and saw. four police officers responded to a call regarding a loud party at a residence. A common-sense approach is required by the U. and proceeded down the driveway to investigate. When the government's interest is only to arrest for a minor offense. 126 S. According to the testimony of one of the officers.m. they observed two juveniles drinking beer in the backyard. with some difficulty. Moreover. The juvenile eventually broke free. Before agents of the government may invade the sanctity of the home." and an important factor to be considered when determining whether any exigency exists is the gravity of the underlying offense for which the arrest is being made.Ct. amend. swung a fist and struck one of the adults in the face. IV prohibition on "unreasonable searches and seizures.S. they heard shouting from inside. although no exigency is created simply because there is probable cause to believe that a serious crime has been committed. The officer testified that he observed the victim of the blow spitting blood into a nearby sink.
The Court first ruled that defendant's arrest did not violate the Fourth Amendment because (1) it was based upon probable cause. When Is a Person Seized? United States v. Moreover.S. 446 US 544 (1980) --(Page 46 of 101)-- . The need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency. 423 US 411 (1976) Defendant's conviction for possession of stolen mail was reversed when the appellate court determined that the warrantless arrest of defendant violated his Fourth Amendment rights and that the postarrest search of defendant's car was coerced. amend. IV. there is nothing in the Court's prior cases indicating that under the Fourth Amendment a warrant is required to make a valid arrest for a felony. U. The relevant prior decisions are uniformly to the contrary. viewed objectively. An action is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. the United States Supreme Court reversed. One exigency obviating the requirement of a warrant is the need to assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury. regardless of the individual officer's state of mind. F. as the government acted upon information from a reliable informant that defendant possessed stolen cards Because there is a strong presumption of constitutionality due to an Act of Congress. A police officer may arrest without warrant one believed by the officer upon reasonable cause to have been guilty of a felony 2. law enforcement officers may enter a home without a warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury. as long as the circumstances. 1." obviously the Court should be reluctant to decide that a search thus authorized by Congress was unreasonable and that the Act was therefore unconstitutional. Mendenhall. especially when it turns on what is "reasonable. Seizures and Arrests Is a Warrant Needed for Arrests? United States v. justify the action. Const. On certiorari. Watson. Accordingly. The officer's subjective motivation is irrelevant.
a reasonable person would have believed that she was not free to leave. A person has been seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendmentonly if. 127 S. would be the threatening presence of several officers. even though defendant was not expressly told that she was free to decline to cooperate with their inquiry. Brendlin v. The lower appellate court reversed. the court reversed the judgment of the lower appellate court. the driver of the car is seized within the meaning of the 4th Amendment. in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident. California. As long as the person to whom questions are put remains free to disregard the questions and walk away. Ct. there has been no intrusion upon that person's liberty or privacy as would under the Constitution require some particularized and objective justification. The court held that a person had been seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if. in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident. or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled. Defendant was convicted of possessing heroin with intent to distribute after the district court denied her motion to suppress the introduction of the heroin at trial. then he or she has not been seized. The court held that defendant was not seized when she was approached by the federal agents who asked to see her ticket and identification. holding that defendant's consent to the search of her person had not been voluntarily given. 2400 (2007) When a police officer makes a traffic stop. Drayton. even where the person did not attempt to leave. his freedom of movement is restrained. a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave. Only when such restraint is imposed is there any foundation whatever for invoking constitutional safeguards. The reasonable person test is objective and presupposes an innocent person. On appeal. --(Page 47 of 101)-- . Examples of circumstances that might indicate a seizure. The passenger is seized as well and so may challenge the constitutionality of the stop. 536 US 194 (2002) If a reasonable person would feel free to terminate the encounter. some physical touching of the person of the citizen. by means of physical force or a show of authority. the display of a weapon by an officer. A person is seized only when. United States v. The court held that the totality of the evidence was adequate to support the district court's findings that defendant voluntarily consented to accompany the officers and that defendant consented to the search of her person freely and voluntarily.
and he was untouched at the time he discarded the cocaine. 1598 (2008) --(Page 48 of 101)-- . Virginia v. 499 US 621 (1991) The court granted certiorari on the issue of whether defendant had been seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment at the time he dropped the cocaine when he saw an officer running towards him. The common law may have made an attempted seizure unlawful in certain circumstances. The Court found that the test for a show of authority was an objective one and that defendant was not seized until he was tackled. therefore. a seizure did not occur when the subject had not yielded. For What Crimes May a Person Be Arrested? Atwater v. Petitioners sued respondents. Hodari. The cocaine abandoned while defendant was running was not the fruit of a seizure and not excludable. Defendant's case did not involve the application of any physical force. Moore. 532 US 318 (2001) Respondent officer arrested petitioner arrestee for seatbelt violations and placed her in jail until she was released on bond. 3. Respondent officer had probable cause to believe that petitioner arrestee had committed a crime in his presence. Neither usage nor common-law tradition makes an attempted seizure a seizure. but it made many things unlawful.Ct. The court determined that the Fourth Amendment does not limit police officers' authority to arrest without warrant for minor criminal offenses. respondent officer was authorized to make a custodial arrest without balancing costs and benefits or determining whether or not the arrest was in some sense necessary. 128 S. The Court held that with respect to a show of authority regarding the application of physical force. The court also rejected petitioners' argument for a modern arrest rule. California v. The court rejected petitioners' argument that peace officers' authority to make warrantless arrests for misdemeanors was restricted at common law to instances of breach of the peace. City of Lago Vista. alleging a Fourth Amendment violation. very few of which were elevated to constitutional proscriptions.
If a person is arrested. but it also chose not to attach to violations of its arrest rules the potent remedies that federal courts had applied to Fourth Amendment violations. they arrested him for the misdemeanor even though under Va. Defendant was stopped by police officers who suspected he was driving with a suspended license. Code Ann. they should have only issued him a summons. Ohio. but for a stop there only has to be reasonable suspicion. Virginia chose to protect individual privacy and dignity more than the Fourth Amendment required. there can be a frisk only if there is a reasonable suspicion that the person has a weapon that might endanger the police. 392 US 1 (1968) --(Page 49 of 101)-- . 1. Linking Fourth Amendment protections to state law would have meant losing a bright-line constitutional standard as well as causing those protection to vary from place to place and from time to time. 19. The Court had treated additional protections exclusively as matters of state law. After they confirmed his license was suspended. Stop and Frisk For an arrest. But if a person is stopped. The Authority for Police to Stop and Frisk Terry v. The Court noted that its decisions counseled against changing the calculus that the arrest was constitutionally reasonable because there was probable cause to believe defendant committed the minor crime in the officer's presence. the search incident to the arrest was also constitutional. there must be probable cause.2-74. Because the arrest was constitutional. A search subsequent to arrest revealed he was carrying crack cocaine. the police can do a search incident to the arrest. G.
When an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others."arrests" in traditional terminology. Petitioner sought review of his conviction for carrying a concealed weapon. The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed. that petitioner and his companions were about to commit a daytime robbery. the search satisfied the conditions of U. regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime. based upon his experience. amend. --(Page 50 of 101)-- . Whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away. Furthermore. Const.S. and it is not to be undertaken lightly. On certiorari the court affirmed petitioner's conviction. There must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer." or pat-down. where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual. due weight must be given. the court ruled that the search of the outer clothing of petitioner and his companions was properly limited in time and scope in order for him to determine the presence of weapons and to neutralize the danger posed." but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.S. dangerous. IV. The Fourth Amendment governs "seizures" of the person which do not eventuate in a trip to the station house and prosecution for crime -. not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or "hunch. it would appear to be clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the power to take necessary measures to determine whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical harm. contending that the weapon seized from him was obtained through an illegal search. he has "seized" that person. under U. Const. The court ruled that despite the fact that the arresting police officer lacked probable cause to arrest petitioner at the time he made the "stop and frisk" warrantless intrusion upon petitioner that produced the weapon at issue. And in determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such circumstances. and his belief that petitioner was presently armed. IV: the officer had a reasonable suspicion. and posed a threat to him and to others justified both the officer's "stop" of petitioner and the "frisk. the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger. which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment. of petitioner's overcoat. amend. It is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person. and that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress.
The officer found defendant standing outside a parked truck with a woman inside the truck. But there is no hard and fast limit. In the ordinary course a police officer is free to ask a person for identification without implicating the Fourth Amendment. Asking questions is an essential part of police investigations. Stat. 3. The officer arrested defendant. by itself. and practical demands of the Terry stop. If an investigative stop continues indefinitely. or check identification in the absence of probable cause promotes the strong government interest in solving crimes and bringing offenders to justice. an officer may not arrest a suspect for failure to identify himself if the request for identification is not reasonably related to the circumstances justifying the stop.123. Rev. that is an arrest. at some point it can no longer be justified as an investigative stop. --(Page 51 of 101)-- . Court of Nevada. The officer asked for defendant's identification 11 times and was refused each time. The ability to briefly stop a suspect. Questions concerning a suspect's identity are a routine and accepted part of many Terry stops. The United States Supreme Court determined that the Terry stop. and the State's requirement of a response did not contravene the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment. constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure. rationale. Interrogation relating to one's identity or a request for identification by the police does not. Also. the request for identification was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the Terry stop. 542 US 177 (2004) A police officer responded to a call reporting that a man assaulted a woman. 171. A Terry stop must be justified at its inception and reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the initial stop. ask questions.2. Under these principles. The Distinction Between Stops and Arrests If a person is detained for sustained interrogation. Sixth Judicial Dist. because the request for identity had an immediate relation to the purpose. the request for identification. a "stop and identify" statute that required defendant only to disclose his name. Defendant was convicted for obstructing the officer in carrying out his duties under Nev. Taking a person to the police station for fingerprinting is an arrest and must be based upon probable cause. What May Police Do When They Stop an Individual? Hiibel v.
since the totality of the circumstances warranted the stop for further investigation of defendant's vehicle.4. Reviewing courts making reasonable-suspicion determinations involving investigatory stops must look at the totality of the circumstances of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing. 534 US 266 (2002) Defendant. The United States Supreme Court held. evaluated in isolation. and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard. Reasonable Suspicion for Stopping Cars United States v. regardless of whether the facts taken in isolation appeared innocent. were susceptible to innocent explanations and thus insufficient to support a finding of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the investigatory stop. What is Sufficient for Reasonable Suspicion? a. This process allows officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that might well elude an untrained person. Reasonable Suspicion Based on Informants' Tips Alabama v. rather than taking his family on a recreational outing. traveling with a woman and children in a minivan. --(Page 52 of 101)-- . was stopped by an agent on an unpaved and rarely traveled road near the United States border which was commonly used by smugglers to avoid a border patrol checkpoint. the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause. however. The agent determined that the unusual behavior of the occupants justified an investigatory stop. The appellate court found that certain of the suspicious circumstances. It was reasonable for the agent to make commonsense inferences from his observations and his experience that defendant was attempting to avoid the checkpoint. 496 US 325 (1990) b. Arvizu. Although an officer's reliance on a mere hunch is insufficient to justify a stop. that suppression of the drug evidence was not required. White. during which the agent discovered a substantial amount of drugs.
The State sought review of a judgment holding that officers did not have the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an investigatory stop of respondent's car based on an anonymous tip and that marijuana and cocaine seized were fruits of respondent's unconstitutional detention. Const.S. the United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause. there was reason to believe that the informant was honest and wellinformed. When the officers stopped respondent. the anonymous tip had been sufficiently corroborated to furnish reasonable suspicion that respondent was engaged in criminal activity. is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability. The level of suspicion required for a Terry stop was less demanding than that required for probable cause. amend. quantity and quality. more information will be required to establish the requisite quantum of suspicion than would be required if the tip were more reliable. noting that a "totality of circumstances" approach was used to determine whether an informant's tip established probable cause or the reasonable suspicion required by an officer to make a Terry stop. J. When significant aspects of the informant's predictions were verified. like probable cause. Florida v. but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.. If a tip has a relatively low degree of reliability.L. did not violate U. the whole picture. IV. Both factors. therefore. are considered in the totality of the circumstances. On appeal. Reasonable suspicion. 529 US 266 (2000) --(Page 53 of 101)-- . that must be taken into account when evaluating whether there is reasonable suspicion. The investigative stop. and reasonable suspicion could arise from information less reliable than that required to show probable cause.
approaches an individual. without reasonable suspicion or probable cause. and that headlong flight was the consummate act of evasion. the accurate description of respondent's appearance was not enough since the reasonable suspicion at issue required that the tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality. The Court found that nervous. Const. evasive behavior was a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop. insufficient to justify a police officer's stop and frisk of that person. and that officers were justified in suspecting that defendant was involved in criminal activity based on his presence in an area of heavy narcotics trafficking and his unprovoked flight upon noticing the police. not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person. does not furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed for a detention or seizure. The court held that an anonymous tip that a person was carrying a gun was. 38-caliber handgun. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress. And any refusal to cooperate.S. c. without more. amend. The Court found that the determination of reasonable suspicion had to be based on commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior. IV. Further. Two of the officers caught up with him. Finally. Respondent was searched after an anonymous caller reported to the police that a young black male standing at a particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun. The state supreme court agreed. Illinois v. Defendant was arrested when officers discovered a . concluding that sudden flight in a high crime area did not create a reasonable suspicion justifying a Terry stop. the individual has a right to ignore the police and go about his business. Wardlow. The tip pointing to respondent lacked the moderate indicia of reliability necessary because the call provided no predictive information to enable the police to test the informant's knowledge or credibility. 528 US 119 (2000) Defendant fled upon seeing police officers patrolling an area known for heavy narcotics trafficking. without more. --(Page 54 of 101)-- . The court affirmed a judgment holding that a Terry "stop and frisk" search of respondent based only on an anonymous tip was invalid under U. and conducted a protective pat-down search for weapons. but the appellate court reversed. When an officer. the court declined to modify the Terry standard to license a "firearm exception" since it roved too far from the court's established reliability analysis. Reasonable Suspicion Based on a Person's Trying to Avoid a Police Officer.
the totality of all the circumstances together with all of defendant's actions were sufficient for DEA agents to have a reasonable suspicion that defendant was committing a drug crime. The Exclusionary Rule Is the Exclusionary rule a Desirable Remedy? Hudson v. is not going about one's business. 490 US 1 (1989) Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents in Honolulu learned that defendant had paid cash for his $ 2. the Court determined that the DEA agents were justified in making the stop. A. Flight. d. 2159 (2006) --(Page 55 of 101)-- . The Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court and remanded the case. a drug source. Reasonable Suspicion Based on Profiles United States v. Allowing officers confronted with such flight to stop the fugitive and investigate further is quite consistent with the individual's right to go about his business or to stay put and remain silent in the face of police questioning. Michigan. Because the standard for reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop was less than for probable cause. it is just the opposite. although each of defendant's actions by itself might have been innocent. Unprovoked flight is simply not a mere refusal to cooperate. Sokolow. in fact. by its very nature. defendant appeared nervous and was travelling under a false name. A court sitting to determine the existence of reasonable suspicion must require the agent to articulate the factors leading to that conclusion. but the fact that these factors may be set forth in a "profile" does not somehow detract from their evidentiary significance as seen by a trained agent.Ct. 126 S. II. In addition. They stopped him when he returned to Honolulu and discovered cocaine in his luggage.100 airline tickets to spend a short time in Miami.
--(Page 56 of 101)-- . Rather. not the Supreme Court's first impulse." which sometimes include setting the guilty free and the dangerous at large. granting establishment of the primary illegality. the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained. Attenuation can occur. The Supreme Court has rejected "indiscriminate application" of the rule and has held it to be applicable only where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served--that is. Even in the early days of the exclusionary rule. or causation in the logical sense alone. of course. Attenuation also occurs when. Subsequent case law has rejected this reflexive application of the exclusionary rule. and in turn upon the public. because its officers have violated the law must bear some relation to the purposes which the law is to serve. The United States Supreme Court has never held that evidence is "fruit of the poisonous tree" simply because it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police. but-for cause." The United States Supreme Court has treated identification of a Fourth Amendment violation as synonymous with application of the exclusionary rule to evidence secured incident to that violation. when the causal connection is remote. even given a direct causal connection. the Supreme Court declined to hold that all evidence is "fruit of the poisonous tree" simply because it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police. Rather. The Supreme Court has therefore been cautious against expanding it. Whether the exclusionary sanction is appropriately imposed in a particular case is an issue separate from the question whether the Fourth Amendment rights of the party seeking to invoke the rule were violated by police conduct. What the knock-and-announce rule has never protected is one's interest in preventing the government from seeing or taking evidence described in a warrant. and has repeatedly emphasized that the rule's "costly toll" upon truthseeking and law enforcement objectives presents a high obstacle for those urging its application. Suppression of evidence has always been the United States Supreme Court's last resort. the exclusionary rule is inapplicable. the more apt question in such a case is whether. the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint. The exclusionary rule generates "substantial social costs. where its deterrence benefits outweigh its "substantial social costs. Where the interests that were violated have nothing to do with the seizure of evidence. The penalties visited upon the Government. can be too attenuated to justify exclusion.
likewise applied to the State's prosecution of state crimes. the exclusionary rule. intended for the protection of the people against such unauthorized action. And. --(Page 57 of 101)-- . Noting that the inquiry was essentially the same. 232 US 383 (1914) In review of defendant's contention that the warrantless seizure of his private correspondence violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Denying shortcuts to only one of two cooperating law enforcement agencies tends naturally to breed legitimate suspicion of "working arrangements" whose results are equally tainted. This protection is equally extended to the action of the government and officers of the law acting under it. as necessary to ensure such rights. Ohio. the Court expressed that the preferred analysis for determining the scope of constitutional rights protected by the exclusionary rule focused on the substantive question of whether petitioners had their own rights infringed by the police's search and seizure. rather than on the concept of standing. 367 US 643 (1961) It was apparent that the materials introduced into evidence in the prosecution of defendant were seized during an illegal search of defendant's residence in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 439 US 128 (1978) The Court affirmed petitioners' convictions for armed robbery because their motion to suppress a sawed-off rifle and shells seized by the police during the search of a vehicle in which petitioners were passengers was properly denied. C. which prohibited the introduction into evidence of material seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Illinois. United States. To sanction such proceedings would be to affirm by judicial decision a manifest neglect if not an open defiance of the prohibitions of the Constitution. as previously decided.B. Mapp v. the Court held: 1) that the letters in question were taken from defendant's house by an official of the United States acting under color of his office in direct violation of the constitutional rights of defendant The Fourth Amendment is intended to secure the citizen in person and property against unlawful invasion of the sanctity of his home by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction. Who Can Object to the Introduction of Evidence and Raise the Exclusionary Rule? Rakas v. The Origins of the Exclusionary Rule Weeks v. The Court held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment extended to the States the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The issue of standing involves two inquiries: first.S. through a motion to suppress the evidence at their state court trial. the Court found that petitioners' rights were not violated where they had no legitimate expectation of privacy in areas of a car in which they claimed no property or possessory interest. Capacity to claim the protection of U. the fact that they were legitimately on the premises in the sense that they were in the car with the permission of its owner not being determinative of whether they had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the particular areas of the automobile searched. Further. IV depends not upon a property right in the invaded place but upon whether the person who claims the protection of the amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place. since no showing of any legitimate expectation of privacy in the glove compartment or area under the seat of the car was made. like the trunk of an automobile. and second. IV protected only those places in which petitioners themselves had a reasonable expectation of privacy.S. Const. amend. the defendants' claim would also fail in an analogous situation in a dwelling place. Minnesota v. Carter. and. these are areas in which a passenger qua passenger would not normally have such expectation. Without holding that a property interest was required. cannot challenge. whether the proponent is asserting his own legal rights and interests rather than basing his claim for relief upon the rights of third parties. the Court decided that U. 525 US 83 (1998) --(Page 58 of 101)-- . furthermore. the Court determined that the appropriate measure of rights was no longer guided solely by whether petitioners were legitimately on the premises that the police searched. whether the proponent of a particular legal right has alleged injury in fact. Const. since the search did not violate any of their rights. Using this analysis. Criminal defendants who assert neither a property nor a possessory interest in an automobile in which they were passengers at the time of a police search which encompassed the glove compartment and an area under the seat. amend. the search as violative of the Fourth Amendment. and who do not assert an interest in a rifle and shells which were seized.
Respondents made a motion to suppress the evidence. among other things. a defendant must demonstrate that he personally has an expectation of privacy in the place searched. In addition. amend. The court reversed and remanded. Const. IV purposes than residential property.S. methamphetamine paraphernalia. 127 S. property used for commercial purposes was treated differently for U. holding that an overnight guest in a home could claim the protection of U.S. but one who was merely present with the consent of the householder could not. 1.. either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society. a passenger in the car. amend. contending that the officer's observation was an unreasonable search. one of them recognized defendant. finding. The Court held that the relevant question was to ask whether a reasonable person in defendant's position after the car was stopped would have believed himself free to terminate the encounter between the police and himself. and respondents were arrested and charged with conspiracy to commit a controlled substance crime. and the car. The officer observed respondents bagging cocaine in the apartment. A police officer looked through a window blind in a lessee's apartment based on an informant's tip. Const.Ct. The Court thought that in such circumstances any reasonable passenger would have understood the police officers to be exercising control to the point that no one in the car was free to depart without police permission. one that has a source outside of the Fourth Amendment. IV legitimate expectation of privacy claim. California. the state supreme court determined that respondents had standing to assert a U. 2400 (2007) After officers stopped a car to check its registration without reason to believe it was being operated unlawfully. IV. 487 US 533 (1988) --(Page 59 of 101)-- .e. Based on that observation. The State conceded that the police had no adequate justification to pull the car over. D. An overnight guest in a home may claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment. Upon verifying that defendant was a parole violator. and that his expectation is reasonable. Brendlin v. the officers formally arrested him and searched him. In order to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment. United States. Exceptions to the Exclusionary Rule Independent Source Murray v. the driver. but one who is merely present with the consent of the householder may not. Const. i. Ultimately. amend. a warrant was issued.S.
an unlawful search. while the government should not profit from its illegal activity. which may well be difficult to establish where the seized goods are kept in the police's possession. 467 US 431 (1984) --(Page 60 of 101)-- . The independent source doctrine does not rest upon a metaphysical analysis. When the challenged evidence has an independent source. Invoking the exclusionary rule in such circumstances would have put the police in a worse position than they would have been if no violation had occurred. Williams. tainted one. the exclusionary rule does not apply and the evidence is admissible. or as a consequence of. The independent source doctrine applies also to evidence initially discovered during. Inevitable Discovery If the police can demonstrate that they inevitably would have discovered the evidence. neither should it be placed in a worse position than it would otherwise have occupied. exclusion of such evidence would put the police in a worse position than they would have been in absent any error or violation. Petitioners contended that the independent source doctrine only applied to evidence obtained for the first time during an independent and lawful search. The Court remanded the cases for further findings as to whether the information upon which the warrant was based amounted to an independent source. Nix v. even without a violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Court held that. So long as a later. an unlawful search. if later obtained independently from activities untainted by the initial illegality. The Court rejected that argument and adopted the Government's view that the doctrine also applied to evidence initially discovered during. there is no reason why the independent source doctrine should not apply. it did not explicitly find that the agents would have sought a warrant if they had not earlier entered the premises. but upon the policy that. Petitioners' motions to suppress were based on claims that evidence was seized illegally because agents did not inform the magistrate about a prior warrantless entry to the premises where bales of marijuana were eventually seized. although the district court found that the agents did not reveal their warrantless entry to the magistrate. 2. or as a consequence of. lawful seizure is genuinely independent of an earlier. but later obtained independently from activities untainted by the initial illegality.
--(Page 61 of 101)-- .also lessen the likelihood that the ultimate or inevitable discovery exception will promote police misconduct. the evidence should be received. which led the police to the victim's body. When an officer is aware that the evidence will inevitably be discovered. there will be little to gain from taking any dubious "shortcuts" to obtain the evidence.including the possibility of departmental discipline and civil liability -. If the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that unlawfully obtained evidence ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means. but that it included no such "good faith" requirement. if the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means. Significant disincentives to obtaining evidence illegally -. which allows the admission of unlawfully obtained evidence that ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means. It concluded that the record supported the finding that the victim's body would inevitably have been discovered. no such evidence was admitted. The Court held that there was an inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule. and reversed the appellate court decision. should have been excluded because the evidence was the product of unlawful questioning by the police. but the trial court admitted evidence of the body's location and condition on the theory that the body would have been discovered in any event. he will try to avoid engaging in any questionable practice. the societal costs of the exclusionary rule far outweigh any possible benefits to deterrence that a good-faith requirement might produce. Under the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule. the prosecution need not prove the absence of bad faith in obtaining the evidence. He successfully challenged the conviction on the ground that evidence of his incriminating statements. In that situation. even had the incriminating statements not been elicited from respondent. At his second trial. Cases implementing the exclusionary rule begin with the premise that the challenged evidence is in some sense the product of illegal governmental activity. the evidence is admissible. However. In these circumstances. Respondent was found guilty of first-degree murder.
the Court held that the Miranda warnings could neither automatically nor by themselves protect an accused's Fourth Amendment rights. the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. Miranda warnings. Whether a confession was freely given or improperly coerced. the Court examined the record in light of those factors and concluded that petitioner's statements were inadmissible. petitioner gave inculpatory statements after he was read his constitutional rights. the Court held. Conversely. might permit the admission of such evidence. along with other factors. the intervening circumstances. but it would not be sufficient fully to protect the Fourth. The question whether a confession is the product of a free will must be answered on the facts of each case. No single fact is dispositive --(Page 62 of 101)-- . had to be determined on a case by case basis. 422 US 590 (1975) Following an illegal arrest.3. The statements were admitted at trial on the basis that the Miranda warnings. Exclusion of a confession made without Miranda warnings might be regarded as necessary to effectuate the Fifth Amendment. However. Rather. then the evidence is admissible. if the link between the illegal police act and the evidence is attenuated. though. making admissible that which would normally be excluded. do not alone sufficiently deter a Fourth Amendment violation. and the exclusion of a confession made without them. granting establishment of the primary illegality. the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint. the more apt question in such a case is whether. and that Miranda warnings. Inadequate Causal Connection – Attenuation of the Taint The exclusionary rule applies if there is a substantial causal connection between the illegal police behavior and the evidence. were sufficient to purge the taint of the illegal arrest. The Court held the trial court had to examine factors such as the temporal proximity of the arrest to the confession. particularly. The court need not hold that all evidence is "fruit of the poisonous tree" simply because it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police. On certiorari. by themselves. Brown v. and. The Court also held that the exclusionary rule did not automatically proscribe the use of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons. Illinois.
468 US 897 (1984) This case presented the question whether the exclusionary rule should be modified so as to allow the use of evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause. Rawlings v. 448 US 98 (1980) The statements made by the defendant concerning his ownership of the controlled substances were admissible at trial even assuming that he was being illegally detained by police in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments at the time he made the statements. Kentucky. to be sure. such statements not being the product of the illegal detention. The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule United States v. and. 495 US 14 (1990) Where the police have probable cause to arrest a suspect. on the prosecution. The voluntariness of the statement is a threshold requirement. particularly. and (e) the defendant did not claim that his admissions were anything other than voluntary New York v. The presence of intervening circumstances. (d) the conduct of the police did not rise to the level of conscious or flagrant misconduct requiring exclusion of the defendant's statements. (c) the admissions were a spontaneous reaction to the discovery of the drugs. --(Page 63 of 101)-- . the exclusionary rule does not bar the state's use of a statement made by the defendant outside of his home. And the burden of showing admissibility rests. even though the statement is taken after a warrantless arrest made after nonconsensual entry in the suspect's home. The purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct are all relevant. Leon. but rather of the defendant's exercise of free will in view of the fact that (a) he received Miranda warnings only minutes before making the incriminating statements. But they are not the only factor to be considered. 4. in determining whether the confession is obtained by exploitation of an illegal arrest. The temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession. (b) he was detained in a relatively "congenial" atmosphere. Harris. of course.The Miranda warnings are an important factor.
so long as the circumstances of its issuance are not "entirely unreasonable. We emphasize that the standard of reasonableness we adopt is an objective one." Brennan. Dissent: After today's decisions. however. and the use of fruits of a past unlawful search or seizure works no new Fourth Amendment wrong. The Fourth Amendment contains no provision expressly precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation of its commands. Where the officer's conduct is objectively reasonable. the Court's "reasonable mistake" exception to the exclusionary rule will tend to put a premium on police ignorance of the law. Many objections to a good-faith exception assume that the exception will turn on the subjective good faith of individual officers. and the exclusionary rule is neither intended nor able to cure the invasion of the defendant's rights which he has already suffered. "Grounding the modification in objective reasonableness. retains the value of the exclusionary rule as an incentive for the law enforcement profession as a whole to conduct themselves in accord with the Fourth Amendment. that institutional incentive will be lost. The threat of exclusion cannot be expected significantly to deter them. however. The good-faith exception will encourage police to provide only the bare minimum of information in future warrant applications." all police conduct pursuant to that warrant will be protected from further judicial review. Indeed. The rule thus operates as a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect. The wrong condemned by the Fourth Amendment is "fully accomplished" by the unlawful search or seizure itself. Excluding the evidence can in no way affect his future conduct unless it is to make him less willing to do his duty. The police will now know that if they can secure a warrant. rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved. Dissent: --(Page 64 of 101)-- . as neutral judicial officers. for it is painfully apparent that the officer is acting as a reasonable officer would and should act in similar circumstances. Judges and magistrates are not adjuncts to the law enforcement team. excluding the evidence will not further the ends of the exclusionary rule in any appreciable way. Suppression remains an appropriate remedy if the magistrate or judge in issuing a warrant was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth. Stevens. they have no stake in the outcome of particular criminal prosecutions.
the warrant will be held invalid and its fruits excluded. Exception for Violations of “Knock and Announce” Hudson v. whether it was nevertheless "reasonable" within the meaning of the first. 2159 (2006) --(Page 65 of 101)-- . That rule is in keeping with the well-established principle that except in certain carefully defined classes of cases. if not. Law enforcement officers have long been on notice that despite the magistrate's decision a warrant will be invalidated if the officers did not provide sufficient facts to enable the magistrate to evaluate the existence of probable cause responsibly and independently. Any Fourth Amendment case may present two separate questions: whether the search was conducted pursuant to a warrant issued in accordance with the second Clause. The police drafted an affidavit to support an application for an arrest warrant and search warrant of defendant's home. Police made changes to form. 126 S. they examined a car defendant had borrowed. The uniformly applied rule is that a search conducted pursuant to a warrant that fails to conform to the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment is unconstitutional. Michigan. Massachusetts v. that a search was constitutionally unreasonable but that the seized evidence is admissible because the same search was reasonable. Police could not find proper warrant application and used one from another district that was for controlled substance. under our cases it has never been "reasonable" for the police to rely on the mere fact that a warrant has issued. arguendo. the constitutional text requires that we speak with one voice. 468 US 981 (1984) After police questioned defendant regarding a murder. however. and the judge told the police the warrant was sufficient authority to carry out the search. The warrant form and affidavit were reviewed by a judge. Sheppard. references to controlled substances were not deleted from form that constituted the application. On these questions. the police have always known that if they fail to supply the magistrate with sufficient information. a search of private property without proper consent is unreasonable unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant. 5. The exclusionary rule should not be applied when the officer conducting the search acted in objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate that subsequently is determined to be invalid. We cannot intelligibly assume. Thus. and. Ct.
438 US 154 (1978) There is. the exclusionary rule did not apply as the error that occurred arose from nonrecurring and attenuated negligence. It does not follow that the Fourth Amendment requires adoption of every proposal that might deter police misconduct. 6. In this case. Where the interests that were violated have nothing to do with the seizure of evidence. not reckless or deliberate. and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence was worth the price paid by the justice system. and those allegations must be accompanied by an offer of proof. the miscommunications were not routine or widespread. the challenger's attack must be more than conclusory and must be supported by more than a mere desire to cross-examine. Suppression Hearings The primary mechanism for raising the exclusionary rule is via a “suppression hearing. Deleware. United States.” Generally these occur before trial and many jurisdictions bar a defendant from raising exclusionary rule arguments later unless there is good cause for failure to do so at the suppression hearing. The value of deterrence depends upon the strength of the incentive to commit the forbidden act. deterrence of knock-and-announce violations is not worth a lot. What the knock-and-announce rule has never protected is one's interest in preventing the government from seeing or taking evidence described in a warrant. To mandate an evidentiary hearing. Exception for Certain Department Violations Herring v. 129 S. of course. the exclusionary rule is inapplicable.Ct. Viewed from this perspective. E. a presumption of validity with respect to the affidavit supporting the search warrant. It was far removed from the core concerns that led to the exclusionary rule's adoption. There must be allegations of deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth. Assuming that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred when defendant was arrested on the recalled arrest warrant. Franks v. 695 (2009) The lower court concluded that the error in failing to update the computer database to reflect the recall of the arrest warrant was negligent. To trigger the exclusionary rule. police conduct had to be sufficiently deliberate such that exclusion could meaningfully deter it. they were not so objectively culpable as to require exclusion. by itself to require the extreme sanction of exclusion under the Fourth Amendment. --(Page 66 of 101)-- . That negligent error was not enough.
--(Page 67 of 101)-- . commanding that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. deprives him of that freedom of will or self-control essential to make his confession voluntary within the meaning of the law. in reference to the charge. Police Interrogation and the Privilege Against SelfIncrimination A. for the law cannot measure the force of the influence used. and therefore excludes the declaration if any degree of influence has been exerted. in the courts of the United States. operating upon the fears or hopes of the accused. The Requirement for Voluntariness Hopt v. ceases when the confession appears to have been made either in consequence of inducements of a temporal nature. namely. But the presumption upon which weight is given to such evidence. nor by the exertion of any improper influence. wherever a question arises whether a confession is incompetent because not voluntary. United States. which. voluntary confession of guilt is among the most effectual proofs in the law. the issue is controlled by that portion of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States." A confession. 297 US 278 (1936) Defendants testified during their trial for murder that their confessions were false and had been procured by physical torture. must not be extracted by any sort of threats or violence. or decide upon its effect upon the mind of the prisoner. 110 US 574 (1884) While from the very nature of such evidence it must be subjected to careful scrutiny and received with great caution. Bram v. A confession can never be received in evidence where the prisoner has been influenced by any threat or promise. in order to be admissible. however slight. 168 US 532 (1897) In criminal trials. that one who is innocent will not imperil his safety or prejudice his interests by an untrue statement. held out by one in authority. People of Territory of Utah. must be free and voluntary: that is. Mississippi. and constitutes the strongest evidence against the party making it that can be given of the facts stated in such confession. Due Process and the Requirement for Voluntariness 1. Brown v.III. nor obtained by any direct or implied promises. or because of a threat or promise by or in the presence of such person. touching the charge preferred. a deliberate.
2. But the freedom of a state in establishing its policy is the freedom of constitutional government and is limited by the requirement of due process of law. Determining Whether a Confession is Voluntary a. (2) said that he--the informant--knew that the individual was starting to get some "tough treatment" from other inmates because of a rumor that the individual was suspected of the murder. Fulminante. especially where a suspect has been denied sleep. Nor may a state. where the whole proceeding is but a mask. The Use of Force and Threats of Force Arizona v. 499 US 279 (1991) Eventually. without supplying corrective process. Burden of Proof Burden of Proof that a confession is voluntary is on the prosecution. food water. It may dispense with indictment by a grand jury and substitute complaint or information. A state may not permit an accused to be hurried to conviction under mob domination. the individual confessed to the murder to a fellow inmate who was a paid informant for the Federal Bureau of Investigation. contrive a conviction through the pretense of a trial which in truth is but used as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty through a deliberate deception of court and jury by the presentation of testimony known to be perjured. it is more likely to be deemed involuntary. --(Page 68 of 101)-- .” b. The Court must find voluntariness by the “totality of the circumstances. The state may abolish trial by jury. unless in so doing it offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental. and/or access to a restroom. A state may not deny to the accused the aid of counsel. Factors to be Considered Length of the Interrogation and Deprivation of Basic Bodily Function If an interrogation when on over a long period of time. and (3) offered to protect the individual from his fellow inmates. A state is free to regulate the procedure of its courts in accordance with its own conceptions of policy. through the action of its officers. after the informant had (1) become friends with the individual.
that the admission of the confession was harmless error. A confession is like no other evidence. The Court held that the confession was coerced and that the state failed to meet its burden of establishing. The defendant's own confession is probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted against him. with his only respite being a transfer to an arena presumably considered more appropriate by the police for the task at hand. so much so that the courts may justifiably doubt its ability to put them out of mind even if told to do so. and the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition. New York. Bruno's was the one face visible to petitioner in which he could put some trust. is another factor which deserves mention in the totality of the situation. The admissions of a defendant come from the actor himself. Sarivola's 'protection. A finding of coercion need not depend upon actual violence by a government agent.'" Sarivola's testimony that he told Fulminante that "if [he] would tell the truth. and one that is not supported by any testimony of Fulminante. There was a bond of friendship between them going back a decade into adolescence. There was a credible threat of physical violence to defendant unless he confessed. Rehnquist Dissent Indeed. continued into the night. he had stipulated that "at no time did the defendant indicate he was in fear of other inmates nor did he ever seek Mr. Nor was the questioning conducted during normal business hours. Certainly. a credible threat is sufficient. and did not bear fruition until the not-too-early morning. he could be protected. The decision of the Supreme Court of Arizona rests on an assumption that is squarely contrary to this stipulation. Psychological Pressure Tactics Spano v. confessions have profound impact on the jury. Coercion can be mental as well as physical. --(Page 69 of 101)-- . The use of Bruno. 360 US 315 (1959) Petitioner was questioned for virtually eight straight hours before he confessed. but began in early evening. characterized in this Court by counsel for the State as a "childhood friend" of petitioner's. the most knowledgeable and unimpeachable source of information about his past conduct." adds little if anything to the substance of the parties' stipulation. beyond a reasonable doubt.
there is simply no basis for concluding that any state actor has deprived a criminal defendant of due process of law. We conclude that petitioner's will was overborne by official pressure. and she had no previous experience with the criminal law. if she did not "cooperate. and that there was no friend or adviser to whom she might turn. Coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not "voluntary" within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. and Mental Condition Colorado v. 394 US 731 (1969) Age. Dennis. Defendant was then held in custody and proceeded to confess to a child's murder. 479 US 157 (1986) Majority: Rehnquist. defendant stated for the first time that voices had told him to confess. The psychiatrist who had evaluated the man testified that the man was experiencing "command hallucinations. Illinois. Absent police conduct causally related to the confession. Leyra v. The next day." and that this psychotic condition had motivated his confession but had not impaired his ability to understand his Miranda rights. Dissent: Brennan --(Page 70 of 101)-- . The officer immediately advised him of his Miranda rights and defendant said that he understood the rights. after considering all the facts in their post-indictment setting. and no reason not to believe that the police had ample power to carry out their threats. Deception Lynumn v. defendant was again advised of his rights. Lying to the suspect by telling him that his accomplice had already confessed is OK. fatigue and sympathy falsely aroused. Cupp. 347 US 556 (1954) An officer acting as a friend to a suspect and expressing sympathy for his or her plight is not deception requiring suppression of a confession. Defendant approached a police officer and. without any prompting. Connelly. Level of Education. Fraizer v." It also appeared that these threats were made while she was encircled in her apartment by three police officers and a twice convicted felon who had purportedly "set her up". After another police officer arrived. and her children taken from her. confessed to a murder. 372 US 528 (1963) Oral confession made by defendant only after the police had told her that state financial aid of her infant children would be cut off.
B. Fifth Amendment Limited on In-Custodial Interrogation 1. Coercive Questioning. who question suspects literally every day. stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against selfincrimination. . "custodial interrogation" is questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. Arizona and Its Affirmation by the Supreme Court Miranda v. I would require the trial court to make such a finding on remand." Minimum standards of due process should require that the trial court find substantial indicia of reliability. Judges inherently have great discretion under a “totality of the circumstances” test. but whether the confession was 'free and voluntary'. certain police techniques are repugnant and override free will and thus are not to be tolerated. and the War on Terrorism The Military Commission Act of 2006 Provides for military commissions to try non-citizens accused of terrorism and prohibits the admissibility of statements gained through torture. Marshall: The prosecution may not use statements. Arizona. 4. . Torture. A true commitment to fundamental fairness requires that the inquiry be "not whether the conduct of state officers in obtaining the confession is shocking. whether exculpatory or inculpatory. . --(Page 71 of 101)-- . Is the Voluntariness Test Desirable? Reliability is no the only concern. 384 US 436 (1966) Majority. To hold otherwise allows the State to imprison and possibly to execute a mentally ill defendant based solely upon an inherently unreliable confession. on the basis of evidence extrinsic to the confession itself. before admitting the confession of a mentally ill person into evidence. Critics argue that police. Miranda v. need more instructions than a voluntariness test can provide. 3.
Police Interrogation. The aim in short is toward "voluntariness" in a utopian sense. and ultimately to discourage any confession at all. Dissent: White The new rules are not designed to guard against police brutality or other unmistakably banned forms of coercion. are employed. It is important to keep the subject off balance. Rather. Patience and persistence. To obtain a confession. The police then persuade. either retained or appointed. the police may resort to deceptive stratagems such as giving false legal advice." 23 When normal procedures fail to produce the needed result. is this: To be alone with the subject is essential to prevent distraction and to deprive him of any outside support. provided the waiver is made voluntarily. Even though not involuntary in traditional terms. a confession is involuntary where it is obtained by a law enforcement officer by way of incommunicado interrogation. in clear and unequivocal terms. Those who use third-degree tactics and deny them in court are equally able and destined to lie as skillfully about warnings and waivers. by trading on his insecurity about himself or his surroundings. The Fifth Amendment. for example. the interrogator must "patiently maneuver himself or his quarry into a position from which the desired objective may be attained. He merely confirms the preconceived story the police seek to have him describe. and intelligently. an individual held for interrogation by a law enforcement officer must be warned. A defendant may waive effectuation of his rights to remain silent and to be assisted by counsel at a custodial police interrogation. has never been thought to forbid all pressure to incriminate one's self in the situations --(Page 72 of 101)-- . and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney. to reinforce the nervous or ignorant suspect. trick. or cajole him out of exercising his constitutional rights. in essence. or to view it from a different angle. voluntariness with a vengeance. that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him. If an individual held for interrogation by a law enforcement officer indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking. in an environment created for no purpose other than to subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner. As a constitutional prerequisite to any questioning. the thrust of the new rules is to negate all pressures. knowingly. The aura of confidence in his guilt undermines his will to resist. however. there can be no questioning. at times relentless questioning. that he has a right to remain silent.
. however. On the contrary. Dickerson v. for a statement (surely simple enough to make) that what 18 U. and we decline to overrule Miranda ourselves. 3501 prescribes -. in denial of a discharge in bankruptcy.C.C. it has been held that failure to incriminate one's self can result in denial of removal of one's case from state to federal court. which in essence laid down a rule that the admissibility of such statements should turn only on whether or not they were voluntarily made. Chavez v. inasmuch as 3501 excludes from trial precisely what the Constitution excludes from trial. United States. O'Connor and Scalia --(Page 73 of 101)-- .violates the Constitution. We therefore hold that Miranda and its progeny in this Court govern the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation in both state and federal courts. viz. I dissent from today's decision. Martinez. In Miranda v. 538 US 760 (2003) Plurality Thomas. Arizona. The Court's unspoken assumption that any pressure violates the privilege is not supported by the precedents and it has failed to show why the Fifth Amendment prohibits that relatively mild pressure the Due Process Clause permits. 530 US 428 (2000) miranda rule has a constitutional basis. and in numerous other adverse consequences. but also that Justices whose votes are needed to compose today's majority are on record as believing that a violation of Miranda is not a violation of the Constitution. may not be in effect overruled by an Act of Congress. We hold that Miranda. covered by it. until 3501 is repealed. The reason the statement does not appear is not only (and perhaps not so much) that it would be absurd.S. Congress enacted 18 U.S. and. in refusal of a military commission. 3501. Dissent: Scalia and Thomas One will search today's opinion in vain. In the wake of that decision.the use at trial of a voluntary confession. we held that certain warnings must be given before a suspect's statement made during custodial interrogation could be admitted in evidence.Rehnquist. being a constitutional decision of this Court. will continue to apply it in all cases where there has been a sustainable finding that the defendant's confession was voluntary. compelled confessions. even when a Miranda warning or its equivalent has failed to be given -.
Ginsburg: I would hold that the Self-Incrimination Clause applies at the time and place police use severe compulsion to extract a statement from a suspect.” 3. but said that money damages are not necessary to enforce Miranda. the exclusionary rile is sufficient. the interrogation of respondent was the functional equivalent of an attempt to obtain an involuntary confession from a prisoner by torturous methods. Defenses of Miranda: “Miranda's empirically detectable net damage to law enforcement is zero. A second criticism is the opposite: Miranda prevents police from gaining confessions and it allows guilty people to go free. A third criticism of Miranda is based on constitutional interpretation and the role of the judiciary. a constitutional violation occurs only at trial Souter and Breyer Disagreed . Although conduct by law enforcement officials prior to trial may ultimately impair that right.The privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment is a fundamental trial right of criminal defendants. What are the Requirements for Miranda to Apply? Three questions arise in applying Miranda: When is a person “in custody”? What is interrogation? What police actions are sufficient to meet the requirements of Miranda? --(Page 74 of 101)-- . Miranda has significant effect in increasing professional behavior by police officers and enhancing the public's awareness of constitutional rights. Kennedy: A constitutional right is traduced the moment torture or its close equivalent are brought to bear. 2. Dissent:. Is Miranda Desirable? Three Criticisms: It does not succeed in curing the inherently coercive nature of incustodial interrogation.” It provides clear guidance to police: Administer the simple warnings and follow the procedures and there is a presumption that any confession is admissible. Kenney and Ginsburg Stevens : As a matter of fact.
" Oregon v. Alvarado. Yarborough v. 394 US 324 (1969) The State has argued here that since petitioner was interrogated on his own bed.a. he was told that he was free to go." But the opinion iterated and reiterated the absolute necessity for officers interrogating people "in custody" to give the described warnings. then he was "deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way. petitioner was under arrest and not free to leave when he was questioned in his bedroom in the early hours of the morning. after being told by the police that they thought he was involved in a burglary and that his fingerprints had been found at the scene. thus Miranda was not applicable. At the very least. if respondent entertained an objectively reasonable belief that he was not free to leave during the questioning. in familiar surroundings. 541 US 652 (2004) --(Page 75 of 101)-- . Mathiason. The Court found that no custody was proven. he was seated at a desk. When is a Person “In Custody”? Orozco v. the questioning takes place in a coercive environment. where there are often impartial observers to guard against intimidation or trickery." Plainly the respondent could have so believed. Dissent. According to the officer's testimony. 429 US 492 (1977) The Court found that because defendant had come voluntarily to the station. The Miranda opinion declared that the warnings were required when the person being interrogated was "in custody at the station or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. Texas. A noncustodial situation is not converted into one in which Miranda applies simply because a reviewing court concludes that. our Miranda holding should not apply. no Miranda violation occurred. Marshall: It is true that respondent was not formally placed under arrest. even in the absence of any formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement. Custodial interrogation means questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. but surely formalities alone cannot control. It is true that the Court did say in Miranda that "compulsion to speak in the isolated setting of the police station may well be greater than in courts or other official investigations. and because he did in fact go at the conclusion of a 30 minute interview.
not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned." First. regardless of the nature or severity of the offense of which he is suspected or for which he was arrested. McCarthy.. for purposes of requiring a pre-interrogation advisement of rights. given those circumstances. circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop are not such that the motorist feels completely at the mercy of the police. detention of a motorist pursuant to a traffic stop is presumptively temporary and brief Second. 446 US 291 (1980) – not an interrogation. The initial determination of custody. and second. what were the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. 468 US 420 (1984) A person subjected to custodial interrogation is entitled to the benefit of the procedural safeguards enunciated in Miranda. a court must apply an objective test to resolve the ultimate inquiry: whether there was a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest. Once the scene is set and the players' lines and actions are reconstructed. --(Page 76 of 101)-- . Berkemer v. Two features of an ordinary traffic stop mitigate the danger that a person questioned will be induced "to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely. A ordinary traffic stop is not “in custody” for the purposes of Miranda. would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave. depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation. Courts must examine all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation and determine how a reasonable person in the position of the individual being questioned would gauge the breadth of his or her freedom of action. I is more analogous to a Terry Stop. Custody. Rhode Island v. must be determined based on a how a reasonable person in a suspect's situation would perceive his circumstances. exception bc its there to prevent interrogations…. Two discrete inquiries are essential to the determination of custody. What is an “Interrogation”? b. Innis. for purposes of requiring a pre-interrogation advisement of rights. for purposes of requiring a pre-interrogation advisement of rights: first.
Mauro. Marshall. however. should be considered interrogation. two of the patrolmen conversed with each other concerning the possibility that one of the handicapped children from the nearby school might find a weapon with shells and get hurt. Arizona v. rather than the intent of the police. The term "interrogation" under Miranda refers not only to express questioning. By prohibiting only those relatively few statements or actions that a police officer should know are likely to elicit an incriminating response. The suspect. Dissent: Statements that appear to call for a response from the suspect. But. to understand how this objective standard as applied to the facts before us can rationally lead to the conclusion that there was no interrogation. 481 US 520 (1987) --(Page 77 of 101)-- . because the police surely cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable results of their words or actions. the Court today accords a suspect considerably less protection. Majority said that the conversation was not such that the police should have know it would elicit an incriminating response. told the officers to turn the car around so that he could show them where a shotgun was located. A practice that the police should know is reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response from a suspect thus amounts to interrogation. While the police car was proceeding to its destination. as well as those that are designed to do so. Dissent: I am utterly at a loss. The latter portion of this definition focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect. but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. overhearing the conversation. The Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent. the definition of interrogation can extend only to words or actions on the part of police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. Stevens.
It thus held that the officers' actions in allowing defendant to speak with his wife and taping the conversation were not the functional equivalent of an interrogation under Miranda that violated defendant's previously expressed wish to not be questioned further without a lawyer present. they failed to give respondent any advance warning that Mrs. When a suspect considers himself in the company of cellmates and not officers. Illnois v. or that their conversation would be recorded. After charges have been filed. and that Miranda warnings were not required when an undercover agent was asking questions that could elicit an incriminating response. Miranda warnings are not required when a suspect is unaware that he is speaking to a law enforcement officer and gives a voluntary statement. Coercion is determined from the perspective of the suspect." The record indicates. that the police employed a powerful psychological ploy. As the transcript of the conversation reveals. The State alleged that the statements were voluntary and not coerced. respondent would not have freely chosen to speak with her. It held that although the officers knew that incriminating statements might be made if defendant spoke with his wife. the coercive atmosphere is lacking. Dissent: --(Page 78 of 101)-- . or direct questioning. however. Mauro was coming to talk to him. Dissent This Court reverses. that a police officer would accompany her. 496 US 292 (1990) The prisoner claimed that the statements were properly excluded because he had not been given Miranda warnings by the undercover agent. Perkins. Marshall. psychological ploys. their decision to allow the conversation involved no coercion or psychological ploy designed to elicit an incriminating response. the Federal Constitution's Sixth Amendment prevents the government from interfering with an accused's right to counsel. The sixth amendment applies in a case by case basis. The essential ingredients of a "police-dominated atmosphere" and compulsion are not present when an incarcerated person speaks freely to someone that he believes to be a fellow inmate. finding that no interrogation occurred because Mauro "was not subjected to compelling influences.
the respondent was again advised of his rights." c. After the respondent's parent's arrived. 453 US 355 (1981) The respondent a minor was arrested for murder. At this time the respondent gave a statement. The appellate court held that the respondent was not properly advised of his right to counsel during the interrogation. The Court found that the respondent was informed of his right to have a lawyer present prior to and during interrogation and that he could have one appointed if could not afford one. which was used at his trial. This interaction was not a "conversation". The courts do not require a verbatim recital of the words of the Miranda opinion but rather examine the warnings given to determine if the reference to the right to appointed counsel is linked with some future point in time after the police interrogation. The officer advised the respondent of his Miranda rights. Rather. 492 US 195 (1989) “appoint an attorney for you without costs” --(Page 79 of 101)-- . Perkins. No talismanic incantation is required to satisfy Miranda strictures. The warnings required and the waiver necessary in the absence of a fully effective equivalent are the prerequisites to the admissibility of any statement made by a defendant. Although such abhorrent tricks would play on a suspect's need to confide in a trusted adviser. What is Required of the Police? California v. Prysock. Duckworth v. and the informant were not equal participants in a freeranging discussion. the officer."presumably it allows custodial interrogation by an undercover officer posing as a member of the clergy or a suspect's defense attorney. neither would cause the suspect to "think that the listeners have official power over him. with each man offering his views on different topics. The Court held that the appellate court erred because it was clear that the respondent's Miranda rights were fully conveyed. The Court held that the rigidity of Miranda did not extend to the precise formulation of the warnings given. If Miranda now requires a police officer to issue warnings only in those situations in which the suspect might feel compelled "to speak by the fear of reprisal for remaining silent or in the hope of more lenient treatment should he confess. The respondent declined to talk. it was an interrogation: Perkins was subjected to express questioning likely to evoke an incriminating response. Eagan.
and that an attorney would be appointed for him if he could not afford one. value of its clarity. a police warning must "clearly inform" a suspect taken into custody "that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. after receiving Miranda warnings. were not the subject of police coercion. It would be relatively commonplace for a suspect. as here.. Oregon v. that he had the right to an attorney before and during questioning. --(Page 80 of 101)-- . but only that the suspect be informed. made in his own living room and in the presence of his mother before being taken to the police station. The police also added that they could not provide the prisoner with a lawyer. Under Miranda. Miranda did not require that attorneys be producible on call. Miranda is a profilactic rle to protect 5th amendment and stop coerced confessions. second statement chose to speak. If there is a violation of Miranda. to ask when he will obtain counsel. The Court finally held that defendant's waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights after being arrested was done voluntarily and with full understanding of his rights. the Court held that the initial warnings given to the prisoner touched all of the bases required by Miranda. following waiver of Miranda. instead. Elstad. A warning qualified by an "if and when you go to court" caveat does nothing of the kind. it leads the suspect to believe that a lawyer will not be provided until some indeterminate time in the future after questioning. 4. The "if and when you go to court" advice simply anticipated that question. The Court held that the defendant's statements. The Court also held that a suspect who had once responded to unwarned yet noncoercive questioning was not thereby disabled from waiving his rights and confessing after he had been given the Miranda warnings. but that one would be appointed if and when he went to court. 470 US 298 (1985) 1st statement “yes I was thereburglary” violated Miranda. Dissent. Marshall: The majority reaches this result by seriously mischaracterizing that decision. Majority: balance the cost against accomplishing purpose of the rule: 1st statement involuntary. What are the Consequences of a Violation of Miranda? Majority view: Miranda rule is a constitutionally based rule. then suppress statement in the government’s case in chief.
the second statement was also voluntarily made. unwarned statements that are otherwise voluntary within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment must nevertheless be excluded from evidence under Miranda. though technically in violation of Miranda. Consequently. Souter. There is no warrant for presuming coercive effect where the suspect's initial inculpatory statement. This is an interrogation. however. I: even if the warning is otherwise calid have they creted an enviorment that the secondary statement is not a voluntary waiver of Miranda rights. The Miranda exclusionary rule. in the individual case. Dissent The correct approach. As in any such inquiry. 542 US 600 (2004) Plurality opinion. The Fifth Amendment prohibits use by the prosecution in its case in chief only of compelled testimony. in fact. serves the Fifth Amendment and sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself. Failure to administer Miranda warnings creates a presumption of compulsion. administered for almost 20 years by most courts with no untoward results. Briar (principle) Concurring opinion. was voluntary. --(Page 81 of 101)-- . the change in place of interrogations. the finder of fact must examine the surrounding circumstances and the entire course of police conduct with respect to the suspect in evaluating the voluntariness of his statements. is to presume that an admission or confession obtained in violation of Miranda taints a subsequent confession unless the prosecution can show that the taint is so attenuated as to justify admission of the subsequent confession. Miranda's preventive medicine provides a remedy even to a defendant who has suffered no identifiable constitutional harm. the time that passes between confessions. Stevens. Missouri v. and the change in identity of the interrogators all bear on whether that coercion has carried over into the second confession. Seibert. It may be triggered even in the absence of a Fifth Amendment violation. When a prior statement is actually coerced. The relevant inquiry is whether. The fact that a suspect chooses to speak after being informed of his rights is highly probative. Ginsburg. Thus.
The threshold issue when interrogators question first and warn later is thus whether it would be reasonable to find that in these circumstances the warnings could function "effectively" as Miranda requires. The inquiry is simply whether the warnings reasonably convey to a suspect his rights as required by Miranda. Because the facts did not reasonably support a conclusion that the warnings given could have served their purpose. police arrested defendant for the death of the teenager but refrained from giving her Miranda warnings. a mentally ill teenager died during a scheme to conceal defendant's neglect of the son. the postwarning statements also were inadmissible. Just as no talismanic incantation is required to satisfy Miranda's strictures. or for treating the second stage of interrogation as distinct from the first. The trial court suppressed the prewarning statement but admitted the postwarning recitation. --(Page 82 of 101)-- . police Mirandized defendant and requestioned her. Employing a procedure called "question-first" interrogation. Strategists dedicated to draining the substance out of Miranda could not accomplish by training what the Court had previously held Congress could not do by statute. Supreme Court held that the question-first tactic effectively threatened to thwart Miranda's purpose of reducing the risk that a coerced confession would be admitted. Twenty minutes after eliciting a confession. there is no practical justification for accepting the formal warnings as compliance with Miranda. After defendant's bedridden son's death. it would be absurd to think that mere recitation of the litany suffices to satisfy Miranda in every conceivable circumstance. unwarned and inadmissible segment. Could the warnings effectively advise the suspect that he had a real choice about giving an admissible statement at that juncture? Could they reasonably convey that he could choose to stop talking even if he had talked earlier? For unless the warnings could place a suspect who has just been interrogated in a position to make such an informed choice.
Can use shotgun into evidence. In a sequential confession case. the admissibility of any subsequent statement should turn in these circumstances solely on whether it is knowingly and voluntarily made. is a prohibition on compelling a criminal defendant to testify against himself at trial. Const. Potential violations occur. simple failure to administer Miranda warnings.S. What are the Exceptions to Miranda? There are 4 major exceptions: If the statements are used for impeachment purposes. if the statements were made at the time of booking the suspect in response to routine questions by the police. amend. or if the suspect waived his or her rights under Miranda. unwarned sequence of questioning. Though Miranda requires that the unwarned admission must be suppressed. because the earlier and later statements are realistically seen as parts of a single. Patane. --(Page 83 of 101)-- . Police do not violate a suspect's constitutional rights (or the Miranda rule) by negligent or even deliberate failures to provide the suspect with the full panoply of warnings prescribed by Miranda. 542 US 630 (2004): exclusionary rule balancing. If the statements were obtained in an emergency situation. 5. The Clause cannot be violated by the introduction of nontestimonial evidence obtained as a result of voluntary statements. clarity is served if the later confession is approached by asking whether in the circumstances the Miranda warnings given could reasonably be found effective. A suspect who has once responded to unwarned yet uncoercive questioning is not thereby disabled from waiving his rights and confessing after he has been given the requisite Miranda warnings. If yes. the subsequent statement is inadmissible for want of adequate Miranda warnings. the exclusion of unwarned statements is a complete and sufficient remedy for any perceived Miranda violation. United States v. at that point. V. (fruits – subsequent statements are not the fruits) The core protection afforded by the Self-Incrimination Clause. U. only upon the admission of unwarned statements into evidence at trial. a court can take up the standard issues of voluntary waiver and voluntary statement. And. if at all. unaccompanied by any actual coercion or other circumstances calculated to undermine the suspect's ability to exercise his free will does not so taint the investigatory process that a subsequent voluntary and informed waiver is ineffective for some indeterminate period. if no.
the court held that Miranda did not prevent the state from using defendant's statement to the police to confront defendant with prior inconsistent utterances. 467 US 649 (1984) – public safety exception. Quarles. The statements partially contradicted defendant's direct testimony. the State made no effort to use the statements in its case in chief. dissenting stated that it was monstrous that courts should aid lawbreaking police officers. 401 US 222 (1971) – nothing prevents the use of the statement for impeachment. Thus.a. However. JJ.. Impeachment Harris v. It does not follow from Miranda that evidence inadmissible against an accused in the prosecution's case in chief is barred for all purposes. J. During cross-examination at his trial. and that the court's decision in the instant case went far toward undoing much of the progress made in conforming police methods to the Constitution. Defendant was subsequently convicted of selling heroin to an undercover police officer. the court concluded that defendant's credibility was appropriately impeached by use of his earlier conflicting statements. New York. On appeal. Brennan. joined by Douglas and Marshall. provided of course that the trustworthiness of the evidence satisfies legal standards. Emergencies New York v. and the appellate court affirmed defendant's conviction. --(Page 84 of 101)-- . Miranda bars the prosecution from making its case with statements of an accused made while in custody prior to having or effectively waiving counsel.. defendant was questioned regarding specified statements defendant made to the police immediately following his arrest. conceding that the statements were inadmissible under Miranda. and the state sought to impeach defendant with his statements. More important to get the statement b.
A police officer pursued respondent suspect in a supermarket after a woman identified him as the man who raped her. The officer frisked respondent and discovered that he was wearing an empty shoulder holster. After handcuffing respondent, the officer asked him where the gun was. Respondent said, "the gun is over there." After the officer retrieved the loaded gun, he placed respondent under arrest and read him his Miranda rights. In the subsequent prosecution of respondent for criminal possession of a weapon, the judge excluded the statement and the gun because the officer had not given respondent his Miranda warnings before asking him where the gun was located. The Court held that there was a "public safety" exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be given before a suspect's answers could be admitted into evidence, and that the availability of that exception did not depend upon the motivation of the individual officers involved. The public safety exception will not be difficult for police officers to apply because in each case it will be circumscribed by the exigency which justifies it. Police officers can and will distinguish almost instinctively between questions necessary to secure their own safety or the safety of the public and questions designed solely to elicit testimonial evidence from a suspect. O'Connor, J., concurring in part in the judgment and dissenting in part, filed a separate opinion stating that Miranda required suppression of the incriminating statement but not the gun itself. Marshall, J., joined by Brennan and Stevens, JJ., dissented on the ground that the interrogation violated the Fifth Amendment prohibition of coerced self-incriminating statements. c. Booking Exception Pennslyvania v. Muniz, 496 US 582 (1990) – information during booking; will be inevitably given to police in booking process
--(Page 85 of 101)--
Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol. Defendant argued that portions of a videotape should have been suppressed because he had not been given his Miranda warnings. The state appellate court agreed and vacated defendant's conviction, holding that when the physical nature of the tests began to yield testimonial and communicative statements, the protection afforded by Miranda was invoked. The Court found that the Miranda requirement afforded protection against self-incrimination to persons under custodial interrogation. The Court distinguished between testimonial and real or physical evidence when invoking the privilege. The Court held that a field sobriety test or taking a blood sample constituted real or physical evidence; whereas requiring defendant to respond to specific questions was testimonial. The Court distinguished questions from defendant while he was informed about the properties of a breathalyzer test from utterances made in response to personal questions from the police officer, such as the date of defendant's sixth birthday. The Court held that comments made by defendant while submitting to a test should not have been suppressed. Although the test does not delineate the ways in which a person might be made a witness against himself, the court has long held that the privilege does not protect a suspect from being compelled by the state to produce real or physical evidence. Rather, the privilege protects an accused only from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the state with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature. In order to be testimonial, an accused's communication must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion or disclose information. Only then is a person compelled to be a witness against himself. d. Waiver North Carolina v. Butler, 441 US 369 (1979)
--(Page 86 of 101)--
Defendant was convicted of kidnapping, armed robbery, and felonious assault. In reversing the convictions, the state court found that defendant's incriminating statements had been admitted in violation of Miranda requirements because defendant had refused to waive in writing his right to have counsel present and there had not been a specific oral waiver. On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court held that the state court erred in its reading of Miranda. The Court noted, pursuant to Miranda, that an accused's express statement could constitute a waiver, and that the accused's silence alone after the applicable warnings could not do so. However, the Court did not hold that an accused's express statement was indispensable to a finding of waiver. Thus, the Court held that a court could find an intelligent and understanding rejection of counsel in situations where an accused did not expressly state as much. The question of waiver had to be determined on the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case, including the background, experience, and conduct of defendant. If an interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that a defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel. An express statement that an individual is willing to make a statement and does not want an attorney followed closely by a statement could constitute a waiver. But, a valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of the accused after warnings are given or simply from the fact that a confession was in fact eventually obtained. Moran v. Burbine, 475 US 412 (1986) Respondent confessed to and was convicted of the murder of a young woman. Respondent later challenged his conviction, claiming his confessions should have been suppressed because the police deceived him by failing to inform him that a public defender had called to speak with him while he was in custody, but prior to arraignment On review, the Court found that respondent at no time requested an attorney, and events occurring outside the presence of respondent and entirely unknown to him had no bearing on his capacity to comprehend and knowingly waive his rights. The Court held that once a person knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights, the waiver was valid as a matter of law. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 US 96 (1975)
--(Page 87 of 101)--
after an extended period without questioning. Defendant was arrested in connection with the investigation of robberies. The Court concluded that when the questioning was for different crimes. and (3) having requested counsel. by a different police officer. The admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends under Miranda on whether his "right to cut of questioning" was "scrupulously honored. petitioner was not subject to further interrogation until counsel had been made available to him. where there was no finding that he understood his right to counsel and intelligently and knowingly relinquished it. returned and secured a confession. and the police. After being advised of his rights. The Supreme Court held that (1) the use of petitioner's confession against him violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (2) petitioner did not validly waive his right to counsel. defendant stated that he did not want to talk about the robberies. but detectives from the same police department returned the next day and again interrogated petitioner. The police officers ceased questioning. Minnick v Mississippi. Defendant was thereafter questioned at another police station about a homicide and confessed to the murder. The right to remain silent encompassed within the Miranda rights was not a right to permanently remain silent. where petitioner had asserted his right to counsel and his right to remain silent. in a different station. Petitioner confessed to the crimes during the second interrogation. 451 US 477 (1981) After he was arrested and read his Miranda rights. Arizona. but was a right that had to be scrupulously honored by the police. the request to remain silent had been scrupulously honored. 498 US 146 (1990) --(Page 88 of 101)-- . petitioner requested an attorney. without furnishing him with counsel. unless petitioner himself initiated further communication with the police." Edwards v.
and implements the protections of Miranda in practical and straight-forward terms. his Fifth Amendment right to counsel was satisfied. The state court denied the prisoner's application finding that since counsel was made available to the prisoner. When counsel was requested. Edwards conserves judicial resources which would otherwise be expended in making difficult determinations of voluntariness. or from the coercive pressures that accompany custody and that may increase as custody is prolonged. interrogation must cease. The presence of counsel would be the adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the Fifth Amendment privilege. Authorities may not initiate questioning of the accused in counsel's absence. Officials could not reinitiate interrogation without the presence of the prisoner's attorney. the interrogation of the prisoner had to cease. Federal Bureau of Investigation agents and the local police made persistent attempts to persuade the prisoner to waive his rights. --(Page 89 of 101)-- . His presence would insure that statements made in the government-established atmosphere are not the product of compulsion. On appeal. and officials may not reinitiate interrogation without counsel present. A single consultation with an attorney does not remove the suspect from persistent attempts by officials to persuade him to waive his rights. The rule ensures that any statement made in subsequent interrogation is not the result of coercive pressures. When counsel is requested. The prisoner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief alleging that his statements were taken in violation of his right to counsel under the Fifth Amendment. whether or not the accused has consulted with his attorney. The prisoner was convicted. Edwards is designed to prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights. The prisoner resisted. Two of the residents of such home were killed. The prisoner was arrested and requested an attorney. Preserving the integrity of an accused's choice to communicate with police only through counsel is the essence of Edwards and its progeny. but eventually submitted to interviews without his attorney present. The prisoner spoke with his attorney. the court found that that the prisoner's Fifth Amendment protection was not terminated or suspended by consultation with counsel. The prisoner and his friend escaped from a county jail and broke into a mobile home.
The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel and Police Interrogations 1. Questioning continued. but then saying he did not want a lawyer. which he voluntarily waived. indicating at first he might want a lawyer. Davis v. The need for counsel to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege comprehends not merely a right to consult with counsel prior to questioning. was interviewed by the Naval Investigative Service. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. defendant made comments. If the statement fails to meet the requisite level of clarity. 377 US 201 (1964) --(Page 90 of 101)-- . After the interview was under way. and was given the military equivalent of Miranda warnings. The military judge at general court-martial denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained during the interview. 512 US 452 (1994) Defendant. The NavyMarine Corps Court of Military Review and the United States Court of Military Appeals affirmed. Although a suspect need not speak with the discrimination of an Oxford don. The suspect must unambiguously request counsel. The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel During Interrogations Massiah v. United States. suspect in murder. A statement either is such an assertion of the right to counsel or it is not. C. United States. but also to have counsel present during any questioning if the defendant so desires. holding that defendant's mention of a lawyer during interrogation was not a request for counsel and that the agents properly determined that defendant was not invoking his right to counsel. holding that equivocal requests or comments regarding an attorney did not require questioning officers to stop interrogation so that counsel could be present and that questioning could continue unless a suspect actually requested an attorney. the officers are not required to stop questioning the suspect. he must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney.
expressing the views of six members of the Court. joined by Clark and Harlan. contravenes the basic dictates of fairness in the conduct of criminal causes and the fundamental rights of persons charged with crime. J. the defendant held a conversation in the absence of his counsel with one of his codefendants while sitting in the latter's automobile. unaware that the codefendant. dissented on the ground that the pretrial statements of a defendant in criminal proceedings should be admissible in evidence if voluntarily made and not coerced. pleaded not guilty. 430 US 387 (1977) --(Page 91 of 101)-- . During the period of the proceedings from the time of their arraignment until the beginning of their trial. the Supreme Court of the United States reversed. At the defendant's trial in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. over the defendant's objection. after being indicted with other persons for violating the federal narcotics laws. While free on bail. without the protection afforded by the presence of counsel. Brewer v. had allowed the installation of a radio transmitter under the front seat of the automobile. co-operating with government agents. and was released on bail.. Williams. White. the defendant's incriminating statements. the federal agent. defendants are as much entitled to such aid of counsel during that period as at the trial itself. it was held that under the Sixth Amendment's guaranty of the defendant's right to assistance of counsel. from and after the finding of an indictment. elicited by government agents after he had been indicted and in the absence of his counsel. Any secret interrogation of a defendant. The defendant. testified to incriminating statements made by the defendant during the conversation. by means of which a federal agent listened to the conversation. retained a lawyer. J.. In an opinion by Stewart. and that the absence of counsel should be only one of several factors considered in judging voluntariness. and the trial resulted in the defendant's conviction. On certiorari.. were not admissible at his trial. JJ.
knowingly and intelligently waive his right to have counsel present at an interrogation after counsel has been appointed. An accused can voluntarily. has the weighty obligation to show that the waiver was knowingly and intelligently made. Once adversary proceedings have commenced against an individual. and that respondent was the only one who knew where the body was. The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel Is Offense Specific A key distinction between the fifth Amendment right to counsel and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is that the latter is offense specific. that the officers would not interrogate him. During the trip. After respondent's arraignment. however. another attorney similarly advised respondent. one officer discussed how expected snow might make recovery of the body and a Christian burial impossible. and the officer deliberately set out to elicit information from him when he was entitled to the assistance of counsel. Respondent did not waive his right to counsel because he consistently relied upon the advice of counsel in dealing with the authorities. and that he should not talk to the officers until consulting with the attorney. His attorney advised him that police officers would be transporting him to another city. Respondent was arrested for the abduction of a missing girl. Texas v. The officers gave respondent Miranda warnings. 532 US 162 (2001) --(Page 92 of 101)-- . In the car. 2. The Court held that respondent was entitled to a new trial because he was deprived of the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel. Cobb. The prosecution. Respondent eventually led the officers to the body. respondent expressed no willingness to be interrogated. he has a right to legal representation when the government interrogates him. as judicial proceedings had been initiated against him before the start of the car ride.
whether by way of formal charge. after respondents requested appointment of counsel at their arraignments but before respondents consulted with counsel. but denied knowledge of the missing residents. The United States Supreme Court held that. obtained from a police-initiated custodial interrogation. During the interrogations. any waiver of the right to counsel for the police interrogation was invalid. The Court affirmed holding that respondents' confessions. Respondent confessed to burglary of a residence. respondents were separately arraigned and at that time each requested appointment of counsel. The U. respondents confessed to their crimes. Jackson. After appointment of counsel for the burglary offense. under Miranda to refuse any police questioning concerning uncharged offenses. violated respondents' right to counsel. VI right to counsel is offense specific. Respondent thus had no right to the presence of his previously appointed counsel during the interrogation concerning the murder charge. Michigan v. regardless of whether the murder charge was closely related factually to the burglary offense. Even though the right to counsel under the Federal Constitution's Sixth Amendment does not attach to uncharged offenses. 475 US 625 (1986) Overruled by Montejo In two unrelated murder cases. and their confessions were admitted into evidence at their respective trials. and that under such circumstances. and the confession resulting from that interrogation was admissible. that is. for it does not attach until a prosecution is commenced. respondents were interrogated after each was advised of his Miranda rights. amend. suspects retain the ability. or arraignment. Const. 3. and prosecution was not initiated on the murder offense at the time of the interrogation. at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings. Respondent argued that his right to assistance of counsel was violated since the permission of respondent's appointed counsel was not obtained prior to interrogation. the right to counsel was offense specific. they were separate offenses. Waivers Waiver of the 6th Amendment right to counsel must be a knowing and intelligent waiver. preliminary hearing. --(Page 93 of 101)-- . indictment.S. Since the two offenses required different elements of proof. It cannot be invoked once for all future prosecutions. While in police custody. and before respondents were able to consult with counsel. respondent was subsequently advised of his rights and confessed to murdering the residents. information.
Under Miranda's prophylactic protection of the right against compelled self-incrimination. If police initiate interrogation after a defendant's assertion. and to be advised of that right.the Court presumes that the defendant requests the lawyer's services at every critical stage of the prosecution. interpretation to a defendant's request for counsel -.Ct. The State has the burden of establishing a valid waiver of Sixth Amendment rights. United States v. This settled approach to questions of waiver requires the Court to give a broad. at an arraignment or similar proceeding. any waiver of the defendant's right to counsel for that police-initiated interrogation is invalid. 4.) Defendant was given an opportunity to contend his letter should have been suppressed under Edwards. convicting. rather than a narrow. no subsequent interrogation may take place until counsel is present. whether or not the accused has consulted with his attorney. any suspect subject to custodial interrogation has the right to have a lawyer present if he so requests. interrogation must stop. And under Minnick's prophylactic protection of the Edwards right. 2079 (2009) The Court held that the marginal benefits of Jackson (the number of confessions obtained coercively that were suppressed by its bright-line rule and would otherwise have been admitted) were dwarfed by its substantial costs (hindering society's compelling interest in finding. of his right to counsel. and punishing those who violate the law. Henry. Patterson v. Illinois. Doubts must be resolved in favor of protecting the constitutional claim. The 5th does not apply because there is not an interrogation. Under Edwards' prophylactic protection of the Miranda right. 447 US 264 (1980) --(Page 94 of 101)-- . Statements obtained in violation of the 6th amendment may be used for impeachment purposes. Montejo v. 129 S. 487 US 285 (1988) Defendant's waiver of his right to counsel under the Fifth Amendment pursuant to Miranda was also sufficient for a waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. once such a defendant has invoked his right to have counsel present. What is Impermissible Police Eliciting of Statements? The use of prison informant is an area where the 5th and 6th Amendments differ. Louisana.
477 US 436 (1986) An accused. rather. Henry" while he was in jail and Henry's incriminatory statements were "the product of this conversation. he had "some conversations with Mr. Finding that (1) the police had instructed the informant to ask no questions but merely to listen to what the accused might say. and (3) the accused's statements were spontaneous and unsolicited. after defendant was indicted and while he was in custody. the trial judge denied the motion. had agreed to act as a police informant. amend. an paid undercover informant. --(Page 95 of 101)-- . on grounds that admission of the confession violated his Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel.S. VI does not forbid admission in evidence of an accused's statements to a jailhouse informant who was placed in close proximity but made no effort to stimulate conversations about the crime charged. Prior to the accused's trial in a New York state court. (2) the informant obeyed these instructions. Defendant challenged the admission at trial of incriminating statements made by defendant to his cellmate. constituted the type of affirmative steps to secure incriminating information from defendant outside the presence of his counsel prohibited by the Sixth Amendment. U. Wilson." Kuhlman v. unknown to the accused. who was paid on a contingency fee basis. Nichols was not a passive listener. The accused made incriminating statements which the informant reported. was nevertheless arraigned and confined in a jail cell together with another prisoner who. Const. The Government argues that the federal agents instructed Nichols not to question Henry about the robbery. he moved to suppress the jail cell statements as obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. the Court held that the government's specific mention of defendant to the undercover informant. who denied any involvement in an armed robbery in which a person was killed. 8 Yet according to his own testimony. The Court held that defendant's statements to a government informant should not have been admitted at trial because by intentionally creating a situation likely to induce the defendant to make incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel. The Court held that defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached at the time he made the statements. Further. the government had violated defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
VI is not violated whenever -. beyond merely listening. Evidence had to be presented as to whether the in-court identifications were based on observations or the lineup. Identification Procedures The Right to Counsel 1. No 5th Amendment problem: The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him. 388 US 218 (1967) The employees of a robbed bank identified respondent in a lineup that had been conducted without counsel being present. IV. Wade. and when presence of counsel itself can often avert prejudice and assure a meaningful confrontation at trial. At trial. but the court of appeals reversed his conviction and ordered a new trial.S. the Court could not determine whether the courtroom identifications should be excluded. that was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks. the defendant must demonstrate that the police and their informant took some action. until a hearing could determine whether the in-court identifications had independent origins. either through prior arrangement or voluntarily. Rather. A. reported his incriminating statements to the police.the state obtains incriminating statements from the accused after the right to counsel has attached. intentional or not. amend. a defendant does not make out a violation of that right simply by showing that an informant. The court of appeals concluded that the lineup violated respondent's Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel. The post-indictment lineup was a critical stage of the proceedings. not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material. --(Page 96 of 101)-- . Based on the record. the employees pointed to respondent when asked to identify the robber. Respondent was convicted.by luck or happenstance -. Since U. The Right to Counsel in Lineups United States v. excluding the courtroom identifications. in a pretrial lineup. When it appears that there is grave potential for prejudice. so respondent was entitled to have his attorney present. there can be little doubt that the post-indictment lineup is a critical stage of the prosecution at which an accused is as much entitled to the aid of counsel as at the trial itself. Const. The Court remanded the action to the court of appeals to enter a new judgment vacating respondent's conviction. which may not be capable of reconstruction at trial.
and witnesses identified defendant. The right attaches at the time of arraignment. Kirby. The United States Supreme Court vacated the conviction. Only a per se exclusionary rule as to such testimony can be an effective sanction to assure that law enforcement authorities will respect the accused's constitutional right to the presence of his counsel at the critical lineup. the Court refused to extend the right to an identification that took place before the commencement of any prosecution whatever. Because defendant was identified before he was arrested on the robbery charge. This issue was remanded because the record was inadequate for the Court to determine whether the incourt identifications had an independent source. That testimony is the direct result of the illegal lineup "come at by exploitation of [the primary] illegality. Limits on the Right to Counsel in Identification Procedures Illinois v. Subsequently." Wong Sun. The Sixth Amendment guaranty of the assistance of counsel applies to "critical" stages of the proceedings. This is not to say that a defendant in a criminal case has a constitutional right to counsel only at the trial itself. Witnesses' testimony that they identified defendant at the lineup was inadmissible because it was the direct result of the illegal lineup. even though counsel was not present. --(Page 97 of 101)-- .S. Gilbert v. the pre-indictment identification was admissible. and the Supreme Court of California affirmed the conviction. a lineup was conducted without notice to defendant's counsel. Defendant was convicted. VI. The lineup was illegal because it violated defendant's right to counsel under U. amend. 2. 406 US 682 (1972) Although the Sixth Amendment right to counsel existed at a postindictment pretrial lineup. Const. The State is therefore not entitled to an opportunity to show that that testimony had an independent source. California. A person's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel attaches only at or after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against him. 388 US 263 (1967) Defendant was indicted for robbery and murder and was appointed counsel. The incourt identifications were inadmissible without evidence that they had an independent source. and it exists also at the time of a preliminary hearing.
However. B. the right of the accused to have counsel acting as his assistant. but one was unable to make any selection. Some witnesses selected his picture. that marks the commencement of the "criminal prosecutions" to which alone the explicit guarantees of the Sixth Amendment are applicable. The initiation of judicial criminal proceedings is far from a mere formalism. Due Process Protection for Identification Procedures 1. a claimed violation of due process of law in the conduct of a confrontation depends on the totality of the circumstances. the function of the lawyer has remained essentially the same as his function at trial. It is this point. petitioner government used a photographic display to determine whether witnesses would be able to make in-court identifications of respondent. or advisor to. amend. It is the starting point of the United States' whole system of adversary criminal justice. Counsel has continued to act as a spokesman for. and not as part of a lineup. and only then that the adverse positions of government and defendant have solidified. It is then that a defendant finds himself faced with the prosecutorial forces of organized society. therefore. namely. The accused's right to the "Assistance of Counsel" has meant just that. VI did not grant the right to counsel at photographic displays conducted by respondent for the purpose of allowing a witness to attempt an identification of the offender. California. The Court held that U. Throughout this expansion of the counsel guarantee to trial-like confrontations. 394 US 440 (1969) --(Page 98 of 101)-- . Foster v. Unnecessarily Suggestive Identification Procedures Violate Due Process The practice of showing suspects singly to persons for the purpose of identification. Ash. Const. For it is only then that the government has committed itself to prosecute. The appellate court held that admitting the photographs into evidence constituted the introduction of a post-indictment identification. United States v. at trial some witnesses identified respondent. and immersed in the intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal law. Respondent was convicted. 413 US 300 (1973) Prior to trial of respondent accused. the accused.S. has been widely condemned.
although he "thought" that defendant was one. Even after the one-on-one confrontation. and during the trial such employees also identified the petitioners as the robbers. 390 US 377 (1968) Two petitioners were convicted in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois for the armed robbery of a federally insured savings and loan association. The police brought defendant into a room so that the witness could speak to him. Each case in which an identification by photograph is made must be considered on its own facts. 2. the Court concluded that the procedure so undermined the reliability of the eyewitness identification that it violated defendant's right to due process. two lineups were held.” The Court has rejected due process challenges to suggestive identification procedures if it concludes that there are sufficient indications of reliability. however. and the District Court denied the petitioners' request for production of the photographs which had been shown to the witnesses before the trial. The Supreme Court has been willing to allow convictions baseed on suggestive identifications if the witness has an “independent source for the identification. he identified defendant in court. In reversing defendant's conviction and remanding the case. the witness was still uncertain whether defendant was the robber. The Court granted certiorari to determine if the police lineup had violated defendant's constitutional rights. After defendant was arrested for armed robbery. The Court found that defendant's lineup presented a compelling example of unfair lineup procedures because the suggestive elements in the identification procedure made it all but inevitable that the witness would identify defendant whether or not he was in fact the robber. Limits on the Ability of Courts to Find That Identification Procedures Violate Due Process Foster is the only case in which the Supreme Court has found that an identification procedure violates due process. One petitioner's testimony at his unsuccessful pretrial motion for suppression of certain evidence was admitted against him at the trial. United States. Before the trial the bank employees who had witnessed the robbery identified photographs of the petitioners as representing the robbers. The witness could not positively identify defendant as one of the robbers. The Court held that the lineup had to be judged by the totality of the circumstances. Convictions based on eyewitness identification at trial following a pretrial identification by photograph will be set aside on the ground of misidentification only --(Page 99 of 101)-- . Simmons v. and defendant was convicted.
Neil v. there was very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. and testified at the trial that she had "no doubt" about her identification of the accused and that there was something about his face "I don't think I could ever forget. Brathwaite. whenever it has been obtained through unnecessarily suggested confrontation procedures. 432 US 98 (1977) Respondent. or per se approach. the witness' degree of attention. the accused was convicted of rape. the witness' degree of attention. without regard to reliability. approach is --(Page 100 of 101)-- . The Court determined that it could not say that. 409 US 188 (1972) Following a jury trial in a Tennessee state court. on a claim for habeas relief. The first. under all the circumstances of respondent's case. The victim had spent considerable time with her assailant. the accuracy of the witness' prior description of the criminal. The Court reasoned that the factors that had to be considered included the opportunity of the witness to view respondent at the time of the crime. and the time between the crime and the confrontation. had given the police a description of him. the accuracy of his prior description of the criminal. The second. the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation. or more lenient. Manson v." The factors to be considered in evaluating the likelihood of misidentification include the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime. if the photographic identification procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. The courts of appeals appear to develop at least two approaches to out-of-court identification evidence. Against these factors was weighed the corrupting effect of the suggestive identification itself. proposed a per se rule of exclusion that he claimed was dictated by the demands of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process. focuses on the procedures employed and requires exclusion of the out-of-court identification evidence. and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation. Biggers. The Court adopted the totality of the circumstances test and concluded that the criteria applicable in determining the admissibility of evidence offered by the prosecution concerning an identification were satisfactorily met and complied with in respondent's case. The evidence against him included testimony concerning his identification by the rape victim at a pretrial police station showup. the level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation.
It permits the admission of the confrontation evidence if. Its adherents feel that the per se approach is not mandated by the Due Process Clause. This second approach. serves to limit the societal costs imposed by a sanction that excludes relevant evidence from consideration and evaluation by the trier of fact. XIV. --(Page 101 of 101)-- .S. in contrast to the other. Const. U.one that continues to rely on the totality of the circumstances. amend. despite the suggestive aspect. the out-of-court identification possesses certain features of reliability.
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